{"text": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Constanţa. 6.  On 30 June 2005 he was placed during his pre-trial detention in Poarta Albă Prison. On 9 November 2006 he was convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He served his sentence in the same prison until 16 February 2010, when he was conditionally released. 7.  The first applicant alleged that there had been severe overcrowding, having had to share cells measuring 35 sq. m. with fourteen other prisoners without proper ventilation. He further alleged that there had been a severe lack of hygiene, no provision of hygiene products, a lack of heating during the winter, a lack of bedclothes, an infestation of lice and bugs in the cells, as well as frequent water and power cuts and poor quality water. 8.  In addition, he alleged that strip-searches were conducted regularly on groups of prisoners in the prison yard, even during the winter, with prisoners being bullied by guards. In this connection, the first applicant submitted statements made by three inmates who declared seeing such a search conducted on prisoners, including the first applicant, in December 2006. 9.  The Government submitted that Poarta Albă Prison had been built in 1949 and that no changes were made to the size of the cells since. They further submitted that the prison authorities held no information with respect to the number of persons with whom the first applicant had shared his cell before 5 February 2010, the date a regulation requiring such statistics to be logged entered into force. Hence, between 5 and 16 February 2010 the first applicant had been placed in a cell measuring 68.09 sq. m, which he shared with fourteen other inmates. 10.  With respect to hygiene conditions, the Government mentioned that all prisoners had unrestricted access to water and sanitary facilities, while access to showers was allowed twice per week. In addition, hygiene products and bedclothes were provided to all prisoners in accordance with the regulations and within the limits of the budget available. The Government also mentioned that internal prison regulations provided that prisoners could bring or buy their own hygiene products or bedclothes – the first applicant had been given permission to receive bedclothes from his family on two occasions. The Government also submitted that, according to the governor of Poarta Albă Prison, regular disinfections had been carried out between 2005 and 2010. 11.  The Government further contended that Poarta Albă Prison had its own heating system with wood-burning stoves and a heating program which provided adequate warmth. In this connection, they submitted documents showing that between 2008 and 2010 certain quantities of wood were consumed each year, while certain quantities remained unused. 12.  Lastly, according to documents submitted to the Government by the prison governor, potable water and food were tested regularly and were in compliance with hygiene standards. 13.  On 6 June 2013 the applicants’ representatives at the time informed the Court that the applicant Andrei Dumitrof no longer wished to pursue his application. 14.  Two letters, in which Mr Dumitrof’s attention was drawn to the fact that the Court may strike a case out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the applicant does not intend to pursue the application, were sent by the Court by registered mail directly to him on 30 July and 29 October 2013. The letters remained unanswered and were returned to the Court on 25 September and 5 November 2013 marked “Unknown recipient” and “Recipient moved from the address” respectively.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently serving a prison sentence. Since his sentence began, he has been imprisoned in a number of prisons in Romania. 6.  On 22 January 2007 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention on suspicion of murder. 7.  On 10 July 2007 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to seventeen years and six months’ imprisonment. 8.  According to the information provided by the National Prisons Administration (Administraţia Naţională a Penitenciarelor, the “ANP”), from his arrest to January 2012 the applicant was mainly held in Târgu Jiu, Craiova, Giurgiu, Gherla and Arad Prisons. Every two or three months he spent about a week in a prison hospital, in one of Jilava, Colibaşi or Dej Prisons.\nDuring the reporting period, the applicant was transferred forty-seven times between these eight facilities; fifteen of these transfers were to the psychiatric wards of prison hospitals. 9.  The applicant alleged that in all of the prisons in which he had been held other inmates had tried to poison his food and to beat him to death, and had been encouraged to do so or even helped by the prison authorities. 10.  On 14 March 2007, while in detention, the applicant was diagnosed with delusional disorder, a type of psychosis. Psychiatric treatment in Jilava Prison Hospital was recommended. 11.  According to the official prison records, each time the applicant was admitted to a prison hospital the diagnosis was confirmed. From 2007 to March 2010, each time he was discharged from prison hospital he was prescribed medication for his psychiatric disorder. It is mentioned in the official prison records that he refused to accept the diagnosis and to take his medication. For this reason, he was on each occasion discharged from hospital and transferred back to prison. 12.  From March to July 2010 the applicant spent two periods of two weeks and one period of one week in Jilava Prison Hospital. He was discharged from hospital each time, it being considered that no medication was needed for his psychiatric condition. Following a further period of admission to Colibaşi Prison Hospital in September 2010, he was given medication again. 13.  On several occasions the applicant reported to the authorities that the other inmates were trying to poison him. According to him, instead of receiving an answer to his complaints, he was transferred each time to a psychiatric hospital. He also asked to be placed in a cell alone, in order to prevent other attempts at poisoning him. 14.  According to the information provided by the ANP, the quality of food was tested daily, and water quality was tested periodically. The results were satisfactory. The applicant was never admitted to the infirmary with symptoms of poisoning. 15.  In 2009, in Craiova Prison, he was transferred, at his request, to the maximum security wing of that prison, where he shared a room with two others. While he was there, the applicant nevertheless chose to sleep in a small bathtub (measuring 80 cm by 80 cm) in the unheated bathroom from November 2009 to February 2010, as he feared that his cellmates were trying to poison him while he was asleep. 16.  The applicant lodged criminal complaints against the prison guards, the doctor and the governor of Craiova Prison, whom he accused of improper behaviour. On 10 March 2010, 31 March 2010 and 8 July 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office decided not to bring a criminal prosecution. It noted that there was no evidence that prison officers had encouraged the inmates to poison or beat the applicant. The prosecutor also noted that the applicant had never sought medical help in prison for any poison-related symptoms and that he had never been in conflict with the other inmates or with the wardens. The prosecutor took account of the fact that the applicant had been diagnosed with mixed delusional disorder and that he had been compulsorily admitted to hospital several times, but discharged only a few days later, because he had refused to acknowledge the illness or to receive treatment. 17.  Upon receiving the prosecutor’s decision of 10 March 2010, the applicant asked to be examined by the National Institute for Forensic Medicine (“the Forensic Institute”) to prove that he was not mentally ill. 18.  In Gherla Prison, the applicant chose to sleep on the toilet seat to avoid the alleged poisoning and used to wake up in the middle of the night to rinse his mouth, being certain that he had been poisoned in his sleep. According to the official prison records, the most difficult stage of his detention in Gherla Prison was in April 2010, when he repeatedly complained that the administration was promising benefits for inmates if they poisoned his food and water. 19.  In February 2010 the applicant went on hunger strike to force the prison administration to place him alone in a cell. The judge delegated by the court of appeal to supervise the observance of prisoners’ rights for the purpose of Law no. 275/2006 on the execution of sentences (“the post‑sentencing judge”) visited him and explained that his request could only be met if there were places available in individual cells, which was not the case at that time. In a decision of 24 February 2010 the post-sentencing judge determined that it was appropriate for the applicant to be kept in common dormitories but asked that he be seen daily by a doctor during his hunger strike, to ensure that his life was not endangered. 20.  In 2011, a similar request to be placed alone was denied by the Craiova Prison administration, as there were no individual cells available. 21.  The applicant asked to be transferred to Rahova Prison Hospital, in a single room under medical supervision, from September to November 2009. His request was refused, as it was considered that the conditions of detention in Craiova Prison were appropriate. 22.  On 8 September 2009, 9 November 2009 and 15 June 2011 the Craiova Prison administration responded to inquiries by the ANP concerning the applicant’s allegations of poisoning, explaining the applicant’s mental health problems. In the letter of 15 June 2011 they also informed the ANP that the applicant was not “a person in need” who required the help of another person, as he could take care of himself, notably wash and feed himself.\nAt the end of its investigation, the ANP informed the applicant that his allegations remained unfounded. 23.  The applicant lodged similar complaints with the post-sentencing judge.\nOn 9 November 2010 such a complaint concerning the situation in Giurgiu Prison was dismissed as unfounded. On 12 February 2009 the post‑sentencing judge dismissed a similar complaint concerning Craiova Prison as unfounded. 24.  On 30 August 2008, while in Târgu Jiu Prison, the applicant was involved in a violent incident. 25.  According to the applicant, he was beaten up by three inmates and stabbed in the lungs, kidneys, spleen and other organs by H.G. He was only taken to the doctor seven days after the incident and never received a copy of the medical certificate. Despite the applicant’s complaints H.G. was never punished for the attack. 26.  According to the official prison records, the applicant was found injured by a guard and immediately taken to the prison infirmary, where he refused to be bandaged. As a consequence, he was immediately taken to a civilian hospital. Later on, he was also examined by a forensic doctor, who confirmed the existence of lesions and established that the applicant needed nine to ten days of medical care but that his life had not been endangered. 27.  During disciplinary proceedings opened in the prison, the applicant refused to give statements or to get acquainted with the official reports. On 10 September 2008 the disciplinary commission punished H.G. with three days’ isolation. On 21 November 2008 the same disciplinary commission exonerated the applicant of any responsibility for the incident; a copy of this decision was forwarded on the same day to the applicant. 28.  No criminal complaint was filed with respect to that incident.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first applicant, Bronisław Rosenzweig, is a German national, who was born in 1941 and lives in Berlin. The second applicant is “Bonded Warehouses Ltd”, a public company. 9.  On 18 February 1994 the Main Customs Office granted a licence to run a bonded warehouse in Słubice to the applicant company “International Bonded Warehouses Ltd.”. 10.  On 29 May 1995 the German customs office at Frankfurt/Oder stated in writing that the German customs authorities had no objections to the operation of the applicant company. 11.  On 1 June 1995 a further permit was given for exporting merchandise via the border crossing in Słubice by the Director of the local Customs Office in Słubice. 12.  The applicant submitted that it had been repeatedly suggested that the company should pay various bribes to the customs officials if it wished to continue its operation undisturbed. The Government did not respond to this submission. 13.  By a letter of 22 November 1995 the Director of the local Duty Office in Słubice stated that from 27 November 1995 on he would revoke the permit of 1 June 1995 for exporting merchandise via the Słubice border crossing. It was argued that the permit of 1 June 1995 was not in conformity with an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the border crossings and trans-border movements of goods and persons. 14.  On 27 November 1995 the customs officers ordered that the headquarters of the applicant company be closed and affixed official seals on its door, preventing it thereby from conducting further business. On the same day the applicant company complained to the Main Customs Office, submitting that there were no legal grounds on which the permit should be revoked and that the letter of 22 November 1995 was not an administrative decision, which made it impossible to lodge a formal appeal against it. 15.  In a letter of 21 December 1995 the applicant company reiterated its complaint and stressed that the director of the Słubice Customs Office had failed, despite the company's repeated requests, to give any legal basis for the revocation of the permit. It was argued that the revocation of the permit breached economic freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution, and clearly infringed the terms of a valid licence which the company had received from the Main Customs Office in February 1994. 16.  On 9 February 1996 the applicant company lodged a complaint under Article 17 of the Supreme Administrative Court's Act about the Main Customs Office's failure to give a decision following the appeal of 27 November 1995. It was submitted that the company had a valid permit given under the provisions of customs law. However, the company's operation had been de facto rendered impossible by the letter of 22 November 1995 as it could not run the warehouse if it was not allowed to export merchandise. 17.  In reaction to this complaint, on 14 February 1996 the Main Customs Office informed the applicant company that the permit of 1 June 1995 was of a temporary character. It was to remain valid only until a bridge in nearby Świeck was to be constructed. After the construction of this bridge had been terminated, the border crossing in Słubice was to be used only for small trans-border movement of goods and persons. This was to be understood as allowing for crossing of the border by persons, but taking merchandise out of the country via this crossing did not fall within the ambit of the notion of the “small trans-border movement of goods and persons” and therefore the permit of 1 June 1995 had to be revoked under Article 21 of the Customs Law. 18.  The applicant company appealed, submitting that the revocation of the exporting permit would practically mean that the company had to stop its business operation, carried out under the valid licence of February 1994.\nOn 21 August 1996 the applicant company and the Director of the Legal Department of the Main Customs Office concluded a settlement to the effect that the applicant company would withdraw the appeal it had lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court against the position taken by the Office in its letter of 14 February 1996 and the President of the Office would set aside the decision of the Director of the Słubice Customs Office of 22 November 1995. 19.  On 21 December 1996 the Main Customs Office set the decision of 22 November 1995 aside and ordered that the question be re-examined by the Director of the Słubice Customs Office. 20.  By a letter of 31 January 1997 the German customs office at Frankfurt/Oder confirmed that the German customs authorities had no legal objections whatsoever against the operation of the applicant company. 21.  On 28 May 1997 the Rzepin Customs Office revoked the permit for exporting merchandise by the applicant company via Słubice, stating that the Słubice border crossing was under Polish law designed only for the so‑called “small trans-border movement of goods and persons” and that, therefore, no merchandise could be exported via this crossing. 22.  The applicant company appealed. 23.  On 20 August 1997 the Main Customs Office quashed the decision of 28 May 1997 and discontinued the proceedings, considering that the impugned decision had been in breach of applicable provisions of procedural law since it had not been given in any of the types of proceedings on the merits provided for by the Code of Administrative Procedure. 24.  The applicant company requested that the legal meaning of this decision be interpreted. It emphasised that it was important for it to have clarified whether the original permit of 1 June 1995 was still valid. This, on the plain meaning of the text of this decision, was unclear. 25.  In an interpretative decision of 23 September 1997 the Main Customs Office explained that the fact that the decision of 28 May 1997 had been set aside was to be understood in such a way as to mean that the legal situation existing before this decision had been given still obtained. 26.  The applicant company requested that this issue be re-examined, asking whether the quashing of the decision of 28 May 1997, revoking the permit of 1 June 1995, was to mean that this permit was still valid. 27.  In a decision of 14 November 1997 the Main Customs Office held that the purpose of the decision of 23 September 1997 was not to decide whether the permit of 1 June 1995 was still valid. It upheld the decision of 23 September 1997. 28.  The applicant company appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, arguing that the decisions of the Main Customs Office lacked clarity. The Office had set aside the revocation of the permit, but did not confirm whether the original permit was valid. Therefore it was impossible to establish what was the actual legal situation of the company as far as the validity of its permits was concerned. The applicant company emphasised that it was de facto treated by the customs authorities as if the export permit of June 1995 had been effectively revoked. 29.  In a judgment of 2 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 23 September and 14 November 1997. The court found that the decision of 23 September lacked clarity in that it did not allow the applicant company to elucidate the fundamental uncertainty as to the legal consequence of this decision. Neither were these doubts dispelled by the decision of 14 November in which the Main Customs Office had failed to explain what was the legal situation of the applicants' permit to run their business, and in particular, whether it could still rely on the permit of 1 June 1995. 30.  By a decision of 5 June 1998 the Main Customs Office stated that the decision of 20 August 1998 was to be understood in such a way that the applicant's rights stemming from the decision of 1 June 1995 remained intact. 31.  On 20 June 1998 the Main Customs Office instituted proceedings in order to have the licence to run the warehouse of 18 February 1994 set aside, considering that the applicant company had not been conducting its business for a period longer than three months, without having informed the competent authorities thereof, as required by law. 32.  On 30 November 1998 the Main Customs Office set aside the 1994 licence to run the warehouse, having found that after 20 August 1997 the applicant company had ceased its business activities. Under the provisions of the Customs Code, the customs authorities were obliged to withdraw the licence to run the bonded warehouse if the company enjoying such licence was not exercising it for a period longer than three months. 33.  The applicant company appealed. It argued inter alia that it could not have run the warehouse after 20 August 1997, given that the Słubice Customs Office had withdrawn its permit for exporting merchandise by the applicant company via Słubice, which had made it impossible to continue its business operation. 34.  On 5 March 1999 the Main Customs Office, having re-examined the case, discontinued the appellate proceedings. The office observed that the applicant was wrong in confusing the proceedings regarding the validity of the June 1995 permit with the present proceedings, in which it was the validity of the earlier licence, granted in 1994, which was at issue. The validity of the 1994 licence had not been questioned in the previous proceedings and therefore there were no grounds on which to accept that the applicant was prevented to run its business. 35.  It further noted that the proceedings had to be discontinued since on 1 January 1998 a new Customs Code had entered into force. It provided that various customs licences issued under the old Customs Act were to remain valid for twelve months, during which companies having such licences could lodge new requests to have new licences issued. The applicant company had not submitted such request and the validity of its 1994 licence had consequently expired on 31 December 1999. Therefore the proceedings would not serve any purpose and should be discontinued. 36.  The applicant company appealed. It argued, inter alia, that when giving the contested decision, the Main Customs Office had breached the law in that it entirely failed to take into consideration all circumstances relating to the proceedings concerning the withdrawal of the permit to export. These proceedings, which had lasted from August 1997 until June 1998, had rendered it impossible for the company to continue its business operation. Therefore it was unreasonable to revoke the 1994 licence on the ground that the company had ceased its business activities. 37.  On 5 November 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 5 March 1999 as not being in compliance with law. It considered that the Main Customs Office had incorrectly held that the proceedings had become devoid of purpose. At the time when they had been instituted, i.e. on 20 June 1998, the applicant company's licence was still valid. It therefore had a legal interest in clarifying its legal situation and to confirm whether it was still authorised to run its business. 38.  On 23 March 2000 the Main Customs Office, having regard to the judgment of 5 November 1999, set aside the decision of 30 November 1998, revoking the 1994 licence to run the warehouse. 39.  The applicant company did not resume its operations afterwards. The first applicant submitted that as a result of the withdrawal of the permit and the licence to run the company, described above, it was impossible for him as the principal shareholder and, likewise, for the applicant company, to resume their business operations.   It is the withdrawal of those decisions authorising the company to run its business which constitute the basis of the applicant's claims of pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention. The Government did not respond to this argument.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant company, “Intersplav” (hereinafter “the applicant”), is a joint venture enterprise, based in the town of Sverdlovsk in the Lugansk Region, Ukraine. 9.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10.  The applicant manufactures goods using recycled scrap metal purchased in Ukraine, bearing a 20 % VAT rate. The major part of the applicant’s production is exported from Ukraine at a zero VAT rate. The applicant is thereby entitled to a refund of the VAT due on the price of the scrap metal. Under the Law on Value-Added Tax (see the Domestic Law part below) such a refund should be made within a one-month period following the applicant’s submission of the relevant calculations to the local tax administration. If the refund is delayed, compensation is payable. Both payments (the refund and compensation) are made by the State Treasury upon the submissions of the relevant tax authority. 11.  Since April 1998, the VAT refund to the applicant has been systematically delayed due to the failure of the Sverdlovsk Town Tax Administration to confirm the amounts involved. For the same reason, the applicant could not receive compensation for the delayed VAT refund. 12.  Since 1998, the applicant has complained to the Lugansk Regional Tax Administration and the State Tax Administration about the failure of the Sverdlovsk Town Tax Administration to issue certificates for the VAT refunds on time. However, these authorities found no illegalities in the actions of the Sverdlovsk Town Tax Administration, whilst recognising the existence of the State’s debts to the applicant. 13.  The applicant also complained to the Sverdlovsk Prosecutor and the General Prosecutor’s Office, without any result. 14.  In its letter of 22 October 2002, the applicant claimed that further obstacles had arisen in running its business, including new discriminatory legislation, transport controls by the police, and judicial proceedings against its employees for defamation instituted by the Tax Administration. 15.  Since 1998, the applicant has instituted a number of proceedings, more than 140[1] so far, in the Lugansk Commercial Court against the Sverdlovsk Town Tax Administration and the State Treasury Department in order to receive compensation for the delayed refund of the VAT. 16.  In the proceedings during 1999-2000, the applicant requested the court to oblige the Tax Administration to confirm the amounts of compensation due to the applicant. The court found for the applicant and ordered the tax administration to issue the requested confirmation for the amounts claimed. 17.  In the proceedings during 2001-2003, the applicant changed the subject of its claim and requested the courts to award it the amounts of the VAT refund and compensation directly. The Tax Administration and Treasury both opposed the claims; the former on the basis of an alleged lack of competence in VAT refunding, the latter on the basis of the impossibility of refunding any VAT without prior confirmation of such an amount by the Tax Administration. The court found for the applicant and awarded the claimed amounts in its decisions between 2001 and 2004. It confirmed the applicant’s right to compensation for the various delayed VAT refunds. 18.  The court decisions given between 1999 and 2002 were executed within periods ranging from four days to two years and eight months. The oldest decision that remained unenforced in February 2004, according to the applicant, was given on 18 March 2003. 19.  In its further correspondence, the applicant maintained that the Tax Authorities claimed that the court decisions given in its favour should not be directly enforceable, but would require the prior confirmation of the awarded amounts by the Tax Administration. 20.  On 17 March 2004 the applicant lodged a claim with the Lugansk Commercial Court against the Lugansk Regional Department of the State Treasury and the Sverdlovsk Town Tax Administration for their refusal to enforce the judgments rendered by the said court in the period between March 2003 and February 2004 (see the annex) and for a proposal to convert the amounts awarded by the above judgments into loan bonds with a five-year term. 21.  On 24 May 2004 the court found for the applicant and ordered the defendants to enforce the impugned judgments. 22.  The applicant maintained that, as of 18 June 2004, the amount of the State debt to the company confirmed by court decisions was UAH 26,363,200 (around EUR 4,119,250).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Zelenograd. 7.  On 5 February 1999 three police officers from the Metro police (милиция метро) at Leningradskiy railway station in Moscow, L., S. and I., arrested the applicant and another person, R., on suspicion of burglary. They took them to the Komsomolskaya Metro police station for questioning and urged the applicant to confess. The applicant refused and asked to be provided with a lawyer. Angry about this request, the policemen punched the applicant in the upper body and the head. 8.  Later, the policemen took the applicant to a special Metro police station for further questioning. According to the applicant, as soon as the interrogation had begun, the policemen beat him to make him sign a confession they had prepared. The applicant refused to sign. Angry about this refusal, the policemen cuffed the applicant’s hands behind his back, dropped him on the floor, and applied electric shocks to his neck, kidney and liver areas and private parts. They kicked the applicant in the stomach, put him in a chair, and beat his head with a document file until he fainted. Fifteen minutes later the policemen told the applicant that they would hand him over to officers from the Sokol district police station because the burglary had been committed in that district. 9.  The officers from the Sokol district police station questioned the applicant and placed him in a temporary detention unit. Three days later, the applicant was transferred to remand prison SIZO–48/5. 10.  On the applicant’s admission to the prison, the doctor on duty observed injuries on his body. He sent the applicant to a first-aid point to record the injuries. 11.  On 10 February 1999 the staff at the first-aid point recorded the following injuries sustained by the applicant:\n“Bruises on the soft tissue of the left auricle, right forefinger and right elbow joint and an abrasion on the left shin.”\nThe applicant explained that the injuries were caused by the ill-treatment he had received from the policemen. 12.  On 22 February 1999 the prison administration asked the public prosecutor of the Golovinskiy District to investigate the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment. The prosecutor referred the request to the Metro public prosecutor (прокурор Московского метрополитена) because it was Metro police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. 13.  The applicant’s criminal case was submitted for trial in the Golovinskiy District Court. At the trial, the court questioned as a witness L., the policeman who had arrested the applicant, who stated that he had not used physical coercion against him. The applicant recognised L. as the man who had beaten him. The court asked the Metro public prosecutor about the results of the inquiry (прокурорская проверка) into the alleged ill-treatment. On 9 June 1999 the Internal Investigations Department of the Moscow police informed the court that the applicant could have been injured when being transported to the remand prison. 14.  On 5 October 1999 the court convicted the applicant and R. of burglary and sentenced them to four years and four months’ imprisonment. The court found the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment unsubstantiated, stating:\n“The use of physical coercion [against the applicant and R.] by the policemen has not been corroborated by the results of the inquiry conducted.” 15.  On 15 December 1999 the Moscow City Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. 16.  On 26 June 1999 the Metro public prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators on the ground that there was no indication that a crime had been committed. On 31 October 1999 the applicant asked the Moscow public prosecutor to quash the decision of 26 June 1999. 17.  On 17 January 2000 the Moscow public prosecutor quashed the decision of 26 June 1999 rendered by the Metro public prosecutor and referred the case back for further investigation. 18.  On 24 January 2000 the Metro public prosecutor refused to open criminal proceedings against the policemen for the second time. 19.  On 28 January 2004 a Moscow deputy public prosecutor quashed the decision of 24 January 2000, finding that it was superficial. He noted, in particular, that no medical examination had been carried out to establish the method by which the injuries had been inflicted and their gravity and, furthermore, that O. and D., persons who had been detained simultaneously with the applicant and had sustained similar injuries, had not been questioned. He referred the case back for further investigation. 20.  On 5 March 2004 the deputy Metro public prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen for the third time on the ground that there was no indication that a crime had been committed. In the decision it was noted that the policemen L., S. and I., who had arrested the applicant, had stated that they had not used physical coercion against him. Three other policemen, K., Z. and J., who had been on duty at the police station on 5 and 6 February 1999, were also questioned. K. stated that during his shift the applicant had not been brought to the police station. Z. and J. submitted that on 5 February 1999 at around 2 p.m. two persons had been brought to the police station; however, no physical force had been used against them and no procedural steps had been taken that day. O. and D., the persons who had been detained simultaneously with the applicant, could not be questioned because they did not reside in Moscow any more. As regards the injuries noted in the medical report of 10 February 1999, it was impossible to determine when and in what circumstances they had been inflicted.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Kherson. 5.  In 1996-1997 the applicant’s neighbours, Mr and Mrs P., who lived on the second floor of a two-storey dwelling house, reconstructed their two flats. As a result of this, the applicant’s flat on the first floor of the same house and the property in it were flooded and damaged. 6.  On 10 September 1997 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Komsomolskyy Court against Mr and Mrs P., by which she asked it to declare unlawful the reconstructions they had made, sought elimination of obstacles in using the house and claimed damages. Subsequently, the applicant lodged a similar claim against the local authorities, by which she also sought refutation of information published in a local newspaper concerning the applicant’s alleged failure to pay for the utilities and claimed damages in this respect. 7.  Between 9 September 1998 and 24 April 1999 the proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the applicant’s criminal complaint concerning the matter, which was eventually dismissed as unsubstantiated. 8.  On 28 August 2001 the court discontinued the proceedings in respect of Mr P. because of his death. 9.  Following two reconsiderations of the case, on 31 August 2005 the court allowed in part the applicant’s claim, declared the reconstructions made by Mrs P. unlawful, obliged her to repair the house and the applicant’s flat and ordered Mrs P. to pay the applicant certain amounts in compensation. The court rejected, as unsubstantiated, the applicant’s claim against the local authorities. 10.  On 12 December 2005 and 24 January 2008, respectively, the Kherson Regional Court of Appeal and the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (the latter court acting as a court of cassation) upheld the above judgment. On 14 April 2008 the applicant was served with a copy of the decision of 24 January 2008. 11.  According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings the applicant amended or specified her claims on six occasions and on one occasion she requested the courts to extend the time-limit for lodging her appeal. Nineteen hearings were adjourned upon the applicant’s request or due to her failure to attend them. Thirty-five hearings were adjourned mainly due to the respondents’ or third parties’ failure to attend them and because of the absence of the judge. Three expert examinations were ordered in the course of the proceedings and lasted for about three months (in June-July 1999 and in May 2004). 12.  The applicant disagreed that she had been responsible for the adjournment of some of the hearings mentioned by the Government.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1955 and 1958, respectively, and live in Szolnok. 6.  The applicants intended to set up an enterprise and started to raise funds in March 1994. They contacted a loan agency and signed a real estate sales contract with an individual concerning their detached house on 12 March 1994. Change of ownership was registered on the basis of this contract on 14 July 1995. 7.  In August 1995 the applicants brought an action before the Szolnok District Court requesting the court to order restitutio in integrum by declaring the contract invalid. The fact of the existence of these proceedings (perfeljegyzés) was registered in the Land Registry. This case ceased after a six-month stay by mutual agreement of the parties. However, for unknown reasons, the registration of the proceedings was not deleted from the register until July 1998. 8.  In June 1998 the real estate was sold to a third party. After the deletion of the registration of the civil proceedings described above from the land register, the new owner was entered in that register on 25 August 1998. On 21 September 1998, after having been informed about these events and having unsuccessfully attempted to settle the case otherwise, the applicants brought an action before the Szolnok District Court, identical to the previous one, together with claims about other loan contracts between the same parties. 9.  On 4 March 2004, after holding a hearing in June 2002, the District Court dismissed the applicants’ action in part. It established that, although the contract was ostensible, restitutio in integrum was impossible since the applicants had failed to bring their action before the court in due time. 10.  The District Court pointed out that the purchase contract evidently concealed a loan and was thus invalid. However, this could not have any effect on the acquisition by a third party, whose good faith had not been successfully challenged by the applicants. It relied on paragraph 31(2) of Law-Decree no. 31 of 1972 on the Land Registry which provided – in order to secure the legal certainty of the real estate market – that in such disputes, a third-party proprietor could not be deprived of his acquisition after sixty days of his date of entry in the register, provided that he had acted in good faith and the decision to make the entry in the register had been served on the former owner. 11.  However, applying paragraph 237(2) of the Civil Code, the court restored the financial balance between the parties, taking into account the ostensible purchase contract and other loan contracts. All in all, it obliged the defendants to pay the applicants 8,082,214 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 32,300 euros (EUR)) plus accrued interest, from which HUF 4,160,000 (approximately EUR 16,300) was to compensate for the loss of the property. 12.  All the parties appealed. The Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok County Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision on 20 October 2004. 13.  The Regional Court confirmed that restitutio in integrum was impossible in this case, although it gave different reasoning. It noted that the sixty-day deadline could not be applied since the decision to enter the third party’s acquisition in the register had not been served on the applicants. It also observed that, flowing from the above-mentioned provision of the Law-Decree, after three years no change could be made at all to this entry in the land register. It further stated that paragraph 63(2) of the new Act on the Land Registry (no. 141 of 1997) ruled the same way. The Regional Court saw no reason to depart from the remaining findings of the District Court, including the value of the real estate, which was not in dispute during the appellate proceedings. 14.  The applicants lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court. On 24 May 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed their petition.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first and second applicants were born in 1950 and 1953 and currently live in Moscow, the Russian Federation, and Kutaisi, Georgia, respectively. They are husband and wife. 9.  The first applicant was the deputy mayor of Kutaisi, the second largest city in Georgia, from 1993 to 1995 and the managing director of the company operating the Kutaisi Automotive Plant (“the factory”), one of the most important public companies in the country, from 1995 to 2000. On 29 December 2000 he was appointed chairman of the factory’s supervisory committee at the shareholders’ general meeting. 10.  The first applicant owned 12.95% of the shares through purchases made in 1998 and 2002 and was the principal shareholder in the factory after the State (78.61% of the shares). The second applicant owned 2.6% of the shares, purchased in 2002, so together the couple owned a total of 15.55% of the shares. 11.  The first applicant was kidnapped in December 2002. After being severely ill-treated by his abductors, he was released in exchange for a large ransom paid by his family. 12.  On 12 March 2004 the first applicant was accused of illegally reducing the share capital of the factory, for which he had first been responsible as managing director and then as chairman of the supervisory committee. He was charged with making fictitious sales, transfers and write‑offs, and spending the proceeds without regard to the company’s interests (Article 182 of the Criminal Code – “abuse of authority by embezzling and misappropriating the property of others”). 13.  On 15 March 2004 the police and the Kutaisi prosecutor went to the first applicant’s workplace to arrest him. The arrest was filmed by journalists and broadcast on a local private television station the same night. The broadcast consisted of an interview with the prosecutor following footage showing the first applicant’s arrest and escort down a flight of stairs, with his arms held by policemen and surrounded by journalists. The prosecutor made two comments in respect of the matter: that the documents seized during a search of the first applicant’s office “were relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation and would be assessed and analysed”, and that the charge which the first applicant faced carried up to twelve years’ imprisonment. 14.  The prosecutor’s interview was followed by that of the Governor of the Region. The Governor, without making any reference to the first applicant or the criminal proceedings against him, declared, among other things, that the State, which was “experiencing difficult times [due to a political crisis], would not stray from the path that it had chosen in pursuit of the identification of those who had devoured public money ... which was exactly why pensions and salaries had not been able to be paid on time”. 15.  On 16 March 2004 the first applicant appointed a lawyer to protect his interests. 16.  When questioned for the first time as a suspect on 17 March 2004, the first applicant, assisted by his lawyer, protested his innocence and exercised his right to silence. 17.  On the same day the prosecuting authority brought an application before the Kutaisi City Court to have the first applicant detained pending trial arguing that the first applicant, who was accused of a crime of a serious nature, might try to evade justice, prevent the discovery of the truth and pursue his criminal activities. Ruling on this request on an unspecified date, the City Court decided to place the first applicant in detention for three months. Applying Article 243 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), the first applicant challenged that decision before the Kutaisi Regional Court, which dismissed his appeal on an unspecified date. 18.  On 25 March 2004 the first applicant sent a letter to the prosecuting authority, which read as follows: “Since I am not indifferent to the future of the automobile factory and consider it possible to settle the problems [I am having] with the State, I express my readiness to forfeit the shares in the factory which are currently in my and my wife’s possession to the State.” 19.  On 14 June 2004 the first applicant’s detention pending trial was extended by the Kutaisi Regional Court until 15 July 2004, and in July 2004 it was extended until 15 September 2004. 20.  During the first four months of his detention the first applicant was detained in the same cell as the person charged with his kidnapping in 2002 (see paragraph 11 above) and another person serving a sentence for murder. After the Public Defender’s Office complained of that fact on the ground that it put the applicant’s physical and psychological well-being at risk, the prison authorities transferred the applicant to another cell. 21.  On 1 August 2004 the first applicant and his lawyer were given access to the criminal case materials. On 6 August 2004 the first applicant appointed a second lawyer to protect his interests in the proceedings. 22.  On 6 September 2004 the investigation was terminated, and the first applicant was indicted on the aforementioned charges. Having acquainted himself, with the assistance of his two lawyers, with the case file in its entirety, he again protested his innocence but confirmed his intention to cooperate with the investigation. 23.  On the same day both applicants transferred their shares free of charge, representing an overall total of 15.55% of the factory’s share capital, to the State. 24.  According to a written statement in the case file from Mr G.T., a worker in the factory, on 6 September 2004 he and nine other employees of the factory transferred their shares to the State ex gratia, at the request of the prosecuting authority, in connection with the criminal proceedings against the first applicant and in exchange for the latter’s release from detention. The case file contains a copy of the relevant ex gratia agreements dated 6 September 2004. 25.  The file also contains a witness statement by Mrs M.I., the second applicant’s sister-in-law, that the public prosecutor had also demanded that the first applicant’s family pay 50,000 laris (GEL) (about 21,000 euros (EUR)) to the Fund for the Development of State Bodies ensuring the Protection of the Law (“the Development Fund”) in order to conclude a “procedural agreement” releasing the first applicant from detention. Thus, the public prosecutor had supplied them with the documents necessary for the transfer, adding that the first applicant’s name must not appear as the one paying the money. The public prosecutor insisted that the money not be paid to the Development Fund directly by the applicants. Mrs M.I. therefore agreed to pay the required amount in her own name. 26.  As confirmed by the relevant bank-transfer receipt, that payment was made on 8 September 2004, with Mrs M.I.’s name duly appearing on the document as the source of the transfer. 27.  On the following day, 9 September 2004, the first applicant filed a written statement with the public prosecutor, requesting him to arrange a “procedural agreement” (hereinafter a “plea bargain”), which procedure had been introduced into the Georgian judicial system in February 2004. The applicant specified that, whilst considering himself to be innocent, he was willing to reach an agreement as regards the sentence and to repair the damage caused to the State; he stated that he would pay GEL 35,000 (EUR 14,700) to the State budget in that connection. He added that he fully understood the contents of the agreement. 28.  On the same day the public prosecutor of Kutaisi offered and the first applicant accepted a plea bargain regarding sentence (Article 679 § 2 of the CCP). The written record of the plea agreement mentioned that, whilst the applicant refused to confess to the charges, he had “actively cooperated with the investigation by voluntarily paying compensation in the amount of GEL 4,201,663 (approximately EUR 1,765,000) for the damage caused by his criminal activity by returning 22.5% of the shares in the factory to the State”. The prosecutor further noted that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant was charged with a particularly serious offence liable to a term of imprisonment of six to twelve years, it was still possible, having due regard to the full compensation of the damage and in the interest of the efficient use of State resources, to offer him a plea bargain. Notably, the prosecutor promised that he would request the trial court to convict the applicant without an examination of the merits, seeking a reduced sentence in the form of a GEL 35,000 (EUR 14,700) fine. It was explained to the applicant that the proposed plea bargain would not exempt him from civil liability. The first applicant stated that he fully understood the content of the bargain and was ready to accept it and that his decision was not the result of any duress, pressure or any kind of undue promise. The record of the plea agreement was duly signed by the prosecutor, the applicant and one of his two lawyers. 29.  Also on the same day the public prosecutor filed a brief with the Kutaisi City Court, requesting approval of the aforementioned plea bargain consisting of no examination of the merits of the case, of finding the first applicant guilty of the charges brought against him and of reducing the sentence to which the offences were liable by fining the accused GEL 35,000 (EUR 14,700). It was mentioned in the prosecutorial brief that it was accompanied by the written record of the plea agreement and twelve volumes of the criminal case materials. 30.  Also on the same day Mrs M.I. effected a bank transfer to the State in payment of the fine of GEL 35,000 (EUR 14,700) as per the above-mentioned plea bargain between the first applicant and the public prosecutor. 31.  At an oral hearing on 10 September 2004, the Kutaisi City Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, examined the prosecutor’s request of 9 September 2004. As disclosed by the record of the hearing, the judge explained to the first applicant, who was assisted by one of the two lawyers who had countersigned the plea bargain (see paragraph 28 above), his rights under Article 679-3 of the CCP. In reply, the applicant acknowledged that he was well aware of his rights and that he had agreed to the bargain voluntarily, without having being subjected to any kind of undue pressure during the negotiations with the prosecutor. That was confirmed by the lawyer as well. The first applicant and his lawyer then asked the judge to endorse the plea bargain, as submitted by the prosecutor, confirming that they fully accepted its consequences. The lawyer added that he had assisted in the plea-bargaining negotiations between his client and the prosecution, that it was his client who had insisted on reaching a settlement, and that he, as a lawyer, had provided all the necessary counselling to the applicant. 32.  Relying on the documentary evidence and the testimony of various witnesses acquired during the investigative stage, the Kutaisi Court found that the charges brought against the first applicant were well-founded. The court also noted that, when he was charged on 6 September 2004 with crimes under Article 182 §§ 2 (a), (b) and (c) and 3 (b) of the Criminal Code, the applicant “did not plead guilty and exercised his right to silence. However, having actively cooperated with the investigation, he had voluntarily repaired the damage of GEL 4,201,663 [EUR 1,765,000] caused by his criminal activity by returning 22.5% of the shares in the factory to the State”. 33.  The City Court further held that, following the judicial examination, it reached the conclusion that the plea bargain had been concluded in accordance with the law, that the first applicant had signed it in full knowledge of the facts and that it was not the result of any duress, pressure or any kind of promise which went beyond what was permitted in plea bargaining. The court thus sanctioned the agreement by declaring the first applicant guilty of the charges brought against him and sentencing him to a GEL 35,000 (EUR 14,700) fine. The first applicant was then immediately released from the courtroom. 34.  As mentioned in its operative part, the Kutaisi City Court’s decision of 10 September 2004 was final and not subject to appeal. A request could be made to have the decision quashed and the case reopened though, if newly discovered circumstances justified such a course of action. 35.  According to the case file, after the termination of the criminal proceedings and his consequent release from detention, the first applicant left Georgia and has since been residing in Moscow, Russia. 36.  After notice of the application had been given to the respondent Government on 21 September 2006 and the parties had exchanged their observations, the applicants complained to the Court, on 12 November 2007, that the General Prosecutor’s Office (“the GPO”) was continuing to exert pressure on them, this time with the aim of having them withdraw their application from the Court. 37.  In support of that assertion, the applicants submitted a written statement given by their daughter, Ms A. Natsvlishvili, dated 6 November 2007. 38.  According to that statement, after having been told by her parents that pressure was being brought to bear on them, in September 2004 Ms Natsvlishvili, who was a student at the Central European University in Budapest at the time, decided to approach an acquaintance of hers who was working at the GPO, Ms T.B. Subsequently, Ms Natsvlishvili exchanged several e-mails with her acquaintance in which the latter, claiming to act on behalf of the GPO, expressed that authority’s position on the applicants’ case. The case file contains a copy of the relevant e-mail exchange. 39.  In the e-mail exchange, Ms Natsvlishvili and Ms T.B. addressed each other on friendly terms, using shortened, pet names and familiar instead of formal forms of address. 40.  Ms Natsvlishvili was the first to contact Ms T.B., on 14 September 2006, asking her, as a friend and an experienced lawyer, to give her some advice about her master’s thesis and a forthcoming examination in law. 41.  On 29 November 2006 Ms T.B. advised the applicants’ daughter, whom she considered to be “a friend”, that she had been “personally” working on her father’s case and thus possessed important information emanating from the Prosecutor General. Inviting the applicants’ daughter to express her parents’ position on the matter, Ms T.B. promised to share her hierarchical superiors’ views with them. 42.  On 11 December 2006 Ms T.B. informed the applicants’ daughter that the GPO would be ready to reopen the first applicant’s criminal case and then terminate it again, this time in his favour, and to return the GEL 35,000 (EUR 14,700) which had been paid by him as a fine. Ms T.B. encouraged the applicants to think about that proposal quickly and to accept it, otherwise, she stated, “the prosecution authority would defend its position in Strasbourg and might even unilaterally annul the plea bargain and reopen the criminal proceedings against the first applicant”. 43.  On 16 December 2006 Ms Natsvlishvili informed Ms T.B. that her father was ready to reach a friendly settlement, as provided for “by the Convention” and under the scrutiny of the Court. Ms Natsvlishvili then asked a number of procedural questions and also enquired whether it was possible, having due regard to the substantial pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage which had been inflicted on her family by the State, to review the conditions of the proposed settlement. 44.  On the same date, 16 December 2006, Ms T.B. replied that “her personal involvement in the case was a guarantee that the applicants’ family would not find itself in an inauspicious situation again”. Ms T.B. then stated that the first applicant should file an application with the GPO, complaining that the plea bargain in question had been reached without a full consideration of his interests. The GPO would then treat that application as a request for the reopening of the case on the basis of newly discovered circumstances. Ms T.B. assured the applicants’ daughter that, after the reopening of the case, the first applicant would, as a matter of fact, be rehabilitated by having obtained the deletion of the conviction from his criminal record. 45.  Ms T.B. then stated that the State would be ready to return the money which had been paid by the first applicant as a fine and the shares in the factory forfeited by the second applicant; she explained that the first applicant’s shares could not be returned as they had already been assigned to a third party. The GPO employee also assured Ms Natsvlishvili that the first applicant would become eligible to return to Georgia and to start business afresh there, in which entrepreneurial activity the prosecution authority would even assist him. Ms T.B. then continued:\n“We all know that errors have been committed, but it has become a particularly vital issue, in the interests of the country, to set aside personal experience and trauma now, notwithstanding the painfulness of those [experiences]. I know that this is difficult, but if you can manage it, I am confident that after years have passed you would then be in a position to tell yourself that you were successful in differentiating Georgia, as your own country, from individual State agents, and to tell yourself that you made your own small sacrifice for your country.” 46.  Ms T.B. specified that “they”, the GPO, were not telling the applicants to first withdraw their application from the Court and to settle the issue at the domestic level afterwards. On the contrary, the State was ready to start working on the settlement of the issue at the domestic level first. However, Ms T.B. then reminded the applicants’ daughter that “they had only a month left for [filing observations with] Strasbourg”. 47.  On an unspecified date, but apparently subsequent to the above‑mentioned e-mail exchange, Ms T.B. informed Ms Natsvlishvili that the State would be ready to pay to the first applicant, in compensation, GEL 50,000 (EUR 22,000) and to take procedural measures to have the conviction deleted from his criminal record. She specified as follows:\n“As regards the issue of rehabilitation and compensation, the decision will apparently belong, according to the applicable rules of jurisdiction, to the Kutaisi Court of Appeal. It will therefore be indicated in this court’s decision that, given the fact that the remainder of [the applicants’] shares have been assigned and that the factory has become indebted, it is factually impossible to return the shares in their entirety, which would then lead to the award of GEL 50,000 [(EUR 22,000)] in pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.” 48.  Ms T.B. then assured the applicants’ daughter that they could trust the GPO, as, in any event, should there be any improper conduct by the authorities, the applicants could always then complain to the Court about the alleged hindrance of the right of individual petition under Article 34 of the Convention, which allegation would be of particular harm for the respondent State’s international image. Ms T.B. mentioned, lastly, that the State might be ready to increase the amount of compensation to a maximum of GEL 85,000 (EUR 35,700).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1965 and is currently in Sweden. 8.  On 18 October 2003 the applicant arrived in Sweden and three days later he requested the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) to grant him asylum and a residence permit in Sweden. 9.  The Board held a first interview with the applicant on 27 May 2004 during which he stated that he was Shia' Muslim and came from a city in the south of Iran where his wife and two minor sons remained. A smuggler had arranged for his travel to Sweden and he had travelled all the way hidden in a lorry. He claimed that he had criticised the Iranian government on several occasions and, the last time he had participated in a student demonstration to show his sympathy, he had been arrested. He had spent seven months in Sepah prison and then been transferred to a prison in his home town where he had spent another seventeen months. He had never been formally tried in court but every third month there had been a sort of religious trial where he had been put before a priest who had decided on his continued imprisonment. While imprisoned, he had been subjected to torture and still suffered from headaches because of it. He knew others who had participated in the demonstration and who were still imprisoned without trial. 10.  A complete asylum investigation was conducted by the Migration Board on 4 June 2004 where the applicant maintained his initial statements and essentially added the following. In 1993 he had quit his job and returned to his village to work as a farmer. He had discussed with other villagers about the lack of human rights and freedom in Iran. One night the Basij (a “people's militia”, loyal to the Supreme Leader) had come and destroyed his fields with a tractor. When he had tried to report the incident to the police, they had advised him not to, since it would lead nowhere. He had also expressed his opinion of the government when he had watched television in public places. The Basij had later destroyed his car, thrown stones at his house and sent messages that he should stop his activities and “information evenings”. He had received the threats through a relative of his wife who worked for the regime. The threats had commenced in 1997 but had become more serious after he had participated in his first demonstration in 2000. It had been a student demonstration and he had escaped when the police intervened. On 9 July 2001 he had participated in his second student demonstration where he had been arrested because police had closed off all escape routes and had been filming the protesters as evidence. Many others had also been arrested. During the demonstration they had shouted slogans against the president and the government and demanded the release of student prisoners. In Sepah prison he had been tortured. He had been stabbed twice in the thigh, boiling water had been poured over his chest and his captors had hit him with their fists. However, on 11 February 2002, he had been transferred to the prison in his home town. He had been planning to escape for almost nine months by being very co-operative with the prison guards so that he had earned their trust. The “religious trials” had taken place at a court outside the prison and the applicant had spoken with three of his friends, who had visited him in prison to help him. On 19 July 2003 he had been taken to the court and his friends had been there. He had worn his normal clothes under his prison outfit and he had not had any handcuffs as the guards trusted him. He had told the guard that he had to go to the bathroom, where he had taken off his prison outfit. In the meantime one of his friends had gone to start the car and another friend had spoken to the guard to distract his attention from the applicant. The applicant had then walked straight out of the court, got into the car and they had driven off. It had been a revolution court and there had been a lot of people. He had then remained hidden at a friend's home for about two months while his friend had found a smuggler to help him out of the country. While he had been in hiding, his wife had been taken to the police twice for questioning about his whereabouts. His father had also been questioned. The applicant underlined that he was not, and never had been, a member of a political party or any organisation and that he had never been formally convicted of any crime. He was convinced that he would be executed if returned to Iran since he had escaped from prison and because he would be accused of having co-operated with those who are against Islam. 11.  The applicant further stated that he continuously suffered from headaches and sleeplessness and had problems with his legs. He submitted a medical certificate, dated 4 February 2005 and issued by Dr I. Markström, a physician at a local health care centre. The certificate stated that the applicant had scars around both ankles, scars on the outside of both kneecaps and two lateral scars on his left thigh. He also had a reddish area stretching from his neck down to his chest and when he yawned there was a loud clicking sound from the left side of his jaw. In the physician's opinion, these injuries could very well originate from the torture to which the applicant claimed that he had been subjected in Iran, namely, that he had been chained around his ankles and suspended upside down for several hours, that boiling water had been thrown at his chest, that he had received blows to his head, jaw, abdomen and legs, and that he had been stabbed twice in the left thigh with a bayonet. 12.  On 27 May 2005 the Migration Board rejected the request. It first noted that the applicant had not claimed to have been a member either of an organisation or of a political party or to have had a leading role in the organisation of demonstrations. Moreover, the proceedings before the revolutionary courts were in general not open to the public. The Board found that the applicant had not substantiated his story in any way and that he had thus failed to show that he had been, or would be, of interest to the Iranian authorities. It therefore considered that the applicant would not attract special attention from the Iranian authorities if he were to be returned to his home country. As concerned the ill-treatment and torture of which the applicant claimed to have been the victim, the Board found that the medical certificate did not prove that he had been tortured even if the injuries documented could very well originate from the torture described. In its view, there was no reason to believe that the applicant would be subjected to ill-treatment or torture upon return to Iran. Thus, it concluded that the applicant could neither be granted asylum in Sweden nor a residence permit based on humanitarian grounds. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Aliens Appeals Board (Utlänningsnämnden), maintaining his claims and adding that about half of the inhabitants in his home town knew him since he used to be a football player. Moreover, he had been one of ten to twelve organisers of the demonstration held in 2001. They had written the banners and decided which slogans to use. The other organisers, who were students and previously imprisoned critics of the regime, had also been punished. Following his escape, his wife had been taken in for questioning about his whereabouts on seven occasions and had been kept in detention on three occasions. His father had been questioned on two occasions and their home had also been searched on two occasions. The applicant further claimed that he had been kept in an isolation cell for the first two months of his detention. Furthermore, the public had access to hearings before the revolutionary courts and it had been relatively easy for him to escape since his friends had distracted the guards and he had thus been able to leave the building. Lastly, submitting four medical certificates, the applicant invoked his deteriorating health as he suffered, inter alia, from depression and panic attacks. 14.  In March 2006 the applicant was informed that the case would be transferred to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen) for further proceedings, following the entry into force of a new Aliens Act (see below under Relevant Domestic Law). 15.  On 18 June 2007 the Migration Court held an oral hearing. In response to his lawyer's questions the applicant stated, inter alia, that he had participated in demonstrations critical against the regime since 1988 and that, in 1997 or 1998, he had started to notice that his criticism was not appreciated. He had participated in yearly demonstrations, such as on women's day and on labour day. Mostly he had participated in meetings on various premises. A relative of his wife had been an official at the intelligence agency and thus he had been assured that nothing would happen to him. He had been one of 4-5,000 participants in the demonstration in 2001 and he had played no special role, but it had been monitored by the authorities. He had been arrested and accused of being against Islam and the regime. In connection with a visit by his wife to Sepah prison while he was there, she had been detained for three days and questioned about him. However, no other relatives had been summoned or questioned by the authorities. He had escaped when his friends had come to the revolutionary court for his hearing and had pretended to have a fight with each other so that he could go to the toilets to change. It had then taken him fifteen seconds to leave the building since there were no exit controls. In response to questions by the Migration Board, the applicant claimed that he had organised demonstrations and that he had been one of the leaders at the demonstration in 2001. He had been arrested because he had been in the front row and had shouted slogans. 16.  In a judgment of 9 July 2007, the Migration Court, by three votes to one, rejected the appeal. It first noted that the applicant appeared to have expanded his grounds for asylum by claiming that he had not just participated in demonstrations but had actually been involved in organising them. However, since he had not been a member of a party or an organisation which was critical of the regime, the court found it unlikely that he would be of any interest to the authorities in his home country if he returned. It further considered that the applicant's account of how he had escaped from the revolutionary court was not credible, having regard, inter alia, to international sources which stated that insights into the functioning of the revolutionary courts were very limited. The court also noted that he had remained in Iran for two months following his escape before leaving the country. Moreover, it found that the applicant had failed to show that he had been tortured in Iran. Thus, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the court concluded that the applicant could not be considered to be in need of protection in Sweden and that his health problems were not of such a serious nature that he could be granted leave to remain on humanitarian grounds. 17.  One of the three lay judges dissented as he considered that the applicant had given a credible account of events and should be granted asylum as a refugee in Sweden. 18.  On 17 July 2007 the applicant appealed to the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen), maintaining his claims and stating that he was only telling the truth. He was also of the opinion that the Migration Court had failed to take into account the medical certificate testifying to his torture injuries. He further requested some extra time in order to submit certain documents that his family had sent to him from Iran. The court granted an extension of the time-limit and, on 7 August 2007, the applicant submitted, among other things, two summonses, one to his wife and one to his father, to appear before the revolutionary court in his home town on 6 August 2003 to answer questions concerning the applicant and his escape from prison. 19.  On 4 September 2007 the Migration Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal. 20.  The applicant was called to a meeting with the Migration Board on 9 November 2007. 21.  On 8 November 2007, following a request by the applicant, the President of the Chamber to which the case had been allocated decided, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, to indicate to the Swedish Government that it was desirable in the interest of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court not to deport the applicant to Iran until further notice. 22.  Following the request by the Court, on 9 November 2007 the Migration Board stayed the enforcement of the deportation order until further notice. 23.  Upon request by the Court, the applicant submitted a forensic medical report dated 14 November 2008 and issued by Dr E. Edston, specialist in forensic medicine at the Crisis and Trauma Centre at Danderyd Hospital. The report was drawn up on the basis of the protocols from the interviews with the applicant before the Migration Board, the medical certificate by Dr I. Markström, a letter from the applicant's representative dated 16 October 2008 and the applicant's own story as told to Dr Edston during his examination on 4 November 2008. The report contained photos of the scars together with a written protocol of all the scars and the medical record from the examination as well as Dr Edston's opinion. 24.  The report noted that the applicant had claimed that he had been tortured in prison in 2001 and that the torture had consisted of beating with fists, kicks, being hit on his kneecaps with rifle butts, having a bayonet stuck twice in his thigh, as well as being flogged, suspended upside down for prolonged period of times and having hot water poured over him. He further stated that, as a result of the torture, he suffered from chronic headaches, reduced feeling in his right thigh, reduced mobility of his jaw, reduced eye sight, an ulcer, pain in his knees when walking and medical problems with his thyroid gland and diabetes. Dr Edston examined the applicant and found numerous scars on his body. 25.  In Dr Edston's opinion, the injuries invoked by the applicant could very well have occurred in 2001 as claimed and the scars observed on his body had the appearance and localisation which corresponded well with his statements of how they had appeared. For example, the scars on his kneecaps could well correspond to blows with rifle butts, the marks on the front of his shins from having been kicked with boots, the marks on his left ankle could have appeared as a consequence of having been suspended upside down by his ankles and the pigmentation on his neck corresponded well with a burn injury. In conclusion, Dr Edston noted that, in cases like this, alternative causes for the origins of the scars could not be completely excluded but that experience showed that self-inflicted injuries and injuries resulting from accidents normally had a different distribution to those showed by the applicant. The findings in the present case favoured the conclusion that the injuries had been inflicted on the applicant completely or to a large extent by other persons and in the manner claimed by him. Thus, the findings strongly indicated that the applicant had been tortured.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972. He is currently serving his sentence in Zabela Prison near Požarevac in Serbia. 6.  On 9 February 2001 a couple were killed. 7.  On 10 February 2001 at about 8 p.m. the applicant was arrested at his home in Grocka. He was taken to Smederevo police station and beaten up by police officers. He then confessed to having participated in the killing. 8.  On 11 February 2001 the applicant was taken to Smederevo Prison. 9.  On 13 February 2001 the applicant was taken to the investigating judge. He met his counsel there, who had meanwhile been appointed by the applicant’s wife, but he was not given the opportunity to talk with him in private. While the applicant confirmed his earlier confession, he complained to the judge that he had been beaten up by the police. The applicant was then examined at Smederevo Hospital. According to the medical report, he had a broken rib and bruises on his chest. 10.  On 14 February 2001 the applicant was taken to the investigating judge again. His counsel was not present. The applicant met his counsel in private for the first time later that day. 11.  On 17 February 2001 the applicant was returned to Smederevo police station and beaten up again. After having collapsed, he was taken to Smederevo Hospital. According to the medical report, he was concussed and had bruises on his head. The investigating judge was informed of the incident. 12.  On 19 February 2001 the applicant appeared before the investigating judge again. His counsel was not present. 13.  When the applicant was taken to the investigating judge for the fourth time on 16 March 2001, his counsel was present and he retracted his confession. 14.  Following a criminal complaint lodged by the applicant’s counsel against unidentified criminal police officers, the public prosecutor obtained a report from Smederevo police station rejecting the applicant’s allegations. The public prosecutor also obtained the medical reports of 13 and 17 February 2001. On 24 September 2001 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute and informed the applicant’s counsel of the possibility of starting a subsidiary prosecution within eight days. Counsel did not do so. 15.  On 4 November 2002 the Smederevo District Court found the applicant and S.P. guilty of murder and sentenced each of them to forty years’ imprisonment. On 9 July 2003 the Supreme Court of Serbia quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a retrial. It instructed the first-instance court to establish whether the applicant had been ill-treated by the police and whether any of his statements were therefore inadmissible. 16.  At a hearing held on 13 May 2004, the applicant described his ill‑treatment in detail and named the alleged perpetrators for the first time. Counsel for S.P. then applied for the minutes of that hearing to be sent to the public prosecutor with a view to prosecuting the police officers named by the applicant. The public prosecutor, who was present at the hearing, raised an objection. She emphasised that a criminal complaint in that connection had been dismissed on 24 September 2001 and that her office had no intention of dealing with the same case again. Counsel for S.P. then applied for that prosecutor to be excluded from the proceedings. On 17 May 2004 the Smederevo District Chief Public Prosecutor rejected that application, but confirmed that the 2001 decision might be reconsidered in view of the new facts, notably the names of the alleged perpetrators. 17.  On 27 December 2004 the Smederevo District Court found the applicant guilty of murder and S.P. of incitement to murder and sentenced each of them to forty years’ imprisonment. It held that the applicant had indeed been beaten at Smederevo police station. The applicant’s statements made there on 10 and 17 February 2001 were thus declared inadmissible. However, it regarded the statements which the applicant had made before the investigating judge on 13, 14 and 19 February as admissible. The court relied in that regard on an expert report prepared by a team of psychiatrists, stating that the applicant’s fear must have receded by the date of his appearance before the investigating judge. 18.  The applicant appealed against the judgment of 27 December 2004. He maintained, among other grounds of appeal, that the admission of the statements which he had made before the investigating judge in February 2001 should have also been barred. On 13 May 2005 the Supreme Court of Serbia upheld the first-instance judgment. 19.  The applicant appealed against the judgment of 13 May 2005. He repeated that the admission of the statements which he had made before the investigating judge in February 2001 should have also been barred. On 14 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Serbia, in a different formation, upheld the second-instance judgment. 20.  On 3 November 2006 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor against six police officers in relation to the events of February 2001. On 18 January 2007 the public prosecutor decided not to prosecute. The reasons for that decision are unknown because the applicant was not informed thereof and the entire file was allegedly destroyed in early 2010 (that is, three years after the decision not to prosecute). 21.  In March 2011 both the applicant and his counsel applied for the reopening of the criminal proceedings described above. On 17 March 2011 the Smederevo Higher Court rejected both applications. On 29 April 2011 the Belgrade Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 17 March 2011.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zamostne. The applicant is the legal successor of his mother, Mrs K.A.P., who died in May 2003. 6.  On 1 September 1944 a property owned by L.B. – the applicant's grandfather and the father of K.A.P.- M.B. and H.L., was taken over by the State pursuant to provisions of the Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation on the Agricultural Reform of 6 September 1944 (Dekret PKWN o przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej). No decision was delivered in the proceedings. 7.  The applicant submits that on 16 October 1991 his mother, K.A.P., who was the legal successor of L.B., informed the Siedlecki Governor (Wojewoda Siedlecki) that she had undertaken certain steps seeking restitution of her property or pecuniary compensation in lieu. 8.  It appears that the Governor informed the applicant's mother by a letter of 20 November 1991 that no laws regulating this matter had been enacted yet. 9.  On 1 December 1995 K.A.P. lodged a request with the Minister of Agriculture and Food Economics (Minister Rolnictwa i Gospodarki Żywnościowej) for restitution of the property. She argued that the property in question had been unlawfully expropriated, since the 1944 Decree had entered into force on 13 September 1944, i.e. after the date of the expropriation. 10.  On 9 January 1996 the Minister referred the case to the Siedlecki Governor. 11.  On 19 February 1996 the Siedlecki Governor gave a decision on the expropriation of the property in question, confirming that the property had been taken over by the State on 1 September 1944. 12.  On 27 February 1996 the applicant's mother appealed against the decision. 13.  On 7 March 1996 she reiterated her arguments. She added that the property in question had comprised a brickyard, a distillery, a glass-works and a power station and, should have therefore been as such, exempted from expropriation within the framework of the agrarian reform law. 14.  On 13 March 1996 the Minister of Agriculture informed K.A.P. that her appeal would be examined in the first quarter of 1997. 15.  On 20 March 1996 K.A.P. lodged a complaint with the Council of Ministers (Rada Ministrów) about the inactivity of the Minister of Agriculture. 16.  By a letter of 22 July 1996 the Office of the Council of Ministers (Biuro Rady Ministrów) requested the Minister of Agriculture to accelerate the proceedings. 17.  On 7 July 1997 K.A.P. enquired about the state of the proceedings pending before the Minister of Agriculture. 18.  On 11 August 1997 the Minister of Agriculture upheld the decision of 19 February 1996. 19.  The applicant's mother appealed. 20.  On 17 July 1998 she asked the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) about the state of the proceedings. 21.  Subsequently, by a letter of 25 November 1998, she complained to the Ombudsman about the excessive length of the proceedings. 22.  On 23 November 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed both the 1997 decision of the Minister of Agriculture and the preceding decision of the Siedlecki Governor. It held that the administrative authorities had failed to address the applicant's arguments concerning the non agricultural status of certain components of the property. 23.  On 27 October 2000 the Lubelski Governor (the Siedleckie Province had ceased to exist in the meantime) gave a decision declaring that the property had been taken over by the State in 1944 without compensation. 24.  On 17 November 2000 K.A.P. lodged an appeal with the Minister of Agriculture and Country Development (Minister Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi). 25.  On 19 February 2001 she lodged a complaint with the Prime Minister (Prezes Rady Ministrów) about the inactivity of the Minister of Agriculture. 26.  She further complained, on 30 March 2001, to the Council of Ministers, about the inactivity of the Minister of Agriculture. 27.  On 17 April 2001 the Chancellery of the Prime Minister (Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów) requested the Minister of Agriculture to consider speeding up of the proceedings. 28.  On 30 May 2001 the Minister of Agriculture and Country Development quashed the decision of 27 October 2000 and remitted the case. 29.  On 9 January 2002 the Lubelski Governor informed K.A.P. that her application would be examined by the end of March 2002, as further evidence had to be taken. 30.  On 23 April 2002 the Lubelski Governor informed K.A.P. that her application would be examined by the end of June 2002. 31.  On 15 July 2002 the Lubelski Governor stayed the proceedings and requested K.A.P. to provide evidence that she was a legal successor of L.B. She lodged an interlocutory appeal. 32.  On 6 November 2002 the Minister of Agriculture dismissed her interlocutory appeal. 33.  On 31 December 2002 K.A.P. appealed against this decision. 34.  On 1 May 2003 K.A.P. died. 35.  On 14 April 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny) stayed the proceedings concerning suspension of the administrative proceedings, pending the termination of the inheritance proceedings after K.A.P.'s death. 36.  On 9 August 2005 the applicant, the legal successor of K.A.P., lodged a complaint with the Minister of Agriculture about the inactivity of the Lubelski Governor. 37.  On 14 November 2005 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed both the Minister's decision of 26 November 2002 and the Lubelski Governor's decision of 2002, by which the proceedings had been stayed. It noted that on 13 April 2000 the Wejherowo District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) had declared K.A.P. to be the legal successor of L.B. It held that the decisions to stay the proceedings had therefore been issued in breach of the provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure, since the authorities should have been aware of the above-mentioned inheritance decision. 38.  Between August 2006 and October 2008 the Lubelski Governor tried to establish the whereabouts of any potential heirs of M.B. and H.L. 39.  On 9 August 2007 the applicant complained to the Lubelski Governor about the unreasonable length of the proceedings. 40.  On 13 September 2007 the Lubelski Governor informed the applicant that his application would be examined by the end of 2007. 41.  On 31 December 2007 the Governor informed the applicant that his application would be examined by the end of February 2008. 42.  On 27 February 2008 the Lubelski Governor informed the applicant that his application would be examined by 30 June 2008. 43.  On 3 April 2009 the Warsaw District Court decided that a trustee of an estate (kurator spadku) should be appointed in respect to parts of property owned by M.B. and H.L. 44.  On 21 April 2009 the Lubelski Governor informed the applicant that the dates and places of birth of both M.B. and H.L. were needed in order to declare them dead and to appoint a trustee of an estate. In these circumstances the new time limit for dealing with his application was set on 31 December 2009. 45.  On 11 January 2010 the Lubelski Governor informed the applicant that his application would be examined by 30 June 2010. 46.  On 24 May 2010 the Lubelski Governor discontinued the administrative proceedings instituted by the applicant. The applicant complained about the decision to the Minister of Agriculture. 47.  The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Andrushivka, Zhytomyr region, Ukraine. 5.  By its judgment of 8 December 2000, the Andrushivka District Court awarded the applicant 700 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused to her by Mr Y. It appears that this judgment became final and the enforcement proceedings were initiated. No further information about enforcement of this judgment is available. 6.  In February 2002 the applicant lodged a claim with the Bogunsky District Court of Zhytomyr against the Bogunsky District Bailiffs’ Service of Zhytomyr (відділ державної виконавчої служби Богунського районного управління юстиції м. Житомира), alleging the latter’s inactivity in respect of the enforcement of the judgment of 8 December 2000 and claiming compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage she had sustained as a result. 7.  On 17 April 2003 the court found in part for the applicant and ordered the defendant to pay her a total of UAH 450.39[1]. The applicant did not appeal against this judgment. 8.  On 21 November 2003 the Bogunsky District Bailiffs’ Service of Zhytomyr instituted enforcement proceedings. Subsequently, the latter transferred the enforcement writ to the Zhytomyr Regional Bailiffs’ Service (відділ примусового виконання рішень державної виконавчої служби Житомирської області) for enforcement. 9.  In the course of these enforcement proceedings the Zhytomyr Regional Bailiffs’ Service requested the Bogunsky District Court of Zhytomyr to replace the Bogunsky District Bailiffs’ Service of Zhytomyr with the local department of the State Treasury of Ukraine, as the debtor under the judgment of 17 April 2003. On 28 October 2004 the court rejected this request. The applicant did not attend this hearing. 10.  On 21 May 2004 the State Treasury of Ukraine replied, upon the applicant’s request, that the 2004 State Budget of Ukraine did not provide funds for payment of compensation for damage caused by officials of the State Bailiffs’ Service. 11.  Between July 2004 and April 2006 the Zhytomyr Regional Bailiffs’ Service several times terminated and resumed the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 17 April 2003. By the decision of 18 April 2006, the Zhytomyr Regional Bailiffs’ Service terminated the enforcement proceedings of the judgment of 17 April 2003 on the ground that the debtor had been liquidated. Apparently the applicant did not appeal against this decision. 12.  The judgment of 17 April 2003 remains unenforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973. He is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment without commutation in Lovech Prison. 6.  The applicant has been sentenced eleven times at the end of different sets of criminal proceedings. In 2002 the prosecutor discontinued as time-barred others, in which he had been detained during different periods in 1991, 1992 and 1995. 7.  In August 2007 the applicant brought proceedings seeking compensation for his allegedly unlawful detention during the criminal proceedings against him which had been discontinued as time-barred in 2002 (see paragraph 6 above). His claim was dismissed by two levels of court in 2008. Referring to section 8 of interpretative decision No. 3 of 22 April 2004 of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraph 43 below), the second-instance court held that State responsibility for damage could not be engaged as measures and steps taken before the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be considered unlawful within the meaning of the SMRDA. 8.  On 13 October 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and murder and convicted to serve a cumulated punishment of life imprisonment without commutation on 26 October 2000. 9.  The applicant was detained and served this punishment in the Lovech and Varna Prisons. He was in Lovech Prison between 17 January 2000 and 14 June 2002, between 12 August 2005 and 20 December 2006, and again as of 19 February 2009, where he continued to be at the time of the last information which the Court received from the Government in May 2011. He was detained in Varna Prison between 14 June 2002 and 12 August 2005, and again between 20 December 2006 and 19 February 2009. 10.  In both prisons and throughout this period the applicant was placed under the “special regime” and was kept in permanently locked cells with heightened security. 11.  The applicant submitted that occasionally he had had to share his cell in Varna Prison with other inmates. According to the Government he was mostly kept alone in his cell in Lovech Prison; they did not provide information in respect of his cell in Varna Prison. 12.  According to the applicant the cells were not equipped with toilet facilities or taps and wash basins. He was allowed to use the common toilet and to wash his hands three times a day before meals. He had had to use a plastic bucket to relieve himself in his cell at all other times. Apart from the daily hourly walk in the open air, these had been the only times he had been allowed out of his cell. 13.  The Government did not dispute that in respect of the period before the autumn of 2008, when works had been carried out in the special security wing in Lovech Prison and toilets and sinks had been installed in each of the cells of the prisoners serving sentences of life imprisonment. Likewise, the windows had been changed. The Government did not provide details in relation to sanitary facilities in Varna Prison. Referring to section 71(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 according to which persons placed under the special regime had to be kept in constantly locked cells and under heightened supervision, they explained that the “special regime” conditions did not allow unrestricted access to the toilet facilities.\n(b)  General hygiene 14.  The applicant complained that he was allowed to shower only once a fortnight in Varna Prison. He further claimed that hygiene in the common areas was poor, with rats in the kitchen and the toilet. 15.  The Government did not comment on conditions in Varna Prison but replied that the cells in Lovech Prison had been cleaned regularly. During the period between 31 May 2004 and 7 June 2004 three checks had been carried out in Lovech Prison by the deputy prison director and medical staff who reported a satisfactory situation. The Government further stressed that the applicant had been provided with 0,2 kg of soap for personal hygiene and 0,25 kg of soap for washing his clothes every month. 16.  The applicant submitted that the food served in the prisons was of poor quality and that the cells were too cold in winter, too hot in summer, damp and lacking in ventilation. 17.  The Government responded that the food was certified for its good quality and was prepared and supervised by a qualified cook. The weekly menu was put together by the prison cook and approved by the prison director, by medical personnel and by a prison administrator. Life prisoners received their food in their cells. When the applicant had refused to eat pork because of his religious convictions, he had been given grilled veal sausages with different side dishes. He had been provided with about 2620 calories a day. 18.  The applicant further claimed that medical services were insufficient. In this regard the Government replied that prisoners serving life sentences were subject to periodical medical checks, which took place in their cells for security reasons. If they needed to be examined by outside medical personnel, they were taken to the prison medical centre. The inmates received any medication they needed from the prison’s pharmacy and could purchase different medicines from external pharmacies once a prescription had been issued. All cases requiring urgent intervention were treated without delay. 19.  The applicant claimed that he had been offered no opportunity for social contact or other occupational activities while serving his sentence of life imprisonment. 20.  Without specifying any particular period of time, frequency or duration, the Government submitted that the applicant had been given the opportunity to take part in cultural and intellectual activities in Lovech Prison. He could order and receive books from the prison library which were taken to his cell. He could read a daily national and two local newspapers. The Government also submitted that the applicant could play chess and participate in essay competitions organised in the prison, to the extent to which the regime of inmates serving life-imprisonment sentences permitted. 21.  On 27 October 2005 the applicant brought proceedings under the SMRDA seeking BGN 25,000 in compensation for the distress and humiliation suffered during the period between 26 October 2000 and 26 October 2005 as a result of the poor conditions of detention in the prisons in Lovech and Varna, as well as of the periods of disciplinary sanctions enforced in cells lacking beds, linen, tables and chairs for a total of 40 days in the same period. 22.  In their decision of 8 May 2006 the court found that the applicant, like the other inmates serving life sentences under the “special regime”, had had to use a bucket in the cell for toilet needs. Life prisoners had only been let out of their cells three times a day when they were allowed to use the communal toilets and wash the buckets; during the rest of the time they had to relieve themselves in the cells in front of other inmates. The court concluded that the humiliation of having to use a bucket for one’s physiological needs could only be justified with security reasons. As the Government had failed to produce evidence that there had been a real and serious risk to security in the applicant’s case, the restrictions applied to his access to a toilet had been excessive and beyond the ones inherent to deprivation of liberty. The court awarded the applicant BGN 200 (approximately EUR 100) in damages suffered as a result of detention in inhuman and degrading material conditions – absence of toilet facilities, bed, linen, table and chair, access of light and fresh air caused by inaction of the respondent party in the period 26 October 2000 – 26 October 2005. The applicant was required to pay court fees at the amount of BGN 992 for the remaining part of his claim. 23.  Upon an appeal by both parties, on 28 December 2006 the Veliko Turnovo Appellate Court quashed the judgment and dismissed the claim. The court found in particular that the applicant’s “special regime” required heightened security arrangements and constantly locked cells, which made it impossible to allow access to the communal toilet at night. However, he had access to the toilet during the day-time slots allowed for that and it had not been established that the prison guards had prevented him from visiting the toilet then. While serving such a punishment was no doubt characterized by negative and unfavourable effects, the circumstances of the case did not attract the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and the prison authorities under the SMRDA since the enforcement of a punishment could not be considered as exercising administrative activities or as unlawful action or inaction within the meaning of Article 1 of this law. According to the appellate court the responsibility of the State for the alleged suffering could be engaged before other unspecified bodies and proceedings. 24.  In a final decision no. 666/08 of 26 May 2008 issued in case no. 1685/2008, the Supreme Court of Cassation accepted that the Ministry of Justice and the prison authorities were the state bodies responsible for the execution of sentences and were therefore liable under the SMRDA for any damage caused in connection with it. It was notorious that the conditions in the Bulgarian prisons were not up to European standards, but these conditions were the same for all inmates. The execution of sentences was in itself accompanied by considerable restrictions associated with deprivation of liberty and the various regimes, especially by the “special regime” as compared to the others, and even more in placement in isolation cells as a disciplinary sanction for offences. In examining such complaints the courts had to take into account and strike the necessary balance between the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment as set by the Constitution and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 3 of the Convention, and the inevitable suffering inherent to deprivation of liberty. The court acknowledged the degrading effect of using buckets in the presence of other prisoners, but also took into account the necessity to ensure security and discipline in accordance with the requirements of the “special regime” served in this department of the prison as well as the personalities and specific conduct of prisoners. In striking this balance in the particular case, the Supreme Court of Cassation found that the applicant’s suffering did not go beyond the level of due respect to his dignity and did not require any compensation. 25.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant brought another set of proceedings under the SMRDA seeking BGN 11,000 in compensation for damages suffered as a result of the application of the “special regime”, which excluded him from labour, educational, cultural and sport activities, during the periods 17 January 2000 – 14 June 2002 and 12 August 2005 – 20 December 2006, when he was in Lovech Prison; as well as 14 June 2002 – 12 August 2005 and after 20 December 2006, when he was in Varna Prison and with the exception of the time between 14 July 2002 and 12 August 2005 when he had been allowed to see a psychologist and take part in educational activities once a week, as well as to play table-tennis for 45 minutes on Fridays. 26.  In a final judgment of 23 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the appellate court’s findings rejecting the applicant’s claim. In particular it observed that the lower (Veliko Turnovo Appellate) court:\n“...established an absence of unlawful conduct by representatives of the prison administration leading to the applicant suffering damage. The applicant is serving his sentence under the ‘special regime’ in accordance with section 127b of the Execution of Punishments Act 1969 [the 1969 Act]. Under section 127d in conjunction with section 127a of the 1969 Act the sentence of life imprisonment without commutation is implemented either in separate prisons or in special sections of the regular prisons. According to section 167g of the regulations for the implementation of the 1969 Act life prisoners are placed in permanently locked cells under heightened security. Only after a decision of the commission under section 17 of the 1969 Act can those prisoners be accommodated in cells together with prisoners serving different sentences and can they take part in joint sport, work, educational or other activities. The lower court concluded on the basis of the legislation referred to above that the administration of Lovech and Varna Prisons cannot be said to have failed to act thus causing the applicant non-pecuniary damage. Admittedly, during the period in question the applicant did not take part in labour, educational or sport activities. However, that is explained with the type of regime under which he is serving his sentence and not with any unlawful conduct by the prison administration. The applicant has been involved in individual correctional activities; he had been allowed to spend an hour a day in the open air in a place furnished with sports equipment. As of February 2007, he has been allowed an additional hour for sport. Moreover, it has not been established that he has suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the absence of labour, sport or cultural activities.” 27.  The Supreme Court of Cassation concluded that:\n“...the lower court rightly held that no unlawful failure to act by the prison administration had been established, contrary to the applicant’s allegations. In order to engage the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice under section 1 of the SMRDA for the prison administration’s alleged failure to act, it is necessary to establish that the lack of action was unlawful, in other words, that there existed an obligation to act and the administration failed to do so. The prison regime is stipulated in the 1969 Act. According to sections 43 and 127a of the 1969 Act, as well as to section 167g of the regulations for its implementation, inmates placed under the “special regime” are mandatorily kept apart from the rest of the prison population. The evidence in the file does not show that the prison administration has acted in breach of the legislative framework regulating the enforcement of the punishment given to the applicant. Mr Hasan refers to Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to other relevant international instruments. However, the evidence gathered in his case does not show that he has been subjected to humiliation. The conditions under which he has been kept in prison are in conformity with the statutory requirements regulating the functioning of the places for deprivation of liberty.” 28.  The applicant submitted that while he was in Varna Prison the entirety of his incoming and outgoing correspondence with his lawyer was subject to inspection in accordance with section 33(1)(c) of the 1969 Act. 29.  He also claimed that the prison administration failed to deliver some of the letters to his mother because they were written in Turkish. He further stated that he could make telephone calls only to members of his family and not to his lawyer. Furthermore, he submitted that the visits by relatives and lawyers to him were held in special premises with a prison officer attending the meeting. 30.  The applicant, a Muslim of Turkish origin, claimed to have frequently been insulted on the basis of his ethnic origin and religious beliefs by the Varna prison authorities and in particular by J.V., one of the prison officers. In particular, the applicant claimed that the authorities had addressed him as “dirty Turk”, “gypsy” and other ethnically-based insults. He submitted declarations made by other prisoners in support of his statements concerning the discriminatory comments. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the district prosecutor of abuse of office by J.V. in relation to a search of the inmates’ cells. He also stated that J.V. had made discriminatory comments against him. By a final order of 23 February 2005 a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against J.V. for abuse of office. As regards the alleged discriminatory insults, the prosecutor stated that they were not subject to public prosecution and that therefore the applicant should have brought a private criminal complaint before the courts. 32.  Between 2006 and 2008 the applicant complained successfully under the Protection Against Discrimination Act on three occasions, alleging other type of discriminatory treatment in prison. In particular the courts found that he had been discriminated against by not having been given meals free from pork as required by his religious convictions; by having been made to put stamps on his letters to State institutions, when that had not been required from prisoners not serving life sentences; and, by having been shaved and had his hair trimmed in his cell, while prisoners with lighter sentences had access to the barber’s premises in the prison. The courts ordered the relevant authorities to discontinue the above discriminatory practices and, in the context of his claim about a failure to respect his religious convictions, to provide to him pork-free food.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Portorož. 5.  On 4 March 1996 the applicant was taken into custody. 6.  On 3 July 1996 after the investigation had been terminated, an indictment was lodged against the applicant before the Nova Gorica District Court. He was charged with fraud, larceny, forgery and abuse of trust. 7.  On 8 October 1996 the first hearing was held. Between 8 October 1996 and 20 January 1997 the court held twenty-eight hearings. In 1997 the court held fifty hearings, in 1998 forty-one hearings and in 1999 twenty hearings. 8.  On 30 September 1999 the Public Prosecutor modified the indictment. 9.  Between December 1999 and March 2001 the court held eleven hearings. 10.  On 13 March 2001 the Public Prosecutor modified the indictment for the second time. 11.  On 22 October 2001 the case was assigned to a new judge P.G. Under the new judge, the court held twenty hearings. Following several motions for recusal of the judge and an action for damages lodged against him by the applicant, the first judge resigned from the case. 12.  On 8 January 2003 the first-instance court decided to try one count of fraud in a separate set of proceedings (K 3/2003). 13.  On 3 March 2004 the case was assigned to a new judge, G.K. Following a civil action for damages lodged against the judge P.G., he requested to be removed from the case (see paragraph 11 above). In the course of the proceedings the applicant lodged several criminal complaints and actions for damages against the judges, the president of the court and the president of the Koper Higher Court as well as requests for change of venue. 14.  On 27 October 2004 the first hearing under the newly appointed judge was held. 15.  On 8 November 2004 the court held a hearing and the applicant lodged a request for recusal of the judge. He also lodged a criminal complaint against him, an action for damages and a constitutional appeal. 16.  During the hearing, held on 11 November 2004, the applicant again lodged a request for recusal of the judge and the president of the court. 17.  Until the end of 2004 the court held nine more hearings. The applicant, by way of protest, refused to participate at six hearings out of nine. 18.  On 10 January 2005 the Nova Gorica District Court after holding over 200 hearings, examining multiple witnesses and appointing one expert, delivered a judgment. The applicant was found guilty of criminal offences concerning fraud and abuse of trust. He was sentenced to six years of imprisonment. Both parties appealed. 19.  On 25 October 2006 the Koper Higher Court delivered a judgment. In its decision the appeal court modified in part the first-instance judgment and found the applicant guilty of an additional criminal offence. The sentence was increased to six years and six months of imprisonment. 20.  On 22 January 2007 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court an appeal against the second-instance judgment and a request for protection of legality. 21.  On 5 April 2007 the applicant lodged a request for recusal of the Supreme Court judges. 22.  On 26 April 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the request for protection of legality. The requests for recusal were also rejected. 23.  On 26 June 2007 the Supreme Court decided on the appeal against the second-instance judgment. The appeal was upheld and the second-instance judgment amended. The applicant was sentenced to five years and six months of imprisonment. 24.  On 11 October 2007 the applicant’s representative lodged a request on protection of legality challenging the decision upon appeal (see paragraph 23). 25.  On 7 July 2008 the Supreme Court rejected the request on protection of legality. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 26.  On 5 November 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal. 27.  On 30 October 2006, following the decision on separation of proceedings (see paragraph 12 above) the Nova Gorica District Court delivered a judgment. The applicant appealed. 28.  On 16 January 2008 the Koper Higher Court rejected the appeal. He lodged an appeal on points of law. 29.  On 16 December 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. He lodged a constitutional appeal. 30.  On 10 October 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant, Mr Mohamed Nuri Al Akidi, was born in 1961. 10.  The applicant was arrested on 10 September 1993 on charges that he had used forged documents in order to obtain unlawfully an excise tax refund. The amount at stake, in respect of which the applicant was eventually convicted, was 15,294,000 Bulgarian levs (the equivalent of 558,236 US dollars at the relevant time). The applicant had acted in concert with three other persons all of whom later submitted applications under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, 26 July 2001, and the cases of Hristov v. Bulgaria, no. 35346/97, and Mihov v. Bulgaria, no. 35519/97). 11.  The charges preferred against the applicant were based on Article 212 § 4 of the Penal Code, which provided for a sentence of ten to twenty years' imprisonment. The accusations concerned alleged false certification of fictitious exports of consignments of cigarettes which in reality had been sold in the country. 12.  On 5 April 1994 the preliminary investigation was completed and an indictment was submitted to the Plovdiv Regional Court. The prosecution relied on 33 witnesses and voluminous documentary material. 13.  The Plovdiv Regional Court sat as a chamber of three judges: a president who was a professional judge and two lay judges. 14.  The first hearing took place on 12 and 13 May 1994 when the Regional Court heard the four co-accused and several witnesses. Some of the witnesses did not appear. The prosecutor and the defence lawyers requested leave to submit further evidence. The court adjourned the hearing. On 16 May 1994 the court, sitting in private, appointed a graphology expert. 15.  Several times during the proceedings the Regional Court had to wait for the case file to be returned by the Supreme Court in Sofia, where it had been sent for the examination of the appeals submitted by the applicant and his co-accused against the Regional Court's refusals to release them on bail. In practice, whenever such an appeal was submitted, the Plovdiv Regional Court transmitted the case file together with the appeal and a prosecutor's opinion. 16.  The case file was sent to the Supreme Court on 28 May 1994 for one of the co-accused's appeal against detention to be examined and was returned on 30 June 1994. 17.  The Regional Court did not deal with the case until 13 September 1994, when the presiding judge ordered the production of a piece of evidence. 18.  The trial resumed on 6 October 1994. The court heard several witnesses and adjourned the hearing as the prosecutor insisted on the examination of other witnesses who had not appeared and in order to enable the accused persons to submit further evidence. Some of the witnesses who had not appeared were ordered to pay fines. 19.  The next trial hearing took place on 29 and 30 November 1994. The financial expert appointed by the court stated that he had been denied access to certain documents and therefore had not finalised his report. The court ordered a bank and the customs office to provide access to the documents in question. Two additional financial experts were also appointed. Both the prosecution and the defence sought to adduce additional evidence. The hearing was adjourned. 20.  Between 20 January and 21 February 1995 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court for the examination of appeals against detention. 21.  The hearing listed for 19 April 1995 was adjourned as the presiding judge was ill. 22.  The next hearing, scheduled for 9 June 1995, was adjourned as one of the lay judges had been taken ill. 23.  On 12 July 1995 the court sitting in private ordered an expert report. 24.  The hearing listed for 21 September 1995 was adjourned owing to the illness of the applicant's lawyer. The court also observed that several witnesses had not been summoned properly and that others, albeit summoned, had not appeared. 25.  Between 3 October and 6 November 1995 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court, which was examining appeals against detention. 26.  The next hearing, listed for 12 January 1996, had to be adjourned as both lay judges were ill. 27.  After learning that the lay judges were prevented by illness from further participation in the proceedings, on 19 February 1996 the Plovdiv Regional Court recommenced the examination of the case with two new lay judges. On that date the court appointed two additional experts. 28.  The new chamber of the court held a hearing on 26 and 27 March 1996. It heard several witnesses and experts. The hearing was adjourned as some of the witnesses had not been summoned due to an omission on the part of the court's clerk and because the parties sought to adduce further evidence. The court fixed the date for the next hearing to 7 and 8 May 1996. 29.  On 7 and 8 May 1996 the court heard several witnesses and an expert. The hearing was adjourned as further evidence had to be obtained. 30.  Between 9 and 28 May 1996 the case file was at the Supreme Court in Sofia in connection with appeals against detention. 31.  The hearing scheduled for 16 and 17 September 1996 was adjourned to 29 and 30 October 1996 as a lay judge had broken his leg and was unable to attend. 32.  The hearing of 30 October 1996 was further adjourned, because the medical experts considered that one of the co-accused was not in a condition to participate in the hearing as he was on a hunger strike. 33.  Between 19 November and 4 December 1996 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court in connection with appeals against detention. In its cover letter to the Supreme Court, the Regional Court drew attention to the fact that a hearing had been listed for 19 December 1996 and called for the return of the case file before that date. 34.  The hearing resumed on 19 December 1996. One witness and the experts were heard. As other witnesses had not appeared, the court accepted the requests of the defence lawyers and the prosecutor for a further adjournment. 35.  The Regional Court throughout the proceedings sought police assistance to establish the addresses of witnesses and bring them before the court. One of the witnesses was suspected of seeking to evade service of the summonses. 36.  The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took place on 28‑31 January 1997. The court heard witnesses and the submissions of the parties to the criminal case and examined other evidence. 37.  On 31 January 1997 the applicant was found guilty of having forged tax documents with a view to obtaining an unlawful gain. He was sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment. His accomplices were also convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between ten and thirteen years. 38.  The court reserved the reasoning of its judgment. It was prepared on an unspecified date at least three months following the delivery of the judgment. 39.  On 7 February 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation against his conviction and sentence. 40.  The case was listed for a hearing on 26 September 1997. On that date the prosecutor appointed to act before the Supreme Court of Cassation declared that he had known one of the convicted persons and that he wished to withdraw. The examination of the case could not proceed and the hearing was adjourned. 41.  The hearing was held on 23 January 1998. 42.  By judgment of 16 March 1998 the court upheld the applicant's conviction and sentence. 43.  On 27 March 1998 date the applicant submitted a petition for review (cassation). 44.  On 10 June 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing in the review (cassation) proceedings. As one of the co-accused joined the proceedings at that moment, the court adjourned the hearing to enable him to make the necessary submissions, which he did on 22 June 1998. 45.  The hearing resumed on 9 December 1998. 46.  On 22 March 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the petitions for review of the applicant and the other accused persons. 47.  At all stages of the proceedings the applicant was legally represented. 48.  On 10 September 1993 the applicant was arrested and detained pending trial. 49.  On 22 September 1993 the applicant's lawyer filed an application for his client's release with the Regional Public Prosecutor. The application was dismissed on 1 October 1993 on the grounds that the charges concerned a crime punishable by more than ten years imprisonment and that there were no circumstances excluding the necessity of the detention. In particular, the applicant was a foreign citizen and, therefore, there was a danger of his absconding. 50.  On 26 October 1993 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court stating that he was a political emigrant and could not return to Iraq and that his passport had been confiscated by the Bulgarian authorities. Furthermore, he had been living in Bulgaria for more than 12 years and his Bulgarian wife was expecting a child. 51.  On 3 November 1993 the Regional Court sitting in private dismissed the appeal holding that the applicant had been charged with a serious wilful offence and that there was a danger of his absconding, committing further offences or obstructing the course of justice. 52.  In March 1994 five persons who had been heard as witnesses in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his accomplices were charged with perjury. Separate proceedings were brought against them. 53.  At the hearing on 6 October 1994 the applicant requested his release on bail stating that he had been detained for more than one year and that he had a family and a permanent address. On the same day the Regional Court dismissed the applications for release filed by all co-accused stating that the charges carried a penalty of ten or more years imprisonment and that there were “no grounds to consider it established that the defendants would not abscond or commit a crime”. The family situation and health condition of the accused persons did not require their release. 54.  On 30 November 1994 the Regional Court refused the applicant's renewed application for release, stating that there were no new circumstances. 55.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He stated that the authorities had not provided any evidence as to the existence of a danger of his absconding, re-offending or obstructing the course of justice and that the charges against him had been weak. He also submitted that all relevant evidence had already been collected. 56.  On 4 December 1994 the Plovdiv Regional Court, before transmitting the appeal to the Supreme Court, sitting in private, examined the matter again and refused to reverse its decision of 30 November 1994. The court held, inter alia, that according to the domestic law and the Supreme Court's practice detention pending trial was prima facie necessary when a person had been accused of having committed a serious wilful offence. To substitute this judicial measure by a more lenient one would only be possible if there had been “not even a hypothetical danger that the accused might abscond or commit further offences”, in particular, “if he is ill or elderly”. 57.  On 21 February 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the applicant's detention. 58.  The Supreme Court explained its practice in matters of pre-trial detention stating that under Article 152 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remand in custody was mandatory for everyone accused of a crime punishable by ten or more years' imprisonment, the only exception being where it was clear beyond doubt that there was no danger of the accused absconding or re-offending. In the Supreme Court's view such would only be the case where, for example, the accused was seriously ill, elderly or in any other condition which excluded the danger of his or her absconding or re-offending. Since the applicant was charged with a crime punishable by more than ten years' imprisonment and as no special circumstances excluding the danger of his absconding or re-offending had been established, there were no grounds for ordering his release on bail. The Supreme Court referred to its practice on the matter. 59.  The Supreme Court further refused to consider the applicant's contention that the evidence against him was weak. It found that it had no jurisdiction to do so in connection with a bail application. Its only task was to examine whether the conditions for pre-trial detention under Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been met. 60.  At the hearing on 21 September 1995 before the Plovdiv Regional Court the applicant again appealed against his detention on the grounds that he had not committed an offence, that he had a permanent address and had been fully co-operating with the authorities during the preliminary investigation. 61.  The prosecutor objected, stating, inter alia, that under the relevant law, and regard being had to the increase in the crime rate in the country, the court was not entitled to release the applicant or the other co-accused. 62.  On 21 September 1995 the Regional Court dismissed the application for bail, holding that there were no new circumstances and that the domestic law required pre-trial detention to be imposed in all cases when a person had been accused of having wilfully committed a serious offence. 63.  Another application for release was dismissed on 19 February 1996 at the trial hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court on the ground that the applicant was charged with a serious wilful crime which automatically required the imposition of pre-trial detention in accordance with Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 64.  At the hearing on 27 March 1996 the applicant renewed his application for release on bail arguing, inter alia, that since all evidence in his case had already been gathered, there was no danger of his absconding or obstructing the course of justice. He also invoked the Convention. The Regional Court dismissed the application on the same day, holding that there were no new facts which required his release and that the length of pre-trial detention was not limited by statute 65.  On 28 January 1997, at the trial hearing, the applicant applied for release on bail. 66.  On 31 January 1997 the applicant was found guilty and was sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Makó. 5.  On 8 October 1993 the applicant’s ex-wife brought an action in trespass against him in the Budapest XVIII/XIX District Court, in the context of a dispute concerning the use of the divorced couple’s flat. 6.  On 21 December 1993 and 5 April 1994 this court held hearings. 7.  On 28 February 1996 the court instructed the plaintiff to submit better particulars of her claims. 8.  On 19 March 1997 the case was transferred to the Makó District Court for reasons of competence. On 9 and 23 September 1997 the court held hearings. After a short stay of the proceedings, a further hearing was held on 16 December 1997, which the plaintiff did not attend. After another stay, hearings took place on 5 May and 25 June 1998. On 7 July 1998 the plaintiff submitted additional particulars of her claims. 9.  The court held hearings on 29 September, 22 October 1998, 15 July, 16 and 23 September 1999. On that day the court gave judgment, partly finding for the plaintiff. It ordered the applicant to pay compensation to the plaintiff in the amount of 67,592 Hungarian forints (HUF) plus accrued interest. The court held that the subject matter of the case was the settlement of scores concerning the division of the matrimonial property. 10.  On appeal, on 26 January 2000 the Csongrád County Regional Court upheld this decision. 11.  On 31 May 2000 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s petition for review, without examining it on the merits, since the disputed amount fell below the statutory threshold of HUF 500,000, under which no review lay against second-instance decisions.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Chernigiv. Since childhood the applicant has suffered from the second-highest officially recognised degree of disability. In particular, the applicant’s walking ability is impaired – he can only walk with the aid of crutches. Since August 1977 the applicant has worked as a senior researcher at the Chernigiv Institute of Agricultural Microbiology. 6.  The applicant was married to O.M., with whom he had a daughter – A.M. – who was born on 5 May 2002. They lived together as a family in the applicant’s flat in Chernigiv. Y.L. – another daughter of O.M.’s – who was born on 30 April 1994, and M.M., the applicant’s mother, also lived in the same flat. 7.  In October 2005 O.M. moved to live at her mother’s flat in Chernigiv, as O.M. was suffering from cancer and required external assistance, taking with her A.M., who was then three years old. 8.  On 3 April 2006 a lawyer acting on behalf of O.M. lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court in Chernigiv against the applicant, seeking maintenance payments. In particular, in the claim it was stated that O.M. and the applicant “had not lived as a married couple” since August 2005, that the applicant “had left the family”, that he was not participating in the upbringing of A.M. and was not contributing to it financially. 9.  The applicant submitted his observations on the claim, in which he stated that it had been O.M. who “had left the family” to live at her mother’s flat and that O.M. had taken A.M. with her. The applicant asserted that he was contributing money towards his daughter’s upbringing and that whenever his daughter had been unwell she had stayed at his home in order to protect O.M. against possible infection, most recently from 31 March to 5 April 2006. The applicant further contended that O.M. was in a poor state of health and taking opioids constantly, and that the claim had been instigated by her relatives, in particular by V.K., O.M.’s mother. The applicant asked the court to order A.M. to return to live at his flat as long as O.M. remained in a poor medical condition. 10.  On 16 May 2006 the Desnyanskyy District Court allowed O.M.’s claim, finding that she and A.M. were living separately from the applicant and that he was not contributing money towards the child’s upbringing. The applicant did not appeal against that judgment, stating that he had only learnt of it after some delay. 11.  On 16 June 2006 O.M. died. V.K. took A.M. away from Chernigiv without informing the applicant of the latter’s whereabouts. 12.  The applicant stated that he had lodged a number of complaints and requests with the police, prosecutors, local child-care authorities and non-governmental organisations seeking assistance in his daughter’s return. In particular, he submitted a copy of his complaint of 19 September 2006 addressed to the police and to the Municipal Centre of Social Services for Family, Children and Youth (Міський центр соціальних служб для сім’ї, дітей та молоді, “the Municipal Family Welfare Centre”) in Chernigiv. 13.  In a letter dated 16 October 2006, the Municipal Family Welfare Centre informed the applicant that his request of 19 September 2006 for his daughter’s return had been examined. The applicant was also informed by V.K.’s neighbours that she had left Chernigiv for Andriyivka, a village in the Chernigiv oblast (about 25 km away from Chernigiv), and had taken A.M. with her. The local authorities in Andriyivka were thus asked to assist the applicant in his request for the return of his daughter. The Chernigiv Municipal Family Welfare Centre also informed the applicant that he should raise the issue of establishing his daughter’s place of residence before the courts. 14.  In October 2006 the police informed the applicant that there were no grounds for opening a criminal case on the basis of his complaint and that he should pursue it directly before the courts in the framework of a private action. 15.  On 11 December 2006 V.K. lodged a request with the Desnyanskyy District Council in Chernigiv asking that she be appointed as A.M.’s tutor, stating that A.M. had been living with her since O.M.’s death, that the applicant suffered from the second-highest officially recognised degree of disability, and that she was not receiving any help from him. 16.  The applicant was not informed about V.K.’s request. 17.  On 22 December 2006, in response to V.K.’s request, the Desnyanskyy District Council adopted a decision appointing her as tutor of A.M. on the grounds that “the child’s mother had died [and] her father, who suffered from the second [highest officially recognised] degree of disability, could not take care of [the child’s] upbringing because of his state of health” (“the tutelage decision”). The decision noted that A.M. was living with V.K. at the latter’s place of residence. 18.  By a letter dated 24 February 2007, the Desnyanskyy District Council informed the applicant about the tutelage decision. 19.  On 31 December 2006 A.M. broke her hip after falling from a cupboard in V.K.’s flat. According to the applicant, this had happened because V.K. had left his daughter without supervision for a long period of time. 20.  In February 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking his daughter’s return. On 8 May 2007 the claim was left undecided as the applicant had failed to appear before the court. According to the applicant, it was his lawyer who had failed to attend the court hearing. 21.  In September 2007 the applicant lodged a new claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking his daughter’s immediate return pursuant to Article 162 of the Family Code. The applicant argued that after his wife’s death, V.K. had retained his daughter unlawfully and without his consent. He also stated that V.K. had hindered his contact with A.M. The applicant invoked Articles 151, 153, 154 and 163 of the Family Code and Article 23 of the Civil Code. 22.   V.K. disputed the applicant’s claim, arguing that she was A.M.’s tutor and that her granddaughter was therefore living lawfully at her home. V.K. stated that in October 2005 O.M. and A.M. had come to live in her flat as O.M. had required assistance for health reasons. After the latter’s death, A.M. had remained with V.K. 23.  V.K. also lodged a counterclaim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of allegedly false information the applicant had submitted to the courts. In her counterclaim, V.K. stated that after the death of O.M. the applicant had, “periodically”, made phone calls asking her to return A.M. to him. V.K. alleged that he had verbally abused her, but provided no further details. 24.  The representatives of the tutelage service (орган опіки та піклування) within the Desnyanskyy District Council submitted that the tutelage decision had been taken because the applicant – due to his disability – had not been able to take care of the child’s upbringing, that the living conditions at the child’s place of residence had been inspected and that the interests of the child had been taken into account. 25.  During a court hearing on 19 December 2007 the applicant stated that he wished his claim to be amended to include a request for cancellation of the tutelage decision. The judge invited the applicant to submit an amended claim in writing. 26.  At a hearing on 8 February 2008 the applicant submitted to the court his amended claim challenging the lawfulness of the tutelage decision and asking the court to order the Desnyanskyy District Council to adopt immediate measures to bring about his daughter’s return. The applicant argued that the contested decision had been taken without his consent and that he had not been informed that the matter had been considered. Referring to the incident on 31 December 2006 as a result of which A.M. had been injured (see paragraph 19 above), the applicant argued that his daughter’s life and health were at risk while she was staying with V.K. The applicant relied inter alia on Articles 152, 153, 157, 160 and 163 of the Family Code, Articles 58, 79, 1167 and 1168 of the Civil Code, and Articles 3 and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of Children of 1989. 27.  The judge sitting in the case refused to include the amended claim in the case file on the grounds that the “amended” claim was in fact a new claim. The judge noted that its inclusion in the case would require the participation of new parties and would complicate consideration of the original claim. 28.  At the hearing on 8 February 2008 the court delivered a judgment rejecting the applicant’s original claim. The court found that the applicant had been informed of the tutelage decision before he had lodged his claim with the court and as he had not challenged that decision, A.M. was staying with V.K. lawfully. 29.  By the same judgment, the court also rejected V.K.’s counterclaim as unsubstantiated. 30.  The applicant appealed, stating that the first-instance court’s refusal to consider his amended claim was groundless and that the judgment was not in accordance with the relevant law. The applicant also stated that the court had not allowed him to question the witnesses who had appeared before the court, but provided no details in that regard. 31.  On 10 April 2008 the Chernigiv Oblast Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. It noted that A.M. had been living “permanently” at V.K.’s place of residence since October 2005 and that, by the judgment of 16 May 2006, the Desnyanskyy District Court had ordered the applicant to pay maintenance to O.M. in respect of A.M.’s upbringing (see paragraph 10 above). The Court of Appeal held that there were no grounds for returning A.M. to the applicant pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the Family Code, given that the tutelage decision was in force, that A.M. was staying lawfully with V.K., and that the latter was opposed to the child’s returning to living with the applicant because she believed that it would be contrary to the child’s interests. 32.  Relying on Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had not produced evidence showing that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to live with the applicant or that it was contrary to her interests to live with her tutor. 33.  The Court of Appeal refused to deal with the arguments brought by the applicant on the basis of his amended claim, since it had not been examined by the court of first instance. In that context the Court of Appeal held that the first-instance court’s decision not to include the amended claim was in compliance with Article 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 34.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He argued that, in dealing with his case, the courts had not acted in accordance with the proper procedure. In particular, the applicant alleged that the courts had unlawfully refused to consider his amended claim, that they had refused to summon witnesses on his behalf without stating the reasons why, that they had not considered the applicant’s request for the inclusion of important documentary evidence, and that they had systematically restricted his procedural rights, in particular the right to study the case file and to put questions to those taking part in the proceedings. 35.  The applicant also argued that the courts’ decisions had not been in accordance with the law. 36.  In his cassation appeal the applicant further alleged that V.K. had systematically hindered his access to the child. 37.  By a decision of 9 September 2008, the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal as unsubstantiated, finding that the arguments contained in it did not constitute a basis for concluding that the judgments of the lower courts were wrong or unlawful. No further reasons were given by the Supreme Court. 38.  According to the applicant, some of the court hearings had been held in the absence of his representative, who was unable to attend for health reasons. He provided no further details in that regard. 39.  On 1 April 2008 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking cancellation of the tutelage decision. The claim was based on the same arguments as those supporting the original and amended claims lodged by the applicant in the course of the first set of proceedings (see paragraphs 21 and 26 above). 40.  On 18 August 2008 the Desnyanskyy District Court, relying on paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, Articles 243-244 of the Family Code and Section 2.2 of the Regulations on Tutelage and Guardianship of 1999, found against the applicant. 41.  The court noted that (i) the applicant had not produced any evidence showing that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to live with the applicant or that it would be contrary to her interests to live with her tutor; (ii) the tutelage service within the Desnyanskyy District Council had not had any concerns about the fulfilment by V.K. of her duties as a tutor; (iii) A.M. had lived at her grandmother’s home for three years before the decision in the case had been taken; (iv) during that period the applicant had not enquired about his child’s situation, had not used any means to communicate with her, and had not visited the child either at her place of residence or at the nursery which she had been attending; and (v) the applicant had participated in his daughter’s upbringing only by making maintenance payments. The court held that the contested decision had been adopted in accordance with the law and that A.M.’s interests had been duly taken into account. 42.  The applicant appealed, stating that the first-instance court had not taken into consideration his submissions that (i) V.K. had unlawfully retained his daughter before the tutelage decision had been adopted; (ii) V.K. had been hindering his communication with the child; (iii) there were witnesses alleging that V.K. had been abusing alcohol and “misbehaving”; (iv) V.K. had been responsible for the incident on 31 December 2006 (see paragraph 19 above); and (v) in addition to paying maintenance, the applicant had been sending money and parcels to A.M. by post, as he had not had the opportunity to deliver them in person. Moreover, V.K. had allegedly refused to let him into her house when he had come to see his daughter and had not answered his phone calls. 43.  The applicant also alleged that the first-instance court had refused to question witnesses on his behalf and that he had not been allowed to put questions to the witnesses who had been questioned by the court. The applicant did not provide further details in respect of those allegations. 44.  On 4 November 2008 the Chernigiv Oblast Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, finding that (i) A.M. had been living with V.K. at her home since October 2005; (ii) A.M. had been under the medical supervision of the clinic in that location since birth; (iii) after O.M.’s death the applicant had not taken charge of the child’s upbringing; (iv) the applicant had not challenged the lawfulness of his daughter’s living with the grandmother prior to the adoption of the tutelage decision; (v) the applicant suffered from the second-highest degree of disability; and (vi) due to his “impaired moving capacity” the applicant had been sleeping in his office overnight on workdays (from Monday to Friday), returning home only for weekends. Relying on those grounds, the Court of Appeal held that the tutelage decision safeguarded the interests of the child, was in accordance with the law, and did not violate the applicant’s rights to educate and support his child. 45.  The Court of Appeal also held that the applicant’s allegations that the retention of his daughter by V.K. had been unlawful, that his communication with A.M. had been hindered and that V.K. had failed to fulfil her duties as a tutor were not supported by evidence and had been disproved by the information submitted by the Desnyanskyy District Council. 46.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He argued that, in violation of the proper procedure, the first-instance and appeal courts (i) had refused the applicant’s requests to have certain audio recordings examined in court and to check the reliability of the documents provided by the Desnyanskyy District Council; (ii) had not included the documentary evidence on which the applicant had relied; (iii) had not allowed the applicant to put questions to witnesses – in particular Y.L. – or to express his views regarding the way the hearings had been held; and (iv) had not observed the relevant regulations when accepting medical information (which he did not further specify). The applicant also stated that the courts had not taken into account his arguments that he had been unable to take care of A.M. because V.K. had hindered his communication with the child. In particular, she had allegedly “hidden” A.M. from the applicant, had not opened the door of her house when the applicant had tried to visit, and had otherwise blocked any opportunity for the applicant to see A.M. The applicant also argued that the courts had not applied the law pertinent to the case. 47.  On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal, finding that it contained no arguments requiring examination of the case material or demonstrating that the lower courts had violated procedural or substantive law. 48.  According to the applicant, V.K. had continued to hinder his communication with A.M. and he had not been able to participate in his daughter’s upbringing. In particular, on occasions when the applicant had come to visit his daughter, V.K. had not opened the door of her house. She had also refused to allow the applicant to take A.M. for medical examination. 49.  The applicant alleged that, despite his repeated requests for assistance in obtaining access to his daughter to enforce his parental rights, the authorities had been reluctant to help him. The applicant submitted copies of letters from the Desnyanskyy District Council and the Andriyivka Council stating inter alia that the living conditions of A.M. were satisfactory and that she was doing well at school. However, the applicant had not contacted the school administration to learn about the child’s everyday life and progress. In a letter dated 6 July 2009, the Desnyanskyy District Council stated that it would no longer deal with further similar requests from the applicant. 50.  The applicant also argued that he could provide adequate living conditions for his daughter, being a physiologist with a teaching qualification; he had sufficient income and owned a flat. The applicant also stated that he had been a tutor to Y. L. 51.  According to the applicant, his daughter’s living conditions at V.K.’s place of residence were worse than the conditions at his home, V.K.’s house in Andriyivka having no sanitary facilities or no natural gas supply. The applicant explained that the school which his daughter attended was about to be closed on the grounds of having too few pupils. The school was two kilometres away from V.K.’s house, whereas the applicant’s house was only about two hundred metres from a school.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and fifth applicants were born in 1960. The second applicant was born in 1959. The third applicant was born in 1969. The fourth applicant was born in 1945. The sixth applicant was born in 1965. The applicants are nationals of Ukraine and reside in Beryslav, the Kherson Region. 6.  In April 1998 the applicants initiated proceedings in the Beryslav City Court (the “Beryslav Court”) against the Department of Education of the Beryslav Municipal Council (the “Department”), seeking to recover an additional salary payment allegedly due to them for their time-in-service. 7.  On 13 May 1998 the Beryslav Court allowed the applicants' claims and ordered the Department to pay the applicants the additional salary (time-in-service bonuses). In particular, it ordered that the first applicant be paid UAH 570.85[1] in compensation, the second – UAH 367.52[2], the third – UAH 204.3[3], the fourth – UAH 863.4[4], the fifth – UAH 561.4[5], and the sixth applicant – UAH 292.3[6]. 8.  On 18 May 1998 the Beryslav City Bailiffs' service (the “Bailiffs”) initiated enforcement proceedings for the judgment of 13 May 1998. 9.  On 2 August 1999 the Beryslav Court suspended the execution of the judgment for three months due to the lack of funds in the budget of the Department. 10.  On 7 March 2001 the Bailiffs informed the applicants that the Beryslav Court had suspended the execution of the judgment of 13 May 1998. On 13 August 2002 the Bailiffs informed the applicants that the judgment of 13 May 1998 would be executed when the State had provided the necessary budgetary funding. The judgment remained unenforced due to the Department's lack of funds. 11.  On 31 July 2003 the amounts due to them pursuant to the judgment of 13 May 1998 were transferred to the applicants. They received the following amounts (the initial sums awarded by that judgment having been subjected to taxation): the first applicant – UAH 401.2[7], the second applicant – UAH 276.35[8], the third applicant – UAH 173.18[9], the fourth applicant – UAH 640.46[10], the fifth applicant – UAH 419.94[11], and the sixth applicant – UAH 242.98[12].", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant, Tønsbergs Blad A/S, is the publisher of the newspaper Tønsbergs Blad. The second applicant, Mrs Marit Haukom, is its former editor-in-chief. She is a Norwegian national who was born in 1952 and lives in the city of Tønsberg in southern Norway. 7.  Tønsbergs Blad is a regional newspaper covering primarily the city of Tønsberg and eight surrounding municipalities in the County of Vestfold. The newspaper is 100% owned by Orkla Media A/S. It is published six days a week. In 2002 it had a daily average circulation of 33,314, corresponding to a 60% household coverage within its primary circulation area. 8.  In a meeting held on 21 September 1999 the Standing Committee on Development and Environmental Affairs (a politically appointed body attached to the Municipal Council) of the Tjøme Municipality asked the municipal administration to provide a survey of properties whose owners were suspected of breaching permanent residence requirements. Under section 5(3) of the Concession Act (Lov om konsesjon ved erverv av fast eiendom) of 31 May 1974 (no. 19), such requirements applied to the extent that it was deemed necessary to prevent private properties intended for permanent residential use from being transformed into holiday homes. Provisions to this effect were further contained in Regulation (forskrift) no. 2089 of 14 December 1984, issued under the above-mentioned Act in respect of the Tjøme Municipality, one of the few municipalities in Norway which applied permanent residence requirements for all-year residences. The purpose was to fend off pressures exerted on the local community by the exceptionally high demand for holiday homes in the Tjøme area, an attractive holiday destination for a large number of people residing notably in the Oslo region. There was also a concern that too many residences were unoccupied during off-season periods. 9.  On 11 October 1999 the municipal administration drew up a list which was entitled “Properties which should be verified in relation to the residence requirements. (Not public)”. It was a tip-off list based on information from inhabitants and local politicians in the Municipality and was presented to the Standing Committee at a meeting open to the public held the following day. The list included the name of Mr Tom Vidar Rygh, who at the time was the Executive Vice-President, the Head of Financial Investments and a member of the Executive Board of Orkla ASA, one of Norway's largest industrial companies. 10.  The property in question had been acquired in 1987 and Mr Rygh's wife held title to it (a fact that was not deemed significant in the defamation proceedings summarised below). An all-year residence had been erected on the property in 1988 and the Rygh family had used it as their main residence for 10 years until 1998, when they had moved to Oslo because of Mr Rygh's professional situation. Before that, they had been given legal advice that using the property solely for holiday purposes would not conflict with the residence requirements under the relevant national law. 11.  Mr Terje Wilhelmsen, a journalist, became aware of the process initiated by the Tjøme Municipality and received a copy of the above-mentioned list. He had a close network of contacts within the Municipality. From autumn 1999 he made a number of enquiries to the Municipality on the subject. On 7 June 2000 the journalist interviewed the director of the Municipality's Planning and Building Department (leder for plan- og bygningssaker), Mr Dag Dreyer Sæter. 12.  On 8 June 2000 the newspaper published as its main story an article written by Mr Wilhelmsen, which gave rise to the defamation proceedings brought against the applicants by Mr Rygh. On the front page there appeared an introduction to the article under the headline (all quotations below are translations from Norwegian):\n“May be forced to sell”\nand the sub-heading\n“[H.K.] and Tom Vidar Rygh will have to explain themselves on permanent residence requirements”\nThe introduction read:\n“Permanent residence requirements: In the worst-case scenario [H.K.] may be forced to sell her property at Hvasser [an island next to Tjøme]. The same applies to Orkla director Tom Vidar Rygh. According to the understanding of Tønsbergs Blad, their properties are on a list which the Tjøme Municipality will submit to the County Governor [Fylkesmannen] in the very near future. The list includes properties whose use is thought not to be in conformity with the permanent residence requirements.\nTaking action: The Tjøme Municipality will now take a firm line towards house owners within the Municipality who do not comply with the permanent residence requirements. For a long time there has been a zero limit on concessions at Tjøme. This means that all-year residences must be inhabited all year. Those who breach this requirement may be forced to rent out or to sell their property. This is confirmed by the director of the Planning and Building Department, Mr Dag Dreyer Sæter.”\nThe front page also contained photographs of Mrs H.K. (a famous singer) and of Mr Rygh. 13.  The article continued inside the paper on page 3 with the following headlines:\n“Tjøme hunts for permanent residence sinners\n[H.K.] and Tom Vidar Rygh may be forced to sell”\nand an introduction:\n“TJØME: Both singer [H.K.] and Orkla director Tom Vidar Rygh may be forced to sell their properties in Tjøme. The reason is that, according to the Tjøme Municipality, they do not comply with the permanent residence requirements applicable to their properties.” 14.  At the top of page 3 the paper published photographs of Mrs Rygh's and Mrs H.K.'s respective properties. Under the former photograph, to the left, there was a caption:\n“RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS: Tom Vidar Rygh owns this property in Sandøsund at Hvasser. The Tjøme Municipality considers that the residence requirements are not satisfied.”\nBetween the two above-mentioned photographs there was a small photo of Mr Rygh with this caption:\n“MUST PROVIDE AN EXPLANATION: - It must be due to a misunderstanding, says Tom Vidar Rygh” 15.  The article stated:\n“The Tjøme Municipality is now in the process of tightening up the obligation to comply with the residence requirement in the municipality. A zero concession limit has long since been introduced. This means that year-round properties must be lived in all year.\nConfrontation\nIn the near future the technical services department of the Tjøme Municipality will approach the County Governor in order to report its suspicion that the residence requirement is not being fulfilled for a number of properties. It is then up to the County Governor to confront the owners of these properties.\nThe director of the Planning and Building Department, Mr Dag Dreyer Sæter, does not wish to comment to Tønsbergs Blad as to which properties are on the list they are sending to the County Governor. But from what Tønsbergs Blad has been given to understand, the property of Tom Vidar Rygh at Sandøsund on Hvasser island is on the list. The same applies to H.K.'s property, which is at Nes on Hvasser.\nClearing up\n'I cannot comment on individual properties at the present time. First we must write to the County Governor. This will occur in the near future.'\n'But will the Tjøme Municipality now tighten up the obligation to comply with the residence requirement?'\n'Yes, indeed. This is an issue that has been discussed at both the administrative and the political levels for some time. Now we want to do something about it. We know that the residence requirements are not being complied with for several properties in the municipality. This is why we are now taking this initiative vis-à-vis the County Governor. Now we want to get this cleared up.'\nCan be rented out\n'What are the owners of these properties risking?'\n'To begin with, they will have to explain themselves to the County Governor. I would emphasise that it is not a requirement that the owners themselves live in the properties. It is enough for them to be rented out on a year-round basis. If this is not done, there may be a question of enforced sale,' says the director of the Planning and Building Department Dag Dreyer Sæter to Tønsbergs Blad.\n'Misunderstanding' H.K. owns the property on Hvasser together with her husband ... He does not wish to comment on the matter to Tønsbergs Blad, in view of the fact that he has heard from neither the Municipality nor the County Governor.\nTom Vidar Rygh told Tønsbergs Blad that if his property on Hvasser was on the Municipality's list of properties where the residence requirements are not being fulfilled, this had to be due to a misunderstanding. Beyond that he did not wish to comment.” 16.  Below, on the same page, Tønsbergs Blad published another article based on interviews with local politicians:\n“Residence requirements are a two-edged sword\nTJØME: May-Sylvi Hansen, who is the leader of the Conservatives on Tjøme Municipal Council, thinks that the time is ripe for a new and thorough political debate on the question of residence requirements.\nAnne Vestad\n'The whole question of residence requirements is a two-edged sword', she says.\nThe Tjøme Conservatives have the maintenance of the residence requirements in their manifesto, but at the same time the party feels a need to have a broad political debate on the question. May-Sylvi Hansen, who in addition to being the leader of the Conservatives on Tjøme Municipal Council also sits on the Planning and Environment Committee, tells Tønsbergs Blad that at any rate she sees no reason for a tightening-up of the obligation to fulfil the residence requirements now.\n'The residence requirements issue is under discussion in the Tjøme Conservative Party, and the question is whether we should perhaps be a little more liberal in the time to come. But this is a two-edged sword. On the one hand we don't want to see year-round residences made into summer homes, but on the other hand we have had considerable migration to Tjøme in recent years – the population is growing fast,' says May-Sylvi Hansen.\nNot a problem any more\n'In the seventies and eighties the residence requirements were entirely necessary in this municipality. But in my opinion, after the big migration to the municipality began, empty houses in the winter are no longer a problem. We should therefore undertake a serious review of the whole issue of residence requirements and ask whether, when all's said and done, it's just an old bogeyman,' says Hansen.\nArne Fjellberg of 'The Tjøme List' independents, who chairs the Planning and Environment Committee, does not agree with May-Sylvi Hansen that the occupation provisions should be liberalised.\n'Must tighten up'\n'I fully support the director of the Planning and Building Department's view that it is necessary to tighten up the obligation that the residence requirements be fulfilled. With the mobility and flexibility that many now have in relation to their work, it shouldn't be a problem to live in Tjøme even if you work somewhere else. We want people to live in the houses of Tjøme, make no mistake about that,' says Fjellberg.\n'So you don't support May-Sylvi Hansen in her view that it is time for a general rethink of the residence requirements?'\n'The Tjøme List wants to retain the residence requirements, but I'm willing to be a part of a discussion of the residence requirement in general. It could surely be useful,' says Arne Fjellberg.” 17.  On 9 June 2000 Aftenposten, one of Norway's largest daily newspapers, published a brief item on the matter, stating, inter alia, that an Orkla director and a famous singer might be forced to sell their properties, without specifying their names. 18.  On 12 June 2000 Mr Rygh addressed a letter to the Tjøme Municipality. Its Chief Executive Officer (Rådmannen), Mr Gunnar A. Hansø, replied by a letter of 22 June 2000, which stated inter alia:\n“The Tjøme Municipality is working on a survey of the status of the permanent residence requirements which have been implemented at Tjøme under section 5(3) of the Concession Act. Part of the reason why this work has started now are the enquiries from a number of local residents. These are neighbours to properties which are used, or should be used, for permanent residence but which, according to these enquiries, are not being used for this purpose. The list of properties that must be 'checked out' has now become quite extensive. A number of the enquiries result from the lack of knowledge about the contents of the regulations and the circumstances pertaining to the relevant users. Consequently, these properties are being checked out, which is an ongoing process. ...\nYour wife's property has been reviewed in the same way, and I can confirm that the property, on legal grounds, has now been removed from the list.” 19.  On contacting the Tjøme Municipality on 29 June 2000, the journalist Mr Wilhelmsen was informed that the Chief Executive Officer had replied to Mr Rygh and that Mrs Rygh's property had been removed from the list. Mr Wilhelmsen received a copy of the above-mentioned letter of 22 June 2000. 20.  On 30 June 2000 Tønsbergs Blad published an article entitled\n“No restrictions on new cottages\nTjøme Chief Executive Officer points to major loopholes in the Concession Act”\nwith the following introduction:\n“Escape: Singer [H.K.] and Orkla director Tom Vidar Rygh escape the permanent residence requirements in the Tjøme Municipality. They were included on the Municipality's list of properties that were subject to residence requirements, but have now been taken off. The reason is that they have built on their land themselves. Thus, the residence requirements do not apply.\nMajor loopholes: Chief Executive Officer Gunnar Hansø (picture) at Tjøme asserts that the Concession Act is filled with holes the size of a barn door. He warns that the Municipality will take up the issue with the Ministry of Agriculture. By exploiting loopholes in the Concession Act, it is easy to get hold of an entirely new holiday home at Tjøme. All you need to do is to acquire a plot and build an all-year residence on it. Then no one can require permanent residence.” 21.  The article continued on page 5, with the following headlines and introduction:\n“Residence requirements do not apply to new houses\n[H.K.] and Tom Vidar Rygh do not have to move to Hvasser.”\n “TJØME: Singer [H.K.] and Orkla director Tom Vidar Rygh do not have to take up permanent residence in the Tjøme Municipality. The reason: they have built on their properties themselves. Thus the Concession Act does not apply. This means that they do not have to reside here.” 22.  In addition the coverage contained photographs of Mr Rygh and Mrs. H.K., with captions stating that they had “escaped” the residence requirements with regard to their properties. There were also photographs of the properties, with captions stating “No residence requirement” and adding that the properties, which had previously been on the Municipality's list of properties not complying with the residence requirements, had now been taken off the list. 23.  The article reproduced an interview with the Municipality's Chief Executive Officer, Mr Hansø, who was reported to have said that he had absolutely no wish to comment on individual cases, but confirmed that some had been cleared and removed from the list: “We did this for legal reasons.” He had further stated, inter alia, that it was unfortunate that the Concession Act, which had loopholes the size of a barn door, did not apply to the purchase of undeveloped sites, but only to properties with buildings on. In practice, that meant that anyone building a year-round residence in the Tjøme Municipality did not have to live in the house at all and could not be forced to move in. They could use it as a summer holiday cabin if they wished. It was not until the residence had been used for a period as a year-round home that the residence requirement would apply, but then only in the event of resale of the property. It could not be fair that residence requirements applied to some properties but not to others. To change this he would raise the matter with the Ministry of Agriculture. 24.  On 5 July 2000 Tønsbergs Blad published an article containing, inter alia, an interview with a former Minister of Agriculture, who stated that the loopholes in the Concession Act that had been detected in Tønsbergs Blad's articles were “completely unreasonable” and should be amended. 25.  On 5 and 6 July 2000 Mr Rygh conveyed to the newspaper orally and in writing his dissatisfaction with its 8 June 2000 coverage, including the fact that his name had been mentioned. The newspaper responded, orally and in writing. By a letter of 18 July 2000, Mr Rygh's lawyer demanded that Tønsbergs Blad publish a rectification and an apology. The newspaper replied that it had acted in accordance with the ethics of journalism and that, immediately after becoming aware that Mr Rygh's property had been removed from the list, it had accordingly published an article on the front page and had offered him space for his own viewpoints, an offer it had maintained for a period thereafter. An interview with Mr Rygh had not been published, as the newspaper had respected his decision that this was not desirable. 26.  In a further article published on 8 August 2000, entitled “Tønsbergs Blad clarifies”, the paper stated that the properties belonging to Mrs H.K. and Mrs Rygh had been removed from the list in question, that the requirements at issue did not apply to their properties and that, accordingly, there had been no breach of the permanent residence requirements with regard to these properties. 27.  On 15 September 2000 Mr Rygh instituted private criminal proceedings (privat straffesak) before the Tønsberg City Court (byrett). He requested that both the introduction on the front page and the article on page 3 be declared null and void under Article 253 of the Penal Code, that Tønsbergs Blad and its editor-in-chief (at the time of publication Mrs Marit Haukom) be punished under Articles 247 and 431 respectively of the Penal Code and that the newspaper and its editor-in-chief be ordered to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage under section 3-6 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969. 28.  By a judgment of 13 September 2001 the City Court acquitted the applicants and ordered Mr Rygh to pay 183,387 Norwegian kroner (NOK) in respect of their costs. It found that a defamatory allegation had been made but, with reference to Article 10 of the Convention, attached special importance to the public interest of the permanent residence issue and to the freedom of the press in respect of presentation and form. 29.  On 26 September 2001 Mr Rygh appealed against the judgment to the Agder High Court (lagmannsrett). 30.  By a judgment of 21 May 2002 the High Court upheld Mr Rygh's claims in part. 31.  As to the first issue, whether the impugned statements amounted to defamation for the purposes of Article 247 of the Penal Code, the High Court observed that it agreed with the City Court that, when considering the 8 June 2000 article in isolation and as a whole, the allegations in question must be understood to mean that the Municipality, after having made a specific assessment of the relevant properties, had taken the stance that a breach of the residence requirements had occurred with regard to Mr Rygh's property, among others, and that his name had therefore been entered on a list which the Municipality had decided to transmit to the County Governor for further processing. The report should therefore be perceived by the ordinary reader as an allegation that Mr Rygh had breached the obligation of residence. 32.  As to the question whether this amounted to a defamatory accusation, the High Court held that a breach of the residence requirements did not constitute a criminal offence but that, in a place like Tjøme, many people would regard it as being immoral and an affront to the public interest. The High Court agreed with the City Court that the accusations were not of the most defamatory kind but, not least in view of the strong personal angle of the report, the High Court found that it was capable of damaging Mr Rygh's good name and reputation. An examination of whether it was capable of causing a loss of the reputation required for the exercise of his profession was not necessary. 33.  The High Court did not find that the applicants had adduced sufficient proof of the defamatory accusation under Article 249 § 1 of the Penal Code to avoid liability for defamation under Article 247. In this connection it observed:\n“It is correct that Tom Vidar Rygh's name was mentioned on a list drawn up in October 1999 by the administration of the Tjøme Municipality for its Standing Committee on Development and Environmental Affairs. The heading of the list reads: 'Properties which should be verified in relation to the residence requirements'. Further, it was noted that the list was not public. Had the Tønsbergs Blad limited itself to stating this, it would have made an accusation that was true. ... Mr Rygh's name was put on the preliminary 'tip-off' list, based on tip-offs from inhabitants, local politicians and others. The High Court has no doubt that a number of local inhabitants could have believed that the residence requirements were breached in so far as Rygh's property was concerned, given the fact that it concerned an all-year residence which had been vacated and used as a holiday home. The mayor of the municipality has explained that he was of the opinion that the permanent residence requirements were breached, as has Mr Sæter, the director of the Planning and Building Department. However, Mr Sæter explained in the proceedings before the High Court that, at that time, he had not conducted a further investigation of the property. His view that the property was subject to the permanent residence requirements had been based on his belief that it had been converted from an older residence. He was fully aware that permanent residence requirements did not apply where a person had acquired an open plot of land and then built a house on it. Mr Sæter also explained that, when he had told the journalist Mr Wilhelmsen that a list would shortly be submitted to the County Governor, he was aware that the list would have to be examined first. According to the High Court's understanding of Mr Sæter, there had been no further elaboration of the preliminary tip-off list since autumn 1999. ... Since Mr Sæter was well aware of the exception to the residence requirements for new buildings on open plots of land, he would have quickly discovered that no obligation of residence applied here. ... The High Court further notes that to date none of the names that were on the provisional tip-off list from the autumn of 1999 have been transmitted to the County Governor because the Municipality believed that there was a breach of the residence requirements.\nThe allegations made by Tønsbergs Blad on 8 June 2000 were therefore demonstrably inaccurate.” 34.  The High Court was divided as to the question whether the accusations were unlawful (rettstridige). A majority of four members found that that was the case, whereas a minority of three members agreed with the City Court. 35.  However, a qualified majority of minimum five votes was required for finding liability under Article 247 of the Penal Code. Mr Rygh's claim that he had been the victim of unlawful defamation under Articles 247 and 431 by the newspaper and its editor-in-chief, respectively, was therefore rejected. 36.  On the other hand, under Article 253 of the Penal Code, which required only a simple majority, the High Court declared the following two statements, published respectively on the front page and on page 3 of the 8 June 2000 issue (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above), null and void:\n“Permanent residence requirements: In the worst–case scenario [H.K.] may be forced to sell her property at Hvasser [an island next to Tjøme]. The same applies to Orkla director Tom Vidar Rygh. According to the understanding of Tønsbergs Blad, their properties are on a list which the Tjøme Municipality will submit to the County Governor in the very near future. The list includes properties whose use is thought not to be in conformity with the permanent residence requirements.”\n“...Tom Vidar Rygh may be forced to sell their properties at Tjøme. The reason is that, according to the Tjøme Municipality, they do not comply with the permanent residence requirements applicable to their properties.”\nThe High Court further decided that the applicants were jointly and severally liable, under section 3-6 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969, to pay Mr Rygh NOK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The High Court in addition decided that no costs should be awarded with respect to the proceedings either before the City Court or the High Court. 37.  The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court against the procedure followed by the High Court (saksbehandlingen), namely the fact that the issue of nullification had been determined by a simple majority, and against its application of the law (rettsanvendelesen). On 4 September 2002 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal in so far as the latter ground was concerned but refused such leave with respect to the former ground. 38.  By a decision of 1 July 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants' appeal and ordered them to pay Mr Rygh NOK 673,879 for his legal costs. When deciding on the question whether to declare parts of the newspaper article null and void, the Supreme Court applied Article 2 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This limited the scope of the Supreme Court's review of the facts of the case (see further on this below). As far as the question of non-pecuniary damage was concerned, the appeal only referred to the application of the law. Therefore, even though the Code of Civil Procedure was to be applied in this regard, in accordance with Article 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court had to base its examination on the same facts as the High Court in this connection too. 39.  In his opinion, to which three other members subscribed, Mr Justice Støle held, inter alia:\n“(33)  I shall first look at how the statements must be understood. It follows from case-law that the interpretation is part of the application of the law .... It is the statements whose nullification is requested which are to be interpreted. The question is how these must be assumed to have been understood by the readers of the newspaper. Taking the wording as our point of departure, we must then look at what perceptions the statements create in the ordinary newspaper reader. In my opinion there is no conflict between the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and that of the Supreme Court as regards the subject matter of the interpretation; see the references to 'the ordinary reader' in the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.\n(34)  The statements to be interpreted are included in the newspaper's first story of 8 June 2000. In the usual way the statements must be interpreted in context with the rest of the news report, with its typography and use of pictures. Like the High Court, however, I find it clear that the subsequent articles, carried on 30 June and 8 August 2000, are not of significance for this purpose. I shall return to the significance of the follow-up reportage in another context. Here it is sufficient to show that these are not suitable for shedding light on the meaning of the statements whose nullification is being requested. ... The statements in the story of 30 June 2000 are more of the nature of a description of a subsequent development, namely that Mr Rygh has been 'cleared' in the case. I would add – not that my standpoint depends on it – that the distance in time to the article to which the nullification claim applies is also materially greater than in Norsk Retstidende ('Rt') 2002-764.\n(35)  The unanimous High Court has summarised its interpretation as follows:\n'When one accordingly considers the article of 8 June 2000 in isolation, the High Court agrees with the City Court that the statements, seen in isolation and as a whole, must be perceived by the ordinary reader as saying that the Municipality, after considering the relevant properties, has taken the position that there has been a breach of the residence requirements for, inter alia, A's property, and that his name has therefore been written down on a list that the Municipality has decided to refer to the County Governor for further action. The story must appear to the ordinary newspaper reader as a statement that Mr Rygh has breached the residence requirements.'\n(36)  This by and large coincides with my own view. The core of the accusation was that Mr Rygh found himself on a list that the Tjøme Municipality had prepared, and which contained the names of persons whom the Municipality considered to have breached the residence requirements. I do not, however, concur with the majority of the High Court that the story 'must appear to the ordinary newspaper reader as a statement that Mr Rygh has breached his residence requirements'. It is clearly apparent from the article that it is the Municipality's opinion that is being reported, and that the list is to be sent to the County Governor for decision.\n(37)  I agree with the High Court that the statements, as interpreted, contain a defamatory accusation; see Article 247 of the Penal Code. It is the first alternative in that provision that is relevant, and the allegation that the Municipality considered that the residence requirements had been breached was liable to damage his 'good name and reputation'. An accusation of a breach of the law of this nature must be regarded as defamatory. It is the public's moral judgment of the act that is decisive, and it is not a requirement that actual damage be demonstrated or substantiated. The High Court found that no evidence of the truth of the accusation was presented, and this conclusion is binding on the Supreme Court.\n...\n(40)  In the specific weighing of factors in our case, the point of departure must be that Tønsbergs Blad has published a defamatory accusation about factual matters, namely that the Municipality had considered Mr Rygh's property under the rules on residence requirements and was of the opinion that Mr Rygh had breached the residence requirements. In this connection I do not accord any independent weight to the fact that he was not the holder of title to the property. The Supreme Court must find that the accusation was untrue – that applies both to the Municipality's alleged perception that the residence requirements had been breached, and the allegation that Mr Rygh's name was entered on a list that the Municipality, on the basis of such a perception, had prepared of owners of properties in respect of which the residence requirements were supposed to have been breached. As regards the facts, a unanimous High Court has found that this was a provisional 'tip-off list' based on tips from inhabitants and local politicians in the Municipality. It had been drawn up by the municipal administration in October 1999, and bore the title 'Properties which should be verified in relation to the residence requirements. (Not public)'. The High Court also noted that the Municipality, at the time the newspaper published the article on 8 June 2000, had not 'undertaken any further processing of the provisional tip-off list from the autumn of 1999'. The Supreme Court is bound by this assessment of the evidence.\n(41)  The main rule in both Norwegian defamation law and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights is that non-proven defamatory allegations of fact are not protected by freedom of expression. As regards the European Court's case-law, I refer to the judgment of 20 May 1999 in Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway (no 21980/93), § 66, and to the judgment of 7 May 2002 in McVicar v. United Kingdom (no. 46311/99), §§ 84 and 87; there must be special grounds for departing from this main rule.\n(42)  There is also a distinction between transmission of other people's untrue accusations and the media's own presentation of non-proven defamatory allegations. Freedom of expression stretches further to cover transmission, depending, inter alia, on who has made the allegation that is transmitted. If it is a report from a public authority, as in the Bladet Tromsø case, freedom of expression enjoys stronger protection.\n(43)  In our case it cannot be found that the newspaper has transmitted a defamatory accusation that was made by others. The article gives no source for the accusation, and the Supreme Court cannot depart from the High Court's (the majority's) assessment of evidence with regard to the newspaper's having based itself on an anonymous source in relation to the information that Mr Rygh was on the list that was to be sent to the County Governor and that his property was 'thus to be looked into with regard to a breach of the residence requirements'. The reliance on anonymous sources otherwise prevents the courts from testing whether the journalist displayed due care by employing that source; see Rt 1987-764, p. 771, and the European Court of Human Rights' judgment in McVicar, § 86. Referring to anonymous sources should therefore in this connection be equated with accusations made by the newspaper without giving sources. I will return later to the question of what grounds the newspaper had at the time of publication for the truth of the accusation.\n(44)  The decision in Rt-2002-764 and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights shows that the specific weighing of factors must take into consideration several criteria. Of these I would emphasise the degree of public interest, the nature of the accusation, including whether the accusation is classified as a 'value judgment' or a 'factual statement', whether it is directed against a public person or a private individual, and the degree of care, including the extent to which the media at the time of publication had factual support for considering the allegation to be true. In general, the protection of the expression will be stronger if it concerns matters of public interest, value judgments, imparting of information, a public person, and if there are strong reasons for holding the allegation to be true. Contrariwise: if the case concerns limited public interest, factual statements, the media's own presentation, private persons and weak grounds for holding the allegation to be true, the protection of the expression will be weaker.\n(45)  That the expression containing the accusation is of public interest is in my view a fundamental criterion for regarding the media's own presentation of untrue defamatory allegations against private individuals about factual matters as being protected by freedom of expression.\n(46)  It is immediately clear that the question of enforcement of the residence requirements for year-round residences in a coastal municipality like Tjøme is of public interest. For Tønsbergs Blad as the local newspaper in the region, this was naturally a topic for critical coverage. The fact that there existed a list of properties that there was a question of referring to the County Governor must also be regarded as being of interest for the residents of the region and the newspaper's readership. Which properties or owners were on the list, on the other hand, must in my opinion be regarded as of limited public interest. If any of the individuals who were entered on the 'tip-off list' – for example owing to their function, position of trust or participation in the public debate – had had a special connection to the issue of residence requirements, it might have been different. It may well be the case that the modern news industry makes considerable use of known persons to arouse the interest of the readers. But I agree with the High Court that the fact that Mr Rygh was a relatively famous person as the executive VP of Orkla does not mean that he can automatically be regarded as a public person in relation to the rules on residence requirements. The majority's emphasis on his not having involved himself in the public debate on this topic appears very consonant with the European Court of Human Rights' reasoning in its judgment of 25 November 1999 in Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway (no. 23118/93), § 52, first sub-paragraph, with its emphasis on Bratholm's 'participation in public debate' as the central theme.\n(47)  I would then return to the question of the journalist's due care in the publication, and view this in the context of the use of an anonymous source and of what factual grounds he had at the time of publication for considering the allegation true. I would first remark that there did not exist any written documentation from the municipality's processing of the matter that could support the allegation, over and above what the unanimous High Court has characterised as 'the provisional tip-off list'. As mentioned, the Supreme Court must in my opinion base its decision on what the High Court has found with regard to the use of an anonymous source. I cannot therefore see that it can be found that the newspaper had other sources or other grounds for its allegation that Mr Rygh's name was on a list that the Municipality should 'in the near future refer to the County Governor'. This was the basis for the accusation that the Municipality considered that Mr Rygh had breached the residence requirements. Even if use of anonymous sources is a recognised tool of modern journalism, such use of sources will imply a stricter requirement of due care. Moreover, in such a situation, it must to a considerable degree be the newspaper's risk that the factual information conveyed may turn out to be untrue.\n(48)  It is true that the same day the newspaper carried an interview with the director of the Municipality's Planning and Building Department, in which it was confirmed that the Municipality would in the near future be sending a list to the County Governor. But in my opinion the interview does not allow the conclusion to be drawn that the Municipality's processing was concluded and that a definitive list therefore existed. In this connection I would not lay any particular emphasis on the fact that representatives of the Municipality may – before consideration of the tip-off list – have considered that the residence requirement applied to the Rygh family's property. Nor did the journalist claim to have based his story on information from these people. Otherwise, in my view, there are generally grounds for emphasising the big difference between being on a so-called tip-off list that has not been considered by the Municipality and being on a list that the Municipality has decided, after processing and consideration, to refer to the County Governor, who is the central government's supervisory and administrative authority.\n(49)  When Mr Rygh was contacted by the journalist immediately prior to the newspaper's running the story on 8 June 2000, his reaction was that the whole thing had to rest on a misunderstanding. Even if it is understandable that the newspaper may have wanted a broader statement from Mr Rygh, I cannot see that he can be blamed for his behaviour here. Without it having any importance for my view on the question I am discussing here, I would like to mention that it was subsequently discovered that Mr Rygh had obtained legal advice on the residence requirements in connection with his family's move to Oslo in 1998 in consequence of his work situation in Orkla. As the situation must have appeared to him, when he was contacted by the journalist immediately before the newspaper ran the story on 8 June 2000, his reaction was in my opinion understandable. The circumstance that I have mentioned here cannot in any event mean that the journalist may be regarded as having acted with due care.\n(50)  The articles that Tønsbergs Blad carried on 30 June and 8 August 2000 are of negligible significance for the questions I have now discussed. The stories came a relatively long time after the initial article. And under Article 253 § 2 of the Penal Code, claims for nullification must be rejected when the person making the accusation 'withdraws it before the main hearing in a manner that the court finds satisfactory to the aggrieved person'. Tønsbergs Blad has not, however, requested the case to be dismissed from the courts, and I have no occasion to enter into any discussion of this question. I would, however, remark that Norwegian defamation law is based on the notion that a withdrawal of an allegation has significance in relation to the sanctions, and not the assessment of unlawfulness (rettstridsvurderingen).\n(51)  As the case now stands, I cannot agree with Tønsbergs Blad that the newspaper's follow-up report means that there is on the whole a balanced presentation suggesting that the statements in the story of 8 June 2000 cannot be deemed unlawful. The story of 30 June 2000 was in particular angled in such a way as to make it less appropriate as a modification of the original statement's defamatory character; see the use of the expression that Mr Rygh 'is escaping' the residence requirements. In the discussion of 8 August 2000, under the headline 'Tønsbergs Blad clarifies', there is a more neutral correction, but it is not stated here either that Mr Rygh has not been on any list that has been considered by the Municipality.\n(52)  By way of conclusion I see good reason to emphasise: as will be apparent from what I have reproduced from the first voting judge in Rt. 2002-764, in considering specific statements the press's role as a central practitioner of freedom of expression must be weighed against the interests of privacy, including the reputation of the individual. When the expression concerns a case of public interest, the role of the press as a 'public watchdog' means that interference with freedom of expression requires a weighty justification. In our case it is the protection of Mr Rygh's reputation that calls for the interference. The only way I can see the situation is that Tønsbergs Blad could have highlighted the residence requirements issue critically, as it did in the reportage of 8 June 2000, without the strong focus on Mr Rygh personally – a focus that rested on a deficient factual basis.\n(53)  In the light of this I have concluded that the statements of which nullification is requested are not protected by Article 10 of the Convention and that the request must be granted. Since the special arguments regarding the compensation claim for non-pecuniary damage have not been maintained, it follows that this part of the judgment is also upheld.” 40.  The dissenting judge, Mr Justice Rieber-Mohn, stated:\n“(56) ... I concur that in its news coverage of 8 June 2000 Tønsbergs Blad published a defamatory statement – an accusation of a factual character – for which there was no factual basis. I also agree with the first voting judge that the core of the accusation is that Mr Rygh found himself on a list that the Tjøme Municipality had drawn up, which contained the names of individuals whom the Municipality considered to have breached the residence requirements. This would, however – assuming it was correct – not have been a final declaration that there had been a breach of the residence requirements. For this reason, among others, I agree with the minority of the High Court and the City Court that the accusation lies in the lower stratum of what can be covered by Article 247 of the Penal Code. I also have the impression that the High Court's majority by and large agree with this.\n(57)  When an untrue defamatory statement is made, the point of departure is also clear under the European Court of Human Rights' case-law concerning Article 10 of the European Convention: the accusation is not protected by freedom of expression. But exceptions to this may be contemplated. If the accusation is to enjoy protection under freedom of expression, it must at the least be demanded that the news coverage in which it is contained is of public interest and additionally that the necessary care was taken by the newspaper. I consider that these criteria were met in this case.\n(58)  There can be no doubt that the general subject with which the newspaper was concerned, and with which the news coverage of 8 June 2000 really dealt, namely compliance with the rules on residence requirements, was and is of great public interest. The question is whether it is in the public interest to publicise a possible breach of the residence requirements on the part of Mr Rygh. I would first mention that in modern journalism it is a common and recognised method of popular education to illustrate general and usually difficult questions by means of the roles and fates of individuals, when they are considered especially relevant. When individuals are unwillingly brought forward, and are subjected to accusations of crime and so forth, a mass medium must have good reasons for this, for example if the person concerned has sought out the light of publicity in this area, or is a prominent person in society who must accept that special demands are made of his integrity and sense of responsibility to society. At the time in question Mr Rygh belonged to the top management of one of the country's biggest industrial conglomerates, and his name was not unfamiliar in the news. In my opinion individuals who have sought prominent positions in society, which require a special degree of trust from the public, must to some extent accept that the media will follow them with the eyes of Argus, not just in their professional activities but also when, in the more private sphere, they challenge laws and other regulations that are particularly meant to safeguard the interests of society. It is therefore possible to conceive of violations of the law by these individuals that in the circumstances will be of public interest, even if the breach carries no criminal responsibility or the penalties are minor. In this case the newspaper thought that Mr Rygh had broken the rules on residence requirements, which in public opinion was and is of major social importance, even if such a contravention is not a criminal offence. I have difficulty seeing that it was not a matter of public interest if such a very prominent person as Mr Rygh had not complied with the residence requirements with regard to his property in the Tjøme Municipality.\n(59)  The question then becomes whether the newspaper has acted with the requisite care. It must be noted that the journalist used an anonymous source when he wrote that Mr Rygh was on the Municipality's list of those who were considered to have breached the residence requirements. It is undisputed that for a long while Tønsbergs Blad had been working on this topic, and that the journalist – who lived at Tjøme – had been in contact with several representatives of the Municipality. It must also be noted that the journalist, on application to the Municipality, received confirmation that there existed a list that the Municipality had drawn up, but the mistake was that this was a list of individuals who, according to external tip-offs, had breached the obligation, and not a list of individuals whom the Municipality had already found to have breached it. The newspaper thus confused the tip-off list, which contained Mr Rygh's name, with the list that the Municipality was indeed to refer to the County Governor for a decision on whether the residence requirements had been complied with.\n(60)  I cannot see that the newspaper is much to be blamed for this confusion. The journalist had reason to believe that a municipal assessment had been carried out at that point. In the story of 8 June 2000 the director of the Planning and Building Department confirmed that technical services would 'in the very near future' write to the County Governor regarding individuals whom the Municipality suspected of breaching the residence requirements. The director also stated: 'We know that the residence requirements are not being complied with for several properties in the Municipality'. And the director did not wish to say 'which properties are on the list we are referring to the County Governor'. This last statement gave the clear impression that the list which the Municipality had assessed already existed. In addition, prominent representatives of the Tjøme Municipality – such as the mayor and the director of the Planning and Building Department – subsequently stated that, at the time when the newspaper had carried the controversial reportage, they had been of the opinion that Mr Rygh was in breach of the residence requirements. This is clearly apparent from the High Court's judgment, both the minority and majority remarks. Tønsbergs Blad was therefore close to the truth in its story of 8 June 2000. I would also mention that, according to the story, the newspaper had approached Mr Rygh for his view of the matter, but he did not want to comment beyond stating that the fact that his name was on the list must have been due to a misunderstanding.”", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1939 and 1933 respectively and live in Sofia. 6.  They are the parents of Mr Ivaylo Zashev, who was shot and killed by people trying to rob him in his aunt’s house in the village of Stavertsi, in the Pleven region, in the late hours of 3 February or the early hours of 4 February 1997. 7.  In the morning of 3 February 1997 Mr Ivaylo Zashev and his brother, Mr Valeri Zashev, both of whom had come to Stavertsi for a business venture, went to a neighbouring village to see if they could buy cattle. Later that day they went to Pleven to exchange 2,000 German marks and 1,000 United States dollars. They were also carrying 200,000 old Bulgarian levs. They did not exchange the money and in the evening went back to Stavertsi. At about 10.45 p.m. they went to sleep. Their aunt, Ms T.L., was sleeping in the adjoining room. 8.  Around midnight the two brothers woke up and saw in the room three men wearing masks and gloves. One of them was carrying a shotgun, the other a metal pipe, and the third was unarmed. The two armed assailants started fighting with Mr Ivaylo Zashev and Mr Valeri Zashev, while the unarmed one sifted through the items in the room. While the assailant with the pipe was hitting Mr Valeri Zashev, Mr Ivaylo Zashev was trying to protect himself with a chair from the one with the shotgun. The assailants ordered the brothers to hand over the money they had. Mr Ivaylo Zashev replied that it was in his trousers and, while the assailants were checking them, he managed secretly to slip the bag with the money under his bed. At that point Ms T.L. entered the room. The assailants were startled. One of them told the one with the shotgun to fire. He pulled the trigger, but the gun jammed. However, after that he fired two shots, the second of which hit Mr Ivaylo Zashev in the chest and pierced his heart and lungs; about a minute later he died. The assailants pushed Ms T.L. to the ground, face down. Then they went out of the house despite Mr Valeri Zashev’s efforts to stop them. They reached their car, which was parked nearby, and left the village. 9.  Approximately two hours after the events, at 1.55 a.m. on 4 February 1997, an investigator from the Pleven Investigation Service inspected the crime scene with two police officers, an expert and a forensic doctor. He found and seized a hunting bullet, a hunting cartridge case, a pistol cartridge case, four rubber bullets and two hunting‑bullet caps. 10.  Later that day the investigator asked an expert to express an opinion on the extent of the injuries suffered by Mr Valeri Zashev and Ms T.L. and the manner in which they had been inflicted. He also asked a clinic in Pleven to clarify the exact cause of Mr Ivaylo Zashev’s death, the distance and the position from which the shot had been fired, and the relative positions of the victim and the shooter. 11.  Between 12 February and the end of March 1997 the investigator interviewed Mr Valeri Zashev, Ms T.L. and a number of other witnesses. 12.  One of those witnesses was a Mr V.K., the personal driver of a Mr P.T., a local businessman. He was arrested by the police on 8 February 1997, and after that kept in custody for a few days in a house in the country near Pleven and repeatedly questioned. According to his subsequent allegations, he was ill‑treated and pressured into testifying in line with the instructions of the police, as well as into identifying certain individuals and objects during identity parades. The police denied these allegations and said that Mr V.K. had made all his statements freely. 13.  Mr V.K. was interviewed by the investigator on 13, 16, 18 and 20 February 1997. He said, inter alia, that on the evening of 3 February 1997 he had seen his boss, Mr P.T., a Mr I.K., and two other men. Mr P.T. had instructed him to go to Stavertsi with Mr I.K. and the two others, in an Audi. When getting out of the car the three men had put masks and gloves on. Mr V.K. had waited for them for a few minutes, during which time he had heard two shots. After that the three had come back to the car, carrying a shotgun. They had driven out of the village and had told Mr V.K. to get out of the car. Mr V.K. had then returned to Mr P.T.’s house, where Mr P.T. had asked him whether the three men had had any United States dollars on them. He had then told him to forget the events of that night. The next day Mr V.K. had heard Mr P.T. and Mr I.K. discussing the incident, with Mr I.K. mentioning a pipe and chair broken in the scuffle, and saying that an old woman had entered and messed up their plans. 14.  Meanwhile, on 15 February 1997 the police seized an Audi, suspected of being the car used by the assailants for their escape. It was inspected on 19 February 1997, and a dark spot measuring four millimetres in diameter was found on the back seat. The same day the investigator asked an expert to determine whether that spot was blood, and if so, of which group. The expert confirmed that the spot was human blood, but could not determine its group because of the insufficiency of the material available for testing. 15.  On 15 February 1997 Mr P.T., Mr I.K. and a Mr V.P. were arrested. On 16 February 1997 Mr P.T. was released, and the investigator carried out an identity parade in which Mr V.K. identified Mr I.K. and Mr V.P. They were then charged and placed in detention. They remained in custody until April 1998, when they were released on bail. 16.  On 21 February 1997 Mr V.K. was presented with a tracksuit seized at Mr I.K.’s home and allegedly worn by him at the time of the offence; he recognised it. 17.  On 25 March 1997 a Mr G.G. was arrested. On 28 March 1997 he was also charged with taking part in the robbery. 18.  On 8 April 1997 the investigator sent the ballistics evidence seized at the crime scene for testing. 19.  Mr V.K. was interviewed again on 12 June 1997. He withdrew his earlier statements and said that he had been coerced by the police into giving false evidence. 20.  On 7 August 1997 the Pleven Regional Prosecutor’s Office, observing that no investigatory steps had been taken for several months, replaced the investigator. 21.  In an interview on 13 August 1997 an individual detained in the same cell as Mr G.G. stated that he had asked him to kill Mr V.K. In an interview of the same date two employees of the country house in which Mr V.K. had been held by the police (see paragraph 12 above) said that while there he had confided in them that he was afraid that his boss, Mr P.T., might kill him because he had testified against him. Mr V.K. had no marks of ill‑treatment. 22.  In August 1997 the Pleven Regional Prosecutor’s Office noted that the accused should remain in custody in view of their apparent resolve to liquidate the witnesses against them. 23.  On 25 September 1997 the investigator ordered Mr P.T.’s detention. Some time after that Mr P.T. was arrested and on 28 October 1997 he was charged. He remained in custody until 18 May 1998. 24.  On 6 and 7 November 1997 the investigator interviewed Mr V.K. again. He again changed his position, reasserting his statements of February 1997 (see paragraph 13 above) and withdrawing his statement of 12 June 1997 (see paragraph 19 above). He said that it had been given under pressure from Mr P.T., who had kidnapped him and deprived him of his liberty for a month. 25.  On 3 and 4 December 1997 Mr V.K. was interviewed again. On 4 December 1997, during an identity parade, he did not recognise Mr G.G. 26.  In a memorandum of 2 September 1998 the head of the Pleven police technical department said that the ballistics evidence seized at the crime scene had been lost when transferred between various departments without the required documents. It was therefore impossible to test it. 27.  No investigative steps were taken in 1998, 1999 and 2000. 28.  On 5 August 1999 the Veliko Tarnovo Appellate Prosecutor’s Office noted that the investigation had suffered from serious setbacks and that not enough had been done to elucidate how and why the missing real evidence had been lost. 29.  On 12 June 2000 Mr Valeri Zashev died. Ms T.L. also died, on 2 October 2000. 30.  On 20 March 2001 the Veliko Tarnovo Appellate Prosecutor’s Office noted that, for no apparent reason, no investigatory steps had been taken after 18 May 1998. It further observed that the file was not bound and ordered properly, which made it difficult to check on the progress of the unfolding of the investigation. It recommended finding out why the case had not been concluded for more than four years and punishing those responsible, as well as taking steps to finalise the case in the near future. Accordingly, on 26 March 2001 the Pleven Regional Prosecutor’s Office instructed the investigator to renew work on the case. 31.  On 23 April 2001 the investigator recommended that the charges be dropped for lack of evidence. The prosecuting authorities disagreed and in July and August 2001 instructed him to question Mr V.K. again and to order a further expert report. However, in the meantime, on 1 August 2001 the investigator left his job and had to be replaced. 32.  On 22 January 2002 the new investigator commissioned a DNA expert report of the blood spot found on the back seat of the seized Audi. On 30 January 2002 the expert said that no blood could be found on the seat. 33.  On 28 May 2002 Mr V.K. was interviewed by the investigator at a public hearing held at the Pleven Regional Court. Mr V.K. stated that he would not testify until measures were taken to protect him, as he had received threats made on behalf of the accused. Accordingly, on 30 May 2002 the investigator requested the police to take measures to protect the witness. The police made contact with Mr V.K. on 18 June 2002. The next day, 19 June 2002, he was asked to go to the police station, where he said that he did not require protection for the time being, but would contact the police if he was threatened again in the future. 34.  On 16 December 2002 Mr V.K. was interviewed again at a public hearing before the Pleven Regional Court. He stated that he had been ill‑treated and pressured by the police into testifying in a certain way about the robbery and into recognising a specific individual during identity parades. He further said that he did not know any of the accused apart from Mr P.T. 35.  On 11 March 2003 the investigator again recommended that the charges be dropped. On 24 March 2003 the Pleven Regional Prosecutor’s Office decided to follow this recommendation. 36.  On an appeal by the applicants, on 16 July 2003 the Pleven Regional Court set this decision aside. It found, inter alia, that it was unclear whether Mr V.K. had made his incriminating statements under police pressure or had retracted them under threats from the accused. The case file contained ample material supporting both versions, but the authorities had done nothing to provide protection for the witness. That had eventually led to him refusing to testify. Nevertheless, the analysis of his statements showed that he had been with the accused both before and after the time when the offence had been committed. The court went on to say that not enough effort had been made to find the lost ballistics evidence. It instructed the investigating authorities to, inter alia, check Mr V.K.’s allegations of police violence against him, take measures to protect him, and then question him again, if need be in the presence of a judge, in order to clarify which of his statements was genuine. The court also said that further efforts should be made to find the missing ballistics evidence. 37.  Between October and December 2003 the investigator interviewed seven police officers who had taken part in the investigation. All of them said that Mr V.K. had given his evidence freely. They were unable to provide definite clues as to the disappearance of the ballistics evidence. 38.  When interviewed on 15 December 2003, Mr V.K. again said that he had been ill-treated by the police and pressured into testifying in a way indicated by them. 39.  On 26 March 2004 the investigator again recommended that the charges against Mr P.T., Mr G.G., Mr V.P. and Mr I.K. be dropped. However, the Pleven Regional Prosecutor’s Office disagreed and on 14 April 2004 indicted them. It alleged that Mr P.T. had incited the rest to rob Mr Ivaylo Zashev and Mr Valeri Zashev; it further alleged that the other three had carried out an armed robbery in the course of which they had killed Mr Ivaylo Zashev. 40.  The trial took place before the Pleven Regional Court (Плевенски окръжен съд) on 15 October and 20 December 2004 and 17 March 2006. The applicants were not summoned and did not take part in it. The court heard numerous witnesses and admitted various documents in evidence. 41.  In a judgment of 17 March 2006 the court acquitted Mr P.T., Mr G.G., Mr V.P. and Mr I.K. of the charges against them. 42.  It found that there was no evidence to show that they had committed the offence. The shotgun had not been found or identified. Likewise, the bullets causing the death of Mr Ivaylo Zashev had not been positively identified. The ballistics evidence found at the crime scene had later been lost because of failure to follow procedures for storing and transporting real evidence, and thus had never been analysed. It was therefore impossible to make any findings about the weapon used to commit the offence or its owner. Furthermore, the investigator had not taken any samples or real evidence from the crime scene, such as tyre or shoe marks, fingerprints or objects, to support even a supposition that any of the accused had been at or even near the crime scene. Nor had the outside of Ms T.L.’s house been checked for traces of the assailants or of the car which they had used to escape. There were no witnesses – save for the brother of the deceased Mr Valeri Zashev and Ms T.L. – who had seen the assailants or the car. The available evidence showed that the Zashevi brothers had neither met the accused or any persons close to them, nor told any of them that they were carrying a sum of money. The analysis of Mr Valeri Zashev’s and Ms T.L.’s statements showed that even they had not seen the assailants properly or identified them. Nor had they seen the car properly. 43.  There was not enough evidence to show that the Audi, which had not been seized until fifteen days after the commission of the offence, had been the one used by the assailants. It had been washed inside and outside before being handed over to the police, and had remained unlocked, including when stored in the police station’s yard. It could not therefore be conclusively established whether the small dark blood spot on its back seat was linked with the offence. The first expert report on this point could not be admitted in evidence, as the investigator’s decision to commission it did not contain any description of the car to be analysed. As to the second expert, he had been unable to reach any conclusion about the blood’s group. 44.  The court went on to say that Mr V.K.’s incriminating statements could not be considered reliable. After analysing in detail the circumstances in which they had been made, it found that it was clear that Mr V.K. had been pressured by the police, who had detained him unlawfully, to testify in a way indicated by them. Nor did the court find the identity parades carried out with Mr V.K.’s participation reliable. Contrary to the rules of procedure, he had not been asked about any distinctive features of the individuals to be recognised before the identification, nor had those individuals been lined up among persons who resembled them. Moreover, Mr V.K. had been instructed whom to identify and on the basis of what physical features. 45.  Finally, the expert examination of the clothes seized at Mr I.K.’s home showed that there were no traces of blood on them. 46.  No other evidence had been put forward by the prosecution to link any of the accused to the commission of the offence. 47.  The prosecution appealed, arguing that the acquittal was ill-founded. 48.  On 30 May 2006 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal (Великотърновски апелативен съд) set the case down for hearing. It noted that the appeal did not point to specific irregularities in the lower court’s judgment, and that there was no request for further evidence to be gathered. 49.  At the hearing, which took place on 18 September 2006, the prosecutor on appeal reluctantly endorsed the appeal. He did not call further evidence. 50.  In a judgment of 4 October 2006 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal. It found that the lower court had properly analysed the entirety of the available material, finding that key pieces of evidence had been lost or spoiled. Its conclusion that the evidence adduced could not link the accused to the commission of the offence had been fully warranted. No arguments had been put forward by the prosecution in the appeal proceedings to cast doubt on that finding. 51.  The prosecution did not appeal again and the judgment became final on 24 October 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Moscow. 6.  In 1995 he opened a fixed-term interest-bearing deposit account at the Rostov-on-Don Branch of the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation (“the bank”). On an unspecified date in 1996-1997 the bank unilaterally reduced the interest rate on his deposit account. The applicant sued the bank for reinstatement of the initial interest rate and compensation of unpaid interest and damages. 7.  On 1 April 1999 the applicant challenged the reduction of the interest rate in the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don. On 21 June 1999 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov rendered a default judgment in favour of the applicant, ordering the bank to cancel its decision to reduce the rate. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. It remained unenforced. 8.  On 22 March 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court, upon the bank’s application for supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 21 June 1999 and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 9.  Due to non-execution of the above judgment of 21 June 1999 by the Bank, in September 1999, the applicant brought another claim to the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov against the Bank, seeking compensation of unpaid interest and damages. 10.  On 13 July 2000 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov rejected the claim. 11.  On 11 October 2000 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the above judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the first instance court. 12.  On an unspecified date, apparently after the quashing of 22 March 2001, the Proletarskiy District Court decided to join the claims concerning the reduction of the rate and the unpaid interest. 13.  On 9 October 2001 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don found for the applicant in part. It held that the reduction of the interest rate was unlawful and awarded the applicant 184,132.77 Russian roubles (RUB) which he would have received if the interest rate had not been reduced during the validity of the contract, up to 9 October 2001. It rejected the remainder of the applicant’s claims as unfounded. 14.  On 26 December 2001 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 15.  On 2 April 2002 the applicant was paid RUB 184,132.77, and the enforcement proceedings were closed. 16.  On 5 April 2002 the applicant introduced a request for clarification of the judgment of 9 October 2001, claiming that the latter obliged the bank to renew the regular payments on the basis of unreduced interest rate. On 18 September 2002 the Rostov Regional Court in the final instance rejected his claim, having found that the renewal issue had not been a subject-matter of the judicial decision of 9 October 2001. 17.  On 6 May 2003 the applicant brought separate proceedings against the bank for payments under the initial interest rate according to the deposit agreement to be calculated from 10 October 2001, as well as for non‑pecuniary damage. He relied on the judgment of the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov of 9 October 2001, which had recalculated the rate until the latter date. 18.  On 25 March 2004 the Kirovskiy District Court of Rostov‑on‑Don found for the applicant and ordered the bank to recalculate the interest rate as from 10 October 2001, on the basis of the findings made in the judgment of the Proletarskiy District Court of 9 October 2001. The court further rejected the claims for non-pecuniary damage as having no basis in domestic law. 19.  On 2 June 2004 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 20.  On 30 June 2005 the bank produced documents confirming recalculation of the rate, as required by the judgment of 25 March 2004. By a decision issued on the same date the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings, since the above judgment had been complied with in full. 21.  On 28 July 2004 the Proletarskiy District Court allowed the bank’s request of 12 July 2004 for restoration of the time-limit for an application for supervisory review of the final judgment of 9 October 2001. According to the applicant, he was not informed about the hearing. 22.  On an unspecified date the bank lodged an application for supervisory review. 23.  On 26 August 2004 a judge of the Rostov Regional Court rejected the application. 24.  On an unspecified date the bank lodged a request for quashing of the judgment of 9 October 2001 due to newly discovered circumstances, namely, the new case-law of the domestic courts of 2003-2004 and the authoritative interpretation of the domestic law provisions by the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued on 14 July 2004. 25.  On 22 November 2004 the Proletarskiy District Court rejected the request. On 19 January 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. The courts found that the changed case-law did not constitute a newly-discovered circumstance. The courts noted, however, that it remained open for the bank to bring a request for supervisory review of the judgment in question on procedural grounds. 26.  Meanwhile, the bank applied to the President of the Rostov Regional Court with a request to revise a refusal to initiate the supervisory‑review proceedings, arguing that the courts incorrectly applied domestic law to the circumstances of the case. 27.  On 2 June 2005 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed the final judgment of 9 October 2001, as upheld on 26 December 2001, by way of the supervisory-review proceedings. The Presidium found that the lower courts had incorrectly established the facts of the case. In particular, it noted that the District Court had omitted to examine whether the applicant had been informed of the entirety of contents of the deposit agreement and whether he had had agreed to a subsequent change of the interest rate without his explicit approval. Furthermore, it found that the lower courts had wrongly interpreted the domestic law, since they had based their judgments on the provisions of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation inapplicable to the dispute at stake. The case was remitted for a fresh examination. 28.  According to the applicant, he was not informed about the hearing of 2 June 2005 and learned about it on 6 July 2005 only. 29.  At some point the applicant challenged the decision of 28 July 2004 on appeal. On 30 November 2005 the Rostov Regional Court rejected his request and upheld the decision. 30.  On 1 July 2005 the Proletarskiy District Court on the Bank’s request issued an interlocutory injunction seizing the applicant’s bank account. On 24 August 2005, the Rostov Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. 31.  On 27 July 2005, as a result of re-consideration of the case after the quashing by way of supervisory review (see paragraph 27 above), the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov rejected the applicant’s claims. 32.  On 24 August 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 33.  On 11 October 2005 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov decided that the applicant should reimburse to the bank RUB 184,132.77 which he had earlier received under the reversed judgment of 9 October 2001. The judgment was not appealed against. 34.  On 13 March 2006 the above amount was debited from the applicant’s account.\n(b)  As regards further recalculation of payments 35.  On 18 October 2005 the Kirovskiy District Court, acting upon the bank’s request and referring to the ruling of the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court of 2 June 2005 (see paragraph 27 above), quashed its judgment of 25 March 2004 due to newly established circumstances and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 36.  On 14 November 2005 the same court rejected the applicant’s claims. 37.  On 16 January 2006 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.\n(c)  As regards enforcement of the judgment of 25 March 2004 38.  At some point the applicant challenged the bailiffs’ decision of 30 June 2005 to discontinue the enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 25 March 2004 as unlawful. He argued that the judgment remained unenforced. According to him, even though the bank had made a recalculation of the interest rate, the calculation had been incorrect and the applicant had not received respective arrears due to him. 39.  On 12 October 2005 the Leninskiy District Court rejected the claim. On 30 November 2005 the decision was annulled on appeal and the case sent for a fresh consideration. 40.  On 1 February 2006 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed his action. The court found, first, that the judgment of 25 March 2004 had been quashed on 2 June 2005, the applicant’s claims had been considered afresh and rejected. In these circumstances, his claim for enforcement of the award of 24 March 2005 was devoid of purpose. Second, the court observed that in any event the respondent bank had duly complied with the obligation to recalculate the interest rate as ordered by the judgment of 25 March 2004. At the same time, the latter judgment had not contained an obligation to pay any pecuniary award to the applicant. 41.  On 15 March 2006 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 42.  On 9 February 2005 the Kirovskiy District Court of Rostov granted the Bank’s claim and dissolved the deposit agreement of 11 May 1995 due to substantially changed circumstances. On 25 April 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal and awarded the applicant RUB 5,000 of compensation of non-pecuniary damage. 43.  It appears that the applicant had not received the compensation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1969. 9.  On 22 May 1996 the applicant was taken into custody by the Jõgeva police on suspicion of having committed burglary. 10.  On 8 November 1996 the applicant was charged with fraud and three counts of burglary. 11.  On 19 May 1997 the Jõgeva County Court (Jõgeva Maakohus) convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment. 12.  On 8 October 1997 the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) quashed the judgment of the County Court on procedural grounds and remitted the case to it for fresh consideration by a differently constituted court. The applicant was ordered to remain in custody. 13.  In November 1998 a new criminal case concerning an act of hooliganism in prison was opened against the applicant, which was later joined to the charges under consideration before the trial court. 14.  On 28 September 1999 the County Court convicted the applicant on all charges and sentenced him to four years and six months’ imprisonment. 15.  On 29 November 1999 the Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant of hooliganism, upholding the County Court’s judgment in respect of the other charges. 16.  On 19 January 2000 the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) refused the applicant leave to lodge an appeal with it. 17.  During his detention on remand from 22 May 1996 the applicant was kept for the most part in Tallinn Central Prison (Keskvangla). In addition to several shorter stays in the prison hospital totalling about three months, the applicant was hospitalised from 17 May 1999 until 22 December 1999. 18.  The applicant spent 14 short periods, lasting from 5 to 15 days, in the Jõgeva Police District Arrest House (Jõgeva Politseiprefektuuri arestimaja), where he was escorted from the Central Prison in connection with his trial. In total he spent 139 days in the arrest house. 19.  On 22 December 1999 he was sent to serve his sentence in Murru Prison. He was released in November 2000. 20.  As regards the Jõgeva Arrest House, the applicant submits that his cell measured 9 sq. m (or 3.5 m by 3 m). It had no ventilation and had only a small window (25 cm by 25 cm). The ventilation was installed in 2000. There was no chair, table or proper bed. Inmates slept on a shared platform which was used by four to five persons. In the cell there was little room for movement, since 60% of it was occupied by the large plank bed. From 6 November to 9 November 1998 the applicant shared his cell with R.J., who was ill with tuberculosis in its contagious form.\nThe inmates were provided with food only once a day. They had to keep their food on the floor, as there were no cupboards for it. The toilet (a hole) and the sink also occupied part of the tiny room. The condition of the cell was extremely insanitary.\n(b)  The Central Prison 21.  The general conditions in Tallinn Central Prison were equally unsatisfactory. The applicant’s cell lacked fresh air and it had no natural light as there were metal slats fitted to the cell window. He was permitted to walk outside his cell for one hour a day. The food in the detention facility was of poor quality. 22.  All ordinary confinement cells where the applicant was held in the Central Prison measured 14 m by 3 m. He stayed in the following cells.\nFrom July to September 1996 he was held in cell no. 89. There were fourteen inmates in it.\nFrom October to December 1996 he was in cell no. 141. There were four inmates.\nIn December 1996 he was in cell no. 78. The number of detainees was eleven.\nFrom December 1996 to April 1997 he was held in cell no. 67. There were fifteen inmates.\nFrom April to May 1997 he was in cell no. 50. It accommodated seventeen persons.\nFrom May 1997 to April 1998 he was held in cell no. 67. The number of detainees was fifteen.\nFrom May to September 1998 he was accommodated in cell no. 73. There were fourteen inmates in it.\nFor one week in September 1998 he stayed in cell no. 72, which held eight inmates.\nFrom September 1998 to April 1999 he was in cell no. 58. The number of inmates was twelve.\nIn May 1999 he was held in cell no. 95, which accommodated twelve detainees.\nFrom May to December 1999 he was in cell no. 168 in the prison hospital. This cell measured 5 m by 2.5 m and there were four inmates in it.\nOn nine occasions the applicant was held in a cell designed for solitary confinement. This room measured 2 m by 2.5 m. It was cold and damp. For the toilet there was a hole in the floor from which rats came out during the night. 23.  The Jõgeva Arrest House was built in 1984 and is located on the first floor of the regional police headquarters, with windows facing south. There were eight cells in the arrest house which measured between 7.55 sq. m and 11.32 sq. m. On average, there were between two and four inmates in a cell. The original size of the glass block windows had been 1.10 m by 3 m. In most of the cells the windows had subsequently been walled up for security reasons. The glass block windows were preserved in cells nos. 7 and 8. Each cell had one electric light. The cells were fitted with large bunk beds for sleeping and each inmate had his own sleeping place. In the cells there was a secluded toilet corner and cold water for daily hygiene. In 1999 the central-heating radiators were replaced with floor heating. In 2000 the ventilation system was renovated. There was a courtyard for walking and, where possible, inmates could take walks for one hour a day. Once a week inmates could take a shower. Once a week inmates could receive parcels and once a month they had the possibility of a visit. If medical aid was needed, it was called for from the town hospital.\nMeals were provided three times a day in the cells, two of them being hot meals. In case of necessity dietary food was provided to the inmates.\nInmates were fully provided with bedclothes and hygiene articles (soap, toilet paper). Bedclothes were changed one a week or more frequently when necessary. 24.  Not all information concerning the various periods of the applicant’s stay in the Jõgeva Arrest House has been preserved. In so far as the information is available, the applicant was kept in the following cells.\nFrom 5 May to 20 May 1997 he was kept in cell no. 4, measuring 10.7 sq. m. There were between one and four inmates in the cell.\nFrom 5 October to 10 October 1997 he was in cell no. 5. The size of the cell was 10.9 sq. m and there were four to six persons in the cell.\nFrom 27 February to 13 March 1998 he was again in cell no. 4. There were up to four detainees in the cell.\nFrom 6 November to 13 November 1998 he was held in cell no. 6. The size of it was 10.9 sq. m and there were between two and four inmates in the cell.\nFrom 21 January to 29 January 1999 he was held in the same cell. There were between three and five inmates in it.\nFrom 12 February to 26 February 1999 he was again in cell no. 5. There were between three and five persons in the cell.\nFrom 9 April to 20 April 1999 he was in cell no. 6. There were between three and five inmates in the cell.\nFrom 10 August to 13 August 1999 he was in cell no. 5. There were three inmates in it.\nFrom 17 September to 1 October 1999 he was in the same cell. There were between three and five persons in the cell.\nFrom 26 November to 3 December 1999 he was again in the same cell. There were three to four persons in it.\nThere was no confirmation that the applicant had been in the same cell as a contagious tuberculosis carrier. Detainees with such a disease were held in the hospital of the Central Prison.\n(b)  The Central Prison 25.  Until 1994 the Central Prison was the only pre-trial detention institution in Estonia alongside police arrest houses. In 1994 a new prison was built in Maardu to house under-age male prisoners. In 1996 and 1997 two sections for remand prisoners were built in Tallinn Prison, to which around 650 inmates were transferred from the Central Prison, allowing for an improvement of the conditions there.\nThe Central Prison was housed in the building of a sea castle built in 1840. In 1914 the building was converted into a prison. The cells in the prison had been rebuilt from the former cannon chambers and were designed for between two and sixteen persons. The outer wall of the castle was built of limestone and was about 1.5 metres thick. The prison’s windows were built where there had formerly been embrasures for cannons. Accordingly, the size of the windows and the natural light coming through them did not comply with the requirements for dwelling facilities. However, all windows could be opened and there was no problem with the inflow of air. The artificial lighting in the cells was sufficient. In 1997-1998 the heating system in most cells had been renovated.\nIn each cell there was a secluded toilet corner and access to cold drinking water, where it was also possible to wash oneself if necessary. At least once a week all inmates went to the sauna or could take a shower. The detainees were given bedclothes, which were changed once a week, or more frequently if necessary. Those who wished were provided with soap, washing powder and toilet paper by the prison. There was at least one hour’s walking time in fresh air every day. Inmates had an unlimited right to make appointments for meetings with the prison chaplain, social workers, doctors and the prison management.\nFor sleeping, the cells had double-tier bunks. There was at least one large table and chairs, the number of which depended on the size of the cell and the number of inmates. In the cells there were cupboards for personal belongings for each detainee. There was also a table and a stool in the punishment cells. Sleeping berths in the punishment cells were folded up and locked for the day.\nPrisoners received three hot meals a day in the cells. The quality of the food was regularly checked by the prison doctor and administration. Persons with health problems could follow a special diet prescribed by the doctor. All detainees had the right to buy additional foodstuffs, tobacco products and articles of basic necessity at the prison shop and to receive parcels from visitors.\nPrisoners could borrow books from the prison’s library. In addition to a couple of copies of newspapers subscribed to by the prison, the inmates could order newspapers and magazines at their own expense. In general, the prisoners were allowed to use radios or television sets in their cells. 26.  The prison hospital was in one of the wings of the Central Prison that was facing the land, where the walls were not as thick and the windows were larger. The natural light in the hospital was also better.\nDetainees with active tuberculosis were treated in a separate ward of the hospital, which was renovated in 1997-1998. Patients with this disease were offered two hours of outdoor exercise every day. 27.  All persons in custody had to pass health checks when admitted to prison; these included an X-ray examination. Examinations carried out by the medical staff showed that more than half of the patients were infected before incarceration. 28.  In 1998 the Government decided that the prison should be condemned as the building was unsuitable for that purpose, and that a new prison should be built in Tartu. Following the completion of the new establishment, the Central Prison was closed down in 2002. 29.  During the applicant’s stay in the Central Prison, he was in fourteen different cells altogether, as well as four different hospital wards and five punishment cells.\n(i)  The cells in which the applicant was held in the Central Prison 30.  From 25 June to 2 September 1996 he was in cell no. 89. The size of the cell was 36.4 sq. m and during the period concerned there were between twelve and fourteen detainees in the cell. The cell had a window measuring 97 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 2 September to 17 October 1996 he was in cell no. 141. The size of the cell was 7.4 sq. m and there were three detainees. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 17 October to 22 October 1996 the applicant was kept in cell no. 125. Its size was also 7.4 sq. m. The number of detainees was between one and three. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 22 October to 22 November 1996 and from 25 November 1997 to 28 November 1997 the applicant was in cell no. 78. The size of the cell was 37.6 sq. m and the number of inmates was between ten and fourteen. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nThe applicant stayed in cell no. 67 for several periods: from 22 November to 20 December 1996, from 25 December 1996 to 2 February 1997, from 11 February to 10 April 1997, from 20 May to 28 October 1997, from 1 December 1997 to 11 February 1998, from 25 February to 30 April 1998 and from 13 July to 14 July 1998. The size of the cell was 37.6 sq. m and the number of detainees was between six and fourteen. The size of the window was 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 8 February to 11 February 1997 the applicant was in cell no. 58. Its size was 34.9 sq. m and the number of inmates was between eleven and fourteen. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 20 April to 20 May 1997 he was in cell no. 50. The size of the cell was 35.5 sq. m and the number of detainees was between eight and fourteen. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 23 October to 25 October 1997 and from 20 November to 25 November 1997 the applicant was in cell no. 131. The size of the cell was 7.4 sq. m and the number of inmates in the cell was two or three. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 25 October to 6 November 1997 he was in cell no. 87. Its size was 36.1 sq. m and the number of detainees was between twelve and fourteen. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 2 May to 26 May 1998 the applicant was kept in cell no. 64a. The size of the cell was 35.8 sq. m and there were between eight and twelve detainees in it. It had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 26 May to 13 July 1998 the applicant was in cell no. 71. Its size was 38.2 sq. m and it had between ten and fourteen detainees. The size of the window was 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 14 July to 1 September 1998 and from 1 October to 2 October 1998 the applicant was in cell no. 73. The capacity of the cell was 37.6 sq. m and it accommodated twelve to fourteen detainees. It had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nFrom 2 October 1998 to 5 February 1999 the applicant was held in cell no. 72. The size of the cell was 37.9 sq. m. There were between eight and fourteen detainees in the cell. The cell had a window measuring 95 cm by 175 cm.\nThe applicant was held in cell no. 95 for several periods: from 5 February to 8 February 1999, from 20 April to 6 May 1999 and from 14 May to 17 May 1999. The cell’s capacity was 33.1 sq. m and it had six to fourteen inmates. Its window measured 95 cm by 175 cm.\n(ii)  The punishment cells in which the applicant was detained in the Central Prison 31.  While serving a disciplinary punishment from 20 December to 25 December 1996 the applicant was alone in punishment cell no. N-5. The cell had a window measuring 70 cm by 150 cm.\nFrom 10 April to 20 April 1997 the applicant was alone in punishment cell no. N-8. Its size was 7.4 sq. m and it had a window measuring 70 cm by 150 cm.\nFrom 28 November to 1 December 1997 the applicant was alone in punishment cell no. N-4. The size of the cell was 7.4 sq. m and it had a window measuring 70 cm by 150 cm.\nFrom 30 April to 2 May 1998 the applicant was alone in punishment cell no. 1. Its size was 7.4 sq. m and it had a window measuring 70 cm by 150 cm.\nFrom 3 September to 9 September 1999 he was held alone in punishment cell no. N-7. Its capacity was 7.4 sq. m and its window measured 70 cm by 150 cm.\n(iii)  The wards in which the applicant stayed in the Central Prison hospital 32.  On 6 November 1997 the applicant was hospitalised for medical treatment. He was in prison hospital ward no. 153, which measured 29.4 sq. m. There were five patients in the ward. The ward had a window measuring 230 cm by 165 cm.\nThe applicant spent several periods in hospital ward no. 154: from 6 November to 20 November 1997, from 14 September to 1 October 1998, from 8 February to 20 April 1999 and from 6 May to 14 May 1999. The size of the ward was 29.4 sq. m and it housed five patients. It had a window of 230 cm by 165 cm.\nFrom 11 February to 25 February 1998 the applicant was in hospital ward no. 177. It measured 26 sq. m and there were four patients in it. It had a window of 230 cm by 165 cm.\nFrom 17 May to 3 September 1999 and from 9 September 1999 to 9 March 2000 he was in hospital ward no. 168. The size of the ward was 15.5 sq. m and there were two to three patients in it. It had a window measuring 230 cm by 165 cm. 33.  According to the applicant’s medical records, he was healthy in March 1997. 34.  In November 1997 cirrhosis of the liver arose as a complication of hepatitis B and C, from which he had suffered in 1994. The applicant was admitted to Tallinn Central Prison hospital with liver damage from 6 November to 20 November 1997.\nOn 11 February 1998 the applicant was again hospitalised and was further diagnosed with hepatitis B and C. He stayed in the prison hospital until 25 February 1998.\nHis further stays in the hospital lasted from 14 September to 1 October 1998, from an unspecified date in October to 6 November 1998 and from 7 May to 14 May 1999. 35.  In May 1999 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis, which led to his hospitalisation from 17 May to 22 December 1999. According to a medical certificate, he was suffering in addition from cirrhosis and hepatitis B and C. 36.  Examinations conducted in March and September 2000 revealed that the applicant was no longer in need of special treatment. 37.  Following the applicant’s release, in November 2000, from Murru Prison where he was serving his sentence, the Tartu County Expert Committee on Disabilities established, in a decision of 28 February 2001, that the applicant’s capacity to work had been reduced by 80%. The cause of this incapacity was general illness. The experts assessed his invalidity as being of the second degree. The decision was effective until 31 March 2002 and a new expert assessment was scheduled for 6 March 2002.\nIn taking their decision, the experts relied on the information on the applicant’s state of health provided by his family doctor and the medical records submitted by the Central Prison hospital.\nII.  FINDINGS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE PREVENTION OF TORTURE AND INHUMAN AND DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (CPT) 38.  In July 1997 the CPT carried out its first visit to Estonia. On 30 October 2002 it published a report of its visit, which contains the following findings concerning the Jõgeva Police District Arrest House and the Central Prison.\n“ ... 26.  The CPT’s delegation visited eight police arrest houses. Conditions of detention were extremely poor in almost all of them.\n... 30.  Very poor conditions of detention were ... found in the arrest houses in Jõgeva ...  Here also, the cells were frequently overcrowded and invariably poorly equipped, there was little or no access to natural light, and artificial lighting and ventilation were often woefully inadequate. ...\nNevertheless, it should be added that detained persons met at Jõgeva Arrest House indicated that staff in that establishment did what they could to alleviate the conditions of detention; for example, family members were allowed to bring packages at any time (rather than once a week, which was the case elsewhere), and detained persons without soap or toilet paper were provided with these items.\n... 33.  In all the arrest houses visited, the delegation observed that the food supplied by the State to detained persons was very meagre in quantity.  Invariably, only one meal was provided per day; this was served at midday and usually consisted of bread and soup, which might on some occasions be accompanied by an egg or a piece of sausage.  Breakfast and supper each consisted merely of tea, which was not always provided with sugar ... In several arrest houses, staff members voiced concern about the inadequate amount of food provided, but added that the very low food allowance per detained person (reportedly 19 kroons in Tallinn and Tartu, falling to 12 kroons in Narva) made it difficult to improve the situation.  Not surprisingly, several detainees indicated that they relied heavily on food brought in by family members.\n... 37.  ... The CPT was also concerned to learn that several detained persons who had been returned from the Central Prison to an arrest house alleged that their medical treatment for tuberculosis had been interrupted, allegations which were confirmed by health care staff in some arrest houses.  Such a situation is highly dangerous for both the prisoners concerned and the public at large. 38.  Depriving someone of his liberty brings with it the responsibility to detain him under conditions which are consistent with the inherent dignity of the human person.  The facts found in the course of the CPT’s visit show that, regarding persons placed in police arrest houses, the Estonian authorities are not fulfilling that responsibility.  Almost without exception, the conditions in the police arrest houses visited could fairly be described as inhuman and degrading.\n... 60.  The CPT’s delegation examined in some depth the situation at the Central Prison in Tallinn, which is widely recognised as the most problematic establishment in the Estonian prison system.  Senior officials of the Prison Board referred to it as ‘a stone around our necks’.\n... 61.  The Central Prison serves principally as a remand facility for the whole of Estonia and also comprises a prison hospital with a nationwide function. The prison moved into its current premises – an old naval fortress – as a temporary measure in 1914. The delegation was informed that, at the time of the visit, its official capacity was 1,100 (including 90 hospital beds). On the first day of the visit, the establishment was holding a total of 1,271 prisoners (including 60 women prisoners, 104 in-patients at the hospital and 107 sentenced prisoners assigned to work in the establishment).\n... 64.  At the outset of the visit, members of the Prison Board identified three serious problems facing the Estonian prison system: a rising prison population, which had led to overcrowding; a lack of work for prisoners, approximately 80% of whom were unemployed; and difficulties in the field of prison staff.\n... 73.  Finally, although the Central Prison shall be dealt with in a separate section of this report, the CPT must emphasise already at this point that many of the prisoners in that establishment were subject to a series of negative factors – overcrowding, poor hygiene conditions, an impoverished regime – which could certainly be described as inhuman and degrading treatment. 74.  The conditions of detention of remand prisoners at the Central Prison were intolerable.\nFirst of all, the prisoners were being held in grossly overcrowded conditions; even the very modest standard applied in Estonia of 2.5 m² per prisoner was not being offered to the majority of remand prisoners. By way of example, cells measuring 35 m² were being used to accommodate 18 or more prisoners; one such cell in the reception unit was accommodating 28 recently admitted prisoners. The delegation also found six prisoners being accommodated in cells measuring 15 m² (in the women’s section). Reference should also be made to a suite of 12 cells, each measuring 3.3 m², found in section 7 of the prison. Most of them had a single occupant, but some were accommodating two inmates. In the CPT’s opinion, a cell of such a limited size is unfit to serve as accommodation for one prisoner, let alone two.\nIn many cells, there was little room for any furniture apart from bunk beds; at best there was a table and stools.  Indeed, living space was at such a premium that, in some cells, inmates did not have their own bed and, consequently, had to take turns to sleep. All of the cells were equipped with a lavatory and a wash basin.  However, the lavatory was not partitioned and prisoners had to resort to makeshift curtain arrangements to try and provide a modicum of privacy; further, these in-cell sanitary facilities were frequently in a very poor state of repair and dirty, as were the cell facilities in general.\nMost cells had only limited access to natural light – often because cell windows were small and/or had been screened or covered – and ventilation was poor. As for the 3.3 m² cells in section 7, they did not have a window at all; consequently, they had no access to natural light and no evident means of ventilation. Further, allegations were heard that the prison’s heating system was not a match for Estonian winters. 75.  The CPT was also concerned to note that many remand prisoners had difficulty maintaining an acceptable level of personal hygiene.  Two factors contributed to this situation:  the prisoners were themselves often destitute, and they received virtually no assistance from the prison establishment.\n Washing powder was the sole item provided to prisoners in their cells, and soap was made available only during the weekly shower.  Prisoners without money or help from their families had to rely on the generosity of fellow inmates to obtain items such as lavatory paper, soap and toothpaste.  This situation was particularly resented by female remand prisoners at the Central Prison; they complained that they had even to manufacture their sanitary towels using rags.\nFurther, no assistance was provided to prisoners who did not have proper clothing at their disposal. 76.  The deplorable material conditions described above were compounded by the absence of anything which remotely resembled a regime.  The principal – practically the only – out-of-cell activity consisted of one hour of outdoor exercise every day. Inmates took their exercise in small groups, in facilities which were not large enough to enable them to exert themselves physically. Loud music was played during exercise periods, apparently in order to prevent any communication between inmates placed in different yards. The only other regular out-of-cell activity was a weekly 20-minute shower session. Visits from relatives or friends were subject to authorisation by the relevant investigating authority and, apparently, a rare occurrence.\nAs regards in-cell activities, they were limited to reading newspapers and books. In short, remand prisoners held at the Central Prison led a monotonous and purposeless existence, a situation which could last for months and, on occasion, for years.\n... 99.  Medical staff in the Central Prison expressed alarm about the rising number of tuberculosis cases. Having regard to available information concerning the prevalence of tuberculosis in Estonian prisons, the CPT tends to agree that there is cause for major concern. Tuberculosis is a serious life-threatening condition if left untreated; prison authorities have a clear obligation to ensure adequate methods of detection and to provide treatment.\nThe screening procedures currently employed (i.e. fluorographic examination of the lung fields on entry to prison and at six monthly intervals) are effective in detecting cases of active pulmonary tuberculosis. However, in view of the rising prevalence of tuberculosis, consideration might usefully be given to the introduction of a more sensitive detection technique by using a tuberculin skin sensitivity test (such as the Mantoux test), in addition to fluorography. By combining these two techniques, a higher case detection rate could be achieved, in particular during the earlier stages of the disease. Further, in view of the high risk of transmission during custody in police arrest houses (where conditions are very conducive to air-borne infection), it would be highly desirable to have the tuberculosis screening process carried out at an earlier stage of a person’s deprivation of liberty.\n... 101.  Hepatitis B transmission amongst inmates was also a source of concern for medical staff at the Central Prison; they indicated that, in their view, transmission was taking place through using non-sterile tattooing needles or penetrative sex between inmates.\n... 103. The Prison Hospital provided in-patient care, covering a range of surgical and non-surgical specialities, to inmates from all prisons in Estonia.\nThe hospital’s health care staff were sufficient in number, comprising fourteen medical doctors and twenty-six nurses; they were all employed full-time at the hospital, and a shift system enabled them to provide a 24-hour emergency service. Further, medical staff were adequately trained and appeared committed to providing the best possible care to patients under the prevailing adverse conditions.  It should be added that medical and nursing files were well kept.\n... 105.  Despite the efforts of medical staff, the material conditions in the hospital were such that care was seriously sub-standard. The hospital was both overcrowded (150 patients for a theoretical capacity of 90) and in a poor state of repair.\nBy way of illustration, up to eight patients were being accommodated in 27 m² rooms, with very limited access to natural light and inadequate ventilation. More generally, the premises as a whole were in a dilapidated state (flaking plaster and peeling paint, broken windows, uneven floors with broken surfaces, and potentially hazardous electrical wiring/installations), which rendered it practically impossible to clean and disinfect to hospital standards.\nPatients’ rooms were not equipped with a call system; further, they were kept locked by prison officers, thus hampering access of health care staff to patients. 106.  The negative effects upon patients’ lives of the situation described above were exacerbated by the fact that, with the exception of those suffering from tuberculosis, patients were offered no outdoor exercise or other activities (reading, games, recreation). 107.  As regards inmates requiring treatment for pulmonary tuberculosis, they were held and cared for in similar conditions to those described in paragraph 105 above. In particular, they were accommodated in overcrowded, poorly-ventilated rooms. The only differences as compared to other patients were that they benefited from two hours of outdoor exercise every day and received a supplemented diet.\n The CPT has noted that, at the time of the visit, four additional rooms had been laid out to accommodate patients suffering from tuberculosis, but were not yet in service.  It appeared that they would offer a far more therapeutic environment: they were spacious, and had good access to natural light and ventilation.” 39.  In their responses to the CPT report, filed in June 1998, the Government submitted the following in respect of the general conditions in the Central Prison and its future:\n“A reduction of the number of remand prisoners in the Central Prison can be made only by their transfer to the Tallinn Prison which is built according to modern standards. This can be done only within certain limits. In the remand unit of the Tallinn Prison up to 5 persons are kept in a cell for reasons of lack of available space.\nThe cells in the Central Prison from which the inmates are transferred to Tallinn Prison will remain in use and as a result the overcrowding of other cells will be reduced. Demolition of the cells which are less than 6 m² is programmed and they will soon be condemned.\nThe general conditions prevailing in the Central Prison will be improved step by step, dependent on resources, which are short at present.\n•  Every inmate has his own mattress today;\n•  During the period August 1997 to April 1998 19 cells have been repaired. During the preparation for last winter the heating system in 27 cells was repaired;\n•  In July 1997 4 new wards were opened in the hospital’s tuberculosis unit; at the present time (according to the plan) the remaining wards of the tuberculosis and surgery units are under repair;\n•  In the fourth quarter of the year 1997 the sauna in the tuberculosis unit was opened and a room for long-term meetings was built. The indoor gymnasium for the convicted was also opened;\n•  In 1998 the disinfection-cell, the kitchen and dependencies (dish washing room, storeroom and corridor) were repaired.\n...\nThe Estonian Prison Board is of the opinion that the Central Prison should be condemned as the building is unfit for the purpose. It was built as a naval fortress and was taken into use as a prison in 1914. It has also been shown that economically it is unprofitable to keep the Central Prison in use. The reasons are that:\n•  the architectural layout of the building is impractical (large cells, insufficient lighting in cells, etc.)\n•  technical facilities (the water supply, canalisation and the central heating piping) are derelict and to replace them would be too expensive\n•  there is no proper ventilation\n•  there is permanent humidity and damp in the building, because the prison is situated on the seaside.\nIt will be necessary to reallocate the prisoners at present detained in the Central Prison, For this reason it is planned to build a new prison in Tartu. The Government decided on 12 May 1998 to find the necessary funds and the construction work will start shortly.” 40.  In September 2003 the CPT carried out its latest visit to Estonia, during which the Jõgeva Arrest House was also inspected. On 27 April 2005 the CPT published a report on its visit. The report contains the following findings, in so far as relevant:\n“ ... 26.  The material conditions under which detained persons (in police custody, on remand or sentenced) were being held in certain police arrest houses, including those in Kohtla-Järve and Narva, were appalling; conditions also remained very poor in Jõgeva.\nDetainees were locked up 24 hours per day - with no outdoor exercise - in cells that were filthy, dimly lit (with no access to natural light, and poor artificial lighting) and severely overcrowded (up to 15 persons in a cell of 15 m²). [Footnote no. 18: In a number of cases, the levels of arrest house overcrowding in September 2003 actually exceeded those observed by the CPT in 1997 and 1999.] The unpartitioned lavatories – where persons were obliged to relieve themselves in the direct presence of their cellmates – exacerbated the effects of the very poor ventilation, rendering the already dank air nauseating. In many cases, persons were provided with no mattresses and blankets, and lacked basic personal hygiene products. The cumulative effect of the execrable material conditions and the impoverished regime could well be described as inhuman and degrading. This state of affairs was exacerbated by the fact that persons were being held under such conditions for prolonged periods (i.e. for up to three months and, on occasion, even longer).\n... 28.  An impoverished regime – 24-hour in-cell lock-up – remained the norm for everyone detained in an arrest house. Of the six arrest houses visited by the delegation, Jõgeva was the only one where detainees were being offered the opportunity to take outdoor exercise, albeit only twice a week or so. Even if a particular establishment was equipped with yards, staff shortages were cited as reasons for not granting outdoor exercise to detainees. The promised enlargement of the 6 m² ‘yards’ at Tartu Arrest House had not taken place, and they remained unused.\nAs regards contacts with the outside world, the Internal Rules of Tallinn Arrest House permitted one two-hour visit once a week.  However, many persons detained at other arrest houses complained that they were allowed only one 15-minute visit per month.\n... 53.  More generally, the CPT has noted that the average amount of space per remand prisoner in Estonia is 3 m². Such an average does not offer a satisfactory amount of living space; the Committee recommends that the Estonian authorities strive to maintain a standard of at least 4 m² of living space per prisoner in multi-occupancy cells, and that official capacities be calculated accordingly.\n...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant was born in 1972. When the application was lodged he was being held in Schrassig Prison. He is currently being held under a semi‑custodial regime in Givenich Prison. 11.  On 15 December 1998 the applicant was remanded in custody. 12.  In a judgment of 22 October 2001 the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment, of which three years were suspended, for assault occasioning actual bodily harm, rape and false imprisonment accompanied by acts of torture, committed on 10 December 1998. 13.  The applicant was granted a divorce on 19 October 2000. He provided the Court with various judicial decisions given between 14 June 2001 and 13 April 2005 concerning his right of contact with his three minor children. 14.  While in prison the applicant submitted several requests for temporary leave of absence (“prison leave”), which are the subject of the present case. 15.  The applicant stated that he had submitted a request for prison leave to the Attorney General in October 2003. 16.  At the request of the counselling service’s psychologist the applicant explained on 16 October 2003 that he was requesting prison leave for one day and had no objection to being escorted while on leave. He stated that the reason for the request was to complete certain administrative formalities, which he detailed as follows:\n“- go to a photographer or photo booth to obtain passport photos;\n- go to the Transport Ministry to renew my driving licence (medical certificate already obtained);\n- go to the Embassy to renew my consular registration card;\n- go to see Mr [B.] at Luxembourg police station, Investigations Division, to pick up an envelope containing documents needed by a former client;\n- go to see the manager of [B.] bank in Esch/Alzette;\n- go to the taxation office in Esch/Alzette;\n- meet a group of friends in a restaurant near Esch/Alzette;\n- go to my flat in Differdange to collect the remaining documents for the same client;\n- take some measurements for items I might make in the [prison] workshop;\n- go to Differdange town hall for a personal interview with the mayor;\n- go to the home of Mrs [S.] in Luxembourg to meet her husband;\n- go to my lawyer’s office to hand over the missing documents for my former client;\n- if possible, go to the bookshop near [S.]’s house.”\nIn his letter, the applicant stated further:\n“... Unfortunately, the civil damages are still far from being paid, as I have not even had enough funds to make a down-payment. At the moment I am still engaged in repaying my loans and other debts to the various authorities under the arrangements entered into with the legal service in order to avoid an unending series of seizures of my property. ...” 17.  On 29 October 2003 a psychologist issued a certificate (confirmed on 25 November 2003 by a second psychologist) stating that the applicant had begun a course of psychotherapy on 19 May 1999 which had been discontinued on 30 September 2002 for reasons beyond his control. The psychologist stressed that the applicant had been anxious to understand what had driven him to commit the offences and to do everything possible to avoid reoffending. 18.  On 5 November 2003 the Attorney General’s representative sent a memorandum to the prison governor worded as follows:\n“...please inform the prisoner Thomas Boulois\nthat by decision of the Prison Board\n[the] request for prison leave ... [is] refused in view of the risk of deportation (an application was made to the Ministry of Justice on 25 June 2003, but no decision has yet been taken). There is also a risk that the prisoner might abscond, given that he has failed to reflect on his crime. Before being allowed any privileges he must begin to pay the civil party.” 19.  On 17 January 2004 the applicant reiterated his request, stating that the reasons and the itinerary for the day’s prison leave remained the same. On 27 January 2004 his lawyer submitted arguments in support of the applicant’s request and concluded as follows:\n“... granting [the applicant] a day’s prison leave during which he could begin to put his affairs in order with a view to leading an independent life [outside] prison, [would] not only aid [the applicant’s] rehabilitation and reintegration into society, but [would] also enable him to start paying compensation to the civil party as quickly as possible. ...” 20.  On 17 March 2004 the Attorney General’s representative sent a memorandum to the prison governor containing the following passages:\n“... please inform the prisoner Thomas Boulois\nthat by decision of the Prison Board\nthe decision of 5 November 2003 refusing his request for prison leave ... remains valid.” 21.  On 25 May 2004 the applicant lodged an application with the Administrative Court (tribunal administratif) for judicial review of the decisions of the Prison Board of 5 November 2003 and 17 March 2004. 22.  At a hearing held on 6 December 2004 the Administrative Court raised of its own motion the question whether it had jurisdiction to examine the application for judicial review. The Government, which had not raised an objection alleging lack of jurisdiction, left the matter to the discretion of the court. 23.  On 23 December 2004 the Administrative Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the application for judicial review, for the following reasons:\n“... A distinction must be made between administrative measures relating to the treatment of prisoners in prison (such as a decision to place them in a more secure part of the prison, and in particular imposing a strict confinement regime – see Administrative Court ruling no. 14568 of 10 July 2002), which are taken in the context of enforcement by the prison service, and decisions which may alter the nature or scope of a sentence handed down by the ordinary courts, which are to be classified as judicial rather than administrative decisions.\nIn the instant case it must be acknowledged that the granting or refusal of the privilege of prison leave constitutes a measure which alters the ‘scope’ of the sentence imposed on the applicant by the ordinary court.\nHence, the two decisions in question are judicial in nature.\nAccordingly, bearing in mind their nature as identified above, the impugned decisions cannot be the subject of an application to the administrative courts... .” 24.  On 14 April 2005 the Higher Administrative Court (cour administrative) upheld this ruling, as follows:\n“The [applicant] submitted that the court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to examine his application for judicial review, arguing that: no other remedy existed in respect of such refusal, with the result that section 2(1) of the Law of 7 November 1996 on the organisation of the administrative courts should be applied; the impugned decisions did not alter the scope of the sentence; the court had denied him justice in breach of Article [6 § 1] of the [Convention] by depriving him of a fair hearing.\n... The [applicant]’s case concerns a request for prison leave, in other words, a decision which alters the nature of the execution of the sentence handed down by the ordinary courts and which should therefore be classified as a judicial rather than an administrative decision.\nThe expression ‘the scope of the sentence imposed’, used by the court, is not to be understood in the present case as the length of the sentence but as the manner of its execution in a broad sense.\nThe administrative court was therefore correct in ruling that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the application.\nA finding by the administrative courts that they lack jurisdiction cannot be construed as a declaration of unwillingness on their part to rule on the issue; the allegation of a denial of justice should therefore be dismissed as unfounded.\nArticle [6 § 1] of the [Convention] is not applicable in relation to a body which has no power to rule on the merits. ...” 25.  On 11 August 2004 the applicant submitted a third request for prison leave, in the following terms:\n“... I have successfully attended several courses run by the CEP-L [Chamber of Commerce] and would like to continue with a view to obtaining the corresponding diplomas.\nThe diplomas concerned are in accounting and computer (PC) use. I completed the previous courses successfully, but for the sake of feasibility it is now essential for me to be able to attend the courses of the autumn session at the CEP-L itself. ...” 26.  In a decision of 21 September 2004 the request was refused on the ground that the applicant could attend courses in prison and that he had made no substantial efforts to date towards paying compensation to the victim. The decision also referred to the reasoning of the decision of 5 November 2003. 27.  In a fourth request, submitted on 24 February 2005, the applicant observed, among other things, that he could not understand why, in view of the need for him to reintegrate into society, he had been refused permission to attend the final classes required in order to obtain the diplomas in accounting and computing. He added that the reason he had requested prison leave was to renew his identity papers and driving licence and make arrangements for the repayment of his debts to the various institutions and the civil party. 28.  On 23 March 2005 his request was refused for failure to give reasons. 29.  On 12 July 2005 a fifth request for prison leave (not provided to the Court) was refused on the ground that there was a risk that the applicant would not return to prison. 30.  On 4 May 2006 a sixth request for prison leave (not provided to the Court) was refused on the ground that the applicant had been making no efforts, in particular with regard to paying the civil damages, and was refusing to abide by the conditions imposed on him. 31.  Following the refusal of this request, the applicant applied to the Attorney General’s Department on five occasions between 10 May and 29 October 2006. He requested assistance in putting in place a repayment plan appropriate to his circumstances and the demands of the civil party, and sought an explanation of the requirements he was expected to meet with a view to his reintegration in society, so that he could take steps to comply with them. On 6 November 2006 the Attorney General’s representative decided that he would not, as matters stood, reply to the various letters, which did not call for any comment. 32.  On 20 November 2006 the Attorney General acknowledged receipt of a request from the applicant for an interview and said that he would meet him during one of his forthcoming visits to the prison. The applicant claimed that the meeting had never taken place. 33.  According to the case file, in April 2009 the applicant was transferred to a semi-custodial regime in Givenich Prison, where he carried on paid work as a cook. On 10 February 2010 he started up a business as a sole trader.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, Mr Vörður Ólafsson, is an Icelandic national who was born in 1961 and lives in Reykjavik. 7.  The applicant is a master builder and is a member of the Master Builders’ Association (“the MBA”). Under the Industry Charge Act (Law no. 134/1993 – “the 1993 Act”), he was under an obligation to pay a levy known as the “industry charge” to the Federation of Icelandic Industries (“the FII”), an organisation of which the applicant was not a member and to which the MBA was not affiliated. The 1993 Act provided that a charge of 0.08% should be levied on all industrial activities in Iceland as defined in the Act. The definition included all activities coming under activity code numbers enumerated in an appendix to the Act. Private-sector enterprises not covered by the code numbers were not subject to the industry charge. This was the case, for example, for enterprises in the meat-processing, milk-processing and fish-processing industries. Other enterprises in the food and drink industry were covered. Enterprises entirely under public ownership or established by special statute were not covered (section 2). Revenues from the industry charge were to be transferred to the FII, and were to be used for the promotion and development of industry in Iceland (section 3). The State Treasury was to receive 0.5% of the charge collected in order to cover the costs of its collection (section 1). 8.  More than 10,000 persons (legal persons and self-employed individuals) paid the industry charge. The FII had between 1,100 and 1,200 members (enterprises and self-employed individuals). 9.  The Government supplied copies of the FII’s reports to the Ministry of Industry regarding the disbursement of the industry charge for the years 2000, 2003 and 2006. 10.  The FII’s report for the year 2003 (dated 4 July 2004) stated:\n“The Federation’s accounts have not indicated whether particular operational items are paid for with funds from membership fees, capital income or the industry charge, because an overwhelming proportion of its work benefits industrial companies whether they are members of the Federation or not. The Ministry of Industry has not expressed any reservation regarding this arrangement, and legislation concerning the industry charge imposes no other requirements.\nThe Federation and the Ministry of Industry are, however, in agreement about the requirement for a more detailed account of how the industry charge is disbursed, and that has been done in this report.” 11.  Under the title “Disbursement of the industry charge in 2003 according to the Federation’s accounts”, the report included a table showing the “Income and expenditure according to the Federation’s audited accounts for the year 2003”. In a separate column the table indicated the percentage of funds originating from the industry charge in relation to each item and sub-item. This included the following items: “Operating profits” and “Operating expenses”. It also detailed “Further itemisation of disbursement of the industry charge according to the accounts”, namely: (1) “Wages and related expenses”; (2) “Meetings and conferences”; (3) “Promotional activities”; (4) “Publications”; (5) “Branches and special projects”; and (6) “General and administrative expenses”.\nFor each of these sub-items the report contained explanatory notes, providing information on the treatment of members as compared with non-members. For example, under sub-item (1) it was stated that 2.5 of the 20 man-years concerned work that benefited members only. With reference to sub-item (3) it was stated that FII exhibitions were open to everyone and that FII members enjoyed a discount on participation fees. Under sub-item (5) it was stated that non-members could access the quality management project but would be charged a higher fee than members. 12.  From the table it appears that in 2003 the FII’s operating revenues totalled 315,800,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK), of which ISK 197,359,000 had originated from the industry charge transferred to the FII by the State Treasury; ISK 84,973,000 from membership fees; and ISK 33,468,000 from other income. That same year, the operating expenses had totalled ISK 289,654,000, of which ISK 234,617,000 (81%) had been spent on public projects (comprising ISK 197,359,000 derived from the industry charge and ISK 37,258,000 from membership fees and other income). 13.  The Government explained that in fulfilling its role and objectives of promoting Icelandic industry pursuant to section 3 of the 1993 Act, the FII notably worked to develop and protect the image of the industry, allocated large amounts of the funds obtained though the industry charge to training, gave opinions on behalf of the business community on draft legislation and regulations in the sphere of environmental affairs, and instilled in public authorities the need to observe restraint in public procurement and to observe clear and transparent tender rules. 14.  At the material time, the applicant paid the following amounts in industry charge for the years indicated: for 2001 ISK 23,023 (255 euros (EUR)); for 2002 ISK 20,639 (EUR 229); for 2003 ISK 12,567 (EUR 139); and for 2004 ISK 5,946 (EUR 66). 15.  On 8 November 2004 the applicant lodged proceedings against the State with the Reykjavik District Court, requesting an order to exempt him from the charges imposed on him in respect of the years 2001 to 2004. 16.  By a judgment of 13 July 2005, the District Court found in favour of the State and dismissed the applicant’s action. 17.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Iceland, arguing, inter alia, that section 3 of the 1993 Act meant that all individuals and companies engaged in particular business activities had to pay membership fees to the FII, irrespective of whether they were members or not. The applicant considered that Article 14 of the Articles of the Federation, which provided for the membership charge, clearly reflected its nature in that, as was provided therein, FII members paying an industry charge which was transferred to the FII should have that part deducted from their membership fees. Thus, by the levy and collection of the charge, membership of the FII was in fact made compulsory for others, although they enjoyed no rights vis-à-vis the FII. Consequently, the industry charge was merely a membership fee to the FII. The applicant submitted that he was a member of the MBA, to which he paid his fees and through which he considered his interests to be best served, and he had no wish to be a member of the FII. The latter pursued policies with which he disagreed and which were contrary to his own interests. The compulsory membership of the FII was incompatible with his right to freedom of association as protected by Article 74 § 2 of the Icelandic Constitution and Article 11 of the Convention. The applicant also argued that by virtue of the 1993 Act, he was unjustifiably taxed in excess of other taxes and that, under the Act, a limited group was being taxed “for the benefit of another limited group or the restricted interests of others”. Finally, he submitted that the imposition of the charge amounted to discrimination in breach of Article 65 of the Constitution, as the taxation was dependent upon the ownership structure of an enterprise, and the enumeration of activity code numbers, on which the taxation was based, was haphazard in nature.\nThe State disputed the applicant’s submission that the industry charge constituted a membership fee to the FII. They argued that by law it was a tax levied by the State on particular groups of individuals and legal persons, in accordance with general and applicable standards, without anything being required in return. By the same Act, the decision had been taken to have the charge transferred to the FII, which was to use it for the promotion and development of Icelandic industry. Such an allocation of tax revenues to an association provided for by law did not mean that those who paid the relevant tax were thereby obliged by law to become members of it. The charge was not expected to be used for the benefit of the members alone, but for the benefit of all industries and industrial development in Iceland, under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry. Any discounts on membership fees were decided unilaterally by the FII, without any connection to the assessment and collection of the charge. The State also denied that the 1993 Act involved discrimination between persons who were in the appellant’s situation and those who enjoyed an exemption from the charge. It was a reasonable and objective arrangement to exempt public enterprises from the charge, and it was in the nature of things that the considerations that applied to companies under public ownership were different from those relating to private enterprises. The State also argued that public support for industry and industrial development sometimes took the form of launching industrial activities that others were not capable of initiating. Finally, the number of publicly owned industrial enterprises had been greatly reduced in recent years. The State also disputed the allegation that the enumeration of activity code numbers governing the taxation had been haphazard. 18.  By a judgment of 20 December 2005, the Supreme Court, by four votes to one, rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the District Court’s judgment. It held as follows:\n“As mentioned in the District Court’s judgment, the Supreme Court rendered a judgment on 17 December 1998 in case no. 166/1998, Gunnar Pétursson v. the Republic of Iceland, published at page 4406 of the Court’s Reports for that year. The appellant in that case requested an exemption from his liability to pay the industry loan fund charge and the industry charge for the years 1995 and 1996. He based his case on arguments that are to a significant degree identical to those invoked by the appellant in the present case. The Supreme Court accepts the view of the respondent in that the above-mentioned case must be regarded as the precedent in the case now to be determined, to the extent that the issues raised by the appellant in support of his present claim were determined in that case.\nIn the earlier case the appellant, as here, maintained that as a result of his liability to pay the industry charge, which is to be transferred to the Federation of Icelandic Industries, he was obliged to be a member of the Federation. The Supreme Court mentioned in its judgment that although the charge was transferred to the Federation, it was to be used for a certain purpose (see section 3 of the 1993 Act), and did not constitute a grant to the Federation. The use of the revenues was subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Industry. The Court accepted that this arrangement did not involve obligatory membership of the Federation of Icelandic Industries in breach of the Constitution and the European Convention [on Human Rights]. It also noted that even if the Federation of Icelandic Industries had exceeded the boundaries laid down in the [1993] Act, this could not have the effect of exempting the appellant from paying the charge. With this in mind, and in other respects by reference to the grounds stated in the contested judgment, the Court must reject the conclusion that the appellant’s arguments in this regard may lead to a granting of his request. Bearing in mind that the Federation of Icelandic Industries is under a legal duty to use the revenues from the industry charge for promoting Icelandic industries and industrial development, and consequently for the benefit of the activities being taxed, the Court cannot accept that the legislature thus exceeded its powers.\nThe appellant submits that equality was not respected, since enterprises under public ownership may be exempted from the charge. As regards this argument, it must be noted that various factors distinguish enterprises under public ownership from privately owned enterprises, and in various fields their taxation is governed by different considerations, as seen in Icelandic tax legislation in general. In his written submissions, the appellant did not present a comparison of his situation vis-à-vis any particular public enterprises. It has not been established that any discrimination has taken place between the appellant and the parties to whom the exemptions of the [1993] Act apply. Finally, the appellant bases his request on the assertion that the activity code enumeration, by reference to which taxation under section 2(1) of the 1993 Act takes place, is haphazard in nature. The charge is levied on industry, subsequently defined as any activity coming under the activity code numbers enumerated in the classification of Icelandic business activities in an appendix to the 1993 Act, as amended by Law no. 81/1996. Industry, thus defined, does not only cover manufacturing industry, but also processing and services, including the construction industry. This defines the activities to be included under the term ‘industry’ within the meaning of the [1993] Act, distinguishing them from other fields of economic activity, including activities that have developed within the fields of agriculture and fishing. Such classification of economic activity has furthermore been recognised as a basis for other forms of taxation other than the industry charge. The appellant’s claim cannot be granted on the basis of the arguments presented.” 19.  The dissenting member of the Supreme Court, Mr Justice Ólafur Börkur Þorvaldsson, gave a separate opinion containing, inter alia, the following reasons:\n“I\nThe original Industry Charge Act was Law no. 48/1975. It was stated in the explanatory notes to the draft law that it had been submitted in accordance with a recommendation of the FII, the National Federation of Craftsmen, and the Union of Icelandic Cooperative Societies. These provided a detailed report, which apparently was adopted verbatim in the explanatory notes. It included the observation that ‘... it may be noted that industrial enterprises and self-employed persons in industry collect various taxes for public authorities, both from their employees and from the consumers. The tax collection they carry out and are responsible for amounts to thousands of millions annually, entirely without remuneration. It therefore seems reasonable that the State should undertake to collect, by way of compensation for these parties, a charge which amounts to only a small fraction of what they collect for the State. This source of revenue should create a financial basis for more active participation by professional federations within Icelandic industry in shaping future industrial development’. The Act also contained a provision similar to that of the Act now in effect, that the Ministry of Industry should be sent an annual report on the use of the revenues derived from the charge. In this context, it was mentioned in the explanatory notes that this was a ‘provision intended to ensure that public authorities will be given a reasonable account of how the industry charge is used’.\nLaw no. 48/1975 was superseded by the present Law no. 134/1993. It was stated in the explanatory notes to the [1993] Act that those liable for the charge would be the same as before, but a system of reference to activity code numbers in accordance with the business activity classification of the Bureau of Statistics was adopted in order to ‘remove any doubt as to who are liable for this charge’. It was furthermore provided that the revenues derived from the charge should be transferred to the FII in their entirety, whereas under the previous Act they had been distributed between the Union of Icelandic Cooperative Societies, the Canning Industry Sales Office, the Federation of Icelandic Industrialists and the National Federation of Craftsmen. At the same time the tax base was changed, since the municipal business tax, on which the level of tax had previously been determined, had been abolished.\nII\nAccording to the Articles of its Statute, the FII is a federation of enterprises, self-employed persons, trades and master builders’ associations, who jointly wish to pursue common goals as enumerated in Article 2. This Article states the purpose and role of the Federation in ten points, as involving the promotion of Icelandic industries in various ways and supporting the members by all the means which are detailed therein. According to the documents submitted, the association involves itself with political issues, for example as regards membership of the European Union and taxation in various fields. Pursuant to Article 8, each member of the Federation enjoys voting rights at its meetings in proportion to his paid membership fees. It is provided in Article 14 that the membership fees are a maximum of 0.15% of the previous year’s turnover, but the board of the Federation may decide to collect lower membership fees. The provision goes on to state that ‘[p]arties paying an industry charge that is transferred to the Federation shall have that part recognised, and deducted when their membership fees to the Federation are calculated. If the industry charge is no longer levied, this deduction shall automatically be abolished. The voting right of each member shall be calculated on the basis of his paid membership fee. Management and decision-making within the Federation is, as generally within associations, the responsibility of its board and the managing director’.\nDocuments submitted from the FII relating to the period to which the [applicant’s] requests pertain do not contain a clear breakdown of how the industry charge is used. It also appears from a comment in the Federation’s reports on the use of the charge for the years 2002 and 2003 that the Federation does ‘not keep separate accounts of whether the individual elements of the Federation’s operations are financed by monies derived from membership fees, capital income, or the industry charge’. A similar declaration on this point is found in the report to the Minister in respect of the year 2001, but a report for 2004 is not in the case file. The Federation’s reports to the Minister are also in other respects similar from year to year. In fact the case file seems to permit the inference that part of the charge is used for the general management of the Federation. It cannot be seen from the submissions in this case that the Minister of Industry has made any observations concerning the use of the charge, and in a letter to the Master Builders’ Association of 15 February 2002, following complaints relating to the use of the charge, he expresses the following opinion: ‘As can be clearly seen from the Industry Charge Act, the FII has the unrestricted power to decide how the charge is allocated, and the Ministry of Industry cannot interfere with this as long as it remains within the framework of the law.’ It can be seen from the submitted reports of the FII for the periods to which this case relates that the arrangement has been used for granting those members of the Federation who pay the industry charge a discount on their membership fees equal to the amount of the charge. As an example, the following comment in the Federation’s report to the Minister of Industry for 2003 may be quoted: ‘It may be pointed out that members who pay the industry charge have it deducted in full from their membership fees to the Federation. It would not be considered proper that companies within the Federation that are liable to the industry charge should pay more to the Federation’s activities than companies that are members, but not liable to the charge. In this way all the member companies of the Federation make equal payments to the Federation, irrespective of whether they are liable to the industry charge or not. On the other hand other companies, remaining outside, only pay the industry charge and thus make a contribution to the general protection of the interests of Icelandic industries.’\nIII\nProvisions on freedom of association are found in Article 74 of the Constitution ... They contain more detailed rules on freedom of association than those directly expressed in Article 11 of the Convention ... Article 74 § 2 of the Constitution provides: ‘No one may be obliged to be a member of any association. Membership of an association may, however, be made obligatory by law if this is necessary in order to enable an association to discharge its functions in the public interest or on account of the rights of others.’\nAs noted above, the purpose of the industry charge is, according to the 1993 Act, the promotion of Icelandic industry, but it is also expressly provided that only the part of the charge corresponding to the cost of its collection is to be transferred to the State Treasury. The remainder is transferred to the FII, to be used as the Federation decides. It also seems that an unspecified proportion of the charge is used for the general activities of the Federation as its board may decide. It can furthermore not be seen from the provisions of the 1993 Act that the Minister of Industry is adequately empowered to ensure that the charge is used in the manner provided for in the Act; in this regard, the Minister simply receives the reports of the Federation. For these reasons the provisions of the 1993 Act cannot be regarded as ensuring that the charge will be used for the activities the Act requires.\nThe payment of membership fees to an association is generally a chief obligation of the members of an association that requires such payments. The applicant is a member of the Master Builders’ Association. Neither he nor his association is a member of the FII. The applicant does not agree with the Federation’s objectives in various fields, considering, as mentioned in the contested judgment, that the Federation acts contrary to his interests, and indeed also contrary to those of many others within industry who also pay the industry charge without being members of the Federation. Nevertheless, by virtue of the 1993 Act, the [applicant] is bound by a duty to pay the charge, which, as described, is transferred to a free association with the purpose of protecting the interests of those active in Icelandic industries and those of its members, as these interests are assessed at any particular time by a decision of the managing director and the board, without any significant involvement of public authorities.\nWhen considering the above and the history of the 1993 Act, and in view of the use of the charge, without objection, for the general activities of the Federation, the arrangement provided for in the Act must be seen as involving, in fact, a duty on the part of the appellant to take a significant part in the Federation’s activities without his agreement. The above provisions of Article 74 § 2 of the Constitution, concerning people’s rights to remain outside associations, must be interpreted as prohibiting an arrangement such as provided for by the 1993 Act, unless that arrangement fulfils the requirements laid down in the second paragraph of the Article. The FII is not an association engaged in activities of the kind referred to therein. For this reason in itself, the appellant’s request for an exemption from his liability to pay the industry charge for the years 2001 to 2004 should be granted, and the respondent should be ordered to pay the appellant the costs of the case in the District Court as well as before the Supreme Court.”", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Batman. 7.  On 7 February 1993 the applicant was taken into custody in Batman by police officers from the Batman Anti-Terrorist Branch and he was held in custody until 5 March 1993. 8.  On 5 March 1993 the Batman Criminal Court ordered the applicant’s remand in custody. 9.  On 6 April 1993 and on 10 October 1994 the Public Prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed two different bills of indictment accusing the applicant of being a member of an illegal terrorist organization and undermining the integrity of the State. 10.  On 5 May 1993 the State Security Court commenced the trial against the applicant and twenty-one other suspects, and prolonged the applicant’s detention. 11.  On 1 December 1995, the State Security Court convicted the applicant under Article 125 of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The charges had been brought under Articles 168 and 125 of the Criminal Code. 12.  Thereafter, the Court of cassation quashed the judgment three times, remitting it to the first-instance court, which reached the same conclusions as before:\n–Court of Cassation decisions quashing the judgments on 9 July 1996, 31 January 2000 and 2 April 2001;\n–the repetitive State Security Court decisions on 11 June 1999 (after numerous hearings), 28 September 2000 (after numerous hearings in the applicant’s absence) and 31 January 2002 (also after numerous hearings). 13.  On that latter date, the State Security Court convicted the applicant under Article 168/2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. He was released the same day. 14.  The applicant did not appeal against this judgment. On 7 February 2002 it became final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Poltava. 6.  On 9 June 2004 the applicant was arrested in connection with criminal proceedings against him and two women, D. and O. In October 2004 the applicant was released under written obligation not to abscond. The criminal proceedings were discontinued in 2008 for lack of corpus delicti in the actions of the applicant and the other accused persons. 7.  As established by the domestic courts, between 10 and 18 June 2004 the applicant was held in the ITT. In the morning of 11 June 2004 the applicant was escorted to the local court for a hearing concerning the preliminary measure to be applied in his respect. He returned to the ITT in the afternoon on the same day. 8.  In January 2007 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Oktyabrskyy District Court of Poltava (“the District Court”) against the ITT and other authorities seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained owing to the inappropriate conditions of his detention in the ITT. 9.  The applicant claimed that throughout the period of his detention in different cells of the ITT the conditions of his detention had been contrary to domestic legislation and Article 3 of the Convention. He stated that: he had not been given a chance to wash himself or clean his teeth as he had not been provided with hygiene products; he had had to sleep on wooden or metal bunks without a mattress or bed linen; every night he had been bitten by insects, putting him at risk of being infected with HIV or other illnesses from the other inmates; instead of a spoon he had been given a small utensil which had made it impossible to eat; he had never been allowed outside exercise and had had no access to fresh air; the toilets in the cells had offered no privacy as they were not properly partitioned; and every morning and evening he and the other detainees had been strip-searched in each other’s presence. In particular, the applicant and the other detainees were ordered to undress, go out of the cell to the corridor and enter a metal cage. During the body search the applicant was pushed with a truncheon and required to face a wall and spread his buttocks. 10.  Further to the applicant’s requests, the District Court questioned the two women, D. and O., who had been held in the ITT during the same period. Owing to the rotation of the detainees, D. was held in the same cells (nos. 3 and 5) as the applicant but on different days. 11.  When questioned in the court, D. submitted that she and other detainees had not been provided with bed linen; the cells had been infested with biting insects, making it impossible to sleep; she had been regularly strip-searched (apart from the applicant); she had not been provided with hygiene products; she had had no outdoor exercise; the utensil for eating had been too small, with the result that the persons using it could not avoid touching the food with their fingers; and the toilets were not properly partitioned. 12.  When questioned in court, O. explained that she had not been provided with bed linen, an appropriate utensil for eating or hygiene products; she had had no outdoor exercise; she had been bitten by insects; and no disinfection measures had been carried out. 13.  Further to the applicant’s requests, the District Court also questioned the applicant’s wife and other persons who saw him and talked with him during the impugned period of his detention or afterwards. All the witnesses were examined in the presence of the applicant. 14.  The applicant also submitted that his allegations could be corroborated by the detainees who had been held in the same cells simultaneously with him. He asked the court to have the ITT submit relevant detention records in order to identify his cellmates and summon them as witnesses. The District Court requested the records from the ITT. The ITT submitted the records concerning the detainees in the cells but those records did not specify the personal information necessary to identify and summon the cellmates. The applicant further demanded that the court inspect the cells in which he had been held in order to verify the facts in dispute. That request was refused and the District Court examined photographs of the ITT provided by the defendants. 15.  During the hearings the defendants submitted that the applicant’s contentions had been unsubstantiated. They argued, in particular, that the strip-searches had been carried out in accordance with domestic regulations, the applicant had had opportunities to receive the necessary products from his relatives, disinfection measures had been carried out twice a month as confirmed by the relevant records, and the physical conditions had been appropriate, as confirmed by the photographs taken on the premises of the ITT. 16.  On 7 June 2007 the District Court dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated. It noted that there was no evidence to suggest that the applicant had sustained any non-pecuniary damage, that there had been any unlawful actions or inactivity on the part of the defendants or that they were guilty of any civil wrongdoing. It pointed out that the applicant’s allegations were supported by statements of witnesses who had no direct experience of the applicant’s personal situation in the ITT. On the other hand, it noted that the record of the disinfection measures carried out in the ITT disproved the applicant’s allegations concerning inappropriate sanitary conditions. It also had regard to the domestic regulations concerning body searches of individuals held in temporary detention centres. 17.  The applicant appealed, claiming that the District Court had failed to take the necessary measures to identify and question his cellmates; it had groundlessly disregarded the statements of D. and O., who had been detained in the ITT during the same period, whose direct experience was relevant to the facts of the case. In particular, witness D. was held in the same cells, though on different days during the period under examination, and her submissions concerning the physical conditions of detention were identical to those of the applicant. The court had not inspected the premises of the ITT. The applicant further emphasised that the practice of strip-searches was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. He referred to the Court’s judgments in the cases of Iwańczuk v. Poland, (no. 25196/94, 15 November 2001) and Van der Ven v. the Netherlands (no. 50901/99, ECHR 2003‑II). He insisted that there had been no reason for strip searches to be carried out twice a day, yet the District Court had considered that practice justified. The applicant argued that by ignoring the Convention requirements on that matter the District Court had failed to respect the Constitution, according to which the Convention was a part of the domestic law. 18.  On 31 July 2007 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court in the presence of the applicant. It noted that, according to the official records submitted by the defendants, during the period at issue the cells in the ITT had been disinfected twice a month; the applicant had been visited by his lawyer; on 13 and 15 June 2004 his wife had given him parcels containing toilet paper, toothpaste, toothbrush and soap. The strip-searches had been carried out in accordance with the internal regulations adopted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The photos submitted by the defendants showed that the toilets in the cells had been properly partitioned, and the exercise yard and the ventilation system had been available. On the other hand, the applicant had not submitted any evidence to substantiate his claim that he had sustained non-pecuniary damage, that the defendants had engaged in unlawful actions or inactivity or that they were guilty of any civil wrongdoing. The applicant’s allegations were contradictory and could not be supported by the statements of the witnesses, as they had no direct experience of the conditions of the applicant’s detention. 19.  The applicant appealed on points of law, repeating the arguments he had raised before the court of appeal. In particular, he insisted that the courts had failed to take measures to identify and question his cellmates. They had not given valid reasons for disregarding the statements of D. and O., who had been detained in the ITT during the same period. The practice of strip searches contradicted Article 3 of the Convention as interpreted in the Court’s case law and the courts had failed to examine the case from that standpoint. 20.  On 28 January 2008 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on point of law noting that the decisions of the lower courts were lawful and substantiated.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and resides in the town of Armyansk, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ukraine. 6.  The applicant instituted proceedings in the Novogrodovskiy Town Court of Donetsk Region against the Novogrodovskaya Mining Company No. 1/3 – a State-owned enterprise – to recover salary arrears. 7.  On 25 April 2002 the Novogrodovskiy Town Court found in favour of the applicant (Решение Новогродовского городского суда Донецкой области) and awarded him UAH 4,087.29[1]. On 5 June 2002 the Novogrodovskiy Town Bailiffs’ Service (Отдел Государственной исполнительной службы Новогродовского городского управления юстиции) initiated the enforcement proceedings. 8.  By a number of decisions of the Commercial Court of the Donetsk Region, the Bailiffs’ Service had been prohibited from selling the property of the Mining Company, due to the bankruptcy proceedings which had been initiated against the company. 9.  In August 2004 the judgment in the applicant’s favour was enforced in full.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 11 February 1995 the applicant and Ms B. got married. Ms B. already had a daughter, T., by a different father. On 23 December 1995 Ms B. gave birth to a daughter, A. In May 1998 the applicant moved out of his and Ms B.'s household. He continued to visit A. every week. From November 1998 Ms B. refused all contact between the applicant and the girl. His attempts to see A., with the help of the local custody and guardianship office, were unsuccessful. 7.  On 15 November 1998 A. was examined by M., the director of the psychological centre, Inex-92. M. stated that A. had a wide range of fears and displayed increased anxiety. On the basis of the tests conducted, it was established that A. had a close relationship with her mother and elder sister, but was distanced from her father and tended to reject him. 8.  On 9 December 1999 A. was examined by psychologist M-va, with a view to determining her emotional state following the long absence of her father. M-va's conclusion stated:\n“1.  [A.] easily establishes contact with a stranger (psychologist) which proves that [she] has developed a feeling of safety. 2.  [A.] is in stable emotional state. The girl is cheery, clever, actively reacts to jokes, displays initiative in communication and in games. 4.  The following [A.'s] statements give rise to concern: “My father does not give me presents...”, “I feel good without him...” and “I don't want to see him”. 5.  The absence of the father is compensated by communication with a great-uncle and role-play games (used as a therapeutic means).” 9.  On 14 January 2001 the applicant's marriage was dissolved and Ms B. was granted full custody of A. 10.  On 22 February 2001 the applicant sued Ms B. for the obstruction of access to his daughter, A. 11.  On 26 April 2001 Ms B. filed a counter-claim seeking to divest the applicant of his parental rights. 12.  On 5 April 2001 Moscow Psychoneurological Dispensary No. 4 carried out a psychological examination of the applicant at the request of the Izmaylovskiy District Court of Moscow. The applicant consented to the examination. The panel of three doctors that examined the applicant stated that he might be suffering from paranoid personality disorder or “sluggish schizophrenia”. However, the conclusive diagnosis could only be made upon an in-patient examination. 13.  On 4 November 2001 A. was examined for a second time by M., the director of the psychological centre, Inex-92. M. stated that A. was highly communicative, intellectually developed and emotionally free. She also displayed a high degree of reflection, stability of mood, optimism and an interest in life. Various tests conducted revealed close relationships between A. and her mother and her elder sister and a rejection of her father. The main reasons for the rejection were expressed by A. as follows: “he offends T. (the elder sister)”, “it is bad with him” and “he is mean”. According to M., the latter statement could be understood to mean that the applicant had an excessive tendency to preach. M. further stated that A.'s rejection of her father was of a stable psychological and motivated nature, which might have been caused by a previous traumatic experience and was not inspired by another person. At the same time, A. willingly accepted the father of her elder sister, her maternal grandfather, sports coaches and a male psychologist. M. concluded that there had been a positive development in A. over the three years that had passed since her first examination: the fears had disappeared, the anxiety had eased, she displayed optimism and emotional stability. A phobic reaction to men, which had previously been observed, had also disappeared. M. stated that, in his view, it was necessary to take into account A.'s opinion concerning the choice of parent so as not to cause repeated psychological trauma. 14.  On 18 December 2001 M. examined the applicant. He noted that the examination was of a superficial nature and could not substitute a complete in-patient psychological examination. M. further stated that the examination did not reveal any psychopathic symptoms. However, taking into account A's persistent rejection of her father, he recommended exercising caution as regards their interaction so as not to cause repeated psychological trauma. 15.  On 8 February 2002 the Izmaylovskiy District Court of Moscow allowed the applicant to visit A. every first Sunday of the month between 12 noon and 2 p.m. in the presence of Ms B. The court relied, inter alia, on an expert's opinion which stated that contact with the father would not have a negative effect on the child. At the same time the court dismissed Ms B.'s counter-claim. 16.  The applicant appealed, requesting additional visiting hours. On 16 April 2002 the Moscow City Court dismissed his appeal and upheld the judgment. 17.  Ms B. failed to comply with the court order and the visit scheduled for 5 May 2002 did not take place. On 27 May 2002 the bailiffs' office opened enforcement proceedings. 18.  The applicant was not able to see A. on either 2 June or 7 July 2002. The bailiff summoned Ms B. and requested her to obey the court order on pain of an administrative fine. 19.  The applicant saw his daughter on 4 August, 1 September, 6 October, 3 November and 1 December 2002, and 5 January, 2 February, 2 March, 6 April, 4 May and 1 June 2003. The meetings were held in the presence of Ms B. who, according to the applicant, prevented A. from speaking to him, playing with him or accepting his gifts. 20.  On 17 October 2002 the applicant applied to the Izmaylovskiy District Court claiming additional visiting hours without Ms B.'s supervision. Ms B. requested that the applicant's access rights be terminated. 21.  On 17 February 2003 the Izmaylovskiy District Court held a hearing during which it granted Ms B.'s motion to adduce the following documents for examination: the medical report from the Psychoneurological Dispensary No. 4 on A.'s psychological state, psychologists' reports on her mental state between 1998-2001, reports from the school and the sports centre that A. had attended and the two reports from A.'s psychological examinations. The applicant submitted a detailed statement in support of his claim and requested an expert psychological examination of A. The court granted the request. It also granted the motion of the local custody and guardianship office to examine A. at the hearing. 22.  Following the examination conducted pursuant to the court order, expert K. stated the following.\na)  A. and her mother had a close relationship characterised by an emotional bond and cooperation. Ms B.'s attitude to her daughter was emotionally-open, she tried to understand and accept the child's emotional state and the relationship was based on the girl's interests. The mother undertook a democratic approach to parenting, which included a high level of verbal communication, the inclusion of the girl in discussions on family issues, the supporting of the child's interests and independence. She paid sufficient attention to the girl's physical and intellectual development.\nb)  During the previous four years A.'s contact with the applicant had been of an episodic and formal nature and, as a rule, in the presence of third persons. The applicant substituted direct parental communication with moralising and attempts to obtain assurances of A.'s affection in front of third persons or to demonstrate Ms B's “undue” conduct. The values and behavioural motives of the applicant and Ms B. differed significantly. The applicant typically had formal relationships with people devoid of pronounced emotional involvement, which were based on certain rules, worked out in the course of his life. His approach to parenting was based on control, implying significant restrictions to the child's conduct. The applicant did not recognise his daughter's right to her own interests and independent choice. He poorly understood, and did not take into account, the girl's psycho-emotional and age-related behaviour.\nc)  A child's “core personality” is formed at approximately five years old. A. had a sufficiently high level of intellectual development. However, her emotional sphere was much more labile than that of an adult and mostly depended on her environment. Her own values and opinions were being developed in the course of communication within the family. Furthermore, it is typical for children to copy the conduct of other persons, primarily the parent of the same sex. Therefore, it might be asserted that A.'s perspective of the issue was nearly identical to her mother's. From the point of view of further social adaptation, her female upbringing (mother, grandmother, elder sister) was sufficiently auspicious as it enabled a model of “female conduct” in society to be successfully put into practice. The remote negative result is that A. might have difficulties in building her own family, due to the absence of an adequate model of conjugal partnership. However, this applies to all children from single-parent families.\nd)  The feeling of safety is a vital human need. The basic feeling of safety is provided by the family. In the first seven years of a child's life, communication with the mother is more important, irrespective of the child's gender. The child forms an image of the father through the prism of the mother's perception and his/her own communication with him, which A. had been deprived of for the last four years. At the time in question, A. saw the applicant as an incomprehensible stranger, whose actions had subverted her feeling of safety. Her mother and grandmother, in compliance with the court order, had effectively forced A. to communicate with her father, whom she did not love and was afraid of. As a result, A.'s immediate family (mother and grandmother) and relatives (father), instead of being the safety factor, became the danger factor. A.'s negative emotional stress, brought about by the meetings with her father was expressed in affective reactions (shouts, tears, obsessive movements) observed after the meetings. The increase of the duration of the meetings, especially in the mother's absence, would entail the risk of the child's persistent neurosis or depression, due to the impossibility of avoiding the subjectively distressing situation. The extreme manifestation of such a condition is self-aggression (suicidal tendencies, thoughts and actions).\ne)  The so-called “female upbringing” was not a factor that would foster a negative or “wrong” attitude by the girl towards men in general. A. was unlikely to develop serious problems from the point of view of social or professional adaptation. She had sufficient experience of communication with the opposite gender through contacts with her peers, teachers, sports coaches, and so on.\nf)  Blood relations do not guarantee mutual love, respect or deep attachment. Emotional relationships are formed in the course of cohabitation, communication, upbringing and communal activity. The inability or unwillingness of the parents to establish a civilised relationship might have affected the negative attitude of A. towards the applicant. The prolonged conflict between the applicant and Ms B., with whom A. identifies, resulted in the child's lack of belief in the possibility of a positive development of her relationship with her father.\ng)  Ignoring the girl's emotional and rational rejection of her father and forcing her to meet with him might cause irretrievable adverse effects on the latter's health and psychological well-being. It might also adversely affect A.'s moral development, since in such a situation neither the family nor the State would provide her with psychological support and safety. 23.  On 24 June 2003 the Izmaylovskiy District Court delivered its judgment. The court had studied several expert reports. In particular, in August and September 2002 A. had been referred to a psychologist at the Izmaylovo centre for children. In the report, the psychologist stated that in August 2002 A. had been provided with psychological aid after meetings with her father since, after the resumption of contacts with her father, the girl was highly agitated, irritable and suffered from nightmares. The same psychologist had consulted the applicant and stated that he was showing no parental interest in or affection for his daughter. His perception of the child was “inadequate” and he displayed “a pathological tendency towards litigation”. 24.  The court also studied the report of the expert examination conducted pursuant to its order of 17 February 2003 and examined expert K. during the hearing. She confirmed the conclusions she had stated in the report and emphasised that forcing A. to meet with the applicant, especially without the presence of Ms B., might irreversibly affect her physical and psychological well-being and possibly lead to neurosis and depression. Furthermore, expert K. asserted a strong opinion that the applicant was interested in having contact with A. only to boost his self-esteem and not to establish a relationship with the child. The absence of such a relationship was acknowledged by the applicant himself in his letters to Ms B. and the bailiff, where he stated that his daughter did not wish to see him, hated him, wanted to change her surname and refused to accept his gifts. 25.  The District Court further examined the opinion of the local custody and guardianship service which stated that meetings between the applicant and A. should be discontinued, having regard to the interests and wishes of the latter, who strongly resisted communication with her father. 26.  The court questioned the applicant, who reiterated his claim. It also questioned Ms B., who stated that during the meetings the applicant had provoked a negative reaction on the part of A., for example, by forcibly removing her glasses or earphones, forcing her to accept a book as a present and then taking pictures so as to document her refusal. He failed to establish a relationship with the girl, did not take into account her opinion, applied coercion and brought her to tears. After the meetings with the applicant A. developed nervousness, problems sleeping and refused to leave the house. This behaviour was noted in the psychologists' reports. 27.  The District Court further examined several other witnesses. A.'s school sports coach and her aunt stated that the girl was very sociable, but reacted negatively to her father, wanted to have her mother's surname, had not allowed him to take a picture of her and had left the classroom when the applicant had come to visit her at school. The applicant's father and brother believed that Ms B. had turned her daughter against her former husband. Ms B.'s step-father said that the applicant and his child had had a wonderful relationship until the parents' separation. 28.  The District Court also questioned A. in the presence of a teacher. A. explained that she did not like her father, did not want to see or talk to him and wanted to have her mother's surname.\nThe District Court held as follows:\n“In accordance with Article 66 § 4 [of the Family Code] and section 8 of ruling no. 10 of 28 May 1998 of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in exceptional cases a court may refuse a parent's claim to determine the order of [his or her] participation in the child's upbringing when communication between the child and ... the parent may adversely affect the child, his physical and psychological well‑being.\nThe court grants the claim to discontinue the father's contact with his daughter and dismisses [his] claim for additional visiting hours, having regard exclusively to the interests of the minor, in particular: the contact ... affects the child's physical and psychological well-being, which is demonstrated by the lack of mutual understanding and communication between the father and the daughter during the meetings ordered by the court's previous decision; having the father's surname is a traumatising situation for the child; the meetings have a very formal nature; the child's conduct at the appearance of her father, when in her mother's presence, is characterised by strong rejection ([she] hid under the desk; ran away; tore up [her] letter of commendation bearing the surname “Rytchenko”; after seeing her father, she refused to go to a picnic with her classmates), which is not conducive to creating psychological comfort and a feeling of safety for the child; the very litigation is psychologically traumatising since it was initiated by [the applicant] but is centred around the seven year-old child, who knows about it because the court decision of 8 February 2002 is being enforced with her participation. Furthermore, the court takes into account that the child was being seen repeatedly by psychologists ...\nThe lack of contact between the father and the daughter and the psychologically traumatising environment for the child is corroborated by the parties' explanations, documentation from the case, statements by witnesses and the opinion of the local custody and guardianship office.” 29.  At the hearing of 24 June 2003 the judge removed one of the applicant's representatives from the courtroom. The applicant also asked his second representative to leave the courtroom and requested that the judge provide him with legal representation. After the refusal to grant his request, the applicant unsuccessfully challenged the judge. 30.  On 22 September 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment. It also mentioned that the applicant's representatives had been removed for contempt of court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Zagreb. 5.  On 11 December 2000 the public utility company V.O., basing its case on unpaid bills for water supply services, instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking payment of the debt. 6.  On 24 January 2001 the Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o ovrsi) ordering the applicant to pay the amounts sought. However, since the applicant challenged the writ by objecting to it on 19 March 2001, the court set it aside. As a consequence, the enforcement proceedings were, pursuant to the relevant legislation, transformed into, and resumed as, regular civil proceedings. 7.  The applicant, who has a formal education as a lawyer but is not an advocate, represented himself in the proceedings. 8.  On 15 November 2005 judge J.G.F. of the Zagreb Municipal Court delivered a judgment ruling for the plaintiff. 9.  On 27 December 2005 the applicant appealed against the first‑instance judgment. Section 357 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that an appeal to a second-instance court has to be lodged through a first‑instance court. Under section 358 of the same Act the first-instance court conducts a preliminary examination of the appeal and may declare it inadmissible if it finds that it does not meet certain procedural requirements, for example if it finds that it was lodged outside the statutory time-limit. It is, however, not authorised to decide on the merits of the appeal. Therefore, the applicant submitted his appeal intended for Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) to Zagreb Municipal Court. In his appeal he wrote, inter alia:\n“After twenty months of waiting ... on 15 November 2005 the second hearing was held, at which, in substance and without hearing [the parties] (apart from stating that the parties were present and that they maintained their positions) the impugned judgment was rendered.\nIt is indicative to mention here that the judge, before dictating the operative provisions of the judgment, asked the defendant whether ‘he would pay this’ to which the defendant replied ‘where did you get that idea?’ [‘što Vam pada na pamet? ‘]and asked whether she had examined the case file.... The judge angrily turned sideways in her chair and dictated the operative provisions of the judgment in the name of the Republic of Croatia to the typist, using a funny expression [navodeći komičan izraz] that the parties were asking for a reasoned judgment – as if in adversarial proceedings judgments without reasons or instruction on remedies available against them existed. Unfortunately, the court did not record these dialogues between the judge and the defendant in the minutes. What judicial professionalism this is! [Kakva li je ovo sudačka profesionalnost!]\nIt is evident from the above-mentioned that in these proceedings no hearing was held in accordance with the law, which amounts to breaches of section 354 paragraph 2 subparagraphs 6 and 11 of the Civil Procedure Act. Apart from this, from the contested judgment or the transcripts of the hearings it cannot be discerned whether the court took any evidence ... for which reason the judgment could not be satisfactorily reasoned ...\nInstead of referring to the evidence taken and assessing its evidentiary value, the court immediately ... states on what basis it arrived at the contested findings, from which it is clear that it accepted all arguments of the plaintiff ...” 10.  After it carried out the preliminary examination of the appeal, Zagreb Municipal Court forwarded it together with the case file to Zagreb County Court. 11.  On 3 April 2007 Judge M.P. at Zagreb County Court delivered a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal and upholding the first-instance judgment. 12.  On 24 July 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment. On 21 January 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible. It found that even though the applicant relied in his constitutional complaint on the relevant Articles of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to a fair hearing and equality before the law, he had not substantiated his complaint by any constitutional law arguments but had merely repeated the arguments raised in the proceedings before the ordinary courts. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had been unable to examine the merits of his constitutional complaint. 13.  After it had completed the preliminary examination of the applicant’s appeal of 27 December 2005 in the above proceedings, on 4 January 2006 Judge J.G.F. at Zagreb Municipal Court issued a decision whereby it fined the applicant 500 Croatian kunas (HRK) for contempt of court. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“I.  The defendant Nikola Žugić from Zagreb ... is hereby fined 500 [Croatian] kunas because in his appeal of 27 December 2005 he insulted the court by stating: ‘It is indicative to mention here that the judge, before dictating the operative provisions of the judgment, asked the defendant whether ‘he would pay this’, to which the defendant replied ‘where did you get that idea?’ and asked whether she had examined the case file.... The judge angrily turned sideways in her chair and dictated the operative provisions of the judgment in the name of the Republic of Croatia to the typist, using a funny expression that the parties were asking for a reasoned judgment – as if in adversarial proceedings judgments without reasons or instruction on remedies available against them existed. Unfortunately, the court did not record these dialogues between the judge and the defendant in the minutes. What judicial professionalism this is!’\n...\nIn the appeal of 27 December 2005 the defendant, insulted the court by, inter alia, [using] the words quoted in the operative provisions of this decision.\nIt would follow from the quoted text that during the main hearing the court communicated with the parties in an improper way, that the judge behaved improperly and that she does not know the law. All this constitutes contempt of court and the statements quoted exceed the limits of necessary respect for the court, even attempting to call into question the knowledge and expertise of the judge at issue, which is an impermissible way for the parties to communicate with the court because it represents a direct insult to the judge as a person, implying that she is ignorant and incompetent to exercise the duty of a judge.\nWhen imposing the fine the court took into account the fact that the defendant insulted not only the court as an institution, but also the judge as a person, on account of which he had to be fined pursuant to section 110 taken in conjunction with section 10 of the [Civil Procedure Act].” 14.  On 16 January 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision arguing, inter alia, that his statements had been arbitrarily interpreted by the first-instance court, that they had not been insulting, and that he had not had any intention of insulting anyone. 15.  By a decision of 3 April 2007 Judge M.P. at Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. The relevant part of that decision read as follows:\n“In this court’s view, the finding of the first-instance court that in his appeal the defendant insulted the court by making the above statements is correct ... It is to be noted that by the statements made in the appeal the defendant demonstrated disrespect for the court, which undoubtedly represents an improper way for the parties to communicate with the court, and exceeds the limits of a civilised and fair relationship with the court as an institution of a society.” 16.  On 24 July 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance decision. On 25 October 2007 the Constitutional Court declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible on the ground that the contested decision did not concern the merits of the case and as such was not susceptible to constitutional review. 17.  On 21 May 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Court of its own motion issued a writ of execution by garnishment of a part of the applicant’s pension with a view to collecting the above fine. The applicant appealed and the proceedings are currently pending before the Zagreb County Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1961, 1974, 1971, 1974, 1967, 1962 and 1967 respectively. The first two applicants live in İzmit. The third applicant lives in Germany and the remainder of the applicants reside in İstanbul. 5.  On 11 January 1998 around 350-400 people gathered at the Ümraniye Sarıgazi Cemevi[1] to commemorate the death of members of the TKP‑ML/TIKKO.[2] The commemoration turned into a violent clash between some of the participants and the security forces. Thirty-five people were arrested, including the applicants. The applicants were first taken to Sarıgazi Gendarmerie. Later on the same day they were transferred to the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command as there was not enough space at the Sarıgazi Gendarmerie. 6.  On various dates between 11 January and 14 January 1998 two gendarmes at Sarıgazi Gendarmerie, Mr E.G. and Mr Ö. K. took the applicants’ statements with the exception of Ercan Başkan who stated that he wished to give his statement before a prosecutor. 7.  On 15 January 1998 the applicants were released pending trial. 8.  On various occasions between 12 and 15 January 1998 the applicants were medically examined. 9.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant was examined by a doctor, Dr O.A. at Sarıyer State Hospital who noted that he had a slight ecchymosis on his nose and an ecchymosis of 5x4 cm on his right tibia. 10.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by another doctor, Dr Ç.A. at Sarıyer State Hospital. This doctor noted that he had an ecchymosis on his right tibia and right femoral region and a number of old ecchymoses on various parts of his back. Dr Ç.A. mentioned that the applicant complained of pain in his chest. 11.  On the same day, the Üsküdar Forensic Medicine Department (hereinafter: “FM department”), relying on the aforementioned medical reports, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 12.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr O.A. who noted grazes on the skin of his right knee joint. 13.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 14.  On the same day, the FM department, referring to the aforementioned medical reports, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for three days. 15.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by two doctors at Şişli Etfal Hospital. The first doctor noted an ecchymosis of 10x10 cm and 3x3 cm as well as pain and sensitivity on the right and the left of his lower back respectively. The second doctor found widespread ecchymoses on the right side of the back. 16.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 17.  On the same day, the FM department, taking into account the medical reports dated 13 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 18.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr O.A. who noted a graze on the skin of the left knee joint. 19.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 20.  On the same day, the FM department, referring to the medical report of 13 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for 3 days. 21.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr A.T. who noted that he had pain in his right periorbital region (around the eyes) and left leg. The doctor found a slight ecchymosis on the right periorbital region. 22.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 23.  On the same day, the FM department, in view of the medical report of 12 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 24.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr O.A. who found a traumatic ecchymosis on her right femoral (thigh) region and left scapula (shoulder blade). He transferred her to Şişli Etfal Hospital where she was examined by two doctors. The first doctor found a traumatic ecchymosis on top of her right femoral region, on top of her left scapula and underneath her right scapula. He noted that the applicant had pain in her neck and right crural region (back of upper legs). The second doctor (an orthopaedist) found an ecchymosis of 7x10 cm on the right lateral side of the femur region as well as subjective pain in this region. No pathology was noted in the X-rays. 25.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A who indicated that the applicant complained of numbness in her right arm and legs. He found that the applicant had ecchymoses on her right femoral region and left scapula region. He further noted a number of ecchymoses on her back. The doctor concluded that these lesions were old. 26.  On the same day, the FM department, as a result of the medical reports of 13 and 15 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 27.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by two doctors at Şişli Etfal Hospital. According to the two medical reports issued on the same day the applicant had a superficial graze on the left side of his nose and his left eyebrows. His left cheek was swollen. The applicant’s scalp had multiple hyperaemic areas and he had an ecchymosis of 5x7 cm on his left gluteal region (buttocks) and multiple superficial grazes on the inside of his femoral region. Dr U.D. noted that the applicant complained of pain in his scrotum and penis. However, he found no ecchymoses, laceration or hyperaemia in the anal region. 28.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 29.  On the same day, the FM department, in view of the medical reports dated 13 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 30.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant, Mr Başkan was bought before the Üsküdar public prosecutor where he denied the accusations against him. In particular, he submitted that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while he was held in custody. He claimed that they had inserted a truncheon in his anus, hit his penis with a stick and squeezed his testicles. In addition, he alleged that they put a plastic bag over his head and that he was blindfolded and threatened. 31.  On the same day, the applicants were brought before the Üsküdar Criminal Court of First Instance where they refuted the accusations that they had taken part in the violent clash on 11 January 1998. In particular, Mr Hazırcı stated that he was coerced to sign the deposition taken by the security forces. Mr İyit[4] and Mr Başkan said that their statements given to the security forces were not true. Ms Uluk stated that her police deposition was not given of her own free will and that they tore up her initial statement and re‑wrote, and made her sign, another one. She also stated that she had been sexually harassed and given electric shocks. The court ordered their release. 32.  On the same day, the representatives of the thirty-five people arrested, including the applicants, submitted a petition to the Üsküdar public prosecutor’s office claiming that their clients had been subjected to ill‑treatment during their interrogation, that they had not been properly medically examined and that they had also been subjected to ill‑treatment after their medical examination. They submitted that their clients had been beaten and deprived of food. They requested an urgent medical examination. 33.  The Üsküdar public prosecutor decided to transfer the applicants to the Haydarpaşa Numune Hospital for a medical examination. According to the report drafted by the prosecutor at the Üsküdar Criminal Court of First Instance on 15 January 1998, the complainants left the court house after the hearing despite his request,and therefore could not be taken to a hospital for a medical examination. 34.  On an unspecified date, the Üsküdar public prosecutor decided that his office lacked competence ratione loci and transferred the case file to the Şişli public prosecutor’s office on 29 January 1998. 35.  On 13 February 1998 Mr T.O., the prosecutor at the Şişli public prosecutor’s office, requested the identities of the gendarmes who had participated in the interrogation of the complainants. 36.  On 11 March 1998 the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command informed the Şişli public prosecutor’s office that Mr E.G. and Mr Ö.K. were the gendarmes who had interrogated the complainants. 37.  On 8 July 1998 Mr E.G. and Mr Ö.K. were heard by a prosecutor. They denied the accusations against them. 38.  On 15 July 1998 the prosecutor, Mr T.O. gave a decision of non‑prosecution against Mr E.G. and Mr Ö.K. on the ground that there was no evidence that they had ill-treated the complainants during interrogation. The prosecutor considered that the physical findings noted in the medical reports were the result of lawful use of force by the gendarmes during arrest. 39.  The applicants’ objection against this decision was dismissed by the 2nd Chamber of the Beyoğlu Assize Court on 29 September 1999. 40.  On 6 July 1998 the applicants, with the exception of Mr Balçık, filed an official complaint with the Üsküdar public prosecutor’s office against the gendarmes at the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command. They submitted that, on various dates, they had been tortured by plain clothes officers. 41.  On 21 October 1998 Mr T.E., another prosecutor at the Şişli public prosecutor’s office, decided that there was no need to investigate the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment since the matter had been investigated and a decision not to prosecute Mr Ö.K. and Mr E. G. had already been given in this respect. 42.  The applicants objected. They submitted that they did not know that an investigation into their allegations had been held, or that a decision of non-prosecution had been rendered, as the decision had never been served on them. They further stated that, in any event, they were subjected to ill-treatment at the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command and not at the Sarıgazi Gendarmerie where Mr Ö.K. and Mr E. G. were stationed. 43.  On 11 June 1999 the First Chamber of the Beyoğlu Assize Court dismissed the applicants’ objection. 44.  The criminal proceedings instigated against the applicants in respect of their involvement in the violent clashes on 11 January 1998 ended with their acquittal. 45.  According to the report issued by the Human Rights Association of Turkey on 14 November 2003, Mr Başkan applied to them on 7 May 1998 for treatment. He gave a description of the alleged ill-treatment he had been subjected to while held in custody in 1994, 1995, and 1996 and in January 1998 at the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command. The report indicates that the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from gingivitis, sinusitis and haemorrhoids and was given appropriate treatment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in the town of Artyom, in the Primorye Region. 7.  The applicant is a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin. He originally lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. 8.  In June 2010, which was a time of mass disorders and interethnic clashes in the region, the applicant had been the head of the territorial board of a municipal authority in which most residents were ethnic Uzbeks. He was, according to him, considered as a leader of the local Uzbek community. 9.  After the clashes, the applicant had repeatedly been invited by the Kyrgyz investigative bodies for questioning as a witness. 10.  In June 2011 the applicant learned that criminal proceedings had been opened against him (see paragraph 12 below). The applicant submits that law-enforcement officers started to extort money from him, threatening him with imprisonment. Due to this he moved to a different city in Kyrgyzstan, to his sister’s home, where he stayed for several months. 11.  Afterwards, in March 2012, the applicant left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. He settled in the Primorye Region, and after obtaining a work permit, worked as a sports instructor. 12.  On 16 June 2011 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant with the commission of violent crimes in June 2010 (attempted murder, participation in mass disorders and unlawful firearms trafficking) and ordered his arrest. It appears that when the authorities eventually tried to execute the arrest order, the applicant had left the country (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). The applicant was therefore put on the international wanted list. 13.  On 14 March 2013 the applicant was arrested in Russia and detained in custody pending extradition 14.  On 5 April 2013 the Kyrgyz authorities lodged an extradition request with the Prosecutor General of Russia, asking that the applicant be extradited to Kyrgyzstan for prosecution and trial. 15.  On 16 September 2013 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office granted the extradition request and ordered the applicant’s extradition. 16.  The applicant appealed, arguing that due to his Uzbek ethnic origin the aforementioned decision would expose him to a serious risk of torture. The applicant supported his appeal through reference, inter alia, to various UN sources, NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no. 49747/11, 16 October 2012). 17.  On 1 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the extradition order, giving the following reasoning:\n“The charges pressed against [the applicant] [by Kyrgyz authorities] are criminal offences liable to punishment in Russia ... They are not time-barred ...\nPursuant to Article 464 § 1 (1) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, an extradition request lodged by a foreign state in respect of a Russian citizen should be denied ...\nIt is apparent from the conclusions of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for the Primorye Region that [the applicant] is not a Russian citizen. ... He holds a Kyrgyz passport ... and is a Kyrgyz national. ...\nOn 28 June 2013 the FMS for Prymorye Region rejected a request from [the applicant] for refugee status in Russia.\n[The applicant’s] allegations of persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities on false criminal charges on the basis of his [Uzbek] ethnic origin were addressed [within the refugee status procedure].\nThe lawfulness of the refusal [to grant the applicant refugee status in Russia] was confirmed by Russia’s FMS on 24 September 2013 ...\n[The applicant’s] argument [that] the decision to extradite him was taken before any judicial review of the refusal to grant him refugee status is groundless.\nIt is apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] arrived in Russia ... for employment purposes and that he had not been persecuted in Kyrgyzstan on racial, national or religious grounds ...\nIt is likewise apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] lodged his request for refugee status on 16 April 2013, while being held in custody following his arrest in Russia ... , [therefore] his appeal against the decision of the FMS did not prevent the Prosecutor General’s Office from taking a decision concerning extradition, in line with ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012 of the Plenary Session of the Russian Supreme Court ...\n[The applicant] does not have immunity from prosecution [and] there are no grounds preventing his extradition.\nThe Prosecutor General’s Office of Kyrgyzstan provided assurances that [in the event of extradition] [the applicant] would have the benefit of [legal assistance]; that he would not be extradited to a third State; that he would be prosecuted only for the offence for which he was being extradited; that [he] would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; that he was being prosecuted for an ordinary criminal offence devoid of any political character or discrimination on any grounds; that he would be able to freely leave Kyrgyzstan after he had stood trial and served a sentence; and that Russian diplomats would be allowed access to him.\nIt is apparent from the above guarantees that [the applicant] is being prosecuted for ordinary criminal offences; his prosecution is not politically motivated and is not connected with his [ethnic origin].\n[The applicant’s] allegations concerning his persecution on political grounds, lack of fair trial in Kyrgyzstan, and persecution of his family members by law-enforcement bodies in Kyrgyzstan are not supported by any objective data.\nThe court has established that [the applicant’s] wife and daughter live in Kyrgyzstan, [that there is] no substantiated information concerning their alleged persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities, [and] that they do not travel outside the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. [The applicant himself] did not apply for refugee status until his arrest.\n... The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have any information that would prevent [the applicant’s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan.\nTherefore, there are no grounds ... preventing [the applicant’s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan for criminal prosecution.\nThe argument of [the applicant’s] lawyer referring to international sources (report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on technical assistance and cooperation on human rights for Kyrgyzstan, report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, International Crisis Group Kyrgyzstan report) to the effect that after the interethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 the law‑enforcement bodies had subjected ethnic Uzbeks to torture and that there are grounds to believe that [the applicant] might be subjected to torture in the event of his extradition, is unsubstantiated. The aforementioned international documents describe the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, are unspecific and unsupported by evidence, and are countered by the guarantees offered by Kyrgyz Republic, which relate directly to the applicant and are sufficient to eliminate the risk of [the applicant’s] being subjected to inhuman treatment.\n[As to] the reference by the defence to ... the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev, [the case] has no connection with [the applicant’s] case and cannot be taken into consideration.\n...” 18.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia. 19.  In the meantime, on 28 January 2014 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Kyrgyzstan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. 20.  On 30 January 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 1 November 2013 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court:\n“The court has taken into consideration the arguments of the defence and the documents submitted, including the concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture [dated December 2013] on Kyrgyzstan’s second periodic report, in which the Committee expressed its deep concern with regard to apparent impunity regarding widespread acts of torture and ill-treatment that remained uninvestigated by the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic ... and the report that the investigations, persecutions, convictions and punishments in connection with the events of June 2010 are mainly directed at persons of Uzbek ethnic origin.\nAt the same time, these circumstances cannot in themselves be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing to extradite [the applicant] to the Kyrgyz Republic ...\nPursuant to Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, no State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture. For the purpose of determining whether such grounds exist, the competent authorities must take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.\n...\nThe provisions of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture imply that it is necessary not only to verify the existence in the State concerned of gross and mass violations of human rights, but also the existence in that State of the likelihood that the individual concerned would personally be at risk of torture if returned to his or her country. That risk must be real, immediate and foreseeable.\nAccording to the legal position of the UN Committee against Torture as outlined in a number of its decisions (...), the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced showing that the individual concerned would be personally at risk ...\nThe Committee ... noted that it is necessary to establish the existence of substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of torture if returned, and that such risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard the Committee has determined, in previous decisions, that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal.\nThe evidential material submitted by the Prosecutor General’s Office – on the basis of which the decision to extradite [the applicant] was taken – does not contain any information demonstrating that [the latter] personally would be at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the event of his extradition.\n[A long passage on the guarantees provided by the Kyrgyz authorities].\nNeither [the applicant] nor his lawyers provided any substantial evidence showing that [the former] was at risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the Kyrgyz authorities, or that he might be persecuted on grounds [such as] race, religion, national or social origin, or political opinion.\n... [The applicant] does not belong to any political or other party, organisation or group that opposes [the present government of Kyrgyzstan].\nWhile living in Kyrgyzstan [the applicant] was not subjected to any torture, inhuman or degrading treatment by the authorities; he arrived in Russia in March 2012, that is to say a year and nine months after the crimes of which he stands accused had been committed in June 2010. [The applicant’s] wife and daughter remain in the Kyrgyz Republic.\nNo evidence has [therefore] been provided showing that [the applicant] or his relatives were persecuted by [the Kyrgyz] authorities.\n[The applicant’s] statement to the effect that he is a “leader of Uzbek diaspora” and belongs to the ethnic Uzbeks – which allegedly gives him reason to believe that he would be subjected to repressive criminal prosecution and unfair conviction – is an assumption unsupported by any evidence. It cannot therefore be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for concluding that he is personally at risk of being subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan.\n...” 21.  On 16 March 2013 the Artyom Town Court in the Primorye Region ordered the applicant’s detention pending extradition until 23 April 2013. 22.  On 22 April 2013 the same court extended the applicant’s detention until 14 September 2013. On the same day the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. On 12 July 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal. 23.  On 13 September 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok extended the applicant’s detention until 13 March 2014. On 19 September 2013 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. The appeal was dispatched by post on 20 September 2013. The Leninskiy District Court received the applicant’s appeal on 21 October 2013. On 23 October 2013 a copy of the appeal was forwarded to the applicant and the local prosecutor’s office, and the latter was invited to submit comments by 28 October 2013. On 31 October 2013 the Leninskiy District Court forwarded the case file to the Primorye Regional Court for examination. On 6 November 2013 an appeal hearing was scheduled for 7 November 2013 and the parties were informed accordingly. On 7 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order of 13 September 2013 on appeal. 24.  On 7 March 2014 the deputy Prosecutor of the Primorye Region decided to release the applicant in the light of the decision of the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the present case. The applicant was released on the same day. 25.  On 16 April 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status with Russia’s FMS, alleging persecution on the grounds of ethnic origin. 26.  On 28 June 2013 the FMS for the Primorye Region rejected the applicant’s request, having found that the applicant had left his country of nationality for reasons falling outside the scope of section 1(1)(1) of the Refugee Act. 27.  On 24 September 2013 Russia’s FMS upheld the refusal of 28 June 2013. 28.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision before the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow. In his appeal he referred to reports concerning the widespread ill-treatment of Uzbek detainees in Kyrgyzstan, as confirmed by various UN sources, NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev. 29.  On 22 January 2014 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant’s appeal against the FMS’s decisions. The District Court considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution in Kyrgyzstan and that his allegations that the criminal charges against him were unlawful fell outside the scope of the refugee status proceedings. The District Court pointed out that his application for refugee status contained no indications that he had been previously accused or convicted of a criminal offence, or that he had been a member of any political, religious or military organisations. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status until after his placement in detention. 30.  In his appeal against the judgment of 22 January 2014 the applicant requested a rigorous examination of his arguments regarding the risk of ill‑treatment. He again referred to various reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs to support his position. 31.  On 20 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal, reiterating the conclusions of the migration authorities and the first‑instance court. 32.  On 25 April 2014 the FMS for the Primorye Region issued a decision granting the applicant temporary asylum in the Russian Federation until 25 April 2015, referring to the existence of circumstances preventing the applicant’s extradition, namely the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the applicant’s case before the Court and the impossibility of foreseeing the duration of those proceedings. 33.  On 10 April 2015 the FMS for the Primorye Region extended the term of the temporary asylum granted to the applicant until 25 April 2016, with reference to the same grounds.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Strzelce Krajeńskie, Poland. 5.  On 3 March 2000 the applicant was brought before the Radomsko District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). He was charged with having committed burglary. The court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody until 1 June 2000. 6.  The applicant was placed in the Piotrków Trybunalski Detention Centre (Areszt Śledczy). His detention was subsequently prolonged several times until the end of the proceedings against him. 7.  On 15 November 2000 the Radomsko District Court convicted the applicant of handling stolen goods and sentenced him to 15 months’ imprisonment. 8.  On 2 February 2001 the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the first-instance judgment. 9.  On 28 May 2001 the applicant’s officially-appointed lawyer, who represented him in the proceedings before both instances, refused to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf. 10.  The applicant sent numerous letters to the Court, most of which appear to have been opened and read by the domestic authorities. 11.  The applicant’s first letter of 1 May 2000 bears the stamp “Radomsko District Prosecutor (Prokuratura Rejonowa w Radomsku)”, the date 8 May 2000 (stamped), and an illegible signature. 12.  His letter of 27 August 2001 bears the same stamp, a signature “prok. R. Gawęcka (Prosecutor R. Gawęcka)”, and the date 28 August 2001, which is both stamped and hand-written. 13.  The applicant’s letter of 10 September 2001 is marked with the same stamp and the date 12 September 2001 (stamped and hand-written) and bears an illegible signature. 14.  The envelopes of the applicant’s letters of 14 and 22 October, 18 November 2001, 2 April, 3 and 22 July, 13 October, 4 December 2002 bear the stamp “Censored” (ocenzurowano) and the official stamp of the Radomsko District Court. Each of them is marked with a date-stamp and an illegible signature. All envelopes bear traces of opening after being sealed: they were cut open and resealed with adhesive tape. 15.  On 3 January 2003 the applicant sent a letter to the Court. He complained that his correspondence with the Court’s Registry had been censored. He enclosed the envelope of the letter sent to him by the Registry on 22 November 2002. The envelope was marked with the stamp “Censored”, the date 5 December 2002 and an illegible signature. The envelope of the applicant’s letter to the Court also bears the stamp “censored”, the date 10 January 2003 and an illegible signature. They have been covered up with white corrector fluid.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1966 respectively and live in Kikinda. 6.  The applicants are journalists and were employed by the local weekly newspaper Kikindske. 7.  On 9 April 2004 the first applicant published an article criticising several criminal convictions he and another journalist had incurred for defamation. The article was entitled ‘They have not punished us much for what we are’ (‘Malo su nas kaznili, kakvi smo’) and, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“Where will our souls go, we wonder. Are we Superhiks [the most prominent villain from the ‘Alan Ford’ comic book] of Kikinda, who take from the poor and give to the rich? Are we arrogant spendthrifts who waste money belonging to all Kikinda citizens, so that poor people have to pay our fines for offensive writing? Has the judge D.K.... punished us too mildly and shouldn’t he have satisfied the request of the lawyer S.K. and deservedly ripped us off to the tune of 150,000 dinars? But couldn’t our prosecutor, who is surely not a blonde, but is being whistled at by workers on strike, have asked for more, since [another column in the K. newspaper] ruined his reputation acquired over decades, and in particular over the past year or two, when he so ‘skilfully’ drafted dismissals to all the [‘]non-workers[‘] and the opposition from [a local factory]? And what should the citizens who finance our public company do and think? Could they also wonder who gave us the right to write insulting texts so that the judges of Kikinda must punish us?... Do we have the right to deny that people are tired of such a behaviour of ours...? Do we have the right to deny our fellow citizens their wish for a quiet life, free of stress and various court proceedings? Do we have a soul, we wonder out loud, and if we do, where will it go after we’ve prepared another scandal? We should be ashamed of ourselves.” 8.  In the same issue, the second applicant was the editor of the page entitled ‘Amusement’, consisting of anagrams, jokes, a crossword and a horoscope. In the top middle section of the page there was a photo of a blonde woman in her underwear, next to which there was a text, which, in its relevant part, read as follows:\n“JPICK and the manager were visited by a blonde the other day. For that occasion the blonde was whistled at by the workers who were not on strike. And she wasn’t even a lawyer...”\nOn the left of the photograph, there was a small box containing three anagrams, the first of which was an anagram of S.K.’s name. 9.  Shortly after publication of the above, S.K. instituted private criminal proceedings for insult against the applicants in the Kikinda Municipal Court. 10.  On 14 February 2005 the court convicted the applicants of insult. The court fined each of them 12,000 dinars (RSD, approximately EUR 150), ordering them jointly to pay S.K. another RSD 16,000 (approximately EUR 200) in respect of the costs of the proceedings. 11.  In its judgment, the first-instance court defined insult as a statement or an action objectively humiliating to a certain individual, constituting an attack on his or her honour. Acknowledging that S.K. was a public figure, the court explained that under domestic law an action done by way of a joke was not a criminal offence as long as that joke did not overstep acceptable boundaries and become insulting. The applicants must have known that S.K. considered their articles insulting, since they had previously been convicted of using identical terms about him. The court took particular note of the fact that the applicants mentioned S.K. directly and indirectly on several different pages of the same newspaper, and concluded that S.K. had proved that those texts had insulted him just by instituting the private criminal proceedings. In particular, the court held as follows:\n“Such writing by the defendants demonstrates the intention to demean the private prosecutor [S.K.]. This is so because it is clear that the defendants, in different ways and in different sections [of the newspaper], compared the private prosecutor to a female, which comparison is objectively insulting in society. Namely, in our mentality it is insulting to feminise a man, and jokes about blondes are not in the least flattering, because they portray blondes as stupid people subject to mockery.” 12.  On appeal, on 4 May 2005 the Zrenjanin District Court upheld the first-instance judgment and its reasoning.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant’s late father owned a house, a garage and an outhouse with some adjoining land in Sofia. By a mayor’s order of 28 March 1989 the above property was expropriated for the construction of a school. The expropriated property was valued at 16,878.20 old Bulgarian levs (BGL). The order, based on section 98(1) of the 1973 Territorial and Urban Planning Act (“the TUPA” – “Закон за териториалното и селищно устройство”) provided that the applicant was to be compensated with a flat and his father was to be compensated with another flat and a garage. Both flats were to be situated in a building which the municipality intended to construct. 6.  By a supplementary order of 15 June 1990, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor indicated the exact flats and the garage with which the applicant and his father were to be compensated, specifying the building in which they would be located and, in the case of the flats, also their precise surface area. 7.  On an unspecified date the municipal authorities opened blocked housing savings accounts with the State Savings Bank in the name of the applicant and his father. An amount equivalent to the estimated value of the expropriated real estate (BGL 16,878.20) was deposited in the housing savings account of the applicant’s father. The latter transferred BGL 8,878 into the applicant’s housing savings account. As the value of the flats and garage offered in compensation was higher than that of the expropriated property, the applicant and his father had to make top-up payments on unspecified dates in the amount of BGL 92,000. The nominal sum was increased considerably owing to the high inflation rate during the relevant period. 8.  In 1991 the municipal authorities took possession of the expropriated property and the buildings were pulled down. However, the construction of the school never started. 9.  While awaiting the construction of the flats the applicant, his family and parents were settled in a municipal council flat. The flat was much smaller than the total surface area of the flats offered in compensation and was situated in a building owned by the municipality which was in a poor state of repair. 10.  The applicant’s father died in 1992. In December 1999 his mother died, whereupon he became the sole owner of all the “future” real property allocated in compensation for the 1989 expropriation. 11.  The construction of the building in which the flats and the garage were to be located did not start as planned. 12.  The applicant made numerous complaints to the municipal authorities, to no avail. By a letter of 5 July 1999 the municipal company Sofinvest EOOD informed the applicant that the construction had not yet started and that no funding was available. 13.  Meanwhile, on 20 March 1995, the applicant requested the mayor to rescind the expropriation order in accordance with section 102 of the 1951 Property Act. On 9 November 1995 the mayor refused on the ground that the house had been demolished and the expropriated plot had been cleared for groundwork. According to the relevant legislation in force, the expropriation order could only be rescinded if the land had not been cleared for groundwork. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Sofia City Court. In a judgment of 10 June 1998 the Sofia City Court upheld the mayor’s refusal for the same reason. 14.  On 10 November 1998 the applicant filed a request with the local governor seeking restitution of the expropriated plot under the provisions of the 1997 Compensation for Expropriated Property Act. On 20 January 1999 the local governor refused on the ground that the expropriated property did not fall within the ambit of that Act. 15.  On 6 April 2001 the applicant filed another request with the municipality seeking to recover the expropriated plot. On 3 July 2001 the deputy mayor advised the applicant to renounce his claims to compensation for the demolished house in a notarised declaration. Although the applicant submitted the requested declaration, on 20 March 2002 the mayor refused to rescind the expropriation order because the house had been demolished and the plot cleared and occupied by the municipality. The applicant did not lodge an appeal with the courts against this refusal. 16.  On an unspecified date the municipal authorities sold the real property expropriated from the applicant’s family to a private third party who planned to build a block of flats on it. 17.  On a further request from the applicant the mayor of the municipality, in orders of 23 May and 8 June 2006, allocated two flats to him, equivalent to those originally due, in buildings under construction. As the municipality did not have any garages available, the orders did not concern the garage which the applicant was entitled to receive. 18.  On 3 April 2007 two flats apparently equivalent to those originally due were delivered to the applicant. As of March 2008 the garage remained undelivered.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Sesto Fiorentino (Florence). 5.  He is the owner of a flat in Sesto Fiorentino, which he had let to G.C. and G.P. 6.  In a registered letter of 29 November 1990, the applicant informed the tenants that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date. 7.  In a writ served on the tenants on 17 April 1991, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 8.  By a decision of 23 May 1991, which was made enforceable on 31 July 1991, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992. 9.  On 29 April 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his son. 10.  On 14 May 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 11.  On 2 June 1993, he served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 July 1993. 12.  Between 15 July 1993 and 15 October 1998, the bailiff made eleven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 13.  Pursuant to section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 27 June 1999. 14.  On that date, the tenants asked the Florence Magistrate for a new suspension. On 11 July 2000, the Florence Magistrate decided to fix a new date for the enforcement proceedings, namely 25 January 2001. 15.  On 31 October 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat because the tenants spontaneously vacated the premises.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1951 respectively and live in Heilbronn and Weinheim. 7.  On 8 October 1997 the applicants distributed four-page folded pamphlets to passers-by in front of a Nuremberg medical centre. The front page contained the following text:\n“'Killing specialist' for unborn children Dr. F. [is] on the premises of the Northern medical centre, Nuremberg”. 8.  The middle pages contained information on the development of the human foetus and about abortion techniques. It further contained the appeals:\n“Please support our struggle against the unpunished killing of unborn children”\nand\n“Therefore: No to abortion”\nThe verso read as follows:\n“Support our protest and our work. Help to ensure that the Fifth Commandment “Thou shall not kill” and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany are in future respected by all doctors in Nuremberg!\nStop the murder of children in their mother's womb on the premises of the Northern medical centre.\nthen: Holocaust\ntoday: Babycaust\n(damals: Holocaust heute: Babycaust)\nWhoever remains silent becomes guilty too!” 9.  The pamphlet bore the name and address of the second applicant as the person legally responsible for its content. 10.  On behalf of the medical centre and Dr F., the City of Nuremberg brought criminal charges against the applicants for defamation. 11.  On 16 July 1998 the Nuremberg District Court (Amtsgericht) acquitted the applicants on the grounds that their action was justified under section 193 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, see Relevant domestic law below). According to the District Court, the dissemination of the pamphlets was covered by the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 5 of the German Basic Law, since the pamphlet, taken as a whole, was not intended to debase Dr F. or the medical centre, but to express the applicants' general rejection of the performance of abortions. The District Court noted that the applicants considered the number of abortions performed in Germany to be crimes which were as abhorrent as the Holocaust. It was not up to the court to evaluate this statement, which was covered by the right to freedom of expression. 12.  Following an examination of the statements contained in the pamphlet, the District Court considered that the applicant's right to freedom of expression had to prevail over the doctor's interest in the protection of his personal honour. 13.  On 26 May 1999 the Nuremberg-Fürth Regional Court (Landgericht) quashed the District Court's judgment and convicted the applicants of defamation to the detriment of the medical centre and of Dr F. The Regional Court considered that the statement “then: Holocaust / today: Babycaust”, seen in the context of the other statements made in the pamphlet, had to be interpreted as putting the lawful activity performed by Dr F. on a level with the Holocaust, a synonym for the most abhorrent and unjustifiable crimes against humanity. According to the Regional Court, this statement was not covered by the applicants' right to freedom of expression, as it debased the doctor in a way which had not been necessary in order to express the applicants' opinion. While expressions of opinion which related to questions of public interest enjoyed a higher degree of protection than those relating to purely private interests, it had to be taken into account if and to which extent the person addressed had participated in the public debate. Furthermore, it had to be considered if the person expressing his thoughts could be at least expected to replace his statement by a statement which was less detrimental to the other person's honour. Applying these principles, the Regional Court considered that the applicants had failed sufficiently to take into account the doctor's interests. It had to be conceded that the applicants, as anti-abortion activists, had a political aim which they were allowed to pursue even by use of exaggerated and polemic criticism. However, by putting the doctor's legal actions on one level with the arbitrary killings of human beings performed by a regime of injustice, the applicants literally qualified him as a mass murderer. According to the Regional Court, this statement amounted to unjustifiable abusive insult (Schmähkritik). 14.  The Regional Court further considered that the other statements contained in the pamphlet were covered by the applicants' right to freedom of expression and had to be accepted. Having regard to all the factors of the case, the Regional Court considered it appropriate to impose twenty daily fines of 20 German marks (DEM) each on the first applicant and thirty daily fines of 60 DEM each on the second applicant, as the person having assumed legal responsibility for the pamphlet's content. 15.  On 8 December 1999 the Bavarian Court of Appeal (Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht) rejected the applicants' appeal on points of law. 16.  On 7 January 2000 the applicants lodged complaints with the Federal Constitutional Court. 17.  On 24 May 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, quashed the Regional Court's judgment insofar as the applicants had been convicted of defamation to the detriment of the medical centre and dismissed the remainder of the applicants' complaints. 18.  The Federal Constitutional Court considered, at the outset, that the criminal courts, when interpreting and applying the criminal law, had to respect the limits imposed by the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Basic Law. The court further considered that the Regional Court had respected these principles. 19.  According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the applicants had not confined themselves generally to criticising the performance of abortions – which they remained free to do – but had directed their statements directly against Dr F. It was clear from the overall context that the incriminated statement referred to Dr F., who was expressly mentioned on the front page. The Federal Constitutional Court further noted that the lower courts had assumed that the impugned statement put the doctor's professional activities on the same level as the Holocaust. It further observed that the Federal Court of Justice, in separate proceedings referring to the same pamphlet, assumed that the statement was meant to express the opinion that the abortions performed by the doctor amounted to mass homicide. However, this interpretation of the statement, which also contained the Holocaust reference, also contained a serious interference with the doctor's personality rights. 20.  The Federal Constitutional Court further considered that the statement seriously infringed the doctor's personality rights. While the applicants' statement did not qualify as abusive insult, the Regional Court's decision was not objectionable as that court had duly weighed the conflicting interests – that is, the applicants' right to freedom of expression and the doctor's personality rights. In particular, the Regional Court had taken into account that the doctor had practised within the framework of the law and had not actively participated in the public debate on abortion. Furthermore, the applicants could have been reasonably expected to express their general criticism without the serious violation of the doctor's personality rights. This decision was served on the applicants' counsel on 22 June 2006. 21.  On 9 November 2006 the Nuremberg Regional Court, following remittal, re-assessed the fines imposed as a penalty for defamation to the doctor's detriment. On 26 June 2007 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and remitted the case to the Nuremberg Regional Court. 22.  On 25 September 2008 the Nuremberg Regional Court re-assessed the sentences and imposed fifteen daily fines of 10 EUR each on the first applicant and ten daily fines of 10 EUR each on the second applicant, thereby taking into account the second applicant's previous convictions. 23.  On 2 April 2009 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeal on points of law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Târgu‑Mureş, Romania. 8.  On 19 October 2001 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant and other third parties in respect of embezzlement, forgery of accountancy papers and tax evasion offences that had allegedly been committed by him in his capacity as director of the limited liability company R. On the same day he was placed in police custody for twenty‑four hours on the basis of Article 148 (c) and (h) of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) on the ground that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, that he was a danger to public order, that the offences with which he had been charged were punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, and that he was preparing to abscond. 9.  On 20 October 2001 the Târgu‑Mureş Prosecutor’s Office issued an arrest warrant on the basis of Article 148 (h) of the CCP and the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention for thirty days on the ground that the offences with which he had been charged were punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment and that he was preparing to abscond. 10.  On 18 February 2002 the applicant and the third parties were indicted to stand trial on the above‑mentioned charges. They continued to remain in pre‑trial detention. 11.  The applicant’s pre‑trial detention was extended repeatedly by final interlocutory judgments of the Târgu‑Mureş County Court. The court confirmed the legality of the detention on the ground that the reasons provided for by Article 148 (h) of the CCP which had justified the applicant’s initial detention remained valid, did not breach his right of presumption of innocence and that the length of proceedings depended on the complexity of the case. Therefore it dismissed the applicant’s repeated arguments that he was not a danger to public order, that his pre‑trial detention could be replaced by alternative measures and that the length of his detention and of the overall proceedings was excessive. The domestic courts did not provide any other explanation for the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. Moreover, the eight hearings held between March 2002 and April 2003 were repeatedly adjourned, inter alia, in order to allow all the suspects to employ the services of a lawyer, for witnesses to be heard, the summoning of various parties to the proceedings, the submission of technical and medical expert reports and the examination of the transfer of the file to another court as a result of the applicant’s request. 12.  By the interlocutory judgment of 20 May 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court, having regard to the length of the pre‑trial detention, the applicant’s complaint concerning his state of health and his medical condition, the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by the parties, ordered the release of the applicant. The court also ordered the applicant not to leave town without the court’s consent pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. Lastly, the court adjourned the hearing until 17 June 2003 for procedural reasons. The Târgu‑Mureş Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the decision. 13.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 23 May 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the Prosecutor’s Office on the ground that according to the medical expert reports the applicant’s health problems could be treated in prison hospitals and that the initial reasons justifying his detention were still valid. Consequently, the court ordered the applicant’s pre‑trial detention to be extended from 26 May to 24 June 2003. 14.  By an interlocutory judgment of 17 June 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court, sitting as a two‑judge bench, again extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention from 25 June to 24 July 2003. The court held that the applicant’s detention was still justified under Article 148 (h) of the CCP. Moreover, the court could not be held responsible for the length of proceedings given the complexity of the case, the large amount of evidence submitted by the parties and the difficulties it faced in summoning the witnesses living in other cities. Lastly, the court adjourned the hearing for procedural reasons and ordered a technical expert report to be drafted. The applicant appealed against the decision. 15.  By a final interlocutory judgement of 2 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the interlocutory judgment of 17 June 2003 in part and ordered the lower court to re‑examine the matter of extending the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. The court held that the decision had been taken by two judges despite the applicable procedural rules requiring that this be done by a single judge. The court did not address the issue of the applicant’s release despite this having been requested by the applicant. 16.  By an interlocutory judgment of 4 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention to 23 July 2003 on the ground that the reasons justifying his initial detention were still valid. It also dismissed the applicant’s claim that his pre‑trial detention had ceased to be lawful after the final interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2003. It held that the said interlocutory judgment had mainly concerned the composition of the bench which had examined the merits of the judgment and considered, in terms of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, that the conditions set out by Article 160c of the CCP had been met. Moreover, the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention had been lawful since it had been the will of both judges. The applicant appealed against the decision. 17.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 7 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 4 July 2003. 18.  By an interlocutory judgment of 23 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court rejected the request of the Prosecutor’s Office for the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention and ordered the applicant’s immediate release. The court held that following the judgment of 2 July 2003 the applicant’s detention from 25 June 2003 had been unlawful in so far as the authorities had not extended the arrest warrant which had expired on 24 June 2003. Moreover, the present decision was not in breach of the res judicata principle in respect of the final decision of 4 July 2003 since the current decision, among others, did not touch on the merits of the case, but only assessed the lawfulness of the detention, and the decision of 4 July had interfered with the applicant’s procedural rights. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed. 19.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 23 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the Prosecutor’s Office. It held that the County Court’s judgment of 23 July 2003 interfered with the legal principle of res judicata. Consequently it quashed the decision and ordered the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention on the general ground that he was a danger to public order and that the reasons justifying his initial detention, including the ground provided for by Article 148 (c) of the CCP, were still valid. 20.  Between 19 August 2003 and 19 April 2004 the applicant’s pre‑trial detention continued to be extended by final interlocutory judgments of the domestic courts generally on the basis of the provisions of Article 148 (h) of the CCP, while his complaints concerning the length of his pre‑trial detention and of the proceedings as a whole were dismissed generally for the reason that the case was complex. Furthermore, no additional reasons or explanations were provided by the courts in respect of the applicant’s personal situation and his repeated claims that his pre‑trial detention following the judgment of 2 July 2003 was illegal were dismissed as res judicata. Finally, the hearings were repeatedly adjourned, inter alia, in order to allow for witnesses and parties to the proceedings to be heard or resummoned and for the submission of technical expert reports. 21.  By an interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court assessed the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention and ordered his immediate release. The court held that the applicant’s detention between 20 October 2001 and 24 June 2003 had been unlawful in so far as the arrest warrant had been issued by a prosecutor who was not a “magistrate” within the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and who had not clearly established the charges against the applicant. The prosecutor had also failed to hear the applicant prior to his detention or to provide reasons for his detention and had failed to immediately bring him before a judge following his arrest. At the same time, it considered that the assessment of lawfulness carried out by the domestic courts following the applicant’s arrest could not have remedied the above‑mentioned failures. Furthermore, it held that the applicant’s pre‑trial detention between 25 June and 4 July 2003 had also been unlawful in so far as following the final judgment of 2 July 2003 the applicant’s arrest had not been based on any express or valid court order. It considered that the previous decisions delivered by the domestic courts in respect of the same issue were not res judicata, because the said principle did not apply to issues such as the applicant’s detention which were separate from the merits of the case concerning the existence of the offence and the guilt of the accused. Moreover, it considered that its argument flowed from the provisions of the domestic procedural law which required courts to regularly assess the lawfulness of pre‑trial detention even if other domestic courts had previously delivered final judgments in respect of the same issue and to revoke ex officio the measure if it had been rendered unlawfully. The court further held that the applicant’s detention after 4 July 2003 had also been unlawful on the ground that the judgment of 4 July 2003 could not simply extend his pre‑trial detention which had started on 20 October 2001 since the applicant had not been lawfully detained at the time. In so far as the judgment could be perceived as a new detention order, the court considered that the legal conditions for such an order had not been met: there were no new grounds for the applicant’s detention, the court had not provided any reasons for it, no new detention order had been issued and the transcript of the applicant’s evidence given to the court in respect of his detention had been missing from the file. Finally, the court held that in any event the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention could no longer be justified. There was no evidence that the applicant was a danger to public order or that his release would interfere with the criminal investigation and his continuous pre‑trial detention of two years and seven months was excessive and did not comply with the guarantees set out by Article 5 of the ECHR. The court also adjourned the hearing on procedural grounds and ordered the resummoning of some of the witnesses. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the decision. 22.  By an interlocutory judgment of 16 June 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal proceedings against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 for twenty‑four hours on the ground that the applicant had not been summoned and ordered his summoning. 23.  By an interlocutory judgment of 17 June 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal, in the absence of the applicant, who had been summoned, but in the presence of his chosen lawyer, suspended the appeal proceedings against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 pending the referral of an objection of unconstitutionality raised by the applicant’s lawyer to the Constitutional Court in respect of Article 38511 (3) of the CCP. Relying on the provisions of Article 303 (6), 3002 and 160b of the CCP the court reviewed and maintained the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. Consequently, it dismissed the applicant’s request for an end to his detention. He had based his request on the argument that after 16 June 2004 his pre‑trial detention had no longer had a legal basis, since the sixty‑day time‑limit for assessing the lawfulness of detention provided for by the Constitution and the CCP had lapsed. 24.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 13 August 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal reviewed and maintained the applicant’s pre‑trial detention on the ground that the reasons justifying the applicant’s initial detention were still valid. 25.  By an interlocutory judgment of 27 August 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court ordered the applicant’s immediate release. It held that the argument of the Prosecutor’s Office that the applicant’s pre‑trial detention was justified by the applicant’s preparation to abscond (Article 148 (c)) had already been dismissed by the domestic courts on 7 March 2002 and that there was no new relevant evidence to rebut that finding. Moreover it held that there was no evidence that the applicant was a danger to public order and that two years and ten months was an unreasonable length of time for the proceedings. At the same time the court adjourned the hearing for procedural reasons. The Târgu‑Mureş Prosecutor’s Office appealed. 26.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 30 August 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of 27 August 2004. The applicant was released the same day. 27.  In October 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the objection of unconstitutionality raised by the applicant’s lawyer at the hearing of 17 June 2004 on the ground that the legal provision contested by the applicant was in compliance with the Constitution. 28.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor Office’s appeal against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 as moot on the ground that the applicant had already been released. 29.  The thirty‑one hearings held by the Târgu‑Mureş County Court between 24 September 2004 and 2 February 2009 were repeatedly adjourned, inter alia, in order to allow for more witnesses to be heard, the summoning of various parties to the proceedings, the resummoning of some of the witnesses, the submission of technical expert reports and the examination of some of the judges’ requests to withdraw from the proceedings. 30.  On an unspecified date in 2008 the applicant was arrested in Italy. He refused to take part via video link in the hearing of 2 February 2009 concerning the criminal proceedings brought against him in Romania and pending before the domestic courts. 31.  By an interlocutory judgment of 6 March 2009 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court decided to separate the proceedings concerning the applicant from the proceedings concerning the other co-accused and ordered the applicant’s temporary transfer from Italy to be arranged. 32.  The proceedings brought against the applicant are still pending before the first‑instance court. 33.  In January 2002, following an episode of depression, the applicant underwent a psychiatric examination. The panel of experts concluded that the applicant’s condition was a “situational reaction” and that he could be treated in detention in Bucharest Prison Hospital which was equipped with a psychiatric unit. 34.  The two psychiatrists on the panel of experts expressed a dissenting opinion. They concluded that the applicant should be treated in a civilian psychiatric hospital because psychotherapy sessions could not be properly provided in detention owing to the “lack of privacy”. 35.  There is no evidence in the applicant’s medical file to show that he spent time in hospital for psychiatric treatment or that he continued to have similar problems afterwards. 36.  The applicant also informed the Court that he had been kept in solitary confinement and that from the end of 2003 he had been under the same detention regime as dangerous detainees, which meant that he had been under constant supervision. His allegations are contradicted by a letter of 13 November 2003 sent by the Târgu‑Mureş Prison authorities to the domestic courts from which it can be seen that the applicant was not classified as a “dangerous detainee”. 37.  According to the applicant’s medical records, he was diagnosed with chronic uveitis in his left eye in May 2002. 38.  A medical expert report drafted in February 2003 concluded that the applicant’s situation required surgery and post‑surgery treatment in a specialised hospital, specifically the Rahova‑Bucharest Prison Hospital. However, his state of health was not incompatible with his detention. 39.  The applicant did not undergo the surgery. However, he did not complain about the lack of medical treatment before the domestic courts under Article 3 of the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 56/2003 (GEO 56/2003) concerning the rights of individuals serving prison sentences. 40.  After his release from prison on 30 August 2004 the applicant underwent cataract surgery in Italy.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Teteven. He was the executive director of Elprom‑EMT, a State‑owned company, against which bankruptcy proceedings were opened in 1997. 9.  On 14 May 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal proceedings against the applicant and against the deputy director of Elprom‑EMT and a company employee. 10.  On 3 June 1997 the applicant was charged with abuse of office and making false official documents, contrary to Articles 282 § 2 and 311 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”). It was alleged that, together with the deputy director, he had abused his managerial position during the period April 1996 – March 1997 and had occasioned losses to the company in order to secure a financial benefit for a private limited liability company in which his wife was a member. The alleged loss to Elprom‑EMT amounted to 23,302,275 old Bulgarian levs (BGL). It was also charged that to facilitate that offence the applicant had made false documents and had incited the deputy director and a company employee to make false documents. 11.  On 6 June 1997 a prosecutor of the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the suspension of the applicant from his position of executive director, on the grounds that the charges against him were for job‑related offences and that there were sufficient grounds to believe that he could jeopardise the investigation if he remained in office. 12.  On 20 June 1997 the investigator in charge of the case ordered an expert financial report, which was assigned to two former employees of Elprom‑EMT. 13.  On 4 August 1997 counsel for the applicant requested to be allowed to consult the case file. The request was granted on 10 August. 14.  A graphological report ordered earlier was ready on 18 September 1997. 15.  On 25 September 1997 the applicant was questioned. Counsel for the applicant requested to be allowed to inspect the case file. The investigator allowed them to consult certain documents but refused access to the whole file. 16.  On 16 October 1997 the expert financial report ordered on 20 June 1997 was ready. 17.  On 20 October and 25 November 1997 the investigator ordered expert reports on the prices of certain items relevant to the investigation. 18.  On 10 December 1997 the applicant was questioned and was allowed, together with his counsel, to consult certain documents in the case file, including the expert reports. 19.  On 29 December 1997 counsel for the applicant requested the disqualification of one of the experts who had prepared the expert financial report. They argued, inter alia, that one of the experts had been chief accountant of Elprom‑EMT and had been dismissed for disciplinary reasons by the applicant, which cast doubt on his objectivity. The request was denied. 20.  It seems that most of the witnesses in the case were questioned on dates between June and December 1997. 21.  On 10 February 1998 the applicant was questioned. His request to be allowed to consult the case file was granted. 22.  On 12 February 1998 counsel for the applicant again requested the disqualification of the experts who had prepared the expert financial report. They repeated their arguments in respect of the first expert and also averred that the other expert had been involved in the bankruptcy proceedings of Elprom‑EMT. 23.  The same day the applicant was presented with the amended charges. These included aggravated embezzlement facilitated by the making of false official documents (Article 202 in conjunction with Article 311 of the CC), embezzlement (Article 201 of the CC), abuse of office (Article 282 of the CC), deliberately entering into contracts disadvantageous to the company he was managing (Article 220 of the CC) and making false official documents (Article 311 of the CC). It was alleged that between March 1996 and February 1997, together with the deputy director of Elprom‑EMT, he had embezzled company assets amounting to BGL 4,833,264.54, for the commission of which offence he had made false official documents, that in June 1995 he had misappropriated a trailer owned by Elprom‑EMT, that between March 1996 and February 1997, together with the deputy director, he had abused his office to secure a financial benefit for a private company, that between August 1996 and January 1997, together with the deputy director, he had deliberately made disadvantageous contracts between Elprom‑EMT and the same private company for which he had secured a financial benefit, and that in December 1994 he had made two false invoices for sums amounting to 365,000 German marks.\nAfter the being charged the applicant was questioned in the presence of counsel. He refused to give explanations. 24.  On 16 February 1998 the applicant and his counsel were allowed to consult the entire case file. The applicant objected to the expert reports and requested the disqualification of the experts. The investigator denied his requests and proposed to the prosecution that the applicant be indicted. 25.  On 16 June 1998 counsel for the applicant requested that the case be remitted for additional investigation, arguing that this was necessary to rectify certain procedural violations. 26.  On 9 July 1998 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office granted the request and referred the case back for investigation. It observed that the relevant circumstances about the relations between Elprom‑EMT and the private company which had allegedly benefited from it had not been fully elucidated and that the investigator had erred in the legal qualification of the offences. It gave specific instructions as to the facts which had to be established. It further expressed the view that the applicant’s request for the disqualification of one of the experts who had prepared the expert financial report was well‑founded, since he had been dismissed by the applicant for disciplinary reasons and the applicant had good reasons to fear his lack of objectivity. It was therefore necessary to prepare a new expert report. In addition, it asserted that it was necessary to charge the applicant anew, since the original presentation of the charges against him had not been specific enough. Finally, it noted that the applicant’s counsel had also been Elprom‑EMT’s counsel in the bankruptcy proceedings against the company, which raised certain doubts as to a potential conflict of interests. It was therefore necessary to establish whether the applicant had reason to doubt the loyalty of his counsel, because if that issue was not elucidated, the applicant could use it as an argument that his defence rights had been infringed. 27.  On 4 November 1998 the investigator, complying with the instructions of the prosecution, ordered a new financial report. 28.  On 26 April 1999 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office, finding that the investigator in charge of the case had not carried out any of its instructions apart from ordering a new financial report, replaced him with a new one. 29.  On 1 June 1999 the new investigator proposed to discontinue the proceedings, on the ground that the charges against the applicant were not supported by sufficient evidence. 30.  On 7 June 1999 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office rejected the proposal and referred the case back for additional investigation. It held that the evidence was not sufficient because the investigation had not been performed thoroughly. 31.  On 9 June 1999 the investigator allowed the applicant to consult the case file. 32.  On 13 June 1999 the financial report ordered on 4 November 1998 was ready. 33.  On 7 January 2000 counsel for the applicant informed the investigator that she would be unavailable until 18 January. 34.  On 19 January 2000 the investigator charged the applicant anew. The charges included, apart from the previous ones, a new charge under Article 219 of the CC (mismanagement resulting in loss for the company). After charging the applicant the investigator questioned him and allowed him and his counsel to consult the case file. 35.  On 31 January 2000 the investigator recommended that the applicant be indicted solely under Article 219 of the CC. 36.  On 14 February 2000 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office decided to discontinue the investigation in respect of the charges under Articles 202 (aggravated embezzlement), 282 (abuse of office) and 311 (making false official documents) of the CC. On 23 March 2000 the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office overturned that decision and referred the case back to the investigator. On appeal by the investigator on 6 April 2000 the Veliko Tarnovo Appellate Prosecutor’s Office affirmed the overturning. 37.  On 12 May 2000 the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office decided to drop the charges under Article 219 of the CC. Its decision was overturned by the Veliko Tarnovo Appellate Prosecutor’s Office on 21 July 2000 and the case was referred back to the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office with instructions to carry out certain investigative steps (inter alia, to order an expert report) and elucidate certain facts relating to transactions carried out by Elprom‑EMT during the period 1996‑97. 38.  On 4 August 2000, when the case was back at the investigation stage, the investigator ordered an additional expert report. 39.  On 8 June 2001 the applicant’s counsel informed the investigator that she would be unavailable until 12 June. 40.  On 12 June 2001 the investigator allowed the applicant and his counsel to consult the case file. 41.  On 19 June 2001 the investigator recommended that the applicant be indicted under Articles 219 (mismanagement resulting in loss), and 311 (making false official documents) of the CC. 42.  On 20 July 2001 the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office decided to drop the charges under Article 219 of the CC and to transfer the case to the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office for continuation of the proceedings under the remaining charges. 43.  On 5 September 2001 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office remitted the case for additional investigation, holding that the investigative steps carried out up until then had not established all relevant circumstances. 44.  On 24 September 2001 the investigator ordered a new expert report, assigning it to new experts. 45.  On 26 February 2003 the applicant and the prosecution entered into a plea‑bargain agreement. The criminal proceedings against him were apparently discontinued soon after. 46.  On 3 June 1997 the applicant was put under house arrest by an investigator who saw him in person and questioned him. 47.  On 12 June 1997 the applicant lodged with the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office a request to be released on bail. On 16 June 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office denied the applicant’s request. The applicant appealed to the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The appeal was dismissed by an order of 8 July 1997. The applicant appealed to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. On 3 September 1997 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the appeal. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Head of the Investigations Division of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. On 31 October 1997 the Head of the Investigations Division dismissed the appeal. 48.  In the meantime, on 7 August and 2 September 1997, the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office had denied two requests by the applicant to be allowed to leave his home for one day. Another request by the applicant to be allowed to leave his home for one day was denied on 29 October 1997. On 12 November 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office allowed the applicant to leave his home for one day. 49.  On 19 November 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office denied a renewed application for release by the applicant. 50.  On 4 December 1997 the applicant submitted a new request for release on bail. On 16 December 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office granted bail, setting the amount at BGL 3,000,000. On an unspecified date in December 1997 the applicant paid the amount of the bail and was released from house arrest.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are:\n1) Ms Nebist Khalitova, born in 1959;\n2) Ms Zarema Almurzayeva, born in 1971;\n3) Ms Zalina Chapayeva, born in 1982; and\n4) Mr Maulat Achkhanov, born in 1929.\nThe first applicant lives in the village of Raduzhnoe. The second, third and fourth applicants live in the village of Pobedinskoe. The two villages are located a short distance one from another in the Groznenskiy District of the Chechen Republic. 7.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Ali Uspayev and the mother of Mr Amir Magomedov. The second applicant is the sister of Mr Aslan Dokayev. Aslan Dokayev was married to the third applicant. The fourth applicant is the father of Mr Rustam Achkhanov. 8.  On the night of 18 July 2001 the first applicant, her son and husband were sleeping in their house in Raduzhnoe. At about 5 a.m. around thirty unidentified armed men wearing camouflage uniforms broke into it. The men did not identify themselves. They had Slavic features and spoke Russian without an accent. 9.  The first applicant looked out of the window and saw the armed men dragging Amir Magomedov, who had his legs in a plaster cast because of a previous trauma, to the gates. Ali Uspayev was lying on the ground in the courtyard with his arms handcuffed behind his back. Then one of the armed men hit the first applicant with a rifle butt and she lost consciousness. Having recovered a few minutes later, she saw that everyone had left the house. 10.  According to her neighbours who witnessed the events, the armed men loaded Amir Magomedov and Ali Uspayev into one of two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) parked next to the first applicant’s house and drove away. Outside the village the two vehicles were joined by two more APCs.\n(b)  Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov 11. On the morning of 18 July 2001 Rustam Achkhanov was driving his VAZ 2106 car. He was accompanied by his acquaintance, Aslan Dokayev. 12.  At about 6 a.m., when they reached the village of Raduzhnoe, unidentified armed men in four APCs without registration numbers opened fire in the direction of the VAZ 2106 car. Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov got out of the car and started running. The armed men continued shooting, wounded Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov and loaded them into one of the APCs. Then they took the music player and some other valuable items from the VAZ 2106 car, poured petrol over it and then set it on fire. The car blew up. The four APCs drove away. 13.  The second, third and fourth applicants did not see their relatives being taken away and obtained the description of the events from inhabitants of Raduzhnoe. 14.  On 18 July 2001 units of the federal troops and the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of the Interior carried out a special operation in the village of Pobedinskoe with a view to arresting members of illegal armed groups and prosecuting them in accordance with the law in force. The servicemen of the Internal Troops had a right to carry and use arms when ensuring peace and order. Residents of the Chechen Republic were advised by officials to abstain from using cars or other vehicles at night because of the unlawful activities of illegal armed groups and the counter-attacks of federal troops. 15.  At about 5 a.m. on 18 July 2001 Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov were travelling in a VAZ 2106 car in the direction of the village of Pobedinskoe. At some point near the bridge on the Alkhanchurskiy canal servicemen participating in the counter-terrorism campaign flagged down the VAZ 2106 car. The servicemen intended to check the identities of those travelling in the car. Rustam Achkhanov stopped the car within seventy metres of the servicemen; Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov left the car and started running. The servicemen fired warning shots in the air. The two men ignored the shots and continued running in the direction of civilians’ houses in the village of Raduzhnoe. Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov escaped the scene and their whereabouts were not established. The servicemen examined the VAZ 2106 car and the surrounding area. They found a RPG-26 hand-held grenade launcher («ручной гранатомет РПГ-26 «Муха»») lying next to the car and two shells for a RPG-7 hand-held grenade launcher («ручной гранатомет РПГ-7») in the car boot. 16.  At about 5 a.m. on 18 July 2001 unidentified persons in camouflage uniforms abducted Amir Magomedov and Ali Uspayev in the village of Raduzhnoe. The whereabouts of the two men were not established. 17.  On 18 July 2001, shortly after Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov were taken away, the second applicant discovered that Amir Magomedov and Ali Uspayev had been abducted as well. She was also told that the four APCs had headed to Solenaya Balka area where the 21st brigade of the Russian federal troops (“the Sophrino brigade”) was stationed. The second applicant immediately communicated that information to the military commander’s office of the Groznenskiy District, the Groznenskiy district department of the interior and the prosecutor’s office of the Groznenskiy District (“the district prosecutor’s office”). Some officials visited the headquarters of the Sophrino brigade and were informed that its officers had not been implicated in the abductions. 18.  On 18 July 2001 officials from a prosecutor’s office visited the first applicant and questioned her about the circumstances of the abduction of her son and husband. 19.  After 18 July 2001 the applicants repeatedly contacted various official bodies, both in person and in writing. In particular, they applied to prosecutors’ offices at different levels, the Administration of the Chechen Republic, the Russian State Duma and the Special Envoy of the Russian President in Chechnya for Rights and Freedoms. The applicants retained copies of some of these complaints and submitted them to the Court. The official bodies forwarded the majority of the complaints to the various prosecutors’ offices for investigation. 20.  On 18 July 2001 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the murder of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov under Article 105 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated murder). The case file was given the number 19109. 21.  On 20 July 2001 the investigation file in case no. 19109 was forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 (“the unit prosecutor’s office”). It appears that the case was then assigned the number 14/33/0405-01. 22.  On 1 August 2001 the second applicant wrote to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic describing in detail the circumstances of the abduction of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov and asking for help in establishing their whereabouts. 23.  On 2 August 2001 the unit prosecutor’s office summoned the second applicant for an interview. 24.  On 13 August 2001 the unit prosecutor’s office transferred the investigation file in case no. 14/33/0405-01 to the military prosecutor’s office of the North Caucasian Circuit (“the circuit prosecutor’s office”). 25.  On 16 August 2001 the unit prosecutor’s office sent a request to the temporary department of the interior of the Staropromyslovskiy District (“the VOVD”), which stated that on 18 July 2001 a group of servicemen commanded by an officer of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) had shot Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov during an attempt to escape arrest and that their corpses had been transported by the APCs. The VOVD was instructed to verify whether the bodies of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov were among any unidentified corpses. 26.  On 29 November 2001 the district prosecutor’s office forwarded the second and fourth applicants’ complaints to the unit prosecutor’s office. 27.  On 30 November 2001 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the fourth applicant’s complaint to the district prosecutor’s office. 28.  On 14 December 2001 the unit prosecutor’s office forwarded the fourth applicant’s letter to the circuit prosecutor’s office to be included in the investigation file in case no. 14/33/0405-01. 29.  On 18 June 2002 the circuit prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation in case no. 14/00/0019-01 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 30.  On 13 November 2002 the second applicant complained to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic that there had been no progress in the investigation in case no. 14/33/0405-01 and asked for assistance in establishing her brother’s whereabouts. 31.  On 17 July 2003 the district prosecutor’s office issued the third applicant with a progress report on case no. 19109 which stated that the investigation had been opened on 18 July 2001 and that on 20 July 2001 the investigation file had been transferred to the unit prosecutor’s office. 32.  On 18 September 2003 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the third applicant that the investigation file in case no. 14/33/0405-01 had been transferred to the circuit prosecutor’s office on 13 August 2001. 33.  On 10 November 2003 the second applicant requested the circuit prosecutor’s office to update her on progress in the investigation in case no. 14/33/0405-01 and to send her a copy of the latest decision. 34.  On 7 February 2004 the second applicant again wrote to the circuit prosecutor’s office repeating her request of 10 November 2003. 35.  On 5 March 2004 the circuit prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s complaint to the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA prosecutor’s office”) and invited the second applicant to send any further queries to the UGA prosecutor’s office or the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. 36.  On 8 March 2004 the UGA prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s letter to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic and mentioned that the investigation file in case no. 34/33/0405-01 had been transferred to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic on 19 February 2003. A copy of the letter was sent to the second applicant. 37.  On 26 March 2004 the UGA prosecutor’s office forwarded the fourth applicant’s complaint to the unit prosecutor’s office. 38.  On 26 April 2004 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic that an inquiry had not established that federal servicemen were implicated in the kidnapping of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov, and forwarded the results of the inquiry. 39.  On 27 April 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the second applicant’s complaint to the district prosecutor’s office. 40.  On 1 June 2004 the second and fourth applicants requested the district prosecutor’s office to inform them of progress in case no. 34/33/0405-01 and to grant them victim status. 41.  On an unspecified date in June 2004 the first, second and fourth applicants visited the district prosecutor’s office and were served with a copy of the decision to suspend the investigation of 18 June 2002. 42.  On 7 July 2004 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the fourth applicant that the investigation file in case no. 19109 had been forwarded to the circuit prosecutor’s office. 43.  In a letter of 7 September 2004 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the Committee on the Constitutional Rights of Nationals of the Chechen Republic and the fourth applicant that the inquiry had established that federal servicemen had not been involved in the kidnapping of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov and that the file had been forwarded to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. 44.  On 30 September 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic informed the second applicant that it had instructed the district prosecutor’s office to reinvigorate the investigation, to take requisite measures to solve the crime and to examine the feasibility of the transfer of the file to a military prosecutor’s office. The second applicant was invited to send further queries to the district prosecutor’s office. 45.  On 12 October 2004 the fourth applicant complained to the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Russia that there had been no effective investigation into his son’s disappearance. 46.  On 29 October 2004 the second, third and fourth applicants requested the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic to inform them which prosecutor’s office was in charge of the investigation and to report on its results. 47.  On 9 November 2004 the second, third and fourth applicants complained to the district prosecutor’s office and the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic that they had not been given any information about the investigation into their relatives’ deaths and requested that they be informed immediately of the outcome of the investigation. 48.  On 9 November 2004 the district prosecutor’s office forwarded the investigation file in case no. 19109 into the murder of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov and the kidnapping of Amir Magomedov and Ali Uspayev to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. The cover letter stated that “the investigation [had] established that the crimes had been committed by servicemen of military unit no. 3499”. The prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic was also asked to consider forwarding the file to the UGA prosecutor’s office. 49.  On 31 December 2004 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the first, second and fourth applicants that the investigation in case no. 14/33/04-05 D had been commenced on 18 July 2001 and that the investigation file had been forwarded to the circuit prosecutor’s office on 13 August 2001 and had not been returned to the unit prosecutor’s office. 50.  On 31 March 2005 the fourth applicant wrote to the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office of Russia complaining of the abduction and disappearance of his son and Aslan Dakayev. In reply, on 11 April 2005, he was informed that the complaint had been forwarded to the UGA prosecutor’s office. 51.  It appears that the investigation into the disappearance and death of the applicants’ relatives has not been completed to date. 52.  On 18 July 2001 the district prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation into the murder of Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov under Article 105 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated murder). The case was assigned the number 19109. Later the case file was transferred to the unit prosecutor’s office to verify the hypothesis of the involvement of servicemen of the Internal Troops in the crime and assigned the number 14/33/0405-01. 53.  On 13 August 2001 the case was transferred to the circuit prosecutor’s office and assigned the number 14/00/0019-01. 54.  In February 2003 the case was returned to the district prosecutor’s office under the number 19109 because the involvement of the servicemen of the Internal Troops in the crime had not been proven. 55.  On 3 November 2004 the district prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation into Amir Magomedov and Ali Uspayev’s disappearance following their abduction by unknown persons under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case was assigned the number 34113 and then joined to case no. 19109. 56.  On 8 November 2004 case no. 19109 was transferred pursuant to the jurisdiction rules to the UGA prosecutor’s office and then accepted for processing by the unit prosecutor’s office under the number 34/33/0405-01. On the same date the investigation was suspended for failure to identify those responsible. 57.  On 19 January 2005 the unit prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 8 November 2004 and resumed the investigation in case no. 34/33/0405‑01. 58.  The circumstances in which Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov were shot at were uncertain. Witnesses claimed that Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov had either been wounded or killed by servicemen and that their bodies had then been put in the APCs. The servicemen who had been present at the scene of the incident denied the allegations and stated that they had fired warning shots in the air to stop Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov who had been trying to run away. 59.  The APCs used in the special operation were examined in the course of the investigation. No traces of blood were found on them. 60.  The bullets and cartridges found at the scene of the incident had not been fired from the servicemen’s weapons. 61.  The investigation failed to prove the involvement of federal servicemen in the crime or to establish the whereabouts of the missing men. The criminal proceedings related to the disappearance of Amir Magomedov, Ali Uspayev, Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov in case no. 34/33/0405-01 have been pending before a military prosecutor’s office. 62.  Despite specific requests by the Court, the Government did not disclose any documents from the investigation files in cases nos. 19109, 14/00/0019-01 and 34/33/0405-01, except for a copy of the decision of 19 January 2005 by the unit prosecutor’s office. They stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since the files contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in criminal proceedings. 63.  On 7 March 2004 the fourth applicant lodged with the Military Court of the North Caucasus Circuit (“the circuit court”) a complaint concerning the disappearance of Amir Magomedov, Ali Uspayev, Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov and that there had been no effective investigation. 64.  On 15 March 2004 the second applicant lodged a complaint with the circuit court about the disappearance of Amir Magomedov, Ali Uspayev, Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov, also alleging an ineffective investigation, 65.  On 2 April 2004 the circuit court forwarded the fourth applicant’s complaint to the Military Court of the Grozny Garrison (“the Grozny court”) for examination on the merits. 66.  On 6 May 2004 the Grozny court returned the complaint about “the decision of the [circuit] prosecutor’s office to suspend investigation in case no. 14/33/0405-01” to the second applicant for lack of jurisdiction. It explained that the complaint should be lodged with a district court of general jurisdiction. 67.  On 1 June 2004 the Grozny court informed the fourth applicant that a hearing of his complaint would be held on 4 June 2004. 68.  On 4 June 2004 the Grozny court, relying on the rules of territorial jurisdiction, decided to forward the fourth applicant’s complaint to the Military Court of the Rostov-on-Don Garrison (“the Rostov court”). 69.  On 8 July 2004 the Rostov court summoned the fourth applicant to attend a hearing of 9 July 2004 to clarify his claims. 70.  On 2 August 2004 the Rostov court informed the fourth applicant that it had requested the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic to report on the location of the case file and the progress in the investigation. 71.  On 30 July 2004 the first, second and fourth applicants lodged a complaint with the Rostov court that the investigative authorities had taken no action and requested that the decision to suspend the investigation of 18 June 2002 be quashed. 72.  On 8 September 2004 the Rostov court summoned the first, second and fourth applicants to attend a hearing scheduled for 10 September 2004. 73.  On 22 November 2004 the fourth applicant was summoned to attend a hearing of the Rostov court on 24 December 2004. In reply the first, second and fourth applicants agreed to have the case examined in their absence and asked to be informed of the eventual outcome of the hearing. 74.  On 18 May 2004 the Grozny court received a complaint by the fourth applicant dated 15 March 2004 about the decision to suspend the investigation into the kidnapping of his son Rustam Achkhanov. In his complaint the fourth applicant reported the following. On 18 July 2001 the car in which Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov had been riding had been fired at by servicemen in the village of Raduzhnoe. Aslan Dokayev and Rustam Achkhanov had been wounded and taken away to an unknown destination. On the same date servicemen had kidnapped Amir Magomedov and Ali Uspayev. 75.  The Grozny court accepted the complaint, scheduled a hearing for 4 June 2004 and notified the fourth applicant accordingly. The latter failed to attend the hearing. On 4 June 2004 the Grozny court was informed that the investigation was pending before the circuit prosecutor’s office and transferred the fourth applicant’s complaint to the Rostov court pursuant to procedural rules. 76.  On 9 July 2004 the Rostov court accepted the fourth applicant’s complaint for processing. The fourth applicant was notified accordingly and replied that he could not attend a hearing on a particular date. 77.  The Rostov court requested the case file from the circuit prosecutor’s office. It was revealed that on 22 November 2002 the Main Military Prosecutor’s Office had been ordered to transfer the case file to the UGA prosecutor’s office. Following an additional inquiry that had not proven the involvement of servicemen in the kidnappings of 18 July 2001 in the village of Raduzhnoe the case file was transferred to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic on 19 February 2003. On 27 February 2003 the case file was sent to the district prosecutor’s office. On 25 August 2004 the case was sent to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. On 19 November 2004 it was transferred to the UGA prosecutor’s office. 78.  On 30 August 2004 the Rostov court received a complaint by the first, second and fourth applicants challenging the decision of 18 June 2001 to suspend the investigation concerning their missing relatives. 79.  On 19 January 2005 the unit prosecutor’s office informed the Rostov court of the following. On 30 September 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic had quashed the decision of 18 June 2002. On 8 November 2004 the district prosecutor’s office had again suspended the proceedings. On 19 January 2005 the unit prosecutor’s office had quashed the decision of 8 November 2004 and resumed the investigation concerning both the presumed killing and the kidnapping of 18 July 2001. 80.  On 20 January 2005 the Rostov court examined the materials before it and dismissed the applicants’ complaint for the reason that the contested decision had already been quashed. On 24 January 2005 the first, second and fourth applicants were sent copies of the Rostov court’s decision. 81.  The decision of 20 January 2005 was not appealed against.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 12 October 2005 the applicant was arrested and charged with assisting the President of a commercial bank in extorting a bribe from a company in order to give it a loan. 8.   On 16 January 2006 the applicant was transferred to the remand centre of the Ministry of Justice no.29/13 (also known as Prison no. 13, former Prison no. 3) in Chişinău. 9.  On 3 February 2006 the Buiucani District Court prolonged the applicant's detention for a period of twenty days. The court found that\n“... the criminal investigation is in its final phase; the final charges are to be submitted and the accused is to have access to the file. Taking into account the serious nature of the crime of which he is accused, the damaging effect of the deed and that, once aware of the contents of the file, the applicant could influence witnesses, destroy evidence and abscond from law enforcement authorities and the court, the court considers justified the prosecutor's request for prolonging the period of detention and rejects the lawyer's request for bail.”\nOn 9 February 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 10.  The applicant made a separate complaint regarding the initial period of his detention, until 3 February 2006 (the case of Ţurcan and Ţurcan v. Moldova, application no. 39835/05). In the present application, he relies on the events subsequent to that date. 11.  On 20 February 2006 the case file was submitted to the trial court. On 6 March 2006 the first hearing took place, during which the applicant submitted a habeas corpus request. He relied on Article 186 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 15 below) and on the cases of Baranowski v. Poland (no. 28358/95, ECHR 2000‑III) and Ječius v. Lithuania (no. 34578/97, ECHR 2000‑IX), and claimed that, following the referral of the case to the trial court on 20 February 2006, his detention did not have a legal basis. He also complained about the inhuman conditions of his detention in Prison no. 13 and referred to the findings of the European\nCommittee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in respect of that remand centre. 12.  The Buiucani District Court rejected his request because\n“[the applicant is] accused of a serious crime and the court does not find at the present time any ground for changing or annulling the preventive measures”. 13.  On 28 September 2006 the Buiucani District Court accepted the applicant's request for release, relying on new relevant circumstances of the case, namely that most evidence had already been examined in court or recorded by the prosecution and that the applicant's health had worsened, and surgery was needed. On 31 October 2006 the same court gave the applicant permission to undergo medical treatment abroad.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant’s late husband was employed by Elektron AD, a company based in Belgrade (“the company”). From 1995 to 1998 he was deployed on certain projects in Russia, for which work, apart from his salary, he had the right to claim an allowance calculated in United States dollars (USD). 5.  On 18 June 1998 the Commercial Court in Belgrade instituted insolvency proceedings in respect of the company. 6.  On an unspecified date thereafter Mr Adamović lodged a pecuniary claim within the insolvency proceedings for salary arrears, deployment allowance, and various social security contributions. On 4 May 2000 the Commercial Court rejected his claim and instructed him to initiate a regular civil suit and request determination of his claim (radi utvrđivanja osporenih potraživanja). 7.  On 22 June 2000 Mr Adamović, as instructed, lodged a separate civil claim. 8.  On 18 November 2002 the Commercial Court rejected the part of Mr Adamović’s request regarding the salaries, as it was considered to have been withdrawn, while the request for deployment allowance was partly granted. By virtue of this judgment the company was ordered to pay him USD 4,258.60 towards the unpaid allowances, together with the social security contributions due and statutory interest, plus 44,750 Yugoslav dinars (YUM) for legal costs. 9.  On 16 April 2003 and 23 October 2003 respectively the District Court and the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 18 November 2002. The judgment of the Supreme Court was served on the applicant after 13 February 2004. 10.  On an unspecified date thereafter, the said judgment having become final, it was acknowledged within the insolvency proceedings. 11.  On 10 September 2003 the costs awarded in the civil proceedings were paid, while on 5 November 2003 the interest calculated on the costs was also paid. 12.  On about a dozen occasions between 15 July 2003 and 10 September 2007 the company paid the applicant various smaller amounts in “hardship assistance” (solidarna pomoć), to help cover certain medical bills. The total of all these sums amounted to an equivalent of less than USD 3,000. These amounts, however, were not specified as being intended to constitute partial payment of the debt, but as assistance to the applicant’s family because of the applicant’s late husband’s illness. 13.  On 28 May 2008 the Commercial Court issued a decision ordering payment of 50% of the guaranteed salary to all the former employees of the company for the period from 1 March 1997 to 18 June 1998. On 5 June 2008 the applicant received a payment under this head of 91,532 Serbian dinars (RSD, about USD 1,800 at the relevant time). 14.  Before the insolvency proceedings the debtor company was entirely socially owned. It has remained registered as fully socially owned in the relevant public registries throughout the insolvency proceedings. 15.  On 29 September 2008 the company was put up for auction, in accordance with the provisions of the applicable law (see paragraph 19 below). Following several unsuccessful auction attempts, on 5 February 2010 the Commercial Court authorised the sale of the company to a third private party. The purchase price has been added to the company’s assets. 16.  On 23 February 2010 the Commercial Court in Belgrade terminated the insolvency proceedings against the company, however continuing with insolvency action against the bankruptcy estate. On 7 October 2011 the Commercial Court authorised payment of certain sums to some of the former employees of the company, but the applicant was not placed on the list for payment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1965 and is currently serving a prison sentence in the Smolensk region. 7.  On 22 December 2002 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. Subsequently he was committed to stand trial by the Glinkovskiy District Court of the Smolensk Region. The trial was fixed for 22 July 2003. 8.  In the morning of 22 July 2003 the applicant had a talk with legal-aid counsel appointed to represent him. He was dissatisfied with the result of that discussion and so refused counsel's services in writing. 9.  The first witness on the stand was the applicant's sister. The applicant had an altercation with her and the judge ordered that he be escorted out of the room. 10.  The applicant was brought back into the courtroom to make his final submissions. After that the judge declared the trial at an end and announced that the verdict would be handed down on 24 July 2003. 11.  On 24 July 2003 the judge delivered the judgment, finding the applicant guilty of murder and sentencing him to fifteen years' imprisonment in a high-security colony. 12.  On 28 July 2003 the applicant filed grounds of appeal. He submitted, in particular, that the entire trial had been conducted in his absence, that he had not been represented and, as a consequence, had not been able to defend himself. He asked that his case be re-heard and that a different legal-aid lawyer be appointed to represent him before the appeal court. 13.  On 11 November 2003 the Smolensk Regional Court held the appeal hearing. The applicant was present but not represented, as he had requested. The Regional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the conviction had been lawful and justified. In the Regional Court's view, there had been no violation of the applicant's right to defend himself because he had voluntarily refused the services of legal-aid counsel before the trial. 14.  On 15 June 2004 the Fokinskiy District Court of Bryansk reviewed the applicant's conviction in the light of recent amendments to the Russian Criminal Code and held that the applicant should serve a prison sentence in a colony with less strict conditions of detention. 15.  On 27 December 2006 the Presidium of the Smolensk Regional Court quashed by way of supervisory review the appeal judgment of 11 November 2003. The Presidium found that the applicant's right to legal representation had been infringed in the appeal proceedings and remitted the case for fresh examination by the appeal court. 16.  On 23 January 2007 the judicial authorities asked the President of the Smolensk Regional Bar Association to appoint counsel to represent the applicant in the proceedings before the appeal court. 17.  On 29 January 2007 the applicant's case was assigned to Ms D. as counsel. The applicant was informed accordingly. 18.  On 31 January 2007 the Smolensk Regional Court scheduled the appeal hearing for 13 February 2007. On the same day Ms D. studied the applicant's case file. 19.  On 6 February 2007 the applicant informed the Regional Court of his decision not to participate in the appeal hearing. In his motion he further questioned the effectiveness of his legal representation referring to the state-appointed lawyer's failure to meet him to prepare his defence. 20.  On 13 February 2007 the Smolensk Regional Court examined the case and upheld the applicant's conviction. Ms D. was present. She did not file any grounds of appeal and appeared to make oral submissions to the court on the basis of the grounds of appeal originally filed by the applicant. The applicant did not attend. The appeal court noted, inter alia, that the trial judge's decision to remove the applicant, who had disturbed order in the courtroom and made threats to persons present there, had been lawful and justified. 21.  On the same day the Smolensk Regional Court granted Ms D.'s request for the payment of her legal fees in the amount of 2,200 roubles and ordered the applicant to pay those expenses.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  In 1986, while being employed by the Municipal Cargo Department of the Ministry of Automobile Transport (Київське міське управління вантажного автомобільного транспорту), the applicant was engaged in emergency operations at the Chernobyl disaster site. Subsequently the applicant was employed by “A.T.E.”, an automobile transportation company. 6.  On 30 March 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Radyansky District Court of Kyiv (Радянський районний суд м. Києва)[1] against the Municipal Department of Automobile Transport (Київське міське територіальне виробниче об’єднання автомобільного транспорту) claiming compensation for health damage sustained in Chernobyl. On 10 January 1995 the court decided to leave the applicant’s claims without consideration for having been lodged against an improper defendant. On 15 March 1995 the Kyiv City Court (Київський міський суд)[2] quashed this ruling and remitted the case for an examination to the first-instance court. 7.  On 14 July 1995 the first-instance court found in part for the applicant. On 27 September 1995 the Kyiv City Court quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 8.  On 28 February 1997 the first-instance court found against the applicant. On 9 April 1997 the Kyiv City Court quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 9.  On 19 September 1997 the first-instance court found in part for the applicant. This judgment became final. 10.  On an unspecified date the Kyiv Department of Justice (Управління юстиції в м. Києві) initiated an investigation into the absence of the verbatim record of the hearing of 19 September 1997 from the case-file. In January 1998 they informed the applicant that contrary to the requirements of applicable law the verbatim record had never been finalised. 11.  On numerous occasions the applicant sought the issuance of the writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 19 September 1997. However, he was informed by the Department of Justice that the writ could not be issued due to the investigation. 12.  On 6 April 1998 the Kyiv City Court quashed the judgment of 19 September 1997 upon the supervisory protest of its President lodged under the extraordinary review procedure and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 13.  On 2 October 1998 the court replaced the defendant in the case by the “A.T.E.”. 14.  On 23 October 1998 the first-instance court found against the applicant. 15.  On 18 November 1998 the Kyiv City Court quashed this judgment following the applicant’s appeal in cassation and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 16.  On 3 February 1999 the Radyansky Court decided to transfer the case to the Starokyivsky District Court of Kyiv (Старокиївський районний суд м. Києва). On 14 April 1999 the Kyiv City Court, upon the protest of its Vice-President, quashed this ruling under the extraordinary review procedure and remitted the case back to the Radyansky Court. 17.  On 8 June 1999 the Radyansky Court replaced the defendant in the case by the Kyiv City Department of the Social Security Fund. 18.  On 15 July 1999 the Radyansky Court ordered the Kyiv City Bureau of Court Experts (Київський науково-дослідний інститут судових експертиз) to carry out an assessment of the damage allegedly sustained by the applicant. 19.  On 25 May 2000 the Bureau delivered its assessment to the court. 20.  On 8 June 2000 the Radyansky Court found in part for the applicant. The applicant appealed in cassation. 21.  On 26 July 2000 the Kyiv City Court quashed this judgment in part concerning the payment of court fees and remitted this part of the case for a fresh consideration. 22.  On 24 April 2001 the Kyiv City Court upon the protest of its Vice-President quashed the rulings of 8 June and 26 July 2000 under the extraordinary review procedure and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh consideration. 23.  In November 2001 the defendant in the case was replaced by the “A.T.E.” and the Municipal Chernobyl Affairs Department (Управління у справах захисту населення від наслідків аварії на Чорнобильській АЕС Київської міської державної адміністрації). 24.  On 18 April 2002 the court found in part for the applicant and awarded him a lump sum in compensation from the Chernobyl Affairs Department. Both parties appealed. 25.  On 18 June 2002 the Kyiv City Court upheld this judgment. The applicant appealed in cassation. According to the law in force at the material time, the cassation appeal was filed with the first-instance court, which was to verify its compliance with procedural rules. 26.  On 26 November 2002, after the applicant rectified procedural shortcomings of his cassation appeal, the first-instance court transferred it to the Supreme Court. 27.  On 5 March 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 28.  The applicant also submitted a large number of other court decisions adopted in different cases against his former employers and various State bodies in 1994-2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  On 24 February 2002 the applicant was travelling on a tram and was approached by Mr G. and Mr S., ticket inspectors employed by the Kyivpastrans municipal enterprise (“the transport company”). As subsequently established by domestic authorities in the indictment and in the judgment convicting S. (see paragraphs 31 and 34 below), there was a disagreement between the applicant and the inspectors as to whether he had a valid ticket. They insisted that the applicant pay a fine for travelling without a ticket, while he insisted that he had broken no rules. The applicant was asked to get off the tram. It was then agreed that the applicant would accompany the inspectors to a tram depot to resolve the dispute. While they were on their way to the depot S. kicked the applicant. In response the applicant sprayed the inspectors with tear gas from a can he had on him. S. then kicked the applicant in the left knee, causing a fracture. A struggle between the applicant and S. ensued. G. and S. then left the scene. The applicant could not stand up or walk following the knee fracture, he was helped to the nearby tram stop by the bystanders who called an ambulance for him. According to the applicant, he has been receiving treatment for his injury until early 2005. 6.  On 26 February 2002 the applicant made a statement to the police describing the circumstances of the incident. In particular, he stated that on the day of the incident he had been approached by two ticket inspectors who questioned the validity of his ticket, suggesting that he appeared too old to be using a student ticket. While they insisted that he pay a fine he insisted his ticket was in order. He volunteered to go with them to a police station to resolve the dispute. In response they suggested that they go to the tram depot instead and he agreed. On the way to the depot he was kicked from behind. He turned round and sprayed the inspectors with tear gas, and was kicked in the knee. He stated that he did not know the names of the inspectors but could identify them by sight. 7.  On 4 March 2002 a police investigator of the Svyatoshynskyy District Police Department (“the District Police Department”) refused to institute criminal proceedings into the incident. The investigator noted that the ticket inspector on duty on the tram line in question at the relevant time was identified as S. He went on to note that S. could not be contacted for an interview since he was said to be on sick leave from work and was not found at his home address. The investigator also noted that the gravity of the applicant’s injuries could only be evaluated after completion of the applicant’s treatment. 8.  On 5 March 2002 a forensic medical expert diagnosed the applicant with a knee fracture and classified this as bodily injuries of medium gravity. 9.  On 18 December 2002 the Svyatoshynskyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the District Prosecutor’s Office”) quashed the decision of 4 March 2002 and instituted criminal proceedings on suspicion of deliberate infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity. On the same day the District Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant about this decision, also informing him that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the investigator who made the decision of 4 March 2002. According to the applicant, he first learned about the decision of 4 March 2002 from this letter from the District Prosecutor’s Office. 10.  On 24 December 2002 another investigator of the District Police Department commenced the investigation. 11.  On 28 December 2002 the investigator recognised the applicant as an aggrieved party in the criminal proceedings. On the same day the applicant was interviewed in this capacity. 12.  On 4 April 2003 the investigator sent a letter to the transport company enquiring whether S. had been working at the relevant time as a ticket inspector and asking the company to identify who S. had been working with on the day of the incident. In April 2003 the company responded that S. had indeed been working as an inspector at the relevant time, that G. had accompanied him on the day of the incident, and that S. had been dismissed on 16 June 2002 for absenteeism. 13.  On 9 April 2003 the applicant, in the course of a photo identification, identified S. as the person who had assaulted him. 14.  According to the Government, on 18 April 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrator. 15.  On 18 September 2003 the investigation was resumed. 16.  On 9 October 2003, in the course of a photo identification, the applicant identified G. as the person who, together with S., participated in the incident. 17.  On 14 October 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrator. 18.  On 31 August 2004 the District Police Department informed the applicant that the investigation in his case was pending. 19.  On 2 February 2005 the District Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 14 October 2003 to suspend the investigation, finding that possible perpetrators had in fact been identified. 20.  On 20 February 2005 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrator. 21.  On 5 April 2005 the investigator resumed the investigation, initiated criminal proceedings against S. and G., and joined the newly initiated proceedings with the existing case file. 22.  On 14 April 2005 the investigator charged S. with infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity, committed in conspiracy with G. The investigator placed S. and G. on the list of wanted persons, and suspended the investigation as the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. 23.  On 20 February and 4 May 2006 the investigator decided to resume the investigation, and on 22 February and 4 May 2006 respectively to suspend it again. 24.  On 10 June 2006 the investigation was resumed. 25.  On 12 June 2006 a face-to-face confrontation was conducted between G. and the applicant, and the applicant was interviewed separately. The applicant stated that S. had kicked him on the knee. While he was not certain that G. had assaulted him, he was assuming that it was G. who had kicked him in the back on 24 February 2002. 26.  On 14 June 2006 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings against G. for lack of corpus delicti in his actions. He relied on the testimony of G., who denied assaulting the applicant, and the testimony of the applicant to the effect that it was S. and not G. who had assaulted him. On the same day he suspended the remaining part of the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrator. 27.  According to the Government, on 24 September 2007 S. was arrested. On the same day the investigation was resumed and the charges were announced to S. 28.  On 25 September 2007 a face-to-face confrontation was conducted between S. as the accused and the applicant as the aggrieved party. 29.  On 20 October 2007 the investigator charged S. with infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity. 30.  According to the Government, on an unspecified date, upon completion of the pre-trial investigation in S.’s case, the applicant was offered an opportunity to study the case file but refused it. According to the applicant, he was not informed about the completion of the investigation or any of the subsequent developments in the criminal proceedings. 31.  On 29 October 2007 the District Prosecutor’s Office approved the bill of indictment indicting S. for infliction of bodily injuries of medium gravity. 32.  On 9 November 2007 the Svyatoshynskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the trial court”) held a preliminary hearing in S.’s case, in which S., his lawyer and a prosecutor participated. The record of the hearing states that the applicant was not present at the hearing. 33.  On 20 November 2007 the trial court examined the case on the merits in the presence of S., his lawyer and the prosecutor and in the absence of the applicant. The trial court, after obtaining favourable opinions from all parties present, ruled that the hearing should proceed in the absence of the applicant and witness G. who, the court stated, “had been duly notified about the hearing”. The court further ruled that, should their presence prove necessary, measures would be taken to ensure the applicant’s and G.’s appearance. In the course of the hearing the court heard a statement from S.. S. did not contest the charges and admitted his guilt. The court ruled that in view of S.’s confession and admission of guilt there was no call to examine any other evidence. 34.  On the same day the trial court convicted S. as charged and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years with probation. In sentencing S. the court took into account that S. had admitted his guilt and expressed remorse, the fact that he had no prior convictions, was employed and had positive references from his then-current place of employment. 35.  According to the information submitted by the Government, the domestic case file in S.’s case does not contain any copies of summonses or notices sent to the applicant in the course of examination of the case by the trial court or any documents indicating that such summonses or notices were sent. 36.  On 7 February 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Holosiyivskyy District Court of Kyiv, against the transport company, seeking damages for the unlawful actions of its employees. 37.  On 15 November 2005 the court rejected his claim on the ground that he had not proved that he had been injured by the employees of the defendant in the performance of their duties. The court noted that the applicant had failed to explain why the individuals identified by him had not yet been charged or convicted, and that the criminal case in connection with the incident was still under investigation. 38.  On 24 January 2006 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 39.  On 30 November 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a court of cassation, upheld the decisions of 15 November 2005 and 24 January 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 5 April 1996 the Diyarbakır provincial gendarmerie command issued an arrest warrant in respect of the applicant, on the basis of which he was arrested and taken into custody on 12 April 1996 by police officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Istanbul Police Headquarters. Upon his arrest, the applicant signed an arrest report acknowledging the warrant and the authorities’ intention to transfer him to the Diyarbakır provincial gendarmerie command. 6.  On 12 April 1996 a house search report was drafted by police officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Istanbul Police Headquarters which indicated that the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of affiliation to the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), an illegal organisation, and of having committed homicide. The report was signed by three police officers and the applicant. 7.  After being held for two days in the Istanbul police headquarters, the applicant was transferred to Diyarbakır, where he was held in the custody of the gendarmerie until 25 April 1996. 8.  On 22 April 1996 the applicant was questioned by officers from the Diyarbakır provincial gendarmerie command, where he was requested to provide information regarding his affiliation to the PKK and his involvement in the killing of a certain B.C. The applicant stated that he was a member of the PKK and that he had killed B.C. in compliance with orders he had received from that organisation. 9.  On 25 April 1996 the applicant was brought before the Diyarbakır public prosecutor, where he alleged that he was not involved in the activities of the PKK. The applicant further contended that in 1992 he had killed B.C. in his village as he had suspected that his partner had had a relationship with him. The applicant stated that the murder was not linked to any terrorist activity. The statements that he had made at the gendarmerie command were read to him. The applicant denied having made them. Furthermore the statements of three other suspects, Ş.B., Ş.C. and S.B., who maintained that the applicant was a member of the PKK, were also read to him. The applicant rejected these statements, claiming that these persons were relatives of B.C. 10.  On the same day, the applicant was brought before a single judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court. He reiterated the statements which he had made before the public prosecutor. Following his questioning, the judge remanded the applicant in custody, holding that there were strong indications that he had committed the offence defined in Article 125 of the former Criminal Code, namely carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 11.  On 10 May 1996 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and six other persons. The applicant was charged under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code, and with killing B.C. 12.  On 14 May 1996 the First Division of the Diyarbakır State Security Court held a hearing and ordered the applicant’s continued detention on remand in view of the nature of the offence, the state of evidence and the content of the case file. 13.  On 19 August 1996 the applicant made statements before the first‑instance court, denying the charges against him. 14.  Between 19 August 1996 and 29 December 1997, the first-instance court postponed the hearings as it was awaiting information and documents from the Lice public prosecutor’s office. 15.  On 29 December 1997 the State Security Court requested the Lice gendarmerie command to provide information concerning the killing of B.C. The court subsequently postponed the hearings until 24 December 1998 on account of the failure of the gendarmerie command to submit the relevant information. 16.  On 22 November 1999 the First Division of the Diyarbakır State Security Court requested the Third Division of the same court to submit a copy of the file in the case brought against Ş.B., Ş.C. and S.B. Between 22 November 1999 and 4 September 2001, the trial court postponed the hearings as the Third Division failed to submit a copy of the case file. 17.  During the trial, the Diyarbakır State Security Court held forty-five hearings. At the end of every hearing the first-instance court considered the applicant’s detention during judicial proceedings, either of its own motion or at the applicant’s request. It ordered the applicant’s continued detention pending trial, having regard to the nature of the offence and the state of the evidence. 18.  On 26 March 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicant under Article 448 of the Criminal Code of homicide and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The court found no convincing evidence that the offence committed by the applicant was linked to terrorist activities. The court ordered the applicant’s release from prison in view of the length of his detention during judicial proceedings. 19.  On 4 July 2002 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 26 March 2002 because the applicant had been unable to examine three witnesses against him during the trial. The case was subsequently remitted to the First Division of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 20.  On 12 August 2002 the first-instance court requested the Istanbul State Security Court to obtain submissions from the applicant on the statements of the witnesses. Between 12 August 2002 and 14 July 2003, the State Security Court held six more hearings whilst awaiting the applicant’s submissions. 21.  On 14 July 2003 the first-instance court convicted the applicant once more of homicide and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 22.  On 8 April 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld this judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1958, 1950 and 1949 respectively and live in Chişinău. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  All the applicants worked for the Ministry of Transport and Communications (“the employer”). They were promoted in 1997 but their salaries were not increased accordingly in the years 1997-98. When the employer refused to increase their salaries, the applicants initiated court proceedings. 8.  On 4 December 2000 the Centru District Court awarded 5,074 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 469 euros (EUR) at the time) to the first applicant and MDL 5,280 (the equivalent of EUR 488 at the time) to the second applicant. On 26 December 2000 the same court awarded MDL 5,388 (the equivalent of EUR 498 at the time) to the third applicant. No appeals were lodged and the judgments became final and enforceable 15 days later. 9.  The applicants complained to a number of State authorities, asking for assistance in having the judgments in their favour enforced. They received a number of replies, including that of the Ministry of Justice of 24 May 2001, which readdressed the complaint to the Centru District Court, requesting it to take “all measures provided by the law”. On 31 May 2001 the vice-president of that court informed the first applicant that the enforcement warrant had been sent to the State Treasury and that enforcement was impossible owing to the lack of money in the employer's account. A number of other authorities, including the Centru District Court, the Ministry of Justice, the President's Office and the Human Rights Centre were asked by the applicants to assist in ensuring the enforcement of the judgment. These complaints were either forwarded to the employer or to the court, with instructions to ensure the enforcement of the judgment. The applicants were informed of the lack of money in the employer's debt settlement account, which had been frozen for enforcement purposes, and that the budget had not been modified to provide for the enforcement of the judgment. The applicants were also informed that 70 similar judgments against the employer were awaiting enforcement. 10.  The applicants submitted to the Court a copy of a Government decision of 17 January 2002, which ordered the Ministry of Finance to allocate to the employer MDL 483,700 from the Government reserve fund, to cover reorganisation expenses. That money was to be returned to the reserve fund from the employer's 2002 budget. In another Government decision, dated 5 June 2002, the employer was allowed to buy an apartment in Chişinău for its Minister, funded by the development fund. 11.  The domestic court fined the employer several times during 2002 for failing to enforce its judgments. 12.  In September 2002 the enforcement warrants were partly enforced. The first applicant received MDL 3,940, the second applicant received MDL 4,145 and the third applicant received MDL 4,172. The remainder (equivalent to EUR 67, EUR 82 and EUR 91 respectively) was withheld as income tax. 13.  The applicants brought a new action for compensation for the pecuniary damage caused by inflation and for non-pecuniary damage, which they left to the court's discretion. 14.  By its final judgments of 4 February 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice found that the judgments in the applicants' favour had been belatedly enforced, and awarded MDL 5,074 (the equivalent of EUR 334 at the time) to the first applicant and MDL 6,715 (the equivalent of EUR 402 at the time) to the third applicant in compensation for the effect of inflation on the value of the 2000 award. The court did not deal with the applicants' request for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. On 7 May 2004 the second applicant's request for compensation was accepted by the Buiucani District Court, which awarded him MDL 6,579 (the equivalent of EUR 474 at the time). 15.   The award of 4 February 2004 was enforced on 4 May 2004. In February 2005 the first and third applicants received MDL 1,755 (EUR 107) each from the employer in compensation for the delay in enforcing this new award.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1947 respectively and live in Hódmezővásárhely. 6.  On 26 August 1994 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicants, a married couple and both archaeologists. On 5 July 1995 a bill of indictment was preferred and the applicants were charged with several counts of aggravated embezzlement, punishable in the circumstances by up to three years of imprisonment. The alleged offences concerned the alienation of numerous artefacts retrieved by the applicants. 7.  After a remittal, on 21 May 1998 the Békéscsaba District Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced them to one year of imprisonment, suspended for two years. On 7 January 1999 the Békés County Regional Court upheld this judgment. The review bench of the Supreme Court confirmed the final judgment on 7 March 2000. The courts relied on documentary evidence, the opinion of experts and the testimony of witnesses and the parties and recognised the lapse of time from the commission of the offences as a mitigating factor. After the lapse of the two-year period of suspension on 7 January 2001, the applicants became exempted (mentesülés) from all legal consequences of their conviction. 8.  On 5 September 2001 the applicants nevertheless requested a retrial. On 9 July 2002 the Békés County Regional Court, acting as a second-instance court, ordered the retrial. 9.  In the resumed proceedings, after a remittal, the Gyula District Court held two oral hearings and dismissed the applicants' retrial motion on 15 September 2004. The court relied on documentary evidence, the opinions of several newly appointed experts as well as the testimony of witnesses and the defendants. The main question of taking evidence was whether the items embezzled by the applicants – that is, archaeological findings – had commercial value for the purposes of the offence of embezzlement. 10.  The applicants appealed seeking acquittal. The Békés County Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision on 26 January 2005, without holding an oral hearing. 11.  The applicants lodged a petition for review. On 1 June 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as inadmissible, without an examination on the merits, since it was incompatible ratione materiae with the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was the head of a private high school (V.) and acting head of the Industrial and Construction College (C., a State-funded institution). In 2004 a criminal investigation was opened into fraudulent acts and abuse of power allegedly committed by the applicant. He was accused of having accepted money from two students for their studies at V. and failing to disclose those payments in the school’s accounts. 7.  On 24 September 2004 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody on the basis of a warrant issued by the Centru District Court that day. On 30 September 2004 the Chişinău Court of Appeal overturned the lower court’s decision, finding there was no reason to believe that the applicant would abscond or interfere with the investigation, noting that he had a fixed address, a family and an under-age child, and that he had undertaken to appear before the investigation authorities whenever summoned. He was released on the same day. 8.  On 20 November 2006 the Grigoriopol District Court sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment for fraud. He was acquitted of all the other charges mainly owing to a lack of evidence that he had illegally accepted money from the students. On the same day he was arrested and placed in prison no. 13 in Chișinău. 9.  On 8 February 2007 the Chişinău Court of Appeal partly quashed the first-instance court’s judgment. The court found that the applicant had been negligent in admitting two new students to V. and accepting tuition fees from them, even though by order of 25 December 2003, the Ministry of Education had suspended V’s licence and the applicant had been ordered to transfer all pupils to other educational institutions. The applicant was thus convicted under Article 329 (1) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 19 below) and his custodial sentence was reduced by the appellate court to eight months. 10.  In an appeal on points of law, the applicant argued that he could not be convicted of a violation of Article 329 (1) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 19 below) because two elements of the crime set out therein had not been met, namely that it had to have been committed by a “public official” and that the damage caused as a result had to be “large-scale”. Firstly, the conviction had been based on his alleged wrongdoing as head of V. As the head of a private institution, he could not be considered a public official (persoană cu funcţii de răspundere), a notion expressly defined in Article 123 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 19 below). He could not therefore be accused of negligence in carrying out any official duties by accepting pupils to study in his private school.\nSecondly, the value of the alleged damage caused (3,020 Moldovan lei (MDL)) was less than the minimum MDL 10,000 required under Article 329 for large-scale damage, as defined in Articles 64 and 126 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 19 below).\nFinally, the applicant argued that he had admitted new pupils to his school because he had challenged the Ministry of Justice’s order of 25 December 2003 in court, which in his opinion meant that the order had been suspended and thus had no legal effect pending the outcome of the litigation. 11.  On 28 June 2007 the Supreme Court of Justice partly quashed the lower court’s judgment. The court dealt with the applicant’s arguments raised in his appeal on points of law as follows:\n“As concerns [the applicant’s] arguments that he must be acquitted under Article 329 (1) of the Criminal Code because the elements of the crime were not present in his actions, these [arguments] are unsubstantiated and are contradicted by the material evidence; the accused’s refusal to admit liability should not necessarily lead to his acquittal since there is pertinent and conclusive evidence which corroborates as a whole and proves with certainty his guilt in having committed the crime: contract no. ... of enrolling S.N. as a student ... concluded between L.G. and the head of [V.]; receipts for [cashing of] MDL 2,000 lei on 30 August 2004 and of MDL 1,000 and MDL 20 on 6 July 2004; [Ministry of Education] order of 25 December 2003 suspending the activity of the private education institutions founded by [V.].”\nThe court noted, however, that the lower courts had not taken into consideration the applicant’s mitigating circumstances, such as the fact that he had no previous convictions and was well regarded in society. In the absence of any aggravating circumstances, the lower courts had incorrectly decided to imprison him. The court therefore ordered the applicant to pay a fine instead of giving him a custodial sentence. He was therefore released on the same day, after approximately seven months of detention in prison no. 13. Taking into account the fact that he had already served time in prison, he was dispensed from paying the fine. 12.  The applicant described the conditions in which he had been held for more than seven months in Chişinău Prison no. 13. The prison was situated in a 165-year-old building. He was detained in a cell measuring 26 square metres which he shared with between eleven and fourteen other detainees. The cell was unventilated, the only air coming in from several holes in a net covering the window. The cell was very cold in winter and very hot in summer, the walls and ceiling were damp and the toilet was not separated from the rest of the cell. During the first five months of detention, the applicant was not issued with any bedding and had to sleep on a bare mattress. When bedding was finally provided, it was changed very rarely. The cell was never cleaned; his mattress was full of parasitic insects and he could not sleep as a result. The light was too weak in the cell for reading. Showers were only allowed once a week and the shower day did not coincide with the day of the week when fresh bedding was issued, which meant the continuous presence of parasitic insects. Food was inadequate and of poor quality; the portions did not conform to the standard decided upon by the Government, particularly in respect of meat, fish, eggs and dairy products. 13.  The applicant made a total of forty-four complaints to various authorities about the conditions of his detention. He asked, inter alia, for the number of persons in cell no. 75 (in which he was being detained) to be reduced to no more than eight detainees instead of the fourteen who were held there at the time of making the complaint, so as to observe the statutory minimum requirement of 4 square metres of living space per detainee. The applicant also asked for an additional hour of exercise time for all the detainees in his cell in an attempt to improve the overcrowding situation. The applicant made six complaints between 19 March and 15 May 2007 about the lack of ventilation and access to fresh air aggravating the overcrowding. On 25 March 2007 he asked to be transferred to a non-smoking cell because he was subjected to passive smoking, which he argued was “a far more serious punishment than the eight months of imprisonment to which [he] had been sentenced”. On 3 May 2007 he complained about the failure to provide adequate food as required by the relevant Government decisions, claiming, inter alia, that reduced quantities of sugar and bread had been distributed to detainees in his cell. The applicant asked for portion sizes to be checked periodically to ensure they were meeting the statutory minimum. On four occasions between 30 March and 28 May 2007 the applicant complained about the presence of parasitic insects and asked for fresh bedding to coincide with shower day so as to avoid the risk of continued infestation. On 12 May 2007 the applicant asked for various materials in order to carry out repairs to their cell (together with his cell mates), as the ceiling was dark and the paint was peeling off the walls. 14.  The applicant received a total of five letters in response, informing him that he would only be transferred to another category of prison following the final determination of his criminal case. The responses, however, failed to address the majority of his complaints. The applicant stated that on 17 May 2007, after repeatedly complaining about the unventilated space, a window was opened in the corridor opposite his cell, providing more fresh air. On 7 June 2007, in reply to his request to be allowed to use the prison library’s reading room, he was informed by the relevant authorities that prison no. 13 had no such facility. 15.  On 19 February and 26 March 2007 the applicant complained that he was being detained in a closed prison, despite having been sentenced to detention in a semi-open prison where, he submitted, he would have had a right to move freely within the prison area (as opposed to having one hour of exercise time in the closed prison). 16.  On 2 July 2007 the prison doctor examined the applicant and informed him that he had been exposed to the risk of contracting tuberculosis. The doctor referred the applicant to a consultant and an eyesight specialist.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Naples. 6.  The applicant is Jewish and a lawyer by profession. On 7 June 2005 he appeared before the Forli investigating judge at a hearing concerning a request for the immediate production of evidence (“incidente probatorio”) in his capacity as representative of one of the two complainants in criminal proceedings against several banks. The investigating judge in charge of the case was prevented from sitting and his replacement invited the parties to choose between two dates for the adjourned hearing – either 13 or 18 October 2005 – already identified by the investigating judge. 7.  The applicant pointed out that both dates coincided with Jewish religious holidays (Yom Kippur and Sukkot respectively) and stated that he would be unable to attend the adjourned hearing because of his religious obligations. He explained that he was a member of the Naples Jewish community, and alleged a breach of sections 4 and 5 of Law no. 101 of 8 March 1989 governing relations between the State and the Union of Italian Jewish communities. 8.  The investigating judge set the hearing down for 13 October 2005. 9.  The same day the applicant lodged an application with the investigating judge in charge of the case to have the hearing adjourned. On 20 June 2005, after examining the application, the judge decided to add it to the case file without ruling on it. 10.  On 11 July 2005 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the investigating judge in charge of the case and his replacement, alleging that they had breached section 2 of Law no. 101 of 1989. The same day he informed the Supreme Council of the Judiciary about the complaint. 11.  At the hearing of 13 October 2005, the investigating judge noted that the applicant was absent for “personal reasons” and asked the parties to express their views on the application for an adjournment made on 7 June. The prosecution and counsel for the defendants objected to the application, arguing in particular that it was not based on any of the statutory grounds for adjournment. However, counsel for the other complainant supported the applicant’s request. 12.  In an order issued the same day the investigating judge rejected the application for an adjournment. He noted at the outset that, under Article 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, only the prosecution and counsel for the defendant were required to be present at hearings concerning the immediate production of evidence; the presence of counsel for the complainant was optional. He went on to observe that the Code of Criminal Procedure did not oblige the judge to adjourn a hearing where counsel for the complainant had legitimate reasons for being unable to appear. Lastly, he stressed that a large number of individuals were involved in the proceedings (the defendants, the complainants, court-appointed experts and experts appointed by the parties) and that, “in view of the heavy workload of the office, which would [have meant] adjourning the hearing until 2006, the application, submitted by an individual with no legitimate reason to request an adjournment, ha[d] to be rejected in accordance with the principle that cases should be heard within a reasonable time”. 13.  On 23 January 2006 the Supreme Council of the Judiciary informed the applicant that it was not competent to examine the matter since the applicant’s complaints related to the exercise of judicial activity. 14.  In the meantime, on 9 January 2006, the Ancona public prosecutor’s office had requested that no further action be taken on the applicant’s complaint. The applicant objected to this request on 28 January 2006. 15.  On 21 September 2006 the Ancona investigating judge made an order discontinuing the proceedings concerning the applicant’s complaint, noting that the applicant had not objected to the request for no further action submitted by the public prosecutor’s office. 16.  On 19 January 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, complaining of the investigating judge’s failure to take account of the objection he had lodged on 28 January 2006. The Court of Cassation, observing that the failure to take the applicant’s objection into account had probably been due to a registry error, set aside the order of 21 September 2006 and referred the case back to the Ancona District Court. 17.  On 12 February 2008 the applicant and the prosecution attended a hearing before the Ancona investigating judge. On 15 February 2008 the latter issued an order discontinuing the proceedings. He noted that there was nothing in the case file to suggest that the investigating judge in charge of the case or the judge who had replaced him at the hearing of 7 June 2005 had had any intention of infringing the applicant’s right to practise his Jewish faith freely or of offending the applicant’s dignity on account of his religious faith.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant, Mr Eduardo A.A. Mathew, is a Netherlands national who was born in 1973. As far as the Court is aware, he is currently living in Providence, Rhode Island, United States. 10.  The applicant, a kickboxing instructor by trade who also had business interests, was arrested on Aruba on 9 October 2001 on a charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm. He was placed in detention on remand in the Aruba Correctional Institution (Korrektie Instituut Aruba – “the KIA”).\nAruba is a “country” (land) of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (see paragraph 125 below). It is one of a group of Caribbean islands known as the Dutch Leewards. Its climate is tropical. 11.  The applicant and the Government disagreed on many of the events that occurred after the applicant had been placed in detention. 12.  It appears that on 16 November 2001 a dispute took place between the applicant and a prison guard, after which the applicant was placed in solitary confinement in the punishment cell (cachot). 13.  The applicant alleged that on 17 November 2001 he had been surreptitiously drugged, after which some guards had come in and ill‑treated him. He stated that a bag had been placed over his head and that when he came to he was lying on the floor in his own blood, covered in urine. He also stated that he had not been let out of the punishment cell for fresh air until 29 November and that he had never received any medical attention despite asking for it. 14.  On 29 November 2001 a violent incident took place in which the then acting governor of the KIA, Mr B.F.C. Vocking, was seriously injured. The applicant was subsequently charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm on him (see below). For his part, the applicant denied having harmed Mr Vocking; according to his version of events, when entering his cell Mr Vocking had bumped into a prison guard, Mr Janga, and had fallen to the floor. 15.  On 4 January 2002 the interim prison governor, Mr F.A. Maduro, who had by that time replaced Mr Vocking, ordered that the applicant be subjected to a special detention regime: he was to spend the remainder of his detention in the committal cell (gijzelaarscel), a solitary confinement cell located next to the punishment cell. In addition, the special regime applicable to the applicant was to comprise the following ten points:\n“1.  Under no circumstances may [the applicant] leave his cell without handcuffs and fetters; 3.  Outdoor exercise [luchten] shall take place in the space located behind the multi-purpose area for one hour a day, to be decided by the head of department of the internal service or, in his absence, the CMK team leader; 5.  Visits by, among others, counsel, probation officers [reclassering], social workers, the medical service and spiritual counsellors, shall take place in his cell where possible; 10.  The prisoner shall also be allowed mail, books and, for example, magazine subscriptions [leesmappen] which are being circulated, once they have been censored.” 16.  On 20 February 2002 the applicant's lawyers, Mr Loth and Mr Römer, wrote to the public prosecutor responsible, Ms Hemmes-Boender, complaining about the applicant's treatment leading up to the events of 29 November 2001. It was stated that the acting prison governor, Mr Vocking, had entered the punishment cell with two prison guards, Mr Janga and Mr Van der Biesen, to interrogate the applicant about some threats he had allegedly made to a prison guard. When the applicant refused to cooperate, they had placed a bag over his head and beaten him, apparently with truncheons. As he lay on the floor, the applicant was kicked with booted feet. At that point the applicant had begun to request medical treatment, which, however, had been withheld. In the course of the scuffle, the acting governor, Mr Vocking, had collided with Mr Janga and fallen to the ground, sustaining severe injuries to his face. The applicant had then been locked in the committal cell, where he had later been visited by Mr Loth and Mr Römer. Conditions in the applicant's cell had been revolting: the cell offered insufficient protection from the elements and the floor was covered in filth, including rotting food scraps several days old. Even assuming that the applicant had been abnormally aggressive, the conditions were tantamount to ill-treatment. A request was made on behalf of the applicant for appropriate action to be taken to ensure his detention in humane conditions. The letter was copied to the Governor of Aruba, the Aruban Minister of Justice, the Procurator General of Aruba, the President of the Joint Court of Justice (Gemeenschappelijk Hof van Justitie) of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba, the Aruban parliament (Staten van Aruba), Mr Fabrice Kellens (member of the Secretariat of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)) and the KIA prison authorities. 17.  The public prosecutor, Ms Hemmes-Boender, replied to the letter on 27 February 2002, stating that matters were not as serious as had been alleged. The prison was being refurbished and the applicant himself had refused to keep his cell clean. She promised that the glass fibre-reinforced resin sheet covering the hole in the ceiling would be raised in order to improve ventilation. 18.  On 26 June 2002 an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) scan of the applicant was taken by Dr C.E. Loo, a radiologist at Dr Horacio E. Oduber Hospital in Aruba's capital, Oranjestad. The medical report drawn up noted degeneration of the fifth lumbar disc (discusdegeneratie L5/S1) and no nerve root compression (geen wortelcompressie). 19.  On 8 August 2002 a radiological examination by Dr I.F.M. Lambertina, a radiologist at Dr Horacio E. Oduber Hospital, showed some lumbar lordosis (excessive backward curvature of the spine, causing concavity of the back) and possible limited sclerosis (hardening) of the two lumbosacral joints, but no degenerative abnormalities. 20.  On 10 September 2002 Dr Carlos A. Vallejo Lopez, the neurosurgeon at Dr Horacio E. Oduber Hospital, wrote a note finding the applicant to be suffering from lumbago and prescribing “more mobilisation” and “active physical therapy” for his lower back. 21.  It appears that on 13 February 2003 an altercation took place in the prison courtyard, in the course of which the applicant sustained injuries. A medical report of the same date by one Dr Perez of the Dr Rudy A.M. Engelbrecht Medical Centre – completed on a pre-printed form in Dutch – described the applicant as having suffered “ill-treatment” (mishandeling). The report stated that the applicant had been found lying on the ground with a head wound and complaining of pain. 22.  On 19 February 2003 the applicant's wife, Ms Arianna Iannuccilli, lodged an official complaint with the Aruba police alleging grievous bodily harm inflicted on the applicant by three prison staff. 23.  On an unknown date, probably in April or May 2003, the applicant was referred by the prison doctor to the island's neurosurgeon, Dr Carlos A. Vallejo Lopez. 24.  On 21 May 2003 Dr Vallejo Lopez examined the applicant. On 22 May and again on several occasions over the following few days he prescribed, in particular, outpatient physiotherapy and painkillers. On 22 May 2003 Dr Vallejo Lopez signed an application for physiotherapy for the applicant's lower back problems. A physiotherapist described the treatment as “mobilisation with walker [a walking frame]”. 25.  On 23 May 2003 the applicant was taken to hospital. 26.  On the same day the applicant was examined by a radiologist, Dr Stojanov, using magnetic resonance imaging. The report noted increased rupturing of the annulus fibrosus L5/S1 on the left side. 27.  Another document of the same date, in an unidentifiable hand, contained the query “Got beaten?!”, noted pain in the applicant's lower back area and legs – with a query as to whether it had been simulated – and suggested mobilisation with a walking frame. 28.  On 5 June 2003 Dr Vallejo Lopez wrote to the KIA asking permission for the applicant to complete the physiotherapy treatment programme as an outpatient. 29.  On 6 June 2003 Dr Vallejo Lopez wrote to the social worker A. de Veer, asking whether it was possible to transport the applicant to hospital twice a week for physiotherapy, surgery not being an option at the prison. On 13 June one Major F. Tromp replied, writing on the same note, that it had been agreed that the KIA would make the appropriate arrangements. 30.  On 13 June 2003 the applicant was released from hospital with the following diagnosis, in the form of a handwritten note by Dr Vallejo Lopez:\n“I.  Lumbar ... compression L5-S1\nII.  Lumbar discal hernia L5-S1\nIII.  Lumbar disc. extrusion L5-S1\nPlan:  A. Physical therapy. B. Surgery.” 31.  On the same date the interim prison governor, Mr Maduro, wrote to the hospital saying that a prison nurse would ensure that the applicant was taken to hospital for treatment twice a week. 32.  It appears that it had been agreed at a meeting the day before that arrangements would be made for the applicant to be taken to the rehabilitation department of Dr Horacio E. Oduber Hospital twice a week. 33.  On 23 June 2003 Dr Rodriguez Robelt and Dr Perez Dopazo of the Aruba Public Health Department wrote to the interim governor of the KIA asking that the applicant be given a wheelchair in order to prevent, in particular, falls like the one that had taken place the week before. 34.  Also on 23 June 2003 Prison Guard First Class Grovell, on behalf of the interim governor, imposed a punishment regime on the applicant for twenty-eight days: the applicant was not to receive any visits or use the telephone. The applicant was said to have attacked prison staff with his walking frame and incited fellow inmates in the remand unit to violence. His actions, moreover, were made more serious by the fact that they had been premeditated. 35.  On the same day another inmate by the name of Ignacio complained to the Queen, the Minister of Justice of Aruba, the Public Prosecution Service and the CPT about an incident that had taken place the day before. The incident had been caused by the alleged refusal of the prison authorities to show Ignacio papers justifying the prolongation of his detention. When he had asked to see them, instead of showing him the papers, prison guards had ill-treated him. This had been witnessed by the applicant, who had told the prison guards to stop. The applicant had not attacked anybody: he had merely tried to block one of the prison guards with his walking frame to prevent further violence. The complaint was co-signed by ten inmates, including the applicant. 36.  On 30 June 2003 another of the applicant's fellow prisoners, one Van der Biezen, signed a statement describing a fire that had broken out in the remand unit, after which prison guards had allegedly come in and ill-treated the applicant. 37.  On 1 July 2003 Dr Rodriguez Robelt examined the applicant. He noted a slight inflammation of the skin where the handcuffs had been and pain in the lumbar region from L5 to S1, which increased when the applicant moved his lower limbs, and made a diagnosis. He prescribed treatment as indicated by the specialist (Dr Vallejo Lopez), urgent palliative care, rest and continued physiotherapy. 38.  On 3 July 2003 the interim prison governor, Mr Maduro, imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant. The punishment involved fourteen days' solitary confinement, commuted in view of the applicant's state of health to twenty-eight days without visits or telephone. The applicant was said to have orchestrated premeditated attacks on prison staff, to have incited fellow prisoners to violence, threatened prison staff, failed to follow orders immediately and to have been an accomplice to arson and the destruction of public property. The punishment was to begin on 21 July 2003, in view of the earlier disciplinary measures imposed on 23 June. 39.  On 4 July 2003 fellow prisoner Van der Biezen signed a statement to the effect that the prison management had fabricated a case against the applicant. 40.  On the same date the neurosurgeon Dr Vallejo Lopez wrote the following statement (original in English):\n“Mr Alexander Matthew [sic], with Lumbalgia and Radicular pain at the level of L5-S1 (Lumbar Discal Hernia S5-S1) is under medical treatment with Physical Therapy, but his condition is not so good, specially the aspect of the pain. Considering the situation of the patient like prisoner (K.I.A. Aruba) it is very difficult to give guarantee that the medical treatment and Physical Therapy treatment are going in the normal direction.\nMr Matthew has indication for surgical procedure, but this indication at the present is not so clear, because of the abnormal situation of the patient. I suggest to have a second opinion with another Neurosurgeon and then it will be possible to define this difficult case.\nConsidering that Aruba has only one Neurosurgeon, we have to explore the needs to get a second opinion with the Neurosurgeon that periodically is visiting the Island or one Neurosurgeon from abroad.\nThe need for a second opinion to evaluate the case of Mr Matthew is Medically necessary.\n[signed] Dr Carlos A. Vallejo Lopez” 41.  On 5 July 2003 a fellow prisoner named Paesch signed a statement to the effect that a fire had broken out in the remand unit, near the applicant's bed. Paesch blamed an unnamed fellow inmate. He stated that guards had come in and beaten the applicant. The applicant had been handcuffed, fettered, beaten and given electric shocks. A statement dated 6 July described ill-treatment inflicted on the applicant in the form of beating, fetters and handcuffs. According to a further statement by the same prisoner, dated 7 July, a guard called Moure had threatened to kill the applicant when he asked for his pills; Paesch did not remember the date on which that had happened. 42.  On 7 July 2003 the lawyer Mr David G. Kock wrote to the interim governor of the KIA noting that the applicant was once again being detained in the committal cell. Pointing out that the Joint Court of Justice had held, in its judgment of 14 April 2003, that the conditions of the applicant's detention there bordered on the unacceptable, he demanded his transfer to another cell and improved conditions of detention. 43.  On 18 October 2003 Ms Iannuccilli wrote to the interim governor of the KIA asking for the applicant to be examined by a doctor of his choice and offering to take responsibility for all costs incurred. 44.  On 20 October 2003 she received a fax, on Aruba Prison Service stationery, which read as follows (original in English):\n“Dear Doctor Iannucelli [sic],\nYour husband can be referred to any specialist of his choice in Aruba, as long as the specialist in question is registered in Aruba according the current law.\nAccording to several medical reports Eduardo needs no surgery, he's supposed to have some medical treatments, but he won't cooperate.\nLet's get that clear, if Eduardo won't cooperate in his healing, he cannot be forced to do so.\nSincerely, 45.  On 23 October 2003 Ms Iannuccilli wrote to the Governor of Aruba, Mr O. Koolman, informing him of the reply she had received and asking him to order that the applicant be removed from the committal cell without further delay and be seen by a specialist medical practitioner from abroad. 46.  On 25 November 2003 Dr Rodriguez Robelt and Dr Perez Dopazo wrote to the KIA prison authorities noting that the applicant had had difficulty attending physiotherapy sessions in recent months. The letter contained the following passages:\n “And without wishing to violate any established rules of the KIA of which we are not aware, we propose and prescribe the following: 2.  Cooperation of prison staff in helping the patient to attend physiotherapy, as he is currently being kept in a place where he has to walk down stairs and is therefore in danger of falling, which would aggravate his condition. 3.  If for any reason the above prescription cannot be followed, it will be necessary to transfer the patient to another place where he does not have to go down stairs and to offer him a wheelchair, as already suggested in our previous request, so that he can find his own way to the point from where he can be taken for physiotherapy. 4.  That he continue to be given assistance in cleaning his cell, as has been done hitherto.\nNote: The patient suffers from a discal hernia (L5-S1) which, even if it does not result in paralysis of his lower limbs, is very painful. That is why the patient declines to walk or to adopt certain positions that cause him pain.” 47.  On 5 January 2004 the applicant again wrote to the interim prison governor, Mr Maduro, complaining that he was still being denied a wheelchair and physiotherapy and being made to walk down two flights of stairs to meet his visitors despite his condition. He stated that his pain was so severe that he had difficulty sitting upright through a fifty-minute visit. 48.  Apparently on 27 January 2004 the applicant was informed orally that he would not be granted early release. It was claimed that he had not been issued with a formal written decision. He submitted a copy of an unsigned document dated 16 January 2004 sent by the registry of the Aruba Court of First Instance to the Aruba Minister of Justice, phrased in the following terms:\n“Please find attached the documents sent to the Central Rehabilitation Board [Centraal College voor de Reclassering] relating to the release of Eduardo Alexander Antonio Mathew. The Board has the honour of informing you as follows.\nIt appears from the appended reports that the above-mentioned Mathew has acted contrary to the conditions for granting provisional release, in particular, by causing grievous bodily harm to a member of staff, fleeing from hospital, failing to follow orders given by KIA staff, issuing threats and insults, disturbing the order, peace and safety of the institution, causing unrest, destroying property, etc.\nThe Central Rehabilitation Board therefore suggests that you consider not granting provisional release to Eduardo Alexander Antonio Mathew, born on Aruba on 9 February 1973.”\n(b)  Complaint proceedings 49.  On 19 November 2001 the applicant wrote to the supervisory board (Commissie van Toezicht) of the KIA. He complained that Mr Vocking had ordered that he be placed in solitary confinement on the basis of a misunderstanding and without interviewing him first. He had been forced to see his lawyer in the punishment cell while naked. He also complained that he had been ill-treated on 17 November. 50.  On 5 September 2002 the applicant, through his lawyer, complained to the KIA's supervisory board about the regime imposed on 4 January 2002 and the condition of the committal cell. Promises to improve these had not been kept. Appended was a handwritten statement addressed to the interim governor of the KIA, Mr Maduro, describing the treatment of the applicant as “illegal”, “corrupt” and “tourcher” (torture); it was signed by a large number of other KIA inmates. 51.  On 7 October 2002 the applicant, through his lawyer, wrote to the KIA supervisory board noting that the roof of the committal cell had finally been repaired, but that the other complaints set out in the letter of 5 September 2002 remained valid. The applicant had not been allowed outdoor exercise for four months and was still being denied the physiotherapy prescribed for him. 52.  On 30 October 2002 the applicant himself wrote to Ms E.M.D. Angela, the chairperson of the KIA supervisory board, complaining that despite the promises made by the public prosecutor, Ms Hemmes-Boender, in her letter of 27 February 2002, his situation had not improved. Since 14 June 2002 he had not been allowed access to fresh air, as prison staff refused to carry his wheelchair downstairs. Physiotherapy was being denied him by the KIA prison authorities, who refused to take the trouble to transport him to hospital. In addition, the lack of ventilation was causing him headaches. 53.  On 19 August 2001 the applicant was arrested by order of the public prosecutor on charges of violence against a former employee. He was placed in police custody and subsequently in detention on remand. He was placed in the remand unit of the KIA, where he remained until he was released on 4 October 2001. 54.  On 9 October 2001 the applicant was rearrested, this time for inflicting grievous bodily harm using weapons, and again placed in the remand unit of the KIA. 55.  On 15 October 2001 the applicant was taken to hospital by KIA personnel for the treatment of stomach complaints. The applicant absconded from hospital the following day. Later that day, accompanied by his lawyer, he returned to the KIA and gave himself up; he was given fourteen days' solitary confinement for absconding. 56.  The Government submitted a report by a prison guard stating that on 25 October 2001 the applicant had refused to return to solitary confinement after outdoor exercise – “for the umpteenth time” (voor de zoveelste keer), in the words of the report – and had been accompanied back to his cell by several guards. 57.  Another report by a prison guard, dated 12 November 2001, described the applicant refusing to return to his cell and threatening violent retribution. 58.  On 16 November 2001 the applicant and some fellow inmates refused to return to their cells for locking in. The prisoners broke down a partition to use parts of it as weapons. This led the acting prison governor, Mr Vocking, to place the applicant in solitary confinement for seven days. The applicant was also denied telephone calls and outdoor exercise until further notice. 59.  On 26 November 2001, upon being refused outdoor exercise, the applicant threatened the prison guards. 60.  The incident in which Mr Vocking was badly injured took place on 29 November 2001. The Government stated that the applicant had deliberately broken Mr Vocking's eye socket, cheekbone and skull and caused him severe concussion by punching him and kicking him in the head. The Government pointed to the applicant's conviction by the Aruba Court of First Instance and the Joint Court of Justice and the rejection of the applicant's appeal on points of law by the Supreme Court on 1 June 2004 (see below). 61.  As a result of this violent altercation the applicant was given thirty-five days' solitary confinement. On 4 January 2002, after the end of this term, a special regime was ordered by the interim prison governor, Mr Maduro, which was intended to last for the remainder of the applicant's detention in the KIA. The ten-point order, which was submitted by both parties, is quoted in extenso above (see paragraph 15). 62.  On 5 March 2002 the applicant's special regime was changed: the applicant would no longer be required to wear fetters as well as handcuffs when leaving his cell unless he endangered prison staff by using his feet. On 1 August 2002 an order was given granting him two hours of outdoor exercise every day. 63.  The applicant's conduct did not, however, change for the better. He continued to threaten prison staff and transgress the rules. The Government submitted reports which described the applicant removing his handcuffs during outdoor exercise, hiding a mobile telephone in his cell and damaging the padlock on the door of his cell beyond repair. 64.  On 2 August 2002 the applicant was asked to leave his cell so that the roof could be repaired. When he stated that he could not walk, prison guards offered to carry him out on a stretcher. The applicant, however, refused, saying that he was suffering from headaches and pain in his back and wanted to see a doctor. He had been seen three days earlier, on 30 July 2002, by the prison doctor, Dr Ernesto Rodriguez; Dr Rodriguez had given him an injection and prescribed medicine. He had also been seen on 1 August 2002 by the prison nurse, Ms Bowina H. Vos. Given the applicant's refusal to be moved, work on the roof of the cell was halted. 65.  A report by a prison guard dated 12 March 2003 stated that on 6 January 2003 at 1.30 a.m. the applicant had been seen doing push-ups, apparently untroubled by his physical condition. 66.  Violent behaviour was reported in the first half of 2003. One official report, by Prison Guard First Class Anthony Williams, related the following events, alleged to have taken place on 13 February 2003:\n“On taking over from Prison Guard Semerel, the reporting officer was told that Prisoner Mathew, who was in a wheelchair, unhandcuffed, near the inner guard post, had been brought back and had to be locked up again. Around 3.10 p.m. the reporting officer ordered Mathew to go to his cell with the help of two outdoor workers (fellow inmates). Mathew refused and informed the reporting officer that he needed to speak with the governor or a supervisor, otherwise he would not return to his cell. The reporting officer telephoned Prison Guard First Class J.M.A. Grovell and notified him of the situation. Grovell then informed the reporting officer that he would send reinforcements to get Mathew back into his cell. The reporting officer was joined by prison officers G. Weller and W. Beyde and again ordered Mathew to go to his cell otherwise he would be carried there. Mathew replied that he would not go to his cell and did not want the two designated, bona fide outdoor workers (fellow inmates) to touch the wheelchair. Knowing Mathew, the reporting officer took out his handcuffs in order to put them on Mathew so as to be prepared for the worst. Unfortunately the reporting officer only succeeded in handcuffing Mathew's right hand since Mathew began to put up fierce resistance and even ripped off a piece of the metal armrest on the wheelchair, which he brandished in the air, with the clear intention of using it as a weapon. At one point Mathew bit the reporting officer's right hand very hard, and the reporting officer responded by elbowing Mathew in the back of his head, but Mathew continued his fierce resistance, waving his hands and feet in the direction of the reporting officer and his colleagues G. Weller and W. Beyde. Beyde finally managed to pull the piece of metal out of Mathew's right hand. With the help of Weller and Beyde, Mathew was held firmly and carried in the direction of the committal cell. Mathew continued to offer fierce resistance by waving his hands and feet, and tried to throw the reporting officer and his two colleagues down the stairs. The reporting officer received a hard blow from the back of Mathew's head, resulting in a cut to the reporting officer's lower lip. While going down the stairs leading to the observation section, Mathew seized the opportunity to fasten the still open handcuff to the rail to prevent his being carried any further. By constantly moving his whole body, Mathew sustained injuries to the back of his head on the metal rail. W. Beyde pulled out his handcuffs in order to secure both of Mathew's hands, and the prisoner was then carried to his cell and locked up. As a result of Mathew's fierce resistance, the reporting officer sustained a broken finger among other injuries. Thus drawn up by the reporting officer under oath of office for forwarding to whomsoever it is deemed necessary.” 67.  Apparently on 1 July 2003 an incident took place, recorded in the following terms in an official report by Prison Guard First Class S.E. Vos:\n“Prisoner Mathew was told three times by Prison Guard First Class L. Pemberton that he had to be transferred to the committal cell. Mathew got out of bed, remained standing (without a walking frame), persistently refused to go to the committal cell, became insolent and began to attack the officers by kicking and punching them. The undersigned tried to grab the prisoner's hands, but Mathew punched the undersigned in the face. The reporting officer, with the help of Prison Guard Pemberton, resorted to force in order to handcuff Mathew so that he could be moved; this was not easy since Mathew offered fierce resistance. With great difficulty, the reporting officer and Prison Guard Pemberton managed to handcuff Mathew. He was then put on a stretcher so that he could be taken to the committal cell. On the way, Mathew became aggressive and insolent again and deliberately fell off the stretcher several times, with the clear intention of hindering his transfer. Once on the ground, Mathew began to threaten the reporting officer and officers present with death or murder. Mathew was put back on the stretcher. While being carried, Mathew shouted at the reporting officer and those present in English: 'All of you get fucked when I come out, I have six more months to do, don't worry!' Upon reaching the committal cell, the handcuffs were removed and the prisoner was locked in the cell. As a result of the blows the reporting officer received from Mathew, the reporting officer had to go to the St. Nicolaas outpatient department to receive medical attention. Knowing Mathew, and in view of his past deeds, the reporting officer feels threatened and fears that Mathew will put his words into action. The reporting officer has therefore notified the criminal investigation authorities.”\nThe Government suggested that this might in fact have been the incident referred to in the statement by one of the applicant's fellow prisoners dated 30 June 2003 (see paragraph 36 above). 68.  By way of disciplinary punishment, the applicant was for each of these incidents denied private visits and use of the telephone for twenty-eight days, in lieu of the fourteen days' solitary confinement he would otherwise have received. These disciplinary measures were enforced consecutively between 23 June and 18 August 2003. 69.  The Government denied all knowledge of any incident on 5 July 2003 (see paragraph 41 above). 70.  In the course of 2003 a further attempt was made to detain the applicant in a normal (multi-person) cell, but the problems were such that he had to be returned to the committal cell. 71.  The Government stated that since the applicant had refused to keep his cell clean, a job normally left to the occupants themselves, the prison authorities had paid another inmate to do it for him. 72.  On 27 April 2004 the Government informed the Court that the Governor of Aruba had decided to grant the applicant early release on the occasion of the Queen's official birthday on 30 April 2004. The applicant was released on that date.\n(b)  Medical treatment 73.  The Government stated that the applicant had reported stomach complaints from the beginning of his detention, but had refused to take prescribed medicines or give a blood sample. 74.  In January 2002 it became apparent that the applicant was injuring his ankles deliberately by rubbing the fetters against them. A nurse treated the wounds with bethadine (a disinfectant) and sterile gauze. The applicant was seen twice by the prison doctor in connection with these complaints, on 24 January and 15 February 2002. On 5 March 2002 it was decided that the fetters would no longer be applied. 75.  On 6 March 2002 the applicant saw the nurse, complaining of headaches and eye problems; on 15 March he was duly taken to the outpatient department. On 26 March he was given a check-up by the KIA medical staff. 76.  On 31 March 2002 the applicant complained that he was suffering from a stomach ache and passing blood. However, he refused to give a urine sample. 77.  On 4 April 2002 the prison doctor again saw the applicant. 78.  On 16 April 2002 the applicant put his back out while doing strenuous physical exercise. He was seen by the doctor and given painkillers. He was seen again on 19 April. 79.  On 26 April 2002 the applicant refused treatment by a psychiatrist from Curaçao. 80.  On 30 July 2002 the applicant was apparently examined by a doctor from Cuba, who found nothing wrong with him. 81.  On 14 August 2002 the applicant was provided with a wheelchair. 82.  On 10 September 2002 the applicant was taken to hospital so that he could consult Dr Vallejo Lopez and Dr Molina. They examined him using X-ray and magnetic imaging scans. They found that the applicant was suffering from lumbago and prescribed physiotherapy. 83.  A report by KIA nursing staff dated 21 January 2003 stated, among other things, that physiotherapy had to be financed by the prisoners themselves and that the applicant had refused to meet the expense involved out of his own pocket; for that reason he was not being given such treatment. It also stated that the applicant had not seen a psychiatrist because of preconditions which he had set before he would agree to do so; finally, despite his allegedly poor physical condition, the applicant did not present the complications that might be expected in the case of a bedridden patient (including constipation, bedsores, poor hygiene – the applicant was able to take showers by himself – loss of appetite and depression). 84.  On 13 February 2003 the applicant had some stitches to the back of his head, which were removed on 20 February. 85.  In February and March 2003 the applicant again complained of back pains, claiming that the painkillers were not effective.\nOn 5 April 2003 the applicant was again seen by Dr Vallejo Lopez, who again prescribed physiotherapy. 86.  On 21 May 2003 the applicant was admitted to hospital for intensive physiotherapy. He remained in hospital until 13 June 2003, the intention being that treatment should continue in the KIA. 87.  On 19 June 2003 the applicant refused to attend physiotherapy. 88.  On 21 June 2003 the applicant stated that he had fallen on his back. He was taken to the outpatient department for treatment. 89.  The applicant missed his appointments with the physiotherapist on 24 and 26 June and 1, 3 and 7 July 2003. He attended physiotherapy on 10 and 15 July. 90.  Physiotherapy was resumed on 6 March 2004, after the applicant had again reported back pains, but discontinued shortly afterwards because the physiotherapist could not identify the problem clearly. 91.  Following an intervention by the supervisory board (see below), physiotherapy was again resumed on 6 April 2004.\n(c)  Complaints proceedings 92.  The Government stated that the applicant had first written to the supervisory board of the KIA on 20 January 2002. The board had considered the applicant's complaints at its meetings of 30 January and 27 February 2002. It had sent him a reply on 26 March 2002, phrased as follows:\n“...\nNearly all your complaints relate to the special regime in the KIA which has applied to you since the incident with Mr Vocking on 29 November 2001. You are – presumably – aware of what the regime involves.\nIn view of all the circumstances of the case, the Board takes the view that the present regime is still necessary at this time for your safety and the safety of others. It has, however, been agreed with the interim governor of the KIA that it will need to be seen in future to what extent (depending on your behaviour and your attitude, in particular vis-à-vis KIA staff) that regime can be relaxed. Everything depends on your behaviour and your attitude.\n...” 93.  On 5 September 2002 the applicant again wrote to the board, through his lawyer, complaining about the regime and the state of his cell. 94.  By letter of 7 October 2002, again through his lawyer, the applicant acknowledged that the roof had been repaired but complained that he had not been allowed outdoor exercise for four months and that he had still not been given the prescribed physiotherapy. 95.  On 30 October 2002 the applicant himself wrote to the supervisory board restating his complaints. On the same day the board inspected the applicant's cell and interviewed him in person about his complaints. This led the board to suggest to the interim governor of the KIA that the applicant be moved back to an ordinary cell subject to certain conditions. The interim governor promised to organise this. 96.  Later, however, the interim governor withdrew his promise following the theft of X-rays from the hospital instigated by the applicant and the latter's refusal to accept the letter setting out the conditions subject to which he would be returned to detention under the ordinary regime. 97.  The supervisory board discussed this problem with the Aruban Minister of Justice, who instructed the interim governor to place the applicant in an ordinary cell. The instruction was obeyed. 98.  However, after the applicant had been placed in a ground-floor cell with other prisoners, an incident took place which led to his being returned to solitary confinement in the committal cell. 99.  After receiving medical information from the applicant's wife, the supervisory board requested the KIA governing body to ensure that the applicant received physiotherapy. They received the reply that no physiotherapist was prepared to treat the applicant: the problem was that the applicant was not willing to meet the expense, and it had not been demonstrated that either he or his family was indigent. 100.  The supervisory board engaged the services of a physiotherapist, Mr Carti, who stipulated that the Aruban Ministry of Justice should guarantee payment for his services. This condition was met and treatment began on 6 March 2004. The Government submitted his handwritten report, which reads as follows (original in English):\n“Mar 6, 04\n9 A.M. \nAlex Matthew [sic]\nc/o – severe lumbago (L) > (R)\nDiff – gait, stairs prolonged w.b.\nOnset: + 1.5 yr ago, gradually worse\nMedi – Tramal [an analgesic]\nPrev PT – hospital last year & no effects.\nObs: gait & walker. Partial w.b.\nAble to t. steps & use of railing. + 20 steps.\nWalked + 90 metres to nurses' station.\nClimbed onto treatment table & min ass.\nc/o PI during massage – trembling. (Aloe heat lotion)\nAfter massage – turned prone to side ... RC and sat up before standing.\n– used a comode [sic] on wheels to return to cell.\nPt complained of too much pain to carry out traditional physical testing however able to stand/turn unassisted.\nS+S do not make sense, or correlate with his physical activities.\nP – D/C physio. due to my inability to determine exactly what the problem is. PT carries out complex physical activities such as twisting lumbar spine and stairs & no or little complaints while trembles and complains of severe pain while massaging his back. He also states that he does not feel the heat from the Aloe heat lotion which was used to massage. My final impression is that physiotherapy at this time (by myself) is unable to help this patient.\n[signed]\nRudolph P. Carti 101.  On 14 June 2002 the Aruba Court of First Instance (Gerecht in Eerste Aanleg van Aruba) delivered its judgment in the criminal case against the applicant. It convicted the applicant on two charges of inflicting grievous bodily harm and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 102.  On 14 April 2003 the Joint Court of Justice gave judgment on the applicant's appeal against his conviction and sentence. It quashed the first-instance judgment of 14 June 2002. In a fresh decision, it held that the applicant's conditions of detention on remand did not constitute grounds for declaring the prosecution inadmissible. It went on to find the applicant guilty of, firstly, having on 19 August 2001, together with another person, inflicted grievous bodily harm on one M. (kicking and beating resulting in fracture of the nose and the zygoma) and, secondly, having on 29 November 2001, acting alone, inflicted grievous bodily harm on Mr Vocking (punching and kicking resulting in the fracture of an eye socket, the sinus, the cheekbones and the cranium, as well as severe concussion). The Joint Court of Justice's reasoning included the following:\n“In determining the sentence the Joint Court of Justice will further consider the circumstances in which the suspect has been, and is still being, detained.\nThe following is apparent in relation to the suspect's conditions of detention. On 16 November 2001 the suspect was placed in a punishment cell. He had already been placed in a punishment cell at an earlier stage for various reasons, including an escape. His stay in the punishment cell was twice extended for seven days, until 30 November 2001, first for failing to follow an order given by a staff member and subsequently for disturbing the order, peace and security of the institution. The second extension related to the action of a number of detainees who refused to return to their cells after outdoor exercise. On 29 November 2001, the date [of the attack on Mr Vocking], the prisoner's solitary confinement was extended for another seven days for threatening and spitting on a prison guard. Afterwards, his solitary confinement was extended until 4 January 2002 for [the attack on Mr Vocking], with the result that the suspect has spent a total of forty-nine days in the punishment cell. By letter of 4 January 2002 the KIA authorities let it be known that the suspect was to spend the remainder of his detention in the committal cell, subject to restrictive measures including not being allowed to leave the cell without handcuffs and fetters. This measure was amended on 5 March 2002 by being limited to the use of handcuffs.\nAs regards the committal cell, it appears that the roof is made of corrugated plastic sheeting and was defective during at least part of the detention period. During [the suspect's] stay in the committal cell he has had no television, activities, work or sport. Moreover, outdoor exercise no longer takes place on a regular basis since the suspect has indicated that he is unable to walk.\nThe Joint Court of Justice considers that the applicant has established that during his period of detention on remand – which has lasted until today – he has been kept under an exceptionally severe regime. The [suspect's] continuous placement in a punishment cell, which began shortly after [his] detention, suggests that the interaction between the suspect and the staff of the KIA has resulted in a downward spiral, in the sense that an incident was followed by punishment, which in turn was followed by a reaction from the suspect, and so on. All this culminated in the attack on Mr Vocking. It is understandable in itself that after such an act the KIA should not have wished, after having imposed an extended stay in the punishment cell, to place the suspect under the normal detention regime again. However, this does not alter the fact that prolonged detention in the punishment cell and the committal cell in restrictive conditions approaches the limits of what is acceptable, assuming that these have not already been exceeded. The Joint Court of Justice also considers it plausible that the conditions of detention have negatively influenced the suspect's health.\nThe above leads the Joint Court of Justice to impose a considerably lighter sentence than would be justified by the crimes.\nThe suspect has also argued that he has been ill-treated in detention. However, an investigation of [that allegation] falls outside the scope of the present proceedings.\nAs a result of the conditions which the suspect has set for his cooperation in drawing up psychiatric reports and a probation report [reclasseringsrapport], no such reports are available. The Joint Court of Justice can therefore consider the suspect's person and personal circumstances only to the extent that these are known from the case file and the hearing.” 103.  The Joint Court of Justice indicated that it would normally have been minded, in view of the crimes committed, to sentence the applicant to five years' imprisonment, but that the sentence would be reduced to three years and six months in view of the conditions of his detention. 104.  The applicant appealed on points of law (cassatie) to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) against this judgment. The appeal was dismissed with summary reasoning on 1 June 2004. 105.  On 19 February 2003 the applicant brought summary civil proceedings in the Aruba Court of First Instance to secure his release from solitary confinement and restrictive conditions of detention. 106.  The Aruba Court of First Instance gave judgment on 12 March 2003 finding that it had no jurisdiction to consider the applicant's action in civil proceedings: the remedy open to the applicant was the “criminal‑law summary suit” (strafrechtelijk kort geding) (Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), which – since the applicant's appeal against his conviction and sentence was pending before the Joint Court of Justice – should be heard by that court also. 107.  Accordingly, on 21 March 2003, the applicant lodged a request with the Joint Court of Justice under Article 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to be restored to ordinary prisoner status and to have the restrictions lifted. 108.  The Joint Court of Justice held a hearing on 16 April 2003. The applicant challenged all the judges on the ground that they had participated in decisions at first instance affecting him. 109.  On 25 April 2003 the Joint Court of Justice rejected the challenge. The hearing on the merits of the applicant's request was resumed on 13 May 2003. 110.  On 27 May 2003 the Joint Court of Justice gave an interlocutory decision on the applicant's request for the lifting of the restrictive conditions of detention. It adjourned the case, summoned the interim governor of the KIA as a party and set him a deadline (17 June 2003) for a written statement of defence. 111.  On 15 July 2003 the Joint Court of Justice gave a decision in the proceedings adjourned on 27 May. It ordered the interim governor to have regard to the following guidelines in relation to the restrictions to which the applicant was subject:\n“(a)  The need for detention in the committal cell should be assessed at regular intervals, at least once a month. In the absence of incidents, transfer to the normal regime should be considered, it being reasonable to expect [the applicant] to abide by the conditions set down in writing by the governor.\n(b)  Any use of irons outside the cell should also be assessed at regular intervals, at least once a week. In the absence of incidents, this restriction should be lifted.\n(c)  [The applicant] should be given the opportunity to go to the outdoor exercise and visiting areas. The Court does not consider it appropriate to oblige the KIA to carry [the applicant] to these areas or to enable him to receive visitors in his cell. [The applicant] has not denied that he can walk with a walking frame. Nor is it apparent from the medical statements that [the applicant] is not able to go to the outdoor exercise and visiting areas himself or that independent walking is itself harmful.\n(d)  It does not appear that [the applicant] has been subjected to special restrictions as regards censoring of his mail.\n(e)  Clearly [the applicant] should be given the medical care considered necessary by the physicians treating him. However, it is not apparent that this has been withheld from him.\n(f)  The Joint Court of Justice would add the following. The said downward spiral has resulted in the applicant's being detained in difficult conditions. Even though he is not blameless in this regard, he should nonetheless be treated as humanely as possible. If, for whatever reason, outdoor exercise, visits or other activities do not take place, then in order that the applicant's detention should remain 'within the limits of what is acceptable' the KIA must consider and decide on each occasion whether measures to compensate the loss may be offered, such as the use of a television or personal computer.\n(g)  In so far as this is not already being done, a written record shall be kept of any future incidents which cause the restrictions to be maintained, as well as of the (reasoned) decisions referred to under (f), in order to determine in any future proceedings whether this decision has been complied with.” 112.  On 17 July 2003 Dr Rodriguez Robelt of the Aruba Public Heath Department wrote to Dr Vallejo Lopez inviting him as a specialist to give an expert opinion and advise on appropriate treatment.\n(b)  The second set of proceedings 113.  On 8 August 2003 the applicant requested the Joint Court of Justice to release him from detention on remand. 114.  On 2 September 2003 the Joint Court of Justice declared the request inadmissible, there being another procedure for that purpose. The Joint Court of Justice's reasoning included the following:\n“3.2  Mathew has asked, in the alternative, that the public prosecution service and/or the prison governor be ordered to transfer him to the formal detention regime applicable to the other prisoners. The public prosecution service has no competence in this matter. The actual execution of orders for detention on remand is the responsibility of the Country of Aruba, represented by the governor of the KIA. The request directed against the public prosecution service will be dismissed for this reason. 3.3.  It is clear from the decision of today's date given by the Joint Court of Justice on Mathew's other request, for the lifting of his detention on remand, that this request has not been granted. Accordingly, Mathew has a legitimate interest based on his alternative claim against the governor of the KIA (transfer to the 'normal detention regime'). 3.4  The Country of Aruba has the responsibility to ensure that the execution of judicial detention orders takes place in accordance with the regulations in force. Mathew's complaints about the way [his detention order is being executed] may be summarised as follows:\n(a)  he is currently being kept in the committal cell for an indeterminate period;\n(b)  he is not being allowed outdoor exercise;\n(c)  he cannot receive visits;\n(d)  he has not been offered compensation as referred to in paragraph 2.6 (f) of the decision of this Court of 15 July 2003;\n(e)  he was not interviewed prior to the imposition of disciplinary measures;\n(f)   the operation he needs is being withheld from him.\nAs to (a): 3.5  In its decision of 15 July 2003 the Joint Court of Justice ruled that detention in the committal cell should be assessed every month. This was based on the consideration that Mathew had been returned to the committal cell in response to an incident. It has become clear in the meantime – since the prison governor has admitted as much at the hearing – that [the applicant's] placement in the committal cell should not (any longer) be seen as a response to an incident, but as – in the prison governor's perception – the only possible regime for Mathew. It has been argued in support of this proposition that Mathew is quite unsuited to detention on remand in a communal setting. This prompts the question whether this is in fact the case, and, if so, what consequences should ensue for the complaints raised in these proceedings by Mathew. 3.6.  Ever since Mathew was first detained in the Aruba Correctional Institution there have been problems, in particular Mathew's unpredictable behaviour. Reports by prison staff of recalcitrant behaviour, followed by the (sudden) use of violence by Mathew, are legion. The number of reported incidents is such that it may be concluded that it is no longer feasible to let Mathew undergo his detention on remand in a communal setting. It is now sufficiently plausible that there is no alternative within the Aruba Correctional Institution, given the aforementioned conclusion, than to keep Mathew detained in the committal cell. It cannot be ruled out that at some point Mathew's attitude and behaviour may show such a change that it may be possible to return him to a communal regime, but the Joint Court of Justice sees no indications that such is the case now or will be in the near future. It is therefore pointless to set the prison governor a time-limit for reconsidering the matter.\nAs to (b) and (c): 3.7.  As regards outdoor exercise and receiving visits, it does not appear that the present circumstances are any different from those noted at the time of the Joint Court of Justice's decision of 15 July 2003. That means that it can once again be considered established that Mathew is given the opportunity to take outdoor exercise and to receive visits in the visitors' area. It is up to Mathew whether or not he makes use of that opportunity. In the absence of medical information to the contrary the Court assumes that Mathew is still able to reach the outdoor exercise and visitors' areas unaided [op eigen kracht].\n...\nAs to (f): 3.10.  As it did at the time of its decision of 15 July 2003, the Joint Court of Justice again finds nothing to indicate that Mathew is being denied the medical assistance he requires. According to the neurosurgeon Carlos A. Vallejo Lopez, in his letter of 4 July 2003, 'surgery is indicated'. The conditions of Mathew's detention, according to that letter, are one reason why the 'prospects' are 'uncertain' at present. Although it is not quite clear to the Joint Court of Justice what is meant by this, one thing is clear: the letter does not state that an operation is necessary now, without further delay. On that basis alone there is no need to order any measures. In addition, the public prosecution service and the prison governor have promised that Mathew will receive the necessary medical care. There is no indication that the public prosecution service and the prison governor will fail to honour that promise. For that reason also there is no need to order any measure.” 115.  The KIA governor was ordered to make provision for the applicant to have his own television in his cell; the applicant's other requests – including a request to be transferred to the Netherlands (the Realm in Europe) – were refused. 116.  The KIA is reported by the Government to be capable of holding 250 prisoners. It comprises a dormitory for prisoners serving short terms of detention in lieu of unpaid fines and separate sections for female prisoners and juveniles. Adult male remand prisoners and convicted prisoners are typically kept in three-person cells. There are four single-prisoner cells intended for convicted prisoners serving very long sentences. There are four observation cells intended for mentally unstable prisoners; these tend to be occupied most of the time. 117.  The committal cell in which the applicant was detained is described as being 7.4 metres long and 3 metres wide and equipped with a bed, a table, a chair, a lavatory and a shower. It is located on the second floor, directly under the roof. 118.  A new high‑security wing is being added to the KIA; it is expected to be suitable for detaining aggressive prisoners. 119.  The applicant was seen by Mr Michele Lancellotti, a chiropractor in Providence, Rhode Island, on 19 May 2004. He complained to Mr Lancellotti of severe lower back pain with numbness in his left leg and occasionally in his right leg. The pain prevented him from walking up and down stairs. He had difficulty getting up from a seated position and walking for any length of time. He further complained of neck pain, headaches, blurred vision and pain and cracking in both knees. He used a walking frame. Mr Lancellotti's report described the applicant as, at that time, “totally disabled” and contained a plan for treatment. 120.  Mr Lancellotti saw the applicant on subsequent occasions. The applicant submitted records of visits dated 21, 24, 26 and 28 May; 2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17, 22, 24 and 29 June ; 1, 6, 13, 19, 21, 23, 26 and 30 July; and 2, 4, 11, 13, 16, 19, 23, 27 and 30 August 2004. A record of a re-evaluation undertaken by Mr Lancellotti on 3 September 2004, based on magnetic resonance images and the applicant's subjective complaints of pain, expressed the opinion that the applicant “has a permanent physical impairment of the body as a whole caused by ill-treatment and neglect; progress is slow”. 121.  The applicant submitted copies of colour photographs, the first showing a man of very muscular build, stated to be the applicant, lying prostrate on a floor, clad only in underpants, with another person's foot on his head, and the second the same man lying prostrate on a floor, with large spatters of a red substance around his head.\nThe red spatters are not visible in the first photograph. No laceration or other injury is discernible in either photograph, although the first shows dark patches on the man's left shoulder and left thigh that might be bruising. 122.  The Government did not deny that the man shown in the photographs was the applicant but they stated that the photographs were bogus. They submitted that the boot and the trousers worn by the person holding his foot on the applicant's head (who was clearly also the person taking the photograph) in the first photograph were identifiable as part of the uniform worn by prison staff: it was obvious, therefore, that the applicant had bribed a member of the KIA staff to take the pictures and smuggle them out of the prison. 123.  The photographs were published, together with others also stated to be an accurate reflection of the treatment meted out to the applicant and of conditions in the KIA generally, in the Aruban press and on an Internet site. The other published photographs included one of a man's ankle that appeared to be bleeding from a small laceration and one of a hole in a roof which was only partially covered by grating and by a sheet of corrugated translucent material. 124.  The publication of the photographs prompted the interim governor of the KIA, Mr Maduro, to lodge a criminal complaint of libel with the Aruban police on 23 July 2002. The police investigation was eventually discontinued, with the permission of the public prosecutor, on 6 December 2002. Ms Iannuccilli was suspected of involvement in the matter but no prosecution was brought.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Lublin, Poland. 5.  On 5 September 1999 the applicant was arrested on charges of illegal possession of weapons. 6.  On 7 September 1999 the Lublin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be detained on remand until 5 December 1999. The court considered that existence of strong evidence against him and the gravity of the charges justified his detention. It also found that the circumstances of the case had not been fully investigated and there was the risk that the applicant would attempt to obstruct the proceedings. 7.  The Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Okregowy) upheld the first-instance decision on 14 October 1999. 8.  On 30 November 1999 the Lublin Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 5 March 2000. It considered that the original grounds given for keeping him in custody were still valid and referred to the complexity of the case. 9.  On 1 March 2000 the Lublin Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 5 June 2000. The court considered that the applicant was suspected of having committed several serious offences (procurement, obstructing the course of criminal proceedings, illegal possession of weapons; he was also a member of an organised crime gang) and there was substantial evidence against him. Since he had attempted to threaten witnesses, his detention was necessary to ensure the proper course of the proceedings. 10.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged by the Lublin Regional Court on 31 May 2000. 11.  On 31 August 2000 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) extended the applicant’s detention until 5 December 2000. It found that the reasons previously given for holding him in custody were still valid. 12.  During the course of the investigation, the applicant lodged several unsuccessful appeals against prolongation of his detention with the Lublin Regional Court and the Supreme Court. 13.  On 27 December 2000 the Lublin Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and seven other co-defendants with the Lublin Regional Court. He charged him with procurement, obstructing the course of criminal proceedings, illegal possession of weapons and participation in an organised crime gang. 14.  The Lublin Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention on 28 December 2000 and on 12 June 2001. 15.  The Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s application for release on 30 January 2001. 16.  The trial started on 14 September 2001. The Regional Court held 16 hearings. 17.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged 3 times by the Court of Appeal, at the Regional Court’s request: on 11 July 2001 and 21 November 2001, 13 February and 22 May 2002 for the same reasons as before. 18.  His appeals against those decisions were dismissed. 19.  On 27 June 2002 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 8 years’ imprisonment. 20.  During the proceedings before the appellate court the applicant remained in custody. 21.  On 25 February 2003 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 22.  On 18 March 2003 the Lublin Regional Court ordered that the applicant remain in custody until 18 June 2003. The Court of Appeal upheld that decision on 9 April 2003. It found that the applicant’s detention was justified by the severity of the anticipated sentence. 23.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged by the Regional Court on 17 June and 9 September 2003. 24.  On 14 November 2003 the Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 31 January 2004. 25.  On 3 December 2003 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed that decision and released the applicant from detention on bail of PLN 40,000 (approx. EUR 10,000). The court considered that the applicant had been detained for a very long period and that the interests of the trial did not justify keeping him in detention. 26.  The applicant was released from custody on 5 December 2003. 27.  On 30 December 2004 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 6 years’ imprisonment. 28.  Following the applicant’s appeal, the proceedings are pending before an appellate court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in St Petersburg. 7.  On 19 May 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of organising a criminal gang and placed in the IVS, which, according to the applicant, was in a poor sanitary condition. 8.  On the following day the applicant’s detention was authorised by domestic courts. It was regularly prolonged until his release (see paragraph 11 below). 9.  On 1 June 2006 the applicant was transferred from the IVS to remand prison IZ-47/1 of St Petersburg, where he stayed until 19 May 2011. The facility was overcrowded. Thus, cell 81 measuring 8 sq. m was equipped with six sleeping places and accommodated up to six inmates; cell 104 measuring 8 sq. m was designed for six detainees and housed up to six individuals; finally, cell 907 measuring 8 sq. m presented six sleeping places and up to six persons who occupied them. 10.  On an unspecified date the St Petersburg City Court commenced the examination of the case. From that date, in order to take part in the hearings, the applicant was regularly transported by prison van between the remand prison and the court premises. While in the courthouse, he was placed in a confinement cell. The applicant alleged that both the van and the cell had been overcrowded. 11.  On 19 May 2011 the St Petersburg City Court ordered to release the applicant and on 14 June 2011 it acquitted him of all charges.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants live in Žilina. The first applicant was born in 1939 and the second applicant was born in 1944. 5.  The first applicant participated in a tender concerning the resolution of a technical problem within a State-owned company. The tender never resulted in a contract as the company went into liquidation. 6.  On 20 November 1991 the first applicant claimed compensation (the equivalent of approximately 200 euros) from the company. He later indicated several Ministries as additional defendants. 7.  On 23 April 1992 the Ministry of Construction and Works informed the District Court in Žilina that the defendant company had ceased to exist and that it had taken over the company’s obligations. The decision concerning the transfer of liabilities of the company was later quashed. 8.  On 26 August 1992 the first applicant extended his action to comprise also the above Ministry as defendant. He later indicated three other Ministries as defendants as it was unclear which authority was liable for the original defendant’s obligations. On 8 December 1992 the first applicant requested that the District Court should issue a payment order. 9.  On 20 February 1995 the Žilina District Court decided to deal separately with the claim to the extent that it concerned three Ministries. At the applicant’s request it discontinued the proceedings in respect of the other defendants including the State-owned company which, in the meantime, had ceased to exist. 10.  On 7 April 1995 the first applicant sued also the Ministry of Economy in the context of the proceedings. In October 1995 and in January 1996 representatives of that Ministry informed the court that the Ministry of Economy lacked standing in the case. 11.  Hearings were held on 28 February 1996 and on 2 September 1996. On 18 July 1996 the applicant requested a change in the defendants. He amended his claim on 3 September 1996. 12.  On 5 February 1998 the District Court asked the first applicant to specify which authorities were defendants in the case. The applicant replied on 19 February 1998. On 18 March 1998 he submitted further information. 13.  On 31 March 1998 the District Court joined to the proceedings the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Construction and Public Works as authorities representing the defendant State. One of the Ministries appealed on 27 April 1998. On 1 April 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of two different authorities. 14.  On 28 October 1998 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 31 March 1998. 15.  On 20 July 1999 the first applicant made a submission to the District Court. 16.  On 1 August 2000, in accordance with the instruction of the Regional Court, the District Court invited the applicant to specify which authority acted on behalf of the Slovak Republic in the proceedings and to specify the sum claimed. The first applicant replied on 10 August 2000. 17.  On 17 October 2000 the District Court asked the defendant for comments on the action. The defendant replied on 30 October 2000. Subsequently the District Court unsuccessfully attempted to obtain documents concerning the work for which the applicant claimed compensation. 18.  On 6 June 2001 the District Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. The court found that the State-owned company which had sought the tenders had been liquidated without any successor by a final decision of 31 March 1992. 19.  On 27 July 2001 the applicant appealed. The file was transmitted to the appellate court on 11 October 2001. 20.  On 5 March 2002 the Žilina Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment which became final on 20 July 2002. 21.  In the meantime, on 5 April 2002, the applicant requested that the court fee should be returned to him. That submission was considered as an appeal against the decision ordering the applicant to pay the fee for the appellate proceedings. The Regional Court in Žilina rejected the appeal, on 8 July 2002, as having been filed out of time. 22.  On 28 November 2002 the applicants extended the application with reference to the facts described below. 23.  The first applicant has been involved in (i) proceedings concerning the validity of transfer of ownership which were brought on 20 January 2001 and which are pending before the Žilina District Court and (ii) proceedings concerning an estate which, at the moment when the complaint was filed, had been pending before the Žilina District Court since 1997. Following the appellate court’s decision given on 11 October 2004, the latter set of proceedings is now again pending before the Žilina District Court. 24.  Both applicants have been plaintiffs in proceedings concerning the validity of a purchase contract. The proceedings were brought on 27 January 2000 and the first instance court gave its decision on 11 November 2004. 25.  On 23 April 2001 the applicants brought proceedings concerning the right of lease. The proceedings are pending before the Žilina District Court which is to decide on the case at first instance. 26.  On 16 August 2000 the first applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about the length of the proceedings concerning his action of 1991. On 16 November 2000 the Constitutional Court rejected the petition on the ground that the first applicant had failed to appoint a lawyer to represent him in the constitutional proceedings as required by the Constitutional Court Act. 27.  As they considered the length of the various sets of proceedings mentioned in point B. above to be excessive, the first applicant or the second applicant sought redress before the Constitutional Court by complaints lodged in June 2002. The applicants were invited to lodge their submissions in accordance with the statutory requirements and, in particular, to appoint a lawyer to represent them in the proceedings as required by the Constitutional Court Act. The applicants replied that the above requirement was discriminatory and contrary to the Constitution. 28.  By three decisions delivered on 20 August 2002 and by another two decisions delivered on 23 October 2002 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ complaints as falling short of the procedural requirements. The decisions stated, inter alia, that the applicants had not appointed a lawyer to represent them before the Constitutional Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 5.  On 18 March 2003 the applicant and two other persons (Mr Sh. and Ms M.) sent a notice to the head of Yekaterinburg town administration of their intention to stage a picket in front of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court.[1] The picket was to take place between 25 and 28 March 2003 between 9 and 11 a.m. The declared purpose of the picket was “to attract public attention to violations of the human right of access to a court”. 6.  On 19 March 2003 the head of the Committee for Public Relations and Mass Media of the Yekaterinburg town administration acknowledged receipt of the notice. He noted that, should the picket cause any inconvenience, such as blocking access to the court-house or impairing its normal functioning, the administration would have to intervene. 7.  On 20 March 2003 the head of the Yekaterinburg public security police ordered that the police should maintain public order and traffic safety during the picket. 8.  On 25 March 2003 the applicant and others held the picket. They distributed press clippings and leaflets about Mr Ovcharuk, the President of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court, who had allegedly been involved in corruption scandals, and collected signatures for his dismissal. 9.  On 27 March 2003 Mr Dementyev, the first deputy president of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court, sent the following letter to the head of the Verkh-Issetskiy police department of Yekaterinburg:\n“With the consent of the Yekaterinburg town administration, a group of citizens comprising Mr Sh., Mr Kuznetsov and Ms M., held a picket in front of the building of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court...\nThe picket notice indicated that the purpose of the picket was ‘to attract public attention to violations of the human right of access to a court’.\nAs the subsequent events demonstrated, the picket organisers misled the officials of the Yekaterinburg town administration as to the real purposes of their action.\nInstead of drawing public attention to the problems of judicial protection and violations of human rights, as it was indicated in the picket notice – if they believed that such problems existed – which would be hard to contradict because the said problems exist in reality, for three days the picket participants distributed printed leaflets and materials of a slanderous and insulting nature which targeted the president of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court personally.\nThe information contained in the extract from the Novaya Gazeta newspaper was more than two years old. It had been checked by the Supreme Qualification Panel of Judges and the Prosecutor General’s Office and found to be slanderous, of which the picket participants, in particular Mr Sh. and Mr Kuznetsov, were perfectly aware.\nThe above stated begs the conclusion that the picket organisers deliberately and maliciously changed the nature of the action and in that way misled the public whom, according to the picket notice, they merely intended to acquaint with the state of judicial protection of human rights.\nThey have committed thereby an administrative offence by violating section 4 of the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council of 28 July 1988, as amended by the Presidential decree of 25 May 1992, and, pursuant to section 8 of that decree, they are administratively liable under Article 20.2 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences...\nAccordingly, I ask you to institute administrative proceedings against Mr Sh., Mr Kuznetsov and Ms M. in accordance with Article 28.3 § 2 (1) of the said Code, prepare a report on an administrative offence and decide on the issue of their legal responsibility for that breach of law. You are requested to inform me of the decision taken.” 10.  On 17 April 2003 an official of the Verkh-Issetskiy police department of Yekaterinburg compiled a report on administrative offences committed by the applicant under Article 20.2 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code on Administrative Offences. According to the report, the applicant had given notice of the picket too late, he had distributed leaflets of a slanderous and insulting nature against the president of the regional court and he had also obstructed the passage of citizens into the court-house. Court bailiffs Mr R. and Mr M. were listed as eyewitnesses. 11.  On 21 April 2003 the head of the Verkh-Issetskiy police department forwarded the report and supplementary materials to the Verkh-Issetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg. The matter was assigned to the justice of the peace of the 3rd Court Circuit of the Verkh-Issetskiy district of Yekaterinburg. 12.  On 15 May 2003 the applicant challenged the judicial formation and requested that the matter be examined in a neighbouring region. He claimed that objective examination of the matter in Yekaterinburg was impossible because it had been initiated at the instigation of the high-ranking officials of the regional court. The justice dismissed his challenge, holding that under the Code on Administrative Offence there were no legal grounds to change the venue. 13.  On 19 May 2003 the justice issued a ruling on an administrative offence (постановление по делу об административном правонарушении) in which she found the applicant guilty on three counts. 14.  Firstly, the justice held that the applicant had breached the established procedure for organising a picket. He had sent the picket notice eight days before the picket date, whereas both the 1988 USSR Supreme Council’s decree and the local Yekaterinburg regulation on public assemblies established a ten-day notification period. 15.  Secondly, the justice found the applicant to have breached public order during the picket. She relied on the following evidence:\n“The applicant’s guilt... is confirmed by the report on an administrative offence dated 17 April 2003; the statements by the witnesses Mr M. and Mr R. who testified in court that they worked as court bailiffs in the Sverdlovsk Regional Court. At about 9.10 a.m. on 25 March 2003 they had gone onto the porch of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court and seen some people with banners – among them Mr Kuznetsov holding the banner ‘Ovcharuk – resign’ – who were standing on the porch right in front of the entrance on the top floor, blocking the passage and distributing leaflets. When they had asked them to show their identity documents and go down the stairs, they had refused but they had gone down after a police officer had approached them. Judges coming to work had told them that the picket participants had blocked access to the court. [List of evidence showing the applicant’s guilt continues:] the report by the court bailiff Mr R. of 25 March 2003; the report by the police officer from the Verkh-Issetskiy police station Mr G. which indicated that between 25 and 28 March 2003 he had been responsible for public order during the picket in front of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court. The picket had been organised by Mr Kuznetsov, Mr Sh. and Ms M., who at 9 a.m. on the day of the picket were standing on the staircase at the entrance to the Sverdlovsk Regional Court and thus obstructing access to the building. Following his intervention and that by the court bailiffs, they had gone down to the pavement in front of the court-house and had not subsequently interfered with the normal functioning of the Regional Court...\nThe judge does not accept the arguments by Mr Kuznetsov’s representative to the effect that Mr Kuznetsov did not block access to the Sverdlovsk Regional Court, because these arguments contradict the evidence that has already been examined in court and because they cannot be confirmed by the witnesses [for the defence] who were present at the picket from 9.30 a.m., because by that time the picket participants had already descended the staircase on orders of the police officer and were no longer blocking access...\nThe photographs [produced by the defence and] examined in court cannot prove that Mr Kuznetsov did not block access to the court-house, because they depict solely the moment when they were taken rather than the entire time during which the picket had been held; moreover, the court does not know when the photographs were taken.” 16.  Thirdly, the judge found that the picket had been conducted at variance with the aims listed in the notice:\n“According to the notice dated 18 March 2003, the initiative group of citizens comprising Mr Sh., Mr Kuznetsov and Ms M. held a protest action against violations of citizens’ right to judicial protection. As [the applicant’s representative] explained in court, the picket aimed at attracting public attention to the problems of judicial protection, such as refusals to accept a claim or unfair judgments. The witness Mr M. stated that he had brought and distributed a newspaper describing certain instances in which citizens’ rights to judicial protection had been breached. At the same time, the picket participants distributed extracts from the Novaya Gazeta newspaper containing A. Politkovskaya’s article ‘Ovcharuk and his team’ which in its contents did not correspond to the aims of the picket. The distribution of those extracts was not contested by the applicant’s representative in court and also confirmed by witnesses.” 17.  The judge declared the applicant guilty under Article 20.2 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences and fined him 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB, approximately 35 euros (EUR)). 18.  On 11 July 2003 the Verkh-Issetskiy District Court of Yekaterinburg, on an appeal by the applicant, upheld the ruling of the justice of the peace, endorsing the reasons that she had given. That judgment was final as no further ordinary appeal lay against it.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Kłomnice. 6.  He is the proprietor, editor-in-chief and journalist of a local weekly Komu i Czemu, published in the Radomsko and Bełchatów Districts. 7.  At the end of May 2005 M.Dz., a local businessman providing services to a district hospital, visited M.D., the district mayor (starosta), to complain about D.K., the director of the hospital. It appears that the hospital owed some money to the businessman. M.Dz. recorded the conversation and the following day passed it on to the applicant. 8.  On 2 June 2005 the applicant wrote to the district mayor and asked him to explain why he had delayed informing the prosecution authorities about the alleged corruption at the district hospital. In reaction to the letter, the district mayor summoned D.K. to respond to those allegations. He also sent a copy of the applicant’s letter to the prosecution service asking for the matter to be examined. In his letter to the prosecution service, the district mayor stated that the applicant’s allegations were insinuations aimed at undermining the public trust in him. A copy of this letter was sent to the applicant. 9.  On 6 June 2005 M.Dz. notified a local member of parliament (“MP”) that the director of the hospital had received bribes from M.Dz. He stated that his recent conversation with the district mayor indicated that the latter had some knowledge about the bribe-taking. On 14 June 2005 the MP relayed this information to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration. Subsequently, the information was transmitted to the Ministry of Justice and then, in turn, to the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Prosecutor’s Office. 10.  In the article “D.K. took bribes” published in issue no. 23 (8-14 June 2005), the applicant stated that “the hospital director was being protected by the district mayor who knew that the subordinate director had taken bribes”. In the article “Corruption of Madame Director” published in issue no. 24 (15-21 June 2005) the applicant wrote that the district mayor had known that D.K. was corrupt but had not notified the prosecution authorities. The same allegation was made in the article published in issue no. 25 (22‑28 June 2005). In the article “Young prosecutor examines Deszcz [the district mayor]” published in issue no. 28 the applicant stated that “the district mayor is obviously fibbing, because he received information that the director took [bribes] from at least two sources”. 11.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the district mayor lodged a private bill of indictment against the applicant with the Piotrków Trybunalski District Court. He accused the applicant of defamation committed through the mass media under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 12.  The bill of indictment related to two separate charges. The first concerned an article entitled “Hey those district roads” published in issue no. 1 of 2005 in which the applicant had discussed mismanagement of road works in the district. The second charge concerned four articles published by the weekly in June and July 2005 in which the applicant alleged that the district mayor had known that D.K. was corrupt but had failed to inform the prosecution service. The district mayor claimed that the impugned articles lowered his standing in the eyes of the public and undermined the public confidence necessary for the discharge of his duties. 13.  On 8 February 2006 the Piotrków Trybunalski District Court gave judgment. It acquitted the applicant of the first charge and convicted him of defamation committed through the mass media in respect of the second charge. The District Court held that the applicant had wrongly alleged in his articles that the district mayor had known that D.K. accepted bribes but had not informed the police about it, despite having been under a duty to do so. Thus, the applicant had lowered D.K.’s public standing and undermined the public confidence necessary for the discharge of his duties. The District Court sentenced the applicant to a fine of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN; 2,600 euros (EUR)). It further ordered him to pay the private prosecutor’s costs (PLN 300; EUR 80) and the costs of the State Treasury (PLN 1,000; EUR 260). 14.  When examining the first charge against the applicant, the trial court observed that the contours of the offence of defamation specified in Article 212 of the Criminal Code were delimited on one hand by the protection of reputation and dignity of a person and, on the other, by so‑called legitimate criticism (dozwolona krytyka) which derived from Article 54 of the Constitution. It noted that in accordance with the Strasbourg case-law political or public activity inevitably resulted in subjecting officials to the judgment of the public opinion. Persons holding important offices were thus required to show a higher degree of tolerance to criticism. 15.  In respect of the second charge, the trial court heard evidence from the applicant, the district mayor, M.Dz., D.K. and G.D. (spokesperson of the district mayor). It further heard the recording of the conversation between the district mayor and M.Dz. 16.  The District Court observed that the applicant and the district mayor had once been good colleagues; however their relations had deteriorated since M.D.’s election as district mayor in 2002. From then onwards the applicant’s newspaper had begun publishing articles virulently criticising the district mayor and his staff. 17.  The court established that the local businessman M.Dz., who provided services to the local hospital and was dissatisfied with his cooperation with the hospital director (D.K.), had informed the district mayor that D.K. had been taking bribes. M.Dz. had recorded his conversation with the district mayor. Subsequently, he had provided the applicant with the content of the recording and informed him that he had given bribes to D.K. 18.  The court found that the applicant had alleged in a series of articles published between 15 June and 19 July 2005 that the district mayor had covered up the corruption affair, without having verified the information received from M.Dz. and disregarding the actual content of the recording. 19.  The court further established that the applicant, when publishing a series of articles about the alleged corruption affair, had relied exclusively on the recorded conversation between the district mayor and M.Dz. It noted that neither the recording nor the statements of M.Dz. had confirmed the allegation that the district mayor had known about bribe-taking in the hospital, and thus the applicant’s assertions had been untrue. Even if the district mayor had some misgivings about the management of the hospital it could not be inferred from that that he had specific knowledge about the corruption. The trial court noted that allegations of covering-up corruption were of immense gravity and that the applicant had published them without having them verified. It underlined that shortly after having received the applicant’s letter of 2 June 2005 the district mayor referred the matter of corruption allegations to the prosecution service. In the court’s view, the applicant had flagrantly breached the journalistic principles of diligence and objectivity. The court further noted that in none of the impugned articles had the applicant referred to the uncertain nature of the presented information. The applicant, as an experienced journalist, should have been particularly cautious with the information received from the disgruntled businessman as he had been aware of a sharp conflict between him and the hospital management. However, he had failed to display particular diligence and had exploited that information for sensational purposes in making the district mayor and his alleged cover-up of the corruption the central part of his articles. The trial court referred to section 12 of the Press Act which obliged journalists to display particular diligence in gathering and using the information, and, in particular, to verify the truthfulness of obtained information. 20.  The District Court held, inter alia, as follows:\n“There is no doubt that by imparting information clearly presupposing that M.D. [the district mayor] had allegedly covered up the corruption affair [the applicant] not only did not demonstrate the requisite diligence but in general did not take the trouble to confirm and verify in any way the information he had received. Without having regard to the gravity of the allegations made against M.D., the applicant hastily used the words of his informant for the purposes of settling his scores with M.D. ... The articles discrediting M.D. did not serve anything but the personal satisfaction of [the applicant], and the concern for the respect of law in the local hospital appeared to be of marginal importance.\nHaving read the series of the above-mentioned articles it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the attention of the applicant was focused on damaging the reputation of the district mayor, while the hospital director D.K. was put on the sidelines. ... Besides, these actions constitute not the only but certainly the most far-reaching element of the personal war with M.D. waged in the weekly Komu i czemu.\nDefamation committed with the knowledge that information and opinions concerning the behaviour or characteristics of another person are false never serve to defend a justifiable public interest.\nSuch actions do not benefit from the protection granted to freedom of expression and the right to criticise under Article 31 § 3 of the Constitution or Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.\nThe real effect of the applicant’s publication cannot be assessed in isolation from the public office held by M.D. It is obvious that the office of the district mayor must be based on public trust and respect. Imparting by means of mass communication information about the alleged participation of the district mayor in the cover-up of a corruption scandal does not enhance his popularity. It risks not only the loss of the office, but also lowers his public standing creating an atmosphere of scandal and suspicion. ... By attributing to M.D. behaviour constituting an offence and doing so by means of mass communication, M. Ziembiński made out all the statutory features of the offence specified in Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code.” 21.  The trial court noted that the applicant published four separate articles containing defamatory statements in respect of the district mayor within the period of a few weeks. Those statements fell outside the limits of permissible criticism referred to in Article 213 § 2 of the Criminal Code since they had been untrue. 22.  The trial court considered that the degree of the applicant’s guilt was significant and for that reason the proceedings could not have been conditionally discontinued. As regards the sentence, the court found that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, a fine would be the most appropriate penalty. It imposed a fine of PLN 10,000, which it considered proportionate to the gravity of the offence, the degree of the applicant’s guilt and his financial standing which was beyond average. With regard to the latter, it had regard to the profits from the ownership of one of the most widely read newspapers in the region. As regards other relevant factors, the court noted that the applicant had deliberately infringed the district mayor’s reputation and had been motivated by personal animosity. At variance with the professional and deontological standards, he failed to respect the requirement of particular diligence when using information at his disposal. The trial court took further into account that the applicant had not in any way recognised that he had acted inappropriately. 23.  The applicant appealed. He contested the factual findings of the first-instance court, in particular that the recorded conversation between M.Dz. and the district mayor had constituted the only source of information about the bribe-taking. He further alleged that the first-instance court had erroneously assessed the evidence. 24.  On 23 May 2006 the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment and found the applicant’s appeal manifestly ill‑founded. It ordered him to pay costs of PLN 1,000 for the appeal proceedings. 25.  The Regional Court endorsed the lower court’s findings. It noted that M.Dz. had been in conflict with the director of the hospital which was related to unpaid invoices of his company. In the past he had frequently complained to the district mayor about the director of the hospital. 26.  The Regional Court held that the recorded conversation and information passed orally by M.Dz. to the applicant had constituted the only basis of the allegations made against the district mayor. According to the court, there was not a single statement of the district mayor in that conversation indicating that he had been aware of the alleged corruption of the director of the hospital. The allegations made by the applicant had been based on isolated parts of the conversation which were taken out of context. The Regional Court also noted that the applicant had not sought comments from D.K. At the time of the publication the applicant had not disposed of any information corroborating the alleged cover-up of the corruption. Nor had such information been disclosed during the trial. The Regional Court, having regard to the evidence heard by the trial court, found that the district mayor had learnt about the alleged corruption in the local hospital from his conversation with M.Dz. at the end of May 2005 and then from the applicant’s letter of 2 June 2005. It accordingly confirmed that the allegations raised by the applicant in his articles had proved to be untrue. 27.  Referring to the case-law of the Strasbourg Court, it recalled that the limits of acceptable criticism were wider with regard to politicians than with regard to private individuals. However, it did not follow from that that the insulting of a politician could go unpunished. 28.  The judgment was served on the applicant on 13 June 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in the town of Seyhan, within the administrative jurisdiction of the province of Adana. 10.  The facts surrounding the events of 5 October 1994 are disputed by the parties. 11.  The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Part B below (see paragraphs 12-21). The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Part C below (see paragraphs 22-23). Documentary evidence submitted by the applicant and the Government is summarised in Part D (see paragraphs 24-27 below) and Part E (see paragraphs 28-52 below) respectively. 12.  On 3 October 1994 Rehib Çabuk and Sefer Cerf were killed in Adana. They were, respectively, district leader and administrative board member of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, People’s Democracy Party), a pro-Kurdish political party. The applicant witnessed the killing and attended the funeral on 4 October 1994. 13.  On 5 October 1994, at about 11 a.m., while the applicant was sitting in the Erzurumlular Café in the Mutlu neighbourhood in Adana, two persons, who later identified themselves as policemen, entered the café. Both were from the anti-terrorism branch of the police and both were armed with pistols. They told the applicant to come out of the café. On leaving the café the applicant was put in a white Renault car, with the registration number 01 HC 644. 14.  There were two other police officers inside the car, both armed with MP-5 automatic weapons. The applicant’s elder brother Suphi Dizman, who was also in the café, asked the police officers why they were taking his brother away. The police told him that they wanted to ask his brother a number of questions and they would then return him to the café. 15.  The car drove in the direction of Kabaktepe and stopped in a deserted field. The applicant was taken out of the car. As soon as he got out, the police officers started to punch and kick him and to beat him with the butts of their guns. The police officers told the applicant that they had seen him at the funeral of Sefer Cerf and Rehib Çabuk the day before. They threatened him and told him that if he continued to be involved in such activities, his end would be like those of the dead HADEP members. 16.  The police officers questioned the applicant about a number of local people. The applicant was also forced to report the activities of local shopkeepers, who were allegedly selling the newspaper Özgür Ülke, a pro-Kurdish newspaper, and who were collecting money, presumably for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (hereinafter “the PKK”). The applicant was threatened that if he did not report the political activities of these shopkeepers regularly, he would be killed. 17.  The applicant denied that he was involved in such activities and protested that they had no reason to treat him like a criminal. He was then put into the car and driven towards the town. Before releasing him, the officers gave the applicant an address and ordered him to be there on the following Friday evening. 18.  When the applicant got home, his relatives took him to the hospital where it was established that his jaw bone had been broken and required surgery. 19.  The applicant, with the assistance of a lawyer, submitted a petition to the Adana Prosecutor’s office on 7 October 1994 and requested the Prosecutor to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers who had ill-treated him. He gave a detailed account of the incident and described the physical features of the police officers in question. The applicant asked the Prosecutor to send him to the Forensic Medicine Directorate to obtain a medical report which could be used as evidence in the criminal proceedings. 20.  The report was obtained from the Adana Forensic Medicine Directorate on 7 October 1994 (for content see paragraph 27 below). 21.  The applicant received no replies from the Prosecutor. 22.  A medical report was issued by the Forensic Medicine Directorate on 7 October 1994 according to which the applicant was unable to work for a period of 25 days. 23.  The applicant made an application to the Adana Public Prosecutor on 7 October 1994. On 10 October 1994 the Adana Public Prosecutor commenced an investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment under file no. 1994/29324. 24.  The following information appears from the documents submitted by the applicant. 25.  On 6 October 1994 the applicant submitted a petition to the Prosecutor’s office in Adana. The contents of this petition formed the basis of his submissions under Part B above (see paragraphs 12-20). He also informed the Prosecutor that he had been taken to hospital after having been released by the police. It had been established at the hospital that his jaw had been broken and required surgery. The applicant submitted the x-rays to the Prosecutor and told him that he wanted to press charges against the police officers. He finally asked the Prosecutor to be sent to the Forensic Medicine Directorate. 26.  On 7 October 1994 the applicant submitted another petition to the Prosecutor’s office in Adana and repeated the contents of his previous petition. He also described the physical features of the police officers in this petition. 27.  According to a medical report prepared by the Forensic Medicine Directorate in Adana, the applicant’s left jawbone had been broken. The report was based on an examination of the applicant as well as of x-rays. The report concluded that the fracture did not constitute a danger to life but would prevent the applicant from working for 25 days. 28.  The following information appears from the documents submitted by the Government. 29.  It appears from this decision that the Adana Prosecutor, after having received the applicant’s petitions, had decided on an unspecified date that he lacked jurisdiction to prosecute the police officers and had forwarded the investigation file to the Adana Administrative Council in order to obtain an authorisation to prosecute the police officers. 30.  On 24 November 1994 the Adana Administrative Council, which was presided over by the deputy Governor of Adana and consisted of six civil servants, found that there was insufficient evidence to open an investigation and decided to decline authorisation for the prosecution of Yaşar Soyyiğit, Hacı Kara, Mustafa Duman and Kadri Dursun, police officers who worked for the anti-terrorism branch of the Adana Police who had allegedly intimidated and ill-treated the applicant on 5 October 1994. 31.  The Administrative Council based its decision on the fact that the applicant, who claimed to have been ill-treated on 5 October 1994, had not asked for his transfer to the Forensic Medicine Directorate until 7 October 1994.  It appears from this decision that the investigation file had been forwarded to the Administrative Council by the Legal Affairs Department of the Adana Police Headquarters, together with a letter drawn up by that department on 18 November 1994. 32.  On 7 December 1994 the Disciplinary Board of the Adana Police decided not to impose any disciplinary measures on the police officers due to a lack of evidence establishing that they had committed the acts complained of. In this decision the applicant was reported as having stated that he had been beaten up by the police officers and that he had been given a medical report showing that he was unable to work for 25 days. The applicant had no complaints against anyone. The applicant’s brother apparently told the Disciplinary Board that his brother had been taken away from the café by the four officers but that he also did not have any complaints against anyone. 33.  In the decision of the disciplinary board, Yaşar Soyyiğit, one of the four police officers, was reported as having stated that he and his colleagues had carried out an identity check in the café during which they were suspicious about the applicant. They had asked him a number of questions in the café and left. They had not beaten him up. The remaining three police officers apparently confirmed the statement given by Yaşar Soyyiğit. 34.  On 31 May 1996 the Council of State quashed the Adana Administrative Council’s decision declining authorisation for the prosecution of the four police officers in so far as it concerned the offence of ill-treatment and upheld the decision not to grant authorisation to prosecute them for the allegation of intimidation. The Council of State further held that the four police officers should be tried before the Adana Criminal Court of First Instance. According to the Council of State, the medical report proved that the applicant had been ill-treated by the four police officers as alleged. 35.  The decision of the Council of State was forwarded to the Adana Prosecutor’s office on 7 August 1996. On 8 August 1996 the Adana Prosecutor forwarded the decision to the Adana Criminal Court of First Instance and asked that court to take the necessary action. 36.  On 11 August 1996 a preliminary hearing was held before the Ninth Chamber of the Adana Criminal Court of First Instance (hereinafter “the trial court”). The court decided to summons the defendants for the next hearing on 14 November 1996 and further decided to obtain the defendants’ identity cards and documents showing their criminal records. 37.  On 12 August 1996 the Adana Prosecutor sent a letter to the Ministry of Justice’s International Law and Foreign Relations Directorate (hereinafter “the Directorate”) and informed the Directorate of the decisions referred to above. The Prosecutor added that the criminal proceedings were pending before the trial court under case-file no. 1996/818 and that a hearing was scheduled for 14 November 1996. In this letter the Prosecutor referred to a letter sent by the Directorate to his office on 7 June 1996 and a reply sent by his office on 13 June 1996. 38.  On 21 August 1996 the trial court asked the Adana Prosecutor to obtain the defendants’ identity cards before the hearing on 14 November 1996. 39.  On 27 August 1996 the Directorate sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and referred to the application lodged by the applicant with the Commission. The Directorate informed the Ministry of the decisions referred to above and added that the criminal proceedings were pending before the trial court under case-file no. 1996/818. The Directorate also referred to a letter sent by the Ministry on 31 May 1996 and their reply of 26 June 1996. 40.  On 5 September 1996 the anti-terrorist branch forwarded to the trial court the identity document of one of the defendants, Yaşar Soyyiğit. 41.  On 14 November 1996 the hearing resumed before the trial court. Only two of the defendants, namely Yaşar Soyyiğit and Hacı Kara, were present in the court room. According to postal receipts, the remaining two defendants had also been summonsed. 42.  Both Mr Soyyiğit and Mr Kara told the trial court that they had gone to the café on the day in question and checked the identity card of the applicant. When they had established that he was not wanted by the authorities for any offence, they had returned the identity card to the applicant. They had not beaten him up. The defendants confirmed the accuracy of the statements they had made during the preliminary investigation. 43.  The trial court, noting that all defendants except Yaşar Soyyiğit had since been posted elsewhere, decided to send letters rogatory to the courts in whose jurisdiction the two absent defendants were living and asked those courts to take statements from them. The trial court also decided to send letters to the Registry Office for Births, Marriages and Deaths to ask for the birth registry records of the defendants. The trial court, noting that the applicant had “inadvertently not been summonsed”, decided to summons him for the next hearing on 29 January 1997. 44.  On 9 December 1996 the Karakoçan Criminal Court of First Instance, acting on the letter rogatory from the trial court, took a statement from Mustafa Duman, one of the two defendants who had failed to attend the hearing before the trial court on 14 November 1996. Mr Duman told the court that neither he nor any of his colleagues had ill-treated the applicant. According to Mr Duman, the applicant had been a PKK member and it was for this reason that he had made the allegations of ill-treatment against the police. 45.  On 25 December 1996 the Akçakale Criminal Court of First Instance, also acting on the letter rogatory from the trial court, took a statement from Kadri Dursun, the fourth defendant. Mr Dursun told the court that he did not remember the incident which, in any event, was just an allegation. He did not even know the applicant. 46.  During the hearing that was held before the trial court on 29 January 1997, the applicant confirmed the accuracy of the contents of his statement taken at the Police Headquarters previously. He further informed the trial court that he wanted to press charges against the defendants. The applicant’s brother Suphi Dizman also confirmed the accuracy of the contents of his statement taken at the Police Headquarters previously and added that the four police officers had beaten up his brother and broken his jaw as a result. 47.  The trial court adjourned the hearing until 27 March 1997 on account of the failure of the Akcakale court to forward Kadri Dursun’s statement in time. 48.  The hearings on 27 March, 4 June and 15 September 1997 had to be postponed on account of the failure of the authorities to submit to the trial court the identity card of Kadri Dursun and the criminal records of Mustafa Duman. 49.  At the hearing on 17 November 1997 the prosecutor was given additional time until 29 December 1997 to submit his observations. 50.  A final hearing took place on 29 December 1997. The defendants did not attend this hearing. The Prosecutor argued that, other than the applicant’s statement, there was no evidence to prove the allegation of ill-treatment. Furthermore, the applicant had obtained the medical report two days after the alleged event. The Prosecutor recommended to the trial court that the defendants be acquitted. 51.  The trial court, noting that the defendants had “vehemently denied the allegations” against them and taking into account the “fact that the medical report was issued two days after the alleged events”, concluded on 29 December 1997 that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the applicant’s injury had been caused by the defendants, and acquitted them. 52.  According to postal receipts submitted by the Government, the decision of the trial court was communicated to the defendants in March 1998.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Bad Dürheim, Germany. She was born and grew up in Schwarzenberg (Austria), but moved to Germany when she married. Her father held shares as a member of the Alpe Rotenbach Agricultural Association (Agrargemeinschaft - hereafter “AA”). 6.  The AA is a public law body, which owns several plots of land in Schwarzenberg. Membership of the AA is expressed in shares which comprise 86 grazing rights (Weiderechte) and ten hut rights (Hüttenrechte). 7.  After their father’s death in 1993, the applicant and her four sisters inherited his property. In the subsequent succession proceedings, the Bezau District Court transferred the title to a share of the deceased’s property to the applicant (Einantwortung) which included three and three-quarters grazing rights and one hut right of the AA Rotenbach. She also inherited three grazing rights relating to another AA, the Alpe Obere, from her father. 8.  On 14 April 1994 the Bregenz District Agricultural Authority (Agrarbezirks­behörde - DAA) rejected, according to the statutes of the AA, the applicant’s requests to be granted the necessary permits to make use of her grazing rights. These decisions were based on the fact that the applicant did not have her ordinary residence (ordentlicher Wohnsitz) in one of the court districts of Bezau, Dornbirn or Bregenz. The Land Vorarlberg has altogether six court districts. 9.  On 29 September 1994 and 3 October 1994, the Vorarlberg Regional Land Reform Board (Landesagrarsenat - “the Regional Board”) dismissed the applicant’s appeals. 10.  The Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s joint complaint for lack of prospect of success. Subsequently, the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint on 23 May 1996 because she did not fulfil the criteria set out in the statutes of the AA. 11.  At the beginning of 1997 the applicant sold the three grazing rights relating to the Alpe Obere to Mr Z., another member of this AA. 12.  On 10 December 1997 the applicant requested the DAA to hold that the provision of the statutes of the AA concerning the inheritance of grazing and hut rights was void and that no authoritative permit was necessary for the enjoyment of these rights. In the alternative she requested the DAA to grant her the permit. 13.  On 15 December 1997 the DAA rejected the applicant’s alternative request as res judicata, because it had already decided on the issue on 14 April 1994. The DAA did not decide on the two main requests. 14.  On 30 June 1998 the Regional Board, after having held a hearing, dismissed her appeal against this decision. 15.  On 7 October 1998 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the complaint. 16.  On 16 December 1999 the Administrative Court quashed the Regional Board’s decision, holding that European Community Law should be taken into account following Austria’s accession to the European Union. Furthermore, the DAA should have decided first on the applicant’s main requests, before being competent to decide on the alternative request. 17.  Subsequently, the Regional Board gave a decision on 21 June 2000, but failed to serve this new decision on the applicant. 18.  Thereupon, on 15 December 2000, the applicant filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag). 19.  On 7 March 2001 the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat – Supreme Board) granted the applicant’s request for transfer of jurisdiction and quashed the DAA’s decision of 15 December 1997, because the DAA had not been competent to decide on the alternative request prior to the main request. 20.  Due to the DAA’s and the Reform Board’s failure to render new decisions, the applicant filed two further requests for transfer of jurisdiction on 27 September 2001and 18 December 2002. 21.  On 24 March 2003 the applicant’s counsel requested access to the applicant’s files at the Supreme Board. This request was met, with the exception of two documents. One concerned a legal expert opinion from the Auditor-General’s Department (Finanzprokuratur) to the Federal Chancellery (Bundes­kanzleramt), concerning different proceedings initiated by the applicant against the State. The second document was a preparatory report by the Regional Board prior to one of its sessions. 22.  On 4 June 2003 the Supreme Board, after hearing the applicant’s counsel, again granted the transfer of jurisdiction and thus found itself competent to adjudicate the case. It rejected the applicant’s main requests put forward on 10 December 1997. After having declared the alternative request a res non judicata, the Supreme Board dismissed the request, because it found that the statutory provisions of the AA were not discriminatory under national or European Community law. It held that limiting the right to property according to the owners’ ordinary residence was in the common interest and constituted a pressing need in order to guarantee the good administration and cultivation of the land. Finally, the Supreme Board also dismissed the applicant’s request for inspection of two documents in the file. It reiterated that the first document, a legal opinion prepared by the Auditor-General’s Department and addressed to the Legal Service in the Federal Chancellery, concerned civil proceedings pending between the applicant and the Republic of Austria. It was in essence advice by the legal representative, namely the Auditor-General’s Department, to a party to the civil proceedings which it represented and for this reason confidential. The second document could not be inspected because, being a draft for a decision to be deliberated on by the Regional Board, it was covered by the confidentiality of deliberations (Beratungs­geheimnis).\nOn 23 July 2003 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court against the decision (Bescheid) of the Supreme Board of 4 June 2003 and, on 4 September 2003, the Constitutional Court granted suspensive effect to the complaint. 23.  The Supreme Board submitted observations on 18 September 2003. 24.  On 24 November 2003 the applicant replied to the observations. 25.  On 3 December 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s request to be granted access to the two documents, for the same reasons as had been given by the Supreme Board. The Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of prospects of success on 23 February 2004. It found that the decision of the Supreme Board did not breach the applicant’s constitutional rights. It was not unreasonable that the members of an AA found it necessary for the purpose of the common administration of their alp to provide in the statutes adopted by them a requirement of close residence of all its members. Subsequently, on the applicant’s request, the Constitutional Court transferred the case to the Administrative Court. 26.  The Administrative Court invited the applicant on 27 April 2004 to supplement her complaint and, on 11 June 2004 the applicant did so. The Supreme Board submitted observations on 3 August 2004. 27.   On 7 July 2005 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the Supreme Board had acted correctly when rejecting the requests for a declaratory decision as that matter could also have been decided in proceedings on the applicant’s request of transfer of grazing rights. As to the decision on the alternative request, the Administrative Court found that the request for granting transfer of the grazing rights was not inadmissible as res judicata, because, following the accession of Austria to the European Union, the authorities had to take their decision not only on the basis of domestic but also EU law. Assuming that the transfer of shares of an AA was covered by the freedom of movement of capital, restriction of this freedom was justified if it pursued an aim in the general interest and applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 28.  Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Justice, the Administrative Court found that a requirement as to residence as laid down in the AA’s statutes was not a priori discriminatory in nature as it was intended to achieve the specific objectives of preserving agricultural communities, viable farms and the promotion of reasonable use of the available areas. AAs and the structure of cultivation created by them were means to achieve these objectives as they secured an efficient and reasonable cultivation and use of the available land. The active common use by several persons entitled to do so was a particular feature of an AA and it could function properly and in accordance with its aim, only with the active participation of its members. Such participation became all the more difficult the greater the distance between the land of the AA on the one hand and the place of residence of the entitled person on the other. In such circumstances, also a feeling of affinity for the community property and an understanding for necessary investments as well as other interests could be lost. 29.  The Administrative Court further considered that, for ensuring the proper administration and running of an AA, a less strict means for achieving this aim than a residence clause for members was not conceivable. Finally, the Administrative Court found that the fact that the person acquiring the right, but who was refused a permit by the agricultural authority in case of inheritance, had to transfer his or her share right at the usual local estimated value to persons entitled to an acquisition struck a fair balance between compensation for the material value of his/her share right and the public interest in securing that the use the land could be exercised within the agricultural community.\nThis decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 1 August 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  On 17 August 1999 a burglary was committed and, among other items, a television and a video recorder were stolen. 8.  A preliminary investigation was opened against two other suspects on 17 August 1999 and against the applicant on 28 August 1999. On the same day the applicant confessed to having committed five burglaries with his accomplices between 29 January and 20 August 1999. 9.  On 31 August 1999 the applicant was charged with committing burglary on 17 August 1999 with his accomplices. 10.  The applicant gave another four statements to the investigator confessing to the other burglaries and providing additional information on how they had been perpetrated. 11.  On 17 September 1999 the preliminary investigation into the burglary of 17 August 1999 was joined to the preliminary investigations into the other four burglaries. 12.  On 7 October 1999 the charges against the applicant were amended to include the other four burglaries. 13.  The preliminary investigation was concluded on 15 October 1999 and on 21 December 1999 the Pazardzhik district public prosecutor’s office issued an indictment against the applicant and his two accomplices for the five burglaries. 14.  The Pazardzhik District Court conducted eleven hearings in the case, the last of which was held on 30 September 2004. 15.  The Court has not been informed of any subsequent developments in or of the outcome of these proceedings. 16.  On 26 August 1999 the police, with the approval of the public prosecutor’s office, searched the apartment in which the applicant and one of his accomplices had been living. The applicant had been renting the said apartment under a lease dated 2 March 1999. 17.  The search and seizure protocol indicates that the search was conducted in the presence of two witnesses. Various items were seized including three cameras, a hi-fi system, a dining set, gloves and a wrench. 18.  On 28 August 1999, under an order issued by an investigator and approved by the public prosecutor’s office, the applicant was arrested and detained for twenty-four hours beginning at 5 p.m. The grounds for his detention were that he was suspected of having committed the burglary on 17 August 1999 because the stolen television and a wrench that had allegedly been used to perpetrate the offence had been found in his apartment, and he had attempted to abscond. 19.  On 29 August 1999 the public prosecutor’s office extended the applicant’s preliminary detention for another two days until 5 p.m. on 31 August 1999. 20.  The applicant was placed in pre-trial detention as part of the decision of 31 August 1999 to charge him and his accomplices with the burglary on 17 August 1999 (see paragraph 9 above). That decision was issued by an investigator and was confirmed later in the day by the public prosecutor’s office. In ordering the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the investigator referred to his alleged lack of a permanent address, the fact that he had committed a number of other burglaries and, in general terms, the risk that he might abscond, re-offend or obstruct the investigation. 21.  The applicant’s pre-trial detention was confirmed in the decision of 7 October 1999 to amend the charges against him (see paragraph 12 above). That decision was issued by an investigator without any indication that it was subsequently confirmed by the public prosecutor’s office. In ordering the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the investigator referred to the lack of a permanent address, the fact that he had committed a number of other burglaries and, in general terms, his personality, the gravity of the offences and the risk that he might abscond. 22.  The report of 15 October 1999 concluding the preliminary investigation (see paragraph 13 above) indicated that the applicant was in pre-trial detention. 23.  In his submissions to the Court, the applicant stated that he had appealed against the decision to order pre-trial detention on 8 October 1999. In his appeal, he had argued, inter alia, that there was no risk of him obstructing the investigation as it had effectively been completed, that he had made a full confession, that he had a permanent address and that his detention had not been ordered by a court, in violation of the Convention. In his submissions to the Court, the applicant further claimed that, because of a delay in scheduling a hearing for the examination of his appeal, on 18 October 1999 he had filed a complaint to that effect with the Supreme Judicial Council and the Ministry of Justice. This purportedly led to a hearing being scheduled for the very next day, 19 October 1999, to which the applicant was summoned at very short notice, while his counsel had found out about it only by chance and had not had time to prepare for the hearing or to call witnesses. 24.  The Government, on the other hand, presented the Court with a copy of the applicant’s appeal dated by the Pazardzhik District Investigation Service as having been deposited only on 18 October 1999. 25.  On 19 October 1999 the appeal was examined by the District Court, which dismissed it on the grounds, inter alia, of the applicant’s prior criminal record and lack of employment, the gravity of the offences and the fact that he did not appear to have a permanent address, as he had been living in rented apartments in different cities and could not provide the permanent address of his next of kin. 26.  On 5 November 1999 the applicant filed another appeal against his detention and requested that bail be set. He maintained that his continued detention was in violation of the Convention, that he had a permanent address and that there was no risk that he would abscond, obstruct the investigation or re-offend. 27.  A report from the Pazardzhik Prison governor dated 9 November 1999 was presented to the District Court which certified that the applicant had thus far been detained for a period of two months and twelve days calculated from 28 August to 10 November 1999. 28.  The District Court examined the applicant’s appeal on 10 November 1999. At the hearing the applicant presented a copy of his rental agreement and called a witness, who informed the court that he would put the applicant up and pay his bail. Taking this into account, the District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered his release on bail of 400 Bulgarian levs. The release was to be effected once a recognizance had been provided. In reaching its decision the court referred, inter alia, to the fact that the applicant had been rehabilitated in respect of his previous convictions, that he had an address at which he could be contacted and that there was insufficient evidence that he might abscond, obstruct the investigation or re-offend. As evidenced by a bank receipt, the recognizance was deposited on 22 December 1999. 29.  The indictment of 21 December 1999 (see paragraph 13 above) indicated that the applicant had been in pre-trial detention since 31 August 1999 and that recognizance had still not been provided. 30.  A communiqué from the Pazardzhik Prison governor, dated 27 December 1999, was sent to the District Court to certify that the applicant had been released on 21 December 1999. However, the original text of the communiqué indicated 22 December as the release date which had been changed to 21 December by hand. 31.  The applicant said that he had been detained at the Pazardzhik Regional Investigation Service detention facility from 28 August to 31 October 1999 where the cells were small, overcrowded and below street level. There was no natural light or fresh air and a strong, unbearable smell in the cells. Quite often there were rodents and cockroaches. A bucket was provided for sanitary needs. There was no hot water or soap. The applicant was not allowed out of his cell for exercise. The food provided was of insufficient quantity and substandard. The applicant was not allowed to read newspapers or books.\n(b)  Pazardzhik Prison 32.  The applicant stated that he was detained at the Pazardzhik Prison for about two months from 1 November 1999 onwards where the conditions were slightly better than in the Pazardzhik Regional Investigation Service detention facility. Similarly, though, the food was insufficient and of the same inferior quality; the cells were small and overcrowded; the light was poor and a bucket was provided for sanitary needs. Limited exercise was provided in the prison yard.\n(c)  Declaration 33.  The applicant’s description of the conditions at the above facilities is corroborated by the signed declaration of another detainee, Mr R. Dobrev. 34.  On 18 April 1998 the applicant was arrested in a block of flats in the town of Montana where a burglary had been committed. He was questioned by the police and released. 35.  At the time, the applicant was living in Montana and so was able to give the authorities his address in that town. In the summer of 1998 he moved to Plovdiv. 36.  On 11 February 1999 the authorities opened a preliminary investigation against the applicant in relation to the burglary in Montana. 37.  On 15 October 1999 the authorities charged the applicant with the burglary in Montana and ordered that he be placed in pre-trial detention. The decision was issued by an investigator and confirmed later in the day by the public prosecutor’s office. In ordering the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the investigator referred to his “personality”. As the authorities were unable to find the applicant at his Montana address, an arrest warrant for his detention was issued on the same day, 15 October 1999. 38.  The preliminary investigation in relation to the burglary in Montana was suspended on 18 October 1999. 39.  On 23 May 2000 the applicant was arrested in Plovdiv on the basis of the Montana arrest warrant. He was then transferred to the Montana Regional Investigation Service. 40.  The preliminary investigation in relation to the burglary in Montana was resumed on 29 May 2000. It is unclear when the applicant was formally charged. 41.  The preliminary investigation was completed on an unspecified date and on 5 June 2000 the investigator in charge forwarded the case file to the public prosecutor’s office with a recommendation for the applicant to be indicted for the burglary in Montana. 43.  In a decision of 22 June 2000 the Montana Regional Court found in favour of the applicant and released him on condition that he did not leave his place of residence without the authorisation of the public prosecutor’s office. The decision became final and the applicant was released on 26 June 2000. 44.  On 11 September 2000 the Montana district public prosecutor’s office discontinued the preliminary investigation against the applicant in respect of the Montana burglary for lack of evidence. The restriction imposed on the applicant not to leave his place of residence without the authorisation of the public prosecutor’s office was also lifted. 45.  The decision of the public prosecutor’s office was confirmed by the Montana District Court on 21 September 2000. 46.  The applicant was detained at the Montana Regional Investigation Service detention facility from 23 May to 26 June 2000. 47.  He described the cells as overcrowded and lacking natural light and fresh air. The food was of insufficient quantity and substandard. He was not allowed to read newspapers or books or to go out of his cell for exercise.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Bijeljina. 6.  From 1979 until 1992 she worked as an accountant in a socially-owned catering company (“the company”) in Bijeljina, in what is today the Republika Srpska. During the 1992-95 war the company dismissed all its employees of Bosniac and Croat origin, including the applicant. The relevant decision reads as follows:\n“Given the special nature of the services performed by the company, all employees of Bosniac and Croat origin should no longer come to work from 22 July 1992”. 7.  Following unsuccessful civil proceedings pursued by the applicant against the company, on 4 May 2000 she appealed to the Human Rights Chamber (a domestic human-rights body set up under Annex 6 to the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace). 8.  In 2002 the company was privatised. 9.  On 27 June 2007 the Constitutional Court (which inherited the cases of the Human Rights Chamber) ordered the Republika Srpska (one of the two Entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina) the following: first, to secure the applicant’s reinstatement within three months of the date of delivery of that decision; second, to pay her outstanding salary for the period from 13 December 1996 (when the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the company) until 27 June 2007, together with default interest at the statutory rate and all work-related benefits, as well as to continue to pay the applicant her salary and all work-related benefits until her reinstatement; and third, to pay the applicant 20 convertible marks (BAM) per working day starting from the date of delivery of that decision until her reinstatement. The Republika Srpska was to pay default interest on the above amounts at the annual rate of ten percent from the expiry of the three-month period until settlement. 10.  On 23 August 2007 the Republika Srpska Government transmitted the decision of 27 June 2007 to the company for enforcement. On 25 September 2007 the company informed the Republika Srpska Government that the decision could not be enforced because the applicant’s post no longer existed. It claimed, furthermore, that it was not its responsibility to enforce the decision since it had not been a party to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. On 23 October 2007 the Republika Srpska informed the company that, in accordance with Rule 56 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 15 below), it was indeed the company’s duty to enforce the decision of 27 June 2007. 11.  On 15 June 2010 the Republika Srpska paid the applicant BAM 16,807.47 in respect of the third order from the Constitutional Court’s decision for the period until 10 June 2010 (the principal debt in the amount of BAM 13,380 and default interest on that sum in the amount of BAM 3,427.47). It would appear that it has continued to pay the amount of BAM 20 per working day since then. 12.  On 8 December 2010 the Constitutional Court held that the third order from its decision of 27 June 2007 had been enforced. It further held that the first order had not been enforced, but that its non-enforcement was justified. In this connection, it relied on the reasoning which the company had provided to the Republika Srpska Government (see paragraph 10 above). Lastly, the Constitutional Court did not say anything as regards the second order. 13. At its session of 9 March 2011 the Republika Srpska Government concluded that it was the company’s responsibility to enforce the Constitutional Court’s decision of 27 June 2007, and not the responsibility of the Republika Srpska.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Chervonograd, Lviv region, Ukraine. 6.  On 30 November 1998 several schools organised a collective visit by pupils to a local cinema, which was owned by the municipal company E., for a film showing. The applicant's daughter, Ms Galyna Igorivna Krivova, born in 1985, was among the pupils who visited that cinema. While the first group of pupils was still watching the film, another group of pupils for the next showing entered the auditorium. As a result of a lack of control of entry to the auditorium during the film, there was a stampede in which four children were trampled to death and fourteen children, including the applicant's daughter, received varying degrees of injury. The applicant's daughter, in particular, was diagnosed with, inter alia, severe post-traumatic hypoxic damage to the central nervous system (посттравматичне постгіпоксичне ураження центральної нервової системи важкого ступеню), a right sided pneumothorax, and other injuries. According to the applicant, her daughter was in a coma for two months. 7.  On 17 January 1999 the applicant's daughter was classified as temporarily Category 1 disabled. Three years later, on 17 January 2002, she was classified as permanently disabled. 8.  The applicant's daughter underwent inpatient medical treatment at least until 18 February 1999, after which she periodically had medical treatment and rehabilitation therapy. 9.  By a judgment of 13 March 2004 the Chervonograd Town Court (“the Town Court”) declared the applicant's daughter incapacitated. Apparently that judgment became final and on 29 April 2004 the Chervonograd Town Council appointed the applicant as the legal guardian of her disabled daughter. 10.  At the present time the applicant's daughter still suffers the consequences of post-traumatic consequences and needs medical assistance and nursing. 11.  On 30 November 1998 the Prosecutor's Office instituted criminal proceedings and on an unspecified date indicted S., the head of the E. company (it appears from the submitted documents that criminal proceedings against other persons were also instituted but were subsequently abandoned for various reasons). 12.  On 2 December 1998 a medical expert reported on the aforesaid injuries to the applicant's daughter and identified them as serious. 13.  Meanwhile, on 1 December 1998 a special administrative committee composed of nine experts was set up to investigate the accident of 30 November 1998. On 10 December 1998 that committee drew up a report which recommended that six persons be dismissed and five others subjected to disciplinary sanctions. 14.  According to the applicant, the pre-trial investigation was completed by 22 September 2000 and the case was transferred to the Town Court. 15.  On 20 March 2001 the applicant lodged a civil claim against S., seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. Five other claims were also lodged with the court by other victims. 16.  On 10 October 2003 the Town Court found S. guilty of abuse of authority and forgery and sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment. The court also banned S. from holding managerial positions for one year. As to the civil claims, the court allowed them in part, awarding, in particular, the applicant 15,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH; about 2,464.91 Euros (EUR) at the material time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by S. 17.  On 27 April 2004 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed that judgment because of procedural shortcomings of the trial before the first-instance court. On 1 July 2004, having held a re-trial, it found S. guilty of forgery in office (he had forged the documents stating that he had taken necessary accident prevention measures and instructed his subordinates) and negligence that had had serious consequences, finding that the cinema personnel had not been instructed and lacked relevant expertise, the auditorium had not been properly equipped and the cinema tickets had been sold without indication of time, row and seat. The court thus sentenced S. to five years' imprisonment and banned him from holding managerial positions for three years. However, in view of the Amnesty Act, the court exempted S. from these punishments. Finally, the court awarded the applicant UAH 143,556.69 (about EUR 22,771.80) in respect of pecuniary damage and UAH 12,000 (about EUR 1,903.51) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by Chervonograd Town Council, as well as UAH 6,000 (about EUR 951.75) in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be paid by S.\nOn the last-mentioned day the Court of Appeal issued a special ruling (окрема постанова) informing its head and the head of State Judges' Administration of the delays in the case caused by the first-instance court. 18.  On 18 January 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine amended the judgment of 1 July 2004, replacing the amnesty with statutory limitation, as the reason for S.'s exemption from the punishment. The court also quashed the judgment in part related to the civil claims, casting doubts on the liability of Chervonograd Town Council. Accordingly, it remitted that matter for fresh consideration. 19.  It appears from the documents submitted that, at this stage of the proceedings, the applicant and another civil claimant requested the Court of Appeal to join to the proceedings a number of legal persons (such as the schools which had organised the pupils' collective visit to the cinema, the E. company, the local department of education, etc.). For these reasons, on 31 March 2005 the Court of Appeal decided to remit the case to the Town Court. 20.  Subsequently, a clinic which had treated the applicant's daughter brought its claim against the defendants and joined the proceedings; the other claimants (some other victims of the accident) withdrew their claims as being settled extra-judicially. In the course of the proceedings the claimants modified their claims on several occasions. 21.  On 31 March 2008 the Town Court found in part for the applicant and other civil claimants. In particular, it ordered the Chervonograd Town Council, the education and culture departments of the Chervonograd Town Executive Committee and S. to pay the applicant, who was acting on her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter, in the specified proportions the total amount of UAH 85,411.97 (about EUR 11,033.40 at the material time) in respect of the care, medical, legal and other expenses she had incurred from the date of the accident to 1 April 2008 and 175% of the statutory minimum salary[1] after 1 April 2008, monthly. Additionally, the court awarded the applicant the total amount of UAH 58,500 (about EUR 7,556.96 at the material time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage to be paid by Chervonograd Town Council and the education and culture departments of the Chervonograd Town Executive Committee. The court also awarded damages to other victims of the accident, as well as to the clinic in reimbursement of medical and other expenses for treating the applicant's daughter. 22.  On 4 March 2009 the Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeals in part and quashed the judgment in part concerning the reimbursement to the clinic of medical and other expenses for treating the applicant's daughter because it had been claimed by the applicant, not the clinic, and the applicant's legal expenses regarding the publication in a newspaper of details of the court's hearings; consequently, it remitted these parts of the case for fresh examination. It also reduced the awards to other victims of the accident and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 23.  On 14 August 2009 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the requests for leave to appeal in cassation lodged by the Chervonograd Town Council and the education and culture departments of the Chervonograd Town Executive Committee. 24.  Apparently, the proceedings in the remitted part are still pending before the first-instance court. 25.  On 6 July 2009 the State Bailiffs' Service instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment of 31 March 2008, as amended on 4 March 2009. 26.  The Chervonograd Town Council and the education and culture departments of the Chervonograd Town Executive Committee requested adjournment of the enforcement for six months, referring to a lack of relevant funds. On 28 September 2009 the Town Court allowed these requests. 27.  On 1 December 1998 the victims of the accident were paid ex gratia by the local authorities the total amount of UAH 30,000, out of which the applicant was paid UAH 1,500 (about 394.74 United States Dollars at the material time). She was further paid:\n- on 26 January 1999 – UAH 2,000 (about EUR 438.54);\n- on 5 March 1999 – UAH 12,000 (about EUR 2,789.21);\n- on 23 September 1999 – UAH 238 (about EUR 50.51);\n- on 2 September 2004 – UAH 2,000 (about EUR 300.39).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Warszawa. 5.  On 9 June 1993 the applicant lodged with the Warszawa District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for division of matrimonial property. She paid the relevant court fees on 9 November 1993. 6.  Between 9 June 1993 and 21 February 2003, the District Court scheduled 28 hearings, 6 of which were adjourned due to the failure of the applicant’s husband to appear; only two hearings were scheduled in 1996, no hearing was scheduled between 8 December 1997 and 15 June 1999 and two hearings were scheduled in 2000. 7.  On 5 March 2003 the Warszawa District Court delivered a partial decision (postanowienie częściowe) on the parties’ respective shares in the matrimonial property. 8.  Between 4 August 2004 and 16 April 2008, the District Court scheduled 13 hearings, 3 of which were adjourned. No hearing was held in 2006. 9.  On 23 June 2008 the Warszawa District Court gave a decision. The applicant appealed. The proceedings are pending before the second-instance court. 10.  On 1 June 2006 the applicant lodged with the Warszawa Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) a complaint under section 5 of the Law on 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”) which entered into force on 17 September 2004. 11.  She sought a ruling declaring that the length of the proceedings before the Warszawa District Court had been excessive and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 2,500 euros (EUR)). 12.  On 4 August 2006 the Warszawa Regional Court gave a decision. The court held that the 2004 Act did not have retroactive effect and, consequently, examined the applicant’s claim only in respect of the period between the entry into force of the 2004 Act on 17 September 2004 and the date on which the complaint had been lodged. The court found that, during that part of the proceedings, there had been some periods of inactivity for which the District Court had been responsible. The court awarded the applicant PLN 2,000 (approx. EUR 526 euros) in just satisfaction.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Turkey. 9.  On 26 July 1995 the Vorarlberg Federal Police Directorate (Sicherheitsdirektion) issued a residence prohibition against the applicant who was then living in Austria. On 5 March 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) and requested the Administrative Court to grant suspensive effect to his complaint. At the same date he filed an application for re-instatement into the proceedings as the legal time-limit for filing a complaint had expired. 10.  Meanwhile, on 29 February 1996 the Bregenz District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) issued a provisional penal order against the applicant, imposing a fine under the Aliens Act, as he had not complied without unreasonable delay with the residence prohibition issued against him on 26 July 1995 and had been unlawfully staying in Austria. 11.  The applicant, assisted by counsel, filed an objection (Einspruch) against this decision. 12.  On 29 April 1996 the District Administrative Authority issued a penal order (Straferkenntnis) confirming its previous decision and imposing a fine of approximately 200 euros (EUR) on the applicant. 13.  On 15 May 1996 the applicant appealed to the Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat - IAP). He submitted that he had commissioned his counsel to file a complaint against the residence prohibition but that the latter had accidentally not done so in time. He had now filed a complaint against the residence prohibition with the Administrative Court and had requested that suspensive effect be granted upon this complaint. He argued that until the Administrative Court’s decision upon this latter request he was still allowed to stay in Austria. The applicant also requested that an oral hearing be held in which he, his counsel and a representative of the District Administrative Authority should be heard. 14.  On 2 October 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s application for re-instatement into the proceedings concerning the residence prohibition and rejected the applicant’s complaint as belated. 15.  On 14 February 1997 the applicant was expelled to Turkey. 16.  On 21 May 1997 the IAP summoned the applicant and his counsel to an oral hearing in the administrative criminal proceedings concerning the fine under the Aliens Act scheduled for the afternoon of 11 June 1997. The summons, which indicated that the applicant could either appear in person or send his counsel, was addressed to the applicant’s counsel. It stated that the hearing would be conducted in the applicant’s absence if he failed to appear. 17.  On the morning of 11 June 1997 the applicant’s counsel informed the IAP that the applicant, in complying with the residence prohibition, had meanwhile moved to Turkey and could therefore not participate in the hearing in the afternoon. Referring to the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention he requested that the hearing should be adjourned sine die. 18.  On the afternoon of 11 June 1997 the hearing took place in the absence of the applicant but in the presence of his counsel, who informed the IAP that he had not informed the applicant of the hearing as he considered this to be the IAP’s task. Referring to the applicant’s rights under Article 6 of the Convention, counsel requested again an oral hearing in the presence of the applicant. 19.  On 18 July 1997 the IAP quashed the penal order insofar as it concerned the charge of having stayed in Austria without a valid residence permit, but maintained the conviction as regards the offence of not having complied with a residence prohibition without undue delay and reduced the fine to approximately EUR 110. It noted that the applicant was only guilty of the offence of not complying with a residence prohibition because the other offence could only be committed if no residence prohibition had been issued. As regards the request for the adjournment of the hearing, the IAP found that the applicant’s interests had been taken care of by his counsel and that his presence had therefore not been necessary, all the more as the appeal concerned questions of law and not of fact. 20.  On 12 August 1997 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court in which he complained inter alia that the IAP had convicted him in absentia. 21.  On 27 November 1997 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s case for lack of prospect of success and transmitted the case to the Administrative Court. 22.  On 19 May 1998 the applicant supplemented his complaint to the Administrative Court. He submitted inter alia that the IAP had breached procedural requirements as it should have heard him in person - in which case he would have stated as a defence that he had been promised orally by the Vorarlberg Public Security Authority to tolerate his further stay in Austria. 23.  On 25 August 1998 the IAP submitted its observations in reply. It stated, inter alia, that in the proceedings before it neither the applicant nor his counsel had ever relied on an undertaking given by the Public Security Authority so the IAP had no reason to explore this avenue, which moreover, was in contrast to other statements made in the proceedings. 24.  On 1 July 1999 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. As regards the complaint that the IAP had held its hearing in the applicant’s absence, the Administrative Court found that it could only quash a decision if an essential procedural defect had occurred. Whether a procedural defect was essential had to be shown by the complainant. The applicant had failed to produce such evidence. In his appeal the applicant had argued that it was common administrative practice that a person who had filed a complaint with the Administrative Court against a residence prohibition and had requested suspensive effect to his complaint was allowed to stay in Austria until the Administrative Court had decided on this latter request. Such an argument did not concern a statement of facts which would make it necessary that its author be heard in person. Moreover there was nothing to show that the applicant could not have instructed his counsel even after having left Austria. Thus, there was no essential procedural defect. This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 26 July 1999.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant is a Polish national who was born in 1944 and lives in Wieliczka, Małopolska Province, in Poland. 10.  The eastern provinces of pre-war Poland were (and in dated usage still are) called “Borderlands” (“Kresy”). They included large areas of present-day Belarus and Ukraine and territories around Vilnius in what is now Lithuania.\nLater, when after the Second World War Poland's eastern border was fixed along the Bug River (whose central course formed part of the Curzon line), the “Borderlands” acquired the name of “territories beyond the Bug River” (“ziemie zabużańskie”).\nThose regions had been invaded by the USSR in September 1939. 11.  Following agreements concluded between the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego) and the former Soviet Socialist Republics of Ukraine (on 9 September 1944), Belarus (on 9 September 1944) and Lithuania (on 22 September 1944) (“the Republican Agreements” – “umowy republikańskie”), the Polish State took upon itself the obligation to compensate persons who were “repatriated” from the “territories beyond the Bug River” and had to abandon their property there. Such property is commonly referred to as “property beyond the Bug River” (“mienie zabużańskie”). 12.  The Polish government estimated that from 1944 to 1953 some 1,240,000 persons were “repatriated” under the provisions of the Republican Agreements. At the oral hearing, the parties agreed that the vast majority of repatriated persons had been compensated for loss of property caused by their repatriation.\nIn that connection, the Government also stated that, on account of the delimitation of the Polish-Soviet State border – and despite the fact that Poland was “compensated” by the Allies with former German lands east of the Oder-Neisse line – Poland suffered a loss of territory amounting to 19.78%. 13.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 14.  After the Second World War, the applicant's grandmother was repatriated from Lwów (now Lviv in Ukraine).\nOn 19 August 1947 the State Repatriation Office (Państwowy Urząd Repatriacyjny) in Cracow issued a certificate attesting that she had owned a piece of real property in Lwów and that the property in question consisted of approximately 400 sq. m of land and a house with a surface area of 260 sq. m. 15.  On 11 June 1968 the Cracow District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) gave a decision declaring that the applicant's mother had inherited the whole of her late mother's property. 16.  On an unknown later date the applicant's mother asked the mayor of Wieliczka to enable her to purchase the so-called right of “perpetual use” (prawo użytkowania wieczystego) of land owned by the State Treasury (see also paragraph 66 below). 17.  In September 1980 an expert from the Cracow Mayor's Office made a report assessing the value of the property abandoned by the applicant's grandmother in Lwów. The actual value was estimated at 1,949,560 old Polish zlotys (PLZ) but, for the purposes of compensation due from the State, the value was fixed at PLZ 532,260. 18.  On 25 March 1981 the mayor of Wieliczka issued a decision enabling the applicant's mother to purchase the right of perpetual use of a plot of 467 sq. m situated in Wieliczka. The fee for the right of perpetual use was PLZ 392 per year and the duration was set at a minimum of forty and a maximum of ninety-nine years. The total fee for use, which amounted to PLZ 38,808 (PLZ 392 x 99 years) was offset against the compensation calculated by the expert in September 1980.\nIn June 2002 an expert commissioned by the government established that the value of this transaction corresponded to 2% of the compensation to which the applicant's family was entitled (see also paragraph 35 below). 19.  The applicant's mother died on 3 November 1989. On 29 December 1989 the Cracow District Court gave a decision declaring that the applicant had inherited the whole of his late mother's property. 20.  In 1992, on a date that has not been specified, the applicant sold the property that his mother had received from the State in 1981. 21.  On 15 September 1992 the applicant asked the Cracow District Office (Urząd Rejonowy) to grant him the remainder of the compensation for the property abandoned by his grandmother in Lwów. He stressed that the value of the compensatory property received by his late mother had been significantly lower than the value of the original property. 22.  In a letter of 16 June 1993, the town planning division of the Cracow District Office informed the applicant that his claim had been entered in the relevant register under no. R/74/92. The relevant part of that letter read as follows:\n“We would like to inform you that at present there is no possibility of satisfying your claim. ... Section 81 of the Land Administration and Expropriation Act of 29 April 1985 [Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości[2]] became, for all practical purposes, a dead letter with the enactment of the Local Self-Government Act of 10 May 1990. [The enactment of that Act] resulted in land being transferred from the [Cracow branch of the] State Treasury to the Cracow Municipality. Consequently, the Head of the Cracow District Office who, under the applicable rules, is responsible for granting compensation, has no possibility of satisfying the claims submitted. It is expected that new legislation will envisage another form of compensation. We should accordingly inform you that your claim will be dealt with after a new statute has determined how to proceed with claims submitted by repatriated persons.” 23.  On 14 June 1994 the Cracow Governor's Office (Urząd Wojewódzki) informed the applicant that the State Treasury had no land for the purposes of granting compensation for property abandoned in the territories beyond the Bug River. 24.  On 12 August 1994 the applicant filed a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny), alleging inactivity on the part of the government in that it had failed to introduce in Parliament legislation dealing with claims submitted by repatriated persons. He also asked for compensation in the form of State Treasury bonds. 2.  Facts after 10 October 1994\n(a)  Events that took place up to 19 December 2002, the date on which the Court declared the application admissible 25.  On 12 October 1994 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant's complaint. It found no indication of inactivity on the part of the State authorities because “the contrary transpired from the fact that the applicant had received replies from the Cracow District Office and the Cracow Governor's Office”. 26.  On 31 August 1999, in connection with the entry into force of the Cabinet's Ordinance of 13 January 1998 (see also paragraphs 51-52 below), the Cracow District Office transmitted the applicant's request of 15 September 1992 for the remainder of the compensation, and the relevant case file, to the mayor (Starosta) of Wieliczka. Meanwhile, following a reform of the local administrative authorities, the former Cracow Province (Województwo Krakowskie) – in which the Wieliczka district is situated – had been enlarged and renamed “Małopolska Province” (Województwo Małopolskie). 27.  On 11 April 2002 the mayor of Wieliczka organised a competitive bid for property situated in Chorągwica being sold by the State Treasury. The bid was entered by seventeen persons, all of whom were repatriated persons or their heirs. The applicant did not participate in the auction. 28.  On 5 July 2002 the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), acting on behalf of repatriated persons, made an application under Article 191 of the Constitution, read in conjunction with Article 188, to the Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny), asking for legal provisions that restricted the possibility of satisfying their entitlements to be declared unconstitutional (see also paragraphs 50, 55, 60 and 70-71 below).\n(b)  Events that took place on and after 19 December 2002 29.  On 19 December 2002 the Constitutional Court heard, and granted, the Ombudsman's application (see also paragraphs 79-87 below). The Constitutional Court's judgment took effect on 8 January 2003. 30.  On 8 January 2003 the Military Property Agency issued a communiqué, which was put on its official website[3] and which read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“The Constitutional Court, in its judgment of 19 December 2002, declared that the provisions relating to the realisation of the Bug River claims by, inter alia, the Military Property Agency were unconstitutional.\nHowever, the implementation of the court's judgment requires that the Land Administration Act 1997, the Law of 30 May 1996 on the administration of certain portions of the State Treasury's property and the Military Property Agency, as well as the Law of 25 May 2001 on the reconstruction, technical modernisation and financing of the Polish army in the years 2001-06, be amended.\nIt is also necessary to amend the Law of 15 February 1995 on income tax from legal persons, in respect of the proceeds received by the agency upon satisfying the Bug River claims.\nIn the circumstances, the Military Property Agency will be able to organise auctions for the sale of immovable property after the amendments to the existing legislation have been made.\nAuctions will be advertised in the press ... and on the [agency's] website.”\nAccording to information made available on the agency's website, in 2002 it had in its possession two categories of property. The first was immovable property no longer used for any military purposes, which was normally sold at auctions. It comprised 13,800 hectares of land and 4,500 buildings with a total surface area of 1,770,000 sq. m. This property included military airports, testing grounds, rifle ranges, hospitals, barracks, offices, recreation and sports centres, buildings designated for social and cultural activities and various other buildings (fuelling stations, workshops, warehouses, etc.). The second category was property that was only temporarily not used by the army. It comprised 650 hectares of land and buildings with a total surface area of 100,000 sq. m. 31.  On 8 January 2003 the State Treasury's Agricultural Property Agency (Agencja Własności Rolnej Skarbu Państwa), a body which at that time administered the State Treasury's Agricultural Property Resources (Zasoby Własności Rolnej Skarbu Państwa) (see also paragraph 91 below), issued a similar communiqué, which was put on its official website[4] and which read as follows:\n“On 8 January 2003 the Constitutional Court's judgment of 19 December 2002 concerning the constitutionality of the provisions governing compensation for the Bug River property came into force.\nAs a consequence of the Court's judgment, it is necessary to amend the provisions relating to the land administration. The judgment does not by itself create a new legal regime and cannot constitute a basis for offsetting the value of the property abandoned outside the State's border against the price of the State Treasury's agricultural property. The principles, conditions and procedure in that respect should therefore be determined. Such actions have already been taken by the Office for Dwellings and Town Development and the Ministry for the Treasury.\nIn the circumstances, this agency will desist from organising auctions for the sale of immovable property held among its resources, except for small plots of agricultural property.\nThe agency's decision is inspired by the need to ensure that the Bug River claimants have their claims satisfied on conditions that are equal for all claimants.” 32.  By the end of 2003 neither of the above-mentioned agencies had resumed auctions. On the date of adoption of this judgment, the Military Property Agency website still contained the – unchanged – communiqué of 8 January 2003 on the suspension of auctions.\nOn 2 February 2004, two days after the entry into force of new legislation on the Bug River claims (see paragraphs 114-19 below), the Agricultural Property Agency (Agencja Nieruchomości Rolnych), a body which had in the meantime replaced the State Treasury's Agricultural Property Agency (see also paragraph 91 below) removed the communiqué of 8 January 2003 from its website and added an announcement entitled “Information for the Bug River people” (“Informacja dla zabużan”), providing a detailed explanation of the operation of the new statute. 33.  Meanwhile, in the spring and summer of 2003, during the process of preparing a bill designed to settle the “Bug River claims” (“roszczenia zabużańskie”; hereafter “the Government Bill” – see also paragraphs 111-13 below), the government estimated the number of claimants and the value of the claims. According to the government, there were 4,120 registered claims, of which 3,910 were verified and regarded as meeting the statutory conditions. The registered claims were valued at three billion new Polish zlotys (PLN). There were also 82,740 unverified claims pending registration, of which 74,470 were likely to be registered. The anticipated value of the unverified claims was PLN 10.45 billion. The anticipated total number of entitled persons was 78,380. As the parliamentary debate over the Government Bill – a debate which was widely discussed throughout the Polish media – progressed, the number of Bug River claims started to grow, since many new claims were being registered. 34.  The statistical reports prepared by the government, in particular the Ministry for the Treasury (Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa) and the Ministry for Infrastructure (Ministerstwo Infrastruktury), have to date not addressed the question of how many of the Bug River claimants have ever obtained any compensation and, if so, whether it was full or partial, and how many of them have not yet received anything at all.\nThe idea of keeping a register of Bug River claims emerged in the course of the preparation of the Government Bill, and such a register is to be kept in the future. Nevertheless, the need to collect the relevant data had already been perceived by the Minister for Infrastructure in July 2002[5], when he replied to a question by J.D., a member of parliament, concerning, in the MP's words, “the final discharge of the Polish State's obligations towards persons who, after the Second World War, had abandoned their immovable property beyond the eastern border”. In his reply, the Minister stated, inter alia:\n“In reply to the question relating to the number of unsatisfied claims, it has to be said that it was estimated by the Cabinet's Office [Urząd Rady Ministrów] at the beginning of the 1990s that there were about 90,000 [such claims]. At present it is very difficult to make such an estimation. ... In practice, every legal successor [of a Bug River claimant] could, and can, obtain a certificate – at present, a decision – [confirming the right to] a share in the abandoned property. What should be the criteria according to which the number of satisfied and unsatisfied claims is to be estimated? Should it be the number of applications made, including [several] applications by legal successors regarding one property abandoned by one owner (testator), or should it be the number of properties abandoned beyond the State's borders?\nIt is also difficult to estimate the number of persons whose entitlement has been satisfied, especially as the entitlement can be enforced throughout the country and it often happens that it is satisfied partially in different provinces until it has been fully settled. This situation creates conditions in which the entitled persons may abuse their rights – a fact of which governors and mayors have notified us. They accordingly suggest that a register ... of the certificates issued confirming the entitlement to ... compensatory property be kept. At present, however, there is no single, comprehensive system for the registration of certificates and decisions entitling claimants to [compensatory property].\nAccordingly, the answer to the deputy's question as to the form in which the [Bug River claims] are to be satisfied and as to the possible legal solutions depends on reliable information on the number of unsatisfied claims. If it emerged that the number was significant and that not all claims could be satisfied under the applicable laws, other legislative solutions would have to be found – which, however, would be particularly difficult in view of the economic and financial problems of the State.” 35.  On 12 June 2003 the Government produced a valuation report prepared by an expert valuer commissioned by them. That report had been drawn up on 14 June 2002. The value of the property that the applicant's grandmother had had to abandon was estimated at PLN 390,000. The expert stated that the applicant's family had so far received 2% of the compensation due. 36.  On 28 October 2003 the mayor of Wieliczka organised a competitive bid for property situated in Chorągwica and Niepołomice, in the Małopolska Province, that was being sold by the State Treasury. The reserve prices were PLN 150,000 and PLN 48,000 respectively. The bid was entered by several Bug River claimants. The first property was sold for PLN 900,000, the second for PLN 425,000. The applicant did not participate in those auctions. 37.  On 30 January 2004, by virtue of the Law of 12 December 2003 on offsetting the value of property abandoned beyond the present borders of the Polish State against the price of State property or the fee for the right of perpetual use (Ustawa o zaliczaniu na poczet ceny sprzedaży albo opłat z tytułu użytkowania wieczystego nieruchomości Skarbu Państwa wartości nieruchomości pozostawionych poza obecnymi granicami Państwa Polskiego – “the December 2003 Act”), the State's obligations towards persons who, like the applicant, have obtained some compensatory property under the previous statutes are considered to have been discharged (see also paragraph 116 below). 38.  On 30 January 2004 fifty-one members of parliament from the opposition party, “Civic Platform” (Platforma Obywatelska), applied to the Constitutional Court, challenging a number of the provisions of the December 2003 Act (see also paragraph 120 below).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 25 June 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of theft of documents and death threat and later charged with several counts of murder and robbery. While in police custody, he was allegedly subjected to beatings. 5.  On 9 July 2004 the applicant was placed in remand prison IZ-27/1 in Khabarovsk. 6.  After an initial period of detention in ordinary cells of the prison, on 18 July 2005 the applicant was transferred to a special section designed for detention of persons sentenced to life imprisonment. The applicant stayed in several cells of that section until his departure to a correctional colony on 19 December 2007. 7.  The parties disagreed on many aspects of the material conditions of the applicant’s detention during that period. 8.  In the Government’s submission, the applicant was accommodated in four cells: 9.  All cells measured 8.1 sq. m and had 2 sleeping places. The applicant stayed in them either alone or with another detainee, but the design capacity was never exceeded. 10.  Each cell had a window covered by metal bars which allowed sufficient access to natural light and fresh air. Two light bulbs, one for daytime and another for night-time lighting were installed in the cells. Running water was available at all times. Toilet pans were located at between 1 and 1.3 m from beds and dining tables and separated from the rest of the cells by a 1.5 meter-high brick partition. The applicant was allowed daily hour-long outdoor exercise. He could take a shower and wash his clothing once a week. 11.  In support of their position, the Government produced a number of certificates and statements issued by the director of remand prison IZ-27/1 on 7 July 2010 showing the numbers of the cells where the applicant stayed, the frequency of outdoor exercise and visits to the shower, as well as descriptions of the cells, their equipment and sanitary installations. The certificates were accompanied by copies of the applicant’s cell record, the prison population register and the schedules of outdoor exercise and sanitary measures covering the entire period of the applicant’s detention. 12.  Further to the Court’s request, the Government submitted a floor plan of the facility, containing indications of the cell surface. 13.  The applicant disputed the Government’s submissions concerning the cells. He provided the following information in that regard: 14.  According to the applicant, the cells presented the following characteristics:\nThe applicant did not provide any information about the number of sleeping places in the cells. 15.  All cells were located in the semi-basement of the remand prison. They were poorly lit and ventilated. Metal shutters on the windows blocked access to natural light and fresh air. Heating did not function. Drinking water was available only on request from the prison guards. The toilet pan was not separated from the living area. The courtyard for outdoor exercise was very small. 16.  To corroborate his claims, the applicant submitted statements by two detainees from the adjacent cells who also stated that the applicant had been ill-treated by prison guards. 17.  On 25 July 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 18.  On 30 May 2006 the applicant’s mother complained to the regional prison authority about the conditions of his detention. In response to the complaint, on 27 June 2006 the authority admitted that the cell where the applicant was held had to be repaired and directed the management of the prison to transfer the applicant to another cell. 19.  On 2 August 2006 the applicant complained to the regional prosecutor about the conditions of his detention. He claimed, in particular, that there were metal shutters on windows, that the toilet pan was not separated from the rest of the cell and that the heating was too weak. Following an inquiry into the applicant’s allegations, on 19 August 2006 the district prosecutor concluded that “the [remand prison] cells [were being] renovated and properly maintained” and refused to open a criminal investigation into the matter. The applicant complained to a court. 20.  On 18 September 2006 the Kirovskiy District Court of Khabarovsk dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the prosecutor’s decision of 19 August 2006. The applicant appealed against the decision of 18 September 2006, but provided no further information about the outcome of these proceedings. 21.  On 9 October 2006 the applicant’s mother lodged another complaint with the regional prison authority, claiming, in particular, that the conditions of his detention had not improved. On 13 November 2006 the authority replied that the applicant’s cell had been recently renovated and satisfied the legal standards and that the applicant had no complaints in that regard.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant is the chairman of the association “Civil Society for Bulgarian Interests, National Dignity, Union and Integration – for Bulgaria” („Гражданско общество за български интереси, национално достойнство, единение и обединение – за България“ – “the association”). 7.  The association was founded on 19 December 1996 in Plovdiv. At a meeting on that date the founders adopted its articles and elected its management bodies. The applicant was elected as its chairman. 8.  The association's articles read, as relevant:\n“1.  [The association] is a Bulgarian patriotic non‑profit organisation. It shall be DEMOCRATIC in form and NATIONAL in content.\nOBJECT: mass, historically and morally enlightening, societal and political, cultural and educational, scientific and research, sport and technical, publishing, advertising, charitable and all other types of activities and services which are allowed (not prohibited) under the [Persons and Family Act of 1949] in respect of non‑profit associations. 2.  [The association] is founded with the aims of: uplifting the Bulgarian spirit; protecting the Bulgarian interests and creating a wealthy, prosperous and patriotic nation; elevating, developing and preserving the Bulgarian national dignity; uniting the Bulgarian identity within and outside the boundaries of the promised Bulgarian land, under the flag of historical truth; protecting and restoring the coat of arms of the Bulgarian Kingdom as a coat of arms of Bulgaria. 3.  [The association] is for the creation of a people's court to judge those responsible for the gravest economic, spiritual, moral and demographic crisis of the Bulgarian society, Bulgarian banking and Bulgarian statehood since 9 September 1944, in particular the period 1994, 1995, 1996 and the following years. ... 4.  [The association] is for a wide discussion ... of the illegal trampling and repealing of our first constitution after our liberation in 1878, the most democratic Constitution of Tarnovo and the imposition of the present [Constitution]...\n[The association] is for the reinstatement (possibly with amendments) of the unlawfully abolished 'CONSTITUTION OF TARNOVO'...\n[The association] is for ... changing the form of government of Bulgaria, for the returning of H.M. KING SIMEON II to the motherland and the throne. ... 8.  ... The core of the [association's] activity shall be the spiritual unification of all Bulgarians, contacts with and consolidation of the Bulgarian Diaspora, establishment of sincere relations with ... all Bulgarians outside Bulgaria, and, in the international relations – point one shall be: abolition (opening) of the border between Bulgaria and Macedonia...” 9.  On an unspecified later date the association submitted to the Plovdiv Regional Court an application for registration. 10.  The Plovdiv Regional Court refused the application in a judgment of 6 June 1997. It held:\n“[According to] clause 2 of [its articles], [the association] intends to protect and restore the coat of arms of the Bulgarian Kingdom as a coat of arms of Bulgaria. According to clause 3 of the articles, the association is for the establishment of a 'people's court to judge those responsible for the gravest economic, spiritual, moral and demographic crisis of the Bulgarian society, Bulgarian banking and Bulgarian statehood since 9 September 1944, in particular the period 1994, 1995, 1996 and the following years'. Clause 4 of the articles provides for a debate on the repealing of the Constitution of Tarnovo and the adoption of the [C]onstitution [of 1991] which is presently in force.\nThe goals which have been enumerated thus far are sufficient to refuse the association's registration. They are clearly political in nature and are characteristic of a political party, whose registration is to be carried out under the Political Parties Act [of 1990].” 11.  The applicant, acting in his capacity of chairman of the association, appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation. He argued, inter alia, that the association's aims were not political, but goals which could be pursued by every citizen. 12.  Following an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1952 providing that the judgments of the regional courts were no longer appealable before the Supreme Court of Cassation, but before the newly established courts of appeals, on 1 April 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation forwarded the applicant's appeal to the newly created Plovdiv Court of Appeals. 13.  On 10 March 1999 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's judgment. It held as follows:\n“The articles of [the association] contain provisions which are contrary to the ... Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria. For instance, clause 2 of the articles provides for the restoration of the coat of arms of the Bulgarian Kingdom as the country's coat of arms. Clause 4 provides for a change of the form of government from republic to monarchy and for the restoration of the Constitution of Tarnovo [of 1879]. Clause 8 of the articles – abolition of the border between Bulgaria and [the former Yugoslav Republic of] Macedonia. These goals, as formulated in the above-cited clauses, run counter to Articles 1, 2 § 2 and 164 of the Constitution. Moreover, the association indeed has political goals, whereas by Article 12 § 2 of the Constitution associations may not pursue political goals and carry out political activities that are characteristic solely of political parties.” 14.  The applicant appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation. He argued that the lower court had incorrectly held that the association's aims were contrary to the Constitution. Furthermore, the association did not pursue political aims, because it was not aspiring to accede to power. The courts' refusal to register it was an infringement of its founders' freedom of expression. 15.  On 17 May 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation directed the applicant to specify the grounds on which he sought the quashing of the judgment below. In line with these instructions, the applicant submitted additional observations. He reiterated his contention that the association's aims were not political, because it was not seeking to accede to power through elections or otherwise, or exercise it. Its aims were characteristic of the civil society and were to be achieved through other, non‑political means. Furthermore, the association's articles did not provide for the creation of a people's court, it did not in fact object to the new coat of arms of Bulgaria and was not seeking to change the form of government from republic to monarchy. These were erroneous findings of the lower court. Finally, the association was seeking to achieve the spiritual union of all Bulgarians, not the abolition of the border between Bulgaria and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 16.  On 11 October 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Plovdiv Court of Appeals' judgment in the following terms:\n“The [lower court] correctly found that the goals set out in clauses 2, 3 and 4 of the association's articles have a certain political tenor and are characteristic of a political party, whose registration is to be carried out under the Political Parties Act [of 1990]. These goals are contrary to Articles 1, 2 § 2 and 12 § 2 [of the Constitution of 1991].”", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lived in Puhoi. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant deposited money in three different accounts in the Savings Bank ('the Bank'), which was, during Soviet times, State-owned. 8.  In 1994 Parliament adopted Decision no. 201-XIII on the indexing of citizens' savings in the Savings Bank of Moldova” (“the 1994 decision”) whereby persons who had reached the age of 60 by 1 January 1994 and who had savings in their accounts in the Bank on 2 January 1992 were entitled to recover a part of their deposits at the rate of one Moldovan leu (MDL) for one Soviet rouble for the first thousand roubles deposited in each account. 9.  On 16 February 1995 the Government adopted Decision no. 108, whereby it created a Commission charged with establishing the amount of compensation to be transferred by the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”) by the 25th day of each month to the Bank for compensation purposes, on the basis of the allocations made for that purpose in the State budget for the relevant year. 10.  The applicant had more than a thousand roubles in each of his three accounts in the Bank and he claimed accordingly MDL 3,000 (the equivalent of 750 United States dollars (USD)). On 7 June 2000 he received MDL 570 after the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”) transferred money to the Bank for compensation purposes. He continued to request the remaining amount and to complain to various authorities. 11.  On 8 November 2001 he initiated court proceedings against the Bank and the Ministry to recover the remaining amount and seeking compensation for the late payment (since the value of the money was depreciating because of high inflation) and for non-pecuniary damage caused by having to wait for the payment (the applicant was recognised as second-degree disabled and had a monthly State pension of MDL 89). Both defendants accepted that the applicant had a right to obtain the outstanding amount of compensation, and stated that the delay in paying was due to the failure to include in the State budget the allocations for that purpose. According to the Ministry, during 1995-1997 it transferred to the Bank 26% of the money necessary to pay the compensation in full to all those affected by the 1994 decision. However, the State budget did not allocate any further funds during 1998-2000, while an additional 7% of the total amount was allocated in the budget for the year 2001. The applicant did not receive any compensation in 2001. 12.  On 4 March 2002 the Centru District Court partly accepted the applicant's claim. It found that the main responsibility for the delay in paying his outstanding compensation lay with the Ministry, which had not transferred the necessary money to the Bank. It ordered the Bank to pay the applicant MDL 266 and the Ministry to pay him MDL 2,163, which constituted the remaining amount due under the 1994 decision (a total of MDL 2,429, or EUR 210 at the time). The court rejected the claim for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage because there was no law dealing with such claims. 13.  In an appeal, the applicant expressly requested the court, on the basis of Article 4 of the Constitution, to apply directly Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention as regards the absence of domestic remedies. 14.  On 7 May 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 March 2002, repeating the reasoning of the first-instance court in rejecting the claim for compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 15.  In an appeal, the applicant repeated his arguments advanced before the lower courts and relied in addition on Article 6 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 18 below). 16.  On 3 September 2002 the Court of Appeal also upheld the lower courts' judgments and confirmed their reasoning in rejecting the claim of compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, because it “had no support in law”. That judgment was final. On 29 July 2004 the outstanding amount was transferred to the applicant's account.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Budapest. 5.  On 11 March 1996 the applicant brought an action before the Pest Central District Court seeking the termination of the common ownership of real estate belonging to him and his divorced wife. 6.  At the subsequent hearings on 27 March, 12 June, 29 June and 21 October 1997 and 26 May 1998, the applicant extended his claims to include the allocation of other items of the matrimonial property. He was repeatedly invited to give better particulars of his claims. 7.  At the hearing on 22 October 1998 the District Court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of expropriation proceedings concerning one of the real properties at issue. 8.  On the applicant’s procedural appeal, on 14 January 1999 the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the proceedings be resumed. Subsequently, hearings were held on 9 September 1999, 6 January and 11 April 2000. On the latter date the District Court appointed a valuation expert. The expert filed his report on 1 August 2000. 9.  Further hearings took place on 12 September 2000, 9 January and 4 October 2001. On 25 January 2002 another valuation expert was appointed. 10.  The court held additional hearings on 12 February, 26 November 2002, 20 March, 10 July 2003, 9 March, 24 July, 4 November 2004, 4 January and 14 April 2005. On the latter date it again invited the applicant to give better particulars of his claims. 11.  The proceedings are still pending. 12.  On 23 May 1997 the Budapest and Pest County Health Insurance Fund issued a payment order against the applicant concerning unpaid social-security contributions. Subsequently the applicant brought an action in the Pest Central District Court challenging the lawfulness of the administrative decision. 13.  On 3 May 1999 the court observed that, due to a change of legislation, the respondent was replaced by the Tax Authority. On 11 January 2000 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s procedural appeal. He filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court which he withdrew on 27 September 2000. 14.  The court held hearings on 28 March and 5 December 2001. On 5 April 2002 an expert accountant was appointed. The expert presented his opinion on 28 August 2002. 15.  Further hearings took place on 2 October and 28 November 2002. 16.  On 22 January 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s action, holding that the payment order had been issued lawfully. 17.  On 11 April 2003 the applicant appealed. 18.  On 26 January 2004 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 19.  On 14 April 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s petition for review.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Hîrbovăţ. 6.  The applicant is the president of the non-governmental organisation Dumitriţa, which specialises in providing assistance to people in need. She suffers from epilepsy with organic personality changes and low frequency tonic epileptic fits. She was treated on an in-patient basis in the Clinical Psychiatric Hospital during the period 22 May to 12 June 2006. 7.  On 27 July 2006 the applicant was summoned to appear before an investigator of the Centre for Fighting Economic Crime and Corruption (“the CFECC”). When she appeared, she was arrested on suspicion of having misappropriated funds donated by a Swedish charity to her organisation for distribution to persons in need. The applicant was placed in the CFECC detention centre. 8.  The applicant informed the investigator of her illness and told him that she needed to regularly take medication prescribed for her by her psychiatrist. The officer allegedly replied that detainees were not allowed to have any medication in their possession. 9.  According to the applicant, on being taken to her cell she had an epileptic fit and an ambulance was called to give her emergency assistance. She was then placed in an unventilated cell with another woman, who smoked continually. The applicant does not smoke and was thus exposed to passive smoking, which exacerbated her epilepsy problems. 10.  On 29 July 2006 the investigator asked the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the applicant's arrest. On the same date Judge Drosu, the investigating judge of the Buiucani District Court, rejected the request, finding it unsubstantiated. The judge noted that the applicant had pleaded not guilty and that the investigator had not proved there was an absolute need to detain the applicant. There was no evidence that she might abscond, put pressure on witnesses or interfere with the course of the investigation. Moreover, the judge took into account the criteria of Article 176 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which had been invoked by the applicant's lawyer, namely, that the applicant “had a stable residence and a job, was of an advanced age and not in good health, and did not have a criminal record”. 11.  Immediately after the hearing of 29 July 2006, the prosecutor informed the applicant that a provisional measure requiring her not to leave her village for thirty days had been imposed. 12.  In reply to a request by the prosecutor of 28 July 2006, on 31 July 2006 the Clinical Psychiatric Hospital of the Ministry of Health and Social Protection (“the CPH”) confirmed that the applicant had been treated for epilepsy in the hospital during the period 22 May to 12 June 2006. The CPH added that urgent medical assistance could be provided to the applicant by calling an ambulance and that she was eligible to receive free medication on the basis of a prescription issued by her local psychiatrist. 13.  On 1 August 2006 the prosecutor appealed against the decision of the investigating judge. He noted that the criminal case had been initiated on 16 June 2006 and that the evidence obtained so far, including an audit of the non-governmental organisation's activities, attested to a misappropriation of funds (amounting to 950,970 Moldovan lei (MDL) or 55,957 euros (EUR) at the time). As the director of Dumitriţa, the applicant was directly responsible for the manner in which the money and items had been used. Since many of the persons receiving aid from the applicant's organisation were elderly and poor, they could easily be influenced by the applicant, who was accused of a serious crime punishable by ten to twenty-five years' imprisonment. Moreover, the applicant might interfere with the course of the investigation, as was clear from her “not guilty” plea and her claim that the Swedish organisation was simply punishing her for her organisation's refusal to participate in a bigger project. 14.  On 7 August 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal quashed the investigating judge's decision of 29 July 2006 and ordered the applicant's detention for ten days. The court found as follows:\n“[I]n examining the request for a preventive measure of detention the [lower] court did not take into account the seriousness of the crime which [the applicant] is suspected of having committed, and adopted a premature and unsubstantiated decision. [The applicant] is suspected of having committed an exceptionally serious crime which is punishable by more than two years' imprisonment, and she may abscond, interfere with the course of the investigation or commit other crimes.” 15.  According to the applicant, she was not summoned to the hearing of 7 August 2006 and did not attend it, although her lawyer did attend. The decision of 7 August 2006 mentioned that the applicant had participated in the hearing. 16.  The applicant was arrested shortly thereafter at her house, on the basis of an arrest warrant of the same date issued by the Chişinău Court of Appeal. The warrant stated as follows:\n“[The applicant] is suspected of having committed a crime punishable by more than two years' imprisonment, and of absconding from the law-enforcement authority and the court, and might interfere with the course of the investigation and commit other crimes”.\nAlso on 7 August 2006, the applicant was formally indicted for the crime. 17.  In the meantime a request by the applicant's lawyer to declare her arrest on 27 July 2006 unlawful was rejected as unfounded by the investigating judge on 3 August 2006. The judge found that although the investigator had only noted one reason as the ground for the applicant's arrest (namely, a direct indication by a witness that she had committed the crime), that ground was expressly provided for by law. 18.  On 11 August 2006 the prosecutor asked for an extension of the applicant's detention pending trial for another thirty days. The request referred to the same facts as those mentioned in the request of 1 August 2006, but mentioned in addition the Court of Appeal's decision of 7 August 2006 and the formal indictment of the same date. The applicant opposed that request, referring to her stable residence and job, as well as her health problems. 19.  On 15 August 2006 the investigating judge of the Buiucani District Court granted the request and extended the applicant's detention pending trial for another thirty days. The court noted that on 7 August 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal had annulled the decision of 29 July 2006 and that on 7 August 2006 the applicant had been indicted for the crime. The court added:\n“[T]he grounds relied on by the Chişinău Court of Appeal for ordering [the applicant's] arrest remain valid. In such circumstances the validity of the arrest warrant shall be extended, since the reasons cited by the prosecution for extending it have priority; [the detention] will be part of the normal course of the criminal proceedings; the arguments of the defence were examined by the appellate court”. 20.  On an unknown date after 15 August 2006 the applicant's lawyer made a habeas corpus request to the investigating judge, in which he referred to the decision of 15 August 2006 and asked for his client's release on medical grounds. He informed the judge of his client's medical condition and of the inadequate medical assistance available at the CFECC, which was contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. He made a similar complaint to the Chişinău Court of Appeal in an appeal against the decision of 15 August 2006, adding that his client had had several epileptic fits after her arrest and that the CFECC could not provide the full-time specialised medical assistance she required. It appears that there was no response to any of these complaints. 21.  The applicant claims that she was summoned before the investigator on several occasions before her arrest on 27 July 2006. She and her lawyer duly appeared before the investigator each time and at no time did she abscond from the investigation. On 17 August 2006 the applicant's lawyer was informed by the Anenii Noi Post Office that no registered mail had been delivered to the applicant during the period 1 to 17 August 2006. Nor was there any evidence in the file that the applicant had in fact been summoned to appear before the Chişinău Court of Appeal on 7 August 2006. In the absence of an official summons, the applicant could not have appeared before the investigating authorities or the courts since that would have been in breach of the preventive measure imposed on her on 29 July 2006 in respect of the undertaking not to leave her village. 22.  According to the medical documents submitted by the Government, the applicant was treated by a psychiatrist (R.V.) during her detention at the CFECC. R.V. visited her twenty-four times, that is, almost every day and on three occasions twice a day. She received the treatment prescribed by that doctor, as can be seen from his notes in the medical visits register. According to the same register, on 17 August 2006 R.V. noted:\n“The administration has been informed about the worsening of the patient's state of health and of the need to transfer her to a medical institution.”\nOn 1 September 2006 R.V. wrote in the medical visits register that the applicant was to be transferred to the hospital in Costiujeni, her condition having improved.\nLater that day the applicant was transferred to the Costiujeni Clinical Psychiatric Hospital for in-patient treatment. Before her release from the CFECC she wrote a note in the medical register (dated 1 August 2006) in which she stated that she had no complaints about her treatment there and thanked the doctor for his assistance. On 20 September 2009 R.V. wrote a “medical report” in which he essentially stated that the applicant had received medical assistance appropriate to her state of health during her detention at the CFECC. 23.  According to the applicant, she had a number of epileptic fits at the time of the events described above, which occurred in the CFECC detention facility and in the prosecutor's office, the court hall and even during a court hearing. Two such fits happened in the prosecutor's office on 29 July 2006 immediately after the hearing, when her lawyer gave her emergency assistance. She also claims that she can occasionally sense the onset of a fit sufficiently far in advance to be able to take the relevant medication and thus prevent the fit from occurring. However, as she was denied access to her medication in the cell, she was not able to prevent any of her fits.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Baj, Hungary. 5.  On 2 October 1992 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Police Department informed the applicant, the managing director of a limited liability company (“the company”), that a criminal investigation had been opened against him on charges of fraud. 6.  On 6 October 1992 the Police Department requested the Tax Authority’s Komárom-Esztergom County Department to carry out a tax inspection of the company. Subsequently, on 13 October 1992 the criminal investigation against the applicant was suspended pending the outcome of the tax inspection. 7.  On 4 January 1993 the Tax Authority informed the Police Department of its findings. Consequently, on 8 January 1993 the Police Department ordered that the criminal investigation against the applicant be continued. 8.  During the period until 14 December 1993, the Police Department questioned several witnesses on altogether fifteen occasions and interrogated the applicant on 24 August and 16 December 1993. On the latter date he refused to give testimony. 9.  On 17 December 1993 the Police Department appointed an expert graphologist. 10.  On 23 December 1993 the Police Department informed the applicant’s lawyer and the Tata District Public Prosecutor’s Office of the results of the investigation. On 27 December 1993 the Police Department terminated the investigations and transferred the file to the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 11.  On 7 February 1994 the Public Prosecutor’s Office preferred a bill of indictment. 12.  The applicant’s request of 26 April 1995 to have the investigation re-opened was rejected by the Tata District Court. 13.  The first trial hearing took place on 12 April 1996. On this occasion the District Court heard several witnesses. The applicant refused to testify and stated that he did not commit the crime with which he was charged. 14.  On 15 April 1996 the District Court enquired of a witness who had failed to appear at the hearing of 12 April due to illness as to the expected date of his recovery. 15.  On the applicant’s motion for bias of 10 June 1996, the presiding judge withdrew from the case. 16.  On 30 October 1996 the President of the District Court appointed another judge. On 16 December 1996 the President of the District Court together with two other judges declared bias. 17.  On 29 April 1997 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Court appointed the Tatabánya District Court to deal with the case. 18.  On 27 April 1999 the Tatabánya District Court held a hearing and acquitted the applicant. 19.  On the appeal of the Prosecutor’s Office, on 11 and 25 January and 22 February 2000 the Regional Court held hearings. 20.  On 14 March 2000 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, which thereby became final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The circumstances of the case are analogous to those described in Maggio and Others v. Italy (nos. 46286/09, 52851/08, 53727/08, 54486/08 and 56001/08, 31 May 2011). 6.  In 1995, by means of the Dini reform, Italy changed its pension system from a retributive one, which applied the remuneration-based (“retributivo”) method of calculation, to a contributory one, where the amount received in pension was dependent on the contributions paid. 7.  The applicants, who had transferred to Italy the contributions they had paid in Switzerland, requested the Istituto Nazionale della Previdenza Sociale (“INPS”) to establish their pensions in accordance with the 1962 Italo-Swiss Convention on Social Security (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice below) on the basis of the contributions paid in Switzerland for work they had performed there over several years (see annexed table for details). As a basis for the calculation of their pensions (in respect of the average remuneration of the last ten years), the INPS employed a theoretical remuneration (“retribuzione teorica”) instead of the real remuneration (“retribuzione effettiva”). The former resulted in a readjustment on the basis of the existing ratio between the contributions applied in Switzerland (8%) and in Italy (32.7%), which meant that the calculation had as its basis a pseudo-salary which according to the applicants amounted to approximately a quarter of the salary actually received by them and therefore led to a reduction in the pension itself. 8.  Consequently, in 2005/6 the applicants instituted judicial proceedings, contending that this was contrary to the spirit of the Italo-Swiss Convention.\nVarious individuals in the applicants’ position had done the same and had been successful, the domestic courts having determined that persons having worked in Switzerland and who had subsequently transferred their contributions to Italy should benefit from the remuneration-based pension calculations, on the basis of the wages earned in Switzerland, irrespective of the fact that the transferred contributions had been paid at a much lower Swiss rate. 9.  Pending their proceedings, Law no. 296/2006 (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice below) entered into force on 1 January 2007. 10.  By a judgment of the Varese Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 23 September 2008 (no. 306/2008), these applicants’ claim was rejected in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 11.  By a judgment of the Varese Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 7 October 2008 (no. 329/2008), these applicants’ claim was rejected in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 12.  By a judgment of the Udine Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 7 October 2008, filed in the relevant registry on 8 October 2008 (no. 311/2008), these applicants’ claim was rejected in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 13.  By a judgment of the Varese Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 26 November 2008, filed in the relevant registry on 9 December 2008 (no. 389/2008), these applicants’ claim was rejected in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 14.  By a judgment of the Bergamo Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 17 September 2008 (no. 789/2008), these applicants’ claim was rejected in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 15.  By a judgment of the Como Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 15 June 2006, filed in the relevant registry on 30 June 2006, Mr Gagliardi’s and Mr De Nile’s claims were rejected as being out of time, their proceedings having been lodged more than three years after the administrative decision regarding their pensions; Mr Rossi’s claim was rejected as the court did not share the ratio of the relevant Court of Cassation case-law at the time, and considered that the relevant legal provisions had been sufficiently clear. 16.  The applicants appealed. 17.  By a judgment of 11 December 2008, filed in the relevant registry on 13 January 2009 (no. 63/2009), the Milan Court of Appeal reformed the first-instance judgment, considering that Mr Gagliardi’s and Mr De Nile’s claims for the dues relating to the three years before they lodged their proceedings could not be considered time-barred. However, it rejected the merits of all three applicants’ claims in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 18.  By two judgments of the Brescia Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 22 September 2006, filed in the relevant registry on 2 October 2006 (nos. 672/2006 and 678/2006) these applicants’ claim was upheld on the basis of the relevant Court of Cassation case-law at the time. 19.  The INPS appealed. 20.  By a judgment of 18 December 2008, filed in the relevant registry on 11 March 2009 (no. 527/2008), the Brescia Court of Appeal reversed the first-instance judgments in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 21.  By two judgments of the Campobasso Tribunal (Labour and Welfare Section) of 12 February 2009 (nos. 89/2009 and 90/2009), these applicants’ claim was rejected in view of the entry into force of Law no. 296/2006. 22.  All the applicants did not appeal further, deeming it to be futile given that the impugned law had been considered legitimate by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 23 May 2008, no. 172 (see Relevant Domestic Law and Practice below), which other courts were then bound to uphold.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Ostrów. 6.  The applicant is married with three children. Prior to her application for an early-retirement pension she had been employed and paid social security contributions to the State. 7.  On 13 August 2001 the applicant filed an application with the Rzeszów Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) to be granted the right to an early-retirement pension for persons raising children who, due to the seriousness of their health condition, required constant care, the so-called “EWK” pension. 8.  Along with her application for a pension, the applicant submitted, among other documents concerning her daughter’s health condition, a medical certificate issued by a specialist medical centre on 20 July 2001. The certificate stated that the child J. (born in 1988) suffered from a renal condition and scoliosis and that she was in need of her parent’s constant care. 9.  On 29 August 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board (“the SSB”) issued a decision granting the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension as of 1 August 2001 in the net amount of 653 Polish zlotys (PLN). 10.  The Social Security Board initially suspended the payment of the pension due to the fact that the applicant was still working on the date of the decision. On 21 September 2001 the applicant resigned from her full‑time job in a private company where she had been working since 1985. Afterwards, payment of the pension was resumed. 11.  On 4 June 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board asked the Main Social Security Board’s doctor (Główny Lekarz Orzecznik) to inform it whether the applicant’s daughter required the permanent care of a parent. On 10 July 2002 the doctor stated that, on the basis of the medical documents, the child could not be considered as ever having required such care. 12.  On 26 July 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued simultaneously two decisions in respect of the applicant. By virtue of one decision, the payment of the applicant’s pension was discontinued with immediate effect. By virtue of the other decision, the Board reopened the proceedings, revoked the initial decision granting a pension and eventually refused to grant the applicant the right to an early-retirement pension under the scheme provided for by the 1989 Ordinance. 13.  The applicant appealed against the respective decisions divesting her of the right to an early-retirement pension. She submitted that she should receive the benefit because her child required constant care, as confirmed by the medical certificate attached to the applicant’s original application for a pension. Moreover, the applicant alleged that the revocation of her retirement pension was contrary to the principle of vested rights. 14.  On 7 March 2003 the Rzeszow Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal. The Regional Court concluded on the basis of the evidence that the applicant’s child did not require her mother’s permanent care since her health condition did not significantly impair her bodily functions. The domestic court held that the applicant had been rightfully divested of her right to a pension under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as she did not satisfy the requirement of necessary permanent care. 15.  The applicant further appealed against the first-instance judgment. 16.  On 17 October 2003 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the appeal. 17.  On 17 March 2004 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to entertain the cassation appeal lodged by the applicant. 18.  Following the social security proceedings the applicant was not ordered to return her early-retirement benefits paid by the Social Security Board, despite the revocation of her right to an early‑retirement pension. 19.  The applicant submitted that after the revocation of pension on 26 July 2002 for five years she had been unsuccessfully looking for job but had received no unemployment or other benefits from the State during that time.\nBetween May 2007 and June 2008 the applicant was offered a paid traineeship by the unemployment office in the amount of PLN 700 per month. The applicant was afterwards employed from June 2008 to June 2010. 20.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s husband and two adult children were employed. They stated that in 2009 the applicant earned PLN 16,000. Moreover, the applicant and her husband owned a small farm. 21.  In addition, the Government submitted information as regards the various types of social benefits available in Poland. However, they did not specify which of those benefits, if any, were available in the applicant’s situation. 22.  Under the relevant laws currently in force, it appears that the applicant will qualify for a regular retirement pension in 2019. 23.  Some 130 applications arising from a similar fact pattern have been brought to the Court. The majority of the applicants form the Association of Victims of the SSB (Stowarzyszenie Osób Poszkodowanych przez ZUS) (“the Association”), an organisation monitoring the practices of the Social Security Board in Poland, in particular in the Podkarpacki region. 24.  Out of all applications lodged with the Court, about twenty‑four applicants decided not to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal given in their case. 25.  One hundred-and-four applicants lodged cassation appeals against the final judgments given in their cases. The Supreme Court entertained and dismissed on the merits fifteen appeals. In eighty‑one applications the Supreme Court refused to entertain cassation appeals on the ground that they did not raise any important legal issues or require the Supreme Court to give a new interpretation to legal provisions which raised serious doubts or gave rise to ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts. In the remaining eight cases cassation appeals were rejected for failure to comply with various procedural requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who live in various districts of the Chechen Republic. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared, allegedly after having been unlawfully detained by servicemen during a special operation. In each of the applications the events concerned took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants have had no news of their missing relatives since the alleged arrests. 6.  The applicants complained about the circumstances to law‑enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without achieving any tangible results. The investigations have mainly consisted of requests for information and formal requests for operational search measures to be carried out by counterparts in various parts of Chechnya and other regions of the North Caucasus. The requests received either negative responses or no reply at all. 7.  From the documents submitted it appears that the relevant State authorities were unable to identify the State servicemen allegedly involved in the arrests or abductions. 8.  In their observations the Government did not challenge the allegations as presented by the applicants. At the same time, they stated that there was no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that State agents had been involved in the incidents. 9.  Below are summaries of the facts in respect of each individual application. Each account of the events is based on the statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or neighbours to the Court and to the domestic investigative authorities. The personal details of the applicants and their disappeared relatives, and some other key facts, are summarised in the attached table (Appendix I). 10.  The applicants are:\n(1) Mr Khamzat Dzhabrailov, who was born in 1941,\n(2) Ms Tamara Taysumova (also referred to as Dzhabrailova), who was born in 1955,\n(3) Ms Zarema Dzhabrailova, who was born in 1978, and\n(4) Ms Larisa Dzhabrailova, who was born in 1985. 11.  The applicants live in Argun, Shali District, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from the Memorial Human Rights Centre. 12.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov, who was born in 1981; the third and fourth applicants are his sisters.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relative 13.  At the material time the applicants and Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov lived in Argun in one household consisting of two dwellings. Between 13 and 15 December 2001 Russian servicemen conducted a sweeping-up operation in that settlement. The town was surrounded by military checkpoints and the residents required authorisation to enter or leave it. On-duty servicemen patrolling the streets made it impossible for the residents to move around. 14.  On 14 December 2001 a group of twenty servicemen arrived at the applicants’ house in an armoured personnel carrier (APC) and a UAZ “tabletka” vehicle with obscured registration plates. The servicemen were camouflaged and unmasked, of Russian or Asian appearance, and spoke unaccented Russian. Having searched Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov’s dwelling, they threatened to take him with them and added that those whom they took away never returned. On the same day the servicemen took the applicants’ neighbour, Mr B.U., to the Argun district military commander’s office (“the military commander’s office”) He was later released, but his car had been taken away from him by the servicemen and remained at the office’s premises. 15.  On 15 December 2001, at around noon, the same servicemen returned to the neighbourhood in the APC and cordoned off the area. Some of them broke into the applicants’ dwelling and locked the applicants inside, while two others entered Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov’s part of the house. They forced Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov outside, put him in the APC and drove to the military commander’s office. Servicemen patrolling the streets witnessed the events but did not interfere. 16.  Later on the same day the second applicant went to the Argun town administration, where she met about fifty relatives of other men arrested during the special operation. Two representatives of the town council informed her that the arrested men had been taken to a “filtering” point on the outskirts of Argun, and they agreed to pass on clothes to Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov. In the evening the applicant learnt that the arrested men would be transferred to the military commander’s office. 17.  On 17 December 2001 the military commander’s office informed the applicants that the special operation had been conducted by a special forces unit which did not report to the office and that none of the arrested men had been brought to their premises. Subsequently, the applicants learnt that Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov and seven other persons arrested between 13 and 15 December 2001 had not been released. 18.  According to the second applicant, on 18 December 2001 she heard Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov screaming in the district military commander’s office. 19.  The applicants have not seen Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov since 15 December 2001.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken in the investigation 20.  On 12 January 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. In his statement he described in detail the circumstances of his son’s abduction by armed men in military uniforms who had arrived in an APC and a UAZ vehicle. He also stated that prior to the abduction, on 14 December 2001, the same group of men had searched his house. The applicant provided a detailed description of the perpetrators and their vehicles and insisted that the APC was the same that had been used by the abductors the day before, on 14 December 2001. 21.  On 17 and 18 January 2002 the investigators questioned the second and third applicants, whose statements about the abduction were detailed and similar to the one given by the first applicant. 22.  On 19 January 2002 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative, Ms M.M., whose statement about the abduction was also similar to the one given by the first applicant. In addition, she stated that from the abductors’ actions it had been clear to her that they were familiar with the house and that they must have been the same men who had searched the applicants’ house on 14 December 2001. 23.  On 3 September 2003 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Ms A.D., whose statement about the abduction was similar to the ones given by the first, second and third applicants. She also stated that the APC used to take away Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov had been the same as that used on 14 December 2001 by the men who had searched the applicants’ house. 24.  On 9 September 2003 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Mr B.U., who stated that on 14 December 2001 armed men who had arrived at his house in an APC had ordered him to take his Mercedes car to the military commander’s office and leave it there for two weeks. 25.  On 10 September 2003 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who stated, amongst other things, that during their first visit on 14 December 2001 the abductors, having searched his house, had gone to his neighbour’s dwelling and taken the Mercedes car. 26.  On various dates in February 2004 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours Mr A.U. and Mr R.U., whose statements concerning the abductors’ visit on 14 December 2001 were similar to the ones given by the first applicant and Mr B.U. (see paragraphs 20 and 24 above). They also questioned the first applicant, who reiterated his previous statements. 27.  On 30 March 2004 the investigators questioned Mr M.S., who had been the head of the Argun department of the Federal Security Service (FSB) at the time of the abduction. The officer denied having any pertinent information concerning the disappearance of Mr Yakub Dzhabrailov. 28.  On various dates in September 2006 the investigators questioned six of the applicants’ neighbours, all of whom confirmed that a special operation had been conducted in Argun on 15 December 2001. 29.  On 21 September 2006 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who stated that his son’s abduction had been organised by the head of the Argun FSB, Mr M.S., and that the Argun prosecutor, Mr R.T., had been aware of it. 30.  On 25 September 2006 the investigators questioned Mr R.T., who denied having any pertinent information about the abduction. 31.  On various dates in August 2011 the investigators questioned the first applicant and several of his relatives and neighbours. No new information concerning the abduction was obtained.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 32.  On 9 January 2002 the Argun district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 78010. 33.  On 5 February 2002 the investigators requested the Military Commander of the United Group Alignment (UGA) to inform them whether their servicemen had detained the applicants’ relative. On an unspecified date the UGA replied that on 15 December 2001 a joint police and military group had conducted a special operation in Argun. 34.  On 30 March 2002 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 35.  On 21 January 2004 the district prosecutor’s office criticised the lack of progress in the investigation and the investigators’ failure to take basic steps. 36.  On 14 September 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the investigators that no military servicemen had been involved in the abduction. 37.  On 10 August 2006 the first applicant wrote to the investigators requesting that they take a number of steps to expedite the search for his son. He also stated that he suspected that Mr M.S., who had been the head of the Argun FSB at the time, was responsible for his son’s abduction, and that the Argun Public Prosecutor and the Argun military commander had known about it but failed to take any action. 38.  On 31 October 2006 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that criminal case no. 78027 had been opened in connection with the discovery of four mutilated corpses on the eastern outskirts of Argun on 28 February 2002. One body was identified as being that of Mr A‑W. Ya., who had been abducted from his home in Argun in January 2001 under similar circumstances. 39.  On 28 February 2008 the first applicant requested that the investigators allow him access to the investigation file. On 6 March 2008 the Shali District Investigation Department granted his request. However, on 1 July 2008 the applicant’s lawyer was denied access to the file’s entire contents on the grounds that the investigation was still pending. 40.  On 17 July 2008 the investigators informed the applicant that the decision of 6 March 2008 had granted him only limited access to the case file. 41.  The contents of a number of documents from the investigation file reflect that the abduction took place “during a sweeping-up operation” by special forces. Such references are made in the decision to suspend the investigation and in the investigators’ request for police assistance, both dated 25 December 2011. 42.  The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions; the last suspension took place on 25 December 2011. The proceedings are still pending. 43.  The applicants are:\n(1) Ms Mata Suleymanova, who was born in 1956,\n(2) Mr Ostambek Suleymanov, who was born in 1950,\n(3) Ms Marem Magamaliyeva, who was born in 1981, and\n(4) Mr Abdul-Malik Suleymanov, who was born in 2002.\nThe applicants live in Gudermes, Gudermes district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 44.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Salambek Suleymanov, who was born in 1974, Mr Khasanbek Suleymanov, who was born in 1979, and Mr Anderbek (also spelt as Andarbek) Suleymanov, who was born in 1981. The third applicant is the wife of Mr Salambek Suleymanov, and the fourth applicant is his son.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relatives 45.  At the material time the applicants and the three Suleymanov brothers resided in two neighbouring houses in Gudermes. Mr Salambek Suleymanov lived with the third and the fourth applicants while Mr Khasanbek Suleymanov and Mr Anderbek Suleymanov lived with the first and second applicants. The town was under curfew. 46. On an unspecified date in September or October 2002 federal servicemen conducted a special operation in Gudermes and arrested about thirty persons, including the Suleymanov brothers. The servicemen took the arrested men to the Gudermes district department of the interior (“ROVD”) in buses belonging to the FSB. After their fingerprints had been checked and photographs taken, the arrested men were released. 47.  On 28 October 2002 two neighbours, Mr Ali M. and Mr Musa Z., visited the applicants. Mr Anderbek Suleymanov joked that his family kept a bomb in the basement. It appears that Mr Musa Z. had previously been detained by the FSB and released in exchange for providing information. According to the applicants, it was possible he had informed the FSB about the joke. 48.  On 29 October 2002, at around 4 a.m., a group of camouflaged servicemen in masks and helmets arrived at the applicants’ houses in two UAZ minivans. They were armed with short-barrelled automatic rifles. The servicemen stormed inside and quickly searched the houses, looking for drugs, firearms, and, in particular, for the bomb allegedly hidden in the basement. Threatening the applicants in unaccented Russian, the servicemen ordered them to lie down on the floor. They collected the applicants’ and the three brothers’ identity documents, forced the latter into the UAZ and drove off in the direction of the town centre, passing unhindered through a checkpoint on the way. 49.  At the beginning of November 2002, about a week after the abduction, a former classmate of Mr Khasanbek Suleymanov told the applicants that their relatives were detained at a temporary detention centre (“IVS”) on the premises of the Gudermes ROVD and that FSB officers guarded them and occasionally took them out. Mr Khasanbek Suleymanov had passed an item of his clothing to his parents through another person and asked him to inform them of his place of detention. However, the ROVD officers denied that the brothers were detained there and refused to allow the applicants to enter the premises. 50.  One of the applicants’ neighbours, a police officer, also confirmed that the three men had been held at the ROVD. 51.  At some later  point the applicants heard from anonymous sources that in 2003 the brothers had been detained on the premises of an FSB department, that in 2003 Mr Salambek Suleymanov had been transferred to detention elsewhere, and that Mr Aslan Dzh., the head of the criminal search unit at the Gudermes ROVD, had ordered the brothers’ abduction. 52.  The applicants have not seen their three relatives since 29 October 2002.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 53.  On 15 November 2002 the first and third applicants were questioned. Both of them provided a detailed description of the abduction similar to the one furnished to the Court. 54.  On the same date, the second applicant was also questioned and granted victim status in the criminal case. His statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one given by the first and third applicants. The second applicant was subsequently questioned again on two occasions: on 18 June 2005 and 20 April 2006. 55.  On 16 November 2002 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Mr Kh.A., who confirmed seeing a group of armed men in UAZ vehicles next to the applicants’ house on the night of the abduction. 56.  On 18 May 2005 the first applicant was also granted victim status and was questioned. She reiterated her previous statement, adding that she had made an official complaint about the abduction on the following day. 57.  On 20 April 2006 the first applicant was questioned again. She reiterated her previous statements and added that in her opinion her sons had been abducted by law-enforcement agents. 58.  On 5 and 6 May 2006 the investigation team questioned the head of the IVS and a senior inspector at the ROVD, who denied having any knowledge of the Suleymanov brothers. According to the IVS registration log of detainees examined on 5 May 2006, the brothers had not been detained there. 59.  On 23 September 2008 the first applicant was questioned again. She stated that she had learnt from Mr Uvais, who had died in 2007, that Mr Aslan Dzh., the head of the criminal search unit at the ROVD, was resposible for her sons’ abduction. 60.  On 8 October 2008 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative Ms M.A., whose statement concerning the alleged organisation of the abduction by Mr Aslan Dzh. was similar to the one given by the first applicant.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 61.  On 30 October 2002 an investigation team examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 62.  On 1 November 2002 the Gudermes district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 57098 in connection with the abduction. According to the investigation plan drawn up on the same day, the abduction could have been perpetrated by criminals pursuing a blood feud, by creditors, by members of illegal armed groups, or by officers of law‑enforcement agencies. 63.  In November 2002, May and June 2005, April 2006 and September 2008 the investigators sent out requests for information to a number of law‑enforcement agencies in Moscow and the Southern Federal Circuit, including the Ministry of the Interior and various ROVD offices, detention centres, military commander’s offices and FSB departments. Only negative replies were received. 64.  On 12 December 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office stated in a procedural document that “the investigation [had] failed to establish to which power structure the abductors belonged”. Subsequently, on 16 August 2006, the investigators stated in another procedural document that “the only substantiated investigative theory was that the culprits belonged to power structures”. 65.  On 5 April 2006 the first applicant requested information on the progress of the investigation. In reply she was informed that the proceedings were still in progress. 66.  On 17 November and December 2006, and then on 4 March and 10 November 2008, the first applicant requested access to the investigation file. Her two latest requests were granted, on 7 March and 11 November 2008. 67.  On 10 September 2008 the applicants’ relatives and neighbours Ms M.A. and Ms N.D. wrote to the investigators stating that Mr Aslan Dzh., the head of the criminal search unit at the Gudermes ROVD, had been involved in the abduction of the applicants’ sons. Following that complaint, on 12 September 2008 a supervising prosecutor ordered the questioning of Mr Aslan Dzh. by the investigators. From the documents submitted it appears that this order was not complied with. 68.  On 19 July 2010 and 26 January 2011 the Russian President’s Human Rights Envoy in Chechnya (“the Envoy”) wrote to the investigators on behalf of the first and second applicants requesting assistance in the seach for the applicants’ sons. In reply he was informed that operational seach measures to solve the crime were under way. 69.  According to the information obtained by the investigation, none of the Sulyemanov brothers were detained in penal institutions in the Russian Federation (see paragraph 51 above). 70.  According to the information received by the investigators at the Gudermes ROVD, the Suleymanov brothers were members of illegal armed groups and Salambek Suleymanov had participated in the activities of illegal Sharia courts. 71.  The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions; the last suspension took place on 14 October 2008. It is still pending. 72.  The applicants are Mr Viktor Chankayev, who was born in 1948, and Ms Zaynap Chankayeva, who was born in 1954. The applicants live in Urus-Martan, Urus-Martan district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 73.  The applicants are the parents of Mr Ramzan Chankayev, who was born in 1985, and the uncle and aunt of Mr Aslan Chankayev, who was born in 1985.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relatives 74.  At the material time the applicants, their son Mr Ramzan Chankayev and their nephew Mr Aslan Chankayev lived together in Urus-Martan. The area was under curfew. Roads leading to and from the settlements were blocked by checkpoints. 75.  On 19 September 2001 a group of about fifteen servicemen arrived at the applicants’ neighbourhood in Urus-Martan and cordoned off the area. Their UAZ car had no registration plates and the registration number of their Ural lorry was obscured by mud. All the servicemen were armed and wore camouflage uniforms and masks, save for the commanding officer. The latter was unmasked, had Slavic features and had an FSB emblem on his sleeve. After a quick search of the applicants’ house, the servicemen told them in unaccented Russian that they had to take Mr Ramzan Chankayev and Mr Aslan Chankayev with them to check their fingerprints at a laboratory situated on the premises of an Azeri market on the western outskirts of Urus-Martan. As the applicants refused to let their relatives go, the commander started shooting in the air. The servicemen then collected the bullet shells, put Mr Aslan Chankayev in the UAZ and Mr Ramzan Chankayev in the Ural and drove away. 76.  On the same morning the servicemen conducted an identity check at the house of a neighbour, Mr N.S. 77.  Immediately after the arrest, the first applicant went to the Azeri market and the Urus-Martan district military commander’s office but his arrested relatives were not there. Then he went to the district prosecutor’s office, where he was told that the two men had been taken to the IVS at the Urus-Martan ROVD. In the evening, an official from the local administration confirmed this information to the second applicant, adding that both young men would be released as soon as they had had their fingerprints checked. Mr Radmir Arbekov, an assistant to the district prosecutor, agreed to pass on some food brought by the applicant for the arrested relatives. However, Mr Ramzan Chankayev and Mr Aslan Chankayev were not released on that day. 78.  On 20 September 2001 the ROVD officers informed the applicants that their relatives had been transferred to the district military commander’s office. None of the officers at that office acknowledged the detention. 79.  On 8 October 2001 the second applicant saw the commanding officer who had participated in her relatives’ arrest on the premises of the military commander’s office. Sometime later she saw two other servicemen who she thought might also have participated in the abduction. When approached, one of the servicemen introduced himself as “Vitaliy”. 80.  The applicants have not seen Mr Ramzan Chankayev and Mr Aslan Chankayev since 19 September 2001.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 81.  On 20 October 2001 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who provided a detailed description of the events similar to the one furnished to the Court. In addition, she stated that she had noticed FSB service stripes on the shoulder of the uniform of one of the abductors. The abductors had told her that they were from the Urus-Martan temporary department of the interior. At about 5 p.m. on the same day she complained to the prosecutor’s office about the abduction; near the office she met the deputy head of the Urus-Martan town administration, Mr L.M., who promised to expedite her relatives’ release from detention. 82.  On 2 November 2001 the investigators questioned the first applicant’s brother and the father of Mr Aslan Chankayev, Mr A.Ch., whose statement concerning the events was similar to the one given by the second applicant. He also added that the abductors had told them that Mr Ramzan Chankayev and Mr Aslan Chankayev would be released an hour later at the Azeri market. 83.  On 3 November 2001 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement concerning the events was similar to the one given by his wife, the second applicant. In addition, he stated that on 8 October 2001, near to the military commander’s office his wife had identified one of the abductors in the presence of the district military commander and the head of the town administration Mr Sh.Ya. 84.  On various dates in November and December 2001 the investigators questioned five of the applicants’ neighbours, none of whom had witnessed the abduction but had learnt about it from the applicants. 85.  On 20 September 2006 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, who reiterated her previous statement and added that the man in charge of the abduction had been called Radmir. 86.  On 20 or 21 September 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants’ daughter, Ms Z.Ch. (also referred to as E.Ch. in the documents submitted), whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to those given by the applicants. In particular, she stated that one of the abductors had had FSB stripes on his uniform.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 87.  According to the applicants, they complained of the abduction to various law-enforcement agencies on 20 September 2001. According to the Government, the applicants complained of the abduction on 27 October 2001. 88.  On 1 October 2001 Mr Arbekov, the assistant to the district prosecutor, wrote to the Chechnya FSB that, according to the registration log of the Khankala FSB department, both Mr Ramzan Chankayev and Mr Aslan Chankayev had been detained there. On 15 October 2001 the district military commander’s office sent out queries to the military units of the Ministry of Defence and the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior. On 16 October 2001 the ROVD informed the applicants that their relatives were not listed in their databases and that operational search files had been opened in connection with their abduction. 89.  On 27 October 2001 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 25137. 90.  On 20 March 2002 the head of the Main Service for the Execution of Sentences stated that the applicants’ relatives had not been detained in the detention centres in the Rostov Region. 91.  On 26 March 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 92.  On 13 October 2005 the applicants requested permission to access the investigation file. No response was given to this request. 93.  On 21 November 2005 the Urus-Martan ROVD informed the investigators that on the date of the abduction of the applicants’ relatives, no special operations had been conducted by the servicemen of the military units stationed in the area. 94.  On 28 September 2006 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were not informed. 95.  On various dates throughout the proceedings, such as 9 November 2001, 4 June 2003 and 13 October 2005, the applicants contacted the investigators to ask about the progress of the investigation and to request assistance in the search for their relatives. In reply they were informed that an investigation was in progress and operational search measures were under way. 96.  On 2 February 2009, having been contacted by the applicants on 27 January 2009, the investigators informed them that the investigation had been suspended on an unspecified date. 97.  The investigation is still pending. 98.  The applicants are:\n(1) Ms Maret Sultanova, who was born in 1958,\n(2) Ms Madina Sultanova, who was born in 1993,\n(3) Mr Khusain Sultanov, who was born in 1984,\n(4) Ms Razet Sultanova, who was born in 1988,\n(5) Ms Zalina Sultanova, who was born in 1989, and\n(6) Mr Ibragim Razhipov, who was born in 1982.\nThe applicants live in Samashki, Achkhoy-Martan district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 99.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Dzhamali (also referred to as Khasan) Sultanov, who was born in 1986. The other applicants are his siblings.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relative 100.  Mr Dzhamali Sultanov suffered from a disability. In September 2004 he had an argument with Mr R.S., a local police officer. According to the applicants, Mr R.S., in order to get back at Dzhamali, might have deliberately misinformed the Achkhoy‑Martan ROVD that Mr Dzhamali Sultanov was involved in illegal activities. 101.  On 5 November 2004, at around 3 a.m., a group of servicemen arrived at the applicants’ house. Five of them broke in. They were in camouflage uniforms and armed with machine guns; three of them wore masks and the others wore helmets and caps. Those whose faces were not covered were of Slavic appearance; the servicemen spoke Russian and Chechen. They asked whether the applicants had any weapons or drugs, then checked Mr Dzhamali Sultanov’s passport, forced him outside and put him in a khaki UAZ car saying that they were taking him to Grozny. Then the UAZ departed in the direction of Achkhoy‑Martan, accompanied by a convoy of about ten vehicles, including UAZs, Gazelle minivans, and VAZ‑21099 and Lada (Жигули) civilian cars. Later that night a serviceman manning a roadblock in the vicinity confirmed that the convoy had entered Achkhoy-Martan. 102.  According to the applicants, the abductors were acting on the false information given to the ROVD by police officer R.S. 103.  Five days later, an acquaintance of the applicants, Mr Akhdan, who served at the seventh military commander’s squadron (седьмая комендантская рота) stationed in Achkhoy-Martan, confirmed that he had seen the convoy in Achkhoy-Martan. According to him, a UAZ car had entered the premises of the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD, while the rest of the convoy had continued to drive on. According to Mr Akhdan, Mr Dzhamali Sultanov had been detained at the ROVD and had been questioned by Mr V.K., the head of the ROVD’s criminal search department. According to the applicants, Mr V.K. was head of the Zheleznodorozhniy ROVD in Voronezh in the Voronezh Region and was on a temporary assignment in Achkhoy-Martan. In a meeting with the first applicant Mr A.S., Mr V.K.’s deputy at the Achkhoy‑Martan ROVD, denied that Mr Dzhamali Sultanov had been detained at the ROVD. Mr Akhdan was killed several days after the conversation with the applicants. 104.  The applicants have not seen Mr Dzhamali Sultanov since 5 November 2004.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 105.  On 26 November 2004 the investigators questioned the first and the third applicants, whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the one submitted to the Court. In addition, the first applicant stated that Mr Dzhamali Sultanov suffered from a learning disability, and had neither been to school nor had any friends. She further stated that she recognised one of the abductors as a police officer from the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD, Mr V.K., also known under the nickname ‘Liman’. The first applicant was subsequently questioned again on 28 December 2004, 10 October 2006 and 25 July 2007 and provided similar statements; the third applicant was questioned again on 25 July 2007 and provided a similar statement. 106.  On 26 November 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant’s husband and the father of Mr Dzhamali Sultanov, Mr Z. Sultanov, whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the ones given by the first and third applicants. He was subsequently questioned again on 10 October 2006 and reiterated his previous statement. 107.  On various dates in November and December 2004, September 2006 and then in July 2008 the investigators questioned a number of the applicants’ neighbours and relatives and other residents of Samashki, all of whom stated that they had learnt of the abduction from the applicants. 108.  On 1 July 2008 the investigators questioned the fourth applicant, whose statement about the abduction was similar to the one given by the first and third applicants. 109. On 3 July 2008 the investigators questioned district police officer Mr Kh.Z., who stated that at about 5 a.m. on 5 November 2004 the first applicant had arrived at his house and informed him of her son’s abduction. She had provided a detailed description of the abductors and their vehicles and also stated that a fortnight prior to the events, Mr Dzhamali Sultanov had had an argument with police officers R.S. and A.A., who had come to the applicants’ household to check the premises.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 110.  On 5 and then on 17 November 2004 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 111.  On 15 November 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 38053 in respect of the abduction. 112.  On 27 December 2004 the investigators checked the transport registration log of checkpoint no. 190 with regard to the passage of the abductors’ convoy on 5 November 2004. No such passage was registered. 113.  On 28 December 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 114.  On 5 January 2005 the investigators checked the transport registration log of checkpoint no. 186 with regard to the passage of the abductors’ convoy on 5 November 2004. No such passage was registered. 115.  On 15 March 2005 the investigation was suspended. On 19 August 2006 the district prosecutor’s office rejected the applicant’s complaint against the decision to suspend the investigation. 116.  On 30 June 2006 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court declared Mr Dzhamali Sultanov a missing person. 117.  On 29 July 2006 the ROVD informed the first applicant that an operational search file had been opened in connection with the abduction. 118.  In March and April 2007 district departments of the Southern Circuit of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences stated that Dzhamali had not been detained in their detention facilities. 119.  On 25 April 2007 the investigators informed the applicants of the progress in the criminal proceedings, stating that, amongst other things, the investigators had questioned over seventy witnesses, including the applicants’ relatives and neighbours, forwarded information requests to a number of law-enforcement agencies in the Southern Federal Circuit, and examined the registration logs of the checkpoints in Samashki and Achkhoy-Martan districts. No involvement of servicemen in the abduction had been established. 120.  The investigation of the criminal case was suspended and resumed on several occasion; the last suspension took place on 10 July 2008. The proceedings are currently pending. 121.  The applicant is Mr Elsi Eldarov, who was born in 1956 and lives in Gekhi, Urus-Martan district, the Chechen Republic. He is represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 122.  The applicant is the brother of Mr Aldan Eldarov, who was born in 1964.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicant’s brother 123.   The facts of this application are based on the same events as those examined by the Court in the case of Musayeva and Others v. Russia, no.  74239/01, 26 July 2007, which concerned the abduction of the applicants’ relatives as a result of a special operation conducted by federal forces in Gekhi between 8 and 10 August 2000, and the subsequent discovery of their bodies. 124.  At the material time the applicant and his brother, Mr Aldan Eldarov, lived in neighbouring houses in Gekhi.  On 8 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 9) August 2000 federal servicemen started a three-day sweeping-up operation in Gekhi. They surrounded the settlement in their UAZ cars and Ural lorries, cordoned off the area and blocked the roads leading to and from the settlement. The servicemen were stationed on the eastern outskirts of Gekhi. Around two hundred of the village’s male residents were arrested during the operation. 125.  At around 10.30 a.m. a group of servicemen conducted a search of Mr Aldan Eldarov’s house. They took away a group photograph of him, his brother and some police officers from Grozny, all of whom were in military uniform. Then the servicemen left and Mr Aldan Eldarov went to see the applicant. 126.  Later, at around 11 a.m., two servicemen arrived at the applicant’s house in a UAZ lorry registration number OBS 31-62 (ОБС 31-62). The applicant knew the servicemen personally as Mr Vadim and Mr Oleg Ye. The latter was in charge of the operation in the applicant’s street. Prior to their being sent to work with the Urus-Martan ROVD, both officers had worked in the economic crimes unit of the Penza Regional Department of the Interior (OVD). The servicemen told the applicant that in connection with the photograph they had to take Mr Aldan Eldarov to the military base. Then they put him in their car and left. The applicant was unable to follow them because his car was stopped by servicemen carrying out the special operation. 127.  On that day the servicemen also arrested a local resident, Mr Akhmet Kadyrov, and his two brothers. After checking their passports, the servicemen took them to the military base in an APC and placed them in cages and tents with other detainees. The cages were surrounded by dozens of military vehicles, including APCs, tanks and a helicopter. The detainees, who were asked whether they knew any rebel fighters or local residents who had weapons, were subjected to beatings. Mr Aldan Eldarov was in a very bad state after questioning, and servicemen took him to hospital in an APC. Mr Akhmet Kadyrov and his brothers were released. 128.  On 10 August 2000 the head of the local administration, Mr Said‑Selim Ay., informed the applicant that the servicemen conducting the operation would release the detainee in exchange for a machine gun. The applicant agreed to the exchange. However, after visiting the military base, Mr Said-Selim Ay. stated that Mr Aldan Eldarov had been taken to hospital. 129.  In September 2000 a burial site was discovered on the outskirts of Gekhi. Two of the bodies were identified as the Musayev brothers, also Gekhi residents, who had been arrested in the same period as Mr Aldan Eldarov. 130.  The applicant has not seen Mr Aldan Eldarov since the date of the abduction.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation into the abduction 131.  On an unspecified date in December 2000 the applicant was questioned. He provided a detailed description of the events, similar to the one furnished to the Court. 132.  On 27 April 2005 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who reiterated the description of his brother’s abduction by officers from the Urus-Martan ROVD during the special operation and his subsequent handing over by the police officers to military servicemen under the command of General Nedobitko. 133.  On 15 November 2005 the investigators questioned officer Mr I.S., who had participated in the special operation in Gekhi and the arrest of local residents, including the applicant’s brother. The officer confirmed that the special operation had been conducted but could not recall any details because of the passage of time. 134.  On 21 November 2005 the investigators questioned officer Mr Oleg Ye., who had participated in the special operation in Gekhi and the arrest of local residents, including the applicant’s brother. The officer confirmed that the special operation had been conducted but could not recall any details.\n(ii) Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 135.  For details of the main investigative steps taken by the authorities between 2000 and 2006 in criminal case no. 24047 opened in connection with the abduction of four residents of Gekhi during the special operation and the subsequent discovery of their bodies, see Musayeva and Others v. Russia, no. 74239/01, §§ 31-48, 26 July 2007. The steps taken by the authorities in respect of the applicant’s brother within the framework of the criminal case may be summarised as follows. 136.  On several occasions in August 2000 the applicant complained to various law-enforcement agencies about his brother’s abduction during the special operation. On 18 September and 28 October 2000 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office criticised the ROVD for failing to open a search file in connection with the abduction. 137.  On 18 September 2000 the ROVD refused to initiate criminal proceedings in connection with the discovery on 13 September 2000 of four male corpses on the outskirts of Gekhi. 138.  On 27 September and 21 December 2000 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 denied any involvement by servicemen in the abduction. 139.  On 16 October 2000 the applicant yet again requested that the Chechnya military prosecutor open a criminal case to investigate the abduction. He submitted to the Court that officer Yefimenko had informed him that the police had handed Mr Aldan Eldarov over to servicemen of the 245th mechanised infantry regiment of the Ministry of Defence under the command of General Nedobitko. It is unclear whether this information was examined by the authorities. 140.  On 18 October 2000 the district prosecutor’s office quashed the ROVD’s decision of 18 September 2000 and opened criminal case no. 24047 in connection with the discovery of the bodies. Subsequently the bodies were referred to in the case file as being those of Mr A. Musayev, Mr U. Musayev, Mr R. Lorsanukayev and Mr R. Abukhadzhiyev. No official identification was carried out. 141.  On 21 April 2005 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been resumed. From the documents submitted it appears that prior to that date he was not informed as to the progress of the proceedings and that the first applicant in the case of Musayeva and Others, cited above, was the only victim in the criminal case to whom the authorities provided information on the progress of the proceedings from time to time. 142.  On 1 October 2005 the applicant was informed that the investigation of the criminal case had again been resumed, and then on 31 October 2005 he was informed that the investigation had been suspended. 143.  From the documents submitted it appears that at some point between October and December 2005 the authorities concluded that four residents had been abducted as a result of the special operation: Mr A. Musayev, Mr U. Musayev, Mr R. Lorsanukayev and the applicant’s brother Mr Aldan Eldarov, and that a Mr R. Abukhadzhiyev had been killed when resisting arrest during the special operation. The four bodies discovered in September 2000 were those of Mr A. Musayev, Mr U. Musayev, Mr R. Lorsanukayev and an unidentified person. 144.  On 18 August 2006 the applicant was informed that the investigation had been resumed. Then on 18 September 2006 he was informed that it had been suspended. 145.  Between November 2007 and July 2008 the investigation was resumed and suspended on several occasions. The applicant was not informed thereof. 146.  On 2 June 2008 the investigation was again resumed and on 23 June 2008 the investigating authorities prepared a plan of operational search measures to be taken in the criminal case. The plan concerned primarily the investigation into the Musayev brothers’ abduction and their subsequent killing and made no mention of a search for Mr Aldan Eldarov. 147.  On 18 August 2008 the investigators were instructed by the supervisory prosecutor to take a number of steps in respect of the applicant’s brother. 148.  In August 2008 the investigators received a reply to their request for information from the Central Archives of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of the Interior, according to which any information pertaining to the special operation in Gekhi in August 2000 and the possible arrest of Mr Aldan Eldarov and the other residents of the village was classified as a State secret. 149.  On 16 September 2008 the investigation was again suspended and then resumed on 20 October 2008, then again suspended on 20 November 2008. The applicant was not informed thereof. 150.  On various dates in 2008 and 2009 the investigators questioned a number of local residents who confirmed that a special operation had been conducted in Gekhi between 8 and 10 August 2000. No information pertinent to the whereabouts of Mr Aldan Eldarov was received. 151.  According to the information received by the investigators, Mr Aldan Eldarov had not been arrested or detained on State premises. 152.  On 27 January and 30 April 2009 the applicant requested that the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office inform him of the progress of the investigation and resume it if it had been suspended. 153.  On 5 May 2009 the investigators agreed to provide the applicant with copies of a few procedural decisions. 154.  The investigation was again suspended and resumed on a number of occasions. The last suspension took place on 16 December 2009. The criminal proceedings are still pending 155.  The applicants are:\n(1) Ms Malika Usumova, who was born in 1960,\n(2) Ms Aminat Usumova, who was born in 1985,\n(3) Mr Zaur Usumov, who was born in 1988,\n(4) Mr Zurab Usumov, who was born in 1994, and\n(5) Ms Laura Usumova, who was born in 1993.\nThe applicants live in Kurchaloy, Kurchaloy district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from Memorial Human Rights Centre. 156.  The first applicant is the wife of Mr Moul Usumov, who was born in 1960; the other applicants are his children.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relative 157.  At the material time Mr Moul Usumov worked at the Kurchaloy FSB. The Kurchaloy district military commander’s office and the Kurchaloy FSB were situated on the eastern outskirts of Kurchaloy, close to the 33rd regiment (33 бригада) of the Russian armed forces stationed at the premises of the State Road Construction Department (дорожно-ремонтно-строительное управление, ДРСУ). 158.  On 30 June 2001, at 3.30 a.m., a group of fifteen to twenty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms with dogs cordoned off the applicants’ neighbourhood using APC no. L119 (Л119), a UAZ car and two Ural lorries. Seven servicemen broke into the applicants’ house and ordered the applicants in unaccented Russian to lie down on the floor. After searching the premises, the servicemen took away money, a number of valuables and Mr Moul Usumov’s military service card. One of the servicemen hit him with his rifle butt, demanding that he spell out his name. Then the servicemen handcuffed Mr Moul Usumov, took him outside, put him in the APC and drove away. 159.  The first applicant and a relative, Mr Sheykhi Usumov, followed the APC and the other vehicles and saw them entering the premises of the 33rd regiment. The applicant also saw other Kurchaloy residents driving towards the regiment. She learnt that seven other men had been arrested that day. 160.  Later on the same day the Kurchaloy district military commander and the head of the Kurchaloy FSB, Mr Viktor Ivanovich, agreed to talk to the first applicant and seven other women. The military commander acknowledged that the servicemen of the 33rd regiment had arrested their relatives but denied the involvement of his subordinates in the abduction. The head of the FSB told the first applicant: “It comes as a shock to me to hear that Mr Moul Usumov has been arrested. He is one of us. Don’t worry, he will be released by 4 p.m.” He replied to the other women: “You should have cried earlier, not now. Your sons are up to their necks in blood and they will be held liable.” Mr Moul Usumov was not released on that day. 161.  On 1 July 2001 the head of the FSB informed the first applicant that the servicemen of the 33rd regiment could detain Mr Moul Usumov for up to ten days. He asked the applicant to bring some clothes for her husband. However, a day later, the officer told her that he could not help her as superior power structures had taken charge of Mr Moul Usumov. The applicant was no longer allowed to talk to him. 162.  Sometime later the deputy military commander informed the applicants that Mr Moul Usumov had been released between 15 and 18 July 2001 along with the seven other detainees. Those individuals later confirmed that they had been detained together with Mr Moul Usumov but that he had not been released with them. 163.  The applicants have not seen Mr Moul Usumov since 30 June 2001.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 164.  On various dates in July 2001 and 2002 the investigators questioned the applicants, Mr Sheykhi Usumov, the applicants’ relatives and a number of other residents of Kurchaloy whose relatives had been abducted on the same date. The witnesses provided similar detailed accounts of the abduction and consistently stated that their relatives, including Mr Moul Usumov, had been detained by military servicemen during a security operation. They provided detailed descriptions of the abductors’ vehicles and related the details of their conversations with the military commander, who had promised to release their relatives. 165.  On 18 and 27 July 2001 the investigators questioned four military officers from military unit no. 3526, all of whom confirmed that as a result of the special operation in Kurchaloy eight men had been detained and taken to military unit no. 3526. From there the detainees had been taken elsewhere by helicopter. 166.  Between 5 and 19 December 2001 the investigators questioned seven police officers who had participated in the special operation in Kurchaloy. All of them stated that they had participated in the operation, visited and searched the houses of local residents and taken several local residents to the premises of military unit no. 3526 and left them there. 167.  On 27 March 2002 the investigators questioned the deputy commander of military unit no. 12016, officer S.V., who confirmed that on 30 June 2001 a special operation had been carried out in Kurchaloy and that as a result of that operation several men had been detained and taken to the premises of military unit no. 3526. 168.  On 28 May 2002 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the headquarters of military unit no. 12016, colonel K.I., who stated that private V.Z. had used physical force against Mr Moul Usumov and the other men detained as a result of the special operation on 30 June 2001; the private had been killed on 8 July 2001. 169.  On various dates in 2001 and 2002 and then in 2009 the investigators questioned a number of servicemen, whose statements may be summarised as follows: they confirmed the fact of the special operation and the detention of the local residents, including the applicants’ relative, but they had no information as to their subsequent whereabouts.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 170.  On 9 July 2001 the Argun district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 39038. In the documents submitted this case was also referred to under no. 14/00/0020-01D and no. 34/33/0406-01D. 171.  On 20 July 2001 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 in Khankala took over the investigation. The applicant was informed thereof on 16 April 2004. 172.  On 27 July 2001 the investigators examined the crime scene at the dugout situated on the premises of military unit no. 12016, where eight residents of Kurchaloy had been detained after their apprehension on 30 June 2001. 173.  On 17 December 2001 the investigators received information from the military counterintelligence unit of the Russian FSB that Mr Moul Usumov, as well as five other persons detained “during the same special operation of 30 June 2001” in Kurchaloy, had been involved in illegal armed groups. 174.  On 7 June 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 denied the involvement of servicemen in the abduction. 175.  On 20 June 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the North Caucasus military command informed the applicants of the following:\n“During the investigation of criminal case no. 14/00/0020-01D ..., it has been established that Mr Moul Usumov was among the persons arrested by servicemen of the first united squadron (первый сводный отряд) on suspicion of involvement in illegal armed groups. The servicemen took the arrested men in APCs to a heliport, and then they took them by helicopter to the squadron’s premises in the Novogroznenskiy settlement. The servicemen then placed the arrested men in an empty engineering warehouse and kept them there until 15-17 July 2001. Since the arrested men’s involvement in illegal armed groups had not been confirmed, between 15 and 17 July 2001 they were released and driven to the Gudermes district. All the arrested men, except Mr Moul Usumov, returned home. Although it was confirmed that the federal servicemen had released Mr Moul Usumov, it has been impossible to establish his whereabouts. On 8 July 2002 the criminal investigation opened in connection with the abduction of the Kurchaloy residents was terminated on the grounds of the death of the suspect ...” 176.  From the documents submitted it appears that no investigative steps were taken in the criminal case between July 2004 and December 2008. Meanwhile, on 3 November 2006, 3 March 2008, 20 August 2008 and 1 November 2008 the first applicant wrote to the Kurchaloy district prosecutor’s office and the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102, asking them to inform her of the progress of the investigation and grant her victim status in the criminal case. 177.  On 27 January 2009 the investigation in case no. 14/00/0020‑01D in connection with Mr Moul Usumov’s abduction was resumed. On an unspecified date in 2009 the first applicant was granted victim status. 178.  On 2 March 2009 the investigations committee of the Prosecutor General’s office at the Znamenskiy Garrison of the Strategic Missile Troops (Ракетные войска стратегического назначения) suspended the investigation in case no. 34/33/0406‑01D and discontinued the part of the criminal proceedings concerning the involvement of officer Mr Yu.K.. In so far as relevant, the decision stated as follows:\n“On 30 June 2001, as a result of a special operation conducted by servicemen of the Kurchaloy military commander’s office under the supervision of Colonel V.I. Pelishchenko, servicemen arrested Mr Moul Usumov [and seven other men] and took them to the premises of the first united squadron stationed at military unit no. 12106 in Novogroznenskiy. Following the orders of Mr Yu.K., the squadron commander, and Mr V.M., the deputy commander of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA”) for special operations, the servicemen placed the arrested men in pits. Mr Yu.K. cannot be held responsible ... since he acted on the orders of Mr V.M. and in the context of counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus aimed at the identification of members of illegal armed groups which were conducted by power structures legally authorised to carry out investigative search measures in Chechnya, namely the Special Early Response Unit (Специальный отряд быстрого реагирования, СОБР) of the East-Siberian Anti-Organised Crime Department (РУБОП) and the special purpose unit of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (ГУИН) at the Ministry of Justice. Moreover, on 9 July 2002 the criminal proceedings brought against Mr V.M. on suspicion of abuse of authority ... were terminated for lack of corpus delicti.” 179.  On 2 March and 3 April 2009 the investigator informed the applicants of the decision of 2 March 2009. 180.  The criminal proceedings are still pending. 181.  The applicant is Mr Ovkhad Tamayev, who was born in 1940 and lives in Roshni-Chu, Urus‑Martan District, the Chechen Republic. He is represented before the Court by Mr Suleyman Visengereyev, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 182.  The applicant is the father of Mr Akhdan Tamayev, who was born in 1972.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicant’s son 183.  At the material time Mr Akhdan Tamayev lived with his family and the applicant in the settlement of Roshni-Chu. The settlement was under curfew. According to the documents he submitted, between 4 and 6 January 2001 Russian servicemen conducted a sweeping-up operation in Roshni‑Chu. The operation’s head office was stationed on the outskirts of the settlement. 184.  On 6 January 2001, at around 9 a.m., the applicant went to the local administration, taking Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s passport with him. Meanwhile, a group of servicemen arrived at the applicant’s house and took Mr Akhdan Tamayev with them because he had failed to show his passport. They put him in a GAZ-66 lorry and drove to the outskirts of Roshni Chu. 185.  The abduction took place in the presence of Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s wife, who immediately ran to the local administration, where she found the applicant and told him about the events. When the applicant returned home, Akhdan was not there. The house was surrounded by servicemen armed with machine guns, accompanied by the head of the administration, Mr Mamatsuyev. A serviceman took Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s passport and assured the applicant that his son would soon be released. Shortly thereafter, Mr G. Gadzhiyev, the military commander for the Urus-Martan district, and Mr Z. Kuryayev, the head of the Urus-Martan ROVD, arrived at the scene. They informed the applicant that Mr Akhdan Tamayev would be taken to the ROVD for an identity check and then released. 186.  On the same day, the servicemen arrested two other residents, the brothers Mr Muslim Movkayev and Mr Alikhan Movkayev. After their release that evening, the brothers informed the applicant that Mr Akhdan Tamayev had been arrested with them. The servicemen had taken the three men to the town’s outskirts in the GAZ-66 lorry, kept them there until 5 p.m. and then taken them to the ROVD. At around 6 p.m. Mr Muslim Movkayev and Mr Alikhan Movhad been released, but Mr Akhdan Tamayev had remained at the police station. 187.  On 7 January 2001 Mr Mamatsuyev told the applicant that he had gone to the ROVD, where he had been promised that Mr Akhdan Tamayev would be released at 10 a.m. on that day. However, he was not released. 188.  On 5 February 2001 the applicant went to the police station. An officer informed him that Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s detention there had been officially registered and that he had been transferred to a department of the FSB. 189.  The applicant has not seen Mr Akhdan Tamayev since 6 January 2001.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 190.  Between 27 January and 15 February 2001, in April 2001 and between 23 July and 7 August 2003, the investigators questioned the applicant, Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s wife, Mr Muslim Movkayev and Mr Alikhan Movkayev, five neighbours and relatives, and six officers, namely Mr A.K., a police officer, officers V.N. and N.Su. of the Penza ROVD who were at the material time working at the Urus-Martan ROVD, Mr T., Mr Kuryayev who was the head of the police, and Mr Mamatsuyev. All the witnesses corroborated the applicant’s version of the events. 191.  In particular, when questioned, the six officers acknowledged that Russian servicemen had conducted a sweeping-up operation on 6 January 2001. According to Mr Kuryayev, Colonel L. had been in charge of the operation. As a result of the operation three men had been taken to the ROVD but their detention had not been officially registered. After a call from the Urus-Martan FSB at around 5 p.m., four or five FSB officers had come to take Mr Akhdan Tamayev with them. The other two detainees had been released.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 192.  On 10, 12, 15, 22, 25 and 26 January 2001 the applicant and his wife complained to various law-enforcement agencies about the abduction. 193.  On 27 January 2001 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 25014. 194.  On 5 March 2001 the district prosecutor’s office decided to transfer the investigation to a military prosecutor’s office, given that servicemen had been involved in the abduction. Referring to witness statements, the decision stated that Mr Akhdan Tamayev had been arrested during a sweeping-up operation, and taken to the police station and then to the FSB. 195.  On 24 March 2001 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 took over the investigation, assigning number 14/33/0168-01-D to the case file. 196.  On 9 April 2001 the FSB military counter-intelligence unit of the North Caucasus Circuit denied having any information about Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s arrest and reported that their forces had not participated in the special operation of 6 January 2001. 197.  On 27 April 2001 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed thereof. 198.  On 27 June 2001 the military prosecutor’s office of the North Caucasus military command transferred the investigation back to the district prosecutor’s office, as the involvement of FSB servicemen in the abduction had not been confirmed. 199.  On 29 December 2001 the district prosecutor’s office took over and resumed the investigation. 200.  On 6 January 2002 the Urus-Martan ROVD reported to the investigators that they had no information as to the identity of the servicemen who had been on duty at the ROVD on 6 January 2001, and that it was impossible to establish their whereabouts. 201.  On 29 January 2002 the district prosecutor’s office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the ROVD officers in connection with Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s abduction, as they had been “acting within the scope of their duties” in handing him over to the FSB officers. On the same date, the investigation was suspended. The applicant was not informed thereof. 202.  Since that time the investigation has been resumed and suspended on numerous occasions. On several occasions supervising prosecutors criticised the progress of the proceedings, ordering the investigators to take a number of basic steps, such as questioning the ROVD officers, checking the reasons for the officials’ failure to register Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s detention at the police station, and verifying the theory of the involvement of FSB officers in the abduction. In particular, on 2 August 2004 the district prosecutor wrote to the Chief Military Prosecutor asking him to take disciplinary measures in respect of the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102, who had failed to comply with his numerous requests to assist the investigation. The applicant was not informed as to the progress of the criminal proceedings. 203.  On 9 and 23 August 2005 and 23 December 2006 the Urus-Martan district FSB denied having any knowledge of Mr Akhdan Tamayev’s arrest or his involvement in illegal armed groups, or any information as to the identity of the district FSB officers who had been on duty on 6 January 2001. 204.  On 31 August 2006 the applicant’s wife, Ms A.T., requested that the investigators provide her with an update on the criminal proceedings. In reply, on 11 October 2006 the investigators informed the applicant and his wife that a search for their son, as well as a search for the perpetrators, was in progress. 205.  On 11 and 26 August 2009 the applicant requested information on the progress of the investigation, asked to be granted victim status and requested permission to familiarise himself with the witness statements in the investigation file. On 26 August 2009 his request was granted and he was allowed to access certain documents from the investigation file. 206.  On 12 September 2009 the investigation was suspended again. It is still pending. 207.  The applicants are:\n(1) Mr Vakhita Ibragimov, who was born in 1960,\n(2) Mr Ilyas Ibragimov, who was born in 1984,\n(3) Ms Satsita Sakhabova, who was born in 1963,\n(4) Ms Toita Sadulayeva, who was born in 1935,\n(5) Ms Zara Aduzova, who was born in 1976,\n(6) Mr Umar Sadulayev, who was born in 2002, and\n(7) Mr Abdul-Vakhid Sadulayev who was born in 1957.\nThe first, second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth applicants live in Shali, Shali district, the Chechen Republic. The seventh applicant lives in Grozny, the Chechen Republic. The applicants are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 208.  The first and third applicants are the parents of Mr Islam Ibragimov, who was born in 1982; the second applicant is his brother. The fourth applicant is the mother of Mr Apti Sadulayev, who was born in 1976; the fifth applicant is his wife, the sixth applicant is his son and the seventh applicant is his brother.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relatives 209.  At the material time Mr Islam Ibragimov and Mr Apti Sadulayev resided in two neighbouring houses in Shali with the applicants and their respective families. 210.  On 17 January 2003, at 4 a.m., a group of armed and masked servicemen arrived at the applicants’ homes in seven APCs with obscured registration plates. They burst into the two houses, ordered everyone in unaccented Russian to lie down on the floor, and checked the identity documents of Mr Islam Ibragimov, Mr Apti Sadulayev and the first applicant. Then the servicemen took them outside, along with the second applicant and Mr Apti Sadulayev’s cousin, Mr Rashid Sadulayev, forced them into an APC, pulling their T-shirts over their heads, and drove away. Three wooden ammunition boxes dropped off one of the APCs. One of the servicemen told the third applicant to look for their relatives at the ROVD. After the abductors’ departure the applicants found, along with the ammunition boxes, several pieces of fog light glass from one of the APCs. 211.  At first, Mr Islam Ibragimov and the first and second applicants were placed in the same APC, together with Mr Apti Sadulayev and Mr Rashid Sadulayev. After about twenty-five minutes the servicemen pulled over, took the arrested men outside, made them lie down on the ground, then put them back in the APC, save for the second applicant, who was put in another APC, which continued to drive. The servicemen drove the second applicant to Tsotsy-Yurt (also spelled as Tsotsan-Yurt) and released him. As to the other four arrested men, their APC pulled over again and the men were put on the ground, asked to say their names and then placed in a wagon. Forty minutes later the servicemen put Mr Rashid Sadulayev and the first applicant in a Ural lorry and drove away. After about thirty minutes the two men arrived at a garage-like building where they were kept until 18 January 2003. According to the applicants, the two men must have been detained in a windmill in Staryie Atagi, which was used as a filtering point by Russian servicemen (see the case of Arzu Akhmadova and Others v. Russia, no. 13670/03, § 195, 8 January 2009 concerning detention in the mill). After that, the men were taken in an APC to the vicinity of the town of Argun and released. 212.  In the days following the abduction, the applicants and their relatives and neighbours contacted various authorities. In particular, in Khankala the applicants’ relative Mr Khasin Abkayev met with Generals Said-Selim Tsuyev and Ibragim Suleymanov, both of whom promised their assistance in the release of the abducted men, and Generals Abrashin and Pospelov, who said that the matter was not within their competence. Further, another of the applicants’ relatives, Mr Bachal Baysuyev, talked to the Chechen President Akhmed-Khadzhi Kadyrov and to General Makarov, both of whom promised to help solve the matter within a week but failed to do so. According to officials, a criminal investigation had been opened against Mr Islam Ibragimov and Mr Apti Sadulayev and both of them were being questioned by the prosecuting authorities. Mr Fedorov, the Shali military commander, confirmed this on local television, adding that they were safe and sound. The applicants did not manage to obtain a recording of the television programme. 213.  The applicants have not seen Mr Islam Ibragimov or Mr Apti Sadulayev since 17 January 2003.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 214.  On 30 January 2003 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who provided a detailed description of the abduction. In particular, he stated that he had been abducted along with a number of his relatives, taken away in an APC and then released near to Tsotsi-Yurt. 215.  On the same date, the investigators granted the fourth applicant victim status and questioned her. She described in detail the circumstances of her son’s abduction. In particular, she stated that the abductors had taken her son away in an APC and that a number of other local residents had been abducted by the same group on the same night. 216.  On 31 January 2003 the investigators granted victim status to the first applicant and questioned him. He provided a detailed description of the abduction. In particular, he stated that he had been placed in the same APC as his two sons, Mr Islam Ibragimov and Mr Ilyas Ibragimov, and that he had been taken to a building where he had spent about twenty-four hours, with his t-shirt pulled over his head and next to Mr Rashid Sadulayev, whom he had been able to identify by his voice. Both of them had been released somewhere near to Argun. 217.  On 21 October 2006 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who described in detail the circumstances surrounding the abduction. In particular, he stated that at first he had been taken by the abductors to the premises of checkpoint no. 112 manned by a Special Police Task Force from the Primorskiy region, and then to a garage for more than one day, where he had been handcuffed and questioned about members of illegal armed groups. 218.  On various dates in October 2006 the investigators questioned five of the applicants’ relatives, who gave statements similar to the ones given by the applicants in 2003.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 219.  On an unspecified date the head of the Shali district administration stated that Mr Islam Ibragimov and Mr Apti Sadulayev had been “driven away in the direction of Khankala by unidentified servicemen in seven APCs, a UAZ car and other vehicles”. 220.  On 17 January 2003 investigators from the Shali district prosecutor’s office (“the district prosecutor’s office”) examined the crime scene, questioned the eyewitnesses and collected the three wooden ammunition boxes and the pieces of fog light glass left behind by the perpetrators. The applicants believed that an expert evaluation would enable the identification of the power structure to which the servicemen and their vehicles belonged. No such evaluation was ordered or carried out. 221.  On 27 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 22017 in connection with the abduction of Mr Islam Ibragimov and Mr Apti Sadulayev “by federal forces servicemen who were armed with machine guns”. On 30 and 31 January 2003 respectively the fourth and the first applicants were granted victim status. 222.  On 22 April 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20116 informed the applicants that no servicemen under their supervision had either conducted special operations or arrested or taken anyone to a law-enforcement agency. 223.  On 4 September 2003 the first and fourth applicants wrote to the investigation team stating that they had been informed by the Shali military commander, who had himself been informed by General Pospelov, that after the abduction their sons had been taken to the headquarters of the Russian federal forces in Khankala, Chechnya. At some later point General Pospelov denied having provided that information to the Shali military commander and told the applicants that the information “was not verified”. The investigators took no further steps to verify that information. 224.  On 2 November 2006 the Shali ROVD informed the applicants that they were taking a number of investigative steps, including forwarding information requests to power structures in Chechnya, examining unidentified bodies against the ROVD’s databases and checking the details of admissions to hospitals in the Shali district. 225.  The investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions, without producing any tangible results. The last suspension took place on 22 October 2006. The applicants were not informed thereof. 226.  On 9 October 2008 the first and the fourth applicants requested permission to access the investigation file. On 18 October and 21 November 2008 respectively the request was granted in part and they were allowed to make copies of the decisions opening and suspending the criminal investigation and granting victim status. 227.  On an unspecified date in September 2009 the first applicant again requested permission to access the investigation file, but to no avail. 228.  On 26 January 2010 the applicants’ representatives wrote to the investigator, asking him to inform them of the progress of the investigation. No reply was given. 229.  On 20 March 2010 the applicants were informed that the Chechnya Investigations Committee had taken over the investigation of the criminal case. 230.  The criminal proceedings are still pending. 231.  The applicants are Ms Malkan Anayeva, who was born in 1959, and Ms Rayana Elmurzayeva, who was born in 2002. They live in Stariye Atagi, Grozny district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 232.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Ziyavdi (also referred to as Ziyavdin) Elmurzayev, who was born in 1979; the second applicant is his daughter.\n(a)  Events surrounding the abduction of the applicants’ relative 233.  At the material time the applicants resided in Stariye Atagi with their family, including Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev and Mr Zayndi Elmurzayev, the first applicant’s husband. 234.  On 21 April 2002, at around 7.30 a.m., a group of about fifty or sixty armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in APC no. 422 BB and two armoured infantry combat vehicles nos. 344 and 346. They were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. The servicemen broke into the house, arrested Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev and Mr Zayndi Elmurzayev, dragged them outside, put them in the APC and departed towards the outskirts of Stariye Atagi. After about a hundred metres they had to let Mr Zayndi Elmurzayev go as he was having a stroke. Then the servicemen continued driving until they arrived at a windmill on the outskirts of Stariye Atagi where a Russian military unit was stationed. 235.  The applicants and their relatives and neighbours followed the servicemen. When they approached the windmill, they saw the three abductors’ vehicles parked on the premises of the military unit. When the servicemen’s noticed the visitors they obscured the registration plates with mud. The deputy head of the Stariye Atagi administration was refused permission to enter the premises. 236.  At around 3 p.m. on the same day servicemen left the military unit in two APCs, one of which had registration number 422 BB, a white VAZ‑2106 car and a khaki UAZ “tabletka” minivan with blackened windows. They drove in the direction of Grozny. The applicants have not seen Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev since his abduction on 21 April 2002.\n(b)  Official investigation into the abduction\n(i)  Main witness statements taken by the investigation 237.  On 30 April 2002 the investigators questioned the first applicant and her husband Mr Zayndi Elmurzayev, both of whom provided a detailed description of the abduction similar to the one furnished to the Court. In particular, they stated that the abductors had ordered the head of the village administration to come to the local police station to pick up Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev, and that the abductors had taken their son away in an APC registration number 422 BB and two armoured infantry combat vehicles nos. 344 and 346. 238.  On 2 May 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s relative Mr A.E., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one given by the first applicant and her husband. In addition, he stated that when he had arrived at the police station with the relatives and the head of the administration, Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev had not been there. On 26 April 2002 he had spoken with the local journalist Mr R.T., who had given him a copy of a report by the regional headquarters of the counter-terrorist operation in the North Caucasus covering 21 and 22 April 2002. The witness furnished the investigators with the document; its text included the following:\n“An active member of illegal armed groups, Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev (call name “Bayram”) was eliminated resisting [arrest]. According to the available information, he was a member of the illegal armed unit of Mr M. Sadayev, which belonged to the illegal armed group of Khattab”. 239.  On 15 January 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours, Ms L.B. and Mr M.B., both of whom stated that they had learnt in 2002 of Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev’s abduction by federal servicemen from fellow villagers, and that prior to the abduction Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev had been suspected of illegal activities.\n(ii)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 240.  On 29 April 2002 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 56060. 241.  On 30 April 2002 the investigation requested that the military authorities inform them of any special operations conducted on 21 April 2002 in Stariye Atagi. According to the replies, no such operations were carried out. 242.  On 22 June 2002 the FSB denied the involvement of Chechnya FSB officers in the abduction. 243.  On 29 June 2002 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 244.  By a letter of 13 July 2002 the head of the criminal investigations department at the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicants that Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev was alive and was serving a sentence. However, at some later point an officer from the prosecutor’s office told the applicants that the letter had been sent to them by mistake. The applicants did not keep a copy of the letter. 245.  On 23 July 2002 the district prosecutor’s office stated that “... Mr Ziyavdi Elmurzayev was abducted by federal servicemen, who put him in APC no. 422 BB, and, accompanied by two infantry combat vehicles, nos. 344 and 346, took him to the windmill near to Stariye Atagi. After that, the same servicemen departed in the direction of Grozny in two APCs, one of which was APC no. 442, a white VAZ-2106 and a khaki UAZ “tabletka”. 246.  On 30 April 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. The applicants were informed thereof on 25 May 2003. 247.  On 20 June 2003 the investigation was again suspended. The applicants were informed that the investigation had been suspended but the police were taking operational search measures to identify the perpetrators. It appears that no investigative steps were taken until 18 December 2006, when the investigation was resumed and the applicants were informed thereof. 248.  On 12 January 2007 the first applicant’s husband was granted victim status in the criminal case. 249.  On 18 January 2007 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended and the applicants were informed thereof. 250.  In the autumn of 2007 the Grozny Investigations Department took over the investigation. The applicants were informed thereof on 17 March 2010. 251.  The criminal proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Lviv. 6.  On 17 August 2010 the applicant notified the Lviv City Mayor on behalf of a local human-rights NGO, “Vartovi zakonu”, of its intention to hold a demonstration every Tuesday from 10.30 a.m. to 1 p.m. near the building of the Lviv Regional Prosecutor’s Office during the period between 17 August 2010 and 1 January 2011. The aim of the demonstration was to draw attention to the issue of corruption in the prosecution service. The number of possible participants was declared as up to fifty persons. There is no information as to whether any such demonstration was held prior to 12 October 2010 (see below). 7.  On 5 October 2010 the Executive Committee of the Lviv City Council lodged a claim with the Lviv Administrative Court seeking to restrict the demonstration announced by the applicant. On 6 October 2010 the court left the above claim without consideration as being submitted too late. The Executive Committee resubmitted its claim on 11 October with a request for renewal of the time-limit for lodging the claim. The same day the court allowed the request and accepted the claim for examination. 8.  On Tuesday 12 October 2010, further to his previous announcement of 17 August 2010, the applicant informed the City Council about the demonstration to be held on that particular day. He thus organised a peaceful demonstration near the Lviv Regional Prosecutor’s Office later that day between 11.30 a.m. and 12.40 a.m. About twenty-five persons took part. They were standing on the pavement in front of the building of the Prosecutor’s Office when the police told them that they should remain at a distance of five metres from the building. That would have forced the demonstrators to stand in the road and obstruct the traffic. After some discussion with the police, they crossed the road and stood on a lawn on the opposite side. The police, however, told the demonstrators that they could not stand on the lawn and should move away, which meant standing in the road again and obstructing the traffic, causing temporary traffic-jams. 9.  Immediately afterwards, the applicant was called aside by two police officers. They grabbed his arms and took him in the direction of the nearby police station. Some of the demonstrators requested the officers to show them their identification and started filming the incident; the officers then let the applicant go. 10.  On 13 October 2010 the Lviv Regional Administrative Court granted a request by the Executive Committee of the Lviv City Council to prohibit the holding of the pre-announced demonstrations by the applicant’s NGO as from 19 October 2010. The decision was appealed against. 11.  According to the applicant, on the same day he was invited to the police station on the pretext that he had failed to appear at a court hearing to which he had been summoned. Upon his arrival at the Galytskyy District Police Station at about 5 p.m., the police accused the applicant of having committed the administrative offences of malicious disobedience to a lawful order by the police and of breaching the procedure for organising and holding a demonstration on 12 October. Between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. the police drew up reports on those administrative offences. The applicant telephoned his lawyer, but the latter was not allowed onto the premises of the police station. At 11 p.m. the applicant was placed in a cell, where he remained without food until 3 p.m. on the next day, 14 October 2010. 12.  On 14 October 2010, before taking him to the court, the police drew up anew the reports on the administrative offences of malicious disobedience to a lawful order by the police and of breaching the procedure for organising and holding a demonstration. In their reports they referred to provisions of the Code on Administrative Offences and to the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations in the city of Lviv (see paragraphs 21 and 28 to 30 below). The reports were signed by the applicant. 13.  At 3 p.m. the applicant was taken to the Galytskyy District Court. He had no opportunity to study the case-file materials before the court hearing. During the hearing, the court rejected the applicant’s request to be represented by the lawyer of his choosing on the ground that the applicant was a human-rights defender and could defend himself. The applicant’s request to summon and question witnesses and examine a video made during the events of 12 October 2010 was also rejected by the court. 14.  By a decision of the same day, the court found the applicant guilty of committing the administrative offences of malicious disobedience to a lawful order by the police, and of breaching the procedure for organising and holding a demonstration. The court noted that the applicant had held a street march without the permission of the Lviv City Council and had ignored the lawful demands of the police to stop breaching the peace. He also refused to follow the police to their station but instead called the participants in the demonstration, who shouted and threatened the officers. The applicant denied all accusations. Having heard the applicant and examined the case-file materials, the court concluded that the applicant’s testimony was refuted by the written reports of the police officers and the traffic police officers. The court noted that the said reports had been drawn up correctly and therefore had to be taken into account. It sentenced the applicant to three days of administrative detention starting from 6 p.m. on 14 October 2010 with reference to the relevant provisions of the Code on Administrative Offences. 15.  At around 6 p.m. on 17 October 2010 the applicant was released. 16.  On 18 October 2010 the applicant appealed against the court’s decision of 14 October 2010. In his appeal, he complained that he had been found guilty even though he had not committed the alleged offences. He noted that under Article 39 of the Constitution a demonstration could be held subject to notifying the authorities and any restrictions on holding one could be imposed only by a court; no permission had therefore been required. He also noted that he had notified the City Council twice about the gathering in question and at the time it was held there had been no court decision prohibiting it. Therefore, he considered that he had organised the gathering of 12 October 2010 lawfully and the conclusions of the first-instance court that he had “held a meeting without permission of the City Council” had not been based on law as no such permission was required by domestic law. He further challenged the conclusion of the police that he had notified the authorities about the event only a few hours in advance, claiming that he had already done so on 17 August 2010. Furthermore, in his opinion, even the requirement of notification two days in advance, which had been established by the procedure for organising and holding meetings, rallies, street marches and demonstrations in the city of Lviv and to which the police referred in their reports on administrative offences, was not based on law, as the Constitutional Court in its decision of 19 April 2001 had decided that the procedure for such notification had to be a matter for legislative regulation. 17.  The applicant further maintained in his appeal that, in the absence of any lawful restrictions on holding a demonstration, demands by the police to stop such an event could not be considered lawful and the law did not provide for liability for disobeying unlawful demands of police officers. He finally complained that the first-instance court had violated his right to defend himself as it had refused to allow his lawyer to appear in the case on the ground that the applicant was a human-rights defender and therefore able to defend his rights himself. 18.  In a supplement to his appeal of 27 October 2010, the applicant complained that his punishment violated Article 11 of the Convention. Referring to provisions of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b-d) of the Convention, he further complained that his right to defend himself had been violated, and that the first-instance court had refused to question the witnesses and to examine a video record of the peaceful demonstration. 19.  On 27 October 2010 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer and rejected it. It summarised the findings of the first-instance court and the arguments of the applicant’s appeal. The court noted that the findings of the first-instance court as to the applicant’s guilt were well-founded and corresponded to the factual circumstances of the case. Those findings, in the court’s opinion, were confirmed by the police reports and other explanations and evidence. In reply to the applicant’s arguments to the effect that there had been no corpus delicti in his actions, the Court of Appeal noted that they should be disregarded, because they were refuted by the body of evidence in the case, without elaborating further on that point. The court referred in its decision to the relevant provisions of the Code on Administrative Offences.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": true, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Petrozavodsk. 6.  In March and September 1996 the applicant won two cases in court against her former employer, a State-owned enterprise, and was awarded a sum of money. 7.  Consequently, enforcement proceedings were instituted by the bailiff and one of the judgments was partly executed. 8.  On 14 April 1997 the bailiff transmitted the materials relating to the enforcement proceedings to the Liquidation Committee as there were bankruptcy proceedings instituted in respect of the enterprise. 9.  The enterprise was declared bankrupt in June 1998 and its debts were considered as paid upon termination of the bankruptcy proceedings in March 1999. No money was paid to the applicant due to the lack of funds. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted court proceedings against various public authorities seeking pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages for the non-enforcement of the court judgments. She claimed that the judgments had not been enforced due to the bailiff's failure to take timely measures to facilitate their enforcement. 11.  On 13 June 2000 the Petrozavodsk Town Court of the Republic of Karelia (Петрозаводский городской суд Республики Карелия) ruled in the applicant's favour. The Town Court found that during the period when the enforcement proceedings were managed by the bailiff, i.e. before 14 April 1997, the enterprise carried out economic activities and paid taxes. However, within that period the bailiff failed to take all the necessary measures to facilitate the timely enforcement of the court judgments. The applicant was awarded pecuniary damages in the amount of 53,655 Russian roubles to be paid from the Federal Treasury. Her claims for non-pecuniary damages were rejected. 12.  On 25 July 2000 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia (Верховный Суд Республики Карелия) upheld the judgment of the Town Court in the final instance. 13.  On 10 August 2000 the bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings on the basis of the court judgment of 13 June 2000. The bailiff ordered the Ministry of Finance (Министерство Финансов РФ) voluntarily to comply with the judgment by 16 August 2000. 14.  On an unspecified date in 2000, while the enforcement proceedings were still in progress, the President of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia (Председатель Верховного Суда Республики Карелия) lodged an application for supervisory review (протест в порядке надзора) of the judgment of 13 June and the decision of 25 July 2000. 15.  On 6 December 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia (Президиум Верховного Суда Республики Карелия) decided to quash the said decisions on the grounds that they conflicted with procedural and substantive laws. The case was remitted for a new examination at first instance. 16.  On an unspecified date following the Presidium's decision the bailiff applied to the courts seeking to stay the enforcement proceedings until there was a final decision taken on the merits of the case. 17.  On 12 January 2001 the Petrozavodsk Town Court of the Republic of Karelia found that in the present circumstances the enforcement proceedings should be terminated rather than stayed. 18.  By decision of 2 March 2001 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia upheld the decision of the Town Court and decided in the final instance to terminate the enforcement proceedings. 19.  On 15 March 2001 the Petrozavodsk Town Court of the Republic of Karelia delivered a new judgment on the merits, rejecting the applicant's claims. The Town Court found that the bailiff had not been responsible for the non-enforcement of the court judgments as the enterprise lacked any assets at the relevant time. 20.  On 17 April 2001 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Karelia upheld the judgment of the Town Court in the final instance.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Bradford. 6.  The applicant was employed by Serco Limited (“Serco”) from 5 December 2003 to his dismissal on 30 June 2004. Serco provided transport to local authorities, including Bradford City Council. 7.  The applicant, who is white British, was employed formerly as a driver’s escort and latterly as a driver. As such, he was responsible for transporting children and adults with physical and/or mental disabilities within the Bradford area. The majority of his passengers were Asian in origin. There had been no complaints about his work or his conduct at work and his supervisor, who was of Asian origin, had nominated him for the award of “first-class employee”. 8.  On 26 May 2004 a local newspaper article published in Bradford and the surrounding areas identified the applicant as a candidate for the British National Party (“the BNP”) in the forthcoming local elections. On the same day, the applicant was temporarily assigned to deliver mail to local council offices. 9.  At the relevant time the BNP only extended membership to white nationals. According to its constitution it was:\n“wholly opposed to any form of integration between British and non-European peoples. It is therefore committed to stemming and reversing the tide of non-white immigration and to restoring, by legal changes, negotiation and consent, the overwhelmingly white makeup of the British population that existed in Britain prior to 1948.” 10.  On 27 May 2004 UNISON, the public sector workers’ trade union, sent a letter to Serco stating that many of its members found the applicant’s continued employment a “significant cause for concern, bearing in mind the BNP’s overt and racist/fascist agenda.” The letter advised Serco that 70-80 percent of its customer base and 35 percent of its workforce were of Asian origin. UNISON asked that Serco take immediate action to ensure its members were not subjected to racial hatred. Another trade union, GMB, and a number of employees also made representations to Serco about the applicant’s continued employment. 11.  On 15 June 2004 the applicant was elected as a local councillor for the BNP. After taking legal advice Serco summarily dismissed him on 30 June 2004. Serco cited, inter alia, potential health and safety risks as the applicant’s continued employment would give rise to considerable anxiety among passengers and their carers. It also expressed concern that the applicant’s continued employment could jeopardise its reputation and possibly lead to the loss of its contract with Bradford City Council. 12.  Ordinarily, one year’s service is required before an employee can bring an action for unfair dismissal under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”), although this qualifying period does not apply where the dismissal was on grounds of pregnancy, race, sex or religion. The applicant therefore lacked sufficient continuous service to bring an action for unfair dismissal. However, on 12 August 2004 he lodged a statutory claim of race discrimination in the Employment Tribunal pursuant to the Race Relations Act 1976 (“the 1976 Act”). 13.  The applicant claimed that he had been unlawfully discriminated against as his dismissal constituted less favourable treatment on racial grounds. The racial grounds relied on were those of the passengers and employees of Serco who were of Asian origin. He further argued that since the BNP was a “whites-only” party, his dismissal also constituted indirect racial discrimination. 14.  The Employment Tribunal gave judgment on 2 February 2005. It noted Serco’s concerns that the applicant’s continued employment might lead to difficulties with other employees; damage its relationship with the unions; lead to attacks on Serco’s minibuses which would jeopardise the health and safety of Serco’s staff, its vulnerable passengers, and the applicant himself; cause considerable anxiety amongst Serco’s passengers and those relatives/carers entrusting vulnerable passengers to its care; and damage its reputation so as potentially to place at risk existing contracts and future bids for work in the public sector and elsewhere. 15.  The Employment Tribunal dismissed the claim of direct discrimination as it was satisfied that if any discrimination existed against the claimant it was not on racial grounds but rather on health and safety grounds. The Tribunal also dismissed the claim of indirect discrimination on the ground that the applicant’s dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, namely the maintenance of health and safety. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Employment Appeal Tribunal. On 27 July 2005 his appeal was upheld on the ground that the Tribunal had erred in its construction of the phrase “on racial grounds” by failing to interpret its meaning broadly and had not indicated how it had come to the conclusion that the applicant’s dismissal was a proportionate means of achieving the aim of ensuring health and safety because, inter alia, there had been no consideration of any alternatives to dismissal. 17.  On 9 September 2005 Serco was granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 18.  On 25 May 2006 the Court of Appeal allowed Serco’s appeal and restored the order of the Employment Tribunal. Mummery LJ found the applicant’s submission that he had been subjected to direct race discrimination to be wrong in principle and inconsistent with the purposes of the legislation. 19.  In rejecting the claim of direct discrimination, the Court of Appeal noted that:\n“Mr Redfearn was treated less favourably not on the ground that he was white, but on the ground of a particular non-racial characteristic shared by him with a tiny proportion of the white population, that is membership of and standing for election for a political party like the BNP. Serco was not adopting a policy which discriminated on the basis of a dividing line of colour or race. Serco would apply the same approach to a member of a similar political party, which confined its membership to black people. The dividing line of colour or race was not made by Serco, but by the BNP which defines its own composition by colour or race. Mr Redfearn cannot credibly make a claim of direct race discrimination by Serco against him on the ground that he is white by relying on the decision of his own chosen political party to limit its membership to white people. The BNP cannot make a non-racial criterion (party membership) a racial one by the terms of its constitution limiting membership to white people. Properly analysed Mr Redfearn’s complaint is of discrimination on political grounds, which falls outside the anti-discrimination laws.” 20.  In rejecting the claim of indirect discrimination, the following was noted:\n“For indirect discrimination ... it is necessary to identify a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ which Serco has applied or would apply equally to persons not of the same race or colour. ... Mr Redfearn ... failed to present the tribunal with a case, which satisfied the requisite elements of a claim for indirect race discrimination and upon which the tribunal could properly make a finding of indirect race discrimination....\nThe employment tribunal appears to have attempted itself a version of a ‘provision, criterion or practice’ in paragraph 5.6 of its decision (see paragraph 28 above). However, it is formulated too narrowly (membership of the BNP) to be meaningful. A provision of ‘membership of the BNP’ could not be applied to a person who was not of the same colour as Mr Redfearn, because only persons of the same colour as him (white) are eligible to be members of the BNP. A more general and meaningful provision along similar lines would be one applying to membership of a political organisation like the BNP, which existed to promote views hostile to members of a different colour than those that belonged to the organisation. If such a provision were applied, however, it would not put persons of the same race as Mr Redfearn ‘at a particular disadvantage’ when compared with other persons within section 1(1A) of the 1976 Act. All such political activists would be at the same disadvantage, whatever colour they were.” 21.  Lastly, with regard to the applicant’s contention that he had been subjected to less favourable treatment arising from membership of a political party contrary to his Convention rights under Articles 9, 10, 11 and 14 and that this should have been taken into account in deciding whether indirect discrimination had been justified, the Court of Appeal stated that:\n“The 1998 Act does not assist Mr Redfearn in this case. He is not entitled to make a claim under it as Serco is not a public authority. Section 3 of the 1998 Act does not assist, as there is no respect in which the relevant provisions of the 1976 Act are incompatible with the Convention rights. As for justification under the 1976 Act I have already explained that it does not arise, as no case of indirect discrimination has been made out.” 22.  The applicant was refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Engelskirchen, Germany. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 7 (first round) and 21 (second round) April 2002 legislative elections took place in Hungary. The coalition which had governed the country from 1998 and, therefore, had been in charge of organising the elections, lost their majority. 8.  The official results of the elections were established by the local and regional electoral commissions following the second round. After the courts had ruled on certain complaints concerning the legality and outcome of the voting procedure, on 4 May 2002 the National Election Committee made a public statement in the Official Gazette, according to which the result had become final. As in previous Hungarian elections, they were virtually identical to the results of the exit poll carried out on the day of the second round and to the preliminary results announced by the Committee on the evening of 21 April 2002. Nevertheless, views were subsequently voiced in certain sections of the media that the elections had been “rigged”. 9.  International observers, in particular the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), found that the parliamentary elections had been conducted in a manner consistent with international standards and that the Hungarian election system had provided the basis for a generally transparent, accountable, free, fair and equal process.[1] 10.  A period of two months elapsed during which a new government, in a coalition of the ex-opposition parties, was formed which took up its functions on 27 May 2002. On the morning of Thursday, 4 July 2002 several hundred demonstrators started to protest against the statutory destruction of the ballots, scheduled for 20 to 22 July. They blocked the centrally located Erzsébet Bridge in Budapest with their cars. Their objective was to force a recount of the election votes. Since they brought the traffic to a complete standstill and had not given prior notice of their gathering to the police, as required by Act no. 3 of 1989 on Freedom of Assembly (“the Assembly Act”), the demonstration was dispersed after several hours. 11.  Shortly afterwards, at around 1 p.m., more demonstrators, again without any prior notification, assembled at Kossuth Square in front of the Parliament building demanding a recount of the votes and expressing their support for the participants in the morning’s events at the Erzsébet Bridge. 12.  According to the applicant’s submissions of 14 February 2005 and the Government’s observations, these demonstrators had been at the Erzsébet Bridge and then relocated to Kossuth Square. However, in her submissions of 23 December 2007, the applicant stated that they had merely been supporters of those who had blocked the Erzsébet Bridge. 13.  Having learnt of these events from the news, the applicant joined the demonstration at around 7 p.m. By that time, traffic and public transport – including the circulation of trams and trolley-buses – had become seriously disrupted in the area of Kossuth Square. The estimated number of demonstrators ranged from several hundred to two or three thousand. The police initially attempted to allow the circulation of traffic to continue but eventually had to close some streets nearby. Finally, faced with an unmanageable situation, they broke up the demonstration at about 9 p.m. without using any force. The applicant participated in the demonstration until it was dispersed. 14.  The Hungarian media reported in detail on the events, and the affair was the leading news in the country. In an official communiqué, the President of the Republic condemned the events of 4 July 2002, declaring them illegal. He underlined that Hungary was a stable parliamentary democracy where human rights were observed and where even critical views should be voiced in a lawful manner.[2] 15.  The applicant sought judicial review of the actions of the police before the Budapest Central District Court. She asserted that the dispersal of the demonstration had been unlawful. 16.  On 1 October 2003 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It established that the duty to inform the police about planned assemblies was applicable to every type of demonstration, including spontaneous ones. Since the applicant did not deny that the demonstration in question had not been notified to the police, as required by section 14 of the Assembly Act, the latter had not had any other choice but to break it up. 17.  Moreover, the court found that the duty to inform the police in advance about assemblies held in public served the protection of the public interest and the rights of others, namely the prevention of disorder and the undisturbed circulation of traffic. Therefore, it concluded that the measures taken by the police had been in compliance with the law. 18.  The applicant appealed. On 13 July 2004 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision. Its judgment was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 31 August 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Nicosia. 5.  On 20 October 1987 the applicant filed a civil action in the District Court of Paphos against two private individuals and the Government requesting damages in respect of unlawful trespass to his property and the increased costs he incurred as a result. 6.  The pleadings were completed around February/March 1989. Subsequently the case was fixed twice for mention and then for hearing on 3 October 1989, at the parties’ request for a hearing date after the summer holidays. The hearing, however, was adjourned on the latter date following an application by the applicant to that effect. 7.  On 14 November 1989, following an application by the applicant, the court issued an order for an inspection to be carried out by the Land Registry Office. The case was left sine die pending the outcome of the inspection. 8.  On 8 January 1993 the Land Registry informed the court that their report was ready. 9.  Between 8 January 1993 and 18 March 1997 the case was adjourned several times. Once at the applicant’s request and three times due to the failure of his lawyer to appear before the court, once by one of the defendants, three times at the request of all parties and once by the court itself. Within this period, the court also dealt with, inter alia, an interlocutory application filed by the defendant Government on 12 October 1995 for the dismissal of the case on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. On 8 November 1995 the court dismissed this application. An appeal was lodged by the defendant Government with the Supreme Court which was withdrawn on 21 February 1997. 10.  On 18 March 1997 the case returned to the District Court of Paphos and was set for hearing on 30 June 1997. Following two adjournments, one at the applicant’s request and the other at one of the defendant’s request, the hearing of the case commenced on 10 December 1997. 11.  The hearing was completed on 22 October 1998. Within this period, approximately ten hearing sessions were held. 12.  On 20 September 1999 the district court delivered its judgment in favour of the applicant concerning his claims against the first two defendants and awarding him costs and nominal damages. The court dismissed the action in so far as the Government was concerned. 13.  On 1 November 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court. 14.  The appeal was heard on 24 April 2001 and on 26 June 2001 the Supreme Court rejected his appeal with costs to be paid by him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Vladlen Mikhaylovich Putistin, was born in 1934 and lives in Kyiv. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant is the son of Mr Mikhail Putistin, a former Dynamo Kyiv football club player who competed in the 1936 USSR football championship when the club took second place in the competition. On 9 August 1942 the applicant’s father participated in the legendary “Death Match” between FC Start – a team mostly composed of professional football players of FC Dynamo Kyiv who were working in a bakery in Kyiv at that time - and a team of pilots from the German Luftwaffe, air defence soldiers and airport technicians (“Flakelf”). The match is known for the humiliating defeat of Flakelf (FC Start defeated Flakelf by a score of 5 - 3), despite the Flakelf players’ alleged display of lack of sportsmanship, which included physical challenges on their opponents, threats of sanctions against them and unfair refereeing by an SS officer. The victory of FC Start in that match allegedly resulted in serious repercussions for its players, who were arrested and sent to a local concentration camp where four of the players were eventually executed. 8.  In 2002 the Kyiv authorities commemorated the 60th anniversary of that match. The commemorations received wide media coverage. 9.  On 3 April 2001 the newspaper Komsomolska Pravda published an article named “The Truth about the Death Match” (original title: “Правда о Матче Смерти”) and was written by O.M., a journalist from that newspaper. In the article she recounted a plan to make a film based on the events surrounding the match of 1942. The article contained an interview with the future director and producer of the film, A.S. and D.K. It also featured a picture of the match poster from 1942 which included the names of all of the footballers who had played in that match. The article mentioned the names of four Dynamo Kyiv players who had been executed (Kuzmenko, Klimenko, Korotkikh and Trusevych), but did not name the applicant’s father. It also stated that A.S. intended to involve Mila Jovovic, Jean Reno and Andriy Shevchenko in the production of the film. The name of the applicant’s father was not legible on the picture of the 1942 match poster. In one paragraph of the article, D.K. stated that, according to his sources:\n“... Actually, there were only four Dynamo players in the Start team created by the director of the local bread factory. And these [were the players who] were executed. And other [football] players worked in the police, collaborated with the Gestapo.”\nOriginal text in Russian: “...Собственно, динамовцев в команде «Старт», которую создал директор местного хлебозавода, было лишь четверо. Их и расстреляли. А остальные игроки работали в полиции, сотрудничали с гестапо.” 10.  In July 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings against the newspaper Komsomolska Pravda and the above-mentioned journalist on the grounds that they had disseminated untrue information about his father contained in the article above (see paragraph 9 above). He sought rectification of this information. He also wished to receive compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 11.  In particular, the applicant claimed that the article suggested that the applicant’s father had collaborated with the occupying police force and the Gestapo in 1942. In support of his claims, he supplied copies of documents of the State Security Service of Ukraine, which revealed that the archives held no information about the applicant’s father’s alleged collaboration with the occupying police force or the Gestapo and that no criminal proceedings had ever been instituted against the applicant’s father in that respect. The archives also confirmed that the applicant’s father had been detained at the Syrets concentration camp. The same information was held in the Kyiv Regional State Archives, which confirmed that the applicant’s father had participated in the “Death Match” and had thereafter been detained at the Syrets concentration camp. 12.  On 25 December 2001 the Obolonskyy District Court of Kyiv rejected the applicant’s claim. It held that the applicant:\n-  was not a person who was directly affected by the publication;\n-  the article was about a film script and contained neither the name of the applicant’s father nor the applicant’s name and it also made no allegation of the applicant’s father having collaborated with the Gestapo. 13.  On 13 March 2002 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. In particular, the court of appeal found that the judgment of the first instance court was lawful and well-substantiated. 14.  On 15 November 2002 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. 15.  On 27 April 2000 the Moskovskyy District Court of Kyiv ordered the newspaper Dzerkalo Tyzhnia to rectify information published about the applicant’s father on 8 October 1999. On 29 April 2000 the newspaper published the following text:\n“Mr Putistin played for Dynamo [Kyiv]. In the summer of 1942 he and other players were arrested and sent to the Syrets concentration camp. In October 1942 he escaped.” 16.  In May 2002 the newspaper Argumenty i Fakty (in issue no. 19), published an article titled “Our Football Players Withstood Death” about the “Death Match”, which stated that only four football players from the “Death Match” had been arrested and sent to the Syrets concentration camp. The article did not contain any reference to the applicant’s father. 17.  The applicant requested the newspaper to rectify this article. In one of the following issues (issue no. 27), the newspaper published the names of all eight football players who had been arrested after the match, including the applicant’s father. 18.  The applicant, dissatisfied with the refusal of the newspaper to publish the information he himself had proposed, instituted proceedings before the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv against the newspaper, seeking the rectification of its published material and damages. The proceedings ended on 28 December 2004 with a final ruling of the Supreme Court upholding the lower courts’ decisions against the applicant. 19.  On 12 May 2003 the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv ordered the newspaper to rectify information published about the applicant’s father on 12 July 2002. The article was written by a journalist (K.) with the headline “The Myth about the ‘Death Match’”. It stated that the “Death Match” story had been created as propaganda by Soviet ideologists, and that the execution of four football players had been provoked by the NKVD (Peoples’ Commissariat of Internal Affairs, i.e. the Soviet police, predecessor of KGB, functioning as State security service). 20.  In particular, the order obliged the newspaper to publish the following:\n“Mykhaylo Fedorovych Putistin played for Dynamo Kyiv and in the summer of 1942, after playing football matches with German teams, was arrested together with other members of his team and sent to the Syrets concentration camp.” 21.  The court also rejected the applicant’s remaining claim for damages. The order of rectification was upheld on appeal on 21 October 2003 and later, in cassation proceedings, on 31 August 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicants were born in 1932 and 1933 respectively and live in Lisbon. 10.  The applicants owned a piece of land measuring 128,619 m² in the region of Evora. By order of the Ministry of Public Works, published in the Official Gazette on 11 September 1995, the land was expropriated in favour of BRISA – Auto-Estradas de Portugal S.A. (“BRISA”), a publicly owned company at the time, to build a motorway. 11.  As no agreement was reached between the applicants and the authorities, the case was submitted, in accordance with the applicable legislation, to the President of the Evora Court of Appeal, who appointed an arbitration committee to value the land. The committee assessed its value at 177,987.17 euros (EUR)[1]. 12.  On 3 March 1997 the Evora first-instance court issued an order notifying the applicants of the arbitration committee's decision. 13.  On 21 March 1997 the applicants lodged an appeal against the arbitration decision with the Evora court. In their opinion the experts had underestimated the value of their farmland and omitted to place a value on a quarry located on the land. They argued that the potential profit from exploiting the quarry should be taken into account when calculating the amount to be paid in compensation for the expropriation. In their opinion they were entitled to EUR 20,864,292 in compensation. 14.  BRISA also challenged the arbitration value, which they considered too high. They thought the value should not exceed EUR 72,643. Their appeal was initially rejected by the Evora court as being out of time, but it was later admitted after the Evora Court of Appeal had delivered a judgment on 11 December 1997 setting aside the initial decision. 15.  On 7 April 1997 the Evora court registry calculated the total court fees due in the applicants' case to be EUR 158,381. 16.  On 24 April 1998 the Evora court decided that no compensation should yet be paid to the applicants as the court fees might well be higher than the minimum sum that might be awarded to the applicants in compensation according to the appeals lodged by the parties, BRISA having requested that the sum be fixed at EUR 72,643. The court then appointed a new arbitration committee made up of three experts appointed by the court and two appointed by the parties (one each). On 11 March 1999, by a majority, the arbitrators set the compensation at EUR 191,116. The arbitrator appointed by the applicants expressed the view that they should be paid EUR 4,040,897. 17.  By an order of 25 March 1999 the court, of its own motion, requested a new expert report, restricted this time to the question of the economic potential of the quarry located on the land. Three geologists from the University of Evora were accordingly appointed as experts. They submitted their report on 9 February 2000, concluding that the maximum amount the exploitation of the quarry could be expected to yield was EUR 9,704,113. 18.  By a judgment of 30 June 2000 the court dismissed both parties' appeals. Considering that the potential gain from the quarry was not to be taken into account, it fixed the compensation for the expropriation at EUR 197,236.25. 19.  On 14 July 2000 the applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment with the Evora Court of Appeal. 20.  In a judgment of 10 July 2003 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in full. 21.  On 11 November 2003 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court but, in an order dated 30 September 2004, the judge rapporteur of the Supreme Court declared the appeal inadmissible. 22.  On 26 October 2004 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal, which the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible by a summary decision on 20 December 2004. 23.  On 26 January 2005 the file was transmitted to the Evora court. 24.  On 4 February 2005 the applicants received notice from the Evora court of the court fees owed for the expropriation proceedings. The sum they were expected to pay amounted to EUR 489,188.42. 25.  On 22 February 2005 the applicants filed a complaint about the fees, alleging in particular that they violated the principles of fair compensation and the right of access to a court. They considered that the sum to be paid, if it was to be proportionate, should not exceed EUR 15,000. They also pointed out what they considered to be various inaccuracies and miscalculations in the court fees. They challenged the basis used before the Evora court to calculate the court tax (which they claimed should have been that stipulated in Article 18 § 2 of the Court Fees Code), as well as the legitimacy of being required to pay anything at all in respect of costs and expenses (custas de parte) to BRISA, which, as a State enterprise, was exempt from paying court fees. 26.  On 1 April 2005, acting on information provided by the registry, the Evora court judge acknowledged the mistakes the applicants had pointed out and ordered their rectification. The amount owed was thus reduced to EUR 309,052.71 so, once the compensation awarded to the applicants had been deducted, they still owed the State EUR 111,816.46. The judge dismissed the applicants' complaint regarding the alleged violations of the principles of fair compensation and the right of access to a court. 27.  The applicants appealed to the Evora Court of Appeal. In a judgment of 13 December 2005, of which they were notified on 19 December 2005, the court dismissed the appeal. 28.  On 12 May 2006 the applicants lodged a constitutional appeal against that decision, alleging that the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Court Fees Code, particularly Article 66 § 2, was contrary to the principles of fair compensation and the right of access to a court guaranteed in the Constitution. In their view, court fees should on no account exceed the sum awarded in compensation for an expropriation. 29.  In a judgment of 28 March 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed their appeal. After noting that it could only examine the constitutionality of Article 66 § 2 of the Court Fees Code, the only provision the courts below had applied, it went on to hold that the provision concerned was not contrary to Articles 20 (access to a court) and 62 § 2 (fair compensation) of the Constitution. Concerning access to a court, it pointed out that while excessively high court fees could in some circumstances be an obstacle to access to a court, this was not the case in this instance as the applicants had been required to pay only EUR 15,000, a sum it considered reasonable. On the subject of fair compensation, the Constitutional Court found that compensation for the loss suffered as a result of expropriation was quite unrelated to the matter of court fees, and that there was accordingly no reason why court fees should not exceed the sum awarded in compensation. 30.  On 20 April 2007 the applicants filed a request to have that judgment rectified, claiming that the Constitutional Court had made a factual mistake, in so far as it had considered in its reasoning that the applicants owed EUR 15,000 in court fees when they were in fact expected to pay EUR 111,816.46. 31.  In a judgment of 25 September 2007 the Constitutional Court acknowledged its mistake and the need to rectify the judgment in respect of Article 20 of the Constitution. It found that EUR 111,816.46 was a large enough sum to have affected the right of access to a court. It accordingly declared Article 66 § 2 of the Court Fees Code, as interpreted by the lower courts, contrary to Article 20 of the Constitution. In respect of Article 62 § 2 of the Constitution concerning fair compensation, however, it held that its earlier decision needed no rectification. 32.  On 6 November 2007 the applicants, wishing to know the exact sum they owed in court fees, filed a request for clarification of the judgment of 25 September 2007. 33.  In a judgment of 13 November 2007 the Constitutional Court rejected that request, considering that it was for the lower court to determine the sum to be paid. 34.  In an order of 4 January 2008, the Evora court, to which the case had been referred back, decided, without giving reasons, that the fees should not exceed the compensation awarded by more than EUR 15,000. 35.  On 20 February 2008 the applicants paid the outstanding sum of EUR 15,000. 36.  On 7 April 2005 the applicants lodged an application (no. 12849/05) with the Court complaining about the lack of compensation in respect of the quarry. The application was rejected by a committee on 30 August 2005, as being out of time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Yuriy Vitaliyovych Lutsenko, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1964. 6.  The applicant was the Minister of the Interior. He occupied this post from 2005 to 2006 and from 18 December 2007 to 11 March 2010. Since 27 August 2014 he has been the leader of the Bloc of Petro Poroshenko party. 7.  On 2 November 2010 the General Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the GPO”) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and another individual, Mr P., on suspicion of abuse of office under Article 191 § 3 of the Criminal Code. On 5 November 2010 the applicant was formally charged. On the same day he gave a written obligation not to abscond. 8.  On 11 December 2010 the GPO instituted another criminal case against the applicant for exceeding his official powers under Article 365 § 3 of the Criminal Code, on the ground that he had arranged for the allocation of a one-room apartment to his driver, Mr P. 9.  The two criminal cases were joined together. 10.  On 13 December 2010 the GPO completed the investigation in the case and formally charged the applicant with both offences, having reclassified his actions specified in the first charge under Article 191 § 5 of the Criminal Code (misappropriation, embezzlement, and conversion of property by malfeasance). 11.  On 26 December 2010 the applicant was arrested and detained in the Security Service Detention Centre (Слідчий Ізолятор Служби Безпеки України). 12.  On 27 December 2010 the Pechersk District Court (Печерський районний суд) (hereinafter “the Pechersk Court”) ordered that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant be changed from a written obligation not to abscond to remand in custody. 13.  On 28 December 2010 the applicant was transferred to Kyiv Pre-Trial Detention Centre no. 13 (Київський Слідчий Ізолятор №13) (hereinafter “the SIZO”). 14.  On 17 May 2011 the GPO submitted the applicant’s criminal case to the Pechersk Court which, on 27 February 2012, rendered a judgment sentencing the applicant to four years’ imprisonment. The case received extensive attention in both national and international media which were present at court hearings. Photographs depicting the applicant behind metal bars were published soon after the court hearings. 15.  On 7 March 2012 the applicant appealed, seeking the quashing of the first-instance judgment on the ground of lack of guilt. 16.  On 16 May 2012 the Kyiv Court of Appeal (Апеляційний суд міста Києва) upheld the judgment of the Pechersk Court. 17.  On 31 August 2012 the applicant was transferred to Mena colony in Chernihiv Region to serve his prison sentence. 18.  In a judgment of 3 April 2013 the Higher Specialised Court of Ukraine for civil and criminal cases (Вищий спеціалізований суд України з розгляду цивільних і кримінальних справ) upheld the applicant’s prison sentence slightly reducing the amount of compensation that he had to pay. 19.  On 7 April 2013 the former President of Ukraine issued a decree of pardon in respect of a number of individuals, including the applicant, who was released the same day. 20.  Prior to his arrest the applicant was diagnosed with diabetes mellitus type 2 and chronic gastritis and pancreatitis. 21.  Upon his admission to the SIZO on 28 December 2010, the applicant was examined by the head of the medical unit and a duty doctor. He underwent clinical, laboratory and X-ray examinations. On the basis of those examinations and the applicant’s anamnesis, he was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension and it was recommended that his arterial pressure be constantly monitored. According to the applicant, the prison doctors did not pay attention to his chronic diseases which were mentioned in the medical report submitted to the Pechersk District Court and indicated orally by him on a number of occasions. 22.  According to the Government, during the period from December 2010 to April 2011 the applicant was under constant supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit who visited him on 29, 30 and 31 December 2010, 1-9, 17 and 24 January, 10, 18 and 25 February, 1, 10 and 20 March and on 1 April 2011. During this period, no complaints were received from him and his state of health remained satisfactory. Doctors regularly measured his blood pressure and pulse rate and carried out his general examination. The applicant denied that he had not complained about problems connected with his state of health. According to him, during the three first months of his detention, he lost more than 20 kilograms, his low-grade fever and spastic stomach pain was constant. 23.  Following the applicant’s complaints about the deterioration of his health, on 24 February 2011, a private medical laboratory took blood samples from him for analysis. Inflammation was diagnosed as a result. The doctor who arrived at that conclusion presumed that it was probably a mixed viral and bacterial infection. A provisional diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis was also made. For more specific diagnoses, further specialist examinations were required. 24.  On 9 March 2011 the applicant was diagnosed with arthritis by SIZO doctors. 25.  On 15 March 2011 a new blood analysis showed some negative changes in the applicant’s immune system. His requests for examination by the cardiologist/rheumatologist who issued the above conclusion were without success. 26.  According to the Government, on 6 and 13 April 2011 the applicant was examined by the head of the SIZO medical unit. He complained of pain in the joints. He was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension and generalised osteoarthritis, and blood pressure monitoring was recommended. 27.  On 21 April 2011 the applicant went on hunger strike in protest at his continued pre-trial detention. 28.  According to the Government, between 22 April and 10 May 2011 the applicant was under daily supervision by doctors of the SIZO medical unit. From time to time he complained of dizziness and general weakness. His state of health remained satisfactory during this period. 29.  On 29 April 2011 the SIZO administration placed him in a solitary-confinement cell and demonstrated forced-feeding facilities (such as handcuffs, a mouth widener and a rubber tube). Those were apparently never applied to him. 30.  According to the Government, on the same day, the applicant was examined by the head of the SIZO medical unit. He complained of heart pain, which he said was worse when he made turning movements. The applicant was diagnosed with symptomatic hypertension, generalised osteoarthritis, and myositis of the left major pectoral muscle. At the same time, he informed the doctor that he had eaten no food for several days and had only had tea without sugar and coffee with sugar. An analysis of the applicant’s urine was carried out. There was a one-plus reaction for acetone. General monitoring of the applicant’s state of health, of the acetone level in his urine, and of his blood pressure was recommended.\nOn 1 May 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from the State Prison Service of Ukraine (Державна пенітенціарна служба України) (hereinafter “the SPS”). He was prescribed an “anti-starvation food mixture” (semolina or oatmeal, butter, sugar, milk, eggs, boiled meat, salt, and ascorbic acid, with a total caloric content of 1,638.5 kcal) and the following medication: NaCL solution, vitamins Bl and B6, and Riboxin solution. On the same date a general blood analysis, a blood sugar-level test and a urine acetone test were carried out for the applicant - (a “three-plus” reaction was obtained). On the same date the applicant consumed 500 ml of “anti-starvation food mixture”.\nOn 2 May 2011 the SPS medical panel found his general state of health stable and held that positive progress was being made in overcoming dizziness and general weakness. A urine test for acetone was carried out for the applicant (a “three-plus” reaction was obtained).\nOn 3 May 2011, upon another examination by the SPS medical panel, a urine acetone test was carried out for the applicant. A “three-plus” reaction was obtained. On the same date the applicant consumed 400 ml of “anti-starvation food mixture”. It was recommended that he undergo further biochemical and general blood tests, a general urine analysis, a blood-sugar-level test and a urine acetone test, and also ultrasonic examinations of his abdominal cavity and kidneys. Injections of Reosorbilact solution and of glucose in solution were given to the applicant.\nOn 4 May 2011 the SPS medical panel saw the applicant again. He was found to have moderate diffuse changes in the liver, chronic cholecystitis and chronic pancreatitis. On the same date the applicant consumed 500 ml of “anti-starvation food mixture”. Injections of Reosorbilact solution and of glucose in solution were given to the applicant. 31.  On 5 May 2011 the applicant’s wife asked the SIZO administration to carry out medical examinations of her husband in her presence. By that time, the applicant had lost about fourteen kilograms in weight. On the same day, according to the Government, the applicant was examined by the SPS medical panel. A general blood test, a blood-sugar-level test and a test of the urine for acetone were carried out at the Dila Laboratory. The test results were low-grade positive. The applicant was diagnosed with chronic cholecystitis and chronic pancreatitis. It was also found that the applicant’s state of health reflected his starvation. On the same date, the applicant refused to eat food or to undergo fluid-maintenance therapy to restore the balance of water, protein, and electrolytes in the body. 32.  On 6 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO medical unit. According to the Government, he was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. He was diagnosed with hypertension of the 1st degree, cardiac insufficiency, type 2 diabetes mellitus in a mild form at the compensation stage, chronic cholecystitis in unstable remission, chronic pancreatitis in unstable remission, osteoarthritis without exacerbation, disseminated osteochondrosis of the spine, and thoracic kyphosis. It was recommended that the applicant: (1) undergo an exercise electrocardiography (ECG) test and ultrasonic examination of the heart in order to exclude ischaemic heart disease; (2) take antihypertensive medication (Prestarium Combi) when the blood pressure was higher than 140/90 mm Hg; take Metoprolol in order to stop the tachycardia which occurred when the pulse rate was higher than 100 beats per minute. The applicant received this medical treatment in full. 33.  According to the Government, on 7 May 2011 he was once again examined by the SPS medical panel. A check test of the urine for acetone was carried out (a “two-plus” reaction was obtained) and a general urine test was also done for the applicant. The panel confirmed the previous diagnosis. The applicant refused to consume any of the “anti-starvation food mixture” or to undergo fluid maintenance therapy.\nOn 8 May 2011 he was examined by a panel of doctors from Kyiv-based medical institutions of the Ministry of Health. The previous diagnosis was confirmed and it was additionally found that the applicant had chronic gastritis in unstable remission. The panel noted that the applicant’s hunger strike was significantly affecting his general state of health. Electrocardiography and echocardiography tests were carried out for the applicant. The urinary reaction for acetone was one-plus. The applicant was refusing to consume the “anti-starvation food mixture”. He was subjected to fluid-maintenance therapy with Aminoven. It was also recommended that the applicant broaden the variety of foods he ate, limiting the consumption of easily digestible carbohydrates (sugar, honey, and sweets); consistently take graduated physical activity; take Duphalac or Guttalax (to normalise bowel function) and probiotics (Lacium or Symbiter).\nOn 9 and 10 May 2011 the applicant was examined by the SPS medical panel. The urinary reaction for acetone was low-grade positive. He refused to consume “anti-starvation food mixture”. He was subjected to fluid-maintenance therapy with a physiological solution, vitamins Bl, B6, C, Riboxin, and Reosorbilact. 34.  According to the applicant, before 10 May 2011 his medical monitoring had been limited to measuring his blood pressure and weighing him, along with a superficial examination by the SIZO doctor. 35.  On 10 May 2011 he was taken to the Kyiv Clinical Emergency Hospital (Міська клінічна лікарня швидкої медичної допомоги) (hereinafter “the Emergency Hospital”). On the following day, the management of the hospital informed the investigator that the applicant was suffering from chronic pancreatitis in the aggravated stage, chronic gastroduodenitis, cardial-type neurocirculatory dystonia, and type 2 diabetes. His condition was evaluated as moderately serious. 36.  On 18 May 2011 the deputy medical director of the Emergency Hospital gave additional details to the applicant’s wife as regards his health. In addition to the aforementioned diagnoses, he noted the following illnesses: chronic cholecystitis, gall bladder polyposis, autoimmune thyroiditis, euthyroidism, seborrheic dermatitis, myopia, osteochondrosis, chronic sinusitis, right-ear deafness, duodenal ulcer, gastric erosion and duodenogastric reflux. 37.  On 23 May 2011 the applicant ended his hunger strike. 38.  According to the Government, on 24 May 2011 he was examined by doctors of the SIZO medical unit. On the same date he ate gruel. He was also subjected to fluid-maintenance treatment with Aminoven and Pariet. Generally, although he continued to complain of general weakness, his condition improved considerably once he had ended the hunger strike.\nThe SIZO doctors saw the applicant also on the next day. They concluded that the applicant was suffering from the following illnesses: exacerbated chronic pancreatitis, chronic cholecystitis, gall-bladder polyposis, chronic duodenal ulcer, autoimmune thyroiditis, euthyroidism, type 2 diabetes mellitus, cardial-type neurocirculatory dystonia of medium severity, seborrheic dermatitis, cervical osteochondrosis, toxic-dyscirculatory encephalopathy of endogenic origin (degree I-II), duodenal ulcer, papillomatous gastropathy, and gastric erosions. On the same date the applicant ate gruel and drank water and carrot juice. The applicant underwent fluid-maintenance treatment and anti-ulcer treatment.\nOn 26 and 27 May 2011 the doctors of the SIZO medical unit confirmed the previous diagnosis. The applicant received fluid-maintenance and anti-ulcer treatment and underwent a urine test (which indicated no acetone), a blood test for sugar, and biochemical analysis of the blood. A consultation with a gastroenterologist was also scheduled for the applicant.\nOn 28 May 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. As a result of the examination, the panel found the applicant’s general state of health to be satisfactory. The applicant was diagnosed with the following conditions: peptic duodenal ulcer, post gastrointestinal haemorrhage condition, erosive gastritis, and mild post haemorrhagic anemia. It was recommended that he receive anti-ulcer treatment as an in-patient basis at a gastroenterology clinic. If it was impossible to arrange in-patient treatment for him, he would have to continue to take Pariet; again undergo a fibrogastroscopy with biopsy, a general blood test, electrolytes (potassium, phosphorus, fecal occult blood test) and eat five small meals a day, sticking to a diet with a high protein content. 39.  According to the applicant, on 28 May 2011 he was examined in the SIZO and diagnosed with a duodenal ulcer in the progressing phase, gastrointestinal bleeding, erosive gastritis, and toxic-metabolic encephalopathy. Moreover, all his previously diagnosed diseases were confirmed. 40.  According to the Government, on 29 May 2011 he was examined by SIZO doctors, who confirmed the previous diagnoses. He continued to receive the anti-ulcer treatment and multiple small-portion meals. 41.  On 30 May 2011 the applicant underwent a urine acetone test, which revealed no acetone, a blood test for sugar, and a general blood test. The examination results confirmed the previous diagnoses. 42.  On 31 May and 1 June 2011 he was examined by SIZO doctors who confirmed the previous diagnoses. Analyses of his blood and urine were carried out. He continued to receive the anti-ulcer treatment and appropriate diet. 43.  On 8 June 2011 the governor of the SIZO informed the President of the Pecherskyy Court of some further diagnoses regarding the applicant’s health, established during his examination of 28 May 2011, and sought leave for him to be examined in the Emergency Hospital. According to the Government, the letter was sent to the court only on 9 June 2011. 44.  In his reply of 14 June 2011 the judge of the Pechersk Court stated that the court did not object to the applicant’s being examined in a civilian hospital. A copy of this letter was sent to the Convoy Service of the Ministry of the Interior with a request for escorted transport for the applicant. 45.  On 23 June 2011 the Convoy Service replied that the applicant’s medical care was the responsibility of the SIZO administration. 46.  On 24 June 2011 the applicant’s wife and his legal representative made a new request to the court that he be hospitalised. They alleged that the applicant had constant stomach pain and had lost more weight, 24 kg in total. On 29 June 2011 the judge replied that the court had no objection. 47.  According to the Government, from 2 June to 2 July 2011 the applicant was examined daily by SIZO doctors. In line with the instructions given following the previous examination by the medical panel, the applicant had regular clinical, biochemical, and general blood tests and urine analyses (these took place on 7, 8, 15, 18, 19, and 30 June 2011). The applicant was receiving anti-ulcer treatment, the recommended diet, and the prescribed outpatient treatment. During this period, the above-mentioned diagnoses remained valid. Furthermore, on 24 June 2011 the doctors found that his peptic duodenal ulcer had begun to cicatrise, which indicated a gradual improvement in his state of health. 48.  According to the Government, the court gave its permission for the applicant’s examination at the Emergency Hospital on 14 July 2011. 49.  On 15 July 2011 the applicant was examined at the Emergency Hospital. Fibrogastroscopy and ultrasonic scans were performed for the applicant. The examination revealed that he had esophageal varicose veins with 1st degree dilatation, moderate portal hypertensive gastropathy, chronic cholecystitis, gall-bladder polyposis, chronic pancreatitis, and urolithic diathesis. It was recommended that the applicant undergo a biochemical blood test, a general blood test, analyses for hepatitis B, C, and D antibody titers, abdominal ultrasonic scanning with Doppler sonography. According to the applicant, he did not receive any of the prescribed medicines. 50.  On 21 July 2011, blood samples were taken from the applicant in the presence of his lawyer for complex liver function tests (hepatitis B, C, and D). At the applicant’s request, in order to ensure an objective analysis, the samples were sent to two laboratories: Eurolab and Synevo. 51.  On 22 July 2011 the applicant underwent abdominal ultrasonic scanning with Doppler sonography at the Emergency Hospital. On the basis of the examination, the following diagnosis was made: signs of diffuse damage to the liver in a chronic hepatosis pattern, portal hypertension of the P’ degree, splenomegaly of the lst degree, and chronic cholecystitis. In pursuance of the recommendation, the applicant was tested for hepatitis B, C, and D markers, and liver function tests were done. 52.  On 23 July 2011 the applicant was prescribed the following medication: Ursofalk, Essentiale Forte, Primer, Chophytol, and Duspatalin. 53.  According to the Government, from 2 to 30 August 2011 the applicant was under daily supervision by SIZO doctors. His state of health remained unchanged. He continued complaining of discomfort in the upper abdomen. He received the medical treatment prescribed for him earlier. 54.  On 30 August 2011 two senior civilian doctors examined the applicant in the SIZO. They diagnosed cirrhosis of the liver supposedly triggered by the earlier hunger strike. Furthermore, two internal haemorrhages were noted. It was recommended that the applicant undergo a more thorough examination in a specialist civilian hospital. In the meantime, he needed to get proper nutrition. 55.  According to the Government, on 2 September 2011, following a court decision, the SIZO was visited by a panel of doctors (gastroenterologists, an endoscopist, and an ultra-sonographer). The applicant refused to be medically examined, to have blood samples taken, or to undergo ultrasonic examinations and fibrogastroduodenoscopy, which had been recommended by the medical panel. 56.  On 6 September 2011 a commission of the Ministry of Health examined the applicant in the SIZO. It recommended that he undergo examination with special equipment so that specific diagnoses could be made. 57.  On 7 and 8 September 2011 blood samples and faeces were taken from the applicant for laboratory tests. 58.  On 13 September 2011 the applicant’s wife again requested the Pechersk Court to allow her husband to be hospitalised and given proper treatment. 59.  On 15 September 2011 the applicant was hospitalised and examined in the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre, which diagnosed the initial signs of portal hypertension, as well as signs of chronic cholecystitis, angiomyolipoma of the right kidney, and parenchymatous cyst of the left kidney. On the same date the applicant underwent an abdominal ultrasonic scan, which discovered signs of gall-bladder polyps and pancreatic diffuse changes, and confirmed the aforementioned kidney pathologies. 60.  On 20 September 2011 the applicant underwent a colonoscopy which showed sigmoid colon diverticulitis. On the same day a newly appointed commission of the Ministry of Health examined him and diagnosed fatty liver disease. Dietetic therapy, mineral-vitamin complex, proton pump blockers and hepato-protectors were prescribed. 61.  According to the Government, on 22 September 2011 the applicant consulted a haematologist. In view of a decreased number of white blood cells (leukocytes) and thrombocytes in his blood, it was recommended that he again undergo a general blood test at two independent laboratories, to be identified by the Ministry of Health. Once the results of those examinations were known it was recommended that the applicant again consult a haematologist. 62.  On 23 September 2011 the applicant’s blood samples were sent to the laboratory for a general blood test. On 26 September 2011, following the haematologist’s recommendation, a blood sample was sent to the Sinevo laboratory for a coagulation profile test. 63.  On 28 September 2011 the applicant again consulted the haematologist. The results of the previous examinations led the doctor to find that he had no blood system disorders. 64.  On 24 October 2011 the applicant completed the course of medical treatment prescribed by the panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions on 20 September 2011. 65.  On 29 September 2011 it was proposed that he undergo a liver biopsy, which he declined.\nAccording to him, the biopsy is a surgical intervention, after which the patient should stay in the medical institution under medical supervision for a period the doctor considers necessary to monitor any post-operative complications. However, the applicant was not provided with guarantees that the medical care would be adequate and that he would stay in the hospital after the biopsy. He considered that removing him immediately to the SIZO would hurt his state of health. Besides, the applicant feared that proper medical care would not be provided to him in the SIZO if there were complications after the biopsy. He referred in this connection to his previous experience. 66.  On 4 October 2011 the applicant’s relatives brought him the proton pump blockers and hepato-protectors which had been prescribed by the Ministry of Health commission specialists as early as 20 September 2011. 67.  According to the Government, on 2 November 2011 the applicant was examined by SIZO doctors. When examined, he complained of general weakness, dragging pain in the right hypochondrium, and discomfort in the upper abdomen and in the intestine area. He was diagnosed with fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, erosive haemorrhagic helicobacter-associated gastritis, and diverticular disease of the sigmoid colon. As the applicant had completed the prescribed course of outpatient treatment, it was proposed that he undergo laboratory and instrumental tests. The applicant submitted a written statement refusing to undergo fibrogastroduodenoscopy and rectosigmoidoscopy. 68.  On 3 November 2011 blood samples were taken from the applicant for laboratory examination at the Kyiv diagnostic centre. In particular, he underwent clinical, general, and biochemical blood tests and a coagulation profile test. 69.  On 5 November 2011, upon a court decision, the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. He was diagnosed with the following conditions: fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter associated gastritis, and diverticular disease of the sigmoid colon. It was recommended that the applicant undergo an abdominal ultrasound scan, a faecal occult blood test, and a faecal analysis for helminth eggs and protozoa, consult a urologist, receive diet-based treatment, take a mineral-vitamin complex, and continue to take proton-pump inhibitors. 70.  On 8 November 2011 the applicant underwent abdominal ultrasonic scanning at the Kyiv City Diagnostic Centre. He was diagnosed with gall bladder polyp signs, moderate pancreatic changes, angiomyolipomas of the right kidney, and small cysts of the left renal sinus. However, he refused to consult a urologist. 71.  On 9 November 2011 he received a parcel with the necessary medication. 72.  According to the Government, during November 2011 the applicant’s state of health remained satisfactory. From time to time he complained of general weakness, discomfort in the large intestine area, and pain in the right hypochondrium. During that period, he was examined daily by doctors of the SIZO medical unit, and regularly provided with the prescribed medical treatment. The diagnosis remained unchanged.\nHowever, the applicant continued to complain of periodic discomfort in the large intestine area. He received the medical treatment prescribed by the panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions on 5 November 2011. 73.  On 14 December 2011 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. The results of the earlier examinations led the doctors to diagnose the applicant with the following conditions: fatty liver disease, signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticular disease of sigmoid colon, but no signs of blood disorder were found. The doctors recommended that the applicant undergo some additional examinations: electrocardiography, irrigoscopy, and an analysis of faeces for dysbiosis, to determine pancreatic (faecal) elastase, and a faecal occult blood test. Also, the applicant was prescribed the following medical treatment: diet-based treatment; Spasmomen or Meteospasmyl; Posterisan suppositories; Kreon; Validolum, to stop pain in the stomach; Chophytol, to continue to take from 19 December 2011. However, on 19 December the applicant on his own initiative refused to start the medical treatment prescribed. 74.  In early January 2012 the applicant complained to the SIZO administration of stomach and intestinal pains. 75.  On 5 and 14 January 2012 he underwent various laboratory tests in respect of his chronic gastrointestinal diseases, and on 11 January 2012 an ultrasonic examination of his abdominal cavity was conducted. 76.  On 19 January 2012, during a court hearing, the applicant complained that he did not feel well. An ambulance was therefore called. The doctor diagnosed exacerbation of chronic pancreatitis and administered some medication to the applicant. The applicant’s overall state of health was assessed as satisfactory. 77.  On 20 January 2012 the applicant was examined by a panel of medical specialists delegated by the Ministry of Health which established the following diagnoses: fatty liver disease (steatosis), signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticulosis of sigmoid colon. While the commission acknowledged a deterioration of the applicant’s health due to “nutrition-regime disturbance and psycho-emotional overload”, it found his health generally satisfactory and not warranting in-patient treatment in a specialist civilian hospital. The physicians recommended normalisation of the nutrition regime and reduction of the psycho-emotional pressure. They also prescribed some medication. 78.  On 23 January 2012 the Ministry of Health delegated another panel, of three gastroenterologists, to examine the applicant in the SIZO. The doctors found him to be in a generally satisfactory state of health, and concluded that he did not require hospitalisation. They also specified the medication to be administered to the applicant, and repeated the earlier recommendation regarding his nutritional needs. 79.  On 24 February 2012 the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors from civilian medical institutions. They noted that his state of health had improved. The applicant was diagnosed with fatty liver disease (steatosis), signs of incipient portal hypertension, chronic helicobacter-associated gastritis, irritable bowel syndrome, and diverticulosis of sigmoid colon. It was advised that he receive rational nutrition diet, continue to take Duspatalin and take Kreon, Valeriana extract, and suppositories with belladonna. The applicant received that medication in full. 80.  On 6 April 2012 he was transferred from the SIZO to the Emergency Hospital for further examination. 81.  According to the applicant, despite numerous check-ups, there was no proper medical treatment or medicine available to him in the SIZO. He received proper medical treatment in the Emergency Hospital on 10 May 2011 and 6 April 2012, but was discharged from the hospital on 23 May 2011 and 20 April 2012 respectively, upon an arbitrary decision by the Prison Service authorities, rather than upon a decision of the doctors treating him at the hospital. He was provided with medication which was incompatible with his general state of health, and although they treated his immediate health problem they contributed to the deterioration of his general state of health. 82.  Upon his admission to the SIZO, the applicant was placed in cell no. 158, measuring 8.58 square metres. He shared the cell with one or two other inmates. According to him, the cell had poor ventilation and lacked personal hygiene facilities. Its walls had mould traces. Furthermore, there was no access to drinking water. Except for period from 28 April to 8 May 2011 (see paragraph 110 below), he shared this cell with two other detainees. 83.  According to the Government, the cell had a proper ventilation system and natural lighting. The applicant had had daily exercise in the fresh air, except on days when lengthy court hearings were held. He was permitted to receive drinking water from relatives. He was allowed to take a shower once or twice a week. 84.  From 8 to 10 May 2011, the applicant was held in cell no. 257 in the SIZO medical unit, which measured 23.21 square metres. 85.  From 10 to 23 May 2011 he was a patient in the Emergency Hospital. 86.  On 23 May 2011 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 260, measuring 22.32 square metres, in the SIZO medical unit, which he shared with another person. He remained there until 1 July 2011. 87.  On 1 July 2011 he was transferred to cell no. 158, which he shared with another inmate. 88.  On 27 March 2012 he was moved to cell no. 136. 89.  On 6 April 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Emergency Hospital. He returned to cell no. 136 on 20 April 2012. 90.  From the documents provided by the Government, in particular the minutes of the hearings held before the Pechersk Court (see annex), it appears that between 23 May 2011 and 16 February 2012 the court held seventy-nine hearings at which the applicant was present. At the hearing of 27 February 2012, it pronounced the judgment convicting the applicant. During thirty-five hearings, the court did not withdraw for deliberation on intermediate procedural issues but at least one break was announced, during twelve hearings the court both withdrew to deliberate and announced at least one break, and eleven hearings were interrupted by deliberations on intermediate procedural issue of the court but otherwise were carried out without a proper break. On 14 and 19 July, 22 August and 29 September 2011, 17, 27 and 31 January, 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 14 and 15 February 2012 the court announced breaks for lunch. However, on 14 July 2011 the applicant had been removed from the courtroom for the rest of the hearing because of his improper behavior before the lunch break was announced.\nMoreover, eighteen hearings were carried out without any deliberation and the court did not announce any break. In particular, on 12 October 2011 the hearing lasted two hours and 51 minutes, on 18 October 2011 it took three hours and 36 minutes, and on 16 and 21 November 2011 the hearings lasted almost three hours. 91.  The applicant continued his hunger strike up to 23 May 2011. He was informed beforehand that the preliminary hearing would be held on that day. According to him, he was woken up at 4.30 a.m. to be taken to the court building for a hearing which started at about 11 a.m. He had to wait in a small convoy room of about 1.5 square metres. Overall, for about twelve to fourteen hours, he was allegedly held without food and drinking water, in poorly ventilated premises. On the same day, he terminated the hunger strike, which had lasted for about a month. 92.  According to the Government, this information was incorrect. The applicant left the hospital at 7 a.m., reaching the court-house at 7.20 a.m. At 10.30 a.m. he was transferred to the courtroom. 93.  According to the applicant, he was brought to the court hearing with an open bleeding stomach ulcer, although this condition required immediate hospitalisation. After the eight-hour hearing he was driven to the SIZO. He was transferred to the medical unit of the SIZO only after he had lost consciousness. Despite this, no treatment was recommended for him. Late at night the applicant’s state of health suddenly worsened. 94.  According to the Government, as long as the applicant was in hospital, his health was under constant supervision by medical specialists there. In the event that his state of health did not permit him to take part in a hearing, this would be notified by the medical staff and the applicant would not then have been convoyed to the court hearing. 95.  According to the applicant, he suffered from the absence of drinking water and nutrition, as well as the lack of rest, during the later court hearings too, while being kept in a metal cage in the courtroom. 96.  On 20 January 2012 the applicant, in his request under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which was subsequently not granted, maintained that on 17 and 18 January 2012 the Pechersk Court had held the hearings daily despite his complaints of deteriorating health and acute pain in his stomach. According to him, the hearings had lasted from 9 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. usually with one thirty-minute break. On 19 January 2012 the court hearing had lasted from 9 a.m. until 11:30 p.m. The applicant stated that after having left the SIZO, he had not been provided with any food or water until his return. Moreover, on 19 January 2012 the court called the ambulance for him four times. 97.  According to the information submitted by the Government, on the days of the hearings detainees received food packs from the prison authorities: the applicant refused these in writing on 1 December 2011 and 11, 19 and 20 January 2012, noting that he had his own food supply. 98.  The Government submitted tables of the schedule of the hearing days (see annex) containing the information about the time when the applicant was put in the car and reached the courtroom, when the hearings started and were closed and the time when the applicant was put in the car and arrived back in the SIZO. They also submitted the minutes of the court hearings held before the Pechersk Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Ryazan. 5.  On 17 February 2000 the applicant filed with the Bilibinskiy District Court of the Chukotka Autonomous Region (“the District Court”) an action against the regional pension authorities and the district social security authority (Отделение Пенсионного фонда РФ по Чукотскому Автономному Округу и Отдел социальной защиты населения Администрации Билибинского района) for recovery of arrears of her old-age pension. She also requested to index-link the arrears. 6.  As the District Court consistently failed to schedule a hearing, the applicant filed a complaint about its lack of action to the Supreme Court of Russia. On 19 October 2000 the Supreme Court in the final instance refused to consider the complaint on its merits as out of the court's competence. 7.  The first hearing in the case was scheduled for 13 November 2000. 8.  On 13 November 2000 the judge failed to appear, and the hearing was fixed for 19 January 2001. 9.  On 9 January 2001 the District Court decided not to consider the applicant's complaints about the judge's inaction ruling that such a complaint could be entertained only by the Judicial Qualifications Board (Квалификационная коллегия судей). 10.  On 19 January 2001 the hearing was adjourned until 22 March 2001 on account of the applicant's failure to appear. The applicant's counsel attended the hearing. 11.  The Government submitted that on 16 February 2001 the applicant applied for supervisory review seeking to quash the above decision to adjourn the hearing on account of certain procedural flaws. The applicant submitted an application for supervisory review with the date shown as 2 February 2001. 12.  On 22 March 2001 the District Court partly granted the applicant's claims. In the same hearing the applicant's counsel informed the court of her actual place of residence which differed from the one indicated in the original statement of claim. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant filed an appeal. She submitted that in her appeal she had complained, among other things, about the first-instance court's decisions to adjourn the hearings. 14.  The applicant's appeal was first fixed to be considered by the Chukotka Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) on 17 May 2001 but was re-scheduled for 19 July 2001. 15.  On 19 July 2001 the Regional Court overturned the judgment on appeal and remitted the case for fresh examination to the District Court. The applicant's complaint about the adjournment decisions was not addressed. 16.  On 23 July 2001 the case was transferred to the Presidium of the Regional Court for consideration pursuant to the applicant's application for supervisory review of 16 February 2001. 17.  On 1 August 2001 the application for supervisory review was rejected, and the case was returned to the District Court. 18.  On 17 August 2001 the District Court fixed the first hearing for 5 December 2001. The court invited the applicant's counsel to provide the applicant's actual address. 19.  On 28 August 2001 the applicant's counsel informed the District Court that the applicant resided at the address indicated in the statement of claim. 20.  On 5 December 2001 the hearing was adjourned till 21 January 2002 on account of the applicant's failure to appear. The applicant's counsel attended the hearing. 21.  On 18 January 2002 the applicant applied for supervisory review of the above decision to adjourn the hearing. 22.  On 21 January 2002 the hearing had been adjourned till 26 February 2002 on account of the applicant's failure to appear. Her counsel attended the hearing, amended the claims and informed the court that the applicant resided in Ryazan. He was invited to provide the applicant's full address. 23.  On 4 February 2002 the applicant applied for supervisory review of the above decision to adjourn the hearing. On 12 February 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court called up the case. 24.  On 9 October 2002 the application for supervisory review was rejected, and the case was returned to the District Court. 25.  The applicant submitted that in December 2002 she had requested the District Court to inform her of the date of the next hearing but received no precise answer. 26.  On 14 May 2003 the applicant filed an amendment to the original statement of claim indicating a new group of respondents. 27.  On 8 July 2003 the District Court held a hearing in presence of the applicant's counsel, in which it accepted the amended claims and adjourned. 28.  On 28 November 2003 the applicant's counsel informed the court that the applicant wished to have the case heard in her absence. The hearing was adjourned till 25 December 2003 on account of the applicant's failure to identify the new respondents. 29.  On 7 December 2003 the applicant notified the District Court that she had already determined the new respondents in her amendment to the statement of claim of 14 May 2003. 30.  On 25 December 2003 the District Court granted the applicant's claims in part. 31.  On 18 March 2004 the Regional Court heard the case on appeal and amended the judgment, awarding to the applicant a total amount of 40,879 roubles and 73 kopecks.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  On 16 May 2006 the applicant’s husband filed a petition for divorce with the Larnaca Family Court. This was on the ground that his marriage to the applicant had broken down irretrievably because, among other reasons, he and the applicant had been separated for five years (that is, one year longer than the minimum period required by law: see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraph 25 below). 6.  The case was set for a directions hearing on 14 June 2006. On that date the applicant appeared in person and asked for additional time to file her defence to the petition: the Family Court acceded to her request and adjourned the hearing to 4 October 2006. 7.  On 14 June 2006 the applicant applied to the Family Court for legal aid. The hearing of that legal aid application was fixed for 15 September 2006. On 15 September the applicant appeared before the court and asked for a one-month extension as she was not sure if she would maintain her application. The court adjourned the legal aid hearing to 19 October 2006. 8.  On 4 October 2006, the applicant attended court and requested a further extension for filing her defence to the petition on the ground that her legal aid application was pending. The court adjourned the case to 1 November 2006 and directed that the applicant file her defence by that date. 9.  The applicant did in fact decide to maintain her legal aid application. When this legal aid application came before the Family Court on 19 October 2006, the court considered that the application came within the scope of the Law on Legal Aid (see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraph 23 below) so it instructed the Welfare Office to prepare a social welfare report on the applicant and adjourned the hearing of the legal aid application to 17 November 2006. 10.  The applicant failed to file her defence to the petition for divorce by 1 November 2006 as directed. She also failed to appear in court on that date. In her absence, counsel for the applicant’s husband requested that the case be set for trial. The court acceded to this request and a trial date of 22 November 2006. 11.  The legal aid application came before the court on 17 November 2006 as scheduled. The applicant attended court. However, because no one from the Welfare Office was present, the court adjourned its examination of the application to 21 December 2006. 12.  On 22 November 2006 the applicant did not appear at court for the trial in the main proceedings. The applicant’s husband attended with counsel. In the applicant’s absence, the court proceeded to hear the evidence of her husband who stated that the couple had been suffering problems and had been separated since December 2000. No other witnesses were heard. The court gave an ex tempore judgment granting the petition for divorce. 13.  Although the petition for divorce had been granted, the hearing in the legal aid application went ahead as scheduled on 21 December 2006. The applicant was not present at court. A representative of the Welfare Office informed the court that, from a letter in the court file dated 20 December 2006, which had been sent by a welfare officer to the court registrar, it appeared that the applicant was no longer interested in receiving legal aid. The court accordingly dismissed the legal aid application for want of prosecution. 14.  On 29 December 2006 the applicant appealed against the Family Court’s judgment to the Family Court of Appeal. She was legally represented on appeal. 15.  The applicant submitted two grounds of appeal: that the Family Court had wrongly proceeded with the hearing of the petition for divorce in her absence, and that it had wrongly decided on the dissolution of the marriage. In respect of both grounds, she submitted that the Family Court had acted in breach of Article 30 of the Constitution (the right of access to court and to a fair trial: see paragraph 22 below), the Law on Legal Aid, and the rule of natural justice, including the right to be heard (audi alteram partem). 16.  In the reasons accompanying her grounds of appeal, she again made reference to Article 30 of the Constitution and the right of litigants to present their case before the court and to be defended by counsel. The applicant again submitted that the rules of natural justice safeguarded the right to be heard. She further stated that she had informed the Family Court that she had applied for legal aid. She had been under the impression that her legal aid application would be examined by the same bench that would hear the petition for divorce. As the legal aid application had been fixed to be examined at a date subsequent to the date the divorce petition was fixed (21 December for the legal aid hearing as against 22 November for the divorce petition hearing), she presumed that the divorce petition would be examined following the granting of legal aid so she could file a defence through a lawyer. It was for this reason that she had not appeared in court on 1 and 22 November 2006. 17.  On 21 September 2007, the applicant’s husband died. In his will he bequeathed part of his property to another woman. As a consequence of the divorce, the applicant was not entitled to inherit from his estate or to receive a widow’s pension. The applicant maintained her appeal against the Family Court’s judgment. 18.  On 19 December 2008, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to file skeleton arguments (written outlines of their submissions), in effect accepting the applicant’s notice of appeal. The Court of Appeal further directed that once the skeleton arguments were submitted, the appeal was to be set down for a hearing. 19.  In her skeleton argument dated 9 January 2009, the applicant developed her ground of appeal relating to Article 30, stating that the Family Court had acted contrary to Articles 30(1) (the right of access to court), Article 30(3)(b) (the right to present one’s case and to have sufficient time for its preparation), and Article 30(3)(d) (the right to counsel and to free legal assistance). She relied on both the relevant case-law of the Cypriot courts on these provisions and on the relevant case-law of this Court on the corresponding provisions of Article 6 of the Convention, including Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32. In respect of her submission as regards the rules of natural justice, she referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed., Vol 1, § 76) and the court’s duty to provide every party with a fair chance to set his case before the court. 20.  A hearing on the merits of the appeal took place before the Court of Appeal on 6 March 2009. At the hearing, the applicant adopted her written submissions. Counsel for the applicant’s ex-husband submitted that Airey could be distinguished on the basis that the Convention did not grant a general right to legal aid and, in any event, the present case was not so complex as to require it. The hearing was adjourned to 8 May 2009. On that date, counsel for the applicant provided the court with copies of the relevant case-law cited in the applicant’s written submissions. No further submissions were made and the court reserved judgment. 21.  On 30 June 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It found:\n“It is the appellant’s position that she had informed the court that she had submitted an application for legal aid and, because she believed that her application would be examined by the court which would examine the substance of the petition for the dissolution of the marriage, she failed to appear on 1 November 2006, with the consequence that the case was heard in her absence and the petition for divorce was granted against her.\nRegarding the allegations of violation of the provisions of Law 165(I)/2002 and the principles of natural justice, no specific reasons have been put forward which could substantiate the above allegations, which are accordingly dismissed.\nRegarding the alleged violation of Article 30 of the Constitution, the appellant has not specified which particular paragraph has been violated and this allegation is dismissed for vagueness. Independently of this conclusion, we have already made detailed reference to what took place both in the proceedings concerning the application for legal aid and the divorce proceedings. From the above, it appears that judgment under appeal was the result of the complete indifference of the appellant to respond to the directions of the Court to file her defence and her failure to appear before the court. The appellant cannot claim that her failure to appear was due to the fact that she believed that the divorce petition would be examined by another court.\nThe appeal is dismissed with costs.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Kościan. 7.  During the Second World War, in 1940, the applicant's entire family – her parents and their children – were expelled from their house and farm in the vicinity of Poznań by German occupying forces. Subsequently, they were for some time placed in a camp for expelled persons in Poznań and then shipped off to eastern Poland, referred to at that time as General Government (“Generalna Gubernia”), which was occupied by the German authorities. The applicant and her family were assigned to live on a farm of local farmers in Szaniawy. At the time of the expulsion, imprisonment and resettlement the applicant was six years old. 8.  On 16 June 2001 the applicant submitted a request for financial assistance from the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation under the so-called second compensation scheme (see paragraph 16 below). She declared that she had been a victim of persecution by the German occupying authorities during the Second World War. In support of her claims the applicant submitted the following documents: a form certifying registration of her stay in Szaniawy during the war, a certificate of her first communion issued by the rector of the parish of Trzebieszów, a certificate of her mother's death in Szaniawy, statements by three witnesses certifying that the applicant had been expelled from the Poznań Province to Szaniawy during the war, the workbook (“Arbeitsbuch”) of her father's sister, issued by the German authorities, and a number of documents from various Polish archives informing the applicant about difficulties in obtaining documents confirming the persecution to which she had been subjected. 9.  In 2002 the Verification Commission of the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation, established under the Agreement of 16 October 1991 between the Polish and German Governments and operating on the basis of its statute, refused to pay financial assistance to the applicant, considering that persons expelled from their homes and properties by the German forces of occupation during the war were not entitled to compensation. 10.  It further stated that the evidence submitted by the applicant, in particular the witness statements, was insufficient to confirm that the applicant and her family had been imprisoned in the camp for expelled persons. 11.  The Foundation in its letter referred to the requirements of eligibility which were laid down by regulations governing the functioning of the second compensation scheme operated by the Foundation (on the basis of a Law of 2000 on the Creation of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation enacted by the German Parliament and the subsequent agreement between that Foundation and the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation, see paragraph 16 below). 12.  The applicant appealed. On 21 November 2003 the Appeals Commission of the Foundation upheld the contested decision. It informed the applicant that she was not eligible for financial assistance under the scheme in respect of her deportation. Neither she nor her family had been deported for the purposes of forced labour to the territory of the German Reich within its borders of 1937.\nMoreover, the evidence which she had submitted did not allow it to be established that the applicant and her family had indeed been imprisoned in the camp in Poznań. It further informed the applicant that no appeal lay against this decision. 13.  On 12 January 2007 the public prosecution services lodged an action on the applicant's behalf with the Warsaw District Court, referring to Article 189 of the Civil Code and to the Court's judgment in the case of Woś v. Poland (no. 22860/02, ECHR 2006‑VII) and seeking to confirm that judicial review of the Foundation's decisions had been available to the applicant at the relevant time. 14.  These proceedings were stayed on an unspecified later date, when the court referred to an individual constitutional complaint pending before the Constitutional Court at that time and brought by a certain Mr K. Subsequently, in June 2007 the Supreme Court, by way of a resolution, held that decisions of the Foundation could be challenged before the ordinary courts (see paragraph 20 below). This approach was indirectly confirmed by a decision given by the Constitutional Court in the case referred to above (see paragraph 21 below). The prosecuting authorities did not request that the civil proceedings brought on the applicant's behalf be resumed. 15.  In February 2007 the Foundation officially notified the public that it had ceased, as from 31 December 2006, to make any further payments to the victims, having allocated all financial resources which had been earmarked for that purpose.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant, a Turkish national who was born in 1903 and died in 2005, was resident in Adana at the relevant time. 10.  During the 1930s he acquired for value a two-floor freestone building, constructed in 1906, in the sub-prefecture of Tarsus, İçel province. The building, which had a total floor space of 516.34 m², was of architectural interest in its own right. 11.  On 1 November 1990 the Committee for the Protection of Adana's Cultural and Natural Heritage decided to classify the property as a “cultural asset” within the meaning of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (Protection) Act (Law no. 2863 of 21 July 1983). On 23 November 1998 it was included in the project for protection of the urban environment. It was also included on the Council of Europe's inventory for the protection of the cultural and natural heritage. 12.  On 4 April 2000 the executive council of İçel province issued an expropriation order in respect of the property in the context of the “Project for the environmental rehabilitation and regeneration of the streets around St Paul's Well”. On the basis of a valuation report submitted on 21 March 2000 by a panel of experts (hereafter “panel no. 1”) made up of three representatives of the authorities and two representatives of property owners, and in line with the “high-grade building” category in the construction price index published by the Ministry of Urban Planning, the council determined the building's value at 36,856,865,000 Turkish liras (TRL) (about 65,326 euros (EUR)[1]). This amount was paid to the applicant on the date of transfer of ownership. 13.  On 12 October 2000 the applicant lodged an application for increased compensation for the expropriated building with the Tarsus District Court. He requested that a new panel of experts, to include a qualified art historian, re-assess the property, taking into account its historical and architectural value. He claimed TRL 1,000,000,000,000 (about EUR 1,728,750) in additional compensation. 14.  On 26 February 2001 the court held a hearing and dismissed the applicant's request for re-valuation of the building on the ground of its historical value. The court held, inter alia, that under section 11 (1) of the Expropriation Act (Law no. 2942) (see paragraph 29 below), the panel of experts responsible for the building's valuation could only determine its value on the basis of clearly defined objective data. At the same time, it agreed to the appointment of a new panel of experts, to be made up of a civil engineer, an architect and a representative of property owners. 15.  On 10 May 2001, after visiting the site, the court-appointed panel of experts (hereafter panel no. 2) submitted its report. With regard to those features and factors which had a bearing on the property's value, it reached the following conclusions:\n“The property in question is located in the Camicedit neighbourhood, within the territory of Tarsus, in the Mersin District. It is recorded in the land register as a solid structure house with a courtyard. Situated in an urban area, it is classed as a listed building in the project for protection of the urban heritage. The decision to classify the building was adopted by the Committee for the Protection of Adana's Cultural and Natural Heritage on 1 November 1990...\nThe property under dispute... is located ... in the town centre, at the corner of two streets, and its south- and east-facing façades give onto the road.. It is situated in a high-density business and retail area... It borders the north side of the plot of land on which St Paul's well is located. The latter, a site of considerable importance in terms of history and tourism, has long been considered sacred, and visited, by Christians. Thus, before its expropriation, the property was at the centre of “religious tourism”.\nArchaeological research indicates that the district of Tarsus is an area that was settled in the period 10,000–4,000 B.C. It is therefore of historical and cultural value. In addition to the historical monuments which are visible above ground, the ruins of an ancient town have been discovered in the course of excavation works alongside the law courts..., and the area has been placed under protection.” 16.  In determining the value of the building, panel no. 2 based its findings primarily on the construction price index published by the Ministry of Urban Planning, specifically the category “buildings requiring restoration”. It stated its findings as follows:\n“The building which is located on the disputed land is composed of two floors, each with a living floor space of 258.17 m², its total living floor space being therefore 516.34 m². It has been constructed from dressed stone and the architecture of the linking pieces is in the Baghdad style. It was designed as a residential building. The ground floor is in a simple [architectural] style, and the first floor has the features of dressed stone buildings. There is a balcony ... on the first floor. The dressed stone of the window arches and balcony is highly embellished. Thus, the disputed property has the features of buildings... constructed in line with the Mediterranean tradition, known as 'Tarsus houses' (Tarsus evleri). It has also been included in the Council of Europe's inventory for the protection of the cultural and natural heritage. It was in this building that Ataturk stayed during his visit to Tarsus in the 1930s. In spite of its age, and having regard to the above-mentioned features, the building has been protected and maintained in good condition by its owners. In those circumstances, a depreciation rate of 50 % has been decided on. As the building comes within class V, group D (buildings requiring restoration) under the Ministry of Urban Planning's circular of 2000..., the approximate cost of construction per square metre ... has been set at TRL 351,413,000.” 17.  Panel no. 2 concluded that panel no. 1 (see paragraph 12 above) had valued the disputed building as an ordinary dressed-stone building, without taking account of its architectural features. It decided not to adopt those valuation criteria and assessed the building's value at an initial TRL 181,448,588,000. It then reduced this amount to TRL 90,724,294,000, noting that the building's depreciation justified a reduction of 50%. However, it then increased this sum to TRL 181,448,588,000, holding that, in view of the building's architectural, historical and cultural features, its value should be increased by 100 %. After deduction of the expropriation compensation already paid to the applicant, the panel decided that the additional compensation should be TRL 144,591,723,000. 18.  A third panel of experts (hereafter “panel no. 3”) submitted a report on 12 June 2001, confirming all of the conclusions in the second expert report. 19.  On 14 June 2001 the applicant requested a further expert report, on the ground that the two previous reports had failed to take sufficient account of the building's architectural and historical features in assessing its value. 20.  On 15 June 2001 the court, after dismissing the request for an additional expert report, allowed part of the applicant's claim and instructed the authorities to pay him TRL 144,591,723,000 (about EUR 139,728) in additional compensation, with interest at the statutory rate, to be calculated from 3 October 2000. 21.  On 19 November 2001 the Court of Cassation set aside that judgment. It held that under section 15 (d) of the Cultural and Natural Heritage (Protection) Act (Law no. 2863), neither a building's architectural or historical features nor those resulting from its rarity could enter into play in the assessment of its value. Consequently, a 100 % increase in the amount of additional compensation could not be considered justified. 22.  On 4 December 2001 the applicant petitioned for rectification of the Court of Cassation's judgment. He contested the amount of expropriation compensation and emphasised, inter alia, the absence of a legal criterion that would enable the value of buildings making up the country's cultural and historical heritage to be calculated. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 23.  On 21 January 2002 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's request for rectification. 24.  On 15 February 2002 the District Court complied with the Court of Cassation's judgment and fixed the amount of additional compensation at TRL 53,867,429,000 (about EUR 45,980), with interest, to be calculated from 3 October 2000. 25.  On 27 May 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 26.  On 23 December 2002 the Ministry of Finance issued a payment order for TRL 124,807,810,000 (about EUR 91,905), broken down as TRL 53,867,429,000 in respect of additional compensation and TRL 70,940,390,000 in respect of interest. 27.  The case file shows that, following judicial proceedings which ended in 2005, the applicant received separate compensation for the land on which the building was constructed. According to information submitted by the Government and uncontested by the applicant's representatives, the compensation received following the expropriation of the land was 145,460 new Turkish liras (TRY)[2] (about EUR 87,101).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1968. He originates from Baghdad. 7.  The applicant applied for asylum in Sweden on 5 November 2007. In support of his application, he submitted in essence the following. He is Christian and had been an active member of the Syrian-Orthodox Church. In Baghdad, he had lived with his wife and two children. In February 2007 his wife, who had worked as a university lecturer teaching Arabic, had received a threatening letter, demanding that she quit her job and stating that, as a Christian, she had no right to teach “the language of the Qur’an”. She had not returned to work after receiving the letter. In April 2007 the applicant had been contacted by a man claiming to be a member of the Mujahedin. He had demanded a contribution of 10,000 U.S. dollars to help the group in its fight against the American troops. The applicant had responded that he did not have the money. One week later, the man had called again, saying that the applicant and his family had to convert to Islam if they did not pay the amount. They had gone into hiding at a friend’s home in another part of Baghdad for three weeks and had thereafter returned to their house. On the day of their return, 6 May 2007, three masked and armed men had tried to pull the applicant out of his car when he had been driving his son home. They had assaulted the applicant, taken his son and disappeared in a car. Three days later the son had been found on the street, strangled. The applicant had reported the murder to the police but had received no help as, according to the police, they could not even protect themselves. The applicant and his family had again moved in with friends in another part of the city. In June 2007 an unknown person had called the applicant, saying that he knew the applicant had a daughter and that she risked being subjected to the same treatment as his son. In September 2007 the family had fled to Syria. The applicant had returned to Iraq alone on 14 September 2007 and had left for Sweden on 25 October the same year. In August 2008 his wife had received a call from their previous neighbours, who had stated that the applicant and his family had been searched for at their house on several occasions. In October 2008 the family had been told that their house had been seized by the persons who had searched for them. 8.  On 30 December 2008 the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) rejected the application. The Board pointed out that a year and a half had passed since the alleged incidents and that the security situation in Baghdad had improved during this period. It also stated that the threats against the applicant appeared to be limited to the area where the incidents had occurred and that the applicant could return to a different part of Baghdad. 9.  The applicant appealed, adding that his wife had returned to Baghdad in April 2009 due to the precarious situation in Syria and that she had tried to return to her previous job. On 2 April 2009, however, she had been attacked and assaulted by two masked men, who had threatened to kill her as she had not obeyed their demand that she quit her job. She had reported the incident to the police but had received no help. She had then returned to Syria. 10.  On 4 May 2010 the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen) upheld the decision of the Board. The court considered that the letter to the applicant’s wife was clearly connected to her work and held that the applicant had failed to show that there was a connection between the letter, the kidnapping and death of his son in May 2007 and the assault of his wife in April 2009. The incidents rather seemed to be individual and separate acts of criminality related to the general security situation in Iraq at that time. Three years had passed since the initial incidents, during which time the level of sectarian violence had declined. 11.  On 27 August 2010 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations-överdomstolen) refused leave to appeal. 12.  In July 2010 the applicant’s wife and his daughter, born in 2002, arrived in Sweden and applied for asylum. The wife essentially gave the same account of events as the applicant, adding that she had returned to Baghdad from Syria in search of a job for a second time in May 2010. She had then been kidnapped and raped by a group of men who had told her that this was her last warning. As she had been raped, it was excluded that her husband would want her back and the couple therefore intended to divorce. 13.  On 22 September 2011 the Migration Board granted the wife and the daughter permanent residence permits in Sweden. The Board had regard to the incidents to which the wife had been exposed when returning to Baghdad on two occasions and concluded that, against the background of the serious violent conflict prevalent in the city, the wife would risk severe assaults if she returned there. Taking further account of her Christian beliefs and status as a single mother without a male network, it found that she had substantiated that she could not rely on the protection of the Iraqi authorities. The Board also considered that there was no reasonable internal flight alternative for her and the daughter. 14.  On 15 December 2011 the Migration Board examined ex officio whether there were any impediments to the enforcement of the applicant’s deportation order. It noted that a residence permit based on family ties could exceptionally be granted if the enforcement of a deportation order would have consequences for a child and it was clear that the family ties were so strong that the permit would have been granted if the application, as prescribed by the standard rules, had been lodged before the arrival in Sweden. It considered that this situation was not at hand in the applicant’s case, as there was no information as to how the relation between the applicant and his wife and daughter would develop. 15.  The applicant has thereafter made two requests for reconsideration, stating that, while he and his wife had been separated for a long time and had been in conflict, they had now decided to reunite. They had moved in with each other and the wife was pregnant with a child expected for October 2012. 16.  On 8 May and 21 September 2012, respectively, the Migration Board again refused to reconsider the case. Taking into account the applicant’s long separation from his wife and their ensuing conflict, it did not find the family ties to be strong enough to grant a residence permit based on an application lodged in Sweden.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Yambol. At the material time she was employed as a human resources specialist at a steel production company. 5.  In February 1998 the applicant’s employment was terminated and she was offered another position with the same company for a lower salary. 6.  On 17 September 1998 she brought a claim against her employer, complaining about the loss of income resulting from her reassignment to a less well-paid job. 7.  In a judgment of 29 June 1999 the Sofia District Court dismissed the claim, and the applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court. 8.  The court held two hearings, one of which was adjourned owing to the defective summoning of the applicant’s employer. At the third hearing, held on 23 November 2000, the applicant asked for the proceedings to be stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings brought in May 1999 (see paragraph 11 below). On 4 June 2001 the court turned down her request. The applicant appealed against this ruling. On 22 November 2001 the Supreme Court of Cassation found that it could not examine the appeal as it had no access to the case file of the May 1999 proceedings. It therefore sent the case back to the Sofia City Court, instructing it to enclose the case file and return all the materials to it for an examination of the appeal. After this was done, on 6 August 2002 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Sofia City Court’s ruling, holding that the determination of the case was not dependent on the outcome of the 1999 proceedings. 9.  The proceedings on the merits then resumed before the Sofia City Court. On 27 October 2004, after holding four more hearings, it upheld the Sofia District Court’s judgment. The text of the court’s judgment indicated that it was appealable on points of law. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal, but on 14 March 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation declared it inadmissible, observing that following a legislative amendment which had entered into force in 2002, appellate judgments in certain employment disputes were no longer subject to appeal on points of law. 11.  In February 1999 the applicant was dismissed from her employment, and on 25 May 1999 she instituted proceedings against her former employer, seeking a declaration that the dismissal had been unfair, reinstatement and compensation for six months of lost wages. 12.  After holding five hearings, two of which were adjourned owing to the failure of an expert to file her report in time, in a judgment of 17 July 2000 the Sofia District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. 13.  On 6 October 2000 the applicant appealed. After holding six hearings, in a judgment of 29 April 2004 the Sofia City Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. 14.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant appealed on points of law. After holding a hearing on 8 February 2008, in a final judgment of 1 July 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in İzmir. He is a homosexual. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Eskişehir Prison.\nIn 2009 a number of sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for, inter alia, forgery of documents, deception, credit-card fraud and misrepresentation on official documents. On 2 June 2009 the Karşıyaka Assize Court sentenced him to one year and eight months’ imprisonment at his first trial. The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation. The case is apparently still pending before that court. On 28 December 2009 the İzmir Assize Court, for its part, sentenced the applicant to ten years, three months and twenty-two days’ imprisonment for committing the offences referred to above more than once. The applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation against that judgment as well. The appeal is still pending. 6.  On 24 October 2008 the applicant went to the Çiğli police station in İzmir and confessed to committing a series of offences, such as forgery of documents, deception, credit-card fraud and misrepresentation on official documents. He was subsequently remanded in custody by a justice of the peace and taken to Buca Prison in İzmir. 7.  At Buca the applicant was first placed in a shared cell with heterosexual inmates. 8.  On 5 February 2009 the applicant’s representative asked the prison authorities to transfer the applicant, for safety reasons, to another shared cell with homosexual prisoners. In support of the request, he specified that his client had been intimidated and bullied by his fellow inmates. According to the record of his statement drawn up the same day and signed by two prison warders and the applicant, the latter made the following statement:\n“I am currently living in block no. 6. I have a homosexual condition (“eşcinsellik hastalığ”). When my fellow inmates found out about this, I started having problems. I have informed the prison governor about the situation through my lawyer. I wish to be transferred to a block adapted to my situation.” 9.  On 5 February 2009 the prison authorities decided to place the applicant on his own in an individual cell. The record of that decision contains the following passage:-\n“... the prisoner, who has said he has a homosexual condition, has been placed in an individual cell instead of his current block.” 10.  The applicant stated that the cell in which he had been placed measured 7 m², with living space of no more than half that. It had a bed and toilets, but no washbasin, was very poorly lit and very dirty and rat-infested. The applicant said that there were ten other cells of the same type that were intended for solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure or for inmates accused of paedophilia or rape. After he had been put in an individual cell on 5 February 2009, the applicant was deprived of any contact with other inmates and any social activity. He had not been permitted any outdoor exercise and had been allowed out of his cell only to see his lawyer or attend hearings held approximately once per month. 11.  The Government did not dispute those facts. They specified that the cell had been equipped with the furniture and facilities necessary for day-to-day living, such as lighting, toilets, a bed, wardrobe and chair. They explained that the applicant had been alone in the cell until another homosexual prisoner had arrived at the prison. 12.  On 21 April 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the İzmir public prosecutor’s office for the measures against him to be lifted. He specified that he was a homosexual and not a transvestite or transsexual. On account of his sexual orientation, he had been detained in an individual cell without any contact with other inmates and without being able to take part in any social activity. He had been detained in those conditions for three months and had had psychiatric problems as a result. He pointed out that in the Turkish prison system only inmates who had been sentenced to whole-life imprisonment were detained in similar conditions. He requested equal treatment to other inmates. 13.  On 7 May 2009 the applicant lodged a further request, through his lawyer, with the İzmir Post-Sentencing Judge, who also had responsibility for monitoring conditions of pre-trial detention, seeking an end to his solitary confinement and a return to ordinary conditions of detention. He stated that there had been no basis for placing and keeping him in solitary confinement and that he had suffered detrimental and irreparable psychological effects as a result. He maintained that these inhuman and degrading conditions of detention had been imposed on him solely on the basis of his sexual orientation, on the pretext of protecting him from bodily harm. He had never asked to be put in cells with other inmates; his complaint was about the fact that for more than three months he had been unable to go outdoors and that the only person he had been able to talk to had been his lawyer. He requested equal treatment to other inmates, with the possibility of outdoor exercise and social activities with other inmates, by means of measures protecting his physical integrity. He observed further that the matters of which he complained amounted to a violation of Articles 3, 5, 6 and 8, taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. 14.  On 25 May 2009 the Post-Sentencing Judge decided, after merely examining the file, that it was not necessary to decide the applicant’s claim on the merits. In doing so, he observed in particular that the applicant was not a “convicted prisoner” but was merely in pre-trial detention and that the practice of the prison authorities was in conformity with the law both in form and substance. He noted that the prison authorities had a discretionary power as Law no. 5275 on the execution of sentences and security measures did not contain specific rules for taking account of the wishes of remand prisoners regarding their placement in prisons, as was the case for the placement of convicted prisoners. He held, inter alia:\n“... it has been established that the applicant is being detained as a preventive measure in an individual cell as the State cannot run the risk of a transvestite being lynched [in a prison] ...” 15.  On 29 May 2009 the applicant challenged that decision before the İzmir Assize Court. He stated in his pleadings that he had been placed in solitary confinement twenty-four hours per day in Buca Prison on no legal basis and that he had been deprived of any contact with other inmates or outdoor exercise. Drawing attention to his age and psychological condition, which had significantly deteriorated since he had been kept in solitary confinement, he explained that he was unable to endure such conditions of detention. He also stated that, notwithstanding the pretext that his physical integrity was at risk on account of his sexual orientation, the fact that he had been placed in solitary confinement was a highly inappropriate measure in his regard. He again requested equal treatment to other inmates and to be allowed outdoor exercise and social activities with other inmates, by means of measures capable of securing his physical integrity. 16.  On 4 June 2009 the Assize Court dismissed the challenge, after receiving the prosecutor’s opinion concerning the applicant’s request, without holding a hearing and without first communicating the prosecutor’s opinion to the applicant. The Assize Court confined itself to ruling that the Post-Sentencing Judge’s decision was in conformity with the law. 17.  During a hearing held on 12 June 2009 in another set of criminal proceedings against the applicant, the 5th Chamber of the İzmir Assize Court decided to send a letter to the Buca prison authorities requesting them to take all necessary measures regarding the applicant’s complaints about his conditions of detention. 18.  On 8 July 2009 the İzmir public prosecutor’s office transferred the applicant to Manisa Psychiatric Hospital for an assessment of his mental state. 19.  From 8 July to 12 August 2009 the applicant was kept under observation at Manisa Psychiatric Hospital. The parties did not provide any precise information about that period in hospital. On 12 August 2009 a medical report was drawn up by three psychiatrists. According to that report, the applicant suffered from a homosexual identity problem (“eşcinsel kimlik bozukluğu”). It also said that the suffering related to his conditions of detention corresponded to symptoms of reactive depression. It was decided that future psychiatric problems could be treated at the prison. The applicant was sent back to Buca Prison. 20.  From 8 August 2009 another homosexual inmate was placed in the applicant’s cell. 21.  On 11 November 2009 the prison authorities decided to separate the two prisoners. From that date the applicant was again deprived of any contact with other inmates. 22.  On 26 February 2010 the applicant was transferred to Eskişehir Prison and placed in a standard cell with three other inmates where he was given the same rights as other prisoners, such as outdoor exercise, sporting activities, regular contact with other inmates, and so on. According to his lawyer, the applicant still suffered from psychological problems – particularly depression and insomnia – on account of his previous solitary confinement at Buca Prison; he was taking anti-depressants and other medicines to calm him down and help him sleep.\n...", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Sarnów. 6.  The applicant is married and has two children. Prior to his application for an early‑retirement pension he had been employed for 25 years and had paid social security contributions to the State. 7.  In July 2001 the applicant filed an application with the Rzeszów Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) to be granted the right to an early‑retirement pension for persons raising children who, due to the seriousness of their health condition, required constant care, the so‑called “EWK” pension. 8.  Along with his application for a pension, the applicant submitted, among other documents concerning his son’s health condition, a medical certificate issued by a specialist medical centre on 15 May 2001. The certificate stated that the child (born in 1994) suffered from mild asthma and bronchitis (astma oskrzelowa lagodna i spastyczne zapalenie oskrzeli) and that he was in need of his parent’s constant care. 9.  On 9 August 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board (“the SSB”) issued a decision granting the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension as of 1 July 2001 in the net amount of 685 Polish zlotys (PLN). 10.  On 20 August 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board asked the Main Social Security Board’s doctor (Główny Lekarz Orzecznik) to inform it whether the applicant’s son required the permanent care of a parent. On 13 September 2002 the doctor stated that, on the basis of the medical documents, the child could not be considered as ever having required such care. 11.  On 19 September 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued simultaneously two decisions in respect of the applicant. By virtue of one decision, the payment of the applicant’s pension was discontinued with immediate effect. By virtue of the other decision, the Board reopened the proceedings, revoked the initial decision granting a pension and eventually refused to grant the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension under the scheme provided for by the 1989 Ordinance. 12.  The applicant appealed against the respective decisions divesting him of the right to an early‑retirement pension. He submitted that he should receive the benefit because his child required constant care, as confirmed by the medical certificate attached to the applicant’s original application for a pension. Moreover, the applicant alleged that the revocation of his retirement pension was contrary to the principle of vested rights. 13.  On 29 May 2003 the Tarnobrzeg Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the appeal. The Regional Court concluded on the basis of the evidence that the applicant’s child did not require his father’s permanent care since his health condition did not significantly impair his bodily functions. The domestic court held that the applicant had been rightfully divested of his right to a pension under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as he did not satisfy the requirement of necessary permanent care. 14.  The applicant further appealed against the first‑instance judgment. 15.  On 20 November 2003 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the appeal. 16.  On 29 April 2004 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) refused to entertain the cassation appeal lodged by the applicant. 17.  Following the social security proceedings the applicant was not ordered to return his early‑retirement benefits paid by the Social Security Board, despite the revocation of his right to an early‑retirement pension. 18.  The applicant submitted that after revocation of the EWK pension he remained unemployed until April 2007. During this time he received no social or unemployment benefits. His wife had been employed seasonally as a heating system operator in schools. They owned a farm which was too small to qualify them for the social security scheme for farmers and from which they derived no income. 19.  The Government submitted that the applicant took up employment in April 2007. They failed to specify the amount of his salary. However, after 2007 the family’s yearly income increased from PLN 6,000 (approx. 1,400 euros (EUR)) to PLN 30,000 (approx. EUR 7,000). The applicant’s wife worked between 2001 and 2010 during the winter months only. The Government maintained that the applicant’s wife also owned a small farm which might have constituted an additional source of income. 20.  In addition, the Government submitted information as regards the various types of social benefits available in Poland. However, they did not specify which of those benefits, if any, were available in the applicant’s situation. 21.  Under the relevant laws currently in force, it appears that the applicant will qualify for a regular retirement pension in 2022. 22.  Some 130 applications arising from a similar fact pattern have been brought to the Court. The majority of the applicants form the Association of Victims of the SSB (Stowarzyszenie Osób Poszkodowanych przez ZUS) (“the Association”), an organisation monitoring the practices of the Social Security Board in Poland, in particular in the Podkarpacki region. 23.  Out of all applications lodged with the Court, about twenty‑four applicants decided not to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal given in their case. 24.  One hundred‑and‑four applicants lodged cassation appeals against the final judgments given in their cases. The Supreme Court entertained and dismissed on the merits fifteen appeals. In eighty‑one applications the Supreme Court refused to entertain cassation appeals on the ground that they did not raise any important legal issues or require the Supreme Court to give a new interpretation to legal provisions which raised serious doubts or gave rise to ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts. In the remaining eight cases cassation appeals were rejected for failure to comply with various procedural requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Dettingen. 11.  In August 1996 the Dettingen municipal authorities imposed a fine of 120 German marks (DEM), plus costs amounting to DEM 36, on V.B., the applicant's son, for having exceeded the speed limit of 50 km/h by 28 km/h on the evening of 21 May 1996, when travelling in a car belonging to the Trinkomat private limited company (Regulations 3 § 3 (1) and 49 § 1 (3) of the Road Traffic Regulations and section 24 of the Road Traffic Act – see “Relevant domestic law” below). The applicant is the owner and manager of that company. 12.  On 4 September 1996 V.B. lodged an objection against the administrative decision imposing the fine. 13.  On 12 March 1997 the trial in the case opened before the Bad Urach District Court. V.B. pleaded not guilty, stating that about fifteen other persons could have been driving the company car in question on that day. The applicant, summoned as a witness, refused to give evidence, as he was entitled to do as a family member. The hearing was adjourned to 19 March 1997. 14.  On 13 March 1997 around 10 a.m. the applicant, on being asked by a policeman to give evidence about his employees in connection with the proceedings against his son, stated again that he did not wish to do so and that none of his employees was currently working on the business premises. On the same day a police officer, on the order of the Bad Urach District Court judge, asked the city of Dettingen to provide a passport photograph of the applicant's son. Police enquiries from the Dettingen trade authorities (Gewerbeamt) about the applicant's employees at the relevant time had led to nothing. 15.  On 13 March 1997, at an unknown time, the Bad Urach District Court, in the context of the above proceedings against V.B., issued a warrant to search the business and residential premises of the applicant. The warrant read as follows:\n“In the context of the preliminary investigations against\n... [V.B.] ...\nconcerning\nthe contravention of a traffic regulation,\npursuant to Article 33 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without a prior hearing, in accordance with Articles 94, 95, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 105, 106 § 1, 111 et seq., and 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 46 of the Contraventions of Regulations Act, 1.  the search of the business and residential premises of the father, Jürgen Buck, ..., 3 ... Street, Dettingen/Erms, Trinkomat company; 2.  the seizure of documents that reveal the identity of the employees of Trinkomat in ... Dettingen between 20 May and 22 May 1996\nare ordered.\nReasons:\nThe son of the manager of Trinkomat, who is charged with having committed, on 21 May 1996, a contravention of Regulation 3 of the Road Traffic Regulations with a company car, has stated at the trial hearing on 12 March 1997 that a driver employed by the company could have committed the offence.\n...” 16.  The search of the residential and business premises in Dettingen, a town of some 10,000 inhabitants, was effected the same day around 2 p.m. by four police officers from the local police station. Several documents, such as personnel files and statements on working hours, were seized; copies were made and the originals were given back to the applicant the next day. The documents disclosed the names of at least six persons, four women and two men, who had been employed by the applicant's company at the relevant time and revealed, furthermore, that another relative of the applicant could have been driving the company car at the time of the speeding offence. The applicant objected to the search and, assisted by counsel, appealed against the search and seizure decision on 13 March 1997, the very day on which the warrant had been issued. 17.  On 21 March 1997 the Tübingen Regional Court, in a decision addressed to V.B., dismissed the appeal of 13 March 1997. It considered that the appeal against the search warrant was inadmissible as it was devoid of purpose (prozessual überholt), the search having been effected in the meantime. The relevance of the few documents seized could be established without the need for a further procedure. The appeal against the seizure order was ill-founded, as the documents seized were relevant for the assessment of the evidence because they could show whether, as asserted by the appellant, one of the company's employees had committed the traffic offence in question. Moreover, the seizure had not been disproportionate because copies of the originals had been filed and the originals handed back. 18.  On 21 May 1997 the Tübingen Regional Court, upon a complaint by the applicant's representative, re-examined the applicant's appeal, declaring it inadmissible as far as the search warrant was concerned and unfounded as to the seizure order. In these respects the court repeated its earlier reasoning. The Regional Court added that its earlier decision of 21 March 1997 had become devoid of purpose and, for the sake of clarity, quashed it. 19.  On 30 June 1997 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He submitted in particular that the District Court, at the hearing of 12 March 1997, had been unable to establish whether the person on the radar photo was V.B. He further stated that the documents seized showed that none of the six other persons who had been working for the applicant's company at the relevant time could have been the person shown on the radar photo. 20.  On 13 September 1997 a panel of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the complaint. The Constitutional Court disagreed with the Regional Court's finding that the appeal against the search warrant was inadmissible for the sole reason that the search had already been carried out. According to the Constitutional Court, that finding disregarded the principle of effective legal protection as guaranteed by Article 19 § 4 of the Basic Law. In support of its view, the Constitutional Court referred to its decision of 30 April 1997, which had reversed its former case-law on the point. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court considered it inappropriate to admit the constitutional complaint. Indeed, when examining the lawfulness of the seizure order, the Regional Court had also, incidentally, addressed the question of the lawfulness of the search order. In any event, the impugned search warrant was obviously lawful. This decision was served on 24 September 1997. 21.  On 19 March 1997, in the resumed trial proceedings, the Bad Urach District Court rendered its judgment against V.B. It found him guilty of having negligently exceeded a speed limit, imposed a fine of DEM 120 (approximately 61 euros) on him in accordance with the uniform scale of fines (Bußgeldkatalog) for the various road-traffic regulatory offences, and ordered him to bear the costs of the proceedings. 22.  As regards V.B.'s personal background, the District Court noted that V.B. had had his driving licence since 1991, that he drove between 40,000 and 50,000 km per year and that there was no record of previous traffic offences. 23.  The District Court, having regard to expert technical evidence, found that the radar check had been properly carried out and that the measurements were correct. Moreover, having compared the photographs taken on the occasion of the radar check, in particular the enlargement prepared by the expert, and V.B.'s passport photograph taken in 1994, which had been retained in the administrative files of the Dettingen municipal authorities, the court reached the conclusion that it was V.B. who had been driving the car. In this respect, the court compared the form of the face, the nose, the position of the eyes and the eyebrows. Furthermore, although V.B. had meanwhile grown a beard, the lower part of the face on the radar photos and of V.B.'s face on the passport photo, showing him without a beard, clearly matched. There were no indications that any other person with the same characteristics had been driving the car at the relevant time. 24.  On 19 August 1997 the Stuttgart Court of Appeal dismissed V.B.'s request for leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in the town of Pestovo in the Novgorod Region. 6.  On the evening of 14 April 2000 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed murder and remanded in custody in detention facility IVS of police station no. 36 in the Vyborgskiy District of St Petersburg (ИВС при 36 отделении милиции Выборгского района г. Санкт-Петербурга). 7.  The arrest report drawn up on 15 April 2000 at 1 p.m. contains the typed description of the applicant's procedural rights, in particular “the right to be represented by a lawyer from the moment of drawing up of the arrest report” and “the right not to incriminate oneself”. It was signed by the applicant and also includes the applicant's statement that he “wishes to give evidence in the presence of counsel G.”. Lastly, the report contains the following hand-written statement, also signed by the applicant:\n“I did commit, together with V., the murder of P. on 5 April 2000.” 8.  A record of the applicant's questioning on 15 April 2000, signed by the applicant and counsel G., according to which the applicant was questioned from 1.15 to 4 p.m. in the presence of counsel G., contains a detailed description of the murder and robbery of P. 9.  According to a subsequent record of 17 April 2000 signed by the applicant and counsel G., the applicant “confirmed his testimony contained in the record of 15 April 2000”. 10.  According to the records of subsequent interviews, also signed by the applicant and his representative, the applicant refused to give further evidence and stated that he confirmed his confession, but only in part. 11.  The records do not contain any indication of or complaints about coercion or ill-treatment. 12.  On 17 April 2000 the prosecutor of the Vyborgskiy District of St Petersburg authorised the applicant's further detention. 13.  According to the applicant, he was transferred to remand prison IZ­45/4 in St Petersburg (SIZO no. 4). 14.  The Government submitted that the transfer had taken place on 20 April 2000. 15.  In his application to the Court the applicant gave the following account of the events of 15 April 2000. 16.  The applicant was escorted for questioning to an office, where he was fettered to the floor with handcuffs and put in an uncomfortable sitting position. The applicant was then beaten up by men who did not state their names. 17.  The applicant submitted that they had beaten him “professionally”, inflicting blows in such a way as to leave no traces and using, in particular, plastic bottles filled with water. They had also held a knife to his throat, threatened him with death and promised to chop his head off. At first, the officers had beaten the applicant without asking him to do or say anything, but after some time they had invited him to confess. When the applicant refused, they had shown him a written statement of his friend V., who had been arrested in connection with the same criminal case and had “confessed to things he had never done”. 18.  The applicant submitted that, being demoralised and fearing for his life, he had confessed to a murder and a robbery but had refused to incriminate V. 19.  The applicant submitted that he had told his counsel about the ill­treatment but his counsel had failed to react. 20.  It does not appear that the applicant requested medical assistance or complained to any domestic authority in connection with the alleged ill­treatment. 21.  By a judgment of 5 December 2000 the St Petersburg City Court convicted the applicant of having killed and robbed P. and having stolen his passport. The court sentenced the applicant to eighteen years' imprisonment in a high security prison and the confiscation of his property. 22.  By the same decision it acquitted him on a separate count of theft because the prosecution had been based solely on the applicant's confession and the victim's statement. Referring to the record of the applicant's psychiatric-psychological examination, the court ordered his compulsory out-patient psychiatric treatment for drug addiction. 23.  The applicant was represented at the trial by counsel G. Throughout the trial they consistently defended the view that the victim had in fact been killed by a third person and not by the applicant. 24.  The court rejected this argument by reference to the oral evidence given by three witnesses and a police officer in charge of the investigation and also to the discrepancies and contradictions in the applicant's own statements. 25.  The court further cited the applicant's and his co-accused's statements from the pre-trial stage describing in detail the killing and robbery, and held that they “corresponded to the factual circumstances of the case in part, concerning the preparation and execution of the robbery of the victim P. and his especially cruel murder by [the applicant]”. In finding the applicant guilty, the court also referred to various pieces of evidence, including, in particular, statements from four witnesses, the crime scene inspection report, three identification parade reports, a record of the identification of the stolen goods, seizure records, forensic medical and biological reports and the applicant's explanations about the blood spots on his jacket. 26.  During the trial the defence argued that the applicant had been forced by the authorities to confess, with threats of violence. In this respect, the court established the following:\n“As to [the applicant's] allegations that, by threatening him with violence and even death, the police officers had forced him to confess to having killed and robbed P., witness Pe. [the investigator] stated that no violence or threats were applied to [either] co-accused throughout their arrest and questioning. They gave evidence voluntarily, on some occasions in the presence of their defence counsel.\nIn this connection Matveyev [the applicant] submitted at a court hearing that Pe. had never threatened him at the pre-trial investigation and that he [the applicant] did not know the names of the police officers who had threatened him and would not be able to identify them.” 27.  According to the minutes of the hearing, the applicant and his counsel did not object to the conclusion of the trial in the absence of witness M. The hearing transcript also contains no indication that the applicant or his defence counsel requested the court to summon witness K. 28.  It appears that some time after the trial the defence changed their counsel. 29.  The applicant, his newly appointed counsel and his mother, admitted to the appeal proceedings as a “public defender”, appealed against the conviction. In his appeal submissions, the applicant's counsel alleged, among other things, that the trial court had failed to summon and examine witnesses K. and M.; that in ordering the applicant's compulsory medical treatment it had failed to properly take into account his state of health; and that it should not have based the applicant's conviction on his forced pre­trial statements and referred to the statement of the investigator in rejecting his submission that the victim had been killed by a third person. The applicant's counsel further contested at length the way in which the trial court had assessed the evidence before it. In his own appeal submissions, the applicant alleged that he had not killed P. 30.  By a decision of 18 April 2000, judge Sh. rejected the applicant's objections to the transcript of the court hearings as unfounded and tending to revise the facts established by the trial court. 31.  By decision of 27 September 2001 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment in respect of the applicant. The hearing was conducted by way of videoconferencing. Both the applicant and his mother were given the floor. 32.  The court held, in particular, that:\n“Having analysed the evidence gathered in the case in its entirety, the first-instance court reached a well-founded conclusion as to [the applicant]'s and [V.'s] guilt in the crimes committed by them ... [,] having provided sufficient reasons for its conclusions concerning their guilt and the classification of the defendants' acts.\nThe case was investigated and examined by the [trial] court without any significant violations of the provisions of the RSFSR CCrP which could have had prejudiced the court's judgment, including the issue of admissibility of evidence.” 33.  The applicant submitted that he had been held in SIZO no. 4 in St Petersburg and also in remand prison IZ-77/3 (SIZO no. 3) in Moscow. In respect of the former facility, he submitted that he had been detained there from 17 April 2000 to 8 September 2001 and from January to March 2002. He did not submit specific dates concerning his detention in SIZO no. 3, but suggested that it had taken place between September 2001 and January 2002. 34.  The Government submitted, with reference to prison records, that the applicant's detention in SIZO no. 4 had lasted from 20 April 2000 to 7 September 2001 and from 23 January 2002 to 13 March 2002, whilst his detention in SIZO no. 3 had taken place in between the mentioned terms, from 10 September 2001 to 21 January 2002. 35.  The applicant gave the following account of the conditions of his detention. 36.  At all times the prison was heavily overcrowded. His cell measured 20 square metres and was meant to accommodate twelve inmates but actually housed between forty and fifty. The bunk beds in the cell had three “levels”, the applicant's sleeping place being on the top level, right under the ceiling. The inmates slept in turns, two or three persons sharing one bed at a time. The applicant slept on a worn-out mattress and was not provided with any bedding. Because the detainees shared beds, they often contracted skin infections and had lice. The inmates had a one-hour outside walk per day. The lavatory pan was separated from the living area by a makeshift partition. As such an arrangement was prohibited by the prison authorities, it was ripped down in the course of every routine check and then rebuilt by the inmates until the next check. 37.  The windows had double bars and metal shutters which let almost no natural light in. The electric lights were always switched on. For the same reason there were problems of fresh air, especially in summer when it was very hot. The windows had no glass and in winter the detainees covered them in order to avoid freezing, so there was even less fresh air. 38.  The quality of the food was deplorable. The inmates were sometimes given out-of-date biscuits from humanitarian supplies. 39.  The applicant could not wash himself properly because the “washing schedule” (once every 8-10 days) was rarely respected by the prison authorities. Furthermore, the shower facility, a former morgue, was in a disgusting state. 40.  On several occasions tuberculosis or hepatitis sufferers and mentally disturbed inmates had been placed in the applicant's cell. The applicant submitted that although the detainees underwent HIV and AIDS tests upon their arrival in the detention facility, they were informed of the results with a considerable delay. 41.  The applicant alleged that he suffered from epileptic fits and nocturnal enuresis and could not count on adequate medical assistance. 42.  He further stated that the regular searches in the cells, assisted by members of the special forces (спецназ), were usually accompanied by violence, especially throughout 2000. On one such occasion the applicant's fellow detainees were ordered to leave the cell and the applicant was ordered to hand over any prohibited items. When he refused, he was ordered to kneel down, which he again refused to do because it was humiliating. In response, persons wearing masks beat him up. 43.  It does not appear that the applicant complained about the alleged incident or requested medical assistance at the time. 44.  The Government disagreed with the above description and submitted that the applicant had been provided with his own sleeping place, bedding and cutlery. They also submitted that all original documentation relating to the periods in question had been destroyed. They submitted that the cells in the prison had had windows measuring between 0.9 and 1 metre and had been equipped with light bulbs. They admitted that the windows had been covered with metal shutters until 1 April 2003. The inmates had been able to wash themselves once a week and also to wash their personal things. The Government denied the applicant's allegations concerning the detention of mentally disturbed persons and persons infected with tuberculosis in his cell, and submitted that such a situation was impossible, since the applicable law did not allow it. There may have been HIV infected persons in the applicant's cell, but that was not in breach of the domestic law or the European Convention on Human Rights. The Government also submitted that the prison administration had taken measures against the insects in the cells and that the quality of the food had been in accordance with all relevant standards. 45.  The applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention in the remand prison in Moscow had been better than in St Petersburg only in two respects: he had been able to shower more regularly and he was provided with a mattress. As to the rest, although there were fewer inmates, the cell was overcrowded and the detainees slept in turns. The ventilation was inadequate, there was lack of natural light and the lights were always switched on. The cell was infested with insects and cockroaches. 46.  The Government disagreed and submitted that between 10 and 12 September 2001 the applicant had been detained in cell no. 417, which measured 14.98 square metres and was equipped with two-tier bunk beds for ten persons. From 12 September 2001 to 21 January 2002 he was detained in cell no. 414, measuring 15 square metres and equipped with ordinary beds for eight persons. The original documentation concerning the number of inmates in these cells at the relevant time was destroyed on 20 February 2004, the regulatory time for its storage having elapsed. The Government submitted that the conditions of detention could not have been worse than those required by the Rules on the prison regime in pre-trial detention centres (as approved by Ministry of Justice Decree no. 148 of 12 May 2000 – see the Relevant Domestic Law section below). The Government argued that the cells had been properly lit, ventilated, and disinfected and had generally been in good condition. 47.  On 19 March 2002 the applicant arrived in the correctional colony OYa-22/7 in Pankovka settlement in the Novgorod Region. 48.  Upon arrival, the applicant was placed in a disciplinary cell for protesting about serving his sentence in the Novgorod Region instead of the Yaroslavl Region as the authorities had allegedly promised him. 49.  He was kept in the disciplinary cell from 19 March to 22 June and from 19 September to 19 November 2002. According to the applicant, the cell measured around 25 square metres and held six prisoners. He was not allowed to have any personal belongings. He could shower once a week and had a one­hour walk per day. There was no table, bench or washbasin and the applicant was not provided with a mattress or bedding. 50.  Throughout his confinement in the disciplinary cell the applicant was prohibited from sending and receiving letters. He was also banned from smoking, reading and receiving parcels. 51.  By letter dated 28 June 2002 the head of the correctional colony OY­22/7 informed the applicant's father that the applicant was detained in the disciplinary cell and that during his detention there all correspondence and family visits were prohibited. 52.  The applicant submits that from 22 June to 19 September 2002 he was held in a “safe cell” (безопасное место) where correspondence was allowed and the restrictions imposed in the disciplinary cell did not apply. 53.  On 23 July 2003 he was transferred to correctional colony YN-88/3 in Uglich in the Yaroslavl Region.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and is now serving his sentence in prison UP-288/T of Minusinsk, the Krasnoyarsk Region. 6.  On 14 August 1989 seven teenagers were found dead near Kazynet railway station of the Askizskiy District of the Republic of Khakassia. On an unspecified date in 1989 the competent authorities opened an investigation into the case. On 24 July 1992 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed murder. By a judgment of 24 March 1995, the Kemerovo Regional Court convicted him as charged and sentenced him to capital punishment. By a judgment of 11 October 1995, the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. On 4 September 1996 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia, by way of supervisory review proceedings, quashed the judgments of 24 March 1995 and 11 October 1995 and remitted the case for an additional investigation. 7. On 17 February 1997 the case file was transferred to the General Prosecutor's Office and the criminal proceedings were reopened. On 3 April 1997 the applicant was released from custody on an undertaking not to leave his town of residence. On 18 August 2000 he was officially charged. 8. On an unspecified date the pre-trial investigation was completed and on 30 November 2000 the case file was submitted to the trial court for judicial examination. 9. On 18 September 2001 the Supreme Court of the Republic Khakasia convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to 15 years' imprisonment. The applicant was detained in the court room immediately after the pronouncement of his sentence. By a judgment of 12 February 2003, the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the city of Poltava. 6.  In November 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Poltava Kyivsky District Court against his former employer – the Poltava Regional Fire Safety Department – claiming payment arrears of a monthly subsistence allowance for the years 1999 and 2000. 7.  On 27 September 2002 the court found in part for the applicant and awarded him 767.04 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH). 8.  On 11 October 2002 the same court rectified its judgment of 27 September 2002 and increased the amount awarded to UAH 797.04. 9.  On 15 April 2003 the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decisions of 27 September and 11 October 2002 and rejected the applicant's claims. The appellate court based its findings on the fact that the Budget Act 2000 had not foreseen expenditure for the payments under the applicable Presidential Decree, and therefore held that the applicant had no entitlement to such payments during the impugned period under the Budgetary System Act. 10.  On 15 September 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision of 15 April 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in the city of Kharkiv, Ukraine. 5.  On 18 October 1995 the applicant was arrested and detained on remand. He was subsequently charged with illegal possession of arms. 6.  On 21 October 1995 the applicant was charged with theft. 7.  On 30 May 1997 the Leninskyy District Court separated the two sets of criminal proceedings against the applicant and remitted the case of theft for further investigation. 8.  On 2 June 1997 the court sentenced the applicant to three and a half years’ imprisonment for illegal possession of arms. On 6 August 1997 the Balakleyskyy District Court amnestied the applicant and he was subsequently released. According to the applicant, the release was subject to an undertaking not to abscond. 9.  On 6 November 1997 the applicant was arrested again, apparently in the context of the criminal proceedings in the case of theft mentioned above, and charged with embezzlement; subsequently this charge was reclassified to theft and robbery. The gravity of the crimes with which he was charged and the danger of his absconding were mentioned in the investigator’s arrest order as reasons for the applicant’s detention on remand. 10.  Alongside the applicant, other persons were charged within these proceedings (by the end of the trial there were fourteen persons), although on different dates and with different crimes. 11.  On 25 December 1997 the Prosecutor of the Kharkiv Region extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 14 April 1998. In doing so he referred to the gravity of the crimes with which the accused were charged and the danger of their absconding. 12.  Between 1998 and 2001 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred several times for examination to the Kharkiv Regional Court. However, the latter remitted it for additional investigation. The last time this happened was on 8 February 2001. In doing so the court, inter alia, ordered the applicant’s further detention on remand; it did not specify any reasons for this detention. On 15 May 2001 the Supreme Court of Ukraine quashed this decision and remitted the case back to the court. 13.  On 6 September 2001 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (formerly Kharkiv Regional Court) remitted the case to the Kharkivskyy District Court of the Kharkiv Region for examination because of the changes introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code on 12 July 2001, which provided that such cases had to be considered by the district courts. 14.  The applicant and his lawyer asked the court to release the applicant on several occasions referring, inter alia, to the applicant’s state of health, but to no avail. In particular, on 27 March, 8 July and 18 August 2003 the Kharkivskyy District Court refused the applicant’s and his lawyer’s requests to replace the applicant’s detention on remand with an undertaking not to abscond. On the latter date the court rejected the applicant’s reference to his poor state of health, arguing that he was taking an active part in the criminal proceedings against him and, therefore, his argument of poor health was ill-founded. Apparently, the remainder of the applicant’s and his lawyer’s requests for release were either not taken into account by the court or the copies of relevant court decisions were not provided to the Court.\nThe applicant was finally released on 1 October 2003 for health reasons, on an undertaking not to abscond. 15.  The other accused and their lawyers also made several requests to the court for their detention to be replaced with an undertaking not to abscond. 16.  In the course of the criminal proceedings the court also considered numerous motions filed by the accused and their lawyers, among which there were motions to order forensic examinations (in total, more than twenty different forensic examinations, for example, medical, fingerprints, and so on, were held at the pre-trial and trial stages), to extend the time-limit for familiarisation with the case-file, to replace one lawyer with another (at least three lawyers were replaced at the applicant’s request). The accused also challenged the judge who was dealing with their case on a number of occasions. 17.  By the end of the trial, sixteen persons had lodged civil claims against the accused. 18.  On 29 July 2004 the Kharkivskyy District Court sentenced the applicant to five years, eleven months and 25 days’ imprisonment for numerous robberies and burglaries. The court also found all the other accused guilty and imposed on them various sentences. The court further examined the civil claims and allowed them in part. 19.  The applicant and prosecutor appealed against this judgment. 20.  On 20 December 2006 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the impugned judgment in regard to the applicant and changed it in regard to other accused. 21.  The applicant appealed in cassation and, according to him, on 12 March 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected his appeal. 22.  According to the applicant, in November 1997 he was beaten by the police. By a letter of 27 January 1998 the prosecutor informed the applicant that on 3 December 1997 a medical expert had established that he had minor bodily injuries. The parties did not provide the Court with a copy of this medical report. 23.  On 10 April 1998, apparently having examined the applicant’s complaints, the prosecutor found no prima facie case of ill-treatment. Accordingly, he refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen concerned. 24.  The applicant further raised his complaints of ill-treatment before the Kharkivskyy District Court during the trial against him. However, the court dismissed these complaints as ill-founded, referring to the prosecutor’s decision. 25.  According to the applicant, between October and November 1995 he was beaten by the police and that caused him, inter alia, a spinal trauma. 26.  The Government produced a collection of documents which appear to be extracts from the applicant’s medical records, a substantial part of which is illegible. The legible pages list the applicant’s diagnoses but contain no information about the nature of treatment administered to the applicant in the Pre-Trial Detention Centre No. 27 (слідчий ізолятор № 27 - hereinafter “the SIZO No. 27”), where he was detained at the material time. They can be summarised as follows. 27.  In the period between 24 December 1996 and 10 January 1997 a medical expert report, prepared in the course of the applicant’s detention, established that the applicant was suffering from a peroneal nerve neuropathy and partial paralysis of the right foot (нейропатія малогомілкового нерва з парезом правої стопи). The experts further concluded that these disorders could have been caused by an osteochondrosis, and that the applicant could be treated in the pre-trial detention centre, where he was detained at the time. He warned that “in the absence of appropriate medical treatment the disease [would] progress”. 28.  Following his arrest in November 1997 (see paragraph 9 above), the applicant was examined by the doctors of the SIZO No. 27, where the applicant was placed. He was also examined by a psychoneurologist on 10 December 1997. The doctors’ report does not contain any information about his alleged neurological problems. 29.  On 14 July 1998 the head of the medical department of the SIZO No. 27 reported to the prosecutor that, having examined the applicant on the same date, it had been concluded that his state of health was satisfactory and he did not need medical treatment. He further stated that the applicant could be detained in the SIZO No. 27. 30.  On 12 October 1999 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and diagnosed with partial paralysis of the right peroneal nerve (парез правого малогомілкового нерва). In this regard the doctor ordered an X‑ ray examination, which revealed sacral assimilation (сакралізація п’ятого поперекового хребця). 31.  Later, on 6 November 1999, the head of the medical department of the SIZO No. 27 reported that the applicant had applied for medical aid on account, inter alia, of partial paralysis of the right peroneal nerve and left peroneal nerve disorder syndrome (синдром порушення лівого малогомілкового нерва). He had received out-patient treatment. Finally, the head of the department stated that the applicant needed additional examinations. 32.  On 31 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a neurologist and diagnosed with partial paralysis of both feet. 33.  Following the applicant’s medical check-up on 17 October 2000, it was reported, inter alia, that his above-mentioned neurological problems were a result of the spinal trauma suffered in 1995. It was further stated that the applicant needed routine surgical treatment. No further information as to whether the applicant underwent this treatment is available. 34.  On an unknown date in October 2001 and on 25 January 2002 the doctors came to the conclusion that the applicant, given his state of health, could be detained in the SIZO No. 27. Furthermore, on 15 March 2003 they concluded that the applicant could be placed in a disciplinary cell (карцер). 35.  On 19 December 2002 the doctors of the SIZO No. 27, following the applicant’s complaints of pain and weakness in the right hand and foot, examined the applicant and concluded that he was suffering from partial paralysis of the right hand and foot. They noted that the disease was progressing and that there was a suspicion of syringomyelia (сирингомієлія)[1]. In their view, to make a diagnosis and to plan a therapeutic approach the applicant needed to undergo additional medical examinations and treatment at a specialised hospital. 36.  According to the Government, on 10 June 2003, following the applicant’s complaints of, inter alia, pain in his right hand, he was examined by a neurologist who reaffirmed his above-mentioned neurological problems. He noted, among other matters, the progressive nature of the disease and the suspected syringomyelia. 37.  On 11 June 2003 the doctors of the SIZO No. 27, having examined the applicant, again diagnosed him as suffering from the progressive neurological problems mentioned in the preceding paragraph. They further noted that in the SIZO No. 27 there was no neurologist, no neurosurgeon, no appropriate medication (in particular, painkillers) and no possibility to provide specialised treatment for the applicant. 38.  On 8 July 2003 the Kharkivskyy District Court of Kharkiv Region, rejecting one of the applicant’s lawyer’s requests to release the applicant, held that the applicant’s detention was lawful and that the court was not competent to consider the issues of detainees’ medical treatment. However, the court noted that it “took into account” the information mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 39.  The applicant again requested his release, referring to his aggravated state of health and lack of necessary medicine; these in his view made it difficult for him to participate effectively in the court proceedings. On 18 August 2003 the Kharkivskyy District Court noted that the SIZO doctors had not requested it to release the applicant in order to participate in the proceedings, and held that the applicant himself and with the assistance of his counsel actively participated in the court proceedings. Accordingly, it rejected the applicant’s request. 40.  On 1 October 2003 the Kharkivskyy District Court noted, referring to the medical data, that “[the applicant] was suffering from the after-effects of a spinal injury and a fracture of the right foot, median and radial nerve neuritis [неврит серединного та радіяльного нерва] and partial paralysis of the right hand” and released him. 41.  The next day the applicant applied to a local hospital for medical assistance and was sent to City Hospital No. 7 where he underwent specialised diagnostic procedures and treatment (including as an in-patient).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant, who was born in 1956, was living in Aktaş village at the time of the alleged events giving rise to this application. The facts of the case are in dispute between the parties and may be summarised as follows. 10.  Until October 1994 the applicant lived in Aktaş, a village of Ovacık district in Tunceli province, in the then state-of-emergency region of Turkey. In 1994, terrorist activity was a major concern in this area. Since the 1980s a violent conflict had been going on in the region between the security forces and sections of the Kurdish population in favour of Kurdish autonomy, in particular members of the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan). The inhabitants of the applicant’s village were suspected of “aiding and abetting terrorists”; and accordingly they were strictly and frequently controlled by the gendarmes stationed near the village. 11.  On 5 October 1994 the security forces surrounded the applicant’s village and assembled the residents in the village square. Using curse words, they told them that the village would be evacuated at once with no possibility of return. The applicant took what he was able to carry with him and left the village. Immediately after the evacuation, the soldiers set the houses and the crops on fire. 12.  The applicant moved temporarily into a prefabricated State disaster housing complex close to Ovacık. 13.  Following the impugned events the applicant filed a petition with the Ovacık Public Prosecutor’s office complaining about the burning down and forced evacuation of his village by gendarmes. 14.  As the case concerned an investigation into alleged acts of the security forces, the Ovacık Public Prosecutor issued a decision of non‑jurisdiction and referred the petition to the office of the District Governor in Ovacık in accordance with the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants (Memurin Muhakematı Kanunu). 15.  The District Governor sent a letter to the Ovacık Gendarmerie Headquarters and requested information about the applicant’s allegations. 16.  In a letter of 1 November 1994 the Gendarmerie Commander informed the District Governor that the security forces had not burned any house during their operations in the area. Accordingly, the Ovacık Administrative Council issued a decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings against the gendarmes. 17.  On 25 October 1995 the Ovacık District Governor sent a letter to the applicant. Relying on the Ovacık Gendarmerie Commander’s letter of 1 November 1994, he explained that he was unconvinced by his allegations. He further explained that pursuant to the established case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court (Danıştay), no inquiry was possible unless the identity of the accused civil servant were specified. He therefore stated that the authorities would not initiate an investigation into the alleged events. 18.  The applicant did not receive this letter. He learned of the Ovacık Public Prosecutor’s decision of non-jurisdiction and the Ovacık Administrative Council’s decision from his fellow villagers. 19.  In 1994 members of the PKK started a propaganda campaign for the organisation in the villages of Ovacık district. They kidnapped young men from these villages and forced them to join the organisation. The PKK militants issued threats against the villagers and harassed them. The inhabitants of the villages left their homes as a result of the pressure exerted by the PKK. 20.  The investigation carried out by the authorities revealed that the applicant’s village had not been burned by the security forces but by terrorists wearing military uniforms. In his statements to the investigating authorities, the applicant failed to specify the identity of the perpetrators of the alleged crime. 21.  The parties submitted various documents with a view to substantiating their claims. These documents, in so far as they are relevant, can be summarised as follows. 22.  The applicant submitted a protocol dated 2 May 2001 in which he claimed that he had suffered financial damages because of the burning down of his village. He submitted that prior to the events in 1994 he had owned 50 acres land, 150 poplar trees, 20 walnut trees, 30 fruit trees, 400 metres square plot of land, two-story house, 40 goats, 4 cows and 50 beehives. This document has been stamped by the mayor of Aktaş village, Cafer Öztürk.\n(b)  Annual Reports of the Human Rights Foundation (“the TIHV”) 23.  The Human Rights Foundation is a non-governmental organisation with its head office in Ankara, Turkey. Its 1993 Report stated that, from 1990 to 1993, more than 913 villages and hamlets had been evacuated. The 1993 Report maintained that village evacuations had accelerated in 1993, mostly targeting the villages whose inhabitants refused to serve as village guards. 24.  The 1994 Report of the TIHV argued that the Government’s policy was to claim that the evacuations and eventual destructions were caused by PKK terror, poverty and the forces of nature. According to the same report, some 50 to 60 villages were burned down in each of the provinces subject to the emergency rule. 25.  The 1995 Report maintained that more than 400 villages had been evacuated in 1995. According to the 1996 Report, the State-of-Emergency Regional Governor once mentioned that a total of 918 villages and 1,767 hamlets had been evacuated for various reasons, although never admitting that evacuations had been carried out by security forces. 26.  The 1997 and 1998 Reports described the Government’s policy of evacuating villages as a systematic “internal security operation” applied throughout the 1990s.\n(c)  Excerpts from “Burned-down / Evacuated Villages and Migration”, a book published by the Human Rights Association 27.  The excerpts gave a comprehensive list of burned-down and/or evacuated villages from February 1990 to January 1999. The list did not make any reference to Aktaş as having been evacuated and destroyed. 28.  The excerpts contained several articles reproduced from a daily newspaper Ülkede Gündem, relating to the evacuation of villages and its detrimental effects on the displaced persons. The articles stressed that numerous villagers had filed petitions with the State authorities, complaining that their villages had been burned down by security forces. 29.  The articles also emphasized that the Government’s public declarations, which appeared to allow displaced villagers to return to their villages, were unreliable. Whenever villagers had attempted to do so, they were physically denied access to their villages.\n(d)  The report of 14 January 1998 of the Turkish Grand National Assembly’s Commission of Inquiry on the measures to be taken in order to address the problems of the persons displaced following the evacuation of settlement units in east and south-east Anatolia 30.  This report was prepared by a Commission of Inquiry composed of ten members of parliament. According to the report, in 1993 and 1994 the inhabitants of 905 villages and 2,923 hamlets were evicted and forced to move to other regions of the country (p.13). 31.  The report included a statement by Mr Doğan Hatipoğlu, a former governor of Diyarbakır. Mr Hatipoğlu explained that, during his office, occasional village evacuations by military authorities were brought to his attention. He stated that – although very rarely – he had received complaints about village burnings. According to Mr Hatipoğlu, it was inconceivable to assert that all the villages were vacated due to PKK coercion. He alleged that the Government had failed to take the necessary measures for a healthy resettlement of displaced persons (p.13). 32.  The report also referred to the “Human Rights Report – Turkey”, prepared and submitted to the Commission of Inquiry in 1995 by Mr Yavuz Önen, the chairman of the Human Rights Foundation. This latter report dedicated a chapter to immigrants and evacuated villages. It argued that, in 1995, the practice of evacuation of villages and hamlets was widespread. Many houses in villages were either destroyed or made uninhabitable. People were forced to emigrate from the region and pressure was exerted on the inhabitants until they left their villages. In early 1995 there was practically no village or hamlet inhabited except those whose inhabitants agreed to become village guards (p.19). 33.  The report of the Commission of Inquiry also referred to the speech delivered at the Turkish Grand National Assembly by Mr Salih Yıldırım, a deputy from Şırnak, on 3 June 1997 on the question of evacuated villages. Mr Yıldırım stated, inter alia, that the villages were evacuated either by the PKK, in order to intimidate those who opposed it, by the authorities since they were unable to protect the villages, or because the inhabitants of those villages refused to become village guards or were suspected of having aided the PKK (p. 20). 34.  In conclusion, it was recommended in the report that the inhabitants of the settlement units should be re-housed in the provinces, districts or central villages – rather than hamlets – close to the area where they used to live and that necessary economic measures should be taken with a view to providing employment to the inhabitants of the region, priority being given to the immigrants. 35.  This report aims at indicating the property owned by the applicant. Following an investigation carried out by the authorities it appeared that the applicant did not own any land according to the records of the land registry office and the municipal registry office. The applicant does not have any registered trees either. In his declaration of 12 May 1986 to the municipality the applicant claimed that he owned a house measuring 80 metres square, whereas in his declaration dated 2 May 1998 he noted that he owned a house measuring 140 square metres which had been built in 1980. According to the official records, he did not have any commercial activity given that he did not pay any tax before 1994. Between 1994 and 2002 he lived in one of the natural disaster houses provided to him by the Government. In 2002 he moved into a new house which was built by the Government within the framework of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project”. The local authorities gave the applicant 10 sheep and 323,000,000 Turkish liras’ aid. He also benefited from the food support by the authorities.\n(b)  Veys Toprak’s statements dated 10 March 2004, taken by two gendarmes 36.  The witness is the mayor of Kandolar neighbourhood in Ovacık. His statements were taken in order to determine the situation of the applicant who had lodged an application with the Court. The witness stated that the applicant had lived in one of the prefabricated houses between 1994 and 2002 and that he had moved to a newly built house provided for him in 2002 by the Government. The applicant died in 2003. At the relevant time nobody lived in Aktaş. There was no electricity, school or telephone in the village.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Chişinău. He is the director of Tantal SRL, a company offering security services. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 12 July 2005 the applicant's company was informed by a client (a petrol supply company) of damage caused to the latter by one of the applicant's employees' having stolen fuel and damaged a fuel pump. On 20 July 2005 the applicant responded by revealing the results of an internal inquiry, which had established that one of the applicant's employees responsible for guarding the relevant petrol stations, G.N., had confessed to the above actions, but had refused to pay for the damage. The applicant proposed to send the relevant information to the local police and the client. 8.  On 25 November 2005 G.N. made a complaint to the General Directorate for Fighting Organised Crime (“GDFOC”), a subdivision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, about threats to him and his family by “persons at the office of the Tantal company” who, from 5 July 2005, had threatened him with violence in order to obtain money from him. When he refused, he was coerced into signing a receipt which showed that he had borrowed money from T.G., another employee of the applicant's company. Finally, G.N. complained that he had been illegally detained between 7 and 11 July 2005 at one of the detention centres. The complaint was registered by GDFOC officer O. 9.  On 26 November 2005 officer M. from the prosecutor general's Office ordered the opening of a criminal investigation into the allegations made by G.N. and the creation, for that purpose, of a team of twenty investigators from two departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The order described the applicant and T.G. as the alleged perpetrators. 10.  On 29 November 2005 the applicant was arrested. The reason given for the arrest was “the victim directly identified the suspect as the perpetrator of the crime; there is reason to believe that the suspect may exert pressure on the victim and witnesses”. From that date until 9 March 2006 the applicant was detained in the GDFOC remand centre, except for a few days when he was on bail (see paragraph 11 below). 11.  The prosecutor asked a court to remand the applicant in custody, accusing the applicant of unlawfully detaining and blackmailing G.N. in order to obtain 1,000 United States dollars (USD) from him. On 2 December 2005 the Buiucani District Court rejected that request. The court found that the prosecutor had not provided sufficient evidence to prove the existence of grounds for detaining the applicant. It further found that G.N.'s detention in July 2005 had been sanctioned by the deputy prosecutor of Chişinău and could not therefore be considered unlawful detention; that no evidence had been adduced to substantiate the danger of the applicant's exerting pressure on the victim or witnesses; and that the applicant had a permanent residence, a job, and supported a child. Nonetheless, the court ordered the applicant's house arrest for ten days. 12.  On 7 December 2005 the Chişinău Court of Appeal quashed that decision, finding that the court had incorrectly applied the law, which did not allow any preventive measure other than remand in custody of persons accused of especially serious crimes. However, the court accepted the applicant's request for release on bail, which was set at 50,000 Moldovan lei (MDL) (3,300 euros (EUR) at the time). He paid that amount and was released. 13.  In the meantime, on 6 December 2005, the applicant's company's licence was revoked at the request of one of the subdivisions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The reasons given were the company's failure to observe the rules on the wearing of uniforms of certain colours, and the participation of the applicant in criminal activities. 14.  On 12 December 2005 the applicant mentioned to the media that his prosecution and arrest had been the result of efforts by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to monopolise the security services market by destroying competitors, including his company. 15.  On 15 December 2005 officer M. ordered the opening of another criminal investigation against the applicant and two others and the creation of a working group consisting of 24 investigators from two departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The reason given was a complaint by H.A and another person about having been blackmailed by the applicant and three other persons between December 2004 and September 2005. The complaint was registered by GDFOC officer O. On the same day, the applicant was arrested, the reasons given in the minutes of arrest being that the victim expressly identified the applicant as the author of the crime. 16.  On 18 December 2005 the prosecutor requested a court to remand the applicant in custody. On the same day the Centru District Court accepted that request and ordered the applicant's detention for ten days. The reasons given by the court were that:\n“the crime of which [the applicant] is accused is a serious one for which the law provides a penalty of more than two years; during the initial stage of proceedings the accused could obstruct the investigation, could put pressure on witnesses and the victim and could destroy evidence”. 17.  The applicant appealed, claiming his innocence and the insufficiency of reasons for choosing the preventive measure of detention. On 22 December 2005 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, giving similar reasons. 18.  At the prosecutor's request, on 23 December 2005 the Buiucani District Court ordered the extension of the applicant's detention by twenty-five days. The court cited the relevant provision of domestic law and found that:\n“[the applicant] is accused of a particularly serious crime, evidence submitted to the court was obtained lawfully, the accused could put pressure on witnesses and the victim, there is a need to verify the submissions of a co-accused and there is a danger of the fabrication of evidence and collusion between the accused. Also, the [applicant] has not made any declarations to the investigating authorities relying on his right to remain silent, which allows him to fabricate defence evidence should he not be detained”.\nOn 30 December 2005 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that decision, giving essentially the same reasons as before. 19.  On 6 January 2006 the applicant made a habeas corpus application, claiming that no evidence had been submitted to the courts in support of the alleged risk if he were to be released. He also drew the court's attention to the large number of investigators assigned to his case, which should have allowed them to take all necessary investigative action. Accordingly, his continued detention was not justified by the needs of the investigation. 20.  On 11 January 2006 the Buiucani District Court rejected that request, finding that:\n“the grounds on which the detention was ordered remain valid. The court also considers that ... the investigation of [the applicant's] case by a group of officers is not a ground provided by law for changing the preventive measure”.\nOn 18 January 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that decision, giving essentially the same reasons as before. 21.  On the same day the Buiucani District Court extended the applicant's detention by a further 15 days. On 25 January 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that decision. Both courts gave essentially the same reasons as before. 22.  Also on 25 January 2006 the applicant's wife asked permission to give the applicant food and newspapers on a daily basis. By a letter of 30 January 2006 from the detention centre's management she was informed that, according to a regulation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the applicant, with the approval of the investigating officer, was allowed one parcel per week. 23.  On 1 February 2006 the Buiucani District Court ordered the extension of the applicant's detention by twenty days, giving essentially the same reasons as before. In his appeal the applicant relied, inter alia, on the Convention and the Court's judgment in Sarban v. Moldova (no. 3456/05, 4 October 2005), submitting a copy of the judgment. On 6 February 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that decision, giving essentially the same reasons as before. 24.  On 17 February 2006 the Buiucani District Court extended the applicant's detention by another ten days. In his appeal the applicant relied on Article 5 of the Convention. On 22 February 2006 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld that decision. Both courts gave the same reasons as before for continuing to detain the applicant. 25.  The first preliminary hearing of the trial court was scheduled for 27 March 2006, but it was postponed owing to the absence of the prosecutor, who had not informed the court of his non-attendance or the reasons for it. At the same hearing, the applicant made a habeas corpus application, claiming that there was no continuing need to detain him and that the conditions of his detention in the Ministry of Justice detention centre were inhuman and degrading. The court refused to examine the application because of the absence of the prosecutor from the hearing. On 3 April 2006 the Buiucani District Court rejected the habeas corpus request lodged by the applicant. 26.  In a further habeas corpus request of 22 May 2006 the applicant's lawyer relied, inter alia, on statements made in court on 14 and 16 April 2006 by H.A. and another person, whose complaints had earlier served as the basis for the initiation of the second criminal investigation against the applicant (see paragraph 15 above). The lawyer reminded the court that one of the two alleged victims had declared before it that the signature on the complaint was not his and that he had no claims against the applicant. H.A., declared that he had claims against two other persons but that he had also included the applicant's name at the suggestion of the GDFOC officer O. He stated that there had been no threats against him and that none of the accused had committed any acts of violence against him. The Government did not dispute that summary of the statements made in court by these two persons. 27.  On 23 May 2006 the Buiucani District Court granted the applicant's habeas corpus request and ordered his release against an undertaking not to leave the city. The court gave the following reasons for its decision:\n“... Both accused have no criminal record, have permanent residence and assure the court that they will not abscond from the law enforcement authorities or the court.\nThe court also considers that the sole argument of the gravity of the crime alleged to have been committed cannot serve as a ground for detention, in the absence of any specific evidence regarding the person's danger to society, the danger of pressuring witnesses who have already given their statements before the court, where none of the grounds provided for in Article 176 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been proved, namely that the accused might abscond, obstruct the investigation or re-offend...” 28.  On 6 and 7 February 2006 the applicant's lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General's Office about the conditions of detention in the GDFOC detention centre. In particular, he complained, relying on Article 3 of the Convention, of the insufficiency and poor quality of food and that he could not receive food from his wife on a daily basis. He also complained that he had been detained alone in a cell and that unidentified persons had visited him, in the absence of his lawyer, with the aim of subjecting him to psychological intimidation to induce him to give up his business. He asked to be transferred from the GDFOC detention centre, as GDFOC was the institution investigating his case, to a centre under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, in order to obtain protection from such unlawful pressure.\nThere was no response to either of the two complaints. 29.  On 7 February 2006 the applicant claimed that his health had deteriorated and asked to be transferred to another centre where he could be given medical assistance, claiming that the GDFOC centre had no medical staff. 30.  On an unknown date the Head of GDFOC replied that the detention centre under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice was overcrowded and that it would be impossible to transfer the applicant there. Should the applicant need it, he would be given full medical assistance. 31.  In an appeal against the decision of 17 February 2006 (see paragraph 24 above), the applicant complained, inter alia, of his conditions of detention: the cell had been situated underground and he had had no access to daylight; low-intensity artificial light had never been turned off; there had been very high humidity; there had been no linen for the wood-covered stone platform which served as a bed; loud music had been played all day long; the ceiling had been so low as to prevent him from standing upright in the cell; access to shower facilities had been limited to one shower every ten days, which had only become possible following numerous requests by the applicant's lawyers; there had been no toilet in the cell and access to the toilet had been limited to once a day. There had been no opportunity for daily exercise and the ventilation system had only been switched on when the administration so decided. There had been no medical staff in the detention centre. The applicant also expressed the fear that he might have contracted tuberculosis. 32.  On 22 February 2006 the applicant's wife requested the GDFOC authorities to transfer him to another detention centre. As an alternative, she requested permission to give him food on a daily basis and requested that the authorities allow him daily walks and access to daylight, switch off the artificial light at night, allow him to use the toilet whenever he needed it (or transfer him to a cell with a toilet), provide access to shower facilities once a week and permit him to be seen by an independent doctor and be given necessary medication. It is unclear whether there was any response to these requests. 33.  In his submissions to this Court, the applicant stated that only the Head of GDFOC had had the keys to his cell and that the quality of food had been very poor. He reiterated his fears that he might have caught tuberculosis and that it was impossible to verify this without medical assistance. 34.  On 9 March 2006 the applicant was transferred to the Ministry of Justice detention centre (Prison no. 13, formerly known as Prison no. 3), where he was detained until his release on 23 May 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lived in Przemyśl, Poland. 6.  On 14 August 1997 the applicant was arrested by the police. On 15 August 1997 the Przemyśl District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided to detain the applicant on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed a homicide. 7.  Subsequently, the applicant's pre-trial detention was prolonged on several occasions, in particular at the hearing held on 5 November 1998. 8.  On 21 December 1998 the Przemyśl Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) convicted the applicant of homicide and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. 9.  On 29 April 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed the impugned judgment and remitted the case. 10.  On 2 June 1999 the Przemyśl Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) decided to prolong the applicant's pre-trial detention. The court gave the following reasons:\n“Prolongation of the applicant's detention on remand is justified by the fact that the applicant has been accused of homicide.” 11.  On 24 February 2000 the Przemyśl Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request for release. The reasons of the decision are as follows:\n“[The applicant] has been accused of having committed [a homicide] and the original reasons for keeping him in detention are still valid.” 12.  On 3 March 2000 the Przemyśl Regional Court further prolonged the applicant's pre-trial detention. The court found that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary because he had been charged with homicide and the trial court had started the process of obtaining expert evidence. 13.  On 12 April 2000 the trial court held the first hearing. Subsequently, ten hearings were held. 14.  On 2 June and 29 August 2000 the applicant's pre-trial detention was prolonged as the courts considered that the necessity to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings and the severity of the anticipated penalty justified keeping him in custody. 15.  On 14 September 2000 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 29 August 2000.\nThe applicant submits that neither he nor his lawyer was informed about the majority of scheduled court sessions at which his detention on remand was prolonged and that he was not allowed to attend any of these sessions. 16.  On 28 December 2000 the Rzeszów Regional Court gave judgment. The court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 17.  On 17 May 2001 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the impugned judgment. The court sentenced the applicant to 15 years' imprisonment. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 18.  On 28 February 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed his cassation appeal as being manifestly ill-founded. 19.  On 28 February 2001 the Court's Registry sent to the applicant, who at that time had been detained on remand in the Przemyśl Detention Centre, an application form and accompanying documents in reply to his letter in which he had notified his intention to lodge a complaint with the Court. The Court's envelope delivered to the applicant bears the stamp: Rzeszów Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy w Rzeszowie) and a hand‑written note: censo., 21.03.2001 (cenzu. 21.03.01). 20.  The envelope from the Chancellery of the Senate of the Republic of Poland of 30 January 2001 bears the same stamp as above and a hand‑written note: censored, 1 [February 20]01 (cenzurowano, 7.02.01) and an illegible signature. 21.  The applicant also submitted that his correspondence with his court‑appointed lawyer had been censored by the authorities of the Przemyśl Detention Centre. He provided an envelope addressed to his lawyer which bears the following stamps: the Rzeszów Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy w Rzeszowie), a hand-written note: censored, 19 [July 20]00 (cenzurowano, 19.07.2000) and an illegible signature. The envelope was posted on 19 July 2000. The second envelope, also addressed to his lawyer, bears the same stamp of the Regional Court, a date: 1.02.2001 and an illegible signature.\nThe third envelope was addressed to the applicant by his lawyer. The envelope, posted on 26 January 2001, bears the following stamps: the Przemyśl Prison 29.01.2001 (Zakład Karny w Przemyślu), the Rzeszów Regional Court, 1.02.2001, and an illegible signature.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Kent. 5.  The applicant and his wife had two children, born in 1982 and 1987. The applicant’s wife died on 2 June 1999. 6.  On 5 October 2000 the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency for the payment of social security benefits. He applied for benefits equivalent to those which a widow, whose husband had died in similar circumstances to those of his wife, would have been entitled, namely a Widow’s Payment (“Wpt”) and a Widowed Mother’s Allowance (“WMA”), payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act”). On 17 October 2000 his application was rejected as these benefits were only available to women. This decision was reconsidered without alteration on 25 October 2000. 7.  The applicant appealed to the Social Security Tribunal on 10 July 2001 and again his claim was rejected. In November 2001 the applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Appeal Commissioner. Eventually permission was granted but his appeal was again rejected on 28 May 2004. The applicant again appealed to the Commissioner who rejected the applicant’s appeal on 13 December 2006. 8.  Finally, the applicant submitted an appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division), which was refused on 16 March 2007. 9.  At the time of his claim in 2000 the applicant was in receipt of child benefit.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Kharkiv. 5.  On 23 August 1996 the applicant was charged with aggravated smuggling. The prosecution's case was that he had arranged for an aircraft to be sold to a Russian company in breach of the relevant customs rules. 6.  On 25 December 1996 an investigator of the Kharkiv Regional Department of the Security Service (Управління Служби Безпеки України по Харківській області hereafter “the USBU”) informed the applicant that the pre-trial investigation had been completed and granted him access to the case-file. 7.  On an unknown date in early February 1997 the investigator drew up the bill of indictment and submitted it to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office (Харківська обласна прокуратура, hereafter “the Prosecutor's Office”) for approval. On 14 February 1997 the Prosecutor's Office decided that further investigations were necessary and remitted the case to the USBU. 8.  By July 1997 the investigator had questioned over 40 witnesses.  On 25 July 1997 he declared the pre-trial investigation completed, and allowed the applicant to consult the case-file. 9.  On 12 August 1997 the Prosecutor's Office sent the case-file together with the bill of indictment to the Kiyevsky District Court of Kharkiv (Київський районний суд м. Харкова, hereafter “the Kiyevsky Court”) for trial proceedings. 10.  The trial commenced on 16 October 1997. 11.  On 1 December 1997, after eight hearings, the Kiyevsky Court remitted the case for further investigations. On 20 January 1998 the Kharkiv Regional Court rejected the prosecution's appeal against this ruling. On 24 June 1998 the Presidium of the Kharkiv Regional Court dismissed a protest (extraordinary appeal) of the Deputy Prosecutor of the Kharkiv Region against these decisions. 12.  On 30 March 1998, in the context of the additional investigation ordered by the Kiyevsky Court, the applicant's charges were amended to include a forgery by an official. 13.  On 1 June 1998 the additional investigation was completed and the applicant was given access to the case-file. On 3 June 1998 the investigator sent the bill of indictment to the Prosecutor's Office for approval. On 24 June 1998 the Prosecutor's Office remitted the case for further investigations. 14.  On 10 July 1998 the investigator requested the Russian authorities to question several witnesses living in Moscow. On 26 August 1998 some of those witnesses were questioned and the minutes were provided to the Ukrainian authorities. A similar request for the Russian authorities to question witnesses living in Khabarovsk, filed on 20 October 1998, was not acted on. 15.  On 4 November 1998 the investigator ordered an expert examination of the whether the aircraft was fit to fly. 16.  On 25 December 1998 the investigator informed the applicant that the pre-trial investigation in his case was completed. Between that date and 1 July 1999 the applicant and his co-accused Mr I. had access to the case‑file. 17.  On 20 April 1999 the applicant was additionally charged with abuse of power. 18.  On 1 July 1999 the Prosecutor's Office approved the bill of indictment and transmitted the case to the Kiyevsky Court. 19.  In the period to 5 July 2001 the court held 20 hearings, examined several motions of the applicant, Mr. I and the company which had bought the aircraft, which had joined the proceedings as a civil claimant. Between 15 and 22 June 2001 the proceedings were suspended due to the applicant's illness. 20.  On 6 July 2001 Kiyevsky Court remitted part of the case file for further investigations. The applicant appealed. On 22 January 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (Апеляційний суд Харківської області, hereafter “the Court of Appeal”) rejected the applicant's appeal against this ruling. 21.  On 18 February 2002 the Kiyevsky Court decided that the remainder of the case also needed additional investigations. 22.  On 22 April 2002 the charges against the applicant were amended in accordance with the new Criminal Code which had entered into force on 1 September 2001. 23.  On 26 April 2002 the investigator completed the pre-trial investigation and granted the applicant and his co-accused access to the case file. On 12 July 2002 the case-file and the bill of indictment were sent to the Chervonozavodsky District Court of Kharkiv (Червонозаводський районний суд м. Харкова hereafter “the Chervonozavodsky Court”). The judge fixed the preparatory hearing for 22 August 2002; it was adjourned until 11 September 2002 because Mr I. was ill. 24.  On 11 September 2002 the Chervonozavodsky Court committed the applicant for trial and fixed the first hearing on the merits for 28 October 2002. 25.  Between October 2002 and November 2003 the trial court held three hearings. Eight sittings scheduled for this period were cancelled because investigator or the prosecutor failed to appear. On two occasions the hearings were adjourned due to the judge's illness and holiday. Two more sittings were cancelled on account of Mr I.'s and the applicant's absence. 26.  Between December 2003 and June 2004 the proceedings were suspended because the authorities had not provided the witnesses living outside Kharkiv with appropriate accommodation during the hearings. 27.  Between 15 June and 13 October 2004 the trial court held fourteen hearings. 28.  On 13 October 2004 the Chervonozavodsky Court acquitted the applicant, having found no corpus delicti in the imputed actions. The prosecution and the applicant appealed. The latter sought an acquittal on the ground that there had been no crime rather than no corpus delicti. The civil claimant also filed an appeal. 29.  On 31 March 2005 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (hereafter “the Court of Appeal”) decided not to entertain the prosecution's appeal on the ground that it was not signed by the prosecutor who had participated in the proceedings before the first instance court. The appeals of the applicant and the civil claimant were rejected as unsubstantiated. The same parties appealed in cassation. 30.  On 11 April 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 31 March 2005 and remitted the case for a fresh appellate hearing on the ground that the Court of Appeal's refusal to entertain the prosecutor's appeal had not been reasonable. 31.  On 1 August 2006 the Court of Appeal granted the prosecutor's appeal, quashed the judgment of 13 October 2004 and remitted the case to the Prosecutor's Office for further pre-trial investigations. 32.  Since 23 January 1997 the applicant has brought seventeen complaints with higher prosecutions authorities, challenging the conduct of criminal proceedings in his case. 33.  The investigation in the case is still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9.  The applicant and her family (her husband and two children, born in 1982 and 1987) moved into a dormitory in Volgograd in 1985. They occupied two rooms in the dormitory, with shared kitchen, shower and toilet facilities. They were registered as living in the dormitory permanently, which was their sole residence. In 1993 the ownership of the dormitory was transferred to a company called “VNIITMASH”. 10.  In 1995 the applicant, along with other residents, was ordered by the District Prosecutor of the Sovetskiy district of Volgograd to vacate the premises because the building required urgent structural renovation. The applicant was provided with temporary housing in another dormitory in Volgograd, although smaller and of inferior quality. In August 1995 the applicant was forcibly evicted from the building and her belongings were transferred. 11.  The applicant, along with other residents, brought an action against VNIITMASH and the administration of the Sovetskiy district for provision of permanent housing and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. They alleged that though the status of the building was a dormitory, their contracts were not for dormitory-type accommodation, but for proper flats. On 24 April 1996 the Volgograd Regional Court confirmed in the final instance the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court to reject the applicants’ claim. VNIITMASH undertook to allow the applicants to return to the dormitory after the renovation, which was scheduled to be completed in September 1996. 12.  The building was not renovated on time, and the applicant applied to the court again. The district administration accepted her claims. The Sovetskiy District Court by its judgment of 22 June 1999 ordered the administration to provide the applicant with “comfortable” (благоустроенное) housing. Neither of the parties appealed, and the judgment entered into force and was forwarded to the bailiff in July 1999. 13.  On 8 September 1999 the renovation in the original building was completed and the ownership of it was transferred to the district administration, with the status of a dormitory. 14.  On 24 September 1999 the administration of the Sovetskiy district issued a voucher (ордер) to the applicant’s family for two rooms of 34 square metres in the newly renovated dormitory building. It appears that the bailiff closed the enforcement procedures on 11 October 1999. 15.  The applicant refused to accept the accommodation offered, as she believed that the housing in the dormitory did not correspond to the definition of “comfortable”, as ordered by the court on 22 June 1999. She also alleged that the conditions had become worse since the renovation. In particular, the applicant and her family would only be able to register as temporary occupants of the building and the rooms offered to them were separated from each other and were connected by a corridor shared with other rooms. Further, they were required to share the toilet and kitchen facilities with a larger number of families, and the quality of the building remained very poor, even after the renovation. 16.  On her complaint, the bailiff reopened the enforcement procedures and on 23 February 2000 prohibited the issuing of housing vouchers by the district administration. 17.  On 27 April 2000 the Sovetskiy District Court, on the administration’s complaint, quashed the bailiff’s order of 23 February 2000. On 28 June 2000 the Volgograd Regional Court confirmed this decision. The courts found that the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of 22 June 1999 had been executed by the administration which had provided her with “comfortable” housing in the dormitory, and the applicant’s refusal to accept it did not warrant continuation of enforcement procedures. 18.  On 18 July 2000 the administration offered three rooms in the dormitory to the applicant, totalling 53,5 square metres. The applicant and her family did not accept the places in the dormitory and refused to move in. 19.  On 6 June 2000 the rapporteur, under Rule 49 § 1 of the Rules of Court, asked the Russian Government the following questions:\n“1. What is the current situation with respect to enforcement of the decision of the Sovetskiy District Court of Volgograd of 22 June 1999? 20.  The Government responded on 18 September 2000. They informed the Court that on 17 July 2000 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court, acting by way of supervisory review upon a request (протест) lodged by its president, had quashed the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of 22 June 1999 and returned the case for a new consideration at first instance. 21.  The applicant later informed the Court that she had not been aware of the session of the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court of 17 July 2000, as the information notice had been sent to her only on 13 July when she was out of town. The representatives of the administration and the District Prosecutor’s Office had attended the hearing and presented their arguments. 22.  On 26 July 2000 the Sovetskiy District Court again considered the case and rejected the applicant’s claim, stating that she was only entitled to housing in the renewed dormitory. The decision was confirmed on 30 August 2000 by the Volgograd Regional Court. On 27 September 2000 the bailiff closed the enforcement proceedings because the court decision of 22 June 1999 had been quashed. 23.  The applicant on several occasions attempted to challenge the court decision by way of supervisory review, but was unsuccessful. 24.  On 12 April 2001 the district administration confirmed the offer of three rooms in the dormitory to the applicant, but she did not accept it. 25.  On 5 October 2001 the complaint was communicated to the Russian Government. 26.  On 4 February 2002 a request for supervisory review was lodged with the Supreme Court by the Deputy President of the Supreme Court. On 4 March 2002 the Supreme Court, acting by way of supervisory review, quashed the following judicial decisions: the decision of the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court of 17 July 2000, the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of 26 July 2000, the decision of the Volgograd Regional Court of 30 August 2000. It has thus restored the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of 22 June 1999. 27.  On 12 April 2002 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court, acting by way of supervisory review upon a request by the President of the Regional Court, again quashed the judgment of the Sovetskiy District Court of 22 June 1999 and returned the case for a new consideration. The new proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants live in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6.  By five judgments of different courts of first instance (the application no. 48249/07 concerns the non-enforcement of two judgments) of 22 January 2003, 5 October 1999, 25 June 2002, 19 December 2000 and 11 January 2000 which became final on 17 September 2003, 1 June 2001, 6 December 2004, 22 February 2001, 7 April 2004, respectively, the Republika Srpska (an Entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) was ordered to pay, within 15 days, the following amounts in convertible marks (BAM)[1] in respect of war damage together with default interest at the statutory rate:\n(i)  BAM 5,555.25 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 881 in respect of legal costs to Mr Jovan Janjić;\n(ii)  BAM 1,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage to the Kandićs;\n(iii)  BAM 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, BAM 400 in respect of pecuniary damage and BAM 2,986.80 in respect of legal costs to the Brborovićs (this is the total amount awarded by the domestic judgments of 5 October 1999 and 25 June 2002); and\n(iv)  BAM 28,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and BAM 2,015 in respect of legal costs to Mr Draženko Zavišić. 7.  The Banja Luka Court of First Instance issued writs of execution (rješenje o izvršenju) on 27 August 2001, 22 December 2006, 12 October 2001 and 9 July 2004, respectively. In the case of Mr Jovan Janjić no writ of execution was issued. 8.  The applicants, except for Mr Jovan Janjić, complained of non‑enforcement to the Human Rights Chamber or to the Constitutional Court. On 8 March 2006 the Human Rights Commission (the legal successor of the Human Rights Chamber) found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the case of the Brborovićs. On 20 December 2005 and 26 June 2007 the Constitutional Court ruled likewise in the case of the Kandićs and Mr Draženko Zavišić. The applicants did not claim compensation, but even if they had done so, their claim would have most likely been refused (see, for example, the Constitutional Court’s decisions AP 774/04 of 20 December 2005, § 438; AP 557/05 of 12 April 2006, § 195; AP 1211/06 of 13 December 2007, § 79; AP 244/08 of 8 December 2010, § 37). 9.  After the extensive information campaign explaining the available options for the settlement of the Republika Srpska’s public debt (including its debt arising from domestic judgments), between 31 March 2008 and 26 May 2009 the applicants informed the authorities that they agreed to be paid only the legal costs in cash and the principal debt and default interest in bonds. Government bonds were then issued on the following dates:\n(i)  on 7 October 2010 to Mr Jovan Janjić;\n(ii)  on 30 October 2009 to Mr Nedeljko Brborović and MsBranislavka Brborović (in respect of the judgment of 25 June 2002);\n(iii)  on 15 December 2008 to Ms Vojka Kandić, Mr Miloš Kandić and Ms Mirjana Kandić; and\n(iv)  on 30 October 2009 to Mr Draženko Zavišić. 10.  Ms Vojka Kandić, Mr Miloš Kandić and Ms Mirjana Kandić have already sold all of their bonds on the Stock Exchange. 11.  Mr Nedeljko Brborović and Mr Milenko Brborović were not issued bonds in respect of the judgment of 5 October 1999.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant association was registered in 1990 and is located in the town of Kakhovka, Kherson region. 6.  In 1990 the applicant association entered into a contract with the Construction Department of the Kherson Regional State Administration (“the Department”; Управління капітального будівництва Херсонської обласної державної адміністрації), according to which the latter undertook to construct a block of flats for the applicant association’s members. 7.  In January 2002 the applicant association instituted proceedings in the Commercial Court of the Kherson Region against the Department, seeking compensation for defaulting on the construction project. 8.  On 5 April 2002 the court found in part for the applicant association and ordered the Department to pay it 144,066.74 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) in compensation. On 27 March 2003 the Commercial Court of Appeal of the Odessa Region quashed the decision of the first-instance court and adopted a new decision, ordering the Department to pay the applicant association UAH 2,227,269.40 in compensation. 9.  On 20 June 2003 the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine rejected the Department’s request for leave to appeal in cassation for failure to comply with procedural requirements. 10.  On 15 July 2003 the Commercial Court of the Kherson Region issued a writ of execution for the decision of the Commercial Court of Appeal of the Odessa Region of 27 March 2003. 11.  On 11 August 2003 the Suvorovskiy District Bailiffs’ Service of Kherson instituted enforcement proceedings. 12.  By decisions of 22 September and 22 December 2003, the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine rejected the Department’s request for leave to appeal in cassation for being lodged out of time. 13.  The decision of 27 March 2003 remains unenforced to the present date with reference to the debtor’s lack of funds and realisable assets.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Brzeg. 5.  On 21 May 1999 the Brzeg District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) issued a “wanted” notice in respect of the applicant and several other men in connection with an investigation into allegations made by six women, some of whom were minors, that a group of several men had raped them, threatened them, beaten them and forced them to take drugs. The warrant for arrest was issued after the prosecution service had established that the applicant had gone into hiding and the police had unsuccessfully attempted to arrest him. 6.  On 21 July 1999 the police attempted to arrest the applicant. However he managed to escape trying in the process to run over police officers while driving away. Two other men sought under the arrest warrant issued in connection with the same investigation were apprehended and arrested. 7.  On 9 August 1999 the applicant was arrested by the police. At the time of arrest he was in possession of a firearm and a forged identification document. On 13 August 1999 the Opole District Court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the following offences: repeated group rape with aggravated cruelty while acting in an organised criminal gang; leading an organised gang; supplying minor victims with drugs; forging an identification document; and destroying a police car. The court also found that, given that he had absconded in the past, there was a risk that the applicant might go into hiding again and try to influence the victims. 8.  The applicant appealed against the decision ordering his detention on remand but his appeal was dismissed on 3 September 1999 by the Opole Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 9.  On 18 October 1999 the Opole Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention relying on the reasonable suspicion of his having committed the offences and on the complexity of the investigation which had not yet been terminated by the prosecutor. 10.  On 13 December 1999 the court decided that the applicant's detention should be prolonged. It considered that, in addition to the strong suspicion against the applicant, the severity of the sentence that might be imposed and the risk of his tampering with evidence and influencing witnesses justified holding him in custody. In addition, the court relied on the risk that, given that he had absconded in the past, he might go into hiding again. The court also observed that only detention on remand would secure the applicant's appearance at the trial. 11.  On 16 December 1999 the applicant was indicted before the Opole Regional Court. It appears that the first hearing was held on 26 April 2000. In 2000 the trial court held in total 13 hearings. 12.  Subsequently, the applicant's detention was prolonged by decisions of 12 June and 13 November 2000 and 15 May 2001. The decisions were based on the reasons given for his detention on previous occasions. 13.  Afterwards, as the length of the applicant's detention had reached the statutory time‑limit of 2 years laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), the Regional Court applied to the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) asking for the applicant's detention to be prolonged beyond that term. On 28 June 2001 the Wrocław Court of Appeal allowed the application and prolonged his pre‑trial detention. The Court of Appeal based its decision on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed serious offences and on the risk that he might interfere with the course of justice. The court further considered that the complexity of the case constituted a special circumstance justifying his remaining in custody. 14.  On 7 November 2001 the Wrocław Court of Appeal again decided to prolong the pre-trial detention of the applicant, finding that the initial reasons for the detention were still valid. Furthermore, the court examined the course of the proceedings before the Opole Regional Court and agreed that the case was particularly complex and time-consuming, given the number of accused and the considerable amount of evidence which had to be examined. It considered that the trial court had acted diligently as it had taken evidence from nineteen witnesses during the last seven hearings. 15.  On 13 February 2002 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 15 May 2002. The court noted that the applicant had been detained on remand for a long time. However, it considered that the particular circumstances of the case justified keeping him in custody until 15 May 2002 by which time the trial should have been completed. 16.  Nevertheless, the trial court again applied to prolong the applicant's detention. On 8 May 2002 the Court of Appeal granted the application. However, it criticised the Regional Court for the delay in the case and requested the trial court “to take adequate and more intensive action to finish the trial”. The court further took into account that the accused were partly responsible for the length of the proceedings because they had lodged vexatious applications for new evidence to be heard and had not complied with time-limits for filing new submissions. 17.  The applicant's numerous applications for release and appeals against decisions prolonging his detention were to no avail. 18.  The Opole Regional Court held 23 hearings in 2001 and 21 hearings in 2002. On 31 July 2002 the Opole Regional Court gave a judgment in which it found the applicant guilty of several counts of repeated group rape with aggravated cruelty and false imprisonment committed while acting in an organised criminal gang. The applicant was also convicted of administering an unknown psychotropic substance to some of the victims and use of a forged identity document. The court acquitted the applicant of being the leader of the organised criminal gang. The applicant was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. The applicant and other co‑accused appealed. 19.  On 2 June 2003 the Wrocław Court of Appeal gave a judgment. It amended the first-instance judgment with respect to the applicant reducing his prison sentence to 10 years and 8 months. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 20.  On 11 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1933 and 1945 respectively and live in Istanbul. They are the parents of Mr Bayram Duran, aged 26, who died in a police station in Istanbul on 16 October 1994, as a result of having been beaten by four police officers. 5.  On 12 October 1994 a certain M.Y. filed a complaint with the police maintaining that a man had threatened his son and taken his money. 6.  On 15 October 1994 M.Y. saw Bayram Duran on a bus and told the bus driver to go to the police station. Once in front of the police station, M.Y. asked the police officers to arrest Bayram Duran, maintaining that the latter was the person who had threatened his son. Subsequently, at around 11 a.m. Bayram Duran was arrested on suspicion of having committed robbery (gasp). 7.  On 16 October 1994 at around 5 a.m. Bayram Duran was found dead at the Gazi police station. 8.  On the same day, at 12.35 p.m. a “scene of incident and examination of the corpse” report was drafted and signed by the Gaziosmanpaşa public prosecutor, a medical expert, the director of the Gaziosmanpaşa police headquarters and four other persons. According to the report, there was no sign of ill-treatment or bullet wound on Bayram Duran’s body. The medical expert concluded that an autopsy was necessary to discover the cause of death. The report also contained details concerning the detention conditions, according to which the cell where Bayram Duran had been found dead had not been cleaned for around one week. There were several cigarette butts on the floor and spider webs on the walls. Furthermore, a sketch plan of the cell where Bayram Duran was found dead was drawn. 9.  On the same day, the Gaziosmanpaşa public prosecutor took statements from the police officers who were on duty. The officers all contended that Bayram Duran had not been tortured or subjected to ill‑treatment while in custody and that they had found him dead in his cell when they had gone there to offer him a cup of tea. 10.  On 17 October 1994 an autopsy was carried out on Bayram Duran’s body. In the autopsy report drafted on 14 December 1994 and signed by four doctors from the hospital at the Cerrahpaşa University, the cause of death was identified as cardiac failure. The forensic experts found a haemorrhage of 3 x 8 cm in the left scapular region. They nevertheless considered that the haemorrhage had not directly caused Bayram Duran’s death. 11.  On 29 December 1994 the Gaziosmanpaşa public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute in respect of Bayram Duran’s death. Basing his decision on the autopsy report of 14 December 1994, the public prosecutor noted that the cause of death was not the haemorrhage. 12.  On 21 February 1995 the first applicant, Ali Duran, filed an objection with the Beyoğlu Assize Court against the decision of 29 December 1994. He maintained that the content of the autopsy report was inadequate as, inter alia, it did not specify how the haemorrhage in Bayram Duran’s body could have been caused. He further contended that the public prosecutor had questioned only the police officers before rendering his decision. Ali Duran finally submitted that his son had been tortured to death and that the decision not to prosecute constituted a violation of his right to life. 13.  On 30 May 1995 the Beyoğlu Assize Court requested the Gaziosmanpaşa Magistrates’ Court to hear evidence from the first applicant and a witness and to conduct an examination of the case. 14.  On 15 September 1995 the Gaziosmanpaşa Magistrates’ Court heard evidence from the first applicant and two witnesses, H.K. and Ü.Y. The court then ordered the Forensic Medicine Institute to draft a report in order to determine whether the haemorrhage in Bayram Duran’s body could have been caused by ill‑treatment and whether there was a link between the haemorrhage and Bayram Duran’s death. 15.  On 13 March 1996 a report was drafted and signed by six forensic medicine experts, including the director of the Forensic Medicine Institute. Having examined the autopsy report, the experts noted that Bayram Duran had suffered from a heart condition. They further considered that the haemorrhage had been caused by a direct trauma to the scapular region. The experts concluded that the stress caused by the trauma and the material conditions in which he had been detained had aggravated Bayram Duran’s heart condition and had given rise to a cardiac failure. 16.  On 9 April 1996 the Beyoğlu Assize Court annulled the decision not to prosecute and decided to initiate criminal proceedings against the seven police officers who had signed the documents concerning Bayram Duran’s arrest on 15 October 1994. In its decision, the court noted that Bayram Duran’s death might have ocurred as a result of torture inflicted on him and it therefore considered that criminal proceedings should be initiated. 17.  On 6 June 1996 the Eyüp public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Eyüp Assize Court charging seven police officers with causing death unintentionally as a result of an act of violence, under Articles 452 § 2 and 251 of the former Criminal Code. 18.  On 28 August 1996 the Eyüp Assize Court decided to transfer the case to the Denizli Assize Court on the ground of public security. 19.  On 18 November 1996, upon the request of the Denizli Assize Court, the Silopi Assize Court heard evidence from one of the accused police officers, A.K., who denied the allegations against him. 20.  On 26 November 1996, at the request of the Denizli Assize Court, the Istanbul Assize Court heard evidence from the persons who had alleged that Bayram Duran had committed robbery. 21.  On 11 December 1996 the Istanbul Assize Court heard evidence from two of the accused police officers, H.A. and M.S., who denied the allegations against them and contended that Bayram Duran had died as a result of a heart attack. 22.  On 20 December 1996 the Istanbul Assize Court heard evidence from the first applicant, H.K. and Ü.Y. The court postponed the hearing as a third witness was not present. 23.  On 24 January 1997 the Istanbul Assize Court heard evidence from the third witness. 24.  On 26 February 1997, at the second hearing before the Denizli Assize Court, the first applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party seeking redress for his pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss (müdahil). 25.  On 26 March 1997 the Istanbul Assize Court heard evidence from one of the accused officers, A.Ç., who contended that he had not inflicted ill-treatment on Bayram Duran. 26.  On the same day, at the request of the Denizli Assize Court, the Edirne Assize Court heard evidence from a doctor who had worked at a medical centre close to the Gazi police station at the time of the incident. The doctor maintained that he had been called to the police station by police officers in order to examine Bayram Duran, but that when he arrived there, Bayram Duran had already died. 27.  Between 7 July 1997 and 10 May 1999 the Denizli Assize Court postponed hearings due to the absence of one of the accused, police chief A.Ş., whose statements had to be taken. 28.  On 10 May 1999 the first-instance court ordered A.Ş.’s detention in his absence. 29.  On 22 June 1999 the second applicant made a request to the Denizli Assize Court to join the proceedings as a civil party, seeking redress for her pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. The first-instance court did not take a decision regarding the applicant’s request. 30.  On 3 December 1999 A.Ş. made statements before the Denizli Assize Court and denied the allegation that Bayram Duran had died as a result of ill-treatment inflicted on him. A.Ş. maintained that Bayram Duran had been in custody on account of a simple accusation and that there had been no reason for inflicting ill-treatment on him. On the same day, the first-instance court reversed its order to detain A.Ş. 31.  On 31 January and 6 April 2000, upon the request of the Denizli Assize Court, the Istanbul Assize Court and the Bakırköy Assize Court once again heard evidence from A.Ç., H.A. and M.S., who reiterated their previous statements. 32.  On 6 September 2000 the Denizli Assize Court gave its judgment in the case. In the judgment, the assize court noted that M.S. had retired from public service and the other accused were serving as police officers. The Denizli Assize Court acquitted A.Ş., A.Ç. and H.A. of the charges against them, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict them since they had left the police station at around 7 p.m. on 15 October 1994 and since the applicant had visited Bayram Duran a number of times up until 7 p.m. on 15 October 1994. The court considered that M.S., A.A., A.K. and İ.U., the officers who had been on duty between 7 p.m. on 15 October 1994 and 5 a.m. on 16 October 1994, had caused Bayram Duran’s death unintentionally by beating him, for reasons that could not be determined, and convicted them. Noting that the death had occurred as a result of the officers’ acts combined with a circumstance that had existed prior to the act which had not been known to the officers, namely Bayram Duran’s heart condition, the court sentenced M.S., A.A., A.K. and İ.U. to five years’ imprisonment pursuant to Articles 448 and 452 § 2 of the former Criminal Code. The court did not apply Article 243 of the former Criminal Code applicable at the time of the commission of the offence as it was unable to establish that the convicted officers had beaten Bayram Duran with a view to extracting a confession of guilt. In its judgment, the court noted that Bayram Duran had been beaten by the convicted police officers and that he had died as a result of the stress caused by this trauma. Taking into account the fact that the actual offender who had caused the trauma to Bayram Duran’s head could not be identified, the assize court reduced the police officers’ prison sentences to two years and six months pursuant to Article 463 of the former Criminal Code. Having regard to the fact that the officers had committed an offence while on duty, the first‑instance court increased the sentence to three years and four months pursuant to Article 251 of the former Criminal Code. The assize court finally reduced the sentence to two years, nine months and ten days of imprisonment for each convict pursuant to Article 59 of the Criminal Code, having regard to the fact that some of the convicted police officers’ statements had been of help to the authorities during the investigation and the criminal proceedings in establishing the circumstances of the case. The first-instance court held that the applicants’ right to redress for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that they had suffered should be reserved. 33.  The first applicant, through the lawyer who had represented him during the proceedings before the assize court, and the convicted police officers appealed. 34.  In his appeal, the first applicant’s lawyer submitted that the application of Article 452 of the former Criminal Code and the lack of severity of the prison sentences rendered the first-instance court’s judgment ineffective, and thus constituted a violation of the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Torture, the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 35.  On 1 October 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 6 September 2000 on procedural grounds. The court held that the Denizli Assize Court had failed to take a decision in respect of the second applicant’s request to join the proceedings. The case file was then remitted to the Denizli Assize Court. 36.  On 10 December 2001 the first-instance court decided to allow the second applicant’s request to join the proceedings as a civil party. 37.  On 25 March 2002 the Denizli Assize Court heard evidence from the accused police officers, who denied the allegations against them. On the same day, the first-instance court once again convicted M.S., A.A., A.K. and İ.U. as charged and sentenced each of them to two years, nine months and ten days’ imprisonment and reserved the applicants’ right to redress for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage that they had suffered. 38.  The applicants, through their lawyer, appealed. They alleged that their son had been killed as a result of torture inflicted on him and that the first-instance court had failed to interpret the facts of the case correctly. They contended that the police officers should have been convicted of homicide as a result of torture under Articles 243 and 450 § 3 of the former Criminal Code in accordance with Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Torture and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The applicants finally claimed that the convicted officers should have been debarred from employment in public service. 39.  On 10 June 2003 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal and upheld the judgment of 25 March 2002. 40.  On 1 June 2005 the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) entered into force. 41.  Subsequently, A.A., A.K. and İ.U. filed requests with the Denizli Assize Court asking that their convictions be revised in the light of the provisions of the new Criminal Code. They maintained that their acts should be considered as “inflicting minor injury”. They further submitted that they had been debarred from public service. A.A., A.K. and İ.U. finally noted that the execution of their prison sentences had been suspended pursuant to Law no. 4616, which governed conditional release, suspension of proceedings and execution of sentences in respect of offences committed before 23 April 1999. 42.  On 24 November 2005 the Denizli Assize Court reviewed the sentences of A.A., A.K. and İ.U. and decided not to reverse its judgment of 25 March 2002. 43.  A.A., A.K. and İ.U. appealed against the judgment of 24 November 2005. 44.  According to the information in the case file based on the latest submissions by the parties, the case is still pending before the Court of Cassation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  On 13 June 2007 the Ust-Ilimsk Town Court of the Irkutsk Region found the applicant guilty of inflicting grave bodily harm which caused the death of the victim and sentenced him to a prison term. The applicant appealed, claiming in general terms that the proceedings had been unfair, and that the court had applied domestic law and assessed the evidence erroneously. He further alleged that the court had failed to examine two witnesses and had delivered its judgment in the absence of one of the co‑defendants. 6.  On 1 October 2007 the Irkutsk Regional Court quashed the conviction on appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. 7.  On 20 March 2009 the Ust-Ilimsk Town Court found the applicant guilty of the same offence and gave him a custodial sentence. The applicant appealed. Giving no further details, he alleged that the Town Court had applied domestic law and assessed the evidence erroneously, and that it had rejected the majority of the motions lodged by the defence. He further complained about the change of his counsel during the proceedings. 8.  On 5 October 2009 the Irkutsk Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint and upheld the judgment on appeal. 9.  Between 26 September 2005 and 9 January 2009 the applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-38/2 of the Irkutsk Region. The prison was severely overcrowded. Thus, cell 95 measuring 24 sq. m was equipped with 8 sleeping places and accommodated up to 17 inmates. In addition, the applicant claimed that he had contracted tuberculosis during his stay there. 10.  From 23 February to 27 April 2008 the applicant was transferred to remand prison IZ-38/1 of Irkutsk and from 17 July to 3 August 2008 he was transferred to penitentiary medical facility LIU-27 in the Irkutsk Region for treatment of his tuberculosis.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1981 and is serving a prison term in the Ryazan Region. 6.  The applicant was a student of a State University, which trained law enforcement officers. On 3 March 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. By a judgment of 23 April 2002, the Omsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of theft and murder, and sentenced him to seventeen years' imprisonment. On 10 April 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment. 7.  From 5 to 13 March 2001 the applicant was detained in a temporary detention centre in the town of Omsk. From 14 March 2001 to 10 June 2003 the applicant was detained in Omsk remand centre no. 55/1. 8.  According to the applicant, he was kept in the remand centre in cell no. 163 (designed for eight persons) together with at least twenty other inmates. Owing to an insufficient number of beds, they had to sleep in shifts. The cell windows were covered with metal shutters that barred access to natural light and air. In 2003 the applicant was kept in the cell together with eight to ten other persons. 9.  The applicant subsequently indicated that in 2001-02 he had been afforded less than two square metres of living space in the cell. The toilet was not separated from the living area. In the absence of any ventilation, the smell spread into the cell. He also alleged that on the days of court hearings in April 2001 he had to get up at 4 a.m. and was taken back at 8 p.m. without any food or drink. 10.  The applicant was kept in the remand centre from 15 March 2001 to 10 June 2003. The applicant was placed in cell no. 163, which measured twenty-one square metres and had five beds. This cell was assigned to former law enforcement officers, who had to be kept separately from the other (potentially hostile) detainees. With reference to certificates issued in February 2008 by the acting director of the remand centre, the Government stated that this cell had accommodated three to five detainees during the relevant periods. In support of the above, the Government enclosed statements made in 2008 by three officers serving in the remand centre, who confirmed that the above information was correct and that the conditions of the applicant's detention during the relevant periods had been appropriate. The Government also enclosed a statement made in 2008 by a convict who had been detained in cell no. 163 from April to July 2001. This person stated that during that period there had been five beds and only four detainees and that the material conditions had been acceptable. A similar statement was made in 2008 by another detainee who had been kept in that cell from December 2002 to February 2003. 11.  From 30 August to 4 September 2002 the applicant was also kept in cell no. 53, which measured 4.8 square metres and had one bed. 12.  According to the Government, the applicant was provided with an individual bed and bedding in both cells. He had access to a shower once a week. He had daily outdoor walks. The metal shutters on the cell window(s) were aimed at preventing inter-cell communication and did not impede access to natural light. The works for removing the shutters were carried out between November 2002 and March 2003. 13.  On the days when investigative measures were carried out or hearings were held (June 2001 – September 2002), the applicant had had to get up 6 a.m. and was taken back to the cell before 10 p.m. On those days, he had been fed and had also been able to take food bought by him or received from next of kin. 14.  As can be seen from the certificate submitted by the Government, the cell record cards for October 2000 – October 2002 were destroyed on 8 August 2004 after the expiry of the one-year retention period. The registers concerning the population of the remand centre between July 2001 and December 2003 were destroyed on 30 August 2004 after the expiry of the one-year retention period. 15.  The following data is given on one of the certificates submitted by the director of the remand centre. The “maximum design capacity” of the remand centre was 1,025 detainees. Between December 2002 and 2004 the design capacity went up to 1,515 detainees owing to the construction of new buildings. As can be seen from another certificate, in 2001 the remand centre accommodated an average of 2,685 persons (to 2,887 beds); in 2002 the figure was 1,999 persons (to 2,305 beds) and in 2003 there were 1,905 persons (to 2,305 beds). 16.  The applicant complained to the prosecutor's office of the Omsk Region alleging that he had been ill-treated at the temporary detention centre and that his state of health had deteriorated while in detention. On 11 April 2001 the prosecutor's office rejected his complaints as unfounded. By a letter of 18 December 2003, the prosecutor's office rejected the applicant's further complaint concerning conditions of detention and stated, in particular, that his state of health had been satisfactory, except for a slight deterioration of his eyesight. 17.  In February 2004 the applicant complained to the Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences about the allegedly degrading conditions of his detention, referring in particular to the overpopulation in the remand centre and lack of access to natural light and airflow in the cells. By a letter of 2 March 2004, the Penitentiary Office acknowledged the overpopulation problem in “certain cells” in the remand centre in 2001 and 2002 and stated that in 1999 the metal shutters had been partly removed from the cell windows and had been completed removed in March 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Ankara. 5.  On an unspecified date in 1990 the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways expropriated a plot of land belonging to the applicant in Ankara in order to build the Ankara Central Motorway. The authorities paid him the value of the land, assessed by a committee of experts, when the expropriation took place. 6.  Following the applicant’s request, on 27 September 1994 the Ankara Civil Court awarded her additional compensation plus interest at the statutory rate applicable. 7.  On 29 January 1996 the Court of Cassation upheld that judgment. 8.  On 9 February 1998 the amount of 2,800,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL) was paid to the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Plovdiv. 5.  On 20 July 1997 she brought proceedings before the Madan District Court against her five siblings for the division of a piece of real property. Between January and April 1998 the court held three hearings and admitted two expert reports in evidence. On 30 April 1998 it allowed the division of only part of the property. 6.  The applicant appealed to the Smolyan Regional Court, claiming that the lower court should have allowed the division of the whole property. A hearing listed for 30 June 1998 was adjourned owing to improper summoning of one of the respondents. The court held two hearings, in May and October 1998, and on 30 April 1999 upheld the lower court's judgment. 7.  The applicant appealed on points of law. A hearing listed for 28 February 2000 was adjourned owing to improper summoning of four of the respondents. It was held on 25 September 2000. On 7 November 2000 the Supreme Court of Cassation, finding, inter alia, that the Smolyan Regional Court had seriously breached basic rules of procedure, quashed its judgment and remitted the case back to that court. 8.  Between December 2000 and March 2002 eight hearings were listed. Medical and financial expert reports were prepared. The case was adjourned once because the applicant and some of the respondents had not been summoned in due time. Another adjournment was ordered because an expert report had not been filed in due time, and another because an expert could not attend the hearing. Two adjournments were ordered because the applicant requested additional tasks to be assigned to the experts. 9.  On 28 March 2002 the Smolyan Regional Court partly reversed the Madan District Court's judgment of 30 April 1998. The applicant appealed on points of law. After hearing the appeal on 10 February 2003, on 4 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court's judgment. 10.  After that the second phase of the proceedings, during which the court was due to carry out the division of the property (see paragraph 14 below), began before the Madan District Court. The court held hearings on 14 April and on 2 June 2003. At the hearing on 2 June 2003 it ordered the case to be sent to the Smolyan Regional Court for the correction of two obvious factual errors in the operative provisions of the judgment of 28 March 2002. That entailed the suspension of the proceedings before the Madan District Court. 11.  On 21 July 2003 the Smolyan Regional Court agreed to make one of the requested corrections but refused to make the other one. One of the respondents appealed. After hearing the appeal on 13 April 2004, on 29 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the ruling of the Smolyan Regional Court. 12.  The proceedings then resumed before the Madan District Court. The court held two hearings at which it admitted in evidence a technical expert report and a number of documents. On 1 December 2004 it allocated the property to one of the respondents. None of the parties appealed against that judgment and it became final. 13.  As the Madan District Court omitted to award costs, on an unspecified date the parties lodged requests seeking a costs order. In additional decisions of 10 and 14 January 2005 the court ordered the respondents to reimburse part of the applicant's costs. After that, there were appeal proceedings and proceedings for correction of obvious factual errors in the two decisions. Those proceedings ended on 5 July 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and resides in Riga. 6.  The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was the chairman of the State-owned joint stock company L. On 14 June 2010 the Bureau for the Prevention and Combating of Corruption (Korupcijas novēršanas un apkarošanas birojs) opened a criminal investigation into suspected unlawful activity by the company’s officials. 8.  On 15 June 2010 at 7 a.m. investigator A.R. ordered a search of the applicant’s apartment. It was possible that he was involved in the offences under investigation, and there was reason to believe that unlawfully obtained money and some other items were located there. 9.  Between 7.40 and 10.40 a.m. officers from the Bureau carried out the search. The applicant was allowed to telephone his lawyer who, according to him, arrived at 9.38 a.m. 10.  The applicant submitted that during the search he had not been free to leave the apartment. 11.  The search record, however, stated that he and his wife had been informed of their right to remain present and make remarks about the investigators’ actions. They had attended the search. His lawyer had noted down in the record that the decision authorising the search did not comply with certain provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums). It was signed by all three of them. 12.  At about 11 a.m. the applicant telephoned a security guard at company L. to ask that his driver place his briefcase in a car. 13.  At 11.15 a.m. the officers informed the applicant he was under arrest. 14.  Between 11.21 and 11.34 a.m. investigator G.B. drew up an arrest record specifying that the applicant had been arrested at 11.15 a.m. on suspicion of abuse of office with intent to obtain a material benefit and assisting money laundering, and that a witness had identified him as a perpetrator. He and his lawyer signed the record, noting also that his arrest was unjustified. 15.  At 6.30 p.m. the applicant was interviewed. 16.  The investigating authorities performed thirty searches in total that day and, according to the applicant, arrested seven other individuals. The Government submitted, without indicating when, that nine individuals had been arrested. They further drew attention to the large scale of the crimes under investigation and various investigative actions. 17.  On 17 June 2010 at about 9 a.m. A.R. served on the applicant a decision declaring him a suspect and an application addressed to the Riga City Centre District Court (Rīgas pilsētas Centra rajona tiesa) for his pre-trial detention. His lawyer was present at the time. 18.  According to A.R. there was a strong suspicion that, between 1 January 2006 and 15 June 2010 the applicant, in his position as chairman of company L., had secured decisions favourable to companies ANS and GGSMT for the reconstruction of hydro units and regarding a thermal power plant project. A sum of no less than 1,130,000 euros (EUR) obtained as a result of this unlawful activity had allegedly been laundered through companies registered in Latvia and abroad, by way of property transactions and investments in companies owned by the applicant and K.M. By doing so, the applicant had allegedly committed the offences of abuse of office with intent to obtain a material benefit and assisting money laundering. 19.  The applicant, referring to his lawyer’s handwritten application, contended that at 9.20 a.m. that morning his lawyer had applied to A.R. for leave to consult, prior to the detention hearing, the documents in support of the application for detention. She had refused the request. The Government, however, submitted that neither the applicant nor his lawyer had made any complaints about access to the case file. 20.  Between 10.04 a.m. and 1.30 p.m. an investigating judge of the Riga City Centre District Court held the hearing. 21.  The applicant’s lawyer requested A.R. to provide evidence in support of the application for detention. She refused to do so and the hearing continued. 22.  The lawyer submitted that the officers had controlled the applicant’s movements in the apartment from the start of the search. He had therefore requested them to draw up a record of his client’s arrest. In this connection, he pointed out that no one could be held in custody for more than forty-eight hours. 23.  The investigating judge granted A.R.’s application and ordered the applicant’s detention pending trial. With regard to the suspicion that he had committed the offences in question, the judge reasoned as follows:\n“...search records, inspection records, statements [and] other material of the criminal proceedings give rise to grounds for suspicion that [the applicant] has committed the offences in relation to which the criminal proceedings have been instituted...” 24.  As regards access to the case file, the judge stated:\n“Section 375(1) of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that case material is a secret of the investigation ... material and evidence that justify [the applicant’s] detention contain secret information ... [the investigator] has the right to disclose this material ... only to officials involved in the criminal proceedings.” 25.  On 21 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. On 5 July 2010 he submitted his arguments in support thereof. 26.  He requested the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) to grant him access to the case file so as to be able to effectively challenge the applicant’s detention. It did not grant the request. 27.  On 6 July 2010 an appeal hearing was held. The lawyer maintained that he had the right to access the documents upon which the applicant’s detention had been based. 28.  The Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the original ruling. With regard to the suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question, the judge stated:\n“The court has had sufficient time to examine the case material furnished to it. The court, like [the lower court], concludes that information has been obtained ... giving rise to grounds for suspicion that [the applicant] has committed the accused offences. The court reached that conclusion having examined ... records of investigative actions [and] witness statements, and with special attention paid to information obtained by ... special investigative actions ... carried out long before the criminal proceedings were instituted.” 29.  As regards access to the case file, the judge reasoned as follows:\n“An official in charge of criminal proceedings presents case material to an investigating or higher judge for them to assess grounds of pre-trial detention. An investigating or higher judge examines the case material ... [which] is kept secret from the parties not conducting the proceedings.” 30.  No appeal lay against this decision. 31.  On 18 August 2010 the investigating judge released the applicant on bail. 32.  On 30 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a complaint regarding his client’s arrest with the Office of the Prosecutor General. 33.  On 8 July 2010 prosecutor V.J. dismissed it. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had noted in the search record that the applicant’s freedom of movement or his liberty had been restricted during the search; they had not noted anything in the arrest record to say that he had been deprived of his liberty before this either. The applicant’s lawyer had not specified the manner in which his client had been deprived of his liberty. It could not therefore be established that he had been deprived of his liberty during the search. 34.  By a final decision of 11 October 2010 chief prosecutor A.K. dismissed the complaint.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants, Triplu-Tudor S.R.L. and Tudor-Auto S.R.L., are two companies incorporated under Moldovan law. 7.  On 18 November 1993 the State Service for the Supervision of Insurance by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Moldova (“the Service”) (Serviciul de Stat pentru supravegherea asigurărilor pe lângă Ministerul Finanţelor al Republicii Moldova) registered the insurance company Tudor and Co. S.R.L., founded by three private parties T.N., V.N. and L.R. (“the founders”). On an unspecified date the founders lodged with the Service a request to register two other insurance companies, which on 3 November 1995 were registered as Triplu-Tudor S.R.L. and Triplu‑Tudor‑Auto S.R.L. They also sought the registration of changes in the companies’ founders, namely the replacement of T.N. and V.N. with other founders, and in one of the company’s names from Triplu-Tudor-Auto S.R.L. into Tudor-Auto S.R.L. On 25 and 27 December 1995 and on 11 January 1996 the Service granted their requests. 8.  On 10 June 1997 the Government adopted Decision no. 533 “on certain regulatory measures of insurance activity” (see paragraph 31 below), according to which insurance companies had to fulfil certain formalities and to obtain new registration certificates before 1 August 1997. 9.  On 31 July 1997 Triplu-Tudor S.R.L. and Tudor-Auto S.R.L. submitted to the Service the required documents together with the evidence of increase in their statutory capital up to 300,000 Moldovan lei (MDL), (65,197 euros (EUR) at the time), as provided for by section 1 of decision no. 533, and requested to register the changes in the constitutional documents and to be issued with new registration certificates for insurance activity (“the certificates“). Since the Service refused to comply with their requests, on an unspecified date each of the applicant companies brought actions against the Service, seeking to order it to register the requested changes and to issue new registration certificates. 10.  On 15 January 1998, during the proceedings before the first-instance court, the Service only registered the changes in the companies’ statutory capital. 11.  On 31 March 1998 the Chişinău Economic Court ruled in favour of the applicant companies and ordered the Service to issue them with new registration certificates. On 15 April 1998 the applicant companies were issued with enforcement warrants which stated “for immediate enforcement”. The Service appealed. 12.  On 24 June 1998 the Appellate Chamber of the Chişinău Economic Court rejected the appeals of the Service in both cases. No further appeals were lodged and the judgments became final and enforceable. 13.  The Service took a number of steps designed to either annul the final judgments or to prevent their enforcement. On 21 July 1998 and 1 June 1999 the Service annulled its decisions of 25 and 27 December 1995 and of 11 January 1996. 14.  On 1 December 1998 the Service requested a stay of the enforcement proceedings, which was dismissed by the Chişinău Economic Court on 12 February 1999. 15.  On an unspecified date it asked for a revision of the judgments of 31 March 1998. On 15 July 1999 the Chişinău Economic Court dismissed the request as unfounded. 16.  On 8 February 2000 the Service lodged a new request for a revision of the judgments of 31 March 1998. By a final decision of 6 September 2000 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the request. 17.  In a separate set of proceedings, on 28 September 1999 the Rîşcani District Court fined the Director of the Service for failure to comply with the judgments in favour of the applicant companies. Following an appeal lodged by the Director, on 4 July 2000 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 28 September 1999 and discontinued the proceedings against him as statute-barred. Nevertheless, in a separate decision of the same date the Supreme Court of Justice specifically addressed the Ministry of Finance about the need to enforce the final judgments in order to avoid subsequent damage to State interests. 18.  On 24 January 2001 the Service issued each of the applicant companies with certificates, but the Minister of Finance did not sign them so that they had no legal force. In February 2001 the applicant companies requested a bailiff to fully enforce the judgments and to obtain the signature of the Minister of Finance on the certificates. 19.  On 18 May and 4 June 2001 the State Registration Chamber requested the applicant companies to submit certain documents in order to re-register the companies, as provided for by a new law on State registration of enterprises. Since the requests specifically stated that the applicant companies should have submitted the originals of their registration certificates, the latter failed to comply with the requests. 20.  The judgments of 31 March 1998 have not been enforced to date. 21.  On 19 April 2000 T.P. (it appears from the case file that the founder T.N., see paragraph 7 above, had changed his name) lodged a request to join the proceedings which ended with the final judgment of 31 March 1998 as a third party. He claimed that he was the owner of a 50% share in the applicant company and that the changes to the applicant company’s statutory documents, introduced on 11 January 1996, had been adopted without his knowledge. 22.  By a final decision of 20 September 2000 the Appellate Chamber of the Economic Court dismissed T.P.’s request as unsubstantiated. 23.  On 6 October 2003 T.P. lodged with the Economic Court of Appeal a request for a revision of the judgment of 31 March 1998, relying mainly on the same grounds as in his request of 19 April 2000. On 8 December 2004 the Economic Court of Appeal dismissed the request as unsubstantiated and statute-barred, since it had been lodged more than three months after the date on which T.P. had found out about “new relevant circumstances”. T.P. lodged an appeal on points of law. 24.   On 31 March 2005 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld his appeal on points of law and quashed the judgment of 31 March 1998. It ordered a full re-examination of the case. The Supreme Court did not deal with the issue of the three-month time-limit for lodging the revision request. 25.  The outcome of the reopened proceedings is unknown.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Grozny. 8.  At the material time the applicant lived with his family in his own house at 148 Klyuchevaya Street in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny, in the residential quarter referred to by the local residents as Ivanovo. The applicant has two sons and two daughters. The oldest son, Magomed Umarov, born in 1975, was a fourth-year student at the Grozny Oil Institute. In November 1999 the applicant and his family left Grozny because of the shelling and lived in railway carriages in a camp for internally displaced persons in Ingushetia. In February 2000 the applicant’s mother died and he and his family came back to Chechnya to bury her. They then remained in Grozny. 9.  On 27 May 2000 at around 6 a.m., when the applicant and his family were asleep at home, a group of men in camouflage uniforms arrived in a Ural military vehicle at 148 Klyuchevaya Street. In his submissions before the Court the applicant also referred to statements of his neighbours to the effect that there had been another car in the street – a UAZ vehicle with the number 469. The men were armed with automatic firearms and some of them were masked. According to the applicant, they were federal servicemen, whilst the Government claimed that they were “unidentified persons”. 10.  The men entered the applicant’s house, having broken down the door. According to the applicant, the first man who entered the house was tall and had a bright complexion and blue eyes. The applicant found out later that the man’s name was Yuriy. The men spoke Russian without an accent. They threatened the applicant’s wife and daughters with firearms, swore at them and beat the applicant. They also searched the house. The men then dragged the applicant out to the courtyard, kicked him and beat him with rifle butts. There were about 30 masked men in the courtyard. The applicant enclosed statements of his wife and daughter corroborating his account of the events. 11.  Magomed Umarov slept in an extension to the house located in the same courtyard. He rushed out into the courtyard, screaming “Why are you beating him?” According to the applicant, the men seized him, beat him and threw him into the Ural truck in which they had arrived. The vehicle had no registration plates. The men then left. Magomed Umarov was not allowed to dress or to put shoes on. Later that day the men returned and collected his son’s passport and student identity card issued by the Grozny Oil Institute. The applicant has had no news of his son since then. 12.  The applicant’s brother immediately took him to Grozny hospital no. 3 where he underwent a medical examination and was diagnosed with bruises on his face, chest and feet and the fracture of two ribs. The applicant received first aid at the hospital and was then released. 13.  In the meantime the applicant’s neighbours noted that the Ural truck in which Magomed Umarov had been taken away bore the inscription “Maestro”. According to the applicant, the inscription indicated that the vehicle belonged to the Temporary Department of the Interior of the Staropromyslovskiy District (временный отдел внутренних дел Старопромысловского района – “the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD”). The Government claimed that the vehicle referred to by the applicant had not been listed among those belonging to the federal forces. 14.  The applicant’s relatives and neighbours went to the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD and to the local military commander’s office, which were only 100 metres away from the applicant’s house. The officials there did not tell them anything and advised them to apply to the Grozny prosecutor’s office (прокуратура г. Грозного). 15.  On the same day at about 9 a.m. the applicant and his relatives went to the Grozny prosecutor’s office. He met the Grozny prosecutor, B., and submitted a written complaint about the attack on his house, his beatings and his son’s detention. He requested that those responsible be identified and prosecuted and that his son’s whereabouts be established. 16.  According to the applicant, the prosecutor immediately summoned the head and senior officers of the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD and berated them in his presence for “dirty work in masks” and that during that meeting the deputy head of the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD warned the personnel of the VOVD about the events by telephone. After the meeting the prosecutor, a senior investigator from his office, the applicant and the others went to the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD and to the military commander’s office of the Staropromyslovskiy District. 17.  At the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD the applicant and his wife identified one of the servicemen who had beaten him that morning at his house. The officers of the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD explained to the prosecutor that they had conducted two “special operations” in the Ivanovo quarter that morning, but that they knew nothing about the Ural truck with an inscription “Maestro”. According to the applicant, the deputy military commander of the Staropromyslovskiy District who introduced himself as Valeriy invited the prosecutor, investigators and the identified officers from the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD for a separate talk, first on the spot and then at the location of the nearest military unit in the building of a local concert hall. They questioned the officers about what they had seen or heard that morning. Thereafter the prosecutor and the investigator assured the applicant that everything would be “sorted out” and left. 18.  The applicant returned home and learnt that on the same morning two other men had been detained in their quarter, the M. brothers. They were released four days later, apparently for a ransom, and told the applicant that they had been detained in a ground pit together with the applicant’s son. There had been ten persons in the pit. The M. brothers told him that they had been brought there with bags over their heads, but believed that it was at the Khankala military base, the headquarters of the Russian military in Chechnya, because they could hear helicopters landing and taking off, and because they had crossed some railway lines on the way. Furthermore, when Magomed Umarov and two other persons had been taken out of the pit, somebody said: “Take them to the Khankala post!”. Twelve days later another young man who had been detained in a Grozny suburb on 25 May 2000 and then released met with the applicant and told him that he had been detained with his son in a pit in terrible conditions and that his son had asked him to do everything possible for his release. 19.  The applicant continued the search for his son. On numerous occasions, both in person and in writing, he applied to prosecutors at various levels, to the Ministry of the Interior, to courts and the administrative authorities in Chechnya and beyond. In dozens of letters addressed to the authorities the applicant stated the facts of his son’s detention and asked for assistance and details on the investigation. He also wrote about his son’s alleged detention at the Khankala military base, referring to the witnesses who had been released, allegedly, for a ransom. Most of the letters were submitted by the applicant during his visits to officials in an attempt to find out Magomed Umarov’s whereabouts. The applicant has submitted copies of some of those letters to the Court. The applicant was given hardly any substantive information concerning his son’s disappearance and the investigation into these events. On several occasions he received copies of letters by which his requests had been forwarded to the different prosecutors’ services. 20.  According to the applicant, during his visits to the prosecutors’ offices he had received hints on several occasions that he should not complain about his son’s abduction, but should rather, like the relatives of those who had been released, seek “middlemen” who could help him find his son, and that otherwise his son could “disappear”. The applicant allegedly tried to act through “middlemen” but failed. 21.  On 28 May 2000 a number of residents of the Staropromyslovskiy District signed a petition addressed to the military commanders of the Staropromyslovskiy District and of Chechnya, with a copy to the Russian President. They complained of a “bullying attitude” on the part of the military stationed in the Staropromyslovskiy District, which included systematic and open extortion of money, cigarettes and alcohol at check-points, disregard of traffic regulations by the drivers of large military vehicles, random shooting and shelling both day and night and robbery and beatings during so-called “sweeping” operations. They referred, in particular, to the beating of the applicant and his son on 27 May 2000 and the absence of information about the latter’s whereabouts since his apprehension. 22.  In a letter of 16 June 2000 the applicant requested the military commander of Chechnya to assist him in locating his son. The commander replied that the Grozny prosecutor’s office (прокуратура г. Грозного) and the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD were responsible for investigating the applicant’s allegations. He further informed the applicant that following the residents’ petition of 28 May 2000 the superiors of the local detachments of the Ministry of the Interior had discussed the issues raised and increased control over their staff at check-points. 23.  On 9 September 2000 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic (прокуратура Чеченской Республики – “the Republican prosecutor’s office”) informed the applicant that on 30 May 2000 the Grozny prosecutor’s office had opened a criminal investigation into his son’s abduction and that the criminal case file had been assigned the number 12050. 24.  On 19 September 2000 the head of the criminal investigation service of the Chechen Department of the Interior informed the applicant that his letter of 27 June 2000 had been forwarded to the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD for the purposes of organising the search for his son. 25.  By letter of 25 October 2000 the Republican prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Grozny prosecutor’s office “for examination”. 26.  On 14 November 2000 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic forwarded the applicant’s complaint concerning the inefficiency of the investigation into his son’s disappearance to the Republican prosecutor’s office. 27.  On 15 November 2000 and 12 February 2001 the applicant complained to the military prosecutor of the Chechen Republic (военный прокурор Чеченской Республики) about the attack on his house, his beatings and his son’s detention, as well as of inefficiency in the investigation and asked for help in finding his son. 28.  On 27 November 2000 the Republican prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that following his complaint “the decision to suspend investigation was quashed and the case file remitted for further investigation with instructions to take more active steps”. The letter did not indicate the date on which the decision to suspend the investigation had been taken or the date on which the proceedings had been resumed and contained no other details. 29.  By letter of 30 November 2000 the Republican prosecutor’s office referred the applicant’s complaint concerning his son’s detention and disappearance to the Grozny prosecutor’s office. 30.  On 19 December 2000 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 (военная прокуратура – войсковая часть 20102) referred the applicant’s complaint to the Grozny Temporary Office of the Interior (временный отдел внутренних дел г. Грозного). The letter stated that there had been no grounds to send the applicant’s complaint to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 since it had not been established that military personnel had been involved in the abduction of the applicant’s son. 31.  On 21 December 2000 the applicant wrote to the Memorial Human Rights Centre and to the Russian Commissioner for Human Rights. 32.  According to the applicant, in late February 2001 he found out that there were a number of unidentified corpses in the premises of a nearby railway station. The applicant went there and saw around 60 bodies that had been taken from the mass grave near the village of Dachnoye. Some of them showed signs of torture, their legs and hands were tied with iron wire. One of the corpses resembled that of the applicant’s son, as it had clothes similar to those Magomed Umarov had been wearing on the day of his detention. The applicant, however, was unable to identify the body, as its head was missing. He felt unwell and left. The next day the applicant returned with his wife to study the body, but was unable to find it. He was told that the corpses had been taken to another village, situated 15-20 km way from Grozny. The applicant went there and was informed that the remains had been photographed and then buried. The applicant looked through the photographs but did not find the headless body. 33.  By letter of 1 April 2001 the Grozny prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that they had studied his complaint, quashed the decision to suspend the criminal investigation and remitted the case for further investigation. The letter did not indicate the date on which the decision to suspend the investigation had been taken or the date on which the proceedings had been resumed and contained no other details. 34.  On 29 May 2001 the Republican prosecutor’s office replied to the applicant’s complaint, stating that the decision to suspend the investigation had been quashed and the case had been remitted for further investigation. The investigation was being supervised by the Republican prosecutor’s office. The letter did not indicate the date on which the decision to suspend the investigation had been taken or the date on which the proceedings had been resumed and contained no other details. 35.  In a letter of 19 June 2001 the applicant requested the Republican prosecutor’s office to question the investigator from the Grozny prosecutor’s office, who had been present on 27 May 2000 during the questioning at the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD and the military commander’s office of the Staropromyslovskiy District, about the identity of the servicemen and the content of their statements made on that day. 36.  In letters of 24 August and 13 September 2001 the Republican prosecutor’s office instructed the Grozny prosecutor’s office to take more active steps in investigating Magomed Umarov’s disappearance. 37.  On 9 October 2001 the applicant wrote to the Republican prosecutor’s office, with a copy to the Special Envoy of the Russian President for Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic. The applicant complained that the investigation into his son’s abduction had been inadequate and plagued with shortcomings, that those responsible had not been identified so far despite compelling evidence exposing them and that he had never been notified of any steps taken during the investigation or of its progress. 38.  On 22 October 2001 the Special Envoy of the Russian President for Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic informed the applicant that his letter of 9 October 2001 had been forwarded to the Prosecutor General’s Office. 39.  In November 2001 the Republican prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the decision to suspend the investigation of the criminal case concerning his son’s abduction had been quashed and that the ongoing investigation was supervised by them. The letter contained no further details. 40.  On 18 December 2001 the Grozny prosecutor’s office replied to the Special Envoy of the Russian President for Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, with a copy to the applicant, that on 30 May 2000 the Grozny prosecutor’s office had opened a criminal investigation into the abduction of Magomed Umarov and the infliction of injuries on the applicant. On 30 July 2001 the investigation had been suspended owing to failure to identify the alleged perpetrators. The letter further stated that on 14 December 2001 the Republican prosecutor’s office had quashed that decision and remitted the file for further investigation and that measures aimed at establishing Magomed Umarov’s whereabouts and identifying those responsible were being taken. 41.  In a letter of 25 December 2001 the Republican prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the investigation into his son’s disappearance was currently under way. 42.  On 19 March 2002 the Southern Federal Circuit Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office (Управление Генеральной прокуратуры РФ в Южном федеральном округе) forwarded the applicant’s complaint about the inadequate investigation into his son’s disappearance to the Republican prosecutor’s office and ordered them to submit before 1 April 2002 information regarding the investigation. 43.  On 23 May 2002 the Republican prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that the decision of 28 January 2001 to suspend proceedings in criminal case no. 12050 had been quashed and the investigation re-opened. 44.  By letter of 6 June 2002 the Southern Federal Circuit Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office transmitted the applicant’s complaint to the Republican prosecutor’s office. 45.  In a letter of 10 June 2002 the Republican prosecutor’s office stated that the applicant’s complaint of 29 May 2000 had been left without examination, as it had contained no new arguments other than those which had previously been examined and replied to. 46.  On 25 June 2002 the Republican prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that they had taken up the case opened in connection with the injuries inflicted on him and the disappearance of his son. 47.  By letter of 21 October 2002 the Chechen Department of the Interior informed the applicant’s wife that all necessary measures aimed at establishing Magomed Umarov’s whereabouts and identifying those involved in his abduction were being taken. 48.  On 21 August 2003 the prosecutor’s office of the Staropromyslovskiy District (прокуратура Старопромысловского района г. Грозного – “the Staropromyslovskiy prosecutor’s office”) notified the applicant that the proceedings in criminal case no. 12050 had been suspended on 30 August 2002 and then resumed on 18 August 2003. In a letter of 27 January 2004 they further informed the applicant that the proceedings had been adjourned on 3 September 2003 in view of the failure to establish the alleged perpetrators. 49.  The Government submitted, with reference to the information provided by the Prosecutor General’s Office, the following information concerning the investigation into the events of 27 May 2000. 50.  On 30 May 2000 the Grozny prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings in connection with the infliction of bodily injuries on the applicant and the abduction of his son, under Articles 126 (2) (aggravated abduction) and 286 (3) (aggravated abuse of power) of the Russian Criminal Code. The case file was assigned the number 12050. 51.  The investigating authorities took a number of steps during the investigation. In particular, on 23 June 2000 the applicant underwent a forensic medical examination which established abrasions and bruises on his face, chest and left foot. In the Government’s submission, those injuries had “caused no harm to the applicant’s health”. 52.  The applicant was granted victim status on 30 May 2000 and questioned on that date and on 27 February 2001. His numerous requests were included in the case file. The applicant’s wife was interviewed on 21 June 2001. 53.  On 24 March 2001 and 18 January 2002 the investigators questioned one of the M. brothers, who had also been detained on 27 May 2000. M. stated that at around 5 a.m. on the date in question he had been abducted from his house in Klyuchevaya Street by unidentified masked men in camouflage uniforms and armed with automatic firearms, taken outside Grozny and put in a pit approximately two metres deep. In the pit he had seen Magomed Umarov who had then been taken away. 54.  On 28 March 2001 the Grozny prosecutor’s office received information to the effect that the personnel of the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD had not carried out any operations in the vicinity of Klyuchevaya Street on 27 May 2000. 55.  On 6 November 2001 the investigators questioned the military commander of the Staropromyslovskiy District, who stated that his office had been organised on 22 June 2000 to replace the temporary military commander’s office and that he had no information regarding documents of the temporary commander’s office. 56.  On 23 September 2003, 19 and 29 January and 18, 20 and 24 June 2005 the investigating authorities also questioned ten other witnesses, who “gave no information relevant for establishing the circumstances of Magomed Umarov’s abduction”. 57.  According to the Government, in the context of the investigation into the applicant’s beatings and his son’s disappearance, the investigators inspected the scene of the incident at 148 Klyuchevaya Street on 14 October 2004 and 27 June 2005, but those inspections “brought no positive results”. 58.  During the investigation, the Chechen Department of the Federal Security Service of Russia (Управление Федеральной службы безопасности РФ по Чеченской Республике) submitted information to the effect that Magomed Umarov had never participated in illegal armed formations. 59.  The investigating authorities sent a number of queries concerning the operation of 27 May 2000, those responsible for the abduction of the applicant’s son, or those who had information about the events of 27 May 2000, to various official bodies and sought lists of persons who had been serving in the Staropromyslovskiy VOVD in May 2000. They also checked registers of unidentified corpses, medical establishments and detention centres so as to establish whether Magomed Umarov was listed or kept there, but to no avail. 60.  On 18 June 2005 the investigating authorities questioned K. A., apparently the applicant’s neighbour, who submitted that on the day of Magomed Umarov’s abduction he had seen two Ural vehicles and men wearing camouflage uniform near the Umarov household. He had learnt about the abduction later. 61.  On 20 June 2005 the investigating authorities questioned I. H., apparently also a neighbour, who submitted that he had learnt about Magomed Umarov’s abduction from other neighbours. 62.  On 24 June 2005 the investigating authorities questioned T. M., the applicant’s neighbour. She submitted that at approximately 4 a. m. she had heard the sound of engines and had gone outside. Near 148 Klyuchevaya Street she had seen servicemen in camouflage uniform and had returned home. Later she had learnt that the servicemen had taken Magomed Umarov with them. 63.  On 18 August 2006 the investigating authorities questioned S. B., on 26 August 2006 they questioned F.D. and on 4 September 2006 S.-E. M., but those individuals submitted that they knew nothing about Magomed Umarov’s abduction. It is not clear who they were and why their statements could have been relevant. 64.  According to the Government’s submission, the investigation had been suspended and resumed on eighteen occasions, but had failed to date to identify the alleged perpetrators or to establish Magomed Umarov’s whereabouts. After the most recent resumption on 21 April 2007 the investigation was being carried out by the Staropromyslovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office and supervised by the Prosecutor General’s Office. 65.  In June 2001 the applicant lodged a complaint against the inactivity of the military and law-enforcement authorities, during the investigation into his son’s abduction and his own beatings, with the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny. In August 2001 the applicant was summoned to that court, which at the time was situated in the village of Beno-Yurt in the Nadterechny District of Chechnya, about 100 kilometres from Grozny. According to the applicant, during a meeting a judge asked him to withdraw his complaint, and then promised to help him obtain free legal aid in the proceedings. The judge allegedly explained to him that his complaint could not be examined because he had not indicated the names and positions of the officials against whom he complained. She also told him that the court would issue a procedural decision rejecting his complaint. 66.  On 18 September 2001 the applicant wrote to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court. He enquired whether he could benefit from legal aid in his case and whether the aforementioned procedural decision had been issued and requested the court to furnish him with a copy of it. He received no reply to that letter. 67.  On 1 November 2001 the applicant wrote to the President of the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic, complaining about the lack of progress in his case lodged in June 2001 with the Staropromyslovskiy District Court. 68.  On 5 December 2001 the applicant received a letter from the Staropromyslovskiy District Court, in which the judge informed him that, upon his request, his submissions to that court had been forwarded to the “Novaya Gazeta” newspaper and suggested that he contact a journalist from that newspaper. According to the applicant, he had never given his consent to the transfer of his submissions to the said newspaper. 69.  On 23 January 2002 the applicant addressed a letter to the Supreme Court of Russia. He complained about the failure to act on the part of the Staropromyslovskiy District Court and the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic. He also complained about the inefficiency of the investigation and referred to the fact that five investigators had been in charge of the case. He stated that all his complaints had been forwarded to the Grozny prosecutor’s office with the result that the criminal investigation file consisted almost entirely of his own complaints to various authorities. It appears that the applicant received no answer to that letter. 70.  Despite specific requests made by the Court on several occasions, the Government did not submit a copy of the investigation file concerning the abduction of Magomed Umarov. They submitted case-file material on 44 pages, which contained mostly decisions on suspension and resumption of the investigation and records of interviews with the applicant and another witness. Copies of those records were of very poor quality and almost illegible. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in criminal proceedings. At the same time, the Government suggested that a Court delegation could have access to the file at the place where the preliminary investigation was being conducted, with the exception of “the documents [disclosing military information and personal data of the witnesses], and without the right to make copies of the case file and to transmit it to others”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The first applicant, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party – “Refah”), was a political party founded on 19 July 1983. It was represented by its chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, who is also the second applicant. He was born in 1926 and lives in Ankara. An engineer by training, he is a politician. At the material time he was a member of Parliament and Refah’s chairman. \nThe third applicant, Mr Şevket Kazan, who was born in 1933, lives in Ankara. He is a politician and a lawyer. At the material time he was a member of Parliament and a vice-chairman of Refah. The fourth applicant, Mr Ahmet Tekdal, who was born in 1931, lives in Ankara. He is a politician and a lawyer. At the material time he was a member of Parliament and a vice-chairman of Refah. 11.  Refah took part in a number of general and local elections. In the local elections in March 1989 Refah obtained about 10% of the votes and its candidates were elected mayor in a number of towns, including five large cities. In the general election of 1991 it obtained 16.88% of the votes. The sixty-two MPs elected as a result took part between 1991 and 1995 in the work of Parliament and its various committees, including the Committee on Constitutional Questions, which proposed amendments to Article 69 of the Constitution that became law on 23 July 1995. During the debate in Parliament on the new sixth paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution (see paragraph 45 below) the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Questions explained when he presented the draft it had prepared that the Constitutional Court would not restrict itself to noting the unconstitutional nature of the individual acts of the members of a party but would then be obliged to declare that the party concerned had become a centre of anti‑constitutional activities on account of those acts. One MP, representing the parliamentary group of the Motherland Party, emphasised the need to change the relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties to take account of the new sixth paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution.\nUltimately, Refah obtained approximately 22% of the votes in the general election of 24 December 1995 and about 35% of the votes in the local elections of 3 November 1996.\nThe results of the 1995 general election made Refah the largest political party in Turkey with a total of 158 seats in the Grand National Assembly (which had 450 members at the material time). On 28 June 1996 Refah came to power by forming a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi), led by Mrs Tansu Ciller. According to an opinion poll carried out in January 1997, if a general election had been held at that time, Refah would have obtained 38% of the votes. The same poll predicted that Refah might obtain 67% of the votes in the general election to be held roughly four years later. 12.  On 21 May 1997 Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court to have Refah dissolved on the grounds that it was a “centre” (mihrak) of activities contrary to the principles of secularism. In support of his application, he referred to the following acts and remarks by certain leaders and members of Refah.\n–  Whenever they spoke in public Refah’s chairman and other leaders advocated the wearing of Islamic headscarves in State schools and buildings occupied by public administrative authorities, whereas the Constitutional Court had already ruled that this infringed the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution.\n–  At a meeting on constitutional reform Refah’s chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had made proposals tending towards the abolition of secularism in Turkey. He had suggested that the adherents of each religious movement should obey their own rules rather than the rules of Turkish law.\n–  On 13 April 1994 Mr Necmettin Erbakan had asked Refah’s representatives in the Grand National Assembly to consider whether the change in the social order which the party sought would be “peaceful or violent” and would be achieved “harmoniously or by bloodshed”.\n–  At a seminar held in January 1991 in Sivas, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had called on Muslims to join Refah, saying that only his party could establish the supremacy of the Koran through a holy war (jihad) and that Muslims should therefore make donations to Refah rather than distributing alms to third parties.\n–  During Ramadan Mr Necmettin Erbakan had received the heads of the Islamist movements at the residence reserved for the Prime Minister, thus assuring them of his support.\n–  Several members of Refah, including some in high office, had made speeches calling for the secular political system to be replaced by a theocratic system. These persons had also advocated the elimination of the opponents of this policy, if necessary by force. Refah, by refusing to open disciplinary proceedings against the members concerned and even, in certain cases, facilitating the dissemination of their speeches, had tacitly approved the views expressed.\n–  On 8 May 1997 a Refah MP, Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik, had said in front of journalists in the corridors of the parliament building that blood would flow if an attempt was made to close the “İmam-Hatip” theological colleges, that the situation might become worse than in Algeria, that he personally wanted blood to flow so that democracy could be installed in the country, that he would strike back against anyone who attacked him and that he would fight to the end for the introduction of Islamic law (sharia).\n–  The Minister of Justice, Mr Şevket Kazan (a Refah MP and vice-chairman of the party), had expressed his support for the mayor of Sincan by visiting him in the prison where he had been detained pending trial after being charged with publicly vindicating international Islamist terrorist groups.\nPrincipal State Counsel further observed that Refah had not opened any disciplinary proceedings against those responsible for the above-mentioned acts and remarks. 13.  On 7 July 1997 Principal State Counsel submitted new evidence against Refah to the Constitutional Court. 14.  On 4 August 1997 Refah’s representatives filed their defence submissions, in which they relied on international human-rights protection instruments, including the Convention, pointing out that these instruments formed part of Turkish written law. They further referred to the case-law of the Commission, which had expressed the opinion that Article 11 of the Convention had been breached in the cases concerning the United Communist Party of Turkey and the Socialist Party, and to the case-law of the Court and the Commission on the restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association authorised by the second paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. They contended that the dissolution of Refah was not prompted by a pressing social need and was not necessary in a democratic society. Nor, according to Refah’s representatives, was their party’s dissolution justified by application of the “clear and present danger” test laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States of America. 15.  Refah’s representatives further rejected Principal State Counsel’s argument that the party was a “centre” of activities which undermined the secular nature of the Republic. They submitted that Refah was not caught by the criteria laid down in the Law on the regulation of political parties for determining whether a political party constituted a “centre of anti‑constitutional activities”. They observed, inter alia, that the prosecuting authorities had not issued any warning to Refah (which had four million members) that might have enabled it to expel any of its members whose acts had contravened the provisions of the Criminal Code. 16.  Refah’s representatives also set out their point of view on the concept of secularism. They asserted that the principle of secularism implied respect for all beliefs and that Refah had shown such respect in its political activity. 17.  The applicants’ representatives alleged that in accusing Mr Necmettin Erbakan of supporting the use of force to achieve political ends and of infringing the principle of secularism the prosecuting authorities had merely cited extracts from his speeches which they had distorted and taken out of context. Moreover, these remarks were covered by Mr Necmettin Erbakan’s parliamentary immunity. They further noted that the dinner he had given to senior officials of the Religious Affairs Department and former members of the theology faculty had been presented by Principal State Counsel as a reception organised for the leaders of Islamist fundamentalist movements, which had in any event been legally proscribed since 1925. 18.  With regard to the remarks of the other Refah leaders and members criticised by Principal State Counsel’s Office, Refah’s representatives observed that these did not constitute any criminal offence.\nThey asserted that none of the MPs whose speeches had been referred to by Principal State Counsel was authorised to represent Refah or held office within the party and claimed that the prosecuting authorities had not set in motion the procedure laid down in the Law on the regulation of political parties so as to give Refah the opportunity, if the need arose, to decide whether or not the persons concerned should continue to be members of the party; the first time Refah’s leadership had been informed of the remarks criticised in the case had been when they read Principal State Counsel’s submissions. The three MPs under attack had been expelled from the party, which had thus done what was necessary to avoid becoming a “centre” of illegal activities within the meaning of the Law on the regulation of political parties. 19.  On 5 August 1997 Principal State Counsel filed his observations on the merits of the case with the Constitutional Court. He submitted that according to the Convention and the case-law of the Turkish courts on constitutional-law issues nothing obliged States to tolerate the existence of political parties that sought the destruction of democracy and the rule of law. He contended that Refah, by describing itself as an army engaged in a jihad and by openly declaring its intention to replace the Republic’s statute law by sharia, had demonstrated that its objectives were incompatible with the requirements of a democratic society. Refah’s aim to establish a plurality of legal systems (in which each group would be governed by a legal system in conformity with its members’ religious beliefs) constituted the first stage in the process designed to substitute a theocratic regime for the Republic. 20.  In their observations on the merits of the case, Refah’s representatives again argued that the dissolution of their party could not be grounded on any of the restrictions permitted by the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Convention. They went on to say that Article 17 was not applicable in the case, as Refah had nothing in common with political parties which sought to install a totalitarian regime. Furthermore, the plurality of legal systems which their party proposed was actually intended to promote the freedom to enter into contracts and the freedom to choose which court should have jurisdiction. 21.  On 11 November 1997 Principal State Counsel submitted his observations orally. On 18 and 20 November 1997 Mr Necmettin Erbakan submitted his oral observations on behalf of Refah. 22.  In a judgment of 9 January 1998, which it delivered following proceedings on preliminary issues it had instituted of its own motion as the court dealing with the merits, the Constitutional Court ruled that, regard being had to Article 69 § 6 of the Constitution, the second paragraph of section 103 of the Law on the regulation of political parties was unconstitutional and declared it null and void. Article 69 § 6, taken together with section 101(d) of the same Law, provided that for a political party to be considered a “centre” of activities contrary to the fundamental principles of the Republic its members had to have been convicted of criminal offences. According to the Constitutional Court, that legal restriction did not cover all cases where the principles of the Republic had been flouted. It pointed out, among other observations, that after the repeal of Article 163 of the Criminal Code activities contrary to the principle of secularism no longer attracted criminal penalties. 23.  On 16 January 1998 the Constitutional Court dissolved Refah on the ground that it had become a “centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism”. It based its decision on sections 101(b) and 103(1) of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties. It also noted the transfer of Refah’s assets to the Treasury as an automatic consequence of dissolution, in accordance with section 107 of Law no. 2820. 24.  In its judgment the Constitutional Court first dismissed the preliminary objections raised by Refah. In that connection it held that the parliamentary immunity of the MPs whose remarks had been mentioned in Principal State Counsel’s submissions of 21 May 1997 had nothing to do with consideration of an application for the dissolution of a political party and forfeiture of political rights by its members, but was a question of the criminal responsibility of the MPs concerned, which was not a matter of constitutional law. 25.  With regard to the merits, the Constitutional Court held that while political parties were the main protagonists of democratic politics their activities were not exempt from certain restrictions. In particular, activities by them incompatible with the rule of law could not be tolerated. The Constitutional Court referred to the provisions of the Constitution which imposed respect for secularism on the various organs of political power. It also cited the numerous provisions of domestic legislation requiring political parties to apply the principle of secularism in a number of fields of political and social life. The Constitutional Court observed that secularism was one of the indispensable conditions of democracy. In Turkey the principle of secularism was safeguarded by the Constitution, on account of the country’s historical experience and the specific features of Islam. The rules of sharia were incompatible with the democratic regime. The principle of secularism prevented the State from manifesting a preference for a particular religion or belief and constituted the foundation of freedom of conscience and equality between citizens before the law. Intervention by the State to preserve the secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary in a democratic society. 26.  The Constitutional Court held that the following evidence proved that Refah had become a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism (see paragraphs 27-39 below): 27.  Refah’s chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had encouraged the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public and educational establishments. On 10 October 1993, at the party’s Fourth Ordinary General Meeting, he had said:\n“... when we were in government, for four years, the notorious Article 163 of the Persecution Code was never applied against any child in the country. In our time there was never any question of hostility to the wearing of headscarves ...”\nIn his speech of 14 December 1995 before the general election he had said:\n“... [university] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to power.”\nBut manifesting one’s religion in such a manner amounted to exerting pressure on persons who did not follow that practice and created discrimination on the ground of religion or beliefs. That finding was supported by various rulings of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court and by the case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights on applications nos. 16278/90 and 18783/91 concerning the wearing of headscarves at universities. 28.  The plurality of legal systems proposed by Mr Necmettin Erbakan was nothing to do with the freedom to enter into contracts as Refah claimed, but was an attempt to establish a distinction between citizens on the ground of their religion and beliefs and was aimed at the installation of a theocratic regime. On 23 March 1993 Mr Erbakan had made the following speech to the National Assembly:\n“... ‘you shall live in a manner compatible with your beliefs’. We want despotism to be abolished. There must be several legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose for himself which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a framework of general principles. Moreover, that has always been the case throughout our history. In our history there have been various religious movements. Everyone lived according to the legal rules of his own organisation, and so everyone lived in peace. Why, then, should I be obliged to live according to another’s rules? ... The right to choose one’s own legal system is an integral part of the freedom of religion.”\nIn addition, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had spoken as follows on 10 October 1993 at a Refah party conference:\n“... we shall guarantee all human rights. We shall guarantee to everyone the right to live as he sees fit and to choose the legal system he prefers. We shall free the administration from centralism. The State which you have installed is a repressive State, not a State at the people’s service. You do not allow the freedom to choose one’s code of law. When we are in power a Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he wishes, and a Christian will be able to marry in church, if he prefers.” 29.  The plurality of legal systems advocated by Mr Necmettin Erbakan in his speeches had its origin in the practice introduced in the first years of Islam by the “Medina Agreement”, which had given the Jewish and polytheist communities the right to live according to their own legal systems, not according to Islamic law. On the basis of the Medina Agreement some Islamist thinkers and politicians had proposed a model of peaceful social co-existence under which each religious group would be free to choose its own legal system. Since the foundation of the Nizam Party in 1970 (dissolved by a judgment of 2 May 1971) Mr Necmettin Erbakan had been seeking to replace the single legal system with a plurality of legal systems. 30.  The Constitutional Court further observed that in a plurality of legal systems, as proposed by Refah, society would have to be divided into several religious movements; each individual would have to choose the movement to which he wished to belong and would thus be subjected to the rights and obligations prescribed by the religion of his community. The Constitutional Court pointed out that such a system, whose origins lay in the history of Islam as a political regime, was inimical to the consciousness of allegiance to a nation having legislative and judicial unity. It would naturally impair judicial unity since each religious movement would set up its own courts and the ordinary courts would be obliged to apply the law according to the religion of those appearing before them, thus obliging the latter to reveal their beliefs. It would also undermine legislative and judicial unity, the preconditions for secularism and the consciousness of nationhood, given that each religious movement would be empowered to decree what legal rules should be applicable to its members. 31.  In addition, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had made a speech on 13 April 1994 to the Refah group in Parliament in which he had advocated setting up a theocratic regime, if necessary through force:\n“The second important point is this: Refah will come to power and a just [social] order [adil dozen] will be established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether this change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail bloodshed. I would have preferred not to have to use those terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of terrorism, and so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel obliged to do so. Today Turkey must take a decision. The Welfare Party will establish a just order, that is certain. [But] will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their minds on that point.” 32.  The reception given by Mr Necmettin Erbakan at the Prime Minister’s residence to the leaders of various religious movements, who had attended in vestments denoting their religious allegiance, unambiguously evidenced Refah’s chairman’s support for these religious groups vis-à-vis public opinion. 33.  In a public speech in April 1994 Mr Şevki Yılmaz, MP for the province of Rize, had issued a clear call to wage a jihad and had argued for the introduction of Islamic law, making the following declaration:\n“We shall certainly call to account those who turn their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who deprive Allah’s Messenger of his jurisdiction in their country.”\nIn another public speech, also in April 1994, Mr Şevki Yılmaz had said:\n“In the hereafter you will be summoned with the leaders you have chosen in this life. ... Have you considered to what extent the Koran is applied in this country? I have done the sums. Only 39% [of the rules] in the Koran are applied in this country. Six thousand five hundred verses have been quietly forgotten ... You found a Koranic school, you build a hostel, you pay for a child’s education, you teach, you preach. ... None of that is part of the chapter on jihad but of that on the amel-i salih [peacetime activities]. Jihad is the name given to the quest for power for the advent of justice, for the propagation of justice and for glorification of Allah’s Word. Allah did not see that task as an abstract political concept; he made it a requirement for warriors [cahudi]. What does that mean? That jihad must be waged by an army! The commander is identified ... The condition to be met before prayer [namaz] is the Islamisation of power. Allah says that, before mosques, it is the path of power which must be Muslim ... It is not erecting vaulted ceilings in the places of prayer which will lead you to Paradise. For Allah does not ask whether you have built up vaulted ceilings in this country. He will not ask that. He will ask you if you have reached a sufficient level ... today, if Muslims have a hundred liras, they must give thirty to the Koranic schools, to train our children, girls and boys, and sixty must be given to the political establishments which open the road to power. Allah asked all His prophets to fight for power. You cannot name a single member of a religious movement who does not fight for power. I tell you, if I had as many heads as I have hairs on my head, even if each of those heads were to be torn from my shoulders for following the way of the Koran, I would not abandon my cause ... The question Allah will ask you is this: ‘Why, in the time of the blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction of an Islamic State?’ Erbakan and his friends want to bring Islam to this country in the form of a political party. The prosecutor understood that clearly. If we could understand that as he did, the problem would be solved. Even Abraham the Jew has realised that in this country the symbol of Islam is Refah. He who incites the Muslim community [cemaat] to take up arms before political power is in Muslim hands is a fool, or a traitor doing the bidding of others. For none of the prophets authorised war before the capture of State power. ... Muslims are intelligent. They do not reveal how they intend to beat their enemy. The general staff gives orders and the soldiers obey. If the general staff reveals its plan, it is up to the commanders of the Muslim community to make a new plan. Our mission is not to talk, but to apply the war plan, as soldiers in the army ...”\nCriminal proceedings had been brought against Mr Şevki Yılmaz. Although his antipathy to secularism was well-known, Refah had adopted him as a candidate in local-government elections. After he had been elected mayor of Rize, Refah had made sure that he was elected as an MP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 34.  In a public speech on 14 March 1993 and a television interview first recorded in 1992 and rebroadcast on 24 November 1996, Mr Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Refah MP for the province of Ankara, had encouraged discrimination between believers and non-believers and had predicted that if the supporters of applying sharia came to power they would annihilate non‑believers:\n“Our homeland belongs to us, but not the regime, dear brothers. The regime and Kemalism belong to others. ... Turkey will be destroyed, gentlemen. People say: Could Turkey become like Algeria? Just as, in Algeria, we got 81% [of the votes], here too we will reach 81%, we will not remain on 20%. Do not waste your energy on us – I am speaking here to you, to those ... of the imperialist West, the colonising West, the wild West, to those who, in order to unite with the rest of the world, become the enemies of honour and modesty, those who lower themselves to the level of dogs, of puppies, in order to imitate the West, to the extent of putting dogs between the legs of Muslim women – it is to you I speak when I say: ‘Do not waste your energy on us, you will die at the hands of the people of Kırıkkale.’ ”\n“... the army says: ‘We can accept it if you’re a supporter of the PKK, but a supporter of sharia, never.’ Well you won’t solve the problem with that attitude. If you want the solution, it’s sharia.”\nRefah had ensured that Mr Ceylan was elected as an MP and its local branches had played videotapes of this speech and the interview. 35.  Refah’s vice-chairman, Mr Ahmet Tekdal, in a speech he made in 1993 while on pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia which was shown by a Turkish television station, had said that he advocated installing a regime based on sharia:\n“In countries which have a parliamentary regime, if the people are not sufficiently aware, if they do not work hard enough to bring about the advent of ‘hak nizami’ [a just order or God’s order], two calamities lie ahead. The first calamity is the renegades they will have to face. They will be tyrannised by them and will eventually disappear. The second calamity is that they will not be able to give a satisfactory account of themselves to Allah, as they will not have worked to establish ‘hak nizami’. And so they will likewise perish. Venerable brothers, our duty is to do what is necessary to introduce the system of justice, taking these subtleties into consideration. The political apparatus which seeks to establish ‘hak nizami’ in Turkey is the Welfare Party.” 36.  On 10 November 1996 the mayor of Kayseri, Mr Şükrü Karatepe, had urged the population to renounce secularism and asked his audience to “keep their hatred alive” until the regime was changed, in the following terms:\n“The dominant forces say ‘either you live as we do or we will sow discord and corruption among you’. So even Welfare Party Ministers dare not reveal their world-outlook inside their Ministries. This morning I too attended a ceremony in my official capacity. When you see me dressed up like this in all this finery, don’t think it’s because I’m a supporter of secularism. In this period when our beliefs are not respected, and indeed are blasphemed against, I have had to attend these ceremonies in spite of myself. The Prime Minister, other Ministers and MPs have certain obligations. But you have no obligations. This system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little longer. Let us see what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and hatred they feel in their hearts.”\nMr Şükrü Karatepe had been convicted of inciting the people to hatred on the ground of religion. 37.  On 8 May 1997 Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik, Refah MP for the province of Şanlıurfa, had spoken in Parliament in favour of the establishment of a regime based on sharia and approving acts of violence like those which were taking place in Algeria:\n“If you attempt to close down the ‘İmam-Hatip’ theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, blood will flow. It would be worse than in Algeria. I too would like blood to flow. That’s how democracy will be installed. And it will be a beautiful thing. The army has not been able to deal with 3,500 members of the PKK. How would it see off six million Islamists? If they piss into the wind they’ll get their faces wet. If anyone attacks me I will strike back. I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.”\nMr İbrahim Halil Çelik had been expelled from the party one month after the application for dissolution had been lodged. His exclusion had probably only been an attempt to evade the penalty in question. 38.  Refah’s vice-chairman, the Minister of Justice, Mr Şevket Kazan, had visited a person detained pending trial for activities contrary to the principle of secularism, thus publicly lending him his support as a Minister. 39.  On the basis of the evidence adduced on 7 July 1997 by Principal State Counsel’s Office, the Constitutional Court held that the following further evidence confirmed that Refah was a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism:\n–  In a public speech on 7 May 1996 Mr Necmettin Erbakan had emphasised the importance of television as an instrument of propaganda in the holy war being waged in order to establish Islamic order:\n“... A State without television is not a State. If today, with your leadership, you wished to create a State, if you wanted to set up a television station, you would not even be able to broadcast for more than twenty-four hours. Do you believe it is as easy as that to create a State? That’s what I told them ten years ago. I remember it now. Because today people who have beliefs, an audience and a certain vision of the world, have a television station of their own, thanks be to God. It is a great event.\nConscience, the fact that the television [channel] has the same conscience in all its programmes, and that the whole is harmonious, is very important. A cause cannot be fought for without [the support of] television. Besides, today we can say that television plays the role of artillery or an air force in the jihad, that is the war for domination of the people ... it would be unthinkable to send a soldier to occupy a hill before those forces had shelled or bombed it. That is why the jihad of today cannot be waged without television. So, for something so vital, sacrifices must be made. What difference does it make if we sacrifice money? Death is close to all of us. When everything is dark, after death, if you want something to show you the way, that something is the money you give today, with conviction, for Kanal 7. It was to remind you of that that I shared my memories with you.\n... That is why, from now on, with that conviction, we will truly make every sacrifice, until it hurts. May those who contribute, with conviction, to the supremacy of Hakk [Allah] be happy. May Allah bless you all, and may He grant Kanal 7 even more success. Greetings.”\n–  By a decree of 13 January 1997 the cabinet (in which the Refah members formed a majority) had reorganised working hours in public establishments to make allowances for fasting during Ramadan. The Supreme Administrative Court had annulled this decree on the ground that it undermined the principle of secularism. 40.  The Constitutional Court observed that it had taken into consideration international human-rights protection instruments, including the Convention. It also referred to the restrictions authorised by the second paragraph of Article 11 and Article 17 of the Convention. It pointed out in that context that Refah’s leaders and members were using democratic rights and freedoms with a view to replacing the democratic order with a system based on sharia. The Constitutional Court observed: \n“Democracy is the antithesis of sharia. [The] principle [of secularism], which is a sign of civic responsibility, was the impetus which enabled the Turkish Republic to move on from Ummah [ümmet – the Muslim religious community] to the nation. With adherence to the principle of secularism, values based on reason and science replaced dogmatic values. ... Persons of different beliefs, desiring to live together, were encouraged to do so by the State’s egalitarian attitude towards them. ... Secularism accelerated civilisation by preventing religion from replacing scientific thought in the State’s activities. It creates a vast environment of civic responsibility and freedom. The philosophy of modernisation of Turkey is based on a humanist ideal, namely living in a more human way. Under a secular regime religion, which is a specific social institution, can have no authority over the constitution and governance of the State. ... Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious matters cannot be regarded as interference contrary to the requirements of democratic society. ... Secularism, which is also the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the philosophical essence of life in Turkey. Within a secular State religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and legislative provisions. Those are not matters to which religious requirements and thought apply, only scientific data, with consideration for the needs of individuals and societies.”\nThe Constitutional Court held that where a political party pursued activities aimed at bringing the democratic order to an end and used its freedom of expression to issue calls to action to achieve that aim, the Constitution and supranational human-rights protection rules authorised its dissolution. 41.  The Constitutional Court observed that the public statements of Refah’s leaders, namely those of Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Şevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal, had directly engaged Refah’s responsibility with regard to the constitutionality of its activities. It further observed that the public statements made by MPs Mr Şevki Yılmaz, Mr Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik, and by the mayor of Kayseri, Mr Şükrü Karatepe, had likewise engaged the party’s responsibility since it had not reacted to them in any way or sought to distance itself from them, or at least not before the commencement of the dissolution proceedings. 42.  As an additional penalty, the Constitutional Court decided to strip Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and İbrahim Halil Çelik of their MP status, in accordance with Article 84 of the Constitution. It found that these persons, by their words and deeds, had caused Refah’s dissolution. The Constitutional Court also banned them for five years from becoming founding members, ordinary members, leaders or auditors of any other political party, pursuant to Article 69 § 8 of the Constitution. 43.  Judges Haşim Kılıç and Sacit Adalı expressed dissenting opinions stating, inter alia, that in their view the dissolution of Refah was not compatible either with the provisions of the Convention or with the case‑law of the European Court of Human Rights on the dissolution of political parties. They observed that political parties which did not support the use of violence should be able to take part in political life and that in a pluralist system there should be room for debate about ideas thought to be disturbing or even shocking. 44.  This judgment was published in the Official Gazette on 22 February 1998.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "3.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in the Isle of Man. He grew raspberries there and had a lucrative contract with the shop Marks & Spencers, but lost it in 1990 when the local environmental health officer let it be known to the shop that the applicant was packing raspberries in his kitchen. The applicant and his wife sued the Department of Local Government and the Environment ('DOLGE') for mis-statement and were awarded over GBP 16,000 in damages by the Manx High Court on 1 April 1993. The applicant did not consider that this was enough, and, wishing to appeal, instructed a new (Manx) advocate, a Mr Carter, then a partner in a firm of advocates called Carter Jones McDonald ('CJM').\nMr Carter advised that there was merit in an appeal, and applied for legal aid on his client's behalf in April 1993: this application was rejected on 25 May 1993. The applicant's Petition of Appeal from the first instance judgment was rejected the next day because it had been filed two days late. Mr Carter advised (via letter and at a meeting) that it would not be unduly difficult to apply for an extension of time in which to lodge the appeal, but that, in the circumstances, the best course of action was for the applicant to cut his losses and to accept an offer put forward by DOLGE. The applicant accepted this advice and, on 17 June 1993, DOLGE's offer of GBP 20,000. 4.  CJM issued proceedings against the applicant for payment of their fees on 7 December 1993. An advocate instructed by the applicant to defend the claim failed to file a Defence in the prescribed period, and judgment was entered for CJM on 5 January 1994. After taxation of CJM's costs, judgment was issued on 2 March 1995 for a total of GBP 929.80. Mr Carter then applied for execution of the judgment and on 9 October 1995, the applicant's property was placed under arrest by the Coroner. The applicant appealed on 30 October 1995 and on 7 November 1995 Mr Carter wrote to the Coroner and the applicant requesting that no further steps be taken in respect of the enforcement of the execution against the applicant until specifically instructed. It appears that the execution remained suspended until the judgment of 17 November 2003 detailed below. 5.  After a delay occasioned by their difficulty in obtaining legal aid, the applicant and his wife brought proceedings on 26 March 1996 against CJM in negligence, claiming that CJM's actions and omissions in April-June 1993 had deprived them of the opportunity to pursue their appeal against the first instance decision in their case against DOLGE. These proceedings are referred to hereafter as “the CJM proceedings.” In them, the applicant and his wife were represented throughout by leading Counsel from England, who had been granted a special temporary licence as a Manx advocate. The proceedings were heard by Acting Deemster Hall, succeeded by Acting Deemster Newey. 6.  The summons issued on 26 March 1996 was not served on CJM until 20 March 1998, the time for service of the summons having been extended by the High Court on 27 February 1997. After the applicant filed a motion for judgment in default of defence on 22 June 1998, it appears a first defence was served out of time on 7 July 1998. A second defence was served on 16 September 1998. After the service of this second defence, a motion filed by the applicant for judgment in default was dismissed by consent on 17 September 1998. On 25 January 1999 the defendants filed a motion for a split trial between liability and quantum issues, which was dismissed on 25 October 2000. It appears that there had been no correspondence between the parties and the High Court between 27 July 1999 and 6 January 2000, leading the High Court to write to the defendants on 26 January 2000 indicating, inter alia, that Acting Deemster Hall “was very anxious to progress the matter”. After the dismissal of the defendant's motion for a split trial on 25 October 2000, it appears it was incumbent on the applicant to apply to have the case set down for trial within 28 days of this date. No application was made. On 12 January 2001, the High Court wrote to the applicant's solicitors requesting that they make the necessary application as soon as possible. On 19 January 2001, the applicant's solicitors replied, apologising for the delay in their application. On 22 January 2001, the High Court replied with instructions from the Acting Deemster that the case be set down for trial within 28 days. Both parties responded expressing concern at this proposal.\nIt further appears that throughout 2001 the parties each filed a number of motions, the defendants requesting a stay in the proceedings and each seeking leave to amend the statement of case, the defence and reply. Further such motions were sought throughout 2002 and January and February 2003. On 31 October 2002 and 12 February 2003, the High Court made orders setting further directions for the proceedings. Further orders were agreed by consent between the parties on 21 June 2001, 1 February 2002 and 17 July 2002, in each instance agreeing to a revised timetable and date for trial. On 20 December 2002 the applicant issued a motion for additional time to serve a further expert report to which the defendants responded with a motion that the action be struck out for non-compliance with orders of the High Court. In order to hear the motions, the High Court vacated the scheduled trial date. They were heard on 12 February 2003 with the defendant's motion being dismissed, the applicant being given leave to serve the expert report and further directions being given to the parties. 7.  The CJM proceedings did not therefore come to trial before Acting Deemster Newey until 21 March 2003, at which point CJM essentially conceded liability and limited themselves to contesting quantum. By a judgment dated 17 November 2003: (1) the judgments obtained by CJM in 1995 were set aside (by consent) and these earlier proceedings dismissed; and (2) the applicant and his wife were awarded the sum of GBP 10,780.93 plus interest of GBP 8,567.13. 8.  The applicant and his wife appealed against the quantum of the award; their appeal was dismissed on 25 May 2004. In a detailed 37 page judgment, the High Court of Justice of the Isle of Man (Staff Government Division) considered and dismissed each head of their challenge to the conclusions of the first instance judge. It seems that the applicant's Counsel was directed by the lead judge at the end of the hearing that his interest was now at end. 9.  The applicant wished to apply to the Privy Council for special leave to appeal directly to the Council but it appears that after failing to obtain such leave as a “poor person” and failing to obtain legal aid from the Manx authorities, he did not do so.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Novosibirsk. The second applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Kazan. The third applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Roshal, Moscow Region. 6.  The applicants are members of the National Bolsheviks Party. 7.  On 14 December 2004 a group of about forty members of the National Bolsheviks Party occupied the waiting area of the President’s administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. 8.  They asked for a meeting with the President, the deputy head of the President’s administration and the President’s economic adviser. They handed out leaflets through the windows featuring a printed letter to the President which listed ten ways in which he had allegedly failed to comply with the Constitution and which called for his resignation. 9.  The intruders stayed in the office for an hour and a half until the police broke down the locked door and arrested them. They did not offer any resistance to the authorities. 10.  On 16 December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicants’ detention on the ground that they were suspected of an especially serious criminal offence. 11.  The applicants were charged, on 21 December 2004, with the attempted violent overthrow of State power (Article 278 of the Criminal Code) and the intentional destruction and degradation of others’ property in public places (Articles 167 § 2 and 214). 12.  By separate decisions of 8, 9 and 11 February 2005 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow extended the applicants’ detention until 14 April 2005 on the basis of the gravity of the charges. The court also found that the second applicant had no registered place of residence in Moscow or the Moscow region, and therefore there was a possibility that she might abscond or interfere with the investigation. In respect of the third applicant the court held that his permanent place of residence in the Moscow region, ongoing studies at a university in Moscow, previously clean criminal record and good character references were insufficient to warrant his release, given the gravity of the charges laid against him. 13.  On 16 February 2005 the applicants’ charge was amended to that of participation in mass disorder, an offence under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 14.  By separate but identically worded decisions of 7 April 2005 the District Court granted the prosecution’s request for an extension of the applicants’ detention until 14 July 2005, for the following reasons:\n“The court takes into account that the case involves forty defendants who have just started, together with their counsel, to study the case file which comprises twelve volumes ... Moreover, the prosecution needs additional time in order to prepare the bill of indictment ...\nHaving regard to the fact that [the first and the second applicants] are not registered with a permanent place of residence in Moscow or the Moscow region and taking into account the gravity of the charges and the prosecutor’s arguments that [the applicants], once released, might flee from justice, the court considers that [the applicants] should remain in custody. ” 15.  On appeal, counsel for the applicants asked for their release as they had no previous criminal record, had good character references and a permanent place of residence and were in employment or studying at the university. He further submitted that the applicants did not require much time to study the case file. At the appeal hearing before the Moscow City Court the applicants confirmed that they had finished studying the case file. 16.  On 11 May 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decisions of 7 April 2005, finding that they had been lawful, sufficiently reasoned and justified. 17.  The investigation was completed on 7 June 2005 and thirty-nine persons, including the applicants, were committed for trial. 18.  On 20 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow scheduled the preliminary hearing for 30 June 2005 and held that all the defendants should meanwhile remain in custody. 19.  On 30 June 2005 the District Court held a preliminary hearing. It rejected the defendants’ requests for release, taking into account their character, young age, frail health, family situation and stable way of life. However, it found, referring to the gravity of the charges, that “the grounds on which the preventive measure [had been] previously imposed still persist[ed]” and that “the case file gave sufficient reasons to believe that, once released, the defendants would flee or interfere with the trial”. It therefore ordered that all the defendants should remain in custody pending trial. 20.  The applicants lodged applications for release. On 27 July 2005 the District Court rejected these requests, finding that their detention was lawful and justified. 21.  On 10 August 2005 the applicants filed new applications for release. On the same day the District Court rejected the requests. It held:\n“The court takes into account the defence’s argument that an individual approach to each defendant’s situation is essential when deciding on the preventive measure.\nExamining the grounds on which ... the court ordered and extended the detention of all the defendants without exception ... the court notes that these grounds still persist today. Therefore, having regard to the state of health, family situation, age, profession and character of all the defendants, and to the personal guarantees offered on their behalf by certain private individuals and included in the case file, the court concludes that, if released, each of the applicants might abscond or obstruct the course of justice in some other way...\nIn the court’s view, in these circumstances, having regard to the gravity of the charges, there are no grounds for varying or revoking the preventive measure in respect of any defendant ...” 22.  On 8 December 2005 the District Court found the applicants and their co-defendants guilty of participation in mass disorder. It gave each applicant a suspended sentence of three years and released them all on probation. 23.  The first and third applicants were held in remand prison no. IZ-77/2 in Moscow.\n(a)  The description provided by the Government 24.  The Government provided the following description of the conditions of detention in respect of the first and third applicants.\n(i)  The cell population in respect of the first applicant 25.  As regards the number of inmates sharing a cell with the first applicant, the Government relied on a number of excerpts from the prison population register in respect of fourteen days and the certificates prepared by the remand prison administration in April 2009.\n \nPeriod of detention\nCell number\nCell area (square metres)\nCell capacity/Number of inmates\nFrom 16 to 17 December 2004\n150 57.9\n14 (22 in December 2005)/14 (21 in December 2005)\n(ii)  The cell population in respect of the third applicant 26.  As regards the number of inmates sharing a cell with the third applicant, the Government relied on a number of excerpts from the prison population register in respect of four days and the certificates prepared by the remand prison administration in April 2009.\n \nPeriod of detention\nCell number\nCell area (square metres)\nCell capacity/Number of inmates\nFrom 16 to 26 December 2004\n281 8.4\n4/2\n(iii)  Other aspects of the conditions of detention in respect of the first and third applicants 27.  According to the Government, the first and third applicants were each provided with their own bed and bedding, a mug, a dish and a spoon. 28.  The lighting in the cells was in compliance with applicable standards. At night low-voltage bulbs were used to maintain lighting for surveillance purposes. The cells were serviced by a ventilation system in good working order. The inmates were allowed exercise for one hour per day in the prison yard. The cells were regularly disinfected.\n(b)  The description provided by the first and third applicants 29.  The first and third applicants contested the Government’s submissions. According to them, the cells where they were detained were overcrowded at all times and infested with insects. The toilet had only been separated by a screen from the living area of the cell and did not offer any privacy. The applicants had been allowed to take a ten-minute shower once a week. The food was scarce and no medicine, other than aspirin and other analgesics, was available. The applicants had been permitted a walk for about an hour per day. The exercise yard was sheltered and measured 15 square metres in area. No books or newspapers had been available. 30.  The second applicant was detained in remand prison no. IZ-77/6 in Moscow. According to the Government, she was held in cells nos. 202 and 204 which measured 131.1 and 131.3 square metres respectively. Cell no. 202 was equipped with forty-four beds and housed thirty-one inmates. Cell no. 204 was equipped with forty-two beds and housed from twenty‑nine to thirty-two inmates. The second applicant had been provided with bed sheets, soap and personal hygiene products. The ventilation system in the cells had been in good working order. Additional access to fresh air was possible through the windows. The cells were disinfected once a month. 31.  According to the second applicant, the cells were infested with cockroaches and crickets. The toilet was separated from the living area of the cell by a screen – one metre in height – which did not offer any privacy. She had been allowed to take a ten-minute shower once a week. The food was of poor quality. No books were available. The inmates received one periodical a month behind publication.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant is a Moldovan national who was born in 1949 and lives in Chişinău (Moldova). He is a lawyer and Chairman of the Moldovan Bar Council. 9.  In 2000 a group composed of members of parliament and the Moldovan Ombudsman sought a ruling from the Constitutional Court that the Lawyers (Organisation of the Profession) Act (Law no. 395-XIV) was unconstitutional. The Act laid down, inter alia, that all lawyers practising in Moldova should be members of the Bar Council, a national association of all lawyers from the local Bars. They argued that compulsory membership of the Bar Council was contrary to the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Moldovan Constitution. 10.  After consulting, inter alia, the Bar Council, which expressed the view that the Act was consistent with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held in a decision of 15 February 2000 that the provisions making membership of the Moldovan Bar Council compulsory were unconstitutional. 11.  The applicant criticised the Constitutional Court’s decision in a telephone interview he gave to A.M., a journalist on the Economiceskoe Obozrenie (“Economic Analysis”) newspaper. 12.  In the February 2000 edition of the newspaper, A.M. published an article on the debate which the Constitutional Court’s decision of 15 February 2000 had sparked off among lawyers. He gave the following account of his telephone interview with the applicant:\n“... After the Constitutional Court’s decision was made public, Economiceskoe Obozrenie put a series of questions to the Chairman of the Bar Council, Mr Gheorghe Amihalachioaie. His comments are tinged with emotion, no doubt because they were made in the heat of the moment:\n‘The Constitutional Court’s decision will produce total anarchy in the legal profession’, said Mr Amihalachioaie. ‘You will see what will happen over the course of the next year. From now on, we no longer have a single system for organising the profession or a unitarian State. We have become accustomed to this – it is easier to live and work in chaos. Taxes are not paid, there is no supervision and, consequently, no ethics, no discipline and no responsibility.\nIn view of this, the question is whether the Constitutional Court is constitutional. In 1990 the United Nations adopted its Basic Principles on the Role of the Bar, which are fully guaranteed by our law. The legal profession is independent the world over. In Moldova it is subordinate to the executive, that is to say the Ministry of Justice. This is a serious breach of fundamental democratic principles.\nThe Constitutional Court did not take into account the judgments of the Strasbourg Court referred to by the Bar Council in its observations. The judges of the Constitutional Court probably do not regard the European Court of Human Rights as an authority. Am I to assume that they have acquired more experience in five years than the Strasbourg judges in fifty? We shall certainly be informing the Council of Europe that Moldova does not comply with the case-law or requirements of the European Court of Human Rights.’\nAccording to Mr Amihalachioaie, lawyers have always been regarded as being at the forefront of the legal profession: ‘Despite everything, even after the Constitutional Court’s decision, the body of lawyers remains a force.’ ...” 13.  In a letter of 18 February 2000, the President of the Constitutional Court informed the applicant that his remarks as reported in the Economiceskoe Obozrenie newspaper could constitute a lack of regard for the court within the meaning of Article 82 § 1 (e) of the Code of Constitutional Procedure and invited him to submit written observations on this point within ten days. 14.  On 28 February 2000 the applicant submitted the requested observations. He said that he had only learned of the publication of his remarks from the letter of 18 February 2000 and confirmed having had a long telephone conversation with the journalist A.M. about the decision of 15 February 2000. He stressed, however, that his remarks had been misquoted and largely taken out of context. He added that, had A.M. submitted the article to him prior to publication, he would have checked the presentation of his remarks carefully and, accordingly, assumed full responsibility for them. 15.  On 6 March 2000 the Constitutional Court issued a final decision pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the Code of Constitutional Procedure in which it imposed an administrative fine on the applicant in the sum of 360 Moldovan lei (equivalent to 36 euros).\nIt found that the applicant had made the following comments in the aforementioned interview: “The Constitutional Court’s decision will produce total anarchy in the legal profession. ... the question is whether the Constitutional Court is constitutional. ... The judges of the Constitutional Court ... do not regard the European Court of Human Rights as an authority.” It found that these comments showed a lack of respect on the applicant’s part for the Constitutional Court and its decision. 16.  As the Constitutional Court’s decision was final, the applicant paid the sum of 360 lei into the Ministry of Finance’s account on 7 July 2000.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant party, Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (“the ÖDP”), is a Turkish political party based in Ankara. 6.  By a decree of 28 November 1998, the Higher Electoral Commission published a list of the eighteen political parties authorised to participate in the parliamentary and municipal elections to be held on 18 April 1999. The ÖDP featured on the list. In order to be able to participate in the elections in question, the political parties had to have had, for at least six months prior to the elections, branches in no fewer than half the country’s provinces and to have already organised their party conference. 7.  On 23 September 1998 the ÖDP applied to the Ministry of Finance for the financial assistance available to political parties under Article 68 of the Constitution. 8.  By a decision of 23 November 1998, the Ministry of Finance refused the application on the ground that only political parties meeting the criteria laid down by Law no. 2820 on political parties were eligible for public funding. 9.  On 29 December 1998 the ÖDP brought proceedings in the Ankara Administrative Court seeking the setting-aside of the decision of 23 November 1998. The ÖDP began by pointing out that the Constitution itself provided that “the State shall grant political parties sufficient and equitable funding” and that “the law shall define the principles applicable to party funding, members’ subscriptions and donations”. The applicant party observed in particular that the criteria laid down by the Law on political parties excluded parties which were not represented in Parliament from entitlement to State subsidies. Pointing to the difficulty of carrying out political activities and campaigning without the necessary financial resources, it contended that the statutory exclusion was unconstitutional and contrary to the principles of a democratic State, to the State’s duty to promote democratic rights and freedoms, and to the principle of non‑discrimination. Furthermore, the provisions in question were in breach of international human rights protection instruments. 10.  In a judgment of 29 September 1999, the Ankara Administrative Court rejected the application lodged by the ÖDP, on the ground that the latter did not satisfy the criteria laid down by Law no. 2820 on political parties. The court did not rule on the plea of unconstitutionality raised by the ÖDP. 11.  The ÖDP lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 29 September 1999, reiterating the arguments it had submitted at first instance. 12.  In a judgment delivered on 25 April 2002 and served on the applicant party on 10 July 2002, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the impugned judgment, which it found to be in accordance with the rules of procedure and law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Voronezh. 5.  She brought civil proceedings against her local authority requesting arrears of child benefits due to her. 6.  On 25 August 2000 the Levoberezhny District Court of Voronezh granted her claims and awarded her the arrears in the amount of roubles 4,287.36 (RUR). The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 4 September 2000. 7.  On 28 November 2000 a writ of execution was issued. 8.  As the judgment remained unexecuted, on an unspecified date the applicant forwarded the writ to the debtor's bank and requested it to debit the sum due from the debtor's account, but the bank refused. 9.  She then brought proceedings against the bank claiming damages for its refusal to enforce the judgment of 25 August 2000. 10.  On 17 April 2003 the Justice of the Peace of the Second Circuit of the Central District of Voronezh dismissed the applicant's claims on the ground that the bank had not been at fault in refusing to enforce the judgment of 25 August 2000. On appeal, the judgment was upheld by the Central District Court of Voronezh on 10 November 2003. 11.  On 30 December 2004 the applicant received RUR 1,402.56 in execution of the judgment of the Levoberezhny District Court of Voronezh of 25 August 2000. 12.  On 26 January 2005 the applicant received RUR 818,16, and on 14 December 2005 the outstanding balance of RUR 2,066.64 thus completing full execution of the judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1919 and lives in the village of Lebedyn. 5.  On 16 August 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Boryspil Town Court against the Boryspil Town Police Department and the State Treasury, seeking compensation. The applicant alleged that Messrs K. and M. had unlawfully attempted to enter and search his flat and insulted him in the presence of his neighbours. Messrs K. and M. took part in the proceedings as third parties. On 30 August 2000 the court found against the applicant. On an unspecified date the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 6.  On 11 September 2001 the Boryspil Town Court found in part for the applicant and awarded him UAH 12,125.09[1] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and court expenses. On an unspecified date the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 7.  On 24 May 2002 the Boryspil Town Court ruled in part for the applicant. It found that two acting police officers, Messrs K. and M., had been ordered by the Boryspil Town Police Department to check the applicant's flat. On 25 April 2000, in the course of execution of the above order, they had unlawfully attempted to enter the applicant's flat and had made abusive statements in his respect. The court held that the State authorities were responsible for the acts of the police officers and ordered the State Treasury to pay the applicant UAH 2,393.09[2] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and court expenses. The court, referring to Article 25 of the Police Act (see paragraph 18 below), further ordered Messrs K. and M. to apologise for their unlawful actions in the presence of the applicant and his neighbours who had witnessed the incident. 8.  On 1 July 2002 the same court rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal for failure to pay court fees and to comply with other procedural formalities. On 9 August 2002 and 2 January 2003, respectively, the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the decision of 1 July 2002. 9.  On 26 April 2003 the Pecherskyy District Bailiffs' Service initiated enforcement proceedings in respect of the monetary award of 24 May 2002. 10.  On 27 August 2003 the applicant was paid the full amount of the award. 11.  On 5 September 2003 the applicant submitted to the Boryspil Town Bailiffs' Service a writ of execution for the non-pecuniary part of the judgment. 12.  On 8 September 2003 the Bailiffs' Service initiated enforcement proceedings in respect of the obligation of Mr K. to apologize to the applicant. 13.  On 3 and 14 October 2003 the Bailiffs' Service fined Mr K. for his failure to comply with the judgment of 24 May 2002. 14.  On 22 October 2003 the Bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings against Mr K., no reasons having been given for this decision. 15.  On 23 March 2004 Mr K. retired. His present place of residence is unknown. 16.  On 25 April 2006 Mr M. together with two other police officers visited the applicant's place of residence. According to the Government, the applicant and his daughter received the apologies from Mr M. for the events of 25 April 2000. The applicant stated that he had been absent during that visit. 17.  On 14 September 2006 the Trudova Slava local newspaper (газета “Трудова Слава”) published an announcement which read as follows:\n“...[Mr M.], an employee of the MIA [Ministry of Internal Affairs], officially apologizes to [Mr] Donichenko, Ivan Petrovych, for the moral damage caused to him by the police officer in the course of exercise of his duties in 2001.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Panevėžys. 6.  The applicant was employed as the head of a municipal kindergarten in Panevėžys. 7.  On 11 December 2007 she was informed by the local office of the Special Investigation Service that, as a person of equivalent status to a civil servant, she was under investigation on suspicion of fraudulent management of accounts, abuse of office and forgery of documents. In May 2008 she was informed of additional suspicions against her concerning further acts of abuse of office, forgery of documents and misappropriation of property. 8.  In June 2008 the applicant submitted a request to the pre-trial judge to terminate the criminal investigation on the grounds that it had been excessively long. The judge refused the request, noting that the investigation had been completed earlier that month and the case was ready for trial. 9.  On 4 July 2008 the case was referred for judicial examination. On 13 July 2009 the Panevėžys District Court (hereinafter “the first-instance court”) found the applicant guilty on several of the charges against her. She was sentenced to a fine of 2,600 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 753 euros (EUR)) and a prohibition on working for the civil service for two years and six months. 10.  The judgment was amended on appeal: on 19 February 2010 the Panevėžys Regional Court (hereinafter “the appellate court”) upheld the applicant’s conviction on some of the charges and acquitted her on several others. Her sentence was reduced to a fine of LTL 1,820 (EUR 527) and a prohibition on working for the civil service for one year and nine months. Soon afterwards the applicant was dismissed from her job by the Panevėžys City Municipality in line with the decision of the appellate court. 11.  By a final judgment of 16 November 2010 the Supreme Court of Lithuania upheld the reasoning of the appellate court but changed the applicant’s sentence. The Supreme Court found that when determining the length of the applicant’s prohibition on working for the civil service, it was necessary to take into account the fact that she had been suspended from her post during the criminal investigation (see paragraphs 12-19 below). As a result, the period of prohibition was reduced to one year and three months. 12.  Immediately after the launch of the criminal investigation against the applicant (see paragraph 7 above), on 12 December 2007 the first-instance court granted the prosecutor’s request to have the applicant suspended from her job as the head of the kindergarten for three months. The court held that there were grounds to believe that the applicant, as a person of equivalent status to a civil servant, might use her official position to hinder the investigation by, for example, destroying or fabricating evidence, or attempting to influence the witnesses in the case, who were her subordinates. 13.  The applicant appealed against the decision, arguing that she could not be equated to a civil servant because she worked under an employment contract with the Panevėžys City Municipality. She further argued that all the important documents had already been collected from the kindergarten and all the relevant witnesses had been questioned, so there was no possibility for her to interfere with the investigation. The applicant also submitted that she had no prior convictions and had never been subject to any disciplinary action at work and that her employer’s evaluation of her had always been positive; thus there were no grounds to believe that she would use her official position to hinder the investigation. Lastly, the applicant submitted that her job in the kindergarten was her only source of income and therefore the suspension would cause significant difficulties for her and her young daughter, whom the applicant was raising alone. However, the appellate court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the reasoning of the first-instance court. 14.  Subsequently the first-instance court granted the prosecutor’s requests to extend the applicant’s suspension from her post by further periods of one to three months on essentially the same grounds. The applicant appealed against all the decisions, raising the same arguments as before, but her appeals were dismissed by the appellate court (on 27 December 2007, 21 March 2008, 26 May 2008, 18 June 2008 and 6 August 2008). On 6 August 2008 the appellate court noted, inter alia, that the applicant was only suspended from holding a specific post in a particular kindergarten, so the suspension did not affect her ability to take a different job and thus obtain a source of income. 15.  On each of the above-mentioned occasions the decision of the first-instance court was taken following a written procedure, while the appellate court held oral hearings (see paragraphs 23 and 25 below). Neither the applicant nor her representative was present at any of these hearings. The prosecutor was present at the hearing of 21 March 2008. 16.  After the criminal case was referred for judicial examination (see paragraph 9 above), in October 2008 the first-instance court held an oral hearing in which it extended the applicant’s suspension from her post by two months on the same grounds as before. The applicant and her representative were present at the hearing. The applicant’s appeal was subsequently dismissed by the appellate court. 17.  On 1 December 2008 the first-instance court in an oral hearing at which the applicant and her representative were present, terminated the applicant’s suspension from her post. The court found that almost all the witnesses had been questioned, so there were no grounds to believe that the applicant might attempt to influence them or otherwise hinder the investigation. The applicant returned to her job as the head of the kindergarten the following day. 18.  However, on 12 December 2008 the appellate court overturned the decision of the first-instance court, finding that the investigation had not been completed yet, so there was still a risk that the applicant may hinder it. Since the appellate court was not authorised by law to adopt a new decision extending the suspension, the prosecutor submitted a new request for an extension to the first-instance court. During this period the applicant continued working as the head of the kindergarten. 19.  On 16 January 2009 the first-instance court, in an oral hearing at which the applicant and her representative were present, renewed the applicant’s suspension from her post for a period of three months. However, on 12 February 2009 the appellate court allowed an appeal by the applicant against this decision and quashed the above extension ordered by the first-instance court. The applicant returned to her job and remained the head of the kindergarten until her dismissal in February 2010 (see paragraph 10 above). 20.  On 20 December 2007 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Inspector of Journalistic Ethics concerning several articles in the Panevėžio rytas newspaper. The publications commented on the criminal case against the applicant and presented statements from her subordinates criticising her competence and personality. The applicant complained that these articles had been defamatory and insulting. She also complained about a comment posted by a user on the website of the Lietuvos rytas newspaper which insulted the applicant and her young daughter on the grounds that the applicant was a single mother. 21.  On 9 June 2008 the Inspector of Journalistic Ethics partly satisfied the applicant’s complaint. The Inspector found that the comment on the website of Lietuvos rytas was insulting to the applicant and her daughter and ordered the newspaper to remove it from the website. With respect to the articles in Panevėžio rytas, the Inspector held that the applicant was a public figure and therefore had to accept a greater level of media attention and criticism. The Inspector also found that the statements about the applicant in the articles in question reflected the opinions of the interviewed individuals, so the newspaper could not be held accountable for their factual accuracy. 22.  The Inspector’s decision indicated that it could be appealed to the court within thirty days. The applicant did not appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Kyiv, Ukraine.\nFirst set of proceedings 5.  In April 1994 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Irpin Town Court (Ірпінський міський суд Київської області) against her former husband seeking to divide their property. The latter lodged a counterclaim. On 18 August 1995 the court divided the property between the applicant and her former husband. 6.  On 6 February 1996 the Kyiv Regional Court (Київський обласний суд)[1] quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 7.  On 23 December 1997 the Irpin Town Court adopted another judgment on the division of property between the applicant and her former husband. The court further rejected the remainder of principal and counter claims. 8.  On 10 March 1998 the Kyiv Regional Court quashed this judgment and, because of the complexity of the issues involved, took over the case. In its ruling the court stated inter alia that by partially rejecting the principal and counter claims the Irpin Town Court in fact had left unsettled the matter of property right over the house which was a part of the disputed property. 9.  In the course of the aforesaid proceedings a number of forensic examinations have been ordered by the courts. In particular, in their rulings of 22 October 1996 and 22 April 1999 the courts, ordering additional examinations, noted inter alia that “inasmuch as long period of time ha[d] lapsed since the previous forensic examination[s]” they, accordingly, were out-of-date and did not correspond to the actual state of things. 10.  By its letter of 16 July 2001 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal remitted the case back to the first instance court for examination. The court did not provide any reasoning for this remittal except for a general reference to Article 31 of the Judiciary Law, which, at the material time, set forth the competence of a court of appeal. 11.  On 19 February 2002 the Irpin Town Court divided the property between the applicant and her former husband. In particular, the court held that the applicant did not have any property rights regarding the house, in which she lived with her former husband. 12.  On 2 July 2002 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. 13.  On 20 January 2003 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant's appeal in cassation.\nSecond set of proceedings 14.  In April 2003 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Irpin Town Court against her former husband complaining that he had evicted her from the house in which they lived. She also sought to move in the house in question. On 26 June 2003 the court found against the applicant and held that the house in question was owned by the applicant's former husband and a certain M. Moreover, in March 2003 the applicant's former husband had sold his part of the house to D. Therefore, the applicant had no property rights over the house in question and there were no legal grounds to move her in. On 21 October 2003 the Kyiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. On 29 August 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant's appeal in cassation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Adana. As the facts of the case are in dispute between the parties, they will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Section B below (paragraph 6). The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraph 7). The documentary evidence submitted by the applicant and the Government is summarised in Section D (paragraph 8-30). 6.  At the time of the incidents the applicant was selling CDs from a street stand in Adana. On 5 July 2001 the applicant and his relative M.Y. were arrested by the police while they were working at the stand. They were taken to the police station and beaten up by a police officer there. As a result of a punch to his ear, the applicant’s eardrum was perforated. The applicant and M.Y. were subsequently released from the police station. 7.  On 5 July 2001 the Adana Police Station received a complaint that damaged CDs were being sold from a street stand. A number of police officers went to the venue and talked the applicant and M.Y. into a solution with the complainant, but they did not arrest them because their activity had not constituted an offence. 8.  On 7 July 2001 the applicant and M.Y. lodged a criminal complaint with the Adana prosecutor against a police officer who they alleged had ill-treated them on 5 July 2001. At the time of their complaint they did not know the identity of the police officer but gave a description of his physical appearance. They also complained that they had been arrested without any explanation and that as a result of that arrest they had been arbitrarily deprived of their rights. 9.  On 9 July 2001 the applicant went back to the Adana prosecutor’s office and complained that he had been injured as a result of the ill-treatment. In order to provide evidence of his injuries the applicant requested a medical examination. On the same day the Adana prosecutor referred the applicant to the Adana Forensic Medicine Institute. 10.  On 10 July 2001 the Adana Forensic Medicine Institute reported that the applicant’s left eardrum had been perforated as a result of physical trauma, and that the injury required a 15-day healing period. 11.  On 10 July 2001 the applicant also applied to the Adana branch of the Turkish Human Rights Foundation, where a number of physical and psychological assessments were carried out by the doctors working for the Foundation. According to a report drawn up on 22 October 2001, the applicant had a perforation in his left eardrum and he was suffering from acute post-traumatic stress disorder. The report concluded that the doctors’ findings were compatible with the applicant’s story of ill-treatment. 12.  In the Turkish Human Rights Foundation’s report the applicant was reported as having described the incident and told the doctors that after he was punched on his ear, his eardrum had been perforated and he was no longer able to hear on that side. He added that, at the end of his arrest, he had not been taken to a forensic doctor for the required medical check, but the police officers had taken him to a private doctor, where he was diagnosed with ear perforation. The applicant submitted the report for the investigation file. However, this evidence was not further investigated during the proceedings. 13.  On 11 July 2001 the applicant and his relative M.Y. gave their statements at the Adana prosecutor’s office. The applicant complained that he had been beaten by a police officer working at the Adana Police Station and as a result his eardrum had been perforated. He said that he did not know the name of the officer, but he could identify him. M.Y. affirmed the same in his statement. He complained that he had also been beaten by the same officer; however, he had not asked to be examined by a doctor because the ill-treatment had not left any marks on his body. 14.  On 16 July 2001 the prosecutor’s office asked for another medical examination at the Adana State Hospital in order to determine the date of injury to the applicant’s ear. It was concluded that it was medically not possible to determine the date of injury. 15.  On 18 July 2001 the applicant submitted the names of his witnesses to the investigating authorities. 16.  On 2 August 2001, a chief police commissioner who had been entrusted with the duty of investigating the applicant’s allegations, questioned the applicant, his relative M.Y., the suspect and two other police officers as witnesses. That administrative investigation was conducted because the domestic law applicable at the time required prosecutors to seek permission from the administrative authorities before they could prosecute a police officer (see paragraph 58 below). A police officer, V.A., who worked at the Adana police station, testified as a witness. He stated that the applicant had neither been arrested nor ill-treated on 5 July 2001. 17. On the same day the applicant was arrested once more after a complaint was received regarding his CD stand, and taken to the police station. He was released the following day. 18.  On 25 October 2001 the Adana prosecutor decided not to prosecute the police officer because the Governor of Adana had denied the requisite permission for a criminal prosecution. 19.  On 6 May 2002 the prosecutor’s decision was notified to the applicant’s lawyer. On the same day the lawyer lodged an objection against the decision. 20.  In response to the applicant’s objection, on 20 May 2002 the Tarsus Assize Court decided to quash the decision and ordered the prosecutor to file criminal charges against the police officer. The Assize Court noted that the prosecutor had not conducted a proper investigation and had failed, in particular, to establish whether the applicant had been taken to the police station on 5 July 2001, and to question the eyewitnesses named by the applicant. 21.  M.T., a police officer working at the Adana Police Station, was subsequently indicted before the Adana 8th Criminal Court of First Instance (hereinafter “the criminal court”) and the applicant was admitted to the case as the complainant. On 14 August 2002 M.T. gave his statement before the criminal court. He denied all the charges. 22.  On 13 August 2002 the suspect M.T. informed the criminal court in writing that he had been assigned to work for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo; therefore, he would not be able to be present at the court hearings. As a result, until June 2004 the criminal court was unable to summon him to take part in the proceedings. 23.  On 18 March 2003 and 29 September 2003 the witnesses proposed by the applicant testified before the criminal court. The first witness stated that he had helped the applicant at his CD stand occasionally, and that he had seen him on the day of the incident. The applicant had told him that he had been ill-treated by the police because he had refused to provide them with free CDs. The other witness testified that he had taken the applicant to the hospital, and during that time the applicant had told him that he had been beaten in the police station. 24.  On 25 March 2003 police officer V.A. (see paragraph 16 above) appeared as a witness before the criminal court. He testified that the applicant had been taken to the police station by the suspect M.T. However, he had not been subjected to ill-treatment. 25.  On 10 June 2004 the suspect M.T. attended the hearing before the criminal court. The applicant was not present at the hearing. The criminal court ordered the applicant to attend the next hearing and identify the suspect from his photographs. However, the applicant and his relative M.Y. could not be brought before the criminal court until May 2005 as a result of a change of address. 26.  On 5 May 2005 the applicant and his relative M.Y. attended the hearing before the criminal court. M.Y. also testified as a witness. He stated that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment at the police station and had suffered injuries to his ear, which was later diagnosed at the hospital as perforation of the eardrum. The criminal court also asked him to identify the suspect from his photograph. M.Y. stated that he needed to see the suspect in person in order to be able to identify him because he considered that he would not be able to do so from the photographs. 27.  On 5 January 2006 the criminal court was informed that the suspect could not appear before the court because he was in Kosovo. The suspect could not be brought before the court until December 2006. 28.  On 17 September 2007 the criminal court decided to acquit the police officer on the ground of insufficient evidence. 29.  On 18 September 2007 the applicant’s lawyer appealed to the Court of Cassation. 30.  On 8 February 2010 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first instance court on the ground that the limitation period had expired, and ordered the discontinuation of the proceedings against the police officer.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Herceg Novi. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 6 February 2003 a Montenegrin daily newspaper published an article about the quality of the water in the Herceg-Novi area, entitled “Taps full of bacteria” (Slavine pune bakterija). The article stated that all of the current water sources contained various bacteria. These assertions were based on a report produced by the Institute for Health (Institut za zdravlje Crne Gore), which had been requested by the Chief State Water Inspector (Glavni republički vodoprivredni inspektor, hereinafter “the Chief Inspector”), apparently with a view to exploring the possibility of connecting additional sources to the water-supply grid. The same article also included a statement by the applicant, at that time the Director of a public corporation called “The Water Supply and Sewage Systems” (JP Vodovod i Kanalizacija, hereinafter “the Water Supply Company”) and a member of the Socialist People’s Party (SNP)[1], that he was not familiar with the analysis at issue, but that the water was regularly tested and always filtered before being pumped into the system. 8.  On the same day the applicant held a press conference in response to the above-mentioned article. The applicant stated that, firstly, all tap water was filtered before being pumped into the water-supply system and was thus safe for use by the public. Secondly, the Chief Inspector had been promoting the interests of the two private companies which had already been granted licences to develop additional water sources and, lastly, the Chief Inspector had been directed to do so by the Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)[2] and the companies in question had themselves obtained their licences unlawfully. The statement was published in several daily newspapers. 9.  On 7 April 2003 the Chief Inspector lodged a private criminal action (privatna krivična tužba) against the applicant for defamation (kleveta), claiming that the latter’s statements were untrue and, therefore, harmful to his honour and reputation. 10.  On 4 September 2003 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica held the main hearing, during which the applicant said that his statement was not defamatory, but that “it was a value judgment, which he could prove”. He stated that he had been informed about the results of the water analysis three days after the press conference, and the analysis clearly stated that the water from the water-supply system was of the necessary quality and was not a danger to health. He explained that there were obviously two reports, one concerning the water sources and one concerning the filtered water. He did not dispute the right of the Chief Inspector to ask for a water analysis, as it was his duty to do so, but the applicant did not think that the analysis of unfiltered water should have been published, but rather the analysis of the filtered water. Finally, he proposed that the court should read the article “Taps full of bacteria” to understand the context in which the impugned statement had been made, and that it should obtain the files concerning other proceedings ongoing at the time between the Water Supply Company and the two private companies in question. 11.  At the same hearing the court also heard the Chief Inspector. He stated that he had always worked professionally and that he did not work under anybody’s orders, he himself having filed a criminal complaint against one of the two companies. He stated that he had ordered the analysis at issue after consulting his Minister, who had “supported” him (“koji [me] je podržao u tome”). He emphasised that the title of the newspaper article had had nothing to do with him, as newspapers wrote what they deemed appropriate (“novine pišu [...] po sopstvenom nahođenju”), although they were contacting him to obtain data. However, he was not interested in what the newspapers had written on this particular issue or why they had not published the analysis of the filtered water (“nije me interesovalo zašto nijesu objavljivali o analizi tretirane vode...”), his main concern being to prove that a particular water source was of adequate quality and that it could be used. 12.  On the same day the court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment. This sentence, however, was suspended and was not to be enforced unless the applicant committed another crime within a period of two years. 13.  In the operative part of the judgment only the following statement was found to amount to defamation, that is, to be “untrue” and “harmful to the honour and reputation of the private prosecutor”:\n“The Inspector [...] works in the interest and at the request of [the two companies], as directed by the DPS”. 14.  In its reasoning the court stated that the statement made by the applicant was not supported by facts and rejected the applicant’s defence that it was merely a value judgment. In the court’s view the applicant had been aware that he might harm the honour and reputation of the private prosecutor and thus had had a defamatory intention (klevetnička namjera). The court refused to read the newspaper article or to request the files of the proceedings referred to by the applicant as that would only have delayed the proceedings and, in any event, neither was relevant for the proceedings at issue. 15.  On an unspecified date thereafter the applicant lodged an appeal. He stated that, firstly, the Chief Inspector had sought the said analysis in order to examine the possibility of connecting water sources administered by the two private companies to the water-supply grid. Secondly, there were two water analyses, before and after it had been filtered, but the Chief Inspector had provided the newspapers only with the analysis of the unfiltered water. Thirdly, the Chief Inspector himself had not responded to the misleading title of the article stating that the taps were full of bacteria, because he was “not interested” in it. Fourthly, the court had refused to read the newspaper article, without which it was impossible to conclude that his intention had been to defame the private prosecutor. Finally, he did not think it was defamatory to say that a “government official worked as directed by the ruling party”, or that his response to such an article could be considered to amount to defamation of the private prosecutor. 16.  On 1 November 2005 the judgment of 4 September 2003 was upheld by the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica, which fully endorsed the reasons given by the Court of First Instance. No effective appeal lay against this judgment to the Court of Serbia and Montenegro (see paragraphs 17-18 and 29 below).", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Trnava. 5.  The applicant's family owned real estate to which the applicant now has the title. It is located in the municipality of Drietomá. 6.  In 1957 a road was built near the property to provide access to a neighbour's property. In 1986 the road was modified. 7.  After the road had been built, changes were made to the Land Registry maps and records in order to designate the road as a separate plot under a separate number and with a separate ownership regime. 8.  Since then the applicant has turned numerous times to the municipal authorities in Drietomá and to all levels of the Land Registry authorities. He claimed that the road had been constructed without the requisite permits; that it served solely the interests of his neighbour, which was unjust; and that it was partly located on his land without valid title, in violation of his property rights. The applicant requested, unsuccessfully, that the legal position be complied with both in the Land Registry records and in reality; that the road be removed; and that he be paid damages. 9.  In a letter of 8 June 1995 the supreme Land Registry body (Úrad geodézie, kartografie a katastra) informed the applicant that his problem could not be solved through the administrative procedure aimed at “restoring original legal borders” (obnovenie hraníc pôvodného právneho stavu) as this procedure only applied to uncontested situations. It was understood that in the applicant's case there was a dispute concerning the border between his property and the road. Such a dispute could only be resolved by a court and the applicant was advised to assert his claims there. 10.  In letters of 9 October and 6 November 1997 the Trenčín district office (Okresný úrad) informed the applicant that the Land Registry had no power to change boundaries of plots and that, in so far as the applicant was seeking such changes, he should bring his claims to the courts. 11.  In a letter of 15 December 1997 the Trenčín regional office (Krajský úrad) informed the applicant that the current Land Registry maps and records in respect of his property had been drawn up and defined in the 1960s and were considered completed. On 1 January 1998 an amendment to the relevant legislation, the Land Registration Act (Law no. 162/1995 Coll.), would enter into force, and would provide for a new administrative procedure aimed at “determination of boundaries” (určenie priebehu hranice). If the applicant believed that the existing Land Registry maps and records interfered with his property rights, from 1 January 1998 he could seek protection of such rights through this procedure. 12.  On 14 January 1998 the applicant brought an action against the district office and the Drietomá municipal office (Obecný úrad) in the Trenčín District Court (Okresný súd). He sought a judicial order against the district office, which was in charge of the relevant Land Registry records, requesting it to rectify these records by bringing them into line with his ownership claim. 13.  On 22 January 1998 the District Court instructed the applicant to provide further and better particulars and advised him that, pursuant to sections 48 to 51 of the amended Land Registration Act, since 1 January 1998 boundary disputes fell within the jurisdiction of Land Registry authorities. 14.  On 17 February 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, observing that at that time land boundary disputes fell to be determined at first instance by district offices in their function as Land Registry authorities. The District Court consequently referred the matter to the Trenčín district office. 15.  On 2 April 2001 the district office sent the matter back to the District Court, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts since it concerned protection and restoration of rights in respect of real property. On 26 April 2001 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) upheld this view. 16.  The District Court subsequently re-registered the action under a new file number. 17.  On 17 September 2001 the District Court requested the applicant to pay the court fees. Subsequently, on 5 and 16 October 2001 and 31 January 2002, the applicant repeatedly requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees. The request was dismissed as unfounded and the dismissal was upheld on appeal. 18.  On 24 June 2002 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had failed to pay the court fees. On 4 October 2003 the District Court corrected the decision by adding a proviso to its operative part to the effect that the decision would be rescinded if the fee was paid within the period allowed for an appeal against that decision. On 22 October 2003 the District Court corrected clerical errors in the operative part of the decision. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 23 March 2004 the Trenčín Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the decision to discontinue the proceedings and it thus became final. 20.  On 26 October 2000 the applicant brought a fresh action against the Trenčín district office and the Drietomá municipal office in the District Court. He argued that after his 1998 action had been transmitted to it, the district office had failed to take any steps to resolve the matter despite repeated reminders. The applicant made claims similar to those he had made in 1998. 21.  On 28 August 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings. It was observed that the applicant's submissions had been aimed at correcting Land Registry records, which was primarily to be done by the Land Registry authorities and, therefore, fell outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. 22.  On 28 January 2002 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 28 August 2001 on the applicant's appeal and remitted the matter to the District Court to continue the proceedings. The Regional Court based its decision on the finding of the Supreme Court of 26 April 2001 in connection with the 1998 action and instructed the District Court to examine whether, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to join the two actions. 23.  On 21 June 2002 the District Court requested the applicant to provide further and better particulars. He responded on 4 July 2002 and then requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees. 24.  On 26 February the District Court granted the applicant a 30% exemption and on 30 June 2003 on the applicant's appeal the Regional Court granted the applicant a full exemption from the court fees. 25.  On 12 July 2005 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in so far as the action was directed against the municipal office. The District Court held that the municipal office was a body of the municipality. It had no legal personality of its own and, therefore, could not be a party to court proceedings. This shortcoming could not be corrected, as the applicant had suggested, by “replacing” the municipal office as the defendant by the municipality, because a defendant who did not exist in law could not be replaced by another entity. 26.  On 17 August and 31 October 2005, respectively, the District Court and, on the applicant's appeal, the Regional Court declared the applicant's appeal against the decision of 16 July 2005 inadmissible as being out of time. 27.  On 29 December 2005 the applicant filed new claims seeking, inter alia, an order to close the road in question. On 12 January 2006 the District Court decided to join the applicant's submission to the action of 2000. 28.  On 20 February 2006 the District Court requested the applicant to provide further and better particulars and later summoned him for an interview in chambers (informatívny výsluch) in order to explore the legal nature of his submissions. 29.  On 19 April 2006 the District Court interviewed the applicant and informed him that his submissions could not be dealt with as a civil action since they fell short of formal requirements, in particular because of their vagueness and lack of substance. In response, the applicant made a new written submission on 3 May 2006. 30.  In the meantime, the District Court sought information concerning the case from the Drietomá municipality, the land registration authorities and the Trenčín district road traffic authority (obvodný prad pre cestnú dopravu a pozemné komunikácie). 31.  The proceedings are still pending. 32.  On 8 September 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He argued that there had been unjustified delays in the 1998 and 2000 actions and in the proceedings before the Land Registry authorities, and claimed 200,000 Slovakian korunas[1] (SKK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 33.  On 14 January 2004 the Constitutional Court appointed a legal-aid lawyer to assist the applicant. 34.  On 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the part of the complaint concerning the delays in the 1998 and 2000 actions admissible and the remainder inadmissible. 35.  On 3 November 2004 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings in so far as the complaint related to the 1998 action. It was observed that the admissibility of this part of the complaint had already been examined (see paragraph 38 below) and that it could not be examined again. 36.  On 8 December 2004 the Constitutional Court (Third Section) found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing “without unjustified delay” (Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution) and “within a reasonable time” (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention) in the 2000 action. At the same time, it ordered the District Court to proceed with the matter promptly and to pay the applicant his legal costs and SKK 10,000[2] in respect of non-pecuniary damage.\nThe Constitutional Court found that the subject matter of the proceedings was not particularly complex and that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings to some extent in that his claim had lacked clarity and that he had failed to discharge his obligation to pay the court fees in time. Delays of more than 17 months were imputable to the District Court. It was observed that the proceedings were still pending, that the courts had not held a single hearing, and that the only issue that had been resolved concerned the court fees. 37.  On 11 March 2004, without offering an explanation, the applicant lodged a new constitutional complaint, which was almost identical to his complaint of 8 September 2003. 38.  On 31 August 2004, under a different file number, the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible in respect of the 2000 action and inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded in respect of the 1998 action. 39.  On 14 January 2005 the Constitutional Court (Fourth Section) delivered a judgment (nález) which was substantially the same as that of 8 December 2004. Making no mention of the judgment of 8 December 2004, the judgment of 14 January 2005 varied slightly in its reasoning and in the amount of the just satisfaction awarded to the applicant, namely SKK 20,000[3].", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant company was established in 1995 and has its registered office in Bratislava. 6.  On 17 March 1995 the applicant company concluded a contract with Slovak Radio (Slovenský rozhlas), Slovakia’s national public-service radio broadcaster, a publicly funded institution with its own legal personality, the status of which is regulated by law (at that time Law no. 619/2003 Coll., as amended, presently Law no. 532/2010 Coll., as amended). 7.  Under the contract, in return for a fee, the applicant company agreed to act as exclusive agent for Slovak Radio as the principal (“the principal”) for the sale of broadcasting time for the purposes of advertising. 8.  The venture worked well and the contract was amended several times. The amended contract was valid until 31 December 2007. 9.  However, in 2004 the relationship between the applicant company and the principal began to sour because the principal was not content with the amount of business acquired by the applicant company in 2003. 10.  The principal had accordingly issued the applicant company with a bill for the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit from such business. 11.  As the applicant company did not pay the bill, the principal served the applicant company with a notice of termination of the contract, considering the applicant company’s failure to pay the bill to be a fundamental breach of the contract. 12.  The notice period expired on 30 September 2005, following which the principal arranged for the sale of its broadcasting time by other means. 13.  On 20 October 2005 the applicant company challenged the validity of the principal’s notice of termination of the contract in court, but later withdrew the action. 14.  The principal, for its part, sued the applicant company for payment of the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit. No information has been made available about the current state and outcome of those proceedings. 15.  On 5 December 2006 the applicant company demanded that the principal pay it the equivalent of some 693,000 euros (EUR), according to the exchange rate applicable at that time, by way of indemnity for termination of the contract.\nWith reference to the contract, the amount of the indemnity had been calculated as the applicant company’s average yearly commission for the preceding five years, taking into account both financial and non-financial transactions between the principal and third parties, the latter being referred to as barter transactions. 16.  As the principal did not satisfy the applicant company’s claim, on 1 June 2006 the applicant company sued it for the above-mentioned amount and late-payment interest. 17.  On 29 March 2007 a copy of the action was served on the principal for observations. Hearings were scheduled for 13 and 27 April and 14 May 2007, in the course of which the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) examined complex documentary evidence and heard the statutory representative of the applicant company and four witnesses. 18.  However, the principal submitted no written observations and appeared at none of the hearings. The circumstances of its absence were disputed (see below). 19.  On 14 May 2007 the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) granted the action in full. It observed that despite having been represented by a lawyer, the principal had failed to submit any observations or to present a good excuse for its failure to appear at any of the hearings. It therefore proceeded to examine the case under Article 101 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended – “the CCP”), which in the event of a party’s unjustified failure to cooperate, allows for the examination of the case on the basis of the elements available.\nAs a preliminary issue, the District Court examined the question of validity of the notice of termination of the contract issued by the principal. It observed that the notice had not been contested and concluded that it was valid. There were no reasons disqualifying the applicant company from being eligible for the indemnity, and the barter transactions had rightly been taken into account in its calculation. 20.  The principal appealed (odvolanie) to the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd).\nIn terms of form, it contested the first-instance judgment in its entirety. Nevertheless, in terms of substance, it acknowledged the existence of the legal basis of the applicant company’s entitlement to indemnity, disputing solely its scope, in so far as the barter transactions were concerned. Without those transactions, the acknowledged amount of the indemnity was equivalent to some EUR 526,000, according to the exchange rate applicable at that time.\nIn support of its challenge to the claim exceeding that amount, the principal pointed out that, in the proceedings in its action for payment of the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant company had lodged a counter-claim for compensation for the barter transactions.\nThe principal also contended that the decision to determine the action in its absence had been arbitrary. 21.  Having examined the appeal, the Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment on 28 November 2007.\nIt considered that, except for the part related to the barter transactions, the applicant company’s claim had been acknowledged by the principal.\nAs to those transactions, it observed that the applicant company had offset a claim for compensation for them against the claims asserted by the principal in its above-mentioned action. The claim for compensation for those transactions was however a different matter from a claim for indemnity for the termination of the contract, which was asserted in the present proceedings, and which the Regional Court found to be well‑founded.\nLastly, as regards the principal’s absence from the first-instance proceedings, the Regional Court observed (i) that the principal had requested the adjournment of the hearing of 13 April 2007; (ii) that the summons for the hearing of 27 April 2007 had not been deliverable to the principal’s lawyer prior to that hearing; and (iii) that on 11 May 2007 the principal’s new lawyer had requested that the hearing of 15 May 2007 be adjourned so as to allow him to study the case file, although the summons for that hearing had already been served on the principal on 3 May 2007 at the latest. In those circumstances, the District Court’s assessment that the principal had been “absolutely passive” in the proceedings was right and the examination of the case in the principal’s absence had been justified. 22.  As no ordinary appeal lay against the Regional Court’s judgment, following its service on the parties, the matter was resolved with the force of a final and binding decision (právoplatnosť) on 9 January 2008.\nOn the expiry of a period of grace for voluntary payment, the judgment became enforceable (vykonateľnosť) on 12 January 2008. 23.  On 10 March 2008 the principal challenged the Regional Court’s judgment by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). Asserting its rights of access to a court and to a fair hearing, it contended that the impugned judgment was grossly arbitrary and contrary to European Union law. In the latter respect, the Regional Court had arbitrarily refused to ask the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. 24.  On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) declared the complaint inadmissible. It held that an unjustified refusal to ask for a preliminary ruling may in certain circumstances give rise to a ground for appealing on points of law (dovolanie) under Article 237 (g) of the CCP. As that remedy had not been exhausted, the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the complaint. 25.  On 25 April 2008 the principal filed a petition with the Office of the Prosecutor General (“the PG”) requesting the latter to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the above-mentioned judgments by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie – “extraordinary appeal”). 26.  The PG decided to accede to the request and on 23 October 2008 challenged the contested judgments in the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd).\nHe argued primarily that the courts had erred in finding the notice of termination of the contract valid because it had not been disputed by the parties. This was a point of law and it could not have been resolved simply with reference to the lack of disagreement of the parties over it. The courts therefore should have examined that question independently and properly. As for the substance, in his view, had the notice been invalid, there would have been no reason for an indemnity. On the other hand, had the notice been valid, the indemnity could have been refused, because it had been based on a breach of contract by the applicant company.\nMoreover, the PG pointed out that the contract had neither provided for nor excluded compensation for barter transactions. In such circumstances, the contract should have been interpreted in terms of the parties’ subsequent practice, which had not involved the payment of compensation for such transactions. They should accordingly not have been taken into account for the purpose of calculation of the indemnity. 27.  Simultaneously, the PG applied for a ruling to suspend the enforceability of the impugned judgments pending the outcome of the extraordinary appeal. The Supreme Court acceded to that request on 8 December 2008. 28.  Meanwhile, on 26 November 2008, the applicant company had submitted observations in reply; it submitted further observations on 3 February and 3 September 2009.\nThe latter observations were not submitted until after the Supreme Court had determined the extraordinary appeal (see paragraph 30 below), as the applicant company did not know of its decision at the time. 29.  In its observations, the applicant company raised numerous arguments, including the following.\nThere was no justification for protecting the principal’s rights by way of an extraordinary appeal because it had failed to protect its own rights with due diligence in the lower courts and because, even at the cassation level, it had left the protection of its rights to the public authorities.\nIn that regard, it had been open to the principal to assert its rights before the Supreme Court directly by way of an appeal on points of law. It had not done so simply in order to avoid incurring court fees for such an appeal.\nMoreover, under Article 243e § 1 of the CCP, the availability of an indirect remedy, an extraordinary appeal (on points of law), was excluded by the availability of a direct remedy, an (ordinary) appeal on points of law.\nAt the appellate level, the only point in dispute had been the part of the applicant company’s claim concerning the barter transactions.\nThe PG’s challenge to the ordinary courts’ findings as regards the validity of the notice to terminate the contract therefore exceeded the grounds of the principal’s petition for an extraordinary appeal. Indeed, it was contrary to it because the principal had not challenged the notice but rather had relied on it. In any event, the PG’s challenge was ill-founded because there was no correlation between the validity of the notice and the fact that it had been based on the applicant company’s refusal to pay the bill submitted by the principal.\nLastly, with reference to Convention case-law, the applicant company submitted that the extraordinary appeal as a remedy against a final and binding judgment in its favour was incompatible with the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. 30.  On 12 August 2009, sitting in chambers, the Supreme Court allowed the extraordinary appeal. It quashed the judgments of both the District Court and the Regional Court and remitted the matter to the former for a new examination.\nIt concluded that the courts had erred in that, firstly, they had omitted to examine the validity of the contract itself and secondly, depending on the outcome of that examination, they had failed properly to examine the validity of the notice. In view of those errors it had not been possible to deal in concreto with the questions of the basis and scope of the applicant company’s claim. 31.  The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicant company’s lawyer on 22 September 2009. As a result, the case was remitted to the first instance, where it has been pending ever since. 32.  On 20 November 2009 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, contesting the Supreme Court’s decision of 12 August 2009. It relied on its rights to access to a court, equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, legal certainty and a fair hearing.\nThe applicant company argued that the admissibility requirements for the extraordinary appeal had not been met, and that the extraordinary appeal had not only been belated but had exceeded the scope of the principal’s petition. In addition, by the mere fact of admitting the extraordinary appeal, the Supreme Court had set at naught the entire preceding judicial process, in violation of the principle of legal certainty.\nThe applicant company further argued that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision, a brand new hearing of the case had been called for, even though no procedural irregularities of the previous hearing had been established. In addition, the contested decision was biased in favour of the principal and was not amenable to review on account of lack of reasoning.\nThe applicant company also contended that the Supreme Court had completely ignored its observations in reply to the extraordinary appeal.\nLastly, the applicant company complained that it had been denied access to the Supreme Court’s case file in the extraordinary appeal. 33.  On 25 November 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant company’s complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill‑founded.\nIn so far as the applicant company had sought to contest the extraordinary appeal in principle, the Constitutional Court observed that the statutory framework for examination of individual complaints did not allow it to examine the compliance of statutes with the Constitution and international instruments as such.\nTo the extent that the applicant company might be understood as wishing to object to any action on the part of the PG, no such objection could be considered because the applicant company had only identified the Supreme Court as the defendant of its complaint.\nAs for the remainder of the complaint, which concerned the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant company had failed to show any constitutionally relevant arbitrariness in the interpretation and application of the relevant rules.\nAs regards the applicant company’s argument that the extraordinary appeal had been lodged belatedly, it was based on the premise that the principal had appealed against the first-instance judgment only in so far as it concerned the barter transactions. That premise was however mistaken because the principal had defined the target of its appeal as the first‑instance judgment as a whole (see paragraph 20 above).\nAs to the Supreme Court’s failure to give a specific answer to the applicant company’s arguments, the Constitutional Court considered that the right to an answer to submitted arguments was related not to a person but to substance. The Supreme Court had thus been under a duty not to reply to the arguments submitted by the applicant company as such, but rather to address the relevant aspects of the case. On the latter point, the applicant company had failed to show that any of the relevant aspects of the case had gone unanswered.\nLastly, the Constitutional Court accepted that it had been a mistake to deny the applicant company access to the Supreme Court’s case file. However, it held that that had no constitutional significance because, in view of the character of the extraordinary appeal proceedings, access to the case file or the lack of it would have had no impact on the outcome of the proceedings. 34.  A copy of the Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant company on 21 January 2011.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1940 and 1942 respectively and live in Budapest. 5.  In a real estate dispute, on 11 October 1995 the applicants brought an action against the Budapest Administrative Office. The Pest Central District Court dismissed their action on 6 May 1997. On 26 February 1998 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed their appeal. 6.  In the context of the above dispute, on 14 May 1996 and 4 July 1997, respectively, the applicants filed criminal reports against various individuals on charges of fraud and other offences. Their complaints against the non-pursuit of these proceedings were finally dismissed on 31 March 1999. 7.  On 26 May 1997 the applicants filed an action with the Buda Central District Court for judicial constitution of a contract of sale of a property. On 16 December 1997 they requested the suspension of the proceedings pending another action of theirs, introduced on 3 October 1997, in which they sought deletion of a related land register entry. On 6 January 1998 the District Court decided to suspend the proceedings since the issues to be determined in the other case were found to be preliminary ones. 8.  In the case concerning the land register entry, on 7 April 1998 the applicants modified their action; therefore, the action had to be extended to include further respondents. However, the applicants did so only on 21 April 1999. After several hearings, the proceedings had to be interrupted between 5 June 2000 and 19 April 2001, pending the succession of a deceased respondent. On 21 March 2002 the District Court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held several hearings and on 15 January 2004 upheld the first-instance decision in a final judgment. The applicants filed a petition for review. On 23 May 2005 the Supreme Court's review bench refused to deal with the merits of the petition holding that the conditions thereof were not met. A further so-called appeal, not recognised under the law, was dismissed on 1 March 2006. 9.  Subsequently the applicants notified the District Court of the termination of the case concerning the land register issue, and the one concerning the constitution of a contract was resumed. Several hearings took place between 10 January 2007 and 18 April 2008. On 28 August 2008 the District Court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held hearings on 28 May and 24 September 2009 and delivered a judgment on 1 October 2009, overruling the first-instance judgment in favour of the applicants and constituting the contract as requested. On 27 November 2009 the respondent filed a petition for review. The case is still pending before the Supreme Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 2006 respectively and live in Würzburg, Germany. 7.  In 2009 the two applicants and V.P., the first applicant’s husband and the second applicant’s father, travelled to Germany, to take up a nine-month paid traineeship in State institutions which the first applicant had been granted there. 8.  On 27 February 2010 the father went to Bulgaria with the second applicant. He refused to return the child to Germany on 20 March 2010, despite the child’s having a ticket for that date and contrary to what had been agreed with the mother. 9.  As a result, the first applicant interrupted her training and returned to Bulgaria on 25 March 2010 where she joined V.P. and their child. 10.  The first applicant brought judicial proceedings seeking protection against V.P. The proceedings were suspended on an unspecified date, following a joint request by the first applicant and V.P. The proceedings were later resumed after the first applicant claimed that the abuse continued. 11.  The Ruse District Court issued, on 28 April 2011, a protection order in favour of the two applicants, prohibiting V.P. from approaching them for the next six months. The court established that, during the period between 25 March 2010 and 31 March 2010, V.P. had subjected the two applicants to psychological abuse. In particular, he had repeatedly insulted the mother in front of the child, had called her a bad mother, had not allowed the two of them to have contact unsupervised by him and, for that purpose, had locked the bathroom and bedroom doors in the apartment at night. The court also found that V.P. had made the first applicant sleep on the floor, had driven at a high speed with the child on the front seat of the car, had held the child over the balcony banister pressing the child’s carotid (neck) artery and had threatened the first applicant that he would “rip [her] open from top to bottom and serve the corresponding jail time”. 12.  As a result of the restraining order V.P. did not have contact with the child between 12 May 2011 and 26 November 2011. 13.  On 31 March 2010 the two applicants left the family home and the first applicant has exercised actual custody over the second applicant ever since. The first applicant was initially granted a scholarship to study for a master’s degree in Germany during the academic year 2010/2011. The father did not give his consent to the child’s travel to Germany. As a result, the second applicant lived with his maternal grand-parents from the autumn of 2010 onwards. 14.  In order to spend as much time as possible with her child, the first applicant traveled frequently between Germany and Bulgaria. She submitted that between March 2010 and October 2012 she spent around half her time in Bulgaria with her child. This negatively affected her studies: because she was often absent from classes in order to visit her child, she needed longer overall time to complete her master’s programme, namely two years instead of one year. She was awarded another scholarship for a doctorate degree in Germany, starting in the academic year 2012/2013. 15.  On 9 April 2010, the first applicant filed a claim for divorce. 16.  On 8 October 2010 the district court pronounced the divorce of the first applicant and her husband as being due to V.P.’s fault, and granted the exercise of parental rights to the first applicant. The father’s contact rights were determined with a view to the child’s possible residence in Germany and were as follows: one week every three months and twenty consecutive days in the summer before the second applicant started school, and half of every school holiday after that. 17.  Following an appeal by V.P., the regional court upheld the lower court’s findings. The Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed his subsequent cassation appeal as inadmissible. The judgment declaring the divorce final became enforceable on 28 February 2012. 18.  In parallel with the divorce proceedings, on 29 April 2010 the first applicant brought proceedings before the district court under Article 123 § 2 of the Family Code (see paragraph 26 below). She sought to obtain a court decision dispensing with the father’s consent to the child’s travel outside the country. More specifically, she requested permission freely to leave the country with her son for a period of one year as of the date of entry into force of the court judgment. 19.  Several court hearings were held. The applicant informed the court about her intended studies in Germany for the academic year 2010/2011, the fact that she had been granted a scholarship, that she had the financial means to take care of her son and that he had adapted well to the social environment in Germany. She did not specifically invoke a provision under the Convention; instead, she expressed her wish to live with and care for her child while she was pursuing her studies in Germany. However, it appears that she did not formally limit in writing her request for permission to travel with her child to Germany or to any other country. 20.  The district court granted the first applicant’s request on 31 August 2010. It found in particular that there was no reason to suspect that she would permanently leave the country with the second applicant. It also held that the father’s access rights had been determined in a preliminary court decision (определение) of 3 August 2010 and, if the first applicant were to obstruct them, V.P. could bring separate proceedings in that connection. 21.  After an appeal by V.P. the regional court upheld that judgment on 7 January 2011. The court observed that the second applicant’s right to freedom of movement was protected under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Identity Documents Act (see paragraphs 25, 28 and 32 below). The right to freedom of movement could only be limited in exceptional situations, namely in order to protect national security, public order, public health and morals or the rights and freedoms of others. None of those exceptions had been established or even claimed in the applicants’ case. The court observed that the first applicant offered good material conditions to the child in Germany, that the child had adapted well during his stay there before March 2010, that the first applicant was going to specialise in European law in the Wurtzburg University and that the second applicant enjoyed considerable care and attention from his mother. The court also held that V.P.’s arguments about his access rights were unrelated to the present proceedings; those arguments had to do with the enforcement of a future court decision in which the exercise of the parental rights in respect of the second applicant were to be definitively determined. The court concluded that it was in the interest of the second applicant to have a passport issued and to travel with the first applicant abroad. 22.  Upon a cassation appeal by V.P., the Supreme Court of Cassation refused the first applicant’s request in a final judgment of 26 June 2012. The court relied on its well established and binding case-law according to which permission for a child’s unlimited travel abroad with one parent only could not be granted because, as a matter of principle, that could never be in the best interest of the child. The reasons were more specifically that there was a risk that the requesting parent could take the child to countries which were in a state of war or in which there was a high risk of natural calamities, and thus endanger the child’s well-being while depriving the State of the possibility to ensure his or her protection. Such permission could be granted, when that was in the interest of the child, in respect of concrete destinations and for a limited period of time. Finally, the court rejected the first applicant’s request that the court define of its own motion concrete boundaries within which travel could be permitted, stating that it was bound by the formulation presented in the applicant’s request. 23.  On 9 July 2012 the first applicant brought a new request for permission of the second applicant’s travel with his mother to Germany and the other European Union countries for a period of three years without the father’s consent. This time she brought her claim under Article 127a of the Family Code 2009, which provision was adopted in the meantime and which governs specifically the question of minors’ travel abroad and the issuing of identity documents for that purpose (see paragraph 26 below). She pointed out that she had consistently facilitated V.P.’s access to the child in accordance with his contact rights determined in the divorce proceedings. She submitted that, because she could not take the second applicant with her to Germany while she was pursuing her studies there, both her child and she were deprived of personal contact with each other. She claimed this negatively affected their family life as she was practically deprived of the possibility to raise her child while the exercise of parental rights had been granted to her. She submitted that her doctoral studies in Germany, which were to last three years as of the fall of 2012, would give her the flexibility necessary for her taking care of her child, given that she could do most of her work from home. Finally, she pointed out that the second applicant continuously asked to be with his mother at all times as he is very attached to her. 24.  In a decision of 6 December 2012, the Ruse District Court allowed the second applicant’s travel to Germany and within the European Union, for the period of three years, accompanied by his mother. The decision was not appealed against and became enforceable on 29 December 2012.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 13 December 2005 she complained to the police about her neighbours. She stated that a “gang” of neighbours had damaged her property and had used “psychotronic generators” in their apartments and cars to cause damage to her health and mind. The applicant also mentioned in the complaint that she had in the past made submissions to the Federal Security Service, the President of the Russian Federation and the State Duma, which had been unsuccessful. 7.  On 20 January 2006 a police officer took statements from the applicant’s neighbours, who stated that she had behaved unreasonably, walked naked on the streets, shouted at people and accused them of various illegal activities. 8.  The Psychoneurological Outpatient Clinic no. 20 of Moscow (“the POC”) was requested by the police on 20 January 2006 to carry out a psychiatric examination of the applicant. 9.  On 14 July 2006 a resident psychiatrist at the POC (Ms K.) issued a report confirming the need for a psychiatric examination of the applicant relying on the evidence obtained seven months before. The report stated that the nature of the applicant’s complaints to various authorities gave reason to believe that they were brought about by a pathology associated with a psychiatric disorder. The psychiatrist concluded that an examination of the applicant was necessary, because progressive development of the disorder might cause a deterioration in her health and aggressive behaviour towards others. The report was certified by the head physician of the POC. It is not clear whether the psychiatrist examined the applicant in person before issuing the report. 10.  On the same day Ms K. filed an application with the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) seeking authorisation for an involuntary psychiatric examination under section 23, subsection 4 (c) of the Law of the Russian Federation on Psychiatric Assistance and Guarantees of the Citizens’ Rights Related to Its Administration 1992 (“the Psychiatric Assistance Act”). The application stated that there was evidence of “a psychiatric disorder resulting in significant damage to health due to the deterioration of a psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance”. It also indicated that on 20 January 2006, during a police interview, the applicant had refused to consent to undergo a voluntary psychiatric examination. The application was also certified by the head physician of the POC. 11.  Evidence attached to the application included the above-mentioned psychiatrist’s report of 14 July 2006, the applicant’s complaint to the police of 13 December 2005, the police officer’s request of 20 January 2006, and the applicant’s neighbours’ statements of 20 January 2006. 12.  The application was received by the District Court on 27 July 2006 and a hearing was scheduled for 18 August 2006. On 14 August 2006 the court sent a summons to the applicant by registered letter, but that was later returned to the sender after several unsuccessful delivery attempts. 13.  On 18 August 2006 the District Court considered the psychiatrist’s application for involuntary psychiatric examination of the applicant. Neither the applicant nor the representative of the POC were present at the hearing. It was noted in the court transcript and decision that both parties had been duly notified of the hearing but that neither had chosen to appear in court. The District Court authorised a psychiatric examination of the applicant without her consent and ordered it to be carried out either at her home or at the POC. It reasoned as follows:\n“The court, having examined the evidence, namely the report of the POC on the need for a psychiatric examination, considers the application well-founded ... for the following reasons.\nIn accordance with Section 23, subsection 4 of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992 ... a psychiatric examination of a person may be carried out without his or his legal representative’s consent when the evidence available suggests that the examinee performs acts giving reason to presume the existence of a severe psychiatric disorder which causes feebleness, i.e. the inability to autonomously satisfy one’s basic needs, or significant damage to health due to the deterioration of a psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance.\nThe said condition ... has been proven by the POC’s medical report, a copy of the applicant’s complaint to [the police] concerning the use of various types of secret weapons, a copy of a statement by Ms Sh. (Ms Petukhova’s neighbour), who stated that Ms Petukhova behaved unreasonably, walked naked on the streets and shouted at people, as well as by other evidence confirming the need for a psychiatric examination of Ms Petukhova.” 14.  The Court has received no evidence to suggest that the applicant was either notified of the decision or provided with a copy. 15.  More than three months later, on 1 December 2006, the POC sent a request to the police seeking their assistance in the applicant’s apprehension in order to prevent her from potentially behaving aggressively towards others. The request stated that the clinic was unable to ensure that the applicant would attend an examination. 16.  On the same day at around 10 a.m. three policemen visited the applicant’s flat and took her by force to a police station. Having spent four hours there she was transferred by ambulance to Psychiatric Hospital no. 13 (“the PH-13”). At 2.30 p.m. on arrival at the hospital, the applicant was informed that she had been brought there under the authorisation of the District Court. It is not clear whether she was allowed to read the court order. 17.  Later that day at 4.30 p.m. the applicant was examined by a medical counselling panel and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia aggravated by paranoid syndrome. 18.  After her release from the hospital on 4 December 2006 the applicant requested the District Court to provide her with a copy of its decision of 18 August 2006 authorising her involuntary psychiatric examination. 19.  On 18 December 2006 the applicant appealed against that decision. She argued, inter alia, that the District Court had examined the case in her absence and that she had not been duly notified of the hearing; that the decision did not contain reasons and that it was based on a single psychiatric report which was accepted by the court without scrutiny. 20.  On 15 February 2007 the Moscow City Court after hearing the applicant and her representative dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the authorisation for an involuntary psychiatric examination. The court reasoned that the applicant’s presence at the District Court hearing was not required under Article 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, it stated that the psychiatric report was well-founded because it contained details of the applicant’s actions giving grounds to presume the existence of a psychiatric disorder. 21.  The applicant applied for supervisory review, but to no avail. 22.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint about Article 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. She alleged that this legal provision did not guarantee her a right to be present during the hearing of an application for involuntary psychiatric examination, since it specified that such applications shall be considered by “a single judge”. 23.  On 18 December 2007 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It argued that the term “single judge” for the purposes of Article 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred only to the composition of a court and did not preclude the parties’ participation in a hearing. 24.  On 1 December 2006 after the applicant was brought to the hospital and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia aggravated by paranoid syndrome (see paragraphs 16-17 above), the medical panel of the PH-13 concluded that involuntary hospitalisation of the applicant was required under section 29 of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992 in order to prevent potentially significant damage to her health due to the deterioration of a psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The application for involuntary hospitalisation was filed with the Lyubinskiy District Court of Moscow on the same day. 25.  On 4 December 2006 the applicant was discharged from PH-13 and advised to follow an outpatient treatment programme. Later that day the deputy head physician of PH-13 requested the Lyubinskiy District Court of Moscow to discontinue the proceedings concerning the applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation in the light of her discharge from the facility. The request was granted and the proceedings discontinued on 6 December 2006. 26.  The applicant did not initiate any proceedings for review of her hospitalisation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Orel. 6.  On 21 October 2000 the applicant called an ambulance for her son, who was forty-two years old at the time. He had a fever and was complaining of chest pains. The paramedic examined him, and, assuming that he was suffering from intercostal neuralgia, administered a pain-killing injection. 7.  On 22 October 2000 Mr Korogodin was examined by a general practitioner, who believed him to be suffering from pyelonephritis and advised him to go to hospital. At the hospital Mr Korogodin underwent a medical examination including an ECG of his kidneys and liver and an X‑ray of his lungs. The doctors who examined him confirmed the diagnosis of intercostal neuralgia. Mr Korogodin was discharged from hospital. 8.  On 23 October 2000 the general practitioner examined Mr Korogodin again and diagnosed him with osteochondrosis. Subsequently, M., a doctor whom the applicant's family knew, examined Mr Korogodin, diagnosed him with pneumonia and urged him to go to hospital. Upon arrival at the Zheleznodorozhniy Hospital in Orel, Mr Korogodin was taken to an intensive care unit. 9.  On 27 October 2000 Mr Korogodin died in hospital. According to the autopsy, the cause of his death was cardiovascular deficiency provoked by pneumonia and purulent pleurisy. 10.  On 24 November 2000 and 10 January 2001 the applicant asked the local prosecutor's office to open a criminal investigation into the matter, alleging that the doctors' negligent failure to diagnose her son correctly at the onset of his disease had caused his death. 11.  In response to the applicant's complaints, the assistant prosecutor of the town of Orel, conducted an inquiry. Within its framework, the regional department of public health formed a commission which comprised specialists from the medical institutions where the applicant's son had undergone treatment. The commission questioned the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin and concluded that the doctors had provided competent medical service. 12.  On 21 January 2001 the applicant submitted Mr Korogodin's medical history file and X-ray examination results. An additional inquiry ensued. On 24 January 2001 the applicant lodged another complaint with the prosecutor's office. 13.  On 6 March 2001 the assistant prosecutor refused to open a criminal investigation against the doctors for lack of corpus delicti. He noted that the death of the applicant's son had resulted from the rapid development of pneumonia coupled with weakened immunity. The assistant prosecutor referred to the findings made by the commission set up by the regional department of public health. The applicant appealed to a superior prosecutor. 14.  On 16 April 2001 the regional prosecutor in charge of the investigation quashed the decision of 6 March 2001 and ordered a criminal investigation into the matter. The prosecutor noted, in substance, that the commission had not been impartial. He referred to the commission's findings as inconclusive and contradictory. 15.  On 7 May 2001 the applicant was recognised as a victim of the crime under investigation. She was advised of her rights, including the right to submit a civil claim against the hospital. 16.  On 19 June 2001 the investigator commissioned a forensic medical expert report to determine whether Mr Korogodin had received proper medical treatment. 17.  On 16 July 2001 the investigator found it impossible to identify those responsible and suspended the investigation into the matter. On 4 February 2002 the district prosecutor declared the decision of 16 July unlawful and quashed it. 18.  On an unspecified date the forensic medical experts completed the report and submitted their findings to the prosecutor's office. The experts discerned no causal link between Mr Korogodin's death and the treatment administered. 19.  On 11 March 2002 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. He based his findings on the medical expert report and statements made by the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin. The applicant appealed to a superior prosecutor. 20.  On 29 March 2002 the town deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 11 March 2002. The deputy prosecutor found that the experts had failed to examine the issue of whether the medical treatment that Mr Korogodin had undergone had been adequate. He referred to the experts' statement that a prompt diagnosis at an early stage of a severe disease could prevent a patient's death. He further noted that the medical expert, P., opined that the X-ray examination had not been properly conducted. Finally, the prosecutor indicated which steps the investigator should now take, including, but not limited to, examining the circumstances of the X-ray examination that Mr Korogodin had undergone. 21.  On 7 May 2002 the investigator yet again discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. 22.  On 19 June 2002 the regional prosecutor in charge of the investigation quashed the decision of 7 May 2002 owing to the investigator's failure to fully determine the circumstances of Mr Korogodin's death. In particular, the prosecutor noted that the investigator had failed to comply with the earlier instructions to examine the circumstances of the X-ray examination. The prosecutor opined that a new comprehensive medical expert evaluation was necessary to elucidate the circumstances of the case. 23.  On 7 August 2002 a new report was prepared by a forensic medical expert bureau in Kursk. The experts noted certain errors committed by the doctors prior to Mr Korogodin's committal to hospital. They further opined that he had received adequate treatment in hospital albeit that certain additional measures could have been taken by the hospital's personnel. 24.  On 14 January 2003 the investigator found it impossible to identify those responsible and suspended the investigation into the matter. 25.  On 21 April 2003 the inter-district prosecutor quashed the decision of 14 January 2003 as unsubstantiated. The investigation was resumed the next day. 26.  On 21 May 2003 the inter-district prosecutor discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. His findings were based on witnesses' testimonies, including those provided by the applicant and the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin, and the results of the medical expert reports. The prosecutor concluded that Mr Korogodin had not recovered from previous illnesses which had negatively affected his immune system and the rapid development of pneumonia could not have been prevented in the circumstances. 27.  On 31 October 2003 the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia sent a letter to the Orel Regional Prosecutor noting that the investigation into Mr Korogodin's death had not been complete. It was further recommended that a new forensic medical evaluation be commissioned in order to reconcile the differences in the opinions contained in two earlier medical forensic expert reports. 28.  On 18 November 2003 the regional deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2003. 29.  On 24 December 2003 the investigator commissioned a new forensic medical expert report. 30.  On 25 April 2005 the Russian Centre for Forensic Medical Expert Evaluations of the Federal Agency for Public Health and Social Development completed a comprehensive forensic medical expert report. The experts noted that Mr Korogodin had been wrongly diagnosed prior to his committal to hospital. They opined, nevertheless, that the errors in question had not been the cause of his death. Mr Korogodin had died as a result of the “severity, aggressiveness and rapid development of the disease”. Lastly, they did not discern that the doctors and paramedics at the medical institutions providing treatment to Mr Korogodin had failed to duly perform their professional duties. 31.  On 6 July 2005 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti on the basis of the witnesses' testimonies and medical expert reports. The applicant appealed. 32.  On 2 December 2005 the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia allowed the applicant's complaint and ordered the local prosecutor's office to resume the investigation into the matter. 33.  On 12 December 2005 the regional deputy prosecutor found the investigation to be incomplete and quashed the decision of 6 July 2005. 34.  On 11 January 2006 the investigator discontinued the proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. The investigator based his findings on statements made by twelve witnesses, including the applicant, the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin, their superiors and the medical experts, and on medical documents, including three forensic medical expert reports. The applicant appealed. 35.  Her complaints were dismissed by the Orel Regional Prosecutor's Office and the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia on 20 January and 11 October 2006 respectively. 36.  On 4 March 2004 the applicant brought a civil claim for damages against the medical institutions where her son had undergone medical treatment. She alleged, inter alia, that her son had died due to the doctors' failure to diagnose him correctly. 37.  On 21 September 2004 the court commissioned a forensic medical expert report. The report was completed on 28 June 2006. The experts concluded that there was no causal link between the deficiencies in the medical treatment Mr Korogodin had received and his death. They further opined that the medical treatment had not caused any harm to Mr Korogodin's condition. His death had resulted from the pathological development of pneumonia. 38.  On 17 April 2006 the Sovetskiy District Court of Orel dismissed the applicant's claims. The court found that the doctors' failure to diagnose Mr Korogodin correctly on 22 October 2000 and a delay in his committal to hospital had not had an adverse impact on his condition. The diagnostics methods and treatment employed by the doctors had been correct but could not have prevented Mr Korogodin's death. The court based its findings on the testimonies given by the applicant, the medical professionals involved in her son's treatment, the four forensic medical expert reports and the materials of the criminal investigation. 39.  On 14 June 2006 the Orel Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 April 2006 on appeal. 40.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant sued the Orel Regional Prosecutor's Office for damage caused allegedly by the inadequate and lengthy investigation into her son's death. 41.  On 20 May 2004 the Sovetskiy District Court of Orel dismissed the applicant's claims. 42.  On 7 July 2004 the Orel Regional Court upheld the judgment of 20 May 2004 on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Maribor. 6.  On 27 February 1988 the applicant, who was a private entrepreneur, was hired by the institution called Dom upokojencev Danice Vogrinec, a retirement home (“the retirement home”), to paint its premises. 7.  On 20 February 1990 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Maribor Basic Court, Maribor Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Mariboru, Enota Maribor) against the retirement home seeking payment for the work he had carried out.\nOn 15 January 1991, after the court had held four hearings, the applicant's claim was upheld in part. 8.  On 6 March 1991 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Mariboru).\nOn 18 July 1991 the court allowed the applicant's appeal, annulled the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. 9.  On 15 October 1991, after a hearing was held, the first-instance court again upheld the applicant's claim in part. Upon the applicant's request a supplementary judgment was issued on 13 December 1991. 10.  The applicant and the retirement home appealed against both judgments to the Maribor Higher Court.\nOn 4 May 1993 the court allowed the appeals of the applicant and his adversary, annulled the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. 11.  Until 28 June 1994, the day the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia, the first-instance court held two hearings. Another hearing was scheduled but did not take place because the applicant's lawyer failed to appear before the court.\nOn 14 October 1994 the court held a hearing.\nThe hearing scheduled for 6 December 1994 was cancelled for an unknown reason.\nOn 1 January 1995 the Maribor Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Mariboru) gained jurisdiction in the present case due to the reform of the Slovenian judicial system.\nOn 10 October 1995 the applicant requested that a date be set for a hearing.\nOn 16 October 1995 the applicant lodged a request for supervision against the judge presiding over the case, but apparently to no avail.\nOn 17 October 1995 the court declared the case out of its jurisdiction and transferred it to the Maribor District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru).\nOn 9 January 1996 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions.\nThere was apparently a dispute between the Maribor Local Court and the Maribor District Court concerning the jurisdiction. In this respect, the Maribor Higher Court decided on 12 January 1996 that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Maribor District Court.\nOn 16 May and 20 September 1996 the court held hearings.\nOn 6 and 11 November 1996 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions.\nOn 22 November 1996 and 10 January 1997 the court held hearings.\nThe judgment of 11 February 1997, dismissing the applicant's claim, was served on the applicant on 14 February 1997. 12.  On 24 February 1997 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court and the following day he amended his appeal. The retirement home cross-appealed.\nOn 4 June 1998 the Maribor Higher Court allowed both appeals, annulled the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 27 June 1998. 13.  On 1 October 1998 the Maribor District Court held a hearing.\nOn 10 November 1998 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions.\nThe hearing scheduled for 19 November 1998 was cancelled for an unknown reason.\nOn 5 February, 25 March, 6 May and 26 August 1999 the court held hearings. At the last hearing the court upheld the applicant's request to appoint an expert in construction engineering. The applicant paid the required deposit for the costs of the expert on 3 September 1999.\nOn 12 January 2000 the court appointed an expert in construction engineering to determine the value of the applicant's work. The expert opinion was delivered on 29 March 2000.\nOn 16 February 2000 the applicant filed a rush notice.\nOn 12 May, 7 September and 10 November 2000 the court held hearings.\nAt the last hearing the court delivered an oral judgment, upholding in part the applicant's claim. On 20 November 2000 the parties to the proceedings informed the court that they would appeal against this judgment, once they receive a written copy.\nIn a letter of 5 March 2001 the applicant requested the court not to deliver a written judgment yet, since he attempted to settle the case with the retirement home. On 9 April 2001 the latter informed the court that a friendly settlement was in progress.\nOn 16 May 2001 the applicant requested the court to issue a written judgment. The written judgment was served on the applicant on 28 May 2001. 14.  On 4 June 2001 the applicant appealed. He amended his appeal on 19 July 2001.\nOn 8 April and 22 May 2002 the applicant filed rush notices.\nOn 30 May 2002 the Maribor Higher Court allowed the appeal in part and amended the judgment in the part referring to costs and expenses. The decision was served on the applicant at an undetermined time, but after 5 June 2006. The applicant did not appeal. 15.  On 24 July 2002 the applicant asked the Public Prosecutor's Office to lodge a request for protection of legality (zahteva za varstvo zakonitosti) with regard to his case. The request was dismissed on 4 September 2002. 16.  On 20 January 2003 the applicant lodged a request for reopening of proceedings with the Maribor District Court. On 12 June 2003 the request was rejected. The decision was served on the applicant on 18 June 2003. 17.  On 23 June 2003 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court, which dismissed his appeal on 1 December 2003. 18.  On 12 December 2004 the applicant requested a leave for an appeal on points of law, which the Maribor District Court rejected on 21 January 2004 as not allowed. 19.  On 27 January 2005 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court against this decision.\nOn 16 December 2004 the court dismissed the appeal. 20.  On 5 January 2005 the applicant lodged submissions which were considered as an appeal on points of law and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court on 18 April 2005.\nThe proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Timişoara. 6.  In the evening of 12 May 2001, after 9 p.m., seven masked police officers, who were members of the special intervention forces, stopped a car in which the applicant was a passenger. The police were searching for a group of suspected criminals. 7.  According to the applicant, the police violently dragged the five people out of the car, held them on the ground and handcuffed them. He also claimed that one of the masked police officers hit him with his fist, from the back, on the left side of his thorax. At that point, he recognised his aggressor as being B.F., with whom he had had an altercation two years earlier. 8.  The police realised the persons they had stopped were not the suspects they were looking for and they released them soon after they arrived at the police headquarters. The applicant claimed that B.F. had said: “We didn’t have you down for today, that’s just how it turned out. The tables have turned, loser” (“nu erai programat pentru astăzi, dar aşa s-a nimerit; vezi, măi fraiere, ca s-a întors roata?”).\nWhile in custody, the applicant complained of stomach pains. 9.  At 1.05 a.m. the next day the applicant went to hospital complaining of stomach pains. The doctor on duty noted a post-traumatic diffused swelling in the abdominal area, but considered that no surgical intervention was required at that time. 10.  As his condition deteriorated, on 15 May 2001 at 0.50 a.m. he returned to the hospital. He was immediately operated on for a ruptured spleen and the organ was removed. He remained in hospital until 22 May 2001.\nOn 23 May 2001 the forensic doctor examined the applicant and issued a report stating that he had suffered a ruptured spleen. He estimated that the applicant needed 25 days to recover. He considered that the injury had posed a danger to the applicant’s life, that it could have dated from 12 May and possibly resulted from the applicant having been hit with a hard object. 11.   The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against B.F., whom he accused of having seriously endangered his physical integrity. He sought damages. 12.  The Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Timişoara Military Court started an investigation. It took evidence from the applicant, B.F. and the other persons who had been present on 12 May 2001. Two passengers from the car and one police officer stated that they had heard B.F. saying to the applicant: “We didn’t have you down for today, that’s just how it turned out”. The same police officer said that he had also heard B.F. saying: “The tables have turned, loser”. One of the passengers said that he had seen B.F. hit the applicant and two other passengers said they had heard the applicant shouting with pain. The other police officers denied that they had seen B.F. hit the applicant. 13.  On 17 May 2002 the Timişoara Forensic Institute, consulted by the prosecutor, confirmed that the ruptured spleen could have been caused by a blow to the abdomen. 14.  On 24 September 2002 the Prosecutor’s Office committed B.F. for trial on charges of seriously endangering the applicant’s physical integrity and of abusive behaviour. 15.  The applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. 16.  On 30 October 2002 the Timişoara Military Court transferred the case to the Timiş County Court, in accordance with Law on the demilitarisation of the police.\nThe County Court heard statements from the applicant and five witnesses, of whom three were police officers. Several documents were adduced as evidence in the case. 17.  On 28 May 2003 the County Court considered that the evidence in the file proved that the attack had taken place and that there had been a causal link between the attack and the applicant’s health problems. It therefore found B.F. guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment. B.F. was also ordered to pay the applicant 100,000,000 Romanian lei for non-pecuniary damage. 18.  B.F. appealed against the County Court’s decision. 19.  On 20 October 2003 the Timişoara Court of Appeal reversed the decision on the ground that there was not enough evidence in the file to prove that B.F. had injured the applicant or to establish the cause of the applicant’s injury.\nThe court noted that the incident had occurred in circumstances which made it impossible for the applicant to recognise his alleged attacker: it had happened very quickly, visibility had been bad and the police officers had been wearing intervention suits and masks. It considered that the applicant could have injured himself when he had been pulled out of the car – and B.F. had not taken part in that operation – or even before the incident with the police. It considered that the evidence in the file indicated that B.F. had been the driver of one of the two police cars involved in the incident and that, according to his remit, he was responsible for ensuring his colleagues’ protection; in that capacity he had not been involved in removing the applicant and the others from their car.\nThe court also considered that the investigation had not been properly conducted, that the prosecutor had failed to identify other witnesses, notably passers-by who had been reported as being in the area where the incident had taken place. 20.  The applicant appealed on points of law. In a final decision of 24 March 2004 the High Court of Cassation and Justice, sitting in a three‑judge panel, quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision and upheld the County Court’s judgment.\nIt considered that the witness testimonies, including the one given by a police officer, concurred to prove B.F.’s guilt. The High Court concluded that B.F. had hit the applicant in revenge for their previous dispute and that nothing in the events of 12 May 2001 had justified such a violent attack. 21.  B.F. sought the Procurator’s General intervention to have the final decision annulled (recurs în anulare). The Procurator General lodged the extraordinary appeal sought by B.F., as he considered that the High Court and the County Court had committed serious errors in assessing the evidence. 22.  On 15 November 2004 the High Court, in a nine-judge bench, examined the extraordinary appeal, quashed the final decision and returned the case to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Timiş County Court to continue the investigation.\nThe High Court noted that B.F.’s conviction was based mostly on the passengers’ statements, to the detriment of the police’s version of the incident which had shown that there had been no physical contact between B.F. and the applicant. It considered that the prosecutor should have pursued the investigation further in order to establish beyond doubt who had injured the applicant. The prosecutor should have also questioned the passers-by, who could have provided an unbiased account of the incident.\nIts decision was final. 23.  The prosecutor started a new investigation. He re-examined the events of 12 May, took statements from and organised confrontations between the applicant and the police officers who had participated in the incident, including B.F. They all maintained their previous positions. B.F. took a polygraph test, the result of which was: absence of simulated behaviour. The applicant refused to take the test, arguing that it was not reliable evidence. 24.  At the prosecutor’s request, the Timişoara Forensic Institute re‑examined the medical evidence. On 27 July 2005 it concluded that there had been a causal link between the incident of 12 May and the applicant’s ruptured spleen. However, the expert report did not exclude the existence of other traumas that could have caused the spleen to rupture. 25.  On 19 October 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office decided to end the investigation against B.F. and continue to try identifying the real attacker. It considered that the evidence gathered was not sufficiently strong to reverse the presumption of innocence in B.F.’s favour. It noted, in particular, the absence of direct proof of a violent attack, the applicant’s hesitations during the investigation, as well as the conclusion of the expert medical report which did not exclude the existence of other traumas that could have caused the spleen to rupture. 26.  The applicant complained against the prosecutor’s decision. On 28 November 2005 the chief prosecutor dismissed his objection. 27.  The applicant further complained before the Timiş County Court. He claimed that the evidence against B.F., including the conclusions of the medical report, had been ignored or misinterpreted and that the prosecutor had overlooked the fact that it was difficult to accurately recall what had happened four years after the incident, which explained his hesitations. He also pointed out that the polygraph test was not recognised as evidence by the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he had refused that test because it would have been carried out by B.F.’s colleagues.\nOn 5 June 2006 the applicant reiterated those arguments before the County Court. 28.  On 25 September 2006 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It considered that there was no evidence in the file to support the allegations of guilt. The court did not reply to the applicant’s arguments. 29.  The applicant appealed against the County Court’s decision, reiterating the evidence in the file that supported his version of events. He also complained that he had not been re-examined by the Forensic Institute.\nOn 5 March 2007 the Timişoara Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It considered that the doubts as to B.F.’s guilt justified the prosecutor’s decision and that B.F. enjoyed the presumption of innocence. The Court of Appeal did not give specific responses to the applicant’s arguments.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1937. 6.  He was the owner of a flat in Livorno, which he had let to M.S. 7.  In a registered letter of 4 March 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 8.  On 9 October 1984, he served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave. 9.  In a writ served on the tenant on 7 January 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Livorno Magistrate. 10.  By a decision of 20 January 1986, which was made enforceable on 21 January 1986, the Livorno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 December 1986. 11.  On 2 April 1987 the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 12.  On 21 April 1987 he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 May 1987. 13.  Between 24 May 1987 and 27 November 1998 the bailiff made eighteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 14.  On 15 December 1998, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zabrze. 6.  From 2000 until 2004 the applicant ran a business, a shoe shop, with his wife. 7.  In October 2004 he started serving a prison sentence. 8.  On 4 September 2006 he lodged a civil action against his wife with the Łuków District Court, claiming that she should transfer the lease of the shop to him, together with the merchandise which had been left there at the time of his arrest. He also claimed compensation for damage which he had allegedly sustained as a result of her having unlawfully taken over the business after his arrest, in the amount of 2,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) per month since October 2004. 9.  He further requested exemption from court fees. In the statement of claim he informed the court that his opportunity to represent himself properly had been curtailed by the fact that he was serving a prison sentence. 10.  The proceedings were conducted under the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to commercial disputes, providing, in particular, for certain restrictions as regards time-limits for proposing evidence to be examined by the first-instance court (prekluzja dowodowa). 11.  On 20 December 2006 the Lublin Regional Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay court fees in the amount of PLN 5,850 but maintained his obligation to pay other court fees as they arose in the future. The court noted that the applicant was poor and did not have any savings which would secure his procedural interests in the proceedings. 12.  On 22 February 2007 the applicant requested that witness C.O., the owner of the shop, be heard by the court to testify on the lease. 13.  On 7 May 2007 the court issued a decision dismissing the applicant’s request for the witness C.O. to be heard. The court reiterated that according to Article 47912 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the applicant’s request had to be refused, as he had failed to submit it with his statement of claim. The court further noted that the requested evidence was of no importance for the case. The decision was sent to the applicant. It was served on him on 30 May 2007. 14.  A date for the hearing was scheduled for 11 June 2007. 15.  By a letter of 31 May 2007 the applicant requested the court to arrange for him to be brought to the hearing from Biała Podlaska Prison, where he was detained at that time. He also reiterated that witness C.O. should be questioned and requested that K.M. and A.M. also be heard by the court as witnesses.  The applicant failed to submit copies of his request to the court as required by Article 128 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 28 below). 16.  On 11 June 2007 the court requested the applicant to complete his request by submitting copies of it with a view to having them served on the defendant. The applicant failed to comply with the court’s request. 17.  A hearing in the case was held on the same day. It lasted five minutes. The defendant stated only that she did not accept the applicant’s claim. The applicant was neither present nor represented. 18.  The court gave a judgment on 25 June 2007. It dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding no grounds on which to accept that he had suffered any damage or that the defendant had been acting unlawfully. 19.  In the written reasons for that judgment the court referred to Article 47912 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 27 below) and held that the applicant’s request for C.O. to be heard as a witness had been submitted too late. It should have been submitted with the statement of claim. The court did not refer to the applicant’s request to be brought to the hearing held on 11 June 2007. 20.  The applicant appealed. He argued that the first-instance court had assessed the evidence wrongly and reached untenable conclusions. He further submitted that he was serving a prison sentence and that it was therefore very difficult for him to effectively defend his interests in the proceedings. He requested exemption from all court fees and for a legal‑aid lawyer to be assigned to represent him before the appellate court. 21.  By a decision of 1 October 2007 the Lublin Regional Court refused to grant legal aid to the applicant, finding that he was able to present his own case to the court. The court was of the view that the fact that his claim had been dismissed was not tantamount to a finding that the applicant was unable to argue his case. The court exempted him from the obligation to pay court fees in the amount of PLN 6,750 and dismissed the remainder of his request. It noted that the applicant remained in prison and that his financial situation had not improved since the previous decision on court fees had been given (see paragraph 10 above). 22.  The applicant appealed against this decision in so far as it related to the refusal of legal aid. He submitted that the fact that he was relatively articulate did not suffice for a finding that he was able to prepare and present legal arguments to the appellate court in a sufficiently competent manner. He reiterated that he was serving a prison sentence, which made it difficult for him to act effectively in defence of his interests in the proceedings. 23.  On 30 October 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal against the refusal to grant legal aid, essentially sharing the views of the first‑instance court. It further noted that the fact that the applicant was serving a prison sentence did not of itself justify assigning a lawyer to the case, because it was not necessary for the applicant to appear in person before the court. 24.  On 18 December 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment, essentially sharing the conclusions of the first‑instance court. The court accepted that the case concerned a commercial dispute and was therefore governed by the more strict regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the written grounds for the judgment the court relied on the parties’ statements of claims and on the defendant’s statements made before the court. 25.  This judgment was served on the applicant on 29 January 2008. 26.  On 6 February 2008 the Lublin Court of Appeal granted the applicant legal aid for the purposes of preparing a cassation appeal. On 11 February 2008 the Lublin Bar Association assigned M. K. to the case. 27.  By a written legal opinion dated 25 February 2008 the lawyer informed the applicant that he was refusing to prepare a cassation appeal in the case. He was of the view that there were no legal grounds on which such an appeal could be prepared. This opinion was served on the applicant shortly afterwards.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant, an Italian national born in 1934, was the general secretary of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) from 1976 to 1993. From 1983 to 1987 he was Prime Minister of Italy. As of April 1994 (according to the applicant) or May 1994 (according to the Italian authorities), he lived in Hammamet (Tunisia). 11.  The proceedings to which this application relates were part of the criminal proceedings brought by the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office during the so-called “clean hands” (mani pulite) campaign. 12.  Between January and October 1993, the Milan Public Prosecutor issued twenty-six notices of prosecution (avvisi di garanzia) in respect of the applicant, in particular for corruption, dishonest receipt of money by a public officer, concealment of dishonest gain and offences against the legislation on the financing of political parties. 13.  On 10 May, 10 September 1993 and 7 May 1994 the Rome Public Prosecutor also issued notices of prosecution in respect of the applicant for dishonest receipt of money by a public officer, offences against the legislation on the financing of political parties, corruption and misuse of public office. 14.  The prosecutions against the applicant and other figures in politics, business and public institutions received attention from the media. 15.  Amongst the cases against the applicant was that of Metropolitana Milanese, which concerned payments of large sums of money made between 1983 and 1992 by a number of firms to the representatives of political parties and the influence the latter exerted on the board of directors of the Metropolitana Milanese company with a view to awarding contracts to those firms in connection with works on the Milan underground system. 16.  On 8 June 1994 the investigating judge committed the applicant and twenty-nine co-defendants for trial before the Milan District Court. The applicant was charged, in particular, with interference with freedom of contract and corruption. 17.  The first trial hearing took place on 20 September 1994. The applicant was not present and the District Court accordingly declared him absent (contumace). Some of the accused requested and obtained a plea bargain, while the position of some other accused persons was separated from that of the applicant. The trial before the Milan District Court thus continued only against the applicant and five co-defendants. The Metropolitana Milanese company joined the proceedings as a civil party. 18.  In a decision of 7 July 1995 the Milan District Court remanded the applicant in custody. On 12 July 1995 counsel for the applicant informed the Milan District Court that he had learned of that decision through the press and asked for a copy of it. On 20 July 1995 the Milan District Court declared the applicant to be latitante, that is, to be deliberately evading the court's jurisdiction. 19.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 7 July 1995. In an order of 25 September 1995, the Milan District Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court held that once the preliminary investigation was completed it was for the trial court to consider whether there were substantial indications of guilt and whether in particular there was still a danger that the applicant would abscond. In this respect the court noted that since 5 May 1994 it had been impossible to find the applicant in Italy and that in the various proceedings brought against him a number of coercive measures had been ordered that could not be enforced. Moreover, in judgments of 29 July 1994 and 7 December 1994 the applicant had been sentenced to terms of imprisonment. In the District Court's view, the applicant's lengthy stay abroad demonstrated his determination to evade the coercive measures ordered against him in 1994. 20.  On 17 and 19 July 1995 the Public Prosecutor sought an order for the interception of the applicant's telephone calls between Italy and his home in Hammamet. The interceptions were aimed at gathering information with a view to arresting the applicant. 21.  In a decision of 21 July 1995 the Milan District Court allowed those applications with a view to facilitating the arrest of the applicant. The court noted that the interceptions had a legal basis and were essential to supervise the applicant's movements and his personal and international relations which had allowed him to continue absconding. The interceptions, carried out by a specialist branch of the Italian police, began on 20 July 1995 and were concluded on 30 September 1995. 22.  At the same time, the Public Prosecutor sought an order for the interception of the applicant's telephone calls between Italy and his home in Hammamet in the context of a set of criminal proceedings for defamation which were pending against the applicant. The Milan investigating judge allowed the interceptions with a view to gathering evidence against the applicant and to identifying the accomplices. The interceptions, carried out by a specialist branch of the Italian police, began on 1 August 1995. The prosecution applied for four extensions of the duration of the interceptions, which were allowed by the investigating judge on 4 and 12 August, and on 1 and 14 September 1995. A request for a further extension was refused on 30 September 1995. The interceptions were thus concluded on 3 October 1995. 23.  At the hearing on 29 September 1995 in the case of Metropolitana Milanese, the Public Prosecutor in charge of the applicant's case, Mr Paolo Ielo, filed the transcripts of the telephone interceptions with the registry and asked that they be admitted as evidence against the applicant. The prosecution argued that they were necessary to assess the applicant's personality in order to determine the sentence if he were convicted, and that they could support the prosecution's allegation that the applicant intended to continue to abscond. The prosecution subsequently read out in court certain extracts of interceptions with a view to proving: a) that the applicant could leave Hammamet; b) that the applicant had started or influenced two virulent press campaigns against a magistrate of the Milan District Court and against an Italian political party; c) that the applicant was collecting information concerning certain politicians and magistrates, with a view to damaging their reputation; d) that the applicant continued to show aggressiveness towards the magistrates who were investigating him. The Public Prosecutor compared the applicant's conduct to that of a “certified criminal” (criminale matricolato) who attacked all those who had done their job and had tried to do it well. The Public Prosecutor declared that the transcripts of the telephone conversations were at the disposal of the District Court and of the defendants. 24.  The transcript of the speech given by Mr Ielo at the hearing of 29 September 1995 reads as follows:\n“I am submitting these further pleas under Article 507. I have already explained why I intend to submit these documents, which consist, firstly, of assessments of Craxi's criminal potential, within the meaning of Article 133, with reference in particular to his conduct after the offence was committed, and, secondly, of assessments as to whether the measure affecting his personal freedom should be maintained for the reasons for which it was decided on, and whether it should be extended for other reasons. I shall try to be extremely brief, although what I have to say will take a little time. I have tried to divide the documents submitted according to subject-matter, and have put together the telephone transcripts - the documents include the measures authorising the telephone tapping and the confiscation orders, which were moreover confirmed by the tribunale della libertà [the court responsible for deciding on the justification for measures restricting personal freedom or property rights]. The first set consists of telephone transcripts and clearly shows that Craxi can move about in Hammamet. This seems self-evident, yet Craxi is someone who, during the proceedings - all the proceedings taking place in Milan - said he had a legitimate reason for not attending and sent doctors' certificates. First he complained that the trials were not taking place, and now that the trials are taking place he wants them postponed on the grounds that he has a legitimate reason for being unable to attend. It is absolutely clear from these telephone transcripts that Craxi is someone who is able to move from the address of the subscription to the telephone line on which he receives calls. Why is this important?  The reason is clear: Craxi is such a liar that he continues to lie even before the courts, saying things that are untrue and belied by documentary evidence.\nThe second point concerns Craxi as a danger to the community, in particular his capacity to operate in the current situation, and become involved in the processes whereby public opinion is shaped and in other processes, which I shall discuss. In my opinion, two operations are particularly important - two press campaigns which were co-ordinated ... or at any rate two press campaigns in which Craxi clearly played an important role. The first is a recent one: I am referring to the telephone calls on 14 September 1995 - I apologise for the vulgarity, but I am reporting the speech of others and am not responsible.\nSubscriber Craxi, talking to Luca Iosi, says, 'the son of the hero' - the reference to Di Pietro is clear. An incomprehensible sentence  'He contributes to the tune of 2,400,000 a year, no less, when it all comes out.'  Luca Iosi says, 'Now we take the wraps off the case and then we shoot him in the balls.' A week later the front page news is:  'Di Pietro too, has a house in the centre for 240,000.'\nThe second press campaign was co-ordinated directly from Hammamet. It is the press campaign that was waged in Italia Settimanale, whose editor is Alessandro Caprettini. What happened? In a nutshell, Craxi sent Alessandro Caprettini a file on the [Northern] League, concerning alleged arms dealings by the League, and Alessandro Caprettini willingly received and published it. What is particularly important is that, in my opinion, the file came from Craxi himself: it was found on Craxi's computer or, rather, on the computer in Craxi's office in via Boezio in Rome and, in particular, was referred to in the conversation between Caprettini and Craxi, in two respects. Firstly, the subscriber - when I say subscriber, I mean Craxi - says, word for word, 'In any case we can do more with them - we can investigate but we can also raise questions.' What he means is that they can be used to raise questions about the Northern League, an Italian political party receiving special attention from a fugitive from justice, who agrees with the editor of a weekly to launch a campaign of this type. The second important thing is: 'Of course I publish the article, and then I go to a prosecutor who is a friend of mine and say, “Hey, look into this affair, will you?” - but this is the sort of thing one does nothing about'.  Further evidence that Craxi is a liar comes from an article in the Indipendente, which published the news that Craxi had denied being the author of the material sent to Italia Settimanale. I am producing this evidence to make it clear that when we talk of Craxi it is not like shooting at the Red Cross: we are talking of someone who is fully active and has a great capacity to influence the media.  In this connection, there is a set of telephone transcripts which show that Craxi was in constant contact with journalists in a wide variety of areas.\nLet us now move on to the last three points which, I believe, deserve a minimum of attention.\nThere is documentary proof, and proof from the telephone transcripts, that Craxi is mounting dossiers in Hammamet against some political activists.  I am referring - with particular regard to the evidence that has been found - to dossiers against D'Alema. He is engaging in “dossierism” ...\nThe President:  What does the neologism mean?  Compiling information or a dossier?\nThe Public Prosecutor: Compiling information in order to attack someone's reputation. This is an activity that was also to be pursued against judges, including myself, but we shall discuss that later.\nI said “dossierism”, which consists in compiling information that can damage people's reputation. This is documented by the telephone transcripts. One alarming aspect, in my view, is that it provides further evidence of Bettino Craxi's criminal potential.\nI am talking about compiling dossiers of information designed to damage the reputation of certain eminent people, and I am thinking of D'Alema, Prodi and Del Turco, about whom I shall talk in connection with a specific note that was found in Craxi's office. The dossiers were mounted with a certain Tina Soncini Massari from Bologna, who is an old friend of Craxi's - by friend I mean someone with whom he had relations which were, I imagine, of a political nature - to the extent that Tina Soncini Massari appears on a list of presents that Craxi gave. She is a leading supporter of Gelli, and is known to the judicial authorities for having arranged to put the Bologna judicial authorities off the track when they were investigating the massacres, by bribing witnesses. In this connection, I can produce evidence that identifies Tina Soncini Massari: the order from the Bologna investigating judge, Dr Grassi if I am not mistaken, which shows that the most recent contact between Gelli and Tina Soncini Massari dates back to 1993, and which makes it clear that she attempted to put the investigators off track and bribed witnesses in the course of the proceedings. These are the sort of people Bettino Craxi, a fugitive from justice who is the subject of pre-trial detention orders, uses in order to hinder investigations. You will be able to see for yourselves what these documents contain, and I shall not dwell on them. What is significant is another note on Del Turco also found in Craxi's office. I shall read you out the beginning so you can understand what all this is about. The Italian Socialist Party administration has always helped to support the Socialist current of the CGIL [Federation of Italian Trade Unions]. Del Turco took over from Marianetti, and the flow of money never stopped. 'On average, Del Turco received 20 to 30 million a month from Balzamo. On the occasion of every election or conference, there were extraordinary payments for instance, and so it went on', and the note continues with information about the politician.\nThere are also telephone transcripts of statements by Bitetto in which he appears to be talking about D'Alema ...  These are statements that have been filed and can be seen by anyone: it is clear to all why they are important from a criminal point of view.\nThen there are documents that show that Bettino Craxi has, or at any rate had, relations with important members of the Italian institutions. I am referring in particular to the telephone transcript of 2 September 1995, during which the subscriber, Craxi, talks to Margherita - she is not identified, who says: 'Alberto told me that he attended a meeting between Arafat and Silvio, and they spent ten minutes talking about you alone. Arafat came to Tunisia to see you and told Silvio Berlusconi to tell you that he too would be happy to have you as his guest in Palestine.' Again in connection with the capacity for communication of the accused, Bettino Craxi, who I repeat is a fugitive from justice and the subject of an arrest warrant for corruption with aggravating circumstances, there is a letter which the State Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister's office sent to Craxi's secretary on 25 June, in which the State Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister's office writes: “Dear Serenella, what you feared has happened, although both Giachieri and Carbonoli promise their good offices and will put things right'.\nBasically, this concerns a recommendation addressed to the State Under-Secretary, who hastens to reply, saying ... Serenella is Serenella Carloni. And let it be clear that Serenella Carloni is nobody in her own right, and yet as Bettino Craxi's secretary she was still able, on 22 June 1995, to make recommendations concerning the allocation of service areas in Perugia.\nThe last point on which I intend to dwell is the constant attacks by Bettino Craxi on those who investigated him. The right to defend oneself is sacred and culminates in a fair trial, but when it is exercised by attacking those involved in the proceedings, those who carried out the investigations, it is, in my view, proof of a very highly developed potential for crime.\nA note found in Craxi's office - Craxi's own office - you may, if you wish, in this connection hear Simonetta Carloni, who, I repeat, confirmed this - contained, among other pleasantries, a very precise reference in time in the form of Dell'Utri's release from prison - it is dated after Dell'Utri's release. Among the pleasantries, the note says: 'The Di Pietro case must become an exemplary case: we must get to the bottom of things because all the conditions are right. The usual logic of hitting one person in order to teach a hundred others a lesson. Forza Italia must regain its independence and this means it must not be subjected to the requirements of allies and exposed to dangers and uncertainty. There are key targets, particularly the Milan Pool [a group of Milan public prosecutors waging war on corruption]. We need to have the courage to call for its arrest before they do. We need to denounce the damage caused by the revolt.  We must begin by using people as examples and waging war. We need to use parliamentary force in every way possible. This includes calling for enquiries with a lot of publicity and denouncing abuses of authority - by Craxi. There is the seizure of the parliamentary question from Maiolo, faxed by the Forza Italia parliamentary group ... Luca Mantovani, who sent it for information to Bettino Craxi two days later with a covering letter which says: 'I would point out, inter alia, that Maiolo has in the last few hours been collecting more documentation with a view to asking further questions in the near future about the management of the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office.' There are telephone transcripts in which we read: 'We need to bombard them in the press'.  There are also attacks connected with what was published in Il Mattino. There is something for everyone - not just for the Milan Public Prosecutor's Office. There are attacks on other colleagues and references to other colleagues. A woman talking to Craxi says, 'He's bewildered too' and says that the person in question was used by the Milan group as a killer; she says she has heard from Biondi that the person coming down to speak is virtually in the service of Caselli. I will spare you all the rest because you can read it for yourself. I shall just read you one extract, partly because it concerns me and partly because it concerns these proceedings. 'So why doesn't someone else come?', with reference to Salamone, who is clearly involved ... he knows the truth of the matter. 'I think Milan stopped him.'  'I am about' - here it is the subscriber, Bettino Craxi, speaking - 'to denounce this Ielo.  Both Borelli's statements against Mancuso and the statements by Ielo come under Article 289 [of the Criminal Code]'.\nHe is speaking to a certain Salvatore, who has not yet been identified, but I hope very soon to identify him, who repeats, 'Yes, but he's dealing with it.' Craxi replies, 'He has nothing to do with this.' The person to whom he is speaking says, 'No, of course not. The minister's dealing with it.'\nThe President: The public prosecutor is requested to bring the charges without making allusions or taking stands, or making comments of a personal nature.\nThe public prosecutor:  President, the charge is based on the premise that these telephone transcripts show, within the meaning of Article 133, behaviour - and this is where the accused, Bettino Craxi, has committed an offence - worthy of a certified criminal - it is the behaviour of someone who attacks all those who have simply done their job, because that is what they are paid to do and that is what they have chosen to do, and have sought to do it properly, but he doesn't care, he has to attack them and ...\nPresident: We have understood why the public prosecutor has asked for these documents to be produced.\nPublic Prosecutor:  The evidence submitted has been greatly summarised, President, because there is further material and I am at the disposal of defence counsel and the court. Ah, wait a minute - there are all the measures authorising the requests for telephone tapping and seizures; they are all appended.\nThe President:  Appended to the individual sets of evidence ... these pleas from the public prosecutor ... Let us begin to hear Craxi's defence counsel, who is the person most directly concerned, and then if the others want to intervene ...” 25.  The applicant's lawyer requested to be granted access to the decisions authorising the interceptions and to all the documents to which the Public Prosecutor had made reference. He declared that he would have commented on them at a later stage, observing, anyway, that some of the facts imputed to his client could not be described as aggressive behaviours, being rather simple statements of the truth. 26.  The District Court reserved its decision on the prosecution's request of admittance of evidence until the hearing of 19 October 1995. The transcripts of the telephone conversations intercepted on the applicant's line were made available to the parties immediately after the hearing of 29 September 1995. Mr Guiso, the applicant's lawyer, was provided with the file including all the transcripts and afforded the possibility of making written submissions. 27.  Respectively on 2 and 9 October 1995, the two applicant's counsels (Mr Lo Giudice and Mr Guiso) were informed that the telephone interceptions had been filed with the Public Prosecutor's Office's registry. The applicant's counsels subsequently objected to the admission of the interceptions as evidence. In particular, they argued that contrary to Article 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter, the “CPP”) the District Court had failed to hold a specific sitting before the trial hearing in the presence of both the defence counsels and of the prosecution in order to select those interceptions that were significant and exclude those considered illegal. Further, the prosecution had failed to apply for an extension of the fifteen-days duration of the telephone tapping, so that those interceptions which had been carried out after the first fifteen days were illegal and could not be used. 28.  The content and the name of the interlocutors of certain telephone conversations were subsequently published in the press. 29.  In particular, \"L'Unità\" of 30 September 1995 published an article entitled “Dossier and conspiracies against Di Pietro [one of the magistrates of the clean hands team]\". It stated that the interceptions made on the applicant's phone showed that he was preparing a defamatory campaign against some political men with the help of a \"lady from Bologna\", who was a member of an illegal association of free-masons. Moreover, in one of the interceptions Mrs Margherita Boniver (an Italian politician) had told Craxi that Mr Berlusconi (the current Prime Minister of Italy) had had a conversation with Mr Arafat about him and that Arafat would have \"invited\" Craxi. In another telephone call, the son of one of the applicant's lawyers had said that \"the Minister\" would have commenced proceedings against Mr Paolo Ielo. 30.  On the same day, as well as on 1 and 2 October 1995, L'Unità also published the following extracts from some of the intercepted phone calls.\nConversation on 26 July 1995 with a certain Luca:\nCraxi (speaking with Luca): “This Salamone [the Public Prosecutor of Brescia] is another one who wants to make a show of himself, I am going to see whether there are elements to introduce a criminal complaint against him.”\nConversation on 28 July with an unknown woman:\nWoman: “I'm in a telephone box in Rome. I saw that friend of yours from the Senate.”\nCraxi: “Why has this big friend of mine failed to say one single word?”\nWoman: “He leaves the comments to you. He is lost and says that this person had been used by the Milan group as a killer. He says that he knew from Biondi that the one who spoke is in practice a servant of Caselli [a well-known Italian magistrate].”\nCraxi: “Ah, yes?”\nWoman: “Concerning the story of the brother.”\nConversation on 3 August 1995 with an unidentified friend:\nCraxi: “They should go and see. It should be established whether a magistrate can buy a Mercedes at a very favorable price. May he borrow money from a friend in order to pay his gambling debts? So all this is legitimate, it can be done. Let's put it in the law: magistrates may borrow money without paying legal interests.”\nConversation on 14 August 1995 with an unknown man:\nman: “Next week I will provide you with all the things you asked me on kronos [a press agency], the most important thing [is] that, at least until one month and a half ago, I do not know if now he has been revoked, Prodi was a counsellor of its biggest company.”\nCraxi: “Ah, ah, ah, very well, give me all the data, please.”\nman: “Counsellor of its biggest company, one of the five members of the directing body was Prodi, so ...”\nCraxi: “Super, then I would like to have the material concerning that other thing ...”\nConversation on 25 August 1995 with Mr Filippo Facci [a journalist]:\nCraxi: “... There are some pillars in Tangentopoli [term used by the press to design the corruption system disclosed by the clean hands inquiry] that stayed outside, they should be all those who stayed inside, then we can find the solution, but no kidding, I am not getting upset because of the apartment of D'Alema [an Italian politician who had subsequently been the Prime Minister of Italy] ... ”\nFacci: “Sorry, the phone fell while I was taking the book, pages 192 and 193, where it speaks about Giovannini ...”\nCraxi: “There is a tale, not really about that thing which will make a little scandal, but it will be a regular contract on which it was not possible to lay ... lies are others and this one Giovannini is another Greganti, close to D'Alema, fuck him. The Public Prosecutor's Office in Rome opened an inquiry for calumny, but the day of reckoning will come, son of ...”\nConversation on 2 September 1995 with a certain Valterino:\nCraxi: “What is going on with the inquiry of Salamone? Now it does not concern Di Pietro, but myself?”\nValterino: “These are saying that they brought papers against you.”\nCraxi: “What papers?”\nValterino: “The papers concerning the search.”\nCraxi: “The papers concerning the search have nothing to do with Di Pietro.”\nConversation on 2 September 1995 with lawyer Guiso:\nGuiso: “Di Pietro is in Cernobbio. Today Il corriere della sera says that he is nobody, and he had been recommended - and this is very important - by an agent of the branch of the American police investigating on financial matters. He is substantially accompanied by him, please consider that he had been three months in America and appears in Cernobbio, he should speak this morning on the subject “foreign politic, ethic and finance.”\nCraxi: “It's crazy, but it is the subject of the Mac Namara Foundation.”\nGuiso: “[This] shows that he was linked to America, not at all the uncertain future he had declared when he abandoned his post. Then, a journalist gave me a book with plenty of information. I cannot send it to you by fax as the characters are very small.”\nCraxi: “Send it to me to that address by DHL. To that address you know.”\nConversation on 5 September 1995 with a journalist of “Il Messaggero”:\nJournalist: “Did you hear about the new Italian politicians?”\nCraxi: “Who are they?”\nJournalist: “Di Pietro.”\nCraxi: “A little adventurous trafficker (avventuriero trafficante).”\nConversation on 6 September on Craxi's line in Hammamet. Mrs. Tina Soncini speaks with a certain Michele:\nSoncini: “I have interesting news to give him.”\nMichele: “He says you can send a fax.”\nSoncini: “I will send it tomorrow with some references to Bologna.”\nMichele: “Let's use a code, a slightly modified code, we know of what kind of persons we are speaking about.”\nSoncini: “I will send some telephone numbers ... I had been told that the mother is a very worldly-minded person.”\nMichele: “Newly rich, all this is useful for us, maybe also apartments ...”\nConversation on 6 September 1995 with a certain Simona:\nCraxi: “The problem was to build up the physiognomy of the personage ... In sum, this is the clue, it seems he had made a number of things on which he was wrong.”\nSimona: “It is an enormous thing, there are ten documents per day.”\nCraxi: “The trials he made, I know about something, we should look at them, people say that the tribunal shut the door in his face, they speak about the preparation of some books by certain friends, ask to send them the list of the members of the publishing house.”\nConversation on 11 September 1995 with Mr De Jorio, a journalist:\nCraxi: “You should speak with somebody who will come and speak to me. The problem ... is to have the hands free and to have information.”\nDe Jorio: “We have some.”\nCraxi: “What is a newspaper like this doing, scandal and satire, isn't it?”\nDe Jorio: “We were the sole newspaper is Italy which published documents on red gladio [a secret organization that the communist party was suspected to have built in order to achieve its aims during the cold war] ... judges have discontinued the proceedings on this matter.”\nCraxi: “It is not the only matter on which they discontinued proceedings, there is a systematic tendency to discontinue proceedings concerning the communist party.”\nDe Jorio: “Do you know what we have discovered? That apart from Pio La Torre, also the gangster Felice Cavallero Pollini was a member of gladio and had been trained abroad ... also the one of the gold of Dongo.”\nCraxi: “There are many things. They believe they have solved the problem with the scapegoat, they are under an illusion, they should have killed me, but as they did not succeed in this ... they tried twice, once the American intelligence, once the English one.”\nDe Jorio: “Mr. President, be careful, I know that here in Italy they want to organize [something], to come [over there] and take you, it seems they are offering 60 million [lire, which is approximately 30 987 euros] per person, within the intelligence, in order to take you and to bring you elsewhere.”\nCraxi: “All right, all right, try to do so.”\nDe Jorio: “I am telling you this because a person I trust during his last meeting with me ... I know that a group Z has been constituted, kept in the shade of a free-masons organisation constituted by approximately 600 magistrates, and the head of this group would be Scalfaro [the President of the Italian Republic at the relevant time].”\nCraxi: “I heard about this thing, but I do not believe it, I am not convinced.”\nConversation on 12 September 1995 with an unidentified journalist:\njournalist: “Will Salamone come [to see you in Hammamet]?”\nCraxi: “I have no idea. I am here, everybody knows where I can be found.”\nConversation on 12 September 1995 with an unknown journalist:\nJournalist: “I will state that you said: “I have friends not only in the Arabic world and I think that in a European capital a center such as the Wiesenthal center will be built, [and this center] will investigate the judicial clans and all those who in these past three years had acted unfairly against me and against many other people.”\nCraxi: “No, that is not good. First of all it is not only against me, it is not the judicial clans, but all the clans including the judicial ones ... [a center which] looks after and will look for the truth ... So much truth which still has to come out.”\nJournalist: “Then I ask you the thing on Di Pietro and then you will answer “I'm writing a book which will be entitled “Mimì an Italian miracle.”\nCraxi: “No, I want to write, I want to write a little book, not a book ... It's too important.”\nConversation on 21 September 1995 with Mr Pierangelo Maurizio, a journalist:\nMaurizio: “Now I'm working for “Il tempo”, and the television show of Gianfranco about Cinquestelle has started again ... I saw that thing about Enel [the Italian electric energy producing company].”\nCraxi: “This story on today's “Il giornale” is the end of the world, do you know whom the political personality I am referring to is?”\nMaurizio: “No, frankly not.”\nCraxi: “It's D'Alema, there is a statement [made by] Bitetto [a director of Enel who was accused of corruption and made statements calling into question the criminal liability of Craxi and other politicians].”\nMaurizio: “... about which you speak in your books.”\nCraxi: “I wasn't aware, there is a statement [made by] Bitetto exposing that years ago, but there is a continuity in the criminal offence, he took part in a meeting in Bari or Brindisi in which were present D'Alema, the regional secretary of PSI and others, where he, as a representative of Enel ... discussed the contracts for public works in Brindisi.”\nMaurizio “What about this statement?”\nCraxi: “I have it, I will forward it to you.”\nMaurizio: “Maybe, I will call you tomorrow.”\nCraxi: “Now a number of things will come out on that young man.”\nMaurizio: “They are getting a different turn ... all the things about D'Alema.”\nCraxi: “Those things from Venice are the less [important], there are other things ... I would like to be personally informed. I would like to have a fax number where I can send things to you.”\nConversation on 23 September 1995 with a certain Rosario:\nRosario: “The fax is broken, I would have liked to send you some extracts from yesterday's and today's newspapers concerning that little dog named Lulù [probably, the former Milan magistrate Antonio Di Pietro] and his son. Did you see them?”\nCraxi: “Yes, yes, thanks.”\nConversation on 23 September 1995 with Roberto “Bobo” Craxi, the applicant's son:\nBobo: “The thing will come out next Monday.”\nCraxi: “Not the next one.”\nBobo: “Not the next one, also because next [Monday] there is the Andreotti case. It will come out Monday, it's 25 pages and they will anticipate it.”\nCraxi: “all right, it will be a hot week and they will be afraid.”\nConversation on 23 September 1995 with Mrs Pia Luisa Bianco, a journalist:\nBianco (speaking with Craxi): “The thing has already been paged up. I will forward it to you in advance ... we will put a big emphasis on it, we already have an agreement with Il corriere della sera in the sense that they will make big titles, don't worry because it is very well managed, you will see, it will have a big impact.”\nConversation on 24 September 1995 with Mrs. Tina Soncini:\nSoncini: “Apart from these documents, I have a channel to acquire more detailed information, but I need that you organize an appointment.”\nConversation on 25 September 1995 with a certain Luca:\nCraxi: “They should be attacked frontally, without fear, to Mancuso they are doing ... This Ielo is behaving like a pure mafioso, an arrogance from the power.”\nLuca: “There is no other alternative but screaming it in their face, we will do it, we will do it. Here everything is all right except for that little asshole of Intini [an Italian politician].”\nConversation on 25 September 1995 with a certain Salvatore [probably Mr Salvatore Lo Giudice, the son of one of the lawyers officially representing Craxi in the Metropolitana Milanese trial. Mr Salvatore Lo Guidice, who is also a lawyer, acted as his father's substitute during some hearings]:\nSalvatore: “Yes, he will think about it.”\nCraxi: “He has nothing to do with this.”\nSalvatore: “No, sure he has, the ministry will think about this.”\nCraxi: “Because it's 289 [Article of the Criminal Code punishing the attempt to impede the functioning of the Constitutional organs].”\nSalvatore: “This is something up to him.”\nCraxi: “To introduce a claim calmly is one thing, but one cannot make all the comments and the political polemics, the speculation made by Ielo is a defamatory one.”\nSalvatore: “But now the serious point is to give him a hand. It is essential to break them on this Venice thing which is the only one they are afraid of, so as he has a number of suspicions, he needs it as he needs bread.”\nCraxi: “I am completely unaware of that story.”\nSalvatore: “I have a lot of material.”\nCraxi: “I will immediately deal with this matter, tomorrow I will send faxes and then I will keep [you] informed.”\nSalvatore; “Then, it is important to ask for the availability of the State.”\nCraxi: “Is it enough that it arrives immediately, then you will call when it leaves.”\nSalvatore: “We are doing everything very quickly, then I will go directly to Rome. In any case this one with whom we are working together can be trusted, then the serious thing is that he is using the same elements of Milan, therefore it would be a big mess if it comes out that with the same elements Milan failed to proceed, there are many ideas to be used.”\nConversation on an unspecified date with a certain Mr. Paolo Farina:\nCraxi: “That one is an idiot, a first-class idiot.”\nFarina: “He was replaced by ...”\nCraxi: “He was replaced because he was incompetent.”\nFarina: “He was replaced by Andò.”\nCraxi: “He was incompetent.”\nFarina: “He tried to suggest that his replacement ...”\nCraxi: “Of course not ...”\nFarina: “They presented themselves as supporters of An [Alleanza nazionale, an Italian political party].”\nCraxi: “Precisely ... but that one is an idiot, an unpretentious personage, I do not know how he could have arrived there.”\nL'Unità also reported that in another conversation with an unknown person, Craxi had showed his appreciation for a recital with Pavarotti transmitted by the Italian television; when he had learned that his friend had not seen it, he had said: “Phone Rossella [the director of a news bulletin] and make them send the cassette to you.” 31.  “Il Giorno” of 30 September 1995 published an article entitled “The attempts to create false evidence by the friend of the head of P2 [an illegal free masons association]”. It made reference to a telephone conversation that the applicant had had on 24 September with Mrs Tina Soncini, in which the discussion concerned “documents made ad hoc” in order to be sent to an editorial company. The article reported the links allegedly existing between Mrs Soncini and Mr Licio Gelli, head of the P2. 32.  “La Repubblica” of 30 September 1995 published an article entitled “We will ask for the arrest of the [clean hands] Pool”. As far as it concerned the telephone interceptions, the article indicated the names of some journalists who had spoken with the applicant on the phone, and the content of the telephone conversation with Mrs Boniver reported by L'Unità. La Repubblica moreover reported the content of a phone call that the applicant had had with Mr Luca Iosi, his “speaker in Italy”, on 14 September 1995. The conversation at issue was interpreted as an attempt to attack Mr Di Pietro in relation to an apartment rented to his son. Its content was the following.\nIosi: “The son of the hero contributes each year for 2 400 000 lire [approximately 1 239 euros].”\nCraxi: “So much... When will this thing come out?”\nIosi: “Now we will make the case grow and then we will shoot them right in the balls [Italian expression which means to attack someone hardly], 200 000 lire [approximately 103 euros] in spite of the rent rates and formally in his own name only in order to put his son in it.” 33.  La Repubblica also reported the content of some telephone conversations the applicant had had with Mrs Tina Soncini, with a certain Anna, with Mr Alessandro Caprettini (the director of an Italian newspaper), with Mrs Alda D'Eusanio and Mr Enrico Mentana (two journalists), and with a certain Ugo. Their content is the following.\nConversation on 21 July 1995:\nCraxi: “Enrico, in this moment you are not helping me.”\nMentana: “You mean, honouring the truth.”\nCraxi: “By reporting the things I am saying, for the Holy Virgin's sake, nothing more ... The boys from Giovine Italia [a political organisation] did something this morning.”\nMentana: “I'm not aware of this.”\nCraxi: “Think about it, nobody was there, there were no televisions, now you should report this news, report this news at least, they were one hundred, they are good, I have sent a memorial of historical nature, something about the Giovine Italia of Mazzini [an Italian patriot] ... if you continue, you will see the little surprise.”\nConversation on 24 July 1995:\nCraxi: “I should come as I came many times in Italy with moustaches: in fact I was coming with a wig and false moustaches ... Idiots.”\nD'Eusanio: “This is the moment to do something about the procedural guaranties, about the magistrates, about the pentiti, Contrada, Tortora [persons accused by pentiti in mafia trials], if you are not taking advantage from these occasions, there would be nothing you could do.”\nCraxi: “Let's say the truth, there are some gangs organising a push-off, real gangs.”\nD'Eusanio: “Bettino [nick-name of Craxi], there are idiots, inefficient persons, cowards.”\nCraxi: “no, no, they reached an agreement, and lack of courage is inside the information, as all this wouldn't happen if there weren't a number of cowards in the newspapers and the televisions.”\nD'Eusanio: “My director is a person who believes in nothing, therefore he is keen on his position and there is somebody protecting him and his friends [to continue] believing in nothing.”\nConversation on 3 August 1995:\nCaprettini: “I believe, the funny thing is the following, you know what I am going to do, I will of course publish this thing, then I will address myself to a magistrate friend and then I'll tell him: let's investigate on this matter, so we'll keep the problem alive.”\nConversation on 29 August 1995:\nCraxi (speaking with Ugo): “I can't understand what is going on in Italy, if we are going to the elections immediately or not; in the affirmative, there is nothing to do; in the negative, in eight months time we will sort out a socialist list, we will put a nice pink carnation [the symbol of the PSI] on it. I will make the socialist list being made, no kidding. This situation cannot be accepted anymore.”\nConversation on 20 September 1995:\nSoncini: “I had information about this, it is hearsay, the father of D'Alema in 1941 was the Secretary of the Guf [University fascist group] of Ravenna, it is for sure.”\nCraxi: “I would like to have a more precise ..”\nSoncini: “I can provide you with the whole story, because after having caused the death of three hundred people, he told it to a journalist.”\nCraxi: “And then we will deal also with the betrayer.”\nConversation on 25 September 1995:\nCraxi: “Send me a text.”\nAnna: “it is very important, I will send it to you and you will forward it to the Public Prosecutor of Venice, Mr Nordio ... Now the important point is to give them a hand, to attack them on this Venice thing which is the only one they fear ... this person who is working with us is somebody I trust, then the serious thing is that he is using the same elements of Milan, which will prove that with the same elements Milan failed to proceed.” 34.  La Repubblica also reported the following telephone conversation current on 10 August 1995 between Anna Craxi, the applicant's wife, and Mrs Veronica Berlusconi, the wife of the actual Prime Minister of Italy.\nVeronica Berlusconi: “Anna, how are you?”\nAnna Craxi: “And how do you do, everything all right?”\nVeronica Berlusconi: “Everything all right, we arrived in Sardinia two days ago. The trip was extremely tiring ...” 35.  La Repubblica noted that “the day on which Lady Veronica made her polite phone call to her friend, the husband of the latter had already been declared latitante [which means deliberately evading justice] by the Milan District Court”. 36.  Il corriere della sera of 1 October 1995 published the content of a telephone conversation that the applicant had with a certain Salvatore, afterwards identified as Mr Salvatore Lo Giudice. The text is the following.\nSalvatore: “We should say we are ready to be heard. Because this is an interesting situation. I had a number of contacts with this magistrate.”\nCraxi: “All right. In the meanwhile I do not even know what these things are.”\nSalvatore: “It's obvious, but he knows that it is not absolutely irrelevant.”\nCraxi: “In view of a speech of a general nature.”\nSalvatore: “Correct. He knows that [this] has nothing to do with that other story; it's only stuff he inserted in order to come and hear you.”\nCraxi: “Send me a text.”\nSalvatore: “It's very important. I'll send it and you will forward it to Mr Nordio, Public Prosecutor attached to the Venice District Court. Do you have that note?”\nCraxi: “I did not even read it.”\nSalvatore: “Look at it, because it is a serious thing. There won't be any problem with Tunisia.”\nCraxi: “Here they are a little bit upset with Italy, in general. I will intervene.”\nSalvatore: “In this way, we will create a great problem for them, as this [person] told me very interesting things. For instance, he has consulted Digos [a branch of the Italian police], and you are in the list of latitanti. So a big contrast will be created, which would help us a lot.”\nCraxi: “Why?”\nSalvatore: “Because then we will be able to prove that the order declaring you latitante was arbitrary. So, if we can bring him [seeing you] it would be difficult for them to justify the fact that you are evading justice.”\nCraxi: “So the other one is not going to come?”\nSalvatore: “He has been blocked in Milan.”\nCraxi: “I do not believe it.”\nSalvatore: “Yes, I know it for sure, he told me. This one, on the contrary, is ready to do seas and mountains [Italian expression which means everything is necessary in order to achieve one's aims].”\nSalvatore: “Then at the Ministry there is an agreement, it would be ...” 37.  On the same day Il corriere della sera published an interview with Mr Salvatore Lo Giudice, who explained that the telephone call at issue did not concern a “conspiracy” organised by the applicant, and a letter of Mrs Belusconi, challenging the opportunity of putting in the file the conversation she had had with the applicant's wife. Articles appeared in Il Corriere della sera and in other newspapers concerning interviews and declarations made by Mr Nordio, Public Prosecutor attached to the Venice District Court, who criticised the release into the public domain of the telephone interceptions and declared that he had never followed irregular procedures in order to serve the interests of the applicant. The latter was at freedom to believe that he could have taken advantage from the legitimate and impartial investigations that Mr Nordio was making. Other declarations made by the persons who spoke with the applicant on the phone were published by the press, as well as the replies of the applicant to the speech made by Mr Paolo Ielo on 29 September 1995. The applicant stated, in particular, that the Public Prosecutor at issue was a “certified liar” (bugiardo matricolato) and had used a “Stalinist” language. 38.  In the following days, La Repubblica, L'Unità and Il Corriere della sera published articles which referred to the above mentioned telephone conversations and to the speech made by Mr Paolo Ielo at the hearing of 29 September 1995. They included attempts to interpret the precise meaning of the conversations. Some of the newspapers commented that the transcripts of the telephone conversations showed, together with other elements, that the applicant was trying to use his influence and his relationships to organise a defamatory campaign against his political adversaries and against the magistrates who were investigating on him. It was moreover discussed in the press whether the applicant had the power to influence the political line of the party Forza Italia, with some members of which he had, apparently, kept close contacts. La Repubblica of 2 October 1995 published an article written on 18 September 1995 by the applicant himself and containing considerations of a political nature. 39.  Mr Paolo Ielo granted the press a number of interviews on the matter; he declared he regretted having compared the applicant to a “certified criminal”, but that it was his duty to control the telephone conversations of a person who was deliberately evading a court order. Even if the telephone interceptions did not disclose any criminally relevant behaviour, they should be taken into account in order to assess the applicant's personality and to fix the penalty that the Public Prosecutor could have demanded at the outset of the court proceedings. 40.  At the hearing of 19 October 1995 the Milan District Court asked the parties to clarify who had disclosed to the press the content of the telephone interceptions before the competent judicial authority had had the opportunity of pronouncing itself on their admissibility. Mr Ielo pointed out that immediately after the hearing of 29 September 1995, the file containing all the telephone interceptions had been forwarded to Mr Guiso, the applicant's lawyer; the file had been returned to the Public Prosecutor Office only the following Monday, when part of the transcripts had already been released into the public domain. Mr Ielo concluded that the Public Prosecutor could not be held responsible for the divulging of these acts. The representative of the civil party declared that he had nothing to say on this point: he had not copied the transcripts and he had not given them to third persons. Mr Guiso confirmed the version given by Mr Ielo. He indicated that he had copied the file which had been forwarded to him, but that this was done in a particularly secret manner, in order to protect the applicant's interests and to avoid any divulging which could be prejudicial for him. Some journalists had requested to be granted access to the transcripts, but Mr Guiso had categorically refused. Mr Giuso underlined that, as prescribed by the law, the file with the transcripts had been made available to all the parties of the trial, and not only to the applicant's defence lawyers. Mr Guiso concluded that the divulging of the transcripts was clearly due to the action of third persons. He was not interested in that, the only point he wanted to raise being why the telephone interceptions had been presented at the public hearing. The lawyers of the other accused persons declared that they were not responsible for the disclosure. 41.  In an order of 19 October 1995, the Milan District Court found that contrary to the applicant's allegations (see paragraph 27 above), the failure to hold a specific hearing prior to the trial in order to select the intercepted telephone conversations did not amount to a violation of the relevant provisions of Italian law. The District Court first observed that according to Article 271 of the CPP and to the Court of Cassation's case law, failure to respect the formalities indicated in Article 268 §§ 4 and 6 of the CPP did not prevent the use of the interceptions. It moreover noted that according to Article 295 § 3 of the CPP, the said Article 268, which concerned wire-tapings made during the preliminary investigations, could apply to the trial phase only “if possible”. In the present case, the selection of the material had been made in the presence of the parties and in its “natural” place, which was the trial hearing. The District Court however decided not to make use of the information yielded by the telephone interceptions made between 20 July and 3 August 1995, in that they were relevant but not “absolutely necessary” within the meaning of Article 507 of the CCP in order to assess the applicant's personality. The District Court further held that the interceptions made after 3 August 1995 could not be used as evidence, as no application had been made by the prosecutor for an extension of the duration of interception, nor could such authorisation be considered as having been implicitly granted for as long as the applicant would be absconding. 42.  In a judgment of 16 April 1996, the Milan District Court convicted the applicant to a penalty of eight years and three months' imprisonment and to a fine of 150 million Italian lire (approximately 77,468 euros). This sentence was confirmed on appeal on 5 June 1997. However, the appeal judgment was quashed by the Court of Cassation and the case was re-heard by the Milan Court of Appeal, which, on 24 July 1998, reduced the penalty imposed on the applicant to four years and six months' imprisonment. This decision became final on 20 April 1999. 43.  The applicant complained about the unfairness of the Metropolitana Milanese criminal proceedings in the ambit of application no 63226/00, introduced on 15 October 1999. In a decision of 14 June 2001, the Court declared this application inadmissible.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first two applicants were born in 1948 and 1960 respectively and live in Paris. 9.  In order to consider an application by Morocco for membership of the European Union, the European Commission decided it would need very precise information on the issue of cannabis production in that State and the measures being taken to eradicate it, that being the avowed political aim of the King of Morocco in person. To that end, the Secretariat General of the Commission requested the Observatoire géopolitique des drogues (OGD – Geopolitical Drugs Observatory) to prepare a report on drug production and trafficking in Morocco. Investigations and reports by the OGD, which closed down in 2000, were considered authoritative. The Paris tribunal de grande instance and the Paris public prosecutor’s office were among the subscribers to its publications. 10.  The OGD delivered its report to the European Commission in February 1994. The report contained the names of people implicated in drug trafficking in Morocco. However, the Commission asked the Observatory for a revised version of the report, with the names of the drug traffickers deleted in order to make it more suitable for the discussions that were scheduled with the Moroccan authorities. This expurgated version of the initial report was published, notably in a book sold by the OGD entitled Etat des drogues, drogue des Etats (“State of drugs, drugs of States”) and containing a chapter on Morocco. The book was referred to in the newspaper Le Monde on 25 May 1994. 11.  After initially remaining confidential, the original version of the report began to circulate. Le Monde learnt of its existence in the autumn of 1995. The report contained twelve chapters with the following titles: (1) “Cannabis in Morocco – the historical background”; (2) “General overview of Er Rif”; (3) “The characteristics of cannabis growing”; (4) “The socio-economic impact and areas of production”; (5) “The increase in the land set aside for cannabis production”; (6) “Morocco – the world’s leading exporter of hashish”; (7) “Drug-trafficking routes”; (8) “The criminal networks”; (9) “The emergence of hard drugs”; (10) “Drug money”; (11) “The ‘war on drugs’ ”; and (12) “Conclusion”. It related how, over a period of ten years, there had been a tenfold increase in the area of land that had historically been used for cannabis production in the region of Er Rif and that current levels of production made “the sharif kingdom a serious contender for the title of the world’s leading exporter of cannabis”. 12.  On 3 November 1995 Le Monde published an article by Mr Incyan giving details of the report. 13.  The front page of the newspaper carried an introductory article under the main headline: “Morocco, world’s leading exporter of cannabis”, and a sub-heading: “King Hassan II’s entourage implicated by confidential report.” The article, which was relatively short (it ran to some thirty or so lines in two columns), summarised the terms of the OGD’s report. A more detailed article (covering six columns) appeared on page two under the headline: “Moroccan government implicated in cannabis trafficking according to confidential report”, and a sub-heading: “The report, which was commissioned by the European Union from the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory, says Morocco is the world’s leading exporter and the European market’s main supplier. It points to the direct responsibility of the sharif authorities in these lucrative activities”. A summary of the article also appeared in an introductory passage which read: “Drugs – Le Monde has obtained a copy of a confidential report sent to the European Union in 1994 in which the OGD says that ‘in just a few years Morocco has become the world’s leading cannabis exporter and the European market’s main supplier’. The report casts doubt on the sharif authorities’ determination to put an end to the trafficking, despite the ‘war on drugs’ they declared in a blaze of publicity in the autumn of 1992. Corruption guarantees the drug-trafficking rings the protection of officials ‘ranging from the humblest customs officer to the King’s inner circle ...’.” 14.  In a letter of 23 November 1995, the King of Morocco made an official request to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for criminal proceedings to be instituted against Le Monde. The request was forwarded to the Minister of Justice, who referred the matter to the Paris public prosecutor’s office, as required by section 48(5) of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881. 15.  Mr Colombani, the editor-in-chief of Le Monde, and Mr Incyan, the author of the article, were summoned to appear in the Paris Criminal Court on charges of insulting a foreign head of State. 16.  In a judgment of 5 July 1996, the Criminal Court found that the journalist had merely quoted extracts from what was undisputedly a reliable report, without distorting or misinterpreting it or making groundless attacks and, consequently, had pursued a legitimate aim. It accepted that he had acted in good faith and acquitted both him and Mr Colombani. 17.  The King of Morocco and the public prosecutor’s office appealed against that decision. 18.  In a judgment of 6 March 1997, the Paris Court of Appeal, while recognising that “informing the public about matters such as the international drug trade is obviously a legitimate aim for the press”, found that the desire to draw the public’s attention to the involvement of the royal entourage and to “the authorities’ accommodating attitude” that pointed to “tolerance on the part of the King ... was not entirely innocent”, since it was “tainted with malicious intent”. The articles in question contained “accusations of duplicity, artifice and hypocrisy that were insulting to a foreign head of State”. The circumstances taken as a whole excluded good faith on the part of the journalist: he had not established that he had “sought to check the accuracy of the OGD’s comments”; instead, he had simply reproduced its unilateral account of events, thus “propounding a theory that contained serious accusations”, without leaving any room for doubt about the reliability of the source. Nor had he sought to check whether the 1994 report remained valid in November 1995. The Court of Appeal noted that the journalist had not shown that he had “contacted any Moroccan dignitaries, officials, public authorities or services for an explanation for the failure to match words with deeds or even to obtain their observations on the tenor of the OGD’s report”. In addition, he had refrained from mentioning the existence of the White Paper published by the Moroccan authorities in November 1994 on “Morocco’s general policy on the prevention of drug trafficking and the economic development of the northern provinces”. 19.  The applicants were therefore found guilty of insulting a foreign head of State and sentenced to fines of 5,000 French francs (FRF) each. They were ordered to pay King Hassan II, who had successfully applied to be joined as a civil party to the proceedings, FRF 1 in damages and FRF 10,000 pursuant to Article 475-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Appeal also ordered Le Monde to make additional reparation in the form of a report publishing details of the convictions. 20.  The applicants appealed on points of law against that judgment. 21.  In a judgment of 20 October 1998, the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal, approving the Court of Appeal’s view that “what [made] the article insulting [was] the suspicion with which the King of Morocco’s determination to put an end to drug trafficking in his country [was] viewed, and the charge that pernicious statements had been made to dramatic effect solely in order to preserve the country’s image”, especially as the Court of Appeal had found that the charge of duplicity had been repeated twice and that the insistence on drawing the reader’s attention to the King in person, in an article that portrayed Morocco as the world’s leading hashish exporter and alleged direct responsibility on the part of the Moroccan government and members of the royal family, was tainted with malicious intent.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sombor, Serbia. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  On 24 February 2005 the applicant bought a store together with a plot of land from the P Company (plot A). 9.  As the owner of the above real estate, as well as of plots B and C, the P Company was burdened with a landed servitude (lični realni teret) in favour of third persons, requiring their life-long maintenance (doživotno izdržavanje). 10.  On the basis of the above contract, however, the servitude in question, being tied, inter alia, to plot A, was partly transferred to the applicant as its new owner. 11.  On 30 March 2005 the applicant and the P Company concluded a court-certified amendment to the contract of 24 February 2005. The P Company thereby accepted to reimburse the applicant for any payments made in connection with the said servitude. This entitlement was itself constituted as a separate landed servitude (easement, stvarni realni teret) tied to plots B and C and established in favour of the applicant as the current owner of plot A, as well as any future owners thereof. 12.  On 30 March 2005 the applicant filed a request with the Municipal Cadastre Office (Služba za katastar nepokretnosti) in Sombor, seeking registration of his easement. 13.  On 11 April 2005 the Municipal Cadastre Office rejected the applicant’s request, stating that the registration sought could not be granted in view of the relevant domestic law. 14.  On 18 July 2005 the applicant appealed against this decision. 15.  On 30 January 2006 the applicant supplemented his appeal with an expert opinion provided by a well-known domestic legal expert, according to whom the applicant’s entitlement of 30 March 2005 was an easement and, as such, had had to be registered by the Municipal Cadastre Office. The expert, retained by the applicant, further noted that the rights of the third persons in question remained unaffected, thus implying that their consent was not needed. 16.  On 29 May 2006 the legal branch of the Department of Geodesy (Republički geodetski zavod - sector za pravne poslove) confirmed the impugned decision of the Municipal Cadastre Office. It stated that the applicant had not offered any proof that the third persons in question had agreed to the arrangement reached on 24 February 2005 and 30 March 2005. It also noted that no judicial review by means of an administrative dispute was possible. 17.  Both the Municipal Cadastre Office and the Department of Geodesy are administrative authorities and, as such, part of the respondent State’s executive branch of government.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  Between 1991 and September 1997 the applicant and her minor son born in 1984 were officially registered as residents in a municipal hostel rented by the Municipal Post Office, the applicant’s employer, for its employees. Throughout this period, the Post Office, in fact, never provided the applicant with a room in this hostel, citing lack of available premises. The applicant and her son were allowed to occupy two beds in a hostel for single individuals managed by “D.H.”, another company. After the expiration of the residency registration, in October 1997 the applicant found an unoccupied room in the Post Office’s hostel and moved there with her son. 6.  On 28 November 1997 the Post Office brought eviction proceedings against the applicant (and her minor son) before the Starokyivsky District Court of Kyiv (Старокиївський районний суд м. Києва). 7.  On 10 December 1997 the Starokyivsky District Court of Kyiv, citing the lack of territorial jurisdiction, referred the case to the Leningradsky District Court of Kyiv (Ленінградський районний суд м. Києва). The latter, in turn, on 22 March 1998, transmitted the case to the Minsky District Court of Kyiv (“the District Court” Мінський районний суд м. Києва)[1]. 8.  On 4 June 1998 the applicant lodged a counter-claim, asserting her right to occupy the room in the Post Office’s hostel. 9.  In 1999 the Kyiv State Administration decided to convert the Post Office’s hostel into a municipal apartment building enabling its occupants to apply for life-long tenancies. 10.  On 20 January 2000 the District Court ordered the applicant’s and her son’s removal to the “D.H.’s” hostel and dismissed her counterclaim. The court found, in particular, that the applicant had never obtained proper authorisation to occupy the room in the Post Office’s hostel. On 29 March 2000 the Kyiv City Court (“the City Court”; Київський міський суд)[2] upheld this judgment on the applicant’s appeal in cassation, it became final and enforcement proceedings were instituted. 11.  On 25 September 2000 Deputy City Prosecutor ordered suspension of the enforcement proceedings. 12.  On 25 December 2000 the Presidium of the Kyiv City Court quashed the previous judgments following the protest introduced by the Deputy City Prosecutor and remitted the case to the District Court for a fresh consideration. The court found, in particular, that “D.H.” should have been summoned to the proceedings, as it was unclear whether the applicant had any right to reside in its hostel. 13.  On 25 December 2001 the District Court rejected the Post Office’s eviction claim, at the same time having refused to recognize the applicant’s right to occupy the room in its former hostel. It found that, although the applicant had no proper authorisation to move into the room at issue, she could not be evicted, as her status of a “D.H.” hostel resident had never been regularized and she had no alternative lodging. Both parties appealed. 14.  On 2 April 2002 the City Court quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration, having found, in particular, that the first-instance court had failed to instruct the applicant that, in view of the City Administration’s decision to convert the hostel into an apartment building, she could request to be issued with an authorisation for life-long tenancy. 15.  On 20 December 2002 the applicant amended her claims, seeking, in particular, to obtain authorisation of tenancy. Her son, having reached the age of majority, joined the proceedings. 16.  On 12 March 2003 the District Court dismissed the Post Office’s eviction claim and ordered the City Administration to issue the applicant with tenancy authorisation. The court found, in particular, that, having been registered as a resident in the Post Office’s hostel, the applicant had acquired the right to occupy a room in it as early as in 1991. The Post Office, however, had unlawfully failed to provide her with a room. The Post Office appealed. 17.  On 12 June 2003 the City Court quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It found, in particular, that the District Court’s conclusions concerning the applicant’s right to reside in the Post Office’s hostel were insufficiently reasoned. The applicant appealed in cassation against this ruling. 18.  On 15 September 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 19.  On 26 January 2005 the District Court rejected the Post Office’s eviction claim and upheld the applicant’s right to occupy the room. This judgment was not appealed against. 20.  In the course of the proceedings the District Court scheduled some sixty hearings. Some twelve of these hearings were adjourned on account of the applicant’s or her representative’s absences in court; eleven on account of the plaintiff’s absences or requests; and fifteen on account of judges’ vacations and various other court matters. 21.  The applicant also maintained, without providing details, that her employer was deliberately processing data on her family life in violation of the law, that the bailiffs had unlawfully interfered with her possessions during the enforcement proceedings and that her son had been unable for a prolonged period of time to receive a passport and to obtain access to professional education on account of lack of residency registration. The applicant did not raise any relevant complaints before the domestic judicial authorities.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2000 as an asylum seeker from Sierra Leone. Although her asylum claim was refused, she was granted exceptional leave to remain and then, in 2005, indefinite leave to remain. After she obtained indefinite leave to remain, she applied to have her son Mohamed Saliou Jalloh, a Sierra Leonean national born in 1994, join her in the United Kingdom. Her son arrived in January 2007, with conditional leave to remain in the United Kingdom, the condition being that he must not have recourse to public funds. He is considered as being “subject to immigration control” within the meaning of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996, as is the applicant (see paragraph 12 below). 7.  At the time of her son’s arrival in the United Kingdom, the applicant was renting a room in a private home. However, her landlord was unwilling to accommodate her son as well, and informed the applicant shortly after her son’s arrival that they would have to move out by 31 March 2007. The applicant applied to the London Borough of Southwark Council for assistance on 9 February 2007, on the basis that she had become unintentionally homeless. An unintentionally homeless person with a minor child would ordinarily qualify as being in priority need pursuant to section 189 of the Housing Act 1996 (see paragraph 13 below), and would thus be provided with suitable housing, usually within the locality. Those in priority need are considered to be a class of persons to whom reasonable preference must be given in the allocation of social housing. As there is a significant shortage of social housing in London, those in priority need would generally be placed in temporary accommodation until appropriate social housing became available. In the case of the applicant, however, as her son was subject to immigration control, he was disregarded by the Council in the determination of whether the applicant was in priority need, in accordance with section 185(4) of the Housing Act 1996. On 14 March 2007 the Council decided that the applicant was not therefore in priority need and not entitled to social housing. 8.  The applicant requested a review of this decision, which was carried out by a senior officer, who reiterated that persons subject to immigration control are not eligible for housing assistance and that persons who are not eligible for housing assistance shall be disregarded when determining whether another person has a priority need for accommodation. As the applicant’s son was not eligible, the applicant did not have a priority need. Consideration was also given to the question of whether the applicant was vulnerable for any other reason; however, it was found that the applicant was not hindered in the performance of everyday tasks by any medical problems and that she was no less able to fend for herself than the average person. There was therefore no special reason to find that she was entitled to homelessness assistance due to vulnerability. On 24 May 2007 the original decision was upheld. 9.  The Council assisted the applicant to find a private-sector tenancy in September 2007, which she accepted. The applicant and her son were not therefore at any point actually homeless. However, the private tenancy was more expensive than a social tenancy would have been, and was outside the Borough of Southwark and therefore far from the applicant’s previous employment and her son’s school. The applicant claimed that she had to give up her job after three months of commuting as she was unable to cope with the travel required, and that her son spent four hours per day travelling to and from school. 10.  The applicant, who had remained on the waiting list for social housing in the Borough of Southwark, obtained an offer of a social tenancy of a one-bedroom flat in March 2009. She and her son therefore moved back to Southwark.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Tirana. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application with the Lushnja Property Restitution and Compensation Commission (Komisioni i Kthimit dhe Kompensimit të Pronave – “the Commission”), seeking to have the property of her deceased relative, confiscated in 1949, returned to her. 8.  On 22 April 1994 the Commission upheld the application and recognised the applicant’s property rights over two villas and a three-storey building measuring 1,380 sq. m and a plot of land measuring 540 sq. m. 9.  As regards the three-storey building and one of the villas, the Commission decided to return the property to the applicant. As regards the other villa, the Commission recognised the applicant’s co-ownership with its existing occupier. However, as it was impossible to allocate the original plot of land measuring 540 sq. m to the applicant, the Commission ordered the payment of compensation in State bonds equivalent to the value of the plot. Lastly, the Commission ordered the authorities to enforce the decision. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a civil action with the Lushnjë District Court challenging the part of the Commission’s decision that recognised one of the villas as being jointly owned and claiming full ownership thereof. Notice of the proceedings was given to the existing occupier and the Commission. 11.  On 23 January 1996 the court upheld the applicant’s civil claim and granted her full ownership of the villa. The court did not rule on the part of the Commission’s decision relating to the compensation issue. 12.  On 10 May 1996, following an appeal by the defendant party, the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision. As no appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court, that decision became final and binding. 13.  On an unspecified date, following the enforcement of the court’s decision, the applicant took possession of the properties allocated to her, that is to say, the two villas and the three-storey building. 14.  In 2004, as no State bonds had been issued, the applicant wrote a letter to the Commission seeking a solution to the compensation issue in respect of his plot of land measuring 540 sq. m. She did not receive a reply to her letter. 15.  To date, the authorities have not provided compensation in respect of the plot of land measuring 540 sq. m, in spite of the Commission’s decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Zgierz. 5.  On 22 January 2004 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed extortion, car insurance fraud and bribery while acting in an organised criminal group. On 24 January 2004 the Zgierz District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered his detention on remand. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question, the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on him, the complexity of the case and the risk that he might tamper with evidence. 6.  On 27 January 2004 the Zgierz District Prosecutor ordered that the applicant’s assets be attached by way of an interim measure. 7.  On 15 April 2004 the Zgierz District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 July 2004. It repeated the grounds previously given for his detention. 8.  On 16 July 2004 the Zgierz District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 31 December 2004. On 20 December 2004 that court ordered his continued detention until 21 January 2005. The court emphasised that the grounds originally given for his detention were still valid. 9.  On 11 January 2005 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) extended the applicant’s detention until 30 June 2005. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, which was corroborated by evidence from witnesses and co-accused. It referred to the seriousness of the charges against him and the complexity of the case. The court made reference to the measures already taken in the investigation and indicated, in a detailed manner, the evidence that still had to be obtained. 10.  On 17 June 2005 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Zgierz District Court. The applicant was charged with one count of car insurance fraud committed in an organised criminal group. The bill of indictment was brought against 46 defendants. 11.  On 23 June 2005 the court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2005. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, the severity of the anticipated penalty and the volume of evidence obtained in the investigation. 12.  On 21 December 2005 the Łódź Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 30 June 2006. On 21 June 2006 it extended his detention until 30 October 2006. All the decisions reiterated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s detention, most notably the reasonable suspicion of his having committed the offences in question and the severity of the anticipated penalty which, in the courts’ opinion, justified keeping him in custody so as to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 13. The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent, numerous applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. In his applications and appeals, he argued that the charge against him was based on unreliable and contradictory evidence and he relied on his personal circumstances, in particular the need to provide care to his wife and their new-born child, his poor health and the fact that he did not have a previous criminal record. 14.  On 25 October 2006 the Łódź Court of Appeal refused the trial court’s application for the applicant’s detention to be extended further. The court held that the trial court had not proceeded speedily with the case, holding only two hearings per month. Moreover, the applicant was charged with one count of car insurance fraud; therefore, he could not be treated in the same manner as the other defendants. 15.  On 30 October 2006 the applicant was released. 16.  Between 17 June 2005 and 10 October 2006 the court held twenty-four hearings. 17.  The proceedings are apparently still pending. 18.  On 28 January 2004 the applicant’s wife asked the District Prosecution to allow her to visit him in prison. The application was dismissed on the same day without any reasons being given. 19.  Following applications of 4 and 29 March, 22 April, 25 May and 23 June 2004 she was allowed to visit the applicant in prison. On one occasion she was allowed to visit him with their child. 20.  On 29 April and 3 June 2004 the applicant’s mother asked the Regional Prosecution to allow her to visit him in prison. Her requests were dismissed on the ground that the applicant’s wife had already visited him and only one visit per month by a member of the family was allowed. 21.  On 30 July 2004 the applicant’s wife asked the District Prosecution to allow her to visit the applicant in prison. The application was dismissed on 2 August 2004 without any reasons being given. 22.  Following applications of 11 January, 2 February, 3 March, 5 April and 5 May 2005 she was allowed to visit the applicant in prison. On two occasions she was allowed to visit him with their child. 23.  The applicant failed to submit any information enabling the Court to establish whether his wife and child were allowed to visit him in 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  All applicants were former employees of “LETEKS” u stečaju (the debtor), which was, at the relevant time, a company predominantly comprised of socially-owned capital. 7.  Since the debtor failed to fulfil its contractual obligations towards employees, on unspecified date, the applicants instituted civil proceedings against it. 8.  On 18 April 2008 the Municipal Court in Leskovac ordered the debtor to pay them:\ni. the salary arrears due between 1 July 2001 and 13 July 2003, plus interest; and\nii. 376,520 Serbian Dinars (RSD) for their costs and expenses. 9.  On 3 October 2010 this judgment became final. 10.  In the period between 17 November 2008 and 16 December 2008 each applicant filed separate requests for the enforcement of the above judgment. 11.  The Municipal Court in Leskovac ultimately accepted the applicants’ requests and issued the enforcement orders respectively. The essential information as to the enforcement proceedings in respect of each application are indicated in the Annex. 12.  On 25 January 2011 the Commercial Court in Leskovac opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor (St. 47/2010). 13.  The applicants duly submitted their respective claims. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicants’ claims based on the judgment of 18 April 2008 were recognised. 15.  The insolvency proceedings against the debtor are still ongoing. 16.  On 5 December 2006 the debtor was privatised. 17.  On 8 April 2008 the contract for the sale of the debtor was annulled because the buyer in question had failed to fulfil his contractual obligations. 18.  As of June 2008 the debtor has been comprised of predominantly State-owned capital. 19.  On 31 October 2010, the applicants filed a constitutional appeal. 20.  The case is still pending before the Constitutional Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Düsseldorf. 5.  The applicant is the mother of E, born on 16 July 1984. Her husband, the father of E, died in 1986. In 1987 the applicant got acquainted with R, his wife G and their four children, who were also living in Dresden. The applicant and R started an intimate relationship which was tolerated by G. During that period, E was regularly taken care of by R and G. In November 1989 the applicant and R moved to Duisburg while E stayed in Dresden with G and the other children. The applicant and R regularly spent the weekends in Dresden with G and the children. 6.  In 1991 R and G moved with their children and E into a house in Ratingen while the applicant stayed in an apartment in Duisburg. 7.  In June 1991 the applicant concluded an agreement with R and G concerning E's care. The agreement indicated that E should continue to live with R and G as she had already done for three years. Subsequently, the relation between the applicant, R and G deteriorated and the applicant's attempts to visit E led to conflicts between them. 8.  In November 1991 the applicant filed an action with the Ratingen District Court (Amtsgericht) and requested that R and G be ordered to return E. In an expert opinion submitted on 20 July 1993 the court-appointed expert O., having examined the applicant, E, R, G and three of their children, considered that E repudiated the applicant and any relation to her family of origin. The expert considered that E had not formed any solid relations within the foster family and that the foster parents did not support her in her psychological development. The child's problems had not been caused by the fact that her mother, who had originally deserted her, now laid claims on her, but by the fact that the child had been torn into the adults' conflicts. She felt compelled to completely identify with the foster family and to suppress any individual emotions. This was aggravated by the fact that the foster family rejected the applicant, which was clear to the child even if it was not openly discussed within the family. The expert concluded that E was completely unable to cope with the current situation and that her stay with the foster family highly jeopardised her welfare. As there was no indication that R and G would change their attitude even if offered expert support, they were unfit to act as E's foster parents. The expert strongly recommended that E should be taken from the foster family and placed in a therapeutic environment where her return to her mother could be prepared. 9.  On 11 May 1994 the Ratingen District Court rejected the applicant's action and ordered that E should remain with the foster family (“Verbleibensanordung” pursuant to section 1632 § 4 of the Civil Code, see relevant domestic law, below). It considered that E suffered from severe personality disorders which originated from the fact that her mother had left her in 1989. In order to prevent E's absolute dislocation, she should stay with the foster family and undergo out-patient psychological treatment. 10.  On 22 August 1994 the Düsseldorf Regional Court (Landgericht) rejected the applicant's appeal. After having heard E, the court estimated that the foster parents had become E's reference persons. E had indicated that she wished to stay with the foster parents whom she called “mum and dad” and that she regarded the applicant merely as the person who had given birth to her. The court held that a break with the environment she had become familiar with during the last years would definitely endanger her welfare. 11.  On 20 May 1996 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) rejected the applicant's further appeal. 12.  On 2 June 1999 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) refused to admit her constitutional complaint. It pointed out that the impugned decisions did not meet the constitutional standards as the courts had not sufficiently justified why they had decided contrary to the expert recommendations. There were serious doubts whether the courts had respected the importance of parental rights when giving their decisions and whether they had sufficiently taken into account the principle of proportionality. However, having regard to the fact that the case was meanwhile pending again before the Regional Court and that the latter had ordered a new expert opinion (see paragraph 15, below), the rejection of her constitutional complaint would not entail any significant disadvantages. The new procedure was likely to respect the applicant's rights as a parent and to observe the principle of proportionality. 13.  On 24 May 1997 the applicant filed a further action with the Ratingen District Court requesting that the foster parents be ordered to return E and, alternatively, a decision granting her access to E. 14.  On 11 June 1997 the Ratingen District Court rejected the applicant's requests, withdrew her custody rights regarding the determination of the child's place of residence, her representation at school, her health care, the right to apply for public assistance and child benefits, and transferred these rights to the Ratingen Youth Office. The court observed that E had been living with the foster parents for eight years and that she considered the foster family as her own family. Since 1991, E had persistently refused to have any contact with the applicant and turned her back to her on the occasion of visiting contacts. Bearing in mind that E was thirteen years old, the court considered her will as a decisive factor in the decision-making process. The apprehensions raised in the expert opinion dated 20 July 1993 had been eliminated by the fact that the representative of the Youth Office attested that E had developed normally and that her current behaviour showed no disturbances. E's recent development confirmed that she benefited from the current situation because she was well-integrated in her family as well as in school. The court pointed out that a further expert opinion in this respect was thus not necessary. Furthermore, it had refrained from hearing E in order to spare her a further appearance before court. E had already testified on several occasions and – as the latest report of the Youth Office revealed – had not changed her attitude. In order to ensure E's proper medical care and her representation at school, it was necessary to transfer partial custody to the Youth Office pursuant to Section 1666 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – see relevant domestic law, below). Moreover, as the numerous attempts in the past to establish a contact between E and the applicant had failed, even with psychological supervision, the court refused to lay down any rules as to the applicant's visiting rights. It deemed it impossible to force the thirteen-year old child to have contact with her mother. 15.  On 16 June 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court's decision. On 20 November 1997 the Regional Court held an oral hearing. On 9 January 1998 the Regional Court commissioned the psychological expert V to examine whether the child E should remain with the foster family and which access rights could be granted to the applicant without jeopardising the child's well-being. On 26 January 1998 the foster parents' counsel brought a motion for bias against the expert V, which was dismissed by the Regional Court on 19 February 1998. On 9 May 1998 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal quashed this decision on the ground that the Regional Court had failed to hear the expert with respect to all of the allegations supporting the motion for bias. On 9 September 1998 the Regional Court, having heard the expert, once again dismissed the motion for bias. The foster parents' complaint against this decision was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 9 February 1999. 16.  Meanwhile, on 5 November 1998 and 28 December 1998, the applicant's counsel had asked for time-limits to be extended. 17.  On 4 March 1999 the Regional Court appointed a curator ad litem to represent E in the proceedings before that court. On 17 March 1999 the Regional Court rejected the foster parents' complaint. On 10 August 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court's decision on the ground that E's interests were sufficiently safeguarded by her being represented by the social worker H. 18.  On 22 March 1999 the expert V was delivered the case-file. On 22 March 1999 the social worker H, acting on E's behalf, lodged a complaint against the order to take evidence, which was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 1999 and by the Court of Appeal on 10 August 1999. Between 13 April and 13 December 1999 the expert held interviews with R, G, the child's curator at the Youth Office, the social worker H and E's school director and class teacher. E refused to take part in the examination. The foster parents attempted to avoid examination and many appointments had to be postponed. 19.  On 31 January and 11 April 2000 the Regional Court asked the expert when she would submit her expert opinion. 20.  On 17 May 2000 the expert submitted her opinion. She noted, at the outset, that the examination could only yield limited results because of the foster parents' refusal to let her inspect the family home and E's consistent refusal to take part in the examination. The expert further noted that E's class teacher described her as a quiet child who appeared to be absent and seemed to be unable to express her emotions. The expert considered that E felt deserted by the applicant and therefore denied any relationship to her. The foster parents appeared to have enforced her negative attitude towards her natural mother and to have, as early as 1991, done everything to keep E permanently within their family. It appeared that the foster parents had failed to encourage contacts between E and the applicant, but had rather tried to prevent such contacts. The adults' actions had not always been guided by the child's best interests, but rather by their desire to hurt one another. The expert further considered that the applicant understood and regretted her past shortcomings, but that she was not ready to respect E's wish to stay with the foster family. R and G, on the other hand, did not acknowledge any misconduct on their side. In spite of certain doubts, the expert considered that R and G were in principle capable of taking care of E. It appeared, however, that E, while experiencing some sort of continuity in the foster family, had not built up stable relationships and that she suppressed any relation to her family of origin. 21.  By way of conclusion, the expert considered it indispensable for the child's development that she was given the opportunity to face her past. It was of utmost importance for E's well-being to arrange contacts with her natural mother. The expert considered that E would be more open to such contacts if her wish to remain with the foster family was respected and if the judicial proceedings came to an end. Accordingly, the expert advised the court to order that E should remain with the foster family and to arrange supervised and gradually increasing contacts between E and the applicant. She further recommended that E be personally heard by the Regional Court, as it had not been possible to hear her during the examination. 22.   On 24 August 2000 the Regional Court held an oral hearing. As the foster parents had lodged a motion for bias against the expert, the Regional Court refrained from hearing the expert, as originally planned. The motion for bias was rejected on 2 November 2000. 23.  On 19 May 2001, following a further oral hearing held on 15 March 2001, the Düsseldorf Regional Court rejected the applicant's appeal. Referring to the expert opinion, the Regional Court considered that it was in E's best interest to remain with the foster family, where she had experienced, for the first time in her life, continuity. It further considered that this was also in accordance with E's own wishes and that E would reach her majority in little more than a year. On the basis of the expert opinion and taking into account E's refusal to have any contacts with the applicant, the Regional Court further considered that it would merely lead to further irritations if E was forced to have contact with her mother and therefore refrained from determining any visiting regulations. The Regional Court further noted that E had been originally willing to be heard by the court but had felt offended by a statement made by the applicant's counsel during a court hearing on 24 August 2000, who had alleged that the child would “end up in prostitution, alcohol- or drug addiction” if she remained in the foster family, and refused any further cooperation. Under these circumstances, the fact that E refused to be heard was at least partly imputable to the applicant's counsel's conduct. 24.   On 12 February 2002 the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's further appeal. The Court of Appeal noted, at the outset, that the proceedings before the Regional Court had lasted unduly long. This could, in general, not be accepted, in particular in proceedings which primarily concerned a child's well-being. The court considered, however, that many requests, motions for bias, requests for extensions of time-limits and complaints lodged both by the applicant and the foster parents considerably delayed the proceedings. In any event, an excessive length of the proceedings could not influence the outcome of the applicant's complaint. 25.  With regard to the substance of the applicant's complaint, the Court of Appeal considered that the decision that E should stay with her foster parents was in accordance with section 1632 § 4 of the Civil Code, because her removal would jeopardise the child's welfare, taking into account the further period of time which had elapsed since the Regional Court had given its decision and the fact that E would reach her majority within five months. The court did not approve that – ever since E's refusal to be heard by the Regional Court in August 2000 – the latter had failed to make further attempts to hear her and had failed, in particular, to summon her to the hearing in March 2001. The Court of Appeal presumed, however, that E's consistent refusal to see her mother since the time when she had been ten years old had been sufficient to convince the Regional Court that E would not be ready to accept any compromises. As E maintained her attitude before the Court of Appeal, that court also refrained from hearing E pursuant to section 50 b § 3 of the Act on Non-Contentions Proceedings (Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit – see relevant domestic law, below). The Court of Appeal further noted that the Federal Constitutional Court, in its decision given on 2 June 1999, had not given any binding guidelines for the present proceedings. 26.  The Court of Appeal finally considered that there was no room for a regulation on access rights for the remaining months until E would reach majority. It noted that E consistently rejected her mother and did not wish to have any contact with her. The Court of Appeal observed that the Regional Court might have given up prematurely in this respect and that it had failed to set a time-limit to the exclusion of access rights. However, given the lapse of time, it was not suitable to correct this decision, as the remaining five months would not suffice to start a pertinent therapy and instigate contacts between mother and daughter. 27.  On 9 July 2002 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's constitutional complaint. It pointed out that the length of the proceedings was very critical. It observed furthermore that the courts had failed to appoint an independent curator ad litem to represent E in the proceedings as provided for in Section 50 of the Act on Non-Contentious Proceedings. However, in view of the fact that E would reach her majority on 16 July 2002, the rejection of the constitutional complaint would not entail any significant disadvantage for the applicant. This decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 20 July 2002. 28.  On 30 October 2002 the Ratingen District Court decreed E's adoption by R and G. The applicant contested this decision before the Federal Constitutional Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Lublin. 5.  The applicant was arrested on 31 January 2001 on suspicion of fraud. On 2 February 2001 the Warsaw District Court ordered his detention on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed aggravated fraud. It relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that the applicant had been previously convicted. In addition, the District Court found that there was the risk that the applicant would abscond, given that he had no permanent abode in the country. 6.  On 27 April 2001 the District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 July 2001, relying on the same grounds as in the first detention order. It observed that the applicant had not registered a permanent residence anywhere in the country. 7.  On 9 May 2001 the applicant was questioned by the prosecutor. On 8 June 2001 the prosecutor ordered that evidence be obtained from psychiatrists to establish whether the applicant had acted in a state of diminished responsibility. The relevant reports were submitted on 18 June and 5 September 2001. 8.  On 20 July 2001 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it ruled that the prolongation of his detention was justified by the need to obtain further evidence. In its decision of 18 September 2001 prolonging the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2001, the District Court invoked for the first time the risk that the applicant might interfere with the proceedings and attempt to influence witnesses. 9.  On 10 November 2001 the prosecution filed with the Warsaw District Court a bill of indictment against the applicant and one other suspect. The applicant was charged with four counts of fraud. The prosecution requested the court to hear twenty-nine witnesses and two experts. 10.  On 22 November 2001 the District Court ordered that the applicant be held in detention until 30 April 2002. It considered that no other preventive measure could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, having regard to the severity of the penalty faced by the applicant and the fact that he had no permanent abode in Poland. 11.  On 25 April 2002 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 August 2002. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it held that there was a risk that the applicant might attempt to influence some of the witnesses who had been in close personal or business relations with him. 12.  On 20 June 2002 the trial court held the first hearing and heard evidence from the applicant and his co-accused. 13.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged on 28 August 2002 (until 31 January 2003). 14.  In the meantime the period of his detention pending trial had exceeded the two-year time-limit set out in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, on 28 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 31 July 2003. It found, inter alia, that the nature of the charge against the applicant might prompt him to influence the witnesses. In addition, it observed that the trial could not be concluded on account of the applicant’s conduct, and not for reasons attributable to the trial court. It also stated that the trial court should endeavour to conclude the trial by 31 July 2003. 15.  The applicant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by a different panel of the Court of Appeal on 4 March 2003. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant had attempted to influence the testimony of his wife as transpired from his letter to her which had been intercepted. Furthermore, it ruled that the applicant’s detention was justified by the fact that he had not lived at the place of his registered permanent residence and that he had been changing addresses and names of his companies without notifying creditors. The Court of Appeal also found that the prolongation was justified by the complexity of the case and the volume of evidence to be heard. 16.  On 7 March 2003 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for the trial court’s judges to withdraw from examining his case. 17.  From 23 April to 14 May 2003 the applicant underwent medical treatment in the Łódź Detention Centre. Hearings scheduled for 7 and 13 May 2003 were cancelled due to the applicant’s treatment. 18.  On 25 July 2003 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 31 October 2003, invoking the same grounds as previously. 19.  On 24 October 2003 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2003. It found that a judgment could not be delivered before 31 October 2003 because of the illness of a lay member of the trial court and a problem with securing the presence of an important witness. 20.  The trial court held about 23 hearings. Four hearings (25 April and 23 May 2002; 10 March, 15 April 2003) were adjourned because the applicant had not been brought by the police to court from a detention centre. It appears that seven hearings were adjourned due to the absence of the applicant’s counsel (25 April, 28 August, 2 October, 22 November and 17 December 2002; 20 and 26 March 2003). Three further hearings were adjourned on account of the illness of a lay judge (18 July and 20 November 2002; 25 September 2003). One hearing was adjourned at the applicant’s request (15 January 2003). On 23 April 2003 the trial court adjourned the hearing due to the absence of witnesses. 21.  During the investigation and the trial the applicant filed a number of unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against decisions prolonging his detention. 22.  On 27 October 2003 the Warsaw District Court delivered its judgment. It convicted the applicant of three counts of fraud and sentenced him to six years and six months’ imprisonment and a fine. 23.  The applicant appealed. On 3 August 2004 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 24.  On 12 January 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded. 25.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant filed with the President of the Warsaw Regional Court a complaint about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time and asked for compensation. He relied specifically on section 18 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”) which entered into force on 17 September 2004. 26.  However, on 13 January 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court decided not to take cognisance of the applicant’s complaint, pursuant to section 5 of the 2004 Act. It held that the complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings had to be lodged during the course of the impugned proceedings. However, in the applicant’s case the complaint could not be examined since the impugned proceedings were terminated by the judgment of the Warsaw Regional Court of 3 August 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Prague. She is the co-owner of a building and plot of land in the Strakonice region. 5.  On 21 September 1988 the other owner instituted civil proceedings before the Strakonice District Court, seeking the termination of the co-ownership arrangement and the assignment of entire property to him. On 31 October 1988 the District Court heard the co-owner. Another hearing was scheduled for 16 November 1988 but, as the applicant failed to attend, it was adjourned. On 13 December 1988 the applicant was heard by the Prague 6 District Court at the request of the Strakonice District Court. 6.  On 14 February 1989 the District Court appointed an expert in order to determine the manner in which the property should be divided. The report was submitted on 6 April 1989. 7.  Three other hearings were held by the District Court on 23 and 30 October 1990 and 7 January 1991. 8.  On 18 July 1991 the District Court ordered an on-site visit to the property. 9.  On 16 March and 14 April 1992 the applicant requested the District Court to explain why her case was not progressing. On 4 September 1992 she filed a complaint with the Ministry of Justice alleging unreasonable delays in the proceedings. 10.  On 25 September 1992 the President of the České Budějovice Regional Court (krajský soud) admitted that her complaint was justified, but explained that the District Court had serious staffing problems. 11.  On 17 June 1993 the applicant again complained of delays to the President of the Regional Court. 12.  On 9 July 1993 a geometric plan was submitted upon the District Court's request of 7 May 1992. 13.  On 5 August 1993 the District Court held a hearing at which the applicant presented her proposal for the division of the property. She finalised her proposal on 23 August 1993. Another hearing was held on 30 September 1993, but was adjourned because the professional licence of the expert had to be verified. 14.  On 25 October 1993 the District Court carried out an on-site visit to the property. On the same day, it adjourned the proceedings pending the production of the reports on the division of the property and its value. 15.  On 6 June 1994 the court appointed an expert to assess the value of the property. 16.  The next hearing was held before the District Court on 27 July 1995. At that hearing the parties disagreed on how to divide the property and settle the co-ownership issue. 17.  On an unspecified date in 1994 the case was assigned to another judge. 18.  A hearing held on 1 August 1995 was adjourned because a new expert had to be appointed to determine the manner in which the property should be divided. 19.  On 16 February 1996 the applicant complained of delays in the proceedings to the Regional Court and, on 7 March 1996, to the President of the District Court. On 28 February 1996 she was informed by the latter that the length of the proceedings was due to the complex nature of the case and the judge's inexperience. 20.  On 12 April 1996 the District Court appointed a third expert to determine the manner in which the property should be divided. A hearing held on 23 June 1996 was adjourned because the expert report had not yet been submitted. This report was submitted on 24 July 1996 and sent to the applicant on 14 October 1996. The latter challenged the expert's impartiality on 19 November 1996. On 10 December 1996 the other owner of the property submitted his comments on the evaluation made of the property. 21.  On 30 April and 23 June 1997 two hearings were held by the District Court which, on 28 August 1997, appointed an expert to carry out an on-site examination of the property by 17 October 1997. According to the Government, these hearings were adjourned at the applicant's request. On 23 October 1997 the expert submitted his conclusions. 22.  On 25 February 1998 the court held a hearing at which the expert was heard. The hearing was then adjourned because a new expert had to be appointed to determine the value of the property. The applicant was invited to submit her opinion in this connection. She submitted her opinion on 30 July 1998, after having been urged to so. On 16 October 1998, after the case had been assigned to a third judge, an on-site examination of the property was carried out on 14 October 1998 in the presence of the expert. On 3 November 1998 the court ordered an expert report to evaluate the property. 23.  On an unspecified date in 1999 the case was assigned to a fourth judge. 24.  On 15 February 1999 the expert on property division matters inspected the premises. On 9 March 1999 he presented his report to the court which, on 12 July 1999, held a hearing. On 30 August 1999 it appointed, at the parties' suggestion, an expert to assess the market value of the property and its sale price. On 11 November 1999 the expert submitted his report. According to the Government, the applicant's proposal to commission a new expert report was dismissed. 25.  On 12 January 2000 a hearing was held before the District Court, but the applicant could not attend since he was ill. Another hearing took place on 10 February 2000 and was adjourned until 12 May 2000. 26.  By a judgment of 17 July 2000 the court terminated the co-ownership, assigning the property to the other owner, who was ordered to pay CZK 127,500 (4,060 euros (EUR)) to the applicant in compensation for her share of the property. 27.  On 2 March 2001 the Regional Court upheld the merits of this judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lived in Bolshaya Kivara in the Republic of Udmurtiya before his arrest. 5.  On 13 July 2005 the applicant was arrested and charged with murder. 6.  On 18 April 2006 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya, at final instance, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years and six months’ imprisonment. 7.  During several periods between 13 July 2005 and 19 January 2007, for a total length of sixty-one day, the applicant was held in IVS Votkinsk, a temporary detention facility located in the Udmurtiya Republic. According to the applicant and the statements by his three cellmates, the conditions of detention in that facility were as follows. The applicant’s cell, located on the basement floor, was overcrowded: it measured 8 sq. m and accommodated up to five inmates. There were no individual beds, mattresses or bed linen. The detainees were afforded one meal per day. No outdoor exercise was available to them. 8.  On 14 July 2005 the sanitary-epidemiological service inspected the detention facility. In their report, drafted on the same day, they noted that the IVS held sixty-three detainees which was nearly twice its design capacity, that there was no heating and restricted access to daylight. The general sanitary state of the facility was poor. The service recommended to the management of the facility to bring the conditions in line with the legal requirements. 9.  It appears that the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to various authorities. In his reply of 27 November 2006 the local prosecutor acknowledged some of his claims and informed the applicant that he had directed the management of the detention facility to upgrade the conditions. 10.  On 23 October 2007 the Votkinsk Town Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya examined the applicant’s civil action in connection with inadequate conditions of detention. It found that a part of the allegations, in particular those concerning an overcrowding of the facility, a lack of bedding and poor sanitary conditions, were substantiated but rejected the claim. 11.  On 19 June 2006 the applicant lodged his first letter to the Court, complaining about violations of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in the criminal proceedings against him. 12.  On 17 August 2006 the applicant despatched the completed application form. 13.  In his letter of 3 April 2007 the applicant gave a detailed account of the conditions of his detention in IVS Votkinsk, alleging that they violated Article 3 of the Convention. 14.  By letter of 23 May 2012, the Registry informed the applicant that his complaint had been more than ten pages long and, referring to the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Practice Direction on Institution of Proceedings, requested him to submit a summary application form listing the complaints which he wished to pursue. 15.  Complying with the above request, on 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged the application form. It contained, in particular, the complaint about the conditions of his detention in IVS Votkinsk.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Chmielno. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied to the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation (“the Foundation”) for compensation on the ground that he and his parents had been deported to Germany with a view to performing forced labour in agriculture. That request was made under the scheme for slave and forced labourers (“the second compensation scheme”) established under the Joint Statement of 17 July 2000, the German Law of 2 August 2000 on the Creation of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation (“the German Foundation Act”; “the GFA”) and the subsequent Agreement of 16 February 2001 between the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation (“the German Foundation”) and the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation. 7.  On 3 September 2003 the Foundation's Verification Commission decided that the applicant was not eligible for compensation. It informed him that under section 11 of the GFA only those forced labourers who had been deported to Germany or to an area occupied by it had been eligible for compensation. In the case of citizens of the Third Reich or persons placed on the List of German Nationals (Deutsche Volksliste; niemiecka grupa narodowościowa) their assignment to work by the German authorities was not considered compulsory. The Verification Commission established on the basis of documentary evidence that the applicant's parents had been placed on the List of German Nationals and that accordingly their assignment to work in Germany had not been compulsory. 8.  On 27 October 2003 the applicant appealed against that decision. He strongly contested the Verification Commission's finding that the assignment to work of the persons who had belonged to the German Nationals' List had not been compulsory. He submitted that the farm of his parents had been sequestered by the German authorities without compensation. Subsequently, the applicant and his parents had been placed in the Jabłonów germanization camp. On account of his internment in the camp as a child the applicant was granted a veteran status by the Polish authorities. The applicant further argued that the seizure of his parents' prosperous farm without payment of compensation had been certainly effected against their will, as had been their transfer to work on a farm in Germany. He submitted that the placement on the German Nationals' List had resulted in most cases from various forms of coercion, in particular in Silesia and Pomerania where his family had been from. He concluded that his and his parents' deportation to perform forced labour in Germany had been compulsory. 9.  On 20 August 2004 the Foundation's Appeal Commission dismissed the applicant's appeal. It reiterated that the applicant had not met the conditions specified in section 11 of the GFA. The Appeal Commission did not reason its decision. 10.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant filed an appeal against that decision with the Appeal Commission for transmission to the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. Since the appeal had not been transmitted, on 3 October 2005 the applicant made an application to the administrative court to impose a fine on the Appeal Commission. 11.  On 19 October 2005 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected his application, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to examine appeals against decisions or inactivity of the Foundation. The court relied on the Supreme Administrative Court's Resolution of 3 December 2001 (no. OPS 3/01; see paragraph 37 below). 12.  On 6 January 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Regional Administrative Court's decision. 13.  On 18 April 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging that the exclusion of the administrative court's jurisdiction in respect of the Foundation's decision had violated Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution, that provision guaranteeing access to court. 14.  On 14 November 2007 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings on procedural grounds (case no. SK 53/06). It found that the claimant had not obtained a “final decision” within the meaning of Article 79 of the Constitution, since he had mistakenly seized the administrative courts and not the civil courts to pursue his appeal against the Foundation's decision. The Constitutional Court relied on the constitutional presumption in favour of jurisdiction of the civil courts and the Supreme Court's Resolution of 27 June 2007 (see paragraph 38 below).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicants were born in 1930 and 1933 respectively and live in Bucharest. 9.  The facts of the case specific to each application, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10.  In 1996 the applicants brought before the Bucharest District Court an action for recovery of possession in respect of property that had been nationalised by Decree no. 92/1950. Situated in Bucharest, at 184-B Calea Griviţei, the property consisted of a house divided into flats and the land on which it was built. At the time, one of the flats was occupied by E.D. under a tenancy agreement entered into with the State in 1986 and extended until 8 April 1999 pursuant to Law no. 17/1994 of 18 April 1994. 11.  In a final judgment of 2 April 1997, the court allowed the applicants’ action on the ground that the nationalisation of the property had been illegal and ordered the competent administrative authorities to return the property to them. On that date the applicants began to pay the rates and land taxes levied on their property.\n(b)  Steps taken to enter into a tenancy agreement with the tenant E.D. 12.  On 26 August 1998 the applicants notified E.D. of the judgment of 2 April 1997 through the intermediary of a bailiff and by registered letter with return receipt, in accordance with Law no. 114/1996 of 11 October 1996. In their notice, the applicants requested E.D. to enter into a tenancy agreement with them, as the new owners of the flat that E.D. occupied, and informed her, for the payment of the rent, of the details of a bank account in their names with the Savings Bank. 13.  In May 1999, after the entry into force of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 40/1999 of 8 April 1999, the applicants visited E.D., who had declined to respond to their request, with a view to entering into a tenancy agreement with her; they were faced with a categorical refusal on the part of E.D.\n(c)  First set of eviction proceedings against E.D. 14.  On 25 August 1999 the applicants brought proceedings for the eviction of E.D. in the Bucharest District Court. They claimed that E.D. was occupying their property without any right of tenancy and had refused to enter into a tenancy agreement with them or to pay them rent in that connection. They further complained that E.D. had been breeding pigs in the basement of the house, thus damaging it and rendering it insalubrious. 15.  In a judgment of 9 January 2000, the District Court granted their application and ordered the eviction of E.D. from the disputed property. It found that E.D. had not requested an extension of her tenancy of the flat occupied by her and her family, which she had been entitled to do under Article 2 of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 40/1999 and which would have enabled her to enter into an agreement with the new landlords. The court further observed that the applicants had not complied with the obligation under Article 10 § 1 of the Ordinance to notify the tenant, within a period of thirty days from the entry into force of the Ordinance, through the intermediary of a bailiff and by registered letter with return receipt, of the date and place fixed for the signing of a tenancy agreement. 16.  Whilst the court observed that, under Article 11 § 1 of the Ordinance, failure by a landlord to comply with those formalities resulted in the extension of the previous tenancy until the signing of a new agreement, it nevertheless considered that this provision was not applicable in the present case in view of the exception provided for by Article 13 (d) of the Ordinance whereby there was no extension in the event of a dispute arising from a tenant’s refusal to enter into a tenancy agreement with the new landlord. The court thus considered that the applicants had adduced evidence of the refusal by E.D. to enter into such an agreement. Accordingly, it held that that existing tenancy agreement had not been extended and that E.D. was occupying the applicants’ property without any right of tenancy. 17.  In a judgment of 11 May 2000, the Bucharest County Court upheld the merits of that judgment on appeal. It considered that the court below had correctly applied Article 13 (d) of the Ordinance, finding that the existing tenancy agreement had not been extended in view of the refusal by E.D., as proven by the applicants, to enter into a new agreement with them as the new landlords. 18.  In a final judgment of 26 September 2000, the Bucharest Court of Appeal granted an appeal by the defendant and dismissed the applicants’ action. It found that the applicants had failed to comply, when serving their notice on E.D. requesting her to enter into a tenancy agreement, with the conditions and formalities laid down in Article 10 § 1 of the Ordinance, and accordingly held that the existing tenancy agreement between E.D. and the State had been automatically extended pursuant to Article 11 § 1 of the Ordinance. The reasoning in the judgment made no mention of the applicability in the present case of Article 13 (d) of the Ordinance.\n(d)  Action for damages against E.D. for deprivation of possession 19.  On 9 August 2001 the applicants brought proceedings against E.D. seeking from her the payment of compensation for having deprived them of the enjoyment of the flat in their house that the defendant had occupied since 1998 without paying them any rent. 20.  In a judgment of 30 November 2001, the Bucharest District Court dismissed their application on the ground that the defendant had a tenancy agreement with the State, which had been extended automatically as the applicants had failed to comply with the formalities provided for in Article 10 § 1 of the Ordinance. That judgment became final on an undetermined date, after being upheld by the Bucharest County Court on an appeal by the applicants.\n(e)  Second set of eviction proceedings against E.D. 21.  On 8 August 2001 the applicants brought eviction proceedings against E.D. in the Bucharest District Court on the ground that she had been occupying a flat, of which they were the owners, without paying them any rent, and that her conduct was such that her cohabitation with the other occupants of the building had become impossible. The applicants indicated that, after they had been granted the return of their property by the final judgment of 2 April 1997, they had made a number of attempts to enter into a tenancy agreement with the defendant, who had constantly behaved aggressively towards them, but had been unsuccessful. They referred to a number of complaints that they had filed against E.D. with law-enforcement agencies. They relied on section 24(b) of Law no. 114/1996 taken in conjunction with Article 13 (i) of the Ordinance. 22.  In a judgment of 14 September 2001, the Bucharest District Court dismissed their action as manifestly ill-founded. It considered that, as it concerned the termination of a tenancy agreement, they should have proved that they had entered into such an agreement with the defendant and that there were circumstances which rendered her cohabitation with the other occupants of the building impossible, but that they had failed to adduce such evidence. The reasoning in this judgment made no reference to the applicants’ complaint concerning E.D.’s failure to pay rent. 23.  The applicants appealed against that judgment. In a final judgment of 15 February 2002, the Bucharest County Court granted their application. It held that E.D. had been occupying their property without any right of tenancy, taking into account the fact that the defendant had prevented the connection of the flat to the town gas network and had impeded the use by the other tenants of the common parts of the building, as a result of which her tenancy agreement was not being automatically extended. The court consequently ordered her eviction from the flat that she had been occupying in the applicants’ building. 24.  On 13 September 2002 the applicants lodged an action for eviction against the members of E.D.’s family who had been living with her in the flat. Their application was granted by a final judgment of 11 November 2002, which ordered the eviction from the flat of the members of E.D.’s family. 25.  On 23 September 2003 a bailiff from the Bucharest District Court’s service for the execution of judgments went to the applicants’ flat and restored possession of the premises to them after breaking the locks on the front door to gain access. The bailiff noted in the record drawn up that day that serious damage had been done to the flat, in which several window panes were missing or broken. 26.  The applicants never received any rent for the flat which E.D. had occupied in their building between 2 April 1997 and 23 September 2003.\n...", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Tirana. 6.  On 15 March 2008 a massive explosion occurred at a demilitarisation facility. The explosion claimed 26 lives. Two hundred and sixty-five other persons were either grievously or lightly wounded and a number of nearby buildings was heavily damaged. The demilitarisation process was carried out by a private commercial company, whose administrator the applicant was. 7.  Following the explosion, the prosecutor started criminal proceedings against the applicant and 28 other persons. 8.  On 17 March 2008 the applicant was remanded in custody. The District Court imposed no time-limits on the length of his detention. It appeared that he was suspected of having committed the criminal offences of murder in aggravating circumstances of more than two persons, destruction of property with explosives and breach of the rules on explosive, flammable or radioactive substances” contrary to Articles 79 (dh) and (ë), 152 and 282 of the Criminal Code. 9.  On 13 March 2009 the prosecutor sent the case against the applicant and the other co-accused for examination to the Supreme Court, since one of the co-accused was a Member of Parliament (MP) as well as a Cabinet Minister. 10.  On 22 May 2009 the Supreme Court decided to sever the proceedings against the MP, who also was a Cabinet Minister, from those against the applicant and the other co-accused. 11.  On 11 June 2009 the case file against all co-accused, including the applicant, was registered with the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”) for examination. 12.  On 19 July 2010 the applicant requested his release on the ground that the time-limits laid down by Articles 262 and 263 § 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) had expired. He argued that the prescribed time-limit started to run from 13 March 2009, the date on which the case was sent for examination to the Supreme Court. 13.  On 23 July 2010 the Tirana District Court, in an interlocutory decision, rejected the request. It considered that, since the time-limit had started to run from 11 June 2009, the date on which the case file was registered at its registry and, since it had been stayed or prolonged on account of other interlocutory decisions, the time-limit had not yet expired. 14.  On 6 August 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision. 15.  On 3 November 2010 the Supreme Court quashed both decisions. It reasoned that Article 263 of the CCP provided for three time-limits: the first running from the date of an accused’s arrest to the date the file is transferred to the first-instance court (Article 263 § 1 of the CCP); the second running from then to the date of delivery of the decision by that court (Article 263 § 2 of the CCP); and the third running from then to the date of delivery of the appellate court’s decision (Article 263 § 3 of the CCP). According to the Supreme Court, in the applicant’s case, the first time-limit ended on 13 March 2009 when the case was sent to the Supreme Court (Article 263 § 1 of the CCP). On that date, the second time-limit before the first-instance court began to run (Article 263 § 2 of the CCP), since the Supreme Court was hearing the case as a first-instance court, one of the co-accused being an MP and a Cabinet Minister. Even though the proceedings against the MP were disjoined from those against the applicant and other co-accused, the period between 13 March 2009 and 11 June 2009, the date on which the case file against the applicant was registered with the District Court, should be taken into account for the purposes of the time-limit prescribed by Article 263 § 2 of the CCP. The Supreme Court indicated that the time-limit set out in Article 265 of the CPP should be deducted from the running of the time-limit prescribed by Article 263, if the stay was attributed, inter alia, to one of the co-accused or his lawyer. For the above reasons, the Supreme Court remitted the case for re-hearing by a different bench.\nRe-hearing proceedings 16.  On 25 November 2010 the applicant’s lawyer, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 November 2010, requested, in writing, the applicant’s release. He argued that his lawful pre-trial detention period had been exceeded by 81 days. 17.  On 26 November 2010 the District Court rejected the request arguing that it had not been submitted in writing in accordance with the law. The applicant appealed. 18.  On 17 December 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision and remitted the case for a re-hearing by a different bench. It found that the District Court had failed to carry out any of the tasks delegated by the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 November 2010. 19.  The applicant appealed on the ground that the Court of Appeal should have examined the case itself instead of delaying the proceedings. 20.  On 27 January 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. 21.  On 16 February 2011 the District Court discontinued the proceedings (pushimi i gjykimit) having regard to its decision of 7 February 2011 (see paragraph 25 below). 22.  On 6 December 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a second request for the applicant’s release on the ground that the time-limits laid down by Articles 262 and 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP had expired. 23.  On the same day the District Court, in an interlocutory decision, rejected the request. It ruled that the time-limit had started to run from 11 June 2009, the date on which the case file was registered with it. It had been stayed for a period of 8 months and 12 days. Consequently, the District Court stated that there remained 2 months and 18 days of pre-trial detention until the expiry of the twelve-month time-limit as provided for by Article 263 § 2 (c). As regards the findings of the Supreme Court on 3 November 2010, the District Court stated that they were binding on the bench re-hearing the case and not on a court hearing a separate request for release. 24.  On 7 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer requested the applicant’s release on the ground that the time-limits laid down by Articles 262 and 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP had expired. 25.  On the same day, in an interlocutory decision, the District Court ordered the applicant’s immediate release and his placement under house arrest in accordance with Article 266 § 1 of the CCP. No further reasons were given. The District Court relied on the Supreme Court decision of 2 February 2011 which had ordered the release of another co-accused who had been detained on the same day as the applicant, because the pre-trial detention time-limits, laid down in Article 263 § 2 (c), had expired (see paragraph 31 below). It accepted that the time-limit had started to run from 13 March 2009 and had exceeded the twelve-month period prescribed by law. The decision did not indicate the expiry date of the time-limit. The prosecutors appealed. 26.  It would appear that the applicant was immediately placed under house arrest. 27.  On 11 March 2011, following the prosecutor’s appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision. 28.  On 9 May 2011, following the prosecutor’s appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decision. 29.  On 24 November 2010 the District Court rejected a co-accused’s request for release on the ground that the time-limit for his detention “pending trial” had expired. In interpreting article 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP, the District Court argued that the time-limit had started to run from 11 June 2009, the date when the case file was registered with its registry. It further held that the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 November 2010 was not binding on that bench (see paragraph 15 above). 30.  On 17 December 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision. 31.  On 2 February 2011 the Supreme Court granted the co-accused’s appeal against the lower courts’ decisions. In interpreting Article 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP, the Supreme Court held that the period of detention “pending trial” had started to run on 13 March 2009, when the prosecutor had registered the case for examination with that court, which had examined it as a first-instance court in accordance with Article 75 (b) of the CCP. 32.  The Supreme Court further referred to its decision of 3 November 2010, which had already directed the lower courts to calculate the period of detention “pending trial”, but had been disregarded by the District Court in that set of proceedings. The Supreme Court ordered the co-accused’s placement under house arrest. 33.  On 12 March 2012, in a lengthy decision, the Tirana District Court found the applicant guilty of a “breach of the rules on explosive, flammable or radioactive substances” – contrary to Article 282 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. All parties appealed. 34.  On 13 February 2013 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the decision. However, it reduced the applicant’s sentence by one third on account of the use of the summary procedure. 35.  The applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court on 19 July 2013. 36.  On 14 February 2013, in a letter about the execution of the sentence, the prosecutor’s office stated that the applicant’s pre-trial detention period from 17 March 2008 to 7 February 2011 was to be counted as a period of four years and four months’ imprisonment in accordance with the law. To that period, had to be added two years and six days, during which period the applicant had been under house arrest. In total, the applicant had served six years, four months and six days’ imprisonment. Consequently, the remaining sentence to be served by the applicant was three months and twenty-four days’ imprisonment. 37.  On 18 March 2013 the District Court, having regard to the applicant’s good conduct, reduced his sentence by 70 days. 38.  On 19 March 2013 the applicant was released from prison, having served the remainder of his sentence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Nicosia. 8.  The applicant was born and grew up in Ayios Amvrosios, a village in the District of Kyrenia. In 1973 he moved his residence to Kyrenia. During the military intervention of July 1974, Turkish troops evicted the applicant and his family from their home and forced them to leave Kyrenia and flee to the south. 9.  The applicant claimed that he had real properties in northern Cyprus. He produced affirmations of ownership issued by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus, according to which he was the owner of the following properties:\n(a)  Kyrenia, Klepini, Boumbourka, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/33, plot no. 72, area: 2,784 sq. m, share: whole;\n(b)  Kyrenia, Ayios Epiktitos, Karamanou Quarter, field with trees, sheet/plan 12/32, plot no. 235, area: 539 sq. m, share: whole;\n(c)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Alakati tou Platymati, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/19, plot no. 220/2, area: 7,078 sq. m, share: whole;\n(d)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vasilion, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/20, plot no. 63, area: 3,365 sq. m, share: whole;\n(e)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vasilion, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/20, plot no. 130, area: 3,301 sq. m, share: whole;\n(f)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vasilion, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/20, plot no. 151, area: 365 sq. m, share: whole;\n(g)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Platanos, garden and cultivated field, sheet/plan 13/22, plot no. 524, area: 55 sq. m, share: whole;\n(h)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vrysi tou Potamou, freshwater spring, sheet/plan 13/22, plot no. 608/1, share: whole;\n(i)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Mangou, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/31, plot no. 34, area: 3,819 sq. m, share: whole;\n(j)  Kyrenia, Pano Kyrenia, house with yard (ground level), No. 7, Demosthenous Street, sheet/plan 12/20, plot no. 34, area: 785 sq. m, share: whole. 10.  The applicant alleged that the house described under paragraph 9 (j) above had been his permanent residence. He lived there with his wife Sophia Andreou Ioannou (the applicant in application no. 18360/91), his son Michael Michael (the applicant in application no. 18361/91) and his daughter Christina Michael. 11.  Following the 1974 intervention and the ensuing Turkish military occupation, the applicant was deprived of access to and the use of his property. He participated in various peaceful demonstrations and marches towards his village. On all occasions he was prevented from walking home by the Turkish troops. 12.  On 9 December 1990 the applicant made one further attempt to return to his home and property in Kyrenia and Ayios Amvrosios by participating in a convoy of cars of fellow refugees intending to return home. 13.  The applicant and his fellow refugees, who had informed the Commander of the United Nations (UN) forces in Cyprus of their intentions, arrived at the check point in the \"buffer zone\", on the main road which links Nicosia with Ayios Amvrosios and Kyrenia. There, they asked the UN officer on duty to be allowed to return to their homes, property and villages. They requested the same officer to forward their demand to the Turkish military authorities. The officer replied that the latter had refused their request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Štip. 6.  On 11 November 1996 the applicant, a farmer who reared cows, concluded an insurance agreement (полиса за осигурување) (“the agreement”) with an insurance company (“the defendant”) against a risk of the cows' death under which the latter would be liable to pay the damage, irrespective of the time of the death, if it was caused by reasons other than illness. On 23 November 1996 one of the applicant's cows died. Since the defendant refused to pay for the loss, on 30 January 1997 the applicant brought a claim against the defendant before the Štip Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”). 7. On 1 March 1997 the trial judge's wife was employed with the defendant as an assistant to the manager of its branch office. 8. On 30 January 1998 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant's claim. 9. The applicant appealed, arguing, amongst other things, that the first-instance court had arbitrarily given weight to evidence in favour of the defendant and that it had refused to examine witnesses as to the cause of death. 10. On 17 June 1998 the Štip Court of Appeal quashed the court of first instance's decision, instructing it to hear evidence from the vet who had examined the cow in order to determine the cause of the death. 11. On 28 March 2000 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant's claim, reiterating its earlier findings. 12. On 20 June 2000 the applicant appealed, arguing that he had never received a copy of the general terms of the contract, and that the cause of death had not been properly established. He also contended that that judge was biased since his wife had started working with the defendant just after the proceedings had started. He asked for the trial judge to be removed if the Court of Appeal were to quash the lower court's decision and remit the case 13. On 27 November 2000 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the lower court. It did not make any comments on the applicant's allegations that the trial judge was biased. 14. The decision was served on the applicant on 24 April 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Konotop. 6.  On 8 January 2009 the Konotop Transport Prosecutor’s Office of the Sumy Region instituted proceedings against the applicant, then an officer of the Konotop Transport Police, on suspicion of abuse and exceeding his authority with respect to Mr Z. 7.  On 9 January 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken to the Konotop Temporary Detention Facility (“the ITT”). 8.  On 12 January 2009 the Konotop Court examined the applicant’s complaint against his arrest and the investigator’s request for the applicant’s detention. The court rejected the applicant’s complaint and extended his detention for up to ten days. 9.  On 17 January 2009 the applicant was charged with abuse and exceeding his authority. 10.  On 19 January 2009 the Konotop Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the grounds that he was accused of a serious offence related to corruption which had become publicly known, that being at large he could evade investigation, continue his criminal activities and influence persons related to the investigation, and that his state of health was compatible with detention. 11.  The same day, the applicant’s lawyer appealed against the above decision. 12.  On 26 January 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”). 13.  On 3 February 2009 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the decision of 19 January 2009. 14.  On 5 March 2009 the Zarichnyy District Court of Sumy extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention for up to three months. The court noted that the applicant was accused of a serious offence and if released could evade investigation and trial, obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case, influence witnesses and victims. This decision was upheld by the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) on 24 March 2009. 15.  On 3 April 2009 the investigator brought additional charges against the applicant for misappropriation of money and documents. 16.  On 7 April 2009 the Zarichnyy District Court of Sumy extended the applicant’s detention for up to four months on the same grounds as in its decision of 5 March 2009. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 28 April 2009. 17.  On 6 May 2009 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention for up to six months on the ground that the applicant was accused of serious offences punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment and that being at large he could obstruct investigation and continue his criminal activities. 18.  On 30 June 2009 the Konotop Court (“the trial court”) held a preparatory hearing. The applicant’s lawyer requested the applicant’s release, but this request was rejected. The court stated that there were no reasons to change the preventive measure in respect of the applicant. 19.  On 23 February 2010 the trial court found the applicant guilty of misappropriation of property and abuse of authority sentencing him to five years’ and one month’s imprisonment and confiscation of half of his property other than his residence. It also barred him from occupying positions in law enforcement for three years. 20.  On 18 May 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 23 February 2010 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the trial court. It also decided that the applicant was to remain in detention pending retrial. 21.  On 17 September 2010 the trial court found the applicant guilty as in its judgment of 23 February 2010, changing the applicant’s sentence of imprisonment to five years and three months. 22.  On 25 November 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 17 September 2010 and remitted the case for retrial. It also decided that the applicant was to remain in detention pending retrial. 23.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant lodged a request with the trial court seeking release from custody on an undertaking not to abscond. He argued in particular that there was no reason to believe that he presented a risk of absconding or influencing witnesses, that he had a wife who was ill and in need of hospitalisation. On the same day the trial court rejected the request stating that it was “premature”. 24.  On 21 February 2011 the trial court convicted the applicant as in its judgment of 23 February 2010. 25.  On 17 May 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 21 February 2011 and remitted the case for retrial. It also decided that the applicant was to remain in detention pending retrial. 26.  On the same day the Court of Appeal issued a separate ruling pointing out to the president of the trial court that the trial court had repeatedly failed to rectify the errors found by the Court of Appeal in its previous decisions. 27.  On 22 September 2011 the applicant requested release claiming that his state of health was not compatible with detention and that he could not receive appropriate medical treatment in SIZO. The trial court rejected this request the same day without giving any reasons. 28.  On 29 September 2011 the trial court found the applicant guilty of misappropriation of property and documents, and abuse of authority, sentencing him to the same punishment as in the judgment of 23 February 2010. 29.  On 17 January 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 29 September 2011 with certain amendments. 30.  On 31 January 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Mensk Prison to serve his sentence. 31.  On 13 July 2012 the applicant was released on parole in accordance with the ruling of the Mensk Court of 5 July 2012. 32.  On 29 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal of 17 January 2012 and remitted the case for a fresh examination on appeal. 33.  On 16 April 2013 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 29 September 2011 and remitted the case for retrial. 34.  As of 31 March 2014 the proceedings in the applicant’s case were pending before the trial court. 35.  From 29 December 2008 to 6 January 2009 the applicant was treated at the Konotop District Hospital where he was diagnosed with hypertension of the first (mildest) degree, hyperlipidemia, myocardial fibrosis, ventricular dilation, obesity, fatty hepatosis, chronic cholecistitis, and chronic pancreatitis. As treatment, the applicant was put on a diet excluding fried, salty, spicy foods, strong tea or coffee and certain other foods. 36.  On 12 January, 15 January and 17 January 2009 the applicant complained to the ITT medical officer of headaches, numbness of limbs, and weakness. He was diagnosed with hypertensive crises and medication was administered. 37.  On 22 January 2009 the applicant was examined at a hospital. It was determined that the applicant did not require hospitalisation. 38.  On 25 January 2009 the ITT medical officer noted that the applicant complained on that day about headache and dizziness. Previous diagnosis was confirmed and medication was administered to the applicant. 39.  On 26 January 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical assistant on his admission to the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”). The applicant did not complain about his health. 40.  On 28 January 2009 the applicant was examined by a doctor of the SIZO medical unit. He was diagnosed with gastritis and medication was prescribed. 41.  On 4 February 2009 the applicant was examined by a doctor who diagnosed him with cardioneurosis and prescribed medication. 42.  According to the Government, the applicant was examined by medical specialists at the SIZO on 23 occasions from 9 February 2009 to 16 August 2011, both on his initiative and as part of regular check-ups. He complained about headaches and stomach aches. Previously established diagnoses were confirmed. In addition, on 25 August 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with dermatitis. The applicant was prescribed various medications. 43.  On 17 August 2011 the head of the SIZO medical unit wrote to the applicant saying that the SIZO provided only urgent dental care, including tooth extraction and pain relief, and did not provide implant care or treatment for cavities. 44.  On 25 November 2011 the applicant complained about a headache, was examined by a neuropathologist and ophthalmologist. He was diagnosed with astheno-vegetative syndrome and prescribed certain medicines. 45.  On 13 January 2012 the applicant complained of stomach aches, was diagnosed with chronic gastroduodenitis and prescribed medication. 46.  On 31 January 2012 the applicant was examined by medical staff on his admission to the Mensk Prison. His state of health was found to be satisfactory. 47.  On 15 June 2012 the applicant was diagnosed as having an inguinal hernia. He was prescribed bed rest. On 18 June, 20 June, 25 June, 5 July and 7 July 2012 the diagnosis and the recommendation were confirmed. 48.  On 13 July 2012 the head of the medical unit of the SIZO issued a certificate which stated that the applicant had repeatedly undergone courses of outpatient treatment while at the SIZO. It further stated that at the time the certificate was issued the applicant continued to complain about his state of health, regularly requested consultations in connection with stomach, liver, heart and kidney pains. It went on to state that in this connection the applicant was recommended additional consultation from gastroenterologist, cardiologist, nephrologist and an infrasound examination and that the SIZO had no such specialists on its staff.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Skopje. 6.  On 4 February 2003 the applicant was apprehended by the police on a location in Skopje and searched. As indicated in the search record, which the applicant duly signed, the search was carried out without a court warrant and in the absence of witnesses, as provided for in sections 200(4) and 202(2) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (“the Act”, see paragraph 32 below). The police confiscated 13 keys and a mobile phone from him. The search was completed at 2.10 pm. 7.  On that date, an investigating judge of Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) issued two separate search warrants (Kri.br.34/03 and Kri.br.35/03) concerning two apartments (nos. 8 and 9 in the building in which the applicant lived) and other premises (наредба за претрес на дом и други простории) owned by the applicant’s father. The search warrants were issued on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had been involved in drug trafficking. 8.  Both apartments and the accompanying cellars were searched that day in the presence of the applicant’s father and two neighbours, who acted as witnesses. Seven packages containing an unknown substance were found. An authorised police officer, the neighbours, as well as the applicant’s father, who was specified in the search records as the occupier of the premises, signed the search records without any objection. The searches were completed at 6 pm. and 7.30 pm. At the request of those attending the search, the following note was included in the search record concerning apartment no. 9:\n“The packages were found in the cellar belonging to apartment no. 10 of the same building, which was opened with a key confiscated during the personal search of [the applicant] ....” 9.  As indicated in that search record, a certificate of confiscation of property (“the certificate”) was issued concerning the seven packages found in the cellar. It stated that the packages had been confiscated in relation to a crime punishable under the Criminal Code (drug trafficking). The applicant had not been present in the cellars while those were being searched but was brought to the premises afterwards (see § 16 below). He signed the certificate of confiscation as a person from whom the packages had been confiscated. 10.  On 5 February 2003 the Criminal Investigations Bureau at the Ministry of the Interior (“the Bureau”, Сектор за криминалистичка техника) carried out an expert examination of the padlock which had secured cellar no.10 and 13 keys that had been confiscated from the applicant. According to the expert report of that date (no. 10.2.6-5520/1), the locking system of the padlock had been damaged and it could be opened with any object, including all keys confiscated from the applicant. 11.  In another expert report (X-164/2003) of that date, the Bureau confirmed that five packages found in cellar no.10 contained 2.296 kg of heroin. As to the remaining 0.991 kg found in the two other packages, the report stated that they contained two substances that were often mixed with heroin. That was confirmed by an additional expert report of the Bureau dated 10 February 2003 (no. X-164/2/2003). As indicated in the report X-164/2003, each of six packages found in the cellar contained between 486gr and 527gr. The dimensions of the largest package were 20x10x2.2 mm. 12.  A third expert report of the Bureau (SK-164/2003) of 5 February 2003 that concerned a fingerprint found on one of the packages confiscated in cellar no.10 stated:\n\"The fingerprints found were entered into the system of automatic search of fingerprints ... it was determined, after verification of the list of suspected candidates, that [the fingerprints] corresponded to (the applicant’s) right middle finger ...\" 13.  On the same date, the Ministry of the Interior lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor accusing the applicant of drug trafficking. In support, it submitted the evidence described above (see paragraphs 6-12 above) and a number of photographs. 14.  On 5 February 2003 an investigating judge of the trial court examined the applicant in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant remained silent. He confirmed, however, that he had signed the record of his personal search and two certificates of confiscation of property. The investigating judge opened an investigation against the applicant and ordered his pre-trial detention for thirty days. 15.  On 17 February 2003 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment with the trial court charging the applicant with having been in possession of and offering for sale 5 packages containing 2.396 kg (the weight was specified to 2.296 kg later at the trial) of heroin and 0.991 kg of other prohibited substances, which had been found in the cellar of the building in which he had lived. 16.  At a hearing held on 19 March 2003, the trial court examined the applicant, who denied any connection with the drugs found in the cellar. As to the cellar, he submitted that it belonged to a third party, whom he did not know. He further stated that after he had been arrested, he had been brought with a police car in front of the building in which he had lived. He had waited in the car for an hour or two before the police had brought him to the cellar. He submitted that there had been many people (мешаница) there, including five police inspectors who had asked him to hold the packages in his hands in order to photograph him. The applicant also stated:\n“They forced me to touch the drugs; I don’t remember what the packages looked like and how many there were. At that point, maybe I touched (the drugs), I don’t remember. Then they photographed me; I refused [to cooperate] the whole time. My father was also present. Then, they brought me to the police (station) where they again forced me to take the [package of] drugs, to hold it in my hands in order to take photographs... Then, they started beating me and jumping over handcuffs (put) on my hands in order to [make me] touch the drugs. Then, they took my fingerprints. I was again physically ill-treated. They stopped when my lawyer arrived...” 17.  As regards the alleged ill-treatment by the police, he stated that he had neither asked for medical assistance nor had he informed the investigating judge due to fear of further ill-treatment by the police. He had not seen how and what key had been used to open the door of the cellar because he had been, at that time, in the police car. He further stated that he had signed the search records in the presence of a police officer and two witnesses. He had voluntarily signed the confiscation records regarding the keys found in his possession. As regards the certificate of confiscation concerning the drugs he stated:\n“... I most probably signed it when they (police officers) gave me five sheets of paper to sign...” 18.  The applicant’s lawyer requested that the court examine the applicant’s father regarding the place where the drugs had been found and title to the apartment. In a statement, the applicant’s father confirmed that the police had shown him two search warrants and that the search had been carried out in his presence and that of two neighbours. He also stated:\n“... I use other cellars in the building, namely two small cellars that I have constructed and another one which belongs to... When they did not find anything (in his cellars), a policeman ... entered cellar no.10, which is currently used by the sister of P.G., who owns the apartment and the cellar. After some time, policemen opened the padlock with the keys confiscated from [the applicant]... After half an hour, a policeman called me and said that he had found something in the cellar’s ventilation shaft... I saw a plastic bag. After he had taken the bags out, I noticed that there were seven bags. He put them on a metal sheet. Before doing so, he called the witnesses, namely the two neighbours, who confirmed what they were looking at. They called my son Duško. When he arrived, [the police officer] told him to stand next to the metal sheet in order for him to be photographed. Actually, he pushed him against the metal sheet and then [the applicant], in order not to fall down, touched the metal sheet with his hands. Thus, he touched the packages. They photographed him with the packages and took him away again. Then they brought the dog. Then we went upstairs to the apartment. [The police officer] forced me to sign the record that the packages had been found in cellar no.10, which I did. That meant that they did not find anything in my place, but in the [cellar belonging to] apartment no.10...” 19.  As indicated in the record, the applicant’s father reiterated that cellar no.10 had been opened with a key found in the applicant’s possession, which belonged to another padlock. He also stated:\n“I want to say that two keys of ours (the applicant’s and his) fitted in that padlock. [The police officer] actually opened (the padlock) with one of my keys and found out that one of the keys that Duško had fitted in the padlock. [They] were a pair, of which I had one and Duško had the other.” 20.  The applicant’s father also stated that the police officer had not been wearing gloves when he had taken the packages out. He had put gloves on later. 21.  In his concluding remarks made at the trial, the applicant’s lawyer objected that no search warrants had been issued regarding the personal search of the applicant and the search of cellar no.10. In the absence of any eyewitnesses, there had been no direct evidence that would link the applicant with the drugs, which had been hidden in a cellar that had belonged to a third party and could have been opened with any key. He also argued that the applicant’s fingerprint had been secured in the absence of an expert and that the police had sought an expert examination ex post facto. He maintained that expert report SK-164/2003 (see paragraph 12 above) had been unclear and imprecise because it had contained no information as to the manner and circumstances under which that fingerprint had been secured. Furthermore, it would have been impossible for the applicant to manipulate the packages with only one finger. He further argued that no fingerprints had been found on the padlock and the cellar where the drugs had been found. 22.  He also challenged the expert examination of the substance found in the packages, arguing that the latter had been too small to contain compacted material in the quantity indicated in the expert report X-164/2003 (see paragraph 11 above). In this connection he argued that it had not been established the place and person who had determined the quantity of the substance. He also submitted that the expert examinations had been carried out in his absence. Furthermore, he challenged whether the substance found had been pure heroin. In this connection he also stated:\n“I think that the problem [arising from] the practice that the prosecuting body also carries out expert examinations means that the evidence [obtained thereby] is not impartial.” 23.  On 20 March 2003 the trial court convicted the applicant, who had a previous criminal record (suspended prison sentence for an act of violence), of drug trafficking and sentenced him to two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. The court established that he had stored, with the aim of offering for sale, the five packages containing 2.296kg of heroin found in cellar no.10. The court held inter alia:\n\"Cellar no.10 where the drugs were found had been locked with a padlock that could be open with any keys besides the original ones.\nThe court established these facts on the basis of admitted written evidence ... The expert examinations of [the Bureau] confirmed that the substance found in the compacted packages was 2.296kg heroin. The expert examination confirmed that the fingerprint, which had been found and secured during the on-site examination, corresponded to the accused’s right middle finger ...\nThe court examined the arguments presented by the defense ...., but it finds that they are unsubstantiated because the court established ... that the written evidence, notably the record concerning the search of home and other premises had been drawn up in lawful procedure in the presence of two witnesses and on the basis of a search warrant issued earlier. The attending witnesses are neighbours who were present there by accident and whom [the applicant’s father] knew. The court established that the accused had signed the certificate for confiscated property without any qualification. He did not contest his signature.\nThe court examined the arguments of [the applicant’s lawyer] that there were no witnesses to corroborate that the accused had hidden the drugs in order to offer it for sale and that the accused could not be brought in connection with the drugs hidden in a cellar that did not belong to him, but (the court) dismissed those arguments on the basis of a written evidence, notably the (fingerprint) expert opinion by [the Bureau], which confirmed that the fingerprint corresponded to the [applicant’s] middle finger. Accordingly it is irrelevant that the drugs were found in the cellar belonging to a third person.\nThe court examined the statement produced by [the applicant’s father] according to which the police officers had pushed his son against the metal sheet where drugs had been put and that, in order not to fall down, he had touched (the packages) but it gave no weight because the responsible police officers acted in compliance with their official duty and after they had found the drugs they photographed him next to (the packages). There was no reason for them to push the accused or to secure evidence with the use of force. The father’s statement was biased because it concerns his son and it is understandable that he wants to help [the applicant] avoid criminal liability ...” 24.  In an appeal of 17 June 2003, the public prosecutor complained that the sentence given to the applicant had been too lenient. 25.  On 24 July 2003 the applicant appealed against the trial court’s judgment, arguing that his conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence, namely there had been no court warrant authorising the search of cellar no.10 and the expert examinations of the substance and the fingerprint found on one of the packages in that cellar. He reiterated his complaints regarding the quality and reliability of the fingerprint expert evidence (see paragraph 21 above). In this connection he complained about the trial court’s failure to examine the police officers who had secured his fingerprint in his absence, as well as the experts who had drawn up report SК-164/2003 and requested that they be examined. He further argued that the trial court could not have validly based its judgment on those expert examinations since they had been carried out by the Bureau, a body that operated within the Ministry, which had set in motion the criminal proceedings against him. Accordingly, the examinations had been biased. He also sought to have alternative expert examinations conducted. That concerned both the fingerprint expert evidence, which according to him, had been the sole evidence linking him with the drugs, as well as the expert examination of the substance. As to the latter examination, he reiterated his complaints raised in the concluding remarks (see paragraph 22 above). 26.  The applicant also requested that the court examines the neighbours (providing their names and addresses) who had attended the search regarding his allegations that his fingerprint found on one of the packages had been the result of an argument which he had had in the cellar with the police after he had refused to comply with their order to touch the packages. 27.  At a public session held on 20 May 2004 in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the trial court’s judgment. It held that:\n\"... the evidence admitted at the trial on which the judgment was based do not contain such deficiencies so as to be regarded unlawful evidence that cannot serve as a legal basis for the judgment, within the meaning of section 15(2) of the Act.\nAs evident from the case-file, the search of the accused’s home and other accompanying premises ... and the personal search of the accused were carried out in accordance with the (relevant) statutory provisions ...\nThe search of the home and other premises was carried out by competent officials on the basis of a written warrant by the investigating judge ... in the presence of two adult citizens, as witnesses and the occupier of the premises-[the applicant’s] father. Search records were drawn up and duly signed by the competent official, the occupier and the attending witnesses, in accordance with sections 198, 199 and 200 of the Act. The personal search of the accused was carried out without a court warrant and in the absence of witnesses, but it was done by competent officials on account of a reasonable suspicion ... in accordance with section 202(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the search records are a valid ground on which the court judgment was based.\nThe court examined the complaint ... concerning the lack of an order by the investigating judge for the expert examinations carried out by [the Bureau] ... regarding the nature and composition of the substance and the origin of the fingerprint evidence; however, the Ministry has competence to request expert examinations ...\n... On the basis of admitted evidence, especially that the accused was in possession of the keys from the door of the cellar; [the applicant’s] fingerprint found on one of the packages containing drugs and the certificate for confiscated property signed by the accused, the trial court had undoubtedly established [the applicant’s] identity as the perpetrator of the criminal offence ...\nThe court examined the complaint regarding the quantity and composition of the drugs, but it dismissed it finding that the trial court had established [the quantity of the drugs], on the basis of the expert opinion by [the Bureau], which applied (it gave a description of the used methodology).\nThe court dismissed the complaint regarding the objectivity of the expert opinions of [the Bureau], since it was a department that was founded and operated within the Ministry of the Interior, as a State body, which had been authorised to carry out expert examinations, as specified in section 234(2) of the Act ... (furthermore, the expert reports) ... had been based on scientific methods, which enable valid results ... on the basis of the case-file, it can be established that after the competent officials had discovered the criminal offense, (they) secured evidence which had been transmitted to [the Bureau] whose experts had determined [the applicant’s] identity applying the system of automatic search of fingerprints.\nThe court considered the complaint regarding the examination of [the neighbours] as witnesses ... but it dismissed it because ... [the neighbours] had signed the search records without any objection, which means, for all practical purposes, that they had confirmed [the record’s] veracity regarding the search. Accordingly, it is not necessary for them to be examined ...\" 28.  On 6 July 2004 the applicant lodged an application for extraordinary review of a final judgment (барање за вонредно преиспитување на правосилна пресуда), arguing that there had been no direct evidence corroborating his guilt. In this connection he reiterated his complaints that cellar no.10 had been searched without a court order; that the trial court should have summoned the experts and police officers regarding his fingerprint; and that the Court of Appeal had wrongly found that their examination and the examination of the neighbours would have been irrelevant. In this connection, the applicant’s lawyer stated that:\n“... the (police) officers present in cellar (no.10) forced [the applicant] to touch the packages in order to confirm whether they [contained] compacted [material]. [The applicant] refused to comply with the officers’ order to touch the packages and due to the mass of people pushing each other (поради настаната мешаница и турканица), he was again taken to the police station. The same method of treating [the applicant] continued in the police station, where he was forced to touch the packages in order to obtain his fingerprint [on them]...” 29.  He further reiterated his concerns regarding the quality and impartiality of the expert examinations carried out by the Bureau (see paragraphs 21, 22 and 25 above) and sought alternative expert examinations of the fingerprint and heroin found. 30.  On 2 November 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s application and confirmed the lower courts’ judgments. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:\n\"... the evidence admitted at the trial on which the judgment was based do not contain such deficiencies so as to be regarded unlawful evidence that cannot serve as a legal basis for the judgment, within the meaning of section 15(2) of the Act. The lower courts correctly established that the search of the accused’s home and other accompanying premises ... and the personal search of the accused had been carried out in accordance with the (relevant) statutory provisions ...The search of the home and other premises, as evident from the admitted written evidence, was carried out, according to this court, by competent officials on the basis of a written warrant by the investigating judge ... in the presence of two adult citizens, as witnesses and the occupier of the premises-[the applicant’s] father. Search records were drawn up and duly signed by the competent official, the occupier and the attending witnesses, which implies that sections 198, 199 and 200 of the Act had been respected.\nIt is true that the personal search of the accused was carried out without a court warrant and in the absence of witnesses, but the lower courts correctly held that such measures had been taken by competent officials on account of a reasonable suspicion ... in accordance with section 202(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the search records are a valid ground on which the court judgment could be based.\nThe Supreme Court examined the complaint ... concerning the lack of an order by the investigating judge for the expert examinations carried out by [the Bureau] ... regarding the nature and composition of the substance and the origin of the fingerprint evidence, but it dismissed them as unsubstantiated. The court had decided in compliance with section 234(2) of the Act ... [The court] cannot accept the allegation raised in the extraordinary review request regarding the objectivity of the expert opinions of [the Bureau], since it was a department that was founded and operated within the Ministry of the Interior, as a State body, which could be requested to carry out expert examinations, as specified in section 234(2) of the Act ...\nThe Supreme Court considers that in the ordinary proceedings the trial court decided in accordance with section 339(2) of the Act. In establishing the facts, it had into consideration and assessed all evidence admitted at the trial, i.e. it assessed the evidence separately and taken together, and on the basis of such assessment, it drew conclusion if certain fact was established ...\nIn view of the foregoing, it is clear that in the ordinary proceedings all legally relevant facts were correctly established ...\" 31.  On 17 February 2005 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request for the protection of legality with the Supreme Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently serving a term of imprisonment in correctional colony IK-18, Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Region. 7.  On 16 April 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. 8.  On 18 April 2005 the Vsevolozhsk Town Court of the Leningrad Region decided to remand the applicant in custody. 9.  On 23 April 2005 the applicant absconded, and on 25 April 2005 he was apprehended by the police. 10.  On 29 May 2006 a deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation approved the bill of indictment against the applicant, and on 2 June 2006 the case was sent to the Leningrad Regional Court for trial. 11.  On 5 June 2006 the Leningrad Regional Court scheduled the preliminary hearing for 15 June 2006. It was subsequently adjourned until 20 June 2006 following requests filed by the applicant and some of his co‑defendants who had not received a copy of the decision of 5 June 2006. 12.  On 23 June 2006 the criminal case was returned to the public prosecutor for rectification of the bill of indictment. 13.  On 27 September 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the above-mentioned decision on appeal, and the case was resubmitted to the Leningrad Regional Court. 14.  As a result of the preliminary hearing held on 7 November 2006, on 8 November 2006 the Leningrad Regional Court fixed the opening date of the trial for 6 December 2006. It was subsequently adjourned until 14 December 2006. 15.  On 14 December 2006 the applicant requested the court to let K. represent him. However, on 21 December 2006 the court dismissed his request in view of the fact that K. had no law degree. 16.  On 11 January 2007 the court began the examination of the evidence. However, owing to the non-attendance of certain witnesses, the applicant’s hospitalisation and the non-attendance of an interpreter, the hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 17.  On 20 March 2007 the applicant requested leave for A. to represent him, but his request was dismissed because A. was the brother of one of the witnesses. Legal-aid counsel was appointed to represent the applicant. 18.  Following the submission of the pleadings the proceedings were adjourned until 9 July 2007 to permit the parties to prepare their comments as to the substance and the wording of the questions to be put to the jury. 19.  On 6 November 2007 the Leningrad Regional Court, following a jury trial, convicted the applicant of aggravated murder, theft, robbery and escape and sentenced him to life imprisonment. When determining the applicant’s sentence the court refused to take into account the time that the applicant had allegedly overspent in prison while serving his sentence in an unrelated criminal case. 20.  During the trial the applicant requested the court to obtain the attendance of a witness on his behalf. However, the court refused his request in view of the fact that the testimony which the witness in question could have given was irrelevant to the establishment of the factual circumstances of the case by the jurors. 21.  However, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s request to read out the testimony given by one of the applicant’s co-defendants at the stage of the pre-trial investigation. 22.  Later, the presiding judge several times drew the jury’s attention to the fact that the information provided during the trial concerning acts other than those with which the applicant was charged, including the statement by the applicant’s co-defendant, was of no relevance to the applicant’s case and was not to be taken into consideration when answering the questions put to the jury. 23.  The applicant received a copy of the trial record with a one-month delay. 24.  On 15 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant was represented by two lawyers of his own choosing. 25.  On 5 July 2008 a copy of the appeal decision was served on the applicant. 26.  On 25 February 2009 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the appeal decision of 15 May 2008 by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for a new appeal hearing. The reason for the quashing was the fact that the applicant had been denied the opportunity to study the verdict. 27.  On 23 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 6 November 2007 on appeal. 28.  From 6 May 2005 to 7 September 2008 and from 7 June to 17 September 2009 the applicant was held in detention facility IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg. He was held in cells nos. 29, 66, 74, 86, 360, 395 and 435 before his conviction and subsequently in cells nos. 47, 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135, designed for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment. All the cells measured eight square metres.\n(a)  The Government’s account 29.  Each cell was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated a maximum of three inmates at any given time. The applicant had always had an individual bed and had been provided with the appropriate bedding (a mattress, a pillow, a blanket, two sheets and a pillowcase) and with tableware. 30.  The cell windows, which measured 1 x 1.1 metres, were not covered with metal screens and therefore allowed sufficient daylight to enter so that the inmates could read and write. The cells were equipped with 60 to 75‑watt filament light bulbs which were on from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. At night the cells were lit by 40-watt security lights. 31.  All the cells were ventilated by means of a ventilation shaft. Natural ventilation via the windows was also available. The cells were equipped with a heating system providing a suitable temperature which was in line with health and safety standards. The average temperature during the summer was maintained at 22 degrees Celsius and during winter at 18 degrees Celsius. 32.  The cells were equipped with toilets separated from the main area by 1.5 metre-high partitions. 33.  The cells were equipped with drinking-water tanks. The inmates were also allowed to use electric water heaters. 34.  The cells were also equipped with dining tables and benches corresponding to the number of detainees, as well as shelves and bedside tables for storage of personal items and foodstuffs. 35.  The applicant could take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. 36.  He was given three hot meals a day on the basis of the established legal norms. The quality of the food was monitored on a regular basis by the medical staff of the detention facility. 37.  The applicant was allowed a daily one-hour outside walk in the facility’s exercise yards, during which he could perform physical exercises. The exercise yards, measuring from 24 to 35 square metres, were equipped with benches, waste bins and sheds providing shelter from rain and snow. Sports equipment was provided to the detainees at their request. 38.  The authorities ensured regular disinfection and pest control in the detention facility. 39.  The applicant was provided with comprehensive medical assistance. The medical service of the facility was fully staffed with qualified personnel, medicines and medical equipment. On his arrival at the facility the applicant was examined by medical specialists; he made no health‑related complaints and denied having tuberculosis, viral hepatitis, venereal or surgical diseases. Subsequently, when he underwent a forensic psychiatric examination, it was revealed that the applicant had viral hepatitis C. Throughout his stay in detention facility IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg the applicant did not show clinical signs of the above‑mentioned disease and therefore did not require any specialised treatment. 40.  In support of their observations the Government provided several certificates issued by the governor of IZ-47/1 on 3 August and 11 August 2009, the results of a laboratory examination of the microclimate of cells nos. 435, 360 and 122 (dated 10 July 2005, 6 June 2006 and 2 December 2007 respectively), statements by wardens (not dated), the schedules for disinfection and pest control in the facility’s premises and a number of certificates concerning the food rations. The Government further provided copies of extracts from the registration log showing the number of detainees on certain days and in certain cells between May and December 2005, April and December 2006, October and November 2007 and February and March 2008. These extracts show that on 1 July and 8 July 2005 and on 2 October 2006, cell no. 435 accommodated four inmates; on 4 August 2005 cell no. 66 accommodated four inmates; on 18 November and 15 December 2005 cell no. 395 accommodated four inmates; and on 5 October and 9 October 2007 and on 10 November 2007 cell no. 86 also accommodated four inmates.\n(b)  The applicant’s account 41.  Cells nos. 29, 86, 360, 395 and 435 were equipped with six sleeping places (two three-tier bunks). They housed from four to six inmates at any given time. Cell no. 66 housed three inmates including the applicant and cell no. 74 housed two inmates including the applicant. 42.  After his conviction on 6 November 2007 the applicant was held on his own in cells nos. 47, 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135, which were reserved for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment at first instance pending the examination of their case on appeal (wing 2/1 with restricted access). Until the repairs in April-May 2008 these cells had not been equipped with bunk beds but with two concrete benches in each cell. 43.  The windows in cells nos. 29, 66, 74, 86, 360, 395 and 435 were equipped with a double grid (one on the outside and one on the inside). In cells nos. 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135 the windows were equipped with a triple grid (on the outside and the inside of the cell, as well as inside the window pane). In addition to the triple grid, densely spaced iron netting was fitted in front of the windows, which allowed very little daylight to enter. In cell no. 130 the window glass had been replaced with a layer of veneer, which also prevented daylight from entering the cell. The window in cell no. 132, in which the applicant had been held for two weeks in February 2008, faced a wall, in addition to the above-mentioned arrangements. 44.  Until April-May 2008 the artificial lighting in cells nos. 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135 consisted of one 60-watt filament light bulb per cell. The bulb was covered by a dust-laden lampshade above the entrance door. 45.  Air shafts existed in cells nos. 29, 66, 74, 86, 360, 395 and 435, but did not function as they were clogged with waste. Cells nos. 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135 did not have any air shafts. The heating system did not function in any of the cells where the applicant was detained until the repairs carried out in the facility in April-May 2008. The applicant had to sleep with his clothes on to keep warm in the wintertime. 46.  There were no hot water taps or drinking-water tanks in the cells. 47.  The lavatory was not separated from the living area and did not offer any privacy. 48.  No bedding was provided to the applicant until November 2007 (until then he had used his own bedding). The bedding provided by the facility was very worn, torn and dirty. Inmates had to dry their laundry indoors, creating excessive humidity in the cells. 49.  The shower was available once a week. At times it was only available once every ten days, every two weeks or even every three weeks. 50.  The food was of extremely poor quality and in scarce supply. 51.  None of the cells was equipped with a dining table or benches (because of the limited space). The inmates ate their food sitting on their bunks holding the plate. 52.  The cells swarmed with spiders, worms, flies, cockroaches, bedbugs and mice. The applicant never witnessed any disinfection or pest control. 53.  Outside exercise, which was supposedly available every day, was skipped on shower days and occasionally on other days for no apparent reason. The exercise yards were too small and did not offer sufficient room for any exercise (an average of five detainees being taken outside simultaneously). 54.  The inmates were not provided with adequate medical assistance. 55.  The applicant’s complaints about the conditions of his detention had availed nothing. Neither he nor the witnesses who could confirm his allegations were ever questioned on the circumstances of which he complained. 56.  In support of his position the applicant made reference to the applications made to the European Court by B., T. and Z., in which they also raised an issue concerning compliance of the conditions of their detention in facility IZ-47/1 during the relevant period with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. 57.  B., in particular, (see A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439/06, 14 October 2010) provided the following account of the conditions of his detention in wing 2/1 of facility IZ-47/1 of St Petersburg:\n“36.  On 29 October 2004 the applicant was placed in solitary cell no. 129 in wing 2/1 with restricted access. The wing was designed for the detention of inmates sentenced to life imprisonment. 37.  On 19 January 2005 the applicant was transferred to solitary cell no. 123 in wing 2/1 with restricted access. According to the applicant, the cell was the equivalent of a disciplinary cell. ... The cell was in the basement where there was no central heating, and the winter temperature there was about 7-10oC.\n... 72.  Mr A.M., who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, was kept in cells nos. 120, 122, 126, 128 and 141 of wing 2/1 of the remand prison on various occasions between June 2004 and July 2007. In his submission, wing 2/1 was reserved for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment at first instance pending the examination of their cases on appeal. The conditions of detention in all the cells were nearly identical. There were no chairs or desks in the cells. The beds were made of concrete. The cells were in a deplorable state. The humidity was high. There was no hot water or heating. The temperature in the cells in winter was as low as outside. There was no mandatory ventilation. Lavatory pans were not separated from the rest of the cells. All inmates in wing 2/1 were kept in solitary confinement. ... 73.  Mr N.M. was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was kept in cell no. 121 of wing 2/1 of the remand prison. In his submission, all the cells in the wing were nearly identical. There was no furniture in the cells. The temperature in the cells in winter was as low as 3oC. There was no hot water. The cells were very humid so that the walls were covered with mould. The lavatory pans were not secluded. The food was of poor quality. ...” 58.  Z. provided the following account of the conditions in wing 2/1 of facility IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg:\n“From 30 March 2006 to 19 April 2007 and from 4 December 2007 to the present I have been detained in wing 2/1 of St Petersburg IZ-47/1. From December 2007 I was held in cell no. 129, and [the applicant] was held in cell no. 130. The conditions in those cells were horrible. The walls were half-destroyed. The ceiling was crumbling. The floor was made of concrete. The heating did not function; the cells were very cold. There were no hot water taps. Ventilation was non-existent. The cells were very dim since filament bulbs over 60 watts were prohibited; the only lamp in the cell was fitted with a 40-watt filament bulb ... The cells were overrun by rodents (rats, mice).\n...\nIn April 2008 I was transferred to cell no. 134, and [the applicant] was moved to cell no. 135. The conditions in those cells were identical to the conditions described above.\nOn 12 November 2008 I was transferred to cell no. 121, and in June 2009 I learned that [the applicant] was being held in cell no. 119. The floor and the ceiling in these cells are painted, but they are crumbling; the concrete floor is covered with a piece of linoleum. The remaining conditions are identical to those described above. ...” 59.  According to the applicant, on 28 October 2007 in the afternoon the door of the cell where he was being held (cell no. 74 at the time) burst open and two prison officers entered and ordered the applicant and his inmates to leave the cell. The purpose of the operation was to make the detainees abandon a collective hunger strike. As soon as the detainees left the cell they were attacked by the “Tayfun” special-purpose unit (отдел специального назначения “Тайфун” ГУИН). The officers of the unit wore balaclavas and used rubber truncheons to hit the detainees. The applicant saw that inmates from other cells were also being beaten up. As a result of the blows he received the applicant lost consciousness and regained it only when locked back in the cell. 60.  On the following day the applicant was placed in the punishment cell for ten days for alleged disobedience. Since he could not walk after the beatings he was helped by two wardens.\n(b)  The Government’s account 61.  According to the Government, a rubber truncheon was used against the applicant for the purpose of repelling an attack by him on a prison officer. They submitted a report on the use of a rubber truncheon against the applicant dated 28 October 2007, accompanied by a medical certificate drawn up following the examination of the applicant after the incident. The certificate recorded multiple abrasions in the area of the applicant’s back and a haematoma in the region of his right knee.\n(c)  Investigation into the events of 28 October 2007 62.  On 1 November and 2 November 2007 the applicant complained about the beatings to the public prosecutor’s office. 63.  In its reply dated 14 December 2007 the St Petersburg public prosecutor’s office informed the applicant as follows:\n“In the course of the inquiry [conducted into the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment] it was established that on 28 October 2007 the prison officers of SIZO-1 had been carrying out a technical inspection of cell no. 74 where [the applicant] was held at the material time. In the course of the inspection [the applicant] refused to comply with the lawful orders given by the prison officers. In order to put a stop to [the applicant’s] unlawful actions physical force and special means had been used against him in accordance with section 45 of the Federal Law on the detention of persons suspected of and charged with criminal offences.\n...\nTaking into account the foregoing, at the present time there are no grounds for the prosecutor’s office to intervene.” 64.  Further, on 27 August 2008 an investigator from the Kalininskiy District investigating department of the St Petersburg public prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the use of special means against the applicant. The decision read as follows:\n“In the course of the inquiry it was established that on 28 October 2007 on the territory of IZ-47/1 a general search was conducted by prison officers of [the above facility] aimed at finding and seizing prohibited items. During the search certain detainees ... broke the rules by failing to abide by the lawful orders of the [prison officers] and insulting [them], as a result of which physical force and special means were used against them.\nTherefore, physical force and special means were lawfully applied to [the applicant] since he had not abided by the lawful orders of the prison officers, a fact confirmed by the medical certificate, the report on the use of a rubber truncheon and the submissions by [four officers involved in the incident] ...” 65.  On 27 July 2009 the acting head of the Kalininskiy District investigating department annulled the above decision, finding as follows:\n“In the course of the study of the material in the case file it was established that the inquiry had been incomplete.\nTherefore the decision [of 27 August 2008] was made prematurely and must be annulled.\nIn the course of the additional inquiry it is necessary to question [the applicant], to obtain and examine the [applicant’s] medical documents, to question the head of the “Tayfun” special-purpose unit, and to take other measures required in order to reach a decision.” 66.  The applicant has yet to be informed of the outcome of the additional inquiry. No information was provided by the Government in that regard. 67.  According to the applicant, he was beaten up by prison officers because of his complaints about the conditions of his detention.\n(b)  The Government’s account 68.  According to the Government, physical force consisting in bending the applicant’s arm behind his back (загиб руки за спину) was applied to the applicant for the purpose of repelling an attack by him on a prison officer. They submitted a report on the use of physical force against the applicant dated 14 February 2008, accompanied by a medical certificate concerning the examination of the applicant after the incident. The certificate indicated that no visible injuries had been detected on the applicant’s body. The Government further submitted statements by three prison officers, according to which in the course of the search conducted in cell no. 130, where the applicant was detained at the material time, the latter had behaved defiantly, had threatened the prison officers, had not responded to warnings and had prevented the officers from carrying out the search. After a mobile phone had been found in the cell the applicant had pounced on one of the prison officers and the latter had had to use physical force against him. The applicant had displayed active physical resistance and had tried to administer blows and kicks, following which he had been forced to the floor. Since he continued to resist, a painful hold (болевой прием самбо) had been applied to him and he had been put back in the cell.\n(c)  Investigation into the events of 14 February 2008 69.  The applicant complained to the public prosecutor’s office about the beatings. 70.  In its reply dated 25 April 2008 the St Petersburg public prosecutor’s office informed the applicant as follows:\n“On 14 February 2008 prison officers of SIZO-1 conducted a search in cell no. 130 where you were detained at the material time. During the search you displayed resistance to the lawful orders of the prison officers. In order to put a stop to your unlawful actions physical force was applied in accordance with section 45 of the Federal Law on the detention of persons suspected of and charged with criminal offences.” 71.  Neither party provided any other documents pertaining to the inquiry into the above incident.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Korinthia. 5.  On 28 July 2000 he was involved in a car accident. On 20 November 2001 criminal proceedings were brought against him for manslaughter and bodily harm caused by a negligent act. 6.  On 15 November 2005 the Korinthos First Instance Criminal Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to a suspended prison sentence of sixteen months (judgment no. 3625/2005). The same day, the applicant lodged an appeal. 7.  By judgment dated 29 January 2008 the Korinthos Court of Appeal reduced his sentence to a suspended prison sentence of thirteen months (judgment no. 129/2008). 8.  On 25 February, 2008, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He challenged the reasoning of the appellate decision and alleged that his rights under Articles 6 §§ 2 and 3 (e) of the Convention had been violated. 9.  By judgment dated 12 June 2008 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal. It held that the appellate court’s decision was well reasoned and that there was no indication that the applicant’s defence rights had been infringed (judgment no. 1566/2008). This judgment was finalised on 9 July 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kazan. 6.  In September 2009 the applicant left Uzbekistan for Russia looking for employment. On 8 September 2009 he arrived in the city of Kazan, Russia. 7.  On 24 December 2009 the Uzbek security service charged the applicant with attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, belonging to a religious group (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and dissemination of subversive materials. 8.  On the same date, an Uzbek judge issued an arrest warrant against the applicant. His name was put on a wanted list. 9.  On 30 March 2010 the Russian police arrested the applicant, who had gone to the premises of the migration authority in order to apply for a temporary residence permit. The police relied on Articles 91 and 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) concerning the arrest of suspects. According to the respondent Government, the presence of the applicant’s name on the wanted list justified his arrest (Article 61 of the Minsk Convention). 10.  On the same date, the Uzbek authorities confirmed to the Russian authorities that the applicant’s name was still on the wanted list. 11.  A deputy town prosecutor applied to the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan seeking the applicant’s detention with a view to extradition. On 1 April 2010 the District Court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and authorised his detention until 8 May 2010 in anticipation of an eventual extradition request. The court referred to Articles 97 § 1, 99, 108 and 466 of the CCrP. The court noted that the applicant was a foreign national and had no permanent place of residence in Russia; a foreign court had issued an arrest warrant against him and his name had been put on a wanted list; he had fled justice in Uzbekistan; and thus there was a risk that he would flee again or continue his criminal activity. 12.  On 15 April 2010 the applicant applied to the Tatarstan Department of the Federal Migration Service for asylum. 13.  On 4 May 2010 the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s Office sent a formal extradition request to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office. 14.  On 7 May 2010 the District Court examined a prosecutor’s request and extended the term of the applicant’s detention until 8 July 2010, with reference to Article 109 § 2 of the CCrP. 15.  Before the expiry of the previous detention order, for unspecified reasons on 25 May 2010 the District Court issued a new detention order, extending the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2010, with reference to Article 109 § 2 of the CCrP. 16.  The applicant considered that it was impracticable in such circumstances to appeal against the detention order of 7 May 2010. 17.  On 4 August 2010 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office authorised the applicant’s extradition. 18.  The applicant was notified of this decision on 23 August 2010. He brought judicial review proceedings against the extradition order, claiming that as his asylum proceedings were pending, the enforcement of the extradition order was suspended. He also asserted that if extradited he would run a serious risk of torture or inhuman treatment. 19.  In the meantime, on 26 August 2010 the applicant was informed that his asylum request had been dismissed. He appealed to a higher migration authority. 20.  On 20 September 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan held a hearing on the applicant’s appeal against the extradition order. The applicant’s counsel pleaded that in the event of his extradition the applicant would be subjected to torture, like many other individuals charged in relation to religious or extremist activities. On the same date the Supreme Court of Tatarstan dismissed the case, considering that the allegations of ill-treatment had been based on mere assumptions and that the applicant had applied for asylum only when criminal proceedings against him had already been pending in Uzbekistan. 21.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia. It appears that on an unspecified date it quashed the judgment of 20 September 2010 and ordered the re-examination of the extradition case. 22.  On 30 September 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2010. It is stated in the detention order that “if the defendant decides to lodge an appeal, he has the right to ask, within three days of receipt of the detention order, for his personal participation in the appeal hearing”. On 30 September 2010 the applicant also signed a note confirming receipt of a copy of the detention order and that he had been informed of his rights to “participate in the appeal hearing and to have legal assistance”. 23.  On 4 October 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a statement of appeal, arguing that there was no evidence that the applicant would flee justice or reoffend; that his application for refugee status was pending; and that the prosecutor’s extension request had been submitted to the district court less than seven days before the expiry of the previous detention order, in breach of Article 109 § 8 of the CCrP. The statement of appeal did not contain any request for the lawyer’s and/or the applicant’s participation in the appeal hearing. 24.  On 5 October 2010 the prosecutor made observations in reply, stating that the applicant’s arguments had been unfounded and that the application for refugee status had been dismissed. 25.  According to the Government, the applicant and his counsel had been informed in advance of the date and time of the appeal hearing. On 8 October 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan heard a prosecutor and upheld the detention order. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had been present at the appeal hearing. 26.  On 25 November 2010 the district court extended the applicant’s detention to 30 January 2011. 27.  Having re-examined the extradition case, on 10 December 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan annulled the extradition order. With reference to the international reports and other material submitted by the applicant and the European Court’s case-law on the matter, the court considered that there was a persistent practice of torture of detained suspects or convicts in Uzbekistan and that the applicant also faced a risk of such mistreatment. The court also noted that “in a number of judgments the European Court has held that the mere fact of detention in this country created a risk of ill-treatment”. 28.  The applicant was released on the same day. 29.  On 3 February 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia examined the prosecutor’s subsequent appeal and upheld the judgment of 10 December 2010. The appeal court noted that there had been a material difference between the criminal offences mentioned in the extradition request and the corresponding offences under the Russian Criminal Code; that the extradition order had been issued before the final decision had been taken on the applicant’s refugee application; and that there had been indications of a risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, in particular in the absence of any relevant assurances on the part of the Uzbek authorities.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  Between 1994 and 1996 the applicant, in his capacity as the President of Bank B., facilitated the sponsoring of the Government by the bank in the production of a book promoting the image of Romania abroad. On 14 March 1997 the applicant was dismissed from his job. 7.  On 24 September 1996 the company O.P. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant, accusing him of abuse of authority (abuz în serviciu, under Article 248 of the Criminal Code) and misappropriation of funds (deturnare de fonduri, under Article 302 of the Criminal Code) in relation to the above-mentioned sponsorship contract. 8.  On 6 November 1996 the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest District Court took a statement from the applicant in connection with the allegations above. 9.  On 14 November 1996 the prosecutor decided not to start criminal proceedings as the facts in the case did not disclose the commission of a crime.\nOn the same date, the applicant was informed of the decision. 10.  On 26 September 1997 Bank B. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant for fraud (înşelăciune, under Article 215 of the Criminal Code) and abuse of authority (under Article 248 of the Criminal Code) in the handling of the same sponsorship contract mentioned above. 11.  On 9 January 1998 the applicant made a statement to the prosecutor. 12.  Witnesses’ and co-defendants’ depositions were taken in November 1996, November and December 1997, January, February, August and December 1998, and March and December 1999. 13.  On 2 February 1998 a criminal investigation for fraud was started in respect of the applicant. 14.  On 17 February 1998 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice enquired about French companies that had been involved in the publication of the book. He asked for evidence to be taken on commission (comisie rogatorie) by the prosecutor attached to the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance. The request was reiterated on 13 October 1998. The documents were received from France on 13 November 1998. 15.  On 12 October 1998 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice overturned the prosecutor’s decisions of 14 November 1996 and 2 February 1998. He considered that as long as the decision of 14 November not to prosecute had not been overturned, the prosecutor could not have legally started the criminal prosecution on 2 February. He ordered the opening of a criminal prosecution for fraud through contracts. 16.  On 3 November 1999 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice changed the legal classification of the offence from fraud to abuse of authority. 17.  On 9 December 1999 the applicant was questioned by the prosecutor at the Supreme Court of Justice for the first time in connection with the new classification of the offence. On the same day the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody until 7 January 2000 on the prosecutor’s order. 18.  On 15 December 1999 the applicant (in the presence of the lawyer of his choice) was informed of the content of his criminal file. 19.  On 16 December 1999 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice issued an indictment for abuse of authority. 20.  The case was registered with the Bucharest County Court. Thirteen hearings took place before this court, from five of which the applicant was absent for medical reasons. On four other occasions the court postponed the oral hearings for various reasons, including requests made by the applicant’s counsel. 21.  On 27 February 2001 the Bucharest County Court declared null and void the prosecution acts, referred the case back to the prosecutor and ordered him to carry out a complete review of the facts under investigation (refacerea urmăririi penale). Upon an appeal by the prosecutor, in a final decision of 22 May 2001 the Bucharest Court of Appeal considered that only the indictment of 16 December 1999 was null and void and therefore referred the case back to the prosecutor and ordered him to review that act.\nThe courts found that the prosecutor had not allowed enough time for the applicant to familiarise himself with the prosecution file and to formulate his requests, if any, in connection with it, and that the prosecutor had acted in haste in indicting the applicant only one day after presenting him with the file. 22.  On 8 January 2002 the applicant made a statement to the prosecutor. 23.  On 18 April 2002 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice decided to end the prosecution against the applicant, on the ground that the legal relationships under examination were of a civil and commercial nature and not of a criminal nature.\nOn 22 April 2002 he informed the applicant of his decision. 24.  On 10 December 1999 the applicant contested his detention pending trial. The Bucharest County Court ordered his release on 14 December 1999. However, this decision was overturned by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final decision of 28 December 1999. The applicant remained in custody. 25.  He later requested the Bucharest County Court to revoke the order for his detention. On 7 January 2000 the court ordered his release from custody. The prosecutor appealed and the County Court’s decision was quashed by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 24 January 2000. The applicant’s detention order was extended by thirty days. 26.  Upon the applicant’s request, the County Court concluded, on 2 February 2000, that his detention order had expired on 7 January. In a final decision of 15 February 2000 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the prosecutor. 27.  Consequently, on 15 February 2000 the applicant was released from custody. 28.  The applicant brought an action against Bank B. claiming compensation for illegal dismissal. In a final decision of 3 March 2003 the Bucharest County Court awarded the applicant 103,992 United States Dollars (USD) in respect of pecuniary damage (loss of earnings) and USD 33,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 29.  On 9 April 2004 the applicant lodged an action against the State, under Articles 504-505 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, 998-999 and 1000 § 3 of the Civil Code and the Convention, seeking compensation for unlawful detention. He claimed 10,000,000,000 Old Romanian Lei (ROL) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, of which USD 12,999 represented salaries that he had not received from Bank B. during his arrest. 30.  On 24 September 2004 the Bucharest County Court allowed the action and granted the applicant ROL 250,000,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It held:\n“The evidence in the file confirms the applicant’s right to compensation under Article 504 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] for his detention...\nThe applicant’s detention for 30 days on the prosecutor’s order; the detention from 7 January 2000 to 15 February 2000 which, as decided by means of a final decision, contravened the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution, which required that the arrest be ordered by a “judicial officer” and extended by a court...; and lastly, the decision to terminate the criminal prosecution against the plaintiff on the ground that the facts committed did not fall within the scope of the criminal law, required the State’s responsibility for the judicial error made in the case...\nConcerning the salaries not received during his arrest, ... the court notes that the applicant was released from his position on 14 March 1997, [Bank B.’]s criminal complaint being posterior to his dismissal. Therefore ... the court considers that there is no causal link between the applicant’s arrest and loss of revenue.\nMoreover, in the Bucharest County Court’s decision of 3 March 2003, ... [which became final], a causal link was established between ... the plaintiff’s dismissal of 14 March 1997, which had not been a consequence of his detention, and the damage incurred, that is, the loss of earnings; this decision awarded compensation for the damage...\n...[ [U]nlawful arrest and prosecution causes moral, social and professional suffering, and breaches dignity, honour and individual freedom, human rights protected by law. However, the amounts claimed by the plaintiff exceed by far the awards made by the European Court ... for just satisfaction under the ... Convention, the instrument invoked by the plaintiff as the legal basis for his claims.” 31.  On 12 October 2005 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the parties, upheld the County Court’s arguments and confirmed that:\n“The plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty affected his honour and reputation, and the reparation can and must be made by a financial award.” 32.  In a final decision of 22 February 2007 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (the former Supreme Court of Justice) dismissed for being out of time and ill-founded respectively, appeals on points of law lodged by the applicant and the State. 33.  On 31 October 2007 the Government informed the Court that the applicant should request the execution of the final decision and communicate to the Ministry of Finance details of a valid bank account where the money could be transferred, but that to date no such steps had been taken by the applicant. 34.  The newspaper “România Liberă” presented in its 17 March 1997 edition the opinion of various political figures on the applicant’s dismissal and arrest:\n“The former president of [Bank B.], Răzvan Temeşan, was called on Friday for questioning by the police, informs prosecutor G.M. from the General Prosecutor’s Office. G.M. pointed out that the hearings might continue in the following days.\nThe Prosecutor’s Office imposed an obligation on Răzvan Temeşan not to leave Bucharest for thirty days. The president of [Bank B.] was accused, in the press, of bad management... S.D., the president of the FPS [the State Property Fund], stated that the members of [Bank B.]’s executive board had been asked on Friday ... to dismiss Răzvan Temeşan ... from his position... C.A., deputy president of the PSDR [the Romanian Social-Democrat Party]: ‘We only comment when we know the exact content of the file. In the case at hand we can only say that, in principle, the investigation of Răzvan Temeşan is part of the general fight against corruption. ... [H]owever, his responsibility shall be determined after investigations by the police and the Prosecutor’s Office...’ H.R., leader of the PL ‘93 [the Liberal Party ‘93]: ‘I believe it is a good thing that the present political power, unlike the former one, is allowing the investigation of fraud in the banking world...’\nThe Romanian National Bank (BNR) considers that the changes in the administration of [Bank B.] reflect the shareholders’ right, in particular FPS’s right, as the major shareholder, to decide upon the bank’s fate, stated A.V., director for communications of BNR... I.D., president of PNTCD [the Agrarian Party] and CDR [the Romanian Democratic Convention]: ‘The facts surrounding Răzvan Temeşan were predictable. Have you not seen what the press published? Maybe it would have been better not to coincide his dismissal with the start of the criminal investigation by the police and the Prosecutor’s Office. But these authorities know better how to proceed...’” 35.  On 15 March 1997 the newspaper “Jurnalul Naţional” published an article on the applicant’s dismissal and arrest. The article presented the point of view expressed during a TV show on corruption and organised crime by E.C., the President of Romania at that time. He stated mainly that:\n“Our objective is to save and protect the Romanian banking system, which needs consolidation. As from next week important action against corruption shall commence...\nOur decision was to fight corruption from the top to the bottom and the action will continue.” 36.  On a different occasion E.M. reiterated his intention to have criminal investigations started in relation to all the corruption scandals that had previously only been investigated by the press. 37.  Other similar positions, as well as interviews with the applicant, were reported in the press. 38.  On 21 January 2000 the Minister of Justice told the newspaper “Cotidianul” that the courts should be more careful when dealing with requests for release from pre-trial detention and noted that some of the most inappropriate decisions to release individuals from custody had been adopted by the Bucharest County Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Warsaw. 9.  On 13 July 1995 the applicant filed with the Warszawa-Mokotów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an action against the Office of the Council of Ministers (Urząd Rady Ministrów) and a housing co-operative K. In her action she requested, inter alia, that a flat be granted to her, submitting that the area of the one allocated to her by co-operative K, on the basis of an agreement between it and the Office of the Council of Ministers, allegedly differed from the area indicated in the decision granting it to her. The applicant also claimed damages for losses allegedly sustained by her as a result of the increase of construction costs. 10.  On 18 July 1995 the District Court declared its lack of jurisdiction over the case and transmitted it to the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). 11.  On 23 September 1995 the court ordered the applicant to indicate the value of her claim (wartość przedmiotu sporu). On 5 October 1995 the court again ordered her to indicate that value, considering that the information provided by her in reply to the previous court order was not satisfactory. In her letter of 16 October 1995 the applicant indicated the value of her claim. On 8 November 1995 she was again ordered to provide certain information concerning the value of the claim. On 23 November 1995 she submitted the relevant information. 12.  On 27 November 1995 the Warsaw Regional Court, having examined the applicant's request, exempted her partially from the court fees. She appealed against that decision. On 27 February 1996 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed her appeal. 13.  On 13 May 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court refused the applicant's request for free legal assistance, considering that at that stage of the proceedings legal assistance was not necessary. The court noted that neither the circumstances of the case, nor the applicant's financial situation called for granting her a legal-aid lawyer. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 19 July 1996 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. 14.  On 9 October 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. On the same day the defendant co-operative lodged a counter-claim against the applicant. 15.  In the pleadings of 15 December 1996 the applicant's lawyer modified her action and raised additional claims, inter alia, for compensation for the allegedly deceitful taking over of her previous flat by the Office of the Council of Ministers. 16.  On 30 July 1997 the applicant requested an interim measure. On 13 August 1997 the court dismissed her request. 17.  On 19 January 1998 the applicant filed another request for an interim measure. On 23 January 1998 the court dismissed it. The applicant appealed against that decision and requested exemption from the court fees relating to that appeal. 18.  On 24 March 1998 the court held a hearing. 19.  On 3 August 1998 the defendant co-operative's lawyer requested the court not to fix hearings between 15 September and 15 October 1998 because of his vacation plans. 20.  On 30 September 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 23 January 1998. 21.  On 17 February 1999 the applicant submitted a request for legal assistance, stating that she had not been able to contact a lawyer chosen by her. 22.  At the hearing held on 9 June 1999 the court ordered an expert opinion concerning the construction costs. 23.  On 2 July 1999 it requested the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers to submit documentation concerning the financing of the construction of the applicant's house. On 29 December 1999 the court repeated its request. 24.  On 14 January 2000 the Office informed the court that it did not possess any such documentation. 25.  On 19 January and 3 April 2001 the court held hearings. 26.  On 22 February 2001, in reply to the applicant's complaint, the Ministry of Justice admitted that the proceedings were lengthy and informed her that they had been taken under the President of the Regional Court's administrative supervision. 27.  On 10 April 2001 the applicant modified her claim and requested exemption from court fees. 28.  On 18 June 2001 the court refused her request. On 30 August 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision. 29.  On 6 December 2001 the Regional Court summoned the applicant to pay a fee relating to her extended claim. 30.  On 24 January 2002 it declined her request for an interim order. 31.  On 18 June 2002 the court stayed the proceedings. On 9 December 2002 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision. 32.  On 27 January 2003 the Regional Court rejected the applicant's additional claim of 10 April 2002, since she had not paid the due fee. On the same day it ordered an expert opinion. 33.  On 10 April 2003 the court granted the applicant partial exemption from court costs. 34.  The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1968. 8.  The applicant is the father of two children, K. born in 1988 and H. born in October 1990. He and the mother of the children divorced in January 1992, having lived apart since November 1990 and K. having lived with his mother and H. with the applicant. The applicant assumed the care of H. some ten days after her birth. According to an agreement reached in connection with the separation and confirmed by the Social Welfare Board, K. was to remain with the mother and H. with the applicant. The parents had joint custody of the children. 9.  M. cohabited with the applicant from March to October 1994. Following their separation, she contacted the social welfare authorities, alleging that H. had been sexually abused by the applicant. The child's stories and behaviour had attracted M.'s attention and she had observed H. frequently touching her genitals and masturbating when going to sleep. M. also reported her suspicions to the family day care nurse. The applicant was not informed of the reports. 10.  On 16 November 1994 during a visit to the day carer's, social welfare officials requested her to monitor H.'s behaviour, which according to her was deviant in that she masturbated before going to sleep. The officials witnessed the same during their visit. On 17 January 1995 they again visited the day carer, who now had kept records of H.'s behaviour. Based on these notes and their own observations, the officials consulted the Family Advice Centre (perheneuvola, familjerådgivningen) and decided to organise H.'s interviews and other examinations owing to a suspicion that she had been sexually abused. The applicant was not informed of those visits. 11.  On 27 January 1995 when arriving to pick H. up from day care, the applicant was directed to the Family Advice Centre, where he was informed of the suspicion of sexual abuse. While denying the suspected abuse, he consented to an examination of H. but he did not accept that her place of residence should change for the period of examination. 12.  The applicant was then informed that H. was to stay with her mother, who was her other legal custodian. According to the Government, he commented on H.'s placement by saying that if H. could not stay with him, the best place for her was with her mother. He was also told that if he agreed on H.'s placement with her mother, the social welfare authorities would not issue a public care order. According to the Government, he consented to H.'s placement with her mother. This was contested by the applicant. 13.  On 2 February 1995 the social welfare authorities were contacted by the applicant's counsel who was told that if the applicant opposed H.'s placement with her mother during the examinations, the alternative was to issue an emergency care order. On the same day counsel withdrew the applicant's alleged consent to H.'s placement with her mother, following which a meeting with the parents was held at the Family Advice Centre on 3 February 1995. 14.  It is undisputed that from 3 February 1995 there was no consent by the applicant to H.'s placement outside his home. The parties disagree as to whether the applicant consented to H.'s placement with her mother for the period 27 January and 2 February 1995. 15.  By an emergency order issued on 8 February 1995 the senior social welfare official placed H. in public care with her mother, pursuant to section 18 of the Child Welfare Act (lastensuojelulaki, barnskyddslagen; Act no. 683/1983). The further consideration of the matter was referred to the Tampere Social Welfare and Health Care Board (hereinafter “the Board”; sosiaali- ja terveyslautakunta, social- och hälsovårdsnämnden), pursuant to section 17 of the said Act. The emergency care order referred to the need to conduct the necessary examinations in the Family Advice Centre in the light of the suspicion that H. had been sexually abused. The decision had not been written on the form approved by the Ministry for Social Welfare and Health Affairs in pursuance of section 14 of the Child Welfare Decree (lastensuojeluasetus, barnskyddsförordningen; Act no. 1010/1983). According to the notice of appeal incorporated into the decision, an appeal could be filed with the Board within fourteen days. 16.  In its decision of 24 February 1995 the Board ordered that the emergency care should continue until 27 March 1995 for the purpose of concluding the examinations. According to the notice of appeal attached to the decision, an appeal could be addressed to the County Administrative Court within thirty days. 17.  The Family Advice Centre's examinations commenced on 7 February 1995 and were completed on 24 March 1995. Two psychologists, J.K. and M.R., and a child psychiatrist, Dr A-K.R., stated in their written opinion of 24 March 1995 that it was highly likely that H. had been sexually abused by the applicant. He was informed of the results of the examination in a meeting on the same day during which J.K., H.'s mother and a friend of the applicant's were also present. The examinations resulted in a conclusion that H. should be placed in public care away from the applicant. 18.  On 24 and 27 March 1995 the Board heard the parents and the paternal grandmother. The applicant again denied having abused H., whereas the paternal grandmother had not noticed anything exceptional in H.'s behaviour. Following the emergency care, she had repeatedly inquired into H.'s “unusual talking” and had come to the conclusion that it had been triggered by something which had occurred in day care. She agreed to assume the care of H. in her home, as did the mother, who further stated that she had never accepted that H. should live with the applicant and that she had tried to avoid any contact with the applicant and his family. He again did not agree that H. would be staying with her mother. On 27 March 1995 the Board confirmed the care order in accordance with section 17 (2) of the Child Welfare Act. It reasoned:\n“The examination of [H.] in the Family Advice Centre has come to an end ... . The examination results confirm the impression that the child has been sexually abused and that her development would be seriously jeopardised if she continued living with her father. In its opinion the Family Advice Centre recommends that the child be placed in public care in order to ensure her healthy development (appendix no. 5).\nIt is not possible to exclude possible abuse by providing open-care support measures.\nPlacing the child in public care is a precondition for ensuring that she receives care corresponding to her stage of development.” 19.  The Board referred its decision to the Häme County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) and the applicant filed an appeal, to which he attached two medical opinions. The first opinion was issued by a general practitioner, Dr A.H., on 3 March 1995, who had seen H. four times at a child welfare clinic, the last occasion being in December 1993. The other opinion was given by a nurse, I.L., of the same clinic on 7 March 1995. She had seen H. last in October 1994. The opinions found nothing exceptional in the child's development and no failure on the part of the applicant in providing her with proper care. Given that H. had been staying with her mother during the period of examination, the applicant argued that it could not be excluded that the latter had influenced the child's behaviour. He reiterated that although H. had been monitored while in day care, he had not been informed of the suspicions until January 1995. He furthermore argued that he had not been heard in accordance with section 15 of the Administrative Procedure Act (hallintomenettelylaki, lagen om förvaltningsförfarande; Act no. 598/1982). When invited to the meeting on 27 January 1995, he had not been informed of its real purpose, namely the plan to take the child into public care. He had allegedly received a copy of the emergency care order of 8 February 1995 only after repeated requests and the paragraph indicating the possibility for him to have it reviewed by the Board had allegedly been crossed out. 20.  On 29 June 1995 social welfare officials and H.'s mother agreed that H. would stay with her paternal grandfather and his partner for two weeks in July 1995 owing to the mother's fatigue. On 18 July 1995 H.'s maternal grandmother informed the social welfare authorities that H. had not returned home the day before. They unsuccessfully tried to contact the mother, following which on 25 July 1995 they agreed with the paternal grandfather that H. would stay with him until the mother could be reached or until the situation could be evaluated. On 17 August 1995 the mother informed the authorities that H. could not stay with her as the situation had drained her strength. She suggested that H. should stay with her paternal grandfather. The same day social welfare officials visited H.'s paternal grandfather and his partner, a family day care nurse by profession, who informed the officials that they could not take care of H. in the long term. It was agreed, however, that H. would stay with them until the County Administrative Court had reached its decision. 21.  On 21 August 1995 the applicant informed the social welfare authorities that he did not approve of the public care. In an opinion of the same day a senior physician, Dr A.L., found H. to be normally developed both physically and mentally. 22.  In a hearing on 31 August 1995 the County Administrative Court examined six witnesses. The psychologist M.R. testified to having met once with H., following which the examination had been continued by the psychologist J.K., who had met her on a few occasions. As the child had appeared to shy away from male interviewers, Dr A-K.R. had eventually taken over the investigation. He further testified that the child's statements to Dr A-K.R., who had recorded the interviews on audio tape, had been consistent with her earlier statements to the day carer. 23.  The paternal grandmother testified that from March 1995 H. had started behaving in an explicitly sexual manner, referring to games played with another child in day care. H. had also referred to the day carer's husband, who had been tickling her. She also testified that the former girlfriend M. at the time of the separation in October 1994 had threatened to “seek revenge” on the applicant. 24.  The day carer testified that H. had continued to masturbate after having been removed from the applicant's home. She denied ever having left H. alone with her husband, which was contested by the applicant. 25.  The applicant requested that the court refer H. to a child psychiatrist for examination. The Board did not object to such an examination as long as it was conducted by a public institution. The applicant contended that in the autumn of 1994 he had, of his own motion, discussed his daughter's behaviour with a social welfare official in another local office, following which he had requested the day carer to observe H. particularly in this respect. The day carer denied that such a conversation had taken place. 26.  The County Administrative Court granted the applicant cost-free counsel retroactively from 27 March 1995. It however rejected his request for a further medical examination of H. By its decision of 29 September 1995 it upheld the care order, reiterating the contents of M.'s report of October 1994 and the observations made by the day carer. From the summer of 1994 the day carer had seen H. frequently masturbating during naps and when playing. According to her notes, such masturbation had lasted from fifteen minutes to one and a half hours at a time. H. had also repeatedly been saying that the applicant had been tickling her in her buttocks and kissing her with his tongue. 27.  The County Administrative Court's reasons for upholding the care order read in extenso as follows:\n“According to the evidence available, the conditions in the home of [H.] have seriously jeopardised her health and development. Open-care support measures have not been possible. The public care of [H.] and her placement outside her original home must be considered to be in her interests.” 28.  The County Administrative Court's decision was notified to the Board on 5 October 1995. The following day social welfare officials presented themselves without giving any advance notice in the paternal grandfather's and his partner's home, removed H. and temporarily placed her in a substitute family. 29.  The applicant appealed against the County Administrative Court's decision, requesting a hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) and a further examination of H. 30.  In a meeting on 11 October 1995 between social welfare officials and the applicant, he was informed that H. had been transferred to a substitute family, to which he objected. The mother consented to the placement. 31.  On 6 November 1995 the applicant removed H. from the venue of a supervised meeting and hid her during the following eleven months. On 1 December 1995 he and H. underwent an examination by a psychologist, H.H., who in a written opinion of 22 January 1996 found H. to be more developed than an average child of her age. She was balanced, very attached to her father and there was no indication of her having been sexually abused. 32.  Two days after the abduction the Board decided that the public care should be implemented in the substitute family. The Board did not accept the paternal grandfather's and his partner's offer to care for H. It noted that the applicant had been heard in person on 11 October 1995. He had been invited to attend the Board's meeting, but he sent instead a letter that was read out at the meeting. 33.  On 30 November 1995 the Board filed observations in reply to the applicant's appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 19 January 1996 he submitted a rejoinder. 34.  On 27 February 1996 the court invited the National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs (hereinafter “the Medicolegal Authority”; terveydenhuollon oikeusturvakeskus, rättsskyddscentralen för hälsovården) to submit a written opinion on the conduct of the examinations by the Family Advice Centre, which was subsequently communicated to the applicant for comments. 35.  Meanwhile, and following the applicant's complaint as to the examinations by the Family Advice Centre, the Medicolegal Authority had obtained expert opinions from its standing experts, a professor in child psychiatry, Dr E.R., and a psychologist T.P., as well as a written opinion from Dr A-K.R. and J.K. In an opinion dated 30 January 1996 Dr E.R. noted inter alia the following:\n“The examinations carried out on H. were initiated on account of 'the sexual games' with the father, of which the child had spoken to the day care nurse, and on account of H.'s frequent masturbation in day care, especially before taking a nap. Although masturbation is relatively usual at that age, it can no longer be considered to merely relate to the age of the child when it is so extensive and intense as described by the day care nurse, especially not where the masturbation is placed in the context of the child's description of 'sexual games' at home. In this light I find the initiation of the examinations concerning sexual abuse a justified measure. .... [Dr A - K.R's] questions [that were put to H.] were not leading although they tended to have an element of pressure given that they were repeated several times as the girl was unable to answer them. ... Whether the girl has undergone psychological tests, either projective tests or tests measuring the child's abilities, remains unclear. Also the contents of [H.'s] playing remain unclear. Thus, I cannot assess the quality of psychologist [J.K.'s] examinations. Pyschologist [M.R.] has met both parents, but the documents I have received do not disclose any detailed description of the contents of the discussions, thus preventing me from assessing also the quality of these discussions. With the exception of the interview carried out by child psychiatrist [A-K.R.], which I find appropriate, I cannot take a position on the nature of the examinations. ...The decision to take the child into public care was made in an appropriate manner by the social welfare authorities, considering that the father had proved to be the likely abuser of the child...” 36.  On 21 May 1996 the Medicolegal Authority gave the applicant permission to consult, during 24 hours, four tape recordings from the examination of H. at the Family Advice Centre. He was not allowed to copy the tapes but had them transcribed. 37.  On 3 June 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court invited the applicant's further observations. In his observations of 19 June 1996 he submitted a written opinion by the psychologist H.H., issued following the abduction. He also requested a hearing including the taking of witness evidence from the former girlfriend M., Dr A-K.R., the psychologist H.H. and Dr G.A., a child psychiatrist and consultant to the Ministry for Social and Health Affairs. Moreover, he objected to not having been provided with the full documentation underlying the Medicolegal Authority's opinion such as Dr A-K.R.'s and the psychologist J.K.'s observations. Lastly, he relied on a written opinion, dated 17 June 1996, by Dr G.A., who considered that the examination by the Family Advice Centre had not shown that H. had been sexually abused by the applicant. On the contrary, it transpired from the transcripts of the interviews that she had been led and pressurised by Dr A-K.R., the clear goal being to detect sexual abuse. Not all interviews had been recorded. Clinical annotations were missing from the records, which rendered it impossible for Dr G.A. to assess the credibility of the Family Advice Centre's examinations. 38.  Following the Medicolegal Authority's request for an additional opinion, Dr E.R. and the psychologist T.P., in their joint opinion of 8 July 1996, expressed the view that the decision to take H. into care and place her first with her mother and later in a substitute family, had been justified and appropriate, considering both H.'s own words and her behaviour. They also took the view that the Family Advice Centre should have considered more thoroughly the conditions for an additional examination of H. given the fact that the psychological examination and the interviews with the parents had been insufficient. Further, they took a stand regarding the examinations carried out on the applicant's request during H.'s abduction by the psychologist H.H. As noted above, the applicant relied on a written opinion of H.H in the Supreme Administrative Court.\n“... Psychologist H.H. has carried out psychological examinations on both H. and her father. A written opinion has been given on account of these examinations. It indicates that H.H. had examined the father on two occasions and the child on one occasion. It is questionable especially in the context of suspected sexual abuse that the same psychologist tests both the suspect and the abused child. .... The examinations were carried out without consultation with those involved in the earlier examination, which in our opinion shows professionally unethical and inconsiderate conduct on the part of the examining psychologist. ....” 39.  In its further opinion of 29 July 1996 to the Supreme Administrative Court the Medicolegal Authority deemed the Family Advice Centre's examinations in 1995 to have been necessary and based on a reasonable suspicion of sexual abuse. The Medicolegal Authority had obtained the audio tapes and documents produced by the Family Advice Centre and had heard the psychologist J.K., Dr A-K.R. and the psychologist M.R. in writing. It had also obtained the above joint opinion of its standing experts. 40.  On 1 August 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court invited the applicant's further observations. In his observations of 19 August 1996 he noted that he had not been provided with copies of the above supplementary opinion by Dr A-K.R and the psychologist M.R. 41.  H. was missing from the authorities until 6 October 1996 when the police fetched her from the applicant's work place. She was placed in a family support centre (perhetukikeskus, familjestödscenter). The applicant was informed of her whereabouts on 22 October 1996. 42.  On 8 October 1996 H. underwent an examination in a university hospital. A paediatrician, Dr H.L., stated in her written opinion of 21 November 1996 that she had not found any signs of sexual abuse in her examinations and found H.'s behaviour to be normal for her age. Dr H.L. did not, however, take any stand regarding the earlier medical opinions. 43.  In a meeting on 21 October 1996 between social welfare officials and staff of the university hospital hesitation was expressed about undertaking new examinations concerning the alleged sexual abuse. 44.  From 8 October 1996 to 16 July 1997 H. underwent child psychiatric examinations at the Tampere university hospital on the basis of a referral dating back to December 1995. During that period the applicant was heard at the surgery on 16 December 1996 and 28 April 1997 and he was consulted over the telephone on 20 February and 1 April 1997. In her written opinion of 15 September 1997 a child psychiatrist, Dr M.R., described H. as a very lonely 6 year old girl, whose basic human relationships with her parents and her brother and other persons close to her were coloured by argument and conflict. The examinations did not concern the sexual abuse suspicion as such an examination would have damaged the child's mental health. H. was considered to suffer from a severe stress reaction and to have adjustment difficulties and she was in need of possibly long-lasting child psychiatric treatment. The opinion recommended child welfare measures with a view to protecting the child. 45.  On 7 November 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request for an oral hearing and a further examination of H., and upheld the County Administrative Court's decision with the following reasons:\n“Since an oral hearing was held before the County Administrative Court, there is no reason to hold one before the Supreme Administrative Court.\nIn view of the opinions already obtained there is no need to obtain an additional opinion.\nFor the reasons given in the County Administrative Court's decision and considering, moreover, the disturbed behaviour of [H.], the Supreme Administrative Court considers that the conditions stated in section 16 of the Child Welfare Act have been met as regards the public care order issued on 27 March 1995. Accordingly, and in view of the requests in the matter, the evidence obtained, and the legal provisions invoked by the County Administrative Court, there is no reason to amend its decision.” 46.  In a meeting with social welfare officials on 17 December 1996 the applicant was informed that H., who was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress, would be moved out of the family support centre within six months. 47.  On 24 April 1997 in a meeting with social welfare officials, the applicant was informed that a substitute family home had been found and he was invited to comment in writing on the intention to transfer H. there. 48.  On the same day he requested the Board to terminate the public care as being no longer justified. He submitted that H.'s initial examination in the Family Advice Centre had been conducted on the basis of the preconceived idea that sexual abuse had taken place. This suspicion had been categorically refuted in the written opinions of Dr G.A. and the psychologist H.H. H.'s behavioural disturbance had not been shown to result from the conditions in the applicant's home. Before the taking into care she had not displayed any signs of being disturbed. Moreover, her wish to continue living with him had been recorded repeatedly. 49.  On 13 May 1997 the senior social welfare official refused the applicant's request that the public care be terminated, being of the view that no alternative care solution existed. Open-care assistance would be insufficient for ensuring the child's healthy physical and mental development. By placing H. in substitute care, the authorities were seeking to provide her with a secure and home-like growing environment and to ensure her mental rehabilitation as well as a healthy development corresponding to her age. Having received the decision, the applicant pursued his request before the Board. 50.  In his submission of 19 May 1997 he objected to the intended transfer of H. to a substitute family home and proposed that she be placed in the family of her former day care nurse, who had consented to receiving her. H.'s mother again consented to the transfer to a substitute family home. 51.  On 21 May 1997 the Board decided to transfer H. to the substitute family home. Her removal took place on the following day. The Board's decision stated, inter alia, that:\n“According to M.R., the examining doctor of the Tampere university hospital, H. suffered from post-traumatic stress, inter alia, because of the abduction, and for the purpose of rehabilitation H. should be provided with a safe home-like growing environment. No suitable substitute family was found that could have taken the child, inter alia, because of the abduction threat by the father. A family home was found which has a home-like atmosphere and has long experience of the care of different children taken into public care. In the family both parents are at home, looking after the children.” 52.  On 26 June 1997 the Board also confirmed the official's refusal to terminate the public care, relying on the reasons given in the official's decision. It further noted that the care order had been triggered by the disturbed behaviour which H. had been repeatedly displaying during 1994. From the sexual point of view her symptoms had differed from those of other children of her age. She had been placed in public care on the basis of the Family Advice Centre's examinations. Her growing environment had been jeopardising her healthy development and open-care assistance had been considered insufficient. 53.  The applicant appealed against the Board's decisions of 21 May and 26 June 1997, arguing that it had failed to hear H. and the other interested parties. In considering that there was no alternative to the public care and in finding open-care assistance insufficient the Board had based itself on events which had occurred two years ago, without obtaining any fresh evidence as to the justification for its decisions. He furthermore recalled that, when H. had been removed from him in October 1996, the social welfare officials had requested her fresh examination in the clinic in view of the expert opinions submitted by him. However, after the Supreme Administrative Court had rejected his final appeal against the care order, social welfare officials had allegedly amended their request to the clinic, asking instead that H. receive treatment according to their instructions. 54.  On 16 July 1997 in a meeting involving social welfare officials, the substitute parents and medical staff, it was observed that according to the patient records of the clinic H.'s symptoms, which had already abated in the family support centre, had continued to diminish in the substitute family home. 55.  On 30 October 1997 the County Administrative Court heard thirteen witnesses. It had at its disposal, inter alia, a written opinion of a psychologist, E.S., whom the personnel of the family home had consulted. On 5 December 1997 it rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision to transfer H. to the substitute family home. It gave the following reasons:\n“... Having been taken into public care, [H.] was officially placed in a substitute family from 6 October 1995 to 6 October 1996. In reality she was a fugitive with her father from 6 November 1995 to 6 October 1996, when she was placed in a family support centre.\nA doctor of the university hospital who examined [H.] after her escape journey considered that she should be provided with secure conditions resembling a home. Her individual nurse at the family support centre has considered the placing of H. in a substitute family to be in her best interests.\nOn the basis of the aforementioned and, in particular, given [H.'s] age and the fact that she will be beginning school, the decision to change the premises for implementing the public care ... has been in her best interests.” 56.  The County Administrative Court also rejected the appeal against the decision not to terminate the public care. It reasoned as follows:\n“On 6 November 1995 [the applicant] abducted [H.], who had been placed in the care of the Board, and was hiding her at different locations until 6 October 1996. After the escape journey [H.] was diagnosed as suffering from various behavioural disturbances, a serious post-traumatic stress syndrome and adjustment difficulties. Throughout her public care it has been difficult to initiate cooperation between the social authorities and [the applicant]. According to the evidence presented, [H.] has adjusted well to the substitute home. In this situation the decision to maintain the public care has been in her best interests.” 57.  The applicant appealed further, requesting an oral hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court. He argued, inter alia, that H. should have been heard prior to the Board's decisions. 58.  In response to the applicant's further query as to when the public care would be terminated, it was noted in the care plan of 24 April 1998 that H. was in the process of settling into the substitute family home. She was doing well in school and she would be able to stay in the family home as long as she needed to. It was also stated in the care plan that the social welfare authorities would consult child psychiatric experts in order to determine H.'s long-term needs as to whether she needed a long-term placement or whether the care could be terminated. 59.  In the spring of 1998 social welfare officials inspected the home of the applicant and his then common-law spouse. It appears that no report was made. 60.  In a meeting on 12 June 1998, which the applicant had not been invited to attend, social welfare officials and staff of the hospital and the Family Advice Centre agreed that the symptoms displayed by H. “more than likely” resulted from her having been subjected to sexual abuse. By now the substitute care had provided H. with sufficient security and in the prevailing circumstances she would be able to develop into a balanced young person and adult. A termination of her public care could have unforeseeable consequences. Her meetings with the applicant would be supported also in the future. 61.  On 11 January 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court, without having held an oral hearing, rejected the applicant's appeal against the County Administrative Court's decision of 5 December 1997. The court found the various documentary evidence and the evidence taken at the lower court's hearing sufficient for a ruling as follows:\n“Section 17, subsection 1 of the Child Welfare Act provides that the Social Welfare Board must, whenever possible in view of the child's age and level of development, clarify his or her own wishes and opinion, and afford a child who has reached the age of twelve as well as his or her parents the opportunity to be heard, before a decision as to the child's placement in public care outside his or her home or as to whether to terminate such care. Considering that [H.] underwent examinations at the child psychiatric clinic of a university hospital and that, according to the results, she was suffering from a serious stress reaction and an adjustment difficulty, and considering that, according to [the Board's] decision of 21 May 1997 she had stated, after an introductory visit, that she was willing to move to the family home, although her opinion has later varied, her opinion has been clarified in accordance with the requirements of the aforementioned provision of the law.\nBefore the challenged decisions were reached the parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard. In the County Administrative Court an opportunity to be heard was provided and an oral hearing was held. The Supreme Administrative Court has further afforded the applicant an opportunity to consult all documents in the case. Accordingly, he has been provided with the material which has affected the decision.\nSection 1 of the Child Welfare Act provides that a child is entitled to a secure and stimulating growth environment as well as to a harmonious and well-balanced development, and has a priority right to protection. Considering the evidence presented in respect of the reasons leading to the public care order, [H.'s] mental symptoms and the changes which have occurred in her life, the conditions for maintaining her public care and changing the premises of the care outside her home, as stipulated in sections 16 and 20 of the Child Welfare Act, existed at that stage. On these grounds and considering the reasons and legal provisions relied upon in the County Administrative Court's decision, there is no reason to amend the outcome of that decision.” 62.  In the care plan meeting on 15 January 1999 and following the applicant's request that the public care be terminated, it was agreed that the social welfare authorities would hold a meeting with child psychiatric experts to assess when it would be best to carry out the examinations in the child psychiatric family ward at the university hospital. 63.  On 28 January 1999 the social welfare authorities remitted the applicant and H. for an examination at the ward. The examination with regard to the applicant's parenting skills, his interaction with H. and H.'s psychological state and need for treatment took place in December 1999. In their opinion of 3 February 2000 Drs P.P-A. and E.K. considered, inter alia, that H.'s mental state had clearly improved during her placement in public care to which she seemed to have adjusted well. She was still suffering from a serious emotional disturbance which would require at least one or two psychotherapy sessions a week during the next two or three years. The relationship between her and the applicant displayed a certain inhibition and distance but the conditions for their bonding to improve were present. H. would need long-term individual therapy and long-lasting cooperation between the family, the carers and the child welfare authorities. They considered that the applicant and H. should have their new joint treatment sessions in June and August 2000. 64.  In a meeting on 13 March 2000 social welfare officials and the parents agreed that H.'s and the applicant's relationship would be observed by the child psychiatric family ward in June and August 2000 with a view to issuing an opinion on the conditions for the termination of the public care. It was further agreed that H. would begin receiving therapy. The therapy sessions began in April 2000. 65.  In her opinion of 28 September 2000 Dr P-P.A stated the following:\n“It has been difficult to achieve cooperation and a treatment relationship at the ward, and no functioning cooperation relationship has emerged. ... The father has difficulties in processing H.'s situation at an emotional level and in seeing the burdening effects of the continuous ... trials on the child. He has repeatedly voiced mistrust towards the authorities and concerning the aims of and grounds for the treatment. Also his attitude towards H.'s individual therapy has changed from having been positive to being negative. Owing to this his acceptance of H.'s treatment has remained problematic ... H. needs long-term individual child psychiatric treatment and long-term cooperation between the family, medical staff and child welfare. ... The father's willingness to ensure the management of H.'s individual therapy has remained uncertain. Having regard to the above and to the evasive and distant nature of their interaction ... there are no preconditions for terminating the public care. ... The treatment will now be focusing on H.'s individual therapy. ... Interaction treatment at the ward will not be recommended for now. ...” 66.  From 27 January to 8 February 1995 there was no formal decision concerning access. 67.  The emergency care order of 8 February 1995 included an access restriction to the effect that the applicant and H. were allowed to meet twice a week under supervision. An agreement concerning access from 7 to 23 February 1995 was signed by the applicant. According to him, notwithstanding that he signed the agreement, he opposed restricting access. According to the Government, no access restriction was in force at the relevant time as the applicant had consented to the arrangement. 68.  The Board's decision of 24 February 1995 to uphold the emergency care included an access restriction to the effect that the applicant and H. were allowed to meet once a week under supervision. 69.  According to the Board's decision of 27 March 1995 following a meeting with the parents on 24 March 1995, H. would continue living with her mother while seeing the applicant under supervision. The decision did not specify the frequency of the meetings and it was to be reviewed at the end of 1995. The applicant accompanied by counsel took part in the Board's meeting on 27 March 1995. Following the meeting, the applicant was informed that he could visit H. at the family support centre once a week. 70.  In a care plan of 26 October 1995 following a meeting with the applicant on 11 October 1995, contacts were reduced to one supervised three-hour visit once a month, starting on 6 November 1995 in the family support centre. This arrangement was to be in force until March 1996. The applicant objected to the restriction and was allegedly not provided with all relevant documentation. No formal decision was issued. 71.  Following the abduction of 6 November 1995, the Board by its decision of 8 November 1995 prohibited access until 31 May 1996, pursuant to section 25 of the Child Welfare Act and section 9 of the Child Welfare Decree. The applicant had been invited to attend the Board's meeting, but he sent instead a letter that was read out at the meeting. As noted above, H. was found with the applicant on 6 October 1996. 72.  On 22 October 1996 the director of the family support centre issued a formal decision, prohibiting all meetings between the applicant and H. until 21 November 1996 owing to the risk of abduction. The applicant was informed that despite the prohibition he would be allowed to see H. in connection with her therapeutic visits to the clinic. On 22 November 1996 the Board issued a decision, maintaining the access prohibition until 30 May 1997. It referred to the abduction following which the applicant had been hiding her from the authorities for eleven months. Referring to section 15, subsections 3 and 4, of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Board did not hear him, considering that such a hearing could jeopardise the purpose of the decision and that the decision could not be postponed. He appealed to the County Administrative Court. In its rejoinder of 21 January 1997 to the applicant's appeal the Board submitted that the applicant had allegedly said, during a visit to the clinic on 16 December 1996, that he intended to abduct H. again. Moreover, the abduction threat had not been the only reason for the access prohibition as H. had been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome for which she needed care. 73.  In a letter of 11 February 1997 the senior social welfare official clarified the access prohibition ordered on 22 November 1996. Despite the prohibition, the applicant was allowed to meet H. during her therapeutic visits to the clinic and to write to and telephone her in the family support centre. It appears that, even though encouraged by social welfare officials to do so, he did not use this opportunity. 74.  On 21 February 1997 the County Administrative Court quashed the access prohibition imposed on 22 November 1996 and remitted the matter for a re-examination by the Board, finding that the Board had not shown sufficient grounds for not hearing the applicant prior to its decision. The decision was notified to the social welfare authorities on 20 March 1997. 75.  On 21 May 1997 the Board issued a formal decision restricting access which was to be in force until 31 December 1997. The frequency and implementation of the meetings were to be agreed upon in connection with the presentation of the care plan indicating where H. was going to live. The applicant had been heard on 24 April 1997. 76.  From 1 September 1997 the social welfare authorities repeatedly tried to arrange meetings with the applicant to draw up a new care plan in order to arrange future visits between him and H. However, he never accepted the suggested dates nor did he make his own proposals. 77.  In his letter of 5 January 1998 the applicant demanded that the family home be informed of his right to meet H., given that the last access restriction had ceased on 31 December 1997. In a letter of 16 January 1998 a social welfare official informed him that it was a normal practice concerning the arrangement of meetings with children placed in a substitute family to agree on the conditions at a meeting at which the social welfare authorities, the substitute parents and the parents were present. She further noted that:\n“....we have on several occasions tried to fix consultations for the purpose of arranging meetings between you and H. but no progress has been made. The situation at present is that we have not made any decision on the restriction of the right of access but have agreed with the family home that you will be able to meet H. there. The frequency of meetings would be one visit per month, and you can directly agree with the family home on the most convenient dates for the meetings. ....” 78.  On 20 January 1998 the family home and the applicant agreed that the applicant and H. would meet in the paternal grandfather's home. The social welfare authorities informed the applicant in a letter dated 21 January 1998 that he could only visit H. in the substitute family home owing to the fact that H. had not seen him for a long time. Neither of the social welfare officials' letters of January 1998 constituted a formal decision. 79.  The social welfare authorities tried to arrange meetings to draw up a care plan again in February 1998 but a meeting was not held until 9 March 1998. According to the care plan, the applicant was to visit H. two times in the substitute family home and once at the paternal grand father's. The leading social officer would also visit the applicant in his home on 7 April 1998. The social welfare officials did not accept the applicant's proposal that H. would visit his home every other weekend. No formal decision was made. 80.  In a care plan meeting on 17 April 1998 social welfare officials did not accept the applicant's proposal that H. be allowed to stay with him and his common-law spouse every other weekend. According to the care plan of 24 April 1998, one visit a month would take place in the substitute family home and once a month the substitute parents would bring H. to the paternal grandfather's for the day. The applicant would be allowed to organise certain outings with H., as long as she would not be subjected to situations creating confusion in her as to which was really her permanent home at that particular moment. The access restriction was to be in force until 26 June 1998. No formal decision was made. 81.  Since a care plan meeting on 26 June 1998 it appears that the visits have been fully agreed on. It was agreed that H. would visit the applicant every other weekend from Saturday to Sunday. She could also spend a week with her paternal grandfather during the summer. The care plan indicated that her public care remained justified in the light of the conclusions reached in a meeting the same month. In a care plan meeting on 18 September 1998 it was agreed that H. would visit the applicant every other weekend from Friday until Sunday and spend the autumn holiday with him. The Christmas holiday would be agreed on between the substitute family home and the applicant. In a care plan meeting on 15 January 1999 it was agreed that the weekend visits were to be conducted as earlier. H. could also spend the winter holidays with the applicant. In a care plan meeting on 13 March 2000 it was agreed that H. would spend four weeks with the applicant in July 2000. It appears that H. has continued to visit the applicant's home every other week and to spend part of her summer holidays with him. 82.  Meanwhile, in civil proceedings initiated before the Tampere District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) on 15 March 1995, H.'s mother requested, allegedly on the recommendation of social welfare officials, that she be granted sole custody of the children and that H. be ordered to live with her. In an interim decision of 15 June 1995 the District Court ordered that H. should live with her mother, following the termination of the public care. It adjourned the further consideration of the case. 83.  In September 1996 the applicant started cohabiting with a woman, whom he married in 1999. 84.  On 3 February 1998 the District Court confirmed an agreement between the applicant and H.'s mother to the effect that they would exercise joint custody of their son K., whereas the applicant would have sole custody of H. and she would live with him following the termination of her public care. 85.  On 7 August 1998 the District Court, in response to the parents' joint request, awarded the applicant sole custody of K., who had moved into the home of the applicant and his common-law spouse in July 1998. 86.  On 3 June 2003 H. was placed temporarily with the applicant and the public care was terminated on 2 February 2004. 87.  On 9 November 2004 H. was again taken into emergency care on the applicant's request. On 4 May 2005 she returned to live with him. 88.  On 30 April 1996 the Board reported the applicant to the police, on suspicion of having sexually abused H. and having abducted her in violation of the public care order and the access restriction. 89.  Further, on an unspecified date, the applicant was charged with having sexually abused H. He was further charged with having abducted her on 6 November 1995. On 28 May 1997 the Tampere District Court held its first hearing. It subsequently heard the applicant and nine witnesses, including the paternal grandmother, the day carer, Drs A.R. and J.K., and received several written expert opinions. 90.  In its judgment of 29 January 1998 the District Court, notwithstanding that it considered H.'s behaviour at the time of the initial care order not to have been normal for her age, found that the evidence did not show that the applicant had committed the sexual acts that he had been charged with. It thus rejected the charges. It declined to consider the charges relating to the abduction, as the Board had not attested that the bringing of charges was in the interests of the child. The court reasoned as follows:\n... Taking into account the incriminating facts, the District Court does not find it established in a reliable manner that [the applicant] is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse of a child nor of sexually indecent behaviour towards a child. ...\nWitness A.K. [the day carer] had made notes about H.'s behaviour in day care between 16 November 1994 and 12 January 1995. When A.K. was heard as a witness, she explained that by “bottom” she had meant “the genitals”. The notes contain entries made in 35 different days. According to the notes of A.K., H. had “tickled” her genitals on all those days, which had lasted from 15 minutes to one and half hours. ....\nAccording to witness A-K.R., who is specialising in child psychiatry, ... a child's behaviour becomes sexually coloured after sexual abuse. Such children masturbate more than usual. The witness had earlier met only one child who had masturbated to the extent of the present one. Child psychiatric literature does not give for this extensive masturbation any explanations other than that the child has in some way been subjected to sexuality. The witness is of the view that the child has been subjected to behaviour which is inappropriate for a child, at least when she has clearly had pathological behaviour. .... The witness is not able to tell whether masturbation is something that the child has herself discovered, but it has clearly been indicated that it is something that she has in some way done together with the father. According to the witness, H. is a strong and determined child whose words are even more convincing than the words of children usually are. In the view of the witness, the most important report in the case are the notes made by the day care nurse. ....\nWitness J.K., who worked as a psychologist at the Family Advice Centre, has stated that a girl masturbating is not necessarily a sign of incest that she has experienced. However girls, who have had some kind of sexual experiences, often show disturbed or excessive sexual behaviour. Excessive masturbation could be a sign of experiences other than sexual abuse, for example other kind of mental instability. There may be hyper or overactive children, distressed children or children showing this kind of behaviour without any explanations thereto. ... 91.  On 26 August 1999, the Turku Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) confirmed the acquittal. In addition to the reasons given by the District Court, it found, inter alia, that it could not be concluded from the Family Advice Centre's initial examination that H. had been sexually abused.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in the town of Novovoronezh in the Voronezh Region. 6.  The applicant is a Chernobyl pensioner. She sued the Welfare Office for the unpaid allowances. 7.  On 15 July 2003 the Novovoronezhskyy Town Court of the Voronezh Region (“the Town Court”) awarded her the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 July 2002 and 31 July 2003 in the amount of 22,109.75 Russian roubles (RUB). The judgment entered into force on 25 July 2003. It was enforced in full on 9 June 2005. 8.  By a judgment of 15 March 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant the unpaid food and disability allowances over the period between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2003 in the amount of RUB 4,329.72 and RUB 643.85 respectively. The judgment acquired legal force on 25 March 2004. It appears that it has not been enforced to date. 9.  On 15 March 2004 the Town Court recovered in the applicant's favour the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 August 2003 and 31 December 2003 in the amount of RUB 13,971.50. The judgment became final on 25 March 2004. It was fully enforced on 3 August 2005. 10.  By a judgment of 6 May 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 January 2004 and 31 March 2004 in the amount of RUB 9,494.54. The court also increased the monthly disability allowance to RUB 5,664.85 as of 1 April 2004 and held that it had to be index-linked in accordance with legislation. On 17 May 2004 the judgment acquired legal force. On 10 June 2004 the Welfare Office ordered to increase the applicant's monthly disability allowance to RUB 5,664.85. On 11 November 2005 the applicant received RUB 9,949.54. 11.  On 9 September 2004 the Town Court recovered in the applicant's favour the unpaid food allowance over the period between 1 January 2004 and 31 March 2004 in the amount of RUB 1,139.34 and the unpaid annual disability allowance for 2004 in the amount of RUB 1,132.96. The court also increased the applicant's monthly food allowance to RUB 679.78 as of 1 April 2004 and ordered to index-link it in accordance with legislation. The court further held that as of 2005 the Welfare Office was to pay the applicant an annual disability allowance and to index-link it in accordance with legislation. The judgment entered into force on 20 September 2004. It appears that it has not been enforced to date. 12.  On 29 September 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant RUB 12,659.40 for the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 April 2004 and 31 July 2004. On 11 October 2004 the judgment acquired legal force. It was fully enforced on 11 November 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  On 29 September 1994, the applicant was arrested mainly on charges of robbery and trespassing. The criminal proceedings against him and three other persons were opened the same day. 6.  On 28 November 1994, he was released from custody. 7.  In an indictment dated 29 September 1995, the Prosecutor's Office attached to the Bucharest County Court committed the applicant and the three other persons for trial. 8.  On 12 October 1995 the case was registered with the Bucharest District Court. 9.  On 2 April 1996, on an appeal by one of the co-accused against an interlocutory judgment rendered in the case, the file was sent to the Bucharest County Court, from where it was returned on 13 May 1996 and was entered into the court's list on 29 May 1996. However, none of the contents of the file could be found after this date. 10.  Consequently, on 7 March 1997, the District Court sent the case back to the County Prosecutor's Office to reconstitute the file. 11.  On 6 June 1997, under Article 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the County Prosecutor's Office referred the case back to the District Court, this being the appropriate judicial authority to reconstitute the file at that stage of the proceedings. 12.  Therefore, on 30 June 1997, the case was re-entered into the District Court's list.\nSeveral items, such as the indictment and the arrest warrants, were requested from the Prosecutor's Office. 13.  On 7 December 2001 the District Court considered the file reconstituted. It gave judgment on 7 February 2003, sentencing the applicant to six years' imprisonment. 14.  Most of the adjournments of the hearings were caused by the failings of the judicial authorities in summoning the defendants or civil parties 15.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the sentence was upheld in a decision of 12 May 2004 of the Bucharest County Court and lastly in a final decision of 29 July 2004 of the Bucharest Court of Appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants, who were born in 1982, 1975 and 1979 respectively, reside in Istanbul. 5.  On 13 July 1998 the first two applicants were arrested and taken into custody at Gaziosmanpaşa police station on suspicion of their involvement in a robbery. Subsequently, on 15 July 1998 the third applicant was taken into custody in connection with the same offence. 6.  The applicants alleged that during their police custody, they had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. In particular, they stated that they had been blindfolded, stripped naked, hung by their arms, given electric shocks, harassed, threatened, punched, kicked, beaten with truncheons and other blunt objects, and subjected to falaka (whipping on the soles of the feet). 7.  On 18 July 1998 the applicants were examined at a hospital. The doctor who examined them reported that there were no signs of physical violence on their bodies. According to the applicants, the doctor was a friend of the police officer who had accompanied them to the hospital, and he had drafted the report without carrying out a medical examination. 8.  On 19 July 1998 the applicants were interrogated by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge. The second and third applicants alleged before the investigating judge that they had been ill-treated during their time in police custody. The applicants were then remanded in custody upon the order of the investigating judge. 9.  On the same date, the applicants filed a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor and complained of ill-treatment. The public prosecutor initiated an investigation and ordered that the applicants be taken to the Gaziosmanpaşa Health Clinic for a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicants noted the following injuries:\n(a)  Mr Yazıcı had three parallel bruises on his back measuring 1x10 cm and a bruise inside his left cheek measuring 1 cm;\n(b)  Mr Polat had two bruises measuring 1x10 cm on his back and a wound measuring 1x2 cm on the back of his right foot; and\n(c)  Mr Sağın had four bruises measuring 1x10 cm on his back and a wound measuring 1x1cm on the outer side of his right foot. 10.  On 10 May 1999 the Gaziosmanpaşa Forensic Medicine Institute issued a report regarding the applicants’ injuries. Based on the findings indicated in the medical report of 19 July 1998, it was concluded that the first and second applicants were unfit to work for five days and the third applicant for seven days. 11.  On 1 October 1999 the prosecutor at the Eyüp Assize Court filed an indictment against three police officers, accusing them of torture pursuant to Article 243 of the former Criminal Code. 12.  On 13 October 1999 the criminal proceedings before the Eyüp Assize Court commenced. The applicants joined the proceedings as civil parties. 13.  On 21 December 2000 Law no. 4616 on conditional release was enacted. This law provided for the suspension of proceedings or of the execution of sentences in respect of crimes committed before 23 April 1999 and for which the maximum penalty did not exceed ten years’ imprisonment. Section 5(a) of Law no. 4616 stipulated that the execution of sentences in respect of offences proscribed by, amongst others, Article 243 of the former Criminal Code could not be suspended. 14.  On 25 October 2005 the Eyüp Assize Court decided that the acts allegedly committed by the accused police officers fell within the scope of Article 245 of the former Criminal Code, regarding ill-treatment. It therefore decided that pursuant to section 1(4) of Law no. 4616, the criminal proceedings should be suspended and subsequently discontinued if no offence of the same or a more serious kind was committed by the offenders within a five-year period. 15.  On 8 November 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the grounds that the statutory time-limit had expired. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings against the police officers were discontinued.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  It would appear from the case file that the salient fact in the domestic proceedings was the applicant’s association with the mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH”)[1]. The term mujahedin has been widely used to refer to foreigners – mainly from the Arab world – who came to BH during the war in support of Bosnian Muslims[2]. However, the same term has been used to describe local Muslims who joined the foreign mujahedin, endorsed their ideology and adjusted to their way of dressing. The phenomenon has been explained by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in Hadžihasanović and Kubura, IT-01-47-T, §§ 411‑18, 15 March 2006, and Delić, IT-04-83-T, §§ 166-199, 15 September 2008, as follows. 7.  The first foreign mujahedin arrived in BH in the summer of 1992 via Croatia and with the assistance of the Croatian authorities. It would appear that their arrival was welcomed by the BH authorities. While the presence of at least some foreign mujahedin seems to have been motivated by a desire to provide humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian Muslim population, most of them actively supported the military struggle against the Bosnian Muslims’ adversaries, ready to conduct a jihad or “holy war”. As stated by Ali Hamad, an ICTY witness of Bahraini origin who came to BH in 1992, some of the mujahedin were members of al-Qaeda who had the aim of “creating a base that would allow them to increase their area of operations”. Some of them also came to perform missionary work. 8.  Upon arrival, foreign mujahedin settled in various locations and did not form a homogeneous entity. Towards the end of 1992, Bosnian Muslims started to join the foreign mujahedin. The locals were provided with military training and participated in combat action. They were also given religious instruction. A number of groups comprising foreign and/or local mujahedin were active. Notwithstanding instances of participation in combat alongside each other, it appears that these groups were anxious to maintain their distinct identities. There were religious and ideological differences between them, which resulted in occasional violent clashes. 9.  On 13 August 1993 the foreign mujahedin were organised into a unit within the local ARBH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) forces[3]. The unit, named “El Mujahedin”, was based in Zenica. Following its establishment, the unit significantly grew in size. By 1995, it consisted of around 1,000 fighters. Although the original idea had been to replenish the unit with foreign mujahedin only, locals soon outnumbered its foreign members. The factors that motivated locals to join it included: its stricter regimental discipline; a better degree of organisation; superior equipment and combat morale; its religious dedication; and material benefits. The unit received funds and assistance from many organisations and individuals from the Islamic world, including the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation[4] and the Benevolence International Foundation[5]. The Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan provided logistical support. 10.  El Mujahedin had a number of features setting it apart from regular ARBH units. It was led by foreign mujahedin who were not appointed by the ARBH. At the top of the hierarchy was an emir, who has been described as the highest-ranking person within the unit. Abu Haris, a Libyan, was its first emir. In December 1993, he was succeeded by an Algerian, Abu Maali, who remained in that position until the end of the war. A different person from the emir, the military commander, headed the military council and was responsible for the conduct of combat operations. In 1993, this post was held by an Egyptian named Vahidin or Wahiuddin. After his death in October 1993, another Egyptian, Muatez, succeeded him. Muatez was killed in September 1995. The unit had a religious council, the shura, which was its supreme decision-making body. It consisted of approximately twenty prominent members of the unit, mostly of Arab origin. The emir was elected by and answerable to the shura. At the end of 1994, Sheikh Shaban joined the leadership of the unit. He was the head of the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan and known to be an extremist who was well-connected with Islamic fundamentalists all over the world (the ICTY relied in that regard on a judgment of the Milan Criminal Court of 1 January 2006). He facilitated the recruitment of volunteers from Arab countries for the struggle in BH. Although Sheikh Shaban did not hold an official function within the unit, its members considered him to be the political authority and even the real emir within the unit. He could issue binding rulings (fatwa) and his authority was never challenged by the shura. Sheikh Shaban was killed, together with Abu Haris, at an HVO (Croatian Defence Council)[6] military checkpoint on 14 December 1995. 11.  The General Framework Agreement for Peace, which ended the war in BH, was initialled at a military base near Dayton, the United States, on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. Article III of Annex 1A to that Agreement called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighbouring and other States, irrespective of whether they were legally and militarily subordinated to any of the local forces. In view of that, on 14 December 1995 the ARBH disbanded El Mujahedin and ordered its foreign members to leave the country by 10 January 1996. Despite initial resistance, the shura accepted that the unit be disbanded. It would appear that awards, such as the “Golden Lily”, were given to its members as an incentive for foreigners to leave. Members of the unit were also provided with ARBH certificates of service, which assisted its foreign members to acquire BH citizenship. Whereas most of the unit’s foreign members left BH, some of them (such as the present applicant) applied for BH citizenship and continue to live in BH to date. 12.  After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the official attitude towards foreign mujahedin changed dramatically. Many lost their BH citizenship or were deported from BH after being declared a threat to national security. 13.  The applicant was born in Iraq in 1960. 14.  He went to Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue his studies in 1979. He first studied in Sarajevo and in 1983 moved to Zenica. In 1987 the applicant married a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have five children together. 15.  During the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the applicant joined El Mujahedin unit mentioned above. 16.  The applicant acquired citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH citizenship”) on three occasions: on 23 March 1992, on 12 January 1995 (under the name of Awad Fadhil) and again on 20 February 1995. He has visited Iraq twice since the 1992-95 war, in 2003 and 2004. The applicant possesses an Iraqi passport, issued by the Iraqi Embassy in Vienna on 23 January 2007, which was valid until 22 January 2011. 17. On 30 August 2006 the competent administrative authorities established that the applicant’s BH citizenship had been acquired by means of fraudulent conduct, false information and concealment of some relevant facts (notably, the fact that he already possessed BH citizenship when he lodged the second application for naturalisation and that he had used documents issued in two different names) and quashed the decisions of 23 March 1992 and 20 February 1995. On 12 January 2007 the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the State Court”) quashed the part of the decision of 30 August 2006 concerning the decision of 20 February 1995 and remitted the case for retrial. 18.  Meanwhile, on 6 June 2007 the applicant filed a request for a temporary residence permit. On 28 September 2007 the Aliens Service suspended those proceedings pending the final resolution of the applicant’s citizenship status. 19.  On 27 November 2008 the competent administrative authorities quashed the decision of 20 February 1995 again. On 3 December 2009 the State Court upheld that decision. On 1 February 2010 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”). It appears that those proceedings are still pending. This does not, however, prevent the applicant’s potential deportation, as he became an unlawful resident from the moment of the notification of the decision of 27 November 2008. The applicant, on the other hand, claimed that he still possesses BH citizenship based on a decision of 12 January 1995 (see paragraph 16 above). That decision was, however, issued in the name of another person (Awad Fadhil) and cannot, therefore, confer any rights on the applicant, as was confirmed in the Government’s observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. 20.   On 23 June 2009 the Aliens Service established that the applicant was a threat to national security and placed him in Istočno Sarajevo Immigration Centre. It relied on secret intelligence reports. On 30 June 2009 the State Court, having assessed the secret evidence, upheld that decision. On 17 September 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. The initial detention period had been extended on a monthly basis until April 2011 when the applicant was released (see paragraph 26 below). 21.  After the decision revoking the applicant’s citizenship of 27 November 2008 had become final, the proceedings before the Aliens Service concerning a request for a temporary residence permit were resumed at the applicant’s request (see paragraph 18 above). On 8 January 2010 the Aliens Service refused his request and granted him a period for voluntary departure of fifteen days. On 2 March 2010 the Ministry of Security upheld that decision. On 1 June 2010 the State Court upheld the decision of 2 March 2010. On 21 April 2011 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. It would appear that those proceedings are still pending. 22.  On 17 February 2010 the applicant claimed asylum. He maintained that Iraqi citizens who had joined the foreign mujahedin during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were treated in Iraq as suspected terrorists and were subjected to ill-treatment. He added that his friend had informed him that his name was on a “black list” and that his family was subjected to threats and ill-treatment due to their affiliation with the Ba’ath Party. The applicant also claimed that he would be persecuted by Shia Muslims and Kurds upon his return to Iraq (Kirkuk) because he is a Sunni Muslim. 23.  On 23 February 2010 the Asylum Service interviewed the applicant in the presence of his lawyer and a UNHCR representative. It also had regard to reports of the US Department of State, the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and the UK Border Agency on Iraq. At the interview the applicant stated that he has visited Iraq twice since the change of regime, in 2003 and 2004. During both visits he stayed with his family in Kirkuk. In 2003 he went to visit his sick father and stayed for one and a half months. He took care of his father and accompanied him to the hospital on several occasions. In 2004 the applicant went to Kirkuk to hold a commemoration for his father and remained there for the whole month of Ramadan and the Bayram holiday. However, he claimed that during these visits he had been forced to hide in fear of the Kurdish authorities as his friend had told him that he was under surveillance and that his name was on a “black list”. The applicant further claimed that in his subsequent contact with his family, after he had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, they had told him that the Kurds had searched their home looking for him. On 4 March 2010 the Asylum Service refused the asylum claim and granted him a period for voluntary departure of fifteen days. The Asylum Service held that the applicant’s statements were contradictory and that he had not provided any evidence in support of his claims. 24.  On 26 May 2010 the State Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a retrial stating that the Asylum Service should make a more thorough assessment of the applicant’s claim. On 21 June 2010 the Asylum Service refused the applicant’s request for asylum and granted him a period for voluntary departure of fifteen days. On 22 September 2010 the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina upheld that decision. On 19 November 2010 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court against that decision. On 9 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It held that, although the general situation in Iraq was insecure and problematic, the applicant had not proved that there was a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of his personal circumstances. 25.  On 8 November 2010 the Aliens Service issued a deportation order accompanied with an entry ban for a period of five years. It stated, however, that removal directions would not be issued for as long as the Court’s interim measure was in force. On 3 December 2010 the Ministry of Security upheld that decision. On 16 March 2011 the State Court also upheld the deportation order. An appeal is pending before the Constitutional Court. 26.  On 5 April 2011 the State Court ordered the applicant’s immediate release from the immigration centre, quashing the last extension order (of 21 March 2011) as unlawful. It held that the relevant authorities had not provided any new evidence as a basis for the applicant’s continued detention. Furthermore, it prescribed the lesser measure of surveillance limiting the applicant’s freedom of movement to his home address in Zenica with the obligation to report daily to the Aliens Service field office in Zenica. It also ordered the confiscation of the applicant’s Iraqi passport and other personal documents he might use in an attempt to leave the country. The applicant was released from detention on 7 April 2011.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Petrozavodsk. He is a practising martial arts instructor specialising in kickboxing and Thai boxing. 6.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop. According to the prosecution, the crime had been committed on 17 June 2002 by the applicant, Va., Ku. and Pa., with intent to coerce the shop owner into accepting their “security services”. 7.  On the following day the Petrozavodsk Town Court authorised the applicant’s remand in custody, citing the gravity of the charges against him and the risk that he would abscond or obstruct the course of justice. The applicant was placed in a temporary detention centre in Petrozavodsk. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 8.  On 12 March 2004 the applicant was transferred to a Petrozavodsk Town Police Department temporary detention centre to study the case file materials. He was placed in cell no. 11 together with eight other inmates. On the same day he had an altercation with officer N. The parties presented differing descriptions of the incident. 9.  According to the applicant, at approximately 11 a.m. officer N. opened the cell door and dragged him out of the cell into the hallway. The applicant did not resist in any way. Several police officers on duty and the head of the duty unit L., as well as the inmates of cell no. 11, witnessed the scene. N. threw the applicant on to the floor, leaned on him and squeezed his neck, applying force to the carotid artery and the Adam’s apple. The policeman accompanied his actions with obscene language and threats. Only the intervention of the head of the duty unit stopped him and allowed the applicant to stand up. The applicant asked for a meeting with a prosecutor and for a medical examination. N. again approached the applicant, threatening him. Afraid for his life and desperately trying to get back into his cell, the applicant raised his leg, apparently in a non-threatening manner. He did not hit anyone. However, the police officers, including N., immediately pinned him to the floor. N. again squeezed the applicant’s neck with both hands. Officer M. stepped over the applicant’s face. The applicant was dragged back to his cell. He again unsuccessfully repeated his requests for a medical examination and a meeting with a prosecutor or a higher‑ranking police officer. The inmates refused to leave the cell and asked the police officers to call a doctor. However, their requests were to no avail. 10.  Half an hour later the applicant and Ga., one of the inmates, were taken to see a deputy head of the Petrozavodsk Town Police Department. The applicant described the incident and showed the injuries on his neck and chest. Ga. corroborated his version of events. They were promised a thorough inquiry into the events in question. 11.  The applicant repeated his allegations of ill-treatment during the subsequent interview with investigator I. After the interview the applicant was taken back to cell no. 11, where an emergency doctor was assisting another inmate. According to the applicant, his request for a medical examination was abruptly dismissed by N., who was present in the cell. In the evening of the same day the applicant was transported back to the remand prison in Petrozavodsk. 12.  The official version of the events of 12 March 2004 was summarised in the judgment of 20 December 2004 (see paragraph 23 below) as follows:\n“The [applicant] ... and other inmates held in the same cell asked to be transferred to another cell. He shouted, knocked on the door of the cell and uttered profanities against the [guards] ... . The applicant and other inmates in cell no. 11 ignored numerous orders of the ... officers to stop the disturbance ... officer N. entered cell no. 11 in order to identify the instigator and to take him out of the cell ... the applicant ... put his arms around N. to restrain him. Then N. raised the applicant slightly off the floor and carried him out of the cell into the hallway. The applicant released N. In the hallway the applicant ... threatened N. and kicked him in the head. ... N. blocked the blow with his left arm. In order to stop the applicant’s illegal actions ... , N. used physical force against him and threw him to the floor. While lying on the floor, the applicant continued kicking N. As a result of the applicant’s actions, N. sustained the following injuries: a blunt injury to the head and concussion, a blunt injury to the left hand with a finger fracture coupled with tissue swelling and a bruise ..., as well as bruises on the left hand and the right arm ... . The applicant’s illegal actions were stopped by the officers.” 13.  On 12 March 2004, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor, who made the following entry in the medical record:\n“No complaints. Objectively: in the middle and third parts of the right side of the neck surface [there are] three bruises of an unidentifiable form, measuring from 2.5 by 1 centimetres to 5 by 2.5 centimetres ... , [there is] a bruise of a similar colour on the front surface of the right side of the chest situated ... closer to the second rib [and] measuring 3 by 2 centimetres. [There is] a linear abrasion on the back surface of the right hand, measuring 0.8 by 0.1 centimetres ... . According [to the applicant], he had an abrasion on the parietal region of the head; ‘there was a small amount of blood on the abrasion’. No other visual injuries ... have been discovered.” 14.  On the same day N. consulted a neurologist, who diagnosed him with concussion and a closed fracture of the little finger on the left hand. 15.  On 17 March 2004 the applicant’s lawyer asked the town prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly beaten up the applicant. 16.  On 26 March 2004 the deputy head of the town police department completed an internal investigation into the incident of 12 March 2004. He concluded that the use of force against the applicant had been lawful. As regards, the events of 12 March 2004, the report stated as follows:\n“... On 12 March 2004 at 11 a.m. [the police officers] heard loud knocking ... on the door of cell. [11]. ... When [the police officers] opened the viewing panel, ... inmate Sh. asked to be transferred to the cell ... where [his relative S.] was being held. It was explained to him that it was impossible to satisfy his request and the viewing panel was closed. Some thirty to forty seconds later, [someone] started knocking on the cell door again, uttering profanities.\nWarden L. and officers F., N. and M. approached the cell, opened the viewing panel to hear Sh.’s demands for a transfer ... . The warden explained that it was impossible to transfer him. Then Sh. claimed that he was not feeling well, that the panel should remain open, that they should be given tea and that the smell in the cell was bad. In response, warden L. explained patiently that, in accordance with the centre’s schedule and in compliance with sanitary standards the cell was to be cleaned in the evening ... . Then the warden ordered the door to cell 11 to be opened. Sh. was told to take his personal effects and move to another cell ... . [The applicant], who was, for no reason, uttering profanities, demonstrating his martial arts skills and making threats ... , was asked to prepare for a transfer too. The atmosphere in the cell was heated. Other inmates started making similar demands about tea, opening up the viewing panel and complaining about a bad smell in the cell. Sh. and [the applicant] refused to transfer to another cell.\nIn accordance with [relevant] regulations, ... the police officers informed [the police department] of the situation. When all the inmates, except for Sh., stepped away from the cell door, officer N. entered the cell and approached Sh. to take him out of the cell ... . At that moment [the applicant] assaulted N., trying to drag him further into the cell. N. put his arms around [the applicant] and carried him out into the hallway, put him face to the wall on the left and let go of him. The other inmates, led by Sh., tried to open the cell door while warden L., officers M. and F. were forcing it closed from the other side ... [The applicant], who was standing by the wall, continued making threats to N. and showing his martial arts skills. Then he assaulted N., locked N.’s neck with his left arm and pulled him towards himself, dragging him to the floor. N. got out of the applicant’s lock, pinned [the applicant] to the floor and restrained him by pressing his arms against the applicant’s chest. ... [The applicant] stopped resisting and said that he had calmed down and would behave in the cell. N. let go of him to let [the applicant] stand up, and stood up himself. At that moment ... [the applicant] kicked N. with his right foot ... in the lower jaw. Trying to cover his face, N. raised his arm. [The applicant] kicked him again, hitting the fingers on N.’s left hand ... . N. put his arms around [the applicant] and they both fell to the ground. N. still had his arms around [the applicant] trying to avoid [the latter’s] kicks ... . Officer M. held [the applicant] by the feet. Then [the applicant] again claimed that he would not resist and would bring the cell back into order ... . The officers let go of [the applicant] and he was taken back into the cell.” 17.  On 8 April 2004 forensic medical expert U. completed a report concerning the applicant’s injuries. In particular, he concluded as follows:\n“The applicant sustained the following injuries: a bruise on the ... back of the head, bruises on the right side of the neck surface and the front of the rib cage on the right, and an abrasion on the right hand. These injuries could have been caused on 12 March 2004. The bruises on the neck and the rib cage were caused by an impact from solid blunt objects. The bruises on the head and the right hand were caused by the impact of blunt objects.” 18.  On 12 April 2004 a senior investigator from the town prosecutor’s office questioned three of the applicant’s fellow inmates on 12 March 2004. Sh. confirmed the applicant’s version of events. B. alleged that the applicant had not attacked N. in the cell. He further submitted that N. had dragged the applicant out of the cell in response to the inmates’ demands to be transferred. He conceded that he could not see what was going on in the hallway after the applicant had been taken out of the cell. Ga. stated that N. had hit the applicant in the cell and had dragged him out. He could not see the rest as the police officers had tried to close the door to the cell. 19.  On 13 April 2004 an investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against police officers L., M., N. and F., finding that the use of physical force by the police officers against the applicant had been lawful. He relied on the statements made the police officers, several inmates of cell no. 11, and the forensic report on the applicant’s injuries. The applicant did not appeal. 20.  On 17 March 2004 a senior investigator with the town prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on a charge of assault on a police officer. Two days later the applicant was served with a copy of the relevant decision. 21.  On 3 April 2004 the applicant was placed for fifteen days in a punishment cell. He was registered as “an inmate with violent tendencies and a propensity to abscond”. 22.  On 28 April 2004 the criminal proceedings against the applicant on the charges of causing grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop (see paragraph 6 above) and assault on the police officer were joined. 23.  On 20 December 2004 the Petrozavodsk Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years’ imprisonment. As to the events of 12 March 2004, i.e., the alleged assault on the police officers, the Town Court relied on the statements given in court by N., warden L., and police officer P., who had been on duty at the temporary detention centre; on the reports prepared by police officers N., M. and F., and on the findings of the internal inquiry of 26 March 2004. The court viewed the video recording of the incident of 12 March 2004, which corroborated the police officer’s account of the events. The court also heard inmates Sh. and B. and examined earlier statements made by inmates D., G. and Ga. The court dismissed their statements as untrue, noting in addition that B., D. and G. had admitted that they had not witnessed the altercation between N. and the applicant in the hallway. Lastly, the court assessed the injuries sustained by the applicant on 12 March 2004 and, with reference to the internal inquiry of 26 March 2004, concluded that they had not caused any permanent damage to his health and that the use of force against the applicant had been lawful. 24.  As to the charge of causing grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop, the Town Court based its findings on the victim’s statement and on the confession of one of the applicant’s co-defendants K., which he made in court, records of identification parades during which the victim had identified the perpetrators of the criminal offence against him, statements by a number of witnesses made in open court, and physical evidence, including expert opinions, records of scene examinations, etc. The Town Court also relied on the statement made by Pa., another co-defendant, admitting that he had committed the criminal offence together with the applicant. Pa. had died before the trial started. According to the minutes of the trial hearing, the applicant and his lawyer did not object to the reading out of Pa.’s statement. 25.  The applicant appealed maintaining his innocence. He claimed that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the Town Court’s findings were based on inadmissible, inconclusive and contradictory evidence. 26.  On 21 February 2005 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic upheld the judgment of 20 December 2004 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning given by the Town Court. 27.  On 20 December 2005 judge R. of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation granted the application for the supervisory review of the appeal judgment of 21 February 2005 lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The case was remitted to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic. 28.  On 25 January 2006 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic noted that the applicant had not been provided with an opportunity to study the trial record, and quashed the appeal judgment of 20 December 2005 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the appeal court. 29.  On 27 March 2006 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic found that the trial court had erred when indicating the applicant’s place of birth in the verdict, quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the Town Court. 30.  However, on 17 May 2006 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic quashed the judgment of 27 March 2006 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh examination to the appeal court. The court noted that the trial court’s erroneous indication of the applicant’s place of birth had not affected the substance of the verdict. 31.  In a new set of appeal proceedings, on 3 July 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 20 December 2004. 32.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with manslaughter and aggravated robbery. According to the prosecution, (1) on 6 October 2002 the applicant and several other persons assaulted D. and beat him to death; (2) on 14 July 2002 the applicant and several other persons attacked Zh. and took RUB 126,000 from him. 33.  On 16 November 2007 the Town Court found the applicant guilty of manslaughter and aggravated robbery and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. The Town Court based the conviction on statements by a number of witnesses, the instigator of the offence and one of the applicant’s co-defendants given in court, statements made during the pre-trial investigation by witnesses Kyu., Pe. and Ma., and extensive material evidence. Kyu., Pe. and Ma. had confessed to committing the manslaughter together with the applicant. Kyu. had died during the pre-trial investigation. Pe. and Ma. had absconded and, despite the authorities’ attempts, which included a nationwide search, were never found. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer objected to the reading out of Kyu.’s, Pe.’s and Ma.’s statements. 34.  On 28 November 2007 a local newspaper published an article reporting on the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his co‑defendants and naming the applicant among the perpetrators of the manslaughter and robbery. 35.  On 21 January 2008 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 36.  Following the applicant’s arrest and placement in custody pending investigation and trial on the charges of causing a grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop and assault on the police officer, the applicant was found guilty as charged on 20 December 2004 as upheld on 21 February 2005 on appeal. Following the supervisory review of the appeal judgment, on 27 March 2006 the appeal court quashed the verdict and remitted the matter for a new trial (see paragraphs 23-29 above). The appeal court further ordered that the applicant should remain in custody pending trial. 37.  On 31 March 2006 the Town Court received the case file. 38.  On 10 May 2006 the Town Court reviewed the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that he should be released. Relying on the gravity of the charges, the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 10 August 2006. His argument regarding the alleged unlawfulness of his detention was dismissed as unsubstantiated. On 22 May 2006 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic upheld the decision of 10 May 2006 on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and resides in the town of Gorlivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine. 5.  According to the applicant, in 1997 he instituted proceedings in the Tsentralno-Miskyy District Court of Gorlivka against his former employer, the Lenin State Mining Company (шахта ім. Леніна м. Горлівки), claiming compensation for damage to his health. On 6 July 2001 the court awarded the applicant a lump sum of 43,241.61[1] Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) and monthly payments of UAH 834.31[2] (рішення Центрально-міського суду м. Горлівки). This judgment became final on 3 December 2001. 6.  On 23 January 2002 the Tsentralno-Miskyy District Bailiffs’ Service of Gorlivka (відділ Державної виконавчої служби Управління юстиції Центрально-міського району м. Горлівки) initiated the enforcement proceedings. 7.  By letters of 17 April, 14 May, 27 December 2002 and 21 November 2003, the Bailiffs’ Service informed the applicant that it was impossible to sell the debtor’s property because, according to the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property, on 26 December 2001 a ban on the forced sale of assets belonging to undertakings in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital had been introduced. 8.  On 27 February 2003 the applicant was paid UAH 11,546.43. According to the Government, in 2005 the applicant had been paid UAH 1,475.64 in addition to the aforesaid sum. No document in support of this statement has been submitted. 9.  The applicant disagreed, stating that he had been paid UAH 11,546.43 only. 10.  Both parties agreed that the court judgment remains partly unenforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  On 1 October 1986 the applicant was called up by the military authorities to take part in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. The applicant was engaged in the operations until 11 January 1987 and, as a result, suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. 8.  In 1991, following an expert opinion which established the link between the applicant's poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events, the applicant was awarded compensation. 9.  In 1997 the applicant brought proceedings against the Shakhty Social Security Service (Управление социальной защиты населения по г. Шахты) as the compensation had not been paid. On 3 March 1997 the Shakhty City Court (Шахтинский городской суд) found in the applicant's favour and awarded him 23,786,567 [The amount is indicated without regard to the denomination in 1998. In accordance with the Presidential Decree “on the Modification of Face Value of Russian Currency and Standards of Value” of 4 August 1997, 1,000 “old” roubles became 1 “new” rouble from 1 January 1998] Russian roubles (RUR) of the outstanding compensation and an equal sum in the form of a penalty. 10.  On 9 April 1999 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service (Служба судебных приставов г. Шахты) instituted enforcement proceedings for recovery of the penalty awarded on 3 March 1997. 11.  In 1999 the applicant brought an action against the Social Security Service to challenge a reduction in the amount of the monthly payment and to recover the unpaid compensation. On 21 May 1999 the Shakhty City Court restored the original amount of the compensation and ordered the Social Security Service to make monthly compensation payments of RUR 3,011.36 with subsequent indexation. The court also ordered the payment of outstanding moneys totalling RUR 8,752.65. 12.  On 30 August 1999 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment of 21 May 1999. 13.  On 16 September 1999 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service notified the applicant that even though the proceedings to enforce the judgment of 3 March 1997 were pending, the payments to the applicant could not be made because the Social Security Service was underfunded. 14.  On 7 October 1999 the Rostov Regional Department of Justice (Главное управление юстиции Ростовской области) notified the applicant that the two judgments could not be complied with because the defendant did not have sufficient funds. 15.  Following a complaint by the applicant about the failure to enforce the judgments, on 12 November 1999 the prosecutor of Shakhty informed the applicant that the Bailiff's Service was following the established enforcement procedure but had been hampered by the defendant's lack of proper funding. 16.  On 22 December 1999 the Rostov Regional Department of Justice informed the applicant that funds to pay the Chernobyl compensation had been allocated from the federal budget and that payment would be made upon receipt of an appropriate transfer from the Ministry of Finance. 17.  On 26 January 2000 the Rostov Regional Prosecutor's Office (Прокуратура Ростовской области) informed the applicant that the non-enforcement could in no way be attributed to the Bailiff's Service, and that the debts would be discharged as soon as proper allocations had been made from the federal budget. 18.  On 22 March 2000 the Rostov Regional Department of Justice notified the applicant that compensation of Chernobyl victims would be financed from the federal budget. 19.  On 11 April 2000 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service informed the applicant that it was impossible to enforce the judgments in his favour because the Rostov Regional Ministry of Labour and Social Development (Министерство труда и социального развития Ростовской области) was underfunded. 20.  On 16 May 2000 the Shakhty prosecutor informed the applicant that even though the Social Security Service had recalculated the amount of compensation due to the applicant in accordance with the judgment of 21 May 1999, the payments had not been made because of lack of funding. 21.  On 9 March 2000 the Shakhty City Court ordered the indexation of the amount of the penalty awarded on 3 March 1997, which had still not been paid to the applicant. An additional writ of execution for the amount of RUR 44,095.37 was issued. 22.  Following a decision taken by the Ministry of Finance, on 5 March 2001 the Shakhty Social Security Service paid the applicant the outstanding debt of RUR 113,040.38. 23.  According to information provided by the social security service on 11 February 2002, the compensation to be paid to the applicant for the period between April 2001 and June 2002 has been assessed at RUR 2,500 per month.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Varna. 7.  In 1968 the applicant and her husband purchased from the State a three-room flat of approximately 76 sq. m in Varna. The flat had become State-owned by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and the following years. 8.  In 1993, shortly after the Restitution Law (ЗВСОНИ) was passed, the former pre-nationalisation owners brought proceedings under section 7 of that law against the applicant and her husband, seeking the nullification of their title and the restoration of the property. 9.  The applicant’s husband passed away in June 1996. She was his sole heir and the proceedings continued against her. 10.  On 29 June 1996 the Varna District Court found that the 1968 transaction had been null and void and allowed the claim. On appeal, on 25 July 1997 the Varna Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. The courts found that the 1968 contract had been signed by a deputy to the mayor instead of the mayor (председател на изпълнителния комитет на районния народен съвет) and that the file did not contain the requisite approval by the Minister of Architecture and Building Planning. The courts also found that the price of the flat, 5,352 levs, had not been determined correctly by the administration (the judicial expert ordered by the court in the 1996 proceedings estimated the price in 1968 at 5,725 levs). 11.  In 1999 the applicant requested the reopening of the proceedings, stating that she had not been duly summoned for the Regional Court’s hearing held on 2 July 1997. In a judgment of 22 July 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the request for reopening. 12.  In 2000 it became possible for persons in the applicant’s situation to obtain compensation from the State, in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. The applicant did not avail herself of that opportunity within the relevant three-month time-limit. She applied for bonds in June 2007 but was informed by a letter of 5 July 2007 from the Varna Regional Governor that she was not entitled to compensation in the form of bonds. 13.  The applicant did not leave the property voluntarily. In 1998 the restored owners instituted enforcement proceedings. The applicant was evicted on 16 August 2006. 14.  On 15 November 2006 the applicant was granted the tenancy of a two-room municipal flat in Varna.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, Mr Barış İnan, is a Turkish national who was born in 1973 and is currently detained in the Kandıra F-type prison, in Kocaeli. 5.  On 8 September 1998 the applicant was arrested during a police operation conducted against the MLKP (the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party). On 14 September 1998 a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 6.  On 18 September 1998 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court lodged a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 7.  On 4 December 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case (no. 1998/259). 8.  According to the information in the case file last submitted by the parties, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending at first instance, which is now the Istanbul Assize Court, and the applicant is still detained on remand. During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant's request. On each occasion the courts ordered the applicant's continued remand in custody, given the content of the file and the state of evidence. 9.  The applicant, Mrs Muhabbet Kurt, is a Turkish national who was born in 1978 and is currently detained in the Gebze prison, in Kocaeli. 10.  On 8 September 1998 the applicant was arrested during a police operation conducted against the MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party). During her detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment. In particular, she claimed to have been raped by police officers. 11.  On 14 September 1998 the applicant, along with eleven other persons, was examined by a doctor at the Istanbul branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute who noted that none of them had sustained any injuries. 12.  On the same day the applicant made statements to the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court and stated that she had been tortured while in police custody. The applicant was subsequently brought before a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court who ordered her pre-trial detention. 13.  On 18 September 1998 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court lodged a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 14.  On 4 December 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case (no. 1998/259). 15.  During the hearing on 8 December 1999, the applicant alleged before the first-instance court that she had been raped while in police custody. At the end of the hearing, the State Security Court requested the public prosecutor's office to initiate an investigation into this allegation. 16.  On 20 December 1999 the public prosecutor's office at the Istanbul State Security Court issued a decision based on a lack of jurisdiction and passed the investigation to the Fatih public prosecutor's office. 17.  On 3 July 2000 the Fatih public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute anyone in relation to the applicant's allegations, holding that there was insufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings. The public prosecutor noted that the applicant did not apply to the national authorities at the end of her detention in police custody until 8 December 1999. He further noted that the medical reports issued at the end of her police custody period did not indicate any sign of violence on her person. 18.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant and her co-accused was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 19.  During the hearings of 4 July and 24 October 2007, the applicant and her representatives primarily challenged the reliability and admissibility in evidence of the statements taken from her in police custody under duress. In particular, the applicant repeated her allegations of rape and requested the court to order the public prosecutor's office to investigate her allegations of ill‑treatment. The assize court heard four witnesses on behalf of the applicant who testified that, at the end of her detention in police custody in 1998, the applicant had claimed to have been raped and that she had been depressed. On both occasions, noting that there had already been an investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, the trial court rejected the applicant's requests. 20.  According to the information in the case file last submitted by the parties, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the Istanbul Assize Court and the applicant is still detained on remand. During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant's request. The courts ordered the applicant's continued remand in custody, given the content of the file and the state of evidence on each occasion. On one occasion, the applicant filed an objection against the first-instance court's remand decision, which was subsequently dismissed by another assize court on 23 August 2006. 21.  The applicant, Mr Azimet Ceyhan, is a Turkish national who was born in 1970 and is currently detained in the Kandıra F-type prison, in Kocaeli. 22.  On an unspecified date in 2000 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant before the Istanbul State Security Court on the charge of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence proscribed by Article 146 of the former Criminal Code. The State Security Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 23.  Subsequently, the case against the applicant (no. 2000/30) was joined to case no. 1998/259 pending before the Istanbul State Security Court. 24.  On 21 February 2000 the applicant was arrested and brought before a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, who ordered the applicant's detention pending trial. 25.  According to the information in the case file last submitted by the parties, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending at first instance, which is now the Fourteenth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court, and the applicant is still detained despite his numerous requests for release. During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant's request. The courts ordered the applicant's continued remand in custody, given the content of the file and the state of evidence on each occasion.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicants were born in 1929 and 1923 respectively. The applicant in application no. 43185/98 (“Dr Price”) is a consultant psychiatrist; the applicant in application no. 43186/98 (“Mrs Lowe”) is a medical secretary. They live in Lincoln. 10.  The applicants, together with Dr Price’s wife, were sued by “K”, a former patient of Dr Price, in respect of property in Florida. The writ was issued on 12 February 1986. Before the action came to trial, the plaintiff was adjudicated bankrupt on 9 August 1989 and the trustee in bankruptcy continued the action. 11.  The trial was set down to commence in the High Court in August 1994 but was postponed until the end of September 1994 because the judge was not available for the length of time needed for the hearing. 12.  On the fourth day of trial, while K was being cross-examined, an adjournment was granted because K claimed to feel unwell. In the event, it emerged that no medical justification could be given for his continued non-attendance, but nonetheless he remained absent for the rest of the trial. Because of the delay caused by K’s non-attendance, the trial could not be concluded in September 1994 and had to be adjourned until January 1995. Judgment was given on 27 April 1995. 13.  The judge accepted the argument of the applicants and Mrs Price that it was necessary to disregard K’s evidence because of his failure to remain for cross-examination. However, on the basis of the documentary evidence and that adduced by the applicants and Mrs Price, the judge found that the transfer of the Florida property should be set aside on the ground that the defendants had not been able to rebut the presumption of undue influence created by the discrepancy in the price they paid K for the property and its value at the time of the transfer, together with the doctor-patient relationship between Dr Price and K. 14.  The formal record of the judge’s order was not prepared by the parties until 26 October 1995. The applicants and Mrs Price applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal on 1 November 1995. The appeal bundles were lodged on 4 October 1996. On 15 January 1997 the appeal was listed for hearing, and it was heard on 16 and 17 April 1997, on which last date the Court of Appeal gave judgment dismissing the appeal. 15.  In connection with the moneys paid by Dr Price for the property, the Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the trial judge that the sum should be repaid, but that no interest should be paid on it. The trial judge had based his decision on the fact that Dr Price “had had possession of the properties and receipt of the rents since the completion of the sale, subject only to the agreement to allow [K] to use number 212 in the early months”. Lord Justice Nourse regarded this as a “rough and ready result”, but one which would “reduce the opportunities for further dispute between the parties”. 16.  On 19 April 1997 the applicants and Mrs Price were refused leave by the Court of Appeal to appeal to the House of Lords. On 30 March 1998 the applicants and Mrs Price were refused leave to appeal by the House of Lords.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is serving a prison sentence in Tomsk. 7.  The applicant was suspected of involvement in a criminal gang. On 1 September 2000 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Tatarstan (the “Prosecutor’s Office”) opened a criminal investigation into the gang’s activities. On 20 September 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of two counts of murder and placed in custody. 8.  On 21 September 2001 the prosecutor authorised the applicant’s detention pending investigation, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk of his absconding and obstructing justice. No time-limit for detention was fixed. 9.  The applicant appealed. He claimed that the prosecutor’s decision of 21 September 2001 lacked justification. He also applied for release, arguing that he had no intention of absconding, had family commitments and a permanent place of residence and a job. 10.  On 6 June 2002 the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan rejected the applicant’s appeal and his application for release and upheld the prosecutor’s decision of 21 September 2001. In particular, the court stated the following:\n“When deciding to detain [the applicant], [the prosecutor] took into account the gravity of the charges and the fact that [the applicant] might abscond and interfere with the establishment of the truth...\nThe arguments furnished by [the applicant and his counsel] are not sufficient to refute [the prosecutor’s] finding that [the applicant] might abscond and interfere with establishment of the truth.” 11.  On 5 July 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the decision of 6 June 2002. 12.  In the meantime, on 28 September 2001 the Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant for murder and involvement in a criminal gang. On an unspecified date the applicant was also charged with fraud, extortion and kidnapping. 13.  On 19 November 2001 the Prosecutor’s Office extended the applicant’s detention until 20 March 2002. The detention order was issued in respect of seven defendants, including the applicant. Referring to the gravity of the charges, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation alleged that the defendants might abscond or interfere with the investigation. The detention order further indicated that several witnesses, including two of the defendants, had identified the applicant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes under investigation. The applicant did not appeal. 14.  On 21 March and 14 June 2002 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Russian Federation extended the applicant’s detention until 4 July and 4 October 2002 respectively. The orders were issued in respect of nine and then twelve defendants, including the applicant, and reiterated verbatim the reasoning previously used to justify keeping the accused in custody. As to the evidence collected in the course of the investigation, the prosecutor referred to numerous witnesses who had testified against the applicant. The applicant did not appeal. 15.  On 30 April 2002 the defendants and their lawyers started studying the case file which comprised seventy-two volumes. 16.  On 29 August 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan further extended the applicant’s detention until 4 January 2003. The court reasoned as follows:\n“[The applicant] should remain in custody since he is charged with grave offences and might abscond and threaten the witnesses and other parties involved in the proceedings. Besides, [the applicant] is to study a considerable volume of the case-file materials. In view of the above, the court grants the investigator’s request to extend [the applicant’s] detention.” 17.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the investigator had not furnished any evidence to substantiate his allegations that the applicant might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice. He further asked the appeal court to release him and apply any other alternative measure prescribed by law to ensure his presence in court or anticipate his custodial sentence, if any. On 6 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 29 August 2002. 18.  On 20 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan further extended the applicant’s detention pending his study of the case file. No time-limit for the detention period was indicated. The court provided the following justification for its decision:\n“[The applicant] should remain in custody since he is charged with grave offences and might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice.” 19.  The applicant appealed. Alleging numerous violations of the applicable rules of criminal procedure in the course of his arrest and detention, he asked the appeal court to release him. 20.  On 5 February 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the detention order of 20 November 2002 on appeal. In particular, it noted as follows:\n“As [the lower court] indicated, [the applicant] may abscond or interfere with administration of justice and has been charged with grave and serious offences. Accordingly, the [lower] court’s decision to extend the applicant’s detention was justified. As regards [the applicant’s] allegations about violations of rules of criminal procedure... they will be subject to examination in the course of the trial ...” 21.  It appears that in 2004 the defendants, including the applicant, and their counsel, completed their study of the case file. According to the Government, on 27 April 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Republic of Tatarstan approved the bill of indictment in respect of the applicant and fifteen other persons and forwarded the case file to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan. 22.  On 22 July 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan reviewed the material in the case file in respect of the sixteen defendants, including the applicant, and scheduled the first hearing for 27 September 2004. The court further decided that the case would be tried by a jury and that fourteen defendants, including the applicant, should remain in custody pending trial. No time-limit for their detention was fixed. When dismissing the defendants’ application for release, the court noted as follows:\n“The defendants have been charged with numerous grave and serious offences which might entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. [The court does not] discern any special exceptional circumstances which would render [the defendants’] release possible. The reasons earlier [indicated by the court] to extend the defendants’ detention, i.e., the risk of absconding, threatening the witnesses and other parties involved in the criminal proceedings or interfering with the administration of justice in any other way, have not ceased to exist.” 23.  The applicant appealed. He argued that he had spent over two years and eight months in detention. He asked the court to release him on an undertaking not to leave town or on bail. He further referred to the fact that he had no previous convictions, that he was married and had a minor child and a full-time job. On 7 September 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 22 July 2004 finding no reason to depart from the lower court’s findings. 24.  On 29 October 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan extended the detention of fourteen defendants, including the applicant, until 29 January 2005. The applicant argued that he should be released pending trial. He claimed that the gravity of the charges alone could not constitute a sufficient reason for extension of his detention; that he had been detained during a lengthy period; that the prosecution had failed to prove that he might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice; that the court had already examined the materials concerning a number of charges against the defendants; and that the criminal proceedings had been too long. The court dismissed the applicant’s arguments, noting as follows:\n“[The defendants’] application for release cannot be granted for the following reasons. They have been charged with grave and serious offences which might entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. [The court does not] discern any special exceptional circumstances which would render [the defendants’] release possible. The reasons earlier [indicated by the court] to extend the defendants’ detention, i.e., the risk of absconding, threatening the witnesses and other parties involved in the criminal proceedings or interfering with the administration of justice in any other way, have not ceased to exist... The fact that the court had already examined several charges against the defendants cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason to justify their release. Nor is the length of the criminal proceedings a factor to be taken into account when deciding the issue of detention.” 25.  On 28 January, 29 April, and 29 July 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan extended the pre-trial detention for the applicant and thirteen other defendants until 29 April, 29 July and 29 October 2005 respectively. Each time the court dismissed the defendants’ applications reproducing verbatim its earlier reasoning as follows:\n“[The defendants’] application for release cannot be granted for the following reasons. They have been charged with grave and serious offences which might entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. [The court does not] discern any special exceptional circumstances which would render [the defendants’] release possible. The reasons earlier [indicated by the court] to extend the defendants’ detention, i.e., the risk of absconding, threatening the witnesses and other parties involved in the criminal proceedings or interfering with the administration of justice in any other way, have not ceased to exist... The fact that the court had already examined several charges against the defendants cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason to justify their release. Nor is the length of the criminal proceedings a factor to be taken into account when deciding the issue of detention.” 26.  It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the above decisions. 27.  On 24 October 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. On 12 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Budapest. 5.  The applicant filed claims with the Budapest Labour Court on 25 August and 7 September 1993, respectively, alleging unlawful dismissal by, and claiming compensation from, his former employer (“proceedings A and B”). 6.  On 30 November 1993 the applicant and 182 other plaintiffs including three trade unions – one of which was represented by the applicant as a member of its legal advice service – filed an action with the same court claiming unlawful legal succession of their former employer (“proceedings C”). 7.  Following a successful motion for bias by the applicant, the Pest County Labour Court was appointed to hear both cases on 13 December 1994. On 22 November and 20 December 1995, respectively, the Labour Court ordered the suspension of the proceedings pending the outcome of proceedings C. 8.  On 12 August 2002 the applicant requested that both cases be resumed, since proceedings B had been discontinued by the appeal court (see paragraph 16 below). 9.  The Labour Court gave judgments dismissing the applicant's actions on 22 January and 22 April 2004, respectively. 10.  On appeal, the Pest County Regional Court delivered judgments, partly accepting the applicant's claims, on 10 June 2005. These decisions were served on the applicant on 3 August and 5 September 2005, respectively. Concerning one of them, a rectification order was issued on 7 September 2005. 11.  On 2 December 1994 the Budapest Labour Court dismissed the action in respect of 123 plaintiffs including the applicant. On 25 August 1995 the Supreme Court appointed the Veszprém County Regional Court to hear the appeal. On 14 February 1996 this court quashed the first-instance decision for formal shortcomings, holding that the applicant had not been authorised to represent some co-plaintiffs. 12.  On 26 February 1997 the Pest County Labour Court was appointed to hear the case. 13.  On 21 April 1998 the applicant requested supplementation of the order of 2 October 1996. On 28 October 1998 the Veszprém County Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request. 14.  The Labour Court held hearings on 18 January, 11 March and 20 May 1999 and delivered a judgment on 27 May 1999. On appeal, on 3 November 1999 the Pest County Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case. On 18 February 2000 the applicant requested the rectification and supplementation of this decision which was done on 19 June 2000. 15.  The Labour Court held further hearings on 21 December 2000 and 18 January 2001. On 26 March 2001 it delivered a judgment dismissing the action in respect of most plaintiffs including the applicant, and discontinuing the proceedings in respect of others. On appeal, the Pest County Regional Court held hearings on 8 October and 26 November 2001. On 15 October 2001 the respondents declared that they would not claim costs from those plaintiffs who withdrew their action and appeal. 16.  On 8 February 2002 the applicant informed the court that, like other plaintiffs, he withdrew his action and appeal. On 18 February 2002 the Regional Court discontinued the proceedings. This decision was served on the applicant on 6 August 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant is a registered association (Verein) in Vienna and the publisher of a periodical called TATblatt. In the 9 December 1992 issue of TATblatt, the following leaflet was published:\n“Querformat, a (new) wall-newspaper against the trend towards the right wing ...”\n“Racism has a name and address\nThe FPÖ [Austrian Freedom Party] and its party officials are certainly interested in your opinion! So, let's call them and tell them what we think of them and their policy. Or let's send them small gifts in response to their racist agitation.\nWe have gathered a small selection of Vienna FPÖ officials, FPÖ offices and of course Jörg Haider in order to facilitate a little the unbureaucratic exchange of opinions.\nThey will surely enjoy your phone calls, letters and parcels: ...”\nThe above text was followed by a list of addresses and telephone numbers of members and offices of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). 10.  Between 25 January and 1 February 1993 an opinion poll (Volksbegehren) under the heading “Austria first” (“Österreich zuerst”) took place which had been initiated by the FPÖ several months before. The opinion poll, on the issue of immigration, consisted of twelve proposals, partly to amend legislation and partly to change administrative practices. It proposed, inter alia, the following:\n– to amend the Federal Constitution by a provision stating that Austria was not a country of immigration;\n– to stop immigration until a satisfactory solution to illegal immigration was found;\n– to oblige all foreign workers to carry an identity card at their place of work, showing that they had a valid work permit;\n– to increase the police force and create a separate border police;\n– to limit the percentage of pupils whose mother tongue was not German to 30 % and, if the percentage were higher, to create separate classes for foreigners;\n– to deny foreigners the right to vote; and\n– to require the immediate expulsion of and residence prohibition on foreign offenders. 11.  On 11 February 1993 Mr Jörg Haider, leader of the FPÖ and at that time a member of Parliament, brought civil proceedings for an injunction under Article 1330 of the Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) against the applicant before the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht). He requested that the applicant be prohibited from repeating the statement according to which he had incited people to “racist agitation” (“rassistische Hetze”) and any similar statements. He further requested that the applicant be prohibited from inviting people to “send small gifts in response to their racist agitation”, together with the publication of the names, telephone numbers and addresses of members of the plaintiff's political party. 12.  The applicant submitted that it had never identified itself with the leaflet at issue and had merely published it out of journalistic interest and in order to inform the public. Moreover, the words “racist agitation” were not a statement of fact but a value judgment, and were meant as a critical comment of the opinion poll “Austria first” which the plaintiff had initiated and which was directed against “immigration without control”. 13.  On 14 April 1994 the Vienna Commercial Court granted the injunction. It found that the impugned statement about “racist agitation” was not a value judgment, but a statement of fact. Such a statement contained a reproach of a criminal offence, namely “incitement to hatred” (Verhetzung) under Article 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), and not only damaged the plaintiff's reputation (Rufschädigung) but also amounted to an insult (Ehrenbeleidigung). In order to avoid the injunction, the applicant therefore needed to prove the truth of its statement. However, it had failed to do so. Even accepting that the plaintiff was, more or less, a right-wing politician, there was no evidence that he had attempted to incite hatred (verhetzen) against aliens or had attacked their human dignity. 14.  As regards the invitation to “send small gifts”, the court observed that a part of the applicant's readership was, for political reasons, prepared to use violence and anarchistic methods. In this respect the court noted that in the 9 December 1992 issue of TATblatt a letter to the editor had been published which read as follows:\n“... we organised in the night of 29 to 30 November our first action against Haider's referendum and have smashed several windows of the FPÖ headquarters in Salzburg. This was only the beginning. ...” 15.  According to another letter to the editor published in the 20 January 1993 issue of TATblatt, an FPÖ party office in Vienna had been “visited”, the words “racism stinks” had been sprayed on the walls, windows smashed and butter acid thrown into the office. The Commercial Court then quoted further letters of this kind which had appeared in various issues of TATblatt. The court found that against this background the invitation to “send small gifts” constituted an attack on the plaintiff's personality rights (Persönlichkeitsrechte) which had to be respected. Accordingly, the court granted the injunction in this respect also. 16.  On 29 August 1994 the applicant appealed against the injunction. 17.  On 26 January 1995 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the appeal. It confirmed the Commercial Court's view that the statement according to which the plaintiff had incited people to “racist agitation” was a statement of fact which the applicant had failed to prove. In this respect the court found as follows:\n“But since – as we have already outlined in dealing with the complaint concerning the facts – the meaning of the term 'racist agitation' could be established on the basis of general experience, and since the defendant has failed to submit any concrete allegations to the effect that the plaintiff had shown conduct corresponding to what is generally known as 'racism' and 'agitation', the court of first instance – without there being a mistake of law – rightly concluded that the defendant was unable to prove the truth of its allegations. ...” 18.  As regards the applicant's argument that this statement was covered by its right to freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal found that the interests of the applicant and the plaintiff had to be balanced against each other. However, the applicant's statement could not be justified by referring to freedom of expression, because the statement went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism by reproaching the plaintiff with a criminal offence. Moreover, the impugned statement was untrue and therefore not protected by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the Commercial Court in respect of both statements. 19.  On 13 March 1995 the applicant introduced an extraordinary appeal on points of law (außerordentliche Revision) against the Court of Appeal's decision in so far as it concerned the prohibition to repeat the statement that the plaintiff had incited people to “racist agitation”. 20.  On 6 April 1995 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) declared the extraordinary appeal inadmissible as it found that the qualification of the statement at issue as a statement of fact was in accordance with its previous case-law.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  HADEP was a political party which had been established on 11 May 1994. At the time of its dissolution on 13 March 2003 its general secretary was the second applicant, Mr Ahmet Turan Demir, who had been elected to that post in February 2003. 6.  In the general election held on 24 December 1995 HADEP received 1,171,623 votes, which represented 4.17% of the total number of votes cast. In the general election held on 18 April 1999 HADEP received 1,482,196 votes. However, as HADEP did not succeed in passing the required threshold of 10%, it was unable to be represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey following these two general elections (see HADEP and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 51292/99, 13 November 2008). In local elections held on 18 April 1999 HADEP won control of 37 municipalities. It had branches in 47 cities and in hundreds of districts. In 2002 HADEP became a member of the Socialist International. 7.  The applicants submitted that, during a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) meeting held on 18 December 1996, a decision had been taken to dissolve HADEP. In support of this assertion the applicants submitted to the Court a report which, they claimed, had been adopted by the National Security Council and which had subsequently been leaked to the press. The report, which is classified 'Secret', details a number of recommendations including “the control and pursuit of HADEP by the State in order to quell its activities”. Following this decision HADEP branches had been raided and its administrators had been subjected to physical pressure. In support of this latter argument the applicants submitted to the Court two reports, detailing the physical attacks on and the killings and forced disappearances of dozens of HADEP members, some of which have been examined by the Court (see, inter alia, Tanış and Others v. Turkey, no. 65899/01, ECHR 2005–VIII). 8. On various dates criminal proceedings were brought against a number of members of HADEP who were holding executive positions within the party. Some of the proceedings were suspended while some ended in convictions. Some of them were convicted of spreading “separatist propaganda”, in breach of section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, while others were convicted of “incitement to racial hatred and hostility in society on the basis of a distinction between social classes, races or religions”, in breach of Article 312 of the Criminal Code. A number of others were convicted of lending assistance to the PKK[1] in breach of Article 169 of the Criminal Code, for making speeches, allowing hunger strikers to use HADEP premises and for possessing a number of documents prepared by PKK members in a law-firm owned by one of them[2]. Some served their prison sentences while execution of the sentences of a number of others was stayed. 9.  On 29 January 1999 the chief prosecutor at the Court of Cassation brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court and demanded that HADEP be dissolved. The chief prosecutor argued that HADEP had become a “centre of illegal activities against the integrity of Turkey”. In support of his allegations the chief prosecutor referred to the criminal proceedings pending against members of HADEP and a number of activities of its members. One incident relied on by the chief prosecutor was that during HADEP's annual general meeting in 1996 the Turkish flag had been taken down and replaced with a PKK flag. 10.  On 25 February 1999 the chief prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to render an interim decision banning HADEP from taking part in the forthcoming April general and local elections. The chief prosecutor's request was refused by the Constitutional Court on 8 March 1999. 11.  On 5 April 1999 lawyers for HADEP submitted a written defence to the Constitutional Court. They alleged that the chief prosecutor's request for the dissolution of HADEP had been made as a result of the National Security Council's above-mentioned decision (see paragraph 7). They further argued, inter alia, that as it was not clear what the accusations against HADEP were, it was not possible for them to make full use of their defence rights. The lawyers relied on Articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and asked the Constitutional Court to take into account the decisions and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning the dissolution of a number of other political parties in Turkey. 12.  The chief prosecutor maintained in his written submissions of 9 April 1999 that HADEP had close ties with the PKK, and alleged that the former was being controlled by the latter. The chief prosecutor also repeated his request for HADEP to be dissolved before the elections which were to be held on 18 April 1999. This request was not accepted by the Constitutional Court. 13. During the proceedings, in their submissions to the Constitutional Court HADEP's representatives drew attention to the fact that the person who had taken down the flag was not a member of the party. They further stated that, immediately after the incident the HADEP congress had publicly condemned the incident. Since then HADEP had been dissociating itself from the incident and condemning it as an attack on a common symbolic value of the people of Turkey. 14.  In its decision of 13 March 2003 the Constitutional Court decided unanimously to dissolve HADEP. The Constitutional Court based its decision on Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and sections 101 and 103 of the Political Parties Act (Law no. 2820). In arriving at its conclusion, the Constitutional Court took account of the activities of certain leaders and members of HADEP and concluded that HADEP had become a centre of illegal activities which included aiding and abetting the PKK. 15.  The Constitutional Court noted, in particular, that during HADEP's annual general meeting in 1996 a non-HADEP member wearing a mask had taken down the Turkish flag and replaced it with a PKK flag and a poster of the then leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. During the same meeting slogans had also been chanted in support of the PKK and its leader[3]. The then general secretary of HADEP Mr Murat Bozlak, who was present during the meeting on that day, had done nothing to stop the Turkish flag being taken down and had stated during his speech that “the existence of the Kurds in Turkey, who were not allowed to speak their mother tongue, had been denied. The PKK, despite ongoing military operations, massacres and provocations, was holding its ceasefire. Nothing could be resolved with military operations or with occupation.” The Constitutional Court considered the taking down of the Turkish flag as proof of the links between HADEP and the PKK. It further considered that the references made by Mr Bozlak to Turkey's fight against terrorism as an “occupation” and portraying Kurds as a separate nation showed that Mr Bozlak was supporting the PKK[4]. 16.  The Constitutional Court referred to Article 11 of the Convention in its judgment and stated that the rights guaranteed in that provision were not absolute and could be restricted in the circumstances listed in Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. It also referred to Article 17 of the Convention, and reached the following conclusion:\n“Carrying out activities, by relying on democratic rights and freedoms, against the indivisible unity of the State with its nation is unacceptable. In such circumstances it is the duty and raison d'être of the State to prevent the abuse of these rights and freedoms. Allowing a political party which supports terrorism and which is supported by terrorism to continue to exist cannot be contemplated.\nIn statements and speeches made on behalf of the People's Democracy Party and in the course of various meetings, the party's general secretary Murat Bozlak, other party officials and chairmen and members of the party's provincial and district branches have stated that the Kurdish nation was a different nation from the Turkish nation; that the State of the Turkish Republic had been enforcing a policy of pressure and oppression on the Kurdish nation; that there was an ongoing war between the PKK terrorist organisation and the State of the Republic of Turkey; and that the Kurdish nation should take sides with the PKK in this war. Some of these activities have resulted in convictions. These persons have thus aided and harboured the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, whose aim is to destroy the indivisible unity of the State. The incidents, which are detailed in relevant parts of this judgment and which took place during the Second Congress of the People's Democracy Party on 23 June 1996 in Ankara, as well as the objects and documents found in the party headquarters and in the party's various branches confirm the [above-mentioned conclusion].\nActivities by members of the People's Democracy Party and the evidence [in our possession] clearly show the links between the respondent party and the PKK. The following incidents and activities – and many others and judgments rendered by courts – are proof of the connection and support between the People's Democracy Party and the PKK terrorist organisation:\n–  organisation of various activities – under instructions from the PKK – such as hunger strikes, demonstrations and issuing press releases with a view to protesting against the attempt to assassinate Öcalan and against the work that had been carried out by the State of the Turkish Republic to apprehend Öcalan, and against his subsequent arrest;\n–  work to create, by referring to concepts such as freedom, brotherhood and peace, a sense of a different nation among the people who live in a certain part of the country or who claim to belong to a certain ethnic group;\n–  description of the State's struggle against the PKK terrorist organisation as a 'dirty war', as well as taking sides with the PKK in this war by carrying out certain activities and by displaying certain behaviour;\n–  provision of training to a number of young people, in line with the PKK ideology but under the disguise of in-party training, with a view to recruiting them to the party first and subsequently to the PKK terrorist organisation in order for them to carry out activities on behalf of the PKK terrorist organisation and then sending them to the PKK's mountain camps as armed militants;\n–  the keeping in the Party's headquarters and in its district and provincial branches, of objects, books, banners and photographs of members of the PKK as well as other PKK terrorist organisation propaganda documents for which the courts have issued confiscation orders;\n–  the fact of allowing people to watch the organisation's media organ MED TV in these places for propaganda purposes; and\n–  speeches and activities during HADEP's Second Congress.\nIn the light of the above, and in accordance with Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and section 101 (b) of the Political Parties Act, it is hereby decided to dissolve HADEP, which has become a centre of illegal activities against the indivisible unity of the State with its nation and which has aided and harboured the PKK terrorist organisation.\n...” 17.  As an ancillary measure under Article 69 § 9 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court banned 46 HADEP members and leaders from becoming founder members, ordinary members, leaders or auditors of any other political party for a period of five years[5]. The Constitutional Court also ordered the transfer of HADEP's property to the Treasury. 18.  The decision of the Constitutional Court became final following its publication in the Official Gazette on 19 July 2003.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Miskolc, Hungary. He is of Roma ethnic origin. 9.  On 9 August 1995 the applicant, accompanied by Ms B. and Mr S., was selling coal from a truck on a door-to-door basis in Orosháza. After an aborted transaction, some would-be purchasers reported to the local police that the three had left their yard without having returned their fuel vouchers. At about 5.45 p.m. two local police officers halted the applicant’s truck and instructed the applicant and his companions to report to the Orosháza Police Station. The applicant was interrogated there by police officers S. and K. 10.  The applicant stated that during the interrogation one of the police officers repeatedly slapped him across the face and left ear while the other punched him on the shoulder. The officers demanded that he reveal where the stolen vouchers had been hidden. 11.  On being released after two hours of interrogation, the applicant was met on the ground floor of the police station by Ms B. and Mr S., as well as by Mr B. and Mr M., both of whom were acquaintances of the applicant and his companions.\nThe applicant stated that when he and his companions were leaving the police station, a police officer issued the following warning to them: “Tell the Miskolc gypsies that they had better not set foot in Orosháza”. 12.  Having returned to his home in Miskolc on 11 August 1995, the applicant consulted Dr V., the local doctor, who advised him to report to the Ear, Nose and Throat Department of Diósgyőr Hospital. On 14 August 1995 Dr C. carried out an operation to reconstruct the applicant’s ear drum which had been damaged as a result of a traumatic perforation. On 16 August 1995 Dr C. reported the case to the police. 13.  On 28 August 1995 the applicant was discharged from hospital. His medical report stated, without reference to any precise date, that he had sustained a traumatic perforation of the left tympanic membrane. This conclusion also figured in two further medical reports issued later by Dr C. on 25 August 1995 and by Dr V. on 29 September 1995. The applicant’s injury was described in a follow-up medical report dated 10 September 1997 as “low-to-medium-grade loss of sound perception” in the left ear. 14.  On 25 September 1995 the Szeged Investigation Office informed the applicant that criminal proceedings had been opened against the police officers involved on the basis of information submitted by Dr C. on 16 August. The police officers were charged with the offences of “forced interrogation” and “ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings”. 15.  The Investigation Office heard the applicant and several witnesses. Four persons were heard from the applicant’s side. \nMr S. stated as follows:\n“[In the building of the police station] I met [the applicant] [...] whose face had a bluish colour in the area under his left ear and was somewhat swollen. I then asked him if they had hurt him. He answered that they had hurt him a little and pointed to the left side of his face saying that it was hurting there. He said that he had no hearing on that side.”\nMs B. stated as follows:\n“[When the applicant was escorted down to the ground floor], it struck me that the left side of his face and his left ear were swollen. I thought that he had been beaten. I asked him about it, to which he only answered that he had been beaten a little. [...] I remember well that the left side of his face was red and I even saw the traces of fingers on it.”\nMr M. stated as follows:\n“[When at last the applicant came down to the ground floor], it struck me immediately that his skin was reddish-bluish around his left ear and even underneath his neck. I had no doubt that his face was swollen as a result of a blow. I then asked him if they had hurt him, [...], he only answered: ‘A little’.” \nMr B. stated as follows:\n[When the applicant was escorted down to the ground floor], it was apparent at once that the left side of his face and his left ear were red. It was obvious that he had been hit. Ms. B. even asked him if he had been hurt. He first answered in the negative. Then I asked him the same question. Then he answered: ‘A little’.”\nThe Investigation Office also heard Dr V. and four police officers who had been on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant’s interrogation. \nThe police witnesses denied any knowledge of ill-treatment having been inflicted on the applicant. \nThe suspected police officers S. and K. consistently denied the applicant’s accusations when questioned on 15 November 1995. \nPolice officer S. stated, inter alia, as follows:\n“I remember [the applicant] having said something of the sort that he was working for those persons as a lorry-driver [...] to set off debts incurred by his wife. [...] He was blaming [his companions] for forcing him to work a lot more than if he had been working for money; and he even mentioned to one of my colleagues that they would either leave him behind or beat him up on the way home because of this.”\nPolice officer K. stated, inter alia, as follows:\n“After the interrogation police officer S. told me that [the persons interrogated] had also quarrelled amongst themselves, maybe they had not properly paid [the applicant], they had a dispute about money or something of the sort [...]” 16.  On 16 November 1995 a medical expert appointed by the Investigation Office expressed the opinion that it could not be excluded that the applicant’s injury had been caused as alleged. However, in the expert’s opinion it could not be determined whether the injury in question had been caused to his ear before, during or after the applicant’s interrogation. 17.  On 30 November 1995 the Investigation Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against police officers K. and S. for lack of any conclusive evidence. On 12 December 1995 the applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation order. 18.  On 24 January 1996 the Orosháza District Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered the investigation to be resumed and that confrontations be organised between the applicant and the police officers concerned and between various witnesses. It also ordered that further witnesses be heard. 19.  In the framework of the resumed proceedings, the Csongrád County Investigation Office, on 1 March 1996, confronted the applicant with the suspected police officers as well as a third police officer who had been heard as a new witness. 20.  On 6 March 1996 the Investigation Office discontinued the investigation. \nRelying on the testimonies given, on the one hand, by the applicant – who had consistently maintained his assertions during the proceedings – and by his companions and, on the other hand, by the police officers concerned, as well as on a confrontation involving all three of them, the Investigation Office found that although the applicant’s injuries might have been inflicted as alleged, it could not be excluded beyond all doubt that the injuries had been sustained before or after his interrogation.\nSince there was no direct witness to the alleged incident and the medical opinion in the case was not conclusive as to the time when the applicant’s injury had been inflicted, the Investigation Office was obliged to dismiss the applicant’s accusations as unsubstantiated and to discontinue the proceedings.\nThe order drew the applicant’s attention to his right to file a complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office under section 148 §§ 1 and 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he wished to challenge the decision to discontinue the case. This order was served on the applicant on 11 March 1996. \nThe applicant did not file a complaint against this order.\nAs of 1 August 1996 the applicant’s working capacity was declared to have diminished by 50% on account of asthma bronchiale and impaired hearing; the respective significance of these two factors was not specified. As a consequence, he was unable to have his lorry driver’s licence renewed or to obtain employment as a driver. 21.  On 30 March 1998 the applicant claimed damages from the Ministry of the Interior. In reply, on 16 April 1998 he was informed by the competent Békés County Police Department that he was not eligible for compensation because he had failed to file a complaint against the discontinuation order of 6 March 1996 and thus to avail himself of an ordinary legal remedy, which was a precondition for establishing official liability. 22.  On 22 April 1998 the applicant appointed the NEKI to take his case. A further medical opinion obtained by the NEKI on 19 August 1998 stated that a traumatic perforation of the tympanic membrane was usually caused by a slap on the ear. Although he did not have the earlier medical expert’s opinion at hand, the expert went on to qualify the applicant’s version of how he had sustained his injury as plausible. 23.  Relying on this new evidence, the NEKI lodged on 25 August 1998 a complaint against the decision of 6 March 1996 with the Attorney General’s Office requesting that the criminal proceedings be re-opened in accordance with section 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24.  On 5 October 1998 the Csongrád County Public Prosecutor’s Office finally dismissed this complaint. In its reasoned decision, the Public Prosecutor’s Office stated that:\n“[it] had thoroughly examined all the documents in the case file.”\nThe decision mentioned that in the absence of coherent testimonies or a conclusive medical expert opinion it was impossible to prove either that the applicant’s injury had been caused during his police detention or that it had been inflicted by the suspected police officers. The Public Prosecutor’s Office noted the delay between the applicant’s interrogation on 9 August and his decision to seek medical help only on 11 August 1995. The decision stated that the new expert opinion did not contain any new facts which warranted the continuation of the investigation or the laying of charges against the suspects. The Public Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the case should be discontinued since it was impossible to prove the applicant’s allegations. The decision was served on the NEKI on 14 October 1998.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1948 and 1970 respectively and live in Bujanovac Municipality. 6.  Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s intervention in Kosovo, on 9 June 1999 the Yugoslav and Serbian Governments agreed to a phased withdrawal of their military and police forces from the territory and a transfer of all effective control to an international security force (“KFOR”). Concerning a number of municipalities, including Suva Reka, the transfer, according to the Military Technical Agreement, was to take place by 15 June 1999. It was further envisaged that it would be up to KFOR to “maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo”. Pursuant to their own phased withdrawal plan, which was to be synchronised with the Yugoslav Army plan, the Serbian police forces envisaged that a transfer of all effective control in Suva Reka Municipality would in fact take place on 13 June 1999. 7.  On 13 June 1999 the first applicant’s husband was kidnapped by the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”) in Suva Reka Municipality. 8.  On 12 March 2002 the Bujanovac Municipal Court declared the first applicant’s husband dead. This ruling became final by 3 April 2002. 9.  On 19 May 2005 the first applicant, together with her children, lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Serbia with the First Municipal Court in Belgrade, seeking compensation for the mental anguish suffered as a consequence of the incident. 10.  On 19 May 2006 the said court ruled against the plaintiffs. 11.  On 21 November 2007 the first-instance judgment was upheld by the Belgrade District Court on appeal. The first applicant was served with the District Court judgment on 23 May 2008. 12.  In their reasoning the First Municipal Court and the District Court opined, inter alia, that while the first applicant’s husband had indeed been kidnapped on 13 June 1999 the Republic of Serbia could not be held liable, within the meaning of Article 180 § 1 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 26 below), since it was up to KFOR to provide for the safety of all citizens of Kosovo from 9 June 1999 onwards (see paragraph 6 above). The fact that national security forces had been in the process of withdrawing from Suva Reka Municipality on 13 June 1999 was therefore merely a technical issue. 13.  The first applicant could not have lodged a further appeal on points of law (revizija), given that the amount of compensation claimed was below the statutory threshold. 14.  On 13 June 1999 the second applicant’s husband was kidnapped by the KLA in Suva Reka Municipality. 15.  On 24 June 2002 the Bujanovac Municipal Court declared the second applicant’s husband dead. This ruling became final by 16 July 2002. 16.  On 31 May 2005 the second applicant, together with her children and other family members, lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Serbia with the First Municipal Court in Belgrade, seeking compensation for mental anguish suffered as a consequence of the incident. 17.  On 19 May 2006 the said court ruled against the plaintiffs. 18.  On 3 April 2008 the first-instance judgment was upheld by the Belgrade District Court on appeal. 19.  In their reasoning the First Municipal Court and the District Court opined, inter alia, that while the second applicant’s husband had indeed been kidnapped on 13 June 1999 the Republic of Serbia could not be held liable within the meaning of Article 180 § 1 of the Obligations Act, since it was up to KFOR to provide for the safety of all citizens of Kosovo from 9 June 1999 onwards. The fact that national security forces had been in the process of withdrawing from Suva Reka Municipality on 13 June 1999 was therefore merely a technical issue. 20.  The second applicant could not have lodged a further appeal on points of law, given that the amount of compensation claimed was below the statutory threshold. 21.  The applicants maintained that in other judgments, rendered between 2006 and 2010, the Belgrade District Court and subsequently the Belgrade Appeals Court, as well as the Supreme Court at third instance, had ruled in favour of other plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that their claims were based on very similar facts and concerned identical legal issues. 22.  Given the case-law provided by the parties, in their reasoning in those judgments where the said courts/different benches of the same court had indeed ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, the Serbian authorities were deemed responsible for the lives and safety of all persons residing in Kosovo up until the actual transfer of effective control to KFOR in respect of each of the municipalities considered separately (see, for example, the judgment of the First Municipal Court in Belgrade P. 431/07 of 24 February 2009, upheld on appeal by the Belgrade District Court; the judgments of the Belgrade District Court Gž. 10832/06, 13799/06, and 11483/08 of 26 December 2006, 5 June 2007 and 14 October 2008 respectively; the judgments of the Belgrade Appeals Court Gž. 2005/10 and 605/10 of 17 March 2010 and 10 June 2010 respectively; and the judgments of the Supreme Court Rev. 1551/07, 1092/08 and 939/08 of 5 September 2007, 24 April 2008 and 7 May 2008 respectively). 23.  On 18 March 2008, according to the Government, the Supreme Court’s Civil Division endorsed this line of reasoning, specifically the reasons given in the same court’s ruling Rev. 1551/07 of 5 September 2007 (cited in paragraph 22 above). 24.  On 10 March 2010, in Rev. 1540/10, the Supreme Court of Cassation ruled against other plaintiffs on the same basis as in the applicants’ case, but in its decision Už. 2786/10 of 28 June 2012 the Constitutional Court quashed this ruling and ordered the re-examination of the matter. On 19 April 2013 the Supreme Court of Cassation apparently ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, this time holding that the Serbian authorities were responsible for the lives and safety of all persons residing in Kosovo until the actual transfer of effective control to KFOR in respect of the municipality in question. 25.  On 1 April 2014 the Supreme Court of Cassation adopted a detailed action plan aimed at ensuring the general harmonisation of case-law throughout the Serbian judicial system. This plan contained a series of measures to be undertaken at various levels of jurisdiction, and, inter alia, included the following: (i) the adoption of guiding legal opinions based on the principles developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; (ii) the dissemination of such opinions; (iii) regular information sharing between the courts; (iv) an increased number of thematic discussions and training programmes; (v) the adoption of specific action plans by the courts at various levels; and (vi) the development of various IT tools and related intranet databases.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, Leokadia Guzicka, is a Polish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Kąty Wrocławskie, Poland. 5.  On 19 April 1994 the applicant brought a claim against her former employer, the “Perspektywa” Co-operative, to the Opole District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). She sought the annulment of the Co-operative Board’s resolution depriving her of her membership of the co-operative, and reinstatement. 6.  On 26 February 1997 the District Court found that it was not competent to deal with the claim and referred the case to the Opole Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). 7.  On 22 June 1998, following the applicant’s complaint, the District Court sent the case-file to the Regional Court. 8.  The first hearing was set down for 18 September 1998. 9.  On 23 October, 23 November and 21 December 1998 the court held hearings. 10.  On 29 January 1999 the court allowed the applicant’s claim.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Shakhty in the Rostov Region. 7.  On 19 and 23 December 2000 the applicant was examined by two medical commissions and found to be in good health and fully fit for military service. 8.  On the basis of the medical reports, the decision was made to call the applicant up for two years of mandatory military service in the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces. 9.  The applicant was assigned to serve in military unit no. 5464 in Kislovodsk. In the unit he was allegedly harassed and ill-treated by senior conscripts and the unit sergeant on account of his Moldovan ethnic origin. 10.  According to the applicant, in late January 2001 he attended a drivers’ training course. In the car park the commander told the applicant and three other conscripts to take the back axle of a ZIL lorry to another place. The applicant injured his spine and later on the same day he was also severely beaten and kicked by senior conscripts for failing to bring the axle close enough to the lorry. On the course the following morning he asked for medical assistance, but the commander refused his request. The applicant did not complain about these events to a prosecutor or any other official. 11.  On 8 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to military unit no. 6794 in Astrakhan (later renumbered as no. 3025). According to the applicant, a medical officer noted his complaint of pains in his knees, but did not prescribe any treatment. It subsequently transpired during an inquiry that the applicant had complained about recurrent pains in his knees to his superior, Lieutenant D., who had exempted him from physical exercise (see paragraph 20 below). 12.  In March 2001 Junior Sergeant Ch., the platoon commander, made the applicant and other servicemen do 350 knee bends outdoors as punishment for their failure to scrub the barracks spotless. Lieutenant D. was present but did not contradict the order. After several hundred knee bends, the applicant collapsed and other soldiers took him by the armpits and dragged him into the medical unit. 13.  Between 6 and 26 March 2001 the applicant received emergency treatment in military unit no. 52218, and then in unit no. 3057 until 17 April 2001. He could not stand on his own and crawled out of bed propping himself up on the bedposts. 14.  Between 17 April and 23 May 2001 the applicant was treated in the neurosurgery clinic of the Rostov-on-Don State Medical University. When he was discharged he was diagnosed with a “closed injury of the spine combined with an impairment of blood circulation at the level of the lower thoracic part of the spinal cord” and found unfit for work. 15.  On 5 June 2001 the medical commission of military unit no. 3057 examined the applicant at the request of the commander of unit no. 6794 and diagnosed him with “consequences of an acute interruption to the blood flow to the spinal cord in the form of cicatrical-commissural epiduritis, arachnoiditis with a disturbance of the flow of cerebrospinal fluid and minor impairment of sensitivity in the lower extremities”. It also established that the condition had been “acquired during military service” and discharged the applicant as “partially fit for military service”. 16.  On 28 June 2001 the applicant was discharged on account of his disability. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s mother complained to the military prosecutor of Rostov-on-Don of an abuse of power committed by Lieutenant D. and Junior Sergeant Ch. 18.  On 10 May 2001 her complaint was forwarded to the military prosecutor of the Astrakhan garrison who in turn sent it on 21 May 2001 to the military prosecutor of the Caspian Fleet. 19.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government enclosed copies of statements by Lieutenant D. and Junior Sergeant Ch., as well as by Privates A.L., A.Sh. and V.P., who had started their service on 1 February 2001. 20.  On 22 May 2001 Lieutenant D. stated as follows:\n“In February 2001 Private Chember was transferred to our unit ... He was assigned to serve in my sub-unit, that is, in the first platoon of the seventh company. Since his transfer into our unit he has started complaining about recurrent pains in his knees. On that ground I exempted him from physical exercise; he stayed within the premises of the company and did not go anywhere. Some two weeks later Private Chember was sent for treatment to the sanitary unit because of acute pains in his knees; I cannot tell why it happened. Some time later he was transferred to a hospital in another town ... I have never applied any unlawful methods to Private Chember.” 21.  On the same date Junior Sergeant Ch. testified as follows:\n“I have known Private Chember since February 2001; he served in the seventh company of military unit 6794, in which I acted as the section commander. I point out that Chember often went to the medical unit. I do not know what he complained about. Every time I acted as the officer-on-duty in the platoon, Chember was usually in for treatment in the medical unit. I think he complained about pains in his legs. I did not know Chember very well because he was not from my platoon ...” 22.  In their similarly worded statements, Privates A.L., A.Sh. and V.P. indicated that the applicant had complained about his “weak legs” since his arrival at military unit no. 6794, that for that reason he had been exempted from physical exercise and squad drill, and that he had often been treated in the medical unit for pains in his legs. 23.  On 31 May 2001 Captain S., a senior investigator with the military prosecutor’s office of the Caspian Fleet, issued a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings. The reasoning read as follows, in full:\n“The inquiry established that the fact of abuse of power by Lieutenant D. and Junior Sergeant Ch. had not actually taken place in reality.\nIt follows from the statement by Lieutenant D. that Private Chember serves under his command. Neither he nor Junior Sergeant Ch. ever abused their power over or used violence against Private Chember or any other military personnel of unit 6794.\nIt follows from the statement by Junior Sergeant Ch. that neither he nor Lieutenant D. ever abused their power over or used violence against Private Chember or any other military personnel of unit 6794.\nAll the servicemen of the seventh company of military unit 6794 – where Chember serves – have been questioned. They stated that no one had harassed Private Chember, and that neither Junior Sergeant Ch. nor Lieutenant D. had ever abused their power over him or any other military personnel of unit 6794.\nThus, the inquiry has established that Junior Sergeant Ch. and Lieutenant D. did not abuse their power over Private Chember or any other military personnel of unit 6794, and accordingly no criminal case may be instituted against them because there was no criminal offence.”\nThe decision indicated that an appeal against it lay to a higher prosecutor or to a court. 24.  On 30 September 2002 the applicant’s mother complained to a higher prosecutor. She wrote, in particular, that her son had never had pains in his knees. She also pointed out that the investigator had not heard the soldiers P., S., C. and Sh., who had been eyewitnesses to the ill-treatment. 25.  On 8 October 2002 Colonel M., the military prosecutor of the Caspian Fleet, replied that her complaint could not be examined because the materials of the inquiry had been forwarded, on 8 August 2002, to the Shakhty Town Court. He indicated that the complaint would be considered upon the return of the materials. The applicant did not receive any further information concerning that complaint. 26.  On 17 March 2002 the applicant lodged a civil action against military units nos. 3025 and 5464 and the North Caucasian Command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He submitted that the injury he had received during his military service caused him physical pain, restricted his day-to-day activities, impaired his career and life plans, and brought feelings of frustration and injustice. 27.  The applicant and his counsel asked the court to appoint a forensic medical examination with a view to determining the origin and nature of his injuries. 28.  On 9 April 2003 the Shakhty Town Court of the Rostov-on-Don Region refused their request by an interim decision:\n“Having heard the parties and studied the case materials, the court finds that the request is unsubstantiated ... because the period when the injury was received is stated in the medical record and that is the period of military service. The establishment of the origin and nature of existing diseases will not help to find those responsible or [to elucidate] the circumstances. The case file contains the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against Sergeant Ch. and Lieutenant D., dated 31 May 2001.” 29.  On the same day the Town Court delivered judgment, by which the applicant’s claim was dismissed. The Town Court examined medical evidence produced by the applicant and interviewed his fellow serviceman P. who confirmed that Junior Sergeant Ch. had forced the applicant and other conscripts to do 350 or more knee bends and that the applicant had collapsed during that exercise. It found as follows:\n“Assessing the collected evidence as a whole, the court finds that the claim is unsubstantiated ... because the [applicant] did not show that the damage to his health had been caused by servicemen of the [Ministry of Internal Affairs]; according to his own statements, he fell ill because of excessive (in his opinion) physical activity (physical exercises, carrying the axle of a ZIL lorry in his hands) and because of ill-treatment by senior conscripts and by Sergeant Ch. However, the case materials contain the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against Sergeant Ch. and Lieutenant D., dated 31 May 2001 ... because there was no indication of a criminal offence. Under the current laws, one of the mandatory conditions for tort liability for non-pecuniary damage is the fault of the tortfeasor ...” 30.  The applicant appealed against the interim decision and judgment of 9 April 2003. 31.  On 25 June 2003 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed his appeal:\n“The [first-instance] court dismissed the claim because it established that the defendants’ liability for causing damage to the [applicant’s] health had not been proven. The [regional] court finds this conclusion correct. On 31 May 2001 an investigator ... refused to initiate criminal proceedings ... The causal link between the defendants’ actions and the [applicant’s] disability is not established. Experts may not establish the causal link between the defendants’ actions and consequences thereof, only a court is competent to do so.” 32.  Following the applicant’s discharge, on 29 August 2001 he was diagnosed with a second-category disability and became entitled to a civilian disability pension. 33.  The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to claim a military pension. On 21 May, 11 June, 29 July and 25 December 2002, his mother received negative responses from the Central Military Medical Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The claims were rejected because he had not produced documents showing that he had injured his spine during military service. According to these replies, the report of 5 June 2001 only established that the condition had been diagnosed during his military service and not that it had been acquired during his military service. 34.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government submitted a report produced by two medical experts (one military and one civilian) on 10 March 2005. The report had been commissioned by the assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor on 9 March 2005 with a view to determining the nature of the applicant’s disability, its causes and origin. The experts made their findings on the basis of the criminal case file and the applicant’s medical records of 2001. In particular, they found as follows:\n“It transpires from the available medical documents that Mr Chember’s conditions were chronic. Having regard to Mr Chember’s young age, his medical history (pains in the legs from the age of ten), and chronic development of the condition, the osteochondrosis of the lumbar spine was contracted in childhood as a result of a metabolic disturbance (dystrophy) ... The existing inflammatory processes in the spine (epiduritis and arachnoiditis) could have appeared ... as a complication of an infectious disease that Mr Chember may have contracted in childhood, such as influenza, tonsillitis, pharyngitis, and so on. These spinal conditions were also of a chronic and continued nature ... which is confirmed by the presence of cicatrical-commissural epiduritis and commissural arachnoiditis, and complaints of pains in the legs from the beginning of military service and before conscription.\nNo objective confirmation that these conditions had been caused by trauma could be found in the available medical records or case-file materials.\nMr Chember’s diseases were chronic and continuing and could have been caused by hereditary factors (according to the materials, his uncle suffered from a similar condition) ...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Amsterdam. The second applicant was born in 1996 and lives in Amsterdam and Uithoorn. 9.  The first applicant came to the Netherlands in June 1994, leaving her two sons from a previous relationship, Jean (born in 1990) and Carlos (born in 1992), with her parents. In the Netherlands she lived with her partner Mr Hoogkamer, who was in paid employment at that time. The first applicant submitted that they had looked into applying for a residence permit allowing her to reside in the Netherlands with her partner, but that, owing to the unavailability of documents concerning Mr Hoogkamer's income, such an application had never actually been made. 10.  In April 1995 the first applicant's son Carlos joined his mother and Mr Hoogkamer. Her other son Jean remained in Brazil with his grandparents. 11.  On 3 February 1996 Rachael, the second applicant, was born to the first applicant and Mr Hoogkamer. The first applicant was invested ipso jure with parental authority (ouderlijk gezag) over Rachael. Rachael was recognised (erkenning) by Mr Hoogkamer on 28 March 1996, as a result of which she obtained Dutch nationality. 12.  The first applicant and Mr Hoogkamer split up in January 1997. Rachael stayed with her father, who subsequently applied to the Amsterdam District Court (kantonrechter) seeking to be awarded parental authority over Rachael. The District Court granted the application on 20 February 1997. The first applicant subsequently appealed to the Amsterdam Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) against that decision. The Regional Court requested the Child Care and Protection Board (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) to examine which attribution of parental authority would be in Rachael's best interests. 13.  On 12 August 1997 the first applicant applied for a residence permit which would allow her to reside in the Netherlands, either – depending on the outcome of the proceedings concerning parental authority – with her daughter Rachael, or in order to have access to her. She also made an application on behalf of her son Carlos. 14.  The Child Care and Protection Board found, in its report of 26 August 1997, that parental authority should remain with Mr Hoogkamer. In view of the likelihood of the first applicant having to return to Brazil, awarding her parental authority over Rachael could lead to a break-off in contact between Rachael and her father and also between Rachael and her paternal grandparents, who were very important to her. It was felt that this would be a traumatic experience for Rachael, who had her roots in the Netherlands and whose bonding with all the persons concerned had taken place in that country. 15.  In a decision of 26 November 1997, the Amsterdam Regional Court nevertheless quashed the decision of the District Court and awarded the first applicant parental authority over Rachael. Mr Hoogkamer lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). 16.  On 12 January 1998 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected the first applicant's application for a residence permit. The first applicant lodged an objection (bezwaar) against this decision. At the hearing on this objection before an official committee (ambtelijke commissie) on 27 May 1998, it was stated on behalf of the first applicant that she worked (illegally, as she was not in possession of a residence permit allowing her to do so) from Monday to Thursday and that on those days Rachael stayed either with her father or with her grandparents. Rachael stayed with her mother on the remaining days of the week. 17.  On 12 June 1998 the Deputy Minister of Justice dismissed the objection, holding that, even if account was taken of Rachael's right to reside in the Netherlands and to be brought up and educated there, the interests of the economic well-being of the country outweighed the interests of the first applicant. Although the first applicant did not claim welfare benefits, she did not pay taxes or social security contributions either, and there were sufficient numbers of nationals of European Union member States or aliens residing lawfully in the Netherlands available to fill the post she was occupying. The general interest also prevailed over Mr Hoogkamer's interest in being able to lead his family life with Rachael in the Netherlands. In this context it was noted that, at the time Mr Hoogkamer started his relationship with the first applicant, the latter had not been entitled to reside in the Netherlands. He had thus accepted that family life with Rachael might have to be enjoyed elsewhere or in a different manner. It was further noted that Mr Hoogkamer did not make a substantial financial contribution to Rachael's care and upbringing since he only took care of those expenses on the days Rachael stayed with him and, as he was in receipt of welfare benefits, those costs were borne by public funds. 18.  The first applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Haarlem. 19.  On 30 October 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Amsterdam Regional Court's decision of 26 November 1997 in the proceedings concerning parental authority and referred the case to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof). 20.  The Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Haarlem, dismissed the appeal against the refusal to grant the first applicant a residence permit. In its decision of 12 February 1999, the Regional Court held that Article 8 of the Convention did not oblige national authorities to ensure that Rachael's parents would not have to choose between leaving Rachael with her father in the Netherlands or letting her go to Brazil with her mother. Both these options were considered to be feasible. According to the Regional Court, the fact that Rachael would have to be without either her father or her mother was, strictly speaking, the result of the parents' choice to conceive a child at a time when the first applicant was not allowed to reside in the Netherlands. No further appeal lay against this decision. 21.  On 28 June 1999 a hearing took place before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the proceedings concerning parental authority, during which an officer of the Child Care and Protection Board told the court that the Board's report of 26 August 1997 remained pertinent and that it was in Rachael's best interests for the status quo – with Mr Hoogkamer having parental authority over her – to be maintained. In its decision of 15 July 1999 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Amsterdam District Court of 20 February 1997 awarding parental authority over Rachael to Mr Hoogkamer. The Court of Appeal accepted that Mr Hoogkamer, supported by Rachael's grandparents, was sufficiently capable of providing Rachael with the necessary upbringing and care, and that he was indeed doing so in practice. It was of the opinion that the submissions made by the first applicant in support of her argument that Rachael's interests would be better served if parental authority were awarded to her – even if this meant Rachael living in Brazil without contact with her father and grandparents – were of insufficient weight compared to the possibilities the father had to offer and was offering. The first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against this decision, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27 October 2000. 22.  Despite having received a letter dated 8 July 1999 from the local police informing her that she had to leave the Netherlands within two weeks, the first applicant remains in the Netherlands. She works from Monday to Friday. Rachael stays with her at the weekend and with her paternal grandparents during the week. This arrangement is confirmed in a letter dated 20 March 2002 written by Rachael's grandparents to the applicants' legal representative:\n“The access arrangement we have concluded with [the first applicant], the mother of our granddaughter Rachael Hoogkamer, is fully satisfactory for all parties. According to the arrangement, Rachael stays with us during the week. On Friday evening we take her to her mother and collect her again late on Sunday afternoon. No disagreement whatsoever has arisen on this point in the past years. We further confirm that the weekend visits of our granddaughter to her mother pass off in a very pleasant fashion and that she enjoys telling us about them. In other words, the close contact with her mother has a beneficial effect on our granddaughter.” 23.  In January 2002 the first applicant applied for a residence permit allowing her to reside in the Netherlands with her new Dutch partner. In this application the first applicant indicated that Rachael was being brought up partly by her grandparents and partly by her new family. The application was rejected on 18 April 2002 as the first applicant was not in possession of the required temporary residence permit (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf). The first applicant did not challenge this decision. 24.  The second son of the first applicant, Jean, has been living with his mother in the Netherlands since February 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Spišské Podhradie. The applicant introduced his application through the intermediary of an advocate, Mrs Elena Smiková. Subsequently, the applicant corresponded with the Registry himself. 5.  On 4 February 1994 the applicant filed an action with the Spišská Nová Ves District Court. He challenged the lawfulness of his dismissal from his employment. 6.  On 22 December 2005 the district court dismissed the action. The Košice Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on 29 January 2007 (final on 14 March 2007). 7.  On 23 August 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay and under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time. 8.  The Constitutional Court held that the case was not complex and that the applicant’s conduct had contributed to the length of the proceedings. Delays imputable to the district court totalled 10 years and 8 months. 9.  The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant SKK 90,000 (the equivalent of 2,328 euros at that time) as just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It ordered the Spišská Nová Ves District Court to reimburse the applicant’s legal costs and avoid any further delay in the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The first applicant, Roman Berliński, is a Polish national born in 1971. The second applicant, Słavomir Berliński, is a Polish national born in 1974. The applicants are brothers. At present they live in Poland. 10.  On 4 October 1993 the applicants, who practice body-building, were attending an athletics club at a Lublin university. The club manager urged the applicants to exit, as they had been present at the club without the appropriate permission. He warned that he would call the police if they did not leave. The applicants did not agree to leave. The manager called the police, and six uniformed officers arrived soon thereafter. 11.  According to the applicants' account, the officers allegedly “showed a hostile attitude” towards them and “were not interested in checking their [identity documents] but simply to force them out” of the athletics club. The policemen “immediately wanted to handcuff them and pulled their arms backwards”. The applicants state that they “resisted this treatment”. The first applicant “managed to get free for a moment”, while the second applicant was “pushed and pulled” by two police officers. He was treated with tear-gas and struck with a stick. 12.  According to the Government, the applicants resisted and attacked the policemen who were trying to apprehend them. One of the officers was kicked in the face and another in the crotch. 13.  The parties submit that only when one officer drew a gun from his holster did the applicants yield. They were then handcuffed. 14.  The applicants were immediately put in a police vehicle. 15.  The Government state that the applicants still resisted whilst being taken to the vehicle, and force again had to be used against them. 16.  The applicants were taken to a police station situated 4 kilometres from the athletics club. 17.  According to the applicants' account, in the police van they were put on the ground and stayed handcuffed. The van had no separate cell for the arrested. The policemen and the applicants were closed together in the rear part of the van. The applicants “had no chance but to expose their bodies to the treatment of the policemen”. They “suffered heavy blows in their heads, kidneys, backs and spines”. The policemen used their police sticks to beat them up. The first applicant lost consciousness. 18.  The Government deny that any ill-treatment occurred in the van. 19.  At the police station the applicants were briefly questioned. The part of the first applicant's custody interview record concerning his physical condition reads: “before [the arrest the applicant was] well, at present [he complains of] pain in the left eye, the neck, the left kidney, the jaw and the head”. The relevant part of the second applicant's custody interview record reads: “pain in the temples, the hands, the nose, the teeth, the right thumb”. In the late evening of the same day the applicants were examined by doctors. The x-ray photograph of the first applicant's cranium showed no apparent injuries to his head. On the basis of the applicants' physical examination, which disclosed no problems in their circulatory and respiratory systems, a doctor concluded that they could be regarded as fit for detention. 20.  The applicants remained in custody until the afternoon of the next day, 5 October 1993, when they were brought before a district prosecutor. They were released after having been questioned by the prosecutor. 21.  The first applicant was taken to a hospital where he remained for 11 days. The second applicant was taken to the same hospital, was immediately released, and later underwent out-patient treatment. 22.  On 5 October 1993, when being questioned by the prosecutors, the applicants complained that they had been beaten up by the police officers in the athletics club and in the police van. The applicants said that they had doubts as to the officers' identity, and that they had asked the policemen to present documents attesting to their authority. They alleged that the officers had refused to do so and that the policemen had instead attempted to arrest them. The applicants further stated that, in the police van, which lacked a separate cell for the arrested, the officers had started to inflict heavy blows all over their bodies. They had been defenceless and had not been able to lessen the impact of the blows because of their hands being handcuffed behind their backs and themselves being pushed onto the vehicle's floor. They submitted that the officers had beaten them all the way to the police station. 23.  On 15 March 1994 a district prosecutor, on suspicion that offences against the applicants' personal rights had been committed in breach of the Polish Criminal Code and the Police Act, instituted investigations relating to the applicants' complaints against the police officers. The police officers who allegedly ill-treated the applicants were regarded as witnesses, not as accused, in the proceedings. 24.  The applicants were called to appear before the district prosecutor on 25 March 1994, but failed to present themselves on that date. 25.  On 28 March 1994 the prosecutor examined a witness DK (policeman). On 30 March witnesses MK and MS (police officers) were examined. On 6 April witnesses MW (the applicants' acquaintance) and EP (the club manager) were questioned. On 13 April the prosecutor summoned witnesses JS and MB, and on 20 April he summoned a witness PW (all police officers). 26.  The applicants were examined on 5 and 9 May 1994. During the inquiries the applicants maintained that the officers had been very hostile towards them from the very beginning, that they had not asked them to leave the athletics club, and that they had, without any reason, beaten them up. The policemen contended that they had been attacked by the applicants, and that only threatening them with a firearm had permitted their apprehension. 27.  On 23 May 1994 the prosecutor heard witnesses MW, JR and JN (police officers). On 24 May 1994 he summoned witnesses AG and JP (doctors). On 26 May the prosecutor examined a witness DJ, and on 27 May he questioned a witness MH (both doctors). 28.  The investigation into the conduct of the policemen was prolonged by decision of a regional prosecutor of 10 June 1994, with a view to examining further witnesses. 29.  On 14 June 1994 the district prosecutor examined witnesses AW and RM (doctors). 30.  On 16 June 1994 the Forensic Department of the Białystok Academy of Medicine produced an opinion as to the applicants' physical condition following the incident. The opinion was delivered at the request of the Lublin District Court in the proceedings against the applicants (also see § 44 below). 31.  The forensic experts, based on the medical records collected throughout the applicants' treatment from 5 October 1993, found that immediately after the incident the first applicant had a haematoma around the left eye, a bruise of 2 x 2 cm on the back of his head, a bruise with grazed skin of 7 x 7 cm on the left side of his jaw, four band-like bruises of significant size on his chest, and that his abdomen and spine were sensitive. The second applicant had small isolated bruises on his chin and neck, bruises on a grazed upper lip, an inner wound in the mucous membrane of the upper lip, lesions of the front teeth, and an injury to the right knee and wrist. 32.  The forensic experts also stated that several days after the incident the first applicant had been increasingly complaining of pain in his head, vertigo, diminished clarity of sight and hearing, and that the second applicant had been complaining about a weak right hand, diminished sensitivity of his fingers, severe headaches, vertigo, nausea, pain in the spine and a reduced ability to move. The experts noted that the subsequent examinations of the applicants had not confirmed any deviations from the normal state of their heath. The experts stated that on 8 October 1993 the first applicant should have been released from hospital but remained following an intervention by the applicants' father. The experts also stressed that the father, himself a doctor, during his visits at the hospital had been instructing the first applicant of what and how he should complain. The first applicant had been released from hospital on 15 October 1993, although after this date he underwent further out-patient treatment of his jaw, chest and spine. 33.  The forensic experts concluded that the injuries sustained by the applicants might have occurred from the use of a rigid, blunt instrument, e.g. a truncheon, and that the lesions might have occurred in the circumstances alleged by them, e.g. from blows by truncheons and fists. The experts held that the damage caused by these injuries to the applicants' soft tissues did not last more than seven days, but that those injuries were serious enough to warrant application of Article 156 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code [causing light bodily harm] against the police officers. The experts also emphasised that the applicants' grievances had contained a certain measure of simulation and exaggeration. 34.  On 29 June 1994 the district prosecutor requested experts at the Wrocław Academy of Medicine to produce a medical opinion specifically in the context of the proceedings concerning the applicants' allegations against the police officers. 35.  By decisions of 9 September and 15 November 1994 the regional prosecutor again prolonged the investigation. 36.  The opinion of the experts at the Wrocław Academy of Medicine was produced on 6 December 1994. They found that following the arrest the first applicant had had bruises on his face and a swollen left eye, and that the second applicant had isolated bruises on the face, a grazed lip and lesions of three teeth. The experts also found that the first applicant had not been suffering from concussion. The experts stated that the injuries of the applicants could occur in the circumstances alleged by the police officers, the applicants or in other circumstances. 37.  The applicants requested the district prosecutor to hear additional witnesses, namely their parents, two district prosecutors and an American basketball player who had witnessed the events of 4 October 1993. On 9 September 1994 the prosecutor dismissed the request on the ground that the applicants' parents had not witnessed the incident, that the testimonies of the prosecutors had not been relevant to the determination of the facts, and that the statements of the American basketball player had been recorded in the proceedings against the applicants. On these grounds the prosecutor considered that no examination of further witnesses was necessary. 38.  On 12 December 1994 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the investigation against the policemen. The prosecutor held that there was a lack of evidence in favour of the applicants' allegations that the officers had committed an offence. On the basis of witnesses' evidence, he held that the policemen had been compelled to use force only following the applicants' refusal to leave the sports club. The prosecutor did not establish that any force had been used against the applicants in the police van. By virtue of the medical opinion of the Wrocław Academy of Medicine, the prosecutor stated that the fact of the applicants' hospitalisation for seven days did not necessarily infer that the full period of seven days had been required to complete the treatment of lesions suffered by the applicants. The prosecutor concluded that “the injuries [sustained by the applicants] could occur both in the circumstances alleged by themselves, as well as in the circumstances alleged by the police officers”. Given the principle of benefit of doubt in favour of the accused, the prosecutor decided to discontinue the case against the police officers. 39.  The applicants appealed against the decision. On 16 January 1995 a regional prosecutor dismissed the appeal and finally discontinued the proceedings. The regional prosecutor found no “unequivocal evidence” of the officers' guilt. He held that the district prosecutor had properly assessed the collected material, and that he had adopted a well-motivated decision. 40.  After questioning the applicants on 5 October 1993, a district prosecutor commenced investigations against them on suspicion that they had attacked the police officers, thereby obstructing them in the course of their duties. On the same day the prosecutor ordered the applicants' bail on suspicion of their having committed an offence under Article 234 of the Criminal Code in regard to the events of 4 October 1993. 41.  On 6 October 1993 the applicants appealed against the bail decision, requesting the prosecuting authorities to appoint a free defence lawyer on the ground of their difficult financial situation, referring inter alia to Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. The applicants received no reply to the requests. 42.  In the course of the investigation the policemen, the applicants and witnesses of the events of 4 October 1993, including witnesses on the applicants' behalf, were summoned. The applicants submitted many applications in which they contended that the allegations against them should have been examined from the angle of their own complaints that the officers had beaten them up. However, by virtue of relevant provisions of domestic criminal procedure, the prosecution decided that the material contained in the case-file relating to the applicants' allegations on their maltreatment by the police officers be separated and that two parallel investigations be conducted in relation to the incident of 4 October 1993. 43.  On 17 February 1994 the applicants were charged with affray, assault and battery on the police officers in the course of the execution of their duties. 44.  On 7 April 1994 the Lublin District Court decided to obtain from the Forensic Department of the Białystok Academy of Medicine an opinion as to the applicants' injuries following the incident. The opinion was produced on 16 June 1994 (also see §§ 30-33 above). 45.  On 17 October 1994 the Lublin District Court decided to obtain an opinion from forensic psychiatrists to establish whether the applicants had been “able to ascertain and measure their actions” to determine their criminal responsibility. The court also decided to appoint a free lawyer to represent the applicants in view of the concern over their state of mind, in accordance with Article 70 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 46.  By a letter of 18 October 1994 the applicants informed the court that they refused to undergo a psychiatric examination. They did not appear for the out-patient psychiatric examination at the Lublin Centre for Mental Health on the date fixed by the court on 10 January 1995. The court ordered compulsory appearance of the applicants on the next date fixed for out-patient psychiatric examination on 2 February 1995. The applicants were brought to the experts on the above date, but refused to be subjected to an examination. The above situation repeated itself on 8 March 1995. In view of the fact that the applicants had refused to undergo out-patient psychiatric examination three times, on 8 March 1995 the forensic psychiatrists requested the court to place the applicants at a mental hospital for a forensic-psychiatric opinion to be produced. 47.  On 23 March 1995 the Lublin District Court ordered the applicants' compulsory placement at the Lublin Centre for Mental Health for a period of no longer than six weeks. The applicants and their counsel appealed against the above decision. In the appeal the applicants' representative declared that he undertook to ensure their voluntary appearance for out-patient psychiatric examination. On 3 April 1995 the Lublin Regional Court, having regard in particular to the above commitment by the applicants' defence counsel, quashed the decision of 23 March 1995. 48.  On the next day fixed for the applicants' out-patient psychiatric examination on 30 May 1995, they again failed to submit to out-patient examination. On 21 June 1995 the experts repeatedly requested the court to order compulsory measures against the applicants in order to produce a forensic-psychiatric opinion. 49.  On 11 July 1995 the Lublin District Court again ordered the applicants' compulsory placement at a mental hospital for a period of no more than six weeks. On the applicants' appeal from this decision, on 24 July 1995 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision of the District Court. 50.  On 1 December 1995 the first applicant was placed at the Lublin Centre for Mental Health. Upon the experts' application requesting to prolong the first applicant's stay at the ward in view of his negative attitude obstructing the production of a proper diagnosis, on 11 January 1996, the Lublin District Court extended the term of the first applicant's examination until 23 February 1996. On his appeal against the above decision, on 22 January 1996 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision of the District Court. The first applicant was released from the psychiatric ward on 15 February 1996. 51.  On 22 February 1996 the final opinion as to the mental condition of the first applicant was issued. The forensic psychiatrists concluded that at the moment of the incident with the police on 4 October 1993 he was able to comprehend the meaning of his acts and to control his conduct. The first applicant was not found to be of unsound mind. The experts also noted that he had been very suspicious and distrustful of the examination. 52.  As the second applicant expressed his willingness to undergo out-patient psychiatric observation, he was not placed in a mental hospital. The forensic psychiatrists delivered their opinion in regard to the second applicant on 27 February 1996. According to the experts' conclusions, the second applicant was mentally sane. The experts also noted that he had been very stressed throughout the examination, often speaking with a raised voice and not noticing the requests to calm him down. 53.  On 7 August 1996 the Lublin District Court found the applicants guilty under Article 234 of the Criminal Code in that they had resisted and assaulted the officers on 4 October 1993. It held that the manager of the athletics club had been entitled to demand the applicants' removal notwithstanding his motives therefor, and that the police had lawfully enforced this demand. The applicants were sentenced: the first applicant to one year and six months' imprisonment and the second applicant to one year's imprisonment. The court suspended the sentences for three years for each of the applicants. 54.  On 17 December 1996 the Lublin Regional Court, upon the applicants' appeal, upheld the first-instance judgment. The Regional Court concluded that “the fact that the defendants did not comply with the request of the five police officers to leave the sports hall shows a lack, on their part, of a critical judgment of their own conduct - this was also confirmed by the forensic psychiatrists”. That decision was final. The applicants were not imprisoned as a result of the conviction.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Ovchepoltsi. 6.  On the evening of 1 May 1991 the applicant was involved in a fight between several people in the village of Ovchepoltsi. During the fight he was stabbed with a knife in the stomach. Some members of the public came to his aid and took him to hospital. 7.  On the same day the applicant was admitted as an in-patient, and underwent an urgent operation. He was discharged on 13 May 1991 and was given thirty days’ sick leave. 8.  On 1 May 1991 the investigating authorities inspected the site where the fight had taken place. They took photos and seized a wooden stick stained with blood. 9.  On 1 and 2 May 1991 several witnesses were questioned. 10.  On 2 May 1991 criminal proceedings were opened against two of the participants in the fight: T.S. and P.S. They were charged with attempted murder and questioned. 11.  On 12 May 1992 the case investigator commissioned a medical expert report to establish the extent of the victim’s injuries. The report relied on the medical records from the applicant’s stay in hospital and established that he had suffered a 3 cm knife wound in the abdominal cavity which resulted in an injury to the great omentum and to the large intestine. The applicant had also suffered a combination of other injuries: large bruises on the face and on the right leg, and a broken rib. 12.  Between 18 May and 8 June 1992 several witnesses were questioned. 13.  It appears that between 1991 and 1994 the applicant’s mother wrote several times to the prosecuting authorities, complaining of inactivity on the part of the investigator in charge of the case. In response, the supervising prosecutor wrote to the investigator on several occasions requesting that the investigation be completed; for example in a letter of 19 August 1994 the prosecutor requested that the investigation be completed “without delay”. 14.  On 17 June 1996 the attempted murder charge against T.S. was changed to a charge of having caused intermediate bodily harm and he was questioned in this connection. 15.  On 11 September 1996 the attempted murder charge against P.S. was also changed to a charge of having caused intermediate bodily harm and he too was questioned. 16.  Between 25 August 2000 and 1 July 2002 some of the witnesses were recalled for further questioning. 17.  On 18 July 2003, following a complaint by the applicant’s lawyer in relation to the length of the investigation and inactivity on the part of the investigator in charge of the case, the supervising prosecutor removed the investigator and gave instructions to the investigating authorities to commission a new medical expert report and to conclude the investigation within thirty days. The Court has not been informed by either party of what substantive investigative steps, if any, were undertaken after that date. 18.  On 5 June 2006 the public prosecutor terminated the proceedings on the ground that the relevant statutory limitation period for bringing a prosecution had lapsed. 19.  On 13 July 2006 the applicant appealed against the order terminating the proceedings. In a decision of 17 July 2006 the Pazardzhik Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) ruled that the assailants remained charged with attempted murder and therefore the statutory limitation period for prosecution had not lapsed. The court remitted the case to the prosecutor’s office, instructing it to continue with the investigation. 20.  T.S. and P.S. appealed against the decision of the Regional Court. In a final decision of 27 September 2006 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal ruled that the assailants had remained charged only with having caused intermediate bodily harm. The court quashed the Regional Court’s decision and upheld the prosecutor’s order terminating the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the town of Ulan-Ude in the Buryatiya Republic. 5.  The Russian authorities initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant:\n-  on 13 June 1999 under Article 198 § 2 of the Criminal Code (tax evasion by a private person); the applicant was charged on 10 August 1999;\n-  on 24 June 1999 under Article 201 § 1 of the Code (abuse of power);\n-  on 29 August 1999 under Article 199 of the Code (tax evasion by a legal entity);\n-  on 13 October 1999 under Article 160 § 3 (b) (misappropriation of private property);\n-  on 21 January 2000 under Article 165 (causing pecuniary damage). 6.  The above cases were joined on a number of occasions, most recently on 4 June 2001. According to the Government, the charges under Articles 165 and 199 of the Code were abandoned on 5 January 2000 and 4 June 2001 respectively (see, however, paragraph 9 below). 7.  According to the Government, the proceedings were suspended on 6 January, 4 February and 17 August 2000, 13 June and 21 September 2001, and 20 January 2003, owing to the applicant’s illness. According to the Government, the applicant and his counsel were advised that the proceedings had been suspended on a number of occasions and subsequently resumed. 8.  On 18 August 2004 the applicant sought access to the case file and, in particular, to the above-mentioned decisions to suspend the proceedings. On 27 August 2004 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Buryatiya Republic sent him a letter stating that the case file might be available at the archives of the Tax Authority in Ulan-Ude. On 5 October 2004 the Investigations Department of the Regional Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that the criminal case against him had been suspended owing to his illness. Upon his renewed request, on 22 December 2004 the applicant received another reply from the Regional Office of the Drugs Control Service stating that the Investigations Department might be able to provide the requested documents. On 8 September 2005 the Drugs Control Service informed the applicant that on 10 July 2003 the criminal case against him had been forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Buryatiya Republic. 9.  On 20 January 2006 the Investigations Department discontinued the proceedings as regards charges under Articles 160, 165, 198, 199 and 201 of the Criminal Code. 10.  In August 1997 the applicant bought a PAZ-320500 bus. On 5 November 1999 the investigator in the criminal case against the applicant (see above) authorised seizure of the bus as security for eventual civil claims against him or eventual confiscation as a penalty under Article 160 § 3 (b) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 16 below). On 9 November 1999 the applicant’s bus was seized. It appears that no civil claims were lodged in the criminal case against the applicant. 11.  On an unspecified date the bus was transferred for safekeeping to a Mr Y. 12.  In September 2003 the applicant brought proceedings in which he challenged the investigator’s seizure order as unlawful and requested the court to release the bus. 13.  On 15 September 2003 the Sovetskiy District Court of Ulan-Ude examined the applicant’s claims with reference to Article 125 of the 2002 Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below) and rejected them as unfounded. The court held as follows:\n“...under Article 175 § 1 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure in order to secure civil claims or eventual confiscation of property the investigator shall issue an order of attachment in respect of the accused’s property which had been unlawfully obtained. Article 160 § 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for confiscation as a penalty. Besides, the case discloses pecuniary loss [sustained by the victim], and the victim has the right to file a civil claim for damages against the applicant...\nThe court finds no reasons for leaving the bus with [the applicant] for safekeeping...\nThe [first instance] court rejected the applicant’s arguments to the effect that his property rights over the bus had been breached by the continuing attachment of property and the criminal case is still pending. The case is being suspended owing to the applicant’s illness...” 14.  On 11 November 2003 the Supreme Court of the Buryatiya Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. The court stated:\n“Under Article 115 § 9 the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is now applicable to issues pertaining to attachment of property, the authority dealing with the criminal case has the power to release the property under the order of attachment, if attachment is no longer needed. As shown by the case file, at present the criminal case against the applicant is being dealt with by the investigating authority, the investigation being suspended. Taking into account the earlier submissions and the requirement of the procedure under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is not empowered to decide on the issue of lifting the order of attachment...” 15.  On 18 July 2006 the deputy prosecutor of the Buryatiya Republic lifted the order of attachment in respect of the applicant’s bus. The applicant was served with a copy of that decision on 21 March 2007. It appears that the authorities were unable to determine where the bus was kept and thus could not return it to the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Ljubljana. 6.  On 6 January 1992 the applicant and her then husband F.B., who had decided to get divorced, entered into an agreement on the partition of their joint property. The agreement stipulated, inter alia, that F.B. would transfer to her, within one year, the ownership of premises on Zaloška Street, unless they agreed on a different location. The agreement further stipulated that if the stated obligations were not fulfilled, the applicant could terminate the agreement and claim a share of the joint property in accordance with the relevant domestic law. On 24 April 1992 the applicant and F.B. divorced. 7.  Subsequently, F.B. did not transfer the ownership of premises on Zaloška Street to the applicant. However, on 24 September 1992 the applicant accepted the keys of certain premises on Trubarjeva Street. After F.B. had bought the latter premises, on 6 November 1992, he offered the applicant the possibility of signing a supplement to the agreement. According to the supplement, the applicant would receive forty per cent of the premises on Trubarjeva Street as a form of alternative performance of the relevant part of the agreement. The applicant refused to sign the supplement to the agreement. 8.  On 3 May 1993 she instituted proceedings in the Ljubljana Basic Court (Temeljno sodišče v Ljublani) seeking termination of the agreement and partition of the joint property. 9.  On 16 November 1993 F.B. died and his heirs, J.B.J, B.E.B. and M.B., took over his capacity in the proceedings. 10.  On 9 November 1995 the court issued a partial judgment terminating the relevant agreement and rejecting the counter-claim lodged by J.B.J, B.E.B. and M.B (“the heirs”). 11.  On 11 April 1996 the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani) quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. The applicant then challenged that decision in an appeal on points of law, but that was rejected by the Supreme Court on 22 May 1997. 12.  In the re-examination proceedings, on 14 September 1998, the (renamed) Ljubljana District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani) issued a new judgment rejecting the applicant’s claim. The court considered that the relevant agreement was not a “fixed contract” (fiksna pogodba) which could be terminated without allowing additional time for its performance. Moreover, from F.B.’s conduct it had not been apparent that he was not going to honour his obligation. The applicant should therefore have offered an additional time-limit to F.B. In addition, the court found that F.B. had in large part fulfilled his obligations and that the applicant, by accepting the keys to the premises on Trubarjeva Street, had agreed to an alternative performance of the agreement. 13.  On 31 March 1999 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. It, however, amended certain parts concerning the payment of costs and expenses. 14.  On 13 May 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). She supplemented the appeal on 25 May 1999. 15.  On 19 April 2000 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s appeal to the extent that it concerned the application of law by the lower courts, but dismissed the remainder. The Supreme Court considered that the interpretation of the relevant agreement concerned the application of the law. It then concluded that F.B. had not fulfilled his obligations by offering the applicant only a share of the premises on Trubarjeva Street. In addition, the applicant had not consented to the alternative performance nor had F.B. showed an intention to fulfil his obligations. The Supreme Court consequently varied the lower courts’ judgments and terminated the relevant agreement. As far as the partition of the joint property was concerned, the Supreme Court remitted the case to the first-instance court. 16.  Two of the heirs (J.B.J. and B.E.B.) lodged a constitutional appeal complaining, inter alia, of the arbitrariness of the Supreme Court’s judgment and of a breach of the provision guaranteeing equal protection of rights (Article 22 of the Constitution). On 30 January 2001 the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) accepted the appeal for consideration, which is equivalent to declaring it admissible. On 10 May 2001 it upheld the appeal by five votes to three, quashed the Supreme Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for re-examination (decision no. Up-232/00). It would appear that the applicant was informed of that decision (see paragraph 22 below), but there is no document in the case file certifying as to when. 17.  The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision was based on the interpretation of the parties’ motivation and of the content of the agreement. In its view, such interpretation constituted an interference with the facts established by the lower courts. However, according to the domestic legislation, the Supreme Court, when deciding on an appeal on points of law, had jurisdiction only for the determination of legal issues. The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision was obviously erroneous and therefore arbitrary. This, and the fact that the Supreme Court had exceeded its jurisdiction, represented an interference with the appellants’ right to equal protection of rights. 18.  In the re-examination proceedings, the Supreme Court, on 17 December 2001, again varied the lower courts’ judgments by terminating the relevant agreement and remitting the case to the first-instance court to determine the partition of the joint property. 19.  After accepting for consideration the relevant part of the heirs’ further constitutional appeal on 17 June 2002, the Constitutional Court, on 12 December 2002, quashed the Supreme Court’s judgment, dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the Ljubljana Higher Court’s judgment of 31 March 1999. The decision was adopted by six votes to two (decision no. Up-140/02). 20.  The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court had again dealt with questions of fact – a matter over which it had no jurisdiction; that it had failed to provide reasons for its decision, which was different from previous decisions adopted in other cases concerning the same issue; and that it had disregarded the instructions given by the Constitutional Court. The latter therefore again found a violation of the right to equal protection of rights. Using the special power afforded in section 60 of the Constitutional Court Act and because of the already lengthy duration of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court, in order to secure effective judicial protection, decided on the merits of the case itself and upheld the Higher Court’s judgment of 31 March 1999. 21.  The Constitutional Court’s decisions of 10 May 2001 and 12 December 2002 noted, under paragraph 3, as follows:\n“in accordance with the provisions of sections 6 and 56 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court served the constitutional appeal on the Supreme Court, on the opposite party (plaintiff) to the proceedings [the applicant] and on the third defendant in the proceedings. None of them replied to the constitutional appeal.” 22.  According to the applicant, she had not received a copy of the first constitutional appeal. On 4 July 2001, a note was prepared by an official in this connection on the Constitutional Court’s premises. The note, which appeared to be part of the file no. Up 232/00, mentioned that the constitutional appeal and admissibility decision of 30 January 2001 had been handed over to the applicant. 23.  In addition, the applicant submitted to the Court copies of receipts relating to the attempt to serve the process by the Constitutional Court, concerning the file no. Up 140/02. It would appear that this process included a copy of the second constitutional appeal, the admissibility decision and a letter informing the applicant that the constitutional appeal had been accepted for consideration and that that the applicant should submit her comments within eight days. It transpires from the receipts that the process was sent by the Constitutional Court on 21 June 2002 but had not been served on the applicant. The address referred to in the receipts and the letter is different from the applicant’s address as mentioned in her claim and in the decisions issued in the domestic proceedings, including in the last Supreme Court judgment. According to the applicant, the address used to serve the process was actually the address of one of the other parties to the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and is serving his sentence in correctional colony no. 2 in the Astrakhan Region. 6.  On 9 May 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder committed during a fight with the victim. Two days later the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan authorised his remand in custody, having noted the gravity of the charges, his previous convictions, including for violent crimes, his failure to “get on the road to improvement”, the absence of an “official” source of income, and his lack of dependants. 7.  That decision was upheld on appeal by the Astrakhan Regional Court, which fully endorsed the District Court’s reasoning. In addition, the Regional Court took into account that the applicant was suffering from the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) but stated that there was no medical evidence that he could not continue being detained in the conditions of a temporary detention facility. 8.  Another extension of the applicant’s detention followed on 9 July 2012, when the District Court accepted the investigator’s arguments that he was likely to re-offend, abscond and interfere with the investigation. The District Court linked those risks to the gravity of the charges against the applicant, his having received “negative characteristics” at his place of residence, as well as his having already been “the subject of criminal prosecution”. At the same time the court examined medical evidence produced by the applicant in support of his claim that the fact that he was suffering from an advanced stage of HIV precluded his detention. The District Court dismissed the claim, stressing that the applicant regularly received medication prescribed by a prison doctor and that his detention in the temporary detention facility did not pose a risk to his health. 9.  The District Court issued further orders extending the applicant’s pre‑trial detention on 2 August, 6 September and 7 November 2012. Each time, it relied on the gravity of the charges and the risk flowing of the applicant absconding, interfering with the course of justice and reoffending. Neither detention order mentioned that the applicant had a criminal record. The applicant’s arguments about the progress of his HIV infection and the rapid deterioration of his health did not convince the District Court. The order of 7 November 2012 extended the applicant’s detention until 9 December 2012. It was upheld on appeal by the Astrakhan Regional Court on 14 November 2012, with reference to the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s “personality”. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“On 11 May 2012 ... the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan ordered [the applicant’s] detention. Subsequently, the detention was lawfully extended. ...\nIn extending the detention for up to seven months, the court reasonably took into account that [the applicant] was charged with a particularly serious criminal offence and that, in view of his personality and the circumstances of the case, he was liable to reoffend or destroy the evidence.\nThe court also correctly held that the case was particularly complex, due to the large number of investigatory activities and complex expert examinations to be conducted. The court also took into account the applicant’s lengthy treatment in the prison hospital.\nThe court correctly concluded that there were no grounds for changing the measure of restraint.”\nThe Regional Court did not address the applicant’s arguments, raised in his statement of appeal, that the investigating authorities significantly delayed a number of procedural actions, including the expert examination scheduled as early as June 2012 and not yet performed. 10.  The District Court further extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 8 December 2012, summarily referring to his “personality” and “socially dangerous conduct”. The court also pointed out that some unspecified expert examinations had been conducted, which had “objectively influenced the length of the investigation”. 11.  On 30 December 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was again extended on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the continued risk of his absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The court used similar wording as in the previous detention orders. 12.  On 16 March 2013 the applicant was served with the final version of the bill of indictment. The bill indicated that the applicant had no criminal record. 13.  On 6 August 2013 the District Court convicted the applicant of murder. The court found that he had killed the victim in the course of an altercation caused by the victim’s insults. The District Court sentenced the applicant to seven years of imprisonment, having taken into account the following mitigating circumstances: the applicant had no criminal record, was “positively characterised”, had surrendered himself to the police, had confessed to the killing and felt deep remorse, and the victim had behaved provocatively having initiated the conflict with the applicant. 14.  In January 2004 the applicant was diagnosed with stage 4A HIV. He was taken under the supervision of specialists of the Astrakhan Regional Centre for Protection from AIDS (hereinafter “the AIDS Centre”). 15.  Medical certificates provided by the applicant show that he had started receiving antiretroviral therapy on 22 March 2011 with very positive results. The viral load had significantly decreased and the applicant’s immune status had improved. A CD4 cell-count test carried out on 17 February 2012 showed that the level of CD4 cells was 489 cells/mm3. 16.  On 11 May 2012 the applicant was placed in detention facility no. 1. On the same date he was examined by a doctor, who recorded no complaints and diagnosed him with a stomach ulcer in remission. 17.  On 26 June 2012 doctors from the AIDS Centre recorded a deterioration in the applicant’s condition. They recommended continuation of the antiretroviral therapy and an in-patient examination. 18.  Between 12 July and 12 September 2012 the applicant underwent a check-up in the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 2 (“the hospital”). He was diagnosed with chronic pancreatitis, chronic gastroduodenitis, iron deficiency anaemia, fungal esophagitis, urolithiasis, and hepatic haemangioma. 19.  It appears that on 16 July 2012 an immunological test was performed. It showed that the level of CD4 cells was 649 cells/mm3. 20.  Since August 2012 the doctors have again recorded a deterioration in the applicant’s condition and an increase in his viral load. They linked the deterioration to prior interruptions in the antiretroviral therapy. It is not clear from the documents submitted by the applicant when and why those interruptions occurred. 21.  On 20 September 2012 a doctor from the AIDS Centre diagnosed the applicant with stage 4A HIV and fungal esophagitis, and recommended that antiretroviral therapy be continued. 22.  On 26 September 2012, on a recommendation of the medical staff of the AIDS Centre, the applicant was again admitted to the hospital. He underwent treatment for HIV and fungal esophagitis. On 8 October 2012 he returned to the detention facility. 23.  Throughout his detention the applicant was prescribed a special diet. 24.  According to a typed copy of the applicant’s medical file provided by the Government, on admission to detention facility no. 1 the applicant was examined by a doctor whom he informed that he was suffering from HIV. 25.  On 16 May 2012 medical staff from the AIDS Centre were allowed to see the applicant. The doctors noted that he was suffering from stage 4A HIV and recommended that his antiretroviral therapy be continued. On the same date the applicant received one month’s dose of antiretroviral drugs (Reyataz and Combivir). 26.  The applicant continued being monitored by the medical staff of the AIDS-Centre, who examined him again on 26 June 2012. Following their recommendations, and in response to the applicant’s complaint of fatigue and pain in the epigastrium (upper abdomen), on 12 July 2012 he was transferred to the hospital for an in-depth examination. On the same date it was noted in his medical file that he was receiving antiretroviral drugs. The entries dated 2 and 6 August 2012 indicated that he had been taking those drugs. 27.  While at the hospital, the applicant was monitored by an infectious diseases specialist, who examined him on twenty-four occasions. The applicant also underwent an ultrasound examination and a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. On 27 August 2012 he was examined by an urologist and a gastroenterologist in a civil hospital. He was also observed by an otolaryngologist and a neurologist. The final diagnosis was: HIV infection aggravated by secondary illnesses, chronic pancreatitis, chronic gastroduodenitis, iron deficiency anaemia, oesophageal candidiasis, hepatic hemangioma, chronic prostatitis, chronic cholecystitis, fungal esophagitis, and a duodenal bulb ulcer. The applicant received treatment for those illnesses. 28.  On 12 September 2012, having found that the applicant’s condition had improved, the hospital discharged him. 29.  On 20 September 2012 a doctor from the AIDS Centre examined the applicant at the detention facility. The doctor noted that the applicant was taking the antiretroviral drugs with strict adherence, and recommended virological and immunological testing, as well as another ultrasound examination and a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. 30.  On 26 September 2012 the applicant was admitted to the hospital for additional tests. On 8 October he was transferred back to the detention facility. 31.  On 18 October 2012 the applicant complained of fatigue, coughing and headaches. A doctor diagnosed chronic bronchitis and prescribed him anti-candidiasis and cough medication, as well as vitamins. 32.  On 4 November 2012 an entry made in the applicant’s medical file indicated that the “last” immunological test had shown the level of CD4 cells at 513 cells/mm3. 33.  On 13 November 2012 the applicant complained to a doctor of heaviness in his abdomen, dizziness and heartburn. The doctor noted that those were the effects of his not complying with the special diet and prescribed medication for his ulcer and gastroduodenitis. 34.  On 27 November 2012 the applicant was examined in response to his complaints of fatigue, pain in the abdomen, and pyrosis. The doctor noted that the applicant had been receiving antiretroviral therapy and recommended his transfer to hospital for an examination and another diagnosis. 35.  On the applicant’s admission to the hospital on 3 December 2012, his complaints of fatigue, heartburn and stomach aches were recorded. On the same date it was again noted that he was receiving antiretroviral drugs. At the hospital he was seen by an infections specialist several times a week, examined by a neurologist and an otolaryngologist, and underwent a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. In addition to his previously recorded illnesses, the applicant was diagnosed with a prostate adenoma. He received treatment for his non-communicable diseases, and was prescribed the same antiretroviral drugs as before. 36.  On 18 January 2013 the applicant was dismissed from the hospital “in a satisfactory condition”, with the proviso that he had to be actively supervised by the detention facility medical personnel. On the same date he was examined by a doctor at the detention facility. The doctor noted that the applicant needed “dynamic supervision” and prescribed medication for his pancreatitis and stomach ulcer. 37.  On 23 January 2013, in response to the applicant’s complaint of back pains, he was prescribed anti-inflammatory drugs. 38.  On 12 February 2013 the applicant complained to a psychiatrist of sleeping problems and irritability, and was prescribed antidepressants. 39.  On 20 March 2013 a doctor from the AIDS Centre paid the applicant a visit. Following the doctor’s recommendation, the applicant was yet again admitted to hospital. On arrival he complained of poor appetite, fatigue, heartburn, pains in his chest and stomach ache. He was then seen by an infectious diseases specialist, an ophthalmologist, an otolaryngologist, a cardiologist and a neurologist. They concluded that there was no change in his diagnosis and prescribed him treatment for the non-communicable infections. On 3 April 2013 it was noted that the applicant was regularly taking antiretroviral drugs. A week later, despite the lack of significant improvement in his condition, he was discharged from the hospital since he had to appear at a court hearing. 40.  On 19 June 2013 the applicant was re-admitted to the hospital. Under the supervision of the infectious diseases specialist he received treatment for cholecystitis and gastroduodenitis. He was also examined by a neurologist, an otolaryngologist and an ophthalmologist, and was diagnosed with cerebrovascular disease. An entry in the record of 19 June 2013 showed that the applicant had enough drugs to last until 23 June 2013. The entry dated 25 June 2013 mentioned that he had not complied with the special diet prescribed to him. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was discharged in “satisfactory condition”, having been provided with antiretroviral drugs until 23 July 2013. 41.  On the applicant’s admission to correctional colony no. 2 on 24 October 2013, he was examined by prison doctors, who noted that he was receiving antiretroviral therapy. 42.  On 20 November 2013, in response to the applicant’s complaints of pain in the abdomen, he was examined by a prison doctor. A fibrogastroduodenoscopy was carried out on 22 November 2013, and he was prescribed medication for gastroduodenitis. 43.  On 10 December 2013 the applicant was examined by an infectious diseases specialist from the AIDS Centre. The doctor observed the applicant’s complaints of pain in the oesophagus and the chest, and noted that he was receiving antiretroviral drugs, namely Reyataz and Combivir. The doctor recommended that the applicant continue with the therapy and undergo an immunological test. He also suggested that he be subjected to an in-patient examination. The applicant refused to be admitted to the hospital. 44.  On 12 and 16 November 2012 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the administration of detention facility no. 1, drawing their attention to the applicant’s state of health and asking for his examination by a medical expert. On 13 November 2012 the facility director informed the lawyer that there was no evidence that the applicant was suffering from an illness preventing detention and that, accordingly, there were no grounds for a medical expert examination. 45.  On 4 February 2013 the applicant’s lawyer reiterated his request. 46.  On 10 December 2012 the applicant’s lawyer requested the investigator in charge of the applicant’s criminal case to order a medical examination of the applicant. On 13 December 2012 the request was refused. However, on 4 February 2014 that decision was revoked, and the applicant’s medical expert examination was authorised. 47.  On 17 January 2013 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan of the correctional colony administration’s inaction and asked the court to authorise the applicant’s medical examination. On 1 April 2013 the court dismissed the complaint and refused the examination request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Bojnice. 5.  The applicant’s mother, Mrs D., owned real property. She died in 1982. Her estate was determined by the State Notary Office (Štátne notárstvo) in Považská Bystrica in a decision of 7 October 1982. The inheritance comprised inter alia a share in a complex of agricultural land which was located in Klobušice and was formally divided into several plots. The share of Mrs D. passed to the applicant’s father, Mr D., who himself already owned an equal share in the land. 6.  In 1983 Mr D. died. His estate was determined by notarial decisions of 18 August 1983 and 4 December 1987. His own share in the above land as well as the share inherited from Mrs D. passed to the applicant and her sister. 7.  On 22 March 1993 the applicant and her sister, who were represented by a lawyer, made a submission to the Považská Bystrica District Court (Okresný súd) described as a “motion for commencement of inheritance proceedings”. They maintained that the above inheritance decisions were flawed by inaccuracies as regards the definition of the parcels, their acreage and the ownership shares to be inherited. The applicant and her sister asserted in particular that in the original decisions no account had been taken of the fact that Mrs D. and Mr D. both had equal shares in the land and that the decisions were wrongfully based on their having only one of these shares. They sought “additional inheritance proceedings” and the “correction of obvious errors” in the original decisions. 8.  On 20 January 1994 the District Court took a formal decision to commence inheritance proceedings and authorised a notary public to carry them out. 9.  On 23 May 1996 the District Court discontinued the proceedings. It interpreted the motion of 22 March 1993 as being formally aimed at determining a “newly discovered inheritance” on the death of Mrs D. It observed that no such new inheritance had in fact been disclosed and concluded that, therefore, there was no case to be determined. 10.  On 31 July 1996, on appeal by the applicant and her sister, the Banská Bystrica Regional Court (Krajský súd) quashed the decision of 23 May 1996 and remitted the matter to the District Court for re‑examination. The Regional Court found that the written version of the decision of 7 October 1982 did not correspond to the oral version as recorded in the minutes of the hearing at which it had been pronounced. The Regional Court instructed the District Court to bring the written version in line with the recorded oral version. The Regional Court observed that even the oral version was not absolutely precise. However, in the Regional Court’s view, once the written version of the decision was so “corrected” and a copy of it was served on the parties, they could appeal against it on the merits. 11.  The case‑file was subsequently transmitted to a notary public who was designated by the District Court to effect certain procedural steps in the matter (súdny komisár). 12.  In September 1998 the notary public obtained a report from the Land Registry explaining changes in definition of the land in issue in the context of the preceding land reforms. 13.  On 20 November 1998 the District Court gave a decision under Article 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure correcting errors in the operative part of the written decision of 7 October 1982 by aligning it with the oral version. 14.  On 1 February 1999 the applicant and her sister appealed against the decision of 7 October 1982, as corrected by the decision of 20 November 1998. They argued that, even after the correction, the ruling as regards the land in question was inoperative as the land was not defined clearly. 15.  On 31 May 1999 the Trenčín Regional Court quashed the decision of 20 November 1998. It found that it was not bound by the views of the Banská Bystrica Regional Court as expressed in its decision of 31 July 1996 and found that it was not right “to correct” the decision of 7 October 1982 by bringing it in line with the recorded oral version which itself was inaccurate. The Trenčín Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court and instructed it to examine the contents of the case file. On the basis of such contents the decision of 7 October 1982 was to be corrected by defining the land properly. 16.  In a letter of 6 October 1999 the Vice President of the District Court acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings, especially in the period prior to 23 May 1996 and between 31 October 1996 and 20 November 1998. 17.  On 8 November 1999 the District Court gave a new decision under Article 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure correcting errors in the decision of 7 October 1982. It defined the parcels belonging to the inheritance and took account of the shares in the ownership of these parcels of both Mrs D. and Mr D. However, the District Court also found that some other parcels to which the applicant and her sister claimed title by way of succession did not belong to the estate of Mrs D. 18.  On 7 December 1999 the applicant and her sister lodged an appeal challenging the decision of 8 November 1999 mainly in so far as it concerned the parcels which had been left out from the estate. They demanded that the decision of 8 November 1999 be quashed and that in the subsequent proceedings a hearing should be held before the District Court in order to clarify the matter and to avoid further confusion. 19.  On 31 May 2000 the Trenčín Regional Court upheld the decision of 8 November 1999. In its summary reasoning the Regional Court referred to and fully endorsed the findings and conclusions of the District Court. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer at some point after 17 August 2000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lived in Tomsk until his arrest. 8.  In July 1996 the applicant was elected to the position of mayor of Tomsk. In 2000 he was re-elected. 9.  In 2006 two co-owners of a private company complained to the Tomsk Regional Department of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) that the applicant’s relative, Ms E., had attempted to extort 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) from them by threatening to destroy their real estate and prevent them from rebuilding. According to the co-owners, following their refusal to pay, the applicant annulled the Tomsk mayor’s decision of 26 September 2005 by which their company had been provided with a plot of land and granted that plot of land to his relative, Ms E. By a letter of 15 September 2006 the applicant had also ordered the Head of the Tomsk Town Land Committee to demolish the company’s property situated on that land. The Government provided the Court with a copy of the co-owners’ complaint registered by the FSB on 5 December 2006. 10.  On 6 December 2006 the office of the Tomsk Regional Prosecutor, acting on the complaint from the co-owners and the results of the preliminary investigative actions performed by the FSB, instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant, suspecting him of having abused his position and having aided and abetted aggravated extortion. On the same day the applicant was arrested and placed in the Tomsk Town temporary detention facility. 11.  The applicant felt ill and was immediately transferred to the Scientific Research Cardiology Institute (“the Institute”), where he was diagnosed with ischemic heart disease, unstable stenocardia, impaired cardiac function, chronic pancreatitis, chronic cholecystitis and bronchitis. 12.  On 8 December 2006 a commission of medical experts from the Institute issued a report finding the applicant fit to participate in the pre-trial investigation. The commission also concluded that the applicant could remain in custody on condition that urgent medical assistance was to be provided to him if necessary. 13.  A senior investigator from the office of the Tomsk Regional Prosecutor asked the Sovetskiy District Court of Tomsk to authorise the applicant’s detention. 14.  On 8 December 2006 the District Court found that the prosecution had to submit additional evidence in support of their request, and granted a seventy-two-hour extension to keep the applicant in police custody. The District Court noted that the applicant should remain under arrest until 6.07 p.m. on 11 December 2006. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“At the hearing the acting head of the department... of the Tomsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office, Ms K., applied for a seventy-two-hour extension to keep [the applicant] in custody pending the submission of additional evidence, namely the suspect’s identification documents – a copy of the suspect’s passport – in support of the request.\nThe suspect, [the applicant], disagreed with the request and stated that there were no grounds for extending his detention.\nThe suspect’s lawyers also disagreed with the request and explained that [the applicant] had no intention to abscond, he had a permanent place of residence and his arrest was unlawful, as there were no grounds for his arrest as required by Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. In these circumstances they asked for the request to be dismissed.\nHaving heard the submissions of the parties to the proceedings and having examined the material in the criminal case file, the court grants the extension...\nBy virtue of Article 108 § 7 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, a court has the right to grant an extension on request. If the court considers that the arrest was lawful and justified, [it] may grant a seventy-two-hour extension from the moment when the court decision has been taken to allow a party to submit additional evidence in support of [the claim] that the application of a measure of restraint such as detention is justified or unjustified.\nHaving examined the material in the case file, the court finds that [the applicant’s] arrest was lawful and justified.\nBy virtue of Article 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, an investigating authority, an investigator or a prosecutor has the right to arrest a person suspected of having committed a criminal offence which is punishable by imprisonment, if one of the following conditions is satisfied:\n(1) that person has been caught committing a crime or immediately after having committed a crime;\n(2) victims or eyewitnesses have identified that person as the perpetrator of a criminal offence; or\n(3) obvious traces or signs of a criminal offence have been discovered on that person or his clothes, or with him or in his house.\nAs follows from the record of [the applicant’s] arrest, he was arrested on 6 December 2006 on suspicion of having committed criminal offences under Article 91 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation because the victims had identified him as the perpetrator of the offences. There were no violations of criminal procedural law.\nOn 6 December 2006, at 9.05 a.m., that is before the arrest, criminal proceedings were instituted against the identified person – [the applicant] – on suspicion of offences under Article 33 § 5, Article 163 § 3 (b) and Article 285 § 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.\nHaving regard to the foregoing, the court considers it lawful and justified to grant a seventy-two-hour extension...” 15.  Several hours later the prosecution provided the District Court with additional evidence (a copy of the applicant’s passport, the report of the medical expert commission showing the state of the applicant’s health, and documents confirming that he was the mayor of Tomsk) in support of its request for authorisation of the applicant’s detention. 16.  Acting upon the additional information provided by the prosecution, the District Court on the same day authorised the applicant’s detention on the grounds that he was charged with serious criminal offences, he had several places of residence and he was liable to abscond and pervert the course of justice. The District Court noted that the applicant was suspected of having abused his position as mayor and that consequently, if released, he could have influenced witnesses who worked in the mayor’s office and could have destroyed evidence. It also relied on the report by the medical commission, which had concluded that the applicant was fit to participate in the criminal proceedings and to remain in custody. 17.  On 11 December 2006 the District Court suspended the applicant from his position as mayor of Tomsk. 18.  On 18 December 2006 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the decisions of 8 December 2006 by which the District Court had granted a seventy-two-hour extension to keep the applicant in police custody and had authorised his detention. The Regional Court endorsed the reasons given by the District Court. 19.  Later in December other two criminal cases were launched against the applicant. On 25 December 2006 he was additionally charged with aggravated abuse of position and illegal business activities. In particular, the prosecution suspected that in 1997, abusing his powers as the mayor of Tomsk, the applicant had unlawfully obtained 30% of the shares in a large wholesale company and approximately 33% of the shares in another public company. 20.  On 30 January 2007 the Tomsk Regional Prosecutor asked the Sovetskiy District Court to extend the applicant’s detention for an additional three months, arguing that the applicant was charged with serious criminal offences and that he was liable to influence witnesses, destroy evidence, pervert the course of justice and abscond. The prosecutor relied on information provided by the Tomsk Regional FSB Department, according to which the applicant wanted to leave Russia and move to a member State of the European Union, possibly Poland or the Czech Republic. A letter from a deputy head of the Tomsk Regional FSB Department was enclosed. The relevant part of the letter read as follows:\n“Thus, according to the available information, [the applicant] has asked his daughter Ms Y. to resign from [her position] in the law-enforcement bodies and to sell quickly the immovable property she owns, including a house..., and has advised her to leave Russia with her children as soon as possible.\nAt the same time, [the applicant] is taking steps to pervert the course of the investigation using his connections with the authorities in Tomsk and the Tomsk Region. In particular, [the applicant], with the help of his relatives and confidants, has influenced officials of the [Tomsk] Town Council who are acting as witnesses in criminal case no. 2006/4500, including by making threats to use physical force against them and their family members. Moreover, he is actively using negative information damaging to the reputation of senior officials and employees of the Tomsk mayor’s office, the Tomsk Regional Administration and members of the Tomsk Town Council.\nFurthermore, ... on orders from [the applicant], his confidants and close relatives visited Moscow and had several meetings with high-ranking officials, including those in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation, and with intermediaries who have connections with corrupt officials in law-enforcement bodies who may discontinue the criminal proceedings against him in return for money. As a result of those meetings, presumably, [the applicant’s] confidants reached an agreement concerning the provision of consultative, administrative and legal assistance in their efforts to secure [the applicant’s] release.\nThe available information supports the conclusion that, if released, [the applicant] will have real opportunities to obstruct the course of justice.” 21.  At the same time the applicant’s lawyers lodged an application with the Sovetskiy District Court for the applicant’s release. They argued that the applicant had a permanent place of residence in Tomsk, that his family also lived in Tomsk, that he did not have any immovable property outside Tomsk and that he did not have a passport to travel. Furthermore, he had been registered as a candidate for the forthcoming parliamentary elections in the Tomsk Region and had deposited RUB 900,000, approximately 26,000 euros (EUR) to be registered as a candidate. The lawyers insisted that the applicant did not intend to abscond, arguing that there was no evidence that his relatives had sold property or had bought foreign currency. They also pointed out that he was sixty-one years old and seriously ill and that he needed special medical treatment and a particular diet which could not be provided in a detention facility. 22.  On 5 February 2007 the District Court accepted the prosecutor’s request and extended the applicant’s detention until 6 May 2007. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“Thus, [the applicant] is currently suspended from his position as mayor of Tomsk; however, by virtue of Article 114 of the Code on Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation, this measure is temporary and does not entail dismissal from the position or loss of social and employment status and personal authority over certain groups of individuals and officials who may be questioned as witnesses in the course of the criminal proceedings. In particular, [the applicant’s] former subordinates may act as witnesses in the criminal investigation.\n...\nWhen on 8 December 2006 the court chose a measure of restraint, [it] noted that there was evidence supporting the conclusion that the defendant might abscond; that evidence did not cease to exist after the examination of the question of the application of the measure of restraint. Thus, [the fact that the applicant has] a permanent place of residence and the family (wife, children, grandchildren) in one town, [and that he does not have] immovable property and bank accounts outside Tomsk cannot serve as an independent ground excluding the possibility of the defendant’s absconding or perverting the course of the investigation. [The applicant] can also participate in the election campaign while outside his electoral district.\nThere is no evidence that the state of [the applicant’s] health has deteriorated since he has been in custody. According to the conclusions of the complex forensic medical examination no. 342-Uzh, [the applicant] has several chronic conditions, including...; however, taking into account those diseases, he may be detained on condition that urgent special medical assistance is provided.” 23.  On 1 March 2007 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 5 February 2007, endorsing the reasons given by the District Court. 24.  On 26 April 2007 the applicant was charged with bribery and an additional two counts of aggravated abuse of position. In particular, the prosecution alleged that he had bought a municipal plot of land, paying a tenth of its value as had been estimated by the Tomsk Town Land Committee, and that he had received RUB 300,000 as a bribe. 25.  On 25 April 2007 the applicant’s counsel, Mr K., asked a senior investigator from the office of the Tomsk Regional Prosecutor to authorise a medical examination of the applicant by three particular specialists in view of the fact that the authorised period of his detention was to expire on 6 May 2007 and he was continuously complaining of severe back and stomach pain and the lack of adequate medical assistance. 26.  Three days later the senior investigator dismissed the request on the ground that the applicant had undergone treatment in a prison hospital from 8 December 2006 to 12 January 2007 and that he had on numerous occasions been examined by groups of prison doctors who had found him fit to participate in the investigation. 27.  On 4 May 2007 the Sovetskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 September 2007 on the grounds that he was charged with serious criminal offences, that he could have influenced witnesses – his former subordinates – using his official powers and that he was liable to pervert the course of justice and abscond. The District Court also found that the applicant’s state of health was stable and he was fit to remain in detention. According to the Government, in its decision to extend the applicant’s detention the District Court had relied on information provided by the Tomsk Regional FSB Department. The FSB officials alleged that the applicant’s relatives “were actively selling immovable and other property belonging to the mayor’s family” and “were using proceeds to buy large sums of foreign currency for a subsequent move to foreign countries”. 28.  On 31 May 2007 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 4 May 2007, finding no grounds for the applicant’s release. 29.  In July and August 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant pertaining to three other counts of abuse of position, two counts of aggravated bribery, possession of drugs and aiding and abetting fraud. 30.  On 23 August 2007 the applicant was served with a bill of indictment comprising accusations on all charges. Four days later the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant and his lawyers began studying the case file. 31.  On 3 September 2007 the Sovetskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 December 2007. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“As it follows from the case file materials, [the applicant] is charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences and the case is very complex, which is confirmed by the substantial volume of the materials (approximately thirty-five volumes) and the necessity for the defendant and his lawyers to study the file...\nIt also follows from the case file materials that the measure of restraint was chosen for [the applicant] correctly, in accordance with Article 97 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, which is based on the particular seriousness of the charges, [and] the presence of the possibility for the defendant to use his official powers to prevent the establishment of the truth.\nThe grounds for the application of such [a measure of restraint] did not cease to exist; [they] did not change and the new grounds, showing that it is necessary to apply another measure of restraint, did not emerge.\nTaking into account the materials of the case file and having regard to the official and material status of the defendant, the court has grounds to consider that, if released, [the applicant] as the head of the municipality might apply pressure to the witnesses, and [he] might also escape from the investigating authorities, including by leaving the Russian Federation.\nA temporary suspension from the office does not mean the dismissal from the position, the loss of social and official status, [the loss] of personal authority over particular groups of private individuals and officials who may be questioned as witnesses in the case during the pre-trial investigation or in a court.\n...\nThe [fact] that [the applicant] does not have a travel passport or medical insurance for a foreign State cannot serve as evidence that it is impossible for him to leave the Russian Federation.\n[The facts that the applicant] has a permanent place of residence, [and] the family (spouse, children and grandchildren) living within the same town, [that he] does not have immovable property or bank accounts in foreign States cannot on their own serve as an independent ground excluding a possibility of the defendant’s absconding the investigation and trial or his liability to pervert the course of the investigation.\nAccording to a medical certificate, [the applicant’s] state of health allows his detention in a temporary detention facility.\n...\nWhile extending the detention, the court takes into account the absence of prior convictions, the defendant’s state of health, the presence of the permanent places of residence and work, [his] age, however, taking into account the above stated, [the court] does not find any ground permitting a change of the measure of restraint applied to [the applicant].” 32.  On 27 September 2007 the Tomsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 3 September 2007, noting that the District Court had not relied exclusively on the gravity of the charges against the applicant, and that it had taken into account other relevant information, such as the likelihood that applicant would abscond and pervert the course of justice by threatening witnesses and victims and prompting them to withdraw or change their statements. 33.  On 3 December 2007 the Tomsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention for an additional three months, until 6 March 2008, to allow the defendants to finish studying the case file. The Regional Court held that the grounds for the applicant’s arrest, that is the gravity of the charges against him and his liability to abscond, pervert the course of justice and reoffend, were still applicable and that they warranted the exceptional duration of the detention for more than twelve months, in spite of the arguments advanced by the defence and the personal surety offered on the applicant’s behalf by the Archbishop of the Tomsk Region. Furthermore, the Regional Court noted that the case file contained information pertaining to the applicant’s attempts to influence a victim, Mr L., and a witness, Mr B., and his alleged attempts to pervert the course of the investigation. 34.  The applicant and his lawyers appealed, arguing that the Regional Court had failed to indicate any instance when the applicant had attempted to influence witnesses or victims. They insisted that the prosecution authorities had not presented any evidence of the applicant’s alleged attempts to influence the course of the investigation or of his liability to abscond or reoffend. 35.  On 11 February 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the decision of 3 December 2007, noting that “at the time of the arrest [the applicant] was the mayor of Tomsk and he was charged with serious criminal offences pertaining to his office.” The Supreme Court also agreed with the Regional Court that additional time was necessary for the parties to finish reading the sixty-one volumes of the case file. 36.  On 3 March 2008 the Tomsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 6 June 2008. The reasoning was identical to the one given in the decision on 3 December 2007, save for one detail: the Regional Court mentioned that in 2007 the applicant’s relatives had bought large amounts of foreign currency. In addition, the Regional Court noted the exceptional duration of the applicant’s detention, holding as follows:\n“While extending [the applicant’s] detention on the grounds prescribed by Article 109 § 7 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the court also notes that the suspect has been in custody for more than a year.\nHowever, the court, relying on Article 109 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, considers that the particular complexity of the criminal case, the seriousness of the charges against [the applicant], [his] social and official status, the presence of circumstances which allow to conclude that, if released, [the applicant] is liable to abscond and pervert the course of justice represent the exclusive grounds warranting the extension of [the applicant’s] detention for more than twelve months.” 37.  On 21 April 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the decision of 3 March 2008, endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court. 38.  On 3 June 2008 the Tomsk Regional Court held a preliminary hearing in the case. It examined and granted a number of requests lodged by the applicant, his co-defendant and their lawyers, including a request for a jury trial and exclusion of certain items from evidence. By the same decision the Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention for an additional six months, until 20 November 2008, noting that the measure of restraint had been correctly chosen and that “the grounds for detention had not changed”. The Regional Court also held that the applicant could influence witnesses who worked in the Tomsk Mayor’s office and that he had several places of residence, thus being liable to abscond. 39.  On 18 August 2008 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the decision, finding that the Regional Court had correctly identified the grounds for the extension of the detention and had issued a reasoned decision. 40.  It appears that the trial proceedings are still pending and the applicant remains in custody. 41.  On 8 December 2006 the applicant, having had an initial diagnosis of ischemic heart disease and unstable stenocardia, was admitted to the hospital in the Tomsk Town temporary detention facility. The Government provided a detailed description of the treatment administered to the applicant, including the type and frequency of medical procedures, type and dose of medicine. They also furnished a copy of the applicant’s medical record and medical certificates. 42.  As it follows from the presented documents, on the day of his admission to the prison hospital the applicant was submitted to five electrocardiographic examinations. It was established that he was not suffering from an acute heart condition. On 11 December 2006 the applicant was examined by a medical commission comprising nine specialists in various fields of medicine. The commission concluded that the applicant suffered from encephalopathy of the first and second degree aggregated by cervicalgia and accompanied by a syndrome of moderate pain; chronic pancreatitis and chronic cholecystitis in the state of remission. The treatment was prescribed. A week later the applicant was again examined by the commission with the participation of two cardiologists from the Tomsk Regional Clinical Hospital. The diagnosis of ischemic heart disease was confirmed. The doctors concluded that the applicant’s state of health was stable and that he did not need permanent medication. On 20 and 21 December 2006 the applicant did not consent to an examination by a neurologist. On 11 January 2007 he refused to have blood taken for a complete biochemical analysis. On the same day a group of three doctors examined the applicant, finding that he could be discharged from the hospital because his health was satisfactory and he was able to take part in investigative actions, including those performed outside the detention facility. On 19 January 2007 the applicant was examined by a medical commission comprising two surgeons, a therapist, a neurologist and an expert in ultrasound examinations from the Tomsk Regional Somatic Hospital. They confirmed the applicant’s diagnosis and set up a schedule for treatment. The applicant received etiotropic and pathogenic treatment in the facility medical department. 43.  As it follows from the information provided by the Government, the applicant remains under constant medical observation by a number of specialists in various fields of medicine, undergoing regular medical check-ups, including ultrasonic scanning, electrocardiographic examinations and blood tests. The applicant’s state of health is considered “stable [and] satisfactory”. 44.  The parties did not dispute the measurements of the cells and the number of inmates detained together with the applicant. As it follows from their submissions, on 12 January 2007 the applicant was placed in cell no. 214 which measured 9.5 square metres and had four sleeping places. He was detained alone. From 1 February to 23 May 2007 the applicant was kept in cell no. 26 which measured 9.2 square metres and was equipped with a two-tier metal bunk. He shared the cell with another detainee. Since 23 May 2007 the applicant has been detained in cell no. 251, measuring 11.5 square metres and having two two-tier metal bunks. From 23 May to 27 September 2007 the cell accommodated two detainees. Since 27 September 2007 the applicant has been sharing the cell with two inmates. 45.  It was likewise undisputed that each cell had a window measuring 70 centimetres in width and 90 to 95 centimetres in length. The windows were not covered with metal shutters, but there were two layers of metal vertical and horizontal lattices on the outer and inner sides of each window. Openings between the metal bars, measuring 20 square centimetres between the external lattices and 16 square centimetres between the internal lattices, brought natural light in the cells. According to the applicant, the lighting was clearly insufficient, as the metal bars blocked access to natural light and fresh air. The applicant claimed that insufficient lighting had impaired his eyesight. His condition was further exacerbated by the fact that he suffered from myopathy and increased intraocular pressure possibly coupled with glaucoma. He experienced severe headaches and became extremely tired if he attempted to work or read. The Government submitted that the size, location and number of windows allowed inmates to read and work in natural lighting. The cells were constantly lit with electric incandescent lighting: 100-watt bulbs during the daytime and 40-watt bulbs at night. The Government stressed that the lighting was in accordance with sanitary norms. 46.  According to the Government, the detention facility was equipped with a central heating system. Each cell had a two- or three-unit heating device. In a certificate issued on 13 November 2007, the facility director noted that the temperature in the cells during the heating season “depended on the provision of the heat by the town heating system, according to the temperature chart”. The Government, relying on the information provided by the facility administration, further stated that the average temperature in the cells was 20 degrees Celsius in winter and 23 degrees Celsius in summer. The applicant averred that the Government did not indicate the year for which the average temperature had been measured. He argued that it was extremely hot in summer and cold in spring and winter. 47.  The parties further submitted that the windows in the cells had a casement. Inmates could open the casement to bring in fresh air. Each cell had a ventilation system. According to the Government, the applicant was also allowed to have a private fan. The latter fact was disputed by the applicant, who pointed out that an extract from a log, presented by the Government and showing his personal belongings, did not bear his signature against the last line, where the private fan was mentioned, although he had confirmed receipt of all other items with a signature. 48.  Each cell was equipped with a lavatory pan, a sink, a tap for running water and wooden desk. A smaller cell had a wooden bench. The lavatory pan was placed in the corner of the cell. The Government produced black and white photos of the cells where the applicant had been detained. The photos showed that the lavatory pan was separated from the living area by a tiled brick partition. As it follows from a certificate issued on 13 November 2007 by the facility director, the height of the partitions varied from 145 to 165 centimetres. The applicant submitted that the partition afforded no privacy, as it had been only installed on the one side of the lavatory pan. The pan could still be seen by inmates lying on the bunks and warders standing near the cell door. The applicant further pointed out that inmates were not provided with cleaning fluids for the sanitary equipment. 49.  The applicant was allowed to take a shower once a week for a minimum of fifteen minutes. The applicant asserted that it was difficult to maintain personal hygiene, particularly in summer when it was extremely hot. He could also take a one-hour walk in a small concrete facility courtyard. The applicant insisted that the courtyard was so small that he could not do any physical exercises although the prison doctor had prescribed him therapeutic exercises to alleviate back pain caused by osteochondrosis. 50.  At all times the applicant had an individual sleeping place and he was provided with bedding. The applicant argued that the bedding, in particular a mattress, did not satisfy his needs. Relying on medical certificates and his medical record, the applicant submitted that he suffered from osteochondrosis of the vertebral column with the primary localisation in the lumbar spine. Prison doctors who had examined the applicant on two occasions recommended that the applicant should be provided with a special board which could be placed under the mattress to provide support for his back. The recommendation was not fulfilled. As a result the applicant suffered from severe back pain. In particular, the pain was so severe that on four occasions in March, April and May 2007 a prison doctor prescribed him painkillers. Furthermore, the applicant pointed out that the distance between the lower and upper tiers of the bunks was only 65 centimetres. The applicant was thus forced to bend when seated, experiencing additional back pain. 51.  The Government, relying on the information provided by the director of the facility and copies of entries to facility logs, further stated that the applicant was given dietetic food “in accordance with the norms established for detainees undergoing medical treatment”. Medical personnel checked the quality of the food and made entries to that effect in logs. On a number of occasions the applicant refused to eat facility food. However, during the entire period of his detention he received 308 food parcels from his relatives and on thirty-seven occasions he bought food from a facility shop. The applicant submitted that the chronic diseases, that is chronic cholecystitis and pancreatitis, from which he suffered required dietary management which could not be met by normal diet alone. The food prepared in the facility did not correspond to the distinctive nutritional needs and was not intended for the dietary management of those diseases. For example, during two first weeks of his detention he was served fried potatoes and boiled fat, which had been expressly prohibited for the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1928 and 1930 respectively. The second applicant lives in Belgorod. 6.  The applicants received old-age pensions. 7.  In 1999 the applicants sued the Pension Fund Agency of Belgorod (“the Agency”) alleging that their pensions had been calculated in breach of a scheme for the calculation of retirement benefits – the “Individual Pensioner Coefficient” (“IPC”) – introduced by the Pensions Law of 1997. The applicants maintained that they were entitled to an IPC of 0.7, whilst the Agency only applied an IPC of 0.525. 8.  On 27 May 1999 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Belgorod (“the Oktyabrskiy District Court”) dismissed the applicants’ claims as unfounded. 9.  On 27 July 1999 the Civil Section of the Belgorod Regional Court (“the Belgorod Regional Court”) set aside the above judgment on appeal and remitted the case for a new examination. 10.  On 23 September 1999 the Oktyabrskiy District Court found in the applicants’ favour. It held that the Agency had misinterpreted the Pensions Law and that the IPC to be applied in the applicants’ case should be 0.7. The court ordered the Agency to increase the applicants’ pension by RUR 642.84 and awarded them arrears of RUR 3,222.6. 11.  On 16 November 1999 the Belgorod Regional Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal, and the judgment of 23 September 1999 became final. 12.  On 3 December 1999 enforcement proceedings commenced. 13.  On 13 January 2000 the Agency requested the court to suspend the enforcement pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Supreme Court of Russia concerning similar pension cases. 14.  On 14 February 2000 the Western Circuit Court of Belgorod (Федеральный суд Западного округа г. Белгорода, “the Western Circuit Court”) dismissed the request, having established no grounds for suspending the enforcement. 15.  On an unspecified date the Agency filed a new request to postpone the execution of the judgment of 23 September 1999. On 17 March 2000 the Western Circuit Court granted the request. 16.  On 18 April 2000, upon the order of the same court, the enforcement proceedings were resumed. 17.  On an unspecified date the Agency again applied for a stay of the enforcement, referring to the lack of funds. On 19 June 2000 the Western Circuit Court rejected this request as groundless. 18.  On 29 June 2000 the acting President of the Belgorod Regional Court ordered a stay of enforcement, as on an unspecified date an extraordinary appeal had been brought against the judgment of 23 September 1999. 19.  On 29 September 2000 the President of the Belgorod Regional Court set aside the above order, following the withdrawal of the extraordinary appeal. The enforcement proceedings re-commenced. 20.  On 19 May 2000 the Agency filed an application to re-consider the judgment of 23 September 1999 on account of newly-discovered circumstances. It stated that on 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour had passed an instruction clarifying the application of the Pensions Law which had gone against the interpretation of that law by the courts in the applicants’ case. The Agency maintained that it had been unaware of these circumstances when the judgment of 23 September 1999 had been given and, therefore, the judgment should be re-considered. 21.  On 15 June 2000 the Western Circuit Court of Belgorod disallowed the Agency’s application, having noted that the instruction in question was not newly-discovered evidence within the meaning of the domestic law. 22.  On 10 October 2000 the Belgorod Regional Court overturned the decision of 15 June 2000 on appeal and remitted the case for a new consideration. 23.  On 2 November 2000 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court set aside the decision of 10 October 2000, referring to a number of procedural irregularities and remitted the case to the appeal instance. 24.  During a new examination, on 21 November 2000, the Belgorod Regional Court again quashed the decision of 15 June 2000 and ordered the first instance to consider the case afresh. 25.  On an unspecified date the President of the Belgorod Regional Court lodged an extraordinary appeal against the decision of 27 July 1999, the judgment of 23 September 1999, the decision of 16 November 1999 and the decision of 21 November 2000. 26.  On 1 February 2001 the Presidium of the Belgorod Regional Court, having examined the extraordinary appeal in the supervisory review proceedings, quashed the aforementioned decisions and judgment and upheld the judgment of 27 May 1999 and the decision of 15 June 2000, thus reinstating the applicants’ IPC at 0.525 and annulling the previously awarded increase as well as the arrears. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicants filed a claim against the Belgorod Regional Department of the Ministry of Justice, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage for the bailiffs’ failure to enforce the judgment of 23 September 1999 within a reasonable time. 28.  On 5 April 2001 the Eastern Circuit Court of Belgorod (Федеральный суд Восточного округа г. Белгорода) rejected the action. The court found that the delays in the enforcement proceedings had not been imputable to the bailiffs. 29.  On 5 June 2001 the Belgorod Regional Court upheld this judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicants were born in 1959 and 1971 respectively and are currently in custody in the Republic of Uzbekistan. They are members of Erk (Freedom), an opposition party in Uzbekistan. 12.  On 3 March 1999 the first applicant arrived in Istanbul from Alma-Ata (Kazakhstan), on a tourist visa. He was arrested by the Turkish police at Atatürk Airport (Istanbul) under an international arrest warrant and taken into police custody on suspicion of homicide, causing injuries through the explosion of a bomb in Uzbekistan and an attempted terrorist attack on the President of Uzbekistan. 13.  The Republic of Uzbekistan requested his extradition under a bilateral treaty with Turkey. 14.  On 5 March 1999 the Bakırköy public prosecutor made an application to the investigating judge for the first applicant to be remanded in custody. The first applicant, who was assisted by his lawyer, was brought before the judge on the same day and remanded in custody for forty-five days, in accordance with the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters. 15.  On 11 March 1999 the first applicant was interviewed by the judge of the Bakırköy Criminal Court. In an order made on the same day under the expedited applications procedure, the judge referred to the charges against the first applicant and noted that the offences concerned were not political or military in nature but ordinary criminal offences. The judge also made an order remanding him in custody pending his extradition. The first applicant, who was assisted by his lawyer and an interpreter, denied the charges and protested his innocence. 16.  In written pleadings that were lodged at a hearing on 11 March 1999, the first applicant’s representative argued that his client was working for the democratisation of his country and that political dissidents in Uzbekistan were arrested by the authorities and subjected to torture in prison. He added that the first applicant had been in Kazakhstan at the material time and had asked the Turkish authorities for political asylum as his life was at risk. He argued that his client was being prosecuted for an offence of a political nature and, relying on Article 9 § 2 of the Turkish Criminal Code, asked the Criminal Court to refuse Uzbekistan’s request for extradition. 17.  On 15 March 1999 the first applicant appealed to the Bakırköy Assize Court against the order made under the expedited applications procedure on 11 March 1999. Having examined the case file, the Assize Court dismissed the first applicant’s appeal on 19 March 1999. 18.  The second applicant entered Turkey on 13 December 1998 on a false passport. On 5 March 1999, acting on a request for his extradition by the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Turkish police arrested him and took him into police custody. He was suspected of homicide, causing injuries to others through the explosion of a bomb in Uzbekistan and an attempted terrorist attack on the President of Uzbekistan. 19.  On 7 March 1999 the Bakırköy public prosecutor made an application to the investigating judge for the second applicant to be remanded in custody. On the same day the second applicant was brought before the judge, who remanded him in custody. 20.  At a hearing on 11 March 1999, the second applicant’s representative submitted that the offence with which his client had been charged was political in nature and that political dissidents in Uzbekistan were arrested by the authorities and subjected to torture in prison. He added that the second applicant had been in Turkey at the material time on a false passport. 21.  In a letter of 12 March 1999 the Fatih public prosecutor applied to the Fatih Criminal Court for a determination of the second applicant’s nationality and of the nature of the alleged offence. 22.  In a decision of 15 March 1999, after hearing the applicant, the Criminal Court determined his nationality and the nature of the offence pursuant to Article 9 of the Turkish Criminal Code. It held that the offences with which he had been charged were not political or military in nature but ordinary criminal offences. It also made an order remanding the applicant in custody pending his extradition. 23.  On 18 March 1999 the second applicant appealed to the Istanbul Assize Court against the judgment of 15 March 1999. Having examined the case file, the Assize Court dismissed the appeal on 26 March 1999. 24.  On 18 March 1999 the President of the relevant Chamber of the Court decided to indicate to the Government, on the basis of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that it was desirable in the interest of the parties and of the smooth progress of the proceedings before the Court not to extradite the applicants to Uzbekistan prior to the meeting of the competent Chamber, which was to take place on 23 March 1999. 25.  On 19 March 1999 the Turkish government issued a decree ordering the applicants’ extradition. 26.  On 23 March 1999 the Chamber decided to extend the interim measure indicated pursuant to Rule 39 until further notice. 27.  On 27 March 1999 the applicants were handed over to the Uzbek authorities. 28.  In a letter of 19 April 1999, the Government informed the Court that it had received the following assurances regarding the two applicants from the Uzbek authorities: on 9 March and 10 April 1999 the Uzbek embassy in Ankara had transmitted two notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to which were appended two letters from the Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan, stating:\n“The applicants’ property will not be liable to general confiscation, and the applicants will not be subjected to acts of torture or sentenced to capital punishment.\nThe Republic of Uzbekistan is a party to the United Nations Convention against Torture and accepts and reaffirms its obligation to comply with the requirements of the provisions of that Convention as regards both Turkey and the international community as a whole.” 29.  On 11 June 1999 the Government transmitted to the Court a diplomatic note dated 8 June 1999 from the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs setting out the following points:\n“It appears from investigations conducted by the Uzbek judicial authorities that Mr Mamatkulov and Mr Askarov have played an active role in planning and organising terrorist acts against the leaders of the Republic of Uzbekistan and its people since May 1997, as members of a criminal organisation led by C.H. and T.Y., who are notorious religious extremists.\nIt appears from information obtained through cooperation with the intelligence services of foreign countries that Mr Mamatkulov and Mr Askarov have committed offences in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.\nTheir indictment, which was drawn up on the basis of previously obtained evidence, includes a number of charges: setting up a criminal organisation, terrorism, a terrorist attack on the President, seizing power through the use of force or by overthrowing the constitutional order, arson, uttering forged documents and voluntary homicide.\nAll the investigations have been conducted with the participation of their lawyers. The defendants have made statements of their own free will on the activities of the criminal organisation and their role within it. That information has been corroborated by the other evidence that has been obtained.\nThe assurances given by the Public Prosecutor of the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning Mr Mamatkulov and Mr Askarov comply with Uzbekistan’s obligations under the United Nation’s Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984.\nThe defendants and their lawyers have examined the prosecution evidence relating to the investigation and the proceedings and a copy of the indictment transmitted to the Supreme Court has been served on them.\nArrangements for the accused’s security during the investigation and trial have been made through the use of secure premises (with cells specially equipped for that purpose) and appropriate measures have been taken to prevent them being attacked.\nThe defendants’ trial in the Supreme Court has recently begun with hearings in public. The hearings are attended by members of the local and foreign press. Members of diplomatic missions and representatives of human rights organisations also attend the hearings.\nOfficials from the embassy of the Republic of Turkey may also attend.” 30.  In a letter of 8 July 1999, the Government informed the Court that by a judgment of 28 June 1999 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan had found the applicants guilty of the offences charged and had sentenced them to terms of imprisonment. 31.  In a letter to the Court dated 15 September 1999, the applicants’ representatives said that they had not been able to contact their clients, that conditions in Uzbek prisons were bad and prisoners subjected to torture. They noted, inter alia:\n“...\nThe applicants did not have a fair trial in the Republic of Uzbekistan. The rule requiring trials to be held in public was not complied with. Our only information about the applicants’ trial comes from the Uzbek authorities.\nWe wrote to the Uzbek embassy in Ankara on 25 June 1999 requesting permission to attend the trial as observers in our capacity as lawyers, but have received no reply.\nAs to the assertion that the applicants’ trial was followed by ‘members of the local and foreign press and representatives of human rights organisations’, the only non-governmental organisation present in Uzbekistan that was able to follow the trial was Human Rights Watch. Although we have made express requests to that organisation, we have not been able to obtain any detailed information about the hearings and events at the trial.\nSince the applicants’ extradition, we have been unable to contact them by either letter or telephone. We still have no means of contacting them. This state of affairs serves to confirm our suspicions that the applicants are not being held in proper prison conditions.\nAccording to the letter sent by the Court on 9 July 1999 and information published in the press, Mr Mamatkulov has been sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment. That is the heaviest sentence that can be handed down under the Uzbek Criminal Code. Furthermore, if account is taken of the conditions of detention in Uzbek prisons, and in particular of the use of torture, it is very difficult for prisoners to serve their sentences in the prisons in proper conditions. Moreover, it is generally believed that certain prisoners, in particular those convicted of offences pertaining to freedom of expression, are given additional sentences.” 32.  On 15 October 2001 the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent the following information to the Turkish embassy in Tashkent:\n“On 28 June 1999 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan found R. Mamatkulov and Z. Askarov guilty of the offences listed below and sentenced them to twenty years’ and eleven years’ imprisonment respectively: 33.  At the hearing on 23 October 2001, the Government informed the Court that on 19 October 2001 two officials from the Turkish embassy in Tashkent had visited the applicants in Zarafshan Prison and Şayhali Prison, which are respectively 750 and 560 kilometres from Tashkent. According to the embassy officials, the applicants were in good health and had not complained about their prison conditions. 34.  On 3 December 2001 the Uzbek authorities communicated to the Government medical certificates that had been drawn up by military doctors in the prisons in which the applicants were being held. The doctors made the following findings:\n“... Mr Mamatkulov was imprisoned on 9 December 2000. He did not present any health problems on arrival. Examinations on 14 December 2000 and 2 April 2001 did not reveal any pathological symptoms.\nOn 19 November 2001 the prisoner attended the prison medical centre complaining of general weakness and a bout of coughing. ... on examination he was diagnosed as suffering from acute bronchitis and was prescribed medication ...”\n“... Mr Abdurasulovich Askarov was imprisoned on 21 July 2001. He did not complain of any health problems on arrival. Examinations conducted on 25 July, 30 August and 23 October 2001 did not reveal any pathological symptoms ...” 35.  On the basis of lists that had been communicated by the Uzbek authorities, the Government informed the Court on 16 April 2004 that the applicants had received a number of visits from close relatives between January 2002 and 2004. 36.  To date, the applicants’ representatives have been unable to contact the applicants.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966. He entered the Czech Republic in 1983. 5.  On 17 December 1997 at 10.30 a.m. the applicant was brought to a police investigation office in order to provide certain explanations (podání vysvětlení) in connection with an investigation for fraud. He was heard by a police investigator from 2.15 to 4.45 p.m. A lawyer was appointed for him. The applicant was arrested at 5.50 p.m, and charged with attempted fraud under sections 8(1) and 250(1) and (4) of the Criminal Code (hereinafter “the CC”) on the ground that he, together with a certain M.M., had opened bogus bank accounts on which they had attempted to collect CZK 56,228,000 (EUR 1,938,897) and CZK 36,572,000 (EUR 1,261,103) through false postal orders. 6.  On 19 December 1997 the applicant was brought before a judge at the Prague 1 District Court (soudce obvodního soudu) who ordered his detention on remand.  On the same day, the applicant’s home was searched. 7.  On 19 January 1998 the Prague Criminology Institute (Kriminalistický ústav) was requested to draw up an expert report on the false postal orders.  On 16 February 1998 the Criminology Technique and Expertise Department of the criminal police (odbor kriminalistické techniky a expertiz) was requested to examine the applicant’s computer and diary. The expert opinions were submitted on 29 April and 12 June 1998 respectively. 8.  On 3 and 18 March, 22 July and 22 October 1998 respectively, the applicant was heard. 9.  On 18 March 1999 he was informed that his criminal activity would be considered as complicity in fraud in an organised group under section 43 of the CC. On 6 September 1999 the postal orders were described. 10.  On 24 September and 9 August 2000 respectively, the applicant was heard. 11.  On 25 April 2001 the applicant’s defence counsel, after having examined her client’s file, asked that the evidence be completed by the hearing of two witnesses, one of them, T., being the applicant’s cousin. His request was refused by the police investigator on 22 May 2001 who did not consider the hearing of these witnesses necessary for the decision of the prosecutor and court. 12.  Meanwhile, 28 other suspects had been charged with the same offence, some of them being placed in custody. 13. On 3 July 2001 the Prague Regional Prosecutor (krajský státní zástupce), upon the investigator’s proposal of 21 June 2001, indicted the applicant and other co-accused before the Prague Regional Court (krajský soud). The applicant was so informed on 4 July 2001. 14.  On 6 September 2001 the Regional Court sent the case back to the Regional Prosecutor for additional investigations. It held that the applicant should remain in custody until 17 December 2001. On 22 November 2001 the High Court dismissed the prosecutor’s objection to this decision. On 5 December 2001 the case file was remitted to the Regional Prosecutor. 15.  On 29 May 2002 the applicant was heard but used his right to remain silent. 16. On 14 August 2002 another expert, having been appointed on 13 February 2002, submitted a report. 17.  Between June 2002 and January 2003, the authorities took a number of procedural steps. 18.  On 30 January 2003 the Regional Prosecutor again indicted all the suspects, including the applicant. The indictment contained 89 pages. The applicant was so informed on 10 April 2003. 19.  On 15 April 2003 the indictment in Czech, French and Arabian was forwarded to the Regional Court which, on 15 July 2003, set the trial for 20 October until 19 November 2003. 20.  On 10 September 2003 a procedural hearing of the applicant was held. The latter said that he would not need an interpreter at the trial. 21.  According to the Government, the Regional Court started to deal with case on 21 October 2003, eight suspects having failed to attend the trial on 20 October 2003. The criminal case relating to two suspects was excluded from the joint trial. 22.  On 22 October 2003 an interpreter into French was appointed to assist M.M. who did not understand Czech. On 27 October 2003 an interpreter into Arabian was appointed for the needs of certain witnesses. 23.  The trial continued between 7 and 30 January 2004, 36 witnesses being summoned and an additional expert report in psychiatry being ordered. According to the Government, the main hearing was actually held from 7 to 9 January 2004 and on 13, 16, 19 and 27 January 2004. 24.  From 19 to 27 January 2004 the case file was given to the Prague High Court (Vrchní soud) for an examination of a complaint made by one of the suspects against a detention order. The matter was decided on 26 January 2004 and, according to the Government, the case file was immediately remitted to the Regional Court. 25.  The court continued to deal with the case between 1 and 26 April 2004, certain witnesses not having attended court. 19 witnesses were summoned to attend the hearing. 26.  On 22 March 2004 the court issued two arrest warrants against two suspects. Nevertheless, the main hearing continued on 1-2, 5, 7-9, 13-16 and 19-20 April 2004. On 21 April 2004 the hearing had to be adjourned until 21 June 2004. 16 witnesses were summoned to attend the court. 27.  The main hearing was held from 21 to 23 June and from 24 to 25 June 2004. 28.  In a judgment of 28 June 2004, the Regional Court found the applicant guilty of attempted fraud under sections 8(1) and 250(1) and (4) of the CC, and was sentenced to five years and six months’ imprisonment. A time-limit for the elaboration of the judgment was extended until 22 January 2005 because of the complexity of the case. 29.  The criminal proceedings are now pending before the High Court, which scheduled a hearing for 21 February 2006. 30.  On 19 December 1997 the judge at the Prague 1 District Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand, upon a request of 18 December 1997 by the Prague Municipal Prosecutor (městský státní zástupce), under section 67(a) and (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCP”), with effect from 17 December 1997 at 5.50 p.m. The judge held that, given the applicant’s Sudanese citizenship and passport and the fact that he was likely to be sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence, there was a risk that he would abscond to avoid the criminal proceedings. The judge also found that the applicant, being prosecuted together with M.M., could influence his co-accused and witnesses who had not yet been heard, and thus jeopardize the investigation. 31.  On 16 January 1998 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against his detention order. 32.  On 3 March 1998 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request for release. On 27 March 1998 the Municipal Court upheld this rejection. 33.  On 2 June 1998 the court, following the Municipal Prosecutor’s request of 29 May 1998, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 17 October 1998. It held that the applicant was likely to be sentenced to a lengthy prison sentence which created the risk that he would abscond abroad if released, and that he could influence M.M. or other persons who had not yet been questioned. 34.  On 30 September 1998 the District Court, upon the Municipal Prosecutor’s request, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 17 February 1999. The court considered that the reasons for the applicant’s detention, as set out in the earlier decision, were still relevant. It emphasised the fear that the applicant would influence M.M. who was currently serving his prison sentence or other persons who had not yet been heard. It finally referred to the complex character of the case which needed to be properly investigated. 35.  On 23 October 1998 the Prague Municipal Court (městský soud) dismissed the applicant’s complaint of 12 October 1998 against this extension. 36.  On 14 December 1998 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) against the court decisions by which his detention on remand had been extended. He complained in particular that his continued detention on remand was not justified, and that the courts had not dealt with the case properly when examining the existence of the reasons for extending his detention. He further complained that he had not been brought before the court within 24 hours, as required by law. He invoked in this connection Articles 3 § 1 (the prohibition on discrimination), 8 §§ 2, 3 and 5 (the right to liberty and security), 36 § 1 (the right to judicial protection) and 40 § 2 (the presumption of innocence) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod). 37.  On 4 January 1999 M.M., whose prison sentence would have expired on 6 January 1999, was taken into custody pursuant to section 67(1)(a) of the CCP. 38.  On 26 January 1999 the District Court, upon the Municipal Prosecutor’s request of 22 January 1999, decided to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand until 17 June 1999, with reference to section 71(2) of the CCP, finding that the reasons for the detention under section 67 § 1(a) and (b) of the CCP continued to exist. The applicant’s belated complaint against this extension was rejected by the Municipal Court on 19 February 1999. 39.   In the meantime, on 15 February 1999, the investigator had decided to join the applicant’s and M.M.’s cases. 40.  On 3 June 1999 the Prague-East District Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 17 November 1999. On 30 June 1999 the Regional Court, upon the applicant’s and M.M.’s complaints, found that the reasons for their detention still existed, but reduced the detention period to 28 September 1999, considering that the investigation could be closed by the end of September 1999. 41.  In the meantime, on 9 June 1999, the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) had rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal as being manifestly unsubstantiated. 42.  On 13 September 1999 the District Court, at the Prague Regional Prosecutor’s (krajský státní zástupce) request of 6 September 1999, extended the applicant’s, M.M.’s and two other suspects’ detention on remand until 31 October 1999 with reference, inter alia, to the necessity to complete the investigation. 43.  On 15 October 1999, the District Court granted the Regional Prosecutor’s request of 11 October 1999 and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 16 December 1999, stating that other persons had been accused in the meantime which would require hearing all 31 accused persons, as well as certain witnesses and experts. It found that there was still a risk that the applicant would influence the witnesses and co-accused and, given the risk of a lengthy prison sentence being imposed on him, he might avoid the criminal prosecution by absconding abroad. 44.  On 29 October and 24 November 1999, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaints against the decisions of 13 September and 15 October 1999, by which his detention had been extended until 31 October and 16 December 1999 respectively. 45.  On 10 December 1999 the High Court, upon the motion of the Prague High Prosecutor’s Office (Vrchní státní zástupce), relying on section 71(3) of the CCP, extended the applicant’s detention until 31 May 2000 finding that there were still reasons for his detention under section 67(1)(a) and (b) of the CCP. It referred, inter alia, to the complex character of the case. It further relied on the reasonable suspicion based on cogent evidence that the applicant had committed the serious criminal offence with which he had been charged. 46.  On 6 January 2000 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) quashed the aforesaid decision, holding that there were no concrete reasons justifying the applicant’s remand in custody for fear of collusion or intimidation, under section 67(b) of the CCP, and decided anew, finding that there was still a risk that the applicant would abscond and avoid the criminal prosecution if released given the possible lengthy prison sentence, his Sudanese citizenship and domicile and his personal and family background. It held that the criminal proceedings had not been terminated within the two-year detention time-limit laid down in section 71(3) of the CCP, due to the complexity of the case and for other serious reasons. The court finally held that, on the basis of the material evidence collected in the pre-trial proceedings, it was possible to conclude that the serious criminal offence with which the applicant had been charged had really been committed by him. 47.  On 5 April and 7 June 2000 respectively, the District Court dismissed the applicant’s requests for release. On 28 April and 13 July 2000 respectively, the Regional Court rejected his complaints against these dismissals. 48.  On 19 May 2000 the High Court, granting the High Prosecutor’s request of 5 May 2000, extended the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2000, pursuant to section 71(3) of the CCP. It referred to the complex character of the case involving 31 suspects. The court stated inter alia that, given the legal classification of the applicant’s offence, he was likely to be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment if convicted. It also noted that, being of a Sudanese nationality and having his domicile not only in Prague but also in Sudan, and having his family there and in the United States of America, the applicant might abscond. It considered, therefore, that his detention was still necessary within the meaning of section 67(1)(a) of the CCP. 49.  On 21 June 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s complaint against this extension, referring, inter alia, to his Tunisian nationality and passport[1], and to the fact that he had his domicile and family in Tunis. The court dismissed any discriminatory element which could be used against the applicant in order to keep him in custody. 50.  On 21 July 2000 the applicant filed a second constitutional appeal, this time filed against the two last decisions. He alleged a violation of Article 8 §§ 1, 2 and 5 of the Charter. 51.  On 24 November 2000 the High Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention up to 30 March 2001 under section 71(3) of the CCP finding, with reference in particular to the extent of pecuniary damage allegedly caused by the suspects, that there was still a real risk that the applicant, a Sudanese citizen, would avoid the criminal prosecution or possible lengthy prison sentence if released. 52.  On 29 November 2000 the applicant’s counsel informed the Constitutional Court that his client’s detention had again been prolonged. 53.  On 21 December 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint of 30 November 2000 against the decision of 24 November 2000 to extend his detention until 30 March 2001. The court shared the opinion of the High Court that the reason for the applicant’s continued detention under section 67(1)(a) of the CCP persisted. It referred in this respect to the previous decision of the High Court of 21 June 2000 describing the applicant’s ties with the Czech Republic, the character of his criminal activities and possible prison sentence. 54.  On 6 February 2001 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s second constitutional appeal as being manifestly ill-founded. It held that the decisions extending the applicant’s detention beyond two years had been taken by virtue of section 71(3) of the CCP, and that it was clear from the evidence available that these decisions had been taken on the basis of the facts established at the material time. 55.  On 20 March 2001 the High Court granted the High Prosecutor’s request of 13 March 2001 to extend the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 30 June 2001. On 24 April 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against this extension. 56.  On 21 May 2001 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for release. On 20 July 2001 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint against this dismissal. 57.  On 19 June 2001 the High Court, upon the High Prosecutor’s request of 5 June 2001, extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 31 August 2001. Referring to the complex character of the case, the seriousness of the criminal activities with which the applicant and the other suspects had been charged and to the evidence collected so far, it found that it had been impossible to close the investigation within the two-year statutory period. It further held that the purpose of the criminal proceedings would be jeopardised if the suspects were released. In this respect the court recalled, inter alia, that the applicant was a Sudanese citizen, that his family lived in Sudan and that he did not have any family or other ties with the Czech Republic. On 18 July 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint of 2 July 2001 against the extension. 58.  On 1 August 2001 the High Court granted the request dated 10 July 2001 of the president of the chamber of the Regional Court to extend the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 17 December 2001, finding that the reason for the applicant’s detention under section 67(1)(a) of the CCP continued to exist. The applicant’s complaint against this extension was dismissed on 21 August 2001 by the Supreme Court which found that there were good reasons to extend his detention in accordance with section 71(4) of the CCP, sharing the opinion of the High Court. It held that the case was factually complex and that the competent authorities had not been responsible for any unjustified delay. 59.  On 17 December 2001 the applicant was released from custody. 60.  On 28 June 2002 the applicant married a Czech woman. 61.  On 16 August 2002 the applicant filed an application for a residence permit in order to live with his Czech wife. 62.  On 2 September 2002 the Prague Aliens and Customs Police Service (služba cizinecké a pohraniční policie) suspended the examination of this request given the criminal investigation against the applicant which was still pending. It held in particular that, under section 70(1)(e) of the Aliens’ Residence in the Czech Republic Act, such a request had to be supported by a certificate of good conduct (doklad k posouzení trestní zachovalosti) proving that he had no criminal record in his own country, in a country where he had his permanent residence or in a country where he had been living for more than six months in the past three years. The Service also held that the application had not contained necessary documents confirming the reason for his residence in the Czech Republic or his financial means to live there. It referred to section 70(1)(c) and (d) of the Act. 63.  On 6 December 2002 the Constitutional Court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s constitutional appeal against the aforesaid decision, in which he had alleged a violation of his rights guaranteed by Article 36 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 40 § 2 of the Charter. 64.  On 2 January and 3 April 2002 respectively, the Deputy Ombudsman (zástupkyně veřejného ochránce práv) found that the Service had proceeded unlawfully. 65.  On 5 June 2003 a private translation company offered employment to the applicant. On 17 July 2003 it withdrew the offer, as the applicant had not submitted his residence permit.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Georgiyevsk. 6.  On 17 September 2001 the applicant brought civil proceedings against the joint stock company “Nov” (акционерное общество “Новь”), subsequently known as the collective farm “Nov” (сельскохозяйственная артель “Новь”), seeking recovery of 100 tons of sunflower seeds under a supply agreement. 7.  On 17 October 2001 the Georgiyevskiy Town Court granted the applicant’s claim. The defendant was absent from the hearing. 8.  On 24 December 2001 the writ of execution was returned to the Georgiyevskiy Town Court as it had not been possible to enforce it. 9.  On 13 March 2002, following a request by the defendant, the Georgiyevskiy Town Court quashed the judgment of 17 October 2001 and resumed the proceedings. 10.  On 22 October 2002 the applicant modified her claims and asked the court to order the defendant to pay her 800,000 Russian roubles. 11.  On 17 December 2002 the Georgiyevskiy Town Court granted the applicant’s claim. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. 12.  The judgment could not be enforced because the defendant had insufficient funds. 13.  On an unspecified date in June 2003 the applicant lodged a claim against the Ministry of Finance seeking compensation for damages incurred through the inappropriate administration of justice, notably the excessive length of proceedings in respect of her claims against the company. She argued that the courts had failed to observe the time-limits prescribed by the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, which had undermined the possibility of enforcement of the final judgment in her favour. 14.  On 21 July 2003 the Basmannyj District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s claim without consideration on the merits. Referring to Ruling no. 1-P, adopted by the Constitutional Court on 25 January 2001 (see paragraph 18 below), the District Court noted that current laws did not determine the grounds or procedure for adjudicating a claim for damages on account of failure by the courts to comply with statutory time-limits. In particular, the court noted as follows:\n“According to Article 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, the rules of civil procedure in federal courts of general jurisdiction are determined by the Russian Constitution, the Judicial System Act, the Code of Civil Procedure and other federal laws.\nThe law has not determined the territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over civil claims for compensation for damage incurred in civil proceedings in cases where a dispute has not been heard on the merits as a consequence of unlawful acts (or failure to act) of a court (a judge), including breach of a reasonable-time guarantee.\nPursuant to Article 134 § 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation, the judge shall dismiss a statement of claim if the claim is subject to examination not in civil proceedings but in another judicial procedure.” 15.  On 10 March 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 21 July 2003 on appeal, finding as follows:\n“In dismissing the claim with reference to Ruling no. 1-P of 25 January 2001 of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the court came to the correct conclusion that its examination by a district court of general jurisdiction would only be possible if a federal law determined that the district court of general jurisdiction had territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over such claims.\nAt the present time, however, neither the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation nor any other federal law ... determines the territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction over claims concerning compensation for damage caused by judicial acts not touching upon the merits of the case.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant, Mr Mihaylov, was born in 1926. He passed away in 2003. His heirs, the second applicant, Mrs Mihaylova, and her two children, Ms Valentina Mihaylova and Mr Stefan Mihaylov, stated that they wished to pursue the application. The applicants were born respectively in 1931, 1956 and 1962, and live in Sofia. 7.  In 1985 the first two applicants purchased from the Sofia municipality a three-room apartment of 88 square metres. The apartment was located in a three-storey building in the centre of Sofia. It had become State property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and for several years afterwards. 8.  Several months after the adoption of the Restitution Law in 1992, the former pre-nationalisation owners brought proceedings under section 7 of that law against the first and second applicants, seeking the nullification of the applicants’ title and the restoration of their property.. 9.  The proceedings ended by final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 13 December 2002. The courts found that the applicants’ title was null and ordered them to vacate the apartment. This finding was based on two grounds: 1) the area where the apartment was located had been earmarked for construction of buildings of more than three storeys, according to the building plan of Sofia, and the relevant legislation prohibited the sale of apartments in three-storey buildings located in such areas; and 2) the 1985 sale contract had not been signed by the mayor but by his deputy. 10.  The applicants vacated the apartment on 30 December 2002. 11.  After the final judgment in their case, the applicants had the opportunity to obtain compensation from the State in the form of compensation bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. The applicants did not avail themselves of this opportunity. 12.  In May 2006 the second applicant was granted the tenancy of a one-room municipal apartment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Lublin. 7.  The applicant and the Government gave partly different statements in respect of certain facts of the case concerning the “dangerous detainee” regime, the conditions of the applicant’s detention and his contact with his family during his detention (see paragraphs 54-71 and 87-98 below). The remaining facts were not in dispute. 8.  On 21 June 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking committed together with other identified and yet unidentified persons. 9.  On 22 June 2006 the Lublin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question. It attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the risk that he would attempt to obstruct the proceedings by bringing to bear pressure on – unspecified – witnesses and co-suspects, in order to create favourable conditions for his defence. 10.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order and further decisions extending his detention, and his numerous applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were all unsuccessful. 11.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on 15 September 2006 (to 20 December 2006) and 5 January 2007 (to 14 April 2007). In their decisions on the matter the authorities relied on the original grounds given for his detention. The courts also stressed that, owing to the complexity of the case, the investigation had still not been completed. 12.  On 4 April 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Lublin District Court. The applicant was charged with drug trafficking, attempted money laundering and obtaining a loan by deception. A.W., the applicant’s common-law wife (konkubina), was indicted on a charge of attempted money laundering in that she had attempted to invest the proceeds of crime received by the applicant from drug trafficking in the purchase of a car and entering into a bank loan agreement in order to conceal the criminal origins of the invested money. 13.  On 10 April 2007 the District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 14 July 2007 and then, on the latter date, until 14 October 2007. The courts repeated the original grounds for his detention. 14.  On 17 July 2007 the Lublin District Court made a severance order referring part of the charges to the Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). Both the prosecutor and the applicant lodged interlocutory appeals against that decision. 15.  On 16 August 2007 the case in its entirety was referred to the Lublin Regional Court. However, on account of the subsequent amendment to the provisions governing the jurisdiction of criminal courts, the case was eventually referred back to the District Court on 30 October 2007. 16.  In the meantime, on 9 October 2007, the Lublin Regional Court had further extended the applicant’s detention until 14 January 2008, holding that evidence so far gathered sufficiently supported the suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It stressed the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the fact that he was a recidivist offender. 17.  During the court proceedings the applicant’s detention pending trial was extended on several occasions, namely on 28 December 2007 (to 14 April 2008), 11 April 2008 (to 30 June 2008), 27 June 2008 (to 30 September 2008), 23 July 2008 (to 24 October 2008). The courts repeated the grounds that had previously been given for keeping him in custody. 18.  The trial was to start on 28 December 2007 but it was adjourned until 22 February 2008 due to the absence of one of the witnesses. 19.  On 22 February 2008 the trial was again adjourned because the presiding judge was ill. 20.  The first hearing was held on 28 March 2008. 21.  On 24 October 2008 the District Court decided that the applicant’s detention should no longer be continued but he remained in custody in the third set of criminal proceedings (see paragraphs 32-39 below). 22.  On 12 July 2011 the Lublin District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to a cumulative penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a fine. 23.  The proceedings are pending the parties’ appeals. 24.  On 22 June 2006 the Lublin District Court remanded the applicant in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion of his having committed robbery, theft and unlawful detention. It attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the risk that he would attempt to obstruct the proceedings by bringing pressure to bear on witnesses and co-suspects in general – their names or any related circumstances were not specified. 25.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order, and likewise his further appeals against decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him were unsuccessful. 26.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on 7 September 2006 (to 30 December 2006) and 29 December 2006. In their decisions on the matter the authorities relied on the original grounds given for holding him in custody. 27.  On an unspecified date in December 2006 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Lublin District Court. The applicant was indicted on charges of robbery, theft and unlawful detention. 28.  The first hearing was scheduled for 28 February 2007 but it was adjourned. The trial started on 15 March 2007. 29.  During the court proceedings the applicant’s detention pending trial was further extended on 17 April, 29 June and 23 October 2007 (to 31 January 2008), 29 January (to 31 March 2008) and 18 March 2008 (to 21 June 2008). The courts repeated the grounds that had previously been given for his continued detention. 30.  On 21 June 2008 the court decided that the applicant’s detention should no longer be continued in this case since the maximum statutory time-limit of two years for pre-trial detention had expired. He was still detained on remand in the first and the third set of criminal proceedings against him (see paragraphs 8 and 21 above and paragraphs 32 and 37 below). 31.  On 2 July 2009 the Lublin District Court gave judgment. The applicant was acquitted of all the offences with which he had been charged. 32.  On 10 October 2007 the Lublin District Court remanded the applicant in custody, relying on the suspicion that he had set up and organised a criminal group involved in drug-trafficking. It attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant, the serious nature of the offences of which he was suspected, the large quantities of drugs involved and the risk that he would attempt to obstruct the proceedings. That risk was based on the assumption that, having regard to the leading role played by him in the group, he might bring pressure to bear on witnesses or other suspects in general; no specific persons were named. 33.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him were unsuccessful. In his submissions, the applicant first of all stressed that the evidence gathered had not supported sufficiently the suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. He maintained that the grounds given for his detention were vague and general and did not indicate any concrete circumstances justifying the risk that he would obstruct the course of the proceedings. He also stated that the prosecutor’s refusal to grant him access to the case file made it impossible for him to challenge the grounds for his continued detention.\nIn its decision of 25 October 2007, rejecting his appeal against the order of 10 October 2007 the Lublin Regional Court held, among other things, the following:\n“It must be firmly stressed that the material gathered in the case [in the form of other accused’s testimonies and the results of searches carried out] makes it highly probable that [the applicant] had committed the offences with which he had been charged. ...\nThe offence in question is liable to a maximum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment which, having regard to the social danger of the offences, the fact that [the applicant] acted together with other persons in an organised criminal group and made crime his permanent source of income, as well as to the quantity of drugs distributed and [the applicant’s] criminal record, supports the [lower court’s] conclusion as to the severity of the anticipated penalty.\nThe District Court was also right in relying on the justified fear that [the applicant] might unlawfully influence statements of other persons. The realisation of the purposes of the investigation requires [the authorities] to make such actions impossible, in particular influencing the content of testimonies or evidence given by the accused.\nIt must be added that, as demonstrated by evidence so far obtained, [the applicant] set up and led an organised criminal group and had a decisive say in all matters concerning its functioning. ...\nIn these circumstances, the imposition of detention is entirely justified because other preventive measures would not be sufficient to ensure the proper course of the investigation.” 34.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on 8 January 2008 (to 9 April 2008) and 1 April 2008 (to 9 June 2008). In their decisions the authorities relied on the original grounds given for keeping him in custody, stressing, in particular, the severity of the penalty – up to eight years’ imprisonment. 35.  On 2 June 2008 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Lublin Regional Court. It comprised 36 charges brought against 17 accused. The applicant was indicted on charges of drug‑trafficking committed as a leader of an organised criminal group. 36.  During the court proceedings the courts further extended the applicant’s detention pending trial on several occasions, namely on 5 June 2008 (to 9 October 2008), 7 October 2008 (to 9 January 2009), 30 December 2008 (to 9 April 2009), 7 April 2009 (to 7 June 2009), 27 May 2009 (to 27 August 2009), on 25 August 2009 (to 9 October 2009), on 7 October 2009 (to 9 December 2009) and on an unspecified subsequent date. The courts essentially repeated the grounds that had previously been given for his continued detention. In some decisions, they also relied on the highly complex nature of the case, stressing that the case file comprised 20 volumes, and the need to carry out time-consuming procedural actions (such, as for instance, the need to acquaint the accused with classified material – a process that lasted for some three weeks in August-September 2009). 37.  On 2 July 2010 the court released the applicant on bail and under police supervision, i.e. on condition that he would report weekly to a police station. It also imposed on the applicant a ban on leaving the country. 38.  On 16 June 2011 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant of setting up and leading an organised criminal group and of participating in the distribution of large amounts of drugs. It sentenced him to a cumulative penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a fine. 39.  The proceedings are pending the parties’ appeals. 40.   On 2 November 2007, in connection with his appeals against the detention order (see paragraphs 32-33 above) the applicant requested the Lublin Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) to grant him access to the investigation file and to allow him to obtain photocopies of some documents relating to the grounds given for his detention. 41.  On 8 November 2007 the prosecutor refused that request, relying on the important interests of the proceedings (ważny interes postępowania). The prosecutor observed that the investigation was still in progress and, in these circumstances, the interests of the investigation outweighed the applicant’s right to be acquainted with the evidence so far obtained by the prosecution. The applicant appealed. 42.  On 10 December 2007 the Lublin Deputy Regional Prosecutor upheld the refusal of 8 November 2007. He observed, in particular, that the right to full disclosure of evidence gathered at the investigative stage of criminal proceedings was not absolute and could, in pursuit of a legitimate aim such as the protection of witnesses or secret sources of information or the interests of the investigation, be subject to limitations. It was also underlined that such limitations were even more stringent during the investigation as at that stage the principle of adversarial proceedings did not apply. 43.  On 27 December 2007 the applicant again asked the investigating prosecutor to grant him access to the case file in order to enable him to make photocopies of certain parts of the file. He listed 86 relevant pages out of some 1,200 contained in the file. The applicant relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention and the principle of equality of arms, stressing that in anticipation of the prosecutor’s request to the trial court for his detention to be further extended, he needed to inspect at least some parts of the evidence in order to challenge properly and effectively the lawfulness of his detention. In their requests, he added, the prosecution relied on evidence, premises and circumstances that were unknown to him, which made it impossible for him to respond to the arguments adduced by them in the procedure for the extension of his detention. Lastly, the applicant invoked his constitutional right to defend himself. 44.  On 8 January 2008 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 9 April 2008 (see also paragraph 34 above). 45.  On 15 January 2008 the prosecutor, relying on Article 156 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), refused to grant the applicant access to the case file. The prosecutor observed that it was already the second such request lodged within a short period of time. The only difference was that this time the applicant relied on the Constitution and international law. That being so, the grounds given for the previous refusal were still valid. It was stressed that the prosecutor in his actions, in particular in assessing evidence, must be guided by the principle of objectivity and must respect the suspect’s defence rights. However, the prosecutor should first of all ensure the efficient and unimpeded course of the investigation. Since several other persons had been charged together with the applicant, the interests of the investigation required the prosecution to keep secret the findings of fact so far made in order to secure an undisturbed process of obtaining evidence and to avoid any attempt to obstruct unlawfully the outcome of the investigation. As regards the constitutional and international-law arguments advanced by the applicant, the prosecutor considered that they had a marginal impact in the context of this decision since it had a legal basis in the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant appealed. 46.  On 29 February 2008 the Lublin Deputy Regional Prosecutor upheld the refusal, repeating the previous grounds. 47.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant made a subsequent request to the investigating prosecutor, asking for photocopies of certain documents contained in the case file. He listed a total of 97 relevant pages, out of some 1,500 currently contained in the file. He relied on the previous arguments, stressing that, given that his last detention order would expire on 9 April 2008, he needed to get acquainted with at least the selected documents – without being given access to the entire case file – so as to be able to challenge effectively the likely prolongation of his detention. 48.  On 31 March 2008 the prosecutor rejected the request without giving any specific grounds for his refusal. 49.  On 1 April 2008 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 9 June 2008 (see paragraph 34 above). 50.  The applicant submitted that as of May 2008, i.e. the time when he had been about to be indicted before the Lublin District Court (see paragraph 35 above), he still had no access to the file. 51.  The applicant submitted that during his detention his correspondence was continually censored by the authorities.\nHe produced seven envelopes of the censored letters. 52.  Four envelopes bear a stamp that reads: “Censored, date ..., Prosecutor” (Ocenzurowano, dnia ... Prokurator), a hand written date and an illegible signature. Those envelopes contained:\n1)  one letter from the Main Police Headquarters (Komenda Główna Policji), censored on 2 August 2006;\n2)  two letters from the Central Administration of Prison Service (Centralny Zarząd Służby Więziennej), censored on 19 October and 8 December 2006 respectively;\n3)  one letter from the Warsaw Regional Inspectorate of Prison Service (Okręgowy Inspektorat Służby Więziennej), censored on 8 December 2006.\nThree envelopes bear a stamp that reads: “Censored, the Lublin Regional Court, received date ..., sent date ...” (Cenzurowano, Sąd Okręgowy Lublin, otrzymano dnia ..., wysłano dnia ...), a stamped date and an illegible signature. The envelopes contained the following letters:\n1)  from the applicant’s defence counsel; censored on 25 June 2007;\n2)  from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, censored on 13 August 2007;\n3)  from the Office of the Committee for European Integration, censored on 16 August 2007. 53.  The applicant did not lodge a civil action for compensation for the infringement of his personal rights on account of censorship of his correspondence under Article 24 read in conjunction with Article 448 of the Civil Code. 54.  Between 21 June 2006 (when he was arrested in the first set of proceedings) and 12 March 2007 (when he was indicted before the Lublin District Court), the applicant, despite numerous requests to that effect, was not allowed to receive visits from his son, M.P., born in 2004. 55.  Between 28 April and 10 October 2007 the applicant was granted several open visits (widzenie przy stoliku) from the child, who was brought to the remand centre by a certain N.S., a third party. 56.  On several occasions the applicant requested the Governor of the Lublin Remand Centre to have the standard 60-minute long visits from the son prolonged to 90 minutes. All his requests were dismissed as the authorities considered that the applicant’s behaviour was not “more than exemplary as regards respecting the internal order in the remand centre and the prison rules” – a circumstance which justified granting visiting privileges. 57.  Between 10 October 2007 (when the applicant was remanded in custody in the third set of proceedings) and 3 December 2007 he was again not allowed to see his son.\n(b)  The Government 58.  The Government submitted that over the period from 21 June 2006 to 12 March 2007 the applicant had not asked for permission to receive visits from the son. 59.  They stated that between 10 October and 3 December 2007 the applicant did not receive visits from the son. 60.  The Government produced a detailed list of visits received by the applicant between 12 July 2006 and 19 January 2010. As from 3 December 2007 he received visits from his son on the following dates: 24 December 2007, 14 January, 11 February, 31 March, 21 April, 19 May, 23 June, 7 and 28 July, 11 and 25 August, 29 September, 13 and 20 October, 3 and 17 November and 22 December 2008. In 2009 the visits took place on 12 January, 2, 16 and 23 February, 9 and 30 March, 17 and 24 April, 11 and 18 May, 1 and 15 June, 6, 20 and 30 July, 3, 17 and 31 August, 13 and 28 September, 4 and 26 October, 8 and 22 November, 6, 20 and 27 December. Further visits took place on 10 and 17 January 2010.\nThe child was initially accompanied by N.S and, as from 29 September 2008 by A.W., the applicant’s common-law wife and the mother of his son.\n(c)  Material in the Court’s file 61.  On 26 November 2007 W.W., the applicant’s defence counsel, made a declaration that reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“As [the applicant’s] defence counsel from the date on which he had been detained on remand [in the first set of the criminal proceedings against him], i.e. 22 June 2006 to 4 April 2007 I made numerous requests on his behalf to the investigating prosecutor, asking him to issue permission for my client to have a visit form his 3‑year old son M. ...\nDespite my repeated requests, I did not obtain such permission. The grounds given for these decisions referred to [such circumstances as] the child’s interests and the possibility of obtaining additional evidence or new facts from my client. Throughout the entire investigation, the prosecutor issued only one permission in March 2007, which was about the time when [the applicant] was indicted before the court. I should add that this put a severe strain on my client and had a negative impact on his psychological state.” 62.  On 7 December 2007 the Lublin Regional Prosecutor informed the applicant that he had granted N.S. a closed visit (widzenie przez telefon) and that the latter was allowed to bring the applicant’s son with him. The visit took place in a special room with a Perspex partition separating the applicant from his visitors. The applicant was informed that in the future he would be granted one such visit from the son monthly and that visits enabling them to have direct contact could not be allowed at that stage of the procedure. 63.  From 21 June 2006 to 29 September 2008 the applicant was not allowed to receive visits from A.W. Initially, the investigation authorities informed him that since A.W. was to be heard as a witness in the first set of criminal proceedings against him she could not obtain permission for visits. Later, on an unspecified date in 2006, in those proceedings A.W. was charged with money laundering committed together with the applicant. She was indicted on that charge before the Lublin District Court on 4 April 2007 (see paragraph 12 above). On this basis, the authorities refused to grant her permissions for visits for some further two years. 64.  On 8 January 2007 the applicant was allowed to have a 60-minute long conversation on the prison phone with A.W.\nOn 29 September 2008 the applicant was granted the first open visit from A.W., who was allowed to bring their son with her. Since then the applicant has been granted on average 2 visits from her and the son monthly (see also paragraphs 60 above and 70 below).\n3  Contact with the mother\n(a)  The applicant 65.  The applicant maintained that from 21 June 2006 until 12 March 2007 he had not been allowed to receive visits from C.K., his mother, on the ground that she was to be heard as a witness in the first set of criminal proceedings against him.\n(b)  The Government 66.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s mother visited the applicant in prison on 6 December 2006 and 12 March 2007. On the first date, the applicant was granted an open visit. The second visit, in which M.K., his son, also participated was closed.\nThe applicant was also allowed to have a 60-minute long conversation on the prison phone with his mother on 11 October 2006 and 30 January 2007.\n(c)  Material in the Court’s file 67.  A copy of the applicant’s request of 7 March 2007 for permission to have a visit from his mother and his son, addressed to the Lublin Regional Prosecutor’s Office (Prokuratura Okręgowa), shows that on the original request the prosecutor made a handwritten note: “I grant permission for a supervised visit; 08.3.2007” and that the permission document was given to the person concerned on 9 March 2007. 68.  The list of visits supplied by the Government shows that between 12 July 2006 and 19 January 2010 the applicant received 147 visits, of which 78 were meetings with his defence counsel (including one together with a police officer), 2 meetings with police officers, 2 meetings with prosecutors and 1 meeting with a notary.\nThe meetings with the defence counsel took place once a month on average.\nThe remaining 64 visits involved the applicant’s family. They lasted from 30 to 60 minutes but on most occasions were 60-minute long. 69.  At the initial stage of his detention the applicant was only allowed to have a 60-minute long conversation on the prison phone with his mother on 11 October 2006. He received the first family visit on 6 December 2006 – it was an open visit from his mother and lasted 60 minutes. 70.  Later, he was allowed to have one 60-minute long phone conversation with his common-law wife, A.W., on 8 January 2007.\nHe was allowed to have a second phone conversation with his mother on 30 January 2007.\nOn 12 March 2007 the applicant received the first – supervised – visit from his son, M.P., who was brought to the remand centre by the applicant’s mother.\nOn 29 September 2008 the applicant received the first visit from A.W., who was allowed to bring their son with her. It was an open visit that lasted 60 minutes. 71.  As regards the visits which took place after the applicant was classified as a “dangerous detainee” (see paragraph 74 below), i.e. from 12 October 2007 onwards, the list of visits supplied by the Government shows that the applicant received 102 visits altogether, of which 53 were meetings with his lawyers, 1 with a police officer, 1 with a notary and 2 with prosecutors. The 45 remaining visits were from his family. 72.  On 21 June 2006 the applicant was placed in the Radom Remand Centre (Areszt Śledczy). On 8 December 2006 he was transferred to the Lublin Remand Centre. 73.  Between 23 February and 14 June 2007 the applicant was placed in a solitary cell for dangerous detainees (a so-called “tymczasowo aresztowany niebezpieczny”; in the relevant legal provisions referred to as „tymczasowo aresztowany stwarzający poważne zagrożenie społeczne albo poważne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa aresztu”) without having been classified as such. The authorities of the Lublin Remand Centre justified their decision by security reasons. At that time, the applicant was not subjected to the stringent regime for dangerous detainees. 74.  On 14 June 2007 the applicant was transferred to a cell for regular prisoners. 75.  On 12 October 2007 the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission (Komisja Penitencjarna) classified the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. It considered that it was necessary to place him in a cell for dangerous detainees as he had been charged with numerous offences, including unlawful detention and violent robbery, committed as a leader of an organised criminal group. The commission also referred to the applicant’s serious lack of moral character (wysoki stopień demoralizacji). The applicant unsuccessfully appealed against this decision. 76.  From 12 October 2007, when the applicant was placed in a cell for dangerous detainees, he remained under increased supervision. The cell, including its sanitary facilities, was constantly monitored via close-circuit television. He was subjected to a body search every time he left and entered the cell, which in practice meant that he had to strip naked in front of prison guards and was required to carry out deep knee-bends. The body search was performed in a separate room, which was monitored and its recording was viewable in a duty room. 77.  The applicant, whenever he was outside his cell, including his appearances at court hearings or medical visits, wore the so-called “joined shackles” (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet. Those shackles consisted of hand‑cuffs and fetters joined together with chains. 78.  On 9 February 2008 he was taken to the Lublin Civil Hospital, where he underwent a number of medical examinations and tests in connection with severe pains in the abdominal cavity. He remained there for several hours, being handcuffed and fettered. He was all the time accompanied and watched by 3 policemen. 79.  The applicant was allowed to spend one hour per day in an outdoor yard but was segregated from other detainees. 80.  Between 20 December 2007 and 6 February 2008, at the applicant’s request, another inmate, a certain L.G. was placed in his cell. Later, from 29 February to 14 April 2008 and from 6 August to 22 September 2008 he had one inmate assigned to his cell. 81.  Every three months the Lublin Remand Centre Penitentiary Commission reviewed, and upheld, its decision classifying the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The relevant decisions were limited to a short description of the nature of the suspicions or charges laid against him which, as such, justified the maintaining of the previous decisions.\nFor example, the decision of 31 July 2008 read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“Pursuant to Article 212a § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, the Penitentiary Commission assigned [the applicant] to the category of detainees who should be placed in a remand centre in conditions ensuring increased protection of society and the security of the remand centre. The decision was based on the suspicion that he had a very high rank in organised crime structures and that he was a person displaying a serious lack of moral character. The detainee is suspected of committing offences of unlawful detention and robbery, which involved particular suffering for victims. On 10 October 2007 a fresh detention order was issued by the Lublin District Court, from which it transpired that he was suspected of setting up and leading an organised criminal group involved in the illegal distribution of large amounts of drugs. For this reason, the Commission upholds its decision to classify him in the category of detainees who should be placed in a remand centre in conditions ensuring increased protection of society and the security of the remand centre because the grounds for the further application of Article 212a § 1 of [the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences] did not cease to exist.” 82.  The applicant appealed against all the decisions, arguing that the authorities violated the provisions of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks karny wykonawczy) relating to that matter. He also complained about being regularly subjected to a body search, constant monitoring of his cell and the generally inadequate equipment of the solitary cell. For instance, in his appeal against the Penitentiary Commission’s decision of 2 July 2009, upholding his classification as a “dangerous detainee”, he submitted, among other things, the following:\n“ ... Since 12 October 2007 I have been classified as a ‘dangerous detainee’ .... This decision is arbitrary and was given without any evaluation of the circumstances that had given rise to classify me as such. I am suspected of drug trafficking in an organised criminal group ... and for this reason I was assigned the “dangerous” category. Article 212a § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences obliges the prison administration to evaluate the circumstances that justify the maintaining of this classification.\nRegrettably, the assessment of [the need to maintain it] is illusory or non-existent and the subsequent extensions of the classification as ‘dangerous’ are, so to speak, automatic.\nThe very fact that I was charged with acting in an organised criminal group is not sufficient to consider me a dangerous person, and certainly not sufficient to maintain this classification for 2 years, having regard to the extent of the interference with [my] civil rights and liberties ... .\nRelying on this classification, the Lublin Remand Centre subjects me to repression and interferences:\n- stripping me naked (including underwear) and inspection of the anus – at least twice a day;\n- isolating me from all persons (I am in a solitary cell) for more than 500 days;\n- watching me during my physiological acts in the toilet;\n- making it impossible for me to participate in any kind of sports activity in the prison sports field (I do not leave the cell at all);\n- walking me in joined shackles all the time.\nGiven the degree of the interference in my life, which amounts to daily ill-treatment and which is not based on a court conviction, one should ask to what extent a mere charge of participating in a criminal group suffices to treat me in this way, especially over the lengthy period of 2 years.\nFor that reason, the acts of the prison administration are in breach of the law, in particular Article 3 of [the Convention]. ... This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that for my part there has never been any danger to the functioning of the remand centre – this is confirmed by the fact that there has been no single instance of the use of force against me. ...[T]he prison administration subjects me to these practices without good reason, and the status of ‘dangerous’ serves, so to speak, as a measure of prevention, whereas this status should be restricted to the necessary minimum – otherwise it becomes an arbitrary interference with the most intimate spheres of human life. ...” 83.  All the applicant’s subsequent, similar appeals were dismissed. The authorities relied on the grounds given for the initial decision.\nBy way of example, the Regional Court’s decision of 19 August 2009, upholding the Penitentiary Commission’s decision of 2 July 2009 (the object of the appeal cited in paragraph 82 above) read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“The detainee’s appeal is groundless and will not be allowed. ...\nPursuant to Article 212a § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, a detainee who is suspected of committing an offence in an organised criminal group or organisation aimed at committing offences shall be placed in a remand centre in conditions ensuring increased protection of society and the security of the remand centre.\nAccording to paragraph 1 of that provision, the review of a decision on classification of a detainee in conditions ensuring increased protection of society and prison security shall take place at least once every three months.\n[The applicant] still poses a serious danger to society and prison security. In addition, he is remanded by the Lublin Regional Court as a person suspected of setting up and leading an organised criminal group involved in illegal distribution of large amounts of drugs.\nAccordingly, it transpires from the material gathered in the present case that the conditions of the above-cited provision have been fulfilled and, by the same token, the contested decision is lawful.” 84.  In 2007-2009 the applicant made many requests to the prison authorities, asking for permission to have in his cell his own sports equipment (i.e. dumb-bells), own TV set, “Playstation” console, computer games, CD‑player and CDs with foreign language courses and music but all those requests were refused. He also asked the authorities to enable him to take part in training, workshops, courses or any sports activities organised for other inmates or to allow him to perform any unpaid work, submitting that his complete isolation from other people was putting an exceptionally severe strain on him. The authorities replied that there would be advertisements informing prisoners of the possibility of enrolling on courses or trainings or of unpaid work opportunities. They added, however, that the need to socialise with others was not a ground for being qualified for participation in such activities in prison. 85.  As of 20 April 2010 the applicant was still not allowed to perform any paid or unpaid work, take part in any training course, workshop or sports activity. 86.  Until his release on 2 July 2010 he was continually classified as a “dangerous detainee”. 87.  The Government submitted that between 23 February and 14 June 2007 the applicant was placed in a solitary cell in accordance with the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice of 31 October 2003 on means of protection of organisational units of the Prison Service (Rozporządzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwości z dn. 31 października 2003 r. w sprawie sposobów ochrony jednostek organizacyjnych Służby Więziennej) (“the 2003 Ordinance”). They did not indicate any specific provision of that ordinance. They added that during his placement in the solitary cell the applicant could watch television.\nThey further stated that in the Lublin Remand Centre the cells in which the applicant was held were equipped with a television set and a radio enabling him to listen to various radio stations. Every Sunday Mass was broadcast. 88.  The applicant stated that he had never had radio in his cell. 89.  The applicant submitted that the living conditions in the Lublin Remand Centre and the Radom Remand Centre were inadequate. The cells were unventilated; the windows were covered by a plastic blind, which made the cell very hot during the summer. The applicant could not wear his own clothes but only a red uniform designated for dangerous detainees, which was not warm enough during the winter time. The furniture was permanently fixed to the floor.\nThe applicant made numerous complaints to the prison authorities and the Ombudsman but they were to no avail. 90.  The applicant was detained in the Radom Remand Centre from 21 June to 8 December 2006. Until 22 November 2006 he was in a cell designated for 3 persons. Each inmate had at his disposal a cell surface of 3 m2. From 22 November to 8 December 2006 (i.e. for 18 days) the space available was 2.73 m2 per person.\nThe cells in which the applicant was placed were equipped with a sanitary corner with a sliding door. 91.  The conditions of detention in the Radom Remand Centre were good. All detainees were provided with the appropriate clothing, linen and detergents. Personal hygiene products were distributed once a month. The bed linen was washed at least twice a month and underwear once a week. Other clothes and footwear were changed depending on a given detainee’s needs. 92.  The detainees received meals in their cells. The meals were always served at the proper temperature and contained all the required nutritional values.\n(b)  Lublin Remand Centre 93.   From 8 December 2006 onwards the applicant was detained in the Lublin Remand Centre. From 6 August 2008 to the beginning of 2010 he was placed in the following cells: X-114 (surface 9.23 m2), X-129 surface 9.23 m2), X-128 (surface 8.13 m2), X-125 (surface 9.62 m2), X- 127 (surface 7.97 m2) and X-117 (surface 7.96 m2). From 29 February to 14 April 2008 and from 6 August to 22 September 2008 he had one inmate assigned to his cell. 94.  All the cells in which the applicant was placed were equipped with a sanitary corner, to which the applicant had permanent access. 95.  The detainees were provided with appropriate clothing, linen and detergents. Personal hygiene products were given to the applicant once a month. The bed linen was washed at least twice a month and underwear once a week. Other clothes and footwear were changed according to a given detainee’s needs. 96.  On 12 October 2007, at the applicant’s request, the authorities provided him with an extra pullover. 97.  The detainees received meals in their cells. The meals were always served at the proper temperature and contained all the required nutritional values. The quality of meals was verified by a doctor and approved by the governor. All the cells were equipped with ventilation and heating. Detainees, including those classified as dangerous, could open the windows in their cells. 98.  Throughout his detention the applicant received adequate medical treatment from prison doctors. He also consulted specialists in psychiatry, dermatology and surgery. 99.  In August 2007 the applicant sued the State Treasury – station fisci the Radom Remand Centre and the Lublin Remand Centre before the Lublin Regional Court, seeking damages for the degrading conditions of his detention. On an unspecified date the particulars of claim were returned to the applicant for non-compliance with formal requirements. 100.  On 15 February 2008 the applicant lodged a fresh claim for damages arising from the physical conditions of his detention (in particular, overcrowding, lack of proper light and ventilation and inadequate clothing provided by the authorities) against the same defendants. It was registered in the Lublin Regional Court under no. IC 90/08. According to the material in the Court’s possession, the proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Istanbul. 5.  On 22 March 1994 the applicant was granted a lease by the Istanbul Municipality to run a car park on a plot of land by the coast in the Kadıköy district of Istanbul. 6.  On 14 and 27 July 1999 and 24 March 2000 the National Estate Directorate attached to the Istanbul Revenue Office issued three orders requesting the applicant to pay compensation for occupying the car park between 1 March 1998 and 31 December 1999. 7.  On 11 August 1999, 29 September 1999 and 14 April 2000 respectively the applicant filed three separate cases with the Istanbul Administrative Court against the Istanbul Revenue Office, requesting that the orders be annulled. The first case concerned the period between 1 March and 31 December 1998, the second case concerned the period between 1 January and 1 August 1999 and the third case concerned the period between 1 August and 31 December 1999.\nAs regards the first two proceedings 8.  On 25 May 2000 the Istanbul Administrative Court annulled the orders dated 14 July 1999 and 27 July 1999. The administrative authority appealed. Subsequently on 17 December 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the respective judgments of the Istanbul Administrative Court. 9.  On 24 June 2005 the Istanbul Administrative Court followed the reasoning set out in the Supreme Administrative Court's decision and dismissed the cases. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 13 March 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the respective judgments of the Istanbul Administrative Court once again. 11.  On 13 November 2006 the Istanbul Administrative Court decided to annul the respective compensation orders. 12.  According to the information in the case file based on the latest submissions by the parties, both actions are apparently still pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.\nAs regards the third set of proceedings 13.  On 23 February 2001 the Istanbul Administrative Court annulled the compensation order dated 24 March 2000. The administrative authority appealed and subsequently on 4 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the judgment of the Istanbul Administrative Court. 14.  On 18 April 2006 the Istanbul Administrative Court followed the reasoning set out in the Supreme Administrative Court's decision and dismissed the case. According to the information in the case file, this action is still pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Maribor. 5.  On 20 August 1999 the applicant through guardian instituted proceedings against her father before the Maribor District Court seeking an increase in alimony. 6.  On 11 October 2000 the first-instance court held the first hearing. A hearing scheduled for 8 December 2000 was postponed at the applicant’s request and was held subsequently on 16 February 2001. 7.  On 22 May 2001 the first-instance court rendered a judgment upholding the applicant’s request in part by increasing the amount of alimony. The defendant appealed. 8.  On 27 November 2001 the Maribor Higher Court upheld the appeal and remitted the case for re-examination. 9.  On 8 May 2002 the first-instance court held a hearing. 10.  On 30 May 2002 the first-instance court issued a judgment upholding the applicant’s request in part. The defendant appealed. 11.  On 19 November 2002 the appeal court rendered a judgment and remitted the case once more for re-examination. The court found that the operative part of the first-instance judgment was not clear and the judgment insufficiently reasoned in some parts. 12.  Further to the remittal the Maribor District Court held two hearings on 27 October 2004 and 13 July 2005. 13.  After the last hearing the court rendered a judgment upholding the applicant’s request. The defendant appealed. 14.  On 11 April 2006 the Maribor Higher Court rejected the appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1975, 1974, 1961 and 1972 respectively. They all live in the town of Cizre. 6.  In March 1994 Abdulaziz Gasyak, Süleyman Gasyak, Yahya Akman and Ömer Candoruk were killed. The applicants were related to these people as follows: Sabri Gasyak is the brother of Abdulaziz Gasyak; Leyla Gasyak was the wife of Süleyman Gasyak; İsa Akman is the father of Yahya Akman and Hanım Candoruk was the wife of Ömer Candoruk. The application was brought by the applicants on their own behalf and on behalf of the remaining heirs of the four deceased men. 7.  The facts of the case, particularly concerning events which took place on 6 March 1994, are disputed by the parties. 8.  The facts as presented by the applicants are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 9-21). The Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraph 22).The documentary evidence submitted by the applicant and the Government is summarised in Section D (paragraphs 23-50). 9.  The applicants’ four relatives were working as tradesmen, buying food, tea and tobacco from the area near the Turkish-Iraqi border and selling them in the nearby town of Cizre and the surrounding areas. 10.  On 6 March 1994 the four men were travelling from Cizre to Silopi in a vehicle which was being driven by Ömer Candoruk. They were stopped by gendarmes at a checkpoint approximately five to six kilometres outside the town of Silopi. Two unmarked Renault cars were parked nearby. At that point, a certain Mr A.M., who lived in Cizre and who knew the four men, was travelling from Cizre to Silopi in a minibus and saw the four men arguing with a group of gendarme officers in plain clothes. Abdulhakim Güven and Adem Yakın, who used to be PKK[1] members but who had been working for the gendarmerie since their arrests, were also with the gendarme officers. MM. Güven and Yakın were referred to in the area as “confessors”[2]. The applicants’ relatives were then put into vehicles. They were joined by gendarme officers and the confessors and the cars began driving in the direction of Cizre. 11.  Mr A.M. then saw something being thrown out of one of the vehicles. He stopped and picked it up and realised that it was Ömer Candoruk’s driving licence. The vehicles then turned off the main road and started heading towards Holan village. Mr A.M. did not see the vehicles again. 12.  According to the information the applicants subsequently gathered from a number of villagers living in Holan village, one of their relatives had jumped out of the moving vehicle and tried to run away, but was shot by one of the confessors or the gendarme officers. His body was put in the boot of one of the vehicles. 13.  The three surviving men were then taken to the gendarme station in Bozalan village, which is located approximately seven to eight kilometres from Cizre. Before sunset they were taken in the same vehicles to a place nearby and were shot and killed. 14.  The killing was witnessed by a certain Mrs E.T. and her female friends who were working in a nearby field. 15.  The following day, 7 March 1994, Mr A.M. told the applicants what he had seen and gave them Ömer Candoruk’s driving licence. The applicants then contacted the police and the gendarmerie in Silopi, but were unable to obtain any information from them. The same day Mrs E.T. told the applicants about the fate of their relatives. The applicants then contacted the gendarmerie and informed the offices of the prosecutor and the governor. 16.  On 8 March 1994 gendarmes found the bodies of the four men covered with soil and stones. They had all been shot dead and their heads smashed with stones. An on-site report prepared the same day stated that the killings had probably been carried out by members of the PKK in a revenge attack because the deceased had been village guards. However, the deceased had never agreed to become village guards, contrary to the advice of the gendarmerie. 17.  No other action was taken in the area by the gendarmes. They did not question the applicants or any of the persons present in the vicinity. 18.  Furthermore, no steps were taken by the Cizre prosecutor who, on 5 April 1994, sent the investigation file to the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court who had jurisdiction to continue the investigation. 19.  The investigation carried out by the prosecutor in Diyarbakır was limited to the sending of occasional letters to the gendarmerie, asking them to search for the perpetrators. The gendarmerie replied that they had been unable to find the perpetrators despite their searches. 20.  The number plate of the vehicle in which the applicants’ relatives had been travelling on 6 March 1994 was subsequently changed, and the vehicle continued to be used by confessors and other plain clothes officials in Cizre. 21.  The authorities unsuccessfully searched for the two confessors, MM. Güven and Yakın. The requests by the prosecutor to be informed of their whereabouts were ignored by the gendarmerie for a long time. Mr Güven was subsequently found and questioned by a police officer. Although the applicants were able to find Mr Yakın’s address and gave it to the authorities, no steps were taken to question him. During the eventual trial of the two confessors for homicide (see paragraphs 36-45 below), neither of them ever appeared before the Şırnak Assize Court (hereafter “the trial court”) to give evidence. 22.  The Government’s submissions were based on the documents drawn up by the national authorities in the course of the investigation, the trial and the compensation proceedings, which documents are summarised below. 23.  On 8 March 1994 the bodies of the four men were recovered by gendarmes and identified by villagers who were present in the area at the time. The gendarmes found five Kalashnikov-type spent bullet cases around the bodies. It was concluded in an on-site report prepared by the gendarmes that the four men had probably been killed by members of the PKK in order to deter other members of their families from becoming village guards. It was established that the four men had been killed where they were found. 24.  The same day the bodies were examined in situ by a doctor who concluded that the four men had been killed by gunshot wounds. The doctor, who observed a large number of bullet entry and exit holes on the bodies, deemed it unnecessary to conduct a full autopsy; the cause of death was established and that was sufficient. A bullet which had entered and exited the body of Abdulaziz Gasyak was secured for further examination. The Cizre prosecutor was also present at the time of the doctor’s examination. 25.  Also that day the Cizre prosecutor decided that his office lacked jurisdiction to investigate the killings “perpetrated by members of the illegal organisation” and sent the file to the Diyarbakır State Security Court prosecutor’s office (“the Diyarbakır prosecutor”). 26.  The Diyarbakır prosecutor instructed the gendarmerie on 18 April 1994 to search for the perpetrators of the killings. 27.  According to a ballistic examination, the five spent bullet cases had been fired by two separate weapons. 28.  On a number of occasions between 1 September 1995 and 22 March 2002, the gendarmerie reported to the Diyarbakır prosecutor that they had been “unable to find the perpetrators of the killings which, in all likelihood, had been carried out by members of the PKK”. On 16 February 2002 a number of soldiers had visited the place where the bodies had been found in 1994, but they had been unable to establish the identities of the perpetrators. 29.  On 11 July 2002 a lawyer representing the applicants wrote to the Diyarbakır prosecutor and asked him to investigate the killings. The lawyer pointed to the fact that none of the relatives of the deceased men or anyone living in the area where the bodies had been found had been questioned by the authorities. He also informed the prosecutor that Mr A.M. and Mrs E.T had witnessed the incidents. 30.  The applicants, who were questioned by the Diyarbakır prosecutor on 15 July 2002, stated that after the killing of their relatives they had been warned by the security forces not to make any complaints. They also told the prosecutor that no investigating authority had ever questioned them. 31.  The same day Mr A.M. and Mrs E.T were also questioned by the Diyarbakır prosecutor. They gave the prosecutor their eyewitness accounts of the events – which are summarised above (see paragraphs 10-11 and 14-15 above) – leading up to the killing of the four men. 32.  Also that day the Diyarbakır prosecutor decided that he lacked jurisdiction to investigate the killings because, although it had been stated by his opposite number in Cizre in 1994 that the killings had been carried out by members of the PKK (see paragraph 25 above), it was now being alleged by the applicants that their relatives had been killed on account of their refusals to become village guards. The two confessors and “their accomplices whose identities could not be determined” were referred to in this document as the “accused”. The Diyarbakır prosecutor then forwarded the file to the office of the Cizre prosecutor. 33.  The applicants and the two eyewitnesses, Mr A.M. and Mrs E.T, were questioned by the Cizre prosecutor on various dates in December 2002 and January and May 2003. They repeated their respective complaints and eyewitness accounts of the events. Mr A.M. also told the prosecutor that he would be willing to identify the two confessors in an identity parade. 34.  On 17 March 2003 Abdulhakim Güven, one of the two confessors allegedly involved in the killings, was questioned by a police officer. He denied the accusations against him. 35.  The other confessor, Adem Yakın, was questioned by the Cizre prosecutor on 15 July 2003. He also denied the accusations and stated that he had been performing his military service at the material time. 36.  On 5 August 2003 the Şırnak prosecutor filed an indictment with the Şırnak Assize Court (“the Şırnak court”), charging the two confessors with the offence of multiple homicide. 37.  In the course of its first hearing on 7 August 2003 the Şırnak court sent letters rogatory to the Assize Courts in Diyarbakır and Batman where the two defendants were living, and asked those courts to question the defendants. 38.  On 12 September 2003 the Diyarbakır Assize Court questioned Abdulhakim Güven who disputed the allegations and stated that at the time of the killings he had been in prison. 39.  During a hearing held on 9 October 2003, Mr A.M. and Mrs E.T repeated their eyewitness accounts before the Şırnak court. The same day the Şırnak court issued an arrest warrant for Adem Yakın. It also ordered that Abdulhakim Güven be photographed with a view to showing his photographs to the eyewitnesses. 40.  On 14 November 2003 Adem Yakın was arrested and questioned by the Batman Assize Court pursuant to the letters rogatory mentioned above. He denied the accusations and maintained that he had been performing his military service at the time of the killings. He was released the same day. 41.  On 30 March 2004 the lawyer for the applicants sent a letter to the Şırnak court, requesting permission for his clients to join the proceedings as interveners. This request was accepted on 12 October 2004. 42.  During the subsequent stages of the proceedings it transpired that on 28 February 1994 – that is, some six days before the killings – Abdulhakim Güven had been released from prison for a period of ten days with the permission of the Diyarbakır State Security Court so that he could “help the security forces with their anti-terrorism operations”. In fact, on various dates in 1994 he had been released from prison to help the security forces. 43.  The Şırnak court had to postpone a number of its hearings to wait for the photographs of Abdulhakim Güven. 44.  After having sent a number of reminders, on 27 January 2005 the Şırnak court was finally provided with the photographs of Abdulhakim Güven taken on 17 January 2005. During a hearing held on 29 March 2005, the eyewitness Mr A.M. was shown the photographs but was unable to identify Abdulhakim Güven. Mr A.M. told the Şırnak court that he had last seen Mr Güven more than ten years ago and that at that time Mr Güven had had a long beard; the person in the photograph did not have a beard. 45.  At the same hearing the prosecutor asked the Şırnak court to acquit the defendants. The Şırnak court accepted that request and acquitted the defendants for lack of sufficient evidence. It considered, in particular, that although Mr A.M. had been in a minibus with a number of other persons, he had been the only person to witness the alleged abduction of the four men. In any event, the defendants had been working as informers and helping the security forces. Such informers were not well regarded by the residents of the region and, as such, the testimony of Mr A.M. implicating the confessors in the killings was disregarded. According to the Şırnak court, the fact that Abdulhakim Güven was not in prison at the time of the killings did not prove that he had taken part in them. He had been helping the security forces with their operations and, as such, it was not logical that he would be involved in a killing. The Şırnak court also decided to inform the relevant prosecutor to continue with the search for the perpetrators. 46.  The applicants appealed. In their appeal petition they referred to the obligations under Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention to carry out effective investigations into incidents of killings, and alleged that the investigation into the killing of their relatives had been flawed. They maintained that the eyewitnesses had been consistent throughout the criminal investigation. The confessor Abdulhakim had lied to the investigating authorities when he said that he had been in prison on 6 March 1994 (paragraph 38 above). The Şırnak court had contented itself with showing the photographs of one of the defendants to an eyewitness and had not summoned the defendants to the trial. Furthermore, the investigating authorities had failed to follow up leads concerning the involvement of the gendarmerie and the security services and had only prosecuted the two confessors. They argued that the trial court had also failed to ensure an identity parade so that the eyewitnesses could have seen and identified the two confessors. 47.  On 14 November 2006 the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal and upheld the two defendants’ acquittals. 48.  In their letter of 20 August 2009 the applicants informed the Court that the same two confessors (that is, Mr Abdulhakim Güven and Mr Adem Yakın), a high-ranking army official and three intelligence officers working for the gendarmerie had been indicted in July 2009 and put on trial for the killing of their four relatives as well as the killing of a number of other persons at around the same time. 49.  On 25 July 2005 the second to fourth applicants, together with a number of other heirs of their deceased relatives, submitted petitions to the Şırnak Governor’s office and claimed compensation under the provisions of the Law on Compensation of the Losses resulting from Terrorism and the Measures Taken against Terrorism (Law no. 5233 of 27 July 2004). In their petitions the three applicants repeated their allegations of State involvement in the killings. 50.  On 10 July 2006 the Şırnak Governor’s office partially accepted the compensation claims made by the three applicants in respect of the killings of their relatives “by members of the PKK”. The second applicant Leyla Gasyak was awarded approximately 2,500 euros (EUR) in respect of the killing of her husband Süleyman Gasyak. The third applicant İsa Akman was awarded approximately EUR 5,000 in respect of the killing of his son Yahya Akman. The fourth applicant Hanım Candoruk was awarded approximately EUR 2,500 in respect of the killing of her husband Ömer Candoruk. Other heirs of these three deceased men were also awarded various sums of money.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Vorkuta, in the Republic of Komi. 6.  On 30 October 1996 police apprehended the applicant on suspicion of having committed theft from a garage, together with Sh. Upon arrival at the police station the applicant and Sh. admitted the charges. The applicant told the police the location of the garage they had robbed. It appears from the records of the applicant’s arrest and first questioning that his right to have legal assistance provided by the state or of his own choosing was explained to him. However, he declined the offer initially and said that he would appoint a counsel to defend him during the trial. 7.  On 1 November 1996 the applicant was remanded in custody. 8.  On 28 February 1997 the prosecution authorities referred the criminal case to the Vorkuta Town Court of the Republic of Komi (“the Town Court”) for trial. 9.  On 9 December 1997 the Town Court found that during the pre-trial investigation the applicant had been deprived of an opportunity to appoint legal counsel of his own choosing. In the Town Court’s view, the applicant’s defence rights had not been respected and the charges against him had been based to a large extent on his self-incriminating testimony. Furthermore, the Town Court established that the applicant had been in custody for a year and that he had contracted tuberculosis. In those circumstances it decided to release the applicant on the undertaking not to leave his place of residence, and returned the case to the prosecution authorities for further investigation. The Town Court ordered that all investigative measures, including questioning the applicant, should be conducted in the presence of the applicant’s legal counsel. 10.  In July 1998 the investigating authorities discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant in the absence of any corpus delicti. However, in November 1998 the Deputy Prosecutor of Vorkuta ordered them to be re-opened. 11.  On 18 December 2000 the Town Court examined the applicant’s case. The applicant was represented by K., a counsel appointed by him. The applicant and Sh. denied all charges. They submitted that they had confessed to theft to protect Sh.’s brother. The applicant refused to give any further testimony, relying on his right not to incriminate himself. 12.  The Town Court heard testimonies by a victim, several witnesses and the investigator in charge of the case, who stated that the applicant had been assisted by a lawyer throughout the proceedings, except at times when he had refused to call one. Each time his refusal had been noted in the records of questioning and endorsed by the applicant. The Town Court held that the applicant had admitted the charges and that other evidence examined in the trial proved his guilt. It dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant’s complaint that he had been questioned on occasion with no counsel present, finding that according to the records of questioning sessions signed by the applicant, he had declined to call a lawyer. 13.  On the same date the Town Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, but ordered the sentence to be lifted under the Amnesty Act of 26 May 2000. On 26 January 2001 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Komi (“the Supreme Court”) upheld the conviction on appeal. 14.  On 22 December 1998 the applicant brought a court action against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, seeking to recover lost wages and obtain compensation for his allegedly unlawful detention. He also claimed damages for his alleged infection with tuberculosis while in detention. He relied on Articles 1070 and 1100 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and claimed 150,000 Russian roubles (RUB). In the course of the proceedings, on 5 July 2001, the applicant increased his claim to RUB 300,000. 15.  In support of his claims concerning his alleged infection with tuberculosis, the applicant provided the Town Court with an extract of his medical record delivered by the hospital of the village of Severnyy on 23 October 1998, and medical certificates delivered by the tuberculosis dispensary of Vorkuta on 23 December 1997 and 5 August 1998. According to those documents the applicant had been diagnosed with tuberculosis in 1997, while in pre-trial detention, and had to follow regular in-patient and sanatorium therapy. 16.  The Town Court delivered its judgment on 23 January 2003. It held that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been lawful and dismissed his claim in respect of compensation for detention. It did not address the applicant’s complaint about his alleged infection with tuberculosis. On 17 March 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1933, 1938, 1952, 1948 and 1945 respectively, and live in Balıkesir and Istanbul. 5.  On 8 December 1972 the applicants' mother lodged a case with the Gönen Civil Court against the Treasury and the Office of the Headman of the Paşaçiftlik village (muhtarlık), requesting that plots of land nos. 117, 130, 135, 168, 274, 438, 494, 497 and 578 be registered in her name. Six other persons intervened in the case, laying claim to the same plots. 6.  On 28 March 1977 the Gönen Civil Court delivered a decision of non‑jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Gönen Cadastre Court. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicants' mother died. On 24 October 1984 the applicants informed the first-instance court that they wished to become parties to the proceedings, as heirs. 8.  On 18 March 2005 the court dismissed the applicants' case and held that the land should have been registered in the name of the interveners' heirs. 9.  On 22 June 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. 10.  On 4 March 2007 the first-instance court resumed the examination of the case following its remittal by the Court of Cassation. 11.  On 28 January 2009 the last hearing was held. 12.  According to the information submitted to the case file in June 2009, the proceedings are currently pending before the Gönen Cadastre Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1980, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1980, 1983, 1978 and 1983, respectively, and live in Istanbul. They were students at various faculties attached to Istanbul University at the time of the events. The applicants were also members of a group called Istanbul University Students’ Coordination (İstanbul Üniversite Öğrencileri Koordinasyonu). 5.  On 3 October 2002 Istanbul University held its opening ceremony for the academic year 2002-2003. During the ceremony, which was attended by politicians, businessmen and the press, the applicants were forcibly removed from the conference hall by plain clothed policemen and taken to Beyazıt police station, approximately 500-600 metres away from the university[1]. 6.  According to the incident report drafted by police officers at 12.15 p.m., the events unfolded as follows. At around 11.20 a.m., while the Chancellor Mr Alemdaroğlu was speaking, some students, from the upper stage of the hall, started shouting out “Freedom to University, an end to investigations” and “Oppression will not intimidate us, decree belongs to the State and the University to us”, and raised banners and placards with similar messages. They also held up enlarged photocopies of disciplinary sanctions given to various students, including one of the applicants, Mr Haşim Özgür Ersoy. Further to a request from the Chancellor’s security adviser, the police warned the students that theirs was an unlawful demonstration and that they were breaching public order by interfering with freedom of education and instruction and disrupting the ceremony. They were asked to come to the police station. However, since the students continued their protest and shouted out “Oppression will not intimidate us”, the police, together with the private security guards of the university, intervened and arrested nineteen students, including the applicants, by using force. The applicants were taken to Beyazıt police station. 7.  At 12.15 p.m. records of the applicants’ arrest were drawn up, which they refused to sign. 8.  At 2 p.m. the applicants were medically examined by a doctor at Haseki Hospital. At 4.55 p.m. they were again examined by a doctor at the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Department. 9.  The doctor at the Haseki Hospital noted that the applicant had ecchymosed lesions in the middle of her left arm. 10.  The doctor at the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Department noted that the applicant had a bruise of 2.5 cm on the middle inside part of her left arm and another bruise of 1 cm on the lower left arm. 11.  The doctor at Haseki Hospital found that the applicant had a skin graze and redness in her lower back region. 12.  The doctor at the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Department noted, in addition to the above, a skin graze of 1 cm on the right side of her neck. It was noted that the applicant had stated that she had sustained these injuries during the upheaval on the university stairs. 13.  The doctor at the Haseki Hospital found an area of bruising and swelling on the applicant’s forehead, bruises and swelling on the nose and a skin graze on the back of the right ear. Further medical analysis did not reveal any bleeding or other problems in the nasal region. 14.  The doctor at the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Department noted the same injuries on the applicant. It was further noted that, as regards the injury on his forehead, the applicant had stated that he had been punched in the face. As to the other injuries, the applicant failed to remember how they had happened during the commotion. 15.  The doctor at Haseki Hospital observed an area of bruising on the applicant’s left arm and four to five areas of redness of 2 cm x 1 cm on the right side of his neck. 16.  The doctor at the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Department noted a 2.5 cm area of bruising on the right shoulder and on the middle of his left arm. The applicant also had a skin graze of 0.5 cm on the middle front part of the neck and a 1 cm skin graze on the right upper and lower part of the neck. 17.  The doctors who examined the applicants found no signs of ill‑treatment on their bodies. In the report drafted by the doctor at the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Institute, it was noted that Ayfer Çiçek had refused to take off her clothes for the examination, stating that she had no injuries. 18.  On the same day the applicants were brought before the Istanbul public prosecutor’s office, from where they were released. The applicants allege that they were detained in police custody for about eleven and a half hours. 19.  On 9 October 2002 the applicants filed a complaint with the Istanbul public prosecutor against the university security guards and the police on duty at the conference hall that day. In their identical complaints, the applicants claimed that, during the Chancellor’s speech, a fellow student had got up to speak and had been impeded by a plain-clothes police officer. Then the applicants had also got up and had been beaten and arrested by the police. The applicants complained that their arms had been twisted and that they had been beaten, particularly on the head. They claimed that the beating had continued outside the conference hall. In the complaints it was also stated that the intervention by the security forces was an interference with their right to freedom of expression, and that they had the right to protest against the existing anti-democratic measures and express their desire for a democratic university at the opening ceremony. They submitted that their arrest and detention had been unlawful and that the disproportionate force used against them had constituted inhuman and degrading treatment. 20.  On 4 November 2002 the Istanbul public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute the police officers or the university security guards. In his decision, the public prosecutor noted that the applicants had breached public order by preventing freedom of education and by disrupting the ceremony when shouting slogans and raising banners. Despite having been invited to come to the police station and to end their unlawful demonstration, they had continued. As a result 19 students had been arrested and detained in police custody using force. It was noted that some of the plaintiffs had suffered minor injuries but others had suffered none, and that the police had had to use force because they had resisted arrest. 21.  On 22 November 2002 the applicants objected to the prosecutor’s decision. In particular, they submitted that the prosecutor had relied solely on police records and had failed to hear evidence from anyone, including themselves. They further challenged the official version that they had resisted arrest, stating that they had not been given any prior warning. 22.  On 26 December 2002 the Beyoğlu Assize Court dismissed the applicants’ objections. That decision was served on them on 18 January 2003. 23.  The Government informed the Court that no criminal proceedings had been instituted against the applicants in respect of the above event.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant company is based in Hoofddorp. Its business is publishing and marketing magazines, including the weekly Autoweek, which caters for readers who are interested in motoring. 10.  On 12 January 2002, an illegal street race was held in an industrial area on the outskirts of the town of Hoorn. Journalists of Autoweek attended this race at the invitation of its organisers. 11.  The applicant company state that the journalists were given the opportunity to take photographs of the street race and of the participating cars and persons on condition that they guarantee that the identities of all participants would remain undisclosed. The Government, for their part, dispute the existence of any agreement involving more than a small number of organisers or participants at most. 12.  The street race was ended by the police, who were present and eventually intervened. No arrests were made. 13.  The applicant company intended to publish an article about illegal car races in Autoweek no. 7/2002 of 6 February 2002. This article would be accompanied by photographs of the street race held on 12 January 2002. These photographs would be edited in such a manner that the participating cars and persons were unidentifiable, thus guaranteeing the anonymity of the participants in the race. The original photographs were stored by the applicant company on a CD-ROM, which was kept in the editorial office of a different magazine published by the applicant company (not Autoweek). 14.  The police and prosecuting authorities were afterwards led to suspect that one of the vehicles participating in the street race had been used as a getaway car following a ram raid on 1 February 2001 (see paragraphs 27-29 below). 15.  On the morning of Friday 1 February 2002, a police officer contacted the Autoweek editorial office by telephone, summoning the editors to surrender to the police all photographic materials concerning the street race of 12 January 2002. This police officer was informed by the staff member whom she had called, namely the features chief editor (chef reportage), that this request could not be met as the journalists had only been given permission to take photographs of the street race after having guaranteed the anonymity of the participants in the race. The features chief editor further told this police officer that he thought that the press was reasonably protected against this kind of action and advised her to contact the editorial office in writing. 16.  In the afternoon of 1 February 2002, at 2.30 p.m., two police detectives visited the Autoweek editorial office and, after having unsuccessfully tried to obtain the surrender of the photographs, issued Autoweek’s editor-in-chief with a summons, within the meaning of Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering). This summons had been issued by the Amsterdam public prosecutor; it ordered the applicant company to surrender, in the context of a criminal investigation into offences defined in Articles 310-312 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht) against an unspecified person, the photographs taken on 12 January 2002 during the illegal street race in Hoorn and all related materials. On behalf of the applicant company, Autoweek’s editor-in-chief Mr Broekhuijsen refused to surrender the photographs, considering this to be contrary to the undertaking given by the journalists to the street race participants as regards their anonymity. 17.  Later that day, a telephone conversation took place between, on the one side, two public prosecutors and, on the other, the lawyer of the applicant company Mr Jansen. Mr Jansen was told by the public prosecutors that “it concerned a matter of life and death”. No further explanation was given and Mr Jansen’s request for written confirmation that the matter was one of “life and death” was not entertained. 18.  The police detectives and the public prosecutors threatened to detain Mr Broekhuijsen during the weekend of 2 to 3 February or even longer for having acted in violation of Article 184 of the Criminal Code, i.e. the offence of failure to comply with an official order (ambtelijk bevel), and to seal and search the whole of the applicant company’s premises, if need be for the entire weekend period and beyond, and remove all computers. The threatened search would entail financial damage for the applicant company as, during that weekend, articles were to be prepared for publication on the subject of the wedding of the Netherlands Crown Prince, due to take place on 2 February 2002. 19.  At 6.01 p.m. on 1 February 2002, Mr Broekhuijsen was arrested on suspicion of having violated Article 184 of the Criminal Code. He was not taken to the police station but remained on the applicant company’s premises. After the Amsterdam public prosecutor had arrived on these premises and after he had been brought before the prosecutor, Mr Broekhuijsen was released at 10 p.m. 20.  The applicant company then consulted their counsel, Mr S., and a second lawyer, Mr D., the latter being a specialist in criminal procedure. At some point the CD-ROM was transferred to the lawyers’ offices unbeknown to the public prosecutor and the police investigators. Upon this, the public prosecutor and the other persons involved went to the lawyers’ offices. 21.  Mr D. spoke with the public prosecutors involved for some two hours, from 11.15 p.m. onwards. Taking the view that judicial authorisation was required, he sought and obtained the agreement of the public prosecutors to seek the intervention of the duty investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) of the Amsterdam Regional Court (rechtbank), who was then contacted by telephone. After having spoken with Mr D., and after having been briefed by one of the public prosecutors, the investigating judge expressed the view that the needs of the criminal investigation outweighed the applicant company’s journalistic privilege. While recognising from the outset that by law he lacked competence in the matter, he also stated that, had he had the power to do so, he would have been prepared to give an order to that effect and even to sanction a search of the offices. 22.  On 2 February 2002 at 1.20 a.m., the applicant company, through Mr S. and Mr D. and under protest, surrendered the CD-ROM containing the photographs to the public prosecutor, who formally seized it. An official receipt issued by a police officer describes it as a CD-ROM in purpose-made packaging, the packaging labelled in handwriting “Photos Illegal Street Races, ANWB [Royal Netherlands Tourist Association] driving simulator, sidecar motorcycle with coffin”. The receipt stated that Mr S. had handed over the CD-ROM under protest. 23.  On 15 April 2002 the applicant company lodged a complaint under Article 552a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking the lifting of the seizure and restitution of the CD‑ROM, an order to the police and prosecution department to destroy copies of the data recorded on the CD-ROM and an injunction preventing the police and prosecution department from taking cognisance or making use of information obtained through the CD-ROM. 24.  On 5 September 2002 a hearing was held before the Regional Court during which the public prosecutor explained why the surrender of the photographs had been found necessary. The summons complained of had been issued in the context of a criminal investigation concerning serious criminals who had pulled cash dispensers out of walls with the aid of a shovel loader, and there was reason to believe that a car used by participants in the street race could lead to the perpetrator(s) of those robberies. 25.  In its decision of 19 September 2002 the Regional Court granted the request to lift the seizure and to return the CD-ROM to the applicant company as the interests of the investigation did not oppose this. It rejected the remainder of the applicant company’s complaint. It found the seizure lawful and, on this point, considered that a publisher/journalist could not, as such, be regarded as enjoying the privilege of non-disclosure (verschoningsrecht) under Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Statutorily, the persons referred to in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and acknowledged as enjoying the privilege of non-disclosure were, amongst others, public notaries, lawyers and doctors. It considered that the right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, included the right freely to gather news (recht van vrije nieuwsgaring) which, consequently, deserved protection unless outweighed by another interest warranting priority. It found that, in the instant case, the criminal investigation interest outweighed the right to free gathering of news in that, as explained by the public prosecutor during the hearing, the investigation at issue did not concern the illegal street race, in which context the undertaking of protection of sources had been given, but an investigation into other serious offences. The Regional Court was therefore of the opinion that the case at hand concerned a situation in which the protection of journalistic sources should yield to general investigation interests, the more so as the undertaking to the journalistic source concerned the street race whereas the investigation did not concern that race. It found established that the data stored on the CD-ROM had been used for the investigation of serious offences and that it had been made clear by the prosecutor that these data were relevant to the investigation at issue as all other investigation avenues had led to nothing. It therefore concluded that the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity had been complied with and that the interference had thus been justified. The Regional Court did not find that the seizure had been rash, although more tactful action on the part of the police and the public prosecutor might have prevented the apparent escalation of the matter. 26.  The applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), which on 3 June 2003 gave a decision declaring it inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that, as the Regional Court had accepted the applicant company’s complaint in so far as it related to the request to lift the seizure and to return the CD-ROM, the applicant company no longer had an interest in its appeal against the ruling of 19 September 2002. Referring to its earlier case-law (Supreme Court, 4 October 1988, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (Netherlands Law Reports – “NJ”) 1989, no. 429, and Supreme Court, 9 January 1990, NJ 1990, no. 369), it held that this finding was not altered by the circumstance that the complaint – apart from a request to return the CD-ROM – also contained a request to order that any print-outs or copies of the CD-ROM were to be destroyed and that data collected with the aid of the CD-ROM could not be used: neither Article 552a nor any other provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for the possibility of obtaining a declaratory ruling that the seizure or the use of the seized item was unlawful once the item had been returned. 27.  The order issued under Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure was closely related to a criminal investigation into a series of ram raids which had taken place on 20 September 2001, 6 November 2001 and 30 November 2001. In these ram raids, cash dispensers were removed from walls using a shovel loader. A group of suspects was identified, the main suspects being A and M. 28.  A telephone conversation involving M, tapped in the context of the investigation into those raids on 12 January 2002, revealed that M and A had participated in an illegal street race in Hoorn with an Audi RS4 motor car earlier that day. 29.  On 1 February 2002 another ram raid took place. During the incident, a bystander was threatened with a firearm. After ramming a wall, the perpetrators removed a cash dispenser and hauled it off in a lorry, which was followed closely by an Audi RS4. The police, who had already been informed of the incident, saw the lorry stop and the driver get into an Audi, which then drove away with three people inside. The police followed, but the Audi accelerated to over 200 kilometres per hour and disappeared from view.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Duderstadt. 5.  On 25 May 1997 the applicant had a traffic accident and suffered severe injuries. He disagreed with the insurance companies involved about the seriousness of his permanent injuries and the amount of insurance benefits due. Three expert medical opinions concerning the degree of his invalidity produced differing results. The dispute resulted in three sets of court proceedings, only one of which is the subject of the present application. 6.  On 28 November 2001 the applicant brought a claim for 219,000 German marks (DEM, 111,972.92 euros (EUR)) plus interest before the Göttingen Regional Court. The claim was registered under file number 2 O 503/01. Prior to the institution of the proceedings he had already been paid DEM 231,000.00 (EUR 118,108.42) by the insurance company. 7.  On 15 May 2002 the court suggested a friendly settlement, which the parties did not accept. 8.  On 8 August 2002 a hearing was held. 9.  On 29 August 2002 the Regional Court ordered a comprehensive expert report regarding the degree of the applicant’s invalidity up to 25 May 2000. The expert was asked not to take into account any developments in the applicant’s health which occurred after that date. 10.  On 19 September 2002 the court sent the files to the appointed expert. 11.  On 16 October 2002 it received the expert’s observation that additional expert reports in the field of thoracic surgery, neurology and psychiatry were also necessary. He suggested two suitable experts. 12.  On 31 October 2002 both the applicant and the defendant consented to the two additional expert opinions and agreed with the proposed choice of experts. 13.  On 14 February 2003 the court received the additional opinion from the thoracic surgery expert, dated 30 January 2003. It informed the applicant but failed to inform the defendant. 14.  On 24 June and 16 September 2003 the applicant asked the court about the status of the proceedings and urged it to expedite the completion of the outstanding expert opinions. 15.  On 26 June and 20 November 2003 the court replied to him that the case files had been sent to an expert in the parallel proceedings. 16.  On 26 January 2004 the applicant asked the court to retrieve the case files from the parallel proceedings. 17.  On 4 May 2004 the applicant informed the court that the expert opinion in the parallel proceedings had already been concluded in 2003 and asked about the whereabouts of the case files. 18.  On 26 July 2004 the court informed the applicant that the expert opinion which had been drawn up in the parallel proceedings would also be considered in the present proceedings. 19.  On 30 September 2004 the applicant opposed this, observing that on 31 October 2002 the parties had agreed upon the experts to be appointed in these proceedings and that the expert opinion in the parallel proceedings was deficient and concerned the applicant’s state of health at the present time, not on 25 May 2000. 20.  On 13 June 2005 the case files and the medical documentation were resubmitted to the main expert. 21.  In the summer of 2005 the defendant was notified of the opinion of the thoracic surgery expert and criticised it on several grounds. 22.  On 14 September 2005 the main expert reminded the court of the need to appoint an additional expert for a neurological and psychiatric expert opinion. 23.  On 1 December 2005 the court appointed the expert whom the parties had agreed upon on 31 October 2002 to prepare the additional neurological and psychiatric expert opinion. 24.  On 6 December 2005 the case files were sent to the neurological and psychiatric expert. 25.  On 10 January 2006 that expert indicated that he wished to involve an additional expert who would draw up a separate expert opinion with regard to the psychiatric aspects. On 31 January 2006 the applicant consented. 26.  On 23 February 2006 the applicant was examined by both experts. 27.  On 16 March 2006 the applicant challenged the main expert on grounds of bias, on the basis of his conduct as an expert in the parallel proceedings. 28.  On 24 March 2006 the court requested the main expert to send back the case files so that it could rule on the challenge for bias. 29.  On 3 April 2006 the main expert submitted his comments on the challenge for bias and sent the case files back to the court. 30.  On 11 August 2006 the applicant urged the court to decide on the challenge for bias and to set a time-limit for the submission of the neurological and psychiatric expert opinions. 31.  On 24 August 2006 the court informed the applicant that the neurological and psychiatric experts had undertaken to submit their opinions by 10 September 2006. 32.  On 10 October 2006 the court urged the neurological and psychiatric experts to submit the opinions but received no answer. 33.  On 11 October 2006 the applicant inquired whether the neurological and psychiatric expert opinions had been submitted. 34.  On 21 October 2006 the present case was transferred to the Sixth Civil Division of the Regional Court and was filed under the number 6 O 95/06. 35.  On 8 December 2006 the applicant again asked the court to set a time-limit for the neurological and psychiatric expert opinions. 36.  On 31 January 2007 the court asked the neurological expert to submit the expert opinions but received no answer. 37.  On 8 February 2007 the applicant reminded the court to urge the expert to submit the neurological and psychiatric expert opinions. 38.  On 12 January 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court concerning the undue length of the proceedings. 39.  On 2 February 2007, the Federal Constitutional Court requested the Regional Court to provide a status update on the proceedings, which the latter transmitted on 22 February 2007 after having requested the neurological and psychiatric experts to return the files. The submissions of the Regional Court, however, mainly explained the circumstances of the parallel proceedings. 40.  Following a corresponding request by the Federal Constitutional Court, the Regional Court transmitted copies of the case files on 9 June 2007 and returned the original files to the neurological and psychiatric expert. 41.  On 20 September 2007 the Federal Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to an effective remedy pursuant to Articles 2(1) and 20(3) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) in the present case on account of the length of the proceedings before the Göttingen Regional Court by explicitly referring to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It observed that the delay between the order of 29 August 2002 to prepare a comprehensive expert opinion and the forwarding of the case files to the neurological and psychiatric expert on 6 December 2005 was contrary to the principle of expeditious proceedings. In this connection it noted that the Regional Court had been aware of the necessity of a neurological and psychiatric expert opinion since 16 October 2002 but had failed to pursue the proceedings which were merely handled as a file joined to the parallel proceedings between June 2003 and August 2004, at least. It found that the Regional Court should have produced copies of the entire case files to facilitate expeditious proceedings and simultaneous examination by the numerous experts. It also found that the court had failed to adopt adequate procedural measures, which the applicant had suggested on several occasions, to facilitate the submission of the neurological and psychiatric expert opinions. It further observed that the Regional Court had failed to decide on the applicant’s challenge for bias against the main expert without giving any reasons. It stated that the Regional Court would subsequently have to take all appropriate measures to expedite the proceedings. 42.  On 15 October 2007 the Federal Constitutional Court sent back the case files to the Regional Court. 43.  On 25 October 2007 the Eighth Civil Division of the Regional Court, under the new file number 8 O 133/07, set a time-limit of 19 November 2007 for the neurological expert to submit his opinions. 44.  On 23 November 2007 the applicant suggested that the neurological expert’s appointment be withdrawn and that a partial judgment be pronounced. 45.  On 29 November 2007 the court extended the time-limit for the neurological expert until 17 December 2007, on pain of a fine of EUR 500. 46.  On 21 December 2007 a neurological expert opinion dated 17 December 2007 and an additional psychiatric expert opinion dated 6 June 2006 were submitted to the court. The neurological expert opinion was forwarded to the applicant on 7 January 2008. 47.  On 21 December 2007 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s challenge for bias against the main expert. 48.  On 21 January 2008 the applicant appealed against this decision. His appeal was dismissed by the Braunschweig Court of Appeal on 7 March 2008. 49.  On 10 June 2008 the neurological expert was heard by the Regional Court with a view to solving preliminary questions regarding the main expert opinion. The Court further heard the thoracic surgery expert regarding his expert opinion dated 30 January 2003. 50.  On 16 July 2008 the files were sent to the main expert for the preparation of an expert opinion. 51.  The case is still pending before the Regional Court to this date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Eisenstadt. 5.  The applicant is a judge at the Eisenstadt Regional Court. In July 1997 he made a study visit to the Commission of the European Union in Brussels. The Federal Ministry of Justice paid his travel expenses and granted the applicant two weeks’ special leave, in addition to which he took two weeks of his annual leave. 6.  On 9 July 1997 the Federal Minister of Justice informed the applicant on his return that it would not reimburse any of the additional expenses he had claimed in the meantime on 20 June 1997. 7.  On 5 September 1997 the applicant formally requested the reimbursement of further costs, incurred during the study visit, in particular the costs for his accommodation in the amount of Austrian schillings 17,699.75 (ATS - 1,284.11 euros (EUR)), and submitted additional records. 8.  On 20 March 1998 the Federal Minister dismissed the applicant’s request on the grounds that the trip had not been an official journey – this having been made clear by the fact that the applicant had taken some annual leave during that period. 9.  On 3 June 1998 the applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court. He submitted that the Federal Minister had interpreted the relevant law incorrectly and that if he had properly assessed the evidence he would have concluded that the study visit to Brussels had to be treated as an official journey. 10.  On 30 January 2002 the Administrative Court quashed the Federal Minister’s decision finding that the President of the Vienna Court of Appeal had been the authority competent to decide on the request for reimbursement at first instance, rather than the Federal Minister. 11.  Thereupon, the matter was transferred to the President of the Vienna Court of Appeal who requested the applicant and the Federal Minister to submit explanations regarding the study visit. 12.  On 17 September 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint (Säumnis­beschwerde) with the Administrative Court against the alleged failure of the President of the Court of Appeal to decide on his request within the statutory six-month time-limit. 13.  On 23 October 2002 the Administrative Court rejected the complaint because the applicant had not made a prior request under Section 73 of the General Administrative Procedure Act for jurisdiction to be transferred to the Federal Minister of Justice as the authority responsible for hearing appeals. 14.  On 29 November 2002 the President of the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request for reimbursement of the costs of his accommodation in Brussels on the grounds that the applicant had not been given instructions for an official journey and had not performed any official duties during his stay in Brussels. Therefore he was not entitled to reimbursement of his costs. 15.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against that decision to the Federal Minister of Justice. 16.  On 4 February 2003 the Federal Minister dismissed the applicant’s appeal, confirming the findings in the first-instance decision. 17.  On 14 April 2003 the applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court against the Federal Minister’s decision. He submitted that while acknowledging that his trip had been in the interest of his official duties (dienstliches Interesse), the Minister had incorrectly assumed that the applicant’s study visit was not to be treated as an official journey. The applicant did not ask for a hearing before the Administrative Court. 18.  On 24 February 2006 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the Minister had correctly assessed the evidence before him and had correctly concluded that the applicant’s study trip had not been treated as an official journey.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Lublin. 6.  The applicant was a surgeon at the Hospital no. 4 in Lublin with thirty‑two years of practice and who started kidney‑transplant operations there. He was also an assistant professor at the Lublin Medical Academy. 7.  In 1998 the applicant was diagnosed with sleep apnoea (a sleep disorder characterised by pauses in breathing during sleep) and since then was required to use a respirator when asleep. 8.  At 6 a.m. on 1 June 2006 five armed plain‑clothes police officers came to the applicant’s flat to arrest him. According to the applicant, they were violently knocking on the door. They presented the prosecutor’s order for the applicant’s arrest. 9.  At about 8 a.m. the applicant was brought in handcuffs to his clinic. The event was seen by hospital staff and patients. The police searched the applicant’s locker. The applicant’s arrest was filmed by one of the police officers. Subsequently, the applicant was brought to the Lublin Regional Police Headquarters where he was questioned. He was informed of the bribe‑taking charges against him. 10.  After questioning, the applicant was taken to the Lublin Military Hospital for a medical check. Doctor O. issued a certificate that the applicant could be held in detention and recommended the use of the respirator. 11.  Subsequently, the applicant was brought to the Lublin‑Północ District Prosecutor. The prosecutor charged him with ten counts of accepting material benefits from his patients for medical treatment and/or making the provision of such treatment conditional upon receiving material benefits (Article 228 § 1 and Article 228 § 4 of the Criminal Code respectively). The charges related to the period between 1997 and 2004 and the impugned amounts ranged from 100 to 500 zlotys (approx. 25 to 125 euros). 12.  The applicant submitted that on 1 June he had been twice approached by police officers from the anti‑corruption unit and once three months later. According to the applicant, they promised him a beneficial treatment if he would confess and name other doctors engaged in corrupt practices. The applicant refused. 13.  On 1 June 2006 the Lublin District Court granted the prosecution’s request and remanded the applicant in custody until 1 September 2006. It found as follows:\n“The prosecution’s request is well‑founded and should be granted. The evidence gathered so far in the proceedings points to a strong likelihood – within the meaning of Article 249 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – that the suspect committed the misdemeanours with which he was charged. [That likelihood] is shown by the depositions of the witnesses who described in an extensive and precise manner the circumstances concerning the acts imputed to the suspect.\nThe suspect is charged with commission of ten misdemeanours; in respect of each of those misdemeanours he is liable to a maximum sentence of at least 8 years’ imprisonment, and thus the need to apply detention on remand in order to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings is justified by the severe penalty to which the suspect is liable. The real possibility that such a penalty would be imposed follow from the multitude of acts, their character and circumstances.\nThe reasons militating against the imposition of detention on remand specified in Article 259 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not identified. The suspect does not have dependent children, and as regards his state of health, it transpires from his medical examination that he may be held in a “room for arrested persons” possessing a respirator and medication.” 14.  At about 6 p.m. on 1 June 2006 the applicant was taken to the Lublin Detention Centre. According to the applicant, he was put in a cell of 10 square meters with five other inmates. He was afraid that one of them could unplug his respirator. 15.  The applicant appealed against the detention order. He argued that the imposition of detention on remand could seriously jeopardise his life or health as he suffered from sleep apnoea. In the case of a power cut or the unplugging of the respirator by one of the co‑detainees the applicant would be exposed to a risk to his life. He also argued that the certificate issued by doctor O. concerned a short period of detention and did not attest that he could be held in detention for a period of three months. Secondly, he submitted that there were no concrete circumstances to substantiate the risk that he would obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings if non‑custodial measures had been applied. On the contrary, the applicant was a surgeon enjoying good professional reputation and a law‑abiding citizen. 16.  On 20 June 2006 a group of doctors from the hospital no. 4 and the Lublin Medical Academy petitioned the Lublin District Prosecutor to release the applicant. The applicant did not submit any information about the follow‑up to this petition. 17.  On 22 June 2006 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the detention order of 1 June 2006. It found, inter alia, that:\n“The suspect is charged, among others, with the offence specified in Article 228 § 4 of the Criminal Code in respect of which he is liable to a sentence exceeding eight years’ imprisonment. It should be noted that the circumstances concerning the significant social danger of the suspect’s acts, his base motives, the large number of acts and their character justify the supposition that the imposition of a severe penalty of imprisonment within the meaning of Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a real possibility. By “the liability to severe penalty” in the light of this provision it should be understood that the fact of having charged a suspect with a crime or misdemeanour for which he is liable to a statutory maximum sentence of at least eight years’ imprisonment gives rise to a legal presumption that the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed may prompt the suspect to undertake actions obstructing the proper conduct of the proceedings (decision of the Supreme Court of 29 August 2000, case no. II KZ 115/00, unreported).\nIn the light of the foregoing it is necessary to impose detention on remand in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, and other more lenient preventive measures may have been insufficient at the present stage of the proceedings.” 18.  As regards the applicant’s state of health, the Regional Court found no reasons indicating that holding him in custody would seriously jeopardise his life or health. It noted that the applicant was provided with constant medical care in detention and that he could be detained in an appropriate medical establishment if his condition so required. 19.  According to the applicant, on 10 July 2006 he was chained and taken to a hospital for examination of his lungs. 20.  On 22 August 2006 the Lublin Regional Medical Chamber issued a guarantee for the applicant and requested the authorities to vary the preventive measure. No further information was provided by the applicant in this respect. 21.  On 28 August 2006 the Lublin District Court extended the applicant’s detention on remand until 1 December 2006. It found that the investigation could not have been concluded within the period of three months due to “particular circumstances of the case”, namely the need to hear evidence from a very large number of witnesses – patients treated by the applicant. On that ground it was justified under Article 263 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prolong the applicant’s detention beyond the ordinary three‑month period. 22.  The District Court found that the initial reasons justifying the applicant’s detention, namely the reasonable suspicion of having committed the impugned offences and the real risk of a severe sentence being imposed were still valid. It noted that the evidence gathered so far in the case pointed to the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. Furthermore, the character of the imputed acts, their number and legal classification indicated the severity of the penalty to which he was liable (eight or ten years’ imprisonment depending on the charge). In the court’s view, the significant social danger of the imputed acts and the manner in which the applicant had operated made the imposition of a severe penalty very likely. According to the court, other, non‑custodial, preventive measures would not have been sufficient to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings since the applicant might unlawfully obstruct the proceedings if released, in particular as the investigation was still ongoing. 23.  The District Court held that the applicant’s release on health grounds was not called for. According to a medical certificate of 28 August 2006 he suffered from some ailments but could be treated in the prison. In addition, he was provided with medical care. 24.  The applicant’s lawyer appealed on 29 August 2006. He submitted that the acts imputed to the applicant could not have been considered as criminal offences but as acts of gratitude of customary nature. He underlined that the lower court’s finding that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings was entirely groundless and arbitrary supposition. In addition, the applicant’s personal circumstances before the commission of the imputed acts indicated that the penalty to be imposed on him would not have been severe. Furthermore, the lawyer argued that having regard to the applicant’s condition (sleep apnoea) his continued detention had serious negative implications for his health. In the alternative, the lawyer requested the court to impose non‑custodial preventive measures. 25.  On 31 August 2006 the Lublin Regional Court held a hearing to examine the applicant’s appeal. The adoption of a decision was postponed at the request of the applicant’s lawyer who wished to obtain information from the detention centre whether the applicant had been able to use the respirator and whether his illness might be treated in detention. The applicant was examined by a doctor of the Lublin Remand Centre on 22 September 2006. He was diagnosed, inter alia, with hypertension, sleep apnoea, hypertrophic cardiomyopathy (HCM) and cardiac dysrhythmia. The doctor found that the applicant’s general condition was relatively good and opined that he could be treated in detention. The medical certificate was received by the court on the same day. 26.  The court scheduled the next hearing for 28 September 2006. The hearing was adjourned since the court considered it necessary to obtain a forensic opinion from the Lublin Medical Academy as to whether the applicant’s illness could be treated in detention. On 16 October 2006 the Lublin Medical Academy informed the court that the requested opinion could not be prepared because the applicant was its employee. On 17 October the court requested the Poznań Medical Academy to prepare a forensic opinion. The request was repeated on 8 November 2006. The opinion was submitted on 15 November 2006. It stated that the applicant’s ailments were of chronic nature and that there was no possibility of a complete recovery. The opinion concluded that the applicant could be treated in detention. In view of his condition, it was necessary to ensure to the applicant frequent medical checks, in particular by a cardiologist and pulmonologist and the regular administration of prescribed drugs. Furthermore, he should be ensured the use of his respirator. 27.  The applicant submitted that the opinion of 15 November 2006 had been prepared solely on the basis of his medical records. He was not consulted or examined by doctors from the Poznań Medical Academy. 28.  On 23 November 2006 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision. It concurred with the lower court that the basic condition for the applicant’s detention on remand, namely the reasonable suspicion of having committed the impugned offences, had been satisfied (Article 249 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In addition, the particular condition set out in Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (severity of the likely penalty) had also been satisfied. In this respect, the Regional Court invoked the same elements as in its earlier decision which warranted the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant (see paragraph 17 above). It further noted that Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed might induce the applicant to obstruct the proceedings. In this regard the court stated that:\n“The court applying detention on remand is thus under no obligation to indicate that the suspect will surely undertake such actions [aimed at obstruction of the proceedings].”\nThe court found that the applicant’s continued detention on remand was necessary in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings and that no other preventive measures would have been sufficient at this stage of the proceedings. 29.  The Regional Court further found that the applicant’s state of health did not justify his release. It relied on a medical certificate of 22 September 2006 and the expert report of 15 November 2006. It further noted that the applicant could be detained in an appropriate medical establishment had his condition so required. 30.  On 29 November 2006 the Lublin District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 1 March 2007. It further held that the applicant would be released if he put up bail in the amount of PLN 30,000 (approx. EUR 7,500) by 13 December 2006. The court found that it was justified to prolong the applicant’s detention beyond the ordinary three‑month period. It noted that since August 2006 the prosecutor questioned several dozen of witnesses and as a result he charged the applicant with the commission of at least ten additional offences under Article 228 § 1 and Article 228 § 4 of the Criminal Code. It also noted that the case could develop further since the prosecutor had planned to question many more witnesses. 31.  The court found that the reasons justifying the applicant’s detention on remand were still valid. The evidence in the case supported the reasonable suspicion against the applicant. Furthermore, the number of charges (at least twenty at the time of the court’s decision) and other elements relied on by the court earlier indicated that the applicant was likely to be sentenced to a severe penalty. However, having regard to the fact that the most severe preventive measure had been already applied for nearly six months and that the prosecutor had carried out many investigatory acts, the court found that bail would be a sufficient measure to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings at that stage. 32.  Lastly, relying on the medical certificate of 22 September 2006 and the expert report of 15 November 2006 the court found that the applicant’s state of health did militate against his detention on remand. 33.  The bail was paid and the applicant was released on 30 November 2006. 34.  On 7 December 2006 the Lublin Regional Court dismissed the prosecution’s appeal against the decision to release the applicant on bail. It agreed with the lower court that the particular condition set out in Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (severity of the likely penalty) had been satisfied in the applicant’s case. However, the fact of this condition being satisfied could not lead to automatic extension of detention on remand. In accordance with Article 257 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the application of the most severe preventive measure was limited to exceptional cases, namely those where there were grounds to assume that other measures would not have been sufficient to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. In the court’s view, at the current stage of the proceedings, the application of detention on remand was not appropriate since – in accordance with the principle of proportionality of the application of preventive measures – they should be applied in the manner that was commensurate to the existing risk to the proper conduct of the proceedings. The court found that in the present case there had been no grounds to consider that the applicant would have interfered with the proper conduct of the proceedings because of the severity of the likely penalty. The applicant made his statements in the case, was not previously convicted and had a permanent abode. It was incorrect on the part of the prosecutor to argue that the risk of obstructing the proceedings was justified by the fact that the case could have developed further and the related necessity to question more witnesses. The court emphasised that the severity of the likely penalty alone did not constitute a sufficient ground for application of detention on remand unless it was linked with a substantiated risk that a suspect might take actions obstructing the proper conduct of the proceedings with a view to avoiding the likely penalty. The evidence collected in the case did not provide any grounds for such an assumption. The court concluded that bail would be a sufficient preventive measure in the applicant’s case. 35.  The applicant submitted that during his detention he had been intimidated by the authorities in various ways. Apparently, his respirator was damaged by the prison guards during searches of the cell. He was made to wait five weeks in pain for a visit to a dentist. He was not provided with a cheap drug against his hypertension. For two weeks he was put in cell no. 60 with five smokers which was very difficult given his condition. Later, he was put in cell no. 38 which had been previously occupied by prisoners suffering from tuberculosis but had not been disinfected. In that cell there was a toilet annex which did not provide any privacy. 36.  According to the medical certificate of 1 December 2006 issued by a specialist in lung diseases the symptoms of the applicant’s sleep disorder intensified. He recommended that the applicant be treated in a specialised institute in Warsaw. 37.  In December 2006 and April 2007 the applicant was hospitalised and diagnosed with ischaemic heart disease. According to the medical certificate of 28 December 2006 the applicant had lost 26 kilograms in weight. Due to his condition following the release the applicant has been unable to practise as a doctor for a certain time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  Between 4.25 and 5.30 p.m. on 27 July 2007 the police, in the presence of the applicant, searched his house and found drugs allegedly belonging to him. After the search the applicant was taken to the Leninskyy District Police Station of Sevastopol and questioned about the matter. He was not allowed to leave the police station. According to the Government, at an unspecified time on the same day the applicant was detained under Article 263 of the Minor Offences Code; no document concerning this has been made available to the Court. 7.  At 7 p.m. on 28 July 2007 an investigator drew up a detention record, pursuant to Article 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”), regarding the applicant, who was suspected of drug dealing committed on 27 July 2007. The applicant was then placed in the Sevastopol City Temporary Detention Centre (Севастопольський міський ізолятор тимчасового тримання, “the ITT”). 8.  According to the applicant, at the police station he was subjected to psychological pressure as a result of which he confessed to the possession of drugs and drug dealing. 9.  On 30 July 2007 he was charged with drug dealing. Subsequently, new charges were brought against him and joined to the case. In particular, he was charged with the illegal possession of drugs in May-July 2007 and during his detention in Simferopol Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit no. 15 (Сімферопольський слідчий ізолятор № 15, “the SIZO”). 10.  By a decision of 31 July 2007 the Leninskyy District Court of Sevastopol (“the District Court”) held that it was necessary to make further enquiries about the applicant and decided to remand him in custody for ten days. On the same date a lawyer of the applicant’s own choosing was given permission to take part in the proceedings. 11.  On 1 August 2007 the Tuberculosis Healthcare Centre in Sevastopol (“the TB Centre”) issued a certificate indicating that the applicant had been registered there since 2000 and was suffering from “chronic infiltrative tuberculosis (“TB”) of the left lung (degeneration phase: MBT+)”, that he had undergone in-patient medical treatment from 2 to 13 March 2007 and “from 16 April to 28 July 2007, when [he had been] discharged [from the TB Centre] for a violation of therapeutic regimen”, and that it was appropriate for him to be held in cells for persons suffering from an active form of TB. 12.  On 6 August 2007 the District Court remanded the applicant to the ITT pending his transfer to the SIZO, without any indication of how long he would stay there. It noted that the applicant had been convicted of drug‑related offences on several occasions, that he was suspected of having committed a serious crime, and that he had continued to engage in similar criminal activities after having served a prison sentence in October 2006. The court also took into account information obtained from the TB Centre about the applicant’s health condition. 13.  According to the applicant, on 9 August 2007 he appealed against the remand order, stating in particular that he was not fit enough to remain in detention owing to the TB. On 29 September 2007 he lodged a complaint with the Leninskyy District Prosecutors’ Office of Sevastopol alleging that from 27 to 28 July 2007 his detention had been unlawful. There is no information as to the outcome of the appeal and complaint or indication that the complaint was received by the authorities. 14.  On completion of the investigations the applicant’s case was referred for trial to the District Court, which, according to the applicant, held its first hearing in the case on 4 November 2007. According to the Government, this hearing was held on 1 November 2007. 15.  On 15 May 2008 the applicant was transferred to the SIZO, but was periodically held at the ITT. 16.  According to the applicant, on 17 June 2008 he lodged a complaint with the Leninskyy District Prosecutors’ Office and the District Court, again alleging that his detention from 27 to 28 July 2007 had been unlawful. No document concerning this has been made available to the Court. 17.  In a judgment of 24 October 2008 the court found the applicant guilty of the illegal possession of drugs and drug dealing, sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of all his property. 18.  On 23 December 2008 the Sevastopol Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the judgment, finding that the first-instance court had not questioned the applicant on each of the charges against him, and it remitted the case to the latter court for fresh consideration. The Court of Appeal also ordered the applicant to remain in detention, without providing reasons or a time-limit for the continued detention. 19.  In 2009 the applicant’s representative unsuccessfully tried to institute administrative court proceedings against the trial court, mainly for its failure to try the applicant in due time. 20.  On 29 March 2010 the District Court ordered the Prosecutor’s Office of the Leninsky District to investigate the applicant’s complaints of psychological and physical pressure applied to him by unspecified police officers. On 31 March 2010 a prosecutor, having interviewed the police officers involved in the applicant’s arrest and having studied his detention documents, found the complaints unsubstantiated. 21.  In a judgment of 6 April 2010 the District Court convicted the applicant on four counts of drug dealing and running a centre for the production and use of illicit drugs, while striking off one count for want of proof of a crime. The applicant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property was ordered. 22.  According to the parties’ last submissions, on 16 November 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the first instance judgment. The applicant received a copy of the decision on 25 January 2011. There is no indication whether he appealed in cassation. 23.  According to the Government, during the criminal proceedings the courts and police heard fifteen witnesses and seven other suspects. Five forensic examinations were carried out. 24.  Out of the twenty-seven court hearings scheduled in the course of the proceedings, thirteen were held, while four were adjourned for unknown reasons, two were adjourned due to both witness’s failure to appear and the applicant’s convoy’s failure to bring him to the court, two were adjourned owing to the applicant’s convoy’s failure to bring him to the court, two were adjourned owing to the presiding judge’s sickness, and one each was adjourned owing to prosecutor’s vacation or his procedural request, the applicant’s studying the case file, both the presiding judge’s sickness and the applicant’s convoy’s failure to bring him to the court. 25.  During the proceedings, the trial court ordered the police to escort witnesses for the hearings on 14 November 2007, 30 September and 9 November 2009. On the last-mentioned date the court adopted a separate resolution (окрема постанова), finding that the ITT had failed to escort the applicant to the hearings on a number of occasions. The court also requested the city police and prosecutors to ensure the applicant’s escort to hearings. The applicant failed to lodge one of his appeals properly; it is unspecified how that delayed the proceedings. 26.  On 28 July 2007 the applicant informed the ITT that he had an active form of TB and was placed in a special cell. There is no indication whether the ITT had a medical practitioner on its staff. 27.  On 8 February 2008 the TB Centre confirmed the applicant’s diagnosis and specified that he required a prolonged course of chemotherapy. 28.  On 15 May 2008 the applicant was admitted to the TB ward of the SIZO and was prescribed “H, R, Z, E” (anti-TB drugs, see paragraph 57 below) and some “vitamins and hepatoprotectors”. 29.  On 9 March 2009 the applicant fell down and injured his left knee while being transported to the ITT. He complained about it to the ITT administration. A doctor confirmed the injury and recommended, without specifying the degree of urgency, that the applicant consult a phthisiatrician. 30.  When brought back from the ITT to the SIZO on 12 March 2009, the applicant was examined by the SIZO doctor, but raised no complaints about his health. According to a medical certificate of the SIZO doctor of 7 April 2010, \"during the examination the applicant did not raise any complaints as he wished to get to his cell sooner\". 31.  On 18 March 2009 he complained to the SIZO doctor of severe left knee pain. On 20 March 2009 the doctor performed an X-ray examination and concluded that the knee cap was broken and displaced. According to the applicant, the SIZO provided him with no medical treatment in respect of that injury. 32.  On 24 March 2009 he was examined by a doctor at the traumatology centre of Simferopol Town Hospital no. 6 (“the hospital”) and his knee was immobilised by a plaster cast. 33.  On 2 April 2009 the applicant complained to the ITT administration about the injury to his left knee and subsequently was seen by an ambulance doctor. 34.  According to the applicant, on 3 April 2009 the ITT ignored an ambulance referral for a medical examination of his knee and instead sent him to the SIZO. There is no indication he was advised such medical examination at the time. 35.  On 3 June 2009 an X-ray of the applicant’s left knee revealed a closed fracture of the left knee cap, with some positive developments. 36.  On 3 July 2009 the phthisiatrician of the TB Centre concluded that the applicant had “infiltrative TB of the upper part of the left lung (Category 4)”; it was recommended that he continue medical treatment for one and half month with “H, R, Z, E”. 37.  On 7 July 2009 the traumatologist, having examined an X-ray of the applicant’s knee, found a healed fracture of the left knee cap and a contracture of the knee. According to him, the applicant did not need a surgical operation. The applicant was prescribed “a course of exercise therapy, Fastum Gel, and massage”. On 9 July 2009 the applicant was again seen by the traumatologist, who noted that he had already been prescribed adequate treatment in respect of the injury. 38.  On 15 July 2009 the phthisiatrician found that the applicant had “infiltrative [TB] of the lungs (Category 4)” and recommended to continue taking “H, R, Z, E, and Levofloxacin”. The doctor indicated the appropriate dosage, frequency and duration for the drugs and also recommended some “vitamins and hepatoprotectors”. 39.  On 28 September 2009 a doctor examined the applicant’s left knee and found no grounds for outpatient treatment or hospitalisation. 40.  On 4 November 2009 a traumatologist examined the applicant and diagnosed him with a consolidated fracture of the left knee cap and a moderately expressed contracture of the left knee joint. He was prescribed medication and exercise therapy. 41.  On 2 June and 20 August 2010 the phthisiatrician at the TB Centre examined the applicant, finding “post-TB residual changes and fibrosis in the upper part of the lungs (Category 5.1)”. He recommended that the applicant undergo repeated courses of anti-relapse therapy, whose particulars were not given. According to the applicant, the doctor’s conclusions of 2 June 2010 were not reliable for unspecified reasons. 42.  On 20 August 2010 the applicant was discharged from the TB ward, which was unlawful, according to him, because he was still sick. 43.  On 1 and 21 October 2010 the applicant began a course of anti‑relapse therapy. He agreed to take the medication, yet questioned the effectiveness of the therapy. 44.  On 2 November 2010 a panel of doctors from the Crimea Medical Forensics Bureau, having studied the applicant’s medical records, including the one drawn up by the traumatologist on 26 October 2010, found that the left-knee fracture had healed, that there were no lasting residual effects of the injury, and concluded that the knee treatment provided by the Simferopol hospital had been timely and thorough. 45.  While detained at the ITT, the applicant asked for medical assistance on 30 July, 14 and 23 August and 5 September 2007, 9 March, 31 March and 28 September 2009, and 1 April 2010. On each occasion the ITT administration called the ambulance, whose doctor came to see the applicant. His chest was X-rayed on 8 February and 15 May 2008, 23 January, 3 June and 10 July 2009, and 3 and 18 February, 2 June and 20 August 2010. The applicant underwent sputum tests on 16, 17 and 19 May, 1 July, 28 November and 1 and 2 December 2008, 23 and 24 January, 24, 25, 26 March, 4 June, 26 and 27 August and 22 September 2009, and 17 February and 20 August 2010, all of which were negative. On 4 June 2009 he underwent urine and blood analyses. According to the Government, during his detention in the SIZO the applicant received a high calorie diet and he was provided with some additional food. The applicant submitted that his food was poor and that there was no evidence he received medication and special food. 46.  During his detention the applicant and his representatives lodged a number of complaints with the police, prosecutors, and courts alleging, inter alia, that the applicant was not receiving proper medical treatment. On 9 October 2009 the Sevastopol Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the ITT duty officer in that regard. The applicant did not appeal. According to the Government, after June 2010 the applicant did not complaint about his state of health. According to the applicant, he complained but his complaints were not dealt with. 47.  After a number of inquiries, on 4 November 2010 the Zaliznychnyi District Prosecutor’s Office of Simferopol refused to institute criminal proceedings against the head and the physician of the SIZO medical unit, the SIZO governor, and the head traumatologist of the Simferopol hospital. Apparently, the applicant did not appeal against that decision. 48.  In 2010 the applicant’s mother instituted court proceedings against the prosecutors for their negligence in respect of her son’s TB infection. It appears that the proceedings are pending before an appellate court. 49.  Article 155 provides:\n“Persons in respect of whom taking into custody is imposed as a preventive measure are kept in places of detention pending trial, i.e., pre-trial detention centres [SIZOs]. In some cases, these persons may be kept in places for detained persons [ITT] ... for not more than three days. If transportation of remanded persons to the pre-trial detention centre ... is impossible within this time-limit because of the long distance or lack of appropriate roads, they may be kept in places for detained persons for up to ten days.” 50.  Section 17 of the Act provides that persons suffering from tuberculosis who are detained in pre-trial detention centres (SIZOs) must receive appropriate treatment in the medical units of these detention centres. 51.  According to the order, there are five main and five sub-categories for the recording of those who have TB or may be affected by it. For instance, patients with chronic TB of various localisation, with or without discharge of bacteria, fall into Category 4. Patients with residual changes of various localisation after the TB is cured fall into Category 5.1. 52.  Under section 6.1, TB treatment is to be administered in specialised anti-TB institutions and to consist of two phases: main chemotherapy and rehabilitation. The main chemotherapy course, an extended, uninterrupted course of treatment, consists of intensive and supportive treatment stages with “first-line” anti-tuberculosis antibiotics (isoniazid, rifampicin, streptomycin, pyrazinamide and ethambutol or “H, R, S, Z, E”). 53.  Under section 6.6.1, to obtain maximal results, medical or surgical treatment of pulmonary TB is to be implemented in conjunction with individualized hygiene plan and regime (complete bed rest, part-time bed rest or a training regime). Treatment is to be followed by rehabilitation, including curative exercise, massage and physiotherapy. 54.  According to section 6.6.2., the diet of a patient with TB infection must take into account his living and working conditions, general state of the organism, its reactivity, nature of any injury, and complications from other organs. The diet should be balanced, yet rich in proteins, minerals, and vitamins, in particular the C, E and B groups. The intake of carbohydrates should be within the norms, or lower if the patient is overweight. 55.  According to section 6.7, pulmonary TB patients of all categories are to be regularly monitored. For instance, Category 4 patients are to be monitored using the following tests: sputum every month for six months, then every two months; sensitivity to the anti-TB drugs and X-ray – at the beginning and once every six months afterwards. The patients with Category 5.1 TB should undergo X-ray at least every six months during the first year of monitoring. 56.  Regular mandatory examinations to determine the effectiveness of the TB treatment and timely registration of side effects and their treatment as set out in Table 15 of the Protocol should be carried out. 57.  According to the Table 15, if such anti-TB drugs as isoniazid, rifampin, pyrazinamide, and ethambutol (“H, R, Z, E”) are administered, examinations and interviews of the patient, plus biochemical and common blood analysis, should be undertaken. The patient should also be examined by a neuropathist and ophthalmologist. 58.  The pertinent parts of the Rules read as follows:\n“... Scope and application 10.1  The European Prison Rules apply to persons who have been remanded in custody by a judicial authority or who have been deprived of their liberty following conviction.\nHealth care 40.4  Medical services in prison shall seek to detect and treat physical ... illnesses or defects from which prisoners may suffer. 40.5  All necessary medical, surgical and psychiatric services including those available in the community shall be provided to the prisoner for that purpose.\nMedical and health care personnel 41.2  Arrangements shall be made to ensure at all times that a qualified medical practitioner is available without delay in cases of urgency. 41.3  Where prisons do not have a full-time medical practitioner, a part-time medical practitioner shall visit regularly. ...\nDuties of the medical practitioner 42.1  The medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall see every prisoner as soon as possible after admission, and shall examine them unless this is obviously unnecessary. ... 42.3  When examining a prisoner the medical practitioner or a qualified nurse reporting to such a medical practitioner shall pay particular attention to: ...\nb.  diagnosing physical ... illness and taking all measures necessary for its treatment and for the continuation of existing medical treatment; ...\nf.  isolating prisoners suspected of infectious or contagious conditions for the period of infection and providing them with proper treatment; 43.1  The medical practitioner shall have the care of the physical ... health of the prisoners and shall see, under the conditions and with a frequency consistent with health care standards in the community, all sick prisoners, all who report illness or injury and any prisoner to whom attention is specially directed. ...\nHealth care provision 46.1  Sick prisoners who require specialist treatment shall be transferred to specialised institutions or to civil hospitals, when such treatment is not available in prison. 46.2  Where a prison service has its own hospital facilities, they shall be adequately staffed and equipped to provide the prisoners referred to them with appropriate care and treatment.” 59.  The pertinent parts of the Report read as follows:\n“... Only the prisons setting has seen some progress in terms of decreased TB prevalence, TB notification rates, and TB mortality (although combined [Ministry of Health/ Sector Development Program]’s figures for mortality show an increase of 13% since 2003). These achievements are a result of progress made over the last five years to improve nourishment of inmates, increase drug supply and laboratory reagents, and provide better overall conditions in prisons (as a result of reductions made in the number of inmates). Also, severely ill patients have been released from the prison setting ... However, [Multiple Drug Resistant TB] in prisons is extremely high, at roughly 20% ... It is evident that since ... 1999, the reported cases of ... TB ... have seen a steady increase until 2006 with subsequent gradual decline as a result of steps taken by Government, including to double/quadruple the TB budget in 2006/2007/2008 vis à vis 2003/2004/2005 budgets. However, it should be noted that TB incidence in Ukraine remains one of the highest in the ECA region and is five times higher than the EU average ... The project did expand the laboratory network in the civil and the prison settings and with additional support from international and local donors and partners, as well as through Government own efforts, this network will be further improved.” 60.  The domestic law pertinent to the issue of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention is summarised in the judgments in the cases of Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine (no. 54825/00, §§ 53-54, ECHR 2005‑II (extracts)); Yeloyev v. Ukraine (no. 17283/02, § 35, 6 November 2008); and Gavazhuk v. Ukraine (no. 17650/02, § 46, 18 February 2010). 61.  Other domestic and international material concerning conditions of detention and treatment of TB infection in detention facilities can be found in the judgments in the cases of Melnik v. Ukraine (no. 72286/01, §§ 47-51, 28 March 2006, and Yakovenko v. Ukraine (no. 15825/06, §§ 53-54, 25 October 2007).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant, Mr David Raban, is an Israeli and Dutch citizen, who was born in 1957 and lives in Yehud, Israel. The second and third applicants are his children, Ela Raban, born in 2003, and Ilan Matzliah Raban, born in 2004. They currently live in Romania with A.R., their mother. 6.  The first applicant and A.R. got married in 2002 in Cyprus. The two had already lived together as a couple in Israel for six months before the wedding. In 2003 and 2004 respectively, their two children, Ela and Ilan Matzliah, were born in Israel. Their last place of residence in Israel was Bat Hefer. 7.  In 2006, as explained by the applicant, the couple, who had joint custody of the children, agreed that the mother and the two children would visit the mother's family in Romania for six months. On 27 April 2006, the mother and the children left for Romania; according to their roundtrip airline tickets, they were scheduled to be back on 24 October 2006.\nHowever, they never returned to Israel; on 3 November 2006, A.R.'s mother informed the first applicant that A.R. and the children would remain in Romania. 8.  Subsequently, the first applicant filed for the return of his children, under the Hague Convention (proceedings described under no. 1 below), while A.R. filed for divorce and custody of the children with the Romanian courts (proceedings described under no. 2 below). 9.  On 8 November 2006 the first applicant filed a request for the return of his children under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). The request was submitted through the Israeli Ministry of Justice to the Romanian Ministry of Justice (“the Ministry”). The first applicant claimed that his wife was wrongfully retaining their children in Romania, without his consent.\nOn 14 February 2007 the Ministry, acting as the Central Authority for the purpose of the Hague Convention, instituted proceedings on behalf of the first applicant before the Bucharest District Court of the Fourth Precinct. 10.  On the basis of the evidence adduced in the case, which included a “psychological evaluation of the children”, the District Court found on 11 October 2007 that the retention of the children in Romania was illegal under Article 3 of the Hague Convention, as at the time of the retention the father had lawful custody rights. It also held that the allegations of A.R. according to which the first applicant had agreed that the children should remain in Romania as his financial situation in Israel was precarious, confirmed by the witness M.-A. T., who stated that neither the applicant, nor A.R. had a job in Israel, were however unsubstantiated, as the first applicant had proved that he had made attempts to rent a house for the family, had enrolled the children in a local kindergarten and was regularly in contact with the children by phone.\nThe defence raised by A.R. under Article 13 § 1 b) of the Hague Convention was also dismissed by the court; it considered that the “state of insecurity” invoked and the “general threat of terrorist attacks” arising in Israel had not proved to be an obstacle to the family living in Israel for more than five years prior to the children's removal, and could not be regarded as having developed to a dangerous degree at that time. The court ordered that the children be returned to their habitual residence in Israel no later than three weeks after the judgment became final. 11.  A.R. filed an appeal against this decision, which was allowed by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final judgment of 7 January 2008. Out of the panel of three judges, Judge M.H. gave a dissenting opinion, favouring the reasoning of the first-instance court.\nThe majority's decision was based on two conclusions: firstly, that Article 3 of the Hague Convention was not applicable to the case, in so far as the children, Romanian citizens, had left Israel and remained in Romania upon the agreement of the parents; secondly, that in any event, the exception provided for by Article 13 1 b) of the Convention was substantiated, as it had been proved that, if returned to Israel, the children would risk exposure to physical or psychological harm. 12.  The appellate court thus found that the children had left Israel and remained in Romania with the consent of their father, due to the worsening of his financial situation. The agreement between the parents was for the children to stay in Romania until the first applicant's financial situation improved –in that respect, even the fact that they had bought roundtrip tickets, which were cheaper than one-way tickets, only underlined the financial difficulties the family was undergoing; however, as time passed, the evidence showed that this situation had kept worsening, since the first applicant had sold the house where they had lived as a family, after the departure of A.R. with the children, and gone to live with his mother. Also, the first applicant had not produced any evidence to support his claim that he had sent money to his children.\nThe court further held that the first applicant had not proved that he had maintained contact with his children; in the file there was only evidence of one visit paid by the first applicant to his children, on 3 October 2007; the phone calls allegedly made by the first applicant to his children in Romania had been made from the house of the first applicant's mother, which was interpreted as meaning that the conversations had been between the children and their paternal grandmother.\nHence, the agreement between the spouses regarding the children remaining in Romania proved to be real and such an agreement could by no means be regarded as breaching Article 3 of the Hague Convention. 13.  Moreover, the evidence in the file showed that the two children had integrated into the Romanian community successfully – they had good results at kindergarten and positive psychological evaluations – arguments which supported a dismissal of the first applicant's action. The court also held that “the evaluation of the children carried out by the General Department for Social Assistance and Child Protection in the presence of a counsellor revealed that no assessment could be made of the possible effects of the separation of the father from his children, insofar as there was insufficient information with regard to the father-children relationship”. 14.  The defence under Article 13 § 1 b) of the Hague Convention, namely, that there was a grave risk of exposing the children to intolerable physical harm if returned to Israel, was also allowed. The court based their reasoning, inter alia, on “the reports produced by Amnesty International”, which stated according to the court, that Bat Hefer was located in a conflict area, where citizens feared for their safety. At the same time, the court based its reasoning on travel advice issued in January 2008 by the US State Department, in which warnings were allegedly made about “potential conflicts which could arise between the Israelis and the Palestinians”, and “signs of possible terrorist attacks in the area” were referred to.\nIn a dissenting opinion to the judgment, Judge H.M. underlined that the above-mentioned documents “did not actually refer specifically to Bat Hefer, but to other regions of Israel”. 15.  The applicant was never given a copy of the above-mentioned reports. In a certificate issued by the Ministry of Justice on 29 May 2008 to the applicant it was mentioned that neither the Amnesty International reports, nor the US State Department release were to be found in the domestic case file. 16.  On 6 March 2007, A.R. filed for divorce, custody of the children and maintenance before the Bucharest District Court of the Fourth Precinct. 17.  On 24 September 2008 the first applicant (defendant), represented by an appointed lawyer, presented his observations in reply to A.R.'s claims. He contended that the Romanian courts did not have general jurisdiction in such proceedings, in so far as the marriage was registered in Cyprus, the defendant was an Israeli and Dutch citizen, the couple's children were Israeli citizens, and the last marital home had been in Israel.\nHe also lodged counterclaims asking the courts to either grant him full custody of the two children, or to order their return to their habitual residence in Israel.\n 18.  On 18 November 2008, the court rejected the first applicant's plea regarding the lack of jurisdiction, considering that “the Romanian courts did have full jurisdiction in such cases, pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility”. 19.  In its judgment of 19 December 2008, the district court granted A.R a divorce on the grounds of exclusive fault by the first applicant.\nBased on the conclusions of a social enquiry report on the children's concrete situation, which held that they were well taken care of and benefited from a good standard of living, and taking into consideration their ages (5 and 4, at that time), the court awarded custody of the children to the mother. The court found that it was in their best interest to remain with their mother, her care and presence being a psychological factor which was absolutely essential for their intellectual, moral and physical development.\nIn the absence of any proof regarding the first applicant's employment and/or income, the court referred to the national minimum wage scale and ordered him to pay monthly maintenance in the amount of 90 RON in respect of each child, starting on 6 March 2007 and until they reached the age of majority.\nNeither the first applicant, nor A.R. have lodged any appeals against this judgment, which thus became final and enforceable.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Geguti no. 8 Prison. 7.  On 8 March 2006 the applicant was arrested in connection with a robbery. 8.  On 16 October 2006 the Kaspi District Court convicted him and three others of conspiracy to commit robbery. The conviction was based on various evidence, including the statements of the victim, who had identified the applicant and the other accused as the perpetrators during the trial. The applicant was sentenced to six years in prison. 9.  As disclosed by the transcript of the trial, the victim, a person of Azerbaijani origin who had difficulty in speaking Georgian, was assisted by an interpreter. The lawyers of the accused, including that of the applicant, extensively examined the victim and other witnesses for the prosecution. 10.  On 8 November 2006 the applicant appealed against the conviction of 16 October 2006, calling into question the lower court’s assessment of the evidence and accusing the investigating authority of procedural omissions. He stated, in particular, that the victim’s incriminating statements lacked credibility, in so far as the victim had been examined at the investigation stage without the assistance of an interpreter. 11.  On 25 May 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, replying to all his major arguments, dismissed the applicant’s appeal of 8 November 2006. As regards the complaint concerning the victim’s statements, the court noted that the conviction had been based on the statements given during the trial, rather than on those obtained at the investigation stage. Having reviewed those statements, the appellate court confirmed their credibility. 12.  The decision of 25 May 2007 dismissing the applicant’s appeal was finally upheld by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 17 January 2008. 13.  According to the case file, prior to the initiation of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his consequent detention, he had had no major medical problems and was in good health. Notably, he had been a member of a wrestling club in Gori and, as his coach confirmed, had been in excellent physical condition and been considered a promising sportsman at that time. 14.  The case file also contains a document dated 4 November 2008 from the Gori tuberculosis hospital, stating that the applicant had never been registered as a patient there. 15.  Subsequent to his arrest on 8 March 2006, the applicant was placed in Tbilisi no. 5 Prison, where he allegedly shared a cell with prisoners infected with pulmonary tuberculosis (“TB”). 16.  On 29 February 2008, the applicant was transferred to Geguti no. 8 Prison, where his state of health began to deteriorate from late May 2008. His symptoms were fever and a cough. 17.  On 18 June 2008, pursuant to a complaint of 17 June 2008 from the applicant’s mother, a medical expert examined the applicant, diagnosing him with TB. On the same day he was transferred to Ksani Prison, where prisoners with TB were housed. 18.  As disclosed by the circumstances of the case, on 7 July 2008 a medical expert of Ksani TB Prison issued an opinion which confirmed that the applicant’s right lung had been affected by TB, with a positive sputum culture, and that the disease was at the stage of disaggregation; the applicant was occasionally coughing up blood. The opinion further disclosed that the applicant had started receiving anti-TB medication under the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course – the treatment strategy for detection and cure of TB recommended by the World Health Organisation) on 26 June 2008. Notably, he had been prescribed with daily dosages of such conventional antibiotics as isoniazid (300 mg), ethambutol (1,100 mg), rifampicin, pyrazinamide (1,600 mg) and streptomycin (1 gr). 19.  On 2 July 2008 the prison authorities arranged for the applicant’s sputum culture and sensibility to be tested by the National Centre for Tubercular and Lung Diseases. The results of those tests, issued on 2 September 2008, showed that the sputum culture was already negative. It was also established that the applicant’s TB bacterium maintained sensitivity with respect to the administered antibiotic drugs, which confirmed the suitability of the ongoing treatment. 20.  On 19 September 2008 the prison authority arranged for another round of specific bacteriological tests (smear, culture and susceptibility), the results of which, issued on 22 September 2008, disclosed that the applicant’s treatment was continuing to show promising results. 21.  On 26 February 2009 the applicant’s treatment was completed, and on the following day he was transferred from Ksani TB Prison to Geguti no. 8 Prison. The termination of the treatment was based on the opinion of the doctor who had been monitoring the applicant since 26 June 2008, as well as on the results of laboratory tests of the applicant’s sputum, dated 18 February 2008, which confirmed that TB bacilli were no longer present in the applicant’s lungs. 22.  The applicant’s medical file further discloses that during the whole period of his treatment, from 26 June 2008 until 26 February 2009, his intake of antibiotics had been closely monitored by medical personnel with the appropriate training. 23.  On 19 April 2010 the prison authorities arranged for an X-ray examination of the applicant’s thorax, the results of which confirmed that there were no new tubercular signs in the applicant’s lungs, thus excluding the risk of relapse.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1961, 1959 and 1964 respectively. 5.  In the course of a police operation against an illegal armed organisation, namely the TKEP (the Communist Labour Party of Turkey), the police arrested and detained Mr Ayhan in police custody on 5 May 1993. The applicant had fake identity papers on him at the time of the arrest. 6.  He was subsequently brought before a judge who remanded him in custody on 19 May 1993. 7.  By an indictment dated 30 July 1993, the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and other accused before the Istanbul State Security Court, accusing the applicant, inter alia, of participation in activities which undermined the constitutional order of the State. These included aggravated theft from various jewellery shops and involvement in the killing of Mr Y.I. and Mr M.Ö in 1990 and 1991 respectively. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 8.  In the course of the proceedings before the Istanbul State Security Court, the latter considered the applicant’s detention at the end of each hearing of its own motion and each time it ordered continued detention with reference to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case file. At the hearing held on 28 January 1997, the applicant requested to be released for the first time. The court ordered the continuation of his detention, having regard to the nature of the offences with which he was charged and the state of the evidence. Thereafter until 30 May 2000 the applicant did not specifically request release. However, the court continued of its own motion to examine the applicant’s detention and ordered it to be continued on the same grounds as before. Between the hearings held on 30 May 2000 and 24 February 2004, the court considered the applicant’s detention regularly, either of its own motion or at the request of the applicant, and each time it ordered his continued detention, having regard to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case file. 9.  On 24 February 2004 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 4 October 2004. 10.  On 10 February 1994 the second applicant, Mr Akkurt, and the third applicant, Mr Töre, were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of involvement in the activities of the above-mentioned organisation. They were remanded in custody on 24 February 1994. 11.  By an indictment dated 17 May 1994, the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicants and other accused before the Istanbul State Security Court, accusing the applicants, inter alia, of involvement in activities which undermined the constitutional order of the State. These included aggravated theft from various jewellery shops. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 12.  In the course of the proceedings before the Istanbul State Security Court, the latter considered the applicants’ detention at the end of each hearing of its own motion, and each time it ordered their continued detention with reference to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case file. At a hearing held on 5 August 1998, the applicants requested to be released for the first time. The court ordered the continuation of their detention, having regard to the nature of the offence and the length of their detention. Thereafter until 4 November 2002 the court considered the applicants’ detention regularly, either of its own motion or at the request of the applicants, and each time it ordered their continued detention, having regard to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case file. On 4 November 2002 the applicants, at their request, were released pending trial. The court took note, in determining their request for release, of the length of time the applicants had already spent in detention and the state of the evidence. 13.  On 27 December 2006 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Their appeal against this decision is apparently pending before the Court of Cassation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Tbilisi. 7.  The applicant worked as an officer at a regional branch of the Customs Department (hereafter “the old customs office” of “the Department”), an agency of the Ministry of Finance.  Due to the structural reorganisation of the Department on 30 June 1995, he was released by an administrative order of 5 August 1995, together with some other people. This order noted that the discharged officers were to be transferred to another, newly established regional customs office (“the new customs office”). 8.  On 5 August 1995 the applicant requested the Department's authorisation to take up his duties at the new customs office. No reply was forthcoming. For the next six years, he complained on numerous occasions before various governmental agencies about the inability to continue his service. 9. In a letter of 21 March 2001, the Department informed the applicant that, after its reorganisation on 30 June 1995, staff had been significantly reduced and, in so far as he had continuously been absent from the old customs office without authorisation, the administration had decided not to employ him any longer. The lawfulness of such a decision, the letter noted, was assured by the provisions of the Labour Code (“the LC”), the sole legislative act which regulated civil servants' labour disputes at that time. The applicant was invited to visit the Department's human resources office, in order to obtain the order for his dismissal and the work log. 10.  On 23 May 2001 the applicant sued the Department for unfair dismissal, requesting reinstatement to his position and compensation for loss of salary. 11.  In a first instance judgment of 22 November 2001, the Isani-Samgori District Court in Tbilisi found in the applicant's favour. However, in an appellate decision of 15 April 2002, the Tbilisi Regional Court rejected his action as time-barred. The appellate court first noted that, in so far as the Civil Service Act of 31 October 1997 had not been enacted at the time of the applicant's dismissal, only the provisions of the LC had been applicable to the dispute. Given the fact that the applicant had continuously been complaining before various authorities, except for the courts, about his inability to pursue his duties as a customs officer, the appellate court found that he had been well aware of the alleged breach of his rights since his dismissal took effect in 1995. In such circumstances, it concluded that the applicant had failed to comply with the one-month time-limit for lodging an employment action, as required by Article 204 § 1 of the LC. 12.  In May 2002 the applicant lodged a cassation claim, in which he called into question the appellate court's assessment of the circumstances of the case and certain evidence. It appears from the case file that the respondent Department did not submit any reply to that claim. 13.  On 12 June 2002 the Civil Affairs Chamber of the Supreme Court of Georgia (“the Chamber”) at an oral hearing attended by the applicant, started the examination of the case but, due to the absence of the Department's representative, adjourned it. The Chamber also decided to dispense with an oral hearing in the further proceedings. 14.  On 13 June 2002 the applicant, complaining about the absence of an oral hearing, requested the President of the Supreme Court to change the Chamber's composition. In a decision of 18 June 2002, the Chamber dismissed this request as unsubstantiated. 15.  In a decision of 19 June 2002, adopted under the written procedure, the Chamber dismissed the applicant's cassation claim. Having confirmed the appellate court's interpretation of the LC, it stated that it lacked jurisdiction to inquire into matters of fact, in so far as the applicant had not raised any “additional and well-founded cassation argument” (Article 407 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1955 and 1961 respectively. They are farmers residing at Ginsenberg, Styria. 6.  On 8 June 1972 the Graz District Agricultural Authority (Agrarbezirksbehörde, \"the District Authority\") opened the Mooskirchen land consolidation proceedings (Zusammenlegungsverfahren) which also concerned the applicants’ land. 7.  On 16 November 1984 the District Authority adopted the consolidation scheme (Zusammenlegungsplan) and on 10 December 1984 the parties to the proceedings were notified. 8.  Subsequently, on 20 December 1984 K. and A., the applicants’ predecessors (the first applicant’s parents), lodged an appeal, alleging that they had not been duly compensated. 9.  On 19 September 1990 the Regional Agricultural Panel (Landes-agrarsenat) dismissed their appeal as unfounded. By decision of 25 February 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case for lack of prospect of success and upon the applicants’ predecessors’ request remitted the case to the Administrative Court. 10.  Thereupon K. and A. lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court, which, on 21 September 1995, quashed the decision of 19 September 1990 for failure to comply with procedural rules and remitted the case back to the Regional Agricultural Panel. 11.  Since the Regional Agricultural Panel failed to decide within a reasonable time K. and the first applicant on 12 January 1998 lodged a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag). 12.  On 1 April 1998 the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat) granted the request and assumed competence. By decision of 3 May 2000 it granted the appeal of 20 December 1984 and remitted the case to the District Authority. 13.  As the District Authority failed to take a decision within the statutory period of six months, K. and the two applicants on 16 January 2001 lodged another request for the transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag). 14.  Having granted the request the Regional Agricultural Panel issued a new consolidation scheme on 26 September 2001. Subsequently the applicants lodged another appeal. 15.  On 4 December 2002 the Supreme Land Reform Board dismissed the applicants’ appeal. Hence the applicants, on 29 January 2003, lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. 16.  On 30 September 2004 the Constitutional Court dealt with the applicants’ complaint. It found that the proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time and that this constituted a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in this respect. However, it held also that for this reason alone it could not quash the impugned decision and dismissed the complaint. Upon the applicants’ request it referred the case to the Administrative Court. 17.  On 24 February 2005 the Administrative Court, upholding the lower-instance decisions, dismissed the applicants’ complaint. It found that the consolidation proceedings were in conformity with the regulations as set out under the consolidation scheme and that the applicants had been duly compensated. As regards plot no. 278a which had initially been of inferior value it noted that in the meantime measures for improving its value by constructing an appropriate drainage system had been adopted. The decision was served on the applicants’ counsel on 18 March 2005. 18.  On 8 May 2006 the applicants lodged public liability proceedings with a view to receiving reimbursement of the remaining difference between the compensation which had been granted by the Supreme Land Reform Board on 3 May 2005 and the amount claimed by them. According to the applicants’ allegations the proceedings are still pending before the Graz Regional Court. 19.  In a different set of proceedings, on 8 January 2003 the applicants lodged a request for compensation under Section 27 § 9 of the Land Consolidation Act (Zusammenlegungsgesetz). They claimed loss of profits because for a period of some twenty-five years, the time of the provisional transfer of land, they had to cultivate land, in particular plot no. 278a, which was of inferior value and yielded less than their original plots. 20.  On 25 May 2005 the Regional Agricultural Panel granted the applicants 4,282 Euros (EUR), rejecting any further requests. It found that it could not grant compensation for the period before the entering into force of Section 27 § 9 of the Land Consolidation Act in 1995. Thereupon the applicants appealed. On 7 December 2005 the Supreme Land Reform Board dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 21.  On 1 March 2007 the Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Land Reform Board’s decision and referred the case to the subordinate authorities. It found that from the object and purpose of the amendment of the Land Consolidation Act of 1995 it was evident that this amendment should also extend to compensation claims concerning losses incurred in years before that act had entered into force. 22.  On 18 June 2007 the Supreme Land Reform Board partly granted the applicants’ appeal and awarded them EUR 21,719.17.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Pabianice. 6.  On 11 April 1994 the applicant's wife filed an action for divorce, dated 8 April 1994, with the Łódź Regional Court. She submitted that the parties had married in 1989, that the marriage had not been a happy one from the beginning, that the applicant was unworthy of any trust, that he had been battering her and that he was generally unable to fulfil the role of husband and father. She claimed maintenance for their daughter X. and custody of the child. 7.  On 14 April 1994 she requested the Pabianice District Prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of sexual abuse of their daughter X. The minutes of her deposition read:\n“We have been married since 1989. In 1990 our daughter X. was born.\nIn April 1994, after a conversation I had with the child, I started to think that my husband could have been, for some time, sexually abusing her, of which I hereby inform the prosecuting authorities. I would like to stress that after I had acquired this information I moved out of our apartment to my sister's place ... It will be for several days only and afterwards I will move in with my parents in W. It seems to me to be a good decision as the child should be, at least for some time, separated from her father. At the same time, I realise that it would be nearly impossible to conduct any interview with my child, regard being had to her age...” 8.  In an undated subsequent opinion, apparently prepared on the basis of a psychological examination of the child carried out on 14 April 1994 in the presence of her mother and maternal grandmother, E.K., a psychologist, described the child's stage of development and concluded:\n“On 14 April 1994 an attempt was made to obtain from X. an account of the events concerned in the case. This attempt failed insofar as it was aimed at obtaining a verbal statement. It can, however, serve as a basis for a description of the child's psychological situation. (...) I think that any further attempt to interview X. would not make any sense. Moreover, it would be detrimental to her development. A child of this age is unable to make any confabulations, without there being a concrete factual basis for what she says. (...) Information obtained from third parties and observation of the child seem to suggest that it is likely that she has been a victim of sexual abuse:\n- inflammation of sexual organs (medical records);\n-secrets shared with her father rewarded by sweets or toys in order to remain unknown to other persons and to the mother; ...\n-reluctance to have sexual organs washed;\n-pains in the legs, bruises on the legs;\n-bizarre play and behaviour.\nThe fact that so many such manifestations occur makes it possible to consider that the charges may be truthful.\nIn my view the child's father should be interviewed. It is also recommended that the child be examined once again, not before September.” 9.  Later on, the child was interviewed by E.K. on 9 January 1995. Her mother was not present during the examination. X. was also requested to make drawings representing her family and to play with dolls representing herself, her father and her mother. 10.  In an opinion dated 17 January 1995, E.K. explained various techniques she had used during this meeting, suited to the child's age. She stated that during the second meeting the child had evoked events which seemed to suggest that she had been sexually abused by her father; that, given her age, there was no possibility that she was talking about things which in reality had not happened; that the drawings she had made constituted a spontaneous form of communication which could not, given her age, have been suggested to her by other persons; that these drawings suggested that she had been sexually abused by her father, possibly also by anal intercourse as she had clearly referred to anal pain in connection with “playing” with her father. 11.  The psychologist stressed that under no circumstances should the issue be raised with the child, who should be excluded entirely from the proceedings in order to safeguard her well-being and development. She noted that the child was more relaxed and confident than in April 1994, when she had realised that the “secrets” her father shared with her had been regarded as evil by other members of the family. 12.  On 31 March 1995 a bill of indictment was laid against the applicant in the Łódź Regional Court. He was charged with having sexually abused his daughter from 1992 until April 1994.\nThe prosecution referred to interviews conducted during the investigations with the applicant, his parents, his wife, her parents and her sister and her aunt K.M.\nFurther, reference was made to: X.'s medical records, police information on the applicant, the opinions prepared by E.K. (referred to above), a psychiatric opinion on the applicant (prepared by N.G. and M.G.-L.), drawings made by X., an expert opinion dated 28 November 1994, prepared by J.B., a sexologist, on the applicant's sexual profile, another report about the applicant's mental health prepared by psychiatrists M.L. and D.J., dated 1 March 1996, and an opinion of a psychologist on the applicant's personality, dated 1 March 1995 and prepared by E.W. 13.  On an unspecified later date the court instituted the proceedings. 14.  On 9 February 1996 an expert opinion, prepared by J.K., a specialist in surgery with considerable experience of working with battered and abused children, was submitted to the court. He prepared it on the basis of his analysis of X.'s medical records, but without interviewing either X. or other persons. He concluded that the symptoms which X. had manifested could have been caused by sexual abuse, but that such symptoms could also have been caused by other physiological factors. He was of the view that, in any event, no evidence pointed with certainty to sexual abuse by her father. 15.  By a decision of 25 April 1996 the court called further expert witnesses: M.K., a psychologist, and another psychologist working for a Diagnostic Centre in Łódź. 16.  In its decision of 24 May 1996 the court observed that doubts had arisen, in the light of J.K.'s opinion, as to whether an expert opinion of a sexologist on the applicant's personality and which had already been prepared for the purposes of the investigation had been sufficient and clear. The court noted J.K's professional experience in an non-governmental organisation helping children, victims of cruelty and sexual abuse. It therefore ordered that another expert opinion be submitted on whether the applicant was suffering from any sexual disturbances, and if this was the case, how they might relate to the charges against him. It appointed a sexologist, Dr A.B., as an expert. 17.  On 12 July 1996 A.B. examined the applicant and on an unspecified later date submitted his opinion to the court. 18.  On 5 March 1997 another expert opinion was submitted to the court in which the procedure for examination as well as the adequacy and soundness of the method used by the psychologist E.K. were assessed. Its conclusion was that there were no grounds for doubting the thoroughness and soundness of the opinion. 19.  On 6 November 1997 the Łódź Regional Court convicted the applicant of having sexually abused X. and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment.\nThe court first recalled the circumstances of the applicant's marriage and the difficulties that had arisen between the spouses. It further established that the applicant's wife, having considered their situation and having discussed the issue with her sister I.K., decided, on 8 April 1994, to petition for divorce. On the same day she had sought legal advice and agreed with the lawyer that a divorce petition would be prepared. In the evening she had surprised the applicant caressing X. in a manner which shocked her as it seemed that he had been touching the child's sexual organs. She had not reacted immediately, but left the apartment with her daughter on the next day and moved in with her sister. On the same day she had talked with X. about her father's conduct and her suspicions of sexual abuse had been confirmed. On 14 April 1994 she had requested the prosecutor to institute an investigation and had been interviewed on the same day. 20.  On 14 April 1994 the psychologist E.K. had met with X., but an attempt to obtain verbal confirmation of the charges of sexual abuse failed. The expert had only established that the convergence of various manifestations in the child's behaviour was sufficient to suppose that sexual abuse could have occurred. 21.  As shown by the expert opinion of 17 January 1995, a further attempt by the psychologist to interview the child had been successful. The psychological tests had allowed the specialist to conclude that the girl's genitals had been touched and manipulated by her father and that this had happened on numerous occasions.\nThe court further referred to an expert opinion of Dr J.B, who had concluded that the applicant had a normal heterosexual drive and that he had a low self-esteem. The latter factor, in the expert's view, could have explained why he might have sought sexual experience with X. instead of normal adult sex. 22.  The court recalled that it had decided not to interview X., having regard to the unequivocal opinion of the psychologist that it would not serve any useful purpose and would be harmful to her, and given that other evidence at its disposal was sufficient to give a ruling in the case. 23.  The court considered that the expert opinions of E.K. were of decisive importance for its judgment. In particular, her second opinion of January 1995 in which she had categorically stated that X. had been sexually abused sufficed to conclude that the applicant was guilty. In that connection, the court recalled that already X's first contact with E.K. in April 1994 had given cause to believe that this had indeed been the case, even though the child had not wanted to talk at that time. Further, the examination carried out in January 1995 had confirmed these suspicions, the more so as the child at that time had been more relaxed and confident. 24.  The court also referred to an expert opinion in which the methods used by E.K. were assessed by two further specialists as methodologically sound and appropriate to the situation and to the child's age. They had not found any grounds on which to challenge its validity.\nThe court further observed that in 1995 the girl had been treated for problems of foecal incontinence. In June 1995 a medical test had been carried out which showed that the muscular tension of her sphincter was too low for a child of her age. The court had heard the expert witness Dr A.D., who was of the view that damage to the child's sphincter might have been caused by anal penetration. The court observed that his medical findings corresponded to the conclusions made by E.K. in her opinion of January 1995 that the child could have been the victim of anal penetration. 25.  The court referred to the opinion and testimony of Dr J.K. and was of the view that this opinion was merely of a theoretical character because he had not examined the child. Hence, his conclusions in which he had disagreed with the conclusions of certain other experts previously prepared in the case were not of decisive importance. 26.  The court further noted that the members of the applicant's wife's family had been questioned in the proceedings, but that their testimony had been very emotional. As they had been interpreting all of the information about the applicant as pointing to his guilt, the court did not consider their testimony to be wholly credible. 27.  The court concluded that in the light of the evidence seen as a whole, the applicant's guilt was not open to doubt. 28.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the finding of his guilt had primarily been based on the opinions prepared by E.K. Having regard to these opinions, the court had refused to take further evidence which would have cast light on the real circumstances of the case. The court had ignored evidence pointing to the applicant's innocence and, on the whole, had failed to take evidence which would have allowed the facts of the case to be established in a full and convincing manner.\nIt was further submitted that the applicant had been effectively deprived of his defence rights. The authorities had decided, in the child's interest, not to interview X. As a result, its role had been limited to the assessment of the opinions submitted by E.K. and of her oral testimony. This had led to a situation in which the accused had been convicted on the basis of E.K.'s reports. Neither the prosecutor nor the court had ever seen the child. The court could not, therefore, form an opinion on the veracity of the charges. 29.  On 12 March 1998 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the impugned judgment. It first observed that the applicant's submission that the lower instance had failed to hear further evidence was incorrect. 30.  It disagreed with the applicant's submission that the refusal to interview X. had deprived him of his defence rights. The applicant, who had been represented by a lawyer, had made full use of his defence rights and had put to the court numerous arguments in his defence. 31.  The appellate court recalled that the first-instance court had concluded that in the light of the evidence seen as a whole, the applicant's guilt was not open to doubt, even in the absence of any oral testimony given by X. This conclusion of the first-instance court had met with the approval of the appellate court, despite the fact that it had been motivated in a rather succinct manner. Neither the prosecution nor the applicant had made a formal request to have X. interviewed by the court, and the attempt to obtain verbal testimony from her during the investigations had failed. Hence, such testimony should be regarded as “testimony impossible to obtain” within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 32.  It was further noted that the validity and soundness of the opinions prepared by E.K. were not open to doubt. The first-instance court had taken specific steps in order to have their probative value assessed by other experts. Further, E.K.'s conclusions had also been assessed by the first‑instance court in the light of other evidence at its disposal. The appellate court referred to the evidence given by A.D., which corroborated the conclusions reached by E.K. The submissions made by A.D. had corresponded to other available evidence. The first-instance court had also taken into consideration the conclusions made by the experts who had examined the applicant.\nThe appellate court concluded that the assessment of the evidence had been thorough and logical and that there were no grounds on which to find that the first‑instance court had reached unreasonable or arbitrary conclusions. 33.  On 22 February 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal as being manifestly ill‑founded.\nOn 2 March 2001 this judgment was served on the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Skopje. 6.  The applicant worked as a waiter in a bar in Skopje. At 3.50 a.m. on 6 January 2002, R.D., a police reservist, fired a shot in the bar hitting the applicant in the chest. According to a medical certificate of 12 September 2002 issued by Skopje Clinical Centre , the applicant was urgently admitted in a “serious condition” (тешка општа состојба). The injuries sustained were described as follows: broken right clavicle and four broken ribs, injury to the subclavian artery, internal haemorrhaging and seizure of the brachial plexus nerves. His right arm was paralysed. The conclusion was that the applicant had sustained serious bodily injury with life-threatening damage and lasting consequences (витална загрозеност и трајни последици). He was operated on twice, the second time in April 2002 in the Clinical Centre of Belgrade, Serbia. 7.  On 27 March 2003 the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) convicted R.D. in absentia of “serious crimes against public security” (тешки дела против општата сигурност). He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. After the court had heard oral evidence from R.D., the applicant and six witnesses and examined other material evidence, it found that R.D., while intoxicated, had unintentionally pulled the trigger of his service gun and shot the applicant, who had been at a distance of one metre. The applicant was advised to pursue his compensation claim by means of a separate civil action. The decision became final on 8 May 2003. 8.  R.D. started serving his sentence on 6 June 2008. On 23 June 2008 the trial court reopened the proceedings, at R.D.’s request. On 12 March 2009 the trial court found R.D. guilty again and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, suspended for four years. No information was provided as to whether that decision was the subject of an appeal or became final. 9.  On 11 November 2002 the applicant, represented by Mr P. Šilegov, brought a civil action against the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”) seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss related to the injury sustained as a result of R.D.’s action. He claimed that the State should be held responsible, given that R.D., instead of being on duty in a police station, had shot him in the bar. He had used his service gun and had been in uniform. He claimed 28,000,000 Macedonian denars (MKD) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and MKD 208,480 for pecuniary damage (expenses related to his medical treatment).[1] 10.  After five adjournments, the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claim on 12 December 2003, finding that the Ministry lacked the requisite capacity to be sued for the damage caused by R.D., who, being a police reservist, was regarded a State official. The court established that between 7.30 p.m. on 5 January 2002 and 7.30 a.m. on 6 January 2002 R.D. had been on duty in a police station in Skopje. He had been assigned to stand guard (службена задача – стража) between midnight and 1 a.m. and between 6 a.m. and 7 a.m. on 6 January 2002. After 1 a.m. on 6 January 2002, instead of returning to the police station, R.D. had gone to the bar on his own initiative, without informing his superior or the latter’s replacement. He had been in uniform and had been carrying his service gun. In the bar, in the presence of other customers and under the influence of alcohol, he had pulled the gun out and shot the applicant, who had been in front of him at a distance of about 1.5 metres. The court found that the applicant had suffered damage as a result of R.D.’s action. However, in order for the Ministry to be held responsible under section 157 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 19 below), the court said that\n“... certain conditions need to be met: the damage must be caused by an official (овластено службено лице), it must be sustained by a physical or legal person and, in particular, it has to be caused by an official in the performance of his or her duties. It also has to result from an unlawful action. The defendant (the State) will be held responsible only if the damage is caused in the course of or in connection with the performance of the official duties. An action will be regarded as carried out in the performance of a duty if it is part of the duties (функција) of the official. It is a a harmful action taken within working hours, in the official capacity of the person concerned and as part of his official duties. Damage may be caused outside official duties, but there must be a causal link with the performance of the duty or the duty itself ... in the present case, R.D. was not in the bar in an official capacity ... so the damage was not caused in connection with the performance of the Ministry’s duties, even though it was caused at a time when R.D. was supposed to be on duty. At the critical time and place R.D. was not acting in an official capacity but as a private person, despite the fact that it was within working hours; he was in uniform and used his service gun. R.D. is responsible for the action taken and damage caused. There is no causal link between his action and his duty ...\nThe fact that [R.D.] was in uniform and used his service gun does not mean, in itself, that he was acting in an official capacity. R.D. did not use the gun in connection with the performance of his duties, but as a customer in the bar ...\nAt the time when the damage occurred, R.D., as a police reservist, was an adult and trained in the use of the gun. The defendant, as the owner of the gun, is relieved, under section 163(2) of the Obligations Act, from responsibility, given that the damage occurred solely as a result of an unforeseeable action by its agent whose consequences could neither have been prevented nor removed.” 11.  The court concluded that the applicant remained entitled to claim compensation from R.D. under section 141 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 16 below). 12.  On 3 March 2004 the applicant appealed, arguing that the Ministry was to be held responsible for R.D.’s actions, as he had acted while on duty, had been in uniform and had fired his service gun. In his submission, the Ministry’s responsibility derived from section 103 of the Employment Act (see paragraph 20 below) under which the Ministry could claim reimbursement from R.D. Lastly, he submitted that he had suffered irreparable damage as a result of the incident, as his right arm had become permanently paralysed. 13.  On 27 April 2004 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding no grounds on which to depart from the lower court’s finding that R.D.’s actions in the bar were not related to his official duties as a police officer. It went on to find that when R.D. shot the applicant he had not been acting as a police officer and had not been performing official duties. There was accordingly no responsibility on the part of the Ministry. The court confirmed the applicant’s entitlement to claim compensation from R.D. 14.  On 21 July 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) with the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had not addressed his arguments regarding the Ministry’s responsibility under the Employment Act. 15.  On 31 May 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, reiterating the reasons given by the lower courts.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently detained in Herby Stare Prison, Poland. 6.  The applicant has been suffering from epilepsy since his early childhood. More recently he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and other serious mental disorders. Prior to his detention, he had attempted to commit suicide and had received in-patient treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 7.  On 19 April 2005 the Będzin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of committing robbery and battery. Subsequently, the applicant's pre‑trial detention was extended by the Będzin District Court in decisions of 14 October 2005 and 11 January 2006, and by the Myszków District Court in decisions of 5 June and 28 September 2006. 8.  On being taken into detention, the applicant was committed to an unspecified remand centre, presumably Sosnowiec Remand Centre. 9.  On 20 April 2005 he was taken to a State psychiatric hospital in Czeladź experiencing intensive auditory hallucinations of a psychotic nature. He remained there for two days. 10.  On 22 April 2005 the applicant was committed to Zabrze Remand Centre but on the same day he was transferred to Rybnik Psychiatric Hospital for observation. On 17 or 18 July 2005 the applicant was transferred back to Zabrze Remand Centre and he remained there until 4 January 2006. 11.  During his detention in Zabrze Remand Centre the applicant was taking psychotropic medicines and he was examined by a psychiatrist on 19 July, 23 August, 6, 21 and 27 September, 8 and 22 November, and 20 and 30 December 2005. In addition, the applicant was under the constant supervision of a psychologist who examined him on 19 July, 23 August, 15 November and 15 December 2005. Finally, the applicant was examined by a prison general practitioner in connection with dermatological problems, coughs, backaches and gastrological disorders. 12.  From 4 January until 5 April 2006 the applicant was detained in Sosnowiec Remand Centre. 13.  On 15 January 2006 he was again taken to Czeladź Psychiatric Hospital experiencing auditory hallucinations and suicidal thoughts. On the following day the applicant's condition stabilised. He was prescribed medicines and returned to Sosnowiec Remand Centre. It was suggested that he should remain under psychiatric supervision. 14.  On 23 January 2006 at about 11 p.m. the applicant attempted to hang himself in Sosnowiec Remand Centre. He was rescued by his fellow cellmates. Immediately afterwards he was examined by the in-house doctor, who did not find any injuries. 15.  On 24 January 2006 the applicant was taken to Czeladź Psychiatric Hospital. Because of the lack of places, he was transported to Opole Psychiatric Hospital, where he was examined by doctors. The applicant was diagnosed with schizophrenia and it was suggested that he remain under psychiatric supervision. Nevertheless, the applicant was not admitted to the hospital as there was no room. As a result, he was taken back to Sosnowiec Remand Centre. 16.  During his remaining time in Sosnowiec Remand Centre the applicant claimed that he had experienced hallucinations. He received regular pharmacological treatment, including psychotropic medicines. Between January and April 2006 he was examined nine times by a psychiatrist or a general practitioner. 17.  On 22 May 2006 the applicant was transferred to Herby Stare Prison. 18.  On his admission to Herby Stare Prison the applicant was examined by a neurologist. The examination did not confirm that the applicant suffered from the disorders which he had described, such as epilepsy, hallucinations and anxiety; nevertheless, the doctor prescribed pharmacological treatment and ordered a psychiatric consultation and observation. 19.  On 25 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist. He complained that he was suffering from insomnia and auditory hallucinations. Moreover, he claimed to have been followed and spied on by his cellmates. The doctor prescribed a drug to treat the applicant's schizophrenia and ordered that he should remain under the supervision of a psychiatrist. 20.  On 1 June 2006 the applicant missed his appointment with a psychiatrist but he was examined one week later. On 27 June 2006 he was examined by a general practitioner and on 10 July 2006 once more by a psychiatrist. During the latter visit, the applicant declared that he was well. 21.  Subsequently, between July 2006 and August 2007 the applicant was examined thirty-five times by doctors with different specialities, including a psychiatrist and a neurosurgeon. 22.  It appears that from 2 April until 4 June 2007 the applicant was hospitalised in a prison psychiatric ward. 23.  From 4 June until 23 or 28 August 2007 he was again detained in Herby Stare Prison. On the day of his release the applicant declared that he was well and had not been experiencing any hallucinations lately. 24.  On 7 September 2007 the applicant was again committed to Herby Stare Prison. He has been detained there to this day. 25.  The parties' statements relating to the conditions of the applicant's detention are, to a large extent, contradictory. 26.  In Zabrze Remand Centre, from 18 July until 20 October 2005, the applicant was detained in cell no. 41 and from 20 October 2005 until 4 January 2006 in cell no. 42. Both cells measured approximately 6.7 square metres.\n(b)  Facts in dispute\n(i)  The Government 27.  The Government did not provide any information as to the number of detainees sharing cells with the applicant. They submitted, however, that Zabrze Remand Centre had faced the problem of overcrowding; indeed, its governor decided to reduce the statutory minimum standard of three square metres per person. On 14 June, 30 September and 29 November 2005 a penitentiary judge was informed about the Governor's decision. 28.  The Government also submitted that in Zabrze Remand Centre each of the applicant's cells had had an annex with a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. That area was separated from the rest of the cell and offered privacy. Detainees were supplied with toiletries and bed linen was changed once every two weeks. The window surface in each of the applicant's cells was over one square metre. The applicant was allowed to take a shower once a week. The shower room had eight shower heads. Sixteen people were allowed inside and they showered in two groups on a rotation basis. 29.  In the Government's submission the applicant had been allowed to have one hour of outdoor exercise in one of seven yards, two of which measured 150 and 120 square metres. The applicant could also participate in social activities two or three times per week for approximately two hours. In addition, he could stay in an entertainment room watching television, reading or playing board games. Finally, in the Government's submission the applicant had access to radio and television programmes through the prison internal broadcasting system and he could rent five books per week from a prison library. 30.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not been given any disciplinary punishments while in Zabrze Remand Centre. On the contrary, he had twice been rewarded for good behaviour.\n(ii)  The applicant 31.  The applicant submitted that he shared the cells in question with two other inmates. 32.  Moreover, he maintained that his cells had been dirty and infested with bedbugs, cockroaches and fungus. Detainees had smoked cigarettes all day long inside the cells. The bed linen and towels were not properly washed and there was a stench in the air. The detainees had washed in cold water. The applicant also claimed that there had been no television set or board games in the entertainment room and that he had not been informed about any social activities available in the remand centre. 33.  The applicant also complained of the practice of bullying detainees by the staff of Zabrze Remand Centre. He submitted that warders had ordered disciplinary punishment under any pretext, demolished cells during frequent and unjustified searches, made detainees undress and do squats and also deprived them of sleep. 34.  In Sosnowiec Remand Centre, between 4 January and 5 April 2006, the applicant was initially detained in cell no. 37, which measured almost sixteen square metres and was shared by four to five persons including the applicant. From 6 February until 30 March 2006 he was detained together with two other detainees in the medical wing's cell no. 58. That cell measured thirteen square metres. Finally, from 30 March until 5 April 2006 he was detained in cell no. 56, which measured ten square metres and a half and was shared by two people. When the number of new admissions increased as of January 2006, the governor of Sosnowiec Remand Centre decided to reduce the available cell space below the minimum statutory limit and to convey the necessary information to the competent penitentiary judge.\n(b)  Facts in dispute\n(i)  The Government 35.  The Government submitted that the sanitary conditions in Sosnowiec Remand Centre had been decent. Each cell had a separate sanitary annex with a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. Detainees took a hot bath or shower once a week. During his detention in cell no. 58 the applicant could take one bath per day. In that cell detainees had access to hot water. In all other cells they were allowed to use a water immersion heater or a wireless kettle. All cells were sufficiently lit and ventilated. Detainees had one hour of outdoor exercise per day and they were also allowed to spend time in an entertainment room. The entertainment room in Wing IV of Sosnowiec Remand Centre, where the applicant had been detained, was equipped with board games and tables to play table football and table tennis. In addition, in the remand centre detainees had access to a library and, in the spring and summertime, to a volleyball court.\n(ii)  The applicant 36.  The applicant contested the above submissions by saying that sanitary conditions in Sosnowiec Remand Centre had been inadequate. The cells were damp and dirty, the towels and bed linen were not washed and the detainees washed in cold water. 37.  The applicant was detained in Herby Stare Prison during three separate periods: from 22 May 2006 and 2 April 2007, from 4 June and 28 August 2007, and from 7 September 2007 onwards.\n(b)  Facts in dispute\n(i)  The Government 38.  The Government supplied the list of cells which the applicant had occupied at different periods. The surface area of these cells varied between ten and eighteen square metres. Their occupancy rate, however, had not been disclosed. On the other hand, the Government submitted that the prison's governor had made a decision to reduce the available cell space below the minimum statutory limit and that between May 2006 and October 2007 he had informed a penitentiary judge about that fact on nineteen occasions. 39.  They claimed that in Herby Stare Prison the sanitary conditions had been decent. Each cell had a separate sanitary annex with a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. Detainees took a hot bath or shower once a week. The bath house was equipped with nineteen shower heads and four or five persons were allowed inside at a time.\n(ii)  The applicant 40.  The applicant argued that all the cells in which he had been detained had been seriously overcrowded. For example, cell no. 32, which measured eighteen square metres, had been shared by nine or ten persons. 41.  The applicant also submitted that sanitary conditions in Herby Stare Prison had been inadequate. Similarly to the other detention facilities where he had been held, the cells were damp and dirty, the towels and bed linen were not washed and the detainees washed in cold water. In addition in Herby Stare Prison the shower room was located in a separate building. In wintertime in particular, it had been difficult for detainees to walk back to the living quarters with wet hair and without proper clothing. Moreover the applicant complained of the lack of privacy because the showers had not been separated. 42.  The applicant did not lodge any formal complaints with the penitentiary authorities on the basis of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. He complained, however, to various State authorities, i.e. to the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) about the inadequate medical care he had received and the conditions of his detention. He also filed several requests for release on health grounds. 43.  In a letter of 6 July 2006 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that his allegations had been considered ill‑founded. It was emphasised that the applicant had been under constant psychiatric supervision and that he had been hospitalised whenever necessary. 44.  On 31 July 2006 the Myszków District Court refused to release the applicant from pre‑trial detention on health grounds as requested by his lawyer. The court referred to unspecified medical reports which stated that the applicant was not suffering from any mental illness, but merely from an antisocial personality disorder. 45.  On 23 November 2006 the Częstochowa Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant against a decision of 28 September 2006 by which the Myszków District Court had extended his pre‑trial detention. 46.  The applicant argued that, because of his mental illness, he should not be held in a detention centre but in a psychiatric hospital. He referred to a number of medical reports which had confirmed his schizophrenia diagnosis and in which it had been recommended that he should remain under psychiatric supervision. 47.  The Częstochowa Regional Court held that there were no contraindications to the applicant's detention in a remand centre. The court stated that, admittedly, a number of psychiatrists from both State and prison hospitals had directed that the applicant should be placed under psychiatric supervision. The court observed, however, that the diagnosis was not credible since the doctors had not had long‑term contact with the applicant and had not had full access to his medical records. Instead, the court relied on an opinion delivered by experts in psychiatry from Rybnik Hospital, who were of the view that the applicant was not suffering from any psychotic disorder. The court stressed that, unlike the others, the latter expert opinion was thorough, as it had been drawn up further to the applicant's five‑week period under psychiatric observation at Rybnik Hospital in 2005 and based on the medical records of his psychiatric treatment prior to his detention. On the other hand, the court took note of discrepancies between the medical reports before it and recommended that the report of the experts from Rybnik Psychiatric Hospital be updated. Nevertheless, the court did not agree to release the applicant from pre‑trial detention in a remand centre.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Zdeněk Jirsák, is a Czech national who was born in 1953 and is currently serving a sentence in Karviná Prison. 6.  The applicant served his prison sentence in Valdice Prison in Sections C and D between 2000 and 2005. 7.  Between 10 November 2000 and 29 January 2001, he shared cell no. 223, of a total surface area of 35.816 sq. m., with nine other prisoners. The cell was rectangular in shape with bunk beds along both of the longer walls. Next to the entrance, which was at one end of the cell, was a separate room with a toilet. At the opposite end of the cell were two large windows, measuring 1.44 sq. m each. One window and half of the second one could be opened. Yellow translucent pieces of fibreglass covered them from the outside at a distance of approximately 1.5 m. It was up to the detainees how and when the windows were opened. The cell was equipped with ten lockers, two tables and ten chairs. 8.  During the whole period of his detention in cell no. 223 the applicant was employed in the prison laundry where he spent nine hours every working day. He was allowed to spend one hour a day outside in the yard. He could also watch television or take part in other recreational activities outside his cell. The applicant could take a hot shower twice a week and wash after work. He was guaranteed one warm meal per day and two hot meals four times a week. He had access to a range of cultural and sports activities, books, newspapers and magazines. 9.  On 28 January 2001 at 7.30 p.m. the applicant broke his ankle in his cell while climbing down from his bunk bed. According to him, he fell because he was dizzy due to the stuffy air in the cell. He did not call for medical assistance as he thought that his ankle was just sprained. He took some pills containing Ibuprofen as a painkiller. In the morning, he was unable to walk due to a severe pain in his ankle, so his cell mates took him to the prison infirmary. 10.  The prison doctor visually examined the applicant and considered him to be heavily intoxicated with medicaments, although he did not conduct a medical test. The doctor did not send him for an x-ray, because the person operating the prison’s x-ray machine was on holiday and due to the applicant’s alleged intoxication, his transfer to a hospital was, in his view, impossible. The applicant, having been proclaimed intoxicated, was sent to solitary confinement. 11.  On the next day, 30 January 2001, the applicant was x-rayed and it was found that his ankle was broken. He was transferred to a prison hospital in Prague. The record shows that the applicant fully cooperated with the medical staff and was operated on at the hospital on 31 January 2001. He then stayed in Prague Prison, where he was treated until 20 March 2001. He was subsequently transferred to Brno Prison, where he continued his treatment, including physiotherapy. The treatment lasted for seven months overall, but the applicant has continued to see a doctor afterwards as he has developed arthritis in his broken ankle. 12.  On 26 March 2001 the applicant was found guilty of the disciplinary offence of self-intoxication. He was sentenced to five days under the “closed prison” regime (uzavřené oddělení). He did not appeal. 13.  He was also dismissed from his prison job because it was considered that on 29 January 2001 he had been absent from work due to his self-intoxication. 14.  In November 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the director of Valdice Prison alleging inadequate treatment of his injury. 15.  On 1 February 2002 the Hradec Králové Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed him that his complaints were unjustified. 16.  On 22 August 2002 the High Prosecutor’s Office expressed doubts about the conduct of the prison authorities towards the applicant and forwarded the complaints to the Ministry of Justice, Department of Prison Inspections (odbor generální inspekce, oddělení vězeňství) to investigate the matter. The prosecutor noted with concern that even though a medical report had found that the applicant had no longer been intoxicated at 3.10 p.m. on 29 January 2001, he still had not been sent for an x-ray but had been kept in solitary confinement until the next day; that the applicant had been dismissed from his prison job during the time of his injury; that he had not been paid sickness benefit; and that he had been subjected to disciplinary punishment for intoxication without any consideration to his claim that he had taken painkillers due to the injury he had suffered. The applicant did not inform the Court about the outcome of this investigation. 17.  On 13 February 2004, in reply to another complaint by the applicant alleging overcrowding in the prison, the High Prosecutor’s Office informed him that it was aware of the fact that some sections in Valdice Prison were overcrowded and that the competent prosecutor had been taking steps to remedy the situation. 18.  On 20 October 2005 the applicant sent another complaint challenging his treatment on 29 and 30 January 2001 to the Prison Directorate General (Generální ředitelství Vězeňské služby) which, on 29 November 2005, found it unsubstantiated. 19.  The applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Czech Republic claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary damage arising from his injury, which had been caused by the unsatisfactory conditions of detention in cell no. 223 in Valdice Prison and inadequate treatment of the injury by the prison doctor. 20.  In a judgment of 7 April 2005 the Jičín District Court (okresní soud) rejected his action, finding that at the material time the applicant had been held together with nine other inmates in a cell measuring 35.816 sq. m. (or 107,448 cubic metres) including a toilet, which was in accordance with Order of the Minister of Justice no. 20/1977 in force at the relevant time, which had required a minimum of 7 cubic metres per prisoner. The court based its findings on the testimony of the applicant, two of his cellmates at the time of the injury, other witnesses and several documents. The information about the cell dimensions was based on a report by the prison authorities and the court did not consider it necessary to measure the cell itself, as requested by the applicant. It did not find any illegality in the prison doctor’s conduct. It dismissed the applicant’s request to admit additional evidence as unnecessary. 21.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions of his detention had been unsatisfactory. He claimed that the court had rejected his request to admit in evidence a medical expert report to assess the conditions of his detention and his request that the court measure the cell itself and not rely on the prison report. 22.  On 19 October 2005 the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud) upheld the first-instance judgment endorsing the District Court’s opinion. 23.  On 10 May 2007 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law (dovolání). It upheld the conclusions of the lower courts that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, including the dimensions of his cell, complied with domestic law. 24.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) complaining about the conditions of his detention and violations of his right to a fair trial in the precedent proceedings. 25.  The Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) sent the appeal to the lower courts that had previously been involved in the case for comments. 26.  On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded, holding that the applicant had merely disagreed with the outcome of the proceedings. It added that the decisions of the ordinary courts had been logical and sufficiently reasoned without any appearance of arbitrariness. The court did not refer in its reasoning to the written observations submitted by the lower courts. It appears from the decision that the District Court maintained, in a short submission, that its decision had not violated the applicant’s constitutional rights and that the Regional Court referred only to the text of its judgment. None of these observations were sent to the applicant, the court finding that they did not bring anything new to the case. 27.  In 2007 the applicant instituted proceedings against the prison doctor who treated him on 29 January 2001, for the protection of his personality rights. On 3 December 2010 the claim was dismissed on the ground that the doctor had been acting in his official capacity and therefore it was the State which should have been sued. At the same time, the prescription period for the claim had already expired. 28.  On 22 July 2010 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages against the State before the Prague 2 District Court (obvodní soud) under the State Liability Act for inhuman conditions of detention for the whole period of his sentence. Those proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Jesenice. 6.  On 15 April 1998 the Kranj District Court instituted insolvency proceedings against the company S., at that time the applicant’s employer. 7.  On 29 April 1998 the receiver in insolvency issued a decision on the termination of the applicant’s employment contract with the company S. 8.  On an unknown date, the applicant lodged his claim for a redundancy payment in the insolvency proceedings. Since the receiver disputed the claim, the Kranj District Court on 11 September 1998 referred the applicant to labour proceedings. 9.  On 22 December 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Kranj Divison of the Labour and Social Court. 10.  In the same period about 150 claims similar to that of the applicant were lodged before the same court. 11.  In 1999 the Kranj Labour and Social Court issued decisions in four cases similar to the applicant’s, dismissing the claims. It held that the workers who had lost their jobs owing to the employer’s insolvency before section 19 of the 1999 Act Amending the Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Slovenia Act (“the 1999 Act”) became effective were not entitled to a redundancy payment. Section 19 explicitly foresaw a right to a redundancy payment for workers who were let go after a company had become insolvent. 12.  In 2000 several applications for a constitutional review of section 19 of the 1999 Act were lodged with the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of non-retroactive application of that provision. 13.  On 5 October 2001, following the negative decisions issued in the four cases (see paragraph 11 above), the trade union which was also representing the applicant requested the court to postpone hearings scheduled in other cases. The union wanted to first check whether the other workers wanted to withdraw their claims in order to avoid the costs of the proceedings. 14.  No formal decision on adjourning or staying the proceedings was issued by the court. 15.  On 10 April 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the motions for review of the constitutionality of section 19 of the 1999 Act. It held that they were unfounded, since they were based on the false premises that the right to a redundancy payment for workers laid off because of their employer’s insolvency was introduced only by section 19, and that moreover it did not apply retroactively. Referring to its own decisions issued in 1994, 1995 and 2000, it stressed that this right had already been foreseen by the general labour legislation in force prior to the adoption of the 1999 Act. It explained that the purpose of Section 19 was solely to explicitly clarify that also workers who lost their jobs because of the insolvency of their employers were entitled to redundancy payments. Such clarification was needed because of the conflicting case-law of the lower courts. In this respect the Constitutional Court emphasised that while it could not interfere with the correct interpretation of legal norms by the lower courts, the latter could not apply an interpretation which would be unconstitutional, arbitrary, or clearly wrong. 16.  On 14 July 2003, the parties settled with the company S., which acknowledged the applicant’s claim. 17.  On 13 July 2006 the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for damage sustained because of the length of the labour proceedings. 18.  On 27 September 2007 the Ljubljana Local Court dismissed his claim. It held that Section 25 of the 2006 Act on Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”) was not applicable, since that provision only applied to cases where an individual had already lodged an application on account of length of proceedings before an international court. Applying the general rules of the 2001 Code of Obligations on pecuniary damages, it further concluded that since the case had been settled the applicant had failed to prove that he had incurred any damage. In any case, there was also no causal link between the conduct of the court and the damage allegedly sustained. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 9 January 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case back to the first-instance court. 20.  On 8 May 2008 the Ljubljana Local Court, in a renewed set of proceedings, again dismissed the applicant’s claim. It concluded that he had failed to prove either any damage on account of delays in the proceedings or any causal link. The applicant appealed. 21.  On 5 November 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 22.  On 27 May 2010 the Constitutional Court granted the applicant’s constitutional appeal by referring to its decision of 18 March 2010 (see paragraph 29 below) and remitted the case to the higher court. 23.  On 15 September 2010 the Ljubljana Higher Court remitted the case back to the first-instance court. 24.  On 25 October 2010 the Ljubljana Local Court, applying by analogy, in accordance with the instructions of the Constitutional Court, the provisions of the 2006 Act, dismissed the applicant’s claim. Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it held that it had been reasonable to suspend the examination of the applicant’s claim pending the outcome of some similar cases and of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 15 above). It held that it could not identify any unreasonable delays in these similar cases, which took five years at three levels of jurisdiction, of which three years were before the Constitutional Court. The applicant appealed. 25.  On 13 April 2011 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law and a constitutional appeal. 26.  On 14 July 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 27.  On 8 May 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Arad. 6.  At around 4 a.m. on 8 August 2010, the applicant and his friends were involved in a fight with a group of people outside a bar. S.L., who was inside the bar, called the police. When the police arrived the group of aggressors ran away. The applicant and his friends were taken to the police station to give statements and possibly complain against their aggressors. 7.  While he was waiting inside the police station, the applicant saw a police officer who was behaving roughly with an arrestee who had just been brought in. He commented loudly that the police officer represented the State authority and should not hit people. D.C.I., the police officer in question, became angry and asked a colleague, M.C., to “take him [the applicant] to the toilets to teach him how to speak”. The applicant, who resisted entering the toilets, was taken outside and then into a back office where the two police officers, D.C.I. and M.C., handcuffed him to a radiator and started punching and kicking him. Alerted by the applicant’s screaming, another police officer entered and put an end to the hitting. At that point, one of the officers who had assaulted the applicant warned him not to say anything or he would find him and beat him again. The applicant and his friends were then escorted home by police officers.\n(b)  The Government’s account of the events 8.  On 8 August 2010 the police were called in order to stop a fight between several people on a street in Arad. By the time the police arrived, the applicant and his friends had had their clothes torn and had already been injured. They were accompanied to the police station to make statements. The police officers took statements from S.L. and D.V. 9.  S.L. declared that he had been in a bar when he had seen that his brother, S.N., was involved in a fight outside. He called the police emergency number and then went outside to help his brother. He and his brother received blows to their bodies. He further stated that he did not wish to lodge a complaint against the aggressors at that time but reserved his right to do so later. D.V. stated that when he had left the bar he had seen some people fighting. Someone was throwing stones, one of which hit him in the leg. He stated that he did not wish to lodge a complaint. 10.  Afterwards the applicant and his friends were all escorted home by the police in order to avoid further violent incidents. 11.  An investigation was opened nonetheless in order to clarify the circumstances surrounding the incident. However, after a discussion on 20 August 2010 with the bar attendant and a sales woman at a nearby store, who said they had not seen or heard anything, the case was closed on 23 August 2010. 12.  Later on 8 August 2010, the applicant went to the emergency unit of Arad County Hospital, where he was diagnosed with maxillofacial trauma, and contusion of the lower lip and of the thorax. His injuries were treated. 13.  On 9 August 2010 a forensic medical certificate was issued by the Arad County Forensic Service at the request of the applicant. According to the certificate, the applicant had a sutured cut on the lower lip and bruising on the upper lip, bruising on the left side of the chest, two excoriations on the left side of the back, grazes and bruising on the right elbow, right leg and the left knee. The applicant also had two excoriations covered with brown scabs measuring 1 by 0.2 cm to 2 by 0.2 cm on the back of each wrist. The injuries may have been caused by an impact with or on a hard object on 8 August 2010. The injuries would require nine days of medical treatment if no complications developed. 14.  On 15 September 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against the two officers who had assaulted him, accusing them of abusive investigative conduct and bodily harm. He lodged his complaint with both the Arad Police and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Timişoara Military County Court. He requested that S.L., S.N. and K.E., who had been taken to the police station with him, be called to testify as witnesses. 15.  On 23 September 2010 the applicant was heard at the Timişoara Military Prosecutor’s Office. He declared that he had been taken to the police station after a street brawl. Once inside the police station, the applicant drew an officer’s attention to his disrespectful behaviour towards someone else. The police officer in question and another colleague of his became angry with him and tried to drag him into the toilets, but he resisted. They then told him to go outside, where one of them, officer D.C.I., punched him in the mouth. He was then handcuffed with his hands behind his back and taken to a room where he was punched and kicked. The applicant further stated that he had suffered severe injuries, for which he was submitting a forensic medical certificate and claiming civil damages from his aggressors. 16.  On 27 September 2010 the Timişoara Military Prosecutor’s Office decided that the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court should deal with the case because the two police officers in question were not members of the military. 17.  In February 2011 the applicant, S.L. and S.N. were heard by a prosecutor from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court. In a statement dated 1 February 2011, handwritten in front of the prosecutor, S.L. stated that he had been taken to the police station on 8 August 2010 following a dispute with a group of people in the street. Once inside the police station he was taken to the second floor together with his brother. Half an hour later, he overheard through an open window a person screaming with pain outside the building and recognised the applicant’s voice. Afterwards he was taken home together with his brother in a police car. Later that day they met the applicant in front of his house and he told them that he had been handcuffed and beaten up by police officers. The applicant showed them his injuries and the marks on his hands. S.L. declared that he knew for sure that the applicant had been beaten up at the police station because he had seen him when they were leaving the police station. On 8 February 2011 S.L.’s statement was typed on a witness statement form bearing the heading of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court and S.L. signed it. In addition to the facts described in the previous handwritten statement, the typewritten statement included the following phrase: “... one of my friends, V., came to me and told me that some ... were beating up my brother and Miclea Alexandru.” In that statement S.L. also mentioned that, after he had heard the applicant shouting outside the police station, he had received on his mobile phone a message from the applicant who was telling him that he was being “beaten by policemen”. At that point he wanted to go outside but he was not allowed to and one hour later he was taken home in a police car together with his brother. 18.  On 1 February 2011 S.N. also gave a handwritten statement in front of the prosecutor. He declared that he had been taken to the police station following a street fight. The applicant was with him. After his arrival at the police station, while he was upstairs to give a statement, he heard the applicant screaming outside. Approximately one hour later he was taken home in a police car together with his brother. Later that day he met the applicant in front of his house. The applicant told him and his brother that he had been beaten up by police officers. He showed them the injuries on his lips and hands. Like his brother, S.N. also stated that he knew the applicant had been beaten inside the police station because he had seen him when they were taken home. That statement was subsequently typed on a witness statement form bearing the heading of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court and was signed by S.N. on 17 February 2011. 19.  On 8 February 2011 the applicant declared that he maintained the account he had given in his initial complaint as well as in his statement of 23 September 2010. 20.  On 15 March 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court decided to join the applicant’s complaint to two complaints lodged by other individuals who claimed that they had been physically assaulted by the same police officers on a previous date. Subsequently, the prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings for abusive investigative conduct as requested by the applicant, since he had not been under investigation at the relevant time. Lastly, the prosecutor held that the investigation for the three counts of abusive behaviour of which D.C.I. and M.C. were accused would be continued by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court, which was the competent authority in view of the defendants’ functions within the police force. 21.  On 22 June 2011 an officer in charge of internal affairs at the Arad County Police took statements from the two police officers who had allegedly physically assaulted the applicant. D.C.I. stated that in the early hours of 8 August 2010 he had taken an arrested person to the police station. When he entered the waiting room he saw a group of six people who were drunk, had had their clothes torn and were visibly injured. They were arguing and swearing at each other. When he asked them politely to wait outside, one of them swore at him. M.C. stated that he had accompanied D.C.I. on the night of the incident. When he saw a group of people in the police station waiting room, he asked what had happened to them and they replied that they had been beaten up by some people on the street and were waiting to give statements. Then he asked them to wait outside. 22.  On 22 July 2011 the police officer in charge of the investigation took statements from T.I., G.S.S. and B.I.M., three of the police officers who had responded to the emergency call. 23.  Officer T.I. stated that he had gone to the scene of the incident accompanied by two police patrols. He found a group of people who claimed to be the injured parties. Amongst them was the applicant. They said that they wished to lodge a criminal complaint against their aggressors, so he accompanied them to the police station. There he took statements from S.L. and D.V., but he did not know whether any of the police officers physically assaulted any of the above-mentioned people. T.I. also stated that after statements had been taken, the applicant had been taken home by officer G.S., while he had accompanied the others home in order to avoid further possible conflicts if they decided to go back to the scene of the incident. 24.  G.S. stated that he was a member of one of the police patrols that had been called to the scene of the incident. When he arrived S.L. told him that he had been physically assaulted by a group of people who had then run away. He maintained that he did not recognise any of the aggressors. The officer further stated:\n“... I accompanied to the police station the person who had been assaulted [S.L.] and Mr D.V., who was also at the scene when the incident took place. The accompanied people had injuries on their bodies, probably caused by the stones with which they had been aggressed and their clothes had also been torn as a result of the incident. ... Subsequently, I was asked by T.I. to accompany home another person involved in the incident in order to avoid other unpleasant incidents, this person was Miclea Alexandru. While I was with Miclea Alexandru and until reaching his home ..., he did not tell me that he had been beaten by a police officer, he had traces of violence on his face, his tee-shirt was torn but I did not ask him where this came from, I assumed it had come from the street fight.” 25.  B.I.M. declared that the applicant could not have been assaulted by police officers since he was one of the people who had been injured in the street fight. 26.  On 12 January 2012 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court decided not to pursue the criminal proceedings with respect to the three counts of abusive behaviour for which officers D.C.I. and M.C. had been investigated. As for the applicant’s complaint, the prosecutor held that the statements given by the applicant and the two persons accompanying him on the day of the incident had been contradicted by the statements of the officers under investigation as well as by those of three other police officers, namely T.I., G.S. and B.I.M. Therefore, it could not be established with certainty that the applicant had been assaulted by the two police officers. 27.  The applicant complained against that decision, claiming that the statements of the two police officers and their colleagues were subjective and should have been corroborated by other evidence. He requested again that K.A. (referred to as K.E. in the initial complaint) be called as a witness and gave his address. He added that K.A.’s testimony would have been relevant, since he had witnessed the applicant receiving a punch from D.C.I. outside the police station. 28.  On 7 February 2012 the applicant’s complaint against the decision not to bring charges was dismissed by the head prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court with the same reasoning, namely that the statements of the injured party had not been corroborated by the statements of the alleged perpetrators and their colleagues. 29.  The applicant contested the prosecutor’s decision before the court, requesting non-pecuniary damages for the injuries sustained. In his submission before the court, the applicant emphasised that as he had been escorted to the police station by only two officers, the statement of the third officer should not have been taken into consideration. In addition, the applicant complained that the prosecutor had overlooked important evidence. The only pieces of evidence he had taken into account were the statements of the two officers under investigation and the statements of their colleagues, who could not have been impartial. The applicant argued that K.A., who had accompanied him to the police station on the day of the incident, should also have been heard by the prosecutors, as he had partially witnessed the alleged ill-treatment. 30.  The applicant’s complaint, together with the other two complaints against the two police officers, were analysed jointly and rejected as manifestly ill-founded by a final decision of the Arad District Court on 18 April 2012. 31.  The court considered that the evidence administered during the criminal investigation had sufficed to conclude that “it had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that on 8 August 2010 the defendants had physically abused [the applicant]”. The court based its verdict on the discrepancies found between the applicant’s account of the events and the statement given by S.L. More specifically, S.L. declared that he had heard the applicant screaming outside the police station, whereas the applicant claimed that he had been beaten inside. S.L. also declared that the applicant had told him that he had been handcuffed with his hands behind his back, whereas the applicant stated that he had been handcuffed to a radiator. In addition, the injuries on the applicant’s body may very well have been caused during the street brawl. That fact had been confirmed by the three police officers who had intervened at the scene, namely T.I., G.S. and B.I.M., as well as by the witness, S.L., who had declared in his statement of 8 February 2011 that he had been told when he was inside the bar that a group of people were “beating up my brother and Miclea Alexandru”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  At the beginning of the events relevant to the application, K. had a daughter, P., and a son, M., born in 1986 and 1988 respectively. P.’s father is X and M.’s father is V. From March to May 1989 K. was voluntarily hospitalised for about three months, having been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. From August to November 1989 and from December 1989 to March 1990, she was again hospitalised for periods of about three months on account of this illness. In 1991 she was hospitalised for less than a week, diagnosed as suffering from an atypical and undefinable psychosis. It appears that social welfare and health authorities have been in contact with the family since 1989. 12.  The applicants initially cohabited from the summer of 1991 to July 1993. In 1991 both P. and M. were living with them. From 1991 to 1993 K. and X were involved in a custody and access dispute concerning P. In May 1992 a residence order was made transferring custody of P. to X. 13.  K. was again hospitalised from 22 April to 7 May 1992, from 13 May to 10 June 1992, and from 11 to 17 January 1993, on account of psychoses. She was in compulsory care between 15 May and 10 June 1992. According to a medical report dated 15 May 1992, K. was paranoid and psychotic. 14.  On 19 March 1993, according to the social welfare authorities’ records, a discussion took place between a social worker and K.’s mother. K.’s mother said that her daughter’s health condition was really bad and that K. had destroyed a childhood picture of hers, a wedding photo of the mother, broken a glass and “pierced the eyes” of all appearing in the photos. K.’s mother had said that she was tired of the situation, as she did not get any support from the mental health authorities. She added that she was worried and afraid that “again something must happen before K. is admitted to care”.\nOn 24 March 1993 K. was placed under observation with a view to determining whether she should be placed in compulsory psychiatric care, having initially been diagnosed as suffering from psychosis. The conditions for compulsory care were not considered to be met but she remained in voluntary care until 5 May 1993. 15.  Allegedly, X did not allow K., P. and M. to meet. On 11 May 1993, when K. was again pregnant, her access to P. was further limited by an order of the District Court of R. Basing itself on a doctor’s opinion, the court held that the child’s mental development would be endangered if the meetings between P. and K. continued without supervision as had been ordered in 1992. 16.  According to the records of the social welfare authorities, M. showed signs of behavioural problems. On 30 March 1992 a psychologist reported how M. had played with two dolls saying – in very vulgar terms – that they were performing sexual acts. On 17 February 1993 K. was said to have broken a mirror in the presence of M. who had kept repeating: “mummy broke the mirror ...”\nNotes of the social authorities of 24 and 30 March 1993 among others state that games which M. played and pictures he drew were of a destructive nature. According to the notes taken on 30 March, he had lately, while the children were singing together at the day-care nursery, shown immense hatred, threatening “to kill everybody”. The occasions when K. fetched him were described as “unpleasant scenes”, M. shouting and hitting his mother who did not react. It was noted, however, that he no longer played doll games with sexual connotations. 17.  According to the records of the social welfare authorities, a discussion between K., her mother, T. and a number of social and mental-health care officials took place on 31 March 1993, during which it was mentioned that the authorities might have to intervene in M.’s upbringing, from the child-protection point of view, in a more drastic way than had been the case so far. It appeared that in connection with K.’s recent hospitalisation T. had “forcibly” taken her from a restaurant, which had made K. furious, with the consequence that she had thrown things around; for example, the microwave oven had ended up on the floor. T. had said that K. was unable to control herself. 18.  On the following day the child welfare support group, consisting of various social and health authorities, agreed that the aim should be to place M. in a children’s home for three months as an assistance measure of open care under section 14 of the 1983 Child Welfare Act (lastensuojelulaki, barnskyddslag 683/1983 – “the 1983 Act”), during which period psychological examinations of the child would be carried out. 19.  On 3 May 1993 a social welfare official decided on behalf of the Social Welfare Board (perusturvalautakunta, grundtrygghetsnämnden) of S. to place M. in a children’s home for a period of three months. This was to be regarded as a short-term support measure pursuant to the 1983 Act. The applicants had been consulted, together with K.’s mother and sister, on 8 April 1993, in order to find an open-care measure which would be practicable. According to the records of that meeting, no such practical measure had been proposed by any of the participants. The applicants had then been heard again on 21 April 1993 and had not objected to the placing of M. in a children’s home. 20.  In an opinion of 12 May 1993, requested by the Social Welfare Board, doctors M.L. and K.R. considered that K. was not at that time able to care for M., but that her mental state would not necessarily permanently prevent her from caring for him. Doctors M.L. and K.R. worked at the hospital of H., where K. had been cared for since 1991 during the periods indicated above. 21.  On 7 June 1993 it was reported by the social welfare authorities that, when K. and T. had come to the children’s home where M. was staying, the boy had undergone a total change in his behaviour, characterised by anger, hatred, swearing, etc. T. had said that he was really tired of the situation and that in his view K. was in need of hospitalisation. When a visit to the health centre had been suggested to her, she had become very angry.\nAccording to a statement of 22 June 1993 by the children’s home, K. and T. had come to the home on 17 June 1993. While T. had been playing with M., other children had come to tell the staff that K. had asked a 3-year-old girl what her name was. As the girl did not reply, K. had raised her voice and shaken the girl, not letting her go until an older girl had given the child’s name. The other children had been frightened by K.’s behaviour. 22.  On 11 June 1993 the social welfare official who had decided on 3 May 1993 to place M. in a children’s home informed the University Hospital of T. and the local hospital of S. in writing that she was very worried about the health of K. and the baby she was carrying. She requested the hospitals to contact her as soon as K. arrived at the hospital and, more particularly, at the time of the baby’s delivery. She also expressed the wish that health-care professionals should pay special attention to the relationship between the mother and the new-born baby from the very beginning. 23.  On 18 June 1993 K. was taken to a district hospital, where she gave birth to J. on the same day. According to the hospital records, the mother stayed calm during the delivery. After the delivery a written decision concerning an emergency care order was served on the hospital. The child was taken to the children’s ward. The mother’s behaviour in the ward was later found to be somewhat restless but not completely disorderly. The hospital records indicate that she understood the situation and wanted to leave hospital the following day. Medication to prevent the secretion of milk was prescribed. It seems that K. left the hospital on 19 June 1993, that is, the following morning, without any post-natal examination. She went to her mother’s home, where she started pushing an empty pram around the place. 24.  J. was immediately placed in emergency care, pursuant to section 18 of the 1983 Act. After the birth of their child, K. and T. were informed of this decision by two social workers at the hospital of H. The Social Director, who had made the decision on behalf of the Social Welfare Board, noted that K.’s mental state had been unstable during the last stages of her pregnancy. He considered that the baby’s health would be endangered since K. had found out about the plans to place the baby in public care. Lastly, he considered that the baby’s father, T., could not guarantee its development and safety. In addition the Social Director referred to the family’s long-standing difficulties, namely, K.’s serious illness and occasionally uncontrolled emotional reactions which could be traumatic for the children, T.’s inability to care for both J. and K., K.’s reluctance to accept guidance, the impossibility of putting the whole responsibility for J.’s development on T., and the impossibility of providing open-care support measures to the necessary extent. The applicants were not heard prior to the decision. On 24 June 1993 the applicants were notified in writing of the decision to take the new-born baby into public care. The notification was also faxed to K. 25.  On 21 June 1993 the Social Director also placed M. in emergency care, citing principally the same reasons as in his decision of 18 June 1993 concerning J. 26.  The applicants did not appeal against the emergency care orders. 27.  On 21 June 1993 the Social Welfare Board took note of the emergency care orders and prohibited all unsupervised access between K. on the one hand, and J. and M. on the other. The number of supervised visits, however, was not restricted. The Board decided to continue preparations for taking M. and J. into care. 28.  A meeting was held by social workers at the family centre on 21 June 1993, before the arrival of the baby from the hospital and in the absence of the applicants. It is mentioned in the report that there was a plan to prohibit the mother’s visits for a month on the ground that her reactions could not be predicted as she had, for example, broken things at home. After this initial period she would be allowed to visit the baby without restriction, but accompanied by her personal nurse. However, this plan was not implemented. The following entry appears in the register for 24 June: “The mother may come with her personal nurse if she wants. Other visitors not allowed for the time being.” 29.  K. was asked to come with T. to the social welfare office on 22 June 1993 at 11.30 a.m. in order to be informed of the decision of 21 June 1993 by the Social Director concerning M. On 24 June 1993 K. and V. (M.’s biological father) were notified in writing of the decision of 21 June 1993. The notification was also faxed to K. 30.  On 22 June 1993 K. was hospitalised voluntarily at the hospital of H. on account of psychosis, having obtained a referral from a doctor at a health care centre. She was treated there until 30 June 1993. 31.  On 23 June 1993 J. was placed in the family centre. T. visited her the same day. 32.  At the beginning of July 1993 T. left the applicants’ home, having been told by the social welfare officials that he had to break off his relationship with K. “if he wanted to keep” J. The applicants nevertheless continued their relationship. 33.  On 15 July 1993 the Social Welfare Board gave its decisions taking J. and M. into “normal” public care, giving reasons similar to those mentioned in the emergency care orders (see paragraph 24 above), and prolonged the access restriction until 15 September 1993. K. was allowed to see the children only in the company of her personal nurse. The Board essentially considered that K.’s state of health remained unstable; that she was subject to aggressive and uncontrolled emotional moods; and that public care proceedings were a severe mental ordeal for a patient. As regards J., the Board therefore believed that her personal security could be jeopardised if access were to take place without supervision. As regards M., the Board feared that K.’s visits to the children’s home “could no longer be supervised by its staff, which would not be in his interest”. Before the decisions of 15 July 1993 the applicants had been heard and had expressed their objection to the care decisions envisaged. 34.  On 15 July 1993 K. visited both her children, accompanied by her personal nurse. The register indicates that it was “a difficult situation”. 35.  On 19 July 1993 T. moved to the family unit of the family centre with J. 36.  On 20 July 1993 K. was again hospitalised in voluntary care at the open ward of the hospital of H., suffering from psychosis. She left hospital the following day, however. On 26 July 1993 she was placed under observation with a view to determining whether she should be placed in compulsory psychiatric care. On 30 July 1993 she was committed to compulsory psychiatric care. According to the file, her relatives had earlier been worried about her and had contacted the hospital in order to get her into hospital care. They reported that K. had disappeared from her home, where she had behaved in an unsettled and aggressive manner. Her hospitalisation lasted until 27 October 1993, that is, three months. 37.  During the period between 18 June and 31 August 1993 K. visited her children at their respective children’s homes. During the visits she was accompanied by her personal nurse from the hospital, who was in contact with the social welfare authorities and arranged the visits having regard to K.’s state of mental health. According to the centre’s register, she visited J. twice during this period. 38.  According to a statement made by a social worker on 4 August 1993, T. had taken good care of J., first at the hospital until 23 June 1993 and later on at the family centre. It was agreed that J. would stay at the family centre and that T. would visit her every other day. J. would visit her father for the first time from 13 to 15 August 1993, during which time T. would organise her christening. The intention was that the baby could move in with her father later on. 39.  After T.’s paternity had been established on 13 July 1993, T. and K. were granted joint custody of J. on 4 August 1993. 40.  T.’s travel expenses to the centre were paid for by the social welfare authorities. From the centre’s records it can be deduced that T. succeeded in creating a relationship with the baby and learned to take good care of her. The home leaves were spent with T. first at his mother’s house and later in his new home. 41.  On 12 August 1993 the Social Welfare Board referred both public care orders to the County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) for confirmation, as the applicants had opposed them. In support of its referrals, the Board submitted a statement by a social welfare official dated 25 August 1993, according to which T. would not be able to care both for M. and the new-born J. alone, since K. was living in the same home and had been psychotic for the last four years. T. had been in contact with J. at the children’s home three to four times a week. While staying in a flat attached to a municipal children’s home, he had cared for J. for two whole weeks and had subsequently cared for her three days a week in his new home. The Board had therefore begun investigating whether it would be possible to entrust him with the responsibility for J. with the help of support measures taken by the Board. 42.  On 9 September 1993 the County Administrative Court confirmed the care order concerning J., considering that K. had been mentally ill; that the applicants had had conflicts “as a result of which T. had moved away from their home at the beginning of July 1993”; that because of K.’s illness and the family’s other problems the applicants had been unable to provide J. with adequate care; that the care support provided to the family had not sufficiently improved the family’s situation and that the measures could not be expected to satisfy J.’s care needs. No hearing was held. 43.  On 11 November 1993 the County Administrative Court confirmed the care order concerning M., repeating the reasons put forward in its decision of 9 September concerning J. No hearing was held. 44.  In an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) against the confirmation of the public care order concerning M., the applicants were represented by the Public Legal Adviser (yleinen oikeusavustaja, allmänna rättsbiträdet) of S. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal on 23 September 1994. 45.  On the same date the Supreme Administrative Court extended the time allowed for an appeal by K. against the confirmation of the care order made in respect of J. 46.  On 18 October 1994 K. appealed against the care order in respect of J. as confirmed by the County Administrative Court on 9 September 1993. On 21 August 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court granted K. cost-free proceedings as from 1 March 1994, appointed Ms Suomela as her representative and upheld the County Administrative Court’s decision of 9 September 1993. 47.  By a decision of 21 January 1994 the Social Welfare Board placed J. in a foster home in K., a town some 120 km away from the applicants’ home. M. joined her on 7 February 1994. The foster parents had no children of their own. Social welfare officials told the applicants and the foster parents that J.’s and M.’s placement would last “for years”. The applicants had proposed that the children’s public care be implemented in the homes of relatives. 48.  In the meantime, on 15 August 1993, J. was christened in the presence of K., T. and M. 49.  A consultation was held at the children’s home, on 18 August 1993, in the presence of T. According to the records, K.’s mental health was very unstable and her psychiatric treatment was expected to have to be continued for four to five years. T., however, had expressed his hopes that K. and he could, together, take care of J. in the future. It was agreed that J. would stay at the children’s home and would visit T. every week from Thursday until Saturday, beginning on 28 August 1993. T. would visit J. on other days, according to an arrangement to be agreed with the children’s home. 50.  On 14 September 1993 the Social Welfare Board prolonged the access restriction until 15 December 1993. 51.  The following notes of a social welfare official appear among those in the case records of the Social Welfare Board:\n“14 September 1993:\n… 2.  ... In addition, the importance of future access between J. and T. has now been questioned, since J.’s placement in [public foster care] is under preparation. It will be difficult for T. to give up J. ...”\n“13 October 1993: 52.  On 27 October 1993 K. was discharged from the hospital of H. 53.  On 2 February 1994 the Social Welfare Board drew up a plan concerning the implementation of the public care. The applicants’ alternative plan was allegedly ignored. For instance, the children could not meet their maternal grandmother at her home. 54.  After the adoption of the care plan on 2 February 1994, the applicants requested a relaxation of the access restriction. For example, T. had been permitted to see J. only once a month. 55.  On 21 March 1994 the applicants requested, inter alia, that the Social Welfare Board should draw up a public care plan aiming at the reunification of the family. 56.  On 3 May 1994 the social welfare authorities organised a meeting in order to revise the care plan of 2 February 1994. The applicants and their representative did not attend the meeting. 57.  On 17 May 1994 the Social Director restricted both applicants’ access to the children to one monthly visit at the foster home, to take place under supervision and last three hours. The Social Director considered that the grounds for public care still existed. In his view, although the applicants were dissatisfied with the visits set out in the care plan, affording the children an unlimited right to see their parents would create an obstacle to their successful placement. The applicants appealed. 58.  On 28 September 1994 the County Administrative Court held an oral hearing concerning the access restriction imposed on 17 May 1994. It took evidence from two psychiatrists, who had interviewed K. One of them, Dr T.I.-E., did not know K. personally but commented on a diagnosis concerning her mental state by indicating that K. had a tendency to react in a psychotic manner to conflict situations. Dr K.P. stated that K.’s state of health did not prevent her from caring for her children. Consequently, if her illness had been the reason for the access restriction, that reason no longer existed. 59.  In a written expert opinion, requested by the Social Welfare Board and submitted to the County Administrative Court, Dr E.V., a child psychiatrist, expressed the opinion that the children should be permanently cared for by the foster parents and that the applicants’ visits should, for the time being, be discontinued so as to protect the children and the foster parents. According to the applicants, Dr E.V. had not met them or the children, nor had he consulted the other psychiatrists before making his proposal. 60.  On 11 October 1994 the County Administrative Court upheld the access restriction issued on 17 May 1994. It noted that neither of the witnesses who had been heard orally had been willing to state any opinion as regards the children’s development. It reasoned, inter alia, as follows:\n“... [By allowing] access to take place once a month and [by allowing contact through correspondence] it will be ensured that the children will retain knowledge about their biological parents. If the grounds for public care later cease to exist, a reunification of the family will thus be possible. ...” 61.  The County Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ request for exemption from costs, since the relevant legislation did not cover disputes concerning access restrictions. At the court’s hearing, the applicants were nevertheless assisted by Ms Suomela. 62.  On 26 May 1994 the applicants requested that the Social Welfare Board discontinue the public care of M. and J. 63.  On 18 September 1994 the Social Director allegedly told the applicants that any further children born to them would also be placed in public care. According to the Government, the Social Director only told them, when expressly asked, that it was possible that any further children born would be taken into public care. 64.  In an opinion of 22 September 1994 submitted at the Social Welfare Board’s request, Dr K.P., a psychiatrist, commented on the possibility of revoking the public care orders. She concluded that K.’s mental state would not prevent her from having custody of the children. According to Dr K.P., K.’s efforts to have public care discontinued and access restrictions relaxed showed that she possessed psychological resources. She noted, inter alia, that T. was K.’s closest support in the care and upbringing of the children. In addition, K.’s mother, at the time her guardian ad litem, was ready to help in caring for them. Dr K.P., however, added that she could not, as a psychiatrist for adults, take any stand as regards the interests of the children. Dr K.P.’s opinion was also based on a report submitted by Dr K.Po., a psychologist, who had come to the same conclusion as regards K.’s ability to have custody of her children. 65.  The Public Legal Adviser advised against requesting revocation of the care orders. 66.  K. was hospitalised from 15 to 24 February and from 11 April to 29 May 1995, apparently on account of psychosis. 67.  On 14 March 1995 the Social Welfare Board rejected the applicants’ request of 26 May 1994 that the care order be revoked, stating as follows:\n“At the moment the health of the children’s mother, K., is better and the family situation has changed in other respects in comparison with the situation in 1993 when the decisions to take the children into care were made.\n...\nAccording to Dr K.P., a psychiatrist, K. still has ‘a lot of instability’ in her emotional life as well as fragility, brought about by the last five years’ experiences and the diagnosis of mental illness for which she needs – and will need for a long time to come – therapeutic support and treatment. A regular medication is also needed in order to guarantee her continued well-being and to make it possible for her to manage in open care and to have custody of her children. Dr K.P., however, did not give her more precise opinion as to K.’s ability to take care of and bring up her children even though Dr K.P. was explicitly asked to give such an opinion. 68.  The applicants appealed on 5 April 1995, requesting that they be granted exemption from costs and afforded free legal representation. They also requested an oral hearing. 69.  On 7 April 1995 a further child, R., was born to the applicants. Having given birth, K. left the hospital for a while on the same evening with the new-born baby wrapped in a blanket, walking barefoot in the cold weather until the hospital staff realised what had happened and intervened. 70.  On 13 April 1995 K. was committed to compulsory psychiatric care and treated at the hospital of H. until 29 May 1995, while R. was being cared for by T. According to a psychiatrist’s observation of 10 April 1995, K. “must have been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia for some time”. 71.  On 15 June 1995 the County Administrative Court granted the applicants exemption from costs and appointed Ms Suomela as their representative in the case concerning their appeal against the Social Welfare Board’s decision of 14 March 1995. It decided not to hold a hearing in respect of the applicants’ request for a revocation of the care orders and provided the parties with an opportunity to supplement their written observations. 72.  On 28 September 1995 the County Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeals of 5 April 1995 without holding an oral hearing. The court noted, inter alia, that according to the medical certificates, K.’s state of health had improved but her emotional life was still unstable. She therefore continued to be in need of psychotherapy and medication. In addition, a further child had been born to the applicants and K. had again been treated at the hospital of H. These two factors had caused an additional strain militating against a revocation of the care orders. 73.  On 17 November 1994 social welfare officials revised the public care plan, proposing that the children meet the applicants once a month on neutral premises at the Family Advice Centre of K., where the foster parents were living. The applicants objected to this proposal, considering that it would have entailed a further restriction of their access to the children. Instead, they requested two meetings a month, one of which was to be at their place of residence. On 22 December 1994 they asked for a separate written decision concerning their access request, so that they could appeal against it. 74.  In a letter of 22 December 1994 the Social Director informed the applicants that there were no longer any grounds for the access restriction. Meetings between the applicants and the children were nevertheless only authorised for three hours once a month on premises chosen by the Social Welfare Board. They were also informed that the meetings would be supervised. 75.  In his decision of 11 January 1995 the Social Director confirmed that there were no longer any grounds for the access restriction. On 31 January and 28 February 1995 the Social Welfare Board confirmed the decision of 11 January 1995. The applicants appealed. 76.  As regards the applicants’ appeal against the Social Welfare Board’s decisions of 31 January and 28 February 1995, the County Administrative Court considered, on 15 June 1995, that the revised care plan drawn up on 17 November 1994 had already entailed an access restriction which had later been renewed by further decisions, without the applicants having been properly heard, in respect of their access request. The matter was referred back to the Social Welfare Board for further consideration. 77.  In the light of the County Administrative Court’s decision the Acting Social Director, on 28 June 1995, formally restricted the applicants’ access to the children to one meeting a month up to 31 May 1996. The meetings were to take place in the foster home. In addition, the foster parents were to visit the applicants with the children every six months. The Director considered, inter alia, that it was important that the children settle themselves in the foster family environment in which they would grow up. Closer contacts with their parents would mean change and insecurity as well as the creation of a new crisis in their development. The process of settling which had started well would be jeopardised. For the children’s progress it was therefore necessary that their situation remain stable and secure. The Director’s decision was confirmed by the Social Welfare Board on 22 August 1995. The applicants appealed. 78.  On 3 November 1995 the County Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeal against the access restriction confirmed on 22 August 1995. 79.  On 25 May 1996 social welfare officials revised the public care plan, proposing that the children meet the applicants once a month on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence. As the applicants were not present when the proposal was made, the care plan was again revised on 9 October 1996 in so far as the access restriction was concerned. The applicants then proposed that the children meet them without supervision once a month. The public care plan was, however, revised as proposed by the social welfare officials. 80.  On 17 June 1996 the Social Director restricted both applicants’ access to the children, until 30 November 1997, to one monthly visit on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence, where access was to take place under supervision for three hours. One of the foster parents was also ordered to be present at the time of the access. The Social Director’s decision was confirmed by the Social Welfare Board on 20 August 1996. The applicants’ appealed against the decision to the County Administrative Court, requesting an oral hearing. The court obtained a statement from a child psychiatrist, Dr J.P., who was also recommended by the applicants’ representative to the Social Welfare Board. Dr J.P.’s statement included the following observations:\n“The right of access of M. and J. to the persons close to them must primarily be examined in the light of their psychological growth and development and their health. This requires an examination of the quality, permanence and durability of their human relationships, because psychological growth and development take place in interaction with human relationships. In my opinion, the human relationships are to be examined from the children’s point of view. ...\n... In conclusion, I note that before M. was placed in the children’s home ... the mother had been in psychiatric hospital for treatment eight times, making a total of thirteen months. Thus, M. had lived with his mother for forty-five months, namely, three years and nine months. The longest that they spent together was two years and one month. ... T. has, as ‘stepfather’, helped to look after M. for at most ten months. ... the foster parents have so far looked after M. for three years and three months without interruption. ... In practice, M. has not had any kind of relationship with his biological father ... \nIn the light of the above, I note that the human relationships in M.’s early childhood have, owing to the circumstances, been non-continuous, short-term and changing. The most stable and continuous relationships have been with his foster parents ... Therefore, these relationships are the most relevant and important ones for M.’s psychological growth and development.\n... J. was born in June 1993. She was taken into public care immediately after she was born. At first, she stayed in the district hospital for a short time, and later at a reception home for small children. T., as the biological father of J., looked after her for two weeks in June and August 1993. J. was placed in the foster family ... in January 1994, when she was some seven months old. So far, J. has stayed with her foster family for some three years and three months without interruption. J. is now a little over 3 years and 10 months old.\nIn the light of the above, I note that, due to the circumstances, J. has not had any significant and important relationships other than those with her foster parents. J.’s relationship with her foster parents is of primary importance for her psychological growth and development. ...\n... From the children’s point of view, especially, but naturally also from that of the foster parents, the foster family is a family to which the principles concerning family life enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the European Convention on Human Rights can be applied in the same way as to biological families. This point of view is especially important when, due to the circumstances, the biological family has not lived together.\nIn the light of the above, I note that the arrangements for helping and supporting the foster parents of M. and J. are in the best interests of the children. The arrangement will, in the first place, ensure the important, continuous and safe human relationships of M. and J. with their foster parents ...\nIt is also important for M. and J.’s psychological growth and development that, in the safe and stable conditions provided by the foster family, they are able to form and maintain a good internalised picture of their biological parents ... from whom they have been separated because of the circumstances.\nIn my opinion, this can be done by complying with the decision of the Social Welfare Board of S. of 20 August 1996 concerning the right of access. At present, an unrestricted right of access or a right of access of the extent suggested by the applicants is not in the interests of the children, because K. and T. are not capable of meeting the emotional needs of M. and J. ... Such arrangements concerning the right of access would clearly endanger the health and development of M. and J. In my opinion, the question of an unrestricted right of access should be evaluated when the children have attained the age of 12.” 81.  In a statement of 10 September 1996 Dr K.P. stated that in her opinion K.’s psychiatric state did not preclude K.’s having custody of her daughter R. 82.  On 2 April 1997 the care plan was again revised by the social welfare authorities. The applicants had been informed of the time of the meeting concerning the revision of this care plan on home visits on 15 January and 10 March 1997. Their representative had also been informed of the meeting by a letter sent on 10 February 1997. The applicants did not attend the meeting, and neither did their representative. The applicants were thus not explicitly heard in this connection but, as they had expressed their opinion on other occasions, the authorities recorded their point of view in the plan. 83.  On 12 June 1997 the County Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeal against the Social Welfare Board’s decision of 20 August 1996 to restrict the applicants’ access right (see paragraph 80 above). It refused the applicants’ request for an oral hearing. 84.  Although the applicants had stated only in their reply that the appeal was also made on R.’s behalf, the County Administrative Court found in its decision that it was in part made in her name. The court stated that a person to whom a decision was directed, or upon whose right, duty or interest it had a direct effect, had the right of appeal. The court considered that the Board’s decision, which concerned R.’s siblings’ and parents’ right of access, was not such a decision. 85.  On 28 November 1997 the Social Director restricted the applicants’, and consequently their youngest child R.’s, access to J. and M. to one monthly visit of three hours on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence until the end of 1998. The applicants did not appeal. 86.  The care plan was again revised on 1 December 1998. 87.  According to a statement made on 3 July 1998 by Dr K.M. (formerly Dr K.P.), K. had not been hospitalised since May 1995 and her health had been stable since the beginning of 1995. There had been no problems concerning the care of R. (who had lived with her parents all the time and had not been taken into care). It was recommended by Dr K.M. that the social welfare authorities should reduce or discontinue control visits to the applicants’ home in order to give K. the possibility of settling down to normal life without constant supervision by the authorities. 88.  The restriction orders were extended by the Social Director on 11 December 1998, until the end of 2000. The visits were to take place under supervision on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence. However, one of the visits was to take place at the applicants’ home in the presence of the foster parents. The Social Director considered, inter alia, that the reunification of the family was not in sight as the foster family was now the children’s de facto home; that the applicants’ access to the children once a month and through correspondence was enough to maintain the children’s awareness of their biological parents; and that closer contacts with the applicants would endanger the children’s development, bring change and insecurity and create a new crisis in their development. The applicants appealed against this decision to the Social Welfare Board which, on 2 February 1999, rejected the appeal and upheld the Social Director’s decisions. In its reasoning, the Board quoted both the County Administrative Court and Dr J.P. 89.  According to the reports drawn up by the supervisor who attended the meetings of the children and the applicants during the period from 25 May 1996 to 10 January 1999, the adults got on quite well together during the meetings. J. often played games with M. When R. was smaller, J. played by herself, but later it seemed that the girls, J. and R., spent more time together. On the other hand, it seemed that the first applicant made very little contact with J. and M. According to the supervisor’s description, especially in the earlier reports, the first applicant seemed to have concentrated on R. 90.  M. visited K. and T. at their home for the weekend of 21 to 23 July 2000 without supervision. 91.  The applicants appealed against the Social Welfare Board’s decision of 2 February 1999, concerning the right of access, to the Administrative Court (formerly the County Administrative Court). An oral hearing, at which M. was also heard, was held on 3 October 2000. In its decision of 13 October 2000 the administrative court upheld the Social Welfare Board’s decision. 92.  The social authorities reviewed the care plan on 23 November 2000, having consulted the applicants, among others. It was decided that the children would remain in the foster home. According to the care plan, M. and J. are allowed to meet K. and T and others close to them, as from 1 January 2001 until 31 December 2001, without supervision once a month alternately at the applicants’ home and the foster parents’ home. The meetings at the applicants’ home will take place from Saturday 11 a.m. until Sunday 4 p.m., and the meetings at the foster parents’ home on Sundays, from 11 a.m. until 5 p.m. The children are also allowed to meet their other relatives freely during those meetings. In addition to the above, the children will also spend a day and a night with the applicants each Christmas, and two weeks each summer during their school holidays. 93.  J. and M.’s foster mother died in May 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 6 May 2012 the applicant was arrested during the dispersal of a political rally at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. He was detained at the police station for at least thirty-six hours pending administrative proceedings in which he was found guilty of failure to obey lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. The parties’ submissions on the circumstances surrounding the public assembly and its dispersal are set out in part A, and the specific facts relating to the applicant are set out in part B below. 7.  On 23 April 2012 five individuals (Mr I. Bakirov, Mr S. Davidis, Ms Y. Lukyanova, Ms N. Mityushkina and Mr S. Udaltsov) submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. The march, with an estimated 5,000 participants, was to begin at 4 p.m. on 6 May 2012 from Triumfalnaya Square followed by a meeting at Manezhnaya Square, which was to end at 8 p.m. The aim of the demonstration was “to protest against abuses and falsifications in the course of the elections to the State Duma and of the President of the Russian Federation, and to demand fair elections, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the international obligations of the Russian Federation”. 8.  On 26 April 2012 the Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security, Mr A. Mayorov, informed the organisers that the requested route could not be allocated because of preparations for the Victory Day parade on 9 May 2012. They proposed that the organisers hold the march between Luzhniki Street and Frunzenskaya embankment. 9.  On 27 April 2012 the organisers declined the proposal and requested an alternative route from Kaluzhskaya Square, down Bolshaya Yakimanka Street and Bolshaya Polyanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square. The march was to begin at 4 p.m., and the meeting had to finish by 7.30 p.m. The number of participants was indicated as 5,000. 10.  On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security approved the alternative route, having noted that the organisers had provided a detailed plan of the proposed events. 11.  On 3 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security informed the Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Mr V. Kolokoltsev, that a different group of organisers had submitted notification of another public event – a meeting at Manezhnaya Square – which the Moscow authorities had rejected. The organisers of that event had expressed their intention to proceed in defiance of the ban and to squat on the square from 6 to 10 May 2012, ready to resist the police if necessary. The Department of the Interior was therefore requested to safeguard public order in Moscow. 12.  At 8 p.m. on 4 May 2012 the First Deputy Head of the Moscow Department of Regional Security, Mr V. Oleynik, held a working meeting with the organisers of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, at which they discussed the security issues. The Deputy Chief of the Public Order Directorate of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Colonel D. Deynichenko, took part in the meeting. The organisers stated at the meeting that the turnout could significantly exceed the expected 5,000 participants. They were warned that exceeding the number originally declared would be unacceptable. According to the applicant, during that meeting the organisers and the authorities agreed that since there was insufficient time for an on-the-spot reconnaissance, which would otherwise have been carried out, the assembly layout and the security arrangements would be identical to the previous public event organised by the same group of opposition activists on 4 February 2012. On that occasion, the march had proceeded down Yakimanka Street, followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, and the venue of the meeting had included the park at Bolotnaya Square (in some documents referred to as “Repin park”) and the Bolotnaya embankment. 13.  On the same day the deputy mayor of Moscow, Mr A. Gorbenko, instructed the Tsentralnyy district prefect to assist the organisers in maintaining public order and security during the event. He ordered the Moscow Department of Regional Security to inform the organisers that their assembly notice had been accepted and to monitor its implementation. Other public agencies were assigned the duties of street cleaning, traffic control and ensuring the presence of ambulances at the site of the assembly. 14.  On 5 May 2012 the Moscow Department of Regional Security requested the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office to issue a warning to the organisers against exceeding the notified number of participants and against erecting camping tents at the meeting venue, an intention allegedly expressed by the organisers at the working meeting. The Moscow Department of Regional Security also referred to information found on the Internet that the demonstrators would go to Manezhnaya Square after the meeting. On the same day the Tsentralnyy District Prosecutor’s Office issued the relevant warning to two of the organisers, Mr Davidis and Mr Udaltsov. 15.  On the same day the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its website the official information about the forthcoming demonstration on 6 May 2012, including a map. The map indicated the route of the march, the traffic restrictions and an access plan to Bolotnaya Square; it delineated the area allotted to the meeting, which included the park at Bolotnaya Square. Access to the meeting was marked through the park. 16.  On the same day the Police Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Major-General V. Golovanov, adopted a plan for safeguarding public order in Moscow on 6 May 2012 (the “security plan”). The ninety-nine-page security plan was an internal document which had not been disclosed to the public or to the organisers. In view of the forthcoming authorised demonstration at Bolotnaya Square and anticipated attempts by other opposition groups to hold unauthorised public gatherings, it provided for security measures in Moscow city centre and set up operational headquarters to implement them. 17.  Thirty-two high-ranking police officers, including eight major-generals, two military commanders and one emergency-relief official, were appointed to the operational headquarters. The Deputy Police Chief of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Major-General V. Kozlov, was appointed as head of the operational headquarters; the Chief of the Special‑Purpose Operational Centre of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Major-General V. Khaustov, and the Deputy Chief of the Public Order Directorate of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Colonel D. Deynichenko, were appointed as deputy heads of the operational headquarters. 18.  The security plan provided for an 8,094-strong crowd-control taskforce, comprising the police and the military, to police the designated security areas and to prevent unauthorised public gatherings and terrorist attacks. The main contingent was the police squad charged with cordon and riot-control duties in accordance with a structured and detailed action plan for each operational unit. Furthermore, it provided for a 785-strong police unit assigned to operational posts across the city centre, with responsibility for apprehending offenders, escorting them to police stations and drawing up administrative offence reports. They were instructed, in particular, to prepare templates for the administrative offence reports and to have at least forty printed copies of them at every police station. The security plan also provided for a 350-strong police unit for intercepting and apprehending organisers and instigators of unauthorised gatherings. The squad had to be equipped with full protection gear and police batons. Each unit had to ensure effective radio communication within the chain of command. They were instructed to keep loudspeakers, metal detectors, handcuffs, fire extinguishers and wire clippers in the police vehicles. 19.  The security plan set out in detail the allocation and deployment of police vehicles, police buses, interception and monitoring vehicles and equipment, dog-handling teams, fire-fighting and rescue equipment, ambulances and a helicopter. It also made provision for a 1,815-strong reserve unit equipped with gas masks, aerosol grenades (“Dreif”), flash grenades (“Zarya‑2”), bang grenades (“Fakel” and “Fakel-C”), a 40-mm hand-held grenade launcher (“Gvozd” 6Г-30), and a 43-mm hand-held grenade launcher (ГМ-94); tubeless pistols (ПБ-4СП) with 23-mm rubber bullets and propelling cartridges, and rifles (KC-23). Two water-cannon vehicles were ordered to be on standby, ready to be used against persistent offenders. 20.  All units were instructed to be vigilant and thorough in detecting and eliminating security threats and to be polite and tactful in their conduct vis‑à-vis citizens, engaging in a lawful dialogue with them without responding to provocations. If faced with an unauthorised gathering they were instructed to give a warning through a loudspeaker, to arrest the most active participants and to record video footage of those incidents. The police chiefs were instructed to place plain-clothes officers among the protesters in order to monitor the threat of violence and terrorist attacks within the crowd and to take measures, where appropriate, to prevent and mitigate the damage and to pursue the perpetrators. 21.  The Chief of the Interior Department of the Tsentralnyy Administrative District of Moscow, Police Major-General V. Paukov, was required, among other tasks, to prepare, together with the organisers, the text of the public announcement to be made if the situation deteriorated. The head of the press communication service of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Internal Service Lieutenant-Colonel Y. Alekseyeva, was in charge of communication with the press. The head of the Department for Liaison with Civil Society of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Internal Service Colonel V. Biryukov, had to ensure “coordination with the representatives of public organisations and also coordination and information flow with other services of the Moscow Department of the Interior”. 22.  The units assigned to police the march and the meeting belonged to “Zone no. 8” (Kaluzhskaya Square, Bolotnaya Square and the adjacent territory). The zone commander was the Chief of the Riot Police of the Moscow Department of the Interior, Police Colonel P. Smirnov, with nine high-ranking police officers (Police Colonel P. Saprykin, Police Colonel A. Zdorenko, Police Lieutenant-Colonel A. Tsukernik, Police Colonel A. Kuznetsov, Police Colonel V. Yermakov, Police Colonel A. Kasatkin, Police Colonel A. Dvoynos, Police Captain R. Bautdinov and Internal Service Lieutenant-Colonel D. Bystrikov) as his deputies. 23.  The units assigned to Zone no. 8 comprised 2,400 riot police officers, of whom 1,158 were on duty at Bolotnaya Square. They were instructed, in particular, to search the demonstrators to prevent them from taking camping tents to the site of the meeting and to obstruct access to Bolshoy Kamenyy bridge, diverting the marchers to Bolotnaya embankment, the site of the meeting. The adjacent park at Bolotnaya Square had to be cordoned off, and the only entrance to Bolotnaya embankment – from Malyy Kamenny bridge – had to be equipped with fourteen metal detectors, which were to be removed just before the march approached the site of the meeting. An exception was made for the organisers and the technical staff, who were allowed access behind the stage through two additional metal detectors. Further arrangements were made for access of the press. 24.  Lastly, the command of Zone no. 8, in particular Police Colonels Smirnov and Saprykin, were under orders to meet the organisers in person at the beginning of the event to remind them of their responsibilities and to have them sign an undertaking. The organisers would undertake to ensure the lawful and safe conduct of the event, and to refrain from any calls for forced change of the constitutional order and from hate speech and propaganda in favour of violence or war. They would also undertake to be present at the venue until the end of the assembly and the departure of the participants. A video recording of the briefing and the signing of the undertaking had to be made. 25.  At about 1.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the organisers were allowed access to Bolotnaya Square to set up the stage and sound equipment. The police searched the vehicles delivering the equipment and seized three tents found amid the gear. They arrested several people for bringing the tents, and the installation of the equipment was delayed. During that time communication between the organisers setting up the stage and those leading the march was sporadic. 26.  At the beginning of the march, Police Colonel A. Makhonin met the organisers at Kaluzhskaya Square to clarify any outstanding organisational matters and to have them sign the undertaking to ensure public order during the demonstration. He specifically asked Mr Udaltsov to ensure that no tents were placed on Bolotnaya Square and that the participants complied with the limits on the place and time allocated for the assembly. The organisers gave their assurances on those issues and signed the undertaking. 27.  The march began at 4.30 p.m. at Kaluzhskaya Square. It went down Yakimanka Street peacefully and without disruption. The turnout exceeded expectations, but there is no consensus as to the exact numbers. The official estimate was that there were 8,000 participants, whereas the organisers considered that there had been about 25,000. The media reported different numbers, some significantly exceeding the above estimates. 28.  At about 5 p.m. the march approached Bolotnaya Square. The leaders found that the layout of the meeting and the placement of the police cordon did not correspond to what they had anticipated. Unlike on 4 February 2012, the park at Bolotnaya Square was excluded from the meeting venue, which was limited to Bolotnaya embankment. The cordon of riot police in full protection gear barred access to the park and continued along the whole perimeter of the meeting area, channelling the demonstration to Bolotnaya embankment. Further down the embankment there was a row of metal detectors at the entrance to the meeting venue. By that time the stage had been erected at the far end of Bolotnaya embankment and a considerable number of people had already accumulated in front of it. 29.  Faced with the police cordon and unable to access the park, the leaders of the march – Mr S. Udaltsov, Mr A. Navalnyy, Mr B. Nemtsov and Mr I. Yashin – stopped and demanded that the police open access to the park. According to the protesters, they were taken aback by the alteration of the expected layout and were unwilling to turn towards Bolotnaya embankment; they therefore demanded that the police officers at the cordon move the cordon back to allow sufficient space for the protesters to pass and to assemble for the meeting. According to the official version, the protesters were not interested in proceeding to the meeting venue; they stopped because they had either intended to break the cordon in order to proceed towards Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge and then to the Kremlin, or to stir up the crowd to incite disorder. It is common ground that the cordon officers did not enter into any discussion with the protest leaders and no senior officer was delegated to negotiate. After about fifteen minutes of attempting to engage with the cordon officers, at 5.16 p.m. the four leaders announced that they were going on a “sit-down strike” and sat on the ground. The people behind them stopped, although some people continued to go past them towards the stage. The leaders of the sit-in called on other demonstrators to follow their example and sit down, but only a few of their entourage did so (between approximately twenty and fifty people in total). 30.  Between 5.20 p.m. and 5.45 p.m. two State Duma deputies, Mr G. Gudkov and Mr D. Gudkov, contacted unidentified senior police officers to negotiate the enlargement of the restricted area by moving the police cordon behind the park along the lines expected by the organisers. At the same time Mr V. Lukin, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, at the request of Police Colonel Biryukov, attempted to convince the leaders of the sit-in to resume the procession and to head towards the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment, where the stage had been set up. During that time no senior police officers or municipal officials came to the site of the sit-down protest, and there was no direct communication between the authorities and the leaders of the sit-in. 31.  At 5.40 p.m. one of the meeting participants announced from the stage that the leaders were calling on the demonstrators to support their protest. Some people waiting in front of the stage headed back to Malyy Kamennyy bridge, either to support the sit-down protest or to leave the meeting. The area in front of the stage almost emptied. 32.  At 5.43 p.m. the media reported that Mr Udaltsov had demanded that the protesters be given airtime on Russia’s main television channels, that the presidential inauguration of Mr Putin be cancelled and that new elections be called. 33.  At 5.50 p.m. the crowd around the sit-down protest built up, which caused some congestion, and the leaders abandoned the protest and headed towards the stage, followed by the crowd. 34.  At 5.55 p.m. the media reported that the police authorities were regarding the strike as a provocation of mass disorder and were considering prosecuting those responsible for it. 35.  At the same time a commotion arose near the police cordon at the place vacated by the sit-down protest, and the police cordon was broken in several places. A crowd of about 100 people spilled over to the empty space beyond the cordon. Within seconds the police restored the cordon, which was reinforced by an additional riot police force. Those who found themselves outside the cordon wandered around, uncertain what to do next. Several people were apprehended, others were pushed back inside the cordon, and some continued to loiter outside or walked towards the park. The police cordon began to push the crowd into the restricted area and advanced by several metres, pressing it inwards. 36.  At 6 p.m. Police Colonel Makhonin told Ms Mityushkina to make an announcement from the stage that the meeting was closed. She did so, but apparently her message was not heard by most of the demonstrators or the media reporters broadcasting from the spot. The live television footage provided by the parties contained no mention of her announcement. 37.  At the same time a Molotov cocktail was launched from the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamenny bridge over the restored police cordon. It landed outside the cordon and the trousers of a passer-by caught fire. The fire was promptly extinguished by the police. 38.  At 6.15 p.m. at the same corner of Malyy Kamenny bridge the riot police began breaking into the demonstration to split the crowd. Running in tight formations, they pushed the crowd apart, arrested some people, confronted others and formed new cordons to isolate sections of the crowd. Some protesters held up metal barriers and aligned them so as to resist the police, threw various objects at the police, shouted and chanted “Shame!” and other slogans, and whenever the police apprehended anyone from among the protesters they attempted to pull them back. The police applied combat techniques and used truncheons. 39.  At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov climbed onto the stage at the opposite end of the square to address the meeting. At that time many people were assembled in front of the stage, but, as it turned out, the sound equipment had been disconnected. Mr Udaltsov took a loudspeaker and shouted:\n“Dear friends! Unfortunately we have no proper sound, but we will carry on our action, we are not going away because our comrades have been arrested, because tomorrow is the coronation of an illegitimate president. We shall begin an indefinite protest action. You agree? We shall not leave until our comrades are released, until the inauguration is cancelled and until we are given airtime on the central television channels. You agree? We are power here! Dear friends, [if] we came out in December [2011] and in March [2012], it was not to put up with the stolen elections, ... it was not to see the chief crook and thief on the throne. Today we have no choice – stay here or give the country to crooks and thieves for another six years. I consider that we shall not leave today. We shall not leave!” 40.  At this point, at 6.21 p.m., several police officers arrested Mr Udaltsov and took him away. Mr Navalnyy attempted to go up onto the stage, but he was also arrested at the stairs and taken away. As he was pushed out by the police officers he turned to the crowd shouting “Nobody shall leave!” 41.  At 6.25 p.m. the police arrested Mr Nemtsov, who had also attempted to address people from the stage. 42.  Meanwhile, at the Malyy Kamenny bridge the police continued dividing the crowd and began pushing some sections away from the venue. Through the loudspeakers they requested the participants to leave for the metro station. The dispersal continued for at least another hour until the venue was fully cleared of all protesters. 43.  On 6 May 2012 Police Colonel Deynichenko drew up a report summarising the security measures taken on that day in Moscow. The report stated that the march, in which about 8,000 people had participated, had begun at 4.15 p.m. and had followed the route to Bolotnaya Square. It listed the groups and organisations represented, the number of participants in each group, the number and colours of their flags and the number and content of their banners. It further stated as follows:\n“... at 5.04 p.m. the organised column ... arrived at the [cordon] and expressed the intention to proceed straight to Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge and [to cross it] to Borovitskaya Square. The police ... ordered them to proceed to Bolotnaya Square, the venue of the meeting. However, the leaders at the head of the column – [Mr Udaltsov, Mr Nemtsov and Mr Navalnyy] – ... called on the marchers through the loudspeaker not to move. Together with some thirty protesters they sat on the ground. Another group of about twenty, called by [their leaders], sat as well. The police ... repeatedly warned them against holding an unauthorised public gathering and required them to proceed to the venue of the meeting or to leave. Besides that, two State Duma deputies, Gennadiy Gudkov and Dmitriy Gudkov, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Lukin, and a member of the Civic Chamber, Nikolay Svanidze, talked to them, but those sitting on the ground did not react and continued chanting slogans ... From 5.58 p.m. to 7 p.m. persons on Malyy Kamennyy bridge and Bolotnaya embankment made attempts to break the cordon, and threw empty glass bottles, fireworks, chunks of tarmac and portable metal barriers at the police officers. From 5 to 6 p.m. music was playing on the stage ... At 5.20 p.m. ... a deputy of the Vologda Regional Duma called on the participants to head to the Malyy Kamennyy bridge to support those sitting on the ground ... At 6 p.m. one of the organisers, Ms Mityushkina ..., went on the stage and declared the meeting closed. At 6.20 p.m. Mr Udaltsov went on the stage and called on the people to take part in an indefinite protest action.\nAt 7 p.m. a group of about 20 individuals including Ms Mityushkina ... attempted to put up three one-sleeper camping tents on Bolotnaya embankment.\n...\nFrom 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. necessary measures were taken to push the citizens away from Malyy Kamennyy bridge, Bolotnaya embankment and Bolotnaya Street and to arrest the most actively resisting ones ..., during which twenty-eight police officers and military servicemen [sustained injuries] of various gravity, four of whom have been hospitalised.\nIn total, 656 people were detained in Moscow to prevent public disorder and unauthorised demonstrations ...\n...\nThe total number of troops deployed for public order and security duties in Moscow was 12,759 servicemen, including 7,609 police officers, 100 traffic police officers, 4,650 military servicemen and 400 members of voluntary brigades.\nAs a result of the measures taken by the Moscow Department of the Interior the tasks of maintaining public order and security have been fully discharged, and no emergency incidents have been allowed to occur.” 44.  On the same day the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened a criminal investigation into suspected offences of mass disorder and violent acts against the police (Article 212 § 2 and Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). 45.  On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 46.  On 22 June 2012 the Investigative Committee set up a group of twenty-seven investigators and put them in charge of the criminal file concerning the events of 6 May 2012. 47.  On an unspecified date two human-rights activists filed a request with the Investigative Committee to open a criminal investigation into the conduct of the police in the same events; they complained, in particular, of the suppression of a lawful public assembly. Another petition was filed, also on an unspecified date, by forty-four human-rights activists and members of NGOs, calling for the curbing of repression against those who had been arrested and prosecuted in relation to the events of 6 May 2012 and denying that mass riots had taken place at Bolotnaya Square. 48.  Following an enquiry from the Investigative Committee about publication of the maps of the assembly of 6 May 2012, on 13 August 2012 the Moscow Department of the Interior replied as follows:\n“... on 5 May 2012 the Moscow Department of the Interior published on its official website ... a notice on ‘Safeguarding public order in Moscow during the public events on 6 May’. The notice included information about the route, the map of traffic restrictions and information about the location of the socio-political events, which a large number of participants were expected to attend, the security measures and the warning against any unlawful acts during the events.\nThe decision to publish this notice was taken by the head of the Department on Liaison with the Mass Media of the Moscow Department of the Interior with the aim of ensuring the security of citizens and media representatives planning to take part in the event.\nThe pictures contained in the notice were schematic and showed the approximate route of the [march] as well as the reference place of the meeting – ‘Bolotnaya Square’ – indicated in the ‘Plan for Safeguarding Public Order in Moscow on 6 May 2012’.\nOn 4 May 2012 a working meeting took place at the Moscow Department of Regional Security with participants from among [the organisers and the Department of the Interior], where they discussed the arrangements for the march ..., the placement of metal detectors, the stage set-up and other organisational matters.\nAfter the meeting ... the [Moscow Department of the Interior] prepared a [security plan] and map providing for the park at Bolotnaya Square to be cordoned off with metal barriers [and] for the participants in the meeting to be accommodated on the road at the Bolotnaya embankment.\nGiven that the agreement on the route of the demonstration and the meeting venue had been reached at the aforementioned working meeting at 9 p.m. on 4 May 2012, the [security plan] and the security maps were prepared at extremely short notice (during the night of 4 to 5 May 2012 and the day of 5 May 2012), to be approved afterwards, on 5 May 2012, by senior officials at the Moscow Department of the Interior.\nThe Department of the Interior did not discuss the security maps and [security plan] with the organisers. Those documents were not published as they were for internal use, showing the placement of the police forces ... and setting out their tasks.” 49.  On an unspecified date eight prominent international NGOs set up an international expert commission to evaluate the events at Bolotnaya Square on 6 May 2012 (“the Expert Commission”). The Expert Commission comprised six international experts whose objective was to provide an independent fact-finding and legal assessment of the circumstances in which the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square had been dispersed. In 2013 the Expert Commission produced a fifty-three-page report containing the chronology and an assessment of the events of May 6 2012. It identified the sources used for the report as follows:\n“The work of the Commission was based on the following materials:\n- evidence from the official investigation, reports and statements made by the relevant authorities and any other official information available on the case;\n- information from public investigations and observations gathered by human rights defenders, journalists and others; and\n- reports by observers and journalists, witness testimony and video materials.\n...\nIn order to provide an objective and complete picture of the events, the Commission developed a series of questions that it distributed to the city administration of Moscow, the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation, police authorities in Moscow, the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation and event organisers. Unfortunately the Commission did not receive replies from the city administration, police authorities or Investigative Committee. As a result, the analysis contained in this report is based on information from open sources, including materials presented by the event organisers, observers and non-governmental organisations, materials from public investigations and information provided by defence attorneys engaged in the so-called ‘Bolotnaya case’. These materials include: eyewitnesses’ testimony, videos from the media and private actors, documents and some open data about the Bolotnaya criminal case. The experts analysed more than 50 hours of video-records and 200 documents related to the Bolotnaya events. In addition, they met organisers, participants and observers of the events and attended several court hearings of the Bolotnaya case.” 50.  Concerning the way the assembly of 6 May 2012 had been organised, the Expert Commission noted the following:\n“... the Moscow Department of Regional Security announced on 4 May [2012] that the event would follow a similar route to the previous rally on 4 February [2012]. The participants were to assemble at Kaluzhskaya Square, set off at 4 p.m. along Bolshaya Yakimanka and Bolshaya Polyanka for a rally in Bolotnaya Square, and disperse at 7.30 p.m. The official notification of approval was issued on 4 May 2012 – just two days before the beginning of the event.\nThat same day, the [Moscow Department of the Interior] published a plan on its website indicating that all of Bolotnaya Square, including the public gardens, would be given over to the rally, while the Bolshoy Kamenny bridge would be closed to vehicles but would remain open to pedestrians. This was the same procedure [the] authorities had adopted for the two previous rallies on Bolotnaya Square on 10 December 2011 and 4 February 2012.\n...\nOn the evening of [5 May 2012], the police cordoned off the [park] of Bolotnaya Square. According to Colonel Yuri Zdorenko, who was responsible for security at the location, this was done ‘in order to prevent the participants from setting up a camp and from [carrying out] other [illegal] acts.’ [The] authorities received information [that] the protesters might attempt to establish a protest camp at the site, causing them to decide that the rally should be confined to only the Bolotnaya waterfront area – a much smaller area than had been originally allocated for the assembly.\n...\nThe police did not, however, inform the organisers of the changes they had decided upon, and they only became aware of the police-imposed changes to the event when they arrived at the site on the afternoon of 6 May [2012].\nThe City Council did not send out a written announcement that a special representative from the city authorities would be present at the event, nor did the chairman of the Moscow local department of the [Interior], Vladimir Kolokoltsev, issue any special orders on sending a special representative of the Ministry to the event.\n...\nThe organisers requested 12 hours to set up a stage and sound equipment for the rally; however, on the morning of 6 May, the authorities only allocated six hours of advance access. Furthermore, at 1.30 p.m., the police did not allow vehicles with stage equipment onto the site until they had been searched. The searches revealed a small number of tents, and [the] authorities detained a number of people as a result. The police finally allowed the truck with the stage equipment onto Bolotnaya Square at 2.50 p.m., just 70 minutes before the march was due to begin.” 51.  As regards the circumstances in which the assembly was dispersed, the Expert Commission’s report stated as follows:\n“As the march approached Bolotnaya Square, [the] demonstrators found that a police cordon was blocking off most of the square, leaving only a narrow stretch along the waterfront for the rally. The police established a triple cordon of officers on Bolshoy Kammenyy bridge, which prevented any movement in the direction of the Kremlin. The first cordon was positioned close to the junction of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and the Bolotnaya waterfront. Students from the Police College and officers of the Patrol Guard Service (without any protective equipment) made up this line. Behind them were two rows of OMON [riot police – OMOН], a line of voluntary citizen patrol (druzhinniki), and another cordon of the OMON [the riot police]. A number of water cannons were visible between the second and third cordons.\n[The report contained two photographs comparing the police cordon on 4 February 2012, a thin line of police officers without protection gear, and the one on 6 May 2012, multiple ranks of riot police with full protection gear backed up by heavy vehicles.]\nThe police cordons, which blocked off movement in the direction of the Kremlin, created a bottleneck that slowed the march’s progress to such an extent that it came to a virtual stop as demonstrators attempted to cross the bridge. Moreover, just beyond Luzhkov bridge, the marchers had to go through a second set of metal detectors, where progress was very slow since there were only 14 detectors.\nBy 5.15 p.m., the majority of the march was immobile. A number of leaders, including Sergey Udaltsov, Alexey Navalnyy and Ilya Yashin, encouraged demonstrators to sit down on the road in front of the ‘Udarnik’ cinema facing the police cordon to protest [against] the inability of the march to continue and to demand that they be given access to the originally allocated space for the rally on Bolotnaya Square. An estimated 50-200 people joined the sit-down protest. The leaders stressed the need to maintain a peaceful protest and appealed to demonstrators to remain calm. Participants chanted: ‘We will not go away’ and ‘Police together with the people’. The leaders attempted to address the crowds using loudspeakers, but those behind the sit-down protest could not hear or see events as they transpired. The sit-down protest did not completely block the road, but it did restrict the movement of those approaching the police lines and the bottleneck caused by the police cordon. As a result, the crowd grew denser as more demonstrators arrived from Bolshaya Yakimanka Street.\nAt 5.42 p.m., the chief of the [Moscow Department of the Interior] issued a statement: ‘The organizers of the rally and other participants refuse to proceed to the agreed place of the rally (to Bolotnaya Square). They [have] stopped on the roadway near the ‘Udarnik’ theatre. Some of them [have] sat on the ground and thus blocked the movement of the column. Despite repeated warnings on the part of the police to proceed to the place of the rally, they won’t move thereby creating a real threat of a jam and trauma for the participants. An inquiry commission is working on the spot to document their actions related to appeals to commit mass public disorder with a view to further consider the issue of instituting criminal proceedings.’\nSome demonstrators appeared to become frustrated with standing and waiting and began to walk away. Some tried to pass through the police cordon to leave the area, but the police refused to let them through. Instead, they were directed to go back through the crowd to Bolshaya Polyanka Street, even though this was practically impossible.\nThe police used loud speakers to inform demonstrators of the rally location. They asked participants to pass directly to Bolotnaya Square and not stop at the bridge, despite the fact that the major part of the square was closed to demonstrators. They announced that all actions on the bridge could be considered illegal. However, given the poor quality of the sound equipment, only those nearest the police could hear this information; the majority of protesters did not hear the police instructions.\n...\nFrom the moment difficulties first arose for demonstrators attempting to cross Malyy Kammenyy bridge, demonstrators made repeated attempts to negotiate with the police over moving their cordons to allow protesters onto Bolotnaya Square.\nDmitry Oreshkin, a member of the Presidential Human Rights Council, and Member of Parliament Gennady Gudkov tried to talk to the police authorities at around 5.30 p.m., but there was no response. Shortly after participants broke through the police cordon at 6.20 p.m., a group of human rights activists spoke to Colonel Birukov, head of the [Moscow Department of the Interior]’s press service. At 7 p.m., Member of Parliament Ilya Ponomarev tried to stop violence during the clashes on the embankment by speaking to the authorities, but he did not get a positive response.\nMany of those involved in organising the event stated that they tried to engage with [the] police throughout the day to ensure the event took place in a peaceful manner.\nNadezhda Mityushkina: ‘I tried unsuccessfully to find the responsible people in the Ministry of the [Interior] in order to solve the organisational problems. I knew whom to contact in case we needed help when issues arose ... Only at 6 – 6.30 p.m. did a police officer approach me. I knew from previous demonstrations that he was a senior officer responsible for communication with event organisers ... and he told me that the authorities had suspended the demonstration. He told me, as one of the rally organizers, to announce from the stage that the event was over, which I did following our conversation.’\nIgor Bakirov: ‘A police officer in a colonel’s uniform contacted me only once, and I showed him the documents [confirming] my credentials as an event organiser. Later clashes with the police erupted, I couldn’t find anyone with whom to communicate and cooperate.’\nSergey Davidis: ‘I personally did not meet nor have time to get into contact with the authorities regarding the fences set up around the perimeter of the rally. I assumed some other organisers had already spoken to the authorities regarding this issue or were speaking with them at that time. There was no one to contact and nothing to talk about. I only saw the OMON officers who behaved aggressively and were not predisposed to get into a conversation.\n...’\nAt 5.55 p.m., as people tried to move through the narrow gap between the police cordon and the waterfront to reach Bolotnaya Square, the police line moved two steps forward, further pressing the crowd. This in turn generated a counter response from the crowd, and protesters began pushing back. In several places, the police cordon broke, and a few dozen people found themselves in the empty space behind the first police line. It is impossible to determine whether the breaking of the cordon was the result of conscious action by sections of the crowd or if the police cordon simply broke due to the pressure from such a large number of people. Some of those who made it past the police lines were young men, but there were also many elderly citizens and others who did not resemble street fighters. Those who found themselves behind the police cordon did not act in an aggressive manner but appeared to move towards the entrance to the Bolotnaya [park], the supposed rally point.\nDifferent demonstrators reacted very differently to the breaking of the police line. Some tried to move away, others called for people to break the cordon, while some tried to restrain the crowd from [trampling on] those who were still taking part in the sit-down protest. As pressure and tension grew, the sit-down protesters stood up rather than risk being trampled. There was a high degree of confusion, and people were not clear on what was happening.\nJust after the breaking of the police cordon at approximately at 6 p.m., a single Molotov cocktail was thrown from the crowd. It landed behind the police ranks and ignited the trousers of ... a 74-year-old demonstrator who had passed through the cordon. The police used their fire extinguishers to put out the fire. This was the only such incident recorded during the day ...\n...\nSoon after the cordons were broken, the authorities began to detain those who remained behind the police lines, taking them to special holding areas. The police also arrested some protesters at the front of the crowd who had not tried to break the cordon. The police cordon was fully restored after about four minutes.\n...\nAt 6.10 p.m., Sergey Udaltsov, Alexey Navalnyy and Boris Nemtsov managed to walk from the Udarnik cinema to the stage at the waterfront followed by a large number of people. A police cordon blocked access to the stage, but they were allowed through. As they tried to start the rally, the police intervened ... the OMON officers then detained Sergey Udaltsov on stage and shortly afterwards detained Boris Nemtsov and Alexey Navalnyy as well. By 6.50 p.m. the organizers began to disassemble the stage.\n...\nIn the two hours between 6 p.m. and 8 p.m., the demonstration was marked by two distinct types of activity. For much of the time, demonstrators and the police stood face to face without much happening. These moments were interspersed with periods when the police advanced and the crowd moved back. There does not appear to have been any clear reason for the police decision to advance other than to divide the crowd up into smaller sections. More than anything, the police advances served to raise tensions and provoke some members of the crowd to push back. There is little evidence that demonstrators initiated the violence. Rather, they appear to have become aggressive only in response to the authorities’ advances.\nDuring these interchanges some protesters threw objects at the police, and the police used their batons freely. The crowd threw plastic bottles, shoes and umbrellas ...\nAt around 6.20 p.m. the police announced that the rally was cancelled and asked protesters to disperse. The police used a loudspeaker to state, ‘Dear citizens, we earnestly ask you not to disturb public order! Otherwise, in accordance with the law, we will have to use force! Please, leave here, and do not stop. Go to the metro.’ Although the police used a loudspeaker, the announcement was not loud enough to reach the majority of the crowd. It is likely that only those nearest to the loudspeakers could have heard the call to disperse.\nThere was confusion over the police demands because at the same time ... Colonel Birukov, head of the Moscow [Department of the Interior]’s press service, told a group of human rights defenders (including Vladimir Lukin, Dmitri Oreshkin, Victor Davydov and Nikolai Svanidze) that the demonstrators could continue to Bolotnaya Square to take part in the rally.\n...\nBy 6.30 p.m. the crowd at the corner of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and the waterfront was cut in two. Those on Malyy Kamennyy bridge were pushed in the direction of Bolshaya Polyanka Street, while those on the waterfront were cut off from both Bolshoy and Malyy Kamennyy bridges.\nAround 6.54 p.m., the police cordon that acted as a barrier along the waterfront near the Luzhkov bridge was removed, and demonstrators were able to move freely along the Bolotnaya waterfront. Approximately 15 minutes later, some 200 police officers in protective equipment who had formed a cordon at the Luzhkov Bridge began pushing protesters in the direction of Lavrushinsky Lane, which runs from Bolotnaya Square to the Tretyakovskaya metro station. At the same time, police began to push people back along the Bolotnaya waterfront from the Luzhkov bridge towards the Udarnik cinema. Those who remained on the waterfront linked arms in passive resistance. The police pushed forward, divided the crowd and began to detain demonstrators.\nAt about 7.47 p.m. ... authorities created a corridor to allow demonstrators to leave the Bolotnaya area.\n...\nAt 7.53 p.m. a group of OMON officers appeared from the bushes of Bolotnaya Gardens and divided those demonstrators that remained on the square. Those on one side were able to move towards Malyy Kamennyy bridge, while those on the other remain[ed] totally blocked between the police lines.\nAt 8.08 p.m. the last groups of people slowly left the waterfront along a corridor formed by the policemen. The police also began to move people away from the Kadashevskaya waterfront on the other side of the Obvondoy Channel. Some people were detained, while others were pushed along Bolshaya Polyanka Street in the direction of the Lavrushinsky Lane.\nBetween 9 and 10 p.m. around two thousand demonstrators moved along Bolshaya Ordynka Street chanting slogans ... and the OMON officers began to detain people and actively disperse the column.” 52.  On 20 March 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy branch of the Investigative Committee dismissed ten individual complaints and two official enquiries made in relation to the matter, one by Mr Ponomarev, a deputy of the State Duma, and another one by Mr A. Babushkin, President of the Public Supervisory Committee of Moscow. The complaints and enquiries concerned the allegedly unlawful acts of the police in dispersing the rally on 6 May 2012, including excessive use of force and arbitrary arrests. The Investigative Committee interviewed one of the ten individuals who had lodged the complaints and four police officers deployed in the cordon around Bolotnaya Square, including squadron and regiment commanders. They stated, in particular, that they had been acting under orders to maintain public safety and to identify and arrest the most active instigators of unrest; only those resisting the demands of the police had been arrested and no force had been used unnecessarily. The police officers stated that when the police had had to intervene, they had used combat manoeuvres and truncheons but not tear gas or other exceptional means of restraint. Squadron Commander S. explained that he had been deployed in the sector adjacent to the stage and that there had been no incidents or disorder in that sector; no one had been arrested. The decision listed thirteen other internal inquiries carried out following individual complaints and medical reports; in six cases the allegations of abuse had been found to be unsubstantiated and in seven cases the police conduct had been found to be lawful. As regards the substance of the complaints at hand, the Investigative Committee found as follows:\n“... having crossed Malyy Kamennyy bridge, the column leaders stopped. Many participants in the march bypassed the organisers and proceeded to Bolotnaya Square towards the stage ... When the march participants had filled nearly all of Bolotnaya embankment, limited by the police cordon on one side and by the stage on the other side, the organisers were still at the point between Malyy Kamennyy bridge, Bolotnaya Square, [the park] and the Udarnik cinema ...\nAt this time the organisers demanded that the police officers let them pass through to the Kremlin. The police told them that they would not let anyone pass through to the Kremlin because the event was authorised to take place at Bolotnaya Square, where the stage had been specially set up, and they were told to proceed. After that, the organisers decided to call a sit-down protest and called upon those present to disobey the lawful orders of the police. After that, the meeting participants congregated opposite the Udarnik cinema, where after a while they attempted to break the cordon, which [the police] did not manage to prevent. Therefore the police began arresting those who had been most actively involved in breaking the cordon; they were put in a police van and then taken to police stations in Moscow. After the confrontation had been localised, the police officers slightly dispersed the crowd, having apprehended the most active perpetrators. From the very beginning of the sit-down protest the police requested the participants through loudspeakers to proceed to the stage, not to act on provocation and not to commit unlawful acts, but these requests had no effect and therefore [it was clear that] the breaking of the cordon had been organised. In suppressing it the police officers acted in coordination and concert. They did not apply force or special means of restraint. However, the work of the officers charged with apprehending offenders did involve the use of force and special means of restraint, in so far as necessary, against persons putting up resistance.\nLater on, in the area of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and at the [park] corner some localised confrontations took place ... force and special means of restraint were used. All those detained at Bolotnaya Square were taken to the police stations ... Administrative offence reports were then submitted to the Justices of the Peace for consideration on the merits.\n...\nIn accordance with Article 42 of the Criminal Code, any acts of a public official connected with the use of his or her official powers which have caused damage to interests protected by law may not be classified as a criminal offence if they were committed pursuant to a binding order or instruction.\n...\nAfter the organisers had decided to call a sit-down protest ... [they] provoked mass disorder, during which the participants threw various objects at the police, thus causing injuries to some of them. Because of this turn of events the police officers detained those participating in the mass disorder with justifiable use of force, and by special means of restraint against those who resisted.\n...\nIn view of the foregoing, the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers ... is refused for the absence of corpus delicti.” 53.  On 24 May 2013 the first criminal case against twelve individuals suspected of participation in mass disorder was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges (“the first Bolotnaya case”). 54.  On 2 December 2013 Mr Navalnyy gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:\n“The political organisers and the formal organisers, we all had a clear idea ... and the Moscow mayor’s office confirmed that the march would be the same as the one that had taken place on 4 February 2012. Bolotnaya Square is a traditional place for holding various opposition events. We all had a clear understanding what the route would be, where the stage would be, what the layout would be. We came there at that time for a rather traditional, customary event, the scenario of which was well-known to everybody ... two days beforehand the maps showing where people would assemble and the direction of the march were published on the official [news] website RiaNovosti; they are still posted there. The map was published on the [police] website ‘Petrovka, 38’ and this map is still posted there. Not only the organisers, but the participants too, they knew where they were going ... When we approached the venue of the meeting ... we saw that the map showing where people would assemble on the square had been essentially altered. It was essentially different from the map of 4 February [2012], and, above all, different from the document which had been agreed with the Moscow mayor’s office and had been published on the website[s] RiaNovosti and ‘Petrovka, 38’ ... [according to which] people were to assemble on Bolotnaya embankment as well as in the park at Bolotnaya Square. However, when we came we saw that the park at Bolotnaya Square, taking up about 80% of the square, was barred and cordoned off ... since [the cordon] did not correspond [to the map] the column stopped. The event organisers and the people who came just waited for this question to be resolved, for the police to remove the wrong cordon, for the police chiefs to reply as to what had changed, why the approved meeting was not being conducted according to the scenario that had been approved ... I had previously [organised events] ... Somebody had taken the map and changed the location of the meeting. This had practically never happened before ... to show visually that we were not moving anywhere, we sat on the ground ... the first line of [the police] cordon was composed of 20-year-old conscripts, and with a thousand people pressing on it the cordon broke. It could only break. This led to an uncontrollable situation, as several policemen were walking and trying to say something through megaphones – impossible to tell what they were saying. Some activists passing by were also speaking through megaphones – impossible to tell what they were saying. No authorities were present on the spot. And [it was] impossible to understand who was in command. So all of that caused the rupture of the police cordon. People started spreading across that spot ...Then I tried to walk over to the stage to try and explain to the gathering what was going on, using the amplifiers. I did not know then that the police had already cut off the amplifiers.\n[Question to the witness] Did anybody try to negotiate with the participants of the sit-down protest?\n- Attempts had been made as much as possible in the circumstances ... everybody had stopped because we all wanted to understand where the representatives from the mayor’s office were, where the appropriate representative of the Department of the Interior was. All the [high-ranking] police officers were asked, but they only shrugged. Nobody could understand what was going on. The State Duma deputies present on the spot tried to act as negotiators, but ... they said that nobody wanted to come up to us. We could see some police officers resembling chiefs, at a distance ... but it was impossible to get to them ... it was impossible to reach the [police] command. Nobody would come to us. Nobody could negotiate despite everyone’s wish to do so.\n... when I was in the detention facility I lodged a complaint about the hindrance of a peaceful public event. This complaint was with the Moscow Department of the Interior. I have set out the arguments [as to why] I considered that there had been ample evidence that the officials of the Moscow Department of the Interior had deliberately provoked the crowd to panic so that [they] could later make claims about mass disorder.” 55.  On the same day Mr Davidis gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:\n“The negotiations with the [mayor’s office] were very difficult this time ... I had been the organiser of most events from 25 December 2011. It was always possible to meet the deadline, to find a compromise, [but not this time]. ... It was [only] on 4 [May 2012] that we received the written agreement. On the same day the working meeting took place ... Usually, everything is decided no later than five days before the event. This time there was practically twenty-four hours’ notice. We could not even bring the vehicles carrying the stage to the square before 1 p.m. [on 6 May 2012]. We were put under very harsh conditions ... we had to put up the stage within three hours ... At the [working meeting] technical issues were discussed, but for the previous events we held, as a matter of practice, [there was] an on-site reconnaissance: the representatives of the organisers [together with] the representatives of the police ... would visit the site, walk through the route and determine where the barriers would be put, the stage, the lavatories, so that there was no ambiguity in understanding the event. This time, because [the working meeting] was on 4 [May 2012], and the event was on 6 [May 2012], it was already clear at the working meeting that we wouldn’t have time for an on-site reconnaissance; therefore at Mr Deynichenko’s suggestion it was stated that in organising the event we would follow the example of the assembly held on 4 February [2012]. Then, it was also a march from Kaluzhskaya Square and a meeting at Bolotnaya Square. The only thing that was noted was that this time the stage would be a bit closer to the park at Bolotnaya Square, at the corner of the square, because originally the event had been declared for 5,000 participants. We had a feeling that people were disappointed, somehow low-spirited, and that not many would come. When we realised that there would be more people I told that to Mr Oleynik [the First Deputy Director of the Regional Security Department], but he told us that it was unacceptable. But it was clear that we could not do anything about it. We warned that there would be significantly more participants ... When we called Mr Deynichenko the following day he told [us] that he had had a map drawn up by the Department of the Interior, and that Mr Udaltsov could come during the day to see it to clarify any issues. During the day he postponed the meeting several times and then he was no longer picking up the phone. Therefore it was not possible to see or discuss the map.\n[Question to the witness] Was the blocking of the park discussed at the working meeting, or later?\n- No, of course not. The event of 4 February [2012] had been organised so that the meeting was held at Bolotnaya Square. Bolotnaya Square is an area comprising the park and Bolotnaya embankment. It was supposed that people would ... turn [like before] towards the park. It was said that everything except the position of the stage, which would be moved forwards 20 metres, would be the same as [the last] time, this was expressly spelled out. We were guided by it.\n[Question to the witness] With whom was it discussed that the positioning of the security forces would be the same, [give us] the names?\n- This was spelled out at the big working meeting at the office of Mr Oleynik and in his presence. Since we realised that we had no time for an on-the-spot reconnaissance, Mr Deynichenko suggested that it would be like the last time as we had already walked along this route.\n...\n... Nadezhda Mityushkina called me several times and complained that they were having trouble bringing in the equipment ... that they could not find anyone in charge. Usually it is the police representative who is responsible for the event, separately for the march and for the meeting. When I crossed [to] the area allocated to the march, even before passing through the metal detectors, Colonel Makhonin, who is traditionally in charge of the march, called me. We met. I gave him a written undertaking not to breach the law ... I told him that [two members of staff] had been arrested [at the stage area] ... he promised to release them ...\n[Question to the witness] What exactly did Colonel Makhonin say? The areas allocated to the march and to the meeting, were they determined in front of the camera?\n- No we did not discuss it ...\n... at the turning [from Malyy Kamenny bridge] the procession came to a standstill ... some people sat on the ground ... those who sat down had justifiably asked for an expansion. I could not push through to get there. I learned that both [State Duma deputies] were conducting negotiations; I thought that it was probably going to settle this situation ... at a certain point Ms Mityushkina called me and said that the police were demanding to close the event. I explained ... that if [the police] considered that there had been breaches, they had to give us time to remedy these defects, they could not end the event at once. I called Mr Udaltsov ... and said that we were coming, [that there was] no need to end anything. Actually when I reached the corner the sit-in protest had already ended. The organisers who had participated in the sit-in protest and [other] people tried to approach the stage ...\n...\nThe official website of the Moscow [Department of the] Interior published the map on which it was shown, just as agreed [and] just as on 4 February 2012, [that] the border [of the meeting venue] was outlined at the far end of the park and not the near one ... all agreements were breached.\n[Question to the witness] During the working meeting on 4 [May 2012] or at the beginning of the [march], did the Department of the Interior warn you about any preparations for provocations, breach of public order, the campsite?\n- No, there were no such talks with the police.\n...\n[Question to the witness] If one has a badge, does it help in principle for talking to the police?\n- No, it does not make any difference. I personally called Mr Deynichenko and asked him to take measures. There was no communication with the police. The police officers did not pick up the phone calls. [I] did not manage to find anyone in charge of the police.\n...\n[Question to the witness] When, according to the rules, ... should the appointments be made to coordinate ... on the part of the organisers and the mayor’s office?\n- The law does not expressly say [when] ... we received no documents from the [Moscow Government] or the Department of the Interior. We had no information as to who was responsible.\n[Question to the witness] That means that at the beginning and during the event you did not know the names of those in charge?\n- Except for the officer in charge of the march, Colonel Makhonin.\n...\n[Question to the witness] When the emergency occurred, who did you try calling at the Department of the Interior command ...?\n- By then I was no longer trying to call anyone. I had heard that [the two State Duma deputies] were holding negotiations. I called Mr Udaltsov to tell him that they were trying to close the meeting, but he told me that they were already heading to the stage, that they had ended the sit-in protest.\n...\n[Question to the witness] Why did the police announce that the event was banned?\n- I cannot explain why such a decision was taken. They themselves impeded the conduct of the event and then they ended it by themselves ...\n...\n[Question to the witness] The reason why [the event was] closed was the sit-down protest?\n- As I understood from Ms Mityushkina, yes.\n[Question to the witness] How did the police make their demands? Through loudspeakers?\n- I would not say that it was some sort of large-scale [announcement]. It was more through physical force. But some demands were made via megaphones, there were no other means.” 56.  On 5 December 2013 Mr Nemtsov gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:\n“... I was not one of the organisers of the event, but I was well informed about the way it had been authorised. On the website of the Moscow Department of the Interior a map was posted showing the location of the police [cordon] and the access points. The map was in the public domain and one could see that the park of Bolotnaya Square should have been opened. But it turned out to be closed. Moreover, we openly announced on the Internet, and it was reported in the media, that the route would be exactly the same as on 4 February 2012 ... On 4 February 2012 there was an authorised event ... all of [Bolotnaya] Square was open, no cordons on Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge. We easily turned into the square, there had been no scuffles ... we were sure that on 6 May 2012 it would be exactly the same picture ... but the police had deceived us, blocked Bolotnaya Square, having left a very narrow passage for the demonstrators. We understood that it would be hard to pass through this bottleneck. We stopped, and to show the police that we were not going to storm the Kremlin and the [Bolshoy] Kamennyy bridge we sat on the ground ... Mr Gudkov [the State Duma deputy], ... offered to be an intermediary in the negotiations between the protesters and the police ... we waited, all was peaceful ... he several times attempted to negotiate but this came to nothing. It became clear that ... the crowd were about to panic. We got up. And an awful scuffle began ... I was moving [to the stage] ... when I arrived there I saw a strange scene for an authorised event. The microphones had all been switched off, Mr Navalnyy and Mr Udaltsov had been arrested just before me. The police never act like that at authorised events. I took a megaphone and addressed the people. I did not speak for long. Within a few minutes the police apprehended me. ...\n[Question to the witness] Why, as you say, were the police particularly aggressive?\n- The demonstration took place just one day before Mr Putin’s inauguration. Naturally, the police had received very strict orders. Naturally, they were paranoid about ‘Maidan’. The fact that they had treacherously breached the agreement and closed off the square, this proves that there were political orders. I was particularly surprised at Mr Gorbenko, the deputy mayor, with whom Mr Gudkov was negotiating. He is a reasonable man, but here he was like a zombie, he would not negotiate with Mr Gudkov. This was strange ... he did not want to talk like a human. ...\n[Question to the witness] Did you know about the intention to set up tents, or about the breaking of the cordon?\n- No, I did not know about it then.\n...\nWe demanded only that [the authorities] implement what had been agreed with [the organisers].” 57.  On 18 December 2013 Ms Mirza, the head of the Ombudsman’s secretariat, gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. She testified, in particular, as follows:\n“... [on 6 May 2012] I was present as an observer ... unlike the usual events held at Bolotnaya Square, [this time] the park was cordoned off ... when we passed the metal detectors ... Mr Biryukov called and asked us to return urgently because ... at Malyy Kamennyy bridge ... [protesters] had sat down on the ground ... [The Ombudsman] tried to persuade these people to stand up and to go and conduct the meeting ... At this time the [second] riot police cordon, which had stood between Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge and Malyy Kamenny bridge, apparently approached the crowd, therefore the pressure built up from both sides ... I tried to leave the congested area ... showed my observer’s badge ... but the riot police were not listening to me, laughed slightly and continued to press, there was no reaction on their part. This somewhat surprised me because we found ourselves there at the request of the Moscow Department of the Interior.\n...\nUsually there was no such multi-layered defence. Bolshoy Kamenny bridge was blocked as if it was warfare, beyond what was required, as we thought ... among the protesters we saw several people in masks, and we reported that to the police, [as] this was unusual. The mood of the Department of the Interior was also unusual, and so was the mood of the riot police. A police chief from the Moscow Department of the Interior, Mr Biryukov, told me, for example, that he could do nothing, that he was not in charge of the riot police and that the riot police reported to the [federal] police, and this was also unusual to us. I spoke to the deputy mayor ... and saw how upset he was, and his very presence there was also [a rare occasion].\n...\nAs I was later told by Mr Biryukov from the Department of the Interior, [the protesters had sat down on the ground] because the passage had been narrowed down. The passage had indeed been narrowed down, I can confirm that, I saw that, the passage was much narrower than usual, and there were metal detectors which were not supposed to be there.\n...\nMr Biryukov was in charge on behalf of the Moscow Department of the Interior – this is absolutely certain because he is always in charge of such events. His name, his function and his telephone number were written on our badges so that he could be contacted if any questions or doubts arose. As to the [representative of the mayor’s office], [I am not sure].\n[Question to the witness] You have explained about the cordon. Why was it not possible, for example, to move it [back] so as to prevent a scuffle?\n- Mr Biryukov is a very constructive person and he knows his job, but he could not explain to me why he could not influence the riot police.\n... [the deputy mayor also] told me that he could not do anything, it was said to me personally. At this time the breaking of the cordon occurred. [The Ombudsman] and our staff, together with a few other people, walked out through [the gap] ...\n[Question to the witness] Did you receive any information while at the cordon? Perhaps you heard from the police officers about the official closure of the public event?\n- No.\n... After the cordon had already been broken, when the arrests had begun, [then] they were telling us through a megaphone to disperse, that the meeting was over, I heard it.” 58.  On 23 December 2013 Mr N. Svanidze, a member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:\n“... [on 6 May 2012] I was present as an observer ... [when] everybody headed towards the narrow bottleneck at the embankment ... it created a jam. Several dozen people sat on the ground, and the cordon moved towards them ... I asked ‘Why won’t they open up the passage?’, but Viktor Aleksandrovich [Biryukov] would turn his face away and would not answer when told that the passage had to be opened. I understood that there was no point talking to him, he was not in command.\n...\n[Question to the witness] Did [the Ombudsman] or anyone else attempt to negotiate the widening of the passage?\n- We could not do anything. We requested it, [Ms Mirza] requested it and I think that [the Ombudsman] did too, but nothing was done. The passage was not widened.\n...\n[Question to the witness] Were there any calls to move towards the Kremlin?\n- No.\n...\n[Question to the witness] During your presence at the event did you know on what territory the meeting had been authorised?\n- Yes, I was convinced that [it was] Bolotnaya Square and the park at Bolotnaya Square.” 59.  On the same day Mr Vasiliev, a staff member at the Ombudsman’s office, gave testimony as a witness in the first Bolotnaya case. He testified, in particular, as follows:\n“... [on 6 May 2012] I was present as an observer ... on that day we gathered at the press centre of the Department of the Interior, we were given maps, instructions on how to behave, the list of public observers ...\n... the Ombudsman asked [the protesters sitting on the ground] why they were not going to the meeting venue. I could not hear the answer, they got up and headed on, after that, congestion occurred ... [the Ombudsman] began looking for the officer responsible for the cordon. There was [the chief press officer] Mr Biryukov there, [the Ombudsman] told him: ‘let’s move the cordon back so that people can pass’ [but] Mr Biryukov told him that it was outside his powers. [The Ombudsman] asked in whose powers it was; he replied ‘I don’t know’. At that moment the police began splitting the crowd ...” 60.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow delivered a judgment in the first Bolotnaya case. It found eight individuals guilty of participation in mass disorder and of violent acts against police officers during the public assembly on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and four years; one of them was released on parole. Three co-defendants had previously been pardoned under the Amnesty Act and a fourth had his case disjoined from the main proceedings. 61.  On 22 May 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy branch of the Investigative Committee dismissed five complaints by individuals who had sustained injuries on 6 May 2012, allegedly through the excessive use of force by the police. The complaints had originally been a part of the criminal investigation file concerning the mass disorder, but were subsequently disjoined from it. During the investigation of the mass disorder case, confrontations were conducted between those who had lodged complaints (in the capacity of the accused in the criminal case) and the police officers accused of violence (in the capacity of victims in the criminal case). The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“In suppressing attempts to break the police cordon, the police officers acted in coordination and concert, without applying physical force or special means of restraint; however, the work of the officers charged with apprehending offenders did involve physical force and special means of restraint, in so far as necessary [to restrain] those resisting.\nAfter the crowd of protesters had calmed down and thinned out a little, the police officers began to tighten the cordon, [and] by doing so encouraged the citizens to proceed to the stage. At the same time many participants in the meeting who did not want to go there began to return to Bolshaya Yakimanka Street in Moscow. The police also accompanied them.\nLater, in the area of Malyy Kamennyy bridge and at the corner of the park [at Bolotnaya Square] confrontations took place between the provocateurs, the persons calling for defiance and the persons displaying such defiance. During the apprehension of those persons force was used by the police because of their resistance, and in a number of cases, special means of restraint were also used for apprehending the most active instigators.\n...\nBecause of such a turn of events the police officers justifiably used physical force to apprehend the participants in the mass disorder, and also special means of restraint in relation to some of them who attempted to resist.” 62.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 21 February 2014, having slightly reduced the prison sentences for two of the defendants. 63.  On 24 July 2014 the Moscow City Court found Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev guilty of organising mass disorder on 6 May 2012. The judgment contained the following findings:\n“The witness Mr Deynichenko testified that on 4 May 2012 he had taken part in a working meeting at the Moscow Department of Regional Security... as a follow-up to the meeting a draft security plan was prepared, and all necessary agreements were reached with the organisers concerning the order of the march and meeting, the movement of the column, the stage set-up, access to the meeting venue, barriers and the exit from the stage; the [organisers] had agreed on that. The question of using the park at Bolotnaya Square was not raised because the declared number of participants was 5,000, whereas over 20,000 people could be accommodated in the open area of the square and the embankment, and [the organisers] had known that in advance. It had been discussed with them how the cordon would be placed from Malyy Kamennyy bridge to the park of Bolotnaya Square, so the organisers knew about the cordon in advance. The placement of the cordon was indicated in the [security plan]. This document was for internal use and access to it was only given to the police; the location of the forces could be changed in an emergency by the operational headquarters. The organisers did not insist on an on-the-spot visit; such visits are held at the initiative of the organisers, which had not been requested because they had known the route ... and the meeting venue ... [The witness Mr Deynichenko] had known that at the beginning of the march the event organisers, including Mr Udaltsov, had discussed between them that they were not going to turn towards the meeting venue but would stop and try to break the cordon to proceed to Bolshoy Kamennyy bridge.\n...\nThe witness N. Sharapov testified that Mr Udaltsov had known the route of the march and had not raised a question about opening up the park at Bolotnaya Square. Moreover, the park was a nature reserve with narrow lanes ... the park had been opened up previously [for a public event], as an exception, on only one occasion, on 4 February 2012, but then it was winter, it was snowing and the declared number of participants had significantly exceeded 5,000. No such exception was made for 6 May 2012.\n... according to the statement of the Moscow City Security Department, ...the meeting venue at Bolotnaya embankment could accommodate 26,660 people ...\nThe fact that no map of the assembly route or the placement of the police had been produced at the working meeting of 4 May 2012, that these questions had not been expressly discussed, ... that the event organisers present at the working meeting had not been shown any maps, was confirmed by them.\n... the court concludes that no official map had been adopted with the organisers and, in the court’s opinion, [the published map] had been based on Mr Udaltsov’s own interview with journalists ...\nTherefore the map presented by the defence has no official character, its provenance is unknown and therefore unreliable and it does not reflect the true route of the demonstration and the placement of the police forces.\n... the witness Mr Makhonin ... testified that on 5 May 2012 he received the [security plan] ... Before the start of the march he personally met the event organisers Ms Mityushkina, Mr Udaltsov [and] Mr Davidis and in the presence of the press and with the use of video recordings explained to them the order of the meeting and the march, warned against the breach of public order during the conduct of the event; and stressed the need to inform him personally about any possible provocations by calling the telephone number known to the organisers. He asked Mr Udaltsov about the intention to proceed towards the Kremlin and to cause mass disorder because the police had received information about it from undercover sources; Mr Udaltsov had assured him that there would be no breaches of order at the event and that they had no intention to move towards the Kremlin ... He (Mr Makhonin) arrived at Bolotnaya Square after the mass disorder had already begun ... After the mass disorder began he tried calling Mr Udaltsov on the phone but there was no reply. Mr Udaltsov did not call him ... Other event organisers had not asked him to move the cordon. Given the circumstances, Ms Mityushkina, at his request, announced the end of the meeting, and the police opened additional exits for those willing to leave. In addition to that, the police repeated through a loudspeaker the announcement about the end of the meeting ...\n... the witness Mr Zdorenko ...testified that ... following information received [from undercover sources] about the possible setting up of a camp site, at about 9 p.m. on 5 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square and organised a search of the area including the park. The park was cordoned off and guarded ... if necessary, at the decision of the operational headquarters, the venue allocated for the meeting could be significantly extended at the expense of the park [at Bolotnaya Square]. However, there was no need for that given that there were no more than 2,500-3,000 persons on Bolotnaya Square ... [others being stopped at] Malyy Kamennyy bridge.\n...\nThe witness A. Zharkov testified that ...while the stage was being set up he had seen an unknown man smuggling four camping tents in rubbish bins.\n...\nThe witness M. Volondina testified that ... before the beginning of the march, police information came through from undercover sources that the event organisers intended to encircle the Kremlin holding hands to prevent the inauguration of the Russian President.\nThe witness M. Zubarev testified that ... he had been [officially] filming ... while Police Officer Makhonin ... explained the order ... and warned the organisers ... and asked Mr Udaltsov to inform him of any possible provocations. Mr Udaltsov stated that they would act lawfully and that he had requested the police to stop any unwanted persons from joining the public event ...\nThe witness Y. Vanyukhin testified that on 6 May 2012 ... at about 6 p.m. Mr Udaltsov, while on the way to the stage, told people around him that they were going to set up a campsite ...\n... the witness Ms Mirza testified that ... Police Officer Biryukov had asked her and [the Ombudsman] to come to Malyy Kamennyy bridge where some of the protesters, including Mr Nemtsov and Mr Udaltsov, had not turned right towards the stage but had gone straight to the cordon, where they had begun a sit-in protest on the pretext that access to the park of Bolotnaya Square had been closed and cordoned off ... While [the Ombudsman] was talking to those sitting on the ground they remained silent and did not reply but would not stand up.\nThe witness Mr Babushkin testified that ... after the first confrontations between the protesters and the police had begun, the latter announced through a loudspeaker that the meeting was cancelled and invited the citizens to leave.\nThe witness Mr Ponomarev testified that ... the police cordon had been placed differently from [the cordon placed for] a similar march on 4 February 2012 ... he proposed to Mr Udaltsov that the cordon be pushed back so that the police would go back a few steps and widen access to Bolotnaya Square, and the latter replied that he would figure it out when they reached the cordon ... he knew that Mr G. Gudkov was negotiating with the police about moving the cordon, which had now been reinforced by the riot police.\n... the witnesses Mr Yashin and Mr Nemtsov testified that ... during the steering committee meeting the question of setting up tents during the public event had not been discussed ... while [Mr G. Gudkov] and [Mr D. Gudkov] were negotiating with the police ... the crowd built up [and] suddenly the police began moving forward, the protesters resisted and the cordon broke ...\nThe witness Mr G. Gudkov [deputy of the State Duma] testified that ... at the request of the organisers, who had told him that they would not go anywhere and would remain sitting until the police moved the cordon back and opened up access to the park at Bolotnaya Square, he had taken part in the negotiations with the police on that matter. He had reached an agreement with the officers of the Moscow Department of the Interior that the cordon would be moved back, but the organisers who had filed the notice [of the event] should have signed the necessary documents. However, those who had called for a sit-in, including Mr Udaltsov, refused [to stand up] to go to the offices of the Moscow Department of the Interior to sign the necessary documents, although he (Mr Gudkov) had proposed several times that they should do so ...\n... the witness Mr D. Gudkov [deputy of the State Duma] testified that ... together with Mr G. Gudkov he had conducted negotiations with the police ... an agreement had been reached that the cordon at the Malyy Kamennyy bridge would be moved back and the access to the park would be opened up, but at that point some young men in hoodies among the protesters began first to push the citizens onto the cordon provoking the [same] response, after that the cordon was broken, the [police] began the arrests and mass disorder ensued.\n...\n... the court [rejects] the testimonies to the effect that it was the police who had begun moving towards the protesters who were peacefully sitting on the ground and thus provoked the breaking of the cordon ... [and finds ] that it was the protesters, and not the police ... who began pushing against the cordon, causing the crowd to panic, which eventually led to the breaking of the cordon and the ensuing mass disorder.\n...\nThe court takes into account the testimony of Mr Davidis that ... at about 6 p.m. Ms Mityushkina, who was responsible for the stage, informed him about the demand of the police that she announce, as an event organiser, that it was terminated. He passed this information on to Mr Udaltsov by phone, [and he] replied that they were standing up and heading towards the stage ... he knew that on 6 May 2012 [some] citizens had brought several tents to Bolotnaya Square, but Mr Udaltsov had not informed him about the need to put up tents during the public event.\n...\nThe court takes into account the testimony of Mr Bakirov ..., one of the [formal] event organisers ..., that nobody had informed him about the need to put up tents during the public event.\n...\n[The court examined] the video recording ... of the conversation between Mr Makhonin and Mr Udaltsov during which the latter assured Mr Makhonin that they would conduct the event in accordance with the authorisation, he would not call on people to stay in Bolotnaya Square and if problems occurred he would maintain contact with the police.\n...\n... [the court examined another video recording] in which Mr Makhonin and Mr Udaltsov discussed the arrangements. Mr Makhonin showed Mr Udaltsov where the metal detectors would be placed; after that they agreed to meet at 3 p.m. ... and exchanged telephone numbers ...\n...\nAccording to [expert witnesses Ms N. and Ms M.], the borders of Bolotnaya Square in Moscow are delimited by Vodootvodnyy channel, Serafimovicha Street, Sofiyskaya embankment and Faleyevskiy passage, and the [park] forms a part of Bolotnaya Square. During public events at Bolotnaya Square the park is always cordoned off and is not used for the passage of citizens.\nThese testimonies are fully corroborated by the reply of the Head of the Yakimanka District Municipality of Moscow of 27 July 2012 and the map indicating the borders of Bolotnaya Square.\n...\n[The court finds] that the place of the sit-in ... was outside the venue approved by the Moscow authorities for the public event ...\n...\nThe organisation of mass disorder may take the form of incitement and controlling the crowd’s actions, directing it to act in breach of the law, or putting forward various demands to the authorities’ representatives. This activity may take different forms, in particular the planning and preparation of such actions, the selection of groups of people to provoke and fuel mass disorder, incitement to commit it, by filing petitions and creating slogans, announcing calls and appeals capable of electrifying the crowd and causing it to feel appalled, influencing people’s attitudes by disseminating leaflets, using the mass media, meetings and various forms of agitation, in developing a plan of crowd activity taking into account people’s moods and accumulated grievances, or guiding the crowd directly to commit mass disorder.\n... this offence is considered accomplished as soon as at least one of the actions enumerated under Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code has been carried out ...\n... the criminal offence of organisation of mass disorder is considered accomplished when organisational activity has been carried out and does not depend on the occurrence or non-occurrence of harmful consequences.\n...\nThere are no grounds to consider the closure of access to the park of Bolotnaya Square and the placement of a guiding police cordon at the foot of Malyy Kamennyy bridge to be a provocation ... since it was only to indicate the direction and it did not obstruct access to the meeting venue at Bolotnaya Square.\n... the reinforcement of the cordon ... was necessary in the circumstances ... to prevent it from breaking ... but the police [cordon] did not advance towards the protesters.\nIt is therefore fully proven that the mass disorder organised by Mr Udaltsov [and others] ... led to the destabilisation of public order and peace in a public place during the conduct of a public event, put a large number of people in danger, including those who had come to fulfil their constitutional right to congregate in peaceful marches and meetings, and led to considerable psychological tension in the vicinity of Bolotnaya Square in Moscow, accompanied by violence against the police ... and the destruction of property ...” 64.  The Moscow City Court sentenced Mr Udaltsov and Mr Razvozzhayev to four and a half years’ imprisonment. On 18 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment of 24 July 2014, with a number of amendments. 65.  On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined another “Bolotnaya” case and found four individuals guilty of participating in mass disorder and committing violent acts against police officers during the demonstration on 6 May 2012. They received prison sentences of between two and a half and three and a half years; one of them was released on parole. That judgment was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 November 2014. 66.  On 6 May 2012 the applicant arrived at Bolotnaya Square at about 6 p.m. to take part in the meeting. He stood in front of the stage on Bolotnaya embankment, within the area designated as the meeting venue. 67.  According to the applicant, between 6 p.m. and 7 p.m. the area around him remained peaceful, although there was general confusion. He claimed that he had not heard any announcement about the termination of the meeting; he had heard the police orders made through a megaphone to disperse, but in the general commotion he was unable to leave immediately and remained within the authorised meeting area until 7 p.m., when he was arbitrarily arrested by the police dispersing the demonstration. The applicant denied that he had received any warning or orders before being arrested. The police apprehended him and took him to a police van, where he waited for an hour before it left Bolotnaya Square for the police station. According to the applicant, there was no traffic at Bolotnaya Square at the time of his arrest; it was still suspended. 68.  According to the Government, the applicant was arrested at 8.30 p.m. at Bolotnaya Square because he was obstructing the traffic and had disregarded the police order to move away. 69.  At 9.30 p.m. the applicant was taken to the Krasnoselskiy District police station in Moscow. At the police station an on-duty officer drew up a statement on an administrative offence (протокол об административном правонарушении) on the basis of a report (рапорт) by Police Officer Y., who had allegedly arrested the applicant. Y.’s report contained the following handwritten statement:\n“I [Y.] report that on 6 May 2012 at 9.30 p.m., at 5/16 Bolotnaya Square, together with Police Lieutenant [A.], I arrested Mr Frumkin.” 70.  The rest of the report was a printed template stating as follows:\n“... who, acting in a group of citizens, took part in an authorised meeting, went out onto the road and thus obstructed the traffic. [He] did not react to the multiple demands of the police to vacate the road ..., thereby disobeying a lawful order of the police, who were fulfilling their service duty of maintaining public order and ensuring safety. He thereby committed an administrative offence under Article 19.3 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences.” 71.  The statement on the administrative offence contained an identical text, but indicated that the applicant had been arrested at 8.30 p.m. The applicant was charged with obstructing traffic and disobeying lawful police orders, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. His administrative detention was ordered with reference to Article 27.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences (протокол об административном задержании). The “reasons” section of the order remained blank. 72.  At 2 p.m. on 7 May 2012 the applicant was taken to court, but his case was not examined. After having spent the day in a transit van without food or drink, at 11.55 p.m. he was taken back to the cell at the Krasnoselskiy District police station. A new order for the applicant’s administrative detention was issued, indicating that he had been detained “for the purpose of drawing up the administrative material”. 73.  At 8 a.m. on 8 May 2012 the applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 100 of the Yakimanka District, who examined the charges. The applicant requested that the case be adjourned on the grounds that he was unfit to stand trial after the detention; he also requested that the hearing be opened to the public and that two police officers be examined as witnesses. Those requests were rejected in order to expedite the proceedings. A further request for the examination of several eyewitnesses was partly refused and partly granted. Three witnesses for the defence were examined. 74.  On the basis of the report written by Police Officer Y., the court established that at 8.30 p.m. on 6 May 2012 the applicant had been walking along the road at Bolotnaya Square and obstructing the traffic, and that he had then disobeyed lawful police orders to vacate the venue. The Justice of the Peace rejected as unreliable two eyewitnesses’ testimonies to the effect that the police had not given the applicant any orders or warnings before arresting him. The applicant was found guilty of disobeying lawful police orders, and was sentenced under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 75.  On 11 May 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined an appeal lodged by the applicant. At the applicant’s request the court examined Ms S. as a witness. She testified that at 7.46 p.m. on 6 May 2012 she had been looking for her son when she saw the applicant in a police van and spoke to him. She also testified that at 9.03 p.m. she had been at Bolotnaya Square; the site had been fully cordoned off and the traffic had not resumed. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the police report and the police statement were inconsistent as regards the time of his arrest and found that the correct interpretation of those documents was that the time of arrest had been 8.30 p.m. and the detention at the police station 9.30 p.m. The court dismissed the video recording submitted by the applicant on the grounds that it did not contain the date and the time of the incident, but found that the applicant’s guilt had been proved by other evidence. It upheld the first-instance judgment. 76.  On 11 January 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court examined the applicant’s administrative case in supervisory-review proceedings and upheld the earlier judicial decisions.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1976 respectively and live in Budapest. 6.  At about 3.45 a.m. on 1 October 2006 the applicants were riding a motorbike in Budapest. Police Officers N. and S. halted them in order to carry out an identity check. The applicants produced American passports. 7.  According to the applicants, the procedure to check their identities degenerated as follows. After Mr Réti’s stepping aside and attempting to make a cell phone call, Officer N. started to behave aggressively and repeatedly kicked him. Officer S. first tried to restrain his partner, but following a remark made by Ms Fizli, he also became aggressive; the officers hit Mr Réti repeatedly and finally handcuffed him, forcing him to the ground. Subsequently, reinforcement was called in. Several officers arrived and joined their colleagues in hitting Mr Réti. When Ms Fizli intervened, an officer pushed her in the chest and then down on the ground, knelt on her face, ordered her to shut up, and finally banged her head against the soil. Simultaneously, another officer knelt on Mr Réti’s back, while an officer forced his truncheon against his neck, thus compressing his throat. Mr Réti lost consciousness. Eventually, the applicants were driven to the police station in two separate police vehicles. 8.  The Government gave the following account of the incident. Despite their understanding of the purpose of the police measure, Mr Réti and Ms Fizli initially insisted on speaking English and were not willing to cooperate, therefore the police officers, Officer N. and Officer S., applied force. As Mr Réti resisted, the police patrol called in reinforcements and handcuffed him with the help of the officers just arriving. Ms Fizli questioned in anger the police officers applying force against her partner and, in the heat of the argument, suddenly turned against Officer P., one of the reinforcement officers. It was perceived that she was trying to hit the officer with the cell phone she held in her hand. Officer P. raised his hands in defence and pushed her away. Ms Fizli bounced back from the officer’s hands, lost her balance and fell against the officer standing behind her, who immobilised her.\nMr Réti was then driven to the police station on suspicion of drunken driving and violence against an official. In the police car, he furiously banged his head against the window and kept kicking the window; therefore, force had to be used to restrain him. On account of her behaviour and lack of cooperation, Ms Fizli was also handcuffed, placed in another police car and taken to the police station. 9.  Committed to the Budapest II District Police Headquarters, the applicants were tested for blood alcohol levels. Mr Réti was under very mild influence (0.45 g/l) while Ms Fizli was under none.\nSubsequently, the applicants were released. 10.  According to the medical report submitted, Mr Réti suffered the following injuries: a contusion and a haematoma on the right cheek, another over the right eye, a further one behind the right knee, several abrasions and contusions on the chest and the belly, and a brain commotion. Ms Fizli had haematomas on her right wrist, several contusions on her right palm, a contusion on her left foot, and a haematoma with a contusion on the right side of her waist. 11.  On 9 October 2006 the applicants filed a criminal report for ill‑treatment in official proceedings. In the subsequent proceedings they maintained in essence the above version of the events. Officers N., S. and P. were interrogated as witnesses. They stated that only lawful force had been applied to overcome the applicants’ resistance. 12.  A forensic expert was appointed, according to whose opinion it could not be determined whether the applicants’ injuries had been caused as they suggested or according to the officers’ version. 13.  On 11 June 2007 the Budapest Investigation Office discontinued the investigation, essentially with regard to the inconclusive medical evidence. 14.  In different proceedings conducted against the applicants for violence against officials, Officers N., S., P. and V. were heard as witnesses. Officers N. and S. were also confronted with the applicants. This procedure was eventually discontinued on 15 May 2007 for want of conclusive evidence. 15.  The applicants filed a complaint against the discontinuation of their case (see paragraph 13 above). They submitted a number of motions in order to have more evidence taken. However, on 24 July 2007 the Budapest Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the complaint. 16.  On 27 September 2007 the applicants, acting as substitute private prosecutors, filed a motion with the Budapest Regional Court.\nThe court held five hearings and heard the applicants as well as Officers N., S. and P., along with several witnesses. It took testimonies from the other officers present at the incident and the medical expert. In these proceedings, no confrontation took place, although Ms Fizli by then stated that an Officer M. – rather than the accused Officer P. – had brutalised her. For the court, this amounted to an inconsistency.\nIn his final address to the court, the applicants’ lawyer pointed out that several contradictions in the file and the testimonies were not resolved. In particular, it remained unclear how many times and under what circumstances the officers had forced the applicants to the ground, and how the applicants could strongly smell of alcohol (as reported by the officers) given the very low blood values. 17.  On 5 October 2009 the court acquitted the accused, observing inter alia that the medical evidence was inconclusive.\nThe applicants appealed. On 21 October 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal held a hearing and upheld the acquittal (service: 29 November 2010).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Armavir. She is disabled and is confined to a wheelchair. She depends on her disability pension as a means of subsistence. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings against her neighbour, M., seeking to have dismantled a construction that the latter had built in 1987 inside the entrance of their multi-flat house for the purpose of insulating the building. In its place the applicant sought to install a wooden ramp for her wheelchair in order to facilitate her access to her flat, situated on the ground floor. 8.  It appears that during the court proceedings the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, modified her claim and asked for the construction in question not to be dismantled but to be allocated to her so that she could install a wooden ramp in its place. 9.  On 26 July 2007 the Armavir Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate with any proof, such as an expert opinion, that it was necessary and possible to dismantle the construction and that it was technically possible to install a wooden ramp in its place. 10.  On 1 August 2007 the applicant, still not represented, lodged an appeal. 11.  On 13 September 2007 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim on appeal. The court found that the applicant’s request to have the construction allocated to her was ill-founded since the construction had not been built by her and, moreover, belonged to the owner of the underlying plot of land. The court further referred to an opinion issued on 16 January 2007 by the Armavir Municipality, according to which it was technically preferable to build a wooden ramp from the balcony side of the applicant’s flat rather than from the building’s main entrance. 12.  On 7 November 2007 the applicant, still unrepresented, lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation. 13.  By a letter of 12 November 2007 the Chief Registrar of the Court of Cassation returned the applicant’s appeal, informing her that the appeal had not been admitted for examination as it had not been lodged by an advocate licensed to act before the Court of Cassation, pursuant to Article 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CCP).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  All of the applicants live in Baskil, Turkey. 6.  On 19 July 1993 each of them brought separate actions before the Baskil Civil Court against the National Water Board. They alleged that their plots of land were illegally seized by the administration for a dam construction without any payment, and requested compensation. 7.  On 18 November 1993 the court ruled that the cases should be characterised as compensation claims arising from de facto expropriations rather than claims for illegal seizures. The court established that a committee of experts had assessed the value of the expropriated land in advance and that the authorities had paid the resulting amounts to the owners registered in the local land registry. The court ordered the administration to pay the applicants an amount of increased compensation, plus interest at the statutory rate, starting from 1986 when the land was submerged in the waters of the dam. 8.  On 6 October 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed these judgments, holding that the cases could not be characterised as compensation claims arising from expropriation. Upon the applicants' request, however, the Court of Cassation reversed its decision and held, on 10 March 1995, that the cases could in fact be characterised as compensation claims arising from expropriation. It proceeded to quash the judgments of the first-instance court only in respect of the date from which the statutory rate of interest began to run. 9.  By decisions of 21 December 1995 and 25 January 1986, the Baskil Civil Court ordered the administration to pay the applicants a certain amount of compensation, plus interest running from 1986, despite the earlier rulings of the Court of Cassation regarding the starting date from which interest was to be calculated. 10.  On 20 November 1996 the Plenary Court of Cassation quashed the judgments of the Baskil Civil Court. The same court rejected the applicants' rectification request on 2 May 1997. 11.  On 9 October 1997 the Baskil Civil Court ordered the administration to pay the applicants 315,650,000, 297,439,800, 265,571,250, 404,680,000 and 708,190,000 Turkish liras (TRL) respectively, plus interest at the statutory rate running from 19 August 1993, the date on which the land was transferred to the National Water Board. 12.  On 17 March 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld these judgments. On 2 April 1998 the Court of Cassation's rulings were served on the applicants. 13.  On 9 December 1998 the administration paid TRL 934,027,000 to Ms Mürvet Fidan, 884,579,000 TRL to Mr Murat Fidan, TRL 790,746,000 to Mr Hikmet Fidan, TRL 1,190,092,000 to Ms Zehra Fidan and TRL 2,041,230,000 to Ms Elif Özbilge.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Rab. 5.  On 20 June 2001 the applicant’s brother J.K. brought a civil action against the applicant and their father in the Rab Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rabu) seeking to be declared a co-owner of the house previously owned by their father. 6.  On 20 February 2002 the applicant lodged a counter-claim against J.K. 7.  By a judgment of 4 October 2004 the single judge of the Rab Municipal Court, Mrs L.P.M., ruled for J.K. and dismissed the applicant’s counter-claim. 8.  By a judgment of 12 December 2007 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. This judgment was served on the applicant’s representative on 14 January 2008. 9.  On 23 January 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the judgments of the ordinary courts. He complained, inter alia, that the first-instance judgment in his case had been rendered by a person whose appointment as a judge had later on been quashed by the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). 10.  On 6 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court held that judgments of the Administrative Court quashing judicial appointments had ex nunc effects only and that therefore the first-instance judgment in his case had been reached by a person who had been a judge at the relevant time. This decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 15 March 2012. 11.  Meanwhile, on 26 November 2003 National Judicial Council (Državno sudbeno vijeće) appointed Mrs L.P.M. a judge of the Rab Municipal Court. L.P.M. took her office on 15 December 2003. 12.  However, a certain Mrs N.M., who was running for the same office, lodged a request for the protection of a constitutionally guaranteed right (zahtjev za zaštitu ustavom zajamčenog prava i slobode čovjeka i građanina) with the Administrative Court against the above decision of the National Judicial Council claiming that L.P.M. had not satisfied statutory requirements for the appointment. 13.  By a judgment of 2 December 2004 the Administrative Court ruled for N.M. and quashed the National Judicial Council’s decision. It found that L.P.M. had not had the required work experience as a law clerk (sudski savjetnik) at the time when the notice of competition for the judicial office at issue had been published. 14.  On 13 July 2005 the Constitutional Court dismissed subsequent constitutional complaint by L.P.M.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1992 and 1996 respectively and live in Belgrade. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  On 28 December 2000 the Third Municipal Court (Treći opštinski sud) in Belgrade dissolved the marriage between the applicants' parents and ordered their father (hereinafter “the defendant”) to pay each of them 25% of his monthly income in child maintenance. 9.  On 27 June 2001 this judgment became final. 10.  On 2 April 2003 the applicants' mother filed a criminal complaint against the defendant, alleging his failure to pay the child maintenance awarded. 11.  On 13 May 2003 the Third Municipal Public Prosecutor's Office requested the opening of the investigation. 12. On 29 May 2003, in the course of the preliminary proceedings before the Third Municipal Court, the applicants' mother, acting on behalf of the applicants, sought payment of the child maintenance accrued on the bases of the judgment adopted on 28 December 2000 (i.e. submitted a “civil-party complaint”; “podnela predlog za ostvarivanje imovinsko-pravnog zahteva”). 13.  On 14 July 2003 the Third Municipal Public Prosecutor's Office formally indicted the defendant in this respect. 14.  The first hearing scheduled for 9 December 2003 was adjourned. 15.  Between March 2004 and April 2005 two hearings were held whilst another three hearings were adjourned on various procedural grounds. 16.  On 25 April 2005 the Third Municipal Court decided to consider the applicants' civil complaint on the merits and requested an expert opinion in respect of the amount of accrued maintenance between January 2001 and June 2005. 17. The expert produced his report on 7 July 2005. 18.  Between August 2005 and October 2006, four hearings were adjourned either because of the failure of the defendant's lawyer to appear before the court or the court's failure to summon him properly. 19.  In view of a possibility of settling the problem with the defendant, the applicants' legal representative requested the court to grant a short adjournment of the hearing of 22 November 2006. The court rescheduled the hearing for 8 December 2006. 20. Between December 2006 and October 2007, another two hearings were held whilst three hearings were adjourned on procedural grounds, one of them because of the presiding judge's “other commitments” (zbog sprečenosti). 21. In a letter of 11 September 2007, addressed to the President of the Third Municipal Court, the applicants alleged that the presiding judge had herself indicated that she “did not know what to do with the case” and would gladly be replaced by another judge. 22.  On 22 November 2007 the Third Municipal Court requested an updated version of the expert's opinion. 23.  The expert submitted his report on 8 January 2008. 24.  The court served this report on the parties at the hearing of 8 February 2008, which was adjourned to allow them to submit their written comments. 25. The hearing scheduled for 6 March 2008 was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicants' representative had failed to appear, and re-scheduled for 1 April 2008. 26.  Given the defendant's failure to appear in court, the court adjourned the hearing of 1 April 2008 and scheduled the next hearing for 9 July 2008. This hearing would appear to have been also adjourned. 27.  On 8 October 2008 the Third Municipal Court found the defendant guilty of failing to pay child maintenance and sentenced him to three months' in prison, suspended for one year. The court further advised the applicants, under Article 206 of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 35 below), to pursue the compensation claims which they had made in the course of the criminal proceedings by means of a separate civil action before the civil courts. It was noted that the data collected in the course of the criminal proceedings were not sufficient to determine the matter in the criminal context. 28.  It would appear that this judgment was not served on the applicants' representative. 29. On 12 February 2009 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Belgrade quashed the Third Municipal Court's judgment and remitted the case for re- consideration. 30.  The Third Municipal Court subsequently adjourned the hearing scheduled for 22 June 2009 in view of the defendant's failure to appear in court. 31.  On 16 July 2009 the Third Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings because the prosecution had become time-barred. It further advised the applicants that they could pursue their claim for damages in a separate civil suit. No appeal having been submitted, this decision became final on 9 October 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Mariupol. 6.  According to the applicant, on 25 December 1999 he lent 3,400 United States dollars (USD) to S. The latter had repaid part of his debt and had agreed to meet the applicant on 18 April 2000 to pay back the remainder, which according to the applicant was USD 2,030. 7.  On 11 April 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant following a complaint by S. that the applicant had extorted money from him. 8.  On 18 April 2000 at around 3 to 4 p.m. and during the applicant’s meeting with S., the applicant was arrested by police officers of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime (співробітники Маріупольського ВБОЗ УБОЗ УМВС України) and taken to a police station. Two passers-by, B. and Bo., provided written statements on the same day to the Head of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime to the effect that the applicant had been talking to S. and F. (S.’s sister) on the street when the policemen arrived and asked him to follow them. The applicant had tried to run away and to throw something from his pocket. The policemen had tried to stop the applicant but he had resisted, sworn at and threatened the policemen. He was handcuffed, put “with difficulties” into B.’s car and taken to the police station. The sum of USD 1,500 and some personal belongings had been confiscated from the applicant. In the report drawn up in relation to the applicant’s arrest, it was stated that the applicant was arrested at 9 p.m. on suspicion of committing a crime, because he could otherwise have absconded. 9.  According to the applicant, from 3 to 9 p.m. on 18 April, and on 26 April 2000, he had been beaten in the police station and had been tortured with the use of an electric current. 10.  On 21 April 2000 the prosecutor of Mariupol authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention because he “had committed a serious crime and was likely to abscond and pervert the course of justice”. The applicant, who was questioned on the same day, submitted that he had been ill-treated by the policemen. Following these submissions, the investigating officer ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant (see paragraph 19). 11.  By August 2000 the pre-trial investigation regarding the charges against the applicant had been completed and the case was transferred to court. According to the applicant, during the examination of his case by the court, twenty-one court hearings were postponed because of the victim’s failure to appear. 12.  On 15 April 2002 the Prymorskiy District Court at Mariupol sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment for physically threatening behaviour made with the aim of securing the repayment of debt, and released him on two years’ probation. In particular, it was found that the applicant had threatened S. and that on 2 February 2000 the applicant, together with unknown accomplices, had beaten S., as confirmed by a medical examination of S. 13.  The applicant submitted extracts from the records of court hearings in his criminal case. On one undated separate page, it is mentioned that police officer R. testified in court that the applicant had suffered a kidney contusion and two broken ribs. Witnesses Sh. and Shi. testified that they had witnessed the applicant’s arrest and that he had been handcuffed and put into a van, but that nobody had beaten him. 14.  On 23 May 2003 the Donetsk Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction of 15 April 2002. 15.  On 13 January 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s application for leave to appeal in cassation. According to the applicant, he had not been informed about the date of the hearing. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had been present at the hearing, whilst the prosecutor had been present and had been heard by the judges. The applicant had received a copy of that decision only on 14 April 2004. 16.  On 19 April 2000 the applicant was taken to the Mariupol Town Emergency Hospital (Маріупольська міська лікарня швидкої медичної допомоги). Upon examination it was noted that the applicant had suffered blows to his back and the left side of his chest, and also had a kidney contusion and haematuria (red blood cells in his urine). 17.  On 24 April 2000 the applicant’s mother requested that a prosecutor institute criminal proceedings against the policemen who had subjected her son to ill-treatment. 18.  On the same date the applicant was placed in the Mariupol Pre-Trial Detention Centre No. 7 (Слідчий ізолятор № 7 м. Маріуполя, hereinafter “the SIZO”). Upon his arrival he complained of headache and difficulties in urination and breathing. He was examined by the SIZO doctor who noted that the applicant had haematuria and an extensive haematoma on his chest. 19.  On 5 May 2000 a forensic medical examination found that the applicant had suffered minor bodily injuries, comprising numerous bruises on his chest, on the right side of his back and on the hips. The examiner found that these bruises could have been inflicted on 18 April 2000 by blows from fists and feet or by the applicant falling down. As for the two broken ribs, the expert noted that on an X-ray of 19 April 2000 it was visible that the applicant had a consolidated fracture of two ribs. Therefore, this injury was not taken into consideration as it had been inflicted earlier than 18 April 2000. 20.  On 27 May 2000 the Head of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime requested that the Mariupol Town Emergency Hospital submit certain X-ray images of the applicant’s ribs to him. According to the applicant, these X-rays were subsequently lost by the police. 21.  On 10 May 2000, following a complaint lodged by the applicant’s mother, the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office (прокуратура Донецької області – “the Regional Prosecutor’s Office”) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen. It stated that during his arrest on 18 April 2000 the applicant had disobeyed police orders, had sworn and had tried to run away, and that the policemen had therefore been forced to use martial arts on the applicant. S., who was questioned during the investigation, testified that on 18 April 2000 he had had a fight with the applicant, that the policemen had then come and used force against the applicant, and that the applicant had fallen on a fence but “finally was brought to the police station”. 22.  On 19 and 20 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a SIZO physician. The applicant complained of pain in his back, heart pain, headache, and haematuria. His diagnosis was the same as upon his arrival at the SIZO and he was prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug. 23.  On 10 October and 15 November 2000 the applicant was again examined by a SIZO physician and diagnosed with acute post-traumatic pyelonephritis on his left side. 24.  On 17 November 2000 the applicant was released from the SIZO. On 24 November 2000 he was hospitalised at the Azov Central Basin Hospital (Азовська центральна басейнова лікарня на водному транспорті м. Маріуполя). He was diagnosed with post-traumatic kidney deformations, possible chronic nephritis and haematuria. In the extract from the applicant’s medical file provided by this hospital it is also mentioned that in April 2000 the applicant had suffered two broken ribs. 25.  The applicant stayed in hospital until the end of December 2000. On 21 December 2000 the applicant was transferred to the Nephrological Ward of the Donetsk Regional Clinical Territorial Medical Unit (нефрологічне відділення Донецького обласного клінічного територіального медичного об’єднання). 26.  The applicant complained of, amongst other things, ill-treatment by the policemen and his unlawful conviction to a Member of Parliament, V. V. redirected the complaint to the General Prosecutor’s Office (Генеральна Прокуратура України). On 11 March 2001 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that his complaint had been transferred to the Prymorskyy District Court at Mariupol, which had exclusive competence to deal with such complaints. 27.  On 14 March 2001 the Prymorskyy District Court sent the applicant’s complaints to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office because the applicant had requested that criminal proceedings be brought against certain people and the Regional Prosecutor’s Office had failed to address this request. Moreover, the court found that the examination of the applicant’s complaints did not fall within its competence. 28.  On 6 April 2001 the Donetsk Regional Court, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, quashed the above-mentioned decision of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of 10 May 2000. The court pointed out the need to investigate the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the policemen in the police station, to question a number of witnesses (B., Bo., S.’s sister and a policeman, indicated by the applicant) and to conduct an additional expert medical examination of the applicant. Moreover, the court noted that it had not been established during the investigation exactly how the applicant had resisted the policemen and who in particular had used martial arts techniques against him. 29.  On the same date the General Prosecutor’s Office again redirected the applicant’s complaints, originally received from V. and the Secretariat of the Ombudsman of Ukraine (Секретаріат Уповноваженого Верховної Ради України з прав людини), to the Prymorskyy District Court for consideration. 30.  On 27 April 2001 the Prymorskyy District Court returned the applicant’s complaints to the General Prosecutor’s Office for the same reasons as mentioned above. 31.  However, on 18 May 2001 the General Prosecutor’s Office sent the applicant’s complaints back to the court, indicating that their examination fell within the exclusive competence of the court. 32.  On 23 May 2001 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen owing to the lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. Police officers R., M., P. and Va. testified that during his arrest the applicant had behaved very aggressively and had insulted F. The applicant had been struck on the face three times by S. and had fallen to the ground. In order to arrest the applicant, the policemen had used martial arts techniques, as the applicant had been struggling and kicking and did not want to get into the car. S. and F. also confirmed the above findings. No force had been used against the applicant in the police station. The prosecutor also noted that, according to the forensic medical examination of 5 May 2000, the applicant had broken his ribs before 18 April 2000 and had been suffering from kidney disease since 1994. 33.  On 29 October 2001 the Voroshylovskyy District Court at Donetsk quashed the decision of 23 May 2001 and remitted the case materials to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for additional investigation. The court indicated that the Regional Prosecutor’s Office had failed to comply with the instructions given by the Donetsk Regional Court on 6 April 2001. In particular, witnesses B. and Bo. had not been questioned and an additional forensic medical examination had not been conducted. 34.  From 7 to 26 December 2001 the applicant underwent further treatment at the Azov Central Basin Hospital. He was diagnosed with a recurrent and persistent haematuria. 35.  On 12 July 2002 a forensic medical examination found that at the material time the applicant presented with light bodily injuries: bruises all over the right side of his chest and back, on the right hip and on the left shoulder, small scratches on his wrists and puffiness in the area of the sixth and seventh ribs. The report stated that such injuries could have been inflicted during the applicant’s arrest in the circumstances indicated by the policemen or in the circumstances described by the applicant. It was also stated that the laboratory findings had failed to confirm the kidney contusion. However, the back contusion could have caused temporary (five to seven days) haematuria. In particular, the applicant had suffered a contusion on the lower part of his back, which could have led to a short‑term (five to seven days) kidney concussion. In the absence of the X‑ray images of the applicant’s ribs, it was also impossible to establish whether the applicant had suffered broken ribs. 36.  On 2 August 2002 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint against the policemen on account of a lack of corpus delicti. The prosecutor referred to the findings of the forensic medical examinations of 5 May 2000 and 12 July 2002. As to the two broken ribs, it was mentioned that on an unidentified date the applicant had been X-rayed at Mariupol Town Emergency Hospital and diagnosed with an old fracture of two ribs. Since the applicant had refused to explain the origin of this fracture, it was concluded that it had occurred before 18 April 2000. During the pre-trial investigation, S. had testified that he had hit the applicant three times on his head and body because the applicant had insulted his sister. The applicant had fallen on a metal fence. Later, the applicant had resisted the policemen, who had then used martial arts techniques and had handcuffed him. The applicant had broken free from the police but had fallen down. He had then been put into the car. The policemen, M., R. and P. confirmed these submissions. R. also testified that S. had hit the applicant whilst the policemen had been holding the applicant by the hands. While being put in the car, the applicant had also hit the car door. 37.  On 29 January 2003 the Voroshylovskyy District Court quashed the above decision and remitted the case materials to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for further investigation. The court referred to the previous court findings of 6 April 2001 and 29 October 2001 and underlined the investigator’s repeated failure to question witnesses B. and Bo. The court also pointed out the contradictions in the policemen’s statements as regards the circumstances of the use of force against the applicant and the blows inflicted by S. In particular, the court indicated the absence of any injuries on the applicant’s head, whereas S. had submitted that he had hit the applicant on the head three times. 38.  On 24 March 2003 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen and S., repeating the same arguments as in its previous decisions. In addition, S. and F. submitted that when police officer R. had showed the applicant his police card, the applicant had knocked it out of his hands, rushed to S. and gripped his throat, whereupon S. had hit the applicant several times. Therefore, the use of force by the police and S. had been justified. 39.  On 23 June 2003 the Voroshylovskyy District Court quashed the above decision and remitted the case materials to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for further investigation. The court reiterated its findings from the decision of 29 January 2003 and indicated that the prosecutor had failed to verify whether the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted on him in the circumstances indicated by the applicant – that is to say, in the police station. 40.  Between 20 May 2004 and 27 July 2005 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen on three further occasions, until on the last-mentioned date criminal proceedings for abuse of authority were finally instituted against the policemen of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime. 41.  However, on 20 December 2005 the proceedings against the officers were terminated on account of the lack of evidence of a crime. 42.  On 15 March 2006 the above decision was quashed by the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The Regional Prosecutor’s Office determined that the applicant should be given victim status, should be questioned and that it should be decided whether a further forensic medical examination was necessary. 43.  On 10 July 2006 the applicant was given victim status and questioned on the next day. 44.  On 19 July 2006 the senior investigation officer of the Mariupol Prosecutor’s Office terminated the proceedings in the case for the absence of evidence of a crime. 45.  On 19 October 2006 the Zhovtnevyy District Court quashed the above decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. The court expressly noted that police officer P. should be questioned, that the applicant’s lawyer should be allowed to participate in the case and that the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies should be clarified. 46.  On 6 December 2006 the Mariupol Prosecutor’s Office (прокуратура м. Маріуполя) again terminated the proceedings in the case for the absence of evidence of a crime. 47.  On 15 January 2007 the prosecutor of Mariupol quashed the above decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. 48.  Following the prosecutor’s remittal, some additional investigatory actions were held. Officer P. was questioned again. He testified that he had seen the applicant lying on the floor in police officer R.’s office. R. had not allowed P. to enter the office, so he had not seen exactly what was happening in there. Face-to-face confrontations had taken place between Sh. and V. and the police officers (Sh. and V. are the applicant’s alleged acquaintances who had testified during the investigation of the criminal case against the applicant that they had witnessed the applicant’s apprehension by the police but that they had not seen that any force had been used on him). As a result it was concluded that “V.’s testimonies had been rebutted”. It had been impossible to check similar testimonies made by Shi., another witness of the applicant’s arrest, because her whereabouts were unknown. The applicant’s mother and the applicant’s neighbour Zh., who had allegedly been questioned earlier in the investigation, stated that the applicant had had no injuries before 17 April 2000. 49.  On 9 April 2007 the Mariupol Prosecutor’s Office terminated the proceedings in the case for the absence of evidence of a crime. The prosecutor referred to previous decisions in the case, the testimonies of the applicant, police officers and witnesses, and to the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations of 5 May 2000 and 12 July 2002. It was determined that during his arrest the applicant had resisted the police officers. The police officers testified that the applicant had hit them and had tried to escape so they had used force on him and had “literally dragged him to a minibus”. Since the applicant had also offended F., her brother S. had several times hit the applicant, causing him to fall on the metal fence. 50.  On 6 May 2008 the Zhovtnevyy District Court at Mariupol upheld the above decision. The court noted the contradictory evidence given by those who had been involved or witnessed the events in question, but concluded that the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted on him by S. and by the police officers when he had resisted his arrest. 51.  On 2 June 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal referred to the findings of the Zhovtnevyy District Court and upheld its decision. 52.  On 17 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 53.  On 30 August 2004 the Zhovtnevyy District Court found in part for the applicant and awarded him 8,170.80 hryvnias (UAH) in respect of pecuniary damage, UAH 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 1,260 in costs and expenses to be paid by the State. The above damage had resulted from the seizure of his personal belongings such as keys and money during his arrest on 18 April 2000. 54.  On 2 November 2005 the Zhovtnevyy District Court again found in part for the applicant and awarded him UAH 2,676.03 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, together with costs and expenses, in connection with the unlawful seizure of two cameras in the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 55.  According to the applicant, these decisions were enforced in full.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Split. He is a pensioner. 5.  The applicant submitted that his pension had been regularly adjusted in line with the increase in wages according to section 30 of the 1991 Pension Insurance Act (Zakon o osnovnim pravima iz mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, Official Gazette no. 53/1991 of 8 October 1991). 6.  On 19 February 1997 the Act on Adjustment of Pensions and Other Benefits from Pension and Invalidity Insurance Funds and on Management of the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Funds (Zakon o usklađivanju mirovina i drugih novčanih primanja iz mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, te upravljanju fondovima mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, Official Gazette no. 20/1997 of 19 February 1997 – “the Pension Adjustment Act”) entered into force, derogating, inter alia, section 30 of the 1991 Pension Insurance Act. Section 3 of the new law provided that the pensions were to be adjusted in line with the increase in living expenses. 7.  On 12 May 1998 the Constitutional Court quashed certain provisions, including section 3, of the aforementioned 1997 legislation as unconstitutional. The Government submitted that, as a result thereof, 427,809 applications had been filed with the Croatian Pension Fund’s regional offices by those seeking adjustment of their pensions in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s decision, that is, in line with the increase in wages. 8.  On 23 June 1998 the applicant applied to the Croatian Pension Fund, Split Office seeking adjustment of his pension for the period between August 1993 and June 1998. 9.  Since the Split Office did not render a decision within the statutory time-limit of two months, on 25 August 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal for failure to respond (see paragraph 25 below) with the Croatian Pension Fund, Central Office as if his request had been denied. 10.  Given that the Central Office also failed to decide on this appeal within the statutory time-limit of two months, on 5 November 1998 the applicant brought an action for failure to respond (see paragraph 26 below) with the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) under the Administrative Disputes Act. 11.  On 8 December 2000 the Pensions Increase Act (Zakon o povećanju mirovina radi otklanjanja razlika u razini mirovina ostvarenih u različitim razdobljima, Official Gazette no. 127/2000 of 20 December 2000) entered into force. Stating as its aim the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the Act increased the pensions of those retired before 31 December 1998. On 19 December 2001 the Constitutional Court refused to institute proceedings for abstract constitutional review of the Act. 12.  On 28 December 2001 the Administrative Court adopted a judgment ordering the Central Office to decide on the applicant’s appeal within 60 days. It also instructed the Central Office to adjust the applicant’s pension for the period between January 1997 and June 1998 in line with the increase in wages, pursuant to the section 30 of the 1991 Pension Insurance Act, but also taking into consideration the increase already provided by the Pensions Increase Act. 13.  On 5 March 2002 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint challenging the Administrative Court’s judgment and complaining about the length of the proceedings. He argued that the court had instructed the Central Office wrongfully. He also alleged that the Croatian Pension Fund and the Administrative Court had failed to decide on his case within a reasonable time. 14.  On 4 July 2002 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible. In respect of the Administrative Court’s judgment, it found the complaint premature since the administrative proceedings were still pending. In respect of the length of the proceedings, it held that the applicant had lodged the constitutional complaint when the case had already been decided; however that remedy could only be used while the proceedings before the Administrative Court were still pending. 15.  Meanwhile, following the judgment of the Administrative Court of 28 December 2001, on 2 April 2002 the Central Office ordered the Split Office to issue a decision in the applicant’s case. 16.  On 23 July 2002 the Split Office dismissed the applicant’s request. It held that it was not possible to adjust the applicant’s pension for the period and in the manner indicated by the Administrative Court since no subordinate legislation had been adopted enabling the Fund to calculate the exact amount of the applicant’s pension for that period in line with increase of wages. In any event, the applicant’s pension had been increased by the Pensions Increase Act, which had fully implemented the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 May 1998. The applicant appealed. 17.  On 21 October 2002 the Central Office dismissed the appeal. 18.  On 29 November 2002 the applicant brought an action with the Administrative Court challenging the decision of the Central Office. 19.  On 5 August 2004 the Act on the Implementation of the Constitutional Court’s Decision of 12 May 1998 (Zakon o provođenju odluke Ustavnog suda od 12. svibnja 1998., Official Gazette no. 105/2004 of 28 July 2004 – “the Implementation Act”) entered into force. Section 2 provides that retired persons whose pensions were reduced in the period between 1 September 1993 and 31 December 1998 (“the pensioners”) have a right to compensation calculated as a difference between the pension to which they had been entitled and the pension actually received during that period, taking into account the increases provided by the Pensions Increase Act. The compensation was to be obtained through a special fund that was to be established by subsequent legislation. 20.  On 29 July 2005 the Pensioners Fund Act (Zakon o umirovljeničkom fondu, Official Gazette no. 93/2005 of 29 July 2005) entered into force. The Act provides that each pensioner has a right to a share in the Fund depending on the amount of compensation he or she is entitled to. In particular, section 41(1) provides that pensioners, who had already been compensated on the basis of a final and enforceable court decision, are not entitled to compensation from the Pensioners Fund. Section 41(2) provides that pensioners involved in pending administrative proceedings, instituted with a view to obtaining compensation (adjustment of their pensions), shall obtain that compensation pursuant to the Pensioners Fund Act. 21.  On 29 December 2005 the Administrative Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. It found that the applicant actually retired under a special statute regulating the pensions of military personnel and that therefore the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 May 1998 had not mandated the increase of his pension. This had been confirmed by the subsequent legislation (see paragraphs 11, 19 and 20 above) implementing that decision. In any event, the legal gap that had followed the decision of the Constitutional Court had been overcome by that legislation. Therefore, the applicant’s claim for the adjustment of his pension would have already been satisfied by increases provided therein. The judgment was served on the applicant on 26 January 2006. 22.  On 17 February 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court against that judgment. The proceedings are currently pending before that court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in the town of Blagoveshchensk, Amur Region. 5.  On 30 November 1998 the Amur regional police stopped a car. During an inspection of the car, the police discovered a large quantity of aviation fuel. As the driver was unable to produce a certificate for the fuel he was transporting, the police (officer S) seized 22,622 litres of fuel. The police entrusted it for safe keeping to a Belogorsk technical college and later to military unit no. 62266. 6.  As the fuel allegedly belonged to a private company OPIUMIK (the “company”), officer S required the company director, Mr P, to produce a document confirming that the fuel had been acquired lawfully. Mr P submitted an invoice dated 1 August 1998. Criminal proceedings were, however, instituted against Mr P on suspicion of forgery of this invoice. The Belogorsk town prosecutor subsequently discontinued the proceedings on the ground that only the forgery of official documents was punishable under the Criminal Code. No decision was taken regarding the fate of the fuel. 7.  As can be seen from the domestic courts’ findings (see paragraph 15 below), in the meantime, officer S decided not to institute any criminal proceedings in relation to the seized fuel. However, on 2 February 1999 the Belogorsk deputy prosecutor set aside this decision and ordered an additional inquiry. There is no indication that this inquiry led to any prosecution or that any decision was taken in relation to the seized fuel. 8.  The company thus attempted to regain possession of its fuel. By a letter of 17 May 1999 the Belogorsk deputy prosecutor informed the company that the fuel had not been attached to the criminal case file against Mr P as evidence and thus no decision had to be taken. He invited Mr P to collect the fuel through the police department. On an unspecified date, however, the company learnt from the Amur police department that the fuel had been stolen when it had been stored in the military unit. 9.  Meanwhile, the national authorities endeavoured to identify the officials responsible for the loss of the fuel. Criminal proceedings were instituted against officer S for abuse of power, as well as against the commander of the military unit and officer St, who had allegedly misappropriated the fuel in the military unit. On 18 December 1999 the Belogorsk town military prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against officer St and the head of the military unit because there was no indication of a criminal offence. On 8 April 2000 the proceedings against officer S were discontinued because his participation in the disappearance of the fuel had not been proven. 10.  It does not appear that any criminal or other investigation continued thereafter in relation to the seized but missing fuel. No further claim was lodged in respect of it by the company or any other person or legal entity. Nor does it appear that the company made any attempts to obtain compensation after 17 May 1999 (cf. paragraph 8 above). Instead, the company chose to assign the related claims to the applicant (see below). 11.  On 26 October 2001 the company transferred title to the seized fuel to the applicant. On 25 November 2001 the parties amended the assignment agreement, indicating that the assignment included a claim in respect of any damage or loss caused by the authorities on account of the seizure of the fuel, as well as a claim for compensation in respect of unjustified enrichment on the same account and a claim for return of the fuel. The amended agreement also stated that the signing of that agreement “annulled the company’s debt of 50,000 Russian roubles under a contract dated 20 October 2000”. 12.  The company informed the regional police department of the transfer of title. Since 27 October 2001 the applicant has unsuccessfully requested the police department to return the fuel. 13.  In November 2001 the applicant sued the Amur Regional Treasury, claiming compensation for the damage incurred as a result of the seizure and loss of the fuel. The Commercial Court of the Amur Region designated the Ministry of the Interior as the proper respondent, with the applicant’s consent. The court also gave the regional police department, the military unit and the company leave to intervene as third parties in the proceedings. 14.  By judgment of 14 March 2002 the Commercial Court of the Amur Region dismissed the applicant’s action. The court held as follows:\n“Under an assignment agreement of 26 October 2001 the OPIUMIK company transferred all its rights to the fuel to [the applicant]...The assignment did not contravene Articles 158, 388 and 389 of the Civil Code... The fuel had been seized in relation to the accusation of forgery against Mr P...\n[T]he criminal prosecution against officer S was discontinued ...The fuel was misappropriated by officer St, against whom proceedings were discontinued on 18 December 1999...\n[T]he responsibility of an officer of the Ministry of the Interior for unlawful seizure of the company’s fuel must be established by a final judgment in a criminal case. The commercial court, under Article 22 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure, does not have the right to assess the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the actions (failure to act) of the investigating authorities and the prosecutor’s office.\nThe plaintiff did not submit any evidence showing that the seizure of the fuel by the officer of the Amur regional police department had been declared unlawful by a court and that [the officer] was responsible for the loss of the fuel.\nThe action must be dismissed because there was no fault on the part of the person who allegedly caused the damage.” 15.  The applicant appealed contending that the absence of a criminal conviction in respect of the officer had been irrelevant and that the respondent and the military unit had entered into a contract for storage of the fuel seized from the company. On 15 April 2002 the Appellate Division of the Commercial Court of the Amur Region upheld the judgment of 14 March 2002. The court stated inter alia as follows:\n“Officer S acted lawfully when he inspected and seized the fuel...Having verified whether the fuel had been lawfully acquired, officer S decided not to bring criminal proceedings; on 2 February 1999 the Belogorsk deputy prosecutor set aside this decision and ordered an additional inquiry...\nOfficer S’s failure to observe the procedure for inspection and transfer of the fuel for safe-keeping purposes has no direct causal link with the loss of the fuel...”\nLastly, the appeal court made the following observations in relation to the military unit:\n“Military unit no. 62266 received the seized fuel for storage ... in accordance with Article 84 § 2 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Article 906 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation the military unit became civilly liable vis-à-vis the plaintiff for the safe keeping of the fuel. Under Article 902 § 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, in the event of the loss of the fuel [the military unit] had to compensate the plaintiff for the resulting damage, unless otherwise provided by the law.”\nThe appeal judgment became final on the same date. 16.  On 11 June 2002 the Commercial Court of the Far Eastern Circuit, sitting as a cassation-instance court, upheld the judgments of 14 March and 15 April 2002. The court noted that the seizure of the fuel had been due to the absence, at the time, of any document confirming the company’s title to it. The court held that the plaintiff had not proved that the investigator had been responsible for the damage caused. 17.  In the meantime, on 29 April 2002 the applicant brought proceedings in the Blagoveshchensk Town Court of the Amur Region against, inter alia, the military unit. He claimed that the authorities’ failure to return the fuel or to pay compensation be declared unlawful. 18.  By a judgment of 12 November 2003 the Town Court rejected the applicant’s claim. The court held that the fuel seizure had been carried out by officer S before any criminal proceedings had been initiated because of the need to conduct urgent investigative measures, namely a crime-scene inspection, in compliance with the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 26 below). The Town Court also held as follows:\n“As established in the judgment of the commercial court, during the seizure of the fuel the OPIUMIK company had not supplied any document to confirm the lawfulness of its acquisition. Later Mr P submitted a forged invoice, which gave rise to criminal proceedings against him. An agreement dated 2 November 1998 between the OPIUMIK company and a Mr G for the purchase of 22,622 litres of fuel was produced before this court. It cannot be accepted as a proof of the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition because the content of that agreement does not correspond to the materials in the criminal case which had been discontinued. Nor does it correspond to Mr P’s deposition in the criminal proceedings, to the invoice or the expert report no. 141-k of 17 February 1999 which stated that the handwritten inscriptions in invoice no. 983 of 1 August 1998 had been done by Mr P. The Court rejects as unfounded Mr P’s allegation that the documents in the criminal file and his deposition had been obtained under duress. Besides, the Court considers that Mr P’s and [the applicant’s] arguments are intended to challenge the circumstances already determined by the final judgment of the commercial court, in particular as regards the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition by the company...The Court concludes that no evidence has been adduced to confirm [it]. The Court does not accept [the applicant’s] argument that the commercial court had confirmed the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition; such matter had not been contested before the commercial court...\nThe grounds for compensation in respect of damage caused by the investigating authorities, including a claim for restitution of the fuel, are regulated by Articles 1069 and 1070 of the Civil Code. Those grounds were also examined by the commercial courts and cannot be subject to a re-examination in the present case. No legal relationship (обязательственные отношения) was established between [the applicant] on the one hand and the military unit, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of the Interior on the other. Hence, his claims ... should be rejected.”\nLastly, the court found that the applicant had missed the statutory time-limit under Article 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure for bringing the matter before the courts of general jurisdiction. 19.  On 9 January 2004 the Amur Regional Court upheld the judgment. The court considered that the commercial court’s judgment of 14 March 2002 had dismissed the applicant’s claims, inter alia, due to his failure to produce evidence confirming the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition. Neither was the civil court provided with any proof that the company had had title to the fuel. 20.  A commercial court issued a private company with an enforcement order for a sum of money against a State-owned enterprise. The company did not submit the writ within the statutory time-limit and bailiffs refused to enforce the judgment. The company assigned the claim to the applicant, who then requested the commercial court to designate him as creditor in respect of the above judicial award and to restore the time-limit for lodging the enforcement order. In 2002 the commercial court rejected both requests. The applicant did not appeal. 21.  The applicant also requested a court of general jurisdiction to designate him as creditor in respect of the assigned award and to award him compensation for the damage sustained. On 26 February 2003 the Primorye Regional Court, at final instance, disallowed the first claim because it had already been determined on 24 October 2002 by the final decision of the commercial court. On 12 March 2003 the Regional Court, at final instance, dismissed the claim for damages on the ground that the applicant’s title had never been confirmed by a court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland. 6.  In 2006 a solicitor in Northern Ireland was arrested and charged with a number of offences, including inciting paramilitaries to murder and perverting the course of justice. The case arose out of the covert recording of his consultations with clients at Antrim police station. As a direct consequence of the criminal proceedings, solicitors in Northern Ireland became aware that their private consultations with detainees in police stations and prisons could be the subject of covert surveillance. Thereafter, solicitors attending detainees in police stations and prisons began to seek assurances from the police that their consultations would not be the subject of such surveillance. 7.  When the police refused to give assurances, judicial review proceedings were initiated on the basis that there had been a breach of the common law right to legal and professional privilege, the statutory right to a private consultation with a lawyer, and Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. 8.  In the case of Re C & Others [2007] NIQB 101A the Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland found that, despite the express statutory right to private consultations, the covert surveillance of lawyer-client consultations was permitted by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”). However, RIPA provided for two principal surveillance schemes: intrusive surveillance and directed surveillance. At the time of the hearing, covert surveillance of legal consultations was being treated as directed surveillance, which was the least restrictive of the two schemes. The Divisional Court held that the fundamental right of a detained person to consult a legal adviser privately necessitated an enhanced authorisation scheme and that protections afforded by the directed as opposed to the intrusive surveillance scheme offered insufficient protection. If the surveillance of consultations between legal advisers and clients in police custody was to be lawful for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention, the safeguards for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance had to apply. 9.  The applicants in these judicial review proceedings appealed against the court’s ruling that the surveillance was permitted by the domestic legislation. The appeal went to the House of Lords, where it was referred to as Re McE (Northern Ireland) [2009] UKHL 15. The House of Lords agreed with the Divisional Court that although the provisions of RIPA could override, inter alia, legal professional privilege, the higher level of authority necessary for an intrusive surveillance warrant was required rather than the directed surveillance warrants that had, until then, been issued. 10.  As the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) had not appealed against the Divisional Court’s ruling that the use of the directed surveillance scheme had breached Article 8 of the Convention, the House of Lords criticised the Secretary of State for not having taken any steps to ensure that covert surveillance of legal consultations was not treated as directed surveillance. 11.  Following the decision of the House of Lords in Re McE the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) Order 2010 (“the 2010 Order”) was adopted and on 6 April 2010 a revised Covert Surveillance Code of Practice (“the Revised Code”) came into effect. Pursuant to the 2010 Order, directed surveillance of consultations between a detainee and his or her professional legal adviser, representative or medical practitioner in connection with legal proceedings was to be treated, for the purposes of RIPA, as intrusive surveillance. 12.  On 15 March 2009 the applicant was arrested in connection with the murder of a Police Constable believed to have been killed by dissident Republicans. 13.  When first arrested the applicant was assessed by the Forensic Medical Officer as a “vulnerable person” within the meaning of the Terrorism Act Code of Practice. Pursuant to paragraph 11.9 of that Code of Practice, he could not be interviewed, save in exceptional circumstances, in the absence of an “appropriate adult”. In the case of a person who was mentally vulnerable, an appropriate adult could be a relative or guardian, or a person experienced in dealing with mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable people. However, prior to being seen by either a solicitor or an appropriate adult, the applicant asked to speak to the officers in charge of the investigation “off the record”. He was interviewed by police officers in the absence of a solicitor or an appropriate adult and during the course of that interview he gave information which led to the recovery of the gun used in the Constable’s murder. 14.  The applicant was detained in custody for twelve days. During this time he was twice seen by a Consultant Psychiatrist and on each occasion he was assessed as being vulnerable and requiring the presence of an appropriate adult. Also during this time his solicitor obtained an assurance from the PSNI that his consultations with the applicant would not be subject to covert surveillance. 15.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant was charged with withholding information about the Constable’s murder. 16.  Following the charge the applicant was detained in custody on the ground that if released he would be at risk of harm from dissident Republicans. 17.  The applicant was released on bail on 8 June 2009. He was arrested and questioned on a further occasion in October 2009 but was subsequently released without charge. 18.  On 4 May 2010 the applicant was arrested for a third time in connection with the Constable’s murder. Following his arrest his solicitor again sought an assurance from the PSNI that his consultations would not be subjected to covert surveillance. The PSNI informed him that\n“[they could] neither confirm nor deny whether any form of covert surveillance has been conducted in any instance. Covert surveillance is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, related statutory instruments and the Revised [Covert Surveillance] Code of Practice”. 19. The applicant sought permission to apply for judicial review of the PSNI’s refusal to give an undertaking that his consultations with his solicitor would not be subjected to covert surveillance. In particular, he alleged that the grounds upon which the authorisation of such surveillance would be appropriate were not sufficiently clearly defined and that the guidance concerning the securing and destruction of legally privileged confidential information was not sufficiently clear or precise. 20.  On 6 May 2010 he was granted permission to apply for judicial review. In granting permission, the court directed that any subsequent consultations with his solicitor and his medical adviser should not be subject to covert surveillance. 21.  On 7 May 2010 the applicant had his first consultation with a Consultant Psychiatrist. 22.  The applicant was released without charge on 8 May 2010. 23.  The charge of withholding evidence appears to have concluded without trial. 24.  The hearing of the judicial review application took place before a Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland on 28 June 2010. On 21 September 2010 the Divisional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. 25.  In dismissing the claim, the court relied on Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, 18 May 2010, which found that the regime under Part I of RIPA was compatible with Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. Although it noted that Kennedy was concerned only with Part I of RIPA, the court considered that the reasoning expressed was “very relevant in view of the parallels between Part I and Part II of the surveillance legal regimes”. 26.  The court found, in particular, that reading RIPA, the 2010 Order and the Revised Code together it was clear that a surveillance operation could only properly be justified if it was a truly proportionate response to a real risk posed by the individual who was the subject of the surveillance, and if the potential usefulness of the surveillance was demonstrably shown. As the Court had indicated in Kennedy, the requirement of foreseeability did not require an exhaustive definition of all conduct that might justify a decision on, for example, national security grounds, and similar reasoning applied in the present case. Consequently, the court held that the wording in the Revised Code was sufficiently clear. 27.  With regard to the applicant’s second allegation, the court accepted that the statutory provisions under Part I of RIPA, which had been considered by the Court in Kennedy, were more detailed, prescriptive and precise than those in Part II. However, taking together the 2010 Order, the Revised Code and the PSNI Service Procedure Implementing Code, the arrangements in place for the use, retention and destruction of retained material in the context of legal consultations was compliant with the Article 8 rights of persons in custody. Moreover, as the Revised Code made it clear that material subject to legal professional privilege was not admissible in court and should be safeguarded by the taking of steps to ensure that it did not prejudice any criminal or civil proceedings, a breach of Article 6 of the Convention would not occur. While there was a risk of a potential “chill factor” (insofar as clients might be less than frank with their solicitors if they were concerned that they were under covert surveillance), the court considered that the revised Code was sufficiently detailed and precise to reassure those in custody that, save in exceptional circumstances, their consultations with lawyers would be in private. 28.  Finally, the court observed that the special considerations which applied to consultations with lawyers or doctors did not apply in the case of meetings with an appropriate adult. It therefore followed that surveillance of such meetings could be authorised as directed surveillance rather than intrusive surveillance. 29.  On 9 November 2010 the Divisional Court heard an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave to appeal was refused although the court certified four questions of law of general public importance. These were as follows:\n“a. Do the current arrangements for authorisation of covert surveillance of consultations between a detained person and (i) his/her solicitor (ii) his/her medical practitioner and/or (iii) an appropriate adult violate Article 6 ECHR in as much as they permit the covert surveillance of legally privileged consultations and the retention of material deriving from legally privileged consultations?\nb. Do the current arrangements for authorisation of covert surveillance of consultations between a detained person and (i) his/her solicitor (ii) his/her medical practitioner and/or (iii) an appropriate adult violate Article 8 ECHR as a result of:-\n(i) a lack of precision and clarity in the guidance governing the authorisation of such surveillance; and/or\n(ii) inadequate guidance as to how and when legally privileged material obtained from such surveillance should be handled, stored, used and destroyed.\nc. Is the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s Service Procedure “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR?\nd. Do the current arrangements for authorisation of covert surveillance of consultations between a detained person and an appropriate adult violate Article 8 ECHR because such surveillance can be authorised as directed rather than intrusive surveillance?” 30.  An application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the Supreme Court on 11 April 2011.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, Mr Vladimir Parnov, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1986 and lives in Chişinău. At the time of the events he worked as a security guard in a café in Chişinău. 7.  According to the applicant, on 22 March 2005, he was approached by four individuals while walking along a street. They offered him a package, the content of which was unknown. At that moment two plain-clothed persons shouted: “Police, don't move”. All the persons started to run, including the applicant. According to the applicant, he was not convinced that the person running after him was a police officer. After being chased for approximately seven hundred metres, the applicant stumbled not far from his house and was arrested by the chasing police officer. The applicant was wrestled to the ground and a pistol with tear gas, which he possessed by virtue of his job, was removed from its holster. The police officer beat him up and then called other police officers to the scene. Later, several passers-by and the applicant's brother-in-law approached the scene, stopped the police officer from beating the applicant and forced him to let the applicant go. The applicant and his brother-in-law were handcuffed and taken to the police station. The former was arrested on charges of aiding the latter to resist arrest. 8.  The applicant submitted that he was ill-treated in the car on the way to the police station and at the police station by several police officers. In particular, he was punched and kicked all over and hit on his head and other parts of his body with a plastic bottle full of water. His head was banged against walls, the floor and furniture. 9.  According to the Government, during the chase the applicant shot at the chasing police officer from his pistol and then resisted arrest. The Government contested the applicant's allegations about any ill-treatment after the arrest and submitted that all of his injuries were a result of his resisting arrest. 10.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant was taken to a court and charged with the administrative offence of resisting arrest. He confessed during proceedings to having fired at the police officer from his tear-gas pistol. On the same date he was found guilty of firing from a tear-gas pistol at a police officer during the chase and sentenced to five days' imprisonment. The next day the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's appeal and changed the sentence to a fine of 180 Moldovan lei (MDL). 11.  On 23 March 2005 the police officer who had arrested the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant complaining that he had shot at him with a tear-gas pistol. On the same date he underwent a forensic examination which showed that he had scratches and bruises on his knees, the palms of his hands and elbows. The injuries were qualified as “light injuries” needing between six and twenty-one days of medical care. The criminal complaint was finally dismissed on 20 May 2005 on the grounds that the applicant had already been convicted for the same offence in the administrative proceedings which ended with the judgment of the Chişinău Court of Appeal of 23 March 2005. 12.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant was visited in custody by a prosecutor. He complained that he had suffered ill-treatment by the police officers and the prosecutor ordered a forensic examination of the applicant's injuries. That examination was carried out on 31 March 2005. In the meantime the applicant was released from custody on 24 March 2005 and was seen by doctors who diagnosed him with a fractured cranial bone, first-degree concussion, post-traumatic acute otitis media of the right ear with perforation, and contusion of the soft tissue of the head and face. On 30 March 2005 the applicant underwent surgery in order to repair the torn tympanic membrane (eardrum). 13.  On 31 March 2005 the applicant was examined by a forensic doctor who found that he had suffered a perforation of the right eardrum and a first-degree head injury. The doctor concluded that the injuries had been caused by contact with a blunt object of a limited surface area, possibly in the circumstances described by the applicant, and that they qualified as “light injuries” which needed between six and twenty-one days of medical care. 14.  On 19 May 2005 the Rascani Prosecutor's Office dismissed the applicant's complaint of ill-treatment. The grounds for dismissing the complaint were the statements of the accused police officers, according to which the applicant had resisted arrest and shot at one of them from a tear-gas pistol. According to the police officers they were obliged to apply force in order to arrest and restrain the applicant and all of his injuries were a result of that. The applicant submitted that he had been ill-treated at the moment of the arrest, in the car and at the police station. He also denied that he had fought the police officers and fired at them from his gun. He submitted that his confession that he had fired at a police officer in the administrative proceedings had been made under duress. The Prosecutor's Office heard testimonies from several witnesses who had seen the applicant being restrained on the ground by a police officer and later being released after several persons had intervened. Some witnesses said that they had heard a gun shot. Only one of them stated that they had seen the applicant shooting at the police officer. Nobody had seen the applicant fighting the arresting police officer. 15.  The applicant challenged the above decision before an investigating judge. He contested the findings of the Prosecutor's Office and reiterated his complaints about the ill-treatment at the hands of the police. However, on 18 April 2006, following a public hearing, an investigating judge from the Râşcani District Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded. 16.  On 8 February 2007 the Râşcani District Court acquitted the applicant in the main criminal proceedings against him concerning the possession and sale of marijuana. The court dismissed, inter alia, the accusations concerning the applicant's shooting at the arresting police officer with a pistol on the grounds of inconsistency in the statements of the witnesses concerning that event. It also considered that there was no evidence that the package of marijuana had belonged to the applicant and that he had intended to sell it.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently imprisoned in the city of Zhytomyr, Ukraine. 6.  On 27 January 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murdering a taxi driver, M., and of several other crimes committed in 2001 (“the 2001 crimes”) and was placed in a cell at the Kyiv Kharkivsky District Police Department. 7.  The same day the applicant requested Mr O. Kh. as his lawyer in the case. This was allowed and the lawyer attended the initial questioning of the applicant. 8.  On 28 January 2001 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer by Mr G., an investigating prosecutor at the Kyiv Kharkivsky District Prosecutor’s Office (“the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office”). 9.  On 1 February 2001 Mr M., a police officer at the Kyiv Kharkivsky District Police Department (“the police department”), who was in charge of investigating the death of a taxi driver, Kh., in the summer of 1998, questioned the applicant with a view to establishing his possible involvement in that crime. The crime was classified as infliction of grievous bodily harm causing death, for which legal representation of a suspect was not obligatory. The applicant signed a waiver of his right to counsel. The applicant was then questioned and confessed that he and Mr S. had murdered Kh. in the summer of 1998 (“the 1998 crime”). On the same day that criminal case was transferred to the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office on the ground that the applicant’s actions could be classified as murder and the investigation of such a crime was within the competence of the prosecutor’s office. 10.  On 2 February 2001 the criminal cases in respect of the 1998 and 2001 crimes were joined. 11.  On the same day, the applicant participated in a videotaped on-site reconstruction of the 2001 crimes. According to the minutes of this investigative action, which was attended by the applicant, his lawyer, two attesting witnesses, investigating prosecutor G. and police officer M., who had questioned the applicant on the previous day, the applicant made statements concerning the circumstances of the 2001 crimes, but denied his involvement in the 1998 crime. 12.  On 2 February 2001, after the reconstruction had been conducted, the applicant signed a waiver in respect of his counsel, O. Kh., on the ground that the latter had prevented him from confessing to the 1998 crime. According to the applicant, while the waiver bore the date of 2 February 2001 it had actually been signed on a later date under coercion from the police officers and the case investigator. 13.  Following the reconstruction of 2 February 2001, the applicant’s lawyer, O. Kh., sought a meeting with the applicant. However, his oral requests, as well as written requests of 6 and 7 February, were rejected by investigating prosecutor G. 14.  On 7 February 2001 the applicant, who was represented by a newly‑appointed counsel, K., participated in a videotaped on-site reconstruction of the 1998 crime and confessed that he had committed it with Mr S. 15.  On 8 February 2001 the lawyer O. Kh. complained to prosecutor V. that investigating prosecutor G. had not replied to his request for a medical examination of the applicant, would not permit him to visit the applicant and had tried to force the applicant to request replacement of his lawyer. 16.  On 9 February 2001 O. Kh. was informed that he had been removed from the case and was furnished with the investigator’s decision to that effect dated 2 February 2001. The decision stated, inter alia, that the applicant had confessed to the 1998 crime but had later asserted his innocence on the advice of O. Kh. The investigator had therefore decided to remove O. Kh. from the case on the basis of Articles 61 and 130 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17.  On 9 February 2001 the applicant, who was represented by yet another lawyer, M., was officially charged with the 1998 and 2001 crimes, served with the indictment and questioned as an accused. 18.  By letter of 10 February 2001, prosecutor V. informed the lawyer O. Kh. that his requests of 2, 6 and 7 February could not be met since he had been removed from the applicant’s case. 19.  In a complaint lodged on 12 February 2001 (see paragraph 36 below), the applicant’s wife raised the issue, inter alia, of the allegedly unlawful removal of O. Kh. from the case against her husband. 20.  On 14 February O. Kh. complained to prosecutor V. about the decision to remove him from the case, and asked him to quash that decision. In his reply of 19 February 2001, prosecutor V. informed O. Kh. that his removal from the case had been well-founded and was in accordance with Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further noted that the lawyer had breached professional ethics by advising his client to assert his innocence and retract part of his previous confession. 21.  In his letter of 4 March 2001 to the General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO) (see paragraph 39 below), the applicant complained that he had signed the waiver in respect of O. Kh. under pressure from the police officers and the case investigator. 22.  On 6 March 2001 O. Kh. complained to the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office about his removal. In its reply of 13 April 2001, the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office stated that the decision to remove the lawyer had been well-founded and that, moreover, the criminal case file contained the waiver in respect of the lawyer signed by the applicant. 23.  On 10 March 2001 the applicant submitted a request to investigating prosecutor G., asking that the lawyer M. be replaced by O. Kh., his first lawyer in the case, as his defence counsel. 24.  On 24 April 2001 the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office replied to the applicant’s letter of 4 March 2001. It informed the applicant that replacement of the lawyer had taken place at his request, that lawyer O. Kh. was allowed to return to the case and that they had found no violation of criminal procedural legislation in the investigation of the criminal case against the applicant. 25.  On 27 May 2001 the applicant asked investigating prosecutor G. to cross-examine him together with his co-accused S., since the accusations against him had been mainly based on statements made by Mr S. 26.  On 1 June 2001 investigating prosecutor G. replied that the cross‑examination would be conducted after additional questioning of S., in case any discrepancies emerged between the testimonies of the applicant and Mr S. 27.  On 8 June 2001 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his first lawyer O. Kh. He confirmed all the statements with regard to the 2001 crimes which he had made during the interview on 27 January 2001. He also repeatedly claimed that he was innocent of the 1998 crime and explained that he had been forced to confess to the latter crime by officers from the police department. 28.  On 24 June 2001 investigating prosecutor G. informed the applicant that his request for cross-examination had been rejected, since no discrepancies had been found between the statements of the applicant and S. 29.  On the same date investigating prosecutor G. issued a new indictment, which was served on the applicant on the following day. 30.  On 20 November 2001 the Kyiv Appellate Court, acting as a first‑instance court, convicted the applicant and S. of the 1998 and 2001 crimes and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Three other individuals were sentenced to between three and six years’ imprisonment. The court did not mention the fact of the lawyer’s removal from the case in its judgment. The court also disregarded the denials by the applicant and S. of their involvement in the 1998 crime on the ground that their confessions during pre-trial investigation were detailed and consistent. 31.  On 18 April 2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the judgment of the appellate court. In reply to the applicant’s complaint about a violation of his right to a defence, the Supreme Court in its judgment of 18 April 2002 stated that it found no evidence of a violation of the right to a defence or of any other serious violation of criminal procedural law that could provide a basis for quashing the judgment of the appellate court. 32.  On arrival at the Kharkivsky police station (according to the Government, on 30 January 2001) the applicant was examined by a paramedic who found him to be in good health. 33.  According to the applicant, on 1 February 2001 he was beaten with truncheons on wrists and shoulders by officers from the police department, who forced him to sign a waiver of his right to counsel and to confess to the 1998 crime, which he had not committed and about which he knew nothing. 34.  On 2 February 2001 the applicant informed his lawyer O. Kh. about the events of 1 February 2001. The lawyer advised the applicant to assert his innocence and to complain about the ill-treatment. The lawyer himself officially asked the authorities to conduct a medical examination of the applicant. This request was handed to the investigating prosecutor, G., who acknowledged its receipt by signing a copy of the request. On an unknown date prosecutor G. replied to O. Kh., stating that his request could not be granted since he had been removed from the case (see paragraph 16 above). 35.  At the end of the interview on 9 February 2001 (see paragraph 17 above) investigating prosecutor G. asked the applicant whether he had any bodily injuries; the applicant answered that at the moment he had none. 36.  On 12 February 2001 the applicant’s wife, Mrs S., complained to the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office (“the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office”) that investigating prosecutor G. of the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office and (unnamed) police officers of the police department had ill-treated the applicant in order to extract confessions with regard to the 1998 crime. She further wrote that, during the investigative action of 2 February 2001, the applicant had retracted his confession and that the lawyer O. Kh. had requested a medical examination of the applicant. In addition, she complained that investigating prosecutor G. had also been threatening her. On 14 February 2001 the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office transferred the request to the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office. 37.  Meanwhile, on 13 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to a pre‑trial detention centre. On arrival the applicant was examined by a doctor and was found to be in good health. The applicant made no complaints of ill-treatment. 38.  On 28 February 2001 the head of the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office, prosecutor V., issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the allegations that bodily harm had been inflicted on the applicant. The prosecutor noted that the applicant had denied any physical violence against him and that no evidence of unlawful actions by the police officers had been found. However, he did not refer to the applicant’s wife’s allegations concerning his subordinate, investigating prosecutor G. That decision was sent to Mrs S. on 2 March 2001 with a cover letter saying that the applicant had denied any violence towards him. 39.  On 4 March 2001 the applicant wrote a complaint to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. In his complaint the applicant stated that on 28 January 2001 police officers had forced him to confess to the 1998 crime, which he had not committed, and that on 2 February 2001 he had been forced to sign a waiver in respect of his lawyer O. Kh., and had been warned by investigating prosecutor G. and by the officers from the police department that he would have problems if he refused to cooperate. The applicant asked the GPO to ensure that his case was given objective consideration and to reinstate O. Kh. as his defence counsel. On 23 March 2001 the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office forwarded this complaint to the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office. On 26 March 2001 the complaint was transferred to investigating prosecutor G. for examination in the context of the investigation into the criminal case against the applicant. 40.  According to the Government, the applicant did not provide the names of the officers from the police department who had allegedly ill-treated him until he was questioned on 8 June 2001. 41.  On 21, 23 and 24 June 2001 investigating prosecutor G. questioned three police officers who had been named by the applicant. All three denied any coercion or other unlawful actions on their part. 42.  In its judgment of 20 November 2001, the Kyiv Court of Appeal stated that the applicant’s retraction of his confessions and his allegations of ill‑treatment had been examined and found to be groundless. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the applicant had not complained of ill-treatment during the investigation, that the first complaint about ill-treatment had been lodged by the applicant on 4 March 2001, more than two months after his arrest, and that the police officers and the investigating prosecutor had denied the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The court also noted that the applicant had been informed of his right to have a lawyer. 43.  The applicant raised the issue of coercion in his appeal to the Supreme Court. 44.  In its judgment of 18 April 2002 the Supreme Court stated that it found no evidence that the applicant had been ill-treated.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Užice. 6.  The applicant was employed by Raketa-Putnički Saobraćaj AD, a company based in Užice (hereinafter “the debtor”). 7.  On 15 June 2008 the applicant was dismissed from his employment. 8.  On unspecified dates the applicant instituted three separate sets of civil proceedings against the debtor, seeking payment of his salary arrears and various social security contributions. 9.  On 2 March 2007 the Užice Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him:\n(a)  salary arrears in the amount of 8,232 Serbian dinars (RSD) for June 2006, RSD 9,408 for July 2006, and RSD 8,232 for August 2006, plus statutory interest;\n(b)  RSD 900 for his legal costs; and\n(c)  the pension, disability, health and unemployment insurance contributions due for the period June to December 2006. 10.  On 22 September 2007 the judgment became final. 11.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment before the Požega Municipal Court. 12.  On 16 April 2008 the court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 13.  On 26 July 2007 the Užice Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him:\n(a)  salary arrears in the amount of RSD 8,800 for February 2007, RSD 9,680 for March 2007, RSD 9,240 for April 2007, and RSD 10,120 for May 2007, plus statutory interest;\n(b)  employee meal benefits (naknada za ishranu na radu) in the amount of RSD 4,385 for December 2006, RSD 4,385 for February 2007, RSD 4,385 for March 2007, and RSD 4,385 for April 2007, plus statutory interest;\n(c)  holiday pay (regres za godišnji odmor) in the amount of RSD 25,000 for 2006, plus statutory interest from 1 January 2007;\n(d)  RSD 1,950 for his legal costs; and\n(e)  the pension, disability, health and unemployment insurance contributions due for the period February to May 2007. 14.  On 11 September 2007 the judgment became final. 15.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment before the Požega Municipal Court. 16.  On 7 February 2008 the court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 17.  On 24 August 2007 the Užice Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him:\n(a)  salary arrears in the amount of RSD 10,648 for February 2007, RSD 10,648 for March 2007, RSD 10,648 for April 2007, and RSD 10,648 for May 2007, plus statutory interest;\n(b)  employee meal benefits (naknada za ishranu na radu) in the amount of RSD 4,620 for September 2006, RSD 4,620 for December 2006, RSD 4,620 for January 2007, RSD 4,620 for February 2007, RSD 4,620 for March 2007, RSD 4,620 for April 2007, and RSD 4,620 for May 2007, plus statutory interest;\n(c)  holiday pay (regres za godišnji odmor) in the amount of RSD 35,135 for 2007, plus statutory interest from 24 June 2007;\n(d)  RSD 6,748.50 for his legal costs; and\n(e)  the pension, disability, health and unemployment insurance contributions due for period October 2006 to June 2007. 18.  On 20 September 2007 that judgment became final. 19.  In January 2009 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment before the Municipal Court in Požega. 20.  On 12 May 2009 the court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 21.  On 12 July 2010 the Užice Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor, which led to the ongoing enforcement proceedings before the Požega Municipal Court being stayed. 22.  In July 2010 the applicant duly registered a claim for the sums specified in the judgments referred to above. 23.  On an unspecified date he was recognised as a secured creditor. 24.  On 17 April 2012 some of the debtor’s property was sold. A sale of the remaining assets was advertised in the newspapers and a public bid opening procedure was scheduled for 29 June 2012. 25.  On 30 December 2002 the debtor was privatised. 26.  On 17 July 2007 the contract for the sale of the debtor was annulled because the buyer in question had failed to fulfil his contractual obligations. 27.  Following the annulment of the debtor’s privatisation the State owned 58.18% of the debtor’s shares. 28.  On 11 December 2008 the State sold its shares to a private company.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1926 and lives in Belgrade. 7.  The general pension system of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (hereinafter “the SFRY”) was set up on the principle of territoriality. This meant that each federal entity, namely the six republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo), had their own pension funds, which were independent of federal government and were responsible for the collection of contributions and the payment of pensions to all individuals who had been working on the territory of the respective republic or province. The pension system was based on the “pay-as-you-go” model and the principle of inter-generational solidarity, which was essentially based on the payment of mandatory contributions during the years of employment and then receiving the pension by instalments once retired. 8.  The military pension system differed, in that it was centralised at the federal level. On 1 January 1973 under, at the relevant time, the Military Personnel Pension and Invalidity Insurance Act (Zakon o mirovinskom i invalidskom osiguranju vojnih obveznika) a federal pension fund was established for employees of the Yugoslav People’s Army (hereinafter “the YPA”) with its registered headquarters in Belgrade. Contributions to this fund were paid from the federal budget, and the fund then paid pensions to military pensioners, irrespective of the location of their military service or where they lived once retired. 9.  On 25 June 1991 the Croatian Parliament (Sabor Republike Hrvatske) declared Croatia independent of Yugoslavia, and on 8 October 1991 all relations between Croatia and the SFRY federal Government were dissolved. The SFRY Military Personnel Pension and Invalidity Insurance Act was incorporated into the Croatian legal system by the Military Personnel Federal Pension, Invalidity Insurance and Child Support Legislation (Acceptance in the Republic of Croatia as Republic Law) Act (Zakon o preuzimanju saveznih zakona iz oblasti mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja i doplatka za djecu vojnih osiguranika koji se u Republici Hrvatskoj primjenjuju kao republički zakoni), enacted by the Parliament on 26 June 1991. 10.  On 23 July 1992 the Government of Croatia enacted a decree on “Pension and Invalidity Rights of Persons Whose Active Military Service in the YPA Terminated Prior to 31 December 1991” (Uredba o ostvarivanju prava iz mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja osoba kojima je prestalo svojstvo aktivne vojne osobe u bivšoj JNA do 31. prosinca 1991.; hereinafter: “the Military Pensions Decree”). The Military Pensions Decree laid down conditions for recognition of the right to advance payments of pensions (akontacija) to former YPA military personnel, provided that they had terminated their military service prior to 31 December 1991, but had not obtained pension rights prior to that date, and that they met all the necessary conditions to be granted a pension under the Military Personnel Pension and Invalidity Insurance Act (see paragraph 8 above). The Military Pensions Decree set out three additional complementary conditions: (1) residence in Croatia, (2) Croatian nationality, and (3) that the person concerned had made himself available for service in the Croatian army prior to 31 December 1991 and was not suspected of an offence against Croatia. The Croatian Republic Workers’ Pension and Invalidity Insurance Fund (Republički fond mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja radnika Hrvatske; hereinafter “the Republic Workers’ Fund”) was assigned to make the necessary arrangements under this Decree. 11.  On the same day the Government of Croatia also enacted a decree on “Payment of Pensions to Former SFRY Republic Pension Beneficiaries” (Uredba o isplati mirovina korisnicima koji su mirovinu ostvarili u republikama bivše Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije). Under that decree all residents of Croatia who had been granted pensions in other republics of the former SFRY, except Slovenia, which had at the time also dissolved its relations with the SFRY federal government, were entitled to payment of their pensions by Croatia. The Republic Workers’ Fund was ordered to pay pensions from the collected contributions which Croatia was not paying to pensioners residing in other republics of the former SFRY due to the ending of financial transfers. 12.  On 6 October 1993 the Croatian Parliament enacted the Yugoslav People’s Army Personnel Pensions Act (Zakon o ostvarivanju prava iz mirovnskog i invalidskog osigurnja pripadnika bivše JNA), which set aside the 1992 Decree (see paragraph 10 above) and part of the 1991 transitional legislation (see paragraph 9 above). Under this Act Croatia assumed responsibility for payment of YPA military pensions obtained prior to 8 October 1991, and for the granting of pensions to YPA military personnel whose service in Croatia had terminated prior to 31 December 1991. 13.  Former YPA military personnel who had obtained pension rights under the former SFRY pension regime prior to 8 October 1991 had the right to have their pension paid by Croatia if their pension from the former federal fund was no longer being paid. Two further conditions were laid down: residence in Croatia and that the person concerned was not being prosecuted for certain criminal offences against Croatia, listed in section 2 of the Act. The Republic Workers’ Fund was tasked with enforcement of the Act. 14.  The Act was set aside by the Pension Insurance Act (Zakon o mirovinskom osiguranju), which was enacted on 10 July 1998 and came into force on 1 January 1999. In the period relevant to this case it was amended several times (see paragraphs 50-53 below). The Pension Insurance Act regulated the compulsory pension insurance scheme on the basis of the principle of inter-generational solidarity (section 2 § 1). It established the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje), which was tasked with the management of pension affairs (section 6) thus replacing the previous Republic Workers’ Fund (section 187 §§ 1 and 3). Accordingly, the Croatian Pension Fund was tasked with the collection of pension contributions and payment of pensions and with the observance of obligations under international agreements on pensions (section 130). Under the Pension Insurance Act payment of pensions abroad was possible only under either an international agreement or a reciprocal agreement (section 88). 15.  The Pension Insurance Act also provided that funds for payment of pensions to YPA military pensioners should be secured in the State’s budget, and that the necessary contributions should be paid to the Croatian Pension Fund on a monthly basis (section 152 § 1). For all Croatian nationals the Pension Insurance Act recognised pensionable years of employment in the period prior to 8 October 1991 under the Military Personnel Pension and Invalidity Insurance Act (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) as pensionable years of employment (section 186). 16.  By an amendment of 29 November 2001 the pensions of, inter alia, YPA military pensioners were reduced and the Croatian Pension Fund was ordered to set the amended levels of their pensions. 17.  On 15 September 1997 Croatia and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro) signed a Social Insurance Treaty (Ugovor o socijalnom osiguranju), hereinafter “the Social Insurance Treaty”), which came into force on 1 May 2003. The Social Insurance Treaty listed the relevant domestic legislation to which it was applicable, namely health insurance and health protection legislation; pension and invalidity insurance legislation; legislation on work-related accidents and work-related illnesses; and unemployment benefits. It was applicable to all persons in the two countries who had rights and duties under the relevant domestic legislation. The right to payment of a pension abroad existed irrespective of the place of residence of the pension beneficiaries within one of the contracting States. The Republic Workers’ Fund was designated the competent liaison authority in Croatia concerning all pension issues (see paragraph 54 below). 18.  According to the Government, after the dissolution of the former SFRY, Serbia maintained a dual pension system for civilian and military pensioners, and stopped paying YPA military pensions to pensioners residing in Croatia. Only in January 2012 was a pension reform carried out in Serbia which had the effect of integrating the military pension fund into the civilian pension and invalidity insurance fund. On an unspecified date the Serbian authorities informed the Croatian pension authorities of this change. They also indicated that they would pay what formerly were military pensions to pensioners residing abroad under the relevant treaties on social insurance or reciprocal agreements. 19.  On 29 June 2001 the republics of the former SFRY signed the Agreement on Succession Issues (Ugovor o pitanjima sukcesije, hereinafter “the Succession Agreement”), which came into force on 2 June 2004 (see paragraph 55 below). 20.  Annexe E to the Succession Agreement dealt with pensions. It was based on the principle of acquired rights, in that rights acquired under one system must be acknowledged and respected in another. Article 1 established the said principle in respect of the pension rights acquired under the former republics’ pension regime (see paragraph 7 above), while Article 2 dealt with military pensions under the former federal regime (see paragraph 8 above). The latter provision stipulated that the State which had recognised the right to payment of the pensions to former SFRY military personnel should continue to pay pensions to all its nationals, irrespective of their place of residence. In cases where a person was a national of more than one republic of the former SFRY, the pension should be paid by the State where that person resided. This pension payment regime differed from the regime established for civilian pensions under Article 1 of Annexe E to the Succession Agreement, which provided that the State which had recognised the pension rights and which paid the pensions should continue with the payments entirely irrespective of the nationality or place of residence of the pension beneficiaries. 21.  The applicant served as a military officer in the YPA between 1941 and 1979, when he retired. On 16 May 1979 the SFRY federal pension fund for retired YPA employees authorised the applicant’s entitlement to a military pension. At that time the applicant was residing in Dubrovnik, Croatia. 22.  On 19 June 1992 the applicant requested the Dubrovnik office of the Republic Workers’ Fund (Republički fond mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja radnika Hrvatske, Područna služba u Dubrovniku) to recognise his entitlement to a military pension under the new Croatian legislation. The applicant substantiated his request by submitting evidence of his place of residence in Croatia at an address in Dubrovnik, evidence of Croatian citizenship, and a document from the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Dubrovniku), confirming that no criminal proceedings against him had been instituted. 23.  On 7 July 1992 the Dubrovnik Office of the Republic Workers’ Fund recognised the applicant’s entitlement to a military pension, as established under the former SFRY Military Personnel Pension and Invalidity Insurance Act (see paragraph 47 below). It found that the applicant had Croatian citizenship and a place of residence in Croatia, and that the competent domestic authorities had not instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for any offence against Croatia. 24.  On 12 December 1992, acting ex officio, the Dubrovnik Office of the Republic Workers’ Fund established the amount of the applicant’s pension under the Military Pensions Decree. The pension was to be paid to the applicant as long as the necessary requirements existed. 25.  On 6 May 1994 the Military Social Insurance Fund of the then Federal Yugoslav Republic Army in Belgrade, Serbia, ordered that payment of the applicant’s military pension should be stopped, on the grounds that they had been informed by the Croatian authorities that the applicant had been granted a pension in Croatia. 26.  According to the applicant, in October 1998 he visited his son in Belgrade, Serbia, and decided to stay with his son for a longer period. He continued to receive payments of his pension through a representative in Dubrovnik. 27.  On 9 June 2003 the applicant informed the Dubrovnik office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Područna služba u Dubrovniku Hrvatskog zavoda za mirovinsko osiguranje) that he had changed his place of residence to Belgrade, Serbia, and requested that his pension be paid to his new address. He submitted evidence of residence in Belgrade and details of his bank account in Serbia. 28.  On 30 September 2003 the Croatian Pension Fund stopped payment of the applicant’s pension. It found that the Social Insurance Treaty with Serbia did not cover YPA military pensions, and that there was no reciprocal agreement with Serbia in that respect, as required under the relevant domestic law, for the payment of pensions abroad. Pension payments were stopped with effect from 1 October 2003. 29.  On 16 December 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Appeal Council of the Executive Council of the Croatian Pension Fund (Žalbeno vijeće Upravnog vijeća Hrvatskog zavoda za mirovinsko osiguranje) arguing that there was no legal ground for his pension to be stopped. He contended that when his pension rights had been recognised under the Military Pensions Decree he had obtained the right to receive the pension from the Republic Workers’ Fund, and that his status was therefore equal to that of other old-age pensioners. He also complained that he had not been able to obtain his pension in Serbia, since payment of his pension there had been stopped on the grounds that his entitlement to a pension had been recognised in Croatia. Finally, the applicant explained that the pension which had been stopped was his only income. 30.  On 17 March 2004 the applicant lodged an administrative action in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining that the Croatian Pension Fund had failed to decide on his appeal against the first-instance decision of the Dubrovnik office of the Croatian Pension Fund. 31.  In his administrative action the applicant reiterated that by recognising his entitlement to a pension under the Military Pensions Decree he had the same status as all other pensioners in Croatia who had been receiving pensions from the Croatian Pension Fund. He explained that he had submitted his request for payment of the pension to Serbia under the Social Insurance Treaty and that the stopping of his pension had been unlawful. The applicant also complained that he and his wife had no other financial means now that his pension had been discontinued. 32.  The Administrative Court invited the applicant to substantiate his action further on 18 March 2004. The applicant complied with this request, and submitted a supplemented administrative action on 3 September 2004, reiterating his previous arguments. 33.  On 5 October 2004 the applicant changed his place of residence to his old address in Dubrovnik and the following day he informed the Dubrovnik Office of the Croatian Pension Fund, asking for payment of his pension to be resumed. The applicant also pointed out that the Croatian Pension Fund had never decided on his appeal against the decision to stop the payment of his pension. 34.  The Appeal Council of the Executive Council of the Croatian Pension Fund dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance decision of the Dubrovnik Office of the Croatian Pension Fund as ill-founded on 24 November 2004, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance decision. 35.  On 10 January 2005 the Dubrovnik office of the Croatian Pension Fund resumed payment of the applicant’s pension. It found that the applicant had changed his place of residence to Croatia, and that all other requirements under the relevant domestic law had been met. The payment of the applicant’s pension was to be resumed with effect from 1 November 2004. 36.  On 12 April 2006 the Administrative Court invited the applicant to explain whether he wanted to pursue his administrative action of 17 March 2004, since the Appeal Council of the Executive Council of the Croatian Pension Fund had decided on his appeal in the meantime. 37.  On 13 November 2006 the applicant informed the Administrative Court that he wanted to pursue his administrative action. Moreover, he indicated that he wanted to extend it to the second-instance decision of the Appeal Council of the Executive Council of the Croatian Pension Fund of 24 November 2004. The applicant again argued that the change of his place of residence had not warranted in any respect, legal or factual, stopping the payment of his pension, and that therefore depriving him of his pension for the period between 1 October 2003 and 31 October 2004 had been unlawful. 38.  On 8 March 2007 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action as ill-founded. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“The reasoning of the impugned decision, and of the first-instance decision, is based on the fact that the plaintiff’s request for payment of the recognised military pension which he had obtained as a YPA employee prior to 8 October 1991 had been refused, because he had a place of residence in Serbia ... and the Social Insurance Treaty between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not cover military pensions of former YPA military personnel obtained through the military [pension] fund prior to 8 October 1991. Between the Republic of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro there is no reciprocal agreement in payment of military pensions, so the [plaintiff’s] pension cannot be paid in Serbia ...\nIn view of what is discernible from the case file this court finds that there has been no breach of law to the detriment of the plaintiff.\nIn this specific case the reasons adduced by the respondent body and the first-instance body are valid. This court finds that it was correctly held by the respondent body that it was not possible for military pensions to be paid abroad ... since it was impossible under either the Treaty or Croatian pension legislation. Payment of a pension abroad is possible under an international treaty or on the basis of a reciprocal agreement, which is not the situation in the present case.” 39.  On 11 May 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). He contended that there had been no legal ground for stopping payment of thirteen of his pension instalments, and that his change of place of residence should not have had any adverse effects on his pension rights. In his view this had created an inequality before the law. 40.  The applicant supplemented his constitutional complaint on 5 June 2007, reiterating his previous arguments. 41.  On 11 March 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant on 21 May 2010. 42.  On 24 February 2012 the applicant informed the Dubrovnik office of the Croatian Pension Fund that he had changed his place of residence to Belgrade, and asked for the pension to be paid to him in Serbia. 43.  On 27 February 2012 the information submitted by the applicant was registered in the information system of the Croatian Pension Fund. Since March 2012 the applicant’s pension has been paid to him in Belgrade, Serbia.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1921 and lives in Michałowice, Poland. 8.  In 1976 the applicant’s former wife lodged with the Pruszków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an action against the applicant in which she sought the distribution of the common property of their marriage. 9.  Up to 30 April 1993, the Pruszków District Court held eighty-four hearings in the case. 10.  Between 9 July 1993 and 7 April 1995 six hearings took place. During that period the parties filed pleadings with the trial court on eighteen occasions. 11.  During the hearing held on 17 May 1995 the applicant made threats against the plaintiff’s counsel. 12.  Between 11 June and 7 September 1995 the District Court held four hearings and received seven memorials from the parties. One of the memorials submitted by the applicant included a list of forty-one questions to the plaintiff. 13.  On 14 September 1995 the applicant made a request to the Ombudsman that the case be transferred to another court. He also threatened that he would blow himself up with a grenade in the courtroom if his case were not decided in 1996. 14.  On 12 March 1996 the President of the Pruszków District Court decided that, in view of the threats made by the applicant against the court and the plaintiff’s counsel, police officers should be present in the courtroom during the hearing scheduled for the next day. However, on 13 March 1996 the hearing was postponed because counsel for the plaintiff failed to attend. 15.  According to the Government, the hearing fixed for 24 April 1996 was cancelled because on 27 March 1996 the applicant had challenged the presiding judge. The challenge was subsequently dismissed. The applicant submitted that the hearing had been adjourned because the plaintiff’s counsel had been absent. 16.  On 2 July 1996 the applicant challenged all the judges of the Pruszków District Court, but subsequently he withdrew the challenge. 17.  On 8 January 1997 the applicant asked the Vice-President of the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) to transfer the case-file to the Pruszków District Court immediately. He pointed out that the Regional Court had decided his procedural request on 25 November 1996 and the case-file had been lying since then in the archives of the Regional Court. As a result, no judicial activity had taken place during that period. On 22 January 1997 the applicant visited the registry of the Warsaw Regional Court and repeated his complaint of 8 January 1997. 18.  On 6 February 1997 the Vice-President of the Warsaw Regional Court informed the applicant that his complaint was well-founded and apologised to him for the delay in returning the case-file to the Pruszków District Court. He also advised the applicant that on 5 February 1997 the case-file had been transmitted to the District Court and a copy of the Regional Court’s decision of 25 November 1996 had been sent to him. 19.  On 28 May 1997 the applicant filed with the trial court three requests concerning an expert witness and the disputed property. 20.  Hearings took place on 28 May, 30 June and 6 August 1997. During the first of these hearings, the plaintiff replied to forty-one questions submitted by the applicant in 1995. 21.  On 12 August 1997 the applicant filed with the trial court written pleadings concerning the distribution of the property. 22.  On 22 August 1997 the Pruszków District Court ordered the applicant to allow the plaintiff access to a water supply on the contested property. The applicant appealed. 23.  On 31 October 1997 the applicant requested the Pruszków District Court to transmit the case-file to the Warsaw Regional Court so that it could decide his appeal against a procedural decision taken by the District Court. On 12 November 1997 the applicant renewed his request in a letter addressed to the Vice-President of the Warsaw Regional Court. He also threatened that he would commit suicide in the courtroom and set fire to the court building if the proceedings in his case were not concluded speedily. 24.  Between 16 July 1998 and 26 May 1999 the District Court held four hearings and issued one decision. During that time, the court received written pleadings on six occasions. 25.  On 3 April 2000 the applicant filed with the District Court written pleadings setting out his terms for a settlement of the case. 26.  On 27 November 2000 the applicant challenged all the judges of the Pruszków District Court. 27.  The proceedings are apparently still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Przemyśl. 6.  During the Second World War the applicant was subjected to forced labour on a farm owned by a German family B. in Leutz (currently Lucień in Poland). 7.  On an unspecified date she submitted a request for compensation to the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation. 8.  On 17 April 2002 the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation awarded the applicant financial assistance in the amount of EUR 1,124.84. It considered that the applicant's persecution fell under the 4th category. This category comprised persons who had been deported to Germany and subjected to forced labour. The amount was to be paid in two instalments, the first one in the sum of PLN 2,823 to be paid from 24 April to 8 May 2002. 9.  On 29 July 2004 the Foundation gave a decision confirming payment of the second instalment, in the amount of PLN 1,247, to be paid from 6 August to 20 August 2004. 10.  On 25 October 2004 the Director of Veterans' Office gave a decision by which he confirmed that the applicant complied with the conditions set out in the applicable domestic law for obtaining the status of a veteran on the strength of her imprisonment in the concentration camp Gross-Rosen in January and February 1945. 11.  On 27 October 2005 the Przemyśl Regional Court gave a judgment by which it confirmed that the applicant satisfied the requirements which the applicable laws attached to the grant of war veteran status and that she was permanently and totally unable to work. It further stated that the applicant's health made it impossible for her to live independently. The court referred to medical reports prepared for the purposes of the proceedings and to a unanimous medical opinion given by a medical panel of the Social Insurance Authority which had also confirmed that the applicant's disability had been caused by her stay in the German concentration camp during the Second World War. 12.  On 22 June 2006 the Foundation refused to award further payment to the applicant for her internment in the concentration camp, finding that the available evidence, in particular written statements submitted by witnesses, was insufficient proof that the applicant had been imprisoned there. The applicant appealed. 13.  The Foundation, by a decision of 4 July 2006, refused to allow her appeal, reiterating the arguments on which it had relied in its first‑instance decision. 14.  On 25 July 2002 the Oleśnica District Court rejected the applicant's statement of claim under Article 189 of the Code of Civil Procedure by which she had requested recognition (ustalenie) that she had been working as a forced labourer in Leutzen during the war, at a farm belonging to family B. The court had regard to a resolution of the Supreme Court of 5 October 2001 (III CZP 46/01), by which the latter court had held that civil courts lacked jurisdiction to examine any claims concerning forced labour during the Second World War and that it could not be accepted that such jurisdiction could be based on Article 189 of the Civil Code. 15.  The applicant appealed. By a decision of 14 August 2002 the Wroclaw Regional Court upheld the contested decision, fully sharing the conclusions of the first-instance court. On an unspecified later date the Regional Court refused to grant her legal aid for the purposes of lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 16.  On 5 February 2008 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the applicant's action by which she claimed PLN 70,000 from the State Treasury as compensation for the State's failure to legislate in order to provide for social insurance entitlements to persons who during the Second World War had been subjected to forced labour and persecution in various factual contexts. The court observed that the applicant was entitled to various social insurance payments arising out of her bad health; in particular, she received a war veteran's benefit and a disability benefit granted to her under the universally applicable provisions of social insurance laws. Moreover, no national or international regulations obliged the Polish State to enact legislation addressing specifically the compensation rights of persons who had suffered during the Second World War and providing for special entitlements for them. 17.  On 12 March 2009 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld this judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in the Lipetsk Region. 6.  From 20 May 2008 to 17 July 2008 the applicant was held in the IZ‑44/1 remand prison in the Kostroma Region in connection with the criminal proceedings against him. 7.  According to the applicant, the three cells in which he was held were severely overcrowded. Cell no. 5 measured eight square meters, was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated up to seven inmates. Cell no. 7 also offered eight square meters of floor surface, was designed for six detainees but housed up to seven inmates. Finally, cell no. 25 measured twenty-four square meters, had fourteen sleeping places and accommodated up to twenty-five persons. 8.  According to the Government, the applicant had been held in cells nos. 7 and 25. Cell no. 7 measured 14.3 square meters and accommodated three detainees, while cell no. 25 measured 29.2 square meters and housed up to seven detainees. The applicant had an individual sleeping place in both cells. 9.  In support of their submissions the Government provided certificates issued by the remand prison governor in June 2012, written statements by prison warders signed on 13 and 18 June 2012, undated photographs, and pages from the prison population register which recorded, for each day, the number of sleeping bunks and the number of inmates in each cell, and the total number of inmates in the remand prison. 10.  On 20 October 2008 the applicant sent his first letter to the Court. It contained, in particular, his complaint about allegedly appalling conditions of his detention in the IZ-44/1 remand prison. 11.  By letter of 14 November 2008 the Registry sent an application package to the applicant, informing him as follows:\n“You must send the duly completed application form and any necessary supplementary documents to the Court as soon as possible and at the latest within six months of the date of the present letter. No extension of this period is possible. If the application form and all the relevant documents are not sent within the above period, the file opened will be destroyed without further warning.” 12.  On 4 May 2009 the applicant dispatched the application form which reached the Registry on 10 August 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in İzmir. 6.  On the night of 31 May 2001, at around midnight, police officers from the anti‑terrorist branch of the İzmir police conducted an operation to arrest a number of persons suspected of participating in an illegal demonstration. To that end, a group of police officers arrived at the two-storey house where the applicant and his uncle Sabri Selvi lived. The police officers were looking for the applicant’s uncle, who was suspected of having been involved in the aforementioned illegal demonstration. 7.  According to the applicant’s version of events, the applicant, who lived on the first floor of the building, heard some noise coming from the second floor, where his uncle lived. He opened his flat door to see what was going on. He saw some persons in civilian clothes and asked them who they were. They asked the applicant to show his identity card. The applicant showed them his identity card, but when he asked them to show their identity cards as well the persons concerned, who turned out to be police officers in civilian clothes, they became angry and complained of the fact that everyone asked to see their identity cards. They then chased the applicant into his flat, beat him up and swore at him. After arresting the applicant, they prepared an arrest report which they forced him to sign. 8.  The arrest and search report dated 31 May 2001, which was signed by six police officers, a witness, the applicant and his uncle Sabri Selvi, stated the following:\n“...Wearing police identification vests and having taken security precautions, we knocked on the door of the flat in question. We told the man who opened the door that we were police officers and that we wanted to carry out a search of the flat. With the agreement of the occupant, who said ‘You may search’, we entered the flat.\nFollowing the identity check, having realised that the man [who opened the door] was ... Sabri Selvi, we arrested him. In his presence, we conducted a search of the [flat] and found no evidence of involvement in crime. When asked whether any damage was caused to anything in the flat due to the search, the arrestee said ‘None’. As we were about to leave the flat together with the arrestee, a person called Yahya Selvi... attacked Deputy Superintendent Ramazan Oral and started hitting him while swearing and saying things like ‘You cannot take anyone away from here; I f..k your mothers and wives’. We overpowered Yahya Selvi by force, arrested him and took him with the other person to police headquarters for investigation...” 9.  On 31 May 2001 at about 2 a.m. the applicant was taken to the Atatürk Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. In his report, the doctor noted the presence of swelling on the applicant’s face. The same day at 12.30 p.m. a statement was taken from the applicant at police headquarters. In his statement, the applicant admitted that he had attacked the police officers while they were conducting a search of his house. He explained that he had been angered by the fact that the police officers had arrived to arrest his uncle at night. He also stated that he had not been subjected to any form of ill‑treatment during his detention in police custody and that he had not given his statement to the police under duress. At about 2 p.m. the applicant was again taken to the Atatürk Hospital. The doctor who examined the applicant prepared a report identical to the previous one. 10.  On 31 May 2001 police officers took statements from Deputy Superintendent Ramazan Oral, who complained that he had been attacked by the applicant. He also requested them to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant. At 2 a.m. on the same day Ramazan Oral underwent a medical examination at the Atatürk Hospital. The doctor who examined Mr Oral noted in his report the presence of a swelling measuring 25 x 35 x 05 mm on the left chin and at ear level, and hyperaemic scratches measuring 10 x 25 mm on Mr Oral’s left arm. He prescribed three days’ sick leave on account of the injuries. 11.  The same day, the applicant’s legal representative submitted a request to the Chief Public Prosecutor’s office in Bornova, seeking information about the whereabouts of the applicant and his uncle and the charges against them. He also asked the prosecutor’s office to grant him permission to meet with the suspects and, in view of the witness statements alleging that the applicant had been beaten up during the arrest, to send the applicant to hospital for a medical examination and treatment. The representative’s request to meet with the applicant and his uncle was dismissed by the prosecutor’s office on 31 May 2001. 12.  On 1 June 2001 the applicant underwent a further medical examination at the Bornova State Hospital. The report stated that there were no signs of physical violence on the applicant’s body. 13.  On the same day the applicant was brought before the Bornova Magistrate’s Court. Assisted by his lawyer, the applicant denied the allegation that he had assaulted Ramazan Oral and alleged that he had been beaten up and insulted by the police officers who had come to his house the day before. Having regard to the nature of the crime and the evidence contained in the case file, the court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention for having obstructed the police officers by using physical violence. 14.  On 4 June 2001 the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 258 of the Criminal Code for resisting the police. In his indictment, the public prosecutor stated that, while the police officers were conducting a search in the applicant’s house, the applicant had assaulted the police officer Ramazan Oral, who had subsequently been declared unfit for work for three days due to his injuries. 15.  On 6 June 2001 the applicant challenged the decision ordering his pre-trial detention and requested the Bornova Assize Court to initiate criminal proceedings against the police officers who had ill-treated him on 31 May 2001. 16.  On 7 June 2001 the Sixth Chamber of the Assize Court, acting as the appeal body, refused the applicant’s request for release pending trial, holding that his pre-trial detention was lawful in view of the evidence contained in the case file. 17.  On 11 July 2001 the Bornova Assize Court heard oral evidence from the applicant’s uncle Sabri Selvi. The latter stated that his nephew had not insulted the police officers, but that one of the officers had slapped him in the face. The court ordered the continued detention of the applicant. 18.  On 10 December 2001 the Bornova Assize Court heard evidence from the applicant’s wife, Garip Selvi, and his brother Kazım Selvi, who lived in the same flat as the applicant. Mrs Selvi stated that her husband had been beaten up by the police officers when he had asked them to show their identity cards to prove that they were police officers, and that he had not resisted his arrest by the police. Mr Kazım Selvi also claimed that his brother Yahya had been beaten up and insulted by the police officers and that he had not assaulted them or resisted arrest. 19.  On 15 February 2002 the applicant’s representative applied to the Bornova Assize Court requesting it to order a criminal investigation concerning the police officers whose actions had led to the unjust detention and trial of the applicant. Relying on the statements given by the defence witnesses Garip Selvi and Kazım Selvi, the applicant’s representative claimed that, on the night of the incident in question, the police had insulted and beaten up the applicant following his request to see their identity cards. He maintained that the applicant should be considered to be the victim of the events rather than the accused. He further noted that no statements had been taken from the police officers by the public prosecutor or the trial court and that there was no evidence against the applicant apart from the medical report [concerning Ramazan Oral] which could easily have been obtained by police officers from the anti-terrorist branch. He therefore alleged that the police officers in question had unlawfully arrested and beaten up the applicant in his bedroom in the middle of the night and had thus violated his right to the protection of his home. 20.  On 19 June 2003 the Bornova Assize Court convicted the applicant of obstructing police officers and sentenced him to two months’ imprisonment. No response was given to the applicant’s allegations. 21.  On 25 October 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the above judgment in view of the more favourable provisions of the new Criminal Code dated 1 June 2005. 22.  Meanwhile, following the administrative re-organisation of the courts in İzmir, the applicant’s case was taken over by the İzmir Criminal Court. 23.  On 15 May 2006 the İzmir Criminal Court convicted the applicant of obstructing police officers in the performance of their duties by insulting and assaulting an officer. It sentenced the applicant to a fine of 240 new Turkish liras (TRY). In its judgment, the court relied on the statements given by Mr Oral, the applicant and witnesses, as well as documentary evidence such as the arrest and search report. 24.  On 15 September 2006 the applicant appealed to the Court of Cassation, complaining that the first-instance court had convicted him without conducting an adequate investigation into the events in question. He claimed that the first-instance court had relied on the investigation carried out by the police officers who had insulted and beaten him. 25.  The proceedings are still pending before the Court of Cassation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in Flers. 6.  The applicant, a Muslim aged eleven at the material time, was enrolled in the first year of a state secondary school in Flers for the academic year 1998-1999. From January 1999 onwards she wore a headscarf to school. 7.  On seven occasions in January 1999 the applicant went to physical education and sports classes wearing her headscarf and refused to take it off despite repeated requests to do so by her teacher, who explained that wearing a headscarf was incompatible with physical education classes. The teacher sent two reports to the headmaster dated 22 January and 8 February 1999. 8.  At a meeting on 11 February 1999 the school's pupil discipline committee decided to expel the applicant from the school for breaching the duty of assiduity by failing to participate actively in physical education and sports classes. 9.  The applicant's parents appealed against that decision to the appeal panel. 10.  In a decision of 17 March 1999 the Director of Education for Caen upheld the decision of the school's pupil discipline committee, after obtaining the opinion of the appeal panel which was based on four grounds:\ni)the duty of assiduity (as defined in section 10 of the Education (General Principles) Act – Law no. 89-486 of 10 July 1989; Article 3-5 of Decree no. 85-924 of 30 August 1985 on Local State Schools; and the school's internal rules);\nii)the provisions of the school's internal rules stipulating that pupils must wear clothing that “complies with the health and safety rules” and attend physical education and sports classes in their sports clothes;\niii) a memorandum (no. 94-116 of 9 March 1994) on pupils' safety during school activities, which specified that “rigorous compliance with the rules governing teaching staff's liability shall not eclipse the very broad personal discretion left to the individual teacher when dealing with actual concrete situations” and that “while managing his or her class the teacher must be capable of identifying and putting a stop to any behaviour on the part of pupils – other than sudden or unforeseeable conduct – that may present a danger”;\niv) a decision of the Conseil d'Etat dated 10 March 1995 in which it had held that wearing a headscarf as a sign of religious affiliation was incompatible with the proper conduct of physical education and sports classes. 11.  The applicant indicated that she subsequently took correspondence courses in order to continue her school studies. 12.  On 28 April 1999 the applicant's parents, acting on their own behalf and as their minor daughter's legal guardians, applied to the Caen Administrative Court to have the decision of the Director of Education set aside. 13.  On 5 October 1999 the court rejected their application. It considered that, by attending physical education and sports classes in dress that would not enable her to take part in the classes in question, the applicant had failed to comply with the duty to attend classes regularly. It also found that the applicant's attitude had created an atmosphere of tension within the school and that on the basis of all the factors involved her expulsion from the school had been justified, regardless of the proposal she had made at the end of January to wear a hat instead of her headscarf. 14.  The applicant's parents appealed against that judgment. On 31 July 2003 the Nantes Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal, on the same grounds as the lower court, finding that the applicant, by behaving as she had done, had overstepped the limits of the right to express and manifest her religious beliefs on the school premises. 15.  The applicant's parents lodged an appeal on points of law with the Conseil d'Etat, relying, inter alia, on their daughter's right to freedom of conscience and expression. 16.  On 29 December 2004 the Conseil d'Etat declared the appeal inadmissible.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Velenje. 6.  On 20 December 1995 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZTi. 7.  On 16 July 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZTi in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 3,212,150 tolars (approximately 13,400 euros) for the injuries sustained.\nBetween 9 December 1997 and 1 February 2001 the applicant lodged three preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.\nOn 16 June and 23 November 1998 he made requests that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the two hearings held on 9 April 1999 and 2 February 2001, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nDuring the proceedings, the court appointed a medical expert.\nAt the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 25 April 2001. 8.  On 9 May 2001 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). ZTi cross-appealed.\nOn 18 July 2002 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld ZTi’s appeal as far as the costs of the proceedings were concerned.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 11 September 2002. 9.  On 19 September 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče) and requested that the Supreme Court’s judge be recused.\nOn 23 October 2003 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 26 November 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Chişinău. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 24 January 2002 on suspicion of abetting bribery. 8.  On 26 January 2002 the Centru District Court issued an order remanding the applicant in custody for a period of thirty days. The court’s reasoning was the following: “the suspect has reached the age at which he may be criminally prosecuted, he is suspected of having committed a serious offence and he is unemployed”. 9.  On 4 February 2002 the applicant was indicted inter alia for the offence of aiding and abetting bribery, involving large sums of money, which was punishable by up to twenty years’ imprisonment. 10.  On 14 February 2002, the Centru District Court examined a habeas corpus request lodged by the applicant and a request lodged by the prosecutor to prolong the detention. In his habeas corpus request the applicant argued that he was married, had three children and was employed. The court dismissed the applicant’s request but upheld the prosecutor’s request and prolonged the detention. 11.  Similar prolongations were ordered up until 23 May 2002, when the investigation was completed and the criminal case file was sent by the prosecution to the Chişinău Regional Court. After that date, the applicant remained in detention without having his detention warrant prolonged. He submitted numerous habeas corpus requests relying inter alia on his medical condition (see paragraph 17 below) and on the impossibility of receiving appropriate medical care in prison due to a lack of specialised doctors and medication, but they were all rejected. 12.  On 13 February 2003 the applicant complained inter alia that from 23 May 2002 he had been detained without any warrant. His request was dismissed. 13.  On 19 December 2005 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request with the Centru District Court arguing inter alia that his detention was incompatible with his medical condition due to the lack of appropriate medical care in prison. He asked to be released from detention. 14.  On 28 December 2005 Judges Catană, Gordilă and Pitic from the Centru District Court found the applicant’s request well-founded and decided to replace the applicant’s remand in custody with house arrest. 15.  It appears that at the time of adoption of the present judgment the applicant was still under house arrest. 16.  From 26 January 2002 the applicant was detained in Remand Centre No. 3 of the Ministry of Justice (Izolatorul Anchetei Preliminare Nr. 3). On several occasions he was hospitalised in the Prison Hospital. 17.  According to medical certificates submitted by the applicant, and not contested by the Government, he suffered from numerous diseases such as chronic hepatitis, second-degree hydronephrosis (accumulation of urine in the kidney because of an obstruction in the urethra), uric diathesis, increased ecogenicity of pancreatic parenchyma, chronic bilateral pyelonephritis (inflammation of the kidney and pelvis caused by bacterial infection) with functional impairment of the right kidney, hydronephrosis of the right kidney with functional impairment, stones in the urinary tract, somatoform disorder, chronic renal failure, head trauma and generalised anxiety disorder of hypertensive type. 18.  On numerous occasions he was prescribed treatment in hospital and even surgery on his right kidney. On 21 October 2002 and 22 April 2003 the applicant was consulted by Dr Spânu, an urologist from the Central Republican Hospital, a hospital belonging to the Ministry of Health, who recommended urgent surgery on his right kidney in order to eliminate an obstruction of the urethra. The doctor advised that a delay might result in the degradation of the kidney and its extirpation. A similar recommendation was reiterated on 23 June 2003 by the Doctor in Chief of the Prison Hospital, Dr. Cuţitaru, who recommended that the operation be carried out in a specialised urological hospital of the Ministry of Health. It does not appear from the Government’s submissions that this recommendation was ever followed up. 19.  The Government argued that the applicant was provided with sufficient medical care, but the applicant disputed this. 20.  The Government submitted numerous reports drawn up by prison doctors stating that the applicant refused to submit to medical checks and treatment and requested to be transferred to a normal hospital. According to some such reports the applicant argued that the treatment in prison was ineffective and that he needed medication which was not available there. 21.  According to a letter addressed to the Centru District Court and to the Prosecutor’s Office by the prison authorities on 15 November 2004, the applicant started a hunger strike to protest against his being treated in the prison. 22.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the lack of adequate medical treatment. By a letter dated 23 September 2003 the applicant’s complaint was rejected and he was informed inter alia that he had had medical checks on 43 occasions by prison doctors and by doctors from outside the prison. He had been offered medical treatment in accordance with the “modest possibilities” of the prison medical service and with the medication brought by his relatives. He had been hospitalised in the medical section of the prison on four occasions, where he had received adequate medical treatment, and on two occasions in the Prison Hospital. 23.  The applicant submitted a letter from the Doctor in Chief of the Prison Hospital addressed to his lawyer, dated 7 October 2003, in which it was stated that there were no urologists, cardiologists and neurosurgeons among the doctors of the Prison Hospital. 24.  In another letter addressed to the applicant’s lawyer by the Chief of the Prison where the applicant was detained, dated 12 October 2005, the latter was informed that there were no such doctors at the prison either and that in the event of an emergency the applicant would be transferred to the Prison Hospital. 25.  On 24 January 2002 the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and another co-accused on charges of abetting bribery. 26.  On 12 February 2002 the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated new criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of fraudulently dispossessing a person of 1,200 United States dollars (USD). 27.  On 25 February 2002 the General Prosecutor’s Office initiated new criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of fraudulent dispossession of two persons of their apartments. 28.  All of the above criminal proceedings were joined in one single case file and the criminal investigation lasted until 23 May 2002, when the General Prosecutor’s Office sent the criminal file to the Chişinău Regional Court. 29.  On 30 May 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court received the criminal file and a judge was assigned to the case. 30.  On 10 June 2002 the judge set 21 June 2002 as the date of the first hearing. 31.  On 21 June 2002 the applicant was unable to come to the hearing due to high blood pressure. He was examined by a doctor who issued him a certificate confirming that the applicant had high blood pressure and was not able to attend the hearing. The hearing was adjourned until 1 July 2002. 32.  On 1 July 2002 the hearing did not take place since the prosecutor and two of the alleged victims were absent. It was adjourned until 16 July 2002. 33.  On 16 July 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 30 July 2002 due to the absence of three of the alleged victims and the applicant’s lawyers. 34.  On 30 July 2002 the applicant informed the court that he was not feeling well and asked to be hospitalised. The court decided to send the applicant for a medical examination at the Central Republican Hospital, a hospital belonging to the Ministry of Health. The hearing appears to have been adjourned indefinitely. 35.  On 20 August 2002 the applicant complained to the court that the authorities were refusing to send him for a medical examination, and that he had therefore commenced a hunger strike on 15 August 2002. 36.  On 12 September 2002 the judge assigned to the case wrote to the prison authorities and asked them to comply with the decision of 30 July 2002. 37.  On 26 September 2002 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the non-enforcement of the decision of 30 July 2002. 38.  It appears that on an unspecified date the prison authorities had attempted to take the applicant to the Prison Hospital, but that he had refused on the ground that the decision of 30 July 2002 provided for his examination in the Central Republican Hospital. The prison authorities informed the judge assigned to the case about the applicant’s refusal. 39.  On 10 October 2002 the applicant wrote again to the judge informing him that the prison authorities had refused to take him to the Central Republican Hospital as provided in the decision of 30 July 2002, and as a result his medical condition was becoming worse. He informed the judge that he had no other solution but to go on hunger strike again. 40.  It appears that one week later the applicant was taken to the Central Republican Hospital for examination since the criminal file contains medical documents from the Central Republican Hospital dated 17 October 2002. 41.  On 24 October 2002 the resumption of the hearings was scheduled. However, the proceedings were adjourned due to the applicant’s medical condition. The applicant was seen by a doctor, who concluded that he was suffering from the consequences of a brain disease (consecinţele afecţiunii organice a creierului cu sindrom cerebral astenic) and noted that he refused the treatment prescribed to him. 42.  On 28 October 2002 the prosecutor and one of the applicant’s lawyers were absent. The applicant declared that he was not satisfied with his lawyers and that he wanted to instruct other lawyers. He requested an adjournment. The hearing was adjourned until 12 November 2002. 43.  On 12 November 2002 the hearing was adjourned due to the fact that the applicant had not instructed a new lawyer. 44.  On 19 November 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 22 November 2002 at the request of the applicant’s new lawyer, who intended to present evidence confirming the applicant’s serious medical condition. 45.  On 22 November 2002 the applicant’s lawyer presented medical documents and requested that the applicant undertake a psychiatric examination in order to establish his competence to plead to the charges. The request was allowed and a psychiatric examination of the applicant was ordered. 46.  On 11 December 2002 a commission of psychiatric doctors concluded that a psychiatric examination would only be possible after the applicant’s admission to the Psychiatric Hospital. 47.  On 4 January 2003 Judge Buruiană ordered that the applicant be admitted to the Psychiatric Hospital in order to carry out the psychiatric examination ordered on 22 November 2002. 48.  On 21 January 2003 the psychiatric examination was completed and the applicant was found competent to plead to the criminal charges. The medical report was sent to the court on 28 January 2003. 49.  On 13 February 2003 the applicant asked the court inter alia about the state of the proceedings and was informed on 20 February by Judge Buruiană that the hearings would be resumed in March 2003 after the lawyer of the other co-accused had returned from a business trip to the Russian Federation. 50.  On 11 March 2003 a hearing was adjourned until 8 April 2003 on the ground of the applicant’s request for a change of lawyer. 51.  On 8 April 2003 the applicant challenged the judge assigned to his case on the ground inter alia that this judge would prolong the examination of the case, would not allow him to undergo surgery on his kidney as recommended by Dr Spânu, would be biased and would reject his habeas corpus requests. The challenge was dismissed and the hearing was adjourned in order to request information from the prison authorities about the applicant’s medical condition. 52.  On 21 April 2003 the applicant requested an adjournment of the hearing on the ground that he was not feeling well and that he needed medical treatment. The hearing was adjourned until 25 April 2003. 53.  On 22 April 2003 the applicant was examined by Dr Spânu, an urologist, who prescribed urgent surgery on his kidney (see paragraph 18 above). 54.  On 25 April 2003 the hearing was resumed and the court examined and dismissed a habeas corpus request lodged by the applicant who relied mainly on his medical condition. The hearing was then adjourned. 55.  On 13 May 2003 the applicant again challenged the judge on the ground that he refused to allow his release on medical grounds; the challenge was dismissed. He also asked that an ambulance be called; this request was also dismissed, the court observing that the applicant was attempting to prolong the criminal proceedings against him. The court also gave the applicant an official warning since he had raised his voice to the judge. The applicant finally dismissed his lawyer and he was given time to sign a contract with another lawyer. 56.  On 21 May 2003 the applicant was absent from the hearing on grounds of health and the court adjourned it until 6 June 2003. 57.  On 6 June 2003 the applicant was absent again and the court adjourned the hearing until 23 June 2003. 58.  On 23 June 2003 the prosecutor informed the court that, according to the new Code of Criminal Procedure which entered into force on 12 June 2003, the Chişinău Regional Court no longer had jurisdiction to examine the criminal case against the applicant. He requested that the case be transmitted to the Centru District Court for examination. The court allowed the Prosecutor’s request and the criminal file was sent to the Centru District Court. 59.  On 21 October 2003 the President of the Centru District Court wrote to the Supreme Court of Justice and asked it to order that the case be transferred to the Court of Appeal because, inter alia, following the judiciary reform of 2003 the Court of Appeal was the successor instance of the Chişinău Regional Court which had already started to examine the case. 60.  On 31 October 2003 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected the request of the President of the Centru District Court and drew her attention to the need to ensure the examination of the case within a reasonable time. 61.  On 18 November 2003 a hearing was held for the first time before the Centru District Court. The applicant challenged the newly appointed judge, Mr Alerguş, on the ground that he would dismiss all his requests. The challenge was dismissed the same day and the hearing was adjourned. 62.  On 16 December 2003 the hearing was adjourned until 19 January 2004 due to the absence of the prosecutor and one of the alleged victims. 63.  On 19 January and 11 February 2004 the hearings were adjourned because the judge was ill. 64.  On 25 February 2004 the judge was involved in a conference and the hearing was adjourned until 25 March 2004. 65.  On 25 March 2004 the judge was involved in a hearing in an unrelated case and the hearing was adjourned until 29 April 2004. 66.  On 29 April 2004 the applicant was absent due to his hospitalisation in the Prison Hospital and the hearing was adjourned until 27 May 2004. 67.  On 27 May 2004 the court started to examine the merits of the case by questioning one of the victims. Since other victims and witnesses were absent, the court adjourned the hearing until 28 June 2004. 68.  On 28 June 2004 the lawyer of the applicant’s co-accused was absent and the co-accused requested an adjournment. The court decided to adjourn the hearing for 23 September 2004 in view of the impending judicial vacation. 69.  On 23 September 2004 the hearing was adjourned until 18 October 2004 because Judge Alerguş had resigned from his functions. 70.  On 1 October 2004 the applicant complained to the Superior Council of Magistrates about the excessive length of the criminal proceedings against him. He received an answer dated 1 November 2004 in which he was informed inter alia that the President of the Centru District Court had been requested to take all necessary measures to ensure the examination of the case within a reasonable time. 71.  On 18 October 2004 the hearing was adjourned until 18 November 2004 because the same judge, Judge Alergus, was ill. 72.  On 18 November 2004 the applicant dismissed his lawyer and a pro bono lawyer was appointed. The applicant requested to be examined by a medical commission, but his request was dismissed. He unsuccessfully challenged the judges who rejected his request. 73.  On 19 November 2004 the applicant requested that his pro bono lawyer be dismissed on grounds of lack of experience and asked to be examined by a medical commission; however, his requests were dismissed. One of the alleged victims was heard and the hearing was adjourned until 24 November 2004. 74.  On 24 November 2004 the court heard a witness and adjourned the hearing until 26 November 2004. 75.  On 26 November 2004 the applicant concluded a representation contract with another lawyer and the hearing was adjourned until 21 December 2004. 76.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant’s new lawyer was involved in another case and could not attend the hearing. The court adjourned the hearing until 23 February 2005. 77.  On 23 February and 1 March 2005 the judge was ill and the hearing was adjourned until 1 April 2005. 78.  On 1 April 2005 the applicant was hospitalised in the Prison Hospital and the prosecutor was absent. The hearing was adjourned until 5 May 2005. 79.  On 5 May 2005 there was a change of prosecutors and the new prosecutor requested an adjournment in order to study the case file. The hearing was adjourned until 1 June 2005. 80.  On 1 and 2 June 2005 the court heard the statements of the applicant and his co-accused in respect of the charges against them. The applicant also submitted that he was ill and was unable to participate in the court hearing. The court adjourned the hearing until 28 June 2005. 81.  On 28 June 2005 the court read out the declarations of several witnesses made during the investigation stage of the proceedings. The applicant requested again to be examined by a medical commission, but his request was dismissed and he was warned not to attempt to prolong the examination of the case. The court adjourned the hearing until 15 September 2005. 82.  On 15 September 2005 the hearing was adjourned until 7 October 2005 due to the illness of the judge. 83.  It appears that between 15 September 2005 and 11 January 2006 (the date on which the Government submitted a copy of the criminal case file to the Court) no hearings took place. 84.  At the date of the adoption of its judgment the Court had not been informed by the parties that the criminal proceedings before the Centru District Court had been concluded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Bethesda, the United States of America. 5.  The applicant owns a flat in Cavtat, Croatia. In September 1995 Parliament passed a law governing the temporary use of property of persons who had left Croatia - Temporary Takeover and Management of Certain Property Act ( Zakon o privremenom preuzimanju i upravljanju određenom imovinom - hereinafter the “Property Takeover Act”), which allowed municipalities to temporarily accommodate other persons in such property. 6.  In 1992 R., a policeman, forcibly moved into the applicant’s flat in Cavtat, Croatia. On 25 September 1995 the Konavle Housing Commission granted him refugee status and legalised his occupation of the applicant’s flat. On 30 January 2002 the applicant applied to the Housing Commission for repossession of her property. 7.  On 11 January 2002 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Dubrovnik Municipal Court seeking R.’s eviction. On 27 February 2002 the claim was declared inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. The applicant appealed. 8.  On 29 August 2002 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Construction seeking annulment of the decision authorising R. to occupy her flat. 9.  The judgment of the Dubrovnik Municipal Court of 27 February 2002 was quashed by the Dubrovnik County Court on 30 August 2002 and the case was remitted to the Municipal Court for a fresh trial. 10.  On 1 October 2002 the Amendments to the Act on Areas of Special State Care (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o područjima od posebne državne skrbi – “the 2002 Amendments”) entered into force. They transferred the jurisdiction in the matter from the housing commissions (which were abolished) to the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction and Construction (Ministarstvo za javne radove, obnovu i graditeljstvo – “the Ministry”). 11.  On 25 October 2003 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court upheld the claim and ordered R.’s eviction. R. appealed. 12.  On 12 December 2003 the Ministry set aside the Property Takeover Commission’s decision authorising R. to occupy the applicant’s flat but also stated that R. had the right to housing under section 7 of the Act on Areas of Special State Concern. 13.  The judgment of the Dubrovnik Municipal Court of 25 October 2003 was quashed by the County Court on 17 February 2005 on the ground that no alternative accommodation had been provided to R. Accordingly, the case was returned to the Municipal Court for further examination. On 12 May 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Supreme Court complaining about the length of the proceedings. In a letter of 26 May 2006 the Supreme Court instructed the Dubrovnik Municipal Court to speed up the proceedings. 14.  On 31 May 2006 the Municipal Court again granted the applicant’s claim and ordered R.’s eviction. R. appealed against this judgment to the Dubrovnik County Court. While the case was pending there the applicant once more applied to the Supreme Court complaining about the length of the proceedings. In a letter of 11 September 2006 the Supreme Court instructed the County Court to speed up the proceedings and adopt a judgment. 15.  On 2 October 2006 the County Court again quashed the judgment of the Municipal Court and accordingly the latter was once more required to examine the applicant’s claims. In a judgment of 27 March 2007 the Municipal Court, as in its previous judgments, found in favour of the applicant. R. appealed against this judgment and the appeal is at present pending before the Dubrovnik County Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Moscow. At the material time the applicant was a district councillor. 7.  On 21 August 2003 the non-governmental organisation “City-wide public council for the protection of citizens' rights in town planning and for the protection of the environment” decided to hold an assembly of Krylatskoye district residents at the Zashchitnikov Neba Square in Moscow. The purposes of the assembly were:\n(1)  to protest against the Moscow mayor's failure to respond to the resolution of the assembly held in May 2003;\n(2)  to protest against the planned construction of several luxurious blocks of flats in the place of facilities for sports and children;\n(3)  to cast a vote of no confidence in the city authorities and call for their resignation;\n(4)  to discuss matters of local self-governance. 8.  On 25 August 2003 the applicant, together with three other co-organisers of the assembly, informed the Prefecture of the Western Administrative District of Moscow – the residential district of Krylatskoye being in its jurisdiction – of the date, time, place and purposes of the assembly. The assembly was scheduled to take place from 6.30 to 8.30 p.m. on Thursday, 4 September 2003, with the participation of about a hundred persons. 9.  On 29 August 2003 the prefect of the Western Administrative District of Moscow issued a decision to accept the notice and instructed the police to ensure public safety during the assembly. 10.  The applicant and co-organisers informed residents of the Krylatskoye district about the planned assembly by way of bill-posting. 11.  On 3 September 2003 the prefect cancelled his previous decision of 29 August 2003 “in connection with the operative information of law-enforcement authorities about an expected outbreak of terrorist activities in the Krylatskoye district and with a view to ensuring the safety of the district's residents”. The police were instructed “to take measures to prevent the assembly planned for 4 September 2003 at the Zashchitnikov Neba Square from being held”. 12.  On 4 September 2003 a few dozen residents gathered on the Zashchitnikov Neba Square and the applicant was among them. No loud speakers were deployed and no attempts were made to start a general discussion. Nevertheless, the police dispersed the crowd by force. 13.  On 5, 6 and 7 September 2003 (Friday to Sunday) the “Day of the City” was celebrated throughout Moscow. The programme for the festivities had been approved by the Moscow Government's resolution of 12 August 2003 and included sixty-one events. The events – such as the “World-wide Tea Festival”, the opening ceremony, “Parade of the Festivals”, the European champions' road running cup, the Moscow cup of the automobile all-round competition, the children's artistic and sport performance, sound and light show, students' parade, and many others – took place in major public thoroughfares. The applicant submitted media reports showing that no scheduled events had been cancelled and that the public festivities had been attended by thousands of people. 14.  The applicant left the Zashchitnikov Neba Square in a private car at about 8 p.m. At a nearby crossing the police blocked his car and, holding the driver at gun-point, took the applicant out of the car by force and escorted him to Krylatskoye district police station (ОВД района «Крылатское»). 15.  According to the administrative-arrest record of 4 September 2003, the applicant was arrested for refusing to comply with a lawful order of the police. 16.  Following the applicant's complaints about unlawful police actions, the Kuntsevskiy District Prosecutor interviewed the officers who had apprehended the applicant. Captain F., Officer D. and the driver, L., stated that they had been present at the meeting site since 6 p.m. At 8 p.m., when people were beginning to leave, they had arrested the applicant and taken him to the police station “for clarification of facts, namely the [legal] ground for holding a public assembly”. Mr N., who had been the duty officer at the police station, testified that at 8 p.m. the head of the police station had told him to prepare a report on an administrative offence of disobedience of police orders committed by Mr Makhmudov, who had been “detained for conducting an unauthorised meeting”. 17.  At the police station the applicant was placed in a cell where he remained until he was brought before a judge on the following day (see below). The cell was dirty and covered with spittle; the applicant was not given any food or drink. 18.  On 5 September 2003 the applicant was brought before a judge of the Kuntsevskiy District Court of Moscow. He was charged with disobeying lawful police orders and with organising an unauthorised assembly, these being administrative offences under Articles 19.3 and 20.2 of the Code on Administrative Offences. The two charges were examined separately. 19.  Examining the charge of disobedience, the judge found as follows:\n“During the preparation and examination of the administrative case a number of breaches of the Code of Administrative Offences have been revealed. These breaches are the grounds for remitting the file to the head of the police station...\nIt is not clear from the case material what the offender's stance is with regard to the offence imputed to him; it appears from his statement that he has not committed any offence; however, in breach of Article 28.2 of the Code, the report does not list witnesses who could confirm the guilt of the offender; nor does it refer to other evidence confirming the offending acts or disobedience of police orders. Besides, it transpires from the decision on the institution of administrative proceedings and the opening of an administrative inquiry that on 5 September 2003 an administrative inquiry was ordered, but no such inquiry has actually been carried out as the file does not contain any depositions or other additional material obtained by such an inquiry. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 28.2 § 2 of the Code, a report on an administrative offence punishable by administrative arrest must be submitted for judicial examination immediately after its issuance. The administrative-arrest record concerning Mr Makhmudov had been prepared at 8 p.m. on 4 September 2003 but the material was submitted to the court only at 4.30 p.m. on 5 September 2003. Finally, the report contains no information as to who disobeyed the order, which police officer gave the order, where he gave the order (house number) or what kind of lawful order it was. The administrative-arrest record does not refer to Article 19.3 of the Code, although the breach of that provision was the basis for the applicant's arrest, or to the grounds for arrest; the record does not describe the detainee's clothing, absence or presence of bodily injuries, or to whom the information about the arrest was communicated. The information on the identity of attesting witnesses is incomplete, the attesting witness no. 2 did not sign the record, and witnesses for the defence have not been examined.” 20.  The judge returned the material to Krylatskoye police station for correction of the above defects and ordered the applicant's release at 5.10 p.m. 21.  On 7 October 2003 the police resubmitted the file to the court. 22.  On 29 October 2003 the Kuntsevskiy District Court found that the police had not made good the defects identified in the decision of 5 September 2003. The judge opined as follows:\n“Mr Makhmudov unambiguously declared himself not guilty of the imputed offence and listed the following [nine] witnesses as being ready to testify that he had not committed any illegal actions against the police officers.\nTaking into account that the available material is insufficient for finding Mr Makhmudov guilty of the administrative offence, that the court has taken measures to make good the defects in the material and for supplementing the evidence, and that those defects have not been remedied, the court considers that all the measures for proving Mr Makhmudov's guilt of the offence have been exhausted and – as the available evidence is not sufficient for a finding of guilt – finds it necessary to discontinue the proceedings”. 23.  Following the applicant's complaint that the legal basis for discontinuance of the proceedings had not been set out explicitly, on 2 December 2003 that decision was quashed by a higher court and the matter remitted for a new examination. 24.  On 19 December 2003 the Kuntsevskiy District Court ordered the discontinuance of the proceedings on the ground that the two-month prescription period had expired.\n 2.  The charge of organising an unauthorised assembly 25.  Having examined the witnesses for the defence, who denied that the assembly had taken place, and the police officers who testified for the prosecution, the judge found that the applicant had been in breach of the established procedure for organising public assemblies. He had known that the prefect's decision of 29 August 2003 had been reversed but proceeded nevertheless with organisation of the assembly. The judge fined the applicant 1,000 Russian roubles (approximately 30 euros). 26.  On 6 July 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on an appeal by the applicant. 27.  The applicant challenged the prefect's decision of 3 September 2003 before the Kuntsevskiy District Court. He claimed that it had no legal basis, for Russian law did not permit cancellation of an authorised assembly, that it had been issued too late, on the eve of the assembly, and that it could not be founded on the “operative information”. He also sought a declaration that the police had unlawfully dispersed the assembly by force. 28.  The District Court asked Krylatskoye police station and the police command of the Western Administrative District of Moscow to produce the operative information which had been the basis for cancelling the authorisation. 29.  On 16 December 2003 Krylatskoye police station replied that there had been no such information in their possession. 30.  On 21 January 2004 the police command of the Western Administrative District replied that the material requested was classified as secret and for that reason could not be made available to the judge. 31.  The applicant asked the District Court to relinquish jurisdiction to the Moscow City Court which was competent, under national law, to hear cases involving confidential material. In an interim decision of 30 January 2004, the District Court refused the request, holding that the purpose of the proceedings was to establish whether or not the prefect's decision had been lawful rather than whether the prefect had or had not received information from the law-enforcement authorities. 32.  In a judgment of 30 January 2004, the District Court rejected the applicant's complaint. It established that the prefect had issued the contested decision further to a letter from the head of the police command of the Western Administrative District of 2 September 2003. In that letter, the police officer had asked the prefect to annul his decision of 29 August 2003 because the police command “had received, from various sources, information about potential terrorist attacks in Moscow, in places of mass gatherings”. The District Court continued as follows:\n“In the court's view, the information of law-enforcement authorities about a possibility of subversive and terrorist attacks in Moscow in places of mass gatherings potentially presupposes the existing threat of violence not just against those citizens who intend to take part in the meeting but also against those citizens who had no intention of exercising their constitutional right to freedom of mass assemblies.\nNo evidence contradicting the information contained in the letter from the police command of the Western Administrative District to the prefect of the Western Administrative District has been produced before the court. The prefect's decision of 3 September 2003 was issued not in connection with the notice filed by the assembly organisers but in connection with a threat of increasing terrorist activities in the areas of mass gatherings, with a view to ensuring the security of the Krylatskoye District's residents...\nAssessing the contested decision, the court finds that the prefect ... acted within the competence of the State body and [his actions] were appropriate to the presumed threat and complied with the Russian Constitution...”\nAs regards the forceful actions of the police in dispersing the meeting, the District Court found as follows:\n“Taking into account the submissions by the claimant and his representatives, by the representatives of the police command of the Western Administrative District and of Krylatskoye police station, and having examined the video material submitted by the claimant and by Krylatskoye district council, the court finds that the actions of the Krylatskoye district police, which were aimed at preventing the mass action from taking place in connection with a real threat to life, health and security of citizens, were compatible with [the Moscow regulations on co-ordinated police action during mass assemblies] and the requirements of Article 17 § 3 of the Constitution which prohibits violations of rights and freedom of others, including during the exercise of the constitutional right to organise meetings, demonstrations, marches and pickets, having regard to the special conditions in the city of Moscow.” 33.  The applicant lodged an appeal. He submitted, in particular, that not a single public gathering organised by the Moscow mayor's office in the framework of the “Day of the City” had been cancelled as a result of a potential terrorist threat. He pointed out that the District Court had failed to supply a concrete legal basis for the prefect's decision to cancel the assembly permit. 34.  On 8 April 2004 the Moscow City Court, in summary fashion, rejected the applicant's appeal. 35.  On 13 November 2003 and 25 March 2004 the applicant lodged a civil claim for damages against Krylatskoye police station, the Moscow branch of the federal treasury and the Ministry of the Interior. He sought compensation for unlawful arrest and overnight detention in inhuman conditions, without sleep, food or drink. 36.  On 6 July 2004 the Kuntsevskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's claim, finding that Article 1070 of the Civil Code did not provide for State officials' liability for non-pecuniary damage incurred through unlawful administrative arrest. 37.  On 14 April 2005 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court quashed that decision and remitted the claim for a fresh examination. 38.  On 16 November 2005 the Kuntsevskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's claim again. It noted that in cases of administrative arrest, State officials would be liable for non-pecuniary damage only if a fault on their part were proven. The applicant had been detained for 21 hours and 10 minutes for his failure to comply with a lawful police order. His arrest had been lawful because the Constitution only required a judicial decision if the relevant period of custody exceeded forty-eight hours. The administrative case against him had been discontinued on a formal ground – the expiry of the prescription period – rather than by a finding of his innocence. Having regard to these circumstances, the District Court found that the State officials had acted within their competence and powers and therefore could not be held liable for non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant. 39.  On 2 March 2006 the Moscow City Court, on an appeal by the applicant, upheld the judgment of 16 November 2006, endorsing, in summary fashion, the District Court's reasoning.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and resides in the town of Zhovti Vody, the Dnipropetrovsk Region. 5.  On 28 May 1999 and 18 October 2000 the Zhovti Vody City Court (hereafter “the City Court”) awarded the applicant a total of UAH 5,712[1] against the State owned Electrongaz Company (hereafter “the Company”) in salary arrears. Both judgments became final and were sent to the Zhovti Vody City Bailiffs’ Office (hereafter “the Bailiffs”) for compulsory enforcement. 6.  In a letter of 24 January 2003, the Bailiffs informed the applicant that the enforcement of the judgments in his favour was impeded by the entry into force of the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property 2001, which barred the attachment and sale of the Company’s capital assets. 7.  On 7 March 2003 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court (hereafter “the Commercial Court”) instituted bankruptcy proceedings against the Company and issued an injunction barring any debt recovery. On 10 October 2003 the Commercial Court approved the rehabilitation proposal and appointed a trustee to run the bankruptcy rehabilitation of the Company’s business. 8.  On 21 October 2004 the Bailiffs terminated the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s favour as both awards were paid to him in full.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Silistra. 5.  On 3 September 1997 the applicant was charged with fraud. 6.  Between 3 September and 12 December 1997 he was in custody. 7.  On 27 March 2000 the Silistra Regional Court found him guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. 8.  On 12 October 2000 the Varna Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and remitted the case for further investigation. 9.  On 31 October 2002 the prosecuting authorities terminated the proceedings as it had not been established that the applicant had committed a criminal offence. 10.  On 4 December 2002 the applicant brought an action for damages under the State and Municipalities Responsibility for Damage Act (“the SMRDA”). He initially sought 60,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN), later reduced to BGN 40,000 (equivalent to 20,450 euros (EUR)), in non‑pecuniary damages stemming from his pre-trial detention and the criminal proceedings against him. 11.  On 27 October 2003 the Dobrich Regional Court found that compensation was due under section 2(2) SMRDA as it had not been established that the applicant had committed a criminal offence. It awarded the applicant BGN 6,000 (EUR 3,067) in non-pecuniary damages. 12.  On 6 April 2004 the Varna Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 13.  In a final judgment of 28 October 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation increased the amount of damages awarded to BGN 9,000 (EUR 4,601). 14.  The courts further applied section 10 § 2 of the SMRDA and ordered the applicant to pay in total BGN 2,480 (EUR 1,268) in court fees, which represented 4% of the dismissed part of his claim.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant stood as a candidate in the parliamentary elections of 31 March 2002 in the single-seat electoral constituency no. 72 in the Zakarpattya (Transcarpathia) region (Одномандатний виборчий округ № 72). 5.  Among the candidates registered in that constituency was Mr G., who, at the material time, occupied the post of Head of the Beregovo District State Administration (Zakarpattya Oblast) (Берегівська державна адміністрація Закарпатської області). 6.  On 13 and 28 March 2002 the local Hungarian-language newspapers Bereginfo and Karpati Igaz Szo published the following appeal to voters:\n“We firmly believe that anyone who honours [Mr G.] with their support on Sunday can do so with a clear conscience, placing their faith and trust in him to ensure the best possible future for our country. He is the only candidate who respects all our interests and is capable of representing and defending those interests at the highest level. He is a man of action who will never abuse your trust in him and who will do his utmost to retain the full support of voters in the future.” 7.  The appeal was followed by a large number of signatures, including those of Mrs D., secretary of the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 (Окружна виборча комісія), and Mr O., the Chairman of the same electoral commission. 8.  On 31 March 2002 the parliamentary elections were held. During the elections an observer, acting on behalf of Mr G. in electoral division no. 14 of constituency no. 72, drew up a report (акт) stating that she had witnessed an unknown person depositing several (she believed there were seven) ballots in the ballot box. The report was signed by two voters. The observers sent by Mr G. to electoral divisions nos. 45 and 58 drew up similar reports of such breaches of electoral law, stating that they had seen respectively five and ten ballots being cast in the ballot box unlawfully. 9.  According to the first results generated by the computerised system, the applicant had obtained 33,567 votes, compared with 33,524 for his main opponent, Mr G. In electoral division no. 14 the applicant had obtained 537 and Mr G. 291 votes out of 1,570 votes cast. In division no. 45, out of 1,244 voters 711 had voted for the applicant and 372 for his opponent. In division no. 58 there had been 830 votes, of which 475 had been cast for the applicant and 219 for Mr G. In division no. 67, of 1,480 voters 765 cast their ballots for the applicant and 387 for his opponent. In total, in the four above-mentioned electoral divisions the applicant had obtained 2,488 votes, against 1,269 for Mr G. 10.  By decision no. 36 of 2 April 2002, the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72, on the basis of the above-mentioned observers’ reports, declared the results in electoral divisions nos. 14, 45 and 58 invalid on the grounds of serious breaches of electoral law. It was also established that on the night of 1 April 2002, after the close of polls and the count, the members of the Electoral Commission of division no. 67 had unlawfully opened the sealed polling station and retrieved the original voting records and several invalid ballots. The next day the Chairman of that division’s Electoral Commission had brought those voting records and ballots to the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72. No reason had been given for these actions. Therefore, the results of the elections in division no. 67 were also declared invalid. On the same date the applicant appealed against this decision to the Central Electoral Commission (Центральна виборча комісія – “the CEC”). 11.  By decision no. 37, the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 announced the final results of the ballot, according to which the applicant had obtained 31,079 votes compared with 32,255 for Mr G. This result corresponded to that set out in the first voting record, referred to above, after deduction of the votes in divisions nos. 14, 45, 58 and 67. Mr G., therefore, was declared elected as a member of parliament for the constituency. 12.  On 3 April 2002 the chairmen and members of the Electoral Commissions of divisions nos. 14, 45, 58 and 67 sent statements to the Chairman of the CEC to the effect that none of the official observers had drawn their attention to any breach of electoral law during the voting or the count, and that the documents submitted by the observers complaining of irregularities had been drawn up after the count, “the results of which did not suit one of the candidates”. 13.  By decision no. 750 of 5 April 2002, the CEC, following the applicant’s complaint of 2 April 2002, set aside decision no. 36 and instructed the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 to give a reasoned decision on the results of the vote in the four divisions in question. Referring to the first paragraph of section 70 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the CEC observed that the impugned decision had not been duly reasoned and that there was no conclusive evidence of the alleged irregularities or the allegation that the number of ballots deposited unlawfully had exceeded 10% of the votes cast in each electoral division. 14.  At a meeting of 6 April 2002, the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72, by a majority of nine votes to two with three abstaining, adopted decisions nos. 40 and 41, whereby the vote in electoral divisions nos. 14, 45, 58 and 67 was declared invalid for the same reasons as before. In these decisions the Commission noted that the twelfth paragraph of section 72 of the Parliamentary Elections Act allowed a vote to be declared invalid on account of “other circumstances making it impossible to establish the results of the expression of the electorate’s wishes”, in addition to those enumerated in section 70 of the Act. The Commission further noted that since section 72 did not list these “other circumstances”, the matter fell within its exclusive competence. Lastly, the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 concluded that the irregularities which it had established and those noted by the observers could be considered as “other circumstances”, making it impossible to establish the electorate’s wishes. 15.  On 9 April 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint challenging decisions nos. 40 and 41 of 6 April 2002. He submitted that the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 had not followed the instructions given by the CEC in its decision of 5 April 2002 concerning the need to give sufficient reasons. 16.  By decision no. 858 of 12 April 2002, the CEC rejected the applicant’s complaint of 9 April 2002 on the ground that, in accordance with section 72 of the Parliamentary Elections Act, the task of establishing the existence of “other circumstances” causing the vote to be declared invalid fell to the constituency electoral commission. 17.  The applicant appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court, which, in a judgment of 24 April 2002, upheld the findings of the CEC, including that concerning the exclusive competence of the constituency Electoral Commissions to establish the “other circumstances” provided for in section 72 of the 2001 Parliamentary Elections Act. 18.  On 3 April 2002 Mr V., the applicant’s observer, in the presence of the observers of other candidates and the Chairman and two members of the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72, drew up a report alleging a breach of electoral law. According to the authors, the conditions in the office of the electoral commission located in the basement of the State Administration building in Beregovo were not adequate to ensure that the ballots were kept secure and intact; in particular, they alleged that the doors and filing cabinets had not been sealed, and that one of the doors did not even have a lock on it. 19.  On 5 April 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the CEC, challenging decision no. 37 of 2 April 2002 whereby Mr G. had been announced the winner of the elections in constituency no. 72 20.  On 7 April 2002, after the CEC’s decision no. 750 (see paragraph 13 above), a recount of the votes in the electoral divisions nos. 14, 45, 58 and 67 was held. After the recount, the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 issued a detailed voting record dated 7 April 2002 setting out the results of the ballot in the constituency, which were the same as those stated in its decision no. 37. 21.  On the same day a member of the constituency Electoral Commission, together with two observers of two of the unsuccessful candidates, prepared a memorandum, addressed to the CEC, alleging that the packages containing the ballot papers had not been sealed by the Electoral Commission of division no. 67, that some of the ballot papers had been damaged and that, in view of these factors, access to the ballots by third parties before the recount could not be ruled out. 22.  On 14 April 2002 the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 drew up the corrected voting record (see paragraph 27 below) setting out the results of the vote. 23.  On the same date the deputy chairman and three members of the Electoral Commission of division no. 67 drew up a memorandum, addressed to the CEC, in which they stated that, in breach of the law, the deputy chairman and secretary of the constituency Electoral Commission, accompanied by four officials of the municipal council and the State Administration acting as observers appointed by Mr G., had come to their homes asking them to sign the corrected voting record. The signatories of the document expressed doubts as to the accuracy of the figures given in the record of 14 April 2002. 24.  On 15 April 2002 the corrected voting records were sent to the CEC. 25.  On 16 April 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the CEC seeking to have the record of 14 April 2002 declared invalid. Referring to the appeal to voters published on 13 and 28 March 2002 in the newspapers Bereginfo and Karpati Igaz Szo, he criticised the fact that the chairman and the secretary of the commission had engaged in election campaigning for his opponent. He also noted that the conditions in which the ballot materials had been kept and the new voting record produced cast doubt on the accuracy of the results of the vote obtained after the recount on 7 April 2002. 26.  In a letter of 18 April 2002, the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 informed the CEC that, in accordance with the instructions of the Zakarpattya Oblast Police Department (ГУ МВС України в Закарпатський області), the commission’s office had been properly protected and that no illegal entry had been found to have occurred. 27.  By a decision of 18 April 2002, the CEC examined and rejected the applicant’s complaints of 5 and 16 April 2002. It noted that the voting record drawn up after the recount of 7 April 2002 did not contain certain data, namely the number of invalid ballots, and that the amended record of 14 April 2002 had corrected that error. The CEC further noted that decision no. 37 of 2 April 2002 had been lawful and valid given that, according to the corrected voting record, Mr G. had obtained the highest number of votes. Moreover, no indication was found that the way in which the recount had been organised had affected the accuracy of the results of the vote. The CEC referred in this regard to the letter of 18 April 2002 of the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72 concerning the security of its office. Lastly, the CEC found that the applicant had failed to indicate any ground provided by the Parliamentary Elections Act for the dismissal of the Chairman and the secretary of the Electoral Commission of constituency no. 72. 28.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court, which, in a judgment given on 22 April 2002, rejected his complaint. It held that the decision of 18 April 2002 had been taken within the CEC’s competence and in a manner prescribed by the applicable domestic law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": true, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first applicant, the political party Herri Batasuna, was founded on 5 June 1986. 9.  The second applicant, the political party Batasuna, was founded on 3 May 2001. 10.  On 27 June 2002 the Spanish parliament enacted Institutional Law no. 6/2002 on political parties (Ley Orgánica 6/2002 de Partidos Políticos – “the LOPP”). According to its explanatory memorandum, that Law was intended to develop Articles 1, 6, 22 and 23 of the Spanish Constitution by amending and updating Law no. 54/1978 of 4 December 1978 on political parties, regard being had to the experience acquired over the years, and to establish a complete and coherent framework for political parties, reflecting their role in a consolidated democracy. 11.  The main innovations introduced by the new Law appeared in Chapter II on the organisation, functioning and activities of political parties, and in Chapter III on their dissolution and suspension by the courts of their activities. 12.  Chapter II lays down the basic criteria intended to ensure compliance with the constitutional requirement that the organisation and operation of political parties be democratic and that they may freely engage in their activities in accordance with the Constitution and the law. Section 9 requires parties to respect democratic principles and human rights, describing in detail the type of conduct that would be in breach of the principles in question. According to the explanatory memorandum, the Law is based on the principle that any project or objective is constitutional provided that it is not pursued by means of activities which breach democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens. The Law is not intended to prohibit the defence of ideas or doctrines calling into question the constitutional framework. Its aim is rather to reconcile freedom and pluralism with respect for human rights and the protection of democracy. The explanatory memorandum states that a party may be dissolved only in the event of repeated or accumulated acts which unequivocally prove the existence of undemocratic conduct at odds with democracy and in breach of constitutional values, democracy and the rights of citizens. In that connection, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of section 9 draw a clear distinction between organisations which defend their ideas or programmes, whatever they may be, in strict compliance with democratic methods and principles, and those whose political activity is based on an accommodation with violence, political support for terrorist organisations or violation of the rights of citizens or democratic principles. 13.  Chapter III sets out the grounds on which political parties may be dissolved or their activities suspended by order of the court and describes the applicable procedure in the courts. The Law invests the “special Chamber” of the Supreme Court established by section 61 of the Judicature Act (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial – “the LOPJ”) with jurisdiction for the dissolution of political parties. Furthermore, provision is made for specific priority proceedings, involving a single level of jurisdiction, which may be brought only by the public prosecutor’s office or the government, of their own motion or at the request of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. According to the LOPP’s explanatory memorandum, the proceedings in question are intended to reconcile the principle of legal certainty and the rights of the defence with the principle of promptness and a reasonable time-limit. The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court upon completion of those proceedings may be challenged only by way of an amparo appeal to the Constitutional Court. Section 12 details the effects of the court-ordered dissolution of a political party. Once the judgment has been served, the dissolved party must cease all activity. Furthermore, it may not set up a political organisation or use an existing party with a view to pursuing the activities of the party that has been declared illegal and dissolved. In order to rule as to whether or not there is any continuity between an existing party and a party which has been dissolved, the Supreme Court has regard to whether any “substantial similarity” exists between the structure, organisation and operation of the parties in question, or other evidence such as the identity of their members or leaders, their funding or their support for violence or terrorism. The assets of a dissolved political party are liquidated and transferred to the Treasury to be used for social and humanitarian purposes. 14.  The LOPP was published in the Official Gazette of the State on 28 June 2002 and came into force the following day. 15.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 16.  Founded as an electoral coalition, the political organisation Herri Batasuna took part in the general elections of 1 March 1979 (the first elections in Spain following the entry into force of the 1978 Constitution). On 5 June 1986 it was entered into the register of political parties at the Ministry of the Interior. 17.  Following the Supreme Court’s sentencing on 1 December 1997 of twenty-three members of Herri Batasuna’s national directorate to imprisonment for collaboration with an armed organisation, Euskal Herritarrok (“EH”) was set up on 2 September 1998 to stand in the Basque elections of 25 October 1998, initially as an association of voters and then as a political party. 18.  On 3 May 2001 Batasuna filed documents at the register of political parties seeking registration as a political party. 19.  On 27 September 2002 the Basque autonomous government brought an action before the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the LOPP, criticising in particular sections 1(1), 2(1), 3(2), 4(2) and (3), 5(1), 6 and 9, Chapter III (sections 10 to 12) and paragraph 2 of the sole transitional provision of that Law. 20.  By a judgment of 12 March 2003, the Constitutional Court declared the impugned Law constitutional. As regards the very existence of such a Law making provision for the dissolution of political parties and its purpose which, according to the Basque government, consisted of “establishing a model of militant democracy imposing restrictions on political parties, in particular by imposing on them an obligation, not provided for in the Constitution, to accept a given political regime or system”, the Constitutional Court stated:\n“According to the applicant government, the argument set out above is based on references in certain paragraphs of sections 6, 9 and 10 of the LOPP to the ‘constitutional values expressed in constitutional principles and human rights’ (section 9(1)), to ‘democratic principles’ (sections 6 and 9(2)), to the ‘system of liberties’ and to the ‘democratic system’ (sections 9 (2) and 10(2), sub-paragraph (c)), to the ‘constitutional order’ and to ‘public peace’ (section 9(2), sub-paragraph (c)). Despite the fact that the legal significance of those references can be grasped only in the context of each of the provisions containing them and that each of the provisions in question must in turn be interpreted in the light of the law and of the legal system as a whole, the Basque government’s submission that there is no place, in our constitutional order, for a model of ‘militant democracy’ within the meaning given to that expression by the Government, namely, a model in which not only compliance with, but also positive acceptance of, the established order and first and foremost the Constitution is required, must be endorsed ... The impugned Law allows for no such model of democracy. Right at the outset, the explanatory memorandum lays down the principle of a distinction between the ideas and aims proclaimed by political parties, on the one hand, and their activities, on the other, and states that ‘the only aims explicitly vetoed are those which fall within the criminal law’, so that ‘any project or objective is deemed to be constitutional provided that it is not pursued by means of activities which breach democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens’. Consequently, and as regards the aspect which is of particular interest here, the Law lists as grounds for illegality ‘conduct’ – that is to say, acts – of political parties which, through their activities, and not through the ultimate aims proclaimed in their manifestos, fail to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the Constitution, which the impugned Law merely mentions.\n... Secondly, and most importantly, it is clear that the principles and values to which the Law refers can be none other than those proclaimed by the Constitution, and that their content and scope depend on the meaning arising out of the interpretation of the positive constitutional provisions as a whole. Thus, in our system, ‘democratic principles’ can only be principles specific to the democratic order arising out of the institutional and normative fabric woven by the Constitution, the actual functioning of which leads to a system of powers, rights and balances giving form to a variant of the democratic model which is precisely that assumed by the Constitution in establishing Spain as a social and democratic State governed by the rule of law (Article 1 § 1 of the Constitution).” 21.  As regards the applicant parties’ argument that the provisions of the Law, namely some of the cases referred to in section 9(3) (tacit support, for example), established a “militant democracy” in breach of the fundamental rights of freedom of ideology, participation, expression and information, the Constitutional Court stated:\n“... the system established by the first three paragraphs of section 9 of the LOPP must firstly be described. The first paragraph refers not to a positive adherence of any kind but to simple respect for constitutional values, which must be demonstrated by political parties when engaging in their activities and which is compatible with the broadest ideological freedom. Paragraph 2 provides that a political party may be declared illegal only ‘when as a result of its activities, it infringes democratic principles, in particular when it seeks thereby to impair or to destroy the system of liberties, to hinder or to put an end to the democratic system by repeatedly and seriously engaging in any of the conduct described below’. Lastly, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) list the general criteria for a party to be declared illegal on account of its activities ... As regards paragraph 3 of section 9 of the LOPP, the flawed drafting of its introduction might suggest that the instances of behaviour described by that provision are in addition to those specified in the preceding paragraph and that they must therefore be interpreted separately. However, an interpretation of these two provisions taken together and an interpretation of the whole section which contains them show that the instances of behaviour described in paragraph 3 of section 9 have the general features described in paragraph 2 of the same section. The instances of behaviour referred to in section 9(3) of the Law merely specify or clarify the principal causes of illegality set out in general terms in section 9(2) of the Law. A separate interpretation and application of such conduct can be done only on the basis of the cases provided for in section 9(2).\nThat having been said, while it is not for the Constitutional Court to determine whether or not mere failure to condemn [terrorist acts] can be construed as implicit support for terrorism, it is clear that symbolic actions can be used, in certain circumstances, to legitimise terrorist acts or excuse or minimise their anti-democratic effects and implicit violation of fundamental rights. In such circumstances it is plainly impossible to speak of a violation of the right to freedom of expression.\n...\nThe same can be said, in general, of sub-paragraph (c) of section 10(2) of the LOPP, which provides: ‘where, through its activities, it repeatedly and seriously violates democratic principles or seeks to impair or to destroy the system of liberties or to hinder the democratic system or to put an end to it by means of the conduct referred to in section 9.’ It must also be stated in this regard that that provision concerns only the activities of political parties and in no way extends to their aims or objectives. The wording of that provision shows, therefore, that only those parties which through their activities rather than their ideology effectively and proactively seek to ‘impair or to destroy the system of liberties’ are liable to be dissolved.” 22.  As regards the Basque government’s complaint that the dissolution measure prescribed by law was disproportionate, the Constitutional Court stated:\n“... taken separately, none of the conduct described in section 9 of the LOPP can entail a party’s dissolution. In order for that measure to be pronounced, as stated in section 9(2), the conduct in question must be engaged in ‘repeatedly and seriously’. Secondly, it must be pointed out that the existence of a party which, through its activities, collaborates with or supports terrorist violence, jeopardises the survival of the pluralist order proclaimed by the Constitution and that, faced with that danger, dissolution would appear to be the only sanction capable of repairing the damage done to the legal order. Lastly, it must be stressed that Article 6 of the Constitution contains a definition of a party. According to the Constitution, a party may only be considered a party if it is the expression of political pluralism. Consequently, it is quite acceptable, constitutionally, for a party whose activities undermine pluralism and to a greater or lesser extent destabilise the democratic order, to be dissolved. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has considered that even though the margin of appreciation left to States must be a narrow one where the dissolution of political parties is concerned, where the pluralism of ideas and parties inherent in democracy is in danger, a State may forestall the execution of a policy at the root of that danger [Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 31 July 2001].\n... it is not sufficient to establish the existence of just one of the acts described by the Law. On the contrary, those acts need to be engaged in ‘repeatedly and seriously’ (section 9(2)) or ‘repeatedly or cumulatively’ (section 9(3)). ... To conclude, [the relevant provisions] describe particularly serious conduct and establish as grounds for dissolution only those which are manifestly incompatible with the peaceful and lawful means which are an essential part of the process of political participation to which the Constitution requires political parties to lend their qualified support. ... The criteria established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights as regards the dissolution of political parties have therefore been complied with (United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports 1998‑III; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, ECHR 1999-VIII; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 31 July 2001 and [GC], ECHR 2003‑II; Yazar and Others v. Turkey, nos. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93, ECHR 2002‑II; and Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey, no. 25141/94, 10 December 2002). That case-law states that in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the dissolution of a party must satisfy certain criteria, namely: (a) the law must include the circumstances and causes of dissolution (that criterion is clearly satisfied by the rules at issue, since they are set out in a formal law); (b) the aim pursued must be legitimate (which, as indicated above, consists in the instant case of protecting the democratic process of political participation through the exclusion of any associative organisation which could be likened to a party exercising an activity not falling within the constitutional definition of political parties); and (c) the dissolution must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (demonstrated in the context of the foregoing analysis of the specific causes of dissolution provided for by law).\n... The fact that convicted terrorists are regularly appointed to positions of leadership or entered on lists of candidates for election may appear to constitute an expression of support for terrorist methods which goes against the obligations imposed by the Constitution on all political parties. Furthermore, the fact that such a practice can be taken into account only if the convicted terrorists have not ‘publicly rejected terrorist aims and methods’ cannot be interpreted as an obligation to disavow earlier activities. The provision in question [section 9(3)(c)] is of prospective effect only and applies only to political parties which are led by convicted terrorists or whose candidates are convicted terrorists. It lays down as a cause of dissolution the regular use of people who may legitimately be assumed to sympathise with terrorist methods rather than with any ideas and programmes that terrorist organisations might seek to implement.\n...” 23.  Lastly, as regards the Basque government’s complaint that the principle of non-retrospectivity in relation to section 9(4) of the LOPP and paragraph 2 of the sole transitional provision had been violated, the Constitutional Court held:\n“For the purposes of applying section 9(4) of the LOPP, which lists the factors that can be taken into account in assessing and characterising activities that may give rise to the dissolution of a political party, the aforementioned paragraph characterises as unlawful ‘the establishment, on a date immediately preceding or following the date of entry into force, of a political party which pursues the activities of another party or succeeds that party with a view to evading application of the provisions of this Law in respect of it’. Worded as it is, that provision cannot be held to be unconstitutional as it is quite clear that its sole purpose is to enable section 9(4) of the LOPP to be applied ‘to activities pursued after the entry into force of this Institutional Law’, as stated therein. In no circumstances does it make provision for the judging of activities and acts prior to the LOPP, since only those subsequent to the entry into force of the Law are deemed to be relevant.\nIn other words, the Law specifically states that the various causes that may lead to dissolution of a party may be taken into account only after its entry into force. The activities considered separately and ‘the continuing nature or repetition’ of the activities mentioned in section 9(4), to which the transitional provision refers, are subsequent to the entry into force of the LOPP. That said, for the purposes of determining the significance of those activities and assessing their relevance to the overall conduct of the party concerned (and for that purpose only, since to take account of conduct pre-dating the effective date of the Law in order to justify a declaration of unlawfulness would be unconstitutional because it would constitute a breach of the principle of non-retrospectivity enshrined in Article 9 § 3 of the Constitution), it is perfectly possible to take into consideration what the Law refers to as the ‘trajectory’ (section 9(4)) of the party in question, which trajectory could encompass acts prior to the entry into force of the Law, but that cannot in any way be considered as a retrospective effect under the Constitution.” 24.  The Constitutional Court also rejected the complaints based on the principle of non bis in idem, the lack of foreseeability and the exceptional nature of the Law, the specific features of the judicial proceedings and the allegations concerning the system for founding and registering political parties. Accordingly, it dismissed the applicant parties’ claims, stating in paragraph 23 of its reasoning that sections 3(1), 5(1), 9(2) and (3) and paragraph 2 of the sole transitional provision of the LOPP were constitutional only if “interpreted in accordance with the terms set out in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20 and 21” of the reasoning of its judgment. 25.  The government of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country subsequently lodged an application with the Court (no. 29134/03), which was declared inadmissible on the ground of incompatibility ratione personae on 3 February 2004. 26.  Meanwhile, by a decision of 26 August 2002 delivered in the context of criminal proceedings for illegal association (Article 515 of the Spanish Criminal Code), central investigating judge no. 5 at the Audiencia Nacional had ordered the suspension of Batasuna’s activities and the closure, for three years, of any headquarters and offices that could be used by Herri Batasuna and Batasuna. The same measure was applied to EH, which is not an applicant before the Court. 27.  On 2 September 2002, implementing an agreement adopted by the Council of Ministers on 30 August 2002, the Attorney-General (Abogado del Estado) lodged an application with the Supreme Court on behalf of the Spanish government for the dissolution of the political parties Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna on the ground that they had breached the new LOPP on account of various acts which conclusively demonstrated conduct inconsistent with democracy, constitutional values, democratic practice and the rights of citizens. 28.  On the same day, State Counsel (Procurador General) also filed an application with the Supreme Court with a view to the dissolution of the political parties Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna in accordance with sections 10 et seq. of the LOPP. In his application, he asked the Supreme Court to find that the parties in question were illegal, and order that they be removed from the register of political parties, that they immediately cease their activities and that the effects of the Law be extended to any party newly created in breach of the Law or succeeding any of the parties concerned, that their assets be liquidated and that they be dissolved in accordance with section 12(1) of the LOPP. 29.  On 10 March 2003 Batasuna sought the referral of a preliminary question to the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of the LOPP as it was of the view that the Law as a whole, and several of the sections thereof taken separately, violated the rights to freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of thought, and the principles of lawfulness, legal certainty, non-retrospectivity of less favourable criminal laws, proportionality and non bis in idem, as well as the right to take part in public affairs. 30.  By a unanimous judgment of 27 March 2003, the Supreme Court refused to refer Batasuna’s question to the Constitutional Court, pointing out that that organisation’s challenges to the constitutionality of the LOPP had already been examined and rejected in the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 12 March 2003. It declared Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna illegal and pronounced their dissolution under sections 9(2) and (3) of the LOPP on the ground that they were part of “a terrorist strategy of ‘tactical separation’”. It considered that significant similarities between the three parties at issue, and between them and the terrorist organisation ETA – “three organisations having substantially the same ideology ... and, moreover, tightly controlled by that terrorist organisation” – had been established. It concluded that in reality there existed a “single entity, namely, the terrorist organisation ETA, hidden behind an apparent plurality of legal entities created at different times according to an ‘operational succession’ devised in advance by that organisation”. It also liquidated the assets of the parties at issue, in accordance with section 12(1)(c) of the same Law. 31.  The Supreme Court noted in its judgment that, while political parties constituted the essential foundations of political pluralism, they had to engage in their activities and pursue their aims and objectives in accordance with the law and democratic processes, stating that activities involving the use of violence or restricting the fundamental rights of others could not be tolerated. The Supreme Court referred to the Spanish constitutional system, which, in its view, unlike other legal systems, did not constitute a model of “militant democracy”, since the only condition imposed on the expression of differences was respect for the rights of others. It pointed out that the LOPP recognised that any project or objective was constitutional provided that it was not “pursued by means of activities which breach[ed] democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens”. In that regard, it pointed out that, by law, political parties were liable to be declared illegal only on the basis of “activities” consisting of serious and repeated conduct. In the instant case, according to the Supreme Court, the calls to violence justifying the restriction of the freedoms of the parties at issue stemmed from a deliberate apportionment of tasks between terrorism and politics, ETA devising “justification of the need for terrorism as one of the functions” entrusted to Herri Batasuna. 32.  Bearing in mind the historical and social context of the fight against terrorism in Spain, the Supreme Court held that the terrorist organisation ETA and its satellite organisation, Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (“KAS”), had been directing Herri Batasuna since its creation. To reach that conclusion, it relied on evidence demonstrating the existence of hierarchical links between the three organisations and revealing, in particular, that KAS, as ETA’s delegate, had controlled the process of appointing the most senior members of Herri Batasuna and its successors (EH and Batasuna) and had participated in it. The Supreme Court held that Herri Batasuna had been created in response to ETA’s wish to split armed activity and mass activity “organically and structurally”, which resulted in “clear hierarchical submission” of the parties at issue to the terrorist organisation ETA. In that connection, it referred to a KAS internal document which read as follows:\n“KAS ... considers that armed struggle in association with mass struggle and institutional struggle – the latter serving the former – is the key to the advance and triumph of the revolution; mass struggle likewise requires an historical alliance of Popular Unity, the physical manifestation of which is Herri Batasuna.” 33.  As regards the “operational succession” held to exist between the three political parties that had been declared illegal, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that the people occupying posts of responsibility within the three organisations – notably their spokesperson, A.O. – and belonging to different parliamentary groups, were the same. It also took account of the existence of premises used by all the parties at issue. As regards links between the applicant parties and the terrorist organisation ETA, it noted that several of their members, in particular their spokesperson, A.O., had been convicted of terrorism-related offences. 34.  The Supreme Court held that the evidence set out below, subsequent to the date of entry into force of the LOPP, showed that the applicant political parties were instruments of ETA’s terrorist strategy.\n–  On 3 July 2002 Batasuna had refused to appoint representatives to the Basque parliamentary committee responsible for the situation and needs of victims of terrorism, as it considered it to be “political, manipulated and biased”.\n–  On 3 July 2002, reacting to the decision of central investigating judge no. 5 at the Audiencia Nacional by which Batasuna had been declared civilly liable for damage caused by street violence (kale borroka), A.O., the spokesperson for that organisation, had exhorted the Basque people to respond “energetically to this new attack” and had criticised the decision for having provoked a “serious and anti-democratic situation”.\n–  On 7 July 2002, during a commemoration of the 1936 battle of Monte Albertia, A.O. had made the following statement:\n“We must continue to work and to struggle, either within or outside the law. The reality is that we will not falter because we are at a point in history where the process we have undertaken must be rendered irreversible.”\n–  On 13 July 2002 the mayor and a Batasuna councillor of the municipality of Lezo had taken part in a demonstration in support of ETA terrorists living in Venezuela.\n–  On 16 July 2002, at a gathering outside the San Sebastian navy command, a Batasuna municipal spokesperson, referred to as J.L., had explained that the purpose of that demonstration was to let the State authorities know “that they could not move around with impunity in Euskal Herria”.\n–  On 19 July 2002 J.E.B., Batsuna’s spokesperson in the municipality of Vitoria, had stated that Batasuna “didn’t want ETA to stop killing, but did not want Euskal Herria to have recourse to any kind of violence and wanted those who engaged in it to cease to exist”.\n–  At a plenary session of the municipal council on 30 July 2002 Batasuna had refused to condemn the campaign of threats against councillors of the Basque Socialist Party (PSE-EE) in the municipality of Amorebieta.\n–  At a press conference on 2 August 2002 concerning the potential handover to Spain of K.B., an ETA member convicted in France, the mayor and the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the municipality of Ondarroa, L.A. and A.A., Batasuna members, had declared that they supported K.B. and “all those who [were] in the same situation”.\n–  Batasuna and its leaders had refused to condemn the Santa Pola attack of 4 August 2002 in which two people had died. In that regard, during a press conference in Pamplona A.O. had described that event as a “painful consequence” of the failure to solve the “political conflict” in the Basque Country and had accused the Spanish Prime Minister [then J.M. Aznar] “of bearing the greatest responsibility” for “what [had happened] [at] that time and what [might] happen in future”.\n–  Municipalities run by Batasuna and that party’s website had used an anagram of “Gestoras Pro-Amnistía”, an organisation that had been declared illegal by central investigating judge no. 5 at the Audiencia Nacional and was on the European list of terrorist organisations (Council Common Position 2001/931/PESC).\n–  At a demonstration organised by Batasuna in San Sebastian on 11 August 2002 and run by Batasuna’s leaders A.O., J.P. and J.A., slogans supporting ETA prisoners and threatening expressions such as “borroka da bide bakarra” (the struggle is the only way), “zuek faxistak zarete terroristak” (you, the Fascists, are the real terrorists) or “gora ETA militarra” (long live ETA military) had been used.\n–  On 12 and 14 August 2002, Batasuna-run town halls had put up placards on their facades supporting terrorism or those engaging in terrorism, alluding to the transfer of “Basque prisoners to the Basque Country” and showing photographs of several terrorists.\n–  At a Batasuna press conference held in Bilbao on 21 August 2002, A.O. had criticised the “Spanish State’s genocide strategy” and proclaimed that the Basque people were going to “organise themselves” and “fight” so that some “little Spanish Fascist” could never again tell Basques what their institutions should be. He had also warned the government of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (nationalist government coalition) that if it took part in closing down Batasuna headquarters, the result would be “an unwanted scenario”, expressions which had been interpreted the following day by the media as “a threat against the Basque executive”.\n–  During an interview with the newspaper Egunkaria on 23 August 2002, J.U., Batasuna’s representative in the Basque parliament, had stated that “ETA [did] not support armed struggle for the fun of it, but that [it was] an organisation conscious of the need to use every means possible to confront the State”.\n–  On 23 August 2002 at a Batasuna meeting held in Bilbao following the demonstration organised by that party against its dissolution, J.P. had criticised the leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party for abiding by Spanish law, accusing them of lacking “national dignity”. He had also encouraged the participants to “go out into the street and respond vigorously”.\n–  Municipalities governed by the parties in question had advocated terrorist activities, as evidenced by the fact that two ETA terrorists had been made honorary citizens (hijo predilecto) by the municipalities of Legazpia and Zaldibia.\n–  Since 29 June 2002 Batasuna council representatives in Vitoria and Lasarte-Oria had been committing acts of harassment against the representatives of non-nationalist parties, thus contributing to a climate of civil confrontation.\n–  Municipalities governed by Batasuna had displayed sketches and placards calling for a struggle against the State, against representatives of State power, against other political parties or members of those parties, notably the Prime Minister of the Spanish government and the leaders of the Partido Popular and the Spanish Socialist Party.\n–  After the entry into force of the LOPP, the three parties at issue had continued to pursue the same strategy of complementing, on a political level, the actions of the terrorist organisation ETA in the context of a jointly organised “operational succession”. 35.  Relying on the above evidence, the Supreme Court held that the activity of the applicant political parties, as manifested through conduct in line with a strategy predefined by the terrorist organisation ETA, consisted of “providing assistance and political support to the actions of terrorist organisations with the aim of overthrowing the constitutional order or seriously disturbing the public peace”, within the meaning of section 9(2)(c) of the LOPP. It concluded that the conduct of which the applicant parties had been accused corresponded to the cases referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (f) and (h) of paragraph 3 of section 9 of that Law. It stated firstly that some of the conduct described, such as Batasuna’s demonstration in San Sebastian, where pro-ETA slogans had been heard, could be characterised as explicit political support for terrorism, while other conduct, such as the refusal of Batasuna and its leaders to condemn the Santa Pola attack of 4 August 2002, sought to “justify terrorist actions and minimise their importance and the violation of the fundamental rights arising therefrom”. In that connection, the Supreme Court stated:\n“In the constitutional context, the existence of political parties which, from an intellectual point of view, fail to take a clear and unequivocal stance against terrorist activities or which, with calculated ambiguity, systematically seek to conceal the fact that they do not disavow criminal acts by officially deploring the consequences thereof without, however, censuring in any way the barbaric behaviour of those who cause such acts through the use of violence to achieve their objectives, cannot be tolerated.\n...\nFor the purposes of these proceedings, the repeated strategic and systematic silence of a political party concerning terrorist activities can only be interpreted, from a political and constitutional viewpoint, as a clear sign of their ‘acceptance by omission’ or ‘implicit acceptance’, that is, as their alignment with the arguments of the perpetrators of those criminal actions and the tacit acceptance of violence as a means of achieving set objectives which, in our constitutional system, can only be achieved by peaceful means.” 36.  The court held, secondly, that other conduct of which the applicant parties had been accused, such as the harassment of representatives of non-nationalist parties in the municipalities of Vitoria and Lasarte-Oria, had contributed to the emergence of a climate of civil confrontation intended to intimidate opponents of terrorism and deprive them of their freedom of opinion. 37.  It observed, thirdly, that conduct such as publicly describing ETA prisoners as political prisoners or using the anagram of “Gestoras Pro-Amnistía” proved that the parties at issue were using symbols reflecting terrorism or violence. It noted, lastly, that the applicant parties had also taken part in activities in praise of terrorist activities. 38.  Turning to the need for and the proportionality of the dissolution of the applicant parties, the Supreme Court pointed out that it was taking account of the text of the Convention and of the Court’s case-law, which would serve as a guide in the interpretation of fundamental constitutional rights, in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Spanish Constitution. It considered that, in view of the applicant parties’ frequent calls to violence, as established by the above-mentioned evidence, the measure to dissolve the applicant parties had been justified for the purposes of protecting the fundamental rights of others, “a necessary element of democracy”. The Supreme Court referred in particular to the Court’s judgment in Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, ECHR 2003‑II), considering that that judgment imposed on parties claiming to exercise functions in a democratic society a real legal duty to distance themselves from any ambiguous or unclear messages as to the use of violence (ibid., § 131). It pointed out furthermore that the calls to violence at issue in the case before it appeared to be more explicit than those at issue in the case submitted to the Court. 39.  Batasuna and Herri Batasuna lodged two amparo appeals with the Constitutional Court against the judgment of the Supreme Court. 40.  In their appeals, they complained firstly of the lack of impartiality of the President of the Supreme Court, who had been the reporting judge in the proceedings leading to their dissolution even though he was the president of the Judicial Council, the body which had issued a favourable report on the bill resulting in the Law at issue. They submitted that the conflation of jurisdictional and consultative functions in one person had resulted in a loss of objective impartiality. Batasuna relied in that regard on Article 24 § 2 of the Constitution (right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal). 41.  Secondly, the applicant parties alleged that the guarantees of a fair trial had not been rigorously observed in so far as the dissolution of Batasuna had been based, inter alia, on the conduct attributed to certain Zaldibia and Legazpia municipal councillors, who had made an alleged member of ETA and an ETA member who had been convicted and had served his sentence honorary citizens (hijo predilecto), facts which had been established ex parte, after completion of the phase of the proceedings during which new evidence could be introduced and without the applicant parties having been able to defend themselves against such allegations. 42.  They complained, thirdly, of a violation of the presumption of innocence, submitting that the facts deemed to have been proven in the judgment of the Supreme Court had been based on a single press release and that Batasuna and its members had been deemed to have carried out acts attributable to another political organisation, namely EH. Moreover, they criticised the judgment of 27 March 2003 for having considered as established fact that Batasuna had been created on the basis of an agreement between the leaders of Herri Batasuna and ETA, and that Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna were in fact one and the same organisation which had been assigned certain functions by ETA and which acted under the instructions of the latter, while those allegations had actually been based on documents having no probative value and on the statements of expert witnesses working for the Spanish government. 43.  Fourthly, and lastly, the applicant parties considered that their right to freedom of expression, thought and association had been breached as a result of their dissolution. 44.  By two unanimous judgments of 16 January 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeals. 45.  In the judgment on Batasuna’s amparo appeal, the Constitutional Court repeated the arguments contradicting the applicant parties’ submissions concerning “militant democracy” set out in its judgment of 12 March 2003. It pointed out that “any project or objective [was] constitutional provided that it [was] not pursued by means of activities which breach[ed] democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens”. It also pointed out that “the constitutionality of section 9 of the LOPP ha[d] been recognised by judgment 48/2003” and that “the answers to the objections raised by Batasuna as to the constitutionality [of the conduct described by the provisions of the Law at issue] could be found in the legal bases of that Law”. 46.  The Constitutional Court stated:\n“The refusal of a political party to condemn terrorist attacks can be seen, in certain cases, as ‘[...] tacit political support for terrorism’ [section 9(3)(a) LOPP], or ‘legitimising terrorist actions for political ends’ [section 9(3)(a) LOPP], in so far as it may excuse terrorism or minimise the significance thereof ... The failure to condemn terrorist actions also constitutes a tacit or implicit manifestation of a certain attitude towards terror. ... Against a backdrop of terrorism that has been in place for over thirty years, with those responsible always legitimising terror by claiming equality between the types of forces fighting each other and by presenting it as the only possible solution to an allegedly historical conflict, the refusal of a party to condemn a specific terrorist attack, which undeniably reflects that party’s wish to disassociate itself from the condemnatory stance taken by other parties in relation to such acts, is all the more significant since it reflects the position of a party which has sought to pass off the terrorist phenomenon as an inevitable reaction to the past and unjust aggression of a terrorised State. ... Furthermore, ... the refusal to condemn [terrorist acts], combined with serious and repeated acts and conduct, indicates an accommodation with terror which runs counter to organised coexistence in the context of a democratic State. ... It must therefore be concluded that it would not appear to be unreasonable or erroneous to take account of facts judicially established in proceedings having observed all the guarantees covering the grounds for dissolution laid down by the LOPP – whose unconstitutionality in abstracto was ruled out by Constitutional Court judgment no. 48/2003 – thus ruling out any possibility of a breach of Article 24 of the Constitution, and that no substantive fundamental right, such as the right of political association (Articles 22 and 6 of the Constitution), the right to freedom of conscience (Article 16 § 1 of the Constitution) and the right to freedom of expression (Article 20 § 1 (a) of the Constitution) has been breached.” 47.  Lastly, in the reasoning of its judgment the Constitutional Court pointed out that in its appeal, Batasuna had literally alleged that the effect of the LOPP “had been to deprive ideologies linked to terrorism and violence of any possibility of developing lawfully, in breach of the procedural definition of democracy”, and had argued that the Law at issue declared unlawful “the mere fact of providing political and ideological support to the actions of terrorist organisations with the aim of overthrowing the constitutional order”. It held that this “link with terrorism and violence” ... “fell outside the constitutionally legitimate scope of the exercise of freedom of association and freedom of expression and could therefore be prohibited by the democratic legislature”. 48.  As regards Herri Batasuna’s amparo appeal, the Constitutional Court again referred to its judgment of 12 March 2003, in which it had indicated that the various causes of dissolution of parties could only be taken into account as of the entry into force of the Law, stating, however, that “for the purpose of determining the significance [of the activities listed by the Law] and assessing their importance having regard to the overall conduct of the party at issue (and for such purposes only, since to take account of conduct prior to the entry into force of the Law in order to justify a declaration of illegality [would have been] unconstitutional in that it [would have] breached the principle of non-retrospectivity enshrined in Article 9 § 3 of the Constitution), it [was] perfectly possible to take into consideration what the Law called the ‘trajectory’ (section 9(4)) of the party at issue which could encompass conduct prior to the entry into force of the Law, without it being possible in any circumstances to consider that to be a case of retrospective application prohibited by the Constitution”. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the applicant party had not been dissolved because of acts pre-dating the entry into force of the Law or conduct attributable to other parties, but because it had been held that Batasuna, Herri Batasuna and EH “constituted ‘successive units’ of a single reality – namely a political organisation used as a tool by a terrorist group for unlawful purposes –, that the successive forms assumed by a single political party had de facto been dissolved, and that the dissolution pronounced by the Supreme Court had been based on subsequent facts stated as being entirely attributable to the applicant party on account of the fact that the Supreme Court had found the three dissolved parties to be materially identical”. 49.  Lastly, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaints of lack of impartiality and failure to comply with the principle of adversarial proceedings as lacking any constitutional basis. 50.  On 6 June 2007 ETA ended the ceasefire that it had declared on 24 March 2006. Since that date, several fatal attacks have been carried out in Spain.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the city of Kaliningrad, in the Kaliningrad Region. 6.  On 15 August 2002 the applicant and two other persons were arrested in Moscow on suspicion of drug trafficking during an undercover police operation. 7.  According to the applicant, the police officers allegedly ill-treated him during the arrest, planted a sachet of drugs into his pocket, and took his money and car documents. 8.  On 17 August 2002 the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant's placement in custody. On 19 August 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against that detention order but it was never examined. 9.  On an unspecified date the investigating authorities allegedly seized the applicant's car. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with drug trafficking and the case was transferred to the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow for trial. 11.  On 28 March 2003 the Ostankinskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of having acquired, transported and sold drugs in an organised criminal group on a particularly large scale. The court established that the applicant, his two co-accused and several other persons had organised a criminal group with a view to drug trafficking. The applicant had transported the drugs and had surveyed the sales. Before the court, he claimed that he had never sold drugs and that the undercover agents had planted them on him. The court dismissed the applicant's submissions, relying on the testimonies of his co-accused and the police officers, including anonymous witness A., and other physical evidence. It sentenced the applicant to nine years' imprisonment and a confiscation of property. 12.  On 22 July 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment. 13.  From 17 August 2002 to 2 April 2003 the applicant had been held in remand centre IZ-77/2 in Moscow. 14.  For the first ten days the applicant was held in cell no. 157 where the conditions of detention were satisfactory. 15.  On 28 August 2002 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 283 which was designed for six persons and had five or six bunks but accommodated eight inmates. The applicant was afforded less than one square metre of cell space. For six months he did not have daily walks. He was not provided with bedding. The lavatory was not separated from the living area and was two metres away from the dining table and one metre away from the bunks. The windows were covered with bars and metal shutters which limited access to natural light. In December 2002, while the outside temperature dropped to between -20º and -28ºC, the cell was not heated; the walls were covered with frost and the applicant had to sleep in his jacket. In November and December 2002 he did not have access to shower. The cell was full of smoke because all inmates smoked, the applicant being a non-smoker. The cell was infested with lice and cockroaches. The applicant's complaints to the administration were left without reply. 16.  On an unspecified date after the trial the applicant was transferred to a cell for convicts where four to five detainees had to share one bunk and slept in shifts.\n(b)  Remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow 17.  From 2 April to 16 August 2003 the applicant was held in remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow, firstly in cell no. 213 and later in cell no. 714. 18.  Cell no. 213 was designed for 30 persons but housed over one hundred inmates. The detainees had to sleep in shifts. The applicant was not provided with bedding. The cell swarmed with lice, bugs and cockroaches but the administration did not provide disinfectants. The lights and the TV were always on. The cell had no ventilation and was filled with smoke. The applicant constantly suffered from hypertension and nose bleeding, developed dermatitis and lost over twenty kilograms in weight. As a result of the inflammation of his sciatic nerve and aggravation of radiculitis, his legs became numb, limiting his ability to move. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to cell no. 714 in the medical wing of the remand centre where he was given anti‑hypertensive medications and received anaesthetic injections to relieve him from pain.\n(c)  Remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk 20.  From 17 to 28 August 2003 the applicant was detained in remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk. 21.  The cell where the applicant was detained had three-tier bunks, two detainees sharing one bunk. No bedding was provided. The cell was smoky and infested with insects. The lavatory was not separated from the living area.\n(d)  Hospital no. 1 of prison IK-8 in Kaliningrad 22.  From 27 October 2004 to 16 February 2005 the applicant stayed in hospital no. 1 of prison IK-8 in Kaliningrad. He was not provided with bedding or any hygiene items. His cells swarmed with lice, bugs and cockroaches and the applicant developed dermatitis. The applicant was held together with Sh., suffering from schizophrenia and advanced tuberculosis and a HIV-positive detainee who had bleeding wounds on his body and used common tableware. He was also kept together with inmates having infectious hepatitis. The food and water were of bad quality and the applicant was deprived of a daily walk. 23.  Referring to certificates issued by the head of remand centre IZ-77/2 and dated 21 and 29 July 2008, the Government stated that in 2002-2003 the maximum capacity of remand centre IZ-77/2 had been 2,110 persons. At the material time the remand centre had accommodated 3,194 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 150 measuring 57.9 square metres and cell no. 283 measuring 10.5 square metres. 24.  With reference to the above certificates, the Government submitted that the applicant had at all times been provided with at least 4 square metres of cell space, a personal sleeping place and bedding. His cells had been sufficiently lit and ventilated and properly heated in winter. The metal shutters in all of them had been removed pursuant to an instruction of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation of 26 November 2002. The cells had been permanently disinfected and the cell windows had been glazed in winter. The applicant had had weekly access to a shower and his bedding had been replaced accordingly. 25.  The Government stated that it had been impossible to indicate the exact number of persons who had been held together with the applicant in his cells owing to the destruction of the logbook containing the headcount of detainees held in the remand centre (книга количественной проверки лиц, содержащихся в следственном изоляторе). 26.  The Government also provided a barely legible copy of the applicant's cell record card (камерная карточка), according to which he had been provided with bedding and cutlery.\n(b)  Remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow 27.  At the time of the applicant's detention in remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow, the centre's maximum capacity had been 1,250 inmates. The applicant had been held there in cells nos. 202, 213 and 704, measuring, respectively, 32.7 square metres, 28.5 square metres and 36.2 square metres. 28.  With reference to certificates issued by the head of remand centre IZ-77/3 dated 22 and 31 July 2008 and the applicant's cell record card, the Government submitted that the applicant had been at all times provided with at least 4 square metres of cell space, a personal sleeping place and bedding. His cells had been sufficiently lit and ventilated and properly heated in winter. The metal shutters in all of them had been removed pursuant to an instruction of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation of 26 November 2002. The cells had been permanently disinfected and the cell windows had been glazed in winter. The applicant had had weekly access to a shower and his bedding had been replaced accordingly. 29.  The Government stated that it had been impossible to indicate the exact number of persons who had been held together with the applicant in his cells owing to destruction of the logbook containing the detainee headcount. 30.  The Government enclosed copies of records of the destruction of documents from IZ-77/3 dated 20 September 2005 and 10 April 2006. According to the first record, on 20 September 2005 an official commission of remand prison IZ-77/3 had destroyed the following documents: lists of prisoners participating in the detention facility's household activities (списки осужденных, используемых на хозяйственных работах), daily orders concerning security and control (суточные приказы по охране и надзору), guard reports (постовые ведомости), check lists (проверочные списки), regulations on the structural subdivisions of certain internal affairs entities (положения о структурных подразделениях органов внутренних дел), and correspondence with various organisations. According to the report of 10 April 2006, on that date a commission consisting of officials of IZ-77/3 had destroyed the following documents: documentation concerning the facility's personnel drills (документы учебных тренировок с личным составом), records of planned and control searches (акты плановых и контрольных обысков), lists of prisoners participating in the detention facility's household activities, a plan of supervision of IZ-77/3 (план надзора ИЗ-77/3), correspondence with various organisations, and copies of orders given by the head of IZ-77/3.\n(c)  Remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk 31.  While the applicant had been detained in remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk, the capacity of that detention facility had been 945 detainees and it had accommodated 894 inmates throughout 2003. In remand centre IZ‑67/1 the applicant had been detained in cell no.171 measuring 17.5 square metres. 32.  The Government made further submissions concerning the material conditions of the applicant's detention in IZ-67/1 similar to their statements concerning remand centres IZ-77/2 and IZ-77/3 summarised above.\n(d)  Hospital no.1 of IK-8 in Kaliningrad 33.  The Government made no submissions concerning hospital no. 1 of IK-8 in Kaliningrad. 34.  In August 2004 the applicant allegedly asked for dental treatment and paid for it. After several consultations the head of the colony's hospital allegedly refused to continue the treatment, which caused the applicant physical and mental suffering because he was unable to eat. 35.  On 11 August 2004 the applicant complained to the colony hospital about the rapid deterioration of his eyesight but was refused any treatment. 36.  One month later, when the applicant was practically unable to move by himself, the administration authorised an ophthalmologist paid by the applicant's wife to examine the applicant. He was diagnosed with retinal detachment in both eyes and urgent surgery was recommended. 37.  In October 2004 the applicant was transferred to hospital no. 1 of IK-8 in Kaliningrad. 38.  It appears that despite the applicant's repeated requests he was not examined by any specialist until December 2004. 39.  On 20 December 2004 an ophthalmologist examined the applicant and diagnosed him with total retinal detachment in both eyes. 40.  On 22 December 2004 a medical panel established that the applicant's illness was incompatible with his continued detention. He was discharged from the hospital on 16 February 2005. 41.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant was granted disability status in connection with his loss of sight. 42.  By a decision of 13 May 2005, the Tsentralny District Court of Kaliningrad ordered the applicant's release from custody owing to health reasons. It appears that he was released on the same day. 43.  In March 2006 the applicant issued proceedings against colony IK-9, colony IK-8 and the Ministry of Finance, claiming compensation in the amount of 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the refusal to provide him with medical treatment, which had in turn caused him to lose his eyesight. It transpires that throughout the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer that he had appointed. 44.  By a judgment of 26 March 2007 the Tsentralny District Court of Kaliningrad granted the applicant's claims in part. The judgment, in so far as relevant, reads:\n“... It follows from the reply of the head of the medical unit of the Kaliningrad regional department of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences... dated 4 April 2005, [the applicant] had been under medical supervision in the medical unit of colony OM-216/9 from 10 September 2003. Upon admission he was examined by a medical panel which concluded that his state of health was satisfactory. Since autumn 2004 [the applicant] had started noticing a rapid deterioration of his eyesight. On 20 October 2004 he was examined by an ophthalmologist. The preliminary diagnosis was: “secondary retinal detachment in both eyes?” To confirm the diagnosis [the applicant] was admitted to hospital no.1 where he stayed from 1 December 2004 to 16 February 2005 and received an in-patient clinical and X-ray examination. The diagnosis was confirmed: “total retinal detachment in both eyes”.\n...\nWitness S. interviewed by the court submitted that she had examined [the applicant] on his wife's request in colony IK-9 on 20 October 2004 when she had diagnosed him with [retinal detachment in both eyes]. She had indicated that he needed an additional examination in a hospital.\n...\nThe medical expert panel in its report no. 98 established the following.\nThe materials available [to the medical panel] do not enable it to establish the exact period of time when [the applicant] acquired the illness which had entailed declaring him disabled.\nHowever it is reasonable to assume that the illness (total retinal detachment in both eyes, in respect of which disability status was granted [to the applicant]) started developing on 15 June 2004 when [the applicant] first complained of periodic blinking of dark spots in his eyes and deterioration of his eyesight.\nAfter examining the case materials and the medical documents, the panel discovered grave defects in the diagnostics and medical treatment during [the applicant's] stay in hospital no.1:\n- in spite of the applicant's complaints of deterioration of his eyesight and the ophthalmologist's request for his additional examination in connection with the diagnosis of secondary retinal detachment in both eyes made on 27 October 2004, [the applicant] was not examined in due time. He was only examined on 20 December 2004 – that is, two months after his admission to the hospital, which had major implications and negative consequences for his eyesight.\n- At the examination in hospital after the diagnosis of “total retinal detachment in both eyes”, [the applicant] did not undergo the ultrasound eye scanning ordered on 20 December 2004. The scanning was indispensable for establishing the origin of his illness, which could have been caused by a trauma, a tumour, myopia, or excessive physical effort.\nAccording to the conclusion of the special medical panel, [the applicant] suffers from total retinal detachment in both eyes which has caused total blindness. It is impossible to establish the exact reason of this condition owing, in particular, to the defects in [the applicant's] examination and treatment in hospital no.1.\n...\nAccording to the clinical data available in [the applicant's] medical file, in 2000 he suffered from slight myopia in both eyes – 0.2 in the right eye and 0.1 in the left eye, corrigible to 1.0.\nMoreover, the development of the applicant's eye problems permits the expert panel to conclude that heightened tension was not the reason for him developing total two-sided retinal detachment.\nThe [applicant's] illness, which entailed his disability, has a clear causal connection with the defects in his medical treatment.\nDespite the fact that the exact reason for [the applicant's illness] could not be identified, grave defects of examination and treatment took place. During the first examination by an ophthalmologist on 20 October 2004 the latter diagnosed [the applicant] with two-sided retinal detachment with a retained pink reflex of the pupil, which indicates that at that moment [the applicant] did not suffer from total retinal detachment and, if treated in due time, a positive outcome including partial preservation of eyesight could not have been excluded. At the examination on 20 December 2004 [the applicant] was already diagnosed with total two-sided retinal detachment.\nHence, the delays in providing [the applicant] with qualified ophthalmologic surgery played a crucial rule in his becoming blind.\nBearing in mind the above mentioned circumstances of the case, the court considers that grave defects in the applicant's examination and treatment while in detention, which had caused his blindness, caused him physical and mental suffering.\nUnder those circumstances the court, taking into account the character of the mental and physical suffering sustained by [the applicant] as a result of his inadequate medical treatment during the service of his prison sentence, which had caused his blindness, considers it appropriate to award him 300,000 Roubles in respect of non-pecuniary damage against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.” 45.  By a special decision (частное определение) taken on the same date as the above-mentioned judgment, the Tsentralny District Court called on the head of Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (“the FSES”) and the head of the Kaliningrad regional department of the FSES to pay attention to the fact that the examination of the applicant's case had revealed the lack of proper organisation of medical treatment for convicts in the colonies of the Kalningrad Region, which seriously endangered their life and health. Both officials were requested to inform the court of the measures taken in that respect within the time-limits provided by the relevant national legislation. 46.  The outcome of that request remains unclear. 47.  On 30 May 2007 the Kaliningrad Regional Court dismissed the prosecutor's appeal against the judgment of 26 March 2007. In particular, it rejected the prosecutor's argument that the amount of the award was excessive and found that it was reasonable and adequate. 48.  The judgment of 26 March 2007 and the appeal decision of 30 May 2007 referred to the applicant's family name as “Romakhov” instead of “Romokhov”. 49.  On 30 May 2007 the judgment of the Tsentralny District Court of Kaliningrad became final and enforceable. 50.  On 24 August 2007 the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation received unspecified “enforcement documents” from the applicant in respect of the above judgment. 51.  On 17 October 2007 the Ministry of Finance received further unspecified “enforcement documents” from the applicant. 52.  By a letter of 21 November 2007 the Ministry of Finance returned the first set of documents to the applicant because he had failed to enclose a duly certified copy of the judgment and his bank details. 53.  By a letter of 5 December 2007 the Ministry returned the second set of documents to the applicant because he had again failed to submit a duly certified copy of the judgment and his bank details. 54.  On 13 February 2008 the Ministry of Finance received the required documents. 55.  On 29 May 2008 the amount of 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) was transferred to the applicant's bank account. 56.  In support of their submissions the Government furnished a copy of the payment order of 29 May 2008, according to which the amount of RUB 300,000 had been transferred to the applicant's account on that date. 57.  According to the applicant, the delay in the execution of the judgment of 26 March 2007 had been caused by the fact that the first-instance court had misspelled his family name as “Romakhov” instead of “Romokhov”, both in the first-instance judgment and the related writ of enforcement.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Thessaloniki. 5.  On 6 March 2000 he lodged an action (no. 2145/2000) with the civil courts seeking the annulment of his late uncle’s will, according to which certain property had been bequeathed to A.A. The applicant alleged that his late uncle had made A.A. his heir after being deceived and blackmailed by her. 6.  On 25 April 2000 A.A. brought criminal complaints against the applicant for malicious defamation, claiming that he had maliciously made false statements in action no. 2145/2000 causing damage to her reputation. 7.  On 29 January 2001 the applicant was prosecuted by the Athens First Instance Prosecutor and the case was remitted to the Athens First Instance Criminal Court. 8.  On 27 June 2005 the Athens First Instance Criminal Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to a suspended prison sentence of eight months (judgment no. 46411/2005). 9.  On the same day the applicant lodged an appeal with the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal challenging the First Instance court’s findings and its evaluation of the evidence. 10.  By judgment dated 18 September 2006 the Court of Appeal reduced the applicant’s sentence to a suspended prison sentence of five months (judgment no. 6800/2006). 11. On 27 October 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation. On 29 March 2007 he lodged additional grounds of appeal. The appeal on points of law was heard on 16 October 2007. 12.  By judgment dated 28 May 2008 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal (judgment no. 1396/2008). This judgment was finalised on 23 July 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1940, 1944 and 1933 respectively and live in Istanbul. 5.  In 1995 Kocaeli Provincial Private Administration Office (Kocaeli İl Özel İdare Müdürlüğü) expropriated a plot of land belonging to the applicants in order to expand the Kocaeli organised industrial zone. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plot of land and the relevant amount was paid to the applicants following the expropriation. 6.  On 23 October 1996 the applicants brought an action in the Gebze Civil Court of First Instance requesting additional compensation. The applicants argued that the plot of land in question should have been considered as urbanised land (arsa) instead of rural land. Three on-site inspections were conducted and three separate expert reports were received by the court. The applicants requested the court to dismiss two experts who took part in the preparation of a report, alleging that these experts were not impartial since they were civil servants. During the hearing on 22 December 1997, the applicants stated that they agreed to base the additional compensation on the lowest amount submitted in the expert reports. On 29 December 1997 the First Instance Court decided that the plot of land in question should be classified as urbanised land and awarded the applicants a certain amount of additional compensation. When deciding on the amount of additional compensation, the court relied on the outcome of another action which qualified the same plot of land as urbanised land. 7.  On 16 June 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on the ground that the expert reports were not sufficient basis for a judgment. 8.  On 4 November 1998 the Gebze Civil Court of First Instance challenged the decision of the Court of Cassation (direnme kararı). The case file was transferred to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation for Civil Law Matters (Hukuk Genel Kurulu). 9.  On 23 December 1998 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 4 November 1998. 10.  On 9 May 2000 the Gebze Civil Court of First Instance decided that the plot of land was of rural nature. In reaching this decision, the court conducted four more on-site inspections and relied on four additional expert reports, where the experts observed that the plot was not reserved for habitation under any urban plan (imar planı) of the Municipality or the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement; it was not situated within residential areas; and there was no annotation in the land registry that this plot was to be used for tourism purposes. Instead, the plot was classified as “field” in the Land Registry. Following the on‑site inspections, the experts decided that the plot should be classified as rural land. Against this background, the court awarded the applicants an additional compensation of 22,568,437,760 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 13,080 euros (EUR)) plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 15 October 1996 for Mr Ali Erdem and from 22 October 1996 for the other applicants. 11.  On 19 September 2000 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. 12.  On 26 January 2001 the Court of Cassation dismissed the request for rectification. 13.  On 20 February 2001 the Kocaeli Provincial Private Administration Office paid the applicants the total sum of TRL 72,198,960,506 (approximately EUR 41,850) interest included.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Maribor. 6.  On the evening of 3 November 1983, the applicant, who was eight months pregnant and was returning home from work, was attacked by three men, A.M., T.D. and N.T. They pulled her into a car, drove to a remote location and raped her one after the other. 7.  Immediately after the incident, the applicant went to the Maribor Police. The police arrested the three men at around midnight. They remained in custody following an investigating judge’s order. They were released from custody on 24 November 1983. The applicant was taken to the Maribor Hospital to be medically examined. 8.  On 5 November 1983 the police lodged a criminal complaint against A.M., T.D. and N.T. accusing them of rape. Three days later, the Maribor District Public Prosecutor asked the investigating judge of the Maribor Basic Court to open an investigation. 9.  During the investigation, three reports concerning the examination of the crime scene were prepared, and the three accused men and witnesses were heard by the investigating judge. T.D. and N.T. admitted to having had sex with the applicant, but denied that any force had been used. A.M. denied having had sex with the applicant. 10.  On 13 March 1984 A.M., T.D. and N.T. were charged with aggravated rape under section 100 § 2 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Slovenia. The proceedings that followed were conducted in secrecy in order to protect the private lives of those involved. 11.  The first trial hearing was scheduled for August 1988. However, it was adjourned due to the absence of A.M. and N.T. Another hearing to be held on 24 February 1989 was adjourned because it had proved impossible to serve a court order on N.T. In this connection, the Government pointed out that all three men had been born outside the territory of Slovenia and were Roma. At the time of the incident, two of them (A.M. and T.D.) resided in Slovenia, while the third (N.T.) resided in another part of what was then Yugoslavia. 12.  On 14 December 1989, an order for detention pending trial was issued against N.T. because he was considered to pose a flight risk. However, he could not be found and went missing. Therefore, an arrest warrant was issued against him on 25 April 1990, which could not, however, be executed. In May 1995, the court conducted inquiries as to the whereabouts of all three defendants and established the places of residence of A.M. and T.D., but not that of N.T. A hearing on 13 October 1995 was adjourned due to the absence of A.M.’s defence counsel. As his whereabouts could not be established, on 26 October 1995 the charges against N.T. were severed into a separate case. 13.  N.T. could not be found and brought to trial in the following years, so an international arrest warrant was issued against him in 2004. However, his whereabouts remained unknown and the charges against him were dropped on 1 October 2008. The international arrest warrant was revoked on 29 September 2010. 14.  The main hearing in the case against A.M. and T.D. began on 18 November 1996 and continued on 27 and 30 March 1998, 29 April 1998 and 5 June 1999. Thirty-one other hearings were scheduled between 29 November 1995 and 4 March 2002, though they were all postponed, mainly due to the absence of the defendants or of their counsel. From 2000 onwards, a number of steps were taken in order to ensure the presence at trial of T.D., who had apparently been absent from Slovenia for some time. At the end of 2000, the presiding judge proposed that he be placed in detention to prevent him failing to appear at court for hearings, but the extrajudicial panel rejected this proposal, ordering that less severe measures, such as bringing him to hearings by force, should be envisaged first. 15.  On 7 July 2003 T.D., who was then fifty years old, died. On 16 January 2004 the part of the case concerning the charges against him was severed from the ongoing proceedings. 16.  The Maribor District Court held hearings on 26 May 2004 and on 3 November 2004. The court, amongst other things, heard A.M., the applicant, her husband and five other witnesses, read out the statements given by T.D. and N.T. earlier in the proceedings, and looked into the applicant’s medical reports, the record of the examination of the scene of the crime, the record of the examination of A.M.’s car and a variety of other documents. 17.  On 3 November 2004 the court issued a judgment finding A.M. guilty of the criminal offence of aggravated rape. He was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison. When setting the sentence, which was below the minimum three-year sentence prescribed by law, the court referred to the significant lapse of time from the commission of the crime. It noted that the reasons for the delays in the proceedings had been predominantly caused by the behaviour of T.D. and N.T. 18.  Following an appeal by A.M., on 10 November 2006 the Maribor Higher Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. It instructed the Maribor District Court to examine whether A.M. had committed the criminal offence in question or had only attempted to commit it, and whether he had previously known the applicant, which might have raised doubts as to her credibility. 19.  On 24 April, 15 June, 14 September, 19 October and 6 November 2007, the court held hearings at which it heard the applicant and a number of witnesses. On the last of those dates, the Maribor District Court issued a judgment finding A.M. guilty of aggravated rape under section 100 § 2 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Slovenia. It sentenced him to two-and-a-half years in prison, referring to the extreme amount of time that had passed since the commission of the offence. 20.  Following a further appeal by A.M., on 10 July 2008 the Maribor Higher Court further reduced his sentence to one year in prison, referring to the passage of time, A.M.’s young age (namely 21) at the time of the event, the fact that he had not been later convicted of any other criminal offence, his deteriorating health and the fact that he had a minor child. It upheld the reminder of the Maribor District Court’s judgment. 21.  A.M. submitted an appeal on points of law (a request for the protection of legality), which was rejected by the Supreme Court on 3 September 2009. 22.  Meanwhile, on 28 July 2009 the applicant had instituted civil proceedings against A.M. seeking damages in the amount of 50,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage suffered as result of the rape which had been established by the final criminal judgment. 23.  On 31 March 2010 the court issued a default judgment. On 18 May 2010 A.M. appealed, arguing that he had not been duly summoned to appear. A hearing was held on 6 September 2010. On 23 December 2010 the court granted reinstatement and summoned the parties to appear at a hearing on 31 March 2011. However, this hearing was adjourned until 24 May 2011 at the request of the defendant’s counsel. On that date the parties reached a court settlement by which A.M. was to pay EUR 15,000 (by means of a number of instalments) to the applicant. The civil case was consequently concluded. The applicant alleged that she has not received any compensation to date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946. 6.  On 6 December 1995 L.T. who had been wounded by a gunshot, requested that a criminal investigation be instituted. Consequently, an investigation in rem was instituted. On 17 January 1996 the applicant was arrested in connection with the investigation. On 18 January 1996 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor imposed pre-trial detention on him and three other suspects on charges of acting in an organised criminal gang and aggravated assault. The prosecutor considered that the evidence had justified the charges against the applicant, who was also suspected of being a leader of the criminal gang. It was further noted that other members of the gang had not yet been arrested. There was therefore a serious risk of collusion and suppression of evidence. Furthermore, there were grounds for believing that the applicant had ordered someone to murder L.T. The applicant appealed. 7.  On 22 January 1996 the prosecutor served the applicant with a written statement of the charges against him. This document referred to the investigation concerning the attempted murder of L.T. The prosecutor observed that the evidence gathered in this investigation had given rise to a suspicion that the attempt on L.T.’s life had been made by an organised criminal gang engaged in assaults and racketeering. Evidence given by certain witnesses, who were to remain anonymous pursuant to Article 164 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969, had unequivocally demonstrated that the applicant was a member of that gang. Hence, charges in respect of criminal offences punishable under Article 276 § 1 of the Criminal Code had to be laid against him. 8.  On 2 February 1996 the Łódź Regional Court upheld the applicant’s detention order of 18 January 1996. It noted that the evidence gathered sufficiently supported the charges against him. It indicated that it was likely that the applicant was a member of an organised criminal gang, committing aggravated assaults with the use of firearms. Having regard to the evidence given by anonymous witness no. 2, and in particular in the light of the statements given by other witnesses, including anonymous witnesses, and having also regard to various documents and the results of the inspection of a car, the court concluded that the charges against the applicant were justified. The character of those charges, involving violent crimes, also justified the decisions to impose and maintain detention, the more so as other members of the gang still remained at liberty. The applicant’s release would endanger the purpose of the ongoing investigation. 9.  On 29 February 1996 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor ordered that an expert opinion be prepared for the purposes of the further investigation. Altogether, fifteen expert opinions were prepared during the investigation. 10.  On 2 March 1996 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor refused the applicant’s new application for release, considering that the evidence gathered in the case, in particular the statements made by the anonymous witnesses, indicated that it was necessary to keep him in custody. 11.  On 12 April 1996 the Łódź Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 28 June 1996, having regard, in particular, to the evidence given by anonymous witnesses nos. 1 to 9. It observed that new developments were to be expected regarding new offences which had come to light, including a crime of manslaughter which appeared to have been committed with the applicant’s involvement. Moreover, new witnesses were to be questioned and further expert evidence had to be gathered, having regard to sixteen expert reports which had been prepared for the purposes of the investigation.\nThe court referred to the evidence gathered in the case and considered that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences concerned. The court also took into account that the applicant had been charged with serious crimes committed by an organised criminal gang. It further referred to the need to continue the process of gathering evidence. 12.  On an unspecified later date in June the applicant’s detention was further extended. Subsequently, on 24 September 1996, the Łódź Court of Appeal held a session during which it extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention until 29 December 1996. 13.  On 21 October 1996 the applicant was granted full access to the file and arrangements were made for him to study it. He examined the file daily from 21 to 31 October and subsequently from 4 until 25 November 1996. Later on, the applicant read the file on 28 and 29 November and from 2 to 8 December 1996. 14.  On 26 November 1996 the Łódź Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 17 January 1997. It observed that the investigation was coming to an end and that the prosecuting authorities had begun to acquaint the suspects with the files. However, it seemed that the suspects, while availing themselves of their procedural rights in this respect, were at the same time trying to prolong the proceedings by various delaying tactics. Thus, it was necessary to extend their detention. 15.  On 20 December 1996 a bill of indictment against the applicant and his ten co‑defendants was lodged with the Łódź Regional Court. The applicant was charged with eleven criminal offences. The bill of indictment concerned fifty different crimes. The case file numbered thirty‑one volumes. 16.  On 17 January 1997 the Supreme Court refused to entertain an appeal by the applicant against the decision of 26 November 1996, finding that, in any event, the time-limits for detention as specified in Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had ceased to apply after the bill of indictment had been lodged with the court. 17.  The first hearing in the case was held on 24 February 1997. From February 1997 until February 1999 the court held seventy-nine hearings. On 25 January 1999 the first-instance court sentenced the applicant to eight years’ imprisonment on various charges. 18.  The applicant appealed. On 4 April 2000 the Łódź Court of Appeal quashed the judgment in part and remitted this part of the case to the first‑instance court. It upheld it in so far as it related to the charge of intimidating witnesses by recourse to physical violence. It upheld the applicant’s conviction in respect of that charge and imposed on him a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. It ordered that the period of detention pending trial be counted towards the sentence. Accordingly, the applicant’s sentence had expired on 18 January 2000. 19.  From 4 April 2000 the applicant was again detained pending trial. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against the judgment of 4 April 2000 in so far as the latter court had upheld the judgment of 25 January 1999. On 3 December 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 20.  On 21 November 2000 the Łódź Regional Court started to hold hearings in the part of the case which had been remitted for re‑examination. Between November 2000 and March 2001 it held fourteen hearings. 21.  On 12 April 2002 the Łódź Regional Court convicted the applicant of various criminal charges and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Nüziders, Austria. 6.  On 16 July 1994 the applicant damaged his car in a car accident. He had taken out insurance with the insurance company IVA. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7.  On 28 July 1995 the applicant and IVA instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Ljubljana Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Ljubljani) seeking damages in the amount of 205,012 tolars (approximately 850 euros) for the car damage.\nOn 5 July 1996 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions and adduced evidence.\nOn 5 July and 8 October 1996 he requested that a date be set for a hearing.\nOn 17 January 1997 the court held a hearing. Since the defendant did not appear before the court and failed to reply to the applicant’s claim, the applicant requested the court to issue a default judgment.\nOn 12 February 1998 the court decided to recommence the hearing in the present case. 8.  On 17 March 1998 the applicant appealed.\nOn 5 October 2000 the Ljubljana Local Court dismissed the appeal.\nOn 19 October 2000 the applicant appealed.\nOn 9 August 2001 the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani) dismissed the appeal. 9.  In the meanwhile the first-instance court continued the proceedings concerning the applicant’s claim.\nOn 20 April 1998 the applicant requested that the defendant’s reply to the claim be served on him.\nBetween 12 May 1998 and 17 December 2003 the applicant lodged six preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.\nBetween 16 October 1998 and 7 May 1999 he made three requests that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the four hearings held between 26 May 1998 and 16 January 2004, one was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nDuring the proceedings, the case was transferred twice to a new judge for an undetermined reason.\nAt the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, rejecting the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 16 February 2004. 10.  On 18 February 2004 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani).\nOn 11 January 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination.\nThe decision was served on the applicant on 7 March 2005. 11.  On 6 May and 13 July 2005 the applicant lodged preliminary written observations with the Ljubljana Local Court.\nThe proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Irkutsk. 5.  In 1989 the applicant's husband received a fatal work-related injury. In 1990 the applicant was granted compensation by her husband's former employer, a private company (“the company”). 6.  On 10 March 1997 the applicant brought court proceedings against the company, following numerous re-calculations of the amount to be paid and regular failures of the company to effectuate the payments. In particular, she sought compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, penalties for the belated payments and indexation of such payments and re-calculation of monthly payments with subsequent indexation. 7.  On 11 February 1998 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk (“the District Court”) granted the applicant's claims in part. The judgment was set aside on appeal on 26 June 1998 by the Irkutsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) which required a new hearing of the case. The appeal court also issued a special statement reprimanding the judge in charge of the applicant's case for erroneous application of the law that resulted in the quashing of the judgment and delays in the proceedings. 8.  Once back at the trial court, the case was assigned to judge V., and on 7 December 1998 it was transferred for unspecified reasons to judge T. 9.  On 16 December 1998 the hearing did not take place as the respondent failed to appear. 10.  On 24 March 1999 the hearing again did not take place due to the judge's illness. 11.  On 13 August 1999 the respondent's representative requested to adjourn the proceedings as he was ill. The proceedings were adjourned to 18 October 1999 with account of the judge's vacation. The parties were requested to provide some additional evidence. 12.  On 18 October 1999 the proceedings again were adjourned at the respondent's representative's request. The respondent was notified that in the event of a default in appearance on 30 November 1999 the case would be examined in its absence. 13.  On 30 November 1999 the court invited the applicant to provide some additional evidence and adjourned the hearing to 7 February 2000. 14.  On 7 February 2000 at the applicant's request the hearing was adjourned to 21 April 2000. On the latter date the hearing did not take place as the judge was away for training. 15.  The hearing of 7 June 2000 did not take place due to the judge's illness. 16.  On 28 October 2000 the case was transmitted back to judge V. 17.  On 27 December 2000 the hearing was adjourned to 14 February 2001 at the respondent's representative's request. 18.  On 22 February 2001 the applicant submitted the amended claims and calculations. 19.  On 27 June 2001 the hearing was adjourned as the respondent's representative requested the court to obtain certain evidence. 20.  From 31 July to 10 December 2001 no hearings were scheduled due to the judge's illness and subsequent vacation. 21.  On 25 January 2002 the hearing did not take place as the applicant's representative failed to appear. 22.  The hearing of 4 March 2002 was adjourned on account of a need to obtain certain evidence. 23.  On 10 April 2002 the case was transferred to judge P., again for unspecified reasons. A hearing was scheduled for 29 August 2002. 24.  Between 29 August and 15 October 2002 three hearings did not take place due to the applicant's failure to appear. 25.  On 13 November 2002 the District Court granted the applicant's claims in part awarding her a lump sum of 7,311 Russian roubles (RUB), RUB 3,600 in penalties and RUB 3,600 in legal expenses. 26.  On 3 April 2003 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 27.  On 17 November 2003 the proceedings were deemed enforced in the part concerning the amount of RUB 7,311. 28.  On 13 December 2005 the District Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings against the company in the part concerning the remainder of the award due to the fact that the company had been liquidated in October 2005 and had no assets to cover the applicant's claims. 29.  It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  On 8 December 1995 S.M., a powerful businessman, lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, who, between March and October 1995, had asked for 20,000 US dollars (USD) for his sick wife, and instead had used the money to buy a Mercedes and a BMW car. The applicant claimed that he was working for the Protection and Guard Service (Serviciul de Protecţie şi Pază), a state body with attributions in the field of national security, but later on the investigation showed that on 5 April 1995 he had been released from duty.\nSimilar complaints of fraud were made by other alleged victims of the applicant. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 11 January 1996 and brought to the Bucharest District Police Detention Centre. The next day the prosecutor ordered his pre-trial detention in the same police facility.\nIn a statement made on 12 February 1996 the applicant informed the prosecutor that he had psychiatric problems that made him unfit for detention and therefore asked to undergo psychiatric tests (see paragraph 23 below). 8.  On 4 April 1996 the Bucharest District Court rejected a request by the prosecutor for an extension of the applicant’s detention. On 8 April 1996 the applicant was released from custody. 9.  On 12 June 1996 the prosecutor ordered the applicant to be remanded in custody. On 14 June 1996 he was arrested again and placed in police detention. 10.  On 24 July 1996 the Bucharest County Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 4 April and extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 11.  He was released again on 18 December 1997. 12.  The parties’ submissions concerning the conditions of detention differ significantly. 13.  According to the applicant, during the first four weeks of his detention he was beaten by masked police officers and by inmates, on the orders of the investigators. 14.  He was woken up in the night and interrogated, under threat of death. He was forced to bend over with his hands handcuffed behind his knees. The investigators would then hang him with his head downwards from a truncheon passed between his hands and legs. He was beaten on his feet with his shoes on until he lost consciousness. 15.  He was subject to the same treatment every two to four days. 16.  He used to be taken to the first-floor offices and beaten over the back and head with 1.5 metre-long metal-reinforced wooden truncheons, while the investigators verbally abused him. 17.  On an unspecified date an inmate called “Nelu” raped the applicant, with the help of other inmates and encouraged by the investigator. He also broke the applicant’s teeth with his fist when the applicant refused to open his mouth. 18.  His inmates urinated on his food and forced him to eat it. 19.  The applicant told his wife about the ill-treatment and she informed his lawyer, who managed to have the applicant moved to a different cell but the applicant was again subjected to ill-treatment by his new inmates. He was forced to squat and do push-ups all night long under the supervision of an inmate. If he refused to obey, the next day he would be beaten. He was not allowed to use the toilets but was beaten when he urinated in the cell. 20.  According to the applicant, the treatment inflicted by the investigators was far worse than that he suffered at the hands of his inmates. Once he was punched in his liver by the police until he almost lost consciousness. 21.  The Government denied that any ill-treatment had been inflicted on the applicant. 22.  They presented a detailed report of the applicant’s detention and medical treatment, based on the prison records and medical files. According to that report, from 30 January to 9 February 1996 the applicant had shared a dormitory with twelve other detainees, including M.I. 23.  From 9 to 28 February he was kept in Jilava Prison Hospital. On 22 February 1996 the psychiatric doctors from the Mina Minovici Forensic Medicine Institute examined the applicant and diagnosed him with a personality disorder. He was prescribed antidepressants. The diagnosis was confirmed by the same Institute on 8 August 1996, on the prosecutor’s request. 24.  From 28 February to 1 April 1996 he was held in the Bucharest Police Detention Centre again and placed in a dormitory with ten other inmates: M.I., B.Y., T.G., C.M., G.M., V.G., L.N., P.N., V.C. and R.S.M. 25.  On 1 April he was sent to Jilava Prison Hospital where he remained until 8 April. He was diagnosed with depression, anxiety and hemiplegia of the left side of his body. 26.  From 14 June to 7 September 1996 he was held in the police facilities again and shared a cell with four other inmates. He spent the rest of his pre-trial detention in Jilava Prison Hospital, where he was treated for depression and a personality disorder. 27.  No detainee named “Nelu” was identified by the prison authorities. 28.  No complaints by the applicant concerning the conditions of detention were registered with the authorities during his detention. 29.  On 16 February 1996 the applicant’s wife lodged a criminal complaint with the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court, claiming that her husband was being subjected to ill‑treatment in detention. She claimed that she had noticed marks of violence on her husband’s face on 14 February 1996 when she had visited him in the prison hospital. He had told her that he had been beaten. 30.  On 15 March 1996 the applicant gave testimony before the prosecutor. The relevant parts of his statement are as follows:\n“I was arrested... and put in a cell with seven other detainees for the first two-three weeks. During that time the prisoner responsible for maintaining order in the cell, a certain “Nelu”, tried to sexually abuse me. During the same period I was taken for questioning and kicked in my stomach and face; I received blows to my cheeks and was kneed... by three to four persons wearing civilian clothes and masks ... This treatment is still going on...\nI should also mention that in ... 1995 I was treated for spasmophilia; in May 1995 I suffered from depression and received treatment for it ... and I was treated for anxiety.” 31.  On 21 March 1996 the prosecutor took depositions from M.I. and S.C., two inmates who stated that they had shared a cell with the applicant, the first from 30 January to 1 April 1996 and the second from 7 March 1996 to an unspecified date. They both stated that the applicant had not complained of ill-treatment by investigators and had not been subjected to any violence in the cell. 32.  On 4 April 1996 the Mina Minovici Forensic Medicine Institute, which had examined the applicant upon the prosecutor’s request, rendered its report, describing the applicant’s condition as follows:\n“1)   pale yellow ecchymoses of 6/7 cm on the right arm, at 1/3 distance from the palm, with receding contour, hard upon palpation (old haematoma, ...);\n2)   pale yellow zone with hyper-pigmented centre, uneven contour, ... isolated on the left arm, at approximately 1/3 distance on the front side (plaque of 5/4 cm);\n3)  semicircular ecchymose of 7/5 cm on the right inguinal zone (with pale yellow centre), bluish with greeny yellow margins and visible contour;\n4)  complains of pain in the right hypochondrium.\nPalpation: liver, approximately 5 cm under the rib cage, very sensitive. Specialist examination recommended (ultrasound scan).\nConclusion: “Georgescu Florin presents injuries caused by hitting with hard objects which could have taken place 15 to 30 days before the medical examination. He would have needed 6 to 7 days’ medical treatment for his injuries.” 33.  On 19 April 1996 the military prosecutor took the following decision: 34.  On 24 April 1996 the military prosecutor sent the following letter to the applicant’s wife:\n“The investigation showed that the facts complained about had taken place because of the conflicts between [the applicant] and his inmates, caused by [the applicant’s] mental illness. They had not been caused by the wardens.” 35.  Neither the applicant nor his wife received a decision by the prosecutor. 36.  On 26 August 2003, on the applicant’s request, the Bucharest Military Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that on 19 April 1996 the prosecutor had decided not to prosecute, as the facts complained about were not prohibited by the criminal law. 37.  On 27 December 1995 the applicant gave the Bucharest Police documents required for the investigation into the allegations against him.\nOn 28 December 1995 his deposition was taken by the police in connection with the facts under examination. The next day the police decided to open a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant. 38.  On 10 January 1996 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court opened criminal proceedings against the applicant on various charges of forgery and abuse of official position. 39.  The applicant’s testimony was heard again either by the police or by the prosecutor on 11, 12 and 30 January, 19 March, 11 June, 9 July and 15 August 1996.\nFrom January to June 1996 several witnesses and alleged victims gave testimony in the case.\nThe applicant’s wife’s deposition was heard by the investigators on 27 December 1995, 5 and 31 January, 19 March and 11 June 1996. 40.  On 11 January, 16 March and 6 June 1996 searches were conducted at the applicant’s home. A Mercedes and a BMW car found in his garage were confiscated and valued by an expert at USD 18,654. On 2 April 1996, with the applicant’s wife’s agreement, the two cars were given to S.M. in compensation for the damage he had sustained. 41.  On 13 September 1996 the prosecutor opened a separate file for the offences allegedly committed between 28 March and 3 April 1995 and referred the case to the Bucharest Military Prosecutor’s Office, as the applicant had been a military officer during that time. 42.  On 16 September the same prosecutor indicted the applicant for an act of fraud allegedly committed on 6 June 1996. On 6 October 2000 the applicant was convicted by the Bucharest District Court. This application to the Court does not concern the proceedings referred to in this paragraph. 43.  Several witnesses gave testimony before the military prosecutor. On 7 December 1999 the Military Prosecutor’s Office decided not to prosecute the applicant for the offences committed before 3 April 1995 and referred the case back to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court in respect of the offences allegedly committed between 26 June and 15 October 1995. It also noted that the applicant had tried to abscond during the investigation. On his request, the applicant was informed of this decision on 8 August 2003 but did not receive a copy of it. 44.  The prosecutor attached to the Bucharest County Court opened the investigation but could not hear the applicant’s testimony before 27 June 2001, as the latter had allegedly absconded. 45.  On 9 September 2002 the prosecutor at the Bucharest County Court also decided not to prosecute the applicant and made reference to the military prosecutor’s decision of 7 December 1999 concerning the same facts. However, on 23 September 2002 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest Court of Appeal annulled the decision and ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings against the applicant. 46.  The case was referred back to the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest County Court on 26 September 2002 and from there to the police for further investigation on 6 November 2002. 47.  On 10 February 2003 the applicant gave testimony. 48.  On 10 March 2003 the police returned the file to the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest County Court with a proposal to indict the applicant. However, on 4 July 2003 the prosecutor closed the investigation as the case had become time-barred. 49.  On 5 November 2003 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court informed the applicant of its decision. 50.  The applicant asked the Bucharest District Court to release a copy of the transcripts made during the hearing of 4 April 1996. This information was requested by the Court. 51.  In a letter of 4 September 2003 the president of the District Court informed the applicant that it was impossible to obtain the document as the file was situated in the old archives which were being reorganised. 52.  In 1995 the Romanian Intelligence Service requested the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice to start a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant for having allegedly blackmailed senior civil servants and businessmen between February and July 2005, pretending to be an employee of the Intelligence Service. 53.  On 11 October 2005 the High Court Prosecutor’s Office relinquished competence in favour of the Bucharest County Court Prosecutor’s Office. On 24 October 2005 the latter searched the applicant’s home and confiscated several documents, including the following:\n-  a letter of 11 August 2003 from the Court concerning the present application;\n-  the medical expert report of 4 April 1996;\n-  the criminal complaint of 16 February 1996;\n-  the military prosecutor’s letter of 24 April 1996;\n-  copies of a letter addressed by the applicant to the Court and of a letter addressed to the Anti-Corruption National Prosecutor’s Office. 54.  All these documents were returned to the applicant on 1 and 21 February 2006. 55.  The applicant claimed that the investigators and the secret services had tried to intimidate him in order to make him withdraw his application to the Court. 56.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the Bucharest District Court. 57.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an action for compensation for illegal detention under Articles 504 and 505 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He considered that the prosecutor’s decision to terminate the proceedings on the ground that they were time-barred had infringed his right of access to a court and had caused him additional damage in so far as it had not ordered the restitution of the two confiscated cars. 58.  In a decision of 27 April 2004 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the applicant’s detention did not fall within any of the categories provided for in Article 504 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he had not proved ownership of the two cars.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Ms I. S., was born in 1962 and lives in Bielefeld. 6.  The applicant married in 1986 and had two children. In 1991 and 1992 she suffered miscarriages and a stillbirth, which caused her a long lasting psychological trauma. 7.  In summer 1999 she became pregnant with twins after an extramarital affair. The natural father insisted on an abortion, as did the husband of the applicant. Both men threatened to leave her. 8.  In November 1999 the husband of the applicant moved out and threatened to stop paying maintenance for his two sons and to the applicant. He put further pressure on her by threatening to break off all contact with his sons if she sued for maintenance. Instead, he offered to move back in with the applicant if she gave away the “illegitimate” children. The applicant’s sister and her mother refused to support her. The applicant felt extremely guilty for having destroyed the family situation for her two sons, yet she was determined not to have an abortion. 9.  On 19 April 2000 the twin sisters, S. and M., were born prematurely. The applicant and the newborn children had to remain in hospital, where until 7 May 2000 the applicant cared for the children.\nThe applicant did not specify the identity of the natural father of the twins. 10.  The applicant made initial contact with the Bielefeld Youth Office during her pregnancy. She allegedly initially thought about having the twins placed in foster care, due to her difficult family and financial situation. The Bielefeld Youth Office – according to the applicant – instead suggested adoption as the applicant herself or her husband would have to pay for the foster care. 11.  From January until October 2000 the applicant received psychological treatment on the advice of her gynaecologist. According to her psychoanalyst the applicant was depressed, had suicidal tendencies, and suffered from anxiety, panic attacks and extreme feelings of guilt as well as a sleeping disorder. The applicant felt overwhelmed by the situation and the decisions to be taken. The potential adoption was a topic of discussion during the treatment. 12.  As the applicant could not take the newborn children home she consented to having them placed in provisional care with a view to later adoption. In this way she hoped to avoid too many changes of the children’s primary carers. She was allegedly told that if placed in foster care the newborns would first be given to an emergency foster family for six months before being handed over to a long-term foster family. 13.  From 8 May 2000 onwards a staff member from the Bielefeld Youth Office advised the applicant to stop visiting the children if she really intended to give them up for adoption. 14.  On 19 May 2000 the children were handed over to the couple who later became their adoptive parents. 15.  In summer 2000 the applicant personally met the future adoptive parents of the twin sisters. The applicant was allegedly so upset that she burst into tears and had to cut the visit short. 16.  On 1 September 2000 it was legally acknowledged that the husband of the applicant was not the father of the twin sisters by judgment of the Bielefeld District Court (no. 34 F 1306/00). The applicant began to work full time in order to support herself and her two sons. 17.  On 9 November 2000 the applicant formally consented to the adoption of the children in a deed before the civil law notary, D.R., in Bielefeld. The declaration reads as follows:\n“I hereby give consent for my children, S. and M., born 19.04.2000 in Bielefeld, to be adopted by the married couple identified under no. [...] on the list of the Bielefeld City Youth Office.\nI declare this for the use of the competent family court. I am aware that this declaration cannot be revoked.\nI have been instructed by the civil law notary as to the legal consequences of the adoption, in particular the fact that all kinship of the children and their children to me and my relatives will cease as will all duties and rights that follow from kinship.\nAlthough I do not know the names of the future parents of my children I trust that the Bielefeld City Youth Office has made a proper choice regarding the parents and respected the interests of the children.\nIn case the family court wishes to inform me about the beginning or the end of care, the beginning or the end of guardianship regarding my children or about the granting of adoption, I hereby empower the Bielefeld City Youth Office to receive that information for me.” 18.  As the identity of the natural father of the children remained unknown, he could not consent to or object to the adoption. 19.  After the declaration of consent had been made, the applicant, the prospective adoptive parents and the twin infants met again in person. On 25 November 2000 an oral agreement was reached between the prospective adoptive parents and the applicant at a meeting at Stormarn District Social Services in the presence of a staff member. It was considered that the adoptive parents would send a short report together with photographs of the children to the applicant once a year through the Bielefeld Youth Office. Whether this agreement laid down any rules regarding regular meetings between the children and the applicant is disputed. A personal meeting in summer 2001 was considered, but did not take place. 20.  On 1 February 2001 the future adoptive parents declared in a deed before a civil law notary that they wished to adopt the twin sisters S. and M. 21.  In March 2001 the District Administrator (Landrat) of Stormarn District, Department of Social Services and Adoption gave an expert opinion on the development of the children in the care of the prospective adoptive parents. 22.  On 21 June 2001 the guardianship division of the Reinbek District Court (proceedings no. 2 XVI 1/01) held a hearing with the prospective adoptive parents in the presence of the twins. The record of the hearing reads:\n“It was debated how the children have been getting on in the family. Particular attention was paid to addressing anxieties resulting from the fact that the natural mother is obviously having enormous difficulties coping on a psychological level with the fact that she has given away her children. There are signs, given that a half-open adoption was agreed on, which lead to the conclusion that the mother seeks contact with the twins. However, the arrangement involving the staff of the Youth Office and the natural mother remains valid, namely, that photographs of the children are to be sent annually to the natural mother. The children will also be told early on that they were adopted.” 23.  On the same day the Reinbek District Court concluded the adoption of S. and M. and declared them the legitimate children of the adoptive parents. The family and the given names of the children were changed accordingly. 24.  On 11 April 2002 the applicant commenced proceedings before the Bielefeld District Court in order to declare her consent to the adoption void. The court transferred the case to the competent Reinbek District Court (no. 2 XVI 6/02). The applicant argued that the adoption was void because the father of the child had not consented to the adoption. She further argued that at the time of giving her consent she had been either in a temporary or in a pathological state of mental disturbance, which had prevented the free exercise of her will. She had not been aware of what she had been doing. She argued – referring to medical evidence – that she had been suffering from an “aggravated reactive form of depression with acute risk of suicide” since 1992, when she had been traumatised by the stillbirth. 25.  The guardian ad litem of the children argued that a revocation of the adoption would be against the best interests of the children, as since their birth they had been almost continuously in the care of the adoptive parents who had established a very good parental relationship with them. 26.  In reaction to the arguments of the guardian ad litem the applicant partly withdrew her application with regard to custody rights and made clear that her aim was no longer to integrate the children into her own family. She acknowledged that the children were well cared for and fully settled in the adoptive family. She underlined that her aim was to regain kinship in order to have a right to contact with the children. In her view her vulnerable situation at the time of the birth had been exploited by the Bielefeld Youth Office; she now felt that she had been unduly influenced to put the children up for adoption. 27.  The Reinbek District Court procured a psychiatric opinion on whether the applicant had been temporarily legally incapable of acting at the time of consenting to the adoption. The expert contacted the applicant, her psychoanalyst at the time and her long-term gynaecologist. According to the psychiatric expert the applicant had been in a situation of extreme conflict from the time she had become aware of her pregnancy. This had aggravated the depression she was already suffering from due to the accidental stillbirth in 1992. He put the applicant’s decision to put the twin sisters up for adoption down to her desire to “get her husband back”. He diagnosed a certain weakness in the applicant’s personality and a dependency on male authority. However, he could not diagnose any past or present psychotic illnesses and therefore concluded that although she had been suffering from a deep inner conflict at the time of consenting to the adoption, the applicant had been legally capable of making a decision on her own. 28.  On 4 June 2003 the court heard the applicant, who explained how, in her view, the Bielefeld Youth Office had unduly used her wish to see her children in the summer of 2000 in order to pressurise her into signing the adoption declaration. 29.  In a decision of 10 June 2003 the Reinbek District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It acknowledged the situation of extreme conflict the applicant had been in at the time of consenting to the adoption and the psychological implications of that. It stated that solutions other than putting the children up for adoption might have been available to resolve the applicant’s personal crisis. In line with the expert opinion, however, the court held that the applicant had still been capable of making decisions. Furthermore, the court stated that the applicant had no legal standing to rely on the lack of consent of the children’s father to the adoption. 30.  Since the applicant did not appeal against the decision, it became final. 31.  On 14 November 2002 the applicant filed proceedings (no. 1 F 32/02) for contact with the children and the right to receive information about them at the Reinbek District Court. She argued that she had been promised meetings with the children every six months and letters and photos of them. A meeting with the children in June 2001 had been scheduled according to the agreement, but did not take place because the responsible member of Bielefeld Youth Office was on extended leave. No other member of the Youth Office had replaced the absent staff member. In September 2001 the applicant received photos of the children. When she mentioned that she was thinking about revoking her consent to the adoption, staff of the Bielefeld Youth Office threatened to stop her contact with the children. A letter that the applicant wrote to the adoptive parents and handed over to the Bielefeld Youth Office was returned with the remark that the applicant should seek psychological treatment. The applicant based her claim for contact on Article 1666 and additionally on Article 1685 § 2 of the Civil Code (see “Relevant domestic law” below). Her claim for the right to receive information about the children was based on Article 1686 of the Civil Code. 32.  On 2 July 2003 the adoptive parents were heard. They opposed the claim of the applicant and asked for it to be dismissed. They referred to the legal basis of adoption under the Civil Code, which only provided for anonymous adoption. According to the hearing record the adoptive parents declared that they still intended to inform the children about the adoption before they started primary school. They had planned to see the mother of the children together with the children in spring 2001. This meeting had been set up for the sole benefit of the applicant, as the children would not have benefited from it. They had had the intention of sending letters to the applicant with information about the children. Now, in view of the court proceedings, they felt insecure and preferred to wait for the court decisions. 33.  In a decision of 21 July 2003 the Reinbek District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for contact with the children. According to the court Article 1684 of the Civil Code was not applicable to the applicant’s case as she had lost her legal status as a parent as a result of the adoption. An analogous application of the Article was, according to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 9 April 2003 (no. 1 BvR 1493/96), not possible. Article 1685 of the Civil Code was applicable, but would not grant contact rights to the applicant as she did not fulfil the legal requirements. The applicant could not be considered as a person who had cared for the children for an extended period of time. In fact, she had only cared for them for two weeks. Even if the criteria of the Federal Constitutional Court in the above-mentioned decision – whether there was a social and family relationship – were applied, the applicant could not be granted contact, as she had not created a significant social and family relationship with the children. The time of pregnancy and the two weeks after the birth did not suffice. The Civil Code grants to the adoptive parents the sole right to establish, grant or deny contact with the children even in respect of the natural mother. Furthermore, the court argued that the children, who were only three years old, might be overwhelmed by the fact that they had two mothers. 34.  On 28 July 2003 the court also dismissed the applicant’s claim in regard to the right to receive information about the children. Article 1686 of the Civil Code was not applicable, as the applicant was not a parent any more. Insofar as Article 1686 might be construed more widely, it would not apply to the applicant as her case did not fall under the scope of Article 1685 of the Civil Code. 35.  On 11 August 2003 the applicant filed an appeal with the Schleswig Court of Appeal. She mainly complained that the Reinbek District Court had neither decided on Article 1666 of the Civil Code as a potential basis of her claim nor on whether a contractual agreement existed; furthermore, her petition for an expert opinion on the children’s best interests had been ignored. She further argued that the criteria of a “long duration”, when applied to parent-child relationships, had to be interpreted from the perspective of the child, whose concept of time differed from that of adults. The natural mother was always a “relevant person” in the sense of Article 1685 of the Civil Code, and this evaluation did not change even after the natural mother ceased to have legal responsibilities. Regarding the right to information, she argued that although she had consented to the adoption, she remained the natural mother and the constitutional protection of the family applied to her. Even the Federal Constitutional Court had acknowledged that during pregnancy a psycho-social relationship between mother and the foetus was established (judgment of 29 January 2003 – 1 BvL 20/99 and 1 BvR 933/01). Lastly, she complained about the length of the proceedings. 36.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant was granted legal aid. 37.  On 30 January 2004 the Schleswig Court of Appeal (10 UF 199/03 and 10 UF 222/03) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Reinbek District Court of 21 and 28 July 2003. Two hearings, one on 15 December 2003 and the other on 30 January 2004, had taken place. Regarding the length of the proceedings before the district court, the Schleswig Court of Appeal found that that court had dealt adequately with the complex case within seven and a half months. Concerning the contact rights of the applicant, the court found that only Article 1685 Civil Code was applicable. Although the applicant was the children’s natural mother, she did not belong to the circle of people who had lived in “domestic community” with the child for a long period of time. According to the court, only foster parents are covered by this terminology. Furthermore, in order to determine “a long period of time” one had to establish whether a child had come to accept that his or her “relevant surroundings” (Bezugswelt) were with the individual in question. In the present case, the time of pregnancy was irrelevant, as an unborn child does not have a concept of its surroundings. Article 1685 Civil Code was in line with the constitutional protection of the family. The natural mother ceased to have contact or custody rights at the moment of adoption. The legal provisions regarding adoption were aimed at the undisturbed development of the child, and they served the best interests of the adopted child, who had to be fully integrated into the adoptive family; the biological family became irrelevant in accordance with the law. Even if the criteria of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 9 April 2003 regarding the natural father of a child born out of wedlock were applied, the natural mother would have to have lived with the children for a considerable time, which was not the case here. As the applicant knew, the right to contact on the basis of a contractual agreement could not be enforced by the family courts, as they were not empowered to regulate such matters. Article 1666 of the Civil Code did not give grounds for a different solution. 38.  Having considered the claim for the right to receive information about the children under Article 1686 of the Civil Code, the court found that the applicant had ceased to be a parent at the moment of adoption. As the legal basis was unambiguous and the circle of people who had a right to such information was strictly limited to the parents, the court found no room for a different interpretation. 39.  On 8 March 2004 the applicant raised a constitutional complaint regarding the denial of her rights to receive information about and have contact with the twin sisters after their adoption. 40.  In a decision of 13 December 2007, served on the applicant’s representative on 19 December 2007, a panel of three constitutional judges refused to admit the constitutional complaint. 41.  The applicant also commenced proceedings in June 2003 concerning the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the twin sisters, in order for the children to be able to raise a constitutional complaint against the adoption decision of the guardianship division of the Reinbek District Court of 21 June 2001 (no. 2 XVI 1/01). These proceedings are the issue of another complaint before this Court (application no. 30296/08). 42.  The applicant divorced her husband and is now remarried. She had a child with her new husband in 2003. 43.  By letter of 16 December 2011 this Court informed the applicant that on 3 December 2011 the Law on a remedy against lengthy court proceedings and criminal investigations (Federal Law Gazette Part I, 2011, page 2302 et seq.) had come into force in the Federal Republic of Germany.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Dublin. 5.  In July 1995 the applicant priest became aware of allegations of sexual abuse against him about alleged events in the 1980s. These allegations were made in a letter from the complainant’s solicitor to the applicant’s religious order. In September 1995 a formal police complaint was made. In June 1996 the applicant was interviewed by the police. 6.  In June 1997 the applicant was charged before the District Court on three counts of indecent assault. In October 1997 the case was transferred to a Circuit Criminal Court where he was charged with a further six counts of indecent assault. A hearing date was fixed (for March 1998). 7.  In February 1998 the applicant sought disclosure of records from a psychiatrist who had treated the complainant. The trial was then adjourned: the applicant claimed that was due to a conflict of interest on the part of the trial judge and the Government claimed that it was partly because the psychiatrist’s records were not available at such short notice. 8.  The applicant began judicial review proceedings in the High Court seeking the prohibition of the criminal proceedings on grounds of delay and seeking disclosure of the psychiatrist’s records. In March 1999 the High Court rejected the application concerning delay and no order for discovery of the psychiatric records was made because the prosecution undertook to procure them. Since the relevant psychiatrist was unwilling to disclose the medical records, in July 1999 the High Court directed the psychiatrist to make discovery, which was done in October 1999. The applicant then applied for discovery of medical records in the possession of North Eastern Health Board. In February 2000 the High Court directed the Circuit Criminal Court to order discovery against the Health Board. In March 2000 the Circuit Criminal Court so ordered and in September 2000 the Health Board made discovery. 9.  In October 2000 the trial began but the jury was discharged and the trial was transferred to another Circuit Criminal Court (the “trial court”). 10.  The applicant sought to trace the authors of entries in the medical records and maintained that there had not been full disclosure of all relevant medical records. The trial was listed for June 2001. However, since witness tracing was incomplete, the trial was adjourned and further discovery orders were made. In early November 2001 statements from the authors of the entries in the medical records were disclosed to the applicant. In March 2002 the prosecution stated to the trial court that another file had been submitted with those statements, that it needed time to furnish it to the applicant but that it would only proceed with the counts of indecent assault with which the applicant had been charged in June 1997. The trial was fixed for October 2002. 11.  In June 2002 the applicant applied to the High Court for leave to apply for judicial review for an order prohibiting his trial because of the delay caused by the failure to make full disclosure. In February 2003 the High Court ruled in his favour. In April 2003 the prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court. In December 2004 the written judgment of the High Court was delivered and in April 2005 the prosecution amended its appeal. In February 2007 the Supreme Court heard the appeal. By judgment of March 2007 (a majority of three to two) it allowed the appeal. Fennelly J, giving judgment for the majority, found that the prosecution was not to blame for the delay. In determining whether an order for prohibition should be made, the correct approach was to balance the right of the accused to be protected from stress and anxiety caused by an unnecessary and inordinate delay against the public interest in the prosecution and conviction of those charged with criminal offences. There was no evidence that the applicant had suffered excessive pre-trial anxiety. 12.  In May 2007 the prosecution requested the trial court not to fix a trial date as a police officer was ill and would be ill for a further six months. The court fixed a trial date for March 2008. In January 2008 the applicant applied to stay his prosecution pending judgment in the present application having regard to a stay on prosecution obtained in the Barry case (see Barry v. Ireland, no. 18273/04, 15 December 2005). The trial court adjourned to February 2008 to receive information on whether the Barry prosecution had indeed been stayed. In February 2008 the trial date (foreseen for March 2008) was vacated since a police witness had had a car accident. At end March 2008 the case was adjourned to May 2008: prosecution submissions on the applicant’s request for a stay on the prosecution were outstanding. In May 2008 the prosecution made those submissions (objecting to a stay) and applied for a hearing date but after the court recess of 2009 (since a police witness would be incapacitated for some time). The trial court fixed a trial date for early July 2009. 13.  Before the trial date, in June 2009, the prosecution drew the applicant’s attention to a reference, in material already disclosed to him, to the complainant having been referred for hypnosis: the prosecution was making further inquiries. By letter of June 2009 the prosecution confirmed that the complainant had not in fact received such treatment. Once the applicant’s further requests for confirmation that the complainant had not been so treated had been responded to, a trial date was fixed for January 2010. 14.  The trial took place over 4 days in January 2010, at the end of which hearing the trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict of not-guilty given, inter alia, the unavailability of three medical witnesses (one of whom had died). The criminal prosecution thereby ended.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  On 29 May 1998 the first applicant married V.D. On 7 January 2003 their son, the second applicant, was born. 7.  In 2006 V.D. initiated divorce proceedings, of which allegedly the first applicant, who was then living in Greece, was not aware. In a judgment of 21 July 2006, which became final on 11 October 2006, the Sofia District Court granted the divorce between the first applicant and V.D. and granted the latter residence rights in respect of the second applicant. The first applicant was granted contact rights for two hours twice a month in V.D.’s presence. 8.  After the divorce, V.D. and the child lived with the third applicant, V.D.’s mother. On 9 February 2006 V.D.’s partner Y.S. moved in with them. On an unspecified date at the end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007 V.D. and Y.S. had a son. 9.  In the summer of 2007 V.D., Y.S. and the children moved out of the third applicant’s home. 10.  In the application to the Court the third applicant stated that during a visit to her house on 24 August 2007 the child told her that his anus hurt. He shared with her that in the evenings Y.S. would come to his bed, put his finger in his anus, and touch his anus, penis and nipples, which were painful. When he told his mother she confronted Y.S., but he replied that it had been just a game. After that Y.S. threatened the child that if he told anyone else, he would beat and punish him. 11.  On the evening of 26 August 2007 the child again complained to his grandmother, the third applicant, that his anus hurt and asked her to take him to a doctor. 12.  The same evening the third applicant, in a telephone conversation, informed the second applicant’s doctor about the situation. Apparently, the second applicant himself told the doctor that his anus hurt because his “dad” [Y.S.] had put his finger there. 13.  On the following morning the second applicant was examined by a surgeon, who established that there were injuries to his anus. 14.  Meanwhile, having been informed about the situation by the third applicant, the first applicant arrived in Bulgaria on 30 August 2007. 15.  On an unspecified date, the third applicant found a CD with family photos on two of which the child was naked on the toilet. During the criminal investigation (see paragraphs 16-33 below) the third applicant submitted that she found the CD in her apartment where the photos had been taken. She also alleged that Y.S. had taken the photos. During her questioning in that connection V.D. stated that she herself had taken the photos with the family camera. 16.  On 27 August 2007, following the third applicant’s complaint, criminal proceedings were opened at first against an unknown perpetrator and later against Y.S. for sexual assault (блудство). On 28 August Y.S. was remanded in custody, but on 31 August 2007 was released on bail. 17.  On 27 August 2007 a forensic medical examination of the child was carried out upon a prosecutor’s order. The doctor found injuries to the child’s anus and concluded that these injuries might have resulted from penetration with a finger. An additional medical expert opinion stated that the injuries could also have been inflicted by penetration with a finger or by constipation. 18.  In an opinion of 29 August 2007, requested by the child’s mother, V.D., a doctor concluded that there were no injuries to the child’s anus. 19.  On 31 August 2007 the police department informed social services about the alleged abuse and recommended that action be taken under the Child Protection Act. 20.  In the period between 27 August 2007 and March 2008 at least eleven expert opinions and assessments were sought and a number of witnesses were questioned. Polygraph tests were conducted on Y.S. and the third applicant. The results of these tests were inconclusive. 21.  In a forensic psychiatric expert opinion of 30 August 2007 two experts concluded that the second applicant’s statements were unreliable and that he was easily influenced by the adults in the family. 22.  In a psychological opinion of 4 September 2007 an expert held that the second applicant’s story about the alleged abuse by Y.S. was tenable. 23.  In another expert opinion, carried out at the request of Lozenets District Social Assistance Office (“the Lozenets SAO”), of 4 October 2007, a doctor concluded that there were no signs of abuse on the second applicant and advised that no further psychological consultations and medical tests in respect of this issue be carried out, as they could have a negative impact on him. 24.  Between 13 November 2007 and February 2008 a forensic psychiatric expert assessment of Y.S.’s personality, a complex psychiatric and sexological expert assessment of Y.S., a psychological and psychiatric expert assessment of the grandmother, a forensic medical expert opinion of the child and an expert opinion on the CD with the photographs (see paragraph 15 above) were obtained. In the latter expert opinion, the expert noted that the CD contained family photos on two of which the child was sitting on the toilet naked. The expert concluded that the photographs had no pornographic content. 25.  In an expert opinion of 4 February 2008 five experts concluded that the second applicant’s testimony was unreliable and that he could not be credited as a witness because he lived in a world of fantasy and was easily influenced by other people. 26.  In an order of 28 February 2008 a prosecutor from the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office, after making an assessment of the conclusions of the expert opinions and the witness statements, discontinued the proceedings for lack of sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed. 27.  On appeal by the first and third applicants, on 18 March 2008 the Sofia District Court quashed the prosecutor’s order and remitted the case to the prosecution for further investigation. The District Court held, inter alia, that the order lacked sufficient reasoning, that the evidence was inconclusive and that the expert opinions did not exclude the possibility of abuse. It also declared the third applicant’s appeal inadmissible, because as the grandmother, she did not have standing to appeal against the discontinuation order. 28.  On an appeal by the prosecutor’s office, in a decision of 1 July 2008 the Sofia City Court upheld the lower court’s decision. The court found that the evidence in the case was inconclusive, as the parties involved had given conflicting statements and some of the expert reports had reached contradictory conclusions. The court pointed out the importance of the testimony of the second applicant’s doctor, who had confirmed the telephone conversation of 26 August 2007, the words used by the child to describe what had happened, and certain contradictions in V.D.’s statements. It also mentioned the apparent conflict between the adults in the family. The City Court noted that the presence of two irreconcilable versions of the events required a careful assessment of the statements and thorough analysis of the situation. It further gave detailed instructions as to the necessary additional actions to be taken, which included further questioning and expert opinions. 29.  In accordance with the Sofia City Court’s instructions on 26 August 2008 a prosecutor from the Sofia district public prosecutors’ office ordered additional investigative actions to be carried out, which included questioning the child’s doctor (see paragraph 12 above) and the surgeon who issued the certificate of 27 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above), and commissioning of expert opinions on the credibility of the child’s story, the grandmother’s attitude towards the child and the nature of the child’s injuries. He also ordered the investigator to report the case to the prosecutor every thirty days. 30.  After the remittal of the case at least six more expert opinions were carried out and a large number of witnesses were questioned, thus the total number of the expert opinions and assessments in the preliminary investigation reached at least eighteen and the number of the witnesses questioned was approaching forty. 31.  In an expert opinion of an unspecified date a forensic doctor, a paediatrician and a surgeon specialising in paediatrics, who had examined the second applicant on 24 September 2008, concluded that there were injuries to his anus which could have been inflicted in the way described by him and that it was unlikely that those injuries had been caused by constipation. 32.  In a psychological expert opinion of 15 October 2008 two psychologists and a psychiatrist concluded that the grandmother did not have an “unnatural attachment” or an obsession with the child, but that the latter’s story about the alleged abuse could have been influenced by the grandmother. 33.  In an expert opinion of 12 November 2008 two child psychiatrists and three child psychologists concluded that the second applicant had reproduced previously heard phrases and was susceptible to influence and inculcation. The experts did not find any indication of sexual abuse. 34.  In an order of 20 January 2009 a prosecutor from the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office ordered two expert opinions to be sought on the CD with the child’s photographs, and the grandmother to be questioned in that connection. 35.  In an expert opinion of an unspecified date three experts concluded that the injuries on the second applicant’s anus could have been inflicted by the insertion of hard objects, such as a thermometer or a fingernail when inserting the thermometer. 36.  Between January and April 2009 a complex psychiatric and sexological expert assessment of Y.S. and the two expert opinions on the CD with the photographs were obtained (see paragraph 34 above). In the latter two opinions the experts concluded that the photographs had been taken in March and April 2006 with a SAMSUNG camera, that the CD had not been tampered with and that the inscription on the CD had not been done by V.D. 37.  During the proceedings at least forty witnesses were questioned. Among the witnesses were relatives, friends and acquaintances of the third applicant and V.D., as well as doctors, experts and social workers. The third applicant, V.D. and Y.S. were questioned several times. V.D. and Y.S. denied the allegations of abuse, the mother stating that the child had never complained to her about such abuse. The third applicant’s mother and brother testified that initially the relations between her, V.D. and Y.S. had been good but then conflicts arose and after the couple and the children moved out of the third applicant’s apartment, she wanted to keep the child with her and did everything possible to separate him from his mother and Y.S. Other witnesses, friends of the third applicant, stated that they had heard about the alleged abuse from the grandmother and that at some point V.D. had started preventing the third applicant from seeing the child. Y.S.’s former partner testified that she had never seen any signs of physical or sexual abuse in him and that he had never shown any unhealthy interest in her underage daughter, who used to live with them. The social workers testified that there was no indication of sexual abuse in respect of the second applicant. 38.  On 27 April 2009 and 8, 11 and 15 September 2009 one of the father’s representatives, Mrs T.Ch., was presented with the materials and findings of the preliminary investigation. She made comments and requests for further investigative actions, which were dismissed on 5 October 2009 as manifestly ill-founded and unnecessary. 39.  In an order of 5 October 2009 a prosecutor from the Sofia district prosecutor’s office discontinued the proceedings for lack of sufficient evidence of an offence. The prosecutor relied, inter alia, on the statements of the social workers who had been involved in the second applicant’s case and who considered that there had been no indication of sexual abuse in respect of the second applicant, as well as on the statements of the witnesses and the conclusions of the expert opinions obtained in the course of the proceedings. He noted in particular that V.D. repeatedly denied the allegations of abuse, the social workers saw no indications of abuse, the photographs on which the child was naked in the bathroom had no pornographic content and none of the individuals questioned had actually witnessed any abuse, most of them having heard about the allegations of abuse from the grandmother. 40.  On 24 November 2009 one of the father’s representatives, Mrs B.B., appealed. She contested the interpretation of the evidence and the findings of the prosecutor and pointed out that the findings of the investigation had not been presented to her. 41.  In a decision of 4 May 2010 the Sofia District Court, after examining the expert opinions and the evidence gathered, concluded that there was not sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed, and upheld the discontinuation, endorsing the prosecutor’s reasoning. The court relied, inter alia, on the conclusions of the psychological expert opinion of 25 January 2009, which stated that the child was easily influenced by others and that his behaviour did not indicate sexual abuse. It also noted that all instructions for further investigative actions given by the courts and the prosecutors had been complied with. 42.  Meanwhile, on 18 January 2010 the other representative of the father, Mrs T. Ch., had also appealed against the discontinuation order of 5 October 2009. Apparently, however, her appeal had not been forwarded to the Sofia District Court, which in its decision of 4 May 2010 had examined only the appeal by Mrs B.B. Following complaints by Mrs T.Ch., in a decision of 10 January 2011 the Sofia District Court quashed the discontinuation of the proceedings and ordered Mrs T.Ch.’s appeal to be heard. 43.  The parties have not informed the Court about the outcome of the proceedings. 44.  On 4 September 2007 the first applicant initiated proceedings under the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act (“the PADVA”) requesting that the Sofia District Court impose an injunction and remove Y.S. from the family home. 45.  In a decision of 5 September 2007 the Sofia District Court discontinued the proceedings, finding that Y.S. could not be the respondent in these proceedings because, as simply a cohabitant of one of the parents, he was not among the persons explicitly listed in section 3 of the PADVA in respect of whom such proceedings could be conducted. 46.  On 28 September 2007 the third applicant initiated proceedings under the PADVA and requested an “order for immediate protection” to be issued and the second applicant’s mother, V.D., to be obliged to take actions to protect the child from the alleged abuse, including removing him from his current home. In an order of 28 September 2007 the Sofia District Court discontinued the proceedings, finding that:\n“the circumstances described in the claim do not disclose domestic violence under... the PADVA.” 47.  On 29 August 2007 the third applicant requested the Lozenets SAO to issue an order to remove the child from his current home. On 31 August 2007 officials from the Lozenets SAO met the father and the grandmother. On the same day the director of the Lozenets SAO issued an order placing the second applicant with his father. 48.  V.D. appealed against this order. In an order of 13 September 2007, served on the first applicant on 23 June 2008, the director of the Sofia Regional Social Assistance Office (“the RSAO”) quashed the order, finding breaches of the required form and procedure. She found, inter alia, that the order lacked sufficient reasoning and that the social services had failed to prepare an assessment of the effect which the removal would have on the second applicant. In conclusion, the director held that the order was not in the best interest of the child and remitted the case to the Lozenets SAO for further work. 49.  On 4 July 2008 the first applicant appealed before the Sofia Administrative Court through the RSAO. He alleged that the RSAO had never forwarded his appeal to the court. It appears that he did not file it directly with the Administrative Court either. 50.  On 24 January 2008 the third applicant requested the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office to initiate court proceedings for removal of the second applicant from his current home under section 26 (2) of the Child Protection Act. 51.  Her request was refused, by an order of 30 January 2008. On appeal, on 29 February 2008 the Sofia city public prosecutor’s office upheld the refusal. The Sofia appellate public prosecutor’s office did the same, in a final order of 30 July 2008. The prosecutors took into account the findings of the criminal proceedings against Y.S., which had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that abuse had taken place, and the opinion of the social services of 30 July 2008, that removal of the child from his current home would have a negative effect on his psychological and emotional development. 52.  On 17 March 2008 the first applicant initiated proceedings under section 26 of the Child Protection Act, requesting the Sofia District Court to place the child with the grandmother. Later in the proceedings he amended his request to include his parents and the child’s aunt among the families where the child could be placed. 53.  In a decision of 7 July 2008, after holding a hearing, the District Court discontinued the proceedings, as the first applicant had failed to pay the additional court fee, noting that the fee had been paid under the wrong case number. The first applicant’s lawyers appealed against the discontinuation, claiming that the wrong case number had been indicated in the summons sent to him in May 2008. 54.  On 14 July 2008 the first applicant’s lawyer requested the correction of a mistake in the transcript of the hearing of 7 July 2008, which was granted on 27 November 2008 after a hearing had been held. Thereafter the appeal procedure against the discontinuation of the proceedings continued. 55.  In a decision of 24 March 2009 the Sofia City Court quashed the decision for discontinuation of the proceedings and remitted the case to the District Court for examination on the merits. The City Court held that under Article 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was for the court to scrutinise the carrying out of all necessary procedural actions, therefore, in the present case, instead of discontinuing the proceedings the District Court should have informed the first applicant that the court fee had been paid under the wrong case number, and ordered him to pay it under the correct number. 56.  On 13 April 2009 the first applicant paid the court fee under the correct case number and the proceedings continued. 57.  Hearings were held on 8 July, 10 August and 28 September 2009. 58.  In a judgment of 26 November 2009 the Sofia District Court dismissed the action, holding that removing the child from his current home was a measure of last resort, which should be taken only after all other means of protecting him within his family environment had failed. In the case at hand these means had not been exhausted. 59.  On an appeal by the first applicant of 8 February 2010, the Sofia City Court examined the expert opinion of 27 August 2007 and the medical certificate of 29 August 2007 (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above) and commissioned a forensic psychiatric and psychological expert opinion on the effects which abuse could have on the second applicant. It admitted to the case file materials from the criminal proceedings against Y.S., the proceedings for deprivation of parental rights (see paragraphs 82-85 below), the social services reports and conclusions given in these proceedings, and a number of other items of written evidence. It also heard as witnesses all relatives who had agreed to receive the child at their home, social workers and other specialists. On 2 and 7 July, 26 September and 23 October 2009, and 2 March and 24 April 2011 social services prepared reports on the material conditions at the child’s current place of residence and on the conditions in the residences of the individuals who were ready to receive him in their homes. In these reports and at a court hearing of 7 March 2011 the social workers concluded that the material conditions in the second applicant’s current home were good, that he was receiving adequate and sufficient care and attention, and that his placement with other relatives would have a negative effect on his sense of security and emotional stability. 60.  In a final judgment of 17 May 2011, relying on the evidence gathered and the conclusions of the social services, the Sofia City Court upheld the previous court’s judgment and refused to remove the second applicant from his current residence. The court held, inter alia, that it had not been proved that sexual abuse had taken place and that not all means of working with the second applicant and providing protection within his current family had been exhausted. It further noted that in similar situations the authorities should act in the best interest of the child and not in the interest of its parents or other relatives. 61.  At the end of August 2007 the Lozenets SAO was notified of possible abuse and started working on the case (see paragraphs 19 and 47 above). 62.  On 11 September 2007 the grandmother lodged a complaint with the State Child Protection Agency, which had a governing and controlling function in the field of child protection, notifying them of the allegation of abuse and requesting assistance with the interim removal of the second applicant from his current home. 63.  On 15 September 2007 the latter forwarded the grandmother’s request to the Lozenets SAO, instructing it to undertake certain measures in order to establish whether there was a risk to the second applicant if he remained in his current home, and also for information on the scheduled actions and the progress of the case. 64.  Meanwhile, on 5 and 27 September 2007 social workers visited the child’s home and met him and his mother, V.D. 65.  On 27 November 2007 a social report was drafted, recommending that the second applicant and his mother have family counselling and psychological help. 66.  Between 20 December 2007 and 20 February 2008 the child and V.D. received regular family counselling and psychological assistance. 67.  On 18 January 2008 the director of the State Child Protection Agency sent a letter to the director of the State Social Assistance Agency (“the SSAA”) in connection with the grandmother’s complaint of 11 September 2007. She pointed out that the report from the Lozenets SAO did not contain an assessment of the risk of abuse and that there was not sufficient information to confirm that the second applicant was not at risk in his current home. She recommended the assignment to the case of one more social worker from another Social Assistance Office, in order to guarantee objectivity of the work in the case. 68.  In that connection, on 21 and 22 February 2008 the State Child Protection Agency carried out an inspection and gave instructions for the future handling of the case. 69.  On 1 July 2008 the child and his mother were referred to an association for counselling and psychological help. During the counselling period at least two reports on the second applicant’s and his mother’s psychological state of health were carried out. Their conclusions showed no signs of sexual or physical abuse. The second applicant also started attending sessions with a speech therapist. 70.  The child and his mother continued to be involved in a number of special programmes for counselling and psychological advice in connection with the allegations of abuse and the conflict between the members of the child’s extended family. 71.  Between May and October 2009 social services prepared several reports and opinions, including those requested by the domestic courts, examining the various proceedings under the Family Code and the Child Protection Act initiated by the applicants. They also held a number of meetings, which included meetings with the child and his mother, V.D., with the child’s teacher, and with his doctor. On several occasions social workers paid impromptu visits to the second applicant’s home, monitoring his development and the relations between him, his younger brother, V.D. and Y.S. 72.  The conclusions of numerous reports prepared by the social authorities were that the environment in the child’s home was “peaceful and harmonious”, his development was normal, all his needs were being adequately met, the material conditions in which he lived were good, and V.D. and Y.S. were open to receiving help from the social authorities. Removing the child from his present home would negatively affect his emotional stability and his sense of security. 73.  During their work with the second applicant psychologists prepared at least six reports assessing the risk of abuse in respect of this applicant. The conclusions were that there was no evidence that such a risk existed. 74.  It appears that at the end of 2010 a proposal was made to discontinue the active work with the second applicant and his family as the child had overcome the stressful situation and did not need further social assistance. It is not clear whether or when the active social work was discontinued. 75.  On 21 May 2008 the first applicant complained to the Sofia RSAO that the work of the Lozenets SAO was slow and inefficient, and requested that an order be issued for the removal of the child from his current home. 76.  In a letter of 10 June 2008 the director of the Sofia RSAO replied that two departments, the Lozenets SAO and the Slatina SAO, were working together on the second applicant’s case; that the child protection authorities had to act in the best interest of the child, and that their efforts were concentrated on re-establishing relations between the members of the family. The director pointed out that the Sofia RSAO could remove the child from his current home only after the relevant authorities had sufficient proof that abuse had taken place. She further expressed a concern about the second applicant’s psychological and emotional state, with regard to the fact that he was involved in and influenced by the conflict between the members of his family. 77.  It appears that in June 2008 the first and second applicants met in the presence of social workers. 78.  On 21 August 2008 the first applicant requested the Slatina SAO to give him certain information on the case, and sought assistance with the re‑establishment of personal contact between him and the second applicant and between the latter and his relatives on his mother’s side. 79.  On 21 November 2008 the Lozenets SAO organised a meeting between the first applicant, the latter’s mother, the third applicant, V.D.’s lawyer and a number of social workers. During the meeting it was established that the first applicant had not seen the second applicant since June 2008 and that V.D. did not allow such contact. 80.  At the end of February 2009 the first applicant reiterated his request to the State Agency for Child Protection for assistance with scheduled contact with the second applicant. 81.  The parties have not submitted information as to the steps taken in that connection after this date. From the materials in the Court’s possession, however, it appears that meetings between the first and second applicants have taken place. Thus, for example, in November 2008 and the spring of 2009 they met at the second applicant’s home. 82.  On 28 March 2008 the third applicant initiated proceedings under Article 70 (2) of the Family Code, claiming that V.D. had denied her contact with the second applicant and requesting the Sofia District Court to take measures which would allow her contact with him. In a judgment of 15 June 2009 the Sofia District Court granted the third applicant contact rights once a month for four hours. The court noted the strained relationship between the third applicant and V.D. and the fact that the third applicant had not been in contact with the child for about two years. It is not clear whether this judgment was appealed against. 83.  The parties have not submitted information as to whether contact has been re-established between the child and his grandmother since that judgment and prior to the latter’s death. 84.  On 11 September 2007 V.D. initiated proceedings to deprive the first applicant of parental rights. In a judgment of 8 June 2008 the Sofia District Court dismissed the claim as manifestly ill-founded. On appeal, on 28 April 2009 this judgment was upheld by the Sofia City Court, which held that the exercising of parental rights by both parents was of major importance for the second applicant’s development. It is not clear whether the parties appealed further. 85.  Meanwhile, on an unspecified date the first applicant initiated proceedings to deprive V.D. of parental rights and for full parental rights in respect of the second applicant. In a judgment of 17 March 2011 the Sofia District Court dismissed the first applicant’s action. It is not clear whether this judgment was appealed against.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and resides in the town of Zhovti Vody, the Dnipropetrovsk Region. 5.  On 7 May 1999 and 30 August 2001 the Zhovti Vody City Court (hereafter “the City Court”) awarded the applicant a total of UAH 3,124[1] against the State-owned Electrongaz Company (hereafter “the Company”) in salary arrears. Both judgments became final and were sent to the Zhovti Vody City Bailiffs’ Office (hereafter “the Bailiffs”) for compulsory enforcement. 6.  In a letter of 27 February 2003, the Bailiffs informed the applicant that the enforcement of the judgments in her favour was impeded by the entry into force of the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property 2001, which barred the attachment and sale of the Company’s assets. 7.  On 7 March 2003 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court (hereafter “the Commercial Court”) instituted bankruptcy proceedings against the Company and issued an injunction barring any debt recovery. On 10 October 2003 the Commercial Court approved a rehabilitation proposal and appointed a trustee to rehabilitate the Company’s business. 8.  On 21 October 2004 the Bailiffs terminated the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s favour as both awards were fully paid to her.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Rocca Priora (Rome). 9.  He is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to C.C. 10.  In a registered letter of 17 April 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 May 1986 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 11.  In a writ served on the tenant on 18 January 1985, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 12.  By a decision of 11 March 1985, which was made enforceable on 2 April 1985, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 February 1987. 13.  On 3 April 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14.  On 27 April 1987 he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 June 1987. 15.  Between 5 June 1987 and 31 January 1989, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession. 16.  On 11 May 1989, the applicant had made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. On 20 October 1993, he reiterated the declaration. 17.  Between 6 September 1989 and 22 February 1996, the bailiff made forty two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 18.  On 24 March 1996, the tenant vacated the premises.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the village of Novodonetskoye, Donetsk region. 5. On 31 May 2002 the Dobropillya Court awarded the applicant against the State-owned coal-mine “Pioner” UAH 26,051[1] in compensation for work-related damage to his health. On 29 August 2002 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal reduced the award to UAH 24,438[2]. 6.  On 7 October 2002 the Dobropillya Office of the Bailiffs' Service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 7.  Between June 2003 and June 2004 the applicant was paid the judgment debt owed to him. 8.  The judgment of 29 August 2002 was enforced in full on 7 June 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Boutros Yaacoub El Khoury was born in 1977. At the time of lodging his applications he was detained in Berlin’s Moabit prison. 6.  On 2 August 2005 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of two counts of drug trafficking. The arrest warrant specified that the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences resulted from statements made by one of his co‑suspects, the separately prosecuted A.K. The District Court further found that there was a risk that the applicant, who did not have a permanent residence in Germany and in the past had been travelling between Brazil and Europe, would abscond. A partly suspended prison sentence had previously been imposed on him in Germany. Moreover, two additional arrest warrants were pending against him in Germany, one relating to a further offence of drug trafficking and the other, dated 1 July 2004, concerning forgery of identification papers. 7.  On 16 August 2006 the applicant was detained in Portugal pending his extradition to Germany (Auslieferungshaft) as a consequence of the arrest warrants dated 1 July 2004 and 2 August 2005. On 8 September 2006 he was extradited to Germany where he was remanded in custody in Berlin Moabit prison. His detention on remand (Untersuchungshaft) was subject to reinforced security conditions. He was kept separate from other prisoners in an isolated cell (isolierter Einzelhaftraum) and was excluded from most group prison events. Contacts with visitors were limited and subject to close supervision. 8.  On 18 September 2006 the Berlin Prosecutor’s Office charged the applicant with having used a forged passport when entering German territory on one occasion in 2003. By a further bill of indictment dated 20 October 2006, he was charged with two counts of drug trafficking, committed jointly with several co-accused, among them G., U. and A.K. He was further accused of having incited G. to import drugs illicitly. 9.  In their description of the facts underlying the drugs-related offences allegedly committed by the applicant, the prosecution authorities mainly relied on statements made by A.K. in the course of separate criminal proceedings jointly conducted against A.K. and U. before the Berlin Regional Court on suspicion of organised drug trafficking. The bill of indictment further specified that the applicant was suffering from a congenital heart defect and as a consequence was not to be subjected to long-lasting situations of physical and mental stress. 10.  On 13 December 2006 the Berlin Regional Court admitted both indictments and opened the trial against the applicant. The trial started on 20 February 2007. The applicant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. 11.  By a judgment of the Berlin Regional Court dated 28 February 2007 in the proceedings separately conducted against A.K., the latter was convicted of several counts of drug trafficking and illicit importation of drugs and sentenced to a cumulative prison sentence of five years and three months. A.K. appealed against the judgment on points of law. 12.  On 20 September 2007 and 30 October 2007 the applicant applied for the arrest warrants dated 1 July 2004 and 2 August 2005 to be set aside. By decisions of 20 September 2007 and 19 November 2007 respectively the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s motions. 13.  By a decision of 17 December 2007 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the risk of absconding prevailed because a final expulsion order against the applicant was in force and he had used various aliases. It stressed that the applicant’s continued detention on remand was still proportionate. The trial court had complied with its obligation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously. Any circumstances that had limited the court’s ability to accelerate the proceedings had their origin outside the latter’s sphere of responsibility. Since the first trial day on 20 February 2007, hearings had been held on 37 days. Delays in the proceedings were the result of comprehensive applications for the taking of evidence by the defence in August and September 2007, in particular of a voluminous motion regarding the applicant’s alibi submitted on 2 August 2007. Moreover, the applicant had been unavailable to attend trial on a number of days due to his participation in separately conducted court proceedings. The Court of Appeal further noted that the fact that one of the judges sitting in the applicant’s case had been seconded to another court since 15 October 2007 had reduced the frequency with which hearings could be held. 14.  On 3 March 2008 the applicant again requested that the arrest warrants be set aside. 15.  By a decision of 7 March 2008 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be continued. In the Regional Court’s view any possible delays in the proceedings were the result of the defence’s continuing voluminous applications for the taking of evidence. 16.  Following the applicant’s appeal against this decision on 29 April 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal lifted the arrest warrant dated 1 July 2004 but rejected the remainder of the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the risk of absconding was still high with regard to the fact that the applicant’s companion had been sentenced to four years in prison, the execution of which had been suspended on the condition that she reported to the police and did not leave the country (Haftverschonung). 17.  The Court of Appeal further held that while the sentence to be expected for the offence of forgery underlying the arrest warrant of 1 July 2004 did not justify its further execution, the applicant’s continued detention on remand on the basis of the arrest warrant dated 2 August 2005 was, for the time being, still proportionate. The Court of Appeal noted in this context that in the period since 20 February 2007 hearings had been held in the instant case on 56 days with an average duration of three hours, amounting to an average of less than one hearing day per week. Gaps in the hearing schedule from 23 April to 7 May 2007, in the period from 12 July until 3 September 2007 and from 22 December 2007 to 6 January 2008, were due to the judges’ absence on leave, while in May 2007 counsel for the defence had been on leave. The Court of Appeal further took into account that on several occasions the Regional Court had dispensed with the reading out of whole documents (so-called “self-reading procedure” – Selbstleseverfahren) to speed up the proceedings. 18.  On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 29 April 2008 and applied for his immediate release. 19.  On 2 June 2008, following a plea bargain between the prosecution and the defence, the proceedings against G. were severed from the applicant’s trial. 20.  On 4 June 2008 the applicant, whose heart condition had deteriorated in the course of his detention and who had previously been treated in the prison hospital, underwent heart surgery. 21.  By a decision of 11 June 2008 (file no. 2 BvR 1062/08) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 29 May 2008, without providing reasons. It further held that, as a consequence, there was no need to decide on the applicant’s request for interim measures. 22.  In the proceedings against A.K., the Federal Court of Justice on 10 July 2008 dismissed A.K.’s appeal on points of law against his conviction by judgment of the Berlin Regional Court dated 28 February 2007. 23.  On 4 August 2008 the applicant submitted a further request to set aside the arrest warrant dated 2 August 2005. He argued that the continued execution of the arrest warrant was disproportionate. 24.  By a decision of 15 August 2008 the Berlin Regional Court held that the applicant’s detention was still proportionate. 25.  On 6 October 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, in which the applicant’s counsel had stated that the applicant’s ability to stand trial was not reduced due to his prior heart surgery. The Court of Appeal found that the strong suspicion of the applicant having engaged in drug trafficking, as well as the risk of his absconding, persisted. With reference to the findings in its decision of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeal further held that the conduct of the proceedings since May 2008 did not change its assessment that his continuing detention on remand was still proportionate. The low frequency with which hearings had been scheduled and the interruption of the trial from 6 to 21 May 2008 and 17 July to 6 August 2008 had not been imputable to the domestic courts. 26.  On 2 November 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Berlin Court of Appeal’s decision alleging, inter alia, that the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct the proceedings expeditiously despite his continued detention on remand violated his rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. By a decision of 26 November 2008 (file no. 2 BvR 2241/08) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons. 27.  By decisions of the Berlin Court of Appeal of 9 March 2009 and the Berlin Regional Court of 20 April 2009 the reinforced security conditions accompanying the applicant’s detention on remand were set aside for the most part. 28.  On 20 April 2009 the Berlin Regional Court, following a further request by the applicant to lift the arrest warrant, again ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be continued. The applicant appealed against the decision. 29.  On 22 May 2009 the Berlin Court of Appeal, referring to the reasoning in its previous decisions, rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the conduct of the proceedings since its last decision of 6 October 2008 had again been determined by continual applications for the taking of evidence filed by the defence as well as requests for the suspension of the proceedings and motions for bias against the court. All such requests had been dealt with by the Regional Court in due course and any resulting delays in the proceedings, like the time lapse between hearings from 13 December 2008 to 4 January 2009 and 5 May 2009 to 1 June 2009, did not fall within the trial court’s sphere of responsibility. 30.  By a decision of 27 July 2009 (file no. 2 BvR 1320/09) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s related constitutional complaint of 18 June 2009. 31.  On 16 September 2009 the Berlin Regional Court pronounced its judgment in the applicant’s trial after having held hearings on a total of 101 days, with an average duration of not more than three hours each, in which it had heard at least twenty witnesses and one expert. 32.  By its judgment of 16 September 2009 the Berlin Regional Court convicted the applicant of two counts of drug trafficking as well as falsification of documents and imposed a cumulative prison sentence (Gesamtfreiheitsstrafe) of six years. In the determination of the applicant’s sentence, the Regional Court had regard to the particular strain to which the applicant had been subject as a result of the long duration of the proceedings as well as of his detention on remand. It emphasised that the latter had lasted around three years, calculated from the date of the applicant’s extradition from Portugal until the pronouncement of the judgment and had been particularly burdensome due to, inter alia, the reinforced security conditions imposed on the applicant and his heart operation in 2008. 33.  As regards the offence of falsification of documents, the Regional Court established that on 2 November 2003 the applicant had entered German territory using a forged Greek passport. 34.  Concerning the drugs-related offences the Regional Court observed that, during the period at issue, the applicant had engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in cooperation with G. and U. In the afternoon of 7 February 2004, the applicant, according to a plan previously agreed with U., had taken over 3 kg of a cocaine mixture as well as 100 kg of hashish from G. in Berlin with a view to reselling the drugs for a profit. The Regional Court also found it established that on an unspecified date in the period between 25 February and 10 March 2004 the applicant had acquired between 95 and 100 g of a cocaine mixture from A.K. for the purpose of reselling it to a customer for a profit. 35.  While the applicant confessed to having used a forged passport on the occasion of his entry into Germany on 2 November 2003, he denied any involvement in drug trafficking. The Regional Court based its finding of facts in this regard on the witness statements made by A.K., whom it considered to be the central witness against the applicant and the only direct witness of the facts underlying the actual crimes. A.K. had secretly observed how G. had handed the drugs over to the applicant on 7 February 2004. On the occasion of a meeting between A.K. and the applicant several weeks after the incident, the applicant had confessed to A.K. that G. had imported the drugs on the applicant’s behalf according to a plan previously set up with U. 36.  Within the period from 6 March 2007 to 15 January 2009, A.K. testified on several occasions as a witness at the applicant’s trial. He answered questions from the trial court and the prosecution throughout the proceedings. At the beginning of the proceedings he furthermore offered to consider answering questions formulated by counsel and put to him by the Regional Court, but refused to answer direct questions from the applicant or the defence, relying on his right to remain silent in order not to incriminate himself by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 49 below). Following his last hearing on 15 January 2009, the witness travelled to Lebanon and subsequent attempts by the Regional Court to summon him to appear at trial were to no avail. By a decision of 31 July 2009 the court held that it would be impossible to have the witness examined in the foreseeable future since the latter was prevented from leaving Lebanon pursuant to a decision by a Lebanese religious court, the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry and the German Embassy in Beirut. Pointing to the court’s obligation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously in view of the applicant’s continuing detention on remand, and having regard to the fact that the witness had repeatedly been heard at trial, the Regional Court was of the opinion that his absence did not justify a further delay in the proceedings. 37.  The court also heard representatives of the police and public prosecution authorities who had been involved in A.K.’s examination at the pre-trial stage as well as the acting judges and public prosecutors in the criminal proceedings conducted in respect of A.K. and in respect of further separately prosecuted co-accused. In addition, at a request by the defence, all available protocols of statements made by A.K. at the various stages of the proceedings were read out at trial with the consent of all parties. 38.  The Regional Court specified in its judgment that A.K’s testimony had only been marginally supplemented and confirmed by the remaining available evidence which had provided information with respect to the motivation underlying the offence, the time when it had been committed and the quality of the drugs at issue. The court emphasised that in view of the decisive nature of A.K.’s statements for the applicant’s conviction and the fact that he had refused to answer any questions from the defence, it had assessed particularly carefully and critically whether the witness had been reliable. This had also been necessary taking into account that A.K. was living in Lebanon, had testified at the applicant’s trial with a view to obtaining a reduction of the expected sentence in his own proceedings on charges of drug trafficking and had repeatedly been found guilty of drug trafficking. 39.  The court nevertheless concluded that A.K. had been a credible witness. His witness statements made at trial had been coherent and consistent with submissions previously made before the investigative authorities at the pre-trial stage. His decision to contribute to the clarification of the facts underlying the charges against the applicant as well as other accused persons involved in organised drug trafficking had been motivated by his wish to cut his link to the drug-dealer scene and start a new life. In the Regional Court’s opinion there was no evidence that he had wrongly incriminated the applicant. 40.  The Regional Court further found that the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention to examine or have examined witnesses against him had been respected in the instant case. A.K.’s refusal to answer questions from the defence did not require the court to exclude his statements as evidence in the trial nor did such behaviour put the witness’s credibility into question. Even following termination of the criminal proceedings against A.K. by final decision of the Federal Court of Justice dated 10 July 2008, the witness could still rely on his right not to testify, by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since there remained a risk that he would incriminate himself with respect to offences that were closely linked to the one of which he had been convicted. Several investigations previously conducted against A.K. in this respect had been discontinued by the prosecution authorities and could be resumed in the future. The court emphasised in this connection that it had done everything in its power to enable an examination of A.K. by the defence. Despite A.K.’s refusal to answer questions from the defence or the applicant, in the beginning he had offered to consider answering the applicant’s questions put to him in writing. The applicant’s counsel declined this offer. As a consequence the court had granted the applicant’s counsel’s request to examine A.K., which he accordingly did. Any attempts in this respect had, however, been to no avail. Therefore the court itself had questioned A.K. on subjects that had appeared to be of importance for the defence and he had answered all questions. Subsequently, upon the court’s proposal the applicant had submitted further subjects of interest in a list. On these matters the court then put questions to A.K. in a later hearing. In addition, in the last part of the trial, A.K. had answered a number of questions that had been proposed by the defence and had been put to him by the court with identical wording. At his counsel’s recommendation he had then decided to refrain from participating in any such indirect questioning. 41.  In his appeal on points of law of 15 April 2010 against the Regional Court’s judgment the applicant complained, inter alia, that neither he nor his counsel had had an opportunity to examine A.K., the main witness against him, at any stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, A.K.’s testimony had not been corroborated by further significant evidence as regards the actual commission of the crime by the applicant. The applicant also argued that, after A.K.’s conviction in the criminal proceedings conducted against him had become final on 10 July 2008, the latter could no longer rely on a right to remain silent by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the applicant’s proceedings. The Regional Court had nevertheless not compelled him to answer questions by the defence at that stage of the proceedings and had consequently not done everything in its power to enable an examination of the witness by the defence, in breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. 42.  By written submissions to the Federal Court of Justice dated 31 August 2010, the Federal Public Prosecutor moved that the applicant’s appeal on points of law be dismissed. He argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had not had an opportunity to examine A.K. at any stage of the proceedings, these had as a whole been fair. 43.  In his reply to the Federal Prosecutor’s submissions, the applicant also claimed that his trial had been unreasonably long. He argued that during 135 weeks or 31 months of trial, hearings had been held on 101 days, which amounted to an average of 0.75 days per week or 3.25 days per month and had on average lasted less than three hours each. 44.  By a decision of 6 December 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as manifestly ill-founded. 45.  By written submissions dated 20 October 2010 to the Federal Court of Justice the applicant complained of a violation of his right to be heard. 46.  On 17 January 2011 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint. 47.  On 13 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained of a violation of his right to a fair trial because he had not been able to question witness A.K. at any stage of the proceedings and of the length of his detention on remand and the length of the proceedings. 48.  By a decision of 18 January 2012 (file no. 2 BvR 447/11) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre, in Turkey. 7.  The applicant first entered Turkey on 24 September 2002 using a false passport. She began living and working in Istanbul without informing the Turkish authorities or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”). 8.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant applied to the UNHCR and asked to be recognised as a refugee. On an unspecified date in 2004 she was detained by the Turkish authorities and deported to Iran, where she claims to have been imprisoned for nine months and subjected to ill‑treatment. 9.  Following her release from prison in Iran, the applicant re‑entered Turkey illegally on 3 February 2005. She learned that her case before the UNHCR had been closed in her absence. 10.  In June 2006 the applicant was diagnosed with myomatosis of the uterus and operated in a private hospital on 5 June 2006. The medical reports, in particular the pathology results, revealed that there were no cancerous cells. 11.  In the meantime, she became interested in Christianity and began attending Bible classes. On 7 September 2007 the applicant was baptised in a Protestant church in Istanbul. On an unspecified date the applicant's son, who was attending the Iranian Consulate School in Istanbul, was expelled on the ground of “conduct against the school's faith”. Some time within a year of that incident the applicant applied to the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul for a passport. While there, she was asked to complete a form stating that she was a Christian. 12.  On an unspecified date at the end of 2007, the applicant applied to the UNHCR and requested that her case be re-examined. 13.  On 3 May 2008 the applicant went to the Fatih police headquarters in Istanbul in order to make statements as a witness regarding a criminal offence committed by third persons. As she was found to have identity documents with different names on them, an investigation was initiated into this and she was arrested. On an unspecified date she was released. 14.  On 9 May 2008 the applicant was rearrested on suspicion of infringement of visa requirements and forging official documents. According to a letter sent by the Istanbul police to the Department responsible for foreigners, borders and asylum attached to the General Police Headquarters on the same day, the applicant had stated that she did not wish to live in Iran and that she had come to Turkey in order to apply to the UNHCR. The same letter stated that the applicant had been placed in the Foreigners' Department of the Istanbul police headquarters with a view to her deportation from Turkey. 15.  On 13 May 2008 the director of the department responsible for foreigners, borders and asylum attached to the General Police Headquarters requested the Istanbul police headquarters to obtain statements from the applicant regarding a number of issues, including her failure to apply to the Turkish authorities when she had applied to the UNHCR, the reason why she had made multiple entries and exits between Iran and Turkey and why she was staying illegally in Turkey. The director also requested that the possible security risks that the applicant may pose in Turkey be determined. 16.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant sent another letter to the Ministry of the Interior. Referring to her medical condition, she requested urgent treatment and asked to be released and issued with a temporary residence permit pending the proceedings before the UNHCR and the Court. 17.  On the same day the applicant was questioned by a police officer at the Istanbul police headquarters. She maintained, inter alia, that she had initially entered Turkey with a false passport and that she had been deported to Iran where she had spent nine months in prison. She contended that when she re-entered Turkish territory on 3 February 2005 she had immediately re-applied to the UNHCR. She noted that she was against the present government in Iran and that she and her family members had been oppressed when they lived in Iran. The applicant mentioned that she had left and re‑entered Turkish territory as that was the only way to renew her visa. She further contended that she had not applied to the Turkish authorities earlier as her case had been closed by the UNHCR. 18.  On 20 May 2008 the applicant's statements were sent to the General Police Headquarters by the Istanbul police. 19.  On 6 and 16 May and 2 June 2008, the applicant's representative lodged petitions with the Istanbul Police Headquarters and requested that his client be released and given a residence permit pending the outcome of her application to the UNHCR. 20.  By a letter dated 10 June 2008, the deputy director of the Istanbul police headquarters informed the Kırklareli police headquarters that the applicant did not wish to return to her country, but wished to seek asylum, and had applied to the Court. The director reiterated that she had been held in the Istanbul police headquarters with a view to her deportation. He further maintained that the applicant should be held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Court. On the same day the applicant was transferred to that facility. 21.  On 18 July 2008 the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that her case before the Turkish authorities was suspended pending the proceedings before the Court. 22.  On 29 December 2008 the applicant and her son were recognised as refugees, under the UNHCR's mandate, on religious grounds. 23.  On 14 April 2009 the applicant's representative lodged a case with the Ankara Administrative Court. He requested the court to annul the decision of the Ministry not to release his client and to order a stay of execution of that decision pending the proceedings. 24.  On 28 May 2009 the Ankara Administrative Court rejected the applicant's request for a stay of execution. 25.  The applicant's representative appealed. On 24 June 2009 the Ankara Regional Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. 26.  In his submissions to the Court dated 16 May 2008 the applicant's representative contended that, although the applicant was suffering from serious consequences of the operation she underwent in June 2006, she did not have access to a doctor in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. On 18 June 2008 he informed the Court that the applicant had been examined by a doctor, who had ordered a further medical examination. Despite this, the Ministry of the Interior did not authorise a further examination and the applicant's health was deteriorating. 27.  On 27 August 2008 the applicant, with four other persons, started a “fast to the death” to protest about her placement and the physical conditions in the Centre. 28.  Before the Court, the applicant maintained that the physical conditions in the Kırklareli Centre were below the minimum standards set by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (the “CPT”). In support of her submissions the applicant provided a number of photographs containing images of several parts of the Centre. In one room there were two bunk beds on which there were pillows and blankets. There was no bed linen on the beds. In another room there were two beds with bed linen, pillows and blankets. The photographs of the kitchen sinks and stoves showed that the latter were unusable. Another photograph showed that there were four sinks in the bathroom. Inside, the toilets were partially covered with some kind of dark substance. Photographs of the cleaning products that had labels in the Cyrillic alphabet showed that their dates had expired nine to ten years ago. 29.  The applicant finally alleged that the officers who worked at the Kırklareli Centre did not treat the detainees well. In particular, she had been insulted and threatened by a police officer. 30.  The Government replied that the applicant was subjected to a series of medical examinations during July 2008 at the Kırklareli State Hospital According to the documents submitted, blood tests, an abdomino-pelvic ultrasound examination and an abdominal tomography were performed on the applicant. The doctors found no pathological signs as a result of these examinations. 31.  The Government denied the applicant's allegation that the physical conditions at the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre did not comply with the minimum standards established by the CPT. Noting that the Centre in question was not a detention facility, the Government provided photographs of a birthday party and an engagement party, both organised in the common room of the Kırklareli Centre. They further submitted photographs of an Islamic celebration (Festival of Sacrifice) organised in the garden of the Centre. 32.  In their submissions dated 9 September 2009, the Government maintained that an investigation had been initiated into the actions of the police officer who had allegedly insulted the applicant in relation to the latter's complaint of ill-treatment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1945, 1935, 1948 and 1938 respectively and live in İskenderun and Belen respectively. 5.  In 1993 the applicants' plots of land in İskenderun were expropriated by the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways. A committee of experts assessed the value of these lands and the determined amounts were paid to them when the expropriation took place. 6.  On 20 August, 10 October and 21 November 1996 respectively, the applicants filed separate actions for compensation with the İskenderun Civil Court of First Instance. 7.  On 19 September 1997 the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay Mıstık Ateş 41,410,845,000 Turkish liras (TRL) plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 7 August 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 8.  On 25 September 1997 the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay Gülizar Pembe TRL 6,467,500,000 plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 11 September 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 9.  On the same day, the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay Yüksel Bozkaya TRL 80,274,368,000 plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 23 October 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 10.  On 7 October 1997 the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay İsmail Karapınar TRL 13,075,000,000 plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 11 September 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 11.  The Court of Cassation upheld the above-mentioned judgments of the İskenderun First Instance Court on 11 May, 20 May and 25 May 1998 respectively. 12.  On 8 April, 13 April, 12 May and 4 June 1999 respectively, the administration paid the applicants the amounts due together with interest.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Tula. 5.  The applicant was a victim of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. He was subsequently granted category 2 disabled status and became entitled to various social benefits. 6.  On 23 January 2001 he lodged an action with the Tsentralniy District Court of Tula (“the District Court”) against the Department of the Interior of the Tula Region (his employer) for the adjustment of his monthly compensation payments for the damage to his health, and for the recovery of unpaid sums due to him. 7.  The first hearing of the case was scheduled for 24 July 2001 but was cancelled because the judge was on leave. 8.  On 23 October 2001 the applicant supplemented his claims. On the same date the District Court stayed the proceedings following a request by the Supreme Court filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation for a review of the constitutionality of certain legal provisions determining the amount of compensation to be paid to Chernobyl victims. 9.  The Constitutional Court ruled on the relevant issues on 19 June 2002. 10.  On 28 August 2003 the proceedings were resumed. 11.  On 6 October 2003 the hearing was adjourned at the respondent’s request as its representative was ill. 12.  On 28 October 2003 the hearing was adjourned following a request by the respondent for third parties to be permitted to join the proceedings. 13.  On 17 December 2003 the hearing was adjourned because both parties failed to appear. 14.  On 10 February 2004 the applicant supplemented his claims. 15.  12 February 2004 the hearing was adjourned because both parties failed to appear. 16.  On 29 March 2004 the hearing was cancelled because the judge was ill. 17.  The next hearings, scheduled for 19 May 2004 and 16 August 2004, were cancelled because the judge was involved in another unrelated set of proceedings. 18.  On 18 October 2004 and 29 November 2004 the hearing was adjourned because the respondent failed to appear. 19.  On 26 January 2005 and 18 March 2005 the hearing was postponed at the request of the respondent; the reasons have not been specified. 20.  On 14 April 2005 the hearing was cancelled because the judge was on leave, and further postponed because the applicant was ill. 21.  On 11 May 2005 and 24 May 2005 the applicant supplemented his claims. 22.  The hearings of 8 June 2005 and 16 June 2005 were cancelled, respectively, in order for the judge to participate in a seminar and because he was ill. 23.  The hearings of 21 September 2005 and 27 September 2005 were held as planned. The next hearing was scheduled for 30 September 2005. 24.  By a decision of 30 September 2005 the District Court stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of another set of proceedings before the Constitutional Court of Russia in a case which was relevant to the determination of the applicant’s case. 25.  On 4 October 2005 the Constitutional Court of Russia resolved that matter. Meanwhile, on 23 May 2006 and 6 June 2006 the applicant supplemented his claims. 26.  On 23 June 2006 the proceedings were resumed and the hearing was scheduled for 11 September 2006, but was further postponed because of the judge’s involvement in other proceedings. 27.  On 20 December 2006 the hearing was held as planned. The next hearing was scheduled for 17 January 2007. 28.  On 17 January 2007 the hearing was held as planned. 29.  On 18 January 2007 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in part. 30.  On 23 August 2007 the Tula Regional Court (“the Regional Court”), acting on appeal, quashed that judgement and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 31.  On 20 February 2008 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in full. 32.  On 22 May 2008 the Regional Court overturned the judgement and ordered a new hearing. 33.  On 4 August 2008 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in part. That decision was upheld on appeal on 13 November 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  In or before the year 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted in Italy against named individuals (not including the applicants) who were charged, inter alia, of conspiracy, money laundering, abuse of a position of influence in financial trading, embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud. In particular it was suspected that Mr EMP organised, financed and managed, directly or indirectly a network of companies situated in various states (San Marino, Italy, Malta, Portugal (Madeira) and Vanuatu) which were all traceable to one source namely, San Marino Investimenti S.A. (hereinafter “S.M.I.”). According to the applicants, Mr EMP owned S.M.I.’s entire capital stock which was instrumental to the accomplishment of a series of investment and fiduciary operations (operazioni fiduciarie) the aim of which was to allow a number of Italian clients to launder money coming from illicit sources (by impeding the identification of the real source of the money entrusted to it by means of a double system of fiduciary mandates (mandati fiduciari)). The group of co-accused were suspected of having, through such network, abusively supplied investment services contrary to the legal requirements as provided in the relevant Italian law (Testo Unico Della Finanza) and of having abusively carried out financial activities without being in possession of the necessary economic and financial requisites and the relevant registration as required by Italian law (Testo Unico Bancario). 8.  In the context of these proceedings, by means of a letter rogatory received by the San Marino judicial authorities on 8 May 2009, the Public Prosecutor’s office (of the Rome Tribunal) asked the San Marino authorities for assistance in obtaining documentation and carrying out searches in various banks, fiduciary institutes and trust companies (banche, fiduciare e societa’ trust) in San Marino, in accordance with Article 29 of the Bilateral Convention on Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Italy and San Marino of 1939. 9.  By a decision of 27 November 2009 (hereinafter also referred to as the exequatur decision), the ordinary first-instance tribunal (Commissario della Legge, hereinafter the Commissario), accepted the request in conjunction with the crimes of conspiracy, money laundering, aggravated fraud and embezzlement with the aim of fraud, considering that the relevant requirements for the execution of the request were fulfilled. In particular the Commissario considered that those crimes were also punishable under San Marino law. It therefore ordered, inter alia, an investigation in respect of all banks, fiduciary institutes and trust companies in San Marino. The purpose was to acquire information and banking documents (inter alia, copies of statements showing transactions and movements, cheques, fiduciary dispositions (disposizioni fiduciarie) and emails) related to a number of named current accounts in specified institutes as well as any other current account which could be traced back (riferibile) to S.M.I, held by all banks and fiduciary institutes in San Marino, which were directly or indirectly involved with the company or physical persons mentioned in this decision. In reaching that decision the Commissario bore in mind the relevant articles of the Bilateral Convention on Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Italy and San Marino of 1939, law no. 104/2009, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and San Marino’s commitment to international organs such as the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) as well as Article 36 of law no. 165/05 which provides that banking secrecy cannot be held against the criminal justice authorities and Article 13 of law no. 104/2009 according to which the act of acquiring copies of documentation amounts to seizure.\nIt gave further details as to the search and seizure operation, inter alia, that copies should be made of the documentation, that in the event that the investigation was successful the directors of the credit institute were to submit the relevant documents within twenty days to the Agency for financial investigations, who in turn would immediately transfer it, indicating the names of those involved (directly or indirectly), to enable notification. It further ordered that where data was held on electronic storage devices (supporti informatici), the collection of data from these devices should be supervised by appointed experts; and that clone copies were to be made of these storage devices, as well as back-up copies. Any means of information technology seized had to be sealed and kept in custody in appropriate places, and the removal of such seals had to be notified to the interested persons to enable them (or their lawyers) to be present. It ordered the judicial police to serve the decision upon the directors of all the banks and trust companies, to the legal representatives of the physical persons, to the directly interested persons, and to persons who were in possession, under whatever title, of the those places. It also warned that documentation obtained and forwarded could not to be used for purposes other than those linked to the criminal proceedings mentioned in the decree accepting the request made in the letter rogatory, unless the court decided otherwise following a further assessment. 10.  By a note of 26 April 2010 the Commissario ordered that Italian citizens who had entered into fiduciary agreements (aperto posizioni fiduciarie) with S.M.I. (1452 in all) should be notified of the decision. It was noted that any information referring to the said citizens and transmitted to the judicial authority of the requesting state could not be used for the purposes other than the prosecution of the criminal offences mentioned in the exequatur decision (non potra essere utilizzata per fini diversi dal perseguimento degli illeciti penali di cui alle norme di legge indicate nel provvedimento di amissione della rogatoria), unless the court decided otherwise following a new assessment. 11.  Following the investigation and implementation of the exequatur decision, in consequence of the last-mentioned order of the Commissario, the applicants were served with the relevant notification (M.N. on 24 January 2011, S.G. on 16 June 2011 and C.R. and I.R. on 4 February 2011). 12.  On an unspecified date the applicants lodged a complaint (Article 30 of law no. 104/2009) before the judge of criminal appeals (Giudice delle Appellazioni Penali) against the Commissario’s decision concerning the seizure of documents related to them on the basis that they were not persons charged with the criminal offences at issue. They alleged a violation of the principles contained in the San Marino Declaration on Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles (hereinafter “the declaration”). In particular they contended that the principle that crimes had to be punishable under the law of the requested state had not been respected, that there had been a violation of both Italian and San Marino law, and they noted the absence of the fumus delicti and of any link between the crimes at issue and the position of the applicants. Moreover, given that many such complaints by persons in similar situations had already been declared inadmissible by the domestic courts for lack of standing - them not being the persons charged and therefore not the direct victims of the seizure - the applicants further complained that Article 30 (3) of law no. 104/2009 was not compatible with the principles laid down in the Declaration, in so far as it had been interpreted as not protecting or recognising the right to lodge a complaint by anyone who was subject to coercive measures of seizure of documents (related to their interests) as a result of an exequatur decision. 13.  By decisions of 25 February 2011 in respect of S.G., C.R. and I.R., and of 30 June 2011 in respect of M.N., the judge of criminal appeals declared the complaints inadmissible. The court noted that the applicants had been served with a notice of the exequatur order and had exhausted pleas available in law in that respect (hanno esperito le impugnazioni previste dalla legge). It further noted that an exequatur decision may only be challenged by a person who is involved in the investigation being carried out by the requested authority, or by a third party who is not investigated but who has been subjected to the measure. A person, who, in consequence of the investigation, is involved in any way with the activity undertaken, may not be considered as an interested person since any breach of the rights or interests of such persons, resulting from the execution of the exequatur decision, must be raised in the ambit of the Italian jurisdictions. The court considered that as established by domestic case-law it was only after the finding of admissibility of the application that a judge had to set a time-limit for submissions. For the purposes of admissibility one had to verify, amongst other things, the juridical interest of the appellant. Moreover, any constitutional complaints could give rise to an assessment of such question by the competent court (Collegio Garante), following a referral, only if the original proceedings were properly instituted, and not where, because of a lack of juridical interest of the appellant, the application was inadmissible. In the present case the appellants were not interested parties in relation to the exequatur decision, but may only have an eventual interest in the effects of such execution, and thus they did not have juridical interest to challenge the said decision. 14.  In relation to the complaint of incompatibility with the Declaration, the court of criminal appeals only pronounced itself on the request made by C.R.: on 29 April 2011 it declared the complaint inadmissible as on that date no proceedings appeared to be pending. 15.  The applicants appealed to the third instance criminal judge (Terza Istanza Penale) reiterating their complaints and invoking the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In particular they noted that the Commissario’s exequatur decision had ordered the seizure of documents related to them, despite them not being linked to any of the activities mentioned in that decision or them having ever had relations with the Italian companies. Moreover, the seized documents were irrelevant for the purposes of ascertaining the existence of the crimes attributed to the accused, thus, the only purpose behind the seizure was to name the Italians who had had dealings with S.M.I. irrespective of any involvement they had had with the facts object of the letter rogatory. They further challenged the appeal decisions in so far as they were issued in breach of the rights of the defence, in particular as they were not allowed to present submissions as provided for in law, neither in respect of the challenge nor in respect of the constitutional complaint. Furthermore, the decisions had lacked reasons and made no reference to the actual position of the applicants and a lack of reasoning in respect of the rejection of the constitutional complaint was particularly detrimental as it did not allow a proper examination of the matter by the third-instance judge. 16.  By decisions of 29 July 2011 filed in the registry on the same day and served on 3 August 2011 in respect of S.G., I.R and C.R., and of 27 October 2011 filed in the registry on the same day and served on 10 November 2011 in respect of M.N., the third-instance criminal judge confirmed the appeal decision in that the appellants lacked juridical interest. In consequence the appeal was inadmissible and in any event there appeared to be no violation of law tainting the impugned decision. The question of constitutional legitimacy of law no. 104/2009 was also rejected on the same ground as that put forward by the appeal court. 17.  In the meantime, the applicants (except for M.N.) had lodged an objection requesting the revocation of the exequatur decision in their respect, on the basis that the documents related to them were of no relevance to the investigation. 18.  By a decision of 7 September 2011, served on their lawyer on an unspecified date, the Commissario held that the objection was to be discontinued (non luogo a procedere) in view of the findings of the third-instance criminal judge. The Commissario noted that the authorities were not limited to carrying out the actions requested by the letters rogatory only in respect of persons formally charged, but could also extend such acts to third persons who were not so charged. 19.  The applicants lodged a further objection requesting the Commissario to restrict the use of the seized documents. By decisions filed in the relevant registry on 19 September 2011 the Commissario held that its exequatur decision of 27 November 2009 had already applied such a limitation, indeed that decision had clearly stated that such documentation was not to be used for purposes other than those linked to the criminal proceedings mentioned in the letters rogatory, unless the court decided otherwise following a further assessment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were both born in 1985 and live in Bad Bevensen and Berlin respectively. 6.  From 6 to 8 June 2007 a G8 summit of Heads of State and Government was held in Heiligendamm, in the vicinity of Rostock. 7.  The police considered that there was a threat of terrorist attacks, in particular by Islamist terrorists, during the summit. Furthermore, having regard to the experience of previous G8 summits, they considered that there was a risk of property damage by left-wing extremists. The latter were found to have planned to protest against, block and sabotage the summit. 8.  The police estimated that there would be around 25,000 participants at an international demonstration in Rostock on 2 June 2007, 2,500 of whom were ready to use violence, and that there would be around 15,000 demonstrators present during the summit, 1,500 of whom would be ready to use violence. 9.  On 2 June 2007 serious riots broke out in Rostock city centre, involving well-organised violent demonstrators, forming what has been termed a “black block”, who attacked the police with stones and baseball bats. 400 policemen were injured. 10.  According to a press release of the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Ministry of the Interior dated 28 June 2007, some 17,000 police officers had been involved in ensuring that the G8 summit could be held without disruption and in protecting its participants from attacks by terrorists or anti‑globalisation demonstrators prepared to use violence. During the summit, 1,112 people had been detained in holding pens for prisoners (Gefangenensammelstellen). The courts had been asked to confirm the detainees’ detention in 628 cases; they had done so in respect of 113 individuals. 11.  In June 2007 the applicants drove to Rostock in order to participate in demonstrations against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm. 12.  On 3 June 2007 at around 10.15 p.m. the applicants’ identity was checked and established by the police in a car park in front of Waldeck prison, where they were standing next to a van in the company of seven other people. No other people were present in the car park. The police submitted that the first applicant had physically resisted the identity check. He had allegedly hit the arms of a policeman who had attempted to determine the second applicant’s identity. He had also kicked another policeman’s shin in order to prevent his own identity from being determined. The applicants submitted that the second applicant had himself been hit by the police, although he had already been holding his identity card in his hand ready for inspection. The police searched the van and found folded-up banners bearing the inscriptions “Freedom for all prisoners” and “Free all now”. The applicants were arrested. It appears that the banners found were seized. 13.  In two separate decisions taken on 4 June 2007 at 4.20 a.m. and 4 a.m. respectively, the Rostock District Court, having examined both applicants in person, ordered their detention (amtlicher Gewahrsam) until 9 June 2007, 12 noon at the latest. 14.  Relying on section 55(1), paragraph 2(a), and section 56(5) of the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Public Security and Order Act (Gesetz über die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – “the PSOA”, see paragraphs 37-38 below), the District Court found that the applicants’ detention had been lawful in order to prevent the imminent commission or continuation of a criminal offence. As the applicants had been found in front of Waldeck prison in a van in which objects calling for the liberation of prisoners had been discovered, it had to be assumed that they had been about to commit or aid and abet a criminal offence. 15.  The District Court further found that the applicants’ continued detention was indispensable and proportionate. At the hearing, both applicants had given the impression that they had intended to proceed with committing an offence. As they had not made any statements or submissions on the merits, they had been unable to justify their conduct. 16.  On 4 June 2007 the Rostock Regional Court, in two separate decisions, dismissed appeals (sofortige Beschwerde) lodged by the first and second applicants. 17.  The Regional Court confirmed the District Court’s finding that the applicants’ arrest had been lawful under section 55(1), paragraph 2 (a), of the PSOA. As the applicants had been found in the vicinity of Waldeck prison in possession of banners with an imperative wording (“free”), they had intended to incite others to free prisoners and that constituted an offence. Moreover, having regard to the material in the case file, the first applicant had obstructed police officers in the exercise of their duties. The second applicant, for his part, had been charged with dangerous interference with rail traffic in 2002 in connection with the transport of “castor”[1] containers. The Regional Court further agreed with the District Court’s reasoning to the effect that the continuation of the applicants’ detention was indispensable and proportionate. 18.  On 7 June 2007 the Rostock Court of Appeal dismissed further appeals (sofortige weitere Beschwerde) subsequently brought by the applicants. In their appeals, the applicants, represented by counsel, had submitted that the slogans on the banners had been addressed to the police and the authorities, urging them to end the numerous arrests and detentions of demonstrators. They had not been meant to call upon others to attack prisons and to free prisoners by force, an interpretation which had to be considered far-fetched, given that there had not been any violent liberation of detainees from German prisons in recent decades. 19.  The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts’ finding that the requirements of section 55(1), paragraph 2(a), of the PSOA had been met. The applicants’ arrest and continued detention was indispensable in order to avert a danger to public security and order. The banner “Free all now”, together with the banner “Freedom for all prisoners”, could be understood as an incitement to liberate prisoners, an offence under Article 120 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 41 below). The police had been entitled to assume that the applicants had intended to drive to Rostock and display the banners at the partly violent demonstrations there. As a result, a crowd which had been ready to use violence might have been incited to liberate people who had been arrested and detained. 20.  In respect of the second applicant, the requirements of section 55(1), paragraph 2(c), of the PSOA (see paragraph 37 below) had also been met. The second applicant had been arrested in 2002 in comparable circumstances on suspicion of dangerous interference with rail traffic in connection with the transport of castor containers. It was irrelevant whether he had subsequently been convicted. 21.  The applicants had not contested the courts’ conclusions; they had not made any statements or submissions on the merits. The police had been obliged to take into consideration the general security situation in Rostock on 2 and 3 June 2007. On those days, very violent clashes between demonstrators and the police had taken place in the city centre. Moreover, the applicants had proved to be prone to violence themselves by attacking police officers. 22.  The Court of Appeal further considered that the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under the Basic Law did not warrant a different conclusion. It accepted that the slogans on the banners could be understood in different ways. However, in the tense situation in and around Rostock the police had been authorised to prevent ambiguous declarations which could have lead to a risk to public security and order. 23.  Furthermore, the duration of the applicants’ detention was proportionate. According to a report by the Rostock police of 6 June 2007, between 6,000 and 10,000 anti-globalisation activists, some of whom were very violent, were moving towards Heiligendamm and were calling for an “attack on the embankment”. It could not be ruled out that the applicants would have participated in those demonstrations with the banners and would thus have incited other demonstrators to liberate prisoners. 24.  On 6 June 2007 both applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court and applied for an interim injunction ordering their immediate release. 25.  The applicants complained that their detention had violated, in particular, their right to liberty and their right to freedom of expression. The second applicant further submitted that his detention had been in breach of his right to freedom of assembly. Both applicants argued that it had been far-fetched to interpret the slogans on the banners as inciting other demonstrators to attack prisons and to liberate prisoners. The banners had been addressed to the police, who had already arrested many anti‑globalisation activists, to the participants in the G8 summit and to the public in general, and had not advocated acts of violence. The applicants further stressed that they did not have any previous convictions. The second applicant submitted, in particular, that the criminal proceedings against him for dangerous interference with rail traffic had been discontinued. 26.  These complaints were initially registered under file nos. 2 BvR 1195/07 and 2 BvR 1196/07. On 8 June 2007 the reporting judge at the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicants’ representatives by telephone that the Federal Constitutional Court would not take a decision on the applicants’ request for interim measures. 27.  On 9 June 2007 at 12 noon the applicants were released from prison. 28.  The applicants’ constitutional complaints of 6 June 2007 were then considered to have become devoid of purpose following their release. 29.  On 6 July 2007 the applicants asked the Constitutional Court to find that their detention had been unconstitutional, despite the fact that they had been released in the meantime. Thereupon, their constitutional complaints were registered anew (files nos. 2 BvR 1521/07 and 2 BvR 1520/07). 30.  On 6 August 2007 the Federal Constitutional Court, in two separate decisions, declined to consider the first and second applicants’ constitutional complaints, without giving reasons (file nos. 2 BvR 1521/07 and 2 BvR 1520/07). 31.  The decision was served on the first applicant’s counsel on 14 August 2007 and on the second applicant’s counsel on 13 August 2007. 32.  The criminal proceedings instituted against the first applicant for having obstructed public officers in the exercise of their duties (Widerstand gegen Vollstreckungsbeamte) in the course of the identity check on 3 June 2007 were discontinued, in exchange for the first applicant paying 200 euros (EUR). The criminal proceedings against the second applicant for the same offence were discontinued on grounds of insignificance. 33.  The applicants submitted that one of the police officers involved in their arrest had later been convicted of causing bodily harm while discharging public duties in relation to a different matter. They submitted that the proceedings were still pending before the appellate court. The Government did not comment on that point. 34.  No criminal proceedings were brought against the applicants for having incited others to free prisoners. 35.  On 20 December 2007 the Rostock Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ complaints of a violation of their right to be heard. 36.  On 1 May 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the first applicant’s fresh constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 538/08) and on 3 May 2008 it declined to consider the second applicant’s fresh constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 164/08). In their complaints the applicants had relied, in particular, on their rights to liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicants were born in 1950, 1966, 1972, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990 and 1993, respectively, and live in Diyarbakır. The first applicant is the wife and the remainder of the applicants are the children of Hakkı Kaya, who has been missing since 16 November 1996. 9.  On 16 November 1996 at about 3 p.m. Hakkı Kaya and his two friends Mr Ahmet Yaşar and a certain Mehmet (full name unknown) were walking in the city centre in Diyarbakır. While they were in front of the Forest Directorate building, a white Renault estate car, with the registration number 06 EKN 22, approached them. Three men dressed in civilian clothes and carrying walkie-talkies introduced themselves as police officers and carried out an identity check. They then forced Mr Kaya into the vehicle, stating that he had to go to the police station to make a statement. 10.  On 28 November 1996 the second applicant filed a complaint with the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor’s office and requested the Prosecutor to investigate Hakkı Kaya’s disappearance. On the same day, Hakkı Kaya’s brother, Mr Şefik Kaya, petitioned the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor’s office and requested information about his brother’s whereabouts. 11.  On 4 December 1996 the police took a statement from Mr Ahmet Yaşar, an eye-witness to Hakkı Kaya’s abduction. In his statement, Mr Yaşar explained that on the day of the incident, while he and his two friends were walking in front of the Diyarbakır Forest Directorate Building, a white Toros estate car with the registration number 06 EKN 22 had approached them. The men in the car carried out an identity check and told Mr Yaşar that he could leave. Mr Yaşar explained that, as everything had happened very quickly, he was unable to give a precise description of these men. He recalled however that one of them was blond, and another had curly hair. He had no idea for whom they were working. 12.  On 5 January 1997 the Diyarbakır Gendarmerie Commander informed the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor that Hakkı Kaya had not been taken into custody. 13.  On 17 March 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor declared a lack of jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s office. The latter commenced an investigation into Mr Kaya’s disappearance and requested the Diyarbakır Security Directorate to search for him. Since that date, the Security Directorate has been sending regular reports to the Prosecutor and checking the customs’ records to see whether Hakkı Kaya has left the country. 14.  On 27 March 1997 the Human Rights Investigation Committee at the Turkish Grand National Assembly informed the applicants that Hakkı Kaya was not in detention. The Committee further informed the applicants that the car with the registration number 06 EKN 22 was a Fiat Şahin, and not a white Toros estate car as alleged, and it belonged to a certain Y.C., who resided in Ankara. 15.  On 7 September 1998 the police took Efendi Kaya’s statement. In his statement, Efendi Kaya explained that his father had been missing since November 1996 and that he had not received any news from him since. 16.  On 28 January 2000 the applicants filed a further complaint with the Public Prosecutor. On 12 June 2000 the police once again took a statement from Efendi Kaya, who repeated his statement of 7 September 1998. 17.  On 13 June 2000 the police took a statement from Mr Recep Girçek, a neighbour of the Kaya family. In his statement, Mr Girçek explained that Hakkı Kaya had been missing since November 1996; however he had no information about his disappearance or his whereabouts. 18.  On 22 March 2001 the authorities took another statement from Efendi Kaya, who repeated his previous statements. 19.  On 11 March 2004 an interview with Mr Abdulkadir Aygan, a former member of the PKK and allegedly a member of JITEM (the Gendarme Intelligence Service), was published in the Ülkede Özgür Gündem newspaper. In this interview, Mr Aygan stated that Hakkı Kaya was one of the persons who had been killed by JITEM. He explained that Mr Kaya’s body had been buried at the Diyarbakır–Silvan motorway, between the villages of Karacali and Han. The applicants submitted a copy of this newspaper article to the Public Prosecutor for further investigation. 20.  On 6 April 2004 the Diyarbakır Security Department informed the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor that Abdülkadir Aygan had been sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a member of a terrorist organisation in 1986. However, as he had benefited from the repentance law of 1985, he had been released from prison and his whereabouts were unknown. The Public Prosecutor continued searching for Abdülkadir Aygan but was not able to locate him. 21.  On 8 June 2004 the second applicant filed a complaint against Abdülkadir Aygan for killing Hakkı Kaya. 22.  The parties submitted various documents with a view to substantiating their claims. These documents, in so far as they are relevant, may be listed as follows.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in Uganda in 1974. She currently lives in London. 9.  The applicant entered the United Kingdom on 28 March 1998 under an assumed name. She was seriously ill and was admitted to hospital, where she was diagnosed as HIV-positive with “considerable immunosuppression and ... disseminated mycobacterium TB”. 10.  On 31 March 1998 solicitors lodged an asylum application on her behalf, claiming that she had been ill-treated and raped by the National Resistance Movement in Uganda because of her association with the Lord’s Resistance Army, and asserting that she was in fear of her life and safety if she were returned. 11.  In August 1998 the applicant developed a second Aids-defining illness, Kaposi’s sarcoma. Her CD4 count was down to 10 (that of a healthy person is over 500). After treatment with antiretroviral drugs and frequent monitoring, her condition began to stabilise so that by 2005, when the House of Lords examined the case, her CD4 count had risen to 414. 12.  In March 2001 a consultant physician prepared an expert report, at the request of the applicant’s solicitor, which expressed the view that without continuing regular antiretroviral treatment to improve and maintain her CD4 count, and monitoring to ensure that the correct combination of drugs was used, the applicant’s life expectancy would be less than one year, due to the disseminated Kaposi’s sarcoma and the risk of infections. The medication she needed would be available in Uganda, but only at considerable expense and in limited supply in the applicant’s home town of Masaka. Moreover, the author of the report pointed out that in Uganda there was no provision for publicly funded blood monitoring, basic nursing care, social security, food or housing. 13.  The Secretary of State refused the asylum claim on 28 March 2001 on grounds of credibility, and also because it was not accepted that the Ugandan authorities were interested in the applicant. The applicant’s Article 3 claim was also rejected, the Secretary of State noting that treatment of Aids in Uganda was comparable to that in any other African country, and that all the major antiretroviral drugs were available in Uganda at highly subsidised prices. 14.  An adjudicator determined the applicant’s appeal on 10 July 2002. He dismissed the appeal against the asylum refusal, but allowed the appeal on Article 3 grounds by reference to the case of D. v. the United Kingdom (2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III). He found that the applicant’s case fell within the scope of the Asylum Directorate Instructions which provide that exceptional leave to remain in or enter the United Kingdom must be given:\n“... where there is credible medical evidence that return, due to the medical facilities in the country concerned, would reduce the applicant’s life expectancy and subject him to acute physical and mental suffering, in circumstances where the UK [United Kingdom] can be regarded as having assumed responsibility for his care. ...” 15.  The Secretary of State appealed against the Article 3 finding, contending that all the Aids drugs available under the National Health Service in the United Kingdom could also be obtained locally, and most were also available at a reduced price through the United Nations’ funded projects and from bilateral Aids donor-funded programmes. The applicant’s return would not, therefore, be to a “complete absence of medical treatment”, and so would not subject her to “acute physical and mental suffering”. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal on 29 November 2002. It found as follows:\n“Medical treatment is available in Uganda for the [applicant’s] condition even though the Tribunal accept that the level of medical provision in Uganda falls below that in the United Kingdom and will continue to lag behind the advance of continuing drug advances which inevitably first become available in highly developed countries. Nonetheless, extensive efforts are being made in Uganda to tackle the Aids situation – Aids-treating drugs are available, refined forms of drug are being supplied (albeit with time lags) and it would not be until the [applicant’s] specific and varying needs became known that her needs could be assessed and the then availability of appropriate treatment decided.” 16.  Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted on 26 June 2003, and on 16 October 2003 the applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by a majority of two to one ([2003] EWCA Civ 1369). With reference to the case of D. v. the United Kingdom (cited above), Lord Justice Laws (with whom Lord Justice Dyson concurred) stated:\n“The contrast between the relative well-being accorded in a signatory State to a very sick person who, for a while, even a long while, is accommodated there, and the scarcities and hardships which (without any violation of international law) he would face if he were returned home, is to my mind – even if the contrast is very great – an extremely fragile basis upon which to erect a legal duty upon the State to confer or extend a right to remain in its territory, a duty unsupported by any decision or policy adopted by the democratic arm, executive or legislature, of the State’s government. The elaboration of immigration policy ... is a paradigm of the responsibility of elected government. One readily understands that such a responsibility may be qualified by a supervening legal obligation arising under the ECHR [the Convention] where the person in question claims to be protected from torture or other mistreatment in his home country in violation of the Article 3 standards, especially if it would be meted out to him at the hands of the State. But a claim to be protected from the harsh effects of a want of resources, albeit made harsher by its contrast with the facilities available in the host country, is to my mind something else altogether.\n... I would hold that the application of Article 3 where the complaint in essence is of want of resources in the applicant’s home country (in contrast to what has been available in the country from which he is to be removed) is only justified where the humanitarian appeal of the case is so powerful that it could not in reason be resisted by the authorities of a civilised State. That does not, I acknowledge, amount to a sharp legal test ... an Article 3 case of this kind must be based on facts which are not only exceptional, but extreme; extreme, that is, judged in the context of cases all or many of which (like this one) demand one’s sympathy on pressing grounds ...”\nLord Justice Carnwath, dissenting, was unable to say that the facts of the case were so clear that the only reasonable conclusion was that Article 3 did not apply. Given the stark contrast between the applicant’s position in the United Kingdom and the practical certainty of a dramatically reduced life expectancy if returned to Uganda with no effective family support, he would have remitted the case to the fact-finding body in the case, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 17.  Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted, and on 5 May 2005 the House of Lords unanimously dismissed the applicant’s appeal ([2005] UKHL 31).\nLord Nicholls of Birkenhead summarised the applicant’s prognosis as follows:\n“... In August 1998 [the applicant] developed a second Aids-defining illness, Kaposi’s sarcoma. The CD4 cell count of a normal healthy person is over 500. Hers was down to 10.\nAs a result of modern drugs and skilled medical treatment over a lengthy period, including a prolonged course of systematic chemotherapy, the [applicant] is now much better. Her CD4 count has risen [from 10] to 414. Her condition is stable. Her doctors say that if she continues to have access to the drugs and medical facilities available in the United Kingdom she should remain well for ‘decades’. But without these drugs and facilities the prognosis is ‘appalling’: she will suffer ill health, discomfort, pain and death within a year or two. This is because the highly active antiretroviral medication she is currently receiving does not cure her disease. It does not restore her to her pre-disease state. The medication replicates the functions of her compromised immune system and protects her from the consequences of her immune deficiency while, and only while, she continues to receive it.\nThe cruel reality is that if the [applicant] returns to Uganda her ability to obtain the necessary medication is problematic. So if she returns to Uganda and cannot obtain the medical assistance she needs to keep her illness under control, her position will be similar to having a life-support machine turned off.”\nLord Hope of Craighead, with whom Lord Nicholls, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed, referred in detail to the Court’s case-law (see paragraphs 32-41 below), and held as follows:\n“... that Strasbourg has adhered throughout to two basic principles. On the one hand, the fundamental nature of the Article 3 guarantees applies irrespective of the reprehensible conduct of the applicant. ... On the other hand, aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State. For an exception to be made where expulsion is resisted on medical grounds the circumstances must be exceptional ... The question on which the Court has to concentrate is whether the present state of the applicant’s health is such that, on humanitarian grounds, he ought not to be expelled unless it can [be] shown that the medical and social facilities that he so obviously needs are actually available to him in the receiving State. The only cases where this test has been found to be satisfied are D. v. the United Kingdom ... and B.B. v. France ... [T]he Strasbourg Court has been at pains in its decisions to avoid any further extension of the exceptional category of case which D. v. the United Kingdom represents.\nIt may be that the Court has not really faced up to the consequences of developments in medical techniques since the cases of D. v. the United Kingdom and B.B. v. France were decided. The position today is that HIV infections can be controlled effectively and indefinitely by the administration of retroviral drugs. In almost all cases where this treatment is being delivered successfully it will be found that at present the patient is in good health. But in almost all these cases stopping the treatment will lead in a very short time to a revival of all the symptoms from which the patient was originally suffering and to an early death. The antiretroviral treatment can be likened to a life‑support machine. Although the effects of terminating the treatment are not so immediate, in the longer term they are just as fatal. It appears to be somewhat disingenuous for the Court to concentrate on the applicant’s state of health which, on a true analysis, is due entirely to the treatment whose continuation is so much at risk.\nBut it cannot be said that the Court is unaware of the advances of medical science in this field. All the recent cases since S.C.C. v. Sweden have demonstrated this feature. The fact that the Court appears to have been unmoved by them is due, I think, to its adherence to the principle that aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State. The way this principle was referred to and then applied in Amegnigan v. the Netherlands ... is, in my opinion, highly significant. What the Court is in effect saying it that the fact that the treatment may be beyond the reach of the applicant in the receiving State is not to be treated as an exceptional circumstance. It might be different if it could be said that it was not available there at all and that the applicant was exposed to an inevitable risk due to its complete absence. But that is increasingly unlikely to be the case in view of the amount of medical aid that is now reaching countries in the Third World, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. For the circumstances to be, as it was put in Amegnigan v. the Netherlands, ‘very exceptional’ it would need to be shown that the applicant’s medical condition had reached such a critical stage that there were compelling humanitarian grounds for not removing him to a place which lacked the medical and social services which he would need to prevent acute suffering while he is dying.\n... So long as [the applicant] continues to take the treatment she will remain healthy and she will have several decades of good health to look forward to. Her present condition cannot be said to be critical. She is fit to travel, and will remain fit if and so long as she can obtain the treatment that she needs when she returns to Uganda. The evidence is that the treatment that she needs is available there, albeit at considerable cost. She also still has relatives there, although her position is that none of them would be willing and able to accommodate and take care of her. In my opinion her case falls into the same category as S.C.C. v. Sweden, Arcila Henao v. the Netherlands, Ndangoya v. Sweden and Amegnigan v. the Netherlands, where the Court has consistently held that the test of exceptional circumstances has not been satisfied. In my opinion the Court’s jurisprudence leads inevitably to the conclusion that her removal to Uganda would not violate the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention. ...”\nLord Hope concluded by observing:\n“[Any extension of the principles in D. v. the United Kingdom] would have the effect of affording all those in the [applicant’s] condition a right of asylum in this country until such time as the standard of medical facilities available in their home countries for the treatment of HIV/Aids had reached that which is available in Europe. It would risk drawing into the United Kingdom large numbers of people already suffering from HIV in the hope that they too could remain here indefinitely so that they could take the benefit of the medical resources that are available in this country. This would result in a very great and no doubt unquantifiable commitment of resources which it is, to say the least, highly questionable the States Parties to the Convention would ever have agreed to. The better course, one might have thought, would be for States to continue to concentrate their efforts on the steps which are currently being taken, with the assistance of the drugs companies, to make the necessary medical care universally and freely available in the countries of the third world which are still suffering so much from the relentless scourge of HIV/Aids.”\nBaroness Hale of Richmond, agreeing that the appeal should be dismissed, reviewed the domestic and Convention authorities and phrased the test to be applied as follows:\n“... whether the applicant’s illness has reached such a critical stage (i.e. he is dying) that it would be inhuman treatment to deprive him of the care which he is currently receiving and send him home to an early death unless there is care available there to enable him to meet that fate with dignity. ... [The test] is not met on the facts of this case.” 18.  According to information obtained by the Court of its own motion, HIV is normally treated by antiretroviral drugs. In the United Kingdom, in common with most developed countries, these drugs are provided in combination, a practice known as “highly active antiretroviral therapy” (HAART). The proper administration of antiretroviral drugs depends on regular monitoring of the patient, including blood tests, and the availability of medical personnel to adjust at frequent intervals the level and type of drugs taken. Such treatment is generally available free of charge on the National Health Service. 19.  In Uganda, attempts have been made to reduce the country’s dependency on imported medication, including producing generic drugs locally. However, in common with most sub-Saharan African countries, the availability of antiretroviral drugs is hampered by limited financial resources and by shortcomings in the health-care infrastructure required to administer them effectively. As a result, according to research carried out by the World Health Organisation (WHO), approximately only half of those needing antiretroviral therapy in Uganda receive it (WHO, “Progress on Global Access to HIV Antiretroviral Therapy”, March 2006, pp. 9, 11 and 72). The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids (UNAIDS) and WHO in their 2007 country situation analysis on Uganda also cited major barriers to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support as including limited public investment, limited service coverage and lack of a policy framework. There are also significant disparities in the provision of drugs between urban and rural areas (WHO, “Summary Country Profile for HIV/Aids Treatment Scale-Up: Uganda”, December 2005). In addition, progress in providing medical care has been offset by the ever-increasing number of people requiring treatment (UNAIDS/WHO, “Aids Epidemic Update”, 2006, p. 18) and given the rapid population growth in Uganda, its stable HIV incidence rate means that an increasing number of people acquire HIV each year (UNAIDS/WHO, “Aids Epidemic Update”, December 2007, p. 17).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Płock. 6.  On 30 May 2004 the applicant was arrested. Two days later, on 1 June 2004 the Gostynin District Court decided to remand him in custody. 7.  By a judgment of 27 June 2005 the Płock Regional Court found the applicant guilty of manslaughter and other offences and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. On 3 November 2005 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 8.  On an unspecified later date the court granted the applicant’s request to assign a legal-aid lawyer to the case for the purposes of filing a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 9.  In a letter of 6 February 2006 the applicant’s legal-aid lawyer informed the Warsaw Court of Appeal that she had found no grounds on which to lodge a cassation appeal. 10.  By a letter of 7 February 2006 the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal forwarded the legal-aid lawyer’s statement to the applicant. The letter read as follows:\n“The Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal ... forwards, enclosed, a copy of a letter of your legal-aid lawyer, for your information. Please be informed that the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal expires on 13 February 2006.” 11.  This Warsaw Court’s of Appeal letter, together with the legal-aid lawyer’s letter of 6 February 2006, were served on the applicant on an unspecified date after 7 February 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, who are brothers, were born in 1986, 1987 and 1985 respectively and live in Bucharest. 6.  In the early hours of 17 March 2008, around five minutes after midnight, the applicants, together with their parents, decided to go to a police station to report that the applicant Marius-Romeo Chinez had been a victim of crime. They stopped a taxi on the street and because the taxi driver, B.G., refused to take them, they got involved in a verbal dispute with him and one of the applicants punched the bonnet of the car. Shortly afterwards, several taxi drivers from the same taxi company arrived at the scene. A team of two police officers (D.M. and F.I.) who were patrolling the area also arrived at the scene of the incident. They were followed by three additional police units. 7.  In the presence of the police the dispute between the applicants and the taxi drivers escalated, with the applicant Mihai Chinez being hit in the face. When he tried to retaliate, the police handcuffed him and took him to their car. At the same time the applicant Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez was hit on the head by an unknown person and lost consciousness. When he saw his brother lying on the ground, the applicant Mihai Chinez refused to get into the police car. At this point the three police officers who had hold of him started hitting him and used their electric stun gun to force him into their car. Afterwards, Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez was lifted off the ground, handcuffed and put into a police car. The applicant Marius-Romeo Chinez, who was watching the scene from a distance, was pushed to the ground by two policemen, handcuffed and taken to another police car nearby. 8.  The applicants were then taken to the police station, where Mihai and Marius-Romeo were punched and kicked in the stomach and chest by the police officers who had brought them in. After several hours of waiting without being questioned and without making a statement, Marius-Romeo was taken by ambulance, under police escort, to the Floreasca Emergency Hospital, where he had treatment for two days. 9.  The other two applicants were questioned separately by different police officers. On 17 March 2008, at around 4 p.m., when a lawyer hired by their father arrived, they were allowed to leave the police station.\n(b)  The Government’s account of the events 10.  According to the incident report drafted by the chief of the police units involved, on 17 March 2008 at around 00.20 a.m. the team of two police officers who were on patrol had seen a group of five persons attacking a taxi driver. When they intervened to stop the fight and to identify the persons involved, the applicants became aggressive towards them too and punched them. The officers asked for support and additional patrol units arrived at the scene. Subsequently, the decision was taken to accompany the attackers, namely the applicants, to the police station to identify them, but because they refused to go the police officers had to use force and handcuff them. The report further mentioned that the applicants had damaged a taxi belonging to Mr. B.G., who was identified by name, age, personal identity number and address.\nThe report also stated:\n“Before the arrival of the police units, several colleagues came to protect the taxi driver and assaulted the five [people]; because of the injuries he sustained Marius-Romeo Chinez was taken to the Floreasca Emergency Hospital, where he was admitted to the surgical ward ...\nOn the occasion of the investigation at the crime scene four eyewitnesses were identified and gave statements ...” 11.  The report concluded that, in accordance with an order given by the prosecutor by telephone, an investigation was immediately launched in connection with assault on police officers by the applicants and their father. 12.  On the same day the chief asked for forensic expert reports from the National Forensic Medicine Institute in connection with the injuries suffered by police officers F.S.I. and N.C. The reports issued on 14 May 2008 confirm that officer F.S.I. had a 4 x 1 cm ecchymosis and excoriation on the left lumbar region, which could have been caused on 17 March 2008 by being hit with a hard object, and which required one to two days’ medical treatment. With respect to officer N.C., the report mentioned that he had a 2 x 2 cm ecchymosis in the left occipital region, which could have been caused by being hit with a hard object on 17 March 2008 and which required one to two days’ medical treatment. 13.  According to a forensic medical report issued on 2 April 2008, Mihai Chinez had a haematoma of 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm in the occipital area, numerous ecchymoses on the face, arms and left leg, and five electrical burns on the left thigh. It was considered that the injuries, which could have occurred on 17 March 2008, were caused by being hit with a hard object, and required two to three days’ medical treatment. 14.  According to a forensic medical report issued in June 2008, Marius-Romeo Chinez had an excoriation of 3 x 2 cm on the right of the forehead, a 1.5 x 1 cm ecchymosis outside the right eye, several ecchymoses and haematomas on the head, a 1 cm wound on the upper lip which had been sutured, several ecchymoses of 7 x 3 cm and 6 x 4 cm on the back and the lower right thorax, as well as on the right elbow. The report mentioned that he was drunk when he was brought to the Emergency Hospital. It was considered that the injuries, which could have been inflicted on 17 March 2008, had been caused by being hit with and against a hard object or surface, and required eight to nine days’ medical treatment. 15.  A forensic medical report issued in August 2008 mentioned that Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez had a haematoma of 1 x 0.5 x 0.3 cm on the right side of the head and two ecchymoses on the right thigh. He also had limited capacity to open his mouth because of an injury to the right side of the jaw. The report concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on 17 March 2008 by being hit with and against hard surfaces and objects, and that they required one to two days’ medical treatment. 16.  On 7 July 2008 the applicants brought criminal proceedings against the police officers who were involved in the events of 17 March 2008, for abusive behaviour, unlawful arrest and misconduct. They claimed that on 17 March 2008 they had been beaten by police officers both before and after they were taken to the police station, following an incident they had been involved in with a taxi driver. 17.  The investigation of the applicants’ complaint conducted by N.I., a police officer from the Control Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, commenced by taking statements from the applicants on 11, 12 and 14 August 2008. They described the course of the events as mentioned in paragraphs 6 to 9 above. The applicant Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez stated that, while he was approaching the two police officers who were handcuffing his brother Mihai, he was hit on the head and lost consciousness. He further mentioned that after his arrival at the police station he had not been ill-treated. The applicant Mihai Chinez stated that “he was told later that [Ionuţ Ludovic] had been hit by taxi drivers and policemen”. The applicants mentioned that they did not know the names of the taxi drivers involved in the incident or of the police officers present at the scene. Lastly, they requested criminal sanctions against the police officers who had assaulted them both in the street and inside the police station. 18.  On 11 August 2008, J.V., the applicants’ mother, who was present during the incident, declared that she had seen around twenty or thirty taxi drivers hitting the applicants Mihai and Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez. Then she had seen the two police officers pushing Marius-Romeo to the ground, hitting him and handcuffing him. She then stated that when the two police officers saw Ionuţ Ludovic lying on the ground they ran towards him, dragged him to their car, slapped him, turned him over with his face to the ground and handcuffed him. By this time all the taxi drivers had left the scene. Once they arrived at the police station she was not allowed to enter or to contact her sons. After approximately one hour she saw the applicant Marius-Romeo being taken away by ambulance, with his handcuffs still on and under police escort. 19.  The investigation continued with the identification of the police officers involved in the incident. In this respect, on 20 August 2008, the operational order of 17 March 2008 as well as the incident report drafted by the police chief (see paragraph 10 above) were attached to the investigation file. 20.  On 24 August 2008 N.I. took statements from police officers D.M. and F.S.I. They declared that they had been on patrol together in a police car when they saw several taxis and several individuals hitting another person. They immediately approached the scene of the incident and asked the aggressors to stop. When they refused the two officers called for back-up, and then intervened in order to remove from the crowd one person who was violent and had blood on his face. When they tried to immobilise this person he went up to a taxi and hit its windscreen with his fist, breaking it. They decided to handcuff him, and at that moment he kicked F.S.I. in the chest and refused to get into the police car, pointing to his brother, who had been beaten and was lying on the ground, and asking them to call an ambulance. Then they put him into the police car with the help of two other colleagues and drove him to their police station. They mentioned in their statement that they did not use any physical or psychological pressure on the person in question, and that they were not equipped with electric stun guns. When they arrived at the police station the person was identified as Mihai Chinez and “was taken over by officer F.L. from the criminal investigations unit and other colleagues who continued the investigation”. 21.  The same day officer D.A.M. gave a statement in which she mentioned that she was part of one of the units called as back-up by officers D.M. and F.S.I. When she arrived at the scene she found one person pointing out a taxi driver who had allegedly just beaten his brother. She got back into her car and drove in the direction indicated but could not find the taxi driver. Then she returned to the scene and, according to her statement, she “identified two eyewitnesses who could describe the incident and they accompanied her to the police station”. She further declared that, once inside the police station, she did not participate in the questioning and did not physically or verbally assault any of the persons involved in the incident. 22.  On 26 August 2008, in a note drafted by officer N.I., police officers D.M., Z.C., N.C., F.I., D.D.M., D.A., P.M.C. and S.L.E. were identified as having been present during the incident under investigation “together with other public order forces”. 23.  On 5 September 2008 officer N.G., who was on duty at the police station on the night of the incident, gave a statement mentioning that he had helped his colleagues D.M. and F.I. to identify the applicants and their parents, and took a statement from J.V., the applicant’s mother. 24.  On 24 and 25 September 2008 statements were taken from officers F.L.C. and D.D.M. They stated that they had not been on duty on the night of the incident, but were called in and asked to come to the police station. When they arrived they were informed about the incident and asked to help their colleagues. F.L.C. declared that he had heard statements from two eyewitnesses. D.D.M. declared that he had questioned Mihai Chinez. Both officers declared that they had not assaulted any of the participants in the incident. 25.  On 25 September 2008 investigating officer N.I. took a statement from officer A.S, who had also been called in from home to the police station in the early hours of 17 March 2008. He stated that “at the station there were a number of people, including taxi drivers, witnesses and members of the Chinez family”. He then proceeded to question Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez. He continued by stating that he was aware that the applicants were being investigated for charges of assault against police officers. Lastly, he concluded that between 2005 and 2007 he was the community police officer in charge of the area in which the applicants lived. He stated in this respect that the applicants were disruptive individuals who had been sanctioned on numerous occasions for disturbing public order, and that in his opinion their complaint was “biased and based on untruths”. 26.  The statements allegedly taken from the applicants and eyewitnesses immediately after the incident inside the police station were not included in the investigation file. 27.  On 2 October 2009 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. On 14 January 2010 it was decided that the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal was competent to examine the case after all, and the file was sent back to them. 28.  On 15 and 17 March 2011 officers F.L.C., A.S. and D.D.M. were heard again, this time before the prosecutor. In addition to his initial statement given in 2008, officer F.L.C. pointed out that, once inside the police station and while he was handcuffed, the applicant Mihai Chinez had banged his own head against the wall and the floor several times. 29.  On 1 June 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the criminal complaint lodged by the applicants against some of the police officers who had taken part in the incident of 17 March 2008, in particular those officers who had questioned the applicants after they were taken to the police station, on the ground that no unlawful act had been committed by them. It held that following the incident the applicants had been restrained by police officers and taken to the police station for identification and questioning, because a car had been destroyed during the incident and police officers had been assaulted. It was further held that when they reached the police station it was already apparent from physical evidence that the applicants had been involved in a violent incident. There was therefore no evidence in the criminal investigation file to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the police officers who questioned the applicants at the police station, in particular A.S, F.L.C. and D.D.M., had acted violently against the applicants. Moreover, it was held that one of the applicants, namely Mihai Chinez, had inflicted injuries on himself. The prosecutor finally decided that the criminal investigation in respect of the remaining police officers, not identified by name, should be continued by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. 30.  The applicants complained against this decision, arguing, inter alia, that no statements had ever been taken from any of the taxi drivers involved in the incident. They also argued that they had been hit by the taxi drivers in the presence of the police officers, who had done nothing to protect them. On the contrary, the police officers had also brutally attacked them, immobilising them in the street and then beating them up once they were inside the police station. They further alleged that two witnesses, namely I.S. and the applicants’ legal representative, had seen the injuries suffered by them but were never called to testify. 31.  On 30 June 2011 the applicants’ complaint was rejected as ill-founded by the General Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 32. The applicants appealed against the prosecutors’ decisions before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, reiterating their previous arguments (see paragraph 30 above). Their appeal was rejected with final effect on 20 October 2011. In reaching this decision the Bucharest Court of Appeal firstly considered that sufficient investigative action had been taken, such as taking statements from the applicants and the police officers present in the police station, and, because the alleged ill-treatment took place in a police station, no other evidence was available that could verify the applicants’ complaint with respect to police officers A.S, F.L.C. and D.D. The court further held that it could not decide with respect to the incident which took place in the street and which involved the taxi drivers, because it was the object of an ongoing investigation conducted by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. 33.  The criminal investigation with respect to the rest of the police officers and concerning the incident which took place in the street is still pending before the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. 34.  The criminal investigation against the applicants for assaulting police officers (see paragraph 11 above) has also not been completed to date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Novomoskovsk. In the early nineties the applicant worked in Russia, however, since 1992 she had a Ukrainian citizenship stamp in her U.S.S.R. passport, which she exchanged for a Ukrainian passport in 1999. 5.  In 1995 the applicant left Russia, moved into her Novomoskovsk house purchased in 1987, and sought to privatize an adjacent plot of land. In September 1996, having received a privatization certificate, she found out that part of the plot she considered to be entitled to, had been privatized by her neighbour, Mrs N.P. 6.  On 10 February 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against Mrs N.P., seeking partial annulment of her privatization documents. 7.  On 19 March 1998 the Novomoskovsk Court (Новомосковський міський суд Дніпропетровської області) dismissed her claims as lodged outside the applicable statute of limitation. The applicant appealed. 8.  On 23 April 1998 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”; Дніпропетровський обласний суд)[1] quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It found that the Novomoskovsk Court had insufficiently analysed the circumstances concerning the application of the statute of limitation. It further instructed the court to examine particular documentary and other evidence and to summon the City Council's Executive Committee (Виконавчий комітет Новомосковської міської ради), which had issued the privatization documents. 9.  In October 1998 Mrs N.P. lodged a counter-claim, seeking to annul the applicant's privatization certificate. She maintained that the applicant had not received Ukrainian citizenship until 1999 and so, under the applicable law, had not been entitled to privatize land before that time. 10.  On 18 January 2001 the Novomoskovsk Court accepted Mrs N.P.'s argument, having dismissed all of the applicant's claims and having allowed all those of Mrs N.P. The applicant appealed. 11.  On 5 March 2001 the Regional Court quashed this judgment. It found that the Novomoskovsk Court had misinterpreted applicable substantive law and breached a number of procedural requirements. Particularly, it had failed to examine a number of relevant documents and witnesses, as well as to substantiate the dismissal of the applicant's claims against Mrs N.P. 12.  On 4 January and 12 November 2003 the applicant amended her claims. 13.  On 15 July 2004 the Novomoskovsk Court partly allowed both parties' claims. In particular, it ordered the Executive Committee to change the planning scheme and record each party's ownership over the land, which she actually used. The applicant appealed. 14.  On 9 December 2004 the Regional Court quashed this judgment, having found that the Novomoskovsk Court had exceeded its procedural authority in deciding to design a planning scheme, which power was vested in the municipal authorities. Furthermore, the court still had failed to examine certain of the documents of relevance to the proceedings. The applicant appealed in cassation. 15.  As of June 2006 the proceedings were pending before the cassation court. 16.  In the course of the proceedings, the first-instance court scheduled some 33 hearings. Most of them were scheduled with intervals ranging from several weeks to five months. On two occasions the intervals between the hearings exceeded six and nine months respectively (28 January 1999 – 12 August 1999 and 3 April 2002 – 21 January 2003). Thirteen hearings were adjourned on account of the absences of municipal authorities summoned into the proceedings. Twice the hearings were adjourned on account of the applicant's failure to appear.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb. 9.  On 10 July 1991 M.T. and H.T. (“the plaintiffs”) brought an action in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the applicant seeking damages for breach of contract. 10.  From 27 November 1991 until 27 January 1992 the plaintiffs were represented by their legal counsel, M.V. and thereafter by his daughter, S.T., who took over her father's law practice. 11.  The plaintiffs, but not M.V., attended the first hearing in the case that was held on 11 December 1991. M.V.'s activity in the proceedings was thus limited to filing one set of submissions with the court on 2 December 1991 in which he responded to the applicant's arguments. 12.  At the next hearing held on 27 January 1992 S.T. replaced her father as the plaintiffs' counsel. 13.  On 28 April 1992 the Municipal Court gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 9 February 1993 the Zagreb County Court (Okružni sud Zagreb) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 14.  In the resumed proceedings, on 6 July 1993 the Zagreb Municipal Court again gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The applicant appealed. 15.  On 27 September 1994 the Zagreb County Court reversed the first-instance judgment, only accepting part of the plaintiffs' claim. 16.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) in which he argued, inter alia, that he had been unable to present his case properly in the Municipal Court. 17.  On 8 December 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law. 18.  On 28 July 2000 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). 19.  Following the service of the Supreme Court's decision, on 24 August 2000 S.T. informed the Zagreb Municipal Court that she had ceased to act for the plaintiffs some four years earlier and that the decision should have been served on the plaintiffs directly. 20.  On 18 December 2000 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It found that the articles of the Constitution on which the applicant sought to rely did not contain any substantive provisions enshrining human rights or fundamental freedoms.\nJudge M.V. was a member of the panel of five judges which delivered that decision. The panel was presided over by another judge. The applicant became aware of the composition of the panel when he received the Constitutional Court's decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently serving a sentence in Rivne Regional Penitentiary no. 76. 8.  According to the applicant, he was detained and ill-treated in police custody from 19 to 21 October 2003. There are no further details or documents. 9.  In the evening of 31 October 2003 the applicant, together with another person, was arrested by the Fontanka police unit of the Kominternovo District Police Department in flagrante delicto on the scene of a robbery and car hijacking. As it would later be confirmed by at least two eye-witnesses (see paragraph 23 below), the applicant attempted escaping from and showed resistance to the police. 10.  According to the applicant, he pleaded guilty to several counts of robbery under torture. He alleged in particular that he had been heavily beaten with rubber truncheons, hanged with his arms twisted behind him and administered electric shocks. 11.  On 1 November 2003 the applicant signed the arrest report in confirmation that his procedural rights had been explained to him. 12.  On the same day the applicant was taken to the Kominternovo Temporary Detention Facility, where a doctor examined him and made a note that he had a bruise under his left eye. 13.  On 4 November 2003 the investigator submitted to the Kominternovo Town Court (Комінтернівський районний суд – “the Kominternovo Court”) a motion on the applicant's detention as a preventive measure pending trial. The investigator noted that the applicant was suspected of having committed serious crimes (three counts of robbery with violence on 22, 26 and 31 October 2003), had no permanent place of residence and had a criminal record, and thus could hinder the investigation or abscond if at liberty. According to the investigator, the applicant had fully admitted his guilt. 14.  On the same date the Kominternovo Court remanded the applicant in custody, having upheld the investigator's reasoning. 15.  On 26 December 2003 the Kominternovo Court extended the term of the applicant's detention to four months, having referred to the necessity to complete the investigation. 16.  On 15 June 2004 the applicant was committed for trial. 17.  No further documents concerning the applicant's detention are available in the case file. 18.  While having raised a general complaint about the conditions of his detention, the applicant did not describe them until in response to the information submitted by the Government. 19.  According to the information provided by the Government, from 7 November 2003 to 3 November 2006 the applicant had been held in fifteen different cells, the smallest of which had measured 7.17 square meters (the applicant had spent three and a half months there, sharing with another inmate), while the largest one had measured about 34.1 square meters (where he had stayed for fifteen days, sharing with eleven other inmates). Each of the cells had a toilet separated from the living area, sufficient natural and artificial light, operational heating, ventilation, water supply and sewage system. 20.  As it transpires from a note by the Odesa SIZO administration issued on an unspecified date, disinfection, disinsection and rat extermination were regularly carried out on the SIZO premises. 21.  The Government provided seven colour photos of the cells the applicant had been detained in. The photos showed that the cells were clean and looked as if they had been repaired not long before the photos had been taken. They had sufficient natural light; the lavatories were separated from the living area and appeared to be clean. 22.  The applicant contested the accuracy of the information submitted by the Government in so far as the number of inmates per cell was concerned and alleged that there had been more detainees in the cells than indicated by the Government. He also alleged that he had not been detained in the cells shown in the photos. 23.  On 23 March 2006 the Malynovskyy District Court of Odesa (Малинівський районний суд – “the Malynovskyy Court”), to which the case had been transferred from the Kominternovo Court on an unspecified date, found the applicant guilty of three counts of robbery with violence, committed on 22, 27 and 31 October 2003 by a group of persons acting in concert, and sentenced him to fourteen years' imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. The court based its findings, inter alia, on the testimonies of the victims of all three instances of robbery, medical reports concerning the injuries they sustained during those robberies, as well as material evidence (certain items seized from the applicant and recognised by the victims as the stolen ones; two knives, a hammer and a sack discovered in the car, which the co-defendants had left immediately before their arrest). The court also heard two eye-witnesses of the applicant's arrest on 31 October 2003, according to whom he had shown resistance to the police and had tried to escape from the scene. Furthermore, it was noted in the verdict that both co-defendants had fully confessed to the crimes they had been charged with on 4 November 2003 and had consistently pled guilty throughout the pre-trial investigation. The court examined their allegations of ill-treatment in police custody, voiced for the first time at the trial, and found them unsubstantiated. Namely, it noted that they had failed to raise any such complaints in the course of the pre-trial investigation and that the circumstances of the case indicated (as confirmed by the eye-witnesses of the arrest and by the police officers who had carried out the arrest and who were questioned by the court) that the bruise on the applicant's face noted on 1 November 2003 might have been sustained in the course of his fight with the police prior to his arrest. 24.  On 22 May 2007 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal (Апеляційний суд Одеської області) upheld that verdict. 25.  The applicant appealed in cassation, alleging that his conviction was not based on solid evidence. The cassation appeal did not contain any allegation of ill-treatment in police custody. 26.  No information about the final outcome of the proceedings has been provided by the parties. However, it appears from the case file that the Supreme Court found against the applicant. 27.  The applicant's letters to the Court dated 30 March, 10 May, 9 June, 12 July, 28 November, 8 and 15 December 2005, as well as 20 March, 16 May and 3 November 2006, were accompanied by cover letters, signed by the Governor of the Odesa SIZO, which contained a brief summary of their contents (for example: “Please find attached a complaint by the accused, Glinov, concerning his rights and the conduct of the investigation in his case”, “... concerning his case and actions of the police officers”, “...concerning the judge's actions”, “... concerning the defence of his rights”, “... concerning the withdrawal of his case”, etc.). 28.  The first page of each of the eighteen letters from the applicant to the Court bore the SIZO stamp with the dispatching date noted in handwriting (eight of those had been sent before 21 December 2005, the other ten on various dates after 21 December 2005 – see paragraph 38 below). 29.  From May 2005 to March 2006 the Registry of the Court requested the applicant eight times to submit documents in substantiation of his complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 30.  Each of the requests was followed by a letter from the applicant, in which he noted that: there were no copying facilities in the SIZO and that he would copy the documents by hand; the facts of his case were self-explanatory; the prospects of Ukraine's accession to the European Union were poor given the alleged violations in his case; and the witnesses allegedly required protection for unspecified reasons. The applicant made no explicit reference to the Court's requests. 31.  The applicant's letters reached the Court on average two weeks to two months following their dispatch. 32.  The case file contains copies of sixteen stamped certificates issued by Odesa-59 Post Office to the SIZO administration in confirmation that it had accepted correspondence from detainees (including the applicant) to be sent to the Strasbourg Court. It also contains copies of extracts from the SIZO logbooks of incoming and outgoing correspondence and “correspondence delivery acts” signed by the SIZO officials. 33.  Between the end of December 2005 and April 2006 (with the exact date not documented due to a technical mistake), the Court received a ten- page letter from the applicant dated 13 December 2005, in which he outlined his vision for the reform of penitentiaries in Ukraine with a view of improving the conditions of detention. It was accompanied by a cover letter from the SIZO administration dated 15 December 2005, according to which its registered number was 5-3-G-1087. The case file contains a copy of a post office receipt of 16 December 2005 for the dispatch, inter alia, of letter 5-3-G-1087 from Mr Glinov. 34.  By a letter of 15 May 2006, which reached the Court on 26 May 2006, the applicant sought the withdrawal of his application referring to “... the failure [of the SIZO administration] to forward [his] letter to the Court of 13 December 2005 in fifty-three pages; a partial change of the charges against [him] on 23 December 2005; a ruling of the court and ... the intense pressurising by the authorities ...” 35.  On 23 May 2006 the Court sent a letter to the applicant informing him that his application had been struck out of the list by decision of Committee on 16 May 2006. 36.  On 2 October 2006 the Court informed the applicant about the restoration of the application to the list of cases and its communication to the respondent Government on 25 September 2006. 37.  Following the communication of the application to the Government, the applicant's correspondence with the Court continued, with some of his letters bearing the SIZO stamp (see paragraph 28 above).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Fougaron. 8.  On 12 June 1996 the Haute-Garonne Assize Court sentenced the applicant to fifteen years' imprisonment for armed robbery carried out as part of a gang, false imprisonment and fraud. He was detained in Lannemezan Prison (département of Hautes-Pyrénées). 9.  In late 1998 his health deteriorated. 10.  On 8 January 1999 a doctor from the Outpatient Consultation and Treatment Unit (unité de consultation et de soins ambulatoires – “the UCSA”) at Lannemezan Prison issued a medical certificate, which stated: \n“This patient has a history of serious [medical] problems ...\nHe was recently found to have B-cell chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, with some evidence of tumour ...\nThe leukaemia is currently not accompanied by any alteration of the other cell lines; in particular, there is no sign of anaemia or thrombocytopenia.\nHowever, bilateral axillary adenopathy is present, predominantly on the right-hand side.\nThis certificate has been issued at the patient's request and handed to him in connection with an application for parole on medical grounds.” 11.  On 30 September 1999 a further medical report stated:\n“This patient has chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, which has caused severe asthenia. Furthermore, there are signs of orthopaedic disorders as a result of an injury to the left knee and the left ankle causing osteoarthritis of the left patellofemoral and tibiofemoral joints and making it painful for him to remain for long periods in a seated position with his legs bent.\nIn addition, on account of the orthopaedic disorders observed in his left lower limb, the patient has to use a walking stick to move about.\nHis condition is not compatible with the use of restraints on his lower limbs.” 12.  On 6 December 1999 the UCSA doctor advised against applying restraints to the applicant's lower limbs. 13.  The applicant applied to the French President for a pardon on medical grounds, but his application was refused on 7 March 2000. 14.  On 31 March 2000 International Prison Watch (IPW) issued the following press release:\n \n“No early release for prisoners with serious illnesses\nOn 7 March 2000 the Minister of Justice refused applications for a pardon lodged on behalf of a prisoner suffering from a rapidly progressive disease.\n52-year-old Jean Mouisel is currently in Lannemezan Prison. He was diagnosed with chronic lymphocytic leukaemia in November 1998. Jean Mouisel has served two-thirds of his sentence. If remissions of sentence are taken into account, he will be due for release in 2002. On 24 February 2000 a doctor from the UCSA at Lannemezan Prison drew up a certificate attesting that the disease was transforming into lymphoma and that an extended course of cancer treatment involving chemotherapy was therefore necessary. This prisoner is taken to hospital once a week and has to endure his illness while in detention. He is allowed only one visit a week from his relatives, in accordance with the prison's rules.\nHis doctor and various associations applied for a pardon on his behalf. The Ministry of Justice, which centralises such applications and takes an initial decision, did not see fit to refer his case to the President's Private Office.\nIPW wishes to stress that 'no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' (Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights).” 15.  On 12 May 2000 the UCSA doctor drew up a further medical certificate, which stated:\n“This patient has chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, which was diagnosed in November 1998 and is currently transforming into lymphoma.\nThe lymphoma was diagnosed in early February 2000 during a check-up at the haematology department at Purpan Hospital in Toulouse.\nMr Mouisel's condition currently requires him to undergo cancer treatment in the form of chemotherapy sessions as a hospital outpatient every three weeks.\nAt the moment, he is receiving chemotherapy at Lannemezan Hospital's medical and surgical centre. The patient's haematological condition will need to be reassessed in early August 2000 once he has finished the chemotherapy he is currently receiving.\nIt is subsequently envisaged that he will begin oral chemotherapy, depending on the reassessment to be carried out at Toulouse University Hospital.\nThe compatibility of his condition with his continued detention remains to be determined by an expert.” 16.  On 3 June 2000 the applicant wrote to tell the prison governor about a chemotherapy session that had taken place at Lannemezan Hospital on 30 May 2000:\n“... After an hour and forty-five minutes, the force of my drip was causing me too much pain. My suffering was so great that I had to lower the speed of the drip. That action was not appreciated by the warder in charge of my escort, Mr T., who came into the room red with anger, yelling and screaming. He told me that if the nurse had turned the drip on full, then I was not to touch it. As he put it, 'he and the other member of the escort were not going to spend all day at the hospital'.\nI was surprised at how aggressive they were being towards me, and I wanted to pull out the drip. The pain was too intense; it was making me suffer and was becoming unbearable ... The intervention of the doctor and nurse ... persuaded me to end the chemotherapy session. After the doctor had gone, the chief escort officer told me that the matter would be dealt with when we got back to the prison. \nAt the end of the chemotherapy session, I felt worse than ever as the injection had made me feel much weaker ... I was duly handcuffed and dragged with brute force along the hospital corridors on a chain which the warder was holding, no doubt as a form of retribution. When we got back that morning, I was handcuffed in the usual way without force.\nI am being treated for leukaemia, a cancer of the blood which is nothing like a mere case of the flu! In my case, unfortunately, there is no possible cure; the disease I have caught here at Lannemezan Prison is incurable.\nI am therefore entitled to conclude that the prison staff who escort me to the hospital regularly ask the nurses to make sure that I am injected as quickly as possible so that they do not have to spend all day waiting around for me.\nAs there is currently no way of solving the problem on an administrative level, I shall have to give up the chemotherapy sessions for the time being. I am not refusing the treatment, but the conditions in which I am receiving it are not satisfactory ... This has been going on for several months and I cannot stand it any longer. My physical condition cannot allow it and my morale is getting lower every day. I am dying, but I would like to die peacefully and not in an atmosphere of conflict.” 17.  Following a further application for a pardon on medical grounds, the Ministry of Justice instructed an expert at the Pau Court of Appeal to assess the applicant's state of health, the treatment he required and the manner in which it should be administered, the likelihood of any changes (for example, regarding life expectancy), and whether his condition and the forms of treatment in progress or envisaged were compatible with detention in a specialist unit. The expert's report, completed on 28 June 2000, read as follows:\n“... Recent developments\nAccording to the certificate of 12 May 2000, Mr Mouisel has a form of chronic leukaemia which was diagnosed in 1998 and is currently transforming into lymphoma ...\nHis condition has necessitated an intensive course of chemotherapy administered following the insertion of a 'portacath'.\nHis condition has also required him to be taken to hospital in a non-emergency ambulance for chemotherapy sessions (at the outpatient department of Lannemezan Hospital's medical and surgical centre), initially every week and subsequently every three weeks ...\nClinical condition on the date of the examination\nFunctional symptoms complained of by the patient:\n–  permanent asthenia and fatigue;\n–  waking up in pain during the night;\n–  ...\n–  muscle fatigue and breathlessness;\n–  alleged psychological impact of stress on his life expectancy and deterioration of his health (this condition has led to his being prescribed a course of antidepressants, which he is currently taking) ...\nIt should be noted that these functional symptoms are to a large extent attributable to the chemotherapy he has been undergoing ...\nParticular mention should be made of a problem relating to the escort and supervision arrangements during visits to hospital for chemotherapy sessions. Indeed, since 20 June 2000 the patient has not consented to treatment.\nClinical examination\n...\nIt should be noted that, according to the documents produced, Mr Mouisel's current degree of disablement was assessed at 80% by the COTOREP [Occupational Counselling and Rehabilitation Board] in a decision of 6 April 2000, and he was awarded a disabled adult's allowance for the period from 2 February 1999 to 2 February 2001.\nConclusion \nBy the date of the examination the applicant's health had deteriorated as a result of the progression of his haematological disorder, diagnosed in November 1998 as leukaemia ...\nMr Mouisel is currently undergoing intensive chemotherapy as an outpatient at Lannemezan Hospital, where he is taken for treatment every three weeks by medical transport (a non-emergency ambulance).\nThe cancer treatment, ... which is already scarcely compatible with imprisonment, is at present causing problems as a result of the position he has adopted recently in not consenting to treatment in the conditions in which he is currently being detained (this has lasted since 20 June 2000, the date scheduled for his treatment).\nHis not consenting to treatment, in spite of all the information received from the UCSA medical team in Lannemezan, is likely to bring about the rapid progression of the disorder observed recently and a reduction in his life expectancy. \nAccordingly, he should be looked after in a specialist unit.” 18.  On 19 July 2000 the applicant was transferred as a matter of urgency to Muret Prison (so that he would be nearer to Toulouse University Hospital) and given a cell of his own. 19.  On 3 October 2000 the applicant applied to the département of Haute-Garonne's Health and Social Affairs Department for acknowledgment of a vaccination-related accident, claiming that he had contracted cancer as a result of a hepatitis-B vaccination. On 24 October 2000 he received a reply from the Ethics and Law Office of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Solidarity informing him that strict liability could not be imposed on the State except for damage sustained as a result of the compulsory vaccinations provided for in the Public Health Code. Hepatitis-B vaccinations were compulsory only for certain occupational groups exposed to a risk of contamination, and the applicant did not belong to any such group. 20.  On 14 November 2000 the applicant was notified of a reply by the Regional Director of the Prison Service to his complaints concerning the application of Article 803 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) on the use of handcuffs or restraints (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below):\n“... The provisions of the Article do not establish an absolute prohibition on the use of handcuffs or restraints and do not expressly refer to the detainee's health. They leave the matter to the discretion of those responsible for laying down, and enforcing, security measures: gendarmes, police officers or prison warders.\nMoreover, Article D 283 CCP provides that handcuffs or restraints are to be used solely in connection with 'precautions against absconding', except where a person is being brought before a judicial authority. Where a long sentence is being served for criminal acts causing bodily harm, the appropriate measures are applied.” 21.  On 20 November 2000 the Minister of Justice refused an application for a pardon lodged on the applicant's behalf by the Ligue des droits de l'homme (Human Rights League). 22.  On 24 November 2000 the applicant received a letter from the doctor who had treated him in Lannemezan:\n“... As regards your condition, there does seem to be a change taking place at the moment ... I think it is always worth fighting an illness, whatever it may be; even if there is no possible cure, a remission in the disease is still possible, especially as Dr N. is offering you a new course of chemotherapy, which I would strongly advise you to agree to ...” 23.  A medical certificate issued on 21 February 2001 by a doctor from the haematology department at Toulouse Hospital reads as follows:\n“Mr Mouisel has been treated by our department since February 2000 for chronic lymphocytic leukaemia, initially with tonsillar hypertrophy on both sides causing dysphagia, and substantial axillary adenopathy on the right-hand side (15 cm in diameter).\nHe was initially given chemotherapy once a week using the COP protocol, then once a month with CVP, and subsequently with chlorambucil.\nThe results obtained were satisfactory, but in November 2000 we noticed a renewed increase in the size of the right axillary adenopathy and therefore resumed monthly chemotherapy using the CVP protocol.\nA biopsy of the lymph nodes in January revealed the presence of Hodgkin's disease. Three cycles of chemotherapy using the ABVD protocol are therefore envisaged, followed by additional radiotherapy.” 24.  In an order of 22 March 2001 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences at the Toulouse tribunal de grande instance released the applicant on parole until 20 March 2005, subject to an obligation to receive medical treatment or care:\n“Admissibility\nMr Mouisel exercises parental responsibility over his daughter, born on 4 September 1993 ..., and no ancillary penalties have been imposed on him entailing the forfeiture of that right.\nArticle 729-3 CCP empowers the judge responsible for the execution of sentences to decide cases concerning prisoners who have less than four years of their sentence to serve and who exercise parental responsibility over a child under the age of 10.\nMerits\nIt appears from the medical certificates adduced in evidence (dated 7 December 2000 and 3 January and 21 February 2001) that the applicant's condition has become incompatible with his continued detention, on account of the medical care he requires during regular visits to hospital.\nIt is therefore appropriate, notwithstanding his criminal record, to release the applicant on parole, subject to his staying at his wife's home (see the declaration of 30 January 2001) and receiving treatment in accordance with a medical protocol at Purpan Hospital. ...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is currently detained in the Cricova prison. 6.  At the time of the events, the applicant was serving a ten-year sentence and was detained in the same detention facility. In August 2008 a murder was committed there and the applicant was one of the suspects. In December 2008 he was taken to the Chişinău Central police station for questioning. According to him, he was told to confess to the murder and was ill-treated after refusing to do so. On 21 January 2009 the applicant was taken to the police station detention facility again. Since he refused to make a confession, he was subjected to such acts of violence as being struck and slapped all over, and was detained in a very cold cell. As a result, he attempted to commit suicide by cutting the veins in his wrist. On 23 January 2009 he was taken to hospital for medical treatment where, according to the documents in the case file, he was seen by a doctor and given stitches and a bandage. After returning from hospital the ill-treatment continued and intensified. According to the applicant, his arms and feet were tied together behind his back and he was suspended on a metal bar placed on two chairs. He was left in that position until he fainted. As a result, his right hand became numb and stopped functioning. He was also beaten on his lower back with a plastic bottle full of water. As a result, he suffered kidney pain and had blood in his urine. The Government disputed the applicant’s allegations concerning ill-treatment. 7.  On 28 January 2009 the applicant was seen by a medical assistant in the police station detention facility, who noted in his medical records that the applicant had complained of pain around his right bicep and that the tissue in that area was swollen. On 30 January 2009 the same medical assistant noted that the applicant had complained of numbness and tingling in his right arm. On 31 January 2009 the same medical assistant concluded that the applicant’s problem was a result of the self-inflicted laceration to his ligament. 8.  In the meantime, on 28 January 2009 the applicant’s family learned of his situation and employed a lawyer. As a result of the lawyer’s involvement, on 30 January 2009 the applicant was transferred back to Cricova prison. 9.  On 12 February 2009 the applicant’s state of health deteriorated and he was hospitalised in a prison hospital, where he was examined by a neurologist and diagnosed with severe radial neuropathy of the right arm (damage to the radial nerve running down the length of the arm, which controls movement in the triceps and is responsible for extending the wrist and fingers). He was released from hospital on 9 April 2009, but returned later on several occasions. 10.  In the meantime, the applicant’s lawyer complained to the prosecutor’s office that his client had been subjected to ill-treatment, but on 31 July 2009 the complaint was dismissed as ill-founded. The investigating authorities found the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment to be ill-founded, in view of the absence of any physical evidence except for that resulting from his self-harm. In reaching this conclusion, the investigating authorities relied on the statements of the accused police officers, who denied ill-treating the applicant, and on the conclusion of the medical assistant from the police station detention facility (see paragraph 7 above). The findings of the doctors from the prison hospital (see paragraph 9 above) were not considered.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants, a married couple and their daughter, were born in 1948, 1953 and 1988 respectively. 7.  The first applicant arrived in Sweden on 26 January 2008 and applied for asylum two days later. The second and third applicants arrived in Sweden on 31 January 2008 and applied for asylum the following day. In support of their applications, the applicants submitted in essence the following. They were Christians and originated from Mosul and Baghdad. They had lived in a rented house in a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood in Baghdad for 13 years. The first applicant had run a shop selling car spare parts. In August 2006 five masked men, claiming to belong to an opposition group, had come to the shop and demanded that the first applicant pay 10,000 U.S. dollars as he was Christian. He had been able to pay only 700‑750 dollars and had been told that the men would return for the rest of the money. They had threatened to kidnap a member of his family if he failed to pay. The first applicant had never returned to the store, but when his son had gone back after a couple of days he had been kidnapped. The son had managed to flee from the boot of the car where he had been held when when the car had stopped at a traffic light. A few days later, a friend of the applicants had informed them that he had found a threatening message on the door to their shop. Shortly thereafter, the applicants had left the country for Syria. The family also claimed that it had not been possible to practise their religion where they had lived because of fear of terrorists destroying the church. The second and third applicants claimed that they had been forced to wear the veil. Moreover, while the two parents had higher education in economics and administration, their daughter had not been able to study since the family feared that she would be kidnapped as Christian women were often exposed to kidnapping, rape and murder on their way to university. 8.  On 20 September 2008 the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) rejected the applications. The Board held that the situation in Iraq as such, or the fact that the applicants were Christians, did not constitute grounds for asylum. It further considered that the blackmailing and kidnapping had had economic grounds rather than religious ones. Even if the family could be seen as a target because of their beliefs, the Board was of the opinion that the incidents were due to the general security situation in Baghdad and not the applicants’ religious affiliation. According to the Board, the other claims – the fear of terrorists and the forced use of the veil – were also connected to the general situation in Baghdad. The Board further pointed out that, at the time of its decision, more than two years had passed since the alleged incidents had taken place. In any event, it concluded that the incidents were not of such severity or intensity that there would be an individual threat against the applicants if they were to return to Iraq. 9.  The applicants appealed, adding to their story that their neighbour in Baghdad had informed them that someone had written “Christians are to be killed” and “Your blood should be spilled” on their house in September 2008. 10.  On 18 June 2009 the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen) upheld the decision of the Board. The court held that, having regard to the several years that had passed since the alleged incidents and to the improved security situation in Baghdad, the evidence did not suggest that there was an individualised threat against the applicants upon return. 11.  On 4 September 2009 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations-överdomstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal. 12.  Subsequently, the applicants claimed that there were impediments to the enforcement of their deportation order. They stated that they were in a bad condition mentally and that the general situation in Iraq had deteriorated. 13.  On 9 March 2010 the Migration Board decided not to reconsider the case, finding that no new circumstances justifying a reconsideration had been presented. The Board’s decision was upheld by the Migration Court on 16 June 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lived until his arrest in Vladimir. 6.  On 23 October 2004 an investigator of the Vladimir prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of aggravated rape. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 25 October 2004. The arrest record was issued at 8.20 p.m. on the same day. It did not indicate the grounds for the applicant’s arrest, save for a reference to Article 91 § 2 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant signed the arrest record, noting that he had been informed of his constitutional rights as an accused, including the right to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel. It appears that the investigator made a handwritten note in the arrest record, stating that the applicant had not been searched. 8.  After the investigator had drawn up the arrest record, he began questioning the applicant in the presence of his lawyer, Mr Bagryanskiy. The record shows that the questioning started at 9.35 p.m. The record bears the applicant’s signature after the paragraph stating that he was informed of the nature of the accusations against him, namely, that he was suspected of having participated in a gang rape on 23 October 2004. He was informed that his car, in which the rape had allegedly taken place, had been seized. The applicant made a handwritten entry in the record, noting that he had decided to make use of his constitutional rights and would remain silent. The applicant’s counsel, Mr Bagryanskiy, wrote in the record that the applicant had not been provided with details surrounding the alleged criminal offence and that therefore the reasons for his arrest had not been explained to him.\n(a)  Authorisation of the pre-trial detention: detention order of 27 October 2004 9.  On 27 October 2004 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladimir authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention, holding as follows:\n“[The applicant] is employed [and] has a permanent place of residence.\nHowever, he has a previous conviction; [the parties] did not provide the court with information showing that the criminal record had expired. [The applicant] is suspected of having committed a serious criminal offence against an individual; [the offence] is punishable by imprisonment. The victim identified [the applicant] as a perpetrator of the criminal offence against her. It follows that, if released, [the applicant] might influence the victim during the pre-trial and judicial investigation; therefore, the victim took part in the identification parade in conditions whereby [the applicant] was prevented from seeing [her].\nConsequently, the court accepts the motion of the senior investigator of the Vladimir prosecutor’s office to place [the applicant] in custody.” 10.  The applicant’s lawyer appealed, arguing that the applicant had not been properly and promptly informed of the reasons for his arrest and that his detention was unlawful. Several days later the lawyer lodged an additional appeal, requesting the applicant’s release on bail or the application of an alternative, more lenient, measure of restraint. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the lawyer urged the Regional Court to take into account the appalling conditions of detention to which the applicant would be subjected. He also argued that the applicant had no criminal record and that the District Court had not had any information disputing that fact. 11.  On 5 November 2004 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the detention order, endorsing the reasons given by the District Court. It noted, in particular, the gravity of the charges against the applicant and his previous conviction, as confirmed by police records presented by the prosecution authorities and undisputed by the applicant. As regards the lawyer’s argument concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention, the Regional Court noted that it was not the courts’ task to deal with the matter in that set of proceedings.\n(b) Extension of the detention: order of 22 December 2004 12.  On 22 December 2004 the Leninskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 11 January 2005 inclusively, noting the applicant’s “personality”, the gravity of the charges against him and the likelihood that he would abscond, re-offend and pervert the course of justice. 13.  The applicant’s lawyer appealed, arguing that the detention was unlawful and excessively long. The lawyer also reiterated the arguments that he had put forward in his statement of appeal against the detention order of 27 October 2004. 14.  On 1 February 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 22 December 2004, holding as follows:\n“Having examined the materials presented in the appeal statements, the court decides as follows.\nWhile examining whether it was necessary to extend [the applicant’s] detention, the judge correctly took into account the gravity of the charges [and] the information on the accused’s character.\nIt follows from the materials presented that [the applicant] was held liable for an administrative offence.\nThe judge’s conclusion that [the applicant] is likely to abscond from the pre-trial investigation and judicial proceedings, to continue his criminal activities, and to pervert the course of justice is corroborated by the record of an additional interrogation of the victim, which is enclosed in the case file and from which it follows that the victim has been receiving insulting phone calls which frighten her and which she considers a way of applying mental pressure on her for having instituted the criminal proceedings.\nThe extension of [the applicant’s] detention is also connected to the necessity of carrying out investigative measures with a view to closing the pre-trial investigation.\nThe judge examined the possibility of applying another, more lenient, measure of restraint to [the applicant], as reflected in the decision, which states that applying a different measure of restraint to the accused cannot be justified.\n...\nBy virtue of the requirements of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, when a judge examines an extension of detention issue, [he] does not have to take into account the conditions of [the applicant’s] detention, as raised by the lawyer in his appeal statement”.\n(c)  Request for release: decision of 14 February 2005 15.  On 9 December 2004 the applicant’s counsel, Mr Bagryanskiy, submitted a request for the applicant’s release to the Leninskiy District Court, arguing that his arrest and subsequent detention were unlawful. 16.  According to the Government, two hearings scheduled for 23 December 2004 and 17 January 2005 were postponed following the prosecutor’s request for a stay in the proceedings or in view of his absence from a hearing. Another delay in the proceedings occurred when the prison transport service did not bring the applicant to the courthouse. The hearing on 1 February 2005 was rescheduled because the applicant’s lawyer did not attend. 17.  On 14 April 2005 the Leninskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had been committed to stand trial and that the first trial hearing had been scheduled for 8 February 2005. 18.  On 17 May 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant, upholding the District Court’s findings.\n(d)  Detention from 12 January to 13 October 2005\ni.  Decision of 25 January 2005 19.  In the meantime, on 12 January 2005 the period of the applicant’s detention authorised by the decision of 22 December 2004 expired. On the following day the applicant, having been served with the final version of the bill of indictment for charges of aggravated robbery and sexual assault in addition to aggravated rape, was committed to stand trial before the Frunzenskiy District Court. The court received the case file on 17 January 2005. 20.  At the preliminary hearing on 25 January 2005 the Frunzenskiy District Court, having noted that the applicant and his co-defendant were charged with a serious criminal offence, that the applicant had been held administratively liable and that there were reasons to believe that, if released, he and his co-defendant would abscond, threaten the victim and pervert the course of justice, concluded that there were no grounds for changing the measure of restraint. 21.  On 16 March 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 January 2005, finding that the lawyers’ arguments that the defendants had permanent places of work and residence in Vladimir and that they had no intention of absconding did not suffice to conclude that the District Court’s decision had been incorrect. The Regional Court also noted that there were no grounds for releasing the defendants after 11 January 2005 because they were considered to be detained “pending judicial proceedings”. In the Regional Court’s opinion, after the District Court had received the criminal case file, it had six months to examine the issue of the applicant’s detention.\nii.  Remittal for further investigation and request for release: decision of 27 April 2005 22.  In April 2005 a lawyer for the applicant, Mr G., asked the Frunzenskiy District Court to remit the case to the prosecutor’s office for further investigation because the investigators had committed various procedural violations and had breached the applicant’s defence rights. At the same time, the applicant’s counsel sought his release. 23.  On 27 April 2005 the District Court remitted the case for further investigation and noted that the measure of restraint applied to the applicant and his co-defendant “should remain unchanged”, as the circumstances which had served as the grounds for their arrest were still present and there were no reasons to authorise a change. 24.  On 28 June 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision, noting that it was well-founded. The Regional Court also found that the co-defendants’ detention was within the six-month period authorised by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n(e)  Extension of the detention until 13 October 2005: order of 7 July 2005 25.  On 7 July 2005 the Frunzenskiy District Court authorised the extension of the applicant’s and his co-defendant’s detention for an additional three months, until 13 October 2005. The District Court stated that the authorised period of the applicant’s detention would expire on 13 July 2005 because the District Court had received the case file on 13 January 2005. It concluded that the defendants had been charged with serous criminal offences and were likely to abscond, pervert the course of justice and threaten the victim. 26.  On 11 August 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision, reasoning as follows:\n“Having discussed the arguments put forward in the appeal statement, the court considers that the decision [of 7 July 2005] is lawful and well-founded.\nWhen the [District] court was taking the decision, [it] took into account the gravity of the three criminal offences which are punishable by more than ten years’ imprisonment and which are considered serious, posing a particular danger to society. The arguments laid down in the appeal statement were examined by the court and the respective findings were made. [It] was found that there were no grounds for changing the measure of restraint. The above-mentioned findings are reasoned and the reasoning should be considered convincing.\nThe courts of the first and second instances examined the complaints that the arrest on 25 October 2004 had been unlawful and that after 11 January 2005 [the applicant and his co-defendant] had been detained unlawfully, and found them to be unsubstantiated.”\n(f)  Extension of the detention until 13 January 2006: order of 13 October 2005 27.  On 13 October 2005 the Frunzenskiy District Court extended the applicant’s and his co-defendant’s detention until 13 January 2006. The wording of the decision was identical to that issued on 7 July 2005. 28.  On 23 November 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision, endorsing the reasons given by the District Court.\n(g)  Extension of the detention until 13 April 2006: order of 11 January 2006 29.  On 11 January 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court, in a decision identical to those issued on 7 July and 13 October 2005, extended the applicant’s and his co-defendant’s detention until 13 April 2006. 30.  On 7 March 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant, concluding that the District Court’s findings were lawful and well-reasoned. 31.  On 10 April 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment and a fine. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. 32.  On 3 November 2004 the applicant was placed in detention facility no. IZ-33/1 in Vladimir. During the entire period of his detention, until 12 May 2006, he was kept in three different cells: nos. 50, 52 and 56. On 10 November 2004 he was held for several hours in cell no. 50. From 3 to 15 November 2004 and from 6 to 17 May 2005 he was kept in cell no. 56. For the remaining period of his detention he applicant was held in cell no. 52. 33.  Relying on certificates issued by the head of the detention facility in May 2009 and barely legible extracts from prison population logs for four days in 2004 and twelve days in 2005, the Government submitted that cell no. 50 measured 77.35 square metres, had had twenty-two sleeping places and housed between ten and twenty-two inmates. Cell no. 52 measured approximately 39.4 square metres, had ten bunks and accommodated from six to ten persons. Cell no. 56 measured approximately 58 square metres, had sixteen sleeping places and housed ten to sixteen persons. To the extent that it was possible for the Court to decipher the extracts from the prison population logs, the number of detainees housed in the cells on the relevant days corresponded to the highest number indicated by the Government for each cell. The Government also submitted that the applicant had always had an individual sleeping place. 34.  The Government further submitted that cell no. 52 had one window and the two other cells had two each. Each window measured 1.1 square metres. From 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. the cell was lit by two or four 80 watt bulbs. At night a 40 watt bulb lit the cell. Each cell had a properly functioning air conditioning system and a heater installed below the window. In addition, inmates were allowed to open a casing in the windows to give them access to fresh air. According to the Government, each cell was equipped with a tap and a lavatory pan, which were installed in a corner, more than 3 metres from a table. The lavatory pan was separated from the living area by a 1.9 metre-high partition. Inmates were allowed to take a shower once every seven days, for which they were afforded between fifteen and thirty minutes. The facility’s shower room was equipped with twelve shower heads. The Government supported their submission with a copy of the schedules of seven “shower days” for cell no. 52, in which the applicant was being held at the time. The schedules showed that the entire cell population had been afforded fifteen minutes to take a shower. According to the schedule lists, from eight to ten inmates had been taken from cell no. 52 to the shower room. 35.  Lastly, the Government stated that the sanitary conditions in the facility had complied with the existing legal requirements. The applicant had received an adequate quantity of food of proper quality. Medical assistance had been provided to him whenever necessary and free of charge. The Government also submitted black-and-white photographs of cells nos. 52 and 56 and of the shower room taken at the end of 2009 in facility no. IZ-33/1. 36.  In the additional observations submitted to the Court on 16 October 2009, the Government stressed that the information concerning the cell floor space and the number of sleeping places had been verified by the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences. The representatives of the Service discovered certain discrepancies between the information provided by the head of facility no. IZ-33/1 and the actual situation. In particular, cell no. 50 measured 47.35 square metres and had thirty-three sleeping places. Cell no. 56 measured 58 square metres and had forty-two sleeping places. The information provided by the head of the facility about cell no. 52 was correct. The Government further submitted that it was impossible to establish the exact number of inmates detained together with the applicant, as the prison population logs had been destroyed prior to the expiry of the statutory time-limit. The official who had destroyed them had been sanctioned. The Government provided the Court with a certificate issued by a committee of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences as a follow-up to the inquiry into the incident. Having noted that the head of facility no. IZ-33/1 had provided the Government with incorrect information concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention and that the Court would probably interpret that fact unfavourably for the Government, the members of the committee stated that it was impossible to establish who had provided the head of the facility with the misleading information. 37.  While the applicant had provided slightly different measurements of the cells, his main dispute was about the number of inmates held in each cell. In particular, he argued that cell no. 52 had twenty-one sleeping places and had usually housed twenty-five to thirty detainees. Cell no. 50, which was equipped with thirty-three sleeping places, housed approximately fifty detainees. Cell no. 56 housed between forty-five and fifty-five detainees. The applicant insisted that owing to severe overcrowding, he had not had an individual bunk. Inmates had had to take turns to sleep. He further pointed out that detainees had been kept in extremely cramped conditions. Part of the cell floor space was occupied by metal bunks serving as beds for the occupants. The rest of the space was taken up by a wooden table, a bench, shelves, a tap, and a lavatory pan. That arrangement had left inmates with literally no free space where they could move. There was a lavatory pan in the corner of the cell, just a few metres away from the wooden table and bunk beds, separated from the living area by a partition no more than 90 cm high. Given that the lavatory pan was installed on a 30 to 40 cm-high pedestal, the partition did not offer any privacy. A curtain which inmates hung to obtain some privacy was removed by the wardens. Furthermore, the facility administration did not provide inmates with cleaning fluids. The lavatory pan was always dirty and had no lid, allowing unpleasant odours to permeate the cell. 38.  The applicant further stated that the cells had had no air conditioning system. They had been damp, stuffy and dark inside. Inmates had been allowed to smoke in the cells, which had been unbearable for the applicant, who did not smoke. Detainees had also washed their clothes in the cells, creating excessive humidity. The cell windows had been too small and had not allowed sufficient light to enter the cells as they were covered by metal netting. The fluorescent lighting had been constantly on. The cells had been infected with bed-bugs, lice and cockroaches but the administration had not provided any insecticides. Inmates had not been provided with toiletries. They had been allowed to take a shower once every seven days. Fifteen minutes had been afforded to fifteen to twenty inmates, while only four to five shower heads had worked. Food had been very scarce and of low quality. Inmates had been allowed to have an outdoor walk for an hour a day in the facility courtyards. The courtyards had been covered by metal roofs, with merely a metre of empty space between the walls and the roof. 39.  The applicant supported his submissions with statements by two inmates: Mr Y. and Mr Z. Between 30 January 2004 and 1 July 2005 Mr Y. had been detained together with the applicant in cells nos. 52 and 56. Although Mr Z., the applicant’s co-defendant, had never shared a cell with the applicant, he had been housed in the facility at the same time as the applicant. Mr Z. had also been kept in cells nos. 50 and 52. Both detainees’ descriptions of the detention conditions were very similar to that given by the applicant. 40.  The applicant also submitted four colour photographs of a cell which he had shared with twenty-three other inmates. The photographs showed from eight to ten inmates in a very small and sombre room with a row of three-tier bunk beds installed along a wall. According to the applicant, the remaining inmates had been taken for their daily outdoor walk when those photographs had been taken. The photographs also showed a long table with two benches placed between the bunks and another wall. The remaining floor space not taken up by the furniture was only sufficient to allow the entire cell population to stand shoulder to shoulder. The bunks were not separated from each other. The inmates had hung linen and clothes on the bunks to get some privacy. There was dirty and worn-out bedding on the bunks, which were installed in such a way that they blocked the window. The window was covered with two rows of metal bars. The photographs also showed a heavily scratched floor and walls with peeling paint. The furniture was in a very dilapidated state. The bunks were rusty, and clothes had been hung on a rope below the ceiling. 41.  In addition, the applicant provided the Court with a copy of order no. 7 issued on 31 January 2005 by the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences. The order dealt with the renovation programme of temporary detention facilities in Russia for 2006. It contained a list of temporary detention facilities and the conditions of detention therein which raised particularly serious concerns. Detention facility no. IZ-33/1 in Vladimir was among them. The order indicated that, with 1,009 detainees, the facility was housing twice its maximum capacity (507 places). It also indicated that inmates in that facility had less than 2.5 square metres of personal space. 42.  Lastly, the applicant presented copies of letters to the Vladimir regional prosecutor from the same head of facility no. IZ-33/1 on whose certificates the Government had relied in their submission to the Court. The letters concerned an inmate, Mr N., who had been detained in the facility from 13 April 2004 to 27 June 2006. Mr N. had also stayed in cells nos. 50 and 56. In his letters to the prosecutor, the head of the facility indicated that cell no. 50 measured 47.35 square metres, had thirty-three bunks and housed twenty-four to thirty-three inmates. Although he indicated the same size of cell no. 56 as in the certificate that he had submitted to the Government, the head of the facility noted that that cell had forty-two sleeping places and twenty-nine to forty-two persons had been detained there together with Mr N. 43.  The applicant lodged a number of complaints before various domestic authorities, including the courts, alleging that he had been detained in appalling conditions. The complaints were to no avail.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Helsinki. He was a journalist on the nationwide magazine 7 päivää. 6.  On 4 December 1996 A., the National Conciliator (valtakunnansovittelija, riksförlikningsmannen) at the time, and B., his female friend, entered late at night A.'s home where his wife was present. The situation escalated, the police were called and the incident, which subsequently involved also A.'s grown-up children, led to A.'s arrest. Following the incident, criminal charges were brought against both A. and B. on 18 December 1996. On 16 January 1997 the Helsinki District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) sentenced A. to a four-month conditional prison sentence for resisting arrest and for criminal damage (vahingonteko, skadegörelse), and B. to a fine for assault. On 17 January 1997 the Council of State (valtioneuvosto, statsrådet) dismissed A. from his post as National Conciliator. On 25 June 1998 the Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten) upheld the judgment with respect to B. As regards A., the case was discontinued as he had died on 14 May 1998. On 15 December 1998 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused B. leave to appeal. 7.  On 6 February 1997 7 päivää magazine published two articles written by the applicant about A. and B. The first article was entitled “A. collects his female friend every day from work, the relationship continues” and it concerned A.'s and B.'s relationship. B.'s conviction as well as her workplace were mentioned as background information but the major part of the article concerned the journalist's eyewitness statements about how A. and B. spent their free time. The caption of the article stated that “A.'s female friend B. visits his home daily”. Also, several pictures of B. were published. The second article was entitled “The police laughed at the ex-national conciliator, A. arrested the journalists”. It was about A. and his behaviour in certain encounters with the media, and B.'s name was mentioned only in passing. The caption of the article stated that “A. requested executive assistance from the police in order to take his female friend secretly to his home”. Prior to these articles, B.'s identity had been revealed and her picture had been published in the media. 8.  In the spring of 1997 A. and B. requested that criminal investigations be conducted against journalists who had written about the incident of 4 December 1996 and the circumstances surrounding it. On an unspecified date they made such a request with respect to the applicant, claiming that the articles published in 7 päivää had invaded B.'s privacy. 9.  On 28 November 2001 the public prosecutor brought charges under Chapter 27, section 3(a), paragraph 2, of the Penal Code against the applicant as well as the editor-in-chief (see Jokitaipale and others v. Finland, no. 43349/05, 6 April 2010), in Vantaa District Court. The charges brought against the applicant clearly indicated that the applicant was charged only for having written the articles in question. He was not charged for having been responsible for the headings, pictures or in which part of the magazine the articles were to be published. 10.  B. concurred with the charges brought by the public prosecutor. She pursued a compensation claim jointly and severally against the applicant, the editor-in-chief and the publishing company, which was joined to the criminal charges. Charges brought against the other journalists of the magazine as well as the editor-in-chief were examined in the same proceedings. 11.  On 8 November 2002 the court, after having held an oral hearing, first decided to declare all parts of the case file secret for ten years except for the applicable legal provisions, the conclusions and the summary of the case. Additionally, B.'s identity was not to be revealed in the public parts of the case file. As to the merits of the case, the court accepted the statement of facts indicated in the charges and noted that the applicant was not responsible for the headings, pictures or in which part of the magazine the articles were to be published. It sentenced the applicant to pay twenty day-fines, amounting to 840 euros (EUR), for invasion of B.'s private life. Moreover, the applicant was ordered to pay B., jointly with the other parties to the case, EUR 4,000 plus interest for non-pecuniary damage as well as her costs and expenses. 12.  The District Court found that the facts mentioned in the articles were of a kind to which the protection of private life typically applied. The Supreme Court had already found in 2002 that the national television broadcast on 23 January 1997, in which B.'s name had been mentioned twice in the context of an interview with A., had invaded her private life. B. did not hold such a position in society that the exception in Chapter 27, section 3(a), paragraph 2 of the Penal Code was applicable. The fact that she was a friend of such a person and that she had been involved in the incident that subsequently led to the dismissal of A. from his post as National Conciliator did not justify revealing her identity. Nor was B.'s conviction of a kind that would justify revealing her identity. The Penal Code provision in question did not require that intent to harm be shown but it was sufficient that the dissemination of information about the private life of a person was capable of causing him or her damage or suffering. The applicant, therefore, had had no right to reveal facts relating to B.'s private life. 13.  By letter dated 9 December 2002 the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court, requesting, inter alia, that an oral hearing be held and if not, that he be given a possibility to submit additional comments. Moreover, he claimed that the disclosure of a convicted person's name could not be considered as falling within the scope of private life, and that the District Court judge had had a fixed idea about the outcome of the case. 14.  On 12 October 2004 the Appeal Court, without holding an oral hearing, upheld the District Court judgment. The court balanced the freedom of expression against the protection of private life in the light of the Court's case-law. It found that, according to the preparatory works and the national and the Court's case-law, the facts mentioned in the articles were of a kind to which the protection of private life typically applied. The Supreme Court had already found in 2002 that B. was not a public figure, and the fact that she was a friend of such a person and that she had been involved in the incident that subsequently led to the dismissal of A. from his post as National Conciliator did not justify revealing her identity. Nor was B.'s conviction of a kind that would have justified revealing her identity. The fact that B.'s identity as A.'s friend had previously been revealed in the media did not justify the subsequent invasion of her private life. 15.  By letter dated 13 December 2004 the applicant applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, reiterating the grounds already presented before the Appeal Court. Moreover, he claimed that the Appeal Court had not reasoned its judgment sufficiently, and that the judgment was written in a manner suggesting collective criminal liability. This conflicted with the presumption of innocence. Further, he claimed that the restrictions on freedom of expression were neither necessary nor justified in this case. 16.  On 15 August 2005 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Gribanovskiy, in the Voronezh Region. 6.  The applicant is suffering from partial deafness (also known as sensor neural hearing loss). 7.  On 17 January 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of several counts of robbery, theft and unlawful possession of arms and taken to a police station for questioning. Following the interrogation, the applicant was remanded in custody pending trial in detention facility IZ-36/2 in Borisoglebsk, Voronezh Region. 8.  Upon the applicant’s arrest he retained a lawyer, Mr B. In March 2001 the applicant asked for Mr B. to be replaced by Mr S. Later the applicant again asked the court for permission to change his lawyer on two occasions, alleging ineffectiveness. It appears that during the trial hearing he was represented by Ms N. 9.  The trial was held on 12 November 2001. The Voronezh Regional Court convicted the applicant, along with nine other co-accused, of theft, aggravated robbery, hijacking, causing deliberate damage to property and possession of firearms, and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment with forfeiture of estate. The applicant appealed on the point of facts and law, contesting his involvement in several episodes and alleging that the sentence was too severe. 10.  According to the applicant, on 26 August 2002 he requested to be present in the courtroom in person for health reasons (partial deafness and weak eyesight) but his request was never examined by the court. 11.  According to the Government, the courts did not receive such a request. 12.  It appears that the applicant was not informed about the date and time of the appeal hearing in due time but learned about it on the day of the appeal hearing. The authorities submitted a certificate from the IZ-77/3 detention centre in Moscow, where the applicant was placed for the duration of the appeal proceedings, informing the Court that it was impossible to submit a copy of the summons to the appeal hearing due to the absence of the applicant’s case file. 13.  On 13 September 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia examined the applicant’s appeal, modified the qualification of his crimes and reduced the sentence to nine years and six months. The appeal hearing was held by video link. The applicant was brought to IZ-77/3 detention centre, which was equipped with the necessary facilities to broadcast the hearing. He was not represented by a lawyer. The prosecutor was present in person in the court room. 14.  According to the applicant, the quality of the video and audio transmission was very low. The applicant, who was suffering from partial deafness, could not follow the appeal hearing properly and when he asked the warders to increase the volume his requests were allegedly refused in a rude manner. He further alleged that he had twice been interrupted by the judge when trying to defend himself and was not able to proceed with the defence due to his confusion and the negative psychological effect caused by the judge’s attitude and the transmission by video link. He further alleged that the overall length of the hearing amounted to less than ten minutes. 15.  According to the Government, the applicant stated his case at the appeal hearing. He did not mention his illness during the appeal examination. The Supreme Court examined his arguments concerning the excessive severity of punishment. The court took into account the applicant’s family situation, his readiness to cooperate with the authorities and the factors which had induced him to commit the crime. 16.  On 19 July 2005 the Rossoshanskiy District Court of the Voronezh Region brought the applicant’s sentence into compliance with the amendments introduced into the Russian Criminal Code in December 2003 and reduced the applicant’s sentence to eight years and six months’ imprisonment. 17.  On 24 August 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia refused to review the judgment of 12 November 2001 and the appeal decision of 13 September 2002 by way of supervisory review, having found no violations. 18.  The applicant was held in the detention facility IZ-36/2 in Borisoglebsk from 22 January to 8 March 2001 and from 27 August 2001 to 12 July 2002. The applicant does not complain about the conditions of his detention in other detention facilities where he was held from 8 March to 27 August 2001. 19.  The Government submitted that the applicant was held in cells nos. 9 and 11 during the above-mentioned period. 20.  According to a certificate of 6 December 2007 issued by the facility administration, cell no. 9 measured 9.63 sq. m and cell no. 11 measured 14.58 sq. m Another certificate of the same date indicated that two inmates were held in cell no. 9 and three inmates were held in cell no. 11 at the relevant period. The personal space afforded to the applicant was consequently over 4 sq. m in each cell. The cell was equipped with heating, ventilation, a window that could be opened, a drinking water container and a lavatory. The windows were covered by metal security shields which were removed in 2003. The applicant had an individual sleeping place and bedding. He received food three times a day in accordance with standard norms. The applicant was given cutlery and personal hygiene items. He was able to shower once a week and exercise outside for one hour a day. 21.  The applicant contested these statements on account of personal space and sanitary conditions. He claimed that the cells were small, dirty and damp. The metal security shields covering the windows blocked access to natural light and fresh air, especially bearing in mind that the cells were located in a semi-basement. The artificial light was never switched off. Drinking water was of poor quality and was supplied in rusty containers. Due to overcrowding in the cells the applicant did not have an individual bed. The lavatory in the corner of the cell had no flush system and was not separated from the living area; the applicant had to use the toilet in front of his cellmates and the wardens who observed them through a peephole in the door. The detainees were given ten to fifteen minutes to take a shower. Two to five detainees had to share one shower and had to wash themselves and their clothes during this short time. 22.  According to the certificates of 6 December 2007 issued by the facility director and the warders, the applicant was held in cells nos. 3, 7, 13, 14 and 23 during the above-mentioned period. The cells measured 11.8, 16.4, 11.8, 17.7, and 12.6 sq. m and housed two, four, two, four and three inmates respectively. The Government submitted consequently that the applicant was afforded no less than 4 sq. m of personal space in each cell. 23.  As to the sanitary conditions, the Government submitted the same information as regards the period from 22 January to 8 March 2001 (see paragraph 20 above). 24.  In support of their allegations the Government provided several certificates issued by the chief of IZ-36/2 on 6 December 2007, statements by the warders (not dated), a copy of the applicant’s prison card stating that the applicant had been provided with bed sheets, cutlery and clothes, as well as a number of certificates concerning the food ration during the relevant period of time and disinfection activities conducted in the detention facility in 2002-2003. 25.  The applicant contested these statements. He claimed, in particular, that he had been held in cells 7, 10, 12 and 13; that the cells were small, dirty and damp. The metal security shields covering the windows blocked access to natural light and fresh air, especially bearing in mind that the cells were located in a semi-basement. The artificial light was never switched off. The cells were dimly lit by a 75-watt bulb, fixed in the ceiling and covered with metal mesh. Drinking water was of poor quality and was supplied in rusty containers. According to the applicant inmates were allowed two to four square metres per person in each cell, and he did not have an individual bed. The lavatory in the corner of the cells had no flush system and was not separated from the living area; it was allegedly located about one metre from the dining table; the applicant had to use the toilet in front of his cellmates and the wardens who observed them through a peephole in the door. The detainees were given ten to fifteen minutes to take a shower. Two to five detainees had to share one shower and had to wash themselves and their clothes during this short time. The applicant also complained about the appalling quality of nutrition, the large numbers of insects and rats, the lack of ventilation, the cold in winter (down to -10ºC in the corner cells) and the inadequate supplies of detergent. In detention the applicant contracted shingles and scabies. 26.  The applicant supported his allegations by statements from his four cellmates, Mr G., Mr K., Mr F. and Mr Sh. who were held in the same cells as the applicant during 2001-2002. Additional submissions supporting the applicant’s description of IZ-63/2 in respect of overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions were lodged by Mr Ka., who had been detained in cells nos. 7 and 9 in 2000, Mr. Ki. who had been held in cells nos. 10 and 13 in 2001, Mr. KH. who had been held in cells nos. 8, 12, 21, 13 and 5 in 2002‑2003 and Mr. G. who presented a general description of the detention building which had allegedly been built in the eighteenth century and not reconstructed since then. Although not all of the witnesses had been detained during exactly the same period of time as the applicant, their submissions relate to the same years and the same cells (nos. 7, 10, 12 and 13) and support the applicant’s allegations. 27.  The Government contested the statements of Mr G., Mr K., Mr F. and Mr Sh. as factually untrue, claiming that these statements were not supported by any evidence and reiterating their description of the conditions of detention. They did not dispute that the persons who had submitted their statements had been held in the same detention facility together with the applicant. 28.  On 23 January 2001 upon the applicant’s arrival in the detention facility the applicant was examined by doctors. Following this examination, he was diagnosed with chronic otitis of the middle ear and given the necessary treatment in the detention facility. 29.  On 27 August 2001 the applicant asked for medical help in the detention facility due to the same problem with his ears. The applicant was examined by a prison doctor and transported to the Borisoglebsk Central Hospital to consult an otolaryngologist where he was diagnosed with bilateral mesotimpanite, a type of chronic ear disease which causes partial hearing loss and periodic pus discharge from the ear. Anti-inflammatory treatment was prescribed to the applicant. 30.  The applicant again complained about his ear problem to the facility administration on 16 September, 9 November, 17 December 2001 and 21 March 2002. It appears that in all cases the applicant was provided with some form of medical treatment. 31.  While in detention, the applicant contracted scabies and shingles. In this respect he received the necessary medication from the facility’s doctor. 32.  After his arrival in the correctional colony IK-8 on 7 December 2002 the applicant received treatment for otitis. On 7 February 2003 at his request he was transported to a regional hospital of Voronezh where he stayed until 15 February 2003 and received anti-inflammatory treatment for his ears. Upon the medical examination conducted in the hospital the doctors diagnosed the applicant with bilateral chronic neural hearing loss. 33.  On 20 February 2003 a medical certificate was issued by the colony administration indicating that the applicant was suffering from hearing impairment in both ears (двусторонняя хроническая нейросенсорная тугоухость). 34.  The applicant submits that on the day of his arrest he had a construction business and was the owner of a house and three imported cars of good quality. 35.  Since the original judgment of 12 November 2001 provided for forfeiture of property, the applicant’s property was apparently confiscated when the judgment became final. Later, following the changes in the Russian criminal law introduced in December 2003, the part of the judgment concerning the forfeiture of property was quashed in the proceedings for bringing the sentence in compliance with these changes (see paragraph 16 above). In any event, it appears that upon the applicant’s release from prison his property was not available to him. 36.  No civil claim was apparently lodged with the domestic authorities for compensation or restitution of property. 37.  On an unspecified date in February 2001 the applicant’s mother died. According to the applicant, he asked the prison authorities to transport him to the funeral venue, which was just ten kilometres away from the prison. His request to attend the ceremony was allegedly refused. The applicant did not submit any decisions or further details in this respect.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Riga. 6.  The Department for the Combat of Organised Crime (Organizētās noziedzības apkarošanas pārvalde) received information regarding the applicant’s alleged involvement in the sale of drugs. The department initiated a covert investigative measure, namely a test purchase of drugs. This measure was carried out on 24 and 26 March 2004. 7.  After the test purchase on 26 March 2004 a police patrol unit working with officers from the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime stopped a vehicle being driven by S.I. in which the applicant was a passenger, at about 10 p.m. near Riga city centre. The applicant was apprehended and taken to State Police premises. 8.  The applicant submitted that he had been repeatedly hit on the head, hit several times on the back, knocked down on to the pavement and pushed, which had resulted in bodily injuries. He had not offered any resistance. 9.  In the Government’s version of events V.V., a police officer, opened the front passenger door and pulled the applicant out of the vehicle by his clothing. The applicant fell on to the edge of the pavement. He was then placed face down on the pavement and handcuffed. 10.  The Government noted that while on State Police premises the applicant had complained of chest pain, saying he had heart disease. 11.  At around 1.30 a.m. the applicant was transported from the premises of the State Police by the emergency medical service to the hospital. Head of the emergency medical service unit made an entry in form no. 573, as follows: “Abdominal contusion (sasitums). Acute gastritis? Facial contusion with skin abrasions (nobrāzumi).” 12.  The applicant was admitted to Riga no. 1 Hospital at 1.33 a.m. The applicant’s medical record indicated the following diagnosis on admission: “Head, thorax and abdominal contusion.” 13.  The entry made following the applicant’s examination by a surgeon at 1.35 a.m. indicated the same diagnosis and the applicant’s complaint: “The patient was beaten up during the arrest approximately one and a half hours ago.” 14.  Further, at 2.20 a.m. a neurosurgeon recorded that the applicant had an eyelid haematoma around his left eye. The doctor also noted that the applicant had said that during his arrest he had fallen and hit his head in the area of the right eyebrow. 15.  At 2.55 a.m. the applicant was referred to be tested for narcotic and psychotropic substances. The applicant was found not to be under the influence of alcohol, narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 16.  On the same day, between 4.35 a.m. and 5.00 a.m., I.K., a chief specialist from the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime questioned the applicant as a suspect. The applicant indicated that he wished to make a statement in the presence of a lawyer. 17.  At 5.51 a.m. the applicant was transferred to a temporary detention facility, where he stayed until 30 March 2004, during which time he did not seek any medical assistance. 18.  On 29 March 2004 between 1.30 p.m. and 1.55 p.m. I.K. questioned the applicant in the presence of a lawyer. The applicant made a statement, the record of the relevant part of which is as follows:\n“... While being arrested on 26 March 2004 [the applicant] was pulled out of the vehicle, a jacket was pulled over [his] head and [he] was pushed on to the ground. [He] then received one to three blows to the head and one blow to the abdomen. [The applicant] does not recall the precise number of blows he received. [He] did not lose consciousness. The blows were [inflicted] with a hard, blunt object.” 19.  In the context of the interrogation of the applicant described above, the Government put to the Court that no complaints or requests had been raised by the applicant or his lawyer. Notwithstanding, a forensic examination of the applicant had been arranged. 20.  Accordingly, on 29 March 2004 I.K. ordered an expert report to ascertain what injuries had been sustained by the applicant, in view of the applicant’s statement that while being arrested he had been kicked on the body and head. The order stated that it had been issued as part of a criminal investigation of unauthorised acquisition, possession and sale of psychotropic substances. 21.  On the same day an expert examined the applicant. In the expert’s report the following information the applicant had provided was recorded:\n“On 26 March 2004 during the arrest police officers in uniforms placed a jacket over [his] head, hit [him] on the head [and] abdomen with something [and he] fell down. It is impossible to tell with accuracy whether the abrasions on [his] legs were caused by the fall or a blow. [He] had nausea [but] did not vomit. [He] did not lose consciousness ...”\nThe expert’s report of 29 March 2004 described the applicant’s condition as follows:\n“A haematoma 4 cm x 2.5 cm on the upper eyelid of the left eye ... an abrasion 0.2 cm x 0.1 cm in the middle area of the right cheek ... no visible injuries on the body found ... seven abrasions from 0.2 cm x 0.2 cm to 1.5 cm x 0.8 cm on the front surface of the left knee joint and on the front surface of the left lower leg ... a haematoma 5 cm x 4 cm on the front surface of the left lower leg.” 22.  On 29 March 2004 the expert recorded in her report that the applicant’s medical records should be requested from Riga no. 1 Hospital. On 30 March 2004 the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime issued a request to Riga no. 1 Hospital for the applicant’s medical records. 23.  On 2 April 2004 the expert added in the same report her conclusions based on the applicant’s examination and the data contained in his medical documentation. In particular:\n“[The applicant] has the following injuries – a contusion on the head with subdermal haematoma and skin abrasion, and a contusion on the left leg with subdermal haematoma and skin abrasions.\nThese injuries could have been caused by hard, blunt objects.\nThe possibility cannot be ruled out that the injuries were caused in the circumstances indicated in the decision and by [the applicant], and on 26 March 2004.\nThe injuries ... are light injuries, which do not cause short-term health impairment for a period of time of more than six days.\nThe diagnosis of ‘head, thorax and abdominal contusion’ cannot be taken into account in the assessment of the gravity of the injuries, because it has not been affirmed by impartial clinical data, in-patient (stacionārā) inspection and examination (visible injuries are not described in the medical history and were not found in the course of the forensic examination).” 24.  The applicant stated in his appeal of 2 April 2004 to the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) against his pre-trial detention that physical force had been applied to him during his arrest, following which he had requested medical assistance at Riga no. 1 Hospital. 25.  On 13 April 2004 officer A.Ž. gave a statement in the criminal investigation regarding the test purchase of drugs carried out on 24 and 26 March 2004, and stated that the applicant had been apprehended on 26 March 2004. A.Ž. gave evidence that the applicant had not been apprehended immediately after the purchase, because it was necessary to ascertain whether the applicant had been working with anyone else. 26.  On 30 April 2004 the Riga Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the pre-trial detention and decided to keep the applicant in custody. The Regional Court in the decision referred to the applicant’s argument contained in his appeal, including the following:\n“... police employees beat up [the applicant] when they arrested him; as a result he needed hospital treatment ...\nIn court [the applicant] and his lawyer ... maintained the appeal ...” 27.  On 9 May 2005 the Vidzeme Regional Court (Vidzemes apgabaltiesa) found the applicant guilty of unauthorised acquisition, possession and transport of narcotic and psychotropic substances on a large scale, with intent to sell. He was sentenced to eight years and six months’ imprisonment, as an aggregated term, with confiscation of property and police control for two years. 28.  On 16 December 2006 the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Krimināllietu tiesu palāta) upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal. Further, on 19 February 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 29.  On 12 March 2007 the applicant made representation to the Vidzeme Regional Court about ill-treatment during his arrest on 26 March 2004. The Regional Court transmitted the request to the Internal Security Office of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iekšējās drošības birojs).\n(a)  Response of the Internal Security Office of the State Police 30.  The applicant submitted to the Court a copy of a letter from the Internal Security Office of the State Police, dated 25 April 2007. It was sent in response to the applicant’s submission of 12 March 2007, mentioned above. The letter stated that the human resources inspection division had requested information from the emergency medical service about the call made to them on 27 March 2004. However, the applicable regulations required records of emergency calls to be kept for a period of one year. It followed from the applicant’s medical records at Riga no. 1 Hospital that on 27 March 2004 the applicant had been diagnosed with head and thorax contusions and that he had told medical staff that he had fallen and hit his head while being arrested. While in the temporary detention facility between 27 and 30 March 2004 the applicant had not asked for medical assistance. 31.  The letter indicated as follows:\n“... in accordance with section 22(2) of the Law on the Police a police employee could not be held responsible for pecuniary or physical harm, caused within the official authority, to an offender who did not comply or who resisted during arrest.”\nThe answer concluded that State Police employees had not violated the relevant statutes.\n(b)  Inquiry and decision of the Internal Security Office of the State Police 32.  In April 2007 the Internal Security Office collected reports (ziņojumi) from D.M., A.Ž. and A.K., officers of the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime. 33.  D.M., in a report of 24 April 2007, indicated that on the day in question he had been working with a team of traffic police officers. Their task had been to intercept the applicant’s vehicle after the test purchase of drugs. Once they had received information about the vehicle with the applicant as a passenger inside, a traffic police employee had stopped the vehicle and invited the driver to step out. At this time other department officers arrived and arrested the applicant. D.M. could not remember the arresting officer or subsequent proceedings with respect to the applicant. 34.  The department officer A.Ž. stated in his report of 11 April 2007 that the applicant’s arrest had been carried out by V.V. He also indicated that the applicant had not been ill-treated. The applicant had complained of heart problems while on department premises and an ambulance had been called. An examination by a doctor revealed no health problems and the applicant was then questioned. 35.  In his report of 27 April 2007 department officer A.K. declared that he had arrived at the scene after the applicant had been arrested. A.K. could not remember who the arresting officer was. According to A.K. the applicant had been transported to department premises. Police officers had not ill-treated the applicant in A.K.’s presence and he had not seen any injuries. 36.  In addition to these reports, the Internal Security Office of the State Police obtained on 17 April 2007 evidence from the temporary detention unit. This indicated that the applicant had not requested medical assistance between 27 and 30 March 2004. On the same day that office also requested the applicant’s medical file from Riga no. 1 Hospital. 37.  Following the applicant’s request of 13 April 2007 to the Prosecutor General to submit information about ill-treatment, a prosecutor took a statement from him on 8 June 2007. The applicant indicated that he wished to provide more details about what had happened on 26 March 2004. The statement included the following:\n“Late in the evening of 26 March 2004 ... [the applicant] was in the vehicle ... as a passenger ... The vehicle was stopped by traffic police ... [The applicant’s] colleague was invited to the police vehicle ... the passenger door on [the applicant’s] side opened and [he] received a hard blow to the head ... the blow pushed him towards the driver’s seat and [he] heard shouts not to move and received several blows on the back ... the same person who had hit [him then] grabbed [him] by [his] jacket and pulled [him] out of the vehicle. The jacket was placed over [his] head ... One of the blows knocked [him] off his feet, as a result of which [he] fell face down with his abdomen on the edge of the pavement. Thereafter a couple of blows followed on [his] body. Everything happened very fast ... [The applicant] heard people passing by saying ‘What are you doing?’ ... [he] was handcuffed ... in the police vehicle [he] was hit on the body ... [The applicant] would be able to recognise the police officer who inflicted the blows ... No physical ill-treatment was inflicted on him at the police station ... After some time ... [the applicant] felt ill ... [he] even lost consciousness in the police station ...” 38.  In the statement the applicant requested that an investigation be conducted and criminal proceedings initiated in respect of the infliction of the injuries, because there had been no reason to resort to violence during the arrest. 39.  The statement was sent for decision to the Internal Security Office of the State Police. 40.  On 18 June 2007 L.L., a senior inspector of the pre-trial investigation division of the Internal Security Office of the State Police, refused to initiate criminal proceedings. This decision, referred to by the Government, did not elaborate reasons for the refusal. 41.  The applicant appealed against the refusal to the Office of the Prosecutor General (Latvijas Republikas Prokuratūras Ģenerālprokuratūra). 42.  On 18 July 2007 V.Č., acting as chief prosecutor of the pre-trial investigation and oversight division, quashed the decision as ungrounded and ordered that the Internal Security Office of the State Police conduct an additional inquiry. His finding read:\n“The decision has been adopted on the basis of an incomplete examination ... without requesting the expert’s report and without clarifying the possible circumstances in which the injuries observed on [the applicant] had been sustained.” 43.  On 7 August 2007 the Internal Security Office of the State Police requested information on the identities of the traffic police employees who had been on duty on 26 March 2004 around 10 p.m. and whether they had participated in the applicant’s arrest. It also asked those officers to attend the Internal Security Office. In response, the Internal Security Office was provided on 14 August 2007 with the information that officers B.M. and L.V. had carried out the arrest and that they had been advised to attend the Internal Security Office. 44.  During August 2007 the Internal Security Office of the State Police collected explanations (paskaidrojumi) from five officers, A.Ž., D.M. and V.V., officers of the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime, and B.M. and L.V., officers of the police patrol unit. 45.  In particular, further statements were taken from A.Ž. and D.M. on 20 August 2007. Their explanations were broadly the same as those they had made previously, on 11 and 24 April 2007 respectively. A.Ž. repeated, inter alia, that the applicant’s arrest had been made by V.V. and that the applicant had not been ill-treated. D.M. again gave evidence that he had no recollection of the identity of the arresting officer or of further proceedings with regard to the applicant. On 24 August 2007 V.V. gave his explanation as follows:\n“On 26 March 2004 a covert measure of investigation was implemented ... Following the experiment [V.V.] received an instruction to apprehend [the applicant] ... when the traffic police officers stopped the vehicle ... [V.V.] approached the vehicle ... and opened the front passenger door. [The applicant] was just then reaching to close the driver’s door, which had been left open. A traffic police employee was at the driver’s door. [V.V.] identified himself as a police employee and invited [the applicant] to step out of the vehicle. [V.V.] does not remember exactly whether [the applicant] was handcuffed and which of the colleagues assisted in [the applicant’s] arrest. Following [his] arrest [he] was taken to the State Police ... but [V.V.] does not remember who took him there. [The applicant] was not subjected to any physical violence when he was arrested, because there was no need to apply physical force.” 46.  B.M. and L.V., officers of the police patrol unit gave explanations on 20 and 27 August 2007 respectively. They both stated that on 26 March 2004 they had been on duty and had been asked to drive to the State Police and work with officers of the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime. L.V. in his explanation of 27 August 2007 specified that department employees had briefed them that it was necessary to intercept a vehicle which might contain a person whose arrest was being sought. After receiving these instructions they had left the department, with department officers. Two of them had been in their own vehicle. At around 10 p.m. on the instruction of the department officers they had stopped a vehicle with a driver and a passenger inside. Both B.M. and L.V. stated that B.M. had approached the driver of the vehicle and asked him to present the necessary documents. The arrest had been made by department employees and no physical force had been used, either on the applicant or the driver of the vehicle. L.V. indicated that he had stayed inside the patrol vehicle while this was going on. B.M. declared that he had not seen the applicant since the arrest. The driver of the vehicle had been taken to the State Police and an administrative report that he had been driving without a licence was drawn up. L.V.’s account stated that both the applicant and the driver had been taken to the State Police.\n(b)  Report of the Internal Security Office of the State Police 47.  On 3 September 2007 a senior inspector of the Internal Security Office of the State Police human resources inspection division issued a report on the results of the inquiry into the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest on 26 March 2004. 48.  The report stated that information from the emergency medical service and Riga no. 1 Hospital, and explanations from the officers A.Ž., D.M., V.V., B.M. and L.V. had been collected. An explanation could not be obtained from A.K., because he did not attend the Internal Security Office as agreed and later went on holiday and was unreachable by telephone. The Internal Security Office had requested S.I., the driver of the vehicle in which the applicant had been a passenger when he was arrested on 26 March 2004, to attend the office. S.I. had informed the office by telephone that he was unable to attend because of the expected birth of a child and because he was too busy. S.I. also said on the telephone that he had been questioned about the incident on several occasions, and that time had passed and he could not remember the precise circumstances of the applicant’s arrest. S.I. did not know whether physical force had been used on the applicant, because he had stepped out of the vehicle. No physical force had been used against S.I. 49.  The report further stated:\n“Likewise, during the inquiry which was conducted no unequivocal and impartial evidence was obtained that police employees had used unjustified physical force on [the applicant] during his arrest. In this regard the police employees categorically deny any use of physical force on [the applicant], whereas [the applicant] alleges to the contrary. Therefore, the question whether the police officers used physical force on [the applicant] and to what extent (during arrest, transport for questioning, or questioning itself) is to be examined in the pre-trial investigation division of the Internal Security Office of the State Police (VP IDP Pirmstiesas izmeklēšanas nodaļa), by taking the necessary actions in criminal procedure (questioning and subsequent confrontation between the police employees concerned).” 50.  With regard to disciplinary liability the report indicated that in any event this would be barred by a period of statutory limitation.\n(c)  Decision of the Internal Security Office of the State Police 51.  On 11 September 2007 the pre-trial investigation division of the Internal Security Office of the State Police refused to initiate criminal proceedings. 52.  That decision established:\n“... on 26 March 2004 [the applicant] was justifiably arrested for a criminal offence ... All the police officers who carried out the arrest on 26 March 2004 indicated that more than three years had passed since the event and they could not remember precisely what had happened. The applicant did not, immediately after the arrest, express any complaints about the police employees’ conduct against him. [The applicant] could obtain the established light injuries, which do not cause short-term health impairment for more than six days, before or during the apprehension, when special measures were applied to him. It may not be asserted unequivocally that during [the applicant’s] arrest the police employees exceeded their authority by intentionally using unjustified force, thus committing a criminal offence as set out in section 317(2) of the Criminal Law.” 53.  On 21 September 2007 the applicant appealed to the Office of the Prosecutor General against the aforementioned refusal to initiate criminal proceedings. He argued that the existence of his injuries had not been disputed and had been confirmed by the expert’s report. He could not have sustained the injuries prior to the arrest because he had been arrested at 10 p.m. on 26 March 2004 and admitted to Riga no. 1 Hospital at 1.33 a.m. the next day. The applicant pointed out that a surgeon had noted on his record “was beaten up one and a half hours ago”. Further, the fact that police officers could not remember the circumstances of the arrest did not prove anything, and was not a justification. He also stressed that no one who could have given impartial information had been questioned. 54.  On 7 November 2007 J.K., a prosecutor responsible for the criminal case against the applicant in respect of drug sale, gave a report that the applicant had never complained of ill-treatment by police officers during the investigation or court hearings. 55.  On 8 November 2007 V.O., as chief prosecutor of the pre-trial investigation and oversight division, confirmed the decision of the Internal Security Office of the State Police of 11 September 2007. She noted that that office had questioned the police officers and had obtained the expert’s report and information from S.I. However, no unequivocal and impartial evidence had been obtained that the injuries had been caused during the arrest. V.O. added the following words to her decision:\n“... [the applicant’s] account of 8 June 2007 that police officers on 26 March 2004 had hit [him] several times on the back has not been confirmed, because the expert’s report did not establish any injuries on the back ... [the applicant] gave a contradictory account of how the abdominal contusion had been acquired (not taken into account in the expert’s report as not affirmed by impartial clinical data). On 29 March 2004 [the applicant] stated that police officers had hit [him] on the abdomen during [his] arrest but [he] had not lost consciousness, however on 8 June 2007 [the applicant] stated that the abdominal contusion had been caused by a fall on asphalt and that [he] had lost consciousness on the State Police premises ... It has also been established that, after being taken to Riga no. 1 Hospital at 1.33 a.m. on 27 March 2004 and examined there by doctors, [the applicant] was taken to a temporary detention facility at 5.51 a.m. ... from which a medical report has been received that between 27 and 30 March 2004 [he] did not request medical assistance.” 56.  V.O. also indicated that there were no grounds to initiate disciplinary proceedings because no evidence had been obtained that State Police employees had exceeded their authority or abused their official position during the arrest. She also explained the period of statutory limitation for disciplinary proceedings. 57.  V.O. stated that this decision was final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  According to the applicant, he is a Russian national, A.L., born in 1972. According to the Government, the applicant is a Chinese national, X.W., born in 1973. He lives in Elista. 7.  On 19 March 2014 the applicant was arrested in St Petersburg on suspicion of murdering a Chinese policeman in 1996. He was in possession of a Russian national passport in the name of A.L., born in 1972 in the Primorskiy region of Russia. 8.  On 21 March 2014 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg ordered the applicant’s detention until 17 April 2014, pending receipt of an official extradition request from the Chinese authorities. The District Court noted that the applicant had been identified by means of photographic comparisons as X.W., a Chinese national born in China in 1973. His name was on Interpol’s list of wanted persons. The Chinese authorities had issued an arrest warrant in his name dated 15 December 2011 from which it was apparent that he was suspected of a criminal offence under Article 232 of the Chinese Criminal Code. That offence was punishable by the death penalty, life imprisonment or at least three years’ imprisonment, and the limitation period was twenty years. The limitation period in respect of a comparable criminal offence in the Russian Criminal Code was fifteen years, but this was suspended if the suspect had fled from justice. The court further noted that a Russian national passport in the name of A.L. had apparently been unlawfully obtained by the applicant after he submitted false information to the competent Russian authorities. It was clear that he was not a Russian national but a Chinese national and could be therefore extradited to China. 9.  The Chinese authorities failed to submit an official extradition request within the thirty-day time-limit established by the Bilateral Treaty on Extradition of 26 June 1995. 10.  On 17 April 2014 the St Petersburg Transport Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release. At the same time he noted that it was necessary to start administrative removal proceedings against the applicant on the grounds that his residence in Russia was unlawful. 11.  Despite the release order, the applicant remained in detention. 12.  On 18 April 2014 the St Petersburg transport police drafted a report on the commission by the applicant of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code (unlawful residence in Russia of a foreign national, see paragraph 47 below). 13.  On the same day, 18 April 2014, the Smolninskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of an administrative offence under Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences and ordered his administrative removal to China. The court took note of a letter dated 21 March 2014 by the Federal Migration Service which showed that it was impossible to establish whether or not the applicant was a Russian national. He had received a Russian national passport in the name of A.L. in 2000 after declaring that he had lost his previous passport, which had been issued in 1988. However, according to the Federal Migration Service, the allegedly lost passport never existed. The court further relied on the extradition case‑file, from which it was apparent that the applicant was in fact a Chinese national, X.W., rather than a Russian national A.L. Being a Chinese national, he was residing in Russia unlawfully without a valid visa or residence permit. The court noted that the applicant was sought by the Chinese authorities on suspicion of murder. He was therefore dangerous and it was necessary to sentence him to administrative removal from Russia. Lastly, the court observed that, although the applicant had a Russian wife, he did not have any children who were minors living in Russia. In such circumstances, and taking into account his dangerousness, the public interest outweighed his personal interest in maintaining his family life in Russia. 14.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that his passport as a Russian national had never been cancelled and was therefore still valid. He further argued that his administrative removal was extradition in disguise. The fifteen-year limitation period established by Russian criminal law had expired and he could no longer be lawfully extradited to China. If he was administratively removed to China he would be immediately arrested and very probably subjected to the death penalty. His removal to China would therefore be in breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 15.  On 24 April 2014 the Federal Migration Service found that the applicant was not a Russian national. He had obtained the Russian national passport in the name of A.L. unlawfully. 16.  On 28 August 2014 the St Petersburg City Court quashed the judgment of 18 April 2014, finding that the administrative offence report of 18 April 2014 had been procedurally defective, and remitted the case to the District Court for a new examination. These proceedings were later discontinued. 17.  On 29 August 2014 the Krasnoselskiy District police drafted a new report on the commission by the applicant of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code. 18.  On 30 August 2014 the Krasnoselskiy District Court of St Petersburg discontinued the administrative offence proceedings against the applicant, finding that the administrative offence report of 29 August 2014 had been procedurally defective. 19.  On 31 August 2104 the applicant was released. His passport, seized upon arrest, was not returned to him. He was served with a decision by the St Petersburg and Leningrad Region Interior Department, dated 29 August 2014, declaring the undesirability of his presence in Russia (the “exclusion order”) which read in its entirety as follows:\n“On 27 August 2014 the Interior Ministry of the Russian Federation decided that your presence (residence) in Russia was undesirable in accordance with section 25 of [the Entry and Exit Procedures Act]. You must therefore leave the Russian Federation before 3 September 2014.\nIf you do not leave before the stated deadline, you will be deported.\nIn accordance with section 27 of [the Entry and Exit Procedures Act], if a decision declaring the undesirability of an individual’s presence (residence) in the Russian Federation has been issued, that individual may no longer enter the Russian Federation.” 20.  The applicant challenged the exclusion order before the Smolninskiy District Court. He also complained that his passport had been unlawfully seized. He submitted that he could not cross the Russian border without a passport and could not therefore comply with the exclusion order by leaving Russia for another country. In these circumstances, the exclusion order would automatically entail his deportation to China. If he was deported to China he would be immediately arrested and very probably subjected to the death penalty. His deportation would therefore be in breach of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 21.  On 12 November 2014 the Smolninskiy District Court found that the exclusion order had been lawful. It had been issued by a competent authority in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and had been based on sufficient reasons. Given that the applicant was sought by the Chinese authorities on suspicion of murder, had been fined several times in Russia for driving offences and had lived in Russia unlawfully with an unlawfully issued passport, there were sufficient reasons to find that he represented a real threat to public order and security. The court further noted that the applicant did not dispute the above facts. The thrust of his complaint was that his deportation to China would expose him to a risk of being subjected to the death penalty that amounted to inhuman treatment. Those arguments could not, however, serve as grounds for annulling the lawfully adopted exclusion order. The court also held that the applicant’s argument that the exclusion order would automatically entail his deportation to China was unconvincing. Firstly, deportation was not automatic and required a separate administrative decision that could be challenged before a court. Secondly, the applicant had the possibility of avoiding deportation to China by leaving Russia for another country. 22.  The court further held that the seizure of the applicant’s passport in the name of A.L. had been lawful. By the decision of 24 April 2014 the Federal Migration Service had found that that passport had been issued unlawfully and that the applicant was not a Russian national. Those were lawful grounds for seizing a passport. The procedure prescribed by law had been respected. 23.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that the domestic law did not require a separate administrative decision on deportation. The exclusion order alone constituted a sufficient legal basis for deportation and his failure to leave Russia before the stated deadline could therefore entail automatic deportation to China. He did not have any remedies with suspensive effect in such a situation. He further reiterated his argument that he could not leave Russia for another country because his passport had been seized by the authorities and he did not have any other identity documents. Lastly, he argued that his deportation to China would amount to a breach of not only Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, but also of Article 8, because he was married to a Russian national. 24.  On 25 February 2015 the St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment of 12 November 2014 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. It added that a genetic test had established that the applicant’s genetic profile matched the genetic profiles of X.W.’s parents. There was therefore no doubt that the applicant’s real name was X.W. It further agreed with the District Court that the applicant could avoid deportation to China by leaving Russia for another country using his Chinese passport. 25.  From 18 April to 29 August 2014 the applicant was detained in a detention centre for aliens (Центр для содержания иностранных граждан) located in Krasnoye Selo in St Petersburg.\n(a)  The applicant’s description 26.  From 18 to 21 April 2014 the applicant was held in a punishment cell. From 18 to 20 April 2014 he was handcuffed. The cell had no windows and was empty. It had no bunk or chair and the applicant had to stand or remain in the squatting position all the time. There was no lavatory bowl or running water. His requests to allow him to use the toilet were refused and he had to relieve himself in a plastic bottle. He was given food only once during that period but was anyway unable to eat it because of his handcuffs. 27.  On 21 April 2014 the applicant was transferred to solitary confinement cell no. 412 on the fourth floor where he remained until 2 July 2014. The cell measured 9 sq. m and was equipped with a bed, a bedside cabinet, a table, a sink and a lavatory bowl that stank. The window did not open so the applicant could not air his cell. The window was also covered with paint which blocked the daylight. The artificial lights were dim. The cell was damp and cold and the applicant had to sleep with his coat on. The cell was swarming with mice. 28.  From 2 July to 29 August 2014 the applicant was held in solitary confinement cell no. 413. The conditions of detention in that cell were similar to those in cell no. 412. 29.  Both cells nos. 412 and 413 were locked and the applicant remained alone all the time. Neither the other inmates nor the warders ever entered the cells. The cells were not equipped with a radio or TV set. The applicant was not given any books or newspapers. He was not allowed to use his mobile telephone. As he was in total isolation, he counted the days by drawing sticks on paper. 30.  It was not until 5 June 2014 that he was allowed to take walks in the yard. In particular, he was allowed to go out in the yard on 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 21 and 30 June, 13, 7, 11, 13, 15, 19, 27 and 29 July and 3, 6, 9, 11, 12, 18, 21, 24 and 25 August 2014. The walks lasted between ten minutes and half an hour. The exercise yard measured 30 m by 8 m and was enclosed by a three-metre-high fence. The applicant was always alone in the yard. 31.  It was very difficult to get permission for family visits. He was allowed only four visits from his wife, each time for less than half an hour and in the presence of warders. 32.  The detention centre had no canteen and the food was brought from other detention facilities. It was always cold and did not contain any vegetable, fruit, meat or dairy products. The warders gave him food through a small window in the door. No drinking water was provided and the applicant had to drink tap water which was of poor quality. 33.  During his four-month stay in the centre the applicant was allowed to take a shower only five times. The water in the shower was cold. There was no laundry service and the applicant had to wash his clothes himself.\n(b)  The Government’s description 34.  According to the Government, the applicant was held in cell no. 412 which measured 27.4 sq. m. The cell had windows, artificial light and central heating. It was equipped with a lavatory bowl, running hot and cold water, a bed, a bedside cabinet and a dining table. 35.  Inmates were provided with hot meals three times per day. They could walk in the exercise yard every morning in accordance with applicable regulations. 36.  The detention centre for aliens had a library which the applicant was allowed to use on request. 37.  The detention centre for aliens had no punishment cells and its warders never used handcuffs. 38.  On 29 August 2014 the applicant was transferred to an administrative detention cell at Krasnoselskiy District police station no. 9 where he remained until 31 August 2014.\n(a)  The applicant’s description 39.  The applicant was placed in a cell at about 4.30 p.m. on 29 August. However, he remained handcuffed until 11.30 p.m. of the same day. 40.  The cell measured 3.75 sq. m. It had concrete walls and ceiling and no windows. There was an opening in the wall measuring 40 cm by 60 cm blocked by a metal sheet with ventilation holes. 41.  The cell was equipped with a narrow wooden bench. There was no table, chair, sink or lavatory bowl. The applicant was not given any food or water. He was not allowed to go to the toilet until about 1 p.m. on 30 August before a court hearing. He remained handcuffed from 1 to 5 p.m. on 30 August 2014 during the entire court hearing and until his return to the police station. 42.  The applicant’s representatives were not allowed to visit him. 43.  The applicant was released at about 4.30 p.m. on 31 August 2014.\n(b)  The Government’s description 44.  The Government submitted the floor plan of police station no. 9. It is apparent from the plan that there were three administrative detention cells, two of them measuring 7.55 sq. m and one measuring 6.5 sq. m. Each cell was equipped with two benches. There was no other furniture and no lavatory facilities in the cell. 45.  The Government confirmed that the windows were blocked by metal screens with holes in them. 46.  According to the police officers’ statements, the applicant was given food but refused to eat it. He preferred to eat food brought by his wife. He was allowed to go to the police station toilet on request. The applicant was not handcuffed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, BENet Praha, spol. s r.o., is a limited liability company incorporated under Czech law with its registered seat in Prague. 6.  Between 1994 and 1997 the applicant company dealt in ferrous alloys. 7.  In April 2001 customs authorities initiated a set of administrative proceedings against the applicant company in order to check the accuracy of the customs debt (concerning customs plus VAT) the company had paid during the aforementioned period of time. 8.  Simultaneously, criminal proceedings were instituted against a person, who was a manager (jednatel) of the applicant company during that period of time, on suspicion of tax evasion while he was managing the applicant company. According to the Government the damage caused to the State exceeded 200,000,000 Czech korunas (CZK; 7,770,000 euros (EUR)). 9.  Within the framework of the criminal proceedings a search of the applicant company's premises was carried out on 24 April 2001. Cash in several currencies in the total amount of approximately CZK 20,000,000 (EUR 770,000) and several documents such as financial files, books of accounts and business documents were seized. According to the applicant company these documents and most of the cash have not yet been returned to it. 10.  On 25 and 27 April 2001 the prosecuting authorities seized all of the applicant company's assets deposited on its five bank accounts on the suspicion that they constituted profits from the criminal activities of the former manager. The applicant company's bank accounts contained at that time funds equivalent to CZK 98,458,516 (EUR 3,786,866). The seizure orders, which were notified to the applicant company on 8 October 2001, did not specify what assets had been seized, nor to what amount. This was remedied on 28 November 2001 by the Prague High Prosecutor (vrchní státní zástupce) who amended the original decisions by writing in the sums to be seized. While doing so, he froze all assets deposited on the applicant company's accounts on that day, which included payments which had come in after 25 April 2001 and 27 April 2001 respectively. The applicant company's assets amounting to CZK 101,909,105 (EUR 3,919,580) were thus seized. 11.  Simultaneously with the criminal investigation, the customs and tax administrative proceedings resulted in the delivery of numerous payment orders assessing duty payable by the applicant company. With all of its assets frozen, the applicant company requested the prosecuting authorities on a number of occasions to lift the seizure in order to discharge these duties, but only few of these requests were granted. Its appeals did not suspend the effect of those orders payable within thirty days of delivery. Consequently, the company had to take out a loan, among other measures adopted to overcome this situation, and avoid insolvency, as it was obliged to pay under these orders a sum totalling CZK 55,000,000 (EUR 2,115,385). 12.  Between 2004 and 2005, upon the applicant company's appeals, all of the payment orders and other decisions adopted by tax and customs authorities imposing the duties on the applicant company were quashed as unlawful either by superior authorities or administrative courts. The tax proceedings were discontinued and sums paid by the applicant company upon the orders reimbursed accordingly. 13.  The former manager has been prosecuted for acts committed in his capacity as the manager of the applicant company and in the context of its business activities. On 4 June 2009 the former manager was acquitted by Prague Municipal Court (městský soud) from some of the charges, and on 30 April 2010 Prague High Court (vrchní soud) upheld that judgment. The investigation concerning other charges is apparently still pending. During the investigation the prosecuting authorities, inter alia, collected over 100,000 pages of documentary evidence, interviewed several hundred witnesses, including homeless persons with unknown whereabouts whose names the accused had allegedly used in sham transactions to evade customs and other duties, and requested legal assistance from the competent authorities of sixteen countries.\nApplication no. 33908/04 14.  In December 2001 the Frýdek-Místek Customs Office (celní úřad) ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties in the amount of CZK 280,672 (EUR 9,955). 15.  In May and June 2002 the Prague 4 Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties of CZK 3,361,940 (EUR 119,242). 16.  On 6 June 2002 the High Prosecutor granted the applicant company's request for the seizure to be lifted for the sum of CZK 280,672. 17.  On 5, 17 and 21 June 2002 respectively, the applicant company requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure in order to enable it to pay the customs duties ordered in May and June 2002. 18.  On 11 July 2002 the High Prosecutor dismissed its requests, finding that the orders had not yet become final. According to the prosecutor, it was premature to lift the seizure under these circumstances, as such a step might have been contrary to the interests pursued by the prosecuting authorities. 19.  The applicant company appealed to the High Court, which dismissed its appeal on 27 August 2002. 20.  On 18 November 2002 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) maintaining that the customs authorities, together with the prosecuting authorities, had misused the law to its detriment and consequently had violated Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Listina základních práv a svobod) (hereinafter “the Charter”). 21.  In December 2002 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) invited the respondent parties to the proceedings, the High Court and the High Prosecutor, to submit written observations on the applicant's constitutional appeal pursuant to section 42(4) of the Constitutional Court Act. 22.  The High Prosecutor did not submit any observations. The High Court submitted written observations, referring to the reasoning of its impugned decision. It expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. This submission was not communicated to the applicant company. 23.  The Constitutional Court also requested the Prague High State Prosecutor's Office to send it the criminal file in the context of which the seizure had been carried out. The Constitutional Court made copies of the relevant documents, which were included in the case file of the Constitutional Court. Subsequently the criminal file was returned to the Prosecutor's Office on 29 May 2003. 24.  On 22 May 2003 the applicant company's acting manager consulted the case file at the Constitutional Court. The next day he sent a letter to the court with the following text:\n“On 22 May 2003, when consulting the case file, I found that it should also include nine files [covering the criminal proceedings] submitted by the Prague High Prosecutor ... [A]bout nine files annexed to the reply of the Prague High Prosecutor submitted upon the Constitutional Court's invitation of 5 December 2002 were dispatched on 8 January 2003 ... and delivered to the Constitutional Court on 9 January 2003.\nAt the time of my study of the case file these nine files had been sent somewhere for consultation. ... I kindly ask you to set another date on which consultation of the case file including the aforesaid documentary evidence, will be possible.” 25.  In a letter of 29 May 2003 from the Constitutional Court judge, the applicant company's acting manager was told to make a direct approach to the High Prosecutor's Office to which the file in question had been returned. The same letter also informed the representative of the applicant company that he was free to inspect the Constitutional Court's file after arranging a visit to do this with the court's registry. 26.  In a letter of 5 June 2003 the applicant company's acting manager asked the Constitutional Court judge to remedy the situation and ensure the applicant company had access to those criminal files. The latter replied, on 1 July 2003, that pursuant to section 30(1) of the Constitutional Court Act, a party to the proceedings must be legally represented. He further stated that the criminal case file was not a Constitutional Court file, but subject to the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular Article 65, which governs access to criminal files.\nOn 11 March 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant company's constitutional appeal (II. ÚS 708/02). It held in particular:\n“As it appears from the decision refusing to lift the seizure of the assets, in the High Prosecutor's view, to lift it could jeopardise the purpose of the criminal proceedings. ... [The High Court] shared his opinion ... In its written observations, it found that there was no ground justifying the conclusion that the seizure of the [applicant company's] assets ... was no longer necessary.\nIn the present case, the Constitutional Court did not consider the conduct of the State authorities a misuse of law to the applicant company's detriment, contrary to the basic requirements of fairness and of Article 4 of the Charter. The mere fact that the applicant company was not successful in its request cannot be in itself considered as violating its right to a fair trial.” 27.  On 18 March 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded another applicant company's constitutional appeal regarding a decision of the High Court to reject another applicant company's request to partially lift the seizure.\nApplication no. 7937/05 28.  In May and June 2002 the Prague II Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties in the amount of CZK 16,527,646 (EUR 584,724). 29.  On 20 August 2002 the High Prosecutor dismissed the applicant company's request of 23 July 2002 for the seizure to be partially lifted in order to enable it to pay this amount. 30.  At the applicant company's request the Customs Office postponed the time-limit for payment of the company's customs duties until 28 February 2003. 31.  On 20 September 2002 the applicant company again requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure in order to enable the company to pay the customs duties ordered in May and June 2002. Its request was, however, refused by the prosecutor on 23 October 2002. This decision was approved by the High Court on 11 December 2002. 32.  On 10 December 2002 and 10 February 2003, the High Prosecutor partly lifted the seizure covering the sum of CZK 16,527,645. The applicant company then discharged its customs debt. However, as it had not done so in time, the Customs Office ordered it to pay a penalty of CZK 232,423 (EUR 8,223). 33.  On 10 October 2002 the High Court dismissed the applicant company's appeal against the High Prosecutor's decision of 20 August 2002. 34.  On 16 December 2002 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal against the High Court's dismissal. 35.  At the invitation of the Constitutional Court the High Court submitted written observations, referring to the reasoning of its impugned decision. It expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. This submission was not communicated to the applicant company. 36.  The appeal was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court on 24 August 2004 (I. ÚS 723/02).\nApplication no. 25249/05 37.  On 4 November 2002 the Mladá Boleslav Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties in the amount of CZK 14,371,989 (EUR 508,460). 38.  On 12 and 29 November 2002 and 3 January 2003 respectively the Kladno Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties amounting to CZK 1,219,922 (EUR 43,159). 39.  On 12 November 2002 and 29 January 2003 the applicant company requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure in order to enable the company to pay its customs duties. 40.  On 25 March 2003 the High Prosecutor decided not to grant the company's requests. 41.  On 2 July 2003 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant company of 2 April 2003 challenging the High Prosecutor's refusal to lift the seizure. 42.  On 13 October 2003 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal alleging a violation of Article 4 of the Charter. 43.  Upon the invitation of the Constitutional Court the High Court and the High Prosecutor submitted written observations. They expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. These submissions were not communicated to the applicant company. 44.  On 15 December 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant company's constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded (I. ÚS 538/03).\nApplication no. 29402/05 45.  On 2 June 2003 the High Prosecutor decided not to grant the applicant company's request of 19 May 2003 to lift the seizure. 46.  On 20 August 2003 the High Court, upon the applicant company's appeal of 9 June 2003, upheld the prosecutor's refusal. 47.  On 11 November 2003 the applicant company introduced a constitutional appeal challenging the aforesaid decisions and alleging, inter alia, that its property rights continued to be limited contrary to the national law. 48.  At the invitation of the Constitutional Court, the High Court submitted written observations, referring to the reasoning of its impugned decision. It expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. This submission was not communicated to the applicant company. 49.  Its appeal was dismissed as unsubstantiated by the Constitutional Court on 9 February 2005 (IV. ÚS 585/03).\nApplication no. 33571/06 50.  On 25 May 2004 the applicant company requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure of its assets, maintaining in particular that it had discharged all its customs duties. 51.  On 16 December 2004 the prosecutor dismissed the request, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that the assets represented profit from the criminal activities of the accused manager. 52.  On 23 December 2004 the applicant company appealed to the High Court. 53.  On 21 February 2005 the High Court accepted in principle that prolonged seizure of assets could constitute a disproportionate interference with property rights, but did not find such a disproportionality in the applicant company's case and thus rejected its appeal. 54.  On 26 July 2005 the applicant company appealed to the Constitutional Court, complaining of excessive length of the seizure of its assets. 55.  Upon the invitation of the Constitutional Court, the High Court and the High Prosecutor submitted its written observations. The High Court proposed that the applicant's constitutional appeal be dismissed. The High Prosecutor informed in detail on several aspects of the criminal proceedings. He also addressed the issue of the length of the seizure by stressing the extent and complexity of the investigation and the need for foreign cooperation. He also proposed to dismiss the appeal. These submissions were communicated to the applicant company in September 2005. The applicant company reacted by sending a letter it had received from the Ministry of Finance which contained an assurance that all money held by the customs authorities would be returned to the applicant company. The letter also contained an apology from the Ministry for problems arising in the complex case of the applicant company. 56.  On 13 January 2006 the Constitutional Court again requested the High Prosecutor to inform it about the stage the investigation had reached and when it was expected to be finished. On 20 January 2006 the High Prosecutor submitted to the court a one-paragraph reply saying that almost all the sixteen States from whom assistance had been requested had responded and it was expected that they would send the required materials before April 2006. He further informed the court that he expected to conclude the investigation by mid-2006 and that it was highly likely that all the accused persons would be tried before a court. These submissions were not communicated to the applicant company. 57.  On 9 February 2006 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded (III. ÚS 394/05). It held that the seizure of the assets was still proportionate in view of the complexity of the investigation and in this context it considered important the assurance of the High Prosecutor that the investigation should be finished that year.\nSubsequent developments 58.  On 30 January 2008 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to property of a company, Benet Czech, spol. s r.o., which was in the same position as the applicant company. It held that the length of the seizure, over six years, was unreasonable, which thus disrupted the fair balance between the general interest of fighting serious crime and the protection of the rights of the applicant company. Consequently, the applicant company lodged another request for the seizure of its bank accounts to be lifted referring to this decision of the Constitutional Court. 59.  On 6 March 2008 the High Prosecutor lifted the seizure of the applicant company's bank accounts, holding that the conclusions of the Constitutional Court also applied to the applicant company.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1966 and 1977 respectively and live in Naberezhnye Chelny, Tatarstan. They are currently serving their respective sentences in correctional facility UE-148/5 in Sviyazhsk, Tatarstan. 6.  On 6 December 2000 Mr D.E., Mr Yu.D. and Mr R.I. were transporting a travel bag with a large sum of money belonging to their employer, Ms S.S., in a car owned by Mr V.G. At about midnight the car was stopped by four armed persons disguised as policemen. Two of them had portable radios. They robbed Mr D.E., Mr Yu.D. and Mr R.I. and beat them up before stealing the travel bag and some other items from the car and leaving.\n(a)  The applicants’ account 7.  In the evening of 7 December 2000 the applicants were in Mr R.’s flat together with Mr Sh. At around 10 p.m. the police entered and searched the flat. They found a travel bag with money and two portable radios. 8.  At 11 p.m. on 7 December 2000 the applicants, Mr Sh. and Mr R. were arrested on suspicion of robbery. The arrest was ordered by a prosecutor. The report on the applicants’ arrest was drawn up at 4 p.m. on 8 December 2000. 9.  Following his arrest, the first applicant was searched in the absence of a lawyer. The police found a wallet in his pocket with a list of towns and traffic police posts located near the road where the crime had been committed. 10.  On 8 December 2000 the second applicant was questioned by investigators in the absence of a lawyer. 11.  On 9 December 2000 the investigator ordered the first applicant’s placement in custody as a measure of restraint. On an unspecified date the same measure was applied to the second applicant. Later, the respective terms of the applicants’ pre-trial detention were extended several times by the prosecutor. 12.  When asked where he had got the money found in Mr R.’s flat, the first applicant explained that he had borrowed it from an acquaintance of his, Mr L. The second applicant said that he had borrowed the money from three persons: his sister, Mr M.A. and Mr I.P. 13.  The investigator questioned Mr L. The printed version of Mr L.’s statement read “I did not give [the first applicant] any money”. 14.  The second applicant’s sister confirmed her brother’s account of events when questioned by the investigator. Mr M.A. and Mr I.P. were not questioned. 15.  The first applicant told the investigator that at about 1 a.m. on 7 December 2000 he had bought some food in a night shop “M.” and requested that sales assistants from the shop be questioned. On 5 May 2001 the request was refused. 16.  The first applicant further requested the investigators to question Mr Yu.I., an employee of a petrol station who had allegedly seen him on the night of the crime. 17.  On unspecified dates Mr D.E., Mr Yu.D., Mr R.I., Mr V.G. and Ms S.S. were granted victim status and were questioned by the investigator. 18.  The applicants did not participate in any identification parade before the victims and did not confront them. 19.  The first applicant told the investigators that the list of towns seized from him during the search had been put into his pocket by a police officer, Mr T. The investigator ordered a graphology examination of the document. The expert report stated that one set of handwriting was identical to that of the first applicant. The first applicant insisted that the expert report had not attributed the handwriting to him. 20.  Two other witnesses, Mr G. and Mr Tr., apparently police officers, were questioned by the investigator. 21.  While in pre-trial detention, the first applicant received a handwritten note allegedly containing threats. He believed that the note had been written by one of his co-accused, Mr Sh. 22.  Upon completion of the investigation the applicants were allowed to study the case file. 23.  On 5 July 2001 the prosecutor drew up a bill of indictment charging Mr R., Mr Sh. and the applicants with aggravated robbery with violence, destruction of property, illegal possession of arms, possession of drugs and theft of official documents. The case file was transmitted to the court.\n(b)  Information submitted by the Government 24.  Following their arrest, the first and second applicants were questioned as suspects on 8 and 9 December 2000 respectively. Neither of them confessed to any crimes. 25.  On 14 December 2000 criminal charges were brought against the second applicant; on the same date he had been questioned as an accused in the presence of counsel, Mr V.T. The second applicant made no statements referring to his right to remain silent. 26.  On 14 or 15 December 2000 the first applicant was officially charged and questioned as an accused in the presence of officially assigned counsel, Mr O.P. The first applicant informed the investigators that he wanted to retain Mr M.; the latter was notified of the first applicant’s request. 27.  On 21 December 2000 the investigators questioned Mr Yu.I. He said that he could not remember which cars had been refuelled at the station on the night of 6 to 7 December 2000. 28.  At some point the second applicant informed the investigators that he wanted to retain Mr A. as counsel. Mr A was then notified of the request. 29.  On 23 March 2001 the applicants were visited by their relatives and asked them to retain Mr M. and Mr. A. as counsel. 30.  At some point the first applicant informed the investigators that, since Mr M. had not visited him, he wanted to retain Mr A. He rejected assistance offered by other lawyers. On 24 March 2001 the first applicant’s mother, Mr M. and Mr A. were notified of his intention. On an unspecified date the head of the Advocates Office informed the investigators that the first applicant had signed no contracts for legal representation with either Mr M. or Mr A. On 3 April 2001 the investigator dismissed the first applicant’s request to retain Mr M. and Mr A. on the ground that he had not registered their appointment with the Advocates Office. 31.  On 2 April 2001 both applicants were charged with another offence in the presence of Mr O.P., Mr V.T. and Mr A. They refused to make any statements and stated that they did not need the lawyers’ assistance. The applicants studied the case file separately from Mr P. and Mr V.T. 32.  On 5 May 2001 the investigator refused a request for additional questioning of Mr Yu.I. 33.  On 17 July 2001 the trial against the applicants and their two co-accused commenced in the Leninskiy District Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya (“the trial court”). 34.  According to the first applicant, on 17 July 2001 he challenged Mr O.P. as counsel because he had seen the lawyer’s last name appear as the name of a police officer in a search report drawn up in respect of one of the first applicant’s co-accused. On 24 July 2001 Mr O.P. was not present at the hearing. 35.  According to the Government, on an unspecified date the second applicant stated that he did not wish to have Mr V.T. as counsel and asked to retain Mr A. Between 18 October and 8 December 2001 he was represented by Mr V.T. The trial court asked the first applicant whether he wished to appoint another lawyer, Mr I., as his counsel; the first applicant submitted that he did not need any assistance from lawyers. On 19 September and 21 October 2001 the first applicant again submitted that he needed no lawyers; he did not allege that his decision to defend himself had been motivated by any financial difficulties.\ni.  Victims’ and witnesses’ statements 36.  On 17 July 2001 the first applicant requested the trial court to summon Mr Yu.I. and the sales assistants from the night shop “M.” who could confirm his alibi. The trial court agreed to summon Mr Yu.I. but refused to summon the sales assistants because their personal particulars were unknown. 37.  On 17 July 2001 the trial court summoned the five victims to attend the hearing scheduled on 24 July 2001. 38.  By letter of 18 September 2001 the victims informed the trial court that they refused to attend the hearing. Mr D.E., Mr Yu.D., Mr V.G. and Ms S.S. explained that they did so in the interests of their own security and that of their families. Mr R.I. said that he could not be absent from work as there was no one to replace him. All the victims also confirmed their pre-trial depositions and requested them to be read out at the trial in their absence. 39.  On 24 September 2001 the trial court summoned the five victims of the crime to attend the hearing scheduled on 8 October 2001. 40.  On 5 October 2001 Mr D.E., Mr Yu.D., Mr R.I., Mr V.G. and Ms S.S. sent the trial court a letter identical to that of 18 September 2001. 41.  On 26 October 2001 the trial court asked the parties if they had any objections to the reading out of the victims’ pre-trial statements. The defence objected, while the prosecution proposed to grant the victims’ request. The trial court found that the victims had not appeared at the hearing for a valid reason; that measures to ensure their attendance had been repeatedly taken; and that the victims had notified the trial court of their absence in advance. The victims’ pre-trial statements were read out. 42.  On 11 October 2001 the first applicant requested the trial court to summon Mr L. in order to clarify one point in his statement. The record of Mr L.’s pre-trial statement had been visibly corrected in pencil to the effect that the printed words “I did not give him any money” were replaced by “I have already given him the money”, which reversed the sense of the statement. The trial court granted the request. Mr L. failed to attend the hearing. According to the applicants, the trial court noted that the latter had been busy at work and asked each co-accused and their lawyers whether there were any objections to the reading out of Mr L.’s pre-trial statement. The first applicant objected. The court did not read out the statement but noted that the applicants themselves had made the correction while studying the case file. 43.  On an unspecified date the court granted a request by the first applicant to summon Mr Yu.I. The latter’s mother informed the trial court by telephone that her son had left home and that his whereabouts were unknown. 44.  Mr R.’s lawyer requested the trial court to summon Mr K., a prosecution witness who had been in Mr R.’s flat on the night of the events and who had stated that he had seen two unknown persons. The trial court noted that it was impossible to establish Mr K.’s whereabouts. 45.  On 26 October 2001 the trial court ruled on whether the statements of the absent witnesses should be read out. According to the Government, the defence raised no objections to the reading out of the pre-trial statements of Mr Yu.I., Mr K. and Mr L. According to the applicants, the defence objected to the reading out of the statements of Mr K. and Mr L. The record of the trial contained a note “No objections”. The printed wording of Mr L.’s statement and the statements by Mr Yu.I and Mr K. were read out. 46.  The trial court questioned the investigator who had dealt with the applicants’ case. He said that he had heard Mr L. saying that he had not given any money to the first applicant. 47.  The first applicant requested to summon Mr T., the police officer who had allegedly put the seized list of towns in his pocket. The court refused the request on the ground that Mr T. was on a business trip. Later, Mr T. appeared before the court and stated that an unidentified police officer had found the list of towns in the first applicant’s pocket. 48.  Mr R. testified against the second applicant in court in respect of the charge of illegal possession of arms. 49.  The second applicant requested to summon Mr I.P., who had allegedly lent him part of the money that the police had found in Mr R.’s flat. According to the second applicant, the court refused to do so because Mr I.P. had left Chuvashiya; the second applicant submitted that the investigators and the court had been aware of Mr I.P.’s whereabouts. The Government submitted that the court had summoned Mr I.P. but he had failed to appear at the hearing. 50.  The trial court granted a request by the second applicant to summon another defence witness, Mr M.A. The latter did not attend the hearing. 51.  On an unspecified date the court dismissed the first applicant’s request to summon the sales assistants who could allegedly confirm his alibi on the ground that they could not remember the first applicant because almost a year had elapsed between December 2000 and October 2001. 52.  The second applicant requested to summon officers of the traffic police squad who had been on duty at the police post near the crime scene on 6 December 2000. He submitted that the squad should have registered all cars passing by the police post and the fact that his car had not been seen by the police could have confirmed his alibi. On an unspecified date the court dismissed the request on the ground that the policemen could not remember all the cars they had seen that night. 53.  The court read out the pre-trial statement by the second applicant’s sister confirming that she had given her brother the money. 54.  The statements of two prosecution witnesses, Mr G. and Mr Tr., were not read out at the hearing; the trial court did not take them into consideration.\nii.  The applicants’ statements 55.  On 18 October 2001 the first applicant requested the trial court to declare the record of his pre-trial questioning inadmissible evidence on the ground that he had been questioned in the absence of a lawyer. He alleged that he had made a self-incriminating statement under police pressure. According to the first applicant, the trial court delivered no ruling in this respect and read out the pre-trial statement. 56.  The second applicant testified at the trial. As his testimony differed from his pre-trial statement, the court decided to read out the latter.\niii.  The applicants’ interlocutory applications and requests 57.  The first applicant challenged the stipendiary judge and the lay judges. He submitted that the bill of indictment had been based on inadmissible evidence. On 11 October 2001 the trial court dismissed the challenge as unsubstantiated. 58.  Requests by the first applicant to order an additional graphology examination of the list of towns seized from him and a graphology examination of the threatening note presumably written by Mr Sh. were dismissed. 59.  Both applicants challenged the court’s secretary, claiming that she had erred when drafting the record of the trial. The challenge was dismissed on 29 October 2001 as unsubstantiated. 60.  The trial court dismissed a request by the applicants to organise a reconstruction of the events. 61.  Certain items of physical evidence collected by the investigation were not presented at the trial. The trial court read out the expert’s report of his examination of the said items drawn up at the pre-trial stage. The first applicant requested to summon the expert who had drawn up the report. The request was dismissed.\niv.  The applicants’ conviction 62.  On 8 November 2001 the trial court found the first applicant guilty of robbery with violence and the second applicant of robbery with violence and illegal possession of firearms and sentenced each of them to nine years’ imprisonment. The applicants were acquitted of the other charges. 63.  The trial court found that the applicants’ guilt was confirmed by the statements of all the victims, the prosecution witnesses – that is, the investigator, Mr T., Mr K. and Mr L. – and in particular by the statement of Mr L. that he had not given any money to the first applicant, and other items of evidence, including the list of towns seized from the first applicant and two portable radios belonging to the applicants. The trial court further found that no credit could be given to the statement of the second applicant’s sister because she had only been trying to help her brother. 64.  When enumerating the pieces of evidence in the judgment, the trial court summarised the second applicant’s pre-trial statement as follows: “[the second applicant] had 100,000 roubles’ worth of money. They had no portable radio transmitters. Mr Polufakin and [the second applicant] each kept the money in their plastic bags.” It did not expressly rely on that statement to prove the second applicant’s guilt. 65.  On 17 November 2001 the second applicant sent his comments on the record of the trial to the trial court. He noted, in particular, that it was recorded on page 71 that there had been no objections to reading out the witnesses’ pre-trial statements despite the fact that he had objected and had requested that the witnesses’ reasons for their absence be stated. 66.  On 21 November 2001 the trial court agreed to amend the record of trial in accordance with some of the second applicant’s comments. Numerous comments, including the one concerning page 71, were rejected.\n(b)  The second-instance proceedings 67.  The applicants appealed to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya (“the appeal court”) against the first-instance judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that the victims and the prosecution witnesses had not been questioned at the trial and that certain points of the victims’ and witnesses’ pre-trial statements had not been clarified. They further alleged that the trial court had relied on inadmissible evidence and that the expert examination report of the physical evidence had been expressed with a certain degree of probability. The first applicant complained about the trial court’s refusal to conduct an additional graphology examination of the list of towns but did not expressly raise an issue of inadmissibility as evidence with regard to this item. 68.  The second applicant’s lawyer, Mr A.T., was absent at the appeal hearing. According to the second applicant, his request to adjourn the hearing due to the lawyer’s absence was dismissed by the court. According to the Government, Mr A.T. was duly informed of the date of the appeal hearing but failed to attend it. The second applicant did not request to postpone the hearing due to his lawyer’s absence. The appeal court studied Mr A.T.’s points of appeal. The first applicant defended himself before the appeal court. 69.  On 8 January 2002 the appeal court upheld the judgment of 8 November 2001. It stated, inter alia, that the applicants’ guilt had been proven by the victims’ pre-trial statements and other evidence, and that the guilt of the first applicant had also been proven by the list of towns found in his wallet. The appeal court further noted that the trial court had taken measures to secure the victims’ and witnesses’ presence and that their statements had been read out in accordance with domestic law.\n(c)  The applicants’ further requests 70.  The trial court dismissed requests by the applicants for access to the case file on 15 and 21 November 2001. 71.  Requests by the applicants for supervisory review were dismissed by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chuvashiya on 3 and 14 March 2003 and by the Supreme Court of Russia on 14 November 2003 and 15 March 2004. 72.  The applicants also complained to the Ombudsman of the Russian Federation, but to no avail. 73.  Between 8 and 18 December 2000 the applicants were kept in the temporary detention centre of Cheboksary. The conditions of detention there were poor. In particular, the first applicant’s cell, located in the basement, was not equipped with a lavatory pan; there was no running water; and the temperature was below 10º Celsius. 74.  Between 18 December 2000 and 24 January 2002 the applicants were kept in the remand prison of Cheboksary. The first applicant’s cell was overcrowded and scantily equipped. On his arrival at the remand prison the first applicant underwent blood tests that revealed no infection with hepatitis C. 75.  Between 24 January and 16 February and 19 May and 4 June 2002, the first applicant was kept in remand prison IZ-16/2, Kazan. The second applicant was kept there between 24 January and 22 February 2002. Their cells were overcrowded. 76.  Between 17 and 23 February and 17 and 18 May 2002, the first applicant was kept in remand prison IZ-66/1, Ekaterinburg. At some point he shared a cell with some eighty inmates. 77.  Between 26 February and 4 March 2002 the first applicant was kept in remand prison IZ-24/1, Krasnoyarsk. His cell was overcrowded. On 28 February 2002 the first applicant complained in writing to the head of the Federal Penitentiary Service (Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний, ФСИН – hereinafter “the FSIN”) of the Krasnoyarsk Region of the poor conditions of his detention; of the fact of his transfer to Siberia; and of unlawful acts by the convoying officers that had escorted him. He also requested that he be placed in an infirmary and provided with an inhalator. He received no reply to his complaint. 78.  Between 5 and 7 March and 14 and 26 April 2002, the first applicant was kept in the transit area of detention facility U-235/15, the Krasnoyarsk Region. On 5 March 2002 he complained to the head of the FSIN of the Krasnoyarsk Region of the poor conditions of detention. He received no formal reply, but was interviewed by the head of the transit area. 79.  Between 7 March and 14 April 2002 the first applicant was kept in Central Hospital No. 2, the Krasnoyarsk Region, in satisfactory conditions. While in hospital, he underwent blood tests that revealed no infection with hepatitis C. 80.  Between 27 April and 16 May 2002 the first applicant was kept in remand prison IZ-55/1, Omsk. He shared a cell with eighteen inmates. The windows in the cell were covered with iron sheets.\n(b)  The Government’s account 81.  Between 24 January and 16 February and 19 May and 4 June 2002, the first applicant was kept in remand prison IZ-16/2, Kazan. The cells were properly equipped. Inmates had an opportunity to use sanitary installations when necessary and could wash in a bath-house once a week. 82.  The first applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-66/1, Ekaterinburg, between 18 and 23 February 2002. His cell measured 35 sq. m and held nine inmates together with the first applicant. He was also kept in that facility from 17 to 18 May 2002 in a cell which measured 17 sq. m and held thirteen inmates. 83.  Between 26 February and 4 March 2002 the first applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-24/1, Krasnoyarsk. His cell measured 45 sq. m and was equipped with twenty-six beds. At the material time it held twenty-two inmates. The first applicant made no complaints concerning the conditions of his detention to employees of the prosecutor’s office of the Krasnoyarsk Region who regularly visited IZ-24/1. 84.  Between 5 and 7 March and 14 and 26 April 2002, the first applicant was kept in the transit area of correctional facility U-235/15, the Krasnoyarsk Region. He was kept in a cell measuring 50 sq. m. No more than fourteen other inmates were kept there at the same time as the first applicant. 85.  Between 7 March and 14 April 2002 the first applicant was kept in Central Hospital No. 2 of the Main Department of the FSIN of the Krasnoyarsk Region. He underwent a medical check-up. As a result, he was diagnosed with post-traumatic arthritis of the left knee and considered unfit to serve the sentence in the penitentiaries of the Krasnoyarsk Region. 86.  Between 27 April and 16 May 2002 the first applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-55/1, Omsk. He shared a cell, which was designed for four persons, with three inmates. 87.  On an unspecified date it was decided that the first applicant should be transferred from Kazan to the Krasnoyarsk Region to serve his sentence. 88.  At the Kazan railway station the first applicant and twelve to fifteen other detainees were placed in a special carriage for detainees in a compartment designed for eight persons. As there was not enough space, the convoying officers used force when placing the detainees in the compartments. 89.  The conditions of transportation were extremely poor: the first applicant and other detainees were underfed during the journey; before leaving remand prison IZ-66/1, Ekaterinburg, the first applicant had received three loaves of bread from the authorities and was not given any other food for the next three days of transportation by rail. 90.  At various railway stations detainees were escorted by different groups of convoying officers. When loading detainees onto trains at railway stations, members of each convoying group used similar practices. In particular, once at a railway station detainees were forced to squat with their heads down. Then the convoying officers ordered them to rise, with their heads still down, and to run forward in the direction of their carriages. Detainees carried their heavy bags in their outstretched arms. Each detainee had to link arms with another. The convoying officers beat those who did not obey.\n(b)  The Government’s account 91.  On 16 February 2002 the first applicant was convoyed to Kazan railway station and put on a train to Ekaterinburg. He shared a compartment with five other detainees. On 17 February 2002 the train arrived at Ekaterinburg railway station. The first applicant did not complain to servicemen of the FSIN of the Sverdlovsk Region of the conditions of his transportation. 92.  On 23 February 2002 the administration of remand prison IZ-66/1 provided the first applicant with a seventy-two hour ration. Then the first applicant was put on a train to Krasnoyarsk. He was placed in a big compartment together with eleven other detainees; the convoying officers did not use force against him. The journey lasted fifty-five hours and fifty-one minutes. On 26 February 2002 the first applicant arrived in Krasnoyarsk. He made no complaints concerning the conditions of his transportation. 93.  On 4 March 2002 the administration of remand prison IZ-24/1 provided the first applicant with a twenty-four hour ration and sent him to Krasnoyarsk railway station. The first applicant was put on a train and placed in a big compartment that he shared with nine other detainees. The convoying officers respected the detainees and did not use force against them. On 5 March 2002 the train arrived at Reshoty railway station, the Krasnoyarsk Region. The first applicant did not complain of the conditions of transportation or of ill-treatment to the convoying officers. 94.  On 26 April 2002 at Reshoty railway station the first applicant was put on a train to Omsk. He shared a big compartment with ten other detainees. The carriage was properly equipped. 95.  On 16 May 2002 in Omsk the first applicant was placed on a train to Ekaterinburg. He shared a compartment with ten other detainees. No force was used against him. He did not complain of the convoying officers’s actions. 96.  On 18 May 2002 in Ekaterinburg the first applicant was put on a train and placed in a compartment together with five other detainees. On 19 May 2002 the first applicant arrived in Kazan. He did not complain of the convoying officers’ actions. 97.  On 4 June 2002 the first applicant was transferred to correctional facility UE-148/5 in Sviyazhsk, the Tatarstan Republic.\n(a)  The first applicant’s account 98.  The correctional facility was overcrowded as 2,300 inmates were detained in premises built for 1,000 persons. In summer there was no hot water. Once a week inmates, who were divided into groups of 250, were allowed to wash in a bath-house equipped with only six working showers. Each group was limited to two hours in the bath-house. 99.  The UE-148/5 infirmary lacked the medicines that the first applicant needed because of his asthma; the catering was very poor; and the food lacked vitamins. 100.  The prison authorities occasionally lost the detainees’ documents and did not allow the inmates to make copies of their respective case files, thus precluding them from complaining to the competent authorities. 101.  On 6 December 2002 the acting head of UE-148/5 punished the first applicant by placing him in a disciplinary cell. The first applicant complained to the court of unlawful actions by an official. His complaint was dismissed by a final decision of 18 December 2003. 102.  In March 2006 the first applicant learned that on 10 June 2002 he had been diagnosed with hepatitis C. 103.  In his observations of 10 November 2006 the first applicant submitted that 1,700 detainees had been in UE-148/5 at that time.\n(b)  The Government’s account 104.  Detainees kept in UE-148/5, the strict-regime correctional facility, lived in residence halls. They could stay inside the halls during certain hours and spent the rest of their time in other premises, such as production units. 105.  On 9 June 2002 the first applicant was allocated an individual sleeping place in the residential hall of brigade no. 7. His cell measured 90 sq.m and accommodated forty-four inmates, which allowed 2.04 sq.m of space per person. 106.  On 7 April 2003 the first applicant was transferred to the residential hall of brigade no. 16 and allocated an individual sleeping place. His cell measured 35 sq.m and accommodated seventeen inmates, which allowed 2.06 sq.m of space per person. 107.  On 5 September 2003 the first applicant was returned to the residence hall of brigade no. 7 and allocated an individual sleeping place. He shared a cell measuring 90 sq.m with forty-one inmates. Each inmate was allocated 2.14 sq.m of space. 108.  On 15 April 2004 the first applicant was transferred to the residential hall of brigade no. 8 and allocated an individual sleeping place. His cell measured 90 sq.m and accommodated forty inmates. Each inmate was allocated 2.25 sq.m of space. 109.  The sanitary facilities of the three residence halls were properly equipped as required by domestic law. In particular, the residence hall of brigade no. 8 comprised three dormitories, with 130 beds in total. It was equipped with a washroom measuring 25 sq.m, in which there were five showers, a mirror, a shelf, a urinal and a foot bath. 110.  There was a properly equipped bath house in UE-148/5 where detainees could wash once a week in accordance with a schedule. 111.  There were five wash basins with cold and hot water taps in every residence hall. While inside the residence halls, detainees could use the wash-basins and lavatory pans when necessary. The production units were equipped with sanitary facilities and wash basins. 112.  The nutrition that detainees received in UE-148/5 corresponded to the norms established by law. UE-148/5 had been fully supplied with food while the first applicant was detained there. The UE-148/5 administration duly controlled the quality of the food. 113.  While in UE-148/5 the first applicant was under constant medical supervision. He underwent regular medical check-ups and received the requisite treatment when necessary. 114.  The first applicant was not detained with those suffering from tuberculosis and hepatitis. Detainees who had earlier suffered from tuberculosis and carriers of the hepatitis virus were under preventive monitoring, but were not contagious. 115.  On 10 June 2002 the first applicant underwent blood tests that revealed that he had been a carrier of the hepatitis C virus. The first applicant showed no clinical signs of hepatitis. 116.  The second applicant suffered from chronic hepatitis B and C. According to the medical certificate issued by the Town Outpatient Polyclinic of Naberezhnye Chelny on 24 April 2003, the second applicant needed a specific diet, vitamins and hepatoprotective medicines. He was also recommended constant medical supervision. 117.  On 13 October 2003 the second applicant received two NO-SPA tablets in the UE-148/2 infirmary. 118.  On 15 January 2006 the second applicant was transferred to the prison hospital of the FSIN of Tatarstan. While being transported by rail he lost consciousness. The convoying officers had no medicines to help him to recover his senses. On the same date he was admitted to the prison hospital. 119.  Between 15 January and 14 February 2006 the second applicant was kept in ward no. 2 of the prison hospital. The ward had only one small window measuring 20 x 20 cm and lacked fresh air and natural light. During that period the second applicant was treated with a glucose solution and Carsil, a hepatoptotective medicine. 120.  While in the hospital, the second applicant complained in writing to a district prosecutor’s office of a lack of medicines and qualified medical assistance in the prison hospital. 121.  On 15 February 2006 the second applicant was transferred to ward no. 4, which had bigger windows. He learned that his inmates were HIV-positive. 122.  The second applicant was treated with medicines which his brother had bought on the doctors’ recommendation, including hepatoprotective medications Heptral and Essenciale. He was losing weight despite keeping to the prescribed diet. 123.  By letter of 24 August 2006 the doctor of the prison hospital informed the second applicant’s lawyer that some medicines administered to the second applicant had been purchased by his relatives. She also said that it could not be established whether the second applicant needed anti-viral therapy as he had been discharged from the prison hospital and noted, further, that such therapy was to be administered only after a complex examination that could not be carried out in penitentiary institutions.\n(b)  The Government’s account 124.  In 1995 the second applicant was registered at the Outpatient Polyclinic no. 4 of Naberezhnye Chelny, Tatarstan, as suffering from chronic viral hepatitis B and C with a high degree of replication activity. 125.  While in detention, the second applicant regularly underwent medical check-ups and chest X-rays that revealed no clinical evidence of tuberculosis. There was no clinical evidence confirming that he suffered from cirrhosis. 126.  On 21 February 2001 the second applicant received treatment for a respiratory viral infection. In August and November 2001 he was treated for neurodermatitis. He had no traumas or bodily injuries. 127.  On 19 December 2005 the second applicant was placed in the UE-148/5 infirmary and diagnosed with advanced chronic viral hepatitis C. He was treated, in particular, with Heptral and Essenciale. On 13 January 2006 he was discharged from the UE-148/5 infirmary. 128.  On 15 January 2006 the second applicant was admitted to the prison hospital of the FSIN of Tatarstan and diagnosed with active chronic viral hepatitis C with cholestatic syndrome and impaired cytolic response, and with moderate liver dysfunction. He received adequate treatment, but did not keep to the prescribed diet. 129.  On 21 March 2006 the second applicant’s state of health was described as stable. 130.  On 29 March 2006 the second applicant was discharged from the hospital and transferred to UE-148/5.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1978. She is from Baghdad and is of Mandaean denomination. She was once married, but divorced her husband in 1999, after which she lived with their son, born in 1998, in Iraq while her former husband moved to the United States. 8.  The applicant arrived in Sweden on 27 August 2007 and applied for a residence permit the following day and for asylum on 21 January 2008. She stated that she and her son had left Iraq on 25 July 2007 and had then stayed with relatives in Amman, Jordan, for a month. In Amman she had left behind her son, because she had not been able to afford his trip. Later, her former husband had come to Jordan and brought the son back with him to the United States. To the Swedish authorities the applicant submitted an Iraqi citizenship certificate, an identity card, divorce documents and a membership card for Mandaeans regarding her and her son. 9.  Assisted by legal counsel, the applicant stated in essence the following in support of her application. Her main reason for leaving Iraq was the generally insecure situation for Mandaeans in Iraq, which had affected her and her family personally. Her fears had led to her son going to school only sporadically during the past year. Moreover, at the beginning of June 2007 her mother had received a threatening phone call from someone who had wanted to contact the applicant, presumably to forcibly remarry her with another man. If they did not comply, the applicant understood that her family would have to leave the neighbourhood. They had taken the threats very seriously and she had moved immediately with her son to her grandmother’s house in the al-Dora neighbourhood of Baghdad, where they had stayed for a month. The applicant further stated that her only remaining relative in Iraq was her mother. 10.  On 31 October 2008 the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) rejected the application and ordered the applicant’s deportation to Iraq. The Board held that she had not proved her identity, but that she had made it plausible that she was from Iraq. It further considered that the situation in Iraq as such did not constitute grounds for asylum. While noting that Mandaeans were an exposed minority, their general situation did not suffice either for an individual be granted protection, but his or her personal circumstances would have to be assessed. The Board went on to state that the applicant had not submitted any written evidence in support of her allegations of persecution. Furthermore, she had received a threat on only one occasion and it had not been shown that the person threatening her had referred to her religious beliefs. Nor was there any other indication that she had been ill-treated on account of those beliefs or that she had received other threats before leaving Iraq. The Board then noted that the applicant’s brother, who had also applied for asylum in Sweden, had had his application rejected and his deportation to Iraq ordered and that, consequently, the applicant would likely not lack a male network upon return to Iraq. In conclusion, the Board found that she had not made it probable that she was at personal risk of being subjected to serious ill-treatment if she returned to Iraq. 11.  The applicant’s brother, who had arrived in Sweden on 18 December 2007, had his application for a residence permit rejected by the Migration Board on 2 October 2008. 12.  The applicant appealed, adding the following to her story. Mandaeans, being the smallest and most vulnerable minority in Iraq, were subjected to extortion, kidnappings and murder. Mandaean women and children had been forced to convert to Islam, often after having been assaulted and raped. The Mandaeans were not a large enough community to be able to protect and support each other and there was no particular region where they could settle safely. This was enough to show that she was in need of protection. The applicant asserted that the threat against her had to be seen against this background. Her whole existence had been marked by the threatening atmosphere and demands directed at non-Muslim women and in particular the Mandaeans. Her situation had been further aggravated by the fact that she is a single woman without a social network in Iraq. Her mother had had the intention of leaving the country as well, but the applicant had no information on her whereabouts. Furthermore, in Sweden the applicant had met a Muslim man from Iraq together with whom she now lived. This situation would never be accepted in Iraq. Also, when she had talked about her new relationship in Sweden, her family had reacted very negatively and had virtually frozen her out. 13.  On 14 December 2009 the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen) upheld the decision of the Board. The court acknowledged the difficult situation for Mandaeans in Iraq and stated that, consequently, a lower threshold was applied in assessing the individual risks than in Iraqi cases in general. The general situation for Mandaeans did not suffice of itself to be granted protection, however; an assessment of the applicant’s individual circumstances was necessary. In the absence of written evidence, the court went on to examine the statements made by the applicant. It considered that the threat received concerning forced marriage was primarily related to the general security situation in Iraq at the time. In the two years since the applicant had left the country, the security situation had improved. While the Mandaeans remained disadvantaged, there was no sign that she was still being searched for in Iraq. Nor was there anything to indicate that her mother’s possible exile had been caused by continued threats. The court further found that the negative reaction of the applicant’s family to her new relationship did not imply a need of protection. In that connection, it further noted that the asylum appeal lodged by her brother, who had not turned his back on her, had been rejected on the same day. Thus, she could return to Iraq with him and thereby have a social network in the country. 14.  On 16 February 2010 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrations-överdomstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal. On 25 February 2010 it refused leave to appeal also in the applicant’s brother’s case. 15.  Subsequently, the applicant, as well as her brother, claimed that there were impediments to the enforcement of their deportation orders. Their petition mainly concerned the brother’s period of active duty in the Iraqi army, during which he had gained knowledge of important people in the army and their illegal actions. This knowledge would put both the applicant and her brother at risk if they were returned. The applicant further claimed that her mother had been kidnapped. 16.  On 8 May 2010 the Migration Board rejected the petition, finding that no new circumstances justifying a reconsideration had been presented. It considered that the claims made in relation to the brother did not in any way show that there were threats against him or the applicant. The allegation that the mother had been kidnapped was actually new, but it was unclear when this incident was supposed to have happened and there was nothing to conclude that the possible kidnapping had any personal connection to the situation of the applicant and her brother. The applicant did not appeal against the Board’s decision. 17.  On 23 August 2010 the applicant submitted a letter to the Migration Board, which was perceived by the Board as a new petition for reconsideration. The applicant stated that, if she were forced to return to Iraq, she would have to do so without her current partner or her brother, who were both in Sweden. Her partner had been issued a visa to Syria, as he was born in Damascus, and could not return to Iraq. Consequently, they would be separated, because she could not travel to Syria since she lacked a passport and would not be granted a visa. The applicant further asserted that she had no relatives in Iraq. 18.  On 25 August 2010 the Migration Board decided not to reconsider the case. Although the fact that the applicant’s partner had been granted a visa to Syria was considered to be new, the Board stated that this fact did not constitute a lasting impediment to the enforcement of the deportation order. The applicant did not appeal against the Board’s decision. 19.  The respondent Government have submitted the following notes to the Court, taken from the files of the Migration Board. The applicant’s mother was living with relatives and friends in Baghdad. When the applicant left Iraq, her grandmother and cousins were living in the al-Dora neighbourhood of Baghdad. In Sweden, the applicant has been living in the same flat as her brother and her partner from October 2009 onwards. Her partner left Sweden in October 2010 to be reunited with his family in Syria, whereas her brother is still in Sweden. Furthermore, in reply to the Government’s request for information in the case, the Migration Board had stated that it was likely that the applicant had a large number of relatives left in Baghdad. 20.  The applicant has given the following additional account to the Court. Following her divorce in 1999, she went to live with her parents and her brother. Her father, under whose protection she was living, died in 2005. Her grandmother, with whom she had briefly lived after the threatening telephone call, died in 2008. To her knowledge, she has no relatives left in Iraq, cousins or others. Several relatives are living abroad, in Sweden, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain and Canada. Her sister is living in Denmark. After the applicant and her brother had left Iraq, their mother went to live with a Christian family in Baghdad, from whom she rented a room. In the beginning of 2010, the applicant and her brother received information about their mother’s disappearance. The family with whom the mother had lived called the applicant’s uncle in Sweden and said that they did not think that she had left voluntarily. A police report, sent to the uncle only in 2012, states that the report was filed on 7 June 2011 by the mother’s landlord, who had told the police that the mother had been missing since 5 December 2010. The applicant does not know why the landlord did not file a report earlier or why he did not state that her mother had been missing for several months before December 2010. The applicant is still unaware of what has happened to her mother following her disappearance. However, given the time that has passed without any contact with her, she assumes that she is dead. The applicant is still in a relationship with the man she met in Sweden, although he is now living in Syria. The people who disowned her because of that relationship were her relatives in Sweden, with the exception of her brother. The brother married a relative, who is a Swedish citizen, on 27 May 2012. He left Sweden and applied at the Embassy in Tehran for a Swedish residence permit based on his marriage. By a decision of 5 November 2013 the Migration Board granted him a residence permit until 5 November 2015.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Berlin. He studied educational science and aircraft engineering and piloting in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). From 1969 until 1990 he worked for the GDR airline Interflug. 5.  On 4 December 2000 he applied for the transfer of alleged future pension rights under one of the additional pension schemes for certain professions or groups (Zusatzversorgungssysteme). On 20 February 2002 the applicant's request was dismissed. His subsequent administrative appeal, submitted on 13 March 2002, was rejected on 26 July 2002. 6.  On 30 August 2002 he brought an action in the Social Court, which, following a hearing on 20 January 2003, dismissed the action, finding that the applicant did not qualify for any of the additional pension schemes. The judgment was served on the applicant on 20 February 2003. On 18 March 2003 he appealed the judgment. 7.  On 18 June 2003 the Federal Social Court rendered a decision concerning a similar subject-matter, which was consistent with the Social Court's decision in the instant case. On 28 August 2003 the Social Court of Appeal advised the parties of the Federal Social Court's decision and classified the case as ready for decision. 8.  During the course of the appeal proceedings the applicant's representative declared that he was seeking fundamental clarification of the subject-matter before the Federal Constitutional Court. The Social Court of Appeal therefore awaited a decision of that court. 9.  On 24 April 2006 the judge rapporteur enquired whether the appeal was to continue after the Federal Constitutional Court on 1 March 2006 (file no. 1 BvR 320/06) had declined to admit for examination a constitutional complaint in a similar case. 10.  On 8 May 2006 the applicant's representative announced that he would submit further observations until 30 June 2006. After a reminder of the Social Court of Appeal on 15 August 2006 these observations were submitted on 20 December 2006. 11.  On 16 February 2007 the Social Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and refused to grant leave to appeal on points of law. On 15 March 2007 the judgment was served on the applicant's representative. 12.  Within the statutory time limit the applicant's representative objected to the refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law and reasoned the objection on 15 June 2007. On 22 January 2008 the Federal Social Court dismissed the objection as inadmissible. This decision was served on the applicant's representative on 1 February 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Syrotyne, Ukraine. 5.  The applicant worked at “Obyednannya Azot” (Сєверодонецьке державне виробниче підприємство «Об’єднання Азот»), a State chemical company, from 1978. According to the applicant, in December 2000 – January 2001 he was diagnosed as having chronic lymphocytic leukaemia (хронічний лімфолейкоз), a blood cancer. On 26 June 2001 the diagnosis was reaffirmed by a medical expert and he was recognised as having a work-related illness. 6.  In June 2001 the applicant was dismissed because of his absence from work. The applicant alleged that the real reason for his dismissal was his attempts to establish a casual link between his illness and work. 7.  In July 2001 an internal investigation relating to the applicant’s illness was held. A report of 16 July 2001 revealed a number of shortcomings on the part of the employer, including a disregard for minimum work safety conditions, which had led to the applicant’s illness. 8.  The applicant is now in the final stages of the disease. 9.  In January 2002 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Severodonetsk Town Court against “Obyednannya Azot” challenging the reason for his dismissal and seeking compensation for his work-related illness. 10.  Shortly after that, on 31 January 2002, the local department of the State Social Security Fund (Сєверодонецьке відділення виконавчої дирекції Фонду соціального страхування від нещасних випадків на виробництві і професійних захворювань) was joined to the applicant’s case as a co-defendant. 11.  On 2 April 2002 the court split the dismissal claim against “Obyednannya Azot” and the compensation claim against “Obyednannya Azot” and the State Social Security Fund (the “Fund”) into two separate sets of proceedings. 12.  On 29 May 2002 the court stayed the compensation proceedings pending the determination of the dismissal proceedings. 13.  On 23 December 2004 the Severodonetsk Town Court discontinued the dismissal proceedings as “Obyednannya Azot” and the applicant had reached a settlement. 14.  On 28 March 2005 the court went on to examine the compensation claim. 15.  On 20 July 2005 and 15 August 2006 the court ordered forensic medical and psychiatric examinations. 16.  According to the applicant, on 19 January 2007, in order to expedite examination of his case, he was required to relodge his claim against the Fund for compensation for his work-related illness in administrative proceedings (see paragraph 23 et seq.). He also requested the court to discontinue examination of his claim against the Fund in civil proceedings. At the same time, he made a fresh claim against “Obyednannya Azot”, seeking compensation for unlawful dismissal, and requested the court to continue the civil proceedings in his claim against “Obyednannya Azot” seeking compensation for his work-related illness. These requests were granted on the same day. 17.  On 20 April 2007 the Severodonetsk Town Court rejected the applicant’s claims against “Obyednannya Azot”. 18.  On 4 December 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and gave a new one. In particular, it found in part for the applicant and awarded him 1,500 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] in compensation for unlawful dismissal; the claim for compensation for the applicant’s work-related illness was dismissed as unsubstantiated. 19.  On 15 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 20.  On 12 June 2008 the State Bailiffs’ Service refused to institute enforcement proceedings as the writ of enforcement lacked the necessary information about the debtor. 21.  On 24 October 2008 it was concluded, following an internal investigation held by the superior officials of the State Bailiffs’ Service, that the above refusal was lawful. 22.  The judgment of 4 December 2007 is still, apparently, not enforced. 23.  On 19 January 2007 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings in the Severodonetsk Town Court against the local department of the Fund seeking an amount in respect of insurance and compensation for non-pecuniary damage as a result of his work-related illness. 24.  On 19 June 2007 the court rejected the applicant’s claim. 25.  On 14 September 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 19 June 2007. 26.  The applicant appealed in cassation and the proceedings are still pending before the Higher Administrative Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  Mr Miller was born in 1972 and he resides in Stockton-on-Tees, Mr Morrison was born in 1970 and he resides in Aberdeen and Mr Gillespie was born in 1974 and he resides in Greenock. They are represented before the Court by Mr Blades, a lawyer practising in Lincoln. 5.  In April 1996 the first applicant was a soldier and the second applicant was a non-commissioned officer in the regular forces of the British Army. On 29 April 1996 they were charged along with two others (pursuant to section 70 of the Army Act 1955) with four counts of indecent assault contrary to section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. 6.  The convening officer, by order dated 26 July 1996, convened a general court-martial to try them. On 10 September 1996 the first applicant was found guilty on two of the charges and was sentenced to 4 years' imprisonment and to be dismissed with disgrace. The second applicant was found guilty on three of the charges and sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment, to be dismissed from the service with disgrace and to be reduced to the ranks. On 19 December 1996 the confirming officer reduced the first applicant's sentence to two years' imprisonment and the second applicant's sentence to three years and six months' imprisonment, but otherwise the findings of the court-martial were confirmed. 7.  The applicants petitioned the Defence Council against conviction and sentence. By letters dated 18 February 1998 and 27 February 1997, their representatives were informed of the decisions (taken by the Army Board) to reject their petitions. 8.  Both applicants applied to the single judge of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court (“CMAC”) for leave to appeal to that court against conviction and sentence. The first applicant pointed to various alleged failings by the judge advocate during the court-martial and argued that his sentence was excessive. The single judge granted leave to appeal to the full CMAC. Before the full CMAC, the first applicant added a new ground of appeal (that he did not have a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, citing Findlay v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I). The second applicant argued before the single judge that the judge advocate had erred and misdirected the court and that he had been denied a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal (referring also to the Findlay judgment). The single judge granted leave to appeal to the full CMAC. 9.  On 4 March 1996 the applicant, a soldier of the regular forces of the British Army, was charged (pursuant to section 70 of the Army Act 1955) with wounding with intent contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and with inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to section 20 of that Act. 10.  The convening officer, by order dated 13 August 1996, convened a general court-martial. On 6 September 1996 the applicant was found guilty on the first charge and of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to section 47 of the 1861 Act. He was sentenced to three years and six months' imprisonment and to be discharged from the army. 11.  His petition against sentence to the confirming officer was rejected and his conviction and sentence were promulgated on 10 October 1996. By letter dated 20 November 1996, his legal representatives were informed that his petition against sentence had been rejected by a Reviewing Authority appointed by the Army Board of the Defence Council. By letter dated 24 March 1997, the applicant's representatives were informed of the decision (taken by the Army Board) to reject his petition against sentence. 12.  On 20 May 1997 he presented a further petition to the Army Board of the Defence Council against conviction arguing that he had not had a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (referring also to the above-cited Findlay judgment). By letter dated 22 May 1997, he was informed that the Reviewing Authority had decided not to waive the relevant time-limit which had by then expired. It was also indicated in that letter that the “Findlay issue” had been frequently rejected by the Army Board and by the CMAC. 13.  His application to the single judge of the CMAC was dated 18 July 1997 and raised the Findlay issue together with the fact that he could not appeal against sentence only to the CMAC. On 6 October 1997 the single judge rejected that application considering that the grounds of appeal were not arguable. He renewed his application for leave to appeal to the full CMAC raising the same points. 14.  In response to these appeals, affidavits were filed on behalf of the Ministry of Defence explaining that neither the presidents nor the members of the applicants' courts-martial had been under the command of the convening officer and that none had been subordinate to him in the chain of command. Accordingly, the convening officer would not have reported on either the president or the members of the court-martial in their annual confidential reports. A policy decision had been taken that, as from 1 January 1996, all courts-martial would be composed of a president and members who were not in the chain of command of the convening officer. 15.  The applicants' appeals were rejected by detailed judgment of 13 November 1998. As to the “Findlay point”, the CMAC noted the change in policy as regards the constitution of courts-martial in place since January 1996. It considered that there was no chain of command influence and no obvious reason why any observer knowing the constitution of the courts-martial and the full facts would suspect any lack of independence or impartiality. In any event, the CMAC pointed out that the applicants' reliance on the Findlay judgment was misconceived as the only power of the CMAC was to enquire as to whether the convictions were unsafe. Where there was abundant evidence to support the conclusion of the courts-martial which had been properly convened in accordance with domestic law, the composition and behaviour of which had not been criticised, the CMAC considered that there was no possible reason to intervene. It noted that the time for having regard to the provisions of the Convention had not yet been reached, but it was difficult to see, even in such circumstances, how the provisions of Article 6 could be of any assistance to the applicants.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the town of Sukhodolsk, Lugansk region. 5.  On 31 March 1997 the Krasnodon Court awarded the applicant's husband UAH 27,669 from his former employer, the State Mining Company “Duvannaya”, in compensation for health damage inflicted by a work accident. 6.  In May 1998 the applicant's husband died. 7.  On 27 June 2000 the Presidium of the Lugansk Regional Court, upon the prosecutor's protest lodged under the extraordinary review procedure, quashed the judgment of 31 March 1997 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown. 8.  On 21 August 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Krasnodon Court against the State Mining Company “Duvannaya” claiming compensation for health damage allegedly due to her late husband. 9.  Between September 2000 and November 2001 seven out of nineteen hearings were adjourned due to the respondent's representative failure to appear before the court. 10.  On 18 March 2002 the Krasnodon Court found against the applicant. 11.  On 4 July 2002 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal (former Lugansk Regional Court) upheld this judgment. 12.  On 2 August 2002 the applicant lodged with the Krasnodon Court her appeal in cassation. She was requested by the court's secretary to pay the postal expenses for sending her case-file to the Supreme Court. 13.  On 27 November 2002 the Supreme Court returned the case-file to the Krasnodon Court as the applicant also challenged the ruling of 27 June 2000, which was not attached to the case-file. 14.  On 24 October 2003 the Supreme Court returned the case-file to the Krasnodon Court as its ruling of 27 November 2002 was not fulfilled. The Supreme Court further explained that the ruling of 27 June 2000 could not be appealed within the pending proceedings. 15.  On 30 October 2003 the case-file was sent back to the Krasnodon Court. 16.  On 12 April 2004 the Krasnodon Court allowed the applicant until 27 May 2004 to rectify the shortcomings of her appeal in cassation. Following the applicant's request, the time-limit was extended until 25 June 2004. 17.  On 2 August 2004 the case-file was transferred to the Supreme Court. 18.  On 6 November 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal in cassation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Zagreb. 5.  On 28 May 1990 a certain D.I. (“the plaintiff”) brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking the conclusion of a sale contract by which the applicant was to sell her flat to the plaintiff. 6.  On 6 November 1990 the applicant filed her response and a counter-claim alleging that the plaintiff did not pay her the full price for the flat. 7.  In November 1990 the plaintiff requested that the case be joined to another case pending between the same parties. In November 1991, July and November 1992 the applicant requested the court to schedule a hearing. In May 1994 the applicant objected to the plaintiff’s request to have the two cases joined. 8.  The court held hearings on 21 November 1990, 14 February, 8 April and 22 November 1994 and 7 March 1995. 9.  By a judgment of 7 March 1995 the Municipal Court accepted the plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the applicant’s counter-claim. On 23 October 1996 the applicant appealed. 10.  On 9 June 1998 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) accepted the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case. 11.  In the resumed proceedings, the Municipal Court held a hearing on 19 July 1999. On that date it decided to close the main hearing. 12.  On 15 October 1999 the applicant requested the court to reopen the main hearing and obtain an opinion from a financial expert. On 10 November 1999 the court accepted the applicant’s request. 13.  On 21 January 2000 the court heard witnesses and requested the applicant to advance the costs of the expert. On 26 January 2000 the applicant did so. 14.  On 2 February 2000 the court appointed an expert. On 19 May 2000 the expert submitted his report to the court which then forwarded it to the applicant, who received it on 28 August 2000. 15.  On 11 October 2000 the Municipal Court closed the main hearing. 16.  By a judgment of 11 October 2000 the court again accepted the plaintiff’s claim and declared inadmissible the applicant’s counter-claim. The judgment was served on the applicant on 2 July 2001. 17.  The plaintiff and the applicant appealed on 10 July and 12 July 2001, respectively. In her appeal, the applicant also applied to be exempted from the court fees. The appeals were forwarded to the County Court, which received them on 8 February 2002. 18.  On 15 October 2002 the Zagreb County Court, without deciding on the admissibility or merits of the appeals, returned the case-file to the Municipal Court. It instructed the latter to decide on the applicant’s application for exemption from the court fees and the plaintiff’s ‘appeal’ which, in fact, constituted an application for a rectification of the judgment. 19.  On 14 September 2004 the Zagreb County Court accepted the appeals, quashed the Municipal Court’s judgment of 11 October 2000 and remitted the case. 20.  In the resumed proceedings, the Municipal Court scheduled a hearing for 8 March 2005. It appears that the proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court. 21.  Meanwhile, on 9 May 2002 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint about the length of the proceedings. On 14 November 2002 the Constitutional Court dismissed her complaint on its merits. It examined the length of the proceedings in respect of their part following the Convention’s entry into force with respect to Croatia. The Constitutional Court found that the case was complex since it had already been remitted once and because the Municipal Court needed to obtain an expert’s opinion. It also found that the applicant contributed to the length of the proceedings in that until May 1994 she had not objected to the plaintiff’s proposal of November 1990 to have that case joined to another one. Only then did she argue that the second proceedings were irrelevant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in the city of Kharkiv, Ukraine. 5. On 19 March 2004 the Moskovskiy District Court of Kharkiv (“the court”) partly allowed the applicant’s claims and awarded him 4,643.42 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and compensation for loss of earnings, to be paid by the State-controlled company “Serp i molot”. 6.  The applicant did not appeal against this decision under the ordinary appeal procedure, but on 3 February 2005 he lodged a cassation appeal against it. On 4 February 2005 the court returned the applicant’s cassation appeal since the relevant decision had not been appealed under the ordinary appeal procedure. 7.  The applicant states that he received the ruling of 4 February 2005 when the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it had already expired. The applicant did not provide this Court with any document certifying that he had requested the domestic courts to renew the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the ruling of 4 February 2005. 8.  On 31 August 2004 the Moskovskiy District Bailiffs’ Service of Kharkiv initiated enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 19 March 2004. 9.  Following insolvency and liquidation proceedings instituted against the company, on 10 October 2007 the latter was closed down and removed from the relevant enterprises’ register. 10.  In 2007 the applicant received UAH 163.71. The remainder of the judgment has not been enforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the village of Karakert, Armenia. 6.  The applicant has been a member of an opposition political party, the National Democratic Union, since 1995. Since 1997 he has headed the party’s local offices in the Baghramyan area. 7. In March and April 2004 a series of protest rallies were organised in Yerevan by the opposition parties who voiced their criticism of the alleged irregularities which had taken place during the presidential election of February-March 2003 and challenged the legitimacy of the re-elected President. It appears that the applicant participated in these rallies. He alleged that the authorities retaliated by arresting, harassing and searching opposition supporters. 8.  On 10 April 2004 at 5.10 p.m. the applicant was arrested and taken to a police station where an administrative case was initiated against him for disobeying the lawful orders of police officers. 9.  On the same date the Armavir Regional Court sentenced the applicant to ten days’ administrative detention. 10.  The running of the ten-day administrative sentence was to be calculated from 10 April 2004 at 5.10 p.m. The applicant was taken to a detention facility in the town of Ejmiatsin where he served his sentence. 11.  On 20 April 2004 at an unspecified hour, the Armavir Regional Court examined and granted an investigator’s motion, which had apparently been lodged on the same date, seeking to have the applicant’s home searched. The judicial warrant stated:\n“The investigating authority has found it substantiated that on 27 March 2004 at around 12 noon the residents of the village of Myasnikyan of the Armavir Region [K.K. and B.K.] inflicted violence dangerous for health in the pasture located in the administrative area of Lernagogh village in the Armavir Region on representatives of the authorities performing their official duties, [namely] the head of Lernagogh village [S.M.] and head of staff of the Village Council [A.M.]. According to operative information, [B.K. and K.K.] had a weapon during the incident[. F]or the purpose of hiding the mentioned weapon, they gave it to the resident of Karakert village, member of the Union of Yezidis of the Baghramyan area, [the applicant], who may have hidden the mentioned weapon in one of his homes in Karakert village.\nOn 27 March 2004 the Armavir Regional Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings no. 65200604 ... concerning this fact.\nIn view of the fact that the facts of the criminal case provide sufficient grounds to believe that an illegally possessed weapon and ammunition may be found in [the applicant’s] home situated in Karakert village in the Armavir Region, as well as other objects and valuables having significance for the criminal case, the court therefore finds that the motion is well-founded and must be granted.” 12.  It was stated in the warrant that it could be contested within 15 days before the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal. 13.  The applicant alleged that on that day, several hours before the expiry of his administrative sentence, he was taken from the Ejmiatsin detention facility to the Baghramyan Police Department. From there he was escorted home by at least ten police officers. 14.  According to the search record, the search was conducted from 5.10 p.m. to 6.55 p.m. by seven police officers of the Baghramyan Police Department, E.M., B.M., M.G., A.Ge., S.M., G.E. and A.Ga. Two neighbours, G.G. and M.S., were asked by the head of the police team to participate in the search as attesting witnesses. The applicant was asked to surrender the illegal weapon allegedly hidden in his house. The applicant stated that he had no illegal objects at home. As a result of the search, a plastic bag containing a cannabis-like herb was found in the boiler situated in the hallway. The applicant stated that he did not know what it was and who it belonged to. It was mentioned at the end of the record that the applicant had refused to sign the record without providing any reasons. 15.  According to the applicant and the statements of the two attesting witnesses which were appended to the application form, the search was conducted in the following manner. Upon his return home, accompanied by police officers, the applicant found his pregnant wife in a critical condition, apparently suffering a miscarriage, and his one-year-old son crying beside her. On seeing him, the applicant’s wife fainted. A doctor was called and a number of female neighbours came to help. At that point the head of the police team informed the applicant that his house was to be searched, briefly showing him the relevant search warrant. The applicant alleged that attesting witnesses G.G. and M.S. were asked to participate only after the search had already begun. It appears that G.G. was a war veteran who had suffered concussion and was seriously disabled, while M.S. was seventy‑four years old. The search was conducted by more than ten police officers who also used two specially trained dogs. Having searched the house and not found anything, the police officers started searching the yard and the adjacent buildings. The applicant alleged that during the search of the outside premises, the front door of his house was left open and people, including police officers, were coming and going. Moreover, a group of police officers was standing by the front door while the others continued the search. Having found nothing outside the house, the head of the police team announced that they would again search inside the house, to which attesting witness G.G. objected. Following the additional search the police officers found the above-mentioned plastic bag. The attesting witnesses submitted that their objections were not recorded. Moreover, they were persuaded and bullied by the police officers to sign the search record. 16.  The applicant alleged that he was taken back to the police station where the chief of police promised that, if he renounced his political convictions and resigned from the party, no further action would be taken in relation to the cannabis. The applicant refused to make such a deal. 17.  The applicant further alleged that he was kept at the police station overnight. There he was given a meal, including a hamburger. About 15 to 20 minutes after having eaten the meal he felt sick, started vomiting and lost consciousness. An ambulance was called and some injections were administered. According to the applicant, his meal had been laced with a drug. 18.  On 21 April 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 268 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of illegal drug possession. On the same date at 11.18 p.m. the applicant was formally arrested. 19.  On the same date the investigator decided to subject the applicant to a forensic toxicological examination. The applicant alleged that he did not receive a copy of this decision. He was taken to the Republican Centre for Narcotics where a urine sample was taken. 20.  It appears that on the same date, a lawyer was engaged in the case. It further appears that the applicant was questioned and denied the drug possession allegations. 21.  On an unspecified date the plastic bag and the herbal substance, weighing approximately 59 grams, were examined by a forensic expert and the substance was found to be cannabis. 22.  On 23 April 2004 the applicant was formally charged with illegal drug possession and detained by a court order. 23.  On the same date, a toxicological expert opinion was produced, according to which the applicant’s urine sample contained traces indicating cannabis consumption. 24.  On the same date the lawyer filed a motion with the Armavir Regional Prosecutor seeking to stop the prosecution on the ground that, inter alia, the search had been conducted with numerous procedural violations. A similar complaint was lodged on 27 April 2004. 25.  According to the applicant, on an unspecified date his lawyer requested a further examination of the cannabis and the plastic bag by a forensic expert. This request was rejected. He further alleged that, during the investigation, the police officers put pressure on the two attesting witnesses not to attend confrontations which had apparently been requested by the applicant. 26.  On 7 May 2004 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Armavir Regional Prosecutor, challenging the investigator’s impartiality and complaining in detail about the unlawful manner in which the search had been executed, alleging, inter alia, that the bag containing cannabis had been planted by the police officers conducting the search. 27.  On 9 June 2004 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Armavir Regional Prosecutor that the search warrant had lacked proper grounds and that the search had been conducted with numerous procedural violations. The lawyer argued that the investigator had failed to obtain any evidence when investigating his allegations of irregularities. Such evidence could have been obtained by questioning the applicant’s neighbours and the doctor who had provided first aid to his wife, who had been present during the search, and by holding confrontations between the applicant and the attesting witnesses. 28.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s criminal case was brought before the Armavir Regional Court. 29.  It appears that, in the proceedings before the Regional Court, the applicant’s lawyer filed a motion seeking to exclude the results of the search as unlawfully obtained evidence. It further appears that the Regional Court did not take any decision on this motion. 30.  Attesting witnesses M.S. and G.G. both testified before the trial court. In reply to the questions put by the applicant’s lawyer M.S. stated, inter alia, that he and G.G. were watching the police officers as much as they could while entering and going out of the rooms together with the police officers. When giving his account of the events G.G. stated among other things that he helped one of the police officers to reach the water boiler from which a plastic bag and a plate were taken out. He further stated that both the plastic bag and the plate were covered with dust. However, the plate was dustier compared to the plastic bag. Both M.S. and G.G. stated that they did not remember whether they were informed of their right to have the objections that they might have included in the search record and that the applicant refused to sign it stating that the discovered bag did not belong to him. 31.  On 22 June 2004 the Armavir Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one and a half years’ imprisonment. In doing so, the Regional Court relied on, inter alia, the witness testimony of the police officers who had conducted the search, including E.M., A.Gh., M.G., M.M., L.F. and A.Ga., and of the two attesting witnesses, as well as the results of the analysis of the applicant’s urine sample. 32.  On 29 June 2004 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal. The lawyer argued, inter alia, that the search of the applicant’s home had been conducted with a number of procedural violations and therefore its results could not be used as evidence. In particular, he claimed that the search warrant was not presented to the applicant to get acquainted with it, no signature was obtained from him in this respect and that his objections were not included into the record of the search. He further argued that the search had been authorised by the court on the basis of fabricated police materials and therefore lacked any valid grounds. He also submitted that, according to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Regional Court should not have relied on the testimony of the police officers, since they had been summoned and examined solely in connection with the performance of their procedural duties and not in connection with the irregularities alleged by the applicant. Furthermore, the Regional Court had failed to take into account the submissions of the attesting witnesses which confirmed the applicant’s allegations of irregularities. 33.  On 10 August 2004 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction finding, inter alia, that no significant procedural violations had taken place during the investigation of the case. The Court of Appeal relied on the same evidence, except for the testimony of the police officers. 34.  No appeal was lodged against this judgment within the ten-day statutory time-limit, so it became final. 35.  On 6 September 2004 the applicant was released on parole. 36.  On 15 November 2004 an advocate holding a special licence lodged an appeal on points of law on behalf of the applicant against the final judgment of the Court of Appeal. He requested that the judgment of the Court of Appeal be quashed and the case be remitted for further investigation due to the procedural violations taken place during the investigation, including the execution of the search. 37.  On 10 December 2004 the Court of Cassation examined the appeal on the merits and decided to dismiss it finding that, inter alia, no significant violations of the procedural law had taken place which required the case being remitted for further investigation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  Upon a private company’s request, in May 1996 L. K., a forest engineer employed by the company, made an estimation of the amount of damages caused to the company’s territory by wild animals under the responsibility of a hunting society. Subsequently, on 1 August 1996 the company brought an action in compensation against the hunting society, the members of which were the applicants. 5.  In March 1997 the hunting society was dissolved. The proceedings were discontinued on 10 June 1997, pending the identification of successors to the proceedings. 6.  On 6 March 1999 the proceedings continued, as the plaintiff designated the applicants as successors to the proceedings. 7.  The Kiskőrös District Court appointed an expert, J. K., to establish the value of the hunters’ house. The expert filed an opinion on 30 November 2000. 8.  On 9 July 2003 the Kiskőrös District Court found for the plaintiff. This judgment was quashed by the Csongrád County Regional Court on 23 February 2005. 9.  In the resumed proceedings, due to the bias declared by the judges in Bács-Kiskun County, the case was heard by the Szeged District Court. The court requested L. K. to submit a further expert report to establish the amount of damages caused. He filed an opinion on 24 January 2006. 10.  On 3 March 2006 the first-instance court gave judgment, finding for the plaintiff. The applicants appealed, arguing - among others - that they had not received the copy of minutes of the hearing of 28 October 2005 on time, and questioning the impartiality of L. K. 11.  On appeal, the Csongrád County Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment. Concerning the minutes of the hearing, the second-instance court pointed out that the District Court had no legal obligation to send them the minutes automatically. They had the options of requesting copies either by post or in person at the court. The applicants had requested the copies for the first time on 11 January 2006, following which the court had sent the minutes on 13 January 2006 despite the fact that the applicants had not paid the copy fees. The delivery of the mail sent according to the rules had not been successful. Following the repeated request of the applicants on 16 February 2006, the copies had been sent once again on 21 February 2006. Moreover, the court pointed out that the respondents had been present at the hearing, where they had the opportunity to take notes, and could have submitted observations within eight days to L. K.’s expert report, delivered to them on 13 February 2006. As to the impartiality of L. K., the court emphasised that he had been the only expert to see the damages on-site in 1996. Ten years after the occurrence of the damages, appointing a further forensic expert to proceed on the basis of documentary evidence would have been futile in the court’s opinion. In addition, L. K. had followed the court’s instructions when preparing the expert report. 12.  The applicants lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which upheld the final judgment on 10 May 2007. This decision was served on the applicants on 14 June 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant is the father of a son (S.), born on 30 July 1990. In 1997 the applicant and the child’s mother (K.) separated. S. remained with his mother. In 1998 the applicant and S.’s mother were divorced. 6.  On 21 January 1998 the Pankow District Court awarded K. sole custody of S. and decided that the applicant would be entitled to personal contact with his son every other weekend. In September 1998, however, the applicant ceased to have contact with his son. 7.  On 7 October 1998 the applicant requested the Pankow District Court to impose a coercive fine on the mother to enforce his access rights. The District Court registered his request under file number 11 F 4813/98. 8.  Between 9 November 1998 and 10 March 1999 the parties and the Youth Office submitted observations. 9.  On 17 May 1999 the applicant withdrew his request and stated that he now wished the court to mediate between the parents with a view to reaching an agreement on the applicant’s contact rights according to section 52a of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit – see “Relevant Domestic Law” below). The District Court pursued the applicant’s modified request under the same file number (11 F 4813/98). 10.  On 13 August 1999 the District Court heard S., who declared that he wished to see his father only occasionally under the supervision of a third person. 12.  On 18 October 1999 the District Court held a further hearing at which the parties declared that the court currently did not need to take any action. 13.  On 22 February 2000 the applicant applied for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and a contact supervisor (Umgangsbegleitperson) arguing that the mediation proceedings had failed. 14.  On 10 March 2000 the District Court appointed a guardian ad litem and set down the case for hearing on 5 April 2000. However, that hearing was postponed to 15 May 2000 as agreed with the parties. 15.  On 5 June 2000 a further hearing was held, and on 14 June 2000 the District Court ordered supervised contact for a period between late June and mid-December. 17.  On 28 September 2000 the District Court asked the contact supervisor to comment on the failure to have contact established between the applicant and his son. In October and November 2000 the District Court reminded the contact supervisor of its request of 28 September 2000 and unsuccessfully attempted to contact the latter by phone. 19.  On 11 December 2000 the District Court sent a further reminder to the contact supervisor and requested the parties to comment on the question as to whether the mediation proceedings should be continued. 21.  On 20 March 2001 the District Court decided to continue the proceedings after the parties had agreed on a one-off supervised contact. 22.  On 6 July 2001 the contact centre informed the District Court that the contact supervisor had been replaced with another person, and on 11 July 2001 the District Court appointed that person as contact supervisor. 23.  On 14 August 2001 the District Court received the contact supervisor’s report, according to which S. refused to see his father. 24.  On 22 September 2001 the applicant asked the District Court to declare that the mediation proceedings had failed and to commission an expert report. 25. On 22 November 2001 the District Court heard S. again, who firmly declared that his father no longer existed for him. 26.  On 27 November 2001 the District Court commissioned a psychological expert report on the question of contact. That expert informed the court on 25 February 2002 that he could be biased. Accordingly, the mother’s representative challenged the expert for bias on 26 March. On 10 April 2002 the District Court ordered the expert to stop his examinations, and on 6 June 2002 the mother withdrew her challenge of bias. On 13 June 2002 the District Court ordered the expert to continue his examinations. 27.  On 11 September 2002 the District Court requested the expert to consider further questions raised by the applicant. 28.  On 19 November 2002 the expert informed the court that K. had refused to attend a meeting with the expert until mid-January 2003. Subsequently, the District Court asked K. to ensure that a meeting was held by the end of 2002. On 2 January 2003 the District Court asked all persons involved in the proceedings to support the expert in the preparation of his report. On 16 January 2003 the expert informed the District Court that for the time being K. was unwilling to meet the expert. On 23 January 2003 the District Court ordered K. to cooperate with the expert within two months and announced that further measures would be taken in the event of non-compliance. 29.  On 2 April 2003 the expert informed the court that a meeting had been held with K. on 13 March 2003, that the applicant and his son had called each other and that the applicant considered withdrawing his application. 30.  On 30 April 2003, at the applicant’s request of 11 April 2003, the District Court ordered the expert to swiftly continue his examination. On 30 June 2003 the expert gave his report in which he suggested a suspension of the applicant’s contact with S. for a period of two years. 31.  On 21 October 2003 the District Court heard S., who insisted that he did not wish to see his father any longer. 32.  At an oral hearing held on 22 October 2003 the applicant announced that he would withdraw his application. However, on 19 November 2003 the applicant insisted on a court decision. 33.  On 10 December 2003 the District Court, relying on the expert’s report, suspended the applicant’s rights to access for two years. 34.  On 30 December 2003 the applicant appealed to the Berlin Court of Appeal, and on 18 January 2004 he submitted his statement of grounds of appeal, which the court received on 2 February 2004. 35.  On 13 May 2004 the Berlin Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court, arguing that S. had suffered from the persistent conflict between his parents about the applicant’s contact rights and from the respective proceedings, which had been pending now for more than five years and which had led to lasting psychological damage to the child. In order to protect himself, the boy refused to expose himself to this conflict, by refusing to see his father. 36.  On 30 June 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, which the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit on 14 July 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Balassagyarmat. 9.  In 1974 the applicant married in former Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, the couple moved to Hungary. Their daughter was born in January 1980. 10.  On 17 September 1996 the applicant’s wife, then a Slovak national, filed for divorce before the Balassagyarmat District Court. She also sought custody of their child and the division of the matrimonial property. 11.  Shortly afterwards, the applicant challenged his paternity of their daughter before the District Court. On 24 January 1997 the District Court rejected this action as being incomplete. 12.  Meanwhile, on 25 November 1996 and 11 February 1997 the District Court held hearings in the principal proceedings. 13.  On 11 March 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. 14.  At the hearing on 13 June 1997 the District Court suspended the proceedings in the divorce case pending a decision on the paternity dispute. 15.  On 27 August 1997 the District Court again rejected the applicant’s paternity action as being incomplete. 16.  On 9 September 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. On 25 March 1998 the District Court dismissed his claims. On 10 September 1998 the Nógrád County Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 17.  Meanwhile, on 16 February 1998 the applicant’s wife requested that the principal proceedings be continued. She argued that their daughter had reached the age of 18 and for that reason it was no longer necessary to decide the question of custody; consequently, the outcome of the paternity proceedings was irrelevant to the determination of the divorce action. The proceedings were resumed soon afterwards. 18.  Subsequently, the applicant brought a counter-action seeking the invalidation of the marriage. At the hearing on 23 April 1998 the District Court ordered that the relevant provisions of the Czechoslovakian Civil Code be obtained via the Ministry of Justice. 19.  On 4 November 1998 the applicant’s daughter filed a rebuttal of the presumption of the applicant’s paternity. On 19 January 1999 the District Court appointed a medical expert to carry out a blood group examination of the parties. On 14 April 1999 the expert verified the applicant’s paternity. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew her claims and these proceedings were discontinued. 20.  In the principal proceedings, the translation of the Czechoslovakian law reached the District Court on 19 October 1999. 21.  On 26 October 1999 the District Court requested, via the Ministry of Justice, a copy of the parties’ marriage certificate from the archives of the Slovakian Nagykürtös District Registry. 22.  On 9 December 1999 another hearing was held. On the same day, the District Court dismissed, in a partial decision, the applicant’s counter-claim for invalidation of the marriage. The District Court relied on documentary evidence received from Slovakia. On 16 May 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 23.  On 28 August 2000 the District Court held a further hearing and ordered a bank to submit information about the parties’ assets. 24.  On 2 October 2000 the District Court pronounced the parties’ divorce and disjoined the remainder of the claims. In this latter respect, it ordered that the Land Registry be notified of the dispute concerning the division of the matrimonial property. 25.  On 14 November 2000 the applicant appealed against the first-instance decision and challenged the Regional Court for bias. On 8 February 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed his motion. On 10 May 2001 the Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 26.  On 18 December 2000 the District Court appointed experts to assess the value of the parties’ assets. 27.  On 21 January 2001 the applicant challenged all of the judges of Nógrád County for bias. On 22 January 2001 the Regional Court transferred the case file to the Supreme Court. 28.  On 20 March 2001 an inspection of the parties’ property holdings properties was carried out. 29.  On 28 March 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias and sent the case file back to the Regional Court. Subsequently, on 22 May 2001 the Regional Court appointed the Salgótarján District Court to hear the case. 30.  The case – in so far as it concerns the division of the matrimonial property – is still pending before the Salgótarján District Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1932, lives in Bratislava and is of fragile health. The second applicant was born in 1941 and also lived in Bratislava. She died on 28 October 2001 during the proceedings before the Court. In a letter of 2 April 2004 the first applicant informed the Court that he wished to pursue the application also in the name of the late second applicant. 5.  In 1989 the applicants concluded a contract with the State represented by the Bratislava II Housing Administration (bytový podnik) under which they purchased a family house located in Bratislava. The house had originally belonged to spouses S. Mrs S was a foreign national. The spouses S. had left the former Czechoslovakia in 1982. Mr S. was subsequently convicted of having stayed abroad illegally and sentenced to forfeiture of all his property. The house thus passed to the State. 6.  In 1990 the Bratislava II District Court (okresný súd) rehabilitated Mr S. by cancelling his criminal conviction. 7.  On 24 April 1991 the spouses S. lodged a civil action against the applicants and the State in the person of the Housing Administration with the Bratislava II District Court seeking a judicial ruling declaring the purchase contract of 1989 void. 8.  On 18 March 1992 the Convention entered into force in respect of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which Slovakia is one of the successor states. Prior to this date, the parties appointed lawyers to represent them in the proceedings, the Housing Administration submitted written observations in reply, the District Court held three hearings and sought information from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance as to what legal status had Mrs S. had as a foreigner in the former Czechoslovakia and whether this legal status had qualified her under the applicable foreign exchange rules to acquire immovable property. 9.  On 15 July 1992 the District Court requested information about the legal status of Mrs S. from the Police. 10.  On 23 September 1992 the District Court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs were not present in person. They were however represented by their lawyer. The Housing Administration was not present. The hearing was adjourned with a view to summoning the legal representative of the applicants. 11.  On 14 December 1992, following a hearing, the District Court declared the purchase contract of 1989 void. It found that Mrs S. had not been entitled to acquire the ownership of the house. Spouses S. thus had not become its legal owners. All later dispositions concerning the house had consequently been void. On 12 March 1993 the applicants appealed. On 4 June 1993 the Housing Administration also appealed. 12.  On 30 September 1993 the Bratislava Regional Court (then mestský súd, at present krajský súd) quashed the District Court’s judgment. It held that the first instance court had failed to establish the facts of the case sufficiently and to give adequate reasons for its decision which thus could not be reviewed. The case‑file was returned to the District Court on 9 December 1993. 13.  On 10 November 1994 the District Court listed a hearing for 18 January 1995. The plaintiffs were represented at this hearing by their lawyer. The case was adjourned and the District Court ordered the plaintiffs to submit further documentary evidence. 14.  On 18 October 1995 the District Court judge dealing with the case was replaced by another judge as the former had left for legal training at the Ministry of Justice. The new judge made requests for further information to the plaintiffs and the Police. 15.  On 28 November 1995 and 5 May 1996 the District Court repeatedly requested information from the Police concerning the legal status of Mrs S. as a foreigner at the relevant time. The Police replied on 31 May 1996. 16.  On 9 October 1996 the District Court held another hearing. One of the plaintiffs attended accompanied by their lawyer. The representative of the Housing Administration was not present. The hearing was adjourned with a view to obtaining further information concerning Mrs S. 17.  In a letter of 12 November 1996 the Police informed the District Court that, between 1974 and 1982, Mrs S. had been a lawful permanent resident in Czechoslovakia. 18.  In a letter of 24 July 1996 the President of the District Court informed the applicants that she had found no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The letter stated that the judge dealing with the case had a heavy workload and that a hearing was scheduled for 9 October 1996. 19.  In a letter of 2 August 1996 the applicants disagreed with the President’s reply and argued that the last hearing in the case had been held more than three and a half years ago. In a letter of 6 August 1996 the Vice‑President of the District Court informed the applicants that she had found no reasons for changing the position taken by the President of the District Court on 24 July 1996. 20.  On 22 January 1997, following another hearing, the District Court delivered a new judgment by which it dismissed the action. It found that Mr S. had lost his share of the ownership of the house by the forfeiture imposed on him in his criminal proceedings. It further found that Mrs S. had lost her share in the house by abandoning it (derelictio) and by taking up residence abroad. The District Court concluded that the title to the house had lawfully passed to the State and that it was later properly conveyed to the applicants by means of sale. 21.  On 13 March 1997 the plaintiffs appealed. On 6 May 1997 the Housing Authority filed its observations in reply. 22.  On 18 June 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court (krajský súd) held a hearing on the appeal. One of the plaintiffs attended accompanied by their lawyer. The applicants were represented by their lawyer. The hearing was adjourned and the plaintiffs were ordered to submit further documentary evidence. They did so on 24 June 1997. 23.  On 24 September 1997, following a hearing, the Bratislava Regional Court overturned the District Court’s judgment of 22 January 1997. It found that the house had originally belonged to spouses S. as their undivided matrimonial co‑ownership. The conviction of Mr S. entailed the dissolution of this co‑ownership and the passing of his share in the house to the State. However, the share of Mrs S. remained unaffected. Any dispositions concerning the house therefore necessitated her consent. As the contract of 1989 was concluded without her consent, it was void. 24.  On 3 December 1997 the applicants filed an appeal on points of law. On 22 December 1997 and on 17 February 1998 they were requested to pay the court fees which they did on 24 February 1998. In the meantime, on 23 February 1998, the plaintiffs filed their observations in reply. 25.  On 23 April 1998, in reply to their complaint, the President of the District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint about the length of the proceedings as being unsubstantiated. The letter stated that the case‑file had been submitted to the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) for a decision on the appeal on points of law on 14 April 1998. 26.  On 16 December 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 24 September 1997 as well as the District Court’s judgment of 22 January 1997. It remitted the case to the District Court for a new adjudication. It expressed the view that the contract in question was unlawful only to the extent that it concerned the share of Mrs S. However, it was lawful in so far it concerned the share of Mr S. This share had lawfully passed from him to the State by means of forfeiture and from the State to the applicants by means of sale. In the given circumstances, the latter transfer did not necessitate the consent of Mrs S. The judgment and the case‑file were transmitted to the District Court on 8 February 1999. 27.  The hearing listed by the District Court for 13 September 1999 was adjourned at the applicants’ request, as, due to his health problems, the first applicant could not appear. 28.  On 22 November 1999 the District Court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs were represented by their lawyer. The representative of the Housing Authority was not present. At the hearing the applicants withdrew the power of attorney from their lawyer and objected that they had not been served a copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment. The hearing was adjourned until 10 February 2000. 29.  On 21 December 1999 the applicants filed a counter‑claim seeking compensation for the house in question and for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage they alleged that they had suffered. 30.  On 10 February 2000 the District Court held a hearing at which the applicants withdrew their counter‑claim. The proceedings on it were consequently discontinued. 31.  On 6 April 2000, following a hearing, the District Court gave a new judgment. It found that the contract of 1989 was void to the extent that it concerned the half of the property which belonged to Mrs S as that part of the property had not been transferred to State ownership prior to the sale to the applicant. After the judgment had been served on the parties and the period for filing an appeal had expired, the judgment became final and binding on 6 June 2000. 32.  On 13 March 2000 the applicants filed a submission with the Bratislava II District Court in which they maintained that the State was responsible for the extensive length of the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989. They also maintained that the State was responsible for the fact that the contract was void. They sought to be provided with appropriate accommodation and compensated for both material and moral damage. On 10 August 2000 the District Court informed the applicants that the submission was unclear and that it did not meet the formal requirements for commencing proceedings. The District Court invited the applicants to remedy the shortcomings within 10 days. On 16 October 2000 the applicants filed further submissions and, on 18 November 2000, they demanded that the District Court deal with the case speedily. 33.  In a letter of 8 March 2001, in reply to the applicants’ complaint, the President of the District Court acknowledged that there had been undue delays in the proceedings in that the judge responsible for the case had taken no procedural steps and, since December 2000, she had been on maternity leave. On 23 March 2001 the President of the Regional Court sent a letter to the President of the District Court in which she referred to the latter’s response to the applicants’ complaint. She found that, despite her previous notice, the applicants’ case was still not being dealt with. She requested that the President of the District Court take effective measures in the matter and advised him that a failure to do so would entail consequences. 34.  On 7 September 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicants’ submissions were confused and did not meet the statutory requirements. The decision became formally final and binding on 17 October 2001 (see below). 35.  In a letter dated 15 October 2001 the applicants requested the District Court that the time‑limit for eliminating shortcomings in their submissions be extended to 30 October 2001. On the same day, they requested the Slovak Bar Association that a lawyer be appointed to represent them ex officio and free of charge. On 5 November 2001 the first applicant again requested an extension of the above time‑limit until 1 December 2001. 36.  On the advice of the Bar Association, the first applicant asked the District Court to grant him free legal assistance and to assign a lawyer to him on 15 November 2001 and on 8 January 2002. 37.  On 12 February 2002 the first applicant requested that the District Court re‑open the proceedings on his claim against the State and that it grant him free legal assistance. On 12 April 2002 the District Court invited the first applicant to pay the court fee. 38.  On 6 August 2002 the District Court dismissed the first applicant’s request for free legal assistance. It observed that the re‑opening of proceedings which had been discontinued on the grounds of formal defects in the action was inadmissible under the applicable procedural rules. The District Court therefore considered the first applicant’s request for re‑opening devoid of any prospect of success, in which case no free legal aid could be granted. 39.  On 29 October 2002, on the first applicant’s appeal, the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 6 August 2002. It considered that the first applicant’s submissions were incomprehensible. They could only be decided upon once the District Court further explored and safely established their legal nature which the Regional Court instructed it to do. 40.  The District Court summoned the first applicant for 17 March and for 5 May 2003 for an informative hearing in order to determine the legal nature of his submissions. The first applicant apologised for not being able to take part in the hearing of 17 March due to his health problems. In a letter of 9 April 2003 he again requested that the District Court grant him free legal aid and appoint a legal representative to him. 41.  On 26 August 2003 the District Court acceded to the first applicant’s request and assigned an advocate to assist him in formulating his claim. The case‑file contains no further information concerning the development, current state and possible outcome of the proceedings on the first applicant’s claim. 42.  In a letter of 23 November 2000 the applicants demanded that the Constitutional Court “assist them in expediting the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989”. In a letter of 27 December 2000 a single Constitutional Court judge informed the applicants that the expediting of court proceedings fell outside the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. In a letter of 15 January 2001 the applicants reiterated their request. On 6 February 2001 the Constitutional Court judge informed them that he had found no reasons to change his previous position. 43.  On 6 September 2001 the applicants again requested that the Constitutional Court expedite the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989. In a letter of 20 September 2001 the constitutional judge informed the applicants that their submission did not meet the requirements for a formal constitutional complaint. At the same time the judge advised the applicants of the requirements in question and requested that he remedy his submission accordingly within 15 days. On 15 October 2001 the Constitutional Court judge granted the applicants’ request to extend the time‑limit for remedying his submission until 26 October 2001. 44.  On 13 November 2001 the first applicant asked the Constitutional Court to assign a lawyer ex officio and free of charge to him. By a decision of 4 December 2001 the Constitutional Court granted the request. On 8 January 2002 the first applicant again requested that the Constitutional Court assign a lawyer ex officio and free of charge to him. The case‑file contains no further information concerning the development, current state and possible outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant is an Italian national who was born in 1958. He was in Spoleto Prison when he lodged his application.\nAmong other measures, he was held in pre-trial detention for his involvement in the murder of Judge Falcone and his escort on 26 September 1997. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment by the Caltanissetta Assize Court. On 12 November 1997 he was given a second life sentence, on other charges, by the Palermo Assize Court. That sentence became final on 26 November 1999. 10.  After his arrest on 4 June 1993 the applicant was placed under the special prison regime provided for in section 41 bis of the Prison Administration Act, which derogates from the conditions for ordinary detention laid down in the Act.\nBetween 13 November 1996 and 31 December 2000 the Minister of Justice issued nine decrees, each introducing restrictions for the following six-month periods: 13 November 1996 to 13 May 1997 (decree no. 1); 13 May 1997 to 13 November 1997 (decree no. 2); 14 November 1997 to 14 May 1998 (decree no. 3); 15 May 1998 to 15 November 1998 (decree no. 4); 12 November 1998 to 12 May 1999 (decree no. 5); 11 May 1999 to 11 November 1999 (decree no. 6); 8 November 1999 to 31 December 1999 (decree no. 7); 28 December 1999 to 28 June 2000 (decree no. 8); and 23 June 2000 to 31 December 2000 (decree no. 9).\nThe applicant indicated that he had remained under the same regime for the period following 31 December 2000, but did not provide any precise details. 11.  Decrees nos. 2 to 9 were not formal extensions of the previous decree, but fresh decisions that nonetheless reiterated the earlier decision. 12.  By virtue of the nine decrees, the following restrictions were imposed on the applicant:\n(a)  limits on visits by family members, with a maximum of one visit for one hour per month;\n(b)  no meetings with third parties;\n(c)  prohibition on using the telephone, except for one call – to be recorded – per month to members of the family if the applicant had not had a visit;\n(d)  prohibition on receiving or sending out sums of money in excess of a specified amount, except for defence costs or fines;\n(e)  no more than two parcels of laundry per month;\n(f)  no organisation of cultural, recreational or sports activities;\n(g)  no right to vote in elections for prisoners' representatives or to be elected as a representative;\n(h)  no handicrafts;\n(i)  no more than two hours per day to be spent outdoors. 13.  The applicant appealed against those decrees to the court responsible for the execution of sentences. The parties submitted the factual information set out below.\nDecree no. 1 – The applicant appealed on 2 January 1997. The Palermo court responsible for the execution of sentences held a hearing on 11 March 1997. In an order of 11 March 1997, deposited with the registry on 15 March 1997, the court declared the appeal inadmissible in accordance with the restrictive case-law followed at the time to the effect that the court hearing the case did not have power to examine the merits of the restrictions imposed.\nDecree no. 2 – In an order of 29 July 1997, deposited with the registry on 31 July 1997, the Florence court responsible for the execution of sentences declared inoperative the restrictions referred to in (a), (e) and (f) of the above list.\nDecree no. 3 – On an unknown date the applicant appealed to the Bologna court responsible for the execution of sentences. The court held a hearing on 27 January 1998 and dismissed the appeal in an order of the same day, which was deposited with the registry on 30 January 1998.\nDecree no. 4 – The applicant appealed on 19 May 1998. On 10 October 1998 the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences set the case down for hearing on 12 November 1998. On 30 March 1999 the President of the court declared the appeal inadmissible. He noted that the period of validity of the decree had expired and that the applicant accordingly no longer had any interest in having it examined.\nDecree no. 5 – The applicant did not appeal against this decree.\nDecree no. 6 – The applicant appealed on 14 May 1999. On 9 June 1999 the rehabilitation unit of Spoleto Prison confirmed a report that had previously been made in connection with another appeal. In a request of 21 September 1999 sent to the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences, the applicant's lawyer asked for the appeal to be heard. On 4 December 1999 the President of the court declared the appeal inadmissible. He noted that the period of validity of the decree had expired and that the applicant accordingly no longer had any interest in having it examined.\nDecree no. 7 – The applicant appealed on 12 November 1999. On 12 February 2000 the President of the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences declared the appeal inadmissible. He noted that the period of validity of the decree had expired and that the applicant accordingly no longer had any interest in having it examined.\nDecree no. 8 – On 28 March 2000 the President of the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences granted the applicant legal aid. On 10 April 2000 he set the case down for hearing on 4 May 2000. In an order of the same date, deposited with the registry on 8 May, the court allowed the appeal regarding the restriction on the applicant's right to receive parcels and dismissed the remainder.\nDecree no. 9 – The applicant appealed on 28 June 2000. On 8 January 2001 the President of the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences declared it inadmissible on the ground that the applicant no longer had any interest in having it examined since the period of validity of the decree had expired on 31 December 2000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Plevník - Drienové. 5.  Inheritance proceedings in respect of the applicant's father's estate were concluded by a decision of 31 July 1962. The stamp on that decision indicates that it became final on 27 October 1962. 6.  On 17 February 1995 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court, upon the appeal of an heir lodged on 15 October 1962, quashed the above decision on the ground that it (i) had been issued without sufficient establishment of the facts and (ii) could not be reviewed for lack of reasons. On 6 March 1995 the case file was remitted for further examination to the Považská Bystrica District Court which had taken over similar cases in the meantime. 7.  On 13 July 1998 the district court discontinued the proceedings since the matter at issue was a res iudicata. The district court stated that the decision of the State Notary of 31 July 1962 had become final on 27 October 1962 and that no new assets had been found. On 31 May 1999 the Trenčín Regional Court quashed the decision of 13 July 1998 and remitted the case file for further examination to the first-instance. It reasoned that the decision of the State Notary of 31 July 1962 had been quashed by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 17 February 1995 and the case file had been remitted for further examination. On 25 May 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal on points of law lodged against the decision of the Trenčín Regional Court of 31 May 1999. 8.  On 25 March 2004 the district court stayed the inheritance proceedings pending the outcome of another set of civil proceedings (file no. 6 C 156/04, see below). On 15 July and 18 November 2004 the district court corrected errors in its decision. The district court decided on the applicant's appeal in its decision of 5 May 2005. The decision to stay the inheritance proceedings became final on 3 June 2005. 9.  In the subsequent period, the district court repeatedly verified whether the related civil proceedings had ended. The inheritance proceedings are still stayed. 10.  On 18 March 2010 the Považská Bystrica District Court delivered a judgment. Those proceedings are now pending before the appellate court. 11.  On 7 March 2002 the Považská Bystrica District Court dismissed the applicant's claim to have a donation contract declared null and void. On 22 April 2003 the Trenčín Regional Court confirmed the judgment. 12.  On 10 May 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the Považská Bystrica District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay in proceedings nos. D1133/98, Dnot 652/96. 13.  The Constitutional Court awarded 60,000 Slovakian korunas to the applicant as just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered reimbursement of the applicant's legal costs. It did not order the district court to avoid further delays as the inheritance proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of related civil proceedings. 14.  The Constitutional Court noted that (i) it had jurisdiction to examine the duration of the proceedings only as from 15 February 1993 and (ii) until 6 March 1995 the district court had correctly assumed that the inheritance proceedings had been concluded by a final decision. Therefore, it examined the delays which had occurred in the proceedings only after 6 March 1995. It further stated that even after that date the proceedings had lasted nine years and the district court had been responsible for four years and nine months of delays. 15.  A Constitutional Court judge informed the applicant in a letter of 24 August 2004 that his submission concerning the proceedings before the Považská Bystrica District Court in case no. 3 C 845/01 did not comply with the formal requirements for proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 16.  On 18 February 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's complaint about the length of unspecified proceedings before the Považská Bystrica District and Regional Court and the State Notary as falling short of the statutory requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1970, 1963 and 1989 and live in Paks and Budapest respectively. 6.  At the material time, Mr Vajnai was Vice-President and Ms Noé and Mr Bakó were activists of the Workers’ Party (Munkáspárt), a registered left-wing political party. The party had no known intention of participating in Hungarian political life in defiance of the rule of law. 7.  On 21 December 2008 the applicants organised an event in front of a shopping mall in Budapest, entitled “Anti-Capitalist Santa Claus”, with the intention to demonstrate against consumerism, draw attention to poverty, point out the shortcomings of market economy, and demand free internet access for all. 8.  To express their affiliation with Communism, four persons, including the applicants, displayed a sheet and a flag with a five-pointed red star and distributed leaflets with their political message, depicting red stars. 9.  In application of section 269/B(1) of the Criminal Code, a police patrol which was present called on the applicants to terminate the demonstration, checked their identity and committed them to Budapest VI District Police Department for interrogation. 10.  On 23 December 2008 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Independent Police Complaints Board against the police measures. They relied on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights adopted in the case of Vajnai v. Hungary (no. 33629/06, ECHR 2008). They referred to the Court’s finding that the prosecution for having worn a red star had amounted to a violation of Mr Vajnai’s freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention. 11.  The applicants’ complaints were dismissed by the Complaints Board on 4 March 2009. 12.  The applicants’ further complaints against the measures were dismissed by the District Police Department on 22 May 2009. This decision was upheld by the Budapest Chief Police Commander, acting as a second-instance authority, on 17 November 2009. 13.  On 29 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ requests for judicial review. The court held that the display of the red star contravened section 269/B of the Criminal Code, despite the Vajnai judgment, whose application in the circumstances had been no task of the police officers present on the premises. Consequently, the applicants’ identity check and committal to the Police Department was justified under sections 29 (1) and 33 (1) of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police. 14.  In review proceedings, the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s decision on 22 June 2011 (in the case of Mr Bakó), 27 June 2011 (in the case of Ms Noé), and 5 September 2011 (in the case of Mr Vajnai), endorsing in essence the first-instance decisions’ reasoning. 15.  The applicants, jointly (they had a lawyer in common), incurred altogether 2,760 euros in legal costs.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Kraków. 6.  The realities of the international situation following the end of the Second World War prevented the Republic of Poland from asserting any claims arising out of persecution of its citizens by Nazi Germany, including as forced labourers. 7.  In the period immediately following the Second World War Poland did not conclude a specific agreement with Germany regarding the issue of reparations. It relied on the Potsdam Agreement of 1 August 1945, concluded by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 8.  On 27 February 1953 the London Agreement on Germany’s External Debts (London Debt Agreement) was concluded by the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Under this Agreement, consideration of claims arising out of the Second World War by countries which were at war with or were occupied by Germany during that war, and by nationals of such countries, against the Reich or agencies of the Reich was deferred until final settlement of the issue of reparations. 9.  On 23 August 1953, a day after a similar declaration by the Government of the Soviet Union, the Government of Poland declared that it renounced any claims against Germany in respect of war reparations as of 1 January 1954. In a declaration of 27 September 1969, made at the United Nations, the Government of Poland clarified that the renouncement of 1953 did not affect individual claims arising out of unlawful acts. 10.  In 1972 the Federal Republic of Germany made an ex-gratia payment of DM 100 million to the Polish Government for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments. 11.  It was only after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany of 12 September 1990 (the so‑called Two‑Plus‑Four Treaty) and the conclusion of two treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland in 1990[1] and 1991[2] that the issue of persons persecuted by the Nazi regime was addressed in the bilateral Agreement of 16 October 1991 (see paragraph 30 below). 12.  The issue of compensation for slave and forced labour during the Second World War was addressed in the Joint Statement of 17 July 2000 and the German Law of 2 August 2000 on the Creation of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation (see relevant law below). 13.  In June 1942 the applicant was deported from Grójec, which was then part of the Polish territories annexed by the Third Reich, to Wadów, located on the territory of the General Government (Generalna Gubernia, an administrative entity established by the German authorities in occupied Poland). He worked as a forced labourer on a German farm in Wadów until the liberation in January 1945. 14.  In August 2001 the applicant applied to the “Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation” (“the Foundation” or “the Polish Foundation”) for payment of compensation for his forced labour during the war. That request was made under the scheme for slave and forced labourers (“the second compensation scheme”). On 23 July 2004 the Foundation’s Verification Commission dismissed the applicant’s claims. It found that the applicant’s forced labour did not entitle him to receive benefits under any of the categories for eligibility. The applicant appealed on 31 August 2004. He argued that he had worked on a German farm and submitted three documents in support of his claim. The first document was a certificate issued by the Ruszcza Catholic Parish on the basis of its parish records. The certificate stated that between 1942 and 1945 there had been a farm in Wadów owned by Z.K. (married name: Hochsman) and administered by W. Hochsman, a German national. The second document was a certificate issued by the Wadów Agricultural Society. It confirmed that there had been a farm in Wadów owned and administered by a German national, W. Hoffman. The last document was issued by the Kraków Regional Agrarian Office and certified that in 1945 the farm in Wadów had been acquired by the State in the context of agrarian reform. 15.  On 21 December 2004 the Foundation’s Appeal Commission upheld the refusal. It found that the applicant had been deported from Grójec in Upper Silesia to Wadów in the General Government. In the case of persons deported from one administrative entity to another, it was necessary to establish that they had been subjected to forced labour on a German farm or for a German company. According to the Appeal Commission, the applicant did not adduce documents demonstrating that the farm in Wadów had been under German administration or that its owners had belonged to the List of German Nationals (Deutsche Volksliste; niemiecka grupa narodowościowa). In particular, the Appeal Commission refused to accept a certificate issued by the Ruszcza Catholic Parish as relevant proof, since it had not been based on archival documents. Similarly, it did not consider as relevant the document issued by the Agricultural Society, as it had been based on witness statements. Other documents produced by the applicant did not confirm that the farm in Wadów had been under German administration. 16.  The applicant strongly contested the Verification Commission’s findings. He turned to various authorities and institutions, seeking to challenge those findings. In 2006 he complained to the Ombudsman about the Foundation’s refusal to grant him compensation. 17.  Following the Ombudsman’s inquiry, the Foundation’s Appeal Commission re-examined the applicant’s claims. However, on 29 May 2006 it again refused them. First, the Appeal Commission stated that section 11 of the German Foundation Act (“the GFA”), which set out the categories of eligible persons, was not directly applicable to the applicant. However, following the agreement made in the framework of the so-called “openness clause” (tzw. klauzula otwartości; section 9 § 8 of the GFA) the Polish Foundation with the approval of the German Foundation agreed to extend the category of eligible claimants to other groups, including relocated persons (osoby dyslokowane). That category included forced labourers who had been deported within the territory of the Polish State and crossed the border between the administrative entities established by the occupying authorities. The additional condition for relocated persons was to produce documents which attested that they had worked on a farm under German administration or for a German company. Relevant evidence to that effect should have been produced on the basis of the local archives, indicating which documents had been relied on. 18.  The Appeal Commission underlined that the applicant had not established in a requisite manner that the farm in question had been under German administration. It could not take into consideration the certificate issued by the Wadów Agricultural Society as it had been based on witness statements. The applicant was informed that documents based on witness statements were not regarded as relevant evidence. Furthermore, the Appeal Commission did not consider the certificate issued by the Ruszcza Catholic Parish as sufficient proof that the farm in question had been under German administration. That certificate had been issued on the basis of the parish records but without providing further details about the latter. Similarly, the document issued by the Regional Agrarian Office was not considered relevant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Budapest. 6.  On 17 January 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, then employed as a security guard, and his alleged accomplices. They were charged with aggravated extortion, endorsement of and profiteering from prostitution and other offences. The applicant, when he learned that the police had been looking for him, presented himself at the police station on his own initiative. 7.  On 18 January 2007 the prosecution filed a motion for his pre-trial detention. The risks of absconding, repetition of crime and collusion were referred to. 8.  On 19 January 2007 the Pest Central District Court ordered the detention. Only the last-mentioned reason was retained, since the court held that – in the face of the applicant’s settled family life, legal income and the fact that he had no previous convictions – the impending severe sanction was insufficient reason for assuming that he might abscond and, moreover, that the continuous nature of the offence he was charged with did not necessarily entail the risk of repetition of crime. 9.  On 1 February 2007 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the measure, retaining all the reasons proposed by the prosecution. The Regional Court observed that the applicant had no legal income, his personal situation was unknown and one of his accomplices had absconded. 10.  The applicant’s detention was then repeatedly prolonged at the statutory intervals on the basis of the risk of collusion and intimidation of witnesses. In particular, it was pointed out by the courts that there were elements in the investigation file according to which the applicant and his associate had attempted to influence some witnesses and that a summons sent to a witness – who had subsequently withdrawn his testimony – had been seized by the police from one of the defendants in the case. 11.  On 4 May 2007 the defence proposed, to no avail, that the detention be substituted with a less stringent measure, since at this late stage of the proceedings the risk of collusion was no longer relevant. On 7 May 2007 the applicant’s lawyer complained that no evidence was accessible to him from the prosecution’s side underlying the risk of the applicant’s intimidating the witnesses. On 31 May 2007 the applicant filed another motion, again unsuccessfully, pointing out that the risk of collusion was not substantiated by any evidence known to him. A similar complaint was made in vain on 13 September 2007. 12.  Another prolongation order issued meanwhile, on 12 September 2007, was based afresh on the risk of repetition of crime, in addition to that of absconding. On appeal, the former reason was discarded but the latter retained, with the reasoning that although the investigation had been terminated, the organised nature of the crime with which the accused were charged and their attitude towards the witnesses necessitated the continued detention. 13.  On 17 October 2007 a bill of indictment was preferred. 14.  On 19 October 2007 the detention was prolonged because of the risk of absconding and collusion. The applicant appealed, arguing that nothing indicated that he would abscond in the face of his settled background, and that no elements communicated to him by the authorities would allude to any real risk of collusion.\nOn 28 November 2007 the appeal was rejected but the risk of collusion was not maintained. 15.  At the first court hearing, on 18 December 2007 one of the accomplices was released on bail. However, the same was refused in respect of the applicant. The court pointed out that the proposed bail did not secure the applicant’s availability for justice in view of the impending severe sanction. 16.  A further motion with a view to release on bail was decided on 19 February 2008. The applicant’s detention was maintained, because of the risk of absconding, given the seriousness of the charges. His appeal and further requests for release on bail or the application of less stringent coercion were to no avail. The trial court made repeated references to the risk of absconding in the face of the potential severe sanction. 17.  Finally, on 10 December 2008 the applicant was released but was prohibited from leaving his domicile.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the town of Chekhov in the Moscow region. He is the pastor of the “Christ's Grace” Church of Evangelical Christians (Церковь евангельских христиан “Благодать Христова”). 7.  On 9 September 2002 the applicant applied to the Chekhov Town Council for permission to hold a service in public between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. on 22 or 29 September 2002. 8.  On 20 September 2002 the deputy head of the Chekhov Town Council refused permission. In particular, he stated that the Chekhov Town Council had on many occasions informed the applicant that it was not possible to hold services in public areas in the town (squares, streets, parks, etc.). The applicant was advised to hold services and other religious rites at the registered seat of the church or on other premises owned or used by the church members. 9.  On 26 September 2002 the applicant challenged the refusal of the Town Council before a court. He alleged violations of the rights to freedom of religion and assembly. 10.  On 11 October 2002 the Chekhov Town Court of the Moscow Region examined the applicant's claim and dismissed it. The court found that, pursuant to the domestic law, public worship and other religious rites were subject to an authorisation by a municipal authority. It further ruled as follows:\n“The contested refusal is lawful because it is justified. As the Church of Evangelical Christians practices a religion that is different from the religion professed by the majority of the local residents, and having regard to the fact that in the Chekhov district there are more than twenty religious organisations of different denominations, a service of worship in a public area held by one of them may lead to ... the discontent of individuals of other denominations and public disorder.\nIn these circumstances, the contested acts of the Chekhov Town Council cannot be deemed to impair the rights of the 'Christ's Grace' Church of Evangelical Christians as they do not prevent it from holding services in religious buildings or on other premises intended for that purpose.” 11.  The applicant appealed. On 4 November 2002 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment of 11 October 2002.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ankara. 8.  In the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002, as a member of the People's Republican Party (CHP), he was elected MP for the Konya constituency to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (“the National Assembly”). 9.  Prior to his election he practised as a lawyer in Konya and, in the course of his professional activities, two sets of criminal proceedings were brought against him, one for insulting a lawyer and the other for insulting a public official. 10.  As an MP he enjoyed parliamentary immunity. 11.  On 23 December 2002 the Karapınar public prosecutor applied to the General Directorate of the Ministry of Justice to have the applicant's parliamentary immunity lifted for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against him for insulting a lawyer. 12.  On 17 January 2003 the General Directorate of the Ministry of Justice transmitted the request to the Prime Minister's Office. 13.  On 11 April 2003 the Konya Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) adopted a decision suspending the criminal proceedings against the applicant for insulting a public official, by virtue of Article 83 of the Constitution (on parliamentary immunity) and Article 253 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14.  On 4 December 2003 the Assize Court transmitted the case file to the Ministry of Justice with a view to having the applicant's parliamentary immunity lifted. 15.  On 23 December 2003 the Department of Criminal Affairs of the Ministry of Justice referred the question to the Prime Minister. 16.  The Prime Minister's Office transmitted the case file to the National Assembly's joint committee (“the joint committee”). 17.  On 28 May 2004, after noting that the applicant had requested the lifting of his immunity, the joint committee decided, in view of the nature of the charges, to stay the proceedings against him for insulting a public official until the end of his term of parliamentary office. It transmitted its decision to the plenary Assembly of the National Assembly (“the plenary Assembly”). 18.  When the plenary Assembly met on 8 December 2004 the joint committee's report was read and appended to the minutes of the meeting. 19.  On 15 December 2004 the applicant challenged the joint committee's decision. In his pleadings he made the point that parliamentary immunity had not been introduced to render Members of Parliament unaccountable or immune from punishment, but to allow them to discharge their duties wholly independently and dispassionately. Unlike non-liability, he argued, immunity was by nature a relative and temporary privilege. However, the scope of the immunity, the procedure for lifting it and the shortcomings in its implementation had undermined due respect for the National Assembly. The applicant added that it was unacceptable, in a society governed by the rule of law, that an institution originally meant to help MPs to discharge their duties should be transformed into a personal privilege. 20.  On an unspecified date examination of the matter of the lifting of the applicant's parliamentary immunity in the proceedings concerning the insulting of a lawyer was referred to the joint committee under Rules 131 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly. The National Assembly decided to stay the proceedings until the dissolution of the 22nd Parliament. 21.  On 31 January 2005 the applicant challenged that decision. 22.  His file was then sent before the plenary Assembly. 23.  On 7 February 2005 the Secretariat of the Speaker's Office informed the applicant that the files concerning him had been placed on the agenda of the plenary Assembly. 24.  At the meeting of the plenary Assembly on 16 February 2005 the applicant once again asked to be allowed to avail himself of his right to be judged in a fair trial and requested that the obstacles to his exercise of that right be removed. 25.  The applicant was re-elected as CHP party MP for the Konya constituency in the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007. 26.  On 8 January 2008 the Speaker of the National Assembly sent him a letter informing him of progress with the procedure for lifting his parliamentary immunity.\nThe relevant passages read as follows:\n“(...) during the 22nd Parliament [2002-2007] 299 files concerning immunity were forwarded to the joint committee. In 252 cases the committee decided to stay the proceedings until the next dissolution. In 226 cases that decision was challenged. The files corresponding to those cases were placed on the plenary Assembly's agenda for examination. However, the plenary Assembly did not examine them.\nDuring the 22nd Parliament's term two files concerned your immunity. The first, file no. 3/176, concerned the proceedings brought against you by the Konya-Ereğli public prosecutor for insulting a lawyer; the second, file no. 3/453, concerned the proceedings before the Konya Assize Court for insulting a public official. In both cases the joint committee decided to stay the proceedings until the end of your term of office. Following your appeal, the files were placed on the plenary Assembly's agenda but have not been examined.\nIn this 23rd Parliament [which started in 2007] 77 files concerning the lifting of immunity remain pending before the joint committee. Two of those files are in your name; they were given the numbers 3/107 and 3/129 following your re-election on 22 July 2007. Since the beginning of this Parliament all the files, including yours, have been sent before three preparatory committees set up by the joint committee. These committees started work on 27 December 2007 (...). They are to announce their decisions within a month of that date.” 27.  On 23 and 24 January 2008 the applicant filed two defence memorials against the suspension of the two sets of criminal proceedings against him. In them he repeated his wish to be allowed to exercise his right to a fair trial.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  On 7 August 2000 a mother contacted the police on account of a suspicion that her children, a girl born in 1991 and a boy born in 1993, had been sexually abused by a neighbour, the applicant. On 10 August and 2 September 2000 the siblings were interviewed by a police officer experienced in investigating sexual abuse of children. The applicant was also suspected of having abused two other girls, both friends of the siblings and born in 1991. The girls were interviewed by the police on 11 August and 18 August respectively and again on 3 September 2000. All the interviews were recorded on videotape. 7.  At the time of the first interviews, i.e. on the morning of 10 August 2000, the applicant had not been informed of the suspicions against him and no defence counsel had yet been appointed for him. Neither the applicant nor his counsel was present during the later interviews. The siblings and one of the other girls underwent a psychological examination in the Family Advice Centre with a view to assessing whether their testimonies during the pre-trial investigation were reliable. 8.  Meanwhile, on the afternoon of 10 August 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police. Before the questioning he was notified of the suspicions against him and it appears that he did not exercise his right to have his counsel present. The applicant was in detention from that day until 7 September 2000 when travel restrictions were imposed on him. He was accompanied by counsel when questioned again on 17, 18, 19 and 23 August and 6 September 2000. He was questioned alone on 12 January 2001. 9.  Prior to the close of the pre-trial investigation, in his closing statement the applicant requested, on 7 December 2000, having watched the above-mentioned video recordings, that the siblings be questioned again and that his questions be put to them about how and where they had learnt about the sexual things they had mentioned to him and, in particular, if they had been subjected to sexual acts at a place other than the applicant's home. His request was however refused on 21 January 2001. According to the Government, this was because their mother had refused to allow any further questioning of the children, now aged 7 and 9. 10.  The applicant was charged before the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) with having sexually abused the four children during the summer of 2000. He denied the charges. He however admitted having tapped two of the girls on their buttocks. 11.  In February 2001 the District Court held an oral hearing during which the applicant, the parents of the siblings and the mothers of the other two girls gave evidence. The children were not heard in person. The videotaped interviews with the children were shown during the hearing. The court also heard evidence from a psychologist on the reliability of the statements of the siblings and of one of the other girls. The applicant did not request that the children give evidence at the hearing. 12.  The mother of the siblings testified that they had told her about the improper touching in the same manner as they had done on the videotape. When the touching had become known, on 1 August 2000, her son had reacted intensely by crying and slamming doors. He had also suffered from sleeping problems and her daughter had suffered from headaches. Neither of these ailments had occurred before. According to two written opinions of the Family Advice Centre, the siblings' accounts of the events were considered credible given their detailed and precise nature. There was nothing to suggest that they were the siblings' own inventions. The mothers of the two other girls testified that they had told them about the improper touching in the same manner as they had done on the videotape. 13.  In its judgment of 28 February 2001 the District Court observed that the evidence was mainly of an indirect nature and that the sole direct evidence was the testimony of a psychologist, who had testified as to the children's credibility. 14.  The court noted that the applicant had argued that the main evidence in the case was flawed due to the fact that he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to the children and that the authorities had put leading questions to them. He had also argued that there were shortcomings insofar as the psychological examinations carried out by the Family Advice Centre were concerned. The court however found no such flaws as would significantly have reduced the evidentiary value of the examinations. 15.  The court then stated that the case turned on an assessment of the credibility of the children's statements. While it was true that the pre-trial statements' probative value was weakened by the fact that the applicant had not been able to put questions to the children, these statements were nonetheless reliable as the children had provided details about the events and as their young age gave no reason to believe that they would have sought to lie about the events. Although some leading questions may have been put to the children, there was nothing to suggest that they would have sought to please the interviewer and adapted their replies accordingly. This being so, the court found that questioning the children in court would not have added anything significant to the case. Having regard to their best interests, the questioning of children of such a young age before a court could not be considered justifiable. The court found that the testimonies of the psychologist and the parents supported the credibility of the children's accounts. 16.  It convicted the applicant of having sexually abused the four children and sentenced him to two years and three months' imprisonment. 17.  The applicant appealed, alleging inter alia a breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention in that he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to the children. 18.  The Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) held an oral hearing and was presented with the same evidence as had been before the District Court. The parties agreed that it was in the best interests of the children that they should not be heard before the court. The applicant however rejected the admission of the children's pre-trial statements as evidence since he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to them. 19.  In its judgment of 6 November 2001 the Court of Appeal noted that the children had been interviewed twice during the pre-trial investigation and all but one of the girls had been examined in the Family Advice Centre using tests and interviews. As the questioning of the children, now aged 8 to 10, before the court would probably have caused them suffering, it was possible to use in evidence their pre-trial statements, although the applicant's minimum rights under, inter alia, Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention would thereby be violated. In evaluating the weight to be attached to the children's statements, the court found that it had to take into account the discrepancies pointed out by the applicant and the fact that the police had not put to the children the questions proposed by him in his pre-trial closing statement. 20.  In its assessment of the evidence the appellate court reached the same conclusions as the lower court and upheld the conviction. It however reduced the sentence to one year and eight months' imprisonment, which it considered fair, having regard to the fact that the applicant had not forced the children into doing anything, the relevant sentencing practice and the fact that the applicant had no previous convictions. 21.  The applicant requested leave to appeal, maintaining, inter alia, that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. He did not submit any request for the children to be heard. 22.  On 28 February 2002 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "12.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1965 respectively and live in Bouligny. 13.  In 1990 the applicants had their first child, A., who was born with type 1 infantile spinal amyotrophy, a genetic disorder causing atrophy of the muscles. 14.  In 1992 Mrs Maurice became pregnant again. A prenatal diagnosis conducted at Nancy University Hospital revealed that there was a risk of the unborn child’s being afflicted by the same genetic disorder. The applicants chose to terminate the pregnancy. 15.  In 1997 Mrs Maurice, who was pregnant for the third time, again requested a prenatal diagnosis. This was conducted at Briey General Hospital, which sent the sample to the molecular diagnosis laboratory of the Necker Children’s Hospital Group, run by Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris (“AP-HP”). In June 1997, in the light of that laboratory’s diagnosis, Briey General Hospital assured the applicants that the unborn child was not suffering from infantile spinal amyotrophy and was “healthy”. 16.  C. was born on 25 September 1997. Less than two years after her birth it became apparent that she too suffered from infantile spinal amyotrophy. On 22 July 1999 a report by the head of the laboratory at the Necker Children’s Hospital in Paris revealed that the mistaken prenatal diagnosis was the result of transposing the results of the analyses relating to the applicants’ family and those of another family, caused by the switching of two bottles. 17.  According to medical reports, C. presents grave disorders and objective signs of functional deficiency – frequent falls from which she is unable to get up unassisted, unsteady walk, tiredness at any effort. She needs the assistance of another person (particularly at night in order to turn her over so as to prevent her from suffocating, since she is unable to turn over alone). She cannot sit on her own and moves around with an electric scooter. She has to receive treatment several times a week and cannot be admitted to school because the latter is not suitably equipped. Her family doctor has expressed the view that “one must have reservations until the time of puberty both about motor and respiratory functions and about possible orthopaedic deformations”. These facts gave rise to several sets of proceedings. 18.  On 13 November 2000 the applicants submitted a claim to AP-HP seeking compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of C.’s disability. 19.  They also submitted to the urgent applications judge at the Paris Administrative Court a request for an interim award and for an expert to be appointed. The latter was appointed by an order issued on 4 December 2000. 20.  In an order made on 26 April 2001, the urgent applications judge at the Paris Administrative Court dismissed the request for an interim award on the ground that, as the expert had not yet delivered his report, “AP-HP’s obligation to pay [could] not be regarded as indisputable”. 21.  The expert submitted his report on 11 June 2001, concluding that on the occasion of the prenatal diagnosis conducted at the AP-HP laboratory there had not been medical negligence, because “the techniques employed [had been] consistent with the known scientific facts”, but there had been “negligence in the organisation and functioning of the service causing the transposition of results between two families tested at the same time”. 22.  The applicants lodged a further application, asking for the hospital to be ordered to pay them an advance of 594,551 euros (EUR). In an order made on 19 December 2001, the urgent applications judge at the Paris Administrative Court ordered AP-HP to pay an advance of EUR 152,449. He observed in particular:\n“... it is apparent from the investigation that in May 1997, at Briey General Hospital, a sample of amniotic fluid was taken from [Mrs Maurice] ...; that the analysis of that amniotic fluid was carried out by Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris; that while the results given [to the applicants] indicated that the unborn child was not suffering from infantile spinal amyotrophy, they related to a sample taken from another family tested at the same time and did not mention that, the sample of amniotic fluid having been contaminated by the mother’s blood, they were attended by uncertainty; that [the applicants] are therefore entitled to argue that Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris was guilty of negligent acts or omissions; that those negligent acts wrongly led [the applicants] to the certainty that the child conceived was not suffering from infantile spinal amyotrophy and that [Mrs Maurice’s] pregnancy could be carried to term in the normal way; that these negligent acts must be regarded as the direct causes of the damage sustained by [the applicants] from the disorder from which C. suffers; and that, this being the case, the existence of the obligation claimed by [the applicants] is not seriously open to challenge.” 23.  AP-HP appealed. In its submissions it argued that, while the transposition of the analyses had indeed constituted negligence in the organisation and functioning of the public hospital service, the only result of that negligence had been to deprive the applicants of information apt to enlighten their decision to seek a termination of the pregnancy. On the basis of the above-mentioned expert report, AP-HP submitted that even if the samples had not been transposed, the results would have been uncertain, having regard to the presence of the mother’s blood in the sample taken. Consequently, the applicants would not in any case have had reliable information available to them. 24.  In a judgment of 13 June 2002, the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal varied the order issued by the urgent applications judge, reducing from EUR 152,449 to EUR 15,245 the amount of the interim award to the applicants. In its judgment it observed:\n“Liability:\n... after the birth [of C.], as the child had been found to be suffering from [infantile spinal amyotrophy], it emerged that the reason incorrect information had been given to the parents was that the results of the analyses carried out on two patients had been switched. It is not contested that the results were switched by the staff of [AP-HP] ...The negligence thus committed, as a result of which [Mrs Maurice] had no reason to request an additional examination with a view to termination of the pregnancy on therapeutic grounds, must be regarded as the direct cause of the prejudice suffered by [the applicants].”\nThe court went on to say:\n“Entitlement to the interim award requested:\n... the infantile spinal amyotrophy from which the child C. suffers is not the direct consequence of the above-mentioned negligence ... Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions ... of paragraph I of section 1 of the Law of 4 March 2002 [on patients’ rights and the quality of the health service – “the Law of 4 March 2002”], [AP-HP] would only be required to compensate the damage sustained by [the applicants], to the exclusion of the ‘special burdens arising throughout the life of the child’ from the latter’s disability, compensation for disability being a matter for national solidarity according to those same provisions. That being so, [AP-HP]’s plea that, for assessment of [the applicants’] right to compensation, the above-mentioned provisions of the Law of 4 March 2002 should have been applied to the dispute constitutes a serious defence against the applicants’ claim at first instance, in the amount awarded by the court below. If the above-mentioned legislative provisions ... are held to be applicable in the main proceedings now pending in the Paris Administrative Court, the only obligation [on AP-HP] which could be regarded as not seriously open to challenge would be the obligation to compensate [the applicants] for their non-pecuniary damage, which should be fixed, in the circumstances of the case, at 15,245 euros. Consequently, the interim award [AP-HP] is required to pay should be reduced to that sum ...” 25.  The applicants and AP-HP appealed on points of law. The applicants submitted only one ground of appeal to the Conseil d’Etat. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, they argued that the immediate applicability of the Law of 4 March 2002 to pending proceedings was contrary to the Convention. 26.  Having been seised in the context of a similar case (Draon, also submitted to the Court, application no. 1513/03), the Conseil d’Etat ruled, in an opinion delivered on 6 December 2002, that the Law of 4 March 2002 was indeed applicable to pending proceedings and was compatible with the provisions of the Convention (see paragraph 52 below). 27.  In a judgment of 19 February 2003 the Conseil d’Etat, ruling on the above-mentioned appeal on points of law, followed the line set out in that opinion, observing:\n“It is not seriously open to challenge that such facts constituting gross negligence [faute caractérisée] which deprived [the applicants] of the possibility of terminating the pregnancy on therapeutic grounds, confer entitlement to compensation pursuant to section 1 of the Law of 4 March 2002, which came into force after the ruling of the urgent applications judge at the Paris Administrative Court and is applicable to pending proceedings. It is appropriate, in the particular circumstances of the case, to set at 50,000 euros the amount of the interim award [AP-HP] is required to pay on account of the prejudice sustained by [the applicants] personally.” 28.  Having received no reply from AP-HP two months after submitting their claim on 13 November 2000, and the absence of any reply amounting to implicit rejection, the applicants brought proceedings in the Paris Administrative Court. In their application they requested that the implicit rejection be set aside and AP-HP ordered to pay them, in particular, the following amounts: 2,900,000 French francs (FRF) (EUR 442,102) for the construction of a house and the purchase of a vehicle and a wheelchair; FRF 500,000 (EUR 76,225) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and disruption to their lives; FRF 10,000,000 (EUR 1,524,490) for pecuniary damage; and FRF 30,000 (EUR 4,573) in respect of the non-pecuniary damage suffered by their eldest daughter. 29.  Following the opinion given by the Conseil d’Etat on 6 December 2002, the applicants submitted supplementary observations to the Administrative Court asking it not to consider itself bound by the Judicial Assembly’s opinion and to declare the Law of 4 March 2002 incompatible with the provisions of the Convention. AP-HP, for its part, again submitted that the prenatal diagnosis communicated to the applicants would have been uncertain even if the results had not been transposed. 30.  In a judgment of 25 November 2003, the Paris Administrative Court ordered AP-HP to pay the applicants a total of EUR 224,500 (EUR 220,000 on their own behalf and EUR 4,500 on behalf of their eldest daughter) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and the disruption to their lives. It observed in particular:\n“LIABILITY:\n[The applicants] seek to establish [AP-HP’s] liability for the damage they suffered on account of the fact that their daughter C. was born with a disability not detected during pregnancy.\n...\nThe provisions of section 1 of the Law of 4 March 2002, in the absence of any provisions in the Law providing for deferred entry into force, are applicable under the conditions of ordinary law following publication of the Law in the Official Gazette of the French Republic. The rules which it lays down, as decided by the legislature on general-interest grounds relating to ethical considerations, the proper organisation of the health service and the equitable treatment of all disabled persons, are not incompatible with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention ..., with those of Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention or with those of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to [the] Convention. ... The general-interest ground which the legislature took into account when laying down the rules contained in the first three sub-paragraphs of paragraph I justifies their application to situations which arose prior to the commencement of pending proceedings. Having regard to the wording of the Law of 4 March 2002, neither the fact that the system of compensation has not yet entered into force nor the fact that the mistaken diagnosis is alleged to have resulted from negligence in the organisation and functioning of the service are such as to bar application of the above-mentioned provisions to the present proceedings brought on 16 March 2001.\nThe administrative courts do not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of statute law. The appellants cannot therefore validly assert that the above-mentioned Law of 4 March 2002 is unconstitutional.\n[The applicants], whose eldest daughter suffers from infantile spinal amyotrophy, and who decided in 1992 to terminate another pregnancy after a prenatal diagnosis had revealed that the unborn child was afflicted by the same pathology, had a daughter named C. in 1997 who was discovered during 1999 to be likewise suffering from that disorder despite the fact that, in view of the results of the amniocentesis conducted on [Mrs Maurice], they had been told that the foetus was healthy. That information proved to have been incorrect because the results from two patients had been transposed. The investigation showed that the switch was imputable to [AP-HP], which runs the Necker Children’s Hospital on whose premises the sample had been analysed. The switching of the results constituted gross negligence [faute caractérisée] for the purposes of the Law of 4 March 2002. In order to absolve itself of liability, Assistance publique-Hôpitaux de Paris cannot effectively argue that, even in the absence of negligence, the diagnosis would not have been reliable because of the presence of the mother’s blood in the foetal sample, since in such circumstances it was incumbent on the practitioner responsible for the analysis to inform [the applicants] accordingly, so that they would then have been able to have a new sample taken. The gross negligence mentioned above deprived the applicants of the possibility of terminating the pregnancy on therapeutic grounds, for which there is no time-limit. Such negligence entitles them to compensation under the conditions laid down in section 1 of the Law of 4 March 2002 ...” 31.  As regards assessment of the damage suffered, the court ruled as follows:\n“... firstly, the amounts sought in respect of treatment, special education costs and the costs of building a new house and purchasing a vehicle and an electric wheelchair relate to special burdens arising throughout the life of the child from her disability and cannot therefore be sums for which [AP-HP] is liable, regard being had to the above-mentioned provisions of section 1 of the Law of 4 March 2002;\n... secondly, [the applicants] are suffering non-pecuniary damage and disruptions to their lives, particularly their work, of exceptional gravity, regard being had to the profound and lasting change in their lives resulting from the birth of a second severely disabled child. In the circumstances of the case, these two heads of damage must be assessed at 220,000 euros. Consequently, [AP-HP] is ordered to pay that sum to [the applicants], after deducting the interim award paid;\n... thirdly, the above-mentioned provisions of the Law of 4 March 2002 do not bar payment of compensation, under the rules of ordinary law, for the non-pecuniary damage suffered by A. Maurice on account of the fact that her sister was born with a disability. In the circumstances of the case, a fair assessment of that damage requires [AP-HP] to pay the sum of 4,500 euros to [the applicants] acting on behalf of their child;” 32.  On 19 January 2004 the applicants appealed against the above judgment. The appeal is at present pending before the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal. 33.  In a complaint submitted to the Prime Minister on 24 February 2003, the applicants requested payment of compensation in the sum of EUR 1,970,593.33 based on the State’s liability for damage inflicted by reason of the Law of 4 March 2002. 34.  On expiry of the two-month time-limit following the lodging of their complaint, the applicants referred it to the Paris Administrative Court, requesting it to set aside the Prime Minister’s implicit decision to reject it and to order the State to compensate them for the damage they considered they had suffered. 35.  In a judgment of 25 November 2003, the Paris Administrative Court dismissed the complaint. It observed in particular:\n“It is clear from the drafting history of the Law of 4 March 2002 that this provision is based, firstly, on the desire of the legislature not to require health-care professionals or establishments to pay compensation for the burdens occasioned by a disability not detected during pregnancy, and, secondly, on a fundamental requirement: the rejection of any discrimination between disabled persons whose disability would be compensated for in accordance with the principles of liability and those whose disability would be covered by national solidarity, their mother having refused an abortion or the disability being undetectable at the time of the prenatal diagnosis.\nThis desire on the part of the legislature to eliminate any discrimination between disabled persons is a bar to the establishment [by the applicants] of the State’s liability by reason of the immediate application to pending proceedings of the Law of 4 March 2002, for the purpose of obtaining compensation for the special burdens arising from the disability, not detected during pregnancy, of their child C. Consequently, the [applicants’] submissions seeking the annulment of the contested decision and an order requiring the State to pay damages must be dismissed. \n...” 36.  The applicants appealed against this judgment. The appeal is now pending before the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born on 30 January 1959 and lives in Bucharest, Romania. 7.  The applicant was married to I.R. and the couple had two children, C.I., born on 19 December 1992, and Th.N., born on 12 August 1996. 8.  Following divorce and child custody proceedings initiated by I.R. on 21 March 2001, the Bucharest First District Court of First Instance held on 9 October 2001 that the children should live with their mother. The applicant was entitled to visit his children according to the following schedule: every first and third weekend of the month, from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday; two weeks during the summer holidays; and one week during the winter holidays.\nDuring the proceedings, two environment studies were conducted at the applicant’s home and at I.R.’s home respectively. The studies concluded that the children were well taken care of and that their development was in accordance with their age. It was noted that the elder child, C.I., had started living with the applicant on 24 September 2001, and that their relationship was based on good communication. The applicant expressed his wish that C.I. be placed with him, in the light of their close relationship.\nThe court did not interview the two children, given their young age.\nIn delivering its judgment, the court took into consideration the evidence adduced, including the two studies; it held that the mother had proved to have spent more time with the two children, but it also underlined that it was in the two children’s best interests to be placed with their mother, particularly in view of their age. 9.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, reiterating his wish that he be awarded custody of his elder son, C.I., with whom he had a very close relationship.\nOn 21 May 2002 the Bucharest County Court modified the first-instance court’s judgment concerning the custody of C.I., which was awarded to the applicant, in view also of the child’s own choice in the matter. The first-instance court’s reasoning concerning Th.N. was upheld without being reassessed, seeing that none of the parties contested that part of the judgment. The court’s reasoning observed that:\n“In the present case, it is beyond any doubt that both parents provide for their children a very good environment for their development, both financially, and also morally.\nThe fact that during the marriage it was the mother who dedicated more time to the children was because she had more free time available, and also because traditionally, in any family, it is the mother who predominantly takes care of the children, especially during the first years of their lives.\nIt follows that the father cannot be regarded as not having shown interest in the upbringing and education of the children.” 10.  I.R. appealed against the judgment, arguing mainly that it was not in the best interests of the children that they be separated. In support of her request, she submitted several statements given by the children’s teachers, but also by the psychologist E.I.V., who had examined both children; the reports mainly noted that the two children were extremely happy to see each other, as it was obvious that they had a very affectionate relationship and that their separation had affected them both:\n“The behaviour of the two brothers reveals a strongly affectionate relationship, and their break-up was followed by the psychological breakdown of C.I. (...); their separation has been very traumatising for both children”.\nIn another report written by E.I.V, it was noted that Th.N. had suffered as a result of the conflict-ridden relationship of his parents, and that:\n“The state of conflict that marked the parents’ divorce evidently affected the child. The younger child is stable at present, even though he intensely resents the absence of his older brother.\nThe rare contact he had with his father following the latter’s separation from his mother evidently perturbed the psychological state of the younger child, owing to the father’s attempts to inculcate in him a hostile attitude towards the mother and to undermine his trust and his affection for her”.\nThe applicant for his part submitted a copy of a psychological report of 11 September 2002, as well as a medical certificate issued on 16 September 2002 concerning C.I., stating that: the boy was normally developed, presented a level of maturity appropriate for his age and did not have adjustment difficulties as a result of his parents’ separation; the sadness he had shown a few minutes after seeing his little brother proved only that he had reactions which were normal in the case of two separated brothers; and that C.I. had expressed his wish to stay with his father, even though he loved his brother and his mother. 11.  The Bucharest Court of Appeal gave its final judgment on 25 October 2002, upholding the County Court’s determination. The court held that considering C.I.’s age, his choice to live with his father was relevant and could not be ignored. The court also held that it was in the children’s best interests that their parents made it possible for them to see each other and to spend time together, whether at the mother’s house or at the applicant’s house. 12.  Following I.R.’s refusal to let the applicant take Th.N. from her home, allegedly because he did not want to “leave his mum’s house”, the applicant asked the courts to specify the exact manner in which his rights of contact were to be implemented.\nIn its final judgment of 21 April 2003 the Bucharest County Court held that the applicant was entitled to take Th.N. from I.R.’s home according to the visiting schedule which had been previously accepted by the courts. 13.  On 24 May 2002 the applicant initiated enforcement proceedings against I.R.; on 31 May 2002 his request was granted in court. 14.  The first summons was therefore issued by the bailiff for 28 June 2002; on that occasion, the official record drawn up noted I.R.’s absence from her residence.\nOn 9 July 2002, the bailiff requested information from the competent authorities regarding I.R.’s current residence.\nA further summons was issued on 23 August 2002; the record drawn up on 4 October 2002 in the presence of the bailiff, the applicant and a policeman stated that no one had allowed them to enter the premises, even though noises and a human voice could be heard inside the house. 15.  In a further report issued on 16 May 2003 the bailiff noted that I.R. and Th.N. had not been at home.\nThe official report drawn up on 30 May 2003 noted I.R.’s assertions, according to which it was not she who had opposed the applicant seeing Th.N., but, rather, it was the child who had refused any contact with his father. In order for the father-child relationship to reach a normal level, I.R. further asserted that she would make efforts to encourage the child to grow closer to his father. The parties agreed to allow the two children to meet in a public place, firstly on 1 June 2003, between 6 p.m. and 9 p.m., and then also on the following weekends, Saturday and Sunday, between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m., after which the parents would agree upon the new schedule for mutual visits, so that the children would spend the weekends together, with each parent alternately. 16.  On 17 June 2003 I.R. lodged an objection to the report of 30 May 2003, essentially asking for a suspension of its enforcement, on account on the child’s alleged refusal to leave with his father. In support of her claims, she adduced two reports drawn up by the psychologist E.I.V. on 2 April and 16 June 2003 (see also paragraph 33 below).\nOn 14 July 2003 the Bucharest County Court dismissed I.R.’s objection, holding that the annulment of the report drawn up by the bailiff was not justified, in so far as the reasons relied on concerned the merits of the dispute over contact rights.\nThe judgment became final, as it was not appealed against by any of the parties. 17.  On 4 July 2003 the parents met at the bailiff’s office and agreed that during the summer vacation the children should stay alternately, for two weeks at a time, with each parent. I.R., however, could not agree on the period of time at issue, and thus opposed the applicant’s request that Th.N. should stay with him starting on 15 August 2003 at the latest. 18.  On 19 December 2003, in the presence of the bailiff, the applicant went to I.R.’s known residence, where he talked with I.R.’s mother, who informed him that I.R. and Th.N. had left on vacation the previous day. 19.  On 19 March 2004 the applicant and the bailiff went to I.R.’s known residence, where they found I.R.’s father. He told them that I.R. and Th.N. were not at home and asked them to leave.\nOn 30 April 2004 another report was drawn up by the bailiff, noting Th.N.’s refusal to join his father and go to his home. 20.  On 6 July 2004 I.R. again contested the enforcement of the impugned judgment of 2002, seeking to prove that its enforcement had become impossible, having regard to the precarious state of health of Th.N., following his two visits to his father’s house on the weekends of 6 and 20 June 2004. On those occasions, the child allegedly came back to I.R.’s home sick and confused. Following some urine tests, Th.N. was found to have been intoxicated with benzodiazepine (the first time) and with nicotine (the second time).\nWith respect to the alleged incidents, I.R. also lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, accusing him of having endangered Th.N. s physical integrity (see also paragraph 30 below).\nOn 20 September 2005 the Bucharest (First District) Court of First Instance dismissed I.R.’s complaint, holding that in an objection to enforcement proceedings, the parties were not allowed to submit arguments concerning the merits of the enforceable judgment. Moreover, the court held that I.R. had not proven in any way her accusations against the applicant. 21.  I.R. appealed against that judgment, reiterating her allegations that the applicant had endangered Th.N.’s state of health, thereby rendering it objectively impossible to continue with the enforcement of the disputed judgment allowing him contact.\nOn 12 April 2006 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the appeal. In its final judgment, the court held that:\n“Indeed, medical documents were contained in the file, proving that during a specific period of time, the minor did have in his body certain toxic substances; however, no fault or negligence can be imputed to the father in this regard; therefore, no impediment exists to the enforcement of his contact rights.” 22.  In the meantime, on 30 November 2005 the applicant, in the presence of the bailiff, went to I.R.’s known residence, where they found that I.R. had moved to an unknown place. Consequently, on 6 December 2005 the bailiff requested the competent authorities to inform him of I.R.’s new residence. The authorities’ reply of 22 December 2005 indicated I.R.’s residence, as noted in the official records.\nOn 20 January 2006 the applicant and the bailiff went to that address, where they learnt that the house had been sold to third parties in June 2005.\nOn 23 January 2006 the bailiff requested updated information from the competent authorities regarding the current residence of I.R.; however, in the meantime, on 19 January 2006 I.R. had sent a letter to the bailiff, notifying him and the applicant of her new residence. She had also informed the bailiff that the proceedings seeking to suspend the enforcement of the judgment of 2002 granting the applicant contact rights were still pending (see paragraphs 31-38 below), and thus asked the bailiff to avoid any type of harassment of Th.N. until those proceedings had come to a conclusion. 23.  On 30 November 2006 I.R. officially notified the applicant that he could come and visit Th.N. In his reply sent on 15 December 2006, also through the bailiff’s office, the applicant expressed his contentment that after so much time, I.R. had finally understood that her persistent attempts to obstruct his rights of contact were harmful for the children. 24.  The applicant further submitted that his endeavours to obtain information about his child’s performance at school had been unsuccessful. He alleged that the management of the private school attended by Th. N. had consistently denied him the right to visit his child at school, in view of the content of the judgment of 2002, which had allowed him contact rights that could only be exercised according to the schedule specified therein. 25.  The applicant complained to the Prime Minister about the alleged infringement of his parental rights by the school on 11 March 2004 (the complaints being subsequently remitted to the prosecutor’s office for further investigation) and to the School Inspectorate on 7 April 2004. The applicant has not provided any further details in this regard. 26.  The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against I.R., accusing her of having not complied with the provisions of a final enforceable judgment. On 10 September 2003 the applicant was informed that on 27 May 2003 the prosecutor had decided to close the investigation, in so far as the impugned acts did not attract criminal liability, and had imposed on I.R. an administrative fine of 5,000,000 Romanian lei ((ROL) – approximately 130 euros (EUR)). 27.  On 16 September 2003 the applicant lodged a second criminal complaint, with similar claims. Several persons were questioned, the prosecutor finally deciding on 30 June 2004 not to pursue the criminal investigation, since it appeared from the case file that it was not the mother’s fault, but, rather, the child’s unwillingness to see his father that had obstructed the enforcement of the disputed judgment. 28.  On 3 December 2003 the applicant lodged another similar complaint. The prosecutor decided on 17 March 2004 not to indict I.R., considering that the adduced evidence proved that Th.N. had not wanted to see his father, as he had been traumatised by his parents’ separation. That decision was upheld by the chief prosecutor on 30 June 2004. 29.  On 13 June 2004 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint, accusing the mother of endangering Th.N.’s moral and physical development, and of having slanderously accused him when alleging that he had given drugs to Th.N. while the child was visiting him over two weekends (see paragraph 30 below).\nOn 24 October 2005 the applicant lodged another criminal complaint against I.R., again accusing her of not allowing him to see his child, Th.N., thereby flouting the final judgment of 2002 which allowed him contact rights. The applicant also complained that, following the instructions given by I.R., the headmistress of the school attended by Th.N. had not allowed the applicant to enter the premises, and had refused to speak to him about his son’s activities at school, advising him to contact the school only in writing.\nIn her statement given before the prosecutor on 24 November 2006 I.R. declared that the reason why the applicant could not see Th.N. was because the latter did not wish to have contact with his father, and whenever he was informed that he was supposed to go see his father, “he panicked and was affected”. She also expressed her willingness to communicate with the applicant, so as to prevent any misunderstandings, which hurt both children.\nThe two above-mentioned criminal complaints were joined on 26 March 2009; a decision not to indict I.R. was given on 31 March 2009, the prosecutor holding that the adduced evidence revealed that I.R. had always shown good faith, initiating steps meant to facilitate contact between the applicant and Th.N., but that the latter had refused to meet his father because he felt threatened by him whilst in his presence.\nThe prosecutor also dismissed the complaints regarding the alleged slanderous accusation, considering that I.R. had not intended to defame the applicant, her acts being motivated solely by her wish to protect the best interests of her child Th.N., who at the time was found to have had toxic substances in his body, according to the medical examinations undergone by the child (see paragraph 30 below). 30.  On an unspecified date in June 2004 I.R. lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant. She submitted that after Th.N. had spent the weekend of 4 to 6 June 2004 with his father, he had come back home in a general state of confusion and tiredness. The medical examination performed the next day had revealed that Th.N. had been intoxicated with benzodiazepine.\nOn 20 June 2004, when she had picked up the child from his father, with whom Th.N. had spent the weekend, the child was again in a state of tiredness. The medical examination conducted that evening had shown no signs of benzodiazepine; however, an examination carried out the following morning had found nicotine in the child’s blood.\nThe investigating authorities required an expert report to be prepared by the Institute of Forensic Medicine. On 24 August 2004 I.R. went to the Institute and declared that she refused to allow Th.N. to be examined. The report was drawn up based on the existing medical documents, noting that the source and the context of both intoxications could not be established. As the minor had not been examined, no conclusion on any potential violent acts against him or on potential traces of medical treatment could be formulated.\nThe decision not to indict the applicant delivered by the prosecutor on 15 February 2006 was based on the fact that the adduced evidence had not revealed beyond doubt signs of serious negligence or omission imputable to the applicant in the exercise of his parental rights with respect to the incidents of June 2004. I.R. contested that decision before the courts. Her request was dismissed as out of time on 8 February 2007 by the Bucharest (Second District) Court of First Instance. 31.  On 7 November 2002 I.R. applied to the courts, requesting that she be granted contact rights with respect to C.I.; she also requested that the contact arrangements of the applicant concerning Th.N. be altered, so as to take place on one Saturday monthly, between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. She submitted that this change was necessary in view of the “negative influence” that the applicant exerted on the child, who was afraid that he would be taken away from his mother and who, each time when he was required to leave with his father, had nightmares, states of anxiety and crying fits. 32.  On 3 March 2003, following a social worker’s visit to both of the parents’ homes, a report was drawn up, stating that:\n“The mother is preoccupied with raising and educating Th.N.; the two have a good relationship, based on affection and communication. In the mother’s opinion, the father should be allowed to visit Th.N. at her home and in her presence, for fear that by leaving the child at the father’s house, he might have a bad influence on the child.\nThe mother declared that she had attempted to have personal contact with the minor C.I., but had been obstructed by the father, who had not allowed her to enter his home and who had created a bad image of her in the child’s mind.”\nWhile acknowledging that C.I. enjoyed “optimal living conditions” at his father’s house, the social worker also noted that the two had a harmonious relationship, based on affection and mutual understanding. The applicant had declared that he wished that he could have a closer relationship with his other child, Th.N., but on account of the mother’s attitude, such a goal had become unattainable. C.I. had expressed his wish to spend more time with his brother, whom he truly loved.\nThe social worker also noted that the headmaster of the kindergarten attended by Th.N. had informed him that the applicant was interested in his son’s activities and that “he was sometimes allowed to talk to the child, but only in the presence of another person”.\nThe report’s conclusion pointed to the fact that the two brothers had a very warm relationship, and also that both parents showed an affectionate and caring attitude towards the two children, both expressing their full receptiveness to developing a closer relationship with the child who lived with the other parent. I.R.’s request for a psychological report assessing Th.N. was dismissed by the court on 6 March 2003 as unnecessary. 33.  I.R. subsequently submitted to the file two psychological opinions (aviz psihologic) issued by the psychologist E.I.V., who had seen and examined Th.N. starting in November 2001, immediately after had been separated from his brother. In his report of 2 April 2003, the psychologist stated:\n“The minor (Th.N.) is an intelligent child, who tries to understand the situation, but the fear of being separated from his mother, as happened with his brother, causes new states of anxiety, crying fits, nightmares and nocturnal enuresis [bed-wetting].\nHis current state is also provoked by his father’s unscheduled visits, the child feeling threatened by a possible kidnapping, bearing in mind his brother’s experience. His relationship with his father has deteriorated also on account of the latter’s using insulting words in relation to I.R. and his aggressive behaviour towards the mother in the presence of the child.\nThe minor does not wish to be visited by his father, not even if his brother is also present, owing to the fact that his brother (C.I.) has attempted several times to persuade him that it is very nice to live with their father, because ‘at dad’s you don’t need to respect mummy’s rules: you don’t need to brush your teeth, you don’t need to learn, you don’t need to take piano lessons’; his brother also made him swear that when he reached the age of ten, he would move in with them.”\nIn a further report issued on 16 June 2003 the same psychologist noted the following:\n“I have re-examined Th.N., seeing that new anxiety attacks, episodes of nocturnal enuresis and bruxism [teeth-gnashing] have appeared.\nI have noted that these symptoms appeared following the child’s being visited by his father, who was accompanied by the brother (C.I.), and also by the bailiff and the father’s lawyer. The child has difficulties in relating the incident, as he fears ‘the gentleman who forces him to go to his dad’s’.\nThe symptoms presented are caused, on the one hand, by the fact that his relationship with his father has deteriorated and, on the other hand, by the brutality used in enforcing the [father’s] contact arrangements.\nA pronounced state of anxiety on the child’s part when in the presence of his father, and an increasing change in their relationship are noted.” 34.  The applicant contested I.R.’s arguments, mainly stating that it was impossible for him to have exerted a bad influence on the child Th.N., since he was never really around him because he was not allowed to see him. Moreover, the few times when they had actually met had been in the presence of the bailiff or of the staff at the child’s school. His constant attempts to see Th.N. had been undermined by I.R.’s repeated changes of address and of the child’s kindergartens, and subsequently his schools, changes which had never been brought to his attention. 35.  On 22 May 2003 C.I. was heard by the court in camera, where he declared that he would like to be visited at his home only by his brother Th.N., and not by his mother. 36.  On 9 October 2003 the Bucharest (Second District) Court of First Instance partly allowed I.R.’s request to be allowed to visit C.I. every other weekend, from Friday at 6 p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m., two weeks during the summer vacation and one week during the winter vacation. The court dismissed I.R.’s request for an alteration of the applicant’s contact arrangements with respect to Th.N. as ill-founded, holding that the circumstances which had been taken into account by the courts in the previous proceedings concerning contact had not changed. 37.  The judgment was appealed against by I.R., who reiterated her request that the applicant should be allowed to visit Th.N. one day per month only, on Saturdays, from 2 p.m. to 6 p.m.\nOn 25 March 2004 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed I.R.’s appeal, holding that the visiting schedule she proposed would be unfair, considering that she herself was allowed to see the other child, C.I., for more than just a few hours per month. Besides, I.R. had not proven that the circumstances assessed by the courts in 2002, when the applicant’s contact rights had been established, had changed in any substantial way so as to warrant an alteration of those rights.\nIn a dissenting opinion, Judge M.R. stated that the contact arrangements vis-à-vis Th.N. needed to be changed, namely reduced. I.R. had produced sufficient evidence proving that Th.N. had been psychologically traumatised by the separation from his brother, and that he was convinced that this separation had been caused by his father, who also wanted to separate him from his mother; at the same time, in the process of enforcing his rights of contact with the bailiff’s aid, the father had threatened the child that he would take him with the help of the police if he did not voluntarily come with him; there was evidence in the file (testimonial and expert psychologist opinions) stating that Th.N. suffered from anxiety attacks, nightmares and nocturnal enuresis, on account of his fear of being separated from his mother, and owing to the perceived threat that he would be kidnapped. From that perspective, the judge considered that the child needed a more stable environment, and that he was developing well in the ambience created by his mother and his maternal grandparents. 38.  I.R. lodged an appeal on points of law. On 9 March 2009 it was struck out by the Bucharest Court of Appeal for failure to pursue the proceedings. 39.  On 22 December 2006 I.R. lodged a request seeking to be granted resident parent status with respect to her son C.I.\nShe submitted that on 20 December 2006 C.I. had left his father’s house and moved in with her, and implicitly with his brother Th.N. and with her new family (husband and their few months’ old twins). I.R. alleged that as a consequence of her tense relationship with the applicant, as evidenced by the several criminal complaints he had lodged against her, it had become very difficult for her to maintain contact with C.I., which also impeded the two children’s possibility of spending time together. In the autumn of 2006 her elder son had told her that he wanted to move in with her, to live with her and with his younger brother. His wish was allegedly motivated by his strong and affectionate relationship with his brother, but also by the fact that he felt neglected and badly treated at home, following his father’s moving in with his new girlfriend and her own eleven- year-old son. 40.  The applicant denied these assertions. He reiterated that it was I.R. who had obstructed the development of a normal relationship between the brothers by not allowing him to take Th.N. according to the schedule approved in 2002 by the courts.\nThe applicant also filed counterclaims, asking to be granted custody of Th.N., mainly contending that I.R. would not be able to take care of all the four children she had, in view of the fact that she had many other responsibilities (I.R. being a doctor and a professor as well as a mother and a wife). Moreover, it was important for the children to be raised by their real father, and not a “surrogate father”, namely I.R.’s new husband. 41.  On 5 February 2007 a report was drawn up by a social worker who had visited both parents’ homes and had interviewed the parties.\nThe report reiterated the fact that the intense, litigious past of the parties had decisively aggravated and strained the relationship between the parents, on the one hand, and between them and the children, on the other hand. Such incidents had also contributed to the fact that the two brothers had not been able to see each other as often as they wanted.\nThe social worker also interviewed C.I., who had stated that:\n“he decided in desperation to escape from his father’s home by taxi, as he felt neglected, isolated, offended; he was not allowed to speak to his mother and to his brother Th.N., he was not allowed to have friends over, he did not have a good relationship with his father’s girlfriend or with her son, who had been living with them for the past three years; moreover, he (C.I.) was eager to meet his twin brothers and to spend more time with his maternal grandparents, whom he had not seen for the past five years.”\nThe report noted that at the time of the social worker’s visit, C.I. seemed very happy to stay at his mother’s house, together with all of his brothers, whom he loved, and with his mother’s husband, who was very open and fond of children. He expressed in categorical terms his intention to stay with his mother. He declared that his father had come three times to see him at school and made him believe that he would not oppose his wish to stay with his mother.\nIn conclusion, the report recommended that I.R. should be granted resident parent status with respect to C.I., as not only was this the child’s firm wish, but also, in the new family, the child had been greeted with much love, making him feel included and protected. 42.  On 8 March 2007 the two children, aged ten and fourteen at the time, were heard by the court, separately and in camera. The judge noted Th.N.’s statements, according to which:\n“he lived with his mother and with her husband, whom he loved more than he loved his dad; his father came several times to take him;\n- two or three years ago, he spent the weekend with his dad, and was not allowed to sleep with his brother C.I, but instead he slept with his dad; on the second day he was sick, and when he was taken to hospital by his mother, it became apparent that he had been intoxicated with nicotine; before that weekend, he had spent two other weekends with his dad, but nothing bad had happened to him;\n- last year, on 6 December, he went to the police with his mum, to meet his dad; he said that he did not want to leave with his dad, even though the policeman insisted that he do so;\n- many times, his father had talked badly about his mum, telling him to stop living with her;\n- prior to his parents’ separation, he had witnessed his father strangling his mother.” C.I., for his part, declared that:\n“- when his parents separated, he had decided to leave with his dad, as he had told him that mum had stolen money, and that mum did not care for him and would mistreat him; he witnessed some violent scenes when his father had forced mum to tell him where the money was;\n- his brother had felt sick following a visit to their dad’s, and then his father had shown him a printed paper, telling him that it was proof that mum had given drugs to his brother;\n- at his dad’s, he had felt that he was a burden; his father was not interested in him, did not help him with his homework, never asked anything about how he was getting along at school nobody hugged him while he lived with his dad;\n- mum took care of him, helped him with his homework, bought him clothes, hugged and kissed him;\n-he felt that he could not complain about all these things to anybody; he only saw his mum at school, and his dad was telling him bad things about her; he was afraid to complain to anybody for fear that his father would hear about it and beat him;\n- his father had beaten him when he took some of his [father’s] own food; from that moment on, he had followed all the rules, for fear that he would otherwise be beaten;\n- before he had left for his mother’s house, he had warned his dad that he would leave if he continued to behave in such a way, and his dad had told him that if he left, he should never come back;\n- following his moving in with his mum, his dad had visited him at school every week, promising that he would change, blaming stress at work for his behaviour;\n- if possible, he would like to stop seeing his dad.”\nSeveral witnesses were also heard, mainly stating that the two brothers were well taken care of by their mother and that they were both happy together. 43.  On 5 April 2007 the Bucharest (Second District) Court of First Instance allowed I.R.’s request to be granted resident parent status with respect to C.I.; at the same time, the court allowed the applicant contact, to be exercised during every first and third weekend of the month, from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday, but also for two weeks during the summer holidays and one week during the winter holidays.\nIn so doing, the court held that it was in the best interests of the minor to stay with the parent he felt closer to:\n“Even assuming that the minor C.I. had only imagined a complete scenario of abuse and neglect from his father, the fact that he reproduced the same scenario to several people, as transpired from the evidence, proved the existence of a serious breakdown in communication between him and his father.”\nTaking into account the child’s own choice, but also his best interests, on the basis of the file, the court held that C.I. should stay with his mother, while also allowing the applicant contact on an identical schedule to that set out with respect to Th.N. The court further held that concurrent efforts on the part of both parents were essential for the improvement of the father’s relationship with his two children.\nIn dismissing the applicant’s request to be granted custody of Th.N., the court held:\n“The disputes between the parties regarding the enforcement of the judgment allowing the father contact are not a good enough reason to justify a change with respect to the custody of Th.N.; the father has at his disposal several procedural means aimed at addressing the non-enforcement of a judgment, but he must also find the appropriate means to allow him to grow closer to the child, while the mother’s duty is to explain to the child the importance of staying in touch with his father.” 44.  The judgment was not appealed against and thus became final. 45.  On 16 March 2006 the applicant brought a civil action, seeking to have the final judgment enforced by the imposition of a fine in the event ofnon-compliance. 46.  On 26 September 2006 the court heard Th.N. in camera. Th.N. stated that he feared his father and that he did not wish to see him. He also declared that his father had never assaulted him. 47.  In its final judgment of 28 September 2006, the Bucharest (First District) Court of First Instance allowed the applicant’s claims.\nThe court considered that the profoundly conflict-ridden relationship between the parties, proven also by the numerous criminal complaints they had lodged against each other, had had serious negative repercussions on both children, who had been used by the parents as weapons against each other and in that respect, both parents were at fault. However, Th.N.’s bad impression of his father and his constant fear of him had been caused, at least in part, by I.R., as the child lived with her and she had strong moral authority over the child. The court thus held that I.R. should pay the State a fine of ROL 20 (approximately EUR 0.75) per day, for every day that she failed to comply with the contested judgment.\nOn 20 February 2007 the Bucharest County Court dismissed an appeal lodged by I.R. as inadmissible.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were both born in 1952 and live in Gießen. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  In September 1997 the applicants and their neighbour filed a request with the Gießen administrative authorities (“the administration”) seeking permission to cut down their neighbour’s tree which, according to an expert opinion obtained by the applicants, was causing damage to their house. 7.  On 19 November 1997 the administration rejected this request. On 9 March 1998, on the applicants’ administrative appeal, the administration granted permission to cut down the tree on the ground that they could not exclude the possibility that the damage to the house had been caused by the tree. 8.  Subsequently, the applicants’ neighbour refused to cut down the tree. 9.  In August 1998 the applicants requested the Gießen Regional Court to order their neighbour to cut down the tree. 10.  On 23 November 1998, following submissions by the defendant, who also presented an expert report, the court decided to obtain an expert opinion from a Dr Str. On 30 January 1999 Dr Str. submitted his report. 11.  On 3 May 1999, following a hearing, the Gießen Regional Court decided that the applicants’ neighbour had to cut down the tree or take other measures to prevent the earth from drying out. 12.  On 29 June 1999 the applicants’ neighbour appealed. She also submitted another expert opinion. 13.  On 28 July 1999 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal, on provision of a security by the neighbour, stayed the proceedings for enforcement of the first-instance judgment. Subsequently, the case was transferred to a single judge. 14.  On 9 August 1999 the court scheduled a hearing for 12 November 1999. That day it decided to obtain an expert opinion. On 10 January 2000 it commissioned Professor K., an expert on construction matters. 15.  On 11 January 2000 the applicants lodged a subsequent appeal (Anschlussberufung). 16.  On 2 February 2000 the court amended its decision regarding the taking of evidence. Subsequently, it also requested a further advance. On 26 March 2000 the applicants paid the requisite advance. A few days later they questioned the expert’s qualification. On 26 April 2000 the court sent the files to the expert. 17.  On 25 August 2000, following comments made by the expert about the applicants’ objections against him, the court mandated Professor K. to proceed with the report. On 22 September 2000 Professor K. informed the court about the cost of his services (which amounted to about 25,000 euros (EUR)). 18.  In November 2000 the court requested the files from the expert and on 9 February 2001, on appeal by the defendant, it quashed a decision of the Gießen Regional Court concerning the enforcement proceedings. 19.  On 23 February 2001 the court proposed to the applicants that, in view of the exceptionally high costs claimed by Professor K., evidence should be taken by other means and proposed a Dr S., a landscaping expert. 20.  On 12 March 2001 the applicants opposed the proposal since, in their view, Professor K.’s report was indispensable. They also opposed the choice of Dr S. on the grounds that he had been proposed by the defendant, knew the defendant’s son and it could be assumed that he had been talking with him about the case. 21.  At the subsequent hearing on 20 April 2001 the applicants requested Dr S. to declare that he did not have any personal ties with the defendant or her son and had not dealt with the case before. On 29 June 2001, following this declaration by Dr S., the court commissioned Dr S. to provide an expert opinion. 22.  On 4 November 2001 the court asked the applicants to comment on a statement by Dr S. dated 6 August 2001. In December 2001 the expert requested a further advance. On 11 July 2002 he submitted his report. He came to the conclusion that the tree had not caused the damage to the house. 23.  On 29 August 2002, following the applicants’ submissions, the court asked Dr S. and the first-instance expert, on condition of the payment of a further advance, to explain and supplement their reports. In October 2002 it amended its decision; in November 2002 it requested a further advance. On 20 January 2003 it transferred the files to Dr S. 24.  In April 2003 the court requested a further advance of EUR 500 from both parties. On 1 August 2003, at the request of the applicants, it further amended the order regarding the taking of evidence. On 29 August 2003 the defendant paid the advance. The court then requested the expert to continue with his report. 25.  In June 2004 Dr S. submitted his supplementary report. The court then transferred the files to the parties for further submissions. 26.  On 23 June 2004 the applicants requested the court to transfer the case from the single judge to a bench. 27.  On 2 September 2004 the court scheduled a hearing for 6 October 2004. It later had to be postponed to 3 November 2004 owing to the absence of the parties’ legal counsels. At the hearing, the court (again composed of three judges) established that a report by a construction expert was necessary in order to reach a decision. It also encouraged the parties to reach a friendly settlement in view of the high costs claimed by Professor K. None of the experts were summoned. 28.  On 22 December 2004 the court decided that, in view of the additional submissions, further evidence should be obtained by Dr S. as regards the position of the roots of the tree. It also requested an advance of EUR 2,000. 29.  In February 2005 the applicants asked the court to amend this decision. This however was rejected in March 2005 and again later on a renewed request. In April 2005 the court confirmed that the applicants had already paid the advance (requested again in March) on 5 January 2005. 30.  On 19 October 2005 a local inspection took place. 31.  By a letter dated 21 January 2006 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint on account of the length of the proceedings. On 9 February 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the constitutional complaint for adjudication. It found that there was no indication of a violation of the applicants’ rights. 32.  On 20 March 2006 the Court of Appeal requested another advance of EUR 28,500. In June 2006 it again refused to amend its decision regarding the taking of evidence; also in June 2006 the applicants paid the advance. 33.  On 10 October 2006 the expert informed the parties that the local inspection (which required free access to the applicants’ cellar) should take place on 9 November 2006. At the applicants’ request, it was postponed to 22 January 2007. 34.  On 20 February 2007 the expert submitted an interim report; on 12 July 2007 he submitted his final report. 35.  On 14 September 2007 the court scheduled the hearing. On 19 December 2007 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal ordered the neighbour to cut down the tree.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant was born in 1923 and lives in Skopje. He worked as a pilot in the Yugoslav Army until he retired in 1968. 11.  In former Yugoslavia, the citizens used to pay a tax for housing. On the basis of the accumulated funds the State constructed “socially owned” apartments which were then rented to individuals at legally fixed rates. 12.  The Yugoslav Army was the single army on the territory of the former Yugoslavia governed by laws which were applicable throughout former Yugoslavia. The applicant, as an officer of the Yugoslav Army, paid monthly contributions from his salary to the Yugoslav Army for the construction of army apartments. All army servicemen were entitled to live in army apartments as tenants. 13.  On 28 August 1968 the applicant ceased to be an active officer of the Yugoslav Army under an early retirement scheme. At that time, he lived in Belgrade, as a tenant in an apartment which belonged to the army. On an unspecified date the applicant, having found a job in Skopje, sought to obtain the tenancy of an army apartment there. In December 1979, under an agreement between the Yugoslav Army and the Macedonian Council of Ministers, the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (at that time a member of the Yugoslav Federation) obtained the possession of the applicant’s army apartment in Belgrade in exchange for an apartment in Skopje, which remained the property of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia but was to be used by the Yugoslav Army. In July 1980 the applicant moved into the apartment in Skopje. 14.  On 29 December 1990 the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia enacted a Law on Housing of the Army Servicemen (Закон за станбено обезбедување во ЈНА) (the “Z.S.О.J.N.A.”), according to which army servicemen, current and retired, could purchase apartments in which they lived with a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of army apartments and for development of the construction land. Section 26 of that law provides that the same purchase conditions apply to apartments which do not belong to the army, as it was in the case of the applicant. According to regulations issued by the Yugoslav Federal Ministry, the price difference was to be paid by the federal army (see paragraphs 43-46 below). 15.  Following the fall of Yugoslavia and a referendum held on 8 September 1991, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence. On 17 November 1991 it adopted a Constitution (Устав на РМ) and the Law on the Implementation of the Constitution (Уставен Закон за спроведување на Уставот). According to the Constitution the laws from former Yugoslavia remain in force, except for the laws regulating the organisation and competence of the former Yugoslav federal organs. On 21 February 1992 the Macedonian President and the General of the Yugoslav Army concluded an agreement for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Macedonian territory. 16.  On 28 February 1992 the Macedonian Government concluded an Agreement for Settlement of Claims and Obligations in Respect of Real Property (Спогодба за правата и обврските во врска со примопредажбата на недвижностите на територија на Република Македонија) (“the S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M.”) with the Federal Yugoslav Ministry of Defence. According to this agreement the Macedonian Ministry of Defence took over all the obligations of the Yugoslav Army in respect of army apartments, including the obligation to sell these apartments with a price reduction. The Macedonian Government in 1992 and 1994 enacted regulations implementing this agreement. In 1992 the Macedonian Government enacted Regulations on the Terms of Purchase of the Apartments Obtained by Succession from the Yugoslav Army (Уредба за продажба на државниот стамбен фонд наследен од ЈНА) (“U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A.”), according to which present and former army servicemen living in apartments owned by the Macedonian Ministry of Defence, could purchase them under the Z.S.О.J.N.A 17.  From the Ministry of Defence’s decision of 12 June 1992 it appears that the Ministry exchanged the title of its apartments which were inhabited by civilians with the title of the apartments owned by the Housing Fund (“ПУИГ”) which were inhabited by servicemen. Thereby, the servicemen were able to exercise the right under the Z.S.O.J.N.A. to purchase the apartments at a reduced price. However, this exchange was limited and concerned only six apartments owned by the Housing Fund and twenty owned by the Ministry. No details were provided as to the criteria concerning the exchange. 18.  In 1993 an amended version of the 1990 Law on the Sale of Socially Owned Apartments (Закон за продажба на станови во општествена сопственост) (“the Z.P.S.O.S.”) was promulgated in the Official Gazette. Under the law their tenants were entitled to purchase them on credit and at a beneficial price. Unlike the Z.S.О.J.N.A., the law did not provide for a price adjustment for the amount of the contributions made towards the construction of “socially owned” apartments and the development of the construction land, despite the fact that the tenants had also paid them. 19.  On 26 June 1996 the Constitutional Court abrogated the Z.S.O.J.N.A. without retroactive effect and the respective Government’s Regulations on the ground that they had been contrary to the 1991 Constitution. In particular, the court stated that: (a) the Yugoslav Army, its “housing fund” and the “social ownership” no longer existed; (b) the 1991 Constitution had abolished all the privileges enjoyed by army servicemen; and (c) the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had created an unequal treatment in comparison to the citizens who were entitled to purchase their apartments under the Z.P.S.O.S. The S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M. was not mentioned in the Constitutional Court’s decision. 20.  Between 1992 and 1994, the applicant requested the Macedonian Ministry of Defence to purchase the apartment in Skopje where he had been living since 1980 as a tenant of the Yugoslav Army in accordance with the Z.S.О.J.N.A. and the U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A. The Ministry of Defence informed him, and seven other servicemen of the former Yugoslav Army, that the examination of their requests had been postponed due to some formalities. 21.  On 20 October 1993 the applicant and fifteen other persons asked the Constitutional Court to examine the compatibility of the Z.P.S.O.S. and the relevant regulations issued by the Ministry of Defence with the Z.S.O.J.N.A. On 29 December 1993 this was refused by the Constitutional Court. 22.  On 6 February 1995 the applicant submitted another request to purchase the apartment to the President of the Republic who transmitted it to the Ministry of Defence. 23.  On 22 March 1995 the Ministry of Defence informed the applicant that his request to purchase the apartment had been dismissed on the ground that the U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A. did not apply to apartments other than those which belonged to the Yugoslav Army. In particular, the Ministry stressed that Section 2 § 2 of the 1992 Regulation on the Sale of Apartments for which the Republic has Responsibilities and Rights (Одлука за продажба на становите на кои права, должности и одговорности во поглед на располагањето има Републиката) (“O.P.S.P.D.O.R”) provided that the U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A. did not apply to apartments for official use of the Government. The Ministry argued that on 21 September 1994 the Government had taken a similar position in respect of this issue. Therefore, the applicant would have had the right to purchase the apartment under the U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A. only if it had concerned an apartment owned by the said Ministry. 24.  On 16 February 1995 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Skopje I Municipal Court (Општински суд Скопје I) against the Ministry of Defence, requesting that the apartment be sold to him under an adjusted price in accordance with the Z.S.О.J.N.A. He also invoked Articles 4 and 5 of the Law on the Implementation of the Constitution. 25.  On 25 April 1995 the court granted the applicant’s request. The court stated, inter alia, that the applicant, as an army officer, had the right to purchase the apartment under an adjusted price. In particular, the purchase price should be reduced by the revalorised amount of the monthly contributions which the applicant had paid to the Federal Ministry of Defence for the construction of apartments and for development of construction land. The Municipal Court found that the Macedonian Ministry of Defence was under an obligation to pay the price difference for the apartment. 26.  The Macedonian Ministry of Defence appealed against this decision on grounds that in accordance with a Government Decision the Z.S.О.J.N.A. only applied to apartments owned by the Macedonian Army. 27.  On 1 February 1996 the Skopje Appellate Court (Окружен суд Скопје) upheld the decision of the lower court on the ground that the applicant, as a former officer of the Yugoslav Army, had paid contributions for the construction of army apartments and, therefore, was entitled to purchase an apartment under an adjusted price in accordance with the Z.S.О.J.N.A. The court held, inter alia, that the lower court had reasoned correctly when it had connected the benefit of purchasing an apartment under an adjusted price to the status of the applicant as a former army officer, who had been paying contributions, and not to the identity of the owner of the said apartment. 28.  On 17 April 1996 the applicant and the Government concluded a purchase contract for the apartment on the basis of the Municipal and Appellate Courts’ judgments. The applicant thus purchased the apartment with a price reduced by the amount of contributions he had paid to the former Yugoslav Army. On 15 May 1996 the Skopje I Municipal Court authorised the contract. 29.  From the copy of one document issued by the Public Enterprise for Administering State Property (Јавно претпријатие за стопанисување со стамбен и деловен простор на Република Македонија), it may be deduced that the applicant paid for the apartment in 1996 at the latest. It is not clear whether later the Ministry of Defence reimbursed the Housing Fund the price difference for the apartment. 30.  In the meantime, the Ministry of Defence filed an appeal on points of law (ревизија) with the Supreme Court (Врховен суд на РМ) against the judgment of the Appellate Court of 1 February 1996. 31.  Upon the appeal on 18 December 1997 the Supreme Court quashed the lower court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s request to purchase the apartment for a reduced price. 32.  The Supreme Court noted that in accordance with Article 5 § 1 of the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Constitution of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the federal laws of former Yugoslavia remained in force as Macedonian laws provided that they were harmonised with the Constitution. The powers which were previously exercised by the federal organs were allocated to the bodies of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Z.S.O.J.N.A. remained in force as Macedonian law. 33.  The Supreme Court found that under the Z.S.O.J.N.A. it was for the Yugoslav Army to make up for the price difference for the adjustment of the prices of the apartments which were not owned by the Yugoslav Army. However, on 17 November 1991 the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia enacted its Constitution and became an independent State. Since then there was no Yugoslav Army nor was its housing fund on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Therefore, the applicant could not have the price for his apartment reduced as there was no Yugoslav Army to cover the price difference. 34.  The court did not mention at all the decision of the Constitutional Court and the S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M. Nor did it mention that the applicant had already purchased the apartment by contract, or that the Ministry of Defence had exchanged a number of apartments owned by the Housing Fund and inhabited by other servicemen. The applicant was served with the Supreme Court’s judgment on 4 March 1998. 35.  The parties have not indicated whether the applicant was formally registered as the owner of the apartment in the Land Registry (Државен завод за геодетски работи) after their purchase agreement had been authorised by the Municipal Court in 1996. From the documents it appears the applicant had already recorded his title over the apartment. In addition, the parties have not indicated whether the Government have taken any legal action to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment of 18 December 1997, for example by bringing proceedings for the rescission of the 1996 purchase agreement (see paragraphs 60-65 below). There is no information that such proceedings have ever been instituted. 36.  The applicant still lives in the apartment in question.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in the village of Tatariv, which forms part of Yaremche, a resort town in the Ivano-Frankivsk Region of Ukraine. 7.  The applicant owns a house and an adjacent plot of land in Tatariv. The village of Tatariv is situated in a mountainous region and because of its location holds the status of mountainous residential area. It is also known as a resort for “green tourism” in Carpathy region. It is situated on the banks of Prut river. 8.  On 10 February 2000 Tatariv Village Council (“Tatariv Council”), having considered four sites on which to construct a new cemetery, chose the land previously occupied by garages belonging to a company called Vorokhtya Lisokombinat (“the VL plot”) as it was not occupied, it was located in the village and the cemetery could be constructed at low cost. 9.  The VL plot is located near the applicant’s house (for further details see paragraphs 14 and 33 below), in which he was residing with his family at the time. Two rivers flow at a distance of 30 and 70 metres from the VL plot. Drinking water for Tatariv comes from wells fed by groundwater; there is no centralised water supply system and the wells are not protected. 10.  On 24 May 2000 the All-Ukrainian Bureau of Environmental Investigations informed the Chairman of Yaremche Town Council (“Yaremche Council”) that the construction of the cemetery on the VL plot might cause contamination of the river and the wells situated on adjacent plots of land by ptomaine carried by the groundwater flow. 11.  The cemetery was opened for use by the Yaremche Council in August 2000. It is being administered by the Yaremche Council. 12.  On 6 February 2001 the Yaremche Environmental Health Inspectorate (санітарно-епідеміологічна станція) concluded that the cemetery should not have been constructed on the VL plot in view of its proximity to residential buildings and the risk of contamination of the surrounding environment by ptomaine. 13.  On 20 August 2002 the Regional Environmental Health Inspectorate of the Ministry of Health refused to approve the construction plan. In particular, it stated that the cemetery should not be situated in the proposed area as its distance from private housing did not comply with the norms and standards of a health protection zone (санітарно-захисна зона). 14.  On 30 August 2002 and 20 January 2003 the Marzeyev Institute of Hygiene and Medical Ecology, part of the Academy of Medical Sciences, informed the applicant and Yaremche Council that another location would have to be found for the cemetery. It was of the view that constructing the cemetery on the VL plot would breach environmental health laws and regulations and would worsen the living conditions of the residents of adjacent houses. In particular, it would be located less than 300 metres from the nearest residential buildings, which are 38 metres away from the edge of the cemetery (which would not allow for the establishment of the necessary health protection zone). It could lead to contamination of the groundwater reservoir used by the residents of adjacent households for drinking water and of the nearby rivers with by-products of human decomposition. It further stated that a health protection zone was also intended to reduce psychological pressure on the residents of adjacent houses. 15.  The applicant alleges that from 2002 to the present moment he has been receiving treatment for hypertension and various cardio-related diseases. He supplied in this respect sick leave certificates and medical certificates from 2002 and 2006, relating to him and his wife. He has also provided the Court with death certificates for two of his neighbours Mr R.G. and Mr D.B., who also resided in the vicinity of the prohibited cemetery and died at the age of 68 and 43, respectively. 16.  On 17 September 2002 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that it could not intervene in respect of unauthorised burials taking place on the VL plot: the issue was in the competence of local authorities, including the Yaremche Council, which was responsible for management and maintenance of the cemetery. 17.  On 22 April 2003 the Executive Board of Yaremche Council informed the Regional State Administration that Tatariv Council was considering resettling the applicant. He had twice been invited to discuss a proposal for resettlement of his family to another part of the village but no response had been received. 18.  On 5 May 2003 the Regional Urban Development and Architecture Department (“the Urban Development Department”) informed Yaremche and Tatariv Councils that the area near the applicant’s house was not suitable for construction of the cemetery as it did not respect a 300-metre wide health protection zone that would protect the residential buildings and a 50-metre wide water protection zone to protect the Prutets river. 19.  On 18 May 2003 the Tatariv Council resolved inter alia that the relevant local authorities were prepared to consider the purchase of a house or apartment for the applicant, or to pay him compensation if he refused to reside in the cemetery’s vicinity. 20.  On 21 April 2004 the issue of the site of the cemetery was examined by officials from the Urban Development Department, the Municipal Housing Department, the environmental health inspectorate and the Land Management Department. They recommended to the Chairman of Tatariv Council that another plot on the outskirts of the village of “Ventarivka” be used as a cemetery. 21.  On 22 June 2005 the Regional State Administration informed the applicant that the only way to resolve the issue was to resettle him. They asked him to agree to such a resettlement. They also confirmed that Yaremche Council was willing either to buy a house for the applicant or to provide him with an equivalent plot of land and the funds necessary to construct another house 22.  On 18 July 2005 the Chairman of Yaremche Council invited the applicant to inform the authorities whether his family was willing to resettle and, if so, on what conditions. 23.  In reply, the applicant sought more information on the proposal, such as, details of the specific land plot, house and facilities to be provided. 24.  By letter of 27 July 2005 the Chairman of Yaremche Council, in reply to the applicant’s request for specific proposals, invited the applicant to discuss the proposal in person with a view to a possible compromise. 25.  On 15 August 2005 the Chairman of Tatariv Council asked the Ukrainian State Urban Planning Institute (Дніпромісто – “the Institute”) to develop proposals for the site of a cemetery in the village. 26.  On 21 December 2005 the Institute informed the applicant that it was not within its competence to decide matters such as the question of where to situate the cemetery. It also mentioned that the local development plan for Tatariv proposed a plot in the Chertizh area for the cemetery. However, this was subject to approval by the local council and environmental health inspectorate. It also informed the applicant that no letter of 15 August 2005 with proposals to investigate possible site of the cemetery (see paragraph 25 above) had been received from Tatariv Council. 27.  By letter of 6 March 2006 addressed to the applicant and the Chairman of Tatariv Council, the Urban Development Department stated that it had repeatedly proposed to Tatariv Council that it use an area called Venterivka for the site of the cemetery. However, the council had not taken up that suggestion for unspecified reasons. It also informed the applicant that it was within Tatariv Council’s competence to decide on the allocation of a plot of land for a cemetery. 28.  On several occasions between August 2006 and June 2008 the applicant and members of his family, who resided together, asked Tatariv Council to grant each of them a plot of land on which to construct a house because they felt that living in the cemetery’s vicinity was intolerable. Tatariv Council rejected the requests because of a lack of available plots of land. 29.  According to the results of examinations of drinking water from the applicant’s well conducted by the Yaremche Environmental Health Inspectorate dated 21 August 2008 and 7 July 2009, the toxicological, chemical and organoleptic indices of the water complied with national standards (no E. coli index examination had been made). A conclusion was reached that water could be used for household needs. 30.  On 23 August 2008 and 6 July 2009 the Yaremche Environmental Health Inspectorate carried out a bacteriological analysis of the water from the same well. It established, contrary to the results of the examinations held on 21 August 2008 and 7 July 2009 (see paragraph 29 above) that the E. coli bacteria index in the water gave a reading of 2,380, whereas the normal reading was 10 (see paragraph 72 below), and concluded that the water could not be used for household needs. It also recommended disinfecting the water supply. The cause of water pollution was not established and would require an additional expert report. 31.  On 14 December 2009 in response to a request from the Government, the Yaremche Environmental Health Inspectorate concluded that the reading obtained from the bacteriological analysis which had indicated water contamination did not have any connection to the location of the cemetery, but could also have been caused by other sources. 32.  On 15 December 2009 the Regional Environmental Health Inspectorate informed the applicant that the reasons for the bacterial contamination of the water supply could be established on the basis of a hydrogeological assessment as to whether there were any connections between the drinking water reservoirs and possible sources of contamination. It further stated that according to an analysis of water taken from different parts of the village, the E. coli index exceeded the allowed reading established by law, which provided that drinking water should not contain any index of E. coli or be less than 1 in that index per 100 cm3 (see paragraph 72 in relation to the domestic drinking water standards), nevertheless the E. coli index ranged from 23 to 2,380. 33.  The applicant’s house and well are some 38 metres from the nearest boundary of the cemetery. 34.  By letters of 10, 15 and 16 December 2009 from the Tarariv Council, Yaremche Executive Committee and the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional State Administration, the authorities informed the Government’s agent that the applicant had failed to manifest any interest in being resettled. 35.  On 10 August 2000 the Verkhovyna Court, following the applicant’s claim in proceedings against the Tatariv Council, held that the Council’s decision to situate the cemetery on the VL plot had been unlawful. 36.  At the end of August 2000 residents of Tatariv carried out the first burial at the cemetery. 37.  On 1 December 2000 the Yaremche Court, in another set of new proceedings, found that Tatariv Council had failed to follow the proper procedure for the allocation of a plot of land for a cemetery, namely obtaining an environmental health assessment, and ordered it to prohibit burials on the VL plot. 38.  On 24 December 2000 the residents of Tatariv were informed of the court’s decision to stop the use of the VL plot as a cemetery. Nevertheless, burials continued at the site. 39.  On 29 December 2000 Tatariv Council prohibited burials on the VL plot. On 2 February 2001 the State Bailiffs’ Service terminated enforcement proceedings in the case, considering that the judgment had been fully complied with by the Tatariv Council. 40.  On 2 March 2001 Tatariv Council again decided that the VL plot could be used for the new village cemetery. On 26 March 2001 the applicant lodged a new claim against that decision with the Yaremche Court. 41.  In the meantime, on 22 August 2001 the Regional Environmental Health Inspectorate informed the relevant judge of the Yaremche Court, which assumed jurisdiction over the claims lodged on 26 March 2001 (see paragraph 40 above), that the site of the cemetery did not comply with national environmental health laws and regulations on the planning and construction of urban areas. In particular, the location did not comply with the requirement of a health protection zone between the cemetery and the nearest residential buildings. 42. On 16 October 2001 the Yaremche Court declared Tatariv Council’s decision of 2 March 2001 unlawful. On 17 April 2002 the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 43.  On 25 December 2001 Tatariv Council cancelled its decision of 2 March 2001 in pursuance of the judgment of 16 October 2001. 44.  On 3 July 2003 Tatariv Council approved a new development plan for the village. The plan again authorised the use of the VL plot as a cemetery. 45.  On 22 July 2003 the applicant again instituted proceedings against Tatariv Council, seeking to have the approval of the new development plan for the village, insofar as it concerned the location of the cemetery, declared unlawful. He also sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage, court fees and legal expenses. 46.  On 22 August 2003 the Verkhovyna Court ordered Tatariv Council to inform the residents of the village that burials at the unauthorised cemetery near the applicant’s house were prohibited. 47.  By that time, up to seventy burials had been carried out on the VL plot. The distance between the applicant’s house and some of the graves was less than 120 metres. 48.  The Chairman of Tatariv Council argued before the court that there was no other suitable area for a cemetery in the village. She further submitted that the applicant’s allegation of possible contamination of the water supply was unfounded, as the groundwater flowed away from his property. 49.  On 26 December 2003 the Verkhovyna Court allowed the applicant’s claims and held that the new construction plan was unlawful as regards the location of the cemetery. It found that the VL plot was not suitable for use as a cemetery. In particular, constructing the cemetery on the VL plot had breached the environmental health laws and regulations requiring the establishment of: (a) a health protection zone 300 metres wide separating residential areas from a risk factor; and (b) a water protection zone 50 metres wide separating water supply sources from a risk factor. It observed that those distances could not be reduced. It ordered Tatariv Council to close the cemetery and to pay the applicant 25,000 hryvnias (UAH)[1] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 609.45[2] for costs and expenses. 50.  On 28 May 2004 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court of Appeal (“Court of Appeal”) upheld the judgment of 26 December 2003 in part. In particular, it decided that no award of non-pecuniary damage should be made to the applicant, and it reduced the award for costs and expenses to UAH 151[3]. 51.  On 9 October 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of 28 May 2004. 52.  On 18 June 2004 the Verkhovyna Court issued two writs of execution ordering Tatariv Council to adopt a decision declaring the new development plan unlawful and to close the cemetery. 53.  On 7 July 2004 the State Bailiffs’ Service instituted enforcement proceedings in the case. 54.  Between July 2004 and February 2005 the State Bailiffs’ Service imposed fines on Tatariv Council several times for its refusal to comply with the judgment of 26 December 2003. 55.  On 3 March 2005 the Bailiffs terminated the enforcement proceedings, stating that it had been impossible to enforce the decision without the involvement of Tatariv Council, whose members had failed to adopt a decision in pursuance of the judgment of 26 December 2003. 56.  In March 2005 the applicant requested the Verkhovyna Court to change the terms of the enforcement of the judgment of 26 December 2003. In particular, he sought to have the Chairman of Tatariv Council ordered to execute the judgment. 57.  On 17 October 2005 the Verkhovyna Court rejected the applicant’s request. It held that the Chairman had acted only as a representative of Tatariv Council, the respondent in the case. The Chairman had not been involved as a party to the proceedings. On 6 December 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of 17 October 2005. 58.  In August 2005 the applicant challenged the alleged omissions and inactivity of the Chairman of Tatariv Council as regards the enforcement of the judgment of 26 December 2003 before the Verkhovyna Court. 59.  On 8 November 2005 the Verkhovyna Court found no fault on the part of the Chairman and rejected the applicant’s claim. On 12 January 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 60.  On 16 August 2006 Tatariv Council again refused to declare the new development plan unlawful and to close the cemetery. 61.  On 28 August 2006 the State Bailiffs’ Service informed the applicant that the enforcement proceedings were not subject to renewal. 62.  The applicant also unsuccessfully sought to institute criminal proceedings against the Chairman of Tatariv Council for her alleged failure to enforce the judgment of 26 December 2003. 63.  On 7 May 2002 the Yaremche Court, acting upon the applicant’s request, refused to institute criminal proceedings against a private individual, K.M., for using the VL plot for a burial. On 16 July 2002 and 21 January 2003 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld this decision. 64.  On 3 October 2002 the Yaremche Court in two separate judgments rejected as unsubstantiated damages claims brought by the applicant and his neighbour, D.B., against K.M. and F.G. (private individuals) concerning the unlawful use of the land near their houses for burial purposes. It found no breach of applicant’s rights by the respondents. 65.  The judgments were upheld on 24 December 2002 (in two separate rulings) by the Court of Appeal and subsequently on 15 September 2005 and 15 February 2006 by the Supreme Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Kırşehir. 5.  The facts of the case as presented by the applicant and the Government are based on a number of documents drawn up in the course of the domestic proceedings. The following information appears from the parties’ submissions as well as from the documents submitted by them. 6.  On 17 February 1994 a warrant was issued for the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front-Revolutionary Left (Devrimci Halkın Kurtuluşu Partisi/Cephe-Dev Sol; THKP/C-Dev Sol). He was arrested on 14 July 1994 and taken into police custody. 7.  On 17 July 1994 a police chief at the Istanbul Security Headquarters drafted a report which stated that the applicant had refused to respond to the questions put to him. This report was forwarded to the prosecutor’s office at the Istanbul State Security Court. In another report prepared by the police the same day, the applicant was quoted as having stated that he would only talk to the prosecutor, but that in any event the allegations against him were baseless. 8.  According to a medical report drafted on 17 July 1994 by the Istanbul Forensic Medicine Institute, the applicant had ecchymosed areas, measuring 4x2 cm and 4x7 cm, both under his armpits and on his shoulders. Another ecchymosed area, measuring 2x2 cm, was also observed on his right shoulder. The report stated that the injuries were of a nature which would prevent the applicant from working for a period of three days. 9.  The same day the applicant was brought before the prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court, who questioned him and recorded his statement. In this statement the applicant denied having had any involvement in any illegal organisation. He also informed the prosecutor that he had refused to sign a statement prepared by the police in which the name Dev-Sol was mentioned. The applicant was brought before the duty judge, who questioned him further and ordered his pre-trial detention. Before the judge the applicant repeated his denial of any involvement with any illegal organisation. 10.  On 27 July 1994 the public prosecutor at the Ankara State Security Court filed an indictment, accusing the applicant of membership of the above-mentioned illegal organisation. The prosecutor requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The prosecutor stated that the documents in the case files in respect of a number of persons who were being tried for membership of the same organisation proved that the applicant had also been a member. The prosecutor further alleged that a handwritten autobiography belonging to the applicant, which had been submitted to the illegal organisation, proved that he was one of its members. 11.  On 1 August 1994 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were joined to the ongoing trial of twenty-four persons accused of offences related to the illegal organisation. Subsequently, the trial was conducted by the Ankara State Security Court’s First Chamber (hereafter “the trial court”). 12.  On 19 January 1995 the applicant submitted a letter to the trial court, stating that “pressure” had been exerted on him by the police to force him to accept the accusations. In his letter the applicant denied having given the organisation his autobiography, and maintained that he did not know who had given evidence against him. 13.  On 21 February 1995 the applicant submitted another request to the trial court, in which he asked to be released. In his request the applicant stated that he was not the author of the handwritten autobiography. In that autobiography there was a reference to the son of an uncle; in fact he had no uncles. He maintained that a forensic examination of the autobiography would establish that he was not the author. The applicant also maintained that he did not know the person who had accused him of membership of the organisation. In any event, that person had later retracted his statement. The applicant also alleged that he had been subjected to torture while in police custody. In support of his allegation he referred to the above-mentioned medical report of 17 July 1994. 14.  A total of forty-six hearings were held in the course of the applicant’s trial. A number of hearings had to be postponed on account of some of the defendants’ failure to comply with the summonses. A number of other hearings were postponed to enable the trial court to obtain important documents and reports. At each of these hearings the trial court decided to extend the applicant’s remand in custody. 15.  On 9 December 1997 the trial court, which had a military judge on its bench, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment in accordance with Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The prison sentence was increased by half, pursuant to section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Consequently, the applicant was sentenced to twenty-two years and six months’ imprisonment. One of the applicants’ co-accused, a certain Mr E.K., was also convicted of the same offences and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Mr E.K.’s prison sentence was also increased by half and consequently he was sentenced to a total of fifteen years’ imprisonment. 16.  In finding the applicant guilty of membership of the illegal organisation, the trial court observed that the applicant’s autobiography had been found in the organisation’s possession. It also established that the applicant had joined the organisation with the assistance of two of the co-accused but had escaped from it with the help of another person. 17.  The court’s written judgment was 55 pages long. 18.  The applicant appealed on 15 December 1997. On 27 April 1999 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant’s conviction. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer before the Court of Cassation. 19.  The decision of the Court of Cassation was deposited with the registry of the Ankara State Security Court on 20 May 1999. A committal order was prepared on 24 March 2000, showing the time which the applicant was to spend in prison. The committal order was notified to the applicant on 30 March 2000 by the prison administration.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Nowogard, Poland. 5.  The applicant co-owned an estate. On 15 January 1988 she filed with the Goleniów District Court (sąd rejonowy) an action against the other co-owners for overdue rent and the recovery of possession of some property located on that estate. 6.  On 30 June 1992 the court gave judgment, in which it dismissed the action. 7.  On 9 March 1993 the Szczecin Regional Court (sąd wojewódzki) dismissed the applicant's appeal against that judgment. 8.  On 12 May 1993 she requested the reopening of the proceedings, submitting that she had not been notified of the appellate hearing. 9.  On 16 September 1993 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9 March 1993 and a part of the District Court's judgment. It remitted the part of the case concerning rent for re-examination. 10.  On 24 November 1994 the District Court summoned the applicant to specify her claim. On 16 February 1995 the court, having received the applicant's response, requested her to specify it once more. 11.  On 28 March 1995 the case was transferred to the Szczecin Regional Court, which was competent to examine it as a court of the first-instance. 12.  On 31 October 1995 it held a hearing. The applicant withdrew her claim against one of the co-owners and raised a claim against the Goleniów District Office (Urząd Rejonowy), which also co-owned the disputed property. 13.  On 5 September 1996 the court held a hearing. On the same day it summoned the Goleniów District Office (Urząd Rejonowy) to participate in the procedure as the defendant. 14.  On 18 July 1997 the court stayed the proceedings after the applicant's failure to specify her claim within the set time-limit. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 15.  On 8 August 1997 she requested that her legal-aid lawyer be replaced with another one. 16.  On 17 May 1999 the applicant's lawyer asked the court to resume the examination of the case. On 26 May 1999 the court summoned the applicant to specify her claim and identify the defendant. The applicant submitted that that order was not served on her. She stated that she had been unable to comply with the court order because of difficulty in assessing the value of the property the possession of which she had sought. 17.  By 28 August 2003 the court had not resumed the proceedings. 18.  On 6 June 1991 the applicant filed with the Goleniów District Court an action in which she requested that the co-ownership of an estate be dissolved. 19.  On 17 December 1993 and 12 January 1994 the court held hearings. 20.  In March 1994 an expert opinion was prepared. 21.  The Government submitted that on 22 March 1994 the applicant challenged that opinion and changed her statement of claim. The applicant stated that she had never challenged that opinion and that the modification of her claim had only followed the conclusions of the expert opinion. 22.  On 19 April 1995, as well as 12 June and 17 July 1996 the court held hearings. In June 1996 the applicant changed her statement of claim. 23.  On 12 November 1996 the court exempted the participants to the proceedings from fees relating to an expert opinion. It also ordered the preparation of an opinion. 24.  In 1997 an expert proposed two projects for the division of the estate. The applicant requested a correction to those projects. The Goleniów District Office, being one of the co-owners of the disputed property, did not accept the correction proposed by applicant. 25.  On 17 November 1997 the court issued a decision on remuneration for an expert. In February 1998 that decision was amended. 26.  On 20 May and 30 November 1998 hearings were held. 27.  On 10 December 1998 an expert opinion was ordered. 28.  On 10 February 1999 the court awarded the expert remuneration for the opinion. The applicant appealed that decision. In reply to the court's enquiry, she stated that in fact she intended to challenge that opinion. 29.  On 30 April and 17 May 1999 the court held hearings. 30.  On 24 May 1999 the applicant challenged the participation of an expert in the proceedings. On 12 July 1999 the court dismissed her challenge. On 19 August 1999 it rejected the applicant's appeal against that decision. 31.  On 9 February and 10 April 2000 the court held hearings. It ordered the preparation of another expert opinion. In September an expert informed the court that due to a heavy workload he was unable to prepare that opinion. 32.  On 30 November 2000 the court ordered another expert to carry on that opinion. The expert submitted the opinion in February 2001 and an annex to it in June 2001. The applicant submitted that she was served with a copy of that opinion on 24 July 2001. Subsequently, she challenged it. 33.  The hearing scheduled for 26 November 2001 was adjourned because of the absence of an expert. 34.  On 17 December 2001 the applicant modified her claim. 35.  On 19 December 2001 and 11 January 2002 the court held hearings. 36.  On 13 February 2002 it gave judgment. The applicant lodged an appeal. 37.  On 21 January 2003 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed her appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Split. 5.  An investigation was opened against the applicant and twenty other individuals on 24 November 2006 by an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) in connection with a suspicion that between 2003 and November 2006 they had organised distribution of heroin in Dubrovnik and on the island of Korčula. 6.  During the investigation, the investigating judge heard evidence from a number of witnesses, ordered searches, seizures and freezing of assets, and commissioned psychiatric, telecommunications and financial expert reports. 7.  Following an order by the investigating judge, on 24 November 2006 the police carried out a search of the applicant’s flat and on 5 February 2007 the psychiatrist submitted his report in respect of the applicant. He found that the applicant had used drugs for a relatively short period of time and had not developed an addiction. 8.  On 15 May, 15 June, 8 August and 5 October 2007 the investigating judge established that all the necessary evidence had not been obtained and asked the president of the Split County Court to extend the investigation. The president of the Split County Court granted the requests and the investigation was extended on each of those occasions. 9.  The State Attorney’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Državno odvjetništvo, Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: “the State Attorney’s Office”) indicted the applicant and sixteen others on 15 November 2007 in the Split County Court on charges of conspiracy to supply heroin in Dubrovnik and on the island of Korčula between 2003 and November 2006. 10.  The applicant lodged an objection against the indictment on 7 December 2007, arguing that it had numerous substantive and procedural flaws. On 7 February 2008 the Split County Court sent the indictment back to the State Attorney’s Office on the ground that it needed further clarification. 11.  The State Attorney’s Office submitted an amended indictment against the applicant and sixteen others before the Split County Court on 22 February 2008, reiterating the same charges of conspiracy to supply heroin. On 5 March 2008 the applicant lodged an objection against the above amended indictment, arguing that it had numerous substantive and procedural flaws. A three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s objection on 14 March 2008 as ill-founded. 12.  At a hearing on 13 November 2008 the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. 13.  At hearings held on 17 and 18 December 2008 the trial court heard evidence from two witnesses. Further hearings scheduled for 11 and 12 February 2009 were adjourned indefinitely as one of the defendants had broken his leg and could not attend. 14.  A hearing scheduled for 29 June 2009 was also adjourned because the first accused had asked for members to be removed from the trial panel. 15.  Further hearings were held on 28 August, 8, 15, 16 and 28 September, 20, 21 and 22 October, 2, 3, 4, 17 and 18 November and 21 December 2009, 27 and 29 January, 15, 17, 18 and 19 February, and 15, 29 and 30 March 2010. 16.  At a hearing on 13 May 2010 the applicant gave oral evidence denying all the charges. At hearings held on 14, 17, 21 and 24 May 2010 the other accused gave oral evidence and the parties made their closing statements. 17.  On 24 May 2010 the Split County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the first-instance judgment on 31 January 2011. 19.  The appeal proceedings are still pending. 20.  On 22 November 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of supplying heroin. 21.  The investigating judge of the Split County Court heard the applicant on 23 November 2006 and remanded him in custody for a further forty-eight hours under Article 98 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant appealed against this decision, arguing, inter alia, that he was permanently employed by company K.-V. and had not been engaging in any criminal activity. To support his arguments he submitted his employment contract with company K.-V. On 24 November 2006 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed his appeal. 22.  On 24 November 2006 the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“The pre-trial detention was ordered in respect of the defendants listed under [heading] II of this decision under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because it is possible to order pre-trial detention on this ground for the offence at issue and because [the charges] concern a large quantity of heroin, which the defendants supplied to a larger number of people and for a longer period of time, therefore probably damaging the health of a significant number of people, which all contributes to the particularly grave circumstances of the offence...\nThe pre-trial detention was ordered under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of defendants ... Milan Trifković, ... and ... since they have already been convicted of similar or other offences they now have no permanent income, so there is justified fear that they will reoffend.” 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 6 December 2006, arguing that the charges against him suggested that he had had only a minor role in the alleged organisation of supply of heroin. As to the risk of reoffending, he argued that it was not true that he had no permanent income, as he was employed by company K.-V. In this connection he indicated his employment contract and submitted further documents as evidence of his income. The applicant also asked that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure that the court deemed appropriate. 24.  The appeal was dismissed on 8 December 2006 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“In view of the offence [the accused] are charged with, this panel finds that there are particularly grave circumstances justifying their detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure given that ..., Milan Trifković and ... have already been convicted of similar or other offences, so that for them the detention under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also justified.” 25.  The investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention on 20 December 2006, under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and gravity of charges), reiterating the arguments in his decision of 24 November 2006. 26.  The applicant appealed on 29 December 2006, pointing out that according to the charges held against him he had had only a minor role in the alleged organisation of heroin supplying. He also argued that nothing suggested that he might reoffend, since he was not a drug addict and his previous conviction for the possession of a small quantity of drugs could not in any respect be associated with the charges against him in the present case. He again asked that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure that the court deemed appropriate. 27.  That appeal was dismissed on 17 January 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court. They reiterated their previous arguments. As to the risk of reoffending they added:\n“...and since [the defendants] are users of illegal drugs and do not have a permanent income, the investigating judge properly extended their detention under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 28.  On 19 January 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the arguments in his previous decisions. 29.  The applicant appealed on 23 January 2007, again stating that he had had only a minor role in the organisation of the supply of heroin and argued that the finding that he had no permanent income was not true, because he was employed. The applicant again asked for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure. 30.  The appeal was dismissed on 8 February 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court which reiterated its previous arguments. 31.  On 20 February and 20 March 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as before. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 21 March 2007 where he argued, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the investigating judge had failed to provide sufficient reasons for extending his detention and that he had failed to consider the possibility of applying another preventive measure. 33.  The appeal was dismissed on 4 April 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court which reiterated that the gravity of the charges and the fact that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences and that he was a drug user, justified his detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 34.  On 20 April 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in his previous decisions. 35.  The applicant appealed on 23 April 2007, arguing, inter alia, that the investigating judge had insisted that he had no permanent income, which was not true, because he was employed, and in that respect he had provided sufficient evidence. He also asked that the detention be replaced with another preventive measure. The appeal was dismissed on 4 May 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court, which endorsed the reasoning of the investigating judge. 36.  On 18 May 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in his previous decisions. 37.  The applicant appealed on 21 May 2007, reiterating his arguments that there were no grounds for his continued detention. He again asked for the detention to be replaced with another preventive measure. On 30 May 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, reiterating its previous arguments. 38.  The investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention on 20 June 2007 again under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using identical phrases as in his previous decisions. 39.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 21 June 2007 against the above decision, reiterating his previous arguments and asking for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure: on 27 June 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed his appeal, on the same grounds as before. 40.  On 19 July 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in his previous decisions. 41.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 25 July 2007, reiterating his previous arguments and asking for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure, but on 31 July 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, using identical phrases to those in its previous decision. 42.  On 20 August 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, again using identical reasoning. 43.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 21 August 2007 and on 28 August 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed it, using the same formulation as in its previous decisions. 44.  The investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention on 20 September 2007 under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using identical phrases as in his previous decisions. 45.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 25 September 2007. He again pointed out that the same effect of extending his detention could be achieved by ordering another preventive measure. On 3 October 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the appeal, using the same formulation as in its previous decisions. 46.  On 19 October 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating his previous reasoning. 47.   The applicant lodged an appeal on 23 October 2007, reiterating his previous arguments, but it was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 26 October 2007. 48.  On 16 November 2007, after the applicant had been indicted in the Split County Court, a three-judge panel of that court extended the applicant’s detention, again under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“The criminal record ... shows that the accused ... Milan Trifković ... [has] already been convicted of a criminal offence of the same type as the one concerned in these proceedings ...\nFurthermore, the report drawn up by a neuropsychiatrist ... shows that the defendant... Milan Trifković ... [is a] drug user ...\nTherefore since the accused ... Milan Trifković ... [are] drug users ... there is a risk that they might reoffend.\nAlso, since the accused are charged [with having] organised a group with the aim of trafficking in illegal drugs on the island of Korčula, and were engaged [in that activity for] a long period of time, together with J.C., who was the leader of the group and of all [the criminal] activities, and particularly having in mind the gravity [ of the offences at issue] and the danger to society, as well the prevalence of such offences, this panel considers that in the case at issue there are particularly grave circumstances which significantly differ from the usual manner in which the offence at issue is committed.” 49.  Against that decision the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court on 28 November 2007. As to his previous conviction, he argued that he had been convicted only of possession of illegal drugs for his personal use, which could not in any respect be associated with the charges against him in the present case. Moreover, the psychiatric report showed that he had no addiction to drugs and that there was no risk that he would reoffend. He also pointed out that he was permanently employed and that he had a regular source of income. As to the gravity of the charges, the applicant argued that the charges against him suggested that he had had only a minor role in the alleged organisation of the supply of heroin. The applicant also asked for the detention to be replaced with any preventive measure that the court deemed appropriate. 50.  On 7 December 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the Split County Court. It made no reference to the applicant’s request that his detention be replaced with another preventive measure. 51.  The applicant’s detention was further extended on 7 February 2008 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating its previous arguments. 52.  On 12 February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision, reiterating his previous arguments and asking for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 29 February 2008 in the following terms:\n “According to the indictment, the activities with which the accused are charged took place between the beginning of 2003 and mid-2006, and the accused J.C., in the broader area of Dubrovnik and Korčula, organised a criminal group in which he recruited ... Milan Trifković ... all in order to supply heroin.\nSince all the accused were engaged in a criminal activity for a longer period of time, between the beginning of 2003 and mid-2006, in the broader area of Dubrovnik and Korčula, and since they showed a high degree of criminal resolve by organising continuous [criminal] activity, which shows a particular degree of persistence and criminal resolve, and taking this together with the fact that the accused ... Milan Trifković ... were on more occasions convicted of, [inter alia], the same or similar offences, and ... since the accused ... Milan Trifković are users of illegal drugs, there is a fear that they might reoffend...\nAlso, since the subject of the alleged [criminal] activity was distribution of the illegal drug heroin in large quantities, and since it could have been used for a large number of small packages for individual use, which, if sold on the illegal drug market, could endanger a large number of mostly young people, suggests... that there are particularly grave circumstances surrounding the offence ...\nThe preventive measures under Article 90 of the CCP in respect of the accused Milan Trifković would not have the same effect as detention on the basis of Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 53.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 29 April 2008 extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the same grounds as before. 54.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 6 May 2008, reiterating his previous arguments, but on 30 May 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed it. 55.  On 24 July 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasons as in its previous decisions. 56.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 29 July 2008. He argued that the evidence from the case file showed that he had not been a member of the alleged criminal organisation. As to the risk of reoffending, he pointed out that his previous conviction had concerned small amounts of drugs, for his personal use only, and that he was not a drug addict. He also argued that he was employed and had a regular source of income. On 10 September 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, reiterating the same arguments as in its previous decisions. 57.  On 10 November 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“The criminal record ... shows that the defendant ... Milan Trifković ... [has] already been convicted of a criminal offence of the same type as the one concerned in these proceedings ...\nFurthermore, the report drawn up by a neuropsychiatrist ... shows that the defendant... Milan Trifković ... [is a] drug user ...\nAlso, the defendants are charged with organising a group with the aim of trafficking in illegal drugs on the island of Korčula, that they had been engaging [in that activity for] a long period of time, together with J.C., who was the leader of the group and of all [the criminal] activities.\nThe above-mentioned circumstances, together with the fact that the defendants were allegedly members of a group which was continually [and for a long] period of time engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs, namely heroin, one of the hardest drugs, and that they thus put at risk the health of a large number of people, justify the extension of detention in respect of the defendants ... [including] Milan Trifković ... under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These circumstances justify the fear of reoffending and also amount to particularly grave circumstances [in which] the offence [is alleged to have taken place].” 58.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 13 November 2008, in which he argued that the evidence thus far obtained had not implicated him in the offences in question, save for a statement given by a witness, Ž.T. However, he claimed that her statement was unreliable because it was both contradictory and hearsay evidence, and also contradicted the evidence given by other witnesses. The transcripts of telephone conversations of his which had been taped did not show that he had discussed details of drug trafficking with anyone. Furthermore, no material evidence which could connect him with trafficking in illegal drugs had been found on him. As regards the risk of reoffending, the applicant argued that, even if he had been a drug addict before being detained, during the period of his detention he would surely stop being one because he would not be able to take any drugs during his detention. As regards the argument that he had already been convicted of the same type of offence, he argued that his previous conviction concerned the possession of a small amount of drugs for his personal use, and that he was permanently employed. Against that background, he argued that there was no need for him to remain in detention and asked that his detention be replaced by another preventive measure. 59.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 13 January 2009 again extended the applicant’s detention, under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and with the same reasoning as it had previously given. On 19 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, reiterating his previous arguments. 60.  On 13 February 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 10 November 2008. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“The circumstances which show that there is a risk of reoffending ... are that the defendants are charged [with having been] ... members of a criminal organisation organised by the defendant J.C. in the period between the beginning of 2003 and November 2006, [operating in] the broader area of Dubrovnik and Korčula, and in which sixteen individuals were involved and mutually connected, among whom [were] the defendants Milan Trifković and ..., all [having the] aim of purchasing, storing, transferring and selling the drug heroin in order to obtain significant material gain. They delivered heroin previously bought by the defendant J.C. in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro for the needs of drug addicts on the island of Korčula, in daily amounts of at least 32 grams.\nFurthermore, the defendants Milan Trifković and ... have already been convicted several times of criminal offences of the same type – abuse of illegal drugs ... This shows that their previous life was not in conformity with the law and that their previous conviction has not taught them about the peril of committing criminal offences. Also, the documents in the file show that the defendants Milan Trifković and ... are users of illegal drugs ...\nTherefore, the long period of engaging in such criminal activity, which shows their determination, high level of organisation and criminal resolve ..., together with the fact that they are users of illegal drugs, ... and previous conviction, amount in the view of the Supreme Court ... to specific circumstances which justify the fear that the defendants Milan Trifković and..., if at large, would continue to commit new criminal offences of the same type ...\nThe decision to extend the defendants’ detention on the basis of Article 102 paragraph 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified and lawful in view of the fact that the... charges concern a significant amount of the illegal drug heroin. The fact that there was such a large amount of this drug, which could be divided into a large number of individual doses and thus put at risk the health of a large number of people, especially youngsters, [together with] the international elements of the offence, surpasses by far the usual gravity of such offences.\nThe defendants’ arguments pointing to the lack of evidence that they had committed the criminal offences at issue ... have no bearing on the decision [on their detention]. When deciding upon an appeal against a decision on detention, the appeal court has no competence to assess the factual background of the case or the defendants’ criminal responsibility. For detention to be ordered it suffices that the indictment and the documents in the case file indicate that there is reasonable suspicion. Neither has the principle of proportionality been infringed, because the defendant Milan Trifković has so far spent less than two years and three months in pre-trial detention ... When applying that principle, the relevant factors to be taken into account are not only the time already spent in detention but also the gravity of the criminal charges brought against the defendants and the severity of the sentence faced, as well as the need to order and extend detention.\nThe statement of the defendant Milan Trifković that he is not a drug addict ... is also irrelevant, because drug addiction and drug use are not the decisive motives for committing such criminal offences, and they cannot put into question the importance of all the other above-mentioned points which show at the risk of reoffending ... “ 61.  On the same day, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Split County Court’s decision extending his detention of 13 January 2009, using the same arguments. 62.  On 5 March 2009 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the decision of the Supreme Court of 13 February 2009 dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 10 November 2008 and the decision of the Supreme Court of 13 February 2009 dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 13 January 2009. 63.  The applicant’s detention was again extended on 9 April 2009 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same reasons as in its previous decisions. 64.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 16 April 2009. He argued that for several years his detention had been repeatedly extended, always using the same reasoning as to the gravity of the charges, without any assessment of his individual position in the alleged criminal organisation. He also pointed out that his previous conviction was minor and that he was employed, with a regular source of income. He further argued that the trial had been adjourned indefinitely and that there was a real risk that his detention was becoming a penalty. Finally, he pointed out, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the reasons justifying his detention were no longer relevant and sufficient, and that the domestic courts had never examined the possibility of applying another preventive measure. 65.  On 29 April 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 10 November 2008 inadmissible on the ground that the impugned decisions were no longer in effect, because in the meantime the Split County Court had adopted a fresh decision on his detention on 13 January 2009. 66.  On 6 May 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision extending his detention of 9 April 2009, reiterating its previous arguments. It also found that the purpose of the detention could not be achieved with any other preventive measure. 67.  On 27 May 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 13 January 2009 inadmissible on the ground that that the impugned decisions were no longer in effect, because in the meantime the Split County Court had adopted a fresh decision on his detention, on 9 April 2009. 68.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 6 July 2009 again extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in its previous decisions. 69.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 9 July 2009, pointing out that he had no addiction to drugs and that he was employed and therefore had a regular source of income. He also asked that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure. On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, reiterating its previous arguments. It added that the fact that the applicant had been detained and therefore had not had any opportunity to obtain drugs was not of a decisive influence on the conclusion that he might reoffend. As to his arguments that he was employed and had a regular source of income, the Supreme Court held that it also had no decisive effect, since the proceeds of the offence at issue were significantly higher than his personal income. 70.  On 1 October 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court again extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in its previous decision. 71.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 5 October 2009 in which he argued that the principle of proportionality had been infringed with his continuous detention but on 14 October 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed it, reiterating its previous arguments. As to the proportionality of the detention, the Supreme Court held that this principle had not been infringed, since the charges concerned the most serious offences, for which there was also a possibility of extending the detention for an additional six months under section 28 paragraph 3 of the Act on the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (hereinafter “the AOSCOC”). 72.  On 20 November 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention for a further six months. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“ ... since the maximum limits for detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were about to expire, [this panel] has examined whether there are grounds for extending the accused’s detention or for his release.\nIn the situation at issue, in view of the sentence that the offence at issue carries, the maximum statutory limit under Article 109 § 1(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is three years, and therefore this period would expire in respect of ... the accused Milan Trifković ... on 22 November 2009.\nHowever, under section 28 § 2 of the [AOSCOC] the maximum time-limit of detention during an investigation, if the investigation has been extended, can be twelve months, while paragraph 3 of the same section provides that the maximum period of detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be extended for a further six months if the detention during the investigation has been extended under paragraph 2 of [Section 28 of the AOSCOC].\nSince in this particular case the investigation was extended so that it lasted more than the maximum six months, the conditions for extending the maximum period of the pre-trial detention for a further six months under section 28 paragraph 3 of the [AOSCOC] have been met.\nTherefore, since all the circumstances on which the detention was extended under Article 102 paragraph 1 (1), (3) and (4) of the CCP have not changed, the detention in respect of the accused ... Milan Trifković and ... had to be extended for a further six months ...“ 73.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the above decision on 24 November 2009. He argued that the evidence adduced during the trial did not support the suspicion that he was an important member of the criminal group and that no drugs, objects usually used to sell drugs, or any proceeds of crime had ever been found on or seized from him. The applicant further argued that the Split County Court had been using the same stereotyped formula when extending his detention for three years, and that there were no grounds for extending his detention. He also argued that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and that during that period he had been detained in inhuman and degrading conditions. Finally, he pointed out, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the possibility of replacing his detention with another preventive measure had never been examined. On 27 November 2009 he also submitted to the Supreme Court a statement from company K.-V. confirming that he was permanently employed by that company; he asked again to be released. 74.  The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 11 December 2009. It limited its assessment only to the question of whether further extension would exceed the maximum statutory limit. As to the other arguments put forward by the applicant, the Supreme Court noted:\n“As to the arguments put forward by all three accused in which they complain about the conditions of their detention and challenge the grounds and purpose of their detention on account of its length, it is to be noted that it does not put in any doubt the impugned decision. Namely, the [Split County Court’s] decision did not address the grounds for their detention, since it only concerned examination of statutory conditions for extending the maximum detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in respect of which the arguments in the appeal are irrelevant.” 75.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the above decision of the Supreme Court, reiterating the same arguments from his appeal. 76.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 12 February 2010 extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating arguments from its previous decisions as to the risk of reoffending and the gravity of the charges. 77.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 18 February 2010, reiterating his previous arguments and asking that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure, if one was necessary. 78.  On 25 February 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court of 11 December 2009. The relevant part of the Constitutional Court’s decision reads:\n“It appears from the constitutional complaint, which is identical to the appeal lodged with the Supreme Court, that [the applicant] is complaining about the grounds for his detention, which was not the subject of the impugned decisions. The statutory grounds for his detention are under Article 107 paragraph 2 of the CCP, within the competence of the panel from Article 18 paragraph 3 and Article 20 paragraph 2 of [the CCP], which is obliged to examine the grounds for detention every two months ...\nHowever, in the case at issue, the impugned decisions do not examine the grounds for [the applicant’s] detention, but only whether the conditions for extending the detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been met. ... “ 79.  On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 12 February 2010 on the ground that the same reasons warranting the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure still existed. It also found that the principle of proportionality had not been infringed and that there were no grounds to replace the detention with another preventive measure. 80.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court against the above decision of the Supreme Court, again complaining about the extension of his detention and about the conditions in detention. 81.  The applicant’s detention was again extended by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 17 May 2010 on the basis of Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating its previous arguments. 82.  On 22 May 2010 the maximum statutory time-limit of the applicant’s extended detention expired and the applicant was released.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Austria. 5.  On 11 March 1992 the Kärnten Regional Government (Landesregierung) dismissed the applicant’s request for a permit under the Kärnten Environmental Protection Act (Naturschutzgesetz) to build a tool shed on his agricultural and forestal estate. It noted that the project was contrary to the objectives of the area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) as a tool shed was not necessary in order to cultivate a forestal estate of less than 10 hectares. 6.  Two further requests of the applicant for the granting of a permit were rejected on the ground of res iudicata: On 28 November 1994 the Kärnten Regional Government found that the extension of the applicant’s forestal estate to approximately 6 hectares did not constitute any relevant change of the circumstances. The Administrative Court confirmed this decision on 23 October 1995. On 16 January 1996 the applicant again requested a permit and submitted that he had acquired further 13 hectares of land. On 22 August 1997 the Kärnten Regional Government rejected this request as it found that the purchase contract was not valid and there was, therefore, no change of the relevant circumstances. 7.  On 2 April 1998 the applicant again requested a permit for the tool shed which he had in the meanwhile built. He submitted that the relevant circumstances of his case had changed in that his brother-in-law was disposed to rent him approximately 5 hectares of land. 8.  On 5 October 1998 the applicant filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) to the Kärnten Regional Government as the Spittal an der Drau District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshaupt-mannschaft) failed to decide within the statutory six months time-limit. 9.  Upon request of the Regional Government, the building office (Baubezirksamt) at the District Administrative Authority issued an expert opinion on 20 November 1998. This opinion was communicated to the applicant, who, on 26 March and 21 June 1999 respectively, submitted two opinions of the private experts H and M in reply. 10.  Meanwhile, on 26 May 1999, the building office at the District Administrative Authority, upon request of the Regional Government, commented on the private expert opinion of H. On 22 June 1999 the forestry inspection office (Bezirksforstinspektion) at the District Administrative Authority, upon request of the Regional Government, issued a further statement. Neither document was communicated to the applicant. 11.  On 7 July 1999, the Kärnten Regional Government allowed the applicant’s request for transfer of jurisdiction but dismissed his request for the permit under the Environmental Protection Act. It noted that, due to changes in the relevant legislation, the question whether a project was in accordance with the objectives of the area zoning plan was not any longer relevant in the proceedings concerning a permit under the Environmental Protection Act. The permit could, however, not be granted as the tool shed had an adverse effect on the character of the concerned landscape. The Regional Government referred in this regard to the official expert’s opinion of 20 November 1998, who had found that the project led to urban sprawl. The Regional Government further noted that the construction of the tool shed was not a measure of public interest. It referred in this regard to expert opinions submitted in the previous proceedings which had found that the tool shed was not necessary for the cultivation of the applicant’s forest. The Regional Government finally noted that the applicant had only alleged that he would rent another 5 hectares and had not submitted the rent contract. 12.  The applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) and requested it to hold a hearing. Referring to the findings of the two private expert opinions he had submitted in the proceedings before the Regional Government, the applicant contested the Regional Government’s conclusions. The applicant further complained that the Regional Government had not given sufficient reasons as to why it preferred the findings of the official expert against those of the private expert opinions. In the view of the divergent findings of the experts the Regional Government should have taken another expert opinion. He finally submitted that the Regional Government should have requested him to submit the rent contract if it considered this relevant for the proceedings at issue. 13.  On 25 October 1999 the Regional Government submitted its comments on the applicant’s complaint. It noted inter alia that the private expert opinions had been examined by the building office at the District Administrative Authority. The findings of the private experts were, however, not suitable to disprove the findings of the official expert. In his further comments of 11 December 1999 the applicant complained that he had not been informed about the examination by the building office of the private experts’ opinions and had, therefore, not been able to comment on it. 14.  On 21 March 2001 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint and the request for a hearing. It confirmed the Regional Government’s conclusions and, giving extensive reasons, found that the findings of the private experts had not been relevant and had not disproved the opinion of the official expert. It referred inter alia to an official expert opinion submitted in previous proceedings and the forestry inspection office’s statement of 22 June 1999 which referred to this opinion.\nThe Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 9 April 2001. 15.  The applicant subsequently removed the tool shed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Ankara. 5.  On 23 January 1994 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Istanbul Security Headquarters, on suspicion of being involved in the activities of an illegal armed organisation, namely the TKP/ML (Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist Leninist, Turkish Communist Party / Marxist Leninist). 6.  On 7 February 1994 he was brought before the public prosecutor and then the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court. The same day, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody. 7.  On 31 March 1994 the public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and four others with membership of an illegal armed organisation and involvement in activities which undermined the constitutional order of the State. 8.  At the time of the events, a similar case concerning certain activities of the TKP/ML was pending before the third chamber of the Istanbul State Security Court. Following a jurisdictional conflict between two chambers of the court, on 14 March 1995 the Court of Cassation decided to join the applicant's case to the one pending before the third chamber. Consequently, the number of accused was increased to sixteen people. 9.  The applicant did not attend a number of hearings. 10.  In the course of the proceedings, the court held forty-eight hearings. At the end of each hearing the State Security Court rejected the applicant's requests for release pending trial, having regard to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case file. 11.  On 12 June 2000 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 12.  On 15 May 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. The case was remitted to the Istanbul State Security Court for further examination and the applicant remained in detention. The case was resumed with 15 accused, including the applicant. 13.  On 8 February 2002 the applicant's lawyer requested the court to release the applicant pending trial due to his poor health. He submitted a medical report certifying that Mr Solmaz was suffering from Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome (a brain disorder caused by thiamine deficiency, usually associated with alcoholism). The court dismissed the lawyer's request, maintaining that the applicant could be treated in prison. Moreover, it held that, considering the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the file, the applicant should continue to be detained pending trial. 14.  Following an objection by the applicant's lawyer, the court reconsidered its decision of 8 February 2002. On 18 February 2002, relying on a medical report and considering the length of the period which the applicant had already spent in detention, the court ordered his release pending trial. It further held that it was likely that the final decision of the court would be in favour of the applicant. 15.  State Security Courts were abolished by constitutional amendments introduced on 7 May 2004. Subsequently, the applicant's case was resumed before the Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  After holding seventeen hearings, on 31 January 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment in accordance with Article 146 of the Criminal Code. 17.  However, on an unknown date the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first-instance court once again. The case was resumed before the Istanbul Assize Court, where it is still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "3.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Tokat. 4.  While performing his compulsory military service, the applicant was injured. He was subsequently declared medically unfit to serve in the armed forces on account of his injury and was thus discharged. 5.  The applicant subsequently applied to the Social Security Institution (“Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu”, “SGK”), claiming a special service disability pension. Upon the SGK’s refusal of this claim, he brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court for the annulment of the SGK’s decision denying him a service disability pension. 6.  On 14 April 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, holding that no causal link could be established between the applicant’s disability and the functions he performed in the armed forces. The written opinion of the principal public prosecutor submitted to this court prior to the delivery of the decision was not communicated to the applicant. 7.  On 9 June 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request for rectification of its previous decision as the request had been lodged outside the statutory time-limit.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant, born in 1950, was a Turkish national at the time of the events complained of. He subsequently obtained German nationality. 12.  The applicant is the father of G., born out of wedlock on 29 June 1988. In a document dated 15 June 1988, he acknowledged paternity of the unborn child, and in a further document, dated 15 August 1988, he acknowledged paternity and undertook to pay maintenance. 13.  The applicant met the child's mother, Ms D., in 1985 and in December 1987 he moved into her flat, where they lived together until at least July 1989 or, as stated by the applicant, until February 1990. In any event, the applicant continued to visit the child and her mother until February 1990, and between the end of July and October 1990 he regularly fetched G. for visits. From November 1990 onwards, Ms D. prohibited any contact between the applicant and the child. 14.  On 5 December 1990 the applicant applied to the Wiesbaden District Court for a decision granting him a right of access to his daughter on every Sunday from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. as well as on Boxing Day and Easter Monday. 15.  On 5 September 1991 the District Court, having regard to the statements made by the parties and the Wiesbaden Youth Office and having considered evidence obtained from several witnesses, dismissed the applicant's request. 16.  The court, referring to Article 1711 of the Civil Code, observed that the mother, as the person having custody, determined the father's right of access to the child and that the guardianship court could only grant the father a right of access if this was in the child's best interests. The court found as follows:\n“The Court is convinced that the petitioner's wish for [G.] to visit him is motivated by attachment to his child and genuine affection for her. It nonetheless takes the view that personal contact with her father is not in the child's best interests, since her mother dislikes her father so deeply and opposes all contact so fiercely that any visits ordered by the court would take place in a tense, emotionally charged atmosphere which would probably be extremely harmful to the child.\nThe Court can discern no special circumstances which, given the strong differences between the parents, might make personal contact with her father appear beneficial for [G.] ... The relationship which developed between [G.] and her father in the period from her birth to her father's moving out – that is, approximately one year and nine months – is probably not of such fundamental importance that the risk of seriously upsetting the child by resuming contact opposed by her mother is worth taking. The staff who looked after [G.] at the day nursery, and who were questioned as witnesses, stated that she displayed no – or at least no serious and lasting – behavioural abnormalities when she was parted from her father and contact between them ceased, and that she is a balanced, cheerful and outgoing child. The evidence does not therefore confirm her father's claim that she missed him and frequently asked about him after their contact at the day nursery ceased.\nIt has not therefore been shown that the conditions laid down in Article 1711 § 2 have been met, and the Court is accordingly obliged to dismiss the father's request.” 17.  On 12 March 1992 the applicant appealed to the Wiesbaden Regional Court. 18.  On 12 May 1992 the Regional Court ordered a psychological expert opinion on the question whether contact with the applicant was in G.'s interests. On 8 July 1992, following a first conversation with the expert, the applicant challenged her for bias. He also requested that another expert be appointed on the ground that the scientific approach adopted did not reflect the latest state of research. On 9 September 1992 the Regional Court refused the applicant's request, finding that, taking into account the expert's explanations of 8 August 1992, there were no reasons to doubt her impartiality or her capabilities. 19.  On 17 December 1992 the applicant requested the Regional Court to progress with the proceedings. He also applied for a provisional order granting him a right of access to G. during one afternoon every week and prohibiting her mother from obstructing such contact. 20.  On 23 December 1992 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request for a provisional order granting access. The Regional Court found that there was no urgency and that the applicant could be expected to await the outcome of the main proceedings. Furthermore, such an order would anticipate the possible terms of a final decision. Should a provisional order be issued and the request be eventually dismissed in the main proceedings, the disadvantages for the child would be more serious than those for the applicant in continuing with the prevailing situation. 21.  In her opinion dated 25 February 1993, the expert noted that she had visited the applicant's family in June 1992 and again heard the applicant, the child's mother and the child on several occasions between November 1992 and February 1993. As regards her meetings with G., the expert explained that in the course of various games she had explored her feelings concerning persons and situations and concerning the applicant. They had also looked at a family photo album and G. had avoided looking at the more recent photographs. This reaction showed that G. had repressed the memories of her father. The expert reached the conclusion that a right of access without prior conversations to overcome the conflicts between the parents was not in the child's interests. 22.  By a letter of 8 March 1993, the Regional Court, noting that the District Court had omitted to hear the child, enquired of the expert whether hearing the child in court on the issue of her relationship with her father would place a psychological strain on her. 23.  In her reply of 13 March 1993, the expert indicated that she had not directly asked the child about her father. She had expected that G. would react spontaneously in the course of the meetings and express her feelings towards him. In the expert's view, the fact that G. had not mentioned her father was certainly relevant. The expert further referred to the last meeting, when they had glanced through a family photo album and she had asked G. about whether she still knew her father. On both occasions, she had appeared to repress her memories concerning him. The risk inherent in questioning her about whether she wished to see her father was that, in this conflict between the parents, the child might have the impression that her statements were decisive. Such a situation could provoke serious feelings of guilt. 24.  At a court hearing on 30 April 1993, the applicant and the child's mother entered into an agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, the applicant declared that he would refrain from instituting any court proceedings, making any enquiries about the mother's personal circumstances and exercising his right of custody obtained under Turkish law on condition that they underwent parental therapy. The proceedings were suspended until the termination of this therapy. 25.  On 1 June 1993 the applicant requested that the proceedings be resumed as the child's mother had not approved the two institutions for family therapy proposed by the applicant and had failed to react to his suggestion that she should make a proposal. 26.  On 25 August 1993 the Wiesbaden Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding as follows: \n“Personal contact with a child born out of wedlock is intended to allow a father to satisfy himself as to the child's welfare and development and preserve the natural ties existing between them. It is not therefore the purpose of granting access, but the legal conditions for doing so, which differ: while a parent who does not have custody of a child born in wedlock is entitled to access under Article 1634 [of the Civil Code], Article 1711 [of the Code] does not grant a right of access to the father of a child born out of wedlock. Rather, the law leaves it up to the person having custody, as a rule the mother, to determine whether, and to what extent, the father should be able to spend time with his child. However, the guardianship court may decide that the father is entitled to access if this is in the child's best interests. The main reason for the weaker legal position of the father of a child born out of wedlock is his different social position. After the Federal Constitutional Court's decisions of 1971 and 1981, the constitutionality of Article 1711 can no longer be seriously doubted. For considerations of legal policy, a reform of the law on children born out of wedlock is even more urgently necessary. In the meantime, the courts are bound by Article 1711.\nUnder that provision, the guardianship court decides to grant a father access to a child born out of wedlock if this is beneficial for the child's welfare. It is not enough for such contact to be consistent with, or not contrary to, the child's interests, it must serve those interests and promote them. This interpretation justifies the assumption that fathers should generally be granted access to their children because this enables the latter to develop as normally as possible and helps them to form a clear image of themselves and their origin. It is in fact important for children not simply to have a fantasy picture of their fathers, but to be able to form a personal, realistic picture.\nWhether contact with the father is conducive to the child's well-being depends initially on the father's motives for seeking it. The Regional Court is convinced that the father in this case is motivated by attachment to [G.] and genuine affection for her. Even when a father acts from responsible motives, however, the court is not necessarily obliged to grant him access if there are serious tensions between the parents, these are communicated to the child, and there is reason to fear that every meeting with the father will interfere with the child's further undisturbed development in the residual family provided by the mother ...\nIn view of the findings in the [psychological expert] report referred to above, it must be assumed that this would happen in the instant case. If the father were granted access to [G.] in present circumstances, she would have to shuttle between hostile camps, which should not be asked of her.\nIf – as in this case – there is a danger that differences between parents may affect a child, then special circumstances are needed to justify the assumption that contact with the father will nevertheless have permanently beneficial effects on the child's development or well-being ... However, no such circumstances can be discerned here. It is true that, for the first two years of her life, [G.] grew up with both father and mother, but this period was not conflict-free. The disagreements and sometimes open aggression between her parents – in other words, the family violence she witnessed – have certainly left their mark on her, even if she can no longer recall them spontaneously. As the psychological report indicates, she has also repressed her old ties with her father – a fact reflected in the care she takes to avoid talking about him. In view of all this, the report finds that she does not suffer as a result of the present situation.\nThe Court can rely fully on the report, which has no apparent defects and is not invalidated by the fact that the father sees the situation differently.\nIn finding that therapy had not enabled the parents to put their former conflicts behind them, thus making it possible for [G.] to have access to both of them, the Court did not have to decide who was to blame for this ... The decisive factor is always the child's point of view. As already pointed out, however, the situation in this case is such that the parents must first initiate dialogue with each other.” 27.  The Regional Court finally considered that exceptionally it had not been required to hear the child, since questioning her about her relationship with her father would have placed a psychological strain on her. In this connection, the court referred to the expert's supplementary report of 13 March 1993 (see paragraph 23 above). 28.  On 21 September 1993 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, complaining that the refusal of access to his daughter infringed his parental rights and amounted to discrimination, and alleging that the taking of expert evidence had been unfair. The Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged receipt on 29 September 1993. \nBy a letter of 26 April 1994, the applicant asked the Constitutional Court about the state of the proceedings and urged a speedy decision. On 16 May 1994 the Constitutional Court informed him that in a similar case which had been registered at an earlier date a decision was envisaged for the first half of 1995.\nOn 26 November 1995 the applicant sent a letter to the President of the Federal Constitutional Court complaining that the examination of his constitutional complaint had been postponed until the first half of 1996. In her reply of 15 February 1996 the judge dealing with the applicant's case informed him that, owing to the heavy workload of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1995, it had not been possible to take a decision. A decision was envisaged in 1996. Having regard to the importance of the subject matter, such a decision required careful preparation. 29.  On 1 December 1998 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, refused to entertain the applicant's constitutional complaint.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Izmir. 6.  On 3 September 2007 at around 8.10 p.m. the applicant was shot by officers from a gendarmerie special operations team immediately after he and his brother left a neighbouring house in the vicinity of their hamlet, Gölek, in the district of Mazgirt, in Tunceli, south-east Turkey. 7.  As a result of the shooting, the applicant was hit with a total of eight bullets and suffered injuries to his arms, his legs, and his left shoulder. According to a medical report issued by the Forensic Medicine Department of Fırat University dated 13 November 2007, the injuries that the applicant sustained were life-threatening. According to the report, the applicant received medical treatment and underwent surgical operations at the cardiac surgery units at the Elazığ Military Hospital and the Fırat University Hospital between 3 and 19 September 2007. He was then transferred to the Ege University Hospital in Izmir upon the request of his family members. A further medical report issued on 27 June 2011 by a board of doctors from the Karşıyaka State Hospital stated that the applicant was experiencing difficulties in walking and using his left shoulder as a result of firearm injuries. In particular, he had suffered a 48% loss of function in his legs and a 10% loss of function in his left shoulder. According to the report, the applicant was permanently disabled and only able to walk with the aid of two crutches. The applicant’s brother was not injured during the shooting. 8.  On 4 September 2007 a crime scene investigation was carried out by gendarmerie officers from the Tunceli Provincial Gendarmerie Command, who then drafted a crime scene report. The report was signed by six gendarmerie officers, including İ.S. and M.K., who had taken part in the operation of 3 September 2007. The report drafted by the officers stated that the special operations team had received information that members of the PKK[1], an illegal organisation, would be going to the house where the applicant and his brother had gone. The information had been given by B.B., the son of M.B., the owner of the house, who had been threatened by members of the PKK. The security forces began search and detection activities in the region at around 3.30 a.m. after the receipt of this information and at 3.30 p.m. the commander of the operation, together with two team commanders, identified four points in the vicinity of M.B.’s house at which the officers could position themselves. At around 7.40 p.m. gendarmerie officers arrived in the vicinity, took up position at the four different points identified earlier by their commanders and waited for PKK members. The applicant and his brother arrived at the house at 8 p.m. and left at 8.10 p.m. When they had left the house, E.Ö. and G.A., officers positioned at point no. 3 who had a thermal camera and a night vision device, informed the commander of the operation, İ.S., who was positioned at point no. 2, that the applicant and his brother might have weapons on them. They also informed the commander that the applicant and his brother were acting suspiciously and that they had checked the area around the house with their torches and then turned them off. The team commander subsequently asked M.A. and Y.S., officers who were positioned at the same point and who had thermal cameras, whether the applicant and his brother were carrying weapons. The officers informed the commander that the applicant and his brother had objects in their hands which looked like weapons. The team commander then ordered the applicant and his brother to stop when they were 60 metres away. As they failed to do so, officers first fired warning shots in the air (3-5 shots) and then opened fire in the direction of the applicant and his brother (13-14 shots) towards their feet. They stopped firing when the applicant and his brother shouted that they were villagers. The report further stated that when the officers approached the applicant and his brother and found that the former was wounded, they gave him first aid straight away and the applicant was transferred to Elazığ Military Hospital by helicopter. According to the report, a total of twenty‑six spent bullet cases were found where the officers had been located and there was a distance of 15 to 30 metres between the officers and the applicant and his brother. 9.  A gendarmerie officer also drew a sketch of the scene, according to which the applicant was 60 metres away from M.B.’s house and 15 and 30 metres away from points no. 2 and 1, respectively, where spent bullet cases had been found. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant and his brother lodged a complaint against the gendarmerie officers who had been responsible for the applicant’s shooting. The Mazgirt Public Prosecutor subsequently initiated an investigation against six gendarmerie officers on a charge of exceeding the limits of their powers in resorting to force. 11.  On 6 September 2007 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor took statements from the applicant’s brother, S.T. He submitted that they had gone to M.B.’s house because they had wished to inform his son, B.B., that their mother would not be going to the town centre with him the next day. S.T. further maintained that they had walked with their torches on and that there had been no warning or warning shots before the shooting. He contended that when the shooting had started, he had been 1-2 metres behind his brother. They had both thrown themselves on the ground when the shooting had started. 12.  On 6 and 13 September 2007 the public prosecutor obtained statements from B.B. and M.B., the occupants of the house, respectively. They both maintained that they had informed the security forces of the threats that M.B. had received. B.B. further contended that he had seen the applicant’s mother at around 5 p.m. on the same day and that she had asked him to take her to the town centre the next day. B.B. and M.B. stated that the applicant and his brother had come to their house in order to tell them that their mother would not be going to the town centre with B.B after all and that they had subsequently left. B.B. maintained that he had been surprised when he first saw the applicant and S.T., given that their visit had occurred after sunset. B.B. further noted that he had told the applicant and S.T. to turn their torches on when they left and that they had said “OK”. M.B. maintained that the applicant and his brother had had lit torches in their hands when they had arrived at his house. He also contended that the gunfire had started 2-3 minutes after the applicant and his brother had left; that it had lasted a few minutes; and that at the same time as the gunfire he had heard the applicant and S.T. shouting “We are villagers. Do not fire.” M.B. submitted that his house had also been hit by bullets. 13.  On 11 September 2007 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor took statements from a number of gendarmerie officers who had been involved in the operation of 3 September 2007.  İ.S., the team commander, maintained before the public prosecutor that they had started the operation upon receipt of information that terrorists would be going to M.B.’s house. He noted that a total of twenty-six gendarmerie officers had taken part in the operation. He further contended that E.Ö. and G.A. had informed him that there had been a flash of light from an object carried on the shoulder of one of the suspects which extended to hip level. He further stated that M.A. and Y.S. had also informed him that one suspect was carrying an object that extended from the shoulder to the hip. The commander maintained that the applicant and his brother had come within 10 metres of the point where they were positioned when he shouted at them to stop. According to the commander, the applicant and his brother had failed to stop despite the warning and had attempted to escape when they heard the warning shots. At that point he instructed the officers to open fire. İ.S. noted that a total of five officers had fired towards their feet and that they had stopped firing when the applicant had been shot and his brother had shouted that they were villagers. İ.S. lastly contended that the applicant’s injuries had been his own fault and that they had not intended to kill the applicant or his brother. According to İ.S., if they had intended to kill them, neither the applicant nor his brother would have survived. 14.  In their statements before the public prosecutor, E.Ö. and G.A. maintained that they had seen the applicant and his brother by using a night vision device and a thermal camera while the suspects were walking towards M.B.’s house. They had observed that the suspects had stopped when they were close to the house and had remained kneeling down for a while before entering into the house. They further maintained that they had seen shiny objects on the suspects’ shoulders. The officers noted that when they had left the house the suspects had lit their torches, had pointed them towards the path that they would take and had then turned them off. The officers had informed İ.S. of the aforementioned observations and had considered that the suspects might have been sending a message to another group in the area with their torches. They had then heard İ.S. ordering the suspects to stop and had subsequently heard firing for around five seconds. 15.  M.A., Y.S., and three other officers, R.E., B.B.A and M.K., in almost identical statements before the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor, maintained that İ.S. had told them that officers from another position had informed him that one of the two suspects was carrying an object on his shoulder which extended to hip level. Y.S. and M.K. further noted that they had also received this information through their radio transmitters. They further stated that the applicant and his brother had attempted to run away when their commander had told them to stop. As the suspects had not complied with the commander’s instruction, they had first fired warning shots and had then opened fire towards the suspects’ feet. They had stopped firing when one of the suspects had shouted that they were villagers a few seconds later. They maintained that it had been dark when the shootings occurred and that the applicant and his brother had not had lit torches with them. They stated that the applicant had been wounded because of his own conduct and that they would not have opened fire if the applicant and his brother had stopped in the first place. According to these five officers, the applicant must have been shot in the shoulder after falling to the ground upon being shot in the legs. They lastly contended that they had not intended to kill the applicant or his brother and that if they had had that intention, neither the applicant nor his brother would have survived. 16.  In their statements before the public prosecutor, Ş.Y. and A.Ş., two officers who had been positioned at the farthest point from the house, stated that they had not heard their commander give the order to stop, as it had been impossible due to the distance between them, and that they had heard gunfire for a few seconds. They had also heard their commander’s instruction to hold fire over the radio transmitter. 17.  On 13 September 2007 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor held an onsite inspection in Gölek. The public prosecutor observed the area where the applicant had been shot and heard İ.S., M.K. and A.Ş., who reiterated their statements given on 11 September 2007. During the inspection, a gendarmerie officer took photographs of the area under the instructions of the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor. 18.  On 1 February 2008 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor decided that his office did not have jurisdiction over the prosecution, given that the suspects had allegedly committed the offence of excessive use of force. The Mazgirt Public Prosecutor then sent the investigation file to the Elazığ Military Prosecutor’s Office. 19.  On 31 December 2008 the Elazığ Military Prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the six gendarmerie officers. The military prosecutor noted that the applicant had stated that he and his brother had had their torches on when he had been shot and that there had been hundreds of shots. The prosecutor found these claims unfounded, considering that at the time of the shootings night had not entirely fallen and that it would not therefore have been reasonable to have torches switched on. In the light of the statements of the applicant and his brother that they had not at first realised that they were being targeted and had only thrown themselves to the ground after the shooting had started, the prosecutor considered that the accused officers had not fired directly towards the applicant and his brother. The prosecutor further noted that the applicant’s brother, M.B. and B.B. had all stated that the officers had fired because they had considered the applicant and his brother to be terrorists, a statement which was in line with the accused officers’ defence submissions. According to the prosecutor, the manner in which the applicant and his brother had acted (staying in the house only for 5 minutes, leaving the house without the hosts coming out of the house, keeping a distance between them and turning their torches off while walking) had justified the officers’ suspicions that they were terrorists. The prosecutor further noted that, had there been hundreds of shots fired, the applicant’s brother would also have been injured. The prosecutor considered that it had been reasonable for the gendarmerie officers to think that the torches had been weapons as it had been dark and because the torches, whose dimensions were 25 cm x 15 cm, had not been switched on, and that the information given to the security forces had corresponded to the circumstances as they unfolded. The military prosecutor finally found it established that gendarmerie officers had fired towards the ground and towards the feet of the applicant, whom they had considered to be a terrorist, and with a view to effecting his arrest in accordance with the law. He therefore concluded that the officers had not been at fault and had not used excessive force. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an objection against the decision of the military prosecutor. 21.  On 6 April 2009 the Malatya Military Court upheld the Elazığ Military Prosecutor’s reasoning and dismissed the applicant’s objection.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Drobeta Turnu Severin Prison. 6.  On 28 October 2009 the applicant was convicted of rape and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He has since been serving his sentence in various Romanian prisons.\n \n... 14.  The medical report drawn up when the applicant was admitted to prison on 28 October 2009 indicates that he was “clinically healthy” (clinic aparent sănătos). 15.  From 26 May to 9 June 2011 the applicant was placed in the hospital wing of Rahova Prison, Bucharest, where he underwent surgery on 3 June 2011 for an inguinal hernia on his right side. 16.  From 2 to 8 October 2012 the applicant was placed in the internal medicine unit of the hospital wing of Jilava Prison, for digestive problems. He was included in a screening programme for digestive and liver conditions. Following a medical test to identify the viral markers of hepatitis, the applicant was found to be suffering from viral hepatitis C (purtator VHC). A biochemical blood analysis was conducted; the results indicated that his ALAT, ASAT and GGT enzyme levels were normal, as was his total bilirubin. 17.  In a note summarising the medical tests conducted during the applicant’s hospitalisation (scrisoare medicală), the doctor who had treated him observed that the applicant’s disease was progressing satisfactorily and that no additional examination was necessary at that stage. He recommended that the applicant adhere to a specific diet and refrain from smoking. He prescribed symptomatic treatment, namely hepatoprotective drugs and vitamin therapy, noting that these were to be administered “if needed” (la nevoie). The applicant’s health was scheduled for re-examination within six months. 18.  The applicant was provided with a special diet for persons suffering from disease (norma 18). During January, February and March 2013 he was treated with hepatoprotective drugs. 19.  On 21 February 2013 the applicant refused to be hospitalised for his health check-up. His medical records do not indicate the reasons for this refusal. However, they indicate that his health was to be re-examined within six months. 20.  From 5 to 8 August 2013 the applicant was placed in the internal medicine unit of the hospital wing of Jilava Prison for re-testing of his liver function. Blood tests showed that the ALAT and ASAT enzymes were slightly above the normal levels. On leaving the hospital wing, the applicant was advised to follow a course of hepatoprotective drugs, vitamin therapy and symptomatic treatment, to be administered if needed. He was also advised to have his condition reassessed within six months. 21.  The applicant continued to be provided with the special diet for persons suffering from disease. In August, October and December 2013 he was treated with hepatoprotective drugs. The list of the applicant’s medical consultations shows that, following a medical examination on 9 December 2013 in Jilava Prison, it was recommended that he attend a medical consultation for hepatitis C in Ion Cantacusino public hospital. 23.  On 14 January 2014 the applicant refused to be hospitalised for re-assessment of his health with regard to the hepatitis C condition. On 19 January 2014 the applicant was examined by an internal medicine specialist, who noted that his general state of health was good. 24.  On 28 January 2014 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor. The latter noted a diagnosis of “liver disease under observation” and indicated that the applicant had complained of vomiting. An anti-spasmodic drug was prescribed and administered to him. 25.  On 13 February 2014 the applicant complained of palpitations. He was examined by the prison doctor, who recommended a cardiology test. 26.  From 18 to 21 February 2014 the applicant was placed in the internal medicine and cardiology unit in the hospital wing of Jilava Prison, on the grounds that he required medical supervision for retro-sternal pain and that, as a smoker, he was an at-risk patient. An electrocardiogram and blood test were carried out. The biochemical blood analysis revealed that the ALAT enzyme was one-and-a-half times over the upper norm, that the ASAT enzyme was slightly over the norm and that the GGT enzyme was at normal levels. 27.  A medical certificate issued at the end of his hospitalisation indicated that the applicant was suffering from unstable angina (angor intricat de novo) and potentially toxic liver disease (hepatopatie posibil toxică). The applicant was prescribed treatment for his heart disease and a course of hepatoprotective treatment, to be followed for one month. 28.  In March 2014 the prison took the necessary steps to purchase the hepatoprotective drug, which was administered to the applicant at the beginning and end of May 2014. The applicant’s medical records indicate that he was treated with hepatoprotective drugs in June and July 2014. 29.  In the meantime, on 2 August 2013 the applicant had applied to the judge delegated by the court to supervise the observance of prisoners’ rights in Jilava Prison (“the delegate judge”), complaining about his physical conditions of detention and a lack of medical treatment for his hepatitis C. 30.  By a decision of 19 August 2013, the delegate judge dismissed his complaint. He confirmed the applicant’s allegations that he was being held in a cell measuring 33.96 m², occupied by twenty-seven inmates and containing four tables and six chairs. He further held that the prison authorities had attempted to improve conditions in the cell, noting that it had recently been renovated. He stated that the toilet block was separated from the cell, and that the cell received natural and artificial light. The fact that the cell was equipped with three-tier bunk beds arose from an objective cause, namely an increase in the number of detainees, and not from a lack of good will on the part of the prison authorities. 31.  With regard to the medical treatment provided to the applicant, the judge noted that he received the special diet for persons suffering from disease and that he had just received vitamin therapy. 32.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 4 December 2013 the Bucharest Court of First Instance upheld, in a final judgment, the delegate judge’s decision of 19 August 2013.\n...", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  In April 2008 the applicant was arrested and placed in detention on suspicion of aggravated rape and ill-treatment of a young woman. 7.  On 29 December 2009 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. 8.  In the meantime, between 30 April 2008 and 6 September 2010 the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13 in Chisinau where, according to him, the conditions of detention were very poor. In particular, the applicant alleges that the cells were overcrowded and dirty, that the food was of very poor quality, and that he was not provided with appropriate medical care. 9.  The relevant parts of the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment concerning his visit to Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (The United Nations Human Rights Council, document A/HRC/10/44/Add.3, 12 February 2009) read as follows:\n“B.  Conditions in places of detention\nInstitutions under the Ministry of Justice 30.  Undoubtedly, progress has been achieved in improving conditions of detention. However, some of the institutions visited by the Special Rapporteur were heavily overcrowded. The authorities themselves pointed out that Institution No. 13 in Chişinău was severely overcrowded - on the day of the visit it held 931 persons with the official capacity being 600 (see also appendix). The Special Rapporteur was informed of Government plans to close down this institution. 31.  Common problems at all pre- and post-trial prisons are the poor hygienic conditions, restricted access to health care and lack of medication as well as risk of contamination with tuberculosis and other diseases. Whereas the Special Rapporteur notes that the minimum norms regarding nutrition of detainees (Government Decision n. 609 of 29 May 2006) are checked on a daily basis and that, according to the financial plan of the Penitentiary Department, the food budget for 2008 had almost doubled in comparison to 2004 and is set to rise further, he also received consistent allegations regarding the poor quality and quantity of food ...” 10.  In its report for 2009 (page 117 ­-“Conditions of detention”), the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (“the Human Rights Centre”, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found, inter alia, that:\n“Regarding personal hygiene, clothing and bedding, despite [the fact that] Government decision no. 609 (29 May 2006) concerning minimum daily food requirements and the issuing of items of personal hygiene provides for the issuing of soap to detainees for bathing and other sanitary-hygienic needs, this has remained unfulfilled during 2009.” 11.  In its report for 2010 (page 142 et seq. - “Conditions of detention”) the Human Rights Centre found, inter alia, that:\n“Failure to adhere to the statutory cell size (4 square metres per person) in the living blocks of the institution has become an unpleasant problem which now affects the prison system across the entire country ...\nThe same situation was confirmed during a visit to Chişinău Prison no. 13 in on 9 September 2010. In some cells the living space was not proportionate to the number of detainees. During the visit, eight detainees were being held in cell no. 38, which measured 24 square metres. This situation has been seen repeatedly during visits by the Centre’s staff to the Chişinău Pre-trial Detention Centre. Similar findings were made during visits to Rusca Prison no. 7 on 19 May 2010, where six detainees were being held in a cell measuring 15.5 square metres and to Cricova Prison no. 4, where (in living block no. 7) over twenty detainees were being held in a cell measuring 65 square metres.\nOvercrowding comes directly within the Ombudsman’s remit as part of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, which on many occasions has recognised overcrowding in the country’s prisons ...\n[T]he Prisons Department informed the Ombudsman that meat and fish products are provided [to detainees] whenever possible. At the same time, the authority stated that, owing to the difficult financial situation, during 2010 the detainees in Rezina Prison no. 17 received only 75% and 80% of their normal quotas of meat and fish products respectively. In this connection, the Minister of Justice provided information to the Ombudsman about the expenditure on prisoners’ food in 2010. The cost amounted to MDL 24.05 million, whereas the budgetary need for the same year was, according to the Ministry of Finance’s draft budget, MDL 29.05 million. The daily cost of feeding a detainee in 2010 was MDL 10.24, whilst the daily budgetary need was MDL 12.35. This statistic was often cited by prison authorities to justify why they were unable to provide detainees with meat and fish ...\nAs regards sanitary conditions, lighting and ventilation problems continue to exist in the majority of living blocks in Moldovan prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prisons no. 1 and Rusca Prison no. 7.\nThe Republic of Moldova inherited old gulag-type prisons in dilapidated buildings, corresponding to former Soviet standards. The prisons do not conform to current national and international standards; however, the budget constraints upon the State do not allow for their reconstruction or renovation.\nIn the prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prison no. 1, detainees are held in large-capacity cells insufficiently equipped for their daily needs, namely areas for sleeping, for everyday living and for sanitary equipment. Detainees are held in extremely overcrowded, dark, damp and unventilated spaces full of cigarette smoke. In certain prisons the bunk beds essentially prevent daylight from reaching the living space.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Makiyivka. 6.  At about 6.30 a.m. on 13 November 1995 Mr O.M. was found in a cultivated forest near a railway station, with four gunshot wounds, from which he died the same day in a hospital some two hours later. 7.  On 17 November 1995 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Mr O.M. In the course of a subsequent search of the applicant’s house 1,500 dollars (USD) were seized. 8.  Between 17 November 1995 and 13 December 1996 the applicant was held in custody in the Donetsk Investigative Isolation Unit (SIZO). According to the applicant, the conditions in which he was held were inhuman and degrading. Furthermore, the police allegedly tortured him to obtain a confession. 9.  The applicant consistently denied any involvement in the murder. He acknowledged that on 12 November 1995 his classmate Mr A.F. had driven him to the site of the incident, as he had wanted to see the place, where he had planned a business meeting for 13 November 1995 with a certain Andrey, whose other details he did not know. The following day Mr A.F again accompanied the applicant to the same place along with his father in their car and waited for him nearby. The applicant met Andrey on the railroad bridge as agreed. Andrey took the applicant’s jacket. When the applicant saw two men fire at a passer-by, he became scared and ran through the forest to Mr A.F.’s car and they drove away. During the trip, the applicant threw away his boots and his gloves, as he had realised that other passers-by could have seen him and implicated him in the incident. 10.  On 18 November 1995 Mr N.L., the applicant’s acquaintance, who was a shareholder and a driver in a company managed by Mrs O.M., the victim’s widow, was questioned by the police concerning the murder. As he was questioned as a witness, Mr N.L. was warned of his obligation to provide all the information known to him on pain of criminal sanctions and was not offered the option to consult with a lawyer. He confessed to having hired the applicant to kill Mr O.M. and to having paid him USD 2,000 in advance and USD 10,000 post factum. He also testified that on the eve of the murder the applicant had shown him the gun he had acquired to kill Mr O.M. Soon afterwards Mr N.L. was indicted for incitement to murder. Following his indictment and purportedly a consultation with a lawyer, he retracted his confession and subsequently consistently denied his or the applicant’s involvement in the events throughout the course of the proceedings. 11.  On 21 November 1995 Mr N.L. complained to the prosecutor’s office that the police officers who had questioned him had put him under severe psychological pressure, including threats to accuse him of a capital offence, to have him beaten and raped and to harm his wife and daughter unless he identified the applicant as the killer of Mr O.M. On an unspecified date Mr N.L. also complained that two unknown individuals had attacked him on the porch of his house and told him to confess to his involvement in the murder if he wanted to spare his family serious trouble. The parties did not provide any information concerning the authorities’ reaction to these complaints. 12.  On an unspecified date the case against the applicant and Mr N.L. was referred for trial to the Donetsk Regional Court. According to the prosecution, the applicant was guilty of murder for profit, unlawful possession of firearms and unlawful transactions in foreign currency. According to the prosecution’s version of events, Mrs O.M., grossly upset about her husband’s inappropriate behaviour towards her, had requested Mr N.L. to find somebody to talk to him, threaten and, if necessary, beat him. She allowed him to take some money from 1.5 billion karbovantsi[1] which she had earlier given him for safekeeping, to hire a suitable person. Mr N.L., who was on bad personal terms with Mr O.M. and was afraid to lose his job in his wife’s company, decided to use the money to have Mr O.M. killed. On an unknown date Mr N.L. gave the applicant USD 2,000 for preparation of the murder, including the purchase of a gun, and informed him of the usual time and route by which Mr O.M. walked to work. On an unknown date the applicant acquired from an unknown source a 7.65-calibre foreign gun of an unknown make, and on 13 November 1995 he fired several shots into the victim. On 15 November 1995 Mr N.L. gave the applicant another USD 10,000 in payment for the murder. 13.  On 29 May 1996 the Donetsk Regional Court referred the case for additional investigation, having found that the facts of the case were insufficiently established and the evidence of the defendants’ involvement in the incriminated offences was insufficient. On an unspecified date the case was referred back to the court for trial. 14.  On 13 December 1996 the Donetsk Regional Court acquitted the defendants, having found, in particular, that the prosecution had failed to account for inconsistencies between the available sources of evidence and to secure sufficient proof of the defendants’ guilt. In particular, a number of facts, such as Mr N.L.’s alleged involvement in the crimes and the sums purportedly received by the applicant to commit the murder were lacking in any evidentiary basis save for Mr N.L.’s initial confessions, which he had subsequently retracted as given under duress. Accordingly, the court found the evidence unreliable and, as no other evidence was available, interpreted all the doubts in favour of the defence. 15.  The applicant was released from custody on the day of his acquittal and soon afterwards left the country and settled in Uzbekistan, allegedly fearing reprisals on the part of the police. On an unspecified date Mr N.L. disappeared. 16.  On 9 June 1997 the Donetsk Regional Court placed the applicant and Mr N.L. on the wanted list. According to the applicant, he was unaware of this fact and was never in hiding. He settled, worked, married, had a child and obtained a driver’s licence in his own name. 17.  On 13 December 1997 the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in cassation by the prosecution and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the Donetsk Regional Court. 18.  In 2002, when the applicant applied to the Ukrainian authorities to renew his expired passport, he was arrested and detained in Ukraine pending trial. 19.  As Mr N.L. was not found, on 9 December 2002 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (the former Donetsk Regional Court) solicited the applicant’s opinion about holding a trial in his absence, to which the applicant, represented by a lawyer, agreed. In the course of the trial, the prosecution requested the court to read out depositions by Mr N.L., to which the defence did not object. The court granted the request by the prosecution. 20.  On 3 October 2003 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal accepted the prosecution’s version of events as filed in 1996. It convicted the applicant of murder for profit and unlawful possession of firearms and acquitted him of unlawful transactions in foreign currency, which was by then no longer a criminal offence. 21.  The court found that the applicant’s guilt of having committed the murder as charged was apparent, in particular, on the strength of the following evidence:\n- Mrs O.M.’s testimony that in October 1995 she had requested Mr N.L. to find a person to threaten her husband and had authorised him to pay that person out of 1.5 billion karbovantsi given to him for safekeeping. After her husband had been murdered, Mr N.L. had advised her to be quiet about the matter;\n- Mrs A.L.’s (the applicant’s mother’s) testimony that on 12 November 1995 her son had bought gloves, tennis shoes and a sports bag. On 13 November 1995 her son had told her that he was going to play tennis in the morning, but had subsequently changed his plans and left the town for two days. The 1,500 USD which were seized from the house belonged to the entire family and were long-term savings;\n- Mrs V.V.’s and Mrs O.O.’s testimony that on 13 November 1995, at about 6.30 a.m., they had heard several gunshots and then discovered Mr O.M. wounded near the railroad bridge, and that they had not seen any suspicious men around;\n- Mr M.F.’s testimony that on 13 November 1995, at about 6.30 a.m., he had heard three gunshots and some 20 seconds later had seen a man running across the bridge. He was unable, however, to provide a description of the man and refused to speculate whether it could have been the applicant;\n- Mr A.F.’s testimony that on 12 November 1995 he had driven the applicant to a market in his father’s car, where the applicant had bought a bag, a jacket, tennis shoes and gloves. Subsequently they had gone on to the neighbourhood where the murder would take place the following day, as the applicant had business there. The applicant went into the forest and was absent for some 10 to 12 minutes, after which they returned home and agreed that Mr A.F. would give the applicant a ride the following morning “to meet the boss”. They drove to the place the next day and Mr A.F. and his father waited for the applicant in the car. The applicant returned without his jacket, very agitated, and informed them that he had encountered suspicious individuals. During the trip the applicant threw away his boots and his gloves out of the window. Mr A.F.’s father gave an analogous statement;\n- Mrs A.I.’s depositions, given during the pre-trial investigation, that on 13 November 1995 at 6:15 she had seen a man standing on the railroad bridge with a big dark bag near him, his hands in the pockets;\n- an expert assessment of the bullets fired at Mr O.M., according to which the bullets could have been shot from a gun of one of some eight foreign models;\n- an expert assessment that it was not impossible to fire one of those guns when wearing gloves similar to the ones which the applicant had had on him, as identified by Mr A.F. (his driver);\n- two forensic assessments of the circumstances and causes of Mr O.M.’s death, which described his wounds and found that the shots had been fired from various distances;\n- the testimony by the applicant’s boss, in charge of a currency exchange business, concerning the applicant’s low income;\n- the record of the currency exchange transactions performed by the business in the relevant time, according to which nobody had exchanged any sum higher than USD 500 in a single transaction; and\n- the applicant’s psychiatric assessment, according to which he suffered from no disorder and was answerable for his actions. 22.  No reference in the text of the judgment was made to the confessional statements by Mr N.L. or to the applicant’s allegations that they had been given under duress. 23.  Having recited the aforementioned evidence, the court concluded:\n“Having assessed the evidence in the case, the court considers it established that [the applicant].... had committed murder for profit, which is to be qualified under Section 93(a) of the Criminal Code. His intentional actions, manifested in acquisition, carrying and storage of firearm and ammunition without a respective permit, which have been fully confirmed, fall under Section 222 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine...” 24.  The applicant appealed in cassation. He maintained, inter alia, that his conviction lacked evidentiary basis and de facto relied to a decisive extent on the initial depositions by Mr N.L., given by him in the absence of a lawyer when interrogated as a witness without privilege against self-incrimination, and which he had subsequently retracted as given under duress. He maintained that without a reference to those depositions all the other evidence was insufficient to establish the facts, in particular concerning the possession of the gun and the payment of money for the murder. 25.  The applicant’s lawyer lodged a separate cassation appeal in which he supported the applicant’s allegations concerning the insufficiency of the inculpating evidence. He noted, in particular, that there was no evidence whatsoever that the applicant had ever had a gun, much less fired it, or that the USD 12,000 allegedly given to the applicant had ever existed, much less been transferred to him as suggested, and submitted that it was not possible to establish exactly where the applicant had been at the time when Mr O.M. had been wounded. 26.  On 11 March 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 3 October 2003. In the text of its decision it summarised the evidence on which the conviction was based, as well as referring to the confession made by Mr N.L., as follows:\n“During the hearing [the trial court] also examined the statement of [Mr N. L.] given during the pre-trial proceedings, in which he confirmed that after having talked with [Mrs O. M.] he informed [the applicant] about that, and the latter said that in order to prepare the murder he needed USD 2,000 and USD 10,000 for its committal. He gave [the applicant] USD 2,000, and the latter showed him a gun he had acquired. After the murder of [Mr O.M.], on 15 November 1995 he paid [the applicant] USD 10,000 and the latter told him that he had disposed of the gun, the jacket, the gloves and the boots.\nThe arguments of [the applicant] that [Mr N.L.] had falsely accused him and himself under physical pressure by police officers had also been examined and had been found unsubstantiated...” 27.  In concluding its reasoning, the Supreme Court stated:\n“Therefore, the [trial] court has examined all the circumstances of the case. Having assessed the evidence in its totality, the [trial] court concluded that [the applicant] had committed the premeditated murder for profit of [Mr O.M.] and correctly qualified it as an offence defined in Article 93 (a) of the 1960 Criminal Code.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968. From November 1997 to June 2004 he held a post of customs inspector in Feodosiya. 5.  On 13 October 2004 the applicant was arrested and placed in the Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit (“SIZO”) of Simferopol. Later on, he was moved to the Zaporizhzhya SIZO. 6.  On 15 October 2004 the Feodosiya Town Court (“the Town Court”) remanded the applicant in custody in view of the pending criminal investigations against him. The court noted in particular that the applicant was charged with a serious crime for which he was liable to a penalty of over three years’ imprisonment, and that he was unemployed. The court held, without giving any further details, that there were grounds to believe that, if left at liberty, the applicant would seek to evade investigation and trial, and obstruct the establishment of the truth in his criminal case. 7.  By resolutions of the Town Court and the Kyiv Court of Appeal of 8 December 2004, 8 February, 30 March, 8 July and 7 December 2005, the maximum period of the applicant’s detention was extended, respectively, to four months, six months, nine months, thirteen months, and fourteen months and twelve days, in view of the pending criminal investigations against him. The courts put forward similar reasons for the applicant’s continued detention as in the order of 15 October 2004, and held that there were no grounds for altering the preventive measure applied in the applicant’s respect. In the resolutions of 8 July and 7 December 2005 the courts also noted that the applicant had been studying the case file. By the latter resolution, he was given a time-limit, until 20 December 2005, to complete his study of the file. 8.  On 25 December 2005, the applicant requested the Simferopol SIZO administration to be released, stating that there was no formal decision authorising his detention after 25 December 2005. On 27 December 2005 the request was refused on the ground that his continuing detention was governed by Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that his criminal case had been referred to the court for trial on 23 December 2005. 9.  On an unspecified date the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya (“the District Court”) received the case. 10.  On 3 March 2006 the applicant lodged with that court a petition alleging, among other things, that his continuing detention was unlawful. 11.  On 20 March 2006 the District Court rejected his petition and ordered him to remain in detention, stating that there were no grounds for changing the preventive measure. The court’s order, containing no further explanations or a time-limit for the applicant’s detention, was not subject to appeal. 12.  On 25 October 2007 the District Court rejected another petition for his release by the applicant relying, in particular, on a letter written by prosecutors according to which there was intelligence gathered suggesting that the applicant prepared documents to leave the country. It also relied on information obtained during the hearings indicating that the applicant intended to change his citizenship. The court did not set a time-limit for the applicant’s detention. According to the applicant, the case file contained no documents or other evidence corroborating his intention to leave the country. As to the issue of citizenship, he stated that he had applied for renunciation of the Ukrainian citizenship. 13.  In a judgment of 8 November 2007 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to nine years and six months’ imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. It also stripped him of his service rank and limited his right to serve in law-enforcement agencies. 14.  On 23 June 2008 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) changed the first-instance court’s judgment. While upholding the applicant’s conviction for abuse of office, organised crime, and forgery of official documents, the court discontinued the proceedings concerning the charges of bribery and remitted the case concerning the charges of tax evasion for additional investigation. It also reduced the applicant’s prison sentence to five years. 15.  On 22 October 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court’s judgment and remitted the case for fresh appellate review. 16.  On 19 April 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the District Court. It also ordered further detention of the applicant. According to the latter’s submissions, the case is pending before the District Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  In 1984 the house, which was the property of the applicant’s mother and was where they had been living was demolished by the State without compensation. Therefore on 18 October 1984 the applicant’s mother was authorised to take on the tenancy of Apartment 18 situated at 2 Valea Călugărească Street in Bucharest. 6.  On 25 March 1991 the applicant’s mother made a request to the O. company, a State-representative company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State, to buy the apartment under Decree-law no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992 regarding the sale to the population of dwellings built with State funds. She died on 9 July 1993, the applicant being her only heir. 7.  On 26 January 1994 V.V. took on the tenancy of Apartment 18. According to the applicant, he was living in the apartment at that time.\nOn 29 March 1994 the applicant was evicted from that apartment, as he had no tenancy. The goods in the apartment were entrusted to the keeping of V.V., most of them being placed under a seal in one room. At the latest on 7 December 2000 the O. company demanded that the applicant take the goods removed from the apartment, as it had no suitable place to keep them. 8.  On 17 March 1994 the applicant requested the court to oblige both O. and R. companies, as State-representative companies responsible for the management of property belonging to the State, to sell him Apartment 18. 9.  On 11 May 1998 the Bucharest Court of First Instance allowed the applicant’s action, considering that he had inherited his mother’s right to buy that apartment, and ordered the two companies to conclude a sale contract with the applicant for Apartment 18. 10.  On 30 September 1999 the Bucharest Court of Appeal, by a final decision, dismissed as groundless an appeal by the two companies, which sought to declare the apartment governed by Law no. 112/1995, not by Decree-law no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992. 11.  Although there had been judicial recognition of the authorities’ obligation to sell Apartment 18 to the applicant, the latter was not able to buy it, being informed that on 27 January 1997 the former had sold the apartment to V.V., the then tenant, under Law no. 112/1995. 12.  On 12 February 2001 the applicant requested the court to find the sale of Apartment 18 null and void and to oblige the authorities to perform the sale as provided by the judgment of 30 September 1999.\nOn 5 February 2003 the Bucharest Court of Appeal, by a final decision, dismissed the action, considering that the property was governed by Law no. 112/1995, not by Decree-law no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992, and that V.V. had made the purchase in good faith. 13.  On 27 February 2002 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two managers of the O. company for damaging his personal interest in the course of their duties as civil servants and for giving false information for inclusion in a document. On 5 November 2003 the public prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings because of the prescription of criminal liability. However, the prosecutor considered that the constitutive elements of both criminal offences had been met because, on the one hand, the apartment had been sold despite being the object of pending proceedings and before a final decision on the matter and, on the other hand, the two representatives had been in bad faith when they had signed the sale contract with V.V.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lived in Moscow. 7.  The applicant engaged in commerce and at some point in the early 1990s became the president of the Russian Afghan War Veterans Fund. 8.  In April 1997 the authorities brought criminal proceedings against the applicant and a few other persons on suspicion of several crimes, including masterminding the murder of the applicant's business rivals. 9.  On 21 January 2000 the Military Court of the Moscow District (Московский окружной военный суд), sitting as a bench composed of one professional judge and two lay assessors, examined the case presented by the prosecution and acquitted the applicant and his co-accused on all charges for lack of evidence of his involvement in the alleged crimes (за недоказанностью участия в совершении преступлений). 10.  On 26 January 2000 the prosecution lodged an appeal against the judgment of 21 January 2000, arguing that the first-instance court had wrongly assessed the evidence in the case and “failed to adopt measures aimed at achieving a comprehensive, full and objective investigation of all the circumstances of the case, to eliminate the inconsistencies in the prosecution case file and to have regard to all possible versions of events, but had pinpointed nonexistent inconsistencies for which the investigative authority allegedly failed to account”. 11.  The prosecution suggested that the first instance court ought to have eliminated the inconsistencies in the prosecution case file of its own motion and requested the appeal court to remit the case for re-trial. 12.  On an unspecified date the parties, including the applicant and alleged victims, filed their own arguments. 13.  By decision of 25 July 2000 the Military Division of the Supreme Court of Russia (Военная коллегия Верховного Суда Российской Федерации), sitting as a bench of three professional judges, examined and rejected the arguments of the prosecution and the alleged victims and upheld the judgment of 21 January 2000 in full. The court noted that:\n“... Despite the arguments in the prosecution's appeal about the incomplete and one‑sided nature of examination of the case by the court, the judicial investigation was sufficiently thorough and comprehensive.\nAll pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution and the defence were examined at the court hearing.\nThe court ruled on all applications by the parties concerning the examination of the evidence, took all necessary measures to remedy the shortcomings of the investigation and eliminate the inconsistencies in the oral statements of the questioned persons, and as regards the questions requiring specialist knowledge decided to carry out and then carried out appropriate expert examinations.\nAt the same time, having evaluated the evidence examined in its entirety, the court came to a reasoned conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that every means of collecting evidence in the court proceedings had been exhausted. In fact, this was confirmed by the prosecutor (государственный обвинитель), who did not make any application for a fresh investigation in court (судебное следствие) with a view to eliminating of the existing or newly discovered inconsistencies, and the prosecutor who took part in the appeal hearing ...\nThe constitutional principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms in the administration of justice presupposes the separation of the function of consideration of cases from the functions of the prosecution and the defence submitting argument before the court. Thus, the task of prosecution before the court pertains to the prosecution bodies, whilst the court has an obligation to formulate conclusions about the established facts, regard being had to the evidence examined in the court hearing, to evaluate objectively the lawfulness and validity of the charges, to decide on the issue of acquittal or conviction, have due regard to the evidence collected by the investigation bodies and the arguments of the defence, thus securing the just and impartial resolution of the case and granting the parties equal opportunities to defend their positions. Hence, the court is empowered to determine the guilt of a person only on condition that it has been proven by the prosecuting bodies and officials. The lower court in the present case has fully complied with this requirement of the Constitution of the RF ...\nHaving considered the evidence of guilt and innocence presented in court by the parties, the court came to the conclusion that it was insufficient to convict and that [the court] has exhausted all statutory means of collecting additional evidence, which is why it took a well-grounded decision to acquit [the applicant and two co-accused] for lack of evidence of their involvement in the criminal actions in respect of which they had been accused by the investigative bodies, having interpreted, in accordance with the requirements of the legislation and the Constitution of the RF, all doubts about the guilt in their favour.” 14.  On 25 August 2000 the Deputy Prosecutor General applied for supervisory review of the judgments in the case, arguing that the lower courts ought to have reacted to the breaches of the domestic law and various deficiencies in the prosecution case file by remitting the case for an additional investigation instead of acquitting the accused. He referred to, among other things, paragraph 2 of Article 232(1) of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure in this connection. 15.  On 13 December 2000, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of nine professional judges, heard the parties, including the applicant and his counsel, and accepted the prosecution's arguments. 16.  The court stated that:\n“... the Presidium finds that the prosecution appeal is well-founded and that it should be granted, as the preliminary investigation and the trial, despite the requirements of Article 20 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, were conducted in an incomplete and one-sided manner, without proper inquiry into incriminating and exculpatory circumstances. ...” 17.  The court pointed out several breaches of the domestic procedure by the investigating authorities and various inconsistencies in the prosecution case file and gave a number of detailed instructions as to how these deficiencies should be eliminated. The court quashed the judgment of 21 January 2000 and the appeal decision of 25 July 2000 and remitted the case for a fresh investigation 18.  On 31 January 2001 the applicant died in a car accident. 19.  On 2 April 2001 the prosecution discontinued the case in respect of the applicant on account of his death, and pursued the investigation against S., one of the persons who had stood trial and been acquitted together with the applicant. 20.  On 28 May 2003 co-accused S. was found guilty and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Skopje. 5.  He was employed by the State Land Bureau (Геодетска Управа/ Државен Зaвод за Геодетски Работи) (“the employer”). On 29 September 1994 he sustained grievous bodily injuries while on duty: trying to jump over a fence, he fell down and broke his spine and elbow. Until June 1997 he was several times hospitalised and underwent four spinal operations. 6. On 21 October 1996 the applicant instituted civil proceedings for damages against the employer before the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”). 7.  At a hearing of 8 January 1997 the court ordered the examination of two witnesses. As their whereabouts fell within the territorial competence of the Ohrid Court of First Instance, the trial court requested the latter to carry out the examination. 8. On 4 March 1997 the trial court examined one of the witnesses. The hearing was postponed as the Ohrid Court of First Instance had failed to examine the other witness. 9. On 22 April 1997 the trial court heard the applicant and adjourned the hearing because of the failure of the Ohrid Court of First Instance to examine the other witness. A hearing scheduled for 16 June 1997 was adjourned for the same reason. 10. On 18 June 1997 the Ohrid Court of First Instance provided the trial court with a record of the witnesses' examination. Between 13 January and 17 May 1997 the trial court had requested the Ohrid Court of First Instance to carry out the examination on three occasions. 11. On 30 September 1997 the trial court suspended the proceedings because of the applicant's absence. 12. On 25 November 1997 the applicant requested the trial court to resume the proceedings. 13. On 16 February 1998 the trial court ordered the re-examination of one of the witnesses. It further requested the employer to submit the Working Posts' Regulation (Акт за систематизација на работите и работните задачи) (“the Regulation”). 14. On 26 March 1998 the trial court re-examined one of the witnesses and adjourned the hearing, as the employer had not submitted the Regulation. It postponed a hearing fixed for 14 May 1998 as the Regulation had not been provided yet. The trial court further allowed the applicant's request for an expert examination in relation to the non-pecuniary damage and ordered the Psychiatric Hospital “Bardovci” in Skopje (the “Hospital”) to carry out the examination. The Hospital provided its expert report on 28 August 1998. 15. On 22 October 1998 the applicant requested an additional expert examination concerning the anguish suffered which was allegedly omitted in the previous expert report. The trial court granted his request and ordered the employer to provide information as to whether the applicant had been medically insured. 16. A hearing fixed for 24 November 1998 was adjourned as the additional expert report had not been provided. 17. On 16 February 1999 the trial court partly upheld the applicant's claim and awarded him 3,834,960 Macedonian denars (MKD) together with interest. 18. On 4 October 1999 the Deputy Solicitor General appealed before the Skopje Court of Appeal on the basis that the amount of the award had been excessive; that the lower court had erroneously established the facts, in particular that the employer had not issued a special work-instruction for a particular job at the time of the accident; and that the substantive law had been incorrectly applied. 19. On 23 December 1999 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the Deputy Solicitor General's appeal and upheld the trial court's judgment. 20. On 1 March 2000 the Deputy Solicitor General brought before the Supreme Court an appeal on points of law (ревизија). He complained that the applicant had also contributed to the accident by overlooking the possible negative consequences of jumping over the fence. The Deputy Solicitor General further alleged the incorrect application of the national law. On 9 March 2000 the appeal on points of law was communicated to the applicant. The latter did not file submissions in reply. 21. On 21 April 2000 the applicant applied to the trial court to enforce its judgment and to transfer to him the amount due from the employer's account. Judgment award was paid in September 2001. 22. On 24 October 2002 the Supreme Court partly upheld the Deputy Solicitor General's appeal on points of law and overturned the lower courts' judgments. It dismissed his arguments that there had been substantial procedural deficiencies, but it ruled that the lower courts had incorrectly applied the national law. Referring to the facts as established by the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that they had erroneously found that the applicant had not contributed to the accident. Moreover, it found that there had been no instruction by the employer for the undertaking of the relevant action. It ruled therefore, that the applicant shared the responsibility with the employer for the injuries sustained: it consequently reduced the award by 50% together with statutory interest (законска затезна камата). The interest concerning the pecuniary damage was to be calculated from 21 October 1996 and 22 October 1998, respectively, and the interest concerning the non-pecuniary damage – from 18 February 1999, until the final payment. 23. No further actions were taken by either of the parties in respect of the Supreme Court's judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicants were born in 1961 and 1962 respectively and live in the village of Kormilovka, Omsk Region. 8.  The applicants, a married couple, used to live in Kargasok of the Tomsk Region where they worked as veterinarians. The first applicant held the position of Head Veterinarian of the Kargasok District. 9.  On 26 September 1996 criminal proceedings for fraud were instituted against the first applicant and an obligation not to leave the place of his residence without permission was imposed on him as a preventive measure.  On 22 October 1996 by an order of the investigator the first applicant was suspended from his employment. 10.  In February 1998 criminal proceedings for fraud were instituted against the second applicant and an obligation not to leave the place of her residence without permission was imposed on her as a preventive measure. 11.  The criminal proceedings against both applicants were joined on 17 August 1998. The applicants were accused of submitting false reports on business trips in order to obtain cash from the veterinary practice where the first applicant worked unlawfully. 12.  On 17 July 2000 the applicants asked for the obligation not to leave their place of residence without permission to be cancelled. It appears that the application was not considered. 13.  Over the course of six years the criminal case was several times remitted by the courts for additional investigation: in May 1997 and on 5 February 1998, 21 September 1999, 31 May 2000 and 31 October 2000. 14.  In 2001 the applicants' minor son was invited to attend an interview for a place at the Omsk State Agrarian University. The applicants submitted that he did not attend the interview since neither of them was allowed to accompany him in the journey to Omsk. On an unspecified date the acting prosecutor of the Kargasok District provided the second applicant with the following letter:\n“[The letter] is given to Ms Bevia Andreyevna Fedorova ... in order to confirm that on 10-11 July 2001 she was summoned to the Prosecutor's Office of the Kargasok District, as a result of which she could not leave for Omsk together with her son and be present at ... the interview on 12 July.\n[The letter] is to be presented to the examination panel of the Institute of Veterinary Medicine at the Omsk State Agrarian University.”\nThe applicants' son, having passed general entry exams, was later admitted to the University. 15.  On 13 August 2002 the Parabelskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region acquitted the applicants and cancelled the obligation not to leave their place of residence without permission.  On appeal, on 16 December 2002 the Tomsk Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination by a different composition of judges. 16.  On 8 May 2003 the Parabelskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicants for lack of indication that a crime had been committed. The ruling was quashed on appeal on 30 June 2003 by the Tomsk Regional Court, which remitted the case for a fresh examination to the Molchanovskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region. 17.  The Molchanovskiy District Court convicted the first applicant of misappropriation of property held in trust and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment on 31 December 2003. He was not required to serve the sentence on account of the statutory time-bar. The second applicant was fully acquitted. The court also lifted the obligation not to leave the place of residence without permission in respect of both applicants, although it had already been cancelled by the Parabelskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region on 13 August 2002. 18.  On appeal, on 15 April 2004 the Tomsk Regional Court reversed the judgment in the part relating to the conviction of the first applicant and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The court decided not to apply any measures of restraint in respect of the applicant. 19.  The case was subsequently transmitted to the Sovetskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region. On 28 February 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region convicted the first applicant of misappropriation of property held in trust and sentenced him conditionally to one year's imprisonment. The court, however, released the applicant from the punishment because of the expiry of the statutory time-limit. 20.  On 25 April 2005 the Tomsk Regional Court reversed the judgment on appeal. It held that the first instance court should not have first convicted the applicant of the offence and then released him from the punishment, but should have terminated the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the appeal court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of expiry of the statutory time-limit.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Vittoriosa. 10.  The applicant is the brother of Mrs M., who lived in an apartment above Mr F. 11.  On 17 July 1985 Mr F. applied for an injunction to restrain Mrs M. from hanging out clothes to dry over the courtyard of his apartment, thereby allegedly interfering with his property rights. Mr F. relied on the provisions of Article 403 of the Maltese Civil Code in this connection. 12.  On one occasion following a hearing on the injunction, and after Mrs M. and her lawyer, Dr A., had already left the courtroom, the presiding magistrate changed the date of a future hearing, which had already been fixed. As a consequence, Mrs M. was not aware of the new date and was not present at the hearing. In her absence, on 29 November 1985 the presiding magistrate issued the injunction in favour of Mr F. 13.  According to Maltese law as it stood at the time, Mr F. had to institute proceedings in respect of the property claim preserved by the warrant within four days of the issuing of the injunction; otherwise the injunction would cease to have effect. Accordingly, on 5 December 1985, Mr F. lodged a writ of summons to start proceedings. 14.  On 6 March 1992 the relevant court trying the merits of Mr F.’s civil action found against Mrs M. and issued a permanent injunction against her. On 24 March 1992, as no appeal had been lodged, the case became final. 15.  On 6 December 1985 Mrs M. instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction, claiming that the injunction had been issued in her absence and without giving her the opportunity to testify (see paragraph 77 below). 16.  By a judgment of 15 October 1990, the Civil Court upheld her claim. It held that the audi alteram partem principle was applicable to the procedure for issuing an injunction. Referring to Article 873 § 2 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, which stated that an injunction should not be issued unless the court was satisfied that it was necessary in order to preserve any right of the person seeking it (see paragraph 27 below), the Civil Court held that the relevant test was a matter for the court’s discretion. However, if the court found it necessary to hear the parties, they should be duly heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice. In the present case the court held that, through no fault of her own, Mrs M. had been denied her right to be heard and therefore the said warrant was null and void. 17.  Mr F. appealed against the judgment of 15 October 1990. In the first-instance proceedings Mr F. had been assisted by Dr U., while at the appeal stage he had appointed the latter’s son, Dr C. The Court of Appeal was presided over by the Chief Justice, who sat with two other judges. The Chief Justice was Dr U.’s brother and Dr C.’s uncle. 18.  At the appeal hearing of 12 October 1992, the Chief Justice, after asking some questions, alleged that the conduct of Dr A. was unethical, as he had impugned, without justification, the conduct of Mr F’s lawyer. When it was noted that in the first-instance proceedings Mr F. had been represented by the Chief Justice’s brother, the Chief Justice threatened to refer the case to “the competent authorities”. Furthermore, he dictated a note to this effect, which read as follows:\n“The court is asking Dr A., who himself is declaring that the date of the hearing at first instance had been changed when he and his client had already left the courtroom, why he insisted that the said change of date occurred consequent to a request by a lawyer. Dr A.’s reply is: ‘I deduce so, as there were two lawyers present: Dr U. and myself.’\n... Mrs M.’s lawyer asserts facts and has no problem hypothesising about the behaviour of another lawyer and the judge, after he and his client had walked out of the courtroom.” 19.  Dr A. said a few words in his own defence, but no oral submissions regarding the merits of the appeal were heard. The Chief Justice suspended the hearing and went to his chambers. A few minutes later the lawyers of both parties were called into the Chief Justice’s chambers. Explanations were heard and no further action appears to have been taken. 20.  By a judgment of 5 February 1993, the Court of Appeal found against Mrs M. and reversed the judgment of the Civil Court. It held that principles of natural justice were not mandatory and could not be invoked in preliminary proceedings that were essentially conditional and of a temporary nature. Moreover, the Court of Appeal did not agree with the issue of fact mentioned in the first-instance judgment, in respect of the change in date leading to Mrs M.’s absence at the hearing. In this respect the judgment repeated in part the note which had been dictated during the hearing – “Mrs M.’s lawyer asserts facts and has no problem hypothesising about the behaviour of another lawyer and the judge, after he and his client had walked out of the courtroom”. The Court of Appeal further ordered the removal from the records of the case of a report which supported Mrs M.’s claim, which had been drawn up by the judicial assistant appointed by the Civil Court. 21.  On 25 March 1993 Mrs M. instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, she alleged that the President of the Court of Appeal (the Chief Justice) lacked objective impartiality and that this had been manifest in the incident of 12 October 1992. Observing that the Court of Appeal had denied facts which had already been proved, she further submitted that her right to a fair trial had been violated. 22.  Mrs M. died on 20 January 2002, before her constitutional claim could be determined. On 22 May 2002 the applicant intervened in the proceedings before the Civil Court in his capacity as brother of the plaintiff. 23.  In a judgment of 29 January 2004, the Civil Court dismissed Mrs M.’s claim as frivolous and vexatious. Although it noted that the plaintiff had failed to request the Chief Justice to withdraw from the case before the pronouncement of the final judgment, it rejected the Government’s plea of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies and decided to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction. As to the merits, it made a thorough analysis of the notions and rights emanating from Article 6 of the Convention, including equality of arms, but placed particular emphasis on the requirement of impartiality of the Civil Court. However, it was unable to find any link between the incident of 12 October 1992 and the content of the judgment of 5 February 1993. As confirmed by Dr A. himself, the incident had been defused; however, this could not have given Mrs M. or her lawyer any expectation that the Court of Appeal would rule in her favour. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal was composed of two other judges, who had not been involved in the incident, and there had been no doubt that the judgment, which appeared to be well-reasoned, had been delivered by the bench as a whole. 24.  The applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. 25.  By a judgment of 24 October 2005, the Constitutional Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It reiterated that in accordance with Article 46 § 5 of the Constitution, no appeal lay against a decision dismissing an application as frivolous and vexatious.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lived in Vladivostok. 5.  On 17 July 1995 the commanding officer of a military unit appointed the applicant as deputy master of the medium tanker (MT) Argun. On 25 July 1995 the command of the auxiliary fleet service of the Russian Pacific Fleet sent the applicant on a trade mission to Singapore. On 1 September 1995 the commander of the military unit appointed him as master of MT Argun. The applicant remained in this post until 10 April 1999. 6.  Between 28 April 1994 and 5 April 1996 the tanker was leased out by the State Committee for Management of the Property of the Russian Federation (“the State Property Committee”) to a private company Inakva Co. The lease agreement stipulated that the tanker was to be staffed by the auxiliary fleet service of the Pacific Fleet which also paid the staff's wages in the Russian national currency. Inakva Co was obligated to cover the part of the staff's wages that was paid in foreign currency and the tanker maintenance costs. 7.  On 5 April 1996 the State Property Committee signed a new lease agreement with an American company National Pacific Limited. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant and his crew brought proceedings in the High Court of South Africa for the unpaid wages earned by them in 1995, 1996 and 1999. 9.  On 25 May 1999 the tanker was arrested in Cape Town, South Africa, pending adjudication of the dispute. 10.  By judgment of 25 November 1999 (of 13 August 1999 according to the documents submitted by the Government), the High Court of South Africa declared the Russian Federation to be the lawful owner of the vessel. 11.  On 12 March 2001 the Ministry of State Property of the Russian Federation, the successor of the State Property Committee, signed a new lease agreement with a private company Oil Compact, which was obligated to undertake all possible measures to release the tanker from arrest. 12.  By final judgment of 12 September 2002 the High Court awarded the applicant 79,750.79 United States dollars against the vessel MT Argun and interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum on that amount. The MT Argun was ordered to pay the applicant's costs and travel expenses. It was also decided that the vessel would be sold at an auction to cover the court awards. 13.  On 16 May 2003 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa heard the parties' appeals and upheld the judgment of 12 September 2002. 14.  On 21 November 2003 the Ministry of State Property and Ministry of Defence signed an agreement with a private agent OAO Sovfrakht seeking release of MT Argun from arrest and its transfer to the Russian Military Fleet. On the same day OAO Sovfrakht signed an agreement with a third party Avangard-2 Shipping Company S.A. which won the auction and bought the vessel. 15.  On 16 January 2004 the MT Argun was handed over to the Russian Military Pacific Fleet. 16.  According to the applicant, in June and July 2006 he received part of the judicial award in the amount of 7,156 USD in respect of the wages and 4,752 USD in respect of the accrued interest. 17.  On 4 May 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against the State complaining of the actions (inaction) of the Federal Agency for Management of State Property in respect of his claims for unpaid wages and seeking to recover the said wages in the amount of 72.547 USD as well as legal expenses and non-pecuniary damage. On 5 May 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok declined jurisdiction in the case. This decision was upheld by the Primorye Regional Court on 28 June 2006. 18.  Thereafter, the applicant brought the same claims before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. On 3 October 2006 the District Court declined jurisdiction in favour of a justice of peace. This decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 February 2007. It appears that the applicant did not bring his claims to any other court. 19.  On 25 November 2002 the authorities initiated criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant in connection with his claims in the South African court. 20.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant was charged with fraudulent acquirement of title to the property of the Russian Federation and other related crimes. On the same day his case was sent for preliminary investigation to the military prosecutor's office of the Pacific Fleet, and the applicant was ordered not to leave town. 21.  On 26 August 2003 the preliminary investigation was stayed pending the applicant's convalescence. On 5 December 2003 the investigation was resumed. 22.  Between 16 January 2004 and 17 June 2005 the applicant and his legal counsel studied the case file. 23.  On 20 June 2005 the case was submitted for trial by the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok (“the District Court”) and was assigned to judge I. 24.  On 6 July 2005 the applicant requested that the preparatory hearing be postponed due to his counsel's illness. 25.  On 17 November 2005 the District Court refused to examine the case and ordered the prosecution to redraft the bill of indictment tainted with a number of defects. The case was returned to the court on 29 November 2005. 26.  On 12 January 2006 the hearing did not take place as the judge was involved in different proceedings. 27.  The hearing of 13 January 2006 also did not take place due to the applicant's illness. The proceedings were stayed pending his convalescence. 28.  On 6 July 2006 the proceedings resumed, but the hearing did not take place as the applicant's counsel did not appear. 29.  On 12 July 2006 the applicant was granted leave to study the new bill of indictment until 21 July 2006. 30.  On 24 July 2006 the court granted the applicant's request to send the case back to the prosecutor for re-drafting of the bill of indictment. The case was returned to the court on 18 August 2006 and was assigned to judge P. 31.  The hearings scheduled for September and October 2006 did not take place due to the applicant's illness. 32.  In November 2006 the court began hearing the case on the merits. The court adjourned the proceedings in November 2006, January and June 2007, each time for a week, due to the applicant's or his counsel's illness. 33.  On 25 June 2007 the court adjourned the proceedings for ten days as the judge was away on a study trip. 34.  The hearings of 24 December 2007 and 25 January 2008 did not take place following the applicant's and his counsel's failure to appear. 35.  By judgment of 11 March 2008 the applicant was convicted of fraudulent acquirement of title to property by way of obtaining of the court award of allegedly unpaid wages, and received a suspended sentence of five years' imprisonment. 36.  On 2 June 2009 the applicant died.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Budapest.\nProceedings “A” 5.  On 17 August 1994 Mr E.H. brought an action against the applicant before the Pest Central District Court seeking the vacation of a real property. After several hearings, on 30 November 1999 a judgment was delivered. On 10 November 2000 the Budapest Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case. 6.  In the resumed proceedings, hearings were held on 8 January, 28 March, 14 June, 22 October 2002 and 24 January 2003. On 23 May 2003 a judgment was adopted. On 17 September 2004 the Regional Court upheld this decision. 7.  On 31 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's petition for review in a reasoned decision, holding that the second-instance judgment had not been unlawful to an extent that had a bearing on the merits of the case. This decision was served on 1 June 2005.\nProceedings “B” 8.  On 3 December 1996 the same plaintiff brought an action against the applicant before the District Court, challenging his disinheritance. On 13 and 27 November 1997, 24 March, 2 July and 26 November 1998 hearings were held. On the latter date an interim judgment was adopted. On appeal, the Regional Court held a hearing on 30 September 1999. On 24 February 2000 it partly upheld the interim ruling and partly remitted the case. 9.  In the resumed proceedings, on 31 October 2000 the District Court held a hearing and appointed a graphology expert. He filed his opinion on 10 January 2001. On 27 March, 13 November 2001 and 23 April 2002 hearings took place. Subsequently, the opinions of two more experts were obtained. Further hearings were held on 28 January, 6 May, 30 September 2003, 11 May 2004, 25 January and 19 April 2005, 8 February, 8 March, 10 April, 24 May, 12 July, 11 September and 6 October 2006. 10.  On 13 October 2006 the District Court gave judgment, partly finding for the plaintiff. On 14 June 2007 the Regional Court dismissed the appeals. On 6 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to deal with the applicant's petition for review, since the value of the dispute was under the statutory threshold.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS, was a publicly-traded private open joint-stock company incorporated under the laws of Russia. It was registered in Nefteyugansk, the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Region, and at the relevant time was managed by its subsidiary, OOO “YUKOS” Moskva, registered in Moscow. 7.  The applicant was a holding company established by the Russian Government in 1993 to own and control a number of stand-alone entities specialised in oil production. The company remained fully State-owned until 1995-1996 when, through a series of tenders and auctions, it was privatised. 8.  Between 13 November 2002 and 4 March 2003 the Tax Inspectorate of the town of Nefteyugansk (“the Tax Office”) conducted a tax inspection of the applicant company. 9.  As a result of the inspection, on 28 April 2003 the Tax Office drew up a report indicating a number of relatively minor errors in the company’s tax returns and served it on the company. 10.  Following the company’s objections, on 9 June 2003 the Tax Office adopted a decision in which it found the company liable for having filed incomplete returns in respect of certain taxes. 11.  The decision of the Tax Office was accepted and complied with by the company on 7 July 2003.\n(b)  Additional tax inspection 12.  On 8 December 2003 the Tax Ministry (“the Ministry”), acting as a reviewing body within the meaning of section 87 (3) of the Tax Code, carried out an additional tax inspection of the applicant company. 13.  On 29 December 2003 the Ministry issued a report indicating that the applicant company had a large tax liability for the year 2000. The detailed report came to over 70 pages and had 284 supporting documents in annex. The report was served on the applicant company on the same date. 14.  The Ministry established that in 2000 the applicant company had carried out its activities through a network of 22 trading companies registered in low-tax areas of Russia (“the Republic of Mordoviya, the town of Sarov in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region, the Republic of Kalmykiya, the town of Trekhgornyy in the Chelyabinsk Region, the town of Lesnoy in the Sverdlovsk Region and the Evenk Autonomous District”). For all legal purposes, most of these entities were set up as entirely independent from the applicant, i.e. as belonging and being controlled by third persons, although their sole activity consisted of commissioning the applicant company to buy crude oil on their behalf from the company’s own oil-producing subsidiaries and either putting it up for sale on the domestic market or abroad, or first handing it over to the company’s own oil-processing plants and then selling it. There were no real cash transactions between the applicant company, its oil-processing and oil-producing subsidiaries and the trading entities, and the company’s own promissory notes and mutual offsetting were used instead. All the money thus accumulated from sales was then transferred unilaterally to the “Fund for Financial Support of the Production Development of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS”, a commercial entity founded, owned and run by the applicant company. Since at all relevant times the applicant company took part in all of the transactions of the trading companies, but acted as the companies’ agent and never as an owner of the goods produced and processed by its own subsidiaries and since the compensation paid by the trading entities for its services was negligible, the applicant company’s real turnover was never reflected in any tax documents and, consequently, in its tax returns. In addition, most of the trading companies were in fact sham entities, as they were neither present nor operated in the place of their registration. In addition, they had no assets and no employees of their own. 15.  The Ministry found it established, among other things, that:\n(a)  the actual movement of the traded oil was from the applicant company’s production sites to its own processing or storage facilities;\n(b)  the applicant company acted as an exporter of goods for the purpose of customs clearance, even though the goods had formally been owned and sold by sham companies;\n(c)  through the use of various techniques, the applicant company indirectly established and, at all relevant times de facto, controlled and owned the sham entities;\n(d)  all accounting operations of the companies were carried out by the same two entities, OOO “YUKOS” FBC and OOO “YUKOS” Invest, both dependant on or belonging to the applicant company;\n(e)  the network of sham companies was officially managed by OOO “YUKOS” RM, all official correspondence, including tax documents, being sent from the postal address of OOO “YUKOS” Moskva, the applicant company’s managing subsidiary;\n(f)  the sham companies and the applicant company’s subsidiaries entered into transactions with lowered prices for the purpose of reducing the taxable base of their operations;\n(g)  all revenues perceived by the sham companies were thereafter unilaterally transferred to the applicant company;\n(h)  statements by the owners and directors of the trading entities, who confessed that they had signed documents that they had been required to sign by the officials of the applicant company, and had never conducted any independent activity on behalf of their companies, were true;\n(i)  and, lastly, that the sham companies received tax benefits unlawfully. 16.  Having regard to all this, the Ministry decided that the activities of the sham companies served the purpose of screening the real business activity of the applicant company, that the transactions of these companies were sham and that it had been the applicant company, and not the sham entities, which conducted the transactions and became the owner of the traded goods. In view of the above, and also since neither the sham entities nor the applicant company qualified for the tax exemptions in question, the report concluded that the company, having acted in bad faith, had failed properly to reflect these transactions in its tax declarations, thus avoiding the payment of VAT, motorway tax, corporate property tax, tax for improvement of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities, tax in respect of sales of fuels and lubricants and profit tax. 17.  The report also noted specifically that the tax authorities had requested the applicant company to facilitate reciprocal tax inspections of several of its important subsidiaries. Five of the eleven subsidiary companies refused to comply, four failed to answer, whilst two entities filed incomplete documents. It also specified that during the on-site inspection the applicant company failed to provide the documents requested by the Ministry concerning the transportation of oil. 18.  The report referred, inter alia, to Articles 7 (3), 38, 39 (1) and 41 of the Tax Code, section 3 of Law no. 1992-1 of the Russian Federation (RF) of 6 December 1991 “On Value-Added Tax”, sections 4 and 5 (2) of RF Law no. 1759-1 of 18 October 1991 “On motorway funds in the Russian Federation”, section 21 (“Ch”) of RF Law no. 2118-1 of 27 December 1991 “On the basics of the tax system”, Article 209 (1-2) of the Civil Code, section 2 of RF Law no. 2030-1 of 13 December 1991 “On corporate property tax”, section 2 (1-2) of RF Law no. 2116-1 of 27 December 1991 “On corporate profit tax”, Decision no. 138-O of the Constitutional Court of Russia of 25 July 2001 and Article 56 of the Tax Code. 19.  On 12 January 2004 the applicant company filed its detailed thirty-page objections to the report. The company admitted that for a very short period of time it had partly owned three out of the twenty-two organisations mentioned in the report, but denied its involvement in the ownership and management of the remaining nineteen companies. They maintained this position about their lack of involvement in the companies in question throughout the proceedings. 20.  During a meeting between the representatives of the Ministry and the company on 27 January 2004, the applicant company’s counsel were given an opportunity to state orally their arguments against the report. 21.  Having considered the company’s objections, on 14 April 2004 the Ministry adopted a decision establishing that the applicant company had a large outstanding tax liability for the year 2000. As the applicant company had failed properly to declare the above-mentioned operations in its tax declarations and to pay the corresponding taxes, in accordance with Article  122 (3) of the Tax Code the Ministry found that the company had underreported its tax liability for 2000 and ordered it to pay 47,989,241,953  Russian roubles (“RUB”) (approximately 1,394,748,234  euros, (“EUR”)) in tax arrears, RUB 32,190,599,501.40 (approximately EUR 935,580,142) in default interest and RUB  19,195,696,780 as a 40% penalty (approximately EUR 557,899,293), totalling RUB 99,375,538,234.40 (approximately EUR 2,888,227,669). The arguments contained in the decision were identical to those of the report of 29 December 2003. In addition, the decision responded in detail to each of the counter-arguments advanced by the company in its objections of 12 January 2004. 22.  The decision was served on the applicant company on 15 April 2004. 23.  The company was given until 16 April 2004 to pay voluntarily the amounts due. 24.  The applicant company alleged that it had requested the Ministry to clarify the report of 29 December 2003 and that the Ministry had failed to respond to this request.\n(c)  Institution of proceedings by the Ministry 25.  Under a rule which made it unnecessary to wait until the end of the grace period if there was evidence that the dispute between the tax authority and the taxpayer was insoluble, the Ministry did not wait until 16 April 2004. 26.  On 14 April 2004 it applied to the Moscow City Commercial Court (“the City Court”) and requested the court to attach the applicant company’s assets as a security for the claim. 27.  By decision of 15 April 2004 the City Court initiated proceedings and prohibited the applicant company from disposing of some of its assets pending the outcome of litigation. The injunction did not concern goods produced by the company and related cash transactions. 28.  By the same decision the court fixed the date of the preliminary hearing for 7 May 2004 and invited the applicant company to respond to the Ministry’s claims. 29.  On 23 April 2004 the applicant company filed a motion in which it argued that the City Court had no territorial jurisdiction over the company’s legal headquarters and requested that the case be referred to a court in Nefteyugansk, where it was registered. 30.  On 6 May 2004 the Ministry filed a motion inviting the court to call the applicant company’s managing subsidiary OOO “YUKOS” Moskva as a co-defendant in the case.\n(d)  Hearing of 7 May 2004 31.  At the hearing the City Court examined and dismissed the applicant company’s motion of 23 April 2004. Having regard to the fact that the applicant company was operated by its own subsidiary OOO “YUKOS” Moskva, registered and located in Moscow, the court established that the applicant company’s real headquarters were in Moscow and not in Nefteyugansk. In view of the above, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to deal with the case. 32.  On 17 May 2004 the applicant company appealed against this decision. The appeal was examined and dismissed by the Appeals Division of the Moscow City Commercial Court (“the Appeal Court”) on 3 June 2004. 33.  The City Court also examined and granted the Ministry’s motion of 6 May 2004. The court ordered OOO “YUKOS” Moskva to join the proceedings as a co-defendant and adjourned the hearing until 14 May 2004. 34.  At the hearing of 7 May 2004 the applicant company lodged with the City Court a separate action against the tax assessment of 14 April 2004, seeking to have the assessment decision declared unlawful. The applicant company’s brief came to 42 pages and had 22 supporting documents in annex. This action was examined separately and dismissed as unsubstantiated by the City Court on 27 August 2004. The judgment of 27 August 2004 was upheld on appeal on 23 November 2004. On 30 December 2005 the Circuit Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts.\n(e)  Hearing of 14 May 2004 35.  In the meantime the tax assessment case continued. On 14 May 2004 the City Court rejected the applicant company’s request to adjourn the proceedings, having found that the applicant company’s counterclaim did not require such adjournment of the proceedings concerning the Ministry’s action. 36.  OOO “YUKOS” Moskva also requested that the hearing be adjourned as, it claimed, it was not ready to participate in the proceedings. 37.  This request was rejected by the court as unfounded on the same date. 38.  At the hearing the respondent companies also requested the City Court to vary their procedural status to that of interested parties. 39.  The court rejected this request and, on the applicant company’s motion of 15 April 2004, ordered the Ministry to disclose its evidence. The company’s motion contained a lengthy list of specific documents which, it alleged, should have been in the possession of the Ministry in support of its tax claims. 40.  The court then decided that the merits of the case would be heard on 21 May 2004. 41.  On 17 May 2004 the Ministry invited the applicant company to examine the evidence in the case file at its premises. Two company lawyers went to the Ministry on 18 May and four lawyers went on 19 May 2004. 42.  According to the applicant company, the supporting material underlying the case was first provided to the company on 17 May 2004, when the Ministry filed approximately 24,000 pages of documents. On 18 May 2004 the Ministry allegedly disclosed approximately a further 45,000 pages, and a further 2,000 pages on the eve of the hearing before the City Court, that is, on 20 May 2004. 43.  Relying on a record dated 18 May 2004[1], drawn up and signed by S. Pepelyaev and E. Aleynikova (Ministry representative A. Bondarev allegedly refused to sign it), the applicant company submitted that the documents in question had been presented in an indiscriminate fashion, in unpaginated and unsorted piles placed in nineteen plastic crates (ten of which contained six thousand pages each, with nine others containing some four thousand pages each). All of the documents were allegedly crammed in a room measuring three to four square metres, with two chairs and a desk. No toilet facilities or means of refreshment were provided. 44.  According to the Government, the documents in question (42,269 pages - and not 45,000 pages as claimed by the applicant- filed on 18 May 2004, and a further 1,292 - and not 2,000 pages as claimed by the applicant company, filed on 20 May 2004) were well-known to the applicant company; moreover, it had already possessed these accounting and legal documents prior to the beginning of the proceedings. The documents allegedly reflected the relations between the applicant company and its network of sham entities, and the entirety of the management and accounting activities of these entities had been conducted by the applicant company from the premises of its executive body OOO Yukos-Moskva, located in Moscow. All of the documents were itemised in the Ministry’s document dated 17 May 2004 and filed in execution of the court’s order to disclose the evidence. 45.  The Government also submitted that the applicant company’s lawyers could have studied the evidence both in court and at the Ministry’s premises throughout May, June and July 2004.\n(f)  First-instance judgment 46.  The hearings on the merits of the case commenced on 21 May and lasted until 26 May 2004. It appears that the applicant company requested the court repeatedly to adjourn the proceedings, relying, among other things, on the lack of sufficient time to study the case file. 47.  The Government submitted that the first day of the hearings, 21 May 2004, was devoted to hearing and resolving various motions brought by the applicant company and OOO Yukos-Moskva. On 24 May 2004, after hearing further motions by OOO Yukos-Moskva, the court proceeded to the evidence phase of the trial. The Tax Ministry then explained the evidence that it had submitted to the court. During this phase of the trial, which continued on 25 May 2004, the applicant company’s representatives were able to ask questions, and the defendants made various motions. According to the Government, where the court found that the applicant company had not had an opportunity to review a particular document that the Ministry wished to refer to, the court refused to allow the document to be entered in the record. On 26 May 2004 the applicant company was afforded an opportunity to explain its evidence and to submit additional evidence. The applicant company chose instead to address questions to the Ministry. The applicant company concluded the first-instance hearing of the case with over three hours of pleadings, whilst the Ministry limited its pleadings to brief references to its own tax inspection report, the decision dated 14 April 2004 and the statement of claim. 48.  On 26 May 2004, at the end of the hearings, the City Court gave its judgment in which, for the most part, it reached the same findings and came to the same conclusions as in the Ministry’s decision of 14 April 2004. Having confirmed the factual findings of the decision of 14 April 2004 in respect of the relations and transactions between the sham companies and the applicant company with reference to sundry pieces of evidence, including the statements by the nominal owners of the trading companies, acknowledging to the true nature of their relations with the applicant company, the court then reasoned as follows:\n“... Under section 3 of RF Law no. 1992-1 of 6 December 1991 ‘On value-added tax’, part 2 of section 5 and section 4 of RF Law no. 1759-1 of 18 October 1991 ‘On motorway funds in the Russian Federation’, subpart ‘ch’ of section 21 of RF Law no. 2118-1 of 27 December 1991 ‘On the basics of the tax system’, the sale of goods (works and services) gives rise to an obligation to pay VAT, motorway users’ tax, tax on the sale of oil and oil products and tax for the maintenance of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities.\nUnder part 1 of Article 38 of the Tax Code, objects of taxation may consist of the sale of goods (works and services), assets, profit, value of sold goods (works and services) or other objects having value, quantity or physical characteristics on the presence of which the tax legislation bases the obligation to pay tax.\nUnder part 1 of Article 39 of the Tax Code, sales are defined as the transfer of property rights in respect of goods. Under subpart 1 and 2 of Article 209 of the Civil Code (taking into account Article 11 of the Tax Code) the owner of goods is the person who has the rights of ownership, use and disposal of his property, that is, the person who is entitled to carry out at his own discretion in respect of this property any actions which are not against the law and other legal acts and do not breach the rights and protected interests of other persons ...\nThe court established that the owner of the oil sold under contracts concluded with organisations registered in low-tax territories had been OAO Yukos. The respondents’ arguments about the unlawfulness of the use of the notion of de facto owner (фактический собственник) on the basis that, according to Article 10 (3) and Article 8 (1) part 3 of the Civil Code ... there existed a presumption of good faith on the part of parties involved in civil-law transactions and that therefore the persons indicated as owners in the respective contracts should be regarded as the owners, are baseless, because the above-mentioned organisations never acquired any rights of ownership, use and disposal in respect of oil and oil products (поскольку прав владения, пользования и распоряжения нефтью и нефтепродуктами у данных организаций не возникало).\nOAO NK Yukos was therefore under an obligation to pay [the taxes], and this obligation has not been complied with in good time.\nArticle 41 of the Tax Code establishes that profit is an economic gain in monetary form or in kind, which is taken into account if it is possible to evaluate it and in so far as it can be assessed. Under subparts 1 and 2 of section 2 of RF Law no. 2116-1 of 27 December 1991 ‘On profit tax of enterprises and organisations’ which was then in force, the object of taxation is the gross profit of the enterprise, decreased (or increased) in accordance with the provisions of the present section. The gross profit is the total of revenues (receipts) from the sale of products (works and services), main assets (including plots of land), other property belonging to the enterprise and the profit derived from operations other than sales, less the sum of expenses in respect of these operations. Since it follows from the case file that the economic profit from the sale of oil and oil products was perceived by OAO NK Yukos, it was incumbent on [the applicant company] to comply with the obligation to pay profit tax.\nSection 2 of RF Law no. 2030-1 of 13 December 1991 ‘On corporate property tax’ taxes the main assets, non-material assets, reserves and receipts which are indicated on the taxpayer’s balance sheet. It follows that the obligation to pay property tax was incumbent on the person who was legally responsible for reflecting the main assets, non-material assets, reserves and receipts on its balance sheet. Since it follows from the materials of the case that OAO NK Yukos was under such an obligation, this taxpayer was also under an obligation to pay property tax.\nThe court does not accept the respondent’s arguments that the tax authorities lacked the power to levy taxes from OAO NK Yukos in respect of the sums ... perceived by other organisations. The power of the tax authorities to bring proceedings in courts to ensure the payment of taxes to the budget in cases of bad-faith taxpayers is confirmed by decision no. 138-O of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, dated 25 July 2001. At the same time the bad faith of taxpayer OAO NK Yukos and the fact that the proceeds from transactions in oil and oil products were remitted to it is confirmed by the materials of the case file.\nThe court has also established that the use of tax benefits by organisations which were dependent on OAO NK Yukos and participated in the tax-evasion scheme set up by that company was unlawful.\nPursuant to Article 56 of the Tax Code, tax benefits are recognised as preferences provided for in the tax legislation for certain groups of taxpayers in comparison with other taxpayers, including the possibility of not paying a tax or of paying it at a lower rate.\nThe court believes that tax payers must use their right to such benefits in good faith.\nMeanwhile, it follows from the materials of the case that the taxpayers [concerned] used their right in bad faith.\nThe entities registered on the territory of the Republic of Mordoviya (OOO Yu-Mordoviya ..., ZAO Yukos-M ..., OAO Alta-Treyd ..., OOO Ratmir ..., OOO Mars XXII ...) applied benefits governed by Law of the Republic of Mordoviya no. 9-Z of 9 March 1999 ‘On conditions for the efficient use of the socio-economic potential of the Republic of Mordoviya’, which sets out a special taxation procedure for entities, for the purpose of creating beneficial conditions for attracting capital to the territory of the Republic of Mordoviya, developing the securities market and creating additional jobs. Under section 2 of that law, this special taxation procedure applies in respect of entities (including foreign entities operating through permanent representative offices established in the territory of the Republic of Mordoviya), established after the entry into force of the law (with the exception of entities conducting leasing activities, banks and other credit institutions) and whose business meets one of the following conditions: export operations, with the resulting quarterly earnings totalling at least 15% of the whole of the entity’s earnings; wholesale trading of combustibles and lubricants and other kinds of hydrocarbons with the resulting quarterly earning totalling at least 70% of the whole of the entity’s earnings; and other conditions enumerated in that law. Pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Law, the Government of the Republic of Mordoviya passed resolutions on the application of the special taxation procedure in respect of the mentioned entities and, consequently, on the application of the following tax rates: at the rate of 0% in respect of profit tax in so far as it is credited to the republican and local budgets of the Republic of Mordoviya; at the rate of 0% on motorway users’ tax in so far as it is credited to the Territorial Road Fund of the Republic of Mordoviya; and at the rate of 0% on corporate property tax. Moreover, the above-mentioned entities were exempted by local government resolutions from payment of tax for the maintenance of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities.\nHowever, the special taxation procedure is provided for [by this law] for the purposes of creating favourable conditions in order to attract capital to the territory of the Republic of Mordoviya, develop the securities market and create additional jobs. The entities which used those benefits did not actually carry out their activities on the territory of this subject of the Russian Federation, did not attract capital and did not facilitate the strengthening of the Republic’s socio-economic potential, but, on the contrary, inflicted material damage through non-payment of taxes to the budget of the Republic, the local budget and the federal budget. Thus, the use of the tax benefits in respect of these entities was not aimed at improving the economy of the Republic of Mordoviya but pursued the aim of evading taxes on the production, refining and sales operations in respect of oil and oil products by OAO NK Yukos and is, as a consequence, unlawful.\nThe entity registered on the territory of the Republic of Kalmykiya (OOO Sibirskaya Transportnaya Kompaniya ...) did not pay profit tax, property tax, motorway users’ tax, tax on the acquisition of vehicles and other taxes, under Law no. 12‑P-3 of the Republic of Kalmykiya of 12 March 1999 ‘On tax benefits to enterprises investing in the economy of the Republic of Kalmykiya’, which establishes advantages in respect of taxes and duties for the ... taxpayers that invest in the economy of the Republic of Kalmykiya and are registered as such enterprises with the Ministry of Investment Policy of the Republic of Kalmykiya. Moreover, the entity in question was exempt from the payment of local taxes and ... of profit tax to the consolidated budget.\nAt the same time, it follows from the presumption of good faith on the part of taxpayers (Decisions no. 138-O of the Constitutional Court of 25 July 2001, no. 4-O of 10 January 2002 and no. 108-O of 14 May 2002, Rulings of the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court no. 9408/00 dated 18 September 2001, no. 7374/01 of 18 June 2002, no. 6294/01 of 5 November 2002 and no. 11259/02 of 17 December 2002 and letter no. С5-5/уп-342 of the Deputy President of the Supreme Commercial Court of 17 April 2002) that, for the use of tax advantages to become lawful, the amount of advantages provided and the sum of investments made by the entity should be commensurate. Since the amounts of benefits declared for tax purposes by the above-mentioned entities and the sums of investment made are obviously not commensurate, application of the advantages is unlawful. The application of tax advantages by the given entity is not aimed at improving the economy of the Republic of Kalmykiya but pursues the aim of tax evasion by OAO NK Yukos in respect of the operations of production, refining and sales of oil and oil products and, consequently, is unlawful.\nThe entity registered in the closed administrative territorial formation (‘ZATO’) town of Sarov in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region (OOO Yuksar ...) concluded a tax agreement on the provision of tax concessions with the Sarov municipal administration. The granting of additional tax advantages on the territory of the Sarov ZATO (Federal Nuclear Centre) in 2000 was regulated by the norms of Articles 21 and 56 of the Tax Code, section 58 of Law no. 227-FZ of 31 December 1999 ‘On the federal budget for the year 2000’, section 5 of Law no. 3297-1 ‘On closed administrative territorial formations’ of 14 July 1992, Item 2 of Paragraph 30 of Decree no. 222 of the Russian Government of 13 March 2000 ‘On measures for implementation of the Federal Law ‘On the Federal Budget for 2000’ and Regulations ‘On the investment zone of the town of Sarov’, approved by a Resolution of the Sarov Duma on 30 December 1999. According to the tax agreement, the Sarov administration confers advantages in respect of taxes payable into the Sarov budget to the entity in question in the form of a reduction in the share of taxes and other compulsory payments to the budget, up to 25% of the sums due in VAT, property tax, tax on the sale of fuel and lubricants, motorway users’ tax, tax on vehicle owners, tax on the acquisition of vehicles, profit tax, tax on operations with securities and excise duties; in exchange, the entity undertakes to participate in investment projects (programmes) implemented in the Sarov investment zone or with its participation, aimed at raising additional budget receipts and solving the problems of Sarov’s socio-economic development by transferring quarterly at least 1% of the sum of the tax advantages.\nAt the same time, according to Paragraph 1 of section 5 of the Federal Law no. 3297-1 ‘On closed administrative territorial formations’ of 17 July 1992, additional benefits on taxes and duties are granted by the appropriate local government authorities to entities registered as taxpayers with the authorities of the closed administrative territorial formations in compliance with the above-mentioned law. Entities possessing at least 90% of their capital assets and conducting at least 70% of their activities on the territories of the closed administrative territorial formations (including the requirement that at least 70% of the average number of employees on the payroll must be made up of persons who permanently reside on the territory of the formation in question and that at least 70% of the labour remuneration fund must be paid to employees who permanently reside on the territory of the formation in question) enjoy the right to obtain the benefits in question. Given that OOO Yuksar did not actually carry out any activity on the territory of Sarov, was not actually present on the territory of Sarov and that there were no assets and production facilities necessary for the procurement and storage of oil on the territory of Sarov, Nizhniy Novgorod Region, the given entity applied the tax advantages unlawfully.\nThus, the use of tax advantages by the given entity is not aimed at improving the economy of the Sarov ZATO but pursued the aimed of tax evasion by OAO NK Yukos in respect of its obligation to pay taxes on production and refining operations and the sale of oil and oil products and is, consequently, unlawful.\nEntities registered in the Trekhgornyy ZATO in the Chelyabinsk Region (OOO Kverkus ..., OOO Muskron ..., OOO Nortex ..., OOO Greis ... and OOO Virtus ...) concluded tax agreements with the administration of the town of Trekhgornyy, according to which entities were granted advantages in respect of profit tax, tax for the maintenance of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities, property tax, land tax, tax on the sale of fuel and lubricants, motorway users’ tax, tax on vehicle users, and tax on the acquisition of vehicles, provided that the entities remitted the sum of 5% of the total amount of tax advantages conferred, for implementation of the town’s socio-economic programmes, to the Trekhgornyy administration... Reasoning from the contents and meaning of the tax agreements, it follows that their purpose was implementation of the particularly important socio-economic task of developing the educational, medical and housing spheres in the Trekhgornyy ZATO. At the same time, the sums which were transferred to the budget by the taxpayers in question were many times lower than the sums of the declared tax advantages (the sum of investments is around 0.006% of the sum of the advantages for each taxpayer). Thus, the investments made by the taxpayers did not influence the development of Trekhgornyy’s economy. On the contrary, since the above-mentioned organisations did not in fact carry out any activities, were never located on the territory of Trekhgornyy, had no assets and none of the production facilities necessary to buy and store oil on the territory of Trekhgornyy, the application of tax advantages by the above-mentioned organisations is contrary to part 1 of section 5 of RF Law no. 3297-1 of 17 July 1992 ‘On closed administrative territorial formations’.\nThe organisations registered in the Lesnoy ZATO in the Sverdlovsk Region (OOO Mitra ..., OOO Vald-oyl ..., OOO Bizness-oyl ...) concluded tax agreements on the granting of a targeted tax concession under which organisations were granted the concession in respect of profit tax, land tax, tax on the sales of fuel and lubricants, motorway users’ tax, vehicle users’ tax, tax on the acquisition of vehicles, tax for the maintenance of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities and property tax, whilst the organisations [in question] were under an obligation to transfer to ... the Lesnoy municipal administration sums amounting to 5% of the sums of the granted tax concessions, but no less than 6,000 roubles quarterly, for implementation of the town’s socio-economic programmes. [However], the amounts received from the taxpayers are many times lower than the totals of the declared tax advantages. Accordingly, the investments made by the taxpayers did not influence the development of the economy of the town of Lesnoy because the above-mentioned organisations never carried out any activities on the territory of Lesnoy, were never in fact located on the territory of Lesnoy and had no assets and none of the production facilities required to sell and store oil on the territory of Lesnoy, [and thus] the application of the tax advantages in respect of the above-mentioned organisations is contrary to part 1 of section 5 of RF Law no. 3297-1 of 17 July 1992 ‘On closed administrative territorial formations’.\nThe organisation registered in the Evenk Autonomous District (OOO Petroleum-Treiding) without in fact carrying out any activity on the territory of the district in question and without in fact being located on the territory of the Evenk Autonomous District, abused its right granted by Law no. 108 of the Evenk Autonomous District of 24 September 1998 ‘On specific features of the tax system in the Evenk Autonomous District’. The mentioned organisation was registered in the given district solely for the purpose of acquiring the right to the tax concession that could be granted in the Evenk Autonomous District. The use of the tax benefits by the organisation in question is not aimed at strengthening of economy of the Evenk Autonomous District, but is instead aimed at tax evasion by OAO NK Yukos in respect of extraction and processing transactions and the sale of oil and oil products and is thus unlawful.\nThus, the use of tax concessions by the above-mentioned organisations is not aimed at strengthening the economy of the regions in which they were registered but is aimed at evading the taxes due in respect of the operations of extraction and processing transactions and the sale of oil and oil products by OAO NK Yukos and is thus unlawful. ...” 49.  The first-instance judgment also responded to the applicant company’s submissions. As regards the argument that the Ministry’s calculations were erroneous in that they led to double taxation and the failure to take account of the right to a refund of VAT for export operations, the court noted that, contrary to the applicant company’s allegations, both the revenues and expenses of the sham entities had been taken into account by the Ministry so as to avoid double taxation. In addition, under Law no. 1992-1 of 6 December 1991 “On value-added tax”, in order to claim a refund of the VAT paid during export operations a taxpayer had to justify the claim in accordance with a special procedure and the applicant company had failed to apply for a refund either in 2000 or at any later date. As to the argument that the Ministry’s claim was time-barred, the court refuted it with reference to Article  113 of the Tax Code and Decision no. 138-O of the Constitutional Court of 21 July 2001. The court held that the rules on limitation periods were inapplicable in the case at issue as the applicant company had acted in bad faith. In response to the company’s argument that the interdependency within the meaning of Article 20 of the Tax Code was only relevant for the purposes of price correction under Article 40 of the Code, the court observed that the interdependency of the sham companies and the applicant company was one of the circumstances on the basis of which the tax authorities had proved that the tax offence had been committed by the applicant company in bad faith. 50.  Accordingly, by the judgment of 26 May 2004 the court upheld the decision of 14 April 2004, albeit slightly reducing the payable amounts by reference to the Ministry’s failure to prove the relations of the applicant company with one of the entities mentioned in the decision of 14 April 2004. The court ordered the applicant company to pay RUB 47,989,073,311 (approximately EUR 1,375,080,541) in taxes, RUB 32,190,430,314 (approximately EUR 922,385,687) in default interest and RUB 19,195,606,923 (approximately EUR 550,031,575) in penalties, totalling RUB 99,375,110,548 (approximately EUR 2,847,497,802) and ordered its managing subsidiary OOO “YUKOS” Moskva to comply with this decision. The judgment could be appealed against by the parties within a thirty-day time-limit. 51.  At the hearings of 21 to 26 May 2004 the applicant company and its managing subsidiary were represented by eight counsel. The reasoned copy of the judgment of 26 May 2004 was produced and became available to the parties on 28 May 2004.\n(g)  Appeal proceedings 52.  On 1 June 2004 OOO “YUKOS” Moskva filed an appeal against the judgment of 26 May 2004. 53.  The Ministry appealed against the judgment on 2 June 2004. 54.  On 4 June 2004 the Appeal Court listed the appeals of OOO “YUKOS” Moskva and the Ministry to be heard on 18 June 2004. 55.  On 17 June 2004 the applicant company filed its appeal against the judgment of 26 May 2004. The brief came to 115 pages and contained 41 documents in annex. The company complained, in particular, that the time for filing an appeal had been unlawfully abridged, in breach of its rights to fair and adversarial proceedings, that the first-instance judgment was ungrounded and unlawful, that the evidence in the case was unlawful, that the first-instance court had erred in interpretation and application of the domestic law, in that it had lacked legal authority to “assign” the tax liabilities of one company to another, and that the court’s interpretation of the legislation on tax concessions had been erroneous. The company also argued that the lower court had wrongly assessed the evidence in the case and had come to erroneous factual conclusions in respect of the relationships between the applicant company and the sham companies, that in any event some of the operations of the sham companies had been unrelated to the alleged tax evasion and that the respective sums should not be “assigned” to the applicant company, and also that the case should have been tried in the town of Nefteyugansk, where the company was registered. 56.  The Government submitted that the applicant company attempted to delay the examination of the case by dispatching the appeal brief to an erroneous address. According to the applicant, the above allegation was unsubstantiated. 57.  The appeal hearing in the case lasted from 18 to 29 June 2004. 58.  At the beginning of the hearing on 18 June 2004 the applicant company requested the Appeal Court to adjourn the proceedings. The company considered that the hearing had been fixed for too early a date, before the expiry of the statutory time-limit for lodging appeals. 59.  The court refused this request as unfounded. 60.  At the hearings of 21 and 28 June 2004 the applicant company filed four supplements to its appeal. The company and its managing subsidiary were represented by ten counsel. 61.  Under Article 268 of the Code of Commercial Court Procedure the court fully re-examined the case presented by the Ministry rather than simply reviewing the first-instance judgment. 62.  At the end of the hearing of 29 June 2004 the court delivered its judgment, in which it reached largely similar findings and came to the same conclusions as the first-instance judgment. The court dismissed the company’s appeals as unfounded, but decided to alter the first-instance judgment in part. In particular, it declared the Ministry’s claims in respect of VAT partly unfounded, reduced the amount of the VAT arrears by RUB 22,939,931 (approximately EUR 649,336) and quashed the corresponding penalty of RUB 10,334,226 (approximately EUR 292,520). 63.  The court judgment, in its relevant parts, read as follows:\n“... The parties declared under part 5 of Article 268 of the Code of Commercial Courts Procedure that there was a need to verify the lawfulness and grounds of the first-instance judgment and to hold a fresh hearing of the case in full.\nThe Appeal Court has checked the lawfulness and grounds of the first-instance judgment pursuant to ... Article 268 ... of the Code of Commercial Court Procedure. ...\nThe Appeal Court does not accept the arguments of the respondents concerning erroneous interpretation and application of the norms of the substantive law by the first-instance court and concerning the factual incorrectness of that court’s conclusions.\n[The court went on to review and confirm all factual findings made by the Ministry and the first-instance court in respect of the tax-evasion scheme set up by the applicant company.]\n... Bearing in mind the above-mentioned circumstances, the Appeal Court has established that the de facto owner of the oil was [the applicant company]. The acquisition of the oil and its transfer and subsequent sale was in reality carried out by [the applicant company] as the owner, which is proved by the control of [the applicant company] over all operations, and the actual movement of the oil from the extracting entities to processing entities or oil facilities controlled by [the applicant company], which is proved by the materials of the case.\n...\nThe [applicant company’s] ownership of the oil is confirmed by the interdependence of the contracting parties, by the control that [the applicant company] had over them, by the registration of the contracting parties on territories with a low-tax regime, by the lack of activities by these entities at their place of registration, by the fact that the accounting operations for these entities was carried out by OOO Yukos-Invest or OOO Yukos-FBC, companies officially dependant on [the applicant company], by the fact that the accounting for these entities was filed from the addresses of [the applicant company] and OOO Yukos-Moskva, by the fact that their bank accounts were opened in the same banks owned by [the applicant company], by the presence and character of commercial relations between [the applicant company] and the dependent entities, and by the use of promissory notes and mutual offsetting between them.\n...\nUnder the legislation then in force, such as section 3 of RF Law no. 1992-1 of 6 December 1991 ‘On value-added tax’, part 2 of Section 5 and section 4 of RF Law no. 1759-1 of 18 October 1991 ‘On motorway funds in the Russian Federation’, subpart ‘ch’ of section 21 of RF Law no. 2118-1 of 27 December 1991 ‘On the basics of the tax system’, the sale of goods (works and services) gives rise to an obligation to pay VAT, motorway users’ tax, tax on the sale of oil and oil products and the tax for the maintenance of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities.\nUnder part 1 of Article 39 of the Tax Code, sales are defined as the transfer of property rights in respect of goods. Under subpart 1 and 2 of Article 209 of the Civil Code (taking into account Article 11 of the Tax Code) the owner of goods is the person who has the rights of ownership, use and disposal of his property, that is, the person who is entitled to carry out at his own discretion in respect of this property any actions which are not against the law and other legal acts and do not breach the rights and protected interests of other persons...\nIt follows that the person who in fact has the rights of ownership, use and disposal of the property and who, in view of these rights, exercises in reality and at his discretion in respect of his property any actions, including transfers of property to other persons ... is the owner of this property.\nTherefore, OAO NK Yukos, being the de facto owner of the oil, was under an obligation to pay [the taxes], which has not been complied with in good time.\nAs was previously established, Article 41 of the Tax Code sets out that profit is an economic gain in monetary form or in kind, which is taken into account if it is possible to evaluate it and in so far as it can be assessed, and determined in accordance with the chapters ‘Taxes in respect of the profits of natural persons’, ‘Taxes in respect of the profits of organisations’, and ‘Taxes in respect of the capital profits’ of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation. Under subparts 1 and 2 of section 2 of RF Law no. 2116-1 of 27 December 1991 ‘On profit tax of enterprises and organisations’ which was then in force, the object of taxation is the gross profit of the enterprise, decreased (or increased) in accordance with the provisions of the present section. The gross profit is the total of revenues (receipts) from the sale of products (works and services), main assets (including land parcels), other property of the enterprise and the profit derived from operations other than sales, less the sum of expenses in respect of these operations. The court established that the economic profit from the sale of oil and oil products was perceived by OAO NK Yukos, [and] it was incumbent on [the applicant company] to comply with the obligation to pay profit tax.\nSection 2 of RF Law no. 2030-1 of 13 December 1991 ‘On corporate property tax’ taxes the main assets, non-material assets, reserves and receipts which are indicated on the taxpayer’s balance sheet. It follows that the obligation to pay property tax was incumbent on the person who was legally responsible for reflecting the main assets, non-material assets, reserves and receipts on its balance sheet. Since it follows from the materials of the on-site tax inspection that OAO NK Yukos was under such an obligation, this taxpayer was also under an obligation to pay property tax.\nThe Constitutional Court of the RF in its decision of 25 July 2001 no. 138-0 stated that it followed from the meaning of the norm contained in part 7 of Article 3 of the Tax Code of the RF that there is a presumption of good faith on the part of taxpayers. In order to refute this and establish the taxpayer’s bad faith, the tax authorities have the right – in order to strike a balance between public and private interests – to carry out necessary checks and bring subsequent claims in commercial courts in order to guarantee the payment of taxes to the budget.\nIn view of the above, the tax authorities ... have the right to carry out checks with a view to establishing the de facto owner of sold property and the de facto recipient of the economic profit, and also with a view to establishing [the owner’s] bad faith as expressed in use of the tax-evasion scheme. At the same time, the tax authorities establish the de facto owner with regard to the actual relations between the parties to the transaction, irrespective of whether the persons were declared as owners of the property in the documents submitted during the tax inspections.\nThe circumstances indicating that OAO NK Yukos had in fact the rights of ownership, use and disposal of its oil and oil products and, at its discretion, carried out in this connection any actions, including the sale, transfer for processing, etc., through specially registered organisations dependant on OAO NK Yukos is confirmed by the materials of the case.\n...\nIn view of the above, the court does not accept the respondent’s arguments about the unlawfulness and the lack of factual basis of the decision to levy additional taxes from OAO NK Yukos as the de facto owner of the oil and oil products.\nThe respondent’s argument that OAO NK Yukos had not perceived any economic profit from the application of benefits by the entities mentioned in the decision of the Ministry contradicts the materials of the case. The court had established that OAO NK Yukos received economic profit in the form of unilateral transfers of cash. OAO NK Yukos set up the Fund for Financial Support of the Production Development of OAO NK Yukos [to this end].\n...\nThe argument of OAO NK Yukos that the Ministry is levying taxes in respect of transactions “within the same owner” is unsupported, since the calculations of additional taxes (except for the property tax in respect of which [this is inapplicable]) also take into account the expenses connected with the acquisition of the oil and oil products.\nThe court does not accept the respondent’s arguments that the tax authorities lacked the power to levy taxes from OAO NK Yukos in respect of the sums ... perceived by other organisations. The power of the tax authorities to bring proceedings in courts to ensure the payment of taxes to the budget in cases of bad-faith taxpayers is confirmed by decision no. 138-O of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, dated 25 July 2001. At the same time the bad faith of taxpayer OAO NK Yukos and the fact that the proceeds from transactions involving oil and oil products belonged to it is confirmed by the materials of the case file.\nThe circumstances of the ... acquisition and sale of the oil and oil products, taken in their entirety, as established by the Appeal Court, indicate the presence of bad faith in the actions of OAO NK Yukos, which was expressed in intentional actions aimed at tax evasion by the use of unlawful schemes. In accordance with part 2 of Article 110 of the Tax Code of the RF the tax offence is considered intentional if the person who has committed it knew about the unlawful character of the actions (inactions), wished them or knowingly accepted the possibility of the harmful consequences of such actions (inactions).\nSince OAO NK Yukos intentionally committed actions aimed at tax evasion, and its officers were aware of the unlawful character of such actions, wished or knowingly accepted the possibility of harmful consequences due to such actions, OAO NK Yukos must be held liable under part 3 of Article 122 of the RF Tax Code for the non-payment or incomplete payment of taxes due to the lowering of the taxable base or incorrect calculation of the tax or other unlawful actions (inactions) committed intentionally, in the form of a fine equivalent to 40% of the unpaid taxes.\n...\nHaving re-examined the case and verified the lawfulness and grounds of the first-instance judgment in full, having examined the evidence and having heard the arguments of the parties, the Appeal Court has come to the conclusion that the decision of the Ministry dated 14 April 2004 ... is in compliance with the Tax Code as well as with Federal laws and other laws on taxes...\nThe claims for payment of taxes, interest surcharges and fines made in the decision of the Ministry of 14 April 2004 ... are grounded, lawful and confirmed by the primary documents of the materials of the inspection submitted in justification to the court. ...” 64.  The appeal judgment also responded to the applicant company’s other arguments. As regards the alleged breaches of procedure and the lack of time for the preparation of the defence at first instance, the court noted that it had examined this allegation and that there had been no violation of procedure at first instance and that, in any event, the applicant company had had ample opportunities to study the evidence relied on by the Ministry both at the Ministry’s premises and in court. As regards the argument that the evidence used by the Ministry was inadmissible, the court noted that the materials of the case had been collected in full compliance with the requirements of the domestic legislation. The court also agreed with the first-instance court that the three-year statutory time-limit had been inapplicable in the applicant company’s case since the company had been acting in bad faith. 65.  The first-instance judgment, as upheld on appeal, came into force on 29 June 2004. 66.  The applicant company had two months from the date of the delivery of the appeal judgment to challenge it in third-instance cassation proceedings (кассация).\n(h)  Cassation proceedings 67.  On 7 July 2004 the applicant company filed a cassation appeal against the judgments of 26 May and of 29 June 2004 with the Federal Commercial Court of the Moscow Circuit (“the Circuit Court”). The applicant company’s brief came to 77 pages and had 6 documents in annex. The arguments in the brief were largely similar to those raised by the applicant company on appeal, namely that the judgment was unlawful and unfounded, that the entities mentioned in the report ought to have taken part in the proceedings, that the trial court had had insufficient evidence to conclude that the applicant company and other entities were interrelated, that the evidence used by the trial court was unlawful, that the trial proceedings had not been adversarial and that the principle of equality of arms had been breached. In addition, the company alleged that it had had insufficient time to study the evidence and had been unable to contest the evidence in the case, that the Ministry had unlawfully applied to a court before the applicant company had had an opportunity to comply voluntarily with the decision of 14 April 2004, that the entities mentioned in the report had in fact been eligible for the tax exemptions, that the rules governing tax exemption had been wrongly interpreted, that the Ministry’s claims had been time-barred, that the company had had insufficient time for the preparation of the appeal, and that the case ought to have been examined by a court in Nefteyugansk. 68.  A copy of the reasoned version of the appeal judgment of 29 June 2004 was attached to the brief. 69.  It appears that on an unspecified date the Ministry also challenged the judgments of 26 May and 29 June 2004. 70.  On 17 September 2004 the Circuit Court examined the cassation appeals and upheld in substance the judgments of 26 May and 29 June 2004. 71.  In respect of the applicant company’s allegations of unfairness in the appeal proceedings, the court noted that both defendant companies had had ample opportunities to avail themselves of their right to bring appeals within the statutory time-limit, as the appeal decision was not taken until 29 June 2004, which was more than thirty days after the date of delivery of the judgment of 26 May 2004. Furthermore, the court observed that the evidence presented by the Ministry and examined by the lower courts was lawful and admissible, and that it had been fully available to the defendant companies before the commencement of the trial hearings. The court also noted that on 14 May 2004 the City Court specifically ordered the Ministry to disclose all the evidence in the case, that this order had been complied with by the Ministry and that, despite the fact that the evidence was voluminous, the applicant company had had sufficient time to examine and challenge it repeatedly throughout the proceedings between May and July 2004. 72.  As regards the applicant company’s complaint that the Ministry had brought proceedings before the expiry of the time-limit for voluntary compliance with the decision of 14 April 2004, the court noted that the Ministry and lower courts had acted in compliance with Article 213 of the Code of Commercial Court Procedure, as there were irreconcilable differences between the parties and, throughout the proceedings, the applicant company had had insufficient funds to satisfy the Ministry’s claims. 73.  In respect of the applicant company’s argument that the case should have been tried by a court in Nefteyugansk, the court noted that the City Court had had jurisdiction over the case under Article 54 of the Civil Code and decision no. 6/8 of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court and Supreme Commercial Court of 1 July 1996. 74.  On the merits of the case, the court noted that the lower courts had reached reasoned conclusions that the applicant company was the effective owner of all goods traded by the sham companies registered in low-tax areas, that the transactions of these entities were in fact those of the applicant company, that neither the applicant company nor the sham entities were eligible for the tax exemptions and that the applicant company had perceived the entirety of the resulting profits. The court upheld the lower courts’ conclusion that, acting in bad faith, the applicant company had failed properly to declare its transactions for the year 2000 and to pay corresponding taxes, including VAT, profit tax, motorway users’ tax, property tax, the tax for the maintenance of the housing stock and socio-cultural facilities and tax on the sale of fuel and lubricants. 75.  The court noted some arithmetical mistakes in the appeal judgment of 29 June 2004, increasing the penalty by RUB 1,158,254.40 (approximately EUR 32,613) and reducing the default interest by RUB 22,939,931 (approximately EUR 645,917) accordingly.\n(i)  Constitutional review 76.  On an unspecified date the applicant company lodged a complaint against the domestic courts’ decisions in its case with the Constitutional Court. It specifically raised the question of the lower courts’ refusal to apply the statutory time-limit set out in Article 113 of the Tax Code. 77.  By decision of 18 January 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that the applicant company did not in fact challenge the constitutionality of Article 113 of the Code but rather insisted that this provision was constitutional and should be applied in its case. Therefore, the applicant company was not complaining about the breach of its rights by the above-mentioned provision and, accordingly, the court had no competence to examine the applicant company’s claims.\n(j)  Supervisory review 78.  Simultaneously to bringing the cassation appeal, on 7 July 2004 the applicant company also challenged the judgments of 26 May and 29 June 2004 by way of supervisory review before the Supreme Commercial Court of Russia. 79.  On 31 December 2004 the applicant company’s case was accepted for examination by the Supreme Commercial Court. 80.  By a decision of 13 January 2005 the Supreme Commercial Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court. Addressing one of the applicant company’s arguments, the court noted that the lower courts had decided that the three-year statutory time-bar was inapplicable in the case at issue since the applicant company had been acting in bad faith. It further noted that such an interpretation of the rules governing the time-limits was not in line with the existing legislation and case-law and that therefore the issue should be resolved by the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court. 81.  On 19 April 2005 the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court referred the above-mentioned issue to the Constitutional Court and adjourned the examination of the applicant company’s supervisory review appeal pending a ruling by the Constitutional Court. 82.  By a decision of 14 July 2005 the Constitutional Court decided that it was competent to examine the question of the compatibility of Article 113 of the Tax Code with the Constitution, having cited the application of an individual, one G. A. Polyakova, and the referral by the Supreme Commercial Court. At the same time, it noted specifically that it had no competence to decide individual cases and its ruling would only deal with the points of law in abstracto. 83.  It appears that the legal issues raised by G. A. Polyakova and the applicant company were different. G. A. Polyakova was dissatisfied with the established court practice which required the tax authorities, rather than the courts, to hold a taxpayer liable for a tax offence within the three-year time-limit set out in Article 113 of the Code. On the facts of her individual case, the decision of the tax authorities was taken on time, whilst later the final decision by the courts was taken outside the specified time-limit. As regards the applicant company, it raised the same point which had been previously declared inadmissible by the Constitutional Court in its decision dated 18 January 2005, namely the refusal of the courts in its case to follow the established practice and to declare the claims of the authorities time-barred, as they related to the year 2000 and were set out in the decision to hold the applicant liable for a tax offence on 14 April 2004, that is, outside the three-year time-limit laid down by Article 113 of the Code. 84.  As a result of its examination, the Constitutional Court upheld Article 113 of the Tax Code as compatible with the Constitution, having ruled that the legal provisions on the statutory time-limits ought to be applied in all cases without exception. The court made an abstract review of the provision in question and mentioned the “principles of justice”, “legal equality” and “proportionality” in giving its own “constitutional interpretation” of Article 113. The court noted that the rule set out in Article 113 of the Code was too strict and failed to take into account various relevant circumstances and the actions of taxpayers, including those aimed at hindering tax control and delaying the proceedings. It further ruled that:\n“... the provisions of Article 113 of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation in their constitutional and legal sense and in the present legal context do not exclude [the possibility] that, where the taxpayer impedes tax supervision and the conduct of tax inspections, the court may excuse the tax authorities’ failure to bring the proceedings in time ...”\n“... In their constitutional and legal sense in the context of the present legal regulation... [these provisions] mean that the running of the statutory time-bar in respect of a person prosecuted for tax offences stops on the date of the production of the tax audit report in which the supported facts of the tax offences revealed during the inspection are mentioned and in which there are reference to the relevant articles of the Tax Code or - in cases where there was no need to produce such a report - from the moment on which the respective decision of the tax authority, holding a taxpayer liable for a tax offence, was taken. ...” 85.  Three out of the nineteen judges filed separate opinions in this case. 86.  Judge V. G. Yaroslavtsev disagreed with the majority, having noted that the Constitutional Court acted ultra vires and openly breached the principle of lawfulness by creating an exception from the rule set out in Article 113 where there had previously been none. 87.  Judge G. A. Gadzhiev concurred with the conclusions of the majority but would have preferred to quash, rather than uphold, Article 113 of the Tax Code as unconstitutional and breaching the principle of equality. 88.  Judge A. L. Kononov dissented from the majority ruling, having considered that the Constitutional Court clearly had no competence to decide the matter and that indeed there had been no constitutional issue to resolve as, among other things, there had been no prior difficulties in application of Article 113 of the Tax Code and the contents of this provision had been quite clear. He also criticised the “inexplicable” way in which the Constitutional Court had first rejected the application by the applicant company and had then decided to examine the matter again. Judge Kononov further noted that the decision of the Constitutional Court was vague, unclear and generally questionable. 89.  The case was then returned to the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court. 90.  On 4 October 2005 the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court examined and dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. In respect of the company’s argument that the Ministry’s claims were time-barred, the court noted that during the tax proceedings the company had been actively impeding the tax inspections. In view of this and given the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the court concluded that since the Ministry’s tax audit report in the applicant’s case had been completed on 29 December 2003, that is, within the statutory three-year time-limit as interpreted in the Constitutional Court’s decision of 14 July 2005, the case was not time-barred. 91.  Simultaneously with the determination of the case before the courts in respect of the applicant company’s tax liability for the year 2000, the parties also took part in various enforcement proceedings.\n(a)  Attachment of the applicant’s property\n(i)  The City Court’s decision of 15 April 2004 92.  On 15 April 2004 the City Court accepted for consideration the Ministry’s action in respect of the year 2000 and attached certain of the applicant company’s assets, excluding goods produced by the company and related cash transactions, as a security for the claims. The court also issued writs of execution in this respect (see paragraph 27). This decision was upheld by the Appeal Court on 2 July 2004.\n(ii)  Enforcement of attachment by the bailiffs 93.  By a decision of 16 April 2004 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in connection with the attachment. 94.  On the same day they executed the attachment order by informing the applicant company and the holder of its corporate register, ZAO ‘M-Reestr’, of the decision of 15 April 2004. 95.  According to the Government, the applicant company impeded the execution of the writs issued by the court by hiding its corporate register from the bailiffs. In particular, they alleged that a few hours prior to the bailiffs’ visit, the applicant company had cancelled its contracts with ZAO ‘M‑Reestr’. The register was then dispatched by ordinary post to a location in Russia so that, over the next weeks, it could not be physically found and the execution writs could not be enforced.\n(iii)  The company’s offer of 22 April 2004 96.  On 22 April 2004 the applicant company filed its first court request to have the attachment of the entirety of its assets replaced by the attachment of shares belonging to it in OAO Sibirskaya neftyanaya kompaniya (“the Sibneft company”, a major Russian oil company which had attempted unsuccessfully to merge with the applicant company in 2003), which were allegedly worth three times as much as the then liability. The applicant company also alleged that the attachment order adversely affected its proper functioning and invited the authorities to opt for less intrusive measures, insisting on the lack of any risk of asset-stripping. 97.  By a decision of 23 April 2004 the City Court examined and dismissed this request as unfounded. The court found no evidence that the interim measures affected any of the company’s production activities. 98.  On 17 May 2004 the applicant company appealed against the decision of 23 April 2004. 99.  The outcome of court proceedings in respect of the applicant company’s appeal of 17 May 2004 is unclear. 100.  The Government provided the following background information in connection with the company’s offer of shares in Sibneft. The applicant company had attempted to merge with Sibneft in May-September 2003. As a result of the initial stages of the merger, the applicant company acquired 92% of Sibneft: 20% of these shares were bought for cash, whilst 57.5% were exchanged for 17.2% of the applicant company’s newly issued shares and 14.5% were swapped for 8.8% of the applicant company’s existing shares. In November 2003 it was announced publicly that, at the request of the former Sibneft owners, the parties had decided not to go ahead with the merger. In February 2004 the owners of Sibneft sued the applicant company in this connection, demanding cancellation of the operation whereby the applicant had issued 17.2% of shares. Among other things, on 14 February 2004 they obtained an attachment order in respect of the Sibneft shares remaining in the possession of the applicant company pending the proceedings. On 1 March 2004 the City Court decided to cancel the issue of 17.2% shares by the applicant company. The Government submitted that it was clear from the above-mentioned account that on 22 April 2004, the date on which the applicant company first made the offer of Sibneft shares, the owners of Sibneft already anticipated suing the applicant company again, this time demanding back the 57.5% of Sibneft shares swapped for the cancelled 17.2% of the applicant company’s shares. At the same time, the fate of the remaining issues of Sibneft shares still in the possession of the applicant company was also uncertain.\n(iv)  The applicant company’s request for an injunction against the attachment 101.  On 23 April 2004 the City Court also examined the applicant company’s request for an injunction order against the attachment and rejected it. The court noted that the attachment did not interfere with the company’s day-to-day operations and it was a reasonable measure aimed at securing the Ministry’s claims. 102.  On 2 July 2004 the Appeal Court rejected the company’s appeal and upheld the judgment. 103.  It does not appear that the applicant company brought cassation proceedings in this respect.\n(b)  Enforcement of the Tax Ministry’s decision of 14 April 2004 104.  In the meantime, on 7 May 2004 the applicant company applied to the City Court with a separate action against the tax assessment of 14 April 2004, seeking its invalidation (see paragraph 34 and 35 above). The company also requested interim measures in this connection. 105.  Following the applicant company’s request for interim measures, on 19 May 2004 the City Court stayed the enforcement of the Tax Ministry’s decision of 14 April 2004, having noted that the Ministry could have enforced the decision in the part relating to taxes and default interests even without waiting for the outcome of the Ministry’s claim (Article 46 of the Tax Code[2]). The court decided, however, that this might be detrimental to the applicant company and stayed the decision of 14 April 2004 accordingly. 106.  On 27 May 2004 the applicant company made a public announcement that:\n“... it [was] under an injunction prohibiting it from selling any of its property, including the shares owned by the company. Until the injunction is lifted, the Company is unable to sell its assets in order to obtain liquid funds. Consequently, if the Tax Ministry’s efforts continue, we are very likely to enter a state of bankruptcy before the end of 2004”. 107.  It appears that the City Court’s decision of 19 May 2004 to stay the enforcement was appealed against by the Ministry. Having examined the Ministry’s arguments at the hearing of 23 June 2004, the Appeal Court quashed the first-instance decision of 19 May 2004 as unlawful and rejected the applicant company’s request for interim measures as unfounded. 108.  It does not appear that the applicant company appealed against this decision before the Circuit Court.\n(c)  Enforcement of the judgments concerning the 2000 Tax Assessment\n(i)  First-instance judgment of 26 May 2004 and the appeal decision of 29 June 2004 109.  As mentioned above (paragraphs 46-66), by a judgment of 26 May 2004 the City Court found in favour of the Tax Ministry, upholding the Tax Assessment of 14 April 2004. The Tax Assessment was upheld by the Appeal Court with minor reductions and became enforceable on 29 June 2004. 110.  On 30 June 2004 the Appeal Court issued the writ of enforcement in this respect. The applicant company was to pay RUB 47,958,133,380 (approximately EUR 1,358,914,565) in reassessed taxes, RUB 32,190,430,314 (approximately EUR 912,129,842) in interest surcharges and RUB 19,185,272,697 (approximately EUR 543,623,045) in penalties.\n(ii)  Enforcement proceedings in respect of the writ of 30 June 2004 111.  On 30 June 2004 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings based on the above judgment and gave the applicant company five days to pay. The applicant company was informed that it would be liable to pay enforcement fees of 7%, totalling RUB 6,953,375,547 (approximately EUR  197,026,920), in the event of failure to honour the debt voluntarily. Upon the Ministry’s application, the bailiffs issued sixteen orders freezing the cash held by the applicant company in its Russian bank accounts. The orders did not concern cash added to the accounts after 30 June 2004.\n(iii)  The applicant company’s challenge to the decision of 30 June 2004 112.  On 7 July 2004 the applicant company challenged the bailiffs’ decision of 30 June 2004. 113.  It argued that the decision to open enforcement proceedings had been unlawful as it was in breach of the rules of bailiffs’ territorial competence as the enforcement ought to have taken place in Nefteyugansk and not in Moscow, that the five-day term for voluntary compliance with the court decisions had been too short and that the cash-freezing orders had made such compliance impossible. 114.  On 30 July 2004 the City Court examined and dismissed these claims as groundless. The court ruled that the bailiffs had acted lawfully and that the cash-freezing orders did not interfere with its ability or inability to honour its debts, as the applicant company had been free to dispose of any cash not in the frozen accounts and any cash added to those accounts after 30 June 2004. 115.  It does not appear that the company brought appeal proceedings against this judgment.\n(d)  Seizure of 24 subsidiary companies and related proceedings 116.  In the meantime, on 1 July 2004 the bailiffs decided to seize 24 subsidiary companies belonging to the applicant company. 117.  The applicant appealed against the decision in court. 118.  By a first-instance judgment of 17 September 2004 the appeal was dismissed as unfounded. The judgment was produced on 20 September 2004. 119.  The applicant did not appeal against the judgment before the Appeal Court, though it did bring further appeal proceedings before the Circuit Court. 120.  On 2 February 2005 the judgment was upheld by the Circuit Court.\n(e) The applicant company’s proposal of 5 July 2004 and related proceedings 121.  In addition to the above attempts to stay the enforcement of the judgments concerning the 2000 Tax Assessment, the applicant company, by a letter dated 2 July and filed on 5 July 2004, suggested to the bailiffs for the second time that it repay its debts by using 34.5% of Sibneft stock allegedly worth over 4 billion United States dollars (“USD”, or some EUR 3.3 billion), citing its vertically integrated structure as a possible reason for seeking to find the least intrusive solution as well as the need to honour its contractual debts. 122.  The Government provided the following background information in connection with the applicant’s second offer of Sibneft shares (see paragraph  121 above). At this point, the owners of Sibneft had already obtained a court judgment in their favour by the City Court on 1 March 2004, ordering the applicant company to return the 57.5% of Sibneft shares swapped for the cancelled 17.2% of the applicant company’s shares and on 6 July 2004, that is, on the day after the applicant’s second offer, they had filed court claims demanding the return of 14.5% of the shares previously exchanged for 8.8% of the applicant company’s existing shares. In addition, by a decision of 6 July 2004 the owners of Sibneft had obtained an attachment order in respect of the Sibneft shares in question. 123.  On 14 July 2004 the applicant company filed an action against the bailiffs on account of their alleged failure to respond to the company’s offer of 5 July 2004. 124.  On 17 August 2004 the City Court dismissed this action, having noted that the failure to respond was lawful and within the scope of the bailiffs’ discretion. The court established that some of the steps undertaken by the applicant company during the unsuccessful merger with the Sibneft company had been contested in a different set of proceedings as unlawful. In addition, the applicant company’s ownership of the Sibneft shares had been contested by third parties in two different sets of proceedings. On the basis of these findings, the court concluded that the bailiff had not breached the law by ignoring the company’s offer. 125.  It does not appear that the applicant company appealed against the judgment.\n(f)  Default notice of 5 July 2004 126.  On 5 July 2004 the applicant company received a default notice from syndicated lenders, a group of international banks, who had previously loaned the company USD 1 billion (EUR 821,894,430). The lenders considered that a default had occurred as a result of the recent and well-publicised events in respect of the applicant company and their actual or potential impact on the applicant company’s business and assets. The notice stated that as a result of the default notice the loans were due and payable on demand.\n(g)  The company’s cassation appeal of 7 July 2004 and the motion to stay the enforcement 127.  As set out above (paragraph 67), on 7 July 2004 the applicant company filed a cassation appeal against the court judgments on the 2000 Tax Assessment and at the same time it moved to stay the enforcement proceedings. It argued that its assets were highly valuable, but that it had insufficient cash to honour the debts immediately and that the attachment of assets made any voluntary settlement impossible. The applicant company also argued that enforcement of the court judgments in the case would irreparably damage its business, since a reversal of the enforcement would be impossible. 128.  By a decision of 16 July 2004 the Appeal Court agreed to consider the cassation appeal and, having examined the motion to stay the enforcement, dismissed it as unsubstantiated and unfounded, as the circumstances referred to by the applicant company were irrelevant under the domestic law. The court noted that it would be possible to reverse the enforcement, since the plaintiff was the Treasury. 129.  This decision was upheld by the Circuit Court on 4 August 2004.\n(h)  7% enforcement fee 130.  By a decision of 9 July 2004 the bailiffs levied an enforcement fee of 7% in respect of the applicant company’s failure to comply with the execution writs of 30 June 2004 (see paragraph 110 above). The applicant company was to pay RUB 6,848,291,175.45 (approximately EUR 190,481,640) 131.  On 19 July 2004 the applicant company challenged this decision in court. 132.  By a decision of 3 August 2004 the City Court examined the applicant company’s action and quashed the decision of 9 July 2004 as disproportionate and unjustified. The court decided that the enforcement fee could only be levied if the respondent had acted in bad faith and found that the bailiffs had failed to examine this question. The court also noted that 7% was the highest possible rate and that the bailiffs’ decision failed to explain why the fee could not be lower. Among other things, the court referred to section 3 of Constitutional Court Ruling no. 13-P of 30 July 2001. 133.  Following an appeal by the Ministry, on 27 August 2004 the Appeal Court quashed the decision of 3 August 2004 as erroneous and held that the bailiffs’ actions had been lawful and justified. The court noted that the applicant company had failed to demonstrate that it had taken any steps to meet the liabilities. It further noted that the cash in the applicant company’s accounts was only frozen in certain specified amounts and that, above those amounts, the company was free to function as usual. As to the company’s proposal to offer the Sibneft shares as payment, the court noted that this could not be accepted, because the applicant company’s property rights in respect of these shares had been questioned by a third party in a parallel set of proceedings. In addition, the court noted that the applicant company had failed to use a remedy provided in Article 324 of the Commercial Procedure Code. 134.  The Circuit Court upheld the appeal decision on 6 December 2004.\n(i)  Overall debt in respect of 2000 135.  Overall, in respect of 2000, the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 99,333,836,391 (approximately EUR 2,814,667,452)\n(j)  The applicant company’s proposal of 13 July 2004 and related proceedings 136.  On 13 July 2004 the applicant company again repeated its offer of 34.5% of Sibneft shares to the bailiffs. On the next day the offer was amended to include only 20% of Sibneft shares. The domestic courts at three instances analysed this offer in detail in their decisions of 6, 18 August and 25 October 2004 (see paragraphs 139-146 below).\n(k)  Seizure of shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz\n(i)  Decision of 14 July 2004 137.  On 14 July 2004 the bailiffs seized the shares of OAO Yuganskneftegas, one of the applicant company’s principal production subsidiaries. The decision referred to the applicant company’s inability to meet its liabilities. The attachment did not affect the applicant company’s ability to manage OAO Yuganskneftegaz, but rather prevented the company from selling or encumbering those shares.\n(ii)  The applicant company’s challenge to the decision of 14 July 2004 138.  The applicant company appealed against this decision in court. With reference to section 59 of the Enforcement Proceedings Act, it argued that the bailiffs ought firstly to claim assets which were not involved in the production process, secondly those goods and other values which were not related to the production process and, thirdly, immovable objects, raw material and other main assets relating to the production cycle. In addition, the applicant company referred to Ruling no. 4 of the Plenary Supreme Commercial Court “On certain questions arising out of seizure and enforcement actions in respect of corporate shares”, dated 3 March 1999, which suggested, in respect of those companies which had been privatised by the State as parts of bigger holding groups through the transfer of controlling blocks of shares, that the production cycle of the respective production unit should be preserved as much as possible. The company further claimed that the above ruling was applicable to the case at issue, that OAO Yuganskneftegas was a major production unit and that the bailiffs had produced no evidence that the assets and goods and other values not involved in the production process were insufficient. In addition, it reiterated its offer of the shares in Sibneft.\n(iii)  First-instance proceedings 139.  On 6 August 2004 the City Court examined and allowed the applicant company’s challenge of this seizure. 140.  At the hearing the Ministry and bailiffs referred to sections 9 (5) and 51 (1-4) of the Enforcement Proceedings Act and Government Decree no. 934 “On seizure of securities” of 12 August 1998. They argued that, under the applicable domestic law, the seizure should be made first in respect of the cash-flow and then, under section 46 (5) of the Enforcement Proceedings, it would be open to the bailiffs to assess and seize the assets depending on their liquidity. They countered the applicant company’s arguments by saying that the latter’s references were invalid in that they related to the other stage of enforcement proceedings (the collection of debt and not the seizure as such). Furthermore, they argued that Ruling no. 4 of the Plenum of the Supreme Commercial Court was inapplicable since, in the case of Yuganskneftegas, the State had transferred only 38% of the shares and not a controlling block. With regard to the offer of Sibneft stock, the Ministry and bailiffs argued that the applicant company’s rights in respect of these shares had been contested in separate sets of court proceedings and it was therefore risky to accept them as a payment. Lastly, they informed the court that the applicant company had recently hidden the shareholder registers of its three major subsidiaries, OAO Yuganskneftegas, OAO Samaraneftegas and OAO Tomskneft, which, in their view, demonstrated the risk of possible asset-stripping by the applicant company. 141.  Having examined the parties’ submissions, the court upheld the applicant company’s arguments. It noted that the applicant company’s references to the applicable domestic law were correct. With regard to the non-controlling block argument, the court noted that at the time of transfer of the shares, 25% of shares were privileged and non-voting. For the remaining 75% of the voting stock, the 38% transferred by the State constituted the controlling block. As regards the offer of shares in Sibneft, the court noted that the exact quantity of the contested shares was unclear and that the bailiffs should find out the exact figures and that they should consider the uncontested shares as a possible means of partial settlement. The court concluded that the decision of 14 July 2004 was unlawful and quashed it.\n(iv)  Appeal proceedings 142.  On 9 August 2004 the Ministry challenged the decision of 6 August 2004 on appeal. 143.  On 18 August 2004 the Appeal Court quashed the decision, finding that the first-instance court had erred both in law and fact. In particular, the court confirmed that it was up to the bailiffs to choose the most liquid assets and dispose of them with a view to honouring the applicant company’s huge debt. It also noted that Ruling no. 4 of the Plenary Supreme Commercial Court was inapplicable to the case in issue, as the applicant company, in the years following its privatisation, had restructured its initial shareholding in OAO Yuganskneftegaz in 1999 in such a manner as to take those shares outside the scope of the exception provided by Ruling no. 4.\n(v)  Cassation proceedings 144.  Following an appeal by the applicant company, on 25 October 2004 the Circuit Court upheld the decision of 18 August 2004. 145.  The applicant company’s attempts to bring supervisory review proceedings against this decision proved unsuccessful. 146.  The respective complaint was dismissed by a decision of the Supreme Commercial Court dated 17 December 2004.\n(l)  Seizure of shares of OAO Tomskneft-VNK and OAO Samaraneftegaz 147.  In addition to seizing the shares of OAO Yuganskneftegaz, on 14 July 2004 the bailiffs also seized the shares of OAO Tomskneft-VNK and OAO Samaraneftegas, the applicant company’s two other principal production units. 148.  The applicant company’s complaint against the seizure of OAO Tomskneft-VNK proved unsuccessful. 149.  The City Court dismissed its complaint as unfounded on 13 August 2004. 150.  The applicant company did not contest that judgment before the Appeal Court. 151.  On 5 November 2004 the Circuit Court dismissed the applicant company’s cassation appeal in respect of the judgment of 13 August 2004. The court noted that the seizure was intended to protect the creditor’s claims and that there was no indication that the seizure impeded the production cycle or otherwise disturbed the normal functioning of the company. 152.  The company also complained unsuccessfully about the seizure of its shares in OAO Samaraneftegaz. 153.  The City Court, acting as a first-instance court, dismissed the appeal on 2 September 2004. 154.  The applicant company failed to appeal the judgment before the Appeal Court, although though it did pursue cassation proceedings. 155.  On 18 January 2005 the Circuit Court upheld the judgment.\n(m)  The applicant company’s request to the Ministry of Finance dated 16 July 2004 156.  On 16 July 2004 the applicant company wrote a letter to the Ministry of Finance, applying for respite or payment in instalments in respect of the sums due. It appears that this letter remained unanswered. The Government submitted that the Ministry of Finance had not had any authority to respond to the request, as the issue of respite and payment in instalment lay within the competence of the courts. 157.  On 12 August 2004 the City Court examined the applicant company’s request to re-pay the 2000 Tax Assessment award in instalments and rejected it as unfounded. The court noted, among other things, that the tax debt had resulted from intentional tax evasion by the applicant company and that the conduct of the debtor in court and during the enforcement proceedings demonstrated that it did not intend to pay the debts voluntarily. 158.  It does not appear that the applicant company brought any appeal proceedings in respect of this judgment.\n(n)  The applicant company’s offer of 9 August 2004 159.  On 9 August 2004 the applicant company offered the bailiffs the 20% stake in Sibneft and shares in fifteen other subsidiary companies as a settlement for its debts, requesting that the bailiffs respond within one day. 160.  It appears that the bailiffs responded to the company’s offer on 9 September 2004. It does not appear that the company brought any court proceedings in respect of that response.\n(o)  The Ministry’s response of 22 September 2004 161.  It appears that on 22 September 2004 the Ministry responded to four of the applicant company’s letters about the settlement of the debt, rejecting the offers. 162.  It does not appear that the company brought any separate court proceedings in this respect.\n(p)  The applicant company’s announcement in respect of the shares in Sibneft 163.  On 8 October 2004 the applicant company announced that it would comply with the City Court’s judgment of 1 March 2004, which had cancelled the issue of additional shares in the applicant company, used for the purpose of acquiring Sibneft. The applicant company, acting in compliance with the court order, instructed the registrar to return its 57.5% stake in Sibneft to its former owners. 164.  On 23 March 2004 the Tax Ministry commenced tax inspection in respect of the applicant company’s activities in 2001. The inspection ended on 30 June 2004 and on 5 July 2004 the Ministry served the resultant report on the applicant company. 165.  On the basis of the above-mentioned report, by a decision of 2 September 2004 the Ministry issued a tax assessment for the year 2001 (“the 2001 Tax Assessment”), finding the company liable for having used essentially the same tax arrangement as in the previous year. The Tax Assessment 2001 relied on a similarly wide range of evidence as the Tax Assessment 2000, including the documentary evidence and detailed statements of those involved in the nominal ownership and running of the trading companies. This time the applicant company had to pay RUB 50,759,436,900 (approximately EUR 1,424,746,313) in tax arrears, RUB 28,520,204,254 (approximately EUR 800,522,195) in default interest and RUB 40,607,549,520 in penalties (approximately EUR 1,139,797,051). Since the applicant company had recently been found guilty of a similar offence, the penalty was doubled.\n(b)  The applicant company’s request for a court injunction 166.  On 14 September 2004 the applicant company lodged an appeal against the decision of 2 September 2004 and requested an injunction against the immediate enforcement of this decision. 167.  On 5 October 2004 the City Court turned down the request for an injunction and on 13 October 2004 it issued execution writs in respect of the Ministry’s decision of 2 September 2004. The court referred to Information Letter no. 83 of the Supreme Commercial Court of 13 August 2004, which recommended that requests for interim measures in such situations be granted only if an applicant could demonstrate some security for a creditor’s future claims. The court noted that, in the present case, the applicant company clearly had insufficient cash to satisfy the creditor’s claims, and had failed to produce any security, and dismissed the claims accordingly. 168.  The judgment of 5 October 2004 was upheld by the Appeal Court on 3 December 2004 and by the Circuit Court on 29 March 2005. 169.  As the 2001 Tax Assessment was similar to the 2000 Tax Assessment, the Ministry decided to enforce it directly in the part relating to additional taxes and interest surcharges, without taking the matter to the courts. The applicant company was to pay the amounts due by 4 September 2004. 170.  On 9 September 2004 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in connection with the decision of 2 September 2004. The company was to pay RUB 50,759,436,900 (approximately EUR 1,424,746,313) in tax arrears and RUB 28,520,204,254 (approximately EUR 800,522,195) in default interest. 171.  It appears that the 2001 Tax Assessment, in the part relating to additional taxes and interest surcharges, was upheld by the City Court on 11 October 2004. The judgment of 11 October 2004 was upheld on appeal on 16 February 2005. The Circuit Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts on 9 December 2005. 172.  The applicant company’s request for an injunction pending those proceedings was unsuccessful. The City Court dismissed it in its judgment of 5 October 2004. The refusal was upheld by the Appeal Court on 3 December 2004 and by the Circuit Court on 29 March 2005.\n(b)  Enforcement of penalties 173.  On 3 September 2004 the Ministry applied to the City Court to recover the penalties arising from the 2001 Tax Assessment. . 174.  It appears that on 11 October 2004 the action was examined and granted by the City Court. The judgment in the case was produced on 15 October 2004. 175.  According to the applicant company, its appeal against the judgment of 15[3] October 2004 was dismissed by the Appeal Court on 18 November 2004. It appears that the Circuit Court upheld these two decisions on 15 November 2005. 176.  On 19 November 2004 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the Tax Assessment 2001 in the part relating to penalties. The company was to pay RUB 39,113,140,826 in penalties (approximately EUR 1,097,851,399)[4].\n(c)  7% enforcement fee in respect of additional taxes and interest surcharges 177.  On 20 September 2004 the bailiffs decided to impose a 7% enforcement fee in respect of the applicant company’s failure to abide by the 2001 Tax Assessment in the part relating to taxes and interest surcharges. The applicant company was to pay RUB 5,549,574,880.78 (approximately EUR 155,693,193). 178.  The resolution was served on the applicant company on 1 October 2004. 179.  On 29 October 2004 the City Court examined and dismissed the challenge to the decision of 20 September 2004 as groundless. 180.  It does appear that the company pursued appeal proceedings. 181.  On 1 December 2004 the company appealed in cassation against the judgment of 29 October 2004. 182.  The appeal was dismissed by the Circuit Court on 3 March 2005.\n(d)   7% enforcement fee in respect of penalties 183.  On 9 December 2004 the bailiff decided to impose a 7% enforcement fee in respect the applicant company’s failure to abide by the 2001 Tax Assessment in the part relating to penalties. The company was to pay a 7% enforcement fee of RUB 7,102,488,295 or approximately EUR 190,077,377. 184.  On 23 December 2004 the company challenged this decision in court. 185.  On 3 February 2005 the City Court dismissed the action. 186.  The applicant company failed to appeal the judgment of 3 February 2005. 187.  The Circuit Court upheld the judgment of 3 February 2005 on 16 June 2005.\n(e)  Overall debt in respect of 2001 188.  Overall, in respect of 2001 the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 132,539,253,849.78 (approximately EUR 3,710,836,129). 189.  On 29 October 2004 the Ministry produced an audit report in respect of the applicant company’s activities for the year 2002. The report was received by the company on 1 November 2004. 190.  On 16 November 2004 the Ministry took a decision to levy further tax liabilities, this time in respect of the year 2002 (“the 2002 Tax Assessment”). The applicant company was to pay RUB 90,286,552,485 (approximately EUR 2,425,825,387) in taxes, RUB 31,485,110,355.58 (approximately EUR 845,944,140) in default interest and RUB 72,040,907,796 (approximately EUR 1,935,600,133) in penalties. 191.  The decision established the use of the same tax-evasion scheme (in respect of profit tax, VAT, corporate property tax and motorway users’ tax) as in the decisions concerning the years 2000 and 2001. It mentioned that the company had carried out its activities through OOO Ratmir, OOO Alta-Treid, ZAO Yukos-M, OOO Yu-Mordoviya, OOO Ratibor, OOO Petroleum treyding, OOO Evoyl, OOO Fargoyl, most of which had also been used by the applicant company in previous years. The entities in question, acting in breach of Article 575 of the Civil Code, which prohibits grants and gifts between independently functioning commercial entities, had transferred the entirety of their profits unilaterally to a fund owned and controlled by the applicant company. The decision mentioned that the transfers had been wrongly reflected in the applicant company’s financial accounting and that the company had failed to explain the origin of these funds and had failed to take these sums into account for tax purposes. Accordingly, the applicant company had failed to pay taxes in respect of these amounts. 192.  The decision referred to several other mistakes in the applicant company’s tax declarations. In particular, the tax in respect of the company’s securities transactions was wrongly calculated, there were many general mistakes in the company’s financial accounting, and there were some mistakes in the company’s request for reimbursement of the VAT on export operations (e.g. on one occasion the company failed to submit the required sales contract; it also mentioned one contract but received the money on the basis of a different contract; on some occasions the company failed to submit documents proving customs clearance, indicated wrongly calculated sums, and made multiple mistakes in VAT export documents). There were further multiple mistakes in tax deductions in respect of internal VAT. 193.  The decision also established that the applicant company had used sham entities to lower its group taxes, that the entities and the company’s subsidiaries had entered into transactions with reduced prices, that on some occasions the company had declared the extracted oil as “hydrocarbon liquid” in order to lower the applicable price even further, that there were no cash transactions between the entities and subsidiaries and that the company’s own promissory notes and mutual offsetting had been used instead and that the whole set-up, which had no economic purpose other than tax evasion, had resulted in massive tax evasion by the applicant company. The decision also noted that use of tax concessions in the Republic of Mordoviya and the Evenk Autonomous District by the sham entities had been unlawful, because they had failed to qualify for the exemptions and also because they had been sham companies. The decision was detailed in respect of the composition and all the activities of the sham entities: the Ministry analysed the entirety of their activities month by month. 194.  The applicant company had until 17 November 2004 to meet the debts voluntarily. 2.  Enforcement measures relating to the 2002 Tax Assessment\n(a)  Enforcement of additional taxes, interest surcharges and penalties 195.  By a decision of 18 November 2004 bailiffs proceeded to enforcement of the decision of 16 November 2004 in so far as it related to additional taxes and interest surcharges. 196.  The City Court joined the proceedings by which the applicant company tried to contest the decision of 16 November 2004 and on 23 December 2004 it examined and, in the most part, dismissed the applicant company’s appeals against the decision of 16 November 2004. The court declared the Ministry’s conclusions partly unfounded and reduced the company’s tax liability by RUB 325,628,742 (approximately EUR 8,752,543), its default interest payments by RUB 98,515,758 (approximately EUR 2,647,995) and the penalty by RUB 851,419,688 (approximately EUR 22,885,227). The court also ordered the applicant to pay the penalty in question. 197.  This decision was upheld by the Appeal Court on 5 March 2005 and the Circuit Court on 30 June 2005. 198.  On 28 December 2004 the applicant company also appealed against the Ministry’s decision in respect of the year 2002, in so far as it had ordered that the tax debts and default interest payments be collected directly. 199.  It appears that on 7 February 2005 the City Court examined and dismissed the claim as unfounded. The judgment was upheld on appeal on 4 April 2005. The Circuit Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts on 15 June 2005.\n(b)  7% enforcement fee in respect of additional taxes and interest surcharges 200.  On 9 December 2004 the bailiffs decided to impose a 7% enforcement fee in respect of the applicant company’s failure to comply voluntarily with the 2002 Tax Assessment in the part relating to additional taxes and surcharge interests. 201.  On 23 December 2004 the company appealed against this decision in court, initially claiming that the decision had been unlawful and asking to reduce the fee to 1%. The company then withdrew its claim in the part relating to the reduction of the fee. 202.  On 10 February 2005 the City Court judgment dismissed the appeal. 203.  It does not appear that the company brought any proceedings before the Appeal Court in respect of the judgment. 204.  The applicant company’s cassation appeal was examined and dismissed by the Circuit Court on 16 June 2005.\n(c)  Overall debt in respect of 2002 205.  Overall in respect of the year 2002 (excluding the 7% enforcement fee), the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 192,537,006,448.58 (approximately EUR 4,344,549,434).\n(d)  Written information report communicated by ZAO PricewaterhouseCoopers Audit to the applicant company’s management in respect of the year 2002 206.  In their observations of 15 April 2005 the Government submitted a copy of a report communicated to the applicant company’s management by its auditor ZAO PricewaterhouseCoopers Audit. The applicant company did not comment on the contents of the report. 207.  In contrast to “ordinary” audit reports, which were made public, the internal information report was produced exclusively for the applicant company’s management. 208.  The report noted specifically that the applicant company’s “Fund for Financial Support of the Production Development of OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya YUKOS” was in breach of the domestic law in that the relevant legislation disallowed unilateral transfers and gifts between commercial entities. It also noted that the applicant company’s accounting policy in respect of the operations involving promissory notes had been incompatible with the legislation in force and provided a distorted view of the company’s activities. 209.  In addition, on 15 June 2007 the applicant company’s auditor, ZAO PricewaterhouseCoopers Audit, disavowed its audit certifications in respect of the applicant company’s financial statements for the years 1995-2004 on account of the applicant company’s deliberate attempts to conceal its tax-evasion scheme, as well as its failure to disclose all relevant documents during the respective inspections conducted by the company’s auditors at the time. 210.  On 28 October 2004 the Tax Ministry commenced a tax inspection in respect of the year 2003, which resulted in an audit report that was dated 19 November 2004 and served on the applicant company on the same date. 211.  On the basis of the report, by a decision of 6 December 2004 the Ministry levied tax liabilities for the year 2003 (“the 2003 Tax Assessment”), consisting of RUB 86,228,187,852 (approximately EUR 2,327,114,103) in taxes, RUB 15,235,930,657.66 (approximately EUR 411,185,136) in default interest and RUB 68,939,326,976.40 (approximately EUR 1,860,524,778) in penalties. 212.  The decision established that the company was guilty of having evaded taxes (in particular, VAT, profit tax and advertising tax) by using the same arrangement as in previous years. The decision mentioned the following entities registered either in the Republic of Mordoviya or the Evenk Autonomous District: OOO Yu-Mordoviya, ZAO Yukos-M, OOO Alta-Treyd, OOO Ratmir, OOO Energotreyd, OOO Makro-Treyd, OOO Fargoyl, and OOO Evoyl. It was alleged that the entities were sham and that they had made unilateral transfers to the applicant company, in breach of Article 575 of the Civil Code, that the applicant company had failed to reflect the transferred amounts as its profits, to account for them and to pay taxes in this connection and that the company had used lowered prices to avoid the payment of taxes. The decision contained a detailed contract-by-contract analysis of the sham entities’ transactions. 213.  The decision also mentioned that some of the applicant company’s expenses were unjustifiably deducted from the company’s taxable income, that the company failed to account for some of its operations with promissory notes, that there were some mistakes in calculation of the VAT owed by the company and that the company had evaded payment of advertising tax in Moscow. 214.  The applicant company had one day to comply with the decision, that is, until 7 December 2004. 2.  Enforcement measures relating to the 2003 Tax Assessment\n(a)  Enforcement of additional taxes, interest surcharges and penalties 215.  On 9 December 2004 the bailiffs proceeded to enforcement of the decision of 6 December 2004 in so far as it related to taxes and interest surcharges. 216.  It appears that the City Court joined the proceedings by which the applicant company tried to contest the decision of 9 December 2004 and on 28 April 2005 it examined the company’s challenge. In respect of the company’s request to recalculate automatically the export VAT on operations conducted by the sham entities in the course of these proceedings, the court noted the request was unsubstantiated and also lodged out of time. In particular, the company had failed to submit a proper claim with monthly calculations and evidence that the goods in question had indeed been exported. The court also addressed the applicant company’s argument that Article 75 (3) of the Tax Code prevented the authorities from levying the interest surcharges. It noted that the provision in question only applied to cases in which the sole reason for the taxpayer’s inability to pay tax debts was the seizure of its assets and cash funds. On the facts, the applicant company was unable to pay because it had insufficient funds and not because its assets were frozen. The court concluded that the applicant company’s argument was unfounded. The court also reduced the amount of additional taxes to be paid to RUB 86,221,835,476.37 (EUR 2,399,884,085) and the amount of fines to RUB 68,918,264,491 (EUR 1,918,259,397). The amount of interest surcharges was reduced accordingly. The exact figure of the interest surcharges to be paid by the applicant is unclear. 217.  The judgment was upheld on appeal on 16 August 2005. 218.  The applicant company appealed on cassation. 219.  On 5 December 2005 the Circuit Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts. 220.  The bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the payment of fines on 4 October 2005.\n(b)  7% enforcement fee 221.  On 17 March 2006 the bailiffs decided to impose a 7% enforcement fee in respect of the applicant company’s failure to comply voluntarily with the 2003 Tax Assessment. The applicant company was to pay RUB 7,102,488,296 (EUR  211,872,906) in respect of the unpaid reassessed taxes and interest surcharges and RUB 4,824,278,304 (EUR  143,912,080) in respect of the unpaid fines.\n(c)  Overall debt in respect of the year 2003 222.  Overall, in respect of 2003 (excluding the 7% enforcement fee and the interest surcharges, the exact amount of which is unclear) the applicant company was ordered to pay RUB 155,140,099,967.37 (approximately EUR 4,318,143,482). 223.  On 20 July 2004 the Ministry of Justice announced the forthcoming evaluation and sale of OAO Yuganskneftegaz as a part of its ongoing enforcement procedures. 224.  On 22 July 2004 the applicant company announced that:\n“...the company management [is] currently making every effort to raise additional funds in order to repay, as soon as possible, the tax liability and to finance current operations. However, should those efforts prove unsuccessful and Yuganskneftegaz [be] sold, in the present circumstances, the management of the Company would be compelled to announce the bankruptcy of Russia’s largest oil company”. 225.  On 17 September 2004 the valuation commissioned by the bailiffs and the Ministry of Justice from Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, the investment branch of Dresdner Bank AG (working in Russia as ZAO Dresdner bank), for the purposes of the enforcement proceedings, estimated that 100% of shares in OAO Yuganskneftegas were worth between USD 15.7 and 18.3 billion (between EUR 15.2 and 17.7 billion), excluding the pending and probable tax liabilities of this entity. 226.  The report evaluated 100% of the price of OAO Yuganskneftegaz as a separate entity and, having deduced its corresponding obligations, calculated the cost of its shares, on the basis of which it would be possible to calculate the price of one share in OAO Yuganskneftegaz. 227.  It was specifically mentioned in the report that the valuation was not an opinion concerning the attainable price in the event of the sale of OAO Yuganskneftegaz or any kind of recommendation concerning the starting bid of the auction in the event of the sale of Yuganskneftegaz by the Ministry of Justice or any other State institution, or any recommendation concerning particular actions to be undertaken by the Ministry of Justice with a view to levying the judicially determined or estimated amount of the applicant company’s tax debt. 228.  Among the basic risks affecting the price of OAO Yuganskneftegaz, the report mentioned the tax claims, the validity of oil extraction licences, future oil prices, export quotas etc. The report also mentioned that the price of OAO Yuganskneftegaz as a part of the applicant company could be substantially different from the price of OAO Yuganskneftegaz as a separate entity. The report also mentioned various valuations of OAO Yuganskneftegaz made by third parties, including investment institutions and banks, and ranging from USD 9 to 22 billion (between EUR 7.4 to 18.1 billion). It also mentioned that, because of the size of OAO Yuganskneftegaz, not many buyers would be financially capable of acquiring it. 229.  The valuation (between USD 15.7 and 18.3 billion or EUR 15.2 and 17.7 billion) did not take account of already pending and probable tax claims against OAO Yuganskneftegaz. If and when lodged, these claims would “substantially influence the assessment” of the equity of OAO Yuganskneftegaz. The claims already announced (as on that date) were USD 951.3 million. 230.  In carrying out the valuation, the report used the following three methods: the method of discounted cash flows, a method based on the analysis of comparable transactions, and a method based on the analysis of comparable publicly-held companies. 231.  The report also specifically noted that:\n“...the decision concerning the starting bid of the auction is a tactical one and should strike a balance between the desire to reach the highest price on the one hand, and the need to attract the maximum number of potential buyers on the other. Because of this, the starting bid is most likely to be different from the assessment of the price.” 232.  A copy of the valuation report was served on the applicant company on 13 October 2004. 233.  It does not appear that the applicant company contested the report’s valuations report before the courts. 234.  On 21 October 2004 the bailiffs confirmed to the Ministry that they had collected 79,584,690,127 RUB (approximately EUR 2,183,447,331). 235.  On 4 November 2004 the applicant company responded to the valuation report. It disagreed with the decision to evaluate and sell OAO Yuganskneftegaz, and would have preferred to sell its other assets first. The applicant company informed the bailiffs that it had already honoured a major part of the debt (apparently referring to its tax liability for the year 2000 only) and that the remaining sum was USD 2.5 billion (around EUR  2  billion). The company claimed that it would be more reasonable to lift the seizure and let it dispose of its minor assets in order to honour the remaining debt. 236.  As regards OAO Yuganskneftegas, the company referred to independent valuations by JP Morgan PLC, valuing the subsidiary at “no less than USD 14 billion (some EUR 11 billion)” and “between USD 16.1 billion (EUR 12.6 billion) and USD 22.1 billion (EUR 17.378 billion), including tax liabilities” respectively. 237.  The letter mentioned that the Ministry had brought tax claims against OAO Yuganskneftegaz totalling USD 2.903 billion. 238.  On 18 November 2004 the bailiffs noted that the applicant company’s debt to the Ministry on that date was RUB 204,902,386,620 (approximately EUR 5,506,781,584 or USD 7,147,250,717). Having referred to sections 4, 46 (6), 54 (2) and 88 of the Enforcement Proceedings Act, the bailiffs decided to sell 76.79 % of the shares in OAO Yuganskneftegas at an auction which would take place on 19 December 2004. The published minimum bidding price for 76.79 % of the shares in OAO Yuganskneftegas was RUB 246,753,447,303.18 (approximately USD 8.65 billion or EUR 6.63 billion). 239.  The sale was entrusted to the Russian Fund of Federal Property (“the Property Fund”), a specialised State Institution in charge of organising sales of federal property and the property of those who had debts towards the State. 240.  On the same date, the Property Fund issued a regulation setting out the parameters and rules that would govern the auction, including the number of shares to be sold (43 ordinary shares representing 76.79% of the capital of OAO Yuganskneftegaz), the starting price (RUB 248.6 billion or some USD 8.85 billion), the date and place of the auction (19 December 2004), the eligibility requirements for bidders (the auction was open to all perspective bidders, including foreign individuals and legal entities), which included a cash deposit of RUB 49.4 billion (USD 1.7 billion, or 20% of the starting price), to be paid no later than the day before the auction. 241.  The decision of 18 November 2004 was challenged in court on 26 November 2004. 242.  It appears that on 3 December 2004 the City Court dismissed the appeal against the decision of 18 November 2004. 243.  On 21 January and 3 May 2005 that judgment was upheld on appeal and in cassation respectively. 244.  The applicant company argued that the valuation report had failed to give a market valuation of the asset and that the decision of 18 November 2004 failed to mention a specific price for OAO Yuganskneftegaz. In response, the courts noted that 43 ordinary and 13 privileged shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz had been seized by the bailiffs in satisfaction of the applicant company’s liability, that the shares had been valued by ZAO Dresdner Bank and that the applicant company had been informed of all of the bailiffs’ actions in the course of the enforcement proceedings. They also noted that the seizure of shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz had previously been declared lawful, that the applicant company had been properly notified of all of the steps taken by the bailiffs in the course of the enforcement proceedings and could bring court proceedings against them, that the valuation by ZAO Dresdner Bank had not been contested by the applicant in accordance with the special procedure provided for by the legislation in force, and that the bailiffs had properly indicated the amount of the applicant company’s debt and requested the Fund to sell the amount of shares necessary to satisfy the debt. 245.  In the meantime, on 19 November 2004, the Russian Gazette, an official Government newspaper, published an announcement about the sale of 76.79% of shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz at a public auction organised by the Property Fund. The only two conditions for participating in the auction were to file an application between 19 November and 18 December 2004 and to make a deposit payment. 246.  On 10 December 2004 OOO Gazpromneft, ZAO Intercom and OAO First Venture Company filed applications with the Federal Antimonopoly Service and thus were expected to bid at the auction. 247.  The media reported that OAO Gazprom, a parent company of OOO Gazpromneft, had begun negotiating a financing arrangement with a consortium of international banks to finance its bid at the auction. It was also reported that a number of non-Russian companies, such as ENI, Chevron Texaco, China National Petroleum Corporation and E.ON, had expressed interest in participating in the auction. 248.  On 17 December 2004 the bailiffs noted that the applicant company’s consolidated debt on that date, regard being had also to the 2001 Tax Assessment, was RUB 344,222,156,424.22 (EUR 9,210,844,560.93, or USD 12,365,545,256.86). 7.  The applicant company’s application for bankruptcy in the United States of America and its request for injunctive relief\n(a)  Filing of bankruptcy petition and request for injunctive relief 249.  On 14 December 2004 the applicant company filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division (“the U.S. Bankruptcy Court”). 250.  Simultaneously, the applicant company filed a request for injunctive relief, pursuant to section 105 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in order, among other things, to enforce the automatic stay set out in section 362 (a) of the Bankruptcy Code by enjoining certain parties from participating in the Yuganskneftegaz Auction. The request was directed specifically against “... defendants the Russian Federation, OOO Gazpromneft, ZAO Intercom, OAO First Venture Company, ABN Amro, BNP Paribas, Calyon, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan and Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein ...”.\n(b)  Scope of automatic stay 251.  Under U.S. law, an automatic stay went into immediate effect when the applicant company filed for bankruptcy. The automatic stay protected the company’s assets by preventing the creditors from collecting claims that arose prior to the bankruptcy filing or from taking “possession” or “control” of the applicant company’s property covered under the filing.\n(c)  Temporary restraining order of 16 December 2004 252.  On 16 December 2004, having examined the applicant company’s request, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court issued a temporary restraining order barring certain specific entities from taking any actions with respect to the shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz, including participation in the auction. Among other things, Judge Letitia Z. Clark stated the following:\n“... The court is mindful of the need for deference to the judicial determination of another jurisdiction. This is ... of exceptional importance when it involves that of agencies of another sovereign state. However, in the instant case, the [applicant company] has made a showing that it needs a short additional time to hold its shareholder meeting scheduled for December 20, 2004 and may elect to file for bankruptcy under Russian law in order to proceed with a more orderly adjustment of its assets and debts in accordance with Russian law or to continue to seek international arbitration ...”. 253.  The entities mentioned in the order were (a) the three companies registered to bid at the Auction, including OOO Gazpromneft, ZAO Intercom and OAO First Venture Company, (b) six western financial institutions that had announced their intention to fund OOO Gazpromneft’s bid at the auction (ABN Amro, BNP Paribas, Calyon, Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan and Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein) and (c) those persons in active concert or participation with them.\n(d)  Outcome of the bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. 254.  On 24 February 2005 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court dismissed the applicant company’s petition for bankruptcy with reference to section 1112 (b) of U.S. Bankruptcy Code which gave the court discretion to dismiss a case “in the best interest of the creditors and the estate”. 255.  The court noted that most of the applicant company’s assets were oil and gas within Russia, so that the court’s ability to carry out a re-organisation without the cooperation of the Russian government was extremely limited, that the applicant company sought to substitute U.S. law in place of Russian, European Convention and/or international law, that the applicant company had commenced proceedings in other fora, including the European Court of Human Rights, and the court did not feel that it was uniquely qualified or more able that these other fora to consider the issues presented. Lastly, the court noted that the vast majority of the business and financial activities of the applicant company continued to occur in Russia and that the applicant company was one of the largest producers of petroleum products in Russia. The court held that “the sheer size of [the applicant company] and its impact on the entirety of the Russian economy weighs heavily in favour of allowing resolution in a forum in which participation of the Russian government is assured”. 256.  On 19 December 2004 the Property Fund auctioned 76.79% of the shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz. It appears that media reporters were able to attend the auction. 257.  There were two participants in the auction, OOO Baykalfinansgrup and OOO Gazpromneft. OOO Baykalfinansgrup, the only bidder in the auction, made two bids, first of USD 8.65 billion and then of RUB 260,753,447,303.18 (USD 9.4 billion or EUR 7.05 billion). It appears that whilst taking part in the auction OOO Gazpromneft was prevented from bidding by the injunction of 16 December 2004 (see paragraph 253 above). 258.  On 21 December 2004 the Ministry of Justice issued a report accepting that the Property Fund had properly carried out the services due under the contract of 18 November 2004. 259.  On 21 December 2004 the Property Fund publicly reported the sale of the shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz. 260.  On 31 December 2004 the bailiffs issued a resolution confirming the results of the auction. The resolution stated that OOO Baykalfinansgrup had won the auction for 43 shares in OAO Yuganskneftegaz (76.79% of its stock) for RUB 260,753,447,303.18 (approximately EUR 6,896,341,940 or USD  9,396,960,842). By the time that resolution was issued, the money had already been transferred to the bailiffs. 261.  According to press reports of 31 December 2004, OAO Rosneft, a State-owned oil company, acquired OOO Baykalfinansgrup and thus took control of OAO Yuganskneftegas. 262.  In its consolidated financial statements 2003-2005, dated 15 May 2005,OAO Rosneft declared:\n“... In late December 2004 [OAO Rosneft] acquired a 100% interest in [OOO Baykalfinansgrup], which a few days earlier had won an auction for the sale of a 76.79% interest in [OAO Yuganskneftegaz], which represents 100% of the common shares of [OAO Yuganskneftegaz]. ...” 263.  It appears that on 26 May 2005 the applicant company filed an action in the City Court against the Property Fund, OOO Baykalfinansgrup, OAO Rosneft, OOO Gazpromneft, OAO Gazprom and the Ministry of Justice, seeking to annul the auctioning of 43 shares in OAO Yuganskneftegas and the deed of sale. It also claimed damages in excess of RUB 324 billion. 264.  The action was examined and dismissed by the City Court on 28 February 2007. The court decided that both the Ministry of Justice and the Property Fund[5] had acted within their statutory powers, that the auction procedure had been fully complied with and that the applicant company’s allegation about the auction participants acting in concert had been unsupported by any evidence. 265.  The judgment was upheld by the Appeal Court on 30 May and by the Circuit Court on 12 October 2007. 266.  On 27 January 2005 the applicant company also initiated parallel proceedings against OAO Rosneft, OOO Baykalfinansgrup, Deutsche Bank AG, Deutsche Bank AG London, Deutsche Bank Luxembourg S.A., Deutsche Bank Trust Company Americas and the Russian Federation before the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for violation of the automatic stay. 267.  The applicant company voluntarily withdrew the entire proceedings on 28 March 2005, after its bankruptcy petition was dismissed by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. 268.  It does not appear that any enforcement measures took place in respect of the applicant company after the auctioning of OAO Yuganskneftegaz until September 2005. 269.  On 8 September 2005 a consortium of foreign banks represented by the French bank Société Générale (“the banks”) filed an application with the City Court for recognition and enforcement of an English High Court judgment ordering the applicant company to re-pay the contractual debt of USD 482 million (around EUR 385 million), resulting from the applicant company’s default under a USD 1 billion loan agreement dated 24 September 2003. 270.  On 22 September 2005, at the banks’ request, the bailiffs again attached the applicant company’s property. 271.  In October 2005 the applicant company challenged this order. 272.  On 30 November 2005 the City Court dismissed the appeal as groundless. 273.  The first-instance judgment was upheld by the Appeal Court and by the Circuit Court on 27 February and 12 May 2006 respectively. 274.  In the meantime, on 28 September 2005, the City Court allowed recognition and enforcement of the English High Court judgment. 275.  On 5 December 2005 the Circuit Court granted the applicant company’s cassation appeal and quashed the judgment of 28 September 2005. It remitted the case for a fresh hearing. 276.  On 21 December 2005, having re-examined the case, the City Court allowed the banks’ claims. 277.  On 25 January 2006 the applicant company appealed against the judgment of 21 December 2005. 278.  On 2 March 2006 the Circuit Court dismissed the appeal. 279.  It appears that on 13 December 2005 the banks reached an agreement with the Rosneft company to sell to the latter the applicant company’s debt to the banks. 280.  On 6 March 2006 the banks lodged a petition with the City Court to declare the applicant company bankrupt. 281.  On 9 March 2006 bankruptcy proceedings were initiated against the applicant company upon the banks’ petition. It appears that the Ministry decided to join the proceedings as one of the bankruptcy creditors in respect of remaining tax debts of the 2000-2003 Tax Assessments still owed by the applicant company. 282.  On 14 March 2006 the banks notified the City Court about the decision to sell the debts owed by the applicant company to Rosneft. 283.  On 29 March 2006 the City Court substituted Rosneft in the place of the banks as a bankruptcy creditor. By the same decision the court imposed a supervision order on the applicant company and appointed Mr Eduard Rebgun as the applicant company’s interim receiver. It also prohibited the company’s management from disposing of any of its property exceeding RUB 30 million in value. 284.  On 6 and 7 April 2006 the applicant company appealed against the decision of 29 March 2006 on all three points. 285.  On 27 April 2006 the Appeal Court dismissed the appeals. 286.  On 21 June 2006 the applicant company appealed against the lower courts’ decisions to the Circuit Court. The outcome of these proceedings is unclear. 287.  On 21 April 2006 the Ministry submitted a claim to the City Court, seeking to be included in the list of the applicant company’s creditors for the amount of 353,766,625,235.66 RUB (approximately EUR 10,435,809,153), along with 2,118 pages of documentation. The claim was based on the company’s reassessed tax liability for the year 2004. 288.  In June 2006 the City Court made a number of rulings concerning the formation of the list of creditors. In particular, on 1 and 7 June 2006 the City Court held hearings on the claim. On 14 June 2006 the final hearing of the claim was held. The court allowed the claims in its entirety and dismissed the application for stay. 289.  On 21 June 2006 the City Court delivered a full version of the judgment of 14 June 2006. It decided to include the Ministry in the list of the applicant company’s creditors for the amount claimed and refused to stay the proceedings. 290.  On 3 and 6 July the applicant company appealed against the judgment of 14 June 2006 concerning the allowed claims. 291.  On 4, 7 and 11 August 2006 the Appeal Court heard the applicant company’s arguments. 292.  On the latter date the Appeal Court dismissed the applicant company’s appeal. 293.  It appears that on 18 August 2006 the Appeal Court delivered a full version of the appeal decision. 294.  On 25 July 2006 the Committee of Creditors rejected the rehabilitation plan offered by the management and recommended the applicant company’s liquidation. 295.  On 31 July 2006 the applicant company appealed against this decision. 296.  On 4 August 2006 the City Court examined the applicant company’s situation, declared that the company was bankrupt and dismissed its management. The court appointed Mr E. Rebgun as the applicant company’s trustee. It also refused the company’s request to stay the proceedings. 297.  Both parties appealed on 15 August 2006 298.  The judgment was upheld on appeal and entered into force on 26 September 2006. 299.  It appears that on 22 August 2006 Mr E. Rebgun, acting as the trustee in the company’s bankruptcy proceedings, revoked the authority of all counsel appointed by the applicant company’s previous management, including Mr P. Gardner. 300.  On 23 October 2006 Mr E. Rebgun appointed a consortium of independent appraisers led by ZAO Roseko (“the consortium”), selected through an open tender, to inventory and evaluate the applicant company’s assets with a view to auctioning them. 301.  The consortium carried out its evaluation from October 2006 to July 2007. 302.  From 27 March to 15 August 2007 Mr E. Rebgun held 17 public auctions at which all of the applicant company’s assets were sold in line with the evaluations which had been made earlier by the consortium. The aggregate proceeds amounted to over RUB 860 billion (around USD 33.3 billion). The assets sold included a 20% stake in OAO Sibneft (sold, along with 12 fully owned subsidiaries, blocks of shares in 5 more entities and some exchange notes, for RUB 151.536 billion, or some EUR 4.387 billion), 9.44% of shares of OAO Rosneft (sold, along with 12 exchange notes of OAO Yuganskneftegaz, for RUB 197.840 billion, or some EUR 5.728 billion) and scores of the company’s subsidiary companies. 303.  By a decision of 12 November 2007, the full version of which was produced on 15 November, the City Court examined the applicant company’s situation, heard the report by Mr E. Rebgun and decided to terminate the liquidation proceedings. The applicant company ceased to exist, leaving over RUB 227.1 billion (around USD 9.2 billion) in unsatisfied liabilities. 304.  On 21 November 2007 a certificate was issued to the effect that the applicant company had been liquidated on the basis of the court decision. 305.  It appears that a company Glendale Group Limited and Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. contested the decision of 12 November 2007 before the Appeal Court. The appeal of Glendale Group was declared inadmissible for the failure to submit it on time, whilst the appeal of Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. has been accepted for examination. The hearing in this respect was scheduled by the Appeal Court on 19 November 2007. 306.  The outcome of these proceedings remains unclear.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1987, 1992 and 1968 respectively. They all live in Kraków. 6.  On an unspecified date in 1988 the first applicant, represented by the third applicant, filed with the Kraków Regional Court an application under the New York Convention of 20 June 1956 on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (“the New York Convention”) for the recovery of maintenance from his father, P.M., a Greek national. The first applicant requested that the Greek authorities institute court proceedings with the aim of recovering the maintenance and enforce any decision that might be given by the Greek courts. 7.  On 23 March 1988 the Kraków Regional Court, acting as the Transmitting Agency under the New York Convention, transmitted the application to the Greek Ministry of Justice (“the Greek Ministry”), which acted as the Receiving Agency. 8.  On 13 July 1988 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that the debtor had been summoned but had failed to appear, and that the case had been referred to the Law Department of the Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace for further action. 9.  On 5 August 1989 the Kraków Regional Court wrote to the Greek Ministry requesting information about the progress in the recovery of the maintenance. It appears that in reply the Greek Ministry resent its letter of 13 July 1988. 10.  On 22 January 1990, in response to the query from the Kraków Regional Court, the third applicant informed the court that the first applicant had not received any maintenance payments from the debtor. 11.  On 29 January 1990 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the case. The Ministry requested the assistance of the Polish Embassy in Athens. 12.  On 3 September 1990 the third applicant and P.M. signed an agreement stipulating that P.M. would pay 10,000 Greek drachmas (29.35 EUR) in maintenance to the first applicant monthly for a period of two years. 13.  On 1 October 1990 the third applicant again informed the Kraków Regional Court that she had not received any maintenance payments from the debtor. 14.  On 2 November 1990, upon a request filed by the first applicant, the Kraków Regional Court once again requested the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to intervene in the proceedings. 15.  On 19 December 1990 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that the third applicant had hired a Greek lawyer to act in the divorce and maintenance proceedings. In the lawyer’s opinion, there were good prospects of reaching a friendly settlement in the case. Consequently, the Greek Ministry considered that its intervention at that point was not required. However, it would continue to monitor the situation and inform the Kraków Regional Court of any further developments. The applicant contested the Greek Government’s assertion that she had hired a Greek lawyer. 16.  On 19 November 1992 P.M. acknowledged before a notary his intention to pay 10,000 Greek drachmas in monthly maintenance to the first applicant until he reached the age of 18. He also promised to pay 260,000 drachmas (763.02 EUR) for the period up to 31 December 1992. The monthly maintenance payments were to be deposited on an account at the National Bank of Greece. This notarial deed was declared enforceable. 17.  On 17 February 1993 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that P.M. had acknowledged his obligation to pay maintenance to the first applicant. It requested the Kraków Regional Court to provide it with several additional documents, including the first applicant’s birth certificate and a certificate of his residence, in order for it to proceed with the transfer of the maintenance to Poland. 18.  On 15 November 1993 the Kraków Regional Court sent the requested documents to the Greek Ministry. 19.  The Greek Ministry transmitted the requested documents to the Law Department of the Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace on 1 December 1993. On 24 November 1994 that authority informed the Greek Ministry that the debtor had deposited 260,000 drachmas on a bank account on 23 November 1992. On the same date the said authority requested the debtor to inform it whether he had made any further payments to the account. The debtor replied that he had been making agreed monthly payments to the account and produced documentary evidence to this effect. 20.  In the course of divorce proceedings instituted by the third applicant against P.M., on 7 March 1994 the Kraków-Śródmieście District Court delivered an interim order awarding maintenance payments by P.M. to the first applicant. The court noted that P.M.’s place of residence was unknown. On 5 January 1995 the court increased the amount of maintenance payments. 21.  On 19 July and 28 September 1994 the Kraków Regional Court wrote to the Greek Ministry requesting it to provide information about the progress of the proceedings. It appears that no reply was received to these letters. On 13 May 1996 the Kraków Regional Court sent another request for information. It noted that on 2 February 1995 the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance had issued a divorce decree in default, dissolving the third applicant’s marriage to P.M. 22.  On 11 July 1996 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that the first applicant had received a payment of 540,000 drachmas (1,584.74 EUR) in March 1995. According to the agreement between the parties, this amount was supposed to cover the maintenance due for the period from 1 October 1990 to 31 March 1995. 23.  On 19 September 1996 the Kraków Regional Court informed the third applicant about the letter of 11 July 1996 and requested her to submit comments. On 31 December 1996 the third applicant informed the court that the amount of 540,000 drachmas covered only the period between 1987 and 1990 and that she intended to lodge a claim for non-received maintenance from 1987 to 1996. 24.  On 17 June 1997 the Kraków-Śródmieście District Court gave a judgment in default, increasing the amount of the maintenance payments to be made to the first applicant by P.M. 25.  On 5 May 1998 the Kraków Regional Court again requested assistance from the Greek Ministry. The court informed the Greek Ministry of the debtor’s single payment made in March 1995. The court also informed the Greek Ministry that three judgments in default had so far been given in Poland ordering P.M. to pay maintenance, and that on the basis of those judgments the first applicant had been able to receive substitute maintenance from the “Maintenance Fund” (Fundusz Alimentacyjny). In case of the lack of reaction from the debtor, the third applicant would have to request the enforcement of the Polish judgments in Greece on the basis of the bilateral agreement. No reply was received from the Greek authorities to that letter. 26.  On 25 June 1999 the Kraków Regional Court informed the third applicant that in order to recover the maintenance due to the first applicant it was necessary for her to file a request with the Kraków District Court for the recognition and the enforcement in Greece of the Polish judgments awarding the maintenance, on the basis of the Agreement of 24 October 1979 between the Polish People’s Republic and the Hellenic Republic on legal cooperation in civil and criminal matters (“the 1979 Agreement”). The first applicant filed such a request on 6 July 1999. 27.  On 16 November 1999 the Kraków Regional Court requested the assistance of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 28.  On 18 April 2000 the Polish Ministry of Justice requested the Greek Ministry to assist the first applicant in obtaining the recognition and enforcement in Greece of the Kraków-Śródmieście District Court’s judgment in default of 17 June 1997. 29.  By a letter of 17 July 2000, the Greek Ministry informed the Polish Ministry of Justice that it refused to proceed with the request for the recognition and enforcement of the Polish judgment in question. The Greek Ministry explained that the request could not be allowed due to Article 26 (d) of the 1979 Agreement. This provision stipulated that a request for recognition and enforcement could be refused in Greece if the Greek courts had the sole jurisdiction to examine the matter. Consequently, the Greek Ministry returned the request, along with the entire case file, to the Polish Ministry of Justice. 30.  On 22 March 2001 the Kraków Regional Court wrote to the Greek Ministry noting the Greek Ministry’s position expressed in its earlier letter and requesting it to urgently proceed with the recovery of the maintenance due to the first applicant in accordance with the New York Convention. 31.  On 9 May 2001 the Greek Ministry responded by reasserting the position expressed in its letter of 17 July 2000 and confirming that the entire case file had been returned to the Polish Ministry of Justice on 17 July 2000. 32.  On 15 October 2001 the Kraków-Śródmieście District Court gave another judgment in default increasing the amount of the maintenance payments to the first applicant. 33.  On 14 February 2002 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Greek Ministry of Justice to provide it with information as to the progress of the proceedings and as to the prospects of a successful recovery of maintenance. On 2 July 2002 the Greek Ministry replied by re-sending their letter of 9 May 2001. 34.  On 2 August 2002 the Kraków Regional Court requested the International Law Department of the Polish Ministry of Justice (“the International Law Department”) to provide it with legal advice as to the further steps necessary to recover the maintenance due to the first applicant. 35.  On 25 October 2002 the International Law Department advised the Kraków Regional Court to file a new request with the Greek authorities under the New York Convention. It observed that the prospects of a successful recovery of the maintenance on the basis of the request filed in 1988 were poor, given the lack of a proper response from the Greek authorities. It further informed the Kraków Regional Court that there appeared to be no obstacles to the first applicant requesting the recognition and enforcement of the Kraków District Court’s judgment given on 15 October 2001 directly before Greek courts, on the basis of the Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“the Lugano Convention”) provided that the conditions specified in that convention had been fulfilled. 36.  On 6 January 2004 the Kraków-Podgórze District Court delivered yet another judgment in default, again increasing the amount of the maintenance due to the first applicant. 37.  On 11 August 2004 the Kraków Regional Court sent to the Greek authorities a new request filed by the first applicant under the New York Convention, asking the Greek authorities to recover maintenance in respect of the period from April 1994 onwards. In the same letter, the Kraków Regional Court also requested the Greek authorities to recognise and enforce the Polish judgment of 6 January 2004 under the Lugano Convention. 38.  On 10 November 2004 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that its request for the recovery of maintenance under the New York Convention could not be accepted, because under Article 6 (3) of that convention only Greek private international law was applicable. Consequently, the Polish court which had given the judgment awarding maintenance to the first applicant had had no jurisdiction to do so since at the time of filing the action the debtor had had his permanent residence in Greece. The Greek Ministry returned the entire request together with all attachments. 39.  On 6 December 2004 the Kraków Regional Court requested the International Law Department to provide it with a legal opinion as to the correctness of the Greek Ministry’s position. 40.  On 7 January 2005 the International Law Department stated that the position of the Greek Ministry was incorrect and that the Lugano Convention, which was binding on both Poland and Greece, did not allow Greece to invoke the sole jurisdiction of the Greek courts as an obstacle to the recognition and enforcement of Polish judgments. It noted that the Lugano Convention replaced the 1979 Agreement. The International Law Department further noted that it would perhaps be quicker for the first applicant to send a request for recognition and enforcement under the Lugano Convention directly to the competent court in Thessaloniki. Alternatively, it advised the Kraków Regional Court to resubmit its request to the Greek Ministry of Justice. 41.  On 6 May 2005 the Kraków Regional Court sent another request for the recognition and enforcement in Greece of the judgment of the Kraków-Podgórze District Court of 6 January 2004 on the basis of the Lugano Convention. In the same letter, it reminded the Greek Ministry about the request lodged under the New York Convention and requested the recovery of the maintenance due from the date of the first request filed in 1988. No reply to that request was received. Enquiries with the Polish postal service revealed that the letter had been served on the Greek Ministry on 21 June 2005. 42.  Meanwhile, on 23 August 2005 the Greek Ministry sent the first applicant’s file to the State Legal Council in order for them to proceed with the enforcement of the Kraków-Podgórze District Court’s judgment of 6 January 2004. On 1 September 2005 the State Legal Council transmitted the case to the Law Department of the Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace. 43.  On 22 December 2005 the Kraków Regional Court again sent a letter to the Greek Ministry of Justice. No reply to that letter was received. 44.  On 1 March 2006 the President of the Kraków Regional Court requested the Polish Embassy in Athens to intervene in the case. 45.  On 5 June 2006 the Greek Ministry asked the Kraków Regional Court for a certificate proving that P.M. had been informed of the request which had commenced the proceedings terminated by the judgment of 6 January 2004. Such a certificate was necessary to start recognition and enforcement proceedings on the basis of the Lugano Convention. 46.  On 16 August 2006 the Kraków Regional Court forwarded the requested documents to the Greek Ministry. 47.  On various dates in 2007, at the request of the third applicant, the Kraków Regional Court attested that she had not received any maintenance payments due to the first applicant. The third applicant needed the confirmation to receive substitute maintenance. 48.  On 26 January 2007 the Greek authorities lodged a request for the recognition and enforcement of the judgment of 6 January 2004 with the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance. The first hearing, scheduled for 24 April 2007, was adjourned until 18 September 2007. 49.  On 23 April 2007 the Kraków Regional Court asked the Greek Ministry to provide it with further information as to the progress of the proceedings. On 26 July 2007 the Greek Ministry replied that the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance would examine the case on 18 September 2007. 50.  The hearing set for 18 September 2007 was adjourned owing to elections. Upon a request from the Greek authorities a further hearing was scheduled for 14 December 2007. It was then postponed on account of the friendly-settlement negotiations between the parties. 51.  On 28 November 2007 the Kraków Regional Court asked the Greek Ministry to inform it of the results of the court hearing. 52.  On 9 May 2008 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that on 21 March 2008 the third applicant had reached an agreement with P.M. Under the terms of that agreement P.M. was to pay 9,700 euros to the first applicant as a final settlement of the sums of maintenance awarded by the Polish court up to 18 August 2005. The third applicant declared that she would withdraw her request to enforce the judgment of 6 January 2004. 53.  On 8 June 2008 the third applicant declared that P.M. had paid his debts up to 2005 but had not made any payments for the period between 2005 and 2008, and that he was not paying the current instalments. 54.  On 14 September 2008 the third applicant declared that P.M. had paid part of his debt for the period between 2005 and 2008 (EUR 3,000) but he had not paid the interest. 55.  On 16 January 2009 the third applicant informed the Kraków Regional Court that the case could be closed. On 12 February 2009 the case was closed by the Kraków Regional Court. The latter court informed the Greek Ministry that the recovery proceedings under the New York Convention were terminated. 56.  On 29 August 2007 the first applicant filed a complaint under the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints concerning a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”). He alleged that the length of the proceedings for the recovery of maintenance instituted in 1988 on his behalf by his mother on the basis of the New York Convention had been excessive. He also claimed compensation in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). The applicant explained that he had not been able to recover any maintenance from his father, despite the fact that several judgments awarding maintenance had been handed down in Poland and despite the Kraków Regional Court’s repeated attempts to intervene with the Greek authorities. 57.  On 9 October 2007 the Kraków Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s complaint. It recalled that a mere reference to the overall duration of the proceedings did not suffice for a conclusion that their length had been excessive and that the applicant had failed to sufficiently specify the omissions or delays attributable to the lower court. It further observed that, in any event, the Regional Court’s role as the Transmitting Agency in the impugned proceedings under the New York Convention had been limited solely to carrying out technical and organisational tasks, which the Regional Court had duly done. 58.  On 6 January 2004 Y.M., a Greek national, was declared the father of the second applicant by the Kraków-Podgórze District Court. He was further ordered to pay monthly maintenance in the amount of PLN 900. 59.  On 26 April 2005 the second applicant, represented by his mother, filed with the Kraków Regional Court a request for the recovery of maintenance from Y.M. under the New York Convention. He requested that the Greek authorities secure a friendly settlement of the case or, alternatively, institute court proceedings with the aim of recovering the maintenance and enforce any judgment that might be given in this connection by the Greek courts. 60.  By a letter of 12 May 2005 the Kraków Regional Court asked the applicant to rectify her request, in particular by attaching the required documents. 61.  On 7 June 2005 the Kraków Regional Court, acting as the Transmitting Agency under the New York Convention, transferred the second applicant’s request to the Greek Ministry, acting as the Receiving Agency. 62.  On 10 November 2005 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Greek Ministry to confirm reception of the application filed by the second applicant. It appears that there was no response to that request. Enquiries with the Polish postal service revealed that the request had been served on the Greek Ministry on 28 July 2005. 63.  On 10 November 2005 the Kraków Regional Court issued a certificate for the third applicant attesting that she had not received any maintenance payments due to the second applicant. The certificate was necessary to claim substitute maintenance from the Maintenance Fund. 64.  On 1 March 2006 the Kraków Regional Court requested the assistance of the Polish Embassy in Athens. In reply, on 17 May 2006 the Polish Embassy informed the Kraków Regional Court that the Greek Ministry had instituted proceedings for the recovery of the maintenance due to the second applicant. The Embassy further informed the court that a hearing before the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance, initially scheduled for 24 March 2006, had been rescheduled for 26 May 2006. 65.  On 28 August 2006 and 23 April 2007 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Greek Ministry to inform it of the outcome of the hearing before the Thessaloniki court. 66.  On 22 January and 23 April 2007 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Polish Embassy in Athens to enquire with the Greek authorities about the progress of the proceedings. 67.  On 18 September 2007 the Kraków Regional Court sent the file concerning the second applicant’s case to the International Law Department, requesting its assistance. 68.  On 16 November 2007 the International Law Department sent the case file back to the Kraków Regional Court, informing it that the second applicant should address the Greek authorities directly with a request to be provided with a copy of the decision that had apparently been given in his case by the Greek court. On 29 November 2007 the Kraków Regional Court forwarded the International Law Department’s letter to the third applicant. 69.  On 4 April 2008 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Greek Ministry to inform it about any further steps taken with a view to recovering the maintenance. It sent again a copy of the original request for the recovery of maintenance from Y.M. and requested the Greek Ministry’s assistance as Y.M. had not been paying maintenance due to the second applicant since 1995. On the same day, the Kraków Regional Court requested the Polish Embassy in Athens to intervene in the case. 70.  On 20 May 2008 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that they had already sent to it the judgment of the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance of 23 April 2007 (see paragraph 97 below). They also requested the Kraków Regional Court to provide them with additional information as to the defendant’s property, with a view to the enforcement of the judgment in Greece. The Kraków Regional Court replied to the Greek Ministry that the judgment of the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance given on 23 April 2007 in the third applicant’s case did not concern any maintenance payments in respect of the second applicant. Consequently, it requested the Greek Ministry to proceed with the recovery of the maintenance owed by Y.M. to the second applicant. 71.  In its response of 26 June 2008, the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that the Polish judgment ordering Y.M. to pay maintenance to the second applicant was a judgment in default given in Y.M.’s absence. Consequently, the Greek Ministry requested the Kraków Regional Court to provide it with documents proving that Y.M.’s rights as a defendant in the proceedings before the Polish courts had been respected, as required by Article 23 (b) of the 1979 Agreement. On 4 July 2008 the Kraków Regional Court forwarded the requested documents to the Greek Ministry. 72.  On 1 September 2008 the Greek Ministry transmitted the case to the State Legal Council as a competent authority to institute the proceedings in accordance with the New York Convention. Subsequently, the case was transmitted to the Law Department of the Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace for further action. 73.  On 3 April 2009 the Greek Ministry, acting as the Receiving Agency, filed a claim with the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance for the enforcement of the Kraków-Podgórze District Court’s judgment of 6 January 2004. 74.  On 11 December 2009 the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance gave judgment, dismissing the claim. The court considered that the Ministry had no standing to file such a claim because the New York Convention did not apply to the case. It held that the Council Regulation 44/2001/EC was applicable to the case and that accordingly it was the second applicant who had standing to file a claim for enforcement. It is not clear whether the Ministry lodged an appeal against that judgment. 75.  Meanwhile, on 17 April 2008 the third applicant filed a claim with the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance requesting the recognition and enforcement of the Kraków-Podgórze District Court’s judgment of 6 January 2004. The court gave judgment on 27 May 2009, dismissing the third applicant’s claim. It held that the defendant, Y.M., had not been correctly informed about the proceedings in Poland and therefore could not defend his interests in the proceedings. The court found that Y.M. had been served summons to appear at the hearing scheduled for 14 July 2003 only on 20 September 2003, i.e. after the hearing had taken place. The third applicant appealed. 76.  According to a document dated 1 December 2009 prepared by a judge of the Kraków-Podgórze District Court the rights of Y.M. had been fully respected in the proceedings leading to the Kraków-Podgórze District Court’s judgment of 6 January 2004. The judge noted that the second applicant’s claim had been filed on 20 February 2003 and that the first hearing had been scheduled for 14 July 2003. The latter hearing was adjourned since Y.M. had failed to appear and the Kraków-Podgórze District Court had had no proof that the claim had been served on the defendant. After the court was notified that the claim had been served on Y.M. on 20 September 2003 it scheduled a hearing for 6 January 2004. On that date the Kraków-Podgórze District Court heard the case and delivered judgment in default. The judgment was translated and served on Y.M. on 21 September 2004. He was instructed that he could file an objection to the judgment in default within seven days from the date of the service but he did not react. 77.  A hearing before the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal was scheduled for 17 May 2010. However, that hearing was rescheduled owing to a bomb attack which had occurred in the court in Thessaloniki several days prior to that date. Another hearing in the case, scheduled for 8 November 2010, was also rescheduled, on account of the local elections due to take place from 3 to 12 November 2010. 78.  On 10 June 2011 the Thessaloniki Court of Appeal dismissed the third applicant’s appeal. It upheld the lower court finding that the Y.M.’s rights to participate in the proceedings and to defend his interests had not been respected. Accordingly, the recognition of the judgment in issue would have been contrary to the public order. 79.  It appears that the third applicant did not lodge an appeal with the Court of Cassation. 80.  On 17 April 2008 the third applicant also lodged an action with the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance against Y.M. for maintenance on behalf of the second applicant. The proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of the judgment of 6 January 2004. 81.  On 18 July 2008 the second applicant, represented by his mother, filed a complaint under the 2004 Act. He claimed that the length of the proceedings for the recovery of maintenance instituted by him on 29 April 2005 on the basis of the New York Convention had been excessive. He also claimed compensation in the amount of PLN 10,000. 82.  On 27 August 2008 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The court observed that the second applicant had filed his application for recovery of maintenance under the New York Convention on 29 April 2005. It noted that the initial application had been incomplete and had had to be rectified by the second applicant before being transmitted to the Greek Ministry of Justice. The Court of Appeal considered that the transmission of documents had been carried out without undue delay. It further considered that, in the proceedings under the New York Convention, the Kraków Regional Court had only acted as the Transmitting Agency and, as such, had had no influence on the expeditiousness of the recovery of the maintenance by the Greek authorities. Moreover, the Court of Appeal found that the Regional Court, although it had not been required to do so by law, had on several occasions attempted to intervene in the proceedings by sending reminder letters to the Greek authorities and by soliciting the assistance of the Polish embassy in Athens. Consequently, the Court of Appeal considered that the Regional Court could not be held responsible for the overall length of the impugned proceedings and it dismissed the second applicant’s complaint, refusing to award him any compensation. 83.  On 23 December 2002 the Kraków Regional Court issued a divorce decree in default, dissolving the third applicant’s marriage to a Greek national, Y.M., and ordering Y.M. to pay maintenance to her. 84.  On 24 February 2003 the third applicant lodged an application with the Kraków Regional Court for the recovery of maintenance from Y.M. under the New York Convention. In her application, she requested the Greek authorities to secure a friendly settlement of the case or, alternatively, to institute proceedings with the aim of recovering the maintenance and to recognise and enforce the judgment of 23 December 2002. 85.  On 24 March 2003 the Kraków Regional Court asked the third applicant to rectify her request by attaching the required documents. On 18 August 2003 the court transmitted the application to the Greek Ministry. 86.  On 25 November 2003 the Ministry of Justice sent the applicant’s file to the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance in order for it to proceed with enforcement of the recovery of maintenance from Y.M. The efforts to summon Y.M. proved unsuccessful. On 9 February 2004 the Greek Ministry transmitted the case-file to the State Legal Council with a view to instituting enforcement proceedings in accordance with the New York Convention. Subsequently, the case was referred to the Law Department of the Ministry for Macedonia and Thrace for further action. 87.  Meanwhile, on 7 February 2004 the third applicant married S.K. According to the Polish Government, pursuant to Article 60 § 3 of the Polish Family and Custody Code, Y.M.’s obligation to pay maintenance to the third applicant ceased as a consequence of this act. The applicant contested this assertion of the Polish Government. 88.  On 23 April 2004 the Greek Ministry requested the Kraków Regional Court to provide it with proof that the summons had been served on Y.M. in the proceedings before the Kraków Regional Court. 89.  On 10 August 2004 the Kraków Regional Court sent the requested document to the Greek Ministry, observing that it had already been sent to it on 18 August 2003, together with the initial request for recovery of maintenance. 90.  On 20 October 2004 the Greek authorities brought an action against Y.M. before the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance with the aim of obtaining the recognition and enforcement of the judgment of the Kraków Regional Court of 23 December 2002. 91.  On 24 January 2005 the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance decided to adjourn the hearing in order to verify whether the matter had not already been the subject of another final judgment concerning the same parties. 92.  On 10 March 2005, 30 August 2005 and 12 January 2006 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Greek Ministry to provide it with information as to the progress of the proceedings. It appears that no response was received to these enquiries. 93.  On 12 January 2006 the Kraków Regional Court requested the assistance of the Polish Embassy in Athens. 94.  A hearing before the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance scheduled for 24 March 2006 was adjourned. A hearing took place on 26 May 2006. On 23 July 2006 the court decided to adjourn the hearing for the same reason as previously (see paragraph 91 above). The next hearing scheduled for 20 February 2007 was adjourned. The hearing took place on 9 March 2007. Twice in the course of the proceedings the Greek authorities lodged a request with the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance for a hearing to be scheduled in the case. 95.  On 4 July 2006 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Greek Ministry to provide it with information as to the outcome of the hearing before the Thessaloniki court. Since no reply was received to that request, on 8 January 2007 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Polish Embassy in Athens to enquire with the Greek authorities as to the outcome of the proceedings. 96.  On 12 February 2007 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court of the developments in the case. 97.  On 23 April 2007 the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance gave a judgment recognising the Kraków Regional Court’s divorce verdict of 23 December 2002 as enforceable in Greece. On 4 July 2007 the Greek Ministry sent a copy of the judgment to the Kraków Regional Court. 98.  On 14 September 2007 the Kraków Regional Court requested the Polish Ministry of Justice to provide it with legal advice as to the further steps necessary to recover the maintenance due to the third applicant. On 16 November 2007 the Polish Ministry suggested further cooperation with the Greek Ministry and underlined that the Regional Court acted only as a Transmitting Agency. 99.  On 29 November 2007 the Kraków Regional Court informed the third applicant that she should entrust the carrying out of the enforcement proceedings in Greece to a Greek counsel. The court further informed her that the proceedings in her case would be temporarily stayed pending the outcome of the enforcement proceedings in Greece. 100.  On 18 April 2008 a copy of the judgment of 23 April 2007 was served on Y.M., together with an order of payment for 36,332.96 EUR. 101.  On 20 May 2008 the Greek Ministry asked the Polish Ministry to provide information as regards Y.M.’s assets in Greece. In reply, the third applicant provided the information that Y.M.’s assets included three taverns in Chalastra and Thessaloniki, a house in Chalastra, a flat in Thessaloniki and several cars and motorcycles. 102.  On 12 June 2008 the Greek Ministry informed the Kraków Regional Court that enforcement proceedings against Y.M. on the basis of the judgment of the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance of 23 April 2007 had been initiated and that some property belonging to Y.M. would be seized and auctioned off. 103.  Subsequently, three auctions were organised in order to sell two of Y.M.’s apartments in Thessaloniki (on 17 September 2008, 14 January 2009 and 25 February 2009). However, this was to no avail, as there were no bidders at the auctions. 104.  On 3 April 2009 the Greek authorities requested the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance to fix a lower price for the two apartments in order to facilitate the auction. On 15 July 2009 the court partly granted the request and fixed the price at 48,000 EUR and 44,000 EUR respectively. Two subsequent auctions of 1 and 16 September 2009 were again to no avail for the lack of bidders. 105.  On 14 February 2011 the Greek authorities lodged a request with the Thessaloniki Court of First Instance to authorise the sale of Y.M.’s two apartments through an open sale. 106.  On 30 April 2012 the court dismissed the request, explaining that the Civil Code did not permit an open sale in the circumstances of the case. 107.  In the meantime, on 18 October 2010 the third applicant filed a new application for recovery of maintenance payments. It was forwarded to the Greek Ministry on 2 December 2010. The first hearing was set for 11 February 2011. 108.  On 15 June 2011 the Kraków Regional Court asked the Greek Ministry what the chances were that the maintenance would be recovered from Y.M. The Greek Ministry did not reply. 109.  The Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance was adopted and opened for signature on 20 June 1956 by the United Nations Conference on Maintenance Obligations. Poland and Greece ratified the New York Convention on 13 October 1960 and 1 November 1965 respectively. 110.  The relevant provisions of the New York Convention read as follows:\nArticle 1 - Scope of the Convention 1. The purpose of this Convention is to facilitate the recovery of maintenance to which a person, hereinafter referred to as claimant, who is in the territory of one of the Contracting Parties, claims to be entitled from another person, hereinafter referred to as respondent, who is subject to the jurisdiction of another Contracting Party. This purpose shall be effected through the office of agencies which will hereinafter be referred to as Transmitting and Receiving Agencies. 2. The remedies provided for in this Convention are in addition to, and not in substitution for, any remedies available under municipal or international law.\nArticle 3 - Application to Transmitting Agency 1. Where a claimant is in the territory of one Contracting Party, hereinafter referred to as the State of the claimant, and the respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of another Contracting Party, hereinafter referred to as the State of the respondent, the claimant may make application to a Transmitting Agency in the State of the claimant for the recovery of maintenance from the respondent. (...) 3. The application shall be accompanied by all relevant documents, including, where necessary, a power of attorney authorising the Receiving Agency to act, or to appoint some other person to act, on behalf of the claimant. It shall also be accompanied by a photograph of the claimant and, where available, a photograph of the respondent. 4. The Transmitting Agency shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that the requirements of the law of the State of the Receiving Agency are complied with; ...\nArticle 5 - Transmission of judgments and other judicial acts 1. The Transmitting Agency shall, at the request of the claimant, transmit, under the provisions of article 4, any order, final or provisional, and any other judicial act, obtained by the claimant for the payment of maintenance in a competent tribunal of any of the Contracting Parties, and, where necessary and possible, the record of the proceedings in which such order was made. ... 2. Proceedings under article 6 may include, in accordance with the law of the State of the respondent, exequatur or registration proceedings or an action based upon the act transmitted under paragraph 1.\nArticle 6 - Functions of the Receiving Agency 1. The Receiving Agency shall, subject always to the authority given by the claimant, take, on behalf of the claimant, all appropriate steps for the recovery of maintenance, including the settlement of the claim and, where necessary, the institution and prosecution of an action for maintenance and the execution of any order or other judicial act for the payment of maintenance. 2. The Receiving Agency shall keep the Transmitting Agency currently informed. If it is unable to act, it shall inform the Transmitting Agency of its reasons and return the documents. 3. Notwithstanding anything in this Convention, the law applicable in the determination of all questions arising in any such action or proceedings shall be the law of the State of the respondent, including its private international law.” 111.  The Agreement between Poland and Greece entered into force on 23 December 1981. 112.  The 1979 Agreement provides, in so far as relevant:\nChapter 5\nRecognition and enforcement of decisions in civil matters\nArticle 21\n... 2. Final court decisions in civil matters concerning rights of a pecuniary nature delivered in the territory of one State Party may be recognised as enforceable in the other State-Party if they were delivered after the entry into force of the present Agreement.\nArticle 22\nA request for the recognition or the enforcement of a court decision should be filed with the court which examined the matter in the first instance or with the competent court of the other State-Party. In the former case, the court shall transmit the request to the competent court of the other State-Party, in accordance with the procedure set out in article 2 of the present Agreement.\nArticle 23 1. A request for the recognition or the enforcement of a court decision should include:\n...\nb) a document proving that a plaintiff who did not participate in the proceedings, or his lawyer, had been informed in due time and summoned in due time to a hearing on at least one occasion.\nArticle 26\nRefusal of recognition or enforcement\nRecognition or enforcement may be refused:\n...\nd) if, according to the law of the State Party in whose territory the decision is to be recognised or enforced, the court of that State Party has sole jurisdiction to examine the matter. 113.  Greece and Poland ratified the Lugano Convention on 11 June 1997 and 1 November 1999 respectively. It entered into force in respect of Greece on 1 September 1997 and in respect of Poland on 1 February 2000. 114.  The relevant provisions of the Lugano Convention read as follows:\nTITLE III\nRECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT\nArticle 25\nFor the purposes of this Convention, ‘judgment’ means any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Contracting State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.\nSection 1\nRecognition\nArticle 26\nA judgment given in a Contracting State shall be recognised in the other Contracting States without any special procedure being required.\nAny interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section 2 and 3 of this Title, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognised.\nIf the outcome of proceedings in a court of a Contracting State depends on the determination of an incidental question of recognition that court shall have jurisdiction over that question.\nArticle 27\nA judgment shall not be recognised: 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not duly served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence; 3. if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought; 4. if the court of the State of origin, in order to arrive at its judgment, has decided a preliminary question concerning the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills or succession in a way that conflicts with a rule of the private international law of the State in which the recognition is sought, unless the same result would have been reached by the application of the rules of private international law of that State; 5. if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in a non‑contracting State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that this latter judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the State addressed.\n...\nSection 2\nEnforcement\nArticle 31\nA judgment given in a Contracting State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another Contracting State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.\n...\nArticle 34\nThe court applied to shall give its decision without delay; the party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any submissions on the application.\nThe application may be refused only for one of the reasons specified in Articles 27 and 28.\nUnder no circumstances may the foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.\nArticle 35\nThe appropriate officer of the court shall without delay bring the decision given on the application to the notice of the applicant in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law of the State in which enforcement is sought. 115.  The Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 lays down rules governing the jurisdiction of courts and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters in the European Union countries. The relevant provisions of the Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 read as follows:\nCHAPTER III\nRECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT\nArticle 32\nFor the purposes of this Regulation, ‘judgment’ means any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.\nSection 1\nRecognition\nArticle 33 2. Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Chapter, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognised. 3. If the outcome of proceedings in a court of a Member State depends on the determination of an incidental question of recognition that court shall have jurisdiction over that question.\nArticle 34\nA judgment shall not be recognised: 2. where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so; 3. if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is sought; 4. if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed.\n...\nSection 2\nEnforcement\nArticle 38 1. A judgment given in a Member State and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another Member State when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.\n...\nArticle 40 1. The procedure for making the application shall be governed by the law of the Member State in which enforcement is sought.\n...\nArticle 41\nThe judgment shall be declared enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53 without any review under Articles 34 and 35. The party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any submissions on the application.\nArticle 42 1. The decision on the application for a declaration of enforceability shall forthwith be brought to the notice of the applicant in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law of the Member State in which enforcement is sought.\n...\nArticle 43 1. The court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 shall refuse or revoke a declaration of enforceability only on one of the grounds specified in Articles 34 and 35. It shall give its decision without delay.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, Mr Slobodan Rakić (“the first applicant”), Mr Živorad Ivković (“the second applicant”), Mr Damjan Šapić (“the third applicant”), Mr Dragan Jevtić (“the fourth applicant”), Mr Darko Glišović (“the fifth applicant”), Mr Radoš Mihajlović (“the sixth applicant”), Mr Ljubiša Janićijevic (“the seventh applicant”), Mr Nenad Jovanović (“the eight applicant”), Mr Milan Vitković (“the ninth applicant”), Mr Velibor Terentić (“the tenth applicant”), Mr Radojko Radosavljević (“the eleventh applicant”), Mr Dragoš Tomović (“the twelfth applicant”), Mr Predrag Todić (“the thirteenth applicant”), Mr Nebojša Milutinović (“the fourteenth applicant”), Mr Bojan Ilić (“the fifteenth applicant”), Mr Darko Trifunović (“the sixteenth applicant”), Mr Janko Janković (“the seventeenth applicant”), Mr Dragiša Zdravković (“the eighteenth applicant”), Mr Miljojko Đorđević (“the nineteenth applicant”), Mr Slavko Milošević (“the twentieth applicant”), Mr Miroslav Vučković (“the twenty-first applicant”), Mr Ljubinko Ćirković (“the twenty-second applicant”), Mr Veselin Božović (“the twenty-third applicant”), Mr Nebojša Đorđević (“the twenty-fourth applicant”), Mr Srećko Janićijević (“the twenty-fifth applicant”), Mr Siniša Milić (“the twenty-sixth applicant”), Mr Vladimir Avdalović (“the twenty-seventh applicant”), Mr Slavoljub Vukić (“the twenty-eighth applicant”), Mr Rodoljub Obradović (“the twenty-ninth applicant”) and Mr Dejan Pantić (“the thirtieth applicant”) are all Serbian nationals. 6.  All applicants are employed as police officers with the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia (Ministarstvo unutrašnjih poslova Republike Srbije, hereinafter “the Ministry”). They reside and work in Kosovo.[1] 7.  The facts, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  On 24 January 2000 and 17 July 2003, respectively, the Serbian Government adopted two decisions whereby, inter alia, all of its employees who resided and worked in Kosovo were to be paid double salaries. 9.  On 31 January 2000 the Ministry issued a decision stating that the police officers in question were entitled to have their salaries increased based on a coefficient of 2.5 or 4.5, depending on the circumstances. 10.  In reality, the applicants only received the increase approved by the Ministry, amounting to significantly less than the envisaged doubling of their salaries. 11.  In 2006 and 2007, therefore, they filed separate civil claims against the Ministry with the First Municipal Court (Prvi opštinski sud) in Belgrade, seeking payment of the difference between the salary increase received and the one granted by the Government (the value of the seventh, thirteenth, seventeenth, twentieth, twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth applicants' claims, respectively, exceeded 500,000 dinars, whilst the claims of all other applicants were below this threshold). The applicants further requested payment of unspecified amounts on account of the related pension and disability insurance contributions. 12.  Certain applicants were successful before the Municipal Court; others were not. However, all the applicants were unsuccessful at second instance before the District Court (Okružni sud) in Belgrade (hereinafter “the District Court”). The applicants received those decisions on the following dates:\n- the first applicant on 26 April 2007;\n- the second and third applicants on 7 May 2007;\n- the fourth applicant on 26 June 2007;\n- the fifth applicant on 3 September 2007;\n- the sixth applicant on 19 September 2007;\n- the seventh applicant on 1 October 2007;\n- the eighth applicant on 26 September 2007;\n- the ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants on 8 October 2007;\n- the twelfth applicant on 16 October 2007;\n- the thirteenth and fourteenth applicants on 29 October 2007;\n- the fifteenth applicant on 19 October 2007;\n- the sixteenth, nineteenth and twenty-first applicants on 11 December 2007;\n- the seventeenth applicant on 26 November 2007;\n- the eighteenth applicant on 17 December 2007;\n- the twentieth applicant on 13 December 2007;\n- the twenty-second applicant on 15 January 2008;\n- the twenty-third applicant on 25 January 2008;\n- the twenty-fourth and twenty-eighth applicants on 11 February 2008;\n- the twenty-fifth applicant on 28 February 2008;\n- the twenty-sixth applicant on 27 December 2007;\n- the twenty-seventh and thirtieth applicants on 20 February 2008;\n- the twenty-ninth applicant on 18 February 2008.\nMany of the applicant's colleagues (hereinafter “the plaintiffs”) had brought separate claims concerning the same issue; some were successful whilst others were unsuccessful in the District Court. 13.  In its reasoning in the applicants' cases, the District Court held, inter alia, that the applicable domestic regulation was contained in the decision of the Ministry adopted on 31 January 2000. 14.  However, in seventy-three other judgments, rendered between 25 January 2006 and 1 October 2008, the same District Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that their claims were based on the same facts and concerned identical legal issues. In its reasoning in these other cases, the District Court held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' salaries had to be paid in accordance with the Serbian Government's decisions of 24 January 2000 and/or 17 July 2003. 15.  Of the seventy-three judgments mentioned above, in fifty cases the respondent lodged appeals on points of law (revizije) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Srbije, see paragraphs 24 and 27 below). In the remaining twenty-three cases, however, the respondent lodged no such appeal, apparently in the light of the statutory threshold (see paragraph 25 below). 16.  The Government provided relevant case-law adopted by the Supreme Court, in particular six separate judgments of which one was issued on 3 July 2008 and the remaining five between 25 December 2008 and 1 October 2009. In each case, deciding upon appeals on points of law, the Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiffs, albeit with somewhat different reasoning compared to that employed by the District Court. In particular, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Government's decision of 17 July 2003 had not been directly applicable. 17.  In the meantime, on 23 September 2008, the Civil Division (Građansko odeljenje) of the Supreme Court held a meeting which was meant to resolve the issue of how to rule in all cases such as the applicants' (see paragraph 29 below). In the minutes of this meeting, it was noted inter alia that in two cases registered in 2008, where appeals on points of law had been considered, the Supreme Court had in fact confirmed the lower courts' rulings rendered in favour of the plaintiffs (Rev II 429/08 and Rev 623/08). The meeting, however, was ultimately adjourned pending the outcome of a case which had been brought before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Srbije) concerning the abstract review of the constitutionality of the Government's decision adopted on 17 July 2003. On 16 April 2010 the Constitutional Court held that the impugned decision was unconstitutional. 18.  In eighteen separate cases the plaintiffs thereafter lodged their appeals with the Constitutional Court (ustavne žalbe), but, according to the information contained in the case file, these proceedings are all still pending. 19.  None of the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law or attempted to obtain constitutional redress.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Hagimus. 7.  Following the construction of a public road, her house was damaged and she brought an action against the Local Council. 8.  On 1 June 2001 she obtained a judgment in her favour, according to which the Local Council was obliged to pay her 155,868 Moldovan lei (MDL). On 29 January 2002 the Chişinău Regional Court dismissed the Local Council’s appeal. On 11 April 2002 the Court of Appeal dismissed the Local Council’s appeal on points of law and the judgment became final. 9.  It appears from the documents submitted by the applicant that on 21 May 2002 an enforcement warrant was sent by the Căuşeni District Court to the Căuşeni Department of Enforcement of Judgments. 10.  The applicant complained to the Căuşeni District Court and to the Ministry of Justice on numerous occasions about the non-enforcement of the judgment favourable to her. 11.  In a letter of 28 August 2002 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that during the enforcement proceedings the court decided to change the manner of enforcement of the judgment and on 29 July 2002 it issued a decision in that respect. That decision was challenged by one of the parties to the proceedings. 12.  In the meantime, on 11 July 2002 the Prosecutor General’s Office filed a request for annulment of all the judgments, and asked the Supreme Court of Justice to re-open the proceedings. 13.  On 2 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the request for annulment, quashed all the judgments and ordered the re-opening of the proceedings. The re-opened proceedings are still pending before the domestic courts.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants live in various towns of Leningrad and Pskov Regions of Russia. 5.  The applicants, all former or active military servicepersons, were entitled to certain service-related benefits, to be paid by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. In 2002 they sued the military authorities claiming the arrears related to those benefits. 6.  On the dates set out in appendixes nos. 2, 3 and 4 the domestic courts granted the applicants' claims and ordered the military authorities to pay them the respective amounts. Some of the awards were denominated in Russian roubles (RUB), whereas others were denominated in United States dollars (USD). 7.  On various dates the courts issued writs of execution. The applicants forwarded them with accompanying documents to the treasury office. However, the writs were returned to the applicants unexecuted. The treasury office explained to some of the applicants that the Ministry of Defence (the debtor) had no funds available. The applicants then addressed the writs of execution to the Ministry of Finance. However, the judgments remained unexecuted. 8.  In March-April 2003 some of the applicants wrote letters to the Ministry of Finance and other State bodies seeking the enforcement of the judgments. The Ministry of Finance replied that they had no power to execute the judgments and transfer the money from the accounts of the Ministry of Defence without the consent of the latter. The Ministry of Defence informed the applicants that the judgments could not be executed since no funds had been allocated for that purpose. 9.  On the dates set out in appendix no. 2 the applicants listed therein received the amounts due pursuant to the execution writs. They submitted copies of banking receipts as evidence in that respect. 10.  The applicants listed in appendix no. 3 were awarded various sums of money denominated in USD, to be converted into RUB at a rate applicable on the date of the judgment. However, the payments were made to them at a rate applicable on the date of the execution, which was lower. As a result, they received lesser amounts in RUB than they had expected. The applicants claimed that the judgments in their favour were thus not executed in full. They submitted copies of banking receipts and information on the official exchange rates (those of the Central Bank) on the relevant dates. 11.  Mr Sedykh, Mr Kositsyn and Mr Oleg Zakirov were also awarded various amounts denominated in USD (see appendix no. 4). Mr Sedykh was awarded a sum in USD at a rate applicable on the date of execution. The judgments in favour of Mr Kositsyn and Mr Oleg Zakirov did not indicate the exchange rate applicable for the payment. The applicants claimed that the judgments in their favour were not executed in full referring to the same arguments as the applicants listed in appendix no. 3 (see paragraph 10 above). According to the Government the judgments in favour of the applicants listed in appendix no. 3 and in favour of Mr Sedykh, Mr Kositsyn and Mr Oleg Zakirov were fully executed. 12.  On 21 January 2003 the lawyer of the above two applicants addressed the writs of execution to the Ministry of Finance. According to the official stamp of the Ministry, they were received on the same day. 13.  On 27 August 2003 the Ministry of Finance returned the documents along with the writ of execution to Mr Nikolaychuk on the ground that his lawyer had not submitted all the necessary supporting documents. According to the applicants all the necessary documents were submitted. In October 2003 the applicants' lawyer re-submitted the documents of Mr Nikolaychuk to the Ministry of Finance. 14.  According to Ms Bobrova, her documents were apparently returned to her address indicated on the writ of execution. Since Ms Bobrova did not live at that address at the time, the post office sent the documents back to the Ministry of Finance. According to the Government, the Ministry of Finance have never received Ms Bobrova's documents. 15.  The judgments in favour of Mr Nikolaychuk and Ms Bobrova (see appendix no. 4) are not executed to date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in the town of Novovoronezh in the Voronezh Region. 5.  The applicant was entitled to a disability allowance and commodity benefits. She sued the local Social Security Committee for the unpaid allowance and benefits, and claimed their re-adjustment. 6.  By judgment of 16 July 2003, the Novovoronezh Town Court of the Voronezh Region awarded the applicant 22,109.75 Russian roubles (RUB) for the period from 1 July 2002 to 31 July 2003. On 14 October 2003 the Voronezh Regional Court upheld the judgment. The applicant received the money due to her on 7 June 2005. On 5 September 2005 the Town Court awarded the applicant RUB 5,552.02 as compensation for inflationary losses caused by the delay in the enforcement of the judgment of 16 July 2003, as upheld on 14 October 2003. It appears that the compensation award has not been paid to the applicant. 7.  By judgment of 5 January 2004, the Town Court awarded the applicant RUB 13,971.25 for the period from 1 August to 31 December 2003. This judgment became final on 15 January 2004. It was enforced on 4 August 2005. 8.  On 15 April 2004 the Town Court increased the applicant’s monthly allowance to RUB 5,664.84 and awarded her RUB 9,494.52 in arrears for the period from 1 January to 31 March 2004. The judgment became final on 26 April 2004. It was enforced on 25 August 2005. 9.  On 30 September 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant RUB 9,494.52. On 11 October 2004 the judgment became final. The applicant received the money on 25 August 2005. 10.  By judgment of 15 November 2005, the Town Court awarded RUB 5,700.35 as compensation for inflationary losses in respect of the sums awarded to the applicant on 5 January, 15 April and 30 September 2004. It appears that the compensation award has not been paid to the applicant. 11.  By judgment of 16 February 2004, the Town Court awarded the applicant RUB 4,973.57. The judgment became final on 26 February 2004. Apparently, it remains without enforcement. 12.  On 6 September 2004 the Town Court awarded RUB 2,272.30 to the applicant and increased her monthly commodity benefits to RUB 679.78. The judgment became final on 17 September 2004. It appears that on 16 July 2004 the applicant received RUB 500 in execution of that judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant company, Bazalt Impeks limited liability company, is a Ukrainian legal entity registered in Svitlovodsk. 5.  In June 2006 an IT company lodged a claim with the Kirovograd Regional Commercial Court against the applicant company seeking the cancellation of a contract and return of property. 6.  By a decision of 26 July 2006, the court found against the applicant company. On 2 October 2006 the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Commercial Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 7.  By a decision of 12 December 2006, the Higher Commercial Court, upon the applicant company’s appeal, quashed the decisions of the lower courts and found in favour of the applicant company. 8.  On 20 February 2007 the Supreme Court of Ukraine, upon the IT company’s cassation appeal, quashed the ruling of the Higher Commercial Court on the ground that its findings had been unfounded and erroneous, and upheld the decision of the Dnipropetrovs’k Regional Commercial Court of Appeal. In taking this decision, the Supreme Court noted:\n“The Supreme Court of Ukraine, with regard to the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Constitution of Ukraine, does not consider it necessary to remit the case for fresh examination to the first-instance court. This would be contrary to the provisions of Article 125 of the Constitution of Ukraine and sections 2 and 39 of the Law of Ukraine “On the Judicial System of Ukraine” [the Judiciary Act] regarding the status of the Supreme Court of Ukraine and its task to ensure the administration of justice in accordance with the law. It would further cause a constitutionally unacceptable need to quash the lawful decision of the court of appeal. In this regard, the list of possible outcomes of cassation appeals against decisions of the Higher Commercial Court of Ukraine envisaged in Article 111-18 of the Code of Commercial Procedure of Ukraine is not considered a legal impediment to adopting the decision.” 9.  On 5 March 2007 the decision of the Supreme Court was sent to the applicant company.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Szatymaz. When introducing the application, he was detained at Szeged Prison. 6.  The applicant was arrested on 8 January 2008. From 11 January 2008 on he was detained on remand at Szeged Prison on charges of trafficking in goods subject to excise tax. On 9 October 2009 the Csongrád County Regional Court found him guilty as charged. Pursuant to the final judgment of 9 June 2010 of the Szeged Court of Appeal, he served a prison sentence of three years and six months in a strict regime at Szeged Prison. His pre-trial detention was credited against his imprisonment. 7.  Szeged Prison is comprised of two separate parts: Unit I, a strict- and medium-regime facility for sentenced prisoners, and Unit II, a facility for remand prisoners. The applicant’s pre-trial detention, which is the subject matter of his complaints, took place in various cells of Unit II, and the remainder of his detention, as from 10 June 2010, in Unit I. 8.  The applicant submitted that he had shared cells with an average of 16 sq metres’ ground surface with five to seven persons, not counting furniture, and could stay outside the cell only about an hour daily. He also stated that he could receive visitors for only one hour every month (an exception being his brother, who was granted three extra visits, lasting two hours on each occasion); however, he had not been at all allowed to touch his family members during these visits. Moreover, despite his requests, the prison administration had not provided him with toiletries free of charge, nor had it authorised him to possess, with a view to preparing his defence, a personal computer in his cell, although it would have had no access to internet. Lastly, he submitted that the prison had not provided him with free stationery so that he could post submissions to the authorities in charge of his criminal case pending at that time. 9.  He submitted that his requests and complaints concerning the above matters and also the catering at the prison, to various instances of the penitentiary administration were to no avail. He availed himself of a formal remedy with regard to the refusal by the prison administration to authorise him to possess a personal computer in his cell. Whilst the Government submitted that Szeged Prison had been inspected by the penitentiary prosecutor once every two weeks, the applicant stated that no such visit had taken place in Unit II during his detention. 10.  According to the National Penitentiary Service’s statistics available on its website[1], the average occupancy rate of Hungarian prisons was 118% in 2008, 124% in 2009 and 133% in 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  On 9 November 1994 the Braunau District Administrative Authority (Bezirks­hauptmannschaft) convicted the applicant twice under the Motor Vehicles Act (Kraftfahrgesetz) for failure to comply with the instructions of the Authority to inform them who had used his car on specific days (Lenkerauskunft), and sentenced him, on each offence, to a fine of 4,000 ATS or six days’ imprisonment in default. The Authority noted that the applicant had given information but found it to be incorrect. 10.  On 29 November 1994 the applicant filed an appeal against this decision with the Upper Austrian Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat). He complained that the District Administrative Authority had incorrectly applied the law and failed to sufficiently assess the evidence before it or clarify why the information he had given was untrue. The applicant did not request a hearing, nor did he expressly waive this right. No oral hearing was held. 11.  On 2 January 1995 the Independent Administrative Panel dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the sentence. 12.  On 28 February 1995 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). He complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the Independent Administrative Panel had failed to hold a hearing. Such a hearing would have been necessary because his appeal was not limited to points of law. He had also criticised the District Administrative Authority’s assessment of evidence. Therefore an oral hearing would have been necessary. In such a hearing the Independent Administrative Panel could have properly assessed this evidence, which had already been obtained at first instance, as well as fresh evidence. 13.  On 13 July 1995 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint on the ground that it did not have sufficient prospects of success. Upon a request filed by the applicant on 10 August 1995, the Constitutional Court transferred the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 14.  On 23 February 1996 the Administrative Court, relying on Section 33a of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz), declined to deal with the applicant’s case, finding that it did not raise important legal issues. On 10 May 1996 this decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1942 and 1943 respectively and live in Warsaw. 6.  The applicants are legal successors of the former owners of a property in the vicinity of Warsaw, called Willa Janówka, composed of a number of plots owned by several individuals. 7.  In 1971 the then owners of the property, including E.P., the applicants’ mother, were obliged by an administrative decision to transfer their land to the State Treasury without compensation within the framework of a larger expropriation scheme. 8.  On 30 December 2005 the Local Self-Government Board of Appeal (Samorządowe Kolegium Odwoławcze w Warszawie) gave a decision concerning the applicants and three other persons, legal successors of the other former owners expropriated by the 1971 decision. It declared that that decision had been issued in flagrant breach of the law in force at the material time. The parties were further informed that the corrective decision gave rise to a compensation claim on their part for damage caused by the original unlawful decision. 9.  On 28 August 2006 the applicants sought compensation for damage caused by the decision given in 1971. 10.  On 15 May 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the applicants’ claim and awarded 64,487 Polish zlotys (PLN) to each of them, corresponding to the value of the expropriated land. It held that the conditions determining civil liability in tort, namely a tortious event which caused damage and the establishment of a causal link between the event and the damage, were met in the case. In respect of tort committed by the State Treasury and caused by unlawful administrative decisions compensation could be sought only after a subsequent decision declared that the original administrative decision was unlawful. Such a corrective decision (decyzja nadzorcza) had been given in the applicants’ case in 2005 (see paragraph 8 above). 11.  The court went on to state that it was necessary to determine which provisions of substantive law were applicable to the circumstances of the case. The choice of substantive provisions determined, in turn, the beginning and the length of the time-limit within which the compensation claim had to be brought before the courts. The court noted that the original administrative decision had been given before 1 September 2004. On that date the Law of 17 June 2004 amending the Civil Code had entered into force. This law had fundamentally changed the legal framework concerning civil liability of the State Treasury. It abrogated, inter alia, Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure and enacted Article 417 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 22-24 below). The court was of the view that it was the latter provision which should be applied to the circumstances of the case. Under this provision, read together with the provisions of the Civil Code on liability in tort, the prescription period started to run only when the decision of 30 December 2005, confirming the unlawfulness of the original expropriation decision, became final. The prescription period of three years had not therefore expired. 12.  The defendant State Treasury, represented by the mayor of Warsaw, appealed. 13.  On 26 November 2009 the Warsaw Court of Appeal examined the appeal and dismissed the applicants’ claim. It endorsed the findings of fact made by the lower court as to the existence of pecuniary damage and the causal link between the 1971 decision and that damage. However, it was of the view that the provisions concerning the State’s civil liability in tort should have been interpreted differently by the first-instance court, in particular as to the determination of the prescription period. The court observed that under the communist regime it was practically impossible, essentially for political reasons, to vindicate claims originating in unlawful administrative decisions or to seek compensation from the State Treasury for damage in tort caused by such decisions. The earliest date on which it was possible to do so was 4 June 1989, when the first partially free parliamentary elections were held in Poland. It was from that date that the prescription period of ten years provided for by Article 442 of the Civil Code started to run. The applicants should have availed themselves of the available remedy, namely they should have obtained a decision declaring the original expropriation decision unlawful prior to 4 June 1999 when the ten-year prescription period came to an end. 14.  The applicants appealed on points of law. They argued that the contested judgment was in breach of Article 77 of the 1997 Constitution in so far as it guaranteed the right to compensation for damage caused by the State. Neither the damage caused by the 1971 decision nor its unlawfulness were in dispute between the parties.\nThey further submitted that the case raised a significant legal issue in so far as there were divergent strands of case-law regarding the interpretation of legal provisions governing the State’s civil liability for administrative decisions made prior to 1 September 2004 and declared unlawful after that date. These differences in the judicial approach to similar cases, both as to the determination of the beginning of the prescription period and as to its length, had a decisive influence on the outcome of compensation cases brought by victims of unlawful administrative decisions and on the applicants’ case. 15.  On 21 October 2010 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera as a single judge, refused to hear the applicants’ appeal on points of law, holding that it did not raise any significant legal issue. 16.  Parallel to the applicants’ case, A.C., a successor of another owner expropriated by the same expropriation decision given in 1971 and covered by the same corrective decision of 30 December 2005 (see paragraph 8 above), sought compensation in civil proceedings for damage caused by the original decision. She lodged her claim with the Warsaw Regional Court on 30 August 2006. 17.  By a judgment of 30 September 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed her claim and awarded her compensation in the amount of PLN 110,187, corresponding to the value of the plot of land owned by A.C.’s legal predecessor. It recounted briefly the divergent views expressed by the civil courts, including the Supreme Court, in cases concerning claims for pecuniary damage caused by administrative decisions declared unlawful after 1 September 2004. It noted that the manner in which the provisions concerning the State’s liability in tort for unlawful administrative decisions were interpreted had given rise to serious difficulties and differences of opinion in judicial practice. It disagreed with the view expressed in certain judicial decisions that the ten-year prescription period for bringing compensation claims before the courts had started to run when the unlawful decision had been given, but its running was subsequently stayed until 4 June 1989. The Regional Court was of the view that the three‑year prescription period, referred to in the former Article 160 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, was applicable to the circumstances of the case. It further held that this period had started to run when the corrective decision of 30 December 2005 declaring the 1971 decision unlawful had become final. 18.  On 5 September 2006 R.W., another legal successor of the original owners, brought a compensation case before the Warsaw Regional Court, claiming compensation from the State Treasury, represented by the mayor of Warsaw, for damage originating in the 1971 decision. He also referred to the corrective decision of 30 December 2005. 19.  By a judgment of 10 July 2012 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed his claim and awarded him PLN 82,988, corresponding to the value of the land concerned. The court stressed that it was not in dispute that the original administrative decision had been unlawful. Nor was it in dispute that that decision had caused damage to the claimant. The court referred to the resolution given by the Supreme Court on 31 March 2011 (see paragraph 27 below). It shared the view expressed by the Supreme Court in this resolution that it was not justified to interpret the applicable provisions in a way imposing on the applicant an obligation to seek a declaration of unlawfulness of the original administrative decision within ten years after 4 June 1989.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Volgograd. 5.  Pursuant to a decision of the Volgograd Central District Administration of 14 October 1987 the applicant began receiving a monthly single mother allowance in respect of her daughter who was born on 15 April 1986. 6.  In 1998, from April to July, the applicant received no payments.\nOn 4 September 1998 the applicant brought proceedings before the Central District Court of the City of Volgograd (Центральный районный суд города Волгограда) requesting the payment of outstanding sums. 7.  By a judgment of 21 September 1998 the court allowed the applicant’s claim and ordered the Finance Department of the Volgograd Regional Administration (Волгоградское облфинуправление) to pay the applicant 467.56 roubles (RUR). 8.  Following the entry into force of the judgment, the court’s bailiff instituted enforcement proceedings for recovery of the sum awarded to the applicant. However, the applicant was informed that in 1998 the court judgment could not be enforced, because the defendant lacked sufficient funds. 9.  The applicant complained about the non-enforcement of the judgment to the Department of Justice of the Volgograd Regional Administration (Управление юстиции администрации Волгоградской области), which on 16 February 1999 forwarded her complaint to the bailiff’s service of the first instance court for reply and necessary measures.\nIn an undated letter of 1999, the bailiff’s service informed the applicant that it had issued a writ of execution, but had not yet received from the defendant the sum due to the applicant. 10.  According to the Governments submissions, which were not contested by the applicant, the sum of RUR 467.56 was paid to her twice – on 29 September 2000 and on 9 October 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  On 25 April 1992 the applicant married Ms Z.J. 7.  On 9 October 1993 Z.J. gave birth to their son I.R. 8.  In December 1993 Z.J., together with their son, moved out of the flat in which she had lived with the applicant and went to live with her parents. After that she started avoiding contact with the applicant. Prior to the institution of the divorce and custody proceedings in February 1996 (see paragraphs 9-30 below) the applicant saw his son only twice, in January 1994 and in 1995 during Easter holidays. The applicant and Z.J. officially divorced by a court judgment to that effect on 12 February 2002 (see paragraphs 21-22 below). 9.  On 19 February 1996 Z.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking divorce, custody of, and the maintenance for their son. 10.  On 22 April 1997 the court asked the Zagreb Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Zagreb, hereafter “the local social welfare centre”) to prepare a report on the family situation in the Ribić family and submit its recommendation as to whom of the parents custody of their son should be awarded. 11.  The Government submitted that the applicant had ignored the local social welfare centre’s calls to attend interviews necessary for the preparation of the report by not collecting the centre’s letters to that effect from the post office. The applicant denied that allegation, noted that the Government had not substantiated it by relevant documents and invited them to do so. He further submitted that while it was true that in the period between 1993 and 2003 he had worked in Ljubljana (Slovenia) on weekdays, he had been staying in Zagreb every weekend. If there had been any problem with the service of the local social welfare centre’s correspondence to him, the centre should have contacted the advocate who had represented him in the civil proceedings in question. 12.  On 7 July 1997 the applicant’s and Z.J.’ legal representatives agreed to temporarily suspend the proceedings (mirovanje postupka) for a period of three months with a view to reaching an amicable solution, which however did not materialise. 13.  Thus, in the further course of the proceedings, on 23 January 1998, the court decided to obtain information on the parties’ income, and scheduled the next hearing for 20 April 1998 with a view to hearing the parties. 14.  However, the hearing scheduled for 20 April 1998 was adjourned because the applicant did not attend it. 15.  At the hearing held on 22 May 1998 the court again decided to hear the parties and invited Z.J. to provide information on her income, something the applicant had already done. 16.  At that hearing and in his written submission of 9 March 1999 the applicant asked the court to issue a provisional measure whereby it would provisionally regulate his contacts with his son. According to the information submitted by the parties, the court did not decide on the applicant’s motion, apparently because under the legislation in force at the material time interim contact orders were in the exclusive jurisdiction of the social welfare centres as administrative authorities (see paragraph 81 below). 17.  At the hearing held on 9 October 1998 the court heard the parties and decided to obtain an opinion from an expert in psychiatry with a view to deciding on custody and access rights. However, since the applicant and Z.J. did not advance the costs of the expert opinion until seven months later, the case-file was not sent to the appointed expert institution before 11 June 1999. 18.  In the course of the preparation of the expert opinion, on 26 February 2000 the applicant met with his son, for the first time since Easter of 1995 (see paragraph 8 above). On the same date the applicant and Z.J. signed an agreement regarding the contact schedule they would propose to the court. In particular, it was agreed to propose to the court that the contacts between the applicant and his son take place in the presence of both parents for two hours on the premises specified by the local social welfare centre and in the presence of a child-welfare professional designated by the centre. In the first three months, the contacts were to take place twice a month, and thereafter every week. After a year the local social welfare centre were to assess the situation and propose further arrangements. 19.  By 3 April 2000 the designated expert institution had finalised the expert opinion, which was received by the court 11 days later. The experts’ recommendation was in line with the parties’ agreement of 26 February 2000, which they endorsed. The experts particularly emphasised the need for the contacts between the applicant and his son to take place in the presence of Z.J. and a child-welfare professional designated by the local social welfare centre. 20.  Since both parties objected to the expert opinion, the court held three more hearings, on 25 May and 14 and 28 September 2001 during which the court heard the psychiatrist who had prepared it. The court also obtained fresh information on the parties’ income with a view to deciding on the maintenance for their son. 21.  On 26 October 2001 the Municipal Court pronounced judgment whereby it: (a) dissolved the marriage between the applicant and Z.J., (b) awarded custody of their son to Z.J., (c) granted the applicant access (contact) rights, and (d) ordered the applicant to regularly pay a certain amount of money as maintenance for his son. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:\n“Contacts between I.R. and his father Zdenko Ribić shall take place twice a month on Saturdays for two hours for the period of two months, and after that once a week on Saturdays in the child’s home in the presence of the mother and a psychologist or social worker. After a year the local social welfare centre may propose changes in the frequency [of contacts].\n...\nSince both parties repeatedly, by their non-attendance and their failure to advance the costs of the expert opinion, caused hearings to be postponed and thereby protracted the proceedings for several years ... each party should bear their own [litigation] costs.” 22.  Following an appeal by both parties, on 12 February 2002 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the first-instance judgment in so far as it concerned access rights and maintenance and remitted the case. It upheld the contested judgment in so far as it concerned divorce and custody, which part thereby became final. 23.  In the resumed proceedings, the Zagreb Municipal Court held hearings on 5 July 2002, and on 27 January, 19 March and 12 July 2003. 24.  In addition, on 26 August 2002 the court invited the local social welfare centre to prepare a report and submit its recommendation on the applicant’s contact with his son. In the course of their preparation the expert team of the centre, consisting of a social worker and a psychologist, conducted several joint and separate interviews with the parties. The centre’s experts also contacted the applicant’s son’s school and obtained an opinion on his school performance. 25.  On 7 February 2003 the local social welfare centre submitted its report and recommendation to the court. Its expert team recommended that the contacts between the applicant and his son take place every second Saturday for two hours for the period of three months, and after that every Saturday, in the presence of the mother and a child-welfare professional. However, the centre’s experts suggested that the contacts should not take place in the child’s home as it was not a neutral ground and could give rise to conflicts between the applicant on the one side and Z.J. and her parents on the other. Their report indicated that the applicant’s son was very emotionally attached to his mother, that he did not know his father but wanted to meet him. The expert’s opinion also suggested that the centre impose a child-protection measure of supervision of exercise of parental authority focusing on contacts between the applicant and his son, with a view to facilitating those contacts and assisting the parents in improving communication between them (see paragraph 59 below). 26.  At the hearing held on 19 March 2003 the court heard the parties. 27.  On 4 July 2003 the court rendered a partial judgment whereby it decided on the maintenance for the applicant’s son. At the same time it decided to stay the proceedings in so far they concerned the applicant’s access rights pending the outcome of the concurrent civil proceedings his former wife had instituted against him with a view to depriving him of parental responsibility (see paragraphs 77-78 below). The applicant appealed. 28.  On 3 February 2004 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the partial judgment on maintenance and upheld it. At the same time it quashed the first-instance decision to stay the proceedings and remitted the case. It held that the applicant had the right to maintain contact with his son as long as he was not deprived of parental responsibility. 29.  In the resumed proceedings, on 23 July 2004 the Zagreb Municipal Court adopted a judgment whereby it again granted the applicant access rights and issued a detailed contact schedule. In particular, the court decided that in the first three months the contacts between the applicant and his son were to take place every second Saturday for two hours on the premises of the local social welfare centre and in the presence of the mother and either a psychologist or social worker designated by the centre. In the next three months the contacts were to be arranged in the same manner but every Saturday, and, after another three months, in the same way but in the absence of the mother. After nine months the applicant were to exercise his access rights for four hours every Tuesday and Thursday in those weeks when the applicant’s son had school in the morning, every second weekend, thirty days of summer and seven days of winter holidays, as well as every second official or church holiday. 30.  On 12 April 2005 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the first-instance judgment. The first-instance judgment of 23 July 2004 became final when the second-instance judgment of 12 April 2005 was served on both parties on 29 June 2005. 31.  As Z.J. refused to comply with the above judgment of 23 July 2004 and obstructed the exercise of the applicant’s access rights, on 12 May 2005 he applied for enforcement of that judgment before the Zagreb Municipal Court. 32.  On 25 August 2005 that court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o ovrsi) whereby it ordered Z.J., at the risk of fine of 3,000 Croatian kunas (HRK), to allow the applicant to exercise his access rights. 33.  On 8 November 2005 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the writ. 34.  On 2 December 2005 the local social welfare centre informed the court that Z.J. was not complying with judgment of 23 July 2004 as she had not been bringing the applicant’s son to the scheduled meetings on the centre’s premises where the contacts between him and the applicant were to be arranged. The centre thus asked to court to enforce the judgment through a judicial enforcement officer. 35.  On 22 December 2005 the Zagreb Municipal Court issued a decision whereby it fined Z.J. HRK 3,000 for non-compliance with the judgment of 23 July 2004, and again ordered her, at the risk of further fine of HRK 6,000, to do so within fifteen days. Z.J. appealed but on 21 November 2006 the County Court dismissed her appeal. 36.  In the meantime, on 29 December 2005, Z.J. asked for postponement of enforcement but the Municipal Court dismissed her motion. 37.  Since Z.J. had paid the fine but nevertheless did not comply with the judgment, on 30 November 2006 the Zagreb Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s motion of 27 September 2006 and issued a new writ of execution whereby it ordered a judicial enforcement officer, with the assistance of a pedagogue or a social worker employed with local social welfare centre, and a police officer, to take the applicant’s son from Z.J., or any other person each time the applicant was entitled pursuant to the contact schedule to exercise his access rights, and to return him to her afterwards. Even though the court ordered that the costs of that intervention by the enforcement officer were to be borne by Z.J., it invited the applicant to advance those costs within eight days of the service of the writ. 38.  By a decision of 14 February 2007 the Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings because the applicant had not advanced the costs. The applicant then first on 7 March 2007 appealed against that decision but, on 29 March 2007 withdrew that appeal and, eventually, on 23 November 2007 withdrew his application for enforcement of 12 May 2005 (see paragraph 31 above). 39.  Accordingly, on 4 December 2007 the Zagreb Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings.\n(b)  Second set of enforcement proceedings 40.  Meanwhile, on 23 April 2007 the applicant again applied for enforcement of the above judgment of 23 July 2004 (see paragraph 29 above) before the Zagreb Municipal Court. 41.  On 6 December 2007 that court issued a writ of execution identical to the one of 30 November 2006 (see paragraph 37 above). 42.  On 24 December 2007 Z.J. appealed against the writ and on 2 January 2008 sought that the enforcement be postponed. 43.  On 6 February 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Court dismissed Z.J.’s motion for postponement of the enforcement. On 25 February 2008 Z.J. appealed against that decision. 44.  On 28 February 2011 the Municipal Court forwarded Z.J.’s appeals of 24 December 2007 and 25 February 2008 to the Zagreb County Court for a decision. 45.  By a letter of 19 April 2011 the County Court returned the case file to the Municipal Court asking it to correct certain errors in the first-instance proceedings. 46.  In the meantime, on 10 June 2009 the applicant had lodged a request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining about the length of the second set of the enforcement proceedings. 47.  On 26 September 2011 the Supreme Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and: (a) awarded him HRK 5,000 in compensation, (b) ordered the Zagreb Municipal Court to correct the errors indicated in the Zagreb County Court’s letter of 19 April 2011 within a month (see paragraph 45 above), and (c) ordered the Zagreb County Court to decide on Z.J.’s appeals of 24 December 2007 and 25 February 2008 within three months upon receiving the case file again from the Municipal Court. 48.  By decisions of 6 March 2012 the County Court dismissed Z.J.’s appeals of 24 December 2007 and 25 February 2008. 49.  Meanwhile, on 9 October 2011 the applicant’s son turned eighteen and became an adult. Accordingly, the above enforcement proceedings became obsolete. Consequently, by a decision of 13 January 2013 the Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings. 50.  Parallel to the above civil proceedings concerning inter alia custody and access, the local social welfare centre acted in various ways in order to solve the family conflicts. 51.  On 20 March 2003 the local social welfare centre issued a decision whereby it provisionally granted the applicant access rights until the judgment in the above civil proceedings became final, and issued a contact schedule. In particular, the centre decided that the contacts between the applicant and his son were to take place every second Friday for one hour on its premises in the presence of a child-welfare professional for a period of three months. The decision specified that an appeal against it did not suspend its enforcement. On 14 April 2003 Z.J. appealed against that decision. 52.  On 15 April 2003 the centre informed Z.J. of the need to cooperate with it and enable the contacts between the applicant and his son. It warned her that the failure to do so may be considered as dereliction of her duties as a parent calling for more stringent child-protection measures. 53.  On 27 June 2003 the applicant applied to the centre for enforcement of its decision of 20 March 2003. 54.  However, acting on the appeal by Z.J. of 14 April 2003, on 22 September 2003 the relevant Ministry, as the second-instance administrative authority, quashed the centre’s decision of 20 March 2003 and remitted the case. Accordingly, on 3 December 2003 the centre discontinued the administrative enforcement proceedings instituted by the applicant on 27 June 2003. 55.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant applied to the centre to issue a new decision on his access rights. 56.  On 22 December 2003 the local social welfare centre issued a new decision whereby it again provisionally granted the applicant access rights until the judgment in the above civil proceedings became final, and issued a new contact schedule. The decision specified that an appeal against it did not suspend its enforcement. On 19 January 2004 Z.J. appealed. 57.  On 13 July 2004 the relevant Ministry dismissed that appeal and upheld the centre’s decision. Z.J. then brought an action in the Administrative Court against the Ministry’s decision, which that court dismissed on 17 February 2005. 58.  In the meantime, on 15 October 2004 the applicant applied for enforcement of the local social welfare centre’s decision of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 56 above). However, it would appear that before 29 June 2005, that is, the date on which the judgment of the Zagreb Municipal Court of 23 July 2004 in the above civil proceedings became final (see paragraph 29-30 above) and thus superseded the decision the applicant sought to enforce, the local social welfare centre did not issue an enforcement order or undertake other steps to enforce its decision. 59.  Concurrently with the administrative proceedings described above (see paragraphs 51-58), the local social welfare centre conducted other administrative proceedings. In particular, by a decision of 23 December 2003 the local social welfare centre imposed a child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority (see paragraph 82 below) for a period of one year, appointed a supervising officer and drafted a supervision programme. 60.  On 2 February 2004 the supervision officer informed the centre that Z.J. ignored her calls to arrange the first meeting between the applicant and his son in the execution of the centre’s decision of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 56 above) granting him provisional access rights. On the same day the centre adopted the opinion that the supervision measure should be discontinued as ineffective and that criminal-law measures should be set in motion instead (see paragraph 68 below). 61.  On 1 March 2004 the supervising officer submitted her report to the centre stating that no contacts between the applicant and his son had taken place since the adoption of the centre’s decision of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 56 above). At the same time she proposed that the contacts between the applicant and his son be arranged on school premises in the presence of a pedagogue. 62.  By a decision of 9 March 2004 the centre discontinued the application of the child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of the parental authority imposed by its decision of 23 December 2003 (see paragraph 59 above). It stated that the measure was ineffective given Z.J.’s lack of cooperation and that other, more stringent, child-protection measures were warranted. On 17 March 2004 Z.J. appealed against that decision. 63.  On 17 February 2005 the relevant Ministry quashed the centre’s decisions of 23 December 2003 and 9 March 2004 (see paragraphs 59 and 62 above) and remitted the case. 64.  In the resumed proceedings, after having heard the applicant and Z.J. on 19 April 2005, by a decision of 13 May 2005 the centre again imposed the child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority for a period of one year, appointed a supervising officer and prepared a programme of supervision. Z.J. appealed. 65.  On 3 June, 4 and 31 July 2005 the supervising officer informed the centre that contacts between the applicant and his son had not taken place due to Z.J.’s lack of cooperation. 66.  On 29 December 2005 the relevant Ministry dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the centre’s decision of 13 May 2005 (see paragraph 64 above). 67.  The child-protection measure imposed by the centre in its decision of 13 May 2005 expired on 15 May 2006. Monthly reports submitted by the supervising officer suggest that in that one-year period the applicant had not met his son. 68.  On 5 February 2004 the local social welfare centre invited the Zagreb State Attorney’s Office to bring criminal charges against Z.J. for her failure to cooperate with the centre and the supervising officer, obstruction of measures issued by the centre and dereliction of her duties as a parent regarding her son’s contacts with his father. 69.  On 24 March 2004 the Zagreb State Attorney’s Office informed the social welfare centre that, for the time being, there were no grounds to prosecute Z.J. for the criminal offence of obstruction of the child-protection measures defined in section 215 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 84 below) because the decisions whose execution Z.J. allegedly obstructed had not become final. 70.  On 14 April 2004 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against Z.J. with the same State Attorney’s Office accusing her of the same criminal offence. 71.  On 29 September 2004 the State Attorney’s Office dismissed his criminal complaint. In so doing, it advanced the same reasons as those stated in its letter to the social welfare centre of 24 March 2004 (see paragraph 69 above). 72.  On 18 November 2005 the local social welfare centre informed the State Attorney’s Office that decisions whose execution Z.J. had been obstructing had become final and invited the State Attorney’s Office to criminally prosecute her. 73.  On 5 December 2005 the State Attorney’s Office indicted Z.J. before the Zagreb Municipal Court for having been obstructing the court-ordered contacts between the applicant and his son. In particular, she was charged with the criminal offence of obstruction of child-protection measures laid down in section 215 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 84 below). 74.  By a judgment of 24 June 2008 the Municipal Court found Z.J. guilty as charged and convicted her but the judgment was subsequently quashed by the Zagreb County Court following her appeal and the case was remitted. 75.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 24 January 2011 the Zagreb Municipal Court again found Z.J. guilty as charged and sentenced her to five months’ imprisonment but imposed a suspended sentence with supervision (uvjetna osuda sa zaštitnim nadzorom) for a period of three years provided that in that (probation) period she did not commit a further offence. In its judgment the court noted, inter alia, the following:\n“This court is deeply aware that all decisions and judgments including this one can no longer remedy the harm and evil caused by the conduct of the accused, primarily to her child, who grew up without a father ... However, it can at least emphasise that such behaviour is unacceptable and punishable ... When determining the penalty the court took into account, as aggravating circumstances, the fact that for a number of years the accused deliberately, perfidiously and deceitfully obstructed enforcement of any court decision or decision of the social welfare centre and in so doing behaved arrogantly and acted as if she was untouchable and in that way hindered a healthy and undisturbed development of her son. The court did not find any special mitigating circumstances.” 76.  By a judgment of 16 March 2012 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the first-instance judgment. 77.  In 2002 Z.J. instituted non-contentious proceedings against the applicant before the Zagreb Municipal Court with a view to depriving him of parental responsibility for his son. 78.  By a judgment of 2 November 2004 the court dismissed Z.J.’s petition. It held that her claims that the applicant had abandoned his son, grossly neglected his duties as a parent and failed to pay (regularly) for his maintenance were unfounded. In so doing it relied on the report of the local social welfare centre suggesting that it was Z.J. who had obstructed the applicant’s contacts with his son.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Nicosia. 8.  On 19 July 1989 she joined an anti-Turkish demonstration in the Ayios Kassianos area in Nicosia in which the applicants in the Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey and Loizidou v. Turkey cases (see below) also took part. 9.  According to an affidavit sworn by the applicant before the Nicosia District Court on 3 January 2000, the demonstration of 19 July 1989 was peaceful and was held on the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in support of the missing persons and to protest against human rights violations. 10.  The demonstrators gathered at the Ayios Kassianos school in Nicosia. After United Nations (UN) soldiers had shouted a warning to the demonstrators not to advance further, the applicant was seized by the hair, beaten and assaulted by Turkish military personnel and/or other personnel acting under Turkish control. The beating was inflicted with electrical batons by 3 or 4 policemen all over the applicant’s body, in particular the head and back. One of the blows caused a painful injury to the applicant’s right arm and elbow, with loss of blood. She was then dragged to a small, stiflingly hot room in which other demonstrators were also being held. One of the prisoners had been severely beaten and was unconscious. 11.  The applicant and the other detainees were subsequently led through a hostile crowd that spat and swore at them to a bus that was waiting to take them to the so-called “Pavlides Garage”. As she entered the garage her handbag was seized. She was forced to sit on the floor; the toilet facilities were filthy. A crowd that had gathered outside the garage was swearing, shouting abuse and threats and throwing stones, some of which came through the corrugated iron roof. One of the detainees, a doctor, treated the applicant’s arm, which was still bleeding, with whatever he had to hand and bandaged it. One of the female prisoners (Mrs Vrahimi – see application no. 16078/90) was then beaten in front of the others, who remained silent, fearing for their own fate. A woman shouted that she was an American citizen and was released shortly afterwards. 12.  While in the garage, the applicant was interrogated but refused to sign the statement, which was written in Turkish. The interrogation took place in Greek and touched mainly on political subjects. The next day, 20 July 1989, she and the other detainees were given food and at the same time photographed and filmed by a television crew. 13.  Later that day, after being subjected to a body search, the applicant was taken to a court which remanded her in custody for two days. She was transferred with other women who had been arrested at the same time to the Ortakeuy prison, where she was held in a cell with another woman. The conditions of detention were appalling, the cell was unbearably hot and during the night the applicant and the other detainees were constantly checked and counted by the guards and as a result, were unable to sleep. The applicant went on hunger strike. 14.  During the evening of 21 July 1989 the applicant was taken to the Nicosia District Court for trial. The judge asked her and the other accused whether they wanted legal representation; they replied that they would only accept as defence counsel a lawyer registered with the bar association of the Republic of Cyprus. As a result, they were not assisted by a lawyer. The interpretation into Greek was poor and did not cover all the words used by the witnesses and the parties. Each time an accused tried to speak and give an explanation, she was interrupted. Although the applicant had never previously seen some of the exhibits that were produced at the trial (notably a pair of scissors, gloves and a saw), one of the prosecution witnesses said that he had found a penknife in her handbag. The applicant alleged that she had taken it with her to peel an apple and that the blade was not even two inches long. She tried to explain the position to the judge but was not allowed to. She showed her bandaged arm in order to complain about the beating she had suffered, but an officer replied that she could have injured herself by falling down. After the trial the applicant was taken back to prison. 15.  On 22 July 1989 the court ordered the applicant to enter into a recognizance of 1,000,000 Turkish liras as a guarantee that she would not commit further breaches of the peace for a period of one year. The trial judge noted that it was the second time the applicant had illegally entered “TRNC” territory. Most of the accused, including the applicant, were also sentenced to 2 days’ imprisonment and a fine of 50 Cypriot pounds (CYP – approximately 85 euros (EUR)), with five additional days in prison in default of payment within 24 hours. After the public delivery of the judgment, they were returned to prison. 16.  On 24 July 1989 the applicant was released and taken by bus to southern Cyprus. 17.  As a result of the beating described above, three of the applicant’s vertebrae were damaged. The doctors told her that the condition of her central nerve was continuously deteriorating and that no surgery could be carried out. 18.  The Government alleged that the applicant had participated in a violent demonstration with the aim of enflaming anti-Turkish sentiment. The demonstrators, supported by the Greek-Cypriot administration, were demanding that the “Green Line” in Nicosia should be dismantled. Some carried Greek flags, clubs, knives and wire-cutters. They were acting in a provocative manner and shouting abuse. The demonstrators were warned in Greek and English that unless they dispersed they would be arrested in accordance with the laws of the “TRNC”. The applicant was arrested by the Turkish-Cypriot police after crossing the UN buffer zone and entering the area under Turkish-Cypriot control. The Turkish-Cypriot police intervened in the face of the manifest inability of the Greek-Cypriot authorities and the UN Force in Cyprus to contain the incursion and its possible consequences. 19.  No force was used against demonstrators who did not intrude into the “TRNC” border area and, in the case of demonstrators who were arrested for violating the border, no more force was used than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances in order to arrest and detain the persons concerned. No one was ill-treated. It was possible that some of the demonstrators had hurt themselves in the confusion or in attempting to scale barbed wire or other fencing. Had the Turkish police, or anyone else, assaulted or beaten any of the demonstrators, the UN Secretary General would no doubt have referred to this in his report to the Security Council. 20.  The applicant was charged, tried, found guilty and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. She pleaded not guilty, but did not give evidence and declined to use the available judicial remedies. She was asked if she required assistance from a lawyer registered in the “TRNC”, but refused and did not ask for legal representation. Interpretation services were provided at the trial by qualified interpreters. All the proceedings were translated into Greek. 21.  In his report of 7 December 1989 on the UN operations in Cyprus, the UN Secretary General stated, inter alia:\n“A serious situation, however, arose in July as a result of a demonstration by Greek Cypriots in Nicosia. The details are as follows:\n(a) In the evening of 19 July, some 1,000 Greek Cypriot demonstrators, mostly women, forced their way into the UN buffer zone in the Ayios Kassianos area of Nicosia. The demonstrators broke through a wire barrier maintained by UNFICYP and destroyed an UNFICYP observation post. They then broke through the line formed by UNFICYP soldiers and entered a former school complex where UNFICYP reinforcements regrouped to prevent them from proceeding further. A short while later, Turkish-Cypriot police and security forces elements forced their way into the area and apprehended 111 persons, 101 of them women;\n(b) The Ayios Kassianos school complex is situated in the UN buffer zone. However, the Turkish forces claim it to be on their side of the cease-fire line. Under working arrangements with UNFICYP, the Turkish-Cypriot security forces have patrolled the school grounds for several years within specific restrictions. This patrolling ceased altogether as part of the unmanning agreement implemented last May;\n(c) In the afternoon of 21 July, some 300 Greek Cypriots gathered at the main entrance to the UN protected area in Nicosia, in which the UN headquarters is located, to protest the continuing detention by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities of those apprehended at Ayios Kassianos. The demonstrators, whose number fluctuated between 200 and 2,000, blocked all UN traffic through this entrance until 30 July, when the Turkish-Cypriot authorities released the last two detainees;\n(d) The events described above created considerable tension in the island and intensive efforts were made, both at the UN headquarters and at Nicosia, to contain and resolve the situation. On 21 July, I expressed my concern at the events that have taken place and stressed that it was vital that all parties keep in mind the purpose of the UN buffer zone as well as their responsibility to ensure that that area was not violated. I also urged the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to release without delay all those who had been detained. On 24 July, the President of the Security Council announced that he had conveyed to the representatives of all the parties, on behalf of the members of the Council, the Council’s deep concern at the tense situation created by the incidents of 19 July. He also stressed the need strictly to respect the UN buffer zone and appealed for the immediate release of all persons still detained. He asked all concerned to show maximum restraint and to take urgent steps that would bring about a relaxation of tension and contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the negotiations.” 22.  The applicant produced 21 photographs taken at different times during the demonstration on 19 July 1989. Photographs 1 to 7 were intended to show that, notwithstanding the deployment of the Turkish-Cypriot police, the demonstration was peaceful. In photographs 8 to 10 members of the Turkish-Cypriot police are seen breaking up the UNFICYP cordon. The final set of photographs show members of the Turkish-Cypriot police using force to arrest some of the women demonstrators. 23.  The English translation of the Nicosia District Court judgment of 22 July 1989 indicates that the applicant, together with 23 other women, was charged with two offences: entering “TRNC” territory without permission (contrary to sections 2, 8 and 9 of Law No. 5/72 – see paragraph 30 below) and entering “TRNC” territory other than through an approved port (contrary to subsections 12(1) and (5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law – see paragraph 31 below). 24.  The judgment was given in the presence of the accused and of an interpreter. The trial judge noted the following:\n(i) the accused did not accept the charges against them and stated that they did not wish to use the services of a lawyer registered in the “TRNC”;\n(ii) some of the accused had fainted during the trial and had been taken to hospital and excused from attending the hearing;\n(iii) the public prosecutor called 7 witnesses, whose statements were translated into Greek for the accused’s benefit;\n(iv) the witnesses (mainly police officers on duty at the time of the demonstration) declared that the accused had illegally entered the “TRNC” buffer zone, shouted abuse at the Turkish-Cypriot forces, resisted arrest by pulling and pushing; knives and other cutting objects had been found in the bags of some of the demonstrators who had been arrested; in particular, the witnesses declared that the demonstrators had passed the barriers at the UN observation post, broken the wooden door of a church and moved toward a water reservoir; according to a map shown at trial, the area where the accused had entered was “TRNC” territory;\n(v) the accused did not call any defence witnesses and did not address the court;\n(vi) the accused had been told that they could cross-examine witnesses in turn and, if they so wished, choose one of their number to cross-examine the witnesses on behalf of all the accused; however, they had not done so;\n(vii) relying on the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the District Court came to the conclusion that the accused had crossed the borders of the “TRNC” at an unapproved entry point and without permission and had resisted by various means the UN and Turkish forces which had tried to stop them;\n(viii) the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, so that the accused were guilty on both counts;\n(ix) in deciding on the sentence, the District Court took into account the seriousness of the offence, and the fact that the accused had shown no remorse and continued to deny the validity of the “TRNC”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Beograd. The second applicant is a joint stock company with its seat in Beograd. 5.  On 11 October 1991 the second applicant directly instituted enforcement proceedings in the Novi Sad Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud u Novom Sadu) against a certain company V. 6.  On 30 October 1991 the court issued an enforcement order. Since V. filed an objection, the case was transformed into civil proceedings. 7.  The second applicant amended its claim on four occasions: on 4 May and 19 November 1993, 9 February and 12 October 1994. 8.  On 15 February 1995 the court gave a judgment in the second applicant’s favour, accepting its claim in part. On 6 October 1995 the court gave a supplementary judgment (dopunska presuda) in the case. 9.  On 30 May 1996 the Beograd High Commercial Court (Viši Trgovinski sud u Beogradu) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case because of factual shortcomings. 10.  By this time, four different judges had been assigned to hear the second applicant’s case, the last change of judges having occurred on 23 January 2003. 11.  On 11 November 2004 the court appointed an expert, ordering him to prepare his opinion within 30 days. This expert submitted his opinion on 14 October 2005. 12.  The court subsequently held hearings on 30 November 2005, 25 January and 13 February 2006. The hearing scheduled for 20 December 2005 was adjourned because the second applicant failed to appear. 13.  On 13 February 2006 the court closed the main hearing and gave a judgment dismissing the second applicant’s claim. 14.  On appeal, on 3 November 2006 the Beograd High Commercial Court again quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 15.  In the resumed proceedings, on 8 December 2006 the Novi Sad Commercial Court stayed the proceedings because, meanwhile, on 22 March 2006 the Zrenjanin Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud u Zrenjaninu) had opened bankruptcy proceedings against the second applicant. 16.  The proceedings resumed on 16 February 2007, when the Novi Sad Commercial Court declared that it no longer had territorial jurisdiction in the matter and sent the case file to the Zrenjanin Commercial Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Tychy, Poland. 10.  He is a member and an employee of a labour co-operative (spółdzielnia pracy). 11.  On 12 April 1991 he filed with the Warsaw Regional Court an action in which he requested the annulment of several resolutions adopted by the assembly of the representatives of the co-operative (walne zgromadzenie). The contested resolutions concerned the co-operative’s finances. 12.  Between 1992 and 1995, in addition to the original claim, the applicant challenged other resolutions relating to the division of the yearly profits of the co-operative. 13.  On 18 November 1992 the court heard two witnesses and ordered an expert opinion. 14.  On 14 May 1993 the applicant extended his claim. 15.  On 9 September 1993 an expert refused to prepare the opinion ordered by the court, relying on the applicant’s alleged lack of co-operation. The applicant submits that that allegation was not confirmed by the court. 16.  At the hearing held on 15 October 1993 the court summoned the applicant to submit documents that could be of relevance to that opinion. 17.  The opinion was submitted to the court in March 1994. 18.  On 3 March 1994 the applicant modified his claim. 19.  On 24 March 1994 the court issued a decision concerning the remuneration of the court expert. The decision was subsequently amended by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. 20.  On 9 May 1994 the applicant extended his claim. 21.  In a letter of 9 August 1994 the President of the Warsaw Court of Appeal admitted that the time-limit for preparing the expert opinion had not been observed by the expert and that there had been periods of inactivity on the part of the Regional Court. On 10 October 1994 the court refused the applicant’s request for exemption from court costs. On 13 December 1994 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 22.  On 21 October 1994 and 4 April 1995 the applicant modified his claim. 23.  According to the Government, on 19 May 1995 the court held a hearing. The applicant submits that it was adjourned because the defendant had not been duly summoned. 24.  On 23 May 1995 the court dismissed the applicant’s subsequent request for exemption from court costs. On 3 October 1995 the Warsaw Court of Appeal amended in part that decision. 25.  On 7 February 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. 26.  On 21 March and 1 July 1996 the applicant extended his claim. 27.  The Government submit that the hearing scheduled for 4 December 1996 was adjourned, as the parties considered reaching a settlement. The applicant states that the court itself suggested the settlement of the case and gave the parties a time-limit to start negotiations. On 22 January 1997 the defendant informed the court that no settlement had been reached. 28.  On 5 November 1997 the court held another hearing. 29.  On 14 November 1997 it gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s action. The applicant appealed. 30.  On 24 April 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal gave judgment. It quashed a part of the first-instance court’s judgment and remitted the case in that part for re-examination. The applicant lodged with the Supreme Court a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 31.  On 25 May 2001 the Supreme Court refused to admit that appeal. 32.  Subsequently, pursuant to the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal, some of the applicant’s claims were remitted to the Warsaw Regional Court for re-examination. 33.  On 14 January 2002 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. 34.  On 28 January 2002 it gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 14 May 2002 the applicant appealed. 35.  By a final judgment of 4 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant company was founded in 1992 and is based in Baia Mare. 5.  On 14 March 1996 the applicant company lodged an action seeking to compel company A. (a State-owned private company) to return 2,934,854,487 Romanian lei (ROL), representing the price of merchandise delivered by the applicant and not paid by A., plus interest. The defendant objected, claiming that the debt had already been paid. 6.  The applicant paid ROL 10,000 in court fees but was asked by the court to make a supplementary payment to cover a percentage of the total claim. On 31 May 1996 the court calculated the fee at ROL 270,162,136.\nOn 28 June 1996 the company contested the new court fee and argued that according to the law, as interpreted by the higher courts, it should only pay ROL 10,000.\nOn 4 October 1996 it reiterated its position on the matter. 7.  On the same day the court started deliberations in the case. 8.  On 11 October 1996 the court restored the case to its list and summoned the parties to a hearing on 29 November 1996 to discuss the need for an expert evaluation of the claims. 9.  On 20 January 1997 company A. accepted the calculation of the debt. 10.  An evaluation of the debt was ordered and the report was submitted to the court on 11 December 1997. 11.  On several occasions during the proceedings the defendant asked that the applicant company be requested to pay court fees. Several adjournments were granted to this end. 12.  On 26 September 1997 the defendant informed the court that insolvency proceedings had been initiated against it (see paragraph 19 below). 13.  On 5 February 1998 the Maramureş County Court cancelled the action for failure to pay the court fees. It also noted that the applicant company had never contested the level of the court fee. 14.  The applicant company appealed, arguing that according to the law on which it based its initial action the court fee was set at a lump sum of ROL 10,000 irrespective of the amount claimed, a sum which it had already paid over at the start of the proceedings. The applicant paid the court fees for the appeal in the amount of ROL 10,000 and ROL 3,000 in judicial stamps. 15.  On 27 May 1998 the Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as unfounded. The decision was enforceable. 16.  On 24 June 1998 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. 17.  On 9 May 2006 the applicant company sought information on the proceedings from the Maramureş County Court. In reply, on 12 May 2006 the County Court informed the applicant company that due to an administrative error the appeal on points of law had only been forwarded to the Supreme Court of Justice on 12 May 2006. 18.  In a final decision of 15 February 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the appeal as ill-founded. It noted that in so far as the debtor contested the claim, the first‑instance court was correct in seeking court fees proportionate to the value of the claim. 19.  On 5 April 1995 one of company A.'s creditors sought institution of insolvency proceedings against company A., under the relevant Articles of the Commercial Code. 20.  From 10 May 1995 to 25 June 1997 the proceedings were stayed at company A.'s request, as the Government had adopted programmes for the financial rehabilitation of the company (Government Ordinance no. 13/1995 on restructuring State-owned companies). 21.  On 18 March 1998 the Maramureş County Court declared company A. insolvent. Following the reports on the company's financial situation, on 9 July 1998 it started winding-up proceedings. 22.  On 11 June 1998 the applicant company requested the inclusion in the creditors' list of its claim of 1,474,012.64 United States dollars (USD). The claim was contested by the “debtor”, company A.\nOn 9 February 1999 the applicant reiterated its claim, which was included provisionally in the creditors' list pending examination of the objections raised. 23.  On 16 February 2000 the County Court rejected the applicant company's claim as no longer enforceable (prescrisă). It considered that enforcement time had not been interrupted by the action for recovery of debt, in so far as that action had been annulled for failure to pay the court fees. 24.  On 22 November 2000 the Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. It reiterated that the claim was no longer enforceable. It also considered that the claim, which had been contested by the debtor, had not been certified and quantified in the proceedings for recovery of debt, because the applicant's action had been cancelled. 25.  On 20 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the decision, which thus became final. 26.  On 30 May 2000 the Oradea Customs Office (Direcţia Generală Vamală Oradea) sought the winding up of the applicant company's business for an unpaid debt of ROL 458,121,902. 27.  On 26 June 2000 the proceedings were stayed as the applicant company contested the debt (the applicant company won that action on 18 September 2002). 28.  On 3 November 2003 the Maramureş County Court started the winding-up proceedings. On 21 January 2004 the Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal quashed the decision and rejected the 30 May 2000 request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1949, 1951, 1976, 1977, 1984, 1993, 2003 and 1981 respectively and live in Yerevan. 5.  Mr Sisak Danielyan, Ms Kima Danielyan, Mr Andranik Danielyan, Ms Naira Danielyan, Ms Seda Danielyan and Ms Sona Danielyan jointly owned a house measuring 130 sq. m. situated at 11 Byuzand Street, Yerevan. The applicants alleged that Ms Meri Danielyan and Ms Kristine Mnatsakanyan, as members of their family, enjoyed a right of use in respect of this house, while the Government contested this allegation and claimed that they did not enjoy the right of use in respect of the house and simply had the right to live in it. 6.  On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the immovable property (plots of land, buildings and constructions) situated within the administrative boundaries of the Central District of Yerevan to be taken for the needs of the State for the purpose of carrying out construction projects, covering a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. 7.  On 17 June 2004 the Government adopted Decree no. 909-N, contracting out the construction of one of the sections of Byuzand Street – which was to be renamed as Main Avenue – to a private company, Glendale Hills CJSC. 8.  On 28 July 2004 Glendale Hills CJSC and the Yerevan Mayor’s Office signed an agreement which, inter alia, authorised the former to negotiate directly with the owners of the property subject to expropriation and, should such negotiations fail, to institute court proceedings on behalf of the State, seeking forced expropriation of such property. 9.  It appears that Glendale Hills CJSC attempted to organise a measuring and valuation of the applicants’ house in order to offer them compensation for the purposes of expropriation, unsuccessfully, since the applicants created obstacles. 10.  On 10 March 2005 Glendale Hills CJSC instituted proceedings on behalf of the State against all the applicants except one (Ms Kristine Mnatsakanyan), seeking to oblige them to allow a valuation of their house and sign an agreement on taking of their property for State needs based on the results of such valuation, and to evict them. 11.  On 15 March 2005 all the applicants except one (Ms Meri Danielyan) lodged a counter-claim in which they contested the constitutionality of Government Decree no. 1151-N. They submitted, inter alia, that this Decree contradicted Article 28 of the Constitution, according to which property could be expropriated only through the adoption of a law concerning the property in question. They further submitted that the Government was not authorised under the same Article to decide on the expropriation of property. 12.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the claim of Glendale Hills CJSC, ordering that the defendants be evicted through payment of compensation. The amount of compensation was to be estimated according to the market value following the relevant valuation. The District Court also ordered that they pay court fees in the amount of 4,000 Armenian drams (AMD). It appears that the District Court refused to admit the applicants’ counter-claim on the ground that it was not competent to decide upon the constitutionality of Government Decree no. 1151-N. 13.  On 29 March 2005 the defendant applicants lodged an appeal. 14.  It appears that on 18 April 2005 Orran Ltd real estate company carried out a valuation of the house in question, which was valued at the Armenian dram equivalent of USD 82,600. 15.  On 21 April 2005 the Court of Appeal granted the claim of Glendale Hills CJSC. The Court of Appeal found that the defendants were obliged to give up their ownership through payment of compensation and decided to terminate their ownership by awarding them the Armenian dram equivalent of USD 82,600. 16.  On 5 May 2005 the seven applicants in question lodged an appeal on points of law. On 13 May 2005 they filed additional submissions to their appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the deprivation of their property was in violation of Article 28 of the Constitution. 17.  On 27 May 2005 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Ruše. 6.  On 11 November 2006 K.R. sent a letter to the applicant by registered mail. In the letter, she asked the applicant to repay a loan which she had given to her in 2004 within thirty days of receipt of the letter, and stated that she would institute court proceedings if the applicant failed to pay. 7.  Following the applicant’s refusal on 13 November 2006 to accept the letter and sign the notice of receipt, K.R. resent it by ordinary mail. 8.  On 20 November 2006 the applicant replied to K.R. with a letter, the relevant parts of which read:\n“I do not owe you anything!\nIt is true that you gave me some money as a gift. I did not want to take it, but you literally forced me, saying that you did not have anyone to whom you could give it and that I had helped you a lot... Those were your words, remember!\nFor the time being, I do not have any money. I have a loan that I have not yet repaid; therefore, for now, I cannot return your gift.\n...\nWhen I have it, I will gladly return your gift!” 9.  On 13 December 2006 K.R. brought an action against the applicant, claiming repayment of the loan (totalling 14,000 euros (EUR)) which she had allegedly given to her in July and August 2004, on the basis of oral agreements. In order to prove that the loan existed, K.R. attached to her claim the letter written by the applicant on 20 November 2006 (see paragraph 8 above), as the only evidence in support of her claim. 10.  On 22 January 2007 the applicant, allegedly unaware of the claim which had been brought against her, travelled to Vienna in order to obtain a visa for a trip to Namibia. She stayed in Vienna until 26 January 2007, when she obtained a visa, and flew to Namibia on the same day. 11.  On 24 January 2007 the Maribor District Court forwarded K.R.’s claim to the applicant, advising her that she had thirty days to file her observations. Referring to section 277 of the Civil Procedure Act, the District Court warned the applicant that, in the event that she failed to reply within the given time-limit, it would grant the claim by default judgment. 12.  On 25 January 2007 the postman tried (unsuccessfully) to serve the applicant with the court documents, including the claim, at her home address. He left in her mailbox a standard official delivery slip used in registered mail deliveries, which was printed on a thin piece of paper measuring 7.3 cm by 10 cm. The slip informed her that he would return the following day. 13.  The following day, having not located the applicant at her address, the postman left another delivery slip of identical dimensions in her mailbox, informing her that she could collect the relevant correspondence at the post office within the next fifteen days. The delivery slip included a reference to sections 140 and 141 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 26 below). 14.  As the applicant did not collect the mail from the post office within fifteen days, the letter in question was returned to the Maribor District Court by the post office, with a note indicating that the correspondence had not been collected, and that a delivery slip had been left in the applicant’s mailbox. Service was deemed to have been effected on 26 January 2007, when the delivery slip was left in her mailbox; therefore, the deadline for her to file any observations expired on 26 February 2007. 15.  The applicant claims that, upon her return from Namibia on 24 March 2007, she did not find either of the two delivery slips allegedly left by the postman in her mailbox, and that she was entirely unaware of the proceedings which were pending. 16.  On 14 September 2007 the Maribor District Court issued a default judgment, allowing K.R.’s claim and ordering the applicant to pay her EUR 14,000 with default interest within fifteen days. The relevant reasoning of the District Court was as follows:\n“The court had to establish from the facts which were submitted with the claim whether or not the claim was well-founded, and whether or not the facts on which the claim was based contradicted the evidence submitted by the plaintiff herself, or facts which are generally known.\nThe plaintiff submitted with the claim a letter from the defendant dated 20 November 2006 (A3), from which it appears that she received ‘some money’ as a gift.\nThe submissions of the defendant in the letter dated 20 November 2006 – that she received some money as a gift – do not, of themselves, negate the plaintiff’s submissions that the plaintiff gave the money as a loan, yet the defendant was given the opportunity and the right to defend her position in the proceedings before the court by submitting a response to the claim [and] has failed to do so.\nIn addition, the submissions of the defendant in the letter dated 20 November 2006 that she would return the money which had been given to her (‘When I have it, I will gladly return your gift!’) cannot be ignored either.” 17.  The default judgment was served on the applicant on 19 September 2007. 18.  On 28 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s default judgment and an application to reinstate the proceedings. She explained that she had failed to respond to the claim owing to her absence from Slovenia, submitted that she had not received the delivery slips allegedly left in her mailbox, and asked the court to set aside the decision and order the reservice of K.R.’s claim. As proof of her absence, she attached to both the appeal and the application to reinstate the proceedings a document issued by a travel company, L., confirming that she had been issued with a plane ticket for a flight from Munich to Windhoek on 26 January 2007 and a return ticket for 24 March 2007. She also attached copies of pages from her passport which contained a valid tourist visa for Namibia for the period between 26 January 2007 and 21 April 2007, and Namibian border control stamps confirming her entry to Namibia on 27 January 2007 and her departure on 24 March 2007. 19.  On 13 December 2007 the Maribor District Court rejected the applicant’s application to reinstate the proceedings, on the basis that the application had been lodged outside the three-month time-limit. It held that the applicant should have found the delivery slips left in her mailbox by the end of March at the latest after she had returned from Namibia. Therefore, she should have lodged an application to reinstate the proceedings within three months of her return. The applicant appealed. 20.  On 9 September 2008 the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the 14 September 2007 and 13 December 2007 decisions of the District Court. It held that it could not accept the applicant’s submissions that there had been no delivery slips in her mailbox, as it had been noted on the notice of delivery that they had been left there. It further dismissed the applicant’s submissions that the evidence used by the plaintiff (namely the letter of 20 November 2006) contradicted the facts alleged. 21.  On 4 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 22.  On 11 November 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the conditions for issuing a default judgment had been fulfilled. In respect of the issue of whether or not the evidence used by the plaintiff contradicted the submissions set out in the claim, the Supreme Court held as follows:\n“It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff attached to the claim [the applicant’s letter of 20 November 2006 – see paragraph 8 above] that the letter referred to a gift as well as to the return of a gift. It should be stressed that, for the purpose of issuing a default judgment, it is not important that the evidence submitted confirms the plaintiff’s allegations (in the present case, allegations concerning a loan). It is only important that the allegations contained in the claim do not contradict either the evidence which has been submitted or generally known facts. Since it cannot be concluded from the letter that [the money] was not a loan but a gift, the issuing of the default judgment was correct.” 23.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. 24.  On 22 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint by referring to section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 30 below). 25.  On an unknown date after the decision of 14 September 2007 became final, K.R. instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant. She later withdrew the application for enforcement after the applicant paid her the sum of EUR 4,000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  The applicant is an active member of civil society who holds leading positions in several NGOs, including the Unity of Armenian Volunteers, the Defence of Liberated Lands and Araks‑Kur charity fund. He is of an Armenian origin and since 1992 has apparently been permanently resident in Armenia where he has a family and owns an apartment. 7.  The applicant appears to be a critic of the Armenian authorities. He alleges that in this connection he has been invited to visit the National Security Service (NSS) on several occasions, where he was ordered to stop his cooperation with the opposition and his criticism of the government. 8.  On an unspecified date the Head of the Principal Department for Safeguarding the Constitutional Order and Fight Against Terrorism of the NSS filed a motion, seeking to carry out secret surveillance and recording of the applicant’s telephone and other conversations. 9.  On 15 August 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan examined the motion, finding:\n“It is evident from the materials submitted to the court and the motion that the Principal Department for Safeguarding the Constitutional Order and Fight Against Terrorism of the NSS has sufficient grounds to believe that [the applicant], born in 1967 in Lebanon, a Lebanese national, residing at 17 Lepsius Str, apt 42, Yerevan, leader of the Armenian Volunteers Unity organisation, is carrying out activities aimed to destabilise the internal political situation in Armenia and to create a situation of civil disobedience, thereby creating a basis for the change of government in Armenia through unconstitutional means by making public calls.” 10.  The District Court decided to grant the motion, authorising the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone and other conversations made to and from the applicant’s three mobile and three landline numbers for a period of six months, taking into account that they might contain information substantiating the above-mentioned circumstances, the use of which would facilitate the disclosure of a crime and obtaining evidence, since there were elements of an offence prescribed by Article 301 of the Criminal Code (CC) in the applicant’s actions. In doing so, the District Court referred to, inter alia, Articles 281 and 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 11.  On 2 December 2006 the applicant gave a speech at an assembly organised by the Unity of Armenian Volunteers. The assembly took place in the hall of the Yerevan State Choreography College and was attended by about 150 people. The applicant called on the participants of the assembly to get organised, otherwise nothing would move forward. It was not enough to keep telling the President and the Prime Minister to resign; they would never do that. Peaceful assemblies would not make them resign. Nor would external pressure. He called on the participants to create a significant force, in order to make the authorities resign, stating that the main and only objective was to get rid of them. He further stressed that they should not allow those in power to multiply, otherwise the future plans of the participants of the assembly would encounter serious obstacles. The applicant called the authorities “monsters” who would become even more dangerous if they were allowed to multiply. The applicant agreed with other speech makers that any means were acceptable for achieving their goals. 12.  On 8 December 2006 the Investigative Department of the National Security Service decided to institute criminal proceedings under Article 301 of the CC on the ground that public calls for a violent overthrow of the government had been made during the speeches given at the above assembly. 13.  On 9 December 2006 at 10.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested and taken to the NSS. 14.  On the same date the applicant’s office was searched, as a result of which a revolver and various types of bullets were found. 15.  On 10 December 2006 at 3.45 p.m. the relevant arrest record was drawn up. It stated that the applicant was suspected of offences under Articles 235 § 1 and 301 of the CC. It appears that his passport was seized. 16.  On the same date the applicant was questioned as a suspect. He refused to give testimony, stating that the criminal proceedings against him were politically motivated. 17.  On 12 December 2006 the applicant was formally charged under Articles 235 § 1 and 301 of the CC. He was accused of making calls for a violent overthrow of the government and of not handing in, and illegally keeping, his weapon after his demobilisation in 1998. Another person, V.M., who had also given a speech at the above assembly, was accused together with the applicant under Article 301 of the CC. Their speeches had been recorded. 18.  On the same date the investigator filed a motion with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to have the applicant detained for a period of two months and arguing that, if at large, he could abscond and obstruct the investigation. It appears that on the same date three members of the parliament filed a statement with the District Court, giving their personal guarantees for the applicant’s proper conduct and requesting that no detention be imposed. 19.  On the same date the District Court examined the investigator’s motion, including the charge and the circumstances surrounding it. The District Court decided to grant the motion, taking into account the nature and degree of dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that it was at the top of the list of offences directed against state power and finding that the materials of the case provided sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on persons involved in the proceedings. 20.  On 19 December 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing, inter alia, that there was no reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence and that the District Court had failed to provide reasons justifying the necessity of his placement in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the investigating authority had a recording of his speech at its disposal, so the allegation that he could unlawfully influence witnesses was unfounded. Furthermore, the allegation that he could abscond was not supported by any arguments or evidence, while the court did not take into account the fact that he was a permanent resident in Armenia, with two minor children and an elderly, sick mother who were dependent on him. 21.  On 27 December 2006 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In dismissing the applicant’s argument about the lack of a reasonable suspicion, the Court of Appeal found that his involvement in the imputed acts, which included features of offences envisaged by Articles 235 § 1 and 301 of the CC, was substantiated by evidence, such as various records and expert opinions, produced by the investigator and examined in court. As to the reasons given by the District Court, the Court of Appeal found these to be justified. 22.  On the same date the applicant filed a motion requesting to be released on bail. He submitted that he was known to the investigating authority and the court, he had a clear and concrete place of residence and he had never attempted to abscond. He asked the court to fix the amount of bail. 23.  On 30 December 2007 another person, V.A., who was the applicant’s friend, was also charged under Article 235 § 1 of the CC with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in the context of the same criminal proceedings. 24.  On 7 January 2007 the District Court refused the applicant’s request for bail, citing the same grounds as those justifying his detention. 25.  On 22 January 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, adding that the applicant was a foreign national and therefore could abscond. Furthermore, it was unacceptable to release the applicant on bail in view of the fact that his co-accused, V.A., who was also charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, was in detention. 26.  On 1 February 2007 the investigator filed a motion with the District Court seeking to have the applicant’s detention period, which was to expire on 10 February 2007, extended by two months. The investigator argued that the applicant could abscond because he was a foreign national. He further argued that on 15 January 2007 the applicant had transmitted through his lawyer a short note to co-accused V.A. which said “be strong”. This suggested that he was attempting to exert unlawful influence on the participants in the proceedings. 27.  On 7 February 2007 the District Court, having examined the investigator’s motion and other materials, granted this motion, finding that there was a need to carry out further investigative measures and citing the same grounds as before in justifying the applicant’s continued detention. 28.  On 8 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal. In his appeal he argued, inter alia, that the extension of his detention had been effected in violation of the time-limits prescribed by Article 139 § 1 of the CCP. 29.  On 23 February 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the District Court, taking into account the circumstances mentioned in the investigator’s motion, had taken a reasoned decision, since the grounds for the applicant’s detention had not ceased to exist. As to the violation of the time-limits, the Court of Appeal considered this not to be of such gravity as to have affected the correct outcome of examination of the investigator’s motion. 30.  On 30 March 2007 the investigator filed a motion with the District Court seeking to have the applicant’s detention period, which was to expire on 10 April 2007, extended by two months on the same grounds. 31.  On 4 April 2007 the District Court examined and granted this motion on the same grounds. In the proceedings before the District Court the applicant’s lawyer asked the court whether any evidence had been submitted by the investigator in support of his motion which would be examined in court. The presiding judge replied that the materials of the criminal case related to the motion had been submitted by the investigator during the examination of his previous motion. These materials had been examined and returned by the court. The criminal procedure rules did not allow the lawyers access to the materials of a criminal case before the completion of the investigation. 32.  Following this announcement the applicant’s lawyer challenged the judge’s impartiality, inter alia, on the ground that the judge had not disclosed the materials in question to the defence during the previous proceedings. The judge dismissed this challenge with reference to, inter alia, Article 73 § 1 (12) of the CCP. 33.  On 19 April 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments as previously. 34.  The applicant alleged that his lawyers had not been notified of the hearing to take place upon his appeal and were therefore not able to appear. 35.  The Government contested this allegation and alleged that on 11 May 2007 the Court of Appeal had sent notifications to both the General Prosecutor’s Office and the applicant’s lawyers, which were received by them, informing them that the hearing on the applicant’s appeal would take place on 14 May 2007. 36.  On 14 May 2007 the applicants lawyers filed a challenge with the Chairman of the Court of Appeal, contesting the impartiality of the judges who were assigned to examine the appeal. The lawyers stated in their challenge that they had been informed on 11 March that the case had been assigned to a judge rapporteur. 37.  On the same date the Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal in the absence of both parties. The Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the appeal with the same reasoning as on 23 February 2007. This decision stated that the parties had been duly notified of the hearing but failed to appear. The same follows from the transcript of the court hearing, in which it was stated that the parties had also been informed by a judge’s assistant by telephone. It appears that a copy of this decision was received by the applicant’s lawyers on 18 May 2007. 38.  In May 2007 the investigation was over and from 15 to 29 May the applicant was granted access to the case file. He submits that only then did he find out about the decision of 15 August 2006 authorising the secret surveillance of his telephone communications. 39.  On 5 June 2007 the prosecutor approved the indictment and the case was sent to court. 40.  On 7 June 2007 Judge M. of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to take over the applicant’s criminal case. 41.  On 10 June 2007 the applicant’s detention period, authorised by the decision of 4 April 2007, expired. 42.  On 12 June 2007 the applicant complained to the General Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice that his detention authorised by a court had expired on 10 June 2007 and that his continued detention was unlawful. He sought to be released. 43.  On 22 June 2007 Judge M. decided to put the applicant’s criminal case down for trial. This decision stated that the preventive measure imposed on the applicant was to remain unchanged. 44.  On 6 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan found the applicant guilty under Article 235 § 1 and acquitted him under Article 301. The District Court, having examined the statements the applicant had made in his speech, found that they could not be qualified as calls for a violent overthrow of the government. As to the charge of illegal possession of a weapon, the District Court found that the applicant had kept the weapon and the ammunition without a permit after his demobilisation. The applicant was sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant’s two co-accused were found guilty as charged. 45.  On 25 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld this judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the town of Novovolyns'k, Volyn' region. 5.  On 12 November 2002 the Novovolyns'k Court ordered the State-owned mine No. 5 “Novovolyns'ka” to pay the applicant UAH 28,422[1] in compensation for damage to his health. This judgment became final and the writ of execution was issued on the same day. 6.  On 25 December 2002 the Novovolyns'k Office of the Bailiffs' Service (hereinafter “the Bailiffs”) initiated the enforcement proceedings. 7.  On 1 April 2003 the debtor company was reorganised and joined to the State-owned “Volyn'vugillya” company, which became the debtor in the enforcement proceedings. 8.  Between November 2003 and April 2005 the applicant was partially paid the judgment debt owed to him. 9.  On 13 April 2005 the remainder of the debt was transferred to the applicant's bank account and the enforcement proceedings were discontinued on the same date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Štúrovo. 6.  On 5 February 2004 the police arrested the applicant. He was accused of planning a robbery[1] and remanded in custody from that date. 7.  Several decisions extending the applicant’s detention were made. In particular, on 18 November 2004 the Žilina District Court extended his detention in the context of the pre-trial proceedings until 24 January 2005. 8.  On 21 January 2005 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant and several other persons before the Žilina Regional Court. 9.  The applicant requested to be released, arguing that the Regional Court had not extended his detention after the expiry of the period indicated in the District Court’s decision of 18 November 2004. 10.  On 20 April 2005 the Regional Court ordered the applicant’s release. Upon a complaint lodged by the public prosecutor the Supreme Court decided on 24 May 2005 that the applicant should remain remanded in custody. 11.  On 2 June 2005 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for release. On 15 June 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed a complaint by the applicant against that decision. 12.  On 22 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that his detention in the period after 24 January 2005 and the Supreme Court’s above decision of 24 May 2005 were both unlawful. In a separate complaint lodged on 31 August 2005 the applicant complained about the refusal to release him in the proceedings leading to the Supreme Court’s decision of 15 June 2005. 13.  On 5 February 2006 the applicant was released. 14.  On 10 May 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right under Article 5 § 1 had been violated as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 2005. There had been no judicial decision extending his detention after 24 January 2005, and there existed no justification for that situation. 15.  The Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 2005 in so far as it concerned the applicant and ordered the Supreme Court to reimburse the applicant’s costs in the constitutional proceedings. It dismissed the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction with reference to a conclusion which a different chamber of the Constitutional court had reached in the case of one of the applicant’s co-accused. According to that conclusion, (i) the finding of a violation of Article 5 § 1 provided appropriate redress to the plaintiff and (ii) the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 2005 was based on that court’s earlier practice, which, however, was not in accordance with practice under the Convention. 16.  In a judgment of 30 November 2006 the Constitutional Court found that by its decision of 15 June 2005 the Supreme Court had breached the applicant’s right under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the Supreme Court should have remedied the situation resulting from the applicant’s unlawful detention from 25 January 2005 by ordering his release. 17.  The judgment stated, in particular:\n“In the Constitutional Court’s view, the jurisdiction of the court involved at the pre-trial stage ended with the filing of the indictment on 21 January 2005. The indictment as such is not a ground for continued detention of a person, as it does not explicitly follow from the law, and it is inadmissible to extend the possibilities of restricting a person’s liberty by extensive interpretation of several provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nHowever, a court’s decision on detention of a person given at the pre-trial stage can constitute a ground for such person’s detention for a short period following the indictment. Otherwise it would be practically impossible to ensure continued detention of a person after an indictment has been filed. In the circumstances, a ground for the applicant’s detention existed until 25 January 2005. The detention should have been extended by a decision given no later than 25 January 2005 if it was to continue after that date. In the absence of any such decision, the restriction of the applicant’s liberty after 25 January 2005 was unlawful.\nThe unlawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty after 25 January 2005 cannot be justified retrospectively, not even by a judicial decision. Subsequent judicial decisions could not have extended the applicant’s detention, as it had ended on 25 January 2005. The only existing possibility was to remand the applicant in custody again. As this was not done, his subsequent deprivation of liberty had no legal ground.” 18.  The Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 15 June 2005, granted the equivalent of 2,818 euros (EUR) to the applicant as just satisfaction and ordered the Supreme Court to reimburse the applicant’s costs.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1964 respectively. They live in Oslo. The first applicant is a musician and the second applicant is an actress. They are both known to the public in Norway. 6.  On 20 August 2005, the applicants married in a private ceremony which took place outdoors on an islet in the municipality of Tjøme in the Oslo fjord, approximately 100 km south of the capital. 7.  Subsequently, the weekly magazine Se og Hør, hereafter “the magazine”, published a two-page article about the wedding, accompanied by six photographs. One photograph showed the bride, her father and her bridesmaids arriving at the islet in a small rowing boat; another showed the bride being brought to the groom by her father on the islet, surrounded by people; and yet another photograph showed the bride and the groom returning to the mainland on foot by crossing the lake on stepping stones. In the last photograph, the bride was barefoot with her wedding dress raised above her knees to avoid getting the dress wet. There was also a photograph of a couple and their baby who were wedding guests. Finally, there were two old photographs: one of the applicants framed in a heart and one of the second applicant and the applicants’ young son attending a musical festival one month earlier. 8.  The article described the ceremony, the applicants and some of the guests. It stated, inter alia, that the ceremony was touching; that several guests could not hold back their tears when the bride arrived at the islet and a male voice choir starting singing the song “To live is to love”; and that a party took place after the ceremony in the garden of a named guest house. It also stated that the applicants’ manager had informed the magazine that the applicants did not wish to comment on their wedding. 9.  The applicants brought compensation proceedings against the magazine before Oslo District Court (Oslo tingrett) and invoked, among other things, the right to respect for private life under section 390 of the Penal Code and Article 8 of the Convention. It was not in dispute that the magazine was not invited to the wedding and that the photographs were taken without the applicants’ knowledge approximately 250 meters from the islet. 10.  By judgment of 22 November 2006 the Oslo District Court found for the applicants and ordered the magazine to pay them each 50,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK). In addition, the editor responsible was ordered to pay each applicant NOK 15,000 and the journalist and the photographer were ordered to pay each applicant NOK 5,000. 11.  The magazine appealed to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett), which by judgment of 13 February 2008 upheld the judgment. 12.  The magazine appealed to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett), which by judgment of 2 September 2008 found against the applicants, by three votes to two. 13.  Mr Justice U. gave the following reasons, which in the main were endorsed by the two other members of the majority:\n“I have concluded that the appeal should be allowed.\n(34) In recent years the Supreme Court has considered legal questions relating to violation of privacy in the judgments Rt-2007-687 (Big Brother) and Rt-2008-489 (Plata). My argument is based mainly on these judgments. As follows from the judgments, section 3-6 of the Damages Act concerning redress for violation of privacy must be read in conjunction with section 390 of the Penal Code. The provision in section 3-6 refers, at any rate primarily, to violation of section 390. In my view, there is no need to consider whether, as contended by [the applicants], there may be cases that are covered in principle by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights but not by \"privacy\" under section 390 of the Penal Code. Nor will I examine whether this is a discussion of terminology or of facts.\n(35) I have already described the content of the article. There is no doubt that the case concerns information ‒ which I am using as a general term to refer to both text and pictures ‒ that taken as a whole is relevant to the issue of privacy. There is no reason for me to evaluate individual elements on the basis of whether or not they impinge on the concept of privacy. The article as a whole contains information about the couple and their child in addition to information about the wedding. The relationships within the family and between the family and their friends are clearly of a personal nature.\n(36) Thus the question under consideration is whether a violation of privacy took place, cf. section 390 of the Penal Code. There would have been no question of violation of privacy if consent to publication had been obtained, cf. paragraph 62 of the judgment in the Big Brother case. In this case it has been clearly established that the couple had not been informed beforehand that there were plans to publicise the wedding, nor were they asked for their consent. However, the journalist, Mr S, contacted [the first applicant’s] manager on Monday, immediately before the article went to press. The manager said that the couple did not wish to comment on the wedding. A little later the same day Se og Hør was contacted and informed that the couple did not consent to publication, but the reply was that the magazine was already in the press. It has thus been clearly established that the article was published without the couple’s consent. I would add that I see nothing in the article indicating that the couple had given the magazine permission to report on the wedding in return for payment. On the contrary, the article stated at the end that the two celebrities did not wish to comment.\n(37) The next question is whether the article was unlawful. This question must be decided on the basis of an overall evaluation of the article, cf. paragraph 64 of the Big Brother judgment with further references. In my assessment of legality I also refer to the Big Brother judgment, citing, as was done in the Plata judgment, paragraphs 57 and 58:\n‘... When the penal provision applies to violation of privacy, this necessarily implies that the issue that arises is that of legality. This again implies that the publication must be assessed as a whole, in the actual context and situation, where protection of privacy must be weighed against freedom of expression, cf. Bratholm og Matningsdal, Part Three, 1998, page 222, of the Penal Code and comments, and further references.\n... The European Convention on Human Rights is incorporated into internal Norwegian law in the Human Rights Act. Both Article 8 relating to respect for private and family life and Article 10 relating to the right to freedom of expression are central to the present case. The principles that must be weighed in this case are similar to those that must be weighed under section 3-6, first paragraph, of the Damages Act and section 390 of the Penal Code, and in the present situation these provisions should be interpreted in such a way that their content is in compliance with Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.’\n(38) Reference is also made in paragraph 72 of the Big Brother judgment to the summing up by the European Court of Human Rights in the von Hannover judgment:\n‘... The conclusion must naturally be read in conjunction with the rest of the judgment. The issue throughout is the balancing of the right to privacy against the principle of freedom of expression. The central issue with respect to protection of privacy is therefore whether the published article contributes to a debate of public interest. In other words, the particular importance of protection under Article 10 of the Human Rights Convention lies in the relevance of the information in question to public debate. With respect to publication of details referring exclusively to an individual’s private life, and particularly to the private relationship between two persons who do not occupy positions in politics or in society, this is clearly outside the area that the provisions relating to freedom of expression are intended to regulate.’\n(39) Both [applicants] are well-known figures, but neither of them has had a prominent role either in the public administration or in any other public body. Thus the provisions of Article 10 have no particular weight with respect to the magazine article in question, which clearly has a purely entertainment value. In the assessment of legality, protection under Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention is the most relevant principle to be weighed.\n(40) I will now examine the circumstances in the present case in relation to the issue of legality. As mentioned above, an overall assessment of the magazine article shows that it concerns the subjects’ private life, and the question is whether in spite of this there are grounds for saying that it does not constitute a violation of privacy. A wedding is a very personal act. At the same time it also has a public side. A wedding is a public affirmation that two persons intend to live together, and has legal consequences in many different sectors of society. Thus information about a wedding does not in itself involve a violation of privacy if it is given in a neutral form and based on a reliable source, cf. paragraph 80 of the Big Brother judgment.\n(41) The judgment of the Court of Human Rights in the case of von Hannover and the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in the Big Brother case have premises that seem to go far in support of protection against the use of pictures and texts concerning an individual’s private life. It is therefore necessary to examine the facts on which the judgments were based. Paragraph 49 of the von Hannover case concerns a series of photographs of the aggrieved party. In its evaluation of the application of the law in the case at hand, the court stated in paragraphs 68 and 69:\n‘... The Court finds another point to be of importance: even though, strictly speaking, the present application concerns only the publication of the photos and articles by various German magazines, the context in which these photos were taken ‒ without the applicant’s knowledge or consent and the harassment endured by many public figures in their daily lives cannot be fully disregarded (see paragraph 59 above). In the present case this point is illustrated in particularly striking fashion by the photos taken of the applicant at the Monte Carlo Beach Club tripping over an obstacle and falling down ... It appears that these photos were taken secretly at a distance of several hundred metres, probably from a neighbouring house, whereas journalists’ and photographers’ access to the club was strictly regulated ...\n... The Court reiterates the fundamental importance of protecting private life from the point of view of the development of every human being’s personality. That protection ‒ as stated above ‒ extends beyond the private family circle and also includes a social dimension. The Court considers that anyone, even if they are known to the general public, must be able to enjoy a “legitimate expectation” of protection of and respect for their private life ...’\n(42) Paragraph 59 states:\n‘Furthermore, photos appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even of persecution.’\n(43) Thus the way in which the photos were published and the constant photographing ‒ often by photographers who followed her around ‒ constituted harassment of the aggrieved party and also an invasion of privacy. The situation was similar to some extent in the Big Brother case. Se og Hør ran several articles featuring photos taken from different sources together with speculation and gossip. The magazine also described the relationship between the parties during their life together, which was an invasion of their private life as a couple.\n(44) The right to protection of privacy is no weaker for well-known cultural personalities than it is for others, despite the fact that their photos are published in magazines and newspapers and on the internet in connection with their professional lives. It could be said that in the case of such individuals it is even more important to ensure that their private lives and personal relationships are protected.\n(45) A wedding is a very significant personal experience for the bridal couple, an experience that includes their families, friends and other persons close to them. The wedding ceremony and celebrations are therefore clearly part of private and family life and thus in principle should be protected. However, in my opinion this consideration is only one aspect of the case.\n(46) As mentioned above, a neutral description of two individuals’ wedding is not unlawful.\n(47) Neither the text nor the photos in the disputed magazine article contain anything unfavourable to the couple. The article contains no criticism, nor is there anything in the content that could weaken their reputations.\n(48) Furthermore, although the couple’s relationships with close friends are part of their private life, I cannot see that in this context the naming of a few of the participants constitutes a violation. Nor is it particularly unusual to write that the ceremony was “moving, and several of the guests couldn’t hold back their tears when a men’s choir sang ...”.\n(49) The article contains no photos of the actual wedding ceremony. It is therefore not possible for me to have any views on whether such photos, including close-ups, would have to be regarded in a different light from those featured in the article. Photos in such a situation would clearly have more personal significance than photos showing the bridal couple arriving at or leaving the place where the marriage took place.\n(50) I shall now examine more closely the way the wedding was conducted. The bride arrived at the islet in a rowing boat, with six bridesmaids on board. There she was greeted by her future husband and by a men’s choir singing a hymn. After the ceremony the bride and groom had to step from rock to rock in order to reach the shore, which the bride accomplished in bare feet. As pointed out in paragraph 50 of the von Hannover judgment, the concept of private life is comprehensive, and includes ‘a zone of interaction of a person with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope of ‘private life’. However, a certain amount of weight must be given to the fact that the wedding was organised in a very unusual way, and took place in an area that is accessible to the public under the Outdoor Recreation Act and that is easily visible. As already mentioned, the photos do not show the most personal part of the wedding, the actual marriage ceremony.\n(51) As mentioned above, the photos were taken of a wedding in a place accessible to the public. It can be assumed that even in August there are large numbers of people on Tjøme, which is one of the most popular locations for holiday cottages and recreation in Norway. Furthermore, many of the arrangements were such as to attract attention from third parties, for example the arrival of the bride in an open boat and the presence of a men’s choir singing a hymn on the islet. The arrangements were also spectacular in themselves. In spite of the fact that all individuals, including celebrities, are entitled to protection against being photographed even in public places, I consider that this must be taken into account in the assessment of legality.\n(52) The photos were taken from a headland about 200-250 metres from the islet where the ceremony was being held, and a 300- to 400-millimetre zoom lens was used. For the bridal couple, however, the situation would not have been any better if the photography had taken place somewhere closer, or from a place where the photographer and journalist could have been seen by the wedding party. This could have disturbed the whole wedding. Nor was the photographing in the nature of a breach of confidence, as it would have been if for example any of the participants had published personal photos taken during or in connection with the wedding. The situation would also have been different if the photos had been taken of events taking place in a closed area where the subjects had reason to believe that they were unobserved, cf. paragraph 68, second sub-paragraph, of the von Hannover judgment.\n(53) The article contained a photo of [the second applicant] together with the couple’s under-age child. During the proceedings the focus has been on the photos related to the wedding, and it has not been contended that the use of the photo of the under-age child puts the case in a different light. The photo had previously been published in Aftenposten, and it has not been contended that consent was lacking on that occasion. For these reasons I shall not examine the particular questions raised by the use of a photo of an under-age child without the necessary consent of the parents.\n(54) Thus it must be concluded that the article did not involve unlawful violation of privacy.\n(55) [The applicants] have contended as an alternative that the photos were used in a way that conflicts with the provisions of section 45c of the Copyright Act relating to the right to control the use of one’s image. In my view these provisions should also be read with the reservation that there could be a conflict of principles and in conjunction with Articles 8 and 10 of the Human Rights Convention. The conclusion would then be the same as that of my principal assessment.\n(56) The Court therefore allows the appeal. However, the case raises difficult and uncertain legal questions, clarification of which is in the public interest, cf. section 20-2, third paragraph, a, of the Code of Civil Procedure. No award of costs should therefore be made.” 14.  Mr Justice T. gave the following reasons which in the main were endorsed by the other member of the minority:\n“(58) I am substantially in agreement with the first-voting judge’s general interpretation of section 3-6 of the Damages Act and section 390 of the Penal Code. However, when weighing the right to privacy against the principle of freedom of expression in this specific case, I have arrived at a different conclusion, since I consider that in the present case the appellants have violated the right to privacy under section 390 of the Penal Code.\n(59) I will first examine whether the subject of the article in Se og Hør can be considered to be ‘a personal matter’ in the meaning of section 390.\n(60) I agree with the first-voting judge that information that a marriage has been contracted between two named individuals can be published without being in conflict with the provisions of section 390 of the Penal Code. However, this is not the issue in the present case. The article in Se og Hør also describes in words and pictures details of the arrangements in connection with the wedding ceremony.\n(61) Weddings have always been a subject of general interest in the sense that those close to the bridal couple consider them important and wish to participate. It is also usual for the couple to wish to share the event with others. For these reasons there should in principle be no reason why the press should not report a wedding ceremony that takes place in full public view, and where no special arrangements have been made to indicate that the ceremony is private.\n(62) However, today it is not unusual for the couple to wish to share their wedding and its arrangements only with those closest to them, and often to give the event a personal touch. They are entitled to protect themselves from publicity in such cases as well, and this includes withholding permission for the press to publish the event. In my view the desire to hold a private wedding should be respected in the sense that the wedding ceremony should be regarded as a personal matter within the meaning of section 390.\n(63) A private wedding ceremony may take different forms. For example, a wedding held in a private home provides a clear signal to third parties that the marriage is a personal matter that may not be reported in the form published by Se og Hør without the bridal couple’s prior consent.\n(64) In my view all the relevant circumstances indicate that in the present case the wedding was a private event. The wedding party was held at a hotel on Tjøme, which in this context is clearly a private area. The islet where the events reported by Se og Hør, and the marriage itself, took place is a relatively short walk away and directly linked with the hotel’s property. In my opinion the fact that there is a general right of public access to the islet under the Outdoor Recreation Act does not prevent this part of the wedding from also being of a clearly private nature. It follows from the von Hannover judgment that protection of privacy also applies to places to which the public has access. Furthermore, consent to the use of the islet had been obtained from the landowner. Thus the arrangement as a whole indicated that the couple wished to restrict the wedding to themselves and their guests. From this perspective the event must be considered to be a personal matter within the meaning of section 390.\n(65) For these reasons I consider that Se og Hør published in words and pictures a number of details relating to a personal matter. Firstly, the magazine published details of the arrangements for the ceremony, which have been described more fully by the first-voting judge. I regard these as the personal touch that the bridal couple had wished to give their wedding and that in my view underlines the private nature of the wedding. Secondly, the article included a description of the guests and the couple’s families, together with the names of well-known figures. In this connection the names of guests with children were also given, and pictures were shown of the children and their parents.\n(66) Like the first-voting judge, I consider that it has been clearly demonstrated that the opposite parties’ consent had not been obtained.\n(67) The next question is whether the publication is legal and justified despite the fact that the subject of the article is a personal matter. It follows from paragraph 72 of Rt-2007-687 that the main question to be weighed is whether ‘the article contributes to a debate of public interest. In other words, the particular importance of the principle of protection under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights lies in the sphere of public debate’. I agree with the first-voting judge that this wording cannot be interpreted in such a way that it does not rule out that the publication of personal matters is justified in cases where it does not contribute to public debate. However, when matters of a personal nature such as those in question here are published, they must have at least a minimum of public interest if the invasion of privacy is to be considered legitimate. In the present case the publication was a celebrity article written for the sole purpose of entertainment. Although the desire to entertain is in itself legitimate, its nature does not justify overriding the affected parties’ desire to protect their privacy. In this connection I place special emphasis on the fact that getting married is a very significant occasion in a person’s life, and that therefore the activities celebrating it ‒ the marriage ceremony and the wedding party ‒ will for most people be one of the most important events of their lives, and will often be associated with strong emotions.\n(68) The fact that the opposite parties are well-known cultural figures in Norway has no bearing on the assessment. Well-known persons also have the right to respect for personal matters of the kind we are dealing with here. I find support for this view both in Rt-2007-687, cf. paragraph 74, and in the von Hannover judgment ..., cf. paragraph 67.\n(69) Although this has not influenced my view of the case, I would also like to comment on Se og Hør’s use of a zoom lens. The zoom lens enabled the journalist and the photographer to take close-up pictures of the bridal couple and their guests that make it look as if they were actually at the event themselves, when in fact they were hidden from those who were being observed. It seems likely that the reason for using this technique was that the journalist and photographer were aware that the bridal couple would have reacted to their presence on the islet and this might have resulted in the marriage ceremony being moved inside the hotel. Using a zoom lens because of the personal and private nature of the event resembles the use of a hidden camera, which is a factor that also weighs against the appellants.\n(70) For these reasons I am of the opinion that the article in Se og Hør cannot be justified on the basis of an assessment of legality, and that the opposite parties are entitled to redress for pain and suffering from the appellants. With regard to the amount of redress, the opposite parties have demanded that the amount decided by the Court of Appeal should be maintained. I have no objections to the amounts decided on. Since I know that I am in the minority, I will not formulate a final conclusion.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  The applicant was born in New Zealand and at all material times was domiciled there. In 1966 he came to the United Kingdom to attend flying courses and at the same time engaged in other occupations of an engineering or building contractor variety, trading under the name “King Enterprises Engineering & Hardware Co”. The applicant met Miss J. and between April 1973 and October 1991 they purchased properties together. 9.  From the 1970s onwards, the applicant's tax returns were incomplete and late, in some cases by several years. From February 1982, the Inland Revenue began investigating a number of guesthouse businesses in London which were associated with the applicant and/or his partner Miss J. of which no mention had been made in the applicant's tax returns. 10.  In December 1985 the General Commissioners of taxes served two notices on the applicant requiring him to provide details of the acquisition of one of the guesthouses and to produce his business records. At a meeting on 21 November 1986, the applicant states that he was informed that the Revenue would be seeking penalties as part of any settlement. 11.  From this time the applicant was involved in frequent discussions and correspondence with the Revenue about his affairs. The Government stated that the Revenue held some 38 meetings with the applicant and/or his accountant between September 1986 and July 1991. 12.  In June 1987 the Revenue requested a statement of assets and liabilities from the applicant. The applicant states that he objected to disclosing all his assets since due to his non-domicile status his overseas assets were of no relevance. When he had not provided the statement by November 1987, the applicant was interviewed by the Inspector of taxes and on 21 November 1987 the “Hansard statement” was read to him. The statement, revised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer from time to time, sets out the practice of the Inland Revenue in cases in which criminal proceedings may be contemplated and outlines the factors taken into account by the Revenue when deciding whether to prosecute. 13.  In April 1988 the General Commissioners served a notice requiring the applicant to give details of all transfers of property and cash and of his bank accounts. The notices included a warning about the financial penalty which could be imposed for non-compliance. 14.  On 18 January 1989 the applicant signed a “Statement of Personal Assets and Liabilities and Business Interests” as at 1 September 1986. He states that this was after the Special Commissioners had refused to require him to disclose his overseas assets. The same month, the Revenue issued tax assessments against the applicant for the tax years 1972/3 to 1986/7. The assessments were for income tax on guesthouse profits and bank interest which had not been declared by the applicant in his tax returns. The total claimed was in excess of 620,000 pounds sterling (GBP). For the tax years more than six years prior to the assessments being made, the Revenue could only raise assessments which were to make good a loss of tax due to the neglect or wilful default of the applicant. 15.  The applicant appealed against the assessments. Initial hearings during early 1989 before the General Commissioners were adjourned on the application of the applicant or Miss J. On 24 August 1989, at the Revenue's application, the appeals were transferred to the Special Commissioners of Taxes. A hearing of one week was scheduled for November 1990. On the date set for the hearing of his appeal, the applicant applied for judicial review of the refusal of the Special Commissioners to hold a preliminary hearing at his request. The appeal was adjourned as a result. After the refusal of permission to apply for judicial review, the appeals were relisted. 16.  The appeals were heard over eighteen days between May and September 1991. The Commissioners initially indicated that they were not prepared to sit one day a week for the convenience of the applicant, but after the Revenue had opened the case it was decided that, exceptionally, the hearings should be arranged to ensure that the applicant and Miss J. were able to attend. The applicant's main submissions were that he had no beneficial interest in three of the guesthouses in respect of which assessments had been made and that certain funds used to purchase property had been a loan from his father. 17.  On 18 November 1991 the Special Commissioners issued their written decision. Some of the assessments were reduced to nil or discharged, but the appeals were dismissed in substance, the Commissioners finding that (for those years for which it was necessary) the purpose of the assessments had been to make good a loss of tax which was due to the applicant's wilful default or neglect. They found that the applicant had traded as a guesthouse proprietor and had derived profits from the trade. The applicant's evidence was described as “irregular in quality” and his claim that he was in partnership with other members of the family, including his infant children was found to be “a complete sham”. The revised assessments amounted to approximately GBP 120,000. 18.  In or about the end of December 1991 the applicant applied for the Special Commissioners to state a case by way of appeal to the High Court against the 1991 Commissioners' decision, on the basis that they had erred in law, there being no evidence on which they could reach their determinations. The Special Commissioners drafted the case for the High Court in July 1992 and the applicant lodged his appeal on 17 August 1992. The appeal was heard and dismissed on 26 November 1993. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's further appeal in October 1995. 19.  Meanwhile, in December 1991 the General Commissioners issued a determination under section 88 of the Taxes Management Act 1970 that interest was payable on the assessments from specified dates on which the tax ought to have been paid, to the date of payment. The applicant appealed against the determination. 20.  On 17 October 1994 the Revenue issued penalty determinations, assessed at 80% of the tax lost (the maximum penalty then being 100% of the lost tax, plus GBP 50). The penalties amounted to over GBP 50,000. The applicant appealed against the penalty determinations. 21.  In April 1995 the General Commissioners agreed that the interest and penalty appeals should be transferred to the Special Commissioners. At about the same time, the Revenue discovered the existence of a further property, Roundwood Lodge, which had been purchased in 1983 and which was in the applicant's name. The Revenue took the view that the property had been purchased with funds from the profits of the applicant's business and the funds were therefore taxable. In April 1996 further assessments to income tax were therefore issued on guesthouse profits for the years from 1977/78 to 1985/86. The applicant appealed against the further assessments and the matter was later transferred to the Special Commissioners to be consolidated with other appeals. 22.  Meanwhile, on March 1996 the applicant suffered a stroke which he states affected his memory and his ability to cope with pressure. In August 1996 he wrote to the Revenue to ask that the “matters in hand” be adjourned to enable him to concentrate on his recovery. He appeared before the General Commissioners on 24 October 1996 when his request for further time for preparation of various matters was granted. 23.  Meanwhile, despite reminders from the Inland Revenue on 6 June 1996 and 14 November 1996, the clerk to the General Commissioners did not write to the clerk of the Special Commissioners requesting a transfer until 3 March 1997. Despite further reminders in March, April and May 1997, he failed also to request a transfer of appeals against further assessments made in April 1996. The General Commissioners asked the clerk to request a transfer of these appeals on 24 October 1996. 24.  On 6 March 1997 the Special Commissioners agreed to accept jurisdiction and issued requests for information about the status of various appeals. In September 1997 the appeals were consolidated. 25.  In February 1998 there was a preliminary hearing of the appeals against, (i) the December 1991 determination of interest, (ii) the 1994 penalty determination and (iii) the further assessments raised in 1996. The substantive hearing began in May 1998 and was heard over seventeen days between then and April 1999. The applicant represented himself. During the hearing he applied for a copy of the notes made by the 1991 Commissioners. When the application was refused he sought permission to judicially review the decision, which was also refused. 26.  On 23 March 2000 the Special Commissioners dismissed the appeals. They held, inter alia, that they were bound by the factual findings of the 1991 Commissioners on the issue of neglect/wilful default for the years in respect of which such findings had been required. For the later years, in respect of which no determinations had been made by the 1991 Commissioners, they found wilful default and neglect on the part of the applicant (which was necessary to uphold the penalty determination). They also found that the capital statement he had prepared in 1991 was not truthful. As the amount of tax due was correctly determined by the 1991 Commissioners, the interest determination was also correct. The 80% penalties were appropriate. They allowed his appeal against the further (1996) assessments in part, by allowing some reduction in the amount claimed, but found that the applicant had been the owner of Roundwood Lodge and had purchased it with his own funds. 27.  In May 2001 Mr Justice Jacob dismissed the appeals against the findings of the 2000 Commissioners. As regarded the applicant's complaints raised about the procedures under Article 6, he found that the system of imposition of penalties for fraudulent or negligent delivery of incorrect returns or statements was “criminal” for the purposes of the Convention. He noted that the system was plainly punitive and deterrent, and the potential fine was very substantial and dependent on the culpability of the taxpayer, rather than being an administrative matter. The amount of the fine imposed also depended on the degree of culpability as mitigation, essentially a criminal matter, was more where the taxpayer was less culpable. The judge agreed with the applicant that the proceedings began in 1987 when the Hansard warning was given and considered whether the length of the proceedings was unreasonable. The judge noted that the applicant made no complaint of delay up to the 1991 decision and that some of the subsequent delay had been caused by or contributed to by the applicant, inter alia, in the way in which 16 hearing days were spread over nearly a year and due to problems arising from his illness. However, he observed that nothing happened for a two year period when the case was referred to the Special Commissioners, notwithstanding reminders from the Inland Revenue. In conclusion the judge said:\n“The decision of the 1991 Commissioners was released on 18 November 1991. Mr King waited some 5 weeks before asking for a case stated (appeal by way of cases stated was the procedure then). There was then an 8 month delay before that was produced (delay not of Mr King's making). The appeal was launched on 17 August 1992. Judgment was given on 14 January 1994. The Revenue delayed making a penalty determination until 17 October 1994. Whilst it is understandable, and at least not unreasonable, for the Revenue to wait until the hearing of the first appeal, it makes no sense for them to have waited some 9 months thereafter. The possibility of a determination was simply left hanging. Meanwhile the parties' attention was focused on other things, namely Mr King's further appeal to the Court of Appeal and, more significantly so far as Mr King's contribution to delay was concerned, the Revenue's discovery of the purchase in 1983 by Mr King of the substantial property, Roundwood Lodge. This led to further assessments and appeals therefrom which, it was decided fairly early on, should be heard with the interest and penalty appeals. ...\nIt seems that but for Mr King's concealment of Roundwood Lodge, the two other appeals would have been heard earlier than 1998. It is not possible to be precise as to how much delay was caused by the introduction of this factor into the case, but it is far from insignificant. Naturally it prolonged the hearing itself, but on top of that I think a fair estimate of its effect is that it delayed the penalty and interest appeals for about three years.\n... The result of all this is that there was delay through no fault of Mr King of, say, five years from the date of the 1991 decision. Is that too much? Marginally, but only just, I think not. He was not thereby prejudiced. ... He merely had to pay the penalty later. But for the complication of Roundwood Lodge, however, I think the time to determination of the penalty appeals would have been inconsistent with Article 6 (1). In future cases it is highly desirable that such appeals (and penalty determinations) are put on a fast track. So far as I can see they were treated in the same way as other determinations and appeals, but it should be appreciated that more is at stake in the case of penalties. Serious consideration should be given to penalty determination being made earlier - in appropriate cases along with the assessments giving rise to the penalties. ... I see no reason why the 1991 Commissioners could not have dealt with a penalty determination appeal if such a determination had been made at the same time as the 1989 determinations or shortly thereafter.” 28.  The judge found in addition that the case was a serious one in which penalties were appropriate and the figure of 80% was not too high. So far as the further assessments were concerned, the reasoning of the Commissioners was detailed and convincing. The applicant had given misleading information to the Revenue and to the 1991 Commissioners and the further assessments had been to make good a loss of tax attributable to the applicant's wilful default or neglect. There was no error of law and no reason to overturn the decision. 29.  The applicant applied for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Permission was refused on paper in July 2001 and at a hearing on 3 October 2001. 30.  On the question of delay, the Court of Appeal said,\n“The delays which occurred in relation to the penalty determination must be seen in the context of what has plainly been an extended campaign by the applicant in disputing his liabilities to the Revenue and in deferring the date on which those liabilities have to be satisfied. Moreover, I find ... the greatest difficulty in seeing how the applicant could be prejudiced simply by the fact that the penalty might have been imposed earlier.” 31.  The court was not persuaded that an appeal on that basis would have any prospect of success. Although by the time of the appeal a medical report had been provided to the effect that the applicant's memory had been significantly impaired as a result of his stroke, the author was unable to date the onset of the memory loss or its duration. The report did not take the applicant's case as to prejudice any further.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 6.  In 1995 the applicant's vehicle was damaged in a road traffic accident. On 25 June 1997 he sued a private company in charge of road maintenance for damages. He alleged that the accident had been caused by its failure to clean up the road. The examination of the matter was stayed pending the payment of the court fee by the applicant. The proceedings were resumed on 13 October 1997. 7.  On 29 October 1997 the Sovetskiy District Court of Chelyabinsk granted a request by the respondent company to adjourn the proceedings pending the criminal investigation into the road traffic accident. The proceedings were resumed on 27 April 1998. 8.  On 25 May 1998 the representative of the respondent company failed to appear and the hearing was adjourned. 9.  On 4 and 16 June and 5 October 1998 the District Court adjourned the court hearing as the applicant modified his claims. 10.  On 9 October 1998 the District Court granted a request by the respondent company for an expert report to determine the value of the applicant's vehicle and stayed the proceedings. The respondent company failed to pay the expert's fee and the case file was returned to the court. 11.  On 27 January and 11 March 1999 the District Court adjourned the hearing, granting the respondent company's requests to study the case file. 12.  Between 4 November 1999 and 13 April 2000 the proceedings were adjourned pending the criminal investigation further to requests by the respondent company and the applicant. 13.  On 1 December 2000 the District Court adjourned the hearing further to a request by the respondent company to summon new witnesses. 14.  On 20 March 2001 the applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing pending the criminal investigation. 15.  On 27 September 2001 the District Court granted the applicant's claims in part. On 15 November 2001 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the District Court for a fresh examination. The Regional Court noted that the District Court had failed to properly establish the circumstances of the road traffic accident and to determine the responsibility of all the parties involved. 16.  On 4 February 2002 the District Court adjourned the preparatory hearing owing to the parties' failure to appear. The preparatory hearing was subsequently held on 13 March 2002. 17.  On 27 May and 6 November 2002 the District Court granted the applicant's request and adjourned the hearing pending the criminal investigation. 18.  On 2 February 2004 the applicant asked the court to resume the hearing of the matter. On 2 March 2004 the District Court annulled its own decision of 6 November 2002 and resumed the proceedings. 19.  On 19 March 2004 the applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing in order to modify his claims. 20.  On 13 May 2004 the applicant submitted the modified claims and asked the court to summon certain witnesses. 21.  On 17 June 2004 the District Court dismissed the applicant's claims in full. On 9 December 2004 the Regional Court quashed that judgment and granted the applicant's claim in part. The court based its findings, inter alia, on the materials in the criminal investigation file, such as the crime-scene investigation and forensic expert reports.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant is a limited liability company with its seat in Lovas. 5.  The Veszprém County Administrative Office rejected the request of the applicant, a real-estate developer, for a building permit to construct a three-flat condominium. The Office was of the view that the project was irreconcilable with the planned location, the historical neighbourhood of Veszprém town. 6.  On 21 June 2001 the applicant challenged this decision in court. 7.  On 25 March 2003 the Veszprém County Regional Court quashed the administrative decision and remitted the case to the administrative authorities. 8.  In the resumed administrative proceedings, on 2 March 2007 the applicant’s request was again dismissed. 9.  On 18 April 2007 the applicant renewed its action. 10.  On 31 October 2007 the Regional Court dismissed the action, holding that the administrative decisions had been given in compliance with the law. 11.  On 25 February 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed, on the merits, the applicant’s petition for review (service: 14 April 2009).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicants in case no. 15441/05 are:\n1) Ms Malayka (also spelled as Malika) Adamovna Basayeva, born in 1956,\n2) Ms Nura Basayeva, born in 1937,\n3) Ms Limon Lechayevna Basayeva, born in 1979,\n4) Ms Kheda Lechayevna Basayeva, born in 1990,\n5) Mr Khasan Khavazhovich Basayev, born in 2002,\n6) Mr Khoza Salmanovich Basayev, born in 1960,\nThe applicants in case no. 20731/04 are:\n7) Ms Tatyana Aliyevna Dikayeva, born in 1969,\n8) Mr Ali Dautovich Dikayev, born in 1932,\n9) Ms Dagman Osmanovna Dautmirzayeva (also known as Dikayeva), born in 1977,\n10) Ms Makka Dikayeva, born in 1997, and\n11) Ms Madina Dikayeva, born in 1999. 8.  The applicants live in Martan-Chu, in Urus-Martan district, Chechnya. Prior to her death in December 2005 the second applicant also lived there. Applicants one to six are relatives of Mr Lecha Basayev, who was born in 1955. The first applicant is his wife; the second applicant was his mother; the third and the fourth applicants are his daughters; the fifth applicant is his grandson and the sixth applicant is his brother. The applicants from seven to eleven are the relatives of Mr Lema Dikayev, who was born in 1965. The seventh applicant is his sister; the eighth applicant is his father; the ninth applicant is his wife; the tenth and eleventh applicants are his daughters. At the material time Lema Dikayev had a second-degree disability; he had sutures in his abdominal area which had been put in 1996. 9.  At the material time Martan-Chu was under the full control of the Russian federal forces and the area was under a curfew. Russian military checkpoints were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement. 10.  On the night of 5-6 July 2002 the applicants, their relatives and Lecha Basayev were sleeping in their house in Bazarnaya Street in the village of Martan-Chu, Urus-Martan district, Chechnya. The applicants' house had several interconnected bedrooms. The fifth applicant, who was just a few months old at the time, was sleeping in one room; the first and the fourth applicants were sleeping in the second bedroom and Lecha Basayev was sleeping in the third bedroom. It rained that night. 11.  At about 1.30 a.m. the first applicant woke up and heard someone banging on the door. When she approached the door, a group of about ten armed masked men with flashlights and in camouflage uniforms broke into the house and asked in Russian: “Where is Lecha Basayev?” The intruders dispersed into different rooms. They ordered the first applicant to lie down on the bed. The men pointed their machine guns at the first and the fourth applicants. 12.  The men neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. They spoke unaccented Russian. The applicants thought that they were Russian military servicemen. The servicemen ransacked the house. When the first applicant tried to ask for explanations, she was ordered to shut up. During the search one of the servicemen asked the first applicant: “Did you go to visit anyone by car two or three days ago?” She answered that they had not been anywhere. Then he told her: “We know that. We know everything”. 13.  About five minutes later the servicemen took Lecha Basayev outside. They walked through the first and the fourth applicants' bedroom. The first applicant saw that her husband had his clothes on. A few minutes later the first and the fourth applicants heard the sound of adhesive tape. 14.  Having spent eight or ten minutes in the applicants' house, prior to leaving, the servicemen ordered the applicants to stay inside: “We will be watching the house, so if you dare to go outside, we will shoot you”. After that the servicemen left with Lecha Basayev. 15.  As soon as the servicemen left, the first applicant went outside. She did not see anyone in the yard. Approximately 50 metres from the house she saw a big group of military servicemen walking in the direction of the village centre. 16.  At about 2 a.m. the first applicant returned to the house. A few minutes later she informed the sixth applicant, who lived nearby, about the abduction of his brother, Lecha Basayev. The sixth applicant asked her to stay at home until the end of the curfew. 17.  Early in the morning on 6 July 2002 the first applicant followed the footprints left by the servicemen's boots. They were clearly visible on the wet ground. The traces ended on the paved road which led to the village centre. The first applicants assumed that if the military servicemen had come to their house on foot, they must have walked from the local military commander's office. 18.  After that, early in the same morning, the sixth applicant and the first applicant's son went to the head of the village administration. He told them that he would go to Urus-Martan and would find out who had taken Lecha Basayev away. 19.  Next, at about 7 a.m. on the same morning, the sixth applicant and the first applicant's son went to the house of Mr M., the head of the Urus-Martan district department of the interior (the ROVD). There they met the seventh and eighth applicants, who informed them that on the very same night Russian military servicemen had beaten and taken away their relative, Lema Dikayev. According to the seventh applicant, the military servicemen had arrived at their house in two APCs (armoured personnel carriers) and a military URAL lorry which had been parked next to the building of the village administration. The seventh and eighth applicants told the sixth applicant that the head of the ROVD was still sleeping, so the sixth applicant and his relative returned home. 20.  Later on the same morning the second applicant went to the head of the ROVD. The latter promised to her that he would find out who had apprehended Lecha Basayev. 21.  Before noon on 6 July 2002 the first applicant went to the ROVD, where in front of the building she met the seventh and eighth applicants and other villagers whose relatives had been detained in Martan-Chu the night before. 22.  Some time later  the applicants' fellow villager, who worked at the material time for the local police and whose name the applicants did not disclose, told the applicants that in the morning of 6 July 2002 he had seen Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev in the building of the ROVD. According to the witness, Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev had been sitting in the corridor with their hands tied behind their backs; their eyes and mouths had been taped over with adhesive tape. Four other residents of the village had also been detained at the ROVD: three members of Mr Az.'s family and Mr B. These four men had been released on the afternoon of 6 July 2002. 23.  In support of their statements, the applicants of Lecha Basayev's family submitted the following accounts: an account by the first applicant dated 5 February 2004; an account by the seventh applicant dated 9 February 2002; an account by the sixth applicant dated 9 February 2004; an account by Mrs Kh. D. dated 9 February 2002 and an account by the fourth applicant dated 12 February 2004.\nb)  Abduction of Lema Dikayev and subsequent events 24.  On the night of 5-6 July 2002 the applicants, Lema Dikayev and his mother, Mrs Dikayeva, were sleeping in their family house at 24 Pionerskaya Street, Martan-Chu. At about 2.00 a.m. on 6 July 2002 twelve armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks broke into the house. The men did not identify themselves. The applicants thought that they were Russian military servicemen as they spoke unaccented Russian. The servicemen pointed their guns at the Dikayevs and ordered them to stay in their beds. They searched the house without producing any warrant. 25.  After the search the servicemen took Lema Dikayev out of his bedroom to the corridor, kicked him and beat him with rifle butts. The applicants were kept in their bedrooms, but through the open doors they could see and hear the servicemen beating their relative. The ninth applicant saw the intruders beating her husband and ordering him to open his mouth. The applicants saw him bleeding. They concluded that it was the result of the abdominal sutures' splitting open. When the seventh applicant asked the servicemen where they intended to take Lema, one of them replied to her in Russian that they would see him the next day in the ROVD. 26.  The servicemen blindfolded Lema Dikayev and taped his mouth with adhesive tape. They put clothing and shoes on him and tied his arms behind his back. After that they locked the applicants and Mrs Dikayeva in the bedrooms and took Lema Dikayev outside. After Lema Dikayev's beating spots of blood were left on the floor of the corridor. 27.  The seventh applicant managed to go outside and followed the servicemen. She noticed APCs and a URAL lorry parked about 200 metres from the house. The servicemen wiped the blood from Lema Dikayev, loaded him into one of the APCs and drove away. The applicant returned home and let her relatives out. 28.  In the afternoon of 6 July 2002 the servicemen returned to the Dikayevs' house and searched it. They did not produce any search warrant. 29.  On 6 July 2002 the applicants and their relatives went to the ROVD to obtain information about Lema Dikayev. One of the police officers told them that he had seen Lema in the ROVD building sitting on the floor in the hallway with his arms tied behind his back and his mouth taped over with adhesive tape. The seventh applicant and Mr T.Sh. visited Mr M., the head of the ROVD, and told him that Lema Dikayev had been seen on the ROVD premises. The officer promised to help and invited the seventh applicant to make complaints to the prosecutor's office and the ROVD. 30.  On the same date the seventh applicant contacted, both in person and in writing, the district prosecutor's office, the ROVD, the Urus-Martan district military commander's office (the district military commander's office) and the local administration, complaining that her brother had been abducted. 31.  On the evening of 6 July 2002 the officers from the ROVD told the applicants that Lema Dikayev was not detained in the ROVD building. 32.  On 8 July 2002 Russian servicemen again visited the Dikayevs, told them that they were searching for weapons and carried out another search. Then they threatened to set the house on fire. The seventh applicant ran to the head of the ROVD, Mr M., and asked him to help her. Mr M. contacted someone on a portable radio and ordered the servicemen not to set the house on fire. The servicemen obeyed. When they were leaving the house, one of the officers, who introduced himself as Georgiy, told the eighth applicant that the servicemen had acted under the orders of Mr G., the Urus-Martan district military commander. 33.  On same date, 8 July 2002, an official of the local administration told the seventh applicant that her brother was being detained on the premises of the district military commander's office. After that the seventh applicant visited the military commander, Mr G., who confirmed that Lema Dikayev was detained in their office. Mr G. also told the applicant that her brother had been implicated in the murder of Mr Kh.T., an officer of a law-enforcement agency. The seventh applicant suggested that if that was the case then Lema Dikayev should have been committed to trial. Mr G. replied that it was useless to try Chechens. 34.  On an unspecified date in August 2003 the seventh applicant visited the head of the ROVD, Mr M., who told her that if she was patient for at least a year her brother would return home. When the applicant asked Mr M. whether he had any information concerning Lema Dikayev's fate, he said that he risked being killed if he replied. 35.  The applicants continued their search for Lema Dikayev and contacted the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”), prosecutors' offices at different levels, the Chechnya administration and the Russian President. 36.  In support of their statements the applicants of Lema Dikayev's family submitted the following accounts: a statement by the ninth applicant dated 28 March 2003; two statements by the seventh applicant dated 29 March 2003 and 9 February 2004 and a hand-drawn map of the applicants' house. 37.  The Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the applicants. According to their submission, “at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 unidentified armed persons in camouflage uniforms and masks kidnapped from their houses situated in Bazarnaya Street in Martan-Chu in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya Mr Lecha Salmanovich Basayev and Mr Lema Aliyevich Dikayev and took them away to an unknown destination”. 38.  On 9 July 2002 the first applicant complained to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office (the district prosecutor's office) about the abduction of Lecha Basayev. The applicant did not retain a copy of her complaint. 39.  On 1 August 2002 the eighth applicant wrote to the district military commander's office and the district prosecutor's office describing in detail the circumstances of Lema Dikayev's abduction and asking for assistance in establishing his whereabouts. 40.   On 2 August 2002 the first applicant complained again to the district prosecutor's office that Lecha Basayev had been abducted. In her letter she stated that he had been abducted by a group of approximately twenty unidentified masked armed men and pointed out that her complaints about it to a number of State authorities had produced no results. 41.  At some point in August 2002 a district police officer visited Lecha Basayev's house and obtained a statement from the fourth applicant concerning the circumstances of Lecha Basayev's abduction. 42.  On 23 August 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office (the district prosecutor's office) initiated an investigation into the abduction of Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 61117. In the submitted documents it is also referred to under no. 6117. 43.  On 24 August 2002 the first and seventh applicants were granted victim status in the criminal case. 44.  On 12 October 2002 the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment (the UGA) forwarded the eighth applicant's complaint to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102. 45.  On 23 October 2002 the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure to identify the perpetrators. 46.  On 20 December 2002 the seventh applicant wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor's office stating that her brother had been taken away by representatives of federal forces and asking for his whereabouts to be established. 47.  On 5 February and 3 April 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that on 23 October 2002 the investigation in the criminal case had been suspended. 48.  On 20 February, 22 March, 5 April and 25 June 2003 the prosecutors' offices forwarded the applicants' complaints about their relatives' abduction to the prosecutors' offices of lower levels for examination. 49.  On 21 April 2003 the seventh applicant requested the district prosecutor's office to inform her about the progress of the investigation in the criminal case. 50.  On 22 May 2003 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicants that as a result of their query it had been established that the military servicemen had not been implicated in the disappearance of Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev. 51.  On 17 June 2003 the seventh applicant wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor's office complaining about her brother's abduction and the unauthorised search of their family house. She described in detail the circumstances of Lema Dikayev's abduction and stated that the abductors had beaten him up in the presence of his family members. She requested the authorities to resume the investigation in the criminal case, to establish her brother's whereabouts and to take necessary measures to identify the culprits. 52.  On 9 July 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office forwarded the seventh applicant's complaint to the investigator and ordered that the investigation in the criminal case be resumed due to its incompleteness. 53.  On 21 August 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicants that the investigation in the criminal case had been resumed. 54.  On 23 January 2004 the district prosecutor's office again resumed the investigation in the criminal case. 55.  On 30 January 2004 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the seventh applicant about the decision of 23 January 2004 and noted that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 56.  On 31 January 2004 the Chechnya department of the FSB informed the seventh applicant that the FSB did not have any information concerning her brother's whereabouts and fate. 57.  On 14 April 2004 the seventh applicant wrote to the district military commander's office requesting assistance in the search for her brother. She described in detail the circumstances of Lema Dikayev's abduction and stated that the abductors had beaten him in the presence of his family members. 58.  On 4 September 2004 the first applicant again complained to a number of State authorities, including the district prosecutor's office, the ROVD and the Urus-Martan district department of the FSB, about Lecha Basayev's abduction. She stated that her husband had been abducted by a group of servicemen of the Russian federal forces; that she had complained about it to various law enforcement agencies and that none of them had accepted responsibility for the abduction. 59.  On 21 November 2004 the first applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office. In her letter she described the circumstances of her husband's abduction. She expressed her concerns in connection with the absence of any information about Lecha Basayev's whereabouts for more than two years and stated that the authorities had been procrastinating with the investigation. The applicant asked the prosecutor's office to take the following measures: informing her about the progress and the results of the investigation; reopening of the investigation and conducting it in a thorough and effective manner; establishing and questioning of the employees of the local military commander's office; establishing who had used APCs and URAL vehicles in the area on the night of 6 July 2002; questioning of the vehicles' drivers and of the relevant military personnel; collection of documentation reflecting the use of the vehicles; questioning of the military servicemen who had manned the checkpoint in Martan-Chu on the night of 6 July 2002; and transfer of the criminal case, if necessary, to the military prosecutor's office for investigation. 60.  On 21 November 2004 the seventh applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office and stated that her brother Lema Dikayev had been abducted by representatives of law-enforcement agencies who had subjected him to beatings. She further stated that on 6 July 2002 Mr G. G., the district military commander, had informed her that her brother had been detained at the district military commander's office; that after her brother's abduction, unidentified men had twice arrived at their house in the same military vehicles as the ones used during her brother's abduction. The seventh applicant requested the district prosecutor's office to inform her about the progress in the investigation, to resume the proceedings and take basic investigative measures. 61.  On 21 December 2004 the SRJI reiterated the request, describing the circumstances of Lema Dikayev's abduction and stating that he had been subjected to beatings by the abductors. No response was given to either of the requests. 62.  On 10 October and 20 December 2005 and on 19 June 2006 the eighth applicant requested the district prosecutor's office to resume the investigation in the criminal case and provide him with access to the investigation file. No response was given to these requests. 63.  The applicants received no other information relating to the investigation into the abduction of their relatives. 64.  On 1 August 2002 the first and the seventh applicants complained about the abduction of Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev to the district prosecutor's office and requested assistance in establishing their whereabouts. 65.  On 23 August 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 61117. 66.  On 24 August 2002 the first and the seventh applicants were granted victim status in the criminal case. The seventh applicant was questioned and stated that on 6 July 2002 she and her relatives were sleeping at home; at about 2 a.m. a group of unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had broken into the house. They had gone to the room of her brother Lema Dikayev and taken him outside. Lema Dikayev's father (the eighth applicant) had asked the men where they were taking his son; in response he had been told that Lema Dikayev could be exchanged for a machine gun. According to the applicant, she had followed the intruders and had seen her brother being put into an APC. 67.  On 23 October 2002 the investigators suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure to establish the perpetrators. 68.  On 21 August 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed because not all necessary measures had been taken. The applicants were informed about this decision. 69.  On 21 September 2003 the investigators suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure to establish the perpetrators. The applicants were informed about this decision. 70.  On 23 January 2004 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed owing to “incompleteness of the conducted investigation”. The applicants were informed about this decision. 71.  On 23 February 2004 the investigators suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure to establish the perpetrators. The applicants were informed about this decision. 72.  On 8 November 2005 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed. The applicants were informed about this decision. 73.  On 9 November 2005 the investigators suspended the investigation in the criminal case owing to the failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The applicants were informed about this decision. 74.  On 20 June 2006 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed. The applicants were informed about this decision. 75.  On 21 June 2006 the investigators suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure to establish the perpetrators. The applicants were informed about this decision. 76.  On 7 June 2007 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed. The applicants were informed about this decision. 77.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned the ninth applicant, who stated that at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 a group of unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had broken into her family house, pushed her husband Lema Dikayev off the bed; kicked him and beat him with rifle butts. After that the men had searched the house for about half an hour; then they had taped over Lema Dikayev's mouth, bound his hands and taken him away to an unknown destination. 78.  On an unspecified date the investigators conducted a crime scene examination in Lecha Basayev's house. Nothing was collected from the scene. 79.  On an unspecified date the investigators requested that the ROVD provide them with character references for Lecha Basayev. According to their response, although Lecha Basayev was given good references by his neighbours, on 23 May 2002 he had been sentenced to three years' probation for illegal purchase and storage of explosives and drugs. 80.  On unspecified dates the investigators requested that the ROVD, the Chechnya Department of the FSB, various departments of the Ministry of the Interior in Chechnya, military units and military commanders' offices inform the investigation whether they had arrested Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev or had brought any criminal charges against them. According to the responses, these agencies did not have any information concerning either a special operation conducted on 6 July 2002 or the whereabouts of the missing men. The prosecutors' offices of various levels in Chechnya informed the investigators that the missing men had not been detained by law enforcement agencies; criminal or administrative charges had not been brought against them; neither of the missing men had applied for medical assistance and their corpses had not been found. 81.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned Lecha Basayev's son, Mr Kh.B., who stated that at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 he and his family had been sleeping at home when a group of unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms had broken into their house. The men had requested his passport. Having checked his passport, the men had asked about the whereabouts of Lecha Basayev, who was sleeping in another room. Some time later the witness had seen that the armed men had taken his father outside. When the witness had gone outside, the armed men had already left. As it had rained that night, the witness was able to see tyre imprints of armoured vehicles on the ground next to the house. The imprints had led in the direction of Urus-Martan. In the morning the witness had found out from his fellow villagers that another resident of Martan-Chu, Lema Dikayev, had also been abducted on the same night. 82.  On an unspecified date the investigators again questioned the first applicant who stated that at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 a group of unidentified armed men had broken into their house. The men, who spoke unaccented Russian, had been wearing camouflage uniforms and masks. They had told her to go to another room and started searching the house. Upon completion of the search the men had told her not to follow them. Sometime later the applicant had gone outside and had seen that the armed men were walking with her husband Lecha Basayev towards the centre of Martan-Chu. The applicant had attempted to run after them, but the armed men had told her that they would open fire if she followed them. The men had not used physical force against Lecha Basayev. They had not told the applicant where they were taking her husband, but had promised to release him at some point later. 83.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned Lecha Basayev's relative, Mrs Kh.D. who stated that at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 a group of ten to fifteen armed masked men in camouflage uniforms had broken into their house. The witness had got scared and started screaming. The men, who spoke unaccented Russian, had told her to be quiet and stay in her room. She had heard Lecha Basayev's voice in the corridor; then she had heard the sound of adhesive tape. After the armed men had left the house she had gone out of her room. The second applicant had told her that the intruders had taken Lecha Basayev away. 84.  It appears that on an unspecified date the investigators again questioned the seventh applicant, who stated that at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had broken into their house. The men had immediately proceeded to the room of Lema Dikayev. When the eighth applicant had asked the men where they were taking Lema Dikayev, they replied that if he wanted to see his son he would need to exchange him for a machine gun. After that they had taken Lema outside, put him in an APC and had driven away in an unknown direction. According to the witness, on 8 July 2002 she had spoken to the district military commander who had told her that her brother Lema Dikayev had been detained at the request of the head of the ROVD and the head of the local administration, as they suspected that Lema Dikayev had been involved in the murder of Mr Kh.T. 85.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned the ninth applicant, who stated that at about 2 a.m. on 6 July 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms had broken into their house. The men had immediately gone to the room where she and her husband had been sleeping. The men had started beating Lema Dikayev with rifle butts. After that they had ordered the witness to bring her husband's passport. However, then they had stopped her and told her that they would take the documents themselves. After that they had searched the house for about half an hour. Having finished the search the men had covered her husband's eyes and mouth with adhesive tape and bound his hands. They had told the witness that they would release her husband after receiving answers to some questions. The intruders, who spoke unaccented Russian, had ordered the family members to stay in the house, threatening to throw a grenade inside if the applicants disobeyed. According to the witness, she had heard the sounds of armoured vehicles parked next to the house. 86.  On 7 June 2007 the district prosecutor's office together with the ROVD and other law enforcement agencies drew up a plan of investigative measures to be taken in criminal case no. 61117. However, the investigators failed to obtain any relevant information with this plan . 87.  On 8 June 2007 the investigators requested that detention centres in various regions of the Northern Caucasus inform them whether Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev were detained on their premises. According to the responses, the missing men had never been detained in any of the detention centres. 88.  On 11 June 2007 the investigators questioned Mr A.Sh., Lema Dikayev's neighbour, who stated that on the night of the abduction at about 2 a.m. he had heard a car engine. He had gone to his gate when an armed masked man in camouflage uniform had appeared in front of him. The man had pointed his machine gun at him and ordered to get inside. According to the witness, at that moment he had seen a group of five to six armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms walk by his house in the direction of Pochtovaya Street. The witness had got scared and gone inside where he stayed until the morning. Early in the morning he had found out from Mrs S.D., Lema Dikayev's relative, that Lema Dikayev and another resident of Martan-Chu, Lecha Basayev, had been abducted that night. 89.  Between 14 and 28 June 2007 the investigators questioned five other residents of Martan-Chu, Mr S.A., Mr A.E., Mr A.Sh., Mr A.A. and Mr B.Sh., each of whom stated that they had found out about the abduction on the morning of 6 July 2002. 90.  On 28 June 2007 the investigators questioned Mr M., who had been the head of the ROVD at the material time. According to the witness, in July 2002 he had been informed that a group of unidentified armed men had abducted two residents of Martan-Chu, Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev. He did not remember that on 6 July 2002 the seventh applicant had told him that on 6 July 2002 her brother Lema Dikayev had been seen detained in the ROVD and that on 8 July 2002 she had requested assistance in the search for her brother. According to the witness, he had not told the applicant that if she was patient for a year, then her brother Lema Dikayev would return home. 91.  On 2 July 2007 the investigators again questioned the seventh applicant, who stated that at about 4 p.m. on 6 July 2002 she had seen a UAZ vehicle and a VAZ-2107 car leaving the premises of the district military commander's office. Some time later that day she had been told that unidentified persons had arrived at her house. When the seventh applicant had returned home, her father, the eighth applicant, informed her that unidentified men in similar vehicles had searched their house looking for weapons. The applicant had concluded that the unidentified men had arrived in the vehicles she had seen at the military commander's office. According to the applicant, next to the building of the local administration she had seen the APCs in which the abductors had taken away her brother. The applicant further stated that on 8 July 2002 she had been in Urus-Martan when someone had informed her that unidentified persons had arrived at her house and were going to set it on fire; one of them had told the eighth applicant that they were acting in accordance with the order issued by the military commander, Mr G. The applicant and her relative Mr V.Sh. had gone to Mr M., the head of the ROVD, and requested him to stop them. The head of the ROVD had contacted someone on a portable radio and after that he had told the applicant that her house would not be burned down. 92.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned Mr A.K., the head of the local administration, who stated that on the dates specified by the seventh applicant no APCs had been parked next to the administration building. 93.  On 3 July 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants' relative Mr V.Sh., who stated that around 8 July 2002 the seventh applicant had asked him to speak to Mr M., the head of the ROVD, as unidentified persons had arrived at her house and were conducting a search. The seventh applicant had not been present during the conversation as she was waiting in the hallway. The head of the ROVD had not contacted anyone by portable radio, but he had promised to help resolve the situation. 94.  It appears that on an unspecified date the investigators again questioned Mr M., the head of the ROVD, who provided a statement similar to the one given by Mr V.Sh. 95.  According to the Government, the investigation in criminal case no. 61117 was suspended and resumed on several occasions. For instance, the investigation was suspended on 7 July 2007 for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators and resumed on 15 August 2007 for additional investigative measures to be taken; then it was suspended on 15 September 2007 and resumed on 4 May 2008 for the same reasons. 96.  On 16 August 2007 the investigators questioned the eighth applicant, who stated that on the night of 6 July 2002 his son Lema Dikayev had been abducted by a group of men in camouflage uniforms and masks who were armed with automatic weapons. That night the witness had not heard any military vehicles. On the morning of 6 July 2002 he had been told that another resident of Martan-Chu, Lecha Basayev, had also been abducted on the same night. In the afternoon of 6 July 2002, a group of armed servicemen without masks had arrived at his house. One of them had told the witness that according to some information in their possession, a machine gun, an automatic rifle and two grenades had been hidden in the household. After that they had searched the roof and found what they were looking for. The same group of men had returned to the house at some point later and had again searched the household. The witness had spoken to one of the servicemen; however, the witness did not remember that this serviceman had told him that the group was acting under the orders of the military commander, Mr G. 97.  On 16 August 2007 the investigators also questioned a resident of Martan-Chu, Mr Yu.I., who stated that at the material time he had been the deputy head of the Martan-Chu village administration. On the morning of 6 July 2002 he had been told that during the night, at about 2 a.m., unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had abducted Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev. One of their relatives had complained about it to the Martan-Chu village administration. According to the witness, he had called the head of the ROVD, Mr M., and requested information about the circumstances of the abduction. The latter had told him that he had not heard about the search of the Dikayevs' house. According to the witness, he had not seen military vehicles on 6 July 2002 and he had not issued any orders to the military commander Mr G. concerning the detention of Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev. 98.  On 6 September 2007 the investigation of the criminal case was transferred from the Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office to the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor's office. 99.  On 11 September 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants' neighbour, Mr S.A., who stated that he had found out from his fellow villagers that during the night of 6 July 2002 unidentified armed men had abducted Lecha Basayev and Lema Dikayev. According to the witness, he had not heard any noise which could have been caused by armoured vehicles. 100.  The Government further submitted that the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation. 101.  In response to requests by the Court the Government disclosed several documents from criminal case no. 61117 stating that the investigation was in progress and therefore disclosure of other documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. The Government submitted copies of the following documents:\n1) a procedural decision to institute an investigation into the abduction dated 23 August 2002;\n2) two decisions to grant victim status in the criminal case to the first and the seventh applicants dated 24 August 2002;\n3) decisions to suspended the criminal investigation dated 23 October 2002, 21 September 2003, 23 February 2004, 9 November 2005, and 21 June 2006;\n4) decisions to resume the investigation in the criminal case dated 21 August 2003, 21 January 2004, 8 November 2005, 20 June 2006, and 7 June 2007;\n5) the investigators' decisions to take up the criminal case;\n6) letters informing the applicants about the suspensions and the resumptions of the investigation in the criminal case.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Žalec. 5.  On 21 May 1997 the applicant, employed as a teacher in a music school, instituted proceedings before the Celje Labour Court seeking the annulment of a decision on the classification in a pay grade. 6.  On 1 February 2000 the first hearing was held. 7.  After two more hearings, on 24 March 2000 the first-instance court delivered a judgment rejecting the applicant’s request. He appealed. 8.  On 7 December 2001 the Higher Labour and Social Court upheld his appeal and remitted the case for re-examination. 9.  On 11 June 2002 the first-instance court delivered a judgment rejecting his request. He appealed. 10.  On 26 February 2004 the second instance court rejected his appeal. He lodged an appeal on points of law. 11.  On 11 January 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. He lodged a constitutional complaint. 12.  On 17 March 2006 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as unsubstantiated. The decision was served on the applicant on 21 March 2006. 13.  On 7 September 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Celje Labour Court seeking the annulment of a decision on the classification in a pay grade and requesting for the two proceedings to be joined. 14.  On 10 December 2002 the first hearing was held. The first-instance court rejected the request for joining the proceedings and delivered a judgment rejecting the applicant’s claim. He appealed. 15.  On 15 April 2004 the Higher Labour and Social Court rejected his appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 28 May 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Mr Šekerović was born in 1932 and lives in Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ms Pašalić was born in 1926 and lives in Belgrade, Serbia. 6.  Mr Šekerović was granted an old-age pension in 1984 and Ms Pašalić in 1981. 7.  In 1992 they moved from what is today the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Federation”) to what is today the Republika Srpska (each of the Federation and the Republika Srpska being an “Entity”). While they were internally displaced, they received their pensions from the Republika Srpska Pension Fund (“the RS Fund”). 8.  Having returned to the Federation in 2000 and 2001 respectively, the applicants unsuccessfully sought to have their pension entitlements transferred from the RS Fund to the Federation Pension Fund (“the FBH Fund”). Therefore, in 2002 they lodged applications with the Human Rights Chamber, a domestic human-rights body set up by Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 9.  On 10 January 2003 the Human Rights Chamber delivered a landmark decision concerning three applicants, including one of the applicants in the present case (Ms Pašalić) and the applicant in Karanović (cited above), who had been granted pensions in what is today the Federation before the war, who had then moved to what is today the Republika Srpska during the war, and who, for that reason only, continued to receive RS Fund pensions despite their return to the Federation after the war (pursuant to the Pension Agreement, see paragraph 16 below). They were thus treated differently from those who had stayed in what is today the Federation during the war. The Human Rights Chamber considered that difference in treatment to be discriminatory and an obstacle to the return of displaced persons to their pre-war homes (RS Fund pensions were normally lower than FBH Fund pensions, and the cost of living was normally higher in the Federation). Furthermore, it held that the situation complained of had racist connotations (given the nature of the war, the population that had moved from what is today the Federation to what is today the Republika Srpska during the war had primarily been Serbs, and those who had stayed were mostly Bosniacs and Croats). The Human Rights Chamber ordered the Federation: (a) to take all necessary legislative and administrative actions by 10 July 2003 to ensure that the applicants were no longer discriminated against, particularly in comparison to those pensioners who had remained in what is today the Federation during the war; and (b) to compensate the applicants for the difference between their RS Fund pensions and the amount they would have received from the FBH Fund from the date of their application to the Human Rights Chamber until the date of the Federation’s compliance with the order under (a) above. 10.  Having assessed that her pension from the FBH Fund would have been lower than the nominal amount of her pension from the RS Fund, on 22 July 2003 the FBH Fund informed Ms Pašalić that she would not be paid any compensation. The FBH Fund disregarded the fact that, at that time, pensioners in the Republika Srpska, as opposed to those in the Federation, did not receive the nominal amount of their pensions, but only a fraction thereof, owing to fiscal difficulties in that Entity. 11.  Mr Šekerović’s case was still pending when the Human Rights Chamber ceased to exist on 31 December 2003. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”) took over his case and on 27 June 2007 delivered a judgment similar to that in Ms Pašalić’s case. 12.  On 14 December 2007 the FBH Fund decided to pay Mr Šekerović 8,345 convertible marks (BAM)[1] by way of compensation for the difference between the sum which he had received from the RS Fund between 16 April 2002 and 30 November 2007 and the sum which he would have received from the FBH Fund in the same period. It also decided to continue paying any such difference in the future. In March 2008, for example, the applicant received BAM 531 from the RS Fund and BAM 105 from the FBH Fund. 13.  After the Karanović judgment, cited above, the FBH Fund revised its practice and agreed to compensate Ms Pašalić for the difference between the sum which she had actually received from the RS Fund (rather than the nominal amount of her RS Fund pension, see paragraph 10 above) and the sum which she would have received from the FBH Fund in the period after 18 February 2002. In order to determine the amount due, on 23 June and 22 July 2008 the FBH Fund asked the RS Fund to indicate the sums actually paid to Ms Pašalić. The RS Fund failed to respond. On 3 July and 28 August 2008 the FBH Fund sent letters to Ms Pašalić (one to an address in Sarajevo and the other to an address in Belgrade), but they were returned as undeliverable (addressee unknown). In June 2010 the applicant finally provided the necessary information and in July 2010 the FBH Fund paid Ms Pašalić BAM 1,425 (that is, BAM 839 for 2002, BAM 530 for 2003 and BAM 56 for 2004). Since 2005 the applicant had apparently been receiving more from the RS Fund than she would have received from the FBH Fund (in April 2010 she thus received BAM 627 from the RS Fund whereas she would have received BAM 483 from the FBH Fund). 14.  On 13 October 2010 the Constitutional Court held that its decision in Mr Šekerović’s case of 27 June 2007 had not been enforced, because he had not yet been granted an FBH Fund pension (see paragraph 19 below). 15.  According to official figures, the average pension has always been lower in the Republika Srpska than in the Federation. That difference has, however, decreased: while in 2003 the average pension was BAM 133 in the Republika Srpska and BAM 192 in the Federation, in 2009 the figures were BAM 335 in the Republika Srpska and BAM 346 in the Federation. Furthermore, pensioners in the Republika Srpska now receive, as do those in the Federation, the nominal amount of their pensions (until recently, the former, as opposed to the latter, were only receiving a fraction of their nominal pensions owing to fiscal difficulties in that Entity).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Zhytomyr. 6.  The applicant was the director of B., a limited liability company. In 2007 and 2008 the company took out bank loans for the purpose of production activities. In April 2009 the company changed the composition of the shareholders and management. The changes were allegedly made on the basis of forged documents. Subsequently, the company failed to repay the loans. The company refused the banks’ requests to repay the debts. The applicant claimed that he was no longer working at the company. 7.  On 30 October 2009 the Prosecutor of Zhytomyr City instituted criminal proceedings in connection with the embezzlement of funds by the managers and owners of company B. and the forgery of documents. 8.  On 25 and 27 November 2009 the investigator of the Zhytomyr Prosecutor’s Office questioned the employees of the banks dealing with the loans to company B., the shareholders and the staff of company B. The witnesses gave details as to the role of the applicant in arranging the loan agreements and in the way the shareholders and management had been changed. One of the former shareholders claimed that his signature had been inserted on loan documents which he had not actually signed. He alleged that the applicant had then calmed him down by explaining that everything would be fine; his signature had been inserted without asking him as nobody had wished to bother him. 9.  On 27 November 2009 the applicant was also questioned. At 10.15 p.m. on 27 November 2009 the investigator of the Zhytomyr Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that he was being arrested and detained for seventy-two hours on suspicion of having committed a crime. The investigator drew up an arrest report specifying that the applicant was being arrested in accordance with Articles 106 and 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the grounds that “eyewitnesses had directly identified him as a person who had committed a crime”. 10.  On 28 November 2009 the applicant challenged his arrest and detention before the Bohunskyy District Court of Zhytomyr (“the District Court”). He argued that his arrest and detention had been unlawful, noting that no eyewitness had identified him as a person who had committed any crime; furthermore, the alleged events had taken place a long time ago and there was no risk that he would abscond since he had previously voluntarily appeared before the investigator. 11.  On 30 November 2009 the investigator applied to the District Court with a request to place the applicant in pre-trial detention. On the same day the District Court, relying on Article 165-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, found that in order to make a decision on the application of a preventive measure it required more information concerning the applicant’s personality, family status and lifestyle. The court therefore ordered that the investigator produce that information and extended the applicant’s preliminary detention to ten days. 12.  On 7 December 2009 the investigator released the applicant against a written undertaking not to abscond. The investigator noted that the applicant was disabled; he was the breadwinner for three minor children, one of whom was disabled; he had a permanent place of residence; and that there was no information that he would abscond or hinder the proceedings. 13.  On 29 January 2010 the District Court found that the applicant’s arrest had been unlawful because the prosecutor’s office had failed to provide evidence that any eyewitness had identified the applicant as a person who had committed a crime. The court further considered that the applicant’s arrest and his further detention had not been justified and necessary in the circumstances of the case. The prosecutor appealed against that decision. 14.  On 23 February 2010 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision as unfounded, noting that the District Court had not properly examined the witnesses’ statements available in the criminal case file. The case was remitted to the District Court for fresh consideration. 15.  On 15 March 2010 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the witness statements available in the file had identified the applicant as a person who had committed the alleged crimes. The applicant appealed against that decision. 16.  On 7 April 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 15 March 2010, noting that the case file contained the statements of witnesses who had identified the applicant as a person who had committed the alleged crimes. 17.  On 11 May 2010, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law as inadmissible, noting that the decisions of 15 March and 7 April 2010 were not amenable to review by the Supreme Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 31 May 2000 the applicant, a tax police officer, was arrested. He was later remanded in custody on suspicion of banditry, robbery and abuse of power. His detention was subsequently extended on several occasions. 7.  The proceedings against the applicant and co-accused were surrounded by an extensive media campaign. In particular, on 6 June 2000 the Segodnia daily newspaper published an article which contained a detailed description by a journalist of the charges against the applicant and co-accused. According to the applicant’s submissions, similar statements were repeated in other Moscow newspapers («Московский Комсомолец») in June 2000. The applicant asserted that the prosecutor had included these articles in the case file as evidence against him. 8.  In April 2001 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case was referred to the Moscow City Court. 9.  On 8 May 2002 the Moscow City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. The court relied on statements of many witnesses, including co-defendants and victims, and forensic expert reports. 10.  On 1 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia, acting on appeal, quashed the judgment due to procedural defects and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11.  On 19 February 2003 the Moscow City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. During the trial the defendants, relying on their right to silence, refused to testify. The court based its findings on numerous witnesses’ depositions and submissions by the defendants during the pre-trial investigation. 12.  According to the applicant, on 9 June 2003 another Moscow newspaper («Российский Курьер») published an article discussing the applicant’s criminal case. 13.  On 29 July 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia, acting on appeal, upheld the judgment with minor changes. 14.  From 5 June 2000 to 9 September 2003 the applicant was detained in facilities nos. IZ-77/2 and IZ-77/3 in Moscow. 15.  According to certificates issued on 15 February 2006 by the acting facility director, and produced by the Government, the applicant was kept in eight cells. From 5 June to 27 October 2000 he was detained in cells nos. 314, 501, 146 and 218. According to the Government, the information on the number of inmates during the above period was not available as the documents had been destroyed. 16.   Further, the Government submitted that from 27 October 2000 to 22 January 2002 there had been fifteen detainees on average together with the applicant in cell no. 501, which was designed for thirty-eight persons. From 22 January to 12 February 2002 there were four detainees on average in cell no. 27, which was designed for six persons. From 12 February to 17 April 2002 there were ten detainees on average in cell no. 51, which was designed for eight persons. From 17 April to 17 May 2002 there were twenty-five detainees on average in cell no. 140, which was designed for twenty-two persons. There were fifty-one detainees on average in the same cell from 28 October 2002 to 16 February 2003. From 17 to 30 May 2002 there were two detainees on average in cell no. 37, which was designed for six persons. From 16 February to 28 June 2003 there were twenty-eight detainees on average in cell no. 146, which was designed for twenty persons. Finally, from 28 June to 14 August 2003 there were twenty detainees in cell no. 2, which was designed for twenty-two persons. 17.  The Government supported their assertions with copies of extracts from registration logs showing the number of detainees on 1 December 2001, 12 and 13 February, 1 and 2 April, 14 and 15 April, 18 and 19 May, 30 and 31 October 2002, 12 and 13 June, and 2 and 3 August 2003. The registration logs did not include the detainees’ names. The Government did not provide the Court with information on the cell measurements. 18.  The applicant contested this information in part. He stated that from 9 to 19 July 2000 he had shared cell no. 146, which measured 48 sq. m, with up to seventy detainees. There were thirty-eight detainees in the same cell as the applicant from 15 February to 31 March 2002 and from 15 February 2003 to 16 August 2003, and they had to sleep in shifts. Further, according to the applicant, cell no. 501 measuring 36 sq. m, in which he was kept from 19 July to 24 August 2000 and from 24 September 2000 to 18 January 2001, housed thirty-eight detainees. From 4 October 2002 to 15 February 2003 the applicant was kept in cell no. 140, measuring 48 sq. m, with at least thirty-seven other detainees.\n(b)  Facility no. IZ-77/3 19.  From 30 May to 29 October 2002 and from 14 August to 9 September 2003 the applicant was kept in detention facility no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, in cells nos. 524 and 523 respectively. According to the Government, in cell no. 524 he was kept at different periods with twenty-one to thirty-four other detainees; and in cell no. 523 with twenty-one to twenty-four detainees. 20.  The applicant stated that both cells measured 30 sq. m and there were thirty persons there with him. 21.  The Government, relying on the information provided by the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences, submitted, with respect to both facilities, that the cells had been ventilated naturally through the windows. Each cell also had a ventilation shaft. The cells had natural light and the metal shutters (“eyelashes”) were removed on 25 November 2002 following a relevant directive of the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore there were twenty-four-hour artificial lights, as well as security lights. The partition around the toilet offered sufficient privacy. 22.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s description and submitted that the sanitary conditions had been unsatisfactory. The windows of the cells let almost no daylight in as they were covered with “eyelashes”, and due to insufficient daylight the applicant’s eyesight deteriorated significantly during the period of detention. Toilet facilities were not separated from the living area, the cells had no ventilation and the air was always stuffy. Smoking was not restricted in the cells, which exposed the applicant, who is a non-smoker, to heavy tobacco smoke and made him feel sick. The cells were infected with bed-bugs and lice but the administration did not provide any insecticides. 23.  The applicant produced written statements by Mr M., who had been detained in cell no. 501 in detention facility IZ-77/2 in 2000-2002, and Mr V. who had been detained together with the applicant from 17 November 2002 to 15 February 2003 in cell no. 140 and from 15 February to 16 August 2003 in cell no. 146 in detention facility IZ-77/2. They confirmed the applicant’s account of the conditions of detention there, including information on cell measurements, number of detainees and sanitary conditions.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Budapest. His previous applications (nos. 23209/94 and 27313/95) to the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) were joined and declared inadmissible by the Plenary Commission on 13 January 1997. 9.  On 18 November 1965 the Budapest Regional Court, in the context of criminal proceedings with certain political connotations, convicted the applicant of espionage and sentenced him to six and a half years’ imprisonment. The Court also ordered the confiscation of his property. On 23 February 1966 the Supreme Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, amended the first-instance judgment in that the criminal offence was characterised as attempted sedition and the prison term was reduced to five years. The remainder of the appeal was dismissed. Subsequently the applicant served his sentence. His property, namely his villa and garden as well as his car and money in a bank, was confiscated. 10.  On 25 October 1989 the Attorney General lodged an appeal on legal grounds with the Supreme Court against the judgments of 1965 and 1966, proposing that the applicant’s conviction be quashed as being unlawful and that the applicant be acquitted. On 12 December 1989 the Supreme Court followed this proposal. 11.  On 6 February 1990 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Budapest Regional Court claiming restitution of his property. He further claimed compensation as a victim of a miscarriage of justice. On 19 February 1993 the Regional Court awarded him four million Hungarian forints (HUF) as compensation for damage suffered as a consequence of his imprisonment. 12.  In the restitution proceedings, between September 1990 and February 1992 the Regional Court held several hearings. Moreover, given that both the confiscated car and real estate had been sold and that, therefore, only compensation was feasible, the court took expert evidence as to the value of this property. The Technical Institute of Judicial Experts prepared an opinion on that question. 13.  On 24 February 1992 the Regional Court, following a further hearing, issued an order awarding the applicant HUF 50,000 for the car, plus HUF 6,200,000 in compensation for his losses. The remainder of his claims was dismissed. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court sitting as a second instance, claiming higher compensation. 14.  On 10 December 1992 the Supreme Court considered the case by way of a written procedure and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 15.  On 12 February 1993 the Attorney General, reacting to the applicant’s request to seek review of the Supreme Court’s decision, informed him that restitution proceedings were governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which excluded such a review. 16.  On 19 February 1993 the applicant nevertheless lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, complaining of the Budapest Regional Court’s decision, as well as of the second-instance decision taken by the Supreme Court. 17.  On 22 June 1993 the Supreme Court rejected his petition. 18.  On 5 April 1995 the Constitutional Court decided that the application of procedural rules assigning restitution cases to the criminal courts – and excluding a review by the Supreme Court – amounted to arbitrary discrimination. The Constitutional Court amended the said rules to the effect that the files should be forwarded to the civil courts with a view to conducting the proceedings. Concerning the applicant’s particular case, it decided that he should be entitled to institute civil review proceedings before the Supreme Court. 19.  The applicant’s renewed petition for review dated 8 April 1995 was received at the Supreme Court on 10 April 1995. He filed further submissions on 10 and 13 May 1995. 20.  On 19 October 1995 the Supreme Court rejected the renewed petition. It noted the background to the applicant’s case, including its rejection of the applicant’s previous petition. However, as the Code of Criminal Procedure only envisaged the possibility of one such petition, the Supreme Court had to reject any further petition brought by the same person. 21.  On 12 February 1996 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s further constitutional complaint. It considered that the applicant’s submissions did not raise any questions of constitutionality within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Court Act, but were limited to complaining that the Supreme Court had failed to implement properly the Constitutional Court’s earlier decision. To the extent that the applicant, in his submissions, pursued his petition for review, the Constitutional Court referred the case to the Budapest Regional Court for further action, the latter being the competent court for the civil procedure. 22.  On 7 March 1996 the Budapest Regional Court forwarded the files to the Supreme Court for a decision on the applicant’s petition for review. 23.  On 12 November 1996 the Supreme Court again rejected the applicant’s petition for review. It explained that, according to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, no review could take place in proceedings of the present kind. Subsequently the applicant brought a further complaint before the Constitutional Court with a view to the annulment of that decision. 24.  On 9 June 1998 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the procedural situation governing the examination of criminal restitution claims in civil review proceedings. 25.  Following the ensuing change in legislation, on 15 February 2000 the Supreme Court annulled its decision of 12 November 1996 and ordered a review of the merits of the applicant’s restitution claims. 26.  On 25 June 2001 the Supreme Court’s review bench considered the case by way of a written procedure and dismissed the applicant’s petition on its merits. It held that the lower courts’ procedure, and in particular the manner of taking evidence – although it had been governed by the rules of criminal procedure concerning restitution – had complied with the Code of Civil Procedure. That decision was served on 6 August 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1963 and 1959 respectively and live in Vienna. 7.  The applicants live together in a homosexual relationship. The second applicant is a civil servant and, for the purpose of accident and sickness insurance cover, he is insured with the Civil Servants Insurance Corporation (“the CSIC”) (Versicherungsanstalt Öffentlicher Bediensteter). On 1 July 1997 the first applicant asked the CSIC to recognise him as the dependent (Angehöriger) and to extend the second applicant's insurance cover to include him. He submitted that section 56(6) of the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act (“the CSSAIA”) (Beamten-Kranken- und Unfallversicherungsgesetz) only referred to persons of the opposite sex living with the principally insured person and running the common household without receiving any payment. But, because there were no good reasons for excluding persons living in a homosexual relationship from the privilege of extended insurance cover, section 56(6) should be interpreted as also including homosexual partners. 8.  On 2 September 1997 the CSIC dismissed the request, holding that, because the first applicant was of the same sex as the second applicant, his request had to be dismissed. This decision was served on the second applicant who, on 1 October 1997, filed an objection. 9.  On 21 November 1997 the Mayor of Vienna, acting as the Regional Governor, quashed the decision on procedural grounds. He held that the CSIC should have served its decision on the first applicant. 10.  On 13 January 1998 the CSIC dismissed a request by the first applicant and this time served the decision on him. The first applicant filed objections. 11.  The mayor of Vienna confirmed the CSIC's decision on 19 March 1998. Thereupon the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court in which he argued that the exclusion, under section 56(6) of the CSSAIA, of homosexual couples from the extension of insurance cover was in breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, of the Convention and was therefore unconstitutional. 12.  On 15 June 1998 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the first applicant's complaint. Referring to its previous case-law, the Constitutional Court found that, in the issue at hand, the legislator had had a very wide margin in which to reach a decision and the decision taken had been within that margin. 13.  On an unspecified date the Constitutional Court granted a request by the first applicant for the case to be transferred to the Administrative Court. On 7 September 1998 the first applicant supplemented his complaint to the Administrative Court. 14.  On 4 October 2001 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant's complaint. It found that the authorities had correctly concluded that section 56(6) of the CSSAIA only applied to heterosexual partnerships. There was no issue under Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, of the Convention, because Article 8 did not guarantee specific social rights, and the case at issue did not therefore fall within the ambit of that provision. The exclusion of homosexual partnerships from the scope of section 56(6) of the CSSAIA also complied with the principle of equality because that difference in treatment was justified. While it was true that, where persons of different sex living together in a household in which one of them was running that household while not being gainfully employed, it was, as a rule, safe to conclude that they were cohabiting in a partnership, that was not the case if two persons of the same sex were living together in a household. In the absence of any possibility to register a homosexual partnership, it would have been necessary to undertake delicate enquiries into the most intimate sphere of the person concerned. That difference in the factual situation justified different treatment in law. 15.  In proceedings instituted by the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of two similar provisions to section 56(6) of the CSSAIA relating to extending insurance cover to relatives, on 10 October 2005 the Constitutional Court decided to quash section 123(8b) of the General Social Security Act (“the GSSA”) (Allgemeines Sozial-versicherungsgesetz) and section 83(3) of the Social Security Act for Trade and Commerce (“the TCSSA”) (Gewerbliches Sozialversicherungsgesetz). The Constitutional Court explicitly referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Karner v. Austria (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, 24 July 2003) and held that the two provisions in which the extension of insurance cover to unrelated persons living with the insured were discriminatory because they were restricted to persons of the opposite sex. 16.  On 1 August 2006 the Social Rights Amendment Act (“the SRAA”) (Sozialrechts-Änderungsgesetz) entered into force amending in particular the GSSA, the TCSSA and also section 56 of the CSSAIA. A second amendment to section 56 of the CSSAIA entered into force on 1 July 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Amsterdam. 6.  On 20 November 2001 the applicant was arrested in Lübeck in Germany. On 21 November 2001 the Lübeck District Court (Amtsgericht) issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest on suspicion of trafficking in and importing narcotic substances. He was subsequently remanded in custody. 7.  Following negotiations with the applicant's legal representatives, the Lübeck Public Prosecutor gave the applicant an assurance that the prosecution service would institute proceedings under Article 11 of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (European Treaty Series no. 112, “the Transfer Convention”) if the applicant confessed to the alleged crimes. Furthermore, they would refrain from requesting a sentence exceeding eight years' imprisonment. 8.  On 25 March 2002 the applicant confessed in writing to having committed the crimes specified in the arrest warrant. 9.  On 6 May 2002 the Lübeck Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant. 10.  Prior to the oral hearing, the applicant's counsel informed the trial court of the agreement reached between the applicant's defence lawyers and the public prosecution service. 11.  During the oral hearing before the Lübeck Regional Court (Landgericht), which took place on 26 August 2002, the applicant gave a full confession. The Public Prosecutor requested a sentence of eight years' imprisonment. According to the transcript of the hearing, the Public Prosecutor moreover declared as follows:\n“....the Public Prosecution Office does not see any reason not to proceed in accordance with Article 11 of the Council of Europe's Transfer Convention.” 12.  On 26 August 2002 the Lübeck Regional Court, on the basis of the applicant's confession, convicted him of unlawful trafficking in and importing narcotic substances and sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment. The court accepted the applicant's confession as a mitigating factor. The applicant having waived his right to appeal, the judgment became final on the same day. 13.  On 28 August 2002 the applicant applied to the Schleswig-Holstein Ministry of Justice to institute transfer proceedings under Article 11 of the Transfer Convention. In his pleadings, the applicant's counsel relied upon the agreement between the defence, the criminal chamber at the Lübeck Regional Court and the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Lübeck Regional Court. 14.  On 9 September 2002 the Ministry of Justice acknowledged receipt of the applicant's request and informed him that the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors (Leitender Oberstaatsanwalt) in Lübeck had been invited to submit comments on it. 15.  On 20 February 2003 the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors stated that he would only endorse a transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention on condition that the Dutch authorities gave an assurance of continued enforcement and did not release him before two-thirds of the sentence had been served. 16.  By a letter of 5 March 2003 the applicant reminded the Justice Ministry that, during the oral hearing held on 26 August 2002, the Public Prosecutor had given an assurance that he would support the applicant's request to be transferred under Article 11 of that Convention. 17.  On 12 March 2003 the Justice Ministry sent the applicant's submissions to the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors for comment. They pointed out that it was no longer standard practice in Germany to institute transfer proceedings under Article 11. 18.  On 24 April 2003 the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors submitted a report containing a statement given by the Public Prosecutor at the hearing. The latter stated that, when giving the assurance, he had not known the difference between Articles 10 and 11 of the Transfer Convention and had expected the applicant to be transferred to the Netherlands to serve the sentence imposed by the German courts. It had been important to him to express his view that the applicant should be allowed to serve his sentence in his home country. 19.  Based on this statement, the Head of Public Prosecution considered that the applicant could not be under the impression that he had been promised a transfer under Article 11 with binding effect on the Ministry of Justice. Subsequently, the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors refused to endorse a transfer under Article 11 and suggested a transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention. 20.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant asked the Schleswig-Holstein Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) for a judicial determination under section 23 of the Introductory Act to the Courts Act (Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, EGGVG, see Relevant Domestic Law, below) with regard to the Public Prosecutor's decision to pursue the applicant's transfer under Article 10 and not, as he had previously been assured, under Article 11 of the Transfer Convention. He submitted that he had only confessed in the light of the Public Prosecutor's assurance that the prosecution service would support his transfer under Article 11, and that the Public Prosecutor's decision to pursue the transfer under Article 10 violated his right to a fair trial under the Convention. 21.  On 20 May 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's request as inadmissible. Referring to the Public Prosecutor's submissions, the Court of Appeal considered that the Public Prosecutor's comment on the applicant's transfer request did not constitute a judicial decision within the meaning of section 23 of the Courts Act, as it did not concern the domestic administration of criminal justice, but related to a diplomatic relationship with a foreign State. Furthermore, the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons did not confer any individual rights on the applicant. 22.  On 26 May 2003 the applicant requested the Ministry of Justice to reconsider its decision, having regard to the principle of fair trial. 23.  On 18 June 2003 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant of its intention to pursue proceedings under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention, having regard to State practice in relation to the Netherlands. 24.  On 1 October 2003 the applicant gave his consent to his transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention. On 6 October 2003 the Dutch Justice Ministry gave its consent to the applicant's transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention. 25.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant was handed over to the Dutch authorities and subsequently served the remainder of his sentence in a Dutch prison. 26.  On 18 January 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Ministry's decision of 18 June 2003. 27.  On 14 January 2005 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, declined to consider the applicant's constitutional complaint. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. With regard to domestic remedies, the Federal Constitutional Court found as follows:\n“The applicant has no right to a judicial review of the exercise of discretion in so far as the decision is based on general, in particular foreign policy, considerations..., the evaluation of which belongs to the core area of Government. However, the judicial review of discretionary powers in respect of law enforcement remains unaffected thereby, in particular with regard to the statement made on the day of the trial by the Lübeck Public Prosecutor's Office... It cannot be denied that uncertainties may remain for the person seeking justice in this connection in view of the previously disputed contestability of decisions by the authorising authority, as well as in regard to the possible legal remedies. Sufficient account is taken of the possible uncertainties in regard to the legal remedy on account of the possibility of a binding referral under section 17a § 2 of the Courts Act. It is reasonable to expect the applicant to have recourse to a disputed legal remedy.” 28.  According to the Federal Constitutional Court, it was for the lower courts to decide which court was competent in the applicant's case. These courts had further to consider whether the impugned act interfered with the applicant's right to a fair trial or with the principle of protection of legitimate confidence. Notwithstanding the possibility of lodging a fresh request, the fact that the relevant time-limits for lodging appeals might in the meantime have expired did not lead to the constitutional complaint being admissible. 29.  This decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 10 February 2005. 30.  On 14 February 2005 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged a fresh request with the Justice Ministry that execution of his sentence be taken over under Article 11 of the Transfer Convention. 31.  On 20 March 2007 the applicant was released from prison, having served two thirds of his sentence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1937 respectively and live in Slovyansk, Donetsk region, Ukraine. 5.  At the material time the applicants worked at the Soda State Plant (ВАТ «Содовий завод»). 6.  On 31 October 1997 and 14 May 2003 the Slovyansk Town Court awarded Mrs Len 1,709.25 and 5,513.92 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and other payments, to be paid by the above-mentioned company. 7.  On 3 November 1997 and 22 February 2001 the Slovyansk Town Court, and on 22 September 2003 the Labour Disputes Commission, awarded Mr Len the amounts of UAH 2,211.18 (about USD 1,176.47), UAH 9,157.04 (about EUR 1,855.94) and UAH 2,356.92 (about EUR 399.22) in salary arrears, to be paid by the above-mentioned company. 8.  These decisions became final and the State Bailiffs' Service instituted proceedings to enforce them. 9.  On 3 January 2001 the Donetsk Arbitration Court (after June 2001 – the Donetsk Commercial Court) instituted insolvency proceedings against the debtor company. On 4 September 2003 the court, having declared the debtor insolvent, ordered its liquidation, which is still pending. 10.  The decisions given in the applicants' favour have still not been enforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in the village of Ponyatovka, Odessa region, Ukraine. 8.  The applicant worked as a customs officer at the Rozdilnyanska Customs Office in the Odessa Region, Ukraine. 9.  On 24 July 2000 the applicant was charged with the criminal offences of aiding and abetting in smuggling and tax evasion, abuse of power and fraud. The same day the applicant was arrested. He remained in custody until 6 November 2000. 10.  On 6 November 2000 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv decided the applicant’s case. The court established, in particular, that the applicant had certified documents confirming that two vans with goods had left the customs territory of Ukraine, and that the applicant had not checked the actual presence of the vehicles at the customs post. The goods were, however, found and seized by the Security Service somewhere else within the customs territory of Ukraine. The court did not find any proof that the applicant had acted deliberately in order to aid the crime: the applicant denied any criminal intent and no other persons involved in the actual smuggling or tax evasion had been established by the investigation. On the basis of these findings, the court sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment for the negligent performance of his professional duties and to a fine of UAH 400[1]. At the same time, the court acquitted the applicant of other charges. By the same decision, the applicant was absolved from this sentence under the Amnesty Law of 11 May 2000. This decision was not appealed and became final on 14 November 2000. 11.  On an unspecified date, the President of the Chernigiv Regional Court lodged a request for a supervisory review of the judgment of 6 November 2000, on the grounds of an erroneous qualification of the applicant’s actions and his unreasonable acquittal on the other criminal charges brought by the prosecution. The President also noted that the sentence was too lenient. 12.  On 25 December 2000 the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court allowed the request of its President, quashed the judgment of 6 November 2000, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The court instructed the first instance court to examine more thoroughly the existing evidence in the case and to conduct additional, more comprehensive interrogations of the accused and the witnesses. 13.  On 29 January 2001 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv considered the case anew and sentenced the applicant to five years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years pending probation, and a fine of UAH 1,000[2]. The court found the applicant guilty of aiding and abetting in smuggling, an abuse of power and fraud. The court acquitted the applicant of aiding and abetting tax evasion, since all the smuggled goods had been seized by the law enforcement bodies and no profit had been made by anyone selling them. 14.  On 1 March 2001 the Criminal Chamber of the Chernigiv Regional Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. The former found that the first instance court had correctly qualified the applicant’s actions. This decision was final. 15.  On an unspecified date, the President of the Chernigiv Regional Court lodged a request for a supervisory review of the judgments of 29 January and 1 March 2001, on the ground that the courts had not followed the instructions given in the previous decision of the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court of 25 December 2000 about the qualification of the applicant’s actions and the severity of the sentence. 16.  On 19 March 2001 the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court chaired by the President allowed the request, quashed the decision of 29 January 2001, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The Presidium found that the first instance court had not followed the earlier instructions and that the sentence was too lenient. 17.  On 2 October 2001 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv considered the case anew, found the applicant guilty of all charges and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. 18.  On 9 July 2002 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s cassation appeal and changed the decision of the first instance court, sentencing the applicant to two years’ imprisonment for the negligent performance of his professional duties. The court noted that no criminal intent in the applicant’s actions could be established and, given the lapse of time, it seemed improbable that any other offenders, who had been directly involved in smuggling, could be found. Therefore, the court acquitted the applicant of the other charges (aiding and abetting in smuggling and tax evasion) for a lack of corpus delicti. By the same decision, the applicant was absolved from his sentence under the Amnesty Law of 11 May 2000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, Mr Jerzy Wizerkaniuk, is a Polish national who was born in 1952 and lives in Kościan. At the material time he was a chief editor and a co-owner of the local newspaper “Gazeta Kościańska”, published in Kościan. 7.  On 24 February 2003 two journalists working for the applicant’s newspaper interviewed a local M.P., Mr T. M. The interview, arranged during a chance meeting between one of the journalists and the M.P. several days earlier, at a session of the Kościan Municipal Council, took place in the M.P.’s office in Kościan and lasted about two hours. All questions and answers were tape-recorded. It related to the M.P.’s public and business activities. After the meeting the M.P. requested that the text of the interview be submitted for his authorisation (autoryzacja) before its publication, as provided for by Section 14 of the 1984 Press Act (Prawo Prasowe) (see paragraph 29 below). 8.  The verbatim transcript of the interview, subsequently prepared by the two journalists, ran to forty standard pages. The applicant requested P.S., the editing journalist of the newspaper, to prepare an edited version of the interview, fit for the publication purposes. That version ran to three standard pages. The latter version was subsequently presented to the interviewee, approximately a month after the conversation. He read it and informed an employee of his office, Mr K. P., that he would not give his consent to the publication of the text. He was of the view that the text did not correspond to the conversation he had had with the two journalists and that many important statements he had made were not included. He asked Mr K.P. to inform the applicant of his refusal. Shortly afterwards, the applicant called the M.P. who reiterated his refusal. 9.  In an undated letter to the applicant, served on him on 5 May 2003, the M.P. stated:\n“It is true that in February I talked to two representatives of “Gazeta Kościańska”. During that conversation, which was in any event very informal, I replied to a number of questions. However, the text submitted for my authorisation only after a month, failed to include many of my important statements and to reflect the character and contents of my statements, [a state of affairs] which I cannot accept.” 10.  On 29 April 2003 the newspaper published a short text asking the readers whether they would be interested in having an interview with Mr T.M., the local M.P., published. 11.  On 7 May 2003 parts of the verbatim records of the interview, edited by P.S. and accompanied by photos made when the interview was conducted, were published by “Gazeta Kościańska”. The text carried a lead informing the reader that the M.P. had refused to grant his authorisation for the publication of the interview and that the newspaper was publishing parts of the interview as recorded on the tape, including in its original grammatical form. 12.  On 19 May 2003 the M.P. informed the Kościan District Prosecutor that the applicant had committed a criminal offence by publishing parts of the interview without his authorisation and against his will. 13.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on a charge of publishing an interview with the M.P. in spite of the latter’s refusal to authorise its publication. During the investigation the M.P. submitted that he had talked to the two journalists from the applicant’s newspaper. They had had a casual conversation rather than a formal interview. A month later he had been given the text to be published which, in his view, failed to reflect many of his important assertions. Moreover, he was of the view that the text failed to convey both the character and the substance of his statements. 14.  By a judgment of 30 April 2004 the Poznań District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. The court established the facts of the case as summarised above (see paragraphs 7-11 above). It further found that the applicant had published the interview despite the M.P.’s refusal to authorise its publication. This in itself amounted to a criminal offence punishable under section 14 read together with section 49 of the 1984 Press Act (see paragraph 29 below). The court observed that it was possible for the interviewed person to renounce his or her right to grant authorisation for the text to be published, but such a declaration had to be unequivocal. 15.  The court noted the submission made by P.S., who was heard as a witness. According to P.S., the newspaper had not published the three-page summary which had initially been submitted for the M.P.’s approval. It had published parts of the interview quoted verbatim. The court found his statement credible.\nThe court further noted that M.P.’s photographs taken during the interview had also been published together with the interview. The applicant had failed to indicate which photographs he intended to publish and to show them to M.P. before the publication. 16.   The court further observed that the applicant had failed to comply with his obligation, under the Press Act, to obtain the authorisation of the interviewed person. It was of the view that the fact that the interview had been published without the required authorisation breached the interviewee’s personal rights. The applicant had acted with intent to break the law, but he had been motivated by his wish to fulfil his journalistic duties by making the interview available to the public. Having regard to the latter factor, the court concluded that the offence concerned could not be regarded as serious.\nConsequently, and having regard also to the fact that it was not open to any doubt that the applicant was a law-abiding citizen and that his conduct had always been irreproachable, the court conditionally discontinued the proceedings, obliged the applicant to pay 1,000 zlotys (PLN) to a charity and ordered him to bear the costs of the proceedings. 17.  By a judgment of the Poznań Regional Court of 6 October 2004, served on the applicant on 15 November 2004, the first-instance judgment was upheld. The court noted, inter alia, that the photographs taken during the interview constituted its inherent part. The applicant, by publishing them without the interviewee’s consent, had breached his personal rights within the meaning of Article 23 of the Civil Code. 18.  The applicant subsequently lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, challenging the compatibility with the Constitution of section 14 in conjunction with section 49 of the Press Act 1984, in so far as they provided for a fine or for restriction of liberty to be imposed on a journalist or publisher for failing to ask an interviewee for his or her authorisation. He relied on Article 54, guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression, and Article 31 of the Constitution, providing for the principle of proportionality in respect of restrictions on constitutional rights. 19.  In the ensuing constitutional proceedings the Constitutional Court sought the opinions of the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), the Prosecutor General (Prokurator Generalny) and the Speaker of the Parliament (Marszałek Sejmu). In their opinions submitted to that court they concluded that section 49, read together with section 14 of the Press Act, was incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression. They were of the view, in particular, that the restriction on the exercise of that right by imposition of a criminal penalty was incompatible with Article 31 of the Constitution, which enshrined the principle of proportionality in respect of restrictions imposed on the exercise of civil rights and freedoms (see paragraph 27 below). They further referred to the existing civil law instruments available for the purposes of effective protection of personal rights (see paragraphs 30-32 below). 20.  The Constitutional Court gave a judgment on the merits of his constitutional complaint on 29 September 2008. It held that the contested provisions of the Press Act were compatible with Article 54 of the Constitution read together with its Article 31. 21.  The court noted that it was proposed in a public debate to do away with the obligation to seek and obtain the authorisation provided for by the Press Act. However, the opinions pointing to the potential danger of such a legislative measure could not be overlooked. The Constitutional Court was of the view that abrogating the authorisation requirement would, on the one hand, expose persons interviewed by the press to the risk of having their personal rights breached by having their words distorted and, on the other, be dangerous for the exercise of the freedom of expression. The essence of the authorisation was not only to ensure that statements made by interviewees were rendered literally, but also to protect the integrality of such statements. This, in turn, ensured that the intentions of the speaker were faithfully conveyed.\nTherefore, the applicant’s argument that the authorisation requirement gave the interviewee an opportunity to block the publication of a statement indefinitely was incorrect. 22.  The judgment further read:\n“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. It is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. The press has a duty to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. This duty is closely intertwined with the right of the public to receive information. (...)\nStatements made public by the media could, as they have a great power of persuasion, lead to the infringement of the personal rights of the individuals concerned. In certain cases the post factum remedies available under law are insufficient to provide effective redress for such infringements, and in some cases the damage could indeed be irreparable. However, a publicly made statement not only could be an instrument of an infringement, but could also be unlawfully distorted. This was why the legislature decided to grant additional protection to statements made in the context of interviews by creating the authorisation requirement. Assuming that this requirement amounted to a restriction on freedom of expression as it obliged journalists to obtain authorisation from the author of literally quoted statements, its necessity in a democratic society has to be examined. [The] freedom of expression is not ius infinitum and could therefore be limited. However, it is necessary that restrictions on its exercise are compatible with the principle of proportionality set out in Article 31 of the Constitution. This provision allows for restrictions imposed on individual rights only when they have statutory legal basis and are necessary in a democratic state in the interests of national security or public safety, for the protection of environment, health or morals, for the protection of rights of others. These restrictions cannot not impair the essence of rights and freedoms. (...)\nArticle 47 of the Constitution provides for everyone’s right to the legal protection of one’s private and family life, of one’s honour and good reputation, and for the right to decide about one’s personal life. No restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of these rights (...). On the contrary, the freedom of expression can be restricted. The obligation to obtain the interviewee’s consent amounted to a restriction. However, such restriction cannot be seen as impairing the essence of the freedom of expression, because it concerns only statements quoted verbatim in press publications. It does not restrict or limit journalists’ right to inform the public of the content of such a statement by summarising it. When a journalist chooses to summarise or otherwise convey the content of a statement made by the interviewee, he or she is not obliged to seek the interviewee’s authorisation or to inform them of the intended publication. Nor, therefore, does it restrict the right of the public to obtain information.\n[...] that requirement is also necessary in a democratic society to protect the personal rights of journalists’ sources. Hence, not only it is not in breach of any constitutional right but, on the contrary, it had to be regarded as a guarantee of the effective exercise of constitutional rights.\nFurthermore, this requirement is justified not only by the necessity to protect individual rights [...] but it derives its legal foundation from other elements which, taken together, formed the constitutional notion of the public interest. As the authorisation serves to establish with full clarity the authorship of a given statement made public, it contributes to the clarity and transparency of public debate. It makes it possible for the reader to be certain that the speaker identifies himself with the statement’s content and would not try to change it or to distance himself from it. It is therefore in the reader’s interest to maintain it. Without this requirement, readers could not be sure whether statements purportedly made in the context of interviews are really authentic.\nIn the Constitutional Court’s opinion the authorisation requirement was therefore a means of guaranteeing the reader’s right to obtain reliable, credible, truthful, honest, clear, not misleading and responsible information. This right has not been expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, but it was anchored in it. [...]” 23.  In so far as the criminal sanction for failure to obtain the authorisation was concerned, the Constitutional Court observed that it aimed at ensuring that the citizen’s right to reliable information was respected. Authorisation was the simplest way to ensure the veracity of the message, whereas statements published without authorisation could be distorted, which was clearly undesirable. 24.  The Constitutional Court referred to the legal provisions penalising defamation. It was of the view that while the offence of defamation was directed against an individual’s reputation, in the same way the offence penalised by section 14 read together with section 49 of the Press Act was aimed at obtaining compliance with the obligation to quote and report statements made by interviewees in a fair and accurate manner, in order to protect their personal rights. The penal sanction provided for by these provisions thus respected the principle of proportionality. 25.  A dissenting opinion of Justice Rzepliński was attached to that judgment. He had regard, firstly, to considerations which could be said to have constituted the ratio legis of the Press Act when it had been adopted in 1984. He noted that the 1952 Constitution, in force at that time, guaranteed neither the right to freedom of expression nor the right to respect for family and private life in any form comparable to the current constitutional regulations. At that time all media had been subject to preventive censorship and it was ultimately the State which decided what could be published or broadcast. The opinion further read, inter alia:\n“The provisions of the Press Act regarding the authorisation requirement were only, at that time, an additional safeguard against the press publishing any information given to journalists by the communist party or State agents if such information was capable of jeopardising the interests of then political power.\n[Given that constitutional background, it is only natural that] the Press Act did not provide for any distinction in respect of the authorisation requirement between the persons exercising public functions and all other persons. Thus, that Act provided for identical protection, by way of the criminal law, of persons holding public offices who were, for that reason, obliged to provide information about their acts to journalists, playing the role of “watchdogs” of the public powers on behalf of public opinion, and all other, “private”, persons. (...)\nMoreover, the Press Act failed to indicate any time-limit within which a journalist could reasonably expect that authorisation would be granted or refused. (...)\nWhile it is true that during the last years of the ancien régime, in 1998/89, State censorship became less strict, the origin of the examined provisions of the Press Act and the place they had in the legal order at that time cannot be ignored.” 26.  Justice Rzepliński further disagreed with the Constitutional Court in so far as it had held that the restrictions imposed by the impugned provisions satisfied the test of proportionality, enshrined in Article 31 of the Constitution. In this context, he stated that the freedom of speech standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgments could not be overlooked. The dissenting opinion further read:\n“The impugned provisions [seen in this light] amounted to an unnecessary and excessive interference with the freedom of the press in the interest of the personal rights of persons providing information to the press. These provisions were not necessary for that purpose at the time they were adopted and are still less necessary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law.\nAuthorisation to publish information quoted verbatim is unknown to the legal systems of other States of the European Union. (...)\nThe authorisation requirement amounts to censorship which makes it impossible for the reader to know the original statement made by the interviewee. It may dissuade journalist who is wishing to obtain an interview for their newspaper with a politician important in a national or local context from asking uncomfortable, searching questions. (...)\nIn a democratic state a politician, a public person, has no right to manipulate his or her statements post factum. If he or she resorts to such manipulation, the public opinion is entitled to know this because it is an important element relevant for public image of a politician if he or she tampers with his or her public statements. The requirement of authorisation makes it impossible for the public to acquire such knowledge. Citizens expect politicians to have the courage to make wise decisions in difficult situations. If a politician is unsure of the choice of words to be used when speaking in a public situation it might be a signal to the public that he or she is unable to cope with stressful circumstances. It is something that public opinion is entitled to know. (...)\nI do not share the view expressed by the Constitutional Court in the present case that a journalist, when refused authorisation to publish a verbatim quotation, can resort to paraphrasing the statements concerned; that the Press Act therefore does not in any way restrict the journalist’s right to convey the interviewee’s thoughts and the right to inform the public thereof (...). I am of the view that public opinion always has a right to be informed of the interviewee’s statements quoted verbatim always where a journalist deems it necessary to convey information which is interesting for readers. I am also of the opinion that that descriptive technique is manipulative and makes it possible for both a journalist and an interviewee to shirk responsibility for the words they use. Furthermore, the fact that the impugned provisions of the Press Act make it possible to use such “techniques” and “evasions” demonstrates that they do not meet the standards required of a fair-minded legislator. (...)\nThere is no right in the Constitution or in a democratic society to “true” or “right” information. A journalist is not obliged to provide such information; if only because he or she does not exercise public powers. His or her professional duty is to seek and disseminate information, views and judgments. Only persons receiving information, readers, listeners, TV watchers or internet users are to decide whether information is true or not. (...)\nThe authorisation requirement is not, as such, wrong. A journalist, when talking to experts, may have, at the editing stage, some doubts whether he or she has properly understood what they said, even where the interview was recorded. In practice, in such situations journalists themselves request the persons interviewed to read the text and to correct or supplement it. A journalist is well aware that errors he committed in gathering specialist information could jeopardise his position on the market. What then is a sword of a criminal sanction needed for? (...)\nThe mere fact that section 49 of the Press Act has practically never been applied recently by the courts (...) does not mean that it does not play in the Polish legal system a negative role, with a chilling effect on public debate. No one challenges the constitutionality of the provisions of civil law applied by the courts in the context of disagreements arising out of press publications.”", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, a Ukrainian national, was born in 1980 and lives in the village of Pryberezhne, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. 5.  In 1998 the applicant was seriously injured due to the fault of his teacher. As a result, he became an invalid. 6.  On 3 July 2000 the Saky Town Court (the “Saky Court”) ordered the State College of Audit and Economics of Kharkiv (the “College”), to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH 32,178.02[1] and a monthly payment of UAH 519.75[2] in compensation. On 27 September 2000 the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The judgment became final and was enforced in full on 6 March 2001. 7.  On 6 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal lodged against the above decisions under the new cassation procedure. On 5 March 2004 the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the request of the College for review of the case in the light of newly discovered circumstances. 8.  On 28 March 2002 the Saky Court ordered the College to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH 38,575.35[3] and a monthly payment of UAH 750.20[4] in compensation. 9.  On 10 May 2002 the Zhovtneviy District Bailiffs' Service of Kharkiv instituted enforcement proceedings. 10.  In December 2002 the Bailiffs' Service informed the applicant that the judgment could not be enforced due to the lack of State budgetary allocations in respect of the College's expenditure. 11.  On 11 July 2003 the Bailiffs' Service discontinued the enforcement proceedings on the ground that the debtor lacked funds. 12.  In April 2004 the applicant received a total of UAH 2,250[5] in payment of the allowance for three months. 13.  On 4 May 2005 the judgment was enforced in full. 14.  On 3 June 2003 the Saky Court awarded the applicant UAH 20,757.74[6] against the College in compensation. 15.  On 26 November 2003 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea upheld the decision of the first instance court. The enforcement proceedings commenced in June 2004. 16.  On 30 May 2005 the judgment was enforced in full. 17.  In 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings in the same court against the College, seeking compensation for his medical, hygienic, and food expenses, and for loss of income. On 19 May 2004 the court endorsed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant and the College, according to which the latter was to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH 1,770[7] and a monthly payment of UAH 1,435[8] in compensation. 18.   On 28 January 2005 the judgment was enforced in full. 19.  In January 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zhovtneviy District Court of Kharkiv (the “Zhovtneviy Court”) against the Bailiffs' Service for failure to enforce the judgment of 28 March 2002. On 4 April 2003 the court rejected the applicant's complaint, finding no fault on the part of the Bailiffs' Service. It held that the judgment could not be enforced due to the lack of State budgetary allocations in respect of the College's expenditure, for which the Bailiffs' Service was not responsible. 20.  On 17 June 2003 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 4 April 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 21.  On 3 September 2003 the Zhovtneviy Court found against the applicant on grounds similar to those on which it based its decision of 4 April 2003. 22.  On 3 December 2003 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 3 September 2003. 23.  The applicant's appeal in cassation is still pending before the Supreme Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Radovljica. 6.  During the works on a nearby motorway, some plots of the applicant’s land were damaged by the investor – the National Road Administration of Ljubljana (“the NRAL”). 7.  On 4 July 1992 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the NRAL in the Kranj Basic Court, Radovljica Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Kranju, Enota v Radovljici), seeking compensation in the amount of 2,487,490 Slovenian tolars (approximately 10,370 euros).\nOn 22 April 1993 the court held a hearing and decided to appoint an expert to assess the damage sustained by the applicant.\nOn 28 June 1994 the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia.\nOn 10 October 1994 the applicant appealed against the court’s decision on the expert’s costs. On 9 January 1995 he also appealed against the subsequently issued correcting decision concerning these costs. On 27 February 1996 the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani) rejected the second applicant’s appeal.\nIn the meantime, the Slovenian judicial system was reorganized and the Kranj District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Kranju), on 1 January 1995, obtained jurisdiction in the present case.\nOn 6 May 1998 the applicant made a request that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the two hearings held on 11 March and 7 June 1999, neither was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nAt the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 4 September 1999. 8.  On 17 September 1999 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court. The NRAL cross-appealed.\nOn 23 March 2000 the applicant made a request to expedite the proceedings.\nOn 11 October 2000, the Higher Court upheld both appeals and the case was remitted to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on an unspecified date. 9.  In the re-examination proceedings, between 28 March and 3 December 2001, the applicant filed three written submissions.\nThe court appointed a new expert to asses the damage.\nOf the three hearings held between 28 May 2001 and 18 September 2003, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant. However, one hearing fixed for 3 May 2001 was called off on the applicant’s request.\nAt the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 2 December 2003. 10. On 15 December 2003 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court.\nOn 2 March 2005 the court upheld the applicant’s appeal regarding the costs of the proceedings and in this part remitted the case to the first instance court. The court rejected the remainder of the appeal.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 5 April 2005. 11. On 30 March 2005 the Kranj District Court issued a new decision on the costs of the proceedings, which was served on the applicant on 6 April 2005. 12.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant appealed also against this decision.\nOn 23 November 2005, the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.\nThe decision was served on the applicant on 13 December 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are:\n(1) Mr Kursolt Bibolovich Dolsayev[1], born in 1949;\n(2) Ms Mak (also spelled as Makka) Isayevna Dolsayeva, born in 1953;\n(3) Ms Madina Kursoltovna Dolsayeva, born in 1982;\n(4) Mr Shamil (also known as Adam) Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1984; and\n(5) Mr Baysongur Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1995.\nThe first, third, fourth and fifth applicants live in the village of Martan-Chu, in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya. Prior to her death in June 2007 the second applicant also lived there. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  The first and second applicants were married. They were the parents of Beslan Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1974, Mr Rizvan Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1977, Mr Rizavdi Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1978, and Mr Shuddi Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1980, as well as the third, fourth and the fifth applicants. 9.  At the material time Beslan Dolsayev worked as a police officer of the department of the interior of the Zavodskoy district of Grozny (“the Zavodskoy ROVD”) and had a service machine gun. The Dolsayev brothers had positive references from local authorities and were not suspected of participation in illegal armed groups. 10.  From December 1999 Martan-Chu was under the full control of the Russian federal forces. From the end of September 2001 the village was under curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. The checkpoints of the Russian military forces were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement. Military servicemen conducted regular identity checks in the village; prior to the events in question they had visited the applicants' house for identity checks on eleven occasions. 11. On the night between 20 and 21 October 2002 Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev, the applicants and other members of the Dolsayev family were sleeping in their house at 4 Tsentralnaya Street, Martan-Chu, in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya. At about 4 a.m. around thirty men in camouflage uniform and masks and armed with machine guns entered the Dolsayevs' yard. They were equipped with portable radio transmitters but used gestures to communicate among themselves. The men shouted that they belonged to the Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defence (“the GRU”) and ordered everyone not to move. Ten of them broke into the house. Meanwhile, one or two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and a Ural vehicle arrived at the house; their registration numbers were painted over. 12.  The servicemen ordered the men from the Dolsayev family to stand along the wall, checked everyone's identity papers and took Beslan Dolsayev's service gun. Some of them searched the house without producing any warrant and took away a large knife with a black handle. 13.  The servicemen then instructed Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev to go outside; the brothers were not allowed to put on clothing. After that, the four brothers were placed in the APC. The servicemen also intended to take the fourth applicant with them, but the second applicant dissuaded them from doing so as he was sick. 14.  Having locked the women together with the fifth applicant in one room and the first and fourth applicants in another, the intruders left the house and drove away in the APCs and the Ural vehicle. 15.  The applicants' neighbour Ms A.M. submitted in her witness statement that on the night of the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers she had been awoken by the sounds of heavy military vehicles passing by her yard. When she had looked out of the window, she had seen an armoured military vehicle on wheels. She could not identify whether this was a tank or an APC. The vehicle had been parked about 50 metres away, next to the school yard; its headlights were off, but it was clearly visible in the electric light coming from the school's boiler room. Some time later she had seen men in military uniform; the men had got into the vehicle and left without turning the headlights on. They had left in the direction of the military checkpoint located on the road to Urus-Martan. 16.  After the abductors had left, the first and fourth applicants were released from the room by their neighbour, Mr A.S. The first applicant ran outside and saw footprints in the yard and the vegetable garden. The footprints led in the direction of the school, located 40-45 metres away from the applicants' house. The first applicant followed the traces. Next to the school he saw APC tyre marks; they led in the direction of the road from Martan-Chu to Urus-Martan, where a military checkpoint manned by servicemen of the district military commander's office was located. 17.  The applicants have had no news of Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev since 21 October 2002.\n(b)  Subsequent events 18.  On one of the days between the end of October 2002 and the end of November 2002, in the morning, the second and fourth applicants were together at a market in Urus-Martan. There they saw a Russian soldier holding the knife which had been taken away by the abductors of their relatives. The applicants recognised the knife by its shape and the black handle. They followed the soldier to the town's central square. There they met the first applicant and told him about the soldier. The latter was standing next to a group of parked APCs and military Ural vehicles. At that moment the first applicant saw an acquaintance of his who was a police officer, Captain T.Sh. The first applicant told him about his sons' abduction and asked whether he could arrest the soldier. Mr T.Sh. told the applicant that the police did not have the jurisdiction to arrest military personnel. 19.  According to the second applicant, in August 2003 she provided this information to the authorities investigating her sons' abduction. She did not mention to them that she had been together with her younger son when she had seen the soldier as she feared for her son's safety. The first applicant also provided the investigators with a statement concerning the events in question. 20.  In support of their application the applicants submitted a number of documents, including the following: witness statements provided by the first applicant on 20 May 2003, 13 July 2003 and on an unspecified date; witness statements provided by the second applicant on 20 May 2003 and on an unspecified date; a witness statement by the applicants' neighbour Mr S.A., provided on an unspecified date; a witness statement by the applicants' neighbour Mr A.S., provided on an unspecified date; a witness statement by the applicants' relative Ms Z.G., provided on 20 May 2003; four character references for Beslan Dolsayev, provided by the Zavodskoy ROVD, the Urus-Martan ROVD and the Martan-Chu village administration on 25 July 2002 and on unspecified dates; a copy of the newspaper announcement introducing a curfew in the Urus-Martan district as of 25 September 2001; four statements certifying that Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev did not participate in military clashes in Chechnya, all dated 22 May 2003; character references for Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev, all undated; three hand-drawn maps of the premises of the applicants' house; and copies of documents received by the applicants from the investigating authorities. 21.  The Government did not challenge most of the facts as submitted by the applicants. According to the Government, “at about 4 a.m. on 21 October 2002 unidentified persons armed with automatic weapons arrived at the village of Martan-Chu in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya and took Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev away from their house”. 22.  At the same time the Government contended that the applicants' statement of facts was unreliable. In particular, they pointed out that according to the first applicant's witness statement of 2 November 2002, the abductors had locked him in a room with his younger son Adam. However, several years later the applicant changed his testimony. In his witness statement provided on 16 May 2007 the applicant stated that he had been locked by the abductors in a room with his son Shamil and that he had heard one of the intruders saying to the others in Russian: “The commander said to leave Shamil [here] as he is an invalid”. 23.  The Government further pointed out that the applicants had not been sure about the precise number of intruders who had broken into their house on 21 October 2002 as in their statements the number varied from 10 to 25. In addition, the applicants had been inconsistent in their descriptions of the abductors' behaviour: the first applicant had stated that the intruders had initially enquired whether there were any weapons in the house, whereas according to the second applicant, the intruders had not asked any questions. 24.  The Government also expressed their doubts concerning the reliability of the witness statement provided by the applicants' neighbour Ms A.M. In particular, they questioned her inability to distinguish between a tank and an APC and emphasised that she had not witnessed the Dolsayev brothers being placed in the vehicles.\n(b)  Subsequent events 25.  The Government did not dispute that the applicants had seen the soldier with the knife which had been taken away by the abductors. However, they contended that the first and second applicants had provided inconsistent accounts of these events: according to the second applicant's witness statement of 14 August 2003, the events in question had taken place about a week after the abduction and the soldier had been walking alone, whereas according to the first applicant's witness statement given at a later date (the Government did not specify the date), the events in question had taken place about a month after the abduction and the soldier had been accompanied by two other servicemen. 26.  The Government further stated that the applicants' failure to submit this information to the authorities in a timely manner had impeded the investigation into the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers. 27.  Since 21 October 2002 the applicants have repeatedly applied in person and in writing to various public bodies. They have been supported in their efforts by the SRJI. In their letters to the authorities the applicants referred to their relatives' abduction and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. Mostly these enquiries have remained unanswered, or purely formal replies have been given in which the applicants' requests have been forwarded to various prosecutors' offices. The applicants submitted to the Court some of their letters to the authorities and their replies. These documents are summarised below. 28.  On 21 October 2002, immediately after the detention of her sons, the second applicant wrote to the prosecutor's office of the Urus-Martan district (“the district prosecutor's office”) describing in detail the circumstances of their abduction and asking for assistance in releasing them. In particular, she pointed out that on the morning after the abduction she and members of her family had discovered APC tyre marks next to their family's vegetable garden. 29.  On 30 October 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev under Article 126 § 2 (aggravated kidnapping) of the Russian Criminal Code. The case was assigned no. 61144. No investigative measures, other than the questioning of the first and second applicants on 2 November 2002, were taken following the opening of the criminal proceedings. 30.  On 22 November 2002 the second applicant wrote to the military commander of the Urus-Martan district (“the district military commander”), the Urus-Martan district department of the interior (ROVD) and the district prosecutor's office. She stated that her four sons had been abducted by servicemen of law-enforcement agencies of the Urus-Martan district and requested assistance in establishing her sons' whereabouts. 31.  On 11 December 2002 the military prosecutor's office of the North-Caucasus military circuit informed the second applicant that her complaint had been forwarded to the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA”). 32.  On 30 December 2002 the district prosecutor's office granted the second applicant victim status in criminal proceedings concerning the kidnapping of the Dolsayev brothers (case no. 61144). 33.  On the same date the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation in case no. 61144 owing to the failure to identify the culprits. On 16 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant of the suspension of the investigation. 34.  On 24 January 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that in spite of the suspension of the investigation in criminal case no. 61144, operational-search measures were being taken to solve the crime. 35.  On 1 February 2003 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 (“the unit military prosecutor's office”) informed the second applicant that it did not have any information either about the involvement of military personnel, the police or the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the kidnapping of her relatives or about the whereabouts of the Dolsayev brothers. 36.  On 3 March 2003 the Zavodskoy ROVD carried out an internal inquiry into the disappearance of Beslan Dolsayev. It was established that he had been kidnapped by “unidentified persons armed with machine guns and wearing camouflage uniform and masks”. Beslan Dolsayev's service machine gun was declared lost and put on a missing list. 37.  On 17 March 2003 the office of the Prosecutor General sent a report to the Commission of the Russian State Duma for Assistance in Political Settlement and Protection of Human Rights in Chechnya. The report provided data on disappearances in Chechnya and described investigative measures taken by the authorities to solve the kidnappings. The document referred to a specific group of disappearance cases, including the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers, in which the investigation had been opened and then suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. It noted that in all such cases the investigation had found no evidence implicating federal servicemen and that further steps were being taken to solve these crimes. 38.  On 24 March 2003 the Prosecutor General's office forwarded a letter from a deputy of the Russian State Duma accompanying the second applicant's complaint to the Chechnya prosecutor's office. 39.  On 4 April 2003 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor's office to inform him of the progress in the investigation into his sons' disappearance and to grant him victim status in the criminal case. On 11 April 2003 the district prosecutor's office replied that the investigation had been suspended on 30 December 2002. 40.  On 21 April 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that the time-limit of the investigation in case no. 61144 had been extended until 20 May 2003 and that it was supervising the criminal proceedings. 41.  On 25 April 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that it was not necessary to grant him victim status in the criminal case since his wife had already been granted such status. 42.  On 8 May 2003 the Main Military Prosecutor's Office forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the military prosecutor's office of the UGA. 43.  On 20 May 2003 the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators and informed the second applicant of this. 44.  On 13 June 2003 the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (“the Chechnya MVD”) forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the ROVD. 45.  On 30 June 2003 the district military commander informed the second applicant that he had no information either about the whereabouts of the Dolsayev brothers or about the reasons for their abduction. 46.  On 11 July 2003 the military prosecutor's office of the UGA requested the unit military prosecutor's office to establish whether military personnel had been involved in the Dolsayev brothers' abduction. 47.  On 14 July 2003 the office of the Prosecutor General informed the first applicant that his complaint about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation in case no. 61144 had been forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor's office. 48.  On 23 July 2003 the second applicant requested the Chechnya prosecutor's office to overturn the decision to suspend the investigation into her sons' abduction and to ensure that the investigators took the necessary measures to solve the crime. 49.  On 7 August 2003 the Chechnya MVD informed the first applicant that the identities of the perpetrators of the Dolsayev brothers' abduction had not been established, but that measures to identify the culprits were in progress. 50.  On 14 August 2003 the second applicant was questioned by the investigators. In her statement she pointed out that at some time between the end of October and the end of November 2002, in Urus-Martan, she had seen a soldier with the knife which had been taken away from her house by her sons' abductors. 51.  On 6 September 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that the investigation into her sons' abduction had been suspended on 6 September 2003. 52.  On 17 September 2003 the second applicant complained to the district prosecutor about the suspension of the investigation in the criminal case and requested that it be resumed. She expressed the opinion that her sons had been abducted by State representatives and pointed out that she had provided the investigators with detailed information which could have assisted them in identifying the perpetrators. In particular, she stated that she had told the investigators that the abductors had used military vehicles and had been able to pass through the checkpoints of the Russian military forces at night; that the abductors must have had permission from the military commander's office to drive through the checkpoints; that the investigators had failed to question chief officers of local law-enforcement agencies who could have given such permission; and that the investigators had demonstrated their negligent attitude towards the investigation by failing to preserve and examine the tyre marks found next to the applicants' yard and to question the servicemen who had manned the village checkpoints on the night of the abduction. The second applicant did not receive any response to this complaint. 53.  On 28 April 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that it was taking investigative measures to identify the perpetrators. 54.  On 17 October 2005 the applicants' representative, the SRJI, wrote to the district prosecutor's office requesting information about the progress of the investigation in the criminal case and asking for the applicants to be allowed to study the material in the case file. No response was given to this letter. 55.  On 16 November 2005 the first applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. He expressed the opinion that his sons had been abducted by representatives of federal forces. He complained about the ineffectiveness of the investigation and pointed out that the lack of information about the investigation precluded him from appealing against the investigators' decisions. He requested that the investigation into his sons' abduction be resumed and that he be allowed to study the investigation file. No response was given to this request. 56.  On 24 November 2006 the second applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. She requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be provided with information concerning its progress. 57.  On 27 November 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that it had rejected her request of 24 November 2006. 58.  On 28 November 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that on the same date it had suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 59.  On 19 March 2007 the first applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. He complained about the lack of information concerning the investigation and requested that the investigation be resumed and that he be allowed to study the case file. 60.  On 22 March 2007 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that “as a person who has witness status in the criminal case, [he did] not have the right to lodge the request [to study the case file]...”. 61.  On 10 May 2007 the first applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about the lack of information concerning the investigation and requested to be granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 62.  On 10 May 2007 the second applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about the lack of information concerning the investigation and requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be allowed to study the case file. 63.  On 14 May 2007 the district prosecutor's office partly allowed the second applicant's complaint. Its decision stated that the applicant would receive permission to study the material in the case file “which would not divulge investigative secrets”. 64.  On 16 May 2007 the district prosecutor's office granted the first applicant victim status in criminal case no. 61144. 65.  On 5 July 2007 the district prosecutor's office conducted a crime scene examination at the applicants' household. No evidence was collected from the scene. 66.  On 5 July 2007 and 17 July 2007 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor's office that he be granted the status of a civil plaintiff in the criminal case. No response was given to these requests. 67.  On 20 July 2007 the applicants' lawyer Mr M.A. submitted to the SRJI a written statement concerning his study of the investigation file in case no. 61144. In this letter he described the following:\n“... the criminal case file comprises one volume. The case was opened on 30 October 2002 ... Makka Dolsayeva was granted victim status and questioned. Kursolt Dolsayev was also questioned. No other investigative measures were taken. The investigation forwarded information requests to law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya asking whether the latter had apprehended the Dolsayev brothers; according to the responses, the brothers had not been apprehended [by the law-enforcement agencies].\nOn 30 December 2002 [the prosecutor's office] decided to suspend the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators; the investigator's decision stated that all possible investigative measures in the absence of anyone to be charged with the crime had been taken.\n... the crime scene examination was not conducted. Therefore it is possible to conclude that from the very beginning the investigation in the criminal case led to a dead-end; one could not possibly talk about its effectiveness.\nFor instance, in their witness statements Kursolt and Makka Dolsayev stated that after the abduction they had seen tyre marks of military vehicles on the ground; however, the investigation did not find that it was necessary to examine the crime scene [although] traces of the criminals or any other evidence left [by the culprits] could have been discovered there ...\nThe investigation did not question all the witnesses to the crime. [The applicants'] neighbours were questioned only in August 2003.\n... on 20 April 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed owing to 'the lack of response to several information requests forwarded to law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya'.\n... on 20 May 2003 the decision to suspend the criminal investigation was taken.\nOn 6 August 2003 the investigation was resumed.\nA plan of operational-investigative measures was drawn up on 6 August 2003. According to the prosecutor's office, the investigation's main theory was the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers by servicemen of federal forces. To verify this theory, [the investigation] issued the order 'to conduct by 18 August 2003 an expert evaluation of the objects collected from the crime scene'. However, it should be recalled that the crime scene examination had not been conducted and, consequently, no objects had been collected from the scene. The investigative orders listed in the plan of operational-investigative measures had not been carried out.\nThe investigation in the criminal case was suspended on 6 September 2003.\nOn 4 April 2005 the investigation was resumed.\nOrders concerning 'verification of the operations conducted by the servicemen of the Urus-Martan FSB and servicemen of the Urus-Martan district military commander's office on the day of abduction' were issued ...\nOn 4 May 2005 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended.\nOn 6 June 2005 the investigation was resumed ...\nOn 6 July 2005 the investigation was suspended.\nOn 27 November 2006 the investigation was resumed ...\nOn 28 November 2006 the investigation was suspended.\nOn 14 May 2007 the investigation was resumed ...\nOn 18 May 2007 the investigation was suspended again.\nOn 29 June 2007 the investigation was resumed.\nOn 5 July 2007 the investigation conducted a crime scene examination, during which photos of the Dolsayev family's household were taken. 'Nothing was collected from the crime scene.'\nThe investigation file contains the response of military unit no. 6845 to an information request by the prosecutor's office: 'the military commander's office of the Internal Troops [of the Ministry of the Interior] has been stationed in the Urus-Martan district since 2003. At present it is not possible to provide information concerning the military units and their servicemen [stationed in the area in 2002] as in 2002 the military commander's office consisted of units of the Ministry of Defence. [However,] in 2003 the office was discontinued; therefore, it is not possible to provide information as to which units became its successor.'\n[In the investigation file] there is also the response of the OG VOGO (operational unit of the temporary operational group – оперативная группировка временной оперативной группы) and PMVD (units of the Ministry of the Interior) (подразделений МВД): 'there is no information concerning the passage of military vehicles through the checkpoints in the Urus-Martan district in the end of 2002 as there is no archive.'\nIn conclusion, it is possible to say that the investigation of this criminal case has not been carried out. The investigation file contains practically no information other than requests for information and assistance and responses to them; the latter state that none of the law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya apprehended the Dolsayev brothers. The prosecutor's office did not even try to verify whether this was true. The crime scene examination was not conducted until five years after the abduction ...”\n(b)  Court proceedings initiated by the applicants 68.  On 31 October 2003 the Urus-Martan District Court of Chechnya (“the District Court”) granted a request by the second applicant and declared Beslan Dolsayev a missing person as of 21 October 2002. 69.  On 17 November 2003 the District Court delivered a similar decision in respect of Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev and declared them missing persons as of 21 October 2002. 70.  On 31 January 2005 the District Court granted a request by the first applicant and declared Beslan Dolsayev deceased as of 21 October 2002. 71.  On 30 October 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev's abduction under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned no. 61144. The criminal case was opened within the time-frame prescribed by Articles 143 and 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (decisions taken upon receipt of information about a crime) – that is, within ten days from the receipt of the information about the abduction of the applicants' relatives. 72.  The first applicant was questioned on 2 November 2002; the second applicant was questioned on the same date. The second applicant was granted victim status on 30 December 2002; the first applicant was granted this status on 16 May 2007. 73.  The investigation questioned a number of witnesses. On 2 November 2002 the second applicant testified that at about 4 a.m. on 21 October 2002 she had heard some noise from the street. She looked out from the window and saw a group of 20-25 armed men in camouflage uniform and masks. Some of these men entered her house. One of them told her that they were from the GRU. The men put four of the applicant's sons against the wall and asked who was working in the police. Beslan Dolsayev told them that he worked at the Zavodskoy ROVD. Then the intruders took away his service gun, ammunition, service uniform and identity card. After that the men took the applicant's sons outside. They locked her husband Kursolt Dolsayev and her sick son Shamil in a bedroom; the applicant and her daughter-in-law had been locked in another room. After the intruders left, the applicant saw on the ground tyre marks from a car and an APC. On 2 November 2002 the first applicant provided a similar witness statement. However, he also stated that one of the intruders had had a gun with a telescopic sight, and that he had been locked by the intruders in one of the rooms together with his son Adam. On 16 May 2007 the first applicant changed his previous testimony by stating that he had been locked in one of the bedrooms with his son Shamil. On an unspecified date the investigation questioned the fourth applicant, Shamil Dolsayev, whose description of the events was similar to that of his parents. 74.  According to the Government, the applicants provided contradictory statements concerning the subsequent discovery of the knife: the second applicant testified that she had seen the soldier with the knife about a week after the abduction and that the soldier had been accompanied by other servicemen, whereas the first applicant submitted that he had seen the soldier a month after the abduction and that the soldier had been alone. In addition, the applicants' statements contained discrepancies as to the way the soldier had escaped from the applicants. The applicants had also failed to describe the knife's features to the investigation and to inform the authorities that the abductors had stolen their property. 75.  The investigators questioned the applicants' neighbours Ms Kh.N., Mr A.S. and Mr S.A., who had provided similar statements to the effect that they had discovered about the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers from the applicants. The investigators also questioned officer P.M., the head of the road-patrol unit of the Urus-Martan ROVD. According to his statement, he had been informed about the abduction on 21 October 2002. Another witness, the head of the Martan-Chu village administration, Mr E.M., testified that on 21 October 2002 one of the village residents had told him about the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers by unidentified men. 76.  The investigators also requested information about the disappearance of the Dolsayev brothers from various State authorities. On 15 January 2003 the information centre of the Ministry of the Interior stated that it had no records concerning either the detention of the Dolsayev brothers or the opening of criminal proceedings against them. The investigators also obtained information from the public prosecutors' offices and units of the Ministry of Defence, according to which the bodies of the Dolsayev brothers had not been found among the unidentified corpses discovered in Chechnya. 77.  The Government submitted that although the criminal investigation had failed to establish the whereabouts of Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev and the internal investigation conducted by the Zavodskoy ROVD into the circumstances of the disappearance of its officer Beslan Dolsayev had also failed to identify those responsible for his abduction, the investigating authorities had forwarded information requests to competent State agencies and had taken other steps to solve the abduction. The investigation found no evidence to support the theory of the involvement of Russian federal forces in the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers. The law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya had never arrested or detained Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev on criminal or administrative charges and had not carried out any criminal investigations in respect of them. No special operations had been carried out in the Urus-Martan district on 21 October 2002. In addition, according to the statement provided by the head of the Martan-Chu village administration, at the material time it had been possible to drive in and from the village without passing through the military checkpoints by countryside roads located near Urus-Martan and the villages Tangi-Chu and Goy-Chu (also known as Komsomolskoye). 78.  The Government further submitted that the description of the perpetrators provided by the witnesses did not demonstrate that the perpetrators were representatives of the State. Although the camouflage uniform used by the perpetrators was similar to the uniform of military servicemen, such uniform was available for purchase everywhere in the Russian Federation. In addition, the masks used by the perpetrators did not have individual features distinguishing criminals from military servicemen. The fact that the perpetrators had spoken Russian did not mean that these men must have been Russian military servicemen; they could have been residents of Chechnya or members of illegal armed groups from other countries who spoke the language. 79.  According to the Government, the investigation had been suspended and resumed on several occasions; in spite of the large volume of operational-search and investigative measures carried out by the authorities, the investigation had failed to identify those responsible for the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers. The Government further submitted that at the material time a counterterrorist operation had been taking place in Chechnya and there had been daily attacks on the federal forces. Therefore, owing to the risk this investigative measure could have represented for law-enforcement officers, the prosecutor's office had not conducted the crime scene examination in the applicants' house and its surroundings. The Government further contended that the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation, that the first and second applicants had been granted victim status in the criminal case and that the investigators had complied with all the instructions issued by the supervising prosecutors. 80.  Despite specific requests by the Court, the Government did not disclose most of the contents of the investigation file in case no. 61144, providing only copies of the following documents:\n(a) the second applicant's witness statements, dated 2 November 2002 and 14 August 2003; and\n(b) the first applicant's witness statements, dated 2 November 2002, 6 April 2005, 16 June 2005 and 16 May 2007.\nThe Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.   The applicant, Mr Bogdan Ioan Bulea, is a Romanian national who was born in 1973. 6.  On 30 January 2003 the applicant was arrested and charged with several crimes. On 24 February 2003 the investigation concluded with the applicant’s indictment for fraud, use of forged documents and associating with several people with the goal of committing economic crimes. 7.  On 28 August 2003 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was replaced by the Bacău County Court with the preventive measure of a prohibition on leaving town. Claiming that the prohibition on leaving his town of residence had prevented him from obtaining a job, the applicant sought to have the measure overturned. On 25 November 2003 the Bacău County Court allowed the applicant’s application and replaced it with a prohibition on leaving the country. 8.  On 20 April 2004 the Bacău County Court convicted the applicant of aggravated fraud, use of forged documents and associating with several people with the goal of committing crimes and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. 9.  The applicant filed an appeal, which was partially allowed on 22 March 2005 when the Galaţi Court of Appeal decided to send the case back to the Galaţi County Court for retrial on the merits. 10. During the retrial, the applicant sought the revocation of the preventive measure prohibiting him from leaving the country on several occasions, complaining that the unreasonably long travel ban had prevented him from conducting his business activities and earning a living for his family. He also argued that there were no reasons to suspect that he posed a flight risk. On 7 March 2006 the Galaţi County Court rejected the applicant’s application, holding that the severity of the crimes he was accused of, the significant losses to the State treasury which had been caused by those offences and the early phase of the trial justified the need to keep the preventive measure against him in place. The court further stated that the duration of the proceedings and the duration of the preventive measure imposed on him were also due to the complexity of the case, which involved numerous defendants and witnesses.\nSimilar applications for revocation of the preventive measure filed by the applicant were rejected with the same reasoning by the Galaţi County Court on 3 and 28 April 2006. On 19 September 2006 a new application by the applicant was again rejected by the same court, which found that the measure was still necessary given the significant losses caused to the State treasury, the complexity of the case and the fact that the measure had not been in force for an excessive period of time. 11. On 30 March 2007 a new judgment on the merits was issued by the Galaţi County Court, which found the applicant guilty of aggravated fraud, use of forged documents and associating with several people with the goal of committing crimes and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. The applicant was also obliged to repay to the State treasury the sum of 3,740,901,433 Romanian lei (ROL) which he had received illegally. The court analysed the necessity of the preventive measure prohibiting the applicant from leaving the country and decided to maintain it, considering that it was necessary in view of the severity of the crimes committed by the applicant. 12.  The applicant filed an appeal against the judgment of 30 March 2007. During the appeal hearings before the Galaţi Court of Appeal, the applicant once again applied for the removal of the prohibition on leaving the country. At a hearing which took place on 8 October 2008 the court rejected the applicant’s application with the reasoning that, at this stage of the proceedings, given the fact that the applicant had been convicted by the first-instance court but also in view of his numerous attempts to delay the proceedings, keeping the measure in place was warranted. On 18 December 2008 the Galaţi Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The preventive measure imposed on the applicant was maintained, the court holding that the reasons for imposing the measure were still valid. 13.  Both the applicant and the prosecutor filed appeals on points of law (recurs) against the judgment of 18 December 2008. 14.  By a final judgment of 18 March 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed the prosecutor’s appeal and convicted the applicant of aggravated fraud and associating with several people with the goal of committing crimes and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The obligation to reimburse the sum illegally received from the State treasury was upheld. 15.  On 8 April 2010 the applicant started serving his sentence in Bacău Prison. 16.  In his application form of 17 May 2010 the applicant complained that the atmosphere in the prison cell was terrifying and amounted to psychological pressure. 17.  In his letter of 9 July 2010 the applicant complained before the Court that his prison cell was overcrowded, measuring 24 sq. m and having twenty-seven beds arranged in three-level bunks separated by a space of one metre. The applicant also complained that the cell only had one window of 1 sq. m and was therefore lacking in natural light and ventilation. In addition, he complained that he was being held in the same cell as very dangerous criminals. 18.  According to an order of the prison administration submitted by the applicant, there was no electricity provided in the cells between 7:30 a.m. and 7 p.m., while between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. electricity was only provided for the security light. 19.  The applicant was detained in Bacău Prison between 8 April 2010 and 15 July 2010. 20.  Between 8 April and 3 May 2010 he was held in the intake area and was detained in cell no. 115, which measured 26.27 sq. m and had fifteen beds installed. The applicant shared the cell with a maximum of seven other detainees. The window measured 1.73 sq. m. 21.  Between 3 May and 7 July 2010 the applicant was detained in cell no. 107, which measured 39.36 sq. m, had twenty-seven beds installed and which he shared with a maximum of seventeen other detainees. The window measured 2.78 sq. m. 22.  Between 7 and 15 July 2010 the applicant was detained in cell no. 506, which measured 32.13 sq. m, had ten beds and which he shared with nine other detainees. The window measured 2.52 sq. m. 23.  In respect of the hygiene conditions in the cells, the Government submitted that the cells each had a bathroom with individual toilets, showers and sinks and windows which provided natural light and allowed ventilation. The cells and the bathrooms were also equipped with an electric ventilation system. 24.  On 15 July 2010 the applicant’s application for temporary release for three months was allowed by the Bacău Court of Appeal and he was released from prison on the same date. 25.  Because the applicant did not return to continue serving his sentence after the expiry of the three-month term, on 19 October 2010 a nationwide search warrant for him was issued. On 4 November 2011 the warrant was extended to the international level by the Bacău County Police. The applicant remains at large.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  On 3 November 1975 the applicant’s parents requested a court to declare that they had acquired by prescription ownership of a plot of land which had been in their possession for more than 15 years. It appears that they were summoned by the court to identify the successors of the original owners and to indicate their addresses. The participation of these persons in the proceedings was necessary to preclude them from invoking their rights after the matter had been decided upon. 10.  As the applicant’s parents had failed to establish the addresses of all the persons potentially concerned, the proceedings were stayed on 31 July 1976. The number of persons potentially affected by the outcome of the proceedings amounted at that time to thirty-eight, some of whom resided abroad. 11.  On unspecified dates in 1977 the applicant’s parents died and the applicant and her sister inherited their estate. 12.  Between 1975 and 1990, some of the original owners of the property or their successors died and the number of persons potentially affected by the outcome of the proceedings (as further successors of the original owners) increased. 13.  On 15 October 1990 the applicant, being unable to identify all the successors of the original owners or to indicate their addresses, requested the Ostrów Wielkopolski District Court to publish a press notice summoning persons potentially interested in the outcome of the case and to resume the proceedings. 14.  On 17 September 1993 the court decided to appoint a court officer (curator absenti) to represent persons potentially affected by the proceedings but whose addresses were unknown. The court also ordered the publication of a press notice to summon other persons potentially concerned. 15.  At a hearing held on 29 April 1994 the court found that some of the other persons already involved in the proceedings had died. The court again instructed the applicant to indicate the addresses of their successors. The applicant failed to do so and by a decision of 13 January 1997 the court refused to resume the proceedings. 16.  On 22 February 1999 the applicant again requested the court to resume the proceedings on the merits. Apparently, by that stage fifty-three persons were potentially interested in the outcome of the proceedings. 17.  On 25 March 1999 the Ostrów District Court refused to resume the proceedings in view of the applicant’s failure to submit the addresses of all persons potentially affected. The court also decided to discontinue the proceedings, finding that more than three years had elapsed since the date of the last procedural step in the case. 18.  On 2 April 1999 the applicant appealed against this decision and on 27 October 1999 the Kalisz Regional Court partly allowed her appeal. In particular, the court found that there were no grounds to discontinue the proceedings as some procedural steps had been taken during the preceding three years even though technically the proceedings had been stayed. Nevertheless, the court decided that the proceedings should remain stayed in view of the applicant’s failure to comply with the court order. 19.  On 3 March 1999 the Ostrów District Court again summoned the applicant to indicate the current address of one of the potential litigants and the legal successors of another.\nIt appears that the applicant did not file with the court the addresses requested and on 2 February 2000 the trial court rendered a decision discontinuing the proceedings. The applicant appealed. On an unspecified date her appeal was allowed. 20.  On 18 January 2002 the applicant was again summoned to submit the names and addresses of potential litigants, including one allegedly living in Ukraine, on pain of a stay of the proceedings. On 19 February 2002 the court stayed the proceedings, having regard to the applicant’s failure to indicate the legal successors of five litigants and to give the current addresses of a further seven litigants. 21.  On 21 February 2005 the court discontinued the proceedings, having regard to the fact that the applicant had failed to request, within three years, that the stayed proceedings be resumed. 22.  On 21 March 2005 the applicant appealed and objected to the obligation to identify and find the legal successors of former owners and to indicate their addresses. She submitted that the case would have been terminated long ago had the appointment of the curator absenti and the publication of press notice been properly used by the court. She requested the court to publish a press notice or appoint a curator again. 23.  On 31 May 2005 the court summoned her to pay PLN 160 by way or a court fee for the appeal, to identify the legal successors of another six parties who had died and to submit fifty copies of her appeal. The applicant refused to pay the fee, arguing that she had paid this amount several times, but that this had not led to any progress in the resolution of the merits of the case. She also refused to identify the legal successors or addresses of sixteen persons referred to in the decision of 21 February and the summons of 31 May 2005 and reiterated that she had already repeatedly informed the court that she was unable to do so. She referred to her request to publish a press notice to summon potential parties to join the proceedings by way of a press notice. 24.  On 15 June 2005 the court refused to entertain her appeal on the ground that she had refused to pay the court fee and refused to submit fifty copies of the appeal. 25.  The applicant appealed against this decision, submitting that in the absence of the addresses of all potential litigants the requirement to submit fifty copies of her appeal was unreasonable because in any event these copies could not be served on them. 26.  On 28 July 2005 the court summoned her to rectify her appeal by paying PLN 160, by submitting twenty six copies of the appeal, by indicating the legal successors of six deceased litigants and by giving the addresses of two further litigants. 27.   In her pleadings of 12 August 2005 the applicant again submitted that publication of a press notice and the appointment of curator absenti provided for in Article 609 of the Code of Civil Procedure were specifically designated to address situations such as this which had arisen in her case. 28.  On 12 August 2005 the court rejected her appeal against the decision of 15 June 2005, having regard to her failure to comply with the summons of 28 July 2005. 29.  The applicant appealed against this decision, again submitting that she was unable to identify the names and addresses of the persons concerned. 30.  On 21 September 2005 the court rejected her appeal on the ground that she had failed to pay a court fee in the amount of PLN 160 and to submit twenty six copies of her appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1965 and 1961 respectively and live in Ramučiai, Kaunas Region. They are wife and husband. 6.  In 1993 the Karmėlava Circuit Council of the Kaunas Region (Kauno rajono Karmėlavos apylinkės tarnyba) assigned a plot of land measuring 1.97 hectares to the first applicant (hereinafter “the land”), Ms Noreikienė (hereinafter “the first applicant”), for individual farming. In 1996 the Kaunas County Administration authorised her to buy the land for a nominal price of 123 “single-use investment vouchers” (investiciniai čekiai) and 6 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 1.7 euro (EUR)). 7.  On 2 August 2004 the first applicant signed a land purchase agreement with the Kaunas County Administration to acquire the land from the State. The plot was subsequently registered in the Land Registry in the joint names of both applicants. 8.  In 2005 a third party, V.A., brought a civil claim against the Kaunas County Administration and the both applicants, seeking restoration of his ownership rights to the land. He argued that a request for restitution of property had already been submitted in 1991, so the land had been assigned and later sold to the first applicant unlawfully. 9.  On 14 April 2006 the Kaunas District Court (Kauno rajono apylinkės teismas) allowed V.A.’s claim. It held that the first applicant had been assigned the land unlawfully because the local authorities had an obligation to resolve restitution claims before assigning plots to new owners, and because she did not fulfil the legal criteria for being assigned land. Applying the principle of priority of former owners’ rights, the court annulled the administrative decisions assigning the land to the first applicant and the land purchase agreement, and ordered the Kaunas County Administration to return LTL 129 (EUR 37) to the applicants. 10.  On 31 October 2006 the Kaunas Regional Court quashed the lower court’s decision and dismissed the civil claim. V.A. lodged a cassation appeal. On 15 May 2007 the Supreme Court quashed the disputed decision and remitted the case to the Kaunas Regional Court for re-examination. 11.  On 24 September 2007 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld the first‑instance decision of 14 April 2006 and allowed V.A.’s claim. 12.  On 30 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicants’ cassation appeal, on the grounds that it did not raise any important legal issues.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Kosice. 5.  The applicant is a sports journalist. On 18 November 1997 a local daily newspaper published an article containing negative remarks about the applicant's professionalism, ethics and education. 6.  On 26 January 1998 the applicant brought a libel action in the Košice II District Court (Okresný súd) against the chief editor of the daily and “his office”. He sought a judicial order that the defendants publish a correction of the libellous information. In the course of the action there have been several corporate and personal changes on the side of the defendants causing ambiguity as to their standing to be sued in the case. 7.  On 25 March and 18 May 1998, respectively, the District Court invited the applicant to submit further information and to pay the court fee. The applicant complied on 2 April and 26 May 1998, respectively. 8.  On 21 December 1998 the applicant amended the action and submitted a further specification of who the defendants were. 9.  On 22 March 1999 the District Court ruled that the modification of the scope of the action was impermissible. On 30 December 1999 the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) overturned this decision on the applicant's appeal and approved the modification. 10.  Between 1 October 1998 and 2 October 2001 the District Court held 3 hearings that were adjourned due to the absence of the defendant. Another 2 hearings were scheduled but did not take place because the judge was absent for health reasons. 11.  On 21 August 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He contended that the length of the proceedings in his action was excessive and claimed 935,000 Slovakian korunas[1] (SKK) in damages. 12.  On 16 April 2003 the Constitutional Court found that there had been a violation of the applicant's right to a hearing “without undue delay” (Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution) and within a “reasonable time” (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention) in his action. The Constitutional Court ordered that the District Court proceed with the matter promptly; pay the applicant SKK 40,000[2] by way of compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage; and reimburse the applicant's legal costs. The subject‑matter of the proceedings was neither legally nor factually complex. The applicant had caused no delays and what was at stake for him called for special diligence. However, for almost 3 years, the District Court had proceeded with the case inefficiently. 13.  Between 12 December 2002 and 1 February 2005 the District Court took several decisions ascertaining who the defendants in the action were and correcting clerical errors in those decisions. The applicant challenged these decisions by way of appeals (odvolanie) and appeals on points of law (dovolanie). The latter were declared inadmissible on 25 August and 21 October 2005 as, in the circumstances, no such remedy was available.\nIn this period, the District Court sought information from the Registry of Inhabitants concerning the address of one of the defendants and requested that court mail be served on him by the police. 14.  According to the applicant, in the meantime the newspaper in question ceased to exist. 15.  On 23 January 2006 the District Court requested the applicant to identify the defendants of his action in accordance with the applicable procedural requirements and the current state of affairs. He responded on 2 February 2006. The District Court then made further inquiries into who was to be sued in the case. 16.  On 15 June 2006 the District Court held a hearing. It was adjourned and the applicant was again requested to specify who the defendants were. The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the village of Angisa, Ajarian Autonomous Republic (“the AAR”), Georgia. 6.  On 15 February 2006 a criminal investigation was launched by the Ministry of the Interior of the AAR into the activities of a Mr A.K., on account of his alleged association with the criminal underworld, under Article 223(1) of the Criminal Code. Notably, he was suspected of being a “thief in law” (for an exact definition of this term, see paragraphs 18‑20 below) who ran criminal syndicates and participated in the settlement of various private disputes through criminal actions. In the course of the investigation, a number of relevant witnesses were questioned – the officers of the prisons where Mr A.K. had served his previous prison terms, his family members and other close persons, all of whom confirmed that Mr A.K. had indeed obtained, through the criminal ritual of “baptism”, the title of a “thief in law” in 1999. Since then he had participated in management of the “thieves’ underworld” (a well-organised network of criminal syndicates; for more details see paragraphs 21-22 below), in accordance with the special rules regulating the conduct of members of the criminal underworld. 7.  On 5 March 2006 a search warrant was issued in respect of Mr A.K., who was living at that time in either Ukraine or Russia. According to the findings of that investigation, the fugitive suspect had been in regular telephone contact with other purported criminal leaders in the AAR, instructing them on how to settle various private disputes in the region. The subsequent judicially authorised tapping of Mr A.K.’s telephone conversation showed that one of the persons who had been receiving regular instructions from the “thief in law” was the applicant. Consequently, the criminal probe was expanded to include the latter’s activities. 8.  On 31 July 2006 the applicant and another person, Mr Y.A., were arrested on suspicion of being members of the “thieves’ underworld”, an offence punishable under Article 223(1) § 1 of the Criminal Code. When questioned on the same day, the applicant confirmed that he had already known Mr A.K. for thirty years and was aware that he possessed the criminal title of a “thief in law”. The applicant added that a thief in law was, in his opinion, “a righteous man (კაი კაცობა)”. 9.  On 29 September 2006 the criminal investigation against Mr A.K., the applicant and Mr Y.A., was terminated, and the case was transmitted by the prosecution service to a trial court. 10.  By a judgment of 27 March 2007, the Batumi City Court convicted the applicant and Mr Y.A. of being members of the “thieves’ underworld” (Article 223(1) § 1 of the Criminal Code), sentencing them to seven and five years’ imprisonment respectively, whilst Mr A.K. was convicted of being a “thief in law” (Article 223(1) § 2 of the Criminal Code) and sentenced to ten years in prison. 11.  The activities imputed to the applicant were described by the court, in general terms, as follows:\n“Acknowledging and giving recognition to the thieves’ underworld, [the applicant] has publicly expressed his support for it through his own lifestyle, and has been actively involved in achieving the goals of this underworld... by obtaining profits for its members and for other persons, and by terrorising and exercising coercion with respect to ordinary individuals; [the applicant] has disseminated the special rules of the thieves’ underworld through his own actions, and by assisting the thief in law in running this underworld.” 12.  More specifically, the finding of the applicant’s guilt was based on the following three episodes, the reality of which had been confirmed by statements from numerous pertinent witnesses, examined during both the investigation stage and the trial, and evidence obtained by tapping the telephone lines of the applicant, the other convicts and other relevant persons. 13.  Firstly, the City Court established that Mr A.K., generally acknowledged to be one of the most authoritative criminal bosses in the region, had requested the applicant to settle a dispute over an apartment between his mother-in-law and another individual. The court accused the applicant of accepting that task and becoming involved, between 24 June and July 2006, in unofficial adjudication of the dispute, using Mr A.K.’s criminal authority. In reply, the applicant unsuccessfully argued that he had merely wished to help the woman, who was his close acquaintance, to have the dispute settled by friendly agreement, as indeed the parties had been invited to do during a civil court hearing of their case at the relevant time; he had been unaware that such ordinary conduct was a criminal offence. He did not contest that he had indeed been asked by Mr A.K., his old friend, to look into the dispute. 14.  Secondly, the City Court established that the same co-accused “thief in law”, Mr A.K., had requested the applicant, on 24 July 2006, to establish the whereabouts in Batumi of two young men, aged 20-25 years, who had refused to pay a fare to a private taxi driver. The applicant was asked to persuade the young men, using his own authority as a senior member of the criminal world, and the authority of the more influential Mr A.K., to settle the debt towards the driver. Implicitly acknowledging that he had indeed been requested to look into this second private dispute by Mr A.K., the applicant unsuccessfully argued that he had not taken any action in practice and thus could not understand why he should be held responsible for something which had not occurred. 15.  Lastly, the City Court relied on the fact that on 8 July 2006 the applicant, when visiting an imprisoned acquaintance who was considered by members of the “thieves’ underworld” to be a promising young man, that is, a future “thief in law”, the applicant, in addition to discussing financial issues relating to the kitty (obshyak), the common fund belonging to the “thieves’ underworld”, had also informed him that the Minister of the Interior might soon lose his post, which would then naturally lead to reinforcement of the authority of “thieves’ in law” and of the relevant rules of conduct in the criminal world. With respect to this third episode, the applicant unsuccessfully argued before the court that he had merely expressed his opinion about the personality of the Minister of the Interior and that he should not be punished for that. 16.  On 10 July 2007 the Kutaisi Court of Appeal, dismissing the applicant’s appeal in which he reiterated all of his previous arguments, fully upheld his conviction of 27 March 2007. 17.  By a decision of 29 February 2008, the Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the applicant’s cassation appeal as inadmissible, thus terminating the criminal proceedings against him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Baku. 6.  He is a person with a Category 2 disability. 7.  The applicant is an independent journalist and the chairman of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety (“IRFS”), a non-governmental organisation specialising in the protection of journalists’ rights. He also worked as a reporter for the news agency Turan Information Agency. 8.  On 14 June 2008 a group called the “Che Guevara Fan Club” held a gathering at a private café in Baku to celebrate the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Che Guevara. The café in question was located in the basement of a building in the city centre and there were about twenty-five attendees in the gathering. The applicant, accompanied by two other colleagues (R.A. and M.H.) from the IRFS, attended this gathering. 9.  The gathering began at noon and approximately thirty minutes later about thirty police officers entered the café. Some of them were in police uniform and others were in plain clothes. They suspended the gathering and announced that they were going to take the attendees to the police station. 10.  The applicant identified himself, informing the police officers that he was a journalist and the chairman of the IRFS. He had with him his identity card and the card confirming that he was the chairman of the IRFS. The applicant also asked the police officers to identify themselves and to release his arrested colleagues. He further informed the Turan Information Agency by telephone about the police intervention. In response, one of the police officers, who was apparently in charge of the intervention, ordered other police officers to take the applicant to the police station. 11.  According to the applicant, he was taken to a police car by four police officers, who used force against him. In particular, they punched and kicked him in the stomach. 12.  In support of his version of events, the applicant relied on written eyewitness statements from R.A. and M.H., dated respectively 23 June 2008 and 24 June 2008, who confirmed that the applicant had informed the police officers that he was a journalist and the chairman of the IRFS before asking the police officers to release them. A police officer had then instructed other police officers to arrest the applicant and they had used force against him while taking him to a police car. 13.  After his arrival at the police station, the applicant had been separated from the others who had been arrested and had been taken to the office of the Deputy Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, A.K. Four police officers had entered the room and had threatened the applicant in the presence of A.K. One of the police officers, O.A., had, according to the applicant, shouted at him and had taken out his gun. Hitting his gun on the table, he had shouted “I can eliminate you”, “I can arrest you”, “I can send you to jail”. Then he had pushed down the applicant’s head by pressing on the back of his neck so that his head hit the table. The applicant had warned the police officer that he was a person with a Category 2 disability and that his health was fragile. At that point O.A. had struck the applicant in the neck with his elbow; as a result, the applicant had lost consciousness. 14.  In support of his version of events, the applicant relied on the above-mentioned written eyewitness statements from R.A. and M.H. In particular, R.A. submitted in his witness statement that, when he was in the corridor in the police station, the applicant was taken to the office of the Deputy Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. He had then heard someone who was shouting at the applicant saying “I can eliminate you”, “I can send you to jail”. 15.  When the applicant regained consciousness, he had asked the police officers to call an ambulance because he did not feel well. They allegedly refused to do so, but had taken him out of the room. The applicant’s colleagues had seen him in the corridor and had asked other members of the IRFS to call an ambulance. They had also informed the media about the applicant’s ill-treatment by the police. 16.  In the meantime, some journalists, human rights defenders and youth movement activists who had been informed of the arrest of the applicant and his colleagues had begun gathering in front of the police station. 17.  At around 4 p.m. two police officers accompanied the applicant to the door leading out of the police station, but the applicant had been able to take only a few steps and had then again lost consciousness. In support of his version of events, the applicant relied on written eyewitness statements from I.A. (journalist), R.H. (civil society activist) and M.A. (director of the Turan Information Agency), who were at that time present in front of the police station. The witnesses stated that, when the applicant was taken out of the police station, he was unconscious and was taken by an ambulance, which was called by them, to hospital. 18.  At 5.20 p.m. the applicant was admitted to hospital with the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury and contusion of the soft tissues around the nape of his neck. The applicant remained in the intensive care unit of the hospital for four days. He was released from hospital on 25 June 2008. 19.  The events of 14 June 2008 attracted significant public and media interest both inside the country and internationally. In particular, a number of human rights organisations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, expressed concern over the applicant’s arrest and ill-treatment by the police, asking the domestic authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the incident. 20.  On 14 June 2008 the police intervened in the gathering in question on the basis of a complaint from people living in the neighbourhood of the café, who complained about noise and the behaviour of those attending. The applicant and other attendees who were unable to produce their identity cards were taken to the police station but were released once their identity had been established. During his stay at the police station the applicant was not ill-treated by the police. 21.  A criminal inquiry was launched by Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 in connection with the information about the applicant’s admission to the Clinical Medical Centre with injuries. 22.  On 15 June 2008 the applicant was questioned in hospital by an investigator from Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. The applicant described in detail the circumstances of his arrest and detention by the police on 14 June 2008. In particular, he stated that on 14 June 2008 he had attended the gathering commemorating the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Che Guevara, which had been interrupted by a police intervention. When he protested about the arrest of his journalist colleagues on the orders of the police officer who was apparently in charge of the intervention, four police officers forcibly took him to a police car. Following his arrival at Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, he was taken to the room of the Deputy Head of the police station. Other police officers were also in the room and one of them, who was wearing black sunglasses, began insulting him. He then began threatening him, took out his gun and shouted at him. The same police officer also struck him in the neck, as a result of which he lost consciousness. The police officers then took him out of the room. 23.  While the criminal inquiry was still pending, on 17 June 2008 the spokesman for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, E.Z., in an interview with the Turan Information Agency, stated as follows concerning the applicant’s arrest and alleged ill-treatment by the police:\n“The statements made to the media by the chairman of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, Emin Huseynov, alleging that he was subjected to duress by the police are not true. Even the allegations published in the media are contradictory.”\nHe further continued:\n“On 14 June a group of people held an unauthorised gathering at a café. The police requested the interruption of the unauthorised gathering. Twenty people were taken to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 in order to establish their identity and to conduct the relevant explanatory interviews (izahat işləri). They were all released following the explanatory interviews. At that time, Emin Huseynov said that he did not feel well. An ambulance was called immediately. It was established during the medical examination that his health problem was related to his previous diseases. It was established during the medical examination that E. Huseynov had lost consciousness because his blood pressure reached 190.” 24.  According to the applicant, he was examined by a forensic expert in hospital on 18 June 2008. The forensic report dated 23 June 2008 provides that the examination began on 15 June 2008 and ended on 20 June 2008 without specifying the exact date of the applicant’s examination by the forensic expert in hospital. The forensic report of 23 June 2008 reads:\n“Questions addressed to the forensic expert: 1.  What kind of injuries are there on E. Huseynov’s body? What are their degree of gravity and characteristics? In which order and with which instrument were they inflicted? Could these injuries be sustained as a result of a fall, a beating or were they inflicted by E. Huseynov himself? 2.  Does the date of infliction of the injuries on the body of citizen E. Huseynov correspond to the date indicated in the descriptive part of the decision?\nInformation about the case\nIt appears from the decision that a report in connection with the information that citizen E. Huseynov, who resides in ..., has sustained injuries was assigned to me. E. Huseynov, who was questioned during the inquiry, stated that on 14 June 2008 a person that he did not know had struck him in the neck in Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. Citizen E. Huseynov attended the Clinical Medical Centre in connection with his injuries.\nThe examination was carried out in the resuscitation and intensive care unit of the Clinical Medical Centre of the Baku City Main Health Department in the presence of the lawyer Rashid Hajili. According to the person examined, at approximately 12.30 p.m. – 1 p.m. on 14 June 2008 during an event dedicated to the eightieth anniversary of the birth of Che Guevara in café Alaturka, plain clothes persons took him and other attendees to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22. He was struck in his head at that moment and later at the police station. He replies in detail and precisely to the questions about the incident and other questions. 2.  No injuries or objective signs of injury were noticed on the hairy part of the head, the face and other parts of the body.\nIt appears from medical record no. 5190 of the patient of the Clinical Medical Centre of the Baku City Main Health Department that at 5.20 p.m. on 14 June 2008 E. Huseynov, who is 29 years old, was admitted to the resuscitation and intensive care unit by a team from emergency unit no. 2 with the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury and contusion of the soft tissues around the nape of the neck (qapalı kəllə beyin travması, ənsə nahiyəsinin yumşaq toxumlarının əzilməsi). It was not possible for him to describe his complaints when he was admitted to hospital. According to those who brought him to hospital, the patient sustained the injury as a result of a beating. His general state was serious. The skin and mucous membrane were of ordinary color. The respiration was vesicular. The respiratory rate was 19 breaths per minute, the blood pressure was 190/120 mm Hg, the heart pulse was beating 120 per minute. The abdomen was not hard and there was no pain. Neurological status: his conscious awareness was impaired to the point of deafness. His reaction to bright light was positive, he turned away from it. His pupils and tendon reflexes were at equal distance from each side and they were alive. Meningitis symptoms and pathological reflexes were not observed. In the examination no injury was noticed on the skin. Diagnosis: neurological reaction (nevrotik reaksiya). At 5.25 p.m. on 14 June 2008 the patient, who was in a serious neurological state (nevrotik vəziyyət), was directly admitted from the admission unit to the resuscitation and intensive care unit. His conscious awareness was in soporous state. The tendon and corneal reflexes were alive. The skin and mucous membrane which may be observed by eye were pale. The blood pressure was 190/110 mm Hg, the heart pulse was beating 116 per minute. The respiration was normal and sufficient. The urination was normal. Hb-120 g/l, leucocytes 8,4-10 g/l. On 15 June 2008 there was no pathological change in side projected X-ray examinations of side and neck vertebras of the cranium. At 10 a.m. on 15 June 2008 the comment of the doctor on duty: the patient’s state was stable. He was conscious and replied to questions. His pupils were at equal distance from each side and corneal reflexes were alive. There were no meningitis elements. The skin and observable mucous membrane were pale ... (illegible), the heart pulse was beating 96 per minute, the blood pressure was 130/90 mm Hg ... (illegible), the respiratory rate was 20 breaths per minute ... (illegible). His tongue was wet, the abdomen was not hard, the urination was adequate. It was written in the summary of the cerebral computed tomography opinion dated 17 June 2008 that intraparenchymal traumatic pathological changes were not observed in E. Huseynov. In the computed tomography examination of 17 June 2008 pathological change in the neck area and traumatic change in the neck part of the vertebral column were not revealed. In the ultrasound examination of 17 June 2008 no liquid was revealed in the abdomen and there was no hematoma in the parenchymal organs. It was noted in the log dated 17 June 2008 that an examination was carried out by the doctors, the experts in neurotrauma, A.Y. and Q.I., the head of the resuscitation and intensive care unit, V.R., the experts in resuscitation, C.N. and F.T., and the following were noted: his general state was stable, he complained about headaches. The blood pressure was 120/70 mm Hg, the heart pulse was beating 88 per minute. Neurological status: he was conscious and adequately replied to questions. His pupils and tendon reflexes were at equal distance from each side and they were alive. No change was observed in the cranial-brain nerves. There were no meningitis symptoms. Taking into account the patient’s subjective complaints, it was desirable to subject him to a computed tomography examination. Bearing in mind the patient’s state, it was decided that the further examination and treatment of the patient be continued in the neurotrauma department. It appears from the subsequent log that the patient was examined jointly by the assistant professor M. and the head of the department. It was further indicated that E. Huseynov’s illness was related to extended osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, numerous disc protrusions in the back and neck areas (C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 3-4, L 5, S 1), chronic dyscirculatory encephalopathy and vestibulopathy. His treatment in connection with the above-mentioned diseases is ongoing. Clinical diagnosis: neurological reaction, vertebrogenic syndrome, C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7 intervertebral disc protrusions, paroxysmal vein distention.\nThe forensic expert: C.A.\nConclusion\nRelying on the forensic examination of E. Huseynov, born in 1979, and the content of the medical documents, I conclude as follows in reply to questions addressed in the decision: 2.  E. Huseynov’s in-patient treatment was related to his previous diseases - extended osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, numerous disc protrusions in the back and neck areas (C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 3-4, L 5, S 1), chronic dyscirculatory encephalopathy and vestibulopathy.” 25.  The applicant was not provided with a copy of the forensic report. 26.  On 25 June 2008 Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 issued an explanation (arayış) concerning the police intervention of 14 June 2008. The relevant part of this document, signed by the Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, M.T., reads:\n“On the basis of the information that about fifty people had gathered at café “Alaturka” in the basement of building no. 6 at 28 May Street in Baku on 14 June 2008, at around 1 p.m. police officers from the Baku City Police Office took measures in order to identify the persons gathered in this place and to establish the purpose of the gathering, and twenty-two of them were taken to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22.\nAfter these individuals had arrived at Police Station no. 22 at 1.55 p.m., they were registered in the “apprehended persons’ registration log” (gətirilmiş şəxslərin qeydiyyat kitabı) and were released at 4.30 p.m. At the police station, their identity was established and statements were taken from nine of them in order to establish the purpose of their gathering in that location.\n... At the police station, their identity was established and they were released following a “prophylactic conversation” (profilaktik söhbət). It was also established that Huseynov Emin Rafik oglu, who presented a document stating that he was the chairman of the Institute for Reporters’ Freedom and Safety, was among the persons apprehended...” 27.  By a decision of 27 June 2008, the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that there was no evidence that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“It was established during the examination of patients’ reception log in the Clinical Medical Centre that citizen E. Huseynov was admitted to the hospital with the diagnosis of neurological reaction at 5.20 p.m. on 14 June 2008. This was also noted in extract no. 5196, dated 20 June 2008, from the patient’s in-patient and out-patient medical record provided by the Clinical Medical Centre.\nIn connection with the above-mentioned, the forensic report no. 143/TM of 23 June 2008, ordered on 15 June 2008, which was carried out by ... provides in reply to the questions addressed to the expert, on the basis of E. Huseynov’s forensic examination and the content of the medical documents, that no injuries or objective signs of injury (bruise, abrasion, wound, swelling, etc.) were noticed on the body of E. Huseynov and that E. Huseynov’s in-patient treatment was related to his previous diseases - extended osteochondrosis of the vertebral column, numerous disc protrusions in the back and neck areas (C 4-5, C 5-6, C 6-7, L 3-4, L 5, S 1), chronic dyscirculatory encephalopathy and vestibulopathy.\nIt appears from the evidence collected in connection with the fact that citizen Huseynov Emin Rafik oglu had sustained an injury and from the forensic report dated 23 June 2008 ... that there were no injuries or objective signs of injury on E. Huseynov’s body. As no criminal act has been established in this respect, it is appropriate to refuse to institute criminal proceedings.” 28.  The applicant was not informed of the decision of 27 June 2008 concerning the investigator’s refusal to institute criminal proceedings. 29.  On 16 March 2009 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Nasimi District Court. Relying on Articles 3, 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention, he complained that he had been ill-treated by the police during his arrest and whilst in police custody, and that the domestic authorities had failed to conduct an effective investigation in this respect. The applicant further complained that he had been unlawfully deprived of his liberty and that the police intervention of 14 June 2008 had been unlawful and had constituted an unjustified interference with his rights to freedom of expression and assembly. The applicant pointed out, in particular, that the investigator had questioned neither the police officers who had been involved in the ill-treatment nor the other witnesses. He also stated that he had not learned about the existence of the investigator’s decision of 27 June 2008 until 3 March 2009 and that he had never been provided with a copy of the forensic report. 30.  On 31 March 2009 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding the investigator’s decision lawful. The court’s decision was silent as to the applicant’s particular complaints. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“... It was established during the examination of patients’ reception log in the Clinical Medical Centre that citizen E. Huseynov was admitted to the hospital with the diagnosis of neurological reaction at 5.20 p.m. on 14 June 2008. This was also noted in extract no. 5196, dated 20 June 2008, from the patient’s in-patient and out-patient medical record provided by the Clinical Medical Centre.\nIt appears from the forensic report ... that no injuries or objective signs of injury (bruise, abrasion, wound, swelling, etc.) were noticed on E. Huseynov’s body. It was noted that E. Huseynov’s in-patient treatment was related to the previous diseases ... that he had suffered.\nTherefore, the court considers that in carrying out a preliminary examination in compliance with Article 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for establishing whether there were sufficient basis to institute criminal proceedings the investigator took all the necessary steps and, as it was not established that there had been a criminal element in the examined fact, a justified and lawful decision on refusal to institute criminal proceedings was adopted.” 31.  On 6 April 2009 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. He also complained that the investigator had not arranged an identity parade including the police officer O.A. and neither had he questioned the police officers involved in his arrest and detention and, in particular, the Deputy Head of the Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 in whose room and whose presence he had been ill-treated. He had failed to obtain video recordings from security cameras situated in the police station in question. The applicant also disputed the conclusions of the forensic report, pointing out that he had not been provided with a copy of it. 32.  On 27 April 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 33.  In the meantime, the applicant also lodged a civil action against the Nasimi District Police Office, asking for compensation. Relying on Articles 3, 5, 10 and 11 of the Convention, he complained that he had been ill-treated by the police, that he had been arrested and taken to the police station unlawfully, and that the police intervention in the gathering had constituted an unlawful interference with his rights to freedom of expression and assembly. In support of his claim, the applicant relied on written eyewitness statements from R.A. and M.H., who stated that police officers had used force against the applicant during his arrest. They also stated that when the applicant was in the room of the Deputy Head of Nasimi District Police Station no. 22, they had heard someone shouting at the applicant “I can eliminate you”, “I can send you to jail”. When the applicant had been taken out of the room, he did not feel well. 34.  On 25 July 2008 the Nasimi District Court refused to admit his action, finding that it did not comply with the procedural requirements for lodging a complaint. 35.  On 2 September 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 36.  On 17 November 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the Baku Court of Appeal’s decision and remitted the case to the lower courts for a new examination. 37.  On 17 June 2009 the Nasimi District Court, having examined the applicant’s action on the merits, decided to dismiss it. The court found that the applicant had been taken to the police station because he had not had his identity card on him. The court also held that the police intervention had been lawful, since the gathering at the café in the city centre disturbed other people present and consequently the police had intervened. As regards the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment, the court held that it had not been established that the applicant had been ill-treated by the police. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n“It was established at the court hearing that an investigator from Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 had examined the fact that E. Huseynov had sustained injuries, that it had been decided to refuse to institute criminal proceedings on the basis of the collected materials because no criminal act had been established, and that this decision had not been challenged.\nMoreover, it was established at the court hearing on the basis of witness statements that the applicant had been taken to Nasimi District Police Station no. 22 because he had not had his identity card on him, that he had been detained for a certain period of time, and that he had been then released following the establishment of his identity.\nIt was also established at the court that E. Huseynov had been previously sustained brain injury and regularly underwent medical treatment in Azerbaijan and abroad for a long period of time. Unexpected health problems were previously observed in his case and the fact that he had felt unwell after having been brought to the police station was not related to any duress, but to his previous illness.\n Furthermore, it was not established at the court hearing that the applicant had sustained a bodily injury or subjected to physical violence, beaten or been under duress at the police station.” 38.  On 3 August 2009 the applicant appealed against this decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 39.  On 14 October 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 40.  On 7 May 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The first, second and third applicants were born in 1950, 1973 and 1971, respectively, and currently live in Belgrade, Serbia. 11.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 12.  The first applicant, her husband and the other two applicants were holders of a specially protected tenancy concerning a flat in Podgorica (nosioci odnosno korisnici stanarskog prava), Montenegro, where they lived. 13.  In 1989 the first applicant and her husband divorced and the former was granted custody of the other two applicants. 14.  On 26 January 1994 the first applicant obtained a decision from the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud u Podgorici) declaring her the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy on the family’s flat. In addition, her former husband (“the respondent”) was ordered to vacate the flat within fifteen days from the date when the decision became final. 15.  On 27 April 1994 the decision of the Court of First Instance was upheld on appeal by the High Court (Viši sud u Podgorici) and thereby became final. 16.  Given that the respondent did not comply with the court order to vacate the flat, on 31 May 1994 the first applicant instituted a formal judicial enforcement procedure before the Court of First Instance. 17.  The enforcement order was issued on the same date. 18.  On 8 July 1994 the bailiffs attempted to evict the respondent together with his new wife and minor children but the eviction was adjourned because he threatened to use force. 19.  On 14 July 1994 they tried again, this time assisted by the police, but apparently the planned eviction was adjourned for the same reason. 20.  On 15 July 1994 the first applicant bought the flat and became its owner. 21.  On 26 October 1994 the bailiffs and the police once again failed to evict the respondent who kept threatening the first applicant in their presence and bore arms on his person. There also appear to have been additional weapons, ammunition and even a bomb in the flat at the time. The police took the respondent to their station but released him shortly afterwards without pressing charges. 22.  On 28 November 1994 and 16 March 1995 another two scheduled evictions failed, the latter due to the “respondent’s request for the provision of social assistance” in respect of his minor children. 23.  On 23 October 1995 the first applicant gifted the flat to the second and third applicants. 24.  On 3 June 1996 and 1 August 1996, respectively, another two scheduled evictions failed. 25.  On 3 June 1998 the Ministry of Justice informed the first applicant that the Court of First Instance had committed to enforce the eviction order before the end of the month. 26.  On 27 October 1998 and 1 November 1999 another two scheduled evictions failed. 27.  In the meantime, on 13 August 1999, the Real Estate Directorate (Direkcija za nekretnine) issued a formal decision recognising the second and the third applicants as the new owners of the flat in question. 28.  In March of 2004 another eviction was attempted but failed. In the presence of police officers, fire fighters, paramedics, bailiffs and the enforcement judge herself, as well as his wife and their children, the respondent threatened to blow up the entire flat. His neighbours also seem to have opposed the eviction, some of them apparently going so far as to physically confront the police. 29.  Throughout the years the first applicant complained to numerous State bodies about the non-enforcement of the judgment rendered in her favour, but to no avail. 30.  On 9 February 2006 another scheduled enforcement failed because the respondent had threatened to “spill blood” rather than be evicted. 31.  On 5 May 2006 and 31 January 2007, respectively, the enforcement judge sent letters to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, seeking assistance. 32.  On 15 February 2007 the enforcement judge was told, at a meeting with the police, that the eviction in question was too dangerous to be carried out, that the respondent could blow up the entire building by means of a remote control device, and that the officers themselves were not equipped to deal with a situation of this sort. The police therefore proposed that the applicants be provided with another flat instead of the one in question. 33.  On 19 November 2007 the enforcement judge urged the Ministry of Justice to secure the kind of police assistance needed for the respondent’s ultimate eviction. 34.  On 26 March 2004 the second applicant, on her own behalf and on behalf of the third applicant, authorised the first applicant to sell the flat in question. 35.  On 30 January 2006 the second and third applicants authorised the first applicant, inter alia, to represent them in the enforcement proceedings. 36.  The applicants maintain that the gift contract of 1995 (see paragraph 23 above) and the said powers of attorney were submitted to the enforcement court. The first applicant was therefore the second and third applicants’ legal representative in the enforcement proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The Christian Democratic People’s Party (“the CDPP”) is a political party in the Republic of Moldova which was represented in Parliament and was in opposition at the time of the events. 6.  On 3 December 2003 the applicant party applied to the Chişinău Municipal Council for an authorisation to hold a protest demonstration in the Square of the Great National Assembly, in front of the Government’s building, on 25 January 2004. According to the application, the organisers intended to express views on the functioning of the democratic institutions in Moldova, the respect for human rights and the Moldo-Russian conflict in Transdniestria. 7.  On 20 January 2004 the Chişinău Municipal Council rejected the applicant party’s request on the ground that “it had convincing evidence of the fact that during the meeting, there will be calls to a war of agression, ethnic hatred and public violence”. 8.  The applicant party challenged the refusal in court and argued, inter alia, that the reasons relied upon by the Municipal Council were entirely baseless. 9.  On 23 January 2004 the Chişinău Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant party’s action. The court found that the Municipal Council’s refusal to authorise the CDPP’s demonstration was justified because the leaflets disseminated by it contained such slogans as “Down with Voronin’s totalitarian regime” and “Down with Putin’s occupation regime”. According to the Court of Appeal, these slogans constituted a call to a violent overthrow of the constitutional regime and to hatred towards the Russian people. In this context, the court recalled that during a previous demonstration organised by the applicant party to protest against the presence of the Russian military in Transdniestria, the protesters burned a picture of the President of the Russian Federation and a Russian flag. 10.  The applicant party appealed against the above decision arguing, inter alia, that the impugned slogans could not have reasonably been interpreted as a call to a violent overthrow of the Government or as a call to ethnic hatred and that the refusal to authorise the meeting constituted a breach of its rights guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. 11.  On 21 April 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant party’s appeal and confirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are residents of Batalova Vodenitsa, a neighbourhood of Sofia. They describe themselves as being of Roma origin. 7.  Unlike some other European countries, where the Roma often have an itinerant way of life, in Bulgaria, at least since the 1960s, the great majority of the Roma live a settled life. Typically, Bulgarian towns feature one or more predominantly Roma neighbourhoods in non-central areas. 8.  Some of the applicants or their parents and in some cases their grand‑parents moved to Batalova Vodenitsa at the end of the 1960s and in the 1970s. Others are more recent arrivals who settled there in the 1990s. 9.  In the 1960s land in the neighbourhood in question was expropriated by the State and cleared in the context of the authorities’ housing construction policy. A number of blocks of flats were constructed there, but the plots currently inhabited by the applicants remained vacant, having been earmarked for a green area, which was never landscaped. 10.  The applicants’ families built their homes on State land without any authorisation. The area thus gradually developed into a small Roma settlement. It appears that between 200 and 300 persons live there. 11.  Most of the buildings are single-storey houses. There is no sewage or plumbing. The inhabitants use water from two public fountains. 12.  Most applicants’ registered addresses are at their homes in Batalova Vodenitsa. Many of them are registered at one and the same address although they live in separate buildings which do not figure on any official area plan. Most of the applicants live in their houses with their families, including young children or grandchildren. 13.  The applicants never sought to regularise the buildings they had constructed. This was in principle possible through applications for building permits and planning approval. According to the applicants, making such applications was difficult for them as they are poor and live their lives in the Roma community, isolated from the rest of society. 14.  It is undisputed by the parties that the applicants’ homes do not meet the basic requirements of the relevant construction and safety regulations and cannot be legalised without substantial reconstruction. 15.  In 1987 the local building plan was amended and the construction of dwellings was envisaged on the plots in question. The plan was never implemented. 16.  Following a legislative reform, in 1996 the land occupied by the applicants became the property of the Sofia municipality. 17.  Until 2005, the State and municipal authorities never took steps to remove the applicants and their families. 18.  Under the relevant law the applicants cannot obtain ownership of the land they occupy. Until 1996 the provisions on acquisitive prescription did not apply in respect of State and municipal land. Since 1996, these provisions, under which a ten-year period of possession may suffice for the acquisition of real property, apply to most categories of municipal land. However, in 2006, shortly before the expiry of ten years after the 1996 amendment, Parliament suspended the running of prescription periods in respect of State and municipal land. The suspension has been extended several times and is currently in force until 31 December 2014 (sections 79 and 86 of the Property Act and the transitional provisions thereto). 19.  According to a statement by a Mr B. T., a Roma resident of Batalova Vodenitsa, his parents are the lawful owners of their house there and possess a notarial deed. A copy of the notarial deed has not been submitted by the applicants. Neither Mr B.T. nor his parents were among the addressees of the removal order of 17 September 2005 (see paragraph 31 below). 20.  From the beginning of the 1990s tension grew in several regions of Sofia between the inhabitants of Roma settlements and their non-Roma neighbours. The issue of Roma settlements, often referred to as “ghettos”, was widely debated in the media. Many commentators urged the emptying of all “Roma ghettos” in Sofia. This line was supported by a number of leading politicians. Occasionally, the views of Roma organisations were also published. 21.  Between 2003 and 2006 several demonstrations were held by non-Roma residents of different areas in Sofia seeking the eviction of their Roma neighbours. Other demonstrations were held by non-Roma persons protesting at news of plans by the authorities to resettle in their neighbourhoods Roma families to be removed from other parts of the city. 22.  It appears that on an unspecified date non-Roma residents of Batalova Vodenitsa formed an association with the aim to bring pressure to bear on the authorities in relation to the applicants’ unlawful settlement. 23.  Most complaints against the Roma inhabitants of Batalova Vodenitsa concerned sanitary risks and repulsive odours caused by the absence of sewage and the fact that the inhabitants kept animals (allegedly including sheep, pigs, hens and horses). Also, many non-Roma residents of the area believed that the Roma inhabitants were responsible for numerous offences, including physical assault, theft and damage to public and private property. The protesters also resented on aesthetic grounds the presence of unsightly shanty houses in the area. 24.  The municipal authorities in Sofia perceived as a serious problem the fact that since 1990 many Roma had moved to Sofia and settled in illegal Roma settlements, thus increasing their overpopulation and generating more illegal construction and sanitary problems. 25.  In March 2000 an unspecified number of individuals, apparently persons who had obtained decisions restoring their property rights over expropriated land in the Batalova Vodenitsa area, complained to the Sofia municipal council that “persons of Roma origin” were unlawfully occupying land in the area. Having examined the matter, on 11 December 2000 the municipal council decided to offer the restored owners other municipal land in exchange for their land. It also invited the mayor of Sofia to develop a plan for the resolution of the “problem as a whole”. No such plan appears to have been adopted. 26.  In 2003 the local building plan in Batalova Vodenitsa was modified by the municipal authorities, who planned to develop the area. 27.  On 2 March 2005 the Sofia municipal council approved in principle the transfer of title to plots of land in Batalova Vodenitsa to Mr K., a private investor. The transfer was effected on 16 May 2006. The plots of land in question were adjacent to the land occupied by the applicants. It is unclear whether Mr K. ever realised any development project. 28.  On 29 August 2005 municipal officials visited the Batalova Vodenitsa neighbourhood and issued a document certifying that the applicants and other persons occupied the land. 29.  On 8 September 2005, Ms S., the district mayor, invited all or almost all residents – approximately 180 Roma, including the applicants – to leave their homes within seven days as they were occupying municipal land unlawfully. The text referred to section 65 of the Municipal Property Act and contained a list of the names of its addressees and also a warning that failure to comply would result in removal by the police. 30.  The applicants filed an appeal. On 15 September 2005 municipal officials issued a document certifying that the residents concerned had not left the area. 31.  As a result, on 17 September 2005 the mayor ordered their forcible removal on 27 September 2005. The order listed individually the names of all those concerned. The mayor also stated her intention to secure a decision for the demolition of the applicants’ houses in accordance with the Building Planning Act (Закон за устройство на територията). 32.  The applicants asked the Sofia City Court to stay their removal pending the examination of their appeal against the removal order. The court granted their request. 33.  On 28 September 2005 a committee representing the Roma residents of the area signed an agreement with the municipal authorities in Sofia according to which the municipality would offer alternative housing to the persons registered as Batalova Vodenitsa residents, whereupon they would be removed. No action was taken by the municipality in execution of this agreement. 34.  The agreement also provided that the committee of representatives would take measures to improve hygiene in the Roma settlement. They also undertook to organise the removal of unauthorised domestic animals kept by residents and keep better order. According to the Government, the situation did not improve. 35.  In the judicial proceedings against the mayor’s order, on 12 January 2006 the Sofia City Court ruled that the removal order was lawful. The applicants appealed. On 12 June 2006, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the City Court’s judgment. 36.  The courts found that the fact that the applicants had not shown a valid legal ground for occupying the land was sufficient to establish that the removal order was lawful. If the applicants considered that they had property rights, it was for them to seek notarial deeds or bring civil proceedings to establish those alleged rights. They had not done so. In these circumstances and having regard to section 92 of the Property Act, their houses were owned by the municipality. 37.  The courts also stated that the applicants’ allegations about violations of the Convention and discrimination were groundless. 38.  The courts ignored as irrelevant under domestic law the applicants’ argument that they should not be removed because they had lived in the area for decades with the authorities’ acquiescence, and their arguments based on the principle of proportionality. 39.  On 21 June 2006, the municipal authorities announced their intention to evict the unlawful residents of Batalova Vodenitsa, including the applicants, by 28 June and to demolish their homes. On 22 June 2006 the district mayor was reported in the press as having stated that the removal order had been issued as a result of numerous complaints by neighbours in relation to the unlawful settlement. 40.  As a result of political pressure, mainly from members of the European Parliament, the authorities did not proceed with the eviction. 41.  In their public declarations the municipal authorities apparently took the stand that the removal of the Batalova Vodenitsa residents was overdue but could not be done immediately because of pressure “from Europe”. Divergent opinions were expressed as to whether the municipality should try to find alternative housing for the residents of Batalova Vodenitsa. In public declarations the mayor of the district stated that this was not possible because the residents concerned had not been registered as persons in need of housing and the municipality could not give them priority over other people who had been on the waiting list for many years. 42.  On an unspecified date shortly after 12 June 2006, Ms S., the mayor of the relevant district, participated in a televised debate concerning the fate of the Roma settlement in Batalova Vodenitsa. She stated, inter alia, that the Roma inhabitants there did not have the right to be registered as persons in need of housing because they were occupying municipal land unlawfully. For that reason, she would not offer them the tenancy of municipal dwellings, there being many other families on the waiting list. The district mayor further stated that the agreement of 28 September 2005 between the mayor of Sofia and a committee of representatives of the Roma families “had been concluded in a pre-electoral period” and that she did not consider herself bound by it. She also stated that the removal order had been upheld by the courts and must be enforced; the fact that the persons concerned had nowhere to go was irrelevant. The mayor further stated that she had received complaints by non-Roma inhabitants of the area and was under a duty to act. 43.  Most of the applicants have not tried to make arrangements to find new homes for their families. Between 2004 and 2007 three of the applicants registered at addresses in other areas of Sofia. In 2005 one of the applicants declared an address in the town of Sandanski as her official address. According to these four applicants, although for short periods they lived outside Batalova Vodenitsa, in dwellings occupied by relatives, their only real home had remained Batalova Vodenitsa. 44.  It appears that after June 2006 negotiations continued between the Roma inhabitants and the municipal authorities regarding possible relocation in temporary municipal housing of those persons in the applicants’ position who had been registered as resident in Batalova Vodenitsa before 1996. Non-governmental organisations defending the rights of the Roma and Government representatives also took part. 45.  Information about intentions to resettle the Batalova Vodenitsa unlawful residents have met with strong opposition from inhabitants of neighbourhoods where such relocation was envisaged. It appears that no viable resettlement plan has ever been elaborated. 46.  In interviews and statements, local officials supported the non-Roma population. In a radio interview in November 2006, the mayor of Ovcha Kupel district in Sofia stated that “the nuisance that a Roma settlement would create [if Roma families were to move into his district] would surpass by far the inconvenience that a refuse tip would create”. He also stated that “Roma families could not expect to live among the citizens as they did not have the necessary culture”. 47.  On 27 June 2008 the municipal authorities served a notice on the inhabitants of the area, including the applicants, requiring them to leave their houses by 10 July 2008, failing which they would be evicted forcibly on 11 July 2008. 48.  The notice was issued in execution of the removal order of September 2005, which was final and enforceable. 49.  On 8 July 2008 the Court indicated to the Government of Bulgaria, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicants should not be evicted from their houses until 23 July 2008, pending receipt by the Court of detailed information about any arrangements made by the authorities to secure housing for the children, elderly, disabled or otherwise vulnerable individuals to be evicted. 50.  The Government submitted a copy of a statement by Ms S., the district mayor, who indicated that two local social homes could provide five rooms each and that several elderly persons could be housed in a third home. There was no information about any possibility to house families together. 51.  Also, it appears that none of the applicants was willing to be separated from the community and housed in such conditions, not least because it was impossible, according to them, to earn a living outside the community. 52.  On 22 July 2008 Ms S., the district mayor, stated that she had suspended the enforcement of the removal order “pending the resolution of the housing problems of the Batalova Vodenitsa residents”. The order was not quashed. 53.  In the light of this information, the President of the Court’s Fifth Section decided on 23 July 2008 to lift the interim measure of 8 July 2008, specifying that the decision was taken on the assumption that the Court and the applicants would be given sufficient notice of any change in the authorities’ position for consideration to be given to a further measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 54.  On 23 July 2008 the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues, which includes representatives of non-governmental organisations and is presided over by the Director of the Ethnic and Demographic Matters Directorate at the Council of Ministers, discussed the issue. Representatives of the Sofia municipality were advised to refrain from measures seeking to resolve the problem in Batalova Vodenitsa at the expense of creating tension in other areas. The majority view was that the Roma families living in Batalova Vodenitsa should not be evicted and their homes should not be demolished before a lasting solution was found. 55.  According to a letter from the Director of Ethnic and Demographic Matters, sent in January 2009 in connection with the present application, the Sofia municipality was working on a programme for the revitalisation of Roma neighbourhoods. It was envisaged to construct temporary housing on several municipal plots of land. Partial initial financing of the construction work could be provided by the Government but other sources were needed as well. It was envisaged to encourage the Roma applying for housing to take jobs in the construction work under the relevant social employment schemes. The project’s elaboration, including architectural plans, was allegedly under way. The project concerned Roma families who moved to Batalova Vodenitsa before 1996. Those who settled there more recently had “to return to their previous homes”. 56.  On 12 January 2010, in reply to a letter from residents protesting against the authorities’ failure to evict their Roma neighbours from Batalova Vodenitsa, Ms S., the district mayor, stated that the enforcement of the 2005 eviction order had been postponed under pressure from members of the European Parliament and that the applicants had started proceedings in the European Court of Human Rights. The letter did not mention plans to secure alternative housing for the persons to be evicted. 57.  According to media reports, in May 2010 plans to resettle the inhabitants of Batalova vodenitsa on other State or municipal property were discussed by the municipal authorities. 58.  In their latest submissions of December 2010 the parties have not reported any progress in the realisation of such projects. 59.  According to the applicants, the resettlement plans mentioned by the authorities are nothing more than empty promises. 60.  In March 2006 a ten-year National Programme (2005-2015) for the Improvement of the Housing Conditions of Roma in Bulgaria was adopted by the Council of Ministers in the context of the international initiative entitled Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015. 61.  In September 2007, the Sofia municipal council adopted a plan for the implementation of the ten-year national programme in Sofia for the period 2007-2013. The document includes an analysis of the existing situation in respect of housing. 62.  According to this analysis, overpopulated Roma settlements had formed over the years in Sofia and nothing had been done by the authorities in the past to address the ensuing problems. Having always been a marginalised group with minimal resources, the Roma cannot in practice acquire real property. Traditionally they occupy vacant land and construct makeshift huts. Although most of them, being persons in need of housing, meet the relevant criteria for tenancy of municipal housing, this option does not work in practice owing to several factors, including the limited number of available municipal dwellings and unwillingness on the part of many Roma families to resettle in municipal flats. Their unwillingness could be explained partly by the lack of the necessary resources to cover the related expenses, such as utility bills, and partly by the animosities which often erupt between non-Roma residents of blocks of flats and Roma families moving in. 63.  The ten-year National Programme and the 2007-2013 Sofia plan provide for the following actions, among others: elaborating municipal housing programmes, legalising buildings if they meet the relevant construction standards, constructing sewage and water-supply facilities in Roma neighbourhoods and providing information and assistance to those who apply for municipal housing. 64.  The 2010 Monitoring report on the implementation of the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005–2015 programme does not mention any progress having been made in respect of Roma housing. The concluding text of the report contains a recommendation to the relevant institutions and stakeholders to make timely use of the possibilities under Article 7(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 1080/2006 on the European Regional Development Fund. 65.  According to media reports, in several regions in Bulgaria construction works are under way for the building of dwellings intended to house Roma who have been removed or are to be removed from land which they occupy unlawfully.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Grobelno. 6.  On 2 February 1996 the applicant was injured in a car accident. The perpetrator had insured his liability with the insurance company ZT. 7.  On 7 April 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings with the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) against ZT seeking damages in the amount of 2,623,290 SIT (approximately 10,950 euros) for the injuries sustained in the car accident.\nBetween 11 June 1997 and 26 June 2002 the applicant filed seven preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.\nOn 1 September and 12 October 1997 the applicant requested that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the four hearings held between 22 January 1999 and 8 July 2002 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nOn 1 February 1999 the Court appointed a medical expert. The court received the expert’s opinion on 30 March 1999. The court also sought an additional opinion from the appointed expert on 22 June 2000.\nBetween 13 April 1999 and 19 November 1999 the court urged the applicant three times to pay the advance money for the expert’s fees. On 27 December 1999 the applicant submitted evidence that she had paid the advance.\nOn 14 December 2000 the court appointed an expert, a clinical psychologist.\nAt the last hearing the court decided to issue a written judgment. The judgment, upholding in part the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 22 October 2002. 8.  On 5 November 2002 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) and requested that the first-instance court issue a supplementary judgment addressing the issues the court failed to address in the first judgment. ZT cross-appealed.\nOn 6 March 2003 the first-instance court issued a supplementary judgment. The judgment was served on the applicant on 12 March 2003.\nOn 25 March 2003 the applicant appealed against the supplementary judgment.\nOn 1 July 2004 the Celje Higher Court allowed the applicant’s and ZT’s appeals.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 15 September 2004. 9.  On 8 October 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče).\nThe proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The first applicant, Mr Antoni Pla Puncernau, who was born in 1966, is the adopted son of the second applicant, Mrs Roser Puncernau Pedro. The second applicant was the first applicant’s supervisor, as Mr Pla Puncernau is mentally handicapped. They both lived in Andorra. She died when the proceedings were still pending before the Court. 11.  In 1949 Mrs Carolina Pujol Oller, the widow of Francesc Pla Guash, died leaving three children: Francesc-Xavier, Carolina and Sara. She had made a will before a notary in 1939. Under the seventh clause of her will, she settled her estate on her son, Francesc-Xavier, as tenant for life. Should he be unable to inherit, the estate was to pass to his sister, Carolina, and if she was also unable to inherit, it was to pass to Sara’s son, Josep Antoni Serra Pla. 12.  The testatrix indicated that Francesc-Xavier, the beneficiary and life tenant under her will, was to transfer the estate to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage. To that effect she had inserted the following clause in her will: “The future heir to the estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage ...” (“El qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o net de legítim i canònic matrimoni ...)”.\nShould those conditions not be met, the testatrix had stipulated that the children and grandchildren of the remaindermen under the settlement would be entitled to her estate. 13.  The beneficiary under the will, Francesc-Xavier, contracted canonical marriage to the second applicant, Roser Puncernau Pedro. By deed drawn up on 11 November 1969 before a notary in La Coruña (Spain), they adopted a child, Antoni, in accordance with the procedure for full adoption. They subsequently adopted a second child. 14.  In 1995 Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol made a will in which he left 300,506 euros (EUR) to his son, Antoni (the first applicant), and EUR 180,303 to his daughter. He named his wife, Roser (the second applicant), sole heir to the remainder of his estate. In a codicil of 3 July 1995, Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol left the assets he had inherited under his mother’s will to his wife for life and to his adopted son, Antoni, as remainderman. The assets in question consisted of real estate. On 12 November 1996 Francesc-Xavier Pla Pujol died. The codicil was opened on 27 November 1996. 15.  Accordingly, the only potential heirs to the estate under the will are the applicants, Antoni Pla Puncernau and his mother, and two sisters, Carolina and Immaculada Serra Areny, who are the great-grandchildren of the testatrix. 16.  On 17 July 1997 Carolina and Immaculada Serra Areny brought proceedings in the Tribunal des Batlles of Andorra to have the codicil of 3 July 1995 declared null and void and seeking an order requiring the applicants, as defendants in the proceedings, to return to the plaintiffs all the assets of the estate of Carolina Pujol Oller, their great-grandmother, and to pay them damages for unlawful possession of the assets. 17.  In a judgment delivered on 14 October 1999, after hearing submissions from both sides, the Civil Division of the Tribunal des Batlles of Andorra dismissed the action for the following reasons:\n“ ...\nIII.  Both parties agree that it is the contents of the will that determine the testatrix’s intention at the time of making it, so that the will has to be interpreted in accordance with that intention, which is to be inferred from the words used in the will (Digest 50, 16, 219). Since 1941 it has been apparent from the case-law of the Andorran courts (judgment of the Judge of Appeals dated 3 February 1941) that ‘on both a partially intestate and a testate succession it is principally the testator’s intention that must be taken into account, as can be inferred from many provisions of Roman and canon law ...’\nIV.  In her will dated 12 October 1939, the testatrix stipulated that ... ‘The future heir to the estate must leave it to a son or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage ...’ [‘El qui arribi a ésser hereu haurà forçosament de transmetre l’herència a un fill o net de legítim i canònic matrimoni ...’].\nIn doing so, the will in question set up a family settlement si sine liberis decesserit. An analysis of this type of settlement shows that the purpose is to secure and preserve the estate by keeping it in the settlor’s family. 18.  The Serra Areny sisters appealed to the High Court of Justice of Andorra. In a judgment delivered on 18 May 2000, after hearing submissions from both sides, the High Court set the lower court’s judgment aside. It allowed the appeal, set aside the codicil of 3 July 1995, declared that the appellants were the legitimate heirs to their great-grandmother’s estate and ordered the applicants to return the property in question. The grounds for the court’s judgment were as follows:\n“II.  ... Accordingly, the fundamental question to be resolved in the instant case is whether a child who has been adopted in accordance with the procedure for full adoption can be regarded as a child of a lawful and canonical marriage, as required by the testatrix ...\nIII. This question has to be resolved in accordance with the legal rules on the relationship of adopted children to their adoptive parents that were in force in 1939 and 1949, that is, between the time when Mrs Carolina Pujol i Oller made her will and the date of her death. A will becomes a legal deed from the date on which it is made in accordance with the statutory formalities. Accordingly, in interpreting the testamentary dispositions, regard must be had in the instant case to the legal position of adopted children in the social and family conditions existing in 1939 when the will was made and possibly in 1949 when the testatrix died ...\nLegal commentators with first-hand experience of Andorran life stress that adoption is practically unheard of in Andorra (Brutails: ‘Andorran customs’, p. 122). That assertion is borne out by all the Andorran case-law reports, in which there is no reference to adoption. This silence on the subject is perfectly understandable, moreover, given that the provisions of Roman law on adoption could not easily be transposed to Andorran families living in the first half of the twentieth century for the following reasons: since the nineteenth century it could be regarded as an institution that had become obsolete and, to a certain extent, unnecessary given that the main purpose – to appoint a successor or heir – had been achieved in the Principality of Andorra through the institution of heretament (agreement, specific to Catalan law, on the succession of a living person), introduced by customary law. In that social and family context, it is difficult to sustain the proposition that, in setting up a family settlement in case her heir should die without leaving offspring of a lawful and canonical marriage, the testatrix was also referring to adopted children, given that, at the time, adoption was not an established institution in the Principality of Andorra.\nThe fact that in the instant case the adoptive parents were married to each other does not make their adopted child a legitimate child or a child born of the marriage. The distinction according to whether a child was born in or out of wedlock is relevant only to illegitimate children ... with regard to adopted children, the distinction according to whether a child was born in or out of wedlock does not apply. Accordingly, a child adopted by a couple is an adopted child and not a legitimate child or a child of the marriage.\nFurthermore, the notarially recorded deed of adoption was drawn up in Spain in accordance with the Spanish procedure for full adoption ... The Law of 24 April 1958, amending the Civil Code, is applicable to the conditions and general effects of full adoption. Under that Law, the act of adopting a child gave him or her the status of the adoptive father/mother’s child, but did not give the child family status with regard to the adoptive parents’ family. Under Article 174-VII of the Spanish Civil Code, adoption created a filial tie between the adoptive parent, the adopted child and his or her legitimate descendants, but not with the adoptive parent’s family. Moreover, the inheritance rights were also limited in the present case: the deed of adoption referred to the relevant 1960 Catalan legislation, that is, a compilation of 1960 Catalan civil law. Article 248 provided that on an intestate succession adopted children were entitled to inherit only from their adoptive father or mother and not from the rest of their adoptive parents’ family. That rule reflected the idea that adoption created only a filial status and not a family status.\nIV.  Accordingly, from a legal standpoint, the adopted children of persons on whom an estate was settled by their father or mother were unconnected with the family circle with regard to the beneficiary’s ascendants. That approach can largely be explained by the minimal impact of adoption on the social and family consciousness in Andorra, both at the time when the will was made and when the testatrix died. The testatrix’s presumed intention has to be established in the light of the circumstances existing at the time of her death. The adopted children of her legitimate son or of the marriage were unconnected with the family circle both from a legal and a sociological point of view.\nThe purpose of a family settlement si sine liberis decesserit under Catalan law is to keep the family estate in the legitimate or married family and Catalan legal tradition has always favoured the exclusion of adopted children from such family settlements ... Thus, in order for adopted children to inherit under this type of settlement, there must be no doubt as to the testatrix’s intention to depart from the usual nature of this institution. In the instant case, the expression ‘offspring of a lawful and canonical marriage’, which appears in the 1939 will, does not suffice to infer that the testatrix intended to depart from the usual meaning given to family settlements si sine liberis decesserit under the Catalan and Andorran law of succession. 19.  The applicants lodged an application with the High Court of Justice to have the proceedings set aside. They submitted that the latter had breached the principle of equality before the law enshrined in Article 6 of the Andorran Constitution and that they had breached Article 10 (right to judicial protection and to a fair trial) of the Andorran Constitution. In a decision of 28 June 2000, the High Court of Justice dismissed their application as ill-founded. 20.  The applicants lodged an empara appeal with the Constitutional Court against the decisions of the High Court of Justice. They alleged a violation of Article 13 § 3 (principle of children’s equality before the law regardless of filiation) and Article 10 (right to judicial protection and a fair trial) of the Andorran Constitution. In a decision of 13 October 2000, the Constitutional Court declared their appeal inadmissible for the following reasons:\n“... It seems clear that the judgment of the High Court of Justice is limited to clarifying and determining, that is, interpreting, a specific point concerning the testatrix’s intention, as expressed in her will in the form of a family settlement in favour of a child or grandson of a lawful and canonical marriage.\nThe High Court of Justice does not at any point suggest that there is general discrimination against, or inequality between, children according to whether they are biological or adopted. Such an assertion would evidently amount to a flagrant breach of Article 13 § 3 of the Constitution and would also be contrary to the prevailing legal opinion according to which legal systems must always be interpreted, which is that all children are equal, irrespective of their origin. However, as submitted in substance by State Counsel, ‘discrimination against adopted children as compared to biological children does not in the instant case derive from an act of the public authorities, that is, from the judgment of the Civil Division of the High Court of Justice, but from the intention of the testatrix or settlor regarding who should inherit under her will’ in accordance with the principle of freedom to make testamentary dispositions, which is a concrete manifestation of the general principle of civil liberty.\nIn its judgment, the High Court of Justice confined itself to interpreting a testamentary disposition. It did so from the legal standpoint it considered adequate and in accordance with its unfettered discretion, seeing that the interpretation of legal instruments is a question of fact which, as such, falls under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.\n...” 21.  The applicants lodged an appeal (recurso de súplica) with the Constitutional Court, which dismissed it on 17 November 2000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Chişinău. 7.  In 1941 the Soviet authorities nationalised the house owned by his parents. In the same year his family was deported to Russia and to Uzbekistan. 8.  On 8 December 1992 the Moldovan Parliament enacted Law No. 1225-XII “on the rehabilitation of the victims of the political repression committed by the totalitarian communist occupying regime”. The Law enabled the victims of the Soviet repression to claim restitution of their confiscated or nationalised property. 9.  In 1997 the applicant lodged an action with the Centru District Court (Judecătoria Sectorului Centru) by which he sought the restitution of his parents’ house. As the former tenants of the house had purchased it from the State, the applicant sought a judicial ruling declaring the purchase contracts null and void. He also requested the eviction of all the occupants of the house. 10.  By a final judgment of 5 November 1997 the applicant’s action was upheld. 11.  Between 1997 and 2002 the applicant lodged numerous complaints about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 November 1997 with the Municipal Council, Centru District Court and the Ministry of Justice. 12.  In 2001 the applicant complained to the Court about the non-enforcement of the final judgment of 5 November 1997. The applicant’s application was given number 74153/01 and was communicated to the Government in January 2003. 13.  In April 2004 four occupants of the applicant’s house lodged with the Chişinău Court of Appeal a request for revision of the judgment of 5 November 1997. Relying on Article 449 of the new Code of Civil Procedure they argued in their request that new information had become known to them. They also asked the court to extend the deadline for lodging the request in view of the fact that the new information had been obtained by them from the National Archives in April 2004. 14.  The applicant alleges that on 20 May 2004 the Government Agent offered him for signature an agreement according to the terms of which he would consent to withdrawing his application to the Court and waiving his right to any compensation in exchange for receiving his house. According to the applicant, the Agent allegedly suggested that in the event of his refusal the Court of Appeal would continue the examination of the revision request lodged by the defendants and the proceedings would remain unresolved for a long time. He refused to sign the agreement. 15.  On 26 May 2004 the Court of Appeal examined the revision request lodged by the occupants of the applicant’s house in which newly discovered facts were invoked. 16.  The new facts relied upon by occupants were an issue of the Municipal Official Gazette of 1940 and four certificates from the National Archives and from the Land Register dated 6 April 2004, 18 May 2004 and 19 May 2004. 17.  A certificate from the National Archives dated 6 April 2004 had the following content:\n“... according to the Municipal Official Gazette of 1940, there is a house with a new number 36 (old number 46) on the Stefan cel Mare street whose owner is Pelagheia Popova and a house with the new number 33 (old number 37) on the Stefan cel Mare street, whose owner is Pelagheia Popov”. 18.  Another certificate from the National Archives dated 6 April 2004 stated:\n“... according to the Archives of the Municipal Council on 29 February 1924 the name of the street Nicolaievskaia was changed to Stefan cel Mare.” 19.  The certificate of 18 May 2004 issued by the National Archives had the following content:\n“... according to the data from the Archives of the Chişinău Municipal Council for the year 1930, there was a house with number 37 on the Stefan cel Mare street (Nicolaevscaia) whose owner was Pelagheia Popova and a house with number 46 on the Stefan cel Mare street (Nicolaevscaia) whose owner was Pelagheia Popov.” 20.  The certificate of 19 May 2004 issued by the Land Register to judge N.B. from the Court of Appeal stated that the owner of the house on 33 Columa Street, was Mr Serghei Popov. It also stated that there was no information as to whom that house belonged before 1940 since the first entry in the Land Register was made in 1952. 21.  According to the Official Gazette of 15 March 1940 issued by the Municipal Council of Chişinău, Romania, in order to eliminate the confusion in the numbering of houses which created economic and administrative difficulties, a new numbering was adopted for certain streets, including the Stefan cel Mare street. The owners of the houses on the concerned streets were obliged to buy from the Municipal Council new number plates and to install them on their houses. The new numbering should have taken effect as of 1 April 1940. Until that date the owners had to have both the old and the new numbers on their houses, in order to facilitate the orientation of the population and authorities. According to a list containing the names of the house owners and their corresponding house numbers, Mrs Pelagheia Popov [the applicant’s mother] was the owner of a house with the old number 37 and the new number 33. The Official Gazette does not contain any other references to her. 22.  The Court of Appeal described in its judgment of 26 May 2004 the content of the above documents and concluded that:\n“the above circumstances were not examined by the court which decided on the merits and on the appeal. They [the circumstances] have an essential importance for an objective ruling on the case. The court which will re-examine the merits shall determine exactly the location and the surface of the house from which the applicant and his family were evicted.”\nThe Court of Appeal decided to extend the time limit for the lodging of the revision request without however giving any reasons thereto. It quashed the final judgment of 5 November 1997, ordered the re-opening of the proceedings and sent the file to the first instance court for a fresh examination. 23.  After the hearing, on 26 May 2004, the Government Agent allegedly told the applicant’s representative that, had he consented to sign the agreement, the revision proceedings and the subsequent quashing and re-opening would not have taken place. The Government deny that this conversation ever took place. 24.  On 18 January 2005 the Court adopted a judgment in the case of Popov v. Moldova, (no. 74153/01, 18 January 2005), in which violations of Article 6 § 1 and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention were found because of the non-enforcement of the final judgment of 5 November 1997 until 26 May 2004. 25.  The proceedings which were re-opened by the Court of Appeal on 26 May 2004 are still pending before the domestic courts. At the date of adoption of the present judgment they were still pending before the first instance court, the Centru District Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant is a Lithuanian national, born in 1950 and living in Kaunas. 9.  The applicant, a police commissioner, was suspected of involvement in a conspiracy to smuggle non-ferrous metals in view of his alleged failure to investigate properly the activities of certain smugglers in 1994. He was arrested on 18 August 1995 in the context of criminal proceedings instituted in 1992. There were eight co-accused in the case, including the applicant. 10.  On 22 August 1995 he was charged with obtaining property by deception (sukčiavimas) under Article 274 of the Criminal Code, abuse of office (piktnaudžiavimas tarnyba) under Article 285 of the Code, and official forgery (tarnybinis suklastojimas) under Article 289 of the Code. On 29 November 1995 the prosecution dropped the last charge. 11.  From 1 December 1995 to 18 January 1996 the co-accused had access to the case-file. On 14 February 1996 a prosecutor confirmed the bill of indictment whereby the applicant was indicted for offences under Articles 274 and 285 of the Criminal Code. On 20 February 1996 the case was transferred to the Vilnius Regional Court. 12.  On 17 May 1996 a judge of the Vilnius Regional Court ordered additional investigations and requested that the prosecution supplement the charges under Articles 274 and 285 of the Criminal Code. On 26 June 1996 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision, finding that the Regional Court was able to consider the question of committal for trial without further investigation measures. The Court of Appeal also ordered the applicant’s release on bail. He was released in open court. On 9 July 1996 the Court of Appeal remitted the case to the Vilnius Regional Court. 13.  On 20 September 1996 the judge of the Vilnius Regional Court committed the applicant for trial on the charges under Articles 274 and 285 of the Criminal Code. 14.  During the trial hearing on 24 April 1998 the judge stated: \n“... the charge of cheating may be supplemented ... [and] the charge under Article 285 [of the Criminal Code] may be amended by adding the ‘selfish interest’ ... .”\nDuring the trial hearing on 11 May 1998 the judge said:\n“... the charge under Article 285 may be supplemented ... with alleged breaches of [the specific provisions] of the Police Act ... .” \nDuring that hearing the trial judge informed the parties that she would pronounce the judgment on 22 May 1998. 15.  On 22 May 1998 the Vilnius Regional Court acquitted the applicant on the count of obtaining property by deception under Article 274 of the Criminal Code. In connection with the charge under Article 285 the court held: “the charge of abuse of office cannot be sustained... . However, [the applicant], being a State official, improperly performed his functions because of negligence” in that he had failed to ensure proper investigation and control of the smuggling case. Since this failure amounted to a breach of certain provisions of the Police Act, the judge found the applicant guilty of official negligence (tarnybos pareigų neatlikimas dėl nerūpestingumo) under Article 288 of the Criminal Code. He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and deprived of the right to occupy an official position in the system of law enforcement. The judge reduced the custodial sentence by one third pursuant to an amnesty law, and found that the applicant had completed the sentence on account of the time spent in detention on remand. 16.  The applicant appealed against the judgment of 22 May 1998, stating that the Vilnius Regional Court had convicted him of an offence not covered by the initial charges and in respect of which he had not been in a position to defend himself. He noted in particular that during the trial the judge had in no way indicated that the charge of abuse of office could be replaced by one of official negligence. 17.  On 9 September 1998 the Court of Appeal held an appeal hearing on questions of fact and law in the presence of the applicant and his defence lawyer. The appeal court heard addresses by the applicant and a prosecutor. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground inter alia that: \n“the allegation that the reclassification was not permitted is unfounded. Both Articles [285 and 288 of the Criminal Code] punish offences against State office. The [first instance court] court only established that [the applicant] improperly performed his functions as an officer because of negligence, but that he did not deliberately take advantage of his official position contrary to the interests of his office. The [original] charge did not refer to breaches [by the applicant] of specific provisions of the Police Act. In accordance with Articles 279 § 2 and 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court warned [the applicant] that the charge could be supplemented with breaches of [the specific provisions] of the Police Act. An adjournment was offered for the preparation of the defence, but the parties did not request such an adjournment ... . The allegation that [the applicant] could not defend himself against the charges is therefore dismissed.” 18.  The applicant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, complaining inter alia that the reclassification of the charge had breached his right to defend himself. On 2 March 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. The cassation court held inter alia that the first instance court had reclassified the offence of abuse of office with that of official negligence in accordance with Articles 279 § 2 and 280 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the appeal court had replaced the initial charge with a lesser one, merely drawing the legal conclusions consistent with the facts laid before it.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Zenzeli village, the Limanskiy District of the Astrakhan Region. 8.  In 1986 the applicant took part in the emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result the applicant suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. In 1996 and 1997 the applicant underwent medical examinations which established the link between the applicant’s poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events. The applicant was awarded compensation, to be paid monthly. 9.  In 1999 the applicant brought proceedings against the Welfare Office of the Limanskiy District of the Astrakhan Region (Отдел социальной защиты населения Лиманского района Астраханской области - “the defendant”) for an increase in the compensation, for backdating the increase and recovering of the unpaid amount. The applicant considered that the amount of compensation had been determined incorrectly. 10.  On 3 November 1999 the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region established, upholding the applicant’s claim, that the applicant was entitled to a monthly compensation of 5,045.73 roubles (RUR). The court established that the debt accrued as a result of previous underpayment was RUR 108,892.07. It also awarded the applicant RUR 60,000.00 as a penalty payment. 11.  By a decision of 14 December 1999 the Astrakhan Regional Court, acting on appeal, upheld the judgment as to the amount of the monthly payment and the principal debt, but reversed the penalty award. The judgment entered into force and enforcement proceedings were instituted. Both parties lodged requests for supervisory review of the courts’ decisions. 12.  On 17 March 2000 the Astrakhan Regional Court stayed the enforcement proceedings, pending the consideration of the defendant’s request for supervisory review. 13.  The defendant’s request for supervisory review was refused by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 13 April 2000. 14.  On 22 May 2000 the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region resumed the enforcement proceedings. 15.  By a decision of 15 August 2000 the President of the Astrakhan Regional Court refused the applicant’s request for supervisory review. 16.  On 15 September 2000 the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region granted a request by the Astrakhan Regional Office for Welfare Payments (Астраханский областной центр по начислению и выплате пенсий и пособий) to suspend the enforcement proceedings. The enforcement was stayed until 1 December 2000 to allow the authorities to “decide how to finance the court awards involving the recalculation of compensation to the victims of the Chernobyl catastrophe”. 17.  On 17 October 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused the applicant’s request for supervisory review of the suspension order. 18.  On an unspecified date, following a request made by the Astrakhan Regional Office for Welfare Payments, the President of the Astrakhan Regional Court brought an extraordinary appeal against the judgments of 3 November 1999 and 14 December 1999. 19.  On 27 December 2000 the Presidium of the Astrakhan Regional Court examined the appeal and quashed both the judgment of the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region dated 3 November 1999 and the judgment of the Astrakhan Regional Court dated 14 December 1999. The Presidium decided that the subordinate courts had wrongly determined the amount of monthly compensation. In particular, they had based all the calculations on the applicant’s salary as of October 1986. The Presidium held that the calculations should have been based on the applicant’s average earnings over the 12 months prior to the date on which the medical examination had established his disability. The case was remitted to the same District Court for a fresh examination. 20.  On 27 February 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in response to the applicant’s complaint, refused to conduct a supervisory review of the decision of 27 December 2000. 21.  By a judgment of 23 April 2001 the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region, acting as a first instance court, awarded the applicant the monthly payment of RUR 3,336.99 and established that the debt accrued was RUR 114,466.01. No penalty was awarded. 22.  On 24 July 2001 the Astrakhan Regional Court acting as an appeal instance reversed the judgment of the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region of 23 April 2001. It pointed out that the District Court had applied the calculation mode incorrectly and that the amounts due had to be recalculated. The case was remitted to the same District Court for a new decision. 23.  On 23 September 2002 the applicant filed a complaint with the Astrakhan Regional Court concerning the length of proceedings. He complained in particular that no decision had been taken in his case since 24 July 2001. 24.  In reply dated 27 September 2002, the applicant was informed that on 22 November 2001, on his request, the proceedings had been stayed pending the Constitutional Court’s decision in a similar case. He was informed that the proceedings had been resumed after the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 June 2002, and that a hearing had been fixed for 7 October 2002. He was also informed that the hearings had not been fixed until 2 September 2002 on the applicant’s request due to his counsel’s absence. 25.  On 4 November 2002 the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region decided that the compensation payable to the applicant by the welfare authorities was RUR 45,640.94. The applicant was also awarded legal costs of RUR 1,300 and non-pecuniary damages of RUR 5,000. 26.  The applicant appealed against this decision. He challenged the principal amount, the amount of non-pecuniary damages and the refusal of the penalty. 27.  By an appeal decision of 14 January 2003 the Astrakhan Regional Court reversed the first instance judgment and remitted the case for fresh examination by the same court. 28.  On 3 March 2003 the Limanskiy District Court of the Astrakhan Region awarded the applicant RUR 235,210.32 of the principal debt, future monthly payments of RUR 4,727.96 and the legal costs of RUR 500. 29.  Both parties appealed against this judgment. 30.  On 29 April 2003 the Astrakhan Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. 31.  On 5 August 2003 the awarded sums were transferred to the applicant’s bank account.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant is a company registered in Chişinău. 6.  On 20 December 1994 two companies (Tehoptimed and Tudor & K.) concluded a contract according to which the latter rented a warehouse from the former. 7.  In June 1996 the applicant company was registered. On 19 February 1997 the original contract for the use of the warehouse was amended to the effect that all the rights and obligations of Tudor & K. passed to the applicant company. The applicant company stored merchandise (food and clothes) in the warehouse. 8.  On 11 June 1997 the police of the Ciocana Commissariat of Chişinău sealed the warehouse rented by the applicant company. On 30 June 1997 the applicant company complained to the Ciocana Commissar about a violation of its right to property and asked for the reasons for the police action. In a reply dated 2 July 1997 the applicant company was informed that the police had acted on the basis of the order of an investigator of the Chişinău Prosecutor’s Office. 9.  On 30 October 1997 the applicant company requested the Chişinău Prosecutor’s Office to revoke the order. In a letter of 19 November 1997 the Chişinău Prosecutor’s Office stated that its actions had been lawful. The applicant company made several other complaints to the Ciocana Police Commissariat and the Chişinău Prosecutor’s Office and received similar answers. In its complaints, the applicant company claimed that the merchandise taken from the rented warehouse had not been listed in the minutes as required by law and that its total value had been 11,750,000 Moldovan lei (MDL), (approximately 1,059,340 United States Dollars (USD)). 10.  The applicant company initiated court proceedings against the Chişinău Prosecutor’s Office, the Ciocana Police Commissariat and Tehoptimed, requesting the restitution of the MDL 11,750,000. 11.  On 31 March 1998 the Chişinău Economic Court found that the sequestration of the applicant company’s property “in the amount of MDL 11,750,000” from its rented warehouse had been unlawful. It ordered the defendants to return the property taken from the applicant company. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final 15 days later. 12.  On 3 September 1998 the applicant company requested an expert report to be prepared in order to establish the current value of the property which had been kept in the sealed warehouse since July 1997. On 4 September 1998 the applicant company obtained access to that property. A list of items found in the warehouse was drawn up. 13.  On 14 September 1998 an expert of the Central Laboratory of Scientific Research of the Ministry of Justice concluded that the warehouse had not been heated or ventilated and was infested with moths and rodents. The food and clothes stored in the warehouse had been severely damaged and their monetary value was MDL 74,158 (approximately USD 6,685). 14.  On 29 October 1998 the Râşcani District Court returned the enforcement warrant to the applicant company and notified it that the total value of the merchandise found in the warehouse was MDL 74,158 and that there was no other property to be returned. 15.  The applicant company requested the Chişinău Economic Court to change the manner of enforcing the warrant by ordering payment of the original value of its property. 16.  At the request of the Prosecutor General’s Office, on 19 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 31 March 1998 and ordered a re-hearing of the case. 17.  On 23 December 2002 the Chişinău Economic Court left the applicant company’s action unexamined because it had failed to appear and had not submitted the originals of the documents confirming its claims. 18.  On 14 January 2003 the same court returned the applicant company’s appeal (contestaţia in anulare) because of its failure to pay court fees. On 19 March 2003 the Economic Court of the Republic of Moldova ordered a re-hearing of the case, finding that the length of the proceedings had already been excessive and that a decision on the substance of the case was required. 19.  On 11 November 2003 the Chişinău Economic Court rejected the applicant company’s claims. It found that on 23 December 1997 the prosecution had informed the applicant company about the discontinuation of the proceedings and that all the restrictions on the use of its property had been lifted. Accordingly, the applicant company could have used its property from that date, which meant that there was no outstanding issue to be decided by the court. 20.  In its appeal the applicant company stated that the investigator’s order to seize its property had been taken in violation of the law and that the seizure itself had been carried out without drawing up a list of all the items seized, again contrary to the law. The applicant company also noted that the unlawful actions of the prosecution and the police had violated its property rights and that not all the items taken from it had been returned. This resulted in its inability to fulfil its contractual obligations towards third parties. 21.  On 15 January 2004 the Appeals Chamber of the Economic Court left the appeal unexamined because of the applicant company’s failure to pay court fees MDL 352,500, (EUR 21,021 at the time). The court gave the applicant company until 12 February 2004 to pay the court fees. 22.  The applicant company requested the postponement of the payment of court fees until after the examination of its case. It relied on its difficult financial situation, annexing bank certificates proving that there had been virtually no money in its accounts since 2002. It also claimed that in 1997, when it lodged its complaint, no court fees were payable. It finally invoked its right to access to justice. 23.  In response to the applicant company’s request, the court postponed the time-limit for payment of the court fee until 15 March 2004. 24.  On 15 March 2004 the Appellate Chamber of the Economic Court rejected the applicant company’s request to postpone the payment of the court fees pending the examination of the case. The court refused to examine the applicant company’s appeal because of its failure to pay the court fees despite two extensions of the time-limit for payment. 25.  In its appeal in cassation the applicant company relied on its difficult financial situation, which, it claimed, had resulted from the unlawful actions of the police and prosecution and had blocked its economic activity. It asked for the postponement of the payment of court fees until after its appeal had been examined. 26.  On 6 May 2004 the Supreme Court of Justice rejected as unfounded the applicant company’s appeal. The court found that the applicant company’s submissions that the lower courts had not taken into consideration its difficult financial situation was unsubstantiated. It found that the courts had the power but not an obligation to postpone the payment of court fees in accordance with Article 86 of the CCP. It also found that no waiver of court fees was possible for legal persons. Since the applicant company had failed to pay the court fees, its appeal was to be rejected.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Khava Tumayeva, born in 1947;\n(2)  Ms Aset Khatuyeva, born in 1983;\n(3)  Ms Ms Kheda Gigayeva, born in 1979;\n(4)  Ms Rukiyat Tumayeva, born in 1981; and\n(5)  Ms Zinaida Tumayeva, born in 1954. 6.  The applicants are Russian nationals, who live in the village of Valerik in the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District of the Chechen Republic. 7.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Shamkhan Tumayev, born in 1982. The second applicant is Shamkhan Tumayev's common-law wife; they are the parents of two minor children. The third and fourth applicants are Shamkhan Tumayev's sisters. The fifth applicant is his aunt. 8.  At the material time the Tumayev family lived at 13 Titova Street in the village of Valerik. The second applicant was pregnant with her second child. Shamkhan Tumayev occupied the right wing of the house together with the second applicant and their child, whilst the first and third to fifth applicants occupied the left wing. 9.  According to the applicants, at the material time the village of Valerik was under the firm control of the Russian federal troops, who maintained manned checkpoints on the roads at the entry to and exit from the village. Moreover, at the time of the events described below, the village was under a curfew and around forty Russian servicemen were stationed there on a permanent basis. 10.  In the applicants' submission, between 18 and 19 September 2004 about a hundred servicemen from units operating under the direction of Ramzan Kadyrov, the then deputy prime minister of the Chechen Republic, arrived in Valerik with a view to carrying out a sweeping operation. They deployed, amongst other things, tanks, armoured personnel carriers and UAZ all-terrain vehicles. 11.  At about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004, around fifteen to twenty armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants' house. They spoke unaccented Russian and all but one of them wore black masks. They shouted: “Open the doors! Police!”. The second applicant opened the door. Several armed men entered the premises and put the second applicant onto the floor. Some armed men stayed in the courtyard. The intruders took the keys from the second applicant and confiscated several video cassettes of various movies, a video cassette with a recording of Shamkhan Tumayev's father, and Shamkhan Tumayev's mobile phone from the safe. They also took Shamkhan Tumayev's passport, checked it and brought Shamkhan Tumayev away. 12.  In the meantime, the first applicant also opened the door. The intruders immediately asked her to give them a passport. The first applicant inferred that they were servicemen carrying out a passport check. She started looking for her own passport. According to the first applicant, in the meantime the servicemen turned everything upside down. Shortly thereafter they locked the first applicant and her relatives in their part of the house. After a while she heard some movements coming from outside, a shot being fired and the noise of leaving vehicles. The first applicant managed to get outside through the window, whereupon she found out that the intruders had taken away Shamkhan Tumayev, his mobile phone and several video cassettes. Her neighbours told her that they had seen a silvery UAZ-469 vehicle. The first applicant also found two spent cartridges in the yard. 13.  Some of the applicants' neighbours and relatives, who had been woken up because of the noise, tried to follow the abductors but the servicemen threatened to kill them, beat them up, put them against a wall and fired several shots above their heads. 14.  In the morning of 20 September 2004 the applicants discovered that three more inhabitants of the village of Valerik, including a Mr Kh., had been abducted by the armed men. 15.  The description of the events of the night of 19 September 2004 is based on the written statements dated 26 May 2005 by the first, second and third applicants and Z.T., on the written statements of the fifth applicant and A.A. made on 27 May 2005, and on the applicants' hand-written sketch of the premises at 13 Titova Street. 16.  The applicants have had no news of Shamkhan Tumayev since 19 September 2004.\n(b)  Media reports regarding Shamkhan Tumayev's disappearance and his fellow residents' meeting in Achkhoy-Martan 17.  On 21 September 2004 a group of residents of Valerik, including the applicants, gathered at the administration of Achkhoy-Martan to protest against the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev. 18.  The applicants submitted several printouts from internet media and an article from a local newspaper. The information contained therein may be summarised as follows: 19.  On 21 September 2004 an internet newspaper called “Grani.ru” published the following information:\n“On 21 September a meeting was conducted in Achkhoy-Martan. According to the news agency “Prima”, participants in the meeting had sought to liberate their fellow resident Shamkhan Tumayev, ... who, according to them, had been abducted by [Ramzan] Kadyrov's forces ...\nSeveral days ago a large number of servicemen of the “battalion” named after Akhmad Kadyrov (the former security service of the former president of Chechnya) had arrived in the [Achkhoy-Martanovskiy] District, which had been followed by “sweeping operations” and abductions of residents of the district.\nTwo days ago, at about 3 a.m., unknown masked people took 22-year-old Shamkhan Tumayev away by force without giving any explanations. On the same day under similar circumstances, his fellow resident of Valerik, [Mr.] Kh., was abducted.” 20.  On the same day an internet newspaper called “Kavkazskiy uzel” reported as follows:\n“Today a considerable number of residents of the village of Valerik gathered at the central square of Achkhoy-Martan, Chechen Republic. They wanted the State authorities to liberate their 22-year-old fellow resident Shamkhan Tumayev, who had been abducted by armed men wearing masks on 19 September. The residents of Valerik consider that Tumayev was kidnapped by officers of the battalion named after Akhmed Kadyrov.\nSeveral days before, a large number of servicemen of that battalion (the former security service of the President of the Chechen Republic) had arrived in the [Achkhoy-Martanovskiy] district in some fifty UAZ vehicles, subsequent to which there had been “sweeping operations” and people had been abducted. In particular, on the day of the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev a [Mr] Kh., 22 years old, had been abducted under similar circumstances.” 21.  Similar information to that described above was posted on 22 September 2004 by the news agency “Prima” on its website and published on 27 September 2004 in an article of the local newspaper “Imam” entitled “People are still disappearing” (“Люди продолжают пропадать”). 22.  The Government submitted that the domestic investigation had obtained no evidence that any special operations had been conducted in Valerik on the night of the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev or that any servicemen had been implicated in his abduction. 23.  Immediately after the abduction the applicants complained about it to the local police office, and on the morning of 19 September 2004 they complained about the abduction to the police of Achkhoy-Martan. 24.  Early in the morning of 19 September 2004 a group of police officers arrived at the applicants' house. They examined the crime scene, took casts of footprints left there and questioned Shamkhan Tumayev's family members. 25.  On 20 September 2004 the applicants visited Mr D., the head of the administration of the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District. Mr D. promised them that he would make a few phone calls in order to gather information on Shamkhan Tumayev's whereabouts. On an unspecified date D. came to the village of Valerik and told the applicants that they should not worry and that their relative would return home. 26.  Subsequently all of the applicants applied to various authorities with a request that they be assisted in searching for Shamkhan Tumayev. 27.  On an unspecified date the first applicant requested that the military commander's office of the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District and the prosecutor's office of the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District (“the district prosecutor's office”) establish her son's whereabouts. 28.  On 24 September 2004 the district prosecutor's office forwarded the second applicant's complaint about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev to the head of the department of the interior of the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District (“ROVD”) and requested the latter body to carry out an inquiry into the matter complained of. The letter stated, in particular, that, per the applicant's complaint, at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 unidentified armed persons wearing masks and camouflage uniforms had burst into the applicants' house and had abducted Shamkhan Tumayev. The abductors had arrived in three white UAZ-469 vehicles. 29.  On 29 September 2004 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into Shamkhan Tumayev's disappearance under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (“aggravated kidnapping”). The case file was assigned the number 38043. The applicants submit that they were not promptly informed of the decision to open the investigation. 30.  On 8 October 2004 the ROVD forwarded the first applicant's complaint of the abduction of her son to the district prosecutor's office. 31.  On 24 December 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicants that the term of the preliminary investigation of case no. 38043 had been extended until 29 January 2005. 32.  On 29 January 2005 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that the investigation into Shamkhan Tumayev's kidnapping had been suspended because of its failure to identify the perpetrators. 33.  On 3 February 2005 the first applicant requested that the district prosecutor's office open a criminal investigation into the abduction of her son, grant her victim status in those proceedings and provide her with copies of the related decisions. 34.  On 12 February 2005 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant of the following. Shamkhan Tumayev had been abducted by around fifteen unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms driving a VAZ-2131 vehicle, a UAZ-469 and an all-terrain UAZ vehicle. The district prosecutor's office had opened an investigation into case no. 38043 and had taken certain investigative measures. In particular, they had examined the crime scene, had compiled a plan of unspecified investigative steps to be taken, had come up with a number of unspecified versions of the abduction and had interviewed the applicants' neighbours and other residents of Valerik. They had also sent requests to various law-enforcement agencies in the Chechen Republic, Ingushetia, Dagestan and the Stavropol Region. However, Shamkhan Tumayev's whereabouts had not been established. On 29 January 2005 the investigation had been suspended. Nevertheless, unspecified operational and search measures were being taken to resolve the crime. 35.  On 25 May 2005 the first applicant requested that the district prosecutor's office inform her of the progress in the investigation into her son's kidnapping. It is unclear whether her request was ever replied to. 36.  Despite specific requests by the Court, the Government did not disclose most of the contents of criminal case no. 38043, providing only copies of some documents relating to the preliminary ROVD inquiry (see below), the decision to institute the investigation; records of several witnesses' interviews; some of the decisions to suspend and reopen the investigation; the crime scene and site inspection reports concerning the applicants' house and three checkpoints; and copies of several replies from the State authorities to the requests for information on Shamkhan Tumayev and his whereabouts made in the course of the investigation. 37.  The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure and in breach of the interests of unspecified parties to criminal proceedings. 38.  Most of the documents submitted by the Government were illegible or legible only in part. All pages in the file submitted by the Government contained three separate page numbers; some documents concerning investigative actions dated November 2004 had been placed in the file submitted to the Court before the documents dated October and September 2004. Some copies of interview records were not full, i.e. they contained only the first page with the witness's data and the beginning of their respective accounts of the events, whilst the remaining pages were missing. In at least five copies of interview records, the year “2005” appears to have been written over with the year “2008”. 39.  The information concerning the investigation, provided by the Government and contained in the documents submitted by them, in so far as they are legible, may be summarised as follows.\n(b)  Preliminary inquiry conducted by the ROVD 40.  On 19 September 2004 the ROVD received the applicants' complaint about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev. In the complaint, the applicants had stated that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 a group of persons in camouflage uniforms and masks driving three white UAZ-469 vehicles had abducted Shamkhan Tumayev and had taken him to an unknown destination. 41.  On the same date the ROVD launched a preliminary inquiry into the abduction and inspected the crime scene. According to the crime scene inspection report, no objects of interest for the inquiry were found in the applicants' house. The report did not mention whether or not there had been a disturbance in the house. 42.  Again on the same date, ROVD officers obtained a written statement from the second applicant, in which she explained that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 someone had started knocking on the door of the part of the house where she had been staying with Shamkhan Tumayev and their two-year-old daughter. When she had opened the door, a group of three to four armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had burst inside and had ordered everyone to lie down. The applicant had inferred that the intruders were servicemen and had complied with the order. Some of the servicemen had then taken Shamkham Tumayev outside and others had ordered the second applicant to open a safe. The servicemen had taken several video cassettes of Indian movies from the safe and had explained that they would check whether they contained any recording of members of illegal armed groups or their terrorist activities. The second applicant had seen about ten servicemen in total and submitted that she had not seen or heard any vehicles in the courtyard or on the street. 43.  Upon being interviewed again on the same date, the second applicant confirmed her account of the events given in the written statement and submitted in addition that, immediately after Shamkhan Tumayev's abduction and after the first applicant had managed to get outside, they had alerted their relatives to the abduction. Their relatives had caught up with the abductors and had seen their vehicles. 44.  On 19 September 2004 ROVD officers interviewed Mr Sh. T. He submitted that at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 2004 the first applicant had come to his house and had told him about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev, following which Sh. T. and three other individuals, I.M., A.T. and R.Kh., had gone in their vehicle in the direction of the neighbouring village of Katyr-Yurt. Whilst they had been driving in Katyr‑Yurt, their car had been stopped by a group of armed men wearing masks, who had checked the vehicle's passengers' identity papers and had ordered them to return home. At about 6 a.m. on 19 September 2004 Sh. T. and his companions had left for Achkhoy-Martan. On their way there they asked servicemen at checkpoint no. 181 whether a convoy of two UAZ vehicles, a silvery Niva and a UAZ all-terrain vehicle had passed the checkpoint on that night, and the servicemen at the checkpoint had allegedly confirmed the passage of those vehicles. 45.  On the same date ROVD officers interviewed Mr V.I., residing at 26 Titova Street. He submitted that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 he had been woken up by the noise of vehicles coming from the street. V.I. had not gone outside. In the morning he had learnt about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev. 46.  It appears that on the same date, 19 September 2004, the ROVD officers also interviewed the first applicant. She stated that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 she had been woken up by knocking on the front door. When she had opened it, three masked and armed persons in camouflage uniforms had burst inside and had asked her to give them her son's passport. The intruders had then locked the first applicant and her relatives up. The first applicant had managed to get outside through the window, whereupon she had seen the second applicant, who had told her that the intruders had taken Shamkhan Tumayev away. The first applicant had heard the noise of several vehicles leaving. 47.  On 21 September 2004 the ROVD extended the time-limit for carrying out the preliminary inquiry into the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev until 1 October, owing to the need to carry out unspecified additional investigative actions. It is unclear whether the ROVD took any further investigative steps after 21 September 2004. 48.  By letter of 29 September 2004, the district prosecutor's office instructed the ROVD to carry out a preliminary inquiry into the applicants' complaint of the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev by a group of armed men in masks and camouflage uniforms who had been driving three white UAZ‑469 vehicles.\n(c)  Institution of the investigation by the district prosecutor's office 49.  On 29 September 2004 the district prosecutor's office received the materials from the preliminary inquiry and instituted a criminal investigation into the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 38043. The decision stated, amongst other things, that from the materials of the ROVD preliminary inquiry it followed that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 a group of about 15 armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks, driving a VAZ-2131 vehicle, a UAZ-469 vehicle and an all-terrain UAZ vehicle, had arrested Shamkhan Tumayev and had taken him to an unknown destination.\n(d)  Investigative steps taken between September 2004 and February 2005 50.  On an unspecified date the district prosecutor's office compiled a plan of investigative steps for case no. 38043. 51.  On 30 September 2004 investigator D. of the district prosecutor's office carried out an additional crime scene inspection at 13 Titova Street, but found no objects of interest to the investigation. 52.  On 1 October 2004 investigator D. interviewed the applicants' neighbour, N.T., as a witness. He stated that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 a group of about fifteen armed persons in masks and camouflage uniforms had burst into the applicants' house and had abducted Shamkhan Tumayev. N.T. had learnt about the particular circumstances of the abduction from the applicants at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 2004 and had immediately gone to their house. In the morning on 19 September 2004 several ROVD officers had come to the applicants' house, had inspected the crime scene and had interviewed the applicants and a number of witnesses. During the interviews, the officers had established that the intruders had driven a VAZ-2131 vehicle, a UAZ-469 vehicle and an all-terrain UAZ vehicle, which had been stationed further along Titova Street. The abductors had not parked the vehicles close to the applicants' house because it was situated in a dead end and they would have encountered problems turning around and going back. 53.  On 1 October 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings relating to case no. 38043. The decision granting her such status stated that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 about fifteen armed masked men in camouflage uniforms, who had been driving a VAZ-2131, a UAZ-469 and an all-terrain UAZ vehicle, had arrested Shamkhan Tumayev and had taken him to an unknown destination. 54.  On the same date the first applicant was interviewed. She reiterated her earlier submissions concerning the circumstances of the abduction of her son and stated, amongst other things, that, when she had managed to get outside after having been locked up, she had seen the second applicant, who had told her about the abduction. The first applicant herself had heard the noise of the vehicles leaving. Although she had not seen the vehicles herself, her neighbours had told her that the abductors had come in a VAZ‑2131, a UAZ-469 and all-terrain UAZ vehicles. The first applicant had also stated that the abductors had spoken Russian. 55.  On 3 October 2004 the investigators interviewed Mr R.D., an officer of the ROVD. He stated, amongst other things, that on 19 September 2004 he had participated in the inspection of the crime scene and the interviewing of the applicants and witnesses. He confirmed the description of the events given to him by the second applicant in her written statement of 19 September 2004 and also referred to her saying that the abductors' vehicles had not been parked directly at the applicants' house but further along the street because the house was at a dead end and that the abductors would have had problems turning around on their way back. 56.  On 7 and 11 October 2004 investigator D. inspected checkpoints nos. 186 and 190 located at the exit from and entry to Achkhoy-Martan. According to the relevant inspection records, no objects of interest to the investigation were found or seized. Both records stated that the checkpoints' vehicle passage logbooks had contained no records concerning the registration of vehicles between 19 and 21 September 2004. 57.  On 12 October 2004 the investigators interviewed the first applicant, who reiterated her earlier submissions concerning the abduction of her son, the abductors' having asked for his passport and having locked her up with her relatives. She also stated that she had learnt from her neighbours about the vehicles in which the abductors had come. 58.  On the same date the investigators interviewed Sh. T. as a witness. He stated that at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 2004 the applicants had come to his home and had told him about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev. Sh. T. had spoken to unspecified people and had learnt from them that the abductors had come in a white armoured Gazel vehicle, a white VAZ-2107 and an all-terrain UAZ vehicle. The above-mentioned unspecified people had not been able to tell Sh. T. whether the vehicles had had licence plates. Those vehicles had gone first in the direction of Katyr‑Yurt but had then turned around and headed in the direction of Shaami-Yurt. 59.  The fourth applicant, who was interviewed as a witness on 12 October 2004, stated that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had burst into the applicants' house and had taken away Shamkhan Tumayev. After their departure the applicants had not been able to find Shamkhan Tumayev's mobile phone. 60.  Between 5 October and 8 November 2004 various State authorities, including the local office of the FSB and the ROVD, replied to the district prosecutor's office affirming that they had no information on Shamkhan Tumayev's whereabouts. 61.  On 24 November 2004 the district prosecutor's office wrote to the applicants to notify them that the term of the preliminary investigation of case no. 38043 had been extended for three months. 62.  On 25 November 2004 the investigators interviewed the applicants' neighbour, V.T. He stated that at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 2004 he had been woken up by shots being fired. He had dressed himself, had gone outside and had seen the first applicant, who had told him about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev. The intruders had come to the applicants' house on foot, having left their vehicles further along the street. They had also locked the first applicant and her relatives up during the abduction. 63.  Between 6 October 2004 and 3 February 2005 the investigation interviewed some thirty residents of Valerik as witnesses. They stated, in almost identical terms, that they had learnt about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev from their fellow residents of Valerik or from the applicants. In particular, they had learnt that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 a group of about fifteen armed masked men in camouflage uniforms had burst into the applicants' house and had taken Shamkhan Tumayev away. The abductors had spoken Russian and had arrived in several vehicles, including UAZ-469, VAZ-2131 and an all‑terrain UAZ vehicle. One witness also mentioned a Gazel vehicle.\n(e)  Investigative actions carried out in June and July 2007 64.  According to an interview record dated 21 June 2007, on that date investigator D. interviewed the fourth applicant as a witness. She confirmed her previous account of the events concerning the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev and submitted that she had mistakenly stated during her previous interview that the abductors had taken Shamkhan Tumayev's mobile phone. She had subsequently learnt from the second applicant that Shamkhan Tumayev had sold the mobile phone about a week before his abduction. She also stated that the video cassettes had not been confiscated. 65.  According to a further interview record dated 21 June 2007, on that date investigator D. interviewed the second applicant as a witness. She confirmed her earlier description of the circumstances of her husband's abduction and stated that, although she had submitted in her previous interview that the abductors had said that they would seize the video cassettes, they had not taken them in the end. As to her husband's mobile phone, she stated that he had sold it a week before his abduction. Their other relatives had not known about it and had stated to the investigation that it had been taken by the abductors. 66.  On 21 June 2007 the investigation interviewed Sh. T. as a witness. He stated that whilst being interviewed on 12 October 2004, he had told the investigators that the abductors had gone first in the direction of Katyr-Yurt and subsequently in the direction of Shaami-Yurt. However, Sh. T. had learnt about that fact on the morning on 19 September 2004 from unspecified residents of Valerik, who had gathered at the local administration's office. Sh. T. had not known who had seen the vehicles move in the above-mentioned direction. 67.  On 21 June 2007 investigator D. refused to open a criminal case into the seizure of the video cassettes and the mobile phone from the applicants' house by the abductors of Shamkhan Tumayev. The decision stated that at about 2 a.m. on 19 September 2004 unidentified armed persons in masks and camouflage uniforms, who had been driving a VAZ-2131, a UAZ-469 and an all-terrain UAZ vehicle, had abducted Shamkhan Tumayev from 13 Titova Street. Referring to the statements obtained from the second and fourth applicants on 21 June 2007, the investigator found that there was no evidence that the video cassettes and the mobile phone had ever been stolen. Lastly, it was stated that it was open to the applicants to appeal against the decision to a higher prosecutor or a court under Article 124 or 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On the same date investigator D informed the applicants of the decision. 68.  Between 25 June and 16 July 2007 investigator D. interviewed some twenty-one residents of Valerik. According to copies of their interview records, which are identically worded, the witnesses had learnt about the abduction of Shamkhan Tumayev from their fellow residents. Shamkhan Tumayev's abductors had been armed and masked and had worn camouflage uniforms. They had driven a VAZ-2131, a UAZ-469 and all‑terrain UAZ vehicles without registration plates. The related documents included two records of interviews with an individual called R.S.Yu., who was said to reside at the same address. The interview records were dated 25 and 30 June 2007 and were identical to each other. 69.  It appears that on an unspecified date in July 2007 the investigation was suspended.\n(f)  Reopening of the investigation in February 2008 70.  On 7 February 2008 the deputy head of the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy inter-district investigating department within the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation reopened the investigation of case no. 38043. The decision to do so had stated that the investigation had been suspended and reopened on numerous occasions, owing to its failure to identify the perpetrators. The latest decision to suspend the investigation had been issued on 19 July 2007. An examination of the file had revealed that the decision to suspend the investigation had been premature, because not all relevant investigative steps had been taken. 71.  On the same date investigator D. wrote to the applicants to notify them about the reopening of the investigation. 72.  The Government submitted that the investigation of case no. 38043 was pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Pabianice. She owns a semi‑detached house located in a residential area. A tailoring workshop employing about 20 people was located in the other half of the building. 6.  On 14 September 1993 the applicant made an application to the City Council for a ban on the operation of the workshop or at least for measures to be taken to reduce the level of noise it generated. 7.  On 11 June 1994 the Director of the Pabianice District Office, to which the application of 14 September 1993 must have been transferred, issued a decision in which it found that the workshop was operating without the required permission. He obliged the owner of the workshop to take steps to remedy the situation, inter alia by obtaining an environmental impact assessment of the workshop and by carrying out adaptation works. 8.  On 30 January 1995 the Governor of Łódź approved a “[t]echnical project on protection of the environment against noise”, and obliged the owner to comply with the project and to submit an evaluation of the noise level. 9.  On 7 February 1995 the Governor of Łódź approved the location of the workshop on condition that the owner complied with the requirements set out in the decision of 30 January 1995. 10.  On 15 March 1995 the Director of the Construction Supervision Department of the Town Office gave instructions as to the way in which the works to adapt the workshop should be conducted. The applicant appealed. 11.  On 4 April 1995 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Governor of Łódź in which she complained that she had not been allowed to participate in the proceedings. She submitted that she should have been treated as a party to them and that she had not received an answer to her application of 14 September 1993. 12.  On 11 May 1995 the applicant made an application to the Minister of Environment for the proceedings – which must have been discontinued on an unspecified earlier date – to be reopened in order to enable her to participate as a party to the proceedings in order to have her arguments taken into consideration. 13.  On 17 May 1995 the Governor of Łódź stayed the appeal proceedings against the decision of 15 March 1995 until the request for reopening of 11 May 1995 had been considered. The workshop’s owner appealed. 14.  On 7 August 1995 the General Inspector of Construction Supervision quashed the decision of 17 May 1995. 15.  On 20 October 1995 the Governor of Łódź stayed the appeal proceedings against the decision of 15 March 1995. The workshop’s owner appealed. 16.  On 15 December 1995 the General Inspector of Construction Supervision upheld the decision of 20 October 1995. The applicant appealed. 17.  On 25 February 1997 the applicant made an application to the Governor of Łódź requesting, inter alia, that the decisions of 7 August 1995 and 15 December 1995 be quashed and that the operation of the workshop be stayed until a decision was made on the merits of her request of 1993. 18.  On 14 November 1997 the Minister of Environment quashed the decisions of 7 August 1995 and 30 January 1995. In the written grounds he stated that the noise pollution inside the applicant’s home was not a matter of environmental protection, so that there was no legal basis for the proceedings to be instituted. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. 19.  In a letter of 12 January 1998 to the Director of the Pabianice District Office the applicant requested that the appeal proceedings against the decision of 15 March 1995 be stayed until the appeal against the decision of 14 November 1997 lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court had been decided. On 30 January 1998 the Governor of Łódź, to whom this request must have been transmitted, stayed the proceedings as requested. The applicant’s neighbour appealed. 20.  On 18 March 1998 the General Inspector of Construction Supervision quashed the decision of 30 January 1998 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 21.  On 26 August 1998 the Governor of the Town of Łódź upheld the decision of 15 March 1995 and set a new time-limit for the workshop’s owner to comply with the imposed obligations. 22.  On 25 November 1998 the Director of the Pabanice District Office granted permission for the operation of the workshop. The applicant appealed.  On 23 March 1999 the Governor of Łódź quashed the decision of 25 November 1998 and remitted the case for reconsideration. The workshop’s owner appealed. 23.  On 13 November 2001 proceedings were instituted to determine whether the operation of the workshop was lawful.  On the same day the applicant was informed that on 13 December 2001 an inspection of the building would be carried out. On the same day  the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the owner’s appeal against the decision of 23 March 1999. 24.  On 29 November 2001 the Mayor of Pabianice stayed the proceedings concerning the granting of permission until the Pabianice District Inspector of Construction Supervision had given a decision as to whether the operation of the workshop complied with the applicable legal requirements. The applicant appealed. 25.  On 8 March 2002 the Mayor of Pabianice issued an operation permit for the workshop. The applicant appealed.  On 26 April 2002 the Governor of Łódź informed the applicant that the time-limit set by law to decide on her appeal had been extended because of the need for checks to be done by the building inspection authorities. 26.  On 7 June 2002 the Governor of Łódź upheld the decision of 8 March 2002. The applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court. 27.  By a decision of 29 October 2002 the Pabianice District Inspector of Construction Supervision authorised the operation of the workshop. The applicant appealed. 28.  On 25 February 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 7 June 2002 and the preceding decision of 8 March 2002. It observed that noise evaluation tests were necessary for a decision allowing the operation of the workshop. Such tests had already been carried out in the case, but not in an appropriate manner. They should have been carried out during the working hours of the workshop and at different times and should have allowed for the applicant’s involvement to enable her to put forward her arguments to the person conducting the tests. 29.  On 18 March 2003 the Pabianice Inspector of Construction Supervision stayed the proceedings concerning the permission to operate the workshop. The applicant appealed and they were resumed at an unspecified later date. 30.  On 3 July 2003 the Mayor of Pabianice issued a decision obliging the workshop’s owner to supplement the submitted documentation by, inter alia, submitting an evaluation of the noise level before 30 September 2003. 31.  On 29 October 2003 the District Inspector of Construction Supervision gave permission to operate the workshop on the basis of noise evaluation tests carried out by a certain S.K. The applicant appealed, challenging the soundness of the outcome of the tests and the way they had been carried out. 32.  On 28 January 2004 the Łódź Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision quashed the decision of 29 October 2003, finding that the applicant had not been given an opportunity to be sufficiently involved in the noise evaluation tests. 33.  On 22 October 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Łódź Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision about inactivity on the part of the Pabianice District Inspector of Construction Supervision, to whom the case had been remitted for reconsideration on the strength of the decision of 28 January 2004. 34.  On 20 October 2004 the Łódź Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision gave a decision in which it found inactivity on the part of the Pabianice District Inspector of Construction Supervision and obliged him to give a decision by 20 February 2005. 35.  On 14 January 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Inspector of Construction Supervision about the administration’s failure to act in her case. 36.  By a decision of 7 March 2005 the General Inspector of Construction Supervision stated that no inactivity on the part of the Łódź Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision had been found. 37.  On 18 March 2005 the Pabianice District Inspector of Construction Supervision stayed the proceedings concerning the request for permission to operate, pending the outcome of noise tests to be carried out by the Regional Inspector of Environmental Protection. The applicant appealed. On 23 June 2005 the Łódź Regional Inspector of Construction Supervision allowed her appeal, quashed the decision staying the proceedings and ordered that they should be conducted further. 38.  On 27 July 2005 the applicant complained to the administrative court about the District Inspector’s failure to take any steps to have a proper noise evaluation carried out and to give a decision on the merits of the case. In his reply of 25 August 2005 the Regional Inspector summarised the developments in the proceedings since the applicant’s complaint of 22 October 2004 and reiterated that the proceedings were, after its decision of 23 June 2005, pending before the first-instance authority. It noted that the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 18 March 2005 to stay the proceedings was fully justified. 39.  By a judgment of 20 October 2005 the Łódź regional administrative court partly allowed the applicant’s complaint and set a one-month time‑limit for the District Inspector to give a decision. It summarised the conduct of the proceedings since its judgment of 25 February 2003. It further observed that the proceedings had been conducted exceedingly slowly and that no valid justification for this unreasonable delay had been adduced by the administrative authorities. 40.  The proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Vienna. 6.  On 4 August 1998 the Meidling District Court (Bezirksgericht), in summary proceedings, ordered the applicant to pay 102,330.48 Austrian schillings (ATS), approximately 7,440 euros (EUR) to G. for the cost of plumbing work carried out in her apartment (Zahlungsbefehl). 7.  On 26 May 1999 the District Court granted G.'s request for the enforcement of the payment of this order and the costs of the proceedings in the amount of approximately EUR 2,150 by judicial sale (Zwangsversteigerung) of the applicant's apartment situated at S.-street 23/17, in the 12th district of Vienna. That address was used by the courts for serving this and subsequent decisions. A registered letter was sent to the applicant at the above address. As it could not be handed over to her personally, it was served on her on 8 June 1999 by deposition (Hinterlegung) in the post office. 8.  On 27 July 1999 the Meidling District Court, referring to two further enforceable payment orders of 24 October 1995 and 15 June 1999 respectively (amounting to approximately EUR 2,100) and to the costs of the respective proceedings, granted another creditor, W., leave to accede to the judicial sale. 9.  The applicant was informed of the date of the judicial sale by registered letter, which was again sent to her address at S.-street 23/17, and was served by deposition in the post office on 6 October 1999. 10.  On 17 November 1999 the judicial sale took place. The applicant did not assist. The District Court sold the applicant's apartment (Zuschlag) for 812,000 ATS (approximately EUR 59,000) to H. GmbH, a limited liability company. The decision of sale was served on the applicant on 24 November 1999 by deposition in the post office. 11.  By a decision of 14 January 2000 the District Court allocated shares of the proceeds to the creditors (Meistbotsverteilungsbeschluss). 12.  In February 2000 the applicant was evicted from the apartment. 13.  In March 2000 the applicant had a nervous breakdown and stayed in a psychiatric hospital between 2 March 2000 and 12 April 2000. It cannot be established on the basis of the file where the applicant lived for the rest of the year 2000. It appears that in 2001 she was housed in a community owned apartment, where she is still living. 14.  In connection with the applicant's stay in the psychiatric hospital, the Fünfhaus District Court instituted guardianship proceedings (Sach-walterschaftsverfahren) and, on 15 March 2000, appointed a provisional guardian for the applicant. In these proceedings a medical expert submitted that the applicant had suffered from paranoid psychosis since 1994 and had since then not been able to make rational decisions, in particular as far as housing matters were concerned. On 15 May 2005 a permanent guardian was appointed for the applicant. 15.  On 3 April 2000 the Meidling District Court served the decision of 17 November 1999 concerning the judicial sale of the applicant's apartment on the applicant's guardian. On 17 April 2000 the applicant, represented by her guardian, appealed against this decision. Referring to the guardianship proceedings, she submitted that the enforcement proceedings were null and void as she had not been capable of participating in the proceedings (prozeßfähig) either at the time of delivery of the respective payment orders or at the time of delivery of the decisions granting enforcement and summoning her to the judicial sale. She further requested that the enforcement proceedings be suspended. 16.  On 26 April 2000 the District Court dismissed the applicant's request for the enforcement proceedings to be suspended. On 3 May 2000 it granted a part of the surplus of the judicial sale to another creditor, A. The applicant, referring again to her argument that the enforcement proceedings should be considered null and void, appealed against both decisions. She further submitted that she had paid all outstanding debts to G. in July 1999. 17.  On 23 June 2000 the Vienna Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht) suspended the proceedings concerning the appeal against the judicial sale of the applicant's apartment and ordered the Meidling District Court to decide on the applicant's capacity to participate in the proceedings since June 1999, when the decision granting enforcement by judicial sale of her apartment had been served on her. 18.  On the applicant's requests, the Meidling District Court, on 3 July 2000, found that the payment orders of 4 August 1998 and 15 June 1999 (see paragraphs 6 and 8 above) were not enforceable. Relying on section 7 § 3 of the Enforcement Act (Exekutionsordnung), it found that the applicant had not been capable of participating in the proceedings at the time of the delivery of the decisions at issue. For the same reasons the Hernals District Court, on 3 May 2001, referring to the expert opinion obtained in the guardianship proceedings and a further expert opinion, found that the payment order of 24 October 1995 (see paragraph 8 above) was not enforceable. 19.  Referring to the first decision, the applicant, in October 2000, requested the District Court to discontinue the enforcement proceedings. On 12 January 2001 the District Court dismissed this request and noted that discontinuation was no longer possible as the decision allocating the proceeds of the sale to the creditors had become final and the creditors had been paid. 20.  In the meantime, on 28 December 2000, the Vienna Regional Civil Court resumed the proceedings concerning the applicant's appeal against the judicial sale. It dismissed the appeal, noting that under section 187 § 1 and section 184 § 1 (3) of the Enforcement Act only persons who had been present at the judicial sale or had erroneously not been summoned had a right to appeal within 14 days from the date of the auction. In contrast to the views expressed by legal writers, it was the Supreme Court's established case‑law that this time-limit was absolute and, therefore, also binding in a case like the present one where the debtor had not been capable of participating in the proceedings and had not been represented. Consequently, the sale of the applicant's apartment had become final and it was no longer possible to claim the nullity of the proceedings. The court therefore revised its decision of 23 June 2000 (see paragraph 17 above) finding that the question of the applicant's capacity to participate in the enforcement proceedings was not relevant. 21.  The applicant, represented by her guardian, requested the Vienna Regional Civil Court to allow an ordinary appeal with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). She argued that section 187 § 1 of the Enforcement Act setting an absolute time-limit for the filing of an appeal against a decision of sale in a judicial auction was unconstitutional and amounted to discrimination against disabled persons not capable of participating in legal proceedings. Such individuals could not be treated like persons with legal capacity, who were able to defend their interests in underlying civil proceedings and could later appeal against a decision granting enforcement. In the present case, the interests of the applicant in declaring the sale of her apartment null and void had to prevail over the interests of the purchaser and the creditors. On the one hand, the applicant had become homeless, having lost her apartment, which had been sold far below its market price in order to satisfy relatively minor claims. On the other hand, annulling the judicial sale of the apartment would not have caused serious or irreparable damage to the creditors or the purchaser. 22.  By a decision of 12 January 2001 the Meidling District Court entered the purchaser of the applicant's apartment, the limited company H., as owner in the land register. 23.  On 24 April 2001 the Vienna Regional Civil Court refused to grant an ordinary appeal. Qualifying the applicant's submissions as an extraordinary appeal, it transferred them to the Supreme Court. 24.  On 30 January 2002 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) rejected the applicant's extraordinary appeal. It noted that the Regional Court's decision was in line with its constant case-law. As to the question regarding the constitutionality of the absolute time-limit for the filing of appeals against a judicial sale, it referred to the necessary protection of the purchaser. 25.  By decision of 12 April 2002 the Vienna Regional Civil Court dismissed the applicant's further appeals against a number of decisions of the District Court, including the decision entering the purchaser of the apartment as owner in the land register (see paragraph 22 above), a decision granting another part of the surplus of the judicial sale to creditor A., and decisions fixing further costs of the enforcement proceedings. It noted that the applicant's arguments were restricted to the allegation that the judicial sale had not become final and that, therefore, all subsequent decisions were null and void. However, according to the Supreme Court's decision, the judicial sale had become final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and currently lives in Leipzig, Germany. 5.  On 16 August 1996 the applicant's apartment in the city of Odessa, Ukraine, was sold by Mr O. (the applicant's nephew), who allegedly acted under a written authority issued by the applicant, to Mrs S. (a private person). The applicant continued to live in the flat until an unknown date in 1999, when he left Ukraine and took up residence in Germany. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant filed a criminal complaint against Mr O., stating that he had stolen his passport and forged his signature on the written authority to sell the apartment. 7.  On 1 October 1996 an investigator of the Malinovsky District Police Station of Odessa (Малинівський районний відділ внутрішніх справ, hereafter “the Police Station”) instituted criminal proceedings against Mr O. for forgery and fraud. 8. On the same date Mrs S. sued the applicant before the Malinovsky District Court of Odessa (hereafter “the Malinovsky Court”) seeking his eviction from the apartment at issue. 9.  On 4 October 1996 the applicant filed with the Malinovsky Court a counterclaim against Mrs S. seeking to have the sales contract for the flat declared null and void for fraud. 10.  On 18 November 1996 an expert with the Criminalistic Expert Unit of the Odessa Police Department (Експертно-Криміналістичне Управління УМВС України в Одеській області, hereafter “the Expert Unit”), in the course of the criminal investigation against Mr O., issued an opinion in which he stated that the signature on the written authority had been executed by a person other than the applicant. 11.  On 22 November 1996 the Malinovsky Court requested from the Police Station a copy of the expert's report of 18 November 1996. 12.  On 17 January 1997 the Malinovsky Court held the first hearing, which was adjourned because of the failure of Mr O. (a witness in this case) failure to appear. 13.  On 6 February 1997 the Malinovsky Court requested the Odessa Institute of Forensic Expert Examinations (Одеський Науково-Дослідний Інститут Судових Експертиз, hereafter “the Institute”) to carry out an expert examination of the applicant's signature on the authority. 14.  On 23 April 1997 the applicant amended his statement of claim, adding a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 15.  On 8 May 1997 an expert with the Institute submitted her report, stating that there was a possibility that the authority had been signed by the applicant with a disguised handwriting. 16.  The hearing scheduled for 19 May 1997 was adjourned on account of Mrs S.'s lawyer failure to appear. 17.  On 21 May 1997 the applicant challenged the presiding judge before the President of the Malinovsky Court. On 25 May 1997 this challenge was accepted and another judge was appointed to hear the case. 18.  Of the eighteen hearings listed between 2 July 1997 and 29 December 1998 six were adjourned due to Mrs S. and her lawyer's failure to appear, and one due to the applicant's absence. On an unspecified date during this period the applicant's case was transmitted from the Malinovsky Court to the Illichevsky District Court of Odessa (hereafter “the Illichevsky Court). 19.  On 29 December 1998 the Illichevsky Court decided to suspend the proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings against Mr O. The applicant appealed against this decision. 20.  On 23 February 1999 the Odessa Regional Court (hereafter “the Regional Court”) found that the appeal had been lodged out of time and invited the Illichevsky Court to determine the admissibility of the applicant's appeal. 21.  On 3 March 1999 the Illichevsky Court granted the applicant leave to appeal out of time. 22.  On 23 March 1999 the Regional Court allowed the applicant's appeal, quashed the decision of 29 December 1998 and ordered a different judge of the Illichevsky Court to examine the merits of the case. 23.  On 6 April 1999 an expert of the Expert Unit, following an additional examination carried out as a part of the criminal investigation, found that the signature on the authority form had not been made by the applicant. 24.  The proceedings before the Illichevsky Court resumed on 4 June 1999. 25.  On 22 June 1999 the Illichevsky Court, following a request of Mrs S., ordered a further expert examination of the signature. 26.  On 12 August 1999 the Institute informed the Illichevsky Court that the examination could not be carried out as Mrs S. had failed to pay the expert's fee. 27.  The proceedings resumed on 21 December 1999, but were adjourned due to the applicant's and his lawyer's absence. As the applicant failed to appear for the hearings scheduled for 4 and 10 January 2000, on the latter date the Illichevsky Court dismissed his claims and, noting that Mrs S. had withdrawn her eviction action as by that time the applicant had moved out of the disputed flat (see paragraph 5 above), discontinued the proceedings. The applicant filed an appeal against this decision and asked for leave to appeal out of time. 28.  On 10 January 2000 the Illichevsky Court granted the applicant leave to appeal out of time. 29.  On 29 February 2000 the Regional Court allowed the applicant's appeal and ordered that the proceedings before the first instance court be continued. 30.  The proceedings resumed on 22 June 2000. The applicant asked the Illichevsky Court to hear his case in his absence. The court decided that the applicant's presence was indispensable for the determination of the case and adjourned the proceedings until 14 September 2000. 31.  Between 14 September and 17 November 2000 the Illichevsky Court fixed seven hearings, one of which was cancelled due to the applicant's lawyer's failure to appear. During this period the applicant's lawyer made four unsuccessful challenges to the impartiality of the presiding judge. 32.  On 17 November 2000 the Illichevsky Court, basing its reasoning principally on the expert's report of 8 May 1997, rejected the applicant's claim as unsubstantiated. The applicant appealed. 33.  On 13 March 2001 the Civil Division of the Regional Court (hereafter “the Civil Division”) granted the applicant's appeal and quashed the judgment of 17 November 2000, holding that the Illichevsky Court had failed to attach due weight to the evidence collected in the course of criminal investigation against Mr O. and had overestimated the importance of the expert's report of 8 May 1997. 34.  On 20 June 2001 the President of the Regional Court lodged a protest (an extraordinary appeal) with the Presidium of the Regional Court (hereafter “the Presidium”) against the ruling of 13 March 2001. He considered that the judgment of 17 November 2000 had been quashed by the Division unreasonably and that the first instance court had correctly established the relevant facts, and had given cogent reasons for its decision. 35.  The protest was examined on 27 June 2001 by the Presidium under the chairmanship of the President of the Regional Court. Having accepted the reasons set out in the protest, the Presidium quashed the ruling of 13 March 2001 and upheld the judgment of 17 November 2000, which became final and binding immediately. Neither the applicant nor his representative was invited to comment upon the protest or to participate in the hearing before the Presidium. 36.  On 20 August 2001 the decision of the Presidium, together with the case-file, was sent to the Illichevsky Court. 37.  On 13 August 2001 the applicant sent a letter to the Regional Court requesting it to account for the delay in the proceedings. On 28 August 2001 the Regional Court informed the applicant about its Presidium's decision and sent him a copy. 38.  On 19 September 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of 27 June 2001 under the new cassation procedure. 39.  On 13 November 2001 the Supreme Court decided not to deal with the appeal because the applicant had failed to meet the relevant procedural requirements, namely clearly to specify which law he alleged to have been breached by the lower courts and in what way. 40.  On 25 January 2002 the Illichevsky Court adjourned consideration of the applicant's cassation appeal and suggested that he remedy its shortcomings by 11 February 2002. 41.  On 18 February 2002 the Illichevsky Court dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal because he had failed to comply with the relevant procedural requirements. 42.  The outcome of the criminal proceedings against Mr O. is unknown.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 5.  On an unspecified date he sued his former wife for title to a half of the flat which they had allegedly purchased while they were married. The matter was repeatedly reviewed by courts at two levels of jurisdiction. 6.  On 20 February 2001 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don dismissed the applicant's claim. 7.  On 11 May 2001 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment of 20 February 2001 on appeal and remitted the matter for further consideration. 8.  On 8 August 2001 the District Court granted the applicant's claim in full. 9.  On 19 September 2001 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 8 August 2001 on appeal. 10.  On 2 October 2002 the applicant's former wife asked the President of the Rostov Regional Court to lodge an application for supervisory review of the judgment of 8 August 2001 as upheld on 19 September 2001. 11.  On 24 December 2002 the acting President of the Rostov Regional Court granted the request and sent the case to the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court for supervisory review. 12.  On 26 December 2002 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court reassessed the evidence and quashed the judgments of 11 May, 8 August and 19 September 2001 by way of supervisory review and reinstated the judgment of 20 February 2001. It considered that the applicant had failed to provide enough evidence to substantiate his title to the disputed property.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lived before his arrest in the town of Khudzhand, Tajikistan. He is currently residing in Moscow. 6.  In 2005 the applicant lost his job at a telephone exchange in Khudzhand and started earning his living by printing various texts for people on his computer, including theses and extracts from the Koran. 7.  In 2005 several persons were arrested in Khudzhand on suspicion of membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir (“HT”), a transnational Islamic organisation, banned in Russia, Germany and some Central Asian republics. Subsequently, the applicant learnt that some of the arrestees had testified before the prosecuting authorities that he was a member of HT and had printed various materials for it from the Internet. The applicant denies being a member of HT. 8.  On 16 February 2006 the prosecutor's office of the Sogdiyskiy Region of Tajikistan (“the Sogdiyskiy prosecutor's office”) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of membership of an extremist organisation (Article 307 § 2 of the Tajikistani Criminal Code (“TCC”)). In particular, the applicant was suspected of having actively worked with HT by printing out leaflets and religious literature for that organisation with a view to their dissemination. The case was assigned the number 9615. 9.  On 19 February 2006 the Sogdiyskiy prosecutor's office ordered the applicant's placement in custody. Shortly thereafter the applicant was arrested and placed in the basement of the Ministry of National Security (MNS). According to the applicant, he was held there for about three months. He was systematically beaten up and was tortured at least six times with electricity. He was held in premises with nothing to rest on, was refused access to the toilet for lengthy periods of time and received no food. 10.  On 6 May 2006 the prosecutor's office of the Bobodzhon‑Gafurovskiy District (“the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office”) opened a further criminal case against the applicant in connection with his alleged activities within HT. In particular, the applicant was suspected of: having secretly studied extremist literature provided by other members of HT; having worked for the organisation as an IT specialist; having printed out the organisation's leaflets and other literature and secretly distributed it among non-members of the organisation; having paid membership fees to the organisation and trained another member to work with the PC. On the same day the applicant was charged with membership of a criminal organisation banned owing to its extremist activities (Articles 187 § 2 and 307.2-3), incitement to religious and other hatred (Article 189 § 3) and public appeals to overthrow the constitutional order and to engage in extremist activities (Articles 307 and 307.1). The criminal case was joined with case no. 9615 and given the number 9431. 11.  According to the applicant, in May 2006 he and other detainees were taken to a construction site for a recreation zone for officers of the MNS, where they were ordered to dig, working in a bending position. When they tried to straighten up, the guards beat them severely. 12.  On 24 May 2006, fearing further beatings, the applicant escaped. 13.  According to the applicant, his relatives told him that after his escape law enforcement officials had tortured his co-accused to find out where he had gone and whether they had helped him to make good his escape. 14.  On 25 May 2006 the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for escaping from custody. The decision stated that on 24 May 2006, “while in custody at a summer cottage [дачный участок] belonging to the MNS”, the applicant had fled to an unknown destination. 15.  On an unspecified date the criminal case against the applicant in connection with his alleged activities within HT was transferred for examination to the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy District Court of the Sogdiyskiy Region 16.  By a decision of 6 June 2006 the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy District Court put the applicant's name on a wanted list and suspended the examination of the criminal case against him pending his arrest. 17.  On 9 June 2006 the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office charged the applicant with escape from custody. 18.  It appears that the applicant was hiding in Tajikistan until December 2006, when he moved to Kyrgyzstan. On an unspecified date in May 2007 the applicant arrived in Russia. 19.  On 5 August 2008 the applicant was arrested in Moscow as a person wanted by the Tajikistani authorities. 20.  On 6 August 2008 the Nagatinskiy deputy prosecutor questioned the applicant about the circumstances of his arrival in Russia. According to the applicant's written explanation [объяснение] of the same date, in 2006 the Tajikistani authorities had opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of membership of an extremist organisation. For about three months in 2006 he had been held in custody. During that period he had been taken on a daily basis to work at a construction site, from where he had escaped. In 2007 the applicant had come to Russia to avoid criminal prosecution and to earn a living. He had not applied for Russian citizenship, refugee status or political asylum. The transcript bore the applicant's signature. In the applicant's submission, the explanation was compiled by the Russian authorities on the basis of material from his criminal case produced by the Tajikistani law enforcement authorities. 21.  On 11 September 2008 the Tajikistani Prosecutor General's Office (“the TPGO“) sent to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office a request for the applicant's extradition to Tajikistan in connection with the charges concerning his membership of HT. The letter stated that the applicant would be tried only on the charges for which his extradition was being sought, and that he would not be extradited to a third country without the consent of the Russian authorities. 22.  On 5 December 2008 the TPGO sent their Russian counterpart an additional request for the applicant's extradition on the charge of escaping from custody. 23.  By a letter of 19 December 2008 the applicant's lawyer informed the Russian Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant intended to challenge before the courts the refusal to grant him refugee status (see below) and requested them to take that fact into account when examining the extradition issue. 24.  On 30 December 2008 the deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation ordered the applicant's extradition to Tajikistan. The decision, in its relevant parts, read as follows:\n“... [Mr] Gaforov is charged with having actively participated in 2002-2006 in the activities of a criminal organisation “Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islam”, aimed at the violent seizure of state power and the overthrow of the constitutional order and banned on the territory of Tajikistan by a court decision ...\n...\nThe [applicant's] actions are punishable under Russian criminal law and correspond to Article 210 of the Russian Criminal Code (membership of a criminal organisation); Article 278 (acts aimed at violent overthrowing of the constitutional order); Article 280 (public appeals in the media to engage in extremist activities); Article 282 § 2 (c) (incitement to hatred and degrading treatment via the mass media, carried out by an organised group); Article 282 § 2 (membership of an extremist organisation); Article 282 § 2 (membership of an organisation banned by a court decision because of its extremist activities); Article 205 § 1 (financing terrorism). The above-mentioned offences carry penalties of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani legislation have not expired.\n...\n[The applicant] is charged with having absconded from custody ... on 24 May 2006 ...\nThe [applicant's] actions are punishable under Article 313 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code (escape from custody of a person detained on remand) and carry a penalty of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] criminal prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani legislation have not expired.” 25.  Lastly, the decision stated that, according to the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”), the applicant had not obtained Russian citizenship, and concluded that there were no other grounds for not extraditing him to Tajikistan. 26.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 30 December 2008, alleging that, if extradited, he would be subjected to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. He averred, in particular, that he had described in detail the treatment to which he had been subjected while in custody in Tajikistan and that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office had disregarded those submissions and the relevant materials from international NGOs showing that the Tajikistani law enforcement authorities systematically tortured detainees. The applicant also submitted that the Tajikistani authorities were not able to provide effective guarantees against the risk of ill-treatment and unfair criminal proceedings. Lastly, he stated that the decision to extradite him had been taken despite the fact that his asylum application was pending. 27.  By a letter of 10 February 2009 the TPGO guaranteed to their Russian counterpart that, if extradited, the applicant would not be persecuted on political, ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious grounds and that he would not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The letter also noted that on 11 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Tajikistan had declared HT a terrorist organisation and had banned its activities on the territory of Tajikistan. 28.  At a hearing on 16 February 2009 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) examined the applicant's complaint about the decision to extradite him to Tajikistan. 29.  According to the hearing transcript, the applicant submitted to the court that after his arrest in 2006 in Tajikistan he had been severely beaten and on six occasions tortured with electricity with a view to extracting a confession that he was a member of HT. He had been held in the MNS basement for about three months. During his detention there he had been systematically beaten and insulted and had been allowed access to the toilet only twice a day. While still in detention, he had been taken to a construction site for an MNS recreation zone. There he and other detainees had worked laying the foundation for a sports centre; they had also been ordered to mow grass. The applicant and other detainees had been systematically subjected to beatings. Unable to stand the beatings and the lack of food, the applicant had escaped. The applicant further stressed that he feared returning to Tajikistan because after his escape several MNS officials had threatened his family. They had allegedly told his family members that if the applicant was caught, they would not leave him alive. An MNS officer who had beaten the applicant and who had been on duty on the day of his escape had allegedly told the applicant's sister that if he went to jail because of the applicant, he would kill the applicant's whole family, once released. 30.  At the hearing the applicant's lawyer also stated that his client's detention was unlawful because the authorities had failed to extend it properly, in breach of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”) and the decisions of the Constitutional Court. 31.  Having heard the applicant and his lawyer and granted their request to include in the case file reports from various NGOs and international organisations on the situation in Tajikistan in relation to torture, the City Court adjourned the examination of the complaint pending the outcome of the asylum proceedings. 32.  By a faxed letter of 25 February 2009 the City Court informed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“the MID”) about the applicant's case and his allegations of the risk of torture were he to be extradited to Tajikistan. The City Court asked the MID to present their position and to assist the court in obtaining information from the Tajikistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the issues raised by the applicant. 33.  By a letter of the same date the City Court asked the Tajikistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit its position and any relevant information on the applicant's allegations concerning the risk of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment should he be extradited to Tajikistan, and to verify those allegations via the relevant State authorities. 34.  On 13 March 2009 the MID replied to the City Court that Tajikistan had become party to almost all the international instruments on the protection of human rights and that it had thereby confirmed its intention to build a democratic and secular state based on respect for the rule of law. A post of ombudsman had been created. The MID did not have any information to indicate that “the applicant's civil rights would be violated if he was extradited”. It does not appear that the Tajikistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the City Court's request. 35.  On 20 April 2009 the City Court examined the applicant's complaint about the decision of 30 December 2008. The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearing 36.  According to the hearing transcript, the applicant reiterated before the court his submissions concerning his alleged torture while in custody in Tajikistan. He submitted that the fact of his previous torture and the threats to his family members proved that he ran a risk of being subjected to such treatment again, should the extradition decision be upheld. The applicant's lawyer asked the court to release the applicant, stressing that he had been detained for a long period of time and that his detention had not been extended despite clear instructions from the Constitutional Court in that respect. 37.  The City Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. The decision, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“ [Mr] Gaforov is charged with having, in the period from August 2002 to February 2006 in the Sogdiyskiy Region of the Republic of Tajikistan, been an active member of the criminal organisation “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, founded with the aim of violent seizure of power and overthrowing the constitutional order, which [organisation] had been banned by a court from the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan because of its extremist activities; [the applicant] is also charged with having financed the above organisation. During the relevant time period, being a member of that organised group and using the mass media, [the applicant] disseminated materials containing public appeals for the violent overthrow of the existing state regime to take control of the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan and seize power there. [The applicant] recruited citizens to the extremist organisation with a view to disrupting the constitutional order of the Republic of Tajikistan; made public appeals to engage in extremist activities; disseminated leaflets and other printed materials aimed at incitement to ethnic, racial, ..., religious hatred, degrading treatment, propaganda proclaiming the superiority of certain citizens based on their religious ... convictions, and the founding of an Islamic state “Caliphate” on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan.\nThe [applicant's] actions are punishable under Russian criminal law and correspond to Article 210 § 2 [of the Russian Criminal Code] (participation in a criminal organisation); Article 278 (acts aimed at violent overthrow of the constitutional order); Article 280 § 2 (public appeals via the mass media to engage in extremist activities); Article 282 § 2 (c) (incitement to hatred and degrading treatment committed by an organised group through the mass media); Article 282-1 § 2 (membership of an extremist organisation); Article 282-2 § 2 (membership of an organisation banned by a final court decision because of its extremist activities); and Article 205-1 § 1 (financing terrorism). The above-mentioned offences carry penalties of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani law have not expired.\n...\nMoreover ... [the applicant] is charged with having absconded from custody ... on 24 May 2006 ...\nThe above-mentioned actions of [the applicant] are punishable under Article 313 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code (escape from custody of a person detained on remand) and carry a penalty of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] criminal prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani law have not expired ...\nThe decision of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation of 30 December 2008 is lawful and well-founded.\nFrom the information submitted by the Russian FMS [Federal Migration Service] and its Moscow branch it follows that [the applicant] had not obtained Russian citizenship or applied for it in accordance with the law\nAt the court hearing [the applicant] explained that he had not applied for Russian citizenship; he had been arrested in Russia as a person whose name had been put on an international wanted list...; [he] had not applied for refugee status before his arrest because he thought that he would not be granted it as a wanted person; he was not a refugee, he had not been and was not being persecuted in the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan on political or any other grounds, except for his criminal prosecution; he had left his place of residence voluntarily, having fled from custody – [a fact] which proves that [the applicant] was deliberately hiding in the territory of the Russian Federation from the Tajikistani law enforcement bodies.\nThus, there are no grounds stipulated in international agreements or the legislation of the Russian Federation to prevent [the applicant's] extradition ...\n...\nThe court has examined and dismissed [the applicant's] arguments, supported by his lawyer ... with reference to the opinion [заключение] of 13 March 2009 by specialist Ms Ryabinina and materials confirming, in their opinion, that he should not be extradited to Tajikistan on account of his possible persecution there. However, having applied to the FMS after his arrest pursuant to an international warrant, [the applicant] himself had explained that he feared extradition to Tajikistan because of the possibility of his conviction leading to a long term of imprisonment.\nHence, the court considers that there is no well-founded fear of [the applicant] becoming a victim of persecution in Tajikistan under Article 1 § 1-1 of the Refugees Act. Consequently, he does not satisfy the criteria to be granted refugee status because only a person who is not a Russian national and who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to avail himself of the protection of that country as a result of such events, can be recognised as a refugee.\nFurthermore, the receiving country furnished an assurance that [the applicant] would be prosecuted only for the crimes with which he had been charged. Moreover, the Republic of Tajikistan is party to almost all international legal instruments on human rights, and has thereby reaffirmed its intention to build a secular democratic state based on the rule of law; a post of Ombudsman had been created there.\nThe issue of whether [the applicant] is guilty of the crimes in respect of which [the Tajikistani authorities] have requested his extradition can only be assessed by a court in the requesting country examining the merits of the criminal case against him. Hence, [the applicant's] and his lawyer's arguments that he is not guilty and that the charges against him are fabricated are not subject to this court's examination.” 38.  The City Court decision was silent on the issue of the applicant's detention. 39.  On 21 April 2009 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”), submitting that the City Court had failed to take into account his arguments, supported by materials from various NGOs, that he would be subjected to torture in the event of extradition. He also averred that the City Court had disregarded that at the time of its examination of the case appeal proceedings against the FMS decision to refuse him refugee status had been pending. 40.  On 8 June 2009 the applicant lodged an additional appeal statement with the Supreme Court submitting that the City Court had failed to assess Ms Ryabinina's opinion and materials from various NGOs attesting to the existence of systematic problems with torture in Tajikistan and had limited its assessment to the MID letter stating merely that “there was no indication that [the applicant's] civil rights would be violated in the event of his extradition”. He stressed that the City Court had confused the risk of torture with the risk of criminal prosecution, although the applicant's position in that respect was unequivocal: he feared his extradition to Tajikistan because he had already been subjected to torture there and he had fled to Russia for that reason. The City Court's conclusion that he had voluntarily left Tajikistan was at odds with the fact that the applicant had fled from custody. Lastly, the City Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria to be granted refugee status, as it was for the civil courts to rule on that matter. 41.  On 8 June 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”) examined the applicant's appeal against the City Court decision. The applicant's lawyer was present at the hearing, but the applicant did not attend. At the hearing the applicant's lawyer filed a written request for release with the Supreme Court. He submitted that his detention in the absence of a judicial decision had exceeded the two-month limit set in Article 109 of the CCrP. In that connection he referred to Article 466 of the CCrP, the Constitutional Court's decisions nos. 101-0 and 333-O-P (see below) and the fact that the latest court decision to place him in custody had been taken on 16 September 2008. He also complained that the Babushkinskiy District Court and the Moscow City Court had refused to examine his complaints about his detention. 42.  By a decision of the same date the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, reproducing verbatim the text of the decision of 20 April 2009. The Supreme Court decision was silent on the matter of the applicant's detention. 43.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant filed an application for asylum with the Moscow Department of the Federal Migration Service (“the Moscow FMS”), stating that he could not return to Tajikistan, where he had been subjected to ill-treatment. In particular, he submitted that in February 2006 he had been arrested by law enforcement officials who had tortured him with electricity and severely beaten him. Two days later he had been transferred to the MNS, where he had been kept in a damp basement together with eight other persons. He had not been fed and had been allowed access to the toilet only twice a day. The applicant and other detainees were systematically beaten up with a view to extracting confessions about their involvement with HT, to which they had finally had to confess because of the beatings. The MNS officers had forced the applicant and his fellow detainees to work on their construction site and had beaten them if they did not work properly. In May 2006, while at a construction site, he had escaped because he could no longer endure the violence. 44.  In an interview with an official of the Moscow FMS on 28 November 2008, the applicant reiterated and confirmed his earlier submissions 45.  On 15 December 2008 the Moscow FMS refused to grant the applicant asylum, finding that the reason for his request was his fear of being sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment if extradited. It further noted that when questioned by FMS officials, the applicant submitted that he had been unlawfully arrested by the Tajikistani law enforcement officials and that he had fled from custody because he had been severely ill-treated. The FMS concluded that the grounds referred to by the applicant did not constitute well-founded fear of being persecuted in his home country. 46.  On 13 January 2009 the applicant appealed to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow (“the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court”) against the decision of 15 December 2008, submitting that the Tajik authorities were persecuting him on religious grounds in connection with his alleged membership of HT, a banned religious organisation. Referring to Article 3 of the Convention, he stressed that the migration authority had disregarded his consistent and convincing submissions in respect of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected. Knowing that the Code of Civil Procedure made no provision for a detainee's transportation to court hearings concerning their civil claims, the applicant did not request the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court to secure his presence. 47.  On 7 April 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court examined the applicant's complaint in the presence of his lawyer and dismissed it. The applicant was not brought to the hearing. The court found that in examining the applicant's application the Moscow FMS had obtained from the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and their Tajikistani counterpart materials concerning his criminal prosecution in Tajikistan. Those State bodies had not confirmed that the Tajikistani authorities were persecuting Tajikistani nationals because of their religious beliefs, or torturing them or treating them inhumanely in connection with criminal proceedings against them. Although the applicant had arrived in Russia in May 2007, he had applied for asylum only after his arrest with a view to extradition. In sum, the applicant had failed to adduce convincing reasons showing that he had well-founded fears of being persecuted in Tajikistan on political, racial, religious, national or ethnic grounds or because of his membership of a particular social group, and had only applied to the migration authorities because of his criminal prosecution. 48.  On 20 April 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 7 April 2009, submitting that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had disregarded his detailed and consistent submissions concerning the ill‑treatment to which he had been subjected while in custody in Tajikistan and his persecution on religious grounds. He also averred that the district court had disregarded a number of reports of UN bodies and NGOs attesting to the widespread practice of ill-treatment of detainees by law enforcement authorities in Tajikistan. 49.  On 25 June 2009 the Moscow City Court set aside the decision of 7 April 2009 and remitted the case at first instance for fresh examination. 50.  On 10 September 2009 the Zamoskvoretstkiy District Court upheld the migration authority's refusal to grant the applicant asylum, reproducing almost verbatim the reasoning of its decision of 7 April 2009. The court also noted that as the applicant only feared criminal prosecution and thus did not qualify for asylum it would not attach any weight to his submissions concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Tajikistan in the event of extradition and the general human rights situation in that country. 51.  The applicant appealed against the decision. Referring to reports of various NGOs, he stressed that the problem of ill-treatment of detainees persisted in Tajikistan and that he feared his extradition not only because of the general situation in the country but also because of his own experience of ill-treatment at the hands of the Tajikistani State officials, who were persecuting him on religious grounds. However, the District Court had refused to take that information into account and limited its assessment to the information provided by the Russian State authorities. 52.  On 26 January 2010 officers of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) interviewed the applicant in the remand facility in connection with his application for international protection. 53.  On 28 January 2010 the City Court upheld the decision of 10 September 2009 in the presence of the applicant's lawyer. The City Court decision, in its relevant part, stated:\n“On 28 November 2008 [Mr] Gaforov, a national of the Republic of Tajikistan, held in IZ-77/4 in Moscow, applied for refugee status.\nIn his questionnaire [анкета] and report form [опросный лист] [the applicant] stated that there was a real risk of his persecution by law enforcement officials who had arrested him in 2006 in Khudzhand and charged him with being a member of HT. Moreover, [the applicant] stated that he feared criminal prosecution and had been subjected to ill-treatment while in detention [in Tajikistan].\nIn arriving at its conclusions the [Moscow FMS] examined information submitted by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and concerning [the applicant's] prosecution by the Tajikistani prosecutor's office on various charges under Articles of the Tajikistani Criminal Code.\nThere is no indication of [the applicant's] persecution on religious grounds in the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office's decision of 6 May 2006 to charge the applicant [with his activities within HT].\nFrom the impugned decision [of the Moscow FMS] it transpires that in arriving at its conclusions the authority took into account information from the [Russian] Prosecutor General's Office and their Tajikistani counterpart.\nIn examining [the applicant's] complaint, the [District] court correctly established that the applicant had not referred to any humanitarian reasons to be granted temporary asylum in the Russian Federation, such as precise details of his personal persecution by the Tajikistani authorities, [or stated] that in the event of his return there existed a real risk to his personal safety from the [Tajikistani] authorities. He had not justified his application for temporary asylum by his state of health or the need for medical assistance. He also failed to submit any evidence that there were obstacles to his returning to Tajikistan.” 54.  On 8 February 2010 the applicant applied to the Moscow FMS for temporary asylum. The outcome of those proceedings is unclear. 55.  On 10 March 2010 the UNHCR office informed the applicant's lawyer that it had examined her client's application for international protection. The examination established that the applicant was “outside his country of nationality due to well-founded fear of being persecuted by the authorities of his country for reasons of imputed political opinions”, that he was “unable to return to the Republic of Tajikistan” and thus “eligible for international protection under the UNHCR mandate”. 56.  On 7 August 2008 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant's placement in custody pending extradition, with reference to Articles 97, 99, 101 and 108 of the Russian CCrP and Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (“the Minsk Convention” – see the Relevant Domestic Law below). The court stated, in particular, that the applicant was charged under the Tajikistani Criminal Code with a crime carrying a sentence of imprisonment, that he had fled from custody, did not have a permanent place of residence or registration in Russia and might, consequently, again abscond to avoid prosecution. It further stated that the need to place the applicant in custody was also justified by his eventual extradition to Tajikistan, and that the related proceedings had been instituted following the Tajik authorities' petition under Article 61 of the Minsk Convention. The decision did not specify the term of the applicant's detention and stated that it was open to appeal before the Moscow City Court within three days after its delivery. There is no indication that the applicant challenged the decision on appeal. 57.  On 16 September 2008, the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant's placement in custody pending extradition, referring to Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP and Article 60 of the Minsk Convention. The court stated that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office was verifying the materials in respect of the applicant's extradition and that no grounds preventing it had been established. On 7 August 2008 the Nagatinskiy District Court had ordered the applicant's placement in custody pending receipt of the formal request for his extradition under Article 61 of the Minsk Convention. By the time of the examination of the case by the Simonovskiy District Court, that request had been received. The applicant was charged with having escaped from custody which, under the Tajikistani Criminal Code, was punishable with over two years' imprisonment. Furthermore, the applicant had absconded, he did not have a permanent place of residence or a permanent job in Russia and his name was on the international list of wanted persons. Hence, the applicant's requests for application of a non-custodial preventive measure were unfounded and he was to be remanded in custody. The decision did not set a time-limit for the applicant's detention and stated that it was open to appeal before the Moscow City Court within three days after its delivery. There is no indication that the applicant challenged the decision on appeal. 58.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant complained to the Babushkinsky District Court of Moscow that his detention in the absence of a judicial decision had exceeded the two-month term set in Article 109 of the CCrP. He referred to Article 466 of the CCrP, Constitutional Court decisions nos. 101-0 and 333-O-P (see the section on Relevant Domestic Law below) and the fact that the latest court decision to place him in custody had been taken on 16 September 2008. He requested his immediate release. 59.  On 27 January 2009 the Babushkinskiy District Court disallowed the applicant's complaint, finding that he had failed to comply with the formal requirements for lodging a civil claim, laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicant was invited to rectify the shortcomings and informed of his right to appeal against the decision. 60.  On 14 September 2009 the applicant complained about his detention to the Nagatinskiy District Court. In particular, he averred that the latest detention order authorising his placement in custody was dated 16 September 2008 and that neither that decision nor the previous one dated 7 August 2008 specified the term of his detention. In any event, since 16 September 2008 the Nagatinskiy prosecutor's office had not requested the courts to extend his detention pursuant to Article 109, so it had become unlawful after the expiry of the two initially authorised two-month terms; that is to say that out of the thirteen months the applicant had spent in custody, nine months of that detention had been unlawful. Furthermore, the Babushkinskiy District Court had refused to examine the applicant's complaint about detention and the City Court had likewise disregarded his request for release submitted at the hearing of 20 April 2009. Relying on Articles 5 §§1 and 4 of the Convention, the Court's case-law, Articles 109 and 110 of the CCrP and the practice of the Constitutional Court, the applicant insisted that his detention had been unlawful, that he had not been provided with an effective remedy to complain about it and that the applicable legislation did not meet the requisite standards of quality of the law. Lastly, he argued that the extradition check against him had been finalised on 30 December 2008 and that after that date no action was taken with a view to extraditing him. 61.  On 21 September 2009 the Nagatinskiy District Court refused to examine the applicant's complaint. It held firstly that the applicant had failed to appeal against the decision of 7 August 2008 within the required time-limits. As to the alleged inaction of the prosecutor's office, it was open to the applicant to complain about it under Article 125 of the CCrP to the Simonovskiy District Court, which had territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 62.  On 21 October 2009 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Moscow City Court. 63.  On the same date the applicant complained to the Simonovskiy District Court, reiterating his submissions made in the complaint of 14 September 2009. 64.  By a letter of 29 October 2009 the Simonovskiy District Court returned the applicant's complaint of 21 October 2009, stating that in the Russian Federation criminal proceedings were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCrP and that the applicant had failed to refer to any provisions of the CCrP in his submissions. 65.  On 8 December 2009 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General's Office about his detention, averring that he had been held in custody for sixteen months and that twelve months of that detention had been unlawful because the prosecutor's office had failed to request the courts to extend it. He also stressed that the decision to extradite him had become final in June 2009, after which date no action had been taken with a view to extraditing him. 66.  On 21 December 2009 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 21 September 2009. It held, in particular, that it was open to the applicant to complain about his detention to a court having territorial jurisdiction or to an appeal court. 67.  On 30 December 2009 the Prosecutor General's Office replied to the applicant that his detention had been authorised first by the Nagatinskiy and then by the Simonovskiy District Court, pursuant to Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP. According to Article 109 of the CCrP, the maximum term of detention of persons charged with particularly serious crimes was up to eighteen months. The Prosecutor General's Office had decided on the applicant's extradition on 30 December 2008, that is within the required time-limit. The applicant's ensuing detention was prompted by his appeals to the courts against the extradition order and by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As to the Supreme Court Ruling of 29 October 2009 (see below), it was applicable only to persons in respect of whom the Russian authorities were carrying out an extradition check, and not to those in respect of whom the Prosecutor General's Office had already issued an extradition order. In the applicant's case the Prosecutor General's Office had decided on 30 December 2008 to extradite him and that decision was to be enforced. 68.  On 22 January 2010 the Ombudsman to the President of the Russian Federation (“the ombudsman”) wrote to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation stating, in particular, that the European Court of Human Rights had recently found a breach of Article 5 of the Convention on account of the unsatisfying quality of the law in several cases involving persons detained pending extradition. Yet the practice continued, in breach of the applicable Russian legislation, of keeping in custody foreign nationals whose detention on remand had not been extended. The ombudsman opined that the problem lay in the domestic authorities' inconsistent practice in applying the relevant legislation, and had persisted even after the Constitutional Court's Ruling no. 101-O and the Supreme Court's Ruling no. 22 (see Relevant Domestic Law below). The ombudsman referred to the Yuldashev, Isakov, Khaydarov and Sultanov cases, which were pending before the Court, in which the term of the applicants' detention pending extradition had exceeded the eighteen-month maximum term laid down in Article 109 of the CCrP. 69.  The ombudsman further stressed that on 5 February 2010 the eighteen-month maximum detention term was about to expire for the applicant in the present case and that the domestic courts had twice authorised his remand in custody without setting any time-limit for his detention. He also stated that the Government were justifying the detention on remand of the applicants in the above-mentioned cases by the fact that the Strasbourg Court had indicated to them under Rule 39 to suspend their extradition. However, nothing in the Strasbourg Court's Rules provided for the respondent State's obligation to hold detainees whose extradition was suspended in custody in breach of the Russian legislation. Lastly, the ombudsman asked the Prosecutor General to carefully examine the situation of the persons mentioned in his letter, in particular with regard to the extension of their detention for an unlimited period of time, and to further improvement of the legislation and its correct application in order to prevent possible violations of the Convention. 70.  By a letter of 8 February 2010 the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation replied to the ombudsman. The letter, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“...\n...the decisions to extradite the applicants in the cases mentioned [in your letter] were taken within the time-limits established by Article 109 of the CCrP, the lawfulness of those decisions was verified by the courts and those decisions are bound to be executed. To release the above-mentioned persons from custody would entail breach by the Russian Federation of its international obligations concerning extradition.\nThe possibility to apply the provisions of the CCrP in respect of the time-limits for the detention of persons held in custody pending extradition was first mentioned in Constitutional Court Ruling no.  101-O ... In its Ruling... no. 158-O the Constitutional Court stated that in its previous Ruling no. 101-O it had not, and could not have, established what particular provisions of the CCrP were to regulate the procedures and time-limits for the detention of persons in custody pending extradition ... as it had no jurisdiction in the matter ...\nThe Supreme Court, in its replies of 9 August and 6 October 2008 to the Prosecutor General's requests for clarification, explained that in deciding on procedures and time-limits for the detention of persons detained pending extradition, the authorities were to apply the provisions of the CCrP. However, this issue had never been examined by the Plenary of the Supreme Court and the practice of the domestic authorities in this respect had not been studied or summarised.\nUntil 29 October 2009 there was no uniform judicial practice on this category of cases in different regions of the Russian Federation. Some judges requested that the time-limits for detention be extended, others refused to extend those time-limits, considering it unnecessary.\nOn 26 November 2009, following the Supreme Court's Ruling no. 22 ..., the Prosecutor General's office sent out to prosecutors in all regions of the Russian Federation an information letter explaining the order on extending the time-limits for the detention of persons in respect of whom the extradition check was pending and the decision to extradite was not yet final... Further time-limits for the detention of a person pending extradition are regulated by Article 467 of the CCrP.\nThe lengthy detention of Mr Yuldashev, Mr Isakov, Mr Khaydarov, Mr Sultanov and [the applicant] Mr A.Gaforov ... is at the present moment a consequence of the European Court's application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pending the examination of their cases [by the Strasbourg Court].” 71.  On 23 April 2010 the Babushkinskiy district prosecutor ordered the applicant's release from custody, finding that the time-limits for his detention under Article 109 of the CCrP had expired and that there was no reason to extend his detention. 72.  On the same date the Babushkinskiy District Court dismissed the prosecutor's request to confine the applicant to the detention centre for foreign nationals [центр содержания иностранных граждан ГУВД по г. Москве]. The court held that only persons charged with administrative offences could be held in the above-mentioned centre and that, in any event, the maximum time-limits for the applicant's detention had expired pursuant to Articles 107-109 of the CCrP. 73.  It appears that the applicant was released shortly thereafter.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and was detained in Diyarbakır prison at the time of his application to the Court. 5.  On 8 November 1993 the applicant was taken into police custody by police officers from the Diyarbakır Security Directorate on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). 6.  On 26 November 1993 he was brought before a judge who ordered his detention on remand. 7.  On 29 November 1993 the applicant filed an objection against the decision of 26 November 1993. 8.  On 7 December 1993 the Diyarbakır State Security Court dismissed the applicant’s objection. 9.  On 23 December 1993 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and ten other persons. The applicant was charged under Article 125 of the Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 10.  On 28 December 1993 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing in the case against the applicant and the other co-accused (case no. 1993/663). 11.  Between 28 December 1993 and 16 January 1996 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held fourteen hearings, approximately once every two months on the merits of the case. During this time, at each hearing the court heard some of the accused and requested documents from various authorities with a view to completing the case file. 12.  Meanwhile, on 4 October 1994 the first-instance court decided to join another case (case no. 1993/821) to case no. 1993/663. 13.  On 26 March 1996 the public prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The first-instance court requested the applicant and some of the other co-accused to make their defence submissions. 14.  Between 26 March 1996 and 16 September 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court adjourned the hearings as some of the accused had failed to file their defence submissions. 15.  In the meantime, on 3 July 1996 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to join another case (case no. 1994/433) to case no. 1993/633. 16.  On 21 October 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to join a third case (case no. 1996/512) to case no. 1993/663. 17.  Between 21 October 1997 and 3 March 1998 the first-instance court heard the accused of the joined case and collected evidence in their respect. 18.  On 3 March 1998 the court requested the public prosecutor to submit his observations on the merits of the case. 19.  On 22 July 1998 the public prosecutor amended the indictment concerning the applicant and charged him under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code with membership of an illegal organisation. 20.  On 15 September 1998 the applicant’s lawyer contended that the applicant had been employed in Alanya at the time of the alleged offence and requested the first-instance court to conduct a further investigation with a view to confirming the veracity of his claim. The court accepted the applicant’s request and ordered the Alanya gendarmerie command to obtain evidence in that respect. 21.  On 29 December 1998 the court adjourned the hearing as it did not receive the requested information from the Alanya gendarmerie command. 22.  On 2 February 1999 the first-instance court withdrew its order of 15 September 1998. 23.  On 2 March 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court requested the accused to file their defence submissions. On an unspecified date, the applicant made his submissions. 24.  On 23 March 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court concluded the proceedings against twenty accused persons, including the applicant, and convicted the latter of membership of the PKK under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713. The first-instance court sentenced the applicant to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment and permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service. 25.  The Diyarbakır State Security Court held forty-one hearings in total. At the end of each hearing the court considered the applicant’s and the other co‑accused’s continued detention, either of its own motion or upon the request of the accused. The court ordered the applicant’s continued detention on every occasion, having regard to the state of the evidence, the nature of the offence and the content of the case file. 26.  On 17 February 2000 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court in respect of the applicant and some of the other co-accused.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in the village of Vladimirivka, the Donetsk region, Ukraine. 5.  The applicant is an employee of the Pivdennodonbaska State Mine (hereinafter - the SMP Mine). On 24 June 1996 he suffered an industrial injury. 6.  In October 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Volnovakha City Court against the SMP Mine seeking compensation for the injury. On 16 June 2000 the court found in part for the applicant. 7.  On 6 December 2000 the Presidium of the Donetsk Regional Court allowed the protest lodged by the Deputy President of the Donetsk Regional Court and quashed the decision of 16 June 2000. The case was remitted for a fresh consideration to the Vugledar City Court. 8.  On 7 June 2001 the Vugledar City Court found that the applicant had been injured due to the fault of the SMP Mine and ordered it to pay him UAH 37,465.41[1] in compensation and UAH 800[2] of costs and expenses (рішення Вугледарського міського суду Донецької області). The court also awarded the applicant a monthly allowance of UAH 162.57[3] in compensation for loss of earnings for the period of 8 May – 8 September 2001. 9.  On 6 August 2001 the Vugledar City Bailiffs' Service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 7 June 2001. 10.  According to the Government, the judgment was fully enforced in instalments: during the periods of April – December 2002 and August – December 2003 the applicant received a total of UAH 10,227[4], and in 2004 he received the remaining amount of the judgment debt (UAH 27,238[5]). The last payment took place in May 2004. The applicant was also paid UAH 800 for his legal expenses. 11.  On 1 June 2004 the Bailiffs' Service terminated the enforcement proceedings as the judgment of 7 June 2001 was enforced in full. The applicant never challenged the Bailiffs' decisions of 1 June 2004. Nevertheless, he maintains that the debtor still owes him UAH 515.27[6]. 12.  In July 2004 the applicant lodged a new claim with the Voroshilovskiy District Court of Donetsk against the State Enterprise “Donetsk Coal Energy Company” (Державне підприємство „Донецька вугільна енергетична компанія”), seeking compensation for the substantial delay in the enforcement of the judgment of 7 June 2001. Within the course of the proceedings the court appointed a forensic accounting expertise to calculate the amount of compensation due to the applicant. In their conclusions of 14 July 2005 the experts mentioned, inter alia, that, out of the total amount of the judgment award, UAH 515.27 remained unpaid. 13.  On 1 November 2005 the court partly allowed the applicant's claim as, according to the domestic legislation then in force, untimely paid salary had to be recalculated if a price index had increased for more than 1 % during the relevant period of delay in payment. The court also found that the applicant had sustained moral damage as the result of the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour. The court awarded the applicant the total of UAH 8,609.88[7], including UAH 500[8] in compensation for moral damage. 14.  On 28 November 2005 the Voroshilovskiy District Bailiffs' Service of Donetsk instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 1 November 2005. 15.  On 6 December 2005 the enforcement proceedings were terminated in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On measures to ensure the stable operation of fuel and energy sector enterprises” (Закон України „Про заходи, спрямовані на забезпечення сталого функціонування підприємств паливно-енергетичного комплексу»). 16.  The judgment of 1 November 2005 remained unenforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Kaluga. 7.  The applicant submitted two medical documents issued on 18 December 2000 and 27 March 2002 in Kazakhstan, stating that he was suffering from non-osteogenic fibroma of the bones, a condition causing tumours. 8.  On 16 November 2006 the Almaty Department for Economic Crimes and Corruption of the Republic of Kazakhstan launched a criminal case against the applicant for fraud. 9.  By a decision of 7 February 2007 the authorities issued an arrest warrant in respect of the applicant, which was authorised by the prosecutor on 7 March 2007. 10.  On 16 February 2007 the applicant was charged with fraud, and on 4 April 2007 he was placed on the international wanted list. 11.  In April or May 2007 the applicant moved to Russia. 12.  On 9 June 2009 the applicant was detained as a wanted person in Kaluga. 13.  On 10 June 2009 he was questioned by the prosecutor’s office of the Kaluga Region. The applicant stated that he had arrived in Russia in September 2007 as a visitor and had subsequently learned of the criminal proceedings initiated against him in Kazakhstan. He had decided not to return to Kazakhstan to avoid criminal prosecution. According to the Government, the applicant had not indicated any fear of ill-treatment or torture in Kazakhstan and had assumed that he was not a victim of political persecution. The Government did not provide a copy of the record of the interview. 14.  By a decision of 10 June 2009 the Kaluga District Court, Kaluga Region, remanded the applicant in custody pending extradition. Subsequently, the detention period was extended on several occasions. 15.  On 16 July 2009 the Prosecutor General’s office of the Republic of Kazakhstan requested the applicant’s extradition pending criminal charges against him. The request contained assurances that the applicant would not be extradited to a third state without the consent of the Russian Federation, nor would he be held criminally liable for a different crime committed before his extradition, that upon termination of the trial proceedings and completion of any criminal sentence the applicant would be free to leave Kazakhstan and that the charges against the applicant were of a common criminal nature and he would not be discriminated against on any ground. 16.  On 30 December 2009 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office ordered the applicant’s extradition. 17.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office of the Kaluga Region investigated the applicant’s allegations of lack of proper medical treatment while in detention. In its conclusion issued on 14 January 2010 it stated that during his detention in Russia the applicant had been examined by medical professionals on numerous occasions, including in connection with his tumour condition. There had been no deterioration in his condition during the detention, and the medical documents supplied had served as proof that the necessary medical treatment would be available to the applicant in Kazakhstan. 18.  On 29 January 2010 the applicant’s representative challenged the extradition order. 19.  On 19 February 2010 the Prosecutor General’s office of Kazakhstan submitted an additional letter to the Prosecutor General’s office of the Russian Federation, containing further assurances in respect of the applicant. In particular, it referred to the ratification by Kazakhstan on 24 April 2005 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, prohibiting, among other things, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. The author of the letter pledged that, irrespective of the fact that Kazakhstan was not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, it would ensure the rights guaranteed to the applicant by Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 14 of the Convention. Finally, the letter assured that the applicant would be detained in compliance with the Detention Act of 30 March 1999 and would be provided with medical aid, if necessary. 20.  On 24 February 2010 the Kaluga Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint against the extradition order. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant’s extradition would not violate the European Convention, as the applicant was being prosecuted for a common crime and there was nothing to suggest that he would be subject to torture, inhuman treatment or lack of adequate medical treatment in Kazakhstan. It further considered that none of the medical documents provided demonstrated that the applicant had an illness which precluded him from being detained or extradited. It also relied on the assurances given by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan. 21.  By a decision of 22 April 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that decision on appeal. The appeal decision essentially repeated the reasoning of the lower court. 22.  On 7 April 2010 the President of the Chamber to which the case had been allocated decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to indicate to the Russian Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited to Kazakhstan for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. The case was also granted priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 23.  On 18 August 2009 the Federal Migration Service office of the Kaluga Region rejected the applicant’s application for refugee status after analysing his arguments in accordance with the Refugees Act and concluding that the applicant did not have any grounds to fear persecution if he returned to Kazakhstan. By a decision of 10 December 2009 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld this decision on appeal in final instance. 24.  On 4 December 2009 the same office refused to accept the applicant’s application for Russian citizenship, referring to the criminal charges against him in Kazakhstan. 25.  Finally, on 18 January 2010 the same office refused the applicant’s request for asylum in Russia. On 1 April 2010 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal at the final level of jurisdiction. 26.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security (Article 22 § 1). Arrest, remand in custody and custodial detention are permissible only on the basis of a court order. The term during which a person may be detained prior to obtaining such an order cannot exceed forty-eight hours (Article 22 § 2).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Sofia. 7.  In 1968 the applicant and his wife bought from the Sofia municipality a two-room apartment of 49 square metres which had become State property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and the following years. 8.  In February 1992 the Restitution Law entered into force. 9.  In December 1992 the applicant and his wife conveyed their title to their grandson, retaining for themselves the right to use the apartment. The applicant's wife died in 1995; the applicant and their daughter were her heirs. 10.  On 30 December 1997, following a renewal of the initial one-year time-limit to bring an action under section 7 of the Restitution Law, the heir of the former owner of the apartment brought such an action against the applicant and his daughter, seeking to establish that the title of the applicant and his wife had been null and void. 11.  The ensuing proceedings ended by final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 14 July 2005. The domestic courts found that the title of the applicant and his wife had been null and void ab initio because the sale of the property in 1968 had been flawed as three of the requisite documents, namely the initial decision to sell the property, its approval, and the sale contract, had not been signed by the mayor or, respectively, the mayor of the region, as required by law, but by their deputies. 12.  In the meantime, on 15 March 2002 the heir of the former owner of the apartment brought a rei vindicatio action and an action for damages against the applicant who was still living in the apartment. In a judgment of 14 March 2006 the Sofia District Court allowed the claims and ordered the applicant to vacate the property. It found also that the applicant was liable for damages as his title had been found to be null and void ab initio and he had thus used the flat without any valid legal ground. 13.  The domestic court noted that the former owner's rights to the apartment at issue had been restored ex lege by virtue of the Restitution Law's entry into force in February 1992. Therefore, the applicant's liability for damages for having used the apartment without any valid ground had arisen on that date. On that basis, the Sofia District Court ordered the applicant to pay to the former owner 1,807.50, Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of 927 euros (EUR), in damages for the period from February 1992 to March 2002. The applicant's liability was limited to the latter date because this was when the action for damages had been brought. Apparently, the applicant failed to rely on the rules of statutory limitation, which under Bulgarian law was five years and could have led to the restriction of his liability to the period after March 1997. The applicant was also ordered to pay BGN 440, the equivalent of EUR 225, for the other party's expenses. 14.  Upon appeal by the applicant, on 15 October 2007 the Sofia District Court's judgment was upheld by the Sofia City Court. Considering that he stood no chance in cassation, the applicant did not appeal against that judgment. 15.  On 23 August 2006 the applicant and his daughter applied to receive compensation through bonds for the loss of the apartment. At the time of the applicant's latest communication to the Court of May 2010 the regional governor had not yet decided on the application for bonds. 16.  In October 2006 the applicant vacated the apartment and was granted the tenancy of a municipally-owned dwelling. 17.  The relevant background facts, domestic law and practice concerning the effect of the restitution on Bulgaria on third parties have been summarised in the Court's judgment in the case of Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01, and 194/02, 15 March 2007). 18.  The relevant judicial practice concerning liability for damages of persons who lost their property pursuant to section 7 of the Restitution Law has been summarised in the judgment in the case of Kayriakovi v. Bulgaria (no. 30945/04, § 18, 7 January 2010). 19.  Under Bulgarian law, the right to use a property, provided for in sections 56-62 of the Property Act of 1951, is considered a right in rem.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Kopeysk in the Chelyabinsk Region. 6.  On 5 December 2003 the applicant was taken into custody in connection with criminal proceedings against him and placed in Chelyabinsk remand prison no. IZ-74/1. On the same day he had a medical examination including an X-ray of his lungs, which revealed no signs of tuberculosis. 7.  On various dates between 25 December 2003 and 5 August 2004 the applicant was taken from the remand prison to the temporary detention centre (IVS) located on the premises of the Kopeysk police department. His stays in the centre lasted at least overnight and up to four consecutive days. In total, he spent thirty-six days there. 8.  The building in which the Kopeysk IVS was located had been constructed in 1935. Since it had been designed for short-term detention only, its cells were not equipped with flush toilets or running water. Instead, water tanks and water fountains were put at the inmates' disposal. The toilet was located in the courtyard. 9.  The applicant submitted that all ten cells of the Kopeysk IVS had been overcrowded and had housed up to six persons. The one-hour outdoor exercise was divided between ten cells, with the consequence that each cell was only allowed some six minutes for outdoor exercise and a visit to the toilet. The Government claimed that it was impossible to establish the number of detainees because the documents had been destroyed upon the expiry of the statutory storage period. 10.  The cells were furnished with bunk beds but no mattresses or bed linen were given to inmates. In the absence of dining tables, inmates had to eat while sitting on the beds or on the floor. 11.  According to the applicant, cells were infested with insects and small rodents. The Government denied that allegation and submitted that the IVS had regularly undergone disinfection and rat extermination. 12.  The applicant complained to the prosecutor's office about the conditions of his detention. 13.  On 9 August 2004 the Kopeysk town prosecutor sent a formal representation to the acting head of the Kopeysk IVS, requiring him to remedy “most serious violations of the law and of orders of the Ministry of the Interior” which had been established by an inquiry instituted upon numerous complaints from inmates held in the Kopeysk IVS. The representation read in particular as follows:\n“The conditions of detention in the Kopeysk IVS do not meet hygienic and sanitary requirements. Each cell accommodates on average six persons, which is in excess of the maximum population.\nSanitary and hygienic conditions in the Kopeysk IVS have remained unsatisfactory: 14.  On 4 September 2004 the applicant underwent a medical examination in prison hospital no. GLPU-17 and was diagnosed with tuberculosis. 15.  In 2005, the prosecutor's office for the Chelyabinsk Region launched a comprehensive review of the conditions of detention in the IVS facilities of the Chelyabinsk Region. On 16 September 2005 the regional prosecutor sent a formal representation to the head of the regional Department of the Interior. He noted that the conditions of detention in a large majority of regional IVS facilities were in breach of the requirements of the Detention of Suspects Act (see below). In the Kopeysk IVS, among others, the sanitary norm of no less than four sq. metres of personal space per inmate was not respected and detainees were not allowed to go outdoors for exercise. 16.  The Government submitted that a new building of the Kopeysk IVS had been constructed and would become operational in May 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant lives in Białystok. 6.  In 1991 the applicant married Mr S.D. On 21 December 1998 their son J. was born. 7.  In February 2006 the applicant's husband took their son for a winter holiday but afterwards failed to return with him to the family's flat. The applicant's husband rented a new flat and started hindering the applicant's contact with her son. 8.  In February 2006 the applicant filed for divorce. 9.  On 24 May 2006 the Białystok District Court (Sąd Okręgowy) gave an interim order which stipulated that, during the divorce proceedings, the child's place of residence would be with the applicant. The court ordered the applicant's husband to pay child maintenance and granted him access to J. on Thursdays and every other Saturday and Sunday. The interim order became final and enforceable on 25 May 2006. 10.  On 5 July 2006 the District Court ordered the court-appointed guardians to enforce the decision of 24 May 2006 and to remove the child from his father's care. 11.  On 14 July 2006 one of the guardians made a first attempt to enforce the court's order, which failed owing to the attitude of the father who refused to hand J. over to his mother. The guardian refused to call for police assistance or to inform the public prosecutor about the events. 12.  The applicant informed the prosecutor that her child had been kidnapped by her husband. However, on 25 July 2006 the Kolno District Prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that no offence had been committed. This decision was upheld by the Białystok District Court on an unspecified later date. 13.  The applicant was unable to assist the same guardian in her next attempt to remove the child from his father's care, which had been scheduled for 11 August 2006. Consequently, it had to be cancelled. 14.  Given the subsequent inactivity of the guardians, the applicant lodged a complaint with the District Court on 6 December 2006. 15.  In reply, she was informed by the President of the Łomża District Court that the guardians had received an instruction from a family court judge to cease their attempts to remove the child. 16.  Following her second complaint about the court-appointed guardians, on 16 and 17 January and 5 February 2007, the President of the Białystok Regional Court (Prezes Sądu Okręgowego) wrote to the applicant informing her that he agreed that there had been shortcomings in the guardians' attempts to remove the child from his father's care and that new measures would shortly be taken. He noted, in particular, that before ordering a forced removal of the child, the applicant's husband should have been invited to voluntarily hand J. over. This had resulted in the unsuccessful enforcement of the court's order. 17.  On 12 February 2007 the guardians made another attempt to remove the child. However, the applicant's husband had gone with the child to the adjacent flat. Both the guardians and the police refused to enter that flat. 18.  On 20 February 2007 the Białystok District Court ordered the applicant's husband to hand over the child voluntarily to his mother within three days. 19.  Since the father had failed to comply with this order, on 19 March 2007 the Białystok District Court gave a decision in which it authorised the court-appointed guardians to forcibly remove the child. 20.  At a hearing held on 30 March 2007, in the course of the divorce proceedings, the court heard experts who had prepared an expert opinion requested by the court. They testified that the child's father had been manipulating the child with the aim of alienating him from his mother. The father had also made it difficult for the child to rebuild his relationship with his mother by ensuring that there was no private contact between her and the child. During visits the father was always present. In the best interest of the child, the experts recommended that custody be given to the applicant. 21.  On 30 March 2007 the guardians made a fourth attempt to remove the child while he was at school. However, it was unsuccessful because the father had been notified by one of the guardians about the plan and thus did not bring the child to school on that day. 22.  The guardians scheduled the next attempt to remove the child for sometime between 6 and 26 April 2007; however, it did not take place as the applicant did not receive formal notification until 28 April 2007. On 19 July 2007 the Białystok Regional Court considered that the late notification given to the applicant had been in violation of the domestic law. 23.  On 27 August 2007 one of the guardians again attempted to remove the child; however, the child's father refused to open the door to the applicant and the guardian. 24.  In August 2007 the applicant's former husband went into hiding with the child, so the guardians could not notify him of the next planned action. Even so, they did not inform the Kolno District Prosecutor about this fact until 29 November 2007. Subsequently, the Białystok District Court ordered that the applicant's former husband be heard by the Łomża District Court; for an unknown reason this order has never been carried out. 25.  On 10 September 2007 the Białystok Regional Court dissolved the applicant's marriage. The court also decided to award the applicant full parental rights over J. It further found that the best interests of J. required that his place of residence be with his mother. The parental rights of the applicant's former husband were limited to decisions regarding the child's health and education. He was ordered to pay child maintenance and authorised to visit J. according to the arrangements set out in the judgment. The court considered that the applicant's former husband had been manipulating the child and alienating J. from his mother and other members of his family. 26.  The applicant's husband lodged an appeal against the judgment. 27.  Since September 2007 the applicant's child has not been attending school. On 5 December 2007 the applicant was fined for not fulfilling J.'s educational obligations. It appears that the decision was later quashed. 28.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant received a reply from the President of the Białystok Regional Court to another of her complaints about the guardians' inefficiency. The President considered that some delays had been caused by the father's obstructive attitude but also by a lack of co-operation between the applicant and the guardians. Nevertheless, the last action by one of the guardians, which had taken place on 30 August 2007, had shown a lack of diligence, and the guardian had been instructed to make better use of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Article 598¹¹). 29.  On 28 February 2008 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) upheld the divorce judgment and dismissed the applicant's husband's appeal as manifestly ill-founded. The judgment is final. 30.  On 14 April 2008 the Białystok District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings concerning the enforcement of the court's order of 24 May 2006. It found that the enforcement proceedings had lost their legal basis in the light of the final judgment pronouncing the applicant's divorce. On 17 June 2008 the Białystok Regional Court quashed that decision. The court considered that the enforcement proceedings should be continued since parental rights had been awarded to the applicant and she wished the proceedings aiming at the enforcement of the court's decisions to be continued. Moreover, the child remained in the care of an unauthorised person. 31.  On 14 August 2008 the President of the Bialystok Regional Court again replied to the applicant's complaints that the enforcement proceedings were taking too long. The President informed the applicant that he would be personally overseeing the enforcement proceedings. He also stated that “the enforcement is still not effective and incorrect procedural decisions have again been taken, which have led to the proceedings being unnecessarily protracted”. 32.  On an unspecified later date the applicant's former husband applied to be granted custody of J and to change the decision limiting his parental rights. 33.  On 2 April 2009 the Bialystok District Court, sitting in camera, gave a temporary order in which it decided that, until the matter of custody was re-examined on the merits, the child's place of residence should be with his father. The court pointed to the fact that the child had been living with his father prior to the divorce proceedings and had very few ties with his mother. The court took into consideration that the child, who was eleven years old, had expressed his preference to live with his father. Moreover, the court considered that J. had been having contact with the applicant and that remaining temporarily with his father would be in his best interest. 34.  The applicant appealed against the decision, complaining that she had not been informed of the proceedings to change the custody order instituted by her former husband and that the decision had been issued without holding a hearing. She maintained that the child's father had not been properly caring for J. and had not fulfilled the court's orders. 35.  On 13 May 2009 the Bialystok Regional Court upheld the decision and dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court held that it had been necessary to legalise the existing status quo as J. had been in the care of his father since 2006. 36.  To date J. has not been removed from his father's care. Prior to 2 April 2009, that had been in breach of the interim order of 24 May 2006 and the final divorce judgment of 10 September 2007. During that time, the applicant had only had infrequent contact with J., always in public places and in the presence of the child's father.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Belgium. 5.  On 20 March 1998 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody by police officers at the Diyarbakır Security Directorate on suspicion of his involvement in the activities of an illegal organisation. 6.  On 22 March 1998 the applicant was brought before a judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court who ordered his release pending trial. 7.  On 4 May 1998 the public prosecutor at the İzmir State Security Court filed a bill of indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. He requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713. 8.  On 15 September 1998 the İzmir State Security Court joined the trial of the applicant to the ongoing trial of four other accused. Throughout the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer. 9.  On 15 December 1998 the İzmir State Security Court, relying on the applicant's statement to the police, the witness testimonies of other suspects as well as other evidence, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 1 July 1999. 10.  Following the decision of the Court of Cassation the applicant fled to Belgium where he successfully applied for asylum. 11.  The applicant submitted that on 17 August 2005 he was arrested and taken into custody in Spain on the basis of a Red Notice issued by Turkey via Interpol on the ground of his original indictment in July 1999 and his subsequent case before the Court. He was released the next day since he had been granted asylum by Belgium. The Government denied the existence of any such notice. 12.  The Government further submitted that the applicant's sentence had been reduced to six years and three months' imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the new Criminal Code.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant company, which conducted business within the textile industry, was not a member of any employers' association. Thus, it was not automatically bound by any collective bargaining agreement (kollektivavtal) negotiated in the industry, and had not signed any such agreement of its own volition. It had about twenty employees two of whom were members of the Industrial Union (Industrifacket; hereinafter “the union”), an affiliated member of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen; hereinafter “the LO”). 11.  In the spring of 1997 the union requested negotiations with the applicant company with a view to concluding a collective agreement. Such negotiations were held on 13 May 1997. The minutes of the negotiations stated, inter alia, that the applicant company was not interested in reaching an agreement at that time but would consider the matter. The minutes also recorded that the parties had concluded that the salaries paid by the applicant company were higher than the minimum wage stipulated in the collective agreement proposed by the union. 12.  In a subsequent written exchange the applicant company stated that it had no intention of concluding a collective agreement with the union. 13.  Soon thereafter the union demanded that the applicant company sign the so-called IG agreement (IG-avtalet), a collective agreement specially conceived by the union for employers who were not members of an employers' association. The applicant company declined, stating that its terms of employment were considerably more favourable to the employees than those stipulated in the IG agreement, that the existing employment contracts were perfectly adequate and that the employees belonging to the union objected to the union intervening on their behalf. However, it offered to sign a collective agreement with the union incorporating its existing terms of employment. The union rejected this proposal and announced that it might take industrial action. 14.  On 3 October 1997 the union gave the applicant company formal notice (varsel) that it would take action by ordering the cessation of all work at the company and by imposing a “blockade” on the company from 13 October onwards unless an agreement had been reached before that date. 15.  On 17 October 1997 the applicant company instituted proceedings against the union in the Stockholm District Court (tingsrätt), claiming that the threatened industrial action was unlawful and that the union should be ordered to withdraw the notice. The applicant company also requested that the District Court make an interim order to that effect. 16.  On 20 October 1997 the union took the industrial action. It lasted only one day. The notice remained effective, however. 17.  Negotiations were thereafter held before the National Conciliation Board (Statens förlikningsmannaexpedition). The union stated that certain parts of the IG agreement were not negotiable. The applicant company indicated that it was considering joining an employers' association, the Swedish Textile and Clothing Industries' Association (Tekoindustrierna), to which the union responded that it would not take any further industrial action against the company. However, the applicant company did not join that association and the negotiations broke down. 18.  On 13 November 1997 the District Court rejected the applicant company's request for an interim order. 19.  In the substantive proceedings, the union claimed that the District Court had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute and that, instead, it should be referred to the Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen), whose decision should be final. By a decision of 5 December 1997 the District Court, referring to chapter 2, section 1, subsection 4 of the Litigation in Labour Disputes Act (Lagen om rättegången i arbetstvister, 1974:371; hereinafter “the 1974 Act”) and section 41 of the Co-Determination at Work Act (Lagen om medbestämmande i arbetslivet, 1976:580; hereinafter “the 1976 Act”), agreed with the union and transferred the case to the Labour Court. 20.  Before the Labour Court, the applicant company claimed that the composition of the court which would determine the case should be restricted to professional judges – i.e. without members representing employers' and employees' interests – as it would otherwise not meet the requirement of objective impartiality under Article 6 of the Convention. 21.  On 14 January 1998 a bench of the Labour Court composed of members who did not represent labour market interests rejected the applicant company's claim, stating that at the main hearing of a case, the composition of the court had to be in accordance with chapter 3, section 6 of the 1974 Act. 22.  The Labour Court held a hearing in the case on 23 January 1998. 23.  The applicant company maintained that the industrial action taken by the union was aimed at forcing it to join an employers' association or to accept the collective IG agreement drawn up by the union. It stated that only two union members were employed at the company and both of them had declared that they did not want to take part in the industrial action. The applicant company also claimed that its terms of employment were more favourable than those stipulated in the IG agreement. Since the means employed by the union were not reasonably proportional to the aim sought to be achieved, the industrial action had violated the applicant company's right not to join an employers' association and thus its right to negative freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention. Alternatively, the applicant company asserted that the industrial action conflicted with a general principle of proportionality which it maintained was applicable under Swedish law, as it could entail serious economic consequences for the company. 24.  For its part, the union claimed that, on the whole, the terms of employment provided by the applicant company were not more favourable than those contained in the IG agreement although it accepted that the salaries of its two members were higher than the minimum salary prescribed by that agreement. The union also stated that the IG agreement could be adapted to meet the special requirements of the applicant company. It further argued that the Convention was not applicable to the dispute as it only governed relations between individuals and the State and the 1976 Act was applicable as lex specialis. Alternatively, it asserted that Article 11 of the Convention did not afford any protection to a limited liability company and that, in any event, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, p. 637 et seq.) showed that Article 11 did not confer any right not to sign a collective agreement. As regards the industrial action that had been taken, the union stated that it served the legitimate aims of improving the employment situation for union members and protecting them in various ways and could not be considered disproportionate to those aims. The union also claimed that a general principle of proportionality, as invoked by the applicant company, could not be used to limit the constitutional right to take industrial action. In its submission, the right to take such action against employers who were not bound by collective agreements was in principle unlimited under Swedish law. 25.  By a judgment of 11 February 1998 the Labour Court found in favour of the union. Noting at the outset that the parties agreed that the industrial action in question was not unlawful under the 1976 Act, it went on to examine in detail whether it could involve a violation of the applicant company's right to negative freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention, which had been part of Swedish law since its incorporation into domestic law on 1 January 1995.\nFirst, the Labour Court rejected the union's preliminary objections as to the applicability of the Convention, as such, to the dispute at hand. It noted, inter alia, that the rules on industrial action in the 1976 Act – which were based on the constitutional principle that the right to take such action is unlimited unless otherwise provided by law – prescribed the situations in which such action would be unlawful. Thus, it could not be excluded that further restrictions on the right to take industrial action could follow from other legislation, including the Convention. The provisions of the 1976 Act, therefore, did not prevent Article 11 of the Convention from being applicable.\nThe Labour Court then went on to examine whether the industrial action had violated Article 11. It noted that the rationale behind the union's action was not to force the applicant company to join an employers' association but to conclude a collective agreement with it which, according to the union, would promote the economic interests of its members. Among other things, the proposed agreement prescribed that compensation be paid for overtime work, which, indisputably, was not the case under the applicant company's terms of employment. Having regard, inter alia, to the aforementioned judgment in the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden, the Labour Court concluded that the industrial action had not violated the applicant company's rights under Article 11. It found also that there was no basis in law for the applicant company's contention that a general principle of proportionality was applicable in labour disputes. 26.  The Labour Court which heard the case and delivered judgment was composed of seven members. In accordance with the 1974 Act, the Labour Court was composed of two legally trained and qualified judges and five lay assessors. One assessor had been appointed because of her special knowledge of the labour market. However, she did not represent any employers' or employees' interests. Of the other four assessors, two had been nominated by employers' associations (a director of the Swedish Employer's Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen; hereinafter “the SAF”) and an employee of the Ministry of Finance representing the State employers) and two by employees' associations (ombudsmen in the LO and the joint Central Organisation of Salaried Employees and Central Organisation of Swedish Academics (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation and Svenska Akademikers Centralorganisation; hereinafter “the TCO/SACO”), respectively). 27.  The member nominated by the SAF disagreed with the Labour Court's judgment and considered that the industrial action in question violated Article 11 of the Convention, as the union had failed to show that the terms of employment stipulated by the IG agreement were more favourable than those provided by the applicant company. 28.  Following the Labour Court's judgment, the union made a further approach to the applicant company with a view to concluding a collective agreement. The applicant company again refused but informed the union that the rules on overtime work set out in the IG agreement had been introduced at the company. 29.  On 23 February 1998 the union applied to the Labour Court for a declaratory judgment establishing the union's right to take immediate industrial action against the applicant company. It also requested the court to take an interim decision on this matter. 30.  The applicant company opposed the union's claims and again objected to the composition of the Labour Court. It also requested an order requiring the union to provide security for any damage the company might sustain. 31.  By a decision of 9 March 1998 the Labour Court, composed of members who did not represent labour market interests, rejected the applicant company's challenge to its impartiality on the same grounds as in its decision of 14 January 1998. 32.  Following a hearing on 12 March 1998, the Labour Court, by a decision of 13 March, granted the union's request for an interim declaration that the proposed industrial action was lawful. It thus rejected the applicant company's claims that the union's application was res judicata on account of its previous judgment and that the requirements under Swedish law for a declaratory decision – whether final or interim – were not met. It also rejected the applicant company's claim that the proposed action should be deemed unlawful as the rules on overtime work set out in the IG agreement had been introduced at the company – an assertion which was not confirmed by the union – and as the two union members had been dismissed owing to scarcity of work at the company. Referring to its established case-law, the Labour Court further found that the union, being an organisation, did not have to provide security. 33.  The composition of the Labour Court which heard and examined the union's claims was the same as for the judgment of 11 February 1998 (see paragraph 25 above), including two assessors nominated by employers' associations (another SAF director and the same employee of the Ministry of Finance) and two by employees' associations (a former vice-president of a trade union affiliated to the LO and a former head lawyer of a trade union affiliated to the TCO/SACO). 34.  The member nominated by the SAF submitted an opinion dissenting from the Labour Court's decision, on the ground that it was not perfectly clear that the proposed industrial action was lawful, for which reason the union's interim request should be rejected. 35.  The applicant company complained to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), requesting that the Labour Court's decision of 13 March 1998 be set aside owing to a grave procedural error (domvilla). It argued that the Labour Court could not rule on the union's request unless security had been furnished for the applicant company's potential loss. Alternatively, the applicant company's negative freedom of association had been breached as a consequence of the union having been afforded procedural privileges in its capacity as an organisation. On 26 March 1998 the Supreme Court refused the applicant company's request, finding that it had not established any grounds for quashing the Labour Court's decision. 36.  It would appear that the union proceeded with industrial action on 6 April 1998. Supportive industrial action was also taken by other trade unions. On 8 April the applicant company joined the Swedish Textile and Clothing Industries' Association and thus became bound by a collective agreement. The union's own industrial action was immediately suspended but supportive action by another trade union lasted over the Easter weekend until 13 April. 37.  On 30 April 1998, following a settlement between the applicant company and the union and the latter's withdrawal of the application it had lodged on 23 February 1998, the Labour Court struck the proceedings out of its list. 38.  Due to declining profitability, the applicant company went into voluntary liquidation in June 1998. By a decision of 17 June the District Court of Nacka declared the applicant company insolvent. On 30 March 2001 the winding up was terminated and the applicant company dissolved.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Roubaix. 5.  On 21 March 2002 the applicant was arrested by the police on the public highway and taken in the course of the evening to Lommelet de Saint-André Psychiatric Hospital, where she was compulsorily admitted at the request of a third party.\nThe Government submitted that the applicant had been “picked up” on the public highway by a police officer who had asked for her to be admitted to hospital. They added that her admission had been ordered on the basis of two medical certificates issued by different doctors to the effect that she required hospital treatment.\nThe applicant disputed that account and stated that she had been arrested while cycling to the shops and taken to the police station, where she had promptly been examined by a doctor who had been requisitioned to draw up a medical certificate for her admission to hospital. 6.  She submitted that after her admission at the hospital she had immediately been undressed and made to lie down with all four limbs attached to the bedposts in a seclusion cell, without being given any explanation. She had not undergone a medical examination on arrival but had been injected with unknown substances. She had remained in that position for five days, and was released only briefly at mealtimes. 7.  She remained in the hospital until 8 April 2002, without being allowed to receive visits or to make or receive telephone calls. 8.  In the meantime, on 23 March 2002, the applicant's mother applied by registered letter to the President of the Lille tribunal de grande instance for her daughter's immediate discharge. The parties have been unable to establish the date on which the letter was received. However, in a letter of 8 April 2002, Lille State Counsel replied that he was not empowered to deal with the subject matter of her correspondence and that her daughter was required to apply directly to him to be discharged.\nOn 28 March 2002 Afcap in turn applied to the President of the Lille tribunal de grande instance for the applicant's immediate discharge. 9.  On 22 April 2002 State Counsel's Office decided to take no further action on that application as it was devoid of purpose. 10.  Neither the President of the Lille tribunal de grande instance nor the judge responsible for matters relating to personal liberties and detention (juge des libertés et de la détention – “the liberties and detention judge”) ever gave a ruling on the applications.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Naples. 5.  He is the owner of a flat in Naples, which she had let to G.M. 6.  In a registered letter of 8 April 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7.  In a writ served on the tenant on 23 March 1988, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 8.  By a decision of 17 June 1988, which was made enforceable on 5 July 1988, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 4 May 1992. 9.  On 16 December 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10.  On 13 January 1993, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 January 1993. 11.  Between 21 January 1993 and 4 February 2000, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12.  On 30 November 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  The applicant was arrested on 3 September 2004 during a police intervention following complaints of domestic violence made by his wife. On 4 September 2004 the Warsaw District Court remanded him in custody on suspicion of acts of domestic violence committed between May and September 2004. It relied on evidence given by the applicant's wife and his son. It found that there was a risk that the applicant might influence witnesses, in particular his twelve-year old son. The court noted that according to witnesses' statements the applicant had been violent and had not respected the living arrangements in the family flat. Furthermore, the preventive measure (police supervision) which had been imposed so far had proved ineffective. Having regard to the above, the District Court held that only detention during judicial proceedings could secure the proper conduct of the investigation. However, it noted that the investigation should last no longer than two months. 7.  The applicant appealed. However his appeal was dismissed on 5 October 2004. His requests for release were likewise dismissed, on 1 October 2004. 8.  On 26 October 2004 the Warsaw District Court extended the applicant's pre-trial detention until 2 February 2005. It found that his continued detention was necessary in order to prevent the applicant from influencing the victims. 9.  On 9 November 2004 the applicant appealed against the extension of his detention. He argued that the background to the family conflict was related to his older son's alleged addiction to drugs and theft of his money. He also submitted that he had no criminal record and had been declared “second-degree disabled”. 10.  On 5 January 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. It relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that the applicant had just begun psychiatric observation. 11.  On 25 January 2005 the Warsaw District Court extended the applicant's detention until 2 May 2005. It invoked the risk that the applicant, if released, would attempt to influence the victims. It also found that continued detention was justified in order for a psychiatric report to be prepared. 12.  The applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision on 8 February 2005. 13.  The Government submitted that the applicant obtained a copy of the decision of 25 January 2005 only on 24 February 2005. His appeal, dated 25 February 2005, was submitted to the Warsaw District Court on 21 March 2005. 14.  On 6 April 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant's and his lawyer's appeal. It relied, in particular, on the need to obtain a psychiatric report. 15.  On 11 March 2005 the Warsaw Żoliborz District Prosecutor refused the applicant's request to be released on bail. 16.  Meanwhile, on 1 April 2005 the psychiatric experts submitted their report to the District Prosecutor. 17.  On 29 April 2005 the Warsaw District Court ordered that the applicant be held in detention until 2 June 2005. In addition to the risk of obstruction of the proceedings, it held that the extension of detention was justified by the need to assess certain documentary evidence and to enable the applicant to consult the file, as the investigation was nearing its end (scheduled for 9 May 2005). On an unspecified later date the applicant appealed against that extension of his detention. 18.  On 19 May 2005 the Warsaw Żoliborz District Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Warsaw District Court. The applicant was charged with domestic violence in respect of his wife and older son. 19.  On 25 May 2005 the Warsaw District Court extended the applicant's detention until 2 October 2005. On 30 May 2005 the applicant appealed against that decision. On 31 August 2005 the Regional Court dismissed his appeal. On 10 June and 3 August 2005 the District Court refused his applications for release. 20.  On 26 September 2005 the District Court ordered the further extension of the applicant's detention until 2 December 2005. The court referred to the risk of influencing victims' testimonies. On 3 October 2005 the applicant appealed. 21.  On 29 September 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court decided not to take cognisance of the applicant's appeal against the District Court's decision of 29 April 2005 extending his detention, since the period of detention authorised by that decision had expired on 2 June 2005. The applicant lodged a further appeal against that decision. On 3 November 2005 a different panel of the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed his appeal. It observed, however, that the five-month delay of the Warsaw District Court in transmitting the applicant's appeal to the Regional Court, contrary to Article 463 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, had rendered the review of the decision under appeal nugatory. 22.  On 25 November 2005 the Warsaw District Court held a hearing and extended the applicant's detention until 2 January 2006. On the same day it ordered the joinder of the case with two other cases against the applicant. In those two cases he was charged with domestic violence (acts committed between December 2002 and April 2004), insulting police officers and unlawful possession of a stun gun. 23.  Six days after the last detention order, on 1 December 2005, the Warsaw District Court extended the applicant's detention until 2 April 2006. 24.  On 6 December 2005 the applicant's lawyer appealed against the latter extension. On 16 December 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the contested decision. On 15 December 2005 the applicant himself appealed against the decision of 1 December 2005. This appeal was transmitted to the Warsaw Regional Court in October 2006. During a session held on 21 December 2006 the applicant withdrew his appeal. 25.  The trial began on 21 December 2005. It appears that during the hearing the trial court suggested that the applicant accept a sentence of eighteen months' imprisonment; he refused, claiming his innocence. 26.  On 27 March 2006 the applicant was released from detention. On a prosecutor's appeal, the Warsaw District Court quashed its decision. The court stressed that if released the applicant could commit further acts of domestic violence. On 31 March 2006 the applicant was again arrested and placed in the detention centre. On the same date the Warsaw District Court extended the applicant's detention until 2 July 2006. The court referred to the risk of influencing the victims' and witnesses' testimonies and the severity of the anticipated penalty. 27.  On 15 May 2006 the applicant complained to the Minister of Justice about delays in the trial. On 21 June 2006 the Deputy President of the Warsaw Regional Court, to whom the applicant's letter had been transmitted, acknowledged that there had been delays in the proceedings against the applicant. 28.  On 7 August 2006 the Warsaw Żoliborz District Court convicted the applicant of domestic violence and insulting police officers. It sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. The applicant was released on the same day. 29.  On 30 October 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court partly upheld and partly modified the first-instance judgment. The applicant was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. 30.  Meanwhile, on 24 September 2007 the applicant lodged, under the Law of 17 June 2004 (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”), a complaint that his right to a fair trial within a reasonable time had been breached. On 16 November 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court decided not to examine the merits of the complaints.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who are close relatives of persons who disappeared after allegedly being arrested by servicemen. In each of the applications the events took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. 6.  The applicants complained to law-enforcement bodies and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without achieving any tangible results. The investigations consisted mainly of the authorities making requests for information and formal requests to their counterparts in various parts of Chechnya and Ingushetia and other regions of the North Caucasus to take operational search measures. The requests received negative responses or no replies at all. 7.  From the documents submitted it appears that the relevant State authorities were unable to identify the State servicemen allegedly involved in the arrests or abductions. 8.  In their observations the Government did not challenge the allegations as presented by the applicants. At the same time, they stated that there was no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that State agents had been involved in the abductions. 9.  Below are summaries of the facts relevant to each individual application. They are based on the statements provided by the applicants, their relatives and neighbours and copies of the contents of the criminal investigation files furnished by the Government. The personal data of the applicants and their disappeared relatives, and some other key facts, are summarized below and in the attached table (Appendix I). 10.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Mr Gerikhan Sultygov, born in 1972;\n(2)  Ms Fatima Sultygova, born in 1966;\n(3)  Mr Musadi Samrailov, born in 1943, and\n(4)  Ms Maus Nasayeva, born in 1953.\nThe first applicant resides in Chippis, Switzerland. The second applicant lives in Boras, Sweden. The fourth applicant resides in Grozny, Chechnya; prior to his death, the third applicant also lived there. 11.  The third applicant, Mr Musadi Samrailov, passed away on 3 February 2013. Mr Viskhan Samrailov, his grandson and the son of Mr Visadi Samrailov, expressed his wish to pursue the application. 12.  The first and second applicants are the siblings of Mr Alikhan Sultygov, who was born in 1969. The third and fourth applicants are the father and stepmother of Mr Visadi Samrailov, who was born in 1964. 13.  In 2000 the Sultygov family, including the first and second applicants and their children, moved from Grozny to Ingushetia owing to armed hostilities. In the summer of 2000 Mr Alikhan Sultygov returned to Grozny to check on the family house left behind. 14.  On the morning of 4 August 2000 Mr D.U. and Mr Alikhan Sultygov drove in the latter’s Volga car to the house of the Samrailov family through checkpoint no. 7 on the outskirts of Grozny. The checkpoint was manned by servicemen of Special Police Forces Unit (OMON) from the Sverdlovsk Region. The servicemen checked Mr Alikhan Sultygov’s and Mr D.U.’s identity documents and let them through. 15.  On the way back, after having picked up Mr Visadi Samrailov, the three men were stopped at the checkpoint and detained. Mr Alikhan Sultygov, Mr Visadi Samrailov and Mr D.U. were placed in a UAZ vehicle and taken to the Leninskiy district military commander’s office which was situated in the same building as the Leninskiy district department of the interior (the ROVD). Mr Alikhan Sultygov’s car was driven by one of the servicemen. At the office the three men were blindfolded, their hands were bound and they were put in an APC which took them to the main base of the federal military forces in Khankala. 16.  Upon their arrival at the base the three men were put into a pit measuring about two or three metres in depth and about one and a half metres in diameter. The bottom of the pit was covered with stones and broken glass. The three men were not allowed to remove the blindfolds and their hands remained bound; they were not fed, and only given water. The soldiers threw stones at them. 17.  On the next day several servicemen took Mr Alikhan Sultygov out of the pit. He never returned. Two days later the servicemen took away Mr Visadi Samrailov. Later on the same date Mr D.U. was also taken out of the pit, driven for about thirty minutes and released on a highway. The abductors told him to keep his blindfold on for thirty minutes and threatened to kill him if he shared any information about the detention. Then Mr D.U. walked to Grozny. 18.  The applicants have not seen their relatives Mr Alikhan Sultygov and Mr Visadi Samrailov since 4 August 2000. 19.  On an unspecified date in September 2000 the third applicant was questioned about the abduction. He informed the investigators about the details of the events, as related by Mr D.U., including the arrest at the checkpoint and subsequent detention in a pit in Khankala. 20.  On 17 March 2001 the investigators questioned the wife of Mr Visadi Samrailov, Ms M.S., whose statement was similar to the one submitted by the applicants to the Court. In addition, she stated that along with her husband the servicemen had also arrested Mr Alikhan Sultygov and kept him in the pit and that the first and second applicants were searching for him. 21.  On 22 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Visadi Samrailov’s sister, Ms M.I., who stated that on 4 August 2000 an employee of the Leninskiy district military commander’s office, Ms Ya.Ya., had told her that Mr Visadi Samrailov had been brought over to their office and then taken to the military base in Khankala. 22.  On the same date, 22 October 2004, the investigators also questioned Mr Visadi Samrailov’s mother, Ms A.I., whose statement was similar to that of Ms M.I. In addition, she stated that on 4 August 2000 the district military commander had personally confirmed to her that her son had been brought to their office and detained there until 4 p.m. and then taken to Khankala. 23.  On the same date, 22 October 2004 the investigators also questioned the third applicant, whose detailed statement was similar to the ones given by Ms M.I. and Ms A.I. In addition, he stated that at the military base his son, Mr Alikhan Sultygov and Mr D.U. had been kept for several days in a pit and that he had learnt about the details of their detention from Mr D.U. 24.  On 25 October 2004 the investigators questioned Ms Ya.Ya., who stated that in 2000 she had worked at the Leninskiy district military commander’s office and that on an unspecified date in August 2000 she had seen, on the premises, Mr Visadi Samrailov, who had been standing in the hallway with his hands above his head against the wall. At the time the district military commander was officer S. Pe. 25.  On 10 November 2004 the investigators questioned Mr Alikhan Sultygov’s mother, Ms A.S., whose statement was similar to the one given by the third applicant. In addition, she stated that she had learnt the details of the arrest and the subsequent detention from Mr D.U. 26.  On 19 March 2007 Mr D.U. wrote to the investigators providing details of his arrest at the checkpoint and the subsequent detention in Khankala with the applicants’ relatives Mr Visadi Samrailov and Mr Alikhan Sultygov. This information was included in the case file; he was not questioned by the investigators.\n(b)  The main investigative steps taken by the authorities 27.  On 7 August 2000 the third applicant was informed by Mr D.U. of the abduction of Mr Visadi Samrailov. From the documents submitted it follows that on an unspecified date prior to 13 September 2000 he complained about the abduction in writing to the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office and the Leninskiy ROVD stating that his son had been detained at the checkpoint and then taken to the ROVD and the military commander’s office. 28.  At the end of August 2000 Mr Alikhan Sultygov’s mother, Ms A.S., received a note from Mr D.U. stating that her son had been arrested. She immediately went to speak with him; having learnt the details of the arrest and subsequent detention in the pit, she complained thereof to the Grozny military commander’s office. 29.  On 17 March 2001 the district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 11094 to investigate the abduction of Mr Alikhan Sultygov and Mr Visadi Samrailov. 30.  On 17 March 2001 Mr Visadi Samrailov’s wife, Ms M.S., was granted victim status in the criminal case. 31.  On 17 May 2001 the investigation was suspended and on 5 June 2001 it was resumed. The applicants were not informed thereof. 32.  On 6 July 2001 the investigators examined the detainee registration log of the Leninskiy ROVD. According to entry no. 262, on 4 August 2000 Mr Visadi Samrailov had been taken to the ROVD and then handed over to colonel Korolev. 33.  On 13 August 2003 Mr Alikhan Sultygov’s mother, Ms A.S., wrote to the investigators describing the circumstances of her son’s arrest at the checkpoint, his transfer from the ROVD by colonel Korolev to the military base in Khankala and his subsequent detention with Mr D.U. 34.  On 10 November 2004 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 7 August 2006) Ms A.S. was granted victim status in the criminal case. 35.  On 29 March 2007 the third applicant wrote to the investigators asking them to resume the proceedings. He also stated that Mr D.U., who had previously refused to give statements to the authorities out of fear for his life, had agreed to be questioned. 36.  Between 2001 and 2007 the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions. It was last suspended on 5 May 2007. The applicants were not informed thereof. 37.  From the documents submitted it follows that on various dates between 2001 and 2007 the applicants and their relatives sent numerous requests to various authorities asking for assistance and information on the search for their relatives. 38.  On 9 June 2007 the third applicant requested an update on the progress of the investigation. No reply was received. 39.  On 26 October 2009 the investigation was resumed. It is still pending. 40.  The applicant, Ms Fatima Bekova, was born in 1963 and lives in Nazran, Ingushetia. 41.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Ruslan Yandiyev, who was born in 1982. 42.  At the material time the applicant and her son, Mr Ruslan Yandiyev resided in a block of flats at 19 Moskovskaya Street in Nazran, Ingushetia. A block of flats was under construction nearby. 43.  On the morning of 29 September 2005 the applicant left for work. At about 9 a.m. on 29 September 2005 Mr Ruslan Yandiyev went to the construction site and met Mr M.-A.B., an acquaintance who worked there. After a while they were joined by Mr I.Kh., another worker from the site, who had arrived in his “Moskvitch” vehicle. The three men went to the workers’ trailer situated at the site. 44.  Shortly afterwards two vehicles arrived at the construction site: a silver VAZ-21099 vehicle with a registration number containing the digits “06” and a red VAZ-2107 vehicle with the registration number “586 mr 95”. A group of armed men in camouflage uniforms got out of the vehicles and broke into the trailer. Most of the armed men were of Slavic appearance and spoke unaccented Russian. Some others wore civilian clothing and spoke Ingush. 45.  Having broken into the trailer, the armed men immediately started beating Mr I.Kh. and dragged him outside. When Mr M.-A.B. and Mr Ruslan Yandiyev tried to intervene the armed men took them outside and forced them into their vehicles. They then put Mr I.Kh., unconscious and bleeding, into the boot of one of the vehicles and drove away with the three men. The abduction took place in the presence of several witnesses. 46.  The applicant has not had any news from her son, Mr Ruslan Yandiyev since that day.\n(b)  Subsequent events 47.  On the following day, 30 September 2005, the applicant arrived at the construction site and learnt about the abduction. She immediately complained thereof to various law-enforcement authorities, including the Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”) and the Nazran town prosecutor. 48.  On 14 October 2005 a convoy of four white Gazel minivans, a UAZ minivan (“таблетка”) and some other vehicles, arrived at the construction site. A large group of representatives of law-enforcement agencies searched the site looking for hidden explosives and ammunition. Mr P.E. and Mr P.A., who had been present at the site on 29 September 2005, recognised some of the officers as the latter had participated in the abduction of Mr Ruslan Yandiyev. 49.  The Government submitted that on 14 October 2005 a large group of law-enforcement officers had searched the construction site looking for explosives and that on 29 September 2005 no special operations had been conducted to detain Mr Ruslan Yandiyev. 50.  On 9 October 2005 the investigators questioned the applicant, whose statement was similar to the one submitted to the Court. In particular, she stated that she had learnt from workers at the construction site that on 29 September 2005 a group of armed men speaking unaccented Russian had arrived at the site in two vehicles, had beaten Mr I.Kh., Mr M.-A.B. and her son up and taken them away. 51.  On 28 November 2005 the applicant informed the investigators that she had information concerning the possible identities of the police officers from the special forces unit who on 29 September 2005 had taken away her son and two other men from the construction site and on 14 October 2005 had returned to the site. She requested that those officers be questioned. 52.  On 11 August 2006 the investigators questioned Ms F.A., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one furnished by the applicant to the Court. In addition, she stated that on 14 October 2005 a large group of policemen had searched the construction site and that among them had been several officers who had participated in the arrest of the applicant’s son on 29 September 2005 and whom she would be able to identify. On 30 October 2005 another group of policemen had searched the site with metal detectors. 53.  On 30 August 2006 the investigators questioned the senior investigator of the Directorate of the Federal Drug Control Service (“the FDCS”), Mr T.S., who submitted that in the autumn of 2005 he had received information concerning explosives hidden at the construction site. He had gone and inspected the site and the trailers with a number of other officers, including officer I.T. They had found nothing of interest. On that date the FDCS officers had used a UAZ-452 minivan (“таблетка”), an armoured Gazel minivan and a VAZ-2105 car. 54.  On 10 September 2006 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the FDCS, officer I.T., whose statement was similar to that of the senior investigator T.S. In addition, he stated that upon receiving information concerning hidden ammunition or explosives at the construction site, he had informed his superiors and the regional department of the Federal Security Service about it. Then he had gone to the site with Mr Ib.T., the senior investigator Mr T.S., an expert and officers from the special forces unit of the FDCS. At the site they had been joined by officers from the regional department of the Federal Security Service and the Ingushetia Ministry of the Interior. Nothing of interest had been found during the search and the law-enforcement officers had left the site. About a month later he had again searched the trailer and the site with a group of officers from the service and the police but had found nothing of interest. According to the witness, he had learnt of Mr Ruslan Yandiyev’s abduction at some point later. 55.  On 15 September 2006 the investigators again questioned Ms F.A., who confirmed her previous statement and specified that she would be able to identify the abductors. 56.  On an unspecified date in September 2006 the investigators questioned officer M.D., the head of the FDCS special forces unit, who stated that in September 2005 his unit had received an order to search the construction site. He had gone there with his group of officers, about forty in total. They had inspected the trailers at the site and the adjacent area. The witness stated that he had no information concerning the abduction. At some point later he had heard that the officers had subsequently returned to the construction site. 57.  On 4 April 2008 the investigators again questioned the applicant, who reiterated her previous statements and pointed out that two witnesses, Ms F.A. and Ms P.E., had seen the perpetrators at the construction site during the abduction and then during the search on 14 October 2005 and that both of them could identify the culprits. 58.  On 23 April 2008 the investigators again questioned officer M.D., who reiterated his previous statement. 59.  On 14 April 2008 the investigators questioned Ms E.P. A copy of her complete statement was not furnished to the Court; its partial contents did not contain information pertinent to Mr Ruslan Yandiyev. 60.  On 21 April 2008 the investigators again questioned officer I.T., who reiterated his previous statement. 61.  On 22 April 2008 the investigators again questioned Ms F.A., who reiterated her previous statements, gave a detailed description of three of the abductors who spoke Ingush and stressed that she would definitely be able to identify them. 62.  On 13 May 2008 the investigators held an identification parade by showing photographs of the potential suspects to Ms F.A. She identified one of them as one of the officers who had been in charge of the search and the abduction of the applicant’s son on 29 September 2005 and who had subsequently returned to the construction site on 5 October 2005. 63.  On 21 May 2008 the investigators arranged a confrontation between Ms F.A. and officer M.D., whom the former had identified as one of the perpetrators. Ms F.A. reiterated her previous statements and stressed that she was sure that this officer had participated in the abduction. The latter stated that he had indeed participated in the search of the construction site in October 2005 but denied any involvement in the abduction. 64.  On 26 May 2008 the investigators questioned the applicant, who stated that two men had arrived at her home and threatened to blow her house up if she insisted on further investigation into her son’s abduction. The applicant stated that four officers, that is, Mr M.D., Mr T.S., Mr A.Kh. and the investigator Mr I.T. were suspected of her son’s abduction and that they could have been behind those threats. 65.  On 28 May 2008 the investigators questioned a relative of the applicant, Mr M.B., who stated that his nephew Mr Ruslan Yandiyev and two other men had been abducted by law-enforcement officers and that officer I.T. had been in charge of the operation. 66.  On 28 May 2008 the investigators held another identification parade by showing photographs of the potential suspects to Ms F.A. She identified one of them as one of the officers who had been in charge of the search at the construction site and the abduction of the applicant’s son on 29 September 2005 and who had subsequently returned to the site on 5 October 2005. 67.  On 29 May 2008 the investigators arranged a confrontation between Ms F.A. and officer I.T., whom the former had identified as one of the perpetrators. Ms F.A. reiterated her previous statements and stressed that she was sure that he had participated in the abduction. The latter stated that he had indeed participated in the search of the construction site in September and October 2005 but denied any involvement in the abduction. 68.  On 2 June 2008 the investigators questioned Mr M.B., who stated that he had witnessed the abduction and provided a detailed description of the events similar to the one submitted by the applicant to the Court. In addition, he stressed that the abduction had been perpetrated by law‑enforcement officers M.D. and I.T. 69.  On 2 June 2008 the investigators arranged a confrontation between Ms F.A. and officer T.S., whom the former had identified as one of the perpetrators. Ms F.A. reiterated her previous statements and stressed that she was sure that he had also participated in the abduction along with officers M.D. and I.T. Officer T.S. stated that he had indeed participated in the search of the construction site in October 2005 but denied any involvement in the abduction.\n(b)   Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 70.  On 9 October 2005 the Nazran town prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation into the abduction of Mr Ruslan Yandiyev, Mr M.‑A.B. and Mr I.Kh. The case file was given the number 05560115. 71.  On the same date, 9 October 2005, the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 72.  On 1 December 2005 the investigators decided to follow up on the applicant’s information of 28 November 2005 concerning the perpetrators’ identities. 73.  On 15 September 2006 the investigators informed the applicant that the steps taken had not led to the identification of the perpetrators. 74.  On 15 September 2006 the Ingushetia prosecutor’s office, the supervisor of the investigators, informed the applicant that all possible steps to solve the crime had been taken. In particular, from the statements of the FDCS officers questioned by investigators it followed that on 14 October 2005 the officers had indeed inspected the trailer and the site but had not arrested the applicant’s son. 75.  On an unspecified date between October 2006 and February 2007 the investigation was resumed and then suspended again on 19 March 2007 76.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant was allowed to access the case file. 77.  The documents submitted show that on numerous occasions between October 2005 and August 2007 the applicant complained to various law‑enforcement agencies about her son’s abduction by officers of the Ministry of the Interior, stating that a number of witnesses could identify the abductors, requesting that the investigators take a number of urgent steps to solve the crime and asking to be kept abreast of the progress of the investigation. 78.  On 26 May 2008 the applicant complained to the head of the Nazran Town Department of the Interior that the night before two unidentified persons had threatened to blow her house up if she continued to persist with the investigation into her son’s abduction. 79.  On 1 July 2008 the FDCS informed the investigators that their internal inquiry had not confirmed that the three officers who, according to witness Ms F.A., had participated in the abduction on 29 September 2005 had actually been present at the construction site on that date. 80.  The investigation into the abduction was suspended and resumed on numerous occasions. It was last suspended on 26 June 2009. The investigation is still pending. 81.  The applicants, Ms Zeyna Isayeva and Ms Raisa Isayeva, were born in 1950 and 1981 respectively and live in the village of Valerik, Chechnya. 82.  The first applicant is the mother and the second applicant is the sister of Mr Nurdi Isayev, who was born in 1979. According to the information submitted by the applicants, Mr Nurdi Isayev suffered from mental problems which had arisen as a result of a head wound sustained during the first military campaign in Chechnya in the 1990s. 83.  On the morning of 3 February 2000 Russian security forces started a special operation in Valerik aimed at identifying members of illegal armed groups. As part of the operation the servicemen blocked the perimeter of the village. 84.  On the morning of that day about thirty to thirty-five armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in three APCs with obscured registration numbers.  The servicemen checked the applicants’ identity documents and opened gunfire. On hearing the shots, Mr Nurdi Isayev ran away and the servicemen started shooting at him. The first applicant ran to the servicemen, asking them not to shoot at her son as he was mentally ill. However, the servicemen did not stop firing and the first applicant saw him fall to the ground. She fainted and was taken by her relatives to a neighbour’s house. 85.  On the evening of 3 February 2000, after the servicemen had left the village, the applicants returned home. Their house and their car had been burnt. They did not find Mr Nurdi Isayev at home and did not know what had happened to him. 86.  Between 4 and 9 February 2000 the first applicant searched for Mr Nurdi Isayev, but only in Valerik, as the village was blocked for the large‑scale special operation being carried out by the federal forces in the district, including the nearby village of Katyr-Yurt (for the details of the operation see Isayeva v. Russia, no. 57950/00, § 74, 24 February 2005, and Abuyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 27065/05, § 8, 2 December 2010). 87.  On 9 February 2000 the first applicant found several items of Mr Nurdi Isayev’s clothing with traces of blood on them and first-aid materials next to them in a field adjacent to the village. The first applicant inferred that her son had been given medical aid. She collected all those objects and subsequently submitted them to the investigators. 88.  On an unspecified date in 2002 a neighbour of the applicants’ who had been detained in Chernokozovo remand prison, Ms I., returned home. According to a statement by Ms I. produced by the applicants, while in detention in Chernokozovo she had seen two inscriptions made with a sharp object on the cell wall reading “Nurdi Isayev, village of Valerik” and “3 February 2000”. 90.  On 26 February 2001 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose detailed description of the circumstances of her son’s abduction was similar to the one submitted to the Court. In addition, she stated that her neighbour, Mr U.Kh., had also been taken away with her son in the same APC and that the special sweeping-up operation had been conducted by servicemen from the Police Special Task Units of the Penza and Yaroslavl regions. 91.  On 26 February 2001 the investigators questioned one of the first applicant’s daughters, Ms R.I., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one given by the first applicant. 92.  On various dates in February and March 2001 the investigators questioned several of the applicants’ neighbours, whose statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction were similar to that of the first applicant. 93.  On 9 June 2005 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who reiterated her previous statement. 94.  On 9 June 2005 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Mr U.Kh., who confirmed that he had been abducted by military servicemen along with Mr Nurdi Isayev and taken away in an APC. According to the witness, in the APC he had seen that Mr Nurdi Isayev was in a serious condition as he had sustained gunshot wounds to the head and chest. Mr U.Kh. had been detained for about six days and then released. 95.  On 14 March 2007 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who reiterated her previous statements.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 96.  On various dates in 2000 the first applicant complained in person about her son’s disappearance to various State authorities. She described the details of the events and requested assistance in the search for him. Her complaints remained unanswered. 97.  On 23 February 2001 the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 27009. 101.  The documents submitted show that on numerous occasions between 2001 and 2007 the applicants complained of their relative’s abduction to various authorities and requested assistance in the search for him. They received either no replies or replies to the effect that the investigation was in progress. 102.  The investigation was further suspended and resumed on several occasions in 2007 and 2008 and for the last time on an unspecified date in 2010. 103.  The applicant, Mr Tukhan Idigov, was born in 1933, and lived in the village of Shalazhi, Urus-Martan district, Chechnya. On 5 January 2013 the applicant passed away; his daughter, Ms Tamara Idigova, who was born in 1964 and lives in Grozny, expressed her wish to pursue the application on his behalf. 105.  On the night between 3 and 4 May 2003 Mr Anzor Indigov, his parents and wife were sleeping in the applicant’s house on Lenina Street in Shalazhi (also spelt as Salazhi and Shalazi). 106.  At about 2 a.m. on 4 May 2003 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks who spoke unaccented Russian broke into the house. The applicant and his relatives thought that the intruders were federal servicemen. Holding the applicant at gunpoint, the servicemen grabbed Mr Anzor Idigov, who was undressed and barefoot, bound his hands, sealed his mouth with adhesive tape and took him away to an unknown destination. Immediately after that two perpetrators returned and ordered the applicant to hand over Mr Anzor Indigov’s identity documents, saying that they were in a pocket of his jacket. 108.  On 4 May 2003 the investigators questioned the applicant and the wife of Mr Anzor Idigov, Ms Kh.E., both of whom provided detailed descriptions of the abduction and stated that the abductors had been military servicemen. 109.  On the same date, 4 May 2003, the investigators also questioned the applicant’s other son, Mr B.I., whose statement concerning the circumstances of the abduction was similar to those given by the applicant and Ms Kh.E. 110.  On 23 May 2003 the investigators again questioned the applicant, Mr B.I. and Ms Kh.E., all of whom reiterated their previous statements. 111.  On 15 June 2006 the investigators again questioned the applicant, Mr B.I. and Ms Kh.E., all of whom reiterated their previous statements.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 118.  On 14 August 2007 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martan Town Court that the investigation was ineffective and requested that the investigators take a number of necessary steps. 119.  On 28 August 2007 the court dismissed the applicant’s complaint, finding that the investigators had taken all the relevant steps. 120.  From the documents submitted it follows that on several occasions between 2003 and 2007 the applicant complained about the abduction to various authorities. In reply he was either informed that the proceedings were in progress or that his request had been forwarded to another authority. 122.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Larisa Saayeva, born in 1971,\n(2)  Ms Mariyat Beksultanova, born in 1953,\n(3)  Mr Islam Saayev, born in 2001,\n(4)  Ms Lala Saayeva, born in 2003, and\n(5)  Ms Iman Saayeva, born in 2005.\nThe applicants live in Grozny, Chechnya. 123.  The first applicant is the wife and the third to fifth applicants are the children of Mr Idris Saayev, who was born in 1978. The second applicant is his mother. 124.  At the material time the applicants resided at 14/1 Stantsionnaya Street in Grozny. Their property consisted of two houses with a shared courtyard. 125.  On the night between 2 and 3 March 2006 the second applicant and her son Mr Idris Saayev were in one house, whilst the second applicant’s husband, Mr Kh.S., was in the other one. 126.  At about 5 a.m. on 3 March 2006 the second applicant woke up and saw a group of six armed men in camouflage uniforms. All of them but one, who was in charge of the group, were masked and wearing bulletproof jackets and spherical helmets. They were armed with submachine guns with silencers and pistols secured at the thighs by special rifle belts. The applicants thought they were federal servicemen. 127.  Without any explanation the servicemen requested in unaccented Russian that Mr Idris Saayev produce his identity papers and mobile telephone. They also asked the second applicant about her other son, Mr A.S. Shortly thereafter they took Mr Idris Saayev outside without letting him put on any clothing. When the second applicant and her husband got outside, she saw the perpetrators’ UAZ minivan driving away. 128.  At about 6 a.m. on 3 March 2006 the second applicant, her husband Mr Kh.S. and a relative went to the Staropromyslovskiy department of the interior in Grozny (“the ROVD”) to complain about the abduction of Mr Idris Saayev. A police officer told them that Mr Idris Saayev had been detained by the security forces and that he would return home if he cooperated with them and if the applicants did not lodge any official complaints. The second applicant then decided not to lodge a formal complaint, as suggested by the police officer. 129.  In the days that followed the applicants applied in person to various State authorities seeking assistance in the search for their relative; none of the law-enforcement agencies admitted arresting or detaining Mr Idris Saayev. 130.  About a week later the police officer from the ROVD told the applicants that Mr Idris Saayev had been transferred to Operational Search Bureau no. 2 (“ORB-2”) in Grozny. On the same day the applicants requested information at the bureau but were told that their servicemen had not arrested Mr Idris Saayev. 131.  On an unspecified date a certain Mr R.K. told the applicants that Mr Idris Saayev had been abducted by officers of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”). Subsequently, the applicants provided Mr R.K.’s phone number to the investigators (see paragraph 138 below). 133.  On 5 April 2006 the investigators questioned the second applicant, whose statement was similar to the one submitted by the applicants to the Court. She pointed out that the perpetrators had been Russian servicemen and that she had tried to find her son without recourse to an official investigation but to no avail. She stated that the abductors had called her neighbours’ phone, asked to speak to her, and told her that they would discuss the details of her son’s release with her. When at the end of March 2006 she had arrived at the place of the meeting suggested by them, she had seen a vehicle with servicemen in it who had filmed her and left without demanding anything. Having realised that her efforts to find her son were unproductive, about four weeks after the abduction she decided to lodge an official complaint about it. 134.  On the same date, 5 April 2006, the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours Ms Z.I., Mr R.Zh., Mr A.M., Ms A.D. and Mr R.A., all of whom stated that they had not witnessed the abduction but had learnt about it from the applicants. 136.  On 20 July 2007 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the one given by the second applicant.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 137.  On 5 April 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. The applicants provided the investigators with Mr Idris Saayev’s photo. 138.  On 6 April 2006 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office (“the district prosecutor’s office”) opened criminal case no. 53037. 144.  On 15 August 2007 the first applicant complained to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court (“the district court”) stating that the investigation had been unlawfully suspended and requested that the court order the investigators to take effective steps to solve the crime. 146.  On 11 September 2007 the district court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint, stating that the investigation had been resumed on 18 August 2007. 152.  In 2002 the applicant and Mr Rustam Amerkhanov, who suffered from a brain tumour, resided in the village of Shalazhi (also spelt Shalazi), in the Urus-Martan district. At the material time the settlement was under the full control of the federal forces; a number of military units and law‑enforcement agencies were stationed therein. 154.  On the morning of 4 November 2002 the applicant found out that her son had not visited his friend’s house and that on the night between 3 and 4 November 2002 he had been detained by servicemen from the 47th unit of the Special Task Force Division (DON-2) of the Internal Troops of the Russian Ministry of the Interior. 155.  On 5 November 2002 the applicant lodged an abduction complaint with the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office. On the same date the interim district prosecutor, Mr D.Z., obtained confirmation from the Urus‑Martan district department of the interior (ROVD) that Mr Rustam Amerkhanov had been brought by servicemen to the ROVD at about 8 a.m. on 4 November 2002 for an identity check and released about three hours later. 156.  On the same date the applicant, with two of her relatives and the interim district prosecutor, spoke to the officer in charge of the military unit who had detained the applicant’s son. At first the officer stated that Mr Rustam Amerkhanov had been released shortly after the arrest, but then admitted that he had been taken to the ROVD. 157.  On the morning of 6 November 2002 (in the documents submitted the date is also referred to as 4 and 9 November 2002) the interim district prosecutor Mr D.Z. confirmed to the applicant that her son was detained on the premises of the ROVD and that he would be released shortly. The applicant was told to wait for her son outside the ROVD. 158.  Later on the same day, at about 4 p.m. the applicant, who had waited since the morning, spoke to the interim district prosecutor Mr D.Z., who told her that her son was not in fact in the ROVD and that his whereabouts were unknown. A week later Mr D.Z., who had been on a service mission in Chechnya, left the Republic to return to the place of his permanent employment. Prior to his departure he told the applicant that the deputy head of the ROVD, Mr V.B., had questioned Mr Rustam Amerkhanov after the arrest. 159.  On an unspecified date the applicant contacted Mr V.B. and he confirmed to her that he had interviewed her son, that it had been established that the latter had not participated in illegal armed groups and that therefore her son had been released. 161.  In their submission on the facts the Government submitted that Mr Rustam Amerkhanov had been detained by the 47th military unit on the night between 3 and 4 November 2002 and at 7 or 8 a.m. on 4 November 2002 he had been taken to the Special Task Unit (OMON), which was staffed by servicemen from the Omsk region of Russia and was stationed on the premises of the former fruit canning factory. Mr Rustam Amerkhanov was handed over to the head of the OMON unit, officer V.G. 162.  At about 9.15 a.m. on 4 November 2002 Mr Rustam Amerkhanov was taken to see the deputy head of the Urus-Martan ROVD, officer V.B., who signed a statement to that effect. At the ROVD the identity of the applicant’s son was verified and he was interviewed. Shortly thereafter, as his involvement in illegal armed groups had not been confirmed, on the same date, 4 November 2002, Mr Rustam Amerkhanov was released. His whereabouts have been unknown since. 163.  On 6 November 2002 the investigators questioned officer V. G., who confirmed that his unit had detained Mr Rustam Amerkhanov at about 2 a.m. on 4 November 2002. The officer personally interviewed him and concluded that he was not involved in illegal activities. At about 8 a.m. on 4 November 2002 he received an order from the deputy head of the Urus‑Martan ROVD to hand Mr Rustam Amerkhanov over to the police. At about 9.15 on the same morning the witness brought Mr Rustam Amerkhanov to the deputy head of the ROVD, officer V.B. The witness explained that he had initially told the applicant that her son had not been arrested by his unit as he had been concerned that “it would lead to disturbances among the local residents”. 164.  On 6 November 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant, whose statement was similar to the one submitted to the Court. 165.  On 11 November 2002 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the ROVD, officer V.B., who stated that between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m. on 4 November 2002 he had interviewed Mr Rustam Amerkhanov and then released him. Operational search officer I.O. had taken Mr Rustam Amerkhanov to the entrance and the latter had left. 166.  On 12 November 2002 the investigators questioned the operational search officer Mr I.O., who stated that on the morning of 4 November 2002 Mr Rustam Amerkhanov had been brought to the ROVD and taken to the office of officer V.B., who had interviewed him. After the interview officer V.B. had asked the witness to take Mr Rustam Amerkhanov to the gates and release him. The witness had taken the applicant’s son to the gates and the latter had left. 167.  On 15 November 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant, who reiterated her previous statement. In addition, she stated that the deputy head of the ROVD officer V.B. had “blatantly lied” to the investigators that he had released her son on 4 November 2002 as she and two of her relatives, Ms T.A. and Ms Kh.A., and a friend had spent the entire day at the entrance to the building to no avail. 168.  On 15 November 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s sister, Ms T.A., who confirmed the statement the applicant had given on the same date. 169.  On 13 April 2004 the head of the Shalazhi village administration, Mr R.M., submitted a written statement to the investigators which was similar to the one the applicant had given on 15 November 2002. He stressed that for two days officer V. B. had deliberately lied to him and the applicant, denying Mr Rustam Amerkhanov’s arrest, and that this officer must have been responsible for the disappearance of the applicant’s son. 170.  On 29 April 2004 the investigators again questioned the applicant’s sister Ms T.A., who reiterated her previous statement. In addition, she stated that a few days after the disappearance of Mr Rustam Amerkhanov officer V.B. had told her husband, Mr N.A., that Mr Rustam Amerkhanov had been transferred to another law-enforcement agency. 171.  On 28 May 2004 the investigators again questioned officer V.G., who reiterated his statement of 6 November 2002 and added that on the evening of 4 November 2002 he had spoken to the applicant and confirmed that Mr Rustam Amerkhanov had been apprehended by his unit.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 172.  On 12 November 2002 the Urus-Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 61151 under Article 105 of the Criminal Procedure Code (murder) (in the documents submitted also stated as under Article 126 of the Criminal Procedure Code (abduction)). 175.  On 25 September 2003 the investigation was resumed and then again suspended on 25 October 2003. The applicant was not informed thereof. 176.  On 13 April 2004 the investigation was resumed and then again suspended on 15 May 2004. The applicant was not informed thereof. 178.  On 1 July 2004 the investigators examined two registration logs for the period between August 2003 and July 2004: the first log contained the names of persons taken to the Urus-Martan ROVD and the second log contained the names of those detained on its premises. No entries concerning Mr Rustam Amerkhanov were found. 180.  On 5 August 2004 the investigators questioned several of the applicant’s neighbours, all of whom stated that they had learnt of Mr Amerkhanov’s disappearance from others. 181.  The documents submitted show that on numerous occasions between 2002 and 2007 the applicant wrote to various law-enforcement agencies and military authorities, describing the circumstances of her son’s disappearance and the acknowledgement of his arrest by the military and police officers and asking for assistance in establishing his whereabouts. 182.  On 6 April 2010 the head of the Urus-Martan ROVD informed the investigators that the registration log of detainees in the ROVD for the year 2002 could not be examined as it had been lost. 184.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Lyubov Dubas, born in 1959;\n(2)  Mr Bislan Magomadov, born in 1954;\n(3)  Ms Sara Ozdoyeva, born in 2001, and\n(4)  Mr Riyyadus-Solikhiyn Ozdoyev, born in 2003.\nThe applicants live in the village of Katyr-Yurt, Chechnya. 185.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Ms Milana Ozdoyeva, who was born in 1982. The third and fourth applicants are her children. 187.  At about 5 p.m. on 26 December 2003 a group of servicemen from a State agency arrived at the applicants’ house in Katyr-Yurt looking for Ms Milana Ozdoyeva. The servicemen had a copy of Ms Milana Ozdoyeva’s identity card with them and asked about her whereabouts. The first applicant explained that her daughter and her husband were living on Sadovaya Street in the village of Sleptsovskaya, Ingushetiya. Then the servicemen left. 188.  On 27 December 2003 the first applicant complained to the Achkhoy-Martan Department of the Interior (“the ROVD”) about the servicemen’s visit. The deputy head of the ROVD assured her that it had been a mistake. 190.  On 10 January 2004 the first applicant learnt that while she had been at work with her daughter Ms Milana Ozdoyeva at the Achkhoy‑Martan administration, the servicemen had again visited her house looking for her daughter. Then they had gone to the administration and questioned Ms Milana Ozdoyeva on its premises for about thirty minutes. The first applicant learnt from one of the police officers, Mr M.E., that her daughter Ms Milana Ozdoyeva was suspected of planning to become a suicide bomber.\n(b)  Abduction of Ms Milana Ozdoyeva 191.  On the night between 18 and 19 January 2004 the applicants, Ms Milana Ozdoyeva and a relative, Mr A.M., were at home at 68 Lenina Street, Katyr-Yurt. 192.  At about 2 a.m. on 19 January 2004 a group of about fifteen armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks broke into the applicants’ house. The intruders arrived in several vehicles which they parked nearby; some of them carried portable radios. All the intruders spoke unaccented Russian. The applicants inferred that they were federal servicemen. Having searched the house without giving explanations, the servicemen ordered Ms Milana Ozdoyeva to leave with them. One of the servicemen told the first applicant that her daughter would return later in the morning. 193.  The first applicant and Mr A.M. followed the servicemen outside and tried to follow the abductors but they had to return to the house due to the curfew. 195.  Shortly after Ms Milana Ozdoyeva had been taken away, early in the morning on 19 January 2004 the first and second applicants complained to the head of the local administration about their daughter’s abduction. 196.  Later that morning the first applicant and a relative, Ms A.A., went to the ROVD, where police officers told them that nobody had been brought to the police station that night. The first applicant lodged a written complaint about the abduction with the on-duty officer and then with the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor’s office. 197.  On the evening of 19 January 2004 the applicants learnt that the servicemen who had taken Ms Milana Ozdoyeva away had also raided the house of another resident of the village, Mr M.T., but the latter had not been at home. They also learnt that their daughter’s abductors had arrived in a military Ural lorry, which they had parked in the centre of Katyr-Yurt before proceeding to the house on foot. 198.  On 26 January 2004 the first applicant saw one of the servicemen who had visited her house on 10 January 2004, Mr S., at the offices of the local administration. He told her that the theory that Ms Milana Ozdoyeva was a suicide bomber had not been confirmed. 199.  On 19 January 2004 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants, whose description of the abduction was similar to the one submitted to the Court. 200.  On 19 January 2004 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ relative Mr A.M., whose statement concerning the circumstances surrounding the abduction was similar to that of the first and second applicants. 201.  On the same date, 19 January 2004, the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours Mr Sh.M., Mr M.M., and Mr A.-Ya. M., all of whom stated that they had learnt of the abduction from the applicants. 202.  On 30 January 2004 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who reiterated her previous statement and stressed that among the servicemen who had visited the house in December 2003 looking for Ms Milana Ozdoyeva had been a police officer from the ROVD, Mr M.E., who had told her that Ms Milana Ozdoyeva’s late husband had been an active member of illegal armed groups and that Ms Milana Ozdoyeva herself had decided to become a suicide bomber. 203.  On 30 January and 1 February 2004 the investigators again questioned the applicants’ relative Mr A.M., whose statement was similar to that of the first applicant given on 30 January 2004. 204.  Between 30 January and 5 February 2004 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours Ms R.K., Mr T.M. and Ms M.I. as well as previously questioned Mr A.-Ya. M., all of whom stated that they had learnt of the abduction from the applicants. 206.  On various dates in February 2004 the investigators questioned three operational-search officers from the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD, Mr V.Ch., Mr M.E. and Mr D.I., all of whom stated that on 5 January 2004 officers from a special security service had arrived at their police station and asked the deputy head of the ROVD, officer Sh.P., to assign local police officers to go with them to Katyr-Yurt to speak with Ms Milana Ozdoyeva. Following the orders of the head of the ROVD, the police officers had accompanied the officers from the security service to the applicants’ house, where the latter had questioned Ms Milana Ozdoyeva about her life in Ingushetia, her late husband and whether she had been pressurised to become a suicide bomber. 207.  On an unspecified date in February 2004 the investigators questioned the deputy head of the ROVD, officer Sh.P., whose statement was similar to those given by police officers Mr V.Ch., Mr M.E. and Mr D.I. In addition, he stated that the theory of the involvement of the Federal Security Service in Ms Milana Ozdoyeva’s abduction had not been confirmed.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 208.  On 19 January 2004 investigators from the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor’s office examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 211.  On 14 February 2005 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court granted the first applicant’s claim and declared Ms Milana Ozdoyeva a missing person. On 14 August 2009 it declared her dead. 212.  The documents submitted show that on numerous occasions between 2004 and 2008 the applicants contacted various law-enforcement agencies, military authorities and local courts, asking for assistance in establishing the whereabouts of Ms Milana Ozdoyeva and trying to obtain information about the progress of the investigation. For instance, on 26 February 2008 the first applicant complained to the Achkhoy-Martan District Court about the investigators’ refusal to provide her with full access to the case file. On 30 April 2008 the Supreme Court partially allowed the complaint. 213.  The investigation in the criminal case was suspended and resumed on several occasions. The last suspension of the proceedings took place on 10 July 2008. 215.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Tamara Shakhbiyeva, who was born in 1955,\n(2)  Mr Khuseyn Shakhbiyev, who was born in 1950,\n(3)  Mr Saifulla Shakhbiyev, who was born in 2000, and\n(4)  Ms Khedi Khizrayeva, who was born in 1980.\nThe first and second applicants live in Tsotsi-Yurt (also referred to as Oktyabrskoe), Kurchaloy district, Chechnya; the third and fourth applicants live in Grozny. 216.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Ezir-Ali Shakhbiyev, who was born in 1974, Mr Abzu (also spelt Abza) Shakhbiyev, who was born in 1977 and Mr Sayd-Magomed Shakhbiyev, who was born in 1978. The third applicant is the son of Mr Ezir-Ali Shakhbiyev and the fourth applicant is his wife. 217.  At the material time the applicants resided in a family house together with Mr Ezir-Ali Shakhbiyev, Mr Abzu Shakhbiyev and Mr Said‑Magomed Shakhbiyev. Mr N. Ochayev was also staying in their house as he had been hired by the first and second applicants to work in his excavator on their property. 218.  Early in the morning on 4 September 2000 Russian servicemen launched a “sweeping-up” operation in the settlement of Tsotsi-Yurt. The settlement was surrounded by servicemen riding in URAL lorries and military UAZ cars. Helicopters were flying over the area. 219.  At around 5 a.m. on 4 September 2000 an APC and several UAZ cars and URAL lorries arrived at the applicants’ house. A group of twenty‑five to thirty masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms broke in. They blindfolded Mr Ezir-Ali Shakhbiyev, Mr Abzu Shakhbiyev, Mr Said‑Magomed Shakhbiyev and Mr N. Ochayev with torn sheets and took them outside. The servicemen put Mr Ezir-Ali Shakhbiyev in his own VAZ‑2106 car and the other three men in a URAL lorry and drove away. 220.  It appears that at least four other men were arrested in Tsotsi-Yurt that morning, including the second applicant’s brother, Mr Khizir Agamerzayev (also referred to as Agmurzayev). A URAL lorry had driven him to the centre of the settlement. 221.  Several days later the applicants learnt from anonymous sources that the three Shakhbiyev brothers and Mr N. Ochayev had been taken to the Main Federal Military Base in Khankala, Chechnya. 222.  On 13 September 2000 Mr N. Ochayev and Mr Khizir Shakhbiyev and three other Tsotsi-Yurt residents were released at a crossroads on the Rostov-Baku highway in the vicinity of Mesker-Yurt, where they had been brought in an APC. A man from a neighbouring village drove them home. 223.  According to Mr Khizir Agamerzayev, after the arrest he, Mr Ezir‑Ali Shakhbiyev, Mr Abzu Shakhbiyev, Mr Said-Magomed Shakhbiyev and Mr N. Ochayev were put in separate cells in a basement. Mr Khizir Agamerzayev was beaten up and questioned about a certain Mr Yakub from Tsotsi-Yurt, the Barayevs and the Akhmadovs, allegedly members of illegal armed groups. On 12 September 2000 in the morning Mr Khizir Agamerzayev had seen the servicemen take the three Shakhbiyev brothers outside and put them in military vehicles. 225.  On 14 December 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement concerning her sons’ abduction was similar to the one submitted to the Court. She pointed out that in her opinion the abduction had been perpetrated by military servicemen. 226.  On 15 December 2003 the investigators questioned the second applicant, whose statement was similar to the one given by the first applicant. 227.  On 25 May 2005 the investigators again questioned the second applicant, who reiterated his previous statement and added that Mr Khizir Agamerzayev had been arrested together with his sons but released sometime later. At some point later Mr Khizir Agamerzayev had moved to Nazran, Ingushetia. 228.  On 4 and 5 February 2010 the investigators again questioned the first and second applicants, who reiterated their previous statements. 229.  On 9 February 2010 the investigators questioned the son of the first and second applicants, Mr A.Sh., whose statement concerning his brothers’ abduction was similar to the ones given by his parents, the first and second applicants. 230.  On various dates between 9 and 24 February 2010 the investigators questioned a number of witnesses, including the first and second applicants’ relatives and neighbours, the fourth applicant, Mr Khizir Agamerzayev and Mr N. Ochayev. All of them gave statements corraborating those given by the first and second applicants. In addition, Mr N. Ochayev and Mr Khizir Agamerzayev provided a detailed description of their detention on the premises of the military base in Khankala after the abduction. Both of them stated that they had been beaten and questioned about their alleged involvement in illegal armed groups and that the Shakhbiyev brothers had remained in detention while they had been released.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 231.  On 11 November 2000 the Kurchaloy ROVD refused to initiate criminal proceedings in connection with the abduction of the three Shakhbiyev brothers as their arrest had taken place during a “sweeping-up” operation. 232.  On 11 July 2001 the first applicant again complained about her sons’ abduction. On 13 August 2001 the Kurchaloy district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 39051. 233.  On 13 October 2001 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 18 November 2003 upon the supervising prosecutor’s orders. 234.  On 18 December 2003 the investigation was suspended again and then resumed on 20 April 2005 upon the supervising prosecutor’s orders. 235.  On 25 May 2005 (in the documents submitted the date is also given as 27 May 2005) the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 237.  On 14 January 2010 the first applicant requested information on the progresss of the investigation and permission to access the investigation file. 238.  On 28 January 2010 the investigators resumed the proceedings but refused to grant the first applicant permission to access the case file as she did not have victim status in the criminal case. 241.  On 28 April 2010 the investigators granted the first applicant’s request for access to the case file by letting her consult a few documents. 243.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Saykhat Dubayeva, who was born in 1953,\n(2)  Mr Shirvani Dubayev, who was born in 1952,\n(3)  Ms Zalina Dubayeva, who was born in 1996,\n(4)  Mr Shamkhan Dubayev, who was born in 1999 and\n(5)  Mr Shamil Dubayev, who was born in 1986.\nThe applicants live in Berkat-Yurt, Chechnya. 244.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Sharpudi (also spelled as “Sharfutdi”) Dubayev, who was born in 1977. The third and fourth applicants are his children and the fifth applicant is his brother. 245.  On 20 November 2002 Mr Sharpudi Dubayev and four other men, including Mr R.A. and Mr A.I., were driving in a VAZ-2106 car with the registration number X582 AB95 when, about one and a half kilometres from the village of Berkat-Yurt, they were stopped by a group of about twenty or twenty-five masked military servicemen in camouflage uniforms driving in two APCs. The servicemen belonged to the 34th brigade of the military forces which at the material time guarded the oil pipeline which ran adjacent to the settlement. 246.  The servicemen asked the car passengers for their identity documents; then they dragged the men out of the vehicle, forced them into the APCs and took them to the military base where the 34th brigade was stationed. 247.  The applicants’ relative, Mr Sharpudi Dubayev, was detained at an unidentified location in the same cell as Mr R. A. According to the latter, both of them were tortured and questioned. 248.  On 23 November 2002 all of the detained men, save for the applicants’ relative, were blindfolded, taken to an unidentified location and released, whereas Mr Sharpudi Dubayev has been missing ever since. 249.  On 8 September 2003 the investigators questioned the first and second applicant and Mr R.A. Their statements concerning the circumstances surrounding the abduction were similar to those submitted to the Court. 251.  On 8 January 2004 the investigators questioned Mr A.I. and Mr R.A. Their statements concerning the abduction were similar to the ones submitted to the Court. 252.  On various dates in February and March 2011 the investigators questioned the first applicant and two police officers, whose statements did not provide new information.\n(b)  The main investigative steps taken by the authorities 253.  On 28 September 2003 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office initiated a criminal investigation into the abduction under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 42169. 254.  In October 2003 the investigators sent information requests to various authorities. On 15 October 2003 the Grozny district department of the Federal Security Service (FSS) informed the investigators that Mr Sharpudi Dubayev was a member of illegal armed groups who had undergone specialized explosives training in a terrorist camp. 258.  On 12 April 2008 the investigator examined the cells of the military base where Mr Sharpudi Dubayev and the four other men had been detained in November 2002. 259.  On various dates between January 2003 and November 2009 the applicants lodged numerous requests with various prosecutors’ offices and other authorities asking for information on the progress of the criminal investigation and assistance in the search for Mr Sharpudi Dubayev. The replies to their requests were either to the effect that the proceedings were in progress or that the request had been forwarded to another authority. 260.  The investigation was suspended on several occasions. It was last suspended on 29 June 2011. The investigation is still pending. 264.  On 4 May 2004 at 6 a.m. a large group of armed and masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at Mr Umar Mukhadiyev’s house in two APCs with obscured registration numbers and broke in. Pointing their guns at Mr Magomed-Salakh Tekhiyev and Mr Umar Mukhadiyev, the intruders asked them for their passports. Since Mr Magomed-Salakh Tekhiyev had no passport on him, the servicemen tied his hands behind his back, put him in their APC and drove away in the direction of Avtury. 266.  The applicant learnt about the abduction of her son on the same date. She immediately went to the Shali district military commander’s office. Officer Dubovik, the deputy military commander, acknowledged his arrest. He told the applicant that her son and Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev were being detained in Avtury and would be released in three days; however, three days later he said that both men had been taken to the Main Federal Military Base in Khankala and would be released in fifteen days. Fifteen days later officer Dubovik informed the applicant that her son and Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev had absconded on the way to the military base. 268.  On 5 May 2004 the investigators questioned the mother of Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev, Ms Ya.Ch., who stated that her son and his friend Mr Magomed-Salakh Tekhiyev had been abducted early in the morning on 4 May 2004 by military servicemen who had arrived in two APCs. 269.  On the same date, 5 May 2004, the investigators questioned the applicant, who stated that she had learnt from her relatives and neighbours of the abduction of her son and Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev by military servicemen in APCs. 270.  On 8 June 2004 (in the documents submitted the date is also referred to as 8 June 2006) the investigators questioned Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev’s sister, Ms R.D., who provided a detailed description of the abduction which was similar to the applicant’s account submitted to the Court. In addition, she stated that in the afternoon of 4 May 2004 the abductors had returned to the house with her brother Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev, whom they had subjected to beatings in front of their mother, Ms Ya.Ch. They had then searched the garden and left with him again. 271.  On 15 and 17 June 2004 the investigators again questioned Ms Ya.Ch. and the applicant, both of whom reiterated their previous statements. Ms Ya.Ch. added that the abductors had returned with her son later the same day and had searched their vegetable garden. 272.  On 7 September 2004 the investigators questioned the applicant’s daughter, Ms F.T., and neighbours, Ms T.A. and Ms A.Kh., both of whom gave statements similar to those of the applicant and Ms Ya.Ch. 273.  On 16 September 2004 the investigators questioned the Shali district deputy military commander, officer Dubovik, who stated that around 10 May 2004 the applicant and Ms Ya.Ch. had arrived at his office and requested assistance in the search for their sons. He had promised to assist them in the search but had not made any other promises. 274.  On 3 December 2004 the investigators questioned the head of the Serzhen-Yurt town administration, Mr Sh.Ch., who stated that after the abduction of Mr Magomed-Salakh Tekhiyev and Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev he and representatives of the prosecutor’s office had tried to gain access to the military unit stationed on the outskirts of Avtury as the two abducted men could have been being detained there. However, they had not been allowed to enter the premises. For the description of the military unit see also Gakayeva and Others v. Russia, nos. 51534/08, 4401/10, 25518/10, 28779/10, 33175/10, 47393/10, 54753/10, 58131/10, 62207/10 and 73784/10, § 154, 10 October 2013, Dovletukayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 7821/07, 10937/10, 14046/10 and 32782/10, § 25, 24 October 2013. 276.  On 30 April 2011 the investigators questioned the applicant’s son, Mr I.T., whose statement was similar to those of the applicant. In addition, he stated that on the date of the abduction a fellow resident, Mr Bu., had also been abducted and taken to the military unit in Avtury, where he had been detained for three days together with Mr Magomed-Salakh Tekhiyev and Mr Abdulvakhab Chevchiyev. The head of the military unit had been called Sergey and his code name was “Terek-FSB”. According to the witness, at some point later Mr Bu. had left Russia and moved abroad.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 282.  The documents submitted show that on numerous occasions between December 2004 and November 2009 the applicant requested the authorities to assist her in the search for her son, expedite the investigation and provide her with information on the progress of the proceedings. In reply she was either informed that measures were being taken to solve the crime or that her complaints had been forwarded to another authority. 284.  On 25 December 2009, upon a request lodged by the applicant on 18 November 2009, the investigators granted her victim status in the criminal case. 286.  On 28 April 20011 the applicant requested the investigators to provide her with information on the progress of the proceedings. 287.  On 29 April 2011 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 29 April 2009) the investigation was resumed and then suspended on 1 May 2011. 289.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Khava Cholayeva, who was born in 1956,\n(2)  Mr Aslan Cholayev, who was born in 1981, and\n(3)  Ms Eliza Cholayeva, who was born in 1980.\nThe applicants live in Argun, Chechnya. 290.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Timerlan Cholayev, who was born in 1978. The second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his wife. 291.  At around 7.30 a.m. on 12 October 2001 a group of masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms, armed with machineguns, arrived at the applicants’ house in Argun in two APCs without registration numbers and broke in. They woke up Mr Timerlan Cholayev, handcuffed him, forced him into one of the APCs and departed to an unknown destination. 292.  On the same day an officer of the Argun district military commander’s office acknowledged to the applicants that Mr Timerlan Cholayev had been arrested by their servicemen and taken to the Main Federal Military Base in Khankala. 294.  On 4 November 2001 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Ms Ya.I., who stated that on 12 October 2001 a group of military servicemen in APCs had arrived at the applicants’ house and abducted Mr Timerlan Cholayev. 295.  On 4 November 2001 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ relatives Mr R.Ch. and Ms R.D., both of whom stated that their nephew Mr Timerlan Cholayev had been abducted by military servicemen. 296.  On 29 November 2001 the investigators questioned the third applicant, whose statement about the circumstances of the abduction was similar to one submitted to the Court. In addition, she stated that she and her relatives had followed the abductors and had seen that after having taken her husband they had driven to the Argun military commander’s office. 297.  On 11 January 2002 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement was similar to the one submitted to the Court. In addition, she stated that the abductors had told her that they were taking her son in for questioning and would release him afterwards. 298.  On 11 January 2002 the investigators again questioned the third applicant and Ms Ya.I., both of whom reiterated their previous statements. 299.  On 2 December 2002 the investigators again questioned the first and third applicants, who reiterated their previous statements. In addition, they stated that after the abduction the perpetrators had driven to the premises of special military task force brigade no. 34 of the internal troops (34 ОБРОН). 300.  On 3 December 2002 the investigators again questioned the applicants’ relatives Mr M.Ch., Ms R.D. and Ms Ya.I., all of whom reiterated their previous statements. Ms R.D. added that to his knowledge, from the military commander’s office Mr Timerlan Cholayev had been taken to the main military base in Khankala. 302.  On 14 September 2004 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who reiterated her previous statements. In addition, she stated that the abductors had been a group of about thirty servicemen who had spoken unaccented Russian. 303.  On 17 September 2004 the investigators again questioned the applicants’ relative Mr M.Ch., who reiterated his previous statements. 304.  On 11 June 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative Ms Z.Ch., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one submitted by the applicants to the Court. 305.  On 11 June 2007 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ neighbours Mr Sh.S., Mr Kh.I. and Ms Z.Zh., whose statements were similar to that of the first and third applicants. 306.  On 14 June 2007 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Ms B.E., whose statement did not provide any new information. 307.  The documents submitted show that on various dates in June 2007 the police also questioned at least three of the local residents, including the head of the local council of the elders, Mr I.B. None of the statements provided new information. 308.  On 19 and 22 October 2010 the investigators again questioned the first and third applicants, both of whom reiterated their previous statements. 309.  Between 6 and 12 November 2010 the investigators questioned the second applicant, the applicants’ neighbours Ms M.I. and Mr Kh.I. and the applicants’ relative Ms Z.Ch., whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to that of the first and third applicants.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 310.  On 15 October 2001 the first applicant lodged a written complaint about her son’s abduction with the Shali district prosecutor’s office (in the documents submitted also referred to as the Argun prosecutor’s office). 313.  On 23 August, 14 September and 10 November 2004 the military commander’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the investigators that the involvement of servicemen in the abduction had not been established. 317.  On 10 October 2003 the investigation was suspended and on 12 September 2004 it was resumed. The applicants were informed thereof. 318.  On 12 October 2004 the investigation was suspended. From the documents submitted it follows that on an unspecified date in June 2007 it was resumed and then again suspended. 320.  On 6 October 2010 (in the documents submitted the date is also referred to as 15 October 2010) the investigation was resumed. 321.  From the documents submitted it follows that on numerous occasions between 2002 and 2010 the applicants contacted the authorities asking for assistance in the search for Mr Timerlan Cholayev and asking for an effective investigation to be conducted into his disappearance. 322.  On 23 September 2010 the first applicant complained to the Argun Town Court alleging that the investigation into her son’s abduction was ineffective. On 13 October 2010 the Shali Town Court rejected the complaint on the grounds that the proceedings had been resumed. 324.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Layla Titiyeva, who was born in 1943,\n(2)  Ms Khava Medzhidova, who was born in 1998,\n(3)  Ms Medina Akhamdova, who was born in 1962,\n(4)  Ms Zulay Dudurkayeva, who was born in 1940,\n(5)  Mr Ruslan Dudurkayev, who was born in 1968,\n(6)  Ms Makka Dokuyeva, who was born in 1967,\n(7)  Mr Ramazan Dokuyev, who was born in 1973,\n(8)  Ms Zina Akhmedova, who was born in 1968,\n(9)  Ms Khedi Bultayeva, who was born in 1990,\n(10)  Ms Khadizhat Bultayeva, who was born in 1995,\n(11)  Ms Gistam Bultayeva, who was born in 1999 and\n(12)  Ms Khava Dokuyeva, who was born in 1998.\nThe first, second and third applicants live in the settlement of Goryacheistochnenskaya in the Grozny district; the sixth applicant lives in Grozny and the fourth, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth applicants live in Tolstoy-Yurt, Grozny district, Chechnya. 325. The applicants are close relatives of Mr Apti Medzhidov, who was born in 1975, Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev, who was born in 1979, Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev, who was born in 1971, and Mr Alu (in the documents submitted also referred to as Adlan) Bultayev, who was born in 1968. The first applicant is the mother of Mr Apti Medzhidov, the second applicant is his daughter and the third applicant is his sister. The fourth applicant is the mother of Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev and the fifth applicant is his brother. The sixth and seventh applicants are the siblings of Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev and the twelfth applicant is his daughter. The eighth applicant is the wife of Mr Alu Bultayev and the ninth, tenth and eleventh applicants are his daughters. 326.  At the material time Mr Apti Medzhidov, Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev, Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev and Mr Alu Bultayev were policemen of the Road Patrol Service (патрульно-постовая служба) of the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (the Chechnya MVD). They resided with their families in Tolstoy-Yurt, in the Grozny district. 327.  In July 2000 the four men were in Grozny. The town was under curfew and only Russian military vehicles could move around freely. Mr Apti Medzhidov, Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev and Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev were staying at Ms Markha Tatsuyeva’s flat and Mr Alu Bultayev was staying in another flat in the same block of flats. 328.  Early in the morning on 16 July 2000 (in the documents submitted the date is also referred to as 17 July 2000) three or four APCs and several UAZ minivans arrived at the block of flats. A group of fifteen servicemen in camouflage uniforms and helmets stormed into the flat where Mr Alu Bultayev was staying, blindfolded and handcuffed him and put him in one of their APCs. The servicemen also arrested Ms Satsyta Sadykova, his neighbour, and put her in the same APC. 329.  After that the servicemen broke into Ms Markha Tatsuyeva’s flat to arrest her, Mr Apti Medzhidov, Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev and Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev. The servicemen put the four of them in the same APC with Mr Alu Bultayev and Ms Satsyta Sadykova. They then drove the APC to Khankala. Ms Sadykova heard the sounds of helicopters and military vehicles throughout the one‑hour drive. 330.  In Khankala the six arrestees were placed in a detention centre. According to the applicants, the four men were detained there until August 2001 without any official record of their detention. Only Ms Satsyta Sadykova and Ms Markha Tatsuyeva were officially registered as detainees. All of the detainees were kept in pits. Ms Satsyta Sadykova shared her pit with Mr Alu Bultayev. Once they managed to see Mr Apti Medzhidov, Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev, Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev and Ms Markha Tatsuyeva. 331.  On 16 July 2000 Ms Satsyta Sadykova was transferred to another detention centre in Khankala and two days later to a remand prison (SIZO) in Rostov‑on-Don. On 21 July 2000 by a decision of the Rostov-on-Don Investigations Unit of the Federal Security Service (the FSB) she was released from detention. According to the decision, Ms Satsyta Sadykova had been arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities, in particular, blowing up a block of flats in Volgodonsk, in the Rostov Region, in September 1999. Ms Markha Tatsuyeva was released from detention on 21 July 2000. 332.  Sometime later the applicants were informed by anonymous sources that after August 2001 their four relatives had allegedly been detained in remand prions in Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd, Krasnodar and Chernokozovo. 334.  On 25 December 2000 the investigators questioned the sixth applicant, whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one submitted by the applicants to the Court. 335.  On 30 December 2000 the investigators questioned the brother of Mr Alu Bultayev, Mr A.B., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one submitted by the applicants to the Court. 336.  On 26 January 2001 the investigators again questioned the sixth applicant, who reiterated her previous statement and added that Ms Tatsegova had told her that she had been detained in a pit in Khankala and then in a lorry for three days and had then been taken to the remand prison in Rostov-on-Don. According to the witness, she had learnt that her brother Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev had been abducted by servicemen from the Special Task Force Unit staffed by policemen from the Khanty-Mansiyisk Region of Russia. 337.  On 2 May 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one furnished to the Court. In addition, she stated that immediately after the abduction she had spoken to her son’s supervisor, officer A.M., who had told her that her son, along with three colleagues Mr Visarkhan Dokueyv, Mr Alu Bultayev and Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev, had been arrested by servicemen from the Main Intelligence Service (the GRU) and that the four men had been taken along with several women, including Ms Satsyta Sadykova, to the premises of the main military base in Khankala and detained in pits. 338.  On 15 August 2004 the investigators questioned the eighth applicant, whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one submitted to the Court. In addition, she stated that as soon as they had been released from detention, Ms Satsyta Sadykova and Ms Markha Tatsegova had gone to the applicants’ houses and informed them of their detention, together with their relatives, in pits in Khankala. 339.  On 16 August 2004 the investigators questioned the fourth applicant, whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the one submitted to the Court. 340.  On various dates in May and June 2005 the investigators questioned several of the applicants’ fellow villagers. No new information was obtained. 341.  On various dates in July 2007 the investigators questioned several of the applicants’ relatives. No new information was obtained. 342.  On 26 July 2007 the investigators questioned Ms Satsyta Sadykova, who provided a detailed description of the abduction and her subsequent detention in a pit in Khankala, where she had seen Mr Apti Medzhidov, Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev, Mr Visarkhan Dokuyev and Ms Markha Tatsuyeva. 343.  On various dates in September and October 2007 the investigators questioned several of the applicants’ neighbours and the residents of the block of flats where the abduction had taken place. No new information was obtained. 344.  On various dates in August 2009 the investigators questioned several people living in the area where Mr Apti Medzhidov had lived in 2000. No new information was obtained.\n(b)  Main investigative steps taken by the authorities 345.  On 6 November 2000 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 12239 on account of Mr Alu Bultayev’s abduction. 346.  On 25 December 2000 the prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 12355 on account of the abduction of Mr Viskharan Dokuyev. On the same date the sixth applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 349.  The documents submitted by the Government show that at some point between 2000 and 2004 the investigation of the criminal case was extended to include the abduction of Mr Apti Medzhidov and Mr Akhmed Dudurkayev. The investigation files were referred to under numbers 12239, 12355 and 10075. 352.  Between 2001 and 2005 the investigation into the abductions was suspended on several occasions. For instance, the investigation was suspended on 28 May 2005, resumed on 15 June 2005 and suspended again on 15 July 2005. 353.  On 6 May 2006 the investigators stated in a procedural decision that it was established that the applicants’ four relatives had been “abducted by unidentified servicemen belonging to power structures and then taken to [the main military base in] Khankala”. The investigators stated that Ms Satsyta Sadykova and Ms Markha Tatsuyeva had been arrested together with the four men, detained in Khankala and then transferred to the premises of the Rostov-on-Don FSB and that on 21 July 2000 both women had been released. 356.  On 16 July 2007 the investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ four relatives was joined to the investigation into the abduction of Ms Satsyta Sadykova. The joint investigation file was given the number 12239. 361.  On an unspecified date in July 2009 the first applicant wrote to a local human rights organisation asking for assistance in the search for her son Mr Apti Medzhidov. On 11 August 2009 that request was forwarded to the investigators. 362.  On an unspecified date in June 2011 the eighth applicant wrote to a local human rights organisation asking for assistance in the search for her husband, Mr Alu Bultayev. On 27 June 20011 the request was forwarded to the investigators.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants are mother and daughter. They were born in 1945 and 1972 respectively, and live in Kyiv, Ukraine. 5.  At the material time the companies “Spetsenergobud” (дочірнє підприємство «Спеценергобуд») (a subsidiary of “Kyivenergobud” (ВАТ «Київенергобуд»)) and “Atomspetsbud” (Державна будівельно-промислова компанія «Атомспецбуд») were owned by the State. By 29 May 1996 “Kyivenergobud” had been privatised and the State no longer held any shares in it. Atomspetsbud is still owned by the State. 6.  Spetsenergobud and Atomspetsbut were engaged in work on eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. 7.  On 8 December 1998 the Vatutinsky District Court of Kyiv awarded Mr S. – the applicants’ husband and father, respectively – salary arrears in the amount of 5,635 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] to be paid by his former employer, Atomspetsbud. 8.  When that judgment became final, the State Bailiffs’ Service instituted proceedings to enforce it. 9.  On 19 March 2003 Mr S. died. According to the applicants, they are the only heirs of Mr S. 10.  In the course of the enforcement proceedings the sum of UAH 290.16 was paid to the applicants. The remainder of the debt under the judgment of 8 December 1998 has still not been paid. 11.  By an order of the Ministry of Energy dated 27 June 2002, Atomspetsbud was liquidated and a liquidation commission established. As a result, the State Bailiffs’ Service terminated the existing enforcement proceedings and all the writs of enforcement were forwarded to the liquidation commission as creditors’ claims. 12.  The liquidation proceedings are still pending. 13.  Both applicants worked for Spetsenergobud. In 1998 they resigned. 14.  On 17 December 1998 by two separate judgments the Vatutinsky District Court of Kyiv awarded the first and the second applicants salary arrears owed to them in the amounts of UAH 4,555.37[2] and UAH 1,137.88[3], respectively, by their former employer. 15.  When those judgments became final, the State Bailiffs’ Service instituted proceedings to enforce them. On 12 March 2004 those proceedings were terminated as it could not be established that the debtor company had any assets. No information as to whether the applicants challenged the decisions of 12 March 2004 and what other measures were taken by them after that date (for instance, measures aimed to have the enforcement proceedings reinstituted, or to join the liquidation proceedings as creditors, and so on) is available. 16.  The applicants state that the judgments in question have still not been enforced due to the lack of funds of the debtor company. They never claimed damages from the State Bailiffs’ Service. 17.  According to an excerpt from the official companies’ register, in April 2007 the debtor company was under liquidation. However, it is not clear when the liquidation proceedings were instituted and whether they are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants - Mr Blagota Barać, Mr Milan Terzić, Mr Zoran Stanišić, Mr Stanko Burić, Ms Stanica Marković, Mr Radovan Kadović, Mr Ranko Tomašević, Mr Novo Stanišić, Mr Branko Radulović, Mr Novak Nikolić, Mr Mihailo Popović, Mr Milan Golubović, and Mr Ranko Kovačević - are all Montenegrin nationals who were born in 1968, 1953, 1961, 1950, 1956, 1951, 1952, 1963, 1951, 1966, 1955, 1953, and 1955 respectively and live in Danilovgrad. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 14 January 2005 the applicants filed a claim for compensation (isplata zimnice) against their employer. 8.  On 13 February 2006 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Danilovgrad ruled in their favour, awarding them 150 euros (EUR) each, plus legal costs totalling EUR 1,875. 9.  On 26 April 2006 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica overturned the previous judgment and rejected the applicants’ claim, relying solely on the Act on Changes and Amendments to the Labour Act 2004 (Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o radu, hereinafter “the Labour Amendments Act 2004”). At the same time, the applicants were ordered to pay jointly to their employer EUR 900 for legal costs. The applicants received this judgment on 23 May 2006 at earliest. 10.  On 12 September 2006 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) in Podgorica rejected the applicants’ appeal on points of law on procedural grounds (revizija se odbacuje). 11.  On 28 February 2006 the Constitutional Court of Montenegro (Ustavni sud) declared the Labour Amendments Act 2004 unconstitutional (see paragraph 14 below). 12.  On 18 April 2006 that decision was published in Official Gazette no. 24/06 (Službeni list br. 24/06), and thereby the said Act ceased to be in force (see paragraph 13, in particular Article 62 therein, and paragraph 16 below).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Ungheni. 5.  In the evening of 4 July 2002, at approximately 11 p.m., the applicant was apprehended by two police officers. They were seeking the perpetrator of several rapes committed in that area over the previous few months. As the applicant fitted the description given by the victims, he was body‑searched and arrested. 6.  According to the applicant, he was beaten up both on the way to the police headquarters and then all through the night, and forced to confess to crimes he had not committed. His criminal complaint to that effect, lodged on 14 August 2002, was eventually dismissed as unsubstantiated on 30 January 2007 by the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 7.  On 5 July 2002 the applicant made three handwritten statements at the police headquarters. He was not assisted by counsel.\nIn the first statement he denied having committed the crimes. In the second and third statements he confessed to having committed three rapes, on 8 November 2001 and in February and April 2002, and two attempted rapes in May and June 2002, and stated that he had been planning similar deeds for 4 July 2002. He gave details of how he had approached, immobilised and abused the victims on each occasion.\nOn the same day he was taken to the prosecutor’s office attached to the Mureş County Court where, in the presence of counsel, he reiterated his confession. According to the applicant, the police officers who accompanied him to the prosecutor’s office threatened him with violence if he changed his statements before the prosecutor. A police officer was present during the questioning of the applicant in the prosecutor’s office. 8.  The applicant was examined by a panel of psychiatrists and forensic doctors. They concluded that at the time of the offences the applicant was accused of, he had been aware that what he was doing was wrong. They also concluded that he had a personality disorder which led to antisocial behaviour, and he was unable to control his instinctual impulses. On 5 August 2002 they submitted their report to the prosecutor. 9.  On 18 December 2002 the prosecutor lodged the indictment with the Târgu Mureş District Court. Before the court, the applicant was represented by counsel. He retracted his previous confessions and reiterated that he had been beaten and threatened by police during the early questioning sessions. On 11 August 2003 the court convicted the applicant. 10.  However, in a final decision of 17 October 2003 the Târgu Mureş Court of Appeal quashed the applicant’s conviction and sent the case back to the prosecutor’s office for further investigation. The court found that the rights of the defence had been breached in that the applicant had not been assisted by counsel during the first questioning sessions and that the prosecutor had not ordered an expert examination of the material evidence. 11.  Following the instructions set out in the final decision, the prosecutor again heard evidence from the applicant, in the presence of his counsel, and from witnesses and the victims. The applicant denied the commission of the rapes. The prosecutor also ordered an expert examination of the material evidence and assessed whether it would have been feasible for the applicant to leave his work place and commit the rapes within the relevant time frame. 12.  On 16 March 2004 the prosecutor again indicted the applicant. 13.  On 9 October 2006 the Târgu Mureş District Court acquitted the applicant, as it considered that the evidence in the file was not sufficient to allow a conclusion beyond doubt that he had committed the crimes of which he was accused. It noted that some of the material evidence gathered had turned out to be inconclusive and that the applicant had presented an alibi for the time when two of the rapes had occurred. The court did not examine the applicant’s first statements, whereby he had incriminated himself. 14.  In a final decision of 27 September 2007 the Mureş County Court reversed the judgment and convicted the applicant on three counts of rape and one of attempted rape, sentencing him to one year, six months and twenty-six days in prison. The court considered that the applicant’s confessions were consistent with the evidence in the file, in particular the victims’ statements, the expert medical report and the statements made by the witnesses who had attended the reconstruction of the events in the first set of investigations. The court attached weight to the fact that the confessions had been handwritten by the applicant himself and included a detailed description of his modus operandi; it also argued that more often than not the first declarations made in a case reflected the truth, as the person had not yet had the time to reflect and prepare a defence. The court also observed that the applicant had repeated his confession before the prosecutor in the presence of a lawyer, and that at that time he had made no mention of abuse by the investigators. It noted that the applicant had refused to provide biological samples for testing and that the polygraph test he had taken had showed “simulated behaviour”. Lastly, the court noted that no similar rapes had been reported in the area after the applicant’s arrest.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  On 20 October 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Radyansky Nursery School No. 154 in Kyiv (“the school”), a municipal institution, where she was working as a teacher. The other defendant was the school’s principal. The applicant in particular claimed compensation for belated return of her work-record book (трудова книжка). 6.  On 13 April 2000 she lodged another claim seeking the issue of the work-record book’s duplicate containing rectified records. This claim was subsequently joined to the previous one. 7.  On 22 May 2000 the Radyansky District Court of Kyiv (“the Radyansky Court”), later on renamed into the Svyatoshynsky District Court of Kyiv (“the Svyatoshynsky Court”), rejected the applicant’s claim. On 18 October 2000, the Kyiv City Court (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld this judgment. On 2 February 2001 the Radyansky Court rejected the applicant’s request to reverse its judgment in the light of newly discovered facts. This decision was upheld on 11 April 2001 by the Court of Appeal. 8.  According to the Government, during the proceedings leading up to 18 October 2000, the applicant filed five procedural requests, two requests to extend the time-limit for lodging an appeal, and two appeals, which met procedural requirements, but delayed the proceedings for about ten days. 9.  By a final judgment of 2 October 2002, the Supreme Court partly allowed the applicant’s appeal in cassation and changed the first instance judgment. Relying on section 2.10 of the Instruction on keeping work-record books of employees, it ordered the school to issue a duplicate of the rectified work-record book containing no record of the applicant’s dismissal that had been found unlawful in other court proceedings. 10.  On 26 December 2002 the applicant obtained a writ of execution in respect of the judgment of 2 October 2002 and on the next day, she filed it with the State Bailiffs’ Service (“the bailiffs”) which, on 22 January 2003, commenced enforcement of this judgment. In the period to May 2005 the bailiffs twice suspended and re-opened the enforcement proceedings. In May 2005 they requested the Svyatoshynsky Court to interpret the final judgment as it was not sufficiently clear for enforcement purposes. Their request was, however, rejected on 15 June 2005. 11.  On 16 August 2005 the bailiffs ordered the return of the writ of execution to the applicant. On 4 April 2006 the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Kyiv (“the Shevchenkivsky Court”) quashed the order. 12.  On 27 June 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s and the bailiffs’ request to interpret its judgment. 13.  In April 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Shevchenkivsky Court against the bailiffs alleging irregularities in the enforcement proceedings. On 16 June 2009 the bailiffs suspended the enforcement proceedings pending the outcome of this complaint. On 20 October 2009 the complaint was sent to the Svyatoshynsky Court which, on 21 September 2010, ordered the school to hand in the issued duplicates. 14.  According to the applicant, as of 15 November 2010, her work-record book and unduly issued duplicates were with the domestic courts and for this reason she was not able to become employed. 15.  In February 2003 the applicant lodged another claim with the Shevchenkivsky Court against the same defendants. She requested in particular to quash her dismissal order. On 20 October 2003 the court rejected her claims. On 29 December 2003 and 27 December 2004 the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, respectively, dismissed the applicant’s appeals.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in Turkey in 1955 and lives in Vienna. He moved to Austria in 1989 and has been living and working there ever since. 7.  On 17 June 2002 he filed a claim for family allowance backdating to 1 June 1997 for his two children who had been resident in Turkey on a permanent basis. His daughter was born in 1978 and at the time of his claim in 2002 she had already finished her studies and taken up a job as a teacher. His son was born in 1980 and had been a student since 2000. Pursuant to a bilateral agreement, the applicant had been receiving a reduced family allowance until 1996. 8.  On 17 February 2003 the Vienna Tax Office dismissed the applicant’s claim because the children were not resident in Austria, which was one of the main conditions for entitlement to such an allowance. 9.  On 8 April 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal, referring to case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). He argued that the decision taken against him contravened European Union (EU) legislation; however, he did not make a request for a referral to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 (ex 234) of the EU Treaty. 10.  On 24 May 2004 the Independent Financial Panel (Unabhängiger Finanz­senat – “the IFP”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that since Austria had on 30 September 2006 terminated the Social Security Agreement of 12 March 1985 between itself and Turkey (Abkommen zwischen der Republik Österreich und der Türkischen Republik über Soziale Sicherheit) and his children were not resident in Austria, he was no longer entitled to any family allowance. It further found that the applicant did not claim to have ever taken any steps to move his family to Austria. 11.  On 23 September 2004 the applicant made a claim for legal aid and lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, alleging a violation of Article 6 of the Convention on the basis that his case had not been referred to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling, although it appears that no such request had ever been made by him. He also alleged breaches of Article 8, 13 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 12.  On 30 November 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for legal aid because he had already been denied eligibility on 13 July 2004. It further declined to deal with the applicant’s complaint finding that it had no prospects of success, and, upon the applicant’s request, remitted the case to the Administrative Court. In particular it held that the IFP was not a domestic authority obliged to refer cases to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling and that the provisions in question neither contravened the Austrian Constitution nor EU legislation since his children lived in Turkey, which was not a member State of the European Union. 13.  In another set of proceedings the IFP on 22 March 2004 dismissed the applicant’s appeal concerning the alleged failure to pay him tax credits for maintenance payments for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. It held that generally such payments were not possible under Austrian law if the children were over the age of majority and were not in receipt of family allowance. 14.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a second complaint with the Constitutional Court against this decision and made a further claim for legal aid. 15.  On 4 October 2004 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant’s second complaint, finding that it had no prospect of success. It again refused to grant him legal aid. 16.  The applicant requested that the case be remitted to the Administrative Court. The Constitutional Court agreed to do so and thereupon the Administrative Court joined both sets of proceedings. 17.  On 10 August 2005 the Administrative Court, referring to both its own and the Constitutional Court’s case-law, dismissed both complaints. It found that the legislation that had been in force since 1 January 2001, which prevented persons from receiving family allowances for children over the age of majority living abroad, was lawful. It referred to the constitutional provision that prevented the payment of tax credits for maintenance payments in respect of children for whom no family allowance could be received. It further held that since the provisions concerning family allowance were equally applicable to Austrian nationals and foreigners there was no discrimination. Lastly, it found that there was no legal basis on which to refer the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling without giving detailed reasons for such a request. Since there was no appearance of a violation of a right of the applicant, no oral hearing was necessary. That decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 2 September 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant, Ms Şemsi Önen, is a Turkish citizen, born in 1968. At the relevant time, she lived in the village Karataş near Mazıdağı (Mardin) in south-east Turkey. The application was brought by the applicant on behalf of her deceased parents and brother, on her own behalf and on behalf of her ten suriving siblings, namely Mekiye, Ishan, Ercan, Mehmet Nuri, Medine, Sultan, Sevgi, Iskender, Melek and Hamdullah. It concerns the killing of their parents and brother Orhan, allegedly by armed members of the Balpınar village guards, and the investigation thereof. 10.  Since the 1980s, a violent conflict has been conducted in the south-eastern region of Turkey between the security forces and sections of the Kurdish population in favour of Kurdish autonomy, in particular members of the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party). According to the Government, one of the main terrorist activities of the PKK was the killing of people who have acted contrary to the cause of this organisation or who have misused property of the PKK. At the time of the events in issue, ten of the eleven provinces of south-east Turkey had been under emergency rule since 1987. 11.  The facts of the case, in particular the circumstances of the killings and the efforts of the authorities to investigate the killings, are disputed. 12.  As the village of Karataş, where the applicant and her family lived at the time of the events in issue, had refused the village guard system, tension had arisen between Karataş and its neighbouring village Balpınar. This refusal had also resulted in pressure being applied to the villagers by the gendarmes. 13.  On or about 15 November 1992, four Balpınar village guards were killed in a clash with the PKK. On the same day, shortly after the clash, gendarmes and village guards attacked the village of Karataş. This attack lasted several hours. The following day, the Muhtar of Karataş complained to the Governor that his village was being subjected to pressure and violence from the gendarmes and village guards. No investigation of the attack took place. 14.  Some weeks before 16 March 1993 the house of the Muhtar and the applicant's family house were both strafed by several rounds of bullets fired by Balpınar village guards. The Muhtar again complained to the Governor about the pressure exerted on his village by the Balpınar village guards and requested that steps be taken to put an end to it. 15.  In the evening of 16 March 1993 the applicant's older brother, Orhan Önen, and her parents, Ibrahim and Mome Önen, were killed and the applicant suffered a wound to her foot as a result of a planned action by members of the Balpınar village guards to kill Orhan Önen. Before he was shot and killed, the applicant's father was able to pull the scarf from the head of one of the intruders and shouted that he recognised the gunmen as Ali Ertaş, head of the Balpınar village guards, and his nephew Orhan Ertaş, a former Balpınar village guard. The applicant's mother, who was seriously injured by a bullet, died on her way to hospital. 16.  The Commander of the local Fosfat gendarme station, who had possibly been informed beforehand of the plan by the Balpınar village guards to kill Orhan Önen, seriously delayed the applicant's mother's access to medical treatment by refusing to provide a car to replace the defective minibus which was to transport her to a hospital and by unduly delaying the departure of this minibus for Mazıdağı. 17.  The subsequent investigation of these killings was not only ineffective and inadequate in professional terms, but was in fact designed to cover up the involvement of the Balpınar village guards and to prevent the conviction of Ali and Orhan Ertaş. From the very beginning of the investigation, and throughout the entire subsequent proceedings, the authorities blamed the PKK for the killings and failed to keep the applicant informed of any steps taken in the investigation. 18.  On 8 October 1992 PKK forces attacked Balpınar village guards on the slopes of the Kırmızıtepe hill close to the village of Balpınar. This clash lasted about twenty minutes. There were no casualties. To date, the perpetrators of this attack have not been found. 19.  On 15 November 1992 PKK forces ambushed nine Balpınar village guards on a road near the village of Karataş. In the course of this clash, which lasted about fifteen minutes, four village guards were killed and four others wounded. An investigation into the clash was carried out. The Fosfat gendarme station commander, Salih Kaygusuz, took statements from the five surviving village guards during the course of the investigation. To date, the perpetrators of this attack have not been identified. 20.  On 16 March 1993 at about 20.15 hours an armed PKK attack using rocket missiles and heavy weapons was carried out on a PTT radio link station in Mazıdağı-Kaletepe, at a distance of about one kilometre from Mazıdağı. The village guards present returned fire. The clash lasted about ten to fifteen minutes. There were no casualties. Shortly after the clash, gendarmes from the Mazıdağı Central gendarme station arrived at the scene. The next day, a land mine was found on the road leading to the PTT station. The initial investigation of this attack was carried out by Mazıdağı Central gendarme station under the responsibility of the public prosecutor at Mazıdağı. 21.  Also in the evening of 16 March 1993 the killing of three Karataş villagers was reported to the public prosecutor in Mazıdağı. For reasons of security, the public prosecutor only arrived at the scene of the incident at 08.00 hours the next morning. He conducted an investigation, including attendance at the post mortem examination of the bodies of the victims carried out by a medical doctor. 22.  All necessary steps were taken to investigate the killing of the applicant's parents and brother, including the collection of evidence. After having completed his preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor of Mazıdağı issued on 7 July 1993 a decision of lack of jurisdiction and the investigation was referred to the public prosecutor's office at the Diyarbakır State Security Court. This referral resulted in the institution of proceedings against Ali and Orhan Ertaş before the Diyarbakır State Security Court.\nOn 6 May 1994, in the context of these proceedings and on the instructions of the Diyarbakır State Security Court, further statements were taken before a judge of the Mazıdağı Criminal First Instance Court from Ali Ertaş, Mahmut Denli and Mecit Kaya. No statements were taken from the applicant and her sister Mekiye, since they no longer resided in Karataş and their new address could not be established. 23.  On 28 December 1994 the Diyarbakır State Security Court acquitted Ali and Orhan Ertaş for lack of evidence. After this decision the investigation nevertheless continued but the perpetrators of the killing of the applicant's parents and brother have not been found. 24.  The Government submitted that it appeared from information obtained that the PKK had provided the applicant's brother Orhan with a taxi, which he had put to his own private use. He had thus made his family a target of the PKK, a terrorist organisation which was in all likelihood responsible for the killing of the applicant's parents and brother. 25.  On 16 March 1993 an incident report was drawn up by the gendarmes of the Mazıdağı District gendarme station stating that at around 21.30 hours that day, a group of terrorists belonging to the outlawed PKK organisation entered the home of Ibrahim Önen and opened fire. Ibrahim and Orhan Önen were shot and killed. Mome and Şemsi Önen were injured and Mome Önen died on the way to hospital. The report also referred to nine empty Kalashnikov cartridges without further specifications.\nOn the same date NCO Salih Kaygusuz of the Fosfat Gendarme Station drew a sketch map of the interior of the Önen family's two-room house. It indicated in one room the location of the bodies of Ibrahim and Mome Önen, two blood stains between the body of Ibrahim Önen and the front door and five empty cartridges. In the other room the location of the body of Orhan Önen and four empty cartridges was indicated. No blood stains were recorded in the room where the body of Orhan Önen was indicated. The sketch map only recorded what had been found inside the house. It did not contain any information about the immediate surroundings of the house. 26.  According to a post mortem examination report dated 17 March 1993, due to security precautions, the team of experts only arrived on 17 March 1993 at about 08.00 hours in Karataş, acting on a report that three persons had been killed there on 16 March 1993 at 20.00 hours. This team consisted of the public prosecutor of Mazıdağı Yekta Çobanoğlu, the medical doctor Sedat İşçi of the Mazıdağı Health Centre, a clerk, an autopsy assistant and a driver. The report further indicated that Mome had died on the way to hospital and that her body had been brought back to the village. The bodies of Ibrahim, Mome and Orhan Önen had been identified by a relative, Mehmet Hadi Araç. The examination report contained information on bullet - entries and exits and concluded that the respective causes of death were haemorrhaging of the lungs, loss of blood and cessation of vital functions. Given the obvious nature of the cause of death, it was decided that there was no need to conduct an autopsy. 27.  On 1 and 5 April 1993 statements were taken from the applicant and her sister Mekiye by the Fosfat gendarme station commander, Salih Kaygusuz, and by gendarme officer Cengiz Kesler of the Mazıdağı district gendarme station.\nOn 4 April 1993 Salih Kaygusuz took statements from the Balpınar village guards Ali Ertaş, son of Kasım and born in 1953, and Mecit Kaya, son of Mehmet and born in 1960, in relation to the events of 16 March 1993. Ali Ertaş stated that he was the Head of the Balpınar village guards and that on 16 March 1993 he had been on patrol duty on the Kırmızıtepe hill to the west of Balpınar. He denied any involvement in the killing of the applicant's parents and brother and stated that he felt slandered. His account was supported by Mecit Kaya who confirmed that he had been on patrol on the Kırmızıtepe hill together with Ali Ertaş until the morning of 17 March 1993. Mecit Kaya further declared that neither the village of Balpınar nor Ali Ertaş had any involvement in the killings.\nOn 5 April 1993 Mr Salih Kaygusuz took a statement from Orhan Ertaş, son of Şeyhmus and born in 1969, who stated that on 16 March 1993 he had not been in Balpınar. On that day he had been loading goods onto his lorry in the province of Mersin and had driven his lorry to Istanbul. He further declared that due to his work, he never stayed very long in Balpınar. 28.  Between 7 April and 17 May 1993 a ballistics examination was carried out. According to a ballistics report of 29 April 1993 of the forensic laboratory in Diyarbakır, the nine empty 7.62 mm calibre Kalashnikov cartridges found at the scene of the killing had been fired from three different weapons with the same calibre, i.e. six from one weapon, two from another and one from a third weapon. In a report of 17 May 1993, transmitted to the Mazıdağı prosecutor, the forensic laboratory in Diyarbakır concluded that none of the nine cartridges found at the scene of the killings matched the five empty cartridges reportedly taken from the Kalashnikov rifle of Ali Ertaş and that, therefore, the nine cartridges had not been fired from Ali Ertaş' weapon. 29.  On 7 July 1993 the Mazıdağı public prosecutor Yekta Çobanoğlu, decided that he lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. The decision listed Ali and Orhan Ertaş as being suspected of the offence of “politically motivated murder” of the applicant's parents and brother. It noted that, following its investigation, the District gendarme command had concluded that unidentified members of the PKK terrorist organisation had committed the killings, but that, according to the respective accounts of the applicant and her sister Mekiye, their father had recognised the perpetrators as Ali and Orhan Ertaş. Concluding that the alleged offence fell within the scope of Law No. 2845, it was decided that the Mazıdağı prosecutor's office lacked jurisdiction and that the case-file should be transmitted to the prosecutor's office at the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 30.  On 13 September 1993, following referral of the prosecution's case file to the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, the prosecutor at this court, Tanju Güvendiren, took certain additional measures with respect to the ballistics examination. He enquired as to why only five empty cartridge shells had been sent for examination, whereas six such cartridges taken from Kalashnikov weapons owned by six village guards had been required for a comparison. He further instructed the gendarmerie to provide him with a list of the Karataş village guards as well as the Kalashnikov delivery receipts of these village guards and to send the Kalashnikov delivered to Ali Ertaş and all other Kalashnikovs belonging to the village guards to the forensic laboratory in Diyarbakır for a ballistics examination. In the event of there being insufficient replacement rifles, he instructed that these rifles be discharged and the empty cartridges numbered in order to identify which cartridge was fired from which weapon and to send these cartridges to the forensic laboratory for a ballistics examination.\nOn 19 October 1993 the Mazıdağı District gendarme command sent to the prosecutor's office at the Diyarbakır State Security Court sixty-five weapon and ammunition delivery receipts of the Balpınar village guards and sixty-five numbered empty cartridges. No information was provided as to the circumstances of the firing of the weapons. On 27 October 1994 the Regional Criminal Police Laboratory in Diyarbakır submitted to the State Security Court a ballistics examination report which concluded that none of the sixty-five empty 7.62 mm Kalashnikov cartridges matched the nine cartridges found at the place where the applicant's parents and brother had been shot. 31.  On 6 January 1994 prosecutor Tanju Güvendiren charged Ali and Orhan Ertaş with politically motivated murder of the applicant's parents and brother Orhan, under Articles 31, 33 and 448 of the Turkish Penal Code and Article 13/2 of the Law No. 6136.\nOn 21 January 1994 the State Security Court instructed the Mazıdağı Court of First Instance, inter alia, to take statements from Ali and Orhan Ertaş, Mecit Kaya and Mahmut Denli, and to take evidence from Şemsi and Mekiye Önen. It adjourned its further examination until 16 March 1994. On that date it noted that the results of its instructions had not yet arrived and that it appeared from the case-file that weapons seized from the suspects had been sent to the Diyarbakır Police Laboratory for a ballistics examination.\nPending the implementation of its above-mentioned orders for the hearing of witnesses and a request for the preparation of a further forensic laboratory report, the State Security Court adjourned the proceedings several times, on the last occasion until 28 December 1994. 32.  In the meantime, according to a statement dated 4 May 1994 and signed by the gendarmes Yusuf Kocer and Salih Günay and by the Muhtar of Karataş Muhittin Araç, the applicant and her sister Mekiye were living around Cezaevi in the Diyarbakır province, but their address could not be established. In another statement dated 4 May 1994 and signed by the same gendarmes and the Muhtar of Balpınar, Izettin Kaya, it was noted that the current whereabouts of Orhan Ertaş were unknown.\nOn 6 May 1994, in the presence of the Mazıdağı public prosecutor Yekta Çobanoğlu, the judge at the Mazıdağı Court of First Instance, Ayhan İstikbal, took statements from Mahmut Denli, Mecit Kaya and Ali Ertaş. It was noted that Orhan Ertaş had not appeared. Ali Ertaş stated that Orhan Ertaş had left Balpınar some time ago, that he was unaware of Orhan's whereabouts and, in any event, Orhan had not been in the village for a long time. As regards the applicant and her sister Mekiye, it was noted that they had not appeared and that the response to their summons indicated that they were not in the village and were residing in the Cezaevi neighbourhood in Diyarbakır. On 29 June 1994 the State Security Court noted that no statements had been taken from the applicant and her sister Mekiye as their address could not be established. 33.  On 28 December 1994 the State Security Court tried the case in the absence of the defendants as well as of the applicant and her sister. The prosecution submitted that the applicant and her sister had only heard their father state the names of the accused but that there was no other evidence supporting their account. The prosecution argued that, in these circumstances, the accused should be given the benefit of the doubt and acquitted. By judgment of 28 December 1994 the State Security Court unanimously acquitted Ali and Orhan Ertaş of the charges against them. 34.  Since the facts of the case are disputed, particularly concerning the circumstances of the killings and the adequacy of the follow-up investigation, the Commission conducted an investigation with the assistance of the parties. The Commission obtained documentary evidence, including written statements. The oral evidence of the applicant and 12 witnesses was heard by three Delegates at a hearing in Ankara on 30 March and 1 and 2 April 1998. 35.  As regards written evidence, the Commission had particular regard to the statements of both the applicant and his sister Mekiye Önen of 1 and 5 April 1993 (taken by the Fosfat gendarme station commander Salih Kaygusuz and by gendarme officer Cengiz Kesler of the Mazıdağı district gendarme station); a statement by the applicant of 9 June 1993 (taken by Mr Yekta Çobanoğlu, the public prosecutor of Mazıdağı); an undated statement taken by Mr Sedat Aslantaş of the Diyarbakır Branch of the Human Rights Association (submitted to the Commission on 18 October 1993); a statement by the applicant's sister of 6 July 1993 (taken by Yekta Çobanoğlu); statements by village guards Ali Ertaş and Mecit Kaya taken on 4 and 5 April 1993 (at Fosfat gendarme station by Salih Kaygusuz); a statement by Mahmut Denli (taken on 5 April 1993 by gendarme Cengiz Kesler at the Mazıdağı District gendarme station); a statement of 6 July 1993 of Ali Ertaş (taken by Yekta Çobanoğlu); statements taken on 6 May 1994 from Mahmut Denli, Mecit Kaya and Ali Ertaş by judge Ayhan İstikbal of the Mazıdağı Court of First Instance upon request of the State Security Court of Diyarbakır.\nThe Commission also had regard to an incident report and a sketch map, both dated 16 March 1993; an ambulance record of 16 March 1993; a post mortem examination report dated 17 March 1993; correspondence of the Mazıdağı public prosecutor; forensic ballistics inquiries and examinations; Yekta Çobanoğlu's decision of lack of jurisdiction dated 7 July 1993 and a number of minutes of the proceedings before the State Security Court; as well as other documents.\nThe latter included gendarme reports and statements related to the investigation of the attack on Balpınar village guards on 15 November 1992, according to which a group of nine Balpınar village guards travelling by tractor on the road from Balpınar to the Fosfat gendarme station were attacked by PKK forces on 15 November 1992 at around 16.00 hours. At the time of the attack, the village guards found themselves between the villages Arısu and Karataş. Four village guards were injured, amongst whom Ramazan Ertaş, son of Kasım and born in 1955. Four others were killed, amongst whom Nesrettin Ertaş, son of Şeyhmus and born in 1965, and Davut Ertaş, son of Kasım and born in 1944.\nAccount was also taken of letters of various dates between 30 June 1995 and 25 March 1998, from the Commander of the Mazıdağı District gendarme station to the office of the public prosecutor in Mazıdağı in which he informed the public prosecutor that the identities of the PKK members who had killed the applicant's parents and brother had not yet been established. A number of these letters, including one sent on 25 March 1998, stated that the investigation of the matter was still ongoing. 36.  The oral evidence included statements by the applicant herself, Mekiye Önen, Ercan Önen, Muhittin Araç, Tahir Önen, Mehmet Hadi Araç, Salih Kaygusuz, Mahmut Denli, Mecit Kaya, Yekta Çobanoğlu, Sedat İşçi, Cengiz Kesler and Tanju Güvendiren. 37.  The verbatim record of the hearing held on 30 March 1998 contained the following passages of relevance to the Government's preliminary objection as to the authenticity of the application (see paragraph 71 below):\n“Mr RESS: Did you make two statements at the station, and did you sign them?\n \nMiss Şemsi ÖNEN: Yes. I went there a few times. They asked me questions. I answered them. They wrote them down. I put my fingerprint as I don't know how to write. But I don't know what they wrote. I answered the questions just as I'm doing here now. My brother was with me. I put my fingerprint to the statements.\n \nMr. RESS: Since you cannot read, I will only show you your fingerprint, and you will say whether it's yours or not.\n \nA document is shown to the applicant.\n \nMiss Şemsi ÖNEN: Yes, it's mine. That's how I put my fingerprint.” 38.  In relation to the oral evidence, the Commission was aware of the difficulties in assessing evidence obtained orally through interpreters: it therefore paid careful attention to the meaning and significance to be attributed to the statements made by the witnesses appearing before its Delegates. The Commission was aware that the cultural context of the applicant and witnesses rendered it inevitable that there would be a certain degree of imprecision with regard to dates and other details. However it did not consider that this by itself detracted from the credibility of the testimony.\nIn a case where there were contradictory and conflicting factual accounts of events, the Commission was acutely aware of its own limitations as a first instance tribunal of fact. The problems of language were adverted to above; there was also an inevitable lack of detailed and direct familiarity with the conditions in the region. In addition, the Commission had no powers to take specific measures to compel witnesses to give oral or written evidence. In the present case, despite the Commission's specific request, the Government failed to submit certain relevant documents. The Commission was therefore faced with the difficult task of determining events on the basis of incomplete evidence.\nThe Commission's findings can be summarised as follows. 39.  The villages of Balpınar and Karataş were situated in an area which was subjected to significant PKK activity in the early 1990's. It was undisputed that, prior to the events at issue, village guards from Balpınar had been attacked on two occasions by PKK forces and that, on 16 March 1993, PKK forces attacked a nearby PTT radio link installation.\nThe inhabitants of Karataş, Balpınar and about forty other villages belonged to the “Metina” clan. It appeared that, at the relevant time, all villages belonging to this clan, with the exception of the village of Karataş and one other village, had village guards and that pressure was exerted to join the village guard system. A number of witnesses stated that the refusal of Karataş to join the village guard system had resulted in tension between Karataş and Balpınar. Other witnesses denied such tension. The public prosecutor at Mazıdağı confirmed that he had heard rumours that the inhabitants of Karataş opposed the Turkish State and, therefore, the village guards were their enemies. The Balpınar village guards were not authorised to act on their own initiative. They received their orders from and had to report to the Commander of the nearby Fosfat gendarme station. 40.  Although it could not make any definite findings on this point, the Commission did not consider it to be implausible that Karataş' refusal to join the village guard system during a period of significant PKK activity in the area, had resulted in tension between the village guards of Balpınar and the inhabitants of Karataş. 41.  The Commission was satisfied from the evidence given by the applicant and her sister, that in the evening of 16 March 1993 after having introduced themselves as soldiers knowing that the Muhtar was absent from Karataş and wishing to conduct a house search, two armed and masked men entered their family home. One of the men immediately shot and killed their brother Orhan. In the course of their struggle with the intruders, the applicant's father was shot and killed by one of the intruders and the applicant's mother was seriously injured by a shot fired by the other intruder. There was no reason to doubt that both the applicant and her sister heard their father call out the names of the two perpetrators whom he had recognised as Ali and Orhan Ertaş from Balpınar.\nThe killings in question were the result of a premeditated plan to kill the applicant's brother. As to the possible motive for the killing it could not be excluded that there were tensions between the inhabitants of Karataş and the Balpınar village guards at the relevant time which had already resulted in armed attacks on houses in Karataş. Nor could it be excluded that Orhan Önen may have been a particular target because of his suspected involvement in the PKK killing of village guards from Balpınar. On the other hand, the Government's contention that the PKK had a motive for killing Orhan Önen because they had provided him with a vehicle which he had used for his own benefit rather than for services required by the PKK had not only remained unsubstantiated but was, moreover, contradicted by substantial evidence submitted by the applicant. 42.  As to the circumstances of the killing itself, the Commission found it established that the killers were aware that the Muhtar of Karataş was absent from the village and that the applicant and her sister heard their father call out the names of the perpetrators, identifying them as Ali and Orhan Ertaş. Moreover, the evidence of Mahmut Denli and Mecit Kaya that the Balpınar village guards, including Ali Ertaş, had been on guard duty throughout the night of 16 March 1993 was at least open to question. In addition, the suspicion of the involvement of Balpınar village guards was reinforced by the identification of Ali and Orhan Ertaş by the applicant and her sister at the Mazıdağı gendarme station. Nevertheless, while the evidence was sufficient to give rise to suspicion as to the identity of the killers, it had not been established to the required standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant's brother, father and mother were killed by agents of the State.\nIn this connection, the Commission noted that the applicant had given the Delegates a description of the two men: the one who shot her brother Orhan and her mother had been described as a person with long fair hair, hazel eyes and a fair complexion, whilst the man who shot their father was described as having a moustache and black eyes. Her sister, Mekiye, confirmed that the man who shot Orhan had hazel eyes but stated that she had not seen the second intruder. The applicant had further given evidence that, on 5 April 1993, when she subsequently attended the Mazıdağı gendarme station, she saw Ali and Orhan Ertaş and recognised them as the same two men. This was confirmed by Mekiye in that, on the same occasion, she had recognised Orhan Ertaş as one of the killers from his height, build, hazel eyes, nose and complexion.\nThe Commission considered that this evidence should be treated with caution. In the circumstances of the sudden and traumatic events of that night, it was at least doubtful whether either the applicant or her sister would have had an opportunity to form a clear and accurate impression of the features of either man. In particular, Mekiye appeared only fleetingly to have seen her brother's killer, whose face had been masked with a scarf. The Commission noted that the description given by them of Orhan and Ali was contradicted by Muhittin Araç, who knew both men and who described Orhan as being lean with a dark complexion and black hair and Ali as being a more bulky man of the same height with a light complexion and chestnut brown hair.\nAs to the evidence of the subsequent identification of these two men, the Commission found no reason to doubt that the applicant and her sister did see Ali and Orhan Ertaş at the Mazıdağı gendarme station on 5 April 1993. What was, however, more doubtful was whether the identification of the two men was entirely spontaneous or whether the applicant and her sister were made aware that the men were Ali and Orhan, whose names had been called out by their father. 43.  Finally, it had not been established that Salih Kaygusuz, the Commander of the Fosfat gendarme station, had considerably delayed the provision of medical treatment to the applicant's injured mother or that the gendarme forces failed to offer her available assistance. In this connection, the Commission had regard to its findings as regards the time of the armed attack and the moment at which the applicant's mother received medical care in Mazıdağı. 44.  From the evidence of Salih Kaygusuz it appeared that, after the minibus transporting the applicant's mother had left for Mazıdağı, he reported the incident in Karataş to his superiors at the District gendarme station in Mazıdağı and stated that he suspected that the PKK was responsible for the killings. He was told that, for reasons of security, the public prosecutor would only come to Karataş the next morning. He then ordered a first gendarme team to secure the area around Karataş. A second team, led by himself, joined the first team some time later. Thereupon, he and one gendarme team went to Karataş. They arrived sometime after midnight and found the bodies of the three victims inside the applicant's house. 45.  Although the local gendarmes only arrived in Karataş at least three hours after the killings occurred, the Commission accepted that this delay had been caused by the fact that on the same evening an armed attack on a nearby radio link installation had taken place. However, once in Karataş, the gendarmes only secured the scene of the crime and, in the absence of any instructions, passively awaited the arrival of the competent investigation authorities, in the instant case the public prosecutor at Mazıdağı. 46.  According to Salih Kaygusuz, the villagers present were unwilling to provide the first team of gendarmes with any information about the killings. After having secured the scene of the killings, he and the other gendarmes merely awaited the arrival of the prosecutor since they had not been ordered to take any investigative steps. 47.  In the morning of 17 March 1993 an investigation team consisting of the public prosecutor of Mazıdağı, Yekta Çobanoğlu, and, amongst others, Dr. Sedat İşçi left Mazıdağı for Karataş.\nAfter the investigation team had arrived in Karataş and before attending the post mortem examination of the victims' bodies, the public prosecutor briefly inspected the scene of the killings and ordered Salih Kaygusuz to draw a sketch map of the scene of the killings and to collect the empty cartridges lying there. Without having been numbered and without having recorded the exact location of each cartridge, the nine empty cartridges found were put together in a bag and handed to the public prosecutor. No photographs of the scene of the killings were taken by or on behalf of the investigation team. 48.  The information recorded on the sketch map of the scene of the killings appeared to be incomplete. In contrast to a remark in the post mortem body examination report and the testimony of Dr. Sedat İşçi, the sketch map did not indicate a large blood stain on the spot where the body of Orhan Önen had been found. Furthermore, although both Salih Kaygusuz, who drew the sketch map, and Yekta Çobanoğlu were aware that the body of the applicant's mother had been moved, this fact had not been recorded on the sketch map. Although the Commission accepted that, at the time this sketch map was drawn, the members of the investigation team may have been unaware of the fact that the body of the applicant's father had also been moved from the outside of the house, the subsequent investigation could not have been assisted by the fact that the scope of the sketch map was confined to the inside of the house and did not contain any information about the immediate surroundings. 49.  The Commission noted that, according to the post mortem examination report, the applicant's brother, lying in bed, was hit by numerous bullets in his face, by one bullet in his chest and by another bullet in his knee. The Commission found this recorded observation difficult to reconcile with the fact that, according to the sketch map, only four empty cartridges were found in the room where Orhan Önen was shot and with the evidence that not a single bullet had been found in that room. Furthermore, although there was strong evidence suggesting that the applicant's father had been shot and killed outside the house, the sketch map only contained information on what had been found inside the house. Although this was denied by Salih Kaygusuz, the Commission could not exclude that more than the nine recorded empty cartridges were in fact found and collected, including empty cartridges found outside the house. 50.  After having conducted the examination of the bodies and released the victims' remains for burial, the investigation team left Karataş. Although the public prosecutor was aware that both the applicant and her sister were present in Karataş during the visit of the investigation team, neither the public prosecutor nor any other official took any statement's from them or any of the other inhabitants of Karataş on that day. 51.  As early as 17 March 1993 the public prosecutor suspected that the PKK was responsible for the killings and, in a telegram sent the same day, informed the office of the public prosecutor at the State Security Court in Diyarbakır accordingly. Although in his evidence to the Commission's Delegates, Yekta Çobanoğlu stressed that this had only been a provisional opinion, his respective requests dated 17 March 1993 to the Census Directorate in Mazıdağı to issue death certificates in respect of the applicant's parents and brother simply state that they “were murdered by fire-armed members of the outlawed PKK terrorist organisation” and, consequently, their deaths were officially recorded as having been caused by the PKK terrorist organisation. 52.  It was only on 1 April 1993 that the applicant and her sister Mekiye gave a statement about the events of 16 March 1993 to the commander of the Fosfat gendarme station Salih Kaygusuz. The applicant stated that she had heard her father call out the names of the intruders and she further gave a description of the intruders' physical appearance. Mekiye stated that she had heard her father call out only one name and did not give any description of the intruders' physical features. According to Salih Kaygusuz, this was the first time that he heard the allegation that Ali and Orhan Ertaş had committed the killings. 53.  In his testimony to the Delegates, Salih Kaygusuz had a firm recollection that he had also taken statements from Muhittin Araç, Tahir Önen and Mahmut Denli. In reply to the request of the Commission's Delegates to submit these statements, the Government stated by letter of 21 January 1999 that Salih Kaygusuz had not participated in the interrogation of these three persons. The Commission further noted that its case-file did not contain any statement given by any of these three persons at the Fosfat gendarme station. 54.  The Commission further found it established that Yekta Çobanoğlu, from the outset, had a rather firm conviction that PKK forces had committed the killings. Although he stressed that this had only been a provisional opinion inspired by views expressed by the gendarmes and his own experience, the Commission found no support for the asserted provisional nature of this suspicion. In fact, it appeared from the contents of his written communications of 17 March 1993 that he had firm ideas about the identity of the perpetrators. This element, taken together with his failure to try to talk to the applicant and her sister on 17 March 1993, resulted in a loss of time in the initial phase of the investigation. 55.  As regards the encounter on 5 April 1993 between the applicant and her sister and Ali and Orhan Ertaş in the Mazıdağı District gendarme station, the Commission found that it could not be excluded that this encounter was in fact the result of a coincidence since Yekta Çobanoğlu had not ordered a confrontation. It did not appear from the evidence that the applicant and her sister had been invited by the investigation authorities to identify the perpetrators either from a collection of photographs or at an identity parade. The Commission found that no photographs of Ali and Orhan Ertaş had ever been shown to the applicant and her sister and that at no point in time had a formal confrontation been ordered.\nThe Commission further noted from the evidence submitted that, apart from the statement taken from Orhan Ertaş at the Fosfat gendarme station on 5 April 1993, hardly any attempts were made or seriously pursued to obtain any further evidence from him. Nor did it seem that any attempt had been made to verify his alibi by, for instance, checking his whereabouts on 16 and 17 March 1993 by seeking confirmation from those persons present when he was allegedly loading goods in Mersin or from those to whom he had delivered these goods. It did not appear from the statement he gave at the Fosfat gendarme station that he was in fact asked to give the names of persons who had seen him on 16 and 17 March 1993.\nAs regards the alibi advanced by Ali Ertaş, the Commission noted that his presence on Kırmızıtepe hill at the time of the killings was in fact only supported by the statements of Mecit Kaya and Mahmut Denli, whereas the latter had stated to the Commission's Delegates that he had not in fact been in the presence of Ali Ertaş at the time of the killings, but had only seen him shortly afterwards. Given the evidence that there were, in total, 65 village guards in Balpınar who were organised in teams of 12-14 persons, the Commission found it remarkable that, apart from Mecit Kaya, no evidence was taken from the other village guards who were on duty in the same team as Ali Ertaş at the relevant time in order to verify the respective positions of each team member on Kırmızıtepe hill that evening. 56.  After having received the case-file, Tanju Güvendiren, the public prosecutor at the State Security Court noted that the investigation had been incomplete. In order to complete the investigation, he issued a number of instructions to the Mazıdağı District gendarme station by letter of 13 September 1993 including that comparison cartridges be taken from the weapons held by the village guards from Karataş. On 19 October 1993 the Commander of the Mazıdağı District gendarme station transmitted 65 weapon delivery receipts and 65 empty cartridges taken from the Balpınar village guards to the office of the public prosecutor at the State Security Court. This letter contained no information as to when and in which manner these cartridges were obtained.\nAlthough Tanju Güvendiren considered that there was no concrete evidence in support of the accusations made against Ali and Orhan Ertaş and was convinced that the PKK was responsible for the killings, he nevertheless brought proceedings against Ali and Orhan Ertaş on charges of politically motivated murder and indicted them on 6 January 1994 before the State Security Court, which had jurisdiction to determine murder charges linked to terrorism. He did not find it necessary to take any further statements or to order the arrest or pre-trial detention of the accused. In his opinion, it was excluded that the security forces would cover up a crime committed by village guards.\nIn the subsequent proceedings before it, the State Security Court in Diyarbakır requested, inter alia, that statements be taken from Ali and Orhan Ertaş, from the applicant and her sister Mekiye, and from Mecit Kaya and Mahmut Denli. They were all summoned to appear on 6 May 1994 before a judge of the Mazıdağı Court of First Instance in order to give statements, but only Ali Ertaş, Mecit Kaya and Mahmut Denli in fact did so. As the whereabouts of Orhan Ertaş, the applicant and her sister were not established, their summonses were returned to the State Security Court and, consequently, no further statements were taken from them. \nThe Commission noted that, although the gendarmes and the State Security Court were informed that the applicant and her sister were residing in the Cezaevi neighbourhood in Diyarbakır, it did not appear that any attempts were made or ordered to locate them. Nor did it seem that any further attempts were made or ordered to find Orhan Ertaş. The Commission noted that the Muhtar of Karataş, Muhittin Araç, testified that he had been aware of the exact address of the applicant and her sister in Diyarbakır, but that he had never been asked to provide the local gendarmes with this address. He explained his signature on a document dated 4 May 1994 by stating that it had been normal practice in the area for gendarmes to require Muhtars to sign blank documents for future use. No further clarification on this point could be obtained from Salih Kaygusuz, as he had left the Fosfat gendarme station in August 1993. In these circumstances, it was impossible for the Commission to make any findings in this respect. What was clear, however, was that the State Security Court was informed that the applicant and her sister were residing at that time in the Cezaevi neighbourhood of Diyarbakır. In this connection, the Commission had also regard to the evidence of the applicant's brother that, since their departure from Karataş and to date, the Önen family had always lived at the same address in Diyarbakır. 57.  The Commission accepted that the supplementary investigation measures ordered by the public prosecutor at the State Security Court, Tanju Güvendiren, in order to mend certain deficiencies in the preliminary investigation, were appropriate, although it was open to doubt whether, given the passage of time since the killings, these measures were as effective as they might have been in the initial phase of the proceedings. Moreover, he testified that he was convinced at the outset that the PKK was responsible for the killings, which might explain why he decided to indict Ali and Orhan Ertaş before the State Security Court, rather than referring the case to a court competent to try common crimes. This was supported by the fact that, apart from Ali Ertaş, none of the other vital witnesses gave evidence to the State Security Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Moscow. 6.  At the material time the applicant held the position of Head of the Department of Justice of the Sakhalin Region (начальник Управления юстиции Сахалинской области). 7.  On an unspecified date an external audit commenced in the said Department and embezzlement of budgetary assets was subsequently established. 8.  On 25 February 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted in this connection. 9.  On 28 February 2000 at 8 a.m. the applicant retained a lawyer. 10.  On 28 February 2000 at 8:30 a.m. the applicant was arrested and placed in custody. Being questioned as a suspect in the case, the applicant availed herself of the right to remain silent and applied for release on bail or subject to personal surety. 11.  On 29 February 2000 the investigator in charge refused to release the applicant, stating that, according to Article 101 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “a measure of restraint could only be changed in the circumstances when it was no longer needed” and that “there were no such circumstances” in the applicant's case. 12.  On the same date the applicant resigned from her position. 13.  On 1 March 2000 the investigator in charge remanded the applicant in custody. The order, which was approved by a deputy prosecutor of the Sakhalin Region, referred to the danger of the applicant's absconding, the risk of her obstructing the establishment of the truth and influencing the witnesses who had been her subordinates, and to the gravity of the charges against her. 14.  The applicant's request to release her subject to the imposition of another measure of restraint was examined and refused by the investigator on 2 March 2000. 15.  On 6 March 2000 the applicant's lawyer appealed to the court against the applicant's pre-trial detention. 16.  The application was examined by judge A. of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Town Court (“the Town Court”) on 10 March 2000. At the hearing the applicant and her counsel reiterated their request for the applicant's release in view of her poor health, the fact that she had family commitments and a good reference from her former place of work. The judge confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant's remand in custody, having based this decision on “the evidence in the applicant's case file, proving that she might abscond or influence the witnesses if released”. 17.  According to the applicant, the evidence referred to by Judge A. was a transcript of an audio tape recording of telephone conversations of another suspect, K. During one such conversation K. stated that “on Monday Nina Ivanovna will leave forever”. 18.  On 12 April 2000 the Sakhalin Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the decision of 10 March 2000 on appeal. 19.  Meanwhile, on 7 March 2000, formal charges of embezzlement and abuse of power had been brought against the applicant. Since the applicant's counsel was unable to attend the police station that day, the investigating authorities appointed another lawyer to assist her. However, in the absence of her counsel, the applicant refused to read and sign the decision to charge her. 20.  On 15 March 2000 the applicant's lawyer challenged the decision of 7 March 2000 before the court, claiming that the applicant's right to defence had been violated. He also requested the court to release the applicant pending trial. 21.  On 4 April 2000 judge A. of the Town Court disallowed the above complaint, having noted that the allegations advanced by the applicant's representative had already been examined and rejected by the courts during the first judicial review of the applicant's detention. 22.  On 3 May 2000 the Regional Court set aside the above decision and discontinued the proceedings in respect of the complaint of 15 March 2000. The court noted, inter alia, that the applicant was entitled to appeal against the alleged infringement of her right to defence at the trial stage. 23.  On 19 April 2000 the regional prosecutor extended the applicant's detention until 25 June 2000 on the ground that she might flee the trial or put pressure on witnesses while at liberty. 24.  On 17 May 2000 the applicant challenged this order before the court, and requested to be released. She maintained, in particular, that she could not hinder the investigation or influence the witnesses, since the audit had terminated on 13 April 2000. The applicant also referred to poor conditions of her detention and deterioration of her health. 25.  On 25 May 2000 judge A. of the Town Court dismissed the applicant's complaint as unfounded, with reference to the gravity of the charges, “the applicant's personality” and “the evidence in the applicant's case file, proving that she might abscond or influence the witnesses if released”. The judge also noted that the investigating authorities had produced a medical report stating that the applicant had no need of medical treatment. 26.  In her appeal against the decision of 25 May 2000 the applicant stated, inter alia, that Judge A. should have been disqualified from reviewing her detention, as this judge had already considered and rejected her applications for release on two previous occasions. 27.  On 25 June 2000 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 May 2000. With respect to the applicant's argument concerning Judge A., the court noted that the domestic law entitled a judge to examine a repeated complaint about the lawfulness of detention. 28.  On 30 May 2000 a deputy prosecutor of the Sakhalin Region refused the applicant's request for release. 29.  On 2 June 2000 the applicant was charged with a number of additional counts relating to embezzlement, abuse of power and forgery. 30.  On 13 June 2000 the preliminary investigation was terminated and the applicant and her lawyer began studying the case file. 31.  On 21 June 2000 the regional prosecutor ordered the extension of the applicant's detention until 10 August 2000. 32.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor's decision, claiming that she was unable to obstruct the establishment of the truth or influence the witnesses, since the investigation had already terminated. She also referred to her poor state of health. 33.  On 24 July 2000 judge B. of the Town Court dismissed the applicant's complaint, holding that her detention was “in accordance with law” and necessary in view of the seriousness of the charges and the applicant's personality. The judge also took note of medical certificates produced by the applicant's lawyer as well as the aforementioned medical report adduced by the investigating body, and found the applicant's allegations that she was in poor health unsubstantiated. 34.  On 13 September 2000 the Regional Court upheld the above decision on appeal. The court noted that the applicant was charged with a serious criminal offence and its severity alone could, according to Article 96-2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, permit her continued detention. 35.  On 8 August 2000 the applicant's counsel lodged a complaint against the investigator in charge, requesting the court to order the applicant's inpatient examination by an independent medical authority. 36.  On 15 August 2000 Judge B. of the Town Court declined jurisdiction to examine the complaint, stating that it fell within the competence of the prosecutor. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 25 October 2000. 37.  In the meantime, on 7 August 2000, the regional prosecutor extended the period of the applicant's remand in custody until 25 August 2000. 38.  On 15 August 2000 the applicant appealed to the court against the prosecutor's order. Her complaint was assigned to Judge A. of the Town Court. 39.  The applicant sought the withdrawal of the judge. On 18 August 2000 Judge A. dismissed the challenge. 40.  At the hearing on 21 August 2000 the applicant and her defence counsel claimed that the preliminary investigation had been completed, that the applicant had finished studying her case file, and that therefore the investigating authorities had no reasons to believe that the applicant might flee or obstruct the establishment of the truth if at large. Moreover, the applicant posed no danger to the public and suffered from various health problems, which required proper medical treatment. 41.  Having heard the parties, Judge A. found that the applicant should remain in custody, on account of the gravity of the charges and the risk of her absconding. The judge further rejected the applicant's complaints about her health as groundless. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 13 September 2000. 42.  On 23 August 2000 the investigator refused to release the applicant, making a general reference to the absence of any circumstances proving that her detention was no longer needed. 43.  On 25 August 2000 the applicant's case was forwarded to the Town Court for examination. 44.  On 4 September 2000 Judge K. of the Town Court remitted the case for a further investigation and stated that the applicant should remain in custody in view of the seriousness of the charges. 45.  The applicant appealed against the above decision in so far as it concerned her detention. 46.  On 25 October 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal. 47.  Meanwhile, on 22 August 2000 the deputy Prosecutor General had authorised the applicant's detention until 25 October 2000. This order was served on the applicant on 15 September 2000. 48.  On 17 September 2000 the applicant challenged the extension of her custody period before the Town Court, complaining, in particular, that she had not been notified of the order of 22 August 2000 in time. 49.  At the hearing on 25 September 2000 the applicant also referred to the poor state of her health and the absence of any risk that she might abscond or hinder the investigation, which was at an end. Her arguments were examined and rejected as unfounded. Having acknowledged the fact that the order of 22 August 2000 had not been served on the applicant in due time, the court held that this fact did not affect the legal force of the extension order or the lawfulness of the applicant's detention. It therefore ordered the applicant's continued detention, with reference to the gravity of the charges against her. On 25 October 2000 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision. 50.  On 16 October 2000 the applicant requested the investigator to release her. 51.  On 17 October 2000 the investigator informed the applicant that there were no reasons to release her. 52.  On 20 October 2000 the case was again transferred to the Town Court for examination on the merits. 53.  On 4 November 2000 Judge K. of the Town Court scheduled a hearing in the applicant's case and held that “in view of the gravity of the charges [against the applicant] the measure of restraint applied to her should remain unchanged”. The decision did not specify the time-limit for the applicant's detention, nor did it refer to any other matters regarding the lawfulness of her detention. 54.  On 17 November 2000 the applicant appealed against the above decision in so far as it related to her detention. She claimed that between 25 October 2000, when the period of her remand in custody had expired, and 4 November 2000 her detention had had no basis in domestic law. She further complained that the court had ignored her submissions about the state of her health. 55.  On 13 December 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding that her detention was lawful. The court stated that the applicant had been charged with serious crimes, and could be detained on the sole ground of the dangerousness of those offences. With regard to the applicant's argument concerning her detention between 25 October 2000 and 4 November 2000, the court noted that the applicant's case file, including the indictment, had been transmitted to court on 20 October 2000, before the period of her remand in custody had expired. Accordingly, in the court's opinion, the statutory provisions governing the time-limit for detention during the preliminary investigation had been complied with in respect of the applicant. The court further stated that, upon referral of the case to court, the first instance had taken its decision in due time, as prescribed by Article 223-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 56.  The applicant's further requests for release were rejected by the Town Court on 22 and 29 December 2000 and 9 January 2001 with a reference to the absence of any “new grounds for altering [the applicant's] measure of restraint”. 57.  On 6 February 2001 the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Town Court, composed of Judge K. and two lay assessors, convicted the applicant, along with another co-accused, of embezzlement, forgery and abuse of power, and sentenced her to six years and six months' imprisonment and confiscation of her property. 58.  On 23 May 2001 the Sakhalin Regional Court upheld the sentence, having lifted the charges against the applicant on three counts with reference to a limitation period. 59.  Thereafter the applicant applied unsuccessfully for a supervisory review. 60.  On 30 September 2002 the applicant was released on parole. 1.  Detention in the temporary holding facility of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Department of the Interior\n(a)  The applicant's submission on the facts 61.  According to the applicant, from 28 February until 29 March 2000 she was kept in the temporary holding facility of the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Department of the Interior (изолятор временного содержания управления внутренних дел г. Южно-Сахалинска, “the IVS”). In support of that submission, the applicant enclosed the authorities' letters dated 10 and 22 March 2000 respectively sent to her at the address of the IVS. 62.  The applicant corroborated her account below with a written statement from one her former inmates. 63.  The IVS was situated in the basement of the premises of the Department of the Interior. Following her arrest the applicant was placed in a cell measuring approximately 3 x 2.5 metres which was 2.5 metres high. There were no windows in the cell, with the result that there was no natural light, nor any fresh air. The inside temperature did not exceed 12oC. There was an iron sink and a cold-water tap, but the water pressure was very low. There was no toilet bowl or any other installation in the cell, and the applicant had to use the sink for her needs. The cell was overrun with mice, rats, lice, cockroaches and fungus. 64.  The applicant was not allowed to take any toiletries or a change of clothes with her. She was not provided with any bedding and had to sleep on a plain wooden plank bed. During the first two days of her detention the applicant was not given any food or drinking water. 65.  On 29 February 2000, in the evening, the applicant was transferred to another cell which accommodated four other inmates. The conditions in that cell were similar to those described above. It had no windows and was lit by a single 40-watt bulb. All the inmates except the applicant were smokers but the cell was ventilated only once a week when the detainees were taken to shower. 66.  There was a big aluminium tank with a capacity of 80-100 litres in the cell. The tank, which had no cover, was used by the cellmates as a toilet. They stretched a piece of cloth over the top to try to reduce the smell. Every evening the cellmates took the tank out of the cell to the common toilet and washed it in turn using a hose with cold water. The tank was never disinfected. 67.  The applicant was not provided with any bedding until a fortnight later, when she received it from her family, and slept on a wooden plank bed. The detainees were taken to shower no more than once a week; they were not given soap or any other toiletries or a change of clean underwear. During the entire period of her detention in the IVS the applicant did not have even one opportunity for exercise, due to the absence of the necessary facilities. 68.  The applicant was allowed to receive food from her relatives, but, in her submission, she was hardly able to eat given that she had gastrointestinal problems and because of the poor sanitary conditions in the cell. The applicant, who suffered from heart, gastrointestinal and gynaecological conditions, was prohibited from receiving any medicines which she had been taking prior to her detention from her family with the result that her state of health deteriorated. Between 23 and 26 March 2000, following the applicant's complaints about aggravation of osteochondrosis, the IVS authorities called an ambulance and the applicant was given pain-relieving injections. 69.  On 7 March 2000 the applicant's representative applied to the regional prosecutor's office, requesting the applicant's transfer into a separate cell. 70.  In a letter of 13 March 2000 the regional prosecutor instructed the head of the Regional Department of the Interior to grant this request.\n(b)  The Government's submission on the facts 71.  In their additional observations of 7 September 2007 the Government stated that throughout the entire period of her detention the applicant was held in remand centre IZ-62/1. They therefore provided no information relating to the applicant's alleged detention in the IVS. 72.  The exact period during which the applicant was held in remand centre IZ-62/1 (subsequently IZ-65/1) in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (СИЗО- 62/1 – “the IZ-62/1”) and the conditions of her detention there are disputed by the parties. 73.  According to the applicant, on 29 March 2000 she was transferred to the IZ-62/1, in which she remained until 30 September 2002. The applicant corroborated her account of the conditions in the remand centre with written statements by two of her former cellmates, dated 28 February 2001 and 7 December 2007. 74.  In their observations of 15 December 2004 the Government indicated that the applicant was detained in the IZ-62/1 from 29 March 2000 until 29 September 2002. In their additional observations of 7 September 2007 the Government submitted that in the periods from 28 February until 29 March 2000 and from 29 March 2000 until 30 September 2002 the applicant was held in the IZ-62/1. 75.  In their original observations, the Government based the account concerning the applicant's conditions of detention on a number of certificates issued by the head of the IZ-62/1 on 3 November 2004. In their additional observations, in reply to the Court's request that the description of the conditions of the applicant's detention be corroborated with documentary evidence pertaining to the period when she had been detained in the IZ-62/1, the Government submitted a number of certificates issued by the head of the remand centre on 21 August 2007, written explanations given on 17 August 2007 by several warders who had served in the IZ-62/1 at the relevant time, a copy of the applicant's medical file, and photographs of the cells which had accommodated the applicant. The certificates either describe the present-day conditions in the cells in which the applicant was kept or report on various aspects of the applicant's detention at the relevant period. The warders' written statements concern the conditions of the applicant's detention at the relevant period. The medical file is the only document issued during the applicant's detention. It reflects the applicant's medical history in the IZ-62/1.\n(a)  General conditions 76.  According to the applicant, between 29 March and early May 2000 she was held in cell no. 53, then she was transferred to cell no. 47 in which she spent three months, in early August 2000 she was placed in cell no. 020 where she remained until the middle of October 2000, then she spent a month and a half in cell no. 49, and from later November 2000 until 30 September 2002 she was kept in cell no. 54. The Government disputed this submission. One of the certificates of 21 August 2007 submitted by them states that from 29 March until 29 May 2000 the applicant was held in cell no. 49, from 29 May until 29 June 2000 she was kept in cell no. 020, and from this latter date until 30 September 2002 she was kept in cell no. 54. 77.  In the applicant's submission, cell no. 53 measured approximately 24 square metres and was 3 metres high. It was designed for ten detainees. The applicant shared this cell with five inmates. Cell no. 47 also measured approximately 24 square metres and was designed for ten detainees. It held nine inmates. The applicant shared cell no. 020 measuring about 8 square metres and designed for four detainees with another cellmate. Cell no. 49 measured 20 square metres and was designed for ten inmates. It accommodated the applicant and one more detainee. The applicant shared cell no. 54 measuring 14 square metres with another detainee. 78.  According to the Government, cell no. 49 measures between 24.6 square metres, as indicated in a certificate of 3 November 2004, and 26 square metres, as indicated in a certificate of 21 August 2007. The cell is intended for seven detainees, whereas the applicant shared this cell with five cellmates. Cell no. 020 measures 8 square metres and is designed for two detainees. In the Government's submission, the applicant was held there alone. Cell no. 54 measures between 14 square metres, according to a certificate of 3 November 2004, and 15.1 square metres, as stated in a certificate of 21 August 2007. The applicant shared this cell, which could accommodate up to four detainees, with another cellmate. 79.  According to the applicant, in each cell where she was kept there was a single window. In cell no. 53 the window measuring approximately 1 x 1.4 metres was partly covered with glass and partly with plywood and always remained shut, therefore there was no natural ventilation. In cells nos. 47, 020 and 49 the windows were not glazed, whereas in cell no. 54 the window, also measuring 1 x 1.4 metres, was only partly glazed. The applicant submitted in respect of her detention in cell no. 49 that the prison authorities had repeatedly refused to accept glass for the window from her husband and had not glazed the window before the middle of November 2000 following numerous complaints by the applicant to the regional prosecutor's office. In the applicant's submission, the windows in each cell were covered with metal grilles supplemented with “eyelashes”, which are metal strips covering the grille. From the outside the windows were covered with wooden shields, and therefore only refracted daylight could reach inside. Each cell was only illuminated with a single 60-watt bulb. 80.  The Government submitted that during the entire period of the applicant's detention the windows in all the cells had been glazed and had never been covered with plywood. The size of the windows – 1.4 x 1 metres in cells nos. 49 and 54, and 0.8 x 0.8 metres in cell no. 020 – was sufficient to let in enough daylight to enable detainees to read. Each window had a vent which ensured proper natural ventilation of the cells. According to the Government, the shutters had been removed from the windows in the period from January to March 2003. As regards artificial light, the Government submitted that each cell was illuminated with a bulb of 75- up to100-watt in the day and with a 25-watt bulb in the night. 81.  According to the applicant, she was the only non-smoker in the cells where all the other detainees smoked. There was no mechanical ventilation in any of the cells. The cells were damp, with concrete floors. In the winter the temperature in the cells did not exceed 12oC whilst in the summer it was stiflingly hot inside and the temperature reached 24-26oC. In the Government's submission, each cell was equipped with mechanical ventilation and the average temperature was maintained at the level of 20‑22oC with a humidity level of 55.3 per cent. They relied on a report reflecting the results of measurement on 17 August 2007 of temperature and humidity level in cells nos. 49, 020 and 54 of the IZ-65/1. The report was drawn up by a regional authority for hygiene and epidemiology and indicated that the temperature in the cells ranged between 23.5 and 23.9oC with the humidity level ranging between 54.4 and 58.4 per cent. The Government accepted that at least for some time the applicant had had to share a cell with smokers, but insisted that she had not endured severe suffering in this connection, given that a cell had been 3 metres high and had had natural and mechanical ventilation. They also submitted that on 29 May 2000, at the applicant's request, she had been transferred to cell no. 020, where she was held alone, and a month later she was transferred to cell no. 54, which she shared with a non-smoker. 82.  It was not in dispute between the parties that each cell was equipped with a sink and a lavatory pan, that cold running water was available around the clock and that the detainees were also regularly provided with drinking water. The Government also submitted that detainees were provided daily with hot water for hygienic purposes. As regards the toilet, the applicant submitted that it had had no flush system and the inmates washed it with water from a bucket. The Government stated that the toilet in cells nos. 49, 020 and 54 had a flush system which filled with water run from a tap. The applicant also submitted that during the period of her detention in cell no. 54 the toilet was not disinfected even once. 83.  According to the applicant, the lavatory pan was separated by a partition from the sink but not from the living area and dining table. The detainees' attempts to separate the toilet from them with curtains made of sheets were suppressed by the prison authorities. In the Government's submission, the sanitary installations were separated from the living area with a partition which was one metre high and offered privacy. The photographs show that the lavatory pan is separated from the living area by a thick partition and that in cells nos. 49 and 54 there is also a curtain in front of the pan. 84.  According to the applicant, the cells were overrun with cockroaches, mice and rats. The Government stated that all the cells were disinfected twice a month during the summer period and once a month in the winter. 85.  The parties did not dispute the fact that throughout the period of the applicant's detention in the IZ-62/1 she had had a personal sleeping place. According to the applicant, she was provided with a mattress, although it was of poor quality, and was allowed to take her own warm blanket, pillow and bed linen. The Government insisted that the prison authorities had provided the applicant with bedding, including a mattress, a pillow, a semi-woollen blanket, three sheets, two pillowcases and a towel, and that she had signed for these in a register of provision of detainees with bedding. They did not submit the document relied on. A certificate of 21 August 2007 indicates that the relevant documentation cannot be provided, since the time-limit for its storage does not exceed five years. According to the Government, the bed linen was changed weekly. 86.  The parties further agreed that the applicant was allowed to take a shower once a week for 30 minutes. The applicant alleged, however, that she had to wash herself, along with ten to fifteen other detainees, using wash-basins in a room measuring 4 x 4 metres which adjoined another room measuring 2 x 2 metres. The latter room was equipped with two showers. According to her, the cellmates were provided with 50 grams of soap per week. 87.  According to the applicant, the detainees were allowed exercise less than once a day for a period of thirty to sixty minutes. During the period of her detention in cell no. 53 she was taken for outdoor exercise on two or three occasions into a courtyard measuring approximately 2.5 x 2.5 metres. At the same time seven to ten detainees were walking in the courtyard. Each walk lasted about thirty minutes. The Government insisted that the applicant was allowed to take a walk every day for two hours during daylight hours. 88.  In the applicant's submission, the scarce meals were of poor quality, but the prison authorities only allowed her to receive bread and flour products, sugar and tea from her family. She was not allowed to receive any dairy products, fish, meat or juices, which, according to the applicant, she needed in view of her gastrointestinal problems, or any other products such as jam or honey. According to the Government, the applicant, like all the other detainees, was provided with meals three times a day and received a well-balanced menu. In particular, she received daily 100 grams of cereals, 20 grams of noodles, 100 grams of meat, 100 grams of fish, 10 grams of fats, 15 grams of seed-oil, 30 grams of sugar, 500 grams of potatoes, 250 grams of vegetables and 550 grams of bread. A certificate of 21 August 2007 states that the relevant documentation cannot be provided, as it had been destroyed.\n(b)  Medical assistance\ni.  The parties' submission on the facts 89.  According to the applicant, before her placement in custody she had been suffering from heart, gastrointestinal and gynaecological conditions. In support of her submissions, she relied on medical documents confirming that she had undergone treatment in respect of those conditions in the 1990s. In particular, a certificate issued in March 2000 states that in November-December 1999 the applicant was diagnosed with hypertension and ischaemic heart disease and a certificate of 20 December 2000 confirms that the applicant had her gall bladder removed in 1991. There is also a certificate stating that the applicant was diagnosed with hysteromyoma. 90.  The applicant further submitted that her health had deteriorated during her detention. In particular, she started suffering from gastritis, conjunctivitis, myopia and contracted a facial dermatological disease, demodicosis. The applicant adduced a copy of an extract from her medical file dated 18 April 2005 and medical documents of 26 February and 22 June 2006 confirming the presence of those diseases. In the applicant's submission, when in custody she repeatedly complained to the authorities about her poor state of health and requested an independent medical examination. She submitted copies of her written requests to various authorities. 91.  In particular, on 6 April 2000 the applicant requested the head of the IZ-62/1 that she receive an independent medical examination. 92.  On 24 April 2000 the applicant complained to the regional prosecutor that the medical examinations carried out in the IZ-62/1 were inadequate, that her medicines had been taken away and that the authorities had failed to have her independent medical examination carried out. She also complained that she had to share a cell with nine other detainees, all of them smokers, and that although the cells were severely infested with cockroaches the prison authorities made no attempts to exterminate them. 93.  In a letter of 10 May 2000 the regional prosecutor's office informed the applicant about regulations which provided that medicine prescribed to suspects should be kept by a duty officer and taken by patients in the presence of that officer. In respect of the applicant's request to order an independent medical examination, the letter stated that there was no such obligation on the authorities. Lastly, the applicant was invited to address her complaints concerning sanitary conditions in the cell to the administration of the IZ-62/1 or to the administration of the Department for Execution of Punishments. 94.  In her complaint of 17 May 2000 concerning the extension of her pre-trial detention (see paragraph 24 above) the applicant referred, inter alia, to poor conditions of her detention, stating that she was being kept in a poorly lit cell with smokers, that her sight had deteriorated, that her medicines had been seized and that she had not received adequate medical treatment and had been refused an independent medical examination. 95.  On 22 May 2000 the applicant sent another complaint to the regional prosecutor, in which she again mentioned the authorities' failure to have her independent medical examination carried out and complained of deterioration of her sight, high blood pressure and aggravation of her health problems. 96.  In May-July 2000 the applicant suffered from an inflammatory condition on her face which, according to her, proved to be demodicosis. In her submission, the treatment she received from prison doctors was ineffective. On 13 and 14 June 2000 the applicant sent complaints to the head of the regional Department for Execution of Punishments and the regional prosecutor in which she informed them that she was in need of urgent professional medical treatment for her acute facial condition, which could not be administered to her in the remand centre, and requested that she either be examined by specialists in connection with that condition, or admitted to a hospital for inpatient treatment. 97.  On 3 August 2000 the applicant complained in writing to the head of the IZ-62/1 that there was no adequate medical assistance in connection with her heart condition and that medicines for injection and syringes which had been delivered by her family members had been taken away. She also mentioned that the cell in which she was being held was never ventilated. 98.  On 2 November 2000 the applicant, with reference to her heart, gastrointestinal and gynaecological problems and the deterioration of her health in detention, requested the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Town Court to order an independent medical examination. On 12 November 2000 the applicant forwarded a similar request to the head of the IZ-62/1. 99.  On 17 November 2000 the head of the IZ-62/1 sent a written request to the Town Court to allow an independent medical examination of the applicant. 100.  According to the applicant, despite numerous requests, she had no proper medical treatment and her medicines were taken from her by the prison authorities. In the spring 2001 the prison authorities accepted from the applicant's relatives medicines for treatment of heart diseases and disposable syringes. However, according to the applicant, she was not administered any injection until the autumn of 2001 after her numerous complaints to the authorities. In the Government's submission, all the medicines received by the prison authorities from the applicant's relatives were delivered to the applicant, except for medicines for injection and syringes.\nii.  Information from the applicant's medical file 101.  A copy of the applicant's medical file made during her detention in the IZ-62/1 submitted by the Government reveals the following. 102.  On 29 March 2000, on the applicant's arrival at the remand centre, she underwent a medical examination which established that she was fit. During the examination the applicant stated that her gall bladder had been extracted and complained of pain in the small of her back. She made no other complaints. 103.  On 31 March 2000 a duty paramedic attended the applicant in the cell, at her request. The officer took the applicant's blood pressure. 104.  On 7 April 2000, upon the applicant's complaint of slight headaches and some bleeding from the ears, she was examined by a general practitioner and diagnosed with vegetative-vascular dystonia. The applicant was prescribed and administered medication. 105.  On 12 April 2000 the applicant was received by the head of the IZ‑62/1 medical office in connection with her complaint that her medicines had been taken away. Some of the medicines were returned to her. The head of the medical office also took the applicant's blood pressure. 106.  On 19 April 2000 the applicant was examined by a medical commission of the Central Hospital of the Department for Execution of Punishments, including a general practitioner and a surgeon. She complained of pain in the right pre-costal area and constipation. The applicant was diagnosed with biliary dyskinesia and prescribed pain-relieving medicines. Her general state of health was found to be satisfactory. 107.  On 24 April 2000 the applicant's blood pressure was measured. 108.  On 12 May 2000 the applicant refused to undergo a gynaecological examination by a gynaecologist from the city maternity and gynaecology hospital, stating that the person assigned to carry it out was incompetent. She insisted on an independent gynaecological examination as well as examinations by a dermatologist and an ophthalmologist. 109.  On the same date the applicant was examined by the head of the ophthalmological department of the regional hospital, diagnosed with slight myopia and prescribed glasses. 110.  On 16 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a duty paramedic in connection with the inflammation of her face. She was diagnosed with allergic dermatitis and prescribed antihistamine pills and ointment. 111.  The next day the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist in connection with her complaints of insomnia and itching and eruptions on her face. The doctor concluded that she was “almost fit”. 112.  On 22 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a duty paramedic in connection with her complaints of nausea, weakness and shooting pains in the heart area. She was diagnosed with presumed cardio neurosis and prescribed relevant treatment. 113.  On 26 May 2000, upon the applicant's complaint to the effect that she was unable to take part in a court hearing scheduled for that day because of her poor physical condition, she was examined by a general practitioner who concluded that she was fit. 114.  On 28 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a dermatologist in connection with her complaint of eruptions on her face. She was diagnosed with allergic dermatitis and prescribed antihistamines, vitamins and ointments. 115.  On 29 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner who diagnosed her with presumed osteochondrosis and premenopausal syndrome and prescribed relevant treatment. 116.  On 5 June 2000 the applicant was examined by the head of the IZ‑62/1 medical office, who concluded that her dermatological condition was satisfactory. 117.  The next day the applicant was examined by a dermatologist who also confirmed that she was fit. 118.  On 21 June 2000 the applicant had a conversation with the head of the IZ-62/1 medical office as regards the administration of medicines for treatment of heart disease received from the applicant's family members. The applicant was invited to undergo an electrocardiographic monitoring necessary prior to the administration of that medicine, but she refused the monitoring, stating that the device was outdated. 119.  On 22 June 2000 the applicant was attended and examined by the head of the Tselitel medical centre, who concluded that the applicant was suffering from premenopausal syndrome and suggested that she undergo treatment with hormonal medicines. 120.  On 12 July 2000 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner, who diagnosed her with influenza and administered relevant treatment. 121.  On 9 August 2000 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner, who found that she had post-cholecystectomy syndrome. She was prescribed relevant treatment. 122.  On 30 August 2000 the applicant was examined by a duty paramedic as she stated that she had been on hunger strike since 25 August 2000. The paramedic weighed the applicant and took her blood pressure. Her physical condition was found to be satisfactory. 123.  On 13 October 2000 a general practitioner examined the applicant, took her blood pressure and, at the applicant's request, prescribed her the medicines which had been delivered by her family members. 124.  On 26 October 2000 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner and diagnosed with influenza. Relevant treatment was prescribed. 125.  On 14 November 2000 the applicant was examined by a duty paramedic in connection with her complaint of headaches and weakness. The paramedic found that she had vegetative-vascular dystonia and recommended relevant treatment. 126.  On 28 December 2000 a general practitioner diagnosed the applicant with acute laryngotracheitis and prescribed relevant treatment. 127.  On 18 January 2001 the applicant was attended and treated by a general practitioner in connection with pharyngitis and vegetative-vascular dystonia. 128.  On 8 February 2001 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner, diagnosed with acute tracheobronchitis and prescribed relevant treatment. 129.  On 13 February 2001 the applicant was attended and treated by a general practitioner in connection with protracted tracheitis. On 15 February 2001 the general practitioner again examined the applicant and recommended that the treatment be continued. 130.  On 6 March 2002 the applicant was examined by a general practitioner and diagnosed with follicular tonsillitis. Relevant treatment was prescribed. On 10 March 2002 she was attended by a duty paramedic who recommended that she continue with the treatment. 131.  During the period of her detention in remand centre IZ-62/1 the applicant underwent fluorography examinations on six occasions; the examination disclosed no pathologies. 132.  On 3 March 2000 the investigator in charge ordered the seizure of the applicant's flat pending trial. 133.  On 16 March 2000 a deputy regional prosecutor rejected the applicant's complaint against the investigator's order. 134.  On 28 July 2000 the applicant applied to a court, stating that the flat in question was the only housing for her family and therefore was immune from seizure. 135.  On 8 August 2000 the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Town Court found in the applicant's favour and lifted the seizure. 136.  On 3 October 2000, on an appeal by the regional prosecutor, the Sakhalin Regional Court quashed the above judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 137.  It appears that, following the applicant's conviction, on 11 March 2002, the Town Court lifted the seizure of the applicant's flat in a separate set of proceedings. The court noted that this apartment was the permanent place of residence for the applicant's family and was not subject to confiscation. 138.  On 12 March 2002 the Town Court discontinued the proceedings on the applicant's action of 28 July 2000, since she had waived her claims.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961. He is married; he and his wife (born in 1968) have three children, born in 1992, 1993 and 1998 respectively. The family are resident in Zoetermeer. 6.  On 8 December 1997 the applicant arrived in the Netherlands, five months after his wife and two children had arrived there. On 10 December 1997 the applicant applied for asylum. The Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected this application on 19 February 1999 but he did grant the applicant a conditional residence permit (voorwaardelijke vergunning tot verblijf), valid as of 10 December 1997, on the basis of a temporary “policy of protection for certain categories” (categoriaal beschermingsbeleid). The applicant’s wife and children received residence permits for the purpose of asylum that same day. The applicant lodged an objection against the decision to refuse him asylum. 7.  The situation in Afghanistan not having sufficiently improved, the applicant’s conditional residence permit was ex lege converted into an indefinite residence permit after he had held it for a period of three years. Subsequently, with the entry into force of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) on 1 April 2001, the permit held by the applicant came to be named an indefinite residence permit for the purpose of asylum. In view of this development, the applicant’s objection against the decision of 19 February 1999 was declared inadmissible on 16 July 2001. 8.  On 28 May 2004 the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, at that time the successor to the Deputy Minister of Justice) withdrew the applicant’s residence permit (but not those of his wife and children) as Article 1F of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was held against him. The applicant filed an appeal against this decision which was rejected by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague on 29 March 2005. On 4 August 2005 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) confirmed the decision of the Regional Court at final instance. 9.  The applicant’s wife and children were granted Netherlands nationality on 13 December 2004. 10.  On 21 October 2005 the applicant filed a new application for asylum, which was rejected by the Minister on 27 October 2005. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Regional Court of The Hague on 17 November 2005, and on 22 December 2005 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State dismissed the applicant’s appeal at final instance. 11.  Subsequently, on 9 January 2006, the applicant applied for a residence permit for the purpose of residing in the Netherlands with his wife. At the same time, he requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the statutory administrative charges (leges) of 830 euros (EUR). In this respect he invoked Decision 2005/46 amending the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000 (Wijzigingsbesluit Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000), according to which an alien who has a justifiable claim under Article 8 of the Convention in proceedings to obtain a residence permit for the purposes of family reunion (gezinshereniging) or family formation (gezinsvorming) could be exempted from paying the required charges if he or she complied with certain conditions. The applicant argued that he had a legitimate claim under Article 8 and that he had provided sufficient proof that he did not have the resources to pay the charges: since the withdrawal of his residence permit he himself was no longer eligible for social assistance and his family had to survive on social assistance intended for a single-parent family. There were no relatives or third persons prepared or able to pay the charges for him. He submitted a copy of his wife’s social assistance pay slip for the month of December 2005 (stating a total payable amount of EUR 988.71), an official extract from the register of marriages dated 29 December 2005 showing him to be married to his wife, and an official document showing him, his wife and their children to be registered at the same address. 12.  On 23 March 2006 the Minister decided not to process the application for a residence permit, as the applicant had failed to pay the required charge. 13.  The applicant lodged an objection with the Minister against that decision, arguing that he had submitted a reasoned request to be exempted from the obligation to pay the administrative charge, which request the Minister had rejected without stating any grounds. On 31 March 2006 the applicant also applied for a provisional measure (voorlopige voorziening) to the Regional Court of The Hague in order to be allowed to await the outcome of his appeal in the Netherlands. 14.  On 27 March 2007 the Regional Court rejected the request for a provisional measure and at the same time dismissed the objection. It considered that the applicant had failed to submit sufficient proof of his lack of resources to pay the required fees; it had therefore not been unreasonable for the Minister to decide not to process the applicant’s request for a residence permit. 15.  No appeal lay against the judgment of the Regional Court. 16.  On 11 January 2008, in reply to questions put to them pursuant to Rule 49 § 3 (a) of the Rules of Court, the Government confirmed that, at the time the applicant lodged his request for a residence permit for the purpose of residing with his wife, the latter was in receipt of social assistance benefits for a single-parent family. They further confirmed that the applicant was not in possession of a residence permit entitling him to acquire income by working in the Netherlands. He had nevertheless not qualified for the exemption from the obligation to pay administrative charges as he had submitted neither the required declaration of income and assets nor evidence relating to efforts made by his wife (being the residence permit holder with whom the applicant intended to stay) to obtain the necessary funds. 17.  In reply to a further question, the Government submitted on 28 May 2008 that the assessment framework for an objection against the decision not to process an application for a residence permit due to a failure to pay the administrative charges was based on an ex tunc evaluation of whether that decision had been taken on reasonable grounds. Paying the administrative charges or submitting the required evidence subsequently was not an option; nor would it have any bearing on the decision not to process the application, as an ex nunc assessment was no longer possible. 18.  On 21 July 2008, in response to a further question, the Government confirmed that the applicant could submit a new application for a residence permit, which would be processed once he had paid the administrative charges or obtained an exemption from the obligation to pay them. The examination of the merits of such an application would include an assessment of compliance with Article 8 of the Convention.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1953, 1950, 1969 and 1969 and live in Uster, Zürich, Bäretswil and Nussbaumen respectively. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 8.  In 2003 the third applicant, an editor of the Kassensturz television programme, prepared a report on practices employed in selling life-insurance products. The report was prompted by the annual reports of the Private Insurance Ombudsman for the Canton of Zürich and by letters which the programme’s editors had received from viewers expressing their dissatisfaction with insurance brokers. Kassensturz is a long-running weekly consumer-protection programme on Swiss-German television (SF DRS). 9.  The third applicant agreed with the first applicant (the editor-in-chief of SF DRS) and the second applicant (the editor in charge of the programme) that she would record meetings between customers and brokers, using a hidden camera, to provide evidence of the brokers’ inadequate advice. It was decided that the meetings would be recorded in a private flat and that an insurance expert would then be asked to comment on them. 10.  The fourth applicant, a journalist working for SF DRS, arranged a meeting with an insurance broker from company X, which took place on 26 February 2003. She pretended to be a customer interested in taking out life insurance. The SF DRS crew installed two hidden cameras (Lipstickkameras) in the room in which the meeting was to take place, transmitting the recording of the conversation to a neighbouring room where the third applicant and the insurance expert had taken up position, together with a camera operator and a technician who had been assigned to film the expert’s views on the meeting. 11.  Once the meeting had finished, the third applicant joined the broker and the fourth applicant in the room, introduced herself as an editor of Kassensturz and explained to the broker that the conversation had been filmed. The broker replied that he had suspected as much (“Das habe ich gedacht”). The third applicant told him that he had made some crucial errors during the meeting and asked him for his views, but he refused to comment. 12.  The first and second applicants subsequently decided to broadcast part of the filmed meeting during a forthcoming edition of Kassensturz. They suggested that company X be invited to comment on the conversation and the criticism of the broker’s methods, and assured the company that his face and voice would be disguised and would therefore not be recognisable. Before the programme was broadcast, the applicants proceeded to pixelate the broker’s face so that only his hair and skin colour and his clothes could still be made out. His voice was also distorted. 13.  On 3 March 2003 the broker brought a civil action in the Zürich District Court, seeking an injunction preventing the programme from being broadcast. The action was dismissed in a decision of 24 March 2003. 14.  On 25 March 2003 the day after the application for an injunction to protect the broker’s interests had been rejected, excerpts from the meeting of 26 February were broadcast, with the broker’s face and voice disguised as planned. 15.  On 29 August 2006 the single judge for criminal cases at the Dielsdorf District Court (Canton of Zürich) found the first three applicants not guilty of intercepting and recording the conversations of others (offences under Article 179 bis §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code), and the fourth applicant not guilty of the unauthorised recording of conversations (Article 179 ter § 1 of the Criminal Code). 16.  Both the Principal Public Prosecutor (Oberstaatsanwalt) of the Canton of Zürich and the broker, as an injured party, appealed against the judgment of 29 August 2006. 17.  In a judgment of 5 November 2007, the Court of Appeal (Obergericht) of the Canton of Zürich found the first three applicants guilty of recording the conversations of others (Article 179 bis §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code) and of breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera (Article 179 quater §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code). It also found the fourth applicant guilty of unauthorised recording of conversations (Article 179 ter § 1 of the Criminal Code) and breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera (Article 179 quater §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code). The first three applicants were given suspended penalties of fifteen day-fines of 350 Swiss francs (CHF), CHF 200 and CHF 100 respectively, while the fourth applicant received a penalty of five day-fines of CHF 30. 18.  The applicants appealed jointly to the Federal Court against their convictions, relying in particular on the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. They argued that their recourse to the impugned technique had been necessary to achieve the aim pursued. 19.  In a judgment of 7 October 2008, which was served on the applicants’ representative on 15 October 2008, the Federal Court allowed the appeal in so far as it concerned the charge of breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera within the meaning of Article 179 quater of the Criminal Code. It held that there had been a violation of the principle that the trial must relate to the charges brought and a violation of the rights of the defence, and remitted the case to the lower court. 20.  The Federal Court dismissed the remainder of the appeal. It held that the applicants had committed acts falling under Article 179 bis §§ 1 and 2 and Article 179 ter § 1 of the Criminal Code and dismissed their defence of justification. It acknowledged that there was a significant public interest in being informed about practices employed in the field of insurance, and that this interest was liable to be weightier than the individual interests at stake. However, it considered that the applicants could have achieved their aims by other means entailing less interference with the broker’s private interests, for example by commenting on the Ombudsman’s annual reports or interviewing the Ombudsman’s staff or customers who were dissatisfied with their broker’s services. It also found that instead of filming the meeting with a hidden camera, the journalist could have drawn up a record of the conversation, although it acknowledged that the probative value of that method would obviously have been less striking. Lastly, it held that the filming of a single case was insufficient to provide reliable evidence of the scale of the alleged problems, since examples of malpractice in this field were widespread and common knowledge. The public could therefore not draw general conclusions about the quality of advice given by insurance companies from the broadcasting of an isolated example. 21.  On 24 February 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Canton of Zürich found the applicants guilty of breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera, an offence under Article 179 quater of the Criminal Code. It therefore slightly reduced the penalties previously imposed on them: the first three applicants were given twelve day-fines of CHF 350 (approximately 290 euros (EUR)), CHF 200 (approximately EUR 160) and CHF 100 (approximately EUR 80) respectively, instead of fifteen day-fines, and the fourth applicant was given four day-fines of CHF 30 instead of five day-fines. The penalties were all suspended for a probationary period of two years. The applicants did not appeal against that judgment.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Milan, which she had let to L.D.Z. 9.  In a registered letter of 6 June 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 29 December 1984 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 10.  On 11 February 1985, she served a notice to quit on the tenant, but she refused to leave. 11.  In a writ served on the tenant on 19 February 1985, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 12.  By a decision of 27 February 1985, which was made enforceable on 14 March 1985, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 27 February 1986. 13.  On 23 January 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14.  On 7 March 1986, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 April 1986. 15.  Between 18 April 1986 and 18 June 1992 the bailiff made 23 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 16.  Thereafter, the applicant decided not to pursue the enforcement proceedings, in order to avoid useless costs, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police. 17.  On 13 April 1996 the applicant repossessed the flat, which the tenant vacated in pursuance of an agreement reached with the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant, Josef Müller, is a Swiss citizen born in 1924. A businessman by profession, he resides in Zurich in Switzerland. 10.  In 1957 and 1959 the applicant acquired three adjacent properties, used for farming purposes, in Niederhasli in the vicinity of Zurich airport. The combined surfaces of the properties amount to approximately 25,500m2. During the ensuing proceedings at issue, there were, apart from an empty storehouse, no constructions on the properties. 11.  In 1966 these properties were attributed to the residential zone, and in 1984 to the commercial zone. 12.  Meanwhile, in 1983, the area of these properties was designated as pertaining to Security Zone I of Zurich airport and therefore the construction height of any new buildings was to be limited to between 21 and 38 meters. 13.  On 8 July 1983 the applicant applied to the President of the Federal Assessment Commission (Eidgenössische Schätzungskommission), requesting the institution of compensation proceedings on account of an alleged de facto expropriation (materielle Expropriation). The request was refused by the Commission in 1984 and, upon appeal, by the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) on 29 May 1986. 14.  On 7 March 1986 the applicant filed a new request for compensation which was declared inadmissible by the Commission “for the time being” (zur Zeit) on 4 February 1987 although, following the designation of new noise protection zones, the Commission decided to resume proceedings in 1988. Against both decisions the applicant filed administrative law appeals which were dismissed by the Federal Court in 1989. 15.  Meanwhile the applicant requested compensation from the Niederhasli municipality for the change in zone of his properties. The case was transmitted successively to the Federal Assessment Commission, the Dielsdorf District Council and the Government of the Canton of Zurich, which in 1990 ordered the Niederhasli municipality to institute compensation proceedings. Against this last decision the applicant filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich, which in 1992 found that it was up to the Cantonal Assessment Commission rather than the Niederhasli municipality to conduct the compensation proceedings. These proceedings were then instituted before the Cantonal Assessment Commission, though on 30 June 1995 the Federal Assessment Commission decided to suspend the proceedings until the Federal Court had given its judgment. 16.  Meanwhile, the Federal Assessment Commission dismissed on 26 October 1990 the applicant’s request for compensation of 7 March 1986 as, inter alia, there were still adequate possibilities for the applicant to use his properties. 17.  On 6 February 1991 the applicant filed an administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwede) with the Federal Court against this decision, requesting compensation for the depreciation in value of his properties on account of the extension and operations of Zurich airport. He also challenged all the Federal Court judges as they had previously sat in other proceedings concerning himself. 18.  By decision of 5 June 1991, the Federal Court dismissed the applicant’s challenge. 19.  The Federal Court then brought the applicant’s administrative appeal to the attention of the Government of the Canton of Zurich, which in its observations requested the court to dismiss the appeal. The Federal Assessment Commission refrained from filing observations. Upon the applicant’s request, the court authorised a further exchange of observations between the parties. 20.  On 19 August 1993 a delegation of the Federal Court visited the applicant’s properties. On that occasion he was informed that other cases concerning noise protection zones at Geneva airport raised similar problems as the applicant’s case, and that they all had to be dealt with together. 21.  On 14 March 1995 the applicant went bankrupt. The proceedings before the Federal Court were suspended and the bankruptcy office of the Küsnacht municipality was requested to inform the court whether the bankruptcy estate, or individual creditors, wished to continue the proceedings. Following an extension of the time-limit, the Küsnacht bankruptcy office filed its reply on 29 January 1997 whereupon the Federal Court resumed proceedings. On 11 March 1997 the applicant informed the court that he wished to continue the proceedings. 22.  On 4 June 1997, upon the Federal Court’s request, the Federal Agency for Examining Materials and Research (Eidgenössische Materialprüfungs- und Forschungsanstalt) submitted a report on the noise nuisance affecting the applicant’s properties. By letter dated 11 June 1997, the applicant expressed his disagreement with the report, whereas the Government of the Canton of Zurich accepted it on 26 June 1997. 23.  On 17 September 1997 the Federal Court conducted a hearing at which the applicant took the floor, complaining, inter alia, of the duration of the proceedings. The court then deliberated in public, whereby the Rapporteur (Referent) explained the legal considerations of his report and proposed to dismiss the applicant’s appeal. In the further discussion, it transpired that the other four judges shared the Rapporteur’s opinion. The presiding judge then read out the operative part of the judgment. 24.  The judgment, numbering 30 pages, was served on the applicant on 9 October 1997. The Federal Court concluded that the situation of the applicant’s properties did not warrant compensation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1956 and 1957 respectively and live in Zagreb. 6.  On 16 October 1991 the Gospić police learned that seven civilians had been killed that day in the village of Bukovac. Their bodies were transported to the Pathology Department of the Gospić Medical Centre by the members of the Croatian Army who had found them. Two of the bodies were identified as the applicants’ parents, Mile and Ana Pocrnić, and the third as their grandmother, Marija Pocrnić. An investigating judge of the Gospić County Court was informed of the killings. The investigating judge decided that it was not possible to carry out an on-site inspection because of the danger of further attacks by unidentified persons from Široka Kula. 7.  On the same day a pathologist performed an autopsy on the corpses and drew up a post-mortem report. He established that the applicants’ parents and their grandmother had been shot dead. 8.  On 28 December 1991 the Gospić police lodged a criminal complaint with the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office against persons unknown on charges of murder in connection with the killing of seven inhabitants of the Bukovac village on 16 October 1991, including the applicants’ parents, Mile and Ana Pocrnić, and their grandmother Marija Pocrnić. 9.  On 11 September 1992 the Gospić police interviewed I.P., who had been living in Podlapača, a village near Bukovac, during the critical period. On an unspecified date in December 1991 three members of the Serbian paramilitary forces, M.B., R.Š. and J.G., had fired at him, but he had escaped into the woods. While visiting one of his neighbours on 26 October 1991 he had met B. and Č., who had said that they had killed some people in Bukovac. When the police showed him photographs of some members of the Serbian paramilitary forces he recognised B.G. and Č.B. as B. and Č., the persons he had met at his neighbour’s house. 10.  On 14 September 1992 the police interviewed P.J. and I.J., who were brothers. P.J. said that he had met B.G., Č.B. and another man in a prison in Knin. When he had asked B.G. why they had been imprisoned he had told him that they had killed some civilians in Korenica. However, I.J. and P.J. thought that this had not happened in Korenica but in one of the Croatian villages near Lički Osik. 11.  On 15 September 1992 the Gospić police sent a report to the Karlovac Military Prosecutor stating that B.G. and Č.B may have been among the perpetrators of the killings in Bukovac. 12.  Immediately before the Croatian Army military action “Storm” which started on 4 August 1995, the vast majority of the Serbian paramilitary forces fled Croatia, firstly to Bosnia and then to Serbia in some cases. 13.  In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the “UNTAES”). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 14.  On 19 March 1996 the second applicant handed the police a letter sent to her by her relative D.P. 15.  In 2001 the police interviewed the second applicant. 16.  On 23 August 2001 the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka) sent a report to the Ministry of Justice and the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office on the killing of the applicants’ parents and grandmother, allegedly by members of the Serbian paramilitary forces. The report stated that the only survivors who had any information about the killings were D.P. and J.P., who both lived in Canada. A letter of 19 March 1996, drafted by D.P., was also enclosed, as well as a letter drafted by D.P. and his father J.P. on an unspecified date and sent to the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. D.P. alleged that on 16 October 1991 a group of members of the Serbian paramilitary forces from Široka Kula had come to their village, Bukovac, and killed several people. He named D.L., M.Su., M.O., D.V., M.Se., Bo.K., Da.M., N.M., Du.M., Br.K., Ma.U., S.G., Mi.U. and T.G. as those personally known to him. He openly named commanders of various formations of these forces as: P.R., M.O., S.Č. or Ɖ., Mi.Se. and M.K. The only survivors had been himself and his parents. They had been taken from Bukovac to a prison in Korenica. His mother had died in the meantime while he and his father J.P. had emigrated to Canada after the war. 17.  On 1 October 2001 the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office lodged a request for an investigation with the Gospić County Court and asked that D.P. and J.P. be heard as witnesses. 18.  On 15 January 2004 the police interviewed S.Ɖ. and D.S., former members of the Serbian paramilitary forces, in the Zagreb Prison Hospital. S.Ɖ. said that a formation of Serbian paramilitary forces under the command of Mi.S. and D.L. had carried out “actions”, inter alia, in the area of Bukovac. He named several members of that formation. D.S. described various actions in which members of Serbian paramilitary forces had killed civilians in Croatian villages in the broader area of Široka Kula and Lički Osik, including Bukovac, but had no information about the killing of the applicants’ relatives. 19.  On 23 January 2004 the police interviewed B.Č., also a former member of the Serbian paramilitary forces, who described various actions in which members of Serbian paramilitary forces had killed civilians in Croatian villages in the broader area of Široka Kula and Lički Osik, including Bukovac, but had no information about the killing of the applicants’ relatives. 20.  On 2 May 2006 an investigating judge of the Gospić County Court asked the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office whether they still insisted on interviews with D.P. and J.P. since their address was “uncertain”. On 29 June 2006 the investigating judge asked the Gospić Counter-Information Service for the address of D.P. and J.P. On 9 August 2006 the Centre provided the investigating judge with the address of D.P. and J.P. in Canada. 21.  On 16 September 2008 the Department for War Crimes of the Ministry of the Interior sent a detailed report about the possible suspects to the Ličko-senjska Police Department. 22.  On 16 July 2010 the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office sent a report to the State Attorney’s Office on the killing of seven civilians in Bukovac in 1991. The Gospić County Court had informed them that the Canadian Ministry of Justice had invited D.P. and J.P. on three occasions to give their statements, which they had refused to do with the explanation that they had already given their statements in writing. They had almost certainly been referring to a letter to their relatives in Croatia and the one sent to the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. 23.  On 14 September 2010 an investigating judge of the Gospić County Court heard evidence from M.Ć., who confirmed that members of the Serbian paramilitary forces had captured D.P. in 1991. As to the killing of the seven persons in Bukovac, he had heard about that from one I.K., who had died in the meantime. 24.  On 24 October 2011 the police interviewed M.P., I.J. and P.J. M.P. had no relevant information about the killing of the civilians in Bukovac. I.J. and P.J. repeated their earlier statements (see paragraph 10 above). 25.  On 25 October 2011 the police again interviewed I.P., who repeated his statement of 11 September 1992 (see paragraph 9 above). On the same day the police also interviewed N.P., a neighbour of I.P., who admitted that B.G. and Č.B. had visited him in 1991 but said that they had not mentioned the killing of civilians in Bukovac. 26.  On 26 October 2011 the police noted that in March 2011 B.G. and Č.B. had been convicted of war crimes in connection with the killing of R.’s family in Lički Osik, Croatia, and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment by a court in Belgrade. 27.  In 2011 the police interviewed the second applicant again. 28.  On 20 January 2011 the police interviewed D.M., one of the Croatian soldiers who had found the bodies in Bukovac. He had no relevant information about the killing of the civilians in Bukovac. 29.  On 21 January 2011 the police interviewed B.Č., a former member of the Serbian paramilitary forces. He repeated his earlier statement (see paragraph 19 above). 30.  On 22 August 2011 the Belgrade Interpol Office informed the Zagreb Interpol Office that one of the suspects, D.V., had been placed in pre-trial detention in connection with a different set of criminal proceedings. He had in the meantime become a Serbian citizen. 31.  On 2 February 2012 the Ličko-senjska Police Department sent a report to the Karlovac County State Attorney’s Office informing it that two of the persons mentioned in D.P.’s letter (see paragraph 14 above), namely D.L. and M.S., had died. A report drawn up by M.Š., a member of the Serbian paramilitary forces was enclosed. It stated that on 16 October 1991 “they had killed seven people”. A list of the members of the paramilitary forces from the Teslingrad area was also enclosed. 32.  On 21 September 2012 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office sent a criminal complaint against B.G. and Č.B. to the Serbian Prosecutor for War Crimes and asked him for the address of another suspect, M.Š., indicating that he should be questioned about the report he had allegedly drawn up on the events of 16 October 1991 in Bukovac. 33.  On 28 January 2013 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office forwarded a report on the interviews with B.G., Č.B. and M.Š., carried out by the Serbian authorities, to the Ličko-senjska Police Department. They denied any involvement in the killing of the applicants’ relatives. 34.  Between 21 February and 5 March 2013 the Ličko-senjska Police Department interviewed P.J., I.J., D.P., M.P., I.P. and N.P., M.P. and D.P. had no relevant information about the killing of the applicants’ relatives. The others repeated their earlier statements. 35.  On 27 February and 8 March 2013 the Ličko-senjska Police Department sent a report to the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office listing the suspected perpetrators of the killings in Bukovac on 16 October 1991. Four of them had died, fourteen had moved to Serbia, three to the United States and in respect of two of them there was no relevant information. 36.  On 15 March 2013 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office sent the report of 8 March 2013 to the Serbian Prosecutor for War Crimes and asked him to interview the suspects living in Serbia. 37.  In April 2013 the police learned that one of the suspects, I.S., had died.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 5.  In 1986 the applicant took part in the cleaning-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. He was subsequently granted Category 2 disability status and became entitled to various social benefits. The subjects of the present case are the disputes concerning these benefits. 6.  In 1996 the applicant lodged a complaint before the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don alleging a failure of the authorities to comply with the pension law. On 24 July 1996 the District Court upheld the complaint, noting the authorities' unlawful inactivity. 7.  On 18 November 1997 the Proletarskiy District Court upheld the applicant's action against the authorities and awarded him monthly payments of 2,495,023 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for health damage and as food allowance. The District Court also awarded him a lump sum of RUB 47,314,000 in outstanding compensation. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. The authorities did not pay the applicant the lump sum, and made the monthly payments only until September 2000. 8.  On 15 March 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court, by way of supervisory-review proceedings, quashed the judgment of 18 November 1997 and remitted the case for re-examination to the Proletarskiy District Court. 9.  The hearings were adjourned on 14 May 2001 and on 7 June 2001 due to the authorities' failure to appear. 10.  The next hearing was fixed for 5 July 2001 when it was again postponed as the applicant had amended his claims. 11.  On 17 September 2001 the applicant lodged additional claims. 12.  On 24 September 2001 the court granted the authorities' request for stay in the proceedings on the grounds that there were pending related proceedings in the Supreme Court of Russia and in the Constitutional Court of Russia. The proceedings in the Constitutional Court had been initiated by the applicant (see para. 60 below). The applicant appealed against the decision to stay the proceedings, to no avail. 13.  On 24 October 2002 the case was reopened and assigned for hearing for 21 November 2002. 14.  On 21 November 2002 the authorities failed to appear and the proceedings were adjourned. 15.  On 10 December 2002 the Proletarskiy District Court accepted the applicant's claims in part. It ordered that the Social Security Services should pay him a lump sum of RUB 37,992.75 in compensation for health damage, monthly payments of RUB 4,850 and a lump sum of RUB 5,000 in compensation for damage caused by a delay in the payment of monthly benefits. The District Court also noted that the amount of monthly payments was to be index-linked in accordance with the law. The judgment was upheld on appeal and became final on 7 May 2003. 16.  In 2003 the authorities, as well as the applicant, requested reopening of the proceedings by way of supervisory review. 17.  On 13 November 2003 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgments of 10 December 2002 and 7 May 2003 and sent the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium held that the lower court had not calculated the sums of compensation and adjustment of monthly payments in accordance with the relevant law provisions, considering it as mistakes in implementation of substantive, as well as procedural, law. 18.  On 18 December 2003 the authorities failed to appear in court and the hearing was adjourned. 19.  On 23 January 2004 the applicant specified his claim. 20.  On 12 February 2004 the case was postponed as the authorities were not properly informed about the hearing. 21.  On 26 February 2004 the authorities failed to appear and the hearing was adjourned. 22.  On 4 March 2004 the examination of the case was postponed as the judge was considering another case. 23.  On 1 April 2004 the case was adjourned because of default in appearance of the applicant. 24.  On 22 April 2004 the Proletarskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's action in full. The applicant appealed. However, on 29 April 2004 the District Court adjourned the examination of the appeal because the applicant had only submitted a short version of his appeal statement. On 7 June 2004 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 April 2004 as unlawful. 25.  The applicant contested the accuracy of the minutes of the hearing of 22 April 2004. On 29 April 2004 the Proletarskiy District Court dismissed the claim without consideration on the merits. The applicant appealed and on 7 July 2004 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 April 2004 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. On 2 September 2004 the applicant's claim concerning the minutes was dismissed on the merits. 26.  On 13 October 2004 the Rostov Regional Court, acting on appeal, quashed the judgment of 22 April 2004 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 27.  On 16 November 2004 the case was assigned to examination for 30 November 2004. On that date the applicant asked the court to request some documents from the defendant. The hearing was adjourned to 21 December 2004. 28.  Upon the applicant's requests the subsequent hearings were adjourned until 16 February 2005. 29.  On 16 February 2005 the case was adjourned due to the absence of a prosecutor. 30.  On 2 March 2005 the case was not tried again due to the applicant's failure to appear. 31.  On 24 March 2005 the District Court partly upheld the applicant's action and awarded him a lump sum of RUB 45,919.02 in outstanding compensation for health damage, monthly payments of RUB 3,857.94 in compensation for health damage and RUB 6,000 in compensation for damage caused by a delay in payment of monthly sums. Thus, as compared with the quashed final judgment of 18 November 1997, the court awarded a lesser lump sum but higher monthly payments. 32.  On 7 July 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 33.  As to the enforcement of the judgment, the monthly payments were made regularly and the lump sum was transferred to the applicant's account by 30 November 2005. 34.  On 15 February 2006 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don granted the applicant's request and quashed the judgment of 24 March 2005 as upheld on 7 July 2005 due to newly-discovered circumstances. 35.  On 28 February 2006 and on 28 March 2006 the applicant unsuccessfully requested suspension of the proceedings as the same claims were considered by another court (see para. 46 below). 36.  On 17 April 2006 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don discontinued the proceedings as the applicant failed to appear before the court and did not request the case to be tried in his absence. 37.  In August 2000 the applicant lodged an action against the Federal Treasury complaining that the lump sum awarded under the judgment of 18 November 1997 had never been paid to him. He sought compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 38.  On 14 December 2000 the Leninskiy District Court stayed the proceedings because the President of the Rostov Regional Court had lodged an application for a supervisory review of the judgment of 18 November 1997. 39.  The decision of 14 December 2000 was quashed on appeal on 6 March 2001 and the proceedings were resumed. 40.  On 4 June 2003 the Leninskiy District Court disallowed the applicant's action against the Treasury. That decision was quashed on 9 July 2003 and the action was sent to the District Court for an examination on its merits. 41.  On 6 October 2003 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's action on the ground that the judgment of 18 November 1997 had been quashed by way of supervisory review on 15 March 2001 and that on 10 December 2002 the applicant had obtained another judgment in his favour. On 12 November 2003 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 6 October 2003. 42.  In September 1999 the applicant brought proceedings against authorities demanding adjustment of his monthly payments. 43.  On 22 May 2000 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don dismissed the applicant's action. The judgment was upheld on appeal and became final on 11 October 2000. 44.  On 13 February 2006 the applicant requested the case to be reopened due to newly discovered circumstances. 45.  On 30 March 2006 the Leninskiy District Court granted the claim and quashed the judgment of 22 May 2000. 46.  After the resumption of the proceedings the applicant amended his claims several times. Eventually he claimed damages for the delays in payments and failures to adjust them, making the claims similar to those considered in another case (see para. 35 above). 47.  On 17 January 2007 the Leninskiy District Court granted the applicant's claims in part. It made the relevant adjustments and awarded the applicant compensation for the underpaid sums in the amount of RUB 231,065.39, monthly payments of RUB 7,766.51 and yearly payments of RUB 2,387.32. 48.  On 14 May 2007 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 49.  The monthly payments were made without delay. As to the lump sum, it was received by the applicant in November 2007. 50.  In July 2000 the applicant lodged another action seeking adjustment of his monthly payments to take account of increases of the minimum monthly wage. 51.  On 27 October 2000 the Leninskiy District Court upheld the action. That judgment was quashed on appeal on 21 August 2002 and the case was remitted for a fresh examination. 52.  On 4 October 2002 the District Court dismissed the claims in full. On 25 December 2002 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment. 53.  In September 2000 the authorities, by a unilateral decision, reduced the amount of monthly payments to the applicant. Two months later he lodged an action against the authorities complaining about the reduction and seeking compensation for damage. 54.  On 13 December 2000 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Rostov‑on-Don held that the authorities the applicant sued were not the proper respondent and disallowed the action against them. However, the District Court ordered another authority, the local Social Security Service, to join the proceedings as a respondent party and to resume payments of monthly sums to the applicant in accordance with the judgment of 18 November 1997. 55.  On 28 January 2001 the Rostov Regional Court, acting on appeal, upheld the judgment of 13 December 2000 in the part concerning the disallowance but quashed the remaining part of the judgment and sent the matter for a fresh examination. 56.  On 15 November 2001, as a result of the re-examination, the District Court dismissed the applicant's claims in full. The applicant did not appeal. 57.  The applicant lodged an action before the Pervomayskiy District Court asking for information to be disclosed about local judges who had not been provided with housing premises in accordance with the law. By the final judgment of 19 December 2001 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the action, noting that the information was confidential. 58.  In 2001 the applicant unsuccessfully asked the authorities to provide him with information concerning the representation of their interests in courts. He complained about the refusal to a court. 59.  On 19 December 2001 the Rostov Regional Court, in the final instance, dismissed the complaint, noting that the applicant's rights and freedoms had not been infringed by the refusal. 60.  On 24 January 2001 the applicant brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation claiming unconstitutionality of some of the law provisions concerning payments for disability caused by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. 61.  On 19 June 2002 the Constitutional Court found the provisions constitutional, thus rejecting the applicant's claim. At the same time it noted that by these norms the State took an obligation to make the relevant payments within a specified period of time. It underlined, with the reference to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, that when an award is made by a final judgment, it should be enforced without delay. 62.  The applicant, relying on the decision of 19 June 2002 of the Constitutional Court, asked the Pervomayskiy District Court to review its final judgment of 15 November 2001 due to newly discovered circumstances. 63.  On 18 February 2002 the District Court dismissed the request. That decision became final on 7 May 2003 when the Rostov Regional Court upheld it on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Zagreb. She has suffered since her early childhood from cerebral palsy and uses a wheel chair. In 1968 she was deprived of her legal capacity on account of “her physical illness and intellectual underdevelopment”. On 10 July 1979 her legal capacity was fully restored by a ruling of the Zagreb Municipal Court. 7.  On 12 November 2009 the Pešćenica Social Welfare Centre (hereinafter “the Centre”) asked the Zagreb Municipal Court to institute proceedings with a view to partially depriving the applicant of her legal capacity in order to prevent her from disposing of her assets. They relied on a previous ruling of 1968 by the same court by which the applicant had been deprived of her legal capacity (see the preceding paragraph). They further asserted that the applicant had been suffering from “grave bodily damage” (velika tjelesna oštećenja) since early childhood, as she had been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and various chronic illnesses such as diabetes, high blood pressure and defective eyesight. 8.  They further asserted, relying on a statement given by the applicant’s son at the Centre and a report by the Centre’s social worker, that the applicant’s condition had worsened after she had undergone an operation on her head on 9 September 2008. Since then she had suffered from personality changes, manifested in managing her money in an irrational manner, such as by not paying the monthly instalments for the purchase of her flat, electricity, water and other bills, and by purchasing mobile telephone cards instead of food. This could have led to the applicant’s eviction from the flat she occupied, as she had already received a final warning that a civil action in that respect was to be lodged. 9.  The Centre’s request was supported by evidence, such as an electricity bill of 27,625.70 Croatian kunas (HRK) dated 30 March 2009, a copy of a final demand for payment of monthly instalments for the purchase of the applicant’s flat, with the debt amounting to HRK 8,290.25 as at 7 March 2009, a notice that the water supply for the applicant’s flat would be stopped as of 25 May 2009 on account of non-payment of a debt in the amount of HRK 4,447.42, and a debt recovery notice for the amount of HRK 451.70 payable to Croatian Radio and Television (HRT). 10.  On 28 October 2009 the Centre appointed its employee, Ms J.T., as the applicant’s legal guardian in the proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Court. In the proceedings before that court the guardian gave her full consent to the Centre’s application. The applicant was represented by a lawyer of her own choosing. 11.  The Municipal Court heard the applicant on 24 March 2010 and established that:\n“The respondent was found at her address in a wheelchair. She gave very meaningful answers; [she] stressed that she acted autonomously, kept her flat tidy, prepared her meals and was provided with help by her son and a tenant. She moved about independently in her wheelchair and did her own shopping, [and] paid [her own] bills, which gave rise to difficulties during winter. She stated that in the period when she had underwent a head surgery in September [2008], she had been late with paying her utility bills ... She did not agree with the proceedings [being brought] and considered that she did not need a guardian. She stressed that she regularly took [her] prescribed medication ... It is to be noted that the respondent was presentable and her home was tidy.” 12.  In her written submissions the applicant explained that during her hospitalisation she had empowered her son to retrieve money from her bank account and pay the utility bills, which he had not done but had instead taken the money for himself. She asked that her son be examined by the court. 13.  A psychiatric report commissioned for the purposes of the proceedings, drawn up on 12 April 2010 by D.P. and G.M., in so far as relevant reads as follows:\n“A psychiatric examination of the respondent was carried out on 3 April 2010 at her home ... She stated that she had completed elementary school and had been an average pupil, that she had studied law for one year and knew all about the law. To me she said: ‘You know how it was when you operated on me.’ She is dissatisfied with the court proceedings [being brought]: ‘I dislike the Pešćenica [Social Welfare Centre] because they attempted to send me to [a home in] Novi Marof.’ And in respect of her son she said: ‘I am sorry when someone blackmails him’. She stated that she had been paying all her bills and that ‘I previously had a huge negative [balance], [because] I had to pay for the hospital’. She stated that she had a lot of acquaintances who were her former lodgers, whom she saw regularly when out and about in her wheelchair in her neighbourhood and ‘they all respect me’. Upon a direct question she denied having any mental problems.\nPsychological status: conscious, contact easily established, uncertain about time, in other respects well oriented. Has a wide and viscous (viskozni) thought process, with loss of determining tendency. Interacts without distance. In thought content confabulatory with a paranoid position, projections and infantile explanation. Basic disposition is elevated. Intellectually – memory functions are primarily insufficient at the LMR level, additionally compromised with psychoorganic type. Lacks insight into her condition.\nMarija Ivinović suffers from MB. Little, parapresis spast., monoparesis ext. sup. spast. sin., LMR, condition after brain haemorrhage, condition after stroke, condition after meningoencephalitis, with a lack of insight into her condition [and] the need for and purpose of treatment. Owing to this, she is not able to entirely look after her personal needs, rights and interests. Also, because of her state of health and lack of insight she may jeopardise the rights and interests of others.” 14.  On 19 May 2010 the applicant lodged written submissions whereby she objected to the psychiatrists’ findings, stating that it was not clear how they had concluded that she was unable to properly dispose of her money, given that the debts referred to had been incurred by her son when she had been hospitalised. 15.  At a hearing held on 21 October 2010 the psychiatrists gave the following opinion evidence:\n“We entirely endorse our written report of 3 April 2010 and to the objections filed by the respondent we would state the following: on the basis of the enclosed medical records, social history and our own examination we have established that the respondent suffers from Morbus Littlee. She also suffers from triparesis with preserved functions of her right hand, mild mental retardation, and conditions following a brain haemorrhage and meningoencephalitis. Her intellectual capabilities are, owing to the above-mentioned [conditions], additionally compromised on the psychoorganic type. During the interview we noticed confabulations in the content of her thoughts, that is to say fabricated content, a paranoid position, in particular as regards her close family and the employees of the social welfare centre, and infantile explanation. The respondent lacks insight into her condition. All this led us [to conclude] that the respondent does not possess sufficient intellectual capacity to adequately protect her own rights and interests, and because of her lack of insight she might also jeopardise the rights and interests of others. We therefore consider that the application for deprivation of the respondent’s legal capacity as regards disposing of her money and assets and as regards taking decisions about her medical treatment, is appropriate.” 16.  On 21 October 2010 the Zagreb Municipal Court partially deprived the applicant of her legal capacity, thereby stopping her from disposing of her money and other assets and from making independent decisions concerning her medical treatment. The ruling relied exclusively on the opinion given by the two psychiatrists and extensively repeated their findings stated in their written report and their oral evidence given at the hearing of 21 October 2010. 17.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 11 November 2010, in which she argued that partially depriving her of her legal capacity solely on the basis of the psychiatric report had not been justified, because the psychiatrists had lacked knowledge of how she spent her money and how she disposed of her assets. She argued that she had purchased the flat where she lived herself and there was no danger that she would give it up. The assertion that she was paranoid as regards her close family members was not correct. She had had troubled relations with her son at times because he had moved into her flat with his girlfriend and her daughter and had had an interest in having her removed from the flat and placed in a home. Therefore, she had successfully sought their eviction from her flat. She had also changed her bank and her son no longer had authority to use her credit card. She lived a peaceful life, and was a member of the Association of Disabled Persons with Cerebral Palsy and Poliomyelitis. The court conducting the proceedings had had the chance to establish that normal communication with her was possible and that she lived in a tidy flat. The Centre had not proven the need for her to be partially deprived of her legal capacity. Only a bookkeeping expert could have established the facts concerning her debts. 18.  The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Bjelovar County Court on 26 January 2012, which again relied extensively on the psychiatric report. The appeal court added that the applicant had been hospitalised between 9 and 25 September 2008 and 23 October and 13 November 2008, whereas the unpaid bills (see paragraph 9 above) were dated 9 April 2009 (electricity bill of HRK 27,625.70), 18 March 2009 (HRK 8,290.25 in monthly instalments for the purchase of the flat) and 22 May 2009 (water bill of HRK 4,477.42), which indicated that the debts concerned a much longer period than the applicant’s hospitalisation. 19.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, in which she repeated the arguments from her appeal, stressing that the debts in question had been incurred during the period in which she had been hospitalised and her son had had her bank card. Instead of paying her bills he had used the money from her account for his own needs. She added that only one of the psychiatrists who had drawn up the report on her mental state had interviewed her. She also stressed that it was entirely unclear what rights and interests of others she might jeopardise. The complaint was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 13 June 2012.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Bratislava. 5.  On 30 December 1997 the applicant’s wife stopped living with the applicant. She moved to her parents’ house together with her and the applicant’s son who was born on 4 July 1995. 6.  On 20 March 1998 the applicant sought the determination of his right to meet his son. His wife counter-claimed that the applicant should be prohibited from meeting the boy. 7.  On 8 June 1998 the applicant requested the Bratislava III District Court to issue an injunction granting him the right to meet his son every weekend.  On 7 July 1998 the District Court dismissed that request. On 29 October 1998 the court of appeal upheld that decision. It noted that the request was premature as no decision had yet been given as regards the custody of the child. 8.  On 29 June 1999 the Bratislava III District Court granted a divorce to the applicant and his wife. The latter was given custody of their son and the applicant was obliged to contribute to his maintenance. 9.  On 28 July 1999 the applicant, with reference to the above judgment, informed the District Court that he wished to withdraw his action. His former wife withdrew her counter-claim. The Bratislava III District Court therefore discontinued the proceedings on 21 October 1999. 10.  In an action filed on 18 January 2000 before the Bratislava III District Court the applicant claimed the right to meet his son. 11.  A hearing was held on 4 May 2000. On 24 May 2000 the child’s mother counter-claimed that the applicant should be prohibited from meeting their son on the ground that the applicant drank and had behaved in an aggressive manner. At a hearing held on 15 June 2000 the District Court decided to examine jointly the claims of both parents. 12.  On 13 July 2000 neither the child’s mother nor her lawyer appeared before the District Court. The mother did not appear on 17 August 2000 either, and the District Court imposed a procedural fine on her. On 11 September 2000 the police informed the court that they had been unable to serve a document on the applicant’s former wife in person. 13.  A hearing was held on 5 October 2000. 14.  On 16 October 2000 the Bratislava III District Court appointed an expert and instructed her to submit an opinion. 15.  On 3 November 2000 the court requested the applicant to pay an advance on the expert’s fee. The applicant paid the sum on 21 June 2001. 16.  On 6 April 2001 the expert asked to be excused from the case as she was ill. 17.  On 17 April 2001 the District Court excused the expert. At the same time it appointed a different expert and instructed her to submit an opinion within thirty days. 18.  On 2 July 2001 the new expert asked to be excused as she could not assess the case in an impartial manner. 19.  On 1 August 2001 another person was instructed to submit an expert opinion. On 12 September 2001 that person informed the court that he no longer worked as a court expert. According to a note of 16 October 2001 drafted by the judge dealing with the case, the person in question was still registered as an expert. 20.  On 24 September 2001, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, the president of the Bratislava Regional Court admitted that there had been undue delay in the proceedings between November 2000 and the beginning of April 2001. Otherwise, the judge had dealt with the case in an orderly manner, holding hearings at regular intervals. 21.  On 12 November 2001 a fourth expert was appointed. On 22 March 2002 the court urged the expert to submit an opinion. It was submitted on 9 April 2002. 22.  On 29 April 2002 the applicant appealed against the decision of 12 April 2002 concerning the expert’s fees. The appeal was submitted to the Regional Court on 15 May 2002. The Regional Court dismissed the appeal on 5 August 2002. 23.  At the hearing held on 12 November 2002 the District Court heard the expert. The applicant requested that the expert be excluded from the case on grounds of bias. On 12 December 2002 the District Court requested the expert to comment on the applicant’s request. The expert replied on 31 December 2002. On 27 January 2003 the District Court found that the expert was not biased. The applicant appealed on 17 February 2003. 24.  In the meantime, on 15 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the District Court’s decision of 19 December 2002 on the expert’s fees. 25.  On 12 February 2003 and on 25 April 2003 the applicant made further written submissions to the District Court. 26.  In February 2003 the case was submitted to the Regional Court for a decision on the applicant’s appeals against the above-mentioned procedural decisions. 27.  On 25 March 2003 the child’s mother sought an interim measure ordering the applicant to abstain from any contact with their son. She submitted that the applicant had attacked her and the boy on their way to school. 28.  On 27 March 2003 the District Court asked the Regional Court to return the file to it so that it could decide on the request for an injunction. 29.  On 6 May 2003 the Regional Court returned the file to the District Court after it had upheld the first-instance decisions challenged by the applicant. 30.  On 7 May 2003 the District Court asked the expert to answer additional questions. The court dismissed the mother’s request for an injunction. The decision stated that extensive expert evidence was being taken with a view to establishing in a reliable manner whether or not the applicant’s contacts with the child could threaten the latter’s physical and mental health. At that time, it had not yet been established that the injunction which the mother sought to obtain was required to protect the interests of the child.\nThe child’s mother appealed on 20 May 2003.\nOn 28 November 2003 the Regional Court in Bratislava upheld the first-instance decision. It underlined that the mother’s fear of the applicant’s negative impact on the child did not, as such, justify the injunction requested. The court also noted that, because of the mother’s behaviour, the applicant had been unable to participate in the education of his son. 31.  On 12 May 2003 the District Court appointed a guardian to represent the child in the injunction proceedings. On the same day the file was sent to the Constitutional Court which dealt with the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings. The file was returned to the District Court on 5 June 2003. 32.  On 18 June 2003 an administrative authority submitted observations to the District Court. 33.  As indicated above, on 28 November 2003 the court of appeal upheld the decision of 7 May 2003 on the mother’s request for an injunction. The file was returned to the District Court on 14 January 2004. 34.  On 6 February 2004 the District Court asked the applicant to explain one of his earlier submissions. The applicant replied on 18 February 2004. Between 24 February 2004 and 16 March 2004 the case was submitted to the court of appeal. The latter found that no request for the exclusion of the judge of the first-instance court had been filed. 35.  On 21 April 2004 the District Court found that the expert was not to be excluded. 36.  On 21 May 2004 the District Court ordered the assessment of the applicant’s mental health. The expert’s opinion was submitted on 22 November 2004. On 3 February 2005 the opinion was sent to the parties. On the same day the expert who had submitted an opinion on 9 April 2002 was requested to supplement it. On 1 March 2005 that expert informed the court that the child’s mother had refused to co-operate with him. Subsequently, the mother and the child appeared before the expert and he submitted his opinion on 11 May 2005. The opinion was sent to the parties on 17 May 2005. 37.  The District Court scheduled a hearing in the case for 30 May 2006. 38.  The Court has received no information about any further development in the case. 39.  On 7 February 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about undue delays in the Bratislava III District Court proceedings. He requested that the Constitutional Court find as follows:\n“The Bratislava III District Court violated the applicant’s right under Article 48(2) of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay in proceedings 26 P 9/00.\n[The Constitutional Court] awards the applicant 1.2 million Slovak korunas by way of just satisfaction as well as 120,000 Slovak korunas for costs and expenses.”\nIn the reasons for his complaint the applicant also mentioned Article 8 of the Convention submitting that he had been prevented from meeting his son for more than five years. However, as the applicant did not include this particular complaint in the text of the finding which he requested the Constitutional Court to make, the relevant domestic law prevented the Constitutional Court from expressing its view on that issue (see paragraphs 46-48 below). 40.  On 17 September 2003 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right under Article 48(2) of the Constitution had not been violated. 41.  The Constitutional Court held, in particular, that the case was complex. The applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings in that he had repeatedly challenged the expert and the decisions on the expert’s fees, thus prolonging the period for an overall period of nine months. The Constitutional Court also took into account that the applicant had belatedly paid the advance on the expert’s fees. 42.  As to the conduct of the District Court, the Constitutional Court held that the judge had displayed due diligence when dealing with the case. The length of the proceedings was substantially due to difficulties in obtaining an expert opinion. However, the fact that the three experts appointed were unable to submit an opinion could not have been foreseen and no unjustified delays could be imputed to the District Court on that account. The fact that the judge had not urged the first expert to submit the opinion after the expiry of the time-limit set could not affect the position.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The first applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Joensuu. He is a member of the Finnish Bar. The other 17 applicants were his clients at the relevant time (“the client applicants”). 8.  On 26 January 1999 the police conducted a search – it is not entirely clear of which premises – based on the suspicion that the first applicant's clients X and Y (not client applicants before the Court) had committed aggravated debtor's fraud. In the course of that search X managed to destroy the original of a promissory note which the police had attempted to seize and which may have been relevant to the financial arrangements underlying the suspected offence. 9.  At the time the first applicant's status in the investigation had been that of a witness. On 22 February 1999 the police requested him to attend for questioning in this capacity. This request was apparently cancelled before he had taken any action thereon. 10.  A police officer in charge of the criminal investigations granted a search warrant and on 2 March 1999 seven officers of the National Bureau of Investigation (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen), assisted by a tax inspector and an enforcement official (ulosottomies, utmätningsman), searched the first applicant's law office, flat and vehicles. This search warrant was likewise based on the suspicion that X and Y had committed aggravated debtor's fraud but the first applicant was now indicated as a suspect, namely that he had aided and abetted the offences by drafting certain documents. 11.  Under the terms of the warrant the search aimed at examining “the documents, computers and archives of the law office” as well as the first applicant's flat and vehicles “so as to investigate the share transactions by the limited liability company [H.] in 1998 and to find material relating to those transactions”. 12.  During the search of his law office all of the first applicant's client files were allegedly perused. The police also examined all floppy disks and examined his note books pertaining to his meetings with clients. In addition, the hard disks in the office computers were copied: two were copied on the spot and two computers, including the one used by the first applicant himself, were seized for later disk-copying on police premises. Those computers were returned on 4 March 1999. 13.  The first applicant's computer also contained software for electronic mail, including his private and professional messages. 14.  A fellow member of the Bar assisted the first applicant during part of the search. 15.  On 4 March 1999 the first applicant requested the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Joensuu to revoke the seizure as being unlawful. On 24 March 1999 the court nevertheless maintained it, noting that the first applicant was suspected of aiding and abetting aggravated debtor's dishonesty. 16.  On 11 May 1999 the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Eastern Finland upheld the District Court's decision and on 25 November 1999 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the first applicant leave to appeal. 17.  On 4 May 1999 the police certified the return of three of the four hard disks and that they had destroyed any copies thereof. They stated however that they would retain a copy of the fourth hard disk until the lawfulness of the seizure had been finally decided or until the material could be destroyed for any other reason. 18.  In June 1999 three of the applicants (nos. 2-3 and 8) requested the District Court to revoke the seizure of the copy of the fourth hard disk (which contained material relating to their instructions to the first applicant) and to order the police to compensate their costs. They argued that the seizure had been unlawful from the outset. At any rate, the copy in question was of no relevance to the pre-trial investigation concerning X and Y. 19.  In its rejoinder the National Bureau of Investigation referred to the Court of Appeal's decision of 11 May 1999 in which the seizure had been found lawful. Moreover, the hard disks had only been subjected to a targeted search and they were able to search information concerning only relevant companies and individuals. Only the potentially relevant client files in the law office had been perused. The search and seizure had thus not been of wholesale nature. The tax and enforcement officials who had witnessed the search had been – and remained – under a duty to keep secret any information thereby obtained. 20.  On 17 June 1999 the District Court agreed with the three client applicants and ordered that the copy of the fourth hard disk be returned. It rejected, as not being based on law, the applicants' claim for compensation in respect of their costs. The applicants appealed on this point, whereas the police appealed against the revocation order. 21.  In its submissions to the Court of Appeal the National Bureau of Investigation listed the contents of the copied hard disk. For example, specific mention was made of what appears to have been the promissory note which the police had been looking for (and had found). The submissions indicated the debtor's and the creditor's names as well as the amount of the debt. The National Bureau of Investigation furthermore explained that the material on the relevant hard disk had been copied to a so-called optical disk which could in any case not be returned as it also contained internal police data. The submissions by the Bureau were apparently not ordered to be kept confidential. 22.  On 27 January 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the parties' appeals, considering that the matter had been resolved res judicata in the first set of proceedings ending with the Supreme Court's decision of 25 November 1999. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the three client applicants in question. 23.  On 3 March 2000 the public prosecutor charged, among others, X and Y with aggravated debtor's dishonesty but decided to press no charges against the first applicant, having found no evidence of any crime. 24.  On 20 April 2001 the Supreme Court ruled that although a final decision had already been rendered in respect of another appellant, it did not prevent the courts from examining similar appeals filed by other parties. The case was referred back to the Court of Appeal which, on 4 October 2001, revoked the District Court's decision on the basis that the seizure had been lawful. 25.  The three client applicants in question were again granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. On 18 October 2002 it revoked the seizure in so far as it pertained to information which those applicants had given to the first applicant. 26.  The Supreme Court found it undisputed that the copied hard disk contained information relating to the three client applicants' instructions to the first applicant. It had not been argued that this information was not protected by counsel's secrecy obligation under Chapter 17, section 23 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. Nor did the information in question pertain to any suspicion that the first applicant or any one else had committed a crime. 27.  The Supreme Court accepted that the police had been entitled by Chapter 4, section 1 of the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen 450/1987) to seize the first applicant's hard disk and make a copy thereof. Technical reasons and practical needs (the fact that the police had been obliged at the time of the search to copy the whole hard disk) did not however permit any deviation from the prohibition on seizure of privileged material. The police should therefore have returned the computer files immediately or destroyed them. The appellants were awarded reasonable compensation for their costs and expenses. 28.  On 11 November 2002 the Chief Enforcement Officer of Vantaa confirmed that the copy of the hard disk had been destroyed on that day. 29.  On 22 August 2003 the Deputy Chancellor of Justice (valtioneuvoston apulaisoikeuskansleri, justitiekansleradjointen i statsrådet) issued his decision in response to a petition by the Finnish Bar Association concerning, inter alia, the alleged unlawfulness of the coercive measures against the first applicant. He found it established that the tax inspector and the enforcement official had attended the search in their respective capacity as a witness and expert. He nevertheless concluded, inter alia, that from the point of view of foreseeability of domestic law, as required by Article 8 of the Convention, the relationship between the Coercive Measures Act (Chapter 4, section 2, subsection 2), the Code of Judicial Procedure (Chapter 17, section 23, subsection 1 (4)) and the Advocates Act (section 5 c) was somewhat unclear and permitted very diverging interpretations as to the extent to which privileged material could be subject to search and seizure. The Deputy Chancellor therefore requested the Ministry of Justice to consider whether there was a need to amend the relevant legislation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Oberalm. 5.  On 16 March 1994 the applicant requested legal aid as he intended to bring an action for damages against M.L., a lawyer who had represented him in previous civil proceedings. On an unspecified date the applicant withdrew his request. 6.  The applicant, now represented by E.H., a lawyer appointed by him, brought an action against M.L. for damages on 30 November 1994. 7.  On 3 January 1995 the Salzburg Regional Court summoned the applicant for a hearing, scheduled for 6 February 1995. However, on 16 January 1995 the Salzburg Regional Court cancelled the hearing and interrupted proceedings, as the competent Hallein District Court needed to examine the question whether a guardian should be appointed for the applicant. In the decision it noted that as early as 1984 the applicant had suffered from psychosis and a guardian had been appointed. Guardianship had been terminated in June 1987. 8.  On 23 January 1995 the applicant filed a motion challenging judge S., the judge of the Regional Court dealing with the civil proceedings against M.L., for bias. The Regional Court returned the motion to the applicant. On 13 February 1995, as it did not carry the signature of a lawyer. 9.  On 8 June the Hallein District Court provisionally appointed a guardian for the applicant. On 13 September 1995 the Regional Court set the applicant a time-limit of fourteen days for re-submitting the motion of 23 January 1995 signed by his lawyer, otherwise it would be deemed that he had withdrawn his motion. 10.  The applicant again applied for legal aid for the proceedings against M.L. on 23 October 1995. The Regional Court, on 9 November 1995, informed the applicant that his request for legal aid would be transmitted to E.H., who had meanwhile been appointed the applicant’s provisional guardian, for signature. E.H. signed the request on 15 November 1995. 11.   Judge S. commented on the applicant’s motion challenging him for bias on 16 November 1995 and, on 23 November 1995, the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion of 23 January 1995. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 19 January 1996 the District Court discontinued the guardianship proceedings against the applicant. According to an expert opinion obtained he was capable of understanding his actions and their consequences. 13.  By decision of 11 April 1996 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 23 November 1995. On 9 May 1996 the Regional Court dismissed a further motion challenging the judge for bias. On 8 January 1997 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s motion challenging judge S. for bias. 14.  The applicant requested the Salzburg Regional Court to resume the proceedings against M.L. and to schedule a hearing on 19 March 1997. On 1 April 1997 the applicant requested under Section 91 of the Court Act (“section 91 request”), to the Salzburg Regional Court, that a time-limit be set for deciding upon his request for legal aid. 15.  The President of the Regional Court, referring to the applicant’s section 91 request, informed him on 23 April 1997 that, after his motion challenging the judge for bias had finally been dismissed, Judge S. could take further steps in the proceedings. 16.  On 30 May 1997 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid, finding that the applicant had sufficient means to afford assistance by a lawyer. On 12 June 1997 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid in order to appeal against the decision of 30 May 1997, as no representation by a lawyer in such proceedings was necessary. 17.  On 30 September 1997 the applicant made a section 91 request, asking that a time-limit for scheduling a hearing be set. He submitted that he was not represented by a lawyer. 18.  On 20 November 1997 the applicant deposited a folder of documents with the Regional Court. On the next day the Regional Court returned the folder to the applicant, informing him that evidence could only be properly submitted by counsel representing him in the proceedings and in conformity with the rules of the code of civil procedure. 19.  The Salzburg Regional Court, on 10 December 1997, ordered the applicant to re-submit his section 91 request, properly signed by a lawyer. He was also informed that in future submissions made by him personally would no longer be taken into account. 20.  On 29 January 1998 a newly-appointed lawyer, S.K., requested the Regional Court to resume the proceedings against M.L., as after the Hallein District Court’s decision of 19 January 1996 there was no longer a justification for interrupting the proceedings. Thereupon, on 3 February 1998, the Regional Court scheduled a hearing for 1 April 1998. On 1 April 1998 the hearing took place. The Regional Court held further hearings on 9 June 1998 and 8 July 1998. 21.  On 10 July 1998 the Salzburg Regional Court gave a judgment in the proceedings against M.L.. It granted a part of the applicant’s claim and dismissed the remainder. 22.  The applicant appealed on 21 September 1998 and the opposing party replied on 28 October 1998. The Court of Appeal held a hearing on 7 July 1999, in which the applicant, assisted by his counsel, was heard. 23.  On 7 July 1999 the Linz Court of Appeal gave a partial judgment (Teilurteil). It confirmed the Regional Court’s judgment in so far as it had granted the applicant’s claim and modified the Regional Court’s further decision, holding that 50% of the applicant’s further claim was well-founded in substance (dem Grunde nach) but further proceedings had to be conducted to assess the amount due. 24.  The applicant informed the Regional Court on 8 November 1999 that he had withdrawn the power of attorney from his lawyer S.K. and at the same time he requested legal aid. On 22 November 1999 the applicant, at the time not represented by counsel, brought an action for the reopening of the proceedings against the judgment of the Linz Court of Appeal of 7 July 1999. He submitted that one of the documents on which he had relied in these proceedings had actually been forged by him and as this changed the material facts, proceedings should be reopened. 25.  On 18 February 2000 the applicant made a section 91 request for a time-limit to be set for a decision on his request for legal aid concerning his action for reopening the proceedings. 26.  On 10 April 2000 the applicant was granted legal aid and on 21 April 2000 K.R. was appointed his ex officio lawyer. On 3 May 2000 K.R. re-submitted the action for reopening of the proceedings and the section 91 request. 27.  By decision of 30 August 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed an extraordinary appeal on points of law by the applicant against the partial judgment of the Linz Court of Appeal of 7 July 1999. 28.  The applicant’s lawyer informed him on 9 October 2000 that the Regional Court had scheduled a hearing for 22 November 2000. This hearing was subsequently adjourned to 13 February 2001. On 16 November 2000 the defendant M.L. replied to the action for reopening of the proceedings. 29.  On 20 February 2001 the applicant himself made a section 91 request in proceedings against M.L., complaining that the hearing had been adjourned at the request of counsel for the opposing party, which in his view led to an undue prolongation of the proceedings, and that a time-limit for scheduling a hearing should be set. 30.  On 22 February 2001 K.R. informed the applicant that he had agreed to the adjournment request by the opponent party’s lawyer. K.R. informed the applicant on 5 March 2001 that the section 91 request had now been transmitted to him for signature and that he would only sign it on the express instruction of the applicant. On 7 March 2001 the applicant instructed his lawyer to do so, arguing that otherwise he would not be awarded compensation in future proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights. 31.  Judge S. commented on the section 91 request on 21 March 2001. He stated that the hearing had been adjourned with the consent of both parties’ representatives and must therefore be considered vexatious. 32.  On 18 May 2001 the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the action for reopening of the proceedings. On 20 August 2001 the applicant, represented by K.R., appealed against the refusal to reopen the proceedings. On 24 September the opposing party replied. 33.  By decision of 16 April 2002 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s refusal of 18 May 2001 to reopen the proceedings. It granted, however, an ordinary appeal on points of law against that decision, as it considered that there was no case-law on the question whether a reopening could be based on the ground that forged documents had been used, if such an argument had been raised by a plaintiff who had forged the relevant document himself. On 2 May 2002 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. 34.  On 11 July 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal on points of law. This decision was served on K.R. on 2 September 2002. 35.  In the ongoing proceedings following the partial judgment of the Court of Appeal of 7 July 1999 the Regional Court held hearings on 9 January and 11 April 2003. Meanwhile, on 14 January 2003, the applicant modified his claims. 36.  On 5 April 2004 the applicant made a further section 91 request, complaining that on 11 April 2003 the oral proceedings had been closed but up to then no written judgment had been issued. 37.  By decision of 19 April 2004 the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further claims against M.L. by final judgment (Endurteil). On 11 May 2004 the applicant appealed and on 9 June 2004 the opposing party replied. On 14 July 2004 the Linz Court of Appeal did not grant the applicant’s appeal, but reduced the award of procedural costs to the opposing party. 38.  Meanwhile, on 22 June 2004 the applicant brought a further action for reopening of proceedings. On 31 August 2004 the Linz Court of Appeal corrected clerical errors in its judgment of 14 July 2004. 39.  On 22 September 2004 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which the latter rejected as inadmissible on 21 October 2004. 40.  On 1 March 2005 the applicant made a criminal deposition (Anzeige) against Judge S. On 21 April 2005 the Salzburg Public Prosecutor’s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against Judge S. On 9 May 2005 the Review Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Salzburg Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against this decision. 41.  By decision of 22 June 2005 the President of the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion challenging Judge S. for bias. It noted that the Regional Court had given its judgment on 19 April 2004, the Court of Appeal had decided on 14 July 2004 and the Supreme Court on 21 October 2004. The applicant’s challenge of 1 March 2005 was therefore belated. The applicant filed a motion challenging Judge S. for bias because he considered the judgment arbitrary, but he could have raised this critique in appeal proceedings.\nThe applicant’s detention on remand 42.  The applicant remained in detention on remand from 14 May to 14 July 1999 on suspicion of having uttered dangerous threats. On 18 June 1999 the Salzburg Regional Court convicted him of this offence and sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment, of which six months were suspended. 43.  During his detention on remand a hearing was scheduled by the Court of Appeal in the civil proceedings against M.L.. The applicant submits that when he was brought from his cell to the courtroom he was handcuffed. 44.  On 30 December 1999 the applicant complained to the Salzburg Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat) about the handcuffing and claimed compensation. On 1 February 2000 the IAP rejected the application as inadmissible. It found that the measure at issue was taken in the course of criminal proceedings before ordinary courts (namely the proceedings against him for uttering dangerous threats) and was not imputable to an administrative authority, so the IAP did not have jurisdiction.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kurgan. 8.  In 2002 the criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant. On 19 May 2003 he was acquitted by the Kurgan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). That acquittal was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Russia and became final. 9.  The applicant lodged a claim for compensation. On 22 October 2003 the Kurgan Town Court partly allowed that claim and awarded the applicant 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB), this sum was equal to approximately 140 euros (EUR) at the material time. The award was payable from the federal budget. 10.  The judgment of 22 October 2003 was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 11 December 2003 and thus became final. Writ of execution was issued. 11.  On 17 February 2004 the court bailiffs returned the writ of execution to the applicant who was advised to address himself directly to the Ministry of Finance in Moscow. He apparently did so. 12.  On 17 February 2005 the Director of Legal Department at the Ministry of Finance wrote to the applicant assuring him that the final judgment of the Town Court of 22 October 2003 in his favour had been in the course of being enforced. 13.  That judgment remains unenforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Celje. She is an advocate practising in Celje. 7.  In 2001, the applicant was representing M.Š. in civil proceedings for compensation for injuries which M.Š. had allegedly sustained in a physical attack by the defendant. The proceedings were conducted before the Domžale Local Court sitting in a formation of a single judge. The judge in the case was Judge M., a Ljubljana Higher Court judge who had been temporarily appointed to the local court. 8.  It appears from the transcript of the hearing of 28 November 2001 that the applicant was not permitted to ask the defendant certain questions as they were considered suggestive by Judge M. Her proposal that a witness be heard was also rejected, as this evidence was not considered necessary by the judge. 9.  On 28 November 2001 the Domžale Local Court delivered a judgment rejecting M.Š.’s claim for compensation. 10.  On 27 December 2001 the applicant’s client appealed. In the appeal statement drafted by the applicant, Judge M. was criticised for not putting on record some of his procedural decisions and for not including the applicant’s client’s statements in full. It stated, inter alia:\n“It would be reasonable to expect that the judge of a higher court would explain before the trial hearing why it is he who is presiding over this case which ... is being considered at first instance; this is what the judicial code of behaviour would expect him to do. However, the judge was trampling on that code of behaviour by behaving arrogantly and chewing gum during the hearing, and by covering his mouth while talking.\nOn 28 November 2001 proceedings were held before the Domžale Local Court following the principle of the inquisitorial system. The transcript of the hearing shows that [the proceedings] were not carried out in accordance with the Civil Procedure Act.... The judge, despite requests, did not include in the transcript the statements and messages which were given by the plaintiff or her representative...\nThe judge asked the plaintiff whether she understood the Slovenian language, and she confirmed that she did. However, he then chewed gum during the interview, so that the plaintiff could not understand him.\nFollowing this superficial evidence-taking, the judge, without deciding on the other requests for evidence, concluded the hearing. For that reason, the facts of the case were wrongly and insufficiently established...” 11.  On 26 May 2004 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the appeal in the part concerning compensation for bodily injuries. However, it rejected the complaints concerning the alleged procedural defects and inaccuracy of the transcript of the hearing. In particular, the court found that the transcript had been signed by the parties without objection and that none of the parties had challenged the impartiality of the judge by instituting proceedings to that effect. 12.  On 8 January 2002 Judge M., having received the appeal against his judgment of 28 November 2001, issued a decision fining the applicant 150,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT) for contempt of court for her statements in the appeal. It stated that the fine should be paid within fifteen days. The decision reads as follows:\n“In the above civil case, the plaintiff’s representative Alenka Pečnik, attorney, lodged an appeal against judgment no. P 107/97 of this court. In the appeal she gravely insults the presiding judge by stating that he was trampling on the judicial code of behaviour by behaving arrogantly, chewing gum and covering his mouth while communicating with those present at the hearing, and that the proceedings were conducted on an inquisitorial basis. These are insulting and invented allegations and for that reason a monetary fine has been imposed on the plaintiff’s representative on the basis of section 109 read together with section 11, paragraphs 3 to 7, of the Civil Procedure Act. The monetary fine for the attorney can be set up to SIT 1,000,000. Since the present case involves a grave insult, the court considers that the appropriate penalty should be SIT 150,000.” 13.  On 29 January 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal, alleging an incorrect application of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the CPC”) and an incorrect assessment of the facts. In particular, she stated that her statements were true and were not intended to insult the judge but to describe the atmosphere during the hearing, where the judge had repeatedly raised his voice. She also stated that her client was not a native speaker of Slovenian and had been unable to understand the judge because of his behaviour. She claimed that her remarks had been taken out of context, and submitted statements by her client and a witness in support of her allegations. 14.  In her appeal the applicant also requested that the venue of the proceedings be changed, as Judge M. was a judge of the Ljubljana Higher Court, which would normally have had jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Her request was upheld and the case was transferred to the Koper Higher Court. 15.  On 8 April 2003 the Koper Higher Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. If found that although the impugned decision relied on statements which had been taken out of context, these statements were indeed insulting and the tone of the appeal in question was in any event inappropriate. The fact that the applicant tried to tone down the impugned allegations in her appeal undermined her credibility and supported the first-instance court’s conclusion that the allegations were invented. Finally, the Koper Higher Court found that the applicant could have defended her client’s interest by using proper language, without insults. 16.  On 12 May 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. Citing Articles 14, 21, 22 and 23 of the Constitution, the applicant complained that she had been convicted of contempt of court in proceedings which had been unfair and biased. In her submission, it was unacceptable that a judge who felt personally affected by the impugned statements could convict her and impose a penalty, which could be converted to imprisonment. Furthermore, no evidence apart from that provided by the judge himself was examined in the proceedings, and the Higher Court rejected the appeal by relying merely on the statements of the judge. The applicant alleged that the purpose of the statements she had made in the appeal at issue was to draw attention to the inappropriate behaviour of the presiding judge. These were statements of fact, and were supported by the transcript of the hearing and witness statements. They were not made with the intention of humiliating the presiding judge but in defence of her client’s interests. 17.  On 27 May 2003 the applicant paid the fine. 18.  Declaring the appeal admissible on 26 October 2004, the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on the merits on 27 October 2005. Referring to its conclusion concerning judicial impartiality in the decision of 23 June 2005 (see paragraph 21 below), the Constitutional Court found (by five votes to four) that the applicant’s right to an impartial tribunal had not been violated. The Constitutional Court then reviewed the reasons for sentencing the applicant given by the lower courts. It agreed with the lower courts that the applicant’s statements did not represent a legitimate exercise of a lawyer’s duty to defend her client’s interest. It noted that a judicial decision could always be criticised in a way that did not involve an attack on the reputation of the judiciary or a personal attack on a particular judge.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Between 1 March 2005 and 21 September 2011 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-42/2 in the Kemerovo Region. The prison was overcrowded. Thus, cell 219 measuring 36 sq. m was designed for 12 and housed up to 18 individuals. Since October 2011 the applicant was isolated from the other detainees and kept in virtually solitary confinement conditions. In addition, the applicant claimed that on several occasions he had been beaten by prison wardens. 6.  From 12 June to 7 September 2005, from 29 October to 27 November 2009 and from 7 to 15 December 2010 the applicant was transferred from the remand prison to a prison hospital to undergo medical treatment. 7.  It appears that the applicant complained to the regional prosecutor about the conditions of his detention in the remand prison. On an unspecified date he received the prosecutor’s reply and challenged it before courts. 8.  On 28 April 2011 the Kuznetskiy District Court of Novokuznetsk rejected the applicant’s claims. 9.  On 21 June 2011 the Kemerovo Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Shuya in the Ivanovo Region. 6.  The applicant is a holder of 1982 State premium loan bonds (облигации Государственного внутреннего выигрышного займа 1982 года) having a total nominal value of 19,845 “promissory roubles” (see paragraph 17 below). 7.  In 1982, the USSR issued a State internal premium loan to finance certain State programmes (see paragraph 13 below). According to the conditions of the loan, individuals could invest their money in State premium bonds and redeem them at any time during the term of the loan with interest at three per cent per annum. The term of the loan was fixed at twenty years. In that period, 160 State-organised draws were to be held in which some bonds would win cash prizes. 8.  In 1992, the Government of the Russian Federation acknowledged its succession in respect of the obligations of the USSR under the 1982 loan and suspended payments under the 1982 State premium bonds (see paragraph 14 below). 9.  Between 1995 and 2000, a series of Russian laws was adopted which provided for conversion of Soviet securities, including the 1982 loan bonds, into special Russian promissory notes (see paragraphs 16 to 20 below). The Government was mandated to devise a procedure for the conversion and fix the value of the promissory notes. Although a regulation on the conversion was adopted in 2000 (see paragraph 21 below), the actual conversion did not start and application of the regulation has remained suspended to the present day (see paragraph 22 below). 10.  In early 2002, the applicant wrote to the Ministry of Finance to inquire about possibilities and time-limits for converting his 1982 bonds into Russian promissory notes. By a letter of 27 April 2002, a deputy director of the Internal Debt Department confirmed to the applicant that his bonds should be converted into the Russian promissory notes in accordance with the Savings Protection Act. The deputy director went on to explain why the conversion had not yet been possible:\n“Section 10 of the [Conversion Procedure] Act provides that the procedure for calculating the interest accrued on the Russian promissory notes and the procedure for servicing the [internal] debt would be set out in a special federal law, which has not yet been enacted. In this connection, actual payments in [Russian] roubles under the promissory notes – as provided in the [Conversion Procedure] Act – cannot be made and the determination of the value of the ['promissory rouble'] would be of no practical significance since its application has not yet been defined by the legislator.\n...\nOnce the legislation on the procedure for calculating the interest and the debt-servicing procedure has been adopted, the Ministry of Finance will make the necessary arrangements for the conversion of USSR securities... into promissory notes and the servicing of them; it will also launch an open tender for selection of the conversion agent ...” 11.  In November 2002 the applicant brought proceedings before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation challenging the Government for inactivity and failure to put the redemption programme into effect. 12.  On 4 December 2002 the Supreme Court refused to examine the applicant's claim. It found as follows:\n“By virtue of the constitutional principle of separation of powers, the court may not, in civil proceedings, require the Government of the Russian Federation to enact a specific legal act if the law does not explicitly set out the duty of the Government to adopt appropriate regulation; the claim may not be accepted for examination by the court.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, who is of Serbian origin, was born in 1950 and lives in Innsbruck, Austria. 5.  On 29 July 1987 the Sisak Regional Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Područna služba u Sisku – “the Regional Office”), after finding that due to her illness the applicant’s ability to work had been reduced (smanjena sposobnost za rad), issued a decision awarding her the right to reduced working hours (pravo na rad s polovicom radnog vremena). On 15 October 1987 she was also awarded compensation for the loss of salary resulting from the reduced working hours (pravo na naknadu osobnog dohotka zbog rada sa skraćenim radnim vremenom). 6.  The applicant had been receiving this compensation until September 1991 when she was forced to quit her job and leave Petrinja as the town was taken by the occupying forces. She settled in Zagreb as an internally displaced person. 7.  The applicant submitted that she had instituted administrative proceedings before the Regional Office with a view that the payment of compensation for her reduced ability to work be resumed, by making a request to that end on 17 October 1991. The Government submitted that the applicant had done so only on 12 June 1995. 8.  On 20 September 1995 the Regional Office decided to discontinue the administrative proceedings instituted by the applicant’s request. 9.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 29 January 1996 the Central Office of the Croatian Pension Fund (Hrvatski zavod za mirovinsko osiguranje, Središnja služba – “the Central Office”) quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the Regional Office. 10.  In the fresh first-instance proceedings, on 28 June 1999 the Regional Office issued a decision abolishing the applicant’s right to compensation for reduced ability to work as of 21 September 1991. The applicant appealed. 11.  On 29 October 1999 the Central Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. 12.  On 7 December 1999 the applicant brought an action in Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) contesting the second-instance decision. 13.  On 14 November 2002 the Administrative Court quashed the Central Office’s decision of 29 October 1999 for incomplete facts. 14.  In the fresh appellate proceedings, on 6 February 2003 the Central Office quashed the first-instance decision of 28 June 1999 and remitted the case to the Regional Office. 15.  In the fresh first-instance proceedings, on 23 July 2003 the Regional Office restored the applicant’s right to compensation for reduced ability to work and decided that its payment should be resumed as of 1 July 1995. On 18 August 2003 the applicant appealed, arguing that she should also be paid the outstanding instalments of compensation for reduced ability to work in the period before 1 July 1995. 16.  On 6 May 2004 the Central Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision of 23 July 2003. 17.  On 29 June 2004 the applicant brought her second action in the Administrative Court challenging the second-instance decision of 6 May 2004. 18.  On 25 January 2007 the Administrative Court again quashed the contested decision for incomplete facts. 19.  In the fresh appellate proceedings, on 17 May 2007 the Central Office quashed the first-instance decision of 23 July 2003 and remitted the case to the Regional Office. 20.  In the fresh first-instance proceedings, on 4 September 2007 the Regional Office adopted a new decision and dismissed the applicant’s request for payment of compensation for reduced ability to work in the period prior to 1 July 1995. The applicant appealed on 10 October 2007. 21.  On 29 November 2007 the Central Office quashed the first-instance decision of 4 September 2007 and remitted the case to the Regional Office. 22.  As in the fresh first-instance proceedings the Regional Office did not issue a new decision within the statutory time-limit of sixty days, on 4 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal for failure to respond (žalba zbog šutnje administracije) with the Central Office. 23.  On 13 May 2008 the Central Office allowed the applicant’s appeal for failure to respond of 4 March 2008 and ordered the Regional Office to issue a decision in her case within thirty days. 24.  On 16 July 2008 the Regional Office issued a decision dismissing again the applicant’s request for payment of compensation for the period prior to 1 July 1995. The applicant appealed on 12 August 2008. 25.  On 1 October 2008 the Central Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision of 16 July 2008. 26.  On 1 December 2008 the applicant brought another action in the Administrative Court. She contested the decision of the Central Office of 1 October 2008. 27.  On 10 June 2009 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. 28.  On 19 August 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the Administrative Court’s judgment. 29.  On 16 March 2011 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It found that the applicant had not substantiated her complaint by any constitutional law arguments but had merely repeated the arguments raised in the proceedings before the Croatian Pension Fund and the Administrative Court. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had been unable to examine the merits of her constitutional complaint.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment in Berdychiv Prison no. 70. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant had four criminal convictions for theft, in particular. He had been released from prison in October 2007. 7.  From January 2008 onwards, a number of armed robberies and thefts were committed in the Kyiv and Vinnytsia regions. 8.  On 16 July 2008 the Vinnytsia Police Department for Combating Organised Crime, having received some preliminary reports concerning the possible involvement of the applicant in the aforementioned crimes, arrested him together with his brother and an acquaintance. The police approached them when they were in a car at a fuel station. They attempted to flee, but without success. The police broke the side window and, having overcome the resistance of those inside, took them out by force and handcuffed them. Two passers-by witnessed this and gave written explanations to that effect to the police, in which they confirmed the above. 9.  Several guns, gas sprays, some jewellery and several pairs of gloves were found in the car. 10.  The officers wrote a report stating that the detainees had demonstrated manifest disobedience to their orders and had attempted to escape, in response to which martial arts techniques had been practised and handcuffs had been applied to them. The report noted that no firearms had been used. 11.  On the same day, 16 July 2008, the applicant confessed to several counts of theft and robbery. He also wrote a note stating that he had no complaints against the police and that no physical or psychological coercion had been applied to him. 12.  On 17 July 2008 the police drew a report on an administrative offence (a minor offence under Ukrainian legislation) committed by the applicant. It stated that during his arrest he had manifested malicious disobedience to a lawful order given by police officers in breach of Article 185 of the Code of Administrative Offences (see paragraph 67 below). 13.  On the same day the applicant wrote a statement to the effect that during his arrest he had resisted the police and had tried to escape and that he regretted his behaviour. 14.  Still on that day the Zamostyanskyy District Court of Vinnytsia (“the Zamostyanskyy Court”) found the applicant guilty under Article 185 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to ten days’ administrative detention commencing at 11:20 a.m. on 16 July 2008. 15.  It appears from the material in the case file (see paragraph 42 below) that on 17 July 2008 the applicant was examined by doctors after his admission to the Vinnytsia Temporary Detention Facility (ITT). The examination revealed scratches and bruises on his right shoulder. No complaints or requests for medical assistance from the applicant were recorded. 16.  On 16, 17, 18, 19 and 22 July 2008 the applicant confessed to numerous counts of theft and robbery committed in the Vinnytsia and Kyiv regions. All his confessions were accompanied by written statements by the investigator co-signed by the applicant to the effect that the latter had had his rights explained to him. Furthermore, each confession was accompanied by a written waiver by the applicant of his right to legal assistance. 17.  On 25 July 2008 the investigator detained the applicant on suspicion of banditry, numerous counts of theft and armed robbery, money laundering, hooliganism, and illegal arms possession and handling. The applicant signed the report and stated that he agreed with his detention. 18.  On 25 and 26 July 2008 the applicant confessed to some other episodes of theft and robbery. 19.  On 26 July 2008 he was examined by a general practitioner on duty in Central Vinnytsia City Hospital no. 2. The applicant did not raise any complaints and the examination did not reveal any injuries or pathologies. 20.  On the same day the applicant was transferred to Vyshgorod in the Kyiv region, where he was detained till 7 August 2008 in the local temporary detention centre (the “ITT”) described by him as a metal cage in the police station. 21.  On 28 July 2008 the Zamostyanskyy Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure pending trial. 22.  On 30 July 2008 the applicant had his chest X-rayed in a tuberculosis dispensary, with no anomalies having been revealed. 23.  On 2, 3, 4, and 5 August 2008 he reiterated his earlier confessions and confessed to yet more crimes. Like before, all those confessions were accompanied by written confirmation of the explanation to the applicant of his rights and by the applicant’s waiver of his right to a lawyer. 24.  On 7 August 2008 the applicant was taken to the Brovary Town Police Department in the Kyiv region. He underwent a standard initial medical examination there. As noted in the respective journal, he raised no complaints and the examination revealed no bruises, lice or scabies. 25.  On 14 August and on 2 September 2008 the applicant again reiterated his confessions and waived his right to legal representation. 26.  On 3 September 2008 an ambulance was called for him. This was recorded as entry no. 370 in the medical assistance journal. The copy of the journal provided to the Court by the Government ends at entry no. 369. No further information is available concerning the applicant’s condition on 3 September 2008 (see also paragraph 57 below). 27.  On 9 September 2008 an ambulance was again called for the applicant. According to a memo issued by the governor of the Brovary ITT on 27 October 2008, this was done in response to the applicant’s complaining of headache. 28.  According to the applicant, on 11 September 2008 he complained to the Brovary Town Prosecutor’s Office about his ill-treatment, but his complaint remained without response. 29.  On 11 September 2008 the applicant was transferred from Brovary to Vyshgorod. It appears from the material in the case file (see paragraph 42 below) that he was examined by a doctor at his arrival in the Vyshgorod ITT. Some bruises on his shoulders, an abrasion on his right temple and an abrasion on his right elbow were documented. According to the examination report, the applicant raised no complaints and did not seek medical assistance. 30.  On 16, 22 and 26 September 2008 the applicant reiterated his earlier confessions and confessed to yet more crimes. He also signed reports confirming that his rights had been explained to him and waived his right to a lawyer. 31.  On 25 September 2008 the applicant refused to accept a food parcel from his parents handed to him by the Vinnytsia ITT administration. As confirmed by notes written by the applicant’s cell mates, he did so because the cigarettes and the food had been cut into small pieces. The applicant refused to sign any report or write any explanation. 32.  On 30 September 2008 the pre-trial investigation was declared complete and the case was referred to court for trial. 33.  On 7 October 2008 the applicant complained to the Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor’s Office that from 16 to 26 July 2008 he had been ill-treated by the police in the Vinnytsia ITT. The alleged ill-treatment included being beaten, strangled with a plastic bag and suspended from an iron bar. The applicant also submitted that he had received the threat that, if he did not confess, his brother would be imprisoned for life on a false charge of murder. Accordingly, the applicant contended that he had been coerced into signing numerous confessions and waivers of legal assistance. He further complained that from 26 July to 7 August 2008 his ill-treatment had continued in the Vyshgorod ITT. He noted that, although his parents had hired a lawyer for him, he had continuously been forced to waive his right to legal assistance. Lastly, the applicant complained about having suffered psychological pressure and humiliations from the Brovary ITT personnel from 7 to 30 August 2008. He noted that his complaint to the Brovary Prosecutor had been without reply. 34.  On 13 October 2008 the applicant complained to the Vinnytsia Regional Police Department about the attitude of the Vinnytsia ITT personnel towards him, which he considered humiliating. He referred, in particular, to the incident with the food parcel of 25 October 2008. 35.  On an unspecified later date the chief of the aforementioned police department issued an internal inquiry report stating that no food parcels for the applicant had been received during the period of his detention in the ITT from 16 to 30 July 2008 and that the applicant had been arrogant and rude to the administration. 36.  On 14 October 2008 the investigator of the Vinnytsia police department dealing with the applicant’s case gave written explanations to the regional prosecution in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. He submitted that the applicant and those detained as his accomplices had given their confessions and waived their right to a lawyer in a voluntary manner. Since legal representation was not mandatory in the circumstances, those waivers had been accepted. The other police officers concerned gave similar explanations. 37.  On 15 October 2008 the applicant complained to the Minister of the Interior that he had been subjected to various kinds of ill-treatment and humiliation in all the detention facilities. He alleged, in particular, that on 11 September 2008 he had been ill-treated by the Vinnytsia police officers for about eight hours and that his ill-treatment had included beatings, strangling with a plastic bag, hanging from an iron bar and the insertion of a baseball bat into his anus. The applicant also submitted that the Vinnytsia police had failed to deliver a food parcel to him, had extorted a bribe from him and had not allowed him to see the lawyer contracted by his parents. 38.  On 18 October 2008 ‒ in response to the applicant’s complaint of ill-treatment ‒ the Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor’s Office issued a ruling announcing its refusal to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers of the local police department. The officers concerned had been questioned and had contested the applicant’s allegations as untruthful. As noted in the ruling, there was no indication that the applicant had sustained any injuries or that he had complained previously. It was therefore considered clear that he had given his confessions voluntarily. 39.  On 27 October 2008 the governor of the Brovary ITT issued a memo, apparently at the prosecutor’s request, about the applicant’s detention in that facility. It stated that no physical force had been used against the applicant. The memo noted the fact that an ambulance had been called for the applicant following his complaints of headaches on 9 September 2008, but with no further details. 40.  On 31 October 2008 K., the lawyer contracted by the applicant’s parents on an unspecified earlier date, asked the Staromiskyy Court for a meeting with the applicant. On the same date that request was allowed. 41.  On 7 November 2008 the applicant was examined by doctors in the Vinnytsia SIZO. They found him in good health. The examination report noted that the applicant did not raise any complaints and that there were no injuries on him. It should be noted that the copy of the aforementioned report in the case file before the Court, as it stood prior to the communication of the application to the Government, was of very poor quality. Moreover, the report was written in barely legible handwriting. According to the summary of the facts prepared by the Court at that stage, the report in question had referred to several bruises on the applicant. However, as it has since emerged, there were two reports copied on the same page: one of 7 November 2008 and one of 5 February 2009, and it was the latter report which had noted the applicant’s injuries (see paragraph 54 below). 42.  On 10 November 2008 a senior official of the Vinnytsia Regional Police Department for Combating Organised Crime delivered a report on the internal investigation into the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment (as summarised in paragraph 37 above). The investigation had consisted mainly of questioning of the police officers involved, who had denied any ill-treatment of the applicant. The report noted that the medical examinations of the applicant of 17 July and 11 September 2008 had revealed some injuries which had been inflicted in unestablished circumstances (for more details see paragraphs 15 and 29 above). It was decided that the internal investigation be considered complete, the conclusion being that it had not established any evidence to support the applicant’s complaints. 43.  On 19 November 2008 the Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the officials of the Vinnytsia ITT in respect of the allegedly inadequate conditions of the applicant’s detention and his ill-treatment there. It was noted in the ruling that the ITT officials had been questioned and had denied any ill-treatment of the applicant. They had also submitted that he had been detained in adequate conditions. 44.  On 20 November 2008 the Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor issued another ruling refusing the institution of criminal proceedings ‒ this time against the police officers of the Vinnytsia Regional Police Department for Combating Organised Crime, who had been involved in the applicant’s apprehension and the subsequent investigative measures ‒ for the lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The officers submitted that the applicant and his accomplices had manifested malicious disobedience to the orders of the police on 16 July 2008. As a result, “measures of physical intervention and ... handcuffing” had been applied to them. Furthermore, according to the police officers’ statements, the detainees had made their confessions voluntarily. Lastly, the prosecutor noted that the applicant had been examined by doctors on 26 and 30 July 2008, when no injuries were documented or complaints raised (see paragraphs 19 and 22 above). 45.  On 4 December 2008 the Vyshgorod Town Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the Vyshgorod police officers, for the lack of corpus delicti in their actions. The prosecutor noted that the officers in question had denied the veracity of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. Furthermore, it appeared that the applicant himself had eventually retracted his complaints. 46.  On the same day the Brovary Town Prosecutor’s Office also refused to institute criminal proceedings against the Brovary police as regards the conditions of the applicant’s detention in the local ITT. The decision was based on the explanations of the respective police officers. 47.  On 5 January 2009 the applicant refused the services of the lawyer retained by his parents and asked the Staromiskyy Court to allow his parents time to find a new lawyer for him. 48.  On 15 January 2009 he repeated the above refusal and asked the court to conduct its hearing with the participation of his sister, who had earlier been admitted in the proceedings as his “civil defender”. 49.  On 15 January 2009 the applicant complained to the Staromiskyy Court that he had been subjected to ill-treatment by the police on 16 July 2008 and thereafter. He submitted that all his confessions and waivers of legal assistance had been given under duress. 50.  On the same date the applicant also complained of his ill-treatment in police custody to the Prosecutor General’s Office. 51.  On 27 January 2009 the Staromiskyy Court appointed a free lawyer for the applicant, since his parents had not retained a new lawyer for him. 52.  On 4 February 2009 the Staromiskyy Court instructed the Kyiv and Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment. 53.  On 4 February 2009 the applicant was examined by a doctor, who recorded the absence of any injuries, apart from some old scars on both forearms. No further details concerning this examination are available. 54.  On 5 February 2009 the applicant underwent another medical examination which revealed bruises on his buttocks measuring 7x10 cm and 15x10 cm respectively, as well as abrasions on his wrists caused by handcuffs. Another bruise measuring about 15 x ? cm was recorded (the copy of the report in the case file is illegible in this respect; nor is it possible to read where that bruise was located). It is not clear in what circumstances and where that examination was carried out. It has not been commented on by any of the parties. 55.  On 5 March 2009 the Vyshgorod Town Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers in the light of their statements denying the veracity of the applicant’s complaints. 56.  On 11 March 2009 the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office quashed the aforementioned ruling as premature and superficial. It criticised the prosecutor’s failure to clarify when and on what grounds the applicant had been taken to the Vyshgorod ITT before his further transfer to the Brovary ITT, when he had been detained in the Brovary ITT, which of the police officers had been assigned to him and when. Furthermore, it observed that it was essential to question all the doctors who had examined the applicant and had provided him with medical assistance. According to the applicant, it was after his detention in the Vyshgorod ITT that he had requested medical assistance. It was also necessary to analyse all the records pertaining to the ambulance calls made for the applicant, as well as the report on his initial medical examination in the Brovary ITT. Lastly, the applicant’s complaints concerning the refusal to allow a lawyer to see him warranted investigation. 57.  On 24 March 2009 a senior officer in the Vyshgorod police department issued a memo noting that he had visited the Brovary ITT, where he had consulted the medical examination and assistance journal. Two records, those of 7 August and 3 September 2008, concerned the applicant. The ambulance doctor had been questioned. She had recognised her signature next to the record of 3 September 2008 and had verbally explained that she had provided the applicant with the assistance documented in the record. However, she had refused to make any written statements. The memo in question did not contain any further details as to the applicant’s condition on 3 September 2008 or what medical assistance had been provided to him (see also paragraph 26 above). 58.  On 6 May 2009 the Staromiskyy Court found the applicant guilty on seventeen counts of aggravated theft and robbery and sentenced him to eleven and a half years’ imprisonment, as well as confiscation of all his personal property. The confiscated property included a house and a car which had been purchased by the applicant’s parents, but which the court considered to have been bought using the revenue from his criminal activities. The applicant was acquitted of the charges of banditry, money laundering, hooliganism and illegal arms handling. The court noted that the applicant had cooperated with the investigation. At the court hearing, the applicant commented on only two of the charges against him: he denied his participation in one episode of theft and one episode of robbery and submitted that he had earlier confessed to those two episodes under duress. The court dismissed that allegation as unsubstantiated. 59.  The applicant appealed, submitting that he had voluntarily confessed to the criminal offences in question and had shown remorse. Referring to his cooperation with the investigation, as well as the fact that he had a child who was a minor, the applicant sought mitigation of his sentence. He also contested the confiscation-related part of the verdict. 60.  On 16 July 2009 the Vinnytsia Regional Court of Appeal rejected his appeal. 61.  On 16 December 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He submitted that the lower courts’ decisions should be quashed as being contrary to Article 59 of the Constitution (right to legal assistance – see paragraph 65 below) and Article 398 of Code of Criminal Procedure (listing grounds for the annulment of a judgment – see paragraph 66 below). The applicant contended that he had not committed the crimes of which he had been found guilty and that he had incriminated himself after succumbing to “psycho-physical influence and deception by the police”. 62.  On 26 February 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. As to his submission on the ostensibly involuntary nature of his confessions, the Supreme Court noted that the first-instance court had not established any facts showing any coercion of the applicant and he had not disputed that in his appeal. The Supreme Court furthermore observed that the applicant’s allegation of breach of the criminal procedural legislation were too vague. 63.  On 18 August 2010 the Prosecutor General’s Office wrote to the applicant stating that it had instructed the Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor’s Office to investigate his complaints of ill-treatment. 64.  On 2 September 2010 the Vinnytsia Regional Prosecutor’s Office also wrote to the applicant stating that it had already dismissed his complaints, namely on 20 November 2008 (see paragraph 44 above). The prosecutor also referred to a similar ruling by the Kyiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office of 7 November 2008 (the case file before the Court does not contain a copy of the quoted ruling and there is no information about its contents).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Siyazan. He is a farmer. 6.  Following a dispute over ownership rights to a plot of land between the applicant and the Sadan Municipality in the district formerly known as Davachi (“the Municipality”), criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant. 7.  On 29 December 2004 the Davachi District Court convicted the applicant under Article 188 of the Criminal Code (violation of a lawful owner’s right to a plot of land, by means of unauthorised occupation, alteration or cultivation thereof) and sentenced him to a fine in the amount of one hundred conventional financial units (550,000 old Azerbaijani manats, equivalent to 110 new Azerbaijani manats (AZN), which according to the official exchange rates published by the Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan amounted to approximately 84 euros (EUR) at the relevant time). The court found that the applicant had unlawfully occupied and cultivated a plot of land of 0.8 hectares owned by the Municipality. The Court based its findings on witness statements and information provided by the State Committee of Land and Cartography (“the SCLC”). 8.  On an unspecified date, the applicant appealed against the judgment of 29 December 2004, arguing that the plot of land in question was part of a larger parcel of land measuring 50 hectares belonging to his family farming business. On 18 March 2005 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, alleging that the lower courts had erred in their assessment of the facts. On 9 August 2005 the Supreme Court, composed of a panel of three judges including judge N.H., quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 18 March 2005 and remitted the case for a new examination to the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court noted, in particular, that the conviction was based on insufficient evidence. 10.  Taking into consideration the findings of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal sent a new request to the SCLC and the Municipality requesting detailed information about the exact location, measurements and ownership of the plot of land. The Municipality submitted that, according to the official records, the plot in question belonged to the Municipality and not the applicant. The SCLC conducted an on-site inspection of the plot of land and submitted to the court that the plot in question was part of the Municipality’s estate. On 12 July 2006 the Court of Appeal delivered a new judgment upholding the Davachi District Court’s judgment of 29 November 2004 convicting the applicant. The court held that the disputed plot of land which the applicant cultivated belonged to the Municipality and that the relevant law had been applied correctly. 11.  The applicant appealed. On 10 October 2006 the Supreme Court, composed of a panel of three judges including judge N.H., examined the applicant’s appeal. It found that the Court of Appeal had examined all the relevant and available evidence and had committed no breaches of substantive or procedural law. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment of 12 July 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1935 and 1957 respectively and live in Varna. They are mother and daughter. 7.  In 1985 the first applicant and her husband bought from the Varna municipality an apartment of 54 square metres, situated in the centre of the city, which had become State property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria after 1945. 8.  On an unspecified date after that the first applicant's husband died and his property was inherited by the two applicants. 9.  In February 1992 the Restitution Law entered into force. 10.  On 8 July 1992 one of the heirs of the former pre-nationalisation owner of the flat brought proceedings against the applicants under section 7 of the Restitution Law. In a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 7 July 1997 the action was allowed partially, the domestic courts finding that the plaintiff could only claim half of the property. 11.  The courts found that the applicants' title over half of the property was null and void on two grounds: 1) their apartment had been part of a bigger apartment, which had, prior to 1985 and in breach of the relevant construction requirements, been divided by the State into two; and 2) the area where the apartment was located had been earmarked for the construction of buildings of more than three storeys and the applicants' building was of two storeys; the relevant legislation at the time prohibited the sale of apartments in such buildings. 12.  On 20 November 1998 the applicants requested to be compensated with compensation bonds for half of the property. The request was granted and in January 2003 the applicants received bonds for 10,300 Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of approximately 5,280 euros (EUR), in accordance with an expert valuation of a half of their apartment drew up in 2001 or 2002. On 25 November 2004 the applicants sold their bonds for approximately 50% of their face value and received BGN 5,145, the equivalent of EUR 2,640. 13.  In the meantime, on 8 December 1997, following a legislative amendment whereby the time-limit to bring an action under section 7 of the Restitution Law was renewed, the remaining heirs of the former pre-nationalisation owner brought such an action against the applicants regarding the second half of the apartment. 14.  The action was granted in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 14 July 2004. Putting forward arguments identical to the ones concerning the first half of the apartment (see paragraph 11 above), the courts found that the applicants' title to the second half of the property was likewise null and void. 15.  The applicants did not apply for compensation bonds for that half of the apartment, as they were entitled to. 16.  On several occasions after 1997 the first applicant requested to be provided with municipal housing but was informed that no such housing was available. By 2003 the two applicants and the second applicant's family were still living in the disputed flat. In December 2003 they vacated it and rented another apartment. In 2004 the second applicant bought another flat and her family and the first applicant moved in there. 17.  The relevant background facts and domestic law and practice have been summarised in the Court's judgments in the cases of Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01, and 194/02, 15 March 2007) and Tsonkovi v. Bulgaria (no. 27213/04, §§ 14-15, 2 July 2009).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Plovdiv. He was a member of the Board of Directors of a local bank and a director of a private brokerage firm. 7.  On 1 April 1998 the Plovdiv District Prosecutor's Office charged the applicant and Mr A. (the “accused”) with malfeasance. The charge was later dropped, on an unspecified date, due to lack of a punishable offence. 8.  The Plovdiv District Prosecutor's Office also charged the accused with embezzlement on 8 July 1998 and transferred the case to the Plovdiv Regional Prosecutor's Office. 9.  On the next day, 9 July 1998, the Plovdiv Regional Prosecutor's Office imposed on each of the accused bail in the amount of 5,000,000 old Bulgarian levs [approximately 2,560 euros (EUR)]. 10.  The preliminary investigation against the accused continued for the next year with various investigative procedures being conducted in the meantime. 11.  Sometime in October 1999 the applicant's co‑accused, Mr A., absconded. 12.  On 5 November 1999 the applicant was detained on remand under an order of the Plovdiv Regional Prosecutor's Office. 13.  The preliminary investigation against the accused was concluded in December 1999. 14.  At the beginning of January 2000 an indictment for embezzlement of 2,051,819.44 United States dollars was filed against the accused with the Plovdiv Regional Court. 15.  The criminal proceedings continued at the trial stage where an undisclosed number of hearings were held before the Plovdiv Regional Court. 16.  In a judgment of 21 June 2005 the Plovdiv Regional Court found the accused innocent of the charges brought against them. It is unclear whether the Prosecutor's Office appealed against this judgment and whether it subsequently entered into force. 17.  In October 1999 the authorities established that the applicant's co‑accused, Mr A., could not be found and suspected that he had left the country. 18.  On 5 November 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Prosecutor's Office ordered that the applicant be detained on remand despite recognising that he had always punctually and voluntarily attended the investigative procedures conducted during the proceedings. In justifying the detention, the Plovdiv Regional Prosecutor's Office referred to intelligence data received from the Plovdiv Regional Police Directorate on 4 November 1999 that the applicant was purportedly planning to abscond. The applicant was detained on the same day. 19.  On 8 November 1999 the applicant appealed against his detention whereby he challenged the need and justification to amend the measure for securing his appearance in court to detention on remand. In addition, he contested the legal grounds for relying on unverified intelligence data in justifying his detention. 20.  In a letter of 17 November 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Police Directorate once again informed the Plovdiv Regional Court that on 3 November 1999 it had received intelligence data that the applicant was intending to abscond. It also noted that without authorisation from the Minister of Internal Affairs it could not provide the intelligence data to the Prosecutor's Office. 21.  A hearing was held before the Plovdiv Regional Court on 22 November 1999 at which the prosecutor informed the court that his office did not have access to the intelligence data of 3 November 1999, because the police had refused to provide it without the prior approval of the Minister of Internal Affairs. The court considered that it was essential for it to obtain the intelligence data as this affected the rights of the detained to challenge it. The court ordered that the intelligence data be obtained from the police. The applicant insisted that the court rule on his appeal and challenged the possibility of using such intelligence data as evidence. The hearing was adjourned without a ruling on the applicant's appeal. 22.  In a letter of the same day to the Plovdiv Regional Police Directorate the Vice-President of the Plovdiv Regional Court requested that the police provide the court with the facts on which they based their information that the applicant was intending to abscond. In its response of 23 November 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Police Directorate reiterated the statement contained in its letter of 17 November 1999. 23.  The hearing of 26 November 1999 was postponed because the Plovdiv Regional Court considered that it was vital for the police to provide the intelligence data before it ruled on the appeal. The applicant maintained that the Prosecutor's Office had failed to prove the applicant's intention to abscond, challenged the need to postpone the hearing and insisted that the court rule on his appeal on the basis of the facts before it. The hearing was adjourned without a ruling on the applicant's appeal. 24.  In two letters to the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Plovdiv Regional Police Directorate of 29 November 1999, the Vice-President of the Plovdiv Regional Court once again requested that the police provide the court with the facts on which they based their information that the applicant was intending to abscond. In its response of 30 November 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Police Directorate reiterated its previous statements and informed the court that it had received intelligence data that in a conversation on 3 November 1999 the applicant had declared his intention to leave the country because he was worried about the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him and in view of the absconding of his co-accused. The police refused to provide the source of the data. 25.  At the next hearing on 3 December 1999, the Plovdiv Regional Court examined and dismissed the applicant's appeal against his detention. It found that, in view of the charges against him, his detention on remand was mandatory and, moreover, that there was evidence that he would abscond. 26.  After the preliminary investigation was concluded the applicant filed an appeal on 15 December 1999 against his detention arguing that this was a change in circumstances which required a reassessment of his detention on remand. At a hearing held on 21 December 1999 the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. It considered that there was no change in circumstances and, in any event, that his detention was mandatory in view of the charges against him and the likelihood that he would abscond. 27.  On 1 January 2000 amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure entered into force concerning the regime of detention on remand (see below, Relevant domestic law and practice). 28.  The first two hearings at the trial stage of the proceedings were held on 25 January and 22 February 2000. On both occasions the applicant appealed against his detention, which the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed by essentially relying on the intelligence data that he would abscond, that he was charged with a serious intentional offence for which detention on remand was mandatory and that he had another preliminary investigation opened against him. At the hearing of 22 February 2000 a medical expert's report was presented to the court concerning the applicant's deteriorating state of health, but it was found that his treatment could be continued in prison. The applicant appealed against the ruling of 22 February 2000 for dismissing his appeal, which the Plovdiv Regional Court upheld in a formal decision of 7 March 2000. 29.  In a decision of 13 March 2000 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals found that there was no evidence that the applicant would abscond or re-offend and that he had always cooperated with the investigation. In addition, it noted that the police in its letters to the courts had never indicated that the applicant had undertaken any specific actions to abscond. The court also found that the applicant's health condition required treatment and a special diet, which could only be provided in a home environment. As a result, it replaced the applicant's detention on remand with house arrest but without citing any specific reasons for placing the latter restriction on the applicant. 30.  On an unspecified date, the applicant appealed against the imposed house arrest. 31.  The Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal at a hearing on 11 December 2000 as it found that there were no new circumstances warranting a re-evaluation of the imposed restriction on the applicant. On further appeal, the Plovdiv Court of Appeals upheld the decision on 28 December 2000. 32.  On an unspecified date, the applicant filed a second appeal against the imposed house arrest. 33.  On 28 May 2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the second appeal of the applicant as it found that there were no new circumstances warranting a re-evaluation of the imposed restriction and also because he had another preliminary investigation opened against him. 34.  On further appeal, in a decision of 15 June 2001 the Plovdiv Court of Appeals quashed the lower court's decision of 28 May 2001 and amended the measure for securing the applicant's appearance in court to bail in the amount of 5,000 new Bulgarian levs (approximately EUR 2,560). The court found that the applicant had always attended court hearings and had never been the cause for any delays or postponements. Thus, it considered that the imposition of house arrest on the applicant had never been justified and that its overall length (one year and seven months) represented a new circumstance warranting a re-evaluation of the imposed restriction. The court also found that the Plovdiv Regional Court had mistakenly relied on the statutory provisions governing detention on remand when dismissing the applicant's appeal against his house arrest but did not find the imposed house arrest to have been unlawful as such.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4. The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Kočani. 5. On 13 July 1987 the applicant’s parents brought a civil action before the Kočani Municipal Court (Општински Суд Кочани) claiming revocation of a care agreement (“the agreement”) (договор за доживотна издршка) concluded on 25 December 1981 between them and their son, Mr T.K. Under the agreement, Mr T.K. was recognised as holder of the title to a property specified by the agreement in return for caring for his parents. They claimed that after their son’s death in 1982, the defendants, Mr T.K.’s wife and her children no longer lived with them and thus had ceased to fulfil the duties arising from the agreement. 6. On 30 September 1987 the Kočani Municipal Court accepted the claim and revoked the agreement. After hearing the parties to the proceedings and several witnesses, the court found that the personal relationships between the parties had deteriorated over time and that the defendants had consequently failed to care for the applicant’s parents. 7. On 12 February 1988 the then Štip District Court (Окружен Суд во Штип) accepted the defendants’ appeal of 29 October 1987. It held that the agreement had not stated that they should live under the same roof and that the separation of the living arrangements could not be considered a sufficient ground for its revocation. 8. On an unspecified date, the applicant took over the case after her parents died. On 27 June 1991 the Kočani Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The court heard the parties, examined eighteen witnesses and admitted a considerable amount of evidence. 9. On 11 November 1992 the Štip District Court accepted the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 10. On 9 February 1993 the Kočani Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as ill-founded. This decision was set aside by the Štip District Court on 27 April 1994. 11. On 11 April 1996 the Kočani Municipal Court, sitting in a different composition, dismissed the applicant’s claim again. On 29 October 1996 the Štip Court of Appeal upheld an appeal by the applicant of 23 May 1996 and quashed the lower court’s decision. It found, inter alia, that the case had been decided by a single judge instead of by a chamber of three judges as required by law. 12. At the only hearing held on 9 July 1997, the Kočani Court of First Instance granted the applicant’s request and revoked the agreement. This decision was partly confirmed by the Štip Court of Appeal on 24 December 1997. This latter court remitted the decision on the trial costs for fresh consideration. 13. On 23 April 1998 the Kočani Court of First Instance rejected an appeal by the defendants on points of law (ревизија) as out of time. On 12 September 1998 the Štip Court of Appeal remitted the case for re-examination. On 3 November 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the defendants’ appeal on points of law and quashed the lower courts’ decisions described in the preceding paragraph. It found that the first-instance court, sitting in different composition, had erred in law since it had relied on already established evidence without having the parties’ consent to do so. 14. After two hearings, on 13 July 2000 the Kočani Court of First Instance upheld the applicant’s claim and revoked the agreement on the same grounds as in its decision of 9 July 1997. On 13 November 2000 the Štip Court of Appeal ruled in the defendants’ favour and set aside this decision for the reasons described in the preceding paragraph. 15. On 15 October 2001 the Kočani Court of First Instance granted the applicant’s request and revoked the agreement. It examined the parties and eleven witnesses and admitted other evidence. None of the three hearings scheduled was adjourned at the applicant’s request. 16.  On 11 March 2003 the Štip Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the defendants dated 30 November 2001 and confirmed the lower court’s decision on the merits. It overturned (преиначува) it in respect of the trial costs. On 24 April 2003 the defendants lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which was dismissed as inadmissible on 12 May 2004. 17. Meanwhile, on 12 May 2003 the Kočani Court of First Instance had granted the applicant’s request for enforcement of the above decisions in respect of the trial costs. On 23 May 2003 the court suspended the enforcement pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. On 30 November 2004 the enforcement proceedings ended. 18. On 6 December 2005 the Kočani Court of First Instance, in separate proceedings, declared the applicant a successor in title (законски наследник) to her late father and granted her title to part of his property. 19.  During the proceedings on the merits, the composition of the first-instance court sitting in the applicant’s case changed four times.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1936 and 1960 respectively and live in Sofia. The first applicant is the second applicant’s mother. 6.  In 1969 the first applicant and her husband bought from the Sofia municipality an apartment which had become State property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria after 1947. 7.  On 22 February 1993 the heir of the pre-nationalisation owner of the apartment brought proceedings against the first applicant and her husband, alleging that their title to the apartment was null and void and seeking the restoration of his own title. 8.  The case was examined by the Sofia District Court, which dismissed the action in a judgment of 17 July 1995. On an appeal by the former owner’s heir, on 10 June 1996 the Sofia City Court reversed and allowed the claim. 9.  On an unspecified date in the summer of 1996 the first applicant and her husband filed a petition for review (cassation). While the case was pending before the Supreme Court of Cassation, on an unspecified date, most likely in 1998, they also sought the reopening of the proceedings. Under domestic law at the time, they were entitled to do so in view of the fact that the judgment of the Sofia City Court was formally considered to be final. The first applicant and her husband sought reopening on the basis of newly-discovered evidence, namely an instruction of the Ministry of Architecture and Public Works of 1968 concerning the sale of State-owned apartments. 10.  The Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing on 10 November 1998 and dealt both with the petition for review (cassation) submitted in 1996 and the request for reopening submitted in 1998. In a judgment of 2 March 1999 it reopened the proceedings, finding that the first applicant and her husband could not have been aware of the newly-discovered document earlier. It quashed the judgment of the Sofia City Court of 10 June 1996 and remitted the case. Accordingly, it held that it would not examine the petition for review (cassation). 11.  The case was remitted to the Sofia City Court, which held its only hearing on 21 June 2001. Although it took into account the 1968 instruction of the Ministry of Architecture and Public Works on the basis of which the proceedings had been reopened, the domestic court reached again the conclusion that the title of the first applicant and her husband was null and void. In a judgment of 3 August 2001 it allowed the claim against them. 12.  On 29 October 2001 the first applicant and her husband appealed against that judgment in cassation. 13.  On 9 March 2002 the first applicant’s husband passed away and was succeeded by the two applicants. The second applicant joined the proceedings. 14.  The Supreme Court of Cassation held two hearings on 18 March and 4 November 2003. In a final judgment of 9 December 2003 it upheld the Sofia City Court’s judgment of 3 August 2001 whereby the title of the first applicant and her husband had been found to be null and void.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Cuxhaven, in Germany. 5.  The applicant is a shareholder of M.T.V Cosmetics Ltd, a company registered under Cypriot law. From 29 January 1992 onwards he has been involved in a number of civil proceedings concerning the above company. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as derived from the minutes of the proceedings, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 29 January 1992 the applicant filed application no. 24/92 before the District Court of Nicosia complaining about the oppressive conduct of the majority shareholders of M.T.V. Cosmetics Ltd and requesting a number of remedies in this respect. 8.  On 23 December 1992 the court delivered its judgment finding that there had been oppressive conduct and ordering the purchase of the applicant's shares by the majority shareholders at a price determined by an independent valuer. No appeal was filed against this judgment. 9.  Subsequently, on 26 November 1993 the majority shareholders of the company filed an application (also referred to as application no. 24/92) with the District Court of Nicosia requesting it to issue an order requiring, inter alia, the applicant to transfer his shares to the majority shareholders and to comply with the court's judgment of 23 December 1992. 10.  Following the filing of an ex-parte application by the majority shareholders, the court issued interlocutory orders prohibiting the applicant from, inter alia, transferring and/or alienating his shares pending the proceedings for the execution of the court's judgment of 23 December 1992. 11.  Subsequent to an objection put forward by the applicant, the court set aside the interlocutory orders on 28 January 1994. 12.  On 28 September 1994 the court delivered its judgment dismissing the application of 26 November 1993. It found that the application had no legal basis. 13.  On 10 October 1994 the defendants filed an appeal no. 9296 with the Supreme Court. A cross-appeal was lodged by the applicant on 10 October 1997. Both the appeal and the cross-appeal were withdrawn on 22 January 1999. 14.  On 3 February 1994 the majority shareholders (plaintiffs) of M.T.V Cosmetics Ltd filed civil action no. 1056/94  against the applicant before the District Court of Nicosia requesting, in essence, the enforcement of the court's judgment dated 23 December 1992 in application 24/92 (see paragraph 8 above). They requested a number of remedies in this respect. 15.  On the same date the plaintiffs also filed an ex parte application requesting an interlocutory court order prohibiting the applicant from, inter alia, transferring or alienating his shares pending the proceedings and from interfering with the company's affairs. This application was eventually withdrawn on 11 February 1994. 16.  The statement of claim was filed on 11 November 1994 and on 5 December 1994 the plaintiffs filed an application concerning the applicant's failure to submit his statement of defence and counterclaim. The application was set for hearing for 12 December 1994. The hearing was then adjourned twice, for two months in total, at the applicant's request for the purposes of filing his statement of defence. On 16 February 1995 the applicant filed his statement of defence and counterclaim and on 24 February 1995 the plaintiffs withdrew their application of 5 December 1994. The reply to the defence and counterclaim were filed on 9 March 1995. On 26 May 1995 the case was set for hearing for 12 December 1995, six months and seventeen days later. 17.  In the meantime, an application was filed by the applicant on 28 November 1995 concerning a preliminary objection. The application was fixed for hearing on 9 February 1996. The applicant then withdrew part of the objection and the application was set for hearing for 10 April 1996. On that date the hearing of the application was adjourned until 17 June 1996 at the plaintiffs' request. On that date the hearing was adjourned by the court itself until 4 November 1996 and then, on the latter date, until 15 January 1997, following the retirement of the President of the court. An interlocutory decision was delivered on 31 January 1997 dismissing the preliminary objection. 18.  The hearing of the case began on 11 April 1997 and was concluded on 29 March 1999. Approximately twenty hearing sessions were held. Furthermore, within this period about ten interlocutory applications were examined by the court. The applicant filed nine of these applications on: 18 June 1997 (ex parte application for discovery of documents), 1 July 1997 (application concerning the inspection of documents), 10 July 1997 (ex parte application concerning the taking of evidence in Germany), 5 September 1997 (application requesting access to the company's bank accounts), 25 February 1998 (application concerning the summons of witnesses), 31 July 1998 (application by summons for the quashing/setting aside of a previous order issued by the court), 20 August 1998 (application by summons requesting the suspension of the proceedings pending determination of appeal no. 9296 - see paragraph 13 above), 27 November 1998 (two applications, one for the taking evidence of abroad and one for the discovery of documents). It appears from the minutes of the proceedings that at least two of the above applications were withdrawn by the applicant. The plaintiffs filed one interlocutory application within this period, on 30 September 1997, for the amendment of their statement of claim. The court issued nine interlocutory decisions and/or orders in respect of the above applications and the plaintiffs filed an application before the Supreme Court for leave to apply for an order of certiorari in order to quash/set aside one of the above interlocutory decisions. This application was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 19.  Furthermore, on three separate occasions between 3 July 1998 and 3 December 1998, the court expressed its concern in respect of the length of the proceedings in the case. 20.  On 27 May 1999 the District Court dismissed the action and held that the judgment of 23 December 1992 was unenforceable and did not create legal effects for the parties involved. It observed that the latter judgment was incomplete, since it had left the material issue of the value of the applicant's shares unspecified and had referred the whole issue to an independent valuer who had to assess the price of the shares as if there had not been oppression. The independent valuer's decision could not complete the court's decision since he could not perform judicial functions. Furthermore, the applicant had not been ordered to do anything. It was the defendants in that case who had been ordered to buy the shares. 21.  As regards the length of the proceedings the court observed in its judgment that the hearing of the case had commenced in April 1997 and it was completed in a period of two years. It found that the delay was due to the number of interlocutory applications submitted by the parties, including an application for the amendment of the pleadings in the middle of the hearing of the case and, also, due to the extensive evidence put forward by the parties, including thirty-two exhibits and statements from eleven witnesses. Furthermore, the trial judge noted that his transfer in October 1997 had hindered the progress and completion of the proceedings. Finally, the trial judge considered that the fact that the applicant had not been represented by a lawyer for a great part of the proceedings contributed to the delay. 22.  On 6 November 2000 the court awarded the applicant the amount of 14,998.45 Cyprus pounds (CYP) for legal costs plus interest. 23.  On 22 June 1999 the plaintiffs lodged appeal no. 10571 with the Supreme Court against the first instance judgment of 27 May 1999 and on 22 December 2000 they lodged appeal no. 11002 challenging the award of costs. 24.  On 12 July 1999 the Registrar of the District Court of Nicosia sent the appeal notice to the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court informing the latter that the court minutes would be sent to the Supreme Court in eight months. 25.  On 5 May 2000 the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court sent a letter to the Registrar of the District Court of Nicosia requesting that the minutes of the case be sent to the Supreme Court. From 13 July 2000 until 12 June 2001 about eight letters/reminders were sent by the Chief Registrar of the Supreme Court to the District Court in this respect. 26.  In the meantime, it appears that the District Court of Nicosia suspended the execution of its judgment of 27 May 1999 pending the determination of appeal no. 10571, following an application by the plaintiffs seeking a court order in this respect. 27.  On 12 December 2001 the minutes of the first instance proceedings were sent to the Supreme Court and the appeals were fixed for pre-trial directions for 28 January 2002. On that date the appellants' lawyer asked for time for the purpose, inter alia, to make amendments to the grounds of appeal. The appeal was then fixed for 20 March 2002 for pre-trial directions. 28.  On 19 April 2002 the court directed the appellants to file their amended appeal until 3 May 2002 and their written addresses by 17 June 2002. The appellants filed their amended appeal within the deadline but on 17 June 2002 they filed an application requesting an extension of sixty days for the filing of the outline of their addresses. The court examined this application on 25 June 2002 and granted an extension of three weeks to the appellants. On 10 July 2002 and on 13 September 2002 the appellants filed an application for an extension of time for the filing of the outline in their addresses in appeals no. 11002 and no. 10571 respectively. On 19 September 2002 the court examined the above applications and directed that the outlines of the addresses in both appeals should be filed within thirty days. These were filed by the appellants on 17 October 2002. 29.  On 3 December 2002 the applicant filed an application for an extension of seven days for filing the outline of his address. This was granted by the court on 19 December 2002 and the applicant filed the outline on 23 December 2002. 30.  On 21 April 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed both appeals with costs against the appellants. 31.  On 17 July 2003 the applicant filed his list of costs and expenses. This included legal costs at CYP 2,441.70, expenses for the list of costs at CYP 317.46 and expenses incurred due to the fact that he had been permanently residing in Germany at CYP 4,203.15. On 4 November 2003 the Registrar awarded the applicant the amount of CYP 1,940.30 for the first two claims but rejected his latter claim. 32.  The applicant then lodged an appeal (no. 10571) before the Supreme Court requesting the review of the assessment of his costs by the registry. He claimed that his travel expenses to Cyprus and his living expenses therein for the duration of the proceedings should have been reimbursed since at the relevant time he had been permanently residing in Germany. 33.  On 15 June 2005, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. It found that he had failed to establish that he had been a permanent resident of Germany during the material time. 34.  On 14 March 2000 the applicant filed application no.132/00 before the District Court of Nicosia against M.T.V Cosmetics Ltd requesting a number of remedies concerning the formation and activities of the company. 35.  On 12 October 2001 the trial judge issued a decision exempting himself from the proceedings following an objection by the respondent company on 27 September 2001. The case was then put before another judge. 36.  Furthermore, between 5 May 2000 and 17 January 2006, the court dealt with twenty-eight interlocutory applications which were filed by the parties and objections thereto. Eleven of these applications were filed by the applicant and seventeen by the respondents. 37.  In particular the applicant filed: an ex parte application on 21 December 2000 which was dismissed on 16 January 2001; an application on 19 January 2001 for an interim order which he withdrew on 14 June 2001; an ex parte application on 14 March 2001 which was approved on 20 March 2001; an ex parte application on 25 October 2001; an application on 18 April 2002 which was rejected on 14 May 2002 at the applicant's request; an application on 23 April 2002 which he withdrew on 30 April 2002; two ex parte applications on 13 and 14 May 2002 concerning the addition of other respondents to the main application approved  on 6 June 2002 and 23 May 2002 respectively; an application on 23 April 2003 concerning the suspension of the execution of the order of costs which was dismissed by interim decision of 19 February 2004; an ex parte application on 3 June 2003; and, finally, an application on 15 October 2004 for an amendment which he withdrew on 22 September 2005. 38.  The respondents filed two applications on 5 May 2000 and 4 July 2000 for an extension of time for the purpose of filing their observations; three ex parte applications on 23 January 2001, 27 February 2001 and 26 March 2001 requiring the presence of applicant in court for cross-examination purposes on 1 February 2001, 9 March 2001 and 21 May 2001 respectively; an application on 10 September 2001; an application on 27 March 2002 which was partially dismissed by interim decision of 6 August 2002; an application on 18 April 2002; an application on 16 May 2002; an application on 24 March 2003 which was withdrawn on 18 April 2003; an application on 5 September 2003; an application on 9 September 2003 (for the annulment of a previous court order) which was dismissed by interim decision on 19 February 2004; an application on 3 October 2003 requiring the presence of applicant in court for cross-examination purposes; two applications on 7 April 2004 and 29 April 2004  for an extension of time for the purposes of filing an objection to one of the applicant's applications which were granted on 21 April 2004 and 4 May 2004 respectively; an ex parte application on 10 September 2004 requesting leave to cross examine the applicant which was approved on 27 September 2004; and finally, an application on 17 January 2006. 39.  The last interlocutory application was set for directions for 21 February 2006 to allow time to the applicant to file an objection thereto if he so wished. It was then fixed for hearing for 28 March 2006. On that date the hearing did not take place in view of the parties' delayed appearance in court. The court then fixed the hearing of the application for 6 April 2006. 40.  On 11 April 2001 one of the majority shareholders filed civil action 3740/01 before the District Court of Nicosia against M.T.V Cosmetics Ltd, two of the shareholders of the above company and another two companies, seeking a number of remedies, including the restitution of certain of the company's assets which were allegedly fraudulently misappropriated by the above defendants. 41.  On 21 May 2002 the applicant filed an ex parte application before the court requesting that he be added as a second plaintiff to the above action. 42.  By court order of 29 May 2002 the applicant was added as the second plaintiff to the action. 43.  On 17 June 2002 the applicant applied for an extension of time for filing his statement of claim until 20 June 2002. The court approved the application and issued an order in this respect. Furthermore, the first plaintiff and the applicant (second plaintiff) filed their statements of claim on 20 and 21 June 2002 respectively. 44.  From the latter date until 19 February 2004 the court dealt with six interlocutory applications by the parties: two were filed by the first plaintiff, one by the applicant and the rest by the defendants in the action. 45.  On 8 July 2002 the first plaintiff filed an interlocutory application for the issuing of a judgment in accordance with the statement of claim. The application was fixed for 8 October 2002 and adjourned at the parties' request until 6 November 2002. It was then withdrawn on 4 December 2002. 46.  On 27 March 2002 the defendants applied for dismissal of the action. They subsequently withdrew the application on 21 June 2002. 47.  On 16 December 2002 the first plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for the discovery of documents which was approved on 20 December 2002. 48.  On 11 September 2002 the defendants filed an application requesting that the court set aside its order 29 May 2002. The application was fixed for 8 October 2002. On that date an extension was given to the applicant until 6 November 2002 for filing his objection. The application was set for hearing for 11 December 2002 and then adjourned by the court until 10 January 2003. It was then fixed for programming for 6 February 2003 and then 11 March 2003 and set for hearing for 31 March 2003. It was then fixed for directions for 7 April 2003 following a request for some time by the applicant. On that date the applicant filed an application asking for leave to amend his objection to the application. His request was approved and the case was fixed for directions for 5 May 2003. The hearing of the application was held on 2 June 2003. The decision was reserved on 2 June 2003 and the application was rejected by decision of the court on 15 January 2004. 49.  In the meantime, on 3 October 2003, the defendants lodged an interlocutory application. The application was fixed for 4 December 2003 and then for 15 January 2004 following the applicant's request for time in order to file a written objection to the application. The application was approved by the court on 19 February 2004. 50.  On 26 May 2004 an application was lodged requesting that the action be fixed. On 1 June 2004 the court fixed the case for directions for 6 July 2004. The case then appears to have been adjourned twice for direction purposes until 22 September 2004. 51.  From the above date until 31 January 2005 the case was adjourned three times, twice at the defendants' request and one at the applicant's request for the purpose, inter alia, of filing their defence. 52.  The pleadings were completed by 31 January 2005 and on 1 February 2005 an application was filed with the Registrar requesting that the case be fixed for mention. On 7 March 2005 the case was fixed for mention for 12 April 2005 and then 23 May 2005 in view of a question raised by the defendants concerning the statements of claim submitted by the plaintiffs. The case was then adjourned twice until 17 October 2005 pending the determination of an issue concerning the discovery of certain documents and the parties' handling of the case. On 17 October 2005 the case was set for hearing for 1 March 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in the Sverdlovsk Region. 5.  In 1987 she took part in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result she suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. 6.  In 1996 the applicant underwent medical examinations which established the link between her poor health and the involvement in the Chernobyl events. She was awarded a monthly allowance, to be increased on a regular basis in line with the minimum subsistence amount. 7.  In 1999 the applicant sued the local social security authority (Управление социальной защиты населения г. Заречного – “the defendant”) requesting to increase her monthly allowance and backdate the increase. The applicant considered that the amount of the allowance had been determined incorrectly. 8.  On 23 December 1999 the Beloyarsk District Court of the Sverdlovsk Region granted the applicant’s claim and ruled that her monthly allowance had been wrongly calculated. The court did not specify the exact amount of the monthly allowance to be paid to the applicant form then on. However, it ordered the defendant to recalculate the allowance due to the applicant and gave instructions on the recalculation. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 3 January 2000. The enforcement proceedings commenced. 9.  On an unspecified date in the beginning on 2000 the defendant recalculated the applicant’s allowance and backdated the increase. According to the defendant’s calculations, the monthly allowance due to the applicant pursuant to the judgment of 23 December 1999 amounted to 4,175 Russian roubles (RUB) and the underpayments of the allowance for the period of July 1996-February 2000 amounted to RUB 149,173.25. 10.  In March-August 2000 the applicant was receiving RUB 4,175 per month. However, starting form September the monthly allowance paid to the applicant was reduced to RUB 2,500. 11.  On 10 July 2000 the bailiff notified the defendant that the judgment of 23 December 1999 was not enforced in full since the applicant had not yet received RUB 149,173.25 (the underpayments). In their reply of 25 July 2000 to the bailiff the defendant referred to the lack of funding. 12.  According to the Government, in August 2002 RUB 202,611.27 were transferred to the local social security authority to make the payments to the Chernobyl victims. In September 2002 the applicant received RUB 6,731.51 from the defendant. 13.  In 2003 the applicant brought proceedings against the defendant complaining that the monthly allowance paid to her after September 2000 was lower than stipulated in the judgment of 23 December 1999. She also sought to increase the allowance in line with the minimum subsistence amount and to recover the arrears due to her. 14.  On 18 June 2003 the Zarechniy District Court of the Sverdlovsk Region awarded the applicant RUB 302,655.77 as underpayments for the period of July 1996-May 2003. It also held that the allowance payable to the applicant starting form June 2003 should amount to RUB 13,144.56. On 30 September 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal. 15.  On 23 December 2004 the applicant received RUB 60,644.56 on account of the enforcement of the judgment of 18 June 2003. In June 2005 she started receiving monthly allowance in the amount indicated in the judgment. On 6 July 2005 the applicant received RUB 473,341.53. That amount covered the rest of the judgment debt and the underpayments of the allowance which was in January 2004-June 2005 lower than established in the judgement.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1987 and lives in the village of A. in eastern Hungary. 7.  The applicant is innately deaf and dumb and has medium-grade intellectual disability. He is illiterate. 8.  According to the bill of indictment preferred in the case, on 10 April 2011 the applicant – a multiple recidivist offender with the most recent conviction dating from 2 November 2009 – mugged a passer-by in Gyüre. He was then halted for an identity check by officers of the Vásárosnamény Police Department. He attempted to escape but was apprehended while still in possession of the stolen item. He was committed to the police station. 9.  Since the applicant was perceived to use a sort of sign language, a sign-language interpreter was appointed for him at once. Later in the day he was interrogated as a suspect of robbery. No lawyer was present. 10.  The Government submitted that the applicant had understood the charges brought against him but made no complaint about it and admitted the commission of the offence by signing the minutes of the interrogation. The applicant denied this, arguing that the sign language used by him and the one used by the interpreter were different and thus no comprehension had been possible between them.\nThe applicant’s signature on the minutes in question consists of his scribbled nickname, hardly legible. 11.  Between 10 April and 4 July 2011 the applicant was detained on remand on the charge of mugging at Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Prison. 12.  The applicant maintained that the conditions of detention were inapt to his condition and that he had been molested, sexually and otherwise, by the other inmates. The Government argued that special measures had been put in place to address the applicant’s situation (in particular, the prison governor issued an instruction to that effect on 23 May 2011) – an assertion of which the efficacy has been disputed by the applicant (for details, see paragraphs 25 and 26 below). 13.  On 4 July 2011 the applicant was released from detention and placed under house arrest. The Vásárosnamény District Court, having noted that he did not know any sign language and was able to communicate only with his mother, was of the view that the time spent by the applicant in detention had be to be reduced to a minimum. 14.  Meanwhile, on 20 June 2011 the applicant was indicted for robbery. His mental condition was noted by the prosecution. A public defence counsel and a sign-language interpreter were appointed for him. 15.  While detained, the applicant was examined by a forensic psychiatrist. On 30 June 2011 the expert gave the opinion that the applicant’s faculties were to a large extent reduced and that he should be placed under partial guardianship. This was done by the Vásárosnamény District Court on 27 September 2011. The court noted that the applicant’s IQ was 39, he was deaf and dumb, he had medium-grade intellectual disability, he could not count and did not know sign language; the only person with whom he could communicate was his mother. 16.  The criminal proceedings conducted against the applicant are still pending. 17.  The applicant submitted the testimonies of a Mr F. and a Mr R. who were present when Mr Karsai met with the applicant on 6 May 2012 to discuss his representation before the Court. According to these testimonies, the applicant communicated using a peculiar sign-language-like method, essentially only intelligible to his mother, which appeared to be completely different from the standard sign language.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1947, 1943 and 1986 respectively and live in Novigrad. 5.  On 2 February 1998 the applicants brought a civil action against the State and the hospital R. in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking non-pecuniary damages for the death of the first and the second applicant's son and the third applicant's brother. 6.  The court held hearings on 4 June 1998, 18 January, 10 June and 2 September 1999. The applicants withdrew their action in respect of the State. Meanwhile the insurance company C.O. intervened in the proceedings. 7.  The next hearing was held on 10 July 2003. 8.  On 29 April 2004 the court gave judgment awarding the damages sought in part. Following an appeal by the respondents, on 21 March 2006 the Zagreb County Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 9.  Meanwhile, on 10 December 2002 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint concerning the length of proceedings under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. On 17 September 2004 the Constitutional Court accepted the applicants' complaint, finding a violation of their right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarding them each compensation in the amount of 4,400 Croatian kunas (HRK).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant company, Krone Verlag GmbH & Co KG, is the owner and publisher of the daily newspaper Kronen Zeitung. 6.  In 1999 E.R. and U.W., the parents of Christian W., dissolved their common household and concluded a provisional agreement on the custody of Christian under which sole custody was granted to E.R., while his brother stayed with U.W. On 13 February 2001 U.W. asked for custody to be withdrawn from E.R. and transferred to him. 7.  On 22 February 2001 E.R. and U.W. agreed that pending the outcome of an expert report custody be provisionally transferred to U.W. (vorläufige Obsorge) and that for the time being Christian should live with U.W., his father. 8.  It appears that subsequently U.W. hindered contact between Christian and E.R. and, in June 2002, moved to Sweden. Thereupon, by an interlocutory decision (einstweilige Verfügung) of 26 July 2002, custody of Christian was transferred back to E.R. 9.  U.W. was ordered to hand Christian over to E.R. immediately or to take him back to Austria before 5 August 2002. That order was confirmed on appeal on 12 September 2002 and became final. 10.  Thereupon E.R. travelled to Sweden to have that decision enforced. U.W. proposed to E.R. that they enter into an agreement on custody of Christian, and E.R. also agreed to staying in Sweden. However, no such agreement was finally reached. After E.R. had settled in Sweden and found employment there, U.W., together with Christian, left Sweden for Austria. 11.  On 4 November 2002, pending the outcome of the custody proceedings, custody was temporarily transferred to the Salzburg Youth Welfare Office. On 23 December 2003 the court dismissed U.W.’s request for custody to be withdrawn from E.R. and transferred to him. The decision was declared immediately enforceable. 12.  Subsequently, various attempts to enforce that decision were undertaken. The Austrian newspapers reported on these events because U.W. kept them regularly informed and sought publicity. 13.  The first attempt at enforcement, on 23 December 2003, failed because U.W. and Christian went into hiding. U.W. had informed the media of this step in advance. Some time later they returned. In order to enforce the custody decision the competent court scheduled a hearing for 15 January 2004 in the course of which Christian was to be handed over to E.R. U.W. failed to appear at the hearing. 14.  Thereupon the judge ordered that Christian be brought before the court by force (zwangsweise Vorführung). 15.  When that decision had to be enforced by court officers Christian barricaded himself in his elementary school and, since the police officers who intervened decided not to use physical force on the premises of the school, this attempt also failed. These events were also widely covered by the media because U.W. had informed them in advance. 16.  After further unsuccessful attempts the rural police (Gendarmerie) were informed on 26 January 2004 that Christian was at his father’s house. Court officers sent to the house noted, however, that Christian was not in the house but, together with a babysitter, in a car in front of it. The officers tried to take hold of Christian but he cried and resisted. These scenes were again the subject of widespread media coverage because they were observed and photographed by several journalists, who had been informed and had hurried to the spot. 17.  In order to establish whether Christian had suffered injuries during the attempt to enforce the court order, U.W. took him to the Salzburg hospital. On 28 January 2004, by means of a diversion manoeuvre, U.W. and Christian were separated and on the same day Christian was handed over to his mother, E.R., on the premises of the hospital. E.R. and Christian have been living in Sweden since that time. This final phase of the events was also widely reported on in the media. 18.  On 7 July 2004 Christian W., represented by his mother, brought proceedings under Sections 7 and 8a of the Media Act against the applicant company, seeking damages and publication of the ensuing judgment, claiming that a series of articles on the above-mentioned events published by the applicant company between 7 January and 16 February 2004 and which contained a detailed description of the events, giving his full name and illustrated by pictures of him, had breached his rights under those provisions. 19.  He argued that the reporting on him had interfered with his strictly private life in a manner likely to expose and compromise him in public. Moreover, the articles constituted a breach of section 7a of the Media Act, which prohibited reporting on the victim of a crime in a manner which made him or her recognisable in public; that was only allowed if the importance of the offence or the persons implicated meant that there was a preponderant public interest in the information. Both applications were lodged with the Vienna Regional Criminal Court. 20.  On 19 October 2004 the Regional Court gave a detailed judgment in the case, which referred to the following articles published in the applicant company’s newspaper and summed up by the Regional Court as follows:\n“(1)  7 January 2004\nThe heading ‘Missing father returns home with his two boys’, with a picture of Christian. According to the report, the child’s father returned from holiday with Christian and his brother and had to go to the police because the boy was being forced against his wishes to move in with his mother following an inhuman court decision in the context of a divorce battle.\n(2)  8 January 2004\nThe heading ‘Family drama: Christian needs peace at last’, accompanied by a picture of the child. The report describes a failed attempt to take the boy to Sweden and quotes the head teacher of his primary school as saying that Christian suffers from anxiety. A large number of people, some of whom have signed a petition, are reported to be campaigning for Christian to remain with his father.\n(3)  16 January 2004\n(a)  On the front page, the heading ‘My best friend is my dog’. Underneath is a picture of Christian with his dog and text stating that the child does not wish to go to his mother.\n(b)  The heading ‘What’s going on here is inhuman’, with two photographs of Christian. According to this article, five police officers entered the primary school in order to fetch the boy, who refused to go with them. The head teacher, some parents and classmates are reported as saying that what happened was inhuman.\n(4)  17 January 2004\nThe heading ‘Mad scramble for 8-year-old’, with a picture of Christian. The report states that several different people want the child, but no one has asked his opinion, resulting in an inhuman tug-of-war which is already affecting the child psychologically. The article further reports that a bailiff went to the child’s father’s flat but found no one at home.\n(5)  27 January 2004\n(a)  On the front page, the heading ‘Christian’s battle for his home’, with a picture of the plaintiff showing him grimacing as he resists being taken (into the police car) by the bailiff, while his brother tries to obstruct the bailiff.\n(b)  The heading ‘You have no idea what you’re doing to the child’, with two more pictures. The article describes the child being taken from the babysitter’s car to the police car. It likens the scene to something from a distant dictatorship, with two bailiffs trying to tear the young plaintiff away from his familiar surroundings by brute force, against his will and despite his cries for help. Neighbours and friends of the family are reported as crying with rage and directing abuse at the court officials. The plaintiff reportedly sustained a serious injury to his spine at the hands of the bailiffs and had to be taken to hospital.\n(6)  28 January 2004\n(a)  On the front page, the heading ‘The whole of Salzburg up in arms’, accompanied by a photograph of the child lying in a hospital bed wearing a surgical collar. According to the article, the child was injured by the bailiffs’ rough treatment, and everyone was appalled and angered.\n(b)  The heading ‘Bailiff pursues 8-year-old right into hospital’, with three pictures of the plaintiff, one showing him on a stretcher, one of him grimacing in pain in the arms of the bailiff while his brother tries to obstruct the latter, and a close-up of the child, again grimacing in pain, next to the bailiff and the car. The article also details rough treatment by the bailiffs, reportedly causing injury to the child, who is said to have complained of neck pains and to have told reporters how he had been punched in the back of the neck by one of the bailiffs. The doctor treating him is reported to have fitted a surgical collar.\n(c)  The heading ‘Cries for help rang out in the night’, again with pictures of the child and reports on the public’s reaction to the bailiffs’ methods;\n(d)  The heading ‘All for the good of the child’, together with the court’s findings and a picture of the child and\n(e)  letters from readers angered by the treatment of the child by his mother and the court, again with a picture of the plaintiff.\n(7)  29 January 2004\n(a)  Heading on front page ‘Christian abducted from hospital’, together with a photograph.\n(b)  The heading ‘Whole country moved by abduction’, with two photographs. The article criticises the allegedly rough methods of the bailiffs.\n(c)  The heading ‘Did the bailiff want to put a sticker on the child?’, also with critical comments.\n(d)  The heading ‘Abduction from hospital at dead of night’, also with a photograph The article describes the child’s removal from the hospital by his mother and quotes the father as saying that unless tough action is taken against the bailiffs, he will lodge a complaint.\n(e)  The heading ‘Minister Böhmdorfer says violence against children is unacceptable’ again with a photograph and comments on the case, including by the then Justice Minister Dr Dieter Böhmdorfer, who condemns violence against children.\n(8)  30 January 2004\n(a)  The heading ‘Everyone wants Christian finally left in peace’: another report on the mother’s flight with her child, accompanied by a photograph of the child.\n(b)  The heading ‘Scenes like those with Christian are completely avoidable’, also with a photograph. Comments on the case by a crisis-management expert.\n(9)  31 January 2004\n(a)  The heading ‘Christian’s case reopened’, with photograph. The report states that a new expert psychological opinion on the child is to be ordered.\n(b)  The heading ‘Custody battle – the story so far’, describing events up to that point.\n(c)  The heading ‘Blind hatred in salmon pink’, with comments by Günther Traxler, again with a picture of Christian grimacing in pain as the bailiff tries to put him in the police car.\n(10)  2 February 2004\nUnder the heading ‘Christian already in Sweden’, a report stating that the child has already been taken to Sweden by his mother and has had to leave his beloved dog behind. The report is accompanied by a picture.\n(11)  12 February 2004\nThe heading ‘I don’t want to stay here any longer’, again with three pictures of Christian. The reporter writes that the judge and bailiffs will have to answer to a disciplinary board and that Christian no longer wishes to stay with his mother in Sweden but wants to return to his father in Austria.\n(12)  13 February 2004\nThe heading ‘Interpol soon to search for missing Christian’, again with a picture of the child. The report states that the boy has tried to run away from his mother and has disappeared.\n(13)  16 February 2004\nA reader’s letter under the heading ‘Violence is not the answer’, in which a 12‑year‑old criticises the judge, again with a picture showing Christian grimacing in pain.” 21.  The Regional Court allowed the action and ordered the applicant company to pay damages in the amount of EUR 136,000, to publish the judgment in its newspaper, and to bear the costs of the proceedings. The Regional Court found that by publishing the above articles containing details of the custody dispute over nine-year-old Christian W., and, moreover, disclosing his full name and accompanied by a photograph of him partly showing a highly distressed facial expression, the applicant company had exposed his strictly private life in a manner likely to compromise him in public, in breach of section 7 of the Media Act. Moreover, the articles published on 27, 28 and 29 January 2004 had, without justification, disclosed the identity of a person who had been the victim of a criminal offence to a large and not directly informed circle of people, in breach of section 7a of the Media Act. 22.  The Regional Court accepted that there existed a direct link between the events reported on and the public interest because of the sharp criticism voiced of the conduct of the court officials who had attempted to enforce the custody order. However, the person with custody of Christian had not agreed to publication and the public interest in the events could have been satisfied without giving the child’s full name and publishing pictures of him. 23.  On 29 March 2005 the applicant company appealed. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, it argued, inter alia, that the Regional Court had failed to take into account the fact that there had already been an ongoing debate and that Christian’s father, acting as his son’s spokesman and in his interests, had informed the media of the events. Furthermore, it claimed that it had only acted as a public watchdog, informing the public about the proceedings and criticising the domestic authorities in the public interest. 24.  On 21 September 2005 the Vienna Court of Appeal partly allowed the appeal. It found that there had been no breach of section 7a of the Media Act, because under that provision a compensation claim existed only if a media outlet had described acts by which someone had become the victim of a crime and if the description violated the victim’s protected interests. In the present case, however, it was not the description of a criminal act that had breached Christian’s protected interests, since the proceedings against the court officials had ended without a conviction. The Court of Appeal therefore remitted the case to the Regional Court on this point. 25.  It further emphasised that by giving details of the plaintiff’s intimate family life and his full name, and by adding pictures of him, the newspaper had intruded into his strictly private life, as these details had merely been given in order to create a sensation and satisfy the curiosity of its readers. Even if there was a link to public life, a media outlet could report on a person’s strictly private life only to the extent necessary to satisfy the need for information related to those elements which were of relevance to the public interest. Reporting on events relating to a person’s strictly private life therefore had to be appropriate to the circumstances and proportionate. In the present case it had not been necessary for the purpose of informing the public of alleged shortcomings within the judiciary, nor had it been necessary to expose in such an intense and striking manner the severe strain being suffered by the juvenile plaintiff by inserting photographs showing his distress and despair, mentioning his full name and setting out the details of his seizure. 26.  On 19 May 2006 the Regional Court ruled again on the case and found no breach of section 7a of the Media Act. It accordingly reduced the amount of compensation to EUR 130,000. 27.  On 14 March 2007 the Vienna Court of Appeal upheld that decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984. 5.  On 15 October 2009 he was arrested by the Darnytskyy District Police Department of Kyiv on suspicion of having committed a robbery in aggravated circumstances. On the same day he was charged with that crime. 6.  On 16 October 2009 the Darnytskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the Darnytskyy Court”) ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention for two months. 7.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant was also charged with murder. 8.  On 10 December 2009 the Darnytskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months, namely to 15 January 2010. 9.  On 13 January 2010 the Darnytskyy Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to four months, namely to 15 February 2010. 10.  On 13 February 2010 the case was referred to the Kyiv Court of Appeal for consideration on the merits. 11.  On 15 March 2010 the Kyiv Court of Appeal held a preliminary hearing in the case and ordered, inter alia, that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant should be left unchanged. 12.  On 14 April 2011 the Kyiv Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of robbery and murder. It convicted him to fourteen years’ imprisonment and ordered the confiscation of his property. 13.  On 13 September 2011 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh trial. 14.  On 24 December 2013 the applicant was found guilty of robbery and murder and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. The court also ordered the confiscation of the applicant’s property. 15.  The applicant lodged an appeal. No further information was provided.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, a Ukrainian national, was born in 1935. He died on 14 November 2005. In a letter of 16 February 2006, the applicant's wife Mrs Y.P. Parkhomenko informed the Court that she wished to pursue the application. 5.  In 1995 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Krasnodon Town Court (the “Krasnodon Court”) against the Duvannaya State Mine (the “Mine”), seeking the recovery of occupational disability arrears. 6.  On 5 May 1995 the court found for the applicant and ordered the Mine to pay the applicant 273,171,500 karbovantsiv[1] (the former transitional currency of Ukraine before September 1996) in occupational disability arrears. On 15 June 1995 the Lugansk Regional Court upheld this decision. 7.  On 22 December 1995 the same court ordered the Mine to pay the applicant 527,638,000 karbovantsiv[2] in occupational disability arrears. 8.  By two separate decisions of 25 October 2000, the Presidium of the Lugansk Regional Court, following the protest lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor of the Lugansk Region, quashed the above judgments and remitted both cases for a fresh consideration. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant's claims were joined. On 16 May 2002 the Krasnodon Court rejected them. On an unspecified date the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 16 May 2002 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 10.  On 18 December 2002 the Krasnodon Court found in part for the applicant and awarded him UAH 13,854.11[3] in occupational disability arrears and other payments. On 22 April 2003 the court rejected the Mine's request for leave to appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2002 for failure to comply with procedural formalities. 11.  On 24 April 2003 the Krasnodon Court submitted two writs of execution for the judgment of 18 December 2002 to the Krasnodon Town Bailiffs' Service for initiation of enforcement proceedings. 12.  On 12 May 2003 the Bailiffs' Service instituted enforcement proceedings. 13.  Pursuant to the order of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of 23 January 2003 the Mine became a structural division of the Krasnodonvugillya State Enterprise. 14.  On 27 October 2003 the Krasnodon Court changed the debtor in the enforcement proceedings and ordered the Krasnodonvugillya State Enterprise to pay the applicant the award of 18 December 2002. 15.  Pursuant to the order of the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of 8 June 2004 the Krasnodonvugillya State Enterprise was reorganized into the Joint-Stock Company “Krasnodonvugillya”. 16.  On 2 August 2004 the Krasnodon Court changed the debtor in the enforcement proceedings and ordered the JSC “Krasnodonvugillya” to pay the applicant the award of 18 December 2002. 17.  On 29 September 2005 the Bailiffs' Service requested the applicant to provide them with his bank account information in order to transfer the judgment debt. The applicant did not reply. 18.  Between 29 September 2005 and 1 February 2006 the whole amount of the judgment debt due to the applicant was transferred to the Bailiffs' Service's account and became available for payment. 19.  On 7 November 2006 the Bailiffs' Service were informed about the applicant's death. On the same date the enforcement proceedings were suspended until determination of the applicant's heirs. 20.  As the applicant's heirs failed to lodge with the Krasnodon Court a motion to change a creditor in the enforcement proceedings, the judgment debt owed to the applicant remains with the Bailiffs' Service.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Athens. 7.  Since 1986 the applicant lives and works in Greece. He is married to a Greek woman and possesses a valid stay and work permit. 8.  On 8 September 1998, at approximately 07.00 p.m., the applicant and two other Syrian nationals accompanied a friend to the Ano Patissia police station in order to report a robbery. Having waited for a long time to be attended to, the applicant started complaining. He alleges that he was then brutally beaten on his head by a police officer, Mr Georgantzis, while another police officer, Mr Giannopoulos, was holding him still. Other police officers to whom he turned for help insulted him and locked him in an empty office for three hours. The applicant alleges that the behaviour of the police officers changed when they realised that he was legally settled in Greece. Then the applicant was allowed to leave the police station. He went immediately to the regional hospital where he was examined by a doctor at approximately 11 p.m. He obtained a medical certificate by Dr. Kremlis, an otolaryngologist specialist, which read as follows:\n“[The applicant] was examined at the out-patients' department of the otolaryngology clinic on 8 September 1998 reporting a recent beating. The patient complains of buzzing, ear-pain and hearing loss in the left ear. From the clinical examination it was found that he has signs of an ecchymosis on the left zygomatic area and signs of blood on the left side of the auditory duct, which came from the injury to the area around the eardrum membrane. The extent of the damage will be determined upon completion of the remaining otoscopy tests, as the present condition does not appear to be severe.” 9.  Following the incident the applicant suffered from headaches and dizziness. On 16 September 1998 he was diagnosed as suffering from “perforation of the left ear (eardrum)”. A month later a doctor from the same hospital ascertained “an almost complete restoration of the perforation that had been noted a month ago at the tympanic membrane of the left ear”. 10.  The applicant currently suffers from hearing loss in both ears and vertigo. He has undergone several medical examinations and treatment over the last years. On 30 August 2002 a university medical doctor declared that the applicant's working capacity had diminished by 80% on account of vertigo and impaired hearing; the respective significance of these two factors was not specified. As a consequence, he was unable to accomplish any manual work. 11.  On 14 September 1998 the applicant reported the incident to the Minister of Public Order. 12.  On 10 July and 20 November 2000 the Chief of the Greek Police fined Mr Georgantzis and Mr Giannopoulos 100,000 drachmas (293 euros) and 50,000 drachmas (147 euros) respectively. He considered that the above police officers had caused bodily harm to the applicant. 13.  On 27 October 2000 Mr Georgantzis appealed against that decision but his appeal was dismissed by the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal on 30 November 2001 (decision no. 2602/2001). 14.  On 9 September 1998 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against Mr Georgantzis and Mr Giannopoulos and also against the chief of the police station, Mr Moukas. Following a preliminary inquiry, the authorities dropped the criminal charges against Mr Giannopoulos and Mr Moukas. On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were instituted against Mr Georgantzis for causing serious bodily harm. The applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party claiming a specific amount by way of damages. He produced before the court the medical reports which had recorded his injuries. Several witnesses were heard. 15.  On 19 February 2002 the three-member Athens Court of Appeal sitting as a first instance court found Mr Georgantzis guilty of serious bodily harm and sentenced him to four months' imprisonment. The court found that it had been clearly and unequivocally established by the medical reports and the other evidence before it that Mr Georgantzis had first punched the applicant and then violently slapped him on the face, causing him a scratch of approximately 3 x 0.5 cm on the left temple and a perforation of his left eardrum. It also found that Mr Georgantzis' defence “had not been sincere and did not agree with the facts” (decision no. 2048/2002). Mr Georgantzis appealed. 16.  The appeal trial took place on 18 December 2002 before the five-member Athens Court of Appeal. The court heard several witnesses, among whom Mr Giannopoulos and Mr Moukas. It found that it had not been established that the accused had beaten the applicant. It stressed that it had reached that conclusion on the basis of the statements of Mr Giannopoulos and Mr Moukas and of three additional eye-witnesses, one of whom was another colleague of the accused. It considered that the medical reports produced by the applicant were not “safe criteria for the defendant's guilt, mainly because they are directly contrary to the testimonies of the above witnesses who testify with their own knowledge and perception that the defendant did not hit [the applicant]; therefore the injuries referred to [in the medical reports] could have been caused by another reason, taken also into account that the deafness complained of [by the applicant] existed before the incident, as stated by [two eye-] witnesses”. Thus, the appeal court, by a majority, acquitted Mr Georgantzis. However, two judges opined that in view of all the evidence produced before the court the accused should have been declared guilty (decision no. 1861/2002). 17.  On 19 February 2003 the applicant, who did not have the right to appeal in cassation under domestic law, asked the Public Prosecutor to bring the case before the Court of cassation. On 24 February 2003 the latter dismissed his request. 18.  On 4 September 2003 the applicant brought an action for damages against Mr Georgantzis in the Athens Administrative Court of First Instance. 19.  On 30 June 2004 the court rejected his action (decision no. 7820/2004). 20.  On 29 September 2004 the applicant appealed to the Athens Administrative Court of Appeal. The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1978, 2001 and 1997 respectively and live in Istanbul. The first applicant is the wife and the second and third applicants are the children of Mr Yusuf Kaba, who was an officer in the Turkish Navy and died of cancer in 2003. According to the applicants, Mr Kaba's exposure to asbestos at Hasköy Dock had caused his cancer. They were also concerned about the allegedly inadequate treatment he received at the GATA military hospital. 5.  Following Mr Kaba's death, on 22 August 2003 the applicants initiated compensation proceedings in the Military Supreme Administrative Court against the Ministry of Defence. They requested a total of 650,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 400,000 euros (EUR) at the time) in both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. In their application, the applicants complained that Mr Kaba's death was the result of the asbestos levels at Hasköy Dock and stated that he had not received adequate medical treatment at the GATA military hospital. In their submissions the applicants relied on the medical records of the applicant, a report on the asbestos levels at Hasköy Dock and an expert report. The applicants also requested legal aid for the court fees. In their legal-aid claim they submitted documents attesting to their poor financial situation. The official documents attested that the applicants had no income. 6.  On 19 November 2003 the Military Supreme Administrative Court, without giving any reason, decided that the applicants did not qualify for legal aid. The applicants were notified that they had to pay TRL 8,758,870,000 (approximately EUR 5,000) in court fees within one month for the proceedings to be continued, and that failure to do so would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings. In January 2004 the applicants again requested legal aid to pay the court fees. On 21 January 2004 the Military Supreme Administrative Court refused to grant the applicants legal aid, once again without giving reasons. The applicants were requested to pay the fees due within one month in order to be able to continue the proceedings. They were warned that failure to do so would result in the discontinuation of the proceedings. 7.  On 22 April 2004 the applicants requested a rectification of the decision dated 21 January 2004. Subsequently, on 26 April 2004 the applicants' lawyer also lodged a request with the Military Supreme Administrative Court and requested clarification (tavzih) of the decision dated 21 January 2004. In his request the applicants' lawyer referred to the relevant statements of means provided by the domestic authorities. He further stated that while lodging the case he had submitted the relevant medical records concerning Mr Yusuf Kaba, a report on the asbestos levels at Hasköy Dock and an expert report, and that this evidence should be sufficient to prove that they had a well-founded case. 8.  On 12 May 2004 the Military Supreme Administrative Court examined both requests and decided that, as the decision dated 21 January 2004 was not a final decision on the merits of the case, a rectification or a clarification request was not possible under domestic law. The court also decided to discontinue the compensation proceedings because the applicants had not paid the necessary court fees. This decision was served on the applicants on 4 June 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant, a limited liability company, was incorporated on 6 September 1995 by a decision of the Didube District Court of Tbilisi, Georgia. The second applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  In 1995 the Amat Shipping Company Limited and the second applicant founded a limited liability company called Amat-G, the applicant company, in Georgia. The second applicant was appointed general manager of that company. 7.  Amat-G imported fish products from African countries to Georgia. In the years 1996-98, the company paid more than 1,000,000 United States dollars (USD) (approximately 970,874 euros (EUR)[1]) to the State budget in taxes and was considered by the State Tax Department to be a “large tax payer”. 8.  In 1998-99 Amat-G supplied the Georgian Ministry of Defence with various types of fish products at different prices. 9.  However, the Ministry of Defence paid only part of the amount due to Amat-G. 10.  On 29 October 1999 the applicants brought civil proceedings against the Ministry of Defence in the Tbilisi Regional Court for breach of contract and consequential damage, claiming a total of 662,526 Georgian laris (GEL) (EUR 296,771). 11.  In a judgment of 6 December 1999, the Panel for Civil and Commercial Affairs of the Tbilisi Regional Court partly allowed the action of the applicant company, ordering the Ministry of Defence to pay the company compensation of GEL 254,188 (EUR 113,860). 12.  The judgment was never challenged and became binding on 6 January 2000. 13.  On 22 March 2000 the applicants appealed to the execution department of the Ministry of Justice, requesting the immediate enforcement of the judgment. 14.  On 23 March 2000 the enforcement officer of the execution department ordered the Ministry of Defence to pay the applicant company, voluntarily, within one month. 15.  Upon the expiry of that period, the enforcement officer initiated the forcible execution procedure against the Ministry of Defence. He sent the centre of expertise of the Ministry of Justice a list of non-military buildings that could be put up for sale by tender in order to discharge the debt. However, that was the only step taken and the judgment of 6 December 1999 remained unexecuted. 16.  On 10 July 2000 the Ministry of Defence appealed to the Tbilisi Regional Court, seeking a stay of execution of the judgment of 6 December 1999, in accordance with the provisions of Article 263 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the Regional Court dismissed the ministry's request on 3 August 2000, concluding that “postponement of the enforcement would negatively affect the applicant company's interests and violate the principle of an equitable and adversarial hearing”. The ministry was consequently obliged to enforce the judgment without delay, yet it still failed to pay the debt. 17.  During the same period, Amat-G signed a contract with the Amat Shipping Company Corporation on 19 January 2000 for the lease of a ship at a monthly rate of USD 45,000 (EUR 43,689). 18.  On 20 January 2000 Amat-G contacted the Ministry of Defence, explaining that the money owed to it by the ministry was the only means which the applicant company had to pay for the lease of the ship. The applicant company waited eight months in vain to obtain payment of the debt from the Ministry of Defence. Meanwhile, the bill for the lease of the ship had risen to USD 511,200 (EUR 496,311). Amat-G also claimed that it had lost USD 1,344,421 (EUR 1,305,263) in business profits as a result of the ministry's failure to pay the debt on time. In addition, the applicant company faced a tax bill of GEL 41,213 (EUR 18,460). 19.  For these reasons, in September 2001 Amat-G brought an action before the Panel of Administrative Law and Taxation Affairs of the Tbilisi Regional Court against the Ministries of Defence, Justice and Finance, in order to hold them collectively responsible for the harm caused by the non-execution of the judgment of 6 December 1999, in accordance with Article 411 of the Civil Code. The company claimed damages of USD 1,855,621 (EUR 1,801,574) and GEL 41,213 (EUR 18,460). 20.  The Regional Court dismissed the claim on 20 February 2002 on the basis of the provisions of Article 412 of the Civil Code. 21.  On 10 July 2002 the Supreme Court of Georgia dismissed the applicant company's appeal against the Regional Court's decision of 20 February 2002. 22.  The judgment debt of 6 December 1999 has still not been paid, some five and a half years later.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 25 December 1997 the applicant became a member of the executive board of Yurtbank, and subsequently on 25 March 1998 he was appointed as Director General of the bank. 5.  On 19 August 1998 Yurtbank founded the Yurt Security Offshore Bank in the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”). Subsequently, Yurtbank branch offices in Turkey started collecting deposits to be transferred to offshore accounts in the “TRNC”. 6.  On 4 October 1999 the applicant resigned from his post as Director General and subsequently on 30 November 1999 he resigned from membership of the executive board. 7.  On 21 December 1999 the Committee of Ministers decided to transfer the management and control of Yurtbank to the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduat Sigorta Fonu). As result, a new executive board was set up and an inspector was appointed to study the administration of Yurtbank. 8.  On 6 October 2000 the inspector submitted his report. Following an inspection of all the bank’s accounts, the inspector found it established that the Yurt Security Offshore Bank owed 32,898,662,376,959 Turkish liras (TRL), 5,105,982 US dollars (USD) and 7,514,387 German marks (DEM) to account holders. The report stated that these sums had been used by Yurtbank to provide loans to companies owned by Mr A.B., the main shareholder of the bank. The applicant’s name was also included in the list of persons who had authorisation to make the transfers. It was however stressed that the inspection had not revealed any direct or indirect responsibility on the part of the applicant in the impugned transfers. 9.  On 2 November 2000 the new executive board filed a criminal complaint against the former board members, including the applicant. It was alleged that fifteen people, including the applicant, had established a criminal organisation to commit fraud. The complainants stated that the former board members had set up an offshore company with the aim of collecting deposits which they subsequently used to provide irregular loans. In that connection, it was indicated that the deposits collected for the offshore account had never been transferred to the “TRNC”. 10.  On 14 November 2000 the applicant was arrested in Istanbul on suspicion of aggravated fraud. According to a form explaining arrested persons’ rights which the applicant signed, he had been informed of the charges against him and of his right to remain silent. In the form it was further noted that legal assistance could not be provided to persons accused of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 11.  On 17 November 2000 the applicant was questioned without a lawyer present. In his police statement, the applicant explained that although he had been the Director General of the bank, he had not been directly involved in offshore banking activities, which were administered by a separate directorate. He stated that Yurtbank had acted as a correspondent bank for Yurt Security Offshore Bank. He explained that he had not put pressure on the managers of branch offices to collect deposits for offshore accounts but had known that the managers received bonus payments depending on the number of deposits they had collected for offshore accounts. He further explained that, using the deposits saved in offshore accounts, the bank had signed loan contracts with companies which were owned by the main shareholder of the bank, Mr A.B. In concluding these loan agreements, the bank had not requested any security and the agreements had been concluded on the basis of verbal authorisation, without any documents being submitted. The applicant stated that when he had become aware of the illegal activities he had quit his post as Director General of Yurtbank. 12.  On 21 November 2000 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and subsequently the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court. Before the public prosecutor, and without a lawyer present, the applicant repeated his police statement. When the applicant was brought before the investigating judge, the judge allowed the applicant’s lawyer to enter the hearing room. However, he was not allowed to take the floor or advise the applicant. During questioning, the applicant repeated his police statement and pointed out that there was no legislation or court decision that banned offshore banking activities. Following questioning, the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 13.  On 10 January 2001 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court against thirty accused persons, including the applicant. The prosecutor accused the applicant of forming a criminal organisation and of committing aggravated fraud under Articles 313 and 504 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765 – now repealed). In this connection it was alleged that a company owned by Mr A.B. had constructed real estate and that before the construction was finished the persons intending to buy the properties had been provided with real estate loans by Yurtbank, in which Mr A.B. was the main shareholder. In the process of concluding these loan agreements, the requisite legal documents and security had not been requested from the potential buyers, and by granting irregular loans the accused persons had allegedly committed fraud. It was also alleged that offshore banking activities had been used as a cover in order to provide illegal and irregular loans to the companies owned by the bank’s main shareholder, Mr A.B. 14.  On 19 March 2001 the Istanbul State Security Court held its first hearing. In the presence of his lawyer, the applicant submitted his written defence submissions to the court. He stated that he accepted the statements taken from him in custody and pleaded not guilty. 15.  On 18 June 2001 the applicant was released pending trial. 16.  Following a change in the domestic legislation, the case was transferred from the Istanbul State Security Court to the Istanbul Second Assize Court on 24 December 2001. 17.  At a hearing held on 10 October 2002 the trial court appointed three experts. In particular, the experts were asked to clarify whether irregular loans had been provided to companies owned by the main shareholder of the bank; whether the accused board members could be held responsible for those allegedly illegal transactions; and whether in providing the loans the bank had complied with the domestic legislation and obtained the prior authorisations and documents that were legally required. The experts were further asked to investigate the legality of the offshore activities of Yurt Security Offshore Bank. On 14 July 2003 the experts submitted a lengthy report to the court. At the outset, they pointed out that there was no domestic legislation which banned offshore banking activities in Turkey and that the establishment of Yurt Security Offshore Bank had been in line with domestic law and the “TRNC” legislation. 18.  At a hearing held on 4 December 2003, the court ordered another expert report. On 13 January 2004 the report was submitted to the court. The experts concluded that, in the circumstances of the present case, it could not be concluded that the accused persons had committed aggravated fraud. In that connection they referred to the fact that when depositors opened offshore accounts it was clearly indicated in the relevant documents that these were offshore accounts, and therefore the depositors should have been aware of the fact that their deposits were not protected by the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund. 19.  On 15 January 2004, pursuant to a change in the banking legislation, the Istanbul Eighth Assize Court became the competent specialised court to deal with cases concerning the Banking Activities Act (Law no. 4389), and the applicant’s case was accordingly transferred to that court. The new court requested a third expert report in order to calculate the damage sustained by the third-party interveners. In a report dated 14 October 2004, the experts pointed out that from 21 December 1999 onwards the accused persons, including the applicant, had been responsible for a total sum of TRL 15,832,536,971,373. 20.  In the course of the hearings, several witness statements were taken, including from the managers of branch offices, who testified that they had been pressurised into collecting deposits for the offshore accounts. The applicant and his co-accused also submitted several legal opinions to the court drafted by university professors, attesting to the legality of offshore banking activities. 21.  On 17 December 2004 the Istanbul Eighth Assize Court delivered its judgment. It held in the first place that it could not be established that the accused persons had intended to form a criminal organisation. It accordingly acquitted them of this charge. As to the accusations that the applicant had been involved in aggravated fraud on two counts, namely by providing illegal real estate loans and by using offshore banking activities to cover up fraudulent loans, the court found the applicant guilty as charged under Article 504 § 3 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 765). The applicant was accordingly sentenced to a total of five years and ten months’ imprisonment and a fine. In delivering its judgment, the court based its findings on the bank’s inspection reports, the expert reports, the police statements of the applicant and his co-accused, and witness statements. The court found it established that in his capacity as Director General of Yurtbank the applicant had given authorisation for the granting of irregular loans to companies which were owned by Mr A.B. 22.  On 7 February 2005 the applicant appealed. 23.  On 22 April 2005 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation submitted his written opinion on the merits of the case. This opinion was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 7 June 2005. After holding a hearing, the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court in so far as it concerned the term of imprisonment, stating that the sentence should be reassessed in the light of the new Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) that had entered into force in June 2005. It also upheld the acquittal of the applicant on the charge of forming a criminal organisation. 24.  The case was accordingly remitted to the Istanbul Eighth Assize Court. On 29 September 2005 the applicant requested the court to hear evidence from several witnesses, including directors of the bank and certain experts, in particular a certain İ.F. The court rejected his requests on the same day, stating that the proceedings were at a stage where no more evidence was necessary. Nevertheless, at a hearing held on 27 October 2005 the witness İ.F. was heard and he made submissions regarding offshore banking. In his testimony, İ.F. explained the development of offshore banking and maintained that, in his opinion as an expert, the acts in question had not constituted an offence at the time when they were committed by the applicant. 25.  On 29 November 2005 the first-instance court delivered its judgment. In lengthy reasoning, taking into account the decision of the Court of Cassation, it decided to sentence the applicant to one year and fifteen days’ imprisonment and a fine for providing illegal real estate loans, and then suspended this sentence. As to the charge of aggravated fraud through offshore banking activities, the court sentenced him to two years and one month’s imprisonment and a fine under Article 158 § (f) of the new Criminal Code, indicating that this was the most favourable provision applicable to the applicant’s case. In this connection, it was noted that the main shareholder of the bank, Mr A.B., had committed fraud by way of banking activities. The court further stated that although the applicant had not been officially working for the offshore bank, in his capacity as the Director General of Yurtbank he was aware of the fraudulent actions, and had actively participated in the unlawful activities by using Yurtbank’s resources. 26.  The applicant appealed against the judgment of the Assize Court. On 9 February 2006 the opinion of the Principal Public Prosecutor attached to the Court of Cassation was notified to the applicant’s lawyer and on 13 April 2006 the applicant submitted his written observations in reply. 27.  On 19 October 2006 the Court of Cassation discontinued the proceedings concerning the suspended sentence in respect of illegal real estate loans, holding that the statutory time-limit had expired. The appeal court further upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in respect of the applicant’s conviction for aggravated fraud by way of banking activities.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born, respectively, in 1949 and 1946 and live in Zaporizhzhya. 5.  On 18 September 2000 Mrs F. lodged a claim with the Leninskyy District Court of Zaporizhzhya (“the Leninskyy Court”) against the applicants, requesting it to determine how the parties should use their adjacent plot of land. 6.  On 11 January 2002 the court delivered a judgment. On 8 April 2002 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld it. On 16 October 2002 the Supreme Court quashed both decisions and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 7.  On 11 July 2005 the Leninskyy Court delivered a judgment. On 8 December 2005 the Court of Appeal amended it. On 13 December 2006 the Supreme Court quashed both decisions and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 8.  On 19 October 2007 the Leninskyy Court rejected the claim of Mrs F. as unsubstantiated. On 20 May and 26 November 2008, respectively, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld that judgment. 9.   According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings eight hearings were adjourned due to the applicants’ or all parties’ absence or following the applicants’ requests. The applicants disagreed stating that they had attended all hearings. Nineteen hearings were adjourned mainly due to the absence of other parties, absence of a judge or an expert or because the courts needed to collect additional documents. Four forensic examinations were ordered and lasted for about one year. 10.  On 10 October 2000 the applicants lodged a claim with the Leninskyy Court against Mrs F., seeking the elimination of obstacles in using the impugned plot of land. On an unspecified date Mr and Mrs E. joined the proceedings as co-respondents. 11.  Between 5 October 2001 and 16 January 2006, 14 November 2006 and 31 January 2007 and between 22 February 2007 and 5 June 2008 the proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of the first set of the proceedings. Between 1 June and 14 October 2006 the proceedings were suspended with a view to allowing the successors of Mr and Mrs E., who had died in January and April 2006, to take part in the case. 12.  On 25 June 2009, following a friendly settlement reached by the parties, the Leninskyy Court discontinued the proceedings. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 13.  According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings three hearings were adjourned due the applicants’ or all parties’ absence or following the applicants’ request. Two hearings were adjourned due to the respondent’s absence. One forensic examination was ordered and lasted for about four months.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  On 15 April 1997 the applicant company filed a claim against the Best-Sat company in the Bielsko-Biała District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). The value of the claim was PLN 246,969.86. The claim resulted from Best-Sat’s refusal to pay the applicant company’s invoice issued on 8 October 1995 for the construction of a TV cable network, in accordance with the contract concluded between the parties. The applicant company requested that its claim be considered in a summary procedure (postępowanie nakazowe). 8.  On 24 April 1997 the District Court decided that the case should be considered in the ordinary procedure as it did not fulfil the legal conditions for the summary procedure. On 14 May 1997 the applicant company filed with the Bielsko-Biała District Court an interlocutory appeal (zażalenie) against the decision of 24 April 1997. Subsequently, the court ordered the applicant company to pay a court fee of PLN 2,789.60 for the consideration of its interlocutory appeal. On 10 June 1997 the applicant filed with the Bielsko-Biała District Court an application for an exemption from that fee. However, on 21 July 1997 the District Court dismissed that application. The applicant filed another, apparently unsuccessful, interlocutory appeal against the decision of 21 July 1997, claiming that the company was on the brink of insolvency as a result of its enforceable claims not having been satisfied by the Best-Sat company. 9.  On an unspecified later date, the case was transmitted to the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) in order to be considered in the ordinary proceedings. On 3 February 1998 the Regional Court ordered the applicant company to pay a court fee of PLN 13,948.49 for lodging its claim. 10.  On 17 February 1998 the applicant company filed with the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court an application for an exemption from the fee, pursuant to section 113 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It stated that the amount of the fee was considerably beyond its means. It also submitted that, for the first 10 months of 1997, it had made net profits of only PLN 7,695.37, while the company’s assets amounted to PLN 31,366.98, but consisted mostly of claims to be satisfied. 11.  The applicant company stressed that it had no possibility to dispose of its assets promptly in order to secure funds to pay the court fee and, even if that were possible, it would lead to the winding up of the company. It further argued that the lack of funds to pay the court fee did not result from any fault in its activities or from a negligent failure to secure funds for the litigation. It also maintained that its claim resulted from work done over the past few years which had dominated the activities of the company. Consequently, it did not have other possibilities to secure sufficient funds from other contracts. 12.  On 2 March 1998 the Regional Court ordered the applicant company to produce a number of documents concerning its financial situation. The relevant documents were submitted to the court as enclosures to a letter of 16 March 1998. In the same letter the applicant supplemented its application for exemption from the court fees. It stated that it had three enforceable claims, including two against the Best-Sat Company which were the subject of the pending litigation. The third claim, although enforceable as of 25 November 1997, had not been satisfied. The applicant company stated that its fixed assets of PLN 11,670.90 were necessary to continue the running of its business and, if disposed of, the company would have to be wound up. The plaintiff also submitted that in 1997 it had made net profits of PLN 2,723.19, which were used to set off the losses made in 1995 and 1996. 13.  On 25 May 1998 the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court rejected the application. The court gave the following reasons for its decision:\n“At the request of the court, the plaintiff has submitted its balance sheets as of 30 November 1997 and of 30 March 1998, as well as a bank statement regarding its accounts as of 17 March 1998. In the court’s view the above documents prove unequivocally that the plaintiff makes profits from its business, as evidenced by the balance on its bank accounts for the period between December 1997 and March 1998. It should also be pointed out that the plaintiff has gross profits (przychód) from its business activity estimated at PLN 26,322.95, including gross profits from the sale of goods and materials in the amount of PLN 2,365.81.\nFurthermore, according to the balance sheet of 3 March 1998, the plaintiff company has significant fixed assets (majątek trwały) in the amount of PLN 7,192.67, and current assets (majątek obrotowy) in the amount of PLN 31,067.97.\nThe examination of the above documents leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff can afford to pay the court fees because it has sufficient funds.\nIt should also be pointed out that, in case of a lack of such funds, the plaintiff could obtain them by means of partners’ surcharges (dopłaty) since it is a limited liability company.\nAll the other expenses of the plaintiff should be treated by it on equal terms with the expenses which are necessary to pursue its claims...” 14.  On 4 June 1998 the applicant company filed an interlocutory appeal against the decision of 25 May 1998 with the Katowice Court of Appeal. It submitted that the District Court had made a mistake in calculating the amounts of fixed and current assets because the figures relied on were from 1 January 1997, but the value of the assets had decreased since then. As of 31 January 1998 the amount of fixed and current assets was estimated at PLN 5,019.27 and PLN 18,494.77 respectively. The applicant company argued that the combined value of all its assets only slightly exceeded the amount of the court fee, and that, if the latter had to be paid in that amount, the company would be forced to wind up. 15.  The applicant company further pointed out that the fixed assets consisted of office equipment which was necessary to run the business, whereas its current assets consisted mostly of reserves of materials necessary to provide services to clients and claims which were the subject of separate litigation. Thus, even assuming that the value of current assets exceeded the amount of the court fee, it could not be presumed that the former could be disposed of in order to provide the funds necessary to pay that fee. 16.  The applicant company also contested the Regional Court’s view that all expenses should be treated equally, and pointed out that any surplus would be used to pay taxes since failure to do so could result in prosecution. Finally, the applicant observed that the unpaid invoice which gave rise to the present claim related to work done by the applicant company over a period of two years, which had dominated the applicant’s business during that period. That was, to a large extent, the reason why the applicant company had been unable to secure funds for possible litigation expenses. Lastly, the applicant company, in principle, agreed with the Regional Court’s view as to the possibility of obtaining additional funds by means of partners’ surcharges. However, relying on section 113 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it stressed that a legal person was entitled to exemption from court fees if it proved that it did not have sufficient funds. 17.  On 31 July 1998 the Katowice Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal as follows:\n“According to the plaintiff’s documents, its financial situation deteriorated only in 1998. However, it emerges from the documents produced in support of the statement of claim that the plaintiff’s claim results from work done between 1993 and 1995, since the notice to pay for that work is dated 16 January 1995. From that it unequivocally follows that the plaintiff could have secured the funds necessary for the pursuance of its claims prior to 1996 when its financial situation deteriorated, and when, as it transpires from its balance sheets, its assets and gross profits from the sale of goods and materials had been at the level which had been referred to in the contested decision.\nThe Court of Appeal also does not subscribe to the plaintiff’s view that, if at the current moment the plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the court fee, then it can successfully request to be exempted ... under section 113 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\nAs follows from the established case-law of the Supreme Court, and also the case-law of this Court of Appeal, the possibilities of paying the court fees by a legal person should be assessed in the larger context not only of the funds currently held but also those that could possibly have been secured. When the plaintiff holds a current bank account, where its turnover is recorded, and that turnover still in December 1997 was of significant volume, then there are no reasons to assume that the plaintiff could not take out the necessary loan in order to obtain the funds needed to pursue claims of the very significant value of PLN 246,969.86. Obviously, interest will be charged on such a loan, but there are no grounds to hold that the cost of such a loan should be borne by the taxpayers, which would happen if exemption from court fees was granted...\nThe Court of Appeal also fully shares the Regional Court’s argument that, since the plaintiff is a limited liability company, the obligation of the partners to make appropriate surcharges in order to secure funds to cover expenses related to the assertion of claims should be taken into consideration...” 18.  The applicant company did not pay the required court fee. On an unspecified later date, the Bielsko-Biała Regional Court ordered that the applicant company’s statement of claim be returned to it, which meant that its claim was of no legal effect. 19.  According to the applicant company’s tax return for 1997, in that year it made net profits of PLN 4,484.70.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1949 and 1951, respectively, and live in Odessa. 5.  From 1976 until 1996 the second applicant worked for the Chernomorska Penitentiary Institution no. 74 (“the colony”). He was provided with a room in a hall of residence, which was situated on the site of the colony and had the same postal address. He resided there until 1991. Afterwards, the applicants lived together in the first applicant's flat. The second applicant is still entitled to reside in the colony and it remains his registered place of residence. 6.  In September 1998 the applicants instituted civil proceedings in the Prymorskyy District Court of Odessa against the colony and the local post office. They alleged that letters addressed to them by domestic and international courts, which had been delivered to the address of the second applicant, had been unlawfully opened and read by the defendant institutions. The applicants sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 7.  On 29 March 2001 the court rejected the applicants' claims. It established that the colony had opened two letters addressed to the applicants: the letter of 27 October 1998, sent by the Starokyivskyy District Court of Kyiv to the first applicant, and the letter of 24 August 1998, sent by the European Court of Human Rights to the second applicant in the context of his previous application to the Court (no. 44997/98, declared inadmissible on 26 October 1999). 8.  The court held that, pursuant to Article 28 of the Correctional Labour Code of 1970 and section 7 of the Pre-Trial Detention Act of 1993, the administration of the colony had been authorised to monitor all correspondence delivered to it. Since the room of the second applicant was situated on the premises of the colony, his correspondence had been dealt with by its administration in accordance with the rules applicable to detainees' correspondence. The court also found that the administration had acted in accordance with the Instruction on the processing of documents in the organs of the Ministry of the Interior and the Instruction on the organization of the monitoring of correspondence of persons held in penitentiary institutions and pre-trial detention centres, issued by the Ministry of the Interior on 22 June 1993 and 28 May 1999, respectively. The court further stated that the letter addressed to the first applicant had been opened also due to the fact that there had been a detainee with the same name in the colony. The court concluded that the interception of the applicants' correspondence had not violated their constitutional rights. 9.  On 19 July 2001 the Odessa Regional Court upheld the first-instance court's decision. On 15 May 2002 a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the applicants' request for leave to appeal in cassation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 8 February 1977 affiliation proceedings were brought in respect of the applicant before the then Košice City Court. 5.  On 30 November 1988 the Košice Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment delivered on 15 September 1987. 6.  The Košice II District Court, to which the case fell to be examined, experienced difficulties in obtaining the evidence. This was mainly due to the fact that the person who was supposed to be the applicant’s father was a Belgian national and that he had refused to co-operate with the court. 7.  On 22 September 1995 the Constitutional Court found, in proceedings under Article 130 (3) of the Constitution, that the Košice II District Court had violated the applicant’s constitutional right to have the case examined without undue delays. 8.  On 16 January 1996 the Košice II District Court dismissed the action. On 6 May 1997 the Košice Regional Court quashed the judgment and sent the case back to the first instance court. 9.  On 16 June 2000 the Košice II District Court delivered a new judgment by which it dismissed the action. On 17 July 2000 the applicant appealed. 10.  On 16 August 2002 the Košice Regional Court overturned the first instance judgment in that it found that the defendant was the applicant’s father. As to the remainder of the action including the maintenance and the court fee, the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s judgment and sent the case back to the latter. 11.  On 5 November 2002 the defendant filed an appeal on points of law.\nThe proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are:\n1) Mr Akhmed Ismailov, born in 1949,\n2) Mr Alkhazur Ismailov, born in 1985,\n3) Mr Shamil (also spelled Shamal) Ismailov, born in 1995,\n4) Ms Ruman Sokayeva (also spelled as Rumani or Khumana Sakayeva), born in 1963,\n5) Mr Aslambek Merzhoyev (also spelled as Aslambek Merzhuyev), born in 1990,\n6) Ms Kheda Merzhoyeva (also spelled as Kheda Merzhuyeva), born in 1981,\n7) Ms Zalina Merzhoyeva (also known as Aset Merzhoyeva), born in 1979,\n8) Ms Petimat Ismailova, born in 1964,\n9) Ms Kheda Idrisova (also known as Ismailova), born in 1981,\n10) Mr Ramzan Ismailov, born in 1982,\n11) Ms Khazan Ismailova, born in 1984,\n12) Ms Larisa Ismailova, born in 1986,\n13) Ms Laila Ismailova, born in 1990,\n14) Mr Rizvan Ismailov, born in 1992,\n15) Ms Tanzila Ismailova, born in 1994,\n16) Mr Iles (also spelled as Ilez) Ismailov, born in 1995,\n17) Ms Medna Ismailova, born in 1997,\n18) Mr Ibragim Ismailov, born in 1999,\n19) Ms Makka Ismailova, born in 2001,\n20) Ms Markha Ismailova, born in 2001,\n21) Ms Liman Ismailova, born in 2003. 6.  The applicants are four families of Russian nationals who live in Achkhoy-Martan, Chechnya. All four applicant families are related to each other. The first applicant is the father of Aslambek (also spelled as Aslanbek) Ismailov, who was born in 1979, and Aslan Ismailov, who was born in 1981. The second applicant family consists of applicants 2-4. The fourth applicant is the wife of Khizir Ismailov, who was born in 1962; applicants 2 and 3 are his children. The third applicant family consist of applicants 5-7, who are the children of Yusi Daydayev, who was born in 1953. The fourth applicant family consists of applicants 8-21. The eighth applicant is the wife of Yaragi Ismailov, who was born in 1956; applicants 9-21 are his children. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  At the material time the town of Achkhoy-Martan was under the full control of the Russian federal forces. Checkpoints manned by Russian servicemen were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement. The applicant families lived close to each other in two households situated at no. 15a and no. 22 in Orekhova Street, Achkhoy-Martan. The first house was located about 500 metres away from the nearest federal forces checkpoint. 9.  On the night of 13-14 January 2003 the first applicant, his sons Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov and other relatives were sleeping at home at 15a Orekhova Street.  At about 4 a.m. an APC (armoured personnel carrier) with a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms drove through their gate. About ten men got out of the APC and ran into the house. They spoke Russian without accent and were wearing masks and helmets. They neither identified themselves nor produced any documents. The family members thought they were Russian military servicemen. 10.  The servicemen searched the house; they neither explained to the residents what they were looking for nor asked for identity documents. They took Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov into the yard, kicked them and threw them into the APC. The brothers were not allowed to put on any warm clothing. The officers ignored their mother's questions concerning the reason for her sons' being taken away. 11.  The first applicant's wife ran after her sons into the street. She saw several APCs, a military Ural car and groups of Russian military servicemen standing along the street. The vehicles were parked next to different houses with their engines running. The soldiers, who were waiting next to the vehicles, threatened to kill the locals if the latter went outside. The vehicles with the first applicant's sons drove away to an unknown destination.\nb. Abduction of Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev 12.  At the material time the second and fourth applicant families lived at 22 Orekhova Street. Their household consisted of three dwellings in one yard. It was situated about 300 metres away from the first applicant's house and a few hundred metres away from the nearest Russian military forces checkpoint. 13.  On the night of 13-14 January 2003 Yusi Daydayev was visiting the applicants and staying in the first house. Khizir Ismailov and his family were sleeping in the second house; Yaragi Ismailov and his family were in the third one. 14.  At about 4 a. m. a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms broke into Yusi Daydayev's house. It appears that the men beat him up, as the applicants heard him screaming. 15.  Another group of intruders knocked on the door of the second house. When Khizir Ismailov opened the door, they rushed in, forced everyone to lie down on the floor and took Khizir Ismailov away. 16.  The last group of four armed men broke into the third house and took away Yaragi Ismailov. The intruders asked the eighth applicant to bring his passport. While she went to fetch it, the men took her husband outside. The eighth applicant attempted to follow them, but the intruders drove away. None of the men were allowed to put on warm clothing. 17.  The intruders who raided the household at 22 Orekhnova Street and took away Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev were wearing masks and helmets. They spoke unaccented Russian and used swear words. They neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. The applicants thought they were Russian military servicemen. 18.  According to the applicants and their neighbours, eight APCs and a military Ural car were parked in Orekhova Street while Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev were being taken away. 19.  It appears that after Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev were taken away the military vehicles drove towards Samashki village and stopped in the area of the local wheat processing plant, where Russian troops were stationed. 20.  On 23 January 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan district court granted the eighth applicant's claim and declared Yaragi Ismailov a missing person as of 15 January 2003. 21.  The description of the circumstances surrounding the abduction of the applicants' relatives is based on the following documents: an account by Mr V.R. given on 3 August 2005; an account by Ms Z. Kh. given on 3 August 2005; an account by the fourth applicant given on 14 August 2005 and an account by the first applicant's wife Ms M. D. given on 14 August 2005. 22.  The Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the applicants. According to their submission “at about 4 a.m. on 14 January 2003 unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks, who were driving Ural vehicles and APCs, arrived at Orekhova Street in Achkhoy‑Martan, Chechnya, abducted and took away from house no. 15 Aslanbek Ismailov, who was born in 1979, and Aslan Ismailov, who was born in 1981, and from house no. 22 Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev.” 23.  On 23 January 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan district court declared Yaragi Ismailov a missing person with effect from 15 January 2003. 24.  Immediately after her relatives were taken away the eighth applicant called the Achkhoy-Martan district department of the interior (the ROVD) and complained that they had been abducted. The officers told her that they could not do anything about it. 25.  In the morning of 14 January 2003 the applicants complained to a number of State authorities, including the ROVD, the Achkhoy-Martan district prosecutor's office (the district prosecutor's office), the Achkhoy‑Martan district department of the Federal Security Service (the FSB) and the Achkhoy-Martan district military commander's office (the district military commander's office), that their relatives had been abducted. 26.  Since 14 January 2003 the applicants have repeatedly applied in person and in writing to various public bodies. They have been supported in their efforts by the SRJI NGO. In their letters to the authorities the applicants referred to their relatives' detention and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. Mostly these enquiries have remained unanswered, or purely formal replies have been given in which the applicants' requests have been forwarded to various prosecutors' offices. The applicants submitted some of the letters to the authorities and the replies to the Court, which are summarised below. 27.  In the morning of 14 January 2003 a group of representatives of the district prosecutor's office examined the crime scene and questioned the witnesses. 28.  On 17 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Aslambek Ismailov, Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The criminal case file was given the number 44009. 29.  On 17 March 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicants that on an unspecified date the investigation in criminal case no. 44009 had been suspended for failure to establish the identities of the perpetrators. 30.  On 21 March 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office forwarded the first applicant's complaint about his relatives' abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 31.  On 31 March and 24 April 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that on 23 January 2003 the district prosecutor had instructed the investigators to take a number of additional operational search measures to establish the whereabouts of the abducted men and identify the perpetrators. The text of the letter of 31 March 2003 also stated:\n“....the investigation established that the applicant's relatives had been abducted by unidentified servicemen in military vehicles; however, the investigators were unable to establish to which military units these vehicles had belonged.”\n 32.  On 30 September 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that they had examined his complaint about ineffectiveness of the investigation in criminal case no. 44009. As a result, the proceedings had been resumed and the investigators had been instructed to verify the supposition that the abducted men were being detained on the premises of the operational search bureau of the Ministry of the Interior (the ORB) in Grozny ('ОРБ'). 33.  On 24 October 2003 the deputy head of the Achkhoy-Martan district administration wrote to the district prosecutor's office requesting that the investigators find out whether the abducted men were being detained on the premises of the 6th department of the Main Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defence ('6-й отдел ГРУ') in Grozny. 34.  On 31 October 2003 the deputy head of the Achkhoy-Martan district administration informed the first applicant that the authorities' reply to his request of 24 October 2003 stated that the investigation in criminal case no. 44009 had been suspended on 26 June 2003 for failure to establish the identities of the perpetrators; that it had been resumed on 1 October 2003; and that on an unspecified date the investigators had forwarded to the ORB in Grozny a request for assistance in the search for the abducted men. 35.  On 1 November 2003 the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation in criminal case no. 44009 for failure to establish the identities of the perpetrators and informed the applicants. 36.  On 14 January 2004 the Chief Military Prosecutor's office forwarded the first applicant's complaint about his relatives' abduction to the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment (the military prosecutor's office of the UGA) for examination. 37.  On 7 February and 4 March 2005 the military prosecutor's office of the UGA forwarded the first applicant's complaints about the abduction to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 for examination. 38.  On 10 and 12 March 2005 the military prosecutors' offices of military unit no. 20102 and the UGA informed the first applicant that the examination of his complaints had not established any involvement of Russian military servicemen in his relatives' abduction. 39.  On 8 June 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor's office forwarded the first applicant's complaint about the abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 40.  On 28 July 2008 the investigators informed the applicants that on the same date they had suspended the investigation in the criminal case for failure to establish the identities of the perpetrators. 41.  The Government submitted that the district prosecutor's office had received the applicants' complaints about the abduction of their relatives by “unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms, who had arrived in APCs”, on 14 January 2003. 42.  On 14 January 2003 investigators from the district prosecutor's office conducted a crime scene examination at nos. 15a and 22 Orekhova Street in Achkhoy-Martan. Nothing was collected from the scene. 43.  On 14 January 2003 the investigators questioned the fourth applicant; on 21 January 2003 the investigators granted her victim status in the criminal case and questioned her again. The applicant stated that on the night of 14 January 2003 she and her family had been sleeping at home at 22 Orekhova Street. At about 4 a.m. she had heard some noise and gone to the window. She saw a military Kamaz ('Kамаз') lorry next to the house; as it was dark she could not see whether the vehicle had registration numbers. Then someone knocked at the door; her husband Khizir Ismailov opened it and two armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks entered the house. They ordered everyone to lie down on the floor. Having checked the rooms, the armed men left with Khizir Ismailov. One of them took his passport. After that the intruders went to the house of Yaragi Ismailov and took him away in an APC which had arrived at the house. When she went outside she saw the eighth applicant in the yard, who told her that unidentified armed men had also taken their relatives Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev and driven them away in APCs to an unknown destination. After that the fourth applicant ran out in the street and saw a convoy of six or seven APCs and the Kamaz lorry driving away along Sovetskaya Street. 44.  On 17 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office opened criminal case no. 44009 in connection with the abduction of the applicants' relatives and informed the applicants. 45.  On 21 January 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated that on 14 January 2003 he had been at work in Grozny. At about 10 a.m. he had learnt that around 4 a.m. the previous night his sons, Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, his brothers Khizir and Yaragi Ismailov and his brother-in-law Yusi Daydayev had been abducted by unidentified armed men in APCs. From the Government's submission it follows that the applicant was questioned again on 22 January 2003, but the contents of this statement were not disclosed by the Government. 46.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned Ms M.D., the mother of Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, who stated that on the night of 13‑14 January 2003 she had been at home at 15a Orekhova Street with her two sons and daughter. At about 4 a.m. she had gone into the yard and seen an APCs with armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks sitting on top of it. Next to the house she saw her brother-in-law, Khizir Ismailov, several APCs and a lorry with armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks. After that the armed men took her sons Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov outside and drove them away. About ten minutes later a convoy of seven or eight APCs and a lorry drove down the street. The vehicles did not have registration numbers. After that the witness went to her relatives' house at 22 Orekhova Street where she found out about the abduction of her brother Yusi Daydayev and her brothers-in-law Khizir Ismailov and Yaragi Ismailov. 47.  On 21 January 2003 the investigators questioned the eighth applicant, who stated that on the night of 14 January 2003 she and her family members had been at home at 22 Orekhova Street. At about 4 a.m. they had heard screams and noise. Her husband Yaragi Ismailov went outside. He returned and said that military servicemen were on the street. After that two armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks entered the house. They made Yaragi Ismailov lie down on the floor and then ordered him to put his clothing on. The men walked through the rooms and took Yaragi Ismailov, who was barefoot, into the yard where more military servicemen were waiting. 48.  On 27 January 2003 the investigators questioned an officer of the ROVD, Mr U.S. He stated that on the night of 14 January 2003 he had been on duty at the police station. At about 5 a.m. the ROVD received information that unidentified armed men in Ural lorries and APCs had abducted five residents from Orekhova Street that is Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev. The officer immediately informed about it the head of the ROVD, the district department of the FSB and the district military commander's office. After that he sent a group of investigators to the crime scene. Meanwhile, police unit no. 3, stationed next to the cemetery on the outskirts of Achkhoy‑Martan, informed him by radio that a convoy of armoured vehicles was leaving Achkhoy-Martan. About ten to fifteen minutes later the unit reported that the convoy was returning to the settlement. The officer ordered them to watch the convoy's movement. After the convoy drove back into the town, it became impossible to track its movements. According to the information received by the witness from the FSB and the district military commander's office, their units were not participating in a special operation and had not left the base. Therefore, it was impossible to establish the owners of the convoy of armoured vehicles. 49.  On 28 March 2003 the investigators questioned an officer of the ROVD, Mr D.A. He stated that he worked as a district police officer in Achkhoy-Martan. At about 4 a.m. on 14 January 2003 a group of unidentified armed men in APCs and Ural lorries had arrived at Orekhova Street, where from house no. 15a they had abducted Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov and from house no. 22 Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev. In connection with this he and another officer from the ROVD had taken operational search measures; however, it was impossible to establish the whereabouts of the abducted men and the owners of the APCs and the lorries. 50.  On 28 April 2003 the investigators questioned the head of the Achkhoy-Martan administration, Mr S.Kh. He stated that in January 2003 unidentified armed men in APCs and Ural lorries had taken away five residents from Orekhova Street, namely Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev. In connection with this he had taken measures to establish their whereabouts and requested information about the disappeared men from the ROVD and the district military commander's office. However, these agencies did not have any relevant information. 51.  On 25, 26, 28 and 29 April and 5 May 2003 the investigators questioned five officers of the ROVD, all of whom provided similar statements. According to the officers, at the material time they had been serving at checkpoints nos. 1, 2 and 3 located on the bridge over the river Foranga and at a place called Vodozabor. During their duty hours, from 8 a.m. on 13 January to 8 a.m. on 14 January 2003, the APCs and lorries had not passed through the checkpoints. 52.  On 13 May 2003 the investigators again questioned the first applicant, who stated that after the abduction he had complained to various law enforcement agencies, but to no avail. He and his relatives had been searching for the abducted men and meeting other people whose relatives had also been abducted. One of these men had informed him that his sons and Yusi Daydayev had been initially detained in Khankala, Chechnya, and then transferred to the Republic of North Ossetia, either to Mozdok or Vladikavkaz. 53.  On 28 September 2003 the first applicant wrote to the district prosecutor and stated that he had received information about the detention of his abducted relatives on the premises of the 6th department of the ORB ('6-й отдел ОРБ') located on the Staropromyslovskiy main highway in Grozny. The applicant requested that the investigators took measures to verify this information. On the same date the applicant was questioned and reiterated his request. 54.  On 30 September 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that the investigation in the criminal case had been resumed because it was necessary to take investigative measures and verify the information concerning the detention of the abducted men on the premises of the 6th department of the ORB in Grozny. 55.  On 1 November 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended for failure to establish the identities of the perpetrators. 56.  On 26 October 2006 the eighth applicant's lawyer requested that the investigators provide him with access to the entire content of the criminal case file. On 9 November 2006 the investigators partially granted his request, stating that he was allowed to access only the documents reflecting the eighth applicant's participation in the proceedings. The document stated that full access to the case file would be granted only on completion of the investigation. 57.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned the applicants' neighbour, Mr V.M., who stated that on the night of 14 January 2003 he had been sleeping at home, at 19 Orekhova Street in Achkhoy-Martan. At about 4 a.m. he had heard some noise and gone outside. He saw a convoy of seven APCs in Orekhova Street; soldiers were jumping out of the vehicles and taking up combat positions. Several minutes later he heard women screaming. When he saw the servicemen going into the Ismailov family house he thought they were looting and called the police. About five minutes later the convoy drove away towards the centre of Achkhoy‑Martan. There, driving along the central street, the vehicles continued in the direction of Katyr-Yurt in Achkhoy-Martan district. After the servicemen left, he found out that they had taken away his neighbours Aslambek and Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev. 58.  On an unspecified date the investigators received a letter from the Special Envoy of the Russian President in the Chechen Republic for Rights and Freedoms (“the Envoy”), stating that the first applicant had complained to him about the abduction of his relatives by federal servicemen under the command of colonel L.Ch. 59.  On unspecified dates the investigators forwarded requests to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 in Khankala and the Chechnya FSB, asking whether the abducted men were being detained on their premises. According to the replies, these agencies had not conducted any special operations in Achkhoy-Martan at the material time and had not detained the applicants' relatives. 60.  On unspecified dates the investigators forwarded requests to various law enforcement agencies in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus, including prosecutors' offices and military commanders' offices, asking for any information these agencies had concerning the abducted men. According to the replies, no information was available; no criminal proceedings were pending against the abducted men, no special operations had been conducted against them, they had not applied for medical help, their corpses had not been found and no custody records were available in respect of them. 61.  On an unspecified date the investigators forwarded a request to the ORB in Grozny, asking whether they had arrested and detained the applicants' relatives. According to the agency's reply, they had not arrested or detained them. 62.  The Government further submitted that although the investigation had failed to establish the whereabouts of Aslambek Ismailov, Aslan Ismailov, Yaragi Ismailov, Khizir Ismailov and Yusi Daydayev, it was still in progress and all necessary investigative and operational search measures were being taken to solve the crime. 63.  Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose most of the contents of criminal case no. 44009, providing copies of only twenty-two documents. They stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1949 respectively. They live in Urus-Martan in the Chechen Republic. 7.  The applicants are married. They are the parents of Mr Vakha Khavazhovich Abdurzakov, born in 1981. 8.  On the night of 24 to 25 October 2002 the Abdurzakovs were sleeping in their family house at 234 Sheripov Street, Urus-Martan. 9.  At about 3 a.m. on 25 October 2002 barking dogs woke the applicants. The second applicant heard human voices, looked out of the window and saw four armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks. 10.  The second applicant stepped outside the house and saw in the courtyard around thirty armed men who ordered him in Russian to stop. He also heard the engine of an armoured personnel carrier (“APC”). 11.  The armed men ordered the second applicant to raise his hands and entered the house. There they forced him to his knees and searched the house without producing any warrant. Some of them pointed their machine guns at the first applicant. 12.  Meanwhile several armed men entered Vakha Abdurzakov’s room and ordered him to identify himself. The first applicant produced her son’s identity papers. The armed men examined them and ordered Vakha Abdurzakov to rise and took him to the entrance door. When the first applicant begged them not to take her son away, they replied that she should “thank” her neighbours. 13.  The armed men pushed the first applicant into a room and blocked its door with a refrigerator. Then they left the house taking Vakha Abdurzakov with them. 14.  The second applicant unblocked the door and let his wife out of the room. She ran into the street and noticed two UAZ vehicles going towards the town centre. Then she saw two APCs parked nearby. When she had almost reached them they drove away. 15.  In the morning of 25 October 2002 the applicants and their neighbours found bloodstains on the road which led from the applicants’ house to Titov Street, where traces of UAZ tyres were visible. 16.  The applicants concluded that those who had abducted their son were Russian servicemen because they had freely moved around the town during the curfew, had driven military vehicles and had spoken Russian without an accent.\n(b) Money demanded from the applicants 17.  Two or three days before 25 October 2002 Ms Yu., an inhabitant of Urus-Martan, had visited the applicants and told them that Russian law enforcement agencies had been told that their son was participating in illegal armed groups and had been planning to detain him. Ms Yu. had said that she would prevent Vakha Abdurzakov’s arrest if the applicants paid her 400 United States dollars (USD). The applicants had declined her offer as they were convinced that their son had not been involved in any illegal activities. 18.  A few days after Vakha Abdurzakov’s disappearance Ms Yu. again visited the applicants and told them that their son had originally been kept in the Urus-Martan temporary department of the interior (“VOVD”) and then transferred to the military commander’s office of the Urus-Martan District (“the district military commander’s office”). She also mentioned names of two persons involved in Vakha Abdurzakov’s disappearance, “Volodya” and “Sergey”, and said that the latter was the head of the Urus-Martan District Department of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB department”). Later the applicants learned that at the material time the FSB department had been headed by Mr Sergey Konstantinov. 19.  The applicants gave Ms Yu. a parcel with some food and clothing for their son. Later she said that she had transferred the parcel to Vakha Abdurzakov, in detention in the district military commander’s office, and that “Sergey” and “Volodya” had offered to release him for USD 3,000. The applicants did not have the money and promised Ms Yu. that they would consider the offer. 20.  After a certain lapse of time the applicants agreed to pay the money demanded, borrowed USD 2,800 from their acquaintances and gave it to Ms Yu. on 7 January 2003. Nevertheless, they had no news from Vakha Abdurzakov. Ms Yu. explained them that “Sergey” had swindled her out of the money and left Urus-Martan. 21.  At about 3 a.m. on 25 October 2002 unknown armed persons wearing camouflage uniforms entered the house at 234 Sharipov Street, Urus-Martan, apprehended Vakha Abdurzakov and took him away to an unknown destination. 22.  In the morning of 25 October 2002 the applicants visited various law enforcement agencies of the Urus-Martan District but received no information on Vakha Abdurzakov’s detention. On the same day they lodged written complaints with the prosecutor’s office of the Urus-Martan District (“the district prosecutor’s office”), the department of the interior of the Urus-Martan District (“ROVD”) and the Urus-Martan District Court (“the district court”). 23.  In the following months the applicants continued to search for their son and contacted various official bodies, such as the Special Envoy of the Russian President in Chechnya for Rights and Freedoms (“the Special Envoy”), the President of the Chechen Republic, the Russian Ministry of the Defence and the prosecutors’ offices at different levels. In their applications they described in detail the circumstances of Vakha Abdurzakov’s abduction and asked for assistance in establishing his fate and whereabouts. It appears that those applications were to no avail. 24.  On 3 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Vakha Abdurzakov under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given the number 61146. 25.  On 29 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office granted the first applicant victim status in case no. 61146. 26.  On 14 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation in case no. 61146 had been suspended for a failure to identify those responsible and that the ROVD had been instructed to search for Vakha Abdurzakov. 27.  On 21 May 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the Special Envoy’s office that the investigation into Vakha Abdurzakov’s kidnapping had been opened on 3 November 2002, that all requisite investigative measures had been taken and that the ROVD had been instructed to search actively for perpetrators. 28.  On 16 March 2004 the first applicant requested the South Federal Circuit Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office to help her to find her son. Her letter was then forwarded to the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic. 29.  On 22 April 2004 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded to the district office the first applicant’s letter of 16 March 2004 and ordered that the search for Vakha Abdurzakov be actively pursued. 30.  On 16 June 2004 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that the investigation in case no. 61146 had been suspended and that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 31.  On 22 June 2004 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation into her son’s kidnapping, to take the requisite steps to solve the crime, to allow her access to the investigation file and, if necessary, to transfer the case to a military prosecutor’s office. 32.  On 1 July 2004 the district prosecutor’s office replied that, despite the requisite investigative measures taken in case no. 61146, the perpetrators had not been identified. They further noted that other measures were being taken and that the investigation would be resumed once new information on the case was obtained. 33.  On an unspecified date in August-September 2004 the investigation into Vakha Abdurzakov’s kidnapping was resumed. 34.  On 2 September 2004 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor’s office to question Ms Yu. as a witness. 35.  On 17 September 2004 the district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation in case no. 61146 for failure to identify those responsible and informed the first applicant accordingly on 20 September 2004. 36.  On 11 October 2004 the district prosecutor’s office granted the first applicant’s request to question Ms Yu. On an unspecified date Ms Yu. submitted that Vakha Abdurzakov had been detained in the district military commander’s office and that she had given the applicants’ money to “Sergey” and “Volodya” as a payment for his release. 37.  On 19 December 2005 the first applicant requested the district military commander’s office to help in the search for her son. 38.  On 23 December 2005 the first applicant requested assistance from the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic in establishing her son’s whereabouts. 39.  On 13 January 2006 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the first applicant’s complaint to the district prosecutor’s office. 40.  On 18 January 2006 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 41.  On 10 July 2006 the first applicant requested an update on progress in the investigation from the district prosecutor’s office. 42.  On 10 September 2007 the first applicant was informed that the investigation in case no. 61146 had been resumed. 43.  On 3 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation of Vakha Abdurzakov’s abduction under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 61146. 44.  On 10 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office requested information on Vakha Abdurzakov’s whereabouts to the FSB Department, the district military commander’s office, the temporary unit of the Ministry of the Interior and military unit no. 6779. According to the replies received, Vakha Abdurzakov had not been detained by those agencies or kept in a temporary detention facility and no criminal proceedings had been instituted against him. 45.  On 29 November 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She submitted that at about 3 a.m. on 25 October 2002 her son had heard dogs barking and had gone into the street. Someone had ordered him not to move and threatened to open fire. Vakha Abdurzakov had gone back inside the house and told the first applicant that there were soldiers in the courtyard. Then unknown armed men in masks had entered the house, asked her son’s last name and demanded his identity papers. Having taken the identity papers and a gold ring, the men had led Vakha Abdurzakov out of the house. 46.  On 4 December 2002 the district prosecutor’s office questioned the second applicant. He submitted that at about 3 a.m. on 25 October 2002 six unknown armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks had entered his house, made his son get out of bed and taken his identity papers. 47.  On 3 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation for failure to identify those responsible and informed the first applicant accordingly. 48.  On 23 September 2003 the first applicant informed the district prosecutor’s office that two APCs and two UAZ vehicles had been used by her son’s kidnappers. 49.  On 17 August 2004 the district prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 3 January 2003 and resumed the investigation because of the necessity to verify newly discovered information. 50.  On 17 September 2004 the district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation and notified the first applicant accordingly. 51.  On 8 October 2004 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor’s office to question Ms Yu. as a witness. 52.  On 11 October 2004 the investigation was resumed to verify newly discovered information. 53.  On 23 October 2004 Mr Yu., Ms Yu.’s son, was questioned. He submitted that in the winter of 2003 the second applicant had told him that Ms Yu. had taken USD 2,800 from him promising that his son would be released but had not kept her word. The second applicant had demanded that Mr Yu. pay him back. Mr Yu. had requested an explanation from his mother who had confirmed that she had taken the money from the second applicant and given it to a policeman of the Urus-Martan District. Mr Yu. could not tell whether his mother was sincere but he had sold his plot of land to pay the second applicant back. 54.  On 11 November 2004 the investigation in case no. 61146 was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators and the first applicant was notified accordingly. 55.  On 25 October 2005 the district prosecutor’s office questioned Ms Yu. She submitted that in August 2002 an acquaintance of hers, a VOVD serviceman named “Sergey” had asked her whether Abdurzakov the Wahhabi was her neighbour. She had replied that the Abdurzakovs were not Wahhabi. A month later Ms Yu. had told the first applicant that the VOVD had had something against Vakha Abdurzakov and mentioned that other people had been buying up materials compromising their children. After Vakha Abdurzakov’s abduction the first applicant had come to Ms Yu. and asked her for assistance. The following morning the two women had gone to the VOVD premises and asked “Sergey” whether the police had detained Vakha Abdurzakov. He had replied that the police had not been involved and promised to check whether the district military commander’s office was implicated. Later that afternoon “Sergey” had told Ms Yu. that Vakha Abdurzakov had been arrested by the FSB department. Some three months later “Sergey” had told Ms Yu. that FSB servicemen had demanded USD 3,000 as a payment for release of Vakha Abdurzakov. Two days later “Sergey” had come to her place and told her that Vakha Abdurzakov would be released in the morning if the sum was paid. The second applicant had given Ms Yu. USD 2,800. She had added USD 200 of her own and given “Sergey” the money. Vakha Abdurzakov had not come home. A few days later Ms Yu. had learned that “Sergey” and “Volodya” had left the Chechen Republic after the completion of their mission. 56.  On 7 September 2007 the decision of 11 November 2004 was quashed and the investigation in case no. 61146 was resumed. The first applicant was notified accordingly. 57.  On 10 September 2007 the first applicant was questioned. She submitted that after her son had been taken away, she had gone into the street and seen two APCs and two UAZ vehicles parked some 500 metres away from her house. The vehicles had been moving in the direction of the town centre of Urus-Martan. The first applicant had not seen the registration numbers of the vehicles. She had spotted her neighbour on the street. When the first applicant had returned home, she had realised that nine shirts, a man’s suit and a gold ring had been stolen. 58.  On 11 September 2007 the first applicant’s neighbour allegedly seen on the night of 25 October 2002 was questioned and submitted that he had not left his house that night and had not heard any military vehicles. 59.  The investigation, although so far fruitless, was ongoing. The law enforcement authorities of the Chechen Republic had never arrested or detained Vakha Abdurzakov on criminal or administrative charges and had not carried out a criminal investigation in his respect. According to the Government, the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation. 60.  Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose most of the contents of the investigation file in case no. 61146, providing only copies of decisions to suspend and resume the investigation and to grant victim status. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 61.  On 21 July 2004 the first applicant complained of unlawful actions of the district prosecutor’s office to the district court and requested that the investigation into her son’s kidnapping be resumed and that she be allowed to study the case file. 62.  On 6 August 2004 the district court established that the district prosecutor’s office had failed to take all possible investigative measures, in particular to question servicemen of the district military commander’s office and other law enforcement agencies, and ordered that the investigation in case no. 61146 be resumed. The remaining claims were dismissed for the reason that under domestic law access to a criminal case file was only permitted upon completion of an investigation. 63.  On 24 August 2004 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic dismissed the first applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 64.  On 9 November 2004 the first applicant complained to the district court about unlawful actions of the district prosecutor’s office, in particular about the decision of 17 September 2004, and requested that the investigation be resumed and steps be taken to solve the crime. 65.  On 16 December 2004 the district court dismissed the first applicant’s claims arguing that the district prosecutor’s office had taken all necessary investigative measures in case no. 61146. 66.  On 26 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic dismissed the first applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Budapest. The second applicant, Irodalom Kft, is a Hungarian limited liability company, with its seat in Budapest. 6.  Mr Ungváry is a well-reputed historian specialised in 20th century Hungarian history including State security under the Communist regime.\nIrodalom Kft is the publisher of the literary and political weekly Élet és Irodalom. 7.  On 18 May 2007 Élet és Irodalom published a study (entitled The Genesis of a Procedure – Dialógus in Pécs) written by Mr Ungváry. The article dealt with the actions of the security service against a spontaneous student peace movement (“Dialógus”) active in Pécs and elsewhere in the country in the 1980s. The author stated inter alia that:\n“... the Dialógus-affair had demonstrated ... how closely the Ministry of the Interior and the ‘social organisations’ – which had taken over some State-security functions covertly, in case of necessity – had been intertwined”. 8.  The lead of the article pointed out that the recent scandals exposing former agents acting for the party-State’s security system covered up the fact that most reporting for that system had been done through accidental, social or official contacts (as had been the case with a Mr K., a judge of the Constitutional Court at the material time, elected by Parliament), rather than by actual agents.\nThe lead contained the following passage:\n“From the perspective of informing (besúgás) and repression (megtorlás), Officer J. W. ... and the nine “official contacts” (hivatalos kapcsolat) proved to be a lot more important ... [in the Dialógus-affair], [these official contacts including] Mr K. (today judge of the Constitutional Court)... Their respective responsibilities are of course different.”\nThe author argued that Mr K., without being an actual agent,\n“... was in regular and apparently collegial (kollégiális) contact with the State security, quite often anticipating and exceeding its expectations” ... “and as an official contact, he was busy as an informant (besúgó) and demanding hard-line policies”.\nThe writing made reference to the role of further contemporary public figures, amongst others the Prime Minister, a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, a former Member of Parliament and a university professor. 9.  In the article, Mr Ungváry relied, inter alia, on documents available in the Historical Archives of the State Security Service archived as a “strictly confidential action plan”. Referring to the above material, he described the role played by leaders of Pécs University – including Mr K., deputy secretary of the local party committee between 1983 and 1988 – in assisting the security operations.\nMr Ungváry characterised Mr K.’s attitude in the Dialógus case as that of a “hardliner”, in comparison to other “social contacts”. He recalled that Mr K. had ordered the removal of Dialógus’s poster, saying that “the country did not need such an ... organisation [i.e. Dialógus]”, and that he had reproached a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections for having been supported by Dialógus. 10.  In its next issue of 25 May 2007 Élet és Irodalom published Mr K.’s statement written in response to the disputed article, denying the allegations. 11.  On 27 May 2007 a television channel broadcast an interview with Mr Ungváry about the article published in Élet és Irodalom. He reiterated his argument that in the previous political system most reporting had been done through accidental, social or official contacts. He argued that providing information, writing reports or removing posters would have qualified as agent activities, and Mr K. had been responsible for at least one of them. He called the latter ‘trash’.\nMr K. initiated proceedings with a view to obtaining a rectification in the press, refuting the applicants’ allegations. His claim was sustained by the courts and the second applicant published a rectification on 22 February 2008. 12.  In April 2008 a reference book co-authored by Mr Ungváry was published outlining the history of the Communist State security and including a chapter with the full version of the article published in Élet és Irodalom. 13.  On 30 April 2008 an interview with Mr Ungváry appeared on an internet news portal concerning the release of the book, where he called Mr K. “a party secretary writing mood reports”. 14.  Mr K. filed a criminal complaint against Mr Ungváry on charges of libel. In the course of the ensuing proceedings the latter apologised for having called him ‘trash’ in the television interview.\nThe second-instance criminal court was of the view that the statements in question constituted opinions. Mr Ungváry was acquitted on 25 February 2010. 15.  Meanwhile, Mr K. filed a defamation action against both applicants.\nOn 9 February 2009 the Budapest Regional Court found that Mr Ungváry had infringed Mr K.’s personality rights through his statements made in the study published in Élet és Irodalom, the television interview and the book. The second applicant was found to have violated Mr K.’s personality rights through publishing the study. The court relied on section 84(1) of the Civil Code. 16.  Relying in essence on the findings of fact established in the rectification proceedings (see paragraph 11 above), the court established that Mr Ungváry and the publisher had disseminated false and unproven statements tarnishing the reputation of Mr K. by maintaining that the latter had acted as a quasi-agent during the Communist regime, been an informant of and collaborated with the State security, reported to them and carried out their orders, and been a “hardliner” in 1983.\nThe court further found that Mr Ungváry had falsely interpreted Mr K.’s political criticism towards a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections as an action motivated by the State security. 17.  The court ordered Irodalom Kft to pay 1,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 3,500 euros (EUR)) in respect of the article published in Élet és Irodalom. Mr Ungváry was ordered to pay HUF 2,000,000 (EUR 7,000) in damages. 18.  On appeal, on 13 October 2009 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed this judgment and dismissed Mr K.’s action, holding that the impugned statements were value-judgments with sufficient factual background. However, it found that Mr Ungváry had violated Mr K.’s right to honour by calling him ‘trash’. This part of the judgment became final. 19.  On Mr K.’s petition for review, on 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the second-instance decision as to the remainder of the case. It found for Mr K., ruling that his personality rights had been violated by the false impression, given by the article in question, that he had been a quasi-agent and an informant during Communist times, collaborated as an ‘official contact’ with the State security and written reports for them, countered the youth organisation official’s election on the secret service’s instigation and demanded hard-line policies in 1983.\nThe court held that the article had not presented fact-driven conclusions of a historical research but mere defamatory and unsubstantiated statements about Mr K. It further affirmed that the applicants had been required to prove the truth of these allegations but had provided no such factual background.\nThe Supreme Court observed that there was no evidence that Mr K.’s report within the party hierarchy on the Dialógus-affair had been written on the commission, instruction or expectation of the Ministry of the Interior.\nThe judgment contained in particular the following passages:\n“The concept of the author of the impugned article is in essence that, during [the Communist] regime, the so-called ‘official contacts’ also played an important role in the State security’s activities, in addition to the [actual] agents. It is probably true that the Ministry of the Interior indeed considered certain [officials] as ‘official contacts’. It can also be assumed that some of them occasionally cooperated with the State security as ‘official contacts’, that is, carried out State-security tasks, surveyed, reported – in other words, were active in the manner described by the author as ‘unambiguously incarnating the activities of an agent’. However, it is not possible to deduce from this potentiality the general conclusion that every single [official] acted as an ‘official contact’; consequently, in the absence of proven facts, it is not acceptable to qualify all potentially available personalities [i.e. Communist party secretaries] as ‘official contacts’ actually cooperating with the State security. Public opinion condemns those persons who cooperated with the State security, even if they do not fall within the actual category of ‘agent’ or ‘informant’. Therefore, if someone is characterised, without a proper ground, as actually having carried out such activities, this violates that person’s reputation, according to public opinion. ...\nHowever, [Mr Ungváry] has committed breaches of law also in addition [to the authoring of the article], which themselves have justified – although all the breaches have originated in the article published in Élet és Irodalom – the plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary damage. In respect of the statements made in [the television broadcast] and the book, the Supreme Court establishes the further, reasonable non-pecuniary damage due to the plaintiff in the amount of 1,000,000 Hungarian forints.” 20.  The Supreme Court ordered the applicants, jointly and severally, to pay damages in the amount of 2,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 7,000 euros (EUR)) and accrued interest, whereas Mr Ungváry had to pay another HUF 1,000,000 (EUR 3,500) and accrued interest (see paragraph 19 above). The legal costs to be borne by the applicants amounted to approximately EUR 3,300, not including the applicants’ own legal expenses. The plaintiff’s claim as to an obligation on the side of the respondents to publish a compensatory statement was rejected as having been inadequately formulated.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Gdańsk. 8.  In June 1993 the counsel for H.K. (“the petitioner”) filed with the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court (“the court”) a petition to dissolve joint ownership of a certain property, belonging to H.K. and K.K. who owned four fifths of it , and to M.S., who owned one fifth. On 6 July 1993 the court returned the statement of the claim as H.K. had failed to pay the court fees. On 8 July 1993 she requested the court to exempt her from the court fees. On 14 July 1993 the court allowed her request. 9.  The first hearing in the case was held on 10 September 1993. At the hearing H.K. requested the court to summon W.S., the applicant and J.S., who were successors of the late M.S. as parties to the case. 10.  On 14 December 1993 and on 31 January 1994 the applicant filed her pleadings with the court. 11.  On 20 December 1993 the court stayed the proceedings on the ground of the petitioner’s failure to indicate service addresses of certain of the parties. On 2 February 1994 the petitioner requested the court to resume the proceedings. On 4 February 1994 the court allowed this motion. 12.  On 22 March 1994 the second hearing was held before the court. The applicant was absent. The hearing was adjourned until 26 April 1994. 13.  At the hearing held on 26 April 1994 the court heard the petitioner and the applicant. The parties were given a fourteen-day time-limit to state their position with respect to H.K.’s petition to have the property divided, and also to submit their comments on the division proposal. The hearing was adjourned until 24 June 1994. 14.  On 6 May 1994 the court received the applicant’s letter expressing her position as regards the petition. 15.  On 24 June 1994 the court held another hearing. The applicant was absent. The court heard K.K. and granted the parties seven days to submit motions for any evidence to be taken. The hearing was adjourned until 6 September 1994. 16.  On 17 August and 6 September 1994 the applicant filed her further pleadings with the court. 17.  The applicant did not attend the hearing held on 6 September 1994. The court informed the parties about her pleadings. In view of their large volume and failure to produce copies for the other parties, the court ordered the applicant to provide it with the necessary number of copies and granted the other parties seven days to comment on her pleadings. The hearing was adjourned until 3 November 1994, but the court decided to inspect the property on 14 October 1994. 18.  On 15 September 1994 J.S. informed the court that he wished to be paid off by H.K. and K.K. and that he gave up his claim for the physical division of the property. 19.  On 27 September 1994 the petitioner’s counsel replied to the applicant’s pleadings, submitting that in almost all of her pleadings she had insulted the court and the parties. Moreover, she had alleged that all the witnesses were lying, even though no witnesses had been heard so far. On the whole, she had made no valuable contribution to the proceedings and had not adduced any evidence. Subsequently, K.K.’s counsel commented in a similar way on the applicant’s conduct. 20.  On 30 September and 11 October 1994 the applicant filed further pleadings with the court. 21.  On 14 October 1994 the court inspected the property in issue and heard two witnesses. 22.  On 21 October 1994 the applicant filed further pleadings with the court. 23.  At the hearing held on 3 November 1994 the applicant was again absent. The court heard evidence from three witnesses and adjourned the hearing until 21 December 1994. 24.  On 10 November 1994 the petitioner’s counsel requested the court to interview a further six witnesses. On 28 November 1994 the applicant filed further pleadings with the court. 25.  On 30 November 1994 the court heard evidence from one witness. 26.  The applicant was present at the next hearing in the instant case, which was held on 20 December 1994. At her request the court swore in two witnesses before it heard them. The hearing was adjourned until 27 January 1995. 27.  On 5 January 1995 the applicant filed another set of pleadings with the court. 28.  On 27 January 1995 the court held the next hearing. The applicant was absent. The court heard one witness and adjourned the hearing until 3 March 1995. 29.  On 20 February 1995 the applicant proposed in her pleadings that the property be divided into two equal parts, one for her and her father W.S. and the second for the petitioner H.K. and the party K.K. On 1 March 1995 the petitioner H.K. filed with the court her proposal as to the physical division of the property. 30.  The next hearing was held on 3 March 1995. The court granted the parties seven days within which to comment on both proposals and adjourned the hearing until 4 April 1995. 31.  On 15 March 1995 the petitioner submitted to the court that the applicant, together with her father, owned 2/15 of the property in question and the division proposed by her would be unjustified. On 23, 25 and 28 March 1995 the applicant filed her further pleadings with the court. 32.  On 4 April 1995 the court held the next hearing. 33.  In view of the applicant’s absence, and that of her father W.S. and J.S., the court decided to ask the Gdańsk District Court and the Gdynia District Court for their assistance in interviewing the witnesses. It also decided to appoint the expert J.G. to prepare an opinion as to whether it was possible to divide the property between the petitioner and other parties, including the one-fifth share belonging to W.S., the applicant and J.S. On 18 April 1995 the court prepared a list of questions to be asked by the Gdańsk and Gdynia courts. On 11 May 1995 the court requested the Gdynia District Court to question J.S. and enclosed the list of questions to be put to him. On the same day the court requested the Gdynia District Court to hear the applicant and her father W.S. 34.  On 22 May 1995 the court sent the case-file to the expert J.G. and ordered him to prepare the opinion within one month. The expert submitted his report on 23 June 1995. He stated that it was possible to divide the property between the petitioner and K.K., but that physical separation of one-fifth of the property was not possible since there would be no access to the parts thus formed. 35.  On 29 May 1995 the Gdańsk District Court fixed the date for hearing the applicant and her father, as decided on 11 May 1995 (see above), for 26 June 1995. On that date the Gdańsk District Court heard the applicant, but in view of the absence of her father who was also to be interviewed, and at the applicant’s request, the court decided to interview him at home. On 7 September 1995 the Gdańsk Court interviewed the applicant’s father W.S. at his home. The court ascertained that W.S. was unable to answer any questions and did not remember any facts relevant to the case. The Gdańsk District Court then decided to return the file to the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court. 36.  On 12 June 1995 the Gdynia District Court held a hearing to which J. S. was to be summoned to give evidence. J.S. failed to comply with the summons. The Gdynia District Court adjourned the hearing until 13 July 1995. 37.  On 5 July 1995 the applicant filed pleadings with the court, maintaining her proposal of dividing the property into two equal parts, as she had submitted on 20 February 1995. 38.  On 10 July 1995 the petitioner’s counsel agreed in general with the expert’s conclusions that it was possible to divide the property in question, but proposed a different manner of division and therefore requested the court to summon the expert to the hearing. 39.  At the hearing held before the Gdynia District Court on 13 July 1995 J.S. was present but the petitioner H.K. and the party K.K. were absent. The District Court therefore adjourned the hearing until 18 September 1995. On 18 September 1995 none of the parties appeared before the District Court despite the fact that they had been properly summoned. The hearing was adjourned until 30 October 1995. 40.  On 20 October 1995 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court held a hearing. The court considered that in view of the forthcoming hearing in Gdynia the hearing should be adjourned until 5 December 1995. The court also decided to summon the expert J.G. to that hearing. On 23 October 1995 the court enquired of the Gdynia District Court about the outcome of the assistance proceedings before the latter court. 41.  Subsequently, the hearing fixed for 30 October 1995, which was to be held before the Gdynia District Court, was rescheduled for 29 November 1995 since the presiding judge had fallen ill. On 29 November 1995 the parties failed to attend the session of the Gdynia District Court. The session was adjourned until 7 February 1996. 42.  In a letter of 1 December 1995 the expert J.G. informed the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court that he was unable to attend the hearing on 5 December 1995 for professional reasons. The next hearing was held before the court on 5 December 1995. During that hearing the petitioner H.K. lodged a motion claiming acquisitive prescription of one-fifth of the property in question. The court adjourned the hearing. 43.  On 8 December 1995 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court again enquired of the Gdynia District Court about the execution of its request to hear evidence from J.S. On 14 December 1995 the latter court replied that, owing to the absence of the parties, the session at which they were to be interviewed had been adjourned until 7 February 1996. 44.  On 8 January 1996 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court decided to return the petitioner’s motion for acquisitive prescription since the formal shortcomings had not been rectified within the time allowed. 45.  On 26 January 1996 the court held the next hearing. The court heard the expert J.G. and allowed him to prepare a supplementary opinion, as the petitioner H.K. had proposed to divide the property in a different way. The court adjourned the hearing until 19 March 1996. During that time the expert was to inspect the property and prepare an opinion about the possibility of the division of the property in the manner proposed by the petitioner. On 31 January 1996 the case-file was sent to the expert. 46.  On 7 February 1996 the persons summoned to attend the session to be held before the Gdynia District Court failed to do so. The Gdynia District Court subsequently decided to return the request to the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court, having been unable to execute it fully. 47.  On 26 February 1996 the expert J.S. submitted his opinion to the court. 48.  On the same day the applicant filed with the court her reply to the petitioner’s motion for acquisitive prescription. She requested the court to dismiss the application. On 8 March 1996 the applicant submitted to the court her position regarding the expert’s supplementary opinion. 49.  On 21 March 1996 the petitioner requested the court not to arrange any hearings between 8 and 22 May 996 since she had to take care of her sick mother. Thus, the hearing fixed for 20 May 1996 was rescheduled. On 11 April 1996 the petitioner H.K. submitted to the court her comments on the expert’s opinion. 50.  On 12 April 1996 the next hearing was held. Having regard to the death of the applicant’s father W.S., the court stayed the proceedings under Article 174 § 1 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 23 May 1996 the applicant enquired of the court about the course of the proceedings. On 10 June 1996 the applicant provided the court with her father’s will, declaring her to be his only successor. 51.  On 19 September 1996 the applicant requested the Court to resume the proceedings and to order the Gdańsk District Court to hear her. 52.  On 23 September 1996 the court resumed the proceedings under Article 180 § 1 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, on 7 October 1996 the applicant informed the court that the proceedings to establish W.S.’s heirs were still pending before the Gdańsk District Court. In view of this, on 7 October 1996 the court again stayed the proceedings under Article 177 § 1 (1) CCP. 53.  On 30 December 1996 the applicant requested the court to resume the proceedings in the instant case. She submitted a decision of the Gdańsk District Court in the inheritance case. She also requested the court to secure her claim since she was afraid that the party K.K. would sell his share in the property. On the same day the court ordered the applicant to produce the factual grounds for her request. On 30 December 1996 the court resumed the proceedings. The applicant complied with the court’s order on 15 January 1997 and on 3 February 1997 the court dismissed the applicant’s request to have her claim secured by way of an interlocutory decision. On 12 February 1997 the applicant appealed against that decision. On 21 February 1997 the applicant requested the court for leave to pay the court fee for the appeal in two instalments. The court regarded that as a request to be exempted from the court fee and ordered her to provide details regarding her financial situation. On 28 February 1997 the court received the information ordered and on the same day it exempted her from the fee. 54.  On 11 March 1997 the court held the next hearing. The applicant was not present at that hearing, but submitted a medical certificate concerning her poor state of health, which made it impossible for her to participate in any further hearings. As the witnesses summoned were absent, the court adjourned the hearing until 29 April 1997. 55.  On 17 March 1997 the case-file was transferred to the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court, following the applicant’s appeal of 12 February 1997. On 26 March 1997 the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court dismissed her appeal. On 3 April 1997 the case-file was received at the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court. 56.  In a letter of 21 April 1997 the Gdynia District Court requested the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court to provide it with the current address of J.S. since he had moved. On 5 May 1997 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court complied with that request. 57.  In a letter of 24 April 1997 the expert J.G. informed the court that he was unable to attend the hearing to be held on 29 April 1997. 58.  The court held the next hearing on 29 April 1997. The petitioner maintained her motion for acquisitive prescription, the party K.K. joined that motion and the court heard four witnesses and adjourned the hearing until 15 July 1997. 59.  On 8 May 1997 the Gdynia District Court transmitted the request of the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court to hear J.S. to the Kwidzyń District Court, which was competent ratione loci. 60.  In a letter of 28 May 1997 the applicant asked the court whether it was necessary for her to be present at the hearing on 15 July 1997. On 2 June 1997 the court replied that her presence was indeed necessary since it intended to question the parties to the proceedings. On 2 July 1997 the applicant applied to the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court to request the Gdańsk District Court to interview her, invoking her bad health. 61.  On 15 July 1997 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court held the next hearing. The court heard evidence from the expert J.G. As the Kwidzyń District Court had not interviewed J.S., the court decided not to give a preliminary ruling and adjourned the hearing until 9 September 1997. In the meantime the court was to ask the Kwidzyń Court about progress in carrying out the request to interview J.S. 62.  On 24 July 1997 the applicant again requested the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court that she be questioned before the Gdansk Court. 63.  On 9 September 1997 another hearing was held before the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court. The court decided to give a preliminary ruling in the near future, concerning the claim for acquisitive prescription. 64.  On 15 September 1997 the Kwidzyń District Court held a session at which J.S. was present. However, in view of the absence of all the other parties to the proceedings, the court decided to adjourn the session until 29 September 1997 and on 19 September 1997 it informed the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court accordingly. Having regard thereto, the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court decided on 23 September 1997 to reopen the hearing and to adjourn it until 29 October 1997. 65.  On 29 September 1997 J.S. failed to attend the session to be held before the Kwidzyn District Court. The court, accordingly, had to adjourn the hearing again until 16 October 1997. On 16 October 1997 the Kwidzyń District Court finally interviewed J.S. 66.  The next hearing before the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court was held on 28 October 1997. The petitioner H.K. and the party K.K. upheld their motion for acquisitive prescription. The court decided to adjourn the hearing and to give a preliminary ruling on 7 November 1997. 67.  On 7 November 1997 the court gave a preliminary ruling declaring that the petitioner H.K. and the party K.K. had acquired one-fifth of the property in question by way of acquisitive prescription. 68.  On 27 November 1997 the applicant asked the court whether the proceedings had come to an end. On the same day the court informed the applicant about the ruling it had given on 7 November 1997. On 9 December 1997 the applicant requested the court to provide her with written reasons for that ruling and to restore the time-limit for lodging an appeal against it. On 11 December 1997 the court restored the time-limit and on 10 April 1998 the court received the applicant’s appeal against the preliminary ruling of 7 November 1997. 69.  On 17 April 1998 the court ordered the applicant to provide it with a statement concerning her financial situation. The applicant provided the relevant information on 24 April 1998 and on 27 April 1998 the court exempted the applicant from the fee for her appeal. 70.  On 13 May 1998 the case-file was received by the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court, which was to examine the applicant’s appeal against the preliminary ruling on the merits of the case. A hearing was held on 28 May 1998. On 4 June 1998 the Regional Court quashed the preliminary ruling given on 7 November 1997 by the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court and remitted this part of the case for re‑examination. On 7 July 1998 the case-file was served on the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court. 71.  On 26 October 1998 the applicant informed the court that she would not be present at the hearing scheduled for 30 October 1998 owing to her bad health. On that day the court adjourned the hearing until 4 December 1998 as no party attended it. 72.  On 25 November 1998 the applicant informed the court that she would not attend the hearing fixed for 4 December 1998 due to her ill health. 73.  On 4 December 1998 the court held the next hearing. The court granted the petitioner and the party K.K. fourteen days within which to produce the building permit concerning the property. On 9 December 1998 the applicant requested the Court to provide her with a copy of that decision. 74.  On 31 December 1998 the petitioner informed the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court that the building permit could probably be found in the Piotrków Trybunalski Division of the State Archives and requested the court to contact that institution in order to obtain it. On 19 January 1999 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court requested the State Archives to provide it with the copy of the permit. On 25 January 1999 the State Archives informed the court that it did not have the copy of the document requested. 75.  The next hearing was held before the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court on 9 February 1999. One of the parties informed the court that the building permit could probably be found in the bank, which had granted the loan for the construction of the house. The court decided to grant the party fourteen days to produce the permit. On 16 February 1999 the court requested the Gdańsk District Court to hear the applicant. On 1 March 1999 the Gdańsk District Court fixed the hearing for 27 April 1999. On 27 April 1999 the Gdańsk District Court interviewed the applicant as requested. 76.  The next hearing before the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court was fixed for 3 August 1999. By a letter of 13 July 1999 the applicant informed the court that she would not be present at the hearing for health reasons. 77.  At the hearing held on 3 August 1999 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court decided to request the Gdańsk District Court to interview the applicant again since on 27 April 1999 she had been questioned as a witness and not as a party to the proceedings. The hearing was adjourned until 15 September 1999. On 4 August 1999 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court requested the Gdańsk District Court to interview the applicant. 78.  The next hearing before the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court was held on 15 September 1999. It was adjourned as the parties failed to attend. The court adjourned the hearing until 20 October 1999. 79.  The Gdańsk District Court interviewed the applicant on 24 September 1999. 80.  On 22 October 1999 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court contacted the Piotrków Trybunalski and the Tomaszów Mazowiecki Divisions of the State Archives requesting them to provide a copy of the building permit. On 2 November 1999 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki Division provided the court with a copy of the building permit. 81.  On 4 November 1999 the applicant informed the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court that she would not be able, for health reasons, to attend the hearing fixed for 19 November 1999. 82.  On 19 November 1999 the court held the next hearing. In the absence of confirmation that counsel for one of the parties had been properly summoned by post the court adjourned the hearing until 10 December 1999. 83.  In a letter of 7 December 1999 J.S. and his counsel informed the court that they joined the petition of H.K. and K.K. for acquisitive prescription and would not be present at the next hearing. 84.  The next hearing was held on 8 December 1999. No party, except the participant K.K., was present and the court adjourned the hearing until 12 January 2000. 85.  On 7 January 2000 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court rescheduled the hearing from 12 to 24 January 2000 for organisational reasons concerning the court. 86.  On 24 January 2000 the court held a hearing. The court heard the petitioner H.K. and the party K.K. The part of the hearing regarding the petition for acquisitive prescription was closed and the court decided to give a preliminary ruling on 4 February 2000. However, on 4 February 2000 the Court decided to postpone the ruling until 7 February 2000. 87.  On 7 February 2000, following certain information provided by J.S., the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court reopened the hearing and adjourned it until 29 February 2000. The court also ordered the applicant to state her position regarding information provided by J.S. On 14 February 2000 the applicant submitted relevant pleadings. 88.  At the hearing on 29 February 2000 the parties stated that the applicant’s pleadings of 14 February 2000 contained statements insulting to both living and dead members of their families and added nothing relevant to the case. The petitioner and K.K. maintained their application for acquisitive prescription. The court closed the part of the hearing relating to that claim and adjourned the giving of the preliminary ruling until 6 March 2000. On that day the court dismissed the motion for acquisitive prescription. On 9 March 2000 K. K. requested the court to give written grounds for that decision. 89.  On 4 April 2000 the applicant filed with the court her pleadings relating to the written reasons for the decision of 6 March 2000. 90.  The next hearing was held before the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court on 5 July 2000. The court adjourned the hearing until 3 August 2000. However, as the petitioner’s counsel was on holiday, the hearing was subsequently rescheduled for 12 September 2000. On 5 July 2000 the petitioner H.K. requested the court to secure her claim and on 8 August 2000 she supplemented her request with factual circumstances justifying it. On 13 July 2000 the applicant informed the court that she would not be able to participate in the hearing fixed for 12 September 2000, owing to ill health. 91.  On 1 September 2000 the applicant applied to have her share of the property (two-thirds of one-fifth) entered in the land and mortgage register and to be paid off by H.K. and K.K. At the next hearing held on 12 September 2000 the petitioner withdrew her motion for securing the claim and maintained her application for physical division of the property. K.K. joined the latter motion. The court adjourned the hearing until 5 October 2000. 92.  On 22 September 2000 the applicant informed the court that for health reasons she would not be able to participate in the hearing fixed for 5 October 2000. 93.  During the hearing held on 5 October 2000 H.K. and K.K. informed the court about the possibility of a settlement in respect of movable parts of the property. The court adjourned the hearing until 9 November 2000 and ordered the applicant to adduce any evidence she possessed, since in her earlier pleading she had maintained that she had had some additional evidence at her disposal. The applicant replied on 25 October 2000. 94.  The hearing fixed for 9 November 2000 was adjourned at the request of the petitioner’s counsel, invoking the petitioner’s ill health. On 27 December 2000 the Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court fixed the next hearing for 8 January 2001. 95.  On 4 January 2001 the applicant informed the court that she would not be able to participate in that hearing for reasons of ill health and advanced age. At the hearing held on 8 January 2001 the petitioner H.K. and the party informed the court about the friendly settlement regarding movable parts of the property, which had been concluded. Therefore the petitioner’s claim became limited to her application for physical division of the real estate. The parties accepted the proposal of the division prepared by the expert. The Tomaszów Mazowiecki District Court decided to appoint an expert in evaluation of real property. 96.  Subsequently, the expert submitted her report and was questioned by the court on 2 July 2001. 97.  On 4 January 2002 the Gdańsk District Court again interviewed the applicant, at the request of the Tomaszów Mazowiecki Court. 98.  The next hearing was held on 18 December 2002. 99.  The proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant, who had lived for a while in the United States of America, was suspected of drug trafficking and a warrant for his arrest was issued by the United States police in January 1996. 9.  Following the request of the United States authorities, on 15 August 1997 the public prosecutor asked the Skopje Municipal Court to institute a preliminary investigation against the applicant on charges that between January 1992 and May 1995 he had smuggled around 10.5 kg of drugs from Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the United States and that for that purpose had set up a drug-trafficking network involving also his son, who lives in the United States. The prosecution’s request set out the names of the persons involved and against whom criminal proceedings were pending or completed in the United States and asked for their questioning. 10.  On 30 September 1997 the investigating judge opened a criminal investigation against the applicant, decided to hear the witnesses proposed by the prosecution and detained the applicant on remand. 11.  On 1 October 1997 the investigating judge asked the Ministry of Justice to contact the United States government and to request their assistance in the hearing of some witnesses in their country. On 10 October 1997 the Ministry of Justice addressed the request to the United States embassy. 12.  On 7 November 1997 the United States embassy was informed by the investigating judge of the investigation pending against the applicant. The notice contained the names of the witnesses to be examined in the United States and a list of fifteen questions to be put to them. 13.  On 28 November 1997 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that the investigating judge would go to the United States one week later and was summoned to the hearing. 14.  On 1 December 1997 the lawyer was denied a visa for the United States on the ground that he had not produced all the relevant documents required. The United States embassy informed him that it would review his application for a visa provided that he submitted a certificate of his working position, income, and seniority and evidence that he owned real estate and had family ties in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The lawyer never reapplied for a visa. On 2 December 1997 the applicant withdrew his power of attorney. 15.  On 3 December 1997 the applicant appointed another lawyer, who, on the same day, was summoned to attend the hearing of witnesses in the United States, scheduled for 8 December 1997. On the summons, the lawyer placed his signature in the space provided for the bailiff’s signature and the bailiff placed his signature in the space provided for the lawyer’s signature. 16.  On 4 December 1997 the applicant was questioned. He stated that he had been informed by the investigating judge that witnesses would be heard in the United States. He had contacted his second lawyer and left to him the decision whether or not to attend the hearing. He further stated that the expenses for the trip would not be a problem as he had sufficient funds to cover them. 17.  On the same day the investigating judge informed the United States embassy in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that on 28 November 1997 the applicant’s first lawyer had been summoned to attend the questioning of the witnesses in the United States and that the applicant’s second lawyer had declared that there was no need to attend the questioning and that he had insufficient funds to meet the travel expenses. 18.  On 8 and 9 December 1997, five witnesses were heard by the investigating judge in the presence of the public prosecutor and the court interpreter. Their testimonies were recorded. The witnesses were involved in the drug-trafficking network organised by the applicant, and they were all serving prison sentences in the United States for drug trafficking. 19.  According to the witnesses, who were under oath and were heard separately, it was the applicant who had set up the entire network and who had organised the smuggling into the United States and the re-sale there of approximately 10.5 kg of drugs. The applicant had contacts in Bulgaria, from where he would smuggle the drugs into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He would then arrange for them to be smuggled into the United States. Some of the witnesses stated that they had smuggled the drugs in a plaster-cast which the applicant would wrap around one of their legs, as though it were broken. On their arrival in the United States they would hand over the drugs to the applicant’s son in return for payment. Some of the witnesses stated that they had had an agreement with the applicant and his son for drug dealing and had been supplied with the drugs in the applicant’s and his son’s house. 20.  Two of the witnesses who had travelled to Bulgaria on separate occasions gave evidence that they had been taken into Mr Robert M.’s flat in Bulgaria, where Mr Robert M. and the applicant had wrapped plasters with drugs around one of the witnesses’ legs. None of the witnesses made any statement regarding Mr Angel B. 21.  On 22 December 1997 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant with drug trafficking from Bulgaria and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the United States and with setting up an international network for that purpose. The witnesses’ statements were included in the indictment.\nOn 29 December 1997 the applicant was released. 22.  On 1 January 1998 the applicant made a submission to the Municipal Court that there was no case to answer as there was no convincing evidence against him. In particular, the indictment was predominantly based on the testimonies of the witnesses who were serving prison sentences in the United States and who had not been cross-examined by the defence. The applicant argued that the witnesses had a deal with the United States authorities to have their sentences reduced in exchange for their cooperation. On the one hand, since they had already been convicted in the United States, the witnesses were aware that they would not risk anything if they gave false evidence, as they could not be prosecuted for drug trafficking under the law of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On the other hand, if they modified their testimonies, they ran the risk of losing all the benefits which had been agreed upon by the authorities. 23.  On 12 January 1998 the court held that on the basis of all the evidence in the case there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant might have committed the offence with which he had been charged and refused to terminate the criminal proceedings against him. 24.  On 13 January 1998 a hearing was held before the Skopje Municipal Court. On 22 January 1998 a second hearing was held. The applicant claimed to be innocent and stated that he had not travelled to the United States because he knew that it might be dangerous for him.\nPhotographs showing the plaster-cast, belonging to a person involved in the drug dealing with the applicant, in which drugs had been found, photographs of the witnesses, reports on the search of the applicant’s son’s and another witness’s flat where some drugs had been found and the reports on the investigation in connection with the applicant’s son and his pre-trial detention were, inter alia, examined. 25.  The applicant complained that he had been unable to cross-examine the witnesses. He also objected to their statements being read out in open court.\nThe court decided to read out in open court the statements of the witnesses examined in the United States, because “to secure the attendance of the witnesses is extremely difficult and there are also other important reasons”.\nThe applicant challenged the witnesses’ statements without pointing out concretely why they should not be considered trustworthy, or specifying the questions that he would have liked to be put to the witnesses. 26.  At the hearing of 22 January 1998 the applicant requested that two additional witnesses for the defence be examined. The record of the hearing states as follows:\n“... the applicant’s lawyer asked the court to gather information about Mr Robert M., in particular regarding his place of residence, whether Mr Robert M. was charged with being one of the co-organisers [of the drug trafficking] with the accused, [and if so] to obtain his case file, and to call him as a witness.\nHe also called the witness, Mr Angel B., from the village of Kompliven, Bulgaria, to give evidence on whether he knew the accused and Mr Robert M., whether he had ever been in Mr Robert M.’s flat with the accused, whether he knew if the accused had been supplied with drugs (amphetamines), whether he knew some of the prosecution witnesses, etc. ...”\nThe Skopje Municipal Court refused the motion on the ground that “the court [had] sufficient evidence before it to reach its verdict”. 27.  On 26 January 1998 the municipal court found the applicant guilty of drug trafficking within the meaning of Article 255 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The court dismissed the applicant’s objection that there had been a breach of his right of defence in that he had been unable to cross-examine the witnesses, on the ground that it had been impossible to summon them. It considered the witnesses’ statements reliable, since they had had no opportunity to make a deal with the public prosecutor of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to have their sentences in the United States reduced in exchange for giving evidence against the applicant. The court further observed that all the witnesses had recognised the applicant on a photo and that, although each of them had been heard separately by the investigating judge in the presence of the public prosecutor, their statements were consistent and precise. The court also had regard to the applicant’s testimony. 28.  On 26 February 1998 the public prosecutor submitted an appeal to the Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд) requesting an increase of the sentence in view of the nature of the offence committed, the degree of danger to the public, the fact that it concerned organised crime at international level and the fact that the applicant was a habitual offender. 29.  On 6 March 1998 the applicant also filed an appeal with the Skopje Court of Appeal, complaining, inter alia, that the lower court had infringed the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 6 of the Convention, as it had reached its verdict only on the basis of the statements of witnesses whom he had not cross-examined. The applicant further complained about the court’s refusal to hear two additional witnesses on his behalf. 30.  On 20 May 1998 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the ground that the Municipal Court had acted in accordance with Article 325 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stated that witnesses might be heard in the absence of the accused or his lawyer if there was a valid reason making it impossible or extremely difficult to do otherwise (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below).\nThe court found that the lower court had given a reasoned explanation why it was extremely difficult to cross-examine those witnesses at the public hearing. They had been heard only by the investigating judge and the public prosecutor, but the legal representatives of the applicant had been duly summoned for the examination of the witnesses and, therefore, had had a sufficient opportunity to attend the witnesses’ questioning.\nIt held that the statements were consistent and logical and were corroborated by each other and by other evidence such as the reports from the searches carried out in the flat of the applicant’s son and of another witness. It also held that the two witnesses called by the defence were not relevant as they would not have contributed much to the establishment of the truth.\nThe court granted the public prosecutor’s appeal and increased the applicant’s sentence to thirteen years’ imprisonment. 31.  On 11 June 1998 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law (Барање за вонредно преиспитување на правосилна одлука) with the Supreme Court (Врховен суд). 32.  On 2 July 1998 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on points of law on the grounds that the investigating judge had acted within his competence when he decided to interrogate the witnesses in the United States and that the applicant and his lawyers had been given an opportunity to attend the hearing. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that it would have been impossible to have the witnesses heard at the public hearing, as they were serving a prison sentence abroad. Consequently, in accordance with the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure there were sufficient reasons to justify the statements being read out at the public hearing. 33.  On 6 September 1999 the applicant’s son declared before a notary that his father had had nothing to do with drug trafficking. Another person also declared before a public notary that the applicant had been engaged in trade with spare parts for motor vehicles.\nOn 5 October 1999 the applicant applied to the Skopje Municipal Court to have his case reopened on the basis of those declarations. His application was dismissed on 27 October 1999. On 27 December 1999 that decision was upheld by the Skopje Court of Appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Velenje. 6.  On 21 January 1997 the applicant was injured in an accident at work in a lignite mine. The applicant’s employer had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7.  On 24 July 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Celje Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 1,215,600 tolars (approximately 5,000 euros) for the injuries sustained.\nBetween 3 February 1999 and 23 April 2002 the applicant lodged four preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.\nBetween 11 February and 12 November 1998 he made three requests that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the five hearings held between 11 December 1998 and 24 September 2002 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nDuring the proceedings the court appointed a medical expert who was ultimately replaced by another medical expert.\nAt the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 20 November 2002. 8.  On 22 November 2002 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju) and further requested that the first-instance court corrects its judgment for typos and miscalculations. ZT cross-appealed.\nOn 27 November 2002 the first-instance court corrected the judgment. The decision was served on the applicant on 29 November 2002.\nOn 7 April 2004 the Celje Higher Court allowed both appeals in part, decreased the damages awarded and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination of the decision on costs and expenses.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 4 May 2004\nZT requested that the court corrected the judgment for miscalculations.\nOn 13 May 2004 the court corrected the judgment.\nOn 4 June 2004 this decision was served on the applicant. 9.  On 8 October 2004 the first-instance court delivered a new decision on costs and expenses. 10.  On 19 October 2004 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court.\nOn 9 November 2005 the court allowed the appeal and increased the amount awarded for costs and expenses. The decision was served on the applicant on 21 November 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Košice. 6.  On 22 May 1997 an individual, A., disappeared. He was the head of a municipal office and an entrepreneur. It has been submitted by the applicant, and not disputed by the Government, that he was the principal owner of an important industrial enterprise, B., which was going through the process of denationalisation and was at the relevant time still partly co‑owned by the State in the person of the National Property Fund, a public institution responsible for the administration and denationalisation of State‑owned property in Slovakia. 7.  An official search for A. ensued. It was directed by C. At that time he was the head of the criminal investigation department of a regional police headquarters of the region concerned. According to the Government, whose submission has not been disputed by the applicant, C. left the police for the private sector in 1999. 8.  Nevertheless, the search efforts were unsuccessful and, at an unspecified time, A. was pronounced legally dead. 9.  In 2000 a criminal investigation of the disappearance of A. was opened by the Serious Offences Investigation Department in another regional town. The investigation was however stayed in 2005, as no evidence had been established allowing charges to be brought against any specific individual. 10.  The circumstances of the disappearance of A., the search for him and his presumed whereabouts were the subject of an article published on 31 May 2000 in a weekly magazine with nationwide coverage.\nAfter the publication of the article written by the applicant, which is at the heart of the present case, and which is mentioned in detail below, these matters were again written on in another article published at an unspecified time in another weekly magazine with nationwide coverage.\nWithout including a reference to it, the latter article contained some parts of the applicant’s article. 11.  In May 2001 the applicant, who is an editor, obtained information from C. concerning the disappearance of A. 12.  On 29 May 2001 C. signed a written declaration before a notary public confirming, in the following terms, that he had previously provided the applicant with such information for the purpose of having it published:\n“I have heard a recording of an intercepted telephone conversation which took place on the evening when the head of the municipal office in ... [A.] disappeared. At that time I was the head of the criminal investigation department of the regional police headquarters in ...and I personally took part in the search for the missing [A.].\nThe recording contained the voice of [D.], who was calling from [a restaurant] to a hotel ... and announced that [A.] was already on the way. We have not been able to establish who took the call, because the recording, like other evidence, has been removed from the file.\nAt the very beginning of the investigation we were visited by ... who was at that time deputy director of the Slovak Intelligence Service, and who declared that [A.] was dead and that the investigation was over.” 13.  At that time the applicant worked for a daily newspaper named Národná obroda, which was published by a limited liability company, E.\nThe daily had nationwide coverage, and in the course of the ensuing proceedings was accepted by the courts as being opinion-forming (mienkotvorný). 14.  On 16 June 2003 an article written by the applicant was published in Národná obroda under the title:\n‘An industrialist [A.] of [a town] has disappeared and never been found’ 15.  The article drew a parallel between the case of A. and that of another entrepreneur who had disappeared earlier that month. According to the article, that entrepreneur and A. were both associated with one of the major political parties, and their disappearances resembled one another. The individuals referred to in the article included D. and were identified by their full names. 16.  In so far as relevant, the article contained the following passages:\n“The last people who saw [A.] had had a meeting with him in [a restaurant] concerning a capital entry into [B.]. [A.] controlled [B.] ...The dinner was attended by [two businessmen on behalf of another company], and a local representative of their interests, [D.] ...\n‘My husband went to that meeting with concerns’: declared [A.’s] widow. ‘The meeting was originally intended to take place over lunch, but it was suddenly rescheduled for the evening. He had no intention of letting any outsider into the company. My husband left all the documents concerning [the company] with his secretary, who was to pass them on to me if something happened to him.’” 17.  The passage that would later become crucial (see paragraph 29 below) read as follows:\n“The editorial office of [Národná obroda] moreover has in its possession a written statement by one of the police officers who took part in the search for [A.]. ‘I have heard a recording of an intercepted telephone conversation from that evening. [D.] called from [a restaurant] to a hotel ... and announced that [A.] was already on the way. We have not however been able to establish who took the message, and the recording, like other evidence, was later removed from the file.’, submits the former police officer who took part in the search for [A.].\n[D.] dropped [A.] off in his car in front of [a factory] and [A.] has not been seen since. The tape with the recording probably no longer exists.\n‘The next day the then director of counter-espionage at [the Slovak Intelligence Service] ..., seized the recording. He said that [A.] was dead and that the investigation was over.’, alleges the police officer.” 18. D. is a practising lawyer and an entrepreneur involved in national and international trade. On 18 June 2003 he addressed complaints about the article of 16 June 2003 to the chief editor of Národná obroda and to its publisher, E., seeking publication of a correction and an apology, as well as the payment of an equivalent of approximately 120,000 euros (EUR) in damages. He received no reply. 19.  On 4 August 2003 D. lodged a libel action against E. with the Poprad District Court (Okresný súd). He relied on Articles 11 et seq. of the Civil Code (Law no. 40/1964 Coll., as amended) and Article 8 of the Convention, asserted protection of his personal integrity, and claimed damages in the amount mentioned above. 20.  The action was later amended so as eventually to advance the line of argument that the article contained untrue, incomplete and misleading statements, in particular as regards (i) the alleged representation by D. of the interests of another entity; (ii) the implied suggestion that A. had been dragged to the meeting against his will by D.; (iii) the allegation that D. had made a telephone call giving information about A.’s movements; (iv) the business background of the meeting; and (v) the general tenor of the article, which implied that D. might have had something to do with A.’s disappearance. 21.  On 27 July 2004 the District Court admitted the applicant to the proceedings as the second defendant of the action, following an application by D. to that effect at a hearing held the previous day. 22.  Further hearings were held on 18 February and 8 April 2005 and 19 April, 30 May, and 15 December 2006.\nAt these hearings, the parties, their representatives and a number of witnesses were heard, including C., who acknowledged knowing and having spoken to the applicant before the publication of the article and having provided him with information concerning the investigation of the disappearance of A. However, C. could not recall the information he had provided to the applicant in any detail. 23.  The examination of further witness evidence was principally aimed at assessing the repercussions of the article on D.’s reputation and business, the circumstances of the fateful meeting, and its corporate and transactional background. 24.  The District Court also obtained information from the police concerning the status of the criminal investigation of A.’s disappearance and the existence of any elements in the investigation case file originating from the alleged interception of calls. According to the police report, no such elements were or had been present in the investigation file. However, the investigation had only been opened in 2000 (see paragraph 9 above), and prior to its commencement there had been no criminal investigation stricto sensu, but only an official search for A. (see paragraph 7 above). 25.  Following the last-mentioned hearing, on 15 December 2006 the District Court allowed the action in so far as D. was claiming the equivalent of approximately EUR 28,500 in damages and a further EUR 14,650 in costs and expenses, payable by E. and the applicant jointly and severally. The remainder of the claim was dismissed. 26.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the article concerned matters of what was known as large-scale privatisation, that is to say the process of transferring State ownership of industrial enterprises into private hands. This process was undoubtedly of public interest, and the media had the duty to report on matters concerning it. Furthermore, the article only went as far as indicating that the editorial office of Národná obroda had had in its possession a written statement by C., which was true. By no means had the article suggested that the contents of this statement were endorsed by E. or the applicant, and neither were they presented as a matter of fact. 27.  The appeal was subject to a court fee amounting to the equivalent of some EUR 1,950, the applicant’s request for an exemption from which was dismissed. 28.  On 20 February 2008 the Prešov Regional Court (Krajský súd) determined the appeals by quashing the contested judgment and discontinuing the proceedings in so far as they concerned E., because in the course of the proceedings E. had been dissolved and struck out of the Companies’ Register without a legal successor.\nAt the same time, the Regional Court reduced the amount of damages payable by the applicant to the equivalent of some EUR 3,000, along with costs amounting to the equivalent of some EUR 10,150. 29.  The reasoning of the District Court, as complemented by that of the Regional Court, may be summarised as follows:\nThere had been an interference with D.’s personal integrity, stemming in particular from the suggestion that he had made a telephone call concerning A.’s movements. The claimant’s complaint about the other factual allegations in the article, such as that he had been representing someone else’s interests and had dragged A. along to the meeting, was ill-founded.\nAs regards the crucial allegation concerning the alleged phone call, the courts noted that this was based on the information provided to the applicant by C., which however had been unofficial and unconfirmed. In that respect, with reference to the position taken by the police, the courts concluded that the truthfulness of this allegation had not been established.\nIt was the role of the media to provide objective and balanced news, and the applicant’s defence, which relied on the fact that he had obtained the impugned information from C. and the statement that he had no duty to verify it, could not be accepted.\nIn that respect, as a matter of principle, the author and the publisher of an article were responsible for providing truthful content for their published information. This responsibility was to be construed as an objective one, and it was not discharged by quoting the information and referring to its source. Moreover, issues such as intent and negligence were irrelevant.\nThe applicant, who had not ascertained the truthfulness or otherwise of the contested information, was liable for its being untrue, and the fact that he had quoted it and referred to its source was of no consequence.\nThe unlawful interference with his personal integrity had caused considerable damage to D.’s good name and reputation. But the fact that the applicant had cited his source and that, despite the article, D. continued with a private and social life as well as his successful career, militated in favour of reducing the amount of damages as determined by the Court of Appeal. 30.  The matter became resolved by force of a final and binding judgment on 14 April 2008. 31.  On 18 June 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended), alleging a violation of his rights under Article 10 of the Convention.\nThe applicant argued that the information in the article concerning the alleged call by D. was a statement of fact, made in quotation marks and with a general reference to its source. It was, as such, truthful, because the editorial office of Národná obroda did in fact have at its disposal the information quoted. Moreover, in view of the official function of C., the applicant should not have had any legitimate doubt that that information was true. 32.  On 3 June 2008 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) declared the complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. It held that a general court could not bear “secondary liability” for a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of a substantive nature unless there had been a violation of procedural rules. As no violation of any procedural rule had been alleged, there could not have been a violation of the cited substantive provision either.\nThe decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer on 15 August 2008.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5. Mr Leonid Ivanovych Andrusenko was born in 1953 and currently resides in the village of Konstiantynivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine. Mr Valeriy Volodymyrovych Bondarenko was born in 1956 and currently resides in the town of Krasnogorivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine. Mr Ivan Petrovych Mysnianko was born in 1961 and currently resides in the town of Vugledar, Donetsk region, Ukraine. Mr Oleksandr Mykolayovych Goryachykh was born in 1958 and currently resides in the town of Vugledar, Donetsk region, Ukraine. Mr Volodymyr Grygorovych Leontyev was born in 1940 and currently resides in the town of Vugledar, Donetsk region, Ukraine. Mr Ivan Yegorovich Migunov was born in 1956 and currently resides in the town of Vugledar, Donetsk region, Ukraine. 6.  In 1997 Mr Andrusenko was dismissed from the “Pivdennodonbasska” State-owned mine No.3 (the “PDM No.3”). In February 1998 he instituted proceedings in the Vugledar Town Court claiming to reinstate him in his position. On 10 September 1998 the court rejected his claims. On 19 October 1998 the Donetsk Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. On 28 December 1998 the Vugledar Town Court reinstated Mr Andrusenko in his position and ordered the PDM No.3 to pay him compensation in salary arrears. On 22 February 1999 the Donetsk Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The case was remitted to Petrovsky District Court of Donetsk for examination on the merits, on the basis of Mr Andrusenko’s request to change the jurisdiction. On 12 July 2000 the Petrovsky District Court found in part for Mr Andrusenko. On 28 September 2000 the Donetsk Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. Mr Andrusenko lodged a petition with the Donetsk Regional Court seeking consideration of the merits of his claims, without remitting the case for fresh consideration. On 5 December 2000 the Donetsk Regional Court found in part for Mr Andrusenko and awarded him UAH 17,699.68[1] against the PDM No.3 in salary arrears and other payments. On 28 February 2001 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld this judgment. By a letter of 15 December 2004 Mr Andrusenko informed the Court that the judgment in his favour was enforced in June 2004. 7.  On 13 November 2001 the Maryinsky District Court ordered the PDN No.3 to provide Mr Andrusenko with 24 tonnes of coal. It also ordered the PDN No.3 to pay Mr Andrusenko UAH 607.72[2] in compensation. By a letter of 15 December 2004 Mr Andrusenko informed the Court that the pecuniary part of the judgment was enforced by January 2003. However, 24 tonnes of coal awarded in the judgment of 13 November 2001 have been never provided to him. 8.  On 18 January 2002 the Maryinsky District Court ordered the PDN No.3 to pay Mr Andrusenko UAH 244.39[3] in compensation for salary arrears and moral damage. By another judgment delivered on the same date Mr Andrusenko also received UAH 56[4] in salary arrears. By a letter of 15 December 2004 Mr Andrusenko informed the Court that the judgments were enforced by January 2003. 9.  On 29 October 1999 and 15 November 2000 the Maryinsky District Court of the Donetsk Region awarded Mr Bondarenko UAH 8,542.85[5] and UAH 3,785.74[6], respectively, against his employer, the State-owned Krasnogorivsky Vognetryvnyj Zavod factory (the “KVZ”), in salary arrears. On 8 June 2000 the Commercial Court of the Donetsk Region initiated a reorganisation procedure (процедура санації) for the KVZ factory and the enforcement of the judgments was suspended. On 29 May 2003 Mr Bondarenko withdrew the writs of enforcement and the enforcement proceedings were closed. The judgments in his favour remain unenforced. 10.  On 17 and 22 December 1998, and on 10 April 2001 the Vugledar Town Court awarded Mr Musnianko UAH 27,457[7], UAH 1,605[8] and UAH 20,974.69[9], respectively, against his employer, PDM No.3, in compensation for a work-related illness and in salary arrears. By a letter of 20 December 2004 Mr Musnianko informed the Court that the judgments in his favour were enforced by instalments, the final amounts being paid in August and December 2002, and in May 2004, respectively. 11.  On 29 September 2000 the Vugledar Town Court awarded Mr Goryachykh a lump sum of UAH 29,352.24[10] and monthly payments of UAH 420.94[11] until 13 September 2001 against his former employer, the PDM No.3, in compensation for an industrial injury. By a letter of 20 December 2004 Mr Goryachykh informed the Court that the judgment in his favour was enforced in May 2004. 12.  On 2 November 1998 the Vugledar Town Court awarded Mr Leontyev UAH 38,620.60[12] against his former employer, the “Pivdennodonbasska” State-owned mine No.1 (“PDM No.1”), in compensation for an industrial injury. On 25 January 1999 the Vugledar Town Court awarded Mr Leontyev UAH 2,140[13] against the PDM No.1 in compensation for moral damage. On 30 August 1999 the Vugledar Town Court awarded him UAH 6,864.20[14] in compensation for an industrial injury. It also awarded Mr Leontyev UAH 1,575[15] as a single-payment retirement benefit. By a letter of 20 December 2004 Mr Leontyev informed the Court that the judgments in his favour were enforced by April-June 2001 and by January 2003, respectively. 13.  On 3 December 1998 the Vugledar Town Court awarded Mr Migunov UAH 33,625.42[16] against the PDM No.1 in compensation for an industrial injury. On 5 December 2000 the Vugledar Town Court awarded him UAH 2,269.80[17] against the PDM No.1 in additional compensation for the delay in payment. On 15 November 2002 the Vugledar Town Court awarded Mr Migunov UAH 25,706.26[18] against the PDM No.1 in compensation for the delayed payment of salary. By a letter of 25 December 2004 Mr Migunov informed the Court that the judgments in his favour were enforced by February - May 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  On 21 May 1999, he signed a contract for services with the National Association of Securities Dealers, a private enterprise (“the Association”). 6.  On 18 July 2000 he notified the Association of his intention to terminate the contract from 5 August 2000, invoking the Association's non‑compliance with its contractual obligations. 7.  On 13 November 2000, the applicant lodged with the Bucharest County Court an action against the Association seeking compensation for pecuniary damage caused by the latter's failure to fulfil its contractual obligations. 8.  Before the County Court, the Association asked to have the contract declared null and void on the ground that the procedure for the validation of the contract had not been carried out in conformity with its own statutes, this having as result the fact that the contract was not legally binding on it. The applicant contested this argument. 9.  In a judgment of 7 June 2001, the County Court found the contract to be valid and, based on an expert opinion, awarded the applicant 129,648 US dollars (USD) in compensation, USD 8,330 by way of penalties and 96,413,000 Romanian lei (ROL) for court fees.\nAccording to the applicable law, this judgment was enforceable. 10.  In a final decision of 5 November 2001, the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal lodged by the Association and confirmed the judgment. 11.  On 22 January 2002, the applicant, who had instituted proceedings for the enforcement of the judgment of 7 June 2001, received ROL 440,000,000 from the Association.\nThis sum is still in the applicant's possession although proceedings for its recovery have been started by the Association in 2005 and are still pending with the domestic courts. 12.  On 5 December 2001, the Procurator‑General, at the Association's request, lodged an application with the Supreme Court of Justice to have both the judgment of 7 June 2001 and the final decision of 5 November 2001 quashed (“recurs în anulare”) on the ground that the two courts which decided on the case had committed a serious breach of the law when examining the legality of the parties' contract. 13.  On 18 April 2002, the Supreme Court postponed the pronouncement of the final decision until 29 May 2002.\nThe decision was eventually adopted on 5 June 2002. The Supreme Court allowed the application, quashed the final decision of 5 November 2001 and sent the case back to the Bucharest Court of Appeal for a fresh examination on the merits, on the ground that the two courts had not examined whether the contract was valid and binding on both parties and whether the applicant's initial action could still be allowed in the light of the termination of the contract by the applicant on 5 August 2000. 14.  In an interlocutory judgment of 13 November 2002, the Court of Appeal asked the applicant to supplement the court fees by ROL 18,231,600 which he did on 10 December 2002. 15.  In a final decision of 12 March 2003, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the Association's appeal, quashed the judgment of 7 June 2001 and dismissed the applicant's action on the ground that while the contract was valid, the conditions for engaging the Association's responsibility for paying damages were not met. It also ordered the applicant to pay the Association ROL 32,109,680 in court fees.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in İzmir. 5.  On 8 July 1999 the İzmir Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant, charging him with a violation of the Associations Law. 6.  On 19 November 2003 the İzmir Criminal Court sentenced him to a fine. 7.  On 9 March 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 19 November 2003. 8.  On 28 November 2006 the İzmir Criminal Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against the applicant, holding that the prosecution was time-barred.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5. The applicants were born in 1965 and 1979 in Sri Lanka. Currently they live at the Jelling Asylum Centre. They are of Tamil ethnicity. 6.  On 14 September 2005, with valid passports and three month visas, the applicant spouses entered Denmark, where the applicant husband, TN's sister and brother lived permanently. His three other siblings lived elsewhere in Europe. 7.  On 13 December 2005 the applicants requested asylum. 8.  On 19 December 2005 they explained that they had never been arrested, politically active or involved in any conflict with the authorities. The applicants were married on 2 December 2004 and lived in Batticaloa on the east coast of Sri Lanka, where the applicant husband ran a fishing business and an electrical company, and had a good income. They lost their fishing boat and their house in the tsunami on 26 December 2004. Thereafter they lived with the applicant wife's parents. The applicants did not sympathise with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) but the latter had sometimes forced the applicants to support them financially. After the applicants had left Sri Lanka, their motorbike had been confiscated by the Karuna group, which had stated that “they were waiting for the applicants”. The Karuna group, later known as the Tamil People's Liberation Tigers, (TMVP), was led by Karuna, a previous commander in the LTTE. Initially it was a paramilitary group that helped the Government fight the LTTE and later, in 2007, it became a registered political party. 9.  On 22 December 2005 the applicant husband added that on 3 April 2005 he had been confronted by four unknown men, three of whom belonged to the Karuna group, who wanted information about his cousin, who was a member of the LTTE. Later in May 2005 two persons had tried to stop him on his motorcycle. On another day in May, he had been stopped on the street by two of the previously mentioned four persons, who again requested information about the cousin. This was the reason why the applicants had decided to go to Denmark. 10.  On 16 January 2006 the applicant husband added that his home was searched on average once a month in a general way, whereby the whole village was surrounded and the whole population was gathered by the military who wanted to find out whether there were any LTTE members in the village. Every now and then he was taken away by the military. In 1988 he had been detained by the Indian Army for one night and his feet and hands had been tied. He was released after his eldest brother paid bail for him. In 1998 he was detained by the Sri Lankan Army for two nights, suspected of being a member of the LTTE. They hit his jaw, leaving a scar. Following mediation by members of Parliament, he was released together with nine other detainees. The applicant was not detained or ill‑treated by the authorities up to his departure in 2005. In September 2005 two persons had tried to stop him and his wife on their motorbike in a forest area in order to kill them, but they had managed to escape. 11.  By decision of 19 April 2006 the Aliens Authorities (Udlændingestyrelsen, now Udlændingeservice) refused to grant the applicants asylum. 12.  On appeal, during a hearing before the Refugee Board (Flygtningenævnet) on 14 August 2006 the applicant husband stated that he had been approached by the LTTE and asked to pay them money for the first time around 1996. All fishermen were to pay money to the LTTE. The latter would come to his home at one to three month intervals. After he lost his fishing boat in 2004 they stopped asking him for money. On 3 April 2005 he had been confronted by three men from the Karuna group and a Singhalese who beat him and forced him to admit that he had paid money to the LTTE. They also asked about the whereabouts of his cousin, who was a member of the LTTE at the relevant time. The last time he had seen his cousin was at his aunt's home in 2001, but only briefly, and they did not really talk to each other. The applicant did not like the cousin due to his connection with the LTTE. The applicant did not know where the cousin lived at the relevant time and the four men let him go. Later, in May 2005, two persons from the Karuna group, one of whom had taken part in the incident on 3 April 2005, stopped him and asked about his cousin's whereabouts and then let him go. In September 2005, two days prior to his departure, two unknown men had tried to stop him and his wife on their motorcycle, but they had managed to escape. 13.  By decision of 14 August 2006 the Refugee Board confirmed the Aliens Authorities' decision of 19 April 2006 that the applicants failed to fulfil the criteria under section 7 of the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven). It noted that the applicants' asylum motive was based mainly on fear of the Karuna group, which demanded the male applicant's cooperation to obtain information about his cousin. It did not rule out that it was possible, as stated by the applicants, that the Sri Lankan authorities cooperated with the Karuna group but it found that approaches from people related to the Karuna group in Batticaloa had to be considered geographically restricted and emphasized that in the present case the male applicant had a low profile and had been able to depart legally from Colombo in September 2005. 14.  An anonymised summary of the applicants' case, together with thirty other cases involving Sri Lankan nationals, was published on the Refugee Appeal Board's Website. 15.  By letter of 20 September 2006 the applicants' representative requested a re-opening of the case. 16.  On 30 October 2006, in the light of a recommendation of 27 October 2006 from the UNHCR to the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs about the situation in Sri Lanka, the Refugee Appeals Board decided to suspend all cases concerning ethnic Tamils from Sri Lanka. 17.  On 14 March 2007, and anew on 14 August 2007, finding that no essential new information or aspects had been submitted, the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicant's case. 18.  On 27 August 2007, the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs refused the applicants' application for a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. 19.  On 26 September 2007 the Refugee Appeals Board received a letter by a named person, who stated that the applicant husband was suspected by the security forces and the Karuna group of having cooperated with the LTTE. The Refugee Appeals Board understood the letter as a request for a reopening of the case. The applicant husband submitted a letter of 10 October 2007 repeating his previous statements, and adding that he had been forced to try to find the cousin who was a member of the LTTE. 20.  On 29 October 2007, the Refugee Appeals Board refused once more to reopen the applicants' case. 21.  On 31 October 2007 the UNHCR requested the Refugee Appeals Board to stay forced returns of ethnic Tamils from Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka with reference to a letter dated 23 October 2007 from the European Court of Human Rights to the British Government. On the same day the Refugee Appeals Board extended the time-limit for the applicants' departure. 22.  On 6 November 2007 the Refugee Appeals Board replied to the UNHCR's request in general terms, refusing to introduce a general stay of forced returns of ethnic Tamils from Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka with reference to the general situation for this group. 23.  On 2 July 2008 the latter decided to resume the forced deportation of the applicants. 24.   The UNHCR repeated its request on 16 July 2008, to which the Refugee Appeals Board replied on 4 August 2008, again refusing to extend the applicants' departure date. 25.  In the meantime, two daughters were born to the applicants on 28 September 2006 and 9 March 2008.\nSubsequent events before the Court and domestic proceedings 26.  On Friday 1 August 2008 the Danish Refugee Council (Dansk Flygtningehjælp), an NGO, requested that the Refugee Appeals Board reopen the case. It stated, inter alia, that the applicants had provided new information in the case at an interview held with the said NGO. The applicants had stated that, several times since their departure, persons from the Karuna group and Sri Lankan soldiers had contacted the applicant wife's parents, questioned them about the applicants and had their home searched. The parents had therefore gone into hiding. Due to recent developments the Karuna group had been able to operate in the Batticaloa area. The applicant husband had been imprisoned in 1988/1989 and again in 1998 on suspicion of affiliation with the LTTE. Both times he was subjected to ill-treatment, leaving scars on his body and face. Moreover, and differently from claims in previous statements, the applicant had carried out jobs for the LTTE, such as purchasing batteries, petrol, food and other goods in the Government controlled areas and bringing the products to the LTTE. In fact in 1998, the applicant husband had been released from prison at the request of the LTTE so that he could continue to work for them. He had avoided mentioning his work for the LTTE for fear of being expelled from Denmark. 27.  On the same day, on the applicants' behalf, the Danish Refugee Council submitted a letter to the Court of Human Rights requesting that it stay the applicants' deportation. 28.  On 4 August 2008, the Court of Human Rights decided to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that it was in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings that the applicant should not be expelled to Sri Lanka pending the Court's decision. 29.  Consequently, on 7 August 2008 the Refugee Appeals Board extended the time-limit for the applicants' departure until further notice. 30.  On 17 December 2008 the Refugee Appeals Board again refused to reopen the applicants' asylum case finding that no essential new information or aspects had been submitted. As regard the new and extended information, for example about having scars on his body as opposed to his previous explanation about having “only” a scar on his jaw as a result of his detention in 1998, and about his alleged work for the LTTE, the Refugee Appeals Board noted that in view of the numerous times he had been requested to provide all relevant information, and the fact that he had on his own initiative requested a reopening of the case several times with reference to new information, he had not provided a reasonable explanation as to why he had not furnished this information before. The Refugee Appeals Board therefore rejected the new information as fabricated for the occasion. 31.  On 16 December 2009, on the basis of the most recent background information concerning Sri Lanka including, inter alia, a Memorandum of 26 October 2009 prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Refugee Appeals Board decided to review the suspended cases, including the applicant's case. 32.  On 16 March 2010 the Refugee Appeals Board refused to reopen the applicants' case as it found that the most recent general background information would not lead to a revised assessment of the case. More specifically in its letter to the applicant's representative it stated as follows:\n“... The Refugee Appeals Board still finds that, if returned to Sri Lanka, your clients will not risk persecution or outrages as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act by the Sri Lankan authorities, including in connection with arrival at Colombo Airport. In this connection, the Refugee Appeals Board emphasises that your male client stated during the asylum proceedings that he has not been politically active or otherwise been involved in conflicts with the Sri Lankan authorities or the LTTE. The Board thus emphasises that your male client appears not to stand out in any way at all as he has exclusively been the subject of money demands from the LTTE like other fishermen in Batticaloa. In that connection, the Board refers to the fact that your clients left Sri Lanka lawfully using their own Sri Lankan national passports. The Refugee Appeals Board also refers to the fact that it appears from the background material available to the Board that, in general, individuals who have previously supported the LTTE on a lower level are not of interest to the authorities. Thus, generally, only high-profile members of the LTTE who are still active and wanted, or individuals wanted for serious criminal offences are of interest to the authorities, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009, and Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23‑ 29 August 2009. Also against that background, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that your clients will not be at a real risk of persecution or outrages as covered by section 7 of the Aliens Act on the part of the Karuna Group or the TMVP, which are in the factual control of Batticaloa according to United Kingdom: Home Office, Operational Guidance Note, Sri Lanka, August 2009. In that connection, the Refugee Appeals Board observes that your clients' incidents with the group took place in 2005. Likewise, on the background of the above, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that the fact that your male client's cousin has been a member of the LTTE for fifteen years cannot warrant a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act according to the background material now available. It should be noted that your male client stated at the Board hearing on 14 August 2006 about his cousin, V, that he last saw V in 2001 at his mother's sister's house and did not otherwise have any contact with him. The fact that as ethnic Tamils from eastern Sri Lanka your clients may risk being questioned and investigated by the authorities upon entry into the country does not lead to a revised assessment of the case under asylum law. In this assessment, consideration has been given to the background information available to the Board, from which it appears that the individuals at particular risk of being detained and investigated upon entry in Colombo are young Tamils, men in particular, from northern and eastern Sri Lanka: those without ID; those not resident or employed in Colombo; and those recently returned from the West, see United Kingdom: Home Office, Report of Information Gathering Visit to Colombo, Sri Lanka 23 - 29 August 2009. In that connection, the Board refers to the fact that your clients appear not to stand out at all. Against that background, the Refugee Appeals Board finds that it has not been rendered probable that the Sri Lankan authorities would take a special interest in your clients upon return. This also applies regardless of the fact that your male client may have scars on his face or on his body. In that respect, please see the Danish Government's further observations of 20 May 2009 to your pleading of 6 April 2009 in the complaint T.N. and S.N. v. Denmark before the European Court of Human Rights. As in its decision of 14 August 2006, the Refugee Appeals Board still finds that the general situation for ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka is not of such nature that it in itself warrants a residence permit under section 7 of the Aliens Act. The Board observes in that connection that it is a condition for a residence permit under section 7 that, upon a specific and individual assessment, the alien is deemed at risk of persecution or outrages. The authority of the Refugee Appeals Board is restricted to determining asylum-relevant issues, and it is thus outside the Board's authority to determine whether an alien who does not meet the conditions of Article 7 of the Aliens Act may be issued with a residence permit for other reasons of a more humanitarian nature. Against that background and in accordance with its decision of 14 August 2006, the Board still finds that it has not been rendered probable that, in case of return to Sri Lanka, your clients would be at a concrete and individual risk of persecution as covered by section 7(1) of the Aliens Act, or that your clients would be at a real risk of outrages as covered by section 7(2) of the Aliens Act. It should be noted that your clients' time-limit for departure is still suspended until further notice on the basis of the request of 4 August 2008 from the European Court of Human Rights. If your clients' basis of lawful residence in Denmark lapses, your clients must leave Denmark immediately, see section 33 of the Aliens Act. As appears from the decision of the Refugee Appeals Board of 14 August 2006, your clients may be forcibly returned to Sri Lanka if they do not leave voluntarily, see section 32a, cf. section 31, of the Aliens Act. The decision also comprises your clients' two children.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Karlovac. 5.  The applicant and her husband were holders of a specially protected tenancy on a flat in Karlovac. In 1991 a bomb was thrown into the flat and the family moved out of the flat for security reasons. By a decision of the Karlovac Housing Committee of 29 November 1991 they were given another flat in Karlovac for temporary occupation. The applicant’s husband moved out of the flat in 1992 and they subsequently divorced. The applicant and two children born of the marriage continued to occupy the flat. The above-said decision was annulled by the same Commission on 11 November 2000. 6.  In 2000 the Karlovac Municipality, as the owner of the flat, brought a civil action in the Karlovac Municipal Court against the applicant, seeking her eviction. The claim was granted on 1 February 2008 on the ground that the flat at issue had been given for temporary occupation to the applicant’s husband who had left the flat and that that decision had been annulled in 2000 and that therefore she no longer had a legal basis for occupying the flat. 7.  This judgment was upheld by the Karlovac County Court on 19 August 2009. 8.  In her subsequent constitutional complaint the applicant argued that she had been a holder of a specially protected tenancy on a flat in Karlovac, owned by the Karlovac Municipality and had to leave that flat owing to the circumstances not attributable to her. She had moved into the other flat, on the basis of a decision issued by the Karlovac Housing Committee. That other flat was also owned by the Karlovac Municipality and it had been agreed between the owner and the applicant that she would be granted a specially protected tenancy on that other flat. She also argued that the case concerned an existential issue for her; that she had been living in the flat for more than twenty years; that she had addressed the Karlovac Municipality on numerous occasions and had been told “not to worry and that everything would be alright”; that she had fulfilled her obligations as a tenant. The complaint was dismissed on 29 March 2012.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Legnica, Poland. 6.  On 29 November 1999 the applicant lodged a claim for rectification of an entry in a local land register with the Legnica Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). She sought to be considered as the sole owner of the real estate that she had inherited from her late father and which had been erroneously recorded as the joint property of the applicant and her husband. On an unknown date she made an application for an exemption from court fees required from her to take the proceedings (PLN 7,500). On 15 December 1999 the Regional Court dismissed her application. 7.  The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against that decision. 8.  On 30 December 1999 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed her appeal. As she had failed to pay the court fees her claim was returned to her on an unknown later date. 9.  The applicant subsequently lodged a second claim for rectification of the entry in the local land register. On 10 February 2000 the Legnica Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay, within seven days, a court fee of PLN 9,750. 10.  On 15 February 2000 the applicant made an application to be exempted from court fees. The applicant maintained that she received a monthly disability pension of PLN 1,075. In addition, she had some extra income as she was a self‑employed lawyer. However, she had a loan to pay off and a household to support since she was divorced. She further claimed that her income only allowed her to support herself and her daughter and that she had not been able to put money aside for court fees. 11.  On 13 March 2000 the Legnica Regional Court dismissed her application. The court held that the applicant's financial situation was sound since she received a monthly disability pension of PLN 1,075. In addition, the income from her law firm in November amounted to PLN 19,563. The court further held that the applicant could not be considered indigent since she was a practising lawyer. Lastly, the applicant should have set aside money for the litigation. 12.  On 24 March 2000 the applicant filed an interlocutory appeal against this decision. The applicant submitted that the PLN 19,563 mentioned in her tax return constituted her gross income for the period of eleven months. She further claimed that having to pay the full amount of court fees would entail a substantial reduction in her standard of living. Lastly, she argued that Article 113 of the Civil Procedure Code provided a possibility for an exemption from court fees for a person who could demonstrate that payment of such fees would entail a substantial reduction in his or her standard of living. This exemption was not only applicable to the less well-off. 13.  On 26 May 2000 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court held that while the applicant's gross income from her law firm in November amounted to PLN 19,563 her net income in that month had been PLN 2,664. Considering the fact that she also received a monthly disability pension, she could have put aside money for the payment of court fees. 14.  On 26 May 2000 the court ordered the applicant to pay court fees of PLN 9,750, failing which her claim would be rejected. The applicant again asked to be exempted from court fees, repeating her earlier arguments. 15.  On 31 August 2000 the Legnica Regional Court dismissed her application. The court held that the applicant received a monthly disability pension of PLN 1,320 and also at least PLN 1,000 net income from her law firm. Further, in view of the applicant's profession she could not be considered indigent. In addition, the applicant should have set aside the money for the litigation. Lastly, the court stressed that:\n“[the amount of] lawyers' incomes are widely known”.\nThe applicant appealed against this decision. 16.  On 19 December 2000 the Legnica Regional Court returned the statement of claim to the applicant as she had failed to pay the required court fees. According to the applicant, the decision was served on her on 22 December 2000. 17.  On 21 April 2004 the applicant for the third time lodged a statement of claim with the Legnica Regional Court for the rectification of the entry in the local land register. On 12 May 2004 the court ordered her to pay PLN 5,490 [approx. EUR 1,370] in court fees failing which her statement of claim would be returned to her. The applicant did not ask to be exempted from the fees. On 21 May 2004 she paid the fees. 18.  On 24 September 2004 the court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant's claim. On 28 October 2004 the applicant appealed. On an unspecified date the court ordered her to pay PLN 5,490 in court fees on pain of her appeal being rejected. The applicant again failed to ask for an exemption from the court fee. On 16 November 2004 the applicant paid the requested fee. On 12 January 2005 the Legnica Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant's claim. The judgment is final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Moscow. 5.  On 22 November 1994 the applicant and her husband bought a flat. In addition, they agreed to lend a certain sum to the seller.  After the applicant had paid for the flat, the seller refused to transfer the title and move out. The applicant and her husband sued her for eviction. The seller counterclaimed and requested a court to annul the contract and to order restitutio in integrum. 6.  On 4 June 1997 the Moscow City Court, in the final instance, found for the seller. 7.  In June 1999 the applicant sued the seller for return of the purchase price, repayment of the loan and interest on the amounts outstanding. 8.  On 5 March 2001 the Timiryazevskiy District Court partly accepted the action. 9.  The applicant's representative, Mr Martyanov, appealed to the Moscow City Court. He complained that the judgment was unfair and that the District Court had not given the applicant's arguments due consideration. 10.  The Moscow City Court listed an appeal hearing for 2 August 2001 and sent summonses to the applicant and her representative by post. The representative received the summons on 23 July 2001. The summons was not delivered to the applicant. 11.  The appeal hearing of 2 August 2001 was adjourned until 20 August 2001 because the parties defaulted. According to the Government, summonses for the hearing listed for 20 August 2001 were mailed to the parties on 13 August 2001. According to the postmark on the envelope, the summons were dispatched on 17 August 2001 and received at the applicant's local post office on 11 September 2001. 12.  On 20 August 2001 the Moscow City Court adjourned the hearing until 4 September 2001 because the parties did not attend. According to the Government, the Moscow City Court sent summonses to the parties by post on 21 August 2001. 13.  On 4 September 2001 the Moscow City Court examined the appeal and rejected it. Neither party was present. 14.  On 4 October 2001 the applicant received a summons for the hearing that had taken place on 4 September 2001. According to the postmark on the envelope, the summons was dispatched on 24 August 2001 and received at the applicant's local post office on 4 October 2001. 15.  It appears that the judgment of 5 March 2001, as upheld on appeal on 4 September 2001, has remained unenforced because the seller left Moscow and her current place of residence is unknown.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Diyarbakır. 5.  On 22 September 1996 the applicant, who was sixteen years old at the time, was taken into custody by policemen from the Diyarbakır Security Directorate on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). In her police statements dated 6 and 8 October 1996 respectively, the applicant accepted the charges against her. During her interrogations, the applicant did not have the assistance of a lawyer. 6.  On 22 October 1996 the applicant was brought before the Diyarbakır public prosecutor and subsequently before the investigating judge. She was interrogated in the absence of a lawyer by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively and denied the allegations against her. Taking into account the seriousness of the allegations, the judge ordered that the applicant be placed in detention on remand. The applicant was then allowed to have access to a lawyer. 7.  By an indictment dated 3 December 1996, the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and nine other accused. He accused the applicant of being a member of the PKK and accordingly called for her to be sentenced pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 8.  The trial commenced before the Diyarbakır State Security Court. In the subsequent twenty hearings, the court refused to release the applicant on account of the nature of the alleged offence and the state of evidence. 9.  On 2 June 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court concluded that the applicant was a member of the PKK and accordingly sentenced her to eight years and four months’ imprisonment pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 10.  On 20 December 1999 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court. 11.  On 10 August 2001 the applicant was released pending trial. 12.  On 9 April 2002 the court rendered its judgment and sentenced the applicant to eight years and four months’ imprisonment pursuant to Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code. In convicting the applicant, the State Security Court had particular regard to the applicant’s police statements. 13.  On 7 October 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  All the applicants were employed by RTB Bor – grupa Industrija za preradu Majdanpek, a socially-owned company based in Majdanpek (hereinafter “the debtor”). 6. Since the debtor had failed to fulfil its obligations toward its employees, the applicants brought numerous separate civil suits, seeking payment of salary arrears and various social security contributions. 7.  The applicants obtained final court judgments ordering the debtor to pay them certain sums. The essential information as to the domestic proceedings in respect of each application is indicated in the appended table. 8.  Following a period during which the enforcement proceedings had been suspended, between June and August 2011 the final court judgments in question were all fully enforced in respect of the applicants. 9.  Since October 2011, the debtor is a company predominantly comprised of State or socially owned capital and is still in the process of being restructured.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Diyarbakır. 6.  In 1994 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant before the Diyarbakır State Security Court (“the trial court”) for the offence of membership of an illegal organisation[1]. On 15 April 1999 he was acquitted of the charges. When acquitting him, the trial court considered that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the applicant was a member of the illegal organisation. It found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to show that he had aided and abetted the organisation. Nevertheless, considering that the applicant had been coerced to aid and abet the organisation by its members, the trial court concluded that the applicant did not have the requisite mens rea and acquitted him. 7.  Before the appeal lodged by the prosecutor against the applicant's acquittal was examined by the Court of Cassation, the statute of limitations for the offence in question had been reached. Accordingly, on 1 February 2000 the Court of Cassation discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 8.  On 2 June 2000 the applicant was arrested once more and was examined by a doctor before he was placed in police custody in Diyarbakır. According to the report of the medical examination, there were no injuries on the applicant's body. 9.  According to the applicant, during his time in police custody he was subjected to ill-treatment. 10.  On 5 June 2000 police officers took the applicant to a café and two shops in the nearby town of Ergani, which had been bombed in 1993. According to the statements drawn up pertaining to those visits, the applicant told the police officers that he had carried out the bombings with the assistance of a number of other persons. 11.  In a statement taken from the applicant in police custody the same day, the applicant was reported as having detailed his activities within the PKK. 12.  On 6 June 2000 the applicant was released from police custody and was brought before a prosecutor and then before a judge, who questioned him further. The applicant denied the statements taken from him by police officers the previous day, and added that he had not been involved in any bombing. The applicant told the judge that he had signed the statements in police custody because he had thought that he would be ill-treated by the police officers if he refused to sign them. He added that in 1993 he had collected money by making threats on behalf of the PKK, taken part in demonstrations and distributed leaflets in support of that organisation, but that he had already been tried and spent time in prison for those activities (see paragraphs 6-7 above). The judge remanded the applicant in custody pending the introduction of criminal proceedings against him. The same day the applicant was examined by a doctor, who reported that there were no injuries on the applicant's body. 13.  When questioned by the police officers and subsequently by the prosecutor and the judge, the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. 14.  On 1 August 2000 the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, accusing the applicant of activities carried out for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 15.  In the proceedings before the trial court the applicant was represented by a lawyer. During the trial the applicant repeatedly denied his police custody statements and told the trial court that the statements had been taken from him under “intense pressure”. 16.  On 6 November 2001 the trial court found the applicant guilty of offences of membership of an illegal organisation and planting explosives. He was sentenced to seventeen years, four months and ten days' imprisonment. In convicting the applicant the trial court relied on the statements taken from him in police custody (see paragraph 11 above). In response to the applicant's lawyer's submissions that the applicant was being tried twice for the same offence, the trial court stated in its judgment that the previous trial had not concerned the bombing incidents. 17.  On 13 November 2001 the applicant appealed against his conviction and argued, inter alia, that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and that he had been forced to sign a number of documents. 18.  In his written observations submitted to the Court of Cassation the prosecutor referred to the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment and drew the Court of Cassation's attention to the trial court's failure to take into account a video recording which had apparently been made at the time when the police officers took the applicant to the café. The prosecutor's observations were not communicated to the applicant. 19.  As requested by the applicant, the Court of Cassation held a hearing before it rendered its decision on the appeal. Nevertheless, neither the applicant nor his lawyer attended the hearing. On 20 June 2002 the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal and upheld the applicant's conviction. The decision was deposited with the registry of the trial court on 16 December 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1969, and the third and fourth applicants in 1986 and 1999 respectively. They live in Geneva. 6.  The first and second applicants married on 25 December 1988 in Ecuador and brought up the third and fourth applicants together. The third applicant is the second applicant’s daughter and the first applicant’s stepdaughter; the fourth applicant is the first and second applicants’ daughter. 7.  Between 1995 and 1999 the applicants sought asylum in Switzerland on three occasions. Each time their applications were rejected they returned to Ecuador. 8.   On 1 January 2002 the applicants, having re-entered Swiss territory, filed a fresh request for asylum. The first and second applicants claimed that they had been tortured and had received death threats from the Ecuadorian police after the first applicant had attended two political demonstrations in Quito. 9.  On 4 February 2002 the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees (“the Refugee Office”) rejected the applicants’ request. 10.  On 1 March 2005 the first applicant was convicted of selling stolen goods and was given a three-month suspended prison sentence and fined 2,000 francs (CHF). On 15 October 2007 he was convicted of driving without a valid licence and sentenced to 80 hours of community service. On 9 April 2008 he was convicted of attempting to steal perfumes in a shopping centre and was sentenced to 120 hours of community service. On 14 April 2009 he was convicted of buying stolen goods and given a nine‑month suspended sentence and fined 1,000 CHF. The suspension of his previous sentence having been revoked, he served this sentence as from December 2009. 11.  On 24 October 2007 the Federal Administrative Court quashed the decision of 4 February 2002 and ordered the Refugee Office to review the applicants’ request. It considered that the information contained in medical records regarding the first applicant’s state of mental health drawn up in Ecuador in 2001 might be a reason to grant refugee status to the applicants. According to medical certificates, the first applicant suffered from post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and schizoaffective disorder. He had been hospi­talised on several occasions after attempting to commit suicide. 12.  In May 2009 the first and the second applicants separated. Their young daughter, the fourth applicant, stayed with the second applicant, who obtained full parental authority, while the first applicant was granted extended access, including the right to see her every Wednesday, every second weekend and for half of the school holidays. 13.  On 27 October 2009 the Refugee Office granted the third applicant a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. She then withdrew her asylum request and applied for Swiss citizenship, which was granted on 17 September 2012. 14.  On 20 March 2012 the Refugee Office, following a fresh examination of the facts, rejected the remaining applicants’ request for asylum. On 17 April 2012 they lodged an administrative appeal, arguing, inter alia, that they continued to have a close family relationship even after the first two applicants had separated. 15.  On 7 September 2012 the Federal Administrative Court partially reversed the Refugee Office’s decision. The court specified, at the outset, that the decisions given by the Refugee Office could be contested before the Federal Administrative Court, whose decision was final. 16.  The court also observed that the first and second applicants had separated and ceased living together, and that the fourth applicant usually lived with her mother. Accordingly, the family unit had ceased to exist and the principles established under Article 8 of the Convention no longer applied. As a consequence, each applicant’s residence rights had to be examined separately. The court considered that this approach was even more justified in view of the first applicant’s behaviour and his criminal record. 17.  The court further observed that the fourth applicant was then thirteen years old and had from the age of two grown up in Switzerland, where she had attended school and was completely integrated. It appeared that she did not have any practical knowledge of her country of origin, having never returned after her arrival in Switzerland, and that she hardly spoke Spanish, Ecuador’s main language. Under these circumstances, the court considered that sending her back would amount to an uprooting of excessive rigidity (un déracinement d’une rigueur excessive) and granted her and her mother temporary residence (admission provisoire) in Switzerland for a further year, renewable on a yearly basis thereafter. 18.  Regarding the first applicant, the Federal Administrative Court considered his expulsion to be lawful. The court observed, at the outset, that he had not established that he would be at any risk on his return to Ecuador. The court further considered that his state of health gave reason for concern, since he suffered from PTSD and had made several suicide attempts. However, the court observed that Ecuador had a health system which, even if it could not be compared to the Swiss system, was nevertheless reliable. The court considered that the applicant would have access to specialist care in the main urban centres of the country. 19.  The court further noted that the first applicant’s attending doctors considered that his return to Ecuador was in itself likely to jeopardise his health, irrespective of the medical treatment he received. Furthermore, he would be confronted with serious social problems. However, the Federal Administrative Court considered that, under the pertinent legislation, the applicant’s criminal record excluded him from being granted temporary residence. The court noted in this context that the applicant had, over a longer period of time, acquired a total of 1465 stolen goods (primarily gold jewellery) deriving from various burglaries.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 5.  The applicant receives disability allowance following health damage in his previous work in the mining industry. 6.  On 8 September 1999 the applicant seized the Vorkuta Town Court of the Komi Republic (“the Town Court”) with a claim against the local branch of the Social Security Fund of Russia alleging incorrect calculation of his disability allowance and seeking the unpaid damages. On the same day the Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 8 September 2000. 7.  The hearing scheduled for 8 September 2000 did not take place following the respondent’s representative’s default in appearance. The court adjourned the next hearing of 20 October 2000 after granting the respondent’s motion for obtainment of certain archive documents. 8.  On 19 July 2001 the applicant’s representative motioned for adjournment of examination of the case to 16 September 2001 due to her vacation. 9.  At the hearing of 18 September 2001 the applicant’s representative specified the claims and requested that the court join the Ministry of Energy of Russia to the proceedings as a co-respondent. The request was granted by the court, and the hearing was adjourned. 10.  The hearing scheduled for 5 November 2001 did not take place due to the judge’s illness. 11.  By letter of 28 December 2001 the applicant requested that the case be examined in his absence, with participation of his representative. 12.  On 21 February 2002 the applicant’s representative renounced the claims against the Ministry of Energy. 13.  The hearing scheduled for 22 February 2002 did not take place as the parties did not show. The applicant’s representative requested that the court examine the case in her absence as she was involved in different proceedings. 14.  On 11 April 2002 the applicant again motioned for examination of the claims in his absence. 15.  The court postponed the hearing of 16 April 2002 at its own initiative to obtain the applicant’s trade union membership records. 16.  On 11 May 2002 the applicant’s representative specified the claims in writing. At this date the hearing did not take place due to the respondent’s default in appearance. 17.  On 15 May 2002 both the respondent and the applicant’s representative motioned for examination of the case in their absence. The applicant’s claims were once again specified, and the claims against the Ministry of Energy were resumed. 18.  On 16 May 2002 the court ordered an expert examination and adjourned the proceedings. 19.  On 29 October 2002 the expert examination was completed. The next hearing was scheduled for 24 December 2002. 20.  On 23 and 24 December 2002, respectively, the applicant’s representative and the respondent motioned for examination of the claims in their absence. The former once again specified the claims. 21.  On 8 January 2003 the Town Court gave a judgment awarding the applicant 621,999 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages and legal expenses, and RUB 34,350 as monthly payments with further indexation in accordance with the minimum wage. Both parties appealed. 22.  On 31 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic acting as the appeal court remitted the case to the first instance for clarification of the judgment in the calculation part. On 22 May 2003 the trial court clarified the judgment as ordered. 23.  The appeal hearing of 30 June 2003 was adjourned to obtain the documents referred to in the judgment, which were not included in the case-file. 24.  On 17 July 2003 the appeal court again remitted the case to the first instance for correction of an arithmetical error made in the judgment. The error was corrected on 1 September 2003. 25.  On 4 December 2003 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 8 January 2003 on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Vinnytsya. 5.  On 12 January 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of several counts of aggravated murder and robbery. In the course of his arrest force was used against the applicant. 6.  Subsequently, the applicant was taken to a police station, where he was allegedly tortured by unspecified police officers with the aim of extracting a confession of his having committed the crimes of which he was suspected. According to the applicant, during such ill-treatment, which continued for several days thereafter, he received an eye injury which eventually resulted in him suffering a complete loss of eyesight. 7.  Later on the same day he was taken to a temporary detention centre (ізолятор тимчасового тримання – “the ITT”) in Kharkiv. 8.  The next day the applicant was taken to the Kharkiv Emergency Hospital, where he was examined by a trauma specialist, a surgeon and a neurosurgeon. The applicant’s skull was x-rayed and samples of his blood and urine were taken. He was diagnosed with bruising to the chest, lumbar area, kidneys, and soft tissues on the face and the back of his head. The doctors prescribed a further examination of the applicant by an urologist and outpatient supervision by a neurologist. 9.  On 15 January 2001 a prosecutor from the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office questioned the applicant, in the presence of a lawyer appointed to assist him by the authorities, with a view to taking a decision concerning the applicant’s continued detention. The prosecutor noted a haematoma on the applicant’s face next to his right eye. According to the prosecutor’s report to his superior of the same date, the applicant explained that he had received the injury during his arrest, that he had not been ill‑treated by the police after his arrest and that he had voluntarily given his confession. 10.  On 16 January 2001 the prosecutor was instructed by his superior to carry out an inquiry in order to take a decision in accordance with Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 45 below). 11.  On the same date several police officers gave written explanations concerning the applicant’s arrest, in which they stated that the applicant had resisted arrest by “applying unarmed combat techniques and trying to escape”. According to them, “measures of physical restraint and special means [of restraint], namely handcuffs” had been used against the applicant and he had been taken to the police station. 12.  On 19 January 2001 the applicant was taken by the police to see a medical expert. The expert examined the applicant and noted that he displayed bleeding into the eyeball, haematomas and abrasions on the left side of his chest, arms and legs, some of which were three to four days old and others were nine to eleven days old. The expert noted that many of the injuries, including the bleeding into the applicant’s eyeball, had been caused by blunt solid objects. According to the expert’s notes, during the examination the applicant stated that some of his injuries had been caused by him falling down the stairs, that his vision had been deteriorating since he was young, and that he had no complaints about the authorities’ actions. The expert concluded that the injuries were of a minor character and that they had not lead to a deterioration of the applicant’s health. 13.  The applicant remained in police custody until 23 January 2001. On that date he was placed in an investigative detention unit (слідчий ізолятор – “SIZO”) in Kharkiv. Upon his arrival at Kharkiv SIZO, the applicant was examined by a paramedic, who noted several bruises on the left shoulder, chest, arm and knee. The applicant did not receive any treatment for his injuries in Kharkiv SIZO. 14.  According to the applicant, on 26 January 2001 he complained to the same prosecutor from the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office that had previously questioned him that he had been tortured by the police after his arrest. 15.  On the same date the prosecutor issued a decision rejecting the applicant’s complaints and informed the applicant of it. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n“...On 15 January 2001 A. V. Kaverzin was questioned at the regional prosecutor’s office in the course of consideration of the question of ... his placement in Kharkiv [SIZO] No. 27. During his questioning with the participation of [his] defence lawyer, A. V. Kaverzin explained that he had sustained the injuries in the course of his arrest, that he did not have any complaints against the police, [and] that he had made his first statements freely, without psychological or physical pressure on the part of the police officers.\nThe [police] officers ... who had taken part in the arrest of A. V. Kaverzin [were questioned and] explained that they had been aware that A. V. Kaverzin had used firearms during his attempted arrest by the police in the Khmelnytsk Region, as a result of which two police officers had died. Because of that [fact] they had been particularly cautious and when A. V. Kaverzin had attempted to resist [arrest] ... there had been measures of physical restraint and special means [of restraint], namely handcuffs, applied to him.\nAccording to the records of the forensic examination ... dated 19 January 2001, [the following injuries on the body and face of A. V. Kaverzin] had been discovered: bleeding into the eyeball; a haematoma on the left side of the chest; numerous abrasions on the lower limbs that had been caused by blunt solid objects; abrasions and scratches on the wrists that had been caused by blunt solid objects, which could have been the handcuffs; numerous indurations of various parts of the skin with small wounds caused by insects ... the injuries could have been caused to A. V. Kaverzin in the circumstances described by [both] the police officers and A. V. Kaverzin himself. Therefore, there are no elements of a crime in the actions of the police officers.\nOn the basis of the foregoing, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 6 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure] of Ukraine [the prosecutor].\nDecided: 1.  To refuse the opening of a criminal case against [the police] officers who took part in the arrest of ... A. V. Kaverzin on the ground there were no elements of a crime in their actions...” 16.  According to the applicant, he was not given a copy of that decision and its details were not explained to him. 17.  The decision was not challenged before the courts under the procedure envisaged by Article 236-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 18.  On 25 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to Khmelnytsk SIZO. On that date he was examined by a doctor, who noted that the applicant suffered from loss of eyesight as a result of a head injury in January 2001 and had several bruises on his body. 19.  On 24 April 2001 the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who noted that the applicant had suffered a head injury and was completely blind. 20.  During his detention in Khmelnytsk SIZO the applicant was examined by doctors and received specialist ophthalmological treatment in September and October 2001 and in August, September and November 2002. On several occasions he was taken to public hospitals for medical examination. The doctors concluded that the applicant did not require eye surgery and could receive the necessary medical treatment in the SIZO. 21.  On 23 September 2002, on the order of the trial court, a medical panel established that the applicant had become completely blind and, accordingly, suffered from the highest officially recognised degree of disability. The applicant was diagnosed with corneal cicatrix and leucoma, a cataract of the right eye resulting from a penetrating wound, and uveitis in the left eye. The doctors concluded that the applicant was in need of outside assistance to manage aspects of daily life. 22.  On 12 August 2003 the applicant was placed in Dnipropetrovsk Colony to serve his sentence. 23.  During his detention in Dnipropetrovsk Colony the applicant was examined by doctors, including an ophthalmologist, at least once every year. In 2004 he was prescribed eye surgery at a specialised hospital. According to the Government, the applicant did not avail himself of the possibility to undergo the surgery pursuant to paragraph 5 Article 116 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 48 below). 24.  Subsequently, the applicant was prescribed anti-relapse treatment in view of his blindness, which mainly included administering medication. On several occasions the applicant refused to be examined by doctors and in January and February 2006 he refused to be transferred to a hospital within Vinnytsya Colony to receive specialised ophthalmological treatment. 25.  In February 2004 the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Colony did not allow the applicant’s mother to supply him with unspecified medication which he allegedly needed. The authorities explained that the applicant would be given the necessary medication if his doctors so decided. In March 2004 the authorities informed the applicant’s mother that her request for the applicant’s transfer to a specialised prison for persons suffering from the highest degree of disability could not be met as no such a prison existed. The applicant did not provide further details in that respect. 26.  The applicant alleged that in spite of his blindness he had been handcuffed when leaving his cell, including during daily walks and family visits, and had been followed by several wardens with a dog. 27.  He also stated that in Dnipropetrovsk Colony he had been unlawfully refused two-hour daily walks to which he had allegedly been entitled in view of his disability; that his cell had lacked ventilation; and that he had not been allowed to make phone calls. He provided no further details in this respect. 28.  According to the applicant, in April 2004 the prison authorities delayed, for about a month, the dispatch of one of his letters. 29.  By a letter of 16 December 2004 addressed to the applicant’s mother, the Head of the Dnipropetrovsk Penitentiary Service informed her that:\n“...\nDuring [daily] walks [the applicant] has been handcuffed with his hands behind his back, as are all other life-sentenced prisoners, in accordance with paragraph 25 of the Internal Regulations of the Penitentiary Institutions.\n...\nOnce the area for [daily] walks is adapted to the requirements of the Internal Regulations ... as amended on 9 November 2004, life-sentenced prisoners will be allowed to stay there without handcuffs.\nIn accordance with Article 151 of the Code on Execution of Sentences and section 23 of the Internal Regulations of the Penitentiary Institutions, prisoners sentenced for life are entitled to one-hour daily walks.\nPrisoners suffering from tuberculosis ... are entitled to two-hour daily walks.\n[Mr Kaverzin] does not suffer from tuberculosis, he is being detained under the ordinary regulations, and he is being [taken for] one-hour daily walks.\nAll [of Mr Kaverzin’s] correspondence is dispatched in accordance with Article 113 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences; it has not been hindered.” 30.  By a letter of 2 March 2005, the Governor of Dnipropetrovsk Colony informed the applicant’s mother that in 2005 one of the dogs accompanying the prison guards had bit the applicant because of his own recklessness. It was also stated that handcuffs were not being applied during daily walks. 31.  The two above-mentioned letters contained a statement that the actions of the penitentiary authorities could be challenged before a prosecutor. 32.  On 3 December 2008 the applicant was moved to Vinnytsya Colony, where he is currently serving his sentence. The applicant has not provided information concerning the medical assistance provided to him in that colony. 33.  In May 2001 the applicant’s mother was informed that the applicant’s complaint of torture had been rejected as unsubstantiated, though no details of the decision were given to her. In November 2003 she requested a copy of the decision, which was sent to her in February 2004. 34.  Subsequently, the applicant’s mother complained to a Member of Parliament of the applicant’s torture by the police and the authorities’ failure to investigate the matter. Upon a request by the Member of Parliament, in 2005 the materials of the previous inquiry were checked by the prosecutor’s superior, who eventually confirmed the accuracy of the decision issued on 26 January 2001. In particular, the supervising prosecutor studied the materials of the 2001 inquiry. 35.  In March 2005 the applicant lodged a compensation claim with the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv against the State Department for the Execution of Sentences and the Ministry of Interior, alleging that his disability had been caused by the unlawful actions of the police and the failure of the penitentiary authorities to provide him with adequate medical assistance. The courts at two levels of jurisdiction refused to examine the applicant’s claim for failure to meet the relevant procedural requirements. The applicant challenged the refusal in cassation, the outcome of which is unknown. 36.  The criminal investigation in the applicant’s case was completed in November 2001. Subsequently, the criminal case was referred to the Khmelnytsk Court of Appeal for trial. 37.  In the course of the investigation and trial, the applicant was assisted by a lawyer appointed for him by the authorities. That lawyer took part in the first stages of the proceedings before the first-instance court and was later replaced by another lawyer for unknown reasons. The new lawyer continued defending the applicant until those proceedings were completed. 38.  In the course of the trial the applicant contested the charges against him and alleged that his confession to some of the crimes of which he had been accused had been obtained under physical and psychological pressure from the police. 39.  On 13 November 2002 the court found the applicant guilty of thirteen counts of aggravated murder, infliction of grievous bodily injuries, illegal possession of firearms, banditry, and robbery. In particular, the applicant was held to be responsible for the murder of seven people, including three police officers who had attempted to stop him from committing crimes. He was found to be exceptionally dangerous to society and was sentenced to life imprisonment, together with the confiscation of all his property. 40.  The court mainly based its judgment on the statements of about thirty witnesses and victims of the crimes, the testimony given by the applicant at the trial, and on the conclusions of several forensic, ballistic and other expert examinations. The findings of the court concerning one of the counts of murder were partly based on the confessions obtained from the applicant during his time in police custody. 41.  In the same judgment the court, relying on the decision of the prosecutor of 26 January 2001, dismissed the applicant’s complaints of torture by the police and found that there was no evidence that his confession had been obtained under duress. 42.  On 17 December 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation, contesting the first-instance court’s factual findings and legal conclusions. He further argued that, in determining his sentence, the court had not taken into account his poor state of health. The applicant also maintained his allegation of torture by the police. 43.  On 13 May 2003 the Supreme Court partly varied the judgment of 13 November 2002, while confirming the first-instance court’s findings concerning the applicant’s guilt and upholding his sentence. The Supreme Court also rejected the applicant’s allegation of torture on the same grounds as the first-instance court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Abdullah Yaşa (“A.Y.”), a Turkish national, was born in 1993 and lives in Diyarbakır. He was thirteen years old at the time of the events to which the present case relates.\n A.  The 29 March 2006 incident 6.  Following the deaths of fourteen members of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) during an armed clash on 24 March 2006, numerous unlawful demonstrations took place in Diyarbakır between 28 and 31 March 2006, during which eleven demonstrators died. In particular, two persons, namely T. Atakkaya and M. Mızrak, were killed by tear-gas grenades in the course of these events. 7.  On 29 March 2006 A.Y., who was at the scene of a demonstration, was injured in the nose by a tear-gas grenade fired by the police while he was allegedly on his way to his aunt’s house. He was taken to the Diyarbakır public hospital the same day. 8.  On 5 April 2006 A.Y. left hospital, where he had undergone an operation for a maxillo-facial trauma on the day of his arrival, according to the discharge report. 9.  On 14 April 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office (the “public prosecutor’s office”) against the police officers of the Diyarbakır security police headquarters, alleging assault and abuse of power. He explained that he had been hit directly on the nose by a tear-gas grenade. 10.  On 2 August 2006 the public prosecutor’s office interviewed the applicant and his father and mother. A.Y.’s father said that he had been at work at the time of the incident and demanded the conviction of the police officers responsible for the assault on his son. 11.  In her depositions the same day, A.Y.’s mother stated that she had been at home at the time of the incident, and she also demanded the conviction of the police officers responsible for her son’s injuries. 12.  In substance, A.Y. himself testified as follows: while on his way to his aunt’s house he had been hit on the nose by an object as he was watching the police officers. At the time of the incident he had seen the helmeted police officers shooting a projectile in his direction by means of a shoulder-borne device. He had been unable to identify his exact position at the time of the incident, nor had he previously seen anyone throwing objects at the police officers. He did not think that the police officers could have shot at him without noticing his presence, since they had seen him when he had been in the street. He did not know the police officer who had shot at him. He requested the identification and punishment of this officer. He had been taken to hospital by a stranger. 13.  His lawyer, having confirmed his statements, requested the formulation of a forensic report and the submission of medical reports from Diyarbakır public hospital. He also requested the identification of the police officers involved on the day of the incident. 14.  On 6 November 2007 the public prosecutor’s office issued the following decision not to prosecute:\n“... It emerged from the inquiries launched after the complaint ... that A.Y. had not been injured on his way to his aunt’s house. According to video recordings ... and photographs ... the complainant was injured during a demonstration in which he had been actively participating by chanting slogans in support of the PKK terrorist organisation and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, and throwing stones, sticks and Molotov cocktails at the police officers.\nConsequently, the police officers were not criminally liable because they had acted in self-defence within the meaning of Article 25 § 1 of the Criminal Code, and in the exercise of their functions as set out in Article 24 of the same Code. [They] had shot tear-gas grenades in order to disperse the demonstrators who had gathered illegally and were attacking the officers by throwing stones, sticks and Molotov cocktails.\nIn the light of the foregoing comments ... no action is required against the police officers accused of overstepping the bounds of the use of force ....” 15.  On 13 November 2006 the Diyarbakır Department of Forensic Medicine issued a medical report reading as follows:\n“... A.Y. underwent operations on a haemorrhage, a facial oedema, a fractured nose bone and a series of concave incisions.\nConclusion:\nThe patient cannot be treated by means of a straightforward operation,\nHis condition is not life-threatening,\nThe bone fractures constitute moderately severe damage to the applicant’s vital body functions.” 16. On 3 December 2007 the applicant appealed to the Siverek Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) against the decision not to prosecute. He denied his alleged participation in the demonstration in question and argued that the video recordings and photographs on which the decision not to prosecute had been based in no way constituted sufficient evidence of such participation. 17.  By a decision of 31 December 2007, served on the applicant on 10 March 2008, the President of the Assize Court dismissed the appeal. It considered that the police officers’ acts had remained within the framework of the law, since the officers had not acted intentionally but had merely endeavoured to discharge their duties. 18.  It emerges from the case-file that an investigation was automatically launched in respect of the applicant for his alleged participation in an illegal demonstration. On 28 November 2007, as part of this investigation, he was questioned by the public prosecutor’s office. The relevant parts of his statements may be summarised as follows:\n“I completely reject the charges levelled against me. [On the day of the incident] I had left home to visit my aunt, who lives in Bağlar, when I saw a group of police officers near the street where the clinic is located. The officers launched a tear-gas grenade, which hit me in the nose. I had eight days of medical treatment in hospital. I had been alone during this incident, I had not thrown any stones, sticks or Molotov cocktails at the police officers, I did not chant slogans supporting the terrorist organisation, and I reject the photographs taken, the video recordings and the police reports. I agree to have a medical check-up.” 19.  On 25 February 2008 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation, propaganda in support of that organisation and resisting the police. 20.  In his submissions on the merits of the case the public prosecutor sought the applicant’s acquittal for lack of evidence. He stressed in particular that it was not possible, on the basis of the images studied by the Ankara criminal police laboratory, to establish that the applicant had taken part in the demonstration in question. 21.  On 10 July 2008, the Assize Court endorsed the prosecutor’s arguments and acquitted A.Y. According to the case file, in the absence of an appeal on points of law, that judgment became final. 22.  During proceedings before the Court, the Government produced a CD-ROM containing a police video recording. The CD-ROM shows several phases of the demonstrations which took place in Diyarbakır on 29 March 2006, and contains images of the period before and after the launching of the tear-gas grenade which injured the applicant’s head. It also shows that most of the demonstrators were teenagers, some of them with their faces covered, who were throwing stones. Moreover, it is clear that the event took place on a very busy boulevard. Some sequences show the applicant among the demonstrators, although it cannot be clearly ascertained that he was taking part in the demonstration. In the course of the events it can be seen that the applicant has been hit by a tear-gas grenade. Although it is impossible to make out exactly how the police officer fired the tear-gas grenade, it would appear from its impact that it was a direct, flat-trajectory shot (that is, it had been fired horizontally, or else at an angle of under 45o), rather than a high-angle shot (where the launcher is aimed as high as possible so that the tear-gas grenades explode in the air and break up before falling back to earth, thus preventing injuries to demonstrators in the event of an impact).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1980 and 1979 and live in Hatay and Urfa respectively. 6.  On 3 May 1998 Kenan Mak, a student at the Abant İzzet Baysal University in Bolu (“the university”), was killed in an attack. Thereafter, on 3 May of every subsequent year students at the university have held a meeting to mark the anniversary of the killing. 7.  On 3 May 2002 the two applicants were studying at the university when they attended the remembrance meeting. The day before the meeting the chancellor of the university had indicated his approval of the meeting taking place in the canteen of the university. 8.  According to a report drawn up by gendarmes who were responsible for the security of the university, seventy to eighty “left wing students” wearing photographs of Kenan Mak gathered in the university’s canteen on 3 May 2002. The students then proceeded to the university’s garden where they were met by the gendarme Captain, F.Y. Captain Y. told the students that their gathering was in breach of the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act (Law no. 2911) because they were not holding it in the designated place, namely the canteen. He asked the students to disperse, and warned that “otherwise force would be used” to disperse them. Instead, the students displayed a banner stating “down with fascism, Kenan Mak is immortal” and chanted slogans such as “shoulder to shoulder against fascism”. The students then started walking towards the chancellor’s offices. The gendarmes present in the vicinity used force and dispersed the students. The applicants and seven other students were arrested by the gendarmes. During the scuffle Captain Y.’s little finger and a gendarme’s leg were injured by the students. 9.  The applicants were questioned the same day by gendarme officers, and stated that they were aware that prior permission had been sought and granted for the meeting. 10.  The same day the applicants were examined by a doctor. The applicants did not complain about any ill-treatment and the doctor did not observe any injuries on their bodies. They were then sent to the prosecutor’s office where their release was ordered. 11.  The gendarme whose leg was injured during the incident informed the prosecutor on 28 May 2002 that the name of the student who injured him was C.G. 12.  On 5 July 2002 the Bolu prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bolu Criminal Court of First Instance (hereinafter the “trial court”), and accused the applicants and the remaining seven students of “breaching Law no. 2911”. The prosecutor also stated in his indictment that the applicants and C.G. had punched and kicked the gendarme captain and the gendarme. 13.  In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicants rejected the allegations of the use of force by them, but accepted that they had taken part in the demonstration. Captain Y. was not heard by the trial court, but was questioned by a court in another city, pursuant to a letter rogatory sent to that court by the trial court. 14.  On 6 May 2003 the trial court, on the basis of statements given by eyewitnesses, gendarmes, as well as “video footage of the incident”, convicted the applicants of having taken part in an illegal demonstration and of having used force when the gathering was being dispersed by the gendarmes, in breach of section 32 § 3 of Law no. 2911. According to the judgment, in addition to Captain Y. and the gendarme mentioned above, four other gendarmes had also apparently been injured by the applicants and their fellow student C.G. The applicants were sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment. 15.  The applicants appealed against the judgment, and argued that there had been insufficient evidence to warrant their conviction and that they had not been given the opportunity to examine the video footage. In their appeals the applicants referred to their constitutional right to take part in, inter alia, peaceful demonstrations. Finally, the applicants drew the Court of Cassation’s attention to the fact that similar gatherings had been organised in the past to commemorate Kenan Mak’s death and that there had never been any problems caused by those gatherings. 16.  On 9 March 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in respect of the applicants. 17.  The applicants asked the prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to apply to that court for rectification of the decision of 9 March 2006. In their letter to the prosecutor the applicants also pointed out that none of the injured gendarmes had accused them of inflicting their injuries. 18.  The prosecutor accepted the applicants’ request and on 31 July 2006 applied to the Court of Cassation’s president for rectification of the decision. In his application the prosecutor noted that none of the injured gendarmes had named the applicants as the persons responsible for their injuries. The prosecutor referred to Article 11 of the Convention and argued that university grounds could not be regarded as public places within the meaning of Law no. 2911 and that the applicants’ and their fellow students’ actions could not therefore be regarded to be in breach of that Law. The students’ failure to hold their meeting in a place other than the one for which permission had been granted could only be regarded as a disciplinary issue and dealt with by the university administration and not by courts of law. 19.  The prosecutor also noted that the disturbance in the demonstration had been caused by the gendarmes’ intervention. Moreover, the reports drawn up by the gendarmes who had taken part in the operation (see paragraph 8 above) had not made any mention of physical resistance by the students. The trial court had not examined the video footage and had not asked the injured gendarmes to identify the persons responsible for their injuries. As such, the trial court’s decision to convict the applicants under section 32 § 3 of the Law no. 2911 had not been in accordance with applicable law and procedure. 20.  In its decision of 10 October 2006 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation’s Criminal Division observed that the transcripts of one of the hearings held by the trial court did not bear the signature of the court’s clerk, and quashed the decision convicting the applicants. It deemed it unnecessary to examine the points raised by the prosecutor. 21.  A retrial began before the trial court, which rendered its decision on 24 October 2007. Having examined the video footage, the trial court observed that eleven and a half minutes had elapsed between the beginning of the gathering and its dispersal by the gendarmes. It also noted that neither the applicants nor any of the other participants in the demonstration had used force against the gendarmes. Nevertheless, the trial court considered that the applicants and the other students had taken part in an unauthorised meeting and had thus acted in breach of section 32 §1 of Law no. 2911. According to the trial court, the gathering had been unlawful because it had not been organised in the canteen but rather had taken place outside. The applicants were sentenced to one year and three months’ imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended. 22.  The applicants appealed. The appeal proceedings are still pending before the Court of Cassation. 23.  In the meantime, on account of his participation in the demonstration, on 9 December 2002 the university imposed a disciplinary sanction on the first applicant Ali Akgöl, and expelled him from the university for two semesters. As the university’s decision was not quashed by the administrative courts until 2004, the decision was enforced and the applicant’s graduation from the university was thus delayed for one year. 24.  Also in the meantime, the first applicant completed his studies and started working as a teacher. Nevertheless, on 22 August 2006 the Ministry of Education dismissed him from his post on account of his attendance at the demonstration. He was reinstated in his post in July 2007, following the quashing of his conviction by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 20 above).", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Izmir. 6.  On 8 July 2001 at about 11 a.m., the applicant was arrested in Nusaybin by policemen from the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Nusaybin Security Directorate on suspicion of being a member of the illegal PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). He was handcuffed and taken to the Security Directorate Building. 7.  The same day, the applicant was taken to the Nusaybin Hospital where he was examined by a doctor. No signs of injury were found on his body. 8.  The applicant was blindfolded and interrogated in the security directorate. During his interrogation, the applicant was allegedly beaten, insulted, hosed with pressurised water, given electric shocks and raped with a truncheon. 9.  On 10 July 2001 the applicant was once again examined by a doctor and no signs of ill-treatment were found on his body. 10.  The same day at about 7 p.m., the applicant was handed over to the Izmir Security Directorate for further investigations. During his detention in Izmir, the applicant was allegedly blindfolded, insulted and threatened with ill-treatment. 11.  On 13 July 2001 the applicant was taken to the Atatürk Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. In his report, the doctor noted the presence of an old bruise, measuring 1x1 cm, on the front part of the applicant’s left arm and another bruise, measuring 1x1 cm, on the front part of his right arm. 12.  Subsequently, on the same day, the applicant was taken before the investigating judge at the Izmir Magistrate’s Court, who ordered his detention on remand. Before the judge, the applicant complained that he had been ill-treated during his police custody in Nusaybin. 13.  On 17 July 2001 the applicant filed an objection against the remand decision. In his petition, the applicant maintained that he had been ill-treated during his detention. 14.  On 14 August 2001 the Izmir State Security Court Public Prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant in the Izmir State Security Court, accusing him of being a member of an illegal organisation. 15.  During the first trial, which was held on 18 October 2001, the applicant repeated his allegations of ill-treatment. Upon the order of the court, the Izmir Public Prosecutor initiated an investigation into the applicant’s allegations. 16.  On 16 November 2001 Mr M.Ç., a police officer from the Anti-Terrorism Department acting as a rapporteur, submitted his report to the Izmir Security Department. He advised that no proceedings be initiated against the accused police officers as the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated. The rapporteur further contended that the accusations were deceitful and were part of a scenario used by the terrorist organisation to dishonour the fight against terrorism. 17.  On 27 November 2001 the İzmir Public Prosecutor concluded that the applicant’s allegations concerning his police custody in Nusaybin should be separated from the file. He accordingly transferred this part of the case to the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor for further investigation. On the same day, the prosecutor further decided that no prosecution should be brought against the accused police officers as there was insufficient evidence in support of the applicant’s allegations. 18.  On 12 December 2001 the applicant appealed against this decision. He requested a detailed medical examination to prove that he had been ill-treated in custody. On 19 February 2002 the Karşıyaka Assize Court dismissed his appeal, upholding the reasoning of the Izmir public prosecutor. 19.  On 29 January 2002 the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor took statements from the two doctors who had examined the applicant on the first and last days of his custody in Nusaybin. Mr Ramazan Kaya, who had drafted the first medical report dated 8 July 2001, explained to the prosecutor that there had been no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. The second doctor, Ms Sevda Mecit, also stated that she had examined the applicant and asked him whether he had any complaints. In the absence of any finding, she had drafted the medical report dated 10 July 2001. 20.  Between 4 February 2001 and 6 March 2002, the eight police officers, who had been involved in the applicant’s arrest and interrogation, gave statements to the public prosecutor. They all refuted the allegations against them and stated that they had not ill-treated the applicant. 21.  On 1 March 2002 the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor delivered a decision of non-prosecution. In his decision, the prosecutor referred to the two medical reports dated 8 July 2001 and 10 July 2001, which indicated that there were no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. Consequently, the prosecutor found the applicant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. 22.  On 25 July 2002 the applicant appealed against this decision. He requested a detailed medical examination to prove his allegations. 23.  On 7 August 2002 the Mardin Assize Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Warszawa. He is currently detained in the Warsaw Mokotów Remand Centre. 6.  On 14 July 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug smuggling. On 15 July 2004 the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody for 3 months, relying on the reasonable suspicion – supported by evidence taken from witnesses – that he had committed the offence in question and the need to secure the proper course of the proceedings. The court also attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the risk that he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or would otherwise obstruct the proceedings. That risk was justified by the fact that the case involved a large number of accomplices who had not yet been apprehended. 7.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against subsequent decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him were unsuccessful. In his applications and appeals, he argued that his lengthy detention violated the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the imposition of this measure. 8.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on several occasions, namely on 21 September 2004 (to 31 December 2004), 21 December 2004 (to 31 March 2005) and 22 March 2005 (to 30 June 2005). In all their decisions the authorities relied on the original grounds given for the applicant’s detention. The courts also stressed the fact that, owing to the complexity of the case, the investigation had still not been completed. 9.  On 16 June 2005 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). The applicant, together with 3 other co‑accused, was indicted on charges of drug smuggling and conspiracy to import drugs committed in an organised criminal group aiming at importing into Poland considerable amounts of drugs. 10.  During the court proceedings the courts further extended the applicant’s detention on several occasions, namely on 23 June 2005 (to 30 September 2005), on an unspecified subsequent date, on 28 June 2006 (to 30 October 2006), 3 October 2006 (to 31 December 2006), 28 December 2006 (to 30 April 2007), 25 April 2007 (31 August 2007), 22 August 2007 (to 31 December 2007), 11 December 2007 (to 31 March 2008), 18 March 2008 (until 30 June 2008), 25 June 2008 (until 30 September 2008) and 18 September 2008 (until 31 December 2008).\nThe courts repeated the grounds previously given for keeping the applicant in custody. They attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on him and the risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. 11.  On 19 October 2005 the Regional Court held the first hearing. The trial continued until 30 December 2008.\nThroughout that time 98 hearings were scheduled. The hearings took place at last once a month but at certain periods the court held up to 5 hearings per month. On average, they were held at 2 week-intervals and there was no interruption of the trial longer than 5 weeks. 12.  On 30 December 2008 the court convicted the applicant of drug smuggling and conspiracy to import drugs but acquitted him of acting in an organised criminal group. He was sentenced to a cumulative penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment. The Court deducted the period of his detention from 14 July 2004 to 12 June 2005 from his sentence. The applicant appealed. 13.  The applicant did not specify when the proceedings had terminated but it appears that they most likely ended between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. 14.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the Kraków Regional Court convicted the applicant of drug-related offences committed in an armed organised criminal group and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment. The applicant started to serve the sentence on 13 June 2005. 15.  On an unspecified date, apparently on 18 January 2006, the Ostrołęka Regional Prosecutor charged the applicant with, among other things, leading an organised criminal group called “mokotowska” involved in trafficking large amounts of drugs, arms and ammunition, money laundering, bribery of public officials, kidnapping, extortion, armed robbery and other theft-related offences. 16.  On 19 January 2006 the Ostrołęka Distrcit Court remanded the applicant in custody relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged. The court underlined that the suspicion was fully supported by evidence obtained from a crown witness (świadek koronny) and confirmed by other evidence, such as searches, inspections of crime scenes and testimonies of other witnesses. It also referred to the risk that the applicant would try to bring pressure to bear on witnesses, the need to secure the proper course of the investigation and the likelihood that a severe penalty – minimum 8 years’ imprisonment ‑ would be imposed on him. 17.  On an unspecified date, apparently in 2009, the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 14 years’ imprisonment. 18.  The applicant did not inform the Court of the further course of the proceedings. 19.  On 18 July 2007 the applicant lodged with the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) a complaint under section 5 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). 20.  The applicant sought a ruling that the length of the proceedings in case no. IV K 200/05 (see paragraphs 6-13 above) had been excessive and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 2,500 euros (EUR)). 21.  On 25 September 2007 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed his complaint as unfounded. It held that since the beginning of the trial 61 hearings had been scheduled in the case until 24 August 2007 and only 11 of them had been adjourned due to the absence of counsel or co‑suspects and because of a lay judge’s illness. The court concluded that the proceedings had been conducted with the requisite speed and without undue delay. 22.  After his arrest on 14 July 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) the applicant was detained in the Sztum Prison (Zakład Karny). Shortly afterwards, on an unspecified date, he was transferred to the Gdańsk Remand Centre (Areszt Śledczy). He remained there until 22 January 2009 but in 2008 he was transferred to the Warszawa-Mokotów Remand Centre for a few months. From 22 January 2009 to 9 June 2009 he was detained in the Kraków Remand Centre. Later he was held in the Radom Prison and then transferred to the Warsaw Mokotów Remand Centre. 23.  On 22 July 2004 the Sztum Prison Penitentiary Commission (Komisja Penitencjarna) classified the applicant as a “dangerous detainee” (a so-called ”tymczasowo aresztowany niebezpieczny”; in the relevant legal provisions referred to as ”tymczasowo aresztowany stwarzający poważne zagrożenie społeczne albo poważne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa aresztu”). It considered that it was necessary to place the applicant in a solitary cell designated for such detainees at a special high-security prison ward because he had been charged with serious offences committed in an organised criminal group. Pursuant to Article 212a § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks karny wykonawczy), this circumstance by itself justified the classification of a detainee as “dangerous”. The commission also referred to the applicant’s serious lack of moral character (wysoki stopień demoralizacji). 24.  Every three months the Gdańsk Remand Centre’s Penitentiary Commission (Komisja Penitencjarna Aresztu Śledczego) reviewed its decision on the classification of the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The applicant appealed against many of those decisions. He submitted that the offences with which he had been charged, in particular drug-smuggling, did not justify the imposition of the special regime. He argued that the measure had been extended automatically without any consideration for his health and mental well-being, that it had in fact been imposed for an unlimited duration and was putting an exceptionally severe strain on him and his family. He also complained about being subjected to a strip search every time he left and entered the cell.\nAll the appeals were dismissed. 25.  On 3 September 2007 the Gdańsk Regional Court – Penitentiary Division examined the applicant’s appeal against the Gdańsk Remand Centre’s Penitentiary Commission’s decision of 10 July 2007 prolonging the application of the “dangerous detainee” regime and continuing to hold him in a solitary cell.\nIn his appeal, the applicant underlined that the special regime had already been imposed on him for some 3 years and that its continuation had been based solely on the charges laid against him, without any court conviction. In his view, this was in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence.\nThe court rejected the applicant’s argument that the nature of the offences with which he had been charged did not justify the continued application of that regime in his case. In that regard, it stressed that the applicant had been charged in three separate sets of criminal proceedings conducted by different courts or prosecutors and those other charges included, among other things, the leading of an organised and armed criminal group, kidnapping, armed robbery and arms trafficking. The nature of the charges and the applicant’s personal circumstances, such as his previous criminal record, leadership qualities and tendency to dominate the others fully supported the view that there existed the “danger [to society and the security of a remand centre]” referred to in Article 212a of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. In sum, there was no indication that the contested decision was contrary to the law, which was the sole ground on which it could be challenged and possibly quashed. As regards the applicant’s argument that his contacts with his family were severely restricted as a result of his “dangerous detainee” status, the court held that those restrictions were lawful as being applied under the relevant provisions of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences and did not make it impossible for him to maintain such contacts. 26.  On 11 December 2007, 15 February 2008 and 3 June 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court – Penitentiary Division, relying on the same grounds, rejected further appeals against the Penitentiary Commission’s decisions prolonging the imposition of the “dangerous detainee” regime on the applicant. In his appeals, the applicant submitted that his prolonged solitary confinement was putting an exceptionally severe emotional strain on him, which was compounded by his lack of sufficient contact with the family. He also complained that the routine strip-searches, to which he had been subjected, sometimes several times a day, were intrusive, unnecessary and humiliating. 27.  Further decisions on the prolongation of the “dangerous detainee” regime were based on similar grounds or repeated the initial reasons.\nOn 19 August 2009 the Radom Regional Court upheld the Penitentiary Commission’s decision to continue the imposition of the regime, given on 23 June 2009, in view of the serious nature of the charges brought against the applicant and his personal circumstances, such as his leadership qualities and tendency to dominate the others and his serious lack of moral character.\nOn 23 October 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld a similar decision, stressing that since 13 June 2005 the applicant had been serving a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, following his conviction for drug‑related offences committed in an organised criminal group. He had also been convicted at first instance by the Gdańsk District Court for other drug‑related offences and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. In these circumstances, the special regime had to be continued.\nOn 14 July 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld another decision of the Penitentiary Commission, relying on the applicant’s criminal convictions and stressing that under the applicable legal provisions no time‑limit was set for the imposition of the regime.\nOn 30 August 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the Penitentiary Commission’s decision of 2 August 2011. Noting that the decision was based on the fact that the applicant, in view of his personal circumstances and serious lack of moral character, posed a serious danger to prison security and order, as well as to prison officers’ safety, the court found that this assessment had been objective and fully justified the continuation of the regime. 28.  Throughout his detention the applicant repeatedly requested the authorities to place him with another inmate, complaining that his excessively long solitary confinement had severely affected his emotional and mental well-being. 29.  The regime is still being applied to the applicant and he is still held in a solitary cell.\nIn all likelihood, pursuant to Article 212a § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 44 below), the regime will continue until he has finished serving his three consecutive sentences of imprisonment, or at least the sentence following the conviction for leading an organised and armed criminal group, kidnapping, arms and drug trafficking. At present it is estimated that the applicant’s imprisonment would come to an end at the end of 2031. 30.  Since 22 July 2004, when the applicant was placed in a solitary cell for dangerous detainees at the high-security prison ward until present, he has remained under increased supervision. The cells in which he has been held, including their sanitary facilities, have been constantly monitored via close-circuit television. They have also been searched frequently, sometimes on a daily basis.\nHe has been subjected to a so‑called “personal check” (kontrola osobista), i.e. a thorough body search every time he has left and entered the cell. The applicant has explained that this means that each time he enters or leaves the cell he must strip naked in front of prison guards and carry out deep knee-bends from 6 to 10 times to enable an examination of his anus.\nWhenever he is outside his cell and the high-security ward, including his appearances at court hearings, the applicant must be handcuffed or required to wear so-called “joined shackles” (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet (see paragraph 47 below). Those shackles consist of handcuffs and fetters joined together with chains.\nThe applicant has many times unsuccessfully complained to the authorities that outside his cell his hands were handcuffed behind his back, which caused him considerable pain and difficulty in moving, especially during a daily walk.\nThe applicant’s movements outside his cell and the special ward must be supervised by 2 prison guards. He is allowed to have a 1-hour long solitary walk per day in a segregated area. 31.  The applicant was entitled to 1 one-hour visit from the family per month. 32.  He supplied a document issued by the Governor of the Gdańsk Remand Centre on 13 February 2008, setting out a list of visits received by him up to that date.\nFrom 23 August 2004 to 20 January 2008, i.e. for 3 years and some 5 months, he was granted permission to have 11 “open visits” (widzenie przy stoliku). He was also granted 21“closed visits” (widzenie przez telefon) (see also paragraph 58 below). 33.  On most occasions only the applicant’s wife visited him. The applicant has 3 daughters M.H., K.H. and S.H. born, respectively, in 1988, 1993 and 1998. Throughout the above period he received visits from his oldest daughter on 2 occasions and from each of the two younger daughters once. 34.  In 2004 the applicant was granted 6 visits, 2 of which were open and 4 closed. They took place on 23 August (this was an open visit from the applicant’s wife), 17 September (this was a closed visit from his wife, E.H., and M.H., his oldest daughter), 15 October, 29 October (on this occasion he received an open visit from his daughter M.H.), 19 November and 17 December respectively. 35.  In 2005 the applicant was granted 10 visits, only 1 of which was open. They took place on 11 February, 11 March, 15 April, 12 May, 5 July, 28 July, 16 August, 30 September (this was a closed visit from his wife and K.H., one of his daughters), 28 October and 9 December 2005. 36.  In 2006 the applicant received 7 visits (including 1 “open”) from his wife only. They took place on 28 February, 5 April, 13 June, 23 August, 20 October, 30 November and 29 December. 37.  In 2007 the applicant was granted 7 visits from his wife, 4 of which were open visits. They took place on 9 February, 29 March, 1 June (on this open visit the applicant could also see S.H., his youngest daughter), 24 July, 6 September, 24 October and 27 November. 38.  In 2008, as of the date of the issuance of the document, the applicant received one “open visit” from his wife – on 20 January 2008. He submitted that throughout the whole of 2008 he had received 5 family visits. 39.  The applicant stated that his very limited contact with his daughters had been caused by the fact that the Gdańsk Remand Centre and the Kraków Remand Centre did not provide satisfactory conditions for visits by children or minor persons. A visit took place in a room where visitors were separated from a detainee by a Perspex window partition and bars, making it impossible for them to have any direct contact. A visitor, including a child, in order to reach the visiting area in the ward for dangerous detainees had to walk through the entire prison, past prison cells situated on both sides of the corridor. This exposed his daughters to the gaze of inmates and their reaction to the girls’ presence constituted an exceptionally traumatic experience for them. During the meeting, they were separated by a window and bars from their father, which was very stressful for them and made it impossible for them to have any normal contact. For that reason, considering that the conditions in which he was allowed to see his family in prison caused too much distress and suffering for his daughters, the applicant had to give up receiving visits from his daughters. 40.  In the Kraków Remand Centre the visits to “dangerous detainees” could take place only on Tuesdays. For that reason, the applicant’s wife was unable to visit him on every occasion he was entitled to have a monthly visit because she worked from Monday to Friday. 41.  The applicant made numerous complaints about poor visiting conditions and the practical impossibility of having contact with his daughters, but they were to no avail. 42.  The applicant’s correspondence with his family was censored. He supplied three envelopes bearing stamps that read respectively: “censored on 12 November 2007”, “censored on 8 January 2008”, “censored on 30 January 2008” and illegible signatures. The first letter was from his daughter, K.H., and two others from a family member, a certain K[a]. H.\nThe applicant did not inform the Court about the contents of the letters and whether any parts of them had been expunged or otherwise censored.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Tula. 6.  The applicant is a lawyer. In 2003-05 the applicant, together with the lawyer Ms V., represented Ms D. in civil proceedings before the Proletarskiy District Court of Tula. 7.  On 13 April 2005 Judge S. of the District Court sent a complaint to the President of the Tula Bar Association. She alleged that the absence of the applicant and Ms V. without good cause had led to delays in the proceedings. She asked the President to institute disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers and to inform them of the next hearing in Ms D.’s case. In particular, she stated as follows:\n“I draw your attention to the conduct of the lawyers Mr Zubarev and Ms V., which is not compatible with the Lawyers’ Code of Ethics. It has encroached on the rights of the person they were representing before the court ... and has led to unjustifiable delays in the examination of the merits of the case. At the same time [they] have systematically written complaints in Ms D.’s name to various authorities and newspapers, attempting in that way to shift the responsibility for their own incompetence and lack of professionalism onto the judicial system, and thereby expressing contempt for the court.” 8.  The parties did not inform the Court whether there was any follow-up to Judge S.’s complaint on the part of the Bar Association. 9.  Being of the opinion that the above-cited paragraph of Judge S.’s complaint tarnished their professional reputation, the applicant and Ms V. brought a defamation action against her in accordance with Article 152 of the Civil Code. They also sought a compensation award in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 10.  On 3 May 2005 the District Court refused to accept the applicant’s claims for consideration. The court noted that current laws did not define the grounds or procedure for adjudicating that type of claim. In particular, the court noted as follows:\n“According to Article 16 of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of the Judiciary of the Russian Federation, a judge cannot be held liable for an expression of opinion in the course of the administration of justice or for the judgment handed down [by him or her] unless he or she has been found guilty in criminal proceedings concerning the abuse of power or the adoption of an unlawful verdict, judgment or other judicial act.\nPursuant to Article 1070 § 2 of the [Civil Code] of the Russian Federation, ... [d]amage caused within the framework of the administration of justice shall be compensated, provided that the guilt of the judge has been established in a final criminal conviction.\nThe claims lodged by [the applicant] and Ms V. cannot be considered in civil proceedings given that the issue of a judge’s liability for actions taken in the course of the administration of justice must be adjudicated purely in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. [However], current legislation does not lay down the grounds or the procedure for compensation by the State for damage caused by a judge’s unlawful actions (inaction) (including the rules governing the jurisdiction of this type of case).” 11.  Further to an appeal by the applicant, on 16 June 2005 the Tula Regional Court upheld that decision. The court noted, in particular:\n“Pursuant to Article 134 § 1 (1) of the [Code of Civil Procedure] of the Russian Federation, the judge must dismiss a claim [without consideration on the merits] if it cannot be adjudicated in civil proceedings but should instead be considered and adjudicated by way of another judicial process.\nReferring to Article 16 of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of the Judiciary of the Russian Federation, the [first-instance] court established that the claims lodged by Ms V. and [the applicant] concerned the judge’s liability and the compensation for damage caused by the judge’s actions (failure to act). [It] correctly indicated in its decision that the judge should be immune from liability for the actions taken in the course of the administration of justice unless she or he had been found guilty of criminal abuse of power in a final criminal conviction.\nBeing mindful of the fact that the issue of the judge’s liability for actions taken in the course of the administration of justice can be examined only in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the court has rightly dismissed the claims lodged by [the applicant] and Ms V. [without consideration on the merits], noting correctly that current legislation had not yet laid down the grounds or the procedure for compensation by the State for damage caused by a judge’s unlawful actions (inaction) (including the rules governing the jurisdiction of this type of case).”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, a Russian national, was born in 1927 and died in 2003. At the relevant time he lived in Rostov-on-Don. 7.  The second applicant is a Russian national and was born in 1949. He is the applicant's son and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 8.  In 1995 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of theft and placed in police custody. In 1996 the court acquitted him. 9.  In September 1996 the applicant brought proceedings against the State claiming damages for his unlawful detention. On 29 December 1997 the Proletarskiy District Court satisfied his claim ordering the State to pay the applicant damages in the amount of RUR 34,000. This decision entered into force. However on 25 may 1998 the decision in the first applicant's favour was quashed by way of supervisory review. The case was remitted to the first instance court. 10.  On 15 March 1999 the Rostov-on-Don Proletarskiy District Court satisfied the applicant's claims in part awarding him 24,917 Russian Roubles (~970 Euros), to be recovered from the regional branch of the Federal Treasure. The decision was not appealed against and, as follows from a copy of this decision provided by the applicant, became final on 17 March 1999. 11.  On 12 May 1999 the local bailiffs' service initiated the enforcement proceedings against the regional branch of the Treasury. The applicant and the bailiff repeatedly contacted the defendant in order to recover the amount awarded by the District Court. However, the payment orders were returned to the bailiff unexecuted. The regional branch of the Treasury explained that since no budget funds had been allocated from the federal budget for these purposes, the judgment debt could not be paid. 12.  In the following months the bailiffs addressed the Federal Treasury in Moscow and the Ministry of Finance with request to make necessary budget appropriations to execute the judgment of 15 March 1999. As follows from the letter of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Finance of 25 August 1999, the information on the judgment debt was included in a special data-base which listed all claims against the Federal Treasury. 13.  In April 2000 the case-file concerning the enforcement proceedings was transmitted to the bailiffs in Moscow. The applicant was informed that henceforth the enforcement proceedings would be carried out by the bailiffs in Moscow, at the address of the central office of the Federal Treasury. 14.  In the meantime the applicant asked the District Court to clarify which State institution was responsible for payment of the judgment debt. On 13 September 2000 the District Court ruled that the debt should be recovered from the central office of the Federal Treasury in Moscow. The court accordingly delivered a new writ of execution which was forwarded to the bailiffs' service in Moscow. 15. On 26 March 2001 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant. The Moscow-based bailiffs' service explained to the applicant that due to changes in the legislation, and, in particular, pursuant to the Law on the Federal Budget for 2001 (see the “Relevant domestic law” below), they ceased to be responsible for the forced execution of the court judgment against the State authorities. The bailiff proposed the applicant to forward the writ of execution together with some additional documents directly to the Ministry of Finance in Moscow. 16.  According to the respondent Government, at present the writ of execution is with the Ministry of Finance. The second applicant indicated that in December 2004 all documents required pursuant to Decree no. 666 had been submitted to the Ministry of Finance. However, it appears that to date the judgment has not been enforced. 17.  The second applicant was born in 1949 in Germany. Since 1950 his family lived in Australia. According to the applicant, in 1957, when they were visiting relatives in the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities prohibited them from returning to Australia. 18.  The second applicant was also involved in a civil dispute with a private person regarding his father's flat. This dispute ended with the decisions taken by the Rostov Regional Court on 4 December 2002 and by the Proletarskiy District Court on 13 March 2003, which was not appealed against and became final on 25 March 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Shakhtаrsk, the Donetsk region. 5.  On 20 October 2000 the Shakhtаrsk City Court (Шахтарський міський суд Донецької області) awarded the applicant 4,815.28 hryvnyas (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and compensations from his former employer, the Municipal Communal Service Department (“the Company,” Шахтарське міське госпрозрахункове управління комунального господарства). 6.  This judgment was not appealed against, became final and the enforcement proceedings were instituted to collect the judgment debt. 7.  On 7 April 2003 the Company was declared bankrupt and subsequently liquidated. 8.  The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to seek compensation from the Bailiffs for their failure to enforce the judgment. 9.  The judgment remains unenforced to the present date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Lahti. 5.  On 12 October 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police as a suspect in a number of aggravated narcotics offences which had allegedly been committed on 10 December 1999. The offences had been reported to the police on 5 October 2000. The pre-trial investigation was completed on 21 March 2001. 6.  The case was examined and decided by the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) with regard to some of the defendants in May 2001. The charges against the applicant and one other person were removed from the docket for the time being at the public prosecutor's request because H., a witness, had not been located to appear in court. 7.  On 15 April 2002 the public prosecutor preferred charges against the applicant and the other remaining defendant. 8.  On 15 February 2004 H. was summoned to appear before the court on 12 May 2004. That hearing was cancelled as H. was in prison awaiting trial in Sweden. The hearing eventually took place on 11 August 2004. During the hearing H. refused to elaborate on the matter and his pre-trial records were read out to the court. 9.  On the same date the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment. In its judgment the court stated, in reply to the complaint made by the applicant's co-defendant, that when assessed as a whole, the proceedings had lasted longer than usual. However, the delay had been attributable to the legal excuse of a witness, which had prevented the case from being finalised earlier. 10.  On 15 May 2006 the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten), having held an oral hearing, upheld the lower court's judgment. As witness H. was again unavailable for the hearing, despite several previous attempts by the court to reach him, the District Court recordings of his statements were played back during the hearing. 11.  In its decision the court noted that there were no reasons in the co-defendant's case to mitigate the punishment based on the long time that had passed since the offences. It further noted that both defendants had previously been sentenced many times to unconditional prison sentences. Taking that into account the court found that the length of the sentence awarded by the District Court struck a fair balance between the act committed, the motives for that act and other aspects of their guilt. 12.  On 10 October 2006 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant, Mr Juozas Sidabras, was born in 1951 and lives in Kaunas. 7.  He graduated from the Lithuanian Physical Culture Institute (currently the Lithuanian Sports University), qualifying as a sports instructor. 8.  From 1975 to 1986 he was employed by the Lithuanian branch of the USSR State Security Committee (the KGB). After Lithuania declared independence in 1990, he found employment as a tax inspector. 9.  On 31 May 1999 the Lithuanian authorities concluded that the first applicant was subject to the restrictions of Article 2 of the KGB Act (see paragraph 64 below). As a result, on 2 June 1999 he was dismissed by the tax authorities. 10.  The first applicant brought an administrative action against the security intelligence authorities, claiming that his dismissal under the KGB Act, and the ensuing inability to find employment, were unlawful. The domestic courts dismissed his claims (see Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania, nos. 55480/00 and 59330/00, §§ 14-16, ECHR 2004‑VIII). 11.  On 29 November 1999 the first applicant submitted an application to the Court, alleging that he had lost his job and that his employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application of the KGB Act, in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 12.  By a judgment of 27 July 2004 in the case of Sidabras and Džiautas (cited above), the Court found a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. It concluded that the ban on the first applicant seeking employment in various branches of the private sector, in application of Article 2 of the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate measure, despite the legitimacy of the aims pursued (see § 61 of the judgment). The Court ordered the State to pay the first applicant 7,000 euros (EUR) as compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs. 13.  By a letter of 2 November 2004 the Court informed the Lithuanian Government that, as no request had been made under Article 43 of the Convention for the above-mentioned cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber, the judgment of 27 July 2004 had become final on 27 October 2004, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. 14.  In 2005 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe discussed the question of whether the Court’s judgments in the cases of Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (cited above) and Rainys and Gasparavičius v. Lithuania (nos. 70665/01 and 74345/01, 7 April 2005) had been executed. As regards individual measures, the Government informed the Committee of Ministers that the sum awarded to the first applicant had been paid to him. As regards general measures, the Lithuanian Parliament was preparing amendments to the KGB Act, which would be adopted in the near future. Moreover, in order to prevent similar violations of the Convention, the Lithuanian courts and other institutions had been informed about the Court’s judgment and provided with a translation (see also paragraphs 61-63 below). 15.  On 8 December 2006 the first applicant started domestic court proceedings against the State of Lithuania, seeking 257,154 Lithuanian litai (LTL) in pecuniary damages, which he counted as ten years of his tax inspector’s salary, and LTL 500,000 in non-pecuniary damages, which he claimed to have suffered because of the continuing violation of his right to respect for his private life under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The first applicant noted that since 1999 he had been unemployed and registered at the Šiauliai Employment Office (Šiaulių darbo birža), a State institution that provides assistance for job seekers. He argued that, even though he had not been in the service of the KGB for more than twenty years, owing to the restrictions imposed by the KGB Act he had been unable to gain employment in certain branches of the private sector as of 1999. 16.  The first applicant also maintained that the Republic of Lithuania had disregarded its obligations under international treaties and the Convention. Without referring to specific judgments of the Court, he considered that the common principles developed by the Court required that Lithuania execute the Court’s judgment in his case without undue delay. It was his view that the Court’s judgment in his case obliged Lithuania to amend the KGB Act. However, the Lithuanian Parliament had ignored the Court’s judgment and had been stalling any amendment of the KGB Act, which the Court had found to be incompatible with the Convention. He concluded that since 27 October 2004, when the Court’s judgment in his case had become final, the Republic of Lithuania had continued to violate his employment rights. 17.  On 21 February 2007 at the request of the first applicant, the Šiauliai Employment Office issued him with a document to the effect that he had been registered as a job seeker since 14 June 1999, and that between August 2004 and April 2006 he had been turned down a number of times for jobs proposed to him, “for justified reasons”. As it transpires from other documents presented to the Court, those justified reasons included: a lack of professional qualification or work experience for the posts of business manager at a factory producing television sets and at other local companies; another candidate had been chosen for the post of supervisor at a waste management facility; and a lack of English language skills for a job as a hotel manager.\nWithout further explanation, it was also briefly noted in the document of 21 February 2007 that the first applicant “had not been employed because of applicable restrictions (he could not take up jobs which required him to manage people, pedagogical jobs or work in the security sector) (bedarbis neįdarbintas dėl taikomų apribojimų: negali dirbti vadovaujantį, pedagoginį darbą, apsaugoje)”. 18.  On 13 March 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. It observed that the Strasbourg Court had awarded him compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage he had sustained before the Court had adopted its judgment on 27 July 2004. The first-instance court then turned to the first applicant’s claim about the continued discrimination against him after the Court’s judgment. On this point, it observed that the Šiauliai Employment Office’s document of 21 February 2007 stated that he “had not been employed because of applicable restrictions”. Without elaborating any further on the facts, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court merely observed that that particular document and other materials of the case file did not prove that the first applicant’s right to choose a particular private sector job had been infringed because Article 2 of the KGB Act had not been amended after the Court’s judgment. Accordingly, his claim for damages for the period after the Court’s judgment was dismissed. 19.  On 23 March 2007 the first applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. In addition to his previous arguments he further maintained that after the re-establishment of Lithuania’s independence, he had fully cooperated with the Lithuanian authorities and helped to disclose the identities of former KGB officers before they infiltrated the Lithuanian authorities. However, notwithstanding his loyalty to the independent Lithuania and the Court’s judgment in his favour, he had been banned from legal, pedagogical or other jobs because the KGB Act had remained in force. He had been unemployed since June 1999 and thus could not take care of his family.\nAs it appears from his appeal on points of law, the first applicant did not mention any particular instance when he had been refused a job because of his status. Yet he reiterated his point of view that the principles of the Court required that States execute the Court’s judgments without undue delay and within the shortest time possible. 20.  On 14 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the lower court’s decision. It observed that the Convention formed an integral part of the Lithuanian legal system and that individuals could directly rely on its provisions before the national courts. Moreover, in the event of a conflict between the legal norms of the Convention and national laws, the Convention was to be given priority. The Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the lower court’s reasoning that the first applicant’s request for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage sustained before 27 July 2004 (the date of the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in his case) had to be dismissed because an award had already been made by the Court and the applicant had been paid the sum of EUR 7,000. 21.  Regarding the first applicant’s claim in respect of the damage allegedly suffered since then, on the basis of the Court’s judgment in Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy ([GC] nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, § 249, ECHR 2000‑VIII), the Supreme Administrative Court noted that States undertook to take general and, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in their domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible its effects. The States were free to choose how to correct the breach of individual applicants’ Convention rights, provided that the means chosen were compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment. Restitutio in integrum was an important aspect of remedying the violation. 22.  That being so, even though the legislator had an obligation to ensure legal certainty and to reconcile domestic law with the norms of the Convention, legislative amendment was not the only way to implement the Court’s judgment. The fact that the KGB Act had not been amended had not in itself breached the first applicant’s rights. A person’s rights could also be secured by administrative decisions and domestic court practices. Both the KGB Act and the Strasbourg Court’s judgment were in force in Lithuania. For the Supreme Administrative Court, in the event of a conflict between them, priority was to be given to the Court’s judgment. Consequently, even though the KGB Act was still in force, a refusal to employ the first applicant in the private sector based on the restrictions contained in the KGB Act would be unlawful. Accordingly, the protection of a person’s rights through the direct application of the Court’s judgment and before any legislative amendments had been adopted was to be considered proper execution of the Court’s judgment. 23.  Regarding the facts of the case, the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the first applicant had attempted to obtain employment in the private sector. It observed that on 21 February 2007 the Šiauliai Employment Office had issued him with a document certifying that he had been registered as a job seeker since 14 June 1999 and had not been employed because of the restrictions applied to him (see paragraph 17 above). The appellate court noted that in response to its request to explain the reasons for the first applicant’s unemployment in more detail, on 28 December 2007 the Šiauliai Employment Office had provided the appellate court with another document stating that on 14 June 1999 an individual plan for the first applicant’s employment had been prepared with a view to employing him as a lawyer (in-house lawyer; juriskonsultas), because he had more than ten years’ work experience in different companies and institutions in the city of Šiauliai. From 1999 to 2004, more than thirty posts for in-house lawyers had been created in Šiauliai, for which a university degree in law was required and the salary was just higher than minimal salary. The advertisements for those posts had been shown to the first applicant, but he had not been given any of those jobs because the employers considered that he lacked the relevant qualifications. The Šiauliai Employment Office could therefore no longer offer the first applicant other in-house lawyer posts. To increase his chances of finding a job, at the end of 2003 the first applicant had attended computer literacy courses and courses for professional training in the field of administrative work. In 2004 a new individual plan had been compiled together with the first applicant, so that, because he so wished, he could obtain the job of business manager (komercijos vadybininkas). The Šiauliai Employment Office then named six companies which refused the first applicant the job of business manager, administrator and sales manager because other candidates had been chosen or because he lacked knowledge of the English language. 24.  The Supreme Administrative Court observed that those two documents were contradictory. The court deemed it proper to rely on the report of 28 December 2007 as it was more recent and, in the court’s opinion, more comprehensive and explanatory. It concluded that the restrictions which the KGB Act imposed on a person’s ability to find employment in certain areas of the private sector had not been applied to the first applicant. The existence of the KGB Act, as such, had not violated his rights and did not entitle him to compensation. The Supreme Administrative Court determined that there was no proof that, after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004, the first applicant had been prevented from obtaining a private sector job because of the restrictions related to the KGB Act. Furthermore, he had not provided any particular information as to who had refused to employ him on the basis of those restrictions and when. It followed that the first applicant had not managed to secure a job because of the local labour-market situation. Moreover, there was no information that he had attempted to find a job in another manner, that is to say not only relying on the assistance of the Šiauliai Employment Office, but had been refused a job because of the legislative restrictions. To give rise to a violation of the Convention, a breach of a person’s rights had to be real, and not hypothetical. Given that there was no proof that after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004 the first applicant could not obtain a job because the KGB Act remained unchanged, and having concluded that his right to work in the private sector could no longer be restricted because of the direct applicability of the Convention, the first applicant’s claim for damages had to be dismissed. 25.  On 18 April 2008, four days after the Supreme Administrative Court’s final decision in his case, the Šiauliai Employment Office suggested that the first applicant contact two specific private companies for a post as a business manager. On 6 May 2008 the first applicant came back to the Šiauliai Employment Office and stated that he had not taken the business manager’s job in one of those companies because he did not like the conditions offered. He planned to take part in the interview for the business manager’s job in the other company.\nLater in 2008 the first applicant was refused positions of business manager, insurance consultant and other jobs a number of times because he lacked foreign language skills, qualifications, or the relevant work experience. As it transpires from the documents in the Court’s possession, he turned other jobs down simply because he deemed that the salary offered was too low or the work place too far away.\nOn 23 December 2008 the first applicant was appointed as a carer for his mother (paskirtas motinos rūpintoju). The Šiauliai Employment Office therefore discontinued its assistance to him. 26.  The second applicant, Mr Kęstutis Džiautas, was born in 1962 and lives in Vilnius. 27.  On an unspecified date in the 1980s, he graduated from Vilnius University as a lawyer. From 11 February 1991 he worked as a prosecutor. 28.  On 26 May 1999 the Lithuanian authorities concluded that, from 1985 to 1991, the second applicant had been an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB and that he was therefore subject to the restrictions provided for by Article 2 of the KGB Act. As a result, on 31 May 1999 he was dismissed from his job as prosecutor. 29.  The second applicant brought an administrative action against the authorities, claiming that his dismissal under the KGB Act, which made it impossible for him to find employment, was unlawful. The domestic courts dismissed his claims (see Sidabras and Džiautas, cited above, §§ 20-23). 30.  On 5 July 2000 the second applicant lodged an application with the Court. Like the first applicant, he alleged that Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention had been violated. 31.  By a judgment of 27 July 2004 in Sidabras and Džiautas v. Lithuania (cited above), the Court found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention and awarded the second applicant EUR 7,000 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage and costs. 32.  On 5 January 2005 the second applicant wrote to the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Lithuanian Parliament, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice to enquire whether the State intended to amend the KGB Act and, if so, when. At the same time, he acknowledged that the Lithuanian authorities had already paid him a sum of money awarded to him by the Court. 33.  On 11 January 2005 the Government Agent before the Court informed the second applicant that the Ministry of Justice was working on amendments to the KGB Act.\nOn 26 February 2005 the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Seimas informed the second applicant that the Seimas had set up a working group that was also drafting legislative amendments. 34.  According to the Government, as of 29 March 2006 the second applicant was registered in the list of trainee lawyers (advokato padėjėjas), which is a precondition to becoming a lawyer. The Government also noted that the second applicant had submitted his traineeship report on 14 May 2009 and was going to take the Bar exam. 35.  On 20 October 2006 the second applicant sued the Republic of Lithuania for non-pecuniary damage. He claimed to have lost LTL 100,000 as a result of the State’s failure, since 27 July 2004 (the date of the Court’s judgment in his case), to amend the KGB Act. This in turn had restricted his prospects of finding employment in certain private sector areas. He argued that the common principles governing the execution of the Court’s judgments required the State to execute the judgment without undue delay. 36.  On 12 February 2007 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s claim. It noted that the judgment in the Sidabras and Džiautas case did not oblige the State to amend the KGB Act within a specific time-frame and that the Seimas was in the process of discussing the relevant legislative amendments. During the court hearing the second applicant submitted that he had contacted an insurance company and a commercial bank in order to check what the reaction of potential employers would be. He maintained that those employers had replied that they would be unable to employ him because to do so would breach the KGB Act. The first-instance court, however, noted that the second applicant had not provided any evidence to prove that he had actually applied for and been refused any particular job in the private sector. Accordingly, the court had no basis on which to hold that the second applicant had in reality addressed those two employers and that they had refused to hire him. 37.  The second applicant appealed. He pointed out in particular that he had not attempted to obtain employment in the private sector so as not to harm the employers, who would have faced administrative liability if they had employed him. That was the reason why he had no proof of having actually attempted to obtain a job barred to him by the KGB Act. 38.  On 18 April 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s appeal. Its reasoning was similar to that of its decision of 14 April 2008 in the first applicant’s case (see paragraphs 20-22 above). It observed that the second applicant had based his claims for damages on the alleged non-execution of the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004. However, referring to the cases of Scozzari and Giunta (cited above, § 249) and Vermeire v. Belgium (29 November 1991, § 26, Series A no. 214-C), it observed that under Article 46 of the Convention, Contracting States were free to choose the appropriate individual and general measures to discharge their legal obligation to execute the Court’s decisions, albeit monitored by the Committee of Ministers. Moreover, given the abstract nature of the Convention norms, the domestic courts should follow the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence in order better to comprehend their content. 39.  As to the facts of the second applicant’s case, the Supreme Administrative Court observed that, because the Court’s judgment in Sidabras and Džiautas prevailed over the KGB Act, the restrictions on working in certain private sector areas could no longer be imposed on the second applicant. Thus, even though the KGB Act had not been amended, a refusal to employ him on the basis of the restrictions provided for in the KGB Act would be in violation of the Convention and consequently unlawful. It was also the court’s view that protecting a person’s rights by direct application of the Court’s judgments rather than by legislative amendments was an appropriate way to execute those judgments. It followed that, because of the direct applicability of the Convention and the Court’s judgments, the State had not failed to act, the latter being a precondition for the State’s civil liability. 40.  As to the second applicant, he had failed to prove that, after the Court’s judgment of 27 July 2004, he had attempted to obtain employment in the private sector and had been refused owing to the restrictions of the KGB Act. The Supreme Administrative Court stressed that “the mere existence of contradictions and ambiguities in the legal system did not in itself provide grounds for a violation of a person’s rights and did not harm that person”. Similarly, a mere hypothetical violation and a person’s idea that his rights had been breached, without any tangible facts, were not sufficient. The Supreme Administrative Court therefore dismissed the second applicant’s claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 41.  The third applicant, Mr Raimundas Rainys, was born in 1949 and lives in Vilnius. 42.  From 1975 to October 1991 he was an employee of the Lithuanian branch of the KGB. Thereafter he found employment as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company, Omnitel. 43.  On 17 February 2000 the State Security Department informed Omnitel that the third applicant had been a KGB officer and was therefore subject to the restrictions provided for by Article 2 of the KGB Act. As a result, on 23 February 2000 Omnitel dismissed the third applicant from his job. 44.  After unsuccessful litigation before the Lithuanian courts for reinstatement in his job and for unpaid salary (see Rainys and Gasparavičius, cited above, §§ 11-13), the third applicant lodged an application with the Court, alleging that he had lost his job and that his employment prospects had been restricted as a result of the application to him of the KGB Act, in breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 45.  In its judgment in the case of Rainys and Gasparavičius (cited above, § 36) the Court held that the third applicant’s inability to pursue his former profession as a lawyer in a private telecommunications company, and his continuing inability to find private-sector employment because of his “former permanent KGB employee” status under the KGB Act, constituted a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, despite the legitimacy of the aims pursued. The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. 46.  By a letter of 15 July 2005, the Court informed the Lithuanian Government that, as no request had been made under Article 43 of the Convention for the above-mentioned cases to be referred to the Grand Chamber, the judgment of 7 April 2005 had become final on 7 July 2005, in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. 47.  On 25 July 2005 the third applicant requested that the Supreme Administrative Court reopen the proceedings in his earlier case for unlawful actions and reinstatement in his job at Omnitel, on the basis of Article 153 § 2 (1) of the Law on Administrative Court Proceedings (see paragraph 65 below). 48.  On 23 February 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court noted that the proceedings in the domestic courts related to the dismissal of the third applicant from his position as a lawyer with a telecommunications company. It observed that the Court’s judgment gave reason to doubt the lawfulness of those domestic decisions. It therefore decided to reopen the proceedings which the third applicant had previously instituted against the State Security Department and his previous employer, the private telecommunications company, Omnitel.\nFor reasons of jurisdiction, the case was subsequently remitted to the Vilnius Regional Court, a court of general jurisdiction, for a fresh examination. 49.  On 10 July 2007 the Vilnius Regional Court acknowledged that the third applicant had been dismissed from his previous job at Omnitel unlawfully. As to the question of his reinstatement, the court relied on Article 297 § 4 of the Labour Code (see paragraph 67 below) and noted that more than seven years had elapsed since the telecommunications company had dismissed the third applicant from his job. During that time the third applicant had worked in companies specialising in other fields, such as railways and television. Moreover, the activities of the telecommunications company had also evolved. In the court’s view, because he lacked appropriate qualifications and foreign language skills, after such a long time the third applicant would no longer be competent to work as a lawyer in that company. The court also noted that at that time the third applicant was working in another company, without specifying what that company was, and therefore had a source of income. The Regional Court also noted the continuing conflict between the third applicant and the company, which could be another reason not to reinstate him to his former job at Omnitel. Lastly, the court observed that the KGB Act was still in force. In the court’s view, should the third applicant be reinstated, the question of his dismissal could arise de novo, or his employer would face the risk of administrative penalties. In the light of those circumstances, the court dismissed the third applicant’s claim for reinstatement. 50.  The court then turned to the issue of compensation for lost earnings for the period of 23 February 2000 to 23 March 2007, indicated by the third applicant, for which he requested the sum of LTL 136,464. However, it was to be noted that the Court had already awarded him more than LTL 120,000 for both past and future pecuniary loss. Moreover, after his dismissal from Omnitel, the third applicant had worked in different jobs and had received more than LTL 90,000 in salary. Under Lithuanian law, an employee could be awarded no more than three years’ unpaid salary. In the third applicant’s case the salary in Omnitel would amount to LTL 145,440 (LTL 4,040 a month for thirty-six months). Accordingly, the two sums he had already received (LTL 120,000 and LTL 90,000) amounted to more than the award requested. Lastly, the third applicant had acknowledged that since his dismissal from Omnitel, he had continued to receive a pension from another State for his work in the KGB, ranging from LTL 500 to 800 a month. It followed that the claim for pecuniary damage had to be dismissed. 51.  Both the third applicant and Omnitel appealed. At the hearing, the third applicant asked to be paid LTL 167,534 for lost earnings as compensation for the fact that he had still not been reinstated with Omnitel. 52.  On 11 February 2008 the Court of Appeal rejected both appeals. It upheld the lower court’s conclusion that the third applicant had been dismissed from his previous job unlawfully. Moreover, the circumstances mentioned in Article 297 § 4 of the Labour Code existed. Accordingly, the third applicant could not be reinstated in his former job with Omnitel. The court added that “the laws that provide for the prohibition on former [USSR] KGB employees from working in the telecommunications sector are still in force, so that if the [third] applicant were reinstated in his previous job, certain problems might arise”. Additionally, the applicant was working in another company and receiving a pension for his previous work with the KGB. He therefore had a source of income. The Court of Appeal also endorsed the lower court’s view that the third applicant had been compensated by the Strasbourg Court for the pecuniary damage he had suffered as a consequence of his unlawful dismissal. The sum he now asked for – LTL 167,534 – was lower than the awards of LTL 90,000 and 120,000 he had already received. 53.  The third applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his claim for reinstatement and for compensation for lost earnings. He argued that Article 42 § 1 of the Law on the Employment Contract was an imperative legal norm and meant that once the court found that an employee had been dismissed unlawfully, that employee was to be reinstated in his or her previous job. It followed that the argument of the Court of Appeal that “if the [third] applicant were reinstated to his previous job certain problems might arise” was arbitrary. 54.  Omnitel argued that in 2000 it had dismissed the third applicant from his job merely following the letter of the KGB Act. Article 1876 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations provided that an employer could be fined LTL 3,000 to 5,000 should he not comply with the KGB Act. This was all the more likely to happen since the Constitutional Court had recognised Article 2 of the KGB Act as constitutional in its ruling of 4 March 1999, that is before the third applicant was dismissed. Even though the Court had found a violation in the third applicant’s case, the KGB Act was still in force, and therefore the third applicant’s reinstatement was barred. Furthermore, in the judgment of 17 March 2005 the Court had not ordered Lithuania to amend the KGB Act. Nor had the Court ordered the Lithuanian courts to have the third applicant reinstated in his previous job. In his written reply to this last argument, the third applicant observed that the Republic of Lithuania, by not appealing against the Court’s judgment to the Grand Chamber, had shown its agreement with the interpretation and application of the Convention in the Rainys and Gasparavičius judgment. He therefore insisted that the Court’s judgment was sufficient legal basis for him to be reinstated in his former job at the private telecommunications company, Omnitel, notwithstanding the fact that Article 2 of the KGB Act had not been amended. 55.  Lastly, Omnitel maintained that the lower courts had been correct in referring to other circumstances why the third applicant could not be reinstated on the basis of Article 297 § 4 of the Law on the Employment Contract, namely, for economic, technological and organisational reasons, and the fact that it could lead to unfavourable conditions for him (see paragraph 49 above). 56.  On 20 June 2008 the Supreme Court held:\n“The European Convention on Human Rights is an international agreement, ratified by the Seimas. It is therefore an integral part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania... The European Court of Human Rights was established to guarantee the observance of the rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. In ratifying the Convention, the Republic of Lithuania took an undertaking to execute the Court’s final judgments in every case in which it is a party. The Convention norms must be implemented in reality (Konvencijos normos turi būti realiai įgyvendinamos). The State itself establishes the manner in which it will ensure implementation of the Convention norms. One such method is the reopening of proceedings, provided for in Article 366 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Namely, a case which had been terminated by a final court decision may be reopened if the Court finds that the Lithuanian courts’ decisions are in conflict (prieštarauja) with the Convention or its Protocols, to which Lithuania is a party.” 57.  As to the facts of the case, the Supreme Court noted that the third applicant had worked as a lawyer at Omnitel and had been dismissed on 23 February 2000 because of the restrictions provided for in Article 2 of the KGB Act. As the Constitutional Court had held on 4 March 1999, those restrictions were compatible with the Constitution. 58.  The Supreme Court nevertheless observed that on 7 April 2005 the Court had found that the third applicant had lost his job as a lawyer in the private telecommunications company on the basis of the application of the KGB Act which the Court had found to be discriminatory, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8. The Court had also held that the third applicant’s inability to pursue his former profession and his continuing inability to find private sector employment because of his “former KGB officer” status under the Act constituted a disproportionate and thus discriminatory measure, even having regard to the legitimacy of the aims sought (paragraphs 36 and 45 of the Court’s judgment). The Supreme Court then held:\n“Accordingly, even though the KGB Act, which was the basis for dismissing the third applicant from his job, is in force and even acknowledged as being in conformity with the Lithuanian Constitution, the dismissal from his job on the basis of that Act in essence had been recognised as unlawful by the Court’s judgment, that is to say a violation of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8, had been found. This circumstance is not to be questioned when resolving the dispute in the domestic court. Despite the fact that there was no fault in the actions of [the State Security Department or Omnitel], which were implementing the obligations stemming from the KGB Act, the undertaking to implement the provisions of the Convention constituted a legal ground for the courts of the first and appellate instances to conclude that the applicant’s dismissal was unlawful. It must be emphasised that the ground for such a decision is not the provisions of the Law on the Employment Contract or the Labour Code, which regulate the issue of reinstatement, but the provisions of the Convention and the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. At the same time it must be emphasised that, while the KGB Act, the compatibility of which with the Constitution had already been verified (kurio konstitucingumas jau buvo patikrintas) is still in force, the question of reinstating the third applicant to his job may not be resolved favourably. In the circumstances of this case the recognition of the fact that he had been dismissed from his job unlawfully is sufficient satisfaction for him (atleidimo iš darbo pripažinimas neteisėtu šios bylos aplinkybių kontekste yra ieškovui pakankama satisfakcija).” 59.  The Supreme Court noted that the third applicant had been awarded compensation by the Court for actual and future pecuniary damage. Given that he had been awarded EUR 35,000 [approximately LTL 120,000], the third applicant had already been fully compensated for the disproportionate and discriminatory measure – dismissal from his job at Omnitel. For the court of cassation, “there was no legal ground for repeatedly awarding compensation for the violation, which the Court had not found to be of a continuous nature (pakartotinai priteisti žalos atlygimą už pažeidimą, kurio tęstinumo Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismas savo sprendime nekonstatavo, nėra teisinio pagrindo)”. 60.  The Supreme Court thus fully upheld the lower court’s decisions. It also observed that “in the context of the [third applicant’s] case, other arguments by the parties in the appeals on points of law had no legal relevance for the lawfulness of the lower courts’ decisions”. 61.  On 9 February 2005 a working group of the Seimas was set up to prepare amendments to a number of laws, including Article 2 of the KGB Act. According to the documents submitted to the Court by the Government, as of January 2005, the Lithuanian Government submitted a number of reports to the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Council of Europe, explaining individual and general measures regarding execution of the Court’s judgments in the applicants’ cases. They noted, firstly, that the compensation awarded by the Court had been paid to the applicants. The Government also noted that the Court’s judgments and their translations into Lithuanian had been disseminated to the Lithuanian courts. 62.  The Government considered that appropriate execution of the Court’s judgments required setting up legal regulation giving access to employment in the private sector for the former KGB employees, which was in compliance with the Convention requirements. In that connection they indicated that amendments to Article 2 of the KGB Act had been registered in the Seimas and had been presented to its plenary on 14 June 2005. They expected that the law would be amended at the beginning of the Seimas’ autumn session of 2005. The Government also considered that the draft law amending Article 2 of the KGB Act would guarantee the balance between the aims sought and interference with the right to respect for private life. The legislative amendments would also provide appropriate safeguards for avoiding discrimination as well as adequate judicial supervision of the employment restrictions imposed by the KGB Act.\nIn February 2007 the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that the amendments to the KGB Act had been presented to the Seimas on 16 January 2007. However, voting in Parliament had failed because the necessary quorum had not been reached. They reiterated their previous statement about the importance of having the KGB Act amended and expected that the relevant amendments would be adopted in the spring of 2008. In October 2007 the Government wrote to the Department for the Execution of Judgments that a draft new law, amending the KGB Act in its entirety (not only its Article 2), was included in the Seimas’ working programme for the autumn session.\nIn September 2008 the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that the KGB Act had still not been amended and, to their regret, would most likely not be amended until the Seimas’ elections in October 2008. However, a number of specific laws, for example, those regulating the professions of lawyers, bailiffs and notaries, had been amended, so that they no longer banned former KGB employees from taking up those professions. The Government also suggested that the judgments of the Court were directly applicable in the Lithuanian legal system. Therefore, the fact that the KGB Act had not been rectified had no legal consequences for former KGB employees as regards their opportunities to obtain employment in the private sector.\nBy a letter of 22 January 2009, the Government informed the Department for the Execution of Judgments that as of 1 January of that year, even formal restrictions enshrined in the KGB Act had ceased to be valid. 63.  The KGB Act was never amended and is still a valid law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Pécs. 5.  On 16 April 1986 the applicant filed for divorce. In the proceedings before the Nagyatád District Court he also claimed the division of the matrimonial property. 6.  The District Court held hearings on 6 January, 3 March and 19 June 1987. It appointed an expert architect to evaluate the investments which the parties’ had made in their house. 7.  On 22 September 1987 the District Court pronounced the parties’ divorce. 8.  On 21 October 1987 the expert submitted his opinion. 9.  On 23 June 1988 the District Court gave a decision on the division of the matrimonial property.\nOn appeal, on 1 December 1988 the Somogy County Regional Court held a hearing, quashed the first-instance decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 10.  In the resumed proceedings before the District Court, on 17 January 1989 the applicant extended his action to involve his son and the mother of his ex-wife. 11.  On 31 March, 17 April, 16 May, 26 July, 12 September 1989 and 29 August 1990 the District Court held hearings. 12.  On 11 February 1991 the District Court appointed an agricultural expert to make an evaluation of the parties’ orchard. The expert submitted his opinion on 16 April 1991. 13.  On 7 September 1992 the District Court heard the expert architect as well as four witnesses. A further hearing took place on 29 January 1993. 14.  On 2 November 1993 the District Court divided the matrimonial property. 15.  On 2 December 1993 the applicant requested the rectification of the judgment. On 16 December 1993 the District Court dismissed his request. The Regional Court confirmed this decision on 29 April 1994. 16.  On appeal, the Regional Court held hearings on 28 April and 2 June 1994. On 10 June 1994 it modified the first-instance judgment. 17.  On 17 October 1994 the applicant filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. 18.  On 25 April 1995 the Supreme Court quashed the second-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Regional Court. 19.  In the resumed proceedings, a hearing took place on 16 November 1995. On 23 December 1995 the Regional Court appointed an agricultural expert who submitted his opinion on 28 May 1996. 20.  On 5 September and 14 November 1996 the Regional Court held further hearings. On the latter occasion the agricultural expert and a witness were heard. 21.  On 29 November 1996 the Regional Court appointed a forestry expert. The expert presented his opinion on 23 April 1997 and finalised it on 2 June 1997. 22.  On 5 June and 3 July 1997 the Regional Court heard a witness and the forestry expert. 23.  On 10 July 1997 the mother of the applicant’s ex-wife died. The Regional Court interrupted the proceedings on 18 July 1997. On 10 February 1998 the applicant requested the court to arrange for the deceased defendant’s successor to enter the proceedings. On 4 May 1998 the local public notary informed the court that the applicant’s son, being already a party to the case, was the successor. 24.  On 28 August 1998 the Regional Court put further questions to the forestry expert. The expert submitted his replies on 9 November 1998. 25.  On 4 February 1999 the parties requested that the proceedings be stayed. 26.  On 7 October 1999, at the applicant’s request, the Regional Court continued the proceedings and held a hearing. 27.  On 14 October 1999 the Regional Court delivered the final judgment in the case. It was served on the applicant on 4 November 1999.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Padua. 5.  He is the owner of a flat in Battipaglia, which he had let to E.T. 6.  In a writ served on the tenant on 9 July 1991, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Eboli Magistrate. 7.  By a decision of 15 July 1991, which was made enforceable on 4 September 1991, the Eboli Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 March 1992. 8.  On 30 May 1994, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 9.  On 11 August 1994, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 August 1994. 10.  On 26 August 1994, the bailiff made an attempt to recover possession which proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 11.  Thereafter, the applicant decided not to pursue the enforcement proceedings, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police. 12.  On 11 November 1999, the applicant resumed the proceedings. He served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 13.  On 1 December 1999, the tenant instituted civil proceedings before the Salerno District Court contesting the enforcement proceedings. 14.  According to the last information provided by the applicant, pursuant the entry into force of Law Decree no 450 of 27 December 2001, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until the 30 June 2002. 15.  On 15 November 2002 the applicant had not yet recovered possession of the flat.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicants were born in 1972, 1973, 1998 and 1999 respectively and are currently in Sweden. 10.  They arrived in Sweden on 25 August 2002 and applied to the Migration Board (Migrationsverket) for asylum on the following day. The first applicant submitted that he was of Kurdish origin, a Sunnite Muslim, and had lived with his family and worked in Beirut (Lebanon) since 1995. He claimed that in December 1999 he and three of his brothers had been arrested by the Syrian security police and imprisoned in Aleppo (Syria) for nine months because the police wanted information about another brother who had absconded while performing military service in 1998. He further alleged that he had been tortured and ill-treated in prison and had only been released after being hospitalised as a result of the ill-treatment. After his release, he returned to Beirut to stay with his family. Between 2001 and 2002 he was arrested four times by the security police, questioned about his brother's whereabouts and beaten. However, on each occasion, he was released after a few days. In 2002 the applicants moved to Aleppo, where they remained until they left Syria in August 2002.\nThe applicants stated that they had left Syria legally, flying from Damascus to Turkey and then on to Stockholm. They had travelled using their own passports but had destroyed them upon their arrival in Sweden. 11.  On 27 June 2003 the Migration Board rejected the family's application for asylum and their request for residence permits and ordered their deportation to Syria. It noted, firstly, that the general situation of Kurds in Syria was not such as to satisfy the requirements for asylum since, inter alia, Kurds who were Syrian nationals had the same rights as all other citizens. Moreover, the majority of the population in Syria were Sunnite Muslims. The Migration Board then found that the applicants had not shown that they risked persecution if they were sent back to Syria. It observed that, except for the first occasion in 1999, the first applicant had been released shortly after each interrogation by the security police. Moreover, as the interrogations had concerned his brother and not himself, the Migration Board considered that he was not personally in need of protection. In this connection, it noted that the first applicant had not been able to explain why his brother had left the army or why the security police was so interested in him. The Migration Board also observed that the applicants had left Syria legally. 12.  The applicants appealed to the Aliens Appeals Board (Utlänningsnämnden), relying on the same grounds as they had before the Migration Board and adding that Kurds were being persecuted and discriminated against in Syria. They also claimed that they had paid 6,000 United States dollars for false passports which they had subsequently discarded. Furthermore, the second applicant had been admitted to an emergency psychiatric clinic for three days in July 2003 owing to panic attacks. 13.  On 16 September 2003 the Aliens Appeals Board dismissed the appeal on the same grounds as the Migration Board, stating that the new reasons advanced by the applicants did not alter the position. The deportation order was also upheld. 14.  The applicants subsequently lodged a new application with the Aliens Appeals Board which was rejected on 27 November 2003. 15.  Further, during the autumn of 2003, the District Court (tingsrätten) of Blekinge convicted the first applicant of threatening behaviour against his four-year-old daughter and a neighbour. It gave him a suspended sentence and made an order for his deportation from Sweden. However, he appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovrätten) of Skåne and Blekinge, which on 24 February 2004 upheld the conviction and the suspended sentence but quashed the deportation order as it did not consider that the offence in itself merited deportation. 16.  On account of the District Court's decision on deportation, the police authorities had begun preparations to enforce it. In that connection, the Swedish embassy in Damascus ascertained that the applicants had left Damascus legally on 17 August 2002 using their own passports but had in fact travelled via Cyprus, not Turkey. 17.  In January 2004 the family lodged a new application for asylum to the Aliens Appeals Board and requested a stay of execution of the deportation order. They referred to a judgment that had been delivered on 17 November 2003 by the Regional Court in Aleppo which stated that the first applicant had been convicted, in absentia, of complicity in a murder and sentenced to death pursuant to Article 535 § 1 of the Syrian Criminal Code. 18.  On 9 January 2004 the Aliens Appeals Board granted a stay of execution of the deportation order against the applicants until further notice and requested them to submit an original of the judgment and other relevant documents in support of their application. 19.  On 26 January 2004 the applicants submitted to the Aliens Appeals Board a certified copy of the judgment in which it was stated that the first applicant and his brother had, on several occasions, threatened their brother-in-law because they considered that he had ill-treated their sister and paid too small a dowry, thereby dishonouring their family. In November 1998 the first applicant's brother had shot the brother-in-law, after planning the murder with the first applicant, who had provided the weapon. The Syrian court, which noted that the two brothers had absconded, found them guilty of the charges and sentenced them to death. They were also ordered to pay 1,000,000 Syrian pounds to the victim's family and were deprived of their civil rights and all their assets were frozen. The first applicant was also charged with unlawfully possessing a military firearm, a charge which the Syrian court had instructed the military prosecutor to proceed with. Lastly, the court went on to state: “[T]his judgment has been delivered in the accused's absence. [It] can be reopened.” It would appear that the judgment has gained legal force. 20.  The applicants also submitted some further documents concerning the proceedings in Syria, including a summons dated 10 August 2003 requiring the first applicant to present himself before the court within ten days, failing which he would forfeit his civil rights and the control of his assets. The first applicant claimed that he had not been involved in the murder as he had been in Beirut at the material time. He also explained that he had, in fact, spent nine months in custody in 1999-2000 on suspicion of complicity in the murder and had been released on bail on 9 September 2000. He insisted that he had not mentioned this before because it concerned the family's honour and his sister's humiliation. The applicant was represented by a lawyer in Syria whose contact details had been provided to the Aliens Appeals Board. 21.  On 16 February 2004 the Aliens Appeals Board requested the Swedish embassy in Syria to verify whether the judgment was authentic and, if so, whether it was possible to appeal or to have the case reopened. They further enquired if a reprieve was possible and whether death sentences were normally carried out in Syria. 22.  By a letter dated 14 March 2004, the Swedish embassy in Syria informed the Aliens Appeals Board that a local lawyer (förtroendeadvokat) they had engaged had confirmed that the judgment was authentic. He had also carried out research into the Syrian criminal law on sentences for murder and manslaughter, the results of which were attached to the embassy's letter. 23.  The embassy provided the following information in their letter to the Aliens Appeals Board. According to the local lawyer it was probable (sannolikt) that the case would be retried in court once the accused were located and it would then be very likely (troligt) that new witnesses would be called and the entire case reheard. Further, the fact that a case was “honour related” was usually considered a mitigating factor leading to a lighter sentence. The embassy said that the lawyer had also stated that it was not unusual for the Syrian courts to impose the maximum sentence possible when an accused failed to appear for trial after being summoned to do so. It added that, according to their sources, it appeared that the accused had to be present in person in order to obtain a retrial. In this respect, the Syrian judicial system was marked by considerable (betydande) arbitrariness and the death sentence was carried out for serious crimes such as murder. However, every execution had to be approved by the President. The embassy had no reliable information about how frequently death sentences were enforced as they were normally carried out without any public scrutiny or accountability. However, the local lawyer had claimed that it was very rare for the death sentence to be imposed at all by the Syrian courts today. 24.  On 4 March 2004, in response to the information provided by the embassy, the applicants initially noted that the first applicant was wanted in Syria under the judgment. They then observed that the local lawyer had only given his own opinion on the matter and on what he considered was likely to happen. However, there were no guarantees that the case would be reopened or that the outcome would be different. They also stated that it would now be very difficult for the first applicant to find any witnesses to testify on his behalf and that, since the murdered man's family was very wealthy, they would be able to bribe the prosecutor and witnesses and, for that matter, the judge. The first applicant alleged that the murdered man had not been his brother-in-law, contrary to what had been stated in the Syrian judgment (see paragraph 19 above), but that the man's family had relied on forged documents before the Syrian court, stating that the first applicant's sister had been married to him. Thus, the murder was considered to be of the most serious kind. Furthermore, the fact that the first applicant was of Kurdish origin would also expose him to discrimination by the court and possibly to a harsher sentence. The applicants argued that, in view of the fact that the Syrian legal system was arbitrary and corrupt, they had a well-founded fear that the first applicant would be executed if he were returned to Syria and that the family would thereby be destroyed. 25.  On 7 April 2004 the Aliens Appeals Board, by two votes to one, rejected the applicants' request for asylum. The majority considered, on the basis of the local lawyer's research, that it had been established that, if the first applicant returned to Syria, the case against him would be reopened and he would receive a full retrial, at the end of which, if convicted, he would be given a sentence other than death, as the case was “honour related”. Under those circumstances, the majority found that the applicants did not have a well-founded fear and were thus not in need of protection. 26.  The dissenting member of the Aliens Appeals Board considered that, having regard to all the facts of the case, the applicants did have a well-founded fear that the first applicant would be executed if returned to Syria and the family should therefore be granted residence permits in Sweden. 27.  On 19 April 2004, following the Court's indication under Rule 39, the Migration Board granted a stay of execution of the deportation order until further notice. The stay is still in force.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Novocherkassk, the Rostov Region. He is a retired military serviceman. 5.  On 25 March 2003 the Justice of the Peace of the 2nd Court Circuit of Novocherkassk ordered the recovery of the applicant’s pension arrears for the period 1 January 1995 to 31 January 2003 and for the amount owed to be adjusted in line with the rate of inflation. The Justice of the Peace awarded him 40,356.67 Russian roubles (RUB), to be paid by the Military Commissariat of the Rostov Region (“the respondent authority”). The judgment was enforced. 6.  The applicant brought a second claim against the respondent authority seeking a further adjustment to his pension as calculated by the judgment of 25 March 2003, because of an increase to the minimum wage. His claim was backdated to include the period 1995 to 1998. 7.  By a judgment of 15 September 2004 the Novocherkassk Town Court allowed the claim. The court observed, in particular, that the amount awarded on 25 March 2003 had been adjusted to take into account the rise in inflation, but not the increase to the minimum wage for the specified period. The court awarded the applicant RUB 265,594.27, to be paid by the respondent authority, and ordered that the judgment be executed immediately. Representatives of the respondent authority were present at court. 8.  On 12 October 2004 the applicant’s representative sent a copy of the judgment and a writ of execution to the respondent authority. According to its incoming correspondence log (item no. 11734), the documents were registered as having been received. 9.  On an unspecified date the respondent authority lodged a statement of appeal with the Town Court. It appears that on 9 November 2004 (the exact date is unclear) the Novocherkassk Town Court refused to examine the application because the authority had failed to pay the court fee. 10.  On 11 November 2004 the respondent authority withdrew its statement of appeal. 11.  On 24 November 2004 the respondent authority requested a re‑examination of the case in the light of newly discovered circumstances. On 10 February 2005 the Novocherkassk Town Court dismissed the application. 12.  In September 2005 the respondent authority applied for the case be re-examined by way of supervisory review. 13.  On 29 December 2005 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgment of 15 September 2004 by way of supervisory review and transferred the case for fresh examination by a different court. The Presidium concluded that the first-instance court had erroneously applied the substantive law and had failed to verify whether the same claim had already been examined by the Justice of the Peace on 25 March 2003. It also found that the Novocherkassk Town Court had lacked territorial jurisdiction to hear the case. The Presidium noted that judgment had been awarded against the respondent authority and that the case should have been examined by a court in the district where the respondent authority was located. 14.  The applicant did not attend the hearing and received a copy of the judgment on 17 February 2006. 15.  On 17 March 2006 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Rostov examined the applicant’s claim against the respondent authority and rejected it as having no basis in law. No further appeal was brought.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are:\n(1) Mr Magomed Abdulvadudovich[1] Elsiyev, born in 1941,\n(2) Mr Isa Noshayevich Demelkhanov, born in 1956,\n(3) Mr Vakhid Boltiyev, born in 1937,\n(4) Ms Petimat Dzhamaldiyevna[2] Nakayeva, born in 1954,\n(5) Ms Shurka Abubakarova, born in 1939,\n(6) Mr Khozhbaudi Abdul-Vakhitovich Mandiyev, born in 1957,\n(7) Ms Zavra Saidselimovna Demilkhanova, born in 1961, and\n(8) Ms Shakhadat (also spelled as Shakhadad) Alieyvna Agmerzayeva, born in 1962. 7.  The applicants live in the village of Tsotsi-Yurt, in the Kurchaloy district of Chechnya. The applicants’ relatives have been detained and subsequently disappeared. 8.  On 31 August 2002 the Russian military troops surrounded the village of Tsotsi-Yurt (also known as Oktyabrskoye). Between 1 and 8 September 2002 they carried out a large-scale special security operation in the village. The military, under the command of General Studenikin (also spelled as Studenkin), based their headquarters and a temporary filtration point on the outskirts of the village. The filtration point, known to the local residents as “the flour mill” and “the brigade”, consisted of an old barn, a former repair station and a fenced yard. Military division no. 4 (4-я дивизия) was among the units which participated in the special operation. At least 86 persons were apprehended during the operation and taken to the filtration point by “AvtoZak” vehicles (GAZ-53 lorries equipped for transportation of detainees), one of which had the registration number 112 BM 61.\n(b)  Apprehension of Salakh Elsiyev and subsequent events 9.  The first applicant is the father of Mr Salakh Magomedovich Elsiyev, who was born in 1972. 10.  On 2 September 2002 the Elsiyevs were at home, at 21 Shosseinaya Street, in the village of Tsotsi-Yurt. At about 3 p.m. two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and a UAZ car arrived at their house. The vehicles’ registration numbers were covered with mud. 11.  The first applicant went outside. Twelve or thirteen armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks, equipped with portable radio systems and armed with Stechkin pistols and machine guns, entered the yard and ordered the first applicant to prostrate himself. He disobeyed their order. The men forced him against the wall and asked how many men were in the house. The first applicant named his son and himself. 12.  The servicemen entered the house, dragged Salakh Elsiyev outside and put him on the ground. When the first applicant requested the soldiers to explain what was happening, one of them pointed a Stechkin gun at him and ordered him to keep silent. Three or four servicemen entered the Elsiyevs’ house and searched it. They did not produce any search warrant. 13.  The servicemen searched Salakh Elsiyev, then put him in the APC and drove away in the direction of the western outskirts of the village, where the special operation’s headquarters were stationed. The apprehension of the first applicant’s son was witnessed by the first applicant’s neighbour, Mr Sh.G., who provided a witness statement similar to that of the first applicant. 14.  On 3 September 2002 the first applicant and his wife went to the filtration point. They saw that the apprehended men were being kept in the barn. From the date of Salakh Elsiyev’s apprehension the applicant went to the point every day, waiting for the release of his son. In the morning of 7 September 2002 the first applicant returned to the filtration point and saw that all the military vehicles had left in an unknown direction.\n(c)  Apprehension of Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov and Akhmed Demilkhanov 15.  The second applicant is the father of Mr Iskhadzhi Isayevich Demelkhanov (also spelled as Demilkhanov), who was born in 1980. The seventh applicant is the mother of Mr Akhmed Musayevich Demilkhanov (also spelled as Demelkhanov), who was born in 1984. Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov and Akhmed Demilkhanov are cousins and grandchildren of Mr Nozha (also spelled as Nazha) Demelkhanov, who also lives in Tsotsi-Yurt. 16.  At about 7 p.m. on 2 September 2002 two APCs and an infantry battle vehicle (“BMP”) arrived at the second applicant’s house in Vostochnaya Street (the house did not have a number). Around thirty men in camouflage uniforms, some of whom were wearing masks, entered inside. They did not introduce themselves. They were armed with machine guns and grenade launchers and spoke unaccented Russian. 17.  The men took all the family members outside and lined them up along the wall. Then the servicemen searched the house and took several items of the family’s property. Having spent about an hour at the applicant’s house, they drove away. 18.  Fearing for their sons’ safety, the second and seventh applicants sent Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov and Akhmed Demilkhanov to the house of their grandfather, Mr Nozha Demelkhanov. 19.  At about 11 a.m. on 3 September 2002 a Ural and a UAZ vehicle arrived at Nozha Demelkhanov’s gate at 61 Gagarina Street in Tsotsi-Yurt. Ten to twelve armed men rushed into the house, forced its residents outside, ordered the younger men to undress and checked their identity papers. Then the servicemen put Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov and Akhmed Demilkhanov on the ground, beat them with gun butts and loaded them into the UAZ vehicle. 20.  According to a witness, whose name was not disclosed by the applicants out of fear for his safety, for three days following their apprehension Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov and Akhmed Demilkhanov were kept in an “AvtoZak” vehicle parked next to the old mill house.\n(d)  Apprehension of Adam Boltiyev 21.  The third applicant is the father of Mr Adam Vakhidovich Boltiyev, who was born in 1980. 22.  At about 9 a.m. on 3 September 2002 two APCs arrived at the Boltiyevs’ house at 1 Rechnaya Street in Tsotsi-Yurt. A group of servicemen in camouflage uniforms, armed with machine guns and knives, got out of the vehicles and entered the applicant’s house. They did not introduce themselves. 23.  The servicemen checked the Boltiyevs’ identity documents. Adam Boltiyev produced a certificate confirming that his passport was being exchanged. The servicemen decided to take him with them. The third applicant insisted on accompanying his son. Then the servicemen took Adam Boltiyev and the third applicant to a Ural lorry and drove them to the old mill house. 24.  Upon arrival at the filtration point the servicemen ordered the third applicant and his son to lie down on the floor. For several hours the Boltiyevs were not allowed to move. In the evening of 3 September 2002 the servicemen ordered the third applicant to leave and promised to release Adam Boltiyev in a few hours. The third applicant returned home. He has not seen his son ever since.\n(e)  Apprehension of Dzhabrail Debishev 25.  The fourth applicant is the mother of Mr Dzhabrail Abdulovich Debishev, who was born in 1977. 26.  At about 9 a.m. on 3 September 2002 an APC pulled up in front of the fourth applicant’s house at 5 Ovrazhnaya Street in Tsotsi-Yurt. A group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms emerged from the APC, entered the house, ordered the family members to go outside and demanded their identity documents. The soldiers also searched the house and the yard. 27.  After examining Dzhabrail Debishev’s papers the servicemen loaded him into the APC. The fourth applicant followed her son and got into the vehicle, but the servicemen ordered her to come out, threatening to shoot Dzhabrail. She obeyed. The APC drove away in the direction of the old mill house. Some witnesses reported that they had seen Dzhabrail Debishev at the temporary filtration point shortly afterwards.\n(f)  Apprehension of Lom-Ali Abubakarov 28.  The fifth applicant is the mother of Mr Lom-Ali Borisovich Abubakarov, who was born in 1968. 29.  At about 11 a.m. on 3 September 2002 two APCs and one UAZ car without registration numbers arrived at the fifth applicant’s house in Gagarina Street (the house did not have a number). Twenty to twenty-five armed men wearing camouflage uniforms surrounded the house. Ten of them went inside, examined all the wardrobes and asked whether there were any weapons hidden. They spoke unaccented Russian. 30.  The applicant’s family members were forced to go to the yard and asked to produce their identity documents. In the yard the fifth applicant lost consciousness. The servicemen did not allow Lom-Ali Abubakarov to approach her. 31.  After that a Ural lorry without a registration number arrived at the house. The servicemen told the Abubakarovs that they were taking Lom-Ali for an identity check and that in about three hours he would return home. They put him in the lorry and drove away.\n(g)  Apprehension of Ramzan Mandiyev 32.  The sixth applicant is the father of Mr Ramzan Khozhbaudiyevich Mandiyev, who was born in 1981. 33.  On 3 September 2002 the Mandiyev family and their relatives were holding a funeral ceremony at the Mandiyevs’ house in Vostochnaya Street in Tsotsi-Yurt. A group of servicemen arrived at the house in a Ural vehicle, entered inside, examined the corpse, loaded all those present into the vehicle and drove them to the old mill house. There they checked the identity papers of the detained persons and released all of them except for Ramzan Mandiyev. The sixth applicant has not seen him ever since.\n(h)  Apprehension of Aslambek Agmerzayev 34.  The eighth applicant is the wife of Mr Aslambek Vakhayevich Agmerzayev (also spelled as Agamerzayev), who was born in 1956. 35.  On 3 September 2002 an APC arrived at the applicant’s house at 8 Kommunisticheskaya Street in Tsotsi-Yurt; the vehicle’s registration number was painted over. Around fifteen armed men in camouflage uniforms emerged from the vehicle. Some of them wore masks. The men, who spoke unaccented Russian, did not introduce themselves. They ordered the Agmerzayevs to go outside and searched them in the yard. Then they checked Aslambek Agmerzayev’s identity documents and said that something was wrong with them. 36.  After that, without producing any search warrant, the servicemen searched the house. They took some items of the family’s property, forced Aslambek Agmerzayev into the APC and drove away.\n(i)  Completion of the special operation 37.  On 4 September 2002 the head of the Chechen administration, Mr A. Kadyrov, and the chief commander of the United Group Alignment (UGA), General V. Moltenskoy, arrived in the village of Tsotsi-Yurt and negotiated the release of the majority of the persons being kept at the temporary filtration point. However, the applicants’ relatives remained in detention. 38.  For several days after that, the applicants visited the old mill house and waited for their relatives’ release. General Studenikin, who was in charge of the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt, repeatedly promised them that the detainees would be released upon completion of the operation. 39.  On 7 September 2002 the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt was finished. The servicemen did not release the applicants’ relatives. The applicants have not seen Salakh Elsiyev, Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov, Adam Boltiyev, Dzhabrail Debishev, Lom-Ali Abubakarov, Ramzan Mandiyev, Akhmed Demilkhanov and Aslambek Agmerzayev dead or alive ever since. 40.  In support of their statements, the applicants submitted the following documents: a hand-drawn map of the area of Tsotsi-Yurt; a witness statement by the eighth applicant, dated 10 October 2002; a witness statement by the fourth applicant, dated 10 October 2002; a witness statement by the first applicant, dated 10 October 2002; a witness statement by the fifth applicant’s relative Mrs L.B., dated 12 June 2003; a witness statement by the fifth applicant’s relative Mrs M.A., dated 12 June 2003; a witness statement by the sixth applicant’s wife, Mrs R.M., dated 20 June 2003; two witness statements by the second and seventh applicants’ relative Mr N.D., dated 21 June 2003 and 19 April 2004; a witness statement by the second and seventh applicants’ relative Mrs E.D., dated 21 June 2003; a witness statement by the sixth applicant, dated 22 July 2003; a witness statement by the first applicant’s neighbour Mr Sh.G., dated 4 November 2003; a witness statement by the second applicant, dated 4 April 2004; a witness statement by the third applicant, dated 19 April 2004; and a character reference for Dzhabrail Debishev, undated. 41.  According to the Government’s submission, “between 2 and 8 September 2002, on the basis of a military order issued by the Chechnya military commander, the Kurchaloy district military commander’s office conducted a special security operation (рассечение) in the settlement of Tsotsi-Yurt along the river Khunkhulau. A number of vehicles took part in the operation, including one APC-80, two ARVs (armoured reconnaissance vehicle – бронированная разведывательно-дозорная машина (БРДМ)), and KAMAZ (КАМАЗ) and ZIL (ЗИЛ)) lorries. A representative of the United Group Alignment was in charge of the operation. An identity check was also conducted during the operation.” 42.  The Government further referred to a number of documents obtained by the domestic investigation opened into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives. These documents are summarised below. 43.  On 11 September 2002 the interim district prosecutor requested that the Kurchaloy district military commander’s office (the district military commander’s office), the Kurchaloy district department of the Federal Security Service (the district department of the FSB), the Kurchaloy district department of the interior (the ROVD) and the Kurchaloy interim district department of the interior (the VOVD) provide the investigators with information concerning the security operation conducted in Tsotsi-Yurt between 2 and 7 September 2002. 44.  According to a letter received from the district military commander on 13 September 2002, upon the order of the Chechnya military commander, the district military commander’s office had conducted a security operation from 2 to 8 September 2002 in Tsotsi-Yurt, Chechnya. A representative of the UGA had been in charge of the operation. The following military vehicles had been used during the operation: one APC, two BMPs, and KAMAZ and ZIL military lorries. The letter also stated that the servicemen of the district military commander’s office had not participated in the search of the houses and the identity check. 45.  According to a letter from the deputy head of the district department of the FSB, from 1 to 8 September 2002 an identity check was conducted in Tsotsi-Yurt as the authorities had received information that a leader of an illegal armed group, Mr R.Ch., might be hiding in the village. 46. According to a letter of 13 September 2002 from the head of the VOVD, a special operational-investigating group of the Ministry of the Interior (the MVD), had been stationed outside Tsotsi-Yurt. The group had participated in the security operation in the village from 2 to 7 September 2002. 47. According to a letter of 14 September 2002 from the head of the ROVD, officers of the ROVD participated in the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt only between 6 and 8 September 2002.\n(b)  Information concerning the apprehension of the applicants’ relatives 48.  The Government did not challenge most of the facts as submitted by the applicants. In their observations of 9 November 2007 the Government stated that “between 2 and 4 September 2002 in the village of Tsotsi-Yurt in the Kurchaloy district of the Chechen Republic unidentified armed persons kidnapped R. Mandiyev, D. Debishev, A. Demilkhanov, I. Demilkhanov, ... A. Agamerzayev, S. Elsiyev, A. Boltiyev and L.‑A. Abubakarov”. 49.  However, further in the same submission, without mentioning that the applicants’ relatives had been detained by State servicemen, the Government stated that “the material in the investigation file does not provide grounds to assume that the detained [applicants’ relatives] were not released [by military servicemen] along with other residents of the village of Tsotsi-Yurt and that they did not return to their places of residence because of the actions of the military forces rather than other circumstances”. 50.  In their further observations of 11 March 2008 the Government stated that “the authorities of the Russian Federation insist on their position stated in the Memorandum [of 9 November 2007] that the applicants’ relatives were indeed detained [by Russian servicemen] but were later released. The reason for their failure to return home is unknown ...” and that “the Government insist on their position that the detention of [the applicants’ relatives] was lawful, as a special operation was being conducted”. 51.  Referring to the information obtained by the official investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives, the Government submitted to the Court the following information concerning the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of the applicants’ relatives. 52.  Between 7 and 11 September 2002 the investigators conducted preliminary questioning of the second, sixth, first, eighth, fourth and third applicants and the daughter-in-law of the fifth applicant. A summary of their statements, as submitted by the Government, is provided below. 53.  According to the second applicant, at about 11 a.m. on 3 September 2002 unknown armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks arrived at his house in an APC and a Ural lorry without registration numbers. They took away some items of his family’s property. 54.  According to the sixth applicant, on 3 September 2002 his family was holding a funeral ceremony. At about 10.30 a.m. a group of armed men arrived at his house in an APC and a URAL vehicle without registration numbers. The armed men put all the men who had been attending the ceremony into the Ural vehicle and took them to the headquarters of the security operation. There the armed men checked the identity papers of the sixth applicant and his guests and released the applicant and some of the other men. However, four men were not released, including two of the sixth applicant’s sons. Several days later, on 6 September 2002, the sixth applicant’s son Ruslan was released. On the same day, 6 September 2002, at about 5.40 p.m. a Russian general gave a speech on the outskirts of Tsotsi-Yurt and announced that all the detainees had been released. However, the applicant’s other son, Ramzan, did not return home. 55.  According to the first applicant, at about 3.15 p.m. on 2 September 2002, a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at his house in two APCs and a UAZ car; the APCs’ registration numbers were covered with mud. The men were armed with Stechkin automatic pistols and machine guns. 56.  According to the eighth applicant, at about 10 a.m. on 2 September 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at her house in APCs and a URAL lorry. They took away her husband, A. Agmerzayev. On the following day, 3 September 2002, two APCs again arrived at her house. The same armed men looked around her house and the yard and took away some items of their family’s property. They found her husband’s jacket and burned it, along with his passport and other documents. On 5 September 2002, one of the residents of Tsotsi-Yurt, a doctor, Mr A.Kh., told the applicant that from 3 to 4 September 2002 he had been detained during the night together with her husband in the same vehicle; on the following morning he had been released, but her husband had not. 57.  According to the fourth applicant, at about 8 a.m. on 3 September 2002, a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks entered her house and took away her son D. Debishev. 58.  According to the third applicant, on 3 September 2002, a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms arrived at his house in APCs and a URAL vehicle. They put the applicant and his son, A. Boltiyev, in the URAL lorry and took them to the place situated between “the flour mill” and “the brigade”. In the evening the applicant was allowed to return home, but his son remained there. 59.  According to the fifth applicant’s daughter-in-law, at about 11 a.m. on 3 September 2002, a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms took away her husband, L.-A. Abubakarov. According to the witness, another resident of the village, Mr I.A., was also apprehended by the armed men on the same date, but he was released on 4 September 2002. 60.  Immediately after their relatives had been apprehended, the applicants, together with the head of the local administration, wrote to the head of the Chechen administration, Mr A. Kadyrov, describing in detail the circumstances of their relatives’ apprehension and requesting information about their whereabouts. The applicants and their relatives submitted similar complaints to various official bodies, such as the prosecutors’ offices at different levels and the Special Envoy of the Russian President in Chechnya for Rights and Freedoms (“the Special Envoy”). They were assisted in their efforts by the SRJI. The applicants retained copies of a number of their complaints and the authorities’ responses and submitted them to the Court. These documents are summarised below. 61.  On 11 September 2002 the prosecutor’s office of the Kurchaloy district of Chechnya (“the district prosecutor’s office”) instituted an investigation into the disappearances of Salakh Elsiyev, Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov, Akhmed Demilkhanov, Adam Boltiyev, Dzhabrail Debishev, Lom-Ali Abubakarov, Ramzan Mandiyev and Aslambek Agmerzayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 75089. 62.  On 26 September, 3 October, 20 October and 5 November 2002 the applicants wrote to various State authorities, including the district military commander, the Chechnya military commander, the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA and the Prosecutor General’s office, asking for assistance in the search for their disappeared relatives. 63.  On 18 November 2002 the SRJI wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office describing the events of 1 to 7 September 2002 in Tsotsi-Yurt and requesting to be provided with information on the whereabouts of the disappeared men. 64.  On 26 December 2002 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 (the unit military prosecutor’s office) informed the Special Envoy that an inquiry had been conducted which had established that no military personnel had been involved in the disappearance of the applicants’ relatives and that the criminal investigation into the events was under way. 65.  On 31 March 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the Special Envoy that the Shali district prosecutor’s office had opened an investigation into the disappearances of the applicants’ relatives, and that this investigation had found no evidence implicating military servicemen in the abduction of the applicants’ relatives. It appears that the letter provided incorrect information as the investigation was being conducted by the Kurchaloy district prosecutor’s office. 66.  On 18 April 2003 the SRJI requested the district prosecutor’s office to provide the applicants with copies of the decision to open the investigation in criminal case no. 75089, to grant the applicants victim status in the proceedings and to inform them about the progress of the investigation. On 20 May 2003 the district prosecutor’s office rejected the SRJI’s request, stating that information concerning a pending investigation was confidential and that the SRJI’s lawyers were not participants in the proceedings. 67.  On 4 June 2003 the applicants reiterated their request of 18 April 2003. No response was given to this request. 68.  On 26 July 2003 the district prosecutor’s office transferred the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 to the unit military prosecutor’s office as it had been established that the applicants’ relatives had been apprehended by units equipped with armoured vehicles belonging to the Ministry of Defence or the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior. 69.  On 12 August 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was referred back to the district prosecutor’s office, as it had been established that after being apprehended, three of the applicants’ relatives, namely A. Boltiyev, D. Debishev and R. Mandiyev, had been detained in an “AvtoZak” vehicle with the registration number B 112 MB 61, which had belonged to the Ministry of Justice. 70.  On 8 October 2003 the SRJI wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office, complaining in detail of the ineffectiveness of the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 and requesting that it be conducted under the control of the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 71.  On 25 October 2003 the district prosecutor’s office again transferred the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 to the unit military prosecutor’s office and suspended the investigation in case no. 75089 owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 72.  On 30 October 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the SRJI about the suspension of the investigation and stated that the search for the applicants’ relatives and those responsible for their abduction was under way. 73.  On 3 and 19 December 2003 the SRJI wrote to the district and Chechnya prosecutors’ offices, requesting to be provided with information on measures taken by the investigators in the criminal case. In particular, it requested to be informed whether the identities of the servicemen who had participated in the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt had been established; whether General Studenikin had been questioned by the investigators; and whether the residents of Tsotsi-Yurt had been questioned about the events. 74.  On 8 January and 2 February 2004 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the SRJI that the investigation in the criminal case was under way and that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 75.  On 22 January 2004 the unit military prosecutor’s office again referred the investigation in the criminal case back to the district prosecutor’s office without having taken any investigative measures since receiving the case file on 25 October 2003. 76.  On 12 March 2004 the investigation in case no. 75089 was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 77.  On 22 December 2005 the applicants complained to the district prosecutor of the ineffectiveness of the investigation in the criminal case. In their detailed submission they once again described the circumstances of their relatives’ apprehension and requested that the investigators take the following measures in particular: questioning of General Studenikin and other officers who had been in charge of the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt; identification and questioning of the servicemen who had participated in the operation; identification of the military units which had used APCs and other military vehicles during the operation; and questioning of the residents of Tsotsi-Yurt who had witnessed the events. 78.  On 11 September 2002 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Salakh Elsiyev, Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov, Adam Boltiyev, Dzhabrail Debishev, Lom-Ali Abubakarov, Ramzan Mandiyev, Akhmed Demilkhanov and Aslambek Agmerzayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned number 75089. It was decided that the investigation of the criminal case would be conducted by a group of investigators from the district prosecutor’s office. The applicants were informed about the opening of the criminal proceedings on the same date. 79.  On 11 September 2002 the investigators requested information concerning the special operation conducted in Tsotsi-Yurt from 2 to 7 September 2002 from the local law-enforcement agencies (see paragraph 43 above). 80.  In September 2002 the investigators received responses to their information requests, confirming that a security operation had been conducted in Tsotsi-Yurt from 1 to 8 September 2002 (see paragraphs 44-47 above). 81.  On 11 September 2002 the investigators conducted an examination of the crime scene in the houses of the applicants and their relatives. In addition, within the two following weeks the investigators had questioned a number of eyewitnesses to the abductions of the applicants’ relatives. 82.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned the sixth applicant, who stated that at about 10.30 a.m. on 3 September 2002, when he and his relatives had been attending a funeral ceremony, an APC without registration numbers had arrived at his house. A group of armed men, who had arrived in the APC, had called for a Ural lorry without registration numbers, which had arrived along with two UAZ cars. All those attending the funeral, including the applicant’s two sons, had been placed into the vehicles and taken to the place known as “the operation’s headquarters”, where the applicant’s identity documents had been checked and he had been released an hour later. On 5 September 2002 his son Ruslan had been released; his other son Ramzan had not returned home. On the same date the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 83.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who stated that at about 3.15 p.m. on 3 September 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had arrived at his house in APCs and a UAZ car; the vehicles’ registration numbers had been concealed with mud. The men, who had been armed with Stechkin automatic pistols with silencers, had taken away his son, Salakh Elsiyev. On the same date the applicant’s fellow villagers, from the family of Mr V., had also been apprehended by the armed men.\nOn the same date the applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 84.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned the fourth applicant’s husband, who stated that on 2 September 2002 he had seen a convoy of nine APCs and a Ural lorry driving down his street in Tsotsi-Yurt. On the following day, 3 September 2002, at about 9 a.m. an APC with armed military servicemen had arrived at his house. Some of the servicemen had been wearing masks. They had taken away his son and his wife and had driven away. Having driven for about 400 metres, the APC had stopped and the witness’s wife (the fourth applicant) had got out of the vehicle. The fourth applicant had told the witness that she had seen their fellow villager Mr A.P. in the APC. According to the witness, on 5 or 6 September 2002 Mr A.P. had been found by his relatives in the forest and had immediately been sent to hospital for medical treatment. 85.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned Mrs Ya.D., a relative of the second and seventh applicants, who was also granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. According to Mrs Ya.D., at about 10 a.m. on 3 September 2002 a group of unidentified armed men in camouflage uniforms had arrived in APCs and a UAZ car at the house of her relatives in Tsotsi-Yurt. The vehicles had not had registration numbers. The armed men had apprehended her son Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov and his cousin Akhmed Demilkhanov. At about 3 p.m. on the same date a group of armed men in masks had arrived at her house, had conducted an identity check and had looked around the house. 86.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned Mrs Z.D., a relative of the second and seventh applicants, who was also granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. According to Mrs Z.D., at about 10 a.m. on 3 September 2002 an APC and a UAZ car had arrived at her house; the vehicles’ registration numbers had been covered with mud. A group of armed men had got out of the vehicles and had taken away her son Akhmed Demilkhanov and his cousin Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov. The witness and other residents of Tsotsi-Yurt had gone to the outskirts of the village, where the military had been based; but they had not been allowed to go inside the facilities. The witness further stated that on 5 September 2002 the head of the Chechen administration, Mr Kadyrov, and a Russian general had arrived at the village. The general had promised that all those apprehended during the operation would be released in the evening of the same day. However, her son had not returned home. 87.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned the third applicant, who on the same date was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. The applicant stated that at about 8 a.m. on 3 September 2002 an APC without registration numbers had arrived at his house in Tsotsi-Yurt. A group of armed men in camouflage uniforms had descended from it and entered the house. One of them had ordered all members of the applicant’s family to gather in the yard. After that the men had taken the applicant and his son to the outskirts of the village, by the flour mill. In the evening of the same day, at about 6 p.m., the applicant had received his passport back from the servicemen and had been allowed to return home. On his way home the applicant had met a group of fellow villagers who had told him that the military had taken away 15 or 16 men from Tsotsi-Yurt. The applicant’s son had not returned home. 88.  On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned the fifth applicant, who was also granted victim status in the criminal proceedings, and his wife, Mrs L.A. Both witnesses provided analogous testimonies to the effect that at about 11 a.m. on 3 September 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms had taken away their relative Lom-Ali Abubakarov from their home. On the following day, 4 September 2002, the same group of armed men had also apprehended another resident of Tsotsi-Yurt, Mr I.A., who had been released on 4 September 2002. 89. On 12 September 2002 the investigators questioned and granted victim status in the criminal case to the eighth applicant’s husband, Mr V.A. He stated that at about 10 a.m. on 3 September 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms had arrived at his house on an APC. The men looked around the house and asked his son, Aslambek Agmerzayev, to follow them. Together with his son they had gone to another house; after that his son had left with these men in the APC and had not returned home. 90.  On 23 September 2002 the investigators questioned and granted victim status in the criminal case to Mr N.O. He stated that in the morning of 4 September 2002 he had been in his vegetable garden when a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms had blindfolded him and had put him in a vehicle. When the blindfold had been removed, the witness had seen that he was in a forest, surrounded by men in green camouflage uniform. According to the witness, he had spent two days in the forest. The men had tortured him with electricity and had beaten his feet with a stick, asking whether he knew any members of illegal armed groups. After that he had been taken to another place, located in a field, where he had spent three days during which military servicemen had fed him and had given him warm clothes for the night. For three nights the witness had slept in an APC with the servicemen. Afterwards he had been taken to another place, where he had been blindfolded and tied up to a tree. He had managed to set himself free. Having walked for about 3 km, he had entered the village of Martan-Chu in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya, where the local police officers had taken him to the department of the interior of the Urus-Martan district (the Urus-Martan ROVD). After that the witness had returned home. 91.  On 11 November 2002 the district prosecutor’s office suspended the investigation in the criminal case owing to the failure to establish the perpetrators. On the same date the applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 92. On 30 April 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 was resumed. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 93.  On 1 June 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended owing to the failure to establish the perpetrators. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 94.   On 24 July 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 was resumed. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 95.  On 25 July 2003 the investigators questioned Mr P.A., who stated that on 2 September 2002 a group of unidentified armed men had taken him away from his house; together with A. Agmerzayev, he had been taken to the outskirts of Tsotsi-Yurt. In the evening of the same day the armed men had returned passports to fifteen of the detained men and released them. 96.  On 25 July 2003 the investigators had questioned seven witnesses, including Mrs M.T., Mrs E.Kh., Mrs B.V., Mr Sh.G., Mr S.M., Mrs T.I. and Mrs Z.S., who provided analogous statements to the effect that on 2 September 2002 unidentified armed men in APCs and Ural and UAZ vehicles had apprehended a number of their fellow villagers in Tsotsi-Yurt. 97.  On 26 July 2003 the district prosecutor’s office transferred the investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives to the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA as the investigators had established that the applicants’ relatives had been apprehended by military units from the Ministry of Defence or the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior, who had been equipped during the operation with armoured vehicles (see paragraph 136 below). 98.  On 12 August 2003 the military prosecutor’s office referred the criminal case back to the district prosecutor’s office for investigation as it had been established that the applicants’ relatives had been detained in an “AvtoZak” vehicle with the registration number B 112 MB 61 RUS, which had belonged to the Ministry of Justice (see paragraph 136 below). 99.  Between 22 August and 23 October 2003 the investigators forwarded several requests to a number of State officials, including the military commander of the UGA, the head of archives of the Headquarters of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior in the Northern Caucasus, the head of the Department of the Ministry of the Interior in the Southern Federal Circuit and the head of archives of the Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence in the Northern Caucasus, asking to be provided with information concerning the units and the vehicles involved in the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt. 100.  On 25 October 2003 the district prosecutor’s office suspended the criminal investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators and transferred the investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives to the military prosecutor’s office for the second time. The applicants or their relatives were informed about the decision to suspend the investigation. 101.   On 22 January 2004 the military prosecutor’s office once again returned the criminal case file to the district prosecutor’s office for investigation. On the same date the deputy Chechnya prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation and it was resumed. The applicants or their relatives were informed about the resumption of the criminal proceedings. 102.   On 22 January 2004 the investigators forwarded a number of information requests to various law-enforcement agencies. According to the responses received from the Main Information Centres of the Ministry of the Interior of Chechnya and the Ministry of the Interior of the Russian Federation, these agencies did not have any information concerning the detention of the applicants’ relatives. 103.  On 22 January 2004 the investigators requested the district department of the FSB and the district military commander’s office to provide information as to the owner of the vehicle with the registration number B 112 MB 61, in which the abducted men had been detained and whether the agencies had any other information about the disappeared men. 104.  On 27 February 2004 the investigators forwarded a similar information request to the ROVD. In addition they asked the ROVD to conduct a crime-scene examination, to question the fourth applicant and to identify and question other witnesses to the abduction of the applicants’ relatives. 105.  On 7 March 2004 the district department of the FSB replied that it did not have any information about the vehicle. The response from the military commander’s office was of the same nature. 106.  On 1 April 2004 the ROVD replied that it did not have any information about the vehicle and submitted the fourth applicant’s witness statement. According to the statement, on 3 September 2002 an APC with obscured registration numbers had arrived at her house. A group of armed men who had arrived in the APC had taken away her son Dzhabrail Debishev and her neighbour Mr A.P. The latter had returned home on 5 or 6 September 2002. According to the witness, on 6 September 2002 she had spoken with General Studenikin, who had promised to her that at 6 p.m. on the same date the military would release all those detained during the security operation. However, her son had not returned home. 107.  On 12 March 2004 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision on the same date. 108.  On 20 January 2006 the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 was resumed. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 109. On 25 January 2006 the investigators requested the ROVD to conduct a crime-scene examination on the outskirts of Tsotsi-Yurt where the filtration point had been located in 2002. 110.  On an unspecified date in January 2006 the ROVD conducted the crime-scene examination, in which the first applicant took part. It does not appear that any evidence was collected from the scene. 111. On 26 January 2006 the investigators again questioned the first, sixth and seventh applicants. The witnesses gave similar statements to those provided by them in September 2002. The investigators also questioned the second applicant, who provided a similar statement to that of the seventh applicant. 112.  On 30 January 2006 the investigators conducted a crime-scene examination in the house of witness Mr N.O., whose relative had also been apprehended by armed men during the security operation in Tsotsi-Yurt. It does not appear that any evidence was collected from the scene. 113. On 30 January 2006 the investigators questioned Mr I.A., who stated that in September 2002 a group of Russian servicemen had been conducting a “sweeping-up” operation (“зачистка”) in Tsotsi-Yurt. The servicemen had been wearing camouflage uniform with the emblem of a bear on the sleeves. On 3 September 2002 the village had been fully blockaded by the servicemen. On the same day a group of servicemen had arrived at the witness’s house in an APC whose registration numbers had been obscured with mud. The servicemen had put him in a Ural vehicle and had taken him to the filtration point. Lom-Ali Abubakarov had been transported together with the witness in the same lorry. According to the witness, at night he had been kept in a cell located in a GAZ vehicle. Nine other men had been kept inside the same vehicle together with the witness. Some time later the witness had been released, whereas the other detainees had gone missing. 114. On 31 January 2006 the investigators questioned the eighth applicant and the relative of the fifth applicant, who had confirmed the statements they had provided in September 2002. 115. On 1 February 2006 the investigators questioned a witness, Mr A. Kh., who stated that at about 10 a.m. on 3 September 2002 a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms had arrived at his house in an APC and a Ural lorry. The men had entered his house and had taken him to the outskirts of Tsotsi-Yurt. There he had been put in a cell located inside a GAZ vehicle. In the same vehicle, but in another cell, his cousin Aslambek Agmerzayev had also been detained. On the following day, 4 September 2002, he had been released from detention, but A. Agmerzayev had not returned home. 116.  On 1 February 2006 the investigators questioned Mr A.P., who stated that between 2 and 7 September 2002 a security operation aimed at identifying and apprehending members of illegal armed groups had been conducted in Tsotsi-Yurt. On 2 September 2002 he had been apprehended at home by a group of unidentified armed men, who had taken him in an APC to the headquarters of the security operation on the outskirts of the village. His fellow villager Dzhabrail Debishev had been taken there in the same APC. Upon arrival at the headquarters the witness had been placed in a GAZ vehicle which had been modified to serve as a detention facility. In this vehicle he had seen his other fellow villagers, including Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov, Akhmed Demilkhanov, Ibragim Demilkhanov, Ramzan Mandiyev, Salakh Elsiyev, Lom-Ali Abubakarov and Aslambek Agmerzayev. The following morning he had been taken by a helicopter and then by an ARV to an unknown place, where he had been interrogated about the criminal activities of a relative of his who had been killed in 2000. After that his passport had been returned to him and he had been taken by a car to a place located next to the settlement of Khankala, Chechnya. 117.  On 25 February 2006 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 118.  On 28 March 2006 the interim district prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the criminal proceedings and resumed the investigation. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 119.  According to the Government, on 4 April 2006 the investigators again requested information about the disappeared men from various State authorities in various regions of the Russian Federation. 120.  According to the responses received from various offices of the Ministry of the Execution of Punishment, the applicants’ relatives had not been detained on administrative or criminal charges. 121.  According to the responses received from hospitals in various regions of the Russian Federation, the applicants’ relatives had not applied for medical assistance. 122.  On 28 April 2006 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 123.  On 8 December 2006 the deputy Chechnya prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the criminal proceedings and resumed the investigation. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 124.  On 8 December 2006 the investigators requested information from the Department of the State Traffic Safety Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior in the Rostov region (the Traffic Safety Inspectorate) as to the owner of the vehicles with the registration numbers B 112 BM 61 or B 112 MB 61. 125.  On 12 December 2006 the investigators received a response from the Traffic Safety Inspectorate. The letter stated that the registration number B 112 BM 61 had been issued on 13 November 2001 to a GAZ motor vehicle which had belonged to the Main Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of Justice in the Rostov region. However, according to the Government, the theory of the possible involvement of this vehicle in the abduction of the applicants’ relatives was not confirmed by the investigation. 126. On 15 January 2007 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants or their relatives were informed about this decision. 127. On 6 September 2007 the interim district prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the criminal proceedings and resumed the investigation. The criminal case file was forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office for further investigation. 128. According to the Government, the investigation failed to establish the whereabouts of Salakh Elsiyev, Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov, Adam Boltiyev, Dzhabrail Debishev, Lom-Ali Abubakarov, Ramzan Mandiyev, Akhmed Demilkhanov and Aslambek Agmerzayev. 129. It follows from the Government’s submissions that between 11 September 2002 and 6 September 2007 the investigation into the abduction of the applicants’ relatives was suspended and resumed on six occasions, and that it has so far failed to identify the perpetrators. 130.  According to the Government, the applicants have been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation. 131.  Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose any documents from the file in criminal case no. 75089, except for a copy of decision of the Shali Town Court of 13 March 2006, a copy of the procedural decision confirming that the first applicant had familiarised himself with the file in criminal case no. 75089, dated 16 April 2006, and a copy of a signed statement by the first applicant dated 16 April 2006 that he would not disclose any information about the investigation in the criminal case without the prior authorisation of the investigators. The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that the disclosure of other documents from the case file would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file “contained information concerning the disposition of military and special troops, the nature of their activity, and personal data and addresses of the witnesses and other participants in the criminal proceedings”. 132.  On 8 October 2003 the first applicant on behalf of all the applicants complained to the Shali District Court of Chechnya (the District Court) about the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the disappearance of Salakh Elsiyev, Iskhadzhi Demelkhanov, Adam Boltiyev, Dzhabrail Debishev, Lom-Ali Abubakarov, Ramzan Mandiyev, Akhmed Demilkhanov and Aslambek Agmerzayev. It appears that this complaint was not examined by the court. 133.  On 19 December 2003 the SRJI sent a registered letter to the District Court, enquiring about the outcome of the first applicant’s complaint of 8 October 2003. No response was given to the SRJI. 134.  On 23 June 2005 the SRJI reiterated its request. No response was given to this letter. 135.  On an unspecified date at the beginning of 2006 the applicants complained of the ineffectiveness of the investigation in criminal case no. 75089 to the district prosecutor’s office. They requested that the investigation be conducted effectively and that they be provided with access to the investigation file. 136.  On 13 March 2006 the District Court allowed their complaint in part and stated that the applicants should be provided with access to the investigation file “within limits guaranteeing that no investigative secrets will be divulged”. The decision also stated, among other things, the following:\n“... the assistant of the district prosecutor Mr I.T. has submitted [to the court] that ...\n-  it has been established [by the investigation in the criminal case] that those persons [the applicants’ relatives] were apprehended in Tsotsi-Yurt by units which were armed with armoured vehicles – that is, by units belonging to the Ministry of Defence or the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior. In connection with this, in accordance with the decision of the interim prosecutor of the Kurchaloy district of 26 July 2003, criminal case no. 75089 was transferred to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office for subsequent transfer under the rules of jurisdiction to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. However, this criminal case was referred back for additional investigation [to the district prosecutor’s office], as according to the witness statements of V. Boltiyev, A. Debishev and Kh. Mandiyev, the apprehended persons A. Boltiyev, D. Debishev and the Mandiyev brothers had been detained in an ‘AvtoZak’ vehicle with the registration number B 112 MB 61 RUS, belonging to the Ministry of Justice.\n-  according to the decision of the interim prosecutor of the Kurchaloy district of 25 October 2003, criminal case no. 75089 was again forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102; but on 22 January 2004, without having taken any investigative measures, that office returned the case file to the district prosecutor’s office ...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Töging am Inn, Germany. 9.  On 25 November 1992 the applicant and his wife (hereafter Ms W.) divorced before the Groß Gerau District Court. In this context, the District Court granted them joint custody of their two daughters, aged four and eight at that time. 10.  On 6 July 1993, following Ms W.’s appeal (Beschwerde) and after hearing both her and the applicant as well as two representatives of the local Youth Office, the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal granted Ms W. sole custody of the children, while allowing the applicant to retain a right of access. It found that, given the fact that the parents did not seem entirely willing to co-operate in practical matters, it would be in the children’s best interest if decisions concerning their everyday life were taken by their mother alone. It added that the mother had agreed to discuss important decisions with the applicant and that she was expected to ensure that contacts between the applicant and his daughters would continue on a regular basis. In its decision, the Court of Appeal did not admit an appeal on points of law (weitere Beschwerde). 11.  On 9 August 1993 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He claimed in particular that the decision of the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal had misinterpreted the existing provisions on custody of children, notably Section 1671 of the Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law, below), and infringed his parental rights guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Basic Law. 12.  On 23 March 1994 the President of the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that he had communicated the case to 25 third parties, who had the right to submit their observations until 30 September 1994. The list of third parties included the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), the Federal Council (Bundesrat), the Federal Government, the Länder Governments, the President of the Federal Court of Justice, the parties of the proceedings before the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal, as well as various national organisations dealing with family law issues and involved in the protection of children. 13.  On 13 November 1995, following the applicant’s request dated 2 October 1995, the Federal Constitutional Court forwarded the pertinent written observations dated 1 and 25 July, 20 and 27 September, 20 October and 9 December 1994 and 19 February 1995. These included the observations of the Federal Ministry of Justice of 9 December 1994 stating that the Government planned an amendment of the law on family matters, inter alia by introducing explicit provisions on joint custody after divorce. 14.  Towards the end of 1997, the applicant received a telephone call from the Federal Constitutional Court informing him that the questions raised by his complaint would become obsolete with the expected entry into force of the amended Law on Family Matters of 16 December 1997 (Kindschaftsrechtsreformgesetz) on 1 July 1998. The applicant was asked whether he wanted to declare that his constitutional complaint had been disposed of (Erledigterklärung) under these circumstances. 15.  On 24 June 1998 the applicant requested the Constitutional Court to deliver a decision despite the change of law brought about by the Law on Family Matters. 16.  On 22 December 1999 (decision served on 20 January 2000), the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It found that due to the amended Law on Family Matters, the constitutional complaint no longer raised issues of general interest. The applicant’s complaints could be adequately dealt with in proceedings for the amendment of a court order (Abänderungsverfahren) pursuant to Section 1696 § 1 of the Civil Code (see Relevant domestic law, below) before the competent civil courts. In these proceedings, the new legal provisions on family matters could be taken into account.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Štip, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 6.  In 1981 the public undertaking “Elektrostopanstvo” (“the company”) installed a power-distribution pillar on a plot of land, which at that time was the property of the applicant's father. The latter did not object to it. The applicant gained ownership of the land in 1988 as a gift from his father. 7.  On 26 February 1996 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against “Pogon Elektroistok Štip”, a branch of the company, claiming restoration of the property in his possession and removal of the pillar and the auxiliary installations, as they had been constructed without his (and his father's) consent. 8.  Between 26 February 1996 and 10 July 1996 the trial court scheduled nine hearings and took the following actions: an on-site inspection; an examination of a witness and an expertise. Within this period, the applicant also extended his claim requesting compensation. 9.  On 10 July 1996 the Štip Municipal Court upheld the applicant's claim ordering the company to restore the plot of land in the applicant's possession and to remove the pillar and auxiliary installations. 10.  On 25 February 1997 the Štip Court of Appeal quashed the lower court's decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It held that the branch of the company had not had legal capacity to stand in the proceedings. 11.  On 5 September 1997 the trial court requested the applicant to clarify his claim. On 9 September 1997 the applicant replied that the proceedings should continue against the company. 12.  At the hearing held on 27 November 1997 (in the absence of the company albeit properly summoned), the Štip Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant's claim as out on time. It found that the applicant (and his father) had known about the installation of the pillar and that he had failed to bring his claim within the statutory time-limits of three years (subjective term) or ten years (objective term) after the pillar had been fixed on the property. 13.  On 25 November 1998 the Štip Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the lower court's decision. 14.  On 15 January 1999 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court an appeal on points of law (ревизија) against the Appeal Court's decision. He argued that the lower courts had erroneously established the facts and had wrongly applied national law. 15.  On 10 January 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law. It upheld the lower courts' decisions on a different reasoning: by installing the power-distribution pillar in 1981, the company had obtained an encumbrance (право на службеност) over the plot of land to which neither the applicant's father nor the applicant had objected to in 1981 when the pillar was installed or in 1988 when the applicant gained ownership of the property. The judgment was served on the applicant on 11 April 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1934 respectively and live in Makedonski Brod. 5.  On 12 March 1996 the applicants brought a civil action against the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”) claiming an annual leave allowance (регрес за годишен одмор) for 1995. 6. On 18 April 1996 the then Kičevo Municipal Court (“the first-instance court”) ruled in favour of the applicants, ordering the Ministry to pay them the amount claimed. The decision was given in the Ministry's absence, although summoned properly. It became final on 27 May 1996. 7. On 27 June 1997 the applicants requested enforcement of this decision. This request was granted on 29 September 1997. On 5 December 1997 the Attorney-General (Јавен Правобранител) objected to the enforcement order, arguing, inter alia, that it had not been given an opportunity to participate in the substantive proceedings as the Ministry's legal representative. Its objection was dismissed by decisions of 11 March 1999 and 8 March 2000 respectively. In or about May 2000 the amount due was transferred on the applicants' accounts. 8.  On 3 September 2000 the Attorney-General requested that the first-instance court remove the clause attesting that its decision of 18 April 1996 had become final (“the clause”, се брише клаузулата на правосилност) since it had not been summoned, as the Ministry's legal representative, to participate in those proceedings. 9. On 25 September 2000 the first-instance court dismissed this request. The Attorney-General appealed. On 12 June 2001 the Bitola Court of Appeal accepted its appeal and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. On 6 July 2001 the first-instance court accepted the request and removed the clause. The parties were advised to appeal against this decision. The applicants refused to be served with this decision. They did not appeal. 10. On 28 November 2001 the Attorney-General appealed against the first-instance court's decision of 18 April 1996. The applicants refused to have a copy of this appeal communicated to them. 11. On 15 January 2002 the Bitola Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney-General's appeal and quashed the decision of 18 April 1996. 12. On 27 January 2003 the proceedings were stayed. On the applicants' appeal, on 3 April 2003 the Bitola Court of Appeal quashed this decision and remitted the case for re-examination. 13. On 5 September 2003 the first-instance court dismissed the applicants' claim since no such allowance had been paid in 1995 and no funds had been allocated for that purpose in the State's budget. 14. On 19 November 2003 the Bitola Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants of 15 October 2003. This decision was served on them on 10 December 2003. On 6 February 2004 the public prosecutor informed the applicants that there were no grounds for lodging a request for the protection of legality with the Supreme Court. 15.  In separate proceedings, the State requested that the applicants pay back the amount awarded by the first-instance court's decision of 18 April 1996. This request was accepted by court decisions of 7 May and 6 December 2004 respectively.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are four Russian nationals. 6.  As victims of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster they were entitled to social housing under domestic law. Because the authorities had failed to provide them with housing in good time, the applicants sought relief in courts. In October and December 2004 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Krasnodar (“the District Court”) held for the applicants, the judgments became binding. The details of the judgments are shown in the appended table. 7.  In March 2006 the writs of execution were issued in respect of the judgments. According to the writs, the applicants were to be granted housing, as ordered by the domestic court. 8.  In 2006 the respondent authority offered the applicants to settle the case by providing them with cash payment in the amount allegedly representing the value of the flat. The applicants submitted that the amounts proposed were manifestly lower than the market value of the flats granted by the domestic judgments. 9.  By four separate written statements the applicants refused the offer. They stated in their refusals that in accordance with the judgments in their favour and with the writs of execution the authorities were under obligation to provide them with flats, and not with the sums of money. 10.  On 24 May 2007 the District Court instructed the bailiffs to enforce the judgments in accordance with the writs of execution. 11.  On 20 November 2007 the bailiffs informed the applicants that the execution of the judgments in compliance with the writs was impossible, “since the Administration of the Krasnodar Region could only use the monetary funds allocated from the federal budget”. 12.  The authorities sought to alter the mode of enforcement of the judgments from in-kind provision of flats to delivery of housing certificates. By a decision of 6 April 2009, upheld on appeal on 7 May 2009, the District Court refused to change the mode of execution of the judgments.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "3.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Istanbul. 4.  On 10 September 2002 the applicant was taken into police custody by police officers from the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate on suspicion of membership of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and KADEK (the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress). 5.  On 11 September 2002 the applicant was interrogated at the Anti‑Terrorism Branch in the absence of a lawyer. According to a form explaining arrested persons’ rights which the applicant had signed, he had been reminded of the charges against him and of his right to remain silent. It was expressly indicated in the form that, as the applicant had been taken into custody in connection with an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, he could only have access to a lawyer upon being remanded in custody or after the prolongation of his detention in police custody by a court order. In his statement, which was nine pages long, the applicant explained that he had gone to Greece in 1999 illegally for economic reasons, and to avoid military service. In Athens, he had first taken refuge in an organisation controlled by the PKK and had then joined a PKK camp, where he underwent political training. He had subsequently been sent back to Istanbul and from there to Iran, where he had joined another PKK camp and received further training. He had returned to Istanbul in March 2002. He stated that he was only interested in undertaking legal activities as opposed to acts of violence. 6.  At 11.00 a.m. on 13 September 2002 the applicant was examined by a doctor, who stated that there were no traces of ill-treatment on his body. 7.  He was brought before the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court on the same day, again in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant largely reiterated his police statements in respect of the activities he had undertaken in Greece. However, he denied the part about his activities in Iran, alleging that he had gone to Iran for commercial reasons only. He further stated that he had not been ill-treated in police custody, but only threatened. 8.  On the same day the applicant was interrogated by a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court where he stated that he had not been not engaged in any activities for the PKK and denied the parts of the police statement which claimed otherwise. He further contended that he had only stayed at a PKK camp in Greece out of necessity. The judge ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention at the end of the questioning. 9.  On 27 September 2002 the Public Prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment with that court against the applicant and eight other persons, accusing the applicant with membership of the PKK and KADEK, an offence under Article 168 (2) of the former Criminal Code and Section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 10.  The case against the applicant was subsequently transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court following the abolition of State Security Courts by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004. 11.  On 10 April 2006 the Twelfth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court delivered its judgment. It acquitted four of the accused and convicted the applicant and five other accused as charged and sentenced the applicant to six years and three months of imprisonment. 12.  In convicting the applicant, the Istanbul Assize Court had regard to the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the single judge who had ordered his detention on remand. It also took into consideration his co-defendants’ statements regarding the applicant’s involvement with the PKK. The court further noted that, although the applicant had denied all the charges against him, such denial had no credibility in view of the evidence found in the case file. 13.  On 4 December 2008 the Ninth Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. This decision was deposited with the registry of the first-instance court on 23 February 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is serving a prison sentence in Izhevsk. 7.  On 20 June 2000 the applicant and two other persons were apprehended on suspicion of involvement in several incidents of theft. The applicant was allegedly taken to a flat where the police officers beat him up to make him confess to the crimes. On the next day he was transferred to a temporary detention facility at a police station. According to the applicant, the beatings continued on 21, 22, 23 and 26 June 2000. 8.  On 21, 22, 23 and 26 June 2000 in response to the applicant’s complaints of renal colic and pain in the lumbar area, the officer on duty called an ambulance. The applicant was examined on each occasion by a doctor, who did not find it necessary to take him to hospital. The applicant did not tell the doctor or the officer on duty anything as to what might have caused those pains. Nor did he say anything about ill-treatment by the police. 9.  On 21 June 2000 the investigator ordered that the applicant’s flat be searched. On 23 June 2000 the police conducted the search. 10.  On 23 June 2000 the applicant’s family retained a lawyer to represent him during the investigation and trial. On 15 December 2000 the applicant’s father was also admitted to represent him as a lay defender. 11.  On the same day the prosecutor of the Zapadniy Administrative Circuit of Moscow authorised the applicant’s detention. The court reasoned that the applicant should remain in custody pending the collection of the evidence necessary for the preparation of his indictment. 12.  On 30 June 2000 the applicant was charged with several counts of theft. He denied any involvement in the crimes he was charged with. 13.  On 10 August 2000 the prosecutor granted the investigator’s request to extend the detention of the applicant and two other defendants until 21 September 2000. The investigator reasoned that he needed more time “to investigate additional criminal acts committed by [the defendants], to join the criminal case-files, to finalise the bill of indictment and to carry out other investigative tasks in order to complete the preliminary investigation”. 14.  On 8 September 2000 the prosecutor granted the investigator’s request to extend the defendants’ detention until 21 November 2000. The investigator reproduced verbatim the reasoning of his previous request. 15.  On 12 October 2000 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed the applicant’s application for release. The court noted that the gravity of the charges alone could justify the applicant’s detention pending investigation and trial. It also referred to the applicant’s previous conviction and another pending criminal investigation against him. 16.  On 27 November 2000 the Nikulinskiy District Court scheduled the first hearing of the matter for 8 December 2000. The court ruled that the applicant and two other defendants should remain in custody pending trial. No time-limits or reasons justifying the defendants’ detention were indicated. 17.  Between 8 December 2000 and 14 June 2001 the court held twenty-one hearings of the case. On twenty occasions the hearing was adjourned due to the representatives of the defendants’ failure to appear or their need to study the case-file. 18.  On 14 June 2001 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention for three months. The court issued an order in respect of the three defendants, reasoning that their release “might impede a thorough, complete and objective examination of the case”. On 13 August 2001 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 14 June 2001 on appeal. 19.  On 6 August 2001 the District Court found certain procedural irregularities in the bill of indictment and remitted the case to the prosecutor’s office for their rectification. The court ordered that all three defendants should remain in custody. On 6 September 2001 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 6 August 2001 on appeal and remitted the case for consideration to the District Court. The City Court also held that the defendants should remain in custody pending trial. 20.  On 11 October 2001 the District Court received the case-file and scheduled the hearing for 25 October 2001. The court further extended the detention of the three defendants for three months. The court referred to the gravity of the charges against them and the risk that they might impede the thorough, complete and objective examination of the circumstances of the case. On 13 February 2002 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 11 October 2001 on appeal. The City Court held that there was no requirement as a matter of law to decide on the applicant’s detention at that point. 21.  On 5 December 2001 the applicant complained to the District Court that he had been beaten up by police officers on 20, 21, 22, 23 and 26 June 2000. In support of his allegations, he submitted medical certificates indicating that doctors from the emergency response unit had been summoned by the officer on duty to examine him. 22.  On 7 December 2001 the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. 23.  On 1 April 2002 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 7 December 2001 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The court noted, inter alia, that the trial court had failed (1) to ensure the examination of several witnesses, instead relying exclusively on their written statements and (2) to ensure participation of the applicant’s lay defender in the closing arguments. The court indicated that the applicant should remain in custody pending a new trial. 24.  On 15 April 2002 the Nikulinskiy District Court scheduled a new hearing of the case for 23 April 2002. 25.  On 23 April 2002 the District Court dismissed the defendants’ applications for release. The court noted that all three defendants were charged with a serious offence and, if released, they “might interfere with the thorough, complete and objective examination of the case”. 26.  On 17 May 2002 the Nikulinskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. The court based its findings on the statements of witnesses who had testified in court, including the applicant’s co-accused, victims of the crime, and forensic evidence. The court held that the applicant was to serve his sentence in a correctional colony with strict conditions of detention. 27.  On 9 September 2002 the Moscow City Court upheld the applicant’s conviction in substance on appeal, indicating that the applicant was to serve his sentence in a correctional colony with normal conditions of detention. 28.  It appears that the applicant was sent to serve a prison sentence in a correctional colony with strict conditions of detention. On 14 February 2005 he was transferred to a correctional colony with normal conditions of detention. 29.  According to the applicant, he challenged the lawfulness of his detention in the colony with strict conditions of detention by lodging numerous complaints with the prosecutor’s office, department of corrections and the court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1914 and lived in Ljubljana. He died in 2008. 5.  On 1 September 1970 a decision by which the applicant’s house was expropriated in favour of the Municipality of Ljubljana became final. 6.  In 1971, the municipality instituted non-contentious court proceedings to determine the amount of compensation due for the expropriated property. The applicant was a party to those proceedings. 7.  By 1988, the first-instance court had ruled on the matter four times due to three remittals of the case by the second-instance court. The last judgment of the first-instance court, issued on 15 July 1988, was quashed by the Ljubljana Higher Court on 2 March 1989. The latter found that the facts had been insufficiently established. It ordered a re-examination of the case by the first-instance court. 8.  In 1989 the proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of another set of proceedings in which the applicant challenged the validity of the expropriation. After a series of hearings cancelled at the request of the applicant, who maintained that other related sets of proceedings were still pending, the court again suspended the present set of proceedings. At a hearing on 5 April 2004 the applicant’s daughter, who was representing the applicant in the proceedings, informed the court that the denationalisation proceedings no. UE 351-307/93 concerning the real estate, apparently comprising the house in question and the land on which it was situated, were still ongoing. In September 2004 a hearing was cancelled as the case was being transferred to another judge. The latter took over the case in December 2005. 9.  Hearings were held on 30 March and 20 April 2006. At a hearing of 8 June 2006 the applicant submitted, inter alia, that his claim for compensation with respect to the denationalisation of the same property was still pending before the Administrative Court. 10.  On 7 June 2006 the applicant lodged an application with the Court, complaining of a violation of his right to trial within a reasonable time. On 11 December 2007 the Court declared the application inadmissible, finding that the applicant had failed to exhaust the remedies available under the Act on the Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (Jama v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 29978/06). 11.  In the meantime, at the hearing of 14 November 2007, the Ljubljana Local Court established that the proceedings concerning compensation with respect to the denationalisation of the property were pending before the Supreme Court. On 25 February 2008 the latter proceedings were terminated with a decision by which the applicant received compensation comprising state certificates for the nationalised land. His request for denationalisation of the house situated on that land was rejected. 12.  On 21 February 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal with the Ljubljana Local Court. On 13 March 2008 the court informed the applicant that a hearing had been scheduled in his case. 13.  At the hearing of 10 April 2008 the court established that the termination of the denationalisation proceedings had made it possible to continue the present set of proceedings concerning compensation for the expropriated house. The court appointed an expert in construction to prepare a report on the matter. 14.  On 19 September 2008 the court issued a decision setting out the questions which the expert was requested to examine. 15.  In the meantime, on 29 July 2008, the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal asking the court to inform him of the date on which the proceedings would be terminated. On 22 August 2008 the court explained to the applicant that an expert had been appointed in order to prepare a report in the case. 16.  On 1 September 2008 the applicant lodged a motion for a deadline. 17.  On 19 October 2008 the applicant died at the age of 94. Subsequently, his daughter, Mrs M. Preželj, expressed the wish to continue the proceedings before the Court initiated by him. 18.  The expert, who had been hospitalised and had undergone heart surgery in the meantime, submitted his report on 25 March 2010. 19.  On 13 January 2011 the court held a hearing and decided to appoint a new expert. At that hearing the court also requested the applicant’s representative to inform the court of the applicant’s successors. On 24 February 2011 the representative submitted the requested documents. The inheritance decision of 7 May 2010 showed that the applicant’s daughter, M. Preželj, had been named by the applicant as the only person to manage his estate and inherit his property after his death. She was also appointed as an executor of the will and requested to take over all the applicant’s pending proceedings concerning the denationalization of and compensation for the expropriated house. Three remaining next-of-kin were given a certain share in accordance with inheritance law. The applicant’s representative was now his daughter’s representative in the proceedings. 20.  On 6 June 2011 the applicant’s daughter’s representative lodged a supervisory appeal complaining about the delays in the proceedings and pointing out that he had received no reply to the motion for a deadline. 21.  On 8 June 2011 the applicant’s daughter’s representative submitted pleadings in which he argued that there had been no reason for the other successors to enter the proceedings, as the power of attorney given to him by the applicant had not been contested by any of them. In addition, he argued that by virtue of the inheritance decision the applicant’s daughter was authorised to take part in the pending proceedings concerning the applicant’s property and to bring them to an end. 22.  On 1 July 2011 the President of the Ljubljana Local Court sent the applicant’s daughter’s representative a report outlining the major events that had occurred in the proceedings. It was noted in the report that the judge in the case had instructed her assistant lawyer to appoint a new expert. 23.  On 9 September 2011 the President of the Ljubljana Higher Court sent a letter to the applicant’s daughter’s representative in which he noted that the motion for a deadline of 1 September 2008 had been referred to him only three days earlier. He further informed him that the motion had been granted and that the first-instance judge had been instructed to treat this case with priority and to provide him with a progress report every three months.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant lives at Nesoddtangen, Norway. 6.  In 1989 Mrs B., who was then the applicant’s wife, bought a property named Ekheim from him for 6,400,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK), currently corresponding to approximately 760,000 euros (EUR). The couple drew up marital agreements (“ektepakt”) in 1990 and 1995. 7.  On 3 November 1995 Mrs B. and the applicant concluded an agreement stipulating that they each owned 50% of the Ekheim estate, regardless of what was stated or might follow from formal entitlements (hereinafter referred to as the joint ownership agreement). 8.  Subsequently, after their divorce, the applicant lodged an action against Mrs B. with Fredrikstad City Court (tingrett), seeking a ruling to the effect that the marital agreements were invalid and that the joint ownership agreement was valid. By a judgment of 4 April 2001, the City Court found against the applicant and in favour of the respondent, concluding that the marital agreements were valid and that the joint ownership agreement was invalid. The applicant did not appeal against this judgment, which gained legal force. 9.  In 2005 Mrs B. sold the Ekheim estate to Ekheim Invest AS, a limited liability company, for NOK 15,000,000 (approximately EUR 1,1780,000). 10.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the City Court against Ekheim Invest claiming that he had title to 50% of the Ekheim estate and seeking, firstly, an order that the latter convey 50% of the property to him and, secondly, that he held a pre-emption right with respect to the remaining 50%. 11.  According to the summary of the applicant’s submissions made by the City Court in its judgment referred to below, the applicant argued in the main as follows:\n(a)  The question was how to interpret the former spouses’ joint ownership agreement of 3 November 1995. In the case that had previously been decided by the City Court on 4 April 2001, the subject-matter of the dispute had been whether the marital agreements from 1990 and 1995 were valid. The subject-matter in the present case was different. Two spouses having completely separate property had the opportunity to conclude a mutual agreement involving an obligation of performance for each party. According to legal doctrine, such a contract was not dependent on any condition as to form.\n(b)  The contract had been a reality in the present case. Ekheim Invest had purchased the half of the Ekheim estate that had been in Mrs B.’s ownership, not the half owned by the applicant, because Mrs B. had had no right to sell the other half. Consequently, Ekheim Invest ought to transfer by deed of conveyance half of the Ekheim estate back to the applicant.\n(c)  The applicant further submitted that in its 2001 judgment the City Court had not reviewed the validity of the joint ownership agreement. In any event, the legal force of that judgment extended only to the relationship between Mrs B. and the applicant, not between Ekheim Invest and the applicant. The applicant referred to legal doctrine, according to which a judgment as a main rule only had legal force in the relationship between the parties to the proceedings. Moreover, the parties’ arguments ought to be taken as a starting point in the assessment of whether any new factual circumstances had arisen.\n(d)  The applicant’s argument was that in the period since 2001 the estate had increased so greatly in value that the City Court now had to assess the ownership issue independently of the conclusion reached in the 2001 judgment. At that time the mortgages on the property had clearly exceeded its value and it had therefore been unproblematic to hold that, in light of an on-going bankruptcy at the time, the applicant would not have been in a better position in the absence of the marriage settlement agreements. It would be unreasonable if Mrs B. or her successors should be able to profit from the tremendous increase in the property’s value. 12.  By a judgment of 21 January 2008, the City Court found in favour of the respondent Ekheim Invest, on the ground that the applicant did not have title to the property in question as the respondent company had derived its rights from Mrs B. and the City Court had ruled in her favour in its 2001 judgment. It rejected the applicant’s argument based on legal doctrine that the 2001 judgment only had legal force between the parties by referring to another passage in the legal manual in question from which it appeared that the point only applied to disputes between a private party and public authorities. The action brought by the applicant had no public-law aspects and the City Court did not consider that the legal doctrine referred to had any bearing on the present case. 13.  The applicant appealed against the City Court’s judgment of 21 January 2008 to the Borgarting High Court (lagmannsrett). He argued in particular that the City Court had confused his pleadings and references to legal doctrine made at the oral hearing and had shortened the overall duration of the hearing from the three days initially scheduled to five hours. One hour into the hearing the City Court had truncated the hearing of the applicant’s witnesses, including the presentation of documentary evidence regarding the disputed agreements. The City Court’s hearing record had also been marred by formal mistakes. 14.  On 4 April 2008 the High Court warned the applicant that it envisaged refusing admission of his appeal and gave him until 21 April 2008 to comment. After an extension of this time-limit to 5 May 2008 the applicant on the latter date requested that his appeal be admitted for examination or, in the alternative, that the High Court quash the City Court’s judgment and refer the case back to the City Court for fresh examination. On 5 and 11 June 2008 he filed additional submissions. 15.  In a unanimous decision (beslutning) of 12 June 2008 the High Court concluded that it refused to admit the appeal (“Anken nektes fremmet”), giving the following reasons:\n“The High Court finds it clear that the appeal will not succeed, and that its admission should therefore be refused pursuant to Article 29-13(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 16.  The applicant appealed against the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court, arguing notably that the refusal of admission of the appeal lacked reasons. 17.  On 19 September 2008 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts ankeutvalg), pointing out that its jurisdiction was confined to reviewing the High Court procedure (Article 29-13 (5) of the Code of Civil Procedure), unanimously found it clear that the appeal would not succeed and therefore rejected the appeal under Article 30-9 (2).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Roman.\nPhysical conditions of detention and conditions of transport 6.  On 29 September 2011 the applicant was arrested after criminal proceedings had been opened against him for bribe taking. On the same date he was detained in Bacău Police Department’s detention facility. 7.  On 29 November 2011 he was moved to Bacău Prison. 8.  On 20 June 2012 he was released. The criminal proceedings opened against him are still pending before the domestic courts. 9.  In Bacău Police Department’s detention facility and Bacău Prison the applicant had to share a cell with smokers, even though he was a non‑smoker and was suffering from a heart condition. He was unable to rest because the other detainees would smoke continuously from 7 a.m. to 2 p.m., and the cell would be covered by thick smoke. 10.  The cell did not have enough furniture, and lacked coat hangers, shelves and cupboards. Clothes had to be stored on the floor, under beds, where no cleaning was carried out. The bathrooms lacked shelves and privacy, as the washing area and toilet facilities were not separate. In addition, the cell was damp, measured 15 sq. m., had a volume of 50 cubic metres, contained six beds, and was occupied by ten detainees. Cleaning and dehumidification materials were provided by his family, and in the absence of any action on the part of the prison authorities, he and the other detainees had to clean the cell themselves. The cell was not heated during the cold season, and as a result of the extreme cold the applicant had to ask his family to provide him with warmer bed linen. Also, the cell was infested with fleas, lice, bed bugs and mosquitoes, but the detainees were not allowed to disinfect it, even at their own expense. 11.  The detention facilities did not provide detainees with any areas for washing, drying or cleaning their clothes. He was forced to wear dirty clothes, or if he did wash them, he had to wear them damp. 12.  The bed linen provided by the authorities was unusable, was not suitable for the time of year and was not changed during the entire time he was detained. 13.  Warm water was available twice a week for two hours each time therefore not all detainees could wash. He was unable to shave on a daily basis. Detainees did not have access to a barber, toiletries were not provided by the authorities and he had to purchase shaving products at his own expense. 14.  The food was poor, insufficient and served in unhygienic conditions by detainees not wearing the appropriate equipment for serving food. The cutlery and plates were rusty and dirty, and the cell did not have a table and chairs for detainees to be able to sit down and eat their meal. 15.  He was taken out of his cell for a walk only twice a week for thirty minutes; between ten or twenty inmates would be in the prison courtyard at a time. The courtyard was covered by a metal mesh, measured 25 sq. m, had no bathroom facilities and did not receive any sunlight. 16.  The applicant was transported to and from court and was held in the courthouse cells with smokers. 17.  In Bacău Police Department’s detention facility the applicant was detained in a cell which measured 12.82 sq. m and contained four beds. The cell had central heating and was ventilated. The sanitary facilities were outside the cell and were accessible to everyone twenty-four hours a day. Detainees had access to a shower, a sink, and a toilet that was separate from the rest of the bathroom. They were allowed to shower and do their laundry twice a week. 18.  In Bacău Prison the applicant was detained in six different cells. Five of them were in the infirmary. 19.  From 29 November to 5 December 2011 the applicant was detained in a cell which measured 26.09 sq. m and contained twenty-three beds. From 23 February to 7 May 2012 he was detained in a cell which measured 33.05 sq. m and contained eight beds. From 8 to 14 May 2012 he was detained in a cell which measured 26.61 sq. m and contained nine beds. From 15 to 28 May 2012 he was detained in a cell which measured 32.09 sq. m and contained six beds. 20.  All the detention cells had central heating, sanitary facilities, windows, electricity and were furnished. The beds had mattresses, pillows, bed linen and blankets provided by the detention facility. Detainees were also allowed to receive bed linen from their families. 21.  Detainees had unlimited access to cold water. They also had access to warm water every day, based on a pre-approved rota. 22.  The cells were heated daily during the cold season from 5 to 9.30 a.m. and 7 to 11 p.m. 23.  They were disinfected three times a year or whenever needed, by specialist contractors. In addition, detainees were provided with cleaning materials and had a statutory duty to clean their cells. They were also provided with toiletries for their personal hygiene. Starting from December 2011 each individual had to sign for the toiletries they were given. 24.  The detention facilities had cells assigned exclusively to non‑smoking detainees. 25.  Without providing supporting documents, the Government submitted to the Court that when the applicant had been transferred to Bacău Prison, he had declared that he was a smoker. In addition, on 6 and 16 December 2011 and 8 May 2012 he had purchased cigarettes, and on 13 December 2011 he had bought lighters. 26.  The applicant was transferred only to courthouse cells and not to any other detention facilities. The vehicles had windows and heating. 27.  As a general rule, detainees were forbidden from smoking during transfers. Smokers were separated from non-smokers in the courthouse cells. 28.  Between 14 December 2011 and 20 June 2012 the applicant was transferred sixteen times to and from court, for distances of 2 and 62 kilometers.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in the town of Mariinskiy Posad of the Chuvashiya Republic. 5.  On 24 October 1994 the Mariinskiy Posad Town Court convicted the applicant of destruction of the property and sentenced him to two years' imprisonment. That judgment was quashed on 8 August 1996 by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The case was remitted for a fresh examination. 6.  On 10 February 1998 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued because his guilt had not been proven. 7.  In 2001 the applicant sued the Ministry of Finance and the Judicial Department of the Supreme Court in tort. 8.  On 15 May 2001 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow allowed the applicant's action and awarded him 36,012.53 Russian roubles (RUR, approximately 1419 euros). The judgment became final on 6 July 2001. 9.  On 25 July 2002 the Chuvashiya Treasury credited the judgment debt to the account of the applicant's representative. 10.  In 1997 the applicant asked the Mariinskiy Posad Town Council to provide him with housing because his flat had been destroyed by a fire and, as an unlawfully convicted person, he had the right to free housing.  The Council refused and the applicant appealed to a court. 11.  On 3 July 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, in the final instance, ordered that the Mariinskiy Posad Town Council should provide the applicant, within three months, with a flat that met the requirements of Articles 40 and 41 of the RSFSR Housing Code. 12.  According to the Government, on 6 June 2001 the Council offered the applicant to move into a one-room flat. The applicant refused because the flat did not meet the requirements of the Housing Code. 13.  Enforcement proceedings were instituted on 12 July 2001 but the judgment was not enforced because the Council did not have available housing or financial resources to purchase a flat. 14.  In 2002 the applicant asked a court to award him a sum representing the price of the flat with which the Council had to provide him. 15.  On 12 March 2002 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the applicant's request. 16.  In April 2002 the Council offered the applicant a loan which would have allowed him to pay seventy percent of the purchase price of a flat. The applicant declined the offer. 17.  In July 2003 the Council offered the applicant a flat with stove heating. A bailiff refused the offer because the flat was in a dilapidated block of flats and did not satisfy the requirements of the Housing Code. 18.  In April 2004 the applicant was offered another flat which he refused because it had no gas heating and sanitary facilities. 19.  In the meantime, the applicant asked the Supreme Court to amend the method of enforcement of the judgment of 3 July 2001 and to award him money in lieu of the flat. 20.  On 27 April 2004 the Supreme Court granted the applicant's request and awarded him RUR 290,400. The Supreme Court noted that the flat offered in April 2004 had not met the requirements of the RSFSR Housing Code. 21.  Enforcement proceedings were opened on 6 June 2005 and on 22 June 2005 the Council credited the judgment debt to the account of the bailiffs' service. 22.  According to the applicant, on 8 July 2005 he received the money.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Žalec. 6. On 1 December 1998 the applicant slipped in the premises of the company S and injured herself. S had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZA. 7.  On 14 July 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against ZA in the Celje District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 2,210,310 tolars (approximately 9,210 euros) for the injuries sustained.\nBetween 16 September 1999 and 17 April 2003 the applicant lodged four preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.\nBetween 8 May 2001 and 21 March 2002 she made three requests that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the four hearings held between 12 September 2002 and 8 May 2003, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nDuring the proceedings, the court appointed a medical expert and once examined a witness at home.\nAt the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 23 June 2003. 8.  On 4 July 2003 the applicant appealed to the Celje Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Celju). ZM cross-appealed.\nOn 7 April 2005 the court allowed both appeals in part and remitted a part of the case to the first-instance court for re-examination.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 5 May 2005. 9.  On 21 September 2005 the applicant withdrew her claim since the parties had reached an out-of-court settlement. In the letter to the Celje District Court of 21 September 2005, she waved her right to receive the court’s written decision on termination of the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Novovoronezh, Voronezh Region. 5.  In 1999 the applicant brought proceedings against the Chief Department of Finance of the Voronezh Region to claim welfare payments to which she was entitled in respect of her child. 6.  On 5 January 2000 the Novovoronezh Town Court of the Voronezh Region awarded the applicant 3,387.87 roubles (RUR). This judgment entered into force on 15 January 2000. 7.  On 10 February 2000 the enforcement order was issued and sent to the bailiff service of the Tsentralnyy District of Voronezh. 8.  On 10 April 2000 the applicant complained to the Department of Justice of the Voronezh Region about the bailiffs’ failure to execute the judgment in her favour. 9.  On 20 April 2000 the Department of Justice of the Voronezh Region informed the applicant that her award would be enforced in accordance with the order of priority set out by the Federal Law on Enforcement Procedure. 10.  On 26 June 2001 the bailiff terminated execution proceedings in respect of the judgment of 5 January 2000, as the debtor had no sufficient funds. The applicant was suggested to bring an action against the Administration of the Voronezh Region. 11.  On 13 February 2002 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Voronezh granted the applicant’s request to resume enforcement proceedings. In this decision the court dismissed the bailiff’s argument that an action against the Administration of the Voronezh Region was necessary to secure execution of the judgment against the Chief Department of Finance. The court found that the judgment of 5 January 2000 could be enforced as it stood. 12.  The sum awarded has not been paid to the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Vienna. \nShe is the mother of M, L and R, born in wedlock in 1973, 1974 and 1976, respectively. The spouses separated in 1982. Custody of L and M was assigned to the applicant, the custody of R to the father. 5.  In December 1989 M was admitted in a public girls' home as she refused to stay with her mother. She stayed there until January 1992. From December 1989 until September 1995 custody proceedings concerning the temporary transfer of M's custody to the Vienna Youth Welfare Office for the time M had spent at the girls' home were pending before the Austrian courts. 6.  On 3 January 1990 the Vienna Youth Welfare Office, on behalf of M, filed a request with the Floridsdorf District Court that the applicant should pay a monthly contribution to the expenses incurred for M's stay in the girls' home. 7.  The file was later on transferred to the competent Juvenile Court and, in January 1990, the court heard M's parents. 8.  On 8 March 1991 the Youth Welfare Office reduced the amount of the requested monthly contribution. 9.  On 10 April 1991 the President of the Juvenile Court granted the applicant's motion for bias against the competent court clerk (Rechtspfleger). 10.  A hearing scheduled for 25 July 1991 was cancelled due to the applicant's illness. Further hearings scheduled for 2 September 1991 and 11 September 1991 had to be cancelled because the court's attempts to deliver the summons to the applicant were unsuccessful. 11.  On 10 February 1992 the Juvenile Court ordered that the applicant had to pay ATS 2,500 in monthly maintenance for M. The applicant appealed, claiming that she was fit to work to an extent of 75% only. 12.  On 4 March 1992 the case was assigned to another judge as the competent judge had declared himself biased. 13.  On 13 May 1992 the Appeal Chamber quashed the decision and remitted the case back to the Juvenile Court, instructing the latter to take a new decision after having supplemented its proceedings. In particular, it stated that the first instance court ought to appoint a forensic medical expert in order to establish the applicant's fitness to work. 14.  On 20 May 1998 the Juvenile Court ordered the applicant to pay ATS 1,550 in monthly maintenance for M. At that stage of the proceedings, no expert had been heard yet. 15.  Referring to the Appeal Chamber's decision of 13 May 1992, the applicant appealed, again relying on her reduced fitness to work. 16.  On 13 August 1998 the Juvenile Court appointed an expert in forensic medicine to file a report on the question as to which extent the applicant's capacities to earn her living were reduced. 17.  The applicant appealed against this decision, claiming that it no longer made sense to appoint a medical expert, now that the court had already dismissed her request by a decision of 20 May 1998. Further, she claimed that there was no need for a further report as, in this respect, she had already submitted two reports of different medical officers (Amtsarzt). 18.  On 17 and 20 August 1998 the applicant filed motions for bias against the court clerk (Rechtspfleger) I.S., who was dealing with her case, claiming that the appointment of a further medical expert was not justified, that I.S. was handling the case file in a negligent manner, namely that several documents were missing from the file, and that I.S. had been rude to her on the telephone. 19.  On 25 August 1998 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court (Präsident des Jugendgerichtshofs) dismissed her motion for bias, finding that the mere fact that she had appointed a medical expert was not sufficient to cast doubt upon I.S.' impartiality. He also noted that there were no documents missing from the file. 20.  On 17 September 1998 the Appeal Chamber dismissed the applicant's appeal against the appointment of a medical expert, but granted her appeal against the decision of 20 May 1998. In this respect, it referred the case to the Juvenile Court for supplementing the taking of evidence, namely to comply with its decision of 13 May 1992. 21.  On 21 and 23 March 1999 the applicant requested that, pursuant to Section 91 of the Courts Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz), a time-limit be fixed for the decision on the Youth Welfare Office's application of 3 January 1990. 22.  On 23 March 1999 the applicant filed a motion for bias against I.S., claiming that the latter had not been available to her during office hours and that she had refused to give her information requested over the telephone. 23.  On 29 March 1999 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court dismissed her motion as being unfounded. 24.  On 30 March 1999 the President rejected her appeal against this decision, as the relevant provisions of the Court Clerks Act (Rechtspflegergesetz) did not provide for such remedy. 25.  On 8 April 1999 the applicant was summoned by the appointed medical expert to undergo a medical examination at the Institute for Forensic Medicine (Institut für Gerichtsmedizin) on 22 April 1999. 26.  It appears that the applicant filed numerous complaints with the President of the Juvenile Court, again claiming that documents were missing from the file and that I.S. as well as various judges of the Juvenile Court were biased. 27.  On 4 May 1999 the President of the Juvenile Court decided to exclude I.S. from the proceedings. He noted that the latter had expressed that she considered herself biased following a telephone conversation in the course of which the applicant had said she would kill her daughter if I.S. continued to harass her. In these circumstances, the President found it advisable that the matter be re-assigned in accordance with the Juvenile Court's rules on the distribution of cases (Geschäftsverteilung). 28.  On the same day, the Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's requests for a time-limit to be set. Referring to the applicant's numerous requests, complaints and motions for bias filed with the court, it found that there was no indication of a lack of due diligence on behalf of the Juvenile Court, it being rather the applicant who prevented that a decision on the merits had been taken so far. 29.  On 17 May 1999 the Vienna Youth Welfare Office withdrew its request dated of 3 January 1990. 30.  Thereupon, the applicant, on 27 May 1999, withdrew all requests and complaints still pending before the Juvenile Court at that stage. 31.  From 30 July 1990 to 3 September 1990 M stayed with her mother. The latter, on 4 September 1990 filed a request with the Juvenile Court, claiming reimbursement of her expenses incurred during this period. 32.  In September 1990 the Vienna Youth Welfare Office reimbursed the applicant for M's stay with her from 30 July 1990 to 21 August 1990. 33.  On 10 August 1993 the Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's request for expenses incurred during the rest of the period. 34.  On 30 August 1993 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's motion of bias against the competent judge. On 30 December 1993 the Vienna Court of Appeal granted the applicant's appeal against this decision and quashed the decision. 35.  On 20 January 1994 the Appeal Chamber of the Juvenile Court again dismissed the applicant's motion for bias. On 6 May 1994 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal. A further appeal to the Supreme Court was to no avail. A further motion for bias against the President of the Juvenile Court was to no avail either. 36.  On 5 January 1995 the Appeal Chamber quashed the decision of 10 August 1993 and remitted the case back to the first instance court. 37.  On 19 April 1998 the applicant requested that, pursuant to Section 91 of the Courts Act, a time-limit be fixed for the decision on her application of 4 September 1990. 38.  On 8 June 1998 the President of the Vienna Juvenile Court ordered the Juvenile Court to decide on the applicant's request no later than on 31 July 1998. 39.  On 5 August 1998 the Juvenile Court dismissed the applicant's request for maintenance payments of 4 September 1990. 40.  The applicant appealed against this decision. 41.  It appears from the documents submitted that the applicant filed several complaints with the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), claiming that I.S. had not complied with the time limit set by the President of the Juvenile Court because she had gone on holidays, that the competent judicial officer, I.S. was to be found at her office only twice a week and that she had been extraordinarily impolite to her. 42.  Thereupon, the President of the Juvenile Court, on 31 August 1998, informed the applicant that both I.S.'s office hours as well as her right to vacation were in accordance with her assignment. He also expressed his regret that, if, in the course of one of the applicant's numerous telephone calls, I.S. might have acted in a slightly indignant way. However, he emphasised that the applicant's allegations had remained unproved. 43.  On 17 September 1998 the Appeal Chamber dismissed her appeal against the Juvenile Court's decision of 5 August 1998 as being unfounded. Further, it stated that there was no further appeal on points of law in the applicant's case as it did not raise questions of law of fundamental importance (Ausspruch über die Unzulässigkeit der ordentlichen Revision). 44.  Nevertheless, the applicant filed an extraordinary appeal on points of law (ausserordentliche Revision) with the Supreme Court. 45.  Referring to an amendment of Section 14 a of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Ausserstreitgesetz), the Supreme Court on 18 December 1998 remitted the case back to the Vienna Juvenile Appeal Court. According to that provision, instead of filing an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, a party to non-contentious proceedings must now request the Court of Appeal to re-consider its opinion on the admissibility of an ordinary appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court found that, even if in her appeal the applicant had not explicitly requested the Juvenile Appeal Court to declare that a further appeal on points of law be allowed, her appeal should have been understood in such a way. 46.  Thereupon, on 11 January 1999 the Juvenile Appeal Court requested the applicant to remedy procedural defects of her appeal, namely to request that an ordinary appeal in her case be allowed. 47.  As the applicant did not comply with this request, the Juvenile Appeal Court, on 25 February 1999, rejected her appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1982 and is now serving a prison sentence in the correctional facility USh/382/10 in the Saratov Region. 6.  On 21 May 2002, at 9 a.m., the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered M., the mother of his girlfriend, and was brought to the Severnoye Medvedkovo police station in Moscow. The arrest record indicated that the applicant had been arrested on suspicion of murder. The applicant countersigned the record, noting that he had been notified of his rights and had understood them. The applicant’s detention was subsequently extended by prosecutors and courts. 7.  According to the applicant, upon arrival at the police station on 21 May 2002, he was placed in the office of Officer Mus. The latter and another officer started beating him up. They hit and kicked him in the solar plexus, on the head, in the kidney area and the groin with a view to extracting a confession to the murder. After their prolonged beatings the applicant was placed in a cell. After a while Officers S. and L. started beating him up again. They hit him on the head, on the body and in the groin, insisting that he confess to the murder. Despite the ill-treatment, he did not confess. Only when they threatened to rape his mother and girlfriend, the applicant’s psychological resistance was broken and he confessed. 8.  On 21 May 2002, at 10 p.m., the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert in the presence of the investigator in charge of the criminal case and two attesting witnesses. The expert detected and noted in the examination record the following injuries on the applicant’s body: a pinkish-bluish bruise on the left ear measuring 1.2 cm, two reddish-purple bruises on the left side of the thorax measuring around 2×2.25 cm and 2.2×0.6 cm and a cut on the back of the left wrist. According to the record, the persons present at the examination were apprised of their right to make declarations and objections in connection with the examination. The applicant made no observations and countersigned the examination record. 9.  On 22 May 2002 the investigator questioned the applicant about the murder but he denied all accusations. Later on the same day he wrote a statement confessing to the murder. He noted that the confession had been made without any “moral or physical pressure” and that he had no complaints about police officers. 10.  On 23 and 30 May 2002 the investigator questioned the applicant in the presence of his two lawyers. The applicant maintained the confession and described in detail how he had committed the murder. He again confirmed the confession while being questioned during a video-recorded inspection of the crime scene where he was also assisted by his lawyers. 11.  At a questioning on 2 August 2002 the applicant retracted his previous statements and submitted that his confession of 22 May 2002 had been extracted from him by force and that he had not murdered M. 12.  On 24 September 2002 the applicant requested the prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings against Officer “Marat” who had allegedly beaten him up on 21 May 2002. 13.  The applicant submitted a written statement by witness A. dated 26 July 2003 which, in its relevant parts, reads as follows:\n“...I was detained on 21 May 2002 ... at the [applicant’s] flat... together with [the applicant]....We have been together since 11 a.m. on 20 March 2002...The fact that we had spent that time together can be confirmed by Z., D., A. and K.... All those persons who could have confirmed [the applicant’s] alibi ... had been known to the investigation but were never questioned.... Since we were sleeping in the same flat, I saw [the applicant’s] underwear; there had been no traces of blood on it. Thus, the blood [stains] found on the applicant later could have appeared on his clothes only after we had been separated at the police station. [The applicant] was clam and reacted adequately. I am convinced in his innocence...” 14.  On 2 August 2002 an investigator with the Babushkinskiy district prosecutor’s office of Moscow launched an inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment which he had submitted on the same day (see paragraph 11 above). According to the records of interview submitted by the Government, the investigator questioned Officer Mur. on 19 August 2002, Officer S. on 3 September 2002 and Officers L. and Mus. on 20 September 2002. The investigator also ordered a forensic expert examination of the applicant’s injuries. The examination was carried out on 18 September 2002. 15.  By a decision of 20 September 2002, the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against them for lack of evidence of a criminal offence. The decision was based on the applicant’s forensic medical examination and the statements of Officers Mus., Mur., L. and S. According to the expert’s report, the bruises to the applicant’s chest and ear had been caused by a blunt object two to three days before his arrest on 21 May 2002 and the incised wound on his left hand could have been caused on 19 May 2002, the date when he had allegedly committed the murder. Officers Mus., Mur., L. and S. submitted that the applicant had confessed voluntarily and that they had never forced or threatened him. The applicant was given a copy of the decision in the presence of his lawyers on 11 October 2002. 16.  By a decision of 3 October 2002, the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against Officer “Marat”, because no such person had ever served at the Severnoye Medvedkovo police station. 17.  On 24 September and 9 October 2002 the applicant lodged further complaints with the Moscow City Prosecutor about the alleged beatings. 18.  On 11 October 2002 the applicant complained to the Babushkinskiy District Court of Moscow about the prosecutor’s refusal to establish the persons who could have witnessed the victim on the date of the presumed murder. He also complained about the decisions of 20 September and 3 October 2002 refusing to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. In particular, the applicant submitted that the colour of his bruises (rose and blue and not yellow and brown) had indicated that they were freshly inflicted and that the expert’s conclusion as to the date of their infliction had thus been wrong. The applicant further claimed that witness A. could have confirmed that he had not had any bruises on his body before his arrest. On 14 October 2002 the Babushkinskiy District Court disallowed the complaints for lack of territorial jurisdiction. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged similar complaints with the Ostanskinskiy District Court. 20.  On 24 October 2002 the Ostankinskiy District Court dismissed the complaints, finding that the inquiry case file had, at the applicant’s own request, been enclosed in the case file in the criminal proceedings against him and that the criminal case had been sent for trial to the Babushkinskiy District Court. Accordingly, the ill-treatment complaint was to be examined by the trial court. The applicant appealed, alleging that he had not been summoned to the hearing on 24 October 2002. 21.  On 22 November 2002, the Moscow City Court heard the applicant’s counsel and upheld the decision. It found that since the applicant had complained in essence of inadmissibility of evidence in relation to the charge against him, the Ostankinskiy District Court had not been entitled to examine the issue, given that the case had been about to be tried by another court. It further noted that the applicant’s lawyer had been present at the hearing on 24 October 2002 and had submitted arguments on his behalf and that the applicant had never asked to be brought to the hearing. 22.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s criminal case was transferred for trial to the Babushkinskiy District Court. On court hearing days the applicant was allegedly not provided with food. 23.  On 8 December 2004 the District Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The judgment referred to statements from twenty-nine witnesses, in particular a person who had found and identified the knives with which the applicant had allegedly stabbed the victim; three post-mortem examinations of the victim, several DNA tests establishing a match between the samples of the victim’s blood and the bloodstains found on the applicant’s clothes; statements from experts, and further material evidence. It did not refer to the applicant’s confession dated 22 May 2002. However, it took into account his statements of 23 and 30 May 2002 and the video record of the crime scene inspection. 24.  The trial court dismissed as unfounded the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. It noted that Officers Mur., Mus.,, S. and L., when questioned in open court, denied having beaten the applicant up. In the same vein, attesting witnesses present during the crime scene inspection and the applicant’s medical examination on 22 May 2002 testified to the court that the applicant had not complained about the alleged ill-treatment in their presence. Furthermore, his submissions were contradicted by statements from independent witnesses A. and N., who had been arrested, brought to the police station and detained there together with the applicant, and who had testified to the court that nobody had beaten him up or threatened him in their presence. According to the forensic examination, the applicant’s injuries had been sustained two to three days before his arrest. Furthermore, the court considered that he had waited for several months before complaining about the alleged ill-treatment and, when questioned about it by the court, made contradictory statements about the circumstances in which he had sustained the injuries. Thus, he alleged once that he could have sustained the ear injury in a scuffle with skinheads prior to his arrest, on another occasion he claimed that nobody had beaten him up. Moreover, witness V. testified to the Court that he had seen the applicant on 19 May 2002 sleeping under a bench at a subway station in a state of intoxication. 25.  According to the applicant, from 9 a.m. on 21 May 2002 until 6 a.m. on 24 May 2002 he was held in a cell at the Severnoye Medvedkovo police station. Throughout his detention there he was not given food or drink and had nowhere to sleep because the cell had no sleeping place. 26.  On an unspecified date an investigator with the Babushkinskiy District prosecutor’s office requested the head of the temporary detention ward of the Losinoostrovskiy police station to provide him with information on, among other things, the date of the applicant’s admission to the ward. In response, the head of the ward certified that on 21 May 2002, at noon, the applicant had been placed in the Severnoye Medvedkovo police station and that on 23 May 2002, at 10.40 p.m., he had been admitted to the temporary detention facility of the Losinoostrovskiy police station. 27.  On 24 September and 9 October 2002 the applicant complained to the Moscow City prosecutor’s office that from the moment of his arrest on 21 May 2002 he had been detained for more than two days at the Severnoye Medvedkovo police station without food or drink. His complaints were left without reply. Complaints in similar terms were raised by the applicant’s relatives in their open letter to the State Duma dated 27 January 2005. 28.  According to the Government, from 21 to 23 May 2002 the applicant was held in the temporary detention facility of the Losinoostrovskiy police station and was brought to the Severnoye Medvedkovo police station for investigative action. On their completion he was brought back to the Losinoostrovskiy police station. 29.  The applicant was detained in Moscow IZ-77/1 remand centre from 30 May 2002 to 28 March 2005. 30.  For most of the period the applicant was held in cell no. 106 measuring around 50 square metres. It had thirty two-tier bunks and accommodated seventy-five to one hundred inmates. Two bunks were always occupied by the inmates’ bags, leaving twenty-eight sleeping places for the inmates. Detainees had to sleep in shifts, on the floor, under the bunks and under the table. Three or more inmates had to share one bunk. The cell space per detainee was reduced to 0.5 to 0.6 square metres. The situation was the same in other cells where the applicant was detained. The administration only once provided him with bedding and even when his relatives brought him bedding the wardens always seized it. 31.  Cell no. 106 had two windows with metal bars and until November 2003 the windows were covered with metal shutters which barred natural light and airflow. The windows were glazed only in winter and sometimes detainees had to stuff them with wet linen, which served as a replacement for glass when it was frozen, permitting them to maintain the air temperature at around 0.5 ºC. The stuffing was routinely removed by the wardens. The lights and TV were on day and night. As there was no ventilation, it was particularly hot in summer. Allegedly, the administration seized the electric fans provided by the detainees’ relatives and then leased them to the inmates for money. 32.  The sanitary conditions in the cells were unsatisfactory. The toilet was 60 cm high. It was separated from the living area by a partition measuring one metre in height and the inmates had to use the bedding supplied by their relatives to secure at least some privacy. The wardens routinely removed their hand-made partitions so that the applicant had to answer the needs of nature in view of other inmates. Moreover, because of the overcrowding the toilet was always occupied and he could not always have access to it in case of need. The toilet was two metres from the table at which the inmates had their meals. The food was of poor quality and had an unpleasant smell. The inmates went on hunger strike several times in protest at the poor quality of the food. 33.  Detainees were allowed to take showers only once every eight to ten days, in a communal shower. Seventy-five to one hundred inmates were at the same time given half an hour for a shower while only ten to twelve taps were working properly. They could not wash themselves or their clothes properly and had to negotiate with wardens who agreed for money to extend the shower time to one hour. 34.  The applicant received no medical treatment, in particular in respect of his acute tooth pain. He was first given dental treatment only when he arrived at the correctional colony in June 2005. 35.  Once a day the applicant was allowed to take a forty-minute walk in a stone courtyard measuring 20-25 square metres, at the same time as up to ninety others. 36.  On many occasions the applicant complained about the conditions of detention to the administration of the remand centre but his complaints were left without reply. 37.  In support of his description of the conditions of detention the applicant produced written statements by Messrs N., D., Po. and Pe. who had been detained in the same remand centre at the relevant time and confirmed his submissions concerning, in particular, overcrowding, lack of individual sleeping places and bedding and inadequate medical assistance. The applicant also submitted sketched plans and photographs of cell no. 106 and the courtyard. He also furnished an article dated 28 December 2005 and published on the internet site newsru.com, summarising the results of the checks carried out by the Moscow City Prosecutor’s office in 2005 and concerning conditions of detention at remand centres in Moscow. With reference to the results of the check-ups, it was stated that although the overall number of inmates held in the six remand centres of Moscow had decreased over a five-year period, it was still twice the design capacity. A considerable number of detainees were not provided with individual sleeping places. 38.  According to the Government, throughout his detention in the remand centre the applicant was held in the following cells:\n- cell no. 106 measuring 57.8 square metres, having 34 bunks and accommodating 34 inmates;\n- cell no. 118 measuring 32.3 square metres, having 34 bunks and accommodating 35 inmates;\n- cell. No.122 measuring 52.7 square metres, having 20 bunks and accommodating 20 inmates;\n- cell no. 146 measuring 46.57 square metres, having 22 bunks and accommodating 22 inmates;\n- cell no. 238 measuring 21.31 square metres, having 6 bunks and accommodating 6 inmates. 39.  The cells had central heating, water supply and drainage; each cell was equipped with a toilet and a wash basin. The toilet was separated from the living area by a brick partition not less than one metre in height and fully securing the necessary privacy. Depending on their size, the cells had one or two windows with bars; the windows were glazed and permitted the inmates to read and work by natural light. The artificial lighting conformed to the relevant standards and at night its brightness was reduced to a level permitting supervision of the detainees. During the applicant’s detention there had been no artificial ventilation in the cells of the remand centre, but it was introduced subsequently. The air temperature, the humidity level and the quality of water in the applicant’s cells conformed to the relevant standards. 40.  The applicant was properly fed and a medical assistant regularly checked the quality of food and the compliance with the requirements in force as regards its storage. The applicant was regularly examined by the medical staff of the facility and received adequate medical assistance. 41.  The medical unit was equipped with all necessary medications. According to an excerpt of the applicant’s medical record submitted by the Government, he was examined by a dentist on 17 February 2005 and his condition was assessed as satisfactory. He was diagnosed with chronic caries of two teeth but no need for urgent medical intervention was established. Upon arrival at the correctional colony, the applicant was treated for caries of two teeth, which were filled. 42.  To support their submissions, the Government furnished a number of certificates issued by the head of remand centre IZ-77/1 in April 2006 and several excerpts from the applicant’s medical record.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Gdynia. 5.  On 21 April 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On 22 April 1999 the Gdańsk District Court remanded him in custody in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed several offences of armed robbery. 6.  Later, several other persons were detained and charged in connection with the same investigation conducted by the Department of Organised Crime of the Gdańsk Regional Prosecutor's Office. In the course of the investigation, the applicant's detention was prolonged several times. 7.  On 13 December 2000 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's and his eight co-suspects' detention until 31 March 2001. 8.  On 7 March 2001 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 May 2001. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the severity of the anticipated penalty. The Court of Appeal further held that the detention on remand was the only measure which could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings given the nature of the charges and the relations between the suspects, who had acted in an organised group. It also considered that the prolongation of detention was justified by the need to obtain DNA evidence in order to corroborate evidence previously obtained. 9.  On 15 May 2001 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment with the Gdańsk Regional Court. The applicant was charged with several dozen counts of armed robbery which had been committed in an organised armed criminal group. The bill of indictment listed 120 charges brought against 19 defendants, who were all detained on remand. The case file comprised 114 volumes. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 366 witnesses. 10.  On 23 May 2001 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 31 October 2001. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it referred to the complexity of the case, the significant number of defendants and the number of witnesses to be heard in the trial. 11.  On 24 October 2001 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant's detention until 31 March 2002, relying on the same grounds as in its earlier decisions. 12.  The trial began on 28 December 2001. However, as of 22 April 2002 the reading out of the bill of indictment by the prosecution had still not been concluded. Initially, the trial court held three hearings per month. 13.  During the hearing held on 30 January 2002 the trial court ordered the removal of the applicant and two other defendants from the court room. They disrupted the trial by screaming when the prosecutor was reading the bill of indictment, notwithstanding a warning from the presiding judge. Similarly, during the hearings held on 27 May and 14 October 2002 the trial court ordered the applicant's removal on the ground that he had disrupted the trial. 14.  On 13 March 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant and his seven co-defendants be held in custody until 30 September 2002. It considered that the trial could be terminated by the last-mentioned date. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, the Court of Appeal found that the prolongation of detention was justified under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the particular complexity of the case. It further observed that the delays in the trial were partly attributable to some of the defendants who had attempted to disrupt the proceedings and, consequently, had to be removed from the court room. The Court of Appeal instructed the trial court to hold more than 3 hearings per month. Furthermore, it held that no other preventive measure could secure the proper conduct of the trial. In that respect, the Court of Appeal observed that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant and other defendants might interfere with the proceedings, given the nature of the charges, the severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that such attempts had been made in the course of the investigation. 15.  On 27, 28 and 29 May 2002 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant's requests for the presiding judge to withdraw. 16.  On 11 September 2002 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's and his nine co-defendants' detention until 31 December 2002. In addition to the grounds previously relied on, it considered that the applicant's detention was justified under Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since that provision established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant might induce him to obstruct the proceedings. It also noted that the prolongation of his detention was justified by the volume of evidence to be heard at the trial. 17.  On 18 December 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant and his 17 co-defendants be kept in custody until 30 June 2003. It held that the grounds invoked in its previous decisions were still valid. 18.  On 13 January and 31 March 2003 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request for the judges and lay members of the trial court to withdraw. On 15 January 2003 the applicant and seventeen of his co-defendants unsuccessfully challenged the judges and lay members of the trial court. 19.  On 13 January 2003 the trial court refused the applicant's request for dismissal of his legal-aid counsel. Similar requests were dismissed on 12 February and 20 March 2003. 20.  On 25 June 2003 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's and eighteen of his co-defendant's detention until 31 December 2003, relying on the same grounds as given previously. In addition, it observed that the trial could not have been terminated due to obstructiveness on the part of the defendants who had filed numerous requests challenging the trial court. It also noted that the trial court had taken various procedural steps in order to accelerate the proceedings. 21.  In its decision of 30 July 2003 dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of 25 June 2003 prolonging his detention, the Court of Appeal held that Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on the applicant might induce him to obstruct the proceedings[1]. It added that the risk of absconding or tampering with witnesses in the present case did not have to be supported by any concrete facts, but resulted from the above presumption. The Court of Appeal also observed that although the applicant and other defendants were free to make use of their procedural rights, the abuse of those rights undoubtedly led to delays in the trial. 22.  On 1 September 2003 a new legal-aid counsel was appointed for the applicant. The previous counsel was discharged by the trial court from his duties at his own request and following a number of complaints made by the applicant. 23.  Subsequently, the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention on several occasions. The relevant decisions were given on 17 December 2003 (prolonging his detention until 30 June 2004), 23 June 2004 (extending his detention until 31 December 2004), 15 December 2004 (ordering his continued detention until 31 March 2005), 30 March 2005 (prolonging his detention until 30 June 2005) and 22 June 2005 (extending his detention until 30 September 2005). In all those decisions the Court of Appeal stated that the grounds previously given for the applicant's detention were still valid. It also stressed the exceptionally complex nature of the case. 24.  In its decision on the applicant's detention of 23 June 2004, the Court of Appeal observed that up to April 2003 the main reason for the delays during the trial was the obstructiveness of the defendants and the abuse of the rights of the defence. It also observed that the trial could be concluded by the end of 2004 provided that the Regional Court endeavoured to organise the trial efficiently. 25.  On 15 January and 29 July 2004 and 16 and 31 May 2005 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed as unfounded the applicant's requests for various members of the trial court to withdraw. 26.  On 8 March and 24 May 2005 the trial court dismissed the applicant's application for release on health grounds, relying on the report prepared by the experts from the Gdańsk Medical Academy. The applicant was diagnosed with a number of ailments, including a brain tumour. However the experts determined that he could remain and receive treatment in detention. 27.  In its decision of 27 July 2005 dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision of 22 June 2005 prolonging his detention, the Court of Appeal referred, inter alia, to the presumption established under Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held that that presumption alone justified the applicant's continued detention. It also held that keeping the applicant in custody was necessary in order to prevent him from interfering with the trial, given the reasonable risk of such interference which flowed from the fact that he had been charged with commission of offences as a member of an organised criminal group. 28.  By March 2006 the trial court had held some 135 hearings of the 162 which had been scheduled. It heard more than 400 witnesses. 29.  During the trial the applicant filed numerous but unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against the decisions prolonging his detention. He maintained that the length of his detention was excessive and that the charges against him lacked a sufficiently strong basis. 30.  On 21 March 2005 the Gdańsk Regional Court made a severance order with a view to expediting the proceedings, and thereafter four defendants (J.N., G.P., Z.S. and Z.C.), who in the meantime had been released from detention, were to be tried separately. 31.  After 20 June 2005 no hearing was held due to the serious illness of the judge rapporteur. On 21 September 2005 the President of the IV Criminal Section of the Gdańsk Regional Court assigned a new judge rapporteur. Consequently, the trial had to commence de novo. 32.  On 20 September 2005 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant's detention until 31 January 2006. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 18 October 2005 a different panel of the Court of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and ordered the applicant's release under police supervision. It also imposed on him a prohibition on leaving the country. The Court of Appeal had regard to the fact that the trial had to commence de novo and that the applicant had already spent a few years in pre-trial detention. 33.  The applicant was released on 19 October 2005. 34.  On 24 November 2005 the trial court made a further severance order and divided the case into eleven separate cases. 35.  It appears that the proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1945 and resides in the city of Donetsk, Ukraine. 8.  The applicant has worked as an English teacher in a secondary school since 1984. 9.  On 23 March 1996 the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a new wording for the Education Act that provided for, in particular, the payment of certain benefits to teachers. 10.  On 2 April 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Leninsky District Court of Donetsk against the Leninsky District Department for Education, claiming entitlement to those benefits. The applicant maintained that he had more than 10 years’ of service and was thus entitled to a 20% increase in his salary as from 1 January 1997. However, the defendant had not paid him this increase. He further maintained that the defendant had not paid him annual bonuses for excellent work and recreation. The defendant stated that the claimed amounts could not be paid because the State budgets for 1997-1999 did not make any provision for such expenditures. 11.  On 5 October 1999 the court found in part for the applicant. The court rejected the applicant’s claim for an excellent work bonus as such a payment required an assessment of the applicant’s work which was outside the court’s competence. The court also rejected the applicant’s claim for unpaid benefits in 1997 and 1998 as being out of time, according to the law on employment disputes. The court further rejected the applicant’s claim for benefits after 1 June 1999 as the Secondary Education Act, adopted in May 1999, had suspended them. The court, however, awarded the applicant the claimed increase in salary for the period between 1 January and 1 June 1999. 12.  The applicant appealed against this decision to the Donetsk Regional Court. 13.  On 4 November 1999 the regional court quashed the decision of the first instance court and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The court noted, in particular, that the Secondary Education Act had entered into force on 23 June 1999; therefore the first instance court had erroneously overlooked the period between 1 and 23 June 1999. 14.  On 24 February 2000 the Leninsky District Court of Donetsk ruled against the applicant. The court found that, under the transitional clauses of the Secondary Education Act, the provision entitling the applicant to benefits would only resume force on 1 September 2001. Thus, at the time of the examination of the claim, there was no legal basis for it. 15.  On 30 March 2000, the Donetsk Regional Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. It observed that the claims of the applicant for the periods prior to the adoption of the Secondary Education Act could not be satisfied, since at the time of the consideration of the case the relevant provisions of the Education Act had been suspended by the Secondary Education Act. This decision was final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicants were born in 1953 and 1994 respectively. The first applicant lives in West Bloomfield (Michigan) and the second applicant lives in Graz. 11.  The first applicant married an Austrian citizen in April 1994. The marriage was concluded in the United States of America, where the couple set up their common residence. On 11 September 1994 their daughter, the second applicant, was born. The family's last common residence was in Michigan. Under the law of the State of Michigan the parents had joint custody over the second applicant. 12.  On 30 October 1995 the first applicant's wife, without obtaining his consent, left the United States with the second applicant and took her to Austria. 13.  On 31 October 1995 the first applicant, relying on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”), requested the Austrian courts to order the second applicant's return. In these and the subsequent proceedings the first applicant was represented by counsel. 14.  On 3 November 1995 the second applicant's mother filed an application with the Graz District Civil Court (Bezirksgericht für Zivilrechtssachen) for the award of sole custody over the second applicant. 15.  On 20 December 1995 the Graz District Civil Court, after having heard evidence from the first applicant and his wife and the oral statement of an expert in child psychology, Dr. K., ordered that the second applicant be returned to the first applicant at her former place of residence in Michigan. 16.  The court, noting that under Michigan law the first applicant and his wife had joint custody of their daughter, found that the first applicant's wife had wrongfully removed the child within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. Moreover, it dismissed the mother's claim that the child's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. It considered that the second applicant's return could not be hindered by the fact that the mother was her main person of reference and that returning could cause a massive trauma affecting her development. Otherwise, mothers of small children could easily circumvent the aim of the Hague Convention. As to the mother's allegation that the first applicant regularly masturbated in the presence of the child, the court referred to the expert's statement that such conduct would, in view of the child's tender age, not cause immediate harm. The fact that such conduct, if proved, could in the long run be harmful to the child would have to be assessed in the custody proceedings. Finally, it held that the mother could be expected to return with the second applicant to the United States. 17.  On 19 January 1996 the Graz Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen) dismissed an appeal by the second applicant's mother. 18.  The Regional Court confirmed the District Court's assessment as regards the question whether the second applicant's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. It noted that the onus of proof was on the person opposing the return, i.e. the second applicant's mother. Further, it noted that the statement of  the expert in child psychology had denied that there was any such risk. That statement had been made on the assumption that the mother's allegations were true. However, the Regional Court emphasised that the truth of these allegations had not been proved and that the District Court had had the benefit of hearing the first applicant and, thus, of forming a personal impression of him. 19.  On 27 February 1996 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) dismissed a further appeal by the second applicant's mother. 20.  On 27 February 1996 the first applicant filed an application for enforcement of the return order of 20 December 1995. 21.  Meanwhile, the first applicant had started divorce proceedings before the Oakland Circuit Court (Michigan). By a decision of 16 April 1996, the court pronounced a default judgment of divorce. Further, it awarded the first applicant sole custody of the second applicant and ordered that the second applicant should reside with the first applicant in the event of her return. 22.  On 7 May 1996 the file arrived again at the Graz District Civil Court. 23.  On 8 May 1996 the Graz District Civil Court ordered the enforcement of the return order under section 19 (1) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Ausserstreitgesetz). It noted that it was necessary to order coercive measures as there were indications that the mother was obstructing the child's return. She had given an interview to a local newspaper according to which she frequently changed her whereabouts and was determined not to let the child be taken away from her. 24.  In the early hours of 10 May 1996, an attempt to enforce the return order was made in accordance with the terms set out in the order of 8 May. A bailiff, assisted by a police officer, a locksmith and a representative of the Youth Welfare Office, appeared at the house where the second applicant and her mother were living. The first applicant was also present. A search carried out in the house, necessitating the use of force against the second applicant's mother and the forceful opening of several doors, remained unsuccessful. On the occasion of the enforcement attempt the Supreme Court's decision of 27 February 1996 and the enforcement order of 8 May 1996 were served on the second applicant's mother. 25.  On 15 May 1996 the second applicant's mother appealed against the decision of 8 May 1996 and again filed an application for the award of sole custody of the second applicant. 26.  On 29 May 1996 the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, issued an arrest warrant against the second applicant's mother on suspicion of international parental kidnapping. 27.  On 18 June 1996 the first applicant made a further application for enforcement of the return order. 28.  By a decision of 25 June 1996 the Graz District Civil Court, at the request of the second applicant's mother, transferred jurisdiction to the Leibnitz District Court, in the judicial district of which the second applicant had purportedly established her residence. 29.  On 29 August 1996 the Graz Regional Civil Court granted an appeal by the first applicant against the transfer of jurisdiction and, on the mother's appeal, quashed the Graz District Civil Court's enforcement order of 8 May 1996 and referred the case back to it. 30.  Referring to section 19 (1) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act, the court found that, in the enforcement proceedings, the child's well-being had to be taken into account in so far as a change in the situation had occurred since the issue of the return order and the taking of coercive measures. However, under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, this question was not to be examined by the court of its own motion but only upon an application by the person opposing the return. Following the service of the enforcement order of 8 May 1996 the mother had submitted, in particular, that she was the second applicant's main person of reference. Because of the lapse of time, the second applicant no longer recognised her father when she was shown his picture. By being taken away from her mother the child would suffer irreparable harm. The court therefore ordered the District Court to examine whether the situation had changed since the return order of 20 December 1995. It also ordered the District Court to obtain the opinion of an expert child psychologist on the question whether the child's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm and whether coercive measures were compatible with the interests of the child's well-being. 31.  Between May and December 1996 numerous letters were exchanged between the United States Department of State and the Austrian Ministry of Justice, acting as their respective States' Central Authorities under the Hague Convention. The United States Department of State repeatedly requested information as to which steps had been taken to locate the second applicant and to enforce the return order of 20 December 1995. The Austrian Ministry of Justice replied that the first applicant was represented by counsel in the Austrian proceedings and that it was up to him to take all necessary steps to obtain the enforcement of the return order. It also pointed out that there were only rather limited possibilities to locate a child who had disappeared after a return order had been made. 32.  On 15 October 1996 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the first applicant and set aside the enforcement order of 8 May 1996. It noted in particular that the notion of the child's well-being was central to the entire proceedings. When ordering coercive measures under section 19 (1) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act, the court had to take the interests of the child's well-being into account, despite the fact that the return order was final, if the relevant situation had changed in the meantime. Having regard to the aims of the Hague Convention, a refusal of coercive measures was only justified if the child's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm for the child within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. 33.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that particularly difficult problems arose in cases in which the abductor had created the situation in which the return represented a serious danger to the child's well-being. Where the abductor of a small child was the latter's main person of reference and refused to return with the child, a serious threat to the child's well-being might arise. Nevertheless, Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention made clear that the child's well-being took priority over the Convention's general aim of preventing child abduction. Reasons of general deterrence or, in other words, the aim of showing that child abduction was not worthwhile could not justify exposing a child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 34.  In the present case, the mother had claimed that the child, who was now more than two years old, had become alienated from the father. The child's abrupt removal from her main person of reference and her return to the United States would cause her irreparable harm. The Supreme Court emphasised that the particularity of the case lay in the fact that, in the main proceedings, the courts had denied that there was any risk of psychological harm (as a result of the alleged sexual behaviour of the first applicant) exclusively on account of the child's tender age. In these circumstances, it could not be excluded that the child, who was now more than two years old and had been living solely with her mother for more than a year, would suffer grave psychological harm in the event of a return to her father. Thus, the Regional Court had rightly found that the question whether the return order could be enforced by coercive measures needed further examination, including an opinion by an expert in child psychology. It might also prove necessary to assess  whether or not the mother's allegations were at all true. 35.  In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, the case was referred back to the Graz District Civil Court. 36.  On 23 April 1997 the Oakland Circuit Court issued a “safe harbour” order, valid until 21 October 1997, which provided, inter alia, that pending determination of custody in expedited proceedings, the first applicant would not exercise his right to sole custody of the child; the second applicant would live with her mother away from the first applicant, who would undertake to cover their living expenses; and the arrest warrant against the mother would be set aside as soon as she and the second applicant boarded a direct flight to Michigan. 37.  On 29 April 1997 the Graz District Civil Court dismissed an application by the first applicant for enforcement of the return order. 38.  In the continued proceedings, the expert on child psychology, Dr. K., had submitted his opinion on 26 March 1997 and the first applicant had been given an opportunity to comment. On the basis of the expert opinion, the court found that since the second applicant's birth her mother had been her main person of reference. However, the first applicant had had regular contact with her until 30 October 1995, the date of her abduction. Thereafter they had had no contact at all. Since the return order had been made, a year and four months had elapsed and the first applicant had become a complete stranger to the second applicant. Given that a young child needed a stable relationship with the main person of reference at least until the age of six, the second applicant's removal from her main person of reference, namely her mother, would expose her to serious psychological harm. Having regard to the considerable lapse of time since the return order had been made on 20 December 1995, the District Court found that there had been a change in the relevant circumstances, in that the second applicant had lost all contact with the first applicant while her ties with her mother and her maternal grandparents had become ever closer. Consequently, her return would expose her to serious psychological harm. 39.  The court noted the first applicant's statement of 28 April 1997 and his offer within the meaning of the “safe harbour” case-law but considered that this offer did not guarantee that the second applicant's relationship with her main person of reference would be preserved in the long run. As this relationship was indispensable for her well-being, the application for enforcement of the return order had to be dismissed. 40.  On 28 May 1997 the Graz Regional Civil Court dismissed an appeal by the first applicant. It shared the District Court's view that the situation had changed fundamentally since the issuing of the return order. At that time the second applicant had been much younger and, given the short time which had elapsed between her abduction and the issuing of the return order, had not yet lost contact with the first applicant. A return of the second applicant accompanied by her mother could not be envisaged either. Apart from the reasons adduced by the District Court, the mother would face criminal prosecution in the United States and the child would, accordingly, be taken away from her. 41.  On 2, 3  and 4 June 1997 the first applicant was granted a couple of hours of supervised access to the second applicant. 42.  On 9 September 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal by the first applicant on the ground that it did not raise any important legal issues. 43.  On 29 December 1997 the second applicant's mother was awarded sole custody of the second applicant by the Graz District Civil Court. It noted that Article 16 of the Hague Convention, which prohibited the State to which the child has been abducted from taking a decision on custody while proceedings for the child's return were pending, no longer applied, as the decision not to enforce the return order had become final. Following appeal proceedings the judgment became final on 31 March 1998.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Izmir. 5. On 12 December 2003 the Izmir Magistrates’ Court issued an arrest warrant for the applicant on suspicion of assault and attempted murder. 6. On 18 December 2003 the Izmir Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment charging the applicant with the offences of assault and attempted murder. 7. On 6 October 2004 the applicant was arrested. 8. On 9 October 2004 the Antalya Magistrates’ Court ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 9. On 1 December 2005 the Izmir Assize Court sentenced the applicant to six years and two months’ imprisonment. 10. On 21 February 2007 the Izmir Assize Court ordered the applicant’s release pending trial, having considered the time spent under detention on remand. 11. On 6 June 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 1 December 2005. 12. Between 12 October 2004 and 1 December 2005, the Izmir Assize Court examined the applicant’s continued detention at the end of every hearing, either of its own motion or upon the applicant’s requests. On each occasion, the court ordered the applicant’s continued detention, having regard to the state of the evidence, nature of the offence, content of the file and the incomplete collection of evidence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, Mr Sebastian Kliza, is a Polish national who was born in 1978 and lives in Mikołów, Poland. 5.  The applicant was arrested on 26 January 2001 on suspicion of having committed a series of armed robberies as a member of an organised criminal group. On 28 January 2001 the Tychy District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that he be detained pending the outcome of the investigation. 6.  On 9 April 2001 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) prolonged his detention until 17 July 2001. It referred to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. It also stressed that his detention was justified by the need to obtain further evidence. 7.  On 9 July 2001 the Katowice Regional Court prolonged his detention until 17 October 2001. It relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, which was supported by evidence from witnesses and experts. The court further considered that the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation justified holding him in custody. It referred to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. It also relied on the risk that he might tamper with evidence. 8.  On 8 October 2001 the Katowice Regional Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 17 January 2002. It repeated the grounds previously given for his detention. 9.  On an unspecified date in January 2002, the applicant was indicted before the Tychy District Court. The bill of indictment comprised 44 charges of armed robbery committed by an organised criminal group. The charges in the bill of indictment concerned 4 co-accused. 10.  During the proceedings the applicant's detention was extended on several occasions. On 15 January 2002 the Tychy District Court prolonged his detention until 17 July 2002. On 8 July 2002 the court ordered that the term should be prolonged until 17 October 2002. On 16 October 2002 it ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 17 January 2003. It referred to the grounds for detention listed in the previous decisions. 11.  On 2 January 2003 the Tychy District Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 26 January 2003. It repeated the grounds that had been given in the previous decisions and added that the case was complex, given the number of accused and victims. It further observed that the trial had not yet begun for reasons beyond the trial court's control. 12.  On 22 January 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny), on an application from the trial court, prolonged the applicant's detention until 26 June 2003. It repeated the grounds previously given for the applicant's detention. It also found that there were no special grounds, as specified in Article 259 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that would justify lifting the detention and imposing a less severe measure. 13.  On 25 June 2003, on an application from the Tychy District Court, the Katowice Court of Appeal extended the applicant's detention until 26 October 2003. The court relied on a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question. The court also considered that, given the severity of the likely sentence and the fact that the applicant had been charged with acting in an organised criminal group, there was a risk that he would obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. It also acknowledged the delay in the proceedings and asked the trial court to expedite the examination of the case. 14.  On 22 October 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal, on an application from the Tychy District Court, prolonged the applicant's detention until 26 January 2004. It also stated that the proceedings were inordinately lengthy. 15.  Subsequently, on 7 January 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal, on an application from the trial court, prolonged the applicant's detention until 26 March 2004. On 17 March 2004 the Katowice Court of Appeal, on an application from the trial court, prolonged the applicant's detention until 26 May 2004. It stated that the delays in the proceedings were to a large extent caused by the failure to escort the accused to the court and the lack of discipline on the part of the parties to the proceedings. 16.  In the meantime, the District Court had proceeded with the trial. Hearings listed for 10 May and 3 July 2002 were postponed. A hearing scheduled for 20 August 2002 was adjourned upon the request of one of the lawyers. 17.  Of 17 hearings held between 30 January 2003 and 19 December 2003 10 were adjourned. 18.  From 23 January to 2 April 2004 the court held 7 hearings. One of them was adjourned on account of the absence of one of the lawyers. 19.  In the course of the proceedings the applicant made numerous, unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against refusals to release him and decisions extending his detention. 20.  On 9 April 2004 the Tychy District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment. He appealed. 21.  The applicant's detention was subsequently prolonged on several occasions. 22.  On 11 February 2005 the Katowice Regional Court amended the trial court's judgment, acquitted the applicant of the charge of acting in an organised criminal group and reduced the applicant's sentence to 6 years' imprisonment. 23.  The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 24.  In the meantime, between 13 September 2001 and 10 November 2002 and, subsequently, between 11 June 2003 and 11 November 2003 the applicant served prison sentences which had been imposed on him in other criminal proceedings. 25.  On 1 March 2004 the Court received the applicant's first letter of 8 February 2004. The letter was sent while the applicant was detained in the Zabrze Detention Centre. The envelope bears the following stamps: “Zabrze Detention Centre received on 16.02.2004” (Areszt Śledczy w Zabrzu Wpłynęło dnia 16.02.2004) and “District Court in Tychy, censored” (Sąd Rejonowy w Tychach, cenzurowano), a hand-written sentence: “Z: without censorship” (Z: bez cenzury), a hand-written date: “18.2.4”, and an illegible signature. 26.  On 27 April 2004 the Court received the applicant's application form. The envelope in which the application form was delivered bears the following stamps: “Zabrze Detention Centre received on 8.04.2004” (Areszt Śledczy w Zabrzu Wpłynęło dnia 8.04.2004) and “District Court in Tychy, censored” (Sąd Rejonowy w Tychach, cenzurowano), and an illegible signature.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Toronto, Canada. 5.  On 8 August 2000 Mr A. instituted civil proceedings in the Dzerzhinsky District Court of Kharkiv (“the court”) against the applicant and Mr D. alleging that he had been humiliated by them. He claimed compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 6.  On an unspecified date Mr A. requested the court to secure his claim by prohibiting the Migration Office of the Kharkiv Department of the Ministry of Interior (“the Migration Office”) from issuing the applicant with an authorisation to leave Ukraine to live permanently abroad. On 18 July 2002 the court granted Mr A.’s request. 7.  On 23 and 30 September 2002 the court quashed the ruling of 18 July 2002 and attached the applicant’s flat. 8.  On 31 October 2002 the applicant went to live permanently in Canada. On 13 December 2002 he came back to Ukraine. 9.  On 25 March 2003 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), following Mr A.’s appeal, quashed the rulings of 23 and 30 September 2002 and remitted the case for a new consideration to the court. 10.  On 21 April 2003 the applicant lodged a counterclaim against Mr A. claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 11.  In May 2003 the applicant waived his permanent residence in Canada in order to restore his right to receive a pension in Ukraine. 12.  In a letter of 2 October 2003 the court explained to the Head of the Migration Office that as on 25 March 2003 the rulings of 23 and 30 September 2002 had been quashed, the Migration Office should abide by the ruling of 18 July 2002. 13.  On 21 July 2004 the applicant again left Ukraine for Canada, where he lives now. 14. Since July 2004 he has been represented by his representative before the domestic courts. 15.  On 22 April 2005 the court rejected Mr. A.’s claim and partly allowed the applicant’s counterclaim. 16.  On 16 December 2005 the Court of Appeal amended the judgment of 22 April 2005 and dismissed the applicant’s counterclaim. 17.  On 23 February 2006 Mr A. appealed in cassation before the Supreme Court. The cassation proceedings are still pending. 18.  According to the documents provided by the Government, in the course of the proceedings some forty-nine hearings were listed by the domestic courts. Nine hearings were adjourned because the judge was involved in other proceedings, one because he was on holiday and one because the judge was ill. Some twenty-four hearings were adjourned because one or more parties to the proceedings or their representatives failed to appear or at their request. From the documents in the case file it cannot be seen that the domestic courts took any steps to ensure the parties’ presence in the court. No hearings were adjourned solely due to the applicant’s failure to appear.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants, a married couple, were born in 1960 and 1957 respectively and live in the village of Prigorodnoye in the Chechen Republic. 7.  The applicants are the parents of Mr Vidzha Umayev, born in 1982. The first applicant is the sister of Mr Timur Mezhidov, born in 1972. The latter is the brother-in-law of the second applicant. 8.  The description of the events below is based on the information contained in the application form and written statements by the first and second applicants, dated 17 and 23 July 2007 respectively.\n(a)  The detention of Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov 9.  On 14 July 2006 the first applicant, Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov were travelling in the applicants’ VAZ-2107 vehicle from the village of Nikhaloy to the village of Prigorodnoye. 10.  At the Russian federal forces roadblock located at the entrance point of Shatoy village (hereinafter “the Shatoy roadblock”) Russian servicemen stopped the applicants’ vehicle to carry out a check. At the roadblock the first applicant saw a group of seven to eight servicemen of Chechen ethnic origin, who were standing near a silver-grey four-door Niva vehicle and speaking to each other in Chechen. The first applicant observed them for a while and was able to memorise their faces. She also specifically noticed that, whilst the servicemen from the roadblock who checked the identity papers were Russian, those standing by the Niva vehicle were Chechen. After checking Vidzha Umayev’s and Timur Mezhidov’s identity papers, Russian servicemen entered the relevant information in the roadblock logbooks and allowed them to continue their journey. 11.  The first applicant, Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov then drove through Shatoyskiy District and crossed the border into Groznenskiy District. At the bridge in the vicinity of the entrance point of Yarash-Mardy village they saw three Chechen servicemen from the group they had already seen at the Shatoy roadblock. The servicemen walked towards the vehicle and ordered it to stop. One of the servicemen ordered the driver and the passengers, in Chechen, to get out of the vehicle. Vidzha Umayev, Timur Mezhidov and the first applicant complied with the order and got out of the car. One of the servicemen then ordered Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov to get back into the applicants’ vehicle. They obeyed and got into the back seats. At the same moment two servicemen joined them in the back seat, the third serviceman got into the driver’s seat and the vehicle moved off quickly. Vidzha Umayev shouted in Chechen: “That’s my mother! Don’t leave her alone!” and the first applicant rushed towards the car. However, the car did not stop and the first applicant ran into a bridge barrier and fell to the ground. 12.  The applicants have not seen Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov since.\n(b)  The applicants’ search for their missing relatives 13.  On 14 July 2006, shortly after the car with the abductors had left, the first applicant managed to stop a private vehicle, which took her home. Once there she told the second applicant about the abduction, and the applicants immediately left for Shatoy, intending to alert the Shatoyskiy District Department of the Interior (“the ROVD”) to the incident. 14.  On their way, about 2.5 km from the bridge, where the first applicant, her son and brother had been stopped by the Chechen servicemen, the applicants saw their VAZ-2107 vehicle. It was parked about fifty metres from the road, at a dugout in which were two Russian servicemen. In the applicants’ submission, on that day Russian military forces had groups of servicemen stationed at the Shatoy road at about 200 metres distance from each other. The applicants saw that three of the doors of their VAZ-2107 vehicle were open and its headlights were on. Vidzha Umayev’s mobile phone was in the vehicle. The first applicant asked the servicemen how their car had arrived at the dugout. They replied that it had arrived there, followed by a four-door silver-grey Niva vehicle. Two people were taken out of the VAZ-2107 vehicle and put into the silver-grey Niva vehicle, which then left in the direction of the village of Duba-Yurt. 15.  After that the applicants took Vidzha Umayev’s mobile phone and went to the ROVD. From there the second applicant, the head of the ROVD, whom the applicants identified as “Sayd-Akhmed”, and several police officers left for the Shatoy roadblock. The first applicant stayed at the ROVD and lodged a written complaint about the abduction of her son and brother. 16.  On the same day, on arrival at the Shatoy roadblock, the second applicant and Sayd-Akhmed spoke to a senior roadblock officer from the Shatoyskiy District military commander’s office. He confirmed that the servicemen at the roadblock had checked Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov’s identity papers and stated that everything was in order, and that the two men had been let through the roadblock and had left. Meanwhile the first applicant also arrived at the roadblock. While the second applicant was speaking to the officer, a UAZ vehicle with two Chechen servicemen in it arrived at the roadblock. The first applicant identified them as members of the group of Chechen servicemen she had seen at the Shatoy roadblock while the authorities were checking her relatives’ identity papers. The applicants immediately asked those servicemen where the other members of their group were and where they had taken Vidzha Umarov and Timur Mezhidov. The two men laughed and answered that they had not arrested Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov. They also stated that they did not know the other servicemen who had been at the Shatoy roadblock with them. According to the applicants, the head of the ROVD told them that the two Chechen servicemen were from the special Vostok Russian Military Battalion of the Main Intelligence Service (“the GRU”) and that they were called “Yamadayevtsy” after their commander Sulim Yamadayev. The applicants then returned home. 17.  On 15 July 2006 the applicants again complained to various State bodies about the abduction of Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov. They did not keep copies of those complaints. 18.  On 17 or 18 July 2006 a certain Mr I.A., a GRU officer, visited the applicants and told the second applicant that a certain Mr R., a GRU colonel and commander of the 921st regiment, wished to talk to him. 19.  On 23 July 2006 the applicants and Mr I.A. drove to a Russian federal forces base located in the village of Borzoy in the Chechen Republic. The second applicant left his vehicle, with the first applicant and Mr I.A. inside. At the military base checkpoint he was met by two Russian servicemen, one of them a warrant officer and the other a captain. They accompanied the second applicant into the checkpoint building, where Mr R. was already waiting for him. 20.  Mr R. confirmed that the applicant’s son was being held in the military base and said that he “opened his eyes when touched but then rolled them up”. Mr R. then asked the second applicant to write a note for his son, “telling him to answer their questions”. The second applicant asked Mr R. what statement they wanted from his son, but received no reply. The second applicant then handed over to Mr R. medical certificates attesting to his son’s disability. Mr R. looked at them, and from his reaction the second applicant inferred that Mr R. had realised that his servicemen had beaten up a seriously ill person. The second applicant then told Mr R. that he would not write any notes for his son and requested that he be released. Mr R. replied that “they did not have a deal then” and ordered the servicemen to accompany the second applicant to the exit, which they did. The second applicant returned to the car and left the premises with the first applicant. 21.  On an unspecified date in October 2006 the first applicant received a phone call on her mobile phone from a person who whispered “Mother, mother!” and then suddenly the conversation was disconnected. The first applicant inferred that it was Vidzha Umayev and, since the number was displayed, she called back. A woman replied to her in Russian and immediately hung up. When the first applicant dialled the number again, a man’s voice told her not to call that number any more. The first applicant informed the law-enforcement authorities about the call. In the applicants’ submission, at the material time the only company providing mobile communication services in the Chechen Republic was Megafon. The figures 923 indicated that the number from which she had received the call was not a Megafon number but was from another company. In the applicants’ opinion, only Russian army servicemen could have had phone numbers from mobile communication providers other than Megafon. 22.  On an unspecified date in November 2006 Mr I.A. visited the applicants again and offered them information on Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov in exchange for 50,000 Russian roubles (RUB). Two days later the second applicant met Mr I.A. in Prigorodnoye and the latter told him that Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov were not alive. Mr I.A. promised the second applicant that their bodies would be retrieved, and left. 23.  Two days later the second applicant and his relative went to the village of Borzoy to meet Mr I.A. He told the second applicant that there were three mass graves in Borzoy but he did not know in which of them Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov had been buried. He also specified that their bodies were in different graves and that they “had been shot dead by Chechens in the presence of a Russian”. He noted however that he had not witnessed the killings. 24.  On an unspecified date the second applicant contacted a Russian army general whom he knew well and told him about Mr R. The general told the applicant that this was the first time he heard that name and that it must have been a false name. 25.  The Government submitted that on 14 July 2006, on the road between Grozny and Shatoy, near the bridge close to the village of Yarysh‑Mardy, three unidentified individuals wearing camouflage uniforms and carrying automatic weapons had stopped a vehicle in which Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov were travelling, following which the latter disappeared. 26.  It appears that following the applicants’ complaints about the abduction of their relatives the ROVD carried out an inquiry into their allegations. The inquiry was given the number 81. The exact date of the opening of the inquiry remains unclear. 27.  On 25 July 2006 the prosecutor’s office of the Groznenskiy District (“the district prosecutor’s office”) received the inquiry file from the ROVD. 28.  On the same date the district prosecutor’s office instituted a criminal investigation in respect of the abduction of Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned the number 54063. The decision stated that at about 4 p.m. on 14 July 2006 at the bridge near Yarysh-Mardy village, three unidentified armed individuals in camouflage uniforms had stopped the VAZ-2107 vehicle in which Vidzha Umayev, Timur Mezhidov and the first applicant were travelling, and had taken Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov to an unknown destination. 29.  By a letter of 26 July 2006 the prosecutor’s office of the Chechen Republic (“the republican prosecutor’s office”) replied to the first applicant that it had examined her complaint about the abduction of Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov and informed her that on 25 July 2006 the district prosecutor’s office had opened a criminal investigation in respect of the abduction of her son and brother. 30.  On 20 September 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status in connection with the proceedings in case 54063. She was informed of that decision on 21 September 2006. 31.  On 28 May 2007 the first applicant wrote to the President of the Chechen Republic. She described in detail the circumstances of the abduction of her relatives and her attempts to find them and asked for assistance in her search for them. 32.  On 15 June 2007 the republican prosecutor’s office replied to the first applicant that on 25 July 2006 the district prosecutor’s office had opened a criminal case in respect of the abduction of her relatives. The letter also stated that on 25 October 2006 the investigation in case 54063 had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 33.  On 17 July 2007 the first applicant wrote to the district prosecutor’s office, seeking information on the progress of the investigation in case 54063. She requested that the proceedings be resumed if they had been suspended and sought access to the investigation case file and permission to make copies from it. There is no indication that the applicant’s request was ever replied to. 34.  By a letter of 22 June 2007 the district prosecutor’s office informed the first applicant that on 22 July 2007 it had resumed the investigation in case 54063. 35.  In the applicants’ submission, in October 2007 the district prosecutor’s office informed them orally that on an unspecified date the investigation in case 54063 had been suspended again. 36.  The Government refused to submit any documents from criminal case file concerning the abduction of the applicants’ relatives, referring to Article 161 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure.\n(b)  Information concerning the progress of the investigation of the abduction of the applicants’ relatives 37.  The information about the investigation provided by the Government can be summarised as follows. 38.  On 25 July 2006 the district prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation in respect of the abduction of Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned the number 54063. 39.  On 25 October 2006 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 40.  On 22 June 2007 the investigation was resumed because the investigating authorities had established that serviceman R.D. of military unit 44822 was implicated in the abduction. 41.  On 21 July 2007 Mr R.D.’s name was put on a wanted list. 42.  On 6 June 2008 the investigation of the abduction of the applicants’ relatives was entrusted to an investigating committee of the prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation in the Chechen Republic (hereinafter “the investigating committee”). 43.  On 8 July 2008 the investigating committee issued a decision to formally charge Mr R.D. with abducting the applicants’ relatives and the criminal case was transferred to the military investigating department with the United Group Alignment of the Military Forces for Counterterrorist Operations in the North Caucasus Region (hereinafter the “investigating department”). The case file was given the number 34/00/0023-08. 44.  It appears that shortly thereafter the investigation was suspended again and that it was resumed on 11 November 2009. 45.  In the Government’s submission the investigation in case 34/00/0023-08 is still pending.\n(c)  The findings of the investigation 46.  The Government stated that the findings of the preliminary investigation confirmed the version of events submitted by the applicants. 47.  In the Government’s submission, the preliminary investigation established that Mr R.D. had been doing military service in military unit 44822 of the Vostok special-purpose battalion (previously an infantry battalion) since 10 August 2004. In mid-July 2006 Mr R.D. had colluded with two unidentified individuals with a view to abducting Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov. On 14 July 2006, having acquired information on the route taken by Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov, Mr R.D., armed with an automatic weapon, organised an ambush at the Grozny-Shatoy road near Yarysh-Mardy with a view to arresting and abducting them. At about 4 p.m. on the same day Mr R.D. stopped the VAZ-2107 vehicle with Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov, following which “Mr R.D. and two armed men in camouflage uniforms arrested them and took them to an unknown destination”, leaving the first applicant behind. 48.  In the Government’s submission, the above account of the events was confirmed by the first applicant, who had been granted victim status, and the second applicant, who had been interviewed as a witness. The applicants also informed the investigators that following the abduction they had learnt from Mr I.A. that their abducted relatives had been held at the military base in the village of Borzoy and eventually killed. 49.  The first applicant confirmed those submissions during a check of her statement at the crime scene (проверка показаний на месте совершения преступления) and identified Mr R.D. from a photograph as the person who had abducted her son and brother. 50.  Mr I.A., interviewed on an unspecified date, stated that he had learnt about the abduction of Vidzha Umayev and Timur Mezhidov from Z.M. The second applicant had contacted Mr I.A. six months after the abduction, asking the latter to organise a meeting with officers of the military base, following which they had met a serviceman named Volodya, who had asked for RUB 50,000 for information about the applicants’ son and had then informed them that the applicants’ relatives had been killed.\n(d)  Information concerning criminal case 68800 51.  On an unspecified date the investigating authorities opened a criminal case against Mr R.D. on suspicion that he had caused serious damage to the health of a third person by shooting at him at the local market in the village of Borzoy on 23 May 2007. The case file was given the number 68800. 52.  On 18 October 2008 case 68800 was transferred for investigation to an unspecified investigating department of an unspecified military unit. 53.  On 22 January 2009 criminal case 6800 was joined to the criminal case concerning the abduction of the applicant’s relatives and the new file was given the number 34/36/0092-08.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Gödöllő. 6.  The applicant, married and father of a minor, was arrested on 18 January 2006, because the police found several suspicious spare car parts, car documents and various tools in his vehicle. On the same day he was interrogated on suspicion of attempted aggravated larceny, allegedly committed in respect of a van. 7.  On 20 January 2006 the prosecution proposed the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Relying essentially on the above material evidence, it was of the view that there was reasonable suspicion that the applicant and his accomplice, together with other unknown helpers, were active in the car theft business. 8.  On the same day, the Dunakeszi District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, referring to, but not substantiating, the risks of absconding, collusion and repetition of crime. An accomplice was detained as well. 9.  The applicant appealed, challenging the suspicion against him and pointing out that his settled background – he had never been convicted before, had legal income, and supported several family members – rendered unlikely the risks of absconding and repetition of crime. The Pest County Regional Court dismissed the appeal on 27 January 2006, without addressing in detail the applicant’s arguments. 10.  On 13 February 2006 the applicant’s detention was prolonged. The decision referred to eight counts of larceny. In his appeal, the applicant pointed out that the material evidence relating to one of the thefts was in no way capable of connecting him to the vehicle in question, whereas in respect of the remaining seven counts, he had not formally been implicated as a suspect. 11.  On 28 February 2006 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal. Without addressing in detail the defence’s arguments, the court pointed out that it could not assess the evidence at that stage of the proceedings. 12.  On 24 April 2006 the applicant requested his release. He argued that the living conditions of those supported by him had deteriorated. His request was to no avail. 13.  Subsequently, the applicant’s detention was repeatedly prolonged at the statutory intervals. The reasoning in the decisions was largely identical to that in the previous ones, and the discrepancy in the counts of theft with which the applicant was charged persisted. His requests for release were to no avail. 14.  On 10 July 2006 the prosecution again proposed the prolongation of the applicant’s detention. This time, reasonable suspicion was invoked in respect of four counts of car theft. The reasons for the applicant’s proposed detention remained the same. 15.  On 14 July 2006 the District Court held a hearing and sustained the prosecution’s motion, while including in the decision the suspicion of another car theft. The applicant’s appeal and subsequent requests for release were to no avail. 16.  On 29 August 2006 an expert was appointed to examine whether or not the material evidence found in the applicant’s car was capable of connecting him to any car theft. 17.  Further prolongations took place on 19 October and 16 November 2006, with essentially unchanged reasoning. The applicant’s ensuing requests for release or a less stringent measure were unsuccessful. 18.  On 21 December 2006 the applicant was charged with further counts of car theft. 19.  On 15 January 2007 the Pest County Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention. The underlying reasons were the same as before. In his appeal, the applicant complained that the expert opinion had never been communicated to him. 20.  After further prolongations, on 16 May 2007 a bill of indictment was preferred. The applicant was charged with altogether 17 counts of car theft or attempted car theft and one count of forgery of documents. The applicant’s detention was maintained, with reference to the risk of absconding and repetition of crime. 21.  The first hearing took place on 21 November 2007. The applicant’s detention was upheld because, in the trial court’s view, the potential severe sanction gave rise to a risk of absconding. No reason was given as to the risk of repetition of crime. 22.  The applicant’s subsequent requests for release or a less stringent measure were to no avail. 23.  Apart from the one of 10 July 2006, none of the prosecution’s motions to have the applicant’s detention prolonged had made any specific reference to the actual evidence which underlay the alleged risks held against him. The applicant’s lawyer repeatedly complained about having no access to these pieces of evidence – in particular, on 17 July and 20 November 2006 – however, this omission was not redressed; and the courts did not refute the defence’s allegations of having no access. 24.  Of the altogether twenty-four decisions on the applicant’s detention, only one contained separate arguments in respect of each of the two co-detainees. 25.  The authorities prolonging the applicant’s pre-trial detention considered the possibility of applying less stringent measures on 8 May 14 July and 16 November 2006, but eventually they did not avail themselves thereof. 26.  The applicant was finally released on 2 June 2008. A prohibition on leaving his domicile was imposed on him. 27.  On 24 May 2011 the applicant was convicted at first instance. The case is currently in the appeal stage.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Kharkiv, Ukraine. 5.  At the material time the applicant was the director and allegedly the owner of the Passage private company, which provided currency exchange services. On 16 August 1996 the tax police inspected one of the departments of the company, seized some documents and cash assets, and imposed financial sanctions. 6.  On 28 April 1998 the applicant was invited to the Kharkiv State Tax Police Inspectorate (Податкова міліція Державної податкової інспекції м. Харкова) to retrieve the documents that had been removed by the tax police. According to the applicant, at 9 a.m., when he entered the office of S., the Head of the Tax Police Inspectorate, and asked when the documents in question would be returned, the latter started to beat him and broke the tape recorder which the applicant had in his pocket. According to the applicant, several people were present at the time in S.'s office. The latter allegedly told his subordinates not to let the applicant out until 11 a.m. At 11 a.m. the applicant left the Tax Police premises. 7.  On the same day the applicant complained about these events to the Anti-corruption Department of the Kharkiv Regional State Tax Inspectorate (Відділ по боротьбі з корупцією Державної податкової інспекції в Харківській області). The applicant was sent for a medical examination and his complaint was transferred to the Prosecutor's Office. 8.  On 29 April 1998 the medical examination revealed that the applicant had suffered minor injuries, and in particular that he had bruises on his abdomen. No head injury was identified. 9.  From 30 April to 23 May 1998 the applicant was a patient in the neurosurgery department of Hospital No. 4. He was diagnosed with concussion and numerous bruises were found on his head. 10.  On 11 June 1998 a further forensic medical examination concluded that the applicant was suffering from moderately severe physical injuries (including a head injury) which had caused a temporary disability. 11.  On 18 August 1998 the financial sanctions against the Passage company were rescinded. 12.  According to a forensic medical expert opinion of 1 September 1998, the applicant's medical treatment from 30 April to 8 June 1998 was for a head injury, which could have been inflicted on 28 April 1998 or later. It further stated that, since according to the medical examination of 29 April 1998 the applicant had not had a head injury, it was impossible to establish a link between the incident of 28 April 1998 and the applicant's medical treatment for a head injury. 13.  On 2 September 1998 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor's Office (прокуратура м. Харкова) refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr S. for want of corpus delicti. In particular, S. and Sh. and P. (employees of the Tax Police who had been present in the office during the events in question) and Zh. (a security officer) testified that the applicant had not been subjected to any kind of physical pressure. S. and Sh. submitted that the applicant had tried to record his conversation with S. and when the latter had asked the applicant to give him the tape recorder, the applicant had dropped it on the floor and stepped on it. G. (an associate of the applicant, who had accompanied him to the Tax Police office) testified that he had seen the applicant through the window being beaten by S. It was established that it had not been physically possible for G. to have seen the events in question; in any event his testimony was rejected since he was “an interested person”. 14.  On 24 November 1998 the cash assets seized in 1996 were returned to the applicant. 15.  On 1 December 1998 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor's Office rejected the applicant's request to institute criminal proceedings against the tax police officers who had carried out the inspection on 16 August 1996. 16.  On 29 December 1998 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office (прокуратура Харківської області) quashed the decision of 2 September 1998 and opened criminal proceedings to investigate the circumstances of the incident of 28 April 1998. It was stated that the applicant had indeed received moderately serious physical injuries but that the origin of these injuries was unknown. Therefore, more extensive investigation into the facts of the case was needed. 17.  On 9 and 19 April 1999 two additional forensic medical examinations were carried out. The experts held that there was not enough information to conclude that the head injury sustained by the applicant had been received between 28 and 30 April 1998. The bruises on the applicant's abdomen could have resulted from a blow inflicted three to five days before 29 April 1998. 18.  On 21 April 1999 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor's Office terminated the criminal proceedings for lack of evidence that the applicant had been beaten by S. 19.  On 14 January 2000 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office quashed the decision of 21 April 1999, in particular because the hospital doctors who had examined the applicant had not been questioned, and remitted the case for additional investigation to the Kyiv District Prosecutor's Office (прокуратура Київського району м. Харкова). 20.  By a decision of 18 February 2000 the investigating officer of the Kyiv District Prosecutor's Office refused to recognise the applicant as a victim in the proceedings, on the ground of lack of proof that he had sustained moderately severe physical injuries. Following this decision the applicant refused to testify or participate in the investigation. 21.  On 29 June 2000 an investigator of the Kyiv District Prosecutor's Office terminated the criminal proceedings on the ground that the minor physical injuries sustained by the applicant could have been inflicted earlier than 28 April 1998 and that there was no evidence that they had been inflicted by S. In particular, there was no medical evidence to confirm when the applicant had received the head injury. The Tax Police employees testified that S. had not beaten the applicant and the only witness who testified otherwise (G.) had not physically been able to see the events in question; this had been confirmed in a reconstruction of the events. 22.  On 11 January 2001 the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv quashed the decision of 29 June 2000 and ordered that the criminal proceedings be reopened. The court emphasised that the investigation had failed to find out how the applicant had received the injuries in question. 23.  On 5 April 2001 the applicant was declared a victim of an alleged crime. 24.  On 23 April 2001 the applicant introduced a civil claim for compensation for pecuniary damage against S. to be considered in the course of the criminal proceedings. 25.  On 14 August 2001 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office refused to institute criminal proceedings for abuse of power against S., for want of corpus delicti. 26.  On 20 September 2001 a forensic medical examination concluded that on 29 April 1998 the applicant had had bruises on his abdomen which could have been inflicted on 28 April 1998. 27.  On 3 October 2001 the Kyiv District Prosecutor's Office discontinued the criminal proceedings for the infliction of moderately severe physical injuries, in the absence of evidence of a crime. 28.  On 10 October 2001 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office quashed the decision of 3 October 2001 and remitted the case back for further investigation. 29.  On 12 November 2001 the Chervonozavodskyy District Court of Kharkiv quashed the decision of 14 August 2001. 30.  On 27 June 2002 a fresh medical examination again concluded that on 29 April 1998 the applicant had had bruises on his abdomen which could have been inflicted on 28 April 1998. 31.  On 27 August 2002 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor's Office terminated the criminal proceedings on the ground that it was not possible to establish with sufficient certainty that the injuries suffered by the applicant had been inflicted by S. Moreover, the injuries sustained (bruises on the applicant's abdomen) were classified as minor and in this case, according to Article 27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant should have brought a private prosecution directly before the court. 32.  On 21 October 2002 the Kharkiv City Prosecutor's Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against S. on suspicion of burglary, for want of corpus delicti. It was stated that the applicant's tape recorder had been broken as a result of a dispute which had occurred on 28 April 1998 between the applicant and S. However, the applicant had provoked S.'s reaction by trying to record their conversation. 33.  By letters of 2 October, 6 and 20 November and 18 December 2002 and 2 January 2003, the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office informed the applicant that the criminal proceedings had been terminated lawfully. 34.  In March 2001 the applicant instituted defamation proceedings in the Chervonozavodskyy District Court of Kharkiv against the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office. He stated that he had submitted numerous complaints of violations to different State authorities. These had been forwarded to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor's Office, which in its response letters to the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, to the Member of Parliament, L., and to the Prosecutor General, had provided false information about the actions of the tax police in respect of the applicant's enterprise and about the investigation in the applicant's criminal case. 35.  On 2 October 2001 the court upheld the applicant's complaint. 36.  On 21 February 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 2 October 2001 and rejected the applicant's complaint as unsubstantiated. 37.  On 1 October 2002 a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal under the cassation procedure. 38.  On an unidentified date the applicant instituted proceedings in the Pecherskyy District Court against the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, claiming that he had unlawfully refused to examine the applicant's complaints. On 27 January 2004 the court returned the applicant's complaint as he had failed to comply with the procedural requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant companies carry out the slaughter of cattle and pigs, which makes them liable under the Agricultural Market Act (Agrarmarkt­gesetz) to pay agricultural marketing charges, calculated on the basis of the number of animals slaughtered, to Agrarmarkt Austria (“AMA”), the national agricultural marketing board. 6.  In 2006 AMA issued payment orders against the applicant companies. On 5 July 2006 it ordered the first applicant company to pay outstanding contributions for the years 2003 and 2004 in the amount of 56,573.62 euros (EUR) and, in addition, imposed a surcharge for failure to pay, amounting to 10% of the unpaid contributions. On 30 May 2006 it ordered the second applicant company to pay outstanding contributions for the years 2004 and 2005 in the amount of EUR 12,556.43 and imposed a surcharge of 10%. On the same date it ordered the third applicant company to pay outstanding contributions for the years 2005 and 2006 in the amount of EUR 5,936.01, imposing a surcharge of 10%, and ordered the fourth applicant company to pay outstanding contributions for the years 2005 and 2006 in the amount of EUR 96,050.48, imposing a surcharge of 60%. 7.  The applicant companies appealed against these orders. They argued that the above system was contrary to European Union rules on state aid. They also asked for oral hearings to be held in their appeals. 8.  The Federal Minister of Agriculture, Forestry, the Environment and Water (Bundesminister für Land- und Forstwirtschaft, Umwelt und Wasser­wirtschaft), acting as the appeal authority, dismissed the applicant companies’ appeals on 17 July 2006 without holding a hearing. 9.  The applicant companies argued that AMA contributions were levied for financing activities, such as AMA’s quality programme, which were not in compliance with EU law. However, the Federal Minister found that, after a decision of the European Commission of 30 June 2004 (C(2004)2037), the applicant companies had been in a position to know precisely which charges they had to pay. In that decision, the European Commission had stated that it had no objection to AMA’s quality assurance scheme and quality mark, registered as state aid under notification number NN 34A/2000 (“Qualitäts­programme und das AMA-Biozeichen und das AMA-Gütesiegel”), because that state aid was in accordance with the Common Market provided for in the Treaty establishing the European Community (“the EC Treaty”). The Federal Minister referred further to the Administrative Court’s decision no. 2005/17/230 of 20 March 2006, in which the court had also found that the levying of AMA contributions was in compliance with the relevant provisions of EU law. The Federal Minister further held that it had not been necessary to hold a hearing, because a hearing was only held if a decision had been taken by a panel on an appeal against the decision of a tax office or a regional directorate of finance, which was not the case here. 10.  Thereupon, the applicant companies lodged complaints with the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court against the Federal Minister’s decision. Before the Constitutional Court they complained that the surcharges imposed had violated their constitutional right to property. Before the Administrative Court, they complained that the appeal authority had not been a court within the meaning of the case-law of the European Court of Justice, with the result that they had been prevented from having the lawfulness of the European Commission’s decision of 30 June 2004 reviewed by the European Court of Justice in proceedings under Article 234 of the EC Treaty. As regards the imposition of the surcharges, the applicant companies complained that the findings of fact made by the authorities in imposing those surcharges had been insufficient. In particular the authorities had failed to establish whether the objective and subjective elements of the offence (objektiven und subjektiven Tatbildvoraussetzungen) had been met. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, they further complained that there had not been a public hearing and that the criminal charges against them had not been decided by an impartial tribunal established by law (“es ist kein unpartei­isches, auf Gesetz beruhendes Gericht über den erhobenen straf­rechtlichen Vorwurf eingeschritten”). As the authorities imposing the surcharges had failed to hold an oral hearing, the applicant companies asked the Administrative Court for a public hearing. 11.  On 25 September 2006 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the applicant companies’ complaints under Article 144 of the Federal Constitution for lack of prospects of success. 12.  The Administrative Court dismissed the applicant companies’ complaints on 30 January 2007 in separate decisions and held as follows:\n“The present case does not differ in [substance] to the [case] decided by the Administrative Court on 20 March 2006, no. 2005/17/230. Pursuant to Section 43(2) of the Administrative Court Act reference is made to it.\nFor the reasons set out in that decision, the breach of law complained of by the applicant company also does not exist in the present case, for which reason it can be dismissed without further proceedings in camera.\nFor the reasons set out in the decision referred to, Article 6 of the Convention is also of no relevance here.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  In 1992 the applicant was working for a pharmaceuticals company. 5.  In March 1992 the Elin Pelin Investigation Service opened a preliminary investigation into the attempted theft of ten barrels of chemicals from the company premises. In April and May 1992 the applicant and two other employees were charged. 6.  On 2 July 1992 the investigator finished his work on the case and sent the file to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office. On 15 July 1992 that Office dropped the charges against the applicant’s co‑accused and on 24 July 1992 indicted the applicant. 7.  At a hearing held on 27 October 1992 the Elin Pelin District Court found indications that the applicant’s co‑accused might have been involved in the commission of the offence and referred the case back for further investigation. 8.  Following additional inquiries, on 23 March 1993 the investigator charged the applicant and the two other employees anew and on 31 March 1993 sent the file to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office. 9.  On 3 May 1993 the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office again dropped the charges against the applicant’s co‑accused. Upon the appeal of the applicant, on 7 June 1993 the Sofia Regional Prosecutor’s Office confirmed this decision. Upon the applicant’s further appeal, on 9 August 1993 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office found that the facts of the case had not been sufficiently elucidated, quashed the decision and referred the case back for further investigation. 10.  Following an additional investigation, in December 1993 the applicant and the two other employees were charged anew and in January 1994 the file was sent to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office. 11.  On 3 February 1994 the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office referred the case back to the investigator, finding that the facts had not been sufficiently elucidated and that the applicant and one of his co-accused had been questioned in the absence of their counsel. 12.  After addressing these omissions, on 7 March 1994 the investigator sent the file to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office. 13.  On 14 March 1994 the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office dropped the charges against the applicant’s co‑accused and on 27 June 1994 indicted the applicant. 14.  The Elin Pelin District Court examined the case in six hearings which took place between October 1994 and November 1995. It heard a number of witnesses. Three of the hearings were adjourned because certain witnesses, despite being duly subpoenaed, failed to appear. One hearing failed to take place because the prosecutor was absent and one was adjourned to allow the applicant to call additional witnesses. 15.  In a judgment of 30 November 1995 the Elin Pelin District Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to one year and three months’ imprisonment, suspended. 16.  Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed. 17.  The Sofia Regional Court, after adjourning one hearing upon the request of the applicant’s counsel, who had not had enough time to prepare due to the late arrival of the file in the court’s registry, examined the appeal at a hearing held on 26 February 1996. 18.  On 27 February 1996 the Sofia Regional Court quashed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the case to the preliminary investigation stage. It found that the lower court had failed to apprise the applicant of his rights to defend himself and to request the recusal of the judges. It also found that the value of the chemicals had not been assessed by an expert and that the lower court’s findings of fact had not been sufficiently supported by the evidence. 19.  Following additional inquiries, on 15 May 1996 the applicant was charged anew and the file was sent to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office. On 8 July 1996 that Office found that the facts had not been sufficiently elucidated and referred the case back to the investigator. 20.  On an unspecified date the investigator sent the file to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office without having carried out any investigative steps. Accordingly, on 10 October 1996 that Office referred it back. 21.  Following a few additional inquiries, on 8 June 1999 the investigator sent the file to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office with a proposal to drop the charges against the applicant. Finding that its instructions had not been complied with, on 4 October 1999 that Office once more referred the case back to the investigator. 22.  After questioning five witnesses between October 1999 July 2000, on 18 July 2000 the investigator sent the file to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office. After partially reformulating the charges against the applicant on 29 November 2000, on 15 January 2000 that Office again referred the case back to the investigator with instructions to clarify certain aspects of the commission of the offence. 23.  On 26 February 2001 the applicant was charged anew. On 28 February 2001 the file was sent to the Elin Pelin District Prosecutor’s Office, which indicted the applicant on 21 June 2001. 24.  The Elin Pelin District Court examined the case in six hearings which took place between September 2001 and June 2002. It heard a number of witnesses and one expert. Three of the hearings were adjourned because of the absence of witnesses who had not been duly subpoenaed. One hearing was adjourned because the applicant had not been summoned and consequently did not appear. One of the adjournments was also due to the applicant’s request to call additional witnesses. 25.  In a judgment of 10 June 2002 the Elin Pelin District Court found the applicant guilty. It sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment, suspended – below the statutory minimum. In determining the sentence it took into account the applicant’s lack of prior convictions, the lack of information that he was of bad character, the long lapse of time between the commission of the offence and the handing down of the court’s judgment, and the fact that the offence had remained inchoate. 26.  The applicant appealed. 27.  After holding a hearing on 28 October 2002, on 11 November 2002 the Sofia Regional Court upheld the conviction and sentence, with one slight modification relating to the legal characterisation of the offence. 28.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 29.  After holding a hearing on 17 March 2003, on 31 March 2003 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Syktyvkar, Komi Republic. 5.  The applicant and his family were living in a wooden house owned by the municipality on the riverside in Sedkyrkeshch settlement of Syktyvkar. From 1995 the applicant had repeatedly informed the local authorities that the river was overflowing and the house was at risk of destruction. 6.  In the spring of 1998 the town administration made the applicant a few offers of a temporary dwelling. However, the applicant found it unsatisfactory and refused to move. On 18 May 1998 the applicant’s house was flooded, and the applicant’s family moved to his parents’ flat. 7.  On 13 July 1998 the applicant lodged a claim against the Syktyvkar town administration, seeking to be provided with a flat of a total surface area of not less than 36 sq. m. or to receive housing subsidy. He also sought compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 8.  The first hearing was scheduled for 10 August 1998, but it did not take place due to the parties’ default in appearance. The hearing of 26 April 1999 did not take place for the same reason. 9.  On 20 May 1999 the town administration requested that examination of the case be postponed until their representative returned from vacation. The applicant and his representative appeared at the hearing of 7 June 1999, which was adjourned to 21 September and then to 26 October 1999 on account of involvement of the Sedkyrkeshch settlement administration as a co-respondent and to give the applicant time to specify his claims. 10.  On 26 October 1999 the Syktyvkar Town Court (“the Town Court”) partly found for the applicant and obliged the town administration to provide him with a flat. His other claims were dismissed. 11.  On 7 December 1999 in a separate judgment the Town Court awarded the applicant legal expenses in the amount of 2,008 Russian roubles (RUB). 12.  On 27 January 2000 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic (“the appeal court”) overturned the judgment of 26 October 1999 on appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 13.  The parties did not appear at the hearing of 28 March 2000, which was adjourned to 25 September 2000. On the latter date the hearing took place and was adjourned, with the applicant having been invited to specify his claims. 14.  On 26 January 2001 the trial court required that the town administration supply certain documents. 15.  The hearing of 30 October 2001 did not take place as the respondent’s representative failed to appear. On 26 February and 10 October 2002 the hearings were adjourned to give the applicant time to adjust his claims for non-pecuniary damage and to resolve an unspecified motion. On 29 November 2002 the hearing was adjourned following a default in appearance of one of the lay judges sitting in the case. 16.  On 22 January and 8 May 2003 the applicant challenged judge L. on account of procrastination in consideration of the case. On 16 September 2003 the case was assigned to judge N. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant renounced his claim for provision of housing, now seeking to be placed on the waiting list of persons entitled to State-funded housing subsidy, for the amount of the subsidy to be determined and to receive compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. He also sought reimbursement of legal expenses. 18.  On 2 October 2003 the court gave a new judgment in which it ordered the authorities to place the applicant on the waiting list and to determine the amount of subsidy due to him. It also granted the applicant’s pecuniary claim for RUB 12,000. The rest of his claims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage were dismissed. On the same date the court terminated the proceedings concerning reimbursement of legal expenses ruling that the issue had already been decided on 7 December 1999. 19.  On 20 November 2003 the appeal court upheld the judgment on appeal. 20.  On 25 February 2004 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic quashed the judgment of 7 December 1999 which had awarded the applicant legal expenses by way of supervisory review. On 18 March 2004 the applicant learned about this decision and brought new claims for reimbursement of legal expenses. 21.  On 19 March 2004 the sum of RUB 12,000 was transferred to the applicant’s bank account and the enforcement proceedings in this part were terminated. 22.  The hearings of 9 and 23 April 2004, scheduled for examination of the legal expenses claim, did not take place as the applicant failed to appear. 23.  On 14 May 2004 the Town Court disallowed his claim. However, this judgment was overturned on appeal, and a new hearing was required. On 16 July 2004 the Town Court granted his claim and awarded him RUB 4,433. The award was enforced on 2 September 2004. 24.  On 3 February 2005 the bailiff terminated the enforcement proceedings concerning the applicant’s housing claims. It transpires from the text of the decision that on 24 November 2004 the town administration informed the bailiff service that it had determined the amount of the housing subsidy for the applicant, and on 30 December 2004 it stated that the applicant had been placed first on the shortlist of persons entitled to State housing subsidy following destruction of their homes by natural disaster. However, in a copy of the town administration’s letter to the bailiff service of 24 November 2004 obtained by the applicant the author advised that the applicant had been placed on the list of persons in need of improved housing conditions at number 4,134. 25.  The applicant appealed against the decision to terminate the enforcement proceedings. His complaint was first granted by the Town Court which noted that the bailiff had not been in possession of any evidence, other than the respondent’s letters, that the in-kind awards had indeed been enforced. However, this judgment had been set aside on appeal on 28 March 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  In the late evening of 29 April 1993, the father of S., born in 1985, laid a criminal information against the applicant, alleging that the applicant, her private music teacher, had sexually abused S. during an individual music lesson that afternoon. S. and her mother were questioned at the local police office on the afternoon of 30 April 1993. S. was heard by a police officer and confirmed her father’s statements. S.’s mother stated that S. had been very disturbed after her music lesson and that she had later confided in her mother. 9.  On 10 January 1994 the Künzelsau District Court, sitting with a single judge, convicted the applicant of having committed the offence of sexual abuse of a child in concurrence with the offence of sexual abuse of a charge. He was sentenced to seven months’ imprisonment on probation. \nIn establishing the relevant facts, the court relied on the statements made by the mother concerning her daughter’s account of the relevant events, her behaviour after the music lesson on 29 April 1993 and her character in general, and also on the evidence given by the police officer who had questioned S. shortly after the offence in April 1993. \nThe court dismissed the applicant’s request for a psychological expert opinion regarding the credibility of S.’s statements on the ground of the court’s own professional experience, acquired as a judge in family matters, in evaluating statements made by children. \nMoreover, the court observed that it had not been reasonable to hear S. herself, as, according to her mother, she had meanwhile repressed her recollection of the event in question and would seriously suffer if reminded thereof. If S. were to be examined, this would not contribute to a further clarification of the facts, but seriously impair her personal development. 10.  The applicant appealed to the Heilbronn Regional Court, requesting his acquittal. In the appeal proceedings, he was assisted by counsel. 11.  On 17 March 1995 the Heilbronn Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against his conviction of sexual abuse of a child, but set aside the conviction of sexual abuse of a charge. The sentence to seven months’ imprisonment on probation was upheld.\nThe Regional Court noted that the applicant had denied having sexually abused S. It found that his guilt could be established on the basis of the evidence before it, i.e. the statements made by S.’s mother and the police officer as well as a psychological expert opinion on the question of S.’s credibility, ordered in the context of the appeal proceedings. In her report of November 1994, the expert, who had questioned S. in October 1994, confirmed that S.’s statements were credible. \nThe Regional Court considered that the absence of S.’s testimony in court constituted a serious shortcoming in the taking of evidence. In this respect, it noted that the parents had refused to bring their daughter to court on account of the risk that her state of health would deteriorate as she suffered from neurodermatitis. According to the Regional Court, the parents’ refusal was understandable. In this respect, the Regional Court had regard to a medical certificate confirming the parents’ statements and the findings of the psychological expert that S.’s state of health would most likely deteriorate again if she were to be heard anew on the event in question. Taking into account that S.’s statements had been reported by her mother and by the police officer and that an expert opinion on her credibility had been prepared, the Regional Court, considering the rather trivial nature of the charge and the sentence at stake, reached the conclusion that S. was to be regarded as a witness out of reach. 12.  On 2 August 1995 the Stuttgart Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 13.  On 18 January 1996 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to entertain the applicant’s constitutional complaint, leaving open the question whether the complaint had been lodged in time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born in 1931 and has been living since 1970 in Campione d’Italia, which is an Italian enclave of about 1.6 sq. km in the Province of Como (Lombardy), surrounded by the Swiss Canton of Ticino and separated from the rest of Italy by Lake Lugano. 12.  He describes himself as a practising Muslim and a prominent businessman in the financial and political world, in which he purports to be highly regarded. An engineer by training, he has worked in very diverse sectors, in particular banking, foreign trade, industry and real estate. In the course of his business activities, he founded numerous companies of which he was the sole or principal shareholder. 13.  In his submission, he is opposed to all uses of terrorism and has never had any involvement with al-Qaeda. On the contrary, he has consistently denounced not only the means used by that organisation, but also its ideology. 14.  The applicant has further indicated that he has only one kidney that is still functioning properly (the other having deteriorated in recent years). He also suffers from bleeding in his left eye, as shown by a medical certificate of 20 December 2001, and arthritis in the neck. In addition, according to a medical certificate issued by a doctor in Zürich on 5 May 2006, he sustained a fracture in his right hand which was due to be operated on in 2004. The applicant has alleged that, because of the restrictions imposed on him which gave rise to the present application, he was unable to undergo this operation and has continued to suffer from the consequences of the fracture. 15.  On 15 October 1999, in response to the 7 August 1998 bombings by Osama bin Laden and members of his network against the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) the Security Council of the United Nations (adopted, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Resolution 1267 (1999), providing for sanctions against the Taliban (see paragraph 70 below) and created a committee consisting of all the members of the Security Council to monitor the enforcement of that Resolution (“the Sanctions Committee”). 16.  On 2 October 2000, to implement that Resolution, the Swiss Federal Council (the federal executive) adopted an Ordinance “instituting measures against the Taliban” (“the Taliban Ordinance” – see paragraph 66 below), which subsequently underwent a number of amendments, including to its title. 17.  By Resolution 1333 (2000) of 19 December 2000 (see paragraph 71 below), the Security Council extended the sanctions regime. It was now also directed against Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organisation, as well as the Taliban’s senior officials and advisers. In both Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000), the Security Council requested the Sanctions Committee to maintain a list, based on information provided by States and regional organisations, of individuals and entities associated with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. 18.  On 11 April 2001 the Swiss government amended the Taliban Ordinance in order to implement Resolution 1333 (2000). It added a new Article 4a, paragraph 1 of which prohibited entry into and transit through Switzerland for the individuals and entities concerned by the Resolution (but without naming them). 19.  On 24 October 2001 the Federal Prosecutor opened an investigation in respect of the applicant. 20.  On 7 November 2001 the President of the United States of America blocked the assets of Al Taqwa Bank, of which the applicant was the Chairman and principal shareholder. 21.  On 9 November 2001 the applicant and a number of organisations associated with him were added to the Sanctions Committee’s list. On 30 November 2001 (or 9 November according to the applicant’s observations), their names were added to the list in an annex to the Taliban Ordinance. 22.  On 16 January 2002 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1390 (2002), introducing an entry-and-transit ban in respect of “individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, as referred to in the list created pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000)” (see paragraphs 70-71 and 74 below). On 1 May 2002 Article 4a of the Taliban Ordinance was amended accordingly: the entry-and-transit ban applied henceforth to all individuals named in Annex 2 to the Ordinance, including the applicant. 23.  On 10 September 2002 Switzerland became a member of the United Nations. 24.  When he visited London in November 2002, the applicant was arrested and removed to Italy, his money also being seized. 25.  On 10 October 2003, following criticism by the Monitoring Group for the application of the sanctions (see paragraph 72 below), the Canton of Ticino revoked the applicant’s special border-crossing permit. The Monitoring Group had observed, in the course of its inquiry into the applicant’s activities, that he was able to move relatively freely between Switzerland and Italy. In the Government’s submission, it was only from this time onwards that the applicant was actually affected by the entry-and-transit ban. 26.  On 27 November 2003 the Swiss Federal Office of Immigration, Integration and Emigration (IMES) informed the applicant that he was no longer authorised to cross the border. 27.  On 23 March 2004 the applicant lodged a request with the IMES for leave to enter or transit through Switzerland for the purposes of medical treatment in that country and legal proceedings in both Switzerland and Italy. The IMES dismissed that request on 26 March 2004 as being ill-founded. Moreover, it indicated to the applicant that the grounds put forward in support of his request, namely, the need to consult his lawyers and receive treatment and, secondly, the specific situation related to his residence in Campione d’Italia, were not such as to permit the authorities to grant him an exemption from the measure taken against him. 28.  By a decision of 27 April 2005, the Federal Criminal Court ordered the Federal Prosecutor either to discontinue the proceedings or to send the case to the competent federal investigating judge by 31 May 2005. By an order of that date the Federal Prosecutor, finding that the accusations against the applicant were unsubstantiated, closed the investigation in respect of the applicant. 29.  On 22 September 2005 the applicant requested the Federal Council to delete his name and those of the organisations associated with him from the annex to the Taliban Ordinance. He argued, in support of his claim, that the police investigation concerning him had been discontinued by a decision of the Federal Prosecutor and that it was therefore no longer justified to subject him to sanctions. 30.  By a decision of 18 January 2006, the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) rejected his request on the ground that Switzerland could not delete names from the annex to the Taliban Ordinance while they still appeared on the United Nations Sanctions Committee’s list. 31.  On 13 February 2006 the applicant lodged an administrative appeal with the Federal Department of Economic Affairs (“the Department”). 32.  By a decision of 15 June 2006, the Department dismissed that appeal. It confirmed that the deletion of a name from the annex to the Ordinance could be envisaged only once that name had been deleted from the Sanctions Committee’s list, and explained that, for this purpose, it was necessary for the State of citizenship or residence of the person concerned to apply for delisting to the United Nations institutions. As Switzerland was neither the applicant’s State of citizenship nor his State of residence, the Department found that the Swiss authorities were not competent to initiate such a procedure. 33.  On 6 July 2006 the applicant appealed to the Federal Council against the Department’s decision. He requested that his name and those of a certain number of organisations associated with him be deleted from the list in Annex 2 to the Taliban Ordinance. 34.  On 20 September 2006 the Federal Office for Migration (FOM), which had been created in 2005, incorporating the IMES, granted the applicant an exemption for one day, 25 September 2006, so that he could go to Milan for legal proceedings. The applicant did not make use of that authorisation. 35.  On 6 April 2007 the applicant sent to the “focal point” of the Sanctions Committee – a body set up by Resolution 1730 (2006) to receive requests for delisting from individuals or entities on the Sanctions Committee’s lists (see paragraph 76 below) – a request for the deletion of his name from the relevant list. 36.  By a decision of 18 April 2007 the Federal Council, ruling on the appeal of 6 July 2006, referred the case to the Federal Court, finding that the applicant had been subjected to direct restrictions on his right to enjoy his possessions; also that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights consequently applied to his request for deletion from the annex to the Taliban Ordinance, and that, accordingly, the case had to be examined by an independent and impartial tribunal. 37.  In its observations, the Department submitted that the appeal should be dismissed, pointing out that Security Council Resolution 1730 (2006) of 19 December 2006 allowed persons and organisations whose names appeared on the Sanctions Committee’s list to apply for delisting on an individual basis rather than through their State of citizenship or residence. 38.  The applicant maintained his submissions. Moreover, he alleged that on account of the FOM’s evident reluctance to grant exemptions under Article 4a § 2 of the Taliban Ordinance, he could not leave his home in Campione d’Italia despite the lack of adequate medical facilities there, or even go to Italy for administrative or judicial reasons, and that he had therefore effectively spent the past years under house arrest. The addition of his name to the Sanctions Committee’s list was also tantamount to accusing him publicly of being associated with Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taliban, when that was not the case. Furthermore, he argued that the listing, without any justification or any possibility for him to be heard beforehand, breached the principles of prohibition of discrimination, individual freedom, enjoyment of possessions and economic freedom, together with the right to be heard and the right to a fair trial. Lastly, taking the view that the Security Council’s sanctions were contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the peremptory norms of international law (jus cogens), he argued that Switzerland was not obliged to implement them. 39.  By a decision of 11 May 2007, in which it indicated the remedy available, the FOM dismissed a new exemption request by the applicant. By a decision of 12 July 2007, once again indicating the available remedies, it refused to examine a letter from the applicant that it regarded as a request for review. In a letter of 20 July 2007, the applicant explained that there had been a misunderstanding and that his previous letter had in fact been a new request for exemption. On 2 August 2007 the FOM again rejected his request, reminding him that he could challenge the decision by lodging an appeal with the Federal Administrative Court. The applicant did not appeal against the decision. 40.  On 29 October 2007 the focal point for delisting requests denied the applicant’s request of 6 April 2007 to have his name removed from the Sanctions Committee’s list (see paragraph 35 above). On 2 November 2007 the focal point also rejected a request for information concerning the country that had designated him for listing and the reasons for that designation, invoking the confidentiality of the process. Lastly, in letters of 19 and 28 November 2007 the focal point reaffirmed the confidentiality of the process, but nevertheless informed the applicant that a State whose identity could not be disclosed had opposed his delisting. 41.  By a judgment of 14 November 2007 the Federal Court, to which the Federal Council had referred the applicant’s appeal (see paragraph 36 above), declared that appeal admissible but dismissed it on the merits. 42.  It firstly pointed out that, under Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations member States had undertaken to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the Charter. It then observed that under Article 103 of the Charter the obligations arising from that instrument did not only prevail over the domestic law of the member States but also over obligations under other international agreements, regardless of their nature, whether bilateral or multilateral. It further stated that this primacy did not relate only to the Charter but extended to all obligations which arose from a binding resolution of the Security Council. 43.  The Federal Court observed, however, that the Security Council was itself bound by the Charter and was required to act in accordance with its purposes and principles (Article 24 § 2 of the Charter), which included respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article 1 § 3 of the Charter). At the same time, it took the view that the member States were not permitted to avoid an obligation on the ground that a decision (or resolution) by the Security Council was substantively inconsistent with the Charter, in particular decisions (resolutions) based on Chapter VII thereof (action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression). 44.  The Federal Court then observed that under Article 190 of the Federal Constitution (see paragraph 65 below), it was bound by federal laws and international law. It took the view that the applicable international law, in addition to international treaties ratified by Switzerland, also included customary international law, general principles of law and the decisions of international organisations which were binding on Switzerland, including the Security Council’s decisions concerning the sanctions regime. 45.  However, it observed that Article 190 of the Constitution contained no rules on how to settle possible conflicts between different norms of international law which were legally binding on Switzerland, and that in the present case there was such a conflict between the Security Council’s decisions on the one hand and the guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the other. It took the view that unless the conflict could be resolved by the rules on the interpretation of treaties, it would be necessary, in order to settle the issue, to look to the hierarchy of international legal norms, according to which obligations under the United Nations Charter prevailed over obligations under any other international agreement (Article 103 of the Charter, taken together with Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; see paragraphs 69 and 80 below). The Federal Court was of the opinion that the uniform application of United Nations sanctions would be endangered if the courts of States Parties to the European Convention or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were able to disregard those sanctions in order to protect the fundamental rights of certain individuals or organisations. 46.  The court nevertheless accepted that the obligation to implement the Security Council’s decisions was limited by norms of jus cogens. Accordingly, it considered itself bound to ascertain whether the sanctions regime set up by the Security Council was capable of breaching the peremptory norms of international law, as the applicant had claimed. 47.  The Federal Court then cited, as examples of jus cogens norms, the right to life, protection from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, the prohibition of slavery, the prohibition of collective punishment, the principle of individual criminal responsibility and the non-refoulement principle. It took the view, however, that the enjoyment of possessions, economic freedom, the guarantees of a fair trial or the right to an effective remedy did not fall within jus cogens. 48.  As regards the consequences for the applicant of the measures taken against him, in particular the ban on entry into and transit through Switzerland, the Federal Court found as follows:\n“7.4  ... These sanctions include far-reaching commercial restrictions for those affected; the funds necessary for their survival are not, however, blocked (see Resolution 1452 (2002), paragraph 1(a)), as a result of which there is neither any threat to their life or health nor any inhuman or degrading treatment.\nThe travel ban restricts the freedom of movement of those concerned but in principle represents no deprivation of liberty: they are free to move around within their country of residence (see, however, point 10.2 below regarding the appellant’s particular situation); journeys to their home country are also specifically permitted (see Resolution 1735 (2006), paragraph 1(b)).\n...” 49.  The Federal Court further indicated that, generally speaking, sanctions were decided by the Security Council without individuals or organisations being afforded the opportunity to comment either in advance or afterwards or to appeal against them before international or national courts. It mentioned in this connection that, in particular under the terms of Resolution 1730 (2006), the delisting procedure allowing individuals to have direct access to the Sanctions Committee already represented substantial progress, even though the system still had considerable shortcomings from the point of view of human rights. 50.  The Federal Court then examined the question of the extent to which Switzerland was bound by the relevant resolutions, in other words whether it had any latitude (Ermessensspielraum) in implementing them:\n“8.1  The Security Council adopted Resolution 1267 (1999) and the subsequent Resolutions regarding sanctions affecting al-Qaeda and the Taliban on the basis of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, with the express obligation on all member States to adopt an integral and strict approach to implementing the sanctions envisaged therein, ignoring any existing rights and obligations under international agreements or contracts (see paragraph 7 of Resolution 1267 (1999)).\nThe sanctions (freezing of assets, entry-and-transit ban, arms embargo) are described in detail and afford member States no margin of appreciation in their implementation. The names of those affected by the sanctions are also indicated to the member States: this is determined by the list drawn up and maintained by the Sanctions Committee (see paragraph 8(c) of Resolution 1333 (2000)).\nAs regards the possibility of obtaining deletion from the list, the Sanctions Committee has introduced a specific procedure (see paragraphs 13 et seq. of Resolution 1735 (2006) and the directives of the Sanctions Committee dated 12 February 2007). The member States are thus debarred from deciding of their own motion whether or not sanctions should continue to be imposed on a person or organisation appearing on the Sanctions Committee’s list.\nSwitzerland would therefore be in breach of its obligations under the Charter were it to delete the names of the appellant and his organisations from the annex to the Taliban Ordinance.\n... 8.3  In view of the foregoing, Switzerland is not permitted, of its own motion, to delete the appellant’s name from Annex 2 to the Taliban Ordinance.\nIt is to be admitted that in this situation no effective remedy is available to the appellant. The Federal Court may certainly examine whether and to what extent Switzerland is bound by the Resolutions of the Security Council, but it is not permitted to remove the sanctions against the appellant on the ground that they breach his fundamental rights.\nThe Sanctions Committee alone is responsible for the delisting of persons or entities. In spite of the improvements mentioned above, the delisting procedure fails to meet both the requirement of access to a court under Article 29a of the Federal Constitution, Article 6 § 1 of the [Convention] and Article 14 § 1 of the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and that of an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 13 of the [Convention] and Article 2 § 3 of the United Nations Covenant ...” 51.  The Federal Court further examined whether Switzerland, even if it were not authorised to delete the applicant’s name from the list on its own initiative, was nevertheless at least obliged to assist him in connection with the delisting procedure. Its reasoning was as follows:\n“9.1  The lower courts examined whether Switzerland was obliged to initiate the delisting procedure on behalf of the appellant. In the meantime, this issue has become irrelevant as, since the amendment of the delisting procedure, the appellant has been able to make an application himself and has indeed availed himself of this opportunity. 9.2  For his application to be successful he nevertheless relies on the support of Switzerland, since this is the only country to have conducted a comprehensive preliminary investigation, with numerous letters of request, house searches and questioning of witnesses.\nUnited Nations member States are obliged to prosecute persons suspected of financing or supporting terrorism (see paragraph 2(e) of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)) ...\nOn the other hand, should the criminal proceedings end in an acquittal or be discontinued, this should lead to the removal of the preventive sanctions. Admittedly, the country which has conducted the criminal proceedings or preliminary investigation cannot itself proceed with the deletion, but it can at least transmit the results of its investigations to the Sanctions Committee and request or support the person’s delisting.” 52.  Lastly, the Federal Court examined whether the travel ban enforced under Article 4a of the Taliban Ordinance extended beyond the sanctions introduced by the Security Council Resolutions and whether the Swiss authorities thus had any latitude in that connection. The court found as follows:\n“10.1  Article 4a § 1 of the Taliban Ordinance prohibits the individuals listed in Annex 2 from entering or transiting through Switzerland. Article 4a § 2 provides that, in agreement with the United Nations Security Council decisions or for the protection of Swiss interests, the Federal Office for Migration is entitled to grant exemptions.\nAccording to the Security Council Resolutions, the travel ban does not apply if the entry or transit is required for the fulfilment of a judicial process. In addition, exemptions can be granted in individual cases with the agreement of the Sanctions Committee (see paragraph 1(b) of Resolution 1735 (2006)). This includes in particular travel on medical, humanitarian or religious grounds ... 10.2  Article 4a § 2 of the Taliban Ordinance is formulated as an ‘enabling’ provision and gives the impression that the Federal Office for Migration has a certain margin of appreciation. Constitutionally however, the provision is to be interpreted as meaning that an exemption should be granted in all cases where the United Nations sanctions regime so permits. A more far-reaching restriction on the appellant’s freedom of movement could not be regarded as based on the Security Council Resolutions, would not be in the public interest and would be disproportionate in the light of the appellant’s particular situation.\nThe appellant lives in Campione, an Italian enclave in Ticino, with an area of 1.6 sq. km. As a result of the ban on entry into and transit through Switzerland, he is unable to leave Campione. Practically speaking, as the appellant correctly argued, this is tantamount to house arrest and thus represents a serious restriction on his personal liberty. In these circumstances the Swiss authorities are obliged to exhaust all the relaxations of the sanctions regime available under the United Nations Security Council Resolutions.\nThe Federal Office for Migration thus has no margin of appreciation. Rather, it must examine whether the conditions for the granting of an exemption are met. Should the request not fall within one of the general exemptions envisaged by the Security Council, it must be submitted to the Sanctions Committee for approval. 10.3  The question whether the Federal Office for Migration has disregarded the constitutional requirements in dealing with the appellant’s applications for leave to travel abroad does not need to be examined here: the relevant orders of the Federal Office have not been challenged by the appellant and are not a matter of dispute in the present proceedings.\nThe same applies to the question whether the appellant should have moved his place of residence from the Italian enclave of Campione to Italy. To date the appellant has made no such request.” 53.  Following the Federal Court’s judgment, the applicant wrote to the FOM to request it to re-examine the possibility of applying general exemptions to his particular situation. On 28 January 2008 he lodged a new request seeking the suspension of the entry-and-transit ban for three months. By a letter of 21 February 2008, the FOM denied that request, stating that it was unable to grant a suspension for such a long period without referring the matter to the Sanctions Committee, but that it could grant one-off safe conducts. The applicant did not challenge that decision. 54.  On 22 February 2008, at a meeting between the Swiss authorities and the applicant’s representative on the subject of the support that Switzerland could provide to the applicant in his efforts to obtain his delisting, a representative of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs observed that the situation was rather singular as the applicant, on the one hand, was asking what support the Swiss authorities could give him in the United Nations delisting procedure and, on the other, had brought a case against Switzerland before the Court.\nDuring the meeting the applicant’s representative explained that he had received verbal confirmation from the FOM to the effect that his client would be granted one-off authorisations to go to Italy, in order to consult his lawyer in Milan. The representative of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs also indicated that the applicant could ask the Sanctions Committee for a more extensive exemption on account of his particular situation. However, she also repeated that Switzerland could not itself apply to the Sanctions Committee for the applicant’s delisting. She added that her government would nevertheless be prepared to support him, in particular by providing him with an attestation confirming that the criminal proceedings against him had been discontinued. The applicant’s lawyer replied that he had already received a letter attesting to the discontinuance in favour of his client and that this letter was sufficient.\nAs to the applicant’s requests to the Italian authorities with a view to obtaining their support in a delisting procedure, the Federal Department’s representative suggested that the lawyer contact the Italian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, adding that Italy had, at that time, a seat on the Security Council. 55.  The Government informed the Court that in April 2008 an Egyptian military tribunal had sentenced the applicant in absentia to ten years’ imprisonment for providing financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood organisation (see the article on this subject in the daily newspaper Corriere del Ticino of 16 April 2008). The applicant did not dispute the fact that he had been convicted but argued that he had never been informed of the proceedings against him and that he had therefore never had the possibility of defending himself in person or through the intermediary of a lawyer. For those reasons, and also taking into account the fact that the trial was held before a military tribunal even though he was a civilian, he claimed that the proceedings in question were clearly in breach of Article 6. 56.  On 5 July 2008 the Italian government submitted to the Sanctions Committee a request for the applicant’s delisting on the ground that the case against him in Italy had been dismissed. The Committee denied that request by a decision of 15 July 2008. In the applicant’s submission, the Committee had not allowed him to submit his observations to it beforehand. 57.  On 11 September 2008 the FOM granted the applicant the right to enter Switzerland and to remain in the country for two days, but the applicant did not make use of this authorisation. 58.  By a letter of 23 December 2008, the FOM informed the applicant that the entry of Switzerland into the Schengen Area, on 12 December 2008, did not affect his situation. 59.  In their observations before the Chamber, the Swiss Government stated that, to their knowledge, the applicant’s listing had been initiated by a request from the United States of America, and that the same State had submitted to the Sanctions Committee, on 7 July 2009, a request for the delisting of a number of individuals, including the applicant. 60.  On 24 August 2009, in accordance with the procedure laid down by Security Council Resolution 1730 (2006), the applicant submitted a request to the focal point for delisting requests for the deletion of his name from the Sanctions Committee’s list. 61.  On 2 September 2009 Switzerland sent to the Sanctions Committee a copy of a letter of 13 August 2009 from the Federal Prosecutor’s Office to the applicant’s lawyer, in which that Office confirmed that the judicial police investigation in respect of his client had not produced any indications or evidence to show that he had ties with persons or organisations associated with Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda or the Taliban. 62.  On 23 September 2009 the applicant’s name was deleted from the list annexed to the Security Council Resolutions providing for the sanctions in question. According to the applicant, the procedure provided for under Resolution 1730 (2006) was not followed and he received no explanation in this connection. On 29 September 2009 the annex to the Taliban Ordinance was amended accordingly and the amendment took effect on 2 October 2009. 63.  By a motion passed on 1 March 2010, the Foreign Policy Commission of the National Council (lower house of the Federal Parliament) requested the Federal Council to inform the United Nations Security Council that from the end of 2010 it would no longer, in certain cases, be applying the sanctions prescribed against individuals under the counterterrorism resolutions. It moreover called upon the Government to reassert its steadfast commitment to cooperate in the fight against terrorism in accordance with the legal order of the States. The motion had been introduced on 12 June 2009 by Dick Marty, a member of the Council of States (upper house of the Federal Parliament), and it referred to the applicant’s case by way of example. 64.  The Government asserted that even though Switzerland was not a member of the Security Council it had, with other States, actively worked since becoming a member of the United Nations on 10 September 2002 to improve the fairness of the listing and delisting procedure and the legal situation of the persons concerned. Thus, in the summer of 2005, it had launched with Sweden and Germany a new initiative to ensure that fundamental rights would be given more weight in the sanctions procedure. Pursuing its initiative, Switzerland had submitted to the Security Council in 2008, together with Denmark, Germany, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands and Sweden, concrete proposals for the setting-up of an advisory panel of independent experts authorised to submit delisting proposals to the Sanctions Committee. Moreover, in the autumn of 2009 Switzerland had worked intensively with its partners to ensure that the Resolution on the renewal of the sanctions regime against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, scheduled for adoption in December, met that need. In the meantime Switzerland had supported the publication in October 2009 of a report proposing, as an option for an advisory review mechanism, the creation of an ombudsperson. On 17 December 2009 the Security Council adopted Resolution 1904 (2009), setting up the office of ombudsperson to receive complaints from individuals affected by the United Nations Security Council counterterrorism sanctions (see paragraph 78 below). Lastly, Switzerland had called on many occasions, before the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly, for an improvement in the procedural rights of the persons concerned by the sanctions.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lived in Belgorod. 7.  The applicant received an old-age pension. The Law of 21 July 1997 on the Calculation and Upgrading of State Pensions (“the Pensions Act”) introduced, from 1 February 1998 onwards, a new method for calculating pensions. The idea behind this method, based on what is known as an “individual pensioner coefficient”, was to link the pension to the pensioner's previous earnings. 8.  The authority in charge of the applicant's pension, the Pension Fund Agency of Belgorod (“the Agency”), fixed the applicant's coefficient at 0.525. The applicant challenged the Agency's decision in the Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod. She argued that her coefficient should be 0.7 from 1 February 1998. 9.  On 1 July 1999 the District Court found for the applicant, considering that the Agency had misinterpreted the Pensions Act. It decided that the Agency was to recalculate the applicant's pension using a coefficient of 0.7. 10.  The Agency appealed against the judgment. On 19 October 1999 the Belgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment, which became enforceable on the same day. The judgment was never executed. 11.  On 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development (“the Ministry”) issued an Instruction on the “Application of Limitations” established by the Pensions Act (“the Instruction”). The Instruction clarified how to apply the Pensions Act. 12.  On 12 January 2000 a Deputy Prime Minister wrote a letter to the Prosecutor General. She complained that throughout the country courts had been deciding in pensioners' favour based on a manifestly wrong interpretation of the Pensions Act, and that the Pension Fund was unable to meet the unforeseen expenses. She asked the Prosecutor General to ask the Supreme Court to reconsider one such judgment to create a pilot case. 13.  Some time thereafter a group of individuals challenged the Instruction before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. On 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. It found that, contrary to what the complainants had suggested, the Ministry of Labour had not acted ultra vires in issuing the Instruction, and that the Ministry's interpretation of the Pensions Act had been correct. On 25 May 2000 the Cassation Division of the Supreme Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 14.  On 25 May 2000 the Agency lodged an application with the District Court for the reconsideration of the applicant's case owing to newly discovered circumstances on the basis of the Instruction, which supported their position. They argued that the Instruction had been upheld by the Supreme Court. 15.  On 14 September 2000 the District Court examined the Agency's request. The Agency maintained that the interpretation of the Pensions Act in the Instruction was a newly discovered circumstance which warranted the quashing of the judgment. The applicant submitted that the Agency had missed the statutory time-limit for requesting the reconsideration. 16.  The District Court held as follows:\n“... the court considers that the application by the Pension Fund Agency of Belgorod is to be granted for the following reasons:\nOn 29 December 1999 the RF Ministry of Labour and Social Development issued an instruction on the application of the Federal Law on the Calculation and Upgrading of State Pensions. The lawfulness of the instruction was subject to examination by the RF Supreme Court ... which established its compliance with the provisions of the civil legislation.\n... the Pension Fund Agency of Belgorod did not request the reconsideration of the judgment of 1 July 1999 until after the examination of the application [challenging the lawfulness of the Instruction] by the RF Supreme Court... Therefore the Agency had missed the statutory time-limit for requesting the reconsideration for good reason.\nTaking into account the above-mentioned reasons the court considers that the judgment ... of 1 July 1999 is to be quashed owing to newly discovered circumstances.” 17.  In a decision of 14 September 2000 the District Court granted the Agency's application and quashed the judgment of 1 July 1999. 18.  As a result of the fresh examination of the case the District Court delivered a judgment of 14 September 2000 in which it rejected the applicant's claims in full. The applicant appealed against the judgment. On 31 October 2000 the Belgorod Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the judgment of 14 September 2000. 19.  From 1 May 2001, following changes to the pension regulations, the applicant's pension was calculated based on a coefficient exceeding 0.7. According to the Government the coefficient was fixed at 0.84.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1990 and 1989 respectively and live in Chişinău. 6.  The present case concerns the circumstances surrounding the killing of the applicants’ 29-year-old brother Alexei Vlasi during a police operation on 14 March 2009. 7.  On that date at approximately 10.20 p.m. three plain-clothed police officers (N., B. and C.) entered a five-storey apartment block to arrest a person suspected of armed robbery. According to their information, the suspect in question was supposed to be visiting his ex-girlfriend M. that evening, who lived on the fourth floor of the building. 8.  At the same time, M. was coming down the stairs from the fourth floor with a group of four friends. None of them was the suspect wanted by the police. Two young women (S. and Z.) and a young man (G.) were at the front of the group and they passed the police officers between the third and second floor. 9.  Upon passing the first part of the group one of the police officers immediately apprehended G. Alexei Vlasi and M. were several storeys up and saw the police officers as they approached the rest of the group. Two police officers rushed after Alexei Vlasi, who started to run back up the stairs. They apprehended him on the fifth floor. Shortly afterwards, one of the police officers shot him in the back of the head at very close range. He died instantly. 10.  An investigation followed, during which all the witnesses and police officers were questioned. There were two versions of events: that of the group of friends coming down the stairs with the victim (the witnesses), and that of the police officers. 11.  The witnesses’ version was that two police officers, N. and C., were armed with pistols which they were holding upwards. Upon passing the first part of the group, the officers saw that there was someone else upstairs and ran in that direction, leaving the first part of the group with police officer N. They then told police officer N. to come upstairs with the rest of the group. After apprehending Alexei Vlasi somewhere on the fifth floor, police officers B. and C. started to beat him up. All the members of the group recounted an almost identical description of what they had heard and the conversation that had taken place between the two police officers and Alexei Vlasi. According to them, one of the police officers (B.) called Alexei Vlasi by his first name and told him to follow them. In response, he addressed B. by his first name and told him to stop beating him up. Sounds of someone being beaten up were heard and Alexei Vlasi threatened to report his injuries to a forensic doctor. The manner in which he said this last sentence was very specific, as he used a mixture of both Romanian and Russian words and the witnesses recounted it in the same manner. It later transpired that police officer B. and Alexei Vlasi already knew each other, as in 1999 the latter had been arrested by the former for bicycle theft. 12.  The encounter between police officers B. and C. and Alexei Vlasi took place on the fifth and top floor. Two of the witnesses M. and G. were the closest to the scene at the time, being held by police officer N. on the fourth floor. The fourth floor was separated from the fifth floor by two flights of stairs going in opposite directions joined by an intermediate landing. M. (who also already knew police officer B.) started to shout at him, telling him to leave Alexei Vlasi alone. She called him by his first name and tried to get past police officer N. in order to help Alexei Vlasi. In her struggle with police officer N. she could partly see what was happening on the fifth floor. G. was also there. According to them, police officer B. grabbed Alexei Vlasi by his right hand while officer C. grabbed him by his left hand and started to make his way down the stairs from the fifth floor to the landing between the fifth and fourth floors. At about the third from last step, Alexei Vlasi was facing the handrail and grabbed it. The police officers who were behind him bent him over and, according to one of the witnesses, held both his hands behind his back. According to another witness, one of his hands was on the handrail while the other was held by a police officer behind his back. Police officer C. was holding his pistol at the back of Alexei Vlasi’s head while he was bent over. Police officer B. punched him in the ribs and he repeated again that he would be reporting his injuries to a forensic doctor. Immediately afterwards, he was shot in the back of the head by police officer C. at very close range. He collapsed on the landing between the two flights of stairs, with his feet on the stairs and his body on the landing. Blood started to spurt out of his head wound. M. shouted: “He shot him straight in the head!” and her first reaction was to try to stop him losing any more blood with her hands. In what appeared to be an attack of hysteria she started to scream and to attack police officer B. and shouted “Why did you do that?” Another female friend in the group approached her from behind, hugged her and tried to pull her away from the body. 13.  According to the witnesses, Alexei Vlasi did not have anything in his hands after collapsing to the ground. Police officer B. asked officer C.: “What the hell did you do?!” C. did not respond with anything intelligible but remained still, holding his head in his hands. One of the witnesses said they heard him respond in a low voice: “I didn’t want to do that”. He was very pale. According to the witnesses he did not have any visible injuries and could walk perfectly well. Immediately afterwards, officer B. ordered all the witnesses to go into M.’s apartment on the fourth floor. He and police officer N. pushed everybody into her apartment and closed the door. Police officer N. was holding the doorknob so that nobody could leave. Many of the neighbours started to look out of their apartments but the police officers ordered them all to close their doors and stay inside. 14.  According to the police officers, when Alexei Vlasi ran up the stairs, they thought he was the suspect they had been after. They claimed to have been convinced that the victim was the suspect they were looking for and that they only realised their mistake after he had been shot. However, during a confrontation which took place later, police officer B. admitted he had known Alexei Vlasi for a long time. The following description of the police officers’ version of events was made after a video reconstruction of the scene, which was filmed during the investigation with the participation of police officer C. on 7 August 2009. Police officer B. recounted an identical version of events. 15.  Police officer B. chased Alexei Vlasi and approached him from behind on the landing of the top, fifth floor. He put his hand on his shoulder, called him by the name of the wanted suspect, announced that he was a police officer and asked him to come with him. At that moment Alexei turned around and punched police officer B. in the face with his right fist and attempted to run down the stairs. When he punched police officer B. he did not have anything in his hand. Police officer B. was pushed into a wall on his right and lost his balance. However, police officer C., who had already approached them from behind, managed to apprehend Alexei Vlasi by pulling his left arm near his shoulder (in his initial statement police officer C. stated that he had apprehended him by the collar of his jacket). The apprehension took place on the top three steps of the flight of stairs leading to the fifth floor. Police officer C. was behind Alexei Vlasi on a higher step, holding his hand with his left hand and holding his pistol pointed upwards in his right hand. At that moment, without changing his position, Alexei Vlasi stabbed police officer C. in the right thigh with a knife, which he had been holding in his right hand in reverse grip. Then, without changing the position of the knife, Alexei Vlasi attempted to turn to his left and to stab police officer C. in the face. According to police officer C., Alexei Vlasi had been standing upright. Fearing for his life, police officer C. pulled the trigger of the pistol he was still holding upwards and shot him in the upper neck. The police officers did not say how the victim’s body ended up on the landing between the fifth and fourth floor some six or seven steps lower, but it is reasonable to infer that it rolled down by itself before slumping at the bottom of the stairs. 16.  A criminal investigation was formally initiated on 15 March 2009. According to a report describing the scene, Alexei Vlasi’s body was lying in a pool of blood on the intermediate landing between the fourth and fifth floors. There was an open small pocket knife with a lock mechanism with a blade 6.5 cm long in the palm of his right hand. His feet were on the first two steps of the flight of stairs leading to the fifth floor. There were traces of blood on those steps. The report contains pictures of areas stained with blood, such as the landing where the body was lying, the walls around it, and the landing between the third and the fourth floor, where blood had run down from above. No traces of blood appear to have been found above the steps on which the victim’s feet were located. On the wall above the sixth step of the flight of stairs going down to the fourth floor from the landing where the body was lying, there was a bullet hole 2.3 metres above the step, exactly opposite where the witnesses alleged the victim had been shot when facing the handrail. 17.  During the investigation, the Chişinău prosecutor’s office obtained several forensic reports which found, inter alia, that the entry wound was on Alexei Vlasi’s upper left neck and the exit wound was on the right side of his forehead above his eyebrow. According to the forensic report, the shot was fired at such close range that gunshot residue was present on the victim’s skin around the entry wound. Another forensic report found that the police officer who had shot him had had an injury to his right thigh made by a knife wound and the other police officer who had allegedly been punched in the face by Alexei had had a bruise on his face. Another expert report did not find any fingerprints on the knife found in Alexei Vlasi’s palm after his death. 18.  On 21 September 2009 the Chişinău prosecutor’s office decided to discontinue the criminal investigation on the grounds that the police officer who shot Alexei Vlasi had acted in self-defence. The prosecutor’s office was based on the police officers’ version of events. The applicants challenged the above decision before the Prosecutor General’s Office. 19.  On 9 October 2009 a deputy Prosecutor General quashed the above decision on the grounds that it was based exclusively on the police officers’ version of events and that no consideration was given to the witnesses’ statements. The investigator had failed to determine the exact place of the shooting and the victim’s position in relation to the shooter. Moreover, no ballistics test had been conducted in order to determine the trajectory of the bullet. 20.  In the reopened investigation some of the witnesses were re-questioned. One of them, G., changed his statements and submitted that he had not seen or heard anything, but later claimed that he had only done so because he had been pressured and threatened to do so by the accused police officers. 21.  A ballistics test was carried out with the help of an assistant standing where the police officers alleged the victim had been standing at the time of shooting. The assistant had a cabbage placed on his shoulder, near his head. Through a hole pierced in the cabbage, a thread was led to the bullet hole in the wall, which was considerably lower than the cabbage. Taking into consideration the positions of the entry and exit wounds on the victim’s head, it was concluded that, at the moment of the shooting, the victim had been bent over and not standing upright as suggested by the police officers in their version of events. 22.  On 30 June 2010 the Chişinău prosecutor’s office again discontinued the criminal proceedings on similar grounds as the first time, namely on the basis of the police officers’ version of events. It does not appear that the prosecutor attempted to reconcile the findings of the ballistics test with the police officers’ version of events concerning the circumstances of Alexei Vlasi’s shooting. The applicants appealed. 23.  On 22 July 2010 a hierarchically superior prosecutor dismissed the applicants’ appeal. They appealed to an investigating judge. 24.  On 20 October 2010 an investigating judge from the Rascani District Court upheld the applicants’ appeal, quashed the decisions of 30 June and 22 July 2010 and ordered a re-investigation of the case. He concluded that the investigation had been incomplete and that the conclusions reached by the investigators were inconsistent with the evidence in the case file. The investigating judge also noted that no confrontations had been carried out between all the witnesses and the accused officers, no importance had been attached to the fact that no fingerprints had been found on the knife the victim had allegedly stabbed police officer C. with, and that the investigation had not been conducted within a reasonable time. 25.  Following the investigating judge’s decision, the applicants applied to the Prosecutor General’s Office with a request to have the case removed from the Chişinău prosecutor’s office on account of its bias and to have it transferred to another prosecutor’s office. On 8 November 2010 a deputy Prosecutor General rejected the applicants’ request as ill-founded. 26.  On 27 April 2011 the Chişinău prosecutor’s office questioned witness M. again. On 17 May 2011 witness G. was questioned again. He submitted having seen police officer B. stabbing police officer C. in his thigh with a knife before being forced into M.’s apartment after the shooting. According to him, this took place between the third and the fourth floor and he had mentioned it during his initial questioning, but no record had been made. Confrontations were organised between M. and police officer B. and between G. and police officer B. on 20 and 24 May 2011, during which each party maintained their statements. 27.  On 21 July 2011 witness G. took a lie-detector test to determine whether his statement about police officer B. stabbing police office C. with a knife was truthful. The test result was negative, i.e. G.’s statement was not truthful. 28.  On 15 September 2011 the Chişinău prosecutor’s office again discontinued the criminal investigation on similar grounds as the previous occasions. The results of the lie-detector test were added to the decision. The applicants appealed against it and argued that the results of the lie‑detector test were inadmissible because the test had been carried out by colleagues of the accused police officers rather than by independent experts. 29.  On 20 October 2011 the hierarchically superior prosecutor dismissed the applicants’ appeal. They appealed to an investigating judge. 30.  On 12 December 2011 an investigating judge from the Rascani District Court upheld the applicants’ appeal, again finding that the investigation had been incomplete. The judge also declared the results of the lie-detector test inadmissible. 31.  On 13 April 2012, without conducting any further investigative measures, a prosecutor from the Chişinău prosecutor’s office again discontinued the criminal investigation. The content of the decision was identical to that of the decision of 15 September 2011, including reference to the lie-detector test. 32.  On 9 July 2012 the hierarchically superior prosecutor dismissed the applicants’ appeal. They appealed to an investigating judge. 33.  On 16 October 2012 an investigating judge from the Rascani District Court again upheld the applicants’ appeal, quashed the decisions of 13 April and 9 July 2012 and ordered a reopening of the investigation. 34.  On 11 March 2013 a prosecutor from the Chişinău prosecutor’s office again discontinued the criminal investigation. 35.  On 22 April 2013 the hierarchically superior prosecutor dismissed the applicants’ appeal. They appealed to an investigating judge. 36.  On 19 July 2013 an investigating judge from the Rascani District Court again upheld the applicants’ appeal, quashed the decisions of 11 March and 22 April 2012 and ordered a reopening of the investigation. The investigation appears to be pending to date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Bitola. He worked for “Aparati za domakinstvo”, a socially-owned company which was later restructured under the Government’s decision of August 1997 allowing its transformation. 6.  On 21 February 1997 the applicant was reassigned to the post of technologist with the stated aim of increasing productivity and efficiency and improving operations. 7. On 17 March 1997 the applicant brought a civil action seeking to have the reassignment annulled since, in thirty years with the same employer, he had never worked as a technologist. 8.  On 21 May 1997 the Bitola Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”) dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 29 September 1997 the Bitola Court of Appeal quashed this decision ordering the lower court to examine what had been the applicant’s status with the employer; whether and how had the bankruptcy proceedings, initiated meanwhile against the employer, affected the applicant’s employment and whether the employer had been restructured. 9.  On 30 September 1998 the first-instance court annulled the employer’s decision of 27 May 1997 dismissing the applicant (in respect of which the applicant had brought a separate action). According to the Government, in these proceedings the applicant had sought to have the proceedings concerning his reassignment suspended. 10. On 29 March 1999 the applicant’s claim was upheld at first instance. The court held that although the reassignment decision had referred to the relevant provisions of the Labour Act and the General Collective Agreement (see “Relevant domestic laws” below) it had not provided the applicant with concrete reasons for his reassignment. In this connection, it stated that section 27 of the Labour Act had been of a declaratory nature without providing any concrete reason for reassignment. On 29 September 1999 the Bitola Court of Appeal quashed this decision finding that the reassignment decision had provided reasons for the applicant’s reassignment. However, it ordered the first-instance court to determine whether the reassignment had been justified. 11. On 26 March 2001 the first-instance court, deciding the case for the third time, upheld the applicant’s claim and annulled the reassignment decision. The court established that the applicant had worked for the same employer since 1966 in different posts and that no concrete reasons had been given for his reassignment. In this latter respect, it referred to a court annulment, for lack of concrete reasons, of the reassignment of Mr R.V., the applicant’s colleague, which had been based on the same grounds, as the applicant’s (see paragraph 6 above, П.бр. 680/97 of 9 June 1999). Noting that the reassignment decision had been rendered under section 27 of the Labour Act and section 11 of the General Collective Agreement, it stated, inter alia,\n“... in case of reassignment, an employee should be provided with a reasoned decision in writing so that he or she can protect his or her rights and the court may review its lawfulness. In the present case, the disputed decision does not set out any reasonable ground, which implies that the employer had not established the need for the [applicant’s] reassignment. If no reasonable grounds are provided, the reassignment of any employee, including the [applicant], is unlawful. [The employer] has only quoted the terms for reassignment, as specified in the Collective Agreement, without providing any reasonable ground ...” 12. The court also concluded that the reassignment had been unjustified given the applicant’s age and lack of experience required for the new post. 13. On 24 May 2001 the Bitola Court of Appeal dismissed the employer’s appeal and upheld the lower court’s decision. It stated, inter alia:\n“... the reassignment decision does not set out any reasons. The employer has merely referred to the Collective Agreement’s objectives of increasing the productivity and efficiency of the applicant and for work organisation purposes. It does not mean that by mere reference to these grounds, the employer has established the need for the [applicant’s] reassignment...It means that [the applicant] was reassigned to a post which does not correspond to his work experience ...” 14. On 29 May 2003 the Supreme Court allowed an appeal on points of law submitted by the employer on 9 July 2001 and overturned the lower courts’ decisions. It held that they had wrongly applied national law. Referring to section 27 of the Labour Act and section 11 of the Collective Agreement, it found that the employer had been entitled to assess the need for reassignment - which would be well-founded only if an employee was reassigned to a post commensurate with his or her vocational capacity. It further held that the issue as to whether the employee would be more efficient in the new post went beyond the scope of judicial review. It concluded that:\n“Concerning the grounds for reassignment provided in the [disputed] decision, the court considers that it is sufficient to state one of the terms specified in the Collective Agreement. The disputed decision meets this requirement ...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in the Krasnodar region. 5.  According to the applicant, in 1995 he signed a contract with a Russian football club as a football player, obtained a Russian visa and settled in Russia. Later on, he gave up football because of an injury and entered (some time between 1998 and 2002) a higher educational institution in Krasnodar. 6.  It appears that since 2003 or 2004 the applicant has been living in the Krasnodar region with a Russian national, Ms A., as common-law husband and wife.  The applicant has been lawfully resident in Russia at least since 20 October 2004. In April 2005 Ms A. gave birth to a son. The applicant formally acknowledged paternity. The boy was given the applicant’s last name and patronymic. 7.  On 20 June 2006 the applicant was expelled from the University because of his failure to attend classes. It appears that on 9 September 2006 the document authorising his stay in Russia (apparently a student visa) was revoked. 8.  According to the applicant, he applied to a private firm for assistance in obtaining or renewing his visa. It is alleged that an employee of this firm handed over the applicant’s passport to the local Federal Security Office. 9.  On 25 October 2006 Ms A. gave birth to a daughter. Although for unspecified reasons the applicant did not formally register paternity, he never contested it and the girl has his first name as a patronymic. 10.  On 3 November 2006 the applicant was arrested by officers of the Russian Federal Migration Service (“FMS”). On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence of violating the residence regulations for foreign nationals (see paragraph 26 below) and imposed on him a fine of 1,500 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicant was then released. He did not appeal against this court decision and paid the fine. 11.  As the applicant had no valid authorisation to remain in the country he was provided with a transit visa valid from 7 to 16 November 2006, to enable him to leave Russia. However, he did not leave the country, because, as he explained, his wife had recently given birth to their second child and he had to take care of their first child. 12.  The applicant stated that between 1 and 10 January 2007 he could not make any arrangements to regularise his residence status due to the closure of public offices during the public holidays in Russia. 13.  On 11 January 2007 the applicant was subjected to an identity check by FMS officers. As he had no valid document, the officers arrested him and took him to the FMS premises, where they drew up an administrative offence report concerning a violation of residence regulations for foreigners (see paragraphs 26 and 33 below). The report reads as follows:\n“[The applicant] was subjected to an identity check and could not provide evidence of his compliance with the requirement of temporary registration for a period longer than three days of residence...\nI have been informed of my procedural rights, including the right to have access to the record and other materials, the right to legal assistance...Court proceedings, which may result in an administrative arrest or administrative removal from Russia, should be carried out in the presence of the person concerned...[the applicant’s signature]\nThe person’s explanations: {in handwriting in the Russian language} I did not have enough time to renew my registration status.” 14.  According to the applicant, after his arrest he asked in vain to see a lawyer and an interpreter. Having drawn up the report, the FMS officers told the applicant where he should sign it, which he did. One of them wrote down the applicant’s oral explanations (see above). In the applicant’s submission, his language skills were at the time limited: although he could speak and understand some Russian, he had no writing skills. 15.  Later the same day the applicant was taken to the Leninskiy District Court of Krasnodar. The court held a hearing, at which, however, no lawyer or interpreter was designated to assist the applicant. According to the applicant, he was unable to make oral submissions to the court concerning his family status. The District Court judgment reads as follows:\n“[The applicant] had arrived in Krasnodar in November 2004, for educational purposes. During an identity check on 11 January 2007 at his place of his residence it emerged that he had had no registration since 9 September 2006. Having examined the materials, the circumstances of the case, the administrative offence report, the court considers that [the applicant] violated the residence regulations for foreign nationals and thus committed an offence under Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences.”\nThe court sentenced the applicant to a fine in the amount of twenty times the minimum wage (RUB 2,000). The court also ordered the administrative removal of the applicant from Russia, and that he be detained until removal in a special detention facility situated in the village of Kopanskoy. 16.  On 22 January 2007 a lawyer appealed on behalf of the applicant against the first-instance judgment, requesting that the administrative removal be annulled. He argued that the administrative offence report was unlawful, as the applicant had not been provided with an interpreter at the FMS. He also mentioned that the removal would affect his client’s family life, arguing as follows:\n“The court failed to examine the entirety of the relevant circumstances...Since 2003 [the applicant] has been living with a Russian national, A., and has two children, born in 2005 and 2006...These circumstances show that he has a family life...The court did not provide reasons for applying a subsidiary penalty of administrative removal in respect of [the applicant] and did not take account of the matters relating to his family life in Russia. Nor did the court assess the fact that administrative removal would prevent [the applicant] for five years from obtaining permission for temporary residence in Russia. The court should have provided reasons for considering that removal was the only way of striking a fair balance between the private and public interests at stake.” 17.  On 24 January 2007 the Krasnodar Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. Apparently, no oral hearing had been held. The appeal court stated as follows:\n“The argument relating to the existence of a relationship with A. cannot be considered as a ground for residence in Russia without valid permission issued by the competent authority. In addition, [the applicant] had already been fined for a similar offence, whilst no administrative removal had been ordered. Taking account of all circumstances, including [the applicant’s] personality and both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, it should be concluded that the first-instance court issued a lawful decision.”\nThe appeal court further stated that, according to the administrative report, the applicant had been informed of his rights but had not asked for an interpreter and had made a handwritten note in Russian on the report. 18.  The applicant’s lawyer continued to complain about the measure of administrative removal against his client. On 2 March 2007 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the lawyer that the removal was lawful. On or around 14 March 2007 the applicant lodged an application for supervisory review in respect of the court decisions of 11 and 24 January 2007. On 2 April 2007 the Regional Court informed the lawyer that his complaint had been examined by way of supervisory review and that no violations had been found. 19.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged an application for supervisory review before the Supreme Court of Russia. On 4 May 2007 a judge of the Supreme Court rejected it. He stated that the absence of an interpreter could not serve as a reason for quashing the decision, that the applicant had not registered a marriage with Ms A. and that the defence had not provided the district court or the supervisory-review court with evidence confirming that the applicant was the father of the two children. 20.  According to the applicant, the FMS officers repeatedly told him that the State authorities had no funds to pay for his expulsion and told him to return to Cameroon at his own expense. According to the Government, since the applicant’s national passport had expired on 6 June 2007 it was necessary to make arrangements to renew it. 21.  By a letter of 6 July 2007 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed Ms A. that the removal order could not be enforced because no funds had been allocated for this purpose in the federal budget and the applicant’s passport had expired. It was noted that arrangements were being made by the Embassy of Cameroon to issue a departure certificate and travel documents to the applicant. On 9 July 2007 the Embassy issued a travel document. Apparently, Ms A. purchased for the applicant a train ticket to Moscow. 22.  The applicant was released on 16 July 2007. In March 2011 the applicant’s lawyer submitted to the Court a letter from the applicant. In that letter the applicant stated that after his release he had been living with his family in the Krasnodar Region; he had to be discreet because he did not want to be arrested and because the order of administrative removal against him remained enforceable; he could no longer regularise his stay in Russia; he could not work or initiate any administrative procedures concerning marriage or paternity. By April 2011 the removal measure had not been enforced in respect of the applicant. 23.  From 11 January to 16 July 2007 the applicant was detained in Kopanskoy detention facility. 24.  According to the applicant, during his detention he was kept in a metal trailer. In winter the temperature in the trailer was at times as low as 5 degrees Celsius, while in summer it was very hot inside. The applicant was provided with food once a day. He was obliged to do unpaid physical work. His state of health deteriorated significantly, to the extent that an ambulance was called for him on several occasions. 25.  According to the Government, in the living quarters of the detention centre each detainee was provided with an individual bed, bedding and bedside table. The living quarters provided access to water and electricity. A shower room was made available to detainees. Each detainee was afforded three square metres of floor space. Each unit had its own heating system. The applicant was provided with the requisite medical assistance. For instance, on 24 April 2007 he was admitted to hospital because of an abdominal contusion. The applicant received visits from his lawyer, Ms A. and other persons, who supplied him with food and clothes. No detainee was required to work in the detention facility.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The individual applicants are mostly travellers (gens du voyage). The movement ATD Quart Monde (the applicant association [known internationally as ATD Fourth World]) is an association established under the laws of France, having its registered office in Paris. Under Article 2 of its constitution, “[t]he Movement ATD Quart Monde brings together individuals, families and population groups who refuse the fatality of the poverty in which they are condemned to live, and, together with them, men and women, of all origins, who share the same refusal ...”. 8.  The département of Val d’Oise has been home to travellers for very many years. A survey carried out in 2001 by the Association Départementale Voyageurs-Gadjé (ADVOG) identified the presence of 2,500 mobile homes, representing a population of about 10,000 individuals, of which 17% belonged to nomadic families, 42% to sedentary families and 41% to semi-sedentary families, also described as “forced itinerant” or “forced sedentary”.\nThe “forced itinerant” families wish to settle down but are obliged to keep moving as and when they are evicted. The “forced sedentary” families remain nomadic to some extent but are obliged to settle on a particular site when there is no great risk of eviction. These families often remain, when they are evicted, within a specific area covering several municipalities, not straying too far from focal points such as the school attended by their children, the hospital where the elderly are treated or centres of economic activity.\nAs regards the sedentarised families, they are owners, tenants or occupiers of land (private or municipal) on which they live permanently, and families remaining encamped on a site that is normally reserved for short stays (Source: Plans départementaux d’Aide au Logement des Personnes défavorisées du Val d’Oise (PDALPD) 2004-2007 and 2008-2010). 9. The Val d’Oise has two regulatory arrangements aimed at travellers:\n(a)  The “département-level travellers’ reception and accommodation programme” (schéma départemental d’accueil et d’habitat des gens du voyage; under the so-called “Besson Acts” of 31 May 1990 and 5 July 2000 ...), which governs, depending on the needs and existing encampment capacity, the nature, location and capacity of the encampment facilities to be created in municipalities of over 5,000 inhabitants.\n(b)  The “département-level accommodation action plan for persons in need” (plan départemental d’action pour le logement des personnes défavorisées, PDALPD) (provided for by the above-mentioned Law of 31 May 1990 and the Law against exclusion of 29 July 1998), which takes into account the problems raised by sedentary and semi-sedentary families. 10.  Pursuant to the above-mentioned Law of 5 July 2000, and after the annulment of the first travellers’ reception and accommodation programme by the administrative courts, a new programme was adopted in November 2004 for the Val d’Oise in respect of 2004-2010. It provided for the creation, by the 53 municipalities of over 5,000 inhabitants in that département, of 1,035 caravan spaces in encampment areas, including 219 already existing spaces, with 70% State financing. 11.  The PDALPD 2004-2007 plan for the Val d’Oise, adopted in June 2004 and following the previous 2000-2003 plan, stipulated that the actions aimed at travellers should take two forms: first, the creation of encampment areas for traveller families and, second, the provision of family rental accommodation, to be used by sedentary or semi-sedentary families, as already provided for by the previous plan. That accommodation took the form of land, with or without individual houses, on which families could place their caravans to be used for permanent residence. The circular of 21 March 2003 (concerning the implementation of the housing policy and the programming of State financing) provides for the State financing of the family rental accommodation under the same conditions as encampment areas (at 70% of the pre-tax cost within the ceiling); actual houses can be financed with the help of the rental housing loan for social integration (prêt locatif aidé d’intégration, PLAI). 12.  More than 2,000 travellers live in the area covered by the municipality of Herblay (approximately 10% of its population), occupying between 400 and 500 caravans, and most of them have been there for many years. According to the Government, around four-fifths of those mobile homes are in breach of the land-use plan. 13.  In 2000 an urban and social study (maîtrise d’œuvre urbaine et sociale, MOUS) was initiated with a view to providing alternative accommodation for the travellers who had settled in the municipality (created by circular no. 3465 of 22 May 1989, the aim of the study is to promote access to housing for individuals and families in difficulty). The study gave rise, after a social diagnosis by the ADVOG, to a memorandum of understanding dated 23 November 2004 between the prefect of the Val d’Oise, the president of the département council and the mayor of Herblay. The project provided for the creation of four sites, representing a total of 26 family plots. In September 2005 the land-use plan in respect of those sites underwent a simplified revision procedure. The first site, containing eight plots, or 24 spaces, was opened in December 2008. 14.  Under the 2004-2010 travellers’ accommodation programme for the département (see paragraph 10 above) the municipality of Herblay was exempted from the requirement to provide a site for nomadic travellers because of the number of settled families living in mobile homes and the study that was underway (see paragraph 13 above). 15. Pursuant to section 9 of the above-cited Law of 5 July 2000, the mayor of Herblay issued in July 2003, and again in January 2005, orders prohibiting the encampment of travellers’ mobile homes throughout the municipality. 16.  The applicants, who are all French nationals, had been living in Herblay, in the locality of “Bois du Trou-Poulet”, for many years and some of them had been born there ... They were part of a group of twenty-six families (42 adults and 53 children, making a total of 95 people) who had settled on the land. Some of the applicants were owners but most were tenants, while others were squatters. According to the land-use plan published in May 2003, the plots of land in question were situated in zone ND, corresponding to a “natural area qualifying for protection on account of the quality of its landscape and its various characteristics”. The plots had also been classified as ND in the earlier land-use plans. In the zone NDc, where the applicants had settled, camping and caravanning were allowed provided the site was suitably equipped and the persons concerned had the requisite authorisation. 17.  On the application of the municipality of Herblay (the “municipality”) and in accordance with a decision of the president of the Pontoise tribunal de grande instance dated 19 November 2003, two bailiffs, accompanied by police officers, visited the site on 12 February 2004 in order to take note of the occupation of the land and establish the identity of the occupiers. The bailiffs drew up an official report in which they recorded, for each part of the land, the identity of the occupiers and their type of accommodation (caravans, bungalows, huts, permanent buildings). The report stated in particular as follows: “the whole of the site in question is cluttered with a large number of pieces of vehicles, engines, spare car parts and various rubbish in the wooded area around the sites where we recorded the occupiers’ identities”.\n(b)  Injunction proceedings 18.  On 30 April and 11 May 2004 the municipal authorities brought civil proceedings against forty individuals, including the applicants, before the urgent-applications judge of the Pontoise tribunal de grande instance, seeking a ruling that the land was being unlawfully occupied and that the defendants had “illegal placed mobile homes and constructions thereon”, together with an injunction requiring them to remove all their vehicles and mobile homes together with any constructions from the site, on pain of a penalty of 200 euros (EUR) per day, and stipulating that the municipality would be entitled, after a period of two months from the issuance of the injunction, to carry out the eviction and clearance itself with police assistance. 19.  The hearing took place on 18 June 2004. In a decision of 2 July 2004 the urgent-applications judge dismissed the municipality’s application. After noting that the zone NDc, occupied by the defendants, allowed for camping and caravanning, but that the encampment of caravans for more than three months was subject to authorisation unless the land was specially equipped, which was not the case here, the judge considered it sufficiently established that the defendants had been occupying the land for many years, long before the publication of the land-use plan, that some of them had a regular water or electricity supply and that the long-standing toleration of the situation by the municipality, while not amounting to a right, precluded a finding of urgency or of a manifestly unlawful nuisance, which alone could bring the matter within the jurisdiction of the urgent-applications judge. 20.  The judge further observed that, with the annulment of the travellers’ reception and accommodation programme (see paragraph 10 above), the municipality was required by the Law of 5 July 2000 to provide a site for itinerant travellers. Lastly, having regard to the bailiffs’ official report, the judge ordered the defendants to clear the land of all abandoned vehicles and rubbish within a period of two months, on pain of a fine of EUR 200 per day, and ruled that after that period the municipality would be entitled to have the land cleaned up at the defendants’ expense.\n(c)  Proceedings on the merits\n(i)  Judgment of the tribunal de grande instance 21.  In September 2004 the municipality brought an action against forty individuals, including the applicants, in the Pontoise tribunal de grande instance, reiterating the requests it had made to the urgent-applications judge. In a judgment of 22 November 2004 the court granted the authorities’ requests. Two other individuals (including one of the applicants) also intervened in the proceedings voluntarily. The defendants and interveners claimed that they had been living on the Bois du Trou-Poulet site for many years, since before the publication of the land-use plan, in a zone where the development of land for camping and caravanning was authorised. They relied on the right to housing, as a constitutional principle, and on the Connors v. the United Kingdom judgment (no. 66746/01, 27 May 2004), and referred to the obligation for the municipality to make land available for travellers. In the alternative, they said that they would agree to judicial mediation. 22.  The hearing took place on 27 September 2004. In a judgment of 22 November 2004 the court upheld the municipality’s claims. It began by finding that the land-use plan, published in May 2003, was automatically enforceable provided it had not been declared null and void, and that the land occupied by the defendants was in the zone NDc, allowing in principle for the land to be equipped for camping and caravanning, but that the land had not been developed in compliance with the rules of the Town and Country Planning Code (see Article L. 443-1 of the Code). The court held that the defendants, in setting up their caravans, mobile homes and cabins on the land in the absence of a permit or a decision by the prefecture in their favour, had breached the land-use plan, and that the supply of electricity by EDF (Électricité de France) did not confer any rights. After stressing the importance of the right to housing and its legislative and constitutional basis, the court took the view that, while the legislature and the public authorities had to use their best endeavours to guarantee this right as far as possible, it could not be granted “without regard for legality or in breach of the applicable rules”. 23.  The court then analysed the above-cited Connors judgment and found that the situation before it was different, since there was no question here of a summary eviction procedure (unlike Connors), or any lack of procedural safeguards, because the defendants had been able to raise all the arguments that they considered necessary for their defence before an “independent tribunal”, ruling on the merits in compliance with all the procedural rules applied in France. The court found that it did not consider that it was breaching Article 8 of the Convention in giving a decision after responding to the defendants’ submissions and that, in a State governed by the rule of law, it would be unthinkable for the enforcement of a court decision to amount to “inhuman and degrading treatment”. It added that there was no doubt that if the decision was not voluntarily enforced by the defendants, the municipal authorities, the officers of the court and the State’s enforcement bodies would ensure that enforcement was carried out in accordance with the principle of human dignity. 24.  As regards the obligation of the municipality, after the annulment of the travellers’ reception and accommodation programme, to make land available for travellers, the court referred to a letter from the prefect of the Val d’Oise to the mayor showing that the municipality was considered to have fulfilled the obligations imposed by the Law of 5 July 2000. The court further observed that the fact that the defendants had been occupying the land for such a long time might call into question their status as “travellers” and that the département-level programmes were aimed at the nomadic population, not sedentary communities which had been settled in the same place for ten or sometimes twenty years. It rejected the request for judicial mediation on the ground that it would have little chance of success, in view of the context and the large number of defendants. 25.  Consequently, the court ordered the defendants and interveners to remove all vehicles and mobile homes from the land they were occupying, and to demolish any erections thereon, within three months from the date of service of the judgment, failing which they would be fined EUR 70 per person for each day of non-compliance, and held that, after that time-limit, the municipality itself would be entitled to carry out the removal and demolition at the defendants’ expense and with police assistance. The court also ordered them to pay EUR 50 to the municipality in respect of irrecoverable expenses. It took the view that, having regard to the context of the dispute and the lack of urgency resulting from a situation that had existed for many years, it was not necessary to order the provisional enforcement of the judgment.\n(ii)  Judgment of the Court of Appeal 26. Thirty-six of the defendants, including the applicants, lodged an appeal with the Versailles Court of Appeal. The applicant association filed submissions as a voluntary intervener. 27.  The hearing was held on 8 September 2005. In a judgment of 13 October 2005 the Court of Appeal declared the applicant association’s voluntary intervention admissible and upheld the judgment, except in respect of a couple (who are not applicants), for whom it ordered an expert’s report in order to ascertain the conditions of their accommodation and the conformity thereof with the land-use plan. 28.  The Court of Appeal first found that the defendants’ occupation of the land breached the land-use plan, which was automatically enforceable, and responded as follows to the arguments raised:\n“While the right to housing is a constitutional principle, and while Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention ... guarantee respect for each person’s private and family life and protect everyone from inhuman and degrading treatment, these superior principles have not in this particular case been impaired, as the municipality’s action had a legal basis derived from compliance with regulations that are indiscriminately binding on everyone, thus sufficing to establish the public interest that is necessary for the exercise of such action, giving rise to adversarial proceedings at first instance and on appeal, and as the enforcement of a court decision given with due regard for defence rights cannot constitute the alleged degrading and inhuman treatment.\nThe long duration of the occupation does not create rights, neither does the tolerance, however lengthy, of such occupation in breach of the provisions of the municipality’s land-use plan. It is therefore pointless for certain appellants to rely on the schooling of their children, which is not necessarily undermined, or on the irrelevant fact that they hold relocation record books (carnets de circulation), which do not exempt them from complying with the regulations.\nIt is equally pointless for the appellants to allege bad faith on the part of the municipality or that is has breached its statutory obligations under the Besson Act.\nIt transpires from a letter from the prefecture of the Val d’Oise dated 18 May 2004 that the municipality has fulfilled its obligations under the Law of 5 July 2000 concerning travellers, who are considered to be nomadic and not sedentarised, which is not the case for the appellants, who have vigorously asserted their sedentarisation and emphasised the length of their occupation ...” 29.  The Court of Appeal further confirmed the rejection of the judicial mediation that had been sought, on the ground that it did not appear to be the appropriate response “to a resolution of the dispute through which the municipality strives to ensure compliance by and for all its inhabitants with laws and regulations”. Lastly, it dismissed the claim for damages submitted by the municipality and ordered the appellants to pay the sum of EUR 50 each in respect of the costs of the appeal proceedings.\nThe applicants stated that after that judgment had been delivered they received daily visits from an official of the municipality who, referring to the coercive fine, urged them to leave the site.\n(iii)  Proceedings before the Court of Cassation 30.  The applicants, in their own names and on behalf of their minor children, together with the applicant association, applied for legal aid from the legal aid board at the Court of Cassation so that they could lodge an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 13 October 2005. 31.  On 4 and 5 July 2006 the legal aid board issued a series of decisions dismissing their applications on the ground that no ground of appeal on points of law could be raised against the impugned decision within the meaning of section 7 of the Law of 10 July 1991. In a series of identically worded decisions of 23 November 2006, the judge delegated by the President of the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeals against those decisions ... 32.  On 16 January 2007 the applicants filed a declaration with the Court of Cassation’s Registry in which they withdrew their appeals on points of law. A decision of 7 September 2007 took note of their withdrawal. 33.  Following the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the authorities decided, in the context of the département-level accommodation action plan for persons in need (see paragraph 11 above) to undertake an urban and social study (maîtrise d’œuvre urbaine et sociale, “MOUS”) concerning all the families involved in the judicial proceedings, in order to determine their individual situations and assess the options for finding alternative accommodation. 34.  Under an agreement with the prefect of the Val d’Oise dated 20 February 2006, the National Workers’ Housing Association (Société Nationale de Construction de Logements pour les Travailleurs, “SONACOTRA”) was commissioned to carry out a social study concerning all the families in question, in particular to assess their needs in terms of relocation. The study, to be completed within three months, was to provide information for each family on the situation of the land with regard to planning regulations, the current living conditions, the degree of sedentarisation, the family structure and the social situation of the household. The study was also to indicate the relocation arrangements sought by each family (sedentary housing, mobile-home accommodation or a combination), the localities where they wished to be rehoused and their desired status (tenant or owner). The agreement established the composition of the MOUS steering committee and that of the select steering committee, and indicated that this mission would be fully financed by the State. 35.  The findings of the study were presented by the SONACOTRA to the steering committee on 6 June 2006. At a meeting of 17 November 2006 between the select steering committee and the applicant association, held for the presentation to the latter of the results of the social study, the committee agreed that the families who had in the meantime left Bois du Trou-Poulet would be included in the social study. The representatives of those families were received on 16 January 2007 by the select steering committee and it was agreed that they would be interviewed by the SONACOTRA on 30 January, 1, 2 or 5 February 2007. A supplement to the MOUS agreement was drawn up on 29 January 2007 to provide for an additional social study concerning those families, the cost of which was to be covered in full by the State. Lastly, at the request of the applicant association, one last family which had not been interview in the context of the additional social study was included in the MOUS. 36.  The social studies revealed the following information. Out of the thirty-two households interviewed by the SONACOTRA, the wishes for relocation were divided as follows:\n- One household had moved outside the département at the end of the 2005-2006 school year.\n- One household had been rehoused by the municipality in social housing of the low-rent type.\n- Three households (not applicants) had received proposals from the municipality for relocation to family plots on which facilities were being installed (see paragraph 13 above).\n- Five households (all applicants) wanted social housing of the low-rent type.\n- Twenty-one households (of which fourteen are applicants) wanted to be relocated to a mixed site (buildings and caravans).\n- One household occupying social housing in Angers wished to be rehoused in low-rent housing in the Angers area.\n- Only one household among the applicants, that of Vanessa Ricono, could not be interviewed during the social study. 37.  On 12 November 2007 a new MOUS agreement was signed for a period of eight months for the relocation of five households which had opted for social housing of the low-rent type. The agreement entrusted the SONACOTRA, which had in the meantime become ADOMA, with the responsibility of providing relocation support for those families (information, assistance with compiling applications, introduction of support mechanisms, and follow-up of relocation in practical terms). The expenses of the MOUS were covered at 100% by the State. 38.  In the meantime, in October 2004, construction work on a dual carriageway (known as the “11th Avenue”) began in close proximity to the applicants’ homes and lasted for over a year. The lawyer for some of the applicants and the applicant association’s representative for the Val d’Oise sent a number of letters between November 2004 and July 2005 to the mayor of Herblay, to the prefect and to the president of the département council, drawing their attention to the risks caused to the applicants and their children by the construction work. In a number of letters, particularly in April and July 2005, the deputy director general for highway management in the département listed the various safety measures that had been taken under the supervision of a coordinating company (signs, fences, barriers, manhole covers, etc.) and stressed that despite those precautions, the site installations and signs had frequently been the target of vandalism and theft. 39.  At the time of the adoption of the present judgment, the municipality has not enforced the judgment of 13 October 2005. However, the coercive fine, for which no settlement date has been fixed, continues to run in respect of the applicants who have remained at Bois du Trou-Poulet. 40. The applicants can be divided into three groups:\n(i)  Families rehoused in social housing\nFour families were relocated in social housing between March and July 2008 further to the MOUS agreement of 12 November 2007 (see paragraph 37 above): Solange Lefèvre, Catherine Lefèvre and her three children, Sandrine Plumerez and her five children, and Sabrina Lefèvre, her partner (not an applicant) and her three children.\n(ii)  Families remaining in Herblay or having returned there\nA number of families remained at Bois du Trou-Poulet or have returned there:\n- Martine Payen, also concerned by the MOUS, refused two offers of social housing (in particular because of the amount of the rent) and still lives at Bois du Trou-Poulet on land belonging to her.\n- Michèle Perioche and Germain Guiton remained on their rented land.\n- Laetitia Winterstein remained with her partner (not an applicant) and their five children, on land belonging to her grandmother.\n- Steeve Lefèvre and Graziella Avisse and their child have returned to Bois du Trou-Poulet after joining their aunt on an encampment area in Avranches; according to their lawyer, they received an eviction order after their return subject to a coercive fine of 300 EUR per day.\n- Rosita Ricono left Bois du Trou-Poulet and went to live in a hotel; she is now living on a friend’s land in Herblay.\n(iii)  Families who have left the region\nLastly, a number of families have left the region:\n- Pierre Mouche left in May 2005 after undergoing a serious operation (according to his lawyer this was due to dust from the “11th Avenue” construction work). He wandered from place to place with his children, then on his own for four years, between Les Mureaux and Saint Ouen l’Aumône. In 2007 he refused social housing, in particular on account of his inability to live in such housing and his wish to settle on a family plot. He is currently living on a shopping centre carpark in Épône, next to his son Franck Mouche who gives him the assistance required by his state of health.\n- Gypsy Debarre and Paul Mouche, another son of Pierre Mouche, also left with him in 2005 and wandered from place to place with their six children, who were thus unable to attend school on a regular basis; they are currently separated. Gypsy Debarre is living on the Buchelay encampment area, near Mantes-la Jolie, with four of her children. In April 2009 she refused social housing that was offered to her, in particular because of her inability to pay the rent.\n- Sophie Clairsin and Thierry Lefèvre, who left in January 2006, lived on encampment areas in Avranches and Saint Hilaire. After those areas were closed for work, in August 2008 Sophie Clairsin bought a plot of non-buildable land on which she lives with her three children. According to their lawyer, the municipality of Saints has notified them of their obligation to leave the land and has brought proceedings against Sophie Clairsin in her capacity as owner.\n- Patrick Lefèvre and Sylviane Huygue-Bessin and their seven children, together with Catherine Herbrecht and her three children, who also left in January 2006, lived on sites at Avranches and Saint Hilaire until they closed; they then returned to Bois du Trou-Poulet, which the municipality asked them to leave within 48 hours. They are now accommodated on Sophie Clairsin’s land.\n- Philippe Lefèvre lives with his partner (who is not an applicant) in Mayenne, with the parents of the latter.\n- Mario Guiton and Stella Huet live with their three children near the parents of the latter in Normandy, and they return to Herblay for short stays.\n- Jessy Winterstein left Bois du Trou-Poulet with her two children and her current address is unknown.\n- Vanessa Ricono and her partner (who is not an applicant) also left with their child and their current address is unknown. 41.  Those of the applicants who have left explained that, as soon as they left Bois du Trou-Poulet, the municipality had had trenches dug on the land to prevent them from returning and had demolished their cabins; they were unable to recover the personal belongings that they had left behind, as they had been destroyed or stolen.\n(b)  Applications under the “DALO Act” (Law on the enforceable right to housing) 42.  A number of applicants (Michelle Périoche, Germain Guiton, Mario Guiton and Stella Huet, Laetitia Winterstein, Catherine Herbrecht, Sylviane Huygue-Bessin and Patrick Lefèvre, Gypsy Debarre and Paul Mouche, Graziella Avisse and Steeve Lefèvre, Rosita Ricono) filed applications in 2008 and 2009 (2010 for Rosita Ricono) for social housing pursuant to the Law of 2007 on the enforceable right to housing (the “DALO Act”, ...), stipulating that they wanted family plots. Their applications were denied by the mediation board (except for that of Gypsy Debarre), on the ground that they were “not eligible for relief under the DALO Act”. The Administrative Court dismissed their appeals against those decisions.\n(c)  Resolution of the HALDE dated 22 February 2010 43.  On 14 February 2006 the National Association of Catholic Travellers (Association nationale des Gens du Voyage catholiques, ANGVC) complained to the High Authority for the combat against Discriminations and the promotion of Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Ėgalité, the “HALDE”) concerning the ban on travellers’ camps throughout the municipality of Herblay, pursuant to a municipal by-law of 17 January 2005 (see paragraph 15 above). 44.  In a resolution of 22 February 2010, after, in particular, looking at the Court’s case-law (judgments in Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001‑I, and Connors, cited above), the HALDE took the view that the combined effect of the département-level travellers’ reception programme and the municipal by-law, two texts of secondary legislation, had the effect of totally overriding the application of a statute (the Besson Act of 5 July 2000) whose aim was to protect travellers, and thus interfered with their rights.\nThe HALDE thus concluded that the exemption granted to the municipality of Herblay by the département-level programme was not compliant with the above-mentioned Law of 5 July 2000 and recommended that the prefect should review its provisions. It further recommended that the mayor of Herblay should rescind the by-law and suspend any eviction measures taken on the sole basis of that instrument, and requested to be informed within three-months of the action taken in accordance with its resolution.\n(d)  Resolution of the municipal council of Herblay dated 13 September 2012 45.  In an interview given to the newspaper Le Parisien on 13 December 2010, the mayor of Herblay stated that the travellers’ encampment area prescribed by the département-level programme would be created on the land that had been set aside for family plots, as the municipality could not undertake both actions. 46.  The new département-level travellers’ reception programme for the Val d’Oise, approved on 28 March 2011, provides for the creation in Herblay of an encampment area for 25 nomadic caravans. 47.  In a resolution of 13 September 2012 the municipal council of Herblay unanimously adopted a simplified revision of the local planning plan (plan local d’urbanisme, PLU) for the purpose of creating the encampment area. ...\n...", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Munich. 5.  On 8 November 1993 the applicant brought an action against her brother before the Buda Central District Court claiming her statutory share of the inheritance of her deceased mother’s estate. 6.  On 6 May 1994 the District Court held a hearing. On 20 September 1994 a further hearing took place, which lasted 30 minutes. The defendant failed to appear on both occasions. On the latter date, the defendant’s counsel requested that the applicant’s claim be rejected as it had been submitted outside the statutory time-limit. 7.  On 18 November 1994 the District Court held a hearing, which lasted 30 minutes. It ordered the applicant to submit, within 30 days, any evidence that might prove that the period of the statutory limitation had been interrupted. The applicant complied with the order on 10 January 1995. 8.  Meanwhile, on 21 September 1994 the applicant instituted inheritance proceedings before a public notary. A notarial notice was issued on 18 January 1995, in accordance with the Hungarian law on inheritance, requiring the estate to be divided up equally between the applicant and her brother. 9.  On 25 January 1995 the applicant informed the District Court that her representative had withdrawn from the case. \nHearings scheduled for 31 January and 4 April 1995 were adjourned by the District Court, as the applicant, having been hospitalised, was unable to attend. Meanwhile, on 24 March 1995 the applicant notified the court of the name of her new representative. 10.  At the hearing of 20 June 1995 the applicant raised the amount of her claim and requested legal aid. The court ordered the applicant to submit within 30 days all necessary documents proving that she needed legal aid. The applicant complied with the order on 10 August 1995. At the same time, she extended her claim to include her deceased aunt’s estate. 11.  On 18 August 1995 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request for legal aid and ordered her to pay court fees corresponding to the amount of the increased claim. On 2 November 1995 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. 12.  The applicant’s renewed request for exemption from court fees was granted by the District Court on 16 January 1996. The court also took measures to obtain the case-file concerning the estate of the applicant’s deceased aunt. 13.  On 28 February 1996 the District Court held a hearing, which lasted for 35 minutes. On 13 March 1996 the applicant elaborated her claims.\nAt the hearing held on 25 June 1996 the court ordered the defendant, who had repeatedly failed to appear before the court, to submit observations on the merits of the applicant’s claims before 5 September 1996. On 6 September 1996 the District Court imposed a fine on the defendant, who, despite a warning, failed to comply with the court’s order. This decision was later quashed as the defendant’s submissions were proved to have been posted on 5 September 1996. 14.  On 19 November 1996 the District Court heard the defendant’s witnesses and ordered the parties to submit their observations within 30 days. At the hearing the applicant asked that witnesses be heard in support of her evidence and extended the scope of her action by requesting that a real estate contract of sale be nullified. The applicant’s observations were submitted on 22 January 1997. 15.  On 12 March 1997 the District Court heard the defendant and a witness. On 7 April 1997 the applicant informed the court that she had given a power of attorney to a new lawyer. \nAt the hearing on 24 September 1997 the District Court heard the applicant’s daughter as a witness and ordered the applicant to submit her observations within 15 days. The applicant requested that the time-limit be extended by 30 days as she had been in hospital. Her observations were submitted to the court on 25 February and 12 March 1998. 16.  On 17 June 1998 the District Court held a hearing and requested the applicant to specify her claims in the event of the above-mentioned contract of sale being nullified. 17.  In her submissions to the court of 19 November 1998, the applicant amended her action. She extended the scope of her action by claiming, from the defendant’s wife, her share of the inheritance of her deceased father. 18.  On 20 January 1999 the court suspended the case and requested the parties to institute proceedings before a notary. On 2 March 1999 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s procedural appeal. 19.  On 25 June 1999 the applicant’s representative requested the public notary to undertake inheritance proceedings. 20.  On 28 July 1999 the notary requested the applicant’s representative to submit an authorisation certified by the consulate or a public notary practising in the applicant’s country of residence. 21.  At a hearing on 6 December 1999, the notary set a 30-day time-limit for the parties to submit their claims in respect of any movable property that may have been part of the estate. 22.  On 20 January 2000 the notary discontinued the proceedings as the estate contained no movable property. His decision of 18 January 1995 was therefore declared final. 23.  Subsequently, on 31 March 2000 the applicant requested the court to continue the case, to record in the Land Registry that proceedings concerning the inheritance of her mother’s real estate were pending and to give priority to the next hearing. On 20 April 2000 the District Court ordered that the proceedings be noted in the Land Registry. Following the defendants’ unsuccessful appeal, the Land Registry registered the proceedings on 14 August 2000. 24.  On 27 September 2000 the District Court heard witnesses. It also ordered the defendant to submit his counter-claim within 15 days. 25.  On 17 January 2001 the District Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction as the increased value of the applicant’s amended claim required that the case be heard by the Budapest Regional Court at first instance. The case was therefore discontinued before the District Court and transferred to the Regional Court. 26.  On 24 April 2001 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the order to transfer the case. 27.  On 15 November 2001 and 28 February 2002 the Budapest Regional Court held hearings and ordered the applicant to submit the addresses of certain witnesses living in Germany. \nOn 24 May 2002 the Regional Court heard witnesses. 28.  At the next hearing held on 17 October 2002, the Regional Court heard several witnesses. On 20 May and 7 October 2003 the court heard the parties. 29.  On 5 November 2003 the court appointed an expert to inspect the real estate in question. The applicant appealed. 30.  The case is still pending at first instance.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Istanbul. She is the widow of Mr Cengiz Aksakal (“C.A.”), who died on 12 November 1980. 6.  On 12 September 1980 martial law was declared in Turkey following military intervention by the army. 7.  On 18 October 1980 C.A., who was a teacher in the village of Veliköy, in the province of Artvin, surrendered to the police during a military operation and was taken into custody. He was suspected of belonging to the illegal organisation Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way). He spent the first three days in custody at the headquarters of the gendarmerie in Veliköy and the following five at the headquarters of the gendarmerie of the district of Şavşat. C.A., who was in good health at the time of his detention in both locations, was not questioned. 8.  On 26 October 1980 he was transferred to Artvin, where he was interrogated in a sports hall until the following 2 November. On that date, he was imprisoned in the martial law detention facility (sıkıyönetim gözetim evi). 9.  After having been taken ill on 3 November 1980, C.A. was admitted to hospital in a pre-comatose state. On 5 November 1980, he was transferred by ambulance to Trabzon Hospital where he died on 12 November. 10.  According to the autopsy report drawn up on 13 November 1980, the following marks were found on the body of the deceased:\n“Abrasions measuring 3 x 3 cm, going from the outside towards the inside of the eighth and ninth ribs, the scabs of which were coming off; on the right wrist and on the inside of the wrist, a purple mark in the form of two parallel bracelets 1.5 cm wide and on the mark, two wounds, the scabs of which were coming off; on the left wrist, the same mark, 1.5 cm wide; on the left side of the penis, a wound without a scab; on the left foot, a wound with a scab measuring 2 x 1 cm, with, underneath, a bruise measuring 3 x 3 cm; four wounds with scabs under the left knee, a wound with a scab measuring 5 x 1 cm inside the left tibia ...; bruising on the top and lateral surface of the right foot.” 11.  Since the cause of death could not be established on the basis of this information, a conventional autopsy was performed. An examination of the skull and ribcage revealed “ecchymosis measuring 3 x 4 cm at the back, a large haematoma inside the cervical cavity; an infection of the lungs ...” A post-mortem examination was deemed necessary. 12.  In her complaint lodged with the public prosecutor on 28 January 1981, the applicant stated:\n“Two soldiers, accompanied by the village schoolmaster came to our house on the day before the religious holiday. They took my husband away saying that the lieutenant wanted to talk to him. He was held at the village gendarmerie for approximately four days. During that time, I was able to visit him and he was well. He was then transferred to the gendarmerie in the district of Şavşat; I was no longer able to visit him. I was told that he remained there for six days and was then taken to Artvin .... When they returned his body to me, I noticed abrasions and signs of injuries. His tongue was as big as that of an animal, three of his teeth were broken, ... there were marks of torture all over his body. Before being arrested, he had been in good health.” 13.  According to the administrative investigation report (idari tahkikat raporu) of 15 February 1981 signed by three officers, during the course of a military operation on 18 October 1980 C.A. had been arrested after having obeyed an order to surrender. On the same date he had been placed in custody at the Veliköy gendarmerie, where he remained for three days. He spent the following five days at the gendarmerie of the district of Şavşat. During this period no sign of any health problem was recorded. On 26 October 1980 C.A. was transferred to the police headquarters at Artvin where he was questioned. After having been held at the police headquarters for seven days, he was transferred, on 2 November 1980, to the surveillance facility (Gözetim evi) attached to the martial law command. According to the records of that establishment, no sign of illness had been noted upon his arrival. On the following day, at his request, he was transferred to Artvin Hospital. The head physician at that hospital stated that he had asked C.A. if he had been hit on the head or on the body; C.A. allegedly replied that he had not. According to the report drawn up by the hospital, meningitis and pneumonia were diagnosed. Two days later, the patient was transferred to Trabzon Hospital where he died on 12 November. The report concluded that this was a “natural death” (ecel). 14.  On 15 June 1981 three police officers, S.A., İ.Ü. and H.Ö., were questioned as suspects by the martial law prosecutor. They were the police officers who had taken C.A.’s statement on 21 October 1980 in a room at the sports hall. The police officers stated that they had not subjected C.A. to any mistreatment and had not found any evidence against him during questioning. H.Ö. stated that on 26 October 1980, when the report was being drawn up in the presence of C.A., the latter was groaning. When the police officer asked what the matter was, the applicant replied that he had caught a chill and that he had pains in his chest. The three police officers stated that they had brought C.A. to the gendarmerie on 26 October 1980, that on the same day he was to have been placed in the military prison at Artvin, but was detained in custody by the gendarmerie until the following 1 November, notwithstanding the orders of the martial law commander. 15.  On 11 November 1981, at the request of the Şavşat public prosecutor’s office, the body of C.A. was exhumed in order to examine the deceased’s skull. According to the report dated 21 September 1982 drawn up by the forensic institute, the skull showed no sign of trauma, apart from separation at the right temporo-occipital suture. 16.  According to the report of 3 December 1982 issued by the Istanbul forensic institute upon completion of the post-mortem examination of samples of tissue taken from C.A.’s body, the latter had died of pneumonia with spinal haemorrhaging (subaraknoidal kanama) having lasted seven days, and showed no signs of traumatic injury. 17.  In an indictment dated 19 April 1983 drawn up by the military prosecutor at the martial law command, the three police officers (see paragraph 14 above) on duty at the material time at Artvin police station were accused of having caused the death of C.A. after torturing him. The prosecutor stated that the accused had interrogated C.A. in a sports hall instead of in the customary location and that they had concealed their names at the foot of his statement, in breach of the relevant regulations. He also referred to the statements of several witnesses who had seen C.A. on the premises of Artvin police station, once attached to the wall, his arms outstretched, and another time in a deplorable condition, paralysed and unable to speak. 18.  The applicant joined the criminal proceedings brought before Erzurum Military Court No. 2 attached to the martial law command (“the military court”). 19.  On 31 August 1983, a gendarme, F.I., examined as a witness before the Military Court, stated that he had “maybe seen” C.A.’s interrogation but had not participated in it. He stated that he had not noticed any ill treatment during the interrogation, which had been conducted on the top floor of gendarmerie premises or in the sports hall. He stressed that as commander of the gendarmerie centre (jandarma merkez komutanı), his role was limited to appointing the interrogation team guards. 20.  The report of 17 February 1984, unanimously adopted by the plenary meeting of the forensic institute, reads:\n“On 3 November 1980, while in police custody, C.A. was taken to Artvin Hospital in a comatose state. First aid was administered on the basis of the diagnosis of meningitis and pneumonia. On the following 5 November, he was transferred to Trabzon Hospital in a comatose state, with hemiplegia on the left-hand side. He died on 12 November 1980. The ecchymoses noted at the autopsy revealed that violence and assault had been involved and that the party concerned had died of an intracranial haemorrhage. As regards the clinical presentation, a pre-existing underlying condition was noted which prepared the ground for the haemorrhage which was triggered by the trauma. Since a causal link has been established between the cranial trauma and the death, Articles 451 or 452 § 2 of the [Turkish] Criminal Code are applicable in the instant case.” 21.  The accused denied the charges against them throughout the proceedings. They declared that they had never had any contact with C.A. save at the start of the interrogation. Certain witnesses who had initially testified against the accused subsequently retracted their statements. 22.  In a judgment of 15 May 1984, the accused were each sentenced to three years and four months’ imprisonment under Articles 243 and 452 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 23.  The accused, the applicant and the martial law commander appealed on points of law. 24.  In a judgment delivered on 28 December 1984, the Military Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment on the ground that the degree of responsibility of the other persons, notably officers and members of the National Intelligence Organisation (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, hereafter “the MİT”) having taken part in the interrogation of C.A., had not been established and that the defence witnesses had not been heard. 25.  After having conducted a more thorough investigation and having examined further witnesses, in a new judgment of 4 March 1986 the first-instance court acquitted the three police officers on grounds of insufficient evidence. 26.  The applicant again appealed on points of law. 27.  By a judgment of 15 October 1986, the Military Court of Cassation again overturned the judgment at first instance. In its judgment it stated that the records of the Veliköy command contained no entry concerning C.A. and that there was therefore no accurate information on the dates of his arrival or transfer or the identity of the officers in charge of his case. It added that, furthermore, the case file contained no details of the place and conditions of the initial interrogation conducted on 21 October 1980, or the actual conditions of the interrogation of 26 October. It pointed out that even though the accused had stated that the deceased was not “a significant suspect” the fact that agents of the MIT had participated in his interrogation suggested the opposite. In the opinion of the court, the treatment subsequently inflicted on the party concerned confirmed this argument. The Court of Cassation concluded that given that C.A. had been interrogated and tortured during his detention on the gendarmerie premises and up until 2 November by the accused and other persons whose functions had not been ascertained, the omissions in the investigation had to be remedied and, in particular, the gendarmes, the members of the MIT and any other persons present at the material time and place should be questioned. 28.  On 28 January 1987 Turkey’s recognition of the right of individual petition became effective. 29.  The case file was returned to the Military Court, which, after having re-examined it in the light of numerous new witness statements, confirmed its decision of 16 August 1988 acquitting the accused. It concluded that the act of torture had been committed between 26 October and 2 November 1980 by persons other than the accused. It gave notice (ihbar) that a new investigation was to be opened by the Artvin public prosecutor’s office. That decision became final on 21 December 1988. 30.  The investigation and correspondence between the military courts and the Artvin public prosecutor’s office continued. However, a gendarme, M.C., examined as a witness on 3 April 1990 before the Akyazı Criminal Court, following a request for judicial assistance, stated that he had taken leave on 12 October 1980 for a period of one year. 31.  By an indictment of 21 June 1990, the prosecutor at the Artvin Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) charged two new accused, F.I. and M.C., gendarmes at the Artvin gendarmerie, who had been examined as witnesses before the military courts (see paragraphs 19 and 30 above) with the acts of torture having caused the death of C.A. 32.  The applicant sought to intervene in the proceedings before the Assize Court. 33.  Monthly hearings were conducted before this court. Ten or so witnesses were questioned, some following a request for judicial assistance. Some hearings were postponed as a result of problems in ensuring the appearance of witnesses who for the most part had been co-detainees of the deceased and present on the premises on which he had been subjected to the torture. All the witnesses stated that they had seen C.A. being tortured and some stated that they had seen the accused at the scene of the crime. 34.  At the hearing of 8 October 1990 the applicant stated, inter alia, that her husband had been unrecognisable when she saw him at Trabzon Hospital. She filed a complaint against the first doctor who had examined him in Artvin and who had drawn up a certificate, which, according to her, was untruthful, concealing C.A.’s condition. 35.  By a decision of 30 January 1991 the Assize Court sentenced both of the accused to four years and two months’ imprisonment under Articles 243 § 2 and 452 § 2 of the Criminal Code. They were also banned from public office for the same period. 36.  On an appeal by the accused, the Court of Cassation overturned that decision in a judgment of 10 July 1991 on grounds of shortcomings in the investigation. An inconsistency between the leave dates of the accused needed to be resolved and verification was required that the dates on which the witnesses and C.A. had been detained actually did coincide. 37.  After having remedied the shortcomings highlighted by the Court of Cassation, the Assize Court decided, on 16 September 1992, to acquit both of the accused on grounds of insufficient evidence. 38.  The applicant appealed on points of law against that decision. 39.  By a judgment of 6 July 1993, the Court of Cassation overturned the decision on the ground that under Article 253 of the [Turkish] Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused, who were officers at the material time, could not be tried without authorisation from the Ministry of Justice. 40.  By a decision of 19 January 1994, the Assize Court suspended the proceedings for the same reason. 41.  The authorisation in question having been granted by the Ministry of Justice on 24 November 1994, a new indictment was issued on the following 7 December in respect of the same two accused, this time by the Public Prosecutor at the Ardahan Assize Court. 42.  During these proceedings, around twenty hearings were held. As they had done previously, the accused denied any responsibility in the death of C.A., stating that they had never taken part in his interrogation. F.I stated that on the day in question he had been involved in operations in the Şavşat and Ardanuç mountains, and M.C. stated that he had been on leave. The same witnesses (see paragraph 33 above) were examined again, some following a request for judicial assistance, and repeated the statements made at the start of the proceedings. 43.  On 30 December 1997 the Ardahan Assize Court delivered its judgment, referring in particular to the testimony of the co-detainees who had been present at Artvin police station at the same time as C.A. Four of these witnesses stated that they had seen C.A. naked, attached to the radiator, wet and trembling, with injuries to his hands and wrists. Two of them stated that officer F.I. had threatened them, pointing at C.A. and saying “Look at what has happened to him; if you don’t sign, the same thing will happen to you.”  A detainee who had been in the neighbouring cell stated that he had heard C.A. moaning constantly, that in the evenings they would take him away for questioning naked, and that officers M.C. and F.I. and three men in civilian clothing would beat him in the middle of the room as a lesson to the others. Another witness stated that he had seen F.I. and others beat C.A. with truncheons while he was lying on the ground in a pool of water, all the while continuing to spray him with water. He stated that he had heard the sound of a magneto (a magneto-electric machine) and the delirious voice of C.A. uttering the names of his children, unable to walk, his body covered in wounds. These eyewitnesses stated that they had generally had their eyes covered but that sometimes the blindfold had come off, or they had recognized the officers’ voices. Four other detainee witnesses stated that they had seen that the applicant had been tortured, but did not know who had done it. The court considered that the testimony of the co-detainees was only partially credible given their status as detainees and the fact that they would normally have had their eyes covered. In the reasons for the judgment, the court observed that the leave records relating to M.C. kept by the gendarmerie command had been falsified and declared that his statements were not credible. As for F.I., the court pointed out an inconsistency between his statement of 31 August 1983 (see paragraph 19 above) and his subsequent statements. According to the court, the accused were indirectly responsible for the death of C.A. It added that “a team of three civilians” had also taken part in the interrogations, but gave no details of the identity, function or action of these three individuals. It concluded that it had not been definitively established that the accused had themselves tortured the deceased but that they had acted as accomplices to the illegal act by issuing orders (talimat vermek), by procuring the premises (yer tedarik etmek) and by failing to intervene [to prevent the illegal act] (göz yummak). It found that the accused, together with civilians, had participated in the interrogation of C.A. and that the latter had died as a result of his pre-existing condition (önceki hastalığı) and as a result of the torture inflicted by one or more of these civilians whose identity could not be established. The court sentenced M.C. and F.I. to two years and one month’s imprisonment under Articles 243 and 452 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The court accepted two mitigating circumstances to reduce the sentences: the personality of the accused as evidenced by the case file (dosyadaki kişilikleri) and the fact that they were mere accomplices (fer’î fail) rather than the main perpetrators of the crime. 44.  The accused officers and the applicant appealed on points of law. 45.  By a judgment of 22 December 1998, the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Assize Court. 46.  On 28 January 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected an application for “rectification of the judgment” (karar düzeltme) lodged by the convicted officers. 47.  On 6 April 1999 the officers applied to the Assize Court for renewal of the judgment (yargılamanın yenilenmesi), an exceptional review procedure. The result of this application, accepted by the Assize Court for consideration on the basis of various written testimonies submitted by civilians and military personnel and a letter from the General Gendarmerie command, was that execution of the sentences was suspended. 48.  At the request of the accused, the Assize Court gave a decision on 12 January 2001 referring a matter concerning the discriminatory nature of a provision governing the content of an amnesty law to the Constitutional Court. 49.  By a decision of 18 July 2001, the Constitutional Court declared that the provision in question was by no means unconstitutional. 50.  By a judgment of 23 October 2002, after having heard new defence witnesses, notably six officers, the Ardahan Assize Court dismissed the application lodged by the two officers on the ground that the new evidence was not such as to create a favourable situation for the convicted officers. It lifted the stay of execution of their sentences. 51.  The officers finally referred their case to the Minister of Justice for the latter to lodge an appeal with the Court of Cassation (Yazılı emir ile bozma) against their conviction. Having accepted their application, on 8 January 2003 the Minister of Justice ordered the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to lodge an appeal in the interests of the law on the ground that the evidence had not been properly assessed by the Assize Court. 52.  By a judgment of 30 January 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the officers’ application. 53.  The officers continued to serve in the army throughout the proceedings until their retirement. Their sentences have not been executed to date.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  On 11 March 1997 the applicant acquired a car – a Renault 21 Nevada - at an auction organised by the Białystok Tax Office. Having subsequently had certain technical defects of the car repaired, the applicant applied to the Białystok Municipal Office for registration. On an unspecified date the Director of the Office refused to do so on the ground that the car was unfit for use and could therefore be used only as scrap-metal. After numerous entreaties of the applicant, the Director orally agreed to register the car on condition that the applicant replaced the engine and a part of the chassis. On 17 March 1997 the applicant requested the Białystok Tax Office to reimburse the costs involved in the acquisition of the new engine and chassis. On 15 April 1997 the Białystok Tax Office declined the applicant’s request on unspecified grounds. Subsequently, the applicant ordered a new engine and chassis and made an advance payment in the amount of PLN 3000. 10.  On 20 March 1997 the applicant was served with a decision of the Director of the Białystok Municipal Office refusing his request to register the car. The Director referred to the fact that the identification numbers of the engine and chassis had been forged and that that it was therefore impossible to find out who had owned car before its acquisition by the applicant. Therefore, the car could not be considered as a “recovered stolen car” within the meaning of the Annex No. 7 to the ministerial Order of 12 October 1995 (§ 28 below), which was a prerequisite for obtaining new identification numbers. On 23 April 1997 the Białystok Governor upheld the contested decision on the same grounds. 11.  In a letter of 5 May 1997 the Warsaw-Śródmieście District Prosecutor expressed regret for the administrative authority’s refusal to register the applicant’s car and remarked on the lack of consistency in the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the authorities handling the applicant’s case. He also suggested that the applicant request the prosecuting authorities, in their capacity as guardians of legal order, to join administrative proceedings on his behalf.\nOn 7 May 1997 the Białystok Municipal Office informed the applicant that pursuant to the relevant regulations a car of unknown origin could not be registered. 12.  On 3 July 1997 the Białystok District Prosecutor refused to institute proceedings against the public servants who had issued the administrative decisions in the applicant’s case, finding that they had no case to answer. 13.  In reply to the applicant’s request, on 27 August 1997 the Ombudsman refused to act on his behalf, considering that the law only allowed new identification numbers to be engraved and the registration to be obtained on conditions which were not met in the applicant’s case. 14.  On 8 September 1997 the Warszawa-Śródmieście District Prosecutor informed the applicant that the car in question, being “the subject of a criminal offence”, had been handed over to the Białystok Tax Office on the basis of a decision concerning exhibits, with a view to selling it at an auction under §§ 1 and 4 of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 March 1971 (§ 27 below). 15.  On 2 October 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 20 March 1997 and 23 April 1997. It found that the administrative authorities had failed to provide any reasons for their refusal of registration. In respect of the new chassis and engine identification numbers, the court noted that a conclusion as to whether “the stolen car has been recovered” had to be based on the final decision given either in the investigative or in the judicial proceedings. 16.  By a decision of 13 February 1998 the Białystok Municipal Office stayed the proceedings concerning the permit to engrave new car identification numbers until the question whether the car had been “recovered” within the meaning of the applicable law was settled. 17.  By a letter of 17 March 1998 to the Białystok Municipal Office, the Warsaw-Śródmieście District Prosecutor expressed the opinion that, in view of the fact that the Białystok Tax Office had been the legitimate vendor and the applicant, who had purchased the car in good faith, was its legitimate owner, there was no reason for a further delay in registering the car. In reply, the Białystok Municipal Office informed the prosecutor on 31 March 1998 that there was no possibility of registering a vehicle of unknown origin, that is, one lacking original factory numbers. 18.  In a letter to the applicant dated 7 May 1998 the Białystok Appellate Prosecutor considered that there were no grounds on which disciplinary proceedings could be instituted against the Białystok prosecutors. All the same, he acknowledged that the case was “a complex one.” It could not be denied that the applicant was a legitimate owner of the car which he had purchased from a legitimate vendor. In the prosecutor’s view, the difficulty in registering the car stemmed from deficiencies in the legal provisions in specifying the necessary conditions that had to be fulfilled for a car to be registered. These conditions were defined by the Regulation of the Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy of 1 February 1993 (§ 27 below). He further observed that, according to the Supreme Administrative Court’s opinion expressed in the judgment of 2 October 1997, a final decision given either in the investigative or in the judicial proceedings, stating that the car had been stolen, should provide a sufficient basis for its registration (§ 15 above). 19.  On 29 May 1998 the Białystok District Prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for instituting criminal proceedings against the public servants at the Białystok Municipal Office, because it had not been shown that when acting in the applicant’s case they had abused their powers. As for the charge of lack of diligence, this could not be proceeded with, given that the applicant had not suffered pecuniary damage which was sufficiently serious, that is in an amount exceeding 50 average salaries.\nOn the same date the Białystok District Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim against the State Treasury for a declaratory judgment. The court considered that the applicant’s ownership was not in dispute. Nonetheless, the claim to establish that the car met the legal requirements for its registration could not be examined by a civil court. This would constitute an unacceptable way of controlling the lawfulness of an administrative decision, and it was only the Supreme Administrative Court which had jurisdiction to do so. 20.  On 15 June 1998 the Białystok Regional Prosecutor requested the Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy to consider the possibility of granting the applicant, by way of exception, a permit for engraving new car identification numbers. It was argued that in all likelihood the car had been stolen by someone in obscure circumstances to the detriment of an unknown person and subsequently handed over to the tax office to be sold. The fact that the applicant could not be granted the permit to have new car identification numbers engraved had adversely affected his property rights in a manner which, given the circumstances of the case, could not be accepted. This request was later refused by a decision of 24 November 1998. 21.  By a decision of 6 August 1998 the Białystok Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 May 1998 given by the Białystok District Court (§ 19 above), considering that since the applicant had not specified his claim, the question whether the civil courts had jurisdiction to entertain his case remained open.\nBy a decision of 14 October 1998 the Białystok District Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim on the same grounds as those relied on in its first decision of 29 May 1998. 22.  On 17 December 1998 the Białystok District Court dismissed the applicant’s new claim against the State Treasury for a declaratory judgment, considering that a claimant in declaratory civil proceedings could request the court to determine the existence of a right or of a legal relationship, but that it was not open to the claimant to seek findings of fact in such proceedings. 23.  On 23 January 1999 the Warsaw District Prosecutor discontinued the proceedings, instituted at the applicant’s request, concerning the theft of the car and the forging of its identification numbers, on the ground that the perpetrator of the offence was unknown.\nBy a decision of 8 March 1999 the Białystok Municipal Office refused the Białystok Regional Prosecutor’s request to resume the stayed proceedings concerning the permit for engraving new car identification numbers (§ 16 above), considering that the original factory car numbers had not been conclusively established. On 18 March 1999 the Białystok Regional Prosecutor lodged an appeal against this decision with the Regional Self-government Board of Appeal, submitting that since a preliminary question concerning the theft of the car had already been determined, the administrative authority was obliged to register the car. By a decision of 22 March 1999 the Board allowed the appeal and quashed this decision. 24.  On 15 April 1999 the Białystok Municipal Office again refused to grant the applicant a permit for engraving new identification numbers, concluding that the car could not be considered “recovered by the owner or by an insurance company” since its factory numbers and the original owner had not been established in the course of the investigation. The applicant and the Białystok Regional Prosecutor appealed. The Prosecutor, in his appeal of 5 May 1999, referring to the failure to establish the original owner of the car and its factory numbers, expressed the opinion that the Annex No. 7 to the Order of the Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy of 12 October 1995 did not lay down such a requirement for registration and that therefore the first-instance organ had failed to interpret it correctly. 25.  On 3 July 1999 the Białystok Self-government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and referred the case back to the first-instance organ for re-examination, observing that the request should be examined in the light of a new legal situation which had in the meantime changed as a new Regulation had been enacted (see § 29 below). 26.  By a decision of 19 July 1999 the Białystok Municipal Office consented to the engraving of new car identification numbers and, as a consequence, registered the applicant’s car.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Zlatar. 5.  In July 1991 the applicant had a road traffic accident. Since the insurance company C.O. (“the company”) refused to compensate the resultant damage, on 8 July 1992 she instituted civil proceedings against it in the Zlatar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zlataru). 6.  On 15 March 1993 the Municipal Court ruled in the applicant's favour ordering the company to pay her the amount of 222,501 Croatian dinars (HRD) together with the statutory default interest accruable from 19 August 1991. The applicant collected the judgment debt on 16 July 1993. 7.  However, in the meantime, on 2 July 1993 the Municipal Court issued a decision rectifying a clerical error in its judgment of 15 March 1993. Instead of ordering the company to pay the statutory default interest accruable from 19 August 1991 on the entire amount of damages awarded, (HRD 222,501), in the rectified judgment the court ordered the company to do so only on the part of that amount, namely HRD 22,501, which was the amount awarded in respect of pecuniary damage. The company was ordered to pay the accrued interest on the remaining amount of HRD 200,000 only with effect from 15 March 1993. 8.  The decision on rectification was served on the applicant's representative on 26 July 1993. 9.  On 10 September 1993 judge M.M., who was at the time the President of the Zlatar Municipal Court, filed a criminal complaint against the applicant with the Zlatar Municipal State Attorney's Office considering that she had committed a criminal offence. M.M. stated in his complaint that at the beginning of July 1993 a certain Z.F.C., a lawyer employed with the insurance company C.O., had come to his office explaining the clerical error in the Municipal Court's judgment of 15 March 1993 and asking him to influence the applicant – who was working at the time as an advocate – with a view to returning the unlawfully obtained amount. After explaining the error and mentioning that it had been rectified by the Municipal Court's decision of 2 July 1993, judge M.M. stated:\n“... despite the rectification of the judgment, the advocate Marija Parlov-Tkalčić, to date does not want to return the unlawfully appropriated money to [the company] C.O., Zabok, for which reason the civil proceedings no. P-330/93 were instituted [against her].\nSince we consider that the act of the advocate Marija Parlov-Tkalčić also contains elements of criminal liability, we are reporting it to you with a view to investigating it and, possibly, instituting criminal proceedings against her ...” 10.  On 15 September 1993 the Zlatar Municipal State Attorney requested transfer of jurisdiction because he was a friend of the applicant. On 22 September 1993 the case was transferred to the Krapina Municipal State Attorney who, on 24 January 1994 indicted the applicant before the Zlatar Municipal Court charging her with a criminal offence of misappropriation (utaja). 11.  However, on 3 February 1994 the judge assigned to hear the case requested that the case be transferred to another court as its president had actually filed a criminal complaint against the applicant. On 8 March 1994 the Supreme Court (decision no. Kr-103/1994-3) granted the request and decided to transfer the case to the Krapina Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Krapini). The decision in its relevant part read as follows:\nThe ... judge [assigned to hear the case] of the Zlatar Municipal Court made a request that the criminal proceedings ... against Marija Parlov-Tkalčić ... be conducted before the Krapina Municipal Court.\nThe request is substantiated by the fact that the accused Marija Parlov-Tkalčić is an advocate with her office in Zlatar and that the criminal complaint against her was filed by the president of the Zlatar Municipal Court, which may objectively cast doubt on the impartial administration of justice if the proceedings are to be conducted before the Zlatar Municipal Court.\nThe request is well-founded.\nThe circumstances highlighted in the request of the ... judge [assigned to hear the case] constitute in the present instance important reasons within the meaning of section 31(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act for transferring territorial jurisdiction from the Zlatar Municipal Court to the Krapina Municipal Court ... 12.  On 28 November 1997 the Krapina Municipal Court dismissed the charges against the applicant given that the prosecution for the offence she had been charged with had in the meantime become time-barred (apsolutna zastara). 13.  Meanwhile, on 26 August 1993 the insurance company C.O. brought a civil action for unjust enrichment against the applicant in the Zlatar Municipal Court seeking to recover the overpaid interest. The statement of claim was served on the applicant on 7 September 1993. 14.  On 25 April 1997 the applicant made a counter-claim. 15.  The court held hearings on 29 April and 2 December 1999 and 29 March and 5 July 2000. 16.  At the last-mentioned hearing the Zlatar Municipal Court gave judgment against the applicant, ordering her to pay the plaintiff 12,525 Croatian kunas (HRK) together with the statutory default interest accruable from 26 July 1993, as well as HRK 4,381.25 in costs. It also declared her counter-claim inadmissible in one part while dismissing it in the remaining part. 17.  On 11 January 2001 the applicant appealed to the Zlatar County Court (Županijski sud u Zlataru) asking at the same time for transfer of jurisdiction (svrsishodna delegacija nadležnosti) from both the Zlatar Municipal Court and the Zlatar County Court. She argued, inter alia, that the Zlatar County Court could not be expected to be impartial in the examination of her appeal given that judge M.M. – who had in the meantime become the president of that court – had previously filed a criminal complaint against her. 18.  The Government submitted that judge M.M. had been appointed the president of the Zlatar County Court on 14 June 1996 but that this court had become operational only on 15 March 1999. 19.  On 31 May 2001 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant's request for transfer of jurisdiction. It held that the circumstances relied on by the applicant did not cast doubt on the professional and objective examination of her appeal by the Zlatar County Court. Thus, there was no important reason justifying the requested transfer. 20.  On 16 March 2005 the Zlatar County Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. The decision was served on the applicant on 20 April 2005. 21.  On 20 May 2005 the applicant lodged a regular constitutional complaint under section 62 of the Constitutional Court Act against the second-instance judgment. Relying on Article 29 of the Constitution, she claimed, inter alia, that her constitutional right to an impartial court had been violated because the impugned judgment had been delivered by the court whose president had previously filed a criminal complaint against her relying on the same facts as those relied on by the first- and second-instance courts when giving their decisions. On 3 November 2005 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed her constitutional complaint. The decision was served on the applicant on 21 December 2005. 22.  Meanwhile, on 27 January 2005 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act complaining about the length of the above civil proceedings for unjust enrichment. The Constitutional Court examined the length of the proceedings in the period during which they were pending before the ordinary courts thus excluding the period of some seven months while the case was pending before the Constitutional Court itself (see paragraph 21 above). On 15 February 2006 it found a violation of the applicant's constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded her HRK 5,000 in compensation. 23.  According to information provided by the Government in reply to a request made by the Court, the Zlatar County Court has a civil and a criminal division. The civil division has six judges sitting in two different panels. The president of the court sits on one of the panels. The criminal division has three judges, and judges of the civil division sit with them when necessary. The cases are assigned to judges according to Rule 33 of the Court Rules (see paragraph 40 below). Thus, before being allocated to judges, cases are listed in chronological order according to the time when they were received at the court. After that, cases are allocated to judges in the alphabetical order of the panel presidents' last names. However, account is being taken of whether some of the judges participated in the first-instance proceedings in a particular case. If they did, the case is not assigned to them.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Chelyabinsk. The second applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Moscow. 7.  On 10 January 1995 the first applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence and remanded in custody. 8.  By a judgment of 23 June 1998 the applicant was convicted at first instance on a charge of murder and several counts of theft and fraud and sentenced to death. On 20 December 1999 his conviction was upheld on appeal, but the death sentence was commuted to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 9.  On the date of his latest correspondence with the Court, the first applicant was serving a sentence of imprisonment in penitentiary facility YuK-25/1 in Orenburg. 10.  On 20 January 1995 the second applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence and remanded in custody. 11.  On 27 November 1995 the second applicant was convicted at first instance and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal on 19 June 1996. 12.  In another set of criminal proceedings, on 13 November 1998 the second applicant was convicted of murder, aggravated robbery, participation in an organised criminal group and resistance to police officers and sentenced to death. On 15 February 2000 his conviction was upheld on appeal, but the death sentence was commuted to fifteen years’ imprisonment, of which fourteen were to be served in prison and the last year in a correctional facility. 13.  On 23 April 2008 the second applicant was released from prison on parole. 14.  The first and second applicants were kept in pre-trial detention centres from 10 January 1995 to 20 December 1999 and from 20 January 1995 to 22 March 2000 respectively. During those periods the first applicant voted twice in parliamentary elections and the second applicant voted several times in parliamentary and presidential elections and in regional elections of an executive official. 15.  On an unspecified date the first applicant was transferred to a penitentiary facility to serve his prison sentence. Since that date he has been debarred, as a convicted prisoner, from participating in any elections pursuant to Article 32 § 3 of the Russian Constitution (“the Constitution”). 16.  On 22 March 2000 the second applicant was transferred to a prison to continue serving his sentence. From that date, and until his release from prison on 23 April 2008, the second applicant was debarred from voting in elections under the provisions of the aforementioned Article. 17.  In particular, the applicants were ineligible to vote in the elections of members of the State Duma – the lower chamber of the Russian parliament – held on 7 December 2003 and 2 December 2007 and in the presidential elections of 26 March 2000, 14 March 2004 and 2 March 2008. The second applicant was also unable to vote in additional parliamentary elections held in the electoral constituency of his home address on 5 December 2004. 18.  Both applicants challenged, at various times, the aforementioned constitutional provision before the Russian Constitutional Court (“the Constitutional Court”) stating that it violated a number of their constitutional rights. 19.  In letters of 15 March and 6 April 2004, sent to the first and second applicants respectively, the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court replied that the applicants’ complaints fell outside the Constitutional Court’s competence and therefore had no prospects of success. 20.  The second applicant appealed against that decision to the President of the Constitutional Court. 21.  By a decision of 27 May 2004 the Constitutional Court declined to accept the second applicant’s complaint for examination, stating that it had no jurisdiction to check whether certain constitutional provisions were compatible with others. 22.  On 19 July 2004 the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court forwarded the court’s decision to the second applicant. In a letter of 5 August 2004 a regional office of the Department of Execution of Sentences sent the Secretariat’s letter of 19 July 2004 to the second applicant’s prison. According to the second applicant, this correspondence, including the decision of 19 July 2004, was delivered to him on 1 September 2004. 23.  The second applicant then repeatedly brought court proceedings against election commissions at various levels complaining of their refusals to allow him to vote in parliamentary and presidential elections. His complaints were rejected either on formal grounds or on the merits. Final decisions were taken by the appellate courts on 1 December 2007 and 3 April, 5 May, 4 June and 29 September 2008. The domestic courts mainly referred to Article 32 § 3 of the Constitution and the fact that the second applicant was a convicted prisoner, and stated that the domestic law debarred him from voting in elections. In its decision of 1 December 2007 the Lipetsk Regional Court also held as follows:\n“In the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights dated 6 October 2005 in the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom the applicant’s disenfranchisement on account of his serving a sentence of imprisonment was found to be in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention.\nThe European Court noted in that judgment that prisoners in general continued to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention save for the right to liberty, where lawfully imposed detention expressly falls within the scope of Article 5 of the Convention.\nIt was also pointed out that a blanket statutory disenfranchisement of all convicted prisoners in prisons (of the United Kingdom) applies automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.\n... The Russian Federation accepts ... as binding the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights regarding questions of interpretation and application of the Convention and its Protocols in situations of alleged violations of those legal instruments by the Russian Federation where the alleged violation has taken place after their entry into force in respect of the Russian Federation.\nHowever, the aforementioned judgment of the European Court does not allow a conclusion to be reached as to the unreasonableness of restrictions on electoral rights established in the legislation of the Russian Federation in respect of individuals serving a sentence of imprisonment after their conviction by a court.\nApart from the foregoing, the said judgment of the European Court provides that any restrictions on other rights of prisoners (save for the right to liberty) must be justified, although such justification may well be found in considerations of security, in particular the prevention of crime and disorder, which inevitably flow from the circumstances of imprisonment.\nAlso, it is noted that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the individual’s capacity to influence the composition of the law-making power, does not therefore exclude that restrictions on electoral rights could be imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations. The severe measure of disenfranchisement must not, however, be resorted to lightly and the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned.\nTherefore, without ruling out the very possibility of restricting electoral rights of convicted prisoners, the European Court attaches decisive weight to the proportionality and reasonableness of establishing this measure in law.\nThe criteria which the European Court has considered as decisive when determining a question of proportionality of, and justification for, limiting electoral rights of convicted prisoners – the nature and seriousness of their offence and their individual circumstances – were taken into account when [the second applicant’s] punishment was chosen, in accordance with provisions of the [Russian] legislation which were not analysed in the aforementioned judgment.\nAccording to [a relevant provision] of the Russian Penitentiary Code, it is individuals convicted of particularly serious offences, or of particularly serious repeat offences, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding five years ... who serve their sentence in prison.\nIt should also be noted that, in accordance with Article 10 § 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, the penitentiary system must comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which must be their reformation and social rehabilitation.\n[A relevant provision] of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure also lists the reform of a convicted prisoner as one of the aims of punishment, together with the prevention of further crimes.\nTherefore, taking into account the aforementioned criteria, [it can be concluded that] the temporary (for the period of imprisonment) restriction of the electoral rights established in the legislation of the Russian Federation in respect of individuals serving a sentence of imprisonment is, from its inception, reasonable, justified and in the public interest, being a preventive measure aimed at reforming convicted prisoners and deterring them from committing crimes and breaching public order in the future, including in the period when elections are held.\nThe same [reasoning] applies to the restriction of [the second applicant’s] electoral rights.” 24.  The second applicant also attempted to bring proceedings complaining of the refusal of the head of a local election commission to give him copies of certain documents. 25.  On 27 December 2007 the Lipetsk Regional Court returned the second applicant’s claim, stating that it should be lodged with a lower court. 26.  On 4 June 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 27.  In his first letter to the Court dated 16 February 2004, and dispatched, as is clear from the postmark, on 17 February 2004, the first applicant described the circumstances of his case and complained about his disenfranchisement and inability to vote in a number of elections held in Russia. He later reproduced this in an application form of 30 April 2004, which was received by the Court on 23 June 2004. 28.  The second applicant complained about his disenfranchisement and inability to vote in elections in an application form which he dated 29 December 2004 and which, as is clear from the postmark, he sent on 27 February 2005. The Court received the application form on 30 March 2005. 29.  Subsequently, the applicants updated their applications referring to new elections in which they were still ineligible to vote.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": true, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first two applicants, Urszula and Czesław Grzelak, were born in 1969 and 1965 respectively. They are married and live in Sobótka. They are the parents of Mateusz Grzelak (“the third applicant”), who was born in 1991. The first two applicants are declared agnostics. 7.  The third applicant began his schooling in primary school no. 3 in Ostrów Wielkopolski in 1998 (at the age of seven). In conformity with the wishes of his parents he did not attend religious instruction. It appears that he was the only pupil in his class who opted out of that subject. Religious instruction was scheduled in the middle of the school day, between various compulsory courses. The school, despite the wish expressed by the first two applicants, did not offer their son an alternative class in ethics. It appears that when other pupils in his class were following religious instruction the applicants' son was either left without any supervision in the corridor or spent his time in the school library or in the school club. 8.  The Government, for their part, maintained that appropriate supervision had been provided for Mateusz Grzelak while religious instruction classes were in progress. The school had a general obligation of care and supervision towards all pupils who were on its premises at any time. 9.  According to the first two applicants, their son was subjected to discrimination and physical and psychological harassment by other pupils on account of the fact that he did not follow religious instruction. For that reason, in the course of the third year of primary school the applicants moved their son to primary school no. 9 and subsequently to primary school no. 11 in the same town. 10.  On 11 April 2001, when their son was in the third year of primary school, the applicants sent a letter to the headmistress of primary school no. 9 in Ostrów Wielkopolski. They drew her attention to the fact that their son had been ridiculed and harassed by other pupils in the class. They stated that their son was being discriminated against by the majority of his classmates because he did not attend religious education classes. The applicants requested the assistance of the school in resolving the issue. 11.  According to the Government, the applicants did not wait for a reply to their letter of 11 April 2001 and moved their son to primary school no. 11. In a letter of 26 June 2001 the headmistress of primary school no. 9 explained that Mateusz Grzelak had attended that school from 23 October 2000 to 19 April 2001. She noted that he had frequently provoked his colleagues by mocking religious symbols and children who attended religious instruction. The class tutor had informed Mr and Mrs Grzelak about their son's behaviour but they had not responded. The headmistress explained further that the school did not ask for a written declaration as to children's attendance at religious instruction. It sufficed for a parent who did not wish for his or her child to attend religious instruction to report that fact to the class tutor. 12.  The Government further maintained that Mr and Mrs Grzelak had requested primary school no. 11 to provide their son with a course in ethics. According to the Government, the headmistress of that school had contacted the Poznań Education Authority (kuratorium oświaty) to establish whether it was possible to provide such a course for an inter-school group. Since that was not possible owing to the lack of sufficient numbers of interested pupils and parents, the school proposed to the third applicant that he participate in alternative classes in the school club or school library. It appears that the applicants did not report any problems to the school concerning their son's education. 13.  On 1 May 2001 the applicants sent a letter to the Minister of Education, stating that since the beginning of their son's education they had encountered religious intolerance and that the school authorities had failed to react. They put a number of questions to the Minister concerning the Ordinance on the organisation of religious instruction in State schools (see relevant domestic law and practice below). In particular, the applicants raised the following matters in their letter: 3.  Why should children like the applicants' son pass their time unproductively in the school club while other children were attending religious instruction or when the schools were closed for Lent retreat? 4.  Did the fact that a child had a straight line instead of a mark for “religion/ethics” on a school report indicate that the Ordinance of 14 April 1992 of the Minister of Education on the organisation of religious instruction in State schools (“the Ordinance”) infringed the Education Act and human rights instruments? 14.  On 29 May 2001 the Ministry of Education replied to the applicants. In respect of the issues raised by the applicants it informed them as follows:\nRe question 1: Religious instruction and courses in ethics were organised at the parents' request, and where a declaration to that effect was asked for, it was for organisational reasons only.\nRe question 2: If only one pupil was interested in following a course in ethics, then the school authorities should enquire whether it would be possible to follow that course in an inter-school group. If in a given municipality there was no such group, then the school had to arrange for supervision of the pupil during the religious education class.\nRe question 3: In the case referred to above the school should organise other activities for pupils not following religious instruction or supervise them adequately by allowing them to do their homework or to use the library, etc.\nRe question 4: Paragraph 9 of the Ordinance regulated the manner in which marks for “religion/ethics” were entered in school reports. That provision had been interpreted by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 20 April 1993 (see relevant domestic law and practice below). The Constitutional Court had noted that the inclusion of marks for “religion/ethics” in a school report was a consequence of providing courses in those subjects in State schools. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court observed that this rule did not breach the right to freedom of conscience and religion.\nRe question 5: Discrimination against pupils on the ground of their not having attended religious instruction amounted to a breach of the Ordinance and should be reported to the relevant education authorities. 15.  The applicants also applied to the Ombudsman on 14 June 2001, alleging that in their son's case Articles 53 § 7 and 31 § 2 of the Constitution, Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention and various other provisions had been breached. The Ombudsman replied that he could not challenge the Ordinance again following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 20 April 1993. The problems raised in their letter had more to do with the inappropriate behaviour of some teachers and pupils than the law itself. 16.  On 17 October 2001 the applicants sent a letter to the President of the Republic. They requested him to amend the Ordinance with a view to providing guarantees for non-religious children. On 6 November 2001 the President's Office requested the Ministry of Education to reply to the applicants' letter. 17.  On 10 December 2001 the Ministry of Education confirmed its position as set out in the letter of 29 May 2001. In addition to the issues already addressed, the Ministry replied to the applicants' complaint concerning the obligation to make a declaration as to whether the child would follow religious instruction. The Ministry informed the applicants that the school authorities could not require parents to make a “negative declaration”, that is, a declaration that their child would not follow religious instruction. Such a practice would contravene the provisions of the Ordinance and should be reported to the education authorities. The Ministry further informed the applicants that the parents' declaration could not be understood as a declaration concerning their beliefs. 18.  The applicants submitted that they had made repeated requests to the school authorities, asking for their son to be allowed to follow a course in ethics instead of religious instruction. However, none of the primary schools attended by their son had provided a course in ethics. The refusals had been based on the lack of suitable teachers, financial reasons and insufficient numbers of pupils interested in following a course in ethics. 19.  In September 2004 the third applicant began his secondary education. 20.  On 16 July 2009 Mr and Mrs Grzelak complained to the Poznań Education Authority (kuratorium oświaty) that their son had not been offered a course in ethics at Ostrów Wielkopolski secondary school no. 2. Their petition (skarga) was referred to the Ostrów District (powiat) which, as the authority responsible for the school, was competent in the matter. On 27 August 2009 the Council of the Ostrów District dismissed the petition as unfounded. It found that Mateusz Grzelak was the only student in all the schools run by the Ostrów District whose parents wished him to follow a class in ethics. Accordingly, the conditions for the provision of such a class, as set out in the Ordinance, had not been met.\nSchool reports of the third applicant 21.  The school report of the third applicant for the first three years of primary school contained three subjects: behaviour (zachowanie), religion/ethics and general education. In the place reserved for a mark for “religion/ethics” the school report had a straight line. 22.  The school report for the fourth year contained a list of courses that the third applicant had followed, including “religion/ethics”. Once again, there was a straight line against the subject “religion/ethics”. 23.  In the school report for the fifth year in respect of the subject “religion/ethics” there was a straight line and the word ethics was crossed out. A similar situation applied to the primary school leaving certificate which the third applicant obtained in June 2004. 24.  In September 2004 the third applicant began his secondary education in lower secondary school (gimnazjum) no. 4 in Ostrów Wielkopolski. His school reports for the first two years at that school and the leaving certificate of June 2007 had a straight line in the space for “religion/ethics”. 25.  In September 2007 the third applicant began studying at Ostrów Wielkopolski secondary school no. 2 (liceum). On 4 September 2007 his parents requested the school to allow him to take a class in ethics, but it appears that no such class was organised. The school reports for the first and second year in that school had a straight line in the space for the subject “religion/ethics”. The third applicant failed German language in the second year of the liceum and from the school year 2009/2010 he moved to the Ostrów Wielkopolski vocational secondary school.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": true, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Baku. 6.  The applicant stood for the elections to the Milli Majlis (Parliament) of 6 November 2005 as a candidate of the opposition bloc Azadliq, a coalition formed for electoral purposes by the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, with which the applicant was affiliated, together with a number of other opposition parties. He was registered as a candidate by the Constituency Electoral Commission (“the ConEC”) for the single-mandate Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93. 7.  The constituency was divided into forty-two electoral precincts, with one polling station in each precinct. There were a total of eighteen candidates running for election in this constituency. The applicant was the only candidate nominated by Azadliq in that constituency. 8.  According to the ConEC protocol drawn up after election day, one of the applicant's opponents, Z.O., a member of the Motherland Party, obtained the highest number of votes cast in the constituency. Specifically, according to the ConEC protocol, Z.O. received 5,816 votes (41.25%), the applicant received 2,001 votes (14.19%), and a third candidate received 1,821 votes (12.92%). The total number of votes cast for each of the remaining candidates was substantially lower. 9.  On 7 and 8 November 2005 the applicant submitted identical complaints to the ConEC and the Central Electoral Commission (“the CEC”), in which he claimed, inter alia, that:\n(i)  the local executive and municipal authorities, as well as heads of state‑funded institutions and organisations, interfered in the election process in favour of Z.O. prior to and during election day (in the form of openly campaigning in his favour and coercing voters to vote for him);\n(ii)  Z.O.'s supporters (mostly State officials of various sorts) intimidated voters and otherwise attempted to influence voter choice in polling stations;\n(iii)  in several polling stations, observers were harassed or excluded from the voting area by the police;\n(iv)  some citizens residing in relevant election precincts were unable to exercise their right to vote due to the authorities' failure to include them in relevant voters lists; and\n(v)  there were instances of multiple voting and ballot-box stuffing in different polling stations. 10.  In support of his claims, the applicant submitted to the CEC originals of more than 30 affidavits (akt) of election observers, audio tapes and other evidence documenting specific instances of irregularities complained of. Some examples of the evidence presented are summarised below. 11.  The ten-minute audio recording contained interviews with a number of unidentified voters, who stated, inter alia, that prior to election day directors of governmental institutions and public organisations (such as public schools and libraries) located on the territory of the constituency had held staff meetings with the specific purpose of instructing their staff to vote for Z.O., threatening them with salary cuts if Z.O. did not win the election. 12.  In an affidavit signed by them, seven observers in Polling Station no. 1 stated, inter alia, that twenty-five voters had voted twice, however the chairman of the Precinct Electoral Commission (“the PEC”) for this polling station had taken no action when this matter was brought to his attention. 13.  Seven observers in Polling Station no. 11 noted, inter alia, that the director of a public school where the polling station was located had openly intervened in the election process and interfered with the functions of the PEC without any objection by PEC members. Also, the same school director instructed a police officer to forcibly exclude one of the observers from the polling station. 14.  Three observers in Polling Station no. 14 noted, inter alia, that a certain named State official had actively interfered in the election process by openly campaigning in favour of Z.O. on the premises of the polling station, asked voters to vote for him and brought groups of unregistered voters to the polling station to vote for Z.O. 15.  Eight observers in Polling Station no. 16 witnessed one incident of ballot-box stuffing by a PEC member. 16.  An affidavit signed by six observers and candidates' representatives in Polling Station no. 31 stated that, at 7 p.m., when the vote-counting began, all of the observers had been forced out of the polling station premises by the police on the instruction of the PEC chairman. In the absence of the observers, a few hundred false ballots were illegally added into Z.O.'s total vote count in the polling station. According to a separate affidavit signed by observers from the same polling station, the PEC chairman and representatives of the executive and municipal authorities interfered in the election process and instructed voters to vote for Z.O. According to another affidavit, there were also several irregularities in the voter lists in this polling station. 17.  Three observers in Polling Station no. 41 noted, inter alia, that commission members had illegally added several additional ballots during the vote-counting. 18.  In their affidavits, observers from Polling Stations nos. 7, 12, 13, 15, 29, 30 and 37 documented similar incidents of alleged illegal campaigning in favour of Z.O., ballot-box stuffing and other forms of tampering with ballots, and irregularities with voter lists. A number of observers also noted that voting booths in some polling stations were of inadequate standard. 19.  According to the applicant, neither the ConEC nor the CEC replied to his complaints. 20.  According to the Government, the applicant's complaint was examined by the ConEC. As it appears from the documents submitted by the Government, following receipt of the applicant's complaint, the ConEC demanded explanations from the chairmen and members of the relevant PECs in connection with the applicant's allegations. In reply, about twenty PEC chairmen and members submitted brief handwritten statements (some of them as short as one or two sentences), or “explanatory notes” (“izahat”), all signed on 21 November 2005. All these notes stated in general terms that the election process in their respective polling stations had gone smoothly and without any irregularities, undue pressure on voters or any other breaches of the electoral law, and that any allegations by the applicant to the contrary were false. 21.  On 23 November 2005 the ConEC rejected the applicant's complaint. Without any elaboration on details of the applicant's specific allegations, it decided that they were unsubstantiated. At the same time, however, the ConEC confirmed that the condition of the voting booths in Polling Station no. 37 and “some other” (unidentified) polling stations had been poor. This finding did not entail any consequences for the official election results in those polling stations or in the constituency as a whole. 22.  On the same day, 23 November 2005, the CEC issued its final protocol approving the overall election results in the country (with the exception of a few electoral constituencies) and submitted it, together with relevant documents, to the Constitutional Court for review and approval of the election results. The election results for Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93 were among those approved by the CEC, confirming Z.O. as the winner in this constituency. 23.  According to the country-wide results, the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party again won the majority of seats in the Milli Majlis. 24.  On 25 November 2005 the applicant lodged an action with the Court of Appeal, asking the court to invalidate the CEC's final protocol in the part relating to the election results in Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93. In addition to restating all of his complaints made previously to the electoral commissions, he also complained of specific instances of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the PEC protocols which served as a basis for compiling the election results in the constituency as a whole. In particular, he noted a significant discrepancy in the PEC protocol for Polling Station no. 11, in which certain numbers did not add up correctly. As a result, more than 700 blank ballots out of more than 1,000 blank ballots originally issued to the PEC appeared to be “missing” (the protocol indicated that 313 persons had voted in that polling station, but only eleven of the remaining blank ballots were indicated as “unused” and formally “cancelled”, with no explanation as to what happened to the remaining more than 700 blank ballots). The same was the case with the PEC protocol for Polling Station no. 13, where more than 600 blank ballots were unaccounted for. Similar discrepancies were also allegedly found in PEC protocols for five other polling stations. The applicant claimed that these “missing” blank ballots had been sneaked out and illegally used for ballot-box stuffing in favour of Z.O. in various other polling stations. 25.  The applicant argued that, due to all these irregularities, it was not possible to determine the true opinion of the voters in his constituency. He also complained that the CEC had failed to examine his complaint of 7 November 2005. In support of his claims, the applicant submitted copies of the same evidence previously submitted to the CEC, including photocopies of the observers' affidavits and copies of audio material. 26.  On 28 November 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's claims as unsubstantiated. The court did not consider the photocopies of the affidavits as admissible evidence, noting that in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”) either the originals or notarised copies of those affidavits should have been submitted. Specifically, most of the reasoning contained in the Court of Appeal's judgment was limited to the following:\n“According to Article 14.2 of the CCP ..., the court shall examine and rely on only the evidence submitted by the parties.\nAccording to Article 77.1 of the same Code, each party must prove any allegations which it makes in support of its claims and objections.\nBased on the material in the case file and the parties' submissions, [the applicant's] claim against [the CEC] ... cannot be upheld. The alleged incidents concerning Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93, as described in the claim, did not take place. Documents attached to the claim are photocopies and no originals or notarised copies of documents have been submitted. [As such,] affidavits attached to the claim cannot be admitted as evidence. On the other hand, the alleged omission of a significant number of voters from voting lists has not been proved by the material in the case file.\nIn such circumstances, the court considers that [the applicant's] claim against [the CEC] ... must be dismissed.” 27.  On 30 November 2005 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating his claims. He also noted that he had submitted the originals of the documentary evidence to the CEC on 7 November 2005 and argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to take this fact into account. 28.  On 1 December 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on the same grounds as the Court of Appeal's judgment of 28 November 2005. As to the originals of the documentary evidence allegedly submitted to the CEC, the Supreme Court noted that the applicant had failed to submit any evidence proving that he had ever applied to the CEC with a complaint. The reasoning in the Supreme Court's decision was as follows:\n“According to Article 77.1 of the CCP ..., each party must prove any allegations which it makes in support of its claims and objections.\n[The applicant] has not presented any convincing evidence capable of proving the allegations forming the basis of his claim. The photocopies of affidavits attached to his claim were not admitted as convincing evidence by the Court of Appeal in a lawful and justified manner, as they had not been notarised.\nMoreover, the case materials contain no documents confirming that the applicant had applied to the electoral commissions under the procedure specified in Article 112 of the Electoral Code.\nAlthough at the oral hearing the applicant claimed that he had submitted the originals of the affidavits to the CEC, he has not submitted to the court any evidence showing that he had [actually] applied to the CEC.\nHowever, according to Articles 89 and 90 of the CCP ..., originals or duly certified copies of evidence should be submitted to courts. The applicant has not complied with this rule.\nAccording to Article 416 of the CCP ..., the court of cassation instance verifies whether the court of appellate instance has correctly applied substantive and procedural law.\nThe court considers that the Court of Appeal has correctly applied the relevant law and correctly reached the conclusion that the claim was unsubstantiated. There is no ground for quashing the [Court of Appeal's] judgment.” 29.  On the same day, 1 December 2005, the Constitutional Court confirmed the election results in the majority of the electoral constituencies, including Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": true, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Cardiff. 6.  The applicant is a gypsy. In 1999 she moved to the Cae Garw caravan site in Port Talbot, Wales, with her two children. The site was owned by Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council. 7.  On 12 June 2000 Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council entered into a licence agreement with the Gypsy Council which provided that the latter would manage the site. 8.  On 29 March 2004 the applicant entered into a licence agreement with the Gypsy Council to occupy pitch 16 on the site. It was a condition of the licence that:\n“The Licensee or his/her resident family ... must not create a nuisance on the sites or to neighbouring properties. The Licensee shall be held responsible if any ... person living with ... her contravenes any of these Site Rules or Conditions.” 9.  On 30 December 2004 the Gypsy Council issued a notice of termination of licence to the applicant which expired on 6 February 2005. The notice referred to a clause of her licence agreement which provided:\n“The Gypsy Council or the Licensee may terminate this licence by giving the other not less than 28 days written notice to expire on a Sunday in any week.” 10.  No further reasons justifying the termination were given. 11.  Notices to quit were also given to her parents, who occupied a different pitch on the site. 12.  On 18 January 2005 amendments to section 4 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 (“the 1968 Act”) entered into force which introduced the possibility for possession orders to be suspended by a court on the application of the occupier for up to twelve months at a time (see paragraph 36 below). 13.  On 2 August 2005 the Gypsy Council issued a claim for possession against the applicant and five members of her extended family, including her parents, in Neath Port Talbot County Court. In its particulars of claim, the Gypsy Council alleged that all six defendants were guilty of causing very substantial nuisance to the site to the detriment of other occupiers. 14.  The applicant’s parents did not apply for suspension or postponement of the orders. On 1 June 2006, possession orders were made against them by consent. 15.  An oral hearing took place between 24 and 26 July 2006 in Swansea County Court and 28 July 2006 in Neath County Court in respect of the claim for possession against the applicant. In a witness statement lodged prior to the hearing, the applicant indicated that she intended to leave the site when her parents left. 16.  On 25 July 2006 Judge Bidder QC gave a judgment on the preliminary issue of whether the applicant could challenge the making of a possession order in her case. He considered himself bound by the decision of the House of Lords in Kay and Price (see paragraph 42 below), which had examined the effect of this Court’s judgment in Connors v. the United Kingdom, no. 66746/01, 27 May 2004. Thus, he concluded, the only options open to the applicant were to challenge the domestic law itself or to commence judicial review proceedings based on conventional grounds. He concluded:\n“58. ... I do not consider it to be arguable that the decision of the claimants to seek possession against her was unreasonable or that their decision to invoke their domestic law rights could be castigated as unreasonable ... 59. Moreover, the fact that parliament has amended the applicable domestic legislation to afford the gypsy occupier the opportunity to contend that any possession order should be suspended for 12 months at a time distinguishes that case from Connors, and given that that amendment was considered in Kay and Price I find it impossible to say ... that there is a seriously arguable point raised that the law which enables the court to make the possession order is incompatible with article 8 ...” 17.  He invited submissions from the applicant as to the possible temporary suspension of any possession order. He added:\n“71. I should say that on the issue of suspension of the ... order against the [applicant] of possession I would invite the parties to consider the date of 4th November 2006 being the date on which the [applicant’s] parents are required to leave and on which she indicates that she would leave anyway ...” 18.  On 28 July 2006, following the applicant’s submissions that any possession order against her should be suspended, the judge handed down his judgment on the remaining issues. Having reviewed the allegations made against the applicant by the claimant, the judge concluded:\n“27. ... I am not satisfied that Maria Buckland has herself been guilty of any offensive behaviour on site, or of any breach of licence, apart from the relatively minor failure to pay the water charges.” 19.  He was, however, satisfied that her son, who resided part of the time with her, had been involved in an incident on site in which he threatened someone with a gun, although it was not clear whether the gun had been real or merely an imitation; and had dumped garden refuse on the site. 20.  Turning to consider whether the applicant’s personal circumstances, and those of her son, justified a suspension of the possession order which he would be making in her case the judge noted:\n“32. In relation to Maria Buckland, while I am obliged to make a possession order, I find her only breach of site conditions has been recent and is a very modest failure to pay water charges. She has indicated in a recent statement that she intends to move from the site when [her parents] leave, that is on or before 4pm on 24th November. I do consider it appropriate to suspend enforcement of the possession order against her until the same time and date. However, I am clear that the behaviour of [her son] on this site and his attitude towards the Farrows [the family of the site manager] is such that I have to impose conditions on her continued possession, as sought in the draft order – [her son] lives half his time with his father, and I have no doubt that if he cannot live with his mother, he will be able to live with his father ...” 21.  He made an order for possession against the applicant, which he suspended until 24 November 2006 upon the condition that her son leave the site and that she discharge the GBP 95 arrears of water charges at the rate of GBP 5 per week. 22.  On 18 April 2007 the applicant, who was still resident at the site, was granted permission to appeal the possession order to the Court of Appeal. A stay of execution of the order of 28 July 2006 was also ordered. 23.  In November 2007 a bill which would amend the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”) was introduced to Parliament. The effect of the proposed amendment was to allow a defendant in possession proceedings such as the applicant to challenge before the County Court the reasonableness of making a possession order. 24.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed. Considering the impact of the amendment to the 1968 Act to allow suspension of a possession order on whether the applicant could succeed in a conventional public law challenge to the decision to seek a possession order, Lord Justice Dyson noted:\n“42. The significance of the amendment is that a claimant’s decision to seek possession does not involve summary eviction without judicial scrutiny of the justification of the claim to possession. By issuing proceedings, the claimant submits to the jurisdiction of the court, which has power to investigate all the circumstances of the case, including the claimant’s complaints about the defendant’s behaviour.” 25.  He continued:\n“43. ... It may be that, for the reasons given by Lord Brown [in Kay], a public law defence could have been raised successfully in Connors. I would suggest that this is not so much because the family had been in occupation for a great length of time, but rather because it was unreasonable and grossly unfair for the local authority to seek a possession order and obtain the eviction of the occupier merely on the basis of a termination of the licence ‘without the need to make good any underlying reason for taking such precipitate action’. The real difference between the present case and Connors is not that the appellant had been in occupation for a shorter period than was the family in Connors ... On any view, the site was her home and had been for a substantial period of time. The fact that she had not been in occupation for as long as the family in Connors is not, in my judgment, of much significance. The real difference between the two cases is that in Connors, once the licence had been terminated, the authority was entitled to an order for possession whose enforcement could not be suspended by the court.” 26.  He concluded that since the amendment to the 1968 Act, it was difficult to conceive of a case in which a public law defence would succeed. Referring also to the fact that Judge Bidder had made a finding of misconduct on the site by the applicant’s son, for whose behaviour she was responsible under the terms of the licence, Dyson LJ considered that the judge was right to hold that the public law defence was not seriously arguable. 27.  Dyson LJ further noted that the factual situation of Connors was not materially different from the present case in that in both cases the defendant had occupied a site as a home for a number of years. Further, in both cases the claimant had validly and properly terminated the defendant’s licence to occupy so that the defendant had become a trespasser; the claimant was entitled to an order for possession as the owner of the land; and no further justification was required to seek an order for possession. However, it was agreed by the parties that it was not necessary to decide whether the present case could be distinguished from Connors as the distinction was only relevant for any appeal before the House of Lords. 28.  Finally, in respect of the applicant’s argument that the amendment to section 4 of the 1968 Act did not remedy the incompatibility with Article 8, Dyson LJ emphasised that, in principle, a wide margin of appreciation was left to the national authorities in such matters. However, he accepted that the vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority meant that “some special consideration should be given to their needs and different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases” (citing Connors, § 83). He found that the main reason for the narrowing of the margin of appreciation in Connors itself was that the complete absence of any procedural safeguards was a serious interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights in that case, which called for particularly weighty reasons of public interest in justification. However, the precise scope of these safeguards was in his view, a matter for the national authorities to determine. He considered that provided that a reasonable degree of protection was afforded by the domestic law, the Strasbourg Court would not interfere, even if a greater degree of protection could have been afforded. He accordingly rejected the applicant’s submissions, noting:\n“60. The objectionable feature of the legal regime in place before the amendment was that the court was bound not merely to make an order for possession, but to order the eviction of an occupant such as the appellant provided that the 4 weeks’ notice was given. Absent a public law challenge, the occupant had no opportunity to challenge the reasons given by the local authority for seeking possession and the court had no jurisdiction to take the reasons into account in deciding whether to order the occupant’s eviction. The local authority’s reasons were irrelevant as were the occupant’s personal circumstances. Nor did the court have power to suspend an order for possession even in circumstances of extreme hardship which indicated that eviction would not be justified under article 8(2). In short, there was no opportunity for the court to make any assessment of the justification for eviction in order to determine whether the interference with an occupier’s rights under article 8(1) was justified on an application of article 8(2). Provided that the relevant formal requirements had been satisfied, the role of the court was purely mechanistic. 61. The amendment has introduced procedural protections which ensure that the role of the court is no longer a mechanistic one even when a local authority seeks to evict a licensee from a caravan site. Summary eviction has been replaced by judicial examination. Section 4(1) now provides that the enforcement of a possession order may be suspended for such period up to 12 months ‘as the court thinks reasonable’. The court has a wide discretion under subsection (2) to impose conditions when making an order for suspension. By subsection (3), the court may extend the suspension of the possession order for up to 12 months at a time. Subsection (4) requires the court to have regard to ‘all the circumstances’ in deciding whether to exercise its power to suspend. The court is, therefore, required to conduct an examination of all the circumstances of the case ...” 29.  He concluded:\n“63. In my judgment, the decision to provide the procedural safeguards introduced by the amendment of section 4 of the 1968 Act was within the margin of appreciation available to the United Kingdom. More generous safeguards could have been introduced (and they will be when the 1983 Act is amended). But the amendment goes far enough to meet the real thrust of the criticisms made in Connors.” 30.  As to the applicant’s argument that the legislation discriminated against gypsies, Dyson LJ found that although the discrimination point was one of the features of the Court’s reasoning in Connors, it was not the main reason for the decision. Even if that was wrong, Dyson LJ considered that by addressing the lack of procedural safeguards for gypsies of local authority sites, the amendment had also gone a long way to meeting the discrimination point. While discrimination would not be cured completely until the 1983 Act was amended, it had been much mitigated. Thus to the extent that the discrimination persisted, the decision not to eliminate it altogether fell within the margin of appreciation accorded to the contracting States. 31.  On 18 February 2008 the House of Lords refused the applicant’s request for permission to appeal. 32.  In May 2008 the applicant left Cae Garw caravan site for alternative accommodation on land owned by her brother. She claims that her departure was the result of the refusal of leave to appeal and in the face of further threats of eviction The land owned by her brother has no planning permission for residential use and its occupants, which include the applicant’s brother, his six children and the applicants’ parents, share minimal facilities, namely one toilet and one sink with cold running water in a shed with no lighting.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1944 and 1932 respectively and live in Bjelovar. 5.  On 1 March 1992 the applicants’ house in Bjelovar was blown up by unknown perpetrators. 6.  On 1 March 1994 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages. They relied on section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act. 7.  On 3 February 1996 the Amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) entered into force. It provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts or acts of violence were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject. 8.  On 7 June 1999 the Zagreb Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment. 9.  On 31 July 2003 the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”) entered into force. 10.  Pursuant to the 2003 Liability Act, on 14 January 2004 the Municipal Court resumed the proceedings. 11.  Meanwhile, on 21 May 2002 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint about the length of proceedings under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. On 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court accepted the applicants’ complaint. Relying on the Court’s case law (Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, ECHR 2002‑II), it found violations of their constitutional rights to a hearing within a reasonable time and of access to a court. It ordered the Zagreb Municipal Court to give a decision in the applicants’ case within a year and awarded them compensation in the amount of 4,400 Croatian kunas (HRK) each. 12.  On 11 March 2004 the Zagreb Municipal Court declared the applicants’ action inadmissible finding that it no longer had jurisdiction in the matter. 13.  The applicants appealed to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). It would appear that the proceedings are currently pending before that court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 23 September 2005, at 5.50 p.m., the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of attempted murder. 6.  On 26 September 2005 formal charges were brought against the applicant. 7.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (Երևան քաղաքի Կենտրոն և Նորք-Մարաշ համայնքների աոաջին ատյանի դատարան) granted the investigator’s relevant motion and ordered the applicant’s detention on remand for a period of two months, to be calculated from 23 September 2005. 8.  On 14 November 2005 the investigator filed a motion with the District Court, seeking to have the applicant’s detention on remand prolonged for another two months. 9.  On 22 November 2005 the District Court examined and dismissed this motion. This decision was subject to appeal. 10.  On 23 November 2005 at around 11 a.m. a copy of this decision was presented by the applicant’s lawyer to the Chief of the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility («Երևան-Կենտրոն» քրեակատարողական հիմնարկի պետ) where the applicant was held. 11.  On the same date the prosecutor lodged an appeal against the above decision. 12.  Later that day at 5.30 p.m. the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal (ՀՀ քրեական և զինվորական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարան) commenced the examination of the prosecutor’s appeal. The applicant was escorted to the hearing by four national security officers in an official car. 13.  At 5.45 p.m. the applicant’s lawyer arrived and requested a ten-minute recess to be able to consult with the applicant. The Government alleged that the lawyer was deliberately late for the hearing, while the applicant claimed that her lawyer was informed by telephone about this hearing only at 5.30 p.m. 14.  At 5.50 p.m. the applicant’s detention period authorised by the decision of 26 September 2005 expired. 15.  Following the recess, the lawyer challenged the impartiality of the bench. He first alleged that the court had not given the applicant sufficient time to prepare her defence and also failed to ensure equality of arms. Furthermore, there were four national security officers in the court building who prevented the applicant, who was formally already at liberty, from going out of the building. Thus, the fact that such things were happening in the building of the Court of Appeal suggested that the outcome of the proceedings was already pre-determined. 16.  The court departed to the deliberation room to examine this challenge, after which it returned and announced its decision dismissing it. 17.  Thereafter another twenty-minute recess was announced by the court for the defence to be able to familiarise itself with the prosecutor’s appeal and the materials of the case. During the recess an ambulance was called because the applicant felt unwell. Her blood pressure rose to 180/100 but no injections could be administered as she was allergic, so the doctor recommended adjourning the hearing. 18.  The hearing resumed at 8.03 p.m. The applicant’s lawyer requested the adjournment of the hearing in view of the deterioration of the applicant’s health and in order for him to be able to familiarise himself with the prosecutor’s appeal in adequate conditions. The court granted this request and adjourned the hearing until 1 p.m. on 24 November 2005. 19.  The court hearing was over at around 8.30 p.m. 20.  The applicant alleged and the Government did not dispute that during the entire court hearing she was monitored by four national security officers and was not allowed to move freely, to leave the courtroom during the breaks or to go home. After the court hearing was over, she was forcibly taken by these officers and pushed into the same car and taken back to the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility. This was done after one of the officers had a private consultation and received instructions from the presiding judge in the deliberation room. 21.  On 24 November 2005 at 1 p.m. the Court of Appeal resumed the examination of the prosecutor’s appeal. The applicant was not present at this hearing. 22.  The applicant’s lawyers again challenged the impartiality of the bench, alleging that the court had manifested a biased attitude. In particular, the court summoned a hearing on the prosecutor’s appeal immediately before the expiry of the applicant’s detention period. Furthermore, the court did not release the applicant despite the fact that her detention had not been prolonged. Finally, after the hearing was over, the presiding judge departed to the deliberation room where he had a consultation with a national security officer, as a result of which it was decided to keep the applicant in detention. Thereafter she was transported to a national security isolation cell. The lawyers claimed that all the above suggested that the Court of Appeal was not impartial. 23.  The court examined and dismissed this challenge. 24.  Thereafter, one of the applicant’s lawyers made a declaration stating that, following the court hearing of 23 November 2005, the applicant had been taken away by national security officers in an unknown direction, despite the fact that she was already free by virtue of the law. The lawyers refused to participate in the hearing in such circumstances and left the courtroom. 25.  The Court of Appeal examined the prosecutor’s appeal in their absence and decided to quash the decision of the District Court of 22 November 2005 and to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand for another two months. 26.  On 28 November 2005 one of the applicant’s lawyers addressed a letter to the Chief of the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility, complaining:\n“... You ..., as the chief of administration of the detention facility where [the applicant] is kept, at 5.45 p.m. on 23 November 2005 not only did not release her, but had her escorted to court by four officers in an official car having State licence no. 150 SS 02, during the entire [court hearing] you monitored her actions until 8.30 p.m. on [that date], forbidding her to move freely, and at around 8.30-8.45, with the assistance of the same officers, you forcibly (holding her arms, pushing her) placed her in the above car and transported her to the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility where you received her, according to the information at our disposal, without a relevant court decision. In that period (between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m.) the defence called you on numerous occasions and you stated that you would keep [the applicant] until the court hearing scheduled for 1 p.m. on the next day was over...” 27.  On 5 December 2005 the applicant’s lawyers lodged an appeal on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s decision. In their appeal, they again complained about the fact that the applicant had not been released from custody on 23 November 2005. 28.  On 8 December 2005 the applicant’s lawyers made a similar declaration addressed to the Prosecutor General. 29.  By a letter of 9 December 2005 the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարան) returned the appeal since it was no longer competent to examine it following the constitutional amendments.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Willstät, Germany. 6.  The applicant was a minority shareholder in Sokolovská uhelná, a.s. (“the company”), a joint-stock company incorporated under Czech law. 7.  On 4 May 2005 the general meeting of the company adopted, by a vote of the main shareholder, a resolution on the winding up of the company and the transfer of all its assets to the main shareholder. 8.  On 25 June 2005 the applicant lodged with the Plzeň Regional Court (krajský soud) an action to have the resolution set aside, asserting that it had been adopted contrary to applicable law, bilateral investment treaties and her property rights. She also asserted that the law on which the resolution had been based was itself unconstitutional. At the same time, she informed the court administering the Companies Register (obchodní rejstřík) about her action and asked it not to allow the entry in the register of the winding up of the company and the transfer of all its assets to the main shareholder until the legality of the resolution had been decided by the Regional Court. These set-aside proceedings are still pending. 9.  The applicant received cash compensation based on the value of her shares as at 31 December 2001. The amount of compensation was based on an evaluation made by an expert appointed by a court on the proposal of the main shareholder. 10.  On 30 June 2005 the court in charge of the Companies Register approved the registration of the transfer and the deletion of the company from the Companies Register. No hearing was held prior to that decision, which was not served on the applicant as she did not have standing to participate in the proceedings. 11.  On 11 July 2005 the Prague High Court (vrchní soud) rejected the applicant's appeal contesting the above-mentioned decision. It ruled that since the applicant did not have standing to take part in the impugned proceedings, she was not entitled to appeal their outcome. 12.  On 11 May 2006 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) rejected the applicant's constitutional appeal, in which she claimed an impairment of her right to a fair trial and the right to property in relation to the companies register proceedings on the basis that (i) she had not been allowed to be a party to those proceedings as a result of the application of Article 220h(4) of the Commercial Code and (ii) that this had created an irreversible situation. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded, holding that the Commercial Code had not impaired her right of access to court because, apart from the companies register proceedings, there were other proceedings available to the applicant in which she could have asserted her rights. It further held that the applicant's claims that such other proceedings would not guarantee adequate protection of her rights could not be reviewed, because the present appeal had been directed only against the decisions in the companies register proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Gdańsk. 7.  On 16 May 2005 the applicant was arrested. 8.  On 17 May 2005 he was charged with having assisted in counterfeiting a secondary education diploma (udzielenie pomocy w podrobieniu świadectwa maturalnego). The applicant was released on the same day, after having paid a bail of 6,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). 9.  On 30 August 2005 a bill of indictment against the applicant and two other persons was lodged with the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 10. On an unspecified date, one of the co-accused, A.D., requested the court to sentence her without carrying out the whole proceedings and her case was severed for separate examination. A judgment against A.D. was given on 5 October 2005. 11. A first hearing, scheduled on 30 November 2005, was adjourned. No reasons for this decision were provided. 12.  The trial started on 22 December 2005. 13.  On one occasion a hearing was adjourned, as the applicant’s co‑accused failed to appear. 14.  Two hearings were adjourned, as the applicant and his co-accused have not been transferred to the court from prison. 15.  On five occasions the applicant’s lawyer failed to attend the hearings. It appears that on two of those occasions he has not been properly summoned. 16.  Two hearings, scheduled on 9 October and 6 November 2007, were adjourned, as the case-file concerning another set of criminal proceedings has not been delivered to the trial court. 17.  Two hearings, scheduled on 11 December 2007 and 18 January 2008, were adjourned, without any reasons being provided. 18.  A hearing scheduled on 27 February 2008 was cancelled due to the judge-rapporteur’s illness. 19.  On 11 April 2008 the District Prosecutor (Prokurator Prokuratury Rejonowej) requested the trial court to exclude judge J.M., to whom the applicant’s case was assigned, from the proceedings. The prosecutor relied on the fact that J.M. had given a judgment against A.D. and that, according to the recent case-law of the Supreme Court, in circumstances like those of the present case, the same judge could not examine a case against several co-accused on the basis of the same evidentiary material. 20.  On 21 April 2008 the Gdańsk District Court granted the prosecutor’s request and excluded J.M. from the proceedings. The trial has recommenced. 21.  On 9 October 2008 the Gdańs Distirct Court quashed the preventive measure imposed on the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). The amount paid as bail was returned to the applicant. 22.  The proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court. 23.  On 10 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint about a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time with respect to the first set of criminal proceedings against him. He relied on the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). The applicant sought PLN 10,000 in just-satisfaction. 24.  On 1 July 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) acknowledged that the proceedings have indeed been lengthy and awarded PLN 1,000 to the applicant. It underlined that the trial court has failed to ensure that the hearings were adequately prepared and organised. It also noted that the applicant’s lawyer has partly contributed to the overall length of the proceedings. In that respect the trial court was criticised for not having taken disciplinary measures against the applicant’s lawyer at an earlier stage of the proceedings, by informing the Gdańsk Regional Bar about the advocate’s failure to perform his duties. 25.  On 21 November 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking. 26.  On 22 November 2006 the Gdańsk Distirct Court remanded him in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question. It also considered that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the risk that if released, the applicant might tamper with evidence. In that respect the court underlined the fact that the applicant has not admitted to having committed the offence he had been charged with. The court also stressed the severity of the anticipated sentence. 27.  The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against decisions prolonging his detention and all his subsequent applications for release were unsuccessful. 28.  On 12 January 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk District Court. It comprised forty-seven charges of drug trafficking brought against six defendants. 29.  On an unspecified date charges against four of the co-accused, A.S., M.S., D.G. and M.K., were severed, as they requested the court to sentence them without carrying out the whole proceedings. A judgment in their case was delivered on 4 July 2007. 30.  On 11 April 2007 the trial court held its first hearing. 31.  During the court proceedings, the applicant’s detention was further prolonged on 17 January, 21 May, 10 August and 16 November 2007 and on 16 February and 16 May 2008.\nIn all their detention decisions the authorities repeatedly relied on a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, which was supported by evidence from witnesses. They attached importance to the grave nature of that offence and the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. They further considered that the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, especially the need to obtain evidence from witnesses, justified holding him in custody. 32.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant requested the trial court to exclude judge J.M. from the proceedings. He relied on the fact that J.M. had given a judgment against A.S., M.S., D.G. and M.K. and that consequently, he could not examine a case against him, on the basis of the same evidentiary material (see also paragraph 19 above). 33.  On 2 June 2008 the judge was excluded from the proceedings. The trial had to restart. 34.  On 25 July 2008 the Gdańsk District Court lifted the applicant’s detention. The court found that the applicant’s detention was already approaching a two-year period and that, taking into consideration that the trial had to be repeated, he could no longer be held in detention. According to the court, the risk that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings has no longer been a relevant factor, in view of the lapse of time. 35.  From 20 November 2007 to 23 September 2008 the applicant served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him. 36.  The proceedings are still pending before the District Court. 37.  On 14 April 2008 the applicant received a letter from his lawyer. In that respect the applicant presented a copy of an envelope which bears a stamp “censored (“ocenzurowano”). The stamp is crossed out. The envelope also contains a handwritten note which says “censorship abandoned” (“odstąpiono od cenzury”), date and illegible signature.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Lipetsk. In 1994 he retired from military service. 8.  In 2002 he sued the Military Service Commission of the Lipetsk Region (“the Military Commission”), seeking to recover the unpaid pension for the period from February 1994 to November 1998. 9.  On 15 July 2002 the Pravoberezhniy District Court of Lipetsk granted him claim in full and awarded him 32,947.11 Russian roubles (“RUR”) in respect of the unpaid pension. In November 2002 the Military Commission paid him the amount awarded. 10.  The applicant lodged a new claim against the Military Commission, seeking to recover damages incurred through belated payment of the pension. 11.  On 27 January 2003 the Pravoberezhniy District Court granted his claim and awarded him RUR 145,835.69 in damages. 12.  The Military Commission did not lodge an ordinary appeal against the judgment and it became binding and enforceable on 6 February 2003. 13.  On 23 February 2003 the bailiffs’ service of the Pravoberezhniy District instituted enforcement proceedings. 14.  On 20 May 2003 the Military Commission filed an application for supervisory review of the judgment, claiming that the civil-law provisions relating to compensation for damages were not applicable to pensions. 15.  On 25 September 2003 the Presidium of the Lipetsk Regional Court held a supervisory-review hearing. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts but erroneously applied the substantive law because the damages could only be recovered for the three years immediately preceding the judicial decision. On that ground it quashed the judgment of 27 January 2003 and rejected the applicant’s claim in full.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicants were born in 1938, 1942, 1948 and 1962 respectively. They are farmers living in Stumm (Austria). 10.  On 7 July 1966 the Tirol Regional Government as the Agricultural Authority of First Instance (Landesregierung als Agrarbehörde erster Instanz - “the Agricultural Authority”) instituted land consolidation proceedings (Zusammenlegungsverfahren) involving property belonging to the first applicant, the second applicant’s mother, the third applicant and the fourth applicant’s father. 11.  On 18 December 1974 the Agricultural Authority ordered the provisional transfer (vorläufige Übernahme) of compensatory parcels (Grundabfindung). 12.  On 28 December 1980 the municipal council amended the area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) re-designating agricultural land which had, before 1974, belonged to the first applicant, the second applicant’s mother and to the fourth applicant’s father, as building land. 13.  In February 1988 the second applicant took over his mother’s farm. 14.  On 28 July 1988 the consolidation scheme (Zusammenlegungsplan) was issued by the Agricultural Authority confirming the situation created by the provisional transfer. 15.  On 16 September 1988 the third applicant appealed against the consolidation scheme. The first and second applicants as well as the fourth applicant’s father did so on 19 September 1988. 16.  In May, June and October 1989, the Provincial Land Reform Board (Landesagrarsenat - “the Provincial Board”), sitting in camera, held hearings on these appeals. Subsequently, the fourth applicant took over his father’s farm. 17.  On 26 November 1990 all four applicants filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction to the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat - “the Supreme Board”), which the latter dismissed on 27 February 1991. 18.  On 18 April 1991 the Provincial Board, after having held a hearing in camera, dismissed the first applicant’s appeal. 19.  On 3 June 1991 the first applicant filed complaints with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) and the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). In the complaint to the Administrative Court he requested that a public oral hearing be held. 20.  On 25 November 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court. 21.  On 16 November 1993 the Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act (Flurverfassungslandesgesetz), which provides that changes in value which occur after the provisional transfer cannot be taken into account in the determination of compensation. 22.  On 13 October 1995 the Constitutional Court found that section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act was in conformity with the Constitution. 23.  On 28 February 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint rejecting at the same time, in accordance with section 39 § 2 (6) of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungs-gerichtshofgesetz), the applicant’s request for a hearing. 24.  The Administrative Court found in particular that the calculation of compensation as regards the plots of land transferred to the municipality for building a street, had been carried out in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confirmed that the said compensation was in accordance with the relevant law. The decision was served on 24 May 1996. 25.  On 18 April 1991 the Provincial Board, after having held a hearing in camera, dismissed the second applicant’s appeal as being unfounded. 26.  On 3 June 1991 the second applicant filed complaints with the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court. 27.  On 25 November 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court. 28.  On 16 November 1993 the Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act. 29.  On 13 October 1995 the Constitutional Court found that section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act was in conformity with the Constitution. 30.  On 28 February 1996 the Administrative Court quashed the Provincial Board’s decision as far as the second applicant was concerned. It found that the Provincial Board had not given sufficient reasons for calculating the size of a particular part of the applicant’s property involved in the land consolidation proceedings. In this respect, the lawfulness of the compensation could not be assessed. 31.  On 25 July 1996 the Provincial Board, after having held a public hearing, rejected the second applicant’s appeal against the consolidation scheme as being inadmissible. It noted that the second applicant and his mother had concluded a contract of transfer of land on 5 February 1988. However, the request to enter the contract into the land register had only been lodged with the competent court on 19 November 1991. Consequently, the second applicant had not been the legal owner of the land at issue and had not been entitled to file an appeal in 1988. 32.  On 11 September 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court arguing in particular that he had been the legal owner of the land already in 1988 and, therefore, had been entitled to file an appeal. 33.  On 9 June 1997 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint and transferred it to the Administrative Court. On 6 October 1997 and on 20 November 1997, respectively, the applicant and the Provincial Board filed further comments. 34.  On 10 December 1998 the Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s complaint, confirming the reasoning of the Provincial Board. The decision was served on 22 January 1999. 35.  On 18 April 1991 in the case of the third applicant and on 20 June 1991 in the case of the fourth applicant, the Provincial Board - in both cases having held a hearing in camera - partly dismissed their appeals. The third applicant appealed in May 1991 and the fourth applicant in July 1991. 36.  On 7 October 1992 the Supreme Board dismissed the applicants’ further appeals. It found that the transfer of property to the municipality for building a street was in accordance with the law and that the applicants had been duly compensated. 37.  On 21 December 1992 the third applicant, and on 21 January 1993 the fourth applicant, filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court which transferred their appeals to the Administrative Court on 15 June 1993. 38.  On 14 December 1995 and on 21 May 1996, respectively, the Administrative Court quashed the Supreme Board’s decision on the ground that the latter had given insufficient reasons for its calculation of compensation. 39.  On 6 November 1996 the Supreme Board, having held a public hearing, partly dismissed the applicants’ appeals. 40.  On 31 January 1997 the applicants complained to the Constitutional Court which, on 16 June 1997, transferred both cases to the Administrative Court. 41.  On 26 February 1998 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ complaints. The Administrative Court found in particular that the Supreme Board had carried out the calculation of compensation in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confirmed its finding that the said compensation was in accordance with the relevant law. The decision was served on 18 March 1998.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  On 6 November 1992 the Burgomaster (Burgemeester) of Amsterdam, relying on section 219 of the Municipality Act (Gemeentewet) as in force at the relevant time, imposed a prohibition order (verwijderingsbevel) on the applicant to the effect that the latter would not be allowed to enter a particular area, the so-called emergency area, of the city centre for fourteen days. The following events were referred to in the Burgomaster's decision as having led to this order being issued.\n(i)  It transpired from police reports that on 21 July (twice), 29 July, 12 August, 26 August and 10 September 1992 the applicant had either overtly used hard drugs or had had hard drugs in his possession in streets situated in the emergency area and that on each of those occasions he had been ordered to leave the area for eight hours. \n(ii)  On 5 November 1992 the applicant had been heard by the police about his conduct and he had been told that he would either have to desist from such acts, which disturbed public order (openbare orde), or stay away from the area. The applicant had further been informed that, if he committed such acts again in the near future, the Burgomaster would be requested to impose a fourteen-day prohibition order on him. The applicant had told the police that, as well as preparing and using drugs in the area concerned, he also met his friends there. \n(iii)  On 5 November 1992 the applicant had nevertheless overtly used hard drugs on one of the streets in the emergency area. He had once again been ordered to leave the area for eight hours and the police had subsequently requested the Burgomaster to impose a fourteen-day prohibition order on the applicant. 11.  In the opinion of the Burgomaster, the applicant would again commit acts disturbing public order in the near future. In this context, the Burgomaster took account of the kind of conduct involved, namely acts seriously disturbing public order, the repetition and continuity of this conduct, the statement of the applicant, the short period of time within which the acts concerned had been observed and the fact that the applicant had continued his disruptive behaviour despite the eight-hour prohibition orders imposed on him and the warning given by the police. Finally, the Burgomaster noted that neither the applicant's home nor his place of work were situated in the area concerned. 12.  The applicant lodged an objection (bezwaarschrift) against the Burgomaster's prohibition order. He submitted, inter alia, that the Burgomaster ought only to make use of the emergency powers granted him by section 219 of the Municipality Act in exceptional situations. As the Burgomaster had been issuing eight-hour prohibition orders since 1983 and fourteen-day ones since 1989, it could no longer be argued that an exceptional situation prevailed. Moreover, the Burgomaster had had sufficient time to ensure that the emergency measures were enacted in a general municipal by-law (Algemene Politie Verordening). 13.  The applicant also stated that the prohibition order, which in his opinion constituted a criminal sanction, interfered with his right to liberty of movement and violated the principle of proportionality. In this connection, he argued that he had always complied with the prohibition orders imposed on him for a duration of eight hours and that he therefore failed to understand why a prohibition order for fourteen days had been called for all of a sudden. 14.  On 14 January 1993 a hearing took place before an advisory committee. At this hearing the representative of the Burgomaster stated that, in 1992, 3,300 eight-hour prohibition orders (compared with 2,130 in 1991) and 204 fourteen-day prohibition orders (compared with 111 in 1991) had been issued against people dealing in or using drugs or committing acts related to those activities. The representative further stated that it was intended to enact the power to issue prohibition orders in a general municipal by-law. 15.  On 8 March 1993 the committee advised the Burgomaster to dismiss the objection and to maintain the prohibition order. It considered, inter alia, that the disruption of public order in the area concerned was still such as to constitute an exceptional situation within the meaning of section 219 of the Municipality Act. In view of the seriousness and scale of the problems involved, the committee found it unlikely that public order could be adequately maintained by normal methods and that for that reason the Burgomaster was entitled to use the powers granted him under section 219. 16.  Having regard to the fact that the applicant had, within a short period of time, regularly committed acts which had disturbed public order and that the eight-hour prohibition orders which had been issued had not prevented him from doing so, the committee further found that the imposition of a prohibition order for a duration of fourteen days had not been unreasonable. It did not agree with the applicant that the impugned measure constituted a penalty, as it had been taken in order to maintain public order. The committee finally found that the interference with the applicant's right to liberty of movement had been justified. 17.  By a decision of 11 March 1993 the Burgomaster dismissed the applicant's objection, adopting as his own the reasoning applied by the advisory committee. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the Burgomaster's decision with the Judicial Division (Afdeling rechtspraak) of the Raad van State on 19 March 1993. In his appeal, which he detailed in a letter of 17 May 1993, he raised the same complaints as he had before the Burgomaster. In his written observations of 14 March 1994 the Burgomaster referred to the report drawn up by the advisory committee. A hearing took place before the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak), the successor to the Judicial Division, on 23 January 1996. 19.  On 14 May 1996 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the applicant's appeal. Its reasoning included the following:\n \n“Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. According to the third paragraph of that provision, this right shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in that Covenant. An almost identical provision is contained in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.\nSection 219, first paragraph, of the Municipality Act confers on the Burgomaster emergency powers which should be used only in exceptional situations. Such exceptional situations include riotous movements, gatherings or other disturbances of public order, serious calamities, and also a serious fear of the development thereof.\nContrary to what the party seeking review has argued, the issuing of orders in the situations set out in section 219 of the Municipality Act does not run counter to the above-mentioned treaty provisions, since the latter provide for the possibility of restricting the rights concerned by 'law' – a term which includes an order issued by the Burgomaster pursuant to the law – for the protection of public order.\nSection 219 of the Municipality Act is a legal provision intended for situations where ordinary means are insufficient for restoring and maintaining public order.\nIn the opinion of the Division these ordinary means may be considered insufficient in the present case and there was, at the time of the decision appealed against, an exceptional situation. It is relevant in this context that at the time of the decision appealed against it was not possible to solve the problem in question through a municipal regulation. There was not at that time – and there is not now – any relevant provision in a municipal by-law, nor is any other sufficient legal means available.\nOn the basis of the case file and the submissions made at the hearing, in addition to the number of eight-hour and fourteen-day orders that have been issued in the area concerned, the Division finds that the appropriate staff and means available to the defendant were inadequate to counter the difficult situation arising from breaches of public order resulting from the behaviour of drug addicts as described in the decision of 13 November 1989. This leads the Division to hold that it cannot be stated that the defendant could not reasonably make use of the powers granted him by section 219 of the Municipality Act.\nThe Division would, however, express the following reservations.\nIt cannot see why, if the situation described above should continue, the possibility of issuing fourteen-day prohibition orders should not be provided for in a by-law enacted by the Local Council. From the point of view of legal certainty and legitimacy of action by public authority, a regulation provided by a municipal by-law seems preferable to a measure based on the defendant's emergency powers. It appears from the case file that the defendant had already prepared the draft of an appropriate provision, which, however, was never incorporated into the General Municipal By-Law because the method used at present, which was decided on in consultation between the defendant, the police and the prosecuting authorities [verweerder, politie en justitie] with regard to the fourteen-day prohibition orders, was considered extraordinarily effective. The Division is, however, of the opinion that the presumed effectiveness of an emergency measure coupled with the prosecuting policy of the prosecution authorities [Openbaar Ministerie] do not constitute a reason not to make appropriate provision at the municipal level. The Division considers that the defendant, in assessing whether there is an exceptional situation within the meaning of section 219 of the Municipality Act (now section 175 of the Municipality Act), may, in principle, no longer rely on the lack of an appropriate provision in a municipal by-law, in view of the length of time this drugs-related nuisance [drugsoverlast] has already prevailed, causing it to display structural aspects, if the possibility of issuing fourteen-day prohibition orders is not now provided for in a by-law enacted by the Local Council within a reasonable time.”\nThis decision was published, with a learned comment, in Jurisprudentie Bestuursrecht (Administrative Law Jurisprudence) 1996, no. 169. 20.  Apart from the proceedings described above, the applicant was convicted by a single-judge Chamber (politierechter) of the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam on 8 December 1992 of having intentionally failed to comply on 20 November 1992 with the prohibition order imposed by the Burgomaster on 6 November 1992. Under Article 184 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), this failure constituted a criminal offence. He was sentenced to four weeks' imprisonment. Following an appeal to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof), which also convicted the applicant, an appeal on points of law was lodged with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on 8 December 1998. 21.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant do not form part of the case before the Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 11 September 1996 he was injured in a traffic accident. He was found to have suffered light bodily injury. 7.  On 24 February 1997 the applicant brought proceedings, in the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow, for damages against an individual, who had been found guilty of causing the accident and subjected to administrative liability by a decision of the police of 26 September 1996. 8.  In letters dated 9 January and 2 July 1998 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the lack of any developments in his case. 9.  On 6 July 1999 the District Court ordered the applicant's medical examination to be carried out by the Moscow City Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. The decision was not executed. 10.  On 11 January 2001 the District Court again ordered the applicant's medical examination by the Forensic Medical Examination Bureau of the Public Health Committee of the Government of Moscow. Pursuant to this decision, the examination was carried out from 24 January to 9 February 2001. The experts' report of 9 February 2001 no. 8 stated that it would be possible to answer the questions put by the court only after the applicant's in-patient examination with a view to determine the causation between the accident on 11 September 1996 and his present health condition. 11.  On 28 June 2001 the District Court ordered the applicant's in-patient examination. 12.  On 20 January 2003 the District Court ordered the expert assessment of the applicant's state of health and its connection with the accident, to be carried out by the Forensic Medical Examination Bureau of the Public Health Committee of the Government of Moscow. 13.  Following the applicant's requests the District Court demanded various medical institutions to issue the applicant's medical records needed for the expert assessment. 14.  On 14 March 2003 the applicant complained to the Moscow City Court about the delay in the proceedings in his case. 15.  The applicant's expert medical examination ordered by the decision of the District Court of 20 January 2003 was carried out by the Forensic Medical Examination Bureau of the Public Health Committee of the Government of Moscow from 16 March 2005 to 18 March 2005. The experts' report of 18 March 2005 no. 22 confirmed that the applicant had suffered light bodily injury in the accident on 11 September 1996 and that his present health condition had no connection with the accident. 16.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant submitted additional claims and the court adjourned the hearing to 4 May 2005 in order to allow the defendant to get acquainted with the new claims. 17.  On 4 May 2005 the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow examined the case and delivered a judgment in which it granted the applicant's claims in part. It ordered the defendant to pay the applicant compensation in respect of the health damage, moral harm and costs. 18.  The applicant and the defendant appealed against the judgment. 19.  On 6 June 2005 the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1920. She died on 30 April 2006. The second applicant, her daughter and only heir, expressed her wish to pursue the proceedings in her own name and in the name of her deceased mother. The second applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Sofia. 7.  In 1958, Mr Koprinarov, whose heirs the applicants are, purchased from the State one storey of a three-storey house in Plovdiv. The property’s surface area was 109 square metres. The property had belonged to a private person until the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and for several years afterwards. 8.  After the adoption of the Restitution Law (ЗВСОНИ) in 1992, the former pre-nationalisation owners brought proceedings under section 7 of that law against the applicants, seeking the nullification of the applicants’ title and the restoration of their property. 9.  The case went twice through the court system and the Supreme Court of Cassation gave final judgment on 26 July 1999. 10.  The courts examined and dismissed a number of allegations made by the plaintiffs in respect of alleged breaches of the housing regulations and other legal provisions as in force in 1958. The courts found, however, that a relevant document in the file concerning the 1958 transaction – approval by the Minister of Public Construction – had been signed by a Head of Department in the Ministry, not by the Minister personally. It followed that the person from whom the applicants had inherited had obtained the property unlawfully. The applicants’ title was therefore null and void and they were ordered to vacate the property. 11.  The applicants were evicted from the property on 17 September 2001. The eviction was conducted in the presence of special counsel for the applicants, appointed by the relevant court on the basis that the applicants had not been found at their address and the summonses sent had been repeatedly returned undelivered. The applicants appealed against the acts of the enforcement judge arguing, inter alia, that they had never changed their address and that their belongings had been damaged. The appeals were unsuccessful. The courts noted that the applicants had not been found at the address they had indicated and that therefore there had not been procedural violations. Also, the applicants had failed to collect their belongings for more than a month and had thus been responsible for the damage complained of. 12.  Following their eviction, the applicants wrote repeatedly to the municipal authorities asking for compensation in the form of a municipal apartment or land but did not receive a reply. 13.  On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicants brought an action against the Plovdiv Municipality and the Ministry of Public Construction and Regional Development seeking compensation for the fact that they had lost their property owing to an administrative error committed by the defendant bodies in 1958. They claimed the current value of the apartment, estimated at 54,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (27,000 euros (EUR)). The claim was rejected by final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 27 June 2006 on the grounds that the relevant legislation – the State Responsibility for Damage Act 1989 – did not apply retrospectively and that the law provided for a special compensation scheme by bonds in cases like that of the applicants. 14.  In 2000, it became possible for the applicants to obtain compensation from the State in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. 15.  The applicants applied for compensation by bonds only in July 2006, when their claim for damage was rejected. On 16 August 2007 the regional governor declared their request inadmissible for having been submitted outside the three-month time-limit of the adoption of that provision in January 2000. The governor pointed that recent amendments of the restitution law (see paragraph 18 below) had not provided for a new time-limit. 16.  Since an unspecified date the applicants have lived in Sofia, in service accommodation provided by the second applicant’s husband’s office.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Troyes, France. 5.  On an unspecified date in 2001 the applicant brought an action to recover her property from a third person. On 1 November 2001 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Volgograd granted her claim in full and awarded her, inter alia, 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the non-pecuniary damage. 6.  On 11 September 2002 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. The judgment was enforced in full. 7.  On 9 August 2003 the other party to the proceedings lodged an application for a supervisory review of the judgment of 1 November 2001, as upheld on appeal on 11 September 2002. 8.  On 29 October 2003 a judge of the Volgograd Regional Court examined the above application and decided to remit the case for examination on the merits by the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court. He presented the case to the Presidium as the judge rapporteur. 9.  On 13 November 2003 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court held a supervisory-review hearing. It held that the lower courts had erroneously applied the substantive law. On that ground it quashed the judgment of 1 November 2001, as upheld on appeal on 11 September 2002, in the part concerning the award in respect of the non-pecuniary damage. Both the applicant and the defendant attended the hearing and made submissions to the court. The decision was delivered by four judges. The judge rapporteur did not take part in the deliberations or voted on the case. 10.  On 12 January 2004 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Volgograd obliged the applicant to repay RUB 5,000 which she had received by virtue of the judgment of 1 November 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Derry. He was the brother of Colm McCartney.\nA  The attack at Altnamachkin and the initial investigation 7.  On the night of 24 August 1975, Colm McCartney, the applicant's brother and Sean Farmer were driving home from the All-Ireland Gaelic football semi-finals in Croke Park, Dublin. Both men were found shot dead on the Cortamlet Road, Altnamachin, in South Armagh. Colm McCartney had been shot four times, Sean Farmer six times. According to the later inquest, the time of death was about 11.35 pm. The car was found burnt out half a mile from the murder scene. 8.  Prior to their deaths, at about 10.45 pm a police patrol in an unmarked car had been stopped at what was believed to be a bogus checkpoint (“VCP”) manned by armed men in military style uniforms on the A25 several hundred yards from where the bodies were found. A short conversation took place between the three RUC officers and a person holding a torch dressed in full military combat uniform. The officers noticed a second person also dressed in military uniform lying in a ditch apparently giving cover with a rifle. The scene at the checkpoint roused suspicions, inter alia, due to the lack of other vehicles, the accent of the person who stopped them and the length of hair of the man in the ditch. After being allowed through the checkpoint, the officers requested clarification by radio as to the presence of any army checkpoints in the vicinity. They were informed that none were operating. The police patrol drove to a police station, where, requesting army support, they decided to investigate further. 9.  At about 11.30 pm a local resident who had been walking his dog noticed a vehicle stopped on Cortamlet Road. He saw the interior light of the car come on and a door on the passenger side open. Three or four gunshots were heard. The witness saw a light from a lamp lying on the road. He then heard the sound of someone running along the road and a man's voice shouting \"Stop, stop,\" several times. This was followed by a flash and a bang. He heard a wild scream and everything went quiet. Fearing for his safety, the witness hid behind a tree. He heard further shooting, five to ten shots. After some minutes, he heard a car engine being started and the car, brownish with a black vinyl roof, drove past him without its lights on. He went to a neighbour who returned with him to the scene where they found two bodies. They contacted the police. 10.  At first light, a Detective Constable visited the scene and inspected the bodies which were some 50 metres apart. He arranged for the scene to be examined, photographed and mapped. The bodies were identified. 11.  The police visited the McCartney and Farmer families that day. On the same day, Colm McCartney's car was found gutted by fire half a mile from the scene. It was subsequently established by ballistics examinations that three firearms had been used and that the weapons had been used in other incidents. 12.  The police believed that the murders had been carried out by an extreme loyalist paramilitary organisation, reacting to a murder of a local Protestant. They had little doubt that the men who stopped the police patrol had been directly connected with the murders if not in fact the actual murderers. 13.  A report was submitted by the police to the Director of Public Prosecutions on 17 February 1976. 14.  An inquest occurred on 23 July 1976. It appears that the local resident who witnessed the shooting did not appear at the inquest, nor was his statement made available due to the decision of a police officer to protect his identity. 15.  The applicant claimed that there were concerns about the thoroughness of the original investigation. He stated that the occupants of the two cars who had come upon the two bodies were not asked to give a statement to the police or at the inquest. Because of the method used (a VCP manned by persons in uniform), there were allegations of security force collusion made at the time of the shooting. 16.  The investigation did not close and became active again in 1978, when a Catholic priest Father Hugh Murphy was abducted by loyalist paramilitaries intending to use him as a hostage vis-à-vis the IRA. The police arrested a reserve police constable, William McCaughey, who, in the course of questioning, revealed his part in the abduction of the priest and in a variety of other loyalist paramilitary incidents. McCaughey also named a police officer as being involved in a range of incidents. He specifically referred to a well-known paramilitary as being involved in the Altnamachin murders. While this paramilitary had been arrested and interviewed by the police on a number of occasions, the Government stated that there was no record that he had been specifically interviewed about the Altnamachin murders. The police officer was arrested and questioned, inter alia, about his role in the murders of McCartney and Farmer. He made no admissions. He was charged with other serious offences, resigned from the police and was subsequently convicted and sentenced. 17.  McCaughey's revelations gave rise to investigations in eleven specific cases, some of which were linked in terms of the identities of those involved, the modus operandi or by virtue of the ballistics examinations of weapons used. Nine suspects were arrested in total, including five police officers and all were eventually charged with offences. 18.  One of those implicated was a police officer John Weir who was named as having been involved in the murder of a shopkeeper called Strathearn in Ahoghill in April 1977: he was convicted for that murder in June 1980 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Government stated that both McCaughey and Weir refused to name the two loyalist paramilitaries also involved with them in the murder unless they received immunity from prosecution. The police and prosecuting authority took the decision prior to the trial not to enter into any process of bargaining with Weir and McCaughey. While both were approached by the police after their convictions to see if at that stage they would give evidence against the loyalist paramilitaries, each again refused to do so unless there was something in it for themselves. The Government stated that during the period in which Weir was detained he was interviewed on a large number of occasions. At no time did he implicate himself or others in any offence other than the Strathearn murder. 19.  On 1 February 1993, John Weir was released from prison on licence. In January 1999, he made a statement to a journalist alleging RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment (“UDR”) collusion with loyalist paramilitaries from the Portadown area in the mid-1970s. This statement was published in the Sunday Times newspaper in March 1999. It was obtained by the Patrick Finucane Centre, a human rights non-governmental organisation in Derry (“the Centre”). 20.  John Weir's statement made detailed allegations about security force collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in a series of incidents. He alleged inter alia that RUC Reserve Constable Laurence McClure had told him that McClure and Robert McConnell, a member of the UDR, along with members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), a proscribed loyalist paramilitary organisation, had been involved in the murder of Colm McCartney and Sean Farmer. 21.  The statement also made links between the attack on Donnelly's Bar and other attacks allegedly carried out by members of the security forces, both RUC and UDR, and loyalist paramilitaries. This group used the farmhouse in Glennane owned by James Mitchell, a RUC reservist, as a base from which to carry out attacks on Catholics and nationalists. Other attacks allegedly included the murder of John and Brian Reavey and wounding of Anthony Reavey in their home on 4 January 1976 (see application no. 34640/04); the attack on Donnelly's Bar in which Trevor Brecknell, Michael Donnelly and Patrick Donnelly were killed (see application no. 32457/04); the murder of Joseph, Barry and Declan O'Dowd and wounding of Barney O'Dowd (see application no. 34622/04); and the attack on the Rock Bar in which Michael McGrath was seriously injured (see application no. 34651/04). Weir also linked these attacks to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in which 33 people were killed in the Republic of Ireland. 22.  On or about 10 June 1999, RTE, an Irish television channel, broadcast a television programme that contained allegations of security force involvement in a number of deaths, including that of Trevor Brecknell. Weir made allegations on that programme that members of the RUC and UDR were directly involved in the attack on Donnelly's Bar. A BBC Spotlight programme produced a similar documentary. 23.  These allegations attracted considerable attention on both sides of the Irish border and became the subject of police investigation in both jurisdictions. The Government stated that the police investigation in Northern Ireland was focussed on determining whether Weir's allegations should be assessed as sufficiently credible to require a full investigation. They obtained from the journalist an edited transcript of the interview with Weir. While his whereabouts were unknown to the RUC, Weir met with senior Irish police officers at the Irish Embassy on 15 April 1999. A copy of his statement was provided by the Garda to the RUC, along with a further statement made by Weir to another journalist dated 3 February 1999. The police analysed the available materials and sought to identify the personalities to be interviewed. It became apparent that some had died and that others, living abroad, could not be traced. A series of seven interviews were conducted, under cautions, between July and December 2001, of those individuals central to Weir's account who could be traced. No charges were preferred. The interviews followed the format of Weir's allegations being put to the interviewee for his or her response. The predominant response was denial of any involvement and claims that Weir had been untruthful. No admissions were made by any interviewee. Interviews were also conducted with less central personalities and with police officers involved in interviewing Weir in 1978. The latter stated that Weir had not mentioned the matters now being alleged. Amongst those interviewed by the police in the course of the preliminary investigation of Weir's allegations, was one person questioned about the Altnamachin murders. He denied any involvement and made no admissions. 24.  Meetings were held regularly with RUC counterparts in the Republic of Ireland. The RUC co-operated also with the judicial inquiry established in the Republic of Ireland into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (see the description of the inquiry in the Brecknell case referred to above). Amongst matters about which the RUC team provided information to the inquiry was ballistics information which linked some of the weapons used to more than one incident. In February 2000 a substantial report was compiled by the RUC for the Garda dealing with Weir's allegations. It profiled Weir and dealt inter alia with a description of the 1978 investigation into McCaughey, Weir and others. It concluded that the investigation would continue but that his credibility was in doubt. According to the Government, despite inquiries being conducted, Weir's whereabouts could not be traced. This report was not disclosed as the investigation was continuing. An internal RUC report dated 27 February 2001 concluded that it would be necessary to interview Weir before any view could be finalised in respect of the credibility of his allegations: such interview was not possible as his whereabouts were not known. The report noted the absence of any previous mention of the allegations before 1999 and that much of what he said was hearsay and speculation. Inquiries made of the British Embassy in Nigeria (where he had a known address) and the criminal intelligence service and others failed to locate Weir. Contact was made with the Garda and the secretariat of the Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings without positive result. 25.  The Serious Crime Review Team (“SCRT”) was established in March 2004, with responsibilities including the review of all historical murders by way of case assessment for evidential and investigative opportunities. A preliminary case assessment was carried out by a detective chief inspector, who audited all known information and documentation. It was noted that the dossier provided by the Centre included statements from civilian witnesses who had allegedly come across the bodies following the murders. The SCRT attempted without success to obtain access to these materials. In light of the preliminary assessment, the case was referred to the Historical Enquiry Team (“HET”). On 28 April 2006, a senior investigating officer reported on the further review; a number of potential lines of inquiry were identified and recommendations made, including that the HET should extensively interview Weir. This recommendation has been approved. The HET director of Investigations, Detective Chief Superintendent James of the London Metropolitan Police Force, took over personal supervision of the investigation which has progressed through the first three of five stages of the HET process (collection of all relevant material; assessment of the investigations to date; review of evidence, with intelligence and open and non-police sources, together with a meeting with the families of the victims of the attack). As a number of investigative opportunities were identified and to be followed up, the case was to continue to be processed by HET, which had been put in touch with Weir by the Centre. The Government submitted that if any evidence of police involvement in the murders was found, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland would then become involved. The Government have provided recent information that Weir finally agreed to meet with the HET in Dublin; he refused, however, to make a written statement or to give evidence in court. 26.  There has been contact between the police and family members, their solicitors or the Centre. In particular, there were meetings on 21 January 2000 with Chief Superintendent McCann; on 19 December 2001 with Detective Inspector Aiken and in November 2002 with Detective Inspector Williamson and in June and August 2004 with the Chief Constable; members of HET met with families or their representatives on 30 March and 25 May 2006, and there has also been extensive correspondence with the families or their representatives.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Novosibirsk. 7.  Since 1988, the applicant had been receiving an old-age pension. From February 1998, her pension was to be calculated under the Law on Calculating and Upgrading State Pensions. The law introduced a new method for calculating pensions. This method, “a pensioner's individual multiplier” was meant to link the pensioner's pension to his or her previous earnings. 8.  The authority in charge of the applicant's pension, the Pension Fund Agency of the Zayeltsovskiy District of Novosibirsk, fixed the applicant's multiplier at 0.525. The applicant considered that the agency had misread the law, and that her multiplier should be higher. On an unspecified date in 1999 she challenged the agency's decision in a court. Thus, in her view the net underpayments from February 1998 until December 1999 amounted to 1,627.5 Russian Roubles, without taking into account the raise of the local cost of living index. 9.  The case came before the Zayeltsovskiy District Court of Novosibirsk. On 21 October 1999 the court held for the applicant. It found that the agency had misread the law: as from 1 February 1998 the multiplier should have been 0.7. Consequently, the agency was ordered to recalculate the applicant's pension accordingly and pay it. 10.  The agency appealed against the judgment, but on 14 December 1999 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed the appeal, and the judgment came into force. On the same day the court issued a writ of execution where it invited the local branch of the Pension Fund to recalculate the applicant's old age pension, applying the multiplier 0.7, and pay it to the applicant. The enforcement proceedings against the Agency were initiated. The agency recalculated the pension in accordance with the judgment of 14 December 1999 and requested the federal Pension Fund to allocate respective amounts. 11.  On 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development had passed an Instruction on the Application of Limitations Established by the Law on Calculating and Upgrading State Pensions (hereinafter – “Instruction”). The Instruction clarified how to apply the law. 12.  Some time thereafter a group of individuals challenged the Instruction before the Supreme Court. On 10 April 2000 the enforcement of the judgment in the applicant's favour was suspended in connection with the proceedings before the Supreme Court. On 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. It found that contrary to what the plaintiffs suggested the Ministry of Labour had not trespassed its authority when it issued the Instruction, and that the Ministry's interpretation of the Pensions Law had been correct. On 25 May 2000 the Cassation Section of the Supreme Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 13.  On 21 August 2000, the agency asked the District Court to re-open the case due to discovery of new circumstances. They argued that the interpretation of the law on pensions given by the Instruction was different from that of the Zayeltsovskiy District Court. Further, they referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation which confirmed the lawfulness of the Instruction. The agency argued that it had not known about those facts until after the litigation, and that the case should therefore be reconsidered. 14.  On 16 January 2001, the district court granted the agency's request and reopened the judgment under Article 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under this Article, a court might reopen a judgment, if a party discovered significant circumstances that were not and could not have been known to this party during the litigation. 15.  Having reconsidered the case, on 12 February 2001 the district court dismissed the applicant's claims in full. On 22 March 2001, the regional court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Žilina. 6.  On 26 November 2004 the Považská Bystrica District Court remanded the applicant in custody in connection with criminal proceedings in which he was accused of several offences. 7.  On 20 May 2005 a public prosecutor indicted the applicant before the Považská Bystrica District Court. 8.  On 10 August 2005 the applicant requested that he be released from detention. He argued that his detention under the decision of 26 November 2004 had expired on 25 May 2005 and that no decision had been taken to extend it. 9.  The District Court dismissed the applicant’s request on 23 August 2005. On 12 September 2005 the Trenčín Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against that decision. 10.  On 14 November 2005 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 11.  On 15 November 2005 the District Court convicted the applicant of two offences and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. The judgment became final on the same day. 12.  On 6 December 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court, by its decision of 12 September 2005, had breached the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, his detention had been unlawful between 26 May 2005 and 15 November 2005, as the District Court had not delivered a decision extending the applicant’s detention. 13.  The Constitutional Court quashed the Regional Court’s decision, awarded the equivalent of 1,970 euros (at that time) in compensation to the applicant and ordered the Regional Court to reimburse the costs of the applicant’s legal representation in the constitutional proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Ivanovo Region. 6.  On 28 October 2000 victims B. and M. were killed in the latter's house. On 31 October 2000 the applicant was questioned in the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor's office of Ivanovo in relation to the murders. Having been apprised of the privilege against self-incrimination, the applicant stated that he had spent most of the relevant day with his girlfriend Y. and his friend Ov., as well as several other persons (I., K. and V.), except for some time in the afternoon when Ov. and the applicant went to M.'s place but the latter was absent. The applicant added a note to the interview record alleging that he had been threatened with death or violence if he refused to make certain admissions. The record was also signed by a lawyer, Mr O. Immediately thereafter, the applicant signed a suspect arrest record, in which he indicated that he would like to be represented by O. 7.  On the same evening, the investigator twice heard Y., who stated at the second interview around midnight that the applicant had told her that he had killed victim M. The investigator also interviewed Ov., who confirmed in substance the applicant's account of the events but added that the applicant had told him that he had killed victims M. and B. with an axe; Ov. had also heard the applicant discuss an alibi with Y. 8.  On 1 November 2000 the applicant was brought for further interrogation. He was assisted by counsel and refused to testify. According to the applicant, a police officer or several officers exerted pressure on him and hit him on the head with a folder in order to force him to make self-incriminating statements. On the same day Y. gave a more detailed statement in addition to her second statement made on 31 October 2000. 9.  On 2 November 2000 the applicant refused the services of O., allegedly under pressure from unnamed officers. As follows from his written statement, he declined the services of counsel O. due to “contradicting positions on the case” and sought the appointment of a Ms Z. instead. The investigator appointed Z. as counsel and she assisted the applicant during the interview on the same day. The Government referred to the interview record from which it would follow that the applicant had made admissions on that date; that he had felt well and had been willing to give an oral testimony in the presence of counsel Z.; that he had been provided with an opportunity to have a consultation with counsel before the interview; and that he had had no complaints against any police officers. Ov. was also interviewed and provided a more detailed account of the events. 10.  On 3 November 2000 the applicant was examined by a medical expert. The applicant had scratches on his left elbow, bruises and scratches on his right arm and legs, several cuts and scratches on his hands, scratches below the ribs, and a scratch on his head. According to the expert, the above injuries had been sustained four to nine days before the date of the examination. 11.  On 10 November 2000 the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by O. again. However, on 7 December 2000 the applicant retained the services of another counsel, Mr S., who assisted him in the subsequent pre-trial and trial proceedings. 12.  On 20 December 2000 O. (instead of counsel S.) requested the investigator to order an expert report to verify if the applicant had been emotionally disturbed when, according to his version, he had seen victim B. kill victim M. in the latter's house. However, the investigator rephrased the question to the expert as whether the applicant had been emotionally disturbed when the victims had been murdered. 13.  Ov. and Y. were interviewed again in 2001. The investigator also interviewed K., who stated that on 28 October 2000 he had been together with the applicant until his departure in the evening; that Ov. told him that the applicant had killed M. and B. 14.  On an unspecified date, the applicant was charged with murder, robbery and destruction of property.  The case was referred to the Ivanovo Regional Court for trial by a jury. 15.  The trial judge considered that it was appropriate to accept in evidence the applicant's interview record of 2 November 2000 since the applicant's allegation of duress was unfounded. The applicant argued that he had seen victim B. kill victim M.; he admitted the arson of the house but pleaded legitimate self-defence in respect of causing injuries to victim B. during a violent fight. 16.  It also appears that a number of expert reports were presented to the jury. It transpires from the available material that one of the reports concluded that certain traces of blood at the crime scene and on the clothes of the applicant “could belong” to the applicant and victim B. who had the same blood group. 17.  The jury heard a number of witnesses, including witnesses K., V., I., who had seen the applicant in Ov.'s flat on the day of the murders or on the next day. The trial judge allowed the reading out of their pre-trial depositions. 18.  The jury also heard Ov. and the applicant was given an opportunity to put questions to him. At the court hearing Ov. alleged that he had previously made statements against the applicant under pressure from the police. The judge examined the allegation of ill-treatment and rejected it as unfounded. The judge thus allowed the reading out of his pre-trial depositions to the jury (see also paragraph 20 below). 19.  The trial judge twice summoned Y. However, the subpoenas could not be served on her and were returned to the court because she did not live at the address which she had provided to the domestic authorities during the investigation. There was no information about her whereabouts; her next of kin were not aware of her new place of residence. Having excluded Y.'s statement made on 31 October 2000, the trial judge, however, allowed the reading out of her subsequent statements (see also paragraph 21 below). 20.  In her summing-up to the jury on 16 October 2001, the trial judge reiterated the charges against the applicant and the evidence referred to by the parties and declared admissible. The judge explained to the jury that she had not been presented with any evidence indicating that Ov.'s testimony had been obtained under duress or otherwise in breach of law. Considering that the defence counsel had presented a distorted summary of the victims' injuries in his final speech, the judge reiterated the conclusions of the admissible expert reports. She also indicated to the jury that it was not their remit to decide on the putative self-defence issue. 21.  After several hours of deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charges of murder, robbery and destruction of property. On 17 October 2001 the trial judge held the final hearing concerning civil claims, the sentence and other matters to be determined by the trial judge. Y. appeared before the trial judge on that day and explained that she had not received any court summons, which had been sent to her mother's home address. Her mother was unaware of her new place of residence. Having learnt about the trial the day before, she decided to come to the courthouse (see also paragraph 19 above). The trial judge allowed Y. to give her opinion concerning the applicant's personality in so far as this matter could be relevant to the sentence. On the same day, the applicant was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment and the confiscation of his property was ordered. 22.  The applicant submitted objections to the trial verbatim record, considering inter alia that Y. had in fact explained to the trial judge that the investigator had wrongly noted her new home address as her work address. The trial judge, however, rejected those objections as untrue. 23.  The applicant and his counsel submitted appeals to the Supreme Court of Russia. They argued that there had been various defects in the pre-trial investigation, in particular as regards the right to legal assistance; they contested the quality of the evidence, including the expert opinions, and the trial judge's summing-up to the jury. The applicant's counsel S. asked to be notified of the date for the appeal hearing and the applicant asked to be brought to that hearing. 24.  On 8 January 2002 the applicant requested the Regional Court to give him access to the case file in order to prepare his defence on appeal. On 1 February 2002 the Regional Court dismissed his request because Russian law did not vest in the accused a right to have access to the file in appeal proceedings. The applicant unsuccessfully renewed his request in February 2002. 25.  On 22 February 2002 the judge rejected a request by the applicant to have the trial verbatim record amended. Having examined the trial transcript, on 18 March 2002 the applicant's counsel submitted a statement of appeal. A handwritten inscription by the trial judge contained the instruction that “all participants in the proceedings be made aware of that document”. 26.  On 19 April 2002 the Supreme Court granted leave to the applicant to participate in the appeal hearing and ordered that he be brought to Moscow from the Ivanovo Region. As can be seen from a telegram dated 28 May 2002, the applicant's counsel had been informed that the appeal hearing was listed for 4 June 2002 at 10 am. According to the Government, the applicant was also informed accordingly on the same date. 27.  The applicant asserted that in April 2002 he had requested the Supreme Court to grant him access to the documents relating to the appeal proceedings, including the statement of appeal lodged by his lawyer and the written observations prepared by the prosecutor. He received no reply to this request. 28.  On an unspecified date, the prosecutor lodged his observations in reply to the applicant's appeal. A copy of those observations was not made available to the applicant or his counsel. 29.  On 31 May 2002 Moscow remand centre received a letter from the Supreme Court requiring them to make arrangements for the applicant's participation in the appeal hearing on 4 June 2002 at 10 am and for the applicant to be notified of the date of the hearing. 30.  On 4 June 2002 the Supreme Court heard the applicant by way of a video link and upheld the trial judgment. During the appeal hearing the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. The prosecutor was present at the hearing. 31.  The court refused to examine the applicant's arguments directed against the findings of fact made at first instance by the jury since this aspect of the case could not be challenged on appeal. It noted that the applicant had been informed of the special procedure for appeal against the verdict of a jury (see also paragraph 48 below). The appeal court examined the remaining arguments and dismissed them. Lastly, the court noted that the applicant had been given access to the case file before the trial in July-August 2001 and after the trial in December 2001-February 2002. The applicable legislation did not require photocopying of the file. 32.  In 2005 the Regional Court reconsidered the trial and appeal judgments in the light of the amended (more favourable) legislation and lifted the order for the confiscation of the applicant's property. 33.  The applicant complained to the district prosecutor that on 1 November 2000 an officer had hit him on the head with a folder; that he had been subjected to threats on 2 November 2000 and that he had been compelled to decline O.'s services. The prosecutor heard the investigator in charge of the case against the applicant and the officer who had allegedly beat him. On 6 December 2000 the district prosecutor refused to initiate criminal proceedings, noting the applicant's contradictory statements concerning the alleged threats or beating. The inquiry file was then lost. In the resumed proceedings, the district investigator heard the applicant and the investigator in charge of the case against the applicant. On 27 August 2001 the district investigator issued a new decision not to institute criminal proceedings. He referred to the medical report of 3 November 2000, which had revealed injuries sustained, according to the expert, four to nine days before the date of the examination (see paragraph 10 above). The investigator concluded that those injuries had been sustained before the applicant's arrest. He also noted that the applicant had made no health complaints during his detention in the temporary detention centre from 31 October to 3 November 2000. 34.  The applicant was informed of his right to appeal against the above refusals to a prosecutor or to seek judicial review. Instead, the applicant brought court proceedings accusing the town prosecutor of inaction in relation to the alleged threats on 31 October 2000. On 29 March 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo discontinued the proceedings because the town prosecutor had never been asked to deal with the applicant's complaint. The court also held that the prosecutor's office had carried out inquiries but found no evidence of the alleged ill-treatment. Moreover, the District Court referred to the fact that the Regional Court had dealt with this issue at the applicant's trial and also found no evidence of the alleged ill-treatment. On 30 April 2002 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 29 March 2002, considering that only formal decisions were amenable to judicial review. In separate proceedings, the applicant complained about unlawful actions against him on 31 October 2000. On 15 May 2002 the Regional Court took the final decision to discontinue the case because there was no formal decision amenable to review. On 18 April 2003 the applicant again complained to a court about the alleged ill-treatment by the police and the inaction of the regional prosecutor's office. On 19 June 2003 the Regional Court took the final decision to discontinue the case. 35.  From 31 October to 3 November 2000 the applicant was kept in a temporary detention centre in Ivanovo. It appears that from 3 November 2000 to 14 May 2002 he was detained in Ivanovo remand centre no. 1. The applicant was kept in Moscow remand centre no. 77/3 from 14 May to 2 August 2002 in relation to the appeal proceedings in his criminal case. 36.  The applicant submitted that on 4 June 2002 he had spent six hours in a small cell in the remand centre with fifteen other persons. The cell had been overheated and had no ventilation. While the temperature outside on 4 June 2002 had exceeded 30ºC, the temperature in the cell had reached over 50ºC. He had not been given water for six hours and had not been allowed to use the toilet. 37.  The applicant subsequently submitted that the cell measured 18.6 square metres and that he had been detained with up to twenty other persons. 38.  According to the Government, on 4 June 2002 the applicant had been placed in an “assembly cell” measuring 18.6 square metres. This cell had no windows, ventilation, sanitary installations or water supply. However, the prison staff allowed the detainees to go to the toilet outside the cell and provided them with drinking water. Air access was ensured by an opening in the cell door. 39.  Later on the same day, the applicant had been transferred to cell no. 521 measuring 32.7 square metres for the purpose of participating in the appeal hearing before the Supreme Court by way of a video link. The cell was equipped with a ventilation system, water supply and a sink. Toilet facilities were separated from the main area. Drinking water had been made available to the applicant and the lights had been left on. During the summer period the window panes were removed and detainees were provided with fans. The outside temperature had not exceeded 21.4ºC on that day. The applicant had been provided with bedding and tableware in the remand centre. Detainees were provided with three hot meals a day. 40.  The applicant and certain other detainees complained about the conditions of detention in the Moscow remand centre. 41.  According to a letter from the Moscow Prosecutor's Office of 9 March 2004, the conditions of detention in cell no. 521 were acceptable; the outside temperature in Moscow on 4 June 2002 did not exceed +18º C, as indicated by the Moscow Weather Centre. 42.  According to letters from the Moscow Prosecutor's Office of 5 and 7 July 2004, the conditions in a cell measuring 18.6 square metres “did not meet the sanitary requirements” at the material time. After an inquiry the supervising prosecutor concluded on 5 July 2004 that up to late 2002 detainees awaiting an appeal hearing had been placed in the above cell with no window, ventilation, sanitary installations or water supply. Since late 2002 detainees awaiting appeal hearings had been placed in “assembly cell” no. 521. Although the applicant had not provided sufficient details, on the basis of information from the prison staff the prosecutor determined that the applicant had also been kept in cell no. 521 on 4 June 2002. The prosecutor also indicated that the document confirming that the applicant had received the letter from the Supreme Court concerning the appeal hearing did not bear his signature. He concluded that the remand centre staff had nonetheless ensured the applicant's right to participate in the appeal hearing. 43.  According to the applicant, on 23 January 2003 he handed over a letter to be dispatched by the prison administration to the Registry of the Court. In November 2003 the latter acknowledged receipt of his letter dated 14 September 2003 and informed him that no letter dated 23 January 2003 had been received. 44.  On 13 July 2004 the Registry of the Court, by registered mail, requested the applicant to provide by 24 August 2004 certain documents and information concerning his application pending before the Court. According to the acknowledgement-of-receipt card, on 5 August 2004 the letter was received by an unspecified person in the detention facility. According to the Government, on 5 and 15 August 2004 the applicant was called to the office in charge of correspondence in the facility in order to receive the letter, but refused to accept it. 45.  On 22 September 2004 the applicant's sister informed the Court by fax that the applicant had only received the letter on 21 September 2004 in an unsealed envelope. 46.  Following the applicant's complaint about the issue, on 3 November 2004 the Penitentiary Department of the Ivanovo Region replied that the delay in the delivery of the letter did not constitute a hindrance of the applicant's correspondence with the European Court; although the prison officer had been negligent, there had been no intention to delay the letter.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and is now serving a prison sentence in Kazan UE-148/19 correctional colony. 6. On 16 December 2001 he was arrested. On 28 December 2001 the prosecutor’s office of the Novosheshminskiy District of the Republic of Tatarstan authorised his detention on charges of inflicting severe injuries which had caused the death of the victim. 7. By a judgment of 5 March 2002, the Novosheshminskiy District Court of the Republic of Tatarstan convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment in a correctional colony with a special regime. On 14 May 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the judgment on appeal.\n 8. During the relevant periods the applicant was detained in the following detention facilities. From 16 December 2001 to 9 January 2002 he was held in the temporary detention facility at Novosheshminskiy police station (изолятор временного содержания Новошешминского РОВД). He was then transferred to Bugulma IZ-16/03 remand centre (следственный изолятор ИЗ-16/3 Главного управления Федеральной службы исполнения наказаний по Республике Татарстан) where he was held from 9 January to 20 August 2002, except for a short period from 28 to 29 January 2002, which he spent in the temporary detention facility at Novosheshminskiy police station. From 20 August 2002 to 26 August 2003 he was held in Chistopol UE-148/T prison (тюрьма УЭ-148/Т г. Чистополя Республики Татарстан).\n 9. The parties’ descriptions of the conditions of the applicant’s pre-trial and post-trial detention significantly differ on a number of counts. 22. The applicant was held in Bugulma IZ-16/3 detention facility from 9 January to 20 August 2002, except for a short period from 28 to 29 January 2002. 23. According to his submissions, at the material time the cells where he was detained measured 5 x 1.5 metres on average, had six beds and accommodated between twelve and fifteen inmates, who had to take turns to sleep and were not provided with personal bedding. The lights were permanently on. The windows had no glass and were sealed with metal shutters. It was very hot in the summer and freezing in the winter. The toilet was placed very close to the dining table, with no privacy. Despite regular complaints about insects, the administration took no action to fumigate the cells. A shower was available twice a month. No outside exercise was offered to the applicant. The detainees’ food consisted mainly of vegetables and soya products. The medical assistance was inadequate. 2. The Government’s account\n 24. Relying on a certificate dated 27 December 2006 issued by the facility management, the Government submitted that the applicant had been held in five cells:\n- cell no. 212, measuring 21 sq. m and accommodating five inmates including the applicant;\n- cell no. 311, measuring 12 sq. m with six sleeping places;\n- cell no. 312, measuring 12 sq. m with six sleeping places;\n- cell no. 317, measuring 21 sq. m with fourteen sleeping places;\n- cell no. 407, measuring 21 sq. m, with fourteen sleeping places.\n 25. In cell no. 212 the applicant was detained from 8 to 20 August 2002. Due to the destruction of the facility’s records on the expiry of the statutory storage time-limit, it was not possible to establish the exact periods during which the applicant was detained in the other four cells and the exact number of inmates detained with him.\n 26. All cells were equipped with a sink and a lavatory separated from the living area by a partition of not less than one metre in height. Showers were available once a week with a simultaneous change of bedding. The inmates were provided with washbowls for their hygiene needs. The water was supplied centrally and could be heated with electric heaters.\n 27. The cells were ventilated through casement windows and in addition were equipped with ventilation shafts. The cells were aired daily, while the inmates were having their exercise. The average temperature and level of humidity met sanitary and hygiene requirements.\n 28. The windows were not covered with metal shutters, as a result there was enough natural light to allow reading and writing. The cells were also equipped with lamps which could be turned on when necessary. The lamps were covered with a protective fitting. During the night, the artificial lighting was dimmed.\n 29. The cells were fumigated regularly, with the assistance of a special sanitary service when necessary, and the detainees never complained about insects or rats.\n 30. The food met official nutritional standards. The quality of the food was controlled by the facility’s medical unit. In addition, the applicant could receive parcels and could buy food and other things from the facility’s shop.\n 31. During his detention the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place, bedding, cutlery and utensils. He had an hour’s daily exercise. His state of health was monitored regularly and he was provided with medical assistance when necessary. He never complained about the conditions of his detention while in Bugulma IZ-16/3.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Simferopol. 5.  On 16 March 2005 the prosecutors started criminal investigations against her on suspicion of fraud. 6.  On 5 October 2005 she was arrested and placed in a cell in the Simferopol Kyivskyy District Police Station. According to the applicant, the conditions of her detention were degrading. In particular, she was not provided with medical aid, food, or a place to sleep. 7.  The applicant alleges that during her first questioning, on 6 October 2005, she was not assisted by a lawyer. 8.  On 7 October 2005 the Kyivskyy District Court of Simferopol ordered the applicant’s release subject to an undertaking not to abscond. 9.  On 23 July 2007 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Simferopol (“the Tsentralnyy Court”) convicted the applicant of several counts of fraud and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment with confiscation of all her property. The court also ordered the applicant’s placement in custody pending the entry into force of its judgment. 10.  On the same day the applicant was placed in the Simferopol Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit no. 15 (“the SIZO”). 11.  The applicant maintains that the findings of the first-instance court concerning her responsibility for the crimes of which she had been convicted on 23 July 2007 were subsequently relied upon by the same court in a judgment of 30 November 2007 concerning a similar case against another person. She provided no further details of the latter case. 12.  On 20 December 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the judgment of 23 July 2007 and remitted the case to the Tsentralnyy Court for fresh consideration. At the same time, it ordered the applicant to remain detained, without providing reasons or a time-limit for her continued detention. 13.  In the course of the new consideration of the case by the Tsentralnyy Court, the charges against the applicant were changed to one count of fraud. 14.  On 6 February 2008 the court rejected the applicant’s request for release stating in particular that there were no grounds for the release, whereas a quashing of the judgment was not a reason for changing a detention order as such. 15.  On 20 August 2008 the court changed the applicant’s preventive measure in view of the new charges against her and her state of health. It ordered the applicant’s release subject to an undertaking not to abscond. 16.  In a judgment of 27 August 2008 it convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced her to thirteen months’ imprisonment. The court further held that the applicant was not required to serve her sentence, as she had been detained for the same period of time in the course of the proceedings. By the same judgment, the court ordered the destruction of certain items in evidence, which, according to the applicant, included some of her personal belongings seized in the course of the investigations. 17.  The applicant did not appeal against that judgment. 18.  She unsuccessfully lodged a number of complaints with the prosecutors, courts, and the Council of Judges, accusing the investigators and judges of falsification of the case materials and of various procedural violations. She also raised allegations that some of the witnesses against her had made false statements, but to no avail.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Yugorsk, a town in the Tyumen region. 5.  On 29 May 2002 the applicant brought a court action against his former employer seeking compensation for damage to health related to professional hardship. 6.  On 29 November 2004 Yugorskiy District Court (Khanty-Mansiyskiy Region) dismissed his claim as manifestly ill-founded. 7.  On 14 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 29 November 2004. 8.  According to the Government, on 30 December 2004 the District Court sent a letter to the applicant informing him that the appeal hearing had been scheduled for 8 February 2005. 9.  On 8 February 2005 the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Regional Court held a hearing which the applicant did not attend. The adverse party’s representative attended the hearing and made submissions. The Regional Court upheld the judgment of 29 November 2004. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a supervisory review of the appeal decision of 8 February 2005. 11.  By a decision of 14 March 2005 a judge of the Regional Court refused to examine his application on the grounds that the enclosed copy of the appeal decision of 8 February 2005 had not been certified by the relevant court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1974 and 1977 respectively and live in Kielce. 7.  The first applicant (Ms D. Welke), had a school friend, Ms M.B., who was resident in the Netherlands. 8.  In January 2003 the Central Investigation Bureau (“CIB”; Centralne Biuro Śledcze) of the Police was informed by the German authorities about a parcel containing cocaine, which had been dispatched in Brazil and addressed to Ms E.B. in Kielce, Poland. On 3 February 2003 the Chief Police Commissioner (Komendant Główny Policji) authorised the covert surveillance of the parcel on the basis of section 19b § 1 of the Police Act. On 4 February 2003 the parcel was intercepted by officers of the CIB. They opened the parcel and found that it contained, in particular, fourteen plastic bags containing a white powder substance hidden by twos in seven cases. The police experts tested the substance and established that it was cocaine. The officers replaced the drugs with a similar-looking substance. 9.  On 5 February 2003 the Chief Police Commissioner ordered the covert operation (kontrola operacyjna w postaci podsłuchu pomieszczeń). It appears that the police placed a secret recording device in the parcel. 10.  On 6 February 2003 the parcel was delivered to Ms E.B. She was a friend of Ms M.B.’s late mother. On the same day Ms E.B. informed the first applicant that she had received a parcel from Brazil addressed to M.B. The first applicant telephoned her friend who confirmed that she was expecting a parcel and asked the first applicant if she could keep it for her. The first applicant agreed. 11.  On the same day the first applicant went to collect the parcel. She and Ms E.B. partly opened it and found tee-shirts and cardboard cases containing chain necklaces. They did not find anything else in the parcel. 12.  Subsequently Ms Welke took the parcel home, where she met her boyfriend Mr Białek (the second applicant). The applicants opened the parcel and examined its contents. Later on, they both left the flat to call Ms M.B. from a phone box. The first applicant put all contents of the parcel in a plastic bag together with parts of the original parcel indicating the addresses of the sender and the recipient. Then the first applicant hid the plastic bag in her room. 13.  On 6 February 2003 at around 8 p.m. the police arrested the applicants as they were leaving the flat. The officers then searched the flat. The first applicant, at the request of the officers, surrendered the plastic bag with all its contents. Examination of the contents revealed that in each of the seven cases containing chain necklaces were hidden two transparent plastic bags containing a white powder substance. The applicants were charged with drug-trafficking offences. 14.  On 8 February 2003 the Kielce Regional Prosecutor from the Organised Crime Department opened a criminal investigation into the alleged transfer of cocaine from Brazil to Poland. He relied on classified material provided by the Chief Police Commissioner and the information gathered by the CIB officers. 15.  On 8 February 2003 the Kielce District Court remanded the applicants in custody on reasonable suspicion that they had committed the drug-trafficking offences. It had regard to the evidence obtained so far in the case, in particular the witnesses’ statements, the classified evidence, the expert reports and the results of the search. The court noted that the applicants’ statements contradicted the other evidence in the case. On 23 June 2003 the Kielce Regional Court decided to end the applicants’ detention and to release them on bail. The bail was paid on the following day and the applicants were released. The court imposed non-custodial preventive measures on them. 16.  A significant part of the evidence gathered in the case was classified as confidential (poufne). On 9 April 2003 both applicants consulted the classified evidence and other evidence. They did not lodge any motions in respect of the evidence and did not make any comments on the investigation. 17.  On 18 April 2003 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment against the applicants with the Kielce Regional Court. They were charged with trafficking in 971 grams of cocaine. The prosecutor established the facts of the case on the basis of classified evidence, expert reports in chemistry and dactyloscopy, the results of the search of the flat and statements made by Ms E.B. and her friend Ms I.B., and partly on the basis of statements made by the applicants. 18.  Part of the case file and the written reasons for the bill were classified as it contained information covered by professional secrecy (tajemnica służbowa). The prosecutor asked the court for the defendants and their counsel to be allowed to consult the reasons for the bill of indictment, in accordance with the rules laid down in the Protection of Classified Information Act. Furthermore, invoking Article 360 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”), the prosecutor requested that the entire hearing be conducted in camera on account of the important State interests involved. 19.  The first applicant had two defence lawyers and the second applicant had one. On 12 and 26 May 2003 respectively the applicants and their counsel consulted the bill of indictment in the secret registry of the Kielce Regional Court. 20.  On 27 May 2003 the President of the 3rd Criminal Division of the Regional Court authorised the applicants, their counsel and the prosecutor to consult the record of the opening of the parcel, the transcript of the secret recordings and photographic evidence. On 28 May 2003 counsel for the first and second applicants consulted those materials in the secret registry. They were informed that they would be criminally liable in the event of their failure to respect the confidentiality of the information. 21.  The first hearing was set for 27 May 2003. At that hearing the court allowed the prosecutor’s request to conduct the trial in camera, having regard to the important State interests involved as provided for in Article 360 § 1 (3) of the CCP. The applicants’ counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s request. The court directed the persons present in the courtroom (the applicants, their counsel and three police officers) that they were under an obligation to keep confidential all information disclosed during the hearing. The applicants and their counsel could consult the case file in the secret registry of the court. 22.  The Kielce Regional Court held six hearings on the following dates: 27 May, 12 and 23 June, 22 July, 10 September and 8 October 2003. The Regional Court’s bench was composed of one professional judge and two lay judges. 23.  At the first hearing, held on 27 May 2003, the applicants pleaded not guilty. They refused to testify, but answered some questions from the court and their counsel. The trial court heard as witnesses Ms E.B., Ms I.B. and two other persons, friends of the applicants, who had been arrested with them. 24.  On 11 June 2003 the trial court received a copy of the decision of the Warsaw Regional Court of 12 February 2003 authorising the Chief Police Commissioner of 5 February 2003 to order the secret recordings. 25.  On 12 June 2003 the court provided the applicants with the transcript of secret recordings, on which they refused to comment. At the hearing held on 22 July 2003 the trial court heard the secret recordings made by the CIB. According to the applicants, the recordings were of very poor quality. The conversation between the first applicant and Ms E.B. was completely incomprehensible, and only vague extracts of the conversation between the applicants could be heard, interrupted by noises and rattling. 26.  At the hearings held on 10 September and 8 October 2003 the court heard CIB officers involved in the investigation, including those who had opened the parcel on 4 February 2003. The court authorised them to testify in respect of the facts covered by the duty of professional secrecy. 27.  At the hearing held on 10 September 2003 the first applicant requested the trial court to reverse its earlier decision to conduct the proceedings in camera. She submitted that as a consequence of that decision her defence rights had been limited because she had not been allowed to make notes from the file. Her counsel did not take a stand on the request, stating that it was the first applicant’s personal view. The prosecutor objected to the request, claiming that the grounds for the decision to exclude the public remained relevant. He also argued that the first applicant’s defence rights were duly respected as she could personally consult the classified part of the case file. The Regional Court dismissed the request to reverse the earlier decision to conduct the proceedings in camera as the grounds originally invoked for that decision remained fully valid. 28.  On 15 October 2003 the Kielce Regional Court gave judgment. It found the applicants guilty of having participated in the transit of cocaine through Poland in concert with other persons, and sentenced them to one year and six months’ imprisonment and a fine of PLN 1,500. It further ordered them to make a payment of 500 PLN to a local association fighting drug addiction and to reimburse the State’s costs incurred in the proceedings. The written reasons for the judgment were classified as confidential and deposited in the secret registry of the court. The applicants’ counsel were informed accordingly and notified of their right to consult the written reasons. They filed an appeal without consulting the written reasons for the judgment. 29.  When establishing the facts, the Regional Court excluded the evidence obtained by means of the secret recordings ordered by the Chief Police Commissioner on 5 February 2003. The Regional Court observed that the Police Commissioner’s order had not been endorsed by a court within five days as required by section 19 § 3 of the Police Act. Accordingly, the evidence obtained on the basis of that order was unlawful and could not be used in the criminal proceedings against the applicants. On the other hand, the Regional Court confirmed that the secret surveillance of the parcel and the replacement of the cocaine with an unspecified powder substance had been effected in accordance with the Police Act and the relevant Ordinance of the Minister of the Interior. 30.  On the basis of the available evidence, in particular, various statements made by the applicants during the investigation and during the trial, the Regional Court found that at the time when the parcel had been at their disposal the applicants had known that it contained drugs. The court found that the applicants had acted intentionally with a view to transferring the drugs through Poland to the Netherlands. Thus, their guilt had been sufficiently established. 31.  In their appeal, the applicants alleged breaches of several provisions of criminal procedure committed by the prosecution and the court, arbitrary assessment of evidence and disregard for the in dubio pro reo principle. They argued that the excluded evidence should have been omitted as the “fruit of the poisonous tree”, whereas the court had actually based the conviction on that evidence. Further, they submitted that the applicants’ right to defend themselves had been impaired because access to the classified evidence had been very difficult, and neither the applicants nor their lawyers had been allowed to make copies or notes of the written reasons for the judgment. 32.  On 5 February 2004 the Kraków Court of Appeal held a hearing at which the prosecutor requested the court to conduct the proceedings in camera. The applicants’ counsel left the issue to the court’s discretion. The Court of Appeal decided pursuant to Article 360 § 1 (3) of the CCP to allow the prosecutor’s request since the examination of the appeal would not be possible without consideration of the classified evidence. The Court of Appeal further decided to supplement the evidentiary material. It noted that the trial court had not determined the exact circumstances of the removal of the cocaine from the parcel and its replacement by a similar substance and decided, to this end, to hear four police officers who had been involved in the covert interception of the parcel. 33.  On 10 March 2004 the Kraków Court of Appeal held a hearing in camera. It heard evidence from three police officers and established that the cocaine had been removed from the parcel and replaced with a similar substance by the police. 34.  The prosecutor requested the Court of Appeal to hear the secret recordings and argued that the Regional Court had erred in excluding that evidence. The Court of Appeal rejected that request, noting that it could not examine the relevant decision of the Regional Court since the first-instance judgment had not been appealed against by the prosecutor (reformatio in peius). 35.  On the same date, after deliberations, the Court of Appeal amended the judgment of the Regional Court by changing the legal classification of the offence to one of “attempted” transit of drugs (usiłowanie nieudolne) as the police had secretly removed the drug from the parcel and replaced it with a similar substance. It accordingly reduced the applicants’ sentence to one year’s imprisonment. The judge rapporteur presented orally the main reasons for the judgment. The written reasons for the judgment were classified as confidential and could only be consulted in the secret registry of the court. 36.  The Court of Appeal confirmed that the applicants had taken part in the transit of cocaine through Poland. The first applicant had collected the parcel from the addressee and kept it in order to hand it over to a person indicated by Ms M.B.. She had also informed Ms M.B. of the collection of the parcel. The second applicant had assisted the first applicant in the process. 37.  The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, as follows:\n“The applicants’ counsel are wrong to plead that the accused had no intention to take part in the transit of the drugs through Poland. This was sufficiently established by the [admitted] evidence, and in particular by the statements of the accused themselves. (...)\nThe applicants’ counsel are wrong to claim that the accused’s right to defend themselves was restricted on account of the fact that part of the evidence was classified, or that the judgment was the result of the fact that the judges had retained in their mind the content of excluded evidence. Both those situations are a simple consequence of the application of the relevant regulations, namely the regulation regarding classified information and the [regulation on] judicial review of the legality of evidence. ... 3.  The assertion that there was no equality of arms because part of the evidence was classified is incorrect. Such evidence was not withheld from the counsel, as they were able to consult it in the same manner as the prosecutor, and the restrictions on disclosure of classified material were equally applicable to both parties. 4.  (...) The consultation of classified evidence meant accepting certain conditions, including the prohibition on taking notes on the contents of such evidence; nonetheless those restrictions were not of such a nature that they could be considered to limit the rights of the defence. Counsel could memorise the content of the evidence they consulted, then use it, while respecting the requirements of confidentiality, either when pleading at the closed hearings or with due diligence in their written submissions. (...) Those were then not limitations on the rights of the defence, but rather certain impediments in conducting the defence, in any case impediments of a minor degree. In the Court of Appeal’s view, those limitations were necessary since part of the evidence was classified. If they [those limitations] were not applied, the interests protected by the regulation on classified information would be affected. [Those limitations] are present in every case concerning classified information, and thus alleging shortcomings in this respect does not concern just this particular case but relates generally to the principle of the determination of criminal charges based on evidence covered by the regulation on classified information. That would then be a claim of unconstitutionality in respect of the determination of such cases due to the limitation by that regulation of the constitutionally protected rights of the defence (Article 42 § 2 of the Constitution), which is far-reaching, unjustified and – for the Court of Appeal – unconvincing. If those arguments (or rather groundless assertions) of the author of such allegations were to be shared, then the determination of cases involving classified material would be ruled out. (...).” 38.  The Court of Appeal rejected the applicants’ claim that the trial court had based the conviction on the excluded evidence. In this respect it noted, inter alia:\n“The allegation that the Regional Court’s ruling was influenced by the content of the excluded evidence, i.e. the evidence obtained secretly by the police and the explanations of the accused related to that evidence, is incorrect. Firstly, it is not uncommon in criminal proceedings that some evidence is removed from the scope of evidentiary material constituting the basis for a ruling. (...) Ensuring that judges did not know the evidence that was excluded would mean extinguishing those procedural acts in which such evidence was examined, removing the records of such information from the files and restarting every trial before a different panel of the court. That would not be reasonable and it is not provided for by law. (...) In other words, the Court of Appeal examines whether the evidence the Regional Court took as the basis for its ruling was sufficient for it to give the ruling or whether there was insufficient evidentiary basis for it. The Court of Appeal considers that there was sufficient evidence to give the judgment, and thus the judgment [of the Regional Court] has adequate evidentiary basis (with one reservation in respect of the presence of the drug in the parcel). The allegation that the judges [of the Regional Court] were influenced by the content of excluded evidence had no significance for the content of the judgment.” 39.  The applicants lodged cassation appeals. The second applicant’s lawyer submitted, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had not referred to the arguments raised in the appeals, that in its assessment of evidence the court had infringed the principles of impartiality, presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo. They repeated their arguments, submitted to the Court of Appeal, that the unlawfully obtained evidence, although eventually excluded by the first-instance court, had been presented during the trial as admissible evidence, which must have unfairly prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. The defence also argued that since the evidence obtained by means of the secret recordings had been excluded at first instance, there had been no reason to hold the appeal proceedings in private. 40.  On 20 October 2004 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera in a single judge formation, dismissed the applicants’ cassation appeals, finding both of them manifestly ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born in October 1971 and lives in Wiltshire. 12.  The facts, as found by Mr Justice Wall (“Wall J”), who heard the parties’ oral evidence (see paragraph 20 below), are as follows. 13.  On 12 July 2000 the applicant and her partner, J. (born in November 1976), commenced treatment at the Bath Assisted Conception Clinic (“the clinic”). The applicant had been referred for treatment at the clinic five years earlier, when she was married, but had not pursued it because of the breakdown of her marriage. 14.  On 10 October 2001 the applicant and J. were informed, during an appointment at the clinic, that preliminary tests had revealed that the applicant had serious pre-cancerous tumours in both ovaries, and that her ovaries would have to be removed. They were told that because the tumours were growing slowly it would be possible first to extract some eggs for in vitro fertilisation (“IVF”), but that this would have to be done quickly. 15.  The consultation of 10 October 2001 lasted approximately an hour in total. A nurse explained that the applicant and J. would each have to sign a form consenting to the IVF treatment and that, in accordance with the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”), it would be possible for either to withdraw his or her consent at any time before the embryos were implanted in the applicant’s uterus (see paragraph 37 below). The applicant asked the nurse whether it would be possible to freeze her unfertilised eggs, but was informed that this procedure, which had a much lower chance of success, was not performed at the clinic. At that point J. reassured the applicant that they were not going to split up, that she did not need to consider the freezing of her eggs, that she should not be negative and that he wanted to be the father of her child. 16.  Thereafter, the couple entered into the necessary consents, by signing the forms required by the 1990 Act (see paragraph 37 below).\nImmediately beneath the title to the form appeared the following words:\n“NB – do not sign this form unless you have received information about these matters and have been offered counselling. You may vary the terms of this consent at any time except in relation to sperm or embryos which have already been used. Please insert numbers or tick boxes as appropriate.” 17.  On 12 November 2001 the couple attended the clinic and eleven eggs were harvested and fertilised. Six embryos were created and consigned to storage. On 26 November the applicant underwent an operation to remove her ovaries. She was told that she should wait two years before attempting to implant any of the embryos in her uterus. 18.  In May 2002 the relationship broke down. The future of the embryos was discussed between the parties. On 4 July 2002 J. wrote to the clinic to notify it of the separation and to state that the embryos should be destroyed. 19.  The clinic notified the applicant of J.’s withdrawal of consent to further use of the embryos and informed her that it was now under a legal obligation to destroy them, pursuant to paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act (see paragraph 37 below). The applicant commenced proceedings in the High Court, seeking an injunction requiring J. to restore his consent to the use and storage of the embryos and a declaration, inter alia, that he had not varied and could not vary his consent of 10 October 2001. Additionally she sought a declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998 to the effect that section 12 of, and Schedule 3 to, the 1990 Act breached her rights under Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention. She also pleaded that the embryos were entitled to protection under Articles 2 and 8. Interim orders were made requiring the clinic to preserve the embryos until the end of the proceedings. 20.  The trial judge, Wall J, heard the case over five days and took evidence from, among others, the applicant and J. On 1 October 2003, in a 65-page judgment (Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam)), he dismissed the applicant’s claims. 21.  He concluded that under the terms of the 1990 Act, and as a matter of public policy, it had not been open to J. to give an unequivocal consent to the use of the embryos irrespective of any change of circumstance, and that, as a matter of fact, J. had only ever consented to his treatment “together” with the applicant, and not to her continuing treatment on her own in the event that their relationship ended. Wall J thus rejected the applicant’s submission that J. was estopped from withdrawing his consent, finding that both the applicant and J. had embarked on the treatment on the basis that their relationship would continue. On 10 October 2001 J. had been doing his best to reassure the applicant that he loved her and wanted to be the father of her children; giving a truthful expression of his feelings at that moment, but not committing himself for all time. Wall J observed that in the field of personal relationships, endearments and reassurances of this kind were commonplace, but they did not – and could not – have any permanent, legal effect. In undergoing IVF with J., the applicant had taken the only realistic course of action open to her. Wall J continued:\n“However, even if I am wrong about that, and even if an estoppel is capable of existing in the face of the Act, I do not, for the reasons I have given, think it would be unconscionable to allow [J.] to withdraw his consent. It is a right which the Statute gives him within the clear scheme operated by Parliament. It was the basis upon which he gave his consent on 10 October 2001. It is perfectly reasonable for him, in the changed circumstances which appertain, not to want to father a child by Ms Evans.” 22.  As to the applicant’s Convention claims, Wall J held in summary that an embryo was not a person with rights protected under the Convention, and that the applicant’s right to respect for family life was not engaged. He accepted that the relevant provisions of the 1990 Act interfered with the private life of both parties, but held that it was proportionate in its effect, the foundation for the legislation being a treatment regime based on the twin pillars of consent and the interests of the unborn child. He considered it entirely appropriate that the Act required couples embarking on IVF treatment to be in agreement about the treatment, and permitted either party to withdraw from it at any time before the embryo was transferred into the woman. 23.  Wall J emphasised that the provisions of Schedule 3 to the Act (see paragraph 37 below) applied equally to all patients undergoing IVF treatment, irrespective of their sex, and concluded with an illustration of how the requirement for joint consent could similarly affect an infertile man.\n“If a man has testicular cancer and his sperm, preserved prior to radical surgery which renders him permanently infertile, is used to create embryos with his partner; and if the couple have separated before the embryos are transferred into the woman, nobody would suggest that she could not withdraw her consent to treatment and refuse to have the embryos transferred into her. The statutory provisions, like Convention rights, apply to men and women equally.” 24.  The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed in a judgment delivered on 25 June 2004 (Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727).\nThe court held that the clear policy of the 1990 Act was to ensure the continuing consent of both parties from the commencement of treatment to the point of implantation of the embryo, and that “the court should be extremely slow to recognise or to create a principle of waiver that would conflict with the parliamentary scheme”. Like Wall J, the Court of Appeal found that J. had only ever consented to undergoing “treatment together” with the applicant, and had never consented to the applicant using the jointly created embryos alone. Once the relationship had broken down, and J. had indicated that he did not wish the embryos to be preserved or used by the applicant, they were no longer being treated “together”. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that J. had concealed his ambivalence, thereby inducing her to go forward with him into couple treatment, holding this to be an unjustified challenge to the finding of the trial judge who had had the obvious advantage of appraising the oral evidence of the applicant, J., and the other witnesses (see paragraph 20 above). The Court of Appeal was also informed by J.’s counsel that J.’s clear position in withdrawing his consent was one of fundamental rather than purely financial objection. 25.  While there was an interference with the private lives of the parties, Lords Justices Thorpe and Sedley found it to be justified and proportionate, for the following reasons.\n“The less drastic means contended for here is a rule of law making the withdrawal of [J.’s] consent non-conclusive. This would enable [the applicant] to seek a continuance of treatment because of her inability to conceive by any other means. But unless it also gave weight to [J.’s] firm wish not to be father of a child borne by [the applicant], such a rule would diminish the respect owed to his private life in proportion as it enhanced the respect accorded to hers. Further, in order to give it weight the legislation would have to require the [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority] or the clinic or both to make a judgment based on a mixture of ethics, social policy and human sympathy. It would also require a balance to be struck between two entirely incommensurable things. ...\n... The need, as perceived by Parliament, is for bilateral consent to implantation, not simply to the taking and storage of genetic material, and that need cannot be met if one half of the consent is no longer effective. To dilute this requirement in the interests of proportionality, in order to meet [the applicant’s] otherwise intractable biological handicap, by making the withdrawal of the man’s consent relevant but inconclusive, would create new and even more intractable difficulties of arbitrariness and inconsistency. The sympathy and concern which anyone must feel for [the applicant] is not enough to render the legislative scheme ... disproportionate.” 26.  Lady Justice Arden stated, by way of introduction:\n“The 1990 Act inevitably uses clinical language, such as gametes and embryos. But it is clear that the 1990 Act is concerned with the very emotional issue of infertility and the genetic material of two individuals which, if implanted, can lead to the birth of a child. ... Infertility can cause the woman or man affected great personal distress. In the case of a woman, the ability to give birth to a child gives many women a supreme sense of fulfilment and purpose in life. It goes to their sense of identity and to their dignity.”\nShe continued:\n“Like Thorpe and Sedley LJJ, I consider that the imposition of an invariable and ongoing requirement for consent in the 1990 Act in the present type of situation satisfies Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. ... As this is a sensitive area of ethical judgment, the balance to be struck between the parties must primarily be a matter for Parliament ... Parliament has taken the view that no one should have the power to override the need for a genetic parent’s consent. The wisdom of not having such a power is, in my judgment, illustrated by the facts of this case. The personal circumstances of the parties are different from what they were at the outset of treatment, and it would be difficult for a court to judge whether the effect of [J.’s] withdrawal of his consent on [the applicant] is greater than the effect that the invalidation of that withdrawal of consent would have on [J.]. The court has no point of reference by which to make that sort of evaluation. The fact is that each person has a right to be protected against interference with their private life. That is an aspect of the principle of self-determination or personal autonomy. It cannot be said that the interference with [J.’s] right is justified on the ground that interference is necessary to protect [the applicant’s] right, because her right is likewise qualified in the same way by his right. They must have equivalent rights, even though the exact extent of their rights under Article 8 has not been identified.\n... The interference with [the applicant’s] private life is also justified under Article 8 § 2 because, if [the applicant’s] argument succeeded, it would amount to interference with the genetic father’s right to decide not to become a parent. Motherhood could surely not be forced on [the applicant] and likewise fatherhood cannot be forced on [J.], especially as in the present case it will probably involve financial responsibility in law for the child as well.” 27.  On the issue of discrimination, Lords Justices Thorpe and Sedley considered that the true comparison was between women seeking IVF treatment whose partners had withdrawn consent and those whose partners had not done so; Lady Justice Arden considered that the real comparators were fertile and infertile women, since the genetic father had the possibility of withdrawing consent to IVF at a later stage than in ordinary sexual intercourse. The three judges were nevertheless in agreement that, whatever comparators were chosen, the difference in treatment was justified and proportionate under Article 14 of the Convention for the same reasons which underlay the finding of no violation of Article 8. The Court of Appeal further refused leave to appeal against Wall J’s finding that the embryos were not entitled to protection under Article 2, since under domestic law a foetus prior to the moment of birth, much less so an embryo, had no independent rights or interests. 28.  On 29 November 2004 the House of Lords refused the applicant leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Izmir. 6.  On an unspecified date, police officers at the Istanbul airport arrested two persons in possession of passports containing fake visas. In their statements to the police, these two persons submitted that they had paid 3,000 German marks to the applicant and A.G. in order to have their passports stamped. Consequently, on 29 January 1996 police officers carried out a search at the applicant’s home in the presence of one of his siblings. The police officers seized four passports belonging to the applicant, his sibling and two other persons 7.  On 6 March 1996 the applicant surrendered to the police. He was then placed in custody. 8.  On 7 March 1996 the applicant was brought before a single judge at the Izmir Magistrates’ Court who ordered his detention on remand. 9.  On 14 March 1996 the Izmir Principle Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Izmir Assize Court charging the applicant with the offence of forging passport, in particular arranging for false visa stamps for travelling abroad. 10.  On 9 May 1996 the Izmir Assize Court heard the applicant and released him on bail. 11.  On 30 December 1998, following the qualification of the offence as committed by a criminal organisation, the Izmir Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and sent the case-file to Izmir State Security Court. 12.  On 11 February 1999 the Izmir State Security Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and referred the case to the Court of Cassation for determination of the competent court. 13.  On 25 March 1999 the Court of Cassation overturned the Izmir Assize Court’s decision of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and held that the offence in question was within the latter’s jurisdiction. The case-file was therefore sent to the Izmir Assize Court. 14.  Between 22 March 2001 and 3 December 2003 the Izmir Assize Court held eight hearings. All hearings prior to the seventh one, which was held on 5 June 2003, were postponed on the ground that the address of one of the co‑accused, namely A.G., could not be found. During this period, the Izmir Assize Court sent five letters to the Izmir Public Prosecutor’s Office and requested the latter to find out A.G.’s address. 15.  On 3 December 2003 the Izmir Assize Court terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant holding that the prosecution was time‑barred.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Amsterdam. 6.  The applicant was suspected of membership of a crime ring organised around one H., a person widely known to have amassed criminal convictions for serious crimes; of complicity in extortion; and of possession of an illegal firearm. 7.  On 30 January 2006 the applicant was arrested. On 2 February 2006 he was taken into initial detention on remand (bewaring) for fourteen days by order of an investigating judge of the Haarlem Regional Court (rechtbank). The order included the following grounds:\n“(post alia)\nConsidering in addition that it appears that there is a serious reason of public safety requiring the immediate deprivation of liberty;\nConsidering in this connection:\nthat there is a suspicion of a [criminal] act which, according to the law, carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of twelve years or more and that act has caused serious upset to the legal order (een feit waarop naar de wettelijke omschrijving een gevangenisstraf van twaalf jaren of meer is gesteld en de rechtsorde ernstig door dat feit is geschokt);\nthat there is a serious likelihood (dat er ernstig rekening mee moet worden gehouden) that the suspect will commit a crime (misdrijf) by which the health or safety of persons will be endangered, since the framework of the suspicion encompasses the display of aggressive and unrestrained behaviour by the suspect;\nthat detention on remand is necessary in reason for discovering the truth otherwise than through statements of the suspect; ...” 8.  On 14 February 2006 the applicant was taken into extended detention on remand (gevangenhouding) for thirty days by order of the Haarlem Regional Court following a hearing in camera. This decision stated the following grounds:\n“considering that the Regional Court finds, after examining the case, that the suspicion, indications and grounds which have led to the order for the suspect’s initial detention on remand still obtain;\nconsidering that the existence of these grounds is borne out by the conduct, facts and circumstances stated in the order for the suspect’s initial detention on remand, given on 2 February 2006, which the Regional Court adopts as its own; ...” 9.  The Regional Court renewed its order for a further term of thirty days on 11 April 2006. The applicant appealed against this decision; his appeal was dismissed by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) on 17 May 2006. 10.  The order for the applicant’s extended detention on remand was renewed periodically by the Regional Court until its suspension. 11.  On 7 May 2007 the Haarlem Regional Court ordered the suspension (schorsing) of the applicant’s detention on remand with effect from noon the following day. The reason stated was the following:\n“The Regional Court is of the view that the serious reasons and grounds stated in the order for extended detention on remand (bevel tot gevangenhouding) still exist and that Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) is not yet applicable.\nEven so, the Regional Court considers it appropriate, in view of the circumstance that it has today ordered the suspension of the trial until a date next September, to decide as follows as to the execution of the detention on remand.\nThe suspension of the trial is directly linked with the state of health of a co-suspect and the Regional Court’s decision in principle (uitgangspunt) to pursue the proceedings against all suspects simultaneously.\nThat being so, and also in light of the length of the detention on remand until today, the Regional Court is led to suspend the detention on remand until the day on which the trial of the suspect will be pursued.”\nThe co-suspect referred to was H., who needed time to recover from heart surgery which he had undergone in detention before his trial could resume. 12.  The suspension of the applicant’s detention on remand was made subject to the following conditions:\n“1.  that the suspect not seek to evade the execution of the detention on remand order if its suspension should be terminated; 2.  that the suspect, should he be sentenced to a custodial sentence other than [in lieu of a fine or a community service order] for the criminal act for which the detention on remand was ordered, not seek to evade its execution; 8.  that the suspect shall report in person twice a week (zich tweemaal per week dient te melden) at times and places indicated to him by the public prosecution service (openbaar ministerie).” 13.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant submitted a request for his detention on remand to be lifted altogether (opheffing van het bevel tot voorlopige hechtenis). 14.  On 22 August 2007 the Haarlem Regional Court gave a decision in the following terms:\n“This court’s decision of 7 May 2007 suspended the suspect’s pre-trial detention in connection with the special circumstances mentioned in that decision, which did not concern the suspect himself, which entailed the interruption of the trial for a considerable time.\nThe Regional Court has allowed the interest of the suspect in awaiting the resumption of his trial in freedom to prevail over the prosecution interest in keeping the suspect in detention on remand on the grounds stated in the order for extended detention on remand only because of that special situation and only for as long as that situation might continue. As the suspect’s trial will resume before long and the said special situation will from then on no longer exist, there will, from then on, be no reason to allow the suspension of the suspect’s detention on remand to continue.\nThe Regional Court takes the view that the serious reasons and grounds, with the exception of the ground related to the investigations, still exist and considers that Article 67a § 3 [of the Code of Criminal Procedure] is not yet applicable. The mere fact stated by the suspect’s counsel that since the suspect’s liberation there has been no large-scale public protest and that the suspect has complied unreservedly (onverkort) with the suspension conditions do not mean that there is no longer any ‘serious upset to the legal order’ within the meaning of Article 67a § 2 under 1 or the danger of an offence within the meaning of Article 67a § 2 under 2.\nConsidering also the nature of the first-mentioned ground – briefly, an offence carrying a twelve-year sentence that has caused serious upset to the legal order –, the Regional Court does not consider the arguments submitted sufficient reason to suspend the detention on remand, as is requested in the alternative as a less intrusive way of using this means of coercion (minder bezwarende wijze van toepassing van dit dwangmiddel). ...”\nNo appeal was possible against this decision. 15.  The trial resumed on 25 September 2007. The applicant, through his counsel, made a request at the hearing for the detention on remand order to be lifted, or in the alternative, for the suspension to be continued. He argued that his release had not caused any public outcry. 16.  According to the official record (proces-verbaal) of the hearing, the Regional Court gave a refusal, stated by its president in the following terms:\n“The Regional Court refers to its decision of 7 May last. At the time, the medical situation of the co-suspect H., the Regional Court’s desire to consider the cases together, and the fairly long duration of the detention on remand led to the decision to suspend the detention on remand until such time as the trial would resume.\nAs soon as these reasons cease to apply the Regional Court must consider the situation afresh.\nThis does not mean that the Regional Court will look back to see how well things have gone and what ripples your release has caused (hoeveel rumoer er over uw vrijlating is ontstaan), but that it will consider whether the serious reasons and grounds still exist. It takes the view that such is the case.\nAs regards the alternative request, the Regional Court takes the view that the prosecution interest would not be served in sufficient measure if you could, within the framework of a suspension of your detention on remand, await the outcome of your criminal case in freedom. Your personal interest in awaiting the determination of your case in freedom does not outweigh the prosecution interest. Your detention on remand should therefore continue, given also that there is no question at the present time of applying Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nThe president stresses that the Regional Court will continue to consider ex officio whether it is necessary for the detention on remand to continue, and whether there may be grounds to order a variant as regards the modalities of its execution.\nThe Regional Court dismisses both the principal and the alternative requests.” 17.  The applicant was taken back into detention on remand on 27 September 2007. 18.  On 15 November 2007 the applicant’s counsel submitted a further request for the lifting or, in the alternative, the suspension of the detention on remand order. This too was refused. 19.  On 4 December 2007 the Regional Court lifted the applicant’s detention on remand. The decision was in the following terms:\n“That the Regional Court, sitting in camera, has come to take the view that serious reasons and grounds referred to in the order for extended detention on remand still exist, but that at this point Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure leads the Regional Court to take the appertaining decision.” 20.  On 21 December 2007 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment. 21.  The applicant appealed. On 3 July 2009 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment on technical grounds. Convicting the applicant afresh, it sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, six months of which was suspended. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal on 12 October 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant is a German citizen, born in 1947, who lives in Moosthenning, Germany. 7.  In 1993, the applicant and M.G., a Romanian citizen, decided to set up a commercial company. 8.  The envisaged company was registered in Romania on 9 November 1993 under the name Fivarog Impex SRL (hereinafter called “the company”). 9.  In September 1993, the two associates bought in Germany a truck and merchandise on behalf of the company to be registered. The vehicles and the merchandise were registered on the name of a company belonging to M.G (“company P.”) and should have been registered in the accounting books of the company after its setting up. 10.  In March 1994, the applicant bought a trailer for the company that was registered by M.G. in the name of his company P. 11.  M.G. used both vehicles to carry out the activity of company P. and did not register the counter value of the rendered transport services in any accounting books. 12.  In 1995, the applicant transferred the majority of his shares to M.G., who became the main shareholder and administrator of the company. By an act under private signature, the latter undertook the obligation to deliver to the applicant the truck and the trailer. 13.  In 13 August 1996, the applicant filed a criminal complaint against M.G., accusing him of forgery, use of forged items, fraud, fraudulent management of the company and selling goods placed under judicial seizure. He maintained that M.G. used the money obtained by commercial operations performed on behalf of the company for his personal use, without registering them in the accounting books of the company. He added that the truck and the trailer bought for the company and mostly paid for by him were never registered in the name of the company and were used by the company P., which belonged to M.G. 14.  On 11 March 1998, the police opened a criminal investigation against the applicant and M.G., on suspicion of several offences of an economic nature, namely fraud, fraudulent management of the company and intellectual forgery related to the accounting books of the company. 15.  The applicant joined a civil complaint to the criminal proceedings, asking for the return of the trailer and the truck and damages. He evaluated the damages only on 25 March 1998, after an accounting report had been prepared. 16.  On 5 March 1999, the prosecutor attached to the Buftea District Court decided to terminate the investigation against the applicant and M.G. 17.  The applicant lodged a complaint against this decision, which was allowed by the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 26 August 1999. He decided to continue the criminal investigation against M.G. 18.  By a bill of indictment of 17 October 2001 the prosecutor attached to the Buftea District Court accused M.G. of fraudulent management, smuggling and fiscal evasion. In respect of the offences of use of forged documents and fraud, the prosecutor decided to terminate the investigation. The prosecutor also decided to terminate the investigation related to all the offences of which the applicant was accused. 19.  By a judgment of 26 March 2002, the Buftea District Court convicted M.G. of smuggling, fraudulent management and fiscal evasion, and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment, suspended, and placed him on probation. He was also ordered to award pecuniary damages to the company, while the applicant’s request for damages was dismissed on the ground that there was no causal link between the prejudice stated and the offences committed by M.G. 20.  M.G. and the applicant lodged an appeal. The applicant argued, inter alia, that the court was wrong when deciding to dismiss his request for damages. He added that neither the prosecutor nor the court of first instance had analysed or decided on the alleged fraud whose victim he was. 21.  By a decision rendered on 6 December 2002, the Bucharest County Court upheld the judgment of Buftea District Court without providing reasons for the dismissal of the applicant’s appeal. 22.  On 17 April 2003, the Bucharest Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on points of law filed by M.G., on the ground that the defendant’s right to defence had been infringed, as neither he nor his lawyer had been present at the previous hearing. It also allowed the appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant on the ground that the Bucharest County Court did not provide any reason for dismissing his appeal. It quashed the decision of 6 December 2002 and remitted the file to the Bucharest County Court. 23.  On 26 April 2004, the Bucharest County Court partially allowed the appeal lodged by M.G., holding that in respect of fiscal evasion and fraudulent management the criminal liability had become statute-barred. It dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded. 24.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law on the same grounds as those raised before the county court. By a final decision rendered on 8 June 2004, the Bucharest Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal in respect of the request for damages, on the ground that the county court had not provided reasons for dismissing it. 25.  By a decision rendered on 17 December 2004, the county court dismissed the applicant’s appeal again, on the ground that the prejudice experienced by the applicant was not connected with the offences in the charges against M.G. It pointed out that the applicant had the opportunity to bring a separate civil action for damages in which the contractual liability of M.G might be established. 26.  By a final decision rendered on 4 March 2005, the Bucharest Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the county court dismissing the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 27.  On 6 February 1996, the applicant lodged a civil action against M.G. seeking recognition of his property right in respect of the truck and trailer bought in 1993 and 1994 respectively. 28.  By a separate action, lodged on the same day, he requested the judicial seizure of the vehicles. 29.  On 1st March 1996 the Bucharest District Court ordered the seizure of the vehicles and decided to join the two actions in a single file. 30.  Despite the seizure order on the vehicles, on 29 February 1996 M.G. sold them to a third party. Therefore, on 5 May 1996 the applicant added a new claim to the joined action, namely for the cancellation of the sale­purchase agreement between M.G. and the third party. 31.  On 5 April 1996, the Bucharest District Court decided to hear separately the action regarding the seizure of vehicles from the action regarding the recognition of the ownership right over the vehicles and the cancellation of the sale-purchase agreement. 32.  M.G. lodged an appeal against the order of 1 March 1996 for the seizure of the vehicles, dismissed by the Bucharest County Court on 5 June 1996. 33.  On 17 October 1996 the Bucharest District Court dismissed the action as ill-founded. It held that from the analysis of the agreement’s clauses concluded between the applicant and M.G. there had been no transfer of ownership rights over the truck and trailer to the applicant. Furthermore, it dismissed the applicant’s request for the cancellation of the sale-purchase agreement concluded between M.G. and the third party, on the ground that there were no reasons for the cancellation. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Bucharest County Court. The applicant relied on the fact that the agreement interpreted by the court of first instance as a loan agreement had in fact three different clauses, namely the first one was indeed a loan agreement, the second allowed M.G. to use the vehicles until the date of reimbursement of the loan (understood as a favour granted to M.G. for obtaining the money for reimbursement of the loan) and the third one provided for the transfer of ownership title over the vehicles to him on the date of reimbursement of the loan. 35.  On 20 January 1998 the proceedings were stayed at the request of the applicant until the delivery of a final decision in the criminal proceedings, to which the civil proceedings were closely related. 36.  On 28 September 1999 the civil proceedings were reopened to determine whether the reason for staying them persisted. The applicant was present at the hearings. The hearings were adjourned until 9 November 1999, in order for the parties to be able to prove that the criminal proceedings were still pending. 37.  On 9 November 1999, the Bucharest County Court decided to maintain the suspension of the case on the same legal basis, namely Article 244 point 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP). 38.  On 30 November 2000 the proceedings were reopened in order to determine whether the criminal proceedings had been finalised. The parties were summoned for 23 January 2001. Noting the applicant’s absence, the court adjourned the hearings until 20 February 2001. 39.  On 20 February 2001, both parties were absent. Therefore, the Court suspended the civil proceedings on another legal ground, that of the absence of the parties, under Article 244 point 2 of the CCP. 40.  On 24 February 2002, the Bucharest County Court reopened the civil proceedings. The applicant was again summoned at the two addresses indicated by him in the file. 41.  On the ground of the parties’ lack of interest in the appeal, indicated by their absence from the hearing without submitting any request for the adjournment of the case, the court decided to extinguish (a constatat perimarea) the applicant’s appeal on 2 April 2002. From the analysis of the documents submitted by the parties it seems that the applicant did not lodge any appeal against the decision. 42.  On 4 May 2005, the applicant requested the reopening of the civil proceedings before the Bucharest District Court on the ground that the criminal proceedings had been completed on 4 March 2005. 43.  On 11 July 2005, the applicant was informed about the decision of 24 February 2002 to dismiss his civil action.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Munich. 6.  On 17 March 1995 during an investigation undertaken by the tax authorities of Teleorman County, a contravention report was issued against the applicant, suspected of smuggling, and in particular, of having illegally imported into Romania agricultural equipment, which he subsequently used for illicit activities. The report indicated that the matter was to be brought before the prosecution. 7.  Upon the same investigation, the authorities summoned the applicant to the local tax office on 22 March 1995 to provide clarifications in respect of a fake invoice allegation. On 21 March 1995 the applicant presented himself at the tax office and tried to persuade two tax commissioners not to issue a new report against him by offering them money. On the same day, the tax authority issued a new report on the offences of smuggling and active bribery, both of which were brought before the Public Prosecutor’s Office with the County Court of Teleorman. 8.  On 21 March 1995 the applicant was remanded in detention. 9.  On 12 April 1995 he was released under supervision. 10.  On 11 August 1995 the applicant was brought to trial on charges of active bribery, smuggling and fraud-related offences in connection with the importation of agricultural equipment, the seizure of which was equally ordered. 11.  From 1996 to 2000 the court listed at least nine hearings at intervals ranging from five to nine months for failure to properly summon the applicant at his residences in Germany and in Romania. Throughout the trial at first instance, the applicant’s legal representative or, in his absence, a court-appointed lawyer, were present at most of the hearings. 12.  On 14 November 2000 based on contravention and in flagrante reports, customs papers, applicant’s statements and ten witness testimonies, the County Court of Teleorman found the applicant guilty of active bribery and smuggling and convicted him to a two-year deferred prison sentence. He was acquitted of charges of fraud-related offences. With regard to the offence of smuggling, the court applied a newly entered into force law (Law no. 141/1997 which amended the Law no. 30/1978, in force at the commission of the offence) and stated that the act of smuggling was incriminated in both laws, but the new one was more favourable in respect of penalty provisions. The seizure of the agricultural equipment was maintained in court. 13.  On appeal, the Bucharest Court of Appeal listed a total of seven hearings of which four were adjourned in the attendance of documents and information from the Customs Office of Teleorman. Both the applicant and his legal representative were present at all court hearings. 14.  On 20 December 2001 the court rejected the appeal and upheld the lower court’s judgment. The applicant appealed on points of law. 15.  On 11 June 2003 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (the former Supreme Court of Justice) convicted the applicant to a two-year deferred prison sentence for smuggling charges. With regard to the active bribery charges, he was acquitted as the criminal liability had become time-barred. The judgment became final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Novosibirsk. 6.  On 8 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and placed in pre-trial detention pursuant to an order of the Berdsk District Court of the Novosibirsk Region (“the Berdsk District Court”). 7.  Between 3 June 2003 and 12 May 2004 the Berdsk District Court extended the applicant’s detention pending trial on several occasions. On the latter date it ordered that he remain in detention until 12 August 2004. It referred to the seriousness of the charges against him and the absence of any grounds to change that particular preventive measure. 8.  On 11 August 2004 the Berdsk District Court convicted the applicant as charged and he was sentenced to imprisonment. It also ordered that he remain in detention until his conviction became final. 9.  On 15 December 2004 the Novosibirsk Regional Court quashed the applicant’s conviction and sent his case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. Its decision stated that the preventive measure applied to him “should remain unchanged”. 10.  In an interlocutory hearing on 9 March 2005 the Berdsk District Court examined a request by the applicant for release pending trial, subject to him either giving an undertaking not to leave a specified place or the application of a different preventive measure. He argued, in particular, that the Novosibirsk Regional Court’s brief indication in its decision of 15 December 2004 that the preventive measure applied to him should remain unchanged could not serve as a sufficient legal basis for his continued detention. In this connection, the Berdsk District Court noted that the Novosibirsk Regional Court’s decision, in so far as it had concerned the preventive measure, had been lawful as it had been taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of national law. It further did not consider it possible to release the applicant pending trial on account of the seriousness of charges against him and the fact that he was a foreign national and did not reside within the territory of Russia, with the result that he might abscond if at liberty or put pressure on witnesses. The court thus ordered that his detention be extended until 15 June 2005. 11.  On 6 April 2005 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 9 March 2005 on appeal. It stated that the Berdsk District Court, in convicting the applicant on 11 August 2004, had indicated that he should remain in detention until that judgment became final. It further noted that when quashing the conviction, it itself had stated that the preventive measure applied to the applicant should remain unchanged, and that then, in accordance with Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Criminal Code, the Berdsk District Court had extended the applicant’s detention for three months. It thus concluded that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was lawful, well‑founded and based on a court order. 12.  On 8 June 2005 the Berdsk District Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 15 September 2005. He requested his release, stating that he had been in custody for a long time and that his health had deteriorated. The court held that there were no grounds to change the preventive measure applied to him. It referred to the seriousness of the charges against him and the fact that he was a foreign national and did not reside within the territory of Russia, with the result that he might abscond or influence witnesses if released. 13.  On 5 September 2005 the Berdsk District Court ordered that the applicant remain in detention until 15 December 2005. He asked the court to change the preventive measure, referring to the poor state of his health and the fact that he had already been kept in detention for a long time. He further argued that he would not abscond, given that his family lived in Berdsk and owned property nearby. The court stated that because the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious offence, had pleaded not guilty, was a foreign national and was not registered within the territory of Russia, he might seek to evade justice. It also stated that the extension of his detention was necessary, in view of the fact that an expert examination in his case was being carried out in Moscow at the time. 14.  On 14 December 2005 the Berdsk District Court further extended the applicant’s detention until 15 March 2006. He asked to be released, arguing that he had a child and family in the Novosibirsk Region as well as property nearby where he could be registered. He had also already spent a long time in detention and his state of health had deteriorated. The court gave reasons similar to those indicated in its decision of 5 September 2005. 15.  On 15 March 2006 the Berdsk District Court ordered the applicant’s release, subject to him giving an undertaking not to leave a specified place. The court noted that he had been kept in detention for a long time, and that his wife and child lived in Novosibirsk, where the latter went to school. It also took into account the fact that they were Russian nationals, and that there was therefore a possibility, and a place, for the applicant to live in the Novosibirsk Region pending trial. The court further noted that the results of the expert examination carried out in Moscow had since been received. It also referred to the fact that the applicant had no previous criminal record, had positive references from his place of residence and place of work and needed medical treatment as his health had deteriorated. 16.  On 19 May 2006 the Berdsk District Court acquitted the applicant. In the operative part of its judgment it stated that he had a right to “rehabilitation” (реабилитация) and that it was open to him to claim compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 17.  On 21 August 2006 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the acquittal on appeal. 18.  After his acquittal the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the authorities in the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Novosibirsk under Articles 131 and 132 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 136 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He claimed 10,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the pecuniary damage resulting from his unlawful prosecution and detention, and RUB 120,761 for costs and expenses. He argued, in particular, that as a result of being prosecuted for an offence he had not committed he had been deprived of his liberty, which had caused him and his family suffering. Furthermore, he could not work and his health had deteriorated. 19.  On 30 January 2008 the Oktyabrskiy District Court partly allowed the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage and awarded him RUB 500,000 (approximately 12,500 euros). In its reasoning the court firstly noted that under Article 5 of the Convention everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in breach of that provision should have the right to compensation. It further noted that by virtue of the Berdsk District Court’s judgment of 19 May 2006 the applicant had been acquitted and his right to “rehabilitation” had been recognised. On this basis the court found that he had been unlawfully prosecuted, unlawfully detained from 8 April 2003 to 15 March 2006 and, subsequently, unlawfully subjected to an undertaking not to leave a specified place. It further stated that, where a person’s right to rehabilitation had been recognised, the existence of non-pecuniary damage was presumed and it was only the amount to be awarded that had to be established. For these purposes the court took into account the suffering caused to the applicant and the fact that his health had deteriorated. It relied on Articles 1070 and 1100 of the Civil Code in this regard. 20.  On the same date the Oktyabrskiy District Court discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant’s claim for costs and expenses, on the grounds that it could not be examined within the civil proceedings but rather should be brought within criminal proceedings. 21.  On 18 March 2008 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 22.  Between 2003 and 2006, during the examination of the applicant’s case, he was on several occasions taken to the temporary detention facility of the Berdsk Office of the Interior (“the Berdsk IVS”) so that he could take part in the proceedings. 23.  The applicant provided the following information concerning his detention in the IVS:\n-  between 6 and 15 April and 13 and 20 May 2003 he was held with one cellmate in cell no. 9, which measured less than 6 square metres and was equipped with two beds;\n-  between 5 and 12 August 2003 he was again held in cell no. 9, but this time with three cellmates;\n-  between 7 and 21 October 2003 and 3 and 10 February 2004 he was held with nine cellmates in cell no. 6, which measured around 16 square metres;\n-  between 11 and 18 May 2004 he was again held in cell no. 6, but this time with five cellmates;\n-  between 15 and 18 June 2004 he was held with nine cellmates in cell no. 4, which measured around 18 square metres and was equipped with six beds;\n-  between 15 and 20 July 2004 he was again held in cell no. 9, but this time with two cellmates;\n-  between 27 July and 13 August 2004 he was held with one cellmate in cell no. 11, which measured 5.75 square metres and was equipped with one bed;\n-  between 31 August and 7 September 2004 he was held with eleven cellmates in cell no. 8, which measured around 18 square metres and was equipped with six beds;\n-  between 3 and 18 March, 17 and 24 May, 7 and 10 June, 30 and 31 August and 13 and 20 December 2005, and between 14 and 15 March 2006, the applicant was again held in cell no. 8 with six, eight, five, two, six and eight cellmates respectively;\n-  between 31 August and 6 September 2005 the applicant was again held in cell no. 11, but this time with two cellmates. 24.  None of the cells was equipped with a wash basin, which made basic hygiene procedures impossible. Detainees could take a shower only once every ten days. There was no partition between the lavatory and the rest of the room, which offered no privacy. The cells were infested with bedbugs and no pest control treatments were ever conducted. As there were no windows, there was no fresh air or daylight. The ventilation system was turned on very rarely, so the cells were stuffy and humid and in summer it was hard to breathe. The artificial lighting was insufficient, which affected detainees’ eyesight. The fact that there were no tables and chairs was humiliating as detainees had to eat, prepare for hearings and write complaints and applications while sitting on the floor. Food was served only once a day and the applicant was constantly hungry. Walks outside the cells were irregular and did not last for more than fifteen minutes. 25.  According to the Government, they were unable to provide exact information about the cells the applicant was held in 2003 and part of 2004 or the number of inmates he was held with, as the relevant documents had been destroyed on the expiry of their storage period. 26.  They did, however, provide the following information concerning the applicant’s detention in the Berdsk IVS in 2004 to 2006:\n-  between 11 and 18 May 2004 he was held with six inmates in cell no. 6, which measured 17.3 square metres;\n-  between 3 and 18 March, 17 and 24 May, 7 and 10 June and 13 and 20 December 2005, and between 14 and 15 March 2006, he was held with six to nine inmates in cell no. 8, which measured 18.3 square metres;\n-  between 30 August and 6 September 2005 he was held with two cellmates in cell no. 11, which measured 5.75 square metres. 27.  The cells did not have windows but were ventilated. They contained no other furniture apart from beds. The number of cellmates exceeded the number of available beds. Each cell had a wall-mounted lavatory, but there was no partition to divide it from the rest of the cell. The cells were cleaned daily, and pest control treatments were conducted every three months. 28.  Detainees were each provided with bedding, towels, crockery and cutlery. Shaving items were made available upon request at least twice a week. Detainees were taken for a daily walk of a minimum of one hour in a yard measuring 48.8 square metres. Hot meals were provided three times a day. 29.  On 30 August 2005 a group of police officers of the Berdsk Office of the Interior accompanied by an officer of the Berdsk IVS entered the applicants’ cell to inspect it. 30.  According to the applicant, the police officers ordered him and his cellmates to stay crouched down with their hands on the back of their heads and started checking their personal belongings and sleeping places. One of the officers threw a pillow on the floor and the applicant moved to pick it up. An officer tried to then kick him in the head, but as he tried to cover himself with his arms, he kicked him in the arm. The officers insulted and threatened him. 31.  On the same date the applicant complained about the above incident to the Berdsk prosecutor’s office and the Department of Internal Security of the Department of the Interior of the Novosibirsk Region. 32.  On 6 September 2005 an investigator of the Berdsk prosecutor’s office refused to institute a criminal investigation into the incident. The decision stated, in particular, that according to the statements given by the police officers and the head of the Berdsk IVS, no physical force had been used against the applicant. Detainee N., who according to the applicant had remained in the cell and had witnessed the incident, submitted that when the police officers had started the inspection he had left the cell and waited in the corridor. He had heard the applicant arguing with the police officers. When he had re-entered the cell after the inspection, the applicant had told him about the incident and had said that he would be making a complaint. However, N. had not seen him be kicked in the arm. His statement was confirmed by Sh., an officer of the Berdsk IVS who was on duty on 30 August 2005, who stated that N. had been outside the cell during the inspection. The investigator concluded that there was no evidence that an offence had been committed. The decision stated that it could be appealed against to a higher prosecutor or a court. 33.  The Berdsk prosecutor’s office informed the applicant of the decision by letter on 27 September 2005. According to the applicant, he was not informed of the decision. 34.  Nevertheless, the applicant complained about the decision to a higher prosecutor. 35.  On 26 October 2005 the prosecutor of Berdsk dismissed the complaint and upheld the decision. 36.  The applicant did not appeal against the refusal to institute criminal proceedings to a court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  On 23 June 1994 the applicant's husband filed a divorce petition with the Wałbrzych Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). 9.  On 26 August 1994 the applicant filed a pleading. On 19 October 1994 her husband requested the court to find that the applicant was responsible for the marital breakdown. 10.  On 1 September 1995 the court ordered the applicant's husband to pay 170 Polish zlotys (PLN) in family maintenance pending trial. 11.  The court held twelve hearings on the following dates: 26 August, 6 December 1994; 31 January, 21 March, 16 May, 1 September, 28 November 1995; 9 January, 13 February, 19 March, 17 April and 26 April 1996. It heard evidence from at least twelve witnesses. 12.  On 26 April 1996 the court granted a divorce decree. It considered that both spouses had been at fault in respect of the breakdown of their marriage. The court further vested custody rights over their minor child with the applicant and obliged her husband to pay maintenance for the child. 13.  On 28 May 1996 the applicant filed an appeal against the above judgment. She claimed that her husband had been exclusively responsible for the failure of their marriage and that, therefore, divorce was inadmissible in law. 14.  On 5 July 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Wałbrzych Regional Court. 15.  On 10 October 1996 the applicant filed a request for her maintenance claims to be secured. The court considered that further evidence regarding the financial situation of both parties should be obtained. 16.  On 13 November 1996 the court held a hearing. On 9 April 1997 the court amended its decision of 1 September 1995 concerning the family maintenance pending trial, increasing it to PLN 250. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant's maintenance claims. 17.  On 6 June 1997 the Wałbrzych Regional Court ordered that evidence be obtained from experts in psychiatry, psychology and pedagogics. On 27 November 1997 experts from the Family Diagnostics Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny) prepared their report. 18.  Subsequently, the court held hearings on the following dates: 13 February, 16 March, 24 April 1998. 19.  On 15 May 1998 the Wałbrzych Regional Court pronounced divorce, finding that both spouses had been at fault in respect of the breakdown of their marriage. 20.  On 16 June 1998 the applicant filed an appeal with the Wrocław Court of Appeal. On 5 August 1998 it upheld the contested judgment. On the same day the applicant applied to the court to grant her legal assistance and to exempt her from court fees in cassation proceedings. On 28 September 1998 the Wrocław Court of Appeal dismissed her application. 21.  On 12 November 1998 the applicant filed a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 5 August 1998. On 5 January 2001 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) held a hearing and on the same date it dismissed the applicant's cassation appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  On 28 July 1996 police officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the İzmir Security Directorate arrested the applicants on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, the PRK-Rızgari. 10.  On 5 August 1996 the İzmir State Security Court ordered the applicants' detention on remand. 11.  On 28 August 1996 the Chief Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the İzmir State Security Court charging the applicants with membership of the PRK-Rızgari and undertaking actions against the indivisible integrity of the state. The charges were brought under Articles 125 and 168 of the Criminal Code. 12.  In a judgment dated 14 August 1997 the İzmir State Security Court acquitted Ms Melahat Filiz of the charges, holding that there was insufficient evidence to convict her. The court found Mr Nadir Kalkan guilty of the offences under Articles 125 and 168 and sentenced him to capital punishment. 13.  On 19 September 1997 Mr Kalkan lodged an appeal with the Court of Cassation. The applicant did not submit any information concerning the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are spouses who were born in 1957 and 1955 respectively and live in Plovdiv. 6.  Following partition proceedings, in 1980 the first applicant obtained title over a house together with the adjoining land in Plovdiv, previously owned by her ancestor. 7.  By an order of 25 April 1984 the mayor of Plovdiv expropriated the properties with a view to constructing an apartment building. The order was based on sections 95 and 98 of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (“the 1973 Act”) and stipulated that the first applicant was to receive as compensation a three-room flat in a building which was to be erected by a housing construction cooperative and partly financed by the State. The expropriated properties were valued at 7,431.81 old Bulgarian levs (BGL[1]). 8.  By a supplementary order of 5 June 1986 based on section 100 of the 1973 Act (see paragraph 17 below), the mayor indicated the exact flat to be given to the first applicant by way of compensation, specifying the building in which it would be located and its exact size and price. 9.  In November 1986 the applicants vacated the property and were accommodated in a State-owned dwelling. Subsequently the expropriated house was pulled down. 10.  The flat allotted to the first applicant was valued at BGL 22,928. In 1987 the applicants paid to the cooperative part of that price. The remainder, which equalled the value of the first applicant’s expropriated property, was to be covered by the State. 11.  On 3 June 1987 the State Savings Bank informed the Bulgarian National Bank that all members of the housing construction cooperative had paid the instalments due by them for the construction of the building. 12.  Apparently, the construction works started in 1987. 13.  Between 1992 and 1997 the housing construction cooperative informed the mayor of Plovdiv, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Public Works of the increase in construction material prices, including by providing in October 1992 and in July 1997 a calculation of the respective increase in the financing due by the authorities. The cooperative also drew the authorities’ attention to delays in the construction works and requested that the State fulfilled its obligation to pay its share in the financing of the construction works. 14.  It appears that between 1995 and 1997 the Ministry of Finance paid the State’s share for the construction works which had been performed between 1992 and 1997. The applicants and the other persons entitled to receive flats in the building also made further financial contributions on account of the increase in construction material prices. 15.  Apparently, in 1999 and 2001 the Plovdiv Municipality and the housing construction cooperative concluded contracts assigning the construction works of the building to several companies. According to an annex to the contract of 2001, signed in 2005, which specified each party’s financial obligations the State was to cover the whole cost of the construction expenses for the flats of the cooperatives’ members whose properties had been expropriated. The annex further specified that the Plovdiv Municipality’s outstanding financial obligations towards the cooperative amounted to 13,800 new Bulgarian levs (BGN). 16.  The part of the building where the first applicant’s flat was located was completed and its use authorised on 23 July 2007. That month the first applicant and her family moved in the property. On 5 June 2008 the first applicant obtained a notary deed for the flat which stated that its market value was BGN 41,745.82 (21,344 Euros (EUR)).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Iaşi. 7.  The applicant was sentenced in 1992 to ten years’ imprisonment for damage to community property (avut obştesc). By a final decision of 7 September 1993 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the provisions of the Criminal Code referring to crimes against community property. 8.  On 27 August 1996 the Prosecutor General lodged a request to have the proceedings against the applicant reopened, on the basis that his conviction was based on provisions declared unconstitutional. By a final decision of 23 September 1997 the Supreme Court of Justice granted the request to reopen the proceedings, quashed the previous conviction, changed the legal qualification of the offences committed by the applicant and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment for fraud, ordering his immediate release from prison. At that time he had already served fifty‑four months of the original sentence. 9.  On 10 May 2002 the applicant lodged an action in damages against the Ministry of Finance, asking for compensation because he had been imprisoned for fifty-four months, while the final decision of 1997 reduced his sentence to only four months’ imprisonment. 10.  By a final decision of 20 December 2004, the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed his action on the basis of the provisions of Articles 504 and 505 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), which limited the right to be paid compensation solely to acquittal or a decision of the prosecutor not to pursue criminal proceedings. Taking into account that the applicant had not been acquitted, the domestic courts concluded that he did not qualify for payment of compensation on the basis of the provisions of the CCP as in force at that time, and dismissed his claim in this respect. 11.  The applicant was arrested on 28 March 2001 on suspicion of fraud. He was committed for trial on 20 June 2001. By a final decision of 16 January 2003 he was found guilty and was sentenced to three years and eight months’ imprisonment. The domestic courts, after reviewing evidence, including witness statements, a financial report and the applicant’s statements, concluded that the applicant had caused harm to different private companies by issuing cheques without the funds to cover them. The applicant was represented by a lawyer of his own choosing throughout the proceedings. In his appeal on points of law he complained that no evidence had been adduced in his favour. The appellate court reviewed the decisions of the lower courts and concluded that they had assessed the factual situation correctly and identified that the applicant had committed the offence, and that his requests to adduce evidence in his favour had been allowed. 12.  The applicant had been detained in connection with the second set of proceedings from 28 March 2001 until 19 March 2004, when he was released conditionally. 13.  According to him, he was detained in the Iaşi police station cells until 25 June 2001, when he was transferred to Iaşi High‑Security Prison. 14.  The applicant complains mainly of overcrowding and unsatisfactory sanitary conditions. He alleges that during his entire detention he had to share a bed with other prisoners, mostly dangerous criminals.\n(a)Iaşi police station 15.  According to the applicant, in Iaşi police station he occupied cell 20. It had eight beds and was occupied by ten detainees. The surface area of the cell was 14.2 square metres. 16.  He complained that the cell had no toilet. The detainees went to the toilets twice a day, at 6 a.m. and 8 p.m. respectively. The rest of the time the detainees had to use a bucket. 17.  He alleged that he had been allowed to walk outside the cell for twenty minutes each day. 18.  He also complained that there was no running water. 19.  He further complained that the cell had no natural light. It had a small window with a grille.\n(b)Iaşi prison 20.  The applicant alleged that between 25 June 2001 and 18 May 2003 he had been placed in several cells: cells 72 and 74 (when he refused to eat), 95, 4 and 51. 21.  He alleged that cells 4 and 51, where he spent most of his time while in detention, had no natural light. He claimed that when he had complained to the prison authorities about the lack of natural light he had been transferred to cell 95, which he shared with murderers and paedophiles. 22.  He further complained that these cells had more detainees than beds. According to the applicant the cells had a surface area of 32.3 square metres and were occupied by up to forty-five detainees. 23.  He acknowledged that he had refused the twenty‑minute outdoor walks and therefore he had been disciplinarily punished on 31 October 2002. He justified his attitude by the pain caused to his eyes by natural light. 24.  According to the information provided by the Iasi Inspectorate of Police to the Romanian Government, the applicant was placed in cell 20. Each detainee had his own bed. However, there was no information concerning the surface area of the cell and the number of prisoners occupying it for the relevant period of detention. 25.  The cell was fitted with clean toilets and had natural lighting and adequate ventilation.\n(b) Iaşi prison 26.  According to the information submitted by the National Prison Administration (“the NPA”) and the Iaşi Prison Administration, the applicant shared cell 27 with inmates with no previous convictions, serving sentences less severe than ten years’ imprisonment. 27.  The surface area of the cell was 33.3 square metres. However, there was no information concerning the number of prisoners occupying it for the relevant period of detention. 28.  They also alleged that the cell had natural lighting and good ventilation. It had a supply of running and drinking water. 29.  According to the Government the prison had its own electric and heating facilities. The detainees could take a shower at least once a week. 30.  The Government claimed that the applicant used to participate in entertainment and sport activities. However, on the ground that the applicant refused to take the daily walk and to participate in recreation activities, he was sanctioned with a reprimand on 31 October 2002. 31.  The applicant alleged that his eyesight had been seriously impaired as a result of his detention in cells with neon light on permanently. He claimed that at the time of his arrest he had 2.5 dioptres in both eyes, while after twenty months of detention he had 3 dioptres in his right eye and 5 dioptres in his left eye. He submitted in this connection a medical certificate issued by the hospital of the Iaşi Prison on 15 November 2002 attesting to that statement. 32.  The Government maintained that according to the applicant’s medical record, he had been “healthy and fit for work” when he was placed in Iaşi Prison. They also admitted that the applicant has since been under medical surveillance for simple hypermetropy and presbyopia. They also submitted that on 15 November 2002 the applicant had been diagnosed with chronic conjunctivitis and simple hypermetropia and on 7 July 2003 with ophthalmological haemorrhage. 33.  According to the applicant’s medical file, from the date of his imprisonment he was regularly examined by doctors and was prescribed and administered medication during the course of his detention. 34.  The applicant lodged a civil action in damages against the Romanian State for the worsening of his eyesight. His claims were dismissed by the Iaşi County Court in a first-instance judgement of 27 January 2003 as unsubstantiated. From the information available in the case file it appears that the applicant lodged an appeal, but no information is available as to the final outcome of the case. According to the Government, the applicant did not continue the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1937, 1921, 1963, 1929, 1945, 1926, 1943, 1948 and 1950 respectively and live in Gebze. 5.  In 1996 the Kocaeli Provincial Private Administration Office (Kocaeli İl Özel İdare Müdürlüğü) expropriated nineteen plots of land belonging to the applicants. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plots and the relevant amount was paid to the applicants when the expropriation took place. 6.  On 5 November 1996 the applicants brought three separate actions for compensation before the Gebze Civil Court of First-instance. 7.  In order to assess the real value of the land, the court ordered on-site inspections and expert reports. Primarily, the experts worked on the classification of the plots since the value of urbanised land (arsa) was higher than rural land (arazi). In this context, the experts observed that the plots were not reserved for habitation under any urban plan (imar planı) of the Municipality or the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement; they were not situated within residential areas; and there was no annotation in the land registry that these plots were to be used for tourism purposes. Instead, the plots were classified as “fields” in the Land Registry. As a result of the on-site inspections and their findings, the experts decided that the plots should be classified as rural land. They therefore calculated the value of the plots on that basis. 8.  In their written submissions the applicants contested the expert reports. They submitted an expert report dated 5 March 1998 which concluded that the land in question should have been considered urbanised. 9.  After taking into consideration three expert reports for each case, the Gebze Civil Court of First-instance rejected the applicants’ objections in respect of the nature of the land. 10.  On 15 September 1998, 13 March 1998 and 4 May 1998, the court issued three decisions and awarded the applicants the below-mentioned amounts:\n \nSETS OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FIRST-INSTANCE COURT\n \nDATES OF DECISIONS\nAWARDED AMOUNTS\n(In Turkish liras)\n \nFIRST SET OF PROCEEDINGS 11.  On 2 March 1999 the Court of Cassation upheld these decisions. 12.  On 14 May 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicants’ requests for rectification. 13.  Three sets of enforcement proceedings were initiated before the Execution Offices. 14.  At the end of the enforcement proceedings, the amounts indicated below were paid to the applicants by the Kocaeli Provincial Private Administration Office on the dates mentioned:\n \nSETS OF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ENFORCEMENT OFFICE\n \nDATES OF PAYMENT\nAMOUNT OF PAYMENTS\n(In Turkish liras)\n \nFIRST SET OF EXECUTION PROCEEDINGS", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and is currently detained in Nicosia Central Prison. He is serving concurrent eighteen-year sentences pursuant to his conviction for two counts of attempted murder. 7.  On 5 September 2003 the applicant was permitted to leave detention on twenty-four hour leave granted by the prison director. He did not return to the prison when his leave expired. Following a search to trace his whereabouts, he was arrested on 21 September 2003. At the time of his arrest he was in possession of a gun and cartridges and was wearing a bullet-proof vest and a woman’s wig. He was transferred to the maximum security wing of the prison and placed in solitary confinement. He was thus confined until 7 November 2003, that is, for a total of 47 days. 8.  The parties’ submissions concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention during the period of his solitary confinement differed. 9.  The Government agreed that the applicant had been detained in the prison’s maximum security wing but maintained that he was detained in a normal cell. The dimensions of the cell were 2.8 metres by 2.1 metres, that is, 5.88 square metres. It was furnished with a bed, a cupboard and a table. The cell had two windows: an exterior one (0.8m by 0.6m) and a smaller one above the cell door (0.4m by 0.4m). The cell was opened about three times a day for a total of about an hour. This time was used for personal hygiene purposes and taking meals. It was the applicant’s responsibility to clean his cell and he was provided with all the necessary equipment. He had regular direct contact with prison personnel. Moreover, newspapers had been provided in the wing and he had access to books from the prison library. There was a television set in the wing corridor to which the applicant could listen and he would have been provided with a radio if he had requested one. 10.  During the applicant’s confinement he had spent considerable time outside prison when attending court hearings on 2, 10, 13, 16, 22 and 29 October and 4 and 6 November 2003. He was seen on four occasions by the prison doctor (7, 18, 20 and 31 October 2003). He was also visited by a welfare officer on 14 October 2003 and was seen by the prison psychologist on 3 and 30 October 2003. 11.  Although the applicant was allowed to send letters to his family and friends twice a week, he did not attempt to send any such letters. He did not ask to make or receive telephone calls. Visits from family members while the applicant was in solitary confinement were not permitted but during the applicant’s visits to the court, he could meet with his family and friends, and was in fact supplied with food, soft drinks and clothes by his family which he was allowed to take back to prison. On one occasion, a mobile telephone given to the applicant by a family member was confiscated upon his return to prison after a hearing. 12.  The applicant disputed the Government’s description of the conditions of his confinement. He alleged that following his return to prison on 21 September 2003 he was confined in a cold, damp cell of a maximum of five square meters without food, water or suitable clothing. The cell had no external window and the window of the cell door was considerably smaller than the Government had indicated. The applicant was excessively restricted in his ability to use the toilet or have a shower: for the first four days of his solitary confinement he was forced to use an empty water bottle to urinate and nylon bags for other needs. These were provided to him by a prison officer through the small window in the cell door. Due to the cold, his arm and shoulder had frozen and he suffered from pain but the doctor was not allowed by the prison authorities to provide him with painkillers. He was nevertheless given an anti-inflammatory gel by the doctor using her own funds. Relying on the prison logbook submitted to the Court by the Government, the applicant stated that he had not been allowed to go to the toilet prior to 24 September 2003 or to have food or the opportunity to shower before 25 September 2003, although he was given bottled water and an apple from time to time through his small cell window by a prison officer. He had no access to newspapers, books or television. Further, he was not regularly seen by a doctor and he was not allowed regularly to exit his cell for half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the afternoon, as required by the relevant regulations. 13.   While in solitary confinement, the applicant was not permitted to have visits from his family or to make telephone calls. As for the Government’s allegations that he had not asked to make telephone calls, the applicant replied it was not the practice of the prison authorities to give formal decisions refusing requests to make telephone calls in writing, there were no telephone booths in the maximum security block and, in general, prisoners were not allowed to receive calls from outside the prison. He had no contact with his family in the prison during the period of his solitary confinement and no contact was possible during his court visits. In particular, when he attended hearings at the district court in Limassol, he was kept at the Limassol central police station’s cells. It was only after the period of his solitary confinement that he could see his family and friends at the court’s hearings. 14.  The applicant also alleged that the maximum security wing was used to threaten or punish prisoners given the conditions of detention there and, in particular, the fact that another prisoner would beat up prisoners without any attempt by the authorities to protect them. The applicant alleged that he had been ill-treated in this manner on two occasions but did not provide further details. 15.  According to the entries in the prison logbook which was submitted to the Court by the Government, the applicant was returned to prison on 21 September 2003. On 24 September 2003, the logbook records that the applicant left his cell to use the toilet after special notification had been given to the security direction (“φρουραρχείο”). The following day, the entry in the logbook records that he met with the prison director and was given food. 16.  Although the logbook records that on some days the applicant used the toilet on several occasions, on others it indicates that he only used the toilet once.  On 4 October 2003, there is no record of the applicant leaving his cell to use the toilet. Access to shower facilities appears to have been sporadic: at times he showered every couple of days but on other occasions, according to the logbook, he did not leave his cell to shower for two weeks. Similarly, the prison logbook records that on some days the applicant was given two or three meals whereas on others, it would appear that he received only one. On 4 October 2003, there is no entry recording any meal given to the applicant. 17.  The logbook indicates that the applicant saw a prison psychologist four times: on 23 and 26 September and on 3 and 31 October 2003. He saw the prison doctor on 7 and 20 October 2003. He met with the welfare officer on 14 October 2003. On 31 October 2003, he refused to attend a scheduled visit to see a surgeon at the General Hospital 18.  The logbook records that the applicant attended court on seven occasions: on 10 October 2003 for about six hours; on 13 October 2003 for about five hours; On 16 October 2003 for about six hours; on 22 October 2003 for about eight hours; on 27 October 2003, for about one and a half hours; on 29 October 2003 for about seven and a half hours; and on 4 November 2003, for about two hours. 19.  According to the logbook, on 1 November 2003, the applicant met a member of the Prisons Board. On 5 November 2003, he was taken to meet with the Prisons Board and was away from his cell for 20 minutes. 20.  There are two entries in the logbook recording other relevant events. On 17 October 2003, he was taken to a conference room, where he remained for one hour and twenty minutes. On 4 November 2003, he was accompanied by a prison officer to visit a Mr A.T. and was away for about half an hour. 21.  Although the applicant was in solitary confinement until 7 November 2003, only entries from the logbook up to 5 November 2003 have been submitted by the Government. 22.  On the date of the applicant’s arrest following his failure to return to prison, a police investigation began into alleged offences committed while the applicant was at liberty. According to the Government, this was concluded on 11 November 2003 with the filing of charges against the applicant for the commission of various offences. The applicant maintained that he was charged on 10 October 2003. 23.  In parallel, on 5 November 2003, the applicant was charged with several disciplinary offences concerning the breach of the terms of his leave. However, the disciplinary proceedings were not pursued. 24.  On 19 July 2005 the Limassol Assize Court convicted the applicant of escaping from custody and of other offences associated with his escape. The prison director stated in his evidence before the court that the applicant was placed in solitary confinement in order to protect him from other prisoners who were hostile towards him because of restrictions imposed in the prison affecting everyone as a result of the applicant’s escape. The court noted in its judgment that the applicant had entered a plea of not guilty in respect of the disciplinary offences but that the proceedings were not pursued, no witnesses were heard and no sentence was imposed. Given that there had been no trial, no verdict and no imposition of a sentence in the disciplinary proceedings, the court concluded that the applicant’s confinement could not be treated as a disciplinary sentence. 25.  The applicant lodged an appeal against his conviction before the Supreme Court. 26.  On 11 December 2007 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal against his conviction of the offence of escaping from custody given that, at the relevant time, he had been on temporary release and had merely failed to return to prison at the expiry of his release period. 27.  The applicant, in a letter to the office of the Commissioner of Administration (“the Ombudsman”) dated 6 October 2003, complained about his detention for an excessive period of time in the maximum security wing, alleging in particular that during this period he was not able to have visits or contact with his family by telephone or correspondence and that he was only allowed to leave his cell in order to go to the toilet, have a bath or pick up his food tray. He subsequently complained that his letter addressed to the Ombudsman dated 6 October 2003 was delivered late, after having been sent by the prison director to the Director General of the Ministry of Justice. 28.  According to the Ombudsman’s report of 21 November 2003 the applicant had been confined to a cell in the security wing for 47 days. Having been contacted by the Ombudsman, the prison authorities stated that the applicant had been put in solitary confinement for his own protection given the possibility of retaliation by other prisoners due to the restrictive measures imposed on them as a result of the applicant’s failure to return from home leave. The prison authorities confirmed that the applicant was not permitted any visits, telephone conversations or letters and that moreover, he was not allowed to exit his cell except in order to wash himself, to go to the toilet and to get his food. It was further noted that although the Senior Prison Inspector had given instructions on 31 October 2003 that the applicant be returned to normal detention, the applicant was kept confined to his cell until 7 November 2003 as the instructions had not been registered in the records of the wing but had merely been noted on a piece of paper which had been misplaced. 29.  As regards the applicant’s letter to the Ombudsman dated 6 October 2003, the report noted that a copy of that letter, as well as copies of three other letters addressed to recipients other than the prison authorities, had been sent by the prison director to the Director General of the Ministry of Justice in order to seek instructions as to whether the particular letters should be sent to the intended recipients. The Ombudsman received the letter addressed to her on 5 November 2003. 30.  The Ombudsman in her report observed that it did not appear from the file that the confinement of the applicant had been of a disciplinary nature. She also noted that had the applicant’s confinement been a preventive measure or a measure for the protection of the applicant, as claimed by the prison authorities, then under regulation 151(5) of the Prison (General) Regulations 1997 (“Prison Regulations” – see further “Relevant domestic law and practice”, below) the written approval of the prison director would have been required. No such approval had been given. The Ombudsman therefore considered that the applicant’s confinement was a punitive measure. 31.  Moreover, the Ombudsman was not convinced that the denial of the applicant’s right to receive visits, correspondence and telephone contact, for example with his eight year old son, had aimed to protect the applicant from his fellow inmates. She further observed the following:\n“It is noted that although in theory the total seclusion of a person in combination with his total social isolation is not acceptable, in practice the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission have tolerated this type of total confinement in exceptional circumstances. However, this was done in cases concerning particularly dangerous terrorists who had been detained pending their trial and who had been allowed to go into the prison yard at some specific time in the day.” 32.  The Ombudsman concluded that the applicant’s confinement for a total period of 47 days with no right to exit his cell for one hour a day as provided for in the Prison Regulations, in combination with the denial of the applicant’s right to have contact with family and friends, was in breach of the Prison Regulations and constituted a violation of the applicant’s rights under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. 33.  As regards the applicant’s complaint concerning the monitoring of the letter he sent to her, the Ombudsman emphasised the importance of allowing prisoners direct and uninhibited access to her office. In this connection she referred, inter alia, to the European Prison Rules and a report by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the prevention of torture (see further “International materials”, below), as well as the case of Silver and others v. the United Kingdom, (no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, Commission’s report of 11 October 1980, Decisions and Reports (DR) 9, p. 56). 34.  On 1 January 2004 the applicant submitted an additional complaint to the Ombudsman against the prison authorities. He complained that the prison authorities had, on 20 December 2003, refused to allow him to give his father, who had visited him in prison, a letter addressed to the Ombudsman requesting her to send him copies of past correspondence between them. The applicant claimed that he did not want the contents of his letters to the Ombudsman to be monitored by the prison personnel and that for this reason he had decided to send the letter through his father. He had complained on 30 December 2003 to the prison director. 35.  The Ombudsman, in a report dated 15 March 2004, repeated that prisoners should be allowed unrestricted access to her office. She found that there had been unjustified difficulties and unnecessary obstacles in the direct and unhampered communication of the applicant with her office that had negatively affected the exercise of his rights. She noted that on 3 February 2004, at a meeting held in the Ministry of Justice, it was decided that a designated letter box would be placed in the central prisons to allow prisoners, freely and without procedural or substantive restrictions, to submit complaints to the Ombudsman concerning their conditions of detention. 36.  By letter of 22 May 2004 the applicant informed the Court that in May 2004, on the basis of a recommendation by the Attorney-General of Cyprus, fifty-four prisoners were granted an official pardon by the President and were consequently released. The applicant was not among the fifty-four.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and currently lives in Sevastopol, the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea, Ukraine. 5.  At the material time she worked at the Housing Maintenance and Utilities Enterprise “Kotelnikovo” (Управління житлово-комунального господарства «Котельниково»), a municipal enterprise set up and owned by local village council. The labour contract with the applicant was signed by that village council. Subsequently she resigned. 6.  On 16 December 2002 the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Court of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea awarded the applicant 3,151.25 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and other payments due to her by her former employer. 7.  This judgment became final and on 30 January 2003 the State Bailiffs’ Service instituted proceedings to enforce it. According to the Government, in the course of these proceedings the total amount of UAH 357.97 was paid to the applicant. The applicant, in her turn, contested that she had ever been paid any sum under the judgment. 8.  In September 2003 the applicant instituted another set of proceedings against her former employer seeking additional compensation for salary arrears. On 1 February 2005 the court dismissed her claim. The applicant did not appeal against this judgment. 9.  On 15 December 2004 the enforcement proceedings were terminated for lack of funds of the debtor enterprise. The applicant did not challenge this decision before the domestic courts; nor had she reintroduced her writ of enforcement with the State Bailiffs’ Service. 10.  On 26 January 2006 the Commercial Court of the Autonomous Republic of the Crimea initiated liquidation proceedings against the debtor enterprise. These proceedings were terminated on 26 February 2007 and the enterprise was removed from the relevant enterprises’ register. The applicant did not raise her creditor claims within these proceedings. 11.  The judgment of 16 December 2002 remains unenforced. 12.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Pyatykhatky, the Dnipropetrovsk region, Ukraine. 13.  On 11 April and 1 October 2003 the Pyatykhatky District Court of Dnipropetrovsk Region awarded the applicant UAH 1,705.14 and UAH 570.41[2], respectively, in salary arrears due to her by her former employer, the Pyatykhatky Municipal Plumbing Company (Комунальне підприємство водопровідно-каналізаційного господарства в м. П’ятихатки) set up, owned and managed by local town council. 14.  These judgments became final and on 30 April 2003 and 30 March 2004, respectively, the State Bailiffs’ Service instituted proceedings to enforce them. 15.  The applicant complained to various State authorities about lengthy non-enforcement of the judgments in her favour but to no avail. 16.  On 15 May 2007 the awarded amounts were paid to the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Rejowiec Fabryczny. 5.  The applicant was arrested on 20 September 1999 on suspicion of homicide. On 22 September 1999 the Chełm District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a period of 3 months in view of a reasonable suspicion that he had committed homicide. It further held that the likelihood that he would be given a heavy sentence justified his detention on remand. 6.  On 14 December 1999 the Lublin Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) prolonged the applicant’s detention until 19 March 2000. It relied on the reasonable suspicion of his having committed the offence in question and the likelihood of a heavy sentence being imposed on the applicant. In addition, it had regard to the need to obtain expert evidence and a psychiatric examination of the suspects. 7.  On 8 March 2000 the Lublin Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) extended the applicant’s detention until 19 June 2000. It found that in the light of the evidence obtained there was a strong likelihood that the applicant had committed the offence. Furthermore, it relied on the severity of the likely sentence and the need to obtain further expert evidence. On 24 May 2000 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 4 September 2000, reiterating the grounds previously given. It appears that his detention was subsequently prolonged on an unspecified later date. 8.  In the course of the investigation the Regional Prosecutor obtained voluminous evidence and took a series of investigative measures. On 10 July 2000 the prosecution service filed a bill of indictment with the Lublin Regional Court. The applicant was charged with two counts of homicide and armed robbery. There were four other defendants in the case. 9.  On 20 March 2001 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 19 September 2001. It held that the gravity of the charges and the likelihood that the applicant would be given a heavy sentence confirmed the risk that he might obstruct the proceedings. It further held that the applicant’s detention on remand was the only measure which could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. Lastly, when extending the applicant’s detention, the Regional Court had regard to its caseload. 10.  On 19 September 2001 the Court of Appeal granted the Regional Court’s application and prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 December 2001. It noted that the period of the applicant’s detention had reached the 2-year statutory time-limit (Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and criticised the trial court for not having indicated any particular circumstances which would justify the prolongation beyond the statutory time-limit. However, it held that the prolongation was justified on account of other significant obstacles to progress in the proceedings, namely the fact that one of the defendants had failed to appear at the hearing which had led to the adjournment of the trial. The Court of Appeal also noted that although the bill of indictment had been filed on 10 July 2000, the trial court listed the first hearing only for 16 May 2001. 11.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged on 28 November 2001 (until 15 March 2002), on 13 March 2002 (until 30 April 2002) and on 24 April 2002 (until 30 September 2002). In all those decisions the Court of Appeal relied on the same grounds as had been given in the earlier decisions. 12.  The trial court held 20 hearings in the period from 16 May 2001 to 19 September 2002. On 23 September 2002 the Lublin Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. The applicant, who remained in detention, appealed against the first-instance judgment. 13.  On 22 October 2003 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and ordered a retrial. 14.  It appears that the applicant’s detention was prolonged on further unspecified dates. On 7 May 2004 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 31 December 2004. The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged on 3 December 2004 (until 31 March 2005), on 29 March 2005 (until 30 September 2005) and on 19 September 2005 (until 31 December 2005). In all those decisions, the Regional Court relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question and the likelihood of a heavy sentence being imposed. 15.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 3 December 2004 to prolong his detention. He argued, in particular, that the Regional Court had failed to explain why other non-custodial measures were considered insufficient in his case. On 21 December 2004 the Court of Appeal upheld the contested decision. It agreed with the applicant that the reasons given by the Regional Court were very brief and general. However, referring to Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, it held that the applicant’s continued detention served the public interest of protecting society, given that the applicant had been charged with the homicide of two women, having first cruelly treated them. 16.  In its decision of 20 April 2005 upholding the decision of 29 March on the prolongation of the applicant’s detention, the Court of Appeal held that his continued detention on the basis of Article 258 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remained valid. Having regard to the nature of the alleged offences, it held that Article 258 § 2 established a presumption to the effect that the likelihood of a severe penalty being imposed on an accused might induce him to obstruct the proceedings. 17.  On 5 October 2005 the Court of Appeal, having examined the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 19 September 2005 on prolongation of his detention, ordered the applicant’s release under police supervision. It also imposed a ban on leaving the country. The Court of Appeal had regard to the excessive length of the applicant’s detention on remand and the fact that the process of hearing evidence was very advanced. In those circumstances, it was not necessary to prolong further the applicant’s detention. The Court of Appeal also noted that despite the significant length of the applicant’s detention, the Regional Court had failed to ensure the diligent conduct of the trial and, in particular, had not held hearings at reasonable intervals. Furthermore, it observed that the reasons for the continued detention as given by the Regional Court in its decision of 19 September 2005 were very terse. The applicant was released on 6 October 2005. 18.  The Regional Court held 22 hearings in the period from 28 January 2004 to 11 April 2006. The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Innsbruck. 5.  On 23 September 1997 the applicant instituted divorce proceedings against his wife, A., before the Innsbruck District Court (Bezirksgericht). 6.  On 16 January 1998 the District Court dismissed A.'s request for legal aid (Verfahrenshilfe). 7.  Hearings were held in the divorce proceedings on 4 and 27 February 1998. 8.  On 6 November 1998 a further hearing was held in the divorce proceedings, in the course of which A.'s lawyer asked the court to adjourn the hearing in order to examine whether a guardian should be appointed to represent A. He considered that there were strong indications that she was mentally ill and lacked full legal capacity. Subsequently, in separate proceedings, a guardian was appointed for her. 9.  A further hearing in the divorce proceedings was fixed for 7 April 1999 and, at the request of A.'s lawyer, postponed until 21 April 1999. During the hearing on 21 April 1999 A.'s guardian stated that he was unable to approve the previous steps taken in the proceedings. 10.  In order to establish how long A. had lacked legal capacity and to what extent this had affected the previous proceedings, the District Court, on 12 May 1999, appointed Dr H., a psychiatrist, as an expert. On 7 October 1999 the expert submitted his report. On 26 November 1999 this report was discussed by the parties before the District Court. 11.  On 7 January 2000 the District Court declared the proceedings void because A. had been incapable of following the proceedings conducted so far. The applicant appealed against this decision. On 3 March 2000 the Regional Court (Landesgericht) dismissed his appeal. 12.  On 11 April 2000 the applicant requested the District Court to serve the petition for divorce on A.'s guardian. 13.  On 7 June 2000 the District Court scheduled a hearing in the fresh proceedings. The hearing was postponed and eventually took place on 20 September 2000. In the course of that hearing the District Court decided what evidence was to be taken. The applicant objected to the appointment of Dr H. as the expert as he considered him biased. 14.  A further hearing was fixed for 21 November 2000 but, at the applicant's request, was adjourned until 1 December 2000. 15.  Meanwhile, in August 2000, A. requested an interim injunction on the payment of maintenance. The District Court stayed these proceedings pending the receipt of expert opinions on A.'s legal capacity. Proceedings were resumed in December 2003. The request was eventually refused at second instance by the Regional Court on 30 April 2004. 16.  A., represented by her guardian, also requested an interim measure to prevent the applicant from selling parts of the real property that he had acquired during their marriage. This request was partly granted by the District Court on 7 December 2000. On 23 March 2001 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal by A. against that decision. 17.  Meanwhile, on 9 January 2001, the applicant had requested the District Court to hear witnesses in the main proceedings. 18.  On 27 February 2001 Dr H. commented on the applicant's allegation of bias. On 18 June 2001 the District Court appointed another expert, Dr K., to prepare a report on the legal capacity of A. prior to 1996. 19.  Between 19 April 2002 and 4 November 2002 the expert was repeatedly urged by the District Court to submit his report. Although the AKH hospital, where Dr K. had worked until the summer of 2002, repeatedly told the District Court that the file, together with the expert report, had already been sent to the court, the court had not received it. Enquiries with the post office were also to no avail. Eventually, on 13 November 2002, Dr K.'s report, dated 13 February 2002, arrived at the District Court. 20.  Following comments made by the parties on Dr. K.'s report, the District Court returned the report to him on 15 January 2003, ordering him to supplement it. 21.  On 28 April 2003 the applicant filed a request for the acceleration of the proceedings (Fristsetzungantrag) under Section 91 of the Court Act, because the expert had not yet submitted his new report. The applicant also challenged the judge, alleging bias. 22.  On 18 June 2003 the expert, Dr K., submitted his supplemented report attesting that A. had lacked legal capacity at the relevant time. On the same day the District Court dismissed the applicant's challenge concerning the judge. 23.  On 31 July 2003 the applicant requested the District Court to issue an injunction prohibiting A. from selling, encumbering or mortgaging real estate without his agreement. On 29 August 2003 the District Court dismissed that request. 24.  On 25 September 2003 a further hearing took place in the divorce proceedings. At the applicant's request, the District Court appointed a further expert (Obergutachter), Dr N. from Munich (Germany). The expert report by Dr N., dated 22 January 2004, was served on the applicant on 18 March 2004. 25.  Thereupon the applicant requested that this expert also supplement his report on certain points. Dr N. submitted his supplementary opinion on 16 December 2004. 26.  On 9 August 2004 the case was assigned to a new judge. 27.  On 3 February 2005 a further hearing took place, at which A. requested the hearing of twenty-two witnesses. On 8 August 2005 the applicant requested the hearing of a further ten witnesses. The District Court heard witnesses on 21 April 2005, 14 July 2005, 24 November 2005, 1 December 2005, 15 December 2005, and 4 July 2006. In addition, four witnesses were heard by other courts on letters rogatory between 29 September 2005 and 11 May 2006. 28.  After the parties had already been heard by the District Court on 15 December 2005, the applicant, on 23 March 2006, requested to be heard once more. This hearing took place on 4 July 2006. Thereupon the District Court closed the taking of evidence and decided that the judgment was to be given in writing. 29.  On 12 October 2006 the District Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and A. on grounds of mutual fault, while holding that A.'s fault prevailed. 30.  On 29 March 2007 the Regional Court dismissed an appeal by A. against the divorce judgment. 31.  On 26 June 2007 the Supreme Court rejected an extraordinary appeal (außerordentliche Revision) by A. This decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 31 July 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1938 and currently lives in Lancashire. 10.  In 1953 he joined the British army at 15 years of age. He served with the Royal Engineers between February 1954 and April 1968, when he was discharged for reasons unrelated to the present application.\nIn 1981 he was diagnosed as suffering from hypertension and late onset bronchial asthma and in 1989 he was found to have high blood pressure and chronic obstructive airways disease (bronchitis – COAD). He has not worked since 1992 or thereabouts and is registered as an invalid. 11.  The Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment at Porton Down (“Porton Down”) was established during the First World War in order to conduct research into chemical weapons with a view to advancing the protection of the United Kingdom's armed forces against such weapons. The research included tests of gases on humans as well as on animals. Servicemen who participated in the tests were paid extra wages. 12.  The applicant participated in such tests at Porton Down. While there was some debate as to whether he attended in 1962, it was not disputed that he did so in July 1963. His service medical records contained no record of any tests at Porton Down. 13.  The applicant alleged as follows. In the spring of 1962 he was invited to Porton Down; he was medically examined on arrival; he was asked on three or four occasions to enter a sealed and unventilated room, where he was seated and strapped to a chair; over a period of about six hours, drops of mustard gas were applied to patches of tissue which were then taped to his skin; he was told that, if he was unlucky, he might suffer temporary pain or discomfort but otherwise he was not given any, or any proper, warning about the possible consequences of the tests for his health; once the tests were finished he returned to his unit; there was no further medical examination after he left Porton Down. He relied on a memorandum and file note of 13 November 1989 (see paragraph 24 below) and on the conclusions in this respect of 14 January 2004 of the Pensions Appeal Tribunal (“the PAT” – see paragraph 63 below) to substantiate his participation in tests in 1962. 14.  While the Government did not deny that participation, they pointed to a number of matters that appeared to militate against such a conclusion: the summary and alphabetical record books did not refer to his attendance in 1962 but only to his attendance in 1963; there was no documentary evidence at all of the 1962 tests whereas certain records existed of his 1963 tests; and if the PAT had accepted his participation in the 1962 tests, this was based solely on his recollections. 15.  The nerve gas (known as “G-agent” or “GF”) test is described in the relevant records as “exposure to single-breath GF”. The applicant alleged that he was told before the test that the experiment “could not harm a mouse”; that he was placed in an air-tight, glass-partitioned cubicle containing a face mask, the mask was placed over his mouth and nose, the fitting was checked and the chamber was sealed; that a loudspeaker informed him that the test was about to begin and to inhale normally; that he felt an immediate tightening of the chest muscles and lungs which wore off after the end of the test; and that blood samples were taken at regular intervals during the following twenty-four hours. The Government submitted that diluted GF vapours were put into a gas chamber and, as the name of the test suggested, volunteers took a single breath of air with calculated doses of GF gas through a tube connected to that chamber, they held their breath for two seconds and then exhaled. 16.  The other test involved mustard gas and was described in the records as “H sensitivity and penetration”. According to the applicant, it followed the same format as that in 1962.\nThe Government added the following detail: the mustard gas test was designed to test the performance of protective clothing and was carried out in two parts. The first was a sensitivity test to determine an individual's sensitivity to mustard gas and it involved the placement of a dilute solution of the gas on the participant's upper arm. If after twenty-four hours the test subject had a small red mark, he or she was deemed too sensitive and did not participate any further in the tests. On the other hand, if the participant was not demonstrably sensitive, the second part consisted of putting a drop of dilute mustard gas solution on three samples of protective clothing left in place on the participant's body and the skin under the clothing was examined after six and then twenty-four hours. The participants were monitored before and after the tests. The rooms were properly ventilated, the dosages were small and safe and the tests were carefully planned and controlled. 17.  From 1981 the applicant was medically treated for breathlessness and high blood pressure and by 1987 these problems had significantly worsened. He began to search for his Porton Down records through what he described as “medical” and “political” channels. 18.  In response to his doctor's enquiry, in late 1987 the Ministry of Defence (MOD) supplied his doctor with his service medical records on a “medical in confidence” basis. Those records did not refer to the applicant's Porton Down tests. 19.  In a letter of 14 November 1989, Porton Down responded to another enquiry from his doctor. The letter was sent on a “medical in confidence” basis and confirmed the applicant's participation in a GF gas test in July 1963. That GF test had been preceded and succeeded by a full medical examination which revealed no abnormality. The letter also referred (inaccurately, as it later emerged – see paragraph 36 below) to seven blood tests conducted after the GF test and to their results and confirmed that “peak flow meter measurements” had also been taken from the applicant and that “breath-holding tests”, a clothing penetration study (apparently, although not expressly noted, the mustard gas tests) and a battery of personality tests were performed. The results of these tests were not included in the letter and no other records supporting the statements made in the letter were enclosed. His doctor's stamp on it indicates that he decided to tell the applicant that all was normal. The applicant persuaded his doctor to show him the letter in 1994. 20.  By a letter dated 14 December 1989, a consultant informed the applicant's doctor that he doubted that the applicant's bronchial asthma was caused by his exposure to nerve gas. Further tests were to be carried out. 21.  A letter from Dr H. (a professor of environmental toxicology at the University of Leeds and later the court-appointed expert witness in the PAT proceedings – see paragraphs 42-68 below) dated 5 December 1994 to the applicant stated that full and detailed records were required to judge the long-term effects of his participation in the tests and that a long-term epidemiological study would have been useful either to establish that there were long-term effects or to reassure test participants that there were none. His letter of 10 July 1996 repeated his view as to the need for such a study. 22.  An internal Porton Down memorandum of 24 November 1997 noted that certain blood-test figures given in the letter to the applicant's doctor of 14 November 1989 were inaccurate. In addition, it was considered that the applicant's description of the tests was roughly consistent with the procedures in the 1960s. While there were no obvious gaps in the 1960s records, it could not be said that the records were complete: the applicant could have attended in 1962 and his name could have been omitted or incorrectly recorded due to a clerical error. 23.  Inter alia, the applicant carried out a sit-in hunger strike at Porton Down, held a press conference in the House of Commons and requested members of parliament to put parliamentary questions. 24.  Between 11 and 14 November 1989, the applicant went on hunger strike outside Porton Down. On 13 November 1989 he spoke with the Secretary of Porton Down. The latter noted in a memorandum of that date that the applicant's description of the tests was strong enough to indicate that he had been there and he recommended a further search of the records. He also recorded in a file note (of the same date) that the applicant's description of his visits to Porton Down in 1962 and 1963 left him with a level of confidence that he had been a volunteer there on both occasions. This led to the letter of 14 November 1989 to the applicant's doctor (see paragraph 19 above). 25.  In January 1994 the applicant formed the Porton Down Volunteers Association with the object of seeking recognition and redress for test participants. The association has over 300 members to date. 26.  By a letter dated 26 January 1994, the Chief Executive of Porton Down answered, at the request of the Secretary of State for Defence, a series of questions raised by a member of parliament about chemical and biological warfare testing. The Chief Executive's letter described the test procedure, stating that participants were given a medical examination before and after the tests and recalled for check-ups “from time to time”. It was pointed out that there was no evidence that the health of participants had deteriorated because of their test participation. On 22 June 1994 the Chief Executive confirmed the well-established policy of the MOD of releasing service medical records to a veteran's doctor on a “medical in confidence” basis. The Chief Executive's letter of 7 March 1995 (in response to a parliamentary question to the Minister of State for Defence) noted that the tests did not include any plan for long-term systematic monitoring of participants: any monitoring thereafter was purely ad hoc and sporadic. 27.  On 2 February 1994 the applicant wrote to the MOD requesting copies of his medical records and of reports on the relevant tests. The reply of 9 March 1994 from Porton Down recalled the MOD policy of release on a “medical in confidence” basis. The applicant's doctor had been provided with information in 1989 on this basis. It was “entirely up to your own doctor how much or how little of this information he conveys to you”. Further queries from the applicant led to a similar response from Porton Down by letter dated 20 April 1994. 28.  On 12 December 1994 Lord Henley stated in the House of Lords that the MOD would continue to send veterans to their doctors and would release medical records as appropriate. Information was provided to doctors to allow proper diagnosis and “would be released, if necessary”. He repeated that there was no evidence over the previous forty years that test participants had suffered harm to their health. 29.  In response to a series of parliamentary questions put to the Secretary of State for Defence as to the necessity for a public inquiry, the government's representative replied on 28 February 1995 that there was no evidence that any test participants had suffered any long-term damage to their health in the past four decades. Similar responses as to the lack of evidence of harm to the test participants were given by the Minister of State for Defence in Parliament on 4 April and 2 May 1995 in response to questions concerning the instigation of a study into the long-term health effects of exposure to chemical and biological substances. 30.  On 25 April 1995 the applicant and the Labour Party defence spokesman took part in a press conference on the question of Porton Down volunteers and their requirements. 31.  Following a meeting between them, on 2 December 1997 the Minister of State for Defence wrote to the applicant. He referred to the concerns of the applicant (and other test participants) that information about the tests was being withheld. He confirmed that this was not the case but rather reflected “less than thorough” record-keeping than would be currently expected. Henceforth all volunteers would be able to obtain access to all the information held on them at Porton Down and steps would be taken to declassify reports so as to make that information more accessible.\nCertain copies of test documents were enclosed: (a) the alphabetical record book which recorded the applicant's attendance at Porton Down between 13 and 19 July 1963; (b) the summary record book which referred to the two tests carried out on the applicant involving GF and mustard gas and listed the monitoring procedures that were to be carried out on the applicant (chest X-rays, peak flow meter tests, “x 3 x alcohol” quiz, breath-holding tests and blood tests); and (c) a report entitled “Effects of Inhaled GF on Man” which described the single breath GF test and contained an analysis of the results of the tests carried out on fifty-six participants, believed to include the applicant's test. It was indicated that these documents were available to any test participant who requested them.\nThis was the first material obtained by the applicant about his participation in the tests.\nThe letter went on to note that much GF-related research work had already been published in open literature or was in the Public Record Office. The review of files to be disclosed would continue and the applicant was given a list of all relevant research papers already published between 1957 and 1987. There was no evidence to date to suggest that any volunteer had suffered long-term adverse effects. A full independent and long-term study of the health impacts of test participation was not, however, considered feasible or practical so none had been or would be carried out. 32.  In a letter dated 31 August 1999 to the PAT, Porton Down indicated that it was well acquainted with the applicant, having received numerous communications from him and from members of parliament. 33.  By a letter dated 3 May 2001, Porton Down informed the applicant that it had discovered some old laboratory notebooks that included information about the 1963 tests: one book included some previously unavailable details of the mustard patch tests. A pre-exposure chest X-ray and the associated report card were also now available. The applicant was to contact Porton Down if he wanted to see this material or obtain copies. 34.  As well as those disclosed with the Minister of State's letter of 2 December 1997, the following documents were also submitted to the Court. 35.  The Government indicated that these were all the relevant records that could be traced: (a) an extract from a laboratory record of results of personality and intelligence tests; (b) extracts from laboratory records of GF blood tests – seven blood samples were taken from the applicant; and (c) an explanation of the GF blood-test results. 36.  The Government corrected their previous explanations of the seven blood samples (see paragraph 19 above): one was taken on 13 July 1963, a second one prior to the applicant's exposure to GF and the remaining five were taken later. They also corrected other errors relating to information provided in their earlier observations about those tests including the following: “the reference to '25 milligrams of GF [vapour per kilogram of body weight]' appears to have been a typographical error. In fact, calculated doses of GF ranged from 0.16 to 2.84 microgrammes per kilogramme of body weight.” They also disclosed documents recently discovered following a further search: (a) the applicant's pre-exposure X-ray and its associated report card (see paragraph 33 above); (b) a report dated August 1942 which described the manner in which the sensitivity tests to mustard gas were performed and entitled “Technique of the Physiological Experiments Carried Out on the Human Subjects at [Porton Down]”; and (c) extracts from a laboratory notebook entitled “Overgarment Tests. Mustard on Men”, relating to mid-July 1963 and referring to the applicant. 37.  On 10 June 1991 the applicant claimed a service pension on the grounds of “hypertension/breathing problems” resulting from the Porton Down tests (and, in addition, from his radiation exposure on Christmas Island during the relevant nuclear tests there). The Department of Social Security (DSS) obtained copies of his service and civilian medical records together with a report from his doctor, which confirmed that he suffered from hypertension, COAD and late onset bronchial asthma. On 28 January 1992 the Secretary of State rejected his claim for a service pension as there was no causal link demonstrated between the tests and those medical conditions. The applicant did not pursue an appeal at that stage. 38.  The applicant consulted solicitors in 1994 and obtained legal aid for proceedings. By a letter dated 14 November 1994 to the Secretary of State, his solicitors threatened proceedings, alleging, inter alia, negligence, assault and breach of statutory duty on the part of the MOD, and demanding the release of all medical and laboratory records in the possession of the Secretary of State or of Porton Down as regards the test periods in 1962 and 1963, failing which the applicant would apply to the High Court for pre-action discovery. The applicant's representatives met with MOD representatives in early January 1995 on a “without prejudice” basis and by a letter dated 5 June 1995 requested confirmation from the MOD as to whether a certificate would be issued under section 10 of the 1947 Act (“a section 10 certificate”). 39.  By a letter dated 4 July 1995 to the applicant's solicitors, the claims section of the MOD wrote as follows:\n“War Pensions Agency has informed me that a section 10 certificate in respect of acute bronchitis (1963), a bruised knee and loss of hearing will be regarded as attributable to service and a section 10 certificate will be issued. The other ailments for which [the applicant] claimed a war pension have not been regarded as attributable to service.” 40.  On 3 August 1995 a section 10 certificate was signed by the Secretary of State:\n“In so far as the personal injury of [the applicant] is due to anything suffered as a result of his service in the Army between 16 February 1954 and 2 April 1968, I hereby certify that his suffering that thing has been treated as attributable to service for the purpose of entitlement to an award under the Naval, Military and Air Forces Etc. (Disablement and Death) Service Pensions Order 1983, which relates to disablement or death of members of the Army.” 41.  By a letter dated 8 August 1995, the Treasury Solicitor provided a copy of the section 10 certificate to the applicant's representatives. 42.  Following the judgment of this Court in McGinley and Egan v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III) and the Government's disclosure of certain documents in their observations in the present case (on 9 March 1998), the applicant requested an adjournment of the present application in order to pursue an appeal to the PAT and, in particular, disclosure of documents under Rule 6 of the Pensions Appeal Tribunals (England and Wales) Rules 1980 (“the PAT Rules”). The present application was adjourned. 43.  On 1 June 1998 he lodged his PAT appeal. Since the War Pensions Agency (“the WPA” – a specialised agency of the Department of Social Security) clarified that a further form was required, on 8 November 1998 the applicant re-lodged the appeal. 44.  In February 1999 the applicant received his “Statement of Case”. He obtained two extensions of the time-limit for the submission of his “answer” to the Statement of Case (to take advice from an expert chemical pathologist on the documents already disclosed and on those which were also to be requested during the PAT appeal and to consider the intervening observations of the Government in the present application) and he indicated that he would be making an application under Rule 6(1) of the PAT Rules. 45.  On 30 July 1999 his answer was submitted to the WPA along with a letter which noted that the answer included an application for disclosure of documents under Rule 6(1) of the PAT Rules: paragraph 18 of the answer set out a list of seventeen categories of document required by him under that rule. 46.  On 10 August 1999 the WPA responded by pointing out that enquiries were being made to obtain all the information requested under Rule 6(1) of the PAT Rules. Once received, the WPA would ask for the agreement of the President of the PAT to disclose it. 47.  On the same day the WPA wrote to Porton Down enclosing a copy of the applicant's Rule 6 request and asking for the information as soon as possible so that the agreement of the President of the PAT could be obtained. 48.  On 14 March and 13 April 2000 the WPA sent the supplementary Statement of Case (now incorporating the supplemental medical evidence) to the applicant and to the PAT, respectively. 49.  On 3 August 2000 the President of the PAT responded to the applicant's enquiry, indicating that his case had not been listed as it awaited production of further documentary evidence and the Secretary of State's response. However, since the Rule 6 request should not have been made in the applicant's answer to the Statement of Case, that request had just come to light. The applicant was to confirm to the President if he intended paragraph 18 of his answer to constitute his Rule 6 request and, if so, the President would be grateful to receive any observations that would assist his consideration of the relevance of the documents to the appeal issues. The applicant was also to identify the State department to which a Rule 6 direction should be addressed. 50.  On 9 November 2000 the applicant confirmed to the President of the PAT that paragraph 18 of his answer did indeed constitute his Rule 6 request and he made detailed submissions on the matters requested by the President. 51.  By a letter dated 13 November 2000, the President of the PAT requested the applicant to submit a draft direction and attend a hearing on it since he was concerned that the wording of some parts of the Rule 6 request appeared to be ambiguous and lacking in clarity. The applicant submitted a draft direction (essentially listing those documents already included in paragraph 18 of his answer). 52.  By an order dated 1 February 2001, the President of the PAT directed, pursuant to Rule 6(1) of the PAT Rules, disclosure of the scheduled documents by the Secretary of State since the documents “were likely to be relevant to the issues to be determined in the appeal”. 53.  On 6 July 2001 the Secretary of State responded to the direction of the President of the PAT. It was marked “medical in confidence”. It referred to the documents already submitted by the Government to this Court (see paragraphs 34-36 above). The Secretary of State was unable to give a definitive response to the request for the fifth category of document required (namely, “any scientific or medical reports, whether published or prepared for internal use by Porton Down, the [MOD] or other government departments or agencies of the volunteer studies or experiments in Porton Down between 1957 and 1968 which were similar or related to the studies or experiments in which [the applicant] was involved”). A full and careful review had been undertaken and was a time-consuming process. Many of the documents identified as being possibly relevant to the request were classified. The Secretary of State had asked for an urgent review of the classification to be undertaken and, once the review was completed, he would let the PAT have his full response. Otherwise the Secretary of State provided various explanations of the documents already submitted by the Government to this Court and details of the precise dates on which the applicant would have participated in the tests, of the levels of exposure to gases and of various headings and abbreviations in the disclosed documents. The only documents (additional to those already submitted to this Court) disclosed to the PAT were the applicant's service and payment records, the latter of which included a payment for attendance for a week at Porton Down in July 1963. 54.  The MOD's letter was passed to the applicant on 25 July 2001. By a letter dated 19 July 2002, the applicant wrote to the PAT apologising for not having responded and explaining the reasons for the delay. 55.  By a letter dated 23 August 2002, the MOD disclosed documents concerning the above-described fifth category: two reports entitled “The feasibility of performing follow-up studies of the health of volunteers attending [Porton Down]” and “The single-breath administration of Sarin”, from which individual names had been blanked out. The feasibility report acknowledged that the records held at Porton Down prior to the late 1970s generally consisted of the name, service number and age of participants at the date of testing but were not “sufficient to allow either a comprehensive morbidity study or mortality study to proceed”. While a study could be carried out on post-1976 test participants, “such a study would be of very limited value and may only serve to draw attention to [Porton Down's] interest in possible long-term health problems experienced by volunteers”. The feasibility report concluded that a comprehensive follow-up study of all volunteers was “impractical”. Porton Down's library catalogue had also mentioned a document entitled “Unique papers relating to early exposure of volunteers to GD [O-Pinacolyl methylphosphonoflouidate, commonly known as Soman] and GF and DM [diphenylaminearsine chloride, commonly known as Adamsite]”. However, a copy of this document could not be located. A letter of 20 August 2002 was also enclosed which certified that nine of the requested documents were “in the nature of departmental minutes or records” and would not therefore be disclosed (Rule 6(1) of the PAT Rules). 56.  A hearing was fixed for 3 October 2002. On 27 September 2002 the applicant was obliged to request an adjournment since his counsel had advised that further questions needed to be put to Dr H. On 30 September 2002 the PAT declined to adjourn, indicating that it was unlikely Dr H. could or would prepare a report. 57.  On 2 October 2002 the MOD wrote to the PAT and the applicant. While nine documents had been previously certified as non-disclosable, (letter of 23 August 2002 – see paragraph 55 above), seven of those nine documents could now be disclosed. The MOD had “had the opportunity of re-examining the documents ... with a view to assessing whether [they] could be the subject of voluntary disclosure ... in an effort to ensure that everything that can be disclosed has been disclosed and so as to ensure the maximum openness and the maximum assistance to the [PAT]”. Certain blocking out had been done on some disclosed documents to protect the identities of staff involved and to excise irrelevant material. Two documents could still not be disclosed: the first did not appear “to contain anything of relevance” to the applicant's tests and, in any event, “contained information which remains security sensitive and is not properly subject to voluntary disclosure on security grounds”; and the second required permission from the United States before it could be disclosed. 58.  The appeal was scheduled for 3 October 2002. The applicant applied for an adjournment supported by the Veterans Agency (the successor of the WPA – “the VA”). The PAT decision (delivered on 7 October 2002) recorded as follows:\n“The [PAT] are deeply disturbed that this application has proved necessary as a result of the [applicant's] advisers' failure to consider documents disclosed over a year ago, in a timely fashion.\nHowever, since the [VA] also appear to be without documentation and there is confusion by the [applicant] as to whether he also wishes to appeal for hypertension, we have reluctantly decided to allow the adjournment.\nIt is highly unsatisfactory that Court resources have been wasted in this way. To prevent this happening in the future the Tribunal intend to exercise some control over the ongoing progress of the appeal.”\nThe PAT was to clarify with the MOD the status of certain classified documents and the extent to which they could be released to the public, and directed the MOD to provide, by 21 October 2002, disclosure of further documents. The MOD, the VA and the applicant were to notify the PAT by 18 November 2002 of the questions and documents it wanted Dr H. to examine. It was intended that the PAT would add its own questions and submit a composite questionnaire to Dr H. who would report in response to the PAT. The applicant was also to confirm his position as regards the hypertension appeal by 28 October 2002. 59.  On 21 October 2002, the MOD disclosed to the PAT three declassified documents. These were forwarded by the PAT to the applicant by a letter dated 8 November 2002, accompanied by a warning that the MOD had released the documents for the purpose of the appeal and that no information in them was to be used for any other purpose without the consent of the MOD. By a letter dated 25 October 2002, the applicant confirmed that his appeal had been intended to cover hypertension also, he explained the reasons for his confusion and he requested an extension of time to so appeal. A hypertension appeal form was lodged with the PAT on 5 December 2002. 60.  By a letter dated 3 December 2002, the PAT wrote to Dr H. enclosing the documents disclosed by the MOD (at that point) with two sets of questions (prepared by the applicant and the medical member of the PAT). By a letter dated 19 February 2003, Dr H. provided the PAT with a report. The applicant having noted that Dr H. had omitted to respond to the PAT questions, Dr H. did so in a supplemental report sent to the PAT under cover of a letter dated 14 May 2003. 61.  In a document dated 14 October 2003, the MOD submitted its comments on Dr H.'s reports. On 16 October 2003 the VA submitted a supplementary Statement of Case. 62.  The PAT appeal hearing took place on 23 October 2003. It allowed the hypertension appeal to be heard out of time but, once it became clear that the VA had not processed the appeal documentation filed by the applicant, the PAT reluctantly granted the MOD an adjournment to allow the VA time to “properly consider all the evidential material and prepare a reasoned medical opinion”. The COAD appeal was, however, dismissed. 63.  On 14 January 2004 the PAT delivered its written decision. As to the facts, the PAT accepted that the applicant had undergone tests for mustard gas “some time in 1962 as well as the documented tests in July 1963” despite the fact that there was no reference in his service records or in other research records to the 1962 test. The PAT also found “disquieting” the “difficulties” experienced by the applicant in obtaining the records which were produced to the PAT. The PAT also established the following facts:\n“1.  We find that [the applicant] suffered no long-term respiratory effect from skin contact with mustard gas following both tests in 1962 and 1963. 2.  We find that [the applicant] was administered only small doses of mustard gas and GF gas which would have resulted in minimal exposure to mustard gas by off-gassing and a limited and transitory reaction to the GF gas. Although no records relating to doses exist, the mustard gas tests were designed to test the suitability of military clothing to exposure and were not a gas test per se. Furthermore, after a fatality at Porton Down in 1953, safeguards were put in place to ensure that volunteers were only exposed to safe dosages. 3.  The compelling weight of the evidence is that [the applicant] did not receive, in any of the tests, dosages likely to have long-term effects as described in the research papers. In particular, the [PAT expert], although accepting the possibility that given further research through a long-term follow-up study a link might be found, concludes that there is no evidence to link [the applicant's] exposure to either gases with his present condition. We accept [the PAT expert's] conclusion that, given the limited doses and [the applicant's] minimal immediate reactions, this would rule out a link between the tests and the claimed conditions. 4.  We particularly rely on [Dr H.'s] expert report. He has analysed the specific data relevant to [the applicant's] case and considered the conditions for which he is claiming in relation to that specific data. The research papers relied on by the [applicant], although of some evidential value, are very general and speculative. We therefore prefer the evidence, and the conclusions reached by [Dr H.] in his reports.”\nThe PAT also accepted, as a matter of law, that it was sufficient to show that the proved service event was only one of the causes of the condition even if there were other contributory factors. However, it stated:\n“2.  We do not accept that the lack of possible evidence of other follow-up tests is sufficient to constitute reliable evidence. 3.  We find that there is some reliable evidence surrounding the Porton Down tests for which [the applicant] volunteered. However, this evidence tends, if anything, to support the view that there is in fact no link between those tests and [the applicant's] current conditions. The test of reasonable doubt is not therefore met. 4.  There is no reliable evidence to suggest a causal link between the tests for either mustard gas or GF gas and the claimed condition. 5.  [The PAT expert's] views that 'he cannot exclude the possibility' of a link between exposure to GF and/or mustard gas and the claimed condition, does not meet the 'reasonable doubt' test. Furthermore, he 'rules out' exposure to GF as a cause and deems it 'unlikely' that mustard gas is a cause. 6.  Finally, [the applicant's counsel] invites us to allow the appeal for reasons which can be summarised as 'general fairness'. The [PAT] does not have legislative or discretionary power to do so. The decision of the [PAT] is to disallow the appeal for [COAD].” 64.  On 4 February 2004 the applicant applied to the PAT for leave to appeal to the High Court (on the COAD matter) and for a stay of the hypertension appeal then pending before the PAT. On 26 April 2004 leave was refused, the PAT's reserved decision being delivered on 28 April 2004. 65.  On 11 May 2004 the applicant applied for leave to appeal to the High Court. On 13 July 2004 leave was granted. 66.  The applicant's appeal notice and supporting skeleton argument were submitted on 10 August 2004. The appeal was listed to be heard on 7 October 2004. 67.  On 8 October 2004 the High Court allowed the appeal and referred the matter back to the PAT for a further hearing. 68.  On 7 March 2005 a directions hearing was held before the PAT. It ordered the hypertension and COAD appeals to be heard together and mutual disclosure of any further documents relevant to the appeal by 18 April 2005. On the latter date the Treasury Solicitor produced a “schedule of disclosure” listing and disclosing eleven documents: apart from three items, the applicant had not seen them before. The Treasury Solicitor maintained that disclosure of most of the documents (including two sets of minutes of meetings which Rule 6 specifies can be withheld) was not obligatory as they were of marginal relevance, noted that all documents had been downgraded to “unclassified” and indicated that the MOD would endeavour to produce the annexes referred to in certain documents. 69.  The armed forces have, since 1998, put in place a service to deal with enquiries from Porton Down test participants (“the 1998 Scheme”). The relevant information pamphlet noted that participants could request their test records, that a search would be carried out for references to that person and for additional evidence of actual procedures, that a summary would be provided and that, if the person wanted to go to Porton Down, he or she could obtain the actual records. While the pamphlet noted that reasonably comprehensive records had existed since 1942, individuals had to accept that old records in some cases were very sparse, that record keeping in years gone by was not up to current standards and that in certain cases a person's attendance might not even have been marked. The pamphlet claimed that no participant was worse off after the Porton Down tests. 70.  In 2001 the Porton Down Volunteers Medical Assessment Programme was established by the MOD to investigate health concerns of Porton Down test participants. The study involved 111 participants but no control group. The report, published in April 2004, was entitled “Clinical Findings in 111 Ex-Porton Down Volunteers”. It noted that over 20,000 had participated in the tests since Porton Down's establishment in 1916 and that 3,000 had participated in nerve gas tests and 6,000 in mustard gas tests, with some servicemen having been exposed to both. It concluded that:\n“On a clinical basis, no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that participation in Porton Down trials produced any long-term adverse health effects or unusual patterns of disease compared to those of the general population of the same age.” 71.  From July 2002 the MOD funded “an initial pilot research project” on mortality and cancer incidence among Porton Down test participants. It compared 500 participants with a control group of 500 other servicemen and the decision was taken that a full-scale epidemiological study should be undertaken. By mid-2003 this had begun and it was expected to take about two years to complete. 72.  Further to the death of Aircraftsman Maddison in May 1953 after being exposed to Sarin gas (also referred to as GB gas, a nerve agent related to GF), a coroner's inquest was held and recorded “death by misadventure”. An application was brought for a fresh inquest alleging, inter alia, that incomplete evidence had been brought before the coroner and in November 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered a fresh inquest. It concluded on 15 November 2004 with the jury finding that the cause of Mr Maddison's death was the “application of a nerve agent in a non-therapeutic experiment”. Judicial review proceedings appear to be pending.\nIn or around 2004-05 a non-governmental organisation (“Porton Down Veterans”) discovered during searches in the Public Record Office two letters of May and August 1953 containing legal advice from the Treasury Solicitor to the MOD about Mr Maddison's case and about section 10 of the 1947 Act. That organisation sent this material to the Veterans Policy Unit – Legacy Health Issues of the MOD on 7 February 2005. The Treasury Solicitor's letter of August 1953 noted as follows:\n“When the case was referred to me previously I did consider the relevance of section 10 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 but I came to the conclusion that it had no application. On the information before me I am still of that opinion. Subsection (1) of that section, which deals with injuries caused by acts of members of the Armed Forces, can have no application since the administration of the GB gas to ... Maddison was (so I understand) carried out by [civilian] personnel and not by any member of the Armed Forces. Subsection (2) also seems inapplicable. [It] provides that no proceedings in tort are to lie against the Crown for death or personal injury due to anything suffered by a member of the Armed Forces if that thing is suffered by him 'in consequence of the nature or condition of any equipment or supplies used for the purposes of the Armed Forces of the Crown'. As I understand the facts of this case, GB gas cannot be said to be a 'supply used for the purposes of the Armed Forces' at all, it being purely an experimental substance and one which has never been used for the purposes of the Armed Forces. If this is correct, then section 10 of the 1947 Act cannot protect the Crown or the Minister from liability.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and is presently detained in Gdańsk, Poland. 6.  On 28 May 2001 the applicant was arrested by the police while crossing the Latvian-Polish border. On 29 May 2001 he was questioned by the police. On 30 May 2001 the applicant was heard by a prosecutor and was charged with robbery committed while acting in an organised criminal gang. 7.  On 30 May 2001 the Gdańsk District Court decided to place the applicant in pre-trial detention in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed armed robberies as a member of an organised criminal gang. 8.  On 17 August 2001 the Gdańsk Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention relying, in addition to the grounds originally given, on the risk that the applicant would interfere with the course of the proceedings, since the leader of the organised gang had not yet been arrested. 9.  On 13 November and 18 December 2001 the applicant’s detention was extended by the same court. It based its decision on the risk that a severe sentence would be imposed, which made it probable that the applicant would interfere with the course of the proceedings. Moreover, the court relied on the complexity of the case, as it concerned organised crime. 10.  Subsequently, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended, inter alia, on 21 March 2002 and 19 March 2003. The Regional Court reiterated the original grounds given for detention and held that keeping the applicant in custody was necessary for securing the evidence. In the latter decision the court considered that although the investigation had been lengthy, it had been justified by the complexity of the case. 11.  Afterwards, as the length of the applicant’s detention had reached the statutory time‑limit of two years laid down in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), the Regional Court applied to the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) asking for the applicant’s detention to be extended beyond that term. On 19 March, 27 June and 17 December 2003 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal allowed the application and extended his pre‑trial detention. The Court of Appeal based its decisions on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed serious offences and on the risk that he might interfere with the course of justice. The court further considered that the complexity of the case constituted an extraordinary circumstance justifying his continued detention. The court also referred to the fact that the applicant did not have a permanent place of residence in Poland. 12.  In the meantime, on 16 June 2003, the applicant and 14 other co‑accused were indicted before the Gdańsk Regional Court. 13.  In 2004 the applicant’s detention was extended by decisions of the Gdansk Court of Appeal given on 16 June and 28 December. The court reiterated the grounds given previously. 14.  On 14 June and 22 November 2005 the applicant’s detention was further extended. The court observed that the period of detention had been excessive given the complexity of the case and the need to ensure the proper conduct of the final stages of the trial. 15.  On 22 February 2006 the applicant’s detention was further extended. The applicant’s numerous applications for release and appeals against the decisions extending his detention were to no avail. 16.  During the entire proceedings the applicant made numerous, unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against the decisions extending his detention. 17.  On 30 May 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave judgment. The court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment. It appears that the applicant requested that the reasoned judgment be served on him with a view to lodging an appeal. 18.  It appears that the proceedings are pending before the Court of Appeal. The applicant remains in detention.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Diyarbakır. 5.  On 31 October 2000 the applicant was taken into police custody in Diyarbakır on suspicion of membership of Hezbollah, an illegal armed organisation. In his police statement dated 9 November 2000, taken in the absence of a lawyer, the applicant accepted the charges against him. 6.  On 10 November 2000 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and subsequently the investigating judge. Before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant denied that he was a member of Hezbollah. 7.  On 30 November 2000 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment and accused the applicant of membership of an illegal armed organisation. He requested that the applicant be charged and sentenced pursuant to Article 168 of the Criminal Code. On 30 April 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. In convicting the applicant, the court had regard to his statement taken in the absence of a lawyer. 8.  On 30 April 2002 the applicant appealed. On 19 June 2002 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation lodged a written opinion, in which he submitted that the Court of Cassation should uphold the judgment of the State Security Court. This opinion was not served on the applicant or his representative. On 21 October 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 9.  On 8 July 2005 the applicant was released from prison.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Dzerzhinsk, the Nizhniy Novgorod region. 6.  On 26 May 1998 the applicant was arrested, charged with the unlawful possession of firearms and attempted murder of a police officer, and remanded in custody. 7.  On 12 October 1998 the Criminal Section of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court, composed of a professional judge and two lay assessors, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years and six months’ imprisonment. The court referred to statements from five witnesses: two eyewitnesses, two forensic medical examination reports and a ballistic expert’s report. The applicant had extensive opportunities to cross-examine those witnesses and challenge other pieces of evidence throughout the trial. It appears that the court refused the applicant’s request to call two more witnesses. 8.  The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. In his appeal submission he argued that the trial court had made wrong findings of fact and had assessed the evidence incorrectly. He did not raise any objections as to the composition of the first-instance court. 9.  On 26 April 1999 the Supreme Court of Russia examined the applicant’s appeal and reduced the sentence to eight years and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant was present at the hearing, at the end of which the operative part of the decision was read out. According to the applicant, he obtained a copy of the decision on 12 May 1999. 10.  The applicant’s attempts to avail himself of supervisory review proved unsuccessful. 11.  On 17 March 2004 the applicant was released on parole. 12.  According to the applicant, he was held in remand prison IZ – 32/1 in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod (СИЗО – 32/1) from 26 May 1998 to 16 March 1999. 13.  The applicant was kept in a cell designed to hold 24 inmates. During the applicant’s detention the cell accommodated 120 inmates, and therefore he could only sleep taking turns, for no more than four hours a day. Due to lack of space, detainees had to remain standing the rest of the day. 14.  The window of the cell was covered with metal grilles supplemented with “eyelashes”, that is metal strips covering the grille, which let no daylight in. The cell was lit only by a single light bulb. As there was no ventilation, the air was stale and musty. The cell was overrun with cockroaches and bloodsucking insects. Neither the cell nor detainees’ personal belongings were ever sanitised. 15.  Detainees were able to take a shower every eight days. However, only a few of the shower cabins functioned properly, and therefore the detainees did not have enough time to wash themselves. The scarce meals were of poor quality, and the detainees had to eat standing, as the only table in the cell was designed for eight inmates.\n(ii)  Medical assistance 16.  In December 1998 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis and underwent medical treatment until 16 March 1999.\n(b)  The Government’s account\n(i)  General conditions of detention 17.  According to the Government, the applicant was held in remand prison IZ – 32/1 in the city of Nizhniy Novgorod from 5 June 1998 to 16 March 1999. From 26 May to 5 June 1998 he was held in a temporary detention centre of the Dzerzhinsk Directorate of the Interior, Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 18.  During his placement in remand prison IZ – 32/1 the applicant was held in cell no. 3/19, which measured 40.1 square metres and had 20 beds; cell no. 9/69, which measured 40.6 sq. m and had 24 beds; cell no. 19/266, which measured 34.1 sq. m and had 22 beds; and cell no. 1/3, which measured 40.9 sq. m and had 20 beds. 19.  The Government submitted that they were not in a position to provide information about the number of inmates held in the cells at the same time as the applicant because the relevant documents had been destroyed due to the expiry of their storage term. 20.  Every inmate was provided with an individual bed and bedding. The cells had glass windows which measured 1.6 m by 1.4 m. The windows provided natural light sufficient for reading and working. A ventlight ensured natural ventilation in addition to the mandatory ventilation system installed in the cells. The cells were also equipped with central heating. The average temperature in the cells was 18 to 20 degrees Centigrade. Every cell had a washbasin and a lavatory pan separated by a brick partition. The inmates could wash once a week. None of the cells was infested with insects or rodents.\n (ii)  Medical assistance 21.  On 5 June 1998, during a medical check conducted upon the applicant’s arrival at the remand prison, he complained of a stomach ache and loss of vision in his right eye. 22.  On 7 June 1998 the applicant underwent fluorography, which showed the following changes in his lungs: limited fibrosis of the right side and minor calcification in the roots. A tuberculosis doctor regarded these changes as post-specific and recommended supervision by a radiologist. 23.  On 1 December 1998 the applicant again underwent fluorography which showed a minor infiltration in the first intercostal space on the right side with focal shadows. A tuberculosis doctor diagnosed the applicant with focal tuberculosis of the upper part of the right lung in the infiltration phase. Mycobacterium tuberculosis was not found. 24.  The applicant was first placed in a specialised cell for treatment for tuberculosis. He was mainly treated with rifampicin (an antibiotic). 25.  On 22 August 1999 the applicant was placed in medical penitentiary institution no. 10 (ЛИУ-10). An X-ray showed improvement following the treatment. 26.  On an unspecified date the acting deputy head of the Medical Department of the Federal Service of Execution of Sentences issued a medical certificate as to the possibility of the applicant having contracted tuberculosis while in detention. The certificate read, in particular:\n“- [According to the] anamnesis (the patient’s recollection), [the applicant had] peptic ulcer disease, chronic gastroduodenitis since 1996, which is a risk factor for the development of tuberculosis;\n- post-specific changes in the lungs were revealed upon [the applicant’s] arrival at the remand prison [on 1 December 1998] – such changes prove that the applicant had had tuberculosis earlier;\n- the patient’s attitude towards treatment was highly negative, which exacerbated the condition and caused escalation of the tuberculosis process.\nHaving regard to the foregoing, it is possible to assert that previous convictions, presence of risk factors, post-specific changes in the lungs as well as [the applicant’s] placement in cells for detainees in good health before he was diagnosed with active tuberculosis, are evidence of endogenous reactivation of the tuberculosis process and not of [the tuberculosis] being contracted in the remand prison in 1998.” 27.  According to the applicant, he was transferred to remand prison IZ – 48/3 in Moscow (ИЗ – 48/3) on 17 March 1999 and held there until 28 May 1999. 28.  Despite the fact that he was suffering from tuberculosis, the applicant was placed in a cell with detainees in good health. The cell, measuring approximately 11 square metres (2.5 m by 4.5 m) and designed for seven inmates, held 14 to 16 detainees. The ventilation did not function properly and therefore the cell was hot and damp. 29.  The applicant submitted that he did not remember further details of the conditions of his detention in Moscow. 30.  Following his transfer to Moscow, the applicant did not receive any medical treatment for tuberculosis, since remand centre IZ – 48/3 had no facilities for such treatment. According to the applicant, he complained about the lack of any medical assistance to the local authorities and various State bodies, but his complaints remained unanswered. However, the applicant only furnished the Court with an uncertified handwritten copy of one of those complaints.\n(b)  The Government’s account 31.  According to the Government, the applicant was held in remand prison IZ – 48/3 in Moscow between 16 March and 28 May 1999. However, according to the certificate dated 16 June 2005 issued by the head of remand prison IZ-77/3 (former IZ-48/3), the applicant was held there between 17 March and 28 May 1999. 32.  During his placement in remand prison IZ – 48/3 the applicant was held in cell no. 417, which measured 14.98 square metres, and cell no. 419, which measured 14.9 sq. m. The applicant was provided with an individual bed and bedding. The cells had glass windows which measured 0.89 m by 0.94 m. During the daytime the windows provided natural light sufficient for reading and working. The cells also had artificial light provided by luminescent lamps. A ventlight ensured natural ventilation in addition to the mandatory ventilation system installed in the cells. Every cell had a tap, a lavatory pan separated by a brick partition and a tank with drinkable water. The average temperature in the cells was never below 18 Centigrade. The inmates could wash once a week and took at least an hour’s daily exercise. 33.  The Government submitted that they were not in a position to provide information about the number of inmates held in the cells simultaneously with the applicant and the medical assistance available to him because the relevant documents had been destroyed due to the expiry of their storage term. 34.  It appears that from remand prison IZ-48/3 the applicant was transferred to penitentiary institution LIU-10 where he served his sentence. 35.  In January 2000 the applicant was diagnosed with focal tuberculosis of the upper part of the right lung in the carnification phase. 36.  In September 2000 his condition worsened and the applicant was prescribed treatment for tuberculosis. Until March 2003 the applicant’s condition was stable; however in April 2003 his condition worsened further. 37.  On 17 April 2003 the applicant was admitted to the hospital of penitentiary institution LIU-10. 38.  In the course of a search conducted on 20 August 2003 prison officers found and seized over one hundred anti-tuberculosis and ranitidine (anti-histamine) tablets, which the applicant had not taken despite having been prescribed them by the doctor. 39.  The applicant was released on 17 March 2004. 40.  On 21 January 2002, while the applicant was serving his sentence, he lodged a claim for damages caused by the alleged infection with tuberculosis and deterioration of his health due to inadequate treatment while in detention in remand prison IZ – 32/1. By this time the number of the remand prison had been changed to IZ – 52/1. 41.  On 22 August 2002 the Sovetskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod dismissed the claim as unsubstantiated. The judgment read, in particular:\n“On 5 June 1998 [the applicant] was placed in cell 3/19 of remand prison IZ – 52/1 where he remained until 28 August 1999.\nFluorogram no. 33-34 of 7 June 1998 made on [the applicant’s] admittance to remand prison IZ – 52/1 showed post-specific changes in his right lung in the form of limited fibrosis and minor calcification in the roots.\nFluorogram no. 25-26 of 1 December 1998... showed a minor infiltration with focal shadows in the first intercostal space on the right side [and] minor calcification in the roots.\n...on 1 December 1998 [the applicant] was diagnosed with “focal tuberculosis of the upper part of the right lung in the infiltration phase”...\nThe report of the medical commission [included in the materials of the case], concluded that “taking into account post-specific changes in his right lung and the lung’s roots that had been stated earlier as well as such risk factors as a duodenal ulcer and stress reaction to the arrest, the tuberculosis process in the right lung has reactivated.\nImmediately after the disease had been diagnosed, remand prison IZ – 52/1 took measures for the plaintiff’s treatment: [he was] prescribed medication, provided with special] nutrition, [and] subjected to regular medical examinations, which is confirmed by... the plaintiff’s medical file. ...\nHaving analysed the evidence submitted by the defendant (the plaintiff submitted no evidence that he had contracted tuberculosis through the fault of the administration of remand prison IZ – 52/1), the court has not found the administration of remand prison IZ – 52/1 responsible for [the applicant] having contracted tuberculosis...\nIn his statement of claim the plaintiff submitted that he had not suffered from tuberculosis before, which is refuted by the medical file provided by the defendant... According to the medical file, on 7 June 1995 the applicant was admitted for treatment to the surgical department... with the diagnosis: “Dystrophy of the retina of the right eye following thrombosis of the central vein with extensive extravasation, myopia... of the right eye.” ... Fluorography showed limited fibrosis on the right, calcification in the roots. ...[S]uch changes were post-specific... [The applicant] refused further examination and left the hospital. ...\nTuberculosis is an infectious disease which nowadays is spread not only in detention facilities. The court found no evidence to support [the claim] that actions or omissions of the administration of remand prison IZ – 52/1... caused damage to the plaintiff’s health.” 42.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. 43.  On 4 April 2003 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Helsinki. 9.  At 6.14 p.m. on Friday 6 September 1996 the applicant received a telephone call from H., who inquired whether he had any cannabis in his possession. The applicant replied in the negative but added that in a couple of days, after having made some inquiries, he might know better. 10.  At 8.04 a.m. on Sunday 8 September 1996 R. and K. entered Finland in a car in which a quantity of drugs had been hidden. They drove through customs in Turku, south-west Finland, and left for Helsinki. At 8.37 a.m. M. called the applicant and requested him to go and get the drugs because he was unable to do so himself. The applicant accepted. 11.  At 1.48 p.m. and 8.11 p.m. H. called the applicant again. In the first call H. asked the applicant whether he now had any cannabis. The applicant answered that he could provide it later that day. In the second call it was agreed that H. would call the applicant again in order to arrange a meeting later the same evening. At 10.25 p.m. H. called the applicant and they agreed to meet in front of a restaurant twenty minutes after the call. 12.  At the material time, the applicant did not know that H. had been in detention on remand from 3 September 1996. 13.  The parties disagree as to the time of the initial call and as to when the order for narcotics was made. According to the applicant, the first call from H. could have taken place either on Wednesday 4 or Thursday 5 September 1996. That call was the start of the applicant's involvement in the relevant events and the order was placed on 6 September 1996. According to the Government, the order was placed at 8.11 p.m. on 8 September 1996, but the applicant had become involved earlier, during the importation of the drugs into Finland. They did not specify the exact nature or the time of his involvement. 14.  At 11.10 p.m. on 8 September 1996 the applicant was arrested in front of the restaurant while in possession of 986 grams of cannabis. In a later search of his apartment, a further 13.2 grams of cannabis were found. 15.  When questioned by the police, the applicant stated that he had earlier that day met two women at a petrol station, in accordance with the instructions of M., a drug dealer. The women had given him the car. He and M. together had unloaded some ten kilograms of cannabis. The applicant had received about one kilogram and had gone to the restaurant, where he had been arrested. 16.  On 9 September 1996 the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) authorised the police to obtain telephone metering information concerning the applicant's telephone. On 11 September 1996 the court ordered his detention pending trial. 17.  During the criminal investigation the applicant told the police about his earlier drug deals, namely the sale of cannabis purchased from M. in 1996, two incidents of exporting cash to the Netherlands in early 1996, the purchase of three mobile telephone connections to be used by M., the introduction of a third party to M. to purchase another mobile telephone connection and for the export of cash to the Netherlands, and giving M. a key to his apartment. 18.  On 8 October 1996 the applicant was charged with the following offences:\n“I)  aiding and abetting on two occasions the importing of narcotic substances in January and February 1996 [delivering cash to Holland on the order of M.];\nII)  promoting the importation of narcotic substances on three occasions in February-March and July 1996 [acquiring mobile phone connections for M.];\nIII)  an aggravated narcotics offence on 8 September 1996 [possession and handling of 10 kilograms of cannabis together with M. and taking about one kilogram for himself];\nIV)  two narcotics offences in July 1996 [sale of 200-300 and 100 grams of cannabis on the order of M.]; and\nV)  an aggravated narcotics offence in 1996 [sale of five kilograms of cannabis purchased from M.].”\nHe admitted all the events on which the charges were based. 19.  At the hearing on 22 October 1996 the applicant gave evidence against one of his co-defendants. The applicant's counsel clarified that on 8 September 1996 his client had taken delivery of the car in order to obtain one kilogram of cannabis without knowing how much cannabis the car contained. The case was adjourned and the applicant was ordered to remain in custody as the police investigation concerning some of the events had not yet come to an end. 20.  At the hearing on 5 November 1996 the prosecution presented alternative charges against the applicant in so far as he had been charged on count II with promoting the importation of narcotic substances. He was now charged in the alternative with aiding and abetting a narcotics offence on three occasions. The prosecution also made a change to count V to the following effect. As he had earlier been accused of possessing and selling some five kilograms of cannabis in 1996, the altered charge concerned twenty-one kilograms of cannabis of which he had allegedly sold about twenty kilograms to three different persons during the period from 1 April 1996 until 8 September 1996. Also two new charges were added, namely:\n“VI)  aiding and abetting narcotics offences in the spring of 1996 [giving M. keys to his apartment knowing that it was going to be used for the sale of narcotics]; and\nVII)  aiding and abetting an aggravated narcotics offence in May 1996 [introducing a person to M. in order to have him deliver cash to Holland].” 21.  At the hearing on 19 November 1996 the applicant's counsel pointed out as newly acquired information that H. had been in police custody when he had placed the order and he had been released as a reward for his favours to the police. Therefore, counsel argued that no offence had been committed under count III as the events had taken place under police control. The police had set a trap by having the agent provocateur order cannabis from the applicant, who would not have committed the offence had he not been explicitly asked to do so. Counsel had requested the police to produce the telephone metering information about calls made from and to the applicant's mobile telephone, but this had not yet been disclosed.\nThe applicant gave oral evidence that H. had ordered a kilogram of cannabis on Wednesday or Thursday, whereupon the applicant had contacted M., who the same day had confirmed that there would be a shipment that weekend. When H. called again on Saturday, the applicant had told him that the deal might go through on Sunday or Monday. 22.  On 25 November 1996 the police applied to the Espoo District Court for permission not to disclose to the applicant that his mobile telephone had been under surveillance. The same day the court granted permission, relying on Chapter 5a, section 11(2) of the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen). The next day the police informed the applicant of the decision, declining to divulge the requested information. The same day the applicant requested the police to issue a formal decision which could be appealed. On 29 November 1996 the police issued a decision in which it was maintained, inter alia, that the information was not to be disclosed even to a party to criminal proceedings. On the same day the applicant requested the Helsinki District Court to order the police officer in charge of the investigations, Superintendent J.M., to produce the telephone metering information at the next hearing. The applicant had received several telephone calls from H. during the period 3 to 8 September 1996 and the observance of the equality of arms principle required the production of the telephone records. 23.  On 3 December 1996 the District Court held its final hearing. As the criminal investigations had been continuing throughout, at this stage twelve people had already been accused of various narcotics offences. 24.  The applicant's counsel submitted that on 2 December 1996 he had tried to summon Superintendent J.M. to appear before the court, without success. He renewed his request to the court to summon J.M. and to order the disclosure of the telephone metering information. 25.  The prosecutor submitted that the allegation about the calls made by H. while in police custody appeared to be true. He produced a fax from Superintendent J.M. (a memorandum dated 26 November 1996) in which it was maintained that, given the date of H.'s arrest, it was impossible that the police could have incited the applicant and M. to smuggle narcotics, as plans to import the drugs had already been in place. There was no mention in the memorandum as to when H. had called the applicant. The prosecution also produced another fax from J.M. dated 2 December 1996 in which he reiterated that the detailed telephone metering information was classified. He nevertheless maintained that there had been one call on 6 September and three calls on 8 September 1996 from the police to the applicant. No further details were provided. 26.  The applicant submitted that the former of the above faxes gave the court sufficient information to rule on the matter of incitement. It showed that the only reason for his actions under count III was the telephone call from H. The public prosecutor accepted that he did not rule out this possibility and submitted that the calls could be taken into account so as to reduce the applicant's sentence, but not to absolve him of all criminal liability. The applicant's counsel pointed out that the prosecution did not dispute the agent provocateur claim. He withdrew his request to examine Superintendent J.M., who was in any event likely to rely on his right not to testify. He also withdrew the request to the court to order the disclosure of the telephone metering information. 27.  It cannot be concluded from the records of the hearings that any of the co-defendants testified as regards the charges brought against the applicant. According to the Government, both R. and K. were heard at the hearings on 22 October and 19 November 1996. 28.  On 3 December 1996 the applicant was convicted on all counts and sentenced to three years and six months' imprisonment. On count III he was convicted on the basis that on 8 September 1996 he had been in possession of at least ten kilograms of cannabis, having taken delivery of a car in which R. and K. had illegally imported the drugs, and having later removed them from the car and weighed them together with M. The judgment did not mention any police involvement. 29.  On 4 December 1996 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against Superintendent J.M. and Senior Constable J.O., alleging, inter alia, incitement to commit an offence (see paragraph 39). 30.  On 26 December 1996 the applicant complained to the Uusimaa County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen), arguing that the District Court's decision of 25 November 1996 not to disclose to him that his telephone had been under surveillance did not mean that the information gathered should not now be accessible to him. 31.  On 2 January 1997 the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten), requesting an oral hearing on count III. He also requested, relying on Edwards v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 16 December 1992, Series A no. 247‑B, § 36), that the police officer in charge of the criminal investigation, Superintendent J.M, be ordered under Chapter 17, Article 12, of the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken) to produce the telephone metering information. As to the request for an oral hearing, he stated that, following the District Court's judgment, he had received more exact information about the persons involved in the agent provocateur operation. The National Bureau of Investigation (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen) had proceeded with the investigation into the suspected offences. The public prosecutor did not submit any written reply to the appeal. 32.  On 20 February 1997 the applicant submitted a pre-trial investigation report of 3 February 1997 which concluded that J.M. and J.O. were suspected of abuse of public office, breach of official duty and incitement to commit an aggravated narcotics offence. He also produced a subsequent indictment by the County Prosecutor (lääninsyyttäjä, länsåklagaren). Lastly, he renewed his request for disclosure of the telephone metering information. 33.  On 26 February 1997 the County Administrative Board, finding that the applicant in his capacity as a party to the proceedings against him should have access to the telephone metering information, annulled the police decision regarding the non-disclosure and ordered the information to be given to the applicant's counsel. On 11 March 1997 the applicant renewed his request to the Court of Appeal for disclosure of the information. At that time, he had apparently still not received the requested information as the decision had not become final. 34.  Meanwhile, on 10 March 1997, the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, upholding the applicant's conviction. It rejected the requests for a hearing and disclosure of the telephone metering information as ill-founded. It stated that it had admitted to the file the applicant's written submission of 20 February 1997 with annexes, despite the fact that it had arrived after the time-limit for the appeal had expired. The court confirmed the substance of the District Court's judgment but amended some of the reasoning. It found it established that there had been one telephone call to the applicant on 6 September and three calls on 8 September 1996 from a mobile telephone owned by the police. Relying on the pre-trial statements of two of the applicant's co-defendants, R. and K., the court found that “there [had been] an arrangement that the applicant receive the cannabis prior to the order made by H.” and thus found him guilty as charged. It did not specify whether it was making reference to the call of 6 September or to one of the three calls of 8 September. Nor did it specify the date of the applicant's initial involvement with the narcotics. The case file does not disclose that R. and K.'s statements touched upon the chronology of the events as regards the applicant's involvement. 35.  On 5 May 1997 the applicant sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), requesting an oral hearing. He emphasised that charges had been brought against the police officers. Further, the Court of Appeal had based his conviction in part on R. and K.'s pre-trial statements, although neither the prosecution nor the District Court had relied on them. Had the applicant known that those statements, which he had not seen, would be used as evidence against him, he would have cross-examined R. and K. in the District Court. The Court of Appeal had not held an oral hearing and had assumed the functions of the prosecution, thereby violating the applicant's right to examine the witnesses against him. The Court of Appeal had also breached Chapter 26, Article 11a, of the Code of Judicial Procedure as it had not identified the special reasons justifying an examination beyond the arguments and facts adduced in the writ of appeal. The Court of Appeal had reached its conclusion regarding the timing of H.'s call on the basis of the pre-trial investigation report in the proceedings against J.M. and J.O., and thus on material relating to another case. 36.  On 18 June 1997 the applicant submitted the judgment of the District Court in which J.M. and J.O. had been convicted and fined. The incitement charge had however been dismissed (see paragraph 45 below). 37.  On 20 August 1997 the applicant filed a written submission, maintaining that the only differences between his case and that of Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal (no. 25829/94, Commission's report of 25 February 1997, Decisions and Reports) were that he had been deprived of information about the agent provocateur operation and of an opportunity to examine J.M. and J.O. Further, the lower courts' judgments had not been properly reasoned. 38.  On 14 October 1997 the Supreme Court refused him leave to appeal. 39.  As mentioned above, on 4 December 1996 the applicant made a criminal complaint about Superintendent J.M. and Senior Constable J.O. 40.  The applicant's request that the police interview the prosecutor in the criminal proceedings against him about, inter alia, whether the police report in his case had contained sufficient information, was rejected, as was his request that M. be interviewed about whether the applicant had participated in the smuggling of the narcotics prior to 8 September 1996. 41.  During the pre-trial investigation J.M. maintained that H. had agreed to disclose the identity of his drugs supplier only if it was not written down in the report. The applicant's identity had been established from the telephone number produced by H. The purpose of the first call had been to establish whether he had any narcotics in his possession. He had been under surveillance from the afternoon of 8 September 1996 and he had become a suspect as he had been sighted in a rented car together with M. on that afternoon. The police had received information from independent sources that a drugs shipment was going to be smuggled into the country on that day in a rented car. The police had planned on stopping the vehicle but had failed. The only way to find the cannabis had been to call the applicant and place an order. 42.  In the pre-trial investigation the applicant and H. testified that an order had been made in code language in the call of 6 September 1996. 43.  In February and March 1997 the then County Prosecutor brought charges against J.M. and J.O. for abuse of public office, incitement to commit an aggravated narcotics offence and breach of official duty. The indictment alleged:\n“From 6 to 8 September 1996 J.M. in his capacity as Superintendent and J.O. in his capacity as Senior Constable acted in the following manner when carrying out a pre-trial investigation into a suspected narcotics offence in which H. was a suspect: 1.  [J.M. and J.O.] abused their office in relation to [H.], who was under their direct supervision as a detainee on remand, by ... persuading H., who hoped that it would bring him relief as regards his own situation, to make a deal over the telephone to the effect that [the applicant] sell to him one kilogram of cannabis to enable the police to arrest [the applicant] and confiscate the drugs as the deal was about to take place. They thereby restricted his right to liberty to a greater extent than the aim of his arrest required. 2.  [J.M. and J.O.], in the manner explained above, through [H.] on 6 September 1996, deliberately incited [the applicant] to obtain cannabis unlawfully to deliver it to [H.] together with another person receiving at least ten kilograms of narcotics from the persons who imported the narcotics unlawfully. Of this amount [the applicant] took over 986 grams. When [the applicant] arrived at the location agreed on the telephone with [H.] the police arrested [the applicant] and confiscated the cannabis from his possession. [The applicant] was subsequently convicted of an aggravated narcotics offence. ... They have thereby also breached their official duty.”\nThe applicant associated himself with the prosecution. He also brought an alternative private prosecution to the following effect:\n“3.  [J.M.] breached his official duty in that he did not, by making an annotation in the pre-trial investigation records or by any other means, inform [the applicant], the District Prosecutor or the Helsinki District Court of the circumstances in which [the applicant's] offence had taken place. ... These circumstances had become clear at the end of the trial as the District Prosecutor upon [the applicant's] request had requested a clarification of the facts in issue.” 44.  The defence relied, inter alia, on the Court of Appeal's judgment of 10 March 1997 in the applicant's case, in which it was held that there had been an arrangement that the applicant receive the drugs prior to the order made by H. The defence argued that the order had not been made before 8.11 p.m. on 8 September 1996. The applicant gave oral evidence, maintaining that H. had placed the order in his first call, on Wednesday 4 or Thursday 5 September, whereupon the applicant had contacted M. At 8.37 a.m. on 8 September 1996 M. had called the applicant and requested him to take delivery of the narcotics from R. and K. The court also heard oral evidence from H., the defendant police officers and some other officers. 45.  On 5 June 1997 the District Court convicted J.M. and J.O. of abuse of public office and sentenced them to a fine. It held that the facts regarding the telephone calls as described in the indictment were established and stated that it did not believe that H. would have called the applicant solely on his own initiative. It noted that the telephone metering information disclosed that H. had called the applicant at 6.14 p.m. on 6 September and at 1.48 p.m., 8.11 p.m. and 10.25 p.m. on 8 September 1996. It however rejected the incitement charge as the applicant had not been convicted of delivering the kilogram of cannabis to H. Further, J.M. and J.O. had lacked intent to incite the applicant to obtain the remaining drugs. Also the charge concerning breach of official duty was rejected. 46.  The applicant submitted, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had been wrong to find in its judgment of 10 March 1997 that there had been an arrangement that he receive the narcotics prior to H.'s order. 47.  On 8 December 1998 the Helsinki Court of Appeal quashed the convictions of the two police officers for abuse of public office, holding:\n“On 10 March 1997 [the applicant] was convicted by the Helsinki Court of Appeal ... of several narcotics offences committed from the beginning of the year 1996 ... In that judgment it was established that prior to the police officer's order made by telephone there had been an arrangement that he would receive a ten kilo drugs shipment. During the present proceedings, no such grounds have emerged for concluding otherwise. Accordingly, the order for the narcotics in issue did not affect [the applicant's] guilt as to the possession of the ten kilograms of narcotics of which he has been convicted as mentioned above. The guilt of [J.M. and J.O.] as regards a prohibited entrapment operation has not therefore been established. ...” 48.  In his writ of appeal, the State Prosecutor (valtiosyyttäjä, statsåklagaren; who replaced the County Prosecutor) submitted that it could not be concluded from the Court of Appeal judgment of 10 March 1997 that prior to the police order there had been an arrangement for the applicant to receive the narcotics. Further, he pointed out that the applicant had been charged and convicted of an offence committed on 8 September 1996, and not before, and no evidence had even been produced to show that the applicant had been involved in the shipment prior to 8 September 1996. In any event, it had not even been alleged that the shipment had arrived in Finland on 6 September 1996, or earlier. 49.  In its judgment of 22 November 2000 the Supreme Court found that H., who had been in detention on remand, had co-operated with the police. It considered that there was no reason to depart from the lower courts' establishment of the facts, although it remained unclear how the co-operation had been induced. The court found that on 6 and 8 September 1996 H. had discussed with the applicant in general terms whether it would be possible to buy cannabis from him. At 8.11 p.m. on 8 September 1996 H. had placed an order. According to J.M.'s confession, on the evening of 8 September 1996 he had encouraged H. through J.O. to place an order with the applicant for one kilogram of cannabis. H. had therefore called the applicant at 8.11 p.m. The court found it established that J.M. and J.O. at 8.11 p.m. had incited the applicant to commit a new offence by selling narcotics to H. 50.  The Supreme Court noted that in their judgments of 3 December 1996 and 10 March 1997 the District Court and the Court of Appeal respectively had found the applicant guilty of an aggravated narcotics offence in that on 8 September 1996 he had been unlawfully in possession of at least ten kilograms of cannabis having unlawfully taken delivery of a car from persons who had unlawfully imported the narcotics in it and by participating in the unloading and the weighing of the cannabis. It had been established that the applicant had been involved in the importing of these ten kilograms of cannabis long before 6 September 1996. According to the Supreme Court, the telephone conversations between H. and the applicant had not therefore had any impact on the receipt by the applicant of the imported narcotics. Thus, the involvement by J.M. and J.O. could not be regarded as having had any causal relation with the offence of which the applicant had been convicted. In order to convict someone of incitement to commit an offence it was a pre-condition that the offence had actually been committed. That had not been the case here, because the police intervention had prevented the applicant from selling the one kilogram to H. Accordingly, J.M. and J.O. were not guilty of incitement to commit an aggravated narcotics offence. 51.  The Supreme Court found however that J.M. and J.O. had used prohibited methods and were thus guilty of a breach of official duty. 52.  As to the sentence, the Supreme Court noted that the police officers had been tipped off by a third party that a rented car containing narcotics was going to enter the country during the weekend. On the evening of 8 September 1996 the police had sighted the applicant in a rented car, but had not been able to follow it. In order to prevent the narcotics from entering the market, J.M. had decided that it was necessary to encourage H. to place an order and agree on a meeting. This had resulted in the applicant's arrest and the confiscation of a large amount of narcotics. The court concluded that, considering the seriousness of the situation, resorting to the prohibited method was excusable. It therefore decided not to impose a sentence. 53.  On 29 September 1998 the applicant requested a re-opening of the case against him, based on the fact that the District Court had convicted J.M. and J.O. of a breach of official duty. He made reference to the case of Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal (judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑IV). 54.  On 22 November 2000, thus on the same day judgment in the case against Superintendent J.M. and Senior Constable J.O. was delivered, the Supreme Court refused the request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Velenje. 6.  On 17 March 1986 the applicant was injured in an accident at work in a lignite mine. Following two separate court settlements made in 1987 and 1992, the applicant received compensation for the injuries sustained. 7.  On 5 April 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against his employer, a company called RLV, in the Celje Labour Court (Sodišče združenega dela v Celju) seeking damages in the amount of 2,315,789 tolars (approximately 9,600 euros) for the injuries sustained in the accident of 1986, but which only became apparent after the settlements.\nBetween 1 June 1994 and 10 February 1997 the applicant lodged ten preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.\nBetween 1 June 1994 and 13 December 1996 he made four requests that a date be set for a hearing.\nOf the five hearings held between 9 January 1995 and 25 March 1997 none was adjourned at the request of the applicant.\nDuring the proceedings the court appointed a medical expert and a financial expert. The court also sought an additional opinion from the appointed experts.\nAt the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 1 April 1997. 8.  On 10 April 1997 the applicant appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court (Višje delovno in socialno sodišče). RLV cross-appealed.\nOn 3 December 1999 the court allowed the appeals in part and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 17 January 2000. 9.  The hearing before the Celje Labour Court scheduled for 2 March 2000 was adjourned until 30 March 2000 at the applicant’s request.\nBetween 29 March 2000 and 21 March 2001 the applicant lodged three preliminary written submissions.\nOn 20 June 2000 the court sought an additional opinion from the appointed medical expert.\nOn 24 May 2001 the court held a hearing and concluded the case.\nThe judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 21 June 2001. 10.  On 26 June 2001 the applicant appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court. He also sought an exemption from court fees. RLV cross-appealed.\nOn 24 August 2001 the Celje Labour Court rejected the applicant’s request for exemption from court fees.\nOn 4 September 2001 the applicant appealed against the decision concerning court fees to the Higher Labour and Social Court.\nOn 3 October 2003 the Higher Labour and Social Court upheld the first-instance court decision concerning court fees.\nOn the same day the court rejected the appeals against the first-instance court’s judgment. 11.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče).\nOn 15 June 2004 the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal.\nThe judgment was served on the applicant on 28 June 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964. 6.  In 1999 he was diagnosed as suffering from diabetes. He became insulin-dependent on an unspecified later date. 7.  On 22 March 2000 the applicant was arrested. On 24 March 2000 he was remanded in custody by the Gliwice District Court on suspicion that he had killed his mother. On 24 March 2000 the applicant was placed in Bytom Remand Centre. 8.  From 13 March 2001 until 11 October 2001 he was treated for his diabetes in the hospital of the Bytom Remand Centre. The applicant remained there until 23 October 2002. 9.  On 14 August 2002 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. 10.  On 3 September 2002 an ophthalmologist examined the applicant as he had complained about deterioration of his eye-sight. He received a medical prescription for glasses. 11.   From 7 November to 6 December 2002 the applicant was detained at the hospital of Krakow Remand Centre, where he received treatment. From 11 December 2002 until 24 April 2003 the applicant was detained in Bytom Remand Centre. 12.  From 25 April 2003 the applicant was detained in Strzelce Opolskie Remand Centre. He remained there until 2 February 2005. 13.  It transpires from the list of Polish prisons, available on the Internet site of the Polish prison service[1], that Strzelce Opolskie where he served most of his sentence is one of the prisons (i.e. Goleniów, Nysa, Dębica, Koszalin; Tarnów) which are listed as suitable for serving sentences by inmates suffering from insulin-dependent diabetes. 14.  In 2004 the applicant met the director of the prison health service on 7 April, 12 May, 16 June, 4 August, 22 September, 6 October and 24 November 2004 to discuss his condition and the therapeutic options available to him.  It appears that the applicant had been supplied with a glucometer and that he could test his sugar level himself several times a day. 15.  He also took various medicines, including insulin. The applicant alleged, however, that because of the nature of his illness, he had frequently developed hypoglycaemia in the evening. Because he did not have the right to keep any glucose in the cell, he had to acquire sugar from his fellow inmates or the remand centre staff had to call an ambulance. 16.  On 2 February 2005 the applicant was placed in Bytom Remand Centre for the purposes of medical treatment. He remained there until 25 February 2005. 17.  In 2005 the applicant had two meetings with a director and a deputy director of the prison health services, on 5 January and 5 November 2005. 18.  In 2005 the applicant developed glaucoma. He alleged that it was not treated. The Government disagreed. They submitted that he received treatment for this condition from the diagnosis onwards.\nFrom 2 to 25 February 2005 the applicant was placed in the Ophthalmological Ward of the Bytom Remand Centre Hospital. 19.  On 14 August 2006 the applicant was examined by a court‑appointed doctor, who ordered that he should be hospitalised in order to improve his health and stabilise his blood sugar levels. 20.  In July 2006 the applicant developed conjunctivitis. He was treated for it from 7 September until 5 October 2006. 21.  From October 2006 onwards the applicant’s diet was adapted because of his diabetes. He was to receive one additional meal per day so that he could have a fourth injection of insulin. 22.   He also submitted to the Court his diabetic record (książeczka cukrzyka) covering the period from August 2005 to January 2007. It transpires therefrom that he was able to monitor his sugar levels on a regular basis, at least five times a day. He had five injections of insulin per day. 23.  The applicant suffered from headaches. He was examined by a neurologist on 17 April 2000, 17 and 24 May 2000, 7 June, 30 August 2000, 18 December 2001, 2 January, 20 February, 29 May, 19 June and 5 October 2002. Subsequently, a neurologist examined him on 3 January and 5 March 2007. On an unspecified date an MRI scan of his head was carried out. 24.  Eventually, on 6 September 2006 the applicant was transferred to a hospital at Łódź Prison, where he remained until 5 October 2006. 25.  The applicant was examined by an ophthalmologist on 18 October 2006, 9 March, 25 and 29 May 2007. 26.   From 6 October 2006 until 1 March 2007 the applicant was again detained in Strzelce Opolskie Remand Centre. 27.  On 29 January 2007 and 29 March 2007 the applicant talked with the Deputy Director of the Penitentiary Ward about the treatment of diabetes. 28.  On 2 March 2007 the applicant was transferred to Bytom Remand Centre, where he was detained in the hospital. The applicant submitted that the remand centre nurse was frequently late with his insulin injections. On 16 March 2007 the applicant was transferred again to Strzelce Opolskie Remand Centre, where he remained until 17 May 2007. 29.  On many occasions the applicant complained to the penitentiary authorities of his allegedly inadequate medical treatment in Bytom and Strzelce Opolskie Remand Centres. By a letter of 27 April 2007 the Deputy Director of the Opole Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service informed the applicant that his complaints had been considered ill-founded in the light of the finding that the applicant had repeatedly refused to cooperate with the medical staff. 30.  From 18 May until 11 June 2007 the applicant was placed for treatment in the hospital of the Bytom Remand Centre. On the latter date the applicant was transferred back to Strzelce Opolskie Remand Centre. 31.  On 13 June 2007 the applicant discussed the treatment of his diabetes with the penitentiary judge. On 5 September 2007 the applicant discussed with the Deputy Director of the Remand Centre the possibility of hospital treatment. 32.  The applicant submitted a copy of his medical record (książeczka zdrowia) numbering several hundred pages and covering the period from 18 September 2000 to July 2007. It transpires therefrom that the applicant consulted doctors at least twice a month, even more often at times. He regularly received various medication, including antidepressants, vitamins and prescriptions for insulin. He also regularly received packs of glucometer strips for the purpose of measuring blood sugar levels. 33.  From 2 April to 25 July 2008 the applicant received treatment in respect of his alcohol addiction. 34.  On 22 September 2008 the Opole Regional Court – Penitentiary Division decided that the applicant should be released on parole. The court had regard to the applicant’s conduct in the months prior to this decision. The applicant was released immediately afterwards. 35.  From 10 to 22 October 2008 and from 6 to 14 November 2008 the applicant was hospitalised in Gliwice Hospital. His medical records prepared for the purposes of discharge from the hospital show that his diabetes was very unstable and that the general indicator of stabilisation of diabetes (HbA1c) was very high (8,3).[2] In a certificate dated 14 November 2008 the treating doctor observed that the applicant’s blood sugar levels did not fall within the acceptable range of 60 to 140 mg/dl as a result of his lack of knowledge as regards self-treatment of diabetes and adapting insulin doses to amounts of food and physical activity. 36.  On 17 March 2009 the applicant died.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1920 and lives in Istanbul. He is the heir of Mr Mustafa Rıfat Günter and Mrs Rabia Günter. 9.  On 27 March 1985 Mr Mustafa Rıfat Günter and Mrs Rabia Günter made an oral will, in the presence of two witnesses, in which they undertook to give the property rights of their house to the Darülaceze (the poor people's house in Istanbul) in exchange for life-long support. Following this agreement, they were taken to the Darülaceze, where they died on 3 May 1985 and 2 May 1985 respectively. 10.  On 7 May 1985 the Darülaceze requested the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters to grant probate on Mr and Mrs Günter's will. On the same day the court read out the will and recognised the Darülaceze as the legal heir to their property. The decision of the court was notified to the heirs, whose names and addresses were known to the court. The applicant was not personally notified of this decision. However, a further notification was made by way of a newspaper publication for those whose names and addresses were not known to the court. 11.  On 29 December 1992 the applicant filed a petition with the Istanbul First Instance Court in Civil Matters requesting the issue of an inheritance certificate (veraset ilamı), indicating the legal heirs of Mr and Mrs Günter and determining the individual shares. 12.  On 25 May 1993 the applicant brought an action against the Darülaceze before the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters, requesting a declaration that Mr and Mrs Günter's oral will was null and void. He claimed that the will did not satisfy procedural requirements as Mr and Mrs Günter had lacked legal capacity due to their old age. The first hearing took place on 14 July 1993. The representative of the applicant requested time to submit the list of evidence. 13.  On 10 October 1993 the Treasury filed an action with a different chamber of the same court, also requesting the court to declare Mr and Mrs Günter's will null and void. 14.  On 21 October 1993 the applicant submitted his list of evidence to the Şişli First Instance Court in Civil Matters. The court gave time to the Darülaceze to submit its list of evidence. 15.  On 16 December 1993 neither the applicant nor his representatives attended the hearing. As the Darülaceze stated that it did not wish to continue the case, the case was removed from the list. The applicant renewed the case on 28 January 1994. 16.  On 14 April 1994 the applicant did not attend the hearing, but instead he sent a letter of excuse. 17.  At the hearing on 28 April 1994, the applicant maintained that, as the case initiated before the Istanbul First Instance Court of General Jurisdiction concerning the certificate of inheritance of Mr and Mrs Günter was not finalised, the court should postpone the case until after the judicial holidays. The court adjourned the hearing until September, considering that the issue of the inheritance certificate was a prerequisite question (ön mesele) for the present case. 18.  On 20 September 1994 the applicant requested a further adjournment as the case concerning the certificate of inheritance was not finalised. 19.  On 27 December 1994 the parties did not attend the hearing. The applicant sent a letter of excuse. 20.  At the following two hearings, the applicant requested a further adjournment again because the case concerning the certificate of inheritance was not finalised. 21.  On 11 July 1995 the court decided to join the Treasury's case to the applicant's. 22.  On 3 October 1995 the court took the statements of one of the two witnesses named by the applicant. The court was unable to find the other witness as her name was misspelled. It corrected the name of the second witness and sent her a summons. 23.  At the hearings of 26 December 1995 and 2 April 1996, the court postponed the case as the applicant did not attend but sent a letter of excuse. 24.  On 27 June 1996 the second witness named by the applicant gave her statement before the court. As the case concerning the certificate of inheritance was not finalised, the court adjourned to a further date. 25.  At the hearings on 5 November 1996 and 29 January 1997, the applicant did not attend, again sending excuses, and informing the court that the case concerning the inheritance certificate was before the Court of Cassation. 26.  On 15 April 1997 the applicant submitted the inheritance certificate to the court. 27.  On 19 June 1997 the applicant requested the Court to consult with the Forensic Medicine Institute before deciding on the legal capacity of Mr and Mrs Günter. The Forensic Medicine Institute informed the court that the documents in the case-file were insufficient to decide the matter. On 16 October 1997 the court requested the Darülaceze to submit all the medical reports concerning Mr and Mrs Günter. On 18 December 1997 the Darülaceze informed the court that they did not possess any such documents. 28.  On 10 March 1998 the Forensic Medicine Institute drafted a report which concluded that it was impossible to decide the matter on the basis of the current file. 29.  On 17 March 1998 the court held that an action for the annulment of a testamentary disposition (ölüme bağlı tasarruf) must be lodged within a year of the date on which the claimant becomes aware of the reason for nullity or, in any case, within five years after the will was notified to the heirs. It noted that, although the will of Mr and Mrs Günter was notified to the heirs on 7 May 1985, the action was not brought by the applicant before 25 May 1993. It therefore concluded that the applicant's case must be dismissed for failure to comply with the statutory time-limit. The applicant appealed. 30.  On 8 October 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the first instance court. On 15 February 1999 the applicant's request for rectification of the decision was dismissed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bursa. 5.  On 8 March 2000 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of establishing a criminal organisation and committing fraud, threats and bribery. Approximately an hour after the arrest, he underwent a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicant noted no sign of injury on his body. 6.  On the same day, the applicant was taken to the Department of Organised Crime of the Bursa Directorate of Security, where he was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment. More specifically, he was stripped naked, beaten, subjected to electric shocks, hung by the arms, forced to sit naked on cold ground bare and hosed with water. 7.  On 10 March 2000 the applicant’s wife lodged a complaint with the Bursa Public Prosecutor, claiming that her husband was being tortured. 8.  Subsequently, on the same day the Bursa Public Prosecutor initiated an investigation into the matter. 9.  On 12 March 2000, upon the request of the Bursa Directorate of Security, the Bursa Magistrates’ Court decided to prolong the applicant’s detention in police custody for three days. 10.  On 14 March 2000 the applicant was heard by the Bursa Public Prosecutor. He was then transferred to the Bursa Branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute to be examined. The forensic medical report noted the applicant’s complaint as to his ill-treatment and indicated that he had two bruises measuring 8 x 3 cm and 8 x 1 cm on his left arm, a 6 x 5 cm light bruise in his right armpit, a blue-coloured bruise surrounding his left eye, several parallel scabbed lesions around his penis and a scratch measuring 2 x 1 cm below his right knee. 11.  On the same day, following a request from the Department of Organised Crime, the applicant was examined once more by another doctor, who stated that the applicant had complained of headaches, dizziness and sensitivity at the tip of the big toe of his right foot. The report drawn up by that doctor indicated that the applicant’s general health condition was good and that he was conscious. It noted that he had bruises and hyperemia on his left and right sides, further hyperemia on both his arms, scabbed lesions of 2 x 3 cm on his penis (which would probably heal in three days) and a bruise around his eye (to heal in five days). The report concluded that the injuries would not keep the applicant from daily work. 12.  On 20 March 2000 the Bursa Public Prosecutor requested the Forensic Medicine Institute to indicate, on the basis of its medical report dated 14 March 2000, whether the applicant was fit for work. On the same day, the Institute issued another report, reiterating the findings of the initial one and stating that the applicant would be unfit for routine activities for a period of three days. 13.  Following the applicant’s detention on remand, the prison doctor transferred him to the Bursa State Hospital. On 22 March 2000 the applicant was diagnosed with acute lumbar strain and discopathy by a doctor at that hospital. The doctor also indicated that the applicant suffered from spondylosis and sciatica on his right side. The applicant was discharged from the hospital on 27 March 2000. 14.  On 28 March 2000 the Bursa Public Prosecutor heard the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment during his time in police custody. The applicant repeated before the Public Prosecutor that he had been stripped naked and subjected to electric shocks, hung by the arms, forced to sit on cold ground and hosed with cold water every one or two hours during the seven-day period of custody. He added that he had been blindfolded during his arrest and kept that way until he was brought before the Bursa Public Prosecutor for the first time. 15.  The next day, on 29 March 2000, the Bursa Public Prosecutor requested the Bursa Directorate of Security to list the names of the police officers who had been on duty and who had had any contact with the applicant during the time he had been held at the Department of Organised Crime. 16.  In the meantime, the issue was brought to the attention of the Ministry of Justice by one of the Members of Parliament representing Bursa. 17.  Following this event and the coverage of the issue in a local newspaper, on 6 April 2000 the Bursa Public Prosecutor submitted an information document to the Directorate of Criminal Affairs attached to the Ministry of Justice, stating that the medical reports about the applicant corroborated the allegations of ill-treatment and that he had already commenced an investigation into the matter on 10 March 2000. 18.  Subsequently, on 18 April 2000 the Bursa Directorate of Security informed the Bursa Public Prosecutor of the names of thirteen police officers on duty during the period when the alleged events took place. 19.  On 26 April 2000 the Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bursa Assize Court, accusing all thirteen police officers listed of torture, pursuant to Article 243 of the former Criminal Code (Law no. 765). He maintained that the complainants’ accounts of the events and witness statements confirmed the findings of the medical reports and concluded that the seven complainants, including the applicant, had been subjected to ill‑treatment in police custody. 20.  At the first hearing on 29 June 2000, the Bursa Assize Court found that the investigation conducted by the Bursa Public Prosecutor had been inadequate. The court conducted a procedure whereby the complainants identified the police officers they had accused of torture. The applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. 21.  During the course of the ten hearings that followed, the court evaluated medical reports and documents from the Directorate of Security. It also heard statements from the accused police officers, the complainants and several witnesses. 22.  On 27 March 2003 the Bursa Assize Court acquitted ten of the officers, finding that none of the complainants, except for the applicant, had been ill-treated and that those ten officers had not been involved in the applicant’s ill-treatment in police custody. The court found the other three officers, who had been identified by the applicant during the hearings, guilty as charged, having regard to the consistency of the applicant’s account of events with the medical reports. It sentenced the said three officers to ten months’ imprisonment and banned them from public service for a period of two months and fifteen days. The court finally deferred the execution of their sentences pursuant to Section 6 of Law No. 647 on the basis that the officers did not show any likelihood of reoffending. 23.  On 14 June 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in so far as it concerned the acquittal. It quashed the part concerning the sentences, stating that the court should evaluate the case again in the light of the recent Criminal Code (Law no. 5237) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271), both of which had entered into force in 2005. 24.  On 1 February 2007 the Bursa Assize Court held that the former Criminal Code (Law no. 765) was more favourable for the accused police officers. The court once more sentenced them to ten months’ imprisonment and two months and fifteen days’ ban from public service. This time, the sentences were commuted into a fine of 900 Turkish liras[1] for each officer and were suspended again. 25.  The Court of Cassation quashed that judgment on 2 July 2008, maintaining that the first-instance court should have considered whether the pronouncement of the judgment could have been suspended for a period of five years (hükmün açıklanmasının geri bırakılması), pursuant to Article 231 of the recent Code on Criminal Procedure (Law no. 5271). 26.  On 5 November 2008 the Bursa Assize Court held that the officers concerned had beaten and cursed the applicant and administered electroshocks on him in order to a extract confession. The court sentenced the police officers once again to ten months’ imprisonment and banned them from public service for two months and fifteen days, pursuant to Article 243 of the former Criminal Code (Law no. 765). Finally, it suspended the pronouncement of the judgment, having regard to the officers’ lack of criminal records and finding it unlikely that they would reoffend. 27.  The applicant objected to that decision. However, on 28 November 2008 Bursa Assize Court rejected his objection. The final decision was served on the applicant on 15 December 2008. 28.  On 12 May 2000 the Bursa Governorship assigned a chief officer to conduct a disciplinary investigation about the allegations of ill-treatment concerning thirteen police officers. 29.  The investigation began on 22 May 2000 and ended on 3 August 2000, on which date the superintendent officer drew up a report (fezleke). On the basis of two video recordings of the applicant during a search and when his statements were being taken and the statements of the police officers, the witnesses and the complainants, including the applicant, the superintendent indicated that the applicant seemed to be in good health and that the light ecchymoses indicated in the medical reports could have just as well been produced by the applicant himself. He concluded therefore that the police officers’ acts did not require disciplinary action. 30.  On 9 January 2002, having reiterated the findings of the chief officer, the Central Disciplinary Board of the Directorate of Security held that there was no ground to take disciplinary measures against the thirteen police officers.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "3.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Istanbul. 4.  On 15 August 1988 the applicant brought a case before the Erdek Civil Court against the Treasury, requesting to be registered as the owner of a certain plot of land. 5.  On 17 April 1990 the Erdek Civil Court granted the applicant’s request. The Treasury appealed. 6. Whenever he inquired about the outcome of the appeal proceedings, the applicant was informed by the registry of the first-instance court that the proceedings were still pending. In 1998, however, the applicant was informed by the Court of Cassation that the latter had actually rendered its decision long before, on 28 October 1992. The Erdek Civil Court declared, in response to a petition from the applicant, that the case file had never been sent back to it and it had subsequently attempted to recreate the case file, which appeared to have been lost. 7.  On 8 May 1998 the Treasury filed a petition with the Court of Cassation requesting that the decision of 28 October 1992 be rectified. 8.  On 28 September 1998 the Court of Cassation decided that it could not examine the Treasury’s request as the reconstituted file was not sufficient and it needed the original case file for such an examination. It therefore decided to send the file back to the Erdek Civil Court. According to the information submitted by the parties to the Court, the proceedings are still pending. 9.  In 2001 the Land Registry Commission attached to the General Directorate of Land Registration conducted a land registry survey and registered the title to the relevant plot under the name of a certain K.T. and the Treasury. 10.  On 30 May 2001 the applicant brought a case before the Erdek Cadastral Court, challenging the land registry survey. 11.  On 18 May 2004 an on-site inspection of the land was carried out, and on 20 October 2004 the Erdek Cadastral Court allowed the applicant’s request in part. 12.  On 10 November 2005 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 20 October 2004 and on 26 February 2007 it dismissed the Treasury’s rectification request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  On 23 July 1996 the applicant filed an administrative claim with the Bacău Local commission for the application of Law no. 112/1995 (“the local commission”) seeking to obtain restitution in kind of real estate (a building and its appurtenant land) located in Bacău at no. 6 Cuza-Vodă Street, in the limit of a one-third share of property. 6.  By a decision of 20 February 1997 the local commission rejected the applicant’s claim on the ground that the property in question had been unlawfully nationalised by the State. Consequently, the procedure laid down in Law no. 112/1995 did not find its applicability, since it concerned only real estate that had undergone lawful nationalisation. 7.  On 20 May 1998 the applicant brought court proceedings against the Bacău Inspectorate for Culture seeking to recover possession of the claimed share of real property. 8.  By a final judgment of 24 January 2001 the Court of Appeal of Bacău rejected the action on the ground that the property had been nationalised based on the provision of the Decree-Law no. 119/1948, fact which had rendered it lawful. 9.  On 21 May 2001 the applicant filed a new administrative claim (“notificare”) pursuant to a new restitution law, that is, Law no. 10/2001, with the Bacău Inspectorate for Culture, seeking the same property rights as in 1996. 10.  On 22 June 2001 the Bacău Department for Culture, Cults and Cultural Heritage (the new title of the Bacău Inspectorate for Culture, “the Department for Culture” thereon) issued a negative answer, drawn up in general terms. Consequently, the applicant brought a court action on 18 June 2002 seeking to obtain a court order to force the Department of Culture to issue a proper official answer to her claim. 11.  On 14 January 2004 the County Court of Bacău allowed the action and ruled that the concerned authority was under the obligation to issue a “decision” which should, according to Article 23 of Law no. 10/2001, indicate the possibility of restitution in kind, and propose measures of compensation by equivalent where such restitution was not possible. The court stated that the answer issued in June 2001 failed to satisfy legal requirements. The judgment became final on 11 November 2005 before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 12.  On 29 April 2004 the Department for Culture complied with the court order and issued a decision whereby it rejected the restitution claim. It held that restitution in kind was not possible and that the applicant was entitled to compensation according to restitution laws. 13.  On 19 May 2004, the decision was contested in court. 14.  Separately, two of the applicant’s uncles (the three of them claimed ownership rights in common for the same real estate) brought civil proceedings seeking restitution in kind of the same property, in the limit of a two-third share of property. The restitution claim was allowed by the Court of Appeal of Suceava by its decision of 1 March 2004, which ordered that two thirds of the real property be returned to the claimants as lawful owners. The decision became final on 15 September 2006 before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 15.  On 8 June 2005 the County Court of Bacău decided to stay the proceedings until the ones brought by the applicant’s uncles had been finalised. 16.  On 11 April 2007 the legal process was resumed on the applicant’s request (filed on 20 February 2007). 17.  On 1 November 2007 the County Court of Bacău gave its judgment. Basing itself mainly on the findings of the 2004 judgment given by the Court of Appeal of Suceava, it ordered that restitution in kind be made to the applicant for one third of the real estate. It also provided for pecuniary compensation for one third of land (326, 93 sq.m.) for which restitution in kind was not possible. 18.  On appeal brought by both parties, the Court of Appeal of Bacău quashed the judgment and remitted it to the first instance court for re-examination on the merits. By its decision of 14 April 2008 the court found that the first judgment failed to comply with the guarantees of a fair trial in respect of the applicant, whose several requests in evidence had not been considered. The court pointed to a land expert study whose findings could have been essential to clear out doubts as to the current land holders. The first-instance court had also failed to indicate the amount as well as the debtor of the compensation to which the applicant was entitled. 19.  The case was registered for re-trial on 19 June 2008 before the County Court of Bacău. 20.  At the hearing of 24 September 2008 the applicant specified her property claims, in that she sought that the land holders be correctly identified and that an expert study be commissioned by the court to that effect, exactly what the higher court had previously indicated in its remittal judgment. 21.  On 21 January 2009 the court ordered for an expert study to be conducted on the real estate in the interest of both parties and established its costs. On 5 March 2009 the applicant partly complied by paying only half of the expert’s fee. She held that the rest was to be paid for the Department for Culture, as the examination served its interests as well. The expert appointed by the court conducted the examination on 18 June 2009, but failed to submit its report to the court. 22.  On 4 November 2009 the court stayed the proceedings based on Article 1551 of the Code for Civil Procedure as the parties refused to pay the expert fee and the report was essential for the court to examine the merits of the case. 23.  On 27 October 2010 subsequent to the payment of the fee by the applicant, the legal process was resumed. At the same hearing, it was postponed as the expert report had yet to be delivered. 24.  On 8 December 2010 the hearings were again deferred so that a new expert examination be conducted in the case by a newly-appointed land expert (the first expert having been suspended). However, the repeated absence of an expert report had led to the postponement of the ensuing nine hearings. The next hearing was scheduled on 16 November 2012 with the court still expecting that the expert report be drafted and submitted to it. The proceedings are thus pending before the first-instance court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Dubrovnik. 8.  On 13 August 1992 the Croatian Military Police requisitioned the applicant's vehicle for use by the Croatian Army. 9.  By a letter of 1 August 1996 the Dubrovnik Defence Office (Ured za obranu Dubrovnik) informed the applicant that the vehicle had been damaged beyond repair. 10.  On 26 May 1998 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Dubrovniku) seeking compensation for the loss of his vehicle from the State. 11.  On 6 November 1999 Parliament introduced amendments to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1999 Amendments”). The amended legislation provided that all actions for damages against the State for the acts of members of the Croatian Army and the police in the performance of their official duties during the Homeland War in Croatia were to be stayed. 12.  On 2 May 2000 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the above legislation. 13.  On 1 September 2000 the Dubrovnik County Court (Županijski sud u Dubrovniku) dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision. 14.  On 21 May 2003 the applicant lodged a motion with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) seeking a review of the constitutionality of the 1999 Amendments. These proceedings are still pending. 15.  On 14 July 2003 Parliament passed new legislation on the liability of the State for damage caused by members of the Croatian Army and police in the performance of their official duties during the Homeland War (“the 2003 Liability Act”). 16.  In 2004 the applicant's proceedings resumed pursuant to the above legislation. The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Częstochowa. 5.  On 23 October 2003 the applicant, who is a police officer, was charged with abuse of powers. 6.  On 4 November 2003 the applicant was arrested by the police. On 5 November 2003 the applicant was released. The Kraków Appeal Prosecutor (Prokuratura Apelacyjna) suspended the applicant from professional duties and ordered that he be subjected to police supervision in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question. It further referred to the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation. 7.  On 20 November 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the prosecutor, requesting access to the investigation file. On 28 November 2003 the prosecutor dismissed the application. He referred to the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation. 8.  In the meantime, on 22 November 2003, the applicant had lodged an application for his suspension from professional duties to be lifted or replaced by another preventive measure. The application was dismissed by the Prosecutor of Appeal. In his decision the prosecutor referred to the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation and the seriousness of the offences the applicant was charged with. 9.  In the course of the proceedings, on 4 March and 2 June 2004, 14 March 2005 and 28 April 2006, the applicant made unsuccessful applications for his suspension from professional duties to be lifted or replaced by another preventive measure and he appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against decisions dismissing his applications. In his applications he referred to the poor financial situation of his family resulting from the lengthy application of the preventive measure. 10.  On 4 April 2006 the Kraków Appeal Prosecutor decided to obtain a psychiatric report on the applicant and his ability to stand trial. 11.  On 3 September 2007 the applicant lodged an application for his suspension from professional duties to be lifted or replaced by another preventive measure. On 2 October 2007 the Kraków Prosecutor of Appeal lifted the preventive measure. 12.  In the course of the investigation the proceedings were severed on several occasions and of the 110 suspects in this case 75 were indicted. However, the investigation concerning the remaining suspects, including the applicant, has not yet been completed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  On 24 September 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of being a member of a criminal gang specialising in the theft of cars. On 23 November 2006 the applicant was convicted and on 25 April 2007 his conviction was upheld on appeal by the Chişinău Court of Appeal. He was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. During the criminal proceedings against him the applicant was detained in the following detention facilities:\n- 26 November 2003 – 2 December 2003: Prison no. 13;\n- 2 December 2003 – 14 January 2004: detention facility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;\n- 14 January 2004 – 16 February 2004: Prison no. 13;\n- 16 February 2004 – 25 February 2004: detention facility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;\n- 25 February 2004 – 4 January 2007: Prison no. 13;\n- 4 January 2007 – 1 March 2007: Prison no. 16;\n- 1 March 2007 – 1 April 2008: Prison no. 13;\n- 1 April 2008 – 2 June 2010: Prison no. 8;\n- 2 June 2010 – 4 February 2011: Prison no. 12;\n- 4 February 2011 – present: Prison no. 8. 6.  According to the applicant the conditions of detention in Prison no. 13 and Prison no. 8 were very poor and amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. In respect of Prison no. 13, the applicant submitted that the cells were overcrowded and humid and there was no ventilation. He also complained about the quality and quantity of the food. As to Prison no. 8, he submitted that it was located on territory controlled by the Transdniestrian separatist authorities but was itself under the control of the Moldovan constitutional authorities. The separatist authorities had cut off the power and water supplies and disconnected the prison from the sewage network. As a result the inmates had electrical power for only three hours per day and the water was limited to fifteen litres per day, plus another fifty litres once a week for showers and washing clothes. 7.  The relevant parts of the Report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) concerning a visit to Moldova between 14 au 24 September 2007 read as follows (unofficial translation):\n“84. Penitentiary establishment No. 8 in Bender had been the subject of three visits by the CPT since 2003, following the decision of the municipal authorities of Bender to deprive the establishment of running water and electricity supply (and, as of 2005, to disconnect it from the city’s sewage disposal system). The seriousness of the situation confronting the establishment led the Committee to state in the report on its visit in March 2006 that, unless the above-mentioned problems were resolved, prisoners should be relocated elsewhere. In their response to that report, the Moldovan authorities indicated that they considered the situation at Penitentiary establishment No. 8 in Bender to be under control and saw no reasons for the relocation of prisoners to other establishments. 85. When re-visited by the CPT’s delegation on 21 September 2007, the establishment was holding 99 prisoners (compared with 101 on 18 March 2006). The delegation was informed that some 35 inmates had been released since March 2006, and approximately the same number of new prisoners had been admitted. The great majority of the prisoners currently held at the establishment originated from the Transdniestrian region or nearby locations. The delegation gained the impression that all prisoners who had been admitted in the last year had themselves asked for a transfer to Bender, in particular because of wishing to be closer to their families. An examination of the documentation confirmed that newly admitted prisoners had been expressly informed of the conditions prevailing at the establishment (i.e. absence of running water, electricity and sewage disposal) and had confirmed with their signature their wish to be transferred there. Further, it appeared that the few inmates who had requested transfer to other establishments had received satisfaction. 86. As regards material conditions, in terms of living space per prisoner (some 6 m²), state of repair and decoration, the dormitories in which inmates were accommodated offered conditions superior to those witnessed at any other penitentiary establishment seen by the CPT in Moldova. Further, prisoners stated that the food they received was better than that provided elsewhere. Moreover, no problems were reported as regards the heating.\nHowever, in the absence of any progress in the stand-off between the municipal authorities of Bender and the Moldovan authorities, electricity continued to be produced by generators and was available 3 to 4 hours a day in the evenings, enabling inmates inter alia to watch TV. Further, water was delivered regularly by a lorry‑cistern and was distributed into reservoirs supplying the kitchen and the bathroom; inmates could take a shower once a week. As for toilets, cesspools had been installed in the basements of the unused buildings. 87. Prisoners could circulate freely around the establishment’s extensive premises and engage in outdoor sports. However, there was a shortage of organised activities. Some 36 prisoners were employed in the establishment’s general services (kitchen, cleaning, repairs, etc.). Further, the establishment’s director spoke of plans to set up a carpentry workshop; however, it was unclear when these plans would materialise. 88. The delegation was informed that relations with the municipal authorities of Bender had become less tense in the last year. As a result, staff travelling across the border between Moldova and the Transdniestrian region were reportedly able to come to work on a regular basis. 89. To sum up, it is clear that the Moldovan authorities have continued to take steps to alleviate, as far as possible, the difficult situation facing Penitentiary establishment No. 8 in Bender and to ensure that the health and welfare of prisoners are protected. Further, there are signs of a more pragmatic approach on the part of both parties concerned by the stand-off. This is encouraging.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Landshut, Germany. 5.  In 1968 the applicant left the then communist Czechoslovakia. In 1970 she was found guilty of the offence of fleeing the Republic, and all her property was confiscated, including two plots of land (nos. 1141 and 1142) in the cadastral area of Kožichovice (“the land”). 6.  On 31 May 1976 the State transferred the right to the use of the land to the Třebíč municipality. 7.  In 1990 the majority of the land was transferred to the Třebíč cadastral area and the plots were renumbered. The land now comprises the following plots: no. 7283 and parts of nos. 7281, 7378, 2174/1, 2174/2 and 2174/3 in the cadastral area of Třebíč and nos. 1136/1, 1136/19 and a part of no. 1138/1 in the cadastral area of Kožichovice. 8.  On 27 March 1991 the Nový Jičín District Court quashed the applicant’s conviction and all ancillary decisions including the decisions on the confiscation of property with retrospective effect, pursuant to the Judicial Rehabilitation Act. 9.  According to the applicant, she had been registered as the sole owner of the land without interruption from 1960, and in support of that claim she provided extracts from the land register dated 17 September 1992 and 15 August 1995. According to the Government, both the applicant and the State were mistakenly registered as owners after 1971, when the applicant’s property was confiscated, whereas the State should have been registered as the sole owner. 10.  The municipality has been using the part of the land in the cadastral area of Třebíč, which has been partly built upon, for companies providing communal services. 11.  At the end of 1992 the applicant sent a letter to the municipality enclosing a document from the Land Registry confirming that she was the owner and the municipality as the user of the land in issue. On 10 February 1993 the municipality replied that it did not know why it was registered as the user of the land because it had not been using it. There seems to have been, however, some confusion as to which plots of land were concerned as the municipality’s letter explicitly referred to a plot with a different number, which did not in fact exist. 12.  On 7 November 1995 the municipality of Třebíč sent a letter to the applicant at an address in Slovakia, stating that she was registered as the owner of the land in the land register but that according to the 1976 transfer the land had been transferred to the municipality. The municipality therefore asked the applicant whether she could submit any documentation proving that ownership of the land had been transferred from her to the State. The letter was returned undelivered with a note that no such address existed. 13.  On 7 November 1995 the municipality of Třebíč sent a similar letter to the Třebíč District Office asking for information concerning the ownership of the land. On 4 December 1995 the District Office replied that it had no document proving a transfer of the land to the State. 14.  On 22 January 1996 a meeting took place between a representative of the municipality of Třebíč and the applicant’s husband. The record of the meeting stated that a meeting with the owner of the land, that is, the applicant, represented by her husband, had taken place and the representatives of the municipality had asked whether the applicant would be willing to sell the part of the land that was within the cadastral area of Třebíč. The applicant refused to sell it but said that she would be willing to exchange it for a plot of land of equivalent value. 15.  On 5 March 1996 the municipality of Třebíč informed the applicant that it had decided to rent that part of the land that was within the cadastral area of Třebíč. On 25 March 1996 a rental agreement was signed between the applicant and the municipality, which paid annual rent for it in 1996 and 1997. 16.  On 12 November 1997 the municipality requested to be entered in the land register as the sole owner of the part of the land that was within the cadastral area of Třebíč. The Registry granted that request. 17.  On 22 December 1997 the municipality informed the applicant that it had found a document proving that the State had acquired ownership of the land from her, namely criminal judgments given against the applicant in 1970 and 1971. The municipality had accordingly asked the Land Registry to register it as the owner of the part of the land that was within the cadastral area of Třebíč. As a result, it considered the rental agreement to have been rendered null and void and asked the applicant to return to it the rent paid for the years 1996 and 1997. 18.  Subsequently, the applicant, through her lawyer and her husband, began negotiations with the municipality to find a solution to the situation. 19.  In a letter of 10 August 1999 the municipality stated that it was the lawful owner of the part of the land that was within the cadastral area of Třebíč as the applicant had failed to claim it in restitution proceedings. It did not acknowledge any responsibility for its mistake in wrongly attributing ownership of the land to the applicant from 1992 to 1996. 20.  As there appeared to be no basis for a friendly settlement between the applicant and the municipality, the former requested the Land Registry to remedy the mistake and record her as the rightful and sole owner of the land in the register. 21.  On 23 July 2002 the Land Registry rejected her request as unfounded. 22.  On 28 September 1992 the Třebíč Building Office invited the applicant to attend proceedings regarding a request for a building permit in respect of a piece of land adjoining the part of the land that had remained within the cadastral area of Kožichovice. 23.  On 29 January 1993 the applicant sent a letter to the farming cooperative that was using the part of the land within the cadastral area of Kožichovice, requesting them to sign a rental agreement with her. There is no information in the case-file as to whether the farming cooperative replied. 24.  The village of Kožichovice requested the Land Registry to register it as the sole owner of the part of the land within the cadastral area of Kožichovice on 19 January 1995, 10 May 1996, and 14 August 1998, referring to Law no. 172/1991, by which municipalities were able to acquire ownership of certain State property. There is no information in the case-file as to which part of the land was registered as the property of the village at what time. 25.  On 24 October 2003 the applicant brought an action for the determination of the ownership of the land, claiming that she was the lawful owner, as the order for the confiscation of her property had never been executed and had now become time-barred, and she had been listed as the owner of the land both in the former land register (evidence nemovitostí) and the current one (katastr nemovitostí), and that she had been acknowledged as such by the authorities. 26.  On 20 October 2006 the Třebíč District Court found that the State had in practice seized the real property concerned in the 1970s and had subsequently exercised all the associated property rights even though both the State and the applicant had been registered as its owners in the land register. Therefore, the applicant should have claimed the plots of land under the relevant restitution legislation. Relying on the settled case-law of the Supreme Court, the court concluded that if a person could have asked for the return of a property under the restitution legislation he or she could not claim it under a general civil-law action, as the applicant was trying to do. Consequently, it dismissed the applicant’s action for lack of an urgent legal interest (naléhavý právní zájem) on the determination of ownership. 27.  The applicant appealed, stressing that at the time when the restitution legislation had been applicable there had been no one other than herself who could have been considered the owner of the plots of land. The State had treated her as the owner of the real property and thus she could not lawfully have had recourse to the restitution legislation. 28.  On 16 October 2007 the Brno Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, referring to opinion no. Pl. ÚS – st. 21/05 of the Constitutional Court, adopted on 1 November 2005 (see paragraph 34 below). It accepted, however, that the land-registering authorities had not kept their records properly, as both the applicant and the State had been listed as owners of the same land at the same time. If for that reason filing a restitution claim, which would have been an appropriate remedy under normal circumstances, had been outside the time-limits provided by the restitution legislation, the applicant could have considered claiming compensation for administrative malpractice on the part of the authorities. In any event, a civil action was not an appropriate way of raising restitution claims. 29.  On 5 March 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant, endorsing the conclusions of the lower courts that, given that the authorities had seized the applicant’s real property by a final judgment as a result of her conviction, the applicant should have lodged a restitution claim either against the State, which was listed as the real property owner in the land register, or, failing that, with the relevant land authority, which would have made a decision as to ownership. The State had become the owner of the plots when the criminal judgment had become final, irrespective of the time when its ownership had been entered in the land register. 30.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal, complaining under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that the courts had not taken into consideration her submissions regarding the non-execution of the order for the seizure of her property and the impossibility for her to have recourse to restitution legislation. In addition, she claimed that she was unable to seek the protection of her property rights owing to the practice of the Land Registry and the decisions of the courts. 31.  On 30 July 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded, referring to its opinion no. Pl. ÚS – st. 21/05 of 1 November 2005, which stated that the applicant in that case should not have used a general civil-law action but should have lodged her claim under the restitution laws. It further found that the courts had given reasoned and convincing judgments which had observed the relevant legislation and case-law. Finally, it acknowledged that the decisions could be seen as disproportionately harsh towards the applicant, who might have been misled by the incorrect record in the land register. If that was so and the applicant had suffered damage, she could consider claiming compensation from the State under the State Liability Act.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976. 5.  On 29 December 2009 a police investigator initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and charged him with fraudulent appropriation of property. On the same day the applicant was placed on the list of wanted persons. 6.  On 27 April 2010 the applicant was arrested and informed of the charges. 7.  On 29 April 2010 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was ordered by a court. 8.  On 25 June 2010 the applicant was released under a written undertaking not to abscond. 9.  In February 2011 the case was referred to the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”) for trial. 10.  On 4 April 2011 the District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case. Following the request of the prosecutor, it ordered that the preventive measure in respect of the applicant should be changed and that the applicant should be placed in pre-trial detention. The court, paying regard to the fact that the applicant denied his guilt, considered that the applicant could influence witnesses, conceal or remove traces and evidence of the crime. It stated that the applicant was charged with a serious crime and his actual place of residence did not coincide with his registered address. It therefore concluded that the applicant could behave negatively and his isolation was necessary. The court noted that the applicant was of middle age, he was not a disabled person, he did not suffer from chronic illnesses, he had a family and a minor son, and that he worked as director of a company. 11.  On a number of occasions during the trial the applicant requested the District Court to change the preventive measure in his respect and release him. 12.  On 5 July, 19 August, 23 November 2011 and 17 January 2012 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s requests maintaining the impugned preventive measure. The court referred to its decision of 4 April 2011 and repeated that the applicant’s actual and registered addresses did not coincide, he was charged with a serious crime, and that there were grounds to believe that the applicant could behave negatively, if released. The court also repeated that the applicant was of middle age, he was not a disabled person, he did not suffer from chronic illnesses, he had a family and a minor son, and that he worked as director of a company. The court then found that there had been no grounds to change the preventive measure for health reasons or to apply bail; furthermore, the applicant showed no remorse and had refused to admit his guilt. 13.  On 30 January 2012 the District Court found the applicant guilty of fraudulent appropriation of property and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and ordered confiscation of his property. 14.  The Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal and the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court of Ukraine upheld the judgment of 30 January 2012 on 9 April 2013 and 6 February 2014 respectively.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1948, 1936 and 1939 respectively and live in Şanlıurfa. 5.  The applicants were co-owners of a plot of land located in Karaköprü, Şanlıurfa, registered under parcel no. 740 in the land registry. 6.  On 13 April 1989, the Governorship of Şanlıurfa decided to expropriate the applicants' land, together with other plots. The expropriation aimed at allocating the plots to the Ministry of Defence for military needs. 7.  In 1991 the Ministry of Defence seized the land without compensating the applicants. 8.  On 24 September 1996 Mr Gög and Mrs Kolsuzoğlu, with co‑claimants, filed a compensation claim against the Ministry for the de facto expropriation (case no. 1996/857). They submitted that the Ministry had been occupying their land since 1991 without a formal expropriation. 9.  On the same day and complaining about the same situation, Mrs Agbayır also filed a claim together with other co-claimants (case no. 1996/855). 10.  The applicants initiated both cases with partial claims, reserving their right to request additional compensation should the expert valuations exceed their partial claims. 11.  In both cases the Ministry argued that it had been occupying the land since the mid-1970s and that the claims were time-barred. The Ministry relied on Article 38 of the Expropriation Act, Law no. 2942, pursuant to which all claims for de facto expropriations were subject to a 20-year prescription period running from the seizure of the land. 12.  On 4 December 1996 the court conducted on-site examinations. The experts appointed by the court valued the land in which both Mr Gög and Mrs Kolsuzoğlu each held a 1/13 (one thirteenth) share at 52,517,752,560 Turkish liras (TRL), and that in which Mrs Agbayır held a 1/3 (one third) share at TRL 162,555,120,000. 13.  Accordingly, on 27 December 1996, the Şanlıurfa Civil Court handed down two judgments awarding the applicants their respective partial claims in full, i.e., TRL 80,000,000,000 to Mrs Agbayır (case no. 1998/21) and TRL 26,000,000,000 to Mr Gög and Mrs Kolsuzoğlu (case no. 1998/23). 14.  On appeal, the Court of Cassation quashed both judgments, directing the civil court to broaden the scope of its examination regarding the value of the land. 15.  Complying with this ruling, the Şanlıurfa Civil Court restarted the proceedings. As its further examinations resulted in the same valuations, it gave two judgments on 27 October 1998, awarding the applicants the same amounts as before. 16.  The court also ordered the plot in dispute to be registered in the name of the Treasury. In addition, it made a factual finding with respect to the year in which the seizure had taken place. Reasoning that the witness statements brought by the applicants prevailed over the documents submitted by the Ministry, the court was convinced that the seizure had happened in 1991. 17.  On 3 December 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld both judgments. 18.  On 17 May 1999 the relevant amounts, together with their statutory interest, i.e. TRL 165,577,780 (case no. 1998/21) and TRL 53,812,780 (case no. 1998/23), were paid to the applicants. 19.  As the applicants had reserved their right to additional compensation, they initiated subsequent claims to recover the difference between the amounts awarded and the values assessed by the experts and recognised by the court. In this respect, Mrs Agbayır applied, with a co‑claimant, to the Şanlıurfa Civil Court on 20 July 1999, requesting the balance of TRL 27,518,373,000 (case no. 1999/568). A day later, Mr Gög and Mrs Kolsuzoğlu applied to the same court requesting TRL 4,252,180,480 for each of them (case no. 1999/576). 20.  In case no. 1999/568, the court ruled on 5 October 1999 in favour of Mrs Agbayır and granted her claim in full. On 9 December 1999, however, the Court of Cassation favoured, for the first time in the relevant proceedings, the Ministry's thesis that the seizure had taken place in the mid-1970s, and most probably in 1977. Accordingly, it ruled that the additional claims had been filed outside of the 20-year prescription period of Article 38 of the Expropriation Act. 21.  On 4 May 2000 the Şanlıurfa Civil Court complied with that ruling and dismissed case no. 1999/568. On 29 June 2000 the Court of Cassation upheld this ruling. This judgment became final on 10 July 2000. 22.  The proceedings in case no. 1999/576 produced a similar outcome. The Şanlıurfa Civil Court dismissed the additional claims of Mr Gög and Mrs Kolsuzoğlu on 6 July 2000 for being out of time. The Court of Cassation upheld that ruling on 19 April 2001 and refused a rectification review. The judgment became final on 4 June 2001. 23.  On 10 April 2003 the Constitutional Court annulled Article 38 of the Expropriation Act.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in San Giovanni Lupatoto (Verona). 6.  G.S., the applicant's father, was the owner of a flat in Cagliari which he had let to G.A.S. 7.  In a registered letter of 3 June 1991, the applicant's father informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 8.  In a writ served on the tenant on 24 February 1992, the applicant's father reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Cagliari Magistrate. 9.  By a decision of 23 March 1992, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Cagliari Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 June 1992. 10.  On 20 July 1992, the applicant's father served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11.  On an unspecified date, the applicant's father made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. 12.  Subsequently, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 13 October 1992. 13.  Between 13 October 1992 and 23 June 1995, the bailiff made five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant's father was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 14.  On 25 May 1995, the applicant's father made a request for police assistance. 15.  On 27 July 1995, the Cagliari Prefect informed him that the police assistance would be granted after 30 September 1996. 16.  On 22 September 1997, the applicant's father died and his daughter, the actual applicant, inherited the flat and took part in the proceedings as an heir. 17.  On 13 July 1998, the Prefect informed the bailiff that the police assistance would be granted only after 31 December 1998, as there was no urgent necessity, the applicant's father having died. 18.  On 19 April 1999, the applicant served on the tenant the order to vacate the premises. 19.  On 3 May 1999, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 25 May 1999. 20.  On an unspecified day of May 2001, the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises and the applicant recovered possession of the flat.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Gdynia, Poland. 5.  On 8 May 1999 the applicant was arrested by the police. On 9 May 1999 the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided to detain the applicant on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed robbery, kidnapping and larceny. 6.  The applicant’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) on 24 May 1999. 7.  On 25 January 2000 the applicant was indicted before the Gdańsk Regional Court. 8.  The applicant’s detention was prolonged on 27 January 2000. The court reiterated the grounds originally given for his detention and stressed the gravity of the charges. 9.  On 10 April 2000 the first hearing took place before the trial court. 10.  On 18 May 2000 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s application for release. The court considered that the evidence obtained in the case sufficiently justified the charges laid against the applicant. In addition, the gravity of the charges made it probable that a heavy sentence would be imposed. 11.  Between 27 June 2000 and 17 April 2001 eight hearings took place. 12.  Subsequently, the Gdańsk Regional Court made a request under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings to the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) in which it asked that the applicant’s detention on remand be extended beyond 2 years. On 25 April 2001 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal allowed the request. However, it extended the applicant’s detention only until 31 July 2001 and not until October 2001 as requested by the Regional Court. The appellate court considered that it was probable that the applicant had committed the crimes with which he had been charged. In addition, the case did not disclose any of the grounds for the applicant’s release listed in Article 259 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings. At the same time, the court of appeal pointed out that the proceedings had already taken a long time and that any extension of his detention on remand beyond a two‑year period should only be allowed for the purposes of taking all necessary procedural steps to conclude the trial. 13.  Afterwards, hearings were held in June and July 2001. 14.  On 25 July 2001 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal further extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2001. It considered, however, that the proceedings in the applicant’s case had already taken a long time and that the Regional Court had been inefficient in dealing with the case. In this connection, the Gdańsk Court of Appeal pointed out that the trial court had adjourned the case for almost 50 days without giving any reasons. As a result of the adjournment the proceedings had to be recommenced. 15.  Subsequently, hearings took place before the trial court. 16.  On 26 September 2001 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal further prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2001 relying on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences and on the complexity of the case. 17.  Between 10 October 2001 and 21 January 2002 fourteen hearings were held. 18.  On 28 January 2002 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave a judgment. The applicant was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 19.  Subsequently, the applicant’s detention was prolonged on several occasions. 20.  On 9 April 2003 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the case. At the same time the appellate court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 21 July 2003. The court considered that it was necessary to keep the applicant in detention since he had been charged with several crimes which represented “a significant danger to society” (o znacznej szkodliwości społecznej) and which attracted a heavy prison sentence. In addition, the evidence obtained in the case sufficiently supported the probability that the applicant had committed those crimes. Moreover, the court considered that there was a risk that the applicant would go into hiding and that he could interfere with the proceedings if released. It was recalled in this connection that the applicant had been arrested while trying to leave the country. 21.  The applicant appealed against this decision, but his appeal was dismissed on 23 April 2003 by the Gdańsk Court of Appeal. 22.  On 7 October, 18 and 20 November 2003 hearings took place before the Gdańsk Regional Court. 23.  The applicant’s pre-trial detention was prolonged on 8 July 2003, 20 January, 30 July and 7 December 2004. The court reiterated the original grounds for keeping him in custody, in particular the seriousness of the charges against the applicant and the risk that he might receive a heavy sentence. 24.  At the hearings held on 11 January and 19 July 2005 the Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention relying on the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the seriousness of the charges, the severity of the likely sentence and the complexity of the case. The court further stated that since not all of the witnesses had been heard, there was a risk that the applicant might attempt to influence them. 25.  On 27 October 2005 the applicant’s detention on remand was prolonged. The court repeated the grounds relied on in its previous decision given in 2005 in an almost identical manner. 26.  The applicant’s numerous appeals and requests for release were to no avail. 27.  On 27 December 2005 the Gdańsk Regional Court gave a judgment. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to 14 years’ imprisonment. On 12 April 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal. 28.  On 20 November 2006 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal partly upheld the impugned judgment and reduced the applicant’s prison sentence to 11 years’ imprisonment. 29.  On 15 November 2004 the applicant lodged with the Gdańsk Court of Appeal a complaint alleging that his right to have his case examined within a reasonable time had been breached. He relied on the 2004 Act on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. 30.  On 28 December 2004 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal allowed his complaint, found that the length of the criminal proceedings pending before the Regional Court had been unreasonable and awarded the applicant PLN 3,000 in compensation. The court examined the course of the proceedings and found delays between 10 April 2000 and 6 June 2001 for which the trial court had been responsible. The Court of Appeal further instructed the trial court to accelerate its handling of the case so that the trial was concluded within a period much shorter than the one-year period envisaged. 31.  On 29 December 2005 the applicant lodged a second complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings in his case. 32.  On 28 February 2006 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s second complaint. The court examined the course of the proceedings after 28 December 2004 and established that they had been conducted diligently and that there were no delays attributable to the trial court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 18 June 1993 a car was broken into and a number of items were stolen. Shortly thereafter the police apprehended the applicants and took them to a police station. There they confessed that they had committed the offence and gave explanations on the manner in which they had acted. On the same day the victim of the offence was questioned. 5.  On 29 July 1993 a preliminary investigation was opened against the applicants for the theft of the items from the car. 6.  On 21 April 1999 the preliminary investigation (предварително следствие) was transformed into a police investigation (дознание). 7.  On 3 February 2002 an expert report for assessing the value of the stolen items was commissioned. 8.  On 5 and 12 February 2002, respectively, the two applicants were charged and questioned as suspects. On 14 October 2002 they were questioned by a judge. 9.  Between February and June 2002 four witnesses were questioned. 10.  On 2 April 2003 the prosecution authorities filed an indictment with the Plovdiv District Court and on the 11th the President of the Court scheduled the first hearing for 15 January 2004. 11.  At the hearing held on 15 January 2004 the court approved a plea bargain agreement between the applicants and the prosecuting authorities and discontinued the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, Mr Hartwig Dreyer, is a German national who was born in 1926 and lives in Neumunster, Germany. 7.  On 8 September 1983 the Paris International Court of Arbitration ordered the company М. (“the debtor”) to pay the company Ingenieurbüro, H.D., which was solely owned and managed by the applicant, 110,000 German marks (DM), plus interest. 8.  By a final decision of 28 March 1991, the Federal Court in Belgrade recognised this decision. 9.  On 13 September 1993 the applicant sought enforcement of that decision before the Skopje Municipal Court against the debtor’s legal successors, which had resulted from its division in 1982. 10.  On 16 September 1993 the Skopje Municipal Court granted this request. On 2 March 1994 the applicant further specified the debtors, namely companies which succeeded the debtor’s legal successors after their transformation in 1990 (“the companies”). On 24 March 1994 the Skopje Municipal Court dismissed the companies’ objections that they had lacked the requisite capacity to stand in the proceedings. 11.  On 6 January 1995 the applicant specified that in 1989 the debtor had seized to exist and its rights and obligations had transferred to a newly created company M.c.o.. The applicant therefore sought the Skopje Municipal Court to amend the decision of 24 March 1994. This request remained undecided. 12.  On 12 February 1998 the Skopje Court of Appeal upheld the companies’ appeals and remitted the case for re-examination. 13.  On 28 April 2000 the Skopje Court of First Instance requested the applicant to specify the respective debtor or debtors, having in mind his submission of 6 January 1995 (see paragraph 11 above). On 26 May 2000 the applicant reiterated his submission of 2 March 1994 (see paragraph 10 above). 14.  On 1 March 2004 the Skopje Court of First Instance upheld the companies’ objections and set aside (“се става вон сила”) the enforcement order of 16 September 1993. The court found that the companies had not had capacity to stand in the proceedings since company M., referring presumably to M.c.o., had still existed and it was to be considered as the debtor’s legal successor liable to pay the debt. 15.  On 27 September 2004 the applicant was served with the decision of 1 March 2004 through the Embassy of the respondent State in Germany. The parties did not dispute that the applicant’s appeal of 30 April 2005, which remained undecided, was lodged out of time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in the village Shakhterskiy of the Tula Region. 5.  The applicant is a former serviceman. Upon his dismissal certain pecuniary benefits were not paid to him. He instituted civil proceedings for their recovery against military unit no. 23132. 6.  He had a military rank of junior sergeant in reserve at the material time. 7.  On 6 August 2001 the Tula Garrison Military Court granted the applicant’s claim. The court established that from 24 March 2000 to 4 November 2000 the applicant had performed military service in the North Caucasus Region and from 24 March 2000 to 1 May 2000 participated in the military operations in that region. The court found that the applicant was entitled to monetary compensation and the failure to pay it to him in good time constituted a violation of his rights. In its analysis the domestic court referred, inter alia, to the Law on the Status of Military Servicemen (see paragraph 19 below) which provides for entitlement of certain categories of military servicemen to additional monetary compensation, and to Decree of the Federal Government of 20 August 1999 no. 930-54 establishing the amounts of compensation due to military personnel of different ranks for their participation in the military operations on the territory of Dagestan. The court ordered the commander of the military unit concerned to pay the applicant remuneration for his participation in the military operations between 24 March and 1 May 2000 and pecuniary benefits for his service in the North Caucasus Region. An exact amount to be paid was not specified in the operative part of the judgment. 8.  The judgment entered into force on 17 September 2001. 9.  On 9 October 2001 and 5 April 2002 the Tula Garrison Military Court invited the commander of the military unit to report whether the judgment of 6 August 2001 had been executed and notified him of his responsibility for non-execution of the judgment. By letter of 5 April 2002 the court also advised the applicant of his right to ask for a writ of execution to be issued in respect of the judgment. 10.  At some point the applicant complied with the instruction and asked for a writ. On 7 May 2002 the Tula Garrison Military Court issued the writ of execution, and the enforcement proceedings were opened in respect of the judgment. 11.  Since the respondent military unit was based in Shali, Chechnya, on 19 June 2002 the Bailiffs’ Office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the writ to the Chief Bailiff of the Shali District of Chechnya. 12.  In their observations dated 14 July 2006 the Government submitted that the judgment of 6 August 2001 had not been enforced. 13.  In their further observations of 25 May 2007 the Government informed the Court that the amounts of 25,110 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 74,520 of pecuniary benefits for the applicant’s participation in the military operations in the North Caucasus Region were paid to the applicant by the command of the military unit no. 23132 on an unspecified date at his discharge from the military service. They did not submit any documents in this respect.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Badacsony. 5.  In the context of a 1993 dispute concerning a loan given to the applicant by a savings bank, in 1995 execution proceedings were instituted against the applicant. 6.  On 21 January 1999 the applicant filed an action with the Tapolca District Court requesting that the execution be halted or limited. On 8 March 2000 the District Court suspended the execution. On 14 November 2000 the Veszprém County Regional Court dismissed the applicant's motion for bias. 7.  Hearings took place on 17 April and 18 September 2001, and on 14 March, 9 May, 11 July, 3 October and 28 November 2002. 8.  On 13 February 2003 the District Court decided to discontinue the execution but dismissed the applicant's other related claims. On 16 June 2003 he appealed concerning the latter issues. 9.  On 28 January 2004 the Somogy County Regional Court quashed that part of the decision of 13 February 2003 which had been appealed. 10.  On 13 April 2004 the Veszprém District Court was appointed to rehear the case. On 17 May 2004 the applicant modified his action. For reasons of competence, the District Court forwarded the file to the Regional Court on 3 June 2004. On 10 September 2004 the Regional Court changed this decision and referred the case back to the District Court. 11.  Hearings were held on 11 November and 16 December 2004, and on 20 January, 15 February and 8 March 2005. 12.  On 24 March 2005 the District Court partly found for the applicant. 13.  On 31 August 2005 the Somogy County Regional Court quashed this decision. 14.  In the resumed proceedings, on 1 December 2005 the District Court held a hearing. On 9 December 2005 it appointed an expert who presented his opinion on 17 February 2006. According to the information in the Court's case file, the proceedings are apparently still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Msida. 7.  On 8 September 2009 the applicant was arrested. A search of a hotel room close to where he was apprehended revealed a number of packets of cannabis (weighing approximately 15 kg). The following day he was questioned and made a statement. On 10 September 2009, two days after his arrest, he and some other Maltese and foreign suspects were charged with the possession of cannabis not for their own exclusive use and conspiracy for the purposes of drug trafficking. They were brought before a magistrate (sitting in the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry) and remanded in custody. 8.  On 25 March 2010, following multiple bail requests which were rejected by the relevant courts, the applicant lodged constitutional redress proceedings, complaining ‒ inter alia ‒ that there had been a breach of his rights under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and requesting his immediate release as per Article 5 § 4. 9.  By a judgment of 12 August 2010, following a thorough assessment of the factual circumstances and the Court’s relevant case-law, the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction dismissed the applicant’s claims, and thus did not order his release. It pointed out, however, that the decision was without prejudice to any remedies which he would be entitled to request at the proper time and if the need arose. 10.  The applicant appealed. On 18 January 2011, pending the constitutional appeal proceedings, the applicant was granted bail subject to certain conditions (including a curfew order and reporting to the police twice daily, as well as residing in an apartment rented for that purpose) against a number of guarantees, including a bail bond in the form of a deposit of 50,000 euros (EUR) and a further personal guarantee of EUR 15,000. 11.  Since the specified amount was not paid, he remained in custody. 12.  By a judgment of 14 February 2011 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 3 [and § 4] in view of the ongoing passage of time since the first-instance judgment, during which period the applicant’s requests had continued to be repeatedly rejected. Although the court was empowered to order release and alter the bail conditions imposed ‒ noting that by the time of the judgment the applicant had been formally granted bail ‒ it did not deem it appropriate to order release as or take any other action. It awarded the applicant EUR 1,000. 13.  On 18 February 2011 the applicant asked the investigating court (Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry) to reduce the amount of the bail deposit. 14.  By a decision of 22 February 2011 the Court of Magistrates, having heard submissions, reduced the deposit to EUR 40,000 and increased the personal guarantee to EUR 60,000. 15.  On 29 March 2011, still unable to pay, the applicant asked the court to reduce the deposit even further. He referred to his wife’s testimony to the effect that the applicant and his family did not possess such funds. 16.  By a decision of 4 May 2011 the Court of Magistrates, having heard the submissions, reduced the deposit to EUR 15,000 and reduced the personal guarantee to EUR 30,000 (allowing the option of a third-party surety for that amount). However, it required that, before any surety could assume the obligation, proof of the surety’s financial capacity to furnish the requested amount be submitted. 17.  A further request to reduce the amounts was filed by the applicant on 19 July 2011. He reiterated that he did not have the financial means to pay the specified deposit. He stated that he had four dependent children and a wife back in the United Kingdom who barely had enough money to live on and struggled to meet their financial obligations, including paying the children’s school fees and the mortgage. He further submitted that since he had been detained in Malta, the family business had had to be wound up and, to make matters worse, his wife’s medical condition, which prevented her from being gainfully employed, had deteriorated. The family had been living on their meagre savings, of which very little was left at that stage. The amount required for the deposit was, in his view, not reasonable considering his means and financial status. Moreover, he had been in custody for over twenty months and despite the Constitutional Court having found a violation of his rights under Article 5 § 3 in respect of the bail refusals, he had to date not been able to enjoy that right in practice. The applicant’s wife testified to this effect. 18.  By a decision of the Court of Magistrates of 22 July 2011, after hearing the parties’ submissions and the applicant’s wife’s testimony, the court rejected the request. It noted that, according to the documents presented, the matrimonial home (which was a substantial property, demonstrating they were not an average family) was still owned by the applicant and his wife, although burdened with a substantial mortgage. Moreover, the applicant’s wife had sold off the family shoe business in 2010 “implying the inflow of a substantial amount of money within the family.” In the light of previous decisions, and the fact that the accused had no ties with Malta, the court considered that a bail deposit of EUR 15,000 was commensurate with the charges preferred against him. 19.  The applicant filed a further request on 26 July 2011, pointing out that his wife had not stated that the family business had been sold but rather that it had closed down since the applicant was in detention and the applicant’s wife was too ill to run the business. She had also emphasized that the financial means at their disposal were limited since the applicant had not been working for the past two years and she was precluded from working due to her illness, meaning that their savings had been used to meet the daily needs of the family and to pay the mortgage. Moreover, although the house seemed to be of a certain value, this had to be seen in the context of the British property market and the fact that putting the house up for sale was not envisaged. The applicant thus asked the court to review his wife’s testimony and the documents produced by her. 20.  On 12 August 2011 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings (see below). 21.  Following the first-instance judgment of the constitutional jurisdiction (see below), by a decision of 14 March 2012 the Court of Magistrates ‒ after hearing further submissions ‒ reduced the bail deposit to EUR 7,000 and increased the personal guarantee to EUR 60,000. It drew the applicant’s attention to the other bail conditions previously imposed which were still in effect. 22.  Following a further request submitted on 23 April 2012, the Court of Magistrates on the same day allowed his request for modification of the bail conditions, reducing the deposit to EUR 5,000 and increasing the personal guarantee to EUR 70,000. There were other changes to some of the original conditions (such as having to report only once a day to the police station). The applicant deposited the sum of EUR 5,000 and was released on the same day. 23.  In the meantime, on 12 August 2011 the applicant instituted a new set of constitutional redress proceedings, complaining, inter alia, of a breach of Article 5 § 3 in the light of the high guarantees set by the Court of Magistrates, as a result of which it had not ‒ in practice ‒ been possible for him to be released on bail. The applicant’s wife gave evidence on 20 September 2011. She stated that the shop had closed down as she could not run it due to childcare and health problems, and she explained that she had sold the stock at rock-bottom prices. She described her health problems, substantiating them by means of medical reports. She further testified that the bank had foreclosed due to failure to pay the mortgage on the house, resulting in them losing their family home with all the money from the sale going to the bank. The wife stated that the family was living on state benefits, that they had no savings, that their household effects and their car had been sold, and that she had been sending money to her husband to buy necessities and was renting a flat in Malta as a bail address for the applicant. 24.  By a judgment of 16 January 2012 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional competence rejected the applicant’s complaint under the aforementioned provision. It observed that the Court of Magistrates had based its decision on information supplied by the applicant and as of the date of its last decree the financial and personal details available to the court had been insufficient to permit any assessment of the reasonableness of the conditions imposed. Only at a later date did more information become available, demonstrating that the applicant was to blame “when he himself brought no clear evidence of his financial and presence [recte: present] situation until late 2011.” In the light of this, the court held that the applicant’s claim was not justified. However, since by this time the applicant’s personal and financial situation was clearer, though the information was not exhaustive, the court invited the Court of Magistrates to re-evaluate the conditions imposed following the application filed by the applicant. 25.  The applicant appealed, arguing that various items of documentation including bank statements had been presented to the court; moreover, factual mistakes had been made, such as the misconception that his business had been sold and not closed down. 26.  By a judgment of 12 November 2012 the applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Constitutional Court. It observed that evidence before the Court of Magistrates had been scanty, with the exception of documents showing that the couple owned a house worth GBP 700,000 (approx. EUR 807,000) ‒ subject to a mortgage of GBP 381,000 ‒ as well as a shoe business. However, on presentation of further evidence the level of financial guarantees was lowered, the relevant court having realised that, despite the passage of time, the applicant remained unable to pay and the grounds for pre-trial detention were becoming less relevant. 27.  The applicant lodged a request for retrial, which was rejected by a judgment of 28 April 2014. 28.  Following his actual release on bail, the applicant made various requests for alteration of the conditions imposed, in particular permission to return to the United Kingdom for specific events or short intervals between court hearings to see his family. One such request was granted upon condition of presentation of the air ticket and deposit of a EUR 20,000 guarantee. It would appear that this condition could not be fulfilled. Subsequent requests were denied in view of the applicant’s inability to give any financial guarantees and considering that the applicant’s family could join him in Malta. 29.  As mentioned above, on 10 September 2009 the applicant was arraigned in court (the Court of Magistrates as a Court of Criminal Inquiry), where he pleaded not guilty to the charges. The following is a list of hearings which took place subsequently, as is apparent from the documents submitted: 30.  On 14 September 2009 the prosecuting officer and eight other police officers gave evidence, and documents were produced. On 22 September 2009 further documents were produced, and a pharmacist, another police officer and a third person gave evidence. An expert in communications technology and a translator were appointed. The former was instructed to obtain all phone data relating to the applicant between 20 August and 10 September 2009. 31.  On 3 November 2009 a copy of the inquiry was produced and one person gave evidence and produced documents. On 13 November 2009 another two police officers and a lawyer gave evidence and produced documents. A fingerprints expert was appointed. Another hearing was held on 11 December 2009. On 16 December 2009 the communications technology expert and two other individuals gave evidence. On 21 January 2010 the fingerprints expert gave evidence. On 2 February 2010, three witnesses who had already been heard gave further evidence, together with another two individuals. On 11 February 2010 another witness gave evidence and on 12 February 2010 a decree was issued by the court. 32.  On 23 March 2010 the case was adjourned as the magistrate was indisposed. On 25 March 2010 a doctor and the prosecuting officer gave evidence; the latter declared that only three witnesses remained to be heard. 33.  On 4 May 2010 the case was adjourned as the magistrate was indisposed. On 5 May 2010 a police inspector and another person gave evidence and were cross-examined. The co-accused’s lawyer complained that the proceedings were protracted. On 11 May 2010 the case was adjourned due to technical problems. On 22 June 2010 two witnesses who had already given evidence were further heard and cross-examined. The applicant’s lawyer reserved the right to further cross-examination, and requested that a witness be re-heard. 34.  On 2 July 2010 the communications technology expert was cross-examined, and it transpired that he had not asked the foreign phone providers for the records of the calls in the relevant period (see above). Another witness failed to appear, and the applicant’s lawyer requested that another witness be re-heard. On 6 July 2010 the applicant made a request for telephonic data from the United Kingdom (relating to his co-accused). On 14 July 2010 the Attorney General replied that the correct procedure to obtain such data would be by means of letters of request. On 19 July 2010 the Court of Magistrates ordered the applicant to abide by this procedure. 35.  On 4 August the hearing was adjourned. On 16 August 2010 the applicant requested the acquisition of text messages from two mobile phones in the period August to September 2009. On 17 August 2010 the Attorney General reiterated the procedure that should be used. On 19 August 2010 the applicant reiterated his request and the parties made oral submissions. On 20 August 2010 the Attorney General filed a note attaching samples of letters of request to aid the applicant making his request. On the same day and again on 7 September 2010 the applicant contested this procedure. On 15 September 2010 the applicant informed the court of his new legal representatives; the Attorney General gave evidence. On 27 September 2010 the applicant filed a request for letters rogatory to be sent to the United Kingdom. On 30 September 2010 it was noted that the aforementioned request was defective – the court reserved its decision as to whether to suspend the terms applicable to the compilation of evidence. 36.  On 1 October 2010 the applicant submitted a correct request for the telephonic data (August – September 2009). On 12 October 2012 the prosecution agreed to forward the letters in question to the relevant authorities – the court suspended the terms applicable to the compilation of evidence. On 29 October 2010 further evidence was submitted and cross-examinations were carried out. Other hearings were held on 10 and 17 November 2010. On 26 November 2010 the hearing was adjourned as one of the inspectors was indisposed. 37.  On 3 December 2010 the court noted that the letters rogatory had still not been forwarded to the United Kingdom and urged the Attorney General to inform the court about the progress of the letters. On 6 December 2010 the Attorney General stated that data had been missing in the documentation provided by the applicant. On 10 December 2010 it was noted that the data in question was still missing. On 20 December 2010 the hearing was adjourned because the presiding magistrate was indisposed. On 21 December 2010 the Attorney General returned the letters rogatory filed by the applicant to the court as they had not included all the relevant data, in particular the extract of the law relating to the charges levied against the applicant was missing. The court was informed by its staff that this document had not been submitted by the Attorney General. To avoid further loss of time, the applicant volunteered to re-submit the letters rogatory together with a printout of the relevant law bearing the visto of a representative of the Attorney General and the court granted the request. According to the Government, on 29 December 2010 it became apparent that the letters of request could not be processed by the United Kingdom central authority. 38.  A further hearing took place on 18 January 2011, at which it was ordered that an update from the United Kingdom authorities be forwarded to the parties. On 1 February 2011 the applicant was asked whether he wished to add or alter anything to the letters rogatory and on 11 February 2011 he was ordered to file a note with all the information necessary for the execution of the letters of request. On 18 February 2011, following an unfavourable reply from the United Kingdom Central Authority, the applicant asked the Attorney General to ascertain whether or not the telephone service provider was still in possession of the data requested in the letters rogatory. On 22 February 2011 evidence from two witnesses was heard. 39.  On 3 March 2011 the applicant filed fresh letters of request, which were sent to the United Kingdom on 17 March 2011. On 9 March 2011 the case was put off as the magistrate was indisposed. On 16 March 2011 an inspector gave evidence and the Attorney General was asked to give an update about the letters rogatory, which was done the following day. On 29 March 2011, the case was postponed for an unspecified reason. 40.  On 7 April 2011 one witness was heard and on 19 April 2011 another witness produced a document as evidence. On 27 April 2011 the case was adjourned. On 3 May 2011 the court stated that it would decide pending applications in camera. Another witness was heard on 13 May 2011. On 20 May 2011 the court was still waiting for the letters rogatory, so the case was adjourned. On 2 June 2011 the United Kingdom Central Authority replied, and ‒ following orders by the court of 3 and 15 June on 16 June 2011 ‒ a note was filed in court by the Attorney General, which was read out in open court on 24 June 2011. 41.  At the hearings on 6, 19 and 29 July 2011 the court declared that it had no news regarding the letters rogatory from the United Kingdom. On 31 August and 13 September the court urged the Attorney General to submit the information obtained concerning the letters rogatory. On 27 September 2011 a further reply from the United Kingdom central authorities was received, but a hearing of the same day was adjourned due to a bomb threat at the law courts. On 13 October 2011 the court received the response to the letters rogatory, stating that the data requested had been irretrievably lost. It re-activated the terms applicable to the compilation of evidence. 42.  On 2 November 2011 a police officer was cross-examined. On 22 November 2011 the case was adjourned to enable the defence lawyers to communicate with the accused. The case file was forwarded to the Attorney General. Apparently another two hearings took place on 21 December and 27 January, when the case was adjourned on the first occasion because the co-accused was not present, and on the second for an unspecified reason. On 2 February 2012 the case was adjourned for no apparent reason and on 3 February 2012 the case was again adjourned to enable the defence lawyers to communicate with the accused. The case file was forwarded to the Attorney General. 43.  On 13 March 2012 the case was again postponed until the next day for no apparent reason. On 14 March 2012, following a request by the Attorney General to restart the proceedings (Article 432 of the Laws of Malta), the charge was read out and, sworn under oath, the applicant refused to answer the questions put to him in the examination. His co-accused was questioned. The parties declared they were relying on all the evidence already produced and a prima facie decree was handed down. Thus, proceedings were then restarted and hearings were held on 19, 20, and 23 April 2012. On 5 May 2012 the case was adjourned and on 6 July 2012 the applicant requested that a witness be summoned. However, on 17 July the case was again adjourned because the witness in question was in hospital. 44.  On 28 August 2012 the applicant complained that the Attorney General had done nothing to preserve the telephone recordings which were crucial to the defence. Further evidence was heard at the hearings of 11 September 2012, 18 October and 19 December 2012, 29 January, 5 February, 14 March (when new letters rogatory were also presented), and 20 March 2013. On 30 April and 16 May 2013 the case was adjourned for an unspecified reason. On 3 May 2013 the applicant reiterated that he would like to proceed with a number of cross-examinations. The prosecution objected to the request to have the same witnesses heard again. 45.  On 26 June 2013 the applicant requested an adjournment as his lawyer was not available. A hearing took place on 25 July 2013. Further evidence was heard on 6 August 2013. On 17 September 2013 the applicant requested an adjournment. On 24 September 2013 further oral submissions were made and evidence heard, the prosecution stated that the letters rogatory did not comply with the legal requirements. The court suspended the terms applicable to the compilation of evidence. 46.  On 3 October 2013 the case was adjourned for oral submissions. The case was adjourned again on 15 and 25 October 2013 for oral submissions, inter alia, by the Attorney General concerning an application for contempt of court in his regard. 47.   Replies to the letters rogatory having been received, the court re-activated the terms applicable to the compilation of evidence on 5 November 2013. It adjourned the case once again for oral submissions. Further evidence was heard on 12 November 2013. Oral submissions were made on 28 November 2013. 48.  On 15 January 2014 the expert gave evidence and the case was adjourned to 4 February and eventually to 26 February 2014 at the applicant’s request. On 11 March 2014 the applicant stated he intended to file fresh letters of request. Letters rogatory, were exhibited in court on 22 April 2014.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 31 July 1996 the applicant was run over by a motorist, Mr A.I. As a result of the accident, her clothes were damaged and became unusable. Both of her arms, her right ear and her right leg were bruised. Shortly after that she was admitted to a hospital, where she spent a week, and was found to have a broken ankle and a traumatic brain injury. 5.  After criminal proceedings which were later converted to administrative-penal ones, in a judgment of 10 March 1997 the Sofia District Court found A.I. responsible for the accident and fined him. 6.  On 4 June 1997 the applicant brought a civil action against A.I. and his insurer. She sought 500,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL)[1] for pecuniary and BGL 2,000,000 for non-pecuniary damage. 7.  Between October 1997 and March 1999 the Sofia District Court held ten hearings, the first five of which were adjourned because A.I. had not been properly summoned. The court gave judgment on 19 April 1999, awarding the applicant BGL 75,000 compensation for pecuniary and BGL 266,000 for non‑pecuniary damage. It found that there was no valid insurance contract between the insurance company and A.I. and for this reason held that the compensation was due solely by the latter. 8.  On 29 April 1999 the applicant appealed, arguing that she had suffered more serious injuries and that the compensation awarded was inadequate. A.I. also appealed. As the Sofia District Court, through which the appeals had been filed, did not process them until October 2000, the applicant made a complaint about delays. As a result, on 10 November 2000 the chairman of the Sofia City Court instructed the district judge in charge of the case to send it without delay to the Sofia City Court for examination. 9.  After holding a hearing on 7 June 2001, in a judgment of 11 July 2001 the Sofia City Court partly reversed the lower court’s judgment and found that A.I.’s insurance company was liable. The court also increased the award in respect of non‑pecuniary damage to 350 Bulgarian levs (BGN). However, the applicant’s contention that her skull had been fractured in the car accident and that this had resulted in permanent injuries was considered unsubstantiated, as no evidence in support of that had been submitted. 10.  On 10 August 2001 the applicant appealed on points of law. In November 2002, while the proceedings were pending, the 1952 Code of Civil Procedure was amended and provided that henceforth the Supreme Court of Cassation had jurisdiction to hear only cases in which the amount in issue was higher than BGN 5,000. The amendment entered into force with immediate effect and was applicable to pending cases. Accordingly, in a decision of 25 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Cassation terminated the proceedings on the ground that the amount of the compensation claimed was below the minimum for which that court had jurisdiction to hear cases. The applicant was informed of the decision in a letter of 9 December 2002. She did not appeal against it.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Geneva. 5.  On 14 July 1939, before the applicant’s birth, the State-appointed guardian brought an action against A.H., the applicant’s putative biological father, seeking a declaration of paternity and payment of a contribution towards his maintenance. A.H. admitted that he had had sexual relations with the applicant’s mother but denied paternity. 6.  On 26 July 1939, after the applicant’s birth, his mother declared on registering the birth that the father was A.H., with whom she had had sexual relations during the period of conception. 7.  On 30 January 1948 the Geneva Court of First Instance dismissed the action for a declaration of paternity. In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final. 8.  In 1958 the applicant, who had been placed with a foster family, met his mother, who informed him that his father was A.H. According to the applicant, he had regular contact with his father and received presents from him and a monthly payment of 10 Swiss francs ((CHF) – 6.40 euros (EUR)) until he reached the age of majority. A.H. and his family denied those allegations. Only A.H.’s legitimate son admitted that he had received a telephone call from the applicant after A.H.’s death. 9.  Furthermore, A.H. always refused to undergo tests to establish his paternity. In 1976, shortly after his death, a blood-type analysis carried out at the applicant’s request did not rule out his being the latter’s father. 10.  In 1997 the applicant contacted the Geneva University Institute of Forensic Medicine to have a private paternity test carried out, but his request was refused. 11.  On 3 December 1997 the applicant successfully applied to renew the lease for A.H.’s tomb until 2016 for the sum of CHF 2,600 (EUR 1,657). 12.  On 6 May 1999 the applicant applied to the Canton of Geneva Court of First Instance for revision of the judgment of 30 January 1948. In the course of the proceedings he also requested a DNA test on the mortal remains of A.H. 13.  On 25 June 1999 the Court of First Instance refused the request for a DNA test. 14.  On 2 September 1999 the Canton of Geneva Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s application on the ground that it was impossible to obtain a declaration of paternity without also amending the register of births, deaths and marriages. 15.  The Court of Justice argued that the applicant was not entitled to such an amendment of the register as a result of the 1976 revision of the Civil Code abolishing the exceptio plurium constupratorum, a defence which the putative biological father could use in a paternity suit. However, in his application to the Court of First Instance the applicant had sought revision of the 1948 judgment, in which the exceptio plurium had been relied on to the benefit of A.H. 16.  The Court of Justice noted that before 1978 (when the revised Civil Code had come into force), an illegitimate child who was under ten years of age on 1 January 1978 had had the option of converting a maintenance claim into a civil action (paternity suit) where the exceptio plurium had been raised. However, this was no longer permitted under the revised Civil Code. 17.  The Court of Justice accordingly held that, even supposing that the applicant had been awarded maintenance in 1948, he was no longer entitled to have the register of births, deaths and marriages amended, firstly because the law had changed, and secondly because he had been born more than ten years before the end of the transition period between the old and new laws. 18.  His request for evidence to be taken by means of a DNA test was therefore refused. 19.  On 22 December 1999 the Federal Court adopted a judgment, served on 18 May 2000, in which it rejected the applicant’s application on the following grounds:\n“The right to know one’s parentage cannot be absolute in scope but must be weighed against the interests relating to protection of the personal freedom of others – in the instant case, the right of the deceased, deriving from human dignity, to protect his remains from interferences contrary to morality and custom, and the right of the close relatives to respect for the deceased and the inviolability of his corpse. ...\nThe right to know one’s parents is generally linked to the right to be raised by them. The applicant, who is 60 years old, has been able to develop his personality and pursue a large portion of his existence without suffering any medically attested damage to his physical or mental health as a result of his uncertainty as to his parentage, despite the vicissitudes of his childhood and adolescence. On the other hand, while the reasons of family devotion opposing the exhumation of the mortal remains of the late [A.H.] are understandable, the respondents have not advanced any religious or philosophical grounds in support of their position; in particular, they have not argued that they would have renewed the lease on their relative’s tomb had the applicant not done so.\nHowever, in weighing up the conflicting interests, the refusal of the application for an expert examination may be upheld since, in the absence of any consequences of a civil-law nature, the applicant has not established that he has suffered sufficiently serious damage to his psychological well-being, as protected by the right to personal freedom, to justify the evidentiary measure requested. The measure appears excessive in view of the principle of proportionality, having regard to the applicant’s particular circumstances, from which it cannot be concluded that his personality or mental stability might be seriously threatened by the uncertainty that may still persist as regards his parentage, in spite of all the information in his possession suggesting that [A.H.] very probably is his father. The Court of Justice was therefore entitled to restrict the applicant’s personal freedom by taking into consideration that of the respondents, in view of the lack of public interest in having this parental tie established and the disproportionate nature of the steps required to establish it.” 20.  Lastly, the Federal Court observed that there were no consequences of a civil-law nature that could justify implementing the measure sought.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant association, the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya (“the Parish”) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate “Church of 1,000 years of Baptisms in the Kyivan Rus” in the Darnytsky District of Kyiv, is a religious group. On 6 October 2000 it had 29 members, a figure which had increased to 30 by 2005 according to information provided by its representative on 9 February 2005. All the members sit on the Parishioners' Assembly. The head of the applicant association is Mr Volodymyr Makarchykov. 6.  On 5 April 1989 a group of 25 people, including the head of the Parish, decided to form a religious association under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church. On the same date they decided to build a church and name it the “Svyato-Mykhaylivska Church of 1,000 years of Baptisms in the Kyivan Rus'”. The group lodged a request to register the association with the Religious Affairs Council at the Cabinet of Ministers (Рада з питань релігій при Кабінеті Міністрів) and the State Executive Committee. 7.  On 22 February 1990 the Religious Affairs Council registered the group as a religious association of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Darnytsky District of Kyiv (the “religious association”). 8.  On 26 February 1990 the Kyiv City Council informed Mr Makarchykov that the religious association had been granted permission to build a church for the use of its members. 9.  On 4 March 1990 the religious association approved its statute and elected its governing bodies (the Parishioners' Assembly, Parishioners' Council and the Supervisory Board). It decided to admit twelve new members to the Parishioners' Assembly and to elect six of its members to the Parishioners' Council and the Supervisory Board. Mr Makarchykov was elected as a member of the Parishioners' Council and became its chairman. 10.  On 29 March 1990 the Religious Affairs Council registered changes to the governing bodies of the religious association. Mr Makarchykov was registered as its chairman, F.L.E. as deputy chairman and O.L.V. as a treasurer of the religious association. The Council also registered the changes to the composition of the Supervisory Board. 11.  From the date of its creation in April 1989 to December 1999 the Parishioners' Assembly membership varied from about 20 to 27 members. In the course of this period the Parishioners' Assembly was actively involved in making important decisions as to the management and administration of the religious association (appointment of Chairman, treasurer, supervisory board, approval of appointment of a priest, approval of the statutes of affiliates, missions and brotherhoods of the church, important financial and logistical matters and issues related to construction of a new church, etc.). Throughout this period My Makarchykov acted as a Chairman of the religious association and frequently as a secretary during the meetings of the Parishioners' Assembly. 12.  On 22 March 1992 the Parishioners' Assembly passed resolutions for the religious association to change denomination, as it was dissatisfied with the leadership of Archbishop Filaret, the head of the newly registered Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, and for it to become independent in its organisational, religious and commercial activities. It was also decided that it should act under the religious guidance of the Archbishop of the Finnish Orthodox Church in canonical issues. 13.  On 19 November 1992 the Parishioners' Assembly adopted a new statute seeking its registration as a legal entity. The Assembly requested Archbishop Volodymyr of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) to approve the statute. The name of the association was changed to “Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Eparchy Church of 1,000 years of Baptisms in the Kyivan Rus'” (the “Parish”; Свято-Михайлівська парафія Української православної церкви Київської єпархії «Храму на честь 1000-ліття хрещення Київської Русі»). 14.  On 8 February 1993 the representative of the President of Ukraine in Kyiv made a formal decision to register the statute of the Parish (статут релігійної організації). From that date onwards the Parish, as a registered legal entity, belonged to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). The new statute stated:\n“(...) 1.1.  Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya (a religious group) is a religious association of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate “Church of 1,000-years of Baptisms in the Kyivan Rus” (hereinafter the 'Parish') and is created for the purposes of mutual affiliation and the spreading of Orthodox religion and faith. It is composed of secular priests, ministers and laymen and is a part of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Eparchy (Київської єпархії Української Православної Церкви).\n(...) 2.1.  The highest governing body of the Parish is the Parishioners' Assembly, which is eligible in presence of not less than 2/3 of members of the Parishioners' Assembly. Resolutions of the Parishioners' Assembly shall be adopted by a simple majority. 2.2.  In its religious activities, the Parish shall be guided by the priest – prior, who shall be elected by the Parishioners' Assembly. In its administrative-financial activities, it shall be subordinate to the Parishioners' Assembly.\n(...) 2.12.  The Parishioners' Assembly shall accept new members from clergymen and laymen at their request, provided they are at least 18 years of age, attend religious services and confession, follow the canonical guidance of the prior and have not been excommunicated by the church or are being judged by the religious court.\n(...) 2.5.  All official Parish documents shall be signed by the prior and the chair of the Parishioners' Council; banking and other financial documents shall be signed by the chair of the Parishioners' Council and the treasurer.\n(...) 6.1.  Decisions as to changes and amendments to the statute shall be proposed by the Parishioners' Council and adopted by the Parishioners' Assembly... 6.2.  Changes and amendments to the statute shall be made in the same manner and within the same time-limits as those applicable to the registration of the statute.” 15.  On 9 April 1994 the Parishioners' Assembly, in accordance with a proposal by the new prior, refused to introduce changes and amendments to the statute until the construction of the new church building for the use of religious association was finalised. The proposed statute had to conform to the standard statutes of religious associations belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). 16.  In 1994 and 1999 Mr Makarchykov signed a number of documents relating to the construction of the new church in his capacity as chairman of the Parishioners' Council. These documents, which included contracts and decisions of the architectural and State bodies, were accepted by him as the head of the Parishioners' Assembly and countersigned in a number of instances by various State officials. 17.  On 6 October 1999 the Parishioners' Assembly examined complaints about the management of the church that had been sent to Archbishop Volodymyr by new lay members. The Assembly also decided not to make the changes and amendments to the statute of the Parish necessary for its conformity with the standard statute used by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)”. 18.  On 14 October 1999, the Parishioners' Assembly examined the construction works at the site of the new church and decided not to make any changes to the statute until the works had been completed. It also heard complaints from Assembly members about Mr Makarchykov's alleged abuse of funds that had been raised for the construction of the church and against a prior of the Parish, who allegedly had no authority to act. 19.  On 4 November 1999 a commission set up by the Moscow Patriarchate condemned the economic activities of the Parish, as being badly managed and removed the books of account. 20.  On 10 November 1999 the Parishioners' Assembly resolved not to retain Father Tesliuk as prior and requested Archbishop Volodymyr of the Moscow Patriarchate to appoint a different prior. They also condemned the activities of the former prior, Father Nikolay, who had allegedly misused charitable aid from Italy and acted fraudulently. The Parishioners' Assembly also decided to proceed with criminal complaints it had lodged with the police against Father Tesliuk and Father Nikolay. 21.  On 1 December 1999 26 members of the Parishioners' Assembly allowed requests from two members of the Assembly not to participate in its activities owing to pressure from the Moscow Patriarchate on the Parish and the attempts of Father Nikolay to split the Parish. Six members of the Assembly were elected as honorary members, with a right of “advisory vote”. One new member was admitted to the Assembly. The Assembly condemned the report of 4 November 1999 and the decision to remove the Parish's accounting papers. Mr Makarchykov also informed the Assembly that Father Nikolay had unlawfully withheld charitable aid given to the Parish in the amount of 2,880,000 United States dollars (USD). The Assembly decided not to retain Father Nikolay and Father Tesliuk as their priors and requested their transfer away from the Parish. The Assembly was also informed by one of its members that Archbishop Volodymyr refused to discuss with him the internal conflict in the Parish. 22.  According to the applicant association, on 24 December 1999 the Parishioners' Assembly consisted of 27 individuals: Mr B.S., Ms B.I., Mr B.M., Mr G.S., Mr G.V., Mr D.S., Mr Ye.S., Ms Z.N., Mr K.A., Ms K.L., Mr K.V., Ms L.V., Mr V.I. Makarchykov (the Chairman of the Parishioners' Assembly), Ms M.S., Mr M.A., Ms N.M., Ms R.V., Mr R.V., Mr S.S., Mr T.L., Mr Ts.L., Ms Ch.V., Ms Ch.I., Mr Sh.Ye., Mr Sh.M., Mr Sch.D. and Ms Ya.V. 23.  On 24 December 1999 the Parishioners' Assembly, with 21 of its 27 members present, decided to withdraw from the jurisdiction and canonical guidance of the Moscow Patriarchate and to accept that of the Kyiv Patriarchate. The following 6 members of the Assembly were not present during the meeting and did not vote for a change of jurisdiction: Mr G.S., Mr G.V., Mr D.S., Mr K.V., Mr M.A. and Mr Sh.M. The Assembly gave authority to two members of the Assembly, Mr Makarchykov and Mr Sh.Ye., to lodge a request with the Head of the Kyiv City State Administration for the registration of the changes and amendments to the Parish's statute. The Assembly requested Archbishop Filaret of the Kyiv Patriarchate to approve the changes and amendments. 24.  On 25 December 1999 and 10 January 2000 Archbishop Filaret declared the Parish a part of the Kyiv Patriarchate. He also appointed Mr Pavlo Osnovyanenko as a prior and spiritual counsellor of the Parish. 25.  On 27 December 1999 Mr Makarchykov and Mr Ye.Sh. lodged an application with the Kyiv City State Administration to register the amendments to its statute as a result of the change of denomination. 26.  On 28 December 1999 Mr Makarchykov signed a contract on behalf of the Parish with a private contractor “Khades” to ensure the security of the church premises and the partly-constructed new church. 27.  The applicant association alleges that on 1 January 2000 the church premises were taken over by approximately 150-200 clerics and lay people supporting the Moscow Patriarchate, who had arrived at the church in the evening. All the members of the Parishioners' Assembly signed a statement condemning this intrusion into their internal affairs by the representatives of another denomination. The construction work on the new church was also disrupted. According to the private firm responsible for security at the church officials of the Darnytsky District Department of the Interior had warned them not to intervene in the conflict. 28.  On 2 January 2000 Archbishop Volodymyr of the Moscow Patriarchate authorised Archpriests Filaret (Lukyanchuk), V. Rusynka, M. Tereschuk and D. Grygorak and a lawyer of the Kyiv Metropolis, V.F. Volynets, to hold a meeting of the Parishioners' Assembly in the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Church. 29.  On the same day, 309 supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate, who the applicant association alleged were from different churches in the city (although, according to the Government, 295 were active members of the Parish), held a meeting at which they passed a vote of no confidence in Mr Makarchykov as chairman of the Parishioners' Assembly and elected new governing bodies for the church. In particular, they elected a new Parishioners' Assembly composed of 19 members (the “New Assembly”), a treasurer and a supervisory board.\nThe Assembly also adopted the model statute for churches belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate). It approved a proposal from Archpriest Filaret (Lukyanchuk) of the Moscow Patriarchate to elect Father Nikolay (Mykola) as the Chairman of the Parishioners' Assembly. The minutes of the meeting of the Assembly were approved by the secretary of the Moscow Patriarchate, Archpriest V. Kosovsky, on 3 January 2000. 30.  On 2 January 2000 the members of the original Parishioners' Assembly requested the Minister of the Interior, the Head of the Kyiv City State Administration, the General Prosecutor and other law-enforcement authorities to protect their church and property. 31.  On 3 January 2000 the Deputy President of the Darnytsky District Court of Kyiv informed Mr Makarchykov that he should address his complaints concerning the confiscation of church property to the courts in accordance with Articles 137 and 138 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Deputy President also advised that any criminal complaints concerning alleged offences had to be lodged with the police or prosecutor with territorial jurisdiction. 32.  On 4 January 2000 Archbishop Filaret of the Kyiv Patriarchate publicly protested against the “seizure of the church” by representatives of the Moscow Patriarchate. In particular, he stated in letters to the Chairman of the Kyiv City State Administration, the Minister of the Interior, the General Prosecutor, the Head of the Kyiv Department of the Interior, the Human-Rights Ombudsman and the Chairman of the Parliament that the Parishioners' Assembly that had resolved to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the Moscow Patriarchate was the legitimate governing body of the Parish. 33.  On 8 January 2000, 21 members of the original Parishioners' Assembly composed of 27 members held a meeting to discuss the events of 1-3 January 2000. They elected a Parishioners' Council with the following composition: Mr Makarchykov, Chairman; Mr Burtovy, Treasurer; and Mr Krasnook, Assistant to the Chairman. Mr Pavlo Osnovyanko was approved as a prior of the Parish, upon a proposal from the Kyiv Patriarchate. The Assembly elected the Supervisory Board and asked Archbishop Filaret to approve their decisions. 34.  On the same date Archbishop Volodymyr of the Moscow Patriarchate informed the Kyiv City State Administration that the documents that had been submitted for registration of the change of denomination were forged as the majority of the Parish members and its prior opposed the change of denomination to the Kyiv Patriarchate. 35.  On 10 January 2000 Archbishop Filaret of the Kyiv Patriarchate issued a decree approving the composition of the original Parish governing bodies. He also confirmed that Mr Pavlo Osnovyanenko could serve as a prior of the Parish. 36.  On 10 and 14 January 2000 two private individuals, Ms A.M.I. and Mr Z., sought membership of the original Parishioners' Assembly following their decision of 24 December 1999 on the change of denomination. 37.  On 11 January 2000 the State Tax Inspectorate found a number of infringements of economic regulations by the former managers of the Parish. 38.  On 12 January 2000 a group of 9 members of the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) lodged complaints with the President of Ukraine seeking his support in resolving the dispute between the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates over the church premises and the decision of its members to change denomination. 39.  On 16 January 2000 the Darnytsky District Police Department in Kyiv prohibited access to the church or other Parish property until a court had ruled on the change of denomination. Thereafter, the church premises and its property were guarded by the police. 40.  On 15 January 2000 the Registry of the Moscow Patriarchate informed the State Religions' Department that the denomination had been changed as a result of Mr Makarchykov's involvement in financial fraud. It also stated that the Parishioners' Assembly was illegitimate as it had been convened in violation of Article 2.1 of the statute. Moreover, membership of the Parish was not based on observance of the prior's canonical guidance, contrary to Article 2.12 of the statute, as Mr Makarchykov had influenced decisions not to accept new members who were not loyal to him. The Registry added that the change of denomination was contrary to the current statute of the Parish and the Moscow Patriarchate's internal regulations, including the recommended model statutes (типовий статут парафії Української православної церкви) for religious associations within the Moscow Patriarchate. 41.  Between 17 and 31 January 2000 the Parish members and the Archbishop of the Kyiv Patriarchate lodged a series of formal complaints with a member of parliament (V.P. Nechyporuk), the Committee on Organised Crime, the Minister of the Interior and the Prosecutor of Kyiv asking them to take action to prevent the police, who, they said, supported the Moscow Patriarchate, unlawfully interfering in Parish affairs. 42.  On 21 January 2000 the Kyiv City State Administration refused to register the amendments, according to the request of 24 December 1999 (see paragraph 23 above), on the grounds that they contravened Article 2.5 of the Parish statute, in that the documents submitted for registration had not been signed by the prior and the Chairman of the Parishioners' Assembly. 43.  On 29 January 2000 the Parishioners' Assembly, composed of 22 members, condemned the actions of the Moscow Patriarchate in relation to their Parish and its property. They decided to file complaints with the law-enforcement authorities to ensure protection from its unlawful interference with their activities. 44.  On 31 January 2000 the President of the original Parishioners' Assembly Mr Makarchykov complained to the Darnytsky District Prosecutor about the interference in the activities of the Parish. In particular, he alleged that the Moscow Patriarchate and the police had failed to comply with the resolution of 16 January 2000 prohibiting access to all the premises of the Parish until the case had been resolved by a court. 45.  On 31 January 2000 the prior of the Parish and the Chairman of the original Parishioners' Assembly lodged a second request for the registration of changes and amendments to the statute of the Parish with the Kyiv City State Administration. The Assembly again informed the Kyiv City State Administration that on 8 January 2000 it had decided that Mr Pavlo Osnovyanenko would be its prior and Mr Makarchykov its chairman and that both had power under the statute to sign documents on behalf of the Parish. No response was received to this request. 46.  On 3 February 2000 the Kyiv City Council established a committee composed of four of its members (deputies of the Council K.Y.G., D.D.G., O.P.K. and V.O.B.) and the Head of the Department of Religious Affairs of the Kyiv City Council to examine the conflict over the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parish. 47.  On 8 February 2000 the Head of the Darnytsky District Police Department in Kyiv warned Mr Makarchykov that he would be prosecuted if he continued to incite laymen to occupy the church and to confront the supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate. 48.  On 9 February 2000 Mr Makarchykov lodged fresh complaints with the Darnytsky District Police Department asking them to institute criminal proceedings against unlawful occupiers of the church premises and those responsible for denying him access to the premises or to his personal belongings in the church. 49.  On 14 February 2000 the Kyiv Patriarchate certified that the Parish had been within the Patriarchate since 25 December 1999. 50.  On 17 February 2000 the applicant association instituted proceedings in the Kyiv City Court claiming that the Kyiv City State Administration's refusal of 21 January 2000 to register the amendments to the statute of the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya was unlawful. 51.  On 21 April 2000 the Kyiv City Court, composed of three judges, rejected the applicant association's claims, finding that the decision of 21 January 2000 was lawful (see paragraph 42 above). In particular it found that the Parishioners' Assembly composed of 27 members did not represent the entire religious community, that the documents submitted for registration had not been signed by the authorised persons (the prior and the chairman of the Parishioners' Assembly) and that the members of the Parishioners' Assembly of 24 December 1999 no longer belonged to the Moscow Patriarchate, as this minority group had chosen a different denomination. The court concluded that the applicant association was not able to prove that the decision of the Kyiv City State Administration was unlawful.\nThe Kyiv City Court held in particular:\n“...the refusal of the Kyiv City State Administration to register the amendments to the statute was based on the fact that they had been adopted contrary to the statute and would infringe believers' rights.\nThe judicial division holds that the decision [of the Kyiv City State Administration] corresponds to the actual circumstances of the case, and reflects the rights of both religious communities, and the statute of the Parish ... and the Law 'on consciousness and religious organisations'.\n... In accordance with Articles 6.1.and 6.2 of the statute ... decisions with regard to changes and amendments to the statute must be proposed by the Parishioners' Council and adopted by the Parishioners' Assembly ...\n... As can be seen from the minutes of the meeting of the Parishioners' Assembly of 24 December 1999 the religious community of the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parish adopted changes and amendments to the statute of the religious community belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church [Moscow Patriarchate], but was already affiliated to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate.\n... such a method of making changes and amendments to the statute contravenes the Law and Articles 6.1 and 6.2 of the statute and undoubtedly infringes the rights of the religious community belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church [Moscow Patriarchate] which adopted this statute. Changes to the statute could only be adopted by the Parishioners' Assembly of this community.\nIt can be seen that the complaint was lodged by Mr Makarchykov on behalf of the religious group belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church [Moscow Patriarchate]. However this church did not authorise him to act on their behalf, in fact he represents the interests of the religious community belonging to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, which was established on 24 December 1999 and has a right to exist in accordance with the Law “on freedom of consciousness and religious organisations” ...\nTaking into account all of the above, the judicial division considers that the representative of the religious community of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, Mr V.I. Makarchykov, failed to prove in court that the refusal of the Kyiv City Administration of 21 January 2000 ... was unlawful. Therefore the complaint must be rejected.” 52.  On 5 July 2000 a panel of the Supreme Court composed of three judges upheld the judgment of 21 April 2000. It rejected the applicant association's cassation appeal because the provisions of the Parish statute contravened the relevant legislation. It also held that the provisions of the statute concerning fixed membership were contrary to the legislation because they did not allow the majority of the religious group to manifest their religion by participating in the administration of church affairs.\nIn particular the Supreme Court held:\n“... the statute (articles of association) of the religious group has to correspond to the legislation in force.\nAs long as the legislation in force does not provide for a mandatory or other form of fixed membership of the believers with the same religious beliefs, in a legal sense “parishioners' assembly” and the “general assembly of the religious group” are identical notions. The judicial division therefore considers that Articles 2.12, 2.13 of the statute ... do not fully correspond to the legislation. This led to the creation of factual obstacles for a majority of the religious community in deciding statutory issues and a violation of their right to manifest their religion...\nThe judicial division also finds unsubstantiated the submission that there were no defects in the documents concerning the changes and amendments to the statute of the parish filed on behalf of the religious community.” 53.  On 5 March 2001 fifteen members of the original Parishioners' Assembly lodged a petition with the General Prosecutor's Office requesting it to initiate supervisory-review proceedings in the Supreme Court. No supervisory-review proceedings were initiated, however. 54.  On 22 February 2000 the Head of the Darnytsky District Police Department in Kyiv informed Mr Makarchykov, in response to his complaints of 9 February 2000, that it had found no evidence of the offences alleged in his complaints. He was also informed that he was free to collect his personal belongings from the church to which he had allegedly been denied access. 55.  On 23 February 2000 the prior of the Parish and Chairman of the Assembly lodged new complaints with the Kyiv City Prosecutor and the State Religious Affairs Department requesting them to institute criminal proceedings against those involved in the unlawful seizure of the Parish's premises and property. They also complained of the refusal of the Kyiv City State Administration to register the changes to the statute of the Parish on the basis of the joint decision of its members to change denomination. 56.  On 25 February 2000 the Kyiv City State Administration's Department of Religious Affairs asked Mr Makarchykov to provide it with the minutes of the Parishioners' Assembly that had elected Mr Pavlo Osnovyanenko as its prior, confirmation that the Parish's prior belonged to the Moscow Patriarchate and confirmation that the prior's position had been vacant from December 1999 to 8 January 2000. 57.  On 6 March 2000 Mr T., Archbishop of the Kyiv Patriarchate, wrote to the head of the district electricity network asking it to cut off the electricity supply to the church as it had been unlawfully occupied by the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kyiv Patriarchate was unable to gain access. 58.  On 23 March 2000 the Kyiv Prosecutor's Office informed Mr Makarchykov and Mr Osnovyanenko that it had not found any wrongdoing on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate in relation to the church prosecutor's inquiries had revealed no unlawfulness whatsoever as alleged by the applicant. 59.  On 10 April 2000 a Committee of the Kyiv City Council prepared a draft opinion on the situation surrounding the Parish. The opinion was not adopted for examination by the Kyiv City Council as it was signed by only three of the five members of the Committee. 60.  On 5 June 2000 the Parishioners' Assembly composed of 30 members, 21 of whom were present, decided that Mr S.G. could not remain a member as he had joined a new religious group. The Parishioners' Assembly discussed the judgment in which the Kyiv City Court had found that the Parishioners' Assembly contained 309 members. However, it reiterated its view that as from 24 December 1999 it had been composed of only 27 members. Two of the members of the Assembly (K.V. and T.L.) reported that their witness statements had been taken incorrectly. The Assembly also re-elected the Parish's governing bodies (Mr Makarchykov was re-elected as Chairman). 61.  On 13 June 2000 Mr Makarchykov lodged a complaint with the Darnytsky District Prosecutor alleging that he had been attacked and injured on 2 April 2000 by an unknown person who had stolen a briefcase containing official documents belonging to the Parish. He also stated that he had already complained about attacks on him to the police, but that they had failed to act (the police issued two decisions on 8 April and 13 June 2000 refusing to initiate criminal proceedings following allegations by the applicant association). 62.  On 21 June 2000 the Parishioners' Assembly resolved that a car owned by the Parish should be used for the repayment of the Parish's debts. 63.  On 18 August 2000 Mr Makarchykov was arrested by police officers from the Darnytsky District Department of the Interior and “invited for a conversation” at the Department. He was informed that an inquiry was pending in relation to him. In the course of the “conversation” it is alleged that Mr Makarchykov started to curse and swear at the police officers. He was warned that he could be reprimanded, but did not stop. On 19 August 2000 the judge of the Darnytsky District Court of Kyiv reprimanded Mr Makarchykov for his behaviour; however, he did not impose any administrative or criminal sanctions on him. 64.  On 30 August 2000 the Darnytsky District Department of the Interior discontinued criminal proceedings against the applicant association that had been instituted on the basis of a complaint lodged by Mr B. Shtym the newly appointed prior of the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parish (Moscow Patriarchate), as it had found no evidence of an offence on Mr Makarchykov's part. 65.  On 8 September 2000 the Darnytsky District Prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings into allegations of abuse of power by the police. 66.  On 29 September 2000 Mr B. Shtym requested the Kyiv City State Administration to register further amendments to the statute of the Parish. A request was signed by 10 members of the new Assembly, only one of whom (G.S.) was a member of the original Parishioners' Assembly. 67.  On 6 October 2000 the Parishioners' Assembly, composed of 29 members, of whom 22 were present, condemned the ruling of the Supreme Court of 21 April 2000 and decided that the Parish would apply to the European Court of Human Rights for the protection of their rights. The Assembly gave authority to Mr Makarchykov to represent it in the proceedings before the European Court. It also discussed pressure that had been imposed on Ts.O., K.A., Mr Makarchykov and S.S. by the domestic law-enforcement authorities and private individuals. 68.  On 5 December 2000 the Deputy Minister of the Interior and the Head of the City Department of the Interior reviewed Mr Makarchykov's complaints and found them unsubstantiated. They further stated that criminal proceedings against Mr Makarchykov on allegations of theft of property from the church had been discontinued and that the investigator in the case had incurred administrative liability. Similar, complaints were rejected by the Kyiv Prosecutor's Office on 15 December 2000. 69.  On 25 December 2000 the Kyiv City State Administration decided to register the changes to the statute of the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parish pursuant to Mr Shtym's request of 29 September 2000. 70.  On 20 May 2001 22 members of the Parishioners' Assembly held a meeting at which they discussed various pressures that had been exerted on them by the law-enforcement authorities. They decided to seek protection and assistance from the Administration of the President of Ukraine and the General Prosecutor's Office to resolve the dispute surrounding the Parish. They also accepted a request from Ye.S., who had been a member of the Parishioners' Assembly since 25 July 1991, to resign her membership owing to pressure that had been put on her brother, a priest of the Moscow Patriarchate. 71.  On 21 February 2003 the Dniprovsky (the successor to the Darnytsky) Prosecutor's Office reviewed complaints lodged by Mr Makarchykov's sister of attacks on her and her son and her allegedly unlawful dismissal from the Parish. It advised her to take her complaint of unlawful dismissal to the domestic courts. 72.  In 2003-2004 Mr Makarchykov's sister requested asylum in Norway on the grounds of alleged persecution in Ukraine. She stayed in Norway while her request for political asylum was being reviewed. 73.  The Government informed the Court that on 7 August 2003 and 30 September 2004 the prior of the Parish, B. Shtym, informed them that Mr Makarchykov had never been given authority to apply to the European Court on behalf of the Parish, as he had ceased acting as the Chairman of the Parishioners' Assembly on 2 January 2000. Mr Shtym also informed the Government that seven of the original members (G.S., G.V., D.S. Ye.O., R.V., Ya.V and M.A.) had decided to remain members. Three of these (Ye.O, R.V. and Ya.V.) had withdrawn their signatures from the minutes no. 5 of 24 December 1999, by which the Parishioners' Assembly had resolved to change its denomination to the Kyiv Patriarchate. 74.  On 25 February 2004 the Religious Affairs Department of the Kyiv City State Administration informed the applicant association's representative that their religious group had separated from the remainder of the Parish and become a religious group within the Kyiv Patriarchate. It noted that they had not registered as a group with the Kyiv City State Administration. 75.  On 8 February 2005 the Kyiv Patriarchate informed the Court that the Parish, consisting of 30 members, was unable to satisfy their religious needs, as they were unable to use their property or premises. It stated that this was due to the refusal of the Kyiv City Administration to register the changes and amendments to the statute of the Parish that had been made in January 2000. 76.  In a letter of March 2005, K.A., Sh.Ye., N.M., Ch.L., R.V., T.L., Z.N., Z.V., A.M., Ch.A., Ch.V., L.V., Ryb.V., K.V., S.S. and B.M., all confirmed the complaints made by Mr Makarchykov to the European Court and stated that they were unable to use the church premises or to practise their religion in the church, which they had previously used for a long period as a religious association. 77.  On 31 January 2002 Mr Makarchykov and B.M. (a member of the applicant association) instituted proceedings against the Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parish (Moscow Patriarchate) seeking the return of their personal property that had allegedly been confiscated by the new Assembly in January 2000. They also sought compensation for damage. 78.  On 25 February 2004 the Dniprovsky District Court of Kyiv rejected Mr Makarchykov's and B.M's claims as unsubstantiated. 79.  It appears from the documents in the case-file that this judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 18 August 2004 (the parties have not provided a copy of the ruling). It also appears from the case-file that this ruling was not appealed against. 80.  In November 2002 K.S. instituted proceedings against the Darnytsky District Department of the Interior for the return of the car that had been transferred into his ownership for the repayment of Parish's debts before being unlawfully seized by the police. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown. 81.  The applicant association also provided the Court with a number of documents confirming that Mr Makarchykov had acted on behalf of the Parishioners' Assembly from 1991 to 1999 representing its interests in dealings with third parties.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": true, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Moscow. 7.  From 14 March to 6 October 2005 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-77/1 in Moscow. He was accommodated in Cell 243 which measured approximately 11 square metres. The cell had one window and the toilet was located inside the cell, separated with a brick partition approximately 1.2 metre in height. It disposed of four sleeping places. Detainees were allowed one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 8.  The parties disagreed on the number of inmates in Cell 243. 9.  According to the applicant, Cell 243 was constantly overcrowded. It was designed for two inmates but actually housed four persons. He referred to the Court’s findings in respect of the same cell in the case of Starokadomskiy v. Russia (no. 42239/02, §§ 23-24 and 42, 31 July 2008). 10.  The Government maintained that the number of detainees in Cell 243 had not exceeded two persons. In support of their position, they enclosed with their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, a certificate issued by the prison governor on 5 April 2011 and selected pages from the prison population register covering the period between 16 March and 6 October 2005. 11.  On 16 January 2012, further to the Court’s request for more detailed factual information on the number of detainees in Cell 243, the Government submitted the following material:\n– a certificate issued by the prison governor on 27 December 2011, according to which Cell 243 accommodated two persons during the entire period of the applicant’s detention;\n– an undated certificate from the deputy head of the relevant department, according to which there were two detainees in Cell 243;\n– every second page from the prison population register covering the period between 14 March and 30 September 2005. 12.  On 7 March 2012, in response to the Court’s request for clarifications about the origin of visible corrections of the number of detainees in Cell 243 in the prison population register, the Government submitted that, upon making the enquiries, it had been established that the procedure for filling out the prison population register had been breached which had resulted in “careless filling [out]”, corrections and erasures. The head of the department who was responsible for overseeing the compliance with the procedure could not be disciplined because he had retired in 2006. The Government pointed out that the corrections had not been made “with a purpose to misrepresent reliable information but because of carelessness and inattention of the officers of the pre-trial detention centre”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ohrid. 6.  The applicant is suffering from multiple sclerosis. 7.  On 1 April 1994 the Ministry of Health (“the Ministry”) issued a certificate allowing a bank, in which the applicant’s father had a foreign currency savings account, to transfer 20,000 United States dollars into the account of a hospital in the United States, in order to cover medical expenses related to treatment which the applicant was expected to undergo. It was given on the basis of a medical report (конзилијарно мислење) issued by the Skopje Neurology Clinic which stated, inter alia:\n“... [the applicant] is suffering from multiple sclerosis, which requires further medical examination and treatment in a medical institution abroad, given the fact that all possibilities for her treatment in the State are exhausted ...” 8.  Between 17 May and 28 June 1994 the applicant underwent medical treatment in the hospital H.H.I. in the United States. 9.  On 12 July 1994 the Skopje Neurology Clinic issued another medical report (конзилијарно мислење, “the report of 12 July 1994”), the relevant part of which reads as follows:\n“It is impossible to treat the disease in the State due to the critical state of [the applicant’s] health and the Clinic’s calendar of events. [The applicant] should leave immediately or by the middle of the month at the latest ...” 10.  The report was signed by three doctors, who confirmed that it was impossible to treat the disease in the respondent State. As stated in the report, it was expected that the treatment abroad would prevent the progressive deterioration of the applicant’s health. 11.  On 29 November 1994 the applicant requested that the Health Insurance Fund (“the Fund”) issue ex post facto a decision referring her to be treated in hospital H.H.I. (решение за упатување на лекување во странство). This request did not contain a claim for reimbursement of the expenses for the treatment that she had undergone. 12.  On 8 December 1994 the Fund dismissed the applicant’s request after an expert commission set up within the Fund (“the Fund’s commission”) had provided an opinion that the applicant could have been treated in the respondent State. 13.  On 21 March 1995 the applicant appealed against the Fund’s decision to the Ministry, arguing that the Fund’s expert commission had not taken into account the report of 12 July 1994 (see paragraph 9 above). She also requested that the Ministry approve further check-ups and treatment in hospital H.H.I. 14.  On 30 November 1995 the Ministry, as the second-instance administrative body, dismissed the applicant’s appeal after obtaining an opinion from the Second-Instance Medical Commission for Treatment Abroad (“the Second-Instance Commission”). The Ministry found that the possibilities for treatment in the State had not been exhausted. 15.  The applicant initiated administrative-dispute proceedings before the Supreme Court. On 14 January 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Ministry’s decision. It found that it had not been clear whether the applicant was supposed to undergo a medical check-up or prolonged treatment abroad and that there was a contradiction in the medical reports as to whether the possibilities to treat the applicant’s condition domestically had been exhausted. 16.  On 9 July 1999 the Ministry again dismissed the appeal by the applicant against the Fund’s decision of 8 December 1994. 17.  In so far as can be established from the available material, on 7 July 1995 the applicant lodged a separate request with the Fund for reimbursement of the expenses for the treatment that she had undergone in hospital H.H.I. 18.  On 21 September 1995 the Fund ordered a partial reimbursement of the medical expenses in the amount of 278,311 Macedonian denars (MKD), or 20% of the expenses actually incurred. On 12 November 1995 the decision was adjusted to 10%. It appears that on 13 November 1995 the awarded amount was increased to MKD 313,100. 19.  On 11 November 1996 the Ministry examined the applicant’s appeal and increased the award by an additional MKD 50,215. 20.  The applicant challenged the latter decision with an administrative-dispute claim before the Supreme Court. 21.  On 25 March 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 11 November 1996. It found that the Fund and the Ministry had failed to assess whether the applicant could have been treated in the State, in accordance with the Rules on the Conditions and Manner of Referral of Insured Persons for Treatment Abroad (see paragraphs 38-41 below). It further found that these bodies interpreted section 15 of the Rules to signify that a person was not entitled to reimbursement of expenses if he/she had not obtained a prior decision referring him/her for treatment abroad (решение за упатување на лекување во странство). In the court’s view, such an interpretation would be contrary to the Health Protection Act. 22.  On 6 January 1999 the Ministry reached an identical decision to that of 11 November 1996. 23.  The applicant initiated administrative-dispute proceedings against the Ministry’s decision. 24.  On 22 November 2000 the Supreme Court quashed both the decision of 6 January 1999 (see paragraph 22 above) and the decision of 9 July 1999 (see paragraph 16 above). It found that the Ministry should have joined the proceedings for reimbursement of the medical expenses incurred in hospital H.H.I. with the proceedings for referral for treatment abroad. It should have decided in the first place the request for referral to treatment abroad, the outcome of which was decisive for the applicant’s claim for reimbursement of the medical expenses. It again instructed the Ministry to assess whether the applicant could have been treated in the State. 25.  On 23 February 2001 the Ministry quashed the decision of 21 September 1995 (see paragraph 18 above) and decided that the applicant’s treatment abroad could not be recognised as treatment abroad based on a decision of the Fund. Nevertheless, the applicant was to be reimbursed the expenses for treatment abroad not based on such a decision, in the amount of MKD 378,741. The Ministry came to its conclusion on the basis of an opinion of a medical commission of 14 December 2000 which found that the applicant could be treated in the respondent State. 26.  The applicant again challenged the Ministry’s decision before the Supreme Court. 27.  On 13 November 2003 the Supreme Court quashed the decision, finding that the administrative bodies had not established whether at the time of the treatment the possibilities for treatment in the respondent State had been exhausted. 28.  On 5 November 2004 the Ministry again dismissed the appeal against the decision of 21 September 1995, this time based on a conclusion of the Second-Instance Commission of 3 November 2004 that the applicant could have been treated in the respondent State in 1994. 29.  On 14 December 2006 the Supreme Court again quashed the decision of the Ministry. The court found that there had been conflicting medical evidence as to whether the applicant could have been treated in the respondent State at the relevant time. It further requested that the doctors who had drawn up the report of 12 July 1994 give evidence as to whether the possibilities for treatment of the specific condition in the State in 1994 had been exhausted. 30.  After having consulted the doctors, on 8 October 2007, the Ministry again dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 21 September 1995. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“The Minister of Health ... on the basis of all the documents in the file established that the [applicant’s] treatment in the [H.H.I. hospital] cannot be considered as treatment abroad based on a decision of the [Fund] in accordance with sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Rules for Referral for Treatment Abroad (Official Gazette nos. 3/92, 11/92, 32/92 and 48/92) and in accordance with sections 5, 7 and 8 of the subsequently adopted Rules on the Manner of Using Health Services Abroad (Official Gazette no. 111/2000) because under the provisions of both sets of Rules the medical opinion of the respective clinic is merely a proposal for referral for treatment abroad of an insured person, and the assessment and the opinion on the need for treatment abroad is provided by the [Fund’s commission], which assesses whether the possibilities for treatment in the State are exhausted and whether there are possibilities for successful treatment abroad, in which State and in which foreign medical facility.\nThe insured person obtains the right to treatment abroad only by a decision of the [Fund] on the basis of a finding of the [Fund’s commission]. It is a fact that the [applicant] went for treatment abroad without [having obtained] a decision of the [Fund] on her own assessment, given that at that moment there was not even a medical report [by the clinic] which is only a proposal of the clinic for referral to treatment abroad.\nIn the entire proceedings the first- and second-instance bodies acted in accordance with the provisions of the Rules for [Referral to Treatment Abroad] and, in line with section 15 of the Rules, they decided to reimburse expenses as if the treatment had been performed in the [respondent] State, for the reason that the [applicant] had not obtained a right to be treated abroad because the competent commission had found that that condition had been treatable in the State ...\n... That the Supreme Court in its last judgment requests that the members who provided the medical report of 1994 [give evidence] ... is irrelevant, given that the medical report is an initiative – a proposal for initiating certain proceedings – but [it does] not [confer] a right to be treated abroad.\nIf, in the court’s view, the medical report was decisive in the present case, a question arises as to what the competence of the [Fund’s commission] is and why there are provisions in the Rules ... and prescribed proceedings for obtaining the right to treatment abroad.\nHaving in mind the fact that the [Fund’s commission] for referral for treatment abroad, in the present case, had on multiple occasions found that the possibilities for treatment in the existing health institutions at the Skopje Clinic had not been exhausted ... the case is considered under section 15 [of the Rules of 1992], that is section 20 [of the Rules of 2000] ... , and it was decided that expenses for the treatment be reimbursed to the [applicant] in line with the price list for health services in the [respondent State].” 31.  The applicant challenged the Ministry’s decision seeking under the Administrative Disputes Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below) that the Supreme Court hold an oral hearing in order to take evidence from the doctors who had drawn up the 1994 report, the Chairman of the Ministry’s Second-Instance Commission and Dr R.L., the doctor who had treated her. She referred to the certificate of 1 April 1994 (see paragraph 7 above) and the medical report that it had been based on. She argued that, in view of her condition at that juncture and the short period of available time, she had not lodged a request to the Fund before leaving as she had considered that she could have done it after her return to the State. She further argued that the Ministry had failed to decide her claim for referral for treatment abroad and had only decided the claim for reimbursement of expenses. 32.  On 22 January 2009 the Administrative Court, which had meanwhile become competent to decide administrative disputes, held a private session and finally dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It did not in its decision address the applicant’s request for an oral hearing. 33.  The court referred to section 10 § 1 (14) and section 30 of the 2000 Health Insurance Act, as well as sections 20 of the Rules on the Manner of Using Health Services Abroad (see paragraphs 37, 41 and 42 below). It ruled that the administrative bodies had correctly applied the applicable law in awarding the applicant partial compensation for the medical expenses for her treatment in hospital H.H.I. in 1994. The relevant parts of the judgment stated as follows:\n“... In the present case, [the applicant] went for treatment abroad without [having obtained] a decision of [the Fund], on her own assessment, and without a medical report, which she obtained after she had returned from the U.S.A. from the Skopje Neurology Clinic on 12 July 1994, contrary to section 30 of the 2000 Health Insurance Act.\nThe court considers that the [administrative] bodies in the proceedings correctly established that the [applicant’s] treatment in the [H.H.I.] hospital in the U.S.A. cannot be considered as treatment abroad based on a decision of [the Fund] in accordance with sections 7, 9 and 10 of the Rules for referral for treatment abroad (Official Gazette nos. 3/92, 11/92, 32/92 and 48/92) and in accordance with sections 5, 7 and 8 of the Rules on the Manner of Using Health Services Abroad (Official Gazette no. 111/2000), because under the provisions of the two [sets of] Rules the medical report of the relevant clinic is only a proposal for referral for treatment abroad of an insured person, and the assessment and the opinion on the need for treatment abroad is provided by the [Fund’s commission], which assesses whether the possibilities for treatment in the State are exhausted and whether there are possibilities for successful treatment of the condition abroad and in which country or in which foreign medical institution.\nIn deciding, the court assessed [the applicant’s] arguments that in [the respondent State] there had been no possibility of a successful continuation of her treatment and that there had been a need to continue the treatment abroad, but found them groundless since, according to the expert opinion of the Neurology Clinic, all cases of multiple sclerosis have always been treated in the State wherein the therapeutic procedures for these diseases are in accordance with international medical standards. Hence, the court considers that the [administrative] bodies acted in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instructions and removed the breaches in the proceedings in terms of clarification of the contradictions which had existed before, deciding to award expenses as if the treatment had been conducted in the State, under the terms of section 15 of the Rules for Referral to Treatment Abroad, given that [the applicant] had not obtained the right to be treated abroad because the competent [Fund’s commission] had provided its opinion that the condition had been treatable in the State.” 34.  This judgment was served on the applicant on 6 March 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and is currently detained in HMP Whatton. 6.  On 25 April 2007 he received an indeterminate sentence for public protection (“IPP sentence”) following his conviction of the sexual assault of a fifteen-year old girl. The offence had been committed while the applicant was on licence in the community following his release from a sentence for indecent assault against girls under the age of sixteen and while he was undertaking the Sex Offender Treatment Programme (“SOTP”) in the community. A minimum term (“tariff”) of four years was fixed. 7.  The applicant was initially detained in HMP Armley. It was recommended in 2007 that he complete the SOTP. 8.  In June 2008 he was transferred to HMP Rye Hill. He completed an Enhanced Thinking Skills (“ETS”) course in 2008 and the core SOTP on 8 March 2009. On an unknown date, he completed an Alcohol Awareness course. 9.  In August 2009 a Structured Assessment of Risk and Need (“SARN”) report identified that further work was required to reduce the applicant’s risk of reoffending. It was recommended that he complete the extended SOTP and, possibly, a Better Lives Booster (“BLB”) programme. The extended SOTP consisted of seventy-four interactive sessions plus some individual work and generally lasted for around six months. 10.  At a Parole Board review on 7 September 2009 the Panel said that much offending work still had to be done in order to reduce the applicant’s risk and that he should therefore remain in closed conditions. 11.  In September 2009 the applicant was transferred to HMP Acklington. He claims that he had been informed that the extended SOTP was available at that prison. 12.  A memo dated 24 August 2010 from the Programmes Department of HMP Acklington confirmed that the applicant had been assessed as suitable to attend the extended SOTP and that he would have to be transferred to another establishment to complete the course as it was not offered at HMP Acklington. 13.  On 27 August 2010 the applicant completed the Thinking Skills Programme (“TSP”) at HMP Acklington. 14.  In January 2011 a pre-tariff-expiry paper Parole Board review took place. By letter dated 24 February 2011 the applicant was informed that the Parole Board had not recommended his release. His request for an oral hearing was refused. 15.  The letter explained:\n“... The [Intensive Case Management] decision provides a detailed account of the index offence and your previous offending record ... You are given credit for the offence related work you have undertaken but further work in the form of an Extended SOTP (and possible a BLB programme thereafter) is considered necessary to further address your risk factors ... It is clear that significant risk reducing work is required in closed conditions before you can progress further.” 16.  By letter dated 6 April 2011 the National Offender Management Service informed the applicant that the Secretary of State agreed with the Parole Board recommendation. She considered that a number of risk factors were outstanding, namely sexual offending, feelings of grievance, distorted thinking, alcohol misuse and outbursts of anger. She was of the view that the extended SOTP was necessary to reduce the applicant’s risk level. She also indicated that an assessment for the BLB programme was necessary following completion of the extended SOTP and recommended that the applicant continue addressing his alcohol misuse. The letter expressed the expectation that the relevant interventions, or other equivalent risk reduction work, would be completed prior to the next Parole Board review. It clarified, however, that the Secretary of State could not guarantee to place the applicant on the courses identified as there were limits on the availability of resources. 17.  The review period was set at twenty-one months and was made up the following: transfer to an establishment to undertake the extended SOTP; participation in the extended SOTP; participation in post-course reviews; consolidate and test the skills learned; continued development and practice of appropriate risk strategies; assessment for the BLB programme; continued monitoring of alcohol misuse and relapse prevention work if necessary. The review was scheduled to commence in March 2012 and conclude in November 2012, with an oral hearing in September. 18.  On 26 April 2011 the applicant’s tariff period expired. 19.  The applicant sought advice on possible judicial review proceedings in respect of the delay in providing access to the extended SOTP. A letter was sent to HMP Acklington by his solicitors. On 22 September 2011 he was transferred to HMP Whatton. 20.  On 10 October 2011 the applicant requested information from HMP Whatton as to when he would begin the extended SOTP. He was informed in reply that he would be contacted to arrange an assessment as soon as possible. 21.  Meanwhile, the applicant’s solicitors wrote to HMP Whatton seeking information on when he would be allowed to participate in the extended SOTP. By reply dated 28 October 2011, the deputy extended SOTP treatment manager explained:\n“In order that we can be responsive to the needs of Mr Dillon, it is essential that we allow him a period of settling in at HMP Whatton before an assessment for the Extended SOTP can take place.\nAssessments and placements are prioritised on a number of factors including tariff expiry, risk level and treatment readiness. However, please be assured that an assessment will take place as soon as practically possible.\nWe anticipate delivering 4 Extended Programmes in 2012 and Mr Dillon will be considered for one of these programmes, if he is found suitable. The extended programme lasts 5 months. A SARN report will then have to be completed within 26 weeks of treatment being completed. The SARN report will identify any further treatment that is necessary.” 22.  On 12 November 2011 the applicant indicated to HMP Whatton his concern that he might not be adequately prioritised for the extended SOTP, referring to the expectation that the course would be completed by his next Parole Board review. He requested confirmation that he would be prioritised for the extended SOTP. 23.  By reply dated 18 November 2011 he was informed that HMP Whatton made “every attempt to ensure prisoners are treated fairly and have access to offending behaviour programmes”. However, the letter noted that there were limited resources and that there was a large number of IPP prisoners and life sentence prisoners at HMP Whatton whose tariffs had expired. 24.  On 6 January 2012 the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Governor of HMP Whatton to notify him of the fact that judicial review proceedings were being contemplated. They sought an undertaking that the applicant would be given access to an extended SOTP scheduled to begin in April 2012. 25.  On 19 January and 6 February 2012 the applicant was reassessed for participation in the extended SOTP. In a report dated 6 February 2012 he was found not to be sufficiently motivated to undertake the course. The report noted that the second meeting had had to be terminated on account of the applicant’s use of abusive and disrespectful language and his loud and aggressive tone. It explained that while, given the applicant’s tariff expiry date, he would have been prioritised for the April 2012 extended SOTP course, it was considered that he was not ready for secondary treatment at that time. It was recommended that the applicant complete individual work with his offender supervisor to consider, inter alia, the costs and benefits of engaging in the extended SOTP and to address his outstanding treatment needs. Further assessment would take place in June/July 2012. 26.  The applicant subsequently pursued a request for a place on an extended SOTP scheduled to commence in August 2012. 27.  On 13 June 2012 the Parole Board notified the applicant of its decision on the papers not to direct his release or to recommend his transfer to open conditions. The Parole Board set out the details of the index offence and noted that the applicant had committed the offence while on a three-year extended licence following another conviction for sexual offences (see paragraph 6 above). It considered that he had breached the trust placed in him and expressed concern that this might not bode well for the applicant’s likely compliance with licence conditions. The Parole Board reiterated the applicant’s risk factors and turned to examine the evidence of any change during sentence. It explained:\n“You completed the Core SOTP in 2009 and the Thinking Skills Programme in 2010. It was then recommended that you complete the Extended SOTP. Once this has been completed you will be assessed for other programmes such as the Better Lives Booster Programme and the Healthy Sexual Functioning Programme. You are reported to have attended for a programme assessment for the ESOTP at HMP Whatton but prison records state that this was a challenging meeting and that you were not sufficiently motivated to commence the group. You do not agree with this assessment. You will be offered the opportunity to attend for suitability assessment in the future. You have also been put forward for the CALM programme due to the violent offences on your record and difficulties in managing your emotions.” 28.  The Parole Board agreed that the applicant posed a high risk of harm to children. It commended the applicant on his completion of the ETS and core SOTP. However, it concluded:\n“... [T]here is a considerable amount of accredited offending behaviour work still recommended for you to complete to reduce your risks to a level that can be safely managed in less secure conditions. In the first instance it is recommended that you complete the Extended SOTP and CALM and that following the SARN you may need to be assessed for the Better Lives Booster Programme and Health Sexual Functioning Programme. Clearly this will take some considerable time and whilst core areas of risk remain unaddressed there is no merit in an oral hearing being held ...” 29.  The applicant was reassessed for the extended SOTP in July 2012. He was found to be suitable to participate. 30.  In late July 2012 the applicant was informed that he was being considered for a place on an extended SOTP commencing in October 2012. 31.  The applicant completed the extended SOTP in March 2013. He was advised that a SARN report would be completed within the next six months to identify any further work that needed to be done. The SARN report was completed in March 2014.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Warszawa. 5.  On 19 November 2002 the applicant was placed in police custody on suspicion of drug trafficking. On 20 November 2002 the Częstochowa District Court ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. 6.  The court based its detention order on a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence of drug trafficking and the severity of the likely penalty, which gave rise to a fear that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings. Moreover, the court took into account that other suspects had remained at large, which would pose a risk of collusion if the applicant were released. 7.  Subsequent decisions on the extension of the applicant's pre-trial detention were taken on 11 February 2003, 8 May 2003, 3 October 2003, 31 December 2003, 29 March 2004 and 29 June 2004. 8.  The courts referred to the complexity of the case, the need to conduct further investigations, the probability of collusion between the applicant and other suspects and exertion of unlawful pressure on witnesses by the applicant. They stressed that the fact that the applicant had not pleaded guilty posed an additional risk of his influencing other persons involved in the proceedings. In their opinion no other preventive measure could ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 9.  The applicant appealed on several occasions against the decisions extending his detention and requested release from detention or the imposition of a more lenient preventive measure, drawing the court's attention to his poor state of health. 10.  On 27 November 2002 a telephone company was requested to provide an itemised bill of the applicant's telephone calls to other suspects. 11.  On 18 December 2002 and 29 January 2003 confrontations of witnesses and suspects took place. 12.  On 19 December 2002 the prosecutor ordered an expert opinion of a heart specialist with a view to establishing the applicant's state of health. No grounds for the applicant's release from detention were found. 13.  On 19 March 2003 an expert opinion was ordered with a view to determining whether the substance found in the course of police operations had been an illegal drug. The opinion was submitted on 15 May 2003. 14.  On 30 April 2003 and 8 June 2003 expert opinions concerning a weapon which had been found by the police were submitted. 15.  On 5 May 2003 another expert opinion of a heart specialist was ordered. Again, the applicant was found to be fit for detention. 16.  On 25 June 2003 a bill of indictment against the applicant and ten other co-accused was lodged with the court. The applicant did not plead guilty. 17.  On 15 September 2003 the court decided to transfer the case file to the Prosecutor's Office so that shortcomings in the investigation could be corrected. 18.   On 24 December 2003 two expert opinions were ordered with a view to establishing the applicant's mental health. 19.  On 9 February 2004 expert opinions on cardiology and diabetology were ordered. The experts did not find any grounds for the applicant's release. 20.  Hearings were held on the following dates: 27 November 2003, 25 March 2004, 15 April 2004, 13 May 2004, 17 June 2004, 8 July 2004, 12 August 2004, 9 September 2004 and 27 September 2004. Over thirty-five witnesses were examined by the court. 21.  On 17 June 2004 the court ordered that witnesses who had previously failed to appear at hearings be escorted to the court. 22.  On 5 July 2004 an expert opinion on neurology was submitted. No grounds for the applicant's release were found, although it was stated in this opinion that his prolonged detention might pose some future risk to his health and he was referred to a prison hospital for observation. The date of his admission to hospital was fixed for 1 July 2004. 23.  On 30 September 2004 the Częstochowa District Court gave a judgment. The applicant was found guilty of drug trafficking and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The court ordered that the applicant remain in custody until the prison sentence could be enforced. 24.  On 1 October 2004 the applicant appealed against the decision of 30 September 2004 on the extension of his detention. 25.  On 21 October 2004 the Częstochowa Regional Court allowed the applicant's appeal of 1 October 2004 and on the same day he was released from detention. 26.  On 6 December 2004 two appeals against the judgment of 30 September 2004 were lodged by the applicant's lawyers. 27.  On 22 June 2005 the Częstochowa Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case. The proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Arkhangelsk. 7.  The applicant, an advocate at the time, acted as defence counsel for a Mr R. 8.  On 5 August 2003 the Primorskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk, chaired by judge V., removed the applicant from his position as Mr R.'s counsel. The District Court found that the applicant had acted contrary to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Advocate's Code of Ethics. The court noted, in particular:\n“Persistent and repeated voluntary statements made by [the applicant] that he provided legal advice to witnesses N. and S. and at the same time acted as counsel for defendant R. ... show that [the applicant], in violation of the formal requirements of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, provided legal advice and acted as counsel in respect of persons whose interests were in conflict. Therefore, it is not possible for [the applicant] to continue to participate in the trial as legal counsel for defendant R. or to provide legal advice to N. and S.” 9.  On 26 September 2003 the District Court found Mr R. guilty as charged. 10.  On 16 December 2003 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court quashed Mr R.'s conviction and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. The court also upheld on appeal the decision of 5 August 2003. 11.  On 22 December 2003 the applicant asked the Presidium of the Regional Court for supervisory review of the judicial decisions to remove him from being Mr R.'s representative. 12.  On 2 February 2004 judge A. of the Regional Court dismissed the above complaint. In particular, the judge noted as follows:\n“I hereby return your complaint against ... the decisions ... of 5 August 2003 and 16 December 2003 without having considered it on the merits. [The reason for this is that] the Primorskiy District Court of the Arkhangelsk Region opened R.'s trial on 22 January 2004 and it is impossible to verify the lawfulness and inconsistency of the decisions in question.” 13.  On 9 February 2004 the applicant filed a complaint against the judges who had participated in the proceedings for the determination of the criminal charge against Mr R., alleging that they had acted in violation of the rules of criminal procedure by refusing to consider his application for supervisory review in respect of the decision of 5 August 2003. The complaint was addressed to the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation with a copy to the President of the Arkhangelsk Regional Court. The applicant asked for the President's intervention which would prompt, in his opinion, the Arkhangelsk Regional Court to respond to his application for supervisory review. 14.  In particular, the applicant made the following comments in the complaint:\n“... Judges A. and V. used to “plough the fields of justice together” at the Arkhangelsk Regional Prosecutor's Office, and, apparently, they “continue their joint efforts now” at the Arkhangelsk Regional Court ...\n... In my opinion, either judge A. is not quite familiar with the law, which is sad, or judge A. wilfully and knowingly restricts my access to court, which is twice as sad ...\n... On 2 February 2004 I received an absolutely unlawful “brush-off” reply from judge A ...\n... [Judge A.] could have unglued his posterior from [his] seat and brought it to the premises of the Primorskiy District Court ...\n... Otherwise, why would judge A. receive such a salary which I, as a tax payer, contribute to? ...\n... But judge A. simply pushed away my [request for] supervisory review and, by doing so, he seriously violated the rules of criminal procedure and my constitutional rights ...\n... I believe that one telephone call from the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation will be enough to make the Arkhangelsk Regional Court consider my complaint on the merits ...” 15.  The President of the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant's complaint to the Arkhangelsk Regional Court for further action. The President of the Arkhangelsk Regional Court lodged a complaint with the Council of the Arkhangelsk Region Bar Association (the “Council”) alleging that the above comments were offensive and incompatible with the Advocate's Code of Professional Conduct. He stated as follows:\n“In our opinion, [the applicant's complaint] contains remarks which are offensive and tactless vis-à-vis certain judges of the Arkhangelsk Regional Court.\nWe believe that the content and the style of the complaint are impermissible.\nIn our view, the reference made by [the applicant] in his complaint addressed to the President of the Supreme Court of Russia that ... a decision could be made in response to his application for supervisory review through a telephone call ... shows that he is lacking the qualities appropriate to his profession.\n[A]dvocates should, under any circumstances, be tactful and correct vis-à-vis their counterparts and public officers, including judges. [They] should demonstrate respect towards the court and challenge [judicial] acts correctly and in accordance with the law.\nHaving regard to the above ... I hereby request that you follow up on the applicant's conduct and inform the Arkhangelsk Regional Court of the measures taken.” 16.  On 21 April 2004 the Council held a disciplinary hearing. The applicant did not challenge the offensive character of the comments. He submitted that he had been, in a way, provoked by the judges' allegedly unlawful decisions. The Council granted the complaint and terminated the applicant's bar membership as of 22 April 2004. In particular, the Council noted as follows:\n“[The applicant's complaint] addressed to the President of the Supreme Court of Russia contains tactless remarks in respect of certain judges of the Arkhangelsk Regional Court, which amounts to a violation of the Advocate's Code of Professional Conduct ...\nThe content and the style of the [applicant's] complaint addressed to the President of the Supreme Court of Russia are impermissible.\nThe reference made by [the applicant] in his complaint addressed to the President of the Supreme Court of Russia that ... a decision could be made in response to his application for supervisory review through a telephone call ... shows that he is lacking the qualities appropriate to his profession.\n[A]dvocates should, under any circumstances, be tactful and correct vis-à-vis ... judges. [They] should demonstrate respect towards the court and challenge [judicial] acts correctly and in accordance with the law.” 17.  The applicant appealed to the court. He claimed that he was disliked by the members of the Council and their decision had been retaliation against him for his personal views and convictions. He also alleged that the disciplinary hearing had been carried out with certain procedural irregularities. 18.  On 22 June 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Arkhangelsk dismissed the claim brought by the applicant against the Bar Association seeking reinstatement of his membership. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 9 August 2004 the applicant asked the Arkhangelsk Regional Court to transfer the case to another jurisdiction for consideration. The applicant alleged that any judge of the Regional Court would be biased against him because the original complaint which had prompted the disciplinary proceedings against him had been lodged by the President of the said court. On the same day judge M. of the Regional Court refused to consider the applicant's request and returned the relevant documents to him. In particular, the judge informed the applicant as follows:\n“I hereby return your application stating the challenge to the whole composition of ... the Arkhangelsk Regional Court and advise you that, pursuant to the rules of civil procedure, it is only possible to challenge the specific judges who are appointed to consider your case and not the whole composition of [the court].” 20.  On 16 August 2004 the Arkhangelsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 22 June 2004 on appeal. The court dismissed as unsubstantiated the applicant's allegations of the Council's partiality. Nor did it discern any procedural irregularities in the applicant's disbarment.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Casoria. 5.  On 12 December 1992 the applicant and two others, all of whom were charged with fraudulent bankruptcy, were committed for trial in the Naples District Court. After numerous adjournments on account of failure to serve proper notice or lawyers’ strikes, a hearing was held on 23 September 1997. At the hearing the lawyer retained by Mr Sannino produced a list of witnesses he wanted to be summoned to appear in court. They were mainly people who would say that the applicant had been less directly involved in the management of X, a commercial company, after February 1989. The president of the court granted the request. 6.  At a hearing on 18 November 1997, Mr Sannino was represented by a different lawyer of his choosing, Mr G., whom he had retained on 13 September 1996. Mr G. produced the list of witnesses again. The court again granted leave for the persons named in the list to be summoned. A number of witnesses were examined on 3 November 1998 in the presence of the applicant and Mr G. 7.  In a note deposited with the registry of the Naples District Court on 18 January 1999, Mr G. announced that he was withdrawing from the case. He said that the applicant had been informed accordingly by registered letter sent on 18 January 1999. On 19 January 1999 the court assigned the applicant a defence lawyer, Mr B. 8.  On 25 January 1999 Mr B. was informed of the date of the next hearing (17 February 1999). The note he received did not, however, mention that he had been officially assigned to represent Mr Sannino. No notification was sent to Mr Sannino. 9.  Mr B. did not appear at the hearing on 17 February 1999, but the applicant did. The court ordered Mr B. to be replaced by another official defence lawyer, Mr M., and adjourned the case to 16 March 1999. 10.  On that date Mr B. again failed to appear, but the applicant was present. The court ordered Mr B. to be replaced by another official defence lawyer, Mr A. One of the witnesses called by the prosecution was examined by the prosecution’s representative and cross-examined by the lawyer of one of the applicant’s co-defendants. The court adjourned the proceedings to 5 May 1999 and ordered the other witnesses to be summoned. 11.  On that date Mr B. again failed to appear, but the applicant was present. The court ordered Mr B. to be replaced by another official defence lawyer, Mr O. Mr Sannino made a number of spontaneous statements. A witness called by the prosecution was examined. Having regard to the absence of two other prosecution witnesses, the court adjourned its examination of the case to 16 June 1999. The hearing was not held on that date and the proceedings were adjourned on account of the European parliamentary elections. 12.  Further hearings were held on 2 November and 17 December 1999 and on 18 January and 29 March 2000, to which the witnesses on the applicant’s list were not summoned. Mr B., who had still not appeared, was replaced by a different court-appointed defence lawyer each time. 13.  The record of the hearing on 2 November 1999 mentions that the applicant was present, which the applicant himself denies. He states that he attended his trial for the last time on 5 May 1999 and that after the adjournment of 16 June 1999 he was not notified of the date of the next hearing (2 November 1999). A notice of hearing had in fact been issued to a person who did not have authorisation (persona non abilitata) to receive notices. The Government produced a note (relata di notifica) before the Court, drawn up by a court bailiff, according to which notice of the hearing on 2 November 1999 had been served personally on 23 July 1999 on a person identifying himself as Giuseppe Sannino. The applicant maintains that the signature appearing on the note is not his and that on 23 July 1999 he was not at home, but at the Monteprandone Hotel in San Benedetto del Tronto, as had been proved by his lawyer in the appeals lodged after his conviction. Furthermore, he alleges, the indication that the notice of hearing was served on him personally was added by the court bailiff more than five years after the material time, “at the request of the office of the co-Agent at the Permanent Representation of Italy”. 14.  A final hearing was held on 12 April 2000. Neither the applicant nor Mr B. appeared. Mr B. was replaced by a court-appointed lawyer. Witnesses were examined. 15.  In a judgment of 12 April 2000, the text of which was deposited with the court’s registry on 19 April 2000, the Naples District Court sentenced the applicant to two years’ imprisonment. 16.  The applicant was not officially informed that the judgment against him had been deposited with the registry. He submits that, not having been aware of the conviction, he was unable to avail himself of his right to appeal within the statutory thirty-day period. 17.  He claims that he did not learn of his conviction – which had become final on 29 May 2000 – until 11 May 2001, when he asked for a copy of his criminal record. 18.  The applicant also learnt that Mr B. had been appointed to represent him, whereupon he contacted him. 19.  Through Mr B. the applicant lodged an application on 15 November 2001 for leave to appeal out of time. He claims that the notice of the date of the hearing of 2 November 1999 was void on the ground that the court bailiff’s report did not refer to the standing of the person on whom it had been served. Moreover, Mr B.’s appointment was – he alleges – unlawful because his name did not appear on the list of official defence lawyers. In any event Mr B. had never been informed of his appointment. In the applicant’s submission, the time-limit for lodging an appeal had therefore never started running. 20.  At the same time, again through Mr B., the applicant appealed against the judgment of 12 April 2000. He sought an acquittal on the merits and requested the investigation to be reopened for the purpose of hearing evidence from the witnesses indicated in the defence’s list. 21.  By an order of 8 March 2002, the Naples District Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal out of time. It observed that the applicant referred to matters regarding the conduct of the trial at first instance that should have been raised prior to the date on which the judgment of 12 April 2000 had become final. Leave to appeal out of time was granted only where the convicted person proved that he had been prevented by a case of force majeure from taking certain steps within the statutory time-limit, and not where he alleged procedural defects. In those conditions it was not necessary to ascertain whether the facts of which the applicant complained were genuine. 22.  On 29 March 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He alleged that the Naples District Court had wrongly construed the relevant provisions of domestic law, namely, Articles 175 and 670 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP” – see “Relevant domestic law” below). He stated that, through no fault of his own, he had not been aware of the judgment. 23.  In a judgment of 4 March 2003, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 26 March 2003, the Court of Cassation declared the appeal inadmissible. It observed that the applicant was complaining of flaws in the appointment of his court-appointed defence counsel and the service of the notice of the date of the hearing of 2 November 1999. Those flaws could have resulted in certain measures being annulled on grounds of procedural errors, but had been cured (sanate) when the conviction had become final. 24.  On 29 April 2002 the Naples public prosecutor’s office ordered execution of the sentence imposed on the applicant by the judgment of 12 April 2000. Execution was stayed, however. 25.  On 11 June 2002 the applicant requested the application of an alternative measure to detention, namely, probation (affidamento in prova al servizio sociale). By an order of 28 June 2005, the Naples Post-Sentencing Court granted the applicant’s request. On 5 September 2005 the applicant declared that he accepted the obligations stipulated in the probation order, namely, not to leave the district (comune) of Casoria without prior authorisation of the judge supervising enforcement of sentences; to devote himself fully to his work at the M. company; not to leave his house before 8 a.m. and not to return after 8 p.m; not to associate with reoffenders; and to report to the police station at least three times per week.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 and, at the time of lodging his application, he had been serving a custodial sentence at Pravieniškės prison. 7.  On 19 February 2003 the Kaišiadorys District Court convicted the applicant - together with an accomplice - of attempted drug dealing in large quantities (Articles 16 § 2 and 232-1 § 5 of the Criminal Code as then in force). The court established that the offence had been disclosed using a “Criminal Conduct Simulation Model” (“the model”), which had been authorised by the Prosecutor General on 29 May 2002. 8.  The court found that on 4 June 2002 V, a policeman acting as an undercover agent under the model, had met the applicant and, during their conversation on various topics, asked where he could get psychotropic drugs. The applicant had said that he could procure and sell samples to the policeman straight away, and more thereafter if the samples were good. The samples would cost between 15 to 21 LTL per gram, depending on the quantities required. He refused to lower the price for the first transaction, but suggested that it might be cheaper thereafter if V needed a regular supply. However, the officer replied that he could not wait and they agreed to telephone each other on the matter. V had to undergo a hospital intervention. Thereafter it was the applicant who contacted V, suggesting a meeting so that he could provide V with drug samples. On 21 June 2002, the applicant sold V some drugs. 9.  On 23 June 2002 V had telephoned the applicant, requesting more drugs for a total sum of USD 3,000. On 25 June 2002 the applicant provided V with 250 grams of amphetamines. He said that he had around 5 kilos of drugs (amphetamines) and that the price would be lower next time. The applicant and his accomplice were arrested immediately. The applicant pleaded guilty to the attempted drug offence. 10.  The court questioned V as an anonymous witness, outside the courtroom via an audio relay. His identity was not disclosed in order to protect him and the proper functioning of the police drug squad. At that stage the defence did not put any questions to V. After his testimony had been read out by the trial judge, the defence formulated some supplementary questions which were put to him by the judge and answered. The other evidence examined by the court included the transcripts of the conversations between V and the applicant, the testimony of another police officer who acted as V’s back up during the operation, their supervising officer, the testimony of the applicant and his co-accused and an expert’s conclusions. 11.  The documents relating to the authorisation of the model were classified as secret and were not disclosed to the defence because they would have disclosed the identity of the police officers involved and the operational methods of the drug squad. The Government contended that the applicant was not, however, denied access to information about the execution of the model. In their submissions to the Court, the Government provided further information about it. The police had information about the applicant’s continued large scale drug dealings in Lithuania and abroad under the nickname of “Malina”. Two police officers were authorised to contact the applicant and his associates and, should their suspicions prove to be founded, they were authorised to procure drugs from him. The steps to be taken and the equipment to be used to obtain proof were set out in the model, which was authorised for a year. 12.  Defence counsel, in his final submissions to the trial court, contended that the applicant had been incited to commit the offence by the undercover police officer, who had acted unlawfully. Consequently, the latter’s evidence could not be relied on. Counsel requested that the applicant’s acts be qualified as an attempted offence, for which a milder sentence would be appropriate. 13.  The trial court concluded that the use of the model in the case had been lawful. It observed inter alia as follows:\n“[T]he Criminal Conduct Simulation Model is used to collect evidence about the criminal activities of a particular person. That is what happened in the present case. Having obtained information that the defendant ... was selling psychotropic substances, the police officer - whose identity was concealed - expressed his wish to get some drugs. The subsequent activities of [the applicant], i.e., the selling of a large quantity of drugs, were in part determined by the conduct of the police officer.” 14.  The court acknowledged that the applicant’s conduct had been influenced by Officer V from the outset, and commented at the sentencing stage that it had not been established the applicant had sold or tried to sell drugs to anyone other than this officer.  The applicant was convicted of the attempted offence and sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment, as well as to the confiscation of 3000 Lithuanian Litai (“LTL”; about 857 euros [“EUR”]). 15.  The applicant appealed, complaining inter alia that V had overstepped the legitimate limits of investigation by influencing and inciting him to sell a large quantity of drugs. In his view, this warranted a lesser penalty. The Government contended that he did not dispute the finding of the first instance court that the authorisation of the model had been lawful and, consequently, that he had been involved in drug dealing previously. The parties did not request that the evidence be re-heard de novo. 16.  On 10 June 2003 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld the conviction, considering that the applicant was guilty of a completed offence, not a mere attempt. The court thus re-classified the conviction under Article 260 § 2 of the new Criminal Code and increased the sentence to nine years’ imprisonment. With respect to the applicant’s entrapment allegations, the court noted:\n“[I]n establishing the persons involved in drug-dealing, [the officers] did not overstep the limits of the Criminal Conduct Simulation Model. ... [T]he police have only uncovered the ring of persons committing crimes and have discontinued their criminal activities. The officers joined in the crime that was already taking place ... Having established the group of accomplices, the officers discontinued their criminal activities, but did not influence or incite them.” 17.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He alleged that the actions of V had been unlawful. He could have discontinued the crime on 21 June 2002, when the applicant had handed over the drug samples. However, V had offered to buy more drugs for a price significantly higher than their market value. The applicant alleged that V had thus provoked him into selling drugs in large quantities. According to the Government, the aim of this appeal was thus to receive a reduction in sentence. 18.  The Supreme Court partially dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal on 14 October 2003. It held, inter alia, as follows:\n“In the present case, the Criminal Conduct Simulation Model ... was applied in order to protect society and the State from the challenges posed by the consumption and illegal circulation of drugs and psychotropic substances. The model was sanctioned by the Prosecutor General, in view of the possession of information about [the applicant] selling narcotic substances. Such data ... is a lawful ground for the use of the model.\nBy entering into contact with the applicant and offering to buy psychotropic substances from him..., V only joined in the criminal activity of [the applicant] and uncovered his accomplice. Such actions cannot be considered to be entrapment (nusikaltimo provokavimas): it appears from the case file that [the applicant] was not subject to any pressure ... [The applicant’s] allegation that the police undercover agent induced (paskatino) a person who had never offended before to commit a serious crime is unsubstantiated. On the contrary, the use of [the model] helped stop the criminal activity.” 19.  The applicant’s conviction was again re-classified as an attempt to sell drugs in large quantities (Articles 22 § 1 and 260 § 2 of the new Criminal Code), but the sentence of nine years’ imprisonment was retained.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants live in Kuusjoki, Perniö, Tuohittu and Humppila respectively. 5.  The first applicant and Mr Lehtonen were from 1989 to 1991 members of the board of directors of a local bank which subsequently went bankrupt. On 30 December 1993 the successor property management company of the bank, which was owned by the Finnish State, initiated civil proceedings before the Salo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten), claiming compensation from the first applicant and Mr Lehtonen. The company claimed that the first applicant and Mr Lehtonen along with other persons had caused the bank damage exceeding 134 million euros (EUR) through accepting loan applications and neglecting their duty to supervise the acts of the management. Later the amount of damages claimed was lowered to EUR 90 million. 6.  The District Court held preparatory meetings in the case on 8 March 1994, 8 November 1995, 9-10 January 1996 and 25 January 1996. On 5 February 1996 the court gave an interlocutory judgment concerning succession issues and the application of the statute of limitations. During the preparatory meetings the parties agreed to wait for the outcome of other proceedings which were closely related to the case and could provide additional information for its resolution. After the preparatory meetings the case was processed only in writing. The judge responsible for the case was changed a number of times and the parties, despite several attempts, were not able to settle the case. 7.  During the District Court proceedings the first applicant and Mr Lehtonen, among others, requested that the proceedings be terminated and that the complaints of the successor company be either rejected or dismissed without examining the merits. They maintained that, according to the Convention, proceedings should be terminated within a reasonable time. That rule had not been complied with in their case and the proceedings should therefore be discontinued. 8.  On 9 March 1996 Mr Lehtonen died and his estate, comprising his wife and two daughters, continued the case on his behalf (hereafter the second applicant). 9.  On 29 June 2004 the District Court decided to accept the applicants’ request and dismissed the case without examining the merits. The court stated that from the point of view of procedural economy it would be wise to await the outcome of the related proceedings which, however, had lasted longer than expected and were still pending. The case was very complex and it was expected that a judgment would only be rendered in a few years’ time. The applicants had tried to accelerate the proceedings by proposing a settlement on several occasions. The proposals had all been rejected by the successor company. The court concluded that the length of the proceedings was already excessive, that the proceedings could not be accelerated and that the only effective remedy was to dismiss the case without examining the merits. 10.  The successor company appealed to the Turku Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten), which on 29 November 2004 quashed the District Court decision and referred the case back to the District Court. The court found that Finnish law did not give a possibility to reject or dismiss a case without examining the merits in a situation where the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time. Neither the Convention nor the European Court required that in such cases the proceedings should be terminated. The successor company had, as a separate legal person, according to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the Finnish Constitution, a right to have its case considered by a court. This meant that it had a right to have a final decision in the case even if the length of the proceedings had already been excessive. 11.  On 12 April 2005 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal. 12.  On 13 June 2005 the District Court made a proposal for the settlement of the case. According to the terms of the settlement, the applicants, along with other persons, were to pay EUR 17,000 each to the plaintiff who would then receive a total sum of EUR 297,000 from the defendants. It was acknowledged in the settlement that the proceedings in the case had been unreasonably long. In part IV of the settlement it was, however, stipulated that\n “[t]he District Court proposes that after an agreement is reached the defendants would commit not to take any legal action in the European Court of Human Rights regarding the unreasonable length of the proceedings.” 13.  The proposal was accepted by the successor company on 17 June 2005 and by the applicants on 21 June 2005. On 22 June 2005 the District Court issued a decision confirming the settlement. No appeal lay against this decision. 14.  The Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan apulaisoikeusasiamies, riksdagens biträdande justitieombudsman) had already found on 19 June 2003 that the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.   Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, a limited liability company with its registered office in Vienna, is the owner of the daily newspaper Neue Kronenzeitung published by Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG (“the publisher”). 10.  On 9 and 11 December 1994 the Salzburg edition of the Neue Kronenzeitung published an advertisement for subscriptions to the newspaper in which it compared its monthly subscription rates with those of another regional newspaper, the Salzburger Nachrichten. According to the advertisement, the Neue Kronenzeitung was “the best” local newspaper. 11.  On 13 December 1994 the Salzburger Nachrichten applied to the Salzburg Regional Court (Landesgericht) for a preliminary injunction (einstweilige Verfügung) under sections 1 and 2 of the Unfair Competition Act (Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb) against the applicant company and the publisher. It requested that the applicant company and the publisher be ordered to refrain from publishing the advertisement. 12.  On 29 December 1994 the Salzburg Regional Court issued a preliminary injunction against the applicant company and the publisher to preserve the status quo during the proceedings. On appeal by the applicant company and the publisher, the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) quashed the Regional Court's decision. The court stated, inter alia, that the two newspapers were competitors in the same market and for the same readership. On 23 May 1995 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), on appeal by the Salzburger Nachrichten, issued a preliminary injunction. The court found that the advertisement was misleading. It considered that the Salzburger Nachrichten was a “quality newspaper” and the Neue Kronenzeitung was not, and that this difference was not necessarily known to readers. Furthermore, in the particular circumstances of the case, calling the Neue Kronenzeitung “the best” local newspaper amounted to disparagement of the Salzburger Nachrichten. 13.  In the main proceedings which followed, the Salzburg Regional Court ordered the applicant company and the publisher to refrain from publishing the advertisement as long as it did not provide at the same time information which made it possible to avoid any generally pejorative value statement or any other risk of misleading readers. Secondly, it ordered them not to refer to the sales price of the Salzburger Nachrichten as “expensive”. Thirdly, it ordered them to refrain from comparing the sales prices of the two newspapers unless they indicated at the same time the differences in their respective reporting styles, in particular as regards coverage of foreign or domestic politics, economy, culture, science, health, environmental issues and law, and referred also to the Neue Kronenzeitung as an entertainment-orientated communications medium and the Salzburger Nachrichten as a medium mainly geared to information. Lastly, it ordered them to publish the decision. 14.  On 21 March 1997 the Linz Court of Appeal, allowing in part an appeal by the applicant company and the publisher, confined the third branch of the injunction to the order that the applicant company and the publisher refrain from comparing the sales prices of the two newspapers without indicating the differences in their reporting styles as regards coverage of foreign or domestic politics, economy, culture, science, health, environmental issues and law. It confirmed the lower court's decision as to the remaining branches of the injunction. The court considered that it was a matter of common knowledge that both newspapers were competing in the same market. As to the differences in quality between the newspapers and the argument that readers were not familiar with these differences, the Linz Court of Appeal referred to the Supreme Court's decision of 23 May 1995. 15.  On 28 April 1997 the applicant company and the publisher lodged an appeal on points of law against this decision, relying on Article 10 of the Convention. 16.  On 13 May 1997 the Supreme Court declared their appeal on points of law inadmissible. The decision was served on the parties on 16 June 1997.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Łόdź, Poland. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 10 June 1992 Mr Andrzej Kern, at that time the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, notified the Regional Prosecutor that a certain Mr Gąsior and Mrs Izabela Malisiewicz-Gąsior had kidnapped his 17-year-old daughter, M.K. However, Mr Gąsior and Mrs Malisiewicz‑Gąsior submitted that the allegation was false as M.K. had in fact run away from home and had only been accompanied by their son Maciej who had been her boyfriend for a long time. M.K. had previously run away from home on several occasions because of conflicts with her parents.\nOn the same day the Łódź Regional Prosecutor initiated an investigation into the allegations of kidnapping against Mr Gąsior and Mrs Malisiewicz‑Gąsior. On 10 and 11 June 1992 the prosecutor issued a warrant authorising the search of their flat and the tapping of their telephone. They were arrested and remanded in custody. In August 1992 the case was taken over by the Poznań Regional Prosecutor who discontinued the criminal proceedings against them, finding that the allegations of kidnapping had been groundless. Disciplinary proceedings were brought against both prosecutors who had instituted the criminal proceedings. 8.  On 29 June 1992 Mr A. Kern had made a statement on public television in which he said that his daughter had been kidnapped and asked for assistance in finding his child. 9.  The case concerning the alleged kidnapping of M.K. received wide coverage in the media. 10.  The applicant owns a publishing house named “Westa-Druk” which publishes the weekly magazine “Angora”. 11.  On 16 August 1992 the applicant published in “Angora” an interview with Mr Michał Plisecki, a lawyer who at the material time represented Mr Gąsior and Mrs Izabela Malisiewicz-Gąsior in the criminal proceedings concerning the alleged kidnapping. The article was entitled: “If it had been quiet” and was in the form of questions put by a journalist and answers given by Mr M.P. The article, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“‘A[ngora]’:-I have brought you fresh news from Łódź: the arrest warrant against [Maciej Gąsior] has been quashed, the children however have not come back home. M.P. [Michał Plisecki]:- I do not want to – publicly – go into the details concerning the issuing and quashing of the arrest warrant. Allow me not to comment on it because I would have been forced to use very blunt language. I would refer to another issue: if it is true that [M.K.’s] parents - after an unsuccessful attempt to place her in a psychiatric clinic –left her alone, under the care of her grandmother somewhere in the countryside, then should I – as a parent – be shocked by such behaviour? There is no other conclusion from the above fact: they simply do not love her. It is not that they do not understand her, because this is proved by their behaviour as a whole, but that the wish to separate [M.K.] from the world is in the interests of those people. Mr Kern’s statement that he suspected that his daughter had been spying on him while she was dating Maciej and in particular the statement by the mother of [M.K.] that her daughter had been serving as a mattress for Maciej – this is terrifying! That was probably the reason why the Member of Parliament Mr Kołodziejczyk, who represents the interests of all citizens, decided to apply to the family court to solve the tragic problem of [M.K.] and the Kern family. If I may give my private opinion, I also believe that one should think over how to arrange [M.K.’s] future life.\n(...)\n‘A’:- So, if it was not for journalists, it would have been different? Maybe quieter? M.P. If it had been quieter, then from my point of view, and after Mr Kern’s having publicised the case in a certain context, I do not exclude the possibility that my client [Mrs Malisiewicz-Gąsior] would still have been in the detention centre. I do not exclude the possibility that Mr Gąsior would have been arrested too. The fact that my clients are free is due to the pressure of public opinion.\n(...)\n‘A’:- You have said: ‘M.K. ran away from home’. But it has been said that it was an abduction or kidnapping. M.P. The prosecutor and his deputy know that [M.K.] ran away from home. It has been proved by witnesses (...) [M.K.] had asked Maciej to accompany her and that is what happened. This is not a crime!\n‘A’:- The Helsinki Committee [for Human Rights], the Ombudsman, the President... M.P. ... let me add: the Political Group Porozumienie Centrum. Recently the Group made an appeal for assistance for Mr Kern - turning to the Ministers of Justice and of Internal Affairs – in the private matter of Mr Kern. I believe that since Mr Kern has abused power and has caused such unlawfulness and it has been supported by this Political Group, it means that Porozumienie Centrum supports these kinds of methods involving aggressive behaviour.\n ‘A’: -You have said: Mr Kern has abused power. Is it a question or a statement? M.P.:-He has obviously abused power because as the Speaker of the Sejm he had access to the media and gave false information; the fact that he is a liar I can prove – if necessary – in court. I authorise you to print this text. If Mr Kern says that he is not a liar, I will prove the contrary in court!\n‘A’:-What do you think about the fact that the Member of Parliament Mr Kołodziejczyk applied to the Łódź District Court? M.P.:- It is for the court to decide, in every family case, with which parent the child should stay. In such cases both the parents and the child often undergo psychological and psychiatric examination – obviously upon a decision of a court. This is a typical case; the court is to decide on the family matter of Mr and Mrs Kern. Therefore, both the parents and [M.K.] should undergo the relevant examination. This is usual, routine procedure. That, in turn, proves how diligently Mr Kołodziejczyk approached this case. [M.K.] had turned to him for help, placed trust in him. In consequence he contacted, as I know, many people, me included, but I could not dispel his doubts. I then turned (sic!) [he turned] to specialists – psychologists. He was told by them that before they could make any decision they should talk with both the child and the parents. Then, very tactfully, he asked the Speaker [of the Sejm] Mr Chrzanowski to pass these suggestions to Mr Kern. Only after Mr Kern had refused, did Mr Kołodziejczyk do what any honest and respectable person would have done: he informed a court that in the Kern family bad things were happening. It is a lie that Mr Kołodziejczyk ordered the examination by specialists. He cannot order it! He only asked for appropriate action to be undertaken. (...)” 12.  Subsequently, and in connection with the above interview, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Mr Michał Plisecki by the local Bar Council. On 24 June 1995 the High Disciplinary Court (Wyższy Sąd Dyscyplinarny) found that Mr Michał Plisecki had breached the rules of professional conduct and reprimanded him. The court reiterated that the lawyers between themselves (Mr Plisecki, Mr Kern and his wife were all members of the Bar) should follow the rules of politeness and friendliness. The court found that Mr Plisecki had breached those rules and had failed to express his critics in a restraint manner. 13.  On 8 August 1995 Mr Kern, his wife and his daughter M.K., (“the plaintiffs”) lodged against the applicant’s publishing house “Westa-Druk” a civil claim for protection of their personal rights. They maintained that the press had played a major role in the case involving their family as they “presented the facts and judgments tendentiously, causing de facto damage to the plaintiffs.” The plaintiffs further sought an award of PLN 28,000 in compensation and an order requiring the defendant to publish the following apologies:\n“We apologise to the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, Mr A. Kern, his wife Mrs  Zofia Pstrągowska-Kern and his daughter [M.K.] for grossly violating their personal rights by having published the article ‘If it had been quiet’, in Angora (...), in particular, by uncritically quoting the totally irresponsible statements of Mr Michał Plisecki in which he:\n- said of A. Kern that he ‘had obviously abused power’ and ‘caused unlawfulness’ in connection with the investigation conducted by the Łódź Regional Prosecutor into the alleged kidnapping of his daughter,\n- said that Mr Kern had been providing the media with untrue information and called him a liar,\n- imputed to Mr and Mrs Kern the wish to place their daughter in a psychiatric clinic, called their parenting skills into question and stated without any reason that the parents and [MK] should ‘undergo psychiatric and psychological examination.’\nWe express our regret over the harm done to the injured party”. 14.  On 15 May 1998 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The court ordered the applicant to publish apologies as sought in the statement of claim and awarded the plaintiffs compensation in part, i.e. PLN 8,500. The court stated, inter alia:\n“...One should agree with [the applicant] that, being the publisher, he had the right to inform the readers about important circumstances concerning [A. Kern] who at the material time held one of the highest positions in the State. Therefore, publishing such information was not illegal despite the fact that it affected the plaintiffs’ personal rights that are protected by law. The article, however, includes not only information but also statements that damaged their reputation; i.e. their good name. The statement that Mr and Mrs Kern had made an unsuccessful attempt to place their daughter in a psychiatric clinic, that they do not understand and love her and that her separation from the world is in her interest, disparaged their parenting skills, and questioned their moral values.\nThe information that the family should have been examined by psychologists and psychiatrists had also harmed them in the eyes of others.\nIt concerns in particular the parents of Ms [M.K.] who at that time held important positions and the state of their mental health should not have been an object of public discussion. Finally, calling Mr Kern a liar and stating that he had abused power, obviously harmed his good name and exposed him to the loss of trust of his voters and of the leaders of the party of which he was a member. Therefore, the [applicant’s] actions were ... illegal because they breached the good name and reputation of the plaintiffs.\nThe court did not agree with the [applicant’s] opinion that [since] he was not the author of the quoted statements, he was not obliged to check the truthfulness of the information included in the interview with Michał Plisecki...” 15.  On 27 July 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Łódź Court of Appeal. He alleged, inter alia, that the court had infringed his freedom of expression in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, as it had overstepped the margin afforded to it and violated the principle of proportionality between the legitimate aim pursued and the measures applied. The interference with his right was particularly striking as the case concerned a politician who should have been more tolerant of criticism. The applicant further argued that Mr Kern himself had made public information concerning his private life by giving statements concerning the alleged kidnapping of his daughter in the television and the press. 16.  Mr Michał Plisecki, who joined the proceedings as an intervener (interwenient uboczny), also lodged an appeal. 17.  On 26 January 1999 the Łódź Court of Appeal found that the applicant had sullied the good name of the plaintiffs. It amended the judgment in so far as the text of the apology to be published was concerned and increased the sum to be paid by the applicant to all plaintiffs by way of costs and expenses to PLN 3,316. It upheld the remainder of the judgment. The applicant was to publish the following apology:\n“We apologise to Mr Kern, his wife Mrs Zofia Pstrągowska-Kern and daughter [M.K]. for breaching their personal rights by the publication entitled «if it had been quiet» in particular by citing the statements made by the lawyer M.P. in which he referred to the plaintiffs’ parenting skills and gave his opinion as to their family life, and called the first plaintiff a liar.” 18.  The appellate court stated:\n“...The Regional Court based its judgment on the following findings:\nIn 1992 a strong conflict erupted between [M.K.] and her parents on the ground of her contacts with Maciej. [M.K.] regarded Izabela Malisiewicz-Gąsior as a person friendly to her and a moral authority. That influenced the loosening of her relationship with her parents. Finally, in June 1992 [M.K.] left with Maciej. She did not inform her parents of her whereabouts and did not contact them.\nThe plaintiff, Mr Kern, in a television address made an appeal for help in finding his daughter; he also informed the Łódź District Prosecutor that a crime has been committed under Article 188 of the Criminal Code.\nThe District Prosecutor instituted proceedings on charges of kidnapping and false imprisonment of M.K. In the course of these proceedings Mrs Malisiewicz –Gąsior was arrested and the apartment and house of Gąsior’s family was searched. The defence counsel of Mrs Malisiewicz-Gąsior was Mr M.P.” 19.  The Court of Appeal found that the statement that Mr Kern had abused power was within the justifiable bounds of criticism since public opinion was particularly sensitive to all aspects of abuse of power, and the opinion about Mr Kern was given by a professional i.e. a lawyer; therefore, it did not require verification by the publisher. The allegation of abuse of power was also justified given the extraordinary actions undertaken by Mr Kern in a private matter. Following the case-law of the European Court relating to Article 10 of the Convention, a politician should show more tolerance when exposed to criticism than private persons. Then the court stated as follows:\n“It is a different matter, however, with regard to the allegation that Mr Kern was a liar. It is obvious that this description does not have the character of a legal opinion. What is more, the context of the statement does not clarify in relation to what case the plaintiff was alleged to have lied. It was thus a generality suggesting regular untruthfulness on the part of the plaintiff. The explanations for this statement provided by Mr Michał Plisecki later in the course of trial cannot be of particular importance since the published text, and in the form in which it reached the readers, did not include them. This description should then be considered as an ordinary and unjustified epithet [epitet]. In this case the publisher cannot be discharged of the responsibility for besmirching the plaintiff’s good name either on the ground that the author of the statement was a lawyer, because he had not spoken as a professional, or because of the fact that publication was in the form of an interview as, unlike radio or television interviews, it was not a live broadcast and the publisher had the means, by acting with due diligence, to prevent the breach of the plaintiff’s personal rights by this statement. Moreover, it cannot be inferred from the fact that the plaintiff held a public function, so that he agreed there should be a wider limit of permissible criticism of him, or from the fact that he himself made a public appeal for help in finding his daughter, that he had agreed to publication of all free opinions and comments on this subject, including those breaching his personal rights. Given the above described character of the statement, it should be regarded as an evaluation (ocenna) that cannot be verified as true or false and in any case cannot [be seen] as a negative assessment of the plaintiff’s actions within the meaning of Article 41 of the Press Law. In this case the publisher is not protected by Article 10 of the Convention as paragraph 2 of this Article limits the right of freedom of expression when protecting, inter alia, the reputation of others.\nFor these reasons the Court of Appeal considered the appeals of the [applicant] and the intervener manifestly ill-founded.\nBoth appeals are equally unjustified in what they say about the judgment referring to a breach of the first plaintiff’s personal rights by statements about his family life.\nNeither the fact that the first plaintiff had himself introduced the events of his private life into the public sphere by making the address for help in finding his daughter (even if one can consider such an appeal as agreement to publication of information from a private sphere within the meaning of Article 14(6) of the Press Law) nor the fact that as a person holding a public function he was a subject of particular interest to the press authorised the publisher to breach his personal rights by putting into question his mental health and parenting skills.\nOne cannot infer that the plaintiff waived his right to legal protection by the fact that he had subjected himself to public comments on his family matters. It should be underlined that information concerning family life, and even unfavourable comment, does not have to breach personal rights. In this publication the limits of fair criticism and cultural expression had been overstepped. As with the allegation that the first plaintiff was a liar, the publisher is not protected by the fact that he had been quoting the statements of a lawyer who was obliged to exercise strict control over what he said, because matters concerning the family life of the first plaintiff did not have the nature of a legal opinion and the interview itself was not broadcast “live”.\nMoreover, commenting in this manner on the plaintiff’s family life was not covered by a socially justified interest and did not concern the political activity of the plaintiff.\nIn addition it should be said that entering into issues concerning the family sphere, in particular the relationship between parents [and children], if only because of the impossibility to verify the assessments made in this respect, is always unlawful, even if the information given is true (see judgment of the Supreme Court, 11/03/1986).” 20.  The applicant and the intervener each lodged cassation appeals with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). 21.  On 11 October 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeals and ordered the applicant to pay Mr Kern PLN 3,800 for costs and expenses. It agreed with the assessment of the lower courts that in the present case the interference with the freedom of press was justified by the need to protect the reputation of the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court also dismissed the applicant’s arguments that his intention was to report on a case that had shocked the majority of public opinion. The court was of the opinion that publishing an article in which the lawyer of the other party subjectively analysed very delicate family matters and offered categorical judgments on their causes, was not the right way to protect a justified public interest. 22.  It appears that subsequently the judgment was enforced in so far as the payment of compensation was concerned. As regards the publishing of the apologies, the enforcement proceedings are pending.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  All forty-three applicants are Ukrainian nationals who live in the Lugansk Region. They are represented by Mr Nikolay Kozyrev. 5.  The forty-two applicants (see Annex) are/were employees or relatives of employees of State-owned mining companies. During 1999 - 2003 the Krasny Luch Court rendered decisions the applicants’ favour concerning the recovery of salary and/or social benefits arrears, which were enforced in full in 2004 - 2005 with the exception of the judgment in favour of Mr Korniyenko, which remains unenforced (see Annex for details). 6.  Some of the applicants attempted to claim compensation against the Bailiffs’ Service for the delay in the enforcement of the judgments given in their favour, however, these attempts have been to no avail. 7.  After the institution of the Convention proceedings, Mr Boiko Vladimir Ivanovich, Mr Bakushev Valentin Ivanovich, and Mr Butorin Viktor Nikolayevich died. Their widows, Mrs Boiko Valentina Iosifovna, Mrs Bakusheva Tamara Trofimovna, and Butorina Irina Nikolayevna, informed the Court that they wished to pursue the applications of their late husbands. 8.  The 43rd applicant, Mrs Melnikova Inessa Gennadiyevna, is a former employee of the collective agricultural enterprise “Krasnoluchsky” (KSP). The decision given by the Krasny Luch Court on 26 December 2001 ordering KSP to pay her UAH 3,519 in salary arrears was enforced in full on 4 April 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Rudnik. 6.  On 6 July 1995 the Zamość District Court declared the company “Wojewódzkie Przedsiębiorstwo Przemysłu Mięsnego” insolvent and appointed the applicant (a practising lawyer) as an insolvency trustee. Judge M.B was appointed as an insolvency judge. 7.  On 9 August 2000, the court discharged M.B. from his position and appointed M.S as the new insolvency judge. 8.  On 6 September 2000 the applicant asked the insolvency judge to determine the amount of his remuneration. 9.  At the hearing held on 9 October 2000 the question of payment of the applicant's expenses was examined. The hearing was adjourned since the court decided to wait for an opinion from an expert accountant. 10.  On 11 September 2001 the applicant asked to be granted an advance payment on his remuneration. The insolvency judge – M.S. – submitted that the applicant had already been granted an advance payment of 6,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) and he had already obtained PLN 8,650. In addition, he had obtained, for his alleged expenses, a total of PLN 45,668.32. 11.  At the hearing held on 5 October 2001 the Zamość District Court sitting as a panel composed of three judges, including judge M.S., granted the applicant an advance payment of PLN 6,000. 12.  On 8 April 2002 the applicant applied to the District Court in Zamość and requested the sum of PLN 577,292 as payment for his eight years of trustee duties. 13.  M.S., the insolvency judge, in her submissions to the court (przedstawienie), asked it to grant the applicant remuneration in a lower amount, namely PLN 317,989. She submitted that the applicant had been responsible for a lengthy and expensive liquidation proceedings. She also requested the offsetting of the sum of PLN 200,600 that had already been paid to the applicant in the form of advance payments. 14.  At the hearing held on 28 September 2004 the court heard evidence from the applicant. On 30 September 2004 the Zamość District Court at a session held in camera granted the applicant's request in part, and awarded him 317,989. The sum of PLN 266,318.82 already paid to the applicant was offset from the amount. The bench that gave this decision was composed of three professional judges including both M.B and M.S. 15.  On 18 October 2004 the applicant appealed against this decision. He disagreed with the court's decision in general terms. He further argued that the proceedings had been invalid since the insolvency judge, M.S., had acted both as a claimant and as a member of the court, which called into question the court's impartiality. 16.  On 5 January 2005 the Lublin Regional Court at a session held in camera dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court considered that the first-instance court had correctly calculated the trustee's remuneration, in particular because the applicant was responsible for delays in the proceedings. It referred to the fact that the applicant was heard at the hearing held on 28 September 2004 and he was able to present his arguments. In the court's opinion, judge M.S. was entitled to sit on the bench of the commercial court deciding on the applicant's remuneration, given that the Insolvency Act did not provide for any limitations in this respect. 17.  The applicant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 18.  On 3 March 2005 the Lublin Regional Court rejected his cassation appeal as inadmissible in law. 19.  On 16 March 2005 the applicant appealed against this decision. On 14 September 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal confirming that a second-instance court's decision on trustee's remuneration could not be the subject of an appeal. 20.  Meanwhile, on 10 February 2005 the applicant asked to be paid further partial remuneration in the amount of PLN 66,945 for the period between 7 June 2003 and 6 February 2005. 21.  On 20 December 2005 the Zamość District Court held a hearing in that case. The panel of judges was composed of three professional judges, including judge M.S. The applicant challenged judge M.S. In reply, on 24 March 2006 the Lublin Regional Court ordered judge M.S. to withdraw from the panel. The court noted that the insolvency judge, who had already made her submission regarding the applicant's remuneration, would have pre-conceived notions about the issues in the case. 22.  On 27 April 2006 the Zamość District Court granted the applicant partial remuneration in the amount of PLN 22,000. 23.  On 9 October 2007 the Zamość District Court declared the liquidation procedure to be terminated.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Charlottenlund. 7.  At the beginning of the 1990s a new concept called “tax asset stripping cases” (selskabstømmersager) came into existence in Denmark. It covered a criminal activity by which the persons involved committed aggravated debtor fraud by buying up and selling numerous inactive solvent private limited companies within a short period and, for the sake of their own profit, “stripping” the companies of assets, including deposits earmarked for payment of corporation tax. The persons involved were usually intricately interconnected and collaborated in their economic criminal activities, which concerned very large amounts of money. According to surveys made by the customs and tax authorities, approximately one thousand six hundred companies with a total tax debt exceeding two billion Danish kroner (DKK) were stripped in the period from the late 1980s until 1994. Following a number of legislative amendments, the trade in inactive, solvent companies largely ceased in the summer of 1993. 8. At the relevant time the applicant was part owner of a private limited stockbrokers company ([B] & [the applicant] A/S] - hereafter “the company”). 9.   On 18 January 1994 he learnt that the tax authorities were about to check the company’s accounts for the years 1989 to 1992. On 6 May 1994 the tax authorities informed the applicant that the question of whether any criminal liability had occurred would be decided on later. The tax authorities also reported various potential co-offenders to the police. 10. During 1994, 1995 and at the beginning of 1996 the police carried out an investigation comprising, among other things, discovery orders against banks, international letters of request, search warrants and numerous interviews of witnesses. 11. On 17 June 1996, the Copenhagen City Court (Københavns Byret – hereafter “the City Court”), sitting in camera, granted the police a warrant to search the premises of the applicant’s business and those of the company. 12.   On 2 July 1996 the search was carried out by the police. 13.  From July 1996 to February 1998 various investigative steps were taken, also relating to five co-accused in the case, for example searches in Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden, numerous interviews in Denmark and abroad, international letters of request, a request to Interpol, fifteen discovery orders and an order prohibiting the disclosure of the applicant’s name. Moreover, on 19 March 1997 a request for an accountant’s report was made and material for that purpose was obtained, including statements of account, cheque vouchers and so on. 14.  On 12 February 1998 the applicant was officially charged and interrogated by the police. 15.  On 25 June 1998 an indictment was submitted to the City Court, according to which the applicant (and five co-accused, A, B, H, N and R) were charged with “tax asset stripping” committed jointly. The applicant was charged on forty-four counts out of a total of fifty-nine, committed between 26 June and 3 November 1992. His responsibility related to an amount of DKK 87,000,000, equal to approximately 11,600,000 euros (EUR) out of the total tax amount evaded in the case which came to approximately EUR 19,000,000. The indictment related to eighty different companies and six banks in Denmark and abroad. 16.  Between July 1998 and 10 March 1999, fifteen pre-trial hearings were held and the draft of the accountant’s reports was submitted. On the former date, the case was set down for trial on 15 March 1999. 17.  Between 15 March 1999 and 31 January 2001, a total of 119 hearings were held. The applicant, the five co-accused and more than seventy witnesses were heard, including state-registered public accountants. Statements of accounts and a considerable amount of other documentary evidence were also produced. The court records comprised 1,330 pages. The closing speeches were held over ten days in November 2000 and January 2001. 18.  By a judgment of 6 April 2001, which ran to 220 pages, the City Court convicted the applicant in accordance with the indictment. The co-accused were also convicted. The applicant was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In addition, the sum of DKK 3,600,000 was seized, and he was deprived for an indefinite period of the right to establish a private limited company or a company or an association requiring public approval, or to become a manager and/or member of a director’s board of such companies. 19.  The City Court dismissed the applicant’s claim that the length of the proceedings had been at variance with Article 6 of the Convention stating the following:\n“The City Court finds no reason to criticise the prosecution’s decision to join the criminal proceedings against the [applicant and the five co‑accused]. Accordingly, and having regard to the mutual connection between the cases and their character, the City Court finds no violation of Article 6 of the Convention, although there were longer periods of inactivity during one part of the case, while investigation was going on in another part of the case. In this connection [the City Court] notes that the complexity of the acts carried out by [the applicant and the five co-accused] partly when buying and “stripping” the companies for assets, partly when writing off projects abroad, necessitated an investigation of an extraordinary scope. In the City Court’s opinion there were no longer periods, whether before the police, the prosecution or the City Court, during which no part of the case proceeded. It must be emphasised that due to the nature and scope of the charges, the cases against [the applicant] and [the co-accused B and R] could not proceed before the cases against [H, N and A] [had been heard]. [Finally], in view of the character and complexity of the case, [the City Court] considers that the total length of the proceedings did not in itself constitute a breach of the said provision of the Convention.” 20.  On 15 May 2001 the applicant and the five co-accused appealed against the judgment to the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret - “the High Court”). 21.  After that date, twelve preparatory hearings were held, including one on 13 September 2001 during which the trial was scheduled with numerous fixed dates to commence on 24 September 2002. Counsel for the applicant and the co-defendants jointly replied that they only had very limited possibilities to appear during the autumn of 2002. 22.  Thus, although the trial commenced on 24 September 2002, most of the hearings took place in 2003 and 2004. A total of about 90 hearings were held in the case. In February and March 2004 the appeal hearings had to be postponed because a co-defendant fell ill. For the same reason the High Court changed the order of some of the hearings. The Court records comprised 861 pages. The closing speeches were held over ten days in April, May, and June 2004. 23.  On 28 September 2004 the High Court upheld the City Court’s judgment. As regards the length of the proceedings, it stated:\n“In the assessment of whether the proceedings have been concluded within a reasonable time, the starting point ... concerning the [applicant] was on 12 February 1998, when he was charged ...\n [The High Court] upholds the City Court’s judgment and its reasoning with regard to the question of whether Article 6 of the Convention has been violated ...\nThe appeal proceedings were scheduled and carried out without any unreasonable delay. On 13 September 2001 the trial was scheduled to take place on fixed dates as from 12 August 2002. A number of hearing dates in the autumn 2002 and the beginning of 2003 had to be cancelled because some counsel were occupied [with other cases], for which reason the [present] case was delayed. To avoid any further delay caused by impossibilities to appear, the trial, which commenced on 24 September 2002, proceeded in a proper, but not completely suitable order.” 24.  In the period from 7 to 12 October 2004, the applicant and the co‑defendants requested that the Leave to Appeal Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) grant them leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret). Three of the defendants stated in their petitions that they would submit supplementary comments, which were received on 17 December 2004. In January 2005 the cases were sent to the prosecution, which gave its opinion on 29 March 2005. The applicant and the co‑defendants gave their comments in reply and at a meeting on 5 August 2005 the Leave to Appeal Board decided to refuse the requests. Letters of refusal were not sent out, however, as on 9 August 2005 counsel for one of the co-defendants stated that he wanted to submit supplementary comments in the light of a recent judgment in a similar case. 25.  Thereafter, due to an error, nothing happened in the case until 2 May 2006, when the police telephoned the Leave to Appeal Board and drew attention to the case. Subsequently, on his request, counsel for the relevant co-defendant who had wanted to submit supplementary comments did so on 2 and 13 June 2006. The applicant and the co-defendant were informed on 21 June 2006 that their requests for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court had been refused. At the same time the Leave to Appeal Board apologised for the length of the proceedings before it.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The first applicant, the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, is an autonomous Orthodox Church having canonical jurisdiction in the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The other applicants are Moldovan nationals who are members of the eparchic council of the first applicant. They are: Mr Petru Păduraru, Archbishop of Chişinău, Metropolitan of Bessarabia and living in Chişinău; Mr Petru Buburuz, prosyncellus, living in Chişinău; Mr Ioan Eşanu, protosyncellus, living in Călăraşi; Mr Victor Rusu, protopresbyter, living in Lipnic, Ocniţa; Mr Anatol Goncear, a priest living in Zubreşti, Străşeni; Mr Valeriu Cernei, a priest living in Sloveanca, Sângerei; Mr Gheorghe Ioniţă, a priest living in Crasnoarmeisc, Hânceşti; Mr Valeriu Matciac, a priest living in Chişinău; Mr Vlad Cubreacov, member of the Moldovan parliament and of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and living in Chişinău, Mr Anatol Telembici, living in Chişinău; and Mr Alexandru Magola, Chancellor of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, living in Chişinău. 10.  On 14 September 1992 the applicant natural persons joined together to form the applicant Church – the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia – a local, autonomous Orthodox Church. According to its articles of association, it took the place, from the canon-law point of view, of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia which had existed until 1944.\nIn December 1992 it was attached to the patriarchate of Bucharest. 11.  The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia adopted articles of association which determined, among other matters, the composition and administration of its organs, the training, recruitment and disciplinary supervision of its clergy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy and rules concerning its assets. In the preamble to the articles of association the principles governing the organisation and operation of the applicant Church are defined as follows:\n“The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia is a local, autonomous Orthodox Church attached to the patriarchate of Bucharest. The traditional ecclesiastical denomination ‘Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia’ is of a historically conventional nature and has no link with current or previous political situations. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia has no political activities and will have none in future. It shall carry on its work in the territory of the Republic of Moldova. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia shall have the status of an exarchate of the country. According to canon law, communities of the Moldovan diaspora may also become members. No charge shall be made for the accession of individual members and communities living abroad.\nIn the context of its activity in the Republic of Moldova, it shall respect the laws of the State and international human rights law. Communities abroad which have adhered for the purposes of canon law to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia shall establish relations with the authorities of the States concerned, complying with their legislation and the relevant provisions of international law. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia shall cooperate with the authorities of the State in the sphere of culture, education and social assistance. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia does not make any claim of an economic or any other kind against other Churches or religious organisations. The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia maintains ecumenical relations  with other Churches and religious movements and considers that fraternal dialogue is the only proper form of relationship between Churches.\nPriests of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia working in Moldovan territory shall be Moldovan citizens. When nationals of foreign States are invited to come to Moldova to carry on a religious activity or citizens of the Republic of Moldova are sent abroad for the same purpose, the legislation in force must be complied with.\nMembers of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia shall be citizens of the Republic of Moldova who have joined together on a voluntary basis to practise their religion in common, in accordance with their own convictions, and on the basis of the precepts of the Gospel, the Apostolic Canons, Orthodox canon law and Holy Tradition.\nReligious services held in all the communities of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia shall include special prayers for the authorities and institutions of the State, couched in the following terms: ‘We pray, as always, for our country, the Republic of Moldova, for its leaders and for its army. May God protect them and grant them peaceful and honest lives, spent in obedience to the canons of the Church.’ ” 12.  To date, the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia has established 117 communities in Moldovan territory, three communities in Ukraine, one in Lithuania, one in Latvia, two in the Russian Federation and one in Estonia. The communities in Latvia and Lithuania have been recognised by the State authorities and have legal personality.\nNearly one million Moldovan nationals are affiliated to the applicant Church, which has more than 160 clergy.\nThe Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia is recognised by all the Orthodox patriarchates with the exception of the patriarchate of Moscow. 13.  Pursuant to the Religious Denominations Act (Law no. 979-XII of 24 March 1992), which requires religious denominations active in Moldovan territory to be recognised by means of a government decision, the applicant Church applied for recognition on 8 October 1992. It received no reply. 14.  It made further applications on 25 January and 8 February 1995. On a date which has not been specified the Religious Affairs Department refused these applications. 15.  On 8 August 1995 the applicant Petru Păduraru, relying on Article 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which governs judicial review of administrative acts contrary to recognised rights), brought civil proceedings against the government in the Court of First Instance of the Buiucani district of Chişinău. He asked for the decisions refusing to recognise the applicant Church to be set aside. The court ruled in his favour and, on 12 September 1995, ordered recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. 16.  On 15 September 1995 the Buiucani public prosecutor appealed against the Buiucani Court of First Instance’s decision of 12 September 1995. 17.  On 18 October 1995 the Supreme Court of Justice set aside the decision of 12 September 1995 on the ground that the courts did not have jurisdiction to consider the applicant Church’s application for recognition. 18.  On 13 March 1996 the applicant Church filed a fresh application for recognition with the government. On 24 May 1996, having received no reply, the applicants brought civil proceedings against the government in the Chişinău Court of First Instance, seeking recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. On 19 July 1996 that court gave judgment against the applicants. 19.  On 20 August 1996 the applicants again filed an application for recognition, which went unanswered. 20.  The applicants appealed to the Chişinău Municipal Court (Tribunal municipiului) against the judgment of 19 July 1996. In a judgment of 21 May 1997, against which no appeal lay, the Municipal Court quashed the impugned judgment and allowed the applicants’ claim. 21.  However, following a reform of the Moldovan judicial system, the file was sent to the Moldovan Court of Appeal for trial de novo. 22.  On 4 March 1997 the applicants again applied to the government for recognition. On 4 June 1997, not having received any reply, they referred the matter to the Court of Appeal, seeking recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, relying on their freedom of conscience and freedom of association for the purpose of practising their religion. The resulting action was joined to the case already pending before the Court of Appeal. 23.  In the Court of Appeal the government alleged that the case concerned an ecclesiastical conflict within the Orthodox Church in Moldova (the Metropolitan Church of Moldova), which could be resolved only by the Romanian and Russian Orthodox Churches, and that any recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia would provoke conflicts in the Orthodox community. 24.  The Court of Appeal allowed the applicants’ claim in a decision of 19 August 1997. It pointed out, firstly, that Article 31 §§ 1 and 2 of the Moldovan Constitution guaranteed freedom of conscience and that that freedom should be exercised in a spirit of tolerance and respect for others. In addition, the various denominations were free to organise themselves according to their articles of association, subject to compliance with the laws of the Republic. Secondly, it noted that from 8 October 1992 the applicant Church, acting pursuant to sections 14 and 15 of the Religious Denominations Act, had filed with the government a number of applications for recognition, but that no reply had been forthcoming. By a letter of 19 July 1995 the Prime Minister had informed the applicants that the government could not consider the application of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia without interfering with the activity of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. The Court of Appeal further noted that while the applicant Church’s application for recognition had been ignored, the Metropolitan Church of Moldova had been recognised by the government on 7 February 1993, as an eparchy dependent on the patriarchate of Moscow.\nThe Court of Appeal dismissed the government’s argument that recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova made it possible to satisfy the wishes of all Orthodox believers. It pointed out that the term denomination was not to be reserved for catholicism or orthodoxy, but should embrace all faiths and various manifestations of religious feelings by their adherents, in the form of prayers, ritual, religious services or divine worship. It noted that from the point of view of canon law the Metropolitan Church of Moldova was part of the Russian Orthodox Church and therefore dependent on the patriarchate of Moscow, whereas the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was attached to the Romanian Orthodox Church and therefore dependent on the patriarchate of Bucharest.\nThe Court of Appeal held that the government’s refusal to recognise the applicant Church was contrary to the freedom of religion, as guaranteed not only by the Religious Denominations Act but also by Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 5 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to all of which Moldova was party. Noting that the representative of the government had taken the view that the applicant Church’s articles of association complied with domestic legislation, the Court of Appeal ordered the government to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and to ratify its articles of association. 25.  The government appealed against the above decision on the ground that the courts did not have jurisdiction to try such a case. 26.  In a judgment of 9 December 1997 the Supreme Court of Justice set aside the decision of 19 August 1997 and dismissed the applicants’ action on the grounds that it was out of time and manifestly ill-founded.\nIt noted that, according to Article 238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one month was allowed for an appeal against a government decision alleged to infringe a recognised right. The time allowed began to run either on the date of the decision announcing the government’s refusal or, if the they did not reply, one month after the lodging of the application. The Supreme Court of Justice noted that the applicants had submitted their application to the government on 4 March 1997 and lodged their appeal on 4 June 1997; it accordingly ruled their action out of time.\nIt went on to say that, in any event, the government’s refusal of the applicants’ application had not infringed their freedom of religion as guaranteed by international treaties, and in particular by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because they were Orthodox Christians and could manifest their beliefs within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, which the government had recognised by a decision of 7 February 1993.\nThe Supreme Court of Justice considered that the case was simply an administrative dispute within a single Church, which could be settled only by the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, since any interference by the State in the matter might aggravate the situation. It held that the State’s refusal to intervene in this conflict was compatible with Article 9 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights.\nLastly, it noted that the applicants could manifest their beliefs freely, that they had access to Churches and that they had not adduced evidence of any obstacle whatsoever to the practice of their religion. 27.  On 15 March 1999 the applicants again applied to the government for recognition. 28.  By a letter dated 20 July 1999 the Prime Minister refused on the ground that the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was not a religious denomination in the legal sense but a schismatic group within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova.\nHe informed the applicants that the government would not allow their application until a religious solution to the conflict had been found, following the negotiations in progress between the patriarchates of Russia and Romania. 29.  On 10 January 2000 the applicants lodged a further application for recognition with the government. The Court has not been informed of the outcome of that application. 30.  Since the adoption of the Religious Denominations Act, the government has recognised a number of denominations, some of which are listed below.\nOn 7 February 1993 the government ratified the articles of association of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, attached to the patriarchate of Moscow. On 28 August 1995 it recognised the Orthodox Eparchy of the Old Christian Liturgy of Chişinău, attached to the Russian Orthodox Church of the Old Liturgy, whose head office was in Moscow.\nOn 22 July 1993 the government recognised the “Seventh-Day Adventist Church”. On 19 July 1994 it decided to recognise the “Seventh-Day Adventist Church – Reform Movement”.\nOn 9 June 1994 the government ratified the articles of association of the “Federation of Jewish (Religious) Communities” and on 1 September 1997 those of the “Union of Communities of Messianic Jews”. 31.  Since it was first set up, the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia has regularly applied to the Moldovan authorities to explain the reasons for its creation and to seek their support in obtaining official recognition. 32.  The government asked several ministries for their opinion about whether to recognise the applicant Church.\nOn 16 October 1992 the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs informed the government that it was favourable to the recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.\nOn 14 November 1992 the Ministry of Financial Affairs informed the government that it could see no objection to the recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.\nOn 8 February 1993 the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection declared that it was favourable to the recognition of the applicant Church.\nIn a letter of 8 February 1993 the Ministry of Education emphasised the need for the rapid recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia in order to avoid any discrimination against its adherents, while pointing out that its articles of association could be improved upon.\nOn 15 February 1993 the Secretariat of State for Privatisation stated that it was favourable to the recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, while proposing certain amendments to its articles of association. 33.  On 11 March 1993, in reply to a letter from the Bishop of Bălţi, writing on behalf of the Metropolitan of Bessarabia, the Moldovan parliament’s Cultural and Religious Affairs Committee noted that the delay in registering the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was aggravating the social and political situation in Moldova, even though its actions and articles of association complied with Moldovan legislation. The committee therefore asked the government to recognise the applicant Church. 34.  A memorandum from the Religious Affairs Department, dated 21 November 1994, summarised the situation as follows:\n“For nearly two years an ecclesiastical group known under the name of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia has been operating illegally in Moldovan territory. No positive result has been obtained in spite of our sustained efforts to put a stop to its activity (discussions between members of the so-called Church, priests, Mr G.E., Mr I.E. ..., representatives of the State and believers from the localities in which its adherents are active, Mr G.G., Minister of State, and Mr N.A., Deputy Speaker; all the organs of local and national administrative bodies have been informed of the illegal nature of the group, etc.).\nIn addition, although priests and adherents of the Church have been forbidden to take part in divine service, for failure to comply with canon law, they have nevertheless continued their illegal activities in the churches and have also been invited to officiate on the occasion of various public activities organised, for example, by the Ministries of Defence and Health. The management of the Bank of Moldova and the National Customs Service have not acted on our request for liquidation of the group’s bank accounts and strict supervision of its priests during their numerous crossings of the border.\nThe activity of the so-called Church is not limited to attracting new adherents and propagating the ideas of the Romanian Church. It also has all the means necessary for the work of a Church, it appoints priests, including nationals of other States ..., trains clergy, builds churches and many, many other things.\nIt should also be mentioned that the group’s activity (more political than religious) is sustained by forces both from within the country (by certain mayors and their villages, by opposition representatives, and even by some MPs) and from outside (by decision no. 612 of 12 November 1993 the Romanian government granted it 399,400,000 lei to finance its activity ...\nThe activity of this group is causing religious and socio-political tension in Moldova and will have unforeseeable repercussions ...\nThe Religious Affairs Department notes:\n(a)  Within Moldovan territory there is no territorial administrative unit with the name of Bessarabia which might justify setting up a religious group named ‘Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia’. The creation of such a group and recognition of its articles of association would constitute a wrongful anti-State act – a negation of the sovereign and independent State which the Republic of Moldova constitutes.\n(b)  The Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was set up to take the place of the former Eparchy of Bessarabia, founded in 1925 and recognised by Decree no. 1942 promulgated on 4 May 1925 by the King of Romania. Legal recognition of the validity of those acts would imply recognition of their present-day effects within Moldovan territory.\n(c)  All Orthodox parishes in Moldovan territory have been registered as constituent parts of the of the Orthodox Church of Moldova (the Metropolitan Church of Moldova), whose articles of association were ratified by the government in its decision no. 719 of 17 November 1993. \nIn conclusion: 1.  If nothing is done to put a stop to the activity of the so-called Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, the result will be destabilisation not just of the Orthodox Church but of the whole of Moldovan society. 2.  Recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia (Old Style) and ratification of its articles of association by the government would automatically entail the disappearance of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova.” 35.  On 20 February 1996, following a question in Parliament asked by the applicant Vlad Cubreacov, a Moldovan MP, the Deputy Prime Minister wrote a letter to the Speaker explaining the reasons for the government’s refusal to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. He said that the applicant Church was not a denomination distinct from the Orthodox Church but a schismatic group within the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and that any interference by the State to resolve the conflict would be contrary to the Moldovan Constitution. He pointed out that the political party to which Mr Cubreacov belonged had publicly expressed disapproval of the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of 9 December 1997, that Mr Cubreacov himself had criticised the government for their refusal to recognise “this phantom metropolitan Church” and that he continued to support it by exerting pressure in any way he could, through statements to the media and approaches to the national authorities and international organisations. The letter ended with the assertion that the “feverish debates” about the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia were purely political. 36.  On 29 June 1998 the Religious Affairs Department sent the Deputy Prime Minister its opinion on the question of recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. \nIt pointed out in particular that not since 1940 had there been an administrative unit in Moldova with the name “Bessarabia” and that the Orthodox Church had been recognised on 17 November 1993 under the name of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, of which the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was a “schismatic element”. It accordingly considered that recognition of the applicant Church would represent interference by the State in the affairs of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, and that this would aggravate the “unhealthy” situation in which the latter Church was placed. It considered that the articles of association of the applicant Church could not be ratified since they merely “reproduce[d] those of the Orthodox Church of another country”. 37.  On 22 June 1998 the Ministry of Justice informed the government that it did not consider the articles of association of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia to be contrary to Moldovan legislation. 38.  By letters of 25 June and 6 July 1998 the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection and the Ministry of Financial Affairs again informed the government that they could see no objection to recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. 39.  On 7 July 1998 the Ministry of Education informed the government that it supported recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. 40.  On 15 September 1998 the Cultural and Religious Affairs Committee of the Moldovan parliament sent the government, for information, a copy of a report by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, which showed that on 1 January 1998 there were at least four different Orthodox Churches in Russia, some of which had their head offices abroad. The Committee expressed the hope that the above-mentioned report would assist the government to resolve certain similar problems, particularly the problem concerning the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia’s application for recognition. 41.  In a letter sent on 10 January 2000 to the applicant Vlad Cubreacov, the Deputy Attorney-General expressed the view that the government’s refusal to reply to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia’s application for recognition was contrary to the freedom of religion and to Articles 6, 11 and 13 of the Convention. 42.  In a decision of 26 September 2001 the government approved the amended version of Article 1 of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova’s articles of association, worded as follows:\n“The Orthodox Church of Moldova is an independent Church and is the successor in law to ... the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. While complying with the canons and precepts of the Holy Apostles, Fathers of the Church and the Ecumenical Synods, and the decisions of the Universal Apostolic Church, the Orthodox Church of Moldova operates within the territory of the State of the Republic of Moldova in accordance with the provisions of the legislation in force.” 43.  In a letter received by the Court on 21 September 2001 the President of the Republic of Moldova expressed his concern about the possibility that the applicant Church might be recognised. He said that the issue could be resolved only by negotiation between the Russian and Romanian patriarchates, since it would be in breach of Moldovan legislation if the State authorities were to intervene in the conflict. Moreover, if the authorities were to recognise the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, this would have unforeseeable consequences for Moldovan society. 44.  In its Opinion no. 188 (1995) to the Committee of Ministers on Moldova’s application for membership of the Council of Europe, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted the Republic of Moldova’s willingness to fulfil the commitments it had entered into when it lodged its application for membership on 20 April 1993.\nThese commitments, which had been reaffirmed before the adoption of the above-mentioned opinion, included an undertaking to “confirm complete freedom of worship for all citizens without discrimination” and to “ensure a peaceful solution to the dispute between the Moldovan Orthodox Church and the Bessarabian Orthodox Church”. 45.  In its annual report for 1997 the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights criticised the Moldovan government’s refusal to recognise the Metropoltitan Church of Bessarabia. The report stated that as a result of this refusal many churches had been transferred to the ownership of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. It drew attention to allegations that members of the applicant Church’s clergy had been subjected to physical violence without receiving the slightest protection from the authorities. 46.  In its 1998 report the Federation criticised the Religious Denominations Act, and in particular section 4 thereof, which denied any protection of the freedom of religion to the adherents of religions not recognised by a government decision. It pointed out that this section was a discriminatory instrument which enabled the government to make it difficult for the adherents of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia to bring legal proceedings with a view to reclaiming church buildings which belonged to them. In addition, the report mentioned acts of violence and vandalism to which the applicant Church and its members were subjected. 47.  The applicants reported a number of incidents during which members of the clergy or adherents of the applicant Church had allegedly been intimidated or prevented from manifesting their beliefs. 48.  The Government did not dispute that these incidents had taken place. 49.  In 1994 the assembly of Christians of the village of Gârbova (Ocniţa) decided to join the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. The Metropolitan of Bessarabia therefore appointed T.B. as the parish priest. 50.  On 7 January 1994, when T.B. went to the church to celebrate the Christmas mass, the mayor of Gârbova, T.G., forbade him to enter. When the villagers came out of the church to protest, the mayor locked the door and, without further explanation, ordered T.B. to leave the village within twenty-four hours. 51.  The mayor summoned a new assembly of the Christians of the village on 9 January 1994. On that date he informed the villagers that T.B. had been stripped of his post as the village priest because he belonged to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. He introduced a new parish priest who belonged to the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. The assembly rejected the mayor’s proposal. 52.  The mayor called a new assembly of the Christians of the village on 11 January 1994. On that date he introduced to the villagers a third priest, also from the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. He was likewise rejected by the assembly, which expressed its preference for T.B. 53.  In those circumstances, S.M., the chairman of the parish council, was summoned by the mayor and the manager of the local collective farm, who urged him to persuade the villagers to accept T.B.’s removal from office. The chairman of the parish council refused. 54.  On 13 January 1994 S.M. was arrested on his way to church. He was pinned down by five policemen, then thrown into a police van and taken first to the town hall, where he was savagely beaten. He was then taken into police custody at Ocniţa police station, where he was upbraided for showing favour to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. He was not informed of the reasons for his arrest. He was released after being detained for three days. 55.  Following these incidents T.B. left the parish. 56.  In a letter of 20 May 1994 the vice-president of the provincial council for the province (raion) of Făleşti rebuked G.E., priest of the parish of Saint Nicholas and a member of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, for having celebrated the Easter service on 9 May 1994 in the town cemetery, that being an act contrary to the Religious Denominations Act because the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was illegal. For the same reason he was forbidden to conduct divine service in future whether inside a church or in the open air. The vice-chairman of the provincial council warned G.E. not to implement a plan he had to invite priests from Romania to attend divine service on 22 May 1994, given that he had not first obtained official authorisation, as required by section 22 of the Religious Denominations Act. 57.  In November 1994 G.E. was fined 90 lei (MDL) for officiating as a priest of an unrecognised Church, the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. The Court of First Instance upheld the penalty, but reduced the amount of the fine to MDL 54 on the ground that G.E. did not hold any office within the Church concerned. 58.  On 27 October 1996, before the beginning of divine service in the parish church, several persons, led by a priest of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, violently assaulted G.E., drawing blood, and asked him to join the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. They also attacked the priest’s wife, tearing her clothes. 59.  G.E. managed to escape into the church, where the service was taking place, but he was pursued by his assailants, who began to fight with the congregation. A policeman sent to the scene managed to persuade the aggressors to leave the church. 60.  On 15 November 1996 the parish meeting published a declaration expressing the parishioners’ indignation about the acts of violence and intimidation to which members of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia were subjected, requested the authorities to cease to condone such acts and demanded official recognition for their Church. 61.  On 6 June 1998 the applicant Petru Păduraru, Metropolitan of Bessarabia, received two anonymous telegrams warning him not to go to Făleşti. He did not lodge any complaint about this. 62.  On 11 July 1994 the applicant Ioan Eşanu, priest of the parish of Saint Alexander, was summoned by the president of the Călăraşi provincial council to a discussion about the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.\nThat discussion was also attended by the mayor of Călăraşi, the secretary of the provincial council and the parish clerk. The president of the provincial council criticised the applicant for his membership of the applicant Church, which made him a fellow-traveller of those who supported union with Romania. He then gave him one week to produce a certificate attesting to recognition of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, failing which he would have to leave the parish. 63.  In a letter of 24 November 1994 to the Metropolitan of Bessarabia, V.B., a Romanian national, priest of the parish of Cania, reported that he was under intense pressure from the authorities of the province of Cantemir, who had upbraided him for belonging to the applicant Church. 64.  On 19 January 1995 V.B. was summoned to the police station in Cantemir, where he was served with a government decision cancelling his residence and work permits and ordering him to leave Moldovan territory within seventy-two hours and to hand over the permits concerned to the relevant authorities. 65.  On 5 April 1995 Vasile Petrache, priest of the parish of Saint Nicholas, informed the Metropolitan of Bessarabia that the windows of the church, which was affiliated to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, had been broken during incidents that had taken place on the nights of 27 to 28 March and 3 to 4 April 1995. 66.  A similar attack occurred in the night of 13 to 14 May 1995. Vasile Petrache lodged a complaint on each occasion, asking the police to intervene in order to prevent further attacks taking place. 67.  In the night of 3 to 4 September 1996 a grenade was thrown by unknown persons into the house of the Metropolitan of Bessarabia, causing damage. The applicant lodged a complaint about this at the police station in Chişinău. 68.  In autumn 1999, after the death of Vasile Petrache, the Metropolitan of Bessarabia appointed the applicant Petru Buburuz as the parish priest of Saint Nicholas.\nFollowing that appointment the church of Saint Nicholas was occupied by representatives of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, who locked it and prevented the adherents of the applicant Church from entering. They also took possession of the parish documents and seal. 69.  On 8 December 1999 the police issued a summons against Petru Buburuz for organising a public meeting in front of Saint Nicholas’s church on 28 November 1999 without first obtaining the authorisation required for public meetings. 70.  On 28 January 2000 Judge S. of the Buiucani Court of First Instance discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had not organised a meeting but had merely celebrated a mass in his capacity as priest at the request of about a hundred believers who were present. Judge S. also noted that the mass had been celebrated on the square, as the church door had been locked. 71.  In the night of 3 to 4 September 1996 a grenade was thrown into the house of P.G., a member of the clergy of the applicant Church. On 28 September 1996 P.G. was threatened by six persons unknown to him. He immediately lodged a criminal complaint. 72.  In a letter of 22 November 1996 to the President of Moldova, the Minister of the Interior expressed his regret about the slow progress of the investigations into P.G.’s complaints and informed him that on that account disciplinary penalties had been imposed on the police officers responsible for the inquiry. 73.  In a report of 22 June 1998 to the Metropolitan of Bessarabia the parish clerk complained of the actions of one M., a priest of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, who was trying, with the help of the mayor of Bălţi, to oust P.B., a priest of the applicant Church, and have the village church closed. \nNo complaint was lodged with the authorities on this subject. 74.  On 23 August 1999, according to the applicants, Police Captain R., claiming to be acting on the orders of his superior officer, Lieutenant-Colonel B.D., placed seals on the door of the church of Cucioaia (Ghiliceni) and forbade V.R., a priest of the applicant Church, who regularly officiated there, to enter and continue to conduct divine service. After a complaint by the people of the village, the applicant Vlad Cubreacov wrote to the Prime Minister on 26 August 1998 to ask him for an explanation.\nThe incident was also reported in the 26 August 1998 issue of the newspaper Flux. \nThe Government asserted that following the above complaint the Ministry of the Interior ordered an inquiry. The inquiry showed that it was not a policeman but a member of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, Archdeacon D.S., who had placed the seals on the church door. 75.  On 11 April 1998, at about midnight, the parish priest was woken by persons unknown to him who were trying to force open the presbytery door. He was threatened with death if he did not give up the idea of creating a new parish in Cahul. 76.  On 13 April 1998 he was threatened with death by one I.G., a priest of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. On the same day he complained to the police. 77.  After leaving the Metropolitan Church of Moldova in July 1997 to join the applicant Church, the priest of the parish of Mărinici and his family received threats on a number of occasions from various priests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. The windows of his house were broken and, on 2 February 1998, he was attacked in the street and beaten by strangers, who told him not to meddle with “those things” anymore. 78.  The parish priest consulted a forensic physician, who issued a certificate detailing the injuries that had been inflicted on him. He subsequently lodged a criminal complaint with the Cecani police. 79.  The Moldovan newspapers regularly reported incidents described as acts of intimidation against the clergy and worshippers of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. 80.  On 6 December 1998 one V.J., a priest of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, and other persons accompanying him broke open the door of the village church and occupied it. When the parish priest, V.S., a member of the applicant Church, arrived to take the Sunday service he was prevented from entering. The stand-off continued until the villagers belonging to the applicant Church arrived on the scene. 81.  In a report sent to the Metropolitan of Bessarabia on 2 February 2001, N.A., priest of the parish of Leova, stated that the church in Leova had suffered acts of vandalism and that he himself and other parishioners had been the target of public acts of intimidation and death threats from one G.C., a priest of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova. Such acts were repeated on a number of further occasions without any protection being offered by the municipal council to parishioners who were members of the applicant Church. 82.  The Christians of the village of Floreni joined the applicant Church on 12 March 1996 and formed a local community of that Church on 24 March 1996. They also had a chapel built where mass could be celebrated. 83.  On 29 December 1997 the government adopted decision no. 1203, granting the Metropolitan Church of Moldova a right of use in respect of the land on which the chapel built by the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia was situated. That decision was confirmed by a decree of 9 March 1998 issued by the Floreni municipal council. 84.  Following a request by the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia for the right to use the land concerned, in view of the fact that its chapel was built on it, the National Land Registry replied to the Church’s adherents in the parish of Floreni that “the local public authorities [were] not able to adopt such a decision since the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia [had] no recognised legal personality in Moldova”. 85.  On 17 February 2000 the Metropolitan of Bessarabia asked the government Committee for Humanitarian Aid to authorise entry into Moldovan territory of goods to the value of 9,000 United States dollars (USD) sent from the United States, and to classify the goods concerned as humanitarian aid. That request was refused on 25 February 2000. 86.  On 25 February 2000 the applicant Vlad Cubreacov asked the committee to inform him of the reasons for its refusal. He pointed out that the gift (of second-hand clothes), sent by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, had been given a transit visa by the Ukrainian authorities, who accepted that it was a humanitarian gift. However, the goods had been held up by the Moldovan customs since 18 February 2000, so that the addressee was obliged to pay USD 150 per day of storage. The applicant repeated his request for the goods to be allowed to enter Moldovan territory as a humanitarian gift. 87.  On 28 February 2000 the Deputy Prime Minister of Moldova authorised the entry of this humanitarian gift into Moldovan territory. 88.  Vasile Petrache, a priest of the applicant Church, was refused a retirement pension on the ground that he was not a minister of a recognised denomination.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": true, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Paris. 7.  On 21 June 2005 the French first-instance court of Paris pronounced the divorce of the applicant and his wife, Ms K.O., a Hungarian national. It granted the parents joint custody of their daughter, born in October 2000, and placed her with the mother, regulating the applicant’s access rights. At that time, the mother and the child lived in Paris. This decision was upheld by the second-instance French court on 29 November 2006. 8.  Meanwhile, on 19 September 2005, Ms K.O. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant with the French authorities, alleging that he had sexually abused their child. She further requested the suspension of the applicant’s custody and access rights. However, in the absence of any evidence supporting her allegations, the complaint was dismissed on 2 November 2005. 9.  On 29 December 2007, the mother took the child to Hungary for the holidays. The applicant was aware of this. However, in a letter dated 5 January 2008 she informed the applicant that she had enrolled their daughter in a Hungarian school without his consent, with no intention to return her to France. 10.  On 12 March 2008 the applicant brought an action against the mother before the Hungarian Pest Central District Court. He requested the court to establish the abduction of their child by the mother and to order her to return the child to him, relying on Council Regulation (EC) no. 2201 of 2003 concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and Matters of Parental Responsibility (“EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments”) and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”). The District Court established that the habitual residence of the child was in France, because she had the centre of her life there. Moreover, it observed that having had joint custody over their daughter, neither parent could have decided on the habitual residence of the child without the approval of the other parent. The District Court ordered a forensic expert examination of the parties and their daughter. The expert report concluded that abuse or indecency against the child had not been probable and therefore there were no reasons to disregard the obligation to order her return based on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. Thus, on 30 May 2008 this court established the abduction of the child and ordered the mother to take her back to France by 6 June 2008, or to hand her over to the applicant in Hungary on 10 June 2008. 11.  On 2 September 2008 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision, but established that the time-limit to return the child back to France was 27 September 2008, or 1 October 2008 for handing her over in Hungary. (For the execution of this judgment, see heading 3 below.) 12.  The mother lodged a petition for review of the final decision with the Supreme Court, which shared the Regional Court’s view that the legal conditions for the child’s continued stay in Hungary were absent. It assessed forensic psychology reports and concluded that the child was still emotionally attached to her father as well, thus her return to France would not cause her serious trauma. On 18 November 2008 the Supreme Court therefore upheld the Regional Court’s decision. 13.  Following the final judgment delivered by the Regional Court (see paragraph 11 above), the Pest Central District Court ordered the enforcement of the judgment for the return of the child on 15 October 2008. 14.  On 29 October and 26 November 2008 the bailiff unsuccessfully called on Ms K.O. to comply voluntarily with the court order. 15.  On 5 December 2008 the bailiff referred the case file to the Heves District Court in order for it to establish the method of enforcement. 16.  On 17 December 2008 the mother requested the suspension of the enforcement proceedings. The request was dismissed by the Hungarian Heves District Court on 19 December 2008. It further ordered her to pay a fine of 50,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 180 euros (EUR)) and warned her to comply with her obligations. It pointed out that the court could not review an enforceable decision. This decision was upheld by the Heves County Regional Court on 12 February 2009. 17.  Upon the bailiff’s request, the mother’s living conditions were examined by the Guardianship Authority. The attempts to promote the mother’s voluntary compliance with her obligations were without success. 18.  Moreover, Ms K.O. initiated an action before the Pest Central District Court to have the enforcement proceedings terminated. The District Court dismissed her action on 14 January 2009. 19.  On 27 April 2009 the Heves County Regional Court ordered the enforcement of the child’s return with police assistance. The decision became final on 18 June 2009. 20.  On 20 July 2009 the bailiff invited the mother to ensure the child’s return during the on-site proceedings to be effected on 29 July 2009. 21.  In the meantime, on 31 March 2009 the first-instance court of Paris had issued a European arrest warrant against Ms K.O. for the offence of change of custody of a minor. On 27 July 2009 she was arrested in Hungary. 22.  On 28 July 2009 the mother was released by the Budapest Regional Court, which refused to enforce the European arrest warrant. It observed that criminal proceedings were pending against Ms K.O. before the Hungarian authorities for the same act (see paragraphs 40–41 below), which rendered the European arrest warrant obsolete. 23.  On 29 July 2009 the bailiff attempted to hold on-site proceedings, which were unsuccessful as Ms K.O. and her daughter had absconded. The Heves Police Department declared them missing and issued a warrant. 24.  On 19 October 2009 the bailiff effected on-site proceedings at the primary school of the child and established that the child had not attended the classes during the school year. 25.  On 28 October 2009 the bailiff attempted to locate the mother and the child in Eger. However, it was recognised that the address given was non-existent. With police assistance, he searched all potential buildings in the neighbourhood, without success. 26.  Moreover, the police authority carried out regular inspections at the mother’s registered address (on 10, 13, 14, 23 September 2009, 14 January and 18 February 2010) in order to detect potential contact between the mother and her parents. 27.  On 17 February 2010 the bailiff ordered the stay of the enforcement proceedings as the mother and the child were staying at an unknown location. 28.  In the spring of 2010, following a request for mutual legal assistance made by the investigating judge of the French appellate court, the authorities gathered information on the mother from telecommunication providers, contacted Ms K.O.’s former employer, the Mayor’s Office of the registered place of her residence, and heard several witnesses. 29.  The Police Headquarters also monitored the database of the National Health Insurance Fund in order to obtain data as to any potential medical service provided for the mother or the child. 30.  The child’s school was also being monitored. Exemption from class attendance was granted by the school principal on 23 November 2009. It was established that the child failed to appear at exams scheduled for 4 June and 18 August 2010. 31.  The Eger Police Headquarters regularly (on 1, 4, 13 September, 15 October 2009, 20 January, 19 February, 19 March, 24 April, 27 May, 22 June and 25 July 2010) checked the public areas and places as well as the mother’s former address in Eger as, according to certain information, the mother is allegedly residing in Eger. 32.  To date, these measures have not led to locating Ms K.O. or her daughter. 33.  On 15 April 2008 the Paris Court of Appeal issued a certificate concerning the applicant’s access rights established by the French decision of 29 November 2006 (see paragraph 7 above) based on Article 41(2) of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments. 34.  The applicant thereafter requested the Hungarian Eger District Court to enforce his access rights. The case was transferred to the competent guardianship authority on 29 April 2008. The Gyöngyös District Guardianship Authority dismissed his request on 23 May 2008. It established its lack of jurisdiction, relying on Article 10 of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments, as proceedings concerning the child’s abduction were pending before the Pest Central District Court (see paragraph 10 above). 35.  On 12 January 2009 the Heves County Prosecutor’s Office raised an objection against this decision, finding it unlawful. It relied on Article 41 of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments, arguing that the Guardianship Authority not only had jurisdiction, but also a legal obligation to enforce the applicant’s access rights. It therefore proposed that the Guardianship Authority’s decision be quashed. 36.  The Gyöngyös District Guardianship Authority did not accept this proposal and submitted it for review to the North-Hungarian Regional Administrative Office, which shared the Guardianship Authority’s opinion establishing lack of jurisdiction. The applicant sought judicial review of this decision before the Heves County Regional Court. On 27 May 2009 the court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that it would legalise the child’s unlawful retention in Hungary by enforcing his access rights and would be contrary to Article 16 of the Hague Convention. 37.  The applicant’s access rights have not been respected ever since. 38.  At the applicant’s request, but in Ms K.O.’s absence, the French first-instance court of Créteil issued a preliminary injunction placing the child with the applicant and granting him exclusive custody rights on 14 April 2008. 39.  In 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Eger District Court for the recognition of this judgment in Hungary. Following a remittal, the case is currently pending before the Heves Country Regional Court. 40.  On 1 June 2009 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Eger District Public Prosecutor’s Office against the mother. Relying on section 195(4) of the Criminal Code, he considered that Ms K.O. was guilty of endangering a minor due to not having complied with a final judgment obliging her to hand over their daughter to him. 41.  The Heves County Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the complaint on 24 June 2009. It considered that the constitutive elements of the crime had not been fully present as the mother should have been fined for not respecting access rights. However, the fine imposed on her (see paragraph 16) served to enforce her obligation to hand over the child to the applicant. 42.  In the meantime, in the autumn of 2008 the applicant had filed a criminal complaint with the Hungarian authorities for change of custody of a minor, based on section 194 of the Criminal Code. On 29 September 2009 the Heves District Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered investigations. However, finding that no enforceable decision existed concerning exclusive custody of the child, it terminated the investigations on 8 January 2010. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed. 43.  On 14 January 2009 the applicant submitted a complaint to the European Commission, claiming a violation of the Regulation (EC) no. 1393/2007 on the Service in the Member States of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“EC Regulation on Service of Documents”), the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. On 3 November 2009 the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to the Hungarian authorities concerning the possible violation of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments. Reply to the letter of formal notice was submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 2009. The proceedings are still pending. 44.  This Regulation entered into force on 1 March 2005 (with the exception of Denmark) and has direct effect in the Member States of the European Union, including Hungary.\nArticle 1 - Scope\n“1. This Regulation shall apply, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal, in civil matters relating to:\n...\n(b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility. 2. The matters referred to in paragraph 1(b) may, in particular, deal with:\n(a) rights of custody and rights of access”\nArticle 2 - Definitions\n“For the purposes of this Regulation: 11. the term \"wrongful removal or retention\" shall mean a child’s removal or retention where:\n(a) it is in breach of rights of custody acquired by judgment or by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect under the law of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and\n(b) provided that, at the time of removal or retention, the rights of custody were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. Custody shall be considered to be exercised jointly when, pursuant to a judgment or by operation of law, one holder of parental responsibility cannot decide on the child’s place of residence without the consent of another holder of parental responsibility.”\nArticle 10 - Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction\n“In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another Member State and:\n(a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention;\nor\n(b) the child has resided in that other Member State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child is settled in his or her new environment and at least one of the following conditions is met:\n(i) within one year after the holder of rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return has been lodged before the competent authorities of the Member State where the child has been removed or is being retained;\n(ii) a request for return lodged by the holder of rights of custody has been withdrawn and no new request has been lodged within the time limit set in paragraph (i);\n(iii) a case before the court in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention has been closed pursuant to Article 11(7);\n(iv) a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child has been issued by the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention.”\nArticle 11 - Return of the child\n“1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter \"the 1980 Hague Convention\"), in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply. ... 3. A court to which an application for return of a child is made as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall act expeditiously in proceedings on the application, using the most expeditious procedures available in national law.\nWithout prejudice to the first subparagraph, the court shall, except where exceptional circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the application is lodged. ... 8. Notwithstanding a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, any subsequent judgment which requires the return of the child issued by a court having jurisdiction under this Regulation shall be enforceable in accordance with Section 4 of Chapter III below in order to secure the return of the child.”\nArticle 21 - Recognition of a judgment\n“1. A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required.”\nArticle 23 - Grounds of non-recognition for judgments relating to parental responsibility\n“A judgment relating to parental responsibility shall not be recognised:\n...\n(c) where it was given in default of appearance if the person in default was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable that person to arrange for his or her defence unless it is determined that such person has accepted the judgment unequivocally; ...”\nArticle 40 - Scope\n“1. This Section shall apply to:\n(a) rights of access;\nand\n(b) the return of a child entailed by a judgment given pursuant to Article 11(8).”\nArticle 41 - Rights of access\n“1. The rights of access referred to in Article 40(1)(a) granted in an enforceable judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in accordance with paragraph 2.\nEven if national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law of a judgment granting access rights, the court of origin may declare that the judgment shall be enforceable, notwithstanding any appeal.”\nArticle 42 - Return of the child\n“1. The return of a child referred to in Article 40(1)(b) entailed by an enforceable judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in accordance with paragraph 2.\nEven if national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, notwithstanding any appeal, of a judgment requiring the return of the child mentioned in Article 11(b)(8), the court of origin may declare the judgment enforceable.”\nArticle 47 - Enforcement procedure\n“1. The enforcement procedure is governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement. 2. Any judgment delivered by a court of another Member State and declared to be enforceable in accordance with Section 2 or certified in accordance with Article 41(1) or Article 42(1) shall be enforced in the Member State of enforcement in the same conditions as if it had been delivered in that Member State.”\nArticle 60 - Relations with certain multilateral conventions\n“In relations between Member States, this Regulation shall take precedence over the following Conventions in so far as they concern matters governed by this Regulation:\n(e) the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.” 45.  Hungary acceded to this Convention on 7 April 1986, promulgating it in Law-Decree no. 14 of 1986.\nArticle 12\n“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained ... and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. ...”\nArticle 13\n“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -\n...\nb)  there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”\nArticle 16\n“After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice.” 46.  According to section 172(1) of the Act, the obligor is first called to voluntarily fulfil his or her obligation within a given deadline. In case of non-compliance, the bailiff immediately submits the case file to the competent court in order to determine the method of enforcement.\nThe possible methods of enforcement are governed by section 174 of the Act and include the possibility to impose a fine up to HUF 500,000 which may be renewed. Moreover, the court may order the enforcement with police assistance. In such cases, the bailiff sets a date for the on-site proceedings and informs the competent guardianship authority, the obligor, the applicant and the police. If the child to be returned cannot be found at his or her place of residence, the bailiff orders a search warrant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Ljubečna. 6.  On 14 February 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against her brother before the Ljubljana District Court seeking the reimbursement of costs for taking care of their mother, which in accordance with a signed agreement was a shared responsibility of both. 7.  On 8 July 2000 the first-instance court held an opening hearing. 8.  On 3 October 2002 a hearing was held and a judgment delivered. The applicant’s request was rejected. She appealed. 9.  On 22 January 2003 the Ljubljana Higher Court delivered a judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 10.  On 29 May 2003 a hearing was cancelled on the request of the applicant. 11.  Between 16 June 2003 and 6 October 2003 two hearings were held. At the last hearing the first-instance court delivered a judgment upholding the applicant’s request in part. An appeal was lodged. 12.  On 2 March 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court delivered a judgment upholding the first-instance judgment in part and remitting the question on the amount of interests for re-examination. 13.  On 5 July 2005 a hearing was cancelled on the request of the applicant, since the defendant had paid the amount due. 14.  On 12 July 2005 the first-instance court issued a decision on partial withdrawal of the claim and on the amount of costs of proceedings. An appeal was lodged. 15.  On 6 October 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 10 November 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was a victim of a work accident in 1984. He was rendered 100% unfit to work and was found to be in the first degree invalidity category. The employer, The National Institute of Vineyards and Wine (“the NIVW”), was obliged by law to pay him monthly invalidity benefit. After the introduction of the new national currency the amount of benefit was set at approximately 18 euros (EUR) per month and had risen to approximately EUR 50 per month by 2003. He also receives a small State pension. 8.  From 1996 the NIVW stopped paying the compensation and the applicant accumulated a significant debt to public utility companies. He initiated court proceedings to oblige the employer to resume payment of the benefit and to recover benefit for the entire period due. According to the Government, the employer did not have sufficient information about the applicant during the period 1996-2001 and this was the reason for discontinuing the payments. The applicant submitted a copy of his complaint to NIVW regarding the discontinuation of the payments dated January 1998 and the NIVW's two letters in response, according to the last of which (March 1998) the payment of the benefit had been suspended because of lack of funds. The applicant also complained to various authorities in 2000 about the NIVW's failure to pay. In a letter dated 2 August 2000 the deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food Processing assured the applicant that his benefit would soon be paid. 9.  On 11 April 2001 the Ciocana District Court accepted the applicant's claims and awarded him 23,921 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of EUR 2,076 at the time) in respect of compensation due to him to that date. It ordered the NIVW to pay the court fees. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final and enforceable 15 days later. The court then issued a warrant for the enforcement of the judgment. 10.  On 20 February 2002 the NIVW was declared insolvent and an Administrator was appointed for the period of its liquidation. The applicant submitted that the organisation was, in fact, in the process of restructuring and was not liquidated, as evidenced by official documents signed by the NIVW's administrator. He also claimed that the NIVW had continued to pay staff salaries and had even purchased new equipment. He referred to a decision of the Court of Audit (no. 2, 2001), according to which the NIVW had been given a credit in the amount of 2,890,000 United States dollars (USD) by the Ministry of Finance from its own loan from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and that this money had been used to purchase wine production equipment. By July 2000 the NIVW had obtained revenue from this new equipment amounting to approximately EUR 14,500. The applicant also referred to another decision of the same court (no. 20, 2004) according to which in 2003 the NIVW had received from the State budget MDL 785,000 to finance research and specialised education. 11.  From June 2002 until October 2002 the NIVW paid the applicant a total of MDL 8,000. 12.  On 30 October 2002 the applicant initiated new court proceedings requesting the recalculation of the compensation due (because inflation had decreased the value of the earlier award) and also payment of an additional MDL 49,178 (EUR 3,630 at the time) in damages for the late and partial payment of the previous award (in 2001). He also claimed payment of the compensation arrears which had accumulated since that previous judgment. 13.  On 13 November 2002 the NIVW paid him the balance of the 2001 award (MDL 15,900). In a letter dated 14 April 2003 it recognised a part of the applicant's new claims for invalidity benefit for 2002 and stated that the calculation for 2003 would be carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour. 14.  On 26 June 2003 the Centru District Court accepted the applicant's new claims in part and awarded him MDL 7,729 (EUR 478 at the time) for the period 11 April 2001 until 1 June 2003, during which he had been paid only a part of his monthly benefit. The court rejected his claim for compensation for damage caused by delayed enforcement and by inflation during the relevant period. 15.  Having exempted the applicant from payment of the court fees when initiating this second action, the court ordered that the fees be paid by the unsuccessful party, namely the NIVW. 16.  On 10 November 2003 the Economic Court of Appeal issued a certificate confirming that the NIVW was in the process of reorganisation. On 11 November 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 26 June 2003. 17.  He then appealed twice to the Supreme Court of Justice. By letters of 27 November 2003 and 23 April 2004 the court informed the applicant that his appeal had not been examined because he had failed to pay the court fees (approximately EUR 50). His request for an exemption was rejected, the only reason given being that the relevant legal provisions (Articles 85(4) and 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 21 below) did not apply. 18.  In view of the Supreme Court of Justice's refusal to examine his appeal, the judgment of 11 November 2003 became final. 19.  According to a letter from the NIVW director submitted to the Court by the Government, by Government Decision no. 159 of 20 January 2004 the NIVW was split into two separate State companies and received approximately 20% of its funds from the State budget.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Podgorica. 6.  On 8 May 2001 the applicant murdered X and immediately thereafter left the country. 7.  On 6 March 2002 the applicant, in his absence, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 8.  On 27 June 2002 the applicant was arrested in Spain pursuant to an international arrest warrant (potjernica), and placed in custody. 9.  On 14 May 2003 he was extradited to Montenegro. 10.  On 3 February 2004 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were re-opened (ponavljanje krivičnog postupka). 11.  On 10 April 2009 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica found the applicant guilty, sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings as well as court fees (na osnovu sudskog paušala). 12.  On 29 January 2010 the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica quashed the judgment and ordered a retrial. 13.  On 4 October 2010 the High Court found the applicant guilty, sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings and court fees. 14.  On 21 March 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It would appear that on 26 April 2011 the decision was served on the applicant and he was transferred to prison. 15.  On 19 September 2011 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) in Podgorica dismissed an appeal on points of law (zahtjev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosnažne presude) lodged by the applicant. 16.  On 25 November 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining, in substance, about the reasoning of the courts, their assessment of the evidence and their interpretation of the law. He also complained of various irregularities in dealing with his request for review and his action for fair redress (see paragraphs 17-22 below). On 2 November 2012 the applicant withdrew his constitutional appeal and the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings (obustavio je postupak) on 27 November 2012. 17.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant lodged a request for review (kontrolni zahtjev), complaining that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on his appeal within three months (see paragraph 75 below). 18.  On 11 January 2010, having received no reply to the previous request, the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. 19.  On 7 July 2010, having still received no reply, the applicant lodged an action for fair redress (tužba za pravično zadovoljenje). 20.  On 29 September 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the action on the grounds that the applicant had not lodged a request for review. 21.  On 10 May 2011 the applicant lodged another action for fair redress. 22.  On 17 June 2011 the Supreme Court ruled that the criminal proceedings had been unreasonably long. Considering that the applicant’s detention required urgent proceedings, but also that it had been a complex case and that the applicant had contributed to the overall length of the proceedings, the court awarded him 2,000 euros (EUR). The applicant’s proposal that that decision be published was refused as the court did not consider it to be a “serious breach” of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. It was also noted that the applicant had indeed submitted a request for review beforehand, which had not been considered, and that his appeal in that regard had never been forwarded by the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. 23.  On 25 July 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against that decision, complaining, in particular, about the Supreme Court’s rejection of his first action for fair redress, the conclusion that he had contributed to the overall length of the criminal proceedings, and the amount awarded. He also requested that the Supreme Court’s decision be published. In March 2013, when the Government submitted their observations, the constitutional appeal was still pending. 24.  On 6 March 2002 the High Court issued a detention order against the applicant in his absence. 25.  On 20 April 2004, after the applicant was extradited to Montenegro, the High Court issued a new detention order for fear that he might abscond, especially in view of the fact that he had already been in hiding and had been arrested pursuant to an international warrant. 26.  The detention was further extended by the High Court on 1 June 2004, 26 September 2005, 8 September 2008, 23 December 2008, 27 February 2009 and 10 April 2009. The decisions to extend the detention appear to have been subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. 27.  The decision rendered on 8 September 2008 also took account of the gravity of the criminal offence of which the applicant was accused and the sentence that might be imposed on him. 28.  In its decision of 10 April 2009 the High Court took account in addition of the applicant’s personal circumstances, considering that his being unemployed and single increased the risk that he might flee. The decision specified that the applicant’s detention could last until a final decision was issued in the criminal proceedings or, at the most, until he had served fourteen years in prison. 29.  The authorities did not consider in any of those decisions the possibility of ensuring the applicant’s presence at trial by the use of other preventive measures. 30.  On 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining about the length of his detention. It would appear that he amended this appeal on three occasions thereafter, 1 March 2010, 8 December 2010 and 9 December 2010, enclosing some of the relevant documents, such as his request for review, the subsequent appeal, the action for fair redress, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision thereon. In March 2013, when the Government submitted their observations, the constitutional appeal was still pending. 31.  It would appear that the applicant remained in detention until his conviction became final by the Court of Appeal’s ruling in 2011, after which he was transferred to prison to serve his sentence. 32.  The parties’ submissions in this regard differed. 33.  The applicant maintained, in particular, that the cell in which he had been detained had been overcrowded, and that he had lacked drinking water and daily exercise. 34.  More specifically, the cell had measured 25 m2 and had housed fourteen detainees, sleeping on three-tier beds. The cell had also contained closets, a sanitary facility and a dining table. Apparently, the detainees were given a television set in 2007. 35.  Furthermore, between 2003 and 2007, especially in the summer, there was no running water during the day. The detainees, including the applicant, had to collect water in containers during the night so that there would be enough during the day, for both drinking and cleaning purposes. A well was dug in 2007, but this water was apparently not suitable for drinking as it was dirty. 36.  Lastly, until 2007 the daily walks lasted for forty minutes instead of the 120 minutes provided for by the relevant law, and were cancelled altogether on Thursdays and Fridays, as well as on rainy days. It would appear that after the prisoners’ strike in 2007 the duration of walks was increased to sixty minutes and that they were reintroduced on Thursdays. There would still appear to be no walks on Fridays. Until 2009 detainees were not allowed outdoors at all on rainy days and sometimes they would not get out of the cell for twenty days. 37.  The Government, for their part, submitted that the applicant had been detained in a cell measuring 28 m2 with four or five other persons, and only occasionally with nine other detainees. There were general shortages of water supply in the area where the prison was situated and the applicant had two thirty-minute long outdoor walks on a daily basis. They also submitted that the conditions in prison had been significantly improved after the visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (“the CPT”) in 2008 (see paragraphs 114-118 below). 38.  On 14 May 2003, when he was extradited to Montenegro and remanded in custody, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor. On that occasion the applicant claimed that he had no illnesses. In December 2003 he had blood and urine tests. There is no evidence in the case file that he was suffering from any illness at the time. 39.  In March 2006 the applicant was examined at the clinical centre of Montenegro. The medical report issued at the time is mostly illegible. The legible part states that two months earlier when he was under stress, the applicant had had an abnormal pain in his chest which had not recurred, and that his blood pressure was also high at the time. The doctor recommended a cardiological examination (holter monitoring) and a check-up in three months. 40.  Between 15 August 2006 and 26 January 2007 the applicant had four blood tests, the results of which showed that at various times one or two parameters were slightly increased while the remaining parameters were either within the normal range or illegible. There is no evidence in the case file that the applicant underwent the recommended cardiological examination or check-up. 41.  In March 2011 the applicant was again examined at the clinical centre by a specialist in internal medicine (internista). The medical report issued at the time states that the applicant had been having spasms (stezanje) behind the breast bone, which had become more frequent and stronger. The prison doctor recommended holter monitoring by a cardiologist and specified that the applicant’s condition could worsen if the tests were delayed. 42.  Between 22 March and 4 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a cardiologist (holter, electrocardiogram and ergometric tests). The results showed that the applicant’s left heart chamber was slightly enlarged, with hypertrophic walls. There was also a grade I diastolic dysfunction. 43.  On various dates between February 2005 and May 2011 the applicant was examined several times by a dermatologist, a urologist, a physiatrist and a surgeon, and his abdomen and spine were x-rayed. He was prescribed the relevant treatment where needed. 44.  On 7 December 2006 the Ombudsman (Zaštitnik ljudskih prava i sloboda) lodged an application with the Constitutional Court for an assessment of the constitutionality of Article 572 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2003 (see paragraph 70 below). On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings (obustavio postupak) as a new Constitution had been adopted in the meantime, whereas the Ombudsman’s request related to the Constitution that was no longer in force. 45.  On 12 September 2008 several detainees, including the applicant, wrote to the President of the Supreme Court complaining about the length of their detention. 46.  It would appear that in 2008 and 2010 two amnesties were granted to prisoners who had been convicted before those dates. On 6 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica dismissed the applicant’s request that one of those amnesties be granted to him as well. On 30 June 2011 the High Court upheld that decision. 47.  On various dates in 2009 the applicant complained to different international organisations represented in Montenegro, as well as to the Montenegrin Ombudsman, about the length of his detention and of the criminal proceedings. Some of the organisations apparently did not reply at all and others replied that they had no competence to deal with individual cases. The Court of Appeal, in response to an enquiry by the Ombudsman, replied that all realistic measures would be undertaken to expedite the proceedings at issue, although it would be difficult because there had been an influx of urgent and complex cases. 48.  On 14 January 2010, as well as lodging a constitutional appeal in respect of the length of his detention, the applicant also applied for an assessment of the constitutionality of Article 572 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2003. On 10 May 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected (odbacuje se) the request, as the Code had ceased to be in force as of 1 September 2011 (see paragraph 76 below) and thus there was no legal ground to examine if the above-mentioned provision had been in accordance with the Constitution while it had been in force. 49.  On 22 November 2011 the applicant appears to have requested the State Prosecutor (Osnovno državno tužilaštvo) to investigate some of the employees of the Court of Appeal responsible for not having forwarded his request for review to the Supreme Court. On 21 February 2012 the Deputy State Prosecutor (zamjenik osnovnog državnog tužioca) informed the applicant that she would not pursue any criminal prosecution ex officio in this regard. The applicant could, however, take on the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant did so. 50.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant’s sentence was reduced by six months following an amnesty (pomilovanje) granted to him by the President. 51.  On 19 August 2013 the applicant’s sentence was further reduced in view of an amnesty provided for by the new legislation (see paragraph 81 below). On 27 August 2013 that decision became final and the applicant was released.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Irkutsk. 6.  On 8 December 1993 the applicant’s son, Vladimir Shumkov, was arrested on suspicion of murder and placed in a temporary remand centre. On 10 December 1993 he was transferred to a remand prison. 7.  On 9 March 1995 Mr Shumkov was convicted of murder and perjury and sentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. The sentence was due to expire on 7 June 2003. 8.  On 15 July 1995 Mr Shumkov was transferred from the remand prison to correctional facility ITK-19 in Irkutsk to serve his sentence. 9.  On 14 January 1999 he was transferred to correctional facility IK-6 in Irkutsk so as to prevent a conflict with other detainees. 10.  On 6 February 1999 Mr Shumkov requested to be transferred to a different correctional facility since he was in conflict with other detainees and had allegedly been threatened by them. 11.  On 13 July 1999 Mr Shumkov was transferred from correctional facility IK-6 to correctional facility IK-15 in Angarsk, again to prevent a conflict with other detainees. 12.  On 10 April 2001 he was transferred to correctional facility IK-20 in Ust-Kuta, once again to prevent a conflict with other detainees. 13.  In 1995 Mr Shumkov was diagnosed with epilepsy. Later the diagnosis was changed to psychopathic personality disorder. Between 1995 and 2001 he regularly underwent medical examinations and in-patient treatment in prison hospitals:\n- on 2 August 1995 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk and was diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder and epilepsy;\n- on 26 August 1995 he was transferred to prison hospital no. 2 in Angarsk with a diagnosis of epilepsy; he was discharged on 13 September 1995 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 23 July 1996 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk and was diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder, with explosive-type accentuation; he was discharged on 23 August 1996 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 20 March 1997 he was again placed in prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type, and demonstratively blackmailing behaviour with simulation of psychic equivalences and paraxial disorders; he was discharged on 14 May 1997 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 24 February 1998 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type; he was discharged on 12 March 1998 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 7 July 1998 he was admitted to prison hospital no. 2 in Angarsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type with simulation of paraxial disorders; he was discharged on 18 August 1998 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 1 April 1999 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of hystero-excitable type and neurocirculatory dystonia; he was discharged on 14 April 1999 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 9 March 2000 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 2 in Angarsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type with simulation of paraxial disorders; he was discharged on 30 March 2000 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 26 April 2000 he was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive type and a duodenal ulcer; he was discharged on 19 June 2000 following an improvement in his condition;\n- on 28 February 2001 Mr Shumkov was again admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of a duodenal ulcer and hypertension; he was discharged on 30 March 2001 following his recovery;\n- on 23 May 2001 Mr Shumkov was once again admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive type; he was discharged on 6 June 2001 following an improvement in his condition. 14.  On 17 June 2001 Mr Shumkov was placed in a disciplinary cell, where on 1 August 2001 he slashed his left wrist. After medical aid had been administered to him, he was ordered to return to the cell. When Mr Shumkov refused to comply, officers L. and S. used rubber truncheons and physical force to return him to his cell. 15.  On 4 August 2001 at 2 a.m. Mr Shumkov knocked at the door of his cell to attract the warder’s attention, and when the warder Yu. came over Mr Shumkov said that he needed pills for blood pressure. Warder Yu. reported accordingly to Major P., an officer on duty, who promptly arrived at the disciplinary cell and, having opened the door, found that Mr Shumkov had slashed veins in his elbows. Mr Shumkov said that he needed a bandage but refused to accept medical assistance from the warders and also said that he would not let anybody into the cell except for the prison doctor. At 2.15 a.m. Major P. sent officer D. to fetch the prison doctor, G. At around 2.40 a.m. Dr G. arrived, dressed the wounds and administered injections of cardiamine and caffeine. Mr Shumkov was then placed on a stretcher and transported to the medical unit; however, he was dead upon arrival at the unit as a result of heavy blood loss. The time of death was entered in the register as 2.40 a.m. 16.  On 6 August 2001 a post-mortem report was drawn up. According to the report, the cause of Mr Shumkov’s death was heavy blood loss as a result of injuries to the large blood vessels in the antecubital fossa and forearms. 17.  On 10 August 2001 the prison governor, K., decided not to open a criminal investigation into the death of Mr Shumkov for lack of corpus delicti. 18.  On 17 August 2001 the Kazachinsko-Lenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office quashed that decision and referred the case back for additional inquiries. He stated, in particular, that in the course of the inquiries conducted it had not been established whether the officers on duty had tried to provide Mr Shumkov with medical aid and that neither the officers on duty nor the detainees held in adjacent cells had been questioned. 19.  On 20 August 2001 the prison doctor G. provided an explanation concerning the events of 4 August 2001 to the Kazachinsko-Lenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office. He submitted:\n“At 2.30 a.m. on 4 August 2001 a service car arrived to collect me from my home, and I was told that I had to go urgently to the [correctional facility] since a detainee [had collapsed] in a disciplinary cell. I immediately got into the car and at 2.40 a.m. we arrived at the [correctional facility]. Having entered the disciplinary wing, I asked to open the cell where [Mr] Shumkov was being held. [When] the warder opened the door, I saw that [Mr Shumkov] was lying motionless on the floor and blood was splashed around the whole cell. Having examined [Mr Shumkov’s] elbow joints, I found that a vein and an artery were cut open on the left elbow joint and similar injuries had been caused to the right elbow joint. I immediately dressed the wounds and administered injections of cardiamine, caffeine..., glucose and gluconate and performed artificial ventilation. Since the treatment had no effect, [Mr Shumkov] was transported to the medical unit and fifteen minutes after the beginning of the treatment I pronounced him dead as a result of heavy blood loss. Before my arrival at the disciplinary cell the warders did not provide [Mr] Shumkov with medical aid since he requested to be seen by a doctor and refused to accept medical aid until the [doctor’s] arrival. On 1 August 2001 [Mr] Shumkov had committed an act of self-mutilation, having slashed minor blood vessels on his left arm... An antiseptic dressing was applied. If [on 4 August 2001] I had arrived twenty or thirty minutes earlier, it would still have been impossible ... to save [Mr Shumkov’s] life since he had arteries and veins slashed in both arms.” 20.  On 21 August 2001 the prison governor K. again refused to open a criminal investigation as no crime had been committed. He stated that on 4 August 2001 the prisoner had asked warders to call for a doctor because he had high blood pressure. The warders had discovered that the prisoner had cut veins in both elbows. Mr Shumkov had then been placed in the medical unit, where he had died as a result of heavy blood loss. 21.  On 24 August 2001 the Kazachinsko-Lenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office refused to open a criminal investigation into the death of Mr Shumkov for lack of corpus delicti. 22.  On 4 June 2002 the Office of the Prosecutor General set aside the decision of 24 August 2001 and opened a criminal investigation. The prosecutor noted that the district prosecutor’s office had failed to investigate the grounds for Mr Shumkov’s confinement in a disciplinary cell, the circumstances leading to his suicide and his mental state, in particular taking into account the medical records concerning his treatment from 1996 to 2001. Nor had they identified the object with which Mr Shumkov had slashed the veins in his elbows. 23.  The case was forwarded to the Irkutsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant was informed of that decision by letters of 7 and 25 June 2002. 24.  On 8 July 2002 another post-mortem report was drawn up on the basis of Mr Shumkov’s medical file. It confirmed the findings of the post‑mortem report of 6 August 2001. 25.  On 15 July 2002 the prison doctor G. was questioned. He stated that he had known Mr Shumkov since June 2001, when the latter had complained of headaches and high blood pressure. At around 2.40 a.m. on 4 August 2001, following a call from the officer on duty, he had arrived at the disciplinary cell, where he had found that Mr Shumkov had slashed his veins. Dr G. had dressed the wounds and administered an injection of caffeine; however, by that time Mr Shumkov was already in a semi‑conscious state. Mr Shumkov had been then transported to the medical unit, where, according to doctor G.’s statement, he had died at 2.40 a.m. 26.  On the same date the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against officers L. and S. concerning the events of 1 August 2001, and against warder Yu. and Major P. concerning the events of 4 August 2001. The decision stated, inter alia, that after Mr Shumkov had committed an act of self-mutilation on 1 August 2001, his cell had been searched on several occasions and no forbidden items had been found. On 4 August 2001 warder Yu. and Major P. had immediately provided Mr Shumkov with first aid. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained about the length of the criminal investigation. On 30 December 2002 the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office replied to her that it had questioned all the witnesses and had examined medical evidence and that an expert report on Mr Shumkov’s mental state at the relevant time had been commissioned. 28.  On 27 January 2003 the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against the prison governor K. and officer Y., the head of the operating unit, for lack of corpus delicti. It appears that on an unspecified date that decision was quashed. 29.  On 31 January 2003 a commission of four psychiatrists and one psychologist drew up a forensic psychiatric report in respect of Mr Shumkov. The commission concluded as follows:\n“[The commission’s] conclusion:\n[Mr] Shumkov suffered from a chronic psychiatric disorder in the form of psychopathy of mixed type. [This diagnosis] is confirmed by the anamnesis, medical documents and the criminal case file: [Mr Shumkov] had such character traits as difficulty in communication, quarrelsomeness, hot temper, irritability, aggressiveness, affective instability, tendency towards hysterical and demonstrative reactions with self-mutilation in subjectively difficult situations, tendency towards simulative behaviour (his examination and lengthy monitoring in the course of repeated placements for psychiatric and neurological in-patient treatment did not confirm the epileptic nature of the ‘fits’) ... However, the above-mentioned peculiarities of [Mr Shumkov’s] psychic state were not accompanied by a broad decrease in intellect or disturbances of thought, delirium, hallucinations or disturbances of critical and prognostic functions, since as a whole he could control his actions (his conduct changed depending on the place and environment, he took into account the social status and rank of the interlocutor), realise the meaning of his actions and direct them. In the period preceding [the act of self-mutilation committed by Mr Shumkov] ... he did not display signs of a temporary mental disorder or dementia, he did not have delirium or hallucinations, and he could realise the meaning of his actions and direct them.\nThe psychologist’s conclusion:\nPsychological analysis of the contents of the criminal case file confirms that [Mr] Shumkov had such individual psychological peculiarities as egocentrism, emotionally volitional instability, hot temper, increased irritability, malignance, aggressiveness, difficulties in interpersonal contact, tendency towards conflict in close contact, tendency to create conflict situations, [tendency towards] asocial acts, and impulsiveness. In subjectively difficult situations [he] displayed affective outbursts, demonstrative behaviour, a tendency towards impulsive behavioural reactions, simulative behaviour and suicide attempts... The analysis of the contents of the criminal case file confirms the lack of extreme conditions which would have prompted the suicide, and of conditions that would have been conducive to the accumulation of negative emotional experiences and ... neuropsychological tension. [Mr Shumkov’s] individual psychological peculiarities were conducive to his committing suicide.” 30.  On 28 February 2003 Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office again discontinued the criminal proceedings against the prison governor K. and officer Y. on the same ground as before. 31.  On 31 March 2003 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Irkutsk Region quashed the decision of 28 February 2003 as ill-founded and premature. He stated, in particular, that the investigating authorities had failed to clarify all the circumstances preceding Mr Shumkov’s death, had not fully complied with the instructions of the Office of the Prosecutor General, had not made a legal assessment of the correctional facilities’ officers’ actions as regards the search in the disciplinary cell, and of the prison doctor G.’s actions as regards the untimely medical aid provided on 4 August 2001. 32.  On 28 May 2003 the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings on the following grounds. 33.  According to the decision, Mr Shumkov was irritable, aggressive, had an explosive temper and had constant conflicts with other detainees and warders. He often complained of poor health and headaches. During the period of serving his sentence, that is, from December 1993 to August 2001, Mr Shumkov was on eleven occasions admitted to hospitals within the penal system. In 1995 he was diagnosed with epilepsy; however, the diagnosis was not confirmed and in 1998 it was changed to psychopathy. From 23 May to 9 June 2001 Mr Shumkov underwent treatment for his condition in Hospital No. 1 in the Irkutsk Region. For swearing and threatening physical violence he was discharged from the hospital on 9 June 2001 and transferred back to correctional facility IK-20. Between 10 April and 1 August 2001 Mr Shumkov was subjected to disciplinary measures on six occasions. 34.  On 17 June 2001 Mr Shumkov was placed in a disciplinary cell for a breach of discipline. On 1 August 2001 he cut his veins. After medical aid had been administered to him, he refused to return to his cell, insulted and threatened officers L. and S. and grabbed L.’s uniform. So as to prevent his unlawful threats, L. and S., using physical force and rubber truncheons, placed him in the cell. Thereafter Mr Shumkov was examined by a member of staff of the medical unit, who noted bruises on his body and extremities. According to the results of the investigation, officers L. and S. lawfully used rubber truncheons and physical force against Mr Shumkov. On the same date the prison governor ordered Mr Shumkov’s placement in a disciplinary cell for the act of self-mutilation. 35.  At around 2.10 a.m. on 4 August 2001 Mr Shumkov, while being held in disciplinary cell no. 20, cut his veins. He refused medical aid from the officers on duty and requested to be seen by a doctor. At around 2.40 a.m. the prison doctor G. provided Mr Shumkov with medical aid, having dressed the wounds and administered injections, following which Mr Shumkov was transported to the medical unit, where he died at 2.45 a.m. as a result of heavy blood loss. 36.  The prison governor K. submitted that on 1 August 2001 he had ordered Mr Shumkov’s placement in a disciplinary cell for having committed an act of self-mutilation. 37.  A witness, S-v, stated that on 4 August 2001 he had been held in an adjacent disciplinary cell when he had heard Mr Shumkov shouting and complaining of high blood pressure. Then Mr Shumkov had cut his veins. S-v did not know why he had done so. 38.  Major P. stated that on 4 August 2001 he and warder Yu. had been among the officers on duty in the disciplinary wing. At around 2.10 a.m. he had heard screaming from cell no. 20, where Mr Shumkov was being held. At around 2.15 a.m. he and warder Yu. had entered the cell and had seen that Mr Shumkov had cut his veins. They had tried to provide him with medical aid so as to stop the bleeding, but he had firmly refused to be aided and to leave the cell and had stated that he needed a doctor. Major P. had then called for a doctor, who had arrived at the disciplinary wing at 2.40 a.m. Dr G. had dressed the wounds and had administered injections, following which Mr Shumkov had immediately been transported to the medical unit. However, because of the blood loss he had died there at around 2.45 a.m. In the course of additional questioning Major P. submitted that late in the evening of 3 August 2001 he and warders D. and Yu. had conducted an inspection of the disciplinary wing and had not found any forbidden objects. 39.  Warder Yu. made a similar statement and added that after Mr Shumkov had been pronounced dead, officer Y., the head of the operating unit, had arrived at the disciplinary wing and conducted an inspection of cell no. 20. 40.  Dr G. submitted that on 4 August 2001 he had been the prison doctor on standby duty. At around 2.40 a.m., after a call from an officer on duty, he had arrived at the disciplinary wing, where in cell no. 20 he had dressed the wounds and administered an injection of caffeine to Mr Shumkov, who had cut his veins. At the time Mr Shumkov had been in a semi-conscious state. Then Mr Shumkov had been transported on a stretcher to the medical unit, where he had died. Dr G. had pronounced him dead at 2.45 a.m. 41.  The post-mortem report stated that the death of Mr Shumkov had occurred because of heavy blood loss as a result of injuries caused by the slashing of the large vessels in the elbows and forearms. It also noted that the prisoner had had bruises on his body and legs. 42.  According to a psychiatric and psychological expert report, Mr Shumkov suffered from psychopathic personality disorder, was in constant conflict with other persons, and tended towards hysterical behaviour, self-mutilation, suicide attempts and simulation of epileptic fits. However, he was able to assess and control his conduct and never showed symptoms of imbecility. The experts did not establish the existence of any circumstances which could have prompted Mr Shumkov to commit suicide. 43. In the course of the investigation no proof of prison governor K.’s and officer Y.’s having committed such offences as abuse of official powers and incitement to suicide was found. 44.  In the course of additional inquiries, it was established that Mr Shumkov had cut his veins with a piece of a blade from a disposable safety razor which he had had with him in the disciplinary cell as it was allowed by the internal regulations. When warder D. had asked Mr Shumkov what he had done with the piece of blade, he had replied that he had placed it in the lavatory pan. 45.  The additional check also established that duty schedules were fixed for medical staff for holidays and weekends. At night a member of the medical staff remained on duty at his home. The time required for a member of the medical staff to arrive at the correctional facility in reply to an urgent call depended on the distance between his home and the facility. Dr G., who had been the prison doctor on duty on 4 August 2001, had arrived at the facility within twenty minutes from the departure of the operating unit to fetch him. This was also confirmed by Dr G. in the course of additional questioning and by the head of the medical unit, K-v. 46.  Warder D. stated that during the night of 3 to 4 August 2001 he had been the assistant officer on duty. At around 10 p.m. on 3 August 2001 he, Major P. and warder Yu. had conducted an inspection of the disciplinary wing and had found no forbidden objects. At around 2 a.m. on 4 August 2001 or a little later, following a call from warder Yu., he had arrived at disciplinary cell no. 20 and had seen that Mr Shumkov had cut his veins. When he had asked him how he had cut his veins, Mr Shumkov had explained that he had used a piece of blade from a disposable safety razor which he had thrown into the lavatory pan. Mr Shumkov had refused to leave the cell to be provided with first aid and requested to be seen by a doctor. Warder D. then had gone to fetch Dr G. and had returned with him twenty minutes later. He did not know what medical aid Dr G. had provided since he had left to inspect the facility. Having reached the medical unit, he had learnt from Dr G. that Mr Shumkov had died of blood loss. 47.  Having regard also to (i) Annex 1 to the Internal Regulations of Correctional Institutions, adopted by order no. 224 of the Ministry of the Interior of 30 July 2001, which did not forbid the keeping of a disposable safety razor in a disciplinary cell, and (ii) the Instruction on Supervision of Inmates held in Correctional Facilities, adopted by order no. 83 of the Ministry of Justice of 7 March 2000, which provided that constant supervision of inmates held in disciplinary cells must be effected through the inspection hole in the doors of the cells, and that officers on duty must call a doctor for inmates requiring medical assistance, the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the prison governor K., the head of the operating unit Y., Major P., warders D. and Yu. and the prison doctor G. had not committed the alleged offences of incitement to suicide, abuse of official powers and neglect of duty or failure to assist in a dangerous situation, and discontinued the criminal proceedings. 48.  On 9 September 2004 the Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed a complaint by the applicant about the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings, finding that decision to have been lawful and well-founded. 49.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the decision of 28 May 2003 before a court. She also complained that her son’s beating with rubber truncheons by warders on 1 August 2001 had not been lawful. 50.  On 29 October 2004 the Ust-Kuta District Court of the Irkutsk Region dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The applicant was not present at the hearing. 51.  On 14 February 2005 the Irkutsk Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the ground that the applicant had not been duly notified of the hearing of 29 October 2004. 52.  On 5 April 2005 the Ust-Kuta District Court held that the prosecutor’s decision was lawful and dismissed the applicant’s complaints. 53.  On 6 September 2005 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. The applicant’s subsequent application for supervisory review of that decision was refused by the Irkutsk Regional Court on 18 January 2006. 54.  On 29 July 2002 Dr P., a neuropathologist at prison hospital no. 2, was questioned. He submitted that in March 2000 Mr Shumkov had been admitted to the hospital, having been diagnosed with epilepsy. However, the diagnosis had not been confirmed and Mr Shumkov had been diagnosed with a psychopathic disorder. During his stay at the hospital he had displayed unbalanced behaviour and mood swings, and had been irritable and emotionally unstable. Mr Shumkov had been provided with a complete course of treatment. His parents had never been asked to provide any medicines for him since all the required medicines had been available at the hospital. 55.  Having examined Mr Shumkov’s medical file, the neurologist G. stated that in his childhood he had suffered a craniocerebral trauma. Since 1988 he had been suffering from frequent fits that had mostly occurred at night. He had been diagnosed with epilepsy and had undergone in-patient treatment in 1992. Later he had been treated in the psychiatric ward of prison hospital no. 1. There he had repeatedly feigned polymorphous fits and had been placed under constant monitoring, which had revealed no momentary lapses of reason or convulsive contractions, although irritability, hot temper and rudeness had remained. Accordingly, the diagnosis of epilepsy had been changed to one of psychopathy. During the term of Mr Shumkov’s detention, in-patient and outpatient treatment and supervision had been fully available to him. 56.  The head of a psychiatric ward, Sh., having studied Mr Shumkov’s medical file, concluded that while in detention he had been fully provided with the requisite medical assistance for his mental and somatic state. The diagnosis of epilepsy had been correctly discarded and had not subsequently been confirmed. 57.  On 30 April 2009 L., the head of the medical unit of correctional facility IK-20, issued a certificate concerning the circumstances of Mr Shumkov’s death. The certificate stated:\n“At around 2 a.m. on 4 August 2001 ... [Mr Shumkov] knocked at the door of disciplinary cell no. 2, told [warder Yu.] that he had high blood pressure and asked him to call for a doctor on duty.\n[Warder Yu.] reported to [Major P.], [who] immediately sent [warder D.] in a car to fetch [prison doctor G.], who lived near the correctional facility and was required to go to the facility in the event of an emergency. At the same time [Mr Shumkov] was placed under constant visual supervision through the inspection hole in the door of the cell.\nAt 2.15 a.m. [the warders] opened cell no. 20 following changes in [Mr Shumkov’s] behaviour and discovered that he had committed an act of self-mutilation, having cut blood vessels in both arms.\n[Mr Shumkov] refused to leave the cell to receive medical assistance and stated that he would wait for the doctor in the cell. [The warders] brought bandages to the cell in order to dress the wounds. [Mr Shumkov] took the bandages but refused [the warders’] medical assistance.\nAt 2.30 a.m. [Dr G.] arrived and immediately provided [Mr Shumkov] with medical assistance in the cell. [He] dressed the wounds so as to stop the bleeding, administered injections to increase blood pressure and stimulate cardiac activity ..., and performed artificial lung ventilation and indirect heart massage, following which [Mr Shumkov] was taken to the medical unit ... where, despite the efforts to resuscitate him, at 2.40 a.m. he was pronounced dead as a result of heavy blood loss caused by the injuries to the large blood vessels.” 58.  According to a certificate of 21 April 2009 issued by the prison authorities, during Mr Shumkov’s detention in correctional facility IK-20 from 10 April to 23 May 2001 and from 9 June to 4 August 2001 he was held in conditions which complied with the relevant regulations. There was no infringement of Mr Shumkov’s right to life by any officers of the correctional facility. 59.  Another certificate issued on the same date stated, inter alia, that in the course of serving his sentence Mr Shumkov had breached prison discipline thirty-five times, as a result of which he had on six occasions been placed in the disciplinary wing and twenty-seven times in solitary confinement in a disciplinary cell. In 2000 he was recognised as a persistent offender and placed in stricter conditions of detention. All these measures were applied lawfully. Mr Shumkov was hot-tempered, tended to create conflicts, behaved defiantly and did not react to admonitions. 60.  In an undated certificate prison officer A. stated that throughout the term of his imprisonment Mr Shumkov had physically resisted prison officers, provoked conflicts with other inmates, behaved aggressively and breached disciplinary regulations. 61.  In two undated certificates prison officers U. and E. stated that in 1999 they had served in correctional facility IK-6. They submitted that Mr Shumkov had been mentally unstable and had repeatedly created conflicts with other detainees, which was the reason for his subsequent transfer to a different correctional facility. A number of times he had attempted to commit acts of self-mutilation by cutting his forearms. He had also regularly been admitted for treatment in prison hospital no. 1. 62.  In a certificate of 16 April 2009 prison officer B. stated that during the term of his imprisonment Mr Shumkov had on a number of occasions been subjected to disciplinary sanctions for disobedience, insults and conflicts with other inmates. He had often been aggressive and violent. Such behaviour had been caused not only by his psychological particularities but by a manifest unwillingness to follow the prison rules. 63.  In a report of 20 April 2009 prison officer P-na stated that from 1996 to 2000 she had held a post as inspector of the living quarters. She remembered Mr Shumkov as a frequent offender who had behaved defiantly towards other detainees, which had often caused conflicts. 64.  On 2 August 2001 inspector K. of correctional facility IK-20 drew up an internal inspection report concerning the incident of 1 August 2001. According to the report, the use of rubber truncheons in respect of Mr Shumkov was lawful and proportionate. 65.  On 15 August 2002 the Ust-Kuta Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against officers L. and S. in respect of the events of 1 August 2001. The decisions stated, inter alia:\n“On 1 August 2001 [the detainee Mr] Shumkov committed an act of self-mutilation having slashed his veins. However, he was provided with medical aid in due time. After [officers L. and S.] asked [Mr] Shumkov to return to his cell, the latter refused, grabbed [L.’s] uniform, swore at him and threatened him with physical violence. So as to prevent the unlawful threats of [Mr] Shumkov, [L. and S.], using physical force and rubber truncheons, placed him in the cell. [Thereafter] [Mr] Shumkov was examined by a member of staff of the medical unit, who noted bruises on his body and extremities.\nTaking into account the foregoing, as well as the fact that [officers L. and S.] used [rubber truncheons] and physical force in respect of [Mr] Shumkov after the latter’s refusal to comply with their lawful orders, the institution of criminal proceedings against [L. and S.] should be refused for lack of corpus delicti.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Bratislava. 7.  On 28 April and 8 and 16 September 2005 the applicant was charged with attempted murder, robbery and fraud respectively. 8.  On 15 December 2005 the applicant was indicted to stand trial in the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) on those charges. 9.  On 26 January 2006 the Regional Court remitted the case to the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) for the taking of further evidence, in particular in respect of the mental health of the key witness. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) on 27 April 2006, following an interlocutory appeal by the PPS. 10.  On 27 September 2006 the applicant was again indicted to stand trial on the charges mentioned above. 11.  On 30 October 2006 the Bratislava District Court (Okresný súd) held a meeting with a view to making an initial assessment of the indictment (predbežné prejednanie obžaloby). At the conclusion of the meeting, the District Court ordered a hearing of the indictment (hlavné pojednávanie) for 6 December 2006. 12.  In the course of the trial the applicant’s initial charges were re‑qualified and, on 18 May 2007, the District Court found him guilty of a number of offences, including oppression, unlawful restriction of liberty and robbery, and sentenced him to nine years in prison. The judgment was, however, quashed on appeal and the case was remitted to the District Court for re‑examination. The Court has not been informed of any further developments in the case, or of its outcome. 13.  On 29 April 2005 the applicant was arrested and on 2 May 2005 he was remanded in detention pending trial on the murder charge. He was detained under Article 67 §§ 1 (c) and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) (Law no. 141/1961 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time) as he was facing a charge carrying a penalty of imprisonment for eight years or more and there was a risk that he would continue offending. The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal (sťažnosť) against the remand decision, which was declared inadmissible as belated on 16 June 2005. 14.  The applicant’s first request for release was dismissed by the District Court on 22 September 2005 and, following his interlocutory appeal, by the Regional Court on 18 October 2005. The decisions were taken in private (neverejné zasadnutie). 15.  Meanwhile, on 12 October 2005 the PPS had requested judicial authorisation for an extension of the applicant’s detention until 29 April 2006. The request was acceded to by the District Court on 17 October and, following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant, by the Regional Court on 8 November 2005. The decisions were taken in private. 16.  On 26 January 2006, when the applicant’s case was remitted to the PPS for the taking of further evidence (see paragraph 9 above), the Regional Court also ruled that the applicant should remain in detention. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 27 April 2006 following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. The decisions were taken in private. 17.  On or around 2 or 4 October 2006, the applicant again requested release. The request was dismissed by the District Court on 16 October 2006 and, following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant, by the Regional Court on 23 November 2006. The decisions were taken in private. 18.  On 2 November 2006 the applicant lodged an application arguing that, at the preparatory meeting on 30 October 2006 (see paragraph 11 above), the District Court had failed to make a ruling concerning his continued detention. 19.  On 6 November 2006 the relevant Chamber of the District Court ruled that the applicant’s detention should continue; this was confirmed by a ruling on 27 November 2006 by which the President of the Chamber corrected what was termed a clerical error in the decision of 6 November 2006. The decisions were taken in private. 20.  On 24 January 2007 the Regional Court dismissed interlocutory appeals by the applicant against both the decision of 6 November and that of 27 November 2006. The decisions were taken in private.\nThe Regional Court accepted the applicant’s objection that mistakes had occurred on the part of the District Court in that it had failed to rule on his detention during the meeting of 30 October 2006 and in that it had made the ruling of 6 November 2006 with reference to the wrong provisions of the CCP.\nHowever, those errors were merely technical in nature, had been remedied, and had resulted in no prejudice to the applicant.\nAt the same time, the Regional Court rejected a request by the applicant for release in return for a pledge under Article 80 § 1 (b) of the CCP that he would live in accordance with the law. 21.  On 30 July 2007 the applicant challenged the above-mentioned decisions in the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) by way of a complaint (sťažnosť) under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended).\nOn 27 September 2007 the complaint was declared inadmissible as having been lodged outside the statutory two-month time-limit. 22.  On 11 January 2007 the applicant filed a third request for release, which was received at the District Court on 16 January 2007, and which he amended on 26 June 2007. 23.  In its later observations in reply to the applicant’s constitutional complaint (see paragraphs 26 et seq. below), the District Court submitted as follows:\n“... no decision had been taken in respect of [the request for release], which was explained by the ... judge as being because he had considered [the request for release] to be a supplement to the [applicant’s] interlocutory appeal against the decision of 6 November 2006” [see paragraph 19 above]. 24.  In the absence of any decision, on 21 August 2007 the applicant requested that his submissions of 11 January and 26 June 2007 be responded to. The request was lodged with the Regional Court, which transmitted it to the District Court, where it was received on 5 September 2007. 25.  On 24 September 2007 the District Court held a public session (verejné zasadnutie) at which it ordered the applicant’s immediate release, finding that his detention was no longer justified. The written version of the order refers to the applicant’s “request for release”, the release to be “based on the Regional Court’s decision [to quash the convicting judgment]” (see paragraph 12 above), without any further specification.\nThe order was implemented immediately. 26.  The applicant lodged a new complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. No copy of it has been submitted to the Court. However, from the summary of the complaint in the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) (see below), the following can be established. 27.  The complaint was received at the Constitutional Court on 22 August 2007. It was assessed to be a separate complaint from the complaint of 30 July 2007 (see paragraph 21 above). Upon an invitation by the Constitutional Court, the applicant’s lawyer provided further and better particulars on 4 December 2007. 28.  The applicant challenged the District Court’s handling of his request for release of 11 January 2007, alleging a violation of his rights under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as well as the constitutional counterpart of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 29.  The applicant claimed the equivalent of approximately 6,600 euros (EUR) in compensation, citing “a particularly arbitrary and grave violation of [his] rights”. 30.  On 13 December 2007 the complaint was declared admissible. 31.  In its observations in reply to the complaint, which were filed with the Constitutional Court on 26 May 2008, the District Court made the submission cited above (see paragraph 23). 32.  On 17 June 2008 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It observed, inter alia, that it was clear from the title and content of the applicant’s submission of 11 January 2007 that it was a request for release and not a supplement to his interlocutory appeal against the decision of 6 November 2006. It had been the responsibility of the District Court to deal with it accordingly, with priority and adequate expeditiousness, which it had failed to do. 33.  The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of approximately EUR 660, and the reimbursement of his legal costs, by way of just satisfaction. The amount of just satisfaction was determined “on an equitable basis” and with reference to Article 41 of the Convention, the “character of the violation found”, the “length of the District Court’s inactivity”, and the fact that the applicant had been released in the meantime. 34.  In so far as the applicant had invoked Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court observed that the case concerned matters of procedure falling within the ambit of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, and not the former provision, taken in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. Similarly, as no determination of the merits of the case was involved, the constitutional equivalent of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born in 1950. 12.  On 11 February 1980 the applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. His guilty plea was accepted on the basis of medical evidence that he was a man with a severe personality disorder to such a degree that he was amoral. He was sentenced to a term of discretionary life imprisonment. 13.  The applicant’s tariff (that part of the sentence relating to retribution and deterrence) expired on 25 June 1994. His continued detention was based on considerations of risk and dangerousness, the Parole Board considering that he continued to present a risk of serious harm to the public. 14.  The applicant, who is barred by section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 from voting in parliamentary or local elections, issued proceedings in the High Court under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, seeking a declaration that this provision was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 15.  The applicant’s application was heard by the Divisional Court on 21 and 22 March 2001, together with an application for judicial review by two other prisoners, Mr Pearson and Mr Feal-Martinez, who had applied for registration as electors and been refused by the Registration Officer and who also sought a declaration of incompatibility. 16.  In the Divisional Court judgment dated 4 April 2001, Lord Justice Kennedy noted that section 3 had a long history and cited the Secretary of State’s reasons, given in the proceedings, for maintaining the current policy:\n“By committing offences which by themselves or taken with any aggravating circumstances including the offender’s character and previous criminal record require a custodial sentence, such prisoners have forfeited the right to have a say in the way the country is governed for that period. There is more than one element to punishment than forcible detention. Removal from society means removal from the privileges of society, amongst which is the right to vote for one’s representative.”\nExamining the state of practice in other jurisdictions, he observed that in Europe only eight countries, including the United Kingdom, did not give convicted prisoners a vote, while twenty did not disenfranchise prisoners and eight imposed a more restricted disenfranchisement. Reference was made to the United States Supreme Court which had rejected a challenge to the Californian Constitution’s disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners (see Richardson v. Ramirez [1974] 418 United States: Supreme Court Reports 24). Some considerable attention was given to Canadian precedents, which were relied on by both parties, in particular that of the Canadian Supreme Court which, in Sauvé v. Canada (no. 1) ([1992] 2 Supreme Court Reports 438), struck down the disenfranchisement of all prisoners as too widely drawn and infringing the minimum impairment rule, and that of the Federal Court of Appeal which, in Sauvé (no. 2) ([2000] 2 Federal Court Reports 117), upheld the subsequent legislative provision restricting the ban to prisoners serving a sentence of two years or more in a correctional institution. While it was noted that the Canadian courts were applying a differently phrased provision in their Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Divisional Court commented that the judgment of Linden JA in the second case in the Federal Court of Appeal contained helpful observations, in particular as regards the danger of the courts usurping the role of Parliament. The cases before the European Commission of Human Rights and this Court were also reviewed, the Divisional Court noting that the Commission had been consistent in its approach in accepting restrictions on persons convicted and detained.\nLord Justice Kennedy concluded:\n“... I return to what was said by the European Court in paragraph 52 of its judgment in Mathieu-Mohin. Of course as far as an individual prisoner is concerned disenfranchisement does impair the very essence of his right to vote, but that is too simplistic an approach, because what Article 3 of the First Protocol is really concerned with is the wider question of universal franchise, and ‘the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’. If an individual is to be disenfranchised that must be in the pursuit of a legitimate aim. In the case of a convicted prisoner serving his sentence the aim may not be easy to articulate. Clearly there is an element of punishment, and also an element of electoral law. As the Home Secretary said, Parliament has taken the view that for the period during which they are in custody convicted prisoners have forfeited their right to have a say in the way the country is governed. The Working Group said that such prisoners had lost the moral authority to vote. Perhaps the best course is that suggested by Linden JA, namely to leave to philosophers the true nature of this disenfranchisement whilst recognising that the legislation does different things.\nThe European Court also requires that the means employed to restrict the implied Convention rights to vote are not disproportionate, and that is the point at which, as it seems to me, it is appropriate for this Court to defer to the legislature. It is easy to be critical of a law which operates against a wide spectrum (e.g. in relation to its effect on post-tariff discretionary life prisoners, and those detained under some provision of the Mental Health Act 1983), but, as is clear from the authorities, those States which disenfranchise following conviction do not all limit the period of disenfranchisement to the period in custody. Parliament in this country could have provided differently in order to meet the objectives which it discerned, and like McLachlin J in Canada, I would accept that the tailoring process seldom admits of perfection, so the courts must afford some leeway to the legislator. As [counsel for the Secretary of State] submits, there is a broad spectrum of approaches among democratic societies, and the United Kingdom falls into the middle of the spectrum. In course of time this position may move, either by way of further fine tuning, as was recently done in relation to remand prisoners and others, or more radically, but its position in the spectrum is plainly a matter for Parliament not for the courts. That applies even to the ‘hard cases’ of post-tariff discretionary life sentence prisoners ... They have all been convicted and if, for example, Parliament were to have said that all those sentenced to life imprisonment lose the franchise for life the apparent anomaly of their position would disappear. ...\nIf section 3(1) of the 1983 Act can meet the challenge of Article 3 [of the First Protocol] then Article 14 has nothing to offer, any more than Article 10.” 17.  The applicant’s claims were accordingly dismissed as were those of the other prisoners. 18.  On 2 May 2001 an application for permission to appeal was filed on behalf of Mr Pearson and Mr Feal-Martinez, together with a forty-three-page skeleton argument. On 15 May 2001 Lord Justice Buxton considered the application on the papers and refused permission on the ground that the appeal had no real prospect of success. 19.  On 19 May 2001 the applicant filed an application for permission to appeal. On 7 June 2001, his application was considered on the papers by Lord Justice Simon Brown who refused permission for the same reasons as Lord Justice Buxton in relation to the earlier applications. The applicant’s renewed application, together with the renewed applications of Mr Pearson and Mr Feal-Martinez, were refused on 18 June 2001, after oral argument, by Lord Justice Simon Brown. 20.  On 25 May 2004 the applicant was released from prison on licence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": true, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Crikvenica, Croatia. 5.  On 6 July 1992 his weekend house in Nin, Croatia, was blown up by unknown perpetrators. 6.  On 18 May 1993 he instituted civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zadru) seeking damages from the Republic of Croatia for his damaged property. 7.  Pursuant to the Civil Obligations (Amendments) Act 1996 (Zakon o izmjeni Zakona o obveznim odnosima), the Zadar Municipal Court stayed the proceedings on 17 December 1998. 8.  The proceedings resumed on 24 October 2003 pursuant to the “Damage from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations Act 2003” (Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata i javnih demonstracija). 9.  On 20 February 2004 the Zadar Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim for damages. The applicant appealed and the case is now apparently pending before the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Novokuybyshevsk, the Samara Region. 9.  The applicant was born in the Minsk Region, Belarus. In 1992 he moved to live with his father in Tatarstan, Russia. He had a Soviet passport issued by the USSR in 1990. 10.  From 1993 to 1996 the applicant served a prison sentence in Belarus. Upon his release in June 1996 he moved to the Kursk Region, Russia. 11.  From 1998 to 2004 the applicant served another prison sentence in Belarus. Upon his release he went to Orel, Russia. 12.  On 9 March 2004, in Orel, the applicant was issued with a Russian passport. 13.  Later in 2004 he moved to Novokuybyshevsk, Russia. 14.  In a decision of 21 September 2005 an officer of the Samara Region Department of the Interior recognised the applicant as a Russian citizen. The decision was upheld by the Russian Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”). 15.  On 14 March 2007 the Department for Citizenship and Migration of the Belarus Ministry of the Interior informed the FMS that, according to the Belarusian Law on Citizenship of 18 October 1991, the applicant was a citizen of Belarus. 16.  On 23 August 2007 the Samara District Court found that the applicant had been unlawfully granted Russian citizenship since he had concealed the fact that he was a national of another State and ordered the FMS to revoke its decision to that effect. The applicant appealed. 17.  On 1 October 2007 the Samara Regional Court upheld the decision. 18.  On 28 November 2007 the FMS revoked its decision to recognise the applicant as a Russian citizen. 19.  On 17 and 20 December 2007 respectively, the Ministry of the Interior of Belarus and the Embassy of Belarus in Moscow informed the applicant's counsel that the applicant was not a citizen of Belarus. 20.  The applicant's requests for supervisory review of the decisions of 23 August and 1 October 2007 were refused by the Samara Regional Court on 23 January and 1 December 2008, and by the Supreme Court on 10 July 2008. The applicant also submitted a request for the proceedings to be reopened on the grounds of newly discovered evidence. The request was refused by the Samara District Court on 23 October 2008. 21.  On 15 August 2005 the Belarus prosecuting authorities instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and Z. They were suspected of extorting 18,000 United States dollars from a private person in Belarus in 2003. The Belarus prosecuting authorities put the applicant's name on a wanted list and ordered his arrest. 22.  On 16 December 2006 the applicant was arrested in Moscow. 23.  On 18 December 2006 the Russian General Prosecutor's Office refused his extradition to Belarus as, according to the decision of the FMS of 21 September 2005, he was a Russian citizen. 24.  On 30 March 2007 Russian prosecuting authorities took over responsibility for the investigation. 25.  On 8 July 2008 the applicant was arrested in Novokuybyshevsk and placed in custody. 26.  On 9 September 2008, after the decision to recognise the applicant as a Russian citizen had been revoked, the Belarus Prosecutor's Office requested his extradition. 27.  On 16 December 2008 the Russian General Prosecutor's Office authorised his extradition. 28.  On 4 March 2009 the Samara Regional Court upheld the extradition decision. The applicant's counsel appealed to the Supreme Court, contending, in particular: “at present it is impossible to assess the reasons why [the applicant] considers that he might be subjected to ill-treatment in the territory of Belarus, it is impossible either to find them well‑substantiated or to refute them”. This appears to be the first time that allegations of possible ill-treatment were raised before the Russian courts. 29.  On 28 April 2009 the Supreme Court quashed and remitted that decision. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Regional Court had failed to obtain and examine a number of procedural documents related to the applicant's extradition. 30.  On 22 May 2009 the Samara Regional Court again found the decision of the Prosecutor General's Office to extradite the applicant to be lawful. 31.  On 28 July 2009, upon the applicant's appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the decision of 22 May 2009 and quashed it. It instructed the Regional Court to review the applicant's complaint under Article 3 of the European Convention and to assess the applicant's claim that he had applied for territorial asylum in Russia. 32.  On 30 July 2009 the applicant submitted a request to the Samara Department of the FMS for refugee status. 33.  On 13 August 2009 the General Prosecutor of Belarus sent a letter to his counterpart in Russia, guaranteeing that, in the event of the applicant's extradition, he would not be subjected to treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, he would be ensured a fair trial and he would be provided with the necessary medical assistance. 34.  On 3 August 2009 the Samara Department of the FMS declined the applicant's request for refugee status. The Department found that the applicant's real reason for going to Russia and claiming asylum was his fear of criminal prosecution in connection with the charges pending against him in Belarus. 35.  On 26 August 2009 the Samara Regional Court found the decision of the General Prosecutor's Office of 16 December 2008 to be lawful. It considered the applicant's claims under Article 3 of the Convention to be unsubstantiated and unsupported by any evidence. It relied on the assurances issued by the General Prosecutor of Belarus in respect of the applicant. The court further noted that the applicant had not been granted asylum in Russia. 36.  On 8 July 2008 the applicant was arrested in Novokuybyshevsk as a suspect in the criminal case instituted against him in Belarus but which was, at that time, being handled by the Russian prosecuting authorities. 37.  On 9 July 2008 the applicant was charged with extortion. The investigating authorities applied to the Novokuybyshevsk Town Court with a request to remand the applicant in custody on the grounds that he had a criminal record, had been charged with a serious offence, had no legal source of income, did not live at his permanent place of residence in Novokuybyshevsk but in Moscow without having registered properly and, if released, could abscond from the investigating authorities and the court and continue his criminal activities. On the same day the Novokuybyshevsk Town Court granted the request and decided to remand the applicant in custody until 9 September 2008. The applicant appealed. 38.  On 28 July 2008 the Samara Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision. 39.  On 5 August 2008 the Novokuybyshevsk Town Court extended the term of his detention until 23 October 2008 on the grounds that he had been charged with a serious offence and the application of a different preventive measure was impossible due to the applicant's personality and the danger that, if released, he would abscond and get involved in criminal activity. 40.  On 8 September 2008 an investigator of the Novokuybyshevsk Department of the Interior decided to terminate the applicant's detention ordered in the decisions of 9 July and 5 August 2008 on the ground that it had been decided to transfer the criminal case back to the Belarusian prosecuting authorities. However, on the same date the applicant was arrested under Article 61 of the Minsk Convention. 41.  On 10 September 2008 the Novokuybyshevsk Town Court ordered the applicant's detention pending extradition proceedings under Article 466 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, without indicating the term of detention. The applicant appealed. 42.  On 24 September 2008 the Samara Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision. 43.  On 28 April 2009 the Supreme Court, deciding on the applicant's complaint about the lawfulness of his extradition, ordered his detention to be extended by one month, until 28 May 2009, in order to ensure his extradition to Belarus. 44.  On 25 May 2009 the Novokuybyshevsk District Court ordered the applicant's detention to be extended to a period of twelve months, that is to say, until 8 September 2009. 45.  On 28 July 2009 the Supreme Court again reviewed the applicant's claim about the lawfulness of his extradition. It ordered the applicant's release from detention on bail of 3,000,000 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicant did not deposit the bail and remained in custody. 46.  On 4 September 2009 the Samara Regional Court refused the prosecutor's request to extend the applicant's custody until 8 March 2010, that is to say, an increase to eighteen months. 47.  On 8 September 2009 the applicant was released from detention.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the town of Volgograd, the Volgograd Region. 6.  The applicant brought court proceedings claiming an increase in the monthly disability allowance she was entitled to receive. On 24 May 1999 the Kirovskiy District Court of Volgograd awarded the applicant 21,245.46 Russian roubles (RUR) in arrears and increased the allowance to RUR 1,214 as of 1 May 1999. 7.  On 15 June 2000 the District Court awarded the applicant RUR 91,039.35 as compensation for late payment of the allowance. On 1 September 2000 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court reduced that amount to RUR 1,500.  On 29 January 2001 the District Court awarded the applicant RUR 1,790.17 as compensation for the depreciation of the award under the judgment of 24 May 1999 due to inflation. 8.  On 13 June 2001 the District Court increased the monthly allowance to RUR 4,070.89 as of 10 January 2001 and awarded the applicant RUR 20,538.16 in allowance arrears for the period from 1 July 2000 to 31 May 2001, and RUR 2,000 as compensation for late payment of that increased allowance. 9.  The above-mentioned judgments were enforced on 25 December 2002. 10.  On 20 February 2002 the District Court adjusted the allowance amount due to the applicant and awarded her RUR 10,162.80. 11.  On 16 July 2003 the District Court awarded the applicant RUR 11,104 in arrears for the period from 15 February 2002 to 30 June 2003 and increased the monthly allowance to RUR 3,175 effective as of 1 July 2003. On 27 August 2003 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment. On 2 September 2005 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court quashed those judgments. 12.  The awards under the judgment of 20 February 2002 and that of 16 July 2003 were paid to the applicant on 22 November and 15 December 2005, respectively. 13.  The applicant brought civil proceedings claiming compensation for depreciation of the awards under the judgments of 13 June 2001 and 20 February 2002. On 7 December 2005 the District Court dismissed her claims. On 9 February 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court quashed the judgment and ordered a re-examination of the case. Apparently, the proceedings are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in in the village of Novoselye, the Leningradskiy Region. 5.  In 1995 the applicant entered into a contract with a joint-stock company “Energomashstroy” (ОАО «Энергомашстрой»). The contract stipulated that the applicant was under an obligation to transfer a sum of money to the company, whilst the latter undertook to build a flat for the applicant. Having moved into the new flat in January 1998, the applicant detected a number of constructional defects. 6.  On 15 September 1998 the applicant brought an action against the company before the Lomonosovskiy District Court of the Leningradskiy Region (“the District Court”), seeking elimination of the above defects. Thereafter on 16 November 1998, 1 April and 17 September 1999, 26 April 2001, 21 July, 14 August and 15 December 2003 she supplemented and modified her claims, seeking the recovery of the money she had paid under the contract and damages. 7.  On 10 December and 15 December 1998 the applicant requested the District Court to commence proceedings in her case. She received no responses to these requests. 8.  On 1 March 1999 the applicant complained about delay in her case to the Court Administration Department at the Supreme Court of Russia (Управление Судебного департамента при Верховном Суде РФ, “the Court Department”). On 23 March 1999 the Court Department informed the applicant that the hearing in her case would be held on 26 March 1999. 9.  On 26 March 1999 the District Court postponed the hearing until 14 May 1999 due to the parties’ failure to appear. The applicant submitted a request for examination of the case in her absence, whilst the defendant company requested the court to adjourn the hearing by reference to the belated delivery of the court summons. 10.  On 14 May 1999 the hearing was postponed until 10 September 1999 because the judge was engaged in unrelated proceedings. 11.  On 1 August 1999 the applicant requested the District Court to expedite the proceedings in her action. 12.  On 10 September 1999 the hearing was adjourned until 8 October 1999 on the ground that the defendant’s representative was unable to appear as he was attending a hearing in an unrelated case, and then until 19 November 1999, as the court ordered the parties to submit certain documents. On the last mentioned date the hearing was postponed until 14 January 2000 and then until 25 January 2000 in view of the participation of the judge in unrelated proceedings. 13.  On 23 November 1999 the applicant lodged a complaint about delays in her case with the Office of the President of Russia. In response, in a letter of 25 January 2000 the District Court notified the applicant that the hearing would take place on 26 January 2000. 14.  On 26 January 2000 the District Court held a hearing and, upon the defendant’s request, ordered an expert examination of the applicant’s flat so as to ascertain its compliance with building standards. By the same decision the court suspended the proceedings pending the outcome of the examination. The applicant objected to the examination on the ground that such examination had already been performed by another expert body, and that she had already furnished its results with the court. According to the applicant, the District Court ignored her objection. 15.  The applicant appealed against the above decision, and the case-file was transmitted to the Civil Section of the Leningradskiy Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). On 27 April 2000 the latter dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal, thus upholding the decision of 26 January 2000. 16.  On 6 June 2000 the case-file was returned to the District Court and sent to the experts to enable them to carry out the requisite examination. 17.  On 8 December 2000 the experts declined to undertake the examination and returned the case-file to the District Court, stating that the defendant company refused to bear the expenses for the examination. 18.  On 9 January 2001 the District Court resumed the proceedings and fixed a hearing for 24 April 2001. 19.  On 24 April 2001 the District Court postponed the hearing until 4 July 2001 and, upon the applicant’s request, ordered the defendant company to provide certain documents. 20.  On 4 July 2001 the court adjourned a hearing until 4 September 2001 as the defendant had failed to submit the requested documents, and then until 28 September 2001, having ordered the parties to submit the original of the contract between them. On the last mentioned date the hearing was postponed until 19 October 2001, as the District Court invited to the expert body to submit a calculation of the expenses for the examination and ordered the reimbursement of those expenses. 21.  On 19 October 2001 the hearing was postponed until 19 November 2001 because the judge was engaged in unrelated proceedings. 22.  On 19 November 2001 the Lomonosovskiy District Court again stayed the proceedings and reaffirmed the order of 26 January 2000, as the defendant had agreed to reimburse the costs of the expert examination. On 23 January 2002 the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s interlocutory appeal against this decision. 23.  On 27 February 2002 the case-filed was remitted to the District Court and sent to the experts. The latter examined the applicant’s flat on 25 July 2002 and returned the case-file to the District Court on 3 September 2002. 24.  By letter of 4 September 2002 the Lomonosovskiy District Court notified the applicant that the hearing would take place on 11 October 2002. On 11 October 2002 the District Court adjourned the hearing until 1 November 2002 for an unspecified reason, and then until 6 December 2002 on account of the judge’s illness. The applicant objected, but the District Court did not address her objections. On 6 December 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 10 January 2003 upon the applicant’s request. 25.  During 2002 the applicant lodged a number of complaints about the excessive length of the proceedings in her case with various administrative bodies. Mostly she received formal responses that her complaints had been forwarded to the District Court. 26.  Between 10 and 15 January 2003 the hearing was repeatedly interrupted for various reasons, in particular for the failure of one of the lay assessors to appear. 27.  On 15 January 2003 the Lomonosovskiy District Court delivered a judgment, dismissing the applicant’s claims and ordering her to reimburse the costs for the examination of the flat to the company. 28.  On 14 May 2003 the Regional Court quashed the above judgment and remitted the case for a new examination. 29.  The case-file was sent back to the District Court on 17 June 2003, and a hearing was scheduled for 14 August 2003. 30.  Between 14 and 29 August 2003 the hearing was interrupted and resumed on several occasions, in particular because the applicant supplemented her claims and twice requested the court to obtain certain documents. On 29 August 2003 the hearing was postponed until 2 October 2003 upon the applicant’s request to obtain certain documents, and thereafter until 20 November 2003, as the judge was ill. The proceedings were resumed on 24 November 2003, but the hearing was adjourned until 5 December 2003, as the representative of the defendant company had failed to appear on account of his illness. On the last mentioned date the proceedings resumed. 31.  By judgment of 17 December 2003 the Lomonosovskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s claims and ordered her to reimburse the costs of the expert examination to the defendant company. 32.  On 10 March 2004 the Regional Court set aside the first instance judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. On 13 April 2004 the case-file was remitted to the District Court, and on 20 April 2004 a hearing was fixed for 9 June 2004. 33.  On 9 June 2004 the hearing was postponed until 28 July 2004 pending the outcome of friendly settlement negotiations between the parties. It appears that on 28 July 2004 the proceedings were recommenced. 34.  By judgment of 9 August 2004 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in part and awarded her damages against the defendant company. 35.  On 3 November 2004 the Regional Court overturned the judgment of 9 August 2004 and remitted the case to the first instance for a new examination. 36.  On 1 February 2005 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in part and ordered the defendant company to pay her 409,724.2 Russian roubles. 37.  On 13 April 2005 the Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Milan. 9.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10.  Stelios company was the owner of an apartment in Milan which it had let to E.T. 11.  In a registered letter sent in December 1990, Stelios informed the tenant that it intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 29 September 1992 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 12.  In a writ served on the tenant on 19 March 1991, Stelios reiterated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 13.  By a decision of 4 April 1991, which was made enforceable on 30 June 1993, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by the same date. 14.  On 15 December 1992, the applicant became the owner of the apartment and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 15.  On 15 November 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 16.  On 25 January 1994, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 February 1994. 17.  In a registered letter of 13 March 1995, the applicant proposed negotiations to the tenant in order to settle their dispute, but they failed. 18.  Between 11 February 1994 and 15 March 1999, the bailiff made seventeen attempts to recover possession. 19.  Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 20.  On 14 December 1999, the enforcement of the order for possession was suspended pursuant Section 6 of Law no. 431/98 and set for 12 May 2000. 21.  On 9 May 2000 and 13 June 2000, the bailiff made two attempts to recover possession. 22.  Later in June 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  On 21 April 2000 the Prosecutor of the Vatutinsky District of Kyiv (“the Vatutinsky District Prosecutor”) instituted proceedings with regard to embezzlement of funds of the company R. The applicant was originally a witness in the case. 6.  On 4 April 2001 the Vatutinsky District Prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of his involvement in the embezzlement. 7.  On 7 April 2001 the Vatutinsky District Prosecutor decided that the applicant should be detained, as he was suspected of a crime punishable by imprisonment. 8.  On 17 May 2001 the investigator instituted another criminal case against the applicant on suspicion of his involvement in embezzlement and joined it to the first criminal case against the applicant. 9.  On 3 June 2001 the same prosecutor decided that the applicant's detention should be extended to 4 July 2001. 10.  Between 27 June and 6 September 2001 and on 14 September 2001 the applicant and his lawyer studied the criminal case file. 11.  On 14 September 2001 the applicant was indicted for theft. 12.  On 28 September 2001 the indictment was approved by the Vatutinsky District Prosecutor. The case was transferred for examination on its merits to the Vatutinsky District Court of Kyiv (“the Vatutinsky Court”). 13.  On 26 September 2001 the applicant's advocate lodged a request with the Vatutinsky Court seeking the applicant's immediate release. 14.  On 5 October 2001 the Vatutinsky Court received the case file and on 12 October 2001 Judge K. of the Vatutinsky Court held a preparatory hearing in the case. 15.  On 15 October 2001 Judge K. decided that the criminal case against the applicant should be remitted for additional investigation. He also rejected the applicant's request for release of 26 September 2001, finding no grounds for changing the preventive measure applied by the prosecutor. In particular, the court stated that the applicant had been detained on the basis of the prosecutor's decision since 7 April 2001 in order to prevent him from avoiding investigation and appearance in court, obstructing the establishment of the truth in the criminal case and continuing with criminal activity, and in order to ensure compliance with procedural decisions in cases where the law provides for deprivation of liberty for more than three years. No time-limit for detention was fixed. 16.  On 29 January 2002 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the resolution of 15 October 2001 and remitted the case for examination on the merits to the Desnyansky District Court, Kyiv (formerly Vatutinsky District, but after changes to the judicial districts in Kyiv “the Desnyansky Court”). 17.  On 4 March 2002 the Desnyansky Court held a preparatory hearing in the case. It examined the applicant's request to be released on bail and found no reasons for allowing it. It also noted that the applicant had been detained lawfully, given that criminal proceedings against him were pending. 18.  On 11 March 2002 the applicant's lawyer requested the Desnyansky Court to order the applicant's release. This request was refused the same day. The court considered that the applicant might evade and obstruct justice and, given his age, state of health, family status and economic status there were no grounds for replacing the detention with another preventive measure. On 14 March 2002 the court rejected a similar request by the applicant on the same grounds, adding that the seriousness of the charges had also been taken into account. Two more similar requests by the applicant were rejected by the court on 4 and 19 April 2002 on the same grounds. 19.  On 29 April 2002 the Desnyansky Court ordered that the case be again remitted for additional investigation. The court also upheld the applicant's detention, noting without further elaboration that there were no grounds for changing the preventive measure. No time-limit for detention was fixed. 20.  On 23 July 2002 the Court of Appeal quashed the resolution and remitted the case for re-examination on the merits. The court also noted that it had no legal basis for deciding on the applicant's request for release and considered that the conclusions of the first-instance court on the matter were lawful, reasoned and corresponded to the case file materials. Therefore, it left the preventive measure unchanged. 21.  In August 2002 the Court of Appeal ordered the transfer of the criminal case from the Desnyansky Court to the Golosiyevsky District Court of Kyiv (“the Golosiyevsky Court”). 22.  On 28 August 2002 the Golosiyevsky Court ordered a hearing on the merits on 13 September 2002. 23.  On 14 October 2002 Judge C. resumed examination of the case on the merits and informed the applicant's lawyer that she had decided not to remit the case for additional investigation. The court also rejected the applicant's request for release, on the ground that he might avoid and obstruct justice. 24.  On 17 October 2002 the defence challenged Judge C. 25.  On 24 December 2002 Judge C. of the Golosiyevsky Court decided to remit the case for additional investigation. It also decided that there were no grounds for changing the preventive measure in respect of the applicant. 26.  On 13 March 2003 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 24 December 2002 and returned the case to the Golosiyevsky Court for examination on the merits. It also decided again that the applicant should remain in custody, as he had been charged with serious offences which would warrant deprivation of liberty after conviction. 27.  On 13 May 2003 the Golosiyevsky Court decided that the case should be remitted for additional investigation to the Vatutinsky District Prosecutor. It also ordered the applicant's continued detention, without giving any particular reasons for it. The court also rejected the applicant's request for termination of the proceedings in the case. 28.  On 28 July 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal on points of law lodged against the decision not to terminate the proceedings, as the applicant had failed to comply with procedural formalities. 29.  On 4 August 2003 the Desnyansky District Prosecutor released the applicant from detention. The applicant signed an undertaking not to abscond. 30.  On 30 August 2003 the applicant's advocate unsuccessfully requested the prosecution to amnesty the applicant, in view of the nature of the charges brought against him and his poor state of health. 31.  On 24 October 2003 the criminal investigation was adjourned because one of the suspects was being searched for. 32.  On 30 December 2003 the investigator of the Desnyanskiy Distirct Prosecutor's Office terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant on all but two of the charges, for lack of evidence of his involvement in the crime. The criminal case concerning the remaining charges was transferred to the Desnyanskiy District Police Department. 33.  On 18 September 2004 the investigator of the Desnyanskiy District Police Department terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant concerning the remaining charges for lack of evidence of crime and initiated criminal proceedings in respect of crimes committed by an unknown person. This decision appears to have been mistakenly dated 18 September 2003 instead of 18 September 2004. Next day the criminal proceedings were suspended for failure to establish the identity of the suspected offender. 34.  Between 20 April 2001 and 4 August 2003 the applicant was held in the Kyiv SIZO no. 13, a detention facility with, according to the applicant, poor prison conditions and insufficient medical treatment. 35.  According to the Government, in that facility the applicant was held in the following cells:\n-  cell No. 30, measuring nine square metres and designed for three inmates;\n-  cell No. 64, measuring 52.36 sq. m and designed for twenty inmates;\n-  cell No. 66, measuring 53.07 sq. m and designed for twenty-one inmates;\n-  cell No. 68, measuring 61.19 sq. m and designed for twenty-four inmates;\n-  cell No. 72, measuring 10.21 sq. m and designed for four inmates;\n-  cell No. 76, measuring 9.92 sq. m and designed for three inmates;\n-  cell No. 116, measuring 10 sq. m and designed for four inmates;\n-  cell No. 117, measuring 9.96 sq. m and designed for three inmates;\n-  cell No. 128, measuring 15.95 sq. m and designed for six inmates;\n-  cell No. 195, measuring 22.44 sq. m and designed for eight inmates;\n-  cell No. 258, measuring 23.38 sq. m and designed for five inmates;\n-  cell No. 263, measuring 24.9 sq. m and designed for six inmates;\n-  cell No. 326, measuring 12.9 sq. m and designed for five inmates;\n-  cell No. 328, measuring 12.9 sq. m and designed for five inmates;\n-  cell No. 333, measuring 12.9 sq. m and designed for eight inmates;\n-  cell No. 336, measuring 12.9 sq. m and designed for five inmates.\nAll the cells had a constant supply of cold water, natural and artificial light, a separated toilet and ventilation. The number of detainees did not exceed the number of places in each cell. 36.  According to the applicant, he was not held in cells 333 and 336. Cells 64, 66 and 68 had 40 bunks each. Cell 72, measuring 9 sq. m, was damp and very cold in winter. In this latter cell he spent in total about 18 months. In cell no. 195, which had very poor ventilation, he spent about six months in total. 37.  According to the Government, the applicant had a full medical examination on arrival at the SIZO on 20 April 2001. He did not make any complaints about his health and was registered for follow-up (диспансерний облік) in respect of his chronic illnesses. 38.  On 16 November 2001, 24 April 2002 and 15 April 2003 the applicant had regular medical check-ups and was X-rayed. The examination revealed no lung problems. 39.  According to a medical certificate issued on 6 December 2001, the applicant had a mild form of diabetes and required a special diet but not medical treatment. 40.  According to a medical certificate issued on 10 July 2002 the applicant had been diagnosed with ischaemic heart disease, stenocardia and diabetes. 41.  On 15 January 2003 the applicant was examined by a cardiologist, who found him to be suffering from ischaemic heart disease and stenocardia. 42.  On 27 January 2003 the applicant asked for medical assistance, complaining of chest pain and dizziness. Following a medical examination it was decided to place the applicant in the medical wing of the SIZO. From 28 January 2003 the applicant was treated in the medical wing of the SIZO, with a diagnosis of neurocirculatory dystonia and cervical osteochondrosis. The applicant was prescribed several different types of medication. Every third day he was examined by a general doctor. On 29 January 2003 he was examined by the cardiologist who found that the applicant had no heart problems. On 30 January 2003 the applicant was examined by a neuropathologist. On 11 March 2003 the applicant left the medical wing of the SIZO in a satisfactory state of health. Following this treatment, and until his release from detention, the applicant did not consult doctors with any health-related complaints. 43.  Following his release, the applicant underwent medical treatment in Kyiv Hospital no. 15 for arrhythmogenic cardiomyopathy and ciliary arrhythmia from 7 to 27 August 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1964 and currently lives in Offenburg, Germany. 7.  The applicant left Bulgaria for Germany on 15 January 1992 and settled in Offenburg. On 28 January 1994 he married a German national, Ms E. Pfeifer, and adopted her family name. On 24 February 1995 they had a daughter. In July 1997 the applicant started work at a Daimler‑Benz factory in Stuttgart. Between 1998 and 2001, when he was in pre‑trial detention in Bulgaria and unable to provide for his family (see paragraph 24 below), the German authorities paid child support in his stead. 8.  On 19 May 2006 a court in Offenburg granted a divorce petition by the applicant's wife, chiefly on account of his prolonged absence because of the criminal proceedings against him in Bulgaria and the fact that he had been prevented from leaving that country to visit his family in Germany (see paragraphs 24‑38 below). 9.  On 3 February 1992 the Bulgarian authorities opened an investigation against the applicant on suspicion that on 14 January 1992 he had murdered a man in Pleven. On 1 October 1996 an investigator ordered his arrest. 10.  The applicant's whereabouts were established through Interpol and on 3 June 1998 he was arrested in Offenburg. On 22 June 1998 the Bulgarian authorities requested his extradition on charges of premeditated murder. On 7 October 1998 the German authorities agreed to extradite him and on 18 November 1998 he was sent to Bulgaria. 11.  On 29 December 1998 the applicant was charged with premeditated murder committed as a repeat offender. However, in April 1999 the charges were modified to aggravated robbery accompanied by murder. 12.  In a judgment of 18 April 2000 the Pleven Regional Court found the applicant guilty of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to sixteen years' imprisonment. 13.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 24 October 2000 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed his conviction and sentence and referred the case back to the prosecuting authorities. It found, among other things, that the applicant's conviction for robbery was in breach of the “rule of speciality” set forth in Article 14 of the European Convention on Extradition. 14.  On 28 February 2001 the applicant was charged with premeditated murder. On 9 November 2001 the prosecuting authorities decided to drop the charge of murder committed as a repeat offender. Following an application by the private prosecuting parties, in December 2001 the Pleven Regional Court set that decision aside and directed the prosecuting authorities to also charge the applicant with murder committed in the capacity of a repeat offender. 15.  On 15 February 2002 the prosecuting authorities indicted the applicant, charging him with premeditated murder committed as a repeat offender and in complicity. 16.  Between June 2002 and March 2004 the Pleven Regional Court held nine hearings. However, on 24 March 2005, pursuant to a request by the applicant, a judge and a lay judge withdrew from the case, the former because certain remarks that he had made could have been considered indicative of bias, and the latter on the ground that he had taken part in the examination of the application for judicial review of the prosecuting authorities' decision to drop the charge of murder committed as a repeat offender (see paragraph 14 above). Accordingly, the trial had to start anew. 17.  In June or July 2005 the applicant was indicted again. As the Pleven Regional Court found the indictment defective, it had to be re‑submitted in September 2005, charging the applicant with murder committed as a repeat offender. 18.  On 26 May 2006 the Pleven Regional Court acquitted the applicant. 19.  The prosecution appealed to the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal. However, as all the judges of that court had previously dealt with the case, chiefly in connection with requests for release or requests by the applicant to be allowed to leave Bulgaria (see paragraphs 24, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36 and 37 below), in November 2006 the proceedings were transferred to the Sofia Court of Appeal. 20.  On 27 June 2007 the Sofia Court of Appeal quashed the applicant's acquittal and found him guilty of murder committed as a repeat offender. It sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. 21.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 24 January 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court's judgment, finding that it had made certain clerical errors in the text of its judgment which, taken as a whole, made it impossible to ascertain the exact tenor of its ruling. 22.  The Sofia Court of Appeal examined the case afresh on 10 March 2008, and, on 21 April 2008, again quashed the applicant's acquittal and found him guilty of murder committed as a repeat offender. It sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. It observed that there were a number of aggravating circumstances, but went on to say that there existed a compelling mitigating circumstance: the amount of time which had elapsed since the commission of the offence. Part of that period could be attributed to the conduct of the applicant, who had escaped to Germany. However, there were still grounds to impose a punishment below the statutory minimum – fifteen years' imprisonment – to compensate for the excessive duration of the proceedings. 23.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 23 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld his conviction and sentence. It fully approved of the approach taken by the lower court with regard to the quantum of the punishment, saying that the reduction had made good an injustice towards the applicant, namely the failure to determine the charges against him within a reasonable time. 24.  On 19 November 1998, the day following his extradition (see paragraph 10 above), the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention. On 7 February 2001 he was released. 25.  In the meantime, in February 1999 the immigration authorities took away his passport at the request of the investigation authorities. 26.  On 27 June 2001 the applicant asked the prosecuting authorities to allow him to leave Bulgaria for sixty days to visit his wife and daughter in Germany. He argued that he had not seen them for four years, that they were experiencing financial difficulties, that he had a fixed place of abode in both Germany and Bulgaria, and that since his release from custody he had always remained at the disposal of the authorities. On 28 June 2001 his request was refused, and he sought judicial review by the Pleven Regional Court. On 1 August 2001 that court dismissed his application, holding that the gravity of the charges against him and the potential punishment made it likely that he would flee. There was no indication that he needed to travel urgently and there was nothing to indicate that he would not abscond. 27.  In February 2002 the applicant sought leave from the Pleven Regional Court to go to Germany. On 7 March 2002 the judge-rapporteur in his case turned down his request. He held that the fact that the applicant had left Bulgaria immediately after the commission of the offence was indicative of his desire to obstruct the proceedings. If he had really acted in good faith, there would have been no need to track him down through Interpol. There was no guarantee that, if allowed to go to Germany, he would return for the trial. He stood accused of a serious offence, committed as a repeat offender and carrying a punishment of between fifteen years' imprisonment and life imprisonment without parole. The harshness of the punishment in itself made it likely that he would try to flee. 28.  On 23 April 2002 the applicant asked the Pleven Regional Court to allow him to leave Bulgaria for twenty‑five days to visit his wife and daughter in Germany. He chiefly relied on the same arguments as before. On an unspecified date in April, May or June 2002 the judge-rapporteur rejected the request, giving exactly the same reasons as earlier. 29.  On 14 October 2002 the applicant made yet another request to be allowed to travel to Germany. He said that he had not seen his family for more than four years, which had adversely affected his family life, had had profoundly negative effects on the emotional state of his daughter, and had placed his wife and daughter in financial difficulties. He submitted a medical certificate showing that his wife had developed a psychogenic hysterical paralysis, which prevented her from taking proper care of their daughter. He also asserted that he could not provide for his family from Bulgaria and needed to go to Germany and register with the German social services in order to obtain financial support for them. He had not obstructed the progress of the proceedings in any way, had a permanent place of abode in both Bulgaria and Germany, and had never sought to evade justice. On 30 October 2002 the Pleven Regional Court rejected the request, briefly noting that the applicant had been charged with a serious wilful offence. The applicant's ensuing appeal was declared inadmissible by the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal on 13 November 2002, on the grounds that no appeal lay against the lower court's ruling and that the appeal had been signed solely by the applicant's counsel. 30.  On 13 December 2002 the applicant sought leave to travel to Germany, reiterating his earlier arguments. On 8 January 2003 the Pleven Regional Court rejected his request, briefly noting that he stood accused of a serious offence and that the lifting of the travel ban could hinder the establishment of the truth and the conclusion of the trial. 31.  The applicant made a further request on 2 July 2003, reiterating his previous arguments. The court rejected it the same day, briefly noting that the applicant stood accused of a serious offence and had been extradited from Germany. His family-related arguments could not be seen as decisive. The applicant's ensuing appeal was dismissed by the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal on 28 July 2003. 32.  On 25 July 2003 the applicant requested the lifting of the travel ban, reiterating his earlier arguments. On 14 August 2003 the Pleven Regional Court rejected his request, observing that he stood accused of a serious offence, had been hiding in Germany and had been extradited from there. The length of the criminal proceedings had not exceeded a reasonable time. The fact that the applicant's family was in Germany was not decisive, as there was no indication that they could not visit him in Bulgaria. Moreover, he could work in Bulgaria and support his family from there. 33.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 26 August 2003 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's ruling and allowed him to travel to Germany. In a detailed opinion it noted that, although the applicant had been charged with a serious offence and had been extradited and then kept in custody for a long time, he had not missed any hearings in his case. In the court's view, at that stage, when the proceedings had already lasted twelve years and thus exceeded a reasonable time, it was no longer justified to turn down the applicant's requests for permission to travel. The court reviewed the applicant's conduct between 1992 and 1998 and concluded that he had not tried to evade justice. It went on to say that in relying on the gravity of the charges against him the lower court had acted in breach of the presumption of innocence. The only relevant factor in that respect was the conduct of the accused during the proceedings. The court noted that the applicant had not obstructed the proceedings against him in any way since his release from detention, that the evidence against him was contradictory and that his family life had suffered serious disruption on account of a measure which could not be maintained forever. It also held that to allow the applicant to travel to Germany would not create a risk of his evading, because he could be re-arrested and extradited. However, the court turned down the applicant's request for a full lifting of the travel ban. 34.  In August and September 2003 the applicant travelled to Germany. He returned in time for the next hearing, which took place on 18 September 2003. 35.  On 19 December 2003 the applicant asked the Pleven Regional Court to allow him to travel to Germany again. He relied on the same arguments as previously and stressed that he had returned from his previous trip in time for the hearing. The court examined the request at a hearing held on 23 December 2003 and rejected it in a decision of the same day. It said that there was no indication that the applicant's family could not visit him in Bulgaria. He had been extradited from Germany and could not be allowed to leave Bulgaria. The applicant appealed, putting forward numerous detailed arguments. On 12 January 2004 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, saying that the seriousness of the charges against the applicant, coupled with his two previous convictions, showed that he was a dangerous individual. It was therefore likely that, if allowed to leave the country, he would not return. The fact that he had been extradited was telling in this respect. He could maintain contact with his family from Bulgaria. 36.  On 23 February 2004 the applicant made another request to be allowed to travel to Germany, putting forward arguments similar to those supporting his previous requests and stressing that the separation from his wife since 1998 had caused her to apply for a divorce, as could be seen from the grounds cited in her divorce petition (see paragraph 8 above). He repeated his request on 4 March 2004. On the same day the Pleven Regional Court rejected it, observing that there was no indication that the separation between the applicant and his wife had not predated his extradition. Moreover, the applicant had produced no proof to show that the divorce petition had already been heard. He stood accused of a serious wilful offence, in connection with which he had been extradited. The applicant appealed, reiterating his arguments. On 25 March 2004 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's ruling, holding that, in view of the gravity of the charges against the applicant and the fact that he had prior convictions, he was likely to flee. The proceedings against him had not lasted an unreasonably long time, because their duration was not attributable to the conduct of the authorities. The applicant's family could come to Bulgaria, whereas the lifting of the travel ban would render the earlier extradition pointless. 37.  On 8 December 2004 the applicant made a fresh request to be allowed to travel to Germany. On 14 February 2005 the Pleven Regional Court refused it. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 28 February 2005 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal reversed this ruling and allowed the applicant to travel to Germany, giving exactly the same reasons as on 26 August 2003 (see paragraph 33 above). 38.  On 26 May 2006 the Pleven Regional Court, when acquitting the applicant (see paragraph 18 above), fully lifted the prohibition on his leaving Bulgaria. 39.  The applicant went to Germany, where, on 15 March 2007 he was employed by a German company. However, he attended all the hearings in the case against him in Bulgaria. 40.  On 27 June 2007 the Sofia Court of Appeal, when quashing the applicant's acquittal and finding him guilty (see paragraph 20 above), imposed a new travel ban, without giving reasons. The applicant's appeals against that order were declared inadmissible on the ground that no appeal lay against it. 41.  On 10 March 2008 the applicant asked the Sofia Court of Appeal to lift the travel ban. On the same day the court granted his request. It noted that he had a wife and a child in Germany and an address in Germany. It went on to observe that the judicial phase of the proceedings had been pending for too long, that the applicant, whose conduct during the proceedings had been exemplary, had not caused any adjournments, and that the ban had been in force since 27 June 2007. Finally, it could not be overlooked that the applicant had been acquitted by the lower court. 42.  It seems that after that the applicant went to Germany. He is currently there, fighting an extradition request from the Bulgarian authorities, which have issued a European arrest warrant for him with a view to enforcing his sentence, which became final on 23 December 2008 (see paragraphs 22 and 23 above). The proceedings are now pending before the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": true}
{"text": "5.  The applicants live in Voronezh, the Voronezh Region. Their names and dates of birth are indicated in the appended table. 6.  The applicants are pensioners. They sued the local social welfare authorities for underpaid cost-of-living adjustment of their pensions. On the dates set out in Appendix I the domestic courts granted their claims and ordered the welfare authorities of different districts of Voronezh to pay them the respective amounts. The judgments became final on the dates indicated in Appendix I. 7.  In 2001 all the applicants except for Mrs Gurova submitted the writs of execution to the bailiffs. On various dates of the same year the bailiffs discontinued the enforcement proceedings and returned the writs to the respective courts, referring to the debtor’s lack of funds. In 2004 these applicants resubmitted the enforcement documents for execution. The bailiffs returned the writs unenforced, with reference to the lack of funds. 8.  On 16 June 2006 the Levoberezhnyy District Court of Voronezh rejected Mrs Sadchikova’s complaint about the bailiffs’ negligence. 9. In their observations the Government submitted, without further detail, that at some point, apparently after 25 November 2005, the Main Department of Pension Fund of the Levoberezhnyy District of Voronezh had invited the applicant to receive the judgment debt, but she had refused. They informed the Court that on 3 July 2007 the unspecified documents regarding payment of the judgment debt had been sent to a local post office, for delivery to the applicant. They furnished no information or documents confirming that the applicant had received the amount. 10.  According to the Government, the writ of execution issued in respect the award in favour of Mrs Gurova was on 14 June 2000 returned to the Zheleznodorozhnyy District Court of Voronezh, on account of full execution of the award. All the documents concerning the enforcement proceedings were subsequently archived and destroyed. The Government submitted that, apparently, the judgment had been enforced in 2000, but they were not in possession of any documents evidencing the enforcement. 11.  In 2005 Mrs Gurova asked the district pension authority to execute the judgment, but the authority rejected her claim on the ground that the domestic courts’ findings in her favour had been incorrect. 12.  On 11 July 2007 1,489.60 Russian Roubles (RUB) of the judgment debt were transferred to her bank account. According to the Government, this payment had been made due to humanitarian considerations and respect for human rights. 13.   The judgments in favour of the other applicants had been enforced on the dates tabulated in Appendix I. 14.  The above applicants submitted in their observations, without further detail, that at some point after communication of their cases by the Court they had been summoned for interviews by the local prosecutor’s office. It followed from the summonses they received that they were called in respect of their complaints to the Court. The summonses contained a reference to Article 6 of the Federal Law on Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation stipulating that the prosecutor’s instructions were binding, and the failure to comply with them might result in administrative responsibility. 15.   Mrs Gurova furnished a copy of a prosecutor’s explanatory note («объяснение») concerning her interview. It transpires from the note that the prosecutor asked the applicant questions about the judgment in her favour, the state of the enforcement proceedings and the authorities’ refusals to execute the award. The applicant confirmed that she was not willing to settle. Mrs Sadchikova and Mrs Sedykh did not furnish any details in respect of the interviews.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Moscow. 6.  During the evening of 14 October 2003 the applicant assaulted Ms G. in an attempt to steal her handbag. After searching the surrounding streets, Ms G. and her acquaintance, Mr Sh., located the applicant at a bus stop nearby. 7.  As quoted in the report of the internal security office of the Interior Department of the South-West Administrative District of Moscow of 19 December 2003 (see paragraph 21 below), police officers M. and S., who arrived at the scene after a telephone call from Ms G., stated that when they arrived they saw that the applicant’s head had been bleeding and his jacket was torn. They handcuffed him when he attempted to escape. 8.  After taking the applicant to Cheremushinskoye police station, the police officers called an ambulance which took him to a hospital for first aid to be administered. Afterwards he was taken back to the police station and released on the following day after questioning. 9.  On 17 October 2003 criminal proceedings were instituted by the investigative department of Cheremushinskoye police station against the applicant in connection with the incident of 14 October 2003. On the same date the investigator drew up a record of the inspection of Ms G.’s handbag describing its appearance and contents which included a cell phone and a certain amount of money. The record also included an estimate of the cost of the objects. Two attesting witnesses, P. and K., put their signatures on the record of inspection and on the decision of the same date to include in the body of evidence the above-mentioned objects. 10.  The records of the questioning of Ms G. and Mr Sh. of 3 November 2003 contain the following identical statements:\n“[The applicant] tried to run away but Sh. stopped him and grabbed his arms. [The applicant] made several other attempts at absconding before the arrival of the police, which is why Sh. had to physically restrain him, and that might have caused some bodily injury ... Upon their arrival the police handcuffed [the applicant].” 11.  When being questioned on 3 December 2003 as a suspect, the applicant stated the following:\n“The woman pushed me in the chest, and the man hit me on the head with the handle of a handgun, causing bleeding ... The woman walked to a nearby shopping centre and returned with two security guards, after which the three men started beating me. Then the woman used her mobile phone to call the police ... I was then taken to Cheremushkinskoye police station where I was handcuffed to the iron bar of a cell.\nIn the questioning office ... I was told to sit down on the floor. On several occasions I tried to get up and the police officer took a truncheon and hit me across the legs. The other police officers started mocking me and told me to sing [a children’s song] to identify my voice, which I did as I feared that I would be subjected to physical violence.” 12.  On 4 December 2003 an expert forensic report concluded that he suffered from “shift-like” schizophrenia with pronounced psychological effects. 13.  On 27 May 2004 the Cheremushinskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”), while considering the criminal charge against the applicant, refused a request by the applicant’s counsel to summon the attesting witnesses P. and K., who were allegedly ex-police officers, for lack of sufficient grounds to question their identity. Counsel further demanded that the signed documents be struck out of the list of evidence as they were improperly drawn up. This request was also dismissed as the court held that the documents had been drawn up in accordance with the law. 14.  On 28 May 2004 the District Court found that the applicant had committed attempted robbery with assault, but relieved him of criminal liability on account of his mental-health status and ordered his placement in a psychiatric hospital. The court based its conclusion on the statements of Ms G. and Mr Sh. made in court, as well as various procedural documents, including the record of inspection of Ms G.’s belongings and the decision to include the objects in the body of evidence signed by the attesting witnesses. It also referred to the statement made by the applicant’s mother, who acted as his lawful representative, to the effect that the applicant had been beaten up by strangers who had subsequently turned him in to the police. 15.  On 11 August 2004 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) upheld the above-mentioned decision on appeal. 16.  On 16 October 2003 the applicant’s mother complained to the prosecutor of the Cheremushinskiy District of Moscow, requesting the opening of criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in custody. On an unspecified date her complaint was referred by the prosecutor to the internal security office of the Interior Department of the South-West Administrative District of Moscow for an inquiry. 17.  On 16 October 2003 the applicant went to a municipal hospital which recorded multiple bruises on his head, neck and torso, and an abrasion on the back of his head. 18.  On 18 October 2003 he attended at another hospital which recorded an infected wound on his head and hypoesthesia of the fingers of the right hand. 19.  Both records contain the following references:\n“According to the [applicant], on 14 October 2003 he was beaten up by the officers of Cheremushinskoye police station”. 20.  On 4 December 2003 the investigator in charge of the applicant’s criminal case commissioned an expert forensic report on account of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment made in the course of the criminal investigation against him. In his order he indicated that the experts should examine the available medical documents. He also referred the complaint of ill-treatment for examination to the prosecutor’s office of the Cheremushinskiy District of Moscow. 21.  On 19 December 2003 the internal security office of the Interior Department of the South-West Administrative District of Moscow completed the inquiry prompted by the applicant’s mother’s complaint, producing a report of the same date. In particular, the inquiring officer stated as follows:\n“Police officers M. and S. questioned in the course of the inquiry stated that they had put handcuffs on [the applicant] as during the apprehension the latter had put up resistance and had tried to hit M.\nThe above-mentioned officers also stated that when they had discovered that [the applicant] had a head injury, they called an ambulance after escorting [the applicant] to the police station.\nAfter [the applicant] was administered medical aid at Moscow municipal hospital no. 1, he was again brought to Cheremushinskoye police station.\nDuty officer Shi. and investigator G. stated that there had been no unlawful actions during [the applicant’s] apprehension and questioning.\n...\nThus, the allegations of unlawful actions by police officers were not proved during the inquiry, and the use of handcuffs was not in breach of Article 14 of the Police Act.\nHowever, given that the complaint refers to unlawful actions by police officers which fall within the competence of the prosecutor’s office, [I] suggest terminating the internal inquiry, sending the material collected by the internal inquiry to the Cheremushinskiy District prosecutor’s office for taking a decision in accordance with the law, and informing the parties concerned about the decision.” 22.  On 24 December 2003 the State forensic experts issued a conclusion which reiterated the medical data as described above (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above) and stated that the recorded injuries had not led to any consequences for the applicant’s health. The experts could not determine the circumstances or the date of the injuries due to the lack of comprehensive data. 23.  On 9 January 2004 the prosecutor of the Cheremushkinskiy District of Moscow, relying on the statements made by police officers M., S. and Shi. in the context of the investigation by the internal security office, decided not to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. 24.  On 22 September 2004 the applicant, his mother and counsel challenged the above decision in court. 25.  On 18 November 2004 the District Court heard the applicant’s mother, his counsel and a representative of the prosecutor’s office and dismissed the complaint as unfounded after concluding that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by the third parties who had restrained him at the scene. In particular, the court said:\n“As follows from the statements given by Ms G., Mr Sh. and police officers S. and M., at the moment of the arrest [the applicant] ... had injuries which had occurred before arrival of the police. [The applicant’s mother] ... also confirmed at the hearing that her son had been beaten up with a handgun before arrival of the officers of Cheremushkinskoye police station.” 26.  On 3 February 2005 the City Court upheld the above decision on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant, Ms M.B., is a Romanian national who was born in 1958 and lives in Bacău. She was not represented by a lawyer before the Court or before the domestic authorities at any time. 7.  She has been eligible for welfare benefits since 1996 as a disabled person who is unfit to work. 8.  On 14 September 2000 she was diagnosed as suffering from “paranoid schizophrenia”. Since then, she has been registered in the files of several psychiatric institutions. 9.  The applicant is the mother of three children, two of whom, C.-L. and C.-I., born in 1992 and 1994 respectively, were minors at the material time. Her eldest daughter was above the age of majority. 10.  A letter dated 18 January 2011 from the Bacău City Council Guardianship Authority to the Agent of the Romanian Government before the Court states that “according to checks carried out in the database of the Guardianship Authority Section (Compartimentul Autoritate Tutelară) at Bacău City Council, no measures to protect the interests of Ms [M.B.] – who has been diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia – have been put in place (nu s-a instituit), either by means of partial or full guardianship”. The letter adds that “likewise, no temporary guardianship arrangements have been made to assist her two children or to protect their interests during their mother’s detention”. 11.  On several occasions since 2000 the applicant has been taken, usually by the police, to the psychiatric department of Bacău Hospital or the Socola psychiatric clinic and admitted for treatment. This happened between 14 September and 13 October 2000, 1 and 15 May 2002, 21 January and 17 February 2003, 12 May and 2 June 2004, 26 October and 4 November 2005, 18 and 31 March 2006, 21 July and 8 August 2006, 25 August and 13 September 2006, and 8 and 22 October 2007. 12.  For example, in a letter dated 11 January 2003 the Izvoru Bereheciului police asked Bacău Hospital to admit the applicant on the grounds that she had been “found undernourished (subnutrită), living in a room without heating and with no material support”. The letter concluded as follows: “We would be grateful if you could take medical action as her behaviour is antisocial”. 13.  The form for the applicant’s admission to the hospital’s psychiatric department, dated 12 May 2004, included a note in the “type of admission” section indicating that the police had taken her to the hospital as a matter of emergency. A letter from the police dated the same day stated that the reason for taking her to the hospital was that she “represented a danger to her neighbours in the village by habitually starting fires in the courtyard of her house, entering local authority premises and frightening children in the street through her aggressive conduct”. 14.  Similarly, a hospital discharge form dated 8 August 2006 stated that the applicant had been “readmitted to hospital after being brought there by the police (se reinternează adusă de poliţie)” on 21 July 2006. An undated letter signed by the applicant requesting admission to the hospital was filed together with her admission form dated 21 July 2006. The letter stated that, should the need arise, her children could be contacted at their care home, the address of which was indicated. 15.  A similar note indicating “type of admission: police” appears on the admission form dated 25 August 2006. A letter from the police dated the same day gave the same reasons as those set out in the letter of 12 May 2004, adding that the applicant had apparently “also been raped during the night of 24 to 25 August 2006”. These events formed the subject of the B. v. Romania case (no. 42390/07, 10 January 2012). 16.  The documents sent to the Court indicate that each time she was admitted to hospital, the applicant left after stays of varying lengths. 17.  According to information supplied by the Government, the applicant was admitted to hospital four times in 2008, spending a total of five months in the psychiatric department for patients with chronic disorders. 18.  In 2009 she was admitted to Buhuşi Hospital six times, spending a total of ten and a half months in the psychiatric department for patients with chronic disorders. In 2010 she was admitted a further seven times, spending a total of more than eleven months in hospital. 19.  The applicant considers that she has been “permanently detained” by the authorities. She has not informed the Court whether she has challenged these measures under Law no. 487/2002 on mental health and the protection of individuals with mental disorders. 20.  In a letter of 31 January 2011 to the Agent of the Romanian Government, the director of Buhuşi Hospital gave assurances that the applicant was being kept in good conditions in the hospital. The other relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n“In reply to your letter no. 319 of 21 January 2011 concerning the case of [M.B.] we wish to provide the following clarifications: ...\n[M.B.] is a chronically ill patient who has been admitted to psychiatric clinics since 2000; she has delusions of persecution and prejudice.\nShe has the right to receive information, as is demonstrated by her correspondence with the ECHR over several years.\nIn our view, it is surprising that her bizarre, delirious, incoherent allegations – the work of a patient with chronic mental disorders – should be taken into account, thus constantly obliging us to produce replies and official letters running to tens of pages, including archived documents, and to make a sustained effort to refute her blatant lies.\n... [M.B.] is not a victim of the Romanian State but rather of the condition from which she is suffering.” 21.  From 2000 the applicant’s two minor children no longer lived with her and, on account of her illness, were placed in a care home for abandoned children by a decision of the Bacău Child Welfare Board. 22.  Two articles published on 9 and 12 September 2000 in the local newspaper Deşteptarea described the unhealthy conditions in which the applicant and her two minor children were living. 23.  The day after the articles were published, the authorities were informed that the two children were being fed “grass, chestnuts, plantain leaves and mushrooms gathered in parks” and that their mother had also refused to enrol them in school. 24.  On 12 September 2000, at the urging of social workers – as is apparent from a report of 13 September 2000 – the children’s maternal grandmother sought assistance from the Bacău County Social Welfare and Child Protection Department (Direcţia Generală de Asistenţă Socială şi Protecţia Copilului – “the DGASPC”) in having the applicant admitted to a specialist hospital on account of her mental illness and violent behaviour. The grandmother stated that the two children did not attend school and sometimes went without food and were left unsupervised, and gave her consent for them to be taken into care. The children were aged eight and six at the time. 25.  Later that day, four welfare officers, two of them from the DGASPC and the other two from a care home for children, went to the applicant’s house accompanied by a police officer. According to a report of 13 September 2000, drawn up following the visit, it was “plain to see” that the applicant was ill, that there was a lack of food in the house and that the living conditions were inadequate; for example, there was no heating or electricity. The report proposed that the children be taken into care as a matter of urgency because “their mother posed a danger to them”. 26.  The social services obtained statements from three of the applicant’s neighbours, who described the appalling conditions in which the two children were living with their mother. 27.  On the same day, the social workers took the children to the care home, after obtaining their grandmother’s written consent. 28.  Two psychosocial assessment reports were drawn up. They described the children’s family situation and social, material and emotional well-being, highlighting their dangerous living conditions. The reports noted that since 15 September 2000 the applicant had been detained in a psychiatric hospital. 29.  In decisions nos. 978 and 979 of 26 September 2000 the Bacău Child Welfare Board ordered the children’s placement in the Centrul Lalelelor (“Tulips”) care home. 30.  The applicant did not appeal against those decisions. 31.  In decisions nos. 1374 and 1375 of 5 December 2000 the same board transferred the children to the Poiana Florilor (“Flower Meadow”) care home in Humeiuş. 32.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 33.  On an application by the DGASPC, the Bacău County Court ordered in judgments of 14 December 2005 and 27 January 2006 that the children should remain in care. It also decided that the exercise of parental rights was to be delegated to the director of the care home. 34.  The applicant was neither present nor represented in court. 35.  The children were interviewed by the court in the presence of a social worker from the home. 36.  The court observed that in September 2000 the children had been found in their mother’s house in a state of destitution, without any lighting or food, and that they had not been enrolled in school. It added that their maternal grandmother was too old to look after them. The court concluded that the children’s placement in care was in their interests, while also noting that since they had been in the home they had received regular visits from their mother. 37.  The applicant did not appeal against those judgments. 38.  She subsequently contacted various authorities in an attempt to regain custody of her children. 39.  In two judgments of 17 August 2007 the Bacău County Court transferred the two children to the SOS Satul Copiilor (“SOS Children’s Village”) care home in Humeiuş, following the reorganisation of care homes. It held that their continued placement in care was justified by the fact that they had been emotionally abused by their mother at the time when they had initially been taken into care on 12 September 2000. 40.  The applicant did not appeal against those judgments. 41.  Reports issued by the DGASPC and periodic reports by representatives of Izvorul Berheciului District Council indicate that the children have often been visited by their mother.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Barnaul, the Altay Region. 5.  On 20 December 1998 police searched the applicant's house. 6.  On 20 June 2000 the Industrialnyy District Court of Barnaul found, upon the applicant's complaint, that the search had been unlawful. The judgment was not appealed against and acquired legal force ten days later. On 8 May 2001 the Presidium of the Altay Regional Court rejected the Prosecutor's application for supervisory review and upheld the judgment of 20 June 2000. 7.  On 18 December 2003 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Barnaul granted the applicant's action against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation for compensation of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the unlawful search and awarded the applicant 5,000 Russian roubles. By a decision of 24 March 2004 the Altay Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. On 29 July 2004 the Oktyabrskiy District Court issued a writ of execution. 8.  On 15 October 2004 the applicant forwarded the writ of execution to the Ministry of Finance, but on 10 November 2004 the Ministry of Finance returned it to the applicant on the ground that he had failed to submit a duly certified copy of the judgment of 18 December 2003 and a payment request with indication of his bank account. 9.  On 6 December 2004 the applicant re-submitted the enforcement materials to the Ministry of Finance. However, on 12 January 2005 the Ministry of Finance returned them to the applicant for the reason that the date of delivery of the judgment had been indicated incorrectly. 10.  On 8 February 2005 the enforcement documents were once again forwarded to the Ministry of Finance. 11.  The date on which the judgment was enforced is disputed by the parties. According to the Government, the judgment was fully enforced on 2 May 2005. From the applicant's submissions it follows that he had received the amount awarded by the judgment of 18 December 2003 on 2 May 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the town of Ryazan in the Ryazan Region. He is a former military officer. 6.  In 2002 the applicant sued his military unit for wage arrears for his military service in 1996 when he had taken part in a military operation in Tajikistan. 7.  On 22 February 2002 the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison upheld the action and awarded the applicant 163,732.80 Russian roubles (RUR). The judgment was not appealed against and became final. 8.  On 3 April 2002 the applicant received a writ of execution and submitted it to the Ryazan Office of the State Treasury. On 26 April 2002, after the Ryazan Office of the State Treasury had refused to execute the judgement, the applicant submitted the writ to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. 9.  On 30 September 2002 the applicant was discharged from the army. 10.  On 16 July 2003 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Moscow Command, by way of a supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 22 February 2002 and remitted the case for a fresh examination to the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison. 11.  On 15 September 2003 the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison decided not to examine the action as the applicant had defaulted at two hearings. 12.  On 12 August 2004 the Military Section of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, acting on a supervisory review, found that the applicant had not been duly summonsed to the hearings before the Military Court of the Ryazan Garrison, quashed the judgment of 16 July 2003 and the decision of 15 September 2003 and ordered a re-examination of the case by the Presidium of the Military Court of the Moscow Command. 13.  On 15 September 2004 the Presidium of the Military Court of the Moscow Command, by way of supervisory-review proceedings, re-examined the case, awarded the applicant RUR 56,311.20 and dismissed the remainder of his claims. 14.  In January 2005 the applicant asked the Military Section of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to initiate a supervisory review in respect of the judgment of 15 September 2004. On 3 May 2005 the request was dismissed. 15.  In July 2005 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to quash the judgment of 15 September 2004 by way of a supervisory review. On 10 August 2005 the Vice President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to institute supervisory-review proceedings in respect of the judgment of 15 September 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in St Petersburg. 5.  In 1995, a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of fraud and bribery. On 31 August 1995 the investigators searched the applicant’s home and office. They removed some items and money. 6.  On 10 March 1998 the applicant sued the Prosecutor’s Office for the return of his possessions. On 27 May 1998 the proceedings were adjourned pending the outcome of the criminal case. 7.  By decisions of 29 November 2000 and 23 January 2001, the Oktyabrskiy District Court of St Petersburg established that the searches of 31 August 1995 had been unlawful. 8.  In July 2002 the civil proceedings were resumed. 9.  On 4 February 2004 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued. Prosecutors returned a part of the applicant’s possessions but the rest of them had already been disposed of. 10.  In its judgment of 8 February 2005, the Court found that the length of the criminal proceedings against the applicant did not satisfy the “reasonable time” requirement (see Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 136, 8 February 2005). 11.  On 9 March 2005 the Oktyabrskiy District Court partly upheld the applicant’s claims. On 18 May 2005 the St Petersburg City Court remitted the case to the first instance for a fresh examination. 12.  On 13 February 2007 the applicant submitted an amended statement of claims. In particular, he asked the court to award him damages in respect of the loss of value and profit, and, finally, costs and expenses. 13.  By a final judgment of 3 October 2007, the St Petersburg City Court awarded the applicant damages and costs and expenses in the amounts claimed but dismissed his claim for the loss of profit. The City Court acknowledged that the investigative authorities had illegally removed, and subsequently disposed of, the applicant’s property. 14.  The judgment was enforced in January 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1945, 1967, 1945, 1953, 1957 and 1959, respectively. Mr Talat Acar lives in İzmir. The other applicants live in Midyat. 6.  At the time of the events the applicants were living in the village of Çalpınar, which is located within the administrative jurisdiction of the town of Midyat, in south-east Turkey. 7.  On 20 April 1992 a number of villagers from Çalpınar village were travelling in two vehicles. Some time after they left their village the vehicles were stopped by a group of village guards[1]. The village guards then opened fire on the villagers and killed six of them, including the first applicant's brother and the sixth applicant's husband, Mr Süleyman Acar[2]. A number of other villagers were injured. Two of the injured persons, including the second applicant's brother and the fifth applicant's husband, Mr Sabri Acar, died the following day in hospital. The third and the fourth applicants were among those injured in the incident. The third applicant, Yusuf Acar, was shot in the leg and his injuries required a month to heal. The fourth applicant, Süleyman Acar, had broken bones and a bullet had split in his body. The doctors did not deem it necessary to remove the bullet pieces as they were not life-threatening. 8.  The same day the Midyat prosecutor visited the area and, with the assistance of a forensic doctor, examined the bodies. It was established that the deceased persons had been shot at close range. 9.  The prosecutor asked the gendarmes who were in the area to collect the spent bullet cases. When the soldiers refused to help him, the prosecutor himself collected and secured a total of sixty-six spent cartridges discharged from the village guards' rifles. The rifles had been given to the village guards by the gendarmerie. As the gendarmes also refused to take the injured persons to the hospital, the prosecutor's clerk had to do it himself. 10.  The prosecutor expressed the opinion that the village guards had set an ambush to kill the villagers. 11.  According to a report prepared by the gendarmerie, however, it had not been the village guards who opened fire on the villagers but a group of PKK[3] members wearing military uniforms. 12.  On 8 July 1992 the Midyat prosecutor filed an indictment with the Midyat Assize Court, charging twenty-seven village guards with multiple offences of homicide and attempted homicide. 13.  For security reasons the trial was moved from the Midyat Assize Court to the Denizli Assize Court, in the west of the country. 14.  Some eight and a half years later the Denizli Assize Court rendered its judgment on 20 November 2000 and acquitted all the defendants. 15.  On 7 February 2002 the Denizli Assize Court's judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation in respect of seventeen of the twenty-seven village guards but was quashed in respect of the remaining ten. 16.  A retrial began before the Denizli Assize Court, which, on 20 May 2003, found the ten village guards guilty of the murder of the eight villagers as well as the attempted murder of a number of others, including the third and fourth applicants. The village guards were sentenced to life imprisonment. In its judgment the Denizli Assize Court stated the following:\n“In view of the autopsy reports, there is no question as to the cause of death of the villagers. Instead, the question to be resolved is whether those who fired on the villagers were the accused village guards.\nIt is not possible to rely solely on the witness statements as they are contradictory on several points. However the witness statements given during the preliminary investigation seem to be, in general, objective. Relying on these initial statements it is established that the persons who had fired had their faces covered in order not to be recognised.\nFurthermore, in the court's opinion, what a military commander should normally do when he is notified of an incident is to go to the scene of the incident as soon as possible. However in the present case, the fact that the non-commissioned officer Ali Kılıç checked all twenty-seven weapons one by one, without taking any action, is incomprehensible. Moreover the court notes that the Midyat Public Prosecutor maintained that the soldiers were not collecting the empty cartridges to help him and that he had to personally collect the empty cartridges which were near the dead bodies. In view of the above, the court concludes that Ali Kılıç, Kazım Demirbaş and Arif Güner were trying to defend the accused who were working with them to fight against terrorism, and therefore it does not find their statements reliable.\nConsidering the Midyat Public Prosecutor's statements, in which he said that there was a smell of gunpowder, the court comes to the conclusion that the allegation concerning the placing of empty cartridges at the scene of the incident in order to implicate the village guards in the crime is not corroborated in any persuasive manner by eyewitnesses or other evidence.\nMoreover, the fact that three of the sixty-six cartridges were not fired from the village guards' weapons cannot be taken as a proof of their innocence. It is possible that one of the village guards had a weapon that had not been seized by the authorities after the incident.\nIn conclusion, relying on the findings of the ballistic report and the statements of the Midyat Public Prosecutor, who had an impartial position in the present case, the court decides that ten of the accused village guards are responsible for the wounding and killing of the villagers whom they considered to be PKK supporters.” 17.  On 9 December 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the Denizli Assize Court's judgment in respect of two of the village guards and upheld it in respect of the remaining eight. 18.  Criminal proceedings against the two village guards recommenced before the Denizli Assize Court and are still continuing, according to the information in the case file, as submitted by the parties.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Samara. 6.  The applicant was engaged in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. She was issued with a certificate confirming her participation in the emergency operations. As a holder of the certificate she was entitled to certain monthly payments. 7.  In February and March 2000 the Social Security Department of the Oktyabrskiy District of Orsk (Управление социальной защиты населения Октябрьского района г. Орска, hereinafter “the social security service”) paid to the applicant the arrears for the period from November 1999 to March 2000. 8.  On 13 April 2000 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Orsk held that the social security service had unlawfully defaulted on the monthly payments from November 1999 to February 2000. The judgment was not appealed against and became final on 24 April 2000. 9.  In April 2000 the social security service discontinued the payments. The applicant sued the social security service. 10.  On 20 August 2001 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Orsk held that the social security service had unlawfully refused to pay. The applicant held a certificate confirming her participation in the emergency operations in Chernobyl and was entitled to receive the payments. On 25 September 2001 the Orenburg Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal and it became enforceable. 11.  On 14 December 2001 the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs. 12.  On 17 December 2001 the bailiffs opened enforcement proceedings. 13.  On 27 February 2002 the applicant received 11,762 Russian roubles (RUB). 14.  On 11 July 2002 the bailiffs directed that the social security service pay the judgment debt by 20 August 2002. The social security service did not comply. 15.  The judgment remains unenforced in part. According to the Government, the debt amounts to RUB 13,002.20. 16.  On 22 June 2002 Judge R., the President of the Orenburg Regional Court, lodged an application for supervisory review of the judgments of 13 April 2000 and 20 August 2001, as upheld on 25 September 2001. 17.  On 30 September 2002 the Presidium of the Orenburg Regional Court chaired by Judge R. quashed the judgments of 13 April 2000 and 20 August 2001, as upheld on 25 September 2001, and remitted the cases for a fresh examination before the District Court. It found that the District Court had erred in the assessment of the facts and application of domestic law. In particular, it had not verified whether the certificate confirming the applicant's participation in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster was valid. 18.  On 29 November 2002 the Oktyabrskiy District Court held that the discontinuation of the monthly payments had been lawful and dismissed the applicant's claims. It found that the certificate confirming the applicant's participation in the emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster had been issued by an unauthorised person and was void. Consequently the applicant was not entitled to monthly payments.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Iaşi. 5.  On 23 November 1999 the prosecutor attached to the Piteşti Court of Appeal issued an arrest warrant against the applicant, who was accused of tax evasion. 6.  The applicant was apprehended on 5 September 2000 and was placed in police custody for a period of thirty days. The Piteşti District Court, to which the applicant was first brought on 28 September 2000, repeatedly extended his pre-trial detention, until the end of the proceedings before it. 7.  The District Court gave judgment on 19 February 2002. On the basis of the depositions made by the applicant, four co-defendants and twenty-one witnesses, the court convicted the applicant under several heads of tax evasion and forgery, and sentenced him to six years and six months’ imprisonment with an obligation, under Article 113 of the Criminal Code, to undergo medical treatment for his mental disorder as identified by the medical reports adduced in the case. The court ordered that the medical treatment be administered through the prison hospitals, while the applicant was in detention, and continue after his release until his complete recovery. It also upheld the order for the applicant’s detention. 8.  In a decision of 25 June 2002, the Argeş County Court allowed appeals against the judgment and, based on the evidence in the case and the defendants’ depositions, reduced the applicant’s sentence to five years and six months’ imprisonment. It upheld the remainder of the District Court’s judgment. 9.  This decision was confirmed, upon an appeal on points of law by the defendants, in a final decision of 8 October 2002 of the Piteşti Court of Appeal. 10.  On 20 September 2000 the applicant’s lawyer filed a request with the prosecutor for the applicant’s psychiatric evaluation. The Argeş Forensic Medicine Institute examined the applicant and concluded, on 2 October 2000, that he had been mentally competent for legal purposes both when the alleged offences had been committed and at the date of the evaluation.\nThe applicant contested the conclusion of the report. 11.  On 18 December 2000 the “Mina Minovici” Forensic Medicine Institute in Bucharest confirmed the Argeş Forensic Institute’s report, after having examined the applicant. It also recommended that, pursuant to Article 113 of the Criminal Code, the applicant be required to undergo medical treatment for his mental disorder both during the detention and after his release. 12.  On 29 November 2000 the applicant underwent a full medical examination at the Argeş Forensic Medicine Institute. The medical commission concluded that the applicant’s mental disorder did not render him unfit for detention. 13.  According to the detailed medical record from the period of pre-trial detention, submitted by the Government, the applicant was hospitalised seven times in prison hospitals. He was mainly diagnosed with thrombophlebitis, venous insufficiency and a mental disorder. Each time he was discharged, the doctors recommended treatment for his various illnesses, periodical re-evaluations and medical check-ups when needed.\nDuring this interval he was seen twenty-seven times by the prison doctors, on 23 and 30 October, 6, 13 and 27 November, 11 and 20 December 2001, 11 February, 17 June, 1, 8, 20, 22 and 29 July, 5, 12, 16, 19 and 26 August, 2, 9, 20, 23 and 30 September, and 7, 13 and 19 October 2002.\nRecords indicate that medicine was systematically administered for his venous insufficiency and until 20 December 2001 for his mental disorder. The latter treatment was interrupted until 5 August 2002 and after this date was given sporadically. 14.  During his detention, several disciplinary measures were taken against the applicant. Accordingly, his visit and parcel rights were withdrawn on 26 March 2001, 28 December 2001, 10 January and 8 April 2002, for possession of forbidden objects. From 4 to 14 January 2002 he was kept in solitary confinement. 15.  Lastly, on 5 February 2002 the penitentiary authorities placed the applicant in restrictive confinement (“regim restrictiv”), for twelve months due to his recalcitrant behaviour and repetitive infringements of the prison regulations. However, on 14 June 2002 he was reintegrated into the normal detention regime, for good behaviour.\nThe applicant claimed that while subject to the restrictive detention regime he had been kept in a cold cell wearing worn clothes that had been inadequate for the temperature, sometimes handcuffed with his hands above his head, and that for the first month he had not been seen by a doctor and that correspondence to and from his family had been tampered with. 16.  In October 2002, after the adoption of the final decision in the case, the applicant was transferred to Iaşi high-security Prison and placed in the section designated for extremely dangerous prisoners. 17.  The applicant claimed that, despite his repeated requests to be seen by a specialist doctor and administered adequate medical treatment, during the first eight months of detention he had only been examined by the prison doctor, who had consistently informed him that there had been no funds for continuing his treatment. The prison doctor had told him: “there is no problem if you die, we have a priest and there is wood in the store house” (“nu e nici o problemă dacă mori, avem preot şi scânduri la magazie”).\nOn an unspecified date, upon repeated requests by his family to the prison authorities, the applicant was transferred to a different dormitory. 18.  According to the Government, the applicant was placed in shared dormitories, the first measuring 41.12 sq. m and the latter 60.69 sq. m, which he shared respectively with nine and fifty-three other prisoners. The dormitories had windows. Hygiene facilities were permanently accessible to prisoners in a separate room. Warm water was available once a week. The applicant had daily one-hour walks, frequently received visits from members of his family and participated in the social programme of the penitentiary. His medical treatment continued. 19.  On 11 July 2003, the Iaşi prison authorities informed the applicant’s counsel that the applicant was not receiving any medical treatment at that moment, but that such treatment would be administered if necessary. 20.  From 3 February 2004 to 7 February 2005, the execution of the sentence was suspended for medical reasons. On 16 June 2005 the applicant was released on probation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the village of Goyty of the Urus-Martan District of the Chechen Republic. She was the mother of Sultan Shotovich Vagapov. 6.  The applicant alleges that from 14 to 16 January 2005 the Russian authorities “mopped up” the village of Zumsoy of the Itum-Kalinskiy District of Chechnya, by first bombarding and then “cleaning it up” by entering houses and abducting some of the residents. 7.  In January 2005 the applicant was invited for an interview in the Territorial Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Goyty village in the Urus‑Martan District of the Chechen Republic. She alleges that she was shown a copy of her son’s identity card and a photograph of a dead person, presumably her son Sultan Shotovich Vagapov. She was also informed that he had been killed during the mopping-up operation in the village of Zumsoy in early 2005. According to the authorities, the applicant’s son was a rebel whose body would be kept at the military base near the village of Khankala. 8.  The applicant was unable to identify her son solely on the basis of the photograph and asked to see the body, without success. 9.  The applicant’s requests to have the body of her son returned to her remained essentially unanswered until 26 April 2005, when the Military Prosecutor, relying on section 16.1 of the Suppression of Terrorism Act and section 14.1 of the Interment and Burial Act, responded that “the bodies of terrorists are not handed over for burial and the place of their burial remains undisclosed”. 10.  The Prosecutor’s Office indicated that her son had offered armed resistance during the operation of 14 January 2005 and was killed. He was found to have been in possession of an automatic rifle, an ammunition belt and a backpack with his personal belongings. 11.  The Government confirmed that a special operation had taken place in the vicinity of the village of Zumsoy between 14 and 16 January 2005, which had resulted in detection of a boot camp belonging to the insurgents. An airstrike and subsequent search of the area lead to the discovery of the corpse of the applicant’s son, Sultan Shotovich Vagapov, along with an automatic rifle and ammunition presumably belonging to him. The body carried an ID card, which enabled swift identification. 12.  The Government submitted that an official inquiry into, among other things, the finding of the corpse of the applicant’s son resulted in a decision of 15 April 2005. It described the collected pieces of evidence, including the oral evidence given by the soldiers who had searched the area after the airstrike and the circumstances of the death of the applicant’s son, and concluded that his death had resulted from a justified use of lethal force in respect of an armed terrorist. 13.  It appears that the applicant challenged the prosecutor’s letter of 26 April 2005 in court. On 19 December 2005 the Urus-Martan District Court upheld the decision not to return the body of the applicant’s son for burial without reviewing its merits. The first-instance judgment was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chechnya on 30 May 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Warszawa. 5.  The applicant’s testators owned a piece of real property in Warsaw. By virtue of the 1945 Decree on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw (Dekret o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. st. Warszawy) all land in Warsaw was nationalised. The applicant’s testators filed an application for the grant of a right of perpetual use of the real property. On 6 July 1972 the Board of the Warsaw National Council (Prezydium Rady Narodowej) refused the application. On 12 February 1973 the competent Minister upheld that decision. Simultaneously, the applicant’s testators lodged a claim for compensation. On 22 November 1972 the Board of the Warsaw National Council dismissed the claim as according to the 1957 Law on exclusion of detached houses and apartments in housing cooperatives’ buildings from public management (Ustawa o wyłączeniu spod publicznej gospodarki lokalami domów jednorodzinnych oraz lokali w domach spółdzielni mieszkaniowych), the real property in question was not a detached house. Consequently, the 1965 Cabinet Resolution allowing for nationalised detached houses to be compensated was not applicable. The applicant’s testators appealed unsuccessfully against this decision. 6.  On 24 February 1997 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings against the State Treasury for compensation for nationalised family real property. 7.  It appears that on several occasions between 1997 and 2000 the applicant lodged complaints, alleging inactivity on the part of the first‑instance authority. 8.  On 25 February 2000 the Mayor of Warsaw District informed the applicant that the administrative proceedings were in their final stage and in the near future a decision would be issued ordering valuation of the real property. Consequently, the assessment of the amount of compensation would then be possible. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint about inactivity on the part of the Mayor of the Warsaw District with the Supreme Administrative Court. 10.  On 17 November 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court admitted that the proceedings in question had been lengthy and ordered the Mayor to deal with the case within two months of the judgment being served on the parties. The court stated that the relevant organ had not only failed to issue any decision as to the merits during the proceedings in question but had also failed to justify its delay. 11.  On 9 February 2001 the Warszawa District Governor discontinued the relevant proceedings. He stated that the legal regime governing compensation for the expropriation of detached houses had not changed since 1957. Therefore, if a valid decision had been taken in 1972, a re‑examination of the case between the same parties and about the same claim was inadmissible. The applicant appealed against this decision. 12.  On 18 March 2002 the Mazowiecki Governor dismissed the applicant’s appeal concluding in line with the contested District Governor’s decision. 13.  On 27 November 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. 14.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings in order to have a plot of land on which the real property was situated restored to her. 15.  It results from the case file that the relevant proceedings are still pending before the Minister of Infrastructure.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, a Ukrainian national, was born in 1952 and lives in the city of Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine. 5.  In 1999 the applicant, a private entrepreneur, concluded a labour contract with the Shevchenkivskiy District State Administration in Zaporizhzhya. 6.  As the State Administration failed to pay the applicant under the contract, in 2002 she instituted proceedings against it in the Commercial Court of Zaporizhzhya Region, seeking recovery of remuneration and compensation for delay in payment. 7.  On 15 January 2003 the court awarded the applicant UAH 16,094.52[1] (Рішення Господарського суду Запоріжської області). This judgment was not appealed against and became final. 8.  On 28 March 2003 the Shevchenkivskiy District Bailiffs' Service (Відділ Державної виконавчої служби Шевченківського районого управління юстиції м. Запоріжжя) initiated enforcement proceedings. On 3 November 2004 the Bailiffs' Service returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that no funds allowing enforcement of the judgment had been found. 9.  On 28 May 2003 and 30 December 2004 the applicant received UAH 6,000[2] and UAH 5,000[3], respectively. 10.  By letters of 5 November and 6 December 2004 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Department of Justice informed the applicant that there were no funds in the debtor's bank accounts and that it was not possible to dispose of the debtor's property because the debtor was a governmental institution. 11.  On 25 August 2005 the Commercial Court of Zaporizhzhya Region repeatedly ordered the Bailiffs' Service to enforce the judgment in the applicant's favour of 15 January 2003. On 20 August 2005 the Bailiffs' Service refused to institute the enforcement proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. 12.  The judgment in the applicant's favour remains partly unenforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1919 and lives in Monistrol-d’Allier. 9.  On 3 November 1960 the applicant and his wife purchased by notarial deed a dwelling house built on land in the municipality of Arradon, in the département of Morbihan. The house had been built on a dyke that overlapped with land on the seashore falling within the category of maritime public property. 10.  It can be seen from the various documents relating to the house that, by a decision of 5 December 1889, the prefect of Morbihan had authorised Mr A., in consideration of payment of a charge, to “retain on maritime public property in the cove of Kérion, in the municipality of Arradon, a dyke ... on which stands a dwelling house”. The house had allegedly been built prior to that decision despite a decision of the prefect of 31 May 1856 refusing an application for a building permit. The decision of 1889 specified that “the existence of this dyke and dwelling house on maritime public property was recorded in 1886 ... and the permittee undertakes to pay the charge from 1 January 1887”. It also pointed out that the dyke, irregularly shaped and of a surface area of 359.40 sq. m, on which stood the dwelling house measuring 7.60 m by 6.60 m, “cannot interfere in any way with navigation rights or maritime coastal traffic on condition that steps are built at each end of the dyke in order to facilitate public access” and that the authorities “reserved the right to modify or withdraw the authorisation without the permittee thereby acquiring any right to claim compensation or damages in that regard. He must, if required, restore the site to its original state”. 11.  Prior to that, on 2 December 1889, the Directorate-General for Registration and Property had written to the prefect in the following terms:\n“... Having regard to Mr A.’s genuine lack of means, as a former seaman who has reached an advanced age and cannot possibly pay the normal charge, and considering, furthermore, that it would be a drastic measure to order the demolition of the little house that he has built on land reclaimed from the sea and uses as a dwelling house, I have decided to impose the minimum charge thus reflecting the precariousness of the occupancy and preventing the rights of the State from becoming time-barred.\nIn the circumstances I consider ... that there is now no further obstacle to disposing of this case by issuing a concession order, but on Mr A.’s death, his heirs should be served with notice either to purchase the usurped land or to pay the charge at the rate applicable for private occupancy of maritime public property.” 12.  Following the death of Mr A., his two daughters requested authorisation from the authorities to keep the house on the same terms as their parents. Authorisation was granted them by a decision of 9 July 1897 conferring a right of temporary occupancy of the public property in question. The house was subsequently transferred in 1909 and sold in 1957, with the title deeds specifying each time that the small house built on maritime land was included in the sale. The deed of 1957 reads as follows:\n“Title and entry into possession: the purchasers shall hereby acquire title to the land and the little house of Kérion from today’s date. The property is sold free of tenants or occupants.” 13.  The relevant passages of the deed of sale of 1960 read as follows:\n“Title – Entry into possession:\nThe purchasers hereby acquire title to the property conveyed to them under this deed, and shall enter into actual possession thereof from today’s date ...\nFrom the date of their entry into possession they shall pay all taxes and charges payable now or in the future on the house hereby sold together with the land. ...\n... The present sale is concluded in consideration of the principal price of three thousand new francs ...” 14.  Following this purchase, and in order to acquire legal access to the house, the applicant and his wife were granted rights of temporary occupancy of maritime public property that were regularly renewed in 1961 (year during which the applicant was permitted to extend the dyke and a public right of way was granted along the seaward edge of the dyke), 1975, 1986 and 1991. The authorisation of temporary occupancy of 1986 specified that the applicant sought “the renewal of the prefectoral decision of 17 August 1961 authorising the construction of a dyke with a dwelling house on it ...”. The last agreement granting them the right to occupy public property expired on 31 December 1992. The decisions specified that “the requested dyke will not in any way interfere with navigation rights, on condition that it is levelled off above the highest water mark, or with maritime coastal traffic provided that public access is guaranteed at all times” and that “in accordance with Article A 26 of the Code of State Property [see paragraph 40 below], the authorities reserve the right to modify or withdraw the authorisation should they deem it necessary, on any ground whatsoever, without the permittee thereby acquiring any right to claim damages or compensation in that regard. The permittee must, if required, restore the site to its original state by demolishing the constructions built on the public property, including those existing on the date on which the decision was signed. Should he fail to comply with that obligation, the authorities shall do so of their own motion and at his expense”. 15.  By a letter of 14 March 1993, the applicant and his wife requested the prefect of Morbihan to renew authorisation of their occupancy. 16.  The prefect of Morbihan replied on 6 September 1993 informing the applicant that the entry into force of Law no. 86-2 of 3 January 1986 on the development, protection and enhancement of coastal areas (“the Coastal Areas Act”), and in particular section 25 thereof, no longer allowed him to renew authorisation on the previous terms and conditions. Section 25 provided that decisions regarding the use of maritime public property had to take account of the vocation of the zones in question, which ruled out any private use including dwelling houses. However, in order to take account of the length of occupancy and the applicant’s sentimental attachment to the house in question, he proposed to enter into an agreement with the applicant that would authorise limited and strictly personal use and prohibit him from transferring or selling the land and house and from carrying out any work on the property other than maintenance and would include an option for the State, on the expiry of the authorisation, to have the property restored to its original condition or to reuse the buildings. 17.  By a letter dated 19 November 1993, the applicant and his wife rejected the prefect’s offer and requested a concession to build a dyke that would be valid as a transfer of ownership under Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property (see paragraph 43 below). 18.  On 9 March 1994 the prefect of Morbihan gave a decision, based on section 25 of the Coastal Areas Act, in which he considered that there was no public interest justifying the concession requested. He did, however, renew his offer to grant the applicant and his wife a right of temporary occupancy subject to conditions. 19.  On 5 May 1994 the applicant and his wife applied to the Rennes Administrative Court for the prefect’s decision of 9 March 1994 to be set aside. In support of their application, they submitted that the refusal to grant them a concession to build a dyke was unlawful. 20.  By a letter of 4 July 1994, the prefect of Morbihan served notice on the applicant and his wife to regularise their status as unauthorised occupants of public property. That notice was renewed on 10 April 1995. 21.  On 6 September 1995 the Public Works Department of the département of Morbihan drew up an official report recording the administrative offence of unlawful interference with the highway and noting the unlawful occupancy of the land by the applicant, contrary to the provisions of Article L. 28 of the Code of State Property (see paragraph 40 below). 22.  On 20 December 1995 the prefect of Morbihan lodged an application with the Rennes Administrative Court citing the applicant and his wife as defendants in respect of an offence of unlawful interference with the highway as they continued to unlawfully occupy public property. He sought an order against them to pay a fine and restore the foreshore to its original state prior to construction of the house and to restore the dyke on which it stood, within three months. 23.  On 19 February 1996 the Revenue Department served notice on the applicant to pay the sums due for the years 1995 and 1996 for unauthorised occupancy of public property, namely, a total of 56,754 French francs (FRF). 24.  By two separate judgments delivered on 20 March 1997, the Rennes Administrative Court ruled on the application lodged by the applicants on 5 May 1994 (case no. 941506) and the application lodged by the prefect of Morbihan on 20 December 1995 (case no. 953517).\nThe application for the prefect’s decision rejecting their request for a permit to build a dyke to be set aside (case no. 941506) was dismissed on the following grounds:\n“... In support of their argument that the stretch of land on which the dwelling house stands belongs to the category of maritime private property the applicants have exhibited in the proceedings a decision authorising the temporary occupancy of maritime public property dating back to 1889. However, this decision merely takes note that the land in question has been drained and does not certify the lawfulness thereof. Accordingly, it does not call into question the classification of the land as public property.\nIn accordance with Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property, ‘the State may concede, on conditions it shall determine ... the right to build a dyke’. While section 27 of the above-mentioned Act of 3 January 1986 [Coastal Areas Act] has reduced the scope of application of that Article, it does nonetheless specify that ‘land draining carried out prior to the present Act shall continue to be governed by the previous legislation’. Accordingly, the only provisions applicable to the present case are Article L. 64 of the above-mentioned Code and the Maritime Public Property Act of 28 November 1963, which provides that ... ‘subject to any contrary provisions of deeds of concession, land artificially removed from the action of the tide shall be incorporated into the category of maritime public property’. In rejecting the request on the basis of the principles and guidelines laid down in the inter-ministerial circular of 3 January 1973 setting out the policy to be followed for the use of maritime public property, the prefect – when examining the applicant’s particular situation involving an application for a concession – did not err as to the scope of the circular in question, which neither repeals nor amends the above-mentioned legislative provisions but is limited to applying them.\nThe above-mentioned circular, which instructs the authorities responsible for deciding whether or not to grant concessions to build dykes not to transfer title to the plots of land thus created and to accept only installations designed for collective use, to the exclusion of private dwellings, was issued in respect of an area in which the relevant authorities have discretionary power. In referring to the principles laid down in the circular, the prefect does not appear to have interpreted the legislative provisions inaccurately; nor did he fail to consider the specificity of the applicant’s proposal before concluding that there was no special factor justifying an exemption from the instructions analysed above.”\nThe application lodged by the prefect of Morbihan (case no. 953517) was granted. The court stated that “the land on which Mr and Mrs Depalle’s dwelling house stands is indeed public property”. With regard to the offence of unlawful interference with the highway, the court found as follows:\n“... The rules governing public property\n... The purpose of prosecuting someone for the administrative offence of interference with the highway is to preserve the integrity of public property. As can be seen from the judgment delivered by the court today in case no. 941506, the land on which Mr and Mrs Depalle’s dwelling house was built is indeed public property.\nThe administrative courts base their determination of the substance of artificial public property on the judicial interpretation of any private deeds that may be produced whose examination raises a serious difficulty. In the present case the dyke and the house are not publicly owned property, given the exclusively private use made of them and the fact that they do not belong to a public authority, as confirmed by the deed of sale dated 8 October 1960. Accordingly, as it is not seriously disputed that the property in question has been appropriated for private use, it is not necessary to adjourn the application. ...\nWhether there has been unlawful interference with the highway\nWhile Mr and Mrs Depalle have full title to the dwelling house occupied by them and claim, accordingly, that they are therefore not the unlawful occupants of public property, the fact remains that the erection of a permanent structure on public property could not be legally undertaken without either a concession to build a dyke or another type of concession. The investigation into the facts and, in particular, the absence of any documents evidencing that a concession was granted show that the dwelling house in question was illegally built on maritime public property. Accordingly, and despite the production by the owners of undisputed title deeds, the prefect is justified in requesting an order against Mr Depalle to pay a fine and restore the foreshore to its original state prior to the construction of the house.\nPenalty for the offence\n ... Mr Depalle is hereby ordered to pay a fine of FRF 500.\nState property proceedings\nMr Depalle is hereby ordered to restore the property to the state it was in prior to the construction of the buildings within three months of service of this judgment. On expiry of that time-limit Mr Depalle shall pay a fine of FRF 100 per day’s delay in the event of failure to comply with the present judgment and the authorities shall be authorised to enforce it at the cost and risk of the offender ...” 25.  On 2 July 1997 the applicant and his wife lodged an appeal against the judgment delivered in case no. 953517. On 7 July 1997 they appealed against the judgment delivered in case no. 941506.\nIn support of their appeal against the judgment delivered in case no. 941506, the applicant and his wife submitted that the land in question was not public property belonging to the State. They maintained that the land was private property belonging to the State with the twofold effect that the usual rules governing acquisition by adverse possession under private law were applicable to their situation and that the administrative courts did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 26.  By a judgment of 8 December 1999, the Nantes Administrative Court decided to join the two sets of proceedings on the ground that they were connected and to dismiss the applicant and his wife’s appeals on the following grounds:\n“With regard to the application ... concerning the offence of unlawful interference with the highway:\nRegarding the State property proceedings\nFirstly, it is not disputed that the land on which the dyke on which the house occupied by Mr and Mrs Depalle was built was entirely covered by water, independently of any exceptional meteorological circumstances, prior to the draining works undertaken in order to build the dyke. It has not been established, or even alleged by the applicants moreover, that the undrained portion of this land had ever been removed from the action of the tide. The investigation shows, moreover, that the dyke is the result of land draining carried out prior to the entry into force of the above-mentioned Act of 28 November 1963 [the Maritime Public Property Act] ... and that, notwithstanding the various authorisations of temporary occupancy granted by the authorities, as this was not done in the manner prescribed for concessions for the construction of a dyke it has not had the effect of bringing this part of the land thus removed from the action of the tide outside the category of maritime public property. In accordance with the principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility of public property, the submissions by Mr and Mrs Depalle to the effect that the house was built legally and its occupancy accepted by the authorities for a very long time and tolerated even after expiry of the last authorisation to occupy it do not alter the fact that the property falls within the category of maritime public property.\nSecondly, as has been said, the last decision in favour of Mr and Mrs Depalle authorising temporary occupancy of the maritime public property expired on 31 December 1992. In the absence, since that date, of a lawful title of occupancy, the prefect of Morbihan is justified in requesting an order against the occupants to restore the site – if they have not already done so – to its original state prior to construction of the house on maritime public property. In disputing that obligation, the applicants cannot properly rely on the long period of occupancy of the premises or on the fact that the authorities have tolerated the continuation of that occupancy since 31 December 1992 and proposed draft occupancy agreements in order to regularise the situation, which, moreover, they have not taken up. ...\nFifthly, [the obligation to restore the site to its original state] does not constitute a measure prohibited by the requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest. ...\nThe application regarding the refusal to grant a concession to build a dyke\n... Secondly, as section 27 of the above-mentioned Act of 3 January 1986 [the Coastal Areas Act] provides that draining works carried out prior to enactment of that Act shall continue to be governed by the previous legislation, the provisions codified under Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property according to which ‘the State may concede, on conditions it shall determine ... the right to build a dyke ...’ are applicable.\nThe prefect of Morbihan based his decision not to grant Mr and Mrs Depalle the requested concession to build a dyke on the guidelines set out in the circular of 3 January 1973 issued by the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister for Regional Development on the use of public property other than commercial or fishing ports. He did not discern any general-interest ground in favour of granting the applicants’ request.\nBy instructing the authorities responsible for granting concessions to build a dyke not to allow any plot of land whatsoever falling into the category of public property to be reclassified as private property with a view to transferring full title thereto, the ministers signatory to the circular of 3 January 1973 did not adopt any legal rules amending or supplementing the above-mentioned provisions of Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property but confined themselves to applying them. Accordingly, as stated above, the plot of land in question is State-owned public property. There is no evidence in the case that the prefect, before reaching his decision, either failed to examine the particular circumstances of Mr and Mrs Depalle’s request or made a manifest error of assessment in concluding that there was no special feature or general-interest consideration in the case justifying an exemption from the above-mentioned rules.” 27.  On 21 February 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 8 December 1999. The Government Commissioner pointed out, in the same submissions as those made in a similar case, that the value in today’s terms of the purchase price of the house was 1,067,143 euros (EUR). He continued as follows:\n“... However, the acquisition of rights in rem is not permitted under the Law of 25 July 1994 on State-owned Natural Public Property ... nor were these acquired before that Law was passed ... The appellants have not acquired any property rights over their houses; nor have they acquired rights in rem over public property as a result of the successive sales. Given the precarious situation of the buildings, the market value could not be established without taking account of that essential fact and it is to be hoped that the applicants were duly informed of the position when the purchase deeds were drawn up ... Lastly, and despite the fact that we are not especially enthusiastic about the outcome of this case, we have no alternative but to dismiss the appellants’ pleadings. ... They probably committed a tactical error in refusing the prefect’s reiterated offer. Even if they were not exactly delighted by the prospect, it was at least preferable to a straightforward demolition order which will have to be judicially enforced at their expense. All hope is perhaps not lost of renewing contact with the authorities with a view to finding what might be a less drastic solution.\nThere may be a case for suing the State in tort for allowing occupants of public property to nurture for almost a century the hope that they would not be ruthlessly compelled to demolish their property. It should be pointed out that the prospects of success of such an action are fairly slim, however, given the legitimate protection enjoyed by public property. In any event, it is clear that if the public authority were to be found liable, the offenders would bear a considerable portion of liability too.” 28.  By a judgment delivered on 6 March 2002, the Conseil d’Etat dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that he could not rely on any right in rem over the land in question or over the buildings that had been erected on it and that the obligation to restore the land to its original state without any prior compensation was therefore not a measure prohibited by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It also held that the applicant could not rely on the fact that the authorities had tolerated the occupancy of the property in support of his submission that he should be allowed to restore the site to the state it had been in at the time of acquisition of the house. 29.  Following a fire in 2005 the applicant applied for a building permit for identical refurbishment of the house. By a decision of 5 September 2005, he was issued with a building permit following a favourable opinion given by an architect from the Architectes des bâtiments de France under the Coastal Areas Act. The permit was subsequently revoked, however, at the request of the prefect lodged with the mayor of Arradon, on the ground that it was illegal because it had been issued in contravention of the rules of inalienability and imprescriptibility of public property. 30.  In 2007 and 2008 the Revenue Department sent the applicant a reminder to pay the charges for the years 2006 and 2007 in the sum of EUR 5,518 and EUR 5,794 respectively, plus property tax. 31.  The applicant produced a valuation of his house drawn up by an estate agent’s office in November 2008 which states as follows:\n“... a dwelling house ... situated on a plot of land measuring 850 sq. m. ... Having regard to the geographical situation of the property, the condition of the building, the surface area, its location on maritime public property and the local property market, and subject to the owners’ ability to produce a concession agreement in respect of maritime public property, this property is worth between EUR 1,150,000 and 1,200,000.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971. He is currently serving a prison sentence at the Berdychiv Town Correctional Colony (Prison) No. 70, Zhytomyr Region (“the Berdychiv Colony”). 5.  On 4 November 1998 the Deputy Prosecutor of Chernivtsi initiated criminal investigations into the murder of Mrs S. 6.  On 30 July 1999 the applicant’s wife was arrested on suspicion of the murder of Mrs S. On 2 August 1999 she was released. 7.  On 4 August 1999 the prosecutors placed Mr V. on the list of persons suspected of the crime. The investigations were suspended. 8.  On 2 September 1999 the applicant was arrested following the issue of a warrant by the Head of the Investigation Unit of the Chernivtsi Town Prosecutor’s Office on suspicion of the murder of Mrs S., and the criminal investigations resumed. The applicant chose Mr Shelepa to defend him in the proceedings. 9.  On 4 September 1999 the Chernivtsi Town Prosecutor remanded the applicant in custody in view of the pending criminal investigations against him. The applicant remained in detention throughout the proceedings. 10.  On 7 September 1999 the applicant and Mr V. were charged with aggravated murder. 11.  On 18 October 1999 the Chernivtsi Town Prosecutor extended the maximum period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months. 12.  On 23 November 1999 the investigations were completed and the applicant, together with his lawyer, was given access to the case file. 13.  On 20 December 1999 the applicant and his lawyer completed their study of the case file. 14.  On 28 January 2000 the prosecutors referred the case together with the indictment, containing charges of aggravated murder and theft, to the Chernivtsi Regional Court (“the Chernivsti Court”). The latter received the case file on 4 February 2000. 15.  On 25 February 2000 the court remitted the case for additional investigation as it was incomplete. It also ordered the applicant to remain in detention. On 6 March 2000 the prosecutors received the case file. 16.  On 9 March 2000 the prosecutors resumed the pre-trial investigations. 17.  On 13 March 2000 the Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor extended the maximum period of the applicant’s detention to five months on the ground that it was not possible to complete the investigation. 18.  On 15 May 2000 the investigations were completed and the applicant, together with his lawyer, was given access to the case file. On 5 June 2000 the latter finished consulting the file. 19.  On 22 June 2000 the prosecutors referred the case to the Chernivtsi Court. 20.  On 30 June 2000 the court received the case file and on 19 September 2000 it remitted the case for additional investigation. The court refused to change the applicant’s preventive measure. 21.  On 26 September 2000 the prosecutors received the case file. 22.  On 10 October 2000 the Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor extended the maximum period of the applicant’s detention to six months. 23.  On 25 October 2000 the Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine extended the maximum period of the applicant’s detention to nine months. 24.  On 28 November 2000 the investigations were completed and the applicant, together with his lawyer, was given access to the case file. On the same day they completed their study of the case file. 25.  On 22 December 2000 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court. 26.  On 12 January 2001 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Chernivtsi Region withdrew the case from the court and resumed the investigations. 27.  On 18 January 2001 the applicant was informed that the investigations were complete and that he was charged with concealment of crime. 28.  On 26 January 2001 the applicant and his lawyer were given access to the case file. On the same day they completed consulting the case file. 29.  On 1 February 2001 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court. 30.  On 5 February 2001 the court received the case file. 31.  On 14 March 2001 the court remitted the case for additional investigation. The applicant was ordered to remain in detention. 32.  On 19 March 2001 the prosecutors received the case file. 33.  On 29 March 2001 the applicant was informed that the investigations were complete, and was given a copy of the indictment, in which he was charged with aggravated murder and robbery. Between 29 March and 2 April 2001 the applicant and his lawyer consulted the case file. 34.  On 6 April 2001 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court. On 9 April 2001 the court received the case file. 35.  On 17 April 2001 the prosecutors withdrew the case and resumed the investigations. On the same day they issued an indictment, containing the same charges and based on the same facts as the indictment of 29 March 2001. 36.  On 16 May 2001 the applicant was informed that the investigations were complete and he was given a copy of the indictment of 17 April 2001. On the same day the applicant was provided with another lawyer, Mr B., whom the prosecutors gave access to the case file. 37.  According to the applicant, he had agreed to have another lawyer, as the prosecutors told him that Mr Shelepa had not been able to participate in the proceedings due to his illness. From mid-April to 5 May 2001 Mr Shelepa was having medical treatment in a hospital in Kyiv. The latter was not informed that the investigations were complete on 16 May 2001. 38.  On the same day the applicant and his new lawyer finished consulting the case file and on 18 May 2001 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court, the latter having received it on 24 May 2001. 39.  On 29 May 2001 Mr Shelepa was again admitted to participate in the proceedings. 40.  In the course of the investigations, in particular on 11 June and 28 November 2000, and 30 March 2001 the applicant’s lawyer made three requests to the prosecutors that the proceedings against the applicant be discontinued for absence of elements of a crime in his actions. The requests were dismissed as unfounded by the prosecutors’ decisions of 13 June and 30 November 2000 and 3 April 2001. 41.  In the course of the trial, the applicant and his lawyer argued that some of the evidence submitted by the prosecutors had been collected after the expiry of the statutory terms of the investigation and the applicant’s detention and therefore should not be admitted by the court. 42.  On 26 June 2001 the court found the applicant and Mr V. guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced the applicant to twelve years’ imprisonment. It rejected the applicant’s and his lawyer’s argument concerning the admissibility of evidence, holding in particular that the maximum statutory terms of the investigation and pre-trial detention envisaged by the Code of Criminal Procedure had not expired in the case, and that those terms had ceased to run during the periods when the applicant and his lawyer were studying the case file, when it had been referred to the court, and when the lawyer’s petitions had been considered by the prosecutors. The court, relying on Articles 120 and 156 of the same Code, also noted that the terms of the investigation and detention had actually been extended up to twelve months, as the case had been remitted for additional investigation on three occasions. 43.  In his appeal in cassation, the applicant complained about the wrongful assessment of the facts and a violation of his procedural rights in the course of the investigation and trial. 44.  On 25 September 2001 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal in cassation as unsubstantiated.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Andrei Deak, is a Romanian national who was born in 1956 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  The applicant married C.D. (hereinafter referred to as “the mother”), also a Romanian national, in January 1998. In July 1998 their son C.A. (hereinafter referred to as “the child”) was born. 7.  In November 2000 they divorced and according to the divorce agreement between them, endorsed by a final court judgment, the mother was to have custody of the child, while the applicant obtained a right of access of 82 days per year and was to pay a monthly allowance. 8.  In September 2002 the mother travelled to England to commence studying for a Master degree in Business and Administration and left the child in Romania with her parents. 9.  In November 2002 the mother married a British national. She later returned to Romania and on 23 December 2002, without informing the applicant, took the child with her to London. 10.  The applicant found out about the child’s removal from Romania to the United Kingdom in January 2003. 11.  On 6 February 2003 he instituted proceedings in London before the High Court of Justice, Family Division (“the High Court”), under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). The child and the mother were located by the British authorities; however, their place of residence was not disclosed to the applicant. 12.  A directions hearing was held on 27 February 2003 before the High Court at which the parties were requested to file observations on the question whether the removal of the child from Romania was wrongful under Romanian law within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The judge in charge of the case also directed that the matter be set down for final hearing on 11 April 2003. 13.  On 11 April 2003 the parties received permission to file further evidence. 14.  By the time of the next hearing, on 9 May 2003, the High Court was presented by the applicant with documentary evidence emanating from the Ministry of Justice, the Romanian President’s Office, the Child Protection Authority and the Ombudsman, according to which the child’s removal was wrongful under Romanian law. However, the court was not convinced and, in accordance with Article 15 of the Hague Convention, requested a Romanian court decision on the matter. 15.  On 11 June 2003 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Bucharest Third District Court (“District Court”) seeking a ruling that the child’s removal from Romania had been illegal. 16.  On 16 July 2003 the applicant introduced a new application before the same court seeking a ruling that the child’s removal was contrary to Article 3 of the Hague Convention because he also had custody rights over the child. 17.  On 1 September 2003 the District Court held the first hearing in respect of the applicant’s first action; however, as a result of the mother’s request for an adjournment, the proceedings were adjourned until 8 December 2003. 18.  On 29 September 2003 the Romanian Ministry of Justice wrote to the High Court in London, informing it that the Romanian courts had exclusive competence in issuing decisions in accordance with Article 15 of the Hague Convention. 19.  On 30 September 2003 the District Court in Bucharest held the first hearing in respect of the second action and adjourned the case on the grounds that the applicant had failed to sign the application and that the mother had failed to sign her request for an adjournment. 20.  On 2 October 2003 the High Court in London resumed its examination of the case. The judge in charge of the case indicated that since his decision of May 2003 a number of documents from Romania had become available which seemed to indicate that the child’s removal from Romania by his mother was wrongful, and that, had these documents been available earlier, he would not have sought a declaration under Article 15 of the Hague Convention. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the proceedings in Romania had commenced, and in view of the letter from the Romanian Ministry of Justice of 29 September 2003 it was decided to adjourn the proceedings to a date after 8 December 2003 (the date on which the District Court in Bucharest was to hear the case). The judge expressed concern about the time that had elapsed in the proceedings and indicated that if the 8 December hearing in Romania was not conclusive he would discharge the order he had made in May and proceed to adjudication. 21.  On 31 October 2003 the mother submitted her observations concerning the applicant’s actions in the Romanian proceedings and introduced a counter-action seeking, inter alia, a ruling that the applicant did not have a right of custody over the child and that he did not have the right to decide on the child’s place of domicile. 22.  On 8 December 2003 the District Court in Bucharest adjourned the hearing at the applicant’s request so that he could examine the mother’s observations and the counter-action lodged by her. On the same date the two actions lodged by the applicant and the mother’s counter-action were joined. 23.  On 19 December 2003 the judge at the High Court in London, having learned that the final determination of the case before the Romanian court had yet again been put back, made an order that the final hearing in London should take place “as a matter of urgency” in January 2004. 24.  On 5 January 2004 the District Court in Bucharest adopted a final ruling in the case and declared inadmissible the applicant’s actions without entering into the merits of the case. It decided not to examine the mother’s counter-action. Both parties appealed against the judgment. 25.  On 14 January 2004 the proceedings in London were adjourned at the request of the parties to 1 March 2004 to allow time for receipt of the written reasons from the Romanian court. 26.  On 20 January 2004 the District Court in Bucharest delivered its judgment and on 3 and 5 February the parties appealed against it. 27.  On 6 February 2004 the case file was transmitted by the District Court to the Bucharest Court of Appeal and the latter fixed 6 April as the date of the hearing in the case. 28.  On 23 February 2004 the applicant requested the Bucharest Court of Appeal to speed up the proceedings in view of the proceedings pending in London. His request was granted and the date of the hearing was set for 16 March 2004. 29.  On 1 March 2004 the applicant applied for an adjournment in the High Court proceedings in London pending determination of the case by the Bucharest Court of Appeal. His request was granted and the judge in charge of the case ordered that the final hearing should take place as soon as possible after receipt of an authorised translation of the decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 30.  On 15 March 2004 the mother filed her observations with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 31.  On 16 March 2004 the applicant’s representative requested an adjournment from the Bucharest Court of Appeal in order to study the mother’s observations. 32.  On 11 May 2004 the Bucharest Court of Appeal held a hearing in the case and heard submissions from the parties. The pronouncement of the judgment was adjourned to 25 May 2004. 33.  On 25 May 2004 the Fourth Section of the Bucharest Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the first-instance court in part. It examined the applicant’s action on the merits and dismissed it as ill-founded, finding that the applicant did not have custody rights over the child and that the child’s removal from Romania was legal under domestic law and not wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was communicated to the parties on 19 July 2004. 34.  On 3 August 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation (Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie) against the judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 35.  On 16 August 2004 the case file was sent by the Bucharest Court of Appeal to the Court of Cassation of Romania. 36.  On three occasions between November 2004 and March 2005 the applicant lodged requests with the Court of Cassation asking it for a speedier examination of his case on grounds of the urgency of the matter. 37.  It appears that during that period the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure was undergoing changes and that it was not clear which court was competent under the new rules to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law. On 16 March 2005 the Court of Cassation declined jurisdiction in favour of the Bucharest Court of Appeal and on 28 March the case file was sent back to that court. 38.  The Bucharest Court of Appeal scheduled the first hearing in the case for 16 June 2005. 39.  On 13 May 2005 the applicant requested that the proceedings be speeded up in view of an upcoming hearing in the London proceedings. On 19 May the applicant’s request was upheld and the hearing was rescheduled for 26 May 2005. 40.  On 26 May 2005 the Third Section of the Bucharest Court of Appeal held a hearing; however, it decided to adjourn the proceedings to 9 June 2005. 41.  On 9 June 2005 the Court of Appeal resumed the examination of the case and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It found, inter alia, that, under Romanian family law, after divorce the parents of a child do not have equal rights in respect of their child. In particular, the parent who has custody of the child does not need the consent of the other parent in respect of measures concerning the child except for matters relating to adoption and/or losing or re-obtaining Romanian nationality. The parent who does not enjoy custody cannot veto a decision of the other parent concerning the child’s domicile. Accordingly, the removal of the child from Romania by the mother was lawful under Romanian law. 42.  In July 2005, after the Romanian proceedings had ended and the final Romanian judgment had become available in English, the High Court in London resumed its proceedings and listed the case for a final hearing on 3 and 4 August 2005. 43.  On 1 August 2005 the judge in charge of the case at the High Court in London acceded to the applicant’s application for an expert opinion on the law of Romania. The expert was to file his report by 16 September 2005. 44.  Both parties agreed to instruct Dr Mihai to draft a report on Romanian family law and on 14 September 2005 the High Court confirmed the joint instructions to the expert and the time for lodging of the expert report was extended to 7 October 2005 with the final hearing listed for 14 October 2005. 45.  On 28 September 2005 the High Court in London extended the time-limit for the expert report to 11 October and relisted the case for 31 October 2005. 46.  The expert’s report was ready on 11 October 2005; however, the parties wished to put more questions to him. Therefore, on 31 October 2005, on an application from the applicant, the court adjourned the proceedings to 8 December 2005 and made further procedural directions in relation to any further questions to be put to the expert. 47.  On 8 December 2005 the final hearing was listed before the High Court in London for 28 February and 1 March 2006. 48.  On 28 February and 1 March 2006 the High Court held the final hearings in the case and gave judgment on 28 March 2006. The court found in favour of the applicant, choosing to rely on the expert opinion and to disregard the decisions of the Romanian courts. It found that the applicant had custody rights within the meaning of Article 5 of the Hague Convention and that therefore the child’s removal from Romania had been wrongful under Article 3 of the same Convention. The court also rejected an objection based on Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention raised by the mother and issued an order for the return of the child to Romania. 49.  On 7 April 2006 the mother sought leave to appeal. This was granted on 10 April 2006 and the case was fixed for hearing in the Court of Appeal on 25 May 2006. 50.  On 25 May 2006 the Court of Appeal heard and dismissed the mother’s appeal while varying the order for the peremptory return of the child until the end of the school term. 51.  The mother appealed to the House of Lords. Her appeal was heard between 9 and 11 October 2006 and on 16 November 2006 the House of Lords gave judgment allowing the appeal. The House of Lords reversed the judgment of the High Court, finding that the applicant did not have custody rights within the meaning of Article 5 of the Hague Convention and that therefore the child’s removal from Romania was not wrongful under Article 3 of the same Convention. The House of Lords criticised the decision of the High Court to seek a further expert opinion after having obtained a final decision on the matter from the Romanian courts and expressed regret about the length of the proceedings. 52.  Lord Hope of Craighead observed, inter alia, that:\n“Article 15 of the Convention contemplates that the court may need to be provided with a determination from the authorities of the state of the child’s habitual residence that the removal was wrongful. So a judge is not to be criticised if he decides to use this procedure because he cannot responsibly resolve the issue on the information provided by the applicant. Nevertheless if he decides on this course delay will be inevitable. Great care must therefore be taken, in the child’s best interests, to keep this to the absolute minimum. The misfortunes that have beset this case show that, once the court has received the response, it should strive to treat the information which it receives as determinative.\nIn this case the response that was received from Romania was sufficient to show that the child’s removal was not wrongful within the meaning of article 3. On 9 June 2005 the final Court of Appeal of Bucharest, upholding the court of first appeal, stated in the clearest terms that, under the law as it then stood in Romania, termination of marriage through divorce brings joint custody to an end, that cases where the agreement of the parties is required about a measure which the parent with custody proposes are limited, and that none of the rights that the father had been granted on divorce gave him a right of veto or to decide the child’s place of residence. It is wholly understandable that the father should feel aggrieved by what has happened in this case. The effect on his ability to exercise his rights of access is plain to see. But the phrase “rights of custody” has been given a particular definition by the Convention. It is only if there has been a breach of rights of custody as so defined that the removal can be described as wrongful for its purposes. The information provided by the Romanian court shows that, as the law stood at the time of the child’s removal, the father had no such rights.” 53.  Baroness Hale of Richmond commented, inter alia, that:\n“...the Bucharest Court of Appeal concluded that the removal of the child in December 2002 had not been wrongful... How then should the courts of the requested state respond to such a determination? Most certainly not as they did in this case. Having received a determination, binding between the parties, in the final court of the requesting state, the English High Court proceeded in effect to allow the father to challenge that ruling by adducing fresh expert evidence. The fact that the expert was jointly instructed does not cure the vice.” 54.  Lord Carswell stated that:\n“It was quite wrong to permit the father to adduce further expert evidence from Dr Mihai which challenged not only the conclusion but the statement of the content of the father’s rights set out in the judgment of the Romanian court. The English court should have considered the terms of the judgment itself, without any subsequently obtained expert evidence. If it had done so it could only have come to the same conclusion as the Romanian court, even without applying any presumption in its favour.” 55.  Lord Brown commented as follows:\n“This is an extraordinary case. It is, we are told, unique in the length of time which elapsed before the judge’s order for the child’s summary return to Romania (over three years after the commencement of Hague Convention proceedings); and unique too in being the only case in which a United Kingdom court has rejected a foreign court’s article 15 determination that the child’s removal was not in the event wrongful within the meaning of article 3...\nIn circumstances like these it seems to me almost inconceivable that the court requesting the article 15 determination would then not simply accept it. Certainly there would need to be some compelling reason to reject it such as a flagrant breach of the rules of natural justice in the foreign judicial process or a manifest misdirection as to the autonomous meaning of the Convention term “rights of custody”. There is nothing of that sort here. On the contrary, the judge - neither Johnson J (who had requested the determination) nor Hogg J (who later ordered the child’s return to Romania) - on 1 August 2005, acting merely on the father’s request, ordered that an expert in Romanian law be jointly instructed by both parties to cover exactly the same ground as the Romanian Appeal Courts had themselves just covered...” 56.  Throughout the entire proceedings in the United Kingdom the applicant was allowed to meet his child on a number of occasions in special contact centres for periods not exceeding two hours. According to him, however, over the last four years he has only been able to spend about thirty hours with his son. 57.  It does not appear that the applicant ever applied to the United Kingdom courts in order to obtain a judgment from them giving him access to the child. However, on an unspecified date in 2007 he applied to the High Court in London for the recognition of the Romanian judgment of November 2000 (see paragraph 7 above). The Court is not aware of the outcome of those proceedings. 58.  The relevant provisions of the Romanian Family Code read as follows:\nArticle 43 3.  The divorced parent, who was not entrusted with the child, keeps the right to have personal ties with the child, as well as to observe his or her bringing up, education, studies and professional instruction. 59.  The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction provide:\nArticle 3\n“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –\na)  it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and\nb)  at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.\nThe rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.”\nArticle 5\n“For the purposes of this Convention –\na)  ’rights of custody’ shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence;\nb)  ’rights of access’ shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.”\nArticle 7\n“Central Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective States to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of this Convention.\nIn particular, either directly or through any intermediary, they shall take all appropriate measures -\na)  to discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained;\nb)  to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures;\nc)  to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues;\nd)  to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the social background of the child;\ne)  to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in connection with the application of the Convention;\nf)  to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper case, to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access;\ng)  where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisers;\nh)  to provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child;\ni)  to keep other each other informed with respect to the operation of this Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its application.”\nArticle 8\n“Any person, institution or other body claiming that a child has been removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to the Central Authority of the child’s habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance in securing the return of the child...”\nArticle 10\n“The Central Authority of the State where the child is shall take or cause to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary return of the child.”\nArticle 11\n“The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.\nIf the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.”\nArticle 13\n“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that –\na)  the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal of retention; or\nb)  there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.\nThe judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.\nIn considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.”\nArticle 15\n“The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision or determination may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as practicable assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination.”\nArticle 21\n“An application to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access may be presented to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an application for the return of a child.\nThe Central Authorities are bound by the obligations of co-operation which are set forth in Article 7 to promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfilment of any conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject. The Central Authorities shall take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.\nThe Central Authorities, either directly or through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights and securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these rights may be subject.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Warsaw. He is currently detained in Warsaw Remand Centre. 6.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant was held in custody. It does not result from the case-file whether the applicant remains detained in this set of proceedings. 7.  On 5 April 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder, attempted robbery and drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group. 8.  On the same date the Białystok District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody, relying on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. The court indicated that the evidence which had been gathered in the case, in particular the testimonies of witnesses and other suspects, showed that there was a sufficient probability that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It attached importance to the risk that he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or, by other means, would obstruct the proceedings. The latter risk was considered of the utmost importance in the light of the fact that the case involved a large number of alleged accomplices. 9.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against decisions extending his detention and all of his subsequent, numerous applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. 10.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended on several occasions, namely, on 27 June 2006 (to 5 October 2006), 29 September 2006 (to 5 December 2006), 28 November 2006 (to 5 March 2007), 2 March 2007 (to 5 May 2007), 27 April 2007 (to 5 August 2007), 30 July 2007 (to 5 November 2007) and 30 October 2007 (to 5 February 2008). In their decisions, the courts stressed the fact that the applicant had been acting in an organised criminal group. They underlined the unique nature of the proceedings involving organised crime, in which the authorities had to determine the degree of alleged responsibility of each of the suspects. The courts attached importance to the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed on the applicant. 11.  On 30 January 2008 the Białystok District Court refused to extend the applicant’s detention. It stated that the applicant had been held in pre‑trial detention since April 2006 and that this period should have been sufficient for the authorities to collect evidence in the applicant’s case. In addition, it considered that the decision about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention beyond the period of three months should be taken by the Białystok Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 12.  The Prosecutor lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision. 13.  On 13 February 2008 the Białystok Regional Court amended the contested decision and extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to 5 May 2008. The court argued that as the applicant was remanded in custody in the first set of criminal proceedings, his detention in the second set of proceedings was merely administrative. It further stated that the applicant was charged with serious offences committed in an organised criminal group and that there was a high risk that, if released, he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or, by other means, would obstruct the proceedings. Finally, the court observed that the Prosecutor could not have completed the investigation as evidence in proceedings involving organised crime often emerged gradually. 14.  On 29 April 2008 the Białystok District Court extended the applicant’s detention to 5 June 2008. 15.  On an unspecified date the Prosecutor requested the Białystok District Court to extend the applicant’s detention to 5 September 2008. 16.  On 4 June 2008 the Białystok District Court extended the applicant’s detention to 31 July 2008. The court observed that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been extended for over two years almost automatically and it did not seem that the investigation was reaching its final stage. It concluded that the extension of the applicant’s detention for a shorter period than was requested by the Prosecutor should prompt the authorities to accelerate the acts of investigation regarding the applicant. 17.  The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision claiming that he had been detained for over 26 months and that this period should have been sufficient for completing the investigation. 18.  On 9 July 2008 the Białystok Regional Court quashed the contested decision. It stated that the decision about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention beyond the period of one year should be taken by the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 19.  On 17 July 2008 the Białystok Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 31 August 2008. The court underlined the complexity of the case and the severity of the penalty to which the applicant was liable. Having regard to the organised character of the alleged criminal activities, it also held that the applicant’s detention was necessary in order to prevent the applicant from interfering with the proceedings. 20.  The Prosecutor lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision claiming that the period of one month would not be sufficient for collecting evidence in the applicant’s case. 21.  On 7 August 2008 the Białystok Court of Appeal modified the contested decision and extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2008. The court observed that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was indeed lengthy but necessary in the particular circumstances of the case. 22.  On 17 September 2008 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Białystok Regional Court. The applicant was charged with murder, attempted robbery and drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group. 23.  On 23 September 2008 the Białystok Regional Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to 30 December 2008. 24.  In October 2008 the case was referred to the Warszawa-Praga Regional Court. 25.  On several occasions the Warszawa-Praga Regional Court applied to the Warsaw Court of Appeal, asking for the applicant’s detention to be extended. The Warszawa Court of Appeal allowed all those requests extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 22 December 2008 (to 30 June 2009), 25 June 2009 (to 31 December 2009), 10 December 2009 (to 31 May 2010), 27 May 2010 (to 15 October 2010), 7 October 2010 (to 31 January 2011), 18 January 2011 (to 31 May 2011) and 24 May 2011 (to 30 September 2011). 26.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending. The applicant remains detained. 27.  The applicant submitted that during the entire period of his detention he was held in overcrowded cells in conditions which did not comply with the basic standards of hygiene.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 in Gubadly and currently lives in Sumgayit. 6.  The applicant and his family are internally displaced persons from Gubadly. In 1993, during the occupation of the region by Armenian military forces, they fled their permanent place of residence and came to Sumgayit. 7.  After their flight from Gubadly, the applicant's family of six (himself, his wife, three children and the applicant's mother-in-law) resided temporarily in various places in Sumgayit. Immediately prior to the events outlined below they lived in a room in a State-owned hostel. 8.  From 17 June to 5 July 1999 the applicant's wife, Chichek Mammadova, underwent in-patient treatment in the Sumgayit City Emergency Hospital with a diagnosis of “closed craniocerebral injury, brain concussion; contusion of soft tissues of the crown of the head; hysterical psychosis”. 9.  In late 2003 the applicant discovered that there were three vacant rooms in an old administrative building that belonged to the Sumgayit City Military Commissariat (the army recruitment office), which, however, no longer occupied the building. Part of the building was occupied by an association of war veterans, but the rooms that the applicant was interested in were abandoned and in a state of neglect. The rooms were located in auxiliary premises which had a separate entrance from the rear side of the building. The applicant occupied these rooms and conducted substantial repair work there for three months. According to him, the other occupants of the building were aware of his activities but did not object to them. Likewise, according to the applicant, there were no objections by any public authorities to the repair works carried out by him. 10.  After completing the repair works, at the end of 2003 the applicant left his hostel room and moved into the new dwelling together with his family. 11.  On 26 March 2004 two officials (E.G. and Y.A.) of the Sumgayit City Executive Authority (“the SCEA”), an employee of the local housing maintenance and utilities board (K.A.) and a number of police officers arrived in the applicant's new dwelling. They had no court order for his eviction. 12.  At an unspecified time after the arrival of the above-mentioned officials, the applicant's wife, Chichek Mammadova, poured some kerosene on herself and ignited it, apparently in protest at what she perceived as the authorities' intention to evict her family. It appears that at least one of the police officers helped put out the fire on her body, using a blanket he found inside the applicant's home. Chichek Mammadova's brother, who arrived slightly later, took her to hospital by taxi. 13.  Following this incident, the police loaded the possessions of the applicant's family onto a lorry and transported them back to the hostel where the applicant's family had previously resided. 14.  The applicant's wife suffered multiple second- and third-degree burns affecting 50% of the body surface. On 30 March 2004 she died in hospital of complications resulting from her injuries. The results of the autopsy released on 2 April 2004 confirmed that the death had been caused by the extensive burns to her body surface. 15.  According to the applicant, prior to 26 March 2004 he was summoned several times to meet the SCEA officials, who orally demanded him to vacate the rooms in the old Commissariat building and even asked him for a bribe in order to allow him to stay there. He refused their demands. 16.  On 26 March 2004 E.G., Y.A. and a large number of police officers arrived in the applicant's new dwelling and demanded that he and his family immediately vacate the premises. The applicant estimated the total number of police officers at around twenty-five to thirty, noting that most of them were equipped with batons. When the applicant and his family members refused, the police used force on the applicant and his mother-in-law. 17.  At this time Chichek Mammadova experienced a state of shock and psychological anxiety. She poured some kerosene on herself and threatened to set fire to herself if the police officers did not leave immediately. However, the SCEA officials and police officers did not take her threats seriously. E.G. even offered her a box of matches, mockingly encouraging her to keep her word and set fire to herself. 18.  At that moment, the applicant was outside trying to help one of his children, who had fainted a few moments earlier from fright. Therefore, the applicant could not immediately rescue his wife. According to the applicant, none of the police officers made an attempt to rescue her, because they were all busy carrying the applicant's possessions and loading them onto a lorry. 19.  Only Chichek Mammadova's sister, who was also in the vicinity, came to her rescue and extinguished the fire. Only one police officer offered some belated assistance. By this time, Chichek Mammadova had already suffered serious burns. Her brother, who arrived shortly after the incident, took her to hospital by taxi. 20.  According to the Government, at 11 a.m. on 26 March 2004 two SCEA officials, accompanied by five police officers, visited the premises occupied by the applicant's family. The aim of the visit was merely to explain to the applicant that his family was occupying these premises illegally. The applicant immediately left, together with a child of his, and went to a post office to send a complaint against the SCEA officials and the police. After the applicant had left, his wife supposed that her family would be evicted by force. She became anxious and set fire to herself in protest. None of the State officials present had provoked her to do so. A few minutes later her close relatives took her to hospital. 21.  Following this, the officials decided, on the spot, to move the applicant's family's belongings back to the hostel where they had previously resided. 22.  An investigator of the Sumgayit City Prosecutor's Office carried out a preliminary inquiry into the circumstances of Chichek Mammadova's death. 23.  It appears that the investigator questioned a number of witnesses, including the applicant, his mother-in-law, his sister-in-law, the municipal employee K.A., the SCEA officials E.G. and Y.A., and seven police officers (J.M., C.V., N.A., E.N., N.G., N.I. and S.S.) (see summaries of the relevant witness testimonies in section F. below). 24.  By a decision of 14 May 2004 an investigator of the Sumgayit City Prosecutor's Office decided not to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the death of the applicant's wife. 25.  Based on the witness testimonies, the investigator concluded that there was no proof supporting the applicant's allegations that E.G. and Y.A. had entered the applicant's dwelling, that E.G. had offered matches to Chichek Mammadova, that E.G. had ever asked the applicant for a bribe, or that any police officers had used force against Chichek Mammadova. As there were no indications that any third persons had been in any way responsible for the fact that the applicant's wife had attempted suicide, there were no grounds to institute criminal proceedings. 26.  Following this decision, the applicant sent a number of letters to the Sumgayit City Prosecutor's Office asking for a new investigation into the circumstances of his wife's death with a view to determining the responsibility of the SCEA officials and police officers involved in the incident. The Sumgayit City Prosecutor's Office replied, with similarly worded letters, on 15 July, 20 July, 3 September and 28 September 2004. It was noted in these letters that Chichek Mammadova's death had been suicide and that the preliminary inquiry could not establish any responsibility on the part of the State officials in her death. It was also noted, however, that:\n“... during the investigation into the circumstances of the death of Chichek [Mammadova], it was revealed that officials of the City Executive Authority and certain officers of the Sumgayit City Police Office had committed a number of errors [in performing their official duties. The matter has been referred] to the senior management of the City Executive Authority and the City Police Office with a view to eliminating such errors and ensuring that they are not repeated in the future, as well as taking relevant measures against the persons who have committed these errors. ...\n... moreover, a report was submitted to the Sumgayit City Police Office in respect of the officers of the Sumgayit City Police Office who exceeded their authority by participating, without a relevant court order, in an operation to evict you from the building where you had settled illegally; the officers responsible for the misconduct have been punished under the disciplinary procedure.” 27.  In March 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Sumgayit City Court against the decision of the Sumgayit City Prosecutor's Office of 14 May 2004. On 1 April 2005 the Sumgayit City Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the decision of 14 May 2004. It noted that the inquiry did not reveal any evidence that a criminal offence had been committed and that, therefore, the decision of 14 May 2004 was lawful. 28.  On 25 May 2005 the Prosecutor General quashed the Sumgayit City Prosecutor's Office's decision of 14 May 2004 on the refusal to institute criminal proceedings. On 14 June 2005 the case was forwarded to the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office for an additional inquiry into the circumstances of the case. 29.  In the period from 24 June to 12 August 2005, the investigator of the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office questioned a number of witnesses (mostly the same ones as those who had been questioned before) and obtained written testimonies from them (see section F. below). 30.  On 20 July 2005 the investigator requested an expert opinion on Chichek Mammadova's mental condition prior to her death and how it might have affected her actions leading to the suicide. In an expert opinion of 10 August 2005 an expert psychiatrist, having studied Chichek Mammadova's medical records and comments by people who had known her, concluded as follows:\n“No symptoms of a psychogenic-depressive reaction potentially causing her suicide can be observed in Chichek Mammadova's personality and mental traits. However, in the period preceding Chichek Mammadova's death, she had experienced a state of emotional stress of a degree capable of influencing her behaviour.” 31.  On 17 August 2005 the investigator issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings. The decision stated, inter alia:\n“[According to the expert opinion of 10 August 2005,] the act of self-immolation by Chichek Mammadova was carried out in an attempt to prevent [her family's eviction]. During the incident, she found herself in the extreme circumstances of facing eviction from the rooms that [her family] had occupied, and reacted inadequately by self‑immolating in an ostentatious manner, having decided that it would attract the attention of those who were around her, evoke in them feelings of compassion towards herself, and help her resolve the conflict situation she encountered. In the period preceding her death, Chichek Mammadova had experienced emotional stress of a degree that could have influenced her subsequent actions.\n... the additional inquiry revealed that no other person had incited Chichek Mammadova to commit suicide by means of either ill-treating her, debasing her dignity or intimidating her.\nThe claims of [the applicant] have not been confirmed during the additional inquiry ... It was established that the [SCEA and police] officials had carried out their official duties in a lawful manner, had given lawful instructions and had not committed any breaches of law when implementing those instructions, and that there had been no corpus delicti in [their] actions.\nTherefore ... the institution of criminal proceedings should be refused.” 32.  It appears that, following this decision, the applicant sent a number of letters to the Prosecutor General's Office, complaining that the investigation into the circumstances of his wife's death had been inadequate. In letters of 22 September and 10 October 2005 the Prosecutor General's Office responded that the inquiry by the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office did not reveal any criminal elements in the actions of the State officials and that the applicant could challenge the decision of the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office of 17 August 2005 in the courts. The applicant did not lodge a judicial complaint. 33.  On 7 June 2006 the First Deputy to the Prosecutor General quashed the decision of the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office of 17 August 2005 on the refusal to institute criminal proceedings. Having regard to the contradictory testimonies of key witnesses and indications of possible breaches of law by the SCEA and police officials, the First Deputy to the Prosecutor General found that the inquiry had been incomplete and instituted criminal proceedings under Article 125 (incitement to suicide) of the Criminal Code. The Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office was instructed to carry out the investigation. 34.  On 10 June 2006 the applicant was given the procedural status of a “legal successor to a victim of crime”. In June and July 2006 the applicant submitted to the investigator a number of petitions requesting him, inter alia, to summon certain additional witnesses and to remove certain SCEA and police officials from their official posts during the investigation period. On 1 August 2006 the investigator rejected these petitions. 35.  It appears that the investigator again questioned mostly the same group of witnesses who had been questioned before (see paragraphs 23 and 29 above and section F. below). 36.  On 7 September 2006 the three-month investigation period was extended for another two months. 37.  On 1 October 2006 the investigation was suspended. On 14 November 2006 it was resumed. No documents are available in the case file in respect of these procedural events. 38.  On 15 November 2006 the investigator from the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office again suspended the investigation, owing to the inability “to determine the perpetrator of the criminal offence” of incitement to suicide. 39.  The applicant lodged a judicial complaint against the investigator's decision of 15 November 2006 to suspend the investigation. On 19 March 2007 the Binagadi District Court quashed the impugned decision and instructed the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office to resume the investigation. The court noted, inter alia:\n“It appears from the material in the case file that the criminal investigation has not been full and comprehensive, and there was no basis for suspending the criminal proceedings as no face-to-face confrontations between witnesses have been held, and it has not been determined whether there were lawful grounds for the [SCEA and police] officials to enter the residential premises and remove the victim's belongings from there, whether the police officers indeed went to the scene of the incident with the aim of carrying out prophylactic measures, whether such prophylactic measures were lawful, whether any physical force were used against the residents of the premises, and whether the [State officials] at the scene of the incident abused their official authority.” 40.  On 9 April 2007 the investigation was resumed. However, on 25 April 2007 the investigator of the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office decided to suspend the investigation again. In his decision he noted that, after the resumption of the investigation on 9 April 2007, “a number of investigative steps ha[d] been carried out”; however, it was still impossible to determine the perpetrator of the offence of incitement to suicide. The nature of such investigative acts was unspecified. 41.  The applicant lodged a judicial complaint against the investigator's decision of 25 April 2007 to suspend the investigation. On 7 June 2007 the Binagadi District Court dismissed the applicant's complaint and upheld the investigator's decision. On 4 July 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the Binagadi District Court's decision. 42.  On 16 September 2008 the investigator of the Binagadi District Prosecutor's Office issued a decision terminating the criminal proceedings on account of the absence of corpus delicti for the purposes of Article 125 of the Criminal Code in the actions of any of the persons involved in the incident resulting in the applicant's wife's self-immolation. The decision contained, inter alia, the following findings:\n“From 5 March 2004 the [SCEA] became aware of the fact that [the applicant and his family] had changed, of their own free will [without authorisation], their place of residence and were illegally residing in a State-owned non-residential building. Despite several early warnings given by [SCEA and police] officials, [the applicant and his family] continued to illegally reside in those non-residential premises.\nAt around 11 a.m. on 26 March 2004, pursuant to an instruction by the [SCEA's] senior administration, [SCEA officials E.G. and Y.A.], police officers [N.G., E.N., N.A., C.V.], and the Deputy Head of the Sumgayit City Police Office J.M. went ... to the above address to have a prophylactic conversation with [the applicant and his family].\nDuring the prophylactic conversation ... Chichek Mammadova became anxious and, having presumed that [her family] would be evicted from the premises, poured kerosene on herself and ignited it; a state of tension ensued at the scene of the incident; Chichek Mammadova was taken to hospital by her relatives; her husband [the applicant] had left the scene prior to Chichek Mammadova's self-immolation to send a complaint by telegram; as a result, a process of eviction was started in accordance with an instruction given on the spot by [E.G. and Y.A.]; the police officers loaded [the applicant's] belongings onto a lorry and transported them to [the hostel where the applicant's family had previously lived] and delivered them to [R.N.], the superintendent of the hostel.\nIt has been determined that the senior administration of [the SCEA] sent [E.G. and Y.A.] with the purpose of carrying out prophylactic measures in respect of the internally displaced persons who were illegally occupying the State-owned non‑residential premises in order to ensure that [the latter] vacated the premises voluntarily, and that the senior management of [the SCEA] did not instruct its officials to evict the internally displaced persons by force. However, after [the applicant's] wife Chichek Mammadova, who was suffering from a mental illness, had set fire to herself, [E.G. and Y.A.] instructed the police officers to move out the [applicant's] belongings, organised the transportation of those belongings to the hostel..., delivered them to the superintendent [R.N.] and signed a deed of delivery. ...\nIt has been determined that, pursuant to an oral instruction from [the SCEA], the police officers were sent to the above-mentioned address by the administration of the Sumgayit City Police Office in order to participate in carrying out the prophylactic measures and, after the act of self-immolation by Chichek Mammadova, received an instruction directly from [E.G. and Y.A.] to move [the applicant's] belongings.\n[Summaries of witness testimonies and forensic evidence follow.]\nPursuant to Article 5 of the Law on Social Protection of Internally Displaced Persons and Individuals Equated to Them of 21 May 1999, the relevant local executive authorities are responsible for temporary housing of internally displaced persons. Internally displaced persons may be allowed to settle temporarily on their own only if the rights and lawful interests of other persons are not infringed. Otherwise, the relevant executive authority must ensure resettlement of the internally displaced persons to other accommodation ...\nPursuant to clause 4 of the Regulations on Resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons to Other Accommodation, adopted in Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 200 of 24 December 1999, in cases where the temporary settling of internally displaced persons breaches the housing rights of other individuals, the local executive authorities must provide the former with other suitable accommodation.\nAccording to a statement received from the Sumgayit City Court, there has been no judicial order for the eviction of [the applicant] from the premises where he had settled.\n[A summary of the expert opinion on Chichek Mammadova's mental state follows.]\nThe investigation did not reveal evidence in support of [the applicant's] allegations that [the SCEA] officials demanded a bribe from him, abused or exceeded their authority, or unlawfully evicted [the applicant's family], or that the police officers ... abused or exceeded their authority, or used force against [the applicant] and his family members or his mother-in-law. The decisions and actions of [the SCEA and police] officials taken in connection with the premises illegally occupied [by the applicant's family] were lawful and did not transgress the limits specified by the legislation [in force]. The actions of [the SCEA and police] officials did not contain any elements of offences under Articles 308, 309, 311 and 125 of the Criminal Code or any other criminal offences.\nMoreover, the investigation revealed no indications that Chichek Mammadova was driven to commit suicide by way of ill-treatment debasing her dignity or threatening her, and found no person guilty of such acts. No elements of an offence under Article 125 of the Criminal Code have been established in the actions of any person [in connection with this incident].” 43.  Below are summaries of testimonies of the witnesses questioned at various times by the investigation authorities in the course of the above‑mentioned proceedings. The summaries have been derived either from copies of the witness depositions submitted by the Government in their observations or from the texts of the investigation authorities' decisions, or both. It appears that a number of the witnesses were questioned more than once; in such cases, the summary includes the content of all their testimonies. 44.  The applicant testified that, prior to 26 March 2004, he had been called to the SCEA several times and had been demanded to vacate the premises in the Sumgayit Commissariat. On one occasion, he had been accompanied to the SCEA by a police officer, C.V. The applicant claimed that, during these meetings with the SCEA officials, he had been asked for a bribe. 45.  At 11 a.m. on 26 March 2004 K.A. knocked on the applicant's door and did not tell him the real reason for her visit when he asked. When he opened the door, K.A. entered the dwelling with E.G., followed by police officers N.I., S.S. and C.V. (whom the applicant identified by their first names), and several other police officers unknown to him. A “large number” of other unknown police officers remained outside. N.I., S.S. and C.V. used force on the applicant immediately after they had gone inside. The applicant's wife, who witnessed this, asked the police officers why they were doing this and threatened to set fire to herself. In reply, E.G. mockingly challenged her to do so. At that moment, the applicant was able to escape from the police officers and go outside in search of a phone to call his relatives for assistance. When he came back, he saw a burnt blanket at the entrance of the dwelling and found out that his wife had performed self‑immolation and had been taken to hospital. He went to the hospital to see his wife. From the hospital he went to a post office to send telegrams to various authorities complaining about the incident. When he came back to his dwelling from the post office, he saw that his possessions had been removed. 46.  The testimony of the applicant's mother-in-law mostly corroborated the applicant's statements. Unlike him, she was inside the dwelling during the entire incident. She estimated that there had been around twenty to twenty-five officials and police officers during the incident and noted that they all had entered the dwelling. She also noted that, at one point, police officer N.I. had used force on the applicant by twisting his arms. She further submitted that E.G. had gone inside the dwelling and provoked Chichek Mammadova by offering her a box of matches. Following this, Chichek went into another room and emerged from it burning. One of the police officers helped put out the fire by throwing a blanket and a carpet on Chichek Mammadova. 47.  The applicant's sister-in-law was in accord with her mother's testimony. 48.  E.G. stated that the applicant and his family members had been notified earlier about the illegality of their actions and had been asked to vacate their dwelling in the Commissariat building. On 25 March 2004 S.R., a head of department at the SCEA, instructed him and another colleague of his (F.K.) to participate, as “observers” from the SCEA, in the “prophylactic measures” that would be taken the next day in connection with the applicant's illegal occupation of part of the Commissariat building. On 26 March 2004 he went to that address together with Y.A., while F.K. joined them much later. There were already an unspecified number of police officers there. An unspecified number of unidentified relatives and friends of the applicant were also there. The latter verbally insulted him and Y.A. The Deputy Head of the Sumgayit City Police Office (J.M.) was also there and spoke to the applicant about vacating the premises. 49.  E.G. specified that K.A. had knocked on the applicant's door and, immediately after it had been opened, several policemen had gone inside and spoken to the applicant. E.G. himself was standing, together with Y.A., outside the building, about 40-50 metres away from the entrance to the applicant's dwelling. “A little while later”, he heard screams from inside the applicant's dwelling and saw the police officers bring out Chichek Mammadova, who was badly burnt and was then taken to hospital. The applicant was not there at this time, as he had gone away somewhere. After Chichek Mammadova had been driven away, the premises occupied by the applicant and his possessions were left unattended by his family members, so they were loaded onto a lorry and taken to a more “secure place”, that is, the hostel where the applicant had lived before. 50.  E.G. denied speaking to the applicant prior to the incident and asking for any bribe from him. He also denied offering any matches to Chichek Mammadova and repeatedly insisted that he had been standing outside when she had immolated herself. He noted that the police officers had not used any force against the applicant or his family members. He also denied issuing any instructions to move the applicant's possessions out of the dwelling and stated that the police officers had decided to do so by themselves. 51.  Y.A. testified that, on 26 March 2004, his colleagues E.G. and F.K. had asked him to accompany them to the premises that the applicant had illegally occupied. When they arrived, there were already an unspecified number of police officers and an unspecified number of the applicant's relatives and friends. He and E.G. were standing outside the building, a significant distance away from the entrance to the premises occupied by the applicant. A little while later, they heard a commotion inside the premises and saw several police officers run inside. The latter brought out a badly burnt woman and sent her to a hospital. One of the police officers, E.N., helped put out the fire and, as a result, suffered a burn injury to his hand. (However, in another deposition Y.A. slightly changed his recollection of the above events and specified that, after K.A. and several police officers had knocked on the applicant's door, they had all gone inside. A little while later, Y.A. heard screams from the inside and heard the police officers bring out Chichek Mammadova.) 52.  The applicant, by this time, had gone away somewhere else and there was a state of confusion and disarray at the scene of the incident. Therefore, the applicant's possessions were loaded onto a lorry and taken to a more secure place (the hostel) for “temporary storage”. Subsequently, the applicant reclaimed his possessions and took them back to the same premises in the Commissariat building that he had illegally occupied. 53.  Y.A. insisted that he and E.G. had been standing outside when Chichek Mammadova had immolated herself and that E.G. had never offered any matches to her. He submitted that the police officers had not used any force against the applicant or his family members. 54.  F.K. testified that S.R., a head of department at the SCEA, had instructed him and E.G. to participate, as “observers” from the SCEA, in the “prophylactic measures” that would be taken the next day in connection with the applicant's illegal occupation of the premises in the Commissariat building. However, in the early morning of 26 March 2004 he was away on another assignment and arrived at the scene of the incident only after Chichek Mammadova had immolated herself. He had assisted in the transportation and delivery of the applicant's possessions to the hostel's superintendent. 55.  S.R. testified that, in early March 2004, he had received information that a family of internally displaced persons had illegally settled in the administrative building of the Sumgayit Commissariat. Thereafter, the applicant came to the SCEA to meet him personally and asked him to allow his family to stay in that building. However, S.R. refused, stating that the applicant's actions were illegal. 56.  He further noted that, on 26 March 2004, he had instructed E.G. and Y.A. to go to the applicant's premises and have a “prophylactic conversation” with the latter. He also requested the Sumgayit City Police Office to send some police officers there in order to “avoid any incidents”. However, S.R. insisted that he had not instructed either E.G. and Y.A. or the police officers to evict the applicant's family by force. The applicant's possessions were moved out of the premises only after the act of self‑immolation by Chichek Mammadova pursuant to a decision taken on the spot by the SCEA officials, in order to preserve the possessions from possible theft in the atmosphere of confusion which ensued at the scene of the incident. 57.  J.M. testified that he had received an oral instruction to carry out a “prophylactic conversation” with the applicant's family and to protect public order at the site during such “prophylactic” measures. For this purpose, he sent police officers E.N. and N.G. to the Commissariat building. He himself also went there at around noon on 26 March 2004 and talked to the applicant and the SCEA officials who were already there. About 5-10 minutes after his arrival, he heard screams from inside the applicant's dwelling and saw E.N. and N.G. go inside. The latter helped to put out the fire on Chichek Mammadova's body and to send her to hospital. Thereafter, he called more police officers to the scene in order to restore order and preserve the applicant's possessions. 58.  C.V. testified that on 26 March 2004 he and his colleague N.A. had been told that the authorities would carry out a “prophylactic conversation” with the applicant and had been instructed to go to the Commissariat building with the aim of protecting public order. When they arrived at the site, there were four other police officers (J.M., E.N., N.G. and S.S.), as well as E.G., Y.A. and K.A. Then K.A. knocked on the door and the applicant came out. The applicant and J.M. engaged in a conversation. The other police officers, including himself, were standing nearby. E.G. and Y.A. were standing about 30 metres from the entrance to the dwelling. While J.M. and the applicant were talking, C.V. heard screams from inside. He and two other police officers (N.A. and E.N.) went inside and saw Chichek Mammadova on fire, coming out of a back room. The police officers, including himself, put out the fire on her body by throwing blankets on her. At this time, the applicant went away somewhere, possibly to a post office. About 15 minutes later, one of Chichek Mammadova's relatives arrived and took her to hospital. Out of the applicant's family, only the applicant's elderly mother-in-law remained at the scene and she was in a state of shock because of her daughter's suicide attempt. The applicant's home possessions were essentially left unattended at this moment, so they were loaded onto a lorry and taken to a more secure place. 59.  C.V. denied applying any force or pressure on the applicant or his family members. He did not assist in moving out the applicant's possessions. 60.  N.A. testified that on 26 March 2004 he had received an instruction from his superiors to go to the Commissariat building with the aim of protecting public order during the eviction of the applicant's family. He went there together with C.V., another police officer. At an unspecified moment, he heard screams from inside the applicant's premises, and he and other police officers ran inside and saw Chichek Mammadova on fire. They helped put out the fire and took her to hospital. He returned to the scene around two hours later and saw that the applicant's possessions had been loaded onto a lorry. He denied applying any force or pressure on the applicant or his family members. According to him, E.G. was standing outside when Chichek Mammadova immolated herself, never went inside the applicant's premises and never offered her matches. 61.  E.N. testified that on 26 March 2004 he had been told that the authorities would carry out a “prophylactic conversation” with the applicant and had been instructed to go to the Commissariat building with the aim of protecting public order. The aim of the “prophylactic conversation” was to persuade the applicant to vacate the illegally occupied premises voluntarily. There were a total of five police officers at the site (including himself, J.M., C.V., N.A. and N.G.). E.G. and Y.A. were also there and were standing some distance away from the premises, because the applicant's relatives and friends kept insulting them. During J.M.'s conversation with the applicant, E.N. heard screams from inside the premises and immediately ran there. He saw a woman on fire. He took a blanket and extinguished the fire on her body. While doing this, he himself was injured, suffering a burn to his hand. 62.  E.N. denied applying any force or pressure on the applicant or his family members. He also did not assist in moving out the applicant's possessions, as he had to leave the scene to receive medical treatment for his injury. 63.  N.G. testified that on 26 March 2004 he had been told that the authorities would carry out a “prophylactic conversation” with the applicant and had been instructed to go to the Commissariat building with the aim of protecting public order. He went there together with E.N., his colleague. While one of the police officers engaged in conversation with the applicant, E.G., Y.A. and all the police officers (including himself) were standing outside. At this moment, he heard screams from inside the premises. He and E.N. went inside. E.N. extinguished the fire on Chichek Mammadova's body and, while doing this, suffered an injury to his hand. He accompanied E.N., who needed medical treatment, to hospital. Chichek Mammadova was taken to hospital by her relatives. When he returned about an hour later, he saw that the applicant's possessions were being loaded onto a lorry by the applicant's own relatives and friends. Police officers were occasionally assisting them. 64.  N.G. denied applying any force or pressure on the applicant or his family members. He insisted that all the police officers had been standing outside the applicant's premises when Chichek Mammadova had set fire to herself inside the premises. E.G. and Y.A. were also outside, further away from the building. Police officers N.I. and S.S. were not at the scene of the incident at the time of Chichek Mammadova's suicide attempt and arrived only after the incident. 65.  N.I. was a police officer whom the applicant and his mother-in-law specifically identified by first name in their statements, alleging that N.I. had used force against the applicant. 66.  N.I. testified that at around noon on 26 March 2004 he had received information that a woman had immolated herself at the Commissariat building and that a large crowd of people had gathered there. He went to the Commissariat building and saw a lorry loaded with various household items. He enquired of the officials who were there what had happened. He then left the site. 67.  N.I. insisted that he had not participated in this operation, that he had not been at the scene of the incident at the time when Chichek Mammadova had attempted suicide, that he had not met the applicant before, and that he was unaware of any reasons why the applicant had specifically mentioned his name in his complaints. 68.  S.S. was a police officer whom the applicant identified by first name in his testimony, alleging that S.S. had used force against him. 69.  S.S. testified that at around noon on 26 March 2004 he had received an instruction by portable radio to go to the Commissariat building. When he arrived there at around 12.30 p.m., he found out that a woman had committed an act of self-immolation and had been taken to hospital. Other police officers told him the entire story. After he arrived, he only witnessed how the applicant's possessions were being loaded onto a lorry by the applicant's own relatives and friends. Police officers were occasionally assisting them. Out of the applicant's family, only his elderly mother-in-law was there. The applicant and his child had gone. 70.  S.S. insisted that he had not been at the scene of the incident at the time when Chichek Mammadova had attempted suicide and that neither he nor any other police officer had used any force against the applicant or his family members. 71.  K.A. stated that on 26 March 2004 her colleague at the Housing Maintenance and Utilities Board, B.I., had requested her to go to the applicant's dwelling following an instruction received from the SCEA. When she arrived there, she saw E.G., Y.A. and five or six police officers. E.G. and Y.A. told her that they needed a female to knock on the applicant's door and asked her to do it. When the door was opened, both the police officers and the SCEA officials quickly entered inside. Before she knocked on the door, Y.A. had also instructed her to procure a lorry. Therefore, she immediately left the scene after knocking on the door. For this reason, she did not witness the act of self-immolation by the applicant's wife. When she returned to the scene of the incident about 30 minutes later, she heard that Chichek Mammadova had attempted suicide and had been taken to hospital. K.A. was then asked to enter the applicant's dwelling and write an itemised list of the applicant's household items that were being loaded onto the lorry. She did not want to do this, but did so under forceful orders from the SCEA officials. 72.  B.I. stated that he had gone to the applicant's dwelling together with K.A., but had left before all the events had happened because of other urgent business. During the short period when he was there, he saw five or six police officers standing near the Commissariat building and E.G. and Y.A. standing a little further away. 73.  T.M. testified that at around 1 p.m. on 26 March 2004 she had heard about the incident in the Commissariat building. She immediately went there together with a camera operator. However, when they arrived, everything was over and they could not get any video footage of the relevant events. Thereafter, she went to the hospital where Chichek Mammadova had been taken, but was not able to interview her. 74.  R.N. was the superintendent of the State-owned hostel where the applicant's family used to live before they moved to the new dwelling at the Commissariat building. According to him, the applicant's family lived in his hostel from 1994 to January 2004. The applicant's wife suffered from a “nervous disease” and was “mentally unstable”. In January 2004 the applicant's family left the hostel. On 26 March 2004 the SCEA officials and police officers brought the applicant's household possessions back to the hostel for “temporary storage” (as they explained). He signed the list of items and locked the applicant's possessions in a separate room. On 6 April 2004 the applicant reclaimed his possessions. 75.  N.Q. testified that, prior to the applicant's eviction from his dwelling, he had gone to the SCEA together with the applicant with the purpose of obtaining permission for the applicant to stay in the dwelling. He noted that, during that meeting, the SCEA officers had explained to the applicant that he was occupying the dwelling illegally. They had not demanded any bribes from the applicant in return for permission to stay there. 76.  S.B. was a member of an association of veterans which occupied part of the premises in the Commissariat building. He described in general how the applicant had carried out repair works in his dwelling. He noted that there had been no objections from any State authorities during the time when the applicant had carried out the work.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Stronie Śląskie. 6.  On 3 August 1997 the Law of 11 April 1997 on disclosing work for or service in the State’s security services or collaboration with them between 1944 and 1990 by persons exercising public functions (ustawa o ujawnieniu pracy lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944-1990 osób pełniących funkcje publiczne) (the “1997 Lustration Act”) entered into force. 7.  On 14 April 2004 the applicant, a candidate for the European Parliament, declared that he had not collaborated with the communist-era secret services. He was subsequently elected as a Member of the European Parliament. 8.  On 9 December 2004 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) decided to institute lustration proceedings against the applicant following a request made by the Commissioner of the Public Interest (Rzecznik Interesu Publicznego) on the grounds that the applicant had lied in his lustration declaration by denying that he had cooperated with the secret services. 9.  On 17 February 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, acting as the first‑instance lustration court, found that the applicant had submitted an untrue lustration declaration since he had been an intentional and secret collaborator with the State’s secret services. The court established that the applicant had met on probably two occasions in 1973 with agents of the secret services and had agreed to help them as a consultant. 10.  The applicant appealed against the decision. He submitted that he had never collaborated with the secret services and the meeting in question had been in connection with the preparation of an article. The applicant also referred to his subsequent activity in the “Solidarność” movement for which he had been persecuted and detained by the communist authorities. Subsequently, he was allowed to leave Poland and between 1985 and 1994 he was a deputy of the Polish Section of Radio Free Europe in Munich. 11.  On 6 June 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, acting as the second‑instance lustration court, upheld the impugned judgment. 12.  On 1 February 2007 the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. That decision was notified to the applicant on 8 March 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1946. He was the Minister of Health Care from 1993 to 2005. 6.  On 20 October 2005 the applicant was summoned to the Ministry of National Security (“the MNS”). He arrived at the MNS at around 3 p.m. and was questioned until 7 p.m. 7.  After being questioned he was detained on suspicion of abuse of official authority, embezzlement of public funds and complicity in an attempted coup d’état, allegedly planned to take place after the parliamentary elections of 6 November 2005 and masterminded by former Parliament Speaker R. Guliyev (who was living abroad at that time) and several other high-ranking government officials. He was held in the detention facility of the MNS. 8.  It appears that he was dismissed from his ministerial office on the same day. 9.  On 22 October 2005 the Prosecutor General’s Office formally charged the applicant with criminal offences under Articles 28/220.1 (preparation to organise public disorder), 278 (actions aimed at usurping State power), 179.3.2 (high-level embezzlement), 308.2 (abuse of official authority entailing grave consequences), 311.3.2 (repeated bribe-taking) and 311.3.3 (high-level bribe-taking) of the Criminal Code. The applicant was formally charged in criminal case no. 76586. 10.  On 22 October 2005 the Nasimi District Court remanded the applicant in custody for a period of three months (until 20 January 2006). On 13 January 2006 the same court extended this period by another four months (until 20 May 2006). On 19 May 2006 this period was extended again, by another five months (until 20 October 2006). Lastly, on 16 October 2006 the period was extended again, by another six months (until 20 April 2007). The applicant lodged appeals against each of these decisions. All his appeals were dismissed by the Court of Appeal. An appeal by the applicant against the extension decision of 16 October 2006 was dismissed by a decision of the Court of Appeal on 2 November 2006. 11.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation, the investigating authorities carried out a search of the applicant’s home and found, inter alia, large amounts of cash in various currencies, large quantities of gold items and jewellery, and deeds of a number of residential properties. 12.  On 19 January 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a new indictment charging the applicant with criminal offences under Articles 28/220.1, 278, 179.3.2, 306.2 (failure by a public official to execute a final court judgment), 308.1 (abuse of official authority), 308.2, 311.3.1 (bribe‑taking), 311.3.2 and 311.3.3 of the Criminal Code. 13.  On 24 January 2007 a new criminal case (no. 76932) was severed from criminal case no. 76586. Under criminal case no. 76932 the applicant was formally charged with the offences under Articles 179.3.2, 306.2, 308.1, 308.2, 311.3.1, 311.3.2, 311.3.3 and 313 (forgery in public office) of the Criminal Code. 14.  Specifically, the applicant was accused of having committed the following criminal acts, inter alia:\n(i)  Between 1997 and 2004 he had created conditions for unlawful disposal (by way of privatisation) of numerous State-owned real-property assets (land and non-residential premises) which were on the books of the Ministry of Health Care and had a total estimated value of 27,221,574 New Azerbaijani manats (AZN) (approximately 23,500,000 euros (EUR) at that time). Among other things, the applicant was accused of falsifying, with the assistance of accomplices, certain documents related to the above-mentioned assets, in order for that property to be designated suitable for privatisation under the State Privatisation Programme and privatisation laws, whereas in fact those assets did not qualify as such, and were necessary for the proper functioning of State health care institutions. Most of these assets were privatised by dummy companies affiliated to the applicant or his acquaintances and were subsequently resold to the applicant’s family members and acquaintances. In connection with the above transactions, the applicant also received bribes in the total amount of 200,000 United States dollars (USD) (equivalent to AZN 195,460);\n(ii)  He had embezzled AZN 115,240 of public funds in order to pay for the publication of one of his books;\n(iii)  He had taken a number of bribes in the total amount of USD 76,900 (equivalent to AZN 75,423) and another bribe in the amount of AZN 2,800 in exchange for issuing licences to private companies for operating pharmacies, and had kept 70% of the above amounts for himself while distributing the remainder among his accomplices;\n(iv)  He had continually failed to comply with seven final domestic judgments (the earliest of which had been delivered in 1994), ordering the reinstatement of former Ministry of Health Care employees who had been unlawfully dismissed from their positions; and\n(v)  He had committed a number of other acts of embezzlement and abuse of official authority. 15.  On 24 January 2007 the investigating authorities informed the applicant that the pre-trial investigation in criminal case no. 76932 had been completed. Criminal case no. 76932 was sent for trial in the Assize Court. The original criminal case no. 76586, which still carried the charges under Articles 28/220.1 and 179.3.2 of the Criminal Code, was not sent for trial, but was not terminated either. 16.  On 29 January 2007 the applicant’s lawyers lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General, alleging that the defence had not been allowed to properly familiarise themselves with the case materials. In particular, they complained that not all the annexes to the case files had been presented to the defence and that the defence had not been allowed to take photocopies of case materials. By a letter of 2 February 2007 the Prosecutor General rejected this complaint, noting that during the period from 24 to 30 January 2007 the applicant and his lawyers had been allowed access to all forty‑three volumes of the case file, three video-tapes, photographs and other material evidence, and that on 30 January 2007 they had signed a record of familiarisation with the case file together with the annexed time sheets. Furthermore, he stated that, from the content of the other, unrelated complaints lodged with the prosecution authorities at around the same time, it was clear that the defence had sufficient knowledge of the entire investigation case file. Lastly, the Prosecutor General added that, if necessary, the defence would be given an opportunity to consult and take photocopies of the investigation materials again during the trial. 17.  On 15 February 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Assize Court, arguing that the defence had not been given an opportunity to adequately familiarise themselves with the case file and requesting the court to suspend the proceedings on this ground and to send the case back to the investigation stage. By an interim decision of 15 February 2007 the Assize Court refused this request, finding that the defence had been given adequate access to the case file. 18.  The applicant was tried at the Assize Court with ten others, who were either former officials of the Ministry of Health Care or had been involved in commercial transactions with the Ministry. Each of the ten was charged with complicity in some of the criminal offences with which the applicant had been charged. In connection with the embezzlement charges, a civil claim was also advanced against the applicant and some of the other defendants in the criminal case. 19.  In addition there were around twenty civil defendants in the case, against whom no criminal charges had been brought. The civil defendants were the current private owners of the formerly public property which had allegedly been unlawfully embezzled or sold by the applicant.\n(a)  Hearings at the Assize Court 20.  A preliminary hearing was held on 15 February 2007 and hearings on the merits were held from 22 February to 20 April 2007. The hearings were held on working days between around 9.30 a.m. and around 6 p.m., but sometimes lasted until after 7 p.m. 21.  According to the Government, more than 120 witnesses were heard during the trial. The Assize Court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 summarised statements from a large number of witnesses, who testified in connection with all of the accusations against the applicant and the other accused persons. 22.  In addition to hearing witnesses, the court also examined various documentary and other material evidence presented by the prosecution, including various expert reports on forensic handwriting analyses of a large number of documents, reports on valuation of unlawfully privatised properties, and so on. Among this documentary evidence, an important role in the prosecution’s submissions was given to three audit reports of 27 June, 11 August and 18 December 2006 concerning the “audit of the financial and economic activities of the Ministries of Health Care and Economic Development”, prepared by a number of employees (sometimes referred to as “experts” in the relevant court documents) of the Ministry of Finance, the Chamber of Auditors and other State agencies, pursuant to a decision of the Nasimi District Court of 29 November 2005. In sum, these reports concluded that, despite the fact that the State privatisation programme allowed privatisation of State health care facilities only by a decision of the President of the Republic, the applicant had exceeded and abused his official powers and, together with “other persons”, had unlawfully issued instructions and otherwise created conditions for unlawful privatisation of a large number of State-owned health care facilities, plots of land, and other assets. Furthermore, the reports also found that there had been a number of breaches of accounting requirements, instances of mismanagement of State budgetary resources allocated to the Ministry of Health Care, undocumented or improperly documented use of large amounts of money, and so on. It appears that these three reports were among the most decisive pieces of evidence on which the applicant’s eventual conviction was based. In particular, the Assize Court stated in its judgment that these reports confirmed that the applicant had committed acts of abuse of official powers and embezzlement of public funds. 23.  During the hearings, the applicant complained that he was not allowed time to confer with his lawyers in a confidential setting in the course of the hearings, and that whereas the hearings lasted a full day each time, he was not allowed to meet his lawyers at the detention facility at weekends and on other non-working days. In particular, by a letter of 17 March 2007, he complained to the MNS about the MNS Detention Facility’s refusal to allow his lawyers to enter the facility for meetings with the applicant at weekends. Furthermore, in his complaints about the Assize Court judges made in late March and early April 2007, the applicant complained, among other things, that the judges had ignored his complaints concerning inadequate time and facilities for meetings with his lawyers and that the court had repeatedly refused the defence’s requests for short adjournments to the hearings in order to allow the applicant and his lawyers to hold confidential discussions concerning their defence strategy. Instead, they had been forced to confer with each other in the presence of prosecutors and judges. 24.  According to the applicant, the Assize Court essentially ignored the above complaints. According to the Government, the Assize Court examined the applicant’s complaints about meetings with his lawyers and, in particular, on 30 March 2007 adjourned the hearing for the defence to confer and prepare a representation. Also, the Assize Court sent a letter to the acting head of the MNS Detention Facility, reminding the latter of the applicant’s right to meet with his lawyers and requesting him to allow such meetings on days when no hearings were scheduled.\n(b)  Various requests by the applicant concerning examination of additional witnesses 25.  During both the preliminary and the trial hearings, the applicant made a number of requests to the Assize Court concerning various substantive and procedural matters, including examination of additional witnesses, as summarised below.\n(i)  In respect of charges relating to privatisation fraud and abuse of official power 26.  On 15, 22 and 28 February and 6, 7, 12 and 30 March 2007, the applicant requested the court to summon and hear a number of witnesses in connection with the accusations against him of creating conditions for unlawful privatisation and sale of State property and other abuses of official powers. 27.  In these submissions the applicant contested the findings contained in the three audit reports of 27 June, 11 August and 18 December 2006 (see paragraph 22 above). He argued that those findings were wrong and mutually contradictory, and claimed that some of the “experts” who had worked on the relevant audits had either refused to sign those reports or had signed them with reservations. In his submissions the applicant repeatedly insisted that the court summon and hear as witnesses a number of those experts who had worked on the audits and authored the reports, including the head of the State Financial Control Department of the Ministry of Finance and three other experts from that ministry, an auditor of the Chamber of Auditors, a section head of the State Committee for Management of State Property, the Deputy Minister and two other high‑ranking officials of the Ministry of Economic Development, and so on. 28.  Furthermore, the applicant noted that, whereas he was accused of having created conditions for unlawful privatisation and sale of State property which belonged to the Ministry of Health Care, under domestic law the agencies responsible for privatisation of State property were the State Committee for Management of State Property (formerly the Department of Management and Privatisation of State Property) and the Ministry of Economic Development. Only these agencies had the authority to dispose of State property. As such, these State agencies had ultimately carried out and approved the sale and privatisation of the assets in question, and officials of these agencies had signed the relevant final acts. The applicant further argued that his role (as Minister of Health Care and Chairman of the State Commission on Reforms in the Health Care System) in the privatisation procedure was limited to merely submitting proposals to the President and the Cabinet of Ministers for items to be included in lists of various assets suggested for privatisation, as well as giving his confirmation to the Ministry of Economic Development on a case-by-case basis that he did not object to the privatisation of specific State-owned facilities which were on the books of the Ministry of Health Care. Therefore, even if the relevant assets had been privatised unlawfully, he could not be held responsible for it, and the officials of the State Committee for Management of State Property and the Ministry of Economic Development were responsible for the entire privatisation process and for any failure to detect abuse or unlawfulness. For these reasons, the applicant repeatedly insisted in his submissions that the court summon and examine as witnesses the Chairman of the State Committee for Management of State Property and the former Minister of Economic Development (the former Minister of Economic Development, Mr Farhad Aliyev, was tried and convicted in separate criminal proceedings at around the same time in connection with, inter alia, charges of alleged corruption and a number of abuses of official power). 29.  At the preliminary hearing of 15 February 2007 the Assize Court examined the above request and heard the parties’ submissions in connection with it. The prosecution submitted that, at this stage, this request was premature because the question whether it was necessary to examine any additional evidence should be decided after the judicial examination of the prosecution material submitted to the court. Having heard the parties’ submissions, the Assize Court refused the applicant’s request without providing any reasoning. 30.  On 22 February 2007 the Assize Court examined the applicant’s repeated request and refused it on the ground that it had been raised prematurely at the preliminary hearing stage and that it would be examined at the trial hearing stage. 31.  As regards the applicant’s repeated requests to the same end made on 28 February and 6, 7 and 12 March 2007, the Assize Court refused them during various trial hearings, noting that it would determine whether it was necessary to hear additional witnesses at a later stage. 32.  During the trial hearing of 30 March 2007 the applicant submitted the same request again. The Assize Court refused the request. It noted that during previous trial hearings which had been held in the meantime it had already heard representatives of the State Committee for Management of State Property and examined all relevant privatisation-related and other documents signed by officials of this agency: therefore the part of the applicant’s request seeking that the appropriate officials of this agency be heard was no longer relevant and should be rejected. As regards the request to call the experts who had conducted the audits and authored the reports of 27 June, 11 August and 18 December 2006, the Assize Court refused this part of the applicant’s request too, noting that if the court considered, once the relevant reports had been read out at the subsequent hearings, that there were indeed some contradictions in those reports and that it was necessary to seek clarification, the court could decide to grant the request at one of the future hearings and to call those experts to testify. 33.  It appears that at the subsequent hearings the Assize Court did not take up this matter again. 34.  The court’s judgment of 20 April 2007 (see below) was silent in respect of the applicant’s procedural requests for additional witnesses to be heard.\n(ii)  In respect of other charges 35.  A large number of individuals had been questioned by the investigation authorities during the pre-trial investigation, with the purpose of establishing and proving the allegations of corruption by Ministry of Health Care officials, including the applicant, in connection with applications for pharmaceutical licences. Not all those questioned by the investigation authorities were ultimately included in the list of prosecution witnesses to testify against the applicant during the trial. In particular, a number of individuals who stated during pre-trial questioning that they had not been asked for, and had not given, a bribe when they made their licence application were not called to testify during the trial. On 30 March and 2 April 2007 the applicant asked for eleven specifically named individuals who had stated at the pre-trial stage that they had not given any bribes in exchange for approval of their applications for a licence to be called as witnesses. It appears that he intended to use these witnesses’ statements to “disprove” the prosecution’s accusations concerning corruption. These requests were refused. 36.  Furthermore, in connection with various other charges, the applicant repeatedly requested that the authors of the expert reports on valuation of privatised and other properties, the new Minister of Health Care and some other employees of that ministry, the chairman of the State committee for admission of students to higher education institutions, the deputy chairman of the Yeni Azerbaijan Party, various officials of the President’s office, several investigators who had conducted various stages of the pre-trial investigation, and others, be called as witnesses. These requests were also refused.\n(c)  The verdict and sentence 37.  By a judgment of 20 April 2007 the Assize Court found the applicant guilty as charged on all counts under criminal case no. 76932, and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property and three years’ prohibition on holding official positions in public service. The court found that the applicant had caused in excess of AZN 15,000,000 in financial damage by his criminal actions, and that he was responsible for compensating for this damage, as described below. 38.  Initially, the court allowed the civil claim in part, ordering the in‑kind transfer of part of the unlawfully privatised real-property assets back to the Ministry of Health Care. This covered part of the financial damage caused. On the other hand, the court found that some of the unlawfully privatised assets were now owned by bona fide purchasers, and therefore dismissed the civil claim in the part relating to those assets. 39.  As regards the pecuniary damage remaining to be compensated for after the partial upholding of the civil claim, the court found that the applicant remained responsible for damage in the amount of AZN 527,087 personally, and in the total amount of AZN 7,937,822 jointly and severally with three other criminal defendants. In compensation the court ordered, applying the confiscation sanction under Article 179.3.2 of the Criminal Code, that the following private property of the applicant be confiscated: (a) various precious metals and jewellery items valued at AZN 1,040,486, which had been found in his home; (b) USD 1,309,295 in cash found in his home; (c) EUR 884,475 in cash found in his home; (d) AZN 8,984 in cash found in his home; (e) eleven houses and apartments, some of them with auxiliary premises such as garages, collectively valued at AZN 3,655,179.90; and (f) a car valued at AZN 54,000. 40.  The applicant appealed, claiming innocence and arguing, among other things, that his convictions on all counts had been based on inadmissible, irrelevant or insufficient evidence, that he had not been given adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and to meet with his lawyers in confidential circumstances, and that despite his repeated requests the investigating authorities and the trial court had not sought to hear certain witnesses whose statements could have been crucial for the outcome of the case. The other criminal and civil defendants also appealed, on various grounds. 41.  On 21 September 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the part of the Assize Court’s judgment which related to the applicant. The applicant and his lawyers participated in the appeal hearings. 42.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law reiterating his complaints. Hearings in this appeal were held in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer, but in the applicant’s absence. On 16 January 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the parts of the lower courts’ judgments which related to the applicant. 43.  Many years before the events concerning the present case, the applicant, then at an early age, had suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis. It appears that he had been treated successfully and his tuberculosis had been in remission since then. 44.  Prior to the applicant’s arrest, in February 2005 he underwent a magnetic nuclear resonance tomography (“MNRT”) in Munich, Germany, and was diagnosed with “herniation of L3-L4 intervertebral disc”. It was recommended that therapeutic treatment be continued and that ultimately surgery would be necessary if the symptoms persisted. 45.  After his arrest, from 20 October 2005 to 20 April 2007 the applicant was detained in the temporary detention facility of the MNS. From 20 April 2007 to 28 September 2007 he was kept in Detention Facility no. 1. He was then transferred to Penal Facility no. 13, where he is currently serving his prison sentence and where he is kept in a large dormitory designed for more than 100 prisoners. According to the applicant, the conditions of detention in all of these facilities were bad (see paragraphs 71-79 below). 46.  While in detention, the applicant complained of health problems on a regular basis. The following is a summary of the accounts of the applicant’s medical treatment in detention submitted by the applicant and the Government. 47.  On 2 February 2006 the applicant was examined by MNS medical experts and was diagnosed with the following conditions: spinal disc herniation; osteochondrosis; progressing hypertension, stage I; unicameral cyst on the left kidney not entailing a loss of the kidney’s function; a post‑cholecystectomy condition; chronic persisting hepatitis in the remission phase; and mild neurotic reactions. The experts considered that his condition was not critical and that outpatient treatment was sufficient. 48.  On 16 January 2006 the applicant was examined by the head physician of a neurosurgery hospital and was prescribed conservative treatment and a new MNRT. According to the relevant medical report, the applicant refused this treatment. However, according to the applicant, he did not refuse to undergo a new MNRT as the report of 16 January 2006 had indicated. 49.  On 16 May 2006 the applicant was examined by the Chief Phthisiologist of the Ministry of Health Care and on 20 May 2006 by the Head of the Neurology Centre; neither examination revealed any need for surgery. 50.  From 25 February to 8 March 2006 and from 30 May to 8 June 2006 the applicant had medical examinations on an inpatient basis in the Neurological Unit of the Ministry of Justice’s Medical Facility. The applicant was diagnosed with spinal disc herniation and was offered a new MNRT before a decision was made on whether there was a need for surgery. According to the relevant records, the applicant declined this proposal and received only conservative treatment. 51.  However, according to the applicant, he did not refuse an MNRT or surgery. He claimed that the medical records concerning his alleged refusal did not “reflect reality”, as they did not bear his signature. He noted that the Ministry of Justice’s neurological unit lacked a neurosurgery department and specialists to carry out surgery, so he requested surgery in one of the neurosurgery clinics in Baku, but his request was not answered. According to him, his treatment in the Ministry of Justice’s medical facility was terminated abruptly and he was returned to his cell. 52.  According to the relevant medical records, when the applicant was transferred to Detention Facility no. 1 on 20 April 2007 he had no serious complaints about his health. On 1 and 9 June 2007 he was examined by experts of the neurology and therapy units of the Ministry of Justice’s Medical Facility and no need for either inpatient or outpatient treatment was identified at this time. According to the relevant records, on 2 and 4 June 2007 the applicant refused to undergo blood and urine tests. On 6 June the applicant, in the presence of his lawyers, refused to undergo an ultrasound examination. In September 2007 it was proposed that the applicant undergo an MNRT in a private medical clinic (the Tusi Clinic) in order to determine whether surgery was needed. The examination was scheduled for 25 September, but did not take place. According to the Government, the applicant refused to go to the Tusi Clinic at the last moment. According to the applicant, he did not refuse to undergo any tests and the relevant records were falsified. 53.  According to the Government, in January and February 2008 it was suggested three times that the applicant be transferred to the Ministry of Justice Medical Facility in connection with his complaints about pains in his back, but he refused those offers. According to the applicant, in the winter of 2008 he was indeed offered transport to the Medical Facility, but in an “iron-covered unheated lorry”, which was not suitable for his health. As the applicant could not stand or sit comfortably because of pains in his back and legs, and as transportation in such a lorry would be very hard for him to endure, he requested in writing to be transported in an ambulance, lying down, offering to pay any transportation costs himself. This request was refused. 54.  According to the applicant, he continued to suffer from severe pain in his back and lower extremities due to the herniation of the intervertebral disc. His detention in a cold unventilated cell in Penal Facility no. 13 aggravated his health problems. 55.  On 14 August 2008 the applicant, without providing detailed information about the nature of his illnesses, requested the Court to indicate to the Government under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that he should be provided with adequate treatment and with conditions of detention which were appropriate for his illness. In reply, the applicant was requested to provide more detailed information about the nature of his ailments and complaints. The applicant complied with this request. He submitted, inter alia, that urgent surgery was necessary to treat his herniated disc. 56.  On 16 September 2008 the Government was requested, under Rule 49 § 3 of the Rules of Court, to provide information concerning any medical treatment provided to the applicant during the entire period of his detention. In reply, the Government submitted the information summarised above, supported by a number of medical records. The applicant was given an opportunity to comment on the Government’s submissions; these comments, where relevant, are also included in the above summary. 57.  Having regard to the parties’ submissions, on 25 November 2008 the President of the Chamber decided to indicate to the respondent Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the following interim measures, applied until further notice:\n“-  the applicant be immediately transferred to the prison medical facility of the Ministry of Justice;\n-  at the earliest possible time and without any undue delays on both sides, a medical panel be set up on a parity basis, the Government and the applicant each appointing three members from among the qualified medical experts in Azerbaijan, to diagnose the applicant’s specific problems (in particular, the herniated disc problem) and to conclude whether any long-term or immediate treatment, including surgery, is required to treat the problem(s);\n-  on the basis of the findings of the above medical panel, the Government design and submit to the Court [by 20 January 2009] an appropriate and detailed plan of the applicant’s treatment.” 58.  On 19 January 2009 the Government informed the Court about the measures taken. 59.  In particular, according to the documents submitted by the Government, on 12 December 2008 the applicant was transferred to the Medical Facility of the Ministry of Justice. A joint medical panel was composed on a parity basis. The panel consisted of two neurosurgeons, two phthisiologists, and two uro-nephrologists. During the period from 22 to 24 December 2008 a number of medical tests were carried out on the applicant, including an MNRT, urine test, blood test, biochemical tests, ultrasound and others. The medical panel examined the applicant several times. Additionally, cardiologists, gastroenterologists and dentists were invited to carry out necessary tests and examinations. 60.  On 10 January 2009 the medical panel issued its final opinion, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyers. The panel found that the applicant was suffering from the following primary and secondary conditions: a herniation of the L3-L4 spinal disc; osteochondrosis; mild hypertension, stage II; residual signs of inactive (cured) tuberculosis of the right lungs; unicameral cyst on the left kidney; chronic colitis; and signs of first-degree dysbacteriosis. However, the panel unanimously concluded that his condition was not critical and that no surgery was required. His overall health was considered satisfactory. It was noted that he was fully autonomous and could walk using a cane. The diagnosed pathologies were chronic and slow to develop, requiring “conservative” treatment, which could be carried out either on an inpatient or an outpatient basis. 61.  The panel designed a detailed long-term plan for treatment for the applicant’s health problems, noting that for the first month the applicant would receive inpatient treatment in the Medical Facility of the Ministry of Justice, while thereafter such inpatient treatment could be replaced with outpatient treatment in the prison. The relevant treatment, including a detailed list of medications and recommendations, was prescribed. The panel’s opinion indicated that the applicant agreed with the diagnosis and the treatment plan. 62.  On 2 February 2009 the applicant submitted his comments on the Government’s submissions. While he appeared to argue against the Government’s allegedly wrong “interpretation” of some of the joint medical panel’s findings, he did not expressly contest the panel’s conclusions or the prescribed treatment plan. 63.  On 12 February 2009 the President of the Chamber decided to lift the interim measures previously indicated under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 64.  The treatment prescribed by the joint medical panel was carried out on an inpatient basis in the Medical Facility of the Ministry of Justice up to 16 March 2009. 65.  On 7 March 2009 the applicant was examined by a neurosurgeon who was not a member of the joint medical panel. He noted that there had been positive progress of the applicant’s condition and found no necessity for further treatment of the herniated disc, but recommended a spinal corset. 66.  On 14 March 2009 the applicant was examined by the two neurosurgeons who were members of the joint medical panel. The examination did not reveal any pathology in the applicant’s peripheral nervous system. Taking into account the applicant’s complaints of pain, they recommended applying two different types of medicinal ointment, to the backbone and left thigh areas. 67.  On 16 March 2009 the applicant was transferred back to Penal Facility no. 13. According to the Government, his medical treatment was continued on an outpatient basis, as prescribed by the joint medical panel. According to the applicant, the treatment did not comply with the panel’s prescriptions. 68.  Following the applicant’s repeated complaints of pain, on 10 April 2009 he was examined by a neurosurgeon and was prescribed treatment with Reton, a therapeutic ultrasonic device. According to the Government, within a short period of time the Medical Sanitary Unit of Penal Facility no. 13 had acquired this device and the treatment was followed through. According to the applicant, he did not receive this treatment. 69.  With regard to preventative treatment against the recurrence of tuberculosis, the joint medical commission had prescribed anti-tuberculosis medication including Rifampicin and Izoniazid. The treatment was scheduled to start in March 2009. However, the applicant refused to take Rifampicin and asked for Pirazinamid instead. The applicant later agreed to take Rifampicin and the treatment began on 8 April 2009. 70.  From April 2009 the applicant was treated on an outpatient basis by means of daily administration of two drugs for the regulation of blood pressure, two for the prevention of the recurrence of tuberculosis and two ointments for alleviation of pain resulting from the herniated spinal disc. He was able to spend a “considerable part” of the day in the open air outside his cell. However, according to the applicant, this treatment was ineffective, as it did not cure his illnesses or alleviate his condition. 71.  From 20 October 2005 to 20 April 2007 the applicant was held in a single-person cell in the detention facility of the MNS, which was poorly lit during the daytime. The light was not switched off at night. 72.  From 20 to 30 April 2007 the applicant was held in cell no. 119, designed for four inmates, in Detention Facility no. 1. The surface area of the cell was 9.6 sq. m, or 2.4 sq. m per occupant. 73.  From 30 April 2007 to 28 September 2007 the applicant was held in another cell in Detention Facility no. 1, cell no. 123, which was designed for eight inmates. The area of the cell was 15.84 sq. m, or 1.98 sq. m per occupant. The cell was unventilated. The air inside was humid, and the cell was smelly and stuffy. It was too hot inside. There was no wall or other form of separation between the toilet area and the table and beds. The applicant had to eat his meals at the table in close proximity to the toilet. 74.  In both the MNS Detention Facility and Detention Facility no. 1 the applicant was allowed only half an hour’s “outdoor exercise” per day, which was confined to small areas specially designated for this purpose. There was no radio or television or other form of in-cell entertainment in those establishments. The applicant was allowed to read only official State newspapers. 75.  Since 28 September 2007 the applicant has been serving his sentence in Penal Facility no. 13. He is held in a 225 sq. m dormitory, which was designed to hold 128 inmates. According to the applicant, most of the time the dormitory was occupied at full capacity (128 inmates), however occasionally there were fewer inmates when some were released after the expiry of their prison terms. 76.  The air inside the dormitory is stale and humid and filled with cigarette smoke. The inmates hung their laundry to dry inside the dormitory (presumably due to the absence of proper laundry facilities). 77.  The dormitory has no heating or permanent water supply, and no natural gas supply. In winter the temperature inside dropped below freezing. In this connection, in response to a request from the applicant’s lawyer, the head of the Azerbaijani Committee against Torture (a non-governmental organisation) informed the former by a letter of 30 December 2007 that he had personally visited the applicant in Penal Facility no. 13 on 25 December 2007 and witnessed that: (a) there was no heating system in the dormitory where the applicant was held; (b) the floor in the dormitory was made of stone; and (c) there were no natural gas pipes in the dormitory. 78.  There are only seven showers and fourteen toilets available to a total of about 700 to 950 prisoners held in Penal Facility no. 13. The toilets are in bad sanitary condition and have no running water for days, so that the inmates were forced to bring bottles of water with them and stand in a queue to use the toilet. 79.  In all the places he was detained the applicant had to use bedding and clothing brought by his family, as he was not provided with those items. The applicant was not provided with the special-diet meals that he felt he needed because of his health, so he ate only the food brought to him by his family in packages twice a month. 80.  Referring to the fact that Detention Facility no. 1 was demolished in 2009 (without specifying the exact date), the Government claimed to have been unable to conduct an examination of the facility or to provide a detailed account of its conditions. Instead, in connection with the conditions of detention both in Detention Facility no. 1 and Penal Facility no. 13, the Government referred to the findings contained in the judgment of 2 November 2007 of the Nasimi District Court concerning the applicant’s claim of bad conditions of detention (see paragraphs 92-96 below). 81.  In addition, in respect of the conditions of detention in Penal Facility no. 13, referring to the various domestic rules and regulations for penal institutions, the Government provided the following information. 82.  The dormitory in which the applicant was held was designed for 116 inmates. However, after the applicant’s arrival, only 70 to 90 inmates occupied the dormitory at any given time. Until January 2009, “the dormitory was heated by electric heaters”. In January 2009 a central heating system was installed in the dormitory. In support of this submission the Government supplied photographs of the new heating system. 83.  Every prisoner is allowed to have a shower at least once a week. His or her underclothes and bedding are changed at regular intervals. The applicant has access to the running water in the dormitory. Each prisoner has a right to a bed, a cupboard and a chair. Each prisoner also has a right to be provided with individual bedding and other amenities, including two types of blankets, a mattress, a pillow, two bed sheets, two pillow cases, and two towels. 84.  Under the relevant rules, prisoners are provided with meals three times a day at State expense. The daily food norm is 3,265 calories and includes bread, various cereals, pasta, meat, fish, fat, margarine, vegetable oil, granulated sugar, dry tea, salt, potatoes, vegetables, bay leaf, tomato paste, unsalted fresh butter, and eggs. A specific menu is planned on a weekly basis. Smokers are provided with 100 cigarettes every ten days. Prisoners are also allowed to purchase, at their own expense, both food and a certain amount of other necessary products. Prison cells are provided with various board games, and the dormitory is equipped with radio and television sets. 85.  The relevant domestic rules also provide for a right to receive clothing at State expense. Male prisoners have a right to the following clothing items: two types of headwear, a warm waistcoat, two “work” suits, two cotton shirts, two sets of both thin and warm underclothes, two sleeveless vests, two pairs of underpants, three pairs of cotton socks, two pairs of wool-mix socks, two pairs of shoes, a pair of slippers, a cotton belt and a pair of cotton gloves. Each item of clothing is issued to be used for a period of one to three years, depending on the specific item. Prisoners have a right to purchase, at their own expense, additional shoes, clothing and sportswear of the types allowed to be worn in prisons. 86.  On 14 May 2007 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Sabail District Court against the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice (Ədliyyə Nazirliyi Penitensiar Xidməti), complaining about his conditions of detention and lack of adequate medical treatment. 87.  On 28 May 2007 the Sabail District Court refused to hear his action, noting that claims against the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice should be lodged with the Nasimi District Court. 88.  In June 2007 the applicant, through his lawyer, lodged a civil action with the Nasimi District Court, indicating as defendants the Minister of Justice and the Prison Service of the Ministry of Justice. He complained that he had not been provided with the necessary inpatient treatment, that the conditions of his pre-trial and post-trial detention had been bad and inadequate for his health, that he had been prohibited from receiving newspapers in pre-trial detention, and that his transfer to Penal Facility no. 13 had been unlawful, because this prison was located too far from his home. 89.  On 19 June 2007 the Nasimi District Court refused to hear the case, owing to non-compliance with the formal requirements concerning the number of copies of the submissions and notarisation of the power of attorney for the applicant’s lawyer. It appears that subsequently the applicant complied with these requirements and the Nasimi District Court admitted the case for examination. 90.  Prior to the examination of the merits of the case, in August 2007 the applicant’s lawyer requested the court, inter alia, to ensure the applicant’s personal attendance at the hearings. This request was refused, on the grounds that the applicant could effectively argue his case through his legal representative and that ensuring his attendance at the hearings in the civil proceedings could interfere with the criminal proceedings against him, which were taking place at the same time. 91.  During the examination of the merits of the applicant’s claims, the Nasimi District Court had regard to his medical records, including the opinion of the MNS’s medical experts issued on 2 February 2006 (see paragraph 47 above). The hearings were held in the applicant’s absence but with the participation of his lawyer. 92.  By a judgment of 2 November 2007 the Nasimi District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaints. As regards the complaint concerning the failure to provide inpatient treatment, the court found that the applicant himself had repeatedly refused to undergo the medical tests and treatment he was offered. In any event, the medical examinations did not reveal any need for inpatient treatment. 93.  As regards the allegations of poor conditions of pre-trial detention in Detention Facility no. 1, the court found that these allegations were unsubstantiated. In particular, among other things, the court noted that the applicant had been kept in a cell with a total area of 15.84 sq. m, which had eight beds, two windows, two electric lamps and a permanent water supply. Although the cell was designed for eight inmates, “most of the time” only six inmates were kept there; therefore, there was 2.64 sq. m of space per inmate, which was compatible with the domestic minimum standard of 2.5 sq. m for pre-trial detention. 94.  As regards the alleged prohibition on receiving newspapers, the court found that this allegation was unsubstantiated and that the applicant was in fact allowed to obtain four official newspapers from the detention facility authorities or to have any other newspapers brought to him by his lawyer or relatives. 95.  Lastly, with regard to the lawfulness of the applicant’s transfer to Penal Facility no. 13, the court found that it was lawful and that the conditions of his detention in that prison were adequate. It found that the dormitory in which the applicant was held had a total area of 240 sq. m, had ten large windows, and was properly lit and ventilated. It had separate toilet and other sanitary areas and a permanent electricity and water supply. While the dormitory was equipped with fifty-four bunk beds (two-bunk units), it housed a total of seventy inmates at the relevant time. 96.  The court concluded that the applicant received adequate medical assistance and that his conditions of detention did not amount to inhuman or degrading treatment. It accordingly dismissed his claims. 97.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the Nasimi District Court’s judgment of 2 November 2007. He requested to be present at the appellate hearings and asked the court to conduct a physical inspection of his conditions of detention. His requests were not granted. On 6 February 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s judgment. 98.  On 3 June 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and is serving a prison sentence in correctional colony YuK-25/8 in the Orenburg Region. 6.  On 24 June 2002 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated concerted robbery and taken to the Leninskiy District police station of the Orsk town police department. He refused legal assistance, signed a record confirming his refusal and denied the accusations made. He was released on the same day. 7.  On 22 July 2002 the applicant was again remanded in custody. He was charged with aggravated robbery and questioned after he had refused legal assistance. Police officers allegedly threatened and humiliated him with a view to extracting a confession from him. The applicant did not confess. Two days later he was released on a written undertaking not to leave the town. 8.  On 23 July 2002 the local bar association appointed counsel M. to represent the applicant in the criminal proceedings. It appears that M. was appointed to represent the applicant as legal-aid counsel. 9.  On 31 October 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Orsk started examining the applicant's criminal case. On the same day the applicant lodged a written request with the trial court, by which he declined the services of M. and sought leave to represent himself. He explained that it was a voluntary decision and had not been caused by financial difficulties. M. submitted to the court that he agreed with the applicant's request. Having discussed the issue, the court allowed the applicant's request and granted him leave to represent himself. 10.  By a judgment of 10 November 2002, the District Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years' imprisonment. It established that the applicant, together with his two co-defendants, had attacked, robbed and severely beaten up the victim. The applicant's role, previously agreed upon by the co-defendants, consisted, among other things, in threatening the victim with a knife. The court based its findings on partial confessions by the applicant's co-defendants, statements by victims and witnesses and material evidence. It was finally stated in the judgment that it could be appealed against to the Orenburg Regional Court within ten days of its pronouncement or, for the detained defendants, within the same period after receipt of its copy. It was also stated that if the remanded convicts were submitting an appeal statement, they had a “right to request to participate in the examination of the criminal case by the appellate court”. 11.  On 21 November 2002 the applicant appealed against his conviction to the Orenburg Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). He did not dispute that he had taken the money from the victim but disagreed with the way the trial court had established the relevant facts, the distribution of roles between him and his co-defendants and the classification of his own acts. He submitted, in particular, that the trial court had disregarded his testimony and statements by witnesses which supported it, in particular, regarding the trial court's findings about the distribution of responsibility between him and his co-defendants and the classification of his acts as a premeditated robbery. In his appeal statement the applicant neither requested the Regional Court to secure his presence at the appeal hearing nor sought legal representation. According to the Government, the applicant's co-defendants who also appealed against the conviction expressly requested the appellate court to secure their presence at the appeal hearing. 12.  According to the Government, on 25 November 2002 a notification about the appeal hearing was sent to the remand centre where the applicant was being held. 13.  On 19 December 2002 the Regional Court examined the appeals lodged by the applicant and his co-defendants and upheld the judgment. The applicant was absent from the appeal hearing and was not represented before it, while his co-defendants, as well as the prosecutor, attended the hearing and made submissions. 14.  By a judgment of 19 December 2002, the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the conviction.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Senec. 5.  On 10 February 1999 a company sued the applicant for a sum of money which he allegedly owed for the lease of his flat and for services provided by the company. 6.  On 27 May 1999 the Bratislava III District Court issued a payment order under which the applicant was obliged to pay the equivalent of approximately 1,000 euros to the plaintiff. 7.  On 10 June 1999 the applicant challenged the payment order. The case was therefore to be heard by the first instance court in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8.  The District Court held hearings on 18 May 2000, on 12 June 2000, on 11 September 2000 and on 9 October 2000. At the last mentioned hearing the plaintiff extended the action. 9.  On 27 March 2003 the District Court appointed an expert and asked him to submit an opinion. 10.  On 1 December 2003 the judge instructed the court’s registry to transmit the file to the expert. The expert received the file on 29 December 2003. He submitted his opinion to the court on 24 February 2004. 11.  On 4 May 2004 the District Court decided on the expert’s fee. The expert opinion was delivered to the parties on 13 and 14 May 2004 respectively. On 1 June 2004 the applicant submitted his comments on it. 12.  Hearings before the District Court were held on 27 September 2004 and on 11 October 2004. A hearing scheduled for 2 December 2004 was adjourned. 13.  In May 2005 the applicant informed the Court that there had been no further progress in the case. 14.  On 11 March 2003 the applicant filed a complaint about the length of proceedings to the Constitutional Court. He claimed, inter alia, 800,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 15.  On 13 August 2003 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right to a hearing without unjustified delay had been violated and ordered the District Court to proceed with the case without further delays. The decision stated that the District Court had remained inactive between 15 June 1999 and 28 January 2000, that is for more than 7 months, and also between 9 October 2000 and 27 March 2003, that is for more than 29 months. 16.  The Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation noting that the applicant had by his conduct considerably contributed to the fact that the dispute had come into being and that the proceedings had been protracted, since in particular he had not regularly paid the sums due and the company therefore had to extend the action. The Constitutional Court ordered the District Court to reimburse the costs related to the constitutional proceedings to the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1917 and lives in the town of Ternopil. 5.  In 1989 her husband and son, Mr B.P. and Mr B.I., became members of the Cooperative Society for Construction and Repair “Kooperator” (the “Society”). On 22 May 1990 the Ternopil Town Executive Committee (the “Committee”) transferred two plots of land in Ternopil to the Society for the construction of three houses. By decision of 14 November 1990, the Committee transferred a part of that land to the applicant's husband and son for the erection of a two-flat house. On 27 November 1990 the general assembly of the Society adopted a decision similar to the Committee's decision of 14 November 1990. On an unspecified date the Committee transferred the land, with which Mr B.P. and Mr B.I. had been provided, back to the Society. 6.  On 2 December 1991 the general assembly of the Society, headed by Mr B.I., decided to terminate the Society's activity. It further decided to transfer the Society's property to its members. In particular, Mr B.P. was granted the left side of a house and Mr B.I. was granted its right side. As it was later established by the domestic courts, in 1991 there was only the foundation of the future house. In December 1991 the Society closed its bank account. The Society's state registration was annulled in September 1995. 7.  The house was erected by autumn 1994. 8.  Between 1995 and 1997 Mr B.P. unsuccessfully lodged with the Ternopil Town Council (the “Council”) a number of applications, requesting the Council to grant him a right to use the plot of land on which the left part of the house had been constructed. 9.  On 17 February 1997 Mr B.P. died. The applicant inherited all his possessions. 10.  On 8 April 1997 the Council granted Mr B.I. a right to use the plot of land on which the right side of the house had been built. 11.  In June 1997 the applicant lodged with the Ternopil Town Court an administrative law complaint against the Council for failure to consider the request to grant her a right to use the plot of land on which the left part of the house had been constructed. On 9 July 1997 the court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the Council to consider the merits of the applicant's request at its next session. 12.  On 23 July 1997 the Council granted Mr M. a right to use the plot of land, on which the left side of the house had been built, for construction purposes. 13.  In 1996 Mr M. lodged with the Ternopil Regional Prosecutor's Office a criminal law complaint against Mr B.I., accusing the latter of fraud. Mr M. alleged that Mr B.I. had unlawfully attempted to take possession of the left part of the house, which Mr M. had bought from him according to a sales contract of 18 March 1993. On 9 July 1996 the prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings against Mr B.I. 14.  In 1997 Mr B.I. lodged with the Ternopil Regional Security Service Department a criminal law complaint, accusing Mr M. of fraud. Mr B.I. alleged that Mr M. had falsified the official documents in respect of the left part of the house in order to become its owner. On 13 March 1997 the department initiated criminal proceedings against Mr M. 15.  On 25 May 1997 both criminal cases were joined. On 15 July 1997 the Ternopil Town Police Department terminated the criminal proceedings on the ground of absence of corpus delicti in the actions of Mr B.I. and Mr M. The police established that Mr M. had not been a member of the Society in 1991. It also found that there were two different copies of the decision of the general assembly of the Society of 2 December 1991, one of which confirmed the membership of Mr M. and contained his name instead of the name of Mr B.P., the latter being mentioned in the other copy of that decision. The police held that the existence of two different versions was of no importance, as none of the copies had been duly certified by a notary. It further stated that, according to the expert examination of the sales contract of 18 March 1993, the contract had been forged by way of combination of two printed texts. The police also found that the contract had no binding force, as it had not been certified by a notary or by the Society. 16.  In July 1997 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Ternopil Town Court against the Council, seeking the annulment of the latter's decision of 23 July 1997 to grant Mr M. a right to use the plot of land, on which the left side of the house had been built. She further requested the court to oblige the Council to grant her a right to use the plot of land under the left side of the house for an indefinite period of time. The applicant was represented in the proceedings by her son, Mr B. I. Mr M. joined the proceedings as a third party. 17.  In the course of the proceedings, the applicant submitted that her late husband had been the owner of the left part of the house, which had been constructed on the plot of land at issue, as he had been granted that part of the house pursuant to the decision of the Society of 2 December 1991. After her husband's death she inherited his property, including the left part of the house. The construction works were carried out at her and her late husband's expense. She further argued that, although her son had initially agreed to sell the part of the house to Mr M., the latter had refused to pay the price, upon which they had agreed. Thus, the left part of the house was not sold to Mr M. 18.  Mr M., in his turn, argued that in 1993 he had bought from Mr B.I. the foundation of the left part of the house and some construction materials, which formally belonged to Mr B. P. Mr M. further argued that they had agreed that Mr B. I. would complete the construction works. The latter having failed to do so, Mr M. built the left part of the house at his own cost. Between 1993 and 1994, Mr M. paid Mr B. I. around USD 10,000[1] by instalments. Following this, Mr M. refused to pay Mr B. I. higher amounts, as he had completed the construction works himself. Mr M. submitted copies of two documents dated 20 January 1995, according to which Mr B. I. had received from Mr M. 1,550,000,000 karbovanets (the former transitional currency of Ukraine before September 1996) for the left part of the house and that the latter had built that part of the house and reimbursed the money, which Mr B. I. had paid for the construction materials. Mr M. alleged that Mr B. I. had signed these documents as the head of the Society. 19.  The applicant, in reply, contended that the documents, submitted by Mr M. in support of his claim that he had constructed the house and that he had purchased it, including the contract of 1993, had been forged. Referring to the general interpretation of the relevant domestic law given by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, she further argued that, even assuming that Mr M. had participated in the construction of the left part of the house, he could not claim ownership rights in its respect. 20.  The Council submitted that its decision of 23 July 1997 was lawful, as Mr M. had provided it with the documents which had proved that he had constructed the left part of the house. 21.  On 27 August 1997 the Ternopil Town Court found for the applicant and quashed the Council's decision of 23 July 1997. It further ordered the Council to grant the applicant the right to use the land at issue for an indefinite period of time. The court held that Mr M. had not qualified to be granted that right, as he had not been a member of the Society and there was no information in the notary's register that the Society had transferred the plot of land in question to him. 22.  The Council appealed in cassation. 23.  On 29 September 1997 the Ternopil Regional Court informed the Supreme Court of Ukraine about the Council's request for the case to be transferred to another court. The Council alleged that the applicant's son was a member of the family of one of the judges of the Ternopil Regional Court. On 7 October 1997 the Supreme Court ordered that the appeal in cassation against the first instance court's decision was to be heard by the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, instead of the Ternopil Regional Court. The applicant was not informed either about the Council's request or about the decision of the Supreme Court to reassign the case. 24.  On 20 November 1997 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 27 August 1997. 25.  On 10 April 1998 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Khmelnytsk Region lodged a protest with the Presidium of the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, seeking initiation of supervisory review proceedings in the applicant's case. On 27 April 1998 the Presidium allowed the protest, quashed the decisions of 27 August and 20 November 1997, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the Ternopil Town Court. It held that the courts had failed to examine all the circumstances of the case. In particular, they had disregarded the sales contract of 1993 and the receipts for the money paid by Mr M. pursuant to that contract. The Presidium emphasised that there was no evidence in the case file that Mr B.P. had been a member of the Society. It also noted that there had been no building at the time when the Society had decided to transfer its part to Mr B. P. Moreover, the parties failed to submit documentary evidence in support of their claims for ownership rights. 26.  On 22 June 1998 the Supreme Court ordered the Ternopil Town Court to transfer the case to the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, the latter being responsible for selecting a first instance court to reconsider the case. According to the Government, the Ternopil Town Court did not comply with the instructions of the Supreme Court and did not transfer the case. 27.  On 3 July 1998 the Ternopil Town Court found for the applicant. On 25 August 1998 the Ternopil Regional Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. The courts of both instances held that there was enough evidence that Mr B.P. had been a member of the Society. This fact had been established by the Ternopil Town Court in its judgment of 9 July 1997, which had not been appealed against and had become final, and the applicant could not be held responsible for the absence of other documents proving the membership of her deceased husband. The courts also held that the decision of the general assembly of the Society of 2 December 1991 had, in fact, provided for the transfer of certain objects situated on the plot of land at issue, i.e. the foundation and some construction materials, erroneously referring to them as a building. With regard to the sales contract of 1993, the courts stated that Mr B.I. had not been entitled to sell the left part of the house, irrespective of whether he had acted in his capacity as the head of the Society or as a private person. They also referred to the findings of the police of 15 July 1997 that the contract had been falsified. Similarly, they found that the documents submitted by Mr M., in particular a copy of the decision of the general assembly of the Society of 2 December 1991, stating that he had been one of its members and had been granted the left part of the building, and the receipts in respect of the construction expenses were not valid. In any event, a contribution to the construction expenses could not be a valid ground for an ownership claim. 28.  By letter of 12 October 1998, the Deputy President of the Supreme Court requested the Ternopil Town Court to send the case file to the Supreme Court for supervisory review. By the same letter, he informed the Ternopil Town Court and Mr M. that the execution of the judgment of 3 July 1998 was suspended. 29.  On 22 December 1998 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged a protest with the Chamber in Civil Cases of that court, seeking the initiation of supervisory review proceedings in the applicant's case. On 24 March 1999 the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court allowed the protest, quashed the decisions of 3 July and 25 August 1998, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It held that there was no evidence that the left part of the house was owned by either the Society or Mr B.P. Moreover, there was no information as to the latter's membership of that Society, and the lower courts had not verified whether the house had been erected by him in compliance with relevant regulations. The panel further stated that the first instance court had failed to take into consideration the written testimonies of the persons, who had participated in the construction of the house. It stressed that its findings should be taken into account in the new consideration of the case. 30.  On 25 August 1999 the Ternopil Town Court found for the applicant. The court for the most part reiterated the findings contained in the decision of 3 July 1998. It also held that the Society had been the owner of every construction object on the land at issue before it transferred the title to these objects to its members, including Mr B.P. On 28 September 1999 the Ternopil Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 August 1999. 31.  On 6 June 2000 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged a protest with the Chamber in Civil Cases of that court, seeking again the initiation of supervisory review proceedings in the applicant's case. On 5 July 2000 the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court allowed the protest, quashed the decisions of 25 August and 28 September 1999, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It held that the lower courts had failed to take into account the instructions contained in its decision of 24 March 1999. The panel reiterated that the first instance court had failed either to verify whether the Society had been the owner of the objects in question; whether the Society had been in fact liquidated and, if so, when it had been liquidated; whether the Society had been granted a construction permit; or to establish who had actually constructed the part of the house at issue. The panel found that the Society had not had authority to transfer the land to third parties and its members had not had rights to build houses on that land. It finally held that Mr M. had in fact obtained the plot of land at issue as well as all the documentation in respect of the left part of the house, which remained in his actual possession. 32.  On 9 October 2000 the Supreme Court, following the request of Mr M., invited the Khmelnytsk Regional Court to assign the case to one of the first instance courts in the Khmelnytsk region. On 1 November 2000 the regional court transferred the case to the Chemerovetsk Town Court. 33.  In November 2000 Mr M. lodged a counter claim, seeking recognition of his ownership rights in respect of the left part of the house. 34.  On 19 January 2001 the Chemerovetsk Town Court ruled in favour of Mr M. and rejected the applicant's claims. It held that Mr M. had lawfully bought the foundation of the left part of the building and had completed the construction himself, which was supported by the evidence examined in the proceedings. In particular, the court stated that the contract of 1993 was valid, as it had been seized by the police from the flat of Mr M. in 1997, and the two documents of 20 January 1995 were, according to the expert's conclusions, also valid. The court further noted that the written testimonies, certified by a notary, of 16 witnesses, who had carried out construction works, and Mr D., who had been heard by the court as a witness, confirmed that Mr M. had built the left part of the house at his own cost. The court also relied on the letter of 28 February 1996, submitted by Mr M., in which the Ternopil Regional Prosecutor's Office stated that, according to the conclusions of its inquiry into the matter, the left part of the house was built by Mr M. The court also found that the latter was in actual possession of that part of the house, as he had been paying all the communal charges in its respect. The court refused to admit as evidence copies of the bills of costs in respect of construction materials, submitted by the applicant, on the ground that it was not possible to establish whether these construction materials had been used to build the left part of the house. 35.  On 16 February 2001 the applicant requested the Supreme Court to transfer the case to another court on the grounds that it would be difficult for her to participate in the hearings before the Chemerovetsk Town Court with regard to her age and state of health, on one hand, and the distance between her place of residence and the place of the hearing, on the other. On 25 February 2001 the Supreme Court rejected her request as unsubstantiated. 36.  On 1 March 2001 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 January 2001. It also considered that Mr B.P. had not been a member of the Society, as there were no documents proving his membership and he had resided in another location. 37.  In the course of the proceedings before the Chemerovetsk Town Court and the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, the applicant requested the courts to summon the witnesses, on whose written statements Mr M. had relied to show that he had constructed the left part of the building. She argued that these testimonies were false and that some of these witnesses could confirm her submissions that certain construction works had been carried out at her and her late husband's expense. The courts did not reply to her request. 38.  In September 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation against the decisions of 19 January and 1 March 2001 under the new transitional cassation procedure. She complained of the lower courts' incorrect assessment of the evidence. The applicant also argued that the courts had refused to summon the witnesses on whose written testimonies they had relied in their decisions. She maintained that neither she nor her representative had had an opportunity to question these witnesses. 39.  On 22 August 2002 the Chamber in Civil Cases of the Supreme Court considered the merits of the applicant's appeal in cassation and rejected it. The Supreme Court held that Mr M. had lawfully purchased a part of the foundation of the building and had valid grounds to use the plot of land on which the left part of the building had been constructed. The court also held that the written statements of the witnesses, confirming that Mr M. had completed the construction, had been lawfully admitted as evidence in the case. 40.  In 2002 the applicant and Mr B. I. instituted another set of proceedings in the Ternopil Town Court against Mr M., two other members of the family of Mr M., and the Ternopil Town Council, seeking the annulment of the ownership certificate of Mr M. in respect of the house. The applicant and Mr B. I. also sought the annulment of certain other official documents, in which it was mentioned that Mr M. had built a part of the house. 41.  On 12 November 2002 the court found against the applicant and Mr B. I. On 4 February 2003 and 26 May 2004, respectively, the Ternopil Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. 42.  According to the applicant, the courts, which considered her second claim, based their decisions on the findings of the Chemerovetsk Town Court, the Khmelnytsk Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Ukraine made in the course of the first set of civil proceedings (see paragraphs 34, 36 and 39 above).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Volgograd. 7.  On 21 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated murder. 8.  On 23 April 2003 the Elista Town Court of the Kalmykiya Republic formally remanded the applicant in custody, referring to the gravity of the charge and the risk that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. 9.  On 12 June 2003 the Tsenteralniy District Court of Volgograd extended the applicant’s detention until 10 September 2003, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk of his absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. 10.  On 8 September 2003 the Tsenteralniy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 10 December 2003, referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the case. It stated that there was no reason to amend the preventive measure. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s case was joined with the cases of five other persons, who had allegedly acted in conspiracy with the applicant. 12.  In October 2003 the applicant and his co-defendants were charged with organising an armed criminal gang, several counts of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, extortion, infliction of serious injuries and murder. 13.  On 4 December 2003 the Tsenteralniy District Court extended the applicant’s and a co-defendant’s detention until 10 April 2004, referring to the need for an additional investigation and the gravity of the charges. Moreover, the applicant had no permanent place of residence in Volgograd. The court found that there was a risk of the defendants’ absconding or re-offending. 14.  On 12 April 2004 the investigation was completed and six defendants, including the applicant, were committed for trial before the Volgograd Regional Court. 15.  The defendants asked for a trial by jury. 16.  On 20 April 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court fixed a preliminary hearing for 27 April 2004 to examine the request. It further held that the defendants should meanwhile remain in custody. 17.  On 27 April 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court ordered that the defendants be tried by jury and that they remain in custody pending trial. 18.  On 13 October 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2005, referring to the gravity of the charges. 19.  On 12 January 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk that they might put pressure on witnesses and jurors. 20.  On 7 April 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 July 2005. The Regional Court found that, in view of the gravity of the charges, it was “opportune” to keep the defendants in custody. It rejected their requests to release them under an undertaking not to leave the town, since it could not exclude the risk that they would put pressure on witnesses or jurors. 21.  On 29 June 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 October 2005. It found that the defendants might interfere with the proceedings, as they were charged with serious criminal offences, including the charge of being members of an armed criminal gang. 22.  On 4 October 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2006 for the same reasons as before. 23.  The applicant appealed against the extension order of 4 October 2005. In his grounds of appeal he complained that the Regional Court’s conclusions that he could interfere with the investigation or abscond had been hypothetical and had not been supported by facts. He had a permanent place of residence, a minor daughter and elderly parents, and there was therefore no danger of his absconding. On 8 December 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the extension order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful and justified. 24.  On 22 December 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 April 2006 for the same reasons as before. 25.  On 10 April and 5 July 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention for the same reasons as before. 26.  On 2 October 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges and the defendants’ “characters”. The court also indicated that the purpose of the detention was to eliminate any risk of the defendants’ absconding, re-offending or hampering the court proceedings. 27.  The applicant appealed, claiming that the Regional Court had used a stereotyped formula to justify his detention and that its conclusions that he might abscond, reoffend or interfere with the proceedings were not supported by relevant facts. He referred to his positive references and frail health and submitted that he had a minor child and elderly parents. He also complained that his detention had exceeded a reasonable time. 28.  On 28 December 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the extension order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. The defendants were charged with serious criminal offences, and they might therefore abscond, re-offend or obstruct the proceedings. The allegedly excessive length of their detention, their poor health, minor children, elderly parents or permanent place of residence were not sufficient reasons to warrant release. 29.  On 27 December 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 April 2007 for the same reasons as before. 30.  On 10 April 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 July 2007 for the same reasons as before. 31.  On 9 July 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 October 2007, finding that there was no reason to vary the preventive measure. 32.  On 11 October 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2008, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk of absconding or intimidating the witnesses or jurors. 33.  On 9 January 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 April 2008 for the same reasons as before. 34.  On 8 April 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request to be released under an undertaking not to leave the place of residence and extended the defendants’ detention until 12 July 2008. The decision reads as follows:\n“As the trial has not yet been completed, it is necessary to extend the defendants’ detention.\nThe court considers that the gravity of the charges justifies applying to the defendants a preventive measure in the form of detention.\nHowever, in addition to the gravity of the charges - namely the organisation of an armed gang ... and commission of assaults on citizens and murders - carrying a sentence of up to twenty years’ imprisonment for each of the defendants, the court also takes into account other factors.\nThus, the court is entitled to believe that ... application to the defendants of an undertaking not to leave the town or other preventive measures will not exclude the possibility of their absconding or exercising pressure on participants to the proceedings and jurors.\nThe defendants’ argument that their detention has been excessively long is not in itself sufficient to warrant release.\nThe defendants have not produced any material showing the existence of factors making impossible [sic] their stay in detention facility conditions.\nThe court is not convinced by the defendants’ argument that they have not been granted access to the materials submitted by the prosecution in support of their requests for extension. The court has at its disposal only the materials from the criminal case file, which had been studied by the defendants.\nThe court considers that the grounds for the detention of the defendants, charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences, are relevant and sufficient. Their detention serves the interest of society, as it prevents the commission of similar criminal offences and ensures high-quality and effective examination of the present criminal case.\nThe criminal case file contains sufficient evidence against each defendant justifying an extension of their detention...” 35.  On 7 July 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 October 2008, repeating verbatim the decision of 8 April 2008. 36.  On 10 October 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendant’s detention until 12 January 2009, repeating verbatim the decision of 8 April 2008. 37.  The proceedings are still pending before the trial court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Šiauliai. 6.  The applicant was married to V.J., with whom he had two boys – T.J., who was born in 1985, and Do.J., who was born in 1986. 7.  In 1993 the applicant divorced his wife, but they remained living together and had one more boy – Ž.J., born in 1997. 8.  On 18 May 2003 V.J. gave birth to twins – a boy, D.J., and a girl, K.J. 9.  On 5 December 2003 the applicant’s former wife and the mother of their five children died. Immediately afterwards, I.N., a cousin of the applicant’s late wife, took the twins to her home to take care of them. As the applicant wrote in his application to the Court, he had agreed that I.N. would take care of the twins because she had experience in raising children – she had two children of her own. He also mentioned having started dating I.N. and having planned to marry her later. In the applicant’s words, I.N. wanted to get married in church and not to disclose that fact to the State authorities so that it would be possible to keep receiving child benefits. The applicant wrote that then, “seeing such prospects for a bright future, [he] had agreed that I.N. would become official guardian of the twins and [he] had helped her to prepare paperwork for that purpose”. 10.  On 27 January 2004 the Šiauliai City Municipality’s Children’s Rights Protection Service (Vaiko teisių apsaugos tarnyba, hereinafter – “the Service”) decided that I.N. could be the temporary guardian of the twins who, in turn, were to reside with her. The applicant took part in the hearing held at the Service’s premises and agreed with the decision. He noted that he could barely take care of his three other children, who were schoolboys, and was thus unable to raise the babies. He stated that if he had to bring the babies back to his home, he would be forced to quit his job and this would ruin him financially. His job also included working at night. If I.N. had not agreed to take the twins, he would have given them to a foster home for infants. The applicant agreed to have his parental rights limited should I.N. be appointed as the twins’ guardian. He also agreed to pay money towards the twins’ upbringing. 11.  A few days later, on 3 February 2004, the Director of Administration of Šiauliai City Municipality decided that I.N. should be appointed as the temporary guardian of the twins. 12.  Later on, the Service applied to the Šiauliai City District Court, asking it to appoint I.N. as the twins’ permanent guardian (nuolatinė globėja) and manager of their property. 13.  The applicant took part in the court hearing concerning that application and explained that even though he loved all of his children and had been raising the three older ones to the best of his abilities, he was not able to take care of the twins because of a lack of money and knowledge of how to take care of very young children. If he had to quit his job in order to bring up the twins, there would be no money to live on. Whilst noting that he was not giving the twins up, the applicant agreed that I.N. could be appointed as their guardian. He promised to help the twins financially to the best of his abilities. 14.  On 29 April 2004 the Šiauliai City District Court granted the Service’s application and granted permanent guardianship of the twins in favour of I.N., who was also to be manager of their property. The court also made a custody order concerning the twins in I.N.’s favour. The applicant was ordered to pay 50 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 15 euros (EUR)) per month in financial support for each child, until the children came of age. The court noted that the applicant could not take care of the twins because of his lack of knowledge of how to take care of infants. Yet it observed that the applicant worked and took care of his three older children, did not exercise his parental rights improperly, and had no negative influence on the older children. The applicant was also ready to support the twins financially, visit them and communicate with them when they became older. The twins were to be removed from the applicant’s care, although he would retain his parental rights, in accordance with Article 3.179 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 70 below). 15.  The decision could be appealed against to a higher court. The applicant notes that he did not appeal against the decision. 16. According to doctors who examined the twins, during the first years of their lives their development of motor skills was slower than normal, and by the age of three they had specific mixed development disorder (specialus mišrus raidos sutrikimas), and their language development was delayed. They needed speech therapy, physiotherapy and an undemanding regimen (tausojantis režimas). On 7 November 2006, at I.N.’s request and on the basis of reports by psychologists and doctors, the twins received learning support at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. At the centre the twins received help from a speech therapist and special educational needs teachers (specialieji pedagogai), and benefited from such procedures as massages, medical exercise therapy and herbal baths. Upon the request of I.N., who stated that she was ill herself and had to take care of her elderly mother, from 7 November 2006 onwards the twins became weekly boarders (from Mondays to Fridays) at the Special Upbringing Centre. As the doctors later noted during court proceedings, they made no recommendation either in favour of or against the twins boarding there during the week. As I.N. later specified during court hearings, she had not felt it appropriate for the twins to go to a regular kindergarten, because there were twenty-two children in one class (grupė) there, whereas at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre there were only eight children in a class. According to the Government, the children stayed at the Special Upbringing Centre until 31 May 2009. It also appears from the documents before the Court that in the event of illnesses and during holidays the children were taken home (for example, in accordance with a doctor’s recommendation that the children stay at I.N.’s home from 23 December 2008 for four months). 17.  As of 1 September 2009 the twins attended daily pre-school classes at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. On 7 December 2009 the director of the centre noted that the twins were always brought to and collected from the centre by I.N. on time, they were well-rested, properly dressed, and had all the necessary materials for class with them. The applicant came to visit them at the centre twice. After his visits the children acted normally, although they were more interested in the presents he brought and did not communicate much. In May 2010 the institution noted that the applicant would come and see the twins at the centre two to three times a month, teachers were present at the meetings and the children’ behaviour after the meetings was normal. 18.  In autumn 2008 disputes arose between the applicant and I.N. In September 2008 I.N. complained to the Service that the applicant had withdrawn money from the twins’ bank account, without her knowledge or permission, as the administrator of the twin’s property. A criminal case for fraud was opened against the applicant. On 12 April 2010 the applicant was acquitted of that charge the court, having established that he had acted in good faith and in the interests of the twins. 19.  On 9 December 2008 the applicant applied to the Šiauliai City District Court, asking that the twins be returned to him. He argued that the reasons for his two children being removed from his care had ceased to exist. The applicant lived in a three-room apartment and, above all, the twins were now older and he therefore felt able to raise them. Two of his older children, Do.J. and T.J., were now students. The applicant submitted that it would be in the best interests of all his children to grow up together. He also sought to have the twins summoned and questioned in court. 20.  In response, on 15 December 2008 I.N. lodged an application with the same court, seeking to have the applicant’s parental rights permanently limited (as for the outcome of this case, see paragraph 52 below). 21.  By a ruling of 16 March 2009, at I.N.’s request, the Šiauliai City District Court suspended the examination of the case initiated by the applicant for the twins’ custody until the civil case initiated by I.N. for termination of his parental rights was decided. 22.  The applicant appealed against that ruling, arguing that a delay in the proceedings was harmful to his interests and, even more so, to those of his minor children. He emphasised that in 2004 he had been separated from his children not because of his fault but because of circumstances that were beyond his control – the death of his former wife and the particularly young age of the twins. The applicant also noted that it was he who had addressed the Šiauliai City District Court first; only afterwards had I.N. initiated another set of court proceedings against him. Taking into account that a case concerning termination of his parental rights could reach the appellate courts, such proceedings could last a very long time, in breach of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The delay in court proceedings could also push the twins away from their biological father and thus was detrimental to their interests. 23.  By a decision of 21 April 2009 the Šiauliai Regional Court granted the applicant’s appeal, on the ground that a delay in the proceedings would be in breach of the twins’ best interests. The court also established that the applicant had been the first to open court proceedings concerning the twins’ future residence. 24.  In July 2009 the Šiauliai City District Court held a hearing in the case initiated by the applicant regarding the twins’ return to him (see paragraph 19 above), at which the applicant, I.N., their lawyers and the Service’s representative were present. The court considered that an expert report was necessary to establish whether the twins were ready to be returned to the applicant’s home. The applicant’s lawyer insisted that, apparently for reasons of impartiality, if experts were to be appointed, those experts should be from Vilnius, and not from Šiauliai. During another court hearing on 31 August 2009 the applicant testified that he had not had problems with I.N. until 2008 when he found out that the twins had attended weekly boarding. 25.  On 7 December 2009 officials from the Service visited I.N.’s home and had a conversation with the twins, without I.N. being present. The two children called I.N. “mummy”, and the applicant “daddy”, and expressed negative feelings towards their father and about being with him in either his or I.N.’s apartments. The child care specialists admitted, however, that the phrases the twins had used did not always correspond to the language used by children of their age. The conversation with the children also clearly showed that there was a dispute between the applicant and I.N. The child care specialists thus recommended, in the interests of the children, that the applicant and I.N. improve their relationship and strive to ensure that the applicant was able to communicate with his children. The Service concluded that the twins were not yet ready to live with the applicant.\nAccording to a further report, the child care specialists had also previously visited the applicant’s apartment in Šiauliai and found that the conditions there were suitable for children. 26.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant, on 4 March 2010 the Ombudsperson for the Protection of Children’s Rights (Vaiko teisių apsaugos kontrolierius, hereinafter – “the Ombudsperson”) issued a report about his case. The Service informed the Ombudsperson that if the applicant had agreed to raise the twins himself at the time the question of guardianship had been examined, he would have been eligible to receive a monthly payment of around LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) from the State in support. However, at that time the applicant had refused to raise the twins, even though he had stated that he intended to do so “in the future”, without indicating when, and had only applied to the Šiauliai City District Court for a residence order in respect of the twins on 9 December 2008. 27.  The Ombudsperson noted that the Service had an obligation to establish which help, in particular, the applicant’s family would have benefited from, including all the social services and other assistance available. However, in the Ombudsperson’s view, that had not been done, and the authorities had not taken specific steps to enable the twins to be returned to their biological family. 28.  That being so, the Ombudsperson also observed that since the 29 April 2004 court decision to establish permanent guardianship for the twins, the applicant had never contacted the Service regarding his communication with the twins until November 2008. Neither had he applied to have those two children returned to him. Similarly, until November 2008 the applicant had never claimed that I.N. was not taking care of the twins properly. Child care specialists had visited I.N.’s home during the intervening years and there was no evidence that the children had not been taken care of properly. 29.  Whilst noting the conflict between the applicant and I.N. over when and how the applicant could see the twins, the Ombudsperson urged the two to act prudently so that their dispute did not affect the children. The Service was ordered to take steps towards the improvement of the relationship between the applicant and the twins, provided that this was in the children’s best interests. It was necessary to find a proper balance between the interests of the children, namely, their health and development, and their communication with the applicant. That being so, the Service’s finding of 7 December 2009 that the twins were not yet ready to return to their father’s home was not unreasonable. It was pertinent that a sudden termination of the guardianship could cause distress, especially when the twins’ guardianship had been established at a very early age. I.N. had become their guardian when they were infants and, according to the information collected, they were very attached to her. Moreover, they had negative feelings towards their father, which, to a certain extent had been caused by the dispute between I.N. and the applicant. A transitional period was therefore necessary. 30.  As the dispute between the applicant and I.N. escalated, on 24 March 2010 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Šiauliai City District Court seeking a formal decision setting up a contact schedule (dėl bendravimo tvarkos nustatymo) for him and the twins. 31.  On 27 May 2010 the Šiauliai City District Court suspended the proceedings for a contact schedule until the civil case concerning the return of the children to reside with the applicant, wherein a psychological assessment of the children had been ordered by the court, had been concluded (see paragraphs 19–24 above). 32.  The applicant also asked the court to issue interim protective measures (laikinosios apsaugos priemonės), so that he could regularly communicate with the twins. The applicant asked to spend twenty days in a row with the twins during the summer, see them twice a week for no less than four hours each time every week, and for the twins to stay at his home overnight once a week. The applicant also sought to have his two children stay with him overnight during public holidays, every second year. I.N. partly agreed to the request, but asked that the children not be left with the applicant overnight, because they had health problems and were not used to spending the night in another home. When questioned, the twins stated that they wanted to have contact with the applicant, but did not want to stay at his place overnight or to go on holiday with him for more than one day. The Service noted that the twins had not lived with the applicant for a long time and considered that, in order to restore their relationship, an adaptation period was necessary. The Service left the details of the contact order to the court’s discretion. 33.  On the request of the Šiauliai City District Court (see paragraph 24 above), experts at the Vilnius city psychiatric institution (Vaikų ir paauglių teismo psichiatrijos skyrius) examined the twins. Questions were put to the experts by the court, the applicant and I.N.\nIn their report of 10 September 2010, the psychiatrists concluded that D.J. had a strong and positive emotional relationship with I.N., with whom he felt safe. The boy also had an emotionally positive relationship with his father, who was an important person for him, but their contact was insufficient. Such a lack of contact could be one of the reasons why the boy wanted to live with his father. On this last point the psychiatrists also noted that while the boy was able to freely express his wish to live with his father, he did so without being able to think critically and to foresee the consequences of his choice. The psychiatrists also noted:\n“it was not possible to state or to foresee how the change of living place would affect D.J.’s further development. However, taking into account the wish which D.J. had expressed to live with his father, it was unlikely that the change would affect the child negatively, or even cause him harm. [Nonetheless], taking into consideration that from his infancy to [the present] date I.N. had been raising him, it was not recommended to disrupt the relationship between the boy and I.N. completely”.\nThe experts considered that it was for the court to decide how often the child should have contact with his father so that their emotional relationship could resume.\nAs regards the girl, K.J., the psychiatrists concluded that she had an emotionally strong relationship with her guardian, with whom she felt safe. Her relationship with her father was ambivalent, but it had not broken down entirely. Both the applicant and I.N. were important people in K.J.’s life. All things considered, it was not possible to state or to foresee how a change of living place would affect K.J. It was thus for the court to decide how often the child should have contact with her father so that their emotional relationship could resume. The experts also recommended that the applicant and I.N. should share the duties of taking care of the children, and I.N. should actively cooperate by helping the twins to communicate with their father. 34.  On 4 July 2011 the Šiauliai City District Court held that, in order to gradually restore the twins’ emotional connection with their father, contact should be as follows: the applicant could collect the children from I.N.’s home every Wednesday and be with them for two-and-a-half hours; every Saturday he could spend nine-and-a-half hours with them. The court considered that it would only be appropriate for the twins to be with the applicant during school and public holidays once their bonds with him had become stronger. In the court’s view, such a contact order corresponded to the best interests of the children. The court also noted that, should the circumstances change, the applicant or I.N. could ask the court to amend the contact order.\nIn August 2011 and upon I.N.’s request, the court amended the contact order to the effect that, should the applicant be unable to see the twins on Wednesday or Saturday due to their sickness or another justifiable reason, he could meet with them on Thursday or Sunday.\nThe applicant and his lawyer took part in both court hearings. 35.  On 12 September 2011 the Šiauliai City District Court delivered its decision as to the applicant’s application for a residence order. The applicant, I.N., their lawyers, and the Service took part in the hearings before the court. The twins also took part in the hearings, giving evidence without the applicant, I.N. or their lawyers being present. 36.  The court noted that on 24 April 2004 the twins had been removed from the applicant’s care by a court decision for a legitimate reason – namely, because he could not take care of them (Article 3.179 of the Civil Code, see paragraph 70 below). It was important to observe that their separation was in no way linked to fault on the part of the applicant. Moreover, the measure was temporary in that it could be lifted if the circumstances justifying the separation from the twins no longer existed. Accordingly, it was necessary to examine whether those circumstances still existed, and, if not, whether the children’s being returned to live with the applicant would be in their best interests, which were the overriding consideration. The court noted that the best interests of the children, as the primary consideration, were indicated in Article 3 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and in Article 3.3 of the Civil Code. 37.  The Šiauliai City District Court agreed with the applicant’s argument that the grounds for removal of the twins from his care in 2004 had ceased to exist, because the twins were now eight years old and had been taken from the applicant because he had not possessed the appropriate knowledge of how to take care of them when they were infants. That being so, the court nevertheless held that the twins had a strong emotional link with I.N. and their emotional link with the applicant was not sufficient, which situation had clearly been influenced by the fact that the twins had lived separately from the applicant since June 2004. The court also observed that because of the dispute over money between the applicant and I.N. which had started in summer 2008, he had had limited opportunities to take part in educating his children and to communicate with them. It was only from July 2011, when the court had issued an interim order providing for the applicant’s contact with the twins in accordance with a fixed schedule, that the applicant had started to have regular contact with the twins. Even so, the applicant had not taken all possible steps to participate in the upbringing of the twins on an equal basis with I.N. Namely, even though the twins had been removed from his care in June 2004, the applicant had never asked for the twins to be returned to live with him until the disagreement with I.N. arose in summer 2008, even though his two other sons were no longer minors as of December 2003 and December 2004 respectively. The court also noted the applicant’s acknowledgement that until 2008 he had not encountered any obstacles to communicating with the twins. Yet, he had communicated with them only “episodically”, with the result that the emotional connection between the twins and the applicant and his other children was less strong than that existing between the twins and I.N. and her children. As the twins had testified in court, they did not want to live with the father. They did not even want to stay at his home during the weekends, this being confirmed by the applicant’s eldest child, Ž.J. 38.  The Šiauliai City District Court also dismissed the applicant’s argument that I.N. had not been taking care of the twins properly because they had been weekly boarders at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre for three years. On the contrary, the court observed that according to the twins’ doctor, the care centre was of great benefit to the family, because the twins received specialist help there. The court found that the applicant ought to have been more active in making inquiries about the twins’ development and health. Lastly, the court noted the applicant’s statement that he had been aware as early as 2006 that the twins were weekly boarders at the care centre. 39.  The first-instance court concluded that because of the twins’ negative feelings towards the applicant, he would not be able to perform his fatherly duties properly. The court also took the psychiatrists’ report into account and held that the twins’ connection with the applicant was not strong enough, whereas they had a strong emotional connection with I.N. It followed that the grounds for removing the twins, who had expressed their wish to live with I.N. in court, from the applicant’s care persisted. Being returned to live with their father was not in the best interests of the children. Nonetheless, the applicant maintained his parental rights, including the right to have contact with his children, who would be well able to communicate with him whilst staying in a familiar environment, with I.N., where they felt safe. Should the circumstances change, that is to say, once the emotional relationship between the twins and the applicant became stronger, the applicant could apply to the courts again and seek the revocation of I.N.’s guardianship of the twins. The court thus dismissed the applicant’s request that the twins be returned to him. 40.  The applicant appealed, submitting that the first-instance court had erred in establishing that the circumstances on the basis of which the twins had been removed from his care in 2004 were no longer valid, but then going on to examine whether there were other reasons why he would not be able to take care of his children properly. He maintained that he had visited his children and communicated with them regularly from the date of their separation. However, as of 2008 I.N. had started turning the children against him. The court had established that there was a lack of a strong emotional relationship between the applicant and the twins, but had not taken into consideration that I.N. had deliberately taken steps to ensure that the children would be hostile to their father. 41.  The applicant also argued that the lower court had erred in establishing that I.N. had been taking care of the twins properly. He submitted that I.N. had without good reason sent the twins to be boarding pupils at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. Even though during the hearings at first instance the twins’ family doctor and another doctor had confirmed that the twins’ attendance at the centre had been recommended, those specialists had not recommended that the twins board at the centre. The applicant also submitted that until mid-2011 I.N. had not had a job and it was thus not unreasonable to conclude that her sole means of subsistence was child benefit payments, although domestic law required such monies to be used exclusively in the interests of children under guardianship. 42.  The applicant also observed that the first-instance court had completely disregarded the Ombudsperson’s report (see paragraphs 26-29 above). Likewise, the lower court had disregarded the psychiatrists’ reports about the twins (see paragraph 33 above), which had clearly stated that the boy wanted to live with the applicant and that there was no reason to believe that the boy’s well-being would suffer should he be returned to his biological father. 43.  Neither could the applicant agree with the lower court’s conclusion that he had not taken as much of a role in taking care of the twins as I.N. On this point he noted that his participation in the twins’ life had only been restricted as of 2008, when I.N. had taken steps to limit his communication with them. It was also noteworthy that in 2008 the applicant had applied to the courts for an order establishing a schedule for him to have contact with the twins. Lastly, the applicant maintained that the Service had from the very beginning and up to the present date, and by unjustified means, sought to further I.N.’s interests and not those of the children. 44.  By a ruling of 2 February 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision, noting that as an appellate court it was free to interpret the evidence as it saw fit. The applicant and I.N. took part in the appellate court’s hearing. The court noted that the case had a public interest element, because it concerned children’s rights. Accordingly, it examined supplementary evidence of its own motion and took notice of an earlier court decision to dismiss the applicant’s claim that I.N. had been embezzling the twins’ money (see paragraph 18 above). It therefore considered that the applicant’s accusations of selfishness and property mismanagement against I.N. were unfounded. 45.  The court considered that both the applicant and I.N. had not made enough effort to ensure that “the twins would return to the family”. The dispute between the two had negatively influenced the twins’ feelings towards their father, and had had a long term negative impact on the twins’ emotional and psychological development. The court noted the experts’ conclusion that so far the children had developed a firm, safe and positive emotional connection with I.N. Even so, the experts had also acknowledged that the twins’ connection with the applicant still existed and it was emotionally positive. Accordingly, it was crucial to develop that connection, and both the applicant and I.N. had to contribute to that development. The assistance of the Service would also be particularly important. 46.  The court also emphasised that it would necessarily take time for the children to be ready to be returned to their father: the latter and I.N. had to make an effort towards that goal. The children were to get used to the fact that they could see their father when they wanted, and not when I.N. sent them to visit him. On this point the court noted that children of the twins’ age already understood and were affected by the fact that their guardian, I.N., was not enthusiastic about them being in contact with the applicant. Equally, as regards the applicant’s attitude towards the situation, the court considered that the applicant blamed everybody else without seeing any fault on his own part. The panel of judges noted that the applicant was a very uncompromising individual who only accepted the validity of his own viewpoint and was not willing to have regard to the opinions of others. The panel concluded that so long as the applicant was not taking any steps to work on his issues, such as by seeking psychological assistance, the children could not be returned to an emotionally cold and harsh environment. A sudden removal of the children from the environment provided by I.N., which was safe and comforting for the children, would absolutely be a disproportionate and traumatic step which the court could not allow. 47.  The appellate court also noted that from birth the twins had had serious health problems, which had never gone away. In 2008 D.J. had been diagnosed with a medium level of disability; in 2010 the disability’s assessment had been changed to a mild level. K.J had a light level of disability, established in 2008. Both children were hyperactive, had numerous health problems and thus needed a greater level of attention. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the twins could stay at home until he returned from work showed that it would not be possible for him, and he was not ready, to take concrete steps to take care of the two children, who came home from school at noon. The applicant’s other children were busy to the extent that they also could not stay with the twins all the time. 48.  Lastly, the appellate court dismissed the applicant’s argument that the children should be returned to him on the basis of Article 3.181 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 70 below), which, in the applicant’s view, provided that a child should be returned to a parent once the grounds which necessitated their separation no longer existed. The court held that the best interests of the child were the priority. In the applicant’s case the appellate court had not established the existence of any new circumstances. Nevertheless, this did not automatically mean that the twins had to be returned to the applicant’s home immediately. A transitional period was necessary, which, in the court’s view, might be six months. In arriving at that timeframe it took into particular account the fact that this period would include the summer holidays, when the twins could leave their familiar environment, I.N.’s apartment, and re-establish a close relationship with their father. If the twins could have contact with their father for a longer period than the current sporadic, twice-a-week arrangement, they would be able to see that their father was there for them and that they could resolve everyday problems with their father’s assistance. 49.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 13 April 2012 the Supreme Court refused to examine it on the basis that it raised questions of fact only. 50.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant asked the Šiauliai City District Court to resume the suspended civil proceedings regarding his contact rights with the twins, noting that the other civil case concerning his application for the twins’ return had already ended (see paragraph 31 above). Six days later the court resumed the examination of the civil case concerning his application for a contact order, and with the aim that the case be examined expeditiously, set an oral hearing in that case for 26 March 2012. In May of that year the court also decided to join the two civil cases pending in relation to the twins (the civil case concerning the application for a parental contact order initiated by the applicant on 24 March 2010 and the civil case concerning the application for termination of the applicant’s parental rights initiated by I.N. on 15 December 2008; see, respectively, paragraphs 30 and 20 above). 51.  During the hearing of the joined civil case on 27 June 2012 a psychologist was present, the children were questioned (the applicant and I.N. were asked to leave the courtroom, their lawyers were present) and the psychologist made the following comments:\n“... From the statements made by K.J. we understand that the relationship between I.N. and her father is difficult and that the child sees and understands this. The girl mentioned a wish to meet [go out] with both of them if their relationship was better. I did not note entirely negative feelings towards her father, however there is no close relationship, and the relationship between the girl and I.N. is very strong. I understood from both of the children that their father promises things which never come true [and] this fell short of their expectations. D.J. states that he is willing to have contact with his father but only when he [the boy] so wishes, hence the child should not be forced to contact his father. ... The girl has no emotional relationship with her father, because she has seen him disputing [things] and [experienced him making] promises which never came true. The boy wishes to have contact with his father but at the present date the latter cannot arrange that. <...>” 52.  On 13 July 2012 the Šiauliai City District Court rejected I.N.’s civil claim for termination of the applicant’s parental rights (see paragraph 20 above) and partly granted the applicant’s civil claim for a contact order. The court noted that there was no basis for I.N.’s claims that the applicant had harmed the twins or had not taken care of them at all until autumn 2008. On the contrary, the evidence showed that he had been seeking contact with the children. The boy wanted to have contact with the applicant, and the girl would agree to have contact with him if he ceased his dispute with I.N. However, the twins’ contact with the applicant could not be forced. Whilst observing that the child’s best interests were paramount, the first-instance court also relied on the Court’s case-law, noting that in matters of child custody, for example, the reason for considering the “child’s best interests” may be twofold: firstly, to guarantee that the child develops in a sound environment and that a parent cannot take measures that would harm its health and development; secondly, to maintain its ties with its family, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots (the court referred to Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, § 67, 6 December 2007). Lastly, the court rejected all the accusations by I.N. that the applicant had been antagonistic, because a criminal case initiated by her had been dismissed by the authorities (see paragraphs 18 and 44 above). The applicant thus had a right to have contact with the twins and an inherent duty to take part in educating them. He was also able to offer them appropriate living conditions. 53.  The Šiauliai City District Court also noted that both parties to the dispute – the applicant and I.N. – had put their own ambitions and their subjective views as to what would be best for the children first. For that reason, the applicant had sometimes tried to have contact with his daughter when she did not want to spend time with him, although his son was prepared to meet him. As for I.N., she had not attempted to restore the twins’ relations with their father and had showed no concern for the fact that the applicant’s and his daughter’s relationship was getting weaker and was close to breaking down. Accordingly, the parties’ failure to take care of the children’s best interests required that those interests be protected by the courts. Moreover, considering that the biggest issue was the communication between the applicant and his daughter, the court saw it appropriate to set, on its own initiative, a further schedule for their communication during the transitional period, so that the girl’s contact with the applicant be re-established. In particular, a psychologist or child care specialist was to assist the applicant and his daughter, during contact sessions which would take place in a neutral setting. Lastly, the court reiterated that the principle of the rights of the child having priority was relevant not only when setting a schedule for the contact between the applicant and the twins, but also when executing the court decision establishing that schedule. The applicant thus should not make use of his right to see the children, including taking them to his apartment, if this would breach the twins’ rights, even though his right to see them had been established in the court’s decision. 54.  The order establishing a contact schedule between the applicant and his two children essentially specified that, until a psychologist determined the readiness of K.J. to have contact with her father without the presence of a psychologist or a social worker, the applicant should have contact with her once a week in the presence of either a psychologist or a social worker and at a place and time agreed upon in advance. In addition to that, if the twins so agreed, the applicant could see them two or three times a week, for up to four hours, during the working week. He could also have them over every second week from Friday evening to Sunday evening, and also during some of the State holidays and spend with them two weeks during his vacations. 55.  I.N. appealed against the decision, seeking to have the applicant’s application for a contact order rejected and her application to have his parental rights terminated granted. The applicant submitted a response to the appeal, submitting that the decision of the first-instance court had been reasoned and lawful and thus that there were no legal grounds for quashing or changing it. He also claimed that I.N. was influencing the children’s testimony. 56.  On 20 November 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Court fully upheld the lower court’s decision to reject I.N.’s application to have the applicant’s parental rights terminated. In any event, the applicant’s parental rights could only be terminated if he failed to perform his fatherly duties, and there were no indications of this in his case. That being so, the appellate court also noted that at the time of the first-instance proceedings the twins had expressed a categorical and consistent wish not to stay at the applicant’s apartment overnight. In addition, according to the most recent reports by the doctors, the twins had become more nervous and agitated, and their emotional and psychological state and behaviour had become worse. It was therefore considered better for them to reside at I.N.’s home. The psychologist had testified that the boy wanted to see his father, but on a schedule of his choosing. The girl avoided meeting with her father at all. 57.  As concerns the issue of the parental contact order, the appellate court stated as follows:\n“... The panel of judges notes that it is impossible to raise a child without having contact with him/her. In Article 24 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of Children Rights it is also established that if a child’s mother or father does not live with him/her, [the child] must have the opportunity to spend time with [his or her] mother or father, save for the exceptions established by law, [in the event that] such contact could prove to be of detriment to the child. Minimum contact may be established only if permanent maximum contact would be harmful to the interests of the child, if frequently spending time with the [non-resident] parent would traumatise the child psychologically, if the contact and parenting (auklėjimas) [offered] by a parent does not satisfy the interests, wishes and views of the child at all, [or] if [there would be] a negative impact on the child’s maturity and outlook [on life].\nThe evidence in the [instant] case allows the panel of judges to hold that at present there are grounds for changing the maximum parental contact order established by the [lower] court to a minimum [contact order]. The court has had regard to the current categorical and consistent position of the children towards the opportunity to stay overnight with their father as envisaged in the [lower court’s] parental contact order. The medical certificates included in the case file allow the court to state that the children’s state of health, anxiety, and irritability strengthened, their emotional state and behaviour worsened, hence treatment at home is recommended for them. The medical documents recording the existence [of] weakness of the central nervous system, attention-deficit disorder, [delayed] language development, learning [difficulties], etc. were neither refuted during the examination of the case before the court of the first instance, nor during the examination on appeal. While commenting on the children’s feelings towards their father the psychologist has noted that there is not currently a close relationship between the father and the children, the son [D.J.] states that he only wants to have contact with his father when he [D.J.] so wishes, the daughter [K.J.] is avoiding contact with her father. The twins [D.J.] and [K.J.] were examined in terms of their psychological state, heightened fear of separation from their guardian, and feelings of insecurity. While stating that the major problem is the daughter’s [K.J.’s] communication with her father, the court of first instance correctly emphasised the need [for it] to establish additional conditions for contact between the girl and her father, hence it justly noted that the father’s contact with his daughter was essential to restore a normal relationship with his daughter. A transitional period had to be established given that [it would take] a reasonable period of time for the child to become accustomed to [spending time] her father.\nAccordingly, the [lower] court’s conclusion in the present case that it is not currently possible for the father to have maximum contact with his minor daughter [K.J.] is correct, because it is indisputably established in the case that any ties, including emotional ones, between father and daughter have almost broken down. The panel of judges also considers that contact with the [applicant’s] son [D.J.] contrary to his wishes (involuntarily) would not satisfy the interests of the child. In view of the aim of reinstating the lost connection, forced (involuntary) contact [on the part of] the children with their father would be meaningless because forced contact [sessions] may even result in intense hostility towards their father. Hence, on the basis of the arguments presented the existing order should be changed by removing the possibility for the children to stay at their father’s home overnight. Being active in such category of cases the court draws attention to the existing contact order [which provides for] contact sessions during the working week [for] up to four hours. The panel of judges considers that such frequent contact may unbalance the children’s rest periods and in the present case a transitional period is required for rebuilding of the relationship. Hence the panel of judges decides that voluntary contact between the children and [the applicant] on weekends and on holidays would contribute to a proper balancing of the father’s and the children’s interests. Thus the panel decides that the time for collecting and returning the children on weekends and on holidays, with the exception of the father’s and daughter’s contact sessions in the presence of the appointed specialist once a week, should be changed. The court considers that the children may be taken by their father on Saturdays from 12 p.m. until 7 p.m. because these particular hours are optimal - the children’s rest periods during the week and on Sundays will not be disrupted. Accordingly, the [relevant] part of the [lower court’s] decision on the contact order should be changed. Moreover, the panel considers that in view of the transitional period it has emphasised [will be necessary] for the building of relations with their father, the issue of the children spending their holidays with their father has been decided far too early, hence this part of the [lower court’s] decision is to be quashed. The appeal court notes that the [legal] relations [established by] a contact order concerning a child and [by] raising a child are of a continuing nature, hence when the factual circumstances change the father of the children [the applicant] or the guardian [I.N.] have the right to apply to the court seeking a change to the existing order.\nThe panel of judges notes that having regard to the circumstances of the case it might be concluded that there are ongoing disputes between the father and the guardian of his children. The panel of judges emphasises that the parties to the case [have been putting] their own ambitions above those of the children and thus [have] failed to show due loyalty, respect, and tolerance towards each other. Accordingly, the [applicant’s] contact with the children is marked by unnecessary conflict, the children experience and feel it, [the ongoing disputes] make them feel insecure, cause severe damage and have had an impact on [D.J.’s] and [K.J.’s] health and impeded the rebuilding of their relationship with their biological father.\nIn the panel’s view restriction of contact between the father and the children would undoubtedly infringe both the non-resident (skyrium gyvenantis) parent’s right to take part in educating the children and the children’s best interests. [It] would impede the rebuilding, steadying and maintenance of the relationship between father and son, and especially [between father and] daughter. It should be explained to the parties that all issues relating to the raising of the children, as well as issues relating to their needs and interests not included in the order ... established by the procedural decision of the court, should be agreed upon between the parties with due regard to the principles of cooperation and safeguarding the children’s rights and legitimate interests as a priority.” 58.  The amended contact order thus confirmed the transitional period for the applicant’s and his daughter’s communication in the presence of a psychologist and a social worker. Upon a determination by a psychologist of K.J.’s readiness to have contact with her father, the applicant also could see the twins (or one of them) on Saturdays from 12 p.m. until 7 p.m. if the children voluntarily so agreed and did not object. He could also see them on Father’s Day and on his birthday, from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. Lastly, the applicant could take them from their permanent place of residence and have contact from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 24 December, from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 26 December and from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the first day of Easter in even calendar years; and from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 31 December and from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the second day of Easter in odd calendar years. 59.  The decision of the Šiauliai Regional Court became effective after neither of the parties to the proceedings lodged a further appeal. 60.  According to the documents in the Court’s possession, between December 2008 and 25 March 2013 specialists from the Service had frequent meetings and consultations with the applicant and I.N., and individual conversations with the twins (without the presence of their father and/or I.N.). The child care specialists urged the applicant and I.N. to get in touch with the psychologists involved in the case in order to arrange sessions individually and together with the twins concerning their communication problems. 61.  In particular, on 27 February 2012 the applicant contacted the Service asking for assistance in arranging contact sessions with his daughter K.J., claiming that she had been turned against him by I.N. and hence did not want to have contact with him. 62.  On 13 March 2012 child care specialists had a conversation with K.J. at the Service’s premises. I.N. was not present during the conversation. The specialists sought to ascertain the girl’s opinion concerning her contact with the applicant. The girl expressed negative feelings towards contact with her father and towards staying at his home, his visits to I.N.’s home and going out with her father to other places (such as the cinema, a café, or shopping centres). The girl stated that at that time she was not willing to have contact with her father under any circumstances. She also stressed that nobody was influencing her and that she was expressing her own opinion. The specialists concluded that given the need to safeguard the child’s best interests as a priority and the recommendations of the Šiauliai Regional Court (in the decision of 2 February 2012, paragraphs 45-49 above) it was advisable that the applicant and I.N. did not resolve any disputes that might arise in the presence of the children. The specialists also advised that the applicant and I.N. improve their relationship and contact the psychologists to set up consultations and obtain recommendations. 63.  Immediately after the Šiauliai Regional Court decision of 20 November 2012 (see paragraphs 56–59 above), the applicant contacted the Service asking for assistance in arranging contact sessions with his daughter K.J., which were to take place in the presence of a child care specialist and a psychologist. The authority responded the following day, and a session took place on 6 December 2012. The applicant and I.N. were both present. It was decided that individual sessions with the psychologist would be provided for K.J. It was also agreed that the applicant and the guardian would be invited to discussions giving a general summary of K.J.’s sessions with the psychologist. A specialist from the Service would also be invited to the discussions. 64.  Five sessions with the psychologist were provided from 6 December 2012 until 14 February 2013. During the last session, earlier sessions were discussed and conclusions concerning K.J.’s readiness to have contact with her father were made. The applicant, I.N. and a child care specialist were present at the consultation. The psychologist emphasised that K.J. was not yet ready for contact with her father and refused to have that contact. The psychologist also drew attention to the fact that during individual sessions K.J. had become tired quickly, her anxiety and motor activity had increased, and she had sought to finish every session earlier. I.N. confirmed that K.J. was anxious and quickly became tired. The applicant considered that “in order to spare [his] daughter’s emotional and psychological state individual sessions should be terminated”. 65.  On 25 March 2013 specialists from the Service visited the twins. The specialists concluded that the children enjoyed suitable living conditions that were conducive to their development, and noted that they were very affectionate towards I.N. They observed that K.J. enjoyed spending time with the guardian’s daughter, whom she called “sister”, but refused to have contact with her father. K.J. did not have contact with her older biological brothers. 66.  The child care specialists noted that D.J. spoke of I.N. only positively. He also had contact with his father during the times set in the court order – they would go to the shopping mall, cinema, and his father’s apartment. He would also spend time with his older biological brother, Ž.J. D.J. was willing to continue having contact with his father. 67.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits sent to the Court on 11 April 2013 the Government noted that the Service next planned to visit the twins later that month.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1919, 1941, 1947 and 1955, and live in Etes, Bátonyterenye, Salgótarján and Etes, respectively. 5.  In a real estate dispute, on 23 June 1994 Mr S. and others brought an action for a servitude (szolgalom) against the applicants. 6.  After three hearings, the preparation of an expert opinion and the identification of a plaintiff's successor, on 18 June 1998 the Salgótarján District Court found for the plaintiffs. On appeal, on 12 November 1998 the Nógrád County Regional Court quashed this decision. 7.  In the resumed proceedings, on 4 March 1999 the plaintiffs changed their action and claimed ownership. Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of an underlying land register procedure. The latter ended on 8 January 2001. On 23 April 2001 the plaintiffs' representative requested the resumption of the principal case. 8.  The proceedings resumed on 6 June 2001. After several hearings and the opinion of an expert, on 2 December 2003 the District Court dismissed the action. 9.  On appeal, on 11 May 2004 the Regional Court changed this decision and granted the plaintiffs the servitude they sought. 10.  On 20 September 2004 the applicants requested the re-opening of the case. On 27 April 2005 the Regional Court admitted their request. 11.  In the reopened proceedings, on 8 December 2005 the District Court established that the plaintiffs' adverse possession of the servitude in question had not taken place. It ordered the servitude to be deleted from the land register. 12.  On appeal, on 25 April 2006 the Regional Court changed this decision and upheld its decision of 11 May 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Kharkiv. 5.  In November 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”) against her neighbour, Ms. G., disputing her right to use a plot of land. 6.  On 9 February 1999 Ms G. lodged a counterclaim, alleging that she was so entitled.. 7.  On 29 June 2006, following one remittal of the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination, the proceedings were completed by a final ruling of the Supreme Court finding against the applicant. 8.  In the course of proceedings six forensic technical examinations were conducted at the parties’ requests.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Nonnweiler, Germany. 9.  In 1971, the applicant and a company engaged in negotiations with the city of Saarbrücken to obtain a building permit for a plot of land they had bought. In the course of these negotiations, the applicant and the said company undertook to pay 2,535,000 Deutschmarks (DEM) (approximately 1,296,000 Euros (EUR)) of the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure (Erschließung). The applicant also undertook to construct a shopping centre within two years following the grant of the building permit. 10.  On 1 April 1974 the applicant applied for the building permit with the municipal authorities. He offered to submit a bank security to cover the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure concerning the shopping centre, estimated to amount to some DEM 1,500,000. He also suggested that a contract on this point be signed by him and the city. 11.  In August 1974, following municipal elections, the city requested the applicant to submit a bank security of DEM 4,500,000 (approximately EUR 2,300,813) to cover the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure for the plot of land as a whole. Upon his refusal to do this, the city refused its consent to his request for a building permit. It also refused to conclude a contract concerning the construction of the shopping centre and the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure. 12.  On 23 August 1974 the applicant brought an official liability action (Amtshaftungsklage) for compensation in the Saarbrücken Regional Court against the city of Saarbrücken. He complained that the city's sudden decision to request a bank security of DEM 4,500,000, thereby setting up further inequitable conditions for its agreement to the applicant's building project, was a result of informal negotiations between different local political parties before the municipal elections. It constituted a voluntary breach of the principle of continuity in administrative actions. 13.  On 24 February 1975 the local building authorities refused to grant the applicant the requested building permit. This decision was later confirmed by the administrative courts. 14.  On 21 March 1975 the Saarbrücken Regional Court dismissed the applicant's official liability action. According to the Regional Court, nothing suggested that the city of Saarbrücken had acted in breach of its obligations as a public organ. 15.  On 27 June 1975 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate). 16.  In autumn 1976 the applicant's real estate concerned was sold by compulsory auction. 17.  On 3 February 1978 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate) dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded. 18.  On 7 February 1980, following the applicant's appeal on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice quashed this decision and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate). It requested the Court of Appeal to examine whether the city had discontinued abruptly the contractual negotiations with the applicant for arbitrary reasons, because the city was liable to pay damages to the applicant if it had done so. 19.  On 23 October 1981 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate) again dismissed the applicant's appeal. It found that, even assuming that the city had breached its duty as a public organ to act in a consistent manner, the applicant had failed to establish that there was a causal link between the city's conduct and the damage sustained by him. 20.  On 14 October 1982 the Federal Court of Justice decided partly to admit the applicant's renewed appeal on points of law. 21.  On 5 May 1983 the Federal Court of Justice partly quashed the Court of Appeal's decision and remitted the case to the Seventh Senate of that court. It found that the Court of Appeal, in its finding that a causal link was missing between the city's conduct and the damage sustained by the applicant, erroneously did not assess the evidence offered by him. 22.  On 10 July 1984 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Seventh Senate) amended the Regional Court's decision of 21 March 1975. It declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation, but did not yet assess the exact amount of the damages payable (Grundurteil). The Court of Appeal found that the city of Saarbrücken had unforeseeably and without legitimate reasons requested the applicant to submit a bank security of DEM 4,500,000, thereby willingly causing the breakdown of the negotiations about the grant of a building permit. Therefore, it breached its duty as a public organ to act in a consistent manner. 23.  On 11 July 1985 the Federal Court of Justice refused to admit the appeal on points of law lodged by the city of Saarbrücken. 24.  On 19 December 1985 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the city's constitutional complaint. 25.  On 8 July 1986 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal ordered the city of Saarbrücken to pay DEM 5,798,142 (approximately EUR 2.964.543) plus interest to the applicant and dismissed the remainder of his claim. 26.  On 22 June 1989, following both parties' appeals on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice quashed the Court of Appeal's decision as far as the amount of damages was concerned and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal. 27.  On 9 January 1995 the Court of Appeal (renamed Saarland Court of Appeal) ordered that an expert report be prepared on the amount of damages sustained by the applicant. 28.  On 12 January 1999 the Court of Appeal ordered that a further expert report be prepared on the amount of damages sustained by the applicant, taking into consideration additional tax-related aspects. 29.  On 20 July 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court allowed the applicant's constitutional complaint about the length of the official liability proceedings (see in detail paragraphs 36-37 below). 30.  On 25 and 26 September 2000, two different Senates of the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's challenges of the judges of the Court of Appeal on grounds of bias as ill-founded. 31.  On 20 November 2001 the Saarland Court of Appeal (Seventh Senate), after having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant's action for compensation. It found that it was not established that the applicant would have been in a financial position to realise his building project if he had been granted the building permit, regardless of the city's behaviour. The city's actions thus had not caused any financial losses to him. The court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the court proceedings (amounting to some EUR 2,512,222). 32.  On 24 April 2003 the Federal Court of Justice refused to admit the applicant's appeal on points of law against the Saarland Court of Appeal's judgment of 20 November 2001. It fixed the value in dispute (Streitwert) at some EUR 109,000,000 and ordered the applicant, being the party failing in his action, to bear the costs of the proceedings (amounting to another approximately EUR 657,322). 33.  On 28 May 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, claiming that his property rights, his rights to be heard, to a fair trial and to a decision by the judge having jurisdiction (gesetzlicher Richter) had been violated. 34.  On 28 July 2003 (decision served on 4 August 2003) the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's constitutional complaint. It found that he failed sufficiently to substantiate his complaint, which therefore was inadmissible. 35.  On 24 February 2004 the Saarbrücken District Court decided to start insolvency proceedings against the applicant. 36.  On 24 February 2000 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, arguing that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated in the official liability proceedings pending in the Saarland Court of Appeal. 37.  On 20 July 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court held that the applicant's right to an effective judicial remedy under the Basic Law had been violated in that the Saarland Court of Appeal did not render a decision on the amount of compensation to be granted to the applicant within a reasonable time. In its reasoning, it found that, despite the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings, which had been pending since 1974, was obviously excessive. It concluded that, pursuant to Section 95 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), it was restricted to the finding of a violation of the Basic Law. The Court of Appeal was now obliged to take effective measures in order to terminate the proceedings as soon as possible. 38.  On 24 April 2001 the applicant brought another official liability action under Article 34 of the Basic Law taken in conjunction with Section 839 of the Civil Code against the Land Saarland with the Karlsruhe Regional Court. He applied for a declaration (Feststellungsklage) that the Land Saarland was liable to compensate him for the damage which has been and will be caused by the excessive length of the proceedings before the Saarland Court of Appeal. 39.  On 9 November 2001 the Karlsruhe Regional Court allowed the applicant's action and ordered the defendant Land to pay the costs of the proceedings. 40.  On 20 December 2001 the Land Saarland lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Karlsruhe Regional Court of 9 November 2001 with the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal. The proceedings, which had been suspended on the motion of both parties awaiting the outcome of the official liability proceedings against the city of Saarbrücken, are to date still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Geretsberg. 5.  On 24 June 1999 the Braunau District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) charged the applicant with drunken driving. The applicant, represented by counsel, submitted observations on 13 July and 8 September 1999. 6.  On 21 September 1999 the District Administrative Authority issued a penal order (Straferkenntnis) finding the applicant guilty of drunken driving contrary to Sections 5 § 1 and 99 § 1 (a) of the Road Traffic Act (Strassenverkehrsordnung). As to the alcohol level the authority had regard to the results of a breathalyser test and to the corroborating results of a blood alcohol analysis carried out the following day. It imposed a fine of 16,000 Austrian schillings (approximately 1,160 euros) on him with 14 days' imprisonment in default. 7.  The applicant appealed on 12 October 1999. 8.  On 9 December 1999 the Upper Austria Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat) held a hearing at which it questioned the applicant and the two police officers who had carried out the breathalyser tests and a further witness. 9.  By decision of 21 December 1999 the Independent Administrative Panel, having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant's appeal. It found that the applicant had driven his car on 15 June 1999 at 8 p.m. having a proportion of alcohol in his breath exceeding the statutory level. He admitted to having consumed alcohol in the afternoon. Having run out of petrol, the applicant had left the car and had gone to the next petrol station. Upon his return, he had been requested by two police officers to undergo breathalyser tests. The tests, carried out at 8.52 and 8.54 p.m. respectively, had yielded results of 0.84 and 0.86 mg alcohol/litres. The Independent Administrative Panel dismissed the applicant's request to take an expert opinion in order to show that the difference in these results was due to his having consumed one and a half litres of beer when he went to fetch petrol and that he had, before that, not been driving his car in a state of drunkenness. Having regard to the instructions for use of the breathalyser at issue, the Independent Administrative Panel noted that the difference in the two test results was not significant. 10.  In any case, it found that the applicant's defence was not credible as he had stated at his first interrogation to have parked his car at 8 p.m. and had explicitly answered the police officers' question whether he had consumed alcohol after that in the negative. It was only in his written submissions of 13 July that he had claimed to have consumed more beer after 8 p.m. The bill submitted by the applicant did not support his defence as the innkeeper had stated that he had given the applicant this bill two weeks after the incident on his explicit request. He had not remembered the applicant and could not confirm whether he had actually consumed beer at his inn at the relevant time. 11.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) on 3 February 2000. He complained in particular about the refusal of his request to take an expert opinion. On 3 April 2000 the Independent Administrative Panel submitted observations in reply. The applicant made further submissions on 3 May and 21 June 2000. 12.  On 7 August 2003 the Administrative Court, having deliberated on 4 July 2003, dismissed the applicant's complaint as being unfounded. It found in particular that the Independent Administrative Panel's assessment of evidence did not suffer from any defects and that it had given detailed and convincing reasons for its refusal to take the expert opinion requested by the applicant. 13.  The decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 1 September 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the town of Shakhty in the Rostov-on-Don Region. 9.  In 1994 the applicant deposited his savings with “Hermes-Finance”, a Russian investment company. In 1995, when the applicant came to Moscow to recover his deposit, he found the company’s offices closed. 10.  On 12 August 1995 the applicant lodged a civil action against the company in the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow. The court disallowed the applicant’s action for lack of territorial jurisdiction. 11.  On 31 October 1995 the applicant brought an action against the company before the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow. Citing lack of territorial jurisdiction, on 17 November 1995 the Khoroshevskiy District Court transferred the case to the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow. The Government submitted that there was no indication in the case-file of the receipt of the claim by the Tushinskiy District Court. The applicant challenged this statement, referring to the “forwarding note” of 17 November 1995, from the Khoroshevskiy District Court to the Tushinskiy District Court, which had been copied to him. 12.  On 14 February 1996 the applicant sent a letter to the Tushinskiy District Court with a request to explain the delay in examination of his case. No answer was given. 13.  In April 1996 the applicant lodged yet another action against the company with the Moscow City Court. It was not accepted for lack of hierarchical jurisdiction. 14.  On 27 June 1996 the applicant brought an action against the company before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. On 9 August 1996 the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant’s statement of claim to the Moscow City Court, which, in turn, sent the claim on 22 August 1996 to the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow. 15.  On 5 May 1998 the Convention entered into force in respect of the Russian Federation. 16.  The parties offered different versions of further proceedings. 17.  On 8 June 1998 the applicant received a summons to appear before the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow on the same day at 2.10 p.m. The summons was delivered by regular mail and put in his letter box. 18.  On 29 September 1998 the applicant found in his letter box a summons to appear before the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow on 21 September 1998. 19.  On 25 November 1998, on coming home from the office, the applicant found in his letter box a summons to appear before the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow on 26 November 1998 at 2 p.m. 20.  The applicant submitted to the Court copies of the above summonses certified by a notary public. 21.  The applicant did not receive any further summonses or communications from the Tushinskiy District Court. 22.  On 29 March 2000 the applicant sent a letter to the Tushinskiy District Court, requesting it to account for the delay in the proceedings. On 13 April 2000 the applicant’s letter was returned to him with a handwritten request to specify the date when the action had been lodged. The applicant wrote the date on the same letter and sent it back on 20 April 2000. No answer was received. 23.  The Government denied the applicant’s submission that the hearings had been listed for 8 June and 29 [sic] September 1998 as not supported with the case-file materials. 24.  According to them, the first hearing on the applicant’s claim was fixed for 22 October 1998. As the parties failed to appear, the hearing was adjourned until 26 November 1998. The applicant was advised of the new date and he received the summons on 30 November 1998. 25.  On 26 November 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 24 December 1998, as both parties were absent. The applicant received the notice about the adjournment on 21 December 1998. 26.  On 24 December 1998 the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow left the applicant’s claim “without examination”, finding as follows:\n“The parties failed to appear twice, on 26 November and 24 December 1998; they were notified of the hearing date; the plaintiff does not ask for a default judgment, he did not produce the original documents and receipts, the copies submitted are not properly certified; the court does not consider it possible to examine the case on the basis of the materials in the file.” 27.  The decision indicated that an appeal lay to the city court against it within ten days. 28.  At the Court’s request, the Government enclosed a copy of the decision of 24 December 1998 with their additional observations of 19 April 2004. 29.  In support of their statements the Government produced the front and back pages of the case-file. 30.  The front page contains the name of the court, the names of the parties and the following handwritten notes:\n“Received:21 September 1998.Examined:22 October 1998 at 2.15 p.m.26 November 1998 at 2 p.m.24 December 1998 at 9.10 a.m.filed on 19 February 1999.” 31.  The back page contains the following handwritten notes:\n“Summons for 26 November 1998Summons for 24 December 1998[Copy of the decision sent] to the plaintiff on 19 February 199924 February 1999 – Archive.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  He worked as Manager-in-Chief of the State company “Inspectorate for the Transport of Freight and Passengers”, a subdivision of the Ministry of Transportation (“the employer”). 7.  In October 2001 the applicant was dismissed from his job. He brought a court action against the Ministry challenging the lawfulness of his dismissal. 8.  On 7 November 2001 the Centru District Court ordered the applicant's reinstatement. He was reinstated but was dismissed again on the following day. 9.  He brought another action against the Ministry, asking for his reinstatement and payment of his salary for the entire period of his involuntary absence from work. 10.  On 21 December 2001 the Centru District Court found for the applicant and ordered the Ministry to reinstate him. It also awarded the applicant 3,800 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 323 euros (EUR) at the time). 11.  That judgment was upheld by the Chişinău Regional Court on 13 February 2002 and by the Appellate Court on 23 May 2002. 12.  On 22 December 2001 the Centru District Court issued an enforcement warrant which it sent to the Ministry for enforcement. Since the Ministry failed to comply with the warrant within the time-limit set by the court, it was warned and twice given additional time to comply. 13.  On 5 February 2002 the applicant asked the Prosecutor General's Office to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of the refusal of the Minister of Transport, as head of the Ministry, to comply with a final court judgment. In the reply sent to the applicant on 18 February 2002 he was informed that there was no reason for the prosecution to intervene since it was the court's function to supervise the enforcement. The applicant also complained to other authorities (the prosecution service, the President), to no avail. 14.  On 8 February 2002 the Centru District imposed a fine of MDL 900 on the Minister of Transport for failing to comply with its judgment. The court also awarded the applicant his salary for the period of his involuntary absence from work between 21 December 2001 and 8 February 2002, amounting to MDL 2,219 (EUR 195). 15.  On 27 February 2002 a bailiff confirmed the Ministry's non-compliance with the judgment of 21 December 2001. 16.  On 28 February 2002 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the non-enforcement of the judgment. On 22 March 2002 the Ministry of Justice informed him of the previous attempts to enforce the judgment and of a new request by the bailiff to have the Minister of Transport fined. 17.  On 9 April 2002 the Centru District Court imposed a fine of MDL 1,350 on the Minister of Transport at the bailiff's request. The court also awarded the applicant his salary for the period of his involuntary absence from work after 8 February 2002, amounting to MDL 3,360 (EUR 195). According to the applicant, the Minister never paid any of the fines imposed by the court. 18.  On 12 September 2002 the applicant was reinstated and on 18 September 2002 he received MDL 9,925, representing his salary arrears. On 1 October 2002 he was reimbursed for the legal expenses incurred during the trial and on 31 October 2002 he received the last sum due to him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1967 respectively and live in Rajamäki. They have a son, born on 2 May 1999. 7.  The parents chose the name “Axl Mick” for their son. On 8 July 1999 the Hyvinkää Population Registration Authority (maistraatti, magistraten) refused the applicants' application to register this forename under section 32b, subsections 2(1) and 3(2), of the Names Act (nimilaki, namnlagen – see paragraph 16 below) as this form of spelling did not comply with Finnish naming practice. 8.  The applicants appealed to the then Uusimaa County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten, later replaced by the Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen)). They argued that the name “Axl” was common in Denmark and Norway, and it was also used in Australia and the United States. It was pronounceable in the Finnish language and was not incompatible with Finnish naming practice. There were at least three persons with that name registered in the Population Information System (väestötietojärjestelmä, befolkningsdatasystemet) of Finland. Furthermore, they might move abroad later. 9.  The State representative appointed by the State Provincial Office (lääninhallituksen määräämä asiamies, ombudsman förordnad av länssyrelsen) was invited to submit an opinion to the County Administrative Court. In his opinion, the name should have been accepted for registration since owing to increasing international contacts and cooperation, registration of a name could not be refused on the sole basis that it was contrary to domestic naming practice. 10.  In its submissions to the court the Advisory Committee on Names (nimilautakunta, nämnden för namnärenden) considered that the proposed name was incompatible with Finnish naming practice and that the applicants had not adduced adequate reasons for choosing it. 11.  In response to these observations, the applicants maintained that they should be allowed to name their son “Axl” as the Population Registration Authority had registered various other forenames, such as “Minja”, “Tertta”, “Jonina” and “Dersim”, which, in the applicants' view, were modified forenames and contrary to Finnish naming practice in these forms. 12.  The Helsinki Administrative Court dismissed their appeal on 3 October 2000. The court referred to the Names Act, by which a name could be accepted, even if incompatible with domestic naming practice, where a person had a connection with a foreign State on the basis of nationality, family relations or some other special circumstance and the proposed forename accorded with the naming practice of that State. The name could also be accepted for other valid reasons (see paragraph 16 below). The court concluded that the arguments submitted by the applicants were insufficient to allow the forename to be registered. 13.  In their application to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) the applicants claimed that it was open to interpretation whether the name “Axl” was contrary to the Names Act. They contended that some priests and population registration authorities would have accepted the name. Furthermore, at least three Finnish persons already had that name. In their view the name “Axl” should have been accepted for their son because it had been accepted for other persons. The name fulfilled the criteria of the Names Act in that it was clearly a male name and could not cause any harm to their son. Further, they had used the name in family circles. 14.  On 20 September 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Wolverhampton. In March 1995 he was a soldier in the British Army. 9.  On 3 March 1995 the Special Investigations Branch of the military police (“SIB”) began investigating charges against him in relation to the fraudulent misuse of travel warrants. He was due to be interviewed on 28 March 1995 but went missing from his unit. On 20 April 1995 he was arrested by the civilian police and returned to his unit. His commanding officer dealt with the charge of absence without leave summarily and sentenced him to, inter alia, 28 days' imprisonment. The applicant served 23 days. 10.  On 27 May 1995 the applicant was due for release, but his detention was continued because of the SIB investigation. On 1 and 2 June 1995 he was interviewed by the SIB. On 15 June 1995 he instructed his current legal representative. 11.  On 16 June 1995 he was brought before his commanding officer and a charge sheet was read out to him. It recorded one charge of obtaining property by deception (fraudulently claiming motor mileage allowance – “MMA”) contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968. An offence contrary to section 15(1) carries a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment. 12.  On 4 July 1995 the SIB submitted its final report on its investigation into allegations concerning the fraudulent misuse of MMA and of railway warrants (“RW”). 13.  On 29 August 1995 a further charge sheet was read to him. It recorded eight additional charges of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968, charges also relating to MMA. The applicant was remanded in custody for trial by court-martial. 14.  On 15 September 1995 he applied for legal aid under the army legal aid scheme. The legal aid certificate was sent by the Director of Army Legal Services to the applicant's unit on 6 October 1995 and the legal aid certificate was received by the applicant on 6 November 1995. 15.  On 16 October 1995 the applicant requested his military medical records. The records were delivered in four batches between mid-November and 1 December 1995. The applicant's purpose in obtaining these records was the preparation of medical reports supporting his claim that he suffered from epilepsy. 16.  On 11 December 1995, the applicant was released to open arrest. The court-martial hearing, fixed for 20 November 1995, was adjourned in light of the delay in receiving the medical records. The hearing was then fixed for 5 February 1996 as the applicant indicated that he would not be ready before that date. 17.  On 5 February 1996 the hearing was adjourned at the applicant's request to allow him to undergo a brain scan. Hearing dates of 18 and 25 March 1996 were proposed but neither party could make the first date and the applicant could not make the second date. The applicant referred on both occasions to his continuing medical tests for epilepsy. 18.  Given the applicant's allegations of epilepsy, in or around mid-1996 the prosecution decided to have the applicant attend its own medical experts. The applicant did not dispute that he was uncooperative in arranging appointments and that he left certain appointments prior to the examination being completed, even when he had been escorted by colleagues to the consulting rooms. He explained that he was not told that the prosecution had wished to enquire about the existence of his epilepsy. He had also been advised by his legal representative not to attend appointments that had not first been negotiated and certain initial appointments had not been notified to that representative. His appointment of 2 September was postponed by him to 30 September 1996 and that of 25 November was postponed by him to 11 December 1996. 19.  In December 1996 the prosecution received its medical report. It found that there was sufficient doubt about the applicant's epilepsy to allow it to proceed with further charges against him. Accordingly, on 27 March 1997 the applicant was charged with 18 additional offences of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 (concerning the misuse of RW). 20.  However, since the new court-martial system was coming into force on 1 April 1997 (pursuant to the Armed Forces Act 1996), it was decided to proceed against the applicant afresh under that new system. 21.  On 30 July 1997 the applicant's representative was notified that the new Army Prosecuting Authority (“APA”) was ready for trial. By 31 July 1997 the APA had referred all the charges for trial by court-martial. 22.  On 19 August 1997 the Army Criminal Legal Aid Authority (“ACLAA”) wrote to the applicant's representative referring to his letter of April 1996, confirming that legal aid on the MMA charges - which had been initially granted to the applicant's first representatives – had been transferred to the applicant's present representatives and apologising for the delay in that respect. That letter also referred to the additional RW charges and indicated that the ACLAA was currently organising legal aid for those matters also. 23.  On 12 September 1997 the applicant's unit completed the legal aid form for the RW charges, the form was signed by the applicant (by which he certified that all the information was true) and his unit submitted the form to the ACLAA. 24.  On 6 October 1997 the ACLAA requested him to submit certain information omitted from the legal aid form including his capital, his savings, details of the award of damages in his favour in October 1996 (see below) and copies of his bank statements for the last 12 months. He was asked to respond quickly in order to allow the processing of the legal aid application with the minimum of delay. The applicant maintained that he replied by letter dated 8 October 1997. In the copy of that letter submitted to the Court, the applicant stated that his application had been correct, that he had not kept his bank statements and that if they were required it would take a week or so to obtain duplicates from the bank. The ACLAA contended that it had no record of having received that letter and it was not until 21 November 1997 that it became aware that the applicant claimed to have sent a letter. 25.  On 24 November 1997 the applicant wrote to the ACLAA repeating what he had said in his letter of 8 October 1997 but still not enclosing his bank statements. On 26 November 1997 the applicant's commanding officer wrote to ACLAA enclosing the applicant's letters of 8 October and 24 November 1997 and copies of his bank statements which the applicant had collected from his bank under military escort. It was also noted that the applicant had declined to give details of the damages awarded to him in October 1996 but that he had confirmed that he had bought a house for 50,000 pounds sterling (GBP) in January 1997. 26.  On 27 November 1997 the applicant was formally referred for trial by general court-martial. A hearing had been already fixed for 1 December 1997, a date found to be suitable for the parties, including the 56 witnesses the applicant envisaged calling. However, on 1 December 1997 the applicant obtained an adjournment of the hearing because legal aid for the RW charges had been granted on that day. 27.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant wrote to the APA arguing that that his referral for court-martial was invalid as it was not in accordance with the relevant regulating provisions and that it was an abuse of process given the delay to date. A preparatory hearing fixed for 27 March 1998 was adjourned because the applicant did not appear and because the Court-Martial Administration Officer (“CMAO”) had not summoned the military witnesses. 28.  The applicant's claim that the proceedings were invalid was heard by the Judge Advocate on 22-26 June 1998 who rejected the claim. In finding that the delay did not amount to an abuse of process, the Judge Advocate stated that:\n“... there has been ... considerable delay in this matter. This has been delay which is just not acceptable. ... In my view much of this delay was caused by an unsuitable bureaucratic pre-trial process. With the benefit of hindsight, some of those responsible for working that process could have made things better by applying a greater degree of urgency whilst operating those procedures; ... One has in this situation a great deal of sympathy with the defence, although I am bound to say that the fault lies principally with the system rather than with the individuals responsible for working that slow bureaucratic process. ... there has been no significant contribution by the defence to this long and unjustifiable delay.” 29.  The CMAO then offered a court-martial hearing date in September 1998 but the applicant applied to the High Court on 14 July 1998 for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Judge Advocate. He challenged the decision (of 27 November 1997) to refer him for trial by court-martial. He further submitted that the court-martial should be stayed as an abuse of process on two grounds: that those responsible for the course of the proceedings had defaulted in their duties and because of delay. 30.  On 4 November 1998 the High Court directed that the judicial review application be made on notice to the respondent party and it was listed for hearing (for a maximum of two hours) on 26 March 1999. On that date the applicant's solicitor indicated for the first time that the judicial review hearing would probably take two days and the hearing was adjourned. It was re-fixed for 27 July 1999. Prior to the hearing of 27 July 1999 the applicant abandoned his challenge to the decision to refer him for trial by court-martial. At the hearing on that date the Court rejected both grounds for the claim of abuse of process. 31.  The court-martial hearing was then re-fixed for 15 November 1999 but the applicant did not appear. 32.  The court-martial was rescheduled for 22 November 1999 and the court-martial proceeded on that date. The applicant pleaded guilty to obtaining property by deception to the value of GBP 15,000. He was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment, of which he was to serve a further 7 months. The Judge Advocate commented that the delay in the case had been inordinate. He noted that, while the early delays had been avoidable, the delays since 1998 were attributable to the applicant who had used every delaying tactic. 33.  The applicant did not, prior to or during the court-martial, disclose his medical reports. 34.  By letter dated 17 December 1999, the applicant was informed of the reviewing authority's decision to reduce his sentence to three months' imprisonment. On 15 January 2000 a single judge of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court rejected his application for leave to appeal to that court. 35.  In November 1995 the applicant commenced habeas corpus proceedings in the High Court requesting his release on the grounds, inter alia, that he had not been given a formal hearing at which he was informed of the case against him and afforded an opportunity to present his own case for release. In their pleadings, the army authorities admitted that due to an “administrative oversight” the applicant had not been charged until 16 June 1995. Although the army authorities initially accepted that his detention between 27 May and 16 June 1995 was therefore unlawful, they argued later in the pleadings that that detention was, despite the oversight, lawful. On 11 December 1995, further to the army authorities' undertaking to the High Court, the applicant was released to open arrest. In mid-1996 he was released from open arrest and sent on leave. 36.  On 12 February 1996 the applicant instituted further proceedings in the High Court for compensation for, inter alia, unlawful detention between 27 May and 11 December 1995. The Ministry of Defence accepted that his detention between 27 May and 16 June 1995 had been unlawful. Various other admissions were made by the army authorities as regards the failure properly to complete certain reports regarding his ongoing detention but it was denied that such omissions rendered his detention unlawful. The case was settled on 21 October 1996 when the applicant was paid a sum of money and his costs.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977. He is serving a life sentence in prison. 6.  According to an extract from the register of convictions provided by the Government, the applicant had nine criminal convictions and one misdemeanour punishment on record. He was serving a life sentence on the basis of his conviction in 2001 for the murder of two people and attempted manslaughter of another person. Furthermore, he had several convictions for attacking prison officers and other prisoners. In addition, a large number of disciplinary punishments had been imposed on him in prison, including for disobeying orders of and threatening prison officers. In the individual action plans (kinnipeetava individuaalne täitmiskava) drawn up in Tartu Prison and in Viru Prison, the applicant was characterised as a dangerous person lacking in self-control and capable of physically attacking others. 7.  On 3 July 2009 the applicant was informed by prison guard KA that he would be transferred to a punishment cell in the evening in order to serve a disciplinary punishment. The applicant was dissatisfied, as he had been led to understand that he would not have to serve the punishment in question until the resolution by the Chancellor of Justice (Õiguskantsler) of his complaint related to the matter. He said that he would not gather his belongings until he could clarify the situation with a security officer. KA told him that if he continued to object to going to the punishment cell, he would be taken there by force. The applicant replied that he would defend himself if unlawfully attacked. 8.  At 5.45 p.m. KA, together with two further guards, MN and JT, went to the applicant’s cell. KA had a plastic shield and MN and JT wore flak jackets and helmets. KA moved towards the applicant, keeping the shield in front of him. MN and JT followed him. 9.  According to the applicant, KA came up to him and pressed the shield into his chest while the two other guards added pressure from behind. The applicant tried to push back against the shield, while MN and JT tried to grab his hands. Then KA let the shield fall and tried to grab the applicant’s neck. The guards twisted his arms behind his back and ordered him to lie down on the floor. The applicant was brought down and KA pressed his neck so strongly that he lost his breath. According to the applicant, KA pinched his nose with his fingers, covered his mouth with his palm, pressed his knee into his neck and poked him in the eyes with two fingers. While on the floor, the applicant was handcuffed and kicked in the ribs so hard that he felt his left rib cracking. He was then raised up and escorted to the punishment cell. In the corridor the applicant lost his breath, cried that he could not breathe and asked for permission to straighten up but the guards pressed him down and continued on their way. 10.  According to the prison guards, the applicant attempted to hit them and had a scuffle with KA, in the course of which the latter sustained minor injuries. They denied having kicked or strangled the applicant and submitted that he had subsequently threatened to kill them one by one. 11.  In the punishment cell, two nurses came to examine the applicant. They suspected a broken rib and told him to lie still until an X-ray image was taken (for the medical evidence in the case, see paragraphs 21 to 27 below). A guard told them that a medical certificate was required to keep a mattress in the punishment cell around the clock. According to the applicant a nurse confirmed that such a certificate would be drawn up. 12.  At 6.45 a.m. guard OV entered the applicant’s cell and told him to hand in the mattress. The applicant explained that the nurses had drawn up a certificate stating that he needed the mattress around the clock because his rib was broken. The guard left. 13.  At around 8.00 a.m. guards AR, VG, RT and OV came to the applicant’s cell and told him to hand in the mattress. They had a discussion of some length, in the course of which the applicant requested that senior duty officer ML be called. Guard AR warned the applicant that force would be used if necessary. According to the statements of VG given in the subsequent criminal proceedings, the applicant threatened to kill them. The guards left and returned after about fifteen minutes. According to the Government the guards had in the meantime checked with the medical service that the applicant had not in fact been authorised to keep the mattress in the punishment cell. 14.  At around 8.30 a.m. six guards arrived at the applicant’s cell. AR and VG entered, four further guards remained in the corridor or stood at the door to the cell. 15.  According to the applicant, AR came up to him, grabbed his left hand and told him that they were going to take the mattress from him. The applicant pulled his hand away and VG – unexpectedly and without any notice – sprayed pepper spray in his face while AR was attempting to twist his arm. The applicant ran out of the cell into the corridor, covering his face with his hands. Several guards attacked him from behind and he was forced down on the floor. He was repeatedly hit on the back after handcuffs had been put on him. After the applicant shouted that he could not breathe VG struck him a couple more times. He was then raised up off the floor, bent down and guided to the security room. According to the applicant, he fainted several times on the way because his injured rib caused him serious pain when being bent down. 16.  The Government relied on the statements of the prison guards given in the subsequent criminal proceedings. All six prison guards present were interviewed in the criminal proceedings, either as suspects or witnesses. According to AR and VG, the applicant pushed AR when he attempted to take the mattress. Then VG used pepper spray. According to the statements of the guards, the applicant resisted strongly and was forced down on the floor in the corridor. According to VG, he struck the applicant, who was on all fours, three times with a telescopic baton in order to overcome his resistance and handcuff him. AR and RT were unable to give details about the blows inflicted by VG. Nor was OV initially able to provide such details, but at a second interview he stated that by the time he closed the handcuffs, the applicant had not yet been hit with the telescopic baton. AJ thought that the applicant had probably been handcuffed while he was being hit by VG. According to AT, the applicant had been handcuffed but had forcefully struggled and pushed VG with his shoulder, after which the latter had struck him one or two times without much force. 17.  The applicant was then strapped to a restraint bed in accordance with the orders of duty officer ML, as he was still behaving aggressively and offering physical resistance to the officers. 18.  According to the applicant he was suffocating from the pepper spray in his throat but the guards pressed him to the bed, strangled him and did not let him spit. Finally he was allowed to spit and given the water he had asked for. 19.  According to a report on the use of the restraint bed, the applicant was strapped to the bed from 8.40 a.m. to 12.20 p.m. His condition was monitored once an hour, when the necessity of the continued use of the means of restraint was assessed on the basis of his behaviour. 20.  The report contains the following entries. At 8.40 a.m., 9.35 a.m., 10.30 a.m. and 11.25 a.m.: “[use of the restraint measures] to be continued, [the applicant is] aggressive”. At 12.20 p.m.: “[use of the restraint measures] to be discontinued, [the applicant is] calm.” The report also contains an entry according to which medical staff checked on the applicant; the time of the medical check-up recorded on the copy of the report on file is illegible. 21.  According to a medical certificate dated 3 July 2009 medical staff had been asked to establish the applicant’s injuries in the punishment cell. It was stated in the certificate that the applicant had no visible injuries but there was crepitation in the area of the seventh rib on the left side. A rib fracture was suspected. 22.  According to two medical certificates dated 4 July 2009 the applicant was examined by nurse RK at 8.50 a.m. and at 12.20 p.m. after his release from the restraint bed. It is stated in the certificates that the applicant had no visible injuries and did not need medical assistance. According to the applicant these certificates were “fabricated” in order to cover up his beating and were in contradiction with other medical evidence. 23.  On 4 July 2009 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination which revealed no clear traumatic changes. Photographs were taken of the haematomas (described below) on the applicant’s body. He gave a urine sample. Urine test results, dated 6 July 2009, showed red blood cells in the urine. 24.  According to a medical certificate dated 6 July 2009 the applicant had three haematomas measuring 20 by 1.5 cm on his back, a haematoma with a diameter of 8 cm on his right upper arm, a haematoma with a diameter of 3 cm on the right shin, swelling to the left wrist, crepitation in the region of the eighth and the ninth ribs on the left side. The applicant complained that he had been beaten on the back by the guards, complained of pain in his back and said that his urine had been red. The doctor considered that providing the applicant with a mattress was justified. 25.  An ultrasound scan of the applicant’s kidneys performed on 7 July 2009 revealed no signs of disease. 26.  According to a medical certificate concerning the applicant’s examination in a punishment cell on 9 July 2009, there were haematomas on the applicant’s back and ribs. The applicant did not allow the doctor to touch him, was aggressive and demanded a mattress. However, the doctor considered that the applicant’s chronic lower back pain did not serve as a reason for him to have a mattress. She made a recommendation “for further referral to a psychiatrist”. 27.  In a written explanation to the prison director by nurse RK, dated 21 July 2009, she submitted that she had been asked to examine the applicant, who had been strapped to the restraint bed on 4 July 2009. The applicant had complained, as he had already done on the day before, of pain in the chest under the ribs. The nurse and guards, as well as the applicant himself, had wiped his eyes with wet napkins. The nurse had issued a medical certificate stating that she had discovered no injuries on the applicant. At 12.20 p.m. on 4 July 2009, upon the applicant’s release from the restraint bed, she had again been asked to examine him. He had no complaints, save for the previously known complaint of pain in the lower part of his chest. The nurse had issued a certificate stating that she had not discovered any injuries and that the applicant had not needed medical treatment. On both occasions the examination had been carried out visually and the nurse had asked the applicant about his complaints. She had only noticed the haematomas on the evening of 4 July 2009. She had not noticed them before and had not carried out a more detailed examination because this had not been requested by the applicant. Based on her earlier experience with the applicant, the nurse had known that he was very demanding in respect of medical treatment. Thus, she had assumed that the applicant was not suffering from any serious conditions. 28.  On 7 July 2009 the Prisons Department of the Ministry of Justice started a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of abuse of authority by prison guards. The investigation was carried out by Ida Police Headquarters. 29.  On 8 July 2009 the applicant was interviewed as a victim. Between 7 and 28 July 2009 four guards (KA, MN, VG and JT) were interviewed as suspects. Six further prison officers (including OV), a prison doctor and a prisoner were interviewed as witnesses. Reports on the use of the special equipment and means of restraint (shield, helmets, flak jackets and handcuffs on 3 July 2009 and handcuffs and restraint bed on 4 July 2009), and written explanations to the prison director from prison officers involved in the incidents were also included in the criminal case file. 30.  On 23 September 2009 prison guard OV was interviewed for the second time. 31.  On 26 November 2009 the police requested additional information from the prison administration, including the applicant’s medical records and information about the telescopic batons used in the prison. 32.  On 15 December 2009 the police ordered a forensic expert examination of the applicant’s injuries. The expert completed his report on 15 February 2010. He relied on the written materials in the criminal case file, including a report of the applicant’s interview, medical documents and photos of the haematomas on the applicant’s body. He was of the opinion that the stripe-shaped haematomas on the applicant’s back had resulted from blows struck with a blunt instrument such as a stick or a baton, possibly on 4 July 2009. The haematomas on the applicant’s upper arm and shin had resulted from blows struck with a blunt instrument or from the applicant’s body being slammed against it. The haematoma and crepitation in the region of the eighth and the ninth ribs may have resulted from a rib fracture, but that diagnosis could not be confirmed without an X-ray examination. The expert concluded that the injuries in question were not life threatening and usually caused short-term health damage lasting from four days to four weeks. 33.  On 5 February 2010 the applicant was interviewed for the second time. 34.  On 10 February 2010 the police ordered a forensic expert examination of video recordings from prison security cameras. The expert completed his report on 13 April 2010. Having obtained forty-eight magnified and processed images from the video recordings, he concluded that it was not possible to establish the exact time at which the applicant was hit. 35.  On 15 June 2010 the police investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings. She considered that the use of force by the prison guards against the applicant on 3 and 4 July 2009 had been lawful, since he had not complied with their orders and had behaved in an aggressive manner. On 3 July 2009 he had refused to gather his belongings for his transfer to the punishment cell and had threatened to resist if force was used. On 4 July 2009 he had refused to comply with the prison’s internal rules and hand in his mattress. The guards had not denied that they had used force but had asserted that this had been the only way to overcome the applicant’s resistance. The applicant had attempted to escape and run out of the cell. Thus, the use of force had had a legal basis. It did not appear that VG had used the telescopic baton to deliberately cause injuries to the applicant. Nor could it be established that the force used by JT, VG, MN and KA had been excessive. They had countered an imminent attack after a more lenient response had not proved effective and the applicant had continued his resistance. 36.  On 17 June 2010 the police investigator’s decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings was approved by a circuit prosecutor. 37.  On 25 August 2010 the State Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It considered that the use of force, special equipment and means of restraint had been caused by the applicant’s behaviour, that is to say his failure to comply with the orders given to him and his physical and verbal aggressiveness towards the prison officers. It relied on the applicant’s handwritten letter of explanation to the prison director, in which he had confirmed having said on 3 July 2009 that if the prison officers unlawfully attacked him, he would strike back. Furthermore, according to prison guard MN the applicant had threatened to kill them if force was used to transfer him to the punishment cell. Considering the applicant’s extremely aggressive resistance, it had been proportionate to use force to bring him down to the floor and to hold him there. 38.  In respect of the events of 4 July 2009 the State Prosecutor’s Office referred to the statements of the suspects and witnesses, according to which the applicant had threatened the prison officers. It had been established that guard VG had used pepper spray after the applicant had pushed AR. The applicant had been engaged in an unlawful attack and the use of pepper spray against him had been lawful. Although the applicant’s subsequent running into the corridor could not be seen as an attempt to escape, it had still been possible that the situation might have got out of the prison officers’ control and they had had grounds to believe that the applicant would continue attacking them. To prevent such a scenario, the prison officers had legitimately acted in a quick and decisive manner, including through the use of the telescopic baton by VG. The incoherent statements of the witnesses as to the issue of whether the blows with the telescopic baton had been delivered before or after the applicant’s handcuffing did not allow for a firm conclusion to be made on that point. Nevertheless, based on the witness statements, the prosecutor considered it probable that the applicant had been hit before handcuffing. She also referred to the principle that any reasonable doubt should benefit the accused and considered that it had not been established that the prison guards had unlawfully used a weapon, special equipment or force against the applicant. In respect of the applicant’s being strapped to the restraint bed, the State Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the video recordings showed that after being handcuffed the applicant had remained aggressive and had offered physical resistance to the prison officers. 39.  On 21 October 2010 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of the State Prosecutor’s Office. It found that it had been established that the applicant had offered resistance to the prison officers and therefore the use of special equipment and means of restraint had been legitimate. The court agreed with the position expressed in the decision of the State Prosecutor’s Office that the special equipment had been used to the extent it had been necessary to overcome the applicant’s resistance. Thus, there were no grounds to continue the criminal proceedings in respect of the prison officers. 40.  On 6 August 2009 the applicant filed a claim for non-pecuniary damage with the prison administration for his inhuman and degrading treatment on 3 and 4 July 2009. The claim was dismissed and the applicant filed a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court. 41.  In a judgment of 8 March 2010 the Tartu Administrative Court found for the applicant. It declared the use of the means of restraint, special equipment and service weapons in respect of the applicant unlawful. The court found that although the applicant’s failure to comply with the orders given to him had undeniably constituted a threat to the general security of the prison, the use of handcuffs and his immobilisation had nevertheless not been justified, as there was no evidence and it had not been argued that the applicant had been armed or equipped with a dangerous item or that he had intended to escape or attack anyone. However, the court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation, considering that the use of means of restraint and special equipment had been caused, to a large extent, by the applicant’s own behaviour. He had disputed the officers’ orders, engaged in an argument with them, voiced threats and offered physical resistance. In these circumstances the finding of the unlawfulness of the prison’s actions constituted sufficient just satisfaction. 42.  Both parties appealed against the Administrative Court’s judgment. The applicant claimed monetary compensation and the prison administration contended that the prison officers had not acted unlawfully. 43.  At the hearing of the Tartu Court of Appeal on 22 September 2010 the applicant submitted, inter alia, that on 3 July 2009 he had been kicked in ribs once and that on 4 July 2009 he had been hit with a telescopic baton after he had already been handcuffed. Video recordings concerning both 3 and 4 July 2009 were played at the hearing. 44.  By a judgment of 14 October 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the Administrative Court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the use of the means of restraint, special equipment, physical force and service weapons had been lawful. The court considered that the prison had been authorised to use preventive measures in case of a probable threat. It noted that the applicant was serving a life sentence and had two further convictions for attacking prison officers. In January 2009 he had also threatened to kill a prison officer. 45.  In respect of the events of 3 July 2009 the Court of Appeal noted that there was no dispute that the applicant had repeatedly refused to comply with the prison officers’ order to go to a punishment cell. Furthermore, he had offered physical resistance and caused minor injuries to KA. Therefore, physical force and handcuffs had been used. Considering the applicant’s unlawful and aggressive behaviour, threats to the prison officers and to the general security in the prison, as well as the short duration (fifteen minutes) of the use of the handcuffs, the Court of Appeal found that the use of handcuffs had not been unlawful. In respect of the use of force, the court found that there was no evidence to prove that the applicant had been kicked, strangled or poked in the eyes with fingers. According to the medical evidence there had been crepitation but no fractures of the ribs. The court considered that pain in the applicant’s chest that he had complained of could have resulted from his resistance, which had led to a scuffle and his being forced on the floor for handcuffing. 46.  In respect of the events of 4 July 2009 the Court of Appeal considered it established that the applicant had displayed disobedience and threatened the prison officers. He had offered physical resistance against the guard who had attempted to take the mattress. Thus, the use of pepper spray had not been disproportionate or unlawful. Since the subsequent use of physical force had proved not effective, it had also been justified to use the telescopic baton in order to have the applicant handcuffed. The fact that the applicant had been aggressive at the time he was strapped to the restraint bed had also been proven by the video recording shown at the court hearing. 47.  On 17 February 2011 the Supreme Court declined to hear the applicant’s appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Amsterdam. 7.  In 1967 her parents built a holiday home without planning permission on land situated in Zutendaal (Belgium). According to the applicant, however, the house was built in 1962. 8.  Following her mother’s death, a deed of partition was drawn up on 6 January 1986 between the applicant (who, inheriting from her mother, became the remainderman of half of the property) and her father. That deed, which specifically mentions the existence of the building, was registered with the Mortgage Registrar at the Ministry of Finance and a registration fee was paid. 9.  The applicant’s father died on 21 August 1993 and she became the full and sole owner of the entire property. On inheriting the property, the applicant specifically declared in the notarised deed of distribution that the plot was a holiday home. The deeds were registered with the local authorities and the applicant paid the inheritance tax. From then on, the applicant paid an annual property tax (précompte immobilier) and second‑residence tax on the holiday home. According to the applicant, it went without saying that her father had also paid the relevant taxes on the house. 10.  The applicant carried out renovations on the house costing 50,000 euros (EUR) and had the trees on the adjoining land felled. 11.  In 1994 the partly government-controlled Flemish water-supply company carried out works to connect the house to the drainage and water-supply systems. There was no reaction from the local authorities at that time. 12.  On 27 January 1994 a report was drawn up by a police officer who noted that trees had been felled on the property in breach of Article 81, paragraph 3, of the Flemish forestry decree of 13 June 1990. 13.  On 22 February 1994 a report was drawn up by a police officer who noted that the holiday home had been erected in 1967 without planning permission and that it was located in a forested area in which no such permission could be issued. The report also noted that the exterior and roof of the house had been renovated. 14.  On 8 August 1994 the applicant voluntarily reported to the police to make a statement, which was placed on record. 15.  By a decision of 11 October 1994, the municipal council (collège des bourgmestre et échevins) asked the planning inspector to issue an opinion on any remedial action to be taken. By a letter of 19 June 1995, the planning inspector applied to the public prosecutor for the site to be restored to its original condition. 16.   Two reports dated 26 March 1996 and 8 January 1997 mention that the police had sought to question the applicant again but had found it difficult to contact her and that she was temporarily unable to travel for health reasons. 17.  At the request of the Tongeren public prosecutor, the applicant was questioned in Amsterdam on 25 March 1997 by a Dutch police officer. A report was drawn up on that occasion. 18.  On 18 May 1998 the public prosecutor asked the local police to confirm whether or not the building in issue still existed. 19.  A report of 16 June 1998 established that the situation had not changed. 20.  The Tongeren public prosecutor issued the applicant with a summons to appear in court on 12 May 1999, firstly, for having maintained a holiday home, erected without planning permission, between 27 January 1994 and 28 April 1999 and, secondly, for having felled approximately fifty pine trees in breach of the above-mentioned Flemish forestry decree. According to the applicant, there were at least four other houses built without permission in the same forested areas, which had neither been the subject of reports establishing that an offence had been committed nor of prosecution. 21.  On 25 June 1999 the Tongeren Criminal Court issued an interlocutory judgment in absentia, since the applicant had not been duly summoned. 22.  On 6 January 2000 she was once again summoned to appear before the Tongeren Criminal Court. 23.  On 26 May 2000 that court acquitted the applicant of the above-mentioned charges. It held in particular that after twenty-seven years the applicant could legitimately assume, as could any reasonably prudent citizen, that maintaining the building in issue would no longer constitute an offence. The court further held that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the planning inspector’s application to have the land restored to its original condition. The prosecutor appealed. 24.  By a judgment of 6 February 2002, the Antwerp Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in so far as the applicant was acquitted of the charge of felling the trees. However, it found her guilty of maintaining a building erected without planning permission, pursuant to Article 146 of the town and country planning decree of 18 May 1999, and changed the impugned period to between 22 August 1993 and 28 April 1999, having regard to the date on which the applicant’s father had died. 25.  In her submissions the applicant had alleged a violation of the reasonable-time requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, considering that the criminal proceedings had been conducted beyond that time-limit and that after such a long period there had been an interference with her rights of defence, in particular since it had been impossible for her to prove that the house had been built before 1962. She had also criticised the failure of the authorities to act, pointing out that her parents had paid the second-residence tax, that a notarised deed mentioning the building had been registered by the authorities, that she had paid inheritance tax on property that included the building, that extensive infrastructure works had been carried out by a partly government-controlled company with no reaction on the part of the local authorities and that for many years no legal action had been taken. She had also alleged a violation of the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations of citizens and complained of discrimination in comparison with neighbouring property owners. 26.  The Court of Appeal found that a deed of partition drawn up in 1986 and signed by the applicant established that the holiday home had been built in 1967 and concurred furthermore with the findings contained in the report drawn up on 22 February 1994. The Court of Appeal considered that the applicant knew or should have known that the building had been erected without planning permission. As a reasonable and prudent citizen, and even taking account of the attitude of the authorities as she had described it, the applicant could not have inferred that the situation was totally legal and that no proceedings would be brought against her. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant had acted most imprudently by proceeding to renovate the premises after the death of her father. It also found that the fact that four other dwellings had also been erected in the same forested area without planning permission and without their owners being prosecuted did not amount to discrimination. 27.  With regard, more particularly, to compliance with the reasonable-time requirement, the Court of Appeal found that the length of the criminal proceedings had been unreasonable but that this did not alter the fact that the offence had been established and that the applicant had, since 1994, been liable to prosecution. Considering, firstly, that overrunning the reasonable time did not cause the proceedings to become time-barred and, secondly, that account should be taken of the specific circumstances of the case, and in particular of the fact that the applicant had no criminal record, the Court of Appeal merely pronounced a finding of guilt against the applicant. 28.  Referring to the planning inspector’s application lodged pursuant to Articles 149 et seq. of the above-mentioned decree of 18 May 1999, which it deemed to be reasonable, the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to restore the site to its former condition and to demolish the building within one year of the judgment becoming final, with a fine of EUR 125 per day’s delay. It also authorised the municipal council or the planning inspector to enforce the order at the expense of the applicant in the event of non-compliance with the demolition order. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings. 29.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 30.  By a judgment of 7 January 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. 31.  On grounds based on a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings had been unreasonable and it could therefore be concluded that they were time-barred. 32.  The Court of Cassation held that exceeding a reasonable time did not cause criminal proceedings to become time-barred and that, consequently, the Court of Appeal had not been bound to base its decision on that point. 33.  The applicant also submitted that, bearing in mind that the Court of Appeal had merely pronounced a finding of guilt against her, she could not be bound to restore the site to its original condition or to pay the costs of the proceedings. 34.  The Court of Cassation responded that restoration of the site to its original condition did not constitute a penalty but a civil measure, in the same way as the payment of the full costs of the proceedings at the fixed rate, and that consequently these measures were not inconsistent with a simple finding of guilt. 35.  The court also dismissed the ground based on Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 whereby the applicant alleged that after a thirty-year period during which they had tolerated the situation, thus creating an apparently lawful situation, the authorities could no longer rely on the public interest to justify interference with the peaceful enjoyment of her property rights and respect for her private life. 36.  The Court of Cassation found that the Court of Appeal had held, in its unfettered discretion, that the applicant had been most imprudent in maintaining the house without planning permission, that the measure sought by the planning inspector was reasonable and that, consequently, that ground of appeal was inadmissible. 37.  The house was demolished in July 2004 pursuant to an enforcement order. According to an expert, the value of the house at the material time was EUR 62,635. The demolition costs amounted to EUR 3,025.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in the Lviv Region. 5.  In 1991 Mr A. (the applicant’s relative) lodged a claim with the Staryy Sambir Court against the applicant challenging her title to a house which she had inherited under her aunt’s will. In 1993, following the request of Mr A., the court discontinued the proceedings. 6.  On 24 July 1997, following the request of the widow of Mr A. (who had died in the meantime), the same court re-opened the case under the newly-discovered circumstances procedure. 7.  On 6 September 2000 the Galytskyy District Court of Lviv delivered a judgment in the case. On 18 December 2000 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed it and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 8.  On 18 March 2003 the Galytskyy Court invalidated a part of the will. 9.  On 23 June 2003 and 15 November 2004 respectively the Lviv Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the above judgment. The applicant received the decision of 15 November 2004 on 29 January 2005. 10.  Subsequently, the applicant unsuccessfully sought review of the case under the newly-discovered circumstances procedure. 11.  According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings two hearings were adjourned upon the applicant’s requests, three hearings due to her failure to appear and three other hearings due to both parties’ failure to appear. The applicant disagreed. According to her, between 3 and 30 June 2000 she underwent in-patient treatment and thus could not attend one of the hearings referred to by the Government. Three hearings were adjourned due to the absence of the judge or upon the other party’s request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983. His address is unknown. 6.  The applicant and his wife came to Austria in August 2008 and applied for asylum on 19 August 2008. They had travelled from Afghanistan via Iran to Greece. When the applicant and his wife first arrived in Greece they lived in a camp. They subsequently lived with people traffickers for approximately three months, and then in public parks. The applicant claimed that he had queued to apply for asylum in Greece, but had been beaten by the police and driven away. He and his wife had no access to financial support and had had to live in the parks after their money had run out. After four failed attempts, the traffickers managed to take the applicant and his wife to Austria. 7.  In his request for asylum in Austria the applicant claimed in substance to have had problems with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He submitted inter alia that eight years earlier the Taliban had kidnapped two of his brothers. 8.  On 14 October 2008, the Federal Asylum Office East (Bundesasylamt Erstauf­nahmestelle Ost) rejected the applicant’s asylum application on the grounds that Greece was responsible for examining it, pursuant to section 5 of the 2005 Asylum Act (Asylgesetz 2005) in connection with Article 10 § 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”, hereinafter “the Dublin Regulation”), and ordered his expulsion to Greece. It found that the applicant was not facing any real risk of ill‑treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention upon his return to Greece. The authority referred to a number of country reports, in particular those of the UNHCR of April 2008 and of the Swedish Migration Board. It acknowledged the ongoing criticism with regard to proceedings and treatment of asylum-seekers in Greece, but did not consider the applicant’s story of his experiences in Greece credible. The Asylum Office noted the UNHCR’s concern about the difficulties with which many asylum-seekers in Greece were confronted. This applied particularly to the facilities for asylum-seekers, access to asylum proceedings and the quality of the proceedings. On the other hand, the Asylum Office noted that Norway was the only country to have declared that it would no longer transfer asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. The Asylum Office also mentioned a recent decision by the Aliens Litigation Council, according to which there was no reason to suspend further transfers to Greece. The Asylum Office quoted the UNHCR position paper, which welcomed Greece’s reform attempts aimed at strengthening its asylum system. It further noted that a working group had been established, including members of the Greek authorities and the UNHCR, to tackle the “most burning” problems with the asylum system. Furthermore, the Asylum Office held that the relevant European directives were binding for Greece. Lastly, the Asylum Office referred to a fact-finding mission conducted by the Swedish Migration Board in April 2008 reacting to the harsh criticism voiced by various NGOs. The final report of that mission had concluded that there were no humanitarian or other reasons to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. In view of the fact that the asylum authorities of the other EU countries had not stopped transferring asylum-seekers back to Greece, the Asylum Office concluded that it was not necessary to make use of the sovereignty clause in the present case. It further noted that people who had never before lodged an asylum application in Greece and had been transferred to Greece under the Dublin Regulation had full access to asylum proceedings. 9.  The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, referring again to the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system, the danger of refoulement to Afghanistan and the lack of subsistence for asylum-seekers. 10.  On 11 November 2008, the Asylum Court (Asylgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unfounded. It found that an accumulation of proceedings under the sovereignty clause would endanger the “effet utile” principle of Community law. Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation was based on the assumption that all member States were safe countries and that a deportation to one of them could not constitute a human-rights violation. Therefore, arguments against such a deportation would need to be especially substantiated. Referring to the report of a mission of the Swedish Migration Board to Greece in April 2008 that showed that all twenty-six monitored cases had had access to Greek asylum proceedings, it found that there were no deficiencies in the conditions of access to asylum proceedings in Greece. With regard to the present case, the Greek authorities had already stated that the applicant would have access to asylum proceedings once he returned to Greece. Again referring to the mission report of the Swedish Migration Board, it found that the support of asylum-seekers in Greece was acceptable. Asylum-seekers were allowed to work in Greece. Lastly, there would be no risk of refoulement. In conclusion, the applicant would not be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on being returned to Greece. 11.  On 30 January 2009, the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of prospects of success. 12.  That decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 11 February 2009. 13.  The applicant’s wife was expelled to Greece on 25 November 2008. 14.  The applicant was expelled to Greece on 8 April 2009. 15.  At the Court’s request, on 4 August 2011 the applicant’s representative informed the Court of the exact date of the applicant’s transfer to Greece, namely 8 April 2009. He stated that despite being his counsel, he had not received any further information about his client since then. In later submissions he stated that he could establish contact with the applicant, if necessary, via trustworthy persons the applicant still knew in Vienna. He did not, however, provide the applicant’s current address to the Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in the town of Taganrog, the Rostov Region. 5.  In the 1980s the applicant took part in a rescue operation on the site of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. As of the late 1990s the applicant has been in receipt of social benefits in this connection. 6.  On 1 December 1998 the Taganrog Town Court (“the Town Court”) granted the applicant's claim for unpaid social benefits and ordered the pension authority to make him monthly payments of 1,850.55 Russian roubles (RUR  approximately 69 euros (EUR)) and a one-time payment of RUR 32,457 (approximately EUR 1,210). This judgment came into force on 17 April 1999. The sums due pursuant to the judgment of 1 December 1998 were paid in full on 8 May 2002. 7.  By a judgment of 4 October 1999 the Town Court granted the applicant's claim for other unpaid social benefits and ordered the authority to pay him RUR 1,850.55 (approximately EUR 69) monthly and also to make him a one-time payment of RUR 85,650 (approximately EUR 3,172). 8.  It appears that the judgment was not appealed against by the parties and came into force on 14 October 1999. The respective award was paid in full on 8 May 2002. 9.  On 29 August 2000 the Town Court examined and granted the applicant's claim to index-link the social benefits in line with the minimum monthly wage using coefficient “1,581”. It does not appear that the parties challenged the judgment on appeal and on 8 September 2000 it came into force. It appears that the authority disagreed with the judgment and refused to enforce it. 10.  On 6 March 2003 the Regional Court, acting by way of supervisory review upon the application of the President of the Rostov Regional Court under the old Code of Civil Procedure which, in its relevant part, remained in force until 30 June 2003, set aside the judgment of 29 August 2000 and remitted it to the first instance court for a fresh examination on the ground of a serious breach of substantive law. 11.  It appears that on 5 May 2003 the domestic courts re-examined and eventually rejected the applicant's claim. The respective judgment came into force on 30 June 2003. 12.  By a judgment of 5 December 2002 the Town Court examined and granted the applicant's claim for damages in respect of delays in the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2000. 13.  The court ordered the authority to make him a one-time payment of RUR 39,446.93 (approximately EUR 1,240) and monthly payments of RUR 8,007.74 (approximately EUR 251) starting from 1 January 2003. This judgment was rectified by the Town Court decision of 29 January 2003 and later approved by the Rostov Regional Court on 19 February 2003. 14.  It appears that eventually the authority was ordered to pay the applicant RUR 43,102.62 (approximately EUR 1,353) one-time and RUR 8,086.95 (approximately EUR 253) on a monthly basis. 15.  It appears that the judgment was re-opened and quashed on the ground of new circumstances by the Town Court on 10 October 2003. The court considered that the quashing of the judgment of 29 August 2000 constituted a new relevant fact and quashed the judgment of 5 December 2002 accordingly. Subsequently, the court decided to reject the applicant's claims.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Harjumaa. 9.  In April and May 1997 the Tartu Police instituted six criminal investigations relating to several offences of burglary, the forgery of a passport and the unlawful keeping of a firearm. The applicant, one of the suspects, could not be found. On 26 May 1997 the police declared him to be a wanted person. On 7 July 1997 a judge of the Tallinn City Court (Tallinna Linnakohus) authorised the police to take the applicant into custody for two months when he was located. On 27 October 1997 the applicant was caught and taken into custody. On 23 December 1997 the City Court authorised the applicant’s detention until 20 January 1998. However, on 29 December 1997 the City Court granted his request for release on bail. The amount of the bail was set at 42,000 kroons (€ 2,684). 10.  On 12 September 1998 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of having on the same day committed a burglary with three other persons. 11.  The next day the applicant’s arrest was approved by a judge of the Tallinn City Court who authorised the applicant’s detention for 10 days, i.e. until 22 September 1998. The court noted that the applicant had a prior criminal conviction and that he was suspected of having committed a new crime at a time when he had been released on bail in another criminal case (see paragraph 9 above) against him, which was pending before it. 12.  On 22 September 1998 the applicant was formally charged with burglary. On the same day the City Court prolonged his detention until 22 November 1998 on the ground that he had a prior criminal conviction and could re-offend, if released. 13.  In his appeal against the decision the applicant argued that the reasons referred to by the court were inadequate to justify his detention. He had a fixed place of residence and there was no reason to believe that he could commit new offences. Moreover, the reference to his prior conviction was irrelevant, since it was no longer on his criminal record. 14.  On 13 October 1998 the Tallinn Court of Appeal (Tallinna Ringkonnakohus) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It considered that, although the applicant’s criminal record had been expunged, the fact of his conviction of theft in 1995 was still a factor relevant to his character. It also found it significant that the applicant had allegedly committed a new offence while he had been released on bail in other charges. 15.  On 19 November 1998 the City Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 January 1999 for reasons identical to those contained in its previous prolongation order of 22 September 1998. 16.  Following the completion of the preliminary investigation on 13 January 1999, the City Court, by a decision of 20 January 1999, committed the applicant for trial and left unchanged the preventive custody measure. It joined to this case another criminal case against the applicant which concerned further acts of burglary, committed in a group of persons, as well as falsification of a document and unlawful possession of a firearm. 17.  At a hearing before the City Court on 19 February 1999 the applicant requested his release from custody, arguing that his health had deteriorated and that he had difficulty eating without proper dentures which had been broken by a police officer at the time of his arrest. His request was refused on the ground of the danger of his re-offending if released.\nAs one of the co-defendant’s had fallen ill, the City Court adjourned the trial hearing. 18.  At a hearing on 12 April 1999 the City Court refused another request by the applicant for release from custody, referring to the applicant’s prior criminal conviction and his continued criminal activity when he had been released on bail in another criminal case against him. There was thus reason to believe that the applicant would commit further offences if released. The court adjourned the trial hearing due to the ill-health of one of the co-defendants which prevented him from attending. 19.  The applicant’s further requests for release were rejected by the City Court on the same grounds by decisions of 26 May 1999, 22 September 1999, 1 December 1999, 2 February 2000, 30 March 2000 and 31 May 2000. On these dates the trial hearing was adjourned due to the absence of victims, witnesses, defence counsel or co-defendants. 20.  On 4 October 2000 the City Court granted the applicant’s request for release, noting that the applicant had already been in custody for over two years, that he had a fixed place of residence and that the parties had not agreed to sever the charges against the applicant from the rest of the case. 21.  From the end of the year 2000 until the end of year 2003 the trial hearing was adjourned on several occasions for various reasons. 22.  On 22 December 2003, in summary proceedings, the City Court convicted the applicant of burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm and falsification of a document and sentenced him to 2 years, 2 months and 27 days’ imprisonment. The sentence was considered as having been served during the two periods the applicant had spent in pre-trial detention.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and is currently held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre in Turkey. 6.  In 2003 the applicant left his home country and, via Libya, arrived in Syria, where he received religious training. Six months after his arrival in Syria, the applicant was detained for two months under the Syrian Government's policy of detaining and deporting nationals of North African countries. After his release from detention in Syria, the applicant left that country in March 2005 and arrived in Istanbul. He then went to Hatay, a province in the south of Turkey, where he began working. His identity documents were stolen and subsequently the applicant obtained a false passport. 7.  On 15 August 2006 the applicant was arrested by police officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the Hatay police headquarters on suspicion of membership of an international terrorist organisation, namely Al-Qaeda. The search carried out in the apartment he had shared with another person revealed some materials used for manufacturing bombs. During his questioning by the police, in the presence of an interpreter, the applicant stated that he was not a member of Al-Qaeda but of Ennahda, an illegal organisation in Tunisia. 8.  On 17 August 2006 the applicant made statements before the Adana public prosecutor and subsequently the Adana Magistrate's Court, which remanded the applicant in custody. 9.  On 18 August 2006 the applicant lodged an objection against the detention order, which was dismissed on the same day. 10.  On 14 September 2006 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Adana Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of Al-Qaeda under Article 314 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of Law no. 3713. In the indictment the public prosecutor noted, inter alia, that an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant in Tunisia for membership of Ennahda and that the applicant had left his country for that reason in 2003. 11.  On 25 September 2006 the Adana Assize Court allowed the bill of indictment lodged against the applicant and decided to hold the first hearing on the merits of the case on 9 November 2006. 12.  On 9 November 2006 the applicant made statements before the Assize Court. He contended, inter alia, that he did not have any connection with Al-Qaeda and that the material found in his apartment did not belong to him but to his flatmate. 13.  On 25 January 2007 the applicant's representative requested the first-instance court to order the applicant's continued detention. He submitted in this respect that the applicant had applied to both the Turkish authorities and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to be granted refugee status and that, if he were released, he might be deported to Tunisia. The applicant himself also requested that he be kept in detention until the outcome of his application for refugee status. On the same day, the Assize Court ordered the applicant's continued detention, taking into consideration the nature of the offence and the applicant's request. 14.  On 12 April 2007 the Adana Assize Court ordered the applicant's release pending trial. 15.  On 19 February 2008 the Adana Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charge of membership of Al-Qaeda. 16.  Appeal proceedings are currently pending before the Court of Cassation. 17.  On 19 January 2007 the applicant applied to the Ministry of the Interior requesting asylum. 18.  On 16 April 2007 the Ministry of the Interior dismissed this request. According to a document addressed to the Adana public prosecutor's office by the Ministry of Justice on 24 April 2007, the applicant's temporary asylum request was dismissed in view of the offences with which he had been charged and the fact that his presence in Turkey constituted a threat to public safety and public order. It was considered that the applicant had not been sincere in his request but had attempted to use the temporary asylum system in order to avoid deportation to Tunisia. 19.  On 25 April 2007 the decision of the Ministry was served on the applicant. In the documents so served, he was told that he could lodge an objection with the Ministry against this decision within two days. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant objected to the decision of 16 April 2007. On 18 May 2007 he was notified that the Ministry had dismissed his objection. The decisions of 25 April and 18 May 2007 were served by a police officer who spoke Arabic. 21.  In the meantime, on 3 May 2007 the applicant was recognised as a refugee under the UNHCR's mandate. 22.  On 16 October 2007 the applicant was served with a deportation order. 23.  On 17 October 2007 the applicant addressed a petition to the Adana police headquarters. He maintained that his request for temporary asylum had been rejected on 18 May 2007 and that he had learned that he would soon be deported to Tunisia. The applicant requested that his deportation be suspended since his lawyer intended to challenge the deportation order before the administrative courts. 24.  On the same day the applicant's lawyer lodged an application with the Supreme Administrative Court. He requested the setting-aside of the decision rejecting the applicant's asylum request. The applicant's representative further requested the setting-aside of the deportation order. 25.  On 26 October 2007 the applicant's representative filed a petition with the Adana police headquarters and informed the latter of the application he had lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court. He requested the police not to deport the applicant. 26.  On 26 October 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and transferred the petition to the Ankara Administrative Court. 27.  On 14 February 2008 the Ankara Administrative Court requested the Ministry of the Interior to submit a copy of all documents relating to the applicant's case. 28.  On 20 March 2008 the Ankara Administrative Court, after receiving the documents concerning the applicant, rejected the application, holding that the applicant had not complied with the time-limit of sixty days stipulated in the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577). The first-instance court held that the applicant had been notified of the Ministry's decision rejecting his temporary asylum request and ordering his deportation on 18 May 2007, and that the applicant should have challenged this decision by 17 July 2007 at the latest. The court noted that the applicant's petition dated 17 October 2007 to the Adana police headquarters and his application to the Court would not stop the running of the sixty-day time-limit. 29.  On 20 June 2008 the applicant's representative lodged an appeal against the decision of 20 March 2008. In his petition, the representative noted that the Ministry's decision rejecting the applicant's objection had not been served on his lawyer, who had found the document dated 25 April 2007 in the criminal case file by chance. 30.  On 3 July 2008 the applicant's representative was informed by the president of the Ankara Administrative Court that he had failed to pay the court fees and that he had to pay a total of 161.80 Turkish liras (TRY) by postal order within fifteen days. The representative was warned that if he failed to pay this sum, the applicant would be deemed to have waived his right of appeal. 31.  On 11 August 2008 the applicant's representative effected the postal order and paid TRY 162. 32.  On 24 October 2008 the Ankara Administrative Court decided that the applicant had waived his right of appeal since his representative had failed to pay the Court fees despite the warning. 33.  On 12 January 2009 the applicant' representative appealed against the decision of 24 October 2008, claiming that he had paid the fees. He submitted a copy of the postal order in support of his petition. 34.  On 2 February 2009 the Ankara Administrative Court informed the applicant that his representative had failed to pay the Court fees in relation to his appeal dated 12 January 2009. 35.  On 4 March 2009 the applicant's lawyer paid TRY 175 in court fees by way of a postal order. 36.  Following the decision of the Adana Assize Court of 12 April 2007 to release the applicant pending trial, the applicant was not released but was taken to the foreigners' department at the Adana police headquarters. 37.  On 12 April 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Fatih police station in Adana. 38.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant's representative sent a request to the General Police Headquarters for the applicant to be released from detention. In his request he noted that the applicant was being detained in a small cell and that on 26 October 2007 the European Court of Human Rights had indicated to the Turkish Government that the applicant should not be deported to Tunisia until further notice. 39.  The applicant's representative received no reply to his request. 40.  Subsequently, on 12 March 2008 he filed a complaint with the Adana public prosecutor's office against the Minister of the Interior, the Adana Governor, the Adana police director, the director of the foreigners' department at the Adana police headquarters and the director of the Fatih police station. He requested the public prosecutor's office to initiate an investigation into the persons concerned, alleging that they had unlawfully deprived the applicant of his liberty and that his detention in a small cell for ten months constituted ill-treatment. The representative noted in his request that there was no legal basis on which to detain the applicant, since asylum seekers were normally given temporary residence permits in Turkey. He further submitted that the ventilation was inadequate in the cell. The applicant was completely isolated and there was no provision for outdoor exercise. Moreover, the applicant did not have access to a doctor. In particular, when he had had a toothache he was denied access to a dentist and had to take the medication that was given to him by police officers. 41.  On 16 April 2008 the Adana public prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the Minister of the Interior, holding that he had not committed any offence as the applicant was being detained by the police with a view to his deportation. 42.  On 23 September 2008 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided not to process the request from the applicant's lawyer to bring proceedings against the Adana governor. 43.  On the same day the applicant's representative wrote to the department responsible for aliens, borders and asylum attached to the General Police Headquarters, to the Adana police headquarters and to the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Parliament, requesting that his client be released from the Fatih police station. 44.  In the meantime, between 1 October 2007 and 3 November 2008 the applicant was examined and prescribed treatment at the Adana hospital on seven occasions. He was examined by an ophthalmologist, a dentist and a general practitioner in relation to his respiratory problems. 45.  On 7 November 2008 the applicant was transferred to the Kırklareli Aliens' Admission and Accommodation Centre. 46.  On 12 January 2009 the President of the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Parliament sent a reply to the applicant's representative informing him that the applicant was being detained pending the deportation procedure and that he had been transferred to the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. 47.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and twelve other persons in Tunisia on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation, aiding and abetting the organisation and providing financial support to that organisation. According to a document translated from Arabic into Turkish by the applicant, on 12 January 2008 a Tunisian criminal court convicted him of membership of an illegal organisation and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Mr Benieamin Manole, the first applicant, was born in 1956 and lives in Priponesti, Galaţi county. 6.  By decision of 15 January 2006 the first applicant, a farmer, and forty-eight other persons meeting in constituent assembly decided to form a trade union entitled “Agricultural trade union Romanian Farmers Direct”. The first applicant was elected President of the new trade union. 7.  On 23 January 2006 the first applicant applied to the Tecuci District Court seeking the registration of the trade union which he represented, with a view to conferring legal personality on it. He enclosed with his request the statutes of the trade union and the relevant authority form presented to him by the Constituent Assembly, as notarised on 27 January 2006. 8.  According to those statutes, the applicant trade union’s main purpose was to defend the interests of its members, that is to say farmers and persons providing services for farmers, including transport facilities. The first applicant described that purpose as follows:\n“The Romanian Farmers Direct trade union emerged from the desire to help Romanian farmers move on from subsistence farming to agriculture as practised in the European Union, where the production of rural farms is directed towards the market rather than self-sufficiency, as is currently the case in our country, [in order to] provide farmers with a decent standard of living.\nOur trade union has set itself the aim of organising local centres (three or four adjacent municipalities) in all the counties of Romania with a view to providing legal information, accountancy advice and judicial assistance to individual farmers ....\nWe believe that it would be advantageous if as many farmers as possible could come together to think and act in unison in order to ensure the success of our agricultural activities ....” 9.  By judgment of 27 January 2006 the district court, sitting in single-judge formation (Judge N.M.), declared the request for registration of the trade union inadmissible on the grounds that only employees (persoanele încadrate în muncă) and civil servants could set up trade unions. 10.  On appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant trade union, represented by the first applicant, that judgment was quashed by decision of Galaţi County Court on 21 March 2006. That court held that the action had been wrongly declared inadmissible and that the district court should have examined the merits of the case. 11.  By judgment of 12 April 2006 the Tecuci District Court, sitting in the same single-judge formation, rejected the request as ill-founded on the grounds that under Law No. 54/2003 on trade unions (Legea sindicatelor), farmers could not set up trade unions but could only join pre-existing unions. 12.  The applicant trade union lodged an appeal on points of law, submitting, first of all, that the court which had tried the case after invalidation had been the same which had delivered the invalidated judgment of 27 January 2006, and secondly, that Article 40 of the Constitution guaranteeing trade union rights had been infringed. 13.  By decision of 30 May 2006 the county court accepted the applicant trade union’s appeal on points of law insofar as it concerned the make-up of the first-instance trial court, and, assessing the merits of the case, rejected the trade union’s application for the registration of the trade union. In doing so the court observed that only employees holding a contract of employment and civil servants could set up trade unions, to the exclusion of farmers and other self-employed persons, who could only join pre-existing trade unions. 14.  By a handwritten authority form dated 12 November 2006, the first applicant, acting in his own name and on behalf of the applicant trade union – in his capacity as the latter’s representative – appointed Mrs G. Perin counsel to represent them before the Court. That authority was signed by both the first applicant and Mrs G. Perin.\nThe authority may be translated as follows:\n“I, the undersigned Manole Benieamin, born on 18 March 1956 in the municipality of ..., in my capacity as President of the farmers’ trade union ‘Romanian Farmers Direct’ and as legal representative of that trade union, appoint as counsel to defend our case before the European Court of Human Rights Ms Giulia Perin, a lawyer practising in Padua, Italy.”\n \nII.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE\n... 22.  The relevant provisions of the (Revised) European Social Charter, the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and derived European law are expounded in the judgments in the cases of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (no . 2330/09, §§ 58-60) and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey ([GC], no 34503/97, §§ 45-47, ECHR 2008). 2.  International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards\n(a)  ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), and supervision of its application 23.  The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, which was adopted in 1948 and ratified by Romania on 28 May 1957, are set out in the judgments in the cases of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (cited above, § 56) and Danilenkov and Others v. Russia (no. 67336/01, § 105, ECHR 2009 (extracts)). 24.  The relevant parts of the observations of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), adopted in 2012 and published in 2013, concerning the application by Romania of Convention No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise read as follows:\n“The Committee notes, however, that certain issues previously raised are still pending after the adoption of the Social Dialogue Act .... The Committee also notes a number of additional discrepancies between the provisions of the Social Dialogue Act and the Convention in terms of scope of application (such as self-employed, apprentices, dismissed or retired workers), eligibility conditions for trade union officials, restriction of trade union activities ... etc.\nIn this respect, the Committee notes that the Government has recently benefitted from ILO technical assistance seeking to ensure the conformity with the Convention of a draft Emergency Ordinance which substantially amends the Social Dialogue Act. The Committee trusts that the Government will take due account of its comments in the context of this legislative review and that the new legislation will be in full conformity with the Convention. The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report any developments in this respect.” 25.  The relevant parts of the global report entitled “Freedom of association in practice: Lessons learned. Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” read as follows:\n“82.  The ILO supervisory bodies have consistently emphasized that all workers, without any distinction, and irrespective of their employment status, including self-employed workers, managerial employees and workers in cooperatives, should enjoy the right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing, like all other workers. This is all the more important in the case of vulnerable categories of workers for whom the exercise of the right to organize is a way of breaking out of marginalization and poverty. ...\nAgriculture and rural employment 158.  Nearly half the world’s workforce is found in rural areas, which remain the largest source of employment in Africa and most of Asia. Nevertheless, in many countries agricultural and rural workers are still denied the right to organize and bargain collectively. This is despite the fact that the need to protect the rights of those working in agriculture was recognized as early as 1921, when the ILO’s member States adopted the Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (No. 11), according to which agricultural workers should have the same ‘rights of association and combination’ as industrial workers. This Convention has been ratified by 122 member States. 159. At the same time, the practical difficulties of putting into effect the rights to organize and bargain collectively in the sector cannot be minimized. The agricultural sector, and rural employment in general, have distinctive features. In general, agriculture is a sector in which small enterprises with relatively few employees predominate and self-employment is widespread. Much of the wage employment is temporary or seasonal, and farms are spread over wide geographical areas. These factors are a challenge to trade union organization. The number of agricultural trade union members is usually relatively small compared to the total number of workers in the sector. ... 160. In addition to practical difficulties facing agricultural workers who wish to organize, there is also evidence of government interference which restricts the exercise of this basic right. The most common legal obstacle in the sector remains the full or partial exclusion of agricultural workers from legislation guaranteeing the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. ...”\n(b)  ILO Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (No. 11) 26.  The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 11 on the right of association (agriculture), adopted in 1923 and ratified by Romania on 28 May 1930, read as follows:\nArticle 1\n“Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to secure to all those engaged in agriculture the same rights of association and combination as to industrial workers, and to repeal any statutory or other provisions restricting such rights in the case of those engaged in agriculture.”\n(c)  ILO Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention (No. 141) and the relevant recommendations 27.  The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 141 on Rural Workers’ Organisations and their role in economic and social development, which was adopted in 1975 and has not been ratified by Romania, read as follows:\nArticle 2\n“1.  For the purposes of this Convention, the term rural workers means any person engaged in agriculture, handicrafts or a related occupation in a rural area, whether as a wage earner or, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, as a self-employed person such as a tenant, sharecropper or small owner-occupier. 2. This Convention applies only to those tenants, sharecroppers or small owner-occupiers who derive their main income from agriculture, who work the land themselves, with the help only of their family or with the help of occasional outside labour and who do not -\n(a) permanently employ workers; or\n(b) employ a substantial number of seasonal workers; or\n(c) have any land cultivated by sharecroppers or tenants.”\nArticle 3\n“1.  All categories of rural workers, whether they are wage earners or self-employed, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations, of their own choosing without previous authorisation. 2. The principles of freedom of association shall be fully respected; rural workers’ organisations shall be independent and voluntary in character and shall remain free from all interference, coercion or repression. 3. The acquisition of legal personality by organisations of rural workers shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this Article. 4. In exercising the rights provided for in this Article rural workers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land. 5. The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Article.” 28.  ILO Convention No. 141 has been ratified by 40 States, including nineteen member States of the Council of Europe (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 29.  The relevant provisions of Recommendation No. 149 concerning rural workers’ organisations and their role in economic and social development, adopted by the ILO in 1975, read as follows:\nII. Role of Organisations of Rural Workers\n“4. It should be an objective of national policy concerning rural development to facilitate the establishment and growth, on a voluntary basis, of strong and independent organisations of rural workers as an effective means of ensuring the participation of rural workers, without discrimination ... in economic and social development and in the benefits resulting therefrom. 5. Such organisations should, as appropriate, be able to--\n(a) represent, further and defend the interests of rural workers, for instance by undertaking negotiations and consultations at all levels on behalf of such workers collectively;\n(b) represent rural workers in connection with the formulation, implementation and evaluation of programmes of rural development and at all stages and levels of national planning; ...\n(f) contribute to the improvement of the conditions of work and life of rural workers, including occupational safety and health; ...\nIII. Means of Encouraging the Growth of Organisations of Rural Workers 6. In order to enable organisations of rural workers to play their role in economic and social development, member States should adopt and carry out a policy of active encouragement to these organisations, particularly with a view to -\n(a) eliminating obstacles to their establishment, their growth and the pursuit of their lawful activities, as well as such legislative and administrative discrimination against rural workers’ organisations and their members as may exist; ... 7. (1) The principles of freedom of association should be fully respected; rural workers’ organisations should be independent and voluntary in character and should remain free from all interference, coercion or repression. ... 8. (1) Member States should ensure that national laws or regulations do not, given the special circumstances of the rural sector, inhibit the establishment and growth of rural workers’ organisations. ...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "3.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1965, respectively, and live in Samsun and Ankara. 4.  On 17 October 2001 the applicant was discharged from his civil service post following his previous criminal conviction by a martial law court. The conviction had been finalised by the Military Court of Cassation's decision of 11 November 1997. 5.  On 4 January 2002 the applicant brought an action before the Samsun Administrative Court to annul the discharge order. 6.  On 5 June 2002 the Samsun Administrative Court rejected the applicant's request. 7.  On 7 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Samsun Administrative Court. The written opinions of the public prosecutor and of the judge rapporteur (“tetkik hakimi”) concerning his appeal request were not communicated to the applicant. 8.  On 31 December 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request for rectification of its previous decision. 9.  On 11 January 2002 the applicant was discharged from his civil service post after a disciplinary decision. Criminal proceedings were also commenced against the applicant on the same grounds as those which had led to his discharge. 10.  On 15 March 2002 the applicant brought an action before the Ankara Administrative Court to annul the discharge order. 11.  On 25 June 2002 the Ankara Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the offences with which he had been charged. On 22 March 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant's acquittal. 12.  In the meantime, on 31 March 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court refused the applicant's request to annul the discharge order. Relying on Section 131 of the Law on Civil Servants (Law no. 657), the administrative court held that the applicant's acquittal of the criminal charges did not absolve him from the disciplinary sanction. 13.  On 26 April 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court. The written opinions of the public prosecutor and of the judge rapporteur concerning his appeal request were not communicated to the applicant. 14.  On 23 January 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's rectification request. The final decision was served on the applicant on 4 March 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first applicant, Mr Patrick Benjamin, was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape in 1983. His tariff period (the minimum period of detention satisfying the requirements of retribution and deterrence) was set at six years and expired in April 1989. His time in prison was characterised by periods of thought disorder, delusions and behavioural problems and the Secretary of State decided that he was in need of care and treatment in a secure hospital. In August 1989, he was made the subject of a transfer direction and a restriction order under, respectively, sections 47 and 49 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (the 1983 Act) and transferred to Broadmoor Special Hospital. 9.  In October 1993, the Secretary of State decided, following consultation with the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice, that the first applicant should be regarded as a “technical lifer” (that is a person who was suffering from a mental disorder which influenced him to a significant extent at the time of the offence although the court had not made a hospital order on sentencing). 10.  In April 1994, the first applicant was transferred to Bracton Clinic Regional Secure Unit. On 1 July 1996, his case for discharge was considered by the Mental Health Review Tribunal which found that it was not satisfied that the first applicant did not any longer require treatment in a hospital for mental illness. 11.  When his case was reviewed most recently, on 9 January 2001, the MHR Tribunal recommended his discharge. The Secretary of State accepted the recommendation and the first applicant was discharged. 12.  The second applicant, Mr Hueth Wilson, was sentenced to life imprisonment for buggery of a young girl in 1977. The court had before it psychiatric evidence to the effect that he suffered from mental illness. Expert psychiatric evidence recommended that he should be made subject to a hospital order coupled with a restriction order without limit of time under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1959. Due to an absence of any beds in hospitals providing the level of security that the trial judge considered necessary, the judge felt unable to make the orders and passed, instead, a discretionary life sentence. The judge commented that the second applicant could later be transferred to hospital if his condition required it. His tariff period was set at eight years and expired in 1984. 13.  In August 1977, the second applicant was transferred to hospital under the Mental Health Act 1959 (later replaced by the 1983 Act). In November 1977, the applicant returned to prison and there were several other transfers to and from hospital in subsequent years. In October 1992, the second applicant was transferred to Rampton Special Hospital under sections 47 and 49 of the 1983 Act. In June 1993, following consultation with the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice, the Secretary of State decided that the second applicant should be regarded as a “technical lifer”. 14.  On 6 July 1996 the MHR Tribunal considered the second applicant's case for discharge and found that they were not satisfied that he no longer required treatment in hospital for mental illness. His case was reviewed most recently on 13 June 2000 when the Tribunal again did not recommend discharge. 15.  By decisions of the Secretary of State for the Home Department communicated to the applicants in October and November 1992, the Secretary of State refused to certify the applicants as eligible for review by the discretionary lifer panels empowered by section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to order their release on licence. Leave to apply for judicial review of the decisions was granted on 17 May 1993. 16.  On 22 October 1993 the High Court, granting the application, made a declaration that the Secretary of State's policy not to certify discretionary life prisoners under paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”) on the ground that they had been transferred to hospital under the 1983 Act was unlawful ([1994] Q.B. 378). 17.  On appeal, on 19 July 1994, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court's decision in part.  It considered that, although the applicants were existing life prisoners within the meaning of the paragraph 9 of Schedule 12, their discharge nevertheless remained subject to the procedure laid down in section 50 of the 1983 Act. The rights to a hearing under the 1991 Act were conferred only on persons who were solely subject to that Act, and not on those who were mental patients ([1995] Q.B. 43). 18.  The applicants were informed by letter of 18 May 1995 that the House of Lords had refused leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Tychy. 5.  On 13 July 2000 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed burglary. 6.  On 15 July 2000 the Tychy District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a period of three months in view of the strong suspicion that he had committed five counts of burglary. It considered that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would tamper with evidence, given the fact that he had only partly confessed. Further, the court referred to the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings by going into hiding. In that regard, the court relied on evidence from one of the applicant’s co-suspects, who had stated that, shortly before having been arrested, the applicant had tried to leave for Germany in order to evade serving a sentence of imprisonment which had been previously imposed on him. Finally, the court had regard to the severity of the anticipated penalty. 7.  Subsequently, the applicant was charged with 8 counts of burglary. He confessed to 2 counts. 8.  On 30 January 2001 the District Prosecutor terminated the investigation. On the same day he filed a bill of indictment with the Tychy District Court. The applicant had been indicted on 8 charges of burglary and one charge of assault. There were 6 other defendants in the case. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 42 witnesses. 9.  From 1 June 2001 to 19 December 2002 the trial court listed 10 hearings (for 1 June, 6 July, 9 November and 7 December 2001 and 30 January, 20 March, 17 May, 17 July, 27 September and 19 December 2002). All those hearings were cancelled for various reasons, usually because the police had failed to bring the accused from prison. 10.  The trial began on 17 January 2003. The subsequent hearings were held on 30 January, 21 February and 20 and 21 March 2003. At the hearing held on the latter date the District Court fined 5 witnesses who had failed to appear. 11.  The District Court several times prolonged the applicant’s detention, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and that, given his attempt to leave Poland and the resultant risk that he might go into hiding or tamper with evidence, as well as the fact that he had only partly confessed, keeping him in custody was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. The court also relied on the serious nature of the charges against the applicant and the severity of the anticipated penalty. Lastly, the court had regard to the fact that the applicant had a previous conviction. 12.  The relevant decisions were given on 12 October 2000 (prolonging his detention until 5 January 2001), on 28 December 2000 (ordering his continued detention until 13 February 2001), on 8 February 2001 (extending his detention until 13 May 2001), on 10 May 2001 (prolonging that period until 13 August 2001), on 10 August 2001 (ordering his continued detention until 13 November 2001), on 5 November 2001 (extending his detention until 13 February 2002), on 13 February 2002 (prolonging his detention until 13 May 2002) and on 13 May 2002 (ordering his continued detention until 7 July 2002). 13.  In its decision of 10 April 2002 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the prolongation of his detention, the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) instructed the District Court to take determined measures with a view to speedily terminating the trial. 14.  On 14 June 2002 the District Court made an application to the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) pursuant to Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), asking for the applicant’s detention to be prolonged beyond the statutory time-limit of 2 years. The court stressed that, due to the complex nature of the case, it had so far been impossible for it to open the trial and that the applicant should be kept in custody since the grounds originally given for his detention were still valid. 15.  On 26 June 2002 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2002. It relied on the same grounds as previously invoked by the District Court. It noted that the applicant had attempted to flee the country. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal considered that the trial court had not been responsible for the delays incurred in the proceedings to date. In this respect, it referred, inter alia, to the fact that 7 hearings had been cancelled since the police had failed to bring the accused from prison. On the other hand, it considered that prolongation of the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2002 would give the District Court sufficient time to conclude the proceedings, provided that it accelerated its examination of the case. 16.  On 14 November 2002 the Tychy District Court made yet another application under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, asking the Court of Appeal to prolong the applicant’s detention until 30 June 2003. It stressed that it had still been impossible for it to begin the trial and that the grounds previously given for keeping the applicant in custody were still valid. 17.  On 27 November 2002 the Court of Appeal partly granted the application and ordered that the applicant be held in custody until 31 March 2003. It drew the District Court’s attention to the fact that it had not stated any concrete reasons to justify the fact that the proceedings had not been terminated within the time-limit of 2 years specified in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the laconic statement of the District Court that the trial had not been concluded for reasons which could not be attributed to it, was not sufficient. The Court of Appeal also criticised the fact that between June 2002 and 30 December 2002 the District Court had listed only two hearings. A hearing scheduled for 17 July 2002 was cancelled because not all of the victims had been properly summoned, while the hearing listed for 27 September 2002 was cancelled due to the holiday of one of the counsel. The Court of Appeal further noted that on 6 November 2002 a new judge had been assigned to the case. However, it noted that the District Court had not taken any significant measures aimed at concluding the proceedings, as had been indicated in the earlier decisions of the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. It lastly stressed that the case was not particularly complex and suggested that the District Court should properly organise the trial and terminate it by the end of March 2003. 18.  The applicant was released on 21 March 2003. All the applicant’s earlier applications for release and appeals against decisions prolonging his detention had been to no avail.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Chişinău. 7.  In 1941 the Soviet authorities nationalised the house owned by his parents. In the same year his family was deported to Russia and to Uzbekistan. 8.  On 8 December 1992 the Moldovan Parliament enacted Law No. 1225-XII “on the rehabilitation of the victims of the political repression committed by the totalitarian communist occupying regime”. The Law enabled the victims of the Soviet repression to claim restitution of their confiscated or nationalised property. 9.  In 1997 the applicant lodged an action with the Centru District Court (Judecătoria Sectorului Centru) by which he sought the restitution of his parents' house. As the former tenants of the house had purchased it from the State, the applicant sought a judicial ruling declaring the purchase contracts null and void. He also requested the eviction of all the occupants of the house. 10.  On 25 June 1997 the Centru District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the restitution of the house. It declared null and void the contracts by which the house had been sold to the tenants. The court further ordered the Municipal Council to evict all the occupants, and indicated that the Municipal Council was to provide them with alternative accommodation. 11.  The Municipal Council, the Ministry of Privatization and the occupants lodged an appeal with the Chişinău Regional Court (Tribunalul Municipiului Chişinău) against the judgment of the Centru District Court. On 5 November 1997 the Chişinău Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment with some textual amendments. Since nobody lodged an appeal in cassation, the judgment of 5 November 1997 became final. 12.  In 1999, 2000 and 2001 the bailiff assigned to the case brought proceedings against the Municipal Council for failure to comply with the judgment of 5 November 1997 along with twenty-six similar judgments.\nOn 28 December 1999 the Centru District Court issued a decision by which a fine of 18 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of EUR 1.53 at the time) was imposed on the Head of the Housing Division of the Municipal Council for failure to comply with the judgments.\nOn 25 August 2000 the same court issued a decision by which it imposed a fine of MDL 1,800 (the equivalent of EUR 161 at the time) on the Municipal Council. The court found inter alia that the shortage of funds and the lack of available apartments could not be relied upon by the Municipal Council to justify the failure to comply with the above judgments.\nThe Municipal Council lodged an appeal against that decision and on 24 January 2001 the Chişinău Regional Court quashed it on the ground that the shortage of funds and the lack of available apartments had objectively impeded the Municipal Council from complying with the judgments.\nOn 23 February 2001 the Centru District Court issued a decision by which it imposed a fine of MDL 1,800 on the Municipal Council. 13.  Between 1997 and 2002 the applicant lodged numerous complaints about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 November 1997 with the Municipal Council, Centru District Court and the Ministry of Justice. In their replies, the Municipal Council and the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that due to the lack of funds for the construction of apartment buildings and due to the lack of available alternative accommodation for the evicted persons, the judgment of 5 November 1997 could not be complied with. 14.  In April 2004 four occupants of the applicant's house lodged with the Chişinău Court of Appeal a request for revision of the judgments of 25 June 1997 and 5 November 1997. Relying on Article 449 of the new Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 21 below) they argued in their request that new information have become known to them. They also asked the court to extend the deadline for lodging the request in view of the fact that the new information had been obtained by them from the National Archives in April 2004.\nOn 26 May 2004 the Court of Appeal found in favour of the occupants, quashed the judgments of 25 June 1997 and 5 November 1997 and ordered the re-opening of the proceedings in the light of the newly discovered facts. The court also decided to extend the time limit for lodging the request.\nThe new facts relied upon by the Court of Appeal in its judgment were an issue of the Municipal Official Gazette of 1940, and a few certificates from the National Archives and from the Land Register dated April and May 2004. According to these documents, due to a change of numbers of the houses on the street, it was unclear whether the house provided for in the final judgments or another house belonged to the applicant's family. The Court of Appeal did not specify in its judgment whether Article 449 of the new Code of Civil Procedure had a retroactive effect; nor were reasons given for extending the time limit for the lodging of the revision request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1940 and 1946 respectively and live in Limassol, Cyprus. 7.  The applicants were, at the material time, senior officers in the Cypriot Police Force in which they served until retirement. They both served continuously with an interruption of one year and nine months under the conditions set out below. 8.  On an unspecified date in 1992, criminal proceedings were initiated against them in relation to their alleged involvement in the ill-treatment and torture of suspects. The prosecuting authorities failed to prove a prima facie case against them and they were acquitted on 23 July 1993. The court considered that the testimony of the principal prosecution witnesses - the victim and one of his relatives who had been arrested with him- “had been so obviously unreliable that no reasonable court could rely on it and convict the accused”. It also considered that the prosecution had committed a series of improprieties which had tainted the evidence to such an extent that the case against the applicants should be discontinued in the interests of the proper administration of justice. 9.  Subsequently, on 3 September 1993, the Ministerial Council appointed an Independent Investigating Commission (IIC) to examine this matter further. The Commission's findings were delivered on 3 November 1995. It found that the applicants, together with nine other police officers, had engaged in torture practices against certain suspects in order to obtain confessions. On the basis of the Commission's findings, on 7 March 1996, the Ministerial Council terminated the applicants' employment with the Police Force for the protection of public interest. One other police officer was also dismissed by virtue of the same decision, while five junior officers who were also found to have been involved in acts of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners were not dismissed. The applicants' dismissal was widely reported in the national press. 10.  The applicants challenged the legality of the said decision before the Supreme Court, exercising its administrative judicial review jurisdiction. 11.  The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in a plenary session on 26 November 1997. It unanimously annulled the decision of the Ministerial Council which was found to have violated the constitutional rights of the applicants. In particular, it found that their right not to be tried twice for the same offence had been breached and that their right to be presumed innocent, especially in the light of their acquittal, had been prejudiced. It further found that the applicants had effectively been dismissed without trial or disciplinary proceedings and, as such, they had been deprived of any opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, the decision of the Ministerial Council was found to be ultra vires. 12.  On 28 November 1997, the applicants requested reinstatement to their former posts. On 5 December 1997 they returned to duty. 13.  Subsequently, the applicants brought an action under Article 146.6 of the Constitution before the District Court of Nicosia requesting fair and equitable compensation. 14.  Judgment was delivered on 30 April 2000 by the District Court, which refused the applicants' request for exemplary damages. Concerning their request for payment of the difference in their monthly salaries, corresponding to the period in which their service had been interrupted, the court observed that the applicants had received a higher amount upon their dismissal than the requested difference in salaries. This amount had been held by the first applicant throughout the period following his return to duty and until his retirement and it was still held by the second applicant. As regards the first applicant, the amount he had received upon his dismissal had been deducted from the amount to which he was entitled by virtue of his retirement and the difference had been paid to him. The request was accordingly refused. 15.  However, 7,500 Cypriot pounds (CYP), plus 8 per cent interest as from the date that the action was lodged, was awarded in compensation for moral damage. The court pointed out that, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Frangoulides v. The Republic (1982) 1 C.L.R. 462, an award of damages under Article 146.6 of the Constitution was not subject to the common-law rule for quantifying damages aimed at restitutio in integrum, but was governed by the principles of equity. It considered that the applicants had suffered injury to their psychological and moral integrity which was directly caused by the annulled decision. In particular, the following was noted:\n“Within this framework of criteria (established in the domestic case-law), I do not see any good reason why the court should rule, in a case similar to the present one, where, by the exclusive behaviour of the administration (Ministerial Council) the plaintiffs have been expelled from their positions with characterisations that have definitely affected them psychologically as they themselves have maintained, that they should not be entitled to certain compensation for that injury to their psychological integrity. I consider such injury as damage emanating directly from the annulled administrative decision”. 16.  Moreover, it was acknowledged that the decision had serious defamatory effects for them. As such, the relevant award was seen as required by equity to redress the unlawful act of the administration. 17.  The applicants lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court and contended that the award of damages was manifestly insufficient. The Attorney-General lodged a cross-appeal requesting the annulment of the first-instance District Court judgment. 18.  The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 25 April 2005 by which it upheld the first-instance court's decision not to award exemplary damages and reversed the award of moral damages. The court noted that Article 146 (6) of the Constitution entitles a person who sustained injury, as a result of a decision, act or omission by the administration that had been declared null and void , pursuant to Article 146 (4), the right to claim damages or any other remedy from a civil court which may grant fair and equitable compensation. An award of compensation could only be made where the sustained injury had been caused by the annulled act. The administration's duty to comply with the annulment of such an act would require the suppression of all consequences of the annulled act and reinstatement of the status quo ante. Such reinstatement should be complete and address all damaging consequences of the annulled act. The court further noted that “damage” would constitute the loss or injury sustained by a plaintiff as a result of the act on which the cause of action was based. The cause of action provided for in Article 146 (6) of the Constitution was a cause sui generis and was governed by rules of determination of compensation that were different from those provided for in the common law (Frangoulides v. The Republic (1982) 1 C.L.R. 462). The court referred to the case of Egglezakis and others v. The Attorney General of the Republic ((1992) 1 S.C.J. 697), in which the issue as to whether the term “damage” set out in Article 146 (6) was restricted to pecuniary damage or extended to psychological and emotional injury had been left open. The court then stated the following:\n“Such moral damage did not constitute a direct consequence of the annulled administrative act and that, therefore, such an award was not covered by the provisions of Article 146 (6) of the Constitution”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Early in the morning of 13 October 2005 law-enforcement agencies in the town of Nalchik, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya, were attacked by a number of heavily armed people, who appear to have been local insurgents. The agencies included the Republican Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Centre T of the Main Department of the Ministry of the Interior, various district departments of the Ministry of the Interior, the Special Purpose Police Unit of the Republican Ministry of the Interior, various checkpoints of the Traffic Police, the Republican Department of the Federal Security Service, the Republican Department of the Federal Service for the Execution of Penalties and the office of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service. Also, a few privately owned weapon shops were attacked. According to the Government, there were over two hundred and fifty participants in the attack. 6.  The ensuing fight between the governmental forces and the insurgents lasted until at least 14 October 2005. 7.  The first, second, third, fifth and seventh applicants submit that they are relatives of the people whose dead bodies were found following the events of 13 and 14 October 2005 (see paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14). The fourth applicant claims that his son was killed by State agents in the village of Anzorey in the Leskenskiy District of the Republic of Kabardino‑Balkariya on 6 January 2006 (see paragraph 11). The sixth applicant claims that her son was killed by State agents in the town of Nalchik on 12 November 2005 (see paragraph 13). All of the applicants live in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and, unless stated otherwise, are residents of Nalchik. 8.  The first applicant, Mr Khusen Kadirovich Arkhestov, born in 1954, referred to the death of his son Mr Lokman Khusenovich Arkhestov, born on 30 December 1989. 9.  The second applicant, Mrs Kulisum Zhantuganovna Balkizova, born in 1956, referred to the death of her son Mr Kantemir Safudinovich Balkizov, born on 29 March 1982. 10.  The third applicant, Mrs Asiyat Kunakovna Guziyeva, born in 1976, referred to the death of her husband Mr Arsen Gumarovich Margushev, born on 6 January 1979. 11.  The fourth applicant, Mr Askarbi Khamidovich Zhekamukhov, born in 1955, referred to the death of his son Mr Albert Askarbiyevich Zhekamukhov, born on 23 November 1980. 12.  The fifth applicant, Mr Arsen Khazhmastafovich Tukov, born in 1939, referred to the death of his son Mr Anatoliy Arsenovich Tukov, born on 3 August 1974. 13.  The sixth applicant, Mrs Mariya Latifovna Khuranova, who was born in 1955 and lives in the village of Shalushka, referred to the death of her son Mr Azamat Anatolyevich Brayev, born on 29 July 1975. 14.  The seventh applicant, Mrs Lyuda Khazhmuradovna Shogenova, who was born in 1965 and lives in the village of Zalukokoazhe, referred to the death of her brother Mr Aslan Khadzmuratovich Shogenov, born on 26 January 1965. 15.  The Government did not dispute this information. 16.  It appears that on 13 October 2005 the authorities instituted criminal proceedings no. 25/78-05 in connection with the attack in Nalchik. 17.  In the course of the investigation it was established that between 1999 and February 2005 a group of individuals including A. Maskhadov, Sh. Basayev, I. Gorchkhanov, A. Astemirov, Abu-Valid Khattab and Abu‑Dzeit, had formed a terrorist group. It was this group that organised the attack. Thirty-five law-enforcement officers and fifteen civilians were killed, whilst one hundred and thirty-one law-enforcement officers and ninety-two civilians were injured. Massive damage was done to property. 18.  The applicants did not have any procedural status in the criminal proceedings in case no. 25/78-05. 19.  Immediately following the attack, an unspecified number of people (including some of the applicants) signed collective petitions requesting various officials, including the prosecutors, to return the bodies for burial. 20.  Between the end of October 2005 and until at least April 2006 the applicants received replies from the prosecution and other authorities informing them that they would receive definite answers once the investigation into the events had been completed. 21.  Attempts by some of the applicants to challenge these replies in the domestic courts were unsuccessful, as they were rejected as premature both at first instance and on appeal. 22.  On 13 April 2006 the investigation authority terminated the criminal proceedings in respect of the ninety-five deceased on account of their deaths, having taken an individual decision in respect of each deceased person. Each decision described the degree and character of their individual involvement and concluded that these persons had taken part in the attack and died as a result of the ensuing fight. The decisions described the circumstances of death of the persons referred to by the applicants; they are set out below. The respondent Government have submitted the investigation case file in respect of the circumstances of death of each of the deceased persons. 23.  The son of the first applicant, Lokman Khusenovich Arkhestov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Federal Service for the Execution of Penalties. 24.  The son of the second applicant, Kantemir Safudinovich Balkizov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 25.  The husband of the third applicant, Arsen Gumarovich Margushev, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 26.  The son of the fourth applicant, Albert Askarbiyevich Zhekamukhov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005 and subsequently to have escaped from Nalchik and gone into hiding. He was located in the village of Anzorey in the Leskenskiy District of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya on 6 January 2006. After rejecting a call to give himself up, he died as a result of a failed attempt to arrest him. 27.  The son of the fifth applicant, Anatoliy Arsenovich Tukov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 28.  The son of the sixth applicant, Azamat Anatolyevich Brayev, was found to have taken part on 12 October 2005 in an exchange of gunfire with police officers preceding the main attack of 13 October 2005. He belonged to the same group as the attackers, but was detected by police officers by chance one day prior to the attack. 29.  The brother of the seventh applicant, Aslan Khazhmuratovich Shogenov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 30.  The Prosecutor General’s Office notified the applicants of the above decisions on 14 April 2006, but no copies of the decisions in question were attached to the notifications. 31.  In the Strasbourg proceedings the Government submitted copies of the decisions of 13 April 2006 in respect of each of the applicants’ relatives. 32.  The applicants were furnished with death certificates in respect of their relatives:\nNames\nDates of Death\nDates of Issue\nCause of Death 4.  Albert Askarbiyevich Zhekamukhov\n6/01/2006\n9/06/2006\nMassive loss of blood, multiple shrapnel wounds to the head, chest and extremities 6.  Azamat Anatolyevich Brayev\n12/10/2005\n3/07/2007\nMassive loss of blood, multiple gunshot wounds to the head, chest and extremities 33.  According to the Government, ninety-five corpses of the presumed terrorists were cremated on 22 June 2006. 34.  The cremation took place pursuant to a decision not to return the bodies of the deceased to their families, dated 15 May 2006. In contrast to the individual decisions of 13 April 2006, the decision of 15 May 2006 referred to the deceased persons collectively. The decision stated, in particular:\n“... the head of investigation group ... [official S.], having examined the materials in case file no. 25/78-05, established: ... [that] in the course of the counter-terrorist special operation aimed at tackling the attack, 95 terrorists were eliminated, namely:\n[the decision names among the deceased all of the persons referred to by the applicants]\nAt present all forensic expert examinations, including molecular genetic examinations, involving ... the corpses of the deceased terrorists, have been finalised and their identities have been established by way of proper procedure.\nBy decisions of 13-14 April 2006 the criminal proceedings in respect of these 95 persons, who had committed ... the attack on various sites and law-enforcement agents of the town of Nalchik ... was discontinued on account of their deaths, under Article 27 part 1 subpart 2 and Article 24 part 1 subpart 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nPursuant to section 14(1) of the Federal Interment and Burial Act (Law no. 8-FZ) ‘the interment of persons against whom a criminal investigation in connection with their terrorist activities has been closed because of their death following interception of the said terrorist act shall take place in accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation. Their bodies shall not be handed over for burial and the place of their burial shall not be revealed.’\nPursuant to part 3 of Decree no. 164, ‘On interment of persons whose death was caused by the interception of terrorist acts carried out by them’, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on 20 March 2003, ‘the interment of [these] persons shall take place in the locality where death occurred and shall be carried out by agencies specialising in funeral arrangements, set up by organs of the executive branch of the subjects of the Russian Federation or by organs of local government ...’.\n[In view of the above, official S. decided to:] 35.  The Government alleged that the authorities had notified the applicants of the decision of 15 May 2006, but acknowledged that no copy of that decision had been provided to them. 36.  It appears that on several occasions the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicants, in substance, of the refusal to return the bodies. It does not appear that the applicants were furnished with a copy of the decision of 15 May 2006. 37.  The applicants’ initial attempts to obtain judicial review of the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006 were unsuccessful, as the courts refused to examine their arguments.\n(a)  Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 38.  The relatives of those who had taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005 contested the legislation governing the interment of terrorists before the Constitutional Court. 39.  On 28 June 2007 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment (no. 8-P) in which, in essence, it rejected their complaints alleging that section 14(1) of the Interment and Burial Act and Decree no. 164 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 20 March 2003 were unconstitutional. The ruling stated, in particular, that the impugned legal provisions were, in the circumstances, necessary and justified. The court reached the following conclusions regarding the legitimate aims and necessity of the legislation in question:\n“... At the same time, the interest in fighting terrorism, in preventing terrorism in general and specific terms and in providing redress for the effects of terrorist acts, coupled with the risk of mass disorder, clashes between different ethnic groups and aggression by the next of kin of those involved in terrorist activity against the population at large and law-enforcement officials, and lastly the threat to human life and limb, may, in a given historical context, justify the establishment of a particular legal regime, such as that provided for by section 14(1) of the Federal Act, governing the burial of persons who escape prosecution in connection with terrorist activity on account of their death following the interception of a terrorist act ... Those provisions are logically connected to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Recommendation 1687 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on combating terrorism through culture, dated 23 November 2005, in which it was stressed that extremist interpretations of elements of a particular culture or religion, such as heroic martyrdom, self-sacrifice, apocalypse or holy war, as well as secular ideologies (nationalist or revolutionary) could also be used for the justification of terrorist acts. 3.2.  Action to minimise the informational and psychological impact of the terrorist act on the population, including the weakening of its propaganda effect, is one of the means necessary to protect public security and the morals, health, rights and legal interests of citizens. It therefore pursues exactly those aims for which the Constitution of the Russian Federation and international legal instruments permit restrictions on the relevant rights and freedoms.\nThe burial of those who have taken part in a terrorist act, in close proximity to the graves of the victims of their acts, and the observance of rites of burial and remembrance with the paying of respects, as a symbolic act of worship, serve as a means of propaganda for terrorist ideas and also cause offence to relatives of the victims of the acts in question, creating the preconditions for increasing inter-ethnic and religious tension.\nIn the conditions which have arisen in the Russian Federation as a result of the commission of a series of terrorist acts which produced numerous human victims, resulted in widespread negative social reaction and had a major impact on the collective consciousness, the return of the body to the relatives ... may create a threat to social order and peace and to the rights and legal interests of other persons and their security, including incitement to hatred and incitement to engage in acts of vandalism, violence, mass disorder and clashes which may produce further victims. Meanwhile, the burial places of participants in terrorist acts may become a shrine for certain extremist individuals and be used by them as a means of propaganda for the ideology of terrorism and involvement in terrorist activity.\nIn such circumstances, the federal legislature may introduce special arrangements governing the burial of individuals whose death occurred as a result of the interception of a terrorist act in which they were taking part. ...” 40.  The ruling further noted that the application of the measures prescribed in the legislation could be regarded as justified if proper procedural safeguards, such as effective judicial review, were in place to protect individuals from arbitrariness. The court noted that Articles 123-127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for such review. 41.  In sum, the Constitutional Court upheld the impugned provisions as being in conformity with the Constitution but at the same time interpreted them as requiring that the authorities refrain from burying bodies unless a court had confirmed the competent authority’s decision. It reasoned as follows:\n“... The constitutional and legal meaning of the existing norms presupposes the possibility of bringing court proceedings to challenge a decision to discontinue, on account of the deaths of the suspects, a criminal case against or prosecution of participants in a terrorist act. Accordingly, they also presuppose an obligation on the court’s part to examine the substance of the complaint, that is, to verify the lawfulness and well-foundedness of the decision and the conclusions therein as regards the participation of the persons concerned in a terrorist act, and to establish the absence of grounds for rehabilitating [the suspects] and discontinuing the criminal case. They thus entail an examination of the lawfulness of the application of the aforementioned restrictive measures. Until the entry into force of the court judgment the deceased’s remains cannot be buried; the relevant State bodies and officials must take all necessary measures to ensure that the bodies are disposed of in accordance with custom and tradition, in particular through the burial of the remains in the ground ... or by [cremation], individually, if possible, and to ensure compliance prior thereto with the requirements concerning the identification of the deceased ... and of the time, location and cause of death ...” 42.  Judge G.A. Gadzhiyev issued a separate opinion in which he agreed that the impugned provisions were in conformity with the Constitution but held a different view as to how they should be interpreted. The opinion stated as follows:\n“... if the relevant law-enforcement agencies find, as a result of a preliminary investigation, that a terrorist act has been committed and that a given person was involved, but the criminal proceedings against that person ... are discontinued on account of his or her death following interception of the terrorist act, and if they then conclude that the decision to return the body to the family for burial is capable of threatening public order and peace and the health, morals, rights, lawful interests and safety of others, they are entitled to take a decision refusing to hand over the body and applying special arrangements for burial.\nAt the same time, in the event of a refusal to return the body of an individual whose death occurred as the result of the interception of a terrorist act committed by him, the authorities competent to take a decision concerning the burial must secure compliance with all the requirements concerning the establishment of the deceased’s identity, the time and place of death, the cause of death, the place of burial and the data necessary for the proper identification of the grave (a given location and number). The burial must take place with the participation of the relatives, in accordance with custom and tradition and with humanitarian respect for the dead. The administrative authorities of a State governed by the rule of law must respect the cultural values of a multi-ethnic society, transmitted from generation to generation. ...” 43.  Judge A.L. Kononov issued a dissenting opinion in which he described the legislation in question as incompatible with the Constitution. In particular, he noted:\n“... The impugned norms banning the return of the deceased’s bodies to their relatives and providing for their anonymous burial are, in our view, absolutely immoral and reflect the most uncivilised, barbaric and base views of previous generations ...\nThe right of every person to be buried in a dignified manner in accordance with the traditions and customs of his family hardly requires special justification or even to be secured in written form in law. This right is clearly self-evident and stems from human nature as, perhaps, no other natural right. Equally natural and uncontested is the right of every person to conduct the burial of a person who is related and dear to them, to have an opportunity to perform one’s moral duty and display one’s human qualities, to bid farewell, to grieve, mourn and commemorate the deceased, however he may be regarded by society and the state, to have the right to a grave, which in all civilisations represents a sacred value and the symbol of memory. ...”\n(b)  Subsequent proceedings 44.  After the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 28 June 2007 the domestic courts apparently changed their approach and agreed to review the formal lawfulness of the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006. 45.  The applicants brought the following court proceedings in connection with the relevant decisions.\n \nFirst instance judgment of the Nalchik Town Court\nAppeal decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya\nFirst applicant\n14/09/2007 (decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n4/12/2007\n(upheld)\n16/11/2007 (decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n20/5/2008\n(upheld)\nSecond applicant\n6/11/2007\n(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\nJudgment was not appealed against and became final on 16 November 2007\nThird applicant\n19/11/2007\n(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n25/1/2008\nFourth applicant\n27/12/2007\n(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n1/04/2008\nFifth applicant\n19/11/2007\n(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n25/1/2008\nSixth applicant\n19/11/2007\n(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n25/1/2008\nSeventh applicant\n28/01/2008\n(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)\n11/03/2007 46.  As a result of the above-mentioned sets of proceedings the applicants succeeded in having quashed the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006 in part. It appears that the domestic courts subsequently changed their position and the relevant judgments were later quashed by way of supervisory review. After these changes, the courts still could not review the need for application of the measures set out in section 14 (1) of the Interment and Burial Act and Decree no. 164 of 20 March 2003 in individual cases. 47.  According to the applicants who took part in the identification of the bodies, for several days following the events of 13 and 14 October 2005 the corpses (except for the bodies of the relatives of the fourth and sixth applicant, who died at other dates and were identified later) were kept in the town morgue and other locations in wholly unsatisfactory conditions. In particular, the bodies gave off an intense smell owing to the lack of proper refrigeration and were chaotically piled on top of one other. 48.  In response to a letter from the applicants requesting an explanation for the appalling storage conditions, the Prosecutor General’s Office stated in a letter of 14 April 2006 that until a procedural decision in respect of the corpses had been taken they had been kept in specially equipped rooms in refrigerated chambers set to the appropriate temperature. The authorities refused to disclose the locality where the bodies were stored. 49.  According to the Government, the following applicants participated in the identification procedure in person:\nNo.\nThe applicants\nParticipation in identification\n1\nMr Khusen Kadirovich Arkhestov\non 16 October 2005\n2\nMrs Kulisum Zhantuganovna Balkizova\nNo, the deceased was identified by his brother, Mr Ramzan Safudinovich Balkizov\n3\nMrs Asiyat Kunakovna Guziyeva\nNo, the deceased was identified by his sister, Mrs Anzhela Gumarovna Margusheva\n4\nMr Askarbi Khamidovich Zhekamukhov\nNo, the deceased was identified by his mother, Mrs Fatima Magomedovna Zhekamukhova\n5\nMr Arsen Khazhmastafovich Tukov\nNo, the body was identified through a genetic expert examination\n6\nMrs Mariya Latifovna Khuranova\nNo, the deceased was identified by his father, Mr Anatoly Bashirovich Brayev\n7\nMrs Lyuda Khazhmuradovna Shogenova\nYes, on 20 October 2005 50.  According to the applicants, they had access to the bodies both in the Nalchik town morgue and in two refrigerator wagons parked on a plot of land belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. Provision of access to the bodies was random, as not everyone who wanted to take part in the identification process was admitted. In some cases the provision of access was not properly documented. Since the provision of access was limited, the relevant facilities were usually surrounded by crowds of relatives of the deceased. 51.  The Government submitted that the corpses in question had been initially held in the Nalchik town morgue. Between 14 and 18 October 2005 the applicants examined the corpses and the clothing. Thereafter the bodies were placed in two refrigerator wagons. On 1 November 2005 the wagons were moved to the town of Rostov-on-Don for molecular genetic examinations and on 22 June 2006 all bodies were cremated. Between 13 and 22 October 2005 the person in charge of the identification procedure was the head of the investigation group investigator P. As of 22 October 2005 he was replaced by investigator S. The Government also acknowledged that immediately after the attack no facilities had been available to keep the bodies. 52.  According to the Government’s most recent submissions, the overall number of human casualties as a result of the events of 13 October 2005 was twelve civilians, thirty-five police and law-enforcement officers and eighty-seven participants in the attack.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1943 and 1939 respectively and live in Istanbul. 5.  On 6 September 1993 the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways expropriated plots of land belonging to the applicants in Istanbul. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plots of land belonging to the applicants and compensation was paid to them when the expropriation took place. 6.  On 4 February 1994, following the applicants’ request for increased compensation, the Kartal First Instance Court awarded them additional compensation of 48,410,250,000 Turkish liras (TRL) plus interest at the statutory rate of 30% per annum, namely the rate applicable at the date of the court’s decision. The date, 6 September 1993 was fixed by the domestic court for the running of the statutory rate of interest. The parties appealed. 7.  On 12 May 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first instance court. On 2 November 1994 the first instance court re-examined the case and amended the amount of the additional compensation to TRL 45,692,700,000. The decision became final since none of the parties appealed. On 29 December 1997 the administration paid the applicants TRL 95,426,696,000 as the additional compensation together with interest. The interest on the additional compensation was calculated at the statutory rate applicable between the date of the decision of the first instance court in favour of the applicant and 31 December 1997. 8.  Between 1993 and 1999 the rate of inflation averaged 81.7% per annum.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  On 8 May 2002 the applicant brought a civil action, claiming back the money which she had lent to a private person on 14 September 1998, further to a note envisaging repayment within two months. 7.  On 22 May 2002 the respondent replied in writing, claiming that she had repaid the debt and that the applicant's action was time-barred under Articles 129 and 130 of the Civil Code (“the CC”). 8.  On 14 June 2002 the Isani-Samgori District Court allowed the applicant's claim at an oral hearing. The court found that the respondent's assertion about payment of the debt was unsubstantiated. It did not reply to the time-bar objection. 9.  On 5 August 2002 the respondent appealed, reiterating, inter alia, that the applicant's action was time-barred.  The latter replied that, in view of the respondent's continuous promises to discharge the debt, she could not have concluded that her rights had been breached between 1998 and 2001. 10.  On 18 September 2002 the Tbilisi Regional Court quashed the judgment of 14 June 2002 and decided the case anew, dismissing the applicant's action as time-barred. The appellate court found that the limitation period had started to run from the date of non-compliance with the note of 14 September 1998, that is two months after the loan, on 14 November 1998. It noted that the case materials did not substantiate the applicant's assertion that the respondent had continuously promised to return the money. 11.  On 16 October 2002 the applicant lodged a cassation claim. Referring to various circumstances of the case, she reiterated that the respondent's verbal assurances had prevented her from applying to the court earlier. She consequently claimed that the appellate court had wrongly applied Articles 129 and 130 of the CC. 12.  On 19 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the applicant's cassation claim admissible but decided to dispense with an oral hearing on the merits. Both parties were informed of that decision on 22 November 2002. On the same day, the cassation claim was forwarded to the respondent for comments. No reply was forthcoming from the latter. 13.  On 6 February 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation claim. Endorsing the facts of the case as established by the appellate court, the cassation court found that the disputed Articles 129 and 130 of the CC had been correctly interpreted and applied in the appellate judgment of 18 September 2002 and that, consequently, there was no ground, under Article 393 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to quash it.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  On 4 June 1992 the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr Antoni Macierewicz, submitted to Parliament and made public a “list of secret collaborators with the security services between 1945 and 1990”. The list, unofficially called “the Macierewicz list”, contained names of public officials who appeared in the archives of the Ministry and included the President and many Members of Parliament. The publication of the list sparked uproar in the Sejm, a Chamber of the Polish Parliament, which led to the fall of the government of Jan Olszewski a couple of hours later. 7.  The applicant, who had been a Member of Parliament, appeared on the list. 8.  On 11 April 1997 the parliament passed the Law on disclosing work for or service in the State’s security services or collaboration with them between 1944 and 1990 by persons exercising public functions (ustawa o ujawnieniu pracy lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944‑1990 osób pełniących funkcje publiczne; “the 1997 Lustration Act”). It entered into force on 3 August 1997. Persons falling under the provisions of the 1997 Lustration Act, i.e. candidates or holders of public office such as ministers and members of parliament, were required to declare whether or not they had worked for or collaborated with the security services during the communist regime. 9.  On 26 March 1999 the applicant applied to the court to institute the so‑called “auto‑lustration” proceedings under section 18a § 3 of the Lustration Act. He submitted his lustration declaration, in which he stated that he had not been an intentional and secret collaborator with the secret services. 10.  The applicant was the first of many persons from the Macierewicz list who applied for auto‑lustration claiming that they had not been secret collaborators with the communist‑era secret services. In some cases the lustration courts agreed and cleared the name of the person concerned. 11.  On 6 May 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) decided to institute lustration proceedings in the applicant’s case. 12.  On 6 November 2001 the Court of Appeal gave a judgment in which it found that his lustration declaration had been truthful and that the applicant had not been an intentional and secret collaborator with the secret services. The panel of the court was composed of three judges. 13.  The Commissioner of the Public Interest (Rzecznik Interesu Publicznego) appealed against the judgment. 14.  On 30 July 2002 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, acting as the second‑instance lustration court allowed the appeal and remitted the case. The court was constituted of a panel of three judges which included judge R.K. 15.  On 6 April 2005 the Warsaw Court of Appeal acting as the first‑instance lustration court, found that the applicant had been an intentional and secret collaborator with the security services between 1969 and 1977. 16.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. 17.  On 12 September 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment. The court was constituted of a panel of three judges which again included Judge R.K. 18.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal complaining inter alia about the lack of impartiality of Judge R.K. The applicant submitted that this judge had participated in the preparation of his lustration proceedings and was a member of a lustration court between 1999 and 2000. The latter panel was later dissolved; nevertheless, these factors cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality particularly as he was a member of the panels giving judgment at the second‑instance. 19.  The applicant’s cassation appeal was dismissed on 17 April 2008 by the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). The Supreme Court examined inter alia the applicant’s complaint that Judge R.K. had participated in his trial at the first and, on two occasions, the second instance. It dismissed the argument that such participation had given rise to doubts regarding his impartiality, finding that the judge in question had not been a member of the panel that had given a decision at first instance. As regards the applicant’s complaint that Judge R.K. had been a member of the panel of the second-instance court twice, the court noted that, according to the domestic law, such judge was not ex lege excluded from dealing with the case. It was however open to the party having doubts as to the lack of impartiality of the judge to challenge him or her during the proceedings; the applicant had failed to do that. Since the applicant accepted the composition of the second-instance court which gave the judgment on 12 September 2006, he cannot effectively raise doubts as to the lack of impartiality of one of the judges at the cassation appeal stage. 20.  The applicant was barred from being a Member of Parliament for a period of ten years in application of the 1997 Lustration Act. 21.  The judgment was notified to the applicant’s representative in June 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Chişinău, Moldova. He is a journalist. 8.  On 14 August 1998 the Russian language weekly newspaper “Express” published an article entitled “The minor affairs of the big Airport”, signed by the applicant. He gave as sources for his article the outcome of an investigation conducted by him and the materials of a Parliamentary Commission concerning the selling of aircraft. The article stated, inter alia, that:\n“The scandal of the sale of Moldovan aircraft at dumping prices attracted the public attention of Moldovan society, which is already used to being unsurprised by such events. However, these still ongoing events offered our newspaper the opportunity to focus on this topic (see, 'Express' No. 19 and 20 of 19 and 26 June 1998). This article is an attempt to give a meaning to the events, which happened within the State Administration of Civil Aviation ('SACA') in the last two years, on the basis of facts which became known as a result of a press investigation. \nIn 1995 Chişinău International Airport ('CIA') split from the State Air Company 'Air Moldova' and became an independent enterprise. The Head of SACA was L.P., while A.I. was appointed as Head of CIA. An agreement was signed between SACA and A.I. for a period of three years. In 1996 the above agreement was cancelled on the grounds of the negligence of A.I. in carrying out his duties. This fact was the starting point of the story which follows. A.I. disagreed with SACA's decision on his dismissal and lodged a court action seeking his reinstatement. Since court proceedings in Moldova are so lengthy, A.I., who could not accept his dismissal, took steps to approach CIA's staff. To this end, he organised with the support of his adherents a demonstration on the old Airport square. A.I. took the floor and the core of his speech was that he was the only person who, as head of CIA, could ensure its economic growth. \nSACA also decided to seek the opinion of its staff and for this purpose, its Director General, L.P., summoned a meeting of his deputies and the Airport units' heads. Everyone expressed a view and the common opinion was that A.I. was not the right person to be the head of CIA. Hence, the meeting of the Airport administration clearly expressed its distrust of A.I.\nNevertheless, such an outcome did not discourage the pretender to the chairmanship. He even issued a leaflet entitled 'Appeal to the Airport staff', which stated: 1. SACA unfairly dismissed A.I.; 2. A.I. will inevitably become CIA's Chief Executive.\nThis proved to be true, when the court declared SACA's actions to be illegal and ordered the reinstatement of A.I. in his previous post. ...” 9.  The following related to the events that took place after A.I.'s reinstatement:\n“...The purging and transfer of staff marked the reinstatement of A.I. in the position. Many were reminded of their disapproval of the candidature of A.I. for the position of Chief Executive of CIA, expressed at the meeting with directors and managers. ... Once he had become Chief Executive of the Chişinău Airport for the second time and after he had successfully accomplished the first staff purge by means of the reorganisation of the enterprise's structure, A.I. called up his 'team', which had been created in between his two directorships. ... the present Director General L.I., devoted to the policy chosen by his patron A.I. ...\n...One can become convinced about this by the example of another worker promoted by A.I. It is I.V. Not long ago, I.V. was working somewhere in the system of road transport and knew no more about planes than an ordinary person knows, and perhaps what he had been told by his relative A.I. But, probably, I.V. had shown a special interest in airport matters and the idea to hire him at the Airport came to his influential relative. To this end, he did not even hesitate to invent a new position – Deputy Director of Handling. ...\n...Later, A.I. dismissed them from their positions... Instead of them he appointed (a) K.V. (who some time ago had graduated the Odessa Institute of Communications), (b) S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry).\n...Frankly speaking, C.P. himself is not a great expert in landing planes...\n...One of the most colourful figures of A.I.'s conscription became the head of the Staff Unit of the Airport, C.M. Indeed, his position can be characterised as follows: the head of the Airport's Staff Unit would puzzle even an employee of the Staff Unit of any penitentiary. Here are some extracts from reports made by Airport employees:\n'I bring to your attention that on many occasions the head of the staff unit came to the Security Service and asked for a car... to take him home. Usually he was drunk.'\n...\n'I was silent for a long time about the sexual harassment I was exposed to from the head of the Staff Unit, until recently when he came to my office and invited me to his summer cottage. I refused but he started to touch me. I struggled free of his hands and threatened to hit him with a telephone if he would not stop.... Once, when I entered C.M.'s office for work-related purposes, he closed the door and asked me to show him my breasts.'\n...\n... it is probably unnecessary to describe every detail of the adventures of this unrestrained civil servant (распоясавшегося функционера)...\n...The saying that everything is possible (не боги горшки обжигают) is borne out by another example, namely the former veterinary doctor, but currently the Manager of the Services' Purchase Unit, C.V...\n...A.I. has appointed S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry).... \nHowever, now public opinion in Moldova is focused, as we already stated, on the shady deal of the sale of aircraft. The shady deal, behind which, in the opinion of many civil aviation employees, were A.I. and S.I.” 10.  On an unspecified date in 1998 six employees of CIA - I.V., C.P., C.M., C.V., S.I. and A.I. (hereinafter: “the complainants”) - lodged separate civil actions for defamation against the applicant and the publishing office of the newspaper with the Centru District Court. Relying on Articles 7 and 7/1 of the Civil Code, the complainants alleged that the article contained statements which were defamatory of them. On 5 September 1998 the Centru District Court decided to join all six actions. 11.  On 3 December 1998 the Centru District Court found that the information contained in the article was defamatory of each of the complainants and did not correspond to reality in respect of I.V, C.V., S.I. and A.I. In the same decision, the complainants were awarded damages to be paid by the applicant and the newspaper.\n(i)  In respect of I.V. 12.  The court found that the following passage was defamatory of I.V. and did not correspond to reality:\n“...One can become convinced about this by the example of another worker promoted by A.I. It is I.V. Not long ago, I.V. was working somewhere in the system of road transport and knew no more about planes than an ordinary person knows, and perhaps what he had been told by his relative A.I. But, probably, I.V. had shown a special interest in airport matters and the idea to hire him at the Airport came to his influential relative. To this end, he did not even hesitate to create a new position – Deputy Director of Handling. ...” 13.  The court found that I.V. was not a relative of A.I. and that there was no proof that it was A.I. who had invited I.V. to work at the Airport and created a new position for that purpose. The court also found that I.V. had completed technical studies and had graduated from the Academy of Public Administration. The applicant and the newspaper admitted that the information about I.V. being a relative of A.I. was not accurate. The newspaper offered to publish a notice withdrawing it. 14.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay I.V. damages of 900 Moldovan Lei (MDL) and MDL 1,350 respectively.\n(ii)  In respect of C.P. 15.  The court further ruled that the sentence:\n“Frankly speaking, C.P. himself is not a great expert in landing planes”\nwas defamatory of C.P. The court agreed that C.P. had made a rough landing in Budapest once; however, that case could not serve as a basis to question his entire expertise. The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay C.P. damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,800 respectively.\n(iii)  In respect of C.M. 16.  The court quoted in its decision the following two passages as being defamatory of C.M.:\n“One of the most colourful figures of A.I.'s conscription became the head of the Staff Unit of the Airport, C.M. Indeed, his position can be characterised as follows: the head of the Airport's Staff Unit would puzzle even an employee of the staff unit of any penitentiary” \nand \n“it is probably unnecessary to describe every detail of the adventures of this unrestrained civil servant (распоясавшегося функционера).” 17.  The applicant explained that the words used to describe C.M. were justified by the latter's conduct (see paragraph 9 above). In this respect the applicant put forward three witnesses. One of them declared that on one occasion C.M. had been drunk and that the witness had written a report to the Chief Executive about that. The other two witnesses were female employees who declared that on several occasions C.M. had sexually harassed them. 18.  The court decided not to admit the testimony of the first witness, because no sanction had been applied to C.M. as a consequence of the report. As to the statements of the two female witnesses, the court did not make any assessment of them. 19.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay the complainant damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively.\n(iv)  In respect of C.V. 20.  The court found that the sentence:\n“The saying that everything is possible (не боги горшки обжигают) is borne out by another example, namely the former veterinary surgeon, but currently the Manager of the Services Purchase Unit, C.V.”\nwas defamatory of C.V., and did not correspond to reality. 21.  The applicant admitted that a mistake had been made, since C.V. did not graduate from a veterinary school. The court found that C.V. had a diploma from a business school. 22.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay the complainant damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively.\n(v)  In respect of S.I. 23.  The court found that the phrases:\n“A.I. has appointed S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry) ....\n... the shady deal, behind which, in the opinion of many civil aviation employees, were A.I. and S.I.”\nwere defamatory of S.I., and did not correspond to reality. 24.  The applicant admitted to having made a mistake as regards the university attended by S.I., the court finding that she had a diploma from a School of Commerce. As to the “shady deal”, the applicant argued that the dubious character of the transaction with State-owned aircraft was evident from an official report of a Parliamentary Commission and that the participation of S.I. in the conclusion of that transaction was not contested by S.I. herself. Relying on statements of A.I. and S.I., the court found that, even though they were involved in the transaction concerning the sale of State-owned aircraft, they were part of a special commission created by the Government for the purpose of the transaction and that they were not the key persons in that transaction. The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay S.I. damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,800 respectively.\n(vi)  In respect of A.I. 25.  The court identified in its decision the following extracts as being defamatory of A.I. and as not corresponding to reality:\n“... A.I. [...] organised with the support of his adherents a demonstration on the old Airport square. ... He even issued a leaflet, entitled 'Appeal to the Airport staff'. ... The purging and transfer of staff marked the reinstatement of A.I. in the position. Many were reminded of their disapproval of the candidature of A.I. for the position of Chief Executive of CIA, expressed at the meeting with directors and managers. ... Once he had become Chief Executive of the Chişinău Airport for the second time and after he had successfully accomplished the first staff purge by means of the reorganisation of the enterprise's structure, A.I. called up his 'team', which had been created in between his two directorships. ... the present Director General L.P., devoted to the policy chosen by his patron A.I. ... One can become convinced about this by the example of another worker promoted by A.I. It is I.V. Not long ago, I.V. was working somewhere in the system of road transport and knew no more about planes than an ordinary person knows, and perhaps what he had been told by his relative A.I. But, probably, I.V. had shown a special interest in airport matters and the idea to hire him at the Airport came to his influential relative. To this end, he did not even hesitate to invent a new position – Deputy Director of Handling. ... Later, A.I. dismissed them from their positions... Instead of them he appointed (a) K.V. (who some time ago had graduated the Odessa Institute of Communications), (b) S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry). ... Later on, A.I. dismissed S.I. from the position of Director of the State Air Company 'Air Moldova'.... the shady deal, behind which, in the opinion of many civil aviation employees, were A.I. and S.I.” 26.  The applicant put forward a witness who claimed to have heard about a meeting that was held on the Old Airport Square. He also referred to five employees of the Airport who had been dismissed immediately after A.I.'s reinstatement, in support of his statement regarding the alleged staff purge. The court considered that there was no proof that it was A.I. who had organised the meeting on the Old Airport Square or that it was he who later organised a staff purge. The court found that, according to the existing procedures, A.I. did not have the right to employ or to dismiss personnel. Relying on statements of A.I. and S.I., the court also found that even though they had been involved in the sale of State-owned aircraft, they had been part of a special Commission created by the Government for the purpose of the transaction and that they were not the key persons in that transaction. 27.  The newspaper submitted that the article had not been intended to defame the complainants and that it was ready to publish a notice correcting the factual mistakes as to I.V. being a relative of A.I. and as to the schools attended by C.V. and S.I. 28.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay A.I. damages of MDL 1,800 and MDL 3,600 respectively and to publish a notice withdrawing all the statements concerning the complainants found to be defamatory. 29.  The applicant and the newspaper lodged an appeal against this judgment with the Chişinău Regional Court. The applicant requested that the decision be quashed, submitting that he had produced sufficient evidence substantiating the accuracy of the statements made in the published article, despite certain minor and accidental factual errors. 30.  As regards I.V., the applicant provided copies of the former's employment record, including his previous job at an insurance company specialising in car insurance. The applicant also argued that there was nothing defamatory in the statement that I.V. was a relative of A.I. and that it was true that the position of Deputy Director of Handling had never existed before the employment of I.V. 31.  In respect of C.P., the applicant noted that the accuracy of his statements had been substantiated by the written depositions of the complainant himself, which established that he had been involved in a minor aircraft accident in Budapest. 32.  As to C.M., the applicant pointed out that the witnesses put forward by him (Airport employees) confirmed the acts of sexual harassment and abuse (see paragraphs 9 and 17 above) by C.M. 33.  As to C.V., the applicant admitted having made an error in the job profile and that C.V. was not a veterinary surgeon but had a basic diploma in nursing. The applicant did not consider the description given by him to be defamatory. 34.  In so far as S.I. was concerned, the applicant stated that confusion had occurred in respect of the institution she had graduated from. He also submitted that she had indeed worked on the economic aspects of the transaction regarding the sale of State-owned aircraft and that the dubious character of that deal was proved by an official report in an issue of the Official Gazette (“Monitorul Oficial”). 35.  As regards A.I., the applicant noted that the accuracy of the allegations had been proved by the depositions of witnesses and by the content of the leaflet attached to the appeal application. 36.  On 5 July 1999 the Chişinău Regional Court allowed in part the applicant's appeal and amended the District Court's decision by dismissing the initial action filed by C.P., on the ground that the statement contained in the article about him (see paragraph 15 above) had reflected the truth and had therefore not been of a defamatory nature. The court also reduced the amount of the damages to be paid by the applicant and the newspaper to the complainants. The court justified the reduction by the fact that the circulation of the newspaper “Express” was limited. Accordingly, the applicant and the newspaper were ordered to pay MDL 450 and MDL 1,350 respectively to I.V., MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively to C.M., MDL 180 and MDL 1,350 respectively to C.V., MDL 180 and MDL 1,350 respectively to S.I. and MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively to A.I. 37.  The applicant and the newspaper lodged an appeal in cassation with the Court of Appeal, submitting that sufficient supporting evidence had been produced to the first and the second instance courts to prove the truth of the statements made in the impugned article. In particular, the applicant noted that relevant supporting information had been contained in the report of the Parliamentary Comission on the illegal sale of aircraft published in the Official Gazette and that therefore he should be exonerated from any civil responsibility. 38.  On 7 September 1999 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in cassation and upheld the decisions of the Regional Court and District Court, stating that the appeal in cassation was unfounded. The court concluded that the impugned article had contained both defamatory statements which did not correspond to reality and statements which were not of a defamatory nature but did not correspond to reality. The court further ruled that the award of damages imposed on the newspaper had not in any way infringed its right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and by the Law on the Press.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Krasnogorsk, the Moscow Region. 5.  In May 1995 the applicant signed a contract with a building partnership. Under the terms of the contract the applicant was obliged to pay the company a certain sum, and the company was obliged to provide the applicant with a garage. 6.  Since the company failed to comply with its obligation, on 4 December 1996 the applicant brought court proceedings seeking to oblige the company to provide her with a garage and compensate her for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 7.  On 19 March 1997 the Krasnogorsk Town Court scheduled a hearing for 31 March 1997. 8.  In the period between 31 March 1997 and 29 October 1997 the hearing was adjourned on two occasions because of the absence of the parties, and on two occasions because the judge was sitting in unrelated proceedings. 9.  On 29 October 1997 the applicant's case was joined to twenty-four similar cases initiated by other plaintiffs against the same defendant, and the hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 10.  On 4 December 1997 the applicant modified her claims in so far as they concerned the amount of interest and compensation for legal costs to be paid to her by the defendant. 11.  Following a request by the parties, on 9 December 1997 the hearing was adjourned until 14 January 1998. 12.  On 14 January 1998 some of the cases were assigned to be examined separately. The hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 13.  On 18 February 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 18 March 1998 because the judge was sitting in unrelated proceedings. 14.  On 18 March 1998 the Krasnogorsk Town Court examined the merits of the applicant's claim and dismissed it. The judgment was given in the applicant's absence, and she learned of it from other plaintiffs on 28 May 1998, that is, after the procedural time-limit for appealing had already expired. 15.  On 8 October 1998 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment of 18 March 1998 in respect of all the plaintiffs except the applicant. 16.  The applicant applied for the restoration of the procedural time-limit for appeal against the judgment of 18 March 1998, and on 15 February 1999 her request was granted. 17.  On 28 April 1999 the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 18 March 1998 in respect of the applicant because it had been given in her absence. 18.  On 16 June 1999 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court quashed the appeal decision of 8 October 1998 by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for fresh examination. 19.  On 2 August 1999 the case in respect of all the plaintiffs, including the applicant, was submitted to the Krasnogorsk Town Court. 20.  On 5 October 1999 the hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date because the applicant had failed to appear. 21.  On 15 November 1999 the proceedings were suspended until an unspecified date because the defendant's representative was ill. 22.  Following a complaint by the applicant, on 10 April 2000 the proceedings were resumed, and a hearing was scheduled for 5 May 2000. 23.  On 5 May 2000 the Krasnogorsk Town Court again dismissed the applicant's claims. On 4 June 2000 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 24.  Following a request filed by the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Russia on behalf of the applicant and other plaintiffs, on 25 July 2001 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 5 May 2000, as upheld on 4 June 2000, by way of supervisory review, and remitted the case for fresh examination. 25.  The case file was remitted to the Krasnogorskiy Town Court on 9 August 2001. 26.  During the period between 23 April and 30 September 2002 hearings were adjourned on four occasions owing to the defendant's failure to appear before the court. 27.  On 30 September 2002 a hearing was adjourned until 24 October 2002, on the court's initiative, in view of the necessity to obtain certain documents. 28.  On 24 October 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 22 November 2002, on the request of the defendant, for friendly-settlement negotiations. 29.  On 19 November 2002 the applicant asked the court to attach the defendant's property as a security measure. 30.  Following a request by the applicant, on 22 November 2002 the applicant's case was disjoined from the cases lodged by the other plaintiffs. The hearing was adjourned until 27 March 2003. 31.  On 27 March 2003 the applicant amended her claims. The hearing was adjourned until 3 June 2003 because of the necessity to obtain certain documents and because of a further amendment to the applicant's claims. 32.  In the period between 3 June and 21 October 2003, and between 21 December 2003 and 15 March 2004 hearings were adjourned on four occasions because the defendant had failed to appear before the court. 33.  On 20 August 2004 the Krasnogorsk Town Court refused to entertain the applicant's action in view of her failure to appear at the hearings of 23 July and 20 August 2004. 34.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 26 April 2005 the Krasnogorsk Town Court quashed its decision of 20 August 2004, because there was no information in the case file recording that the applicant had been notified of the hearings of 23 July and 20 August 2004. The next hearing was set for 27 May 2005. 35.  On 27 May 2005 the hearing was adjourned until 8 July 2005 because the judge was sitting in unrelated proceedings. 36.  On 8 July 2005 the applicant challenged the judge, without success. The hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 37.  On 5 August 2005 the case was assigned to a different judge and a hearing was fixed for 25 October 2005. 38.  On 6 December 2005 the applicant amended her claims in so far as they concerned the amount to be paid to her in interest and in respect of non-pecuniary damage by the defendant. 39.  In the period between 7 December 2005 and 26 January 2006 hearings were adjourned on two occasions because the defendant had failed to appear. 40.  On 26 January 2006 the applicant waived some of her claims. The hearing was adjourned until 6 February 2006. 41.  On 6 February 2006 the Krasnogorsk Town Court partly granted the applicant's claims. The applicant appealed. 42.  The appeal hearing was scheduled for 18 July 2006. 43.  On 18 July 2006 the appeal hearing was adjourned until 14 August 2006 since both parties had failed to appear and the case file contained no proof that they had been properly notified of it. 44.  On 14 August 2006 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Budapest. 5.  In the context of complications suffered from plastic surgery, on 13 February 1992 the applicant brought an action in compensation against a hospital. 6.  After having held several hearings and obtained the opinion of an expert, on 11 October 1994 the Pest Central District Court gave an interim judgment, accepting the applicant’s entitlement to compensation. On appeal, on 7 November 1995 the Budapest Regional Court upheld this decision. 7.  Subsequently the proceedings continued before the District Court. In January 1996 the applicant extended her claims. After having held several hearings and obtained an expert opinion, on 27 January 2000 the District Court partly found for the applicant. On 24 January 2001 the Regional Court amended this decision. 8.  On 25 June 2003 the Supreme Court quashed these decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 9.  After several hearings in the resumed first-instance proceedings, on 31 October 2006 the District Court ordered the respondent to pay the applicant 1.9 million Hungarian forints (HUF) in compensation plus accrued interest, together with a monthly allowance in arrears and pro futuro. 10.  On 19 February 2008 the Regional Court upheld this judgment. 11.  On 6 May 2008 the first-instance judgment was rectified.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Barnaul. 6.  On 12 October and 15 December 1999 and on 4 February 2000 the applicant was charged with unlawful business activities, tax evasion and fraud, respectively. Three criminal cases against the applicant were initiated. 7.  On 4 February 2000 the applicant was remanded in custody. 8.  On 9 August 2000 the three criminal cases against the applicant were joined. 9.  From 10 December 1999 to 15 March 2001 the prosecutor's office of the Tsentralnyy District of Barnaul extended the preliminary investigation seven times in view of the complexity of the case. 10.  On 29 June 2001 the bill of indictment against the applicant was issued. 11.  On 17 September 2001 the case was transmitted to the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul. 12.  On 6 March 2003 the Tsentralniy District Court of Barnaul convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. 13.  On 15 May 2003 the Altayskiy Regional Court commuted the term of imprisonment to three years and ten months and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 14.  The applicant was released on 23 May 2003. 15.  Following his arrest on 4 February 2000 the applicant was detained in a temporary detention centre in Barnaul (Изолятор временного содержания г. Барнаула). Thereafter, the applicant was transferred to the pre-trial detention centre no. IZ-17/1.\nIn the course of the preliminary investigation the applicant was returned to the temporary detention centre several times in order to participate in investigative measures. The applicant submitted, and the Government did not dispute, that he had spent seventy-nine days in total in the temporary detention centre. The parties did not specify the dates when the transfers to the temporary detention centre had taken place. 16.  It is clear that from 4 to 20 February 2000 the applicant was held in the temporary detention centre in a cell measuring 20 sq. m. The applicant submitted that he shared the cell with thirty inmates, that there had been no beds in the cell and that the inmates had to sleep on the floor. 17.  According to the Government, the exact number of detainees per cell could not be established because the registers had since been destroyed. The Government also submitted that the applicant's cell had been equipped with beds. 18.  From 21 February 2000 to 23 May 2003 the applicant was held in the pre-trial detention centre no. IZ-17/1 in Barnaul. 19.  The parties submitted the following information concerning the cells where the applicant had been held.\n(a)  Measurements of the cells and number of inmates per cell\n(i)  Cell no.  208 20.  Relying on a certificate issued on 18 November 2005 by the pre-trial detention centre governor, the Government submitted that the applicant had been held in cell no. 208 from 21 February 2000 to 17 March 2000 and from 23 March 2000 to 15 June 2000. The cell measured 24.5 sq. m; was equipped with six beds and accommodated up to seven inmates. According to the certificate, at that time the pre-trial detention centre, which is designed to accommodate 1,135 persons, housed 2,600 to 2,790 inmates. 21.  The applicant submitted that the cell measured 12 sq. m and had been severely overcrowded.\n(ii)  Cell no. 205 22.  The Government submitted that from 15 June 2000 to 25 July 2000 the applicant had been held in cell no. 205. The cell measured 32.1 sq. m; it was equipped with eight beds and accommodated up to nine inmates. According to the same certificate, at the material time the detention centre housed 2,600 to 2,750 inmates. 23.  The applicant submitted that the cell measured 16 sq. m and had been severely overcrowded.\n(iii)  Cell no. 221 24.  The Government submitted that from 25 July 2000 to 25 March 2001 the applicant had been held in cell no. 221. The cell measured 24.1 sq. m; it was equipped with six beds and accommodated up to six inmates. According to the same certificate, at the material time the detention centre housed 1,900 to 2,320 inmates. 25.  The applicant submitted that the cell measured 11 sq. m and had been overcrowded.\n(iv)  Cell no. 194 26.  The Government submitted that from 25 March 2001 to 11 April 2001 the applicant had been held in cell no. 194. The cell measured 24.1 sq. m; it was equipped with six beds and accommodated up to six inmates. According to the same certificate, at the material time the detention centre housed 1,900 to 1,980 inmates. 27.  The applicant submitted that the cell measured 10 sq. m and had been overcrowded.\n (v)  Cell no. 192 28.  The Government submitted that from 11 April 2001 to 14 March 2003 the applicant had been held in cell no. 192. The cell measured 24.8 sq. m; it was equipped with six beds and accommodated up to six inmates. According to the same certificate, at the material time the detention centre housed 1,470 to 1,980 inmates. 29.  The applicant disagreed with the Government, claiming that during the two years of his stay in cell no. 192 it had accommodated up to twelve inmates. As a result, inmates had to take turns to sleep or slept on the concrete floor. He submitted written statements by four of his former cellmates, according to which cell no. 192 measured 11 sq. m and had been severely overcrowded.\n(vi)  Cell no. 128 30.  The Government submitted that from 14 April 2003 to 20 May 2003 the applicant had been held in cell no. 128. The cell measured 120.2 sq. m; it was equipped with thirty beds and accommodated up to twenty-seven inmates. According to the same certificate, at the material time the detention centre housed 1,400 to 1,470 inmates. 31.  The applicant submitted that the cell measured 100 sq. m. He did not comment on the number of inmates in the cell.\n(b)  Sanitary conditions in the cells and the freedom of movement enjoyed by the applicant 32.  Relying on the certificate issued on 18 November 2005 by the detention centre governor, the Government submitted that the conditions in all of the cells had been satisfactory. In particular, the cells had been equipped with a lavatory pan separated from the living area and the cell windows had not been covered with metal shutters. The certificate did not describe the state of the cells during the period of the applicant's detention from 21 February 2000 to 23 May 2003. 33.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been allowed one-hour daily walks in the courtyard. 34.  The applicant submitted that a lavatory pan had not been separated from the living area and offered no privacy; it had been located within 0.5 or 1 metre from the dining table. The cell windows were covered with metal shutters and let no air through. There was no ventilation in the cells. 35.  The applicant pointed out that the sanitary conditions in cell no. 128 had been satisfactory.\n(c)  The applicant's placement in solitary confinement cell no. 3 36.  From 17 to 23 March 2000 the applicant was held in solitary cell no. 3 on suspicion of having the HIV virus. The applicant submitted that the cell had been a punishment cell, located in the basement with no access to daylight or fresh air. He also submitted that he had not been given food for the first three days of his stay in that cell because he had not been provided with any cutlery or tableware by the detention centre administration. According to the certificate of 18 November 2005 issued by the detention centre governor and submitted by the Government, cell no. 3 was a solitary confinement cell rather than a punishment cell. The Government also submitted documents showing that the cell had a window and that the applicant had been provided in good time with cutlery, tableware and other necessary items.\n(d)  Medical assistance provided to the applicant 37.  The applicant submitted that during the period of his detention his spine had hurt but he had been refused medical assistance. The Government provided the Court with the applicant's medical file, according to which the applicant had received treatment for spinal osteochondrosis at the detention centre's medical unit. 38.  The applicant was transported from the pre-trial detention centre to the courthouse on 145 occasions, the last time on 15 May 2003. He offered the following description of the days of transport. 39.  On the days of the hearings he had been woken up at 5 a.m. At about 6 a.m. he had been taken from his cell to the so-called “assembly” cell, together with other detainees who had a hearing on that day. 40.  The applicant had not normally arrived back at the prison until 7.30 p.m. and had been held in the “assembly” cell until 10 or 11 p.m. During the day he had received no food or outdoor exercise and had often missed the weekly shower. 41.  The Government submitted that on the days of transport the applicant had been woken at 6 a.m. and taken to the court in the prison van. He would normally come back to the prison no later than 8 p.m. According to the certificate of 18 November 2005 issued by the detention centre governor, on the days of transport the applicant had been fed in the morning and had been given a packed meal in accordance with the order of the Ministry of Justice of 4 February 2004. 42.  The applicant pointed out that the detention centre administration had started to give packed meals to detainees after 4 February 2004 when the respective order was adopted by the Ministry of Justice, whereas he had been released on 23 May 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The first applicant is the editorial board of Pravoye Delo, a newspaper officially registered in Odessa in May 2000. The second applicant is the editor-in-chief of Pravoye Delo. He lives in Odessa. 5.  At the material time Pravoye Delo was a local newspaper published three times a week with a circulation of 3,000 copies. It published reports and material on political and social matters in Ukraine and, in particular, the Odessa Region. Due to lack of funds, the newspaper often reprinted articles and other material obtained from various public sources, including the Internet. 6.  On 19 September 2003 Pravoye Delo published an anonymous letter, allegedly written by an employee of the Security Service of Ukraine, which the second applicant’s colleague, Ms I., had downloaded from a news website. The letter contained allegations that senior officials of the Odessa Regional Department of the Security Service had been engaging in unlawful and corrupt activities, and in particular that they had connections with members of organised criminal groups. One of the paragraphs of the letter read as follows:\n“... The Deputy Head of [the Odessa Regional Department of the Security Service] [I. T.], a close friend and assistant of the Head of the Department P., established ‘business’ contacts with [the organised criminal group] of [A. A.] ... A member of [the organised criminal group] G. T., an agent of [A. A.], who is in charge of the main areas of activities of the gang [is] a coordinator and sponsor of murders, [he] meets with [I. T.] and resolves financial issues for the top officials of the Department of [the Security Service] in the Odessa Region ...” 7.  The letter was followed by these comments, prepared by Ms I. on behalf of the editorial board:\n“When publishing this letter without the knowledge and consent of the editor-in‑chief, I understand that I may not only face trouble ... but I may also create problems for the newspaper. Because, if this letter is [misinformation], then [the media], in which it appears may be endangered. On the other hand, if this letter is genuine, then its author faces a higher risk. Besides, given that this anonimka [anonymous letter] has already been published on the Odessa website Vlasti.net (to which we refer, in accordance with their requirement), we have the blessing of God [to publish it]. We are proceeding on the understanding that, in accordance with the Act on Democratic Civil Control over the Military Organisation and Law-Enforcement Organs of the State, we are carrying out civil control and, under section 29 of the Act, we would like to receive open information concerning the facts described in this letter from the relevant authorities. Moreover, [it is to be noted] that the Department [of the Security Service] in the Odessa Region did not react to an analogous publication in the Top Secret [newspaper] ... I remind [you] that the [Pravoye Delo] newspaper ... is wide open for letters in reply and comments from all interested agencies.” 8.  In October 2003 G. T., who lived in Odessa at the time and was the President of the Ukraine National Thai Boxing Federation, brought defamation proceedings in the Prymorskiy District Court of Odessa against the applicants. G. T. alleged that the information in the 19 September 2003 issue of Pravoye Delo concerned him, and that it was untrue and had damaged his dignity and reputation. He asked the court to order the applicants to publish a retraction and an apology and to pay him compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of 200,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1]. 9.  The applicants first argued before the court that they were not responsible for the accuracy of the information contained in the material that they had published, as they had reproduced material published elsewhere without making any modifications. The publication contained a reference to the source of the material and was followed by comments explaining the editors’ position regarding the material and inviting comments from the persons and bodies concerned. The applicants also submitted that if the court were to award G. T. the amount of compensation he had claimed, the newspaper would become insolvent and would have to close. 10.  Subsequently, at a hearing on 24 April 2004, the second applicant stated that the article was not about the claimant and that its wording did not necessarily establish that it was a particular “G. T.” who was being referred to. 11.  On 7 May 2004 the court ruled against the applicants. It found that the information at issue did concern the claimant, who was a public figure involved in public activities in the Odessa Region and had represented Ukraine at sports events abroad in his capacity as President of the Ukraine National Thai Boxing Federation. In that context, the court noted that this had not been contested by the applicants in their initial submissions and that the publication was about the activities of the Security Service in the Odessa Region. The court further held that the content was defamatory and that the applicants had failed to prove that it was true. It found no grounds on which to exempt the applicants from civil liability under section 42 of the Press Act, as the Internet site to which they had referred was not printed media registered pursuant to section 32 of the Press Act. 12.  The court ordered the first applicant to publish a retraction of the following content of the publication:\n“... A member of [the organised criminal group], G. T., an agent of [A. A.], who is in charge of the main areas of activities of the gang [is] a coordinator and sponsor of murders, [he] meets with [I. T.] and resolves financial issues for the top officials of the Department [of the Security Service] in the Odessa Region ...” 13.  The court further ordered the second applicant to publish an official apology in the newspaper. 14.  In determining the amount of compensation to be paid to the claimant, the court considered the submissions of the latter and the information concerning the financial situation of the newspaper. It noted that its gross annual income was about UAH 22,000[2] and found it reasonable to order the applicants jointly to pay G. T. UAH 15,000[3] for non‑pecuniary damage. The applicants were also ordered to pay to the State Budget UAH 750[4] in court fees. 15.  The applicants appealed. They maintained the submissions they had made before the first-instance court and also contended that the editorial board had not been registered as a legal entity pursuant to the relevant regulations on registration of the media and that the second applicant had not been appointed as editor-in-chief in accordance with the law. Thus, in their view, they could not take part in the proceedings. 16.  The applicants further argued that invoking their civil liability was contrary to section 41 of the Press Act and section 17 of the Act on State Support of Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists, stating that they had not intended to defame G. T. and that, by publishing the material, they had wished to promote public discussion of the issues raised in that material which were of significant public interest. According to them, it was their duty to disseminate the material and the public had a right to receive it. 17.  The second applicant also submitted that he had not authorised the publication of the material at issue and that the legislation did not provide for an obligation to apologise as a sanction for defamation. 18.  On 14 September 2004 and 24 February 2005, respectively, the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court rejected the applicants’ appeals and upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 19.  On 3 July 2006 the applicants and G. T. concluded a friendly-settlement agreement, pursuant to which the latter waived any claim in respect of the amount of compensation awarded in the judgment of 7 May 2004. The applicants, for their part, undertook to cover all the costs and expenses relating to the court proceedings and to publish in Pravoye Delo promotional and informational materials at G. T.’s request, the volume of which was limited to the amount of compensation under the judgment. 20.  In 2008 the applicants discontinued publishing Pravoye Delo.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1933. He was detained in Aachen Prison until his release on 1 March 2008. 6.  The applicant has been convicted twenty-two times since 1949, initially notably for smuggling and thefts. Since 1955 he has spent most of his life in prison. 7.  On 23 April 1968 the Cologne Regional Court convicted the applicant on two charges of joint aggravated (armed) robbery of a bank, sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention. 8.  On 20 January 1970 the Cologne Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery-style theft committed against a money courier. Taking into account the term of imprisonment from the judgment of 23 April 1968, it imposed on the applicant a cumulative sentence of thirteen years’ imprisonment, but quashed the order for preventive detention. The remainder of his prison sentence was suspended on 31 March 1977 and the applicant was released and placed on probation; this suspension was subsequently revoked. 9.  On 7 December 1978 the Cologne Regional Court convicted the applicant, in particular, of two counts of joint aggravated (armed) robbery, of aiding and abetting another joint aggravated robbery, of three counts of aggravated theft and one count of attempted aggravated theft. It sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention under Article 66 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 45-46 below). 10.  The Cologne Regional Court found that the applicant, who had been released from prison on 31 March 1977 and had a job, had committed the said offences between June 1977 and his arrest in November 1977. Together with two accomplices, he had robbed a money courier and a bank, armed. He had further stolen or attempted to steal together with others several cars which had later been used when committing the two robberies and another bank robbery in which the applicant had not otherwise participated. 11.  Having consulted an expert, the Cologne Regional Court found that since his youth the applicant had been strongly inclined to commit offences and to make his living thereby, even though he could have worked. Serving long sentences had not prevented him from reoffending and from committing more and more serious offences at ever shorter intervals. Since there were no indications that the applicant would not reoffend, he was dangerous to the public. 12.  On 11 April 1980 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the judgment of 7 December 1978, which thereby became final. 13.  On 29 April 1983 the Bonn Regional Court reopened the proceedings in respect of one of the applicant’s accomplices, W., who had also been convicted of bank robbery on 7 December 1978, and acquitted him. The third accomplice to the robbery, Schw., had confessed that he had wrongfully incriminated both W. and the applicant in this offence. The applicant’s request for reopening of the proceedings against him was subsequently dismissed. 14.  On 2 February 1993 the Bonn Regional Court suspended the order remanding the applicant in preventive detention from 26 April 1993 (when the applicant would have served his full prison sentence), granted probation and ordered the applicant to be placed under supervision of conduct (Führungsaufsicht) for four years. 15.  The applicant served the sentence imposed by the judgment of 7 December 1978 in full, as well as the remainder of the sentence imposed by the judgment of 20 January 1970, until 26 April 1993. 16.  On 20 May 1996 the Koblenz Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated (armed) robbery committed with others, sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and ordered his preventive detention. It found that the applicant, armed with a machine gun, had robbed a bank together with an accomplice in June 1995; he had been in custody since then. 17.  On 13 November 1996 the Federal Court of Justice quashed the judgment of 20 May 1996 so far as the applicant’s sentence and his preventive detention were concerned and remitted the case to the Regional Court. 18.  On 18 June 1997 the Koblenz Regional Court again sentenced the applicant to ten years’ imprisonment. It considered the conditions for his preventive detention under Article 66 of the Criminal Code to have been met. However, for reasons of proportionality, the court did not order the applicant’s preventive detention, which would then have been of indefinite duration. It argued that from 8 June 2005 onwards, the applicant would be placed in preventive detention on the basis of the judgment of 7 December 1978, as the provisional suspension of his preventive detention on 2 February 1993 was likely to be revoked, and that he would be of advanced age afterwards. 19.  On 6 July 1998 the Bonn Regional Court, acting as the court dealing with the execution of sentences, revoked the suspension of the applicant’s provisional preventive detention granted on 2 February 1993 pursuant to Article 67g § 1 no. 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 51 below) in view of his renewed conviction for aggravated robbery committed in June 1995. 20.  On 1 September 1998 the Cologne Court of Appeal, disagreeing with the General Public Prosecutor’s view, dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 6 July 1998. The applicant’s objection was of no avail. 21.  On 25 February 1999 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (no. 2 BvR 1712/98) against the decision of the Cologne Court of Appeal dated 1 September 1998. It found that the applicant had failed sufficiently to substantiate his complaint, which was therefore inadmissible. It observed, however, that the provisions of the Criminal Code did not permit the revocation of the suspension of the applicant’s provisional preventive detention after the expiry of the four-year period of supervision of his conduct. It was firstly up to the courts dealing with matters relating to the execution of sentences to examine whether the revocation decision could be amended at the applicant’s request or of the court’s own motion. 22.  On 13 April 1999 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request, supported by the Public Prosecutor General, for the decisions of the Bonn Regional Court dated 6 July 1998 and of the Cologne Court of Appeal dated 1 September 1998 to be set aside. It found that under Article 68c § 3, second sentence, of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 52 below), the supervision of the applicant’s conduct for four years ordered in 1993 had not ended until now as the applicant had been detained since June 1995 and the time spent in detention did not count towards the period of the supervision of his conduct. Therefore, the provisional suspension of the preventive detention order against him could still be revoked in 1998. 23.  On 13 September 2004 the Aachen Regional Court started the proceedings for examination of the need for the applicant’s preventive detention after the end of his prison term by requesting the Public Prosecutor’s Office to send the case file and by ordering the Aachen Prison authorities to make a statement. 24.  The director of Aachen Prison thereupon sent a statement dated 30 December 2004, which he supplemented at the court’s request on 25 February 2005. Following two reminders from the Regional Court, the Public Prosecutor’s Office submitted the case file to the court in March 2005. 25.  On 30 March 2005 the Regional Court requested a psychiatric expert to give an opinion on whether the applicant was still so dangerous that his preventive detention was necessary. 26.  The applicant served his prison sentence in full, up to 7 June 2005. From 8 June 2005 the applicant was in preventive detention ordered in the judgment dated 7 December 1978. 27.  Following an inquiry of the Regional Court at the applicant’s request, the latter was examined by the psychiatric expert on 3 August 2005. Following two further requests made by the applicant to make progress in the proceedings, a report drafted by two psychiatric experts was submitted to the court on 16 November 2005. 28.  On 30 March 2006 the Aachen Regional Court, having heard the applicant and his counsel on that day and having consulted the director of Aachen Prison and two experts, ordered the execution of the preventive detention order in respect of the applicant made in the Cologne Regional Court judgment of 7 December 1978. 29.  The Regional Court considered in detail the previous convictions of the applicant, aged 72, notably his convictions for aggravated robbery and robbery-style theft by judgments dated 23 April 1968, 20 January 1970, 7 December 1978 and 18 June 1997. 30.  The Regional Court found that the execution of the preventive detention order against the applicant was still necessary in view of its objective (Article 67c § 1 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 48 below). In the court’s view, the applicant was likely to commit further serious offences similar to those he had previously committed if released (Article 67d § 2 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 50 below). 31.  In the Regional Court’s view, the applicant had been a persistent offender since his youth, who had reoffended shortly after being released on probation and after serving long prison sentences. He did not have any family ties outside prison and did not have any precise plans as to what he would be doing when released. He was lively for his age. He suffered from orthopaedic health problems, notably injuries to his left knee and his hip, which, as found by the prison doctor, entailed a considerable but not extreme walking disability. His walking ability could have been considerably improved by an artificial hip, but he refused to have the operation while he was in prison. Having consulted the prison doctor, the court took the view that the applicant’s walking disability could not yet be considered so severe as to render him physically unable to commit an offence, notably as his previous offences had not required significant mobility. 32.  The Regional Court, having regard to the report dated 16 November 2005 by the two psychiatric experts who had examined the applicant, took the view that the applicant’s personal and social situation remained similar to that which had existed when he was released from prison in 1993 at the age of 59. He had not changed his attitude towards offences and therefore remained dangerous. 33.  On 26 June 2006 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Aachen Regional Court decision of 30 March 2006. It did not share the view expressed by the Federal Constitutional Court in its decision dated 25 February 1999 that the revocation of the suspension of the applicant’s provisional preventive detention had no longer been possible on 6 July 1998 according to the provisions of the Criminal Code. Pursuant to Article 67g § 5 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 51 below), preventive detention would cease to apply at the end of the offender’s supervision of conduct if the court had not revoked the suspension of his preventive detention before that date. However, the supervision of the applicant’s conduct for four years ordered in 1993 had not ended, as the applicant had been detained since June 1995 and the time spent in detention did not count towards the duration of the supervision of conduct (Article 68c § 3, second sentence, of the Criminal Code). 34.  Moreover, the Court of Appeal found that, contrary to the applicant’s submissions in his appeal, the fact that the Regional Court had failed to reach a decision on the applicant’s preventive detention before the applicant had served his full prison sentence on 7 June 2005 (Article 67c § 2 of the Criminal Code) did not render its decision unlawful. In any event, the mistake had been remedied ex nunc when the decision was taken. 35.  According to the Court of Appeal, the applicant needed to be kept in preventive detention in order to protect the public from particularly dangerous offenders. The applicant did not truly question or regret his offences. As found by two experts in an additional report, the applicant’s statements concerning his offences were very similar to those he had made before his previous release from prison, following which he had reoffended. The applicant’s age and the health problems accompanying it did not, at least at the time, warrant a different conclusion as to the danger he presented to the public. The applicant had also already reached retirement age when he had committed his last offence. As found by the prison doctor on 25 February 2005, his knee and hip were damaged. The court found that these illnesses caused pain, but did not entail a walking disability. 36.  Remanding the applicant in preventive detention was also not disproportionate, as he was likely to commit serious offences if released. However, in view of his present illnesses and the usual diminution of physical fitness with advancing age the applicant’s preventive detention would probably not last until its termination in 2015, but would be suspended on probation. Therefore, the applicant should be prepared for a life outside prison. 37.  On 14 July 2006 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s objection against that decision. 38.  On 3 August 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court against the decisions of the Aachen Regional Court dated 30 March 2006 and of the Cologne Court of Appeal dated 26 June 2006. He claimed that his right to liberty had been violated. He argued that, as had been expressly found in the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court dated 25 February 1999, the revocation of the suspension of his provisional preventive detention had no longer been possible on 6 July 1998. Moreover, he had been remanded in preventive detention since 8 June 2005 without a legal basis, in particular because the courts had failed to reach a decision on the necessity of that remand in custody within a reasonable time, as required by Article 67c § 1 of the Criminal Code as interpreted in the well-established case-law of the courts of appeal and of the Federal Constitutional Court itself (see paragraph 49 below). Due to his age, 73, and his walking disability, which had already made him physically unable to reoffend, his preventive detention was also disproportionate. 39.  On 21 September 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 1614/06). It found that the complaint had no prospects of success. 40.  The Federal Constitutional Court considered that, even assuming that the decisions on the necessity to remand the applicant in preventive detention should have been based on paragraph 1 of Article 67c of the Criminal Code, they did not violate the Basic Law. Contrary to the applicant’s view, he had not been detained without legal basis in the period between the end of his prison term and the Regional Court’s decision ordering the execution of the preventive detention order against him. Referring to its decision of 9 March 1976 (file no. 2 BvR 618/75, see paragraph 49 below), it found that the execution of a preventive detention order on the basis of a judgment of the sentencing court ordering it under Article 66 of the Criminal Code was permitted if the Regional Court dealing with the execution of sentences had begun with its examination under Article 67c § 1 of the Criminal Code before the person concerned had fully served his prison sentence, even if it had not yet taken its decision. 41.  The Federal Constitutional Court further took the view that the Regional Court, which had started the proceedings concerning suspension of the applicant’s preventive detention some nine months before the end of the applicant’s prison term, had not delayed the proceedings in a manner which would violate his right to liberty. 42.  Furthermore, the decision of the courts dealing with the execution of sentences not to suspend the preventive detention order against the applicant and grant probation did not appear arbitrary in view of the applicant’s repeated serious offences and there was no violation of the courts’ duty to investigate the matter. 43.  On 20 December 2007 the Aachen Regional Court decided to suspend the preventive detention order made against the applicant in the Cologne Regional Court’s judgment of 7 December 1978 and grant probation as of 1 March 2008; it further ordered supervision of the applicant’s conduct. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case before it, including, in particular, the applicant’s walking disability, the court considered, in accordance with the view taken by the medical expert it had consulted and contrary to the view taken by the director of Aachen Prison and the Cologne Public Prosecutor’s Office, that it was to be expected that the applicant would not commit further serious offences similar to those he had previously been convicted of if released (Article 67d § 2 of the Criminal Code).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Olsztyn. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows: 6.  On 30 June 2000 a wanted notice with a detention order was issued in respect of the applicant. 7.  On 28 August 2000 the applicant was arrested on the strength of the above-mentioned order and on 1 September 2000 the decision as to his detention was given by the Olsztyn District Court. He was charged with numerous counts of major financial fraud (several counts of massive-scale bank fraud, deceiving private companies and other financial offences) committed while acting in an organised criminal group. 8.  The applicant's detention was subsequently extended by the following decisions: the Olsztyn District Court decisions of 7 November 2001, 7 February 2002, 21 February and 20 May 2003; and the Olsztyn Regional Court's decision of 9 February 2001. 9.  The courts repeatedly relied on the strong probability that the applicant had committed the offences that he had been charged with and that there was a real risk that he would receive a severe sentence, thereby giving rise to a presumption that he would obstruct the proper conduct of proceedings. They also referred to the risk of absconding, deriving from the fact that the applicant had been sought pursuant to a wanted notice. 10.  The applicant challenged his detention. He lodged appeals against the Olsztyn District Court decisions of 20 May and 24 July 2003, which were dismissed by the Olsztyn Regional Court on 6 June and 8 August 2003 respectively. 11.  He also lodged numerous requests for release from detention, which were dismissed by the Olsztyn District Court decisions of 19 December 2001, 11 January and 13 February 2002, 10 January, 21 February, 27 March and 16 May 2003. 12.  Furthermore, the applicant requested the application of a more lenient preventive measure to replace his detention. That request was refused by the Olsztyn District Court decision of 28 April 2003. 13.  Until March 2002 the trial court effectively held eight hearings. The court conducted extensive evidentiary proceedings; a considerable number of witnesses was heard, evidence was obtained from documents, searches and other sources. 14.  On 5 March 2002 the Olsztyn District Court found the applicant guilty of fraud. It acquitted him of the charge of membership of a criminal organisation, and imposed a sentence of five years' imprisonment. The applicant appealed. Seven hearings were subsequently held by the second-instance court. 15.  On 1 October 2002 the Olsztyn Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 16.  On 24 July 2003 the Olsztyn District Court again found the applicant guilty of financial fraud and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment. 17.  On 20 July 2004 the Olsztyn Regional Court conditionally released the applicant from serving the remaining part of the sentence, which was due to end on 28 August 2005. 18.  On several occasions between 2003 and 2004 the applicant requested information as to whether a confirmation that the detention order of 30 June 2000 had been served on him was kept in the case file. On 6 June and 10 August 2004 he was informed by the Vice-President of the Regional Court that no such confirmation had been found. 19.  While the applicant was detained, his correspondence was censored on several occasions. 20.  A letter dated 23 November 2001, which was sent to the applicant by his lawyer, bears a “censored” stamp dated 29 November 2001, a handwritten note “on the judge's behalf” and an illegible signature. 21.  Two Olsztyn Tax Office decisions, one dated 30 November 2001, informing the applicant of the institution of tax proceedings against him, and the other dated 3 December 2001, informing the applicant of his right to be heard in the course of the tax proceedings, were also censored. Both decisions bear a “censored” stamp with the date 10 December 2002 and an illegible signature of a judge. They also bear another stamp of the same kind which is almost illegible, bearing the date 11 December 2001 and an illegible signature. 22.  The applicant further submitted an envelope in which the correspondence with the tax office was sent to him. It bears a “censored” stamp with the date 11 December 2001 and an illegible signature of a judge. There are also further notes on it: “it is not subject to censorship” (nie podlega cenzurze) and “I annul subjection to censorship” (uchylam) and “submit to censorship” (poddać cenzurze), followed by an illegible signature. 23.  Finally, the applicant provided two envelopes from letters sent by him to his family and bearing “censored” stamps dated 14 December 2000 and 31 May 2001. 24.  On 16 December 2001, in reply to a complaint by the applicant, the judge admitted that he had stamped the letter of 30 November 2001 sent by the tax office as “censored”, had written a date on it and had signed it. 25.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint to a higher authority, namely with the Vice-President of the Olsztyn Regional Court, about the censorship of his correspondence by the President of the Criminal Division. 26.  On 17 April 2003 he sent a letter to the Vice-President of the Olsztyn Regional Court requiring just satisfaction for the breach of his right to unrestricted correspondence with his lawyer. 27.  On 7 May 2003 the applicant was informed by the Vice-President of the Olsztyn Regional Court that the letter sent by his lawyer had been censored by mistake and thus the applicant did not have any right to just satisfaction. 28.  On 26 March 2003 he was informed by the Vice-President of the Olsztyn Regional Court that the judge should not have subjected the applicant's correspondence with the tax authorities to censorship, as it was covered by the notion of “official correspondence”, and that he had done so by mistake.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the city of Chernigiv. 5.  On 3 May 1999 the Chernigiv City Prosecutor’ Office (hereinafter the Prosecutor’ Office) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for abuse of power and forgery of official documents. The prosecution’s case was that the applicant, while acting in his capacity as a private notary, had fraudulently certified a title and real-estate transactions using invalid registration forms. 6.  On 21 May 1999 the Chernygiv City Prosecutor issued a search warrant in respect of the applicant’s office. The search was carried out the same day. According to the record drawn up on this occasion, the authorities seized at the office notary stamps and documents, a number of accounting records and a metal strong-box.  The latter was opened on 2 July 1999 at the premises of the Prosecutor’s Office. The relevant record stated that there had been found, inter alia, personal items belonging to the applicant. 7.  On 28 July 1999 an investigator from the Prosecutor’s Office closed the applicant’s case given the lack of any corpus delicti. 8.  On 20 September 2000 the acting Chernigiv City Prosecutor overruled the investigator’s decision, as it had been proved that the applicant had committed the imputed offence, but ordered the discontinuation of proceedings due to the insignificance of the offence. The applicant challenged this finding, claiming that he had not committed any offence. On 21 December 2000 the Desniansky District Court of Chernigiv (hereafter “the Desniansky Court”) rejected the applicant’s complaint. 9.  On 26 February 2001 the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court, in the course of supervisory proceedings, quashed the decision of the Desniansky Court and remitted the case. 10.  On 4 April 2001 the Desniansky Court quashed the City Prosecutor’s ruling of 20 September 2000 and ordered a further pre-trial investigation. 11.  On 26 May 2001 an investigator terminated the criminal proceedings on substantially the same grounds as in the September 2000 ruling. On 4 July 2001 the Chernigiv City Prosecutor quashed this decision and ordered further inquiries in the case. 12.  On 4 August 2001 the criminal case was closed due to the insignificance of the offence which had been committed. The applicant’s complaint against this ruling was rejected on 6 November 2001 by the Desniansky Court as being unsubstantiated. In particular, the court indicated that the applicant’s guilt had been proved by the evidence collected in the course of the investigation. 13.  On 24 January 2002 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal (hereafter “the Court of Appeal”) quashed the decision of 6 November 2001 as the local court had failed to specify the evidence in support of its opinion as to the applicant’s guilt. The case was remitted for a fresh consideration. 14.  On 26 June 2002 the Desniansky Court rejected the applicant’s complaint against the ruling of 4 August 2001. The court indicated that the investigation case file contained sufficient evidence to establish that the applicant had forged a certain notary document and wittingly carried out an invalid notarial action. However, having regard to the insignificance of the offence, further criminal prosecution was impractical. As regards the applicant’s submissions concerning the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained by the search of his office, the court found that such complaints could be raised during the trial on the merits and considered itself incompetent to examine them in the course of the proceedings before it.\nOn 9 September 2002 the Court of Appeal upheld this decision. On 13 December 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal under the cassation procedure.\nb.  Compensation proceedings 15.  In January 2000 the applicant instituted proceedings against the Prosecutor’s Office, seeking monetary compensation for the material and moral damage suffered as a result of the allegedly unlawful search of his office (i.e. loss of or damage to personal items and the seizure of documents essential for his professional activity). 16.  On 28 August 2000 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv (hereafter “the Novozavodsky Court”) granted this claim. The court declared the search of the applicant’s office “to have been conducted unlawfully” (визнати проведення обшуку незаконним). In particular, it established that in breach of Article 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter “the CCP”) the investigator, being well aware of the applicant’s whereabouts (at that time he was undergoing hospital treatment), had failed to serve the search warrant on him. Moreover, contrary to Article 186 of the CCP, the authorities, instead of collecting the evidence relating to the criminal case, had seized all the official documents and certain personal items in the applicant’s office. This had effectively denied the applicant the possibility of performing his professional duties until 6 August 1999, when the relevant documents and items were returned to him. The court awarded the applicant UAH 14,140[1] in material and UAH 1,000[2] in moral damages. 17.  On 16 January 2001 the Chernygiv Regional Court, on an appeal by the Prosecutor’s Office, quashed the decision of 28 August 2000 and remitted the case for fresh consideration because the legal basis for the decision (namely the termination of the criminal proceedings on “exonerative” grounds) had ceased to exist. 18.  On 26 December 2001 the Novozavodsky Court examined the applicant’s claim and rejected it as being unsubstantiated. The court, referring to the Prosecutor’s Office’s ruling of 4 August 2001, found that the applicant’s case had been closed on non-exonerative grounds, within the meaning of Article 2 of the Law of Ukraine “on the procedure for compensation of damage caused to the citizen by unlawful actions of bodies of inquiry, pre-trial investigation, prosecutors and courts” 1994, and therefore the applicant had no standing to claim compensation for any acts or omissions allegedly committed by the authorities in the course of the investigation. 19.  On 23 May 2002 the Court of Appeal stayed the appeal proceedings until the determination of the applicant’s complaint against the ruling of the Prosecutor’s Office of 4 August 2001 (i.e. the grounds for the termination of his criminal case). On 3 January 2003 the appeal proceedings were renewed and the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 26 December 2001 was rejected. 20.  In December 2001 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Novozavodsky Court against the Chernigiv Law College and its Principal for defamation. The applicant alleged that, during the Attestation Commission’s hearing on 14 May 2001, the Principal had made three statements about him which were libellous and abusive, including one rudely questioning his mental health. The applicant demanded apologies and compensation for moral damage. 21.  During the trial, one of the applicant’s main arguments was that he had never suffered any mental health problems. He adduced to this effect a certificate supposedly issued by a psychiatric hospital, attesting that the applicant had never been treated there. 22.  The case of the defence was that the Principal had never uttered the obscenities attributed to him by the applicant. However, they challenged the authenticity of the above certificate and asked the court to verify the applicant’s assertions. On 21 March 2002 this application was granted and the Chernigiv Regional Psycho-Neurological Hospital was requested to provide information as to whether the applicant had undergone any psychiatric treatment. On 3 April 2002 the hospital submitted to the court a certificate to the effect that for several years the applicant had been registered as suffering from a certain mental illness and underwent in-patient treatment in different psychiatric establishments. However, several years earlier his psychiatric registration had been cancelled due to long-term remission (a temporary lessening of the severity) of the disease. This information was read out by a judge at one of the subsequent hearings; however, no reference to this evidence was made in the final judgment. 23.  On 3 June 2002 the Novozavodsky Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. The court found, inter alia, that the applicant had failed to prove that the defendant had made any remarks about his sanity. 24.  The applicant appealed, challenging, inter alia, the lawfulness of the court’s request for information about his mental state. 25.  On 1 October 2002 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in substance. On the same day the court issued a separate ruling to the effect that the first instance court’s request for information concerning the applicant’s mental health from the public hospital was contrary to Article 32 of the Constitution, Articles 23 and 31 of the Data Act 1992 and Article 6 of the Psychiatric Medical Assistance Act 2000. In particular, it was indicated that information about a person’s mental health was confidential, and its collection, retention, use and dissemination fell under a special regime. Moreover, the court held that the requested evidence had no relevance to the case.\nSumming up the above considerations, the Court of Appeal found that the judges of the lower courts lacked training in the field of confidential data protection and notified the Regional Centre for Judicial Studies about the need to remedy this lacuna in their training programme. 26.  On 24 June 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal under the cassation procedure.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Orašje, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 5. On 25 November 1994 the applicant brought a civil action against the company V. (“the employer”) and the insurance company C.O. in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages for a work-related injury in the amount of 96,700 Croatian kunas (HRK). 6.  The court held hearings on 2 June and 30 November 1999 and 21 February 2001. 7.  In the period between May 1998 and October 2000 the applicant filed four rush notes urging the court to schedule a hearing and speed up the proceedings. 8.  On 21 February 2001 the Municipal Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed on 6 March 2001 to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). 9.  On 26 March 2001 the applicant applied to be exempted from the court fee for the appeal. Since it was the Municipal Court that was competent to decide on the applicant’s request for exemption, the County Court returned the case-file to it with a view to reaching a decision thereon. A hearing before the Municipal Court scheduled for 14 January 2003 was adjourned since the applicant had not received the summons due to his change of address. The next hearing scheduled for 3 June 2003 was adjourned owing to the illness of the judge assigned to hear the case. Lastly, a hearing at which the applicant gave a declaration of his income and assets was held on 13 May 2004. On 24 May 2004 the applicant was served with the decision in his favour exempting him from the court fee for the appeal. The case-file was then sent back to the County Court with a view to deciding on the applicant’s appeal. 10.  On 5 April 2005 the County Court dismissed the appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 25 April 2005. No appeal on points of law (revizija) lay to the Supreme Court against this judgment (see paragraph 14 below). 11.  Meanwhile, on 23 July 2002 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) complaining about the length of the civil proceedings. 12.  On 17 April 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It held that the delay was attributable to the complexity of the case and the applicant’s conduct. It found that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings in that he had applied for exemption from the court fee only after he had appealed against the first-instance judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in the town of Irkutsk. 6.  On 22 December 1999 the Sverdlovskiy District Court of the Irkutsk Region convicted the applicant of theft and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. On 11 April 2000 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the judgment. 7.  On 7 June 2001 the applicant asked the President of the Regional Court to apply for supervisory review of the above judgments on a number of legal grounds. After leave had been granted, on 2 July 2001 the Presidium of the Regional Court upheld the conviction but reduced the applicant’s sentence to four years and six months because of an error in the calculation of the term. The applicant was not brought to the hearing. 8.  The applicant made further attempts to obtain a review of his conviction and sentence. Apparently in reply to one of those applications, by a letter of 18 November 2002 the Irkutsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office notified the applicant that they had applied for supervisory review of the judgments of 22 December 1999 and 11 April 2000. It appears that the scope of the application for review was limited to an argument that the trial court had erred in determining the prison regime to be applied to the applicant without having regard to the cancellation of his conviction in 1992 for another offence. The applicant received that letter on 22 November 2002. 9.  It appears that on 6 December 2002 the applicant submitted his observations in relation to that request. However, in the meantime, on 2 December 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court had already examined the supervisory review application and found that the 1992 conviction had been cancelled in 1997 and should not have been taken into consideration when the trial court decided whether there had been a repeated commission of a criminal offence (recidivism). It concluded that the applicant’s acts had constituted dangerous rather than “particularly” dangerous recidivism, and changed the type of the correctional facility in which the applicant was to serve his sentence. The Presidium upheld the judgments of 22 December 1999 and 7 June 2001 in the remaining part. The applicant was not brought to that hearing. On 30 December 2002 he was told that the review had taken place, but a copy of the decision was not given to him. 10.  The applicant served his sentence in correctional colony no. UK-272/25 situated in the village of Vikhorevka in the Irkutsk Region. 11.  According to the applicant, on 7 September 2001 the colony administration informed the detainees that a special-purpose squad would be brought to the colony “to discipline detainees”. 12.  On 21 September 2001 five officers of the special-purpose squad arrived at the colony in order to “render practical assistance in carrying out searches and prophylactic measures”.  On the same day the wardens and the officers of the squad searched the applicant’s cell. The applicant objected to the search and the officers intimidated him, beat him up and damaged his personal belongings. The applicant received no medical assistance and the colony doctor refused to record his injuries. The colony administration subsequently refused to dispatch his complaints to the prosecutor. 13.  According to the Government, the Director of the Regional Department for Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of Justice ordered a series of searches in detention facilities with a view to seizing unauthorised items kept by detainees in their cells which could be used for an escape. 14.  Searches were carried out in the applicant’s cell on 10 and 21 September 2001. According to a report dated 10 September 2001, the use of force was accounted for by the applicant’s insults to officers. A report drawn up on 21 September 2001 indicated that the applicant had uttered insults and threats of reprisals. The Government submitted copies of reports by two officers to their superior, stating that during the search on 21 September 2001 the applicant had uttered insults and threats of reprisals to the officers. Another officer stated that the applicant had objected to the search and had swung his hands; because of his refusal to stop after a warning, his hand had been held behind his back, he “had been held in a posture preventing resistance” and had been placed in a separate room pending the search in his cell. A report drawn up by the colony medical assistant indicated that no injuries had been detected on the applicant’s body. 15.  Several detainees complained to the Bratsk Prosecutor’s Office, in charge of supervising penitentiary institutions, about the events of 10 and 21 September 2001. They alleged that they and certain other detainees, including the applicant, had been beaten up by the squad members, with the tacit agreement of the colony administration. 16.  On 21 January 2002 the Bratsk Penitentiary Supervising Prosecutor’s Office refused to initiate criminal proceedings against the squad members. The assistant prosecutor indicated that the squad intervention had been duly authorised by the Regional Department for Execution of Sentences on 6 and 13 September 2001 (decrees nos. 385 and 398). The squad officers wore camouflage with their ID numbers and balaclava masks. On 10 September 2001 during the search of his cell the applicant had refused to comply with orders (to stay in the corridor against the wall), and had threatened the officers with reprisals, insulting them and pushing them away. Therefore, on an order from the colony chief officer the applicant was immobilised. During another cell search on 21 September 2001 the applicant behaved in the same way and also incited other detainees to riot. In order to put a stop to his actions he was immobilised. Special means and weapons were not used. The assistant prosecutor interrogated the complainants and other detainees, some of whom however had stated that special means or weapons had been used against detainees. 17.  On 28 February 2002, on a complaint by the applicant, an official of the Irkutsk Regional Department for Execution of Sentences informed him as follows. On 21 September 2001 five officers of the special-purpose squad had arrived in the colony. The applicant prevented the wardens from carrying out searches and assaulted them verbally and physically. Following the searches, the doctor visited the detainees to find out if they had sustained any injuries. The detainees did not make any complaints or requests.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Narva. 6.  On 17 September 2012 the applicant, in misdemeanour proceedings, was fined 80 euros (EUR) by a police officer of the East Prefecture of the Police and Border Guard Board for a breach of public order (breaking a glass panel of a bus shelter). 7.  The applicant contested this decision before the Viru County Court. He argued that he had not committed the act in question and challenged the assessment of witness statements. He complained about the failure of the police to present him to a witness for identification. Lastly, he complained that the police had not indicated in its decision the specific provisions of the local rules on public order which he had allegedly breached. 8.  The County Court sent summons to the applicant for a hearing scheduled for 21 March 2013 at 12.30 p.m. It was noted in the summons that the applicant’s participation in the hearing was mandatory. Furthermore, it was noted, with reference to Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure (Väärteomenetluse seadustik), that if a complainant failed to appear at the hearing, although he had been notified of the obligation to participate, and the hearing was not adjourned, the court would refuse to examine the complaint. The applicant’s counsel, a representative of the police prefecture and witnesses were also summoned. 9.  The summons sent to the applicant’s address, which he had used throughout the proceedings and which had been indicated in his complaint, could not be served on him personally as he was not present on 4 February 2013 when the court’s security officer attempted to serve the summons. His mother refused to accept the summons and said that the applicant was living abroad. The applicant’s counsel received the summons on 8 February 2013. The witnesses also received the summons in the beginning of February. 10.  On 20 March 2013 the County Court issued a ruling by which the applicant’s complaint was admitted for the proceedings. According to the ruling the hearing was scheduled for 21 March 2013 at 12.30 p.m. and the names of persons to be summoned to the hearing were set out. 11.  On 21 March 2013 the County Court held its hearing. The applicant did not appear. His counsel asked the court to examine the matter without the applicant’s presence as the applicant was abroad and it was not known when he would return to Estonia. According to the applicant’s father, who was in the courtroom as a spectator, the applicant was not to return to Estonia within the next five years. The County Court refused to examine the applicant’s complaint. It delivered its decision in writing on 2 April 2013. 12.  According to the County Court’s decision, the applicant had failed to inform the authorities of his new address. However, as the applicant’s father was aware of the time of the court hearing and of the applicant’s intention not to return to Estonia within the next five years, the court concluded that the applicant’s parents were communicating both with the applicant and his counsel. Thus, the applicant must have been aware of the court hearing and summons sent to him. 13.  The County Court found that in view of the substance of the misdemeanour case and the court’s duty to hear a misdemeanour matter in its entirety, regardless of the limits of the complaint filed, and to verify the factual and legal circumstances on the basis of which the body conducting the extra-judicial proceedings (that is, the police) had made its decision, it was not possible to examine the case without the applicant’s participation. It noted that one of the complaints made by the applicant had been that the body conducting the extra-judicial proceedings had not presented the applicant for identification to the witness. Thus, interviewing of the applicant and presenting him for recognition to the witness were important steps for the adjudication of the matter which could not be accomplished without the applicant’s participation. The court considered that adjourning the hearing would serve no purpose since the applicant was not to return to Estonia within a month – the time-limit for which a hearing could be adjourned under the law of procedure. Moreover, the applicant’s counsel had not requested an adjournment but examination of the complaint without the applicant’s presence. However, for the above reasons the court did not consider it possible to examine the case without the applicant. Relying on Article 126 § 2 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure – which provided that if a complainant failed to appear at the hearing although he had been notified of the obligation to participate in the court hearing – the County Court refused to examine the complaint. 14.  The applicant’s counsel appealed, relying, inter alia, on Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention according to which a person had the right to defend himself through legal assistance of his own choosing. The receipt of the summons was not disputed. 15.  On 23 May 2013 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the ruling of the first-instance court. It noted that under Article 126 § 1 of the Code of Misdemeanour Procedure the court could decide on a discretionary basis whether a complainant’s participation in the court hearing was necessary and, if needed, oblige the person in question to appear. In the case at hand the County Court had given reasons as to why the applicant’s participation was required and it was not possible to examine the case in his absence. The Court of Appeal pointed out that the applicant had challenged in his complaint to the County Court the failure of the police to present him to witnesses for identification. It was, however, unclear, how the County Court could have eliminated this deficiency in the applicant’s absence. 16.  No appeal lay against the Court of Appeal’s ruling.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in the town of Sergiyev Posad in the Moscow Region. 5.  In 1988 the applicant gave up his post in the Zagorskiy engineering plant in order to be appointed to a similar position in a car manufacturing enterprise, ATP-11 (“ATP-11”). The latter refused to appoint the applicant to the position sought. 6.  On an unspecified date in 1988 the applicant sued ATP-11, seeking that it complied with the agreement for his appointment to the post. 7.  On 4 January 1989 the Zagorsk Town Court dismissed his claims. The Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on 2 February 1989. On 4 May 1989 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgments by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for a new examination. 8.  By a judgment of 27 June 1989, the Town Court rejected the applicant’s claims. On 14 July 1989 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 9.  On 7 June 1990 the Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (“the RSFSR Supreme Court”) quashed the judgments of 27 June and 14 July 1989 and remitted the case to the Town Court for a fresh examination. 10.  On 28 December 1990 Judge M. of the Town Court listed a hearing for 9 January 1991. 11.  At a hearing of 23 January 1991 the applicant amended his claims and claimed compensation for forced absence from work due to the ATP-11’s unlawful refusal to appoint him to the post. 12.  On 7 May 1991 judge M. instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion that he had stolen the case file concerning his employment dispute. 13.  On 1 November 1991 the deputy prosecutor of the Moscow Regional prosecutor’s office informed the applicant that there were no reasons to set aside the decision of 7 May 1991. He also noted that the local justice department had been ordered to take immediate measures to restore the materials of the case file in respect of the applicant’s employment dispute. 14.  On 19 March 1998 the Mytishchi Town Court of the Moscow Region acquitted the applicant for lack of evidence. The judgment became final on 27 March 1998. 15.  In the meantime, on 8 April 1992 the applicant requested the President of the Town Court (renamed the Sergiyev Posad Town Court after the town of Zagorsk had been renamed Sergiyev Posad) to restore the case file regarding his employment dispute and to pursue its examination of his claims against ATP-11. The applicant submitted the receipt card showing that the request had been received by the Town Court on 14 April 1992. On 6 May 1992 the President informed the applicant that his employment claims would be adjudicated after the examination of the criminal case against him. 16.  On 1 June 1993 and 1 March 1994 respectively the Regional Court forwarded to the Town Court repeated requests by the applicant for restoration of the case file (заявление о восстановлении утраченного судебного производства) with a view to proceeding with the examination of his employment dispute, further to the decision of 7 June 1990. Those requests were accompanied by the documents from the file preserved by the applicant. In its letter of 1 March 1994 the court noted that in case of dismissal of the applicant’s request to restore the case file the courts were to advise the applicant on his right to re-submit his employment dispute to the courts by means of ordinary civil proceedings. It appears that no action was taken in response to the above requests. 17.  By decision of 1 April 1994, the Town Court refused to examine the applicant’s requests to restore the case file, as formulated in his application of 20 January 1994 and a telegram of 26 March 1994 respectively. The court referred to the ongoing criminal proceedings and held that it could not examine the applicant’s requests until his exculpation. 18.  On 13 October 1994 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the decision of 1 April 1994 and remitted the matter to the Town Court for a fresh examination. 19.  By letter of 20 February 1995, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation advised the applicant that the Presidium of the Regional Court had forwarded his request for restoration of the case file to the Town Court for a fresh examination. 20.  On 25 September 1996 the Regional Court forwarded to the President of the Town Court a complaint by the applicant about the failure to examine his request for restoration of the case file, as ordered by the decision of 13 October 1994. The Regional Court noted that, according to the Town Court’s registry, the related proceedings were still pending before the Town Court. 21.  On 5 May 1998 the Convention entered into force in respect of Russia. 22.  On 6 July 1998 the Regional Court forwarded to the Town Court a further complaint by the applicant about the failure to examine his requests for restoration of the case file. It ordered the Town Court to take all necessary measures with a view to pursuing the examination of the applicant’s request. 23.  By decision of 10 November 1998, the Town Court refused to restore the case file concerning the applicant’s employment dispute. The court noted that it had returned to the applicant the documents lodged in March 1994 after the decision of 1 April 1994 had become legally binding. The applicant had not complied with the court’s requests to re-submit them. Instead of rectifying the shortcomings, the applicant had chosen to complain to higher courts, declaring that the documents were already with the Town Court. In the absence of the relevant documents and any intention on the part of the applicant to submit them, it had to terminate the proceedings. It advised the applicant that it was open to him to re-submit his employment dispute to the Town Court. 24.  It appears that the applicant was not present at the hearing and was not served with a copy of the decision of 11 November 1998. The decision was not appealed against and became final on 22 November 1998. 25.  On 10 February 2002 the applicant renewed his request to the Town Court to restore his case file and to adjudicate his employment dispute. 26.  By a decision of 26 August 2002 the Town Court dismissed the applicant’s request. It noted that the applicant had asked it to restore the file and had submitted copies of documents related to his employment dispute. However, those documents had not been duly certified. They had been partly typewritten and partly handwritten by the applicant, which cast doubt on their authenticity. The applicant had not submitted any other documents and the court itself had been unable to obtain any documents. ATP-11 had been declared insolvent. Eleven years had passed since the case file had been stolen and the applicant had requested to restore it only in 2002. It was impossible to examine authentic written exhibits (evidence) related to the applicant’s labour action. The court finally noted that it was open to the applicant to re-submit his employment dispute to the Town Court. 27.  On 14 October 2002 the Regional Court upheld the decision. It appears that the applicant was provided with both decisions in due time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Ivan Trofimovich Varanitsa, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1934 and currently resides in Krasnoarmeysk, in the Donetsk Region. 6.  On 19 January 2000 the Krasnoarmeysk City Court ordered the State mine “Rodinskaya” (the “Mine”) to pay the applicant UAH 2,961.35[1] in compensation for salary arrears. On the same date the court delivered writs of execution to the applicant. The judgment became final on 31 January 2000. 7.  On 14 February 2000 the Krasnoarmeysk City Bailiffs initiated the enforcement of the judgment of 19 January 2000. The enforcement was suspended on the same date due to the bankruptcy proceedings concerning the Mine pending before the Donetsk Regional Court of Arbitration. 8.  On 6 June 2000 the Krasnoarmeysk City Bailiffs reinitiated the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s case. 9.  On 10 April 2001 the Donetsk Regional Court of Arbitration declared the Mine bankrupt. On 19 June 2001 this decision was quashed by the same court. 10.  On 18, 20 and 25 March 2002 the Krasnoarmeysk City Deparment of Justice, the Department of Justice for the Donetsk Region, informed the applicant that the judgment could not be executed due to the Mine’s lack of funds. 11.  On 9 April 2002 the Krasnoarmeysk City Department of Justice informed the applicant that the Mine had been receiving funds from the State budget in order to pay salary arrears. It also informed the applicant that the Mine’s property could not be attached and that the Execution Service was presently executing earlier writs issued against the Mine in 1998. 12.  On 21 August 2002 the applicant was paid UAH 58.26.[2] 13.  On 23 August 2002 the applicant received UAH 25.52[3]. The remainder of the unpaid debt was therefore UAH 2,877.57[4]. 14.  In August 2003 the mine paid the remainder of the debt to the applicant, which was by then UAH 2,961.35[5]. 15.  On 11 August 2003 the Krasnoarmeysk City Department of Justice terminated the enforcement proceedings in view of the full execution of the judgment of 19 January 2000. 16.  On 8 October 2003 the applicant informed the Court that the judgment given in his favour had been enforced in full. However, he still requested compensation for moral damage for the State’s failure to enforce the judgment for three years and eight months.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Varna. 5.  The applicant worked as a stoker at the Varna port. In 1999 he was dismissed as new requirements he did not meet were introduced for his position. 6.  On an unspecified date in October 1999 the applicant brought an action for unfair dismissal alleging that: 1) the dismissal order had not been reasoned; 2) it had been indicated in it that it had been effective as of a date preceding the date when it had been issued; and 3) it had not been necessary to change the requirements for his position. 7.  In a judgment of the Varna District Court of 8 June 2000, upheld by the Varna Regional Court on 12 January 2001, the applicant's dismissal was found to be unlawful. 8.  Upon appeal by the applicant's former employer, in a judgment of 8 May 2002 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the Regional Court's judgment, finding that the latter had misapplied the law. 9.  Following a fresh examination of the case, on 1 August 2002 the Varna Regional Court delivered a new judgment whereby it dismissed the applicant's claim. 10.  On 3 September 2002 the applicant appealed in cassation. 11.  The Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing to examine the applicant's appeal on 14 October 2004. In a final judgment of 19 November 2004 it upheld the Regional Court's judgment and dismissed the applicant's arguments in respect of the alleged unlawfulness of the dismissal order, finding that: 1) the order indicated the legal ground for the applicant's dismissal, namely that he did not meet the relevant requirements; this represented sufficient reasoning in the case; 2) the order had entered into force on the date it had been served on him, any other date indicated in it as a date of entry into force was irrelevant; and 3) the applicant's former employer had enjoyed discretion, which could not be subject to judicial review, to set the requirements for the applicant's position. 12.  In December 2004 and February 2005 the applicant requested the Varna District Court, where the case file was to be archived, for copies of all court judgments in the case. According to him, the District Court refused to provide him with a copy of the judgment of the Varna Regional Court of 12 January 2001 (see paragraph 7 above). Nevertheless, the applicant has enclosed a copy of the said judgment with his application.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Hajnówka. 6.  On 23 August 2000 the Bielsko Podlaskie District Court convicted the applicant of theft and sentenced him to 2 years' imprisonment. On 12 December 2000 the Białystok Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment. 7.  On 12 January 2001 the court granted the applicant's request to assign a legal-aid lawyer to the case for the purposes of filing a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 8.  In a letter to the applicant dated 7 February 2001 the Białystok Regional Court informed him that the legal‑aid lawyer had found no grounds on which to prepare a cassation appeal. The applicant was not informed of the further procedural steps available to him to lodge a cassation appeal. 9.  In reply to the applicant's subsequent three queries as to what his procedural situation was and whether there was any possibility for him to pursue the cassation proceedings, in particular by having his own draft of a cassation appeal signed by another legal-aid lawyer, on 19 February, 23 and 29 May 2001 the Regional Court stated that it was not for the court to oblige a legal‑aid lawyer to prepare a cassation appeal if he or she had refused to do so and that it was impossible for a lawyer to sign a cassation appeal drafted by the defendant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 in Estonia and lives in Tartu. 5.  In 1995 or 1996 the applicant lodged an application with the Public Prosecutor’s Office in which he requested that criminal proceedings be initiated against four persons, including two police officers. The applicant had allegedly been beaten by these men. A prosecutor refused to initiate criminal proceedings. 6.  Subsequently, the same four persons made a report concerning an offence allegedly committed by the applicant. They argued that the applicant had submitted false accusations concerning the beating. On 8 October 1996 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 174 § 1 (submitting knowingly false accusations concerning the commission of a criminal offence by another person) of the Criminal Code (Kriminaalkoodeks). 7.  In the following years, the applicant repeatedly failed to appear at the police prefecture when summoned. On several occasions it proved to be impossible to compel him by force to appear (sundtoomine), as he was not present at the address he had indicated and his whereabouts were unknown. On some occasions, when the authorities found him, he refused to familiarise himself with the charges, to give statements or to sign an undertaking not to leave his place of residence (allkiri elukohast mittelahkumise kohta). 8.  According to a forensic psychiatric expert opinion given in 2000 on the request of an investigator, the applicant was not mentally unsound but had a paranoid personality disorder. He was considered to be able to give statements, attend court hearings and serve any punishment. 9.  Also in 2000 a new criminal case was instituted against the applicant, again under Article 174 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The case was joined with the case initiated in 1996. 10.  In 2000 and 2001 the period of the preliminary investigation was extended repeatedly due to the applicant’s alleged ill-health. On 28 November 2001 he was compelled by the police to appear in the police prefecture. On the next day, he was presented with the formal charges under Article 174 § 1 of the Criminal Code. He refused to make any statements, to familiarise himself with any documents or to sign them. 11.  On 15 January 2002 the prosecutor approved the summary of charges and the criminal case file was sent to the Tartu County Court (Tartu Maakohus). 12.  On 17 January 2002 the County Court committed the applicant for trial and maintained the signed undertaking not to leave his residence as a preventive measure against him. The hearing was scheduled for 26 March 2002.\nBy a letter of 24 March 2002 the applicant informed the court that he could not participate in the hearing due to his ill-health. He requested that the hearing be adjourned.\nOn 26 March 2002 the hearing was adjourned due to the absence of the applicant and a new hearing was scheduled for 13 June 2002. The court decided that the applicant should be compelled by the police to appear before it on that date.\nAs the police was unable to find the applicant and to secure his attendance at the court hearing on 13 June 2002, the hearing was adjourned until 30 September 2002. The court again decided that the applicant had to be compelled by the police to appear in court. 13.  On 30 September 2002 the applicant failed to appear in court. The police had been unable to secure his attendance, as during repeated checks no one had opened the door at his residence. The applicant’s appointed lawyer, the prosecutor and one of the victims had appeared before the court. The County Court decided to adjourn the hearing and to declare the applicant a fugitive. It decided that when found he should be taken into custody (vahi alla võtmine) and that a new hearing would be scheduled then. The court relied on Articles 66, 68, 73 § 1, 209, 218 and 223 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kriminaalmenetluse koodeks). 14.  The applicant was taken into custody on 2 October 2002 in Tallinn. 15.  He subsequently lodged a complaint addressed to the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus). As stated by the applicant in the complaint, “[it was] handed over on 05.10.2002, in the presence of witnesses, to the officer in charge of the Arrest House of the Tallinn Police Prefecture to be transmitted to the Tartu Court of Appeal”.\nA copy of the complaint submitted to the Court by the Government bears a handwritten note “Complaint received. Tartu County Court. 10.10.02” and a seal and signature of a judge of the County Court.\nAccording to the complaint, the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty was unlawful, as he had not been presented with the decision of the County Court on the basis of which he had been arrested. Moreover, the decision had been taken by the County Court in his absence. He alleged that the registration of his residence at the address where the City Court had sent the summonses had been cancelled. He noted that, according to the Civil Code (General Principles) Act (Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus), in case the residence of a person could not be determined, the place where he or she was actually staying should be deemed his or her residence. On 2 October 2002 he had stayed in Tallinn and prior to that in Tartu. However, he had not received the summonses. He requested that he be immediately released from custody and that the County Court’s decision concerning his arrest be invalidated. 16.  The applicant was kept in custody until 17 October 2002. On that date the Tartu County Court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant, his appointed lawyer and the prosecutor. The court decided that, as the applicant and his lawyer had not familiarised themselves with the case file, the hearing had to be adjourned. As the applicant alleged that he had not received the summons for the hearing of 30 September 2002 and promised to appear before the court when invited in the future, he was released from custody. The court applied a more lenient preventive measure in respect of the applicant – a signed undertaking not to leave his place of residence. 17.  On 5 November 2002 the Tartu Court of Appeal adjourned the hearing concerning the applicant’s appeal against the County Court’s decision of 30 September 2002, since the applicant’s lawyer had not appeared.\nOn the same day the Court of Appeal received the applicant’s amendments to his appeal. He alleged, inter alia, that he had never signed an undertaking not to leave his place of residence and claimed compensation for his unlawful detention. 18.  On 11 November 2002 the Court of Appeal held a hearing and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It noted that, under Article 73 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, preventive custody could be applied in order to prevent a defendant at trial from evading the criminal proceedings or committing a new crime. It held that the County Court had had good grounds to believe that the applicant was evading the criminal proceedings and that he was in breach of a signed undertaking not to leave his place of residence. He had not reacted to summonses sent to his place of residence and had not answered phone calls. The fact that the applicant had been taken into custody had made it possible, on 17 October 2002, to conduct a hearing, after which the applicant had been released. In respect of the applicant’s allegation that he had never signed an undertaking not to leave his place of residence, the Court of Appeal established, based on the case file, that the applicant had been presented with a decision according to which a prohibition to leave his place of residence had been applied as a preventive measure. The fact that the applicant had refused to sign it could not be interpreted to mean that the measure had not been applied. The preventive measure in the form of a signed undertaking not to leave one’s place of residence was not meant to restrict one’s freedom of movement; its purpose was rather to keep the court informed of the person’s whereabouts so that the criminal proceedings could be conducted without delays. However, in the particular instance, the criminal case could not be conducted without delays, as the applicant had failed to comply with the preventive measure applied under Article 69 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Appeal noted that it was not possible in those proceedings concerning the appeal against the County Court’s ruling to decide on the compensation claim for damage.\nUnder the provisions of the applicable criminal procedure law, the decision of the Court of Appeal was final. 19.  In late 2003 and 2004 the hearings in the criminal case were repeatedly adjourned, mainly due to the applicant’s failure to appear before the court and to comply with the court’s orders concerning his forensic psychiatric expert examination. At the same time, the applicant lodged numerous complaints and appeals against various institutions. 20.  According to a forensic psychiatric examination’s report of 3 August 2005, the state of the applicant’s mind did not allow him to understand and control his acts. He was considered to be unable to give statements before a court or to serve punishment. His compulsory treatment was deemed to be unnecessary, as he presented no danger to himself or to society. 21.  By a decision of 21 September 2005, the County Court found it established that the applicant had committed the acts that he had been charged with. However, since his state of mind had deteriorated, as evidenced by the forensic psychiatric examination’s report, and he was unable to give statements before a court and serve punishment, the criminal proceedings were discontinued. The decision could be appealed against within ten days. 22.  By a decision of 27 September 2005, the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) rejected the applicant’s appeal against several decisions of lower courts, including the Court of Appeal’s decision of 11 November 2002. It held that only a lawyer – and not the applicant himself – could appeal against a decision of an appellate court. Moreover, the above decision of the Court of Appeal had been final according to the applicable criminal procedure law. 23.  On 22 October 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal against the County Court’s decision of 21 September 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Silopi. 10.  On 28 April 1992 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of having been involved in the terrorist activities of the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan), proscribed as a terrorist organisation under Turkish law. 11.  On 25 May 1992 the applicant was brought before the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor. He denied the allegations against him. On the same day, a judge at the Şırnak Magistrates' Court (sulh ceza mahkemesi) ordered the applicant's detention on remand. 12.  On 1 September 1992 the public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant with treason under Article 125 of the Criminal Code. 13.  On 12 October 1994 the public prosecutor filed a new indictment, charging the applicant under the same provision of the Criminal Code with involvement in other terrorist activities. 14.  On 28 May 1995, upon the request of the public prosecutor, the applicant's case was joined to another case which was being considered in a different chamber of the Diyarbakır State Security Court. 15.  On 3 July 1998 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicant under Article 125 of the Criminal Code of treason and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 16.  The applicant's sentence was automatically referred to the Court of Cassation for appeal. The applicant's request for a hearing on his appeal was granted. On 27 October 1999 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  In March 1993 welding work was carried out in the applicant’s fashion boutique. On 26 May 1995 the applicant filed an action for damages against the company which had carried out the welding work. She alleged that the welding work had soiled stored clothes and the salesroom of her boutique and had affected her health. The Salzburg Regional Court (Landesgericht), upon her request, had previously granted her legal aid for these proceedings on 4 May 1995. 5.  On 29 August 1995 the Salzburg Regional Court held a first hearing. 6.  On 6 October 1995 it appointed an expert and instructed him to prepare a report. The expert delivered his report on 29 January 1997. 7.  On 2 June 1997 the court held a further hearing. It heard some witnesses and then adjourned the proceedings to hear the expert and further witnesses. On the same day the defendant challenged the expert for bias. The court dismissed this motion on 19 September 1997. 8.  On 17 December 1997 the court held another hearing and heard further witnesses and the expert. It also ordered the parties to submit their extensive questions in writing and, on 3 February 1998, instructed the expert to supplement his opinion. 9.  On 6 July 1998 the expert delivered his supplementary opinion. On 16 November 1998 the court held a hearing and, upon the applicant’s request, decided to appoint a further expert in order to assess the amount of damages. It further requested the applicant to declare whether she still claimed damages for injuries to her health. The proceedings were adjourned in order to appoint the expert and to hear a witness who had not appeared. 10.  In a statement of 14 January 1999 the applicant declared that she maintained her claim for damages as regards injuries to her health. 11.  On 4 March 1999 the court, noting that the applicant had made incorrect statements when declaring her financial situation, withdrew the legal aid granted to her. On 20 April 1999 the Linz Court of Appeal confirmed this decision. Subsequently, on 18 May 1999 the Salzburg Regional Court imposed a fine on the applicant for abuse of process. It further informed the parties that it considered it necessary to decide first whether the claim for damages was well-founded in principle before ordering further expert opinions. 12.  On 2 July 1999 the court dismissed the applicant’s further request for legal aid. On 9 August 1999 the Linz Court of Appeal confirmed this decision. 13.  Meanwhile, on 26 July 1999 the applicant filed an application under Section 91 of the Courts Act (Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz). In particular, she requested that the Regional Court be ordered to hold a further hearing, to question the witness H. and to take a decision. The Regional Court subsequently scheduled a hearing for 10 November 1999. On 17 August 1999 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the application. It found that, until the hearing of 17 December 1997, the court had been mainly concerned with obtaining the necessary expert opinions. There were no delays either during this period, or during the following period until the hearing of 16 November 1998. Subsequently, a number of procedural steps were taken by the applicant relating to the withdrawal of legal aid. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Regional Court had not been dilatory. 14.  The applicant subsequently challenged the competent judge S. and, in a letter of 15 October 1999, complained that S. had not cancelled the hearing of 10 November 1999. On 15 November 1999 the applicant requested that records prepared in1994 in connection with her legal aid case be rectified. 15.  On 16 December 1999 the Salzburg Regional Court sitting with three judges dismissed the applicant’s challenge as unfounded but found that judge S. was biased according to his own declaration (Befangenheitsanzeige). On 7 March 2000 the Linz Court of Appeal confirmed this decision. 16.  On 28 April and on 30 May 2000, the Salzburg Regional Court, presided over by another judge, held oral hearings. On 31 August 2000, upon the parties’ requests, the court appointed two further experts. On 11 December 2000 both of the experts delivered their reports. 17.  On 9 February 2001 the court, presided over by another judge, held another hearing and heard one expert. During this hearing the applicant’s counsel declared that he would inform the court of the outcome of friendly settlement discussions within four weeks. The court adjourned the proceedings sine die in order to obtain an opinion of another expert. 18.  On 22 March 2001 the applicant requested the court to hear another witness. On 3 April 2001 the applicant’s counsel requested the court not to schedule any hearings because of ongoing friendly settlement discussions. The applicant’s counsel repeated this request on 23 August 2001, 25 September 2001, 17 December 2001, 26 February 2002 and on 17 May 2002. In the meantime, on 31 August 2001, the defendant’s counsel had informed the applicant’s counsel that the defendant did not agree with their proposal for a friendly settlement. 19.  On 5 December 2002 the applicant’s counsel requested the court to hold a further hearing. On 21 January 2003 and on 25 April 2003 the court held further hearings. 20.  On 15 July 2003 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It noted that the applicant’s claim had become time-barred as the applicant had not duly continued the proceedings after friendly settlement negotiations had failed in August 2001. 21.  On 14 October 2003 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 22.  On 3 December 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s extraordinary appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Tallinn. 9.  On 5 June 2000 the Tallinn police initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of having committed extortion under Article 142 of the Criminal Code. On 17 June 2000 the applicant was taken into custody.\nThe applicant was charged with having threatened, by way of telephone calls, to explode a bomb in the supermarket Pirita Selver if his demands for a sum of money were not met. 10.  Following the conclusion of the preliminary investigation the criminal case-file was sent to the Tallinn City Court (Tallinna Linnakohus). On 11 January 2001 witnesses K., R. and V. failed to appear at the hearing in the City Court and the hearing was adjourned to 5 February 2001. At the hearing of 5 February 2001 the applicant was questioned. The City Court again adjourned the hearing, since the witnesses had not appeared. Subsequently, the City Court heard the case on 20 February 2001. 11.  According to the record of the City Court hearing, which set out the documents disclosed to the prosecution and defence at the public hearing, the City Court’s case-file included, inter alia, written witness statements made during the preliminary investigation by K. and R., who were both employees of the supermarket. Witness K. had stated that the phone calls on 2 and 4 June 2000 had been made by a male person, probably 40-50 years of age or more. She had submitted that it was possible that she would recognise the voice. Witness R. had submitted that she had received phone calls from a male person on 3 and 4 June 2000. The case-file further contained six tapes with recordings of several phone calls made to the supermarket (from 4, 5, 7, 8 and 11 June 2000) and one tape with an undercover recording of a phone call by the applicant from 29 June 2000, as well as transcripts of the tape recordings.\nAccording to the written records of witness V.’s statements during the preliminary investigation, on 13 June 2000 the applicant had asked him to dial a phone number of the applicant’s girl-friend and hand the handset over to the applicant. They tried to make four phone calls, but none of the calls was answered. The number called to was a local number, the last three digits containing a combination of “fives”, possibly “550” or similar.\nThe City Court’s case-file also included a written statement of witness R.’s testimony, according to which, on 10 August 2000, she had been presented with an undercover recording of a phone call made by the applicant for recognition. She had been of the opinion that the male voice in the recorded conversation closely resembled the voice of the person who in June 2000 had made the bomb threats to the supermarket. She had answered four phone calls to the supermarket. When the threats were made, the voice had been more nervous, but otherwise the voices were identical.\nThe case-file further contained a written record of the examination of an anonymous witness “Artur”, who stated that in June 2000 he had met the applicant at a party, where the latter had said that he had made the threats to the supermarket. In this way the applicant had had a chance to make good money. The owner of a shop located near the supermarket had asked him to make the threats. Every time after making the threats he had called the owner of the shop. Witness Artur stated that from the recordings of the bomb threats on six tapes he recognised the applicant’s voice. Witness Artur considered that the sound of the voice bore a resemblance to that of the applicant, as did some expressions and the manner of speaking.\nIn the case-file there was included a written record of an examination of witness R., who said that, as of 11 June 2000, the information line of the supermarket did not answer calls made from public payphones. Witness R. stated that, based on the voice, the manner of speaking and the references to earlier phone calls, the threats had been made by one person. 12.  All the witnesses failed to appear at the City Court’s hearing of 20 February 2001. Witnesses K. and R. submitted that they were unable to attend the hearing but that they maintained the statements given during the preliminary investigation; witness V. did not live at the address noted by the City Court. At that hearing the City Court refused the request of the applicant’s lawyer to call witnesses K. and R. The record of the hearing does not disclose the reasons why the request was refused. 13.  By a judgment of 20 February 2001 the Tallinn City Court convicted the applicant of the charge and sentenced him to 3 years’ imprisonment. It relied on the testimony of the witnesses K., R., V. and of the anonymous witness Artur, given during the preliminary investigation, as well as on the transcripts of tape recordings of telephone conversations. 14.  According to the judgment, the anonymous witness Artur had recognised the applicant’s voice on the tape and had heard him brag about his bomb threats. Witnesses K. and R. testified that they had received repeated phone calls from the same person, approximately 40-50 years of age, threatening to explode a bomb and demanding a sum of money. In addition, witness R. stated that the applicant’s voice on the tape played to her closely resembled the voice of the man who had made the bomb threats. According to the testimony of witness V., the applicant had told him that he was in need of money and asked him to dial a number, using public phones, of which he remembered the first and last digits. In the event that somebody should answer, he was supposed to hand over the phone to the applicant. The first and last digits of the phone number corresponded to the phone number of the supermarket. 15.  On 26 February 2001 the applicant’s lawyer filed an appeal against the judgment requesting the applicant’s acquittal. She argued that the City Court had not heard any of the witnesses at its hearing and that her request to summon the witnesses had been denied. The City Court had convicted the applicant on the basis of insufficient evidence. The record of the court hearing had stated incorrectly that several items of evidence in the case-file had been disclosed. In fact, this had not been done. As regards the voice identification, the applicant’s lawyer noted that, as the witness R. had been presented with only one voice for recognition, she had not been able to compare voices. In his appeal the applicant noted that the bomb threats continued in July and August 2000, after he had been taken into custody.\nThe applicant’s lawyer did not request in her appeal that any witnesses be called to the appeal court’s hearing. 16.  On 28 March 2001 the Tallinn Court of Appeal (Tallinna Ringkonnakohus) heard the appeal at a public hearing. The applicant’s lawyer reiterated that at the hearing in the City Court it had not been possible to put questions to the witnesses and that her request to summon the witnesses had been denied.\nAccording to the record of the Court of Appeal’s hearing neither the applicant nor his lawyer requested that any witnesses be summoned to the hearing.\nThe Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It noted in its judgment:\n“The [Criminal] Chamber [of the Court of Appeal] finds, as did the City Court, that [the applicant’s] guilt has been established on the basis of an aggregate of evidence and that this aggregate [of evidence] does not include solely the statements of witnesses; all the evidence collected during the pre-trial investigation and examined at the court hearing has been taken into account.”\nThe Court of Appeal found no substantial infringement of the procedural law which would have entailed a reversal of the lower court judgment. 17.  On 18 April 2001 the applicant’s lawyer filed an appeal with the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) repeating the arguments raised before the Court of Appeal. She reiterated that, in violation of the law of criminal procedure, the City Court had not based its judgment on evidence examined at the hearing. The applicant requested in his appeal that an independent expert assessment of the voice be carried out. 18.  On 17 May 2001 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in İzmir. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant’s daughter, Gülperi O., worked as a nurse at the Aegean University Hospital in İzmir. She was married to O.O., who worked in the pharmacy at the same hospital. 8.  According to the applicant, the couple had frequent rows and O.O. used violence against Gülperi O. on a number of occasions. 9.  At 5.30 p.m. on 18 July 2005 O.O. brought Gülperi O. to the accident and emergency department of the Aegean University Hospital and told the doctors and nurses at the hospital that she had taken an overdose of two medicines called “Prent” and “Muscoril”. 10.  A police officer at the hospital took a statement from O.O. at 6.45 p.m. In his statement O.O. was reported as having stated that he and Gülperi O. had had a row earlier in the day; she had attacked him and he had hit her. He had then left home and some time after his return at 3.00 p.m. Gülperi O. had felt unwell. He had then brought her to the hospital. 11.  It was stated in a report prepared by police officers that a police officer had spoken to the prosecutor over the telephone at 6.50 p.m. and that the prosecutor had instructed that police officer to question Gülperi O. and her husband, O.O. 12.  At the time of her admission to the hospital, Gülperi O. was conscious but drowsy. Doctors and nurses, who had been informed about O.O.’s assertion that she had taken an overdose of the two medicines, pumped her stomach. When her pulse slowed down the doctors unsuccessfully tried to resuscitate her. Gülperi O. died at 10.10 p.m. 13.  The doctor and the prosecutor who subsequently examined her body were unable to establish the cause of death and they decided, in view of the fact that the deceased’s husband, O.O., had told the police officers that he had hit her, that a post-mortem examination was necessary. 14.  The post-mortem examination was carried out the following day and samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body were sent for forensic analysis. 15.  On 20 July 2005 the police prepared a report summing up their inquiry. It was stated in this report that Gülperi O. had committed suicide by taking an “overdose of medicines”. 16.  On 22 July 2005 the applicant’s husband, Mr Elaattin Kanter, lodged an official complaint with the İzmir prosecutor against O.O., and alleged that O.O. had been responsible for the death of his daughter. Mr Kanter stated in his complaint petition that O.O. had beaten Gülperi O. up on a number of occasions and, as a result, she had been thinking of divorcing him. However, O.O. had apologized and had persuaded her to change her mind by promising to her that he would not be violent towards her again. Mr Kanter informed the prosecutor that Gülperi O. had telephoned her sister during the afternoon of the day of her death, and that they had had a normal conversation; she had not been suicidal at all. 17.  Mr Kanter alleged that O.O. had forced Gülperi O. to take the medicines and had subsequently dumped her body at the hospital. The family had heard nothing from O.O. since that date and he had not even attended the funeral. 18.  On 25 July 2005 the İzmir prosecutor questioned the applicant and her husband. The applicant told the prosecutor that O.O. had beaten up her daughter before and that as a result she had had to be hospitalised twice with suspected head injuries. Mr Kanter told the prosecutor that his daughter had never been suicidal and that in his opinion O.O. had been responsible for her death. 19.  On 29 July 2005 police officers forwarded photographs of Gülperi O.’s body to their head office with a covering letter stating “...find attached photographs of Gülperi O. who committed suicide by taking an overdose of medicines”. 20.  Also on 29 July 2005 the İzmir prosecutor questioned the hospital personnel who had been on duty on the day in question and had tried to resuscitate Gülperi O. A doctor told the prosecutor that O.O. had told him that Gülperi O. had taken “Muscoril” and “Prent”. 21.  On 19 December 2005 the İzmir prosecutor informed the Registry Office for births, marriages and deaths that Gülperi O. had taken an overdose on 18 July 2005 and had killed herself and that her death could be entered in the records. 22.  According to a report drawn up by the Forensic Medicine Institute on 30 December 2005, no medicines, other drugs or alcohol had been found in the blood and other bodily samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body. 23.  On 30 January 2006 the Forensic Medicine Institute published its report on the post-mortem examination and other forensic examinations carried out on the samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body. According to the report, there was advanced oedema in her lungs and there were no drugs or other foreign substances in her body. The cause of death was established as “acute alveolar swelling and intra-alveolar haemorrhage” in the lungs. 24.  On 13 February 2006 the İzmir prosecutor in charge of the investigation sent a letter to the Forensic Medicine Institute and asked whether suicide or some form of illness could have been the cause of death. 25.  In its response to the İzmir prosecutor the Forensic Medicine Institute confirmed on 24 February 2006 that there had been no foreign substances or medicines ‒ including “Prent” and “Muscaril” (see paragraph 9 above) ‒ in Gülperi O.’s body. The Institute also stated in its letter that, should the judicial authorities conclude that Gülperi O. had committed suicide by taking an overdose, then those judicial authorities should also conclude that the medicines she had used were of a type which could not be detected in forensic examinations of samples taken from internal organs. 26.  On 28 February 2006 the İzmir prosecutor decided to close the investigation. In the decision the prosecutor stated that “the post-mortem report of 30 January 2006 states that Gülperi O. died as a result of lung complications caused by medicinal intoxication”. In the opinion of the prosecutor, Gülperi O. had committed suicide because she had had an argument with her husband. 27.  On 4 April 2006 the applicant lodged an objection with the Karşıyaka Assize Court against the prosecutor’s decision. The applicant drew the Assize Court’s attention to the prosecutor’s failure to question O.O., despite the fact that by his own admission he had beaten Gülperi O. up on the day of her death. She also argued that the prosecutor’s conclusion that her daughter had committed suicide by taking an overdose ran contrary to the conclusions set out in the two reports issued by the Forensic Medicine Institute. She added that the prosecutor had not visited the flat where Gülperi O. used to live with O.O., even though they had informed the prosecutor that the flat had been a mess and that windows had been broken. She alleged in her petition that the prosecutor had accepted from the outset that Gülperi O. had committed suicide and that that had been the reason why she had not conducted an investigation into the allegations brought to her attention. 28.  On 20 June 2006 the applicant and her husband, assisted by a lawyer, submitted another petition to the Assize Court in which they set out additional arguments in support of their request for the prosecutor’s decision to be set aside. 29.  The objection was dismissed by the Karşıyaka Assize Court on 11 July 2006. The Assize Court considered that the prosecutor’s decision had been correct and in accordance with domestic law and procedure. 30.  When notice of the application was given to the respondent Government, the Court asked the Government ‒ pursuant to the parties’ duty to cooperate with the Court under Article 38 of the Convention ‒ to invite the Forensic Medicine Institute to prepare a report, based on the above-mentioned existing medical reports and the prosecutor’s decision of 28 February 2006, and to render an expert opinion as to whether there exist medicines which cannot be detected in forensic examinations of samples taken from internal organs and which could nevertheless have caused the fatal lung problems. The Government were also asked, should the Institute’s answer be in the negative, to invite the Institute to elaborate, on the basis of the documents in the investigation file, on the cause of the lung problems which, according to the report of 30 January 2006, caused the death. 31.  The Government complied with that request and submitted to the Court two reports prepared by the Forensic Medicine Institute on 16 April 2013 and 15 July 2013. 32.  In these two reports, three experts working for the Forensic Medicine Institute confirmed that the samples taken from Gülperi O.’s body had been checked against the list of known substances in their database ‒ including the two medicines named specifically by Gülperi O.’s husband, O.O. (see above in paragraph 9) ‒ and stated that she had not died as a result of having taken any of those substances. It was also stated in the report that the possibility could not be completely ruled out that she might have taken another toxic substance which was not in their database. 33.  The experts at the Forensic Medicine Institute also stated in their reports that they did not agree with the conclusion reached in the autopsy report of 30 January 2006, namely that Gülperi O. had died as a result of “acute alveolar swelling and intra-alveolar haemorrhage” in the lungs. In their opinion, the “acute alveolar swelling and intra-alveolar haemorrhage” was a histopathological finding often caused by anoxia (total oxygen depletion), and could thus not be stated as the cause of death. In the opinion of the three experts, it should have been stated in the autopsy report of 30 January 2006 that the cause of Gülperi O.’s death could not be established.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Cologne. At the time of the events at issue he had been a police officer. He was subsequently dismissed when his conviction for inflicting bodily harm causing death while exercising a public office (Körperverletzung im Amt mit Todesfolge) as a consequence of the trial which forms the subject of the present application became final. 7.  Prior to the proceedings at issue the applicant had already been the subject of preliminary investigations by the public prosecution authorities on eight separate occasions on suspicion of having caused bodily harm while on duty. At the time of the events at issue, seven of these preliminary proceedings had been discontinued in lack of sufficient evidence for the charges and one of the proceedings was still pending. In 2001 he had further been convicted of two counts of libel (Beleidigung) and compulsion (Nötigung) committed in the course of police operations. 8.  On 11 May 2002 the applicant was called to assist other police officers in arresting a man who was acting violently. The man (“the victim”) was overpowered using force by the police officers, including the applicant, arrested and transferred to the Cologne Eigelstein Police Station. One police officer sustained minor injuries during the victim’s arrest. The arrested person was subsequently transferred to a hospital where he fell into a coma and died without having regained consciousness. 9.  Police officer G. and his female colleague H. belonged to an earlier shift but were still present at the police station when the victim was brought to the station. At the time of the events at issue G. and H. had an intimate relationship while G. was married to another woman. They witnessed the victim’s ill-treatment by several police officers at the police station without helping the victim and later discussed the events and what, if any, further action was required in view of the incident. 10.  On 12 May 2002 H. informed her former supervisor that G. and herself had witnessed several police officers surrounding the victim and repeatedly and jointly kicking him in the head, body, arms and legs as he had lain handcuffed on the floor of the “watergate”, a tapered room whose width decreased from approximately 2.5 meters to 1.5 meters and which functioned as the police station’s entry room. The victim had also been kicked and beaten later in a cell. 11.  H.’s former supervisor immediately informed his hierarchical superiors who summoned G. and H. to the police station and questioned them later that day. G. and H. named several police officers, including the applicant, as participants in the victim’s ill-treatment and identified several of them, including the applicant, during an identity parade. 12.  All officers named by G. and H. were suspended from active duty. Criminal investigations were instituted against those officers as well as against G. and H. and conducted by a special team (Sonderkommission) established for this purpose. The head of the Cologne Eigelstein Police Station, who had not been involved in the events at issue, was posted to another police station with a view to enabling an impartial clarification of the circumstances of the case. 13.  On 23 May 2002 counsel for the witnesses G. and H. submitted their written testimonies on the incident of 11 May 2002. As recommended by their respective counsel, G. and H. did not specify their own actions. 14.  The criminal investigations against G. and H. on suspicion of having participated in the victim’s ill-treatment, of not having rendered assistance to the victim and of having attempted to obstruct the prosecution of the police officers involved in the ill-treatment, were discontinued on 24 February 2003. The prosecution authorities specified that there was no evidence that G. and H. had actively participated in the ill-treatment. They further found that in view of the fact that the events had occurred within a short space of time it had been impossible for G. and H. to intervene and effectively prevent the ill-treatment. Furthermore, a psychiatric opinion obtained by G. and H.’s respective counsel from a professor at Munich university hospital expressed doubts as to whether G. and H. would have been personally capable of confronting their colleagues and helping the victim while having regard to the psychological pressure they had been exposed to at the time of the events at issue. 15.  On the same date, 24 February 2003, the applicant and five other police officers involved in the events were charged with jointly inflicting bodily harm causing death while exercising a public office (gemeinschaftliche Körperverletzung im Amt mit Todesfolge) before the Cologne Regional Court sitting in a jury formation (Schwurgericht) with three professional and two lay judges (Schöffen).\nThe subsequent trial was conducted in the period from 26 June to 25 July 2003. 16.  On 8 July 2003, the fifth of in total eleven hearing days, witnesses G. and H., the only eye witnesses of the events in the “watergate” and the cell, testified in court. In reply to the Regional Court’s related question they denied having an intimate relationship. 17.  G. gave an account of his recollection of previous statements made by him in the course of the preliminary proceedings and answered questions posed by the presiding judge, another judge and the public prosecutor. Then counsel assisting the witness declared that the latter would not answer questions by the accused, defence counsel or by the victim’s relatives acting as joint plaintiffs to the prosecution (Nebenkläger). Counsel pointed out that the criminal investigations against the witness for participating in the victim’s ill-treatment had been discontinued but could be reopened and there was thus a risk that the witness could incriminate himself. The Regional Court observed that two of the accused, including the applicant, had indeed declared in the course of the trial that G. had participated in the ill-treatment. He was therefore entitled not to reply to questions of the defence after having testified and having answered questions by members of the court and the prosecutor. Consequently, the court ordered that the witness be granted the right not to answer questions posed by defence counsel or the accused pursuant to section 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see “Relevant domestic law” below). The court further ordered that G. not be put under oath. 18.  Subsequently, witness H. testified, gave an account of her previous testimonies during the investigations, and answered questions by the court and an expert witness. She refused to answer questions by the defence counsel and counsel for the victim’s relatives. Counsel for one of the applicant’s co-accused formulated questions to be put to H. by the court. Counsel for H. then declared that H. would also not answer further questions by the court since there was a risk that the witness could incriminate herself. The Regional Court observed that criminal investigations had been pending against H. on suspicion of not having rendered assistance to the victim and of having attempted to obstruct the prosecution of the police officers involved in the ill-treatment. The court thus ordered that H. be granted the right not to testify pursuant to section 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see “Relevant domestic law” below) and for this reason also refrained from submitting the questions formulated by counsel to the witness. The Court specified that once a witness had invoked his or her right to remain silent pursuant to the said provision any further questions were inadmissible. Furthermore, H. had explicitly stated that she would not answer any further questions even if put by the court. 19.  On 13 July 2003 the applicant and another accused applied for two witnesses to be examined by the court with a view to demonstrating that G. and H. had lied to the court as regards their extramarital affair. They further alleged that G. had not told the truth concerning certain information provided on his past career as a police officer and regarding an intimate relationship with a further female colleague. The Regional Court, assuming that these allegations were correct, considered that the hearing of the proposed witnesses could be dispensed with. 20.  On 14 July 2003 the applicant requested that G. and H.’s statements be excluded as evidence from the trial. 21.  In its judgment of 25 July 2003 the Regional Court held that the accused police officers by jointly and wilfully inflicting bodily harm on the victim had negligently caused the latter’s death and found them guilty as charged. It sentenced the applicant to a suspended prison term of one year and four months.\n(a)  The facts established by the Cologne Regional Court 22.  According to the facts as established by the Regional Court, the victim suffered from an acute boat of psychosis. He threatened two police officers with death who had arrived at the victim’s flat following a neighbour’s emergency call. The officers requested reinforcements, used pepper spray and subsequently subdued the victim using considerable force. The victim thereupon entered into a state of “excited delirium” and displayed extreme agitation, violent behavior, insensitivity to pain, and “superhuman” strength. The applicant and another police officer then arrived as further reinforcements, repeatedly hit the victim’s legs and managed to shackle the victim who nonetheless continued to struggle. No police officer involved in the arrest was aware that the victim was suffering from a psychotic bout. One of the police officers involved, police officer A., sustained minor injuries. 23.  The police officers transported the handcuffed and shackled victim to the Cologne Eigelstein Police Station. In the “watergate” the victim fell to the ground. The officers stood in a circle around the victim and jointly kicked and beat him while being aware that he did no longer present a serious danger. They were angry that the victim continued with his futile resistance which was perceived as particularly unruly. They also wanted to take revenge for their colleague A.’s injuries. As a consequence of his ill‑treatment the applicant’s nose started bleeding. One of the officers called an ambulance, a procedure generally observed in the event a person in police custody sustains, even minor, injuries. 24.  The victim was then pulled from the “watergate” to a cell, leaving a clearly visible trail of blood on the floor. Some officers, including the applicant, continued to jointly beat and kick the victim who was no longer offering any resistance in the cell, leaving stains of the victim’s blood on the wall. 25.  The victim was then transferred to a hospital where the medical personnel at first did not recognise the psychotic bout and did not order that handcuffs and shackles be removed. The victim’s pulse and breathing were not checked continuously. Following the victim’s apnoea and cardiac arrest, he was transferred to the intensive care unit where he was reanimated, possibly causing rib fractures. The victim sustained irreparable brain damage and died on 24 May 2002. 26.  The coroner concluded on the basis of a post-mortem that the victim had collapsed because of psychic excitement that had resulted in an “excited delirium”. The coroner could not decide whether the force used by the police officers or the medical maltreatment in the hospital had caused the victim’s death.\n(b)  The assessment of the testimonies of witnesses G. and H. 27.  The Regional Court declared that it had based its finding on the victim’s ill-treatment in the “watergate” and in the cell on the statements of the witnesses G. and H. While the fact that the defendant had been deprived of the opportunity to examine the witnesses required the court to subject the credibility of their testimonies to particular scrutiny, it had nevertheless not been necessary to exclude them altogether. 28.  In this context the Regional Court noted that there was no plausible reason why the witnesses should have wrongly accused their colleagues. They did not have any tangible benefits from their testimonies but, as also pointed out by the psychiatric expert who had examined the witnesses, risked on the contrary being branded as traitors by other police officers. They had further risked incriminating themselves for not having assisted the victim. 29.  The court was further of the opinion that allegations indicating that G. had accused his colleagues with a view to concealing a possible own involvement in the victim’s ill-treatment were not convincing. Even assuming such involvement, there had been no reasons for G. to expect that any of the police officers participating in the ill-treatment would disclose the underlying events at their own initiative. In fact such allegations were made for the first time by one of the accused after G. and H. had revealed the circumstances of the case. 30.  The court further observed that the witnesses – from their point of view – had a plausible justification for their decision not to answer questions by the defence. G. and H. had an intimate relationship while G. was married to another woman. As it had had transpired already in the course of the preliminary proceedings, they had to expect questions concerning their intimate relationship in a highly publicised trial by the defence with a view to casting doubt on their credibility. 31.  The court considered that the witnesses’ testimonies were credible, consistent and that there was nothing to establish that they had coordinated their testimonies. The psychiatric expert who had examined the witnesses had also confirmed that their description of the events at issue was credible and their behaviour plausible while taking into account the strain G. and H. were exposed to. In contrast, the account of the events given by the applicant and the co-accused and their denial of any involvement in the applicant’s ill-treatment in the “watergate” were contradictory and not supported by the further available evidence. 32.  The witnesses’ descriptions of the events on their part were corroborated at least in part by the statements of some of the accused or other evidence. For instance, the applicant himself had conceded that in the cell he had kicked the victim once in the hip as a warning and with a view to preventing a possible attack by the latter. Another accused, D., had confessed that he had also beaten the victim one time in the cell, not because it was necessary to prevent an attack but rather because he could not control his anger at the victim. Police officer A. who had sustained minor injuries on the occasion of the victim’s arrest and had been heard as a witness on the occasion of the trial had testified that when the victim had been taken to the ambulance one of the accused police officers had told him “We have taken revenge for you”. In the court’s view these additional testimonies constituted evidence that the police officers’ treatment of the victim had not constituted an ordinary and appropriate reaction to the resistance of an arrested person. The Regional Court further referred to two medical expert opinions confirming that while the injuries sustained by the victim were not particularly serious and had not directly led to his death, they could nevertheless be aligned with the description given by G. and H. of his ill-treatment in police custody. 33.  Having regard to the above considerations, the Regional Court concluded that there was nothing to cast doubt on the veracity of G. and H.’s testimonies to the extent they concerned the circumstances of the victim’s ill-treatment. The court conceded that it could not be established whether the force used by the police officers or, alternatively, the medical maltreatment in the hospital had caused the victim’s death and considered that this uncertainty had a mitigating effect on the sentences imposed. The Regional Court nevertheless maintained that the ill-treatment in the “watergate” had led to the victim’s bleeding and consecutive transport to the hospital and that there had therefore been a causal connection between the physical abuse in police custody and the latter’s death. Since the co-accused had acted jointly their respective participation in the ill-treatment was imputable to each of them. 34.  On 28 July 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his appeal brief of 1 December 2003 he complained in particular that the testimonies of witnesses G. and H. had not been excluded despite the defence’s inability to examine those witnesses in breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. 35.  On 2 July 2004 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. 36.  On 16 August 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He argued that the Regional Court’s reliance on the testimonies of witnesses G. and H. had violated his right to a fair trial pursuant to Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (d) of the Convention because the Regional Court had failed to provide for a possibility for the defence to examine witnesses G. and H. 37.  On 27 December 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint for examination (no. 2 BvR 1657/04). The decision was served on the applicant on 11 January 2007. 38.  The Federal Constitutional Court observed that the constitutional right to a fair trial was both affirmed and substantiated by Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of the Convention; that it needed to be concretised on a case-by-case basis; that specific procedural requirements could only be deduced from it if basic requirements of the rule of law were at stake; that the accused had to have access to and a right of participation in the establishment of the facts and that illegally obtained evidence had not always to be excluded. It emphasised that the domestic courts were under a constitutional obligation to take Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 of Convention, as interpreted by this Court, into account and to duly consider the factors found to be relevant by this Court in balancing competing rights when deciding the case before them. 39.  Turning to the circumstances of the case at hand, the Federal Constitutional Court held that there had been no violation of the applicant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. Although the criminal courts had based their findings on the testimonies of witnesses G. and H. whom the defence had had no opportunity to question at any stage of the proceedings, the right to a fair trial did not require that these testimonies be excluded. 40.  The witnesses’ autonomous decision not to answer questions had been based on a sustainable ground, namely their right to remain silent. Public authorities had not caused the applicant’s inability to examine or have examined witnesses G. and H. to such an extent as to warrant the exclusion of their testimonies. The applicant had not had a right to be present during the police interrogation of G. and H. who at that time had been co-suspects. There had been no need to allow for the presence of the applicant’s counsel during the pre-trial examinations of G. and H. because it had not been foreseeable that the witnesses would refuse to answer questions of the defence in court. The witnesses had freely chosen not to answer questions of the defence. H. had declared that she would not answer further questions by the court. The state authorities had thus not been responsible for the inability of the defence to confront the witnesses. Furthermore, the Regional Court had been aware of the reduced evidentiary value of the witnesses’ testimonies. It had extensively questioned the witnesses in open court and, taking into account expert advice, had carefully assessed the testimonies as regards their content, development and possible adjustments. It had thus analysed the testimonies extensively, critically and thoroughly. 41.  Following expiry of the probation period (Bewährungszeit), the Regional Court by a decision of 17 July 2006 remitted the applicant’s sentence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 25 June 1998 the applicant was drafted into the army and assigned to military unit no. 33651, situated next to the border with Azerbaijan. 6.  On 3 December 1998 the applicant, together with five fellow servicemen, was placed on watch in position no. 24. 7.  On 4 December 1998 one of the six watchmen, serviceman H., was found dead in a nearby trench, having been killed by a machine-gun shot. At the time of the killing, only three of the remaining five watchmen were in the area of position no. 24, namely the applicant and servicemen T. and A. The latter two were apparently cutting wood together not far from the position. It appears that the applicant had been seen to have an argument with H. earlier that day. 8.  On 4 March 1999 servicemen T. and A. were brought to a military police station. On 5 March 1999 the applicant was also brought to the same police station. The military police officers started to beat them, seeking to force them to confess to serviceman H.’s murder. According to the applicant, they told the police officers that serviceman H. must have been shot from the other side of the border, to which the officers replied that it had already been established that serviceman H. had been killed at close range, and continued to beat them. 9.  The applicant was initially punched and kicked. The police officers then began to hit him with rubber clubs. The applicant lost consciousness on several occasions but was revived and continued to be beaten. After a while the police officers began to squeeze the applicant’s fingertips with pliers. The same torture techniques were applied to servicemen T. and A. 10.  On 5 March 1999 serviceman T. confessed to the investigator that he had witnessed how the applicant had taken his machine gun and shot H. Since serviceman A. was with serviceman T. at the time of the murder, he was coerced into making a statement to the effect that serviceman T. had told him that he had witnessed the murder. 11.  The police officers subsequently continued to torture the applicant, forcing him to confess to the murder. According to the applicant, this continued for over a month. He was unable to walk and talk properly, and all his fingertips were swollen. 12.  On 16 April 1999 the applicant was interrogated as a suspect by the investigator examining the case, to whom he confessed that he had accidentally shot serviceman H. 13.  On 17 April 1999 the applicant was formally charged with premeditated murder and questioned as an accused by the investigator; during this interview he repeated his confession. Thereafter he was taken to the crime scene, where he made the same statement in front of a video camera and the relevant record was drawn up. On the same date the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention. 14.  According to the applicant, immediately after their release from the police station on an unspecified date, servicemen T. and A. informed the Military Prosecutor of Armenia (ՀՀ զինվորական դատախազ) in writing that they had been coerced into slandering the applicant. 15.  On 19 June 1999 the applicant and servicemen T. and A. were subjected to medical examinations, during which various injuries to their fingers and A.’s head were noted. 16.  On 11 August 1999 a confrontation was held between the applicant and serviceman T., during which the latter confirmed his earlier testimony against the applicant. 17.  On an unspecified date, the applicant’s criminal case was brought before the Syunik Regional Court (Սյունիքի մարզի առաջին ատյանի դատարան). 18.  On 26 October 1999 a hearing was held during which serviceman T. confirmed his earlier testimony against the applicant. 19.  On 6 December 1999 the Syunik Regional Court found the applicant guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. 20.  On 15 June 2000 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal (ՀՀ քրեական և զինվորական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարան) quashed this judgment and remitted the case for additional investigation. 21.  On 12 September 2000, following the additional investigation, the case was brought again before the Syunik Regional Court. 22.  On 13 June 2001 the Syunik Regional Court decided to remit the case for further investigation. 23.  On 3 August 2001 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal quashed this decision on an appeal by the prosecutor and remitted the case to the Syunik Regional Court for examination on the merits. 24.  In the proceedings before the Syunik Regional Court, the applicant’s lawyer asked that the applicant’s confession statements of 16 and 17 April 1999 and the statements made by witnesses T. and A. during the investigation in 1999 be declared inadmissible, since they had been obtained under torture. By that time criminal proceedings had already been instituted against the relevant military police officers on account of the torture of the applicant and servicemen T. and A. 25.  On 19 June 2002 the Syunik Regional Court found the applicant guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. The sentence was to be calculated from the first day of the applicant’s detention on 17 April 1999. In its judgment, the Regional Court stated that “[T]he following ha[d] been established during the court examination” and went on to describe the circumstances in which the applicant had shot serviceman H. The Regional Court then stated:\n“For these actions [the applicant] was charged [with premeditated murder].\nDuring ... questioning on 16 April 1999 [the applicant] admitted to the investigating authority that [serviceman H.] had died from a bullet accidentally shot from [the applicant’s] machine gun.\nOn 17 April 1999 during questioning as an accused he again admitted that [serviceman H.] had died from a bullet which had been shot by [the applicant] as a result of a violation of the rules for the handling of weapons.\n[The applicant] confirmed this statement during the re-enactment of the circumstances of the incident [on 17 April 1999], the video recording of which has been examined during the court proceedings.\n[The applicant] later revoked this confession.\nDuring the court proceedings [the applicant] pleaded not guilty and stated that he had not killed [serviceman H.]; they had not had an argument on the day of the incident, they had not sworn at each other, he was unaware of the circumstances of [serviceman H.’s] death, and his confession had been made under the influence of the violence and threats inflicted on him by the [police officers].\nSuch arguments [by the applicant] are unfounded, contradict the evidence obtained during the court examination and cannot serve as a basis for avoiding criminal liability and punishment.\n[The applicant’s] ... arguments have been rebutted and his commission of the offence has been proven by the following evidence obtained during the court examination: ...” 26.  As an example of such evidence, the Regional Court went on to cite the statement made by witness T. on 5 March 1999. It further stated:\n“[Witness T.] made the same statement before the Syunik Regional Court at [the hearing of 26 October 1999].\nDuring the investigation [witness T.] confirmed this statement at a confrontation with [the applicant on 11 August 1999]. Thereafter [witness T.] revoked this statement and submitted that he had not witnessed the circumstances in which [serviceman H.] had been killed. He also made a similar statement during this court examination, indicating that his statement about witnessing the killing of [serviceman H. by the applicant] had been made under the influence of the violence inflicted on him by the [police officers].\nA similar statement was also made by [witness A.].” 27.  The Regional Court went on to cite a number of circumstantial and hearsay witness statements and an expert opinion to the effect that the shot had been fired at close range, and concluded that:\n“Having evaluated the contradictory statements made by [witnesses T. and A.] during the investigation and the court examination, the court finds that in reality the coercion was applied by [the police officers] at the military police station for the purpose of ensuring disclosure of the truth.\n... The revocation at a later stage by [witness T.] of his [statements made during the investigation] was aimed at helping [the applicant] to avoid criminal liability. The fact that [witness T.] was aware of the circumstances of [serviceman H.’s] death was confirmed by the unconstrained submissions he made at the [court hearing of 26 October 1999], without being subjected to any ill-treatment or threats, and the stories he told to [two fellow villagers] following his demobilisation.” 28.  The Regional Court concluded by citing other evidence substantiating the applicant’s guilt, such as (i) a forensic examination of the victim’s tissue samples and a medical examination of his corpse, according to which he had died from a shot fired at close range; (ii) a ballistic examination, to the effect that the shell found at the crime scene had been fired from AK-74 type machine gun no. 916236, which had been issued to the applicant; (iii) the record of examination of the crime scene, drawn up on 17 April 1999, and a number of other materials. 29.  On 9 October 2002 the Avan and Nor Nork District Court of Yerevan (Երևան քաղաքի Ավան և Նոր Նորք համայնքների առաջին ատյանի դատարան) found military police officer M. and three other police officers guilty of abuse of power and imposed sentences ranging from three to three and a half years’ imprisonment. The District Court found:\n“On 4 March 1999, in connection with the murder of [serviceman H.], ... [police officer M.] brought [servicemen A. and T.] and others to the military police station. On 5 March 1999 [the applicant was also brought to the station]. There [the police officers] beat them for several days, delivered numerous blows to [the applicant] and others with a rubber club and squeezed their fingertips with pliers, causing injuries of various degrees. Then [the police officers] forced them to take off their shoes, put their hands on the backs of their heads and get down on their knees, and started to club their soles. By threatening to continue the ill-treatment, [the police officers] forced [the applicant] to confess that he had murdered [serviceman H.], [serviceman T.] to state that he had witnessed that murder, and [serviceman A.] to state that he was aware of the murder. [The police officers] also threatened the victims with retaliation if they informed any higher authority about the ill-treatment ...\nOn 5 January 2000, in his office in the military police department in Yerevan, [police officer M.] forced [serviceman A.] to state in relation to the ill-treatment that he was not familiar with [police officer M.], that nobody had beaten him and that the injuries on his fingers had been sustained as a result of his hand being squashed by a car door ...\nThe systematic, unprecedented, essentially cruel and degrading actions inflicted by [the police officers on the applicant and others], which had the attributes of torture, entailed grave consequences in that such actions violated the legally guaranteed rights and interests of [the] servicemen ...” 30.  This judgment was based on various witness statements, including those of the applicant and servicemen T. and A., and the results of the medical examinations. 31.  In his witness statement, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that he had been detained until the end of March 1999 in the military police station, where he was regularly beaten. At the end of March 1999 he was transferred to a military prosecutor’s office but then brought back to the police station on 10 April 1999. On his return journey, police officer M. threatened him with retaliation if he refused to confess. On the same day another police officer also threatened him, but promised to qualify the offence as accidental if the applicant agreed to confess; after this the applicant made his confession statement. 32.  In his witness statement, serviceman A. submitted, inter alia, that after testifying to the investigator, he and serviceman T. were kept in the canteen of the police station for about a month. At the beginning of April, police officer M. called him and serviceman T. and demanded that, when questioned by the investigator, they tell him that they had not been beaten or ill-treated in the police station, and that the injuries on their fingers had been sustained as a result of their fingers being squashed by a car door. On 5 January 2000 police officer M. threatened to kill him if he informed the investigator about the ill-treatment. 33.  In his witness statement, serviceman T. submitted, inter alia, that on 30 November 1999, under pressure from police officer M., he had testified to the investigator that nobody had beaten him. 34.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this judgment. 35.  On 14 November 2002 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal refused to examine the appeal since, according to the domestic law, a victim in criminal proceedings had the right to appeal only if the proceedings had been instituted on the basis of his or her complaint. 36.  On 26 December 2002 the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարան) upheld this decision. 37.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against his conviction of 19 June 2002. 38.  In the proceedings before the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal, the applicant submitted that he was not aware of the circumstances of serviceman H.’s death and that he had been coerced into making his confession statement. 39.  Witness T. submitted that he had not seen who had killed serviceman H., since he and witness A. had been absent at the material time. He further submitted that the statement made by him during the preliminary investigation, to the effect that he had witnessed the murder, was untrue and that he had been forced to make it. Immediately after the incident all five servicemen had agreed to say that serviceman H. had been killed by an Azeri sniper, but in reality he knew nothing about the circumstances of H.’s death. Witness A. made similar submissions. 40.  On 1 April 2003 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal decided to uphold the applicant’s conviction. In doing so, the Court of Appeal found that the above submissions were made as a result of collusion between the applicant and the witnesses, aimed at helping him to avoid criminal liability. These submissions were rebutted by the evidence obtained in the case, such as:\n(a)  The applicant’s confession of 16 April 1999 to the investigator. Later and in court the applicant had revoked this statement, as having been made under coercion, but had failed to indicate the details of any coercion applied to him in the investigator’s office.\n(b)  Submissions by witnesses T. and A. to the Syunik Regional Court at the hearing of 26 October 1999, to the effect that one of them had witnessed and the other was aware of the murder. Witnesses T. and A. had later revoked these submissions but accepted that no coercion had been applied to them in court and that these submissions, albeit untrue, had been made voluntarily.\n(c)  Other circumstantial and hearsay witness statements, the relevant expert opinions, various records and the video recording. 41.  The Court of Appeal concluded by stating that the evidence obtained under coercion in the military police station, which was corroborated by the factual circumstances of the case, had not constituted the basis for the charges and had not been used as evidence. 42.  On 14 April 2003 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal. He argued, inter alia, that the applicant’s confession statement of 16 April 1999, and the record and the video recording prepared at the crime scene on the following day, had been made as a result of the beatings, ill-treatment and threats inflicted on the applicant, and could not therefore be used as evidence against him. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal should not have relied on the submissions made by witness T. at the very early stage of the proceedings, including the hearing of 26 October 1999, to justify the credibility of his first accusatory statement, made under torture. These submissions had been the result of the fear experienced by witness T. following the unprecedented violence inflicted on him. He had been under constant pressure from the investigators, having been detained on several occasions, and at the time of the above-mentioned hearing he had not yet been demobilised and was afraid of being taken back into custody and subjected to ill-treatment again. As an example of witness T.’s fear of telling the truth, the applicant’s lawyer referred to T.’s testimony of 30 November 1999, in which he had submitted that the injuries to his fingers had been sustained as a result of his fingers being squashed by a car door. For the last three years, however, since he had revoked his earlier statements, witness T. had been insisting that he was not aware of the circumstances of serviceman H.’s death. Finally, the applicant’s lawyer argued that, contrary to what had been indicated in the Court of Appeal’s judgment, witness A. had never made any accusatory submissions against the applicant during the court examination of the case. On the contrary, he had always insisted that witness T. could not have witnessed the murder since they had been together at the material time. 43.  On 8 May 2003 the Court of Cassation dismissed the lawyer’s appeal and upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment. In doing so, the Court of Cassation found, inter alia, that:\n“The conclusions in the judgment are corroborated by the evidence examined in court, in particular, statements by [witnesses T., A. and others, and the results of various expert opinions].\n... It has been established that after the incident [servicemen T. and A., the applicant and others] agreed ... to testify that [serviceman H.] had been killed by [the Azeris], nevertheless, [serviceman T.] testified in the first-instance court on 26 October 1999 that [serviceman H.] had been killed ... by [the applicant].\nThe arguments of [the applicant’s] lawyer that the judgment was based on statements by [witnesses T. and A.] which had been obtained under torture are groundless, contradict the materials of the case and are rebutted by the following evidence.\n[The applicant and witnesses T. and A. were beaten for several days by the police officers] who demanded that they make honest statements concerning the murder of [serviceman H.]. The police officers did not take any statements from them. The statements were taken by the relevant investigator from the military prosecutor’s office, who did not ill-treat them ...\n[The relevant police officers were convicted]. No criminal proceedings were brought against any of the investigators dealing with the case.\n... On 11 August 1999 a confrontation was held between [the applicant and serviceman T. in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer], during which [serviceman T.] contended that [serviceman H.] had been killed with a machine gun [by the applicant]. It has been established that no ill-treatment was inflicted on him at that time.\nAt a later stage [serviceman T.] revoked the above statements and submitted that he had not seen who had killed [serviceman H.], although he did not deny that on several previous occasions he had submitted that it was [the applicant] who had killed [serviceman H.]. The Court of Appeal rightly considered [T.’s] confession statement as reliable and regarded it as proof of [the applicant’s] guilt.\nDuring the preliminary investigation [the applicant] testified to the investigator from the military prosecutor’s office that it was he who had killed [serviceman H.], albeit accidentally.\nThus, irrespective of the fact that during the preliminary investigation the military police officers ill-treated [the applicant and witnesses T. and A.], the evidence obtained in the case, if evaluated from the perspective of relativity and admissibility, is sufficient in its entirety to convict [the applicant] of the incriminated crime.” 44.  On 22 December 2003 the applicant was released on parole.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Grozny. 6.  At the material time the applicant’s family lived in a dwelling comprising several houses in one courtyard in Shakhterova Street in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny. The family included the applicant, her husband Mr Ali (also sometimes written as Alik) Dudayev, their sons, Mr Alikhan Dudayev and Mr Aslan Dudayev, Ms Amnat (also sometimes written as Aminat) Yakhyayeva, the wife of Mr Aslan Dudayev, and their five children, including Mr Adam Dudayev. The dwelling was located two blocks from the military commander’s office and the Staropromyslovskiy district police station (the ROVD). The area was under curfew. 7.  On the night of 8 to 9 July 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as the night between 7 and 8 July 2002) the applicant’s family were at home. The applicant was not there as she had left to spend the night at her relatives’ house in Grozny. 8.  At about 2 a.m. on 9 July 2002 a group of about fifteen federal servicemen in uniforms and balaclavas, armed with automatic weapons, arrived in an armoured personnel carrier (APC) at the applicant’s home and unlocked the gate. They then started shooting and throwing grenades at the applicant’s house. 9.  One of the applicant’s sons, Mr Alikhan Dudayev, who was a police officer, shot back for about half hour. After that he managed to leave the house and inform the police about the incident. Meanwhile, the applicant’s family lay on the floor to avoid being hit. The applicant’s grandson Adam was injured in the foot and lower back by a hand-grenade explosion. Another APC had arrived at the house in the meantime. 10.  About two hours later the servicemen stormed the building. The applicant’s son Mr Aslan Dudayev stood up and started moving towards the servicemen, trying to warn them that there were women and children in the house. He was shot in the head before the eyes of his wife and five children. His body was moved to another room where he was shot in the head again. 11.  The servicemen then took the applicant’s husband, Mr Ali Dudayev, outside and put him in the APC and drove off. The applicant’s husband has been missing ever since. 12.  At the end of their special operation, the servicemen took the applicant’s family outside and set the house and family car on fire. 13.  The applicant heard of the incident at about 4 a.m. and immediately went home. Upon her arrival, the applicant was told by relatives of the circumstances of her son’s killing and of her husband’s abduction. 14.  In their submissions before the Court the Government did not contest the facts as presented by the applicant. However, they denied any involvement by State agents in the alleged killing of her son and the alleged disappearance of her husband. 15.  In reply to a request from the Court to submit a copy of the documents reflecting the most important steps taken by the investigation into the events of the night between 8 and 9 July 2002, the Government furnished copies of criminal case files nos. 54042 and 54108, running up to 224 pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows. 16.  On 9 July 2002 a group of investigators from the Grozny prosecutor’s office examined the crime scene. As a result, they collected 408 spent cartridges, two bullets and a machine gun as evidence. 17.  On 9 July 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s other son, Mr Alikhan Dudayev, a police officer at the ROVD at the time. He stated that at about 2 a.m. he had been at home and had been woken up by someone opening the outside gates. He had then heard a group of men running into the courtyard. He had asked in Chechen and then in Russian who the men were, but had received no reply. He had seen that one of them was in camouflage uniform and a balaclava and was armed with a machine gun. The witness had warned the man that he was a police officer. In reply, the man had opened fire and the witness shot back. Then the other intruders had opened fire with machine guns and grenades, in an attack of about twenty minutes. The witness had been wounded by grenade splinters in the hand and the torso. He had managed to leave the house and run into the neighbouring courtyard. Meanwhile, the shooting continued. The witness had seen five ROVD officers come out after they heard the gunfire. He had explained the situation to them and they had contacted the local military commander’s office and the ROVD by radio. The witness and the police officers had then heard an APC arriving at the witness’s house, after which the shooting had intensified and had lasted for another half an hour. Then the two APCs had driven off and the gunfire stopped. The police officers had left one of their colleagues with the witness and had gone to the house. Upon their return, they had told him that his brother and father had been taken away in the APCs. 18.  On 9 July 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour, Mr V.M., who stated that on the night between 8 and 9 July 2002 he had been woken up by intense gunfire from automatic firearms at the applicant’s house, which had lasted for about fifty minutes. Then he had seen that the applicant’s house had been set on fire. A group of men had shouted and sworn in unaccented Russian and had then driven off in an APC. 19.  On 9 July 2002 the investigators questioned another neighbour of the applicant, Mr A.T., who stated that the night before he had been woken up by intense gunfire at the applicant’s house. When he had tried to open the door to see what was going on, he had been ordered to stay inside or be shot. He had heard men swearing in Russian. 20.  On 9 July 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbours Mr V.A., Mr A.Ch. and Ms Ay.V., whose statements were similar to the one given by Mr V.M. Ms Ay.V. also stated that at about 3 a.m. someone had demanded that she open her door and let in the wife of Mr Aslan Dudayev, Ms Amnat Yakhyayeva, and her children, including the wounded Adam Dudayev. Ms Amnat Yakhyayeva told the witness that all of the men who had been in their house had been killed by the armed men who had arrived in the APC. On the following morning the witness had found a spent 5.45 mm calibre cartridge at her home, presumably from an automatic gun. 21.  On 9 July 2002 the investigators also questioned the applicant’s neighbour, Mr A.I., whose statement was similar to those of the other neighbours (see paragraphs 18-20 above). In addition, he stated that the shooting at the Dudayevs’ house had continued for at least one and a half hours, that the armed men who had attacked the applicant’s family had been an organised group of fifteen to twenty men in camouflage uniforms, that they had sworn a lot in unaccented Russian and that they had driven in an APC. After the shooting he had gone to the house and found the walls and furniture riddled with bullet holes. He had also found the body of the applicant’s son, Aslan, who had been killed in the gunfire. 22.  On the same date, 9 July 2002, the investigators also questioned the applicant’s neighbours Ms A.Ya., Ms B.Dzh. and Mr Ab.V., whose statements were similar to those of the other neighbours (see paragraphs 18‑21 above). 23.  On 10 July 2002 the investigators opened criminal case no. 54042 (in the documents submitted the number was also referred to as 54048) in connection with the murder of the applicant’s son Mr Aslan Dudayev “by a group of fifteen to twenty armed men in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas who had arrived at the [the applicant’s] house”. 24.  On 10 July 2002 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the body of the applicant’s son Mr Aslan Dudayev. On 12 August 2002 the forensic experts concluded that he had died from two gunshot wounds to the head. 25.  On 13 July 2002 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of the applicant’s grandson Adam Dudayev. On the same date the experts concluded that he had received a perforating shrapnel wound and a gunshot wound to the torso. 26.  On 15 July 2002 the applicant’s son Mr Alikhan Dudayev complained of the incident to the Chechnya Prosecutor. In particular, he stated that on the night of the events he had warned the intruders that he was a police officer, but they had opened fire. After an hour and a half of intense shooting, the perpetrators had taken his brother, Mr Aslan Dudayev, outside and executed him in the courtyard. They had then wounded his nephew Adam, and had taken away his father, Mr Ali Dudayev. Neither the military commander’s office nor the nearby police station had reacted to the gunfire or intervened in any way. 27.  On 18 July 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s daughter-in-law Ms Amnat Yakhyayeva, whose statement concerning the events was similar to that of her brother-in-law, Mr Alikhan Dudayev. In addition, she stated that her husband, Mr Aslan Dudayev, had been shot dead by the perpetrators, who had been in military uniform and had driven around in two APCs. The perpetrators had also taken away the applicant’s husband, Mr Ali Dudayev. 28.  On 18 July 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbours Mr A.V. and Mr M.Kh., whose statements were similar to the applicant’s account before the Court. In addition, Mr M.Kh. stated that after the shooting had stopped, several military vehicles had driven down their street in the direction of the applicant’s house. In the morning he had learned that the attack had been carried out by federal servicemen who had been driving in three APCs. 29.  On 28 July 2002 the investigators ordered a ballistics report on the cartridges, bullets and machine gun collected from the crime scene on 9 July 2002. On 12 August 2002 the ballistic experts concluded that the machine gun had been set for single shots only and that the cartridges had come from several different Kalashnikov machine guns. 30.  On 30 July 2002 the investigators granted the applicant’s son Mr Alikhan Dudayev, the status of victim in the criminal case and questioned him again. He reiterated his previous statement (see paragraph 17 above). 31.  On 1 August 2002 the investigators granted the applicant’s daughter-in-law Ms Amnat Yakhyayeva the status of victim in the criminal case and questioned her. Her statement was similar to the one given on 18 July 2002 (see paragraph 27 above). In addition, she stated that the perpetrators had wounded her father-in-law and taken him away in their APC. 32.  On 1 August 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour Ms Yakh. Dzh., whose statement about the events was similar to those given by the other neighbours and to the applicant’s account before the Court. 33.  On 1 August 2002 the Chechnya Prosecutor wrote to the Chechnya Military Prosecutor asking for assistance in the investigation of the criminal case. The letter stated, inter alia, the following:\n“... The Chechnya prosecutor’s office is investigating a criminal case concerning the killing of Mr A. Dudayev and the wounding of Mr A.M. Dudayev by a group of unidentified persons armed with automatic rifles.\nOne of the theories being pursued by the investigation is that of the involvement in the crime of military servicemen from the United Group Alignment (the UGA). In connection with this I request that an investigator from unit no. 20102 of the military prosecutor’s office be included in the investigators’ group to assist in solving the crime...” 34.  On 21 August 2002 the Grozny military commander’s office informed the investigators that they had no information about the possible identity of the perpetrators and had not issued orders for a special operation at the applicant’s house. 35.  On 10 September 2002 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended owing to a failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant and her relatives were not informed of this. 36.  On 18 July 2003 the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unlawful and premature. He pointed out, among other things, that the investigators had failed to take basic steps, such as questioning the police officers whom Mr Alikhan Dudayev had met after his escape from the house or questioning the officers from the military commander’s office about the attackers’ use of APC military vehicles. The investigation resumed on the same day. 37.  On an unspecified date in July 2003 the applicant complained of her son’s killing and her husband’s abduction to the Staropromyslovskiy district administration, which on 30 July 2003 forwarded her complaint to the investigators for examination. 38.  On 10 August 2003 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour Mr S.D., whose statement was similar to the applicant’s account before the Court. 39.  On 18 August 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended owing to a failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant and her relatives were not informed of this decision. 40.  On 2 June 2009 the investigators again took up the criminal case on the orders of their superiors after receiving a request for information from the applicant. 41.  On 5 July 2009 the investigators granted the applicant the status of a victim in the criminal case and questioned her. The applicant’s statement concerning the circumstances of her son’s killing and the abduction of her husband by military servicemen was similar to her account before the Court. In addition, she stated that even though the servicemen had known that her son Mr Alikhan Dudayev worked in the police, they had still opened fire. 42.  On 7 July 2009 the investigators again suspended the investigation owing to a failure to identify the perpetrators. They informed the applicant of this decision. 43.  The applicant appealed against that decision to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court in Grozny. On 29 September 2009 the court rejected the complaint because earlier that day the investigators had resumed the proceedings in the criminal case. 44.  On 30 September 2009 the investigations in criminal cases 54042 and 54108 were joined under the number 54042 (see below). 45. On 4 October 2009 the investigators suspended the proceedings in the joint criminal case and informed the applicant. 46.  On 9 November 2011 the investigation was resumed by the supervising body as having been unlawfully suspended and the investigators were ordered to take fresh steps. 47.  On 15 December 2011 the investigators again suspended the proceedings in the joint criminal case. 48.  The document submitted shows that the investigation is still pending. 49.  On 11 December 2002 the Grozny prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 54108 in connection with the disappearance of the applicant’s husband, Mr Ali Dudayev. 50.  On 20 December 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s daughter-in-law Ms Amnat Yakhyayeva and her son Mr Alikhan Dudayev. Their statements were similar to the applicant’s account before the Court. 51.  On 24 and 25 December 2002 the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbours Ms A.V. and Ms Z.I., whose statements were similar to the applicant’s account before the Court. In addition, they stated that the perpetrators of the abduction had been military servicemen. 52.  On an unspecified date in February 2003 the investigators informed the applicant’s lawyer that they were taking search measures to establish the whereabouts of the applicant’s missing husband. 53.  On 11 February 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed. 54.  On 18 June 2003 the investigation resumed and was again suspended on 18 August 2003. The applicant was not informed of either decision. 55.  On 2 June 2009 the investigators resumed the investigation at the applicant’s request. 56.  On 5 July 2009 she was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. Her statement was identical to the one given in criminal case no. 54042 (see paragraph 41 above). 57.  On 7 July 2009 the investigators suspended the investigation on account of a failure to identify the perpetrators and informed the applicant. 58.  The applicant appealed against the decision to suspend the proceedings to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court. On 29 September 2009 the court rejected the complaint because earlier on the same day the investigators had resumed proceedings in the criminal case. 59.   On 30 September 2009 the investigation in the criminal case was joined with the investigation in criminal case 54042 under a joint number, 54042. 60.  On 4 October 2009 the investigators again suspended the proceedings in the criminal case and informed the applicant. The document submitted shows that the joint investigation is still pending (see above).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Spain. 10.  On 1 October 1997 the applicant was charged (under Articles 193, first alternative, and Articles 229 and 233, first and second sub-paragraphs of the Penal Code-straffeloven) of having committed on Saturday, 6 May 1995, offences of violent assault, sexual assault and homicide against his cousin Ms T. (aged 17). 11.  The Karmsund District Court (herredsrett), sitting with 2 professional judges and 3 lay judges, held a hearing from 20 October to 19 November 1997, during which 84 witnesses and 5 experts were heard. On 27 November 1997 the District Court convicted the applicant of the charges and sentenced him to 14 years’ imprisonment. Moreover, under Article 3-5 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969, the District Court ordered the applicant to pay NOK 100,000 in compensation to Ms T.’s parents for pain and suffering and additional inconvenience. 12.  The applicant appealed to the Gulating High Court (lagmannsrett), which held a hearing between 4 May and 18 June 1998, during which it took oral evidence from 115 witnesses, 2 of whom were experts appointed by the High Court. Statements by 10 expert witnesses were submitted. Giving its verdict, the jury answered all the questions put to it in the negative. When the jury’s verdict is that the person is not guilty, but the court finds that he is undoubtedly guilty, the court may unanimously decide that the case shall be retried before other judges. The professional judges withdrew and deliberated for approximately 50 minutes, before they came back to announce that they accepted the jury’s verdict. The High Court thence acquitted the applicant of the charges. 13.  On the following day, after hearing the pleas of counsel for the applicant and for the victim’s parents lasting approximately one hour, but without further evidence being submitted by the parties or taken by the court, the High Court judges unanimously upheld the District Court’ decision to award NOK 100,000 in compensation to Ms T.’s parents. On this point the High Court relied on the following considerations:\n“It has been established in case-law that in such a serious case as the present one, and where the question of guilt has been decided in favour of the accused, a condition for making an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damages is that it must be clear on the balance of probabilities that the accused has committed the infringements specified in the indictment, see Norsk Retstidende 1996:864.\nConsidering the evidence adduced in the case as a whole, the High Court finds it clearly probable that [the applicant] has committed the offences against Ms T. with which he was charged and that an award of compensation to her parents should be made under Article 3-5 (2) of the Damage Compensation Act.\nWith respect to the compensation matter the High Court finds the following circumstances established.\nOn Friday, 5 May 1995 the applicant went to the cinema in Kopervik with some of his friends. Around midnight he was in the centre of town. The same night Ms T. had attended a Christian event at Avaldsnes. After this event she hitchhiked to the centre of Kopervik, where she arrived around midnight. She talked to some friends who were in the main street of Kopervik and then left the centre at approximately 12.10 a.m. About the same time [the applicant] left the main street and went for a short while to one of his friend’s house. Thereafter he cycled towards his home. He caught up with his cousin, Ms T., and they continued together. [They] lived about 1 km from one another. They took a road called Gamle Sundsveg. This is a short cut to Ms T.’s home, but a detour for [the applicant]. ...\nWhen they approached the habitation in Sund they stopped. [The applicant] stroked Ms T.’s breasts. She rejected him, kicked his bike, yelled at him and continued on her own. [The applicant] feared that, should Ms T. find his conduct completely unacceptable, it would have disastrous consequences for him when his conduct would be known. He thought about earlier incidents of flashing and obscene behaviour and got scared of the consequences. He charged after her and performed the acts described in the indictment. The High Court considers that his acts had their origin in an explosion of emotion, combined with a sexual attraction to Ms T. According to forensic expert statements, it is established that by the time she was on the road she had already suffered lethal injury. It has not been fully ascertained whether she was dead when he dragged her from the road to the bushes in a field. Here he lifted a 23-kg stone and hit her at least twice on the head. There was blood on both sides of the stone. The accused himself stated that he had the evil idea to conceal her face, so she could not tell anyone, by any means, what he had done.\nHe then left the scene, washed himself clean from the blood and earth in [a lake] nearby and then cycled at random towards Kopervik. After a while he cycled towards his home and encountered a witness. ... She stated that this was at around 1.45 a.m.\nA neighbour, who was the owner of the field, found Ms T. the next morning. ... The police were called.\nAn extensive investigation was carried out and [the applicant] was summoned for questioning at an early stage. He was considered suspect, particularly because the police had some knowledge about his previous sexual acts, of which one incident had led to a formal complaint. At the end of January 1997 [the applicant] gave a new statement to the police and changed his version as to the time of his arrival at home and his choice of roads from the town centre back home. It was inter alia against this background that [the applicant] was apprehended on 8 February 1997. On 10 February 1997 he was placed in custody with a prohibition on correspondence and visits. At the court hearing he accepted his remand in custody. Ten days later [the applicant] delivered to his defence counsel at the time two notes stating that he had killed Ms T. Counsel is thought to have asked the defendant whether he could recall this. He denied it and counsel handed the notes back to [the applicant]. A few days later he confessed and gave detailed information about the course of events and the background. During questioning on 2 March 1997, after having gone through the statements with his counsel, he declared that he was guilty of a crime in accordance with the confession. Approximately one month later the confession was repeated to psychiatric experts. After having been transferred to Bergen regional prison, he began to doubt the accuracy of his confession. ... During a police inquiry on 11 August 1997, his counsel gave notice that [the applicant] would not maintain his previous statement.” 14.  The applicant sought to appeal against the High Court order that he pay compensation, according to the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure 1915 (tvistemålsloven). Ms T.’s parents and the applicant, represented by their respective counsel, took part in these proceedings, but not the prosecution.\nOn 1 February 1999 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) refused the applicant leave to appeal in so far as it concerned the High Court’s assessment of the evidence, but granted leave in so far he was challenging the High Court’s procedure and interpretation of the law. 15.  By a judgment of 24 September 1999 the Supreme Court, by 3 votes to 2, rejected the appeal. 16.  The majority, Mr Justice Skogstad, joined by Mrs Justice Gjølstad and Mrs Justice Coward, stated:\n“Appeal concerning the procedure\nApart from the fact that neither the wording of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the preparatory works suggest that an authorisation to pass judgment on civil claims in spite of a defendant’s acquittal should depend on the reasons for the latter, I cannot find any real grounds to support this proposition. Although it is evident that – in cases like the one at hand – it must be a condition for passing judgment on compensation for non-pecuniary damage that it is clear on the balance of probabilities that the act has been committed [handlingen er begått], the evidentiary standard is not as strict as that applying to a criminal conviction. I have problems seeing that in cases where the defendant has been acquitted, because it has not been found proven that the act has been committed [handlingen er begått], should be placed in a somewhat different position than where there are other grounds for acquittal – as for example where the conduct is not punishable, where it has not been established that the defendant acted with the required criminal guilt, where the defendant is not found to be liable under the criminal law, or where there is self-defence or any other ground of exemption from criminal liability. Should it not be permissible to adjudicate civil claims in criminal proceedings in which the defendant has been acquitted because it has not been established that he has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [begått handlingen], the consequence would be that the claim must be brought up in separate civil proceedings. However such a lawsuit is both time consuming and expensive [and] .... the aggrieved party’s possibilities to pursue such claims will depend on his economic situation. I find no attraction in such a solution.\nI should also point out that if one were to operate a rule whereby an acquittal on the ground that it has not been established that the defendant has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [har begått den handling han er tiltalt for] is treated differently than acquittals on other grounds, it might give rise to difficulties in instances where the case has been tried by a High Court sitting with a jury, as in the present case. A verdict of conviction requires that at least seven of the ten jurors have answered ‘yes’ to the question of guilt and, regardless of whether the jury has answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’, no grounds are given for the verdict. In most instances one will have more or less well-founded perceptions, but never total certainty, as to why the jury has answered in the negative.\nOn several occasions the courts have had to deal with the question whether a civil claim can be adjudicated in spite of the defendant having been acquitted in the criminal case. On those occasions, where the question has been submitted to the Supreme Court or the Appeals Selection Committee, it has not been a condition for dealing with the civil claim in connection with the criminal case that the [criminal] court ... has found it established that the defendant has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [har begått den handling tiltalen gjelder]. ...\nIn my opinion, in the light of existing legal sources, there cannot be any doubt that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1981, it is not a condition for adjudicating a civil claim in connection with criminal proceedings that the court in [the latter] proceedings has found it proven that the defendant has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [har begått den handling saken gjelder]. ...\nConsequently, no procedural errors were committed when the High Court, in spite of [the applicant’s] acquittal in the criminal proceedings, passed judgment on the civil claim. ...\nAppeal concerning the application of the law\nThe appellant has based his appeal on law on the argument that it would be contrary to the presumption of innocence in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention if the court, after the defendant has been acquitted in the criminal case, passes judgment for compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the same case. In any event, he submits, it must be contrary to the presumption of innocence to give such reasoning on the compensation matter as done by the High Court. ...\n[Article 6 § 2] is primarily addressed to judges in criminal proceedings and its main message is that judges shall not prejudge the defendant as having committed the crime of which he is indicted, or that there shall be no prejudgment through statements by public authorities (see Frowein/Peukert: “Europäische Menschenrectskonvention”, “ECHR”, 2. edition (1996) page 280 and following, and Rehof/Trier: Menneskerett – Human Rights (1990), page 164). Both according to legal doctrine and the case-law of the Strasbourg institutions, the provision may also have importance after the criminal case has been terminated (see Harris/O’Boyle/Warbrick: “Law of the ECHR” (1995), pages 246-247 with further references to practice). For instance, in the Sekanina v. Austria judgment, the Court stated that if the defendant has been acquitted by a final judgment, the courts might not, in a subsequent case concerning compensation for unjust prosecution, base its judgment on the fact that the accused is guilty. However, how far these points of view go is somewhat uncertain. While it is the accused and the State who are parties to the compensation proceedings regarding unjust prosecution, such proceedings can be seen as a prolongation of the criminal case. In my view, however, the presumption of innocence can hardly apply to civil proceedings between the accused and the person who has been prejudiced or has suffered damage by the act [which was] the factual basis for a criminal charge in respect of which the defendant has been acquitted [en handling som siktede er frifunnet for]. In any event, it must be evident that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention cannot bar the courts – in a civil case (for example a case for compensation; on dismissal or parental responsibilities) – from establishing facts regarding the course of events in question, even if it should disclose the occurrence of a criminal offence and even if the person against whom the claim is directed has been acquitted of the offence in a preceding criminal case (see, inter alia, Lorenzen/Rehof/Trier: “Den Europæiske Menneskeretskonvention med kommentarer” “The ECHR with comments” (1994), page 199, and Frowein/Peukert, op. cit. page 285). Should the presumption of innocence apply at all to civil proceedings between the aggrieved party and the accused, it must at any rate be a condition for finding a violation of Article 6 § 2 that a decision establishing criminal guilt has been taken. Were the court in a civil case not permitted to base its decision on the fact that the person acquitted of a criminal offence, has in fact committed the act [begått handlingen], the acquittal would deprive the victim, or the person who has suffered damage, of the possibility to obtain a judicial review of claims that he or she might have against the accused. This would, in my view, be contrary to the fundamental right to a fair hearing in Article 6 § 1.\n[The applicant] has argued that a distinction must be made between cases where a civil claim is being reviewed together with the criminal matter and cases where the claim is examined in separate civil proceedings. I do not agree that there is any basis for making such a distinction. The system whereby civil claims may be raised in the criminal case is based upon well-founded considerations of procedural economy and ... can also benefit the defendant. In criminal proceedings the accused is, as a main rule, entitled to defence counsel paid for by the State and, bearing in mind also the thoroughness with which evidence is presented in a criminal trial, the accused, in the event of a civil claim being determined together with the criminal matter, enjoys particular protection against being wrongly judged. If the defendant is acquitted in the criminal case but is ordered to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the accused will be left with a feeling of not having been ‘totally acquitted’. But it should not matter to him whether the compensation claim is determined in connection with the criminal proceedings or in ensuing civil proceedings.\n...\nAs mentioned above, the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention can, in my view, hardly be applied in a civil case between the person acquitted and the aggrieved party. Bearing in mind the nature of this case, I do not, however, find it necessary to take a definite stance on this question, the High Court did not in my view base its decision in the compensation claim on a finding of criminal guilt, which under any circumstance must be a condition for a violation of Article 6 § 2. ...\nThe appellant has pleaded that the courts in practice will have difficulties in applying different evidentiary standards to criminal conviction and compensation. Moreover, he has submitted that when, as in this case, it is a requirement for making an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage that it is clear on the balance of probabilities that the the accused has committed the act [begått handlingen], the evidentiary requirement is so close to that applying to a criminal conviction that this in itself contributes to casting a suspicion of criminal liability. I have difficulties in understanding these arguments. The fact that the evidentiary requirements are different in various relations is nothing special for cases such as the present one. ... [I]t is based on the general view that a qualified probability is required in order for the court to ground its decision on a fact that is strongly incriminating ... The fact that a stricter standard of proof applies in order to protect the interests of the defendant cannot entail a breach of the Convention.” 17.  The minority of the court, Mr Justice Flock joined by Mr Chief Justice Smith in the main reasoning and the conclusion, expressed the following opinion:\n“I am ... of a different opinion as to the main issue in the case. In my view, the appeal on procedure ... should be upheld. When a court primarily has found that the defendant was not the perpetrator of ‘the act with which the case is concerned’, the court may not, in my opinion, in the same judgment order the defendant to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the ground that he nevertheless has performed the same ‘act’.\nUnder the 1981 Code of Criminal Procedure – as noted by the first voting Justice – it was authorised to pass judgment on civil claims even though the defendant had been acquitted of the criminal act. ...The former [limitation in this respect] was repealed. However, in my view, the far reaching application of the new rule made by the High Court in this case does not necessarily follow from the statute or from former Supreme Court rulings. Besides, it would be more consistent with the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, now incorporated into Norwegian law, if the court did not both brand the defendant as the perpetrator of the act under civil law and acquit him of criminal liability in the same judgment. Against this background, the best solution would be to interpret the possibility – and the corresponding duty for the courts – under the statute to adjudicate civil claims in the criminal case with the qualification that the most extreme consequences should be avoided.\nBelow I shall deal with each of the reasons for my position.\nWhen the 1981 Code improved the possibilities of the aggrieved party to have civil claims determined in connection with the criminal proceedings, some instances were mentioned in the preparatory work of claims that could be adjudicated even though the defendant had been acquitted. This was, inter alia, where the purpose, intent or gross negligence required by the Penal Code had not been proved but where it had been shown that the defendant had displayed sufficient negligence to be held liable to pay compensation. However, the preparatory works did not include ... those instances where the defendant had been acquitted because it had not been established that he or she had performed the act as cited in the indictment. This would be the most frequent reason for acquittal in, for example, cases of aggravated sexual assault against minors ... and where compensation for non-pecuniary damage is a recurrent issue.\nSpecial questions arise in this kind of acquittal. A conviction and an order to pay compensation are not only different legal consequences based on different aspects of the case, but also, in the same case and on the same evidence, the court assesses the evidence twice with the possibility of reaching different results. Legally, this would be justified by the fact that the evidentiary requirements for criminal conviction are stricter than those with respect to an order to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. However, this situation is so special – and was excluded under the former legislation – that one would expect that the subject be discussed, or at least be explicitly mentioned, in the preparatory works. As this was not the case, it can be deduced that the legislators probably did not have such cases in mind, or at least did not regard them as essential when the rules were amended in 1981.\nIt is undoubtedly correct that the Supreme Court – and other courts in our country – in certain rulings have noted that an award can be made for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage even if the defendant has been acquitted in the same case. ... However, ... I can hardly see ... that there is such an established case-law in this area as to prevent certain limitations being made in the interpretation of the law.\nAs regards the presumption of innocence in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, it is somewhat uncertain how far this requirement extends in Norwegian law. ...\nWhen taking a decision in the present case, one is faced with the need to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the accused’s interests and, on the other hand, those of the victim and his or her closest relatives. It is important to take into account the fact that the 1981 revision was intended to strengthen the victim’s position. However, I find that an acquittal for having committed the incriminated act – and in particular an act of murder – must clearly appear from the judgment. This is such a prominent consideration that it should in my view be predominant in the interpretation of the law.\n...\nIn following this reasoning, some issues of delimitation will arise as to when the court should abstain from determining civil claims together with an acquittal. The limitation, that is implied in my opinion, on the possibility to adjudicate such claims is inter alia that it must be ascertainable that the acquittal is based on a finding that there is insufficient evidence to show that the accused committed the offence of which he/she was charged. This might be a problem in all cases before the High Court where the question of guilt is decided by a jury, without a reasoned verdict.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Valjevo. 5.  The applicant worked as a truck-driver in a company (“E”) until a work-related accident in July 1990. 6.  On 27 February 1991 the employer declared him redundant. On 9 July 1992 the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Valjevo quashed this decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. This judgment became final on 9 September 1992. 7.  On 12 July 1993 and 30 January 1996 the applicant was reassigned to a position of a tractor-driver and a dumper-driver, respectively. 8.  On 9 May 1996 the applicant was dismissed. 9.  On 29 September 1999 the applicant was reinstated following a court order in that respect (see paragraph 15 below). On 2 March 2000 he was dismissed again. 10.  The applicant had instituted a number of civil and criminal proceedings in respect to the above: 11.  On 6 July 1990 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Labour Court (Sud udruženog rada) in Šabac against his employer seeking payment of salary arrears due from 6 July 1987 to 1 March 1993. On 9 September 1993 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) of Serbia delegated the Municipal Court in Šabac to trial the case. 12.  Following remittals in 1995 and 2001, on 28 February 2006 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim. On 28 April 2006 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Šabac upheld the judgment of 28 February 2006. 13.  On 8 March 2007 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 14.  On 13 September 1993 the applicant instituted labour dispute before the Municipal Court in Valjevo seeking revocation of the employer’s decisions of 12 July 1993, 30 January 1996 and 9 May 1996 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), reinstatement, as well as compensation of due salary arrears, pension benefits and damages. On 18 February 1997 the Supreme Court delegated the Municipal Court in Čačak to trial the case. 15.  On 23 February 1999 the Municipal Court, in a partial judgment (delimična presuda), ordered the applicant’s reinstatement and dismissed his request for revocation of the employer’s decision of 12 July 1993 and his claim for the payment of pension benefits. On 26 August 1999 the District Court in Čačak upheld the judgment of 23 February 1999. 16.  On 9 May 2000 the Municipal Court suspended the proceedings until a final resolution of the labour dispute instituted by the applicant in 1999 (see Part B.3 below). On 12 July 2000 the District Court upheld the decision of 9 May 2000. 17.  On 23 November 2009 the applicant requested the proceedings to be resumed. 18.  On 5 March 2010, the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Čačak, now acting as the competent court, rejected the applicant’s request pending the outcome of his request for reopening of the case instituted by him in 1999 (see paragraph 28 below). On 17 June 2010 the High Court (Viši sud) in Čačak quashed this decision and reversed the case for reconsideration. 19.  On 21 December 2012 the Court of First Instance rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation of due salary arrears. On 10 April 2013 the High Court quashed this judgment and ordered a retrial. 20.  According to the information in the case-file, the proceedings are still pending before the Court of First Instance. 21.  On 6 October 1999 the applicant filed with the Municipal Court in Valjevo a lawsuit seeking revocation of the employer’s decision of 29 September 1999 (see paragraph 9 above). 22.  On 8 March 2000 the applicant filed with the same court a lawsuit seeking revocation of the employer’s decision of 2 March 2000 (see paragraph 9 above). 23.  On 21 June 2000 the Municipal Court joined the two sets of proceedings, ruled partly in favour of the applicant and quashed the employer’s decision of 29 September 1999. 24.  On 16 February 2001 the District Court in Valjevo upheld the judgment of 21 June 2000 in its part favourable to the applicant, quashed it in the remaining part and ordered a retrial in that respect. 25.  Following remittals in 2004, 2005 and 2006, on 21 June 2006 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim for revocation of the employer’s decisions of 9 May 1996 and 2 March 2000, reinstatement and payment of due salary arrears and other employment related benefits. 26.  On 22 December 2006 the District Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. 27.  On 19 April 2007 and 15 May 2008 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 28.  On 2 November 2009 the applicant filed a request for reopening of the case. On 14 May 2010 the Court of First Instance in Valjevo rejected this request. On 23 December 2010 the High Court in Valjevo upheld the decision of 14 May 2010. 29.  On 14 January 2011 the applicant submitted new request for reopening of the case. It would appear that this request is still pending before the Court of First Instance in Valjevo. 30.  On 26 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Municipal Court in Valjevo against his former employer for the payment of employment related benefits due from 1 September 1985 to the date of judgment. 31.  On 10 September 2007 Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim. On 31 January 2009 the District Court in Valjevo upheld the judgment of 10 September 2007. 32.  On 12 June 2008 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 33.  On 5 February 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Municipal Court in Valjevo against his former employer seeking payment of salary arrears due in the period from 1 April 1994 to the date of judgment. 34.  Following a partial reversal in 2009, on 26 January 2011 the Court of First Instance in Valjevo, now acting as the competent court, rejected the applicant’s claim. 35.  On 7 March 2012 the Appeals Court upheld the judgment of 26 January 2011. 36.  On 5 March 2010 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the High Court in Valjevo seeking compensation of damages from the respondent State for alleged judicial malfeasance in several civil and enforcement proceedings including, inter alia, those described in Parts B.1, 2, 3 and 5 above. 37.  On 18 September 2012 the High Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant awarding him 200,000 Serbian dinars (1,725 euros[1]) on account of non-pecuniary damages. 38.  On 18 January 2013 the Appeals Court quashed the High Court judgment and ordered a retrial. 39.  According to the information in the case-file, the proceedings are still pending before the High Court. 40.   On 30 April 2008 the District Court in Valjevo dismissed the applicant’s request for criminal investigation filed on 4 June 2007 against private persons for alleged criminal offence of perjury and forgery of documents related to the applicant’s employment. 41.  By 5 May 2008 the domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s requests for criminal investigation and indictments against several judges sitting in his civil cases. 42.  On 5 November 2008 the District Public Prosecutor (Okružni javni tužilac) in Užice dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint against several judges and prosecutors. 43.  On 20 April 2012 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) of the Republic of Serbia. 44.  On 25 February 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the constitutional appeal inadmissible since the applicant failed to provide documents and information expressly requested by it.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Ştefan Vodă. 7.  In March 1999 the applicant's apartment was burgled. The police caught the burglars and recovered most of the stolen goods, which were deposited at the Ştefan Vodă Police Station as evidence. 8.  In 1999 the applicant's goods were stolen from the police station. 9. On 24 July 2000 the applicant brought an action against the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”), seeking compensation for the stolen goods. 10.  By a judgment of 26 September 2003 the Căuşeni District Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to pay her 183,752 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 11,960 euros (EUR) at the time). The judgment was not appealed against and after fifteen days it became final and enforceable. The District Court issued an enforcement warrant which was received by a Bailiff on 5 November 2003. 11.  On 26 April 2004 a Bailiff informed the applicant that on 14 November, 25 November, 8 December 2003 and 20 February 2004 the Ministry had been ordered to comply with the judgment. The Bailiff also informed her that administrative proceedings had been instituted against the Minister of the Interior for non-enforcement of the final judgment in favour of the applicant. 12.  On 27 May 2004 the Ministry informed the applicant that it had not received the enforcement warrant and that the enforcement would be possible only after having received funds for that purpose. 13.  On 29 December 2004 the applicant received MDL 30,993 (EUR 1,825), on 26 January 2005 she received MDL 7,336 (EUR 450) and on 19 September 2005 she received MDL 72,700 (EUR 4,722). On 13 December 2005 the applicant received the last part of the judgment debt of MDL 72,723 (EUR 4,767).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Berlin. 7.  The proceedings at issue in the present application are part of a large number of proceedings which have been brought before the Liechtenstein courts since 2001. All of these proceedings concern, in substance, questions relating to the property rights to considerable assets (more than 14 million Swiss francs (CHF)) which the applicant had brought into five different foundations (including the H. foundation) set up by him in 1999 in Liechtenstein and of which he was the beneficiary. The applicant’s mother G.B., represented by her guardian, and the applicant’s sisters R. and K. claimed in different sets of proceedings that the applicant had not been the owner of the assets he had brought into the foundations, but that these assets had partly belonged to G.B. and partly to their deceased husband and father. 8.  On 30 August 2001 the Regional Court, on a request lodged by the applicant’s sisters R. and K. in interlocutory proceedings, prohibited the H. foundation and the applicant from disposing of assets amounting to more than three million euros (EUR) deposited with the P. bank. 9.  By submissions dated 27 September 2001, received by the Regional Court on 28 September 2001, the applicant’s two sisters brought an action for payment of some EUR 3,3 million against both the H. foundation and the applicant (file no. 2 CG.2001.317). 10.  On 12 November 2003 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid as he had not given sufficient information on his financial condition despite the court’s repeated requests. That decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal on 3 March 2004, which found that the Regional Court had been obliged to investigate further into the applicant’s financial condition on its own motion. 11.  On 21 July 2004 the Regional Court, having received further information from the applicant, granted the latter legal aid. 12.  On 28 July 2004 R. and K. withdrew the action against the applicant and maintained it only against the H. foundation. 13.  On 30 December 2004 the Regional Court, having questioned the parties and ten witnesses and having inspected numerous documents, ordered the H. foundation to pay R. and K. some EUR 240,000 each and dismissed the remainder of their claim. It found that the applicant’s allegation that he had received the assets he had brought into the H. foundation as a gift from his mother had not been proven. The applicant had therefore not been authorised to bring the assets of the estate of his deceased father into the H. foundation. The amounts payable to R. and K. corresponded to their respective rights to a share in the deceased’s estate. 14.  On 8 February 2005 both R. and K. and the H. foundation lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment. 15.  On 7 March 2005 the applicant, being the beneficiary of the H. foundation, requested leave to intervene in the proceedings as a third party and applied for legal aid. 16.  On 14 June 2005 the Regional Court granted the applicant legal aid and appointed him a lawyer. On 26 August 2005 the applicant joined the proceedings as an intervening third party. 17.  On 7 September 2005 the Court of Appeal, granting the H. foundation’s appeal, quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and dismissed the action brought by R. and K. as inadmissible. It found that the plaintiffs, two of several statutory heirs, had not been authorised to claim assets from the H. foundation for their own account. 18.  On 4 May 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision and remitted the case to that court. It found that, having regard to the principle of good faith, the plaintiffs had standing to sue the H. foundation as the Court of Appeal had accepted that the applicant had unlawfully brought assets from his deceased father’s estate into the foundation, of which he was the beneficiary. It ordered the Court of Appeal to decide upon the plaintiffs’ and the H. foundation’s appeals in the light of its findings. 19.  Subsequently, the Constitutional Court (file no. StGH 2006/56; decision of 26 March 2007) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 26 May 2006 against the Supreme Court’s decision of 4 May 2006. It found that the complaint was inadmissible as the Supreme Court’s impugned decision to remit the case to the lower court did not terminate the proceedings by a final decision on the matter in dispute. 20.  On 21 September 2006 the Court of Appeal, following the remittal of the case to it by the Supreme Court on 4 May 2006, granted the H. foundation’s appeal. It quashed the judgment of the Regional Court dated 30 December 2004, finding that the latter had not sufficiently investigated the facts relevant in order to determine the property of the assets in question, remitted the case to the Regional Court and ordered that court to further investigate the facts of the case. 21.  On 21 November 2007 the Regional Court, granting the applicant’s request, quashed its decision of 14 June 2005 to appoint the applicant a lawyer. The applicant was from then on represented by his wife. 22.  On 10 June 2008 the Regional Court, having examined ten witnesses, essentially by letters of request, and having inspected numerous documents, again ordered the H. foundation to pay R. and K. some EUR 240,000 each (new file no. 02.CG.2006.315-415). The facts it established and the grounds it gave corresponded to those given in its judgment of 30 December 2004. 23.  On 28 June 2008 the applicant and on 9 July 2008 the H. foundation, R. and K. appealed against the Regional Court’s new judgment. 24.  On 25 March 2009 the Court of Appeal, allowing the H. foundation’s and the applicant’s appeal, quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and dismissed the action brought by R. and K. Contrary to the Regional Court and to the courts in parallel sets of proceedings, the Court of Appeal, having taken evidence, found that the assets at issue had belonged to the applicant’s mother alone, and not jointly to her and to the applicant’s deceased father. The applicant had received these assets as a gift from his mother in 1993. R. and K. did not, therefore, have a claim against the applicant as the assets at issue were not part of their deceased father’s estate. 25.  On 1 October 2009 the Supreme Court, allowing the appeal on points of law lodged by R. and K., quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 25 March 2009 and remitted the case to that court. The Supreme Court considered that the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently established the facts which had led it to the conclusion – which ran counter to the conclusions reached by all other courts before in different sets of proceedings – that there had been a valid contract of donation between the applicant and his mother on the assets in question. 26.  On 19 October 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision of 1 October 2009 with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, he claimed, inter alia, that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated. 27.  On 21 May 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s motion for bias against the judges of the Constitutional Court as abusive. It further dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. StGH 2009/177). 28.  The Constitutional Court found that the complaint was inadmissible as the Supreme Court’s impugned decision of 1 October 2009 to remit the case to the lower court did not terminate the proceedings by a final decision on the matter in dispute. 29.  As to the alleged breach of the right to be heard within a reasonable time, the Constitutional Court found that it could still rule on the alleged human rights violation after the Supreme Court had handed down a final decision. In any event, in cases of excessive delays in proceedings the problem arose that the fundamental rights violation caused thereby could not be effectively redressed. The Constitutional Court could only declare that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable, but could not undo the delays. It noted in this context that in proceedings before the administrative authorities, a complainant could assume the rejection of the request made by him to that authority when the latter had remained inactive for more than three months and could pursue his case on appeal (see Article 90 § 6a of the National Administrative Justice Act (Gesetz über die allgemeine Landesverwaltungspflege)). However, this did not apply to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 30.  As regards costs and expenses, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant to pay R. and K. lawyer’s costs in the amount of CHF 3,087.05 and declared the court costs uncollectible, referring to its practice in previous proceedings brought by the applicant before it. 31.  It emerged from a letter dated 17 July 2013 from the Court of Appeal to the applicant’s wife that the Court of Appeal had stayed the proceedings before it pending the proceedings before this Court having regard to a proposal made by the applicant to that effect. 32.  By decision of 2 April 2014 the Court of Appeal declared that the proceedings were terminated and that the court costs were to be borne in accordance with the Court Fees Act (Gerichtsgebührengesetz). It noted that by submissions dated 29 January 2014 the applicant, who had revoked his wife’s power of attorney to represent him in the proceedings before that court, the applicant’s sisters R. and K. and the H. foundation had informed the court that they had agreed on a settlement of the case and requested that the proceedings be stayed perpetually (ewiges Ruhen). This Court has not been informed of the content of the settlement. The proceedings were thus stayed ex lege. The Court of Appeal further explained that the proceedings before it had not been continued following the remittal of the case to it by the Supreme Court’s decision dated 1 October 2009 because the applicant had lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision with the Constitutional Court and subsequently an application with the European Court of Human Rights. None of the parties to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal had requested that the proceedings be continued while the complaint and the application were pending before the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights respectively.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Vienna. 6.  The applicant started practising as a lawyer in 1984. In 1995 he and an Austrian bank (hereinafter “the bank”) entered into a trusteeship agreement in connection with real estate transactions. 7.  One of the applicant’s tasks was to transfer 20,000,000 Austrian schillings (ATS, approximately 1,450,000 euros (EUR)), which he held as a trustee, to company X in exchange for a loan guarantee. 8.  In a report dated 10 May 1996 the bank complained to the Vienna Bar Association (Rechtsanwaltskammer) that the applicant had transferred ATS 20,000,000 to company X, but had not handed over the guarantee, as was stipulated in the trusteeship agreement that he should do. 9.  On 26 August 1996 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court opened preliminary investigations against the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement (Veruntreuung) as regards a breach of the trusteeship agreement with the bank. 10.  On 21 October 1998 the applicant was formally charged with embezzlement for abusing his power under another trusteeship agreement. He was accused of paying out ATS 6,000,000 (approximately EUR 436,000) to a creditor of his clients without being instructed to do so, and of diverting ATS 8,500,000 (approximately EUR 618,000). These proceedings ended with the applicant’s acquittal on 12 January 2000. 11.  During the trial and before the acquittal was pronounced, the public prosecutor had stated that he intended to reserve the applicant’s prosecution for breach of the trusteeship agreement with the bank regarding the transfer of ATS 20,000,000 in exchange for a loan guarantee. 12.  On 7 July 2000 the applicant was charged with fraudulent conversion (Untreue) under Article 153 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetz­buch) in respect of the transfer of ATS 20,000,000. On 12 April 2002 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court convicted the applicant of fraudulent conversion and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction for nullity on 16 October 2002. 13.  On 5 February 2003 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court convicted the applicant again of fraudulent conversion under Article 153 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. It found that the applicant and the bank had concluded a trusteeship agreement on 31 August 1995 under which the bank was to provide a loan of ATS 20,000,000 to the applicant’s client, X, while the applicant was to provide the bank with a loan guarantee in the same amount. The General Conditions for Real Estate Transactions by Trustees applied to that agreement. The bank had transferred the money to the applicant’s account on 5 September 1995. Only two days later the applicant had transferred the entire amount to a savings account. In breach of the trusteeship agreement including the above-mentioned General Conditions, the applicant had transferred part of the sum to his client without obtaining a loan guarantee, and had invested the remainder abroad in the hope of achieving considerable profits. He had told the bank, which had set 31 December 1995 as the deadline for submitting the guarantee, that he would be able to obtain it by 15 February 1996. Although the bank had repeatedly requested the fulfilment of the trusteeship agreement or the reimbursement of the loan, and the applicant knew by then that his investments had been unsuccessful and that he no longer disposed of the entire amount, he continued to use the remaining money, for instance to pay his own fees of ATS 840,000 (approximately EUR 61,000). 14.  On 3 September 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s plea of nullity and referred the case to the Vienna Court of Appeal to decide on the appeal against sentence. On 18 February 2004 the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to three years’ imprisonment. 15.  The applicant served his prison sentence from December 2004 to December 2005 and was released after receiving a pardon from the President of Austria. Before the pardon, the applicant had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (application no. 10185/04), complaining of unfairness of the criminal proceedings. The applicant states that the presidential pardon had been subject to the condition that he withdraw the application with the Court, which he did. 16.  On 24 May 1996 the Vienna Bar Association received the bank’s complaint of 10 May that the applicant had breached the trusteeship agreement (see paragraph 8 above). On 29 May 1996 the Disciplinary Lawyer (Kammeranwalt) appointed an Investigating Commissioner. The applicant made submissions on 5 June and 16 September 1996. 17.  On 25 September 1996 the Disciplinary Council of the Vienna Bar Association (“the Disciplinary Council”, Disziplinarrat der Rechtsanwalts­kammer), issued an interim measure prohibiting the applicant from representing clients before the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, and before the prosecution authorities working at the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, as criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending before that court. 18.  On 15 November 1996 the Disciplinary Council extended the interim measure, imposing on the applicant a temporary ban on practising as a lawyer. 19.  On 20 December 1996 the applicant appealed to the Appeals Board (Oberste Berufungs- und Disziplinarkommission für Rechtsanwälte und Rechts­anwaltsanwärter), which dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1997. 20.  As interim measures are only valid for a period of six months, the measures were extended every six months. The reason given was that criminal proceedings were pending against the applicant. No hearings were held. 21.  On 26 January 2000 the Disciplinary Council lifted the temporary ban on practising as a lawyer, since the applicant had informed it that he had been acquitted (see paragraph 10 above). 22.  On 4 May 2000 the Disciplinary Council again issued an interim decision imposing a temporary ban on practising as a lawyer. It noted that criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending at the Vienna Regional Criminal Court concerning charges of fraudulent conversion to the detriment of the bank. On 2 October 2000 the Appeals Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 23.  The final judgment of the Vienna Court of Appeal of 18 February 2004 (see paragraph 14 above) reached the Disciplinary Council on 24 May 2004. The Disciplinary Council scheduled a hearing on 12 October 2004. The applicant did not receive a summons. Subsequently, a new hearing was scheduled for 15 February 2005. 24.  After holding a hearing at which the applicant and his counsel were present, the Disciplinary Council found on 15 February 2005 that the applicant had breached his professional duties and had infringed the profession’s honour and reputation (section 1 (1) of the Disciplinary Act for Lawyers and Trainee Lawyers (Disziplinarstatut für Rechtsanwälte und Rechts­anwaltsanwärter – the Disciplinary Act) and ordered that he be struck off the register pursuant to section 16 (1) subparagraph (4) of the said Act. Furthermore, it held in favour of him in respect of a number of other alleged disciplinary offences. 25.  The Disciplinary Council held that the applicant had failed\n(1)  to provide the bank with a loan guarantee in exchange for the amount of ATS 20,000,000, as required under the trusteeship agreement of 31 August 1995;\n(2)  to reply to repeated requests from the bank for assurances that the said amount was still in his possession;\n(3)  to transfer the amount to a separate trustee account (Anderkonto); and\n(4)  finally, to fulfil the trusteeship agreement as a whole.\nIt referred to the establishment of facts contained in the Vienna Regional Court’s judgment of 5 February 2003 (see paragraph 13 above) and noted that this was confirmed by its own establishment of the facts. Moreover, the Disciplinary Council referred to the Appeals Board’s established case-law, in accordance with which the disciplinary authorities were bound by the establishment of facts contained in a judgment of a criminal court convicting a lawyer alleged to have committed a disciplinary offence. It noted that disposing of such a large amount of money in breach of the trusteeship agreement amounted to serious professional misconduct and a severe infringement of the profession’s honour and reputation within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Disciplinary Act. Given the circumstances of the case, which had also become publicly known and had caused serious damage to the legal profession, it was not sufficient to impose a ban on practising of up to one year but it was necessary to order that the applicant be struck off the register. It would be unacceptable that the applicant, who was at that time serving his prison sentence, could resume practising immediately after his release. Moreover, no client would entrust his affairs to a lawyer who had diverted such a large amount of money in breach of his duties as a trustee. 26.  The applicant appealed to the Appeals Board, inter alia on the ground that his conviction by the criminal court excluded disciplinary proceedings, which were based on the same facts. In the alternative, he argued that the sanction was disproportionate, having particular regard to the fact that he had already been banned from practising as a lawyer while the proceedings were pending. 27.  On 25 July 2005 the Appeals Board upheld the Disciplinary Council’s decision in respect of points (1) to (3), but amended it in respect of point (4), finding that the applicant had failed to fulfil the trusteeship agreement only in respect of part of the sum. It also confirmed the sanction. 28.  In so far as the applicant relied implicitly on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the Appeals Board referred to the Constitutional Court’s established case-law according to which conduct of a lawyer qualifying as a criminal offence and also infringing the profession’s honour and reputation contained an element, the “disciplinary-law surplus” (“disziplinärer Überhang”) which justified a disciplinary sanction. The Constitutional Court’s case-law relied on the explanatory report to Protocol No. 7, according to which Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 did not protect a person against conviction for the same act in criminal proceedings and in a different set of proceedings, such as disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant. It thus appeared that disciplinary proceedings did not qualify as criminal proceedings. Moreover, the Disciplinary Council had not merely relied on the matters which constituted the criminal offence, but had had particular regard to the ensuing damage to the profession’s honour and reputation. The commission of a serious criminal offence which had a direct link with the exercise of a lawyer’s professional activity served to undermine the trustworthiness of the profession as a whole. This was all the more so where the violation of duties concerned the core activities of a practising lawyer, such as fulfilling a trusteeship agreement. 29.  Regarding the sanction, the Appeals Board noted in particular that meticulous observance of the duties attached to the core activities of a practising lawyer, such as acting as a trustee, was an indispensable condition for maintaining the confidence the general public placed in the legal profession. In the event of a very serious breach of these duties the Bar Association had to show that it was ready to dissociate itself from such misconduct in an unequivocal manner. It had therefore been necessary to impose the maximum sanction, namely striking the applicant off the register. 30.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court alleging, inter alia, that he had been tried twice for the same conduct. He also repeated that the imposition of the severest sanction possible, namely striking him off the register, was not justified in the circumstances. 31.  On 28 February 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the disciplinary decisions were properly reasoned, and that the legal basis on which they had been taken was transparent and clear. As regards the applicant’s complaint that he had been punished twice for the same conduct, the Constitutional Court repeated that the applicant’s actions amounted to a criminal offence, but that they also contained a “disciplinary-law surplus” which could be subject to disciplinary sanctions without violating either Article 6 of the Convention or Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 32.  The Constitutional Court’s judgment was served on the applicant’s counsel on 27 April 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first applicant, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. (“the applicant company”), is a limited liability company operating in the television-broadcasting sector, with its registered office in Rome. The second applicant, Mr Francescantonio Di Stefano, is an Italian national who was born in 1953 and lives in Rome. He is the statutory representative of the applicant company. 9.  By a ministerial decree of 28 July 1999, the appropriate authorities granted Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. a licence for nationwide terrestrial television broadcasting in accordance with Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraphs 56-61 below), authorising it to install and operate an analogue television network. The licence specified that the applicant company was entitled to three frequencies covering 80% of national territory. As regards the allocation of the frequencies, the licence referred to the national frequency-allocation plan, adopted on 30 October 1998. It indicated that the installations should be brought into line with the requirements of the “assignment plan” (piano di assegnazione) within twenty-four months and that the measures taken to that end should conform to the adjustment programme (programma di adeguamento) drawn up by the Communications Regulatory Authority (Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni – AGCOM) in conjunction with the Ministry of Communications (“the Ministry”). It appears from the Consiglio di Stato’s judgment no. 2624 of 31 May 2008 (see paragraph 14 below) that, under the terms of the licence, the allocation of frequencies was deferred until such time as the authorities had adopted the adjustment programme, on the basis of which the applicant company should have upgraded its own installations. The adjustment programme should, in turn, have taken into account the requirements of the national frequency-allocation plan. However, the plan was not implemented. A succession of transitional schemes that benefited existing channels were applied at national level, with the result that, even though it had a licence, the applicant company was unable to broadcast until June 2009 as it had not been allocated any frequencies. 10.  The applicant company, through its statutory representative, made a number of applications to the administrative courts. 11.  In November 1999 the applicant company served formal notice on the Ministry to allocate frequencies to it. In a note of 22 December 1999, the Ministry refused its request. 12.  In 2000 the applicant company lodged an application with the Lazio Regional Administrative Court against the Ministry and RTI (a network of Italian television channels controlled by the Mediaset group), complaining that the authorities had not allocated it any broadcasting frequencies. The application was also directed against RTI because the Retequattro channel had been authorised to broadcast on frequencies that should have been transferred to the applicant company. 13.  On 16 September 2004 the Regional Administrative Court found in favour of the applicant company, holding that the authorities were required either to allocate the frequencies or to revoke the licence. Accordingly, it declared the note of 22 December 1999 void. 14.  RTI appealed to the Consiglio di Stato. In judgment no. 2624 of 31 May 2008, the Consiglio di Stato dismissed the appeal and upheld the Regional Administrative Court’s judgment. It noted that no deadline had been set in the licence for the authorities to adopt the adjustment programme drawn up by AGCOM in conjunction with the Ministry, but that the applicant company had been given twenty-four months to make improvements to its installations. Accordingly, the Consiglio di Stato found that the adjustment programme should have been approved promptly.\nThe Consiglio di Stato added that the Ministry had to give a decision on the applicant company’s request to be allocated frequencies, in accordance with a judgment delivered in the meantime by the European Court of Justice (ECJ – see paragraphs 33-36 below). 15.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant company, because it had still not obtained the frequencies, brought proceedings against the Ministry in the Consiglio di Stato, complaining that the judgment of 31 May 2008 had not been executed. 16.  On 11 December 2008 the Ministry extended the validity of the licence granted in 1999 until the analogue switch-off date and allocated Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. a single channel with effect from 30 June 2009. 17.  The Consiglio di Stato consequently held in judgment no. 243/09 of 20 January 2009 that the Ministry had properly executed its judgment of 31 May 2008. 18.  On 18 February 2009 the applicant company brought a further application in the Regional Administrative Court, arguing that the decree of 11 December 2008 by which the frequencies had been allocated was insufficient in that, contrary to the terms of the licence, it concerned a single channel that did not cover 80% of national territory. In its application the company sought the annulment of the decree and an award of damages. 19.  On 9 February 2010 the applicant company signed an agreement with the Ministry of Economic Development (the former Ministry of Communications), which undertook to assign to it additional frequencies in accordance with the terms of the licence. 20.  On 11 February 2010, pursuant to one of the clauses of that agreement, the applicant company asked for the proceedings pending before the Regional Administrative Court to be struck out. 21.  On 8 March 2011 the applicant company applied to the Regional Administrative Court to restore the case to its list. It sought the annulment of the decree of 11 December 2008 by which the frequencies had been allocated, and an award of damages. It argued that the administrative authorities had not complied fully with their obligation to allocate additional frequencies and had failed to observe the agreement of 9 February 2010 and the decision of 11 December 2008. 22.  Paragraph 6 of the agreement in question stated:\n“Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. undertakes to request, by 11 February 2010, the striking out of application no. 1313/09 pending before the Lazio Regional Administrative Court, to allow it to lapse for failure to submit a fresh application to schedule a hearing within the statutory time-limit and, by the same date, to waive the claims for compensation brought in that application, provided that, by the date on which the case lapses, this agreement, the decision allocating the additional frequencies and the decision of 11 December 2008 have not in the meantime become invalid.\nThe Administration, for its part, undertakes to comply fully with its obligation to allocate additional frequencies, and with this agreement and the decision of 11 December 2008. Should it fail to do so, Centro Europa 7 and the opposing authorities shall regain full possession of their respective procedural prerogatives. In the event that the assignment of the additional frequencies becomes invalid, it is specified that Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. may reactivate application no. 1313/09 only if it would be impossible in this situation for Europa Way S.r.l. to operate one or more of the installations mentioned in Technical Attachment A.” 23.  The proceedings are currently pending before the Regional Administrative Court. 24.  In the meantime, on 27 November 2003, while its initial application was still pending before the Regional Administrative Court, the applicant company had lodged a further application with the same court, seeking in particular an acknowledgment of its entitlement to have the frequencies allocated and compensation for the damage sustained. 25.  In a judgment of 16 September 2004, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the application, holding in particular that the applicant company had only a legitimate interest (interesse legittimo), that is, an individual position indirectly protected as far as was consistent with the public interest, and not a personal right (diritto soggettivo) to be allocated frequencies for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting. 26.  The applicant company appealed to the Consiglio di Stato, arguing that, since it had been granted a licence by the appropriate authorities, it did in fact have a personal right. In particular, it contended that Legislative Decree no. 352/2003 and Law no. 112/2004 did not comply with Community legislation (see paragraphs 65-67 below). 27.  On 19 April 2005 the Consiglio di Stato decided to restrict its examination to the applicant company’s claim for damages and not to rule at that stage on the request for allocation of frequencies. 28.  It nevertheless observed that the failure to allocate frequencies to Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. had been due to essentially legislative factors. 29.  It noted that section 3(2) of Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraph 58 below) enabled the “de facto occupants” of radio frequencies authorised to operate under the previous system to continue broadcasting until new licences were awarded or applications for new licences were rejected, and in any event not after 30 April 1998. 30.  It further noted that section 3(7) of Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraph 61 below) authorised the continuation of such broadcasts by entrusting AGCOM with the task of setting a deadline, on the sole condition that programmes were to be broadcast simultaneously on terrestrial frequencies and by satellite or cable. It pointed out that, in the event of failure by AGCOM to set a deadline, the Constitutional Court had set 31 December 2003 as the date by which programmes broadcast by the “over-quota channels” (that is, existing national television channels exceeding the concentration restrictions imposed by section 2(6) of Law no. 249/1997) were to be broadcast by satellite or cable only, with the result that the frequencies to be allocated to licence holders such as the applicant company would have been freed up. The Consiglio di Stato observed, however, that the deadline had not been complied with following the intervention of the national legislature: section 1 of Legislative Decree no. 352/2003, which had subsequently become Law no. 43/2004 (see paragraph 65 below), had prolonged the activities of the over-quota channels pending the completion of an AGCOM investigation into the development of digital television channels. It added that section 23(5) of Law no. 112/2004 (see paragraph 67 below) had subsequently, by a general authorisation mechanism, extended the possibility for over-quota channels to continue broadcasting on terrestrial frequencies until the national frequency-allocation plan for digital television was implemented, with the result that those channels had not been required to free up the frequencies intended for allocation to licence holders, such as the applicant company. 31.  Law no. 112/2004 had therefore had the effect, according to the Consiglio di Stato, of blocking the frequencies intended for allocation to holders of analogue licences and of preventing new operators from participating in digital television trials. 32.  That being so, the Consiglio di Stato decided to stay the proceedings and requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions, in the EC Treaty, on freedom to provide services and competition, Directive 2002/21/EC (“the Framework Directive”), Directive 2002/20/EC (“the Authorisation Directive”), Directive 2002/77/EC (“the Competition Directive”) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in so far as Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union referred to it. 33.  On 31 January 2008 the ECJ gave judgment. It declared two questions inadmissible, holding that it did not have sufficient information to give a ruling on them. 34.  With regard to the question concerning Article 10 of the Convention, the ECJ concluded as follows:\n“By its first question, the national court asks the Court, essentially, to state whether the provisions of Article 10 of the [Convention], in so far as Article 6 EU refers thereto, preclude, in television-broadcasting matters, national legislation the application of which makes it impossible for an operator holding rights, such as Centro Europa 7, to broadcast without the grant of broadcasting radio frequencies.\n...\nBy those questions, the national court is thus seeking to determine whether there are infringements of Community law for the purpose of ruling on an application for compensation for the losses flowing from such infringements.\n... Article 49 EC and, from the date on which they became applicable, Article 9 § 1 of the Framework Directive, Article 5 § 1, the second sub-paragraph of Article 5 § 2 and Article 7 § 3 of the Authorisation Directive and Article 4 of the Competition Directive must be interpreted as precluding, in television-broadcasting matters, national legislation the application of which makes it impossible for an operator holding rights to broadcast in the absence of broadcasting radio frequencies granted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.\nThat answer, by itself, thus enables the national court to rule on the application made by Centro Europa 7 for compensation for the losses suffered.\nConsequently, regard being had to the Court’s answer to the second, fourth and fifth questions, it is not necessary to rule on the first and third questions.” 35.  As to the merits, the ECJ observed that the existing channels had been authorised to pursue their broadcasting activities as a result of a series of measures by the national legislature, to the detriment of new broadcasters which nevertheless held licences for terrestrial television broadcasting. It noted that these measures had entailed the successive application of transitional arrangements structured in favour of the incumbent networks, and that this had had the effect of preventing operators without broadcasting frequencies, such as the applicant company, from accessing the television-broadcasting market even though they had a licence (granted, in the applicant company’s case, in 1999). The ECJ held:\n“... Law no. 112/2004 ... does not merely allocate to the incumbent operators a priority right to obtain radio frequencies, but reserves them that right exclusively, without restricting in time the privileged position assigned to those operators and without providing for any obligation to relinquish the radio frequencies in breach of the threshold after the transfer to digital television broadcasting.” 36.  The ECJ added that the application of the transitional schemes was not in accordance with the new common regulatory framework (NCRF), which implemented provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular those on freedom to provide services in the area of electronic communications networks and services. It observed in that connection that several provisions of the NCRF stated that the allocation and assignment of frequencies had to be based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria. In the ECJ’s view, such criteria had not been applied in the present case, since the status of the existing channels had not been amended under the transitional schemes and they had continued their broadcasting activities to the detriment of operators such as the applicant company, which, because it had not been allocated any broadcasting frequencies, had been unable to exercise its rights and make use of its licence.\nThe ECJ therefore reached the following conclusions:\n“... it must be stated that, in the area of television broadcasting, freedom to provide services, as enshrined in Article 49 EC and implemented in this area by the NCRF, requires not only the grant of broadcasting authorisations, but also the grant of broadcasting radio frequencies.\nAn operator cannot exercise effectively the rights which it derives from Community law in terms of access to the television-broadcasting market without broadcasting radio frequencies.\n...\nArticle 49 EC and, from the date on which they became applicable, Article 9 § 1 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), Article 5 § 1, the second subparagraph of Article 5 § 2 and Article 7 § 3 of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive), and Article 4 of Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services must be interpreted as precluding, in television-broadcasting matters, national legislation the application of which makes it impossible for an operator holding rights to broadcast in the absence of broadcasting radio frequencies granted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.” 37.  In decision no. 2622/08 of 31 May 2008, the Consiglio di Stato concluded that it could not allocate frequencies in the government’s place or compel the government to do so. It ordered the government to deal with the applicant company’s request for frequencies in a manner consistent with the criteria laid down by the ECJ. It made the following observations in particular:\n“The adoption by the authorities of a specific measure relates more to issues of performance and implementation than to damages: in cases involving an unlawful refusal to take an administrative measure that has been requested, the adoption of the measure does not amount to compensation, but rather to the performance of an obligation incumbent upon the authorities, unless the private party concerned has sustained any damage.” 38.  With regard to the request for the allocation of frequencies, the Consiglio di Stato observed:\n“Where legitimate interests are at stake, however, it is not possible to envisage a specific means of redress because inaction, a delay or an unlawful refusal will always have an impact on a situation that was or remains unsatisfactory, with the result that there is nothing to restore; the issue in relation to such interests concerns the practical implementation of any ruling setting aside the measure complained of.\n...\nApplying these principles to the present case, the Consiglio finds that the appellant’s request for an order requiring the authorities to allocate the network or frequencies is inadmissible.” 39.  The Consiglio di Stato deferred until 16 December 2008 its final decision on the payment of compensation to the applicant company, holding that it was necessary to wait for the relevant regulations to be passed by the government before assessing the amount. 40.  The Consiglio di Stato requested both parties to comply with the following requirements by 16 December 2008. The Ministry was, firstly, to specify what frequencies had been available following the public tendering procedures in 1999 and why they had not been allocated to the applicant company and, secondly, to justify its assertion that the licence granted to the applicant company had expired in 2005. 41.  The applicant company, for its part, was asked by the Consiglio di Stato to submit a report on its activities between 1999 and 2008, and also to explain why it had not taken part in the 2007 public tendering procedure for the allocation of frequencies. 42.  The Consiglio di Stato also asked AGCOM to explain why the national frequency-allocation plan for terrestrial television broadcasting had never been implemented. Lastly, it dismissed the applicant company’s request for the suspension of the provisional authorisation granted to a channel belonging to the Mediaset group (Retequattro) for the use of the frequencies. 43.  In its reply, AGCOM explained to the Consiglio di Stato that the national frequency-allocation plan had been implemented only on 13 November 2008. According to AGCOM, this delay was due to several factors. Firstly, the legal situation was complicated because it was difficult to identify the available broadcasting frequencies as a result of the court decisions in which the over-quota channels had been allowed to continue broadcasting. In addition, the transitional arrangements introduced by Law no. 66/2001 (see paragraphs 63-64 below), which had allowed the channels in question to continue broadcasting in analogue mode, had prevented the plan from being implemented on account of the incompatibility between the interests of the channels likely to be allowed to broadcast under the plan and the interests of the channels that were legally entitled to continue their existing operations. 44.  The applicant company submitted an expert valuation by the commercial bank Unipol assessing the damage sustained at 2,175,213,345.00 euros (EUR). The valuation was based on the profits achieved by Retequattro, the over-quota channel which should have relinquished the frequencies allocated to the applicant company. 45.  In a judgment of 20 January 2009, the Consiglio di Stato, on the basis of Article 2043 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 69 below), ordered the Ministry to pay the applicant company the sum of EUR 1,041,418 in compensation. It observed that, over a period of ten years, the Ministry had acted negligently by having granted Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. a licence without assigning it any broadcasting frequencies. 46.  The Consiglio di Stato found that there was a causal link between the conduct of the administrative authorities and the damage alleged, and that the award of the licence to Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. had not conferred on it the immediate right to pursue the corresponding economic activity; accordingly, the compensation should be calculated on the basis of the legitimate expectation of being allocated the frequencies by the appropriate authorities. 47.  In the opinion of the Consiglio di Stato, the fact that the frequencies had not been allocated until 11 December 2008 was attributable to the authorities. Damage had thus been sustained as a result of an unlawful act for which the authorities incurred non-contractual liability, concerning both the breach of legitimate expectations and the delay in allocating the frequencies. The fact that the authorities had launched a public tendering procedure for the frequencies in 1999, although the situation in the broadcasting sector had not been clarified and there were outstanding technical issues, had been “risky”. The Consiglio di Stato considered that the question of redress for the damage sustained by the applicant company should take this context into account. The authorities’ conduct had not been characterised by “significant gravity” (notevole gravità) and the unlawful act was thus attributable to “negligent” and not intentional conduct on their part. 48.  The Consiglio di Stato added that the pecuniary damage should be assessed with effect from 1 January 2004, since the Constitutional Court had ruled that the “transition period” after which legislation would have to be passed to allow licence holders to start broadcasting had expired on 31 December 2003 (see paragraph 62 below). As to the criteria for determining the damages to be awarded, the Consiglio di Stato pointed out that, as regards the losses sustained, the applicant company had been fully aware, at the time of the call for tenders, of the circumstances of the case and the conditions to which the licence was subject. Furthermore, the sequence of events that had prevented the frequencies from being allocated had been largely foreseeable. Accordingly, the applicant company should have known that it was unlikely to obtain the frequencies, at least in the short term. In addition, it could have purchased the frequencies under section 1 of Law no. 66/2001 (see paragraph 64 below).\nHaving regard to the above considerations, the Consiglio di Stato, without ordering an expert valuation, decided to award the applicant company EUR 391,418 for the losses sustained. As regards loss of earnings, it found that, from 1 January 2004, the applicant company could have achieved profits but had been unable to do so because of the delay in allocating the frequencies; the amount could be assessed at EUR 650,000. It refused to take into account the expert valuation submitted by the applicant company and held that it was unlikely that the company would have purchased shares in the market, even in the event that the over-quota channels had relinquished the frequencies. In the Consiglio di Stato’s view, the comparison between the applicant company and the two leading operators (Mediaset and RAI) was unjustified, especially as it did not take into account the other nationwide operator (La 7), which, although it had greater economic power than the applicant company, was nevertheless operating at a loss.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Novosibirsk. She receives an old-age pension. 5.  On 1 February 1998 the Law on Calculation and Adjustment of State Pensions (hereafter “the Pensions Act”) introduced a new method of calculation of retirement benefits based on what is known as the “individual pensioner coefficient” (“the IPC”). The IPC was the ratio between an individual's wages at the time of retirement and the national average wage. The IPC was meant to maintain a link between pensions and previous earnings. 6.  The applicant considered that the Zayeltsovskiy District Division of the Pension Fund (hereafter “the Fund”) had incorrectly calculated her pension and in March 1999 she sued the Fund for an increase of her pension in accordance with the Pensions Act. 7.  On 22 November 1999 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court of Novosibirsk found in the applicant's favour. The District Court held that the Fund had misconstrued the law and that the applicant's pensions should be recalculated and increased in line with an IPC of 0.7 starting from 1 February 1998. The District Court also awarded the applicant 3,004.08 Russian roubles (RUR) in pension arrears. On 25 January 2000 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment. 8.  On 21 August 2000 the Fund requested the Zayeltsovskiy District Court to reopen the case owing to a newly-discovered circumstance. The Fund claimed that on 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development had issued an Instruction on the Application of Limitations established by the Pensions Act. The Instruction clarified how the Pensions Act should be applied. The Fund further indicated that on 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had dismissed the complaint by a group of individuals challenging the Instruction. The Supreme Court found that the Ministry of Labour had acted within its competence when it had issued the Instruction, and that the Ministry's interpretation of the Pensions Act had been correct. The Fund contended that since it had been unaware of the Supreme Court's decision of 24 April 2000 at the time of the judgment of 22 November 1999, the judgment would have to be reconsidered. 9.  On 31 January 2001 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court granted the Fund's request, quashed the judgment of 22 November 1999 and reopened the proceedings. The District Court applied Article 333 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure according to which judgments could be reconsidered in the event of discovery of significant circumstances which were not, and could not have been, known to the party concerned. The District Court found that the Instruction could serve as such a circumstance. The decision of 31 January 2001 was final and not amenable to appeal. 10.  On 12 February 2001 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court, after the fresh examination of the case, dismissed the applicant's action in full. On 5 April 2001 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  The applicant owns a plot of land with a surface area of 2,183 square metres, located in the municipality of Milanówek, near Warsaw. It is listed in the local land register under entry No. 29735. 7.  On 20 March 1993 the applicant and his neighbours lodged their objections to a proposed new land development plan to be adopted by the municipality. 8.  On 30 March 1993 the municipal council of Milanówek adopted the local land development plan. The applicant's objections were not taken into consideration. Under the plan, the applicant's land was designated for agricultural purposes. A road and a hospital were to be constructed on his land after expropriation. 9.  The applicant and his neighbours complained of this decision to the Mazowsze Governor, arguing inter alia that the plan breached their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. They submitted that the local land development plan had been prepared in a manner which failed to take properly into consideration and reconcile the various interests of the municipality and the local owners. As a result, the plan was unreasonable and did not comply with the standards of good land administration. 10.  They transferred the complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court, after being informed that it alone was competent to examine the matter. 11.  By a judgment of 25 September 1995, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the complaint, considering that there were no indications that the municipal authorities had failed to take into consideration and properly weigh the various competing interests involved in the preparation of the local land development plan. It noted that the restrictions on ownership imposed by land development measures were not per se incompatible with the nature of ownership guaranteed by the Civil Code. 12.  In 1997 the applicant and 36 other inhabitants of Milanówek requested the Mayor to amend the 1993 plan in order to avoid the loss of various investments they had made in their land after the implementation of the plan's projects. This request apparently remained unanswered. 13.  In a letter of 4 April 2000 the Municipal Office, in reply to a query submitted by the applicant and other persons, stated that the municipal authorities were under no obligation to provide any compensation for owners whose property was to be expropriated in the future. They were also informed that the validity of the 1993 plan had been prolonged for a further two years under the amendment to the Local Planning Act 1994 adopted in 1999. 14.  On 7 July 2001 the Mayor of Milanówek refused the applicant's request for an initial approval of a development project on his land (decyzja o warunkach zabudowy), considering that the project would be incompatible with the local land development plan. The applicant wished to have a house built on his land while, under the plan, it was designated for the construction of a road and a hospital. 15.  The applicant appealed against this decision to the Mazowiecki Governor. In a reply of 19 July 2001, he was informed that the appeal should be lodged with the Local Government Board of Appeal and that the construction of the road in Milanówek would not be budgeted before 2010 at the earliest. The applicant addressed the Appeal Board. 16.  On 21 November 2001 the Local Government Board of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal on the ground that his construction project was incompatible with the land development plan. It was further reiterated that, under the Local Planning Act 1994, he had no right to compensation for the fact that his land had been “frozen” or for the restrictions on its use. 17.  On 1 October 2001 the Municipal Office informed the applicant that the plan had been amended in that the construction of the hospital was no longer foreseen. However, the project to build a road remained valid, but no timeframe was specified. 18.  On 11 March 2002 the applicant requested the Municipality to acquire his property. The Municipal Office refused to do so by a letter of 9 May 2002. 19.  On 17 June 2002 the applicant complained to the Municipal Office that the decisions it had given in respect of the land development in his neighbourhood were incompatible with the land development plan adopted in 1993. 20.  By a letter of 2 July 2002, the Office informed the applicant that, under domestic law, the owners of property to be expropriated in the future had no right to compensation for the fact that their land could not be developed. They would be entitled to compensation only after the final expropriation decisions in respect of their property had been taken. 21.  On the same day the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal against the decision of 19 December 2000. The court observed that its jurisdiction was limited to the examination of the lawfulness of the impugned decision. It found that the decision was lawful as it was common ground between the parties that the applicant's construction project was incompatible with the local land development plan.\nIt further noted that the applicant had complained that his situation could not be seen as being compatible with the Constitution, given that owners affected by plans adopted prior to the Constitution's entry into force could not benefit from compensation claims provided for by section 36 of the Local Planning Act 1994. The court referred to the judgment of the Constitutional Court given in 1995 (see paragraph 36 below), which had examined the compatibility with the Constitution of section 68 § 1 of the 1994 Act. That provision had excluded the application of the owners' right to compensation under section 36 to land development plans adopted before 31 December 1994. It had found the provision to be compatible with the Constitution.\nThe Supreme Administrative Court observed that it was not its task to amend or criticise existing laws and that it was bound by this provision. Otherwise, there were no grounds on which to consider that the decision challenged by the applicant had been unlawful. 22.  In the meantime, in January 2002 the applicant petitioned the Ombudsman. 23.  On 20 February 2002 the Ombudsman informed him that the legal framework for “frozen land” was governed by the Local Planning Act 1994. Under section 36 of this Act, owners of such plots were entitled to various forms of compensation, but only insofar as their plots were affected by land development plans adopted after 1 January 1995. 24.  On 31 December 2002 the validity of the 1993 land development plan expired. 25.  On 25 August 2003 the applicant was granted an initial planning permit (decyzja o warunkach zabudowy) in respect of his land.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant, Mrs Valentina Nikolaeva Bevacqua, is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1974 and at the relevant time lived in Sofia. In 2003 or 2004 she moved to Italy. The application is submitted by the first applicant on her own behalf and also on behalf of her son S. (“the second applicant”), a minor, who was born in 1997. 6.  The first applicant married Mr N. in 1995 and gave birth to S. in January 1997. 7.  Later, the relations between the spouses soured, Mr N. became aggressive and on 1 March 2000 the first applicant left the family home with her son and moved into her parents’ apartment. On the same day the first applicant filed for divorce and sought an interim custody order, stating, inter alia, that Mr N. often used offensive language, battered her “without any reason” and did not contribute to the household budget. 8.  On 7 March 2000 a judge at the Sofia District Court examined the case file and fixed the date of the first hearing for 11 April 2000, without examining the request for an interim order. 9.  During the first two months following the separation, Mr N. visited his son every day and took him to his apartment on weekends, with the first applicant’s consent. 10.  On 11 April 2000 the District Court could not proceed with the examination of the divorce case as Mr N. had been taken ill and did not appear. 11.  On 6 May 2000 Mr N. did not bring S. home after a walk. He telephoned the first applicant and told her that his son would live with him. For the next six days he refused the first applicant’s requests for meetings or telephone conversations with her son. 12.  On 9 May 2000 the first applicant complained to the prosecuting authorities. The relevant prosecutor apparently gave instructions that Mr N. should be summoned and served with an official warning. That was not done until 22 June 2000. 13.  On 12 May 2000 the first applicant went to see her son at the kindergarten and took him to her home. In the evening Mr N. telephoned and then appeared outside the first applicant’s home. He was shouting and banging on the door, thus frightening the child and the first applicant. Mr N. eventually managed to enter the apartment, when the first applicant’s father came home. He allegedly hit or pushed the first applicant in the presence of her parents and the child. At one point Mr N. seized his son, but the first applicant was trying to hold him. The child was screaming. Eventually, Mr N. left with the child. 14.  On 18 May 2000 the first applicant visited a forensic doctor who noted a small bruise on her face and a bruise on her hip.  On 25 May 2000 she filed a complaint with the District Prosecutor’s Office and enclosed the medical certificate. 15.  The first applicant also sought the help of a non-governmental organisation assisting female victims of domestic violence. She was offered the possibility to stay with her son in a hostel for such victims in Bourgas. On 25 May 2000 the first applicant collected her son from the kindergarten and travelled with him to Bourgas. She spent four days at the hostel there without disclosing her whereabouts to Mr N. 16.  Mr N. complained to the local Juveniles Pedagogic Unit (see paragraph 43 below), stating that the first applicant had abducted their son. The first applicant was summoned by the police. On 31 May 2000 she returned to Sofia and met the district juveniles inspector. She explained that she had been the victim of violence and that her son’s health was in danger because of the father’s violent behaviour. It appears that the inspector disbelieved the first applicant’s version of the events and allegedly insisted that she could be prosecuted for having abducted her son. 17.  On the same day in the evening Mr N. visited the first applicant in her home, allegedly threatened her and took their son away. 18.  On the following day, 1 June 2000, the juveniles inspector organised a meeting between the first applicant, her former husband and the child. According to the first applicant, the meeting lasted four hours. The child was asked whether he preferred to be with his mother or with his father. The meeting resulted in an oral agreement between the parents, according to which the child would live with his father for a month and then with his mother for another month. As a result of this agreement Mr N. withdrew his complaint for abduction. 19.  According to the first applicant, the agreement was only implemented for a very limited period. 20.  In the following days Mr N. allowed contacts between the first applicant and her son. On an unspecified date the child was ill and the first applicant took care of him in Mr N.’s apartment. 21.  On 13 June 2000 the first applicant appeared before the District Court for a hearing in the divorce proceedings. She was not legally represented. Mr N. did not appear. His lawyer was present. The first applicant stated that she wished to pursue her claims. The court did not examine the request for an interim order. The first applicant did not raise the issue. The court fixed a time-limit for reconciliation, as required by law, and adjourned the examination of the case until 29 September 2000. 22.  On 22 June 2000 the police summoned Mr N. and gave him an official warning in relation to the first applicant’s complaint of 9 May 2000 (see paragraph 12 above). As a result Mr N. allegedly became aggressive. On 28 June 2000, when he brought S. for a visit to his mother’s apartment, Mr N. reacted angrily to remarks by the first applicant and hit her in their son’s presence. On the next day the first applicant visited a medical doctor who noted a bruise on her left eyelid and a swollen cheek. She also reported pain in her right wrist. 23.  On 3 and 6 July 2000 the first applicant complained to the juveniles inspector at the local police station but was told that nothing could be done and that the dispute should be decided by the courts. 24.  In July and August 2000 the first applicant complained to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that they should assist her to obtain the custody of her child and that measures should be taken to protect her son, who was in danger because Mr N. was not taking care of him properly and was aggressive towards her. The first applicant complained that nothing had been done in this respect by the police. In August 2000 she received replies stating that the matter had been examined and that no unlawful conduct on the part of police officers had been noted. The police had done what they could and the remaining issues concerned a private dispute. 25.  On 11 September 2000 the first applicant filed written submissions with the District Court reiterating her request for an interim order. She informed the court about the relevant events since 6 May 2000 and referred to her complaints to the prosecuting authorities. She also stated that her son had been living in conditions which endangered his development. The first applicant sought leave to have two witnesses examined in this respect. 26.  On 12 September 2000 the judge examined the applicant’s submissions in private and decided that the request for an interim order should be dealt with on 12 October 2000, not at the hearing fixed for 26 September 2000. 27.  On 26 September 2000 the District Court held a hearing in the divorce proceedings. It noted the failure of the parties to reconcile and fixed a hearing on the merits for 14 November 2000. 28.  On 12 October 2000 the District Court held a hearing on the issue of interim measures. Mr N. requested that the files of the prosecutors and the police who had examined the first applicant’s complaints be admitted in evidence. He stated that those authorities had heard impartial witnesses – several neighbours – and had convincingly established that the first applicant’s allegations about physical violence were unfounded. The first applicant’s lawyer objected, stating that the files could be relevant to the merits of the divorce proceedings but should not be examined in the interim measures procedure. The court decided to adjourn the hearing until 14 November 2000 in order to allow the production of the prosecutors’ files. 29.  On 14 November 2000 the District Court dealt with the request for an interim order. It heard one witness for each party. The first applicant’s father, who was heard as a witness, confirmed that Mr N. had been aggressive on two occasions and that quarrels often erupted between the child’s parents. A relative of Mr N. testified that he took good care of the child. The first applicant also presented a written opinion by a psycho-therapist working for the non-governmental organisation whose help she had solicited. The therapist described the first applicant’s visits to the centre for victims of domestic violence and stated that in her opinion the first applicant had suffered a strong emotional upset as a result of the behaviour of Mr N. and the authorities’ passive attitude. Mr N. disputed the statements contained in the written opinion. The court decided that that was tantamount to contesting the authenticity of a document and invited the parties to adduce evidence in this respect. Having regard to the need to give the parties time to adduce such evidence and noting that the prosecutors’ files concerning the applicants’ complaints had not been transmitted to it, the District Court adjourned the matter until 12 December 2000. The hearing listed for 12 December 2000 was later adjourned on unspecified grounds. 30.  The next hearing was held on 13 February 2001. In relation to the proceedings concerning the authenticity of the psycho-therapist’s written opinion, the first applicant’s lawyer presented documents demonstrating that the non-governmental organisation for which the therapist worked had been registered in 1997. Mr N.’s lawyer stated that in accordance with legislation in force since 1 January 2001 non-governmental organisations needed re-registration. On that basis he objected to the admission in evidence of the written opinion of the psycho-therapist. The court interpreted that objection as a challenge to the authenticity of the registration documents and invited the parties to adduce evidence in that respect. 31.  At that point, the first applicant withdrew her request and asked the court to rule on the merits of the divorce claims, including the child custody claim. Thereupon, the court terminated the interim measures proceedings. It then heard two witnesses. A neighbour testified that she had heard the spouses quarrelling often in the past and had seen bruises on the first applicant’s body. The latter had complained that Mr N. battered her. A colleague of Mr N. testified that he had never seen him being aggressive. The court also admitted in evidence the prosecutors’ files concerning the first applicant’s complaints submitted in 2000. As the parties sought leave to examine other witnesses, the court adjourned the hearing until 24 April 2001. 32.  From the summer of 2000 the first applicant could only see her son at his kindergarten as the visits to Mr N.’s home created tension. On 7 March 2001 she collected her son and brought him to her home. Mr N. complained to the prosecution authorities and the police and also wrote to the judge dealing with the divorce proceedings. As a result, on 19 March and 17 April 2001 the first applicant was summoned by the police and given official warnings. According to the first applicant, Mr N. also threatened her with physical violence but she kept the child. According to Mr N., on 11 March 2001 in the evening he was attacked by men hired by the first applicant, in her presence. 33.  The last hearing in the divorce proceedings was held on 24 April 2001. In accordance with the Child Protection Act (see paragraph 47 below), an expert of the newly created local Social Care Office gave an opinion after having studied the file and met the child. He reported that the child was afraid of his father as he had battered his mother and that the child preferred to live with his mother. 34.  By judgment of 23 May 2001 the District Court pronounced the divorce and found that both spouses had been responsible for the failure of their marriage. The court further considered that both parties had been good parents but that in view of the low age of the boy he needed his mother. Therefore, the first applicant obtained custody of her child and Mr N. was given visiting rights. 35.  Mr N. appealed, arguing that the allegations that he had been violent were untrue and that he had always cared better for his child. 36.  In the appeal proceedings the Sofia City Court held a hearing on 19 March 2002. It heard two witnesses who confirmed Mr N.’s aggressive behaviour. 37.  On 21 March 2002 the Sofia City Court upheld the lower court’s judgment but considered that there was ample evidence that Mr N. had been aggressive and had battered the first applicant during their marriage. Such behaviour was a bad example for a young boy to witness. The first applicant was therefore better suited to raise the child. 38.  On 18 June 2002 the first applicant visited Mr N.’s apartment, accompanied by two friends, to collect her belongings. Her former husband became aggressive and battered her. On the following day the first applicant visited a forensic doctor who noted bruises on her face, right arm and armpit and her left hip. She complained to the prosecution authorities, which by decisions of October and December 2002 and January 2003 refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr N., noting that it was open to the first applicant to bring private prosecution proceedings, as the alleged injuries fell into the category of light bodily injuries.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954. She lives in Gdańsk-Zaspa. 6.  By a judgment of 30 March 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against a second‑instance administrative decision by which she had been refused a monthly social assistance benefit. This judgment, with its written reasons, was served on the applicant on 28 April 2006. 7.  On an unspecified later date the applicant was granted, by a decision of an official of the court's registry, legal aid for the purposes of lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. 8.  By a further decision of a registry official given on 25 April 2006 the registry requested the local Bar Association to assign a legal-aid lawyer to the case. That order was complied with on 12 June 2006. 9.  On 19 June 2006 the Gdańsk Bar informed the court that Mr M. S. had been assigned to the case. Mr M.S. was so informed on 20 June 2006. 10.  On 21 June 2006 he examined the case file and found that the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal had expired on 28 May 2006. 11.  By a letter to the court dated 1 July 2006 the lawyer informed the court that he saw no legal grounds on which he could draft a cassation appeal. He presented a detailed legal analysis of the case and an explanation why he considered that legal grounds for a cassation appeal did not obtain. He further observed that in the circumstances of the case he could not, in any event, be required to prepare an appeal, having been served with the judgment after the time-limit for its submission had already expired.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7. The applicants were born in 1968 and 1967 respectively and live in Altenberge (Germany). 8. Mrs Haase is the mother of twelve children. While she was married to M. she gave birth to seven children, Matthias, born in 1985, Sascha, born in 1986, Ramona, born in 1987, Alexander, born in 1988, Timo, born in 1990,  and the twins Lisa-Marie and Nico, born in 1992. With her second husband, Mr Haase, she had five children. Anna-Karina was born in 1995, Sandra-Kristin in 1998, Maurice-Pascal in 2000 and Laura-Michelle on 11 December 2001. In December 2003 Mrs Haase gave birth to her last child. 9. In 1993 the relations between Mrs Haase and M. deteriorated. In April 1993 M. instituted divorce proceedings and requested to be afforded parental rights over the children. By a decision of 29 October 1993 the Münster District Court (Amtsgericht) granted parental rights over the three younger children, Timo, Lisa-Marie and Nico, to Mrs Haase and over the four older children to her first husband. The Münster Youth Office appealed against the decision, but withdrew the appeal in September 1994. In December 1993 Mrs Haase moved with the three children to live withher present husband. On 18 November 1994 the Münster District Court pronounced Mrs Haase's divorce from her first husband.  The applicants have been married since December 1994. 10.  In February 2001 Mrs Haase applied to the Münster Youth Office (Amt für Kinder, Jugendliche und Familien - KSD) for family aid. In order to be granted the aid, the applicants agreed to have their family situation assessed by a psychological expert. In May 2001 the Municipal Social Service instructed G. to draw up an expert report. The expert met Mrs Haase and three of her children on 26 September and 11, 15 17 and 22 October 2001 at the applicants' home. 11.  Being of the opinion that the questions put to the children by the expert were irrelevant for the purposes of family aid and having regard to the expert's objection to Mrs Haase attending the meetings with the children's teachers, the applicants refused to co–operate with the expert any longer. 12.  On 17 December 2001 the expert submitted his report to the Münster Youth Office. According to this report, the deficiencies in the children's care and home conditions risked jeopardising their development seriously. There was a damaging cycle of events in which the applicants were unreasonably harsh with their children on repeated occasions and had beaten them. The children needed to be in a secure long-term placement and any further contact between them and the applicants would have to be avoided. 13.  On the same day the Youth Office applied to the Münster District Court for an interim injunction (einstweilige Anordnung) withdrawing the applicants' parental rights over the seven children, namely their four children, Anna-Karina, Sandra-Christine, Maurice-Pascal and Laura-Michelle, and three of the children born during Mrs Haase's first marriage, namely Timo, Nico and Lisa-Marie. 14.  On that very day, i. e. on 17 December 2001, the Münster District Court, without hearing the parents or their children, issued the requested interim injunction. The applicants were ordered to hand over the children forthwith to the Münster Youth Office. The officer in charge of enforcing the decision was authorised to use force if necessary to collect the children. Relying notably on the findings of the expert report, the District Court found that the parents' inability to give the children satisfactory care and education and an abusive exercise of parental authority jeopardised the physical, mental and psychological well-being of all of the children to the extent that their separation from the applicants appeared to be the only possible solution to protect them. The District Court referred to the relevant provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 1666 and 1666a - see paragraphs 53 and 54 below). 15.  By a decision of 18 December 2001 the Münster District Court supplemented its decision of 17 December 2001, prohibiting all access between the applicants and their children and the three children of the first marriage, Timo, Nico and Lisa-Marie. The whereabouts of the children were not to be communicated to the applicants. The District Court further prohibited all access between the four other children of the first marriage and Mrs Haase. She was also forbidden to come nearer than 500 metres to the four other children's residence or their schools. The District Court considered that the expert opinion was sufficient evidence to show that the separation of the parents from their children was necessary for the protection of the children. It had further been shown that the parents would object and try by all means to exert pressure upon the children. In order to avoid stress to the children, these measures were necessary in their best interests. The parents were urged to recognise their own deficiencies in respect of the care and the physical and psychological well-being of the children and take into account the clearly expressed need of the children for a change in their situation. The parents were invited to accept - at least for the time being - the measures taken and to contribute as far as possible to a calming of the general situation. This was only possible if the parents accepted the existing circumstances. The approach of the Youth Office met in part the expressly stated wishes of the children. The District Court concluded that the momentarily inevitable measures were proportionate to the urgent needs and the objective interests of all of the children. 16.  The children were taken on the same day about noon from three different schools, a nursery and from home and were placed in three foster homes. The seven-day-old youngest daughter, Laura-Michelle, was taken from the hospital and since that time has lived with a foster family. 17.  In a letter of 18 December 2001 Dr W., a gynaecologist and head physician at the Johannesstift hospital in Münster, complained to the Münster District Court about the conduct of the authorities. He stated that, according to a telephone call of 17 December 2001, the six children of Mrs Haase as well as the newborn child in the hospital were to be removed from their mother without her knowledge. His patient was to be informed of the measure after her child had been taken from the nursery. Staff members were asked to take the child downstairs to the hospital's entrance and place it in a taxi.\nHe, as the head physician, and the medical hospital staff were surprised and shocked by the lack of warning and considered this conduct an affront to both Mrs Haase and the medical staff. Since 1992 Mrs Haase had been taken care of by the medical staff of the hospital. She had always given the impression of a being highly responsible person. She had come regularly to the preventive medical check-ups during her pregnancy. When she was accompanied by her children, the children behaved well, were friendly and well brought-up. There were no signs that they were in any way neglected or ill-treated. 18.  On 19 December 2001 the Youth Office informed the applicants that the children had been granted financial assistance in the sum of EUR 4,000 per month and that the parents had to contribute to these fees according to their financial means. 19.  On 19 December 2001 the applicants appealed against the District Court's decision of 17 December 2001. They submitted that it was difficult to understand that in the context of family aid an expert opinion on the parents' ability to bring up their children had been drawn up and that they had not been informed about this opinion. The contested decision was unexpected and had been given at a moment when Mrs Haase was in a critical state of health, having given birth to her daughter a week before. They proposed witnesses who would confirm that the children had not been ill-treated, but were being brought up with love and understanding. 20.  On 7 January 2002 the District Court held a hearing in the presence of the applicants assisted by a lawyer, Mrs Haase's first husband, representatives of the Münster Youth Office, a representative of a nursery and the expert G. The four witnesses of the applicants' own choosing were not heard and had to leave the courtroom.\nThe District Court instructed G. to proceed with the assessment of the remaining children and to finalise his report. It further appointed a new expert, H., to assess the applicants' capacity to bring up their children. 21.  In the following interviews to prepare the assessment, the applicants asked the expert make a tape-recording of the interviews. Upon the expert's refusal to do so, the applicants were unwilling to continue to co-operate with him. 22.  On 1 March 2002 the Hamm Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the applicants' appeal against the decision of 17 December 2001. It noted that the District Court had had regard to the report submitted by the Youth Office in connection with its request of 17 December 2001 to revoke the applicants' parental rights and to the expert opinion submitted by G. and that the District Court had considered that the impugned measure was justified. The expert had concluded that the basic needs of the children were not satisfied and that patterns of violence and permanent shortcomings of all kinds determined the children's day-to-day life. It was thus necessary to put an end to the risk to which the well-being of the children appeared to be exposed. A new expert opinion was to be expected by the middle of April 2002. The Court of Appeal found that the applicants' appeal could therefore be dismissed without holding a hearing. It was against the best interests of the children to take them out of the new environment in which they were building up new contacts, and to restore them to their former family, there being the risk that they would be taken to a new environment again shortly afterwards. 23.  On 8 March 2002 the applicants challenged the judge at the Münster District Court for bias. 24.  On 4 April 2002 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), sitting as a bench of three judges, dismissed the applicants' request for an interim injunction.\nThe Federal Constitutional Court found that the applicants' constitutional complaint was neither inadmissible nor manifestly ill-founded. There were doubts in particular whether the courts had breached the applicants' right to a fair hearing and their right to respect for their family life. However, if the requested interim injunction was issued and if later the constitutional complaint had to be dismissed, the children would have to be taken from the applicants again and placed somewhere else. Having regard to the fact that the expert opinion was to be drawn up by mid-April 2002, the applicants should await the outcome of the main proceedings rather than have the children run the risk of being separated from their parents again later. It had to be assumed that the competent courts would conduct the main proceedings speedily having regard to the time element in these matters. 25.  On 10 April 2002 the Münster District Court dismissed the challenge to the judge and on 11 April 2002 another to the expert G. 26.  On 19 April 2002 the Münster District Court appointed a lawyer of the Münster Bar as curator ad litem (Verfahrenspfleger) to represent the children in the proceedings. It instructed the already appointed experts to submit the results of their investigations obtained so far and discharged them from any further expert activity. It appointed a new expert, Professor K., with a view to determining whether separating the children from the family was the only way of eliminating all danger for them. 27.  On 11 June 2002 Professor K. interviewed the applicants at their home. The interview lasted for six hours. 28.  On 21 June 2002 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, set aside the decisions of the Hamm Court of Appeal of 1 March 2002 and the Münster District Court of 17 December 2001 and referred the case back to the Münster District Court. 29.  In so far as the applicants complained about the decisions of the Münster District Court of 18 December 2001 and 7 January 2002, the Federal Constitutional Court declared the constitutional complaint inadmissible, since the applicants had failed to appeal against these decisions in accordance with section 19 of the Act on Non-Contentious Proceedings (Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit - FGG). 30.  In so far as the constitutional complaint was admissible, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that, in accordance with the principles established in its case-law, the decisions of the Münster District Court and the Court of Appeal violated the applicants' family rights as guaranteed by Article 6 § 2, first sentence, of the basic Law, taken together with Article 6 § 3 (see “Relevant Domestic Law” below).\nThere were serious doubts whether the courts had respected the importance of parental rights when giving their decisions and whether they had sufficiently taken into account the principle of proportionality. The question whether the evidence established that there was a risk of harm to the children had not been adequately considered. The District Court and the Court of Appeal had merely referred to the report of the Youth Office and the expert opinion. It did not appear from their decisions whether the expert's conclusions were based on reliable facts. An assessment of the applicants' submissions and considerations as to the possibility of ordering alternative measures, that would not have required the total revocation of parental rights, had not been made. Both the Court of Appeal and the District Court had failed to question the children or give the persons taking part in the proceedings the opportunity to be heard.\nThe measures which had been ordered had led to a drastic change in the lives of all the persons concerned and constituted a particularly serious interference with parental rights. However, no inquiries had been made, even by telephone, before the decision was taken. No reasons were given justifying the urgency of the matter.\nThe Family Court had no information on the possible effects of its decision, since the Youth Office and the expert had not commented on this issue. When examining the advantages and disadvantages of a family measure it was, however, relevant to consider that a separation of the children from their parents could jeopardise the development of the children, in particular in their first years of life.\nThe courts had also failed to clarify the contradiction between the findings in the expert opinion according to which the applicants were not ready to co-operate and the fact that Mrs Haase herself had asked to be granted child-rearing guidance. Furthermore there was no indication whether and to what extent the applicants had refused any contact or help offered by the Youth Office and it was not clear which “specific measures granting assistance” (einzelne Jugendhilfemaßnahmen) had been carried out in the past and why they were not successful.\nThe District Court should have first clarified the questions which arose and in the meantime could have taken alternative provisional measures if there was serious reason to believe that the welfare of the children was at risk. 31.  According to the Federal Constitutional Court, it could not be excluded that, prior to the termination of the proceedings on the merits, which had to be dealt with as a priority, the District Court would issue another emergency decision. If so, the District Court was directed to examine carefully whether, in the light of the evidence obtained in the meantime, the continued separation of the children from the applicants was still justified and whether a repeated change of the children's place of residence would be in their best interests. If the District Court found that the present situation were to be maintained, it would have to consider whether the applicants should be granted a right of access, restricted or subject to conditions if necessary, and whether, in strict accordance with the principle of proportionality, the effects of such a decision should be limited in time. 32.  On 13 and 14 June 2002 four of the children, Timo, Nico, Anna-Karina and Lisa, were interviewed by the judge at the Münster District Court at the respective institutions where they were placed. 33.  According to the minutes of the District Court of 14 June 2002, Timo declared that he wished to return to his parents. He knew that there were certain reasons for placing him and his siblings in a different environment and confirmed that he had had too much work and strain at home. He sent his greetings to his brothers and sisters. 34.  Nico, Anna-Karina and Lisa were interviewed in another foster home. Nico stated that he wished to know whether his parents and his “favourite” father (Lieblingsvater) were all right. He asked why he could not join his “favourite” father and whether somebody, his parents, his father or Maurice, could not come to see him. Lisa and Anna were with him and, according to them, were all right. Lisa had let him know that she too wished to return home. He stated that he was fine. Asked about his dreams, he said that he wished to go to his “favourite” father who was very nice, better than his stepfather. In reply to the question whether the judge should leave a message, he dictated the following letter on a dictaphone: “Dear Sascha (his favourite brother), (his favourite sisters Lisa and Ramona), dear Alex, what a pity that we don't see each other ... Sascha, Matthias, Ramona, Alex, his favourite father and his parents should come and visit him.” (Lieber Sascha (sein Lieblingsbruder), (Lieblingsschwestern Lisa und Ramona) lieber Alex, schade, dass wir uns nicht sehen ... Sascha, Matthias, Ramona, Alex, sein Lieblingsvater und seine Eltern sollten ihn besuchen kommen.)\nThe following letter to his mother was recorded on a dictaphone: “Dear Mama, it is a pity that you do not come and best regards from Maurice and Sandra and Timo and Lisa. Lisa and Anna are all right. Yes and perhaps could you come to see us? Or is that not possible? “ (Liebe Mama! Schade, dass Du nicht kommst und liebe Grüsse von Maurice und Sandra und von Timo und von Anna und dass es Lisa und Anna gut geht. Ja und, vielleicht: könntet Ihr ja mal herkommen. Oder geht das nicht?) 35.  Anna-Karina stated that she felt fine. She was in the company of Lisa and Nico. Everybody said that she should tell her parents that everything was all right. She then added that she did not like it there. 36.  Lisa-Marie regretted that “poor Sandra” was all on her own without any member of the family. She would never bear this. She had to protect Nico and Anna. That was her duty as the elder sister. Nico was beaten very often in that place. She did not know the reason. In reply to a question, she stated that she was doing her homework thoroughly and that she was doing well in school. At home she had almost fallen asleep when doing her homework. When asked what message the judge could pass on, she said that she did not like the place and that she wished to return home. However, the staff did not believe her. She did not really like them. She did not want to go to another institution. She wished to go home. If she were not allowed to go home, she should at least be authorised to see everybody, her brothers and sisters, parents and stepfather. She missed taking Maurice to bed sometimes. Having been told that Nico wished to return to his “favourite” father, Lisa-Maria replied that, unlike Nico, she loved both her father and her stepfather. 37.  On 24 June 2002, as a consequence of the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court, the Münster District Court set down for hearing on 1 July 2002 the request of the Münster Youth Office of 17 December 2001 to provisionally revoke the parental rights of the applicants over the children. It transferred to the Youth Office the right to decide where the children should live (Aufenthaltsbestimmungsrecht). The District Court found that the best interests of the children did not require a modification of the present situation before a decision on the merits was given. The District Court considered that its decision of 18 December 2001 prohibiting the applicants all access to the children was still relevant, since it had not been set aside by the Federal Constitutional Court. 38.  On 1 July 2002 the Münster District Court held a hearing attended inter alia by the applicants assisted by a lawyer, Mrs Haase's first husband, the curator ad litem, a lawyer and representatives of the Münster Youth Office, the experts G. and Professor K. and the children's paediatrician Dr J. Professor K. gave details of her visit to the applicants' home on 11 January 2002 and resumed the content of the interview. Having studied the extensive files concerning the applicants and G.'s report, Professor K. could not confirm that the findings in the report were erroneous. She expressed the view that the children should not be returned to the applicants.\nThe children's paediatrician, Dr J., stated that all the children had been his patients since their birth except the daughter born in December 2001. Although he knew about the children's problems, in particular the difficulties with Nico, the applicants made a quite positive impression on him. It was a big family with many children. However, the applicants were loving parents who took great care of their children. There was no indication that the children had been beaten or otherwise abused.\nThe curator ad litem was opposed to contacts between the applicants and the children. 39.  By an interim injunction of the same day, namely 1 July 2002, the Münster District Court provisionally transferred the custody (Personensorge) over the children to the Münster Youth Office and confirmed its decision of 18 December 2001. The expert was instructed to add to her report. She was requested to comment in particular on whether, in the best interest of the children, it was necessary to maintain the access prohibition, whether the children should be granted access to the older children of the first marriage, Matthias, Sascha, Ramona and Alexander, and if appropriate, in what way such contact could be arranged while keeping the children's place of residence secret. 40.  The District Court relied in particular on the findings of the expert G. that the separation of the applicants from their children had to be maintained. The applicants were incapable of bringing up their children because of their own basic and irreparable educational deficiencies and their abuse of parental authority. The children were emotionally disturbed and presented unusual patterns of behaviour. They had been beaten and locked up. Furthermore the four older children of the first marriage had approved the separation of the younger children from their mother and had refused any contact with her. The sole reason why Mrs Haase was intent on giving a positive impression of herself was to obtain support from others. However, any such support was foredoomed.\nThe District Court noted that Professor K. had not yet submitted her report. However, she had confirmed the findings of the expert G. and had stated at the hearing of 1 July 2002 that there was no alternative to separating the children from the applicants. According to her, Mrs Haase had never been willing to call her own behaviour into question. She satisfied her own needs only and refused to accept child-rearing guidance with a view to reducing her own deficiencies. In fact, she had admitted not having undergone therapy in 1994. Professor K. had found that G.'s expert opinion could not be objected to.\nThe District Court considered that the numerous written statements of witnesses submitted by the applicants confirming that the children had not been beaten or ill-treated did not constitute sufficient evidence in their favour. Harm, such as verbal cruelty, could be of a psychological nature. The statement made by Lisa-Marie that she wished to return to the applicants did not reflect her real intention, but resulted from a conflict of loyalty.\nThe District Court further compared the situation described in an expert report drawn up in 1993 with the present situation: Mrs Haase was always well-dressed while her husband looked tired and worn out. It concluded that Mrs Haase was not aware of her problems. She aggravated with each new pregnancy the emotional deficiencies of the children. This had been confirmed by Professor K. after a discussion with the applicants on 11 June 2002.\nThe District Court affirmed that its decision of 17 December 2001 was based on its experience in cases where coercive measures had to be taken. Had the parents been warned of the requested measure, they would have offered resistance, as was shown by their own reaction and the excessive reaction of the media in the case. An enforcement of the court decisions with the intervention of the authorities and the police would have been contrary to the best interests of the children. 41.  On 16 July 2002 the applicants appealed against this decision to the Hamm Court of Appeal. 42.  On 20 August 2002 the applicants challenged Professor K. for bias. They complained that she had intentionally delayed the preparation of her expert report in order to separate the children from their parents for a longer period. She could not be relied upon to act in the best interests of the children. Without having seen them, she had recommended at the hearing before the District Court of 1 July 2002 that they be separated from the applicants. Her unfriendly conduct vis-à-vis the applicants, when interviewing them at their home on 11 June 2002, and the reference to files dating from Mrs Haase's divorce problems in 1993 confirmed the view that she was not impartial. 43.  On 18 September 2002 the applicants challenged the judge at the Münster District Court for bias. They referred to previous decisions given by that judge in favour of the Youth Office, allegedly in contrast to expert recommendations.\nOn 23 September 2002 the judge declined to stand down.\nOn 30 September 2002 the applicants' lawyer again challenged the judge at the District Court and Professor K. for bias.\nOn 7 October 2002 the Münster District Court dismissed the challenge to the judge on the ground that the applicants' allegations were unsubstantiated. 44.  On 10 December 2002 the Hamm Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeal against the Münster District Court's decision of 7 October 2002.\nOn 19 December 2002 the Münster District Court rejected the challenge for bias in respect of Professor K. 45.  On 13 January 2003 Professor K. submitted her report. She confirmed her previous findings. 46.  On 19 February 2003 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a bench of three judges, refused to entertain the applicants' constitutional appeal against the decisions of 10 December 2002 and 7 October 2002. 47.  On 18 February 2003 the Münster District Court held a hearing. The applicants, the Youth Office, the curator ad litem and the experts G. and K. were present. The curator ad litem declared that the children had adapted to the changed living conditions and appeared to be comfortable with the new situation. 48.  On 4 March 2003 three of the children living with their father, Matthias, Sascha and Alexander, were heard separately by the Münster District Court. They were opposed to seeing their mother. 49.  By a decision on the merits of 6 March 2003, the Münster District Court withdrew the applicants' parental rights over their four children and the three children of the first marriage previously living with them and prohibited access to them until June 2004. It relied on Articles 1666, 1666a and 1684 § 4 of the Civil Code (see paragraphs 53-55 below). The authorities were compelled to take the contested measures, which were justified under Article 6 § 3 of the Basic Law, and necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the health and the rights of the children within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. It found that the domestic situation was difficult and that the children were in danger. The applicants, in particular Mrs Haase, were inflexible and incapable of understanding the children's needs and with her it would be impossible to implement any educative measures. The conditions in which the children had been brought up were highly unsatisfactory. The children had made positive progress in the foster homes in which they had been placed, had gained in confidence and were less affected by behavioural disorders. 50.  By a separate decision of the same day the Münster District Court prohibited contact between Mrs Haase and her four eldest children, Matthias, Sascha, Ramona and Alexander before the end of 2004, or in the case of Mrs Haase's eldest son Matthias, before he attained his majority. 51.  The applicants appealed against the above decisions.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1968. She lives in Grozny. She is the sister of Shema (also spelt Sheima) Inderbiyeva, who was born in 1963, and Shamani Inderbiyeva, who was born in 1966. 7.  At some point in 1999 due to heavy hostilities between Russian forces and Chechen fighters the applicant moved to a refugee camp in Ingushetia. Two of her sisters, Shema Inderbiyeva and Shamani Inderbiyeva, and her mother Yakhita Inderbiyeva remained in their flat – no. 10 in the block of flats at 154B, Pugacheva Street in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny. Most of the other residents of the district left for safer areas, but the applicant’s relatives stayed to look after the family property. According to the applicant, Russian forces regained control over the Staropromyslovskiy District at the beginning of January 2000. 8.  In December 1999 the applicant’s mother and her sisters Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva moved from their flat to the basement under the pavilion situated in the courtyard of their block of flats. On 1 January 2000, owing to the intensity of a fire, Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva decided to hide in the basement of the applicant’s block of flats at no. 285 (in the documents submitted the address is also stated as no. 287) in Derzhavina Street in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny. Their mother, Yakhita, remained in the basement at 154B, Pugacheva Street as she was sick and could not walk.  The applicant’s sisters regularly visited their mother and brought her food. 9.  On 8 February 2000 (in the submitted documents the date was also referred to as 12 February 2000) the applicant, together with an acquaintance, Ms F.A., went to visit her relatives in Grozny. She did not find anybody in her family’s flat in Pugacheva Street and went to find out about her sisters and mother from the neighbours who lived in her block of flats in Derzhavina Street. In the basement of the house the applicant found her mother, who was in bed, in a state of shock and incoherent, and who kept saying: “Russian soldiers, smoke, fire”. 10.  Having spent the night with her mother in the basement, on the following day the applicant went to look for her sisters in Pugacheva Street. In the basement located in the courtyard of her family’s block of flats she found the two burnt corpses of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva. The applicant was able to identify her sisters by their personal belongings, pieces of hair, remaining facial features and teeth crowns. 11.  The applicant collected the remains in pillow cases and returned with them to Derzhavina Street, where she met Ms M.Z., an elderly ethnic Russian. The woman told her that on 10 January 2000 she and her husband had been walking next to the basement at 154B, Pugacheva Street when they had seen three servicemen looking into the basement under the pavilion. One of the servicemen, a senior one, had said to someone in the basement: “Mother, come out and let’s go to the military commander’s office for an identity check”. Then he had leaned over and pulled the applicant’s mother out. He had walked her away from the pavilion by hand whereas two other servicemen had remained next to the basement. Next, one of the two soldiers had thrown something inside. A powerful explosion followed as a result of which the pavilion had been partially destroyed and smoke had been coming out from the basement. The applicant’s mother had turned back and fainted; looking at her the soldiers had started laughing. Ms M.Z. and her husband had become scared and walked away. 12.  On 10 February 2000 the applicant and Ms F.A. went to the Staropromyslovskiy District military commander’s office to obtain permission to bury her sisters’ remains in the cemetery of the village of Valerik in the Urus-Martan District. After she explained to the servicemen that her sisters had been killed by Russian soldiers, the servicemen wanted to detain her and even opened gunfire to stop her, but she managed to run away. Then she saw a group of Chechens in military uniforms and asked them for help. The servicemen from the military commander’s office requested that the Chechens hand the applicant over to them, but they refused. Then the Chechen servicemen took her to the 36th District of Grozny (36-й участок); from there the applicant managed to get a lift to Valerik. 13.  On the same date, 10 February 2000, the applicant buried her sisters’ remains in the Valerik cemetery. After that, she returned to the refugee camp in Ingushetia. 14.  According to the applicant, her mother Yakhita, after witnessing the murder of her daughters Shema and Shamani by the soldiers, suffered a severe psychological breakdown and became mentally ill. 15.  In support of her statements, the applicant submitted her own statement dated 22 February 2010; a statement by Ms G.P. dated 29 January 2004; a statement by Mr S.Kh. dated 1 March 2010; a statement by Ms Z.T. dated 1 February 2004, a copy of the witness statement by the applicant’s mother Yakhita Inderbiyeva dated 5 July 2000 and copies of other documents received from the authorities. The applicant also enclosed a Human Rights Watch report “Civilian Murders in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny” of February 2000 and a sketched map of the district indicating the place where the bodies of her sisters had been discovered. The applicant also referred to the Court’s judgments Khashiyev and Akayeva v. Russia (nos. 57942/00 and 57945/00, 24 February 2005), Makhauri v. Russia (no. 58701/00, 4 October 2007), Tangiyeva v. Russia (no. 57935/00, 29 November 2007), Goncharuk v. Russia (no. 58643/00, 4 October 2007), and Goygova v. Russia (no. 74240/01, 4 October 2007), and the witness statements contained therein, stating that the events she complained of had been examined by the Court in those judgements and that they concerned the same events which had taken place in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny in January 2000. 16.  The Government did not challenge the matter as presented by the applicant. They stated that the circumstances of the events were still under criminal investigation and that unidentified persons had killed the applicant’s sisters. 17.  The death of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva was initially investigated as part of criminal case no. 12038 opened on 3 May 2000 by the Grozny Town Prosecutor’s Office (the town prosecutor’s office). The criminal investigation was initiated after the publication in the newspaper Novaya Gazeta on 27 April 2000 of an article entitled “Freedom or death” concerning the mass murder of civilians by servicemen of the 205th brigade on 19 January 2000 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 19 February 2000) in Grozny. 18.  On 5 and 17 July 2000 the applicant’s other sister Mobarik Inderbiyeva (in the documents submitted also spelt Moberik) and her mother Yakhita Inderbiyeva were questioned by the investigators. 19.  The applicant was neither kept informed of the progress in the investigation of criminal case no. 12038 nor granted victim status in the criminal case. 20.  On 2 July 2003 the Staropromyslovskiy District Prosecutor’s Office in Grozny (the district prosecutor’s office) opened criminal case no. 50080 in connection with the murder of the applicant’s sisters. 21.  On 6 December 2007 the applicant requested that the investigators allow her to access the investigation file. On 10 December 2007 her request was granted in part and she was able to obtain copies of a few basic procedural decisions. 22.  On 15 April 2008 the applicant complained to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny (the district court) that the investigation in criminal case no. 50080 was ineffective. She requested that the court order the district prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation and conduct it in a thorough and effective manner. 23.  On 19 May 2008 the district court rejected the applicant’s complaint stating that on 16 May 2008 the district prosecutor’s office had already resumed the investigation of the criminal case. 24.  According to the applicant, throughout the investigation the authorities failed to provide her with information on the progress of the criminal proceedings in case no. 50080. 25.  On 3 May 2000 the town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 12583 in connection with the publication of the article “Freedom or death” in Novaya Gazeta concerning the mass murder of civilians on 19 February 2000 by the 205th brigade of the Russian military forces in the Katayama (also spelt Katoyama) settlement in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny. 26.  On 17 June 2000 the investigators from the town prosecutor’s office questioned the applicant who stated that on 9 February 2000 she had returned to Grozny from Ingushetia and found out that her sisters Shema and Shamani had been killed by servicemen from military unit no. 3737. On the same date she had found her sisters’ bodies in the basement at no. 154B Pugacheva Street and had subsequently buried them at a cemetery in the Achkhoy‑Martan District. 27.  On the same date the investigators questioned the applicant’s sister Mobarik Inderbiyeva who stated that on 12 February 2000 the applicant had returned home with the remains of their sisters Shema and Shamani who had been blown up by military servicemen with a flamethrower on 10 January 2000 while they had been hiding in the basement. The witness further stated that she had been able to identify the remains of her sisters by their personal belongings, pieces of hair, remaining facial features and teeth crowns. The witness stressed that her sisters could have been killed only by Russian soldiers as the area in question had at the time been under the full control of the Russian military and it had been impossible for persons who had not belonged to the federal forces to access the premises without a special pass. 28. On 5 July 2000 the investigators questioned the applicant’s mother Yakhita Inderbiyeva who stated, amongst other things, that at some point in January 2000 the applicant had told her that she had found the burnt remains of her daughters Shema and Shamani in the basement next to the pavilion. 29.  On 27 July 2000 the investigators questioned Ms Ya.Z. whose statement concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of the applicant’s sisters the Government did not give to the Court. 30. On 11 June 2003 the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office forwarded part of criminal case file no. 12038 to the district prosecutor’s office to be severed into a separate criminal case. The relevant part of the file concerned the discovery by the applicant on 12 February 2000 of the burnt bodies of her sisters Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva. 31.  On 16 June 2003 the investigators in criminal case no. 12583 requested that the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment (the UGA) inform them which military units had participated in the military operation in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny in January and February 2000. 32.  On 25 June 2003 an investigator from the district prosecutor’s office initiated a preliminary inquiry into the discovery by the applicant of her sisters’ bodies. 33.  On 2 July 2003 the district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 50080 under Article 105 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (murder) in connection with the discovery on 12 February 2000 of the bodies of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva in the basement situated across the courtyard from the block of flats at no. 154B Pugacheva Street in Grozny. 34.  On 3 July 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene at no. 154B Pugacheva Street. Nothing was collected from the scene. 35.  On 29 July 2003 the investigators requested that the Staropromyslovskiy District Department of the Interior (the ROVD) identify any witnesses to the applicant’s sisters’ murder and that those witnesses be brought in for questioning. 36.  In reply to the above request, on 1 August 2003 the ROVD informed the investigators that the applicant’s mother and Ms Ya.Z. had been summoned for questioning. 37.  On 15 September 2003 the investigators again requested that the ROVD identify witnesses to the murder, bring the applicant, her mother, her sister Mobarik Inderbiyeva and Ms Ya.Z. for questioning and identify the place of the applicant’s sisters’ burial. 38.  On 17 September 2003 the ROVD reported to the investigators that it was impossible to establish other witnesses to the events, other than the applicant and Mobarik Inderbiyeva, as the buildings in the area had been destroyed as a result of the armed hostilities and residents who had resided there in 2000 had moved elsewhere. 39.  On 17 September 2003 the applicant provided the ROVD officers with a short statement concerning the circumstances surrounding the discovery of her sisters’ bodies and stated that her mother Yakhita Inderbiyeva had developed a mental illness as a result of her daughters’ murder. 40.  On 23 September 2003 the investigators again requested that the ROVD identify the witnesses to the events and bring them for questioning stating that the ROVD had provided them with superficial replies and failed to take meaningful steps to identify the witnesses. 41.  On 5 October 2003 the investigators granted the applicant victim status in criminal case no. 50080 and questioned her. The applicant stated that on 9 February 2000 she had gone from Ingushetia to visit her sisters and mother in Grozny. On 10 February 2000 she had gone to Pugacheva Street where she had met a woman who had told her that her mother had became mentally ill and was living in a basement situated in a former dentist’s office. The applicant had found her mother in an incoherent state. Then the applicant had met an elderly, ethnically Russian couple and the woman had told her about the circumstances of her sisters’ murder by servicemen from military unit no. 3737. According to the woman, the soldiers had conducted a ‘sweeping-up’ operation in the area; they had pulled Yakhita Inderbiyeva out from the basement and let her go, but they had killed her daughters Shema and Shamani who had remained in the basement, with a flamethrower. Then the applicant had gone to the basement, found the burnt bodies of her sisters and had taken the remains to the village of Valerik for burial. 42.  On 17 October 2003 the investigators ordered that the bodies of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva be exhumed. 43.  On 21 October 2003 the investigators examined the bodies. It was impossible to establish any traces of physical violence, other than burns, owing to the state of decomposition. 44.  On 22 October 2003 the investigators ordered forensic medical examinations of the remains of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva and requested that the experts determine the cause of their death, possible origins and the extent of the injuries, traces of gunshot wounds and their number. 45.  On 23 October 2003 the Chechnya Bureau of Forensic Expert Evaluations (the Bureau) reported to the investigators that the state of the bodies of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva, which must have been exposed to high temperatures, precluded them from obtaining the information necessary to reply to the investigators’ questions. 46.  On 2 November 2003 the investigation in criminal case no. 50080 was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 47.  On 3 April 2004 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 1 April 2004) the deputy Chechnya prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered the investigators to resume the proceedings and take a number of steps, such as identifying the servicemen from military unit no. 3737 who had participated in the military operation in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny in January 2000 and providing an explanation of the differences in the witness statements given by the applicant, her sister Mobarik Inderbiyeva and Ms Ya.Z. 48.  On 10 April 2004 the investigators again requested that the ROVD identify among the neighbourhood’s residents the witnesses to the applicant’s sisters’ murder. 49.  On 12 April 2004 the investigators again examined the crime scene; no evidence was collected. 50.  On various dates in April 2004 the investigators questioned a number of witnesses, including Ms M.S., Mr R.M., Ms M.Ib., Ms T.Sh., Ms Kh.D., Mr R.Kh., Mr A.Kh., Ms F.M., Ms M.Kh., and Ms M.O., all of whom stated that at the material time they had lived elsewhere and had not witnessed the events in question; however, at some point they had learnt from their relatives and neighbours that the applicant’s sisters Shema and Shamani had been killed by Russian servicemen and their corpses had been found later in the basement. 51.  On 15 May 2004 the investigators requested that the Central Archives of the Russian Ministry of the Interior (the MVD) provide them with the following information:\n“....the investigation established the involvement in the crime [the murder of the applicant’s sisters] of military servicemen from military brigade no. 205.\nAccording to the reply from the North-Caucasus Headquarters of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of the Interior to our request for information, documents concerning special operations conducted in the Chechen Republic in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 were transferred to the Central Archives of the Ministry of the Interior.\nBased on the above information, I ask you .... to identify which regiments of which military units and troops of the Ministry of the Interior carried out their service duties or were stationed between October 1999 and February 2000 inclusive in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny... and to establish the location of these regiments and units at present...\n...you are also requested to declare which troops of military brigade no. 205 of the Russian Military Forces participated in the military operation in Grozny... between October 1999 and February 2000 in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny...” 52.  On 16 May 2004 the investigators again requested that the ROVD identify the witnesses to the events, including the elderly Russian couple who had informed the applicant of the circumstances of her sisters’ murder, and bring them for questioning. 53.  On 8 June 2004 the investigation in the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 54.  On 9 July 2004 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered the investigators to resume it and take a number of steps, such as identifying the servicemen from military unit no. 3737 who had participated in the military operation in the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny in January 2000. The prosecutor also ordered the investigators to provide an explanation of the differences in the witness statements given by the applicant, her sister Mobarik Inderbiyeva and Ms Ya.Z., and to identify the elderly Russian couple who had informed the applicant about the circumstances of her sisters’ murder. 55.  On 15 July 2004 the investigators again questioned the applicant’s sister Mobarik Inderbiyeva who stated that she had found out about the circumstances of her sisters’ murder from the applicant and that the area where her sisters had been killed had at the time been under the full control of the Russian military. 56.  On 2 August 2004 the investigators questioned Mr I.A. who stated that he had not witnessed the murder, but had learnt from his relatives and neighbours that the applicant’s sisters had been killed during a ‘sweeping‑up’ operation by Russian military servicemen who had been called by the local population ‘the jailers’ (‘тюремщики’). 57.  On the same date, 2 August 2004, the investigators questioned Mr A.G. whose statement about the events was similar to the one given by Mr I.A. 58.  On 9 August 2004 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended for the third time for failure to identify the perpetrators. 59.  On 18 October 2004 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered the investigators to take the necessary steps ordered on 9 July 2004. The investigation was resumed on the same date. 60.  On 21 October 2004 the investigators questioned Mr K.S. whose statement about the events was similar to that given by Mr I.A. (see paragraph 56 above). 61.  On 18 November 2004 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended for the fourth time for failure to identify the perpetrators. 62.  On 14 December 2004 the supervising prosecutor again overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered the investigators to take the necessary steps, including those ordered on 9 July and 18 October 2004. The investigation was resumed on the same date and the applicant was informed of this decision. 63.  On 14 January 2005 the investigation in the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators without having taken any of the steps ordered by the supervising prosecutor. 64.  On 27 January 2005 the investigators requested that the ROVD identify the witnesses to the murder and bring them for questioning. On the same date the investigators requested that the Archives of the North‑Caucasus Military Circuit inform them which military unit had been stationed in the area of the events at the material time. 65.  On 6 December 2007 the applicant complained to the district prosecutor’s office that the investigation into her sisters’ murder was ineffective and requested that the investigators allow her to access the investigation file. 66.  On 10 December 2007 the investigators granted the applicant’s request in part and allowed her to access the procedural documents reflecting the investigative steps taken with her participation. 67.  On 8 April 2008 the applicant again complained to the district prosecutor’s office that the investigation into her sisters’ murder was ineffective and requested that the investigators grant her access to the investigation file and resume the criminal proceedings. No reply was given to this request. 68.  On 16 May 2008 the supervising prosecutor again overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unsubstantiated and premature and ordered the investigators to take the necessary steps, including those ordered on 9 July, 18 October and 14 December 2004. The investigation was resumed on the same date. 69.  On 20 May 2008 the investigators requested that the investigative department of the UGA assist them in identifying the military unit which had been stationed in the area of the events in January and February 2000, provide them with a list of its servicemen for the period and inform them of the stationing of the military unit at present. 70.  On 2 June 2008 the investigators questioned Ms Ya.Z. The Government did not furnish a copy of this statement to the Court either (see paragraph 29 above). 71.  On 9 June 2008 the ROVD informed the investigators that it was impossible to establish the identities of the elderly Russian couple who had witnessed the applicant’s sisters’ murder. 72.  On 16 June 2008 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended for the sixth time for failure to identify the perpetrators. 73.  On 26 June 2008 the applicant again complained to the district prosecutor’s office that the investigation into her sisters’ murder was ineffective and requested that the investigators grant her access to the investigation file and resume the criminal proceedings. 74.  On 30 June 2008 the investigators replied to the applicant’s complaint stating that she was entitled to a copy of the last decision to suspend the investigation. 75.  On an unspecified date in January 2009 the supervising prosecutor again overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as unlawful and ordered the investigators to take the necessary steps. The Government did not furnish the Court with a copy of this document. 76.  On 19 January 2009 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed. 77.  The Government submitted that although the investigation had failed to establish the perpetrators of the murder of Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva, the proceedings were still in progress. The information gathered by the investigators demonstrated that the applicant’s sisters had been killed by unidentified persons and that “it cannot be seen from the case file that Shema and Shamani Inderbiyeva were killed as a result of the use of lethal force by representatives of the State”. The Government further submitted that the domestic authorities had been taking all possible steps to have the crime resolved. 78.  In reply to the Court’s request for the full contents of the investigation file in criminal case no. 50080, the Government stated in a Memorandum of 20 January 2010 that they enclosed the contents of the criminal case file ‘in full’ and that it ran to 171 pages. However, from the documents submitted and their pagination it follows that a number of documents, such as witness statements, were not furnished by the Government and no explanation had been given for the failure to submit the remaining documents to the Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Diyarbakır. He is the owner of a grocery shop in Diyarbakır which he runs with his brother. 5.  According to the arrest report, drafted on 15 February 2001 at around 10.45 a.m. and signed by the applicant and his brother, police officers had received information that shopkeepers on Bal Street were not opening their shops as a protest to mark the second anniversary of the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers' Party), an illegal armed organisation. When the officers arrived at the street in question they asked the applicant and his brother to open their shop. The applicant and his brother swore at them and shouted slogans. In the meantime, a small crowd of children and women had started to throw stones at the police cars. The police officers requested, via wireless radio, reinforcements from the police station. Two police officers sustained injuries while trying to arrest the applicant and his brother. The police officers then used force to subdue the applicant and his brother before arresting them for obstructing an official in the course of his duties. It is also stated that the suspects reached for the gun of one of the police officers. It appears that five police officers took part in the applicant and his brother's arrest. 6.  In his application form the applicant submitted that, on 15 February 2001, before he had opened the shutters of his shop, a number of police officers arrived and started smashing the shop shutters and windows with sledgehammers. When the applicant and his brother attempted to stop the police officers, they were beaten up, arrested and subsequently placed in police custody. 7.  According to a medical report drawn up at the Diyarbakır branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute the same day, at 2.20 p.m., there was a light 4 x 1cm reddish bruise and a traumatic oedema on the front of the applicant's left arm. There was also another red-coloured bruise, measuring 15 cm by 3cm, on the outside of his left thigh. 8.  The same doctor also found a number of injuries on the applicant's brother, including a 1 x 1 cm wound on the right parietal region, a 4 x 1 cm bruise on the right side of his neck, a 10 x 3 cm bruise on the right side of his lower back and left shoulder, slight erosion on his right wrist and a number of superficial grazes. 9.  In the meantime, on the same day, two of the police officers were examined first at the State Hospital, and later at the Diyarbakır branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute. 10.  According to the medical report drawn up at the State Hospital, at 10.50 a.m., police officer M.A.A. had sustained a haematoma on his left eye, had redness and sensitivity on the right side of his chest, a haematoma and swelling on his left hand and a swelling and superficial graze on his right hand. At 1.30 p.m. Mr M.A.A. was examined at the Forensic Medicine Institute, where the doctor found that the police officer had sustained a haematoma on his left eye and a traumatic oedema on his left cheek, pain and sensitivity on his left hand and the right side of his ribs and that he had slight erosion on the right hand. 11.  According to the medical report drawn up at the State Hospital, at 10.50 a.m., police officer H.A.K. had a broad patch of redness on the right side of his neck and shoulder region. At 1.30 p.m. he was examined at the Forensic Medicine Institute, where the doctor found that the police officer had a number of reddish bruises on the right and front of the neck and felt pain and sensitivity in the right shoulder. 12.  On 17 February 2001 the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court granted the police authorisation to detain the applicant and seven other suspects who had been detained for similar acts on that date for an additional period of two days. 13.  On 18 February 2001, while he was still being detained in police custody, the applicant was questioned. In the minutes of the questioning, the applicant was recorded as having stated that he sympathised with the policies of the PKK. On 13 February 2001 he had found a leaflet on the floor outside the shop that had been prepared and distributed by the PKK, inviting local businesses not to open their shops on 15 February. Following this invitation, he had intended not to open his shop until 1.30 p.m. He stated that he had followed such instructions in the past. 14.  On 19 February 2001 the applicant was examined by a doctor at Diyarbakır State Hospital who noted a 5 cm bruise on the front of his right arm, a 10 cm bruise on the top of his left foot and a 5 cm bruise on his left thigh. 15.  The same day the applicant was brought before the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court and then before the duty judge at the same court, where he retracted the statement he had made in police custody and said that he had merely been late in opening his shop on 15 February because he had guests at his house; he had not been protesting at all. In the statement taken by the prosecutor, the applicant was recorded as having said that “he had been beaten up by the police officers but he did not wish to make a complaint”. Before the duty judge the applicant claimed that a police officer named A.K. had hit him with a truncheon when he had tried to prevent the latter from breaking his door down, and that he had neither hit any of the police officers nor shouted any slogans. The duty judge ordered the applicant's remand in custody. 16.  On 21 February 2001 the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment charging the applicant and his brother with the offence of aiding and abetting an illegal organisation, under Article 169 of the Criminal Code. 17.  On 26 February 2001 the criminal proceedings before the Diyarbakır State Security Court (hereinafter “the SSC”) commenced. 18.  In the meantime, on 20 February 2001 the applicant submitted a written petition to the trial court requesting his release. In particular, he claimed that, during his arrest, the police had beaten him and his brother with truncheons, but that he was not complaining about any particular police officer. 19.  On 26 April 2001 the SSC held its first hearing, when it heard evidence from the accused, the police officers and defence witnesses. The applicant claimed, inter alia, that the police officers had tried to break the shutters of his shop with a sledgehammer and that, when he had tried to prevent them, by holding the sledgehammer, they had beaten and arrested him. He also retracted his statements given to the police on the ground that he had signed them without reading them. The four defence witnesses heard by the court stated that they had not seen the applicant shouting, resisting or swearing at the police or a crowd of people throwing stones at the police. Two of the four defence witnesses stated that the applicant had been beaten during his arrest. 20.  The police officers who had arrested the applicant reiterated that the applicant and his brother had refused to open the shutters of their shop and that when, in accordance with the order from the Governor, they had tried to break open the shutters, the applicant and his brother had sworn at them and attacked them. They stated that a crowd of people had been shouting and swearing and attacking them, but that by the time the reinforcements arrived they had all dispersed; only the applicant and his brother had been arrested. 21.  In hearings held on 7 and 28 June 2001 both the prosecutor and the applicant's representative stated that they did not want an additional investigation. On the latter date the trial court released the applicant pending trial. It also decided to hear all the witnesses once again in order to dispel factual contradictions. After having reheard two of the defence witnesses, one of whom altered his testimony, on 21 November 2001 the trial court considered that, although certain inconsistencies remained, the facts had been sufficiently elucidated. 22.  On 28 February 2002 the trial court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years and nine months' imprisonment. The applicant's brother was acquitted. 23.  The applicant appealed and asked the Court of Cassation to hold a hearing. In his grounds of appeal the applicant claimed, in particular, that his statements given to the police had been taken under duress. He reiterated that, during the arrest, he and his brother had been beaten by the police officers, as attested by eyewitnesses, whereas there was no evidence that he and his brother were responsible for the injuries sustained by the police officers. 24.  In his written observations submitted to the Court of Cassation, the prosecutor asked for the conviction to be quashed as the applicant's guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 25.  On 11 November 2002 the Court of Cassation, observing that the applicant's lawyer was absent, decided not to hold a hearing and upheld the applicant's conviction. 26.  On 26 August 2003 the applicant was released from prison. 27.  On 16 October 2003, upon a request by the applicant to benefit from Law no. 4959, the Diyarbakır State Security Court reviewed its previous decision and found that the applicant's conviction and sentence met the requirements of this Law. Accordingly, it “annulled” the applicant's conviction and sentence. Since no one objected to that decision, it became final on 24 October 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Šarišské Bohdanovce. 5.  On 3 October 1994 the applicant and twenty-three other persons instituted civil proceedings before the Košice I District Court which concerned the use of a plot of land which they owned. 6.  By judgment of 7 August 2008 and a decision of 24 November 2008 the Košice I District Court granted an easement to the defendant who owns the sport facility on the plaintiffs’ land (proceedings file no. 15 C 792/94). It decided to determine the compensation which the defendant was to pay to the plaintiffs in a separate set of proceedings. On 20 April 2009 the Košice Regional Court upheld the above first-instance judgment and decision. They became final on 19 May 2009. 7.  On 25 June 2009 the applicant complained to the President of the Košice I District Court about delays in the proceedings. The complaint indicated that, after the judgment of 7 August 2008, the issue of compensation still remained to be determined in a different set of proceedings. 8.  In a reply dated 25 August 2009 and delivered on 31 August 2009 the President of the Košice I District Court informed the applicant that the issue of compensation for easement could be effectively dealt with only after the final effect of the judgment of 7 August 2008. Measures were being taken with a view to determining the issue in the separate set of proceedings. 9.  In the meantime, on 7 August 2009, the applicant filed a complaint to the Constitutional Court. He alleged that in proceedings file no. 15 C 792/94 the Košice I District Court had breached his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. In his complaint the applicant indicated that, after the appeal court’s judgment of 20 April 2009, compensation for the easement remained to be determined. He further submitted that the case was still being dealt with under file no. 15 C 792/94 and that he had received no reply to his complaint of 25 June 2009 addressed to the President of the District Court. 10.  On 2 September 2009 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint. It held that the proceedings complained of, namely those concerning the Košice I District Court file no. 15 C 792/94, had ended with final effect on 19 May 2009. The complaint in that respect had been filed belatedly. 11.  The Constitutional Court noted the applicant’s argument that the compensation issue remained to be determined in a separate set of proceedings. However, the applicant had failed to comply with the formal requirements in that respect as he had not indicated the file number of those proceedings. It was not for the Constitutional Court to remedy such shortcomings as the applicant was represented by a lawyer. 12.  The proceedings concerning the outstanding issue were entered in the Košice I District Court’s electronic registration system under file no. 23 C 221/2009 and assigned to a judge on 14 October 2009. They are pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Moscow. 7.  On 8 October 2004 the applicant travelled from Moscow to Simferopol in Ukraine through Sheremetyevo airport. She had on her 13,020 US dollars (USD), 31 Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH) and 1,100 Russian roubles (RUB). However, she only reported USD 10,000 and UAH 31 in her customs declaration. The customs inspection uncovered the remaining USD 3,020, which the applicant claimed she had forgotten about. She was charged with smuggling, a criminal offence under Article 188 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The money was appended to the criminal case as physical evidence (вещественные доказательства). 8.  On 9 December 2004 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow found the applicant guilty as charged and imposed a suspended sentence of one year's imprisonment, conditional on one year's probation. As regards the money, it referred to Article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and held that:\n“Physical evidence – USD 13,020 and UAH 31 held in the evidence storage room of the Sheremetyevo Customs Office – shall revert to the State.” 9.  In his statement of appeal, counsel for the applicant contested the lawfulness of the confiscation measure. He submitted that the gravity of the offence should have been determined by reference to the amount the applicant had concealed from the customs, that is USD 3,020, rather than the entire amount she had carried. The money had been the object rather than the instrument of the offence and as such it should have been returned to the lawful owner because it had not been claimed that it had been criminally acquired. 10.  On 25 January 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment by a succinct decision, without examining the counsel's arguments in detail. 11.  Counsel for the applicant submitted several applications for supervisory review of the judgments. The applications were rejected by a judge of the Moscow City Court on 22 August 2005, the President of the Moscow City Court on 18 January 2006, and a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation on 12 April 2006. As regards the confiscation measure, the judicial authorities maintained that the measure had been lawful and compliant with Article 81 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 12.  On 26 April 2007 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court examined yet another application for supervisory review. It held that the applicant had been correctly found guilty of smuggling but amended the judgment in part concerning the confiscation measure, having found as follows:\n“However, the decision that the authentically declared amount of USD 10,000 and UAH 31 should revert to the State was not founded on sufficient reasons.\nIn deciding that the foreign currency should revert to the State, the court posited that the currency transported by Ms Adzhigovich was the object of the offence. However, since her criminal intent was directed at the breach of the procedure for transferring cash money (currency) across the customs border rather than at their unlawful misappropriation, the cash money (currency) was not the object of the offence and therefore not liable to confiscation under Article 81 [§ 3] (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nMoreover, according to Article 81 [§ 3] (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, criminally acquired property, money or other valuables must revert to the State. The case file does not contain any evidence to the effect that Ms Adzhigovich obtained the above-mentioned money through criminal means or as the proceeds of criminal activity.\nIn such circumstances, the judgments in the part concerning the decision that the foreign currency should revert to the State may not be considered lawful or justified.”\nThe Presidium held that the judgments would be amended and that USD 10,000 and UAH 31 would be returned to the applicant. 13.  On 5 July 2007 a writ of execution was issued and sent to the bailiffs' service for enforcement. 14.  On 23 January 2008 the bailiffs determined that the enforcement was impossible because the cash money in the amount of USD 10,000 and UAH 31 was absent from the evidence storage room of the Sheremetyevo Customs Office. That money had been taken away on 4 October 2005 by the bailiffs of the Northern Administrative District of Moscow, which appeared to have made enforcement impossible.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1955 and 1963 respectively and live in Eisenerz. 5.  The applicants, as owners of certain plots of agricultural land in Eisenerz, were members of the agricultural association (Agrar­gemeinschaft) “Waldgenossen­schaft Eisenerz”, holding a share in that association (“the share”). That share corresponded to the right to use the land of the agricultural association for farming and forestry. 6.  On 28 November 1988 the applicants filed a request with the Leoben District Agricultural Authority (Agrarbezirksbehörde) to resign from the association and have their share transformed into parcels of land which should then be separated from the association’s land. 7.  On 16 December 1988 the Leoben District Agricultural Authority decided to institute the partition proceedings (Teilungsverfahren). 8.  Since the District Agricultural Authority failed to decide on the merits the applicants lodged a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutions­antrag) on 3 October 1989. 9.  On 24 January 1990 the Regional Land Reform Board (Landes­agrarsenat) declared that it had now jurisdiction in the present case. 10.  By decision of 23 January 1991 the Regional Land Reform Board decided to which percentage of the association’s land the applicants’ shares corresponded. 11.  On 24 September 2003, after having obtained two expert opinions in the field of agriculture and forestry on the feasibility of an actual separation of parcels of land which would correspond to the applicants’ share, the Regional Land Reform Board dismissed the applicants’ request. The Regional Land reform Board decision contained a note as to available remedies (Rechtsmittelbelehrung) which stated that against this decision an appeal could be lodged within two weeks with the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat). 12.  On 15 December 2003 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Supreme Land Reform Board as set out in the instructions as to available remedies. 13.  On 1 December 2004 the Supreme Land Reform Board rejected the applicants’ appeal since it found that it had no jurisdiction in the case. 14.  On 23 December 2004 the applicants lodged a request for reinstatement of the proceedings (Wiedereinsetzung in den vorherigen Stand) along with a complaint with the Constitutional Court. 15.  On 28 February 2005 the Constitutional Court granted the applicants’ request for reinstatement since the instructions as to available remedies given by the Regional Land Reform Board were incorrect. 16.  On 26 September 2005 the Constitutional Court quashed the decision of the Regional Land Reform Board. It found that the applicants’ right to an independent and impartial tribunal under Article 6 of the Convention had been violated since the two experts in the case also belonged to the body deciding on their request and remitted the case back. 17.  Subsequently, on 18 January 2006, the Regional Land Reform Board adjourned the proceedings for further investigations. 18.  On 9 June 2006 the applicants submitted a document containing three possible options for a financial settlement in case of their withdrawal from the association. 19.  By decision of 28 February 2007 the Regional Land Reform Board defined which part of the land belonged to whom and adjourned the proceedings once again. 20.  By letter of 19 September 2007 the Regional Land Reform Board requested the District Agricultural Authority to determine by expert opinions potential parcels of land parts which could be separated from the rest for a settlement. The applicants claimed that this expert opinion had never been served on them. 21.  In the course of an oral hearing on 26 March 2008 to which the applicants allegedly were not summoned the Regional Land Reform Board decided to interrupt the proceeding until 26 March 2011 in order to secure proper evaluation of the association and its property. 22.  On 3 November 2008 the applicants sold their shares of the agricultural association to another member of the association and on 3 November 2009 the District Agricultural Authority closed the proceedings on the applicants’ partition request and in October 2009 the Land Register was amended accordingly.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born on 2 February 1984 and lives in İzmir. 12.  On 29 May 2001 at about 10.15 p.m., the applicant was taken into custody by police officers from the anti-terrorism branch of the İzmir Security Directorate on suspicion of having participated in an unlawful demonstration in support of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan). The applicant was also accused of hanging an illegal banner from a bridge in Bornova on 26 April 2001. 13.  At about 12.30 a.m. on 30 May 2001 the applicant was taken to the Atatürk Teaching and Research Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. The medical report stated that there was no trace of ill-treatment on his body. 14.  Subsequently, at about 1 a.m., the applicant was interrogated at the anti-terrorism branch in the absence of a lawyer. According to a form explaining arrested persons’ rights which the applicant had signed, he had been reminded of the charges against him and of his right to remain silent. In his statement, the applicant admitted his involvement in the youth branch of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – the People’s Democracy Party). He gave the names of several persons who worked for the youth branch of the Bornova District Office. He explained that he was the assistant youth press and publications officer and was also responsible for the Osmangazi neighbourhood. He further stated that it had been part of his job to assign duties to other members of the youth branch. He admitted that he had participated in the demonstration on 29 May 2001 organised by HADEP in support of the imprisoned leader of the PKK. He said that there had been about sixty demonstrators present and that the group had shouted slogans in support of Öcalan and the PKK. He had been arrested on the spot. He also admitted that he had written “Long live leader Apo” on a banner which had been hung from a bridge on 26 April 2001. The police took samples of the applicant’s handwriting and sent it to the police laboratory for examination. 15.  On 1 June 2001 the İzmir Criminal Police Laboratory issued a report after comparing the applicant’s handwriting to that on the banner. It concluded that although certain characteristics of the applicant’s handwriting bore similarities to the handwriting on the banner, it could not be established whether or not the writing on the banner was in fact his. 16.  At 11.45 p.m. on 1 June 2001 the applicant was again examined by a doctor, who stated that there were no traces of ill-treatment on his body. 17.  On the same day, the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and subsequently the investigating judge. Before the public prosecutor, he explained that he was not a member of any political party, but had taken part in certain activities of HADEP. He denied fabricating an illegal banner or participating in the demonstration on 29 May 2001. He stated that he was in the Doğanlar neighbourhood to visit a friend when he was arrested by the police. The applicant also made a statement to the investigating judge, in which he retracted his statement to the police, alleging that it had been extracted under duress. He claimed that he had been beaten and insulted while in police custody. He again denied engaging in any illegal activity and explained that on 29 May 2001 he had gone to the Doğanlar neighbourhood to visit a friend and had not been part of the group shouting slogans. After the questioning was over, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody, having regard to the nature of the offence of which he was accused and the state of the evidence. The applicant was then allowed to have access to a lawyer. 18.  On 11 July 2001 the public prosecutor at the İzmir State Security Court filed an indictment with that court accusing the applicant and eight other accused of aiding and abetting the PKK, an offence under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). 19.  On 16 July 2001 the State Security Court held a preparatory hearing. It decided that the applicant’s detention on remand should be continued and that the accused be invited to prepare their defence submissions. 20.  On 28 August 2001 the State Security Court held its first hearing, in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer. It heard evidence from the applicant in person, who denied the charges against him. The applicant also rejected the police statement, alleging that it had been extracted from him under duress. He explained that while he was in custody, police officers had ordered him to copy the words from a banner. He also stated that he had witnessed the events that had taken place on 29 May 2001; however, he had not taken part in the demonstration as alleged. Instead, he had been in the neighbourhood to visit a friend named Özcan. He also denied hanging an illegal banner from a bridge on 26 April 2001. 21.  At the next hearing, which was held on 25 October 2001, the applicant and his lawyer were both present. The court also heard from other accused persons, all of whom denied having participated in the illegal demonstration on 29 May 2001 and retracted statements they had made previously. The prosecution then called for the applicant to be sentenced pursuant to Article 169 of the Criminal Code and the applicant’s lawyer requested time to submit the applicant’s defence submissions. 22.  On 5 December 2001 the applicant made his defence submissions. He denied the charges against him and requested his release. On the same day, the İzmir State Security Court delivered its judgment. It acquitted five of the accused and convicted the applicant and three other accused as charged. It sentenced the applicant to four years and six months’ imprisonment, which was reduced to two and a half years as the applicant had been a minor at the time of the offence. 23.  In convicting the applicant, the State Security Court had regard to the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively. It also took into consideration his co-defendants’ evidence before the public prosecutor that the applicant had urged them to participate in the demonstration of 29 May 2001. The court noted that the co-defendants had also given evidence that the applicant had been in charge of organising the demonstration. It further took note of the expert report comparing the applicant’s handwriting to that on the banner and of the fact that, according to the police report on the arrest, the applicant had been among the demonstrators. It concluded:\n“... in view of these material facts, the court does not accept the applicant’s denial and finds that his confession to the police is substantiated.” 24.  On 2 January 2002 the applicant’s lawyer appealed against the judgment of the İzmir State Security Court. In her notice of appeal, she alleged a breach of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention, arguing that the proceedings before the first-instance court had been unfair and that the court had failed to assess the evidence properly. 25.  On 27 March 2002 the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation lodged a written opinion with the Ninth Division of the Court of Cassation in which he submitted that the Division should uphold the judgment of the İzmir State Security Court. This opinion was not served on the applicant or his representative. 26.  On 10 June 2002 the Ninth Division of the Court of Cassation, upholding the İzmir State Security Court’s reasoning and assessment of the evidence, dismissed the applicant’s appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1958, 1972 and 1970 respectively. At the time of the introduction of the application, they were living in Istanbul. They currently live in Germany and Switzerland. 6.  On 15, 16 and 17 June 1995, as part of a police operation against an illegal organisation, the TKP-ML/TIKKO[2], the applicants were arrested and taken into custody at the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. 7.  On 28 June 1995 the applicants were brought before the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court, where they maintained that they had been interrogated under duress and ill-treated by the police during their ten days in custody. They contended that they had been beaten, punched, hosed, subjected to Palestinian hanging, deprived of sleep, threatened with death and sexually harassed. They added that, whilst being hung, electric shocks were administered to them through cables attached to their genitals. 8.  On the same day the applicants were examined by a doctor at the Forensic Medicine Institute who noted the following marks on their bodies:\n–Durmuş Kurt: one yellow and one green lesion of 2 x 2 cm on the right shoulder, a lesion of 3 x 0,5 cm on the inner part of the upper arm. The doctor certified him unfit for work for three days.\n–Nurettin Kılıçaslan[3]: four scab-covered lesions of 5 x 0.5 cm which are positioned parallel to each other in the right armpit and a graze of 5 x 1 cm on the right thigh. The doctor certified him unfit for work for three days.\n–Zübeyde Kayar: three scab-covered lesions measuring 4 x 0.5 cm which are positioned parallel to each other in the left armpit. The doctor noted that she had complained of pain and numbness in both arms and hands. He further noted impaired movement in both arms. However, he considered that a final report could only be drawn up once she had been examined by a hospital neurology service. It appears from the case file, however, that the additional examination was never carried out. 9.  On 21 July 1995 the Istanbul public prosecutor decided that he did not have jurisdiction over the case and transmitted the case file to the Fatih public prosecutor for investigation. 10.  On 15 November 1995 the Fatih public prosecutor decided not to prosecute the on-duty police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicants whilst in custody, for lack of evidence. 11.  On 27 November 1996 the International Law and Foreign Relations Directorate of the Ministry of Justice notified the Istanbul public prosecutor that one of the applicants' co-detainees had filed an application with the European Court of Human Rights[4] concerning the allegations of torture during the same custody period. The letter stated that the decision of non-prosecution of 15 November 1995 issued by the Fatih public prosecutor lacked sufficient reasoning, and that a more comprehensive investigation had to be conducted into the allegations of ill-treatment. 12.  On 16 July 1997 the Fatih public prosecutor sent a report to the Istanbul public prosecutor, summarising the facts and the applicants' complaints that they had been tortured whilst in custody between 15 and 28 June 1995 by officers working at the anti-terrorist branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. The Fatih public prosecutor requested the Istanbul public prosecutor to file a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court, charging five police officers with torture, pursuant to Article 243 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 13.  By an indictment filed on 2 September 1997, the public prosecutor instituted criminal proceedings in the Istanbul Assize Court against five police officers for having tortured the applicants and for professional misconduct. 14.  On 27 October 1997 the Istanbul Assize Court heard four of these officers. They denied having ill-treated the applicants. The applicants maintained that they had been subjected to ill-treatment. On the same day, the applicants filed a petition with the court for permission to intervene in the proceedings as civil parties. 15.  On 29 December 1997 the fifth police officer's statement was taken by the Tunceli Assize Court and sent to the Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  On 9 October 1998 the court heard witnesses who confirmed that the applicants had been subjected to torture, and the applicants identified two of the defendant police officers who had allegedly ill-treated them. 17.  In hearings on 30 October 1998 and 9 November 2000, the applicants identified other defendant police officers who had allegedly participated in the acts of torture. 18.  On 19 November 2002, the Istanbul Assize Court decided to discontinue the proceedings against four police officers as the prosecution of the offences had become time-barred. The Assize Court acquitted the fifth police officer for insufficient evidence. 19.  On 23 January 2003 the applicants appealed to the Court of Cassation against this judgment. On 20 October 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Istanbul Assize Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  On 13 January 1993 the applicant was detained on charges of armed robbery, burglary and assault occasioning bodily injuries. 9.  On 13 April 1993 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). The applicant was indicted on the charges of armed robbery, burglary and assault committed together with six other persons. 10.  The court listed hearings for 4, 5 and 6 May 1994 but subsequently cancelled all of them because one of the applicant’s co-defendants had failed to appear. On the last of those dates, the hearing was postponed because Z.K. (one of the co-defendants) was ill and the court considered it necessary to obtain a medical report determining whether or not he would be able to take part in the trial. The relevant report was received at the court’s registry on 13 June. 11.  Two days later the Regional Court set the trial for 6 and 7 September but, on 6 September, it adjourned the hearings since a court interpreter had failed to appear (D.B., one of the co-defendants, was of Lithuanian nationality and therefore not able to follow the trial without the assistance of an interpreter). 12.  The first hearing on the merits was held on 8 November 1994. The court heard evidence from four defendants. The trial continued on 9 and 14 November 1994. In the course of those two hearings, the court heard evidence from other defendants. 13.  The next hearing took place on 16 January 1995. During that hearing the applicant unsuccessfully asked the court to remit the case to the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor and order a further investigation with a view of indicting his wife. On 17 January 1995, in the course of the next hearing, he made a similar application and stated that if it was not granted, he would not attend hearings. Later, he apologised for his behaviour. A hearing listed for 18 January started with a delay because it emerged from a medical certificate made by a prison doctor that the applicant was ill. On that day the court however decided to proceed with the trial in the applicant’s absence because, on the basis of another, subsequently obtained medical certificate, it came to the conclusion that he had misinformed the prison authorities as to the state of his health. The trial continued on 19 and 20 January and on 17, 20 and 23 March 1995. Further hearings were listed for 17, 18 and 19 May 1995. The hearing set for 18 May did not take place because one of the co-defendants had not appeared before the court. In the meantime, on 8 May 1995, the applicant, relying on his previous record of psychiatric treatment, asked the court to order that he be examined by a psychiatrist. 14.  On 19 May 1995 the court ordered that evidence be obtained from psychiatrists to establish whether tempore criminis the applicant and two of his co-defendants had acted in a state of diminished responsibility. It adjourned the trial to 26 and 27 July 1995. 15.  On 22 May 1995 the court requested the Department of Forensic Psychiatry of Warsaw-Mokotów Prison to place the applicant and his co-defendants under psychiatric observation. The applicant underwent that observation from 3 October 1995 to 15 January 1996. 16.  On 29 December 1995, 13 January, 13 and 29 February, 4 March and 16 April 1996, the applicant asked the Warsaw Regional Court to release him. He submitted that his detention on remand had meanwhile exceeded two years and that it was putting a severe strain on his family, especially as his child was ill and his wife and mother needed his help. 17.  The Warsaw Regional Court examined all those applications on 29 April 1996. It dismissed them, holding that the applicant’s detention should continue in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. The court also considered that the length of the applicant’s detention could not in itself be a decisive factor militating in favour of his release. Finally, it added that there were no grounds for releasing him in view of his family situation, in particular under Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In that respect, the court relied on a declaration made by the applicant’s wife (who stated that she did not wish to obtain any help from him). 18.  The applicant appealed, stressing that his detention on remand had meanwhile exceeded three years but his trial had only just commenced. On 23 May 1996 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the appeal in view of the serious nature of the offences with which the applicant had been charged and the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 19.  Meanwhile, on 29 February 1996 and on an unknown date in April 1996, the psychiatric observations ordered with respect to the applicant’s co-defendants had been completed. The psychiatrists’ reports were received at the court’s registry on 21 March and 12 April 1996, respectively. 20.  On 8 May 1996, the Regional Court scheduled hearings for 5 and 6 August 1996. It emerged from a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) of 13 February 1997 (see paragraph 26 below) that those hearings had been cancelled because the applicant’s co-defendants had “disorganised the trial”. In particular, one of them had inflicted injuries on himself. 21.  On 28 May 1996 the applicant challenged the impartiality of the trial court. The challenge was dismissed on 3 June 1996. 22.  On 18 June and 11 September 1996 the applicant made further applications for release. They were dismissed on 4 July and 19 September 1996 respectively. The applicant appealed and, on 28 September 1996, submitted a medical certificate stating that he suffered from gastric ulcers. Following inquiries into the applicant’s personal circumstances and his family’s situation made by the relevant courts, the contested decisions were eventually upheld on appeal. The courts reiterated the grounds previously given for the applicant’s continued detention. 23.  On 8 November 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. However, the composition of the panel of the court had to be changed because one of the judges had meanwhile withdrawn from the case. In consequence, the newly-composed trial court had to rehear evidence that had to date been obtained. The trial continued on 12-13, 16 and 18‑19 December 1996. On 18 December 1996 the court, considering that the applicant behaved in a disorderly manner (he apparently interrupted the process of obtaining evidence from experts) ordered that he be temporarily removed from the court room. A hearing listed for 21 January 1997 was postponed to 4 February because one of the applicant’s co-defendants had failed to appear. In the course of the hearing held on 4 February 1997 the applicant for the second time challenged the impartiality of the trial court. 24.  On 21 January 1997 the applicant asked the court to release him. On 6 February 1997 he lodged another application for release. The court dealt with his applications on 3 March 1997 and dismissed them, holding that there were no grounds for releasing him under Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 25.  In the meantime, on 31 December 1996, the Warsaw Regional Court had made an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, asking it to prolong the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention on remand until 30 May 1997, i.e. beyond the statutory time-limit set in such cases. The Regional Court considered that the prolonged psychiatric observation of three of the co-defendants, the need to obtain evidence and the fact that one co-defendant had gone on a hunger strike and had inflicted injuries on himself fully justified the opinion that the defendants had deliberately obstructed the termination of the proceedings within the statutory time-limit and, consequently, gave sufficient grounds for extending their detention. Referring to the applicant, the court held that he had, by his conduct, obstructed the termination of the proceedings.  It did not specify how the applicant prevented completion of the trial. 26.  The Supreme Court examined that application on 13 February 1997. It prolonged the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention on remand until 30 April 1997. 27.  The trial was to continue on 7 March 1997 but – for unknown reasons – it was postponed to a later date. 28.  On 21 March 1997 the applicant – again unsuccessfully – challenged the impartiality of the trial court. 29.  The trial continued on 1, 4 and 16 April 1997. On 18 April 1997 the court gave judgment. The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 Polish zlotys. 30.  The applicant appealed against his first-instance conviction in July 1997. The Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 2 December 1997.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sokołόw Małopolski. 6.  The applicant is a single mother and has three children. Prior to her application for an early‑retirement pension she had been employed by the same company for twenty years and paid social security contributions to the State. 7.  On 19 January 2001 the applicant filed an application with the Rzeszów Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) to be granted the right to an early‑retirement pension for persons raising children who, due to the seriousness of their health condition, required constant care, the so‑called “EWK” pension”. 8.  Along with her application for a pension, the applicant submitted, among other documents concerning her daughter’s health condition, a medical certificate issued by a specialist medical centre. The certificate stated that the child (born in 1988) suffered from chronic asthma (przewlekła astma oskrzelowa) and that she had been in need of her parent’s constant care. 9.  On 29 January 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board (“the SSB”) issued a decision granting the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension as of 1 January 2001 in the net amount of 593 Polish zlotys (PLN). 10.  The Social Security Board initially suspended the payment of the pension until 1 March 2001 due to the fact that the applicant was still working on the date of the decision. The applicant resigned from her job. 11.  On an unspecified date Rzeszów Social Security Board asked the Main Social Security Board’s doctor (Główny Lekarz Orzecznik) to inform it whether the applicant’s daughter required the permanent care of a parent. On 16 May 2002 the doctor stated that, on the basis of the medical documents, the child could not be considered as ever having required such care. 12.  On 27 May 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued simultaneously two decisions in respect of the applicant. By virtue of one decision, the payment of the applicant’s pension was discontinued with immediate effect. By virtue of the other decision, the Board reopened the proceedings, revoked the initial decision granting a pension and eventually refused to grant the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension under the scheme provided for by the 1989 Ordinance. 13.  The applicant appealed against the respective decisions divesting her of the right to an early‑retirement pension. She submitted that she should receive the benefit because her child required constant care, as confirmed by the medical certificate attached to the applicant’s original application for a pension. Moreover, the applicant alleged that the revocation of her retirement pension was contrary to the principle of vested rights. 14.  On 1 August 2002 the Rzeszow Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) allowed the appeal and granted the applicant the EWK pension. The SSB appealed against the judgment. 15.  On 19 March 2003 the Rzeszow Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and remitted the case for reconsideration. 16.  On 20 November 2003 the Rzeszow Regional Court upheld the SSB’s decision of 27 May 2002 and dismissed the applicant’s appeal against it. The Regional Court concluded on the basis of the evidence that the applicant’s child did not require her mother’s permanent care since her health condition did not significantly impair her bodily functions. The domestic court held that the applicant had been rightfully divested of her right to a pension under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as she did not satisfy the requirement of necessary permanent care. 17.  The applicant further appealed against the first‑instance judgment. 18.  On 26 March 2004 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the appeal. 19.  The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 20.  Following the social security proceedings the applicant was not ordered to return her early‑retirement benefits paid by the Social Security Board, despite the revocation of her right to an early‑retirement pension. 21.  The applicant submitted that after the revocation of the EWK pension she had not received any unemployment or other benefits from the State. 22.  The Government submitted that between 29 August 2006 and 24 August 2009 the applicant has been intermittently employed and was receiving a salary of approximately PLN 11,000 per year. In 2010 the applicant received unemployment benefit for a few months. In addition, the Government maintained that the applicant has been receiving child support payment, apparently from the father of her children, in the amount of PLN 7,500 per year. However, it is not clear how long she has been receiving such payment. 23.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s two adult children have been employed since 2006. Moreover, the child in respect of whom the applicant had been granted the EWK pension, now aged 21, started working in 2009. 24.  In addition, the Government submitted information as regards the various types of social benefits available in Poland. However, they did not specify which of those benefits, if any, were available in the applicant’s situation. 25.  Under the relevant laws currently in force, it appears that the applicant will qualify for a regular retirement pension in 2022. 26.  Some 130 applications arising from a similar fact pattern have been brought to the Court. The majority of the applicants form the Association of Victims of the SSB (Stowarzyszenie Osób Poszkodowanych przez ZUS) (“the Association”), an organisation monitoring the practices of the Social Security Board in Poland, in particular in the Podkarpacki region. 27.  Out of all applications lodged with the Court, about twenty‑four applicants decided not to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal given in their case. 28.  One hundred‑and‑four applicants lodged cassation appeals against the final judgments given in their cases. The Supreme Court entertained and dismissed on the merits fifteen appeals. In eighty‑one applications the Supreme Court refused to entertain cassation appeals on the ground that they did not raise any important legal issues or require the Supreme Court to give a new interpretation to legal provisions which raised serious doubts or gave rise to ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts. In the remaining eight cases cassation appeals were rejected for failure to comply with various procedural requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant was born in 1965. On 17 August 1998 he arrived in Russia from Tajikistan. He stayed in Vladimir at his cousin's flat. 11.  On 22 January 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of the unlawful purchase and possession of drugs. A search was carried out in the flat where he was staying. 12.  On 30 January 1999 the applicant was charged under Article 228 § 1 of the Criminal Code with the unlawful purchase and possession of 3 grams of hashish. He pleaded not guilty and indicated that he did not need an interpreter because he had studied in Leningrad. 13.  On 12 March and 5 April 1999 the applicant's detention was extended until 11 July 1999. 14.  On 4 June 1999 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladimir refused the applicant's request for release on bail. It found that the applicant's detention had been extended in accordance with the law and that no grounds for releasing him could be established. The applicant did not appeal to the Regional Court. 15.  On 30 June and 2 September 1999 the applicant's detention was extended until 21 December 1999. 16.  On 2 December 1999 the acting Prosecutor General approved the extension of the applicant's detention until 21 June 2000. The applicant appealed to the Leninskiy District Court, which on 28 December 1999 dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant had been charged with an particularly serious criminal offence and had resided in Vladimir only temporarily, his permanent residence being in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, so that there was good reason to suspect that he would abscond if released. The applicant did not appeal against that decision to the Regional Court. 17.  On 21 June 2000 the supervising prosecutor approved the bill of indictment and the case against the applicant and twenty co-defendants was sent to the Vladimir Regional Court for trial. 18.  On 23 June and 17 July 2000 the applicant requested the Vladimir Regional Court to review the lawfulness of his detention on remand. 19.  On 18 July 2000 the Vladimir Regional Court ordered the case to be remitted for an additional investigation because the bill of indictment had not been translated into the Tajik language, even though seven of the defendants were Tajik. The court held that the applicant and his co-defendants should remain in custody. 20.  On 24 July 2000 the prosecution appealed against the decision but subsequently withdrew their appeal. On 30 August 2000 the case was returned to the Vladimir Regional Court for examination on the merits. 21.  On 23 November 2000 the Vladimir Regional Court ordered the case to be remitted for an additional investigation because the rights of some of the defendants had been unlawfully restricted. The prosecution appealed. 22.  On 28 February 2001 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation quashed the decision of 23 November 2000. It found that, after the case had been remitted for an additional investigation on 18 July 2000, the prosecution had not remedied the defects identified by the Regional Court. In particular, the prosecution had not arranged for translation of the bill of indictment or checked that the interpreter had the requisite skills. In view of these procedural defects, the Supreme Court held that all the subsequent judicial decisions had been unlawful and remitted the case to the Regional Court for implementation of the decision of 18 July 2000. 23.  On 4 April 2001 the case was remitted to the prosecutor of the Vladimir Region for an additional investigation. On the same day a deputy prosecutor of the Vladimir Region extended the applicant's detention on remand by one month, until 4 May 2001.\n(b)  Extension of the applicant's detention for three months (until 4 September 2001) 24.  On 19 April 2001 the prosecutor of the Vladimir Region applied to the Vladimir Regional Court for an order extending the applicant's detention. The applicant lodged objections in which he alleged, inter alia, that the prosecution had thus far failed to perform any additional investigation. 25.  On 28 April 2001 the Vladimir Regional Court established that the bill of indictment had been translated into Tajik and that on 18 April 2001 the defendants and their lawyers had begun their examination of the case file. Noting the gravity of the charges against the applicant, his Tajik nationality and absence of a permanent residence in Vladimir, the Regional Court further remanded him in custody until 4 September 2001. 26.  On 4 and 17 May 2001 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Vladimir Regional Court.\n(c)  Quashing of the decision to extend the applicant's detention until 4 September 2001 27.  On 8 August 2001 the Supreme Court established that one of the applicant's co-defendants had not been provided with an interpreter into Uzbek and that the applicant and other co-defendants had had no access to the materials examined by the Regional Court. It held as follows:\n“The defects of the court hearing described above and the curtailing of the defendants' statutory rights... are substantial violations of the rules of criminal procedure, which could have affected the judge's conclusions; the decision [of 28 April 2001] must therefore be quashed and the materials of the case relating to the extension of the defendants' pre-trial detention must be referred for a new judicial examination. During the new examination of the prosecutor's request, the above defects shall be remedied... and the arguments by the defendants and their counsel, including those concerning the lawfulness of their detention, shall be reviewed... The preventive measure [imposed on, in particular, the applicant] shall remain unchanged”.\nBy an interim decision of the same date, the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appear at the appeal hearing.\n(d)  Second examination of the request for an extension of the applicant's detention until 4 September 2001 28.  On 11 September and 30 November 2001 the Vladimir Regional Court adjourned hearings in order to afford the defendants additional time in which to read the case-file. 29.  On 27 February 2002 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld a challenge by the applicant against the presiding judge. 30.  On 11 and 13 March, 12 April, 17 and 18 June 2002 hearings were adjourned because of the absence of several lawyers, including the applicant's counsel. 31.  On 15 August 2002 the Vladimir Regional Court again granted the prosecutor's request (of 19 April 2001) for an extension of the defendants' detention on remand until 4 September 2001. It found that it was necessary for the applicant to remain in custody because he was a national of Tajikistan, was not registered as resident in Vladimir, and had been charged with a serious criminal offence. The court also referred to certain “conclusions” contained in the prosecutor's application to the effect that the applicant might abscond or obstruct justice. The content of these “conclusions” was not disclosed. 32.  On 23 September 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the Vladimir Regional Court. He claimed that the contested decision was “unlawful and unconstitutional” and requested leave to appear in person at the appeal hearing. 33.  On 23 January 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 15 August 2002, finding as follows:\n“The judge came to a well-justified conclusion that the defendants... could not be [released pending trial]. The judge had regard to the fact that these persons were charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences, he considered the information on their character and all the circumstances to which the prosecutor had referred in support of his application...\nThe fact that the above-mentioned decision on the prosecutor's application was [only] made after the defendants had spent that length of time in custody... is not a ground for quashing the decision of 15 August 2002 because the first judicial decision on this matter was quashed in accordance with the law and the prosecutor's application of 19 April 2001 was remitted for a new examination. The subsequent progress of the criminal case is, under these circumstances, of no relevance to a decision on the prosecutor's application.”\nBy an interim decision of the same date, the Supreme Court refused the applicant's request for leave to appear because the defendants' arguments were clearly set out in their grounds of appeal and their lawyers were present at the hearing while the prosecutor was not. 34.  Meanwhile, on 4 September 2001 the additional investigation was completed and the case sent to the Vladimir Regional Court. On or about that date the applicant asked the court to order his release pending the trial. 35.  On 9 January 2002 the Vladimir Regional Court fixed the first hearing for 5 February 2002 and held that the applicant should remain in custody pending trial:\n“[The court] did not establish any grounds... to amend or revoke the preventive measure imposed on the accused given the gravity of the offence with which the defendants are charged. Furthermore, the fact that the court decision extending the detention on remand of several defendants in order to afford them [time] to examine the case materials was quashed on appeal is of no legal significance. [In its decision of 8 August 2001] the Supreme Court did not revoke the preventive measure, the case was referred to the [trial] court without delay and no other grounds for amending the preventive measure were established.” 36.  On 11 February 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision. He complained, in particular, that his detention was unlawful because it had significantly exceeded the maximum eighteen-month period permitted by law, that the conditions in which he was detained were poor and that he had been ill-treated by police officers, both at the time of his arrest and subsequently. He alleged that his notice of appeal had never been dispatched to the Supreme Court. 37.  On 5 February 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 26 February because three defendants had failed to appear. On 15 February 2002 the applicant prepared an appeal against the decision to adjourn the hearing; in the notice of appeal, he also repeated the points he had raised in his appeal of 11 February. He again stated that his notice of appeal had not been sent to the Supreme Court. 38.  On 13 March 2002 the Vladimir Regional Court established that the case was not ready for consideration on the merits because of a series of procedural defects: in particular, several defendants had not had sufficient time to study the case file, one defendant had not been provided with interpretation facilities into Uzbek, and the applicant had not been informed in good time of the expert examinations. The court remitted the case for an additional investigation and remanded the defendants in custody “in the light of the gravity and dangerous nature of the offences”. 39.  On 11 April 2002 the prosecution appealed against the decision of 13 March and the applicant did likewise on 29 April. The applicant submitted, in particular, that the domestic law did not permit extensions of detention “during the investigation” beyond the maximum period of eighteen months which had expired, in his case, on 4 April 2001. 40.  On 28 May 2002 the case-file was forwarded to the Supreme Court for examination of the issue of detention on remand. 41.  On 8 August 2002 the Supreme Court refused, in an interim decision, the applicant's request for leave to appear, holding that his position had been clearly and exhaustively stated in the grounds of appeal. 42.  On 12 September 2002 it examined the appeals lodged by the prosecutor, the applicant and his co-defendants and found that the defence rights had not been impaired. On this ground it quashed the decision of 13 March 2002 and instructed the Vladimir Regional Court to proceed with the trial. It held that the applicant and his co-defendants should remain in custody because “there were no legal grounds to amend the preventive measure given the gravity and dangerous nature of the offences”. 43.  On 7 October 2002 the case-file was returned to the Vladimir Regional Court. 44.  On 18 November 2002 the Vladimir Regional Court extended the applicant's detention on remand until 3 December 2002. It found as follows:\n“The case was referred to the Vladimir Regional Court on 2 September 2001; on 13 March 2002 it was decided to remit the case for additional investigation. On 12 September 2002 the Supreme Court quashed that decision on appeal by the prosecutor. Thus, the defendants have remained in custody for 8 months and 16 days, starting from the date of the case's referral and excluding the period between [the end of the] examination on the merits and the quashing of the decision [of 13 March 2002] on appeal.\nRegard being had to the fact that the defendant is charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences, in order to secure the examination of the case and the enforcement of the conviction [sic], there are no grounds to [release the applicant]. Under these circumstances, pursuant to Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the defendant's detention on remand is extended for an additional three months”. 45.  On 4 December 2002 the Vladimir Regional Court granted a further extension of the applicant's detention for three months, that is to say until 3 March 2003 [the decision mistakenly indicates 2002]. The grounds invoked by the court were identical to those set out in the decision of 18 November 2002. 46.  On 22 and 26 November and 5 December 2002 the applicant's lawyers lodged appeals against the decisions of 18 November and 4 December with the Supreme Court. They submitted, in particular, that the six-month period of the applicant's detention which had started from the moment the case was referred for trial, had expired on 2 March 2002 but had been extended only two months and sixteen days later, on 18 November. Therefore, the applicant's detention from 13 March to 12 September 2002 had not been covered by any detention order: the prosecution had not assumed responsibility for the case, whilst the courts considered that the case had been remitted for an additional investigation and held the prosecution accountable for the applicant's detention. 47.  On 3 March, 28 May, 28 August and 27 November 2003 and 27 February 2004 the Vladimir Regional Court authorised further extensions of detention in respect of the applicant and 12 co-defendants, on each occasion for a period of three months. The reasons given in the decisions of 3 March, 28 May and 28 August 2003 were identical to those given in the decisions of 18 November and 4 December 2002 (see above). The decisions of 27 November 2003 and 27 February 2004 referred to the gravity of the charges and the existence of “sufficient reasons to believe that the defendants would abscond”.\nThe applicant submitted appeals against each of these decisions. 48.  Between May 2003 and 15 March 2004 the trial proceeded. On 19 April 2004 the parties began their final submissions. 49.  On 28 May 2004 the Vladimir Regional Court, by an interim decision, held that the applicant's detention on remand was not to be extended because the prosecution had reduced the charges against him. He appears to have been released from custody the same day. 50.  On 21 March 2005 the Supreme Court examined the applicant's and/or his co-defendants' appeals against the decisions of 18 November and 4 December 2002, 3 March, 28 May, 28 August and 27 November 2003 and 27 February 2004 extending their detention on remand.\nThe Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 18 November and 4 December 2002 and 3 March 2003 on the ground that they had been given by an incomplete formation: a single judge instead of a three-judge panel. As regards the applicant's situation, it further held:\n“Since the judge's decision has been quashed because of a breach of the rules of criminal procedure, the court will not examine the arguments in the appeals alleging that the extension of the [applicant's] detention was unlawful on other grounds. The matter will not be remitted for a new examination because [the applicant] has been acquitted.”\nThe Supreme Court upheld the other decisions, finding that the Regional Court had correctly referred to the gravity of the charges and the existence of sufficient grounds to believe that the defendants would abscond during the trial. 51.  On 18 June 2004 the Vladimir Regional Court, by an interim decision, dismissed the charges of participation in an organised criminal enterprise and running an opium den against the applicant after they were withdrawn by the prosecution. 52.  By another interim decision of the same date, the court dismissed a charge against the applicant in respect of one incident of drug possession because of a recent change in the Russian criminal law that had decriminalised possession of negligible amounts of drugs. 53.  Finally, by a judgment of the same date, the court acquitted the applicant of the remaining drug-trafficking charges because his involvement in the commission of the offences could not be proven. Some of his co-defendants were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. 54.  On 21 March 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld, on appeal, the above judgment and decisions of the Vladimir Regional Court. 55.  On 10 December 2002 the Constitutional Court examined the applicant's complaint concerning his exclusion from the proceedings before the Supreme Court and confirmed that the applicant should have had the right to appear in person and plead his case before the court if a prosecutor was present. 56.  On 15 July 2003 the Constitutional Court issued decision (определение) no. 292-O on the applicant's complaint about the ex post facto extension of his “detention during trial” by the Regional Court's decision of 18 November 2002. It held as follows:\n“Article 255 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation provides that the [trial court] may... upon the expiry of six months after the case was sent to it, extend the defendant's detention for successive periods of up to three months. It does not contain, however, any provisions permitting the courts to take a decision extending the defendant's detention on remand once the previously authorised time-limit has expired, in which event the person is detained for a period without a judicial decision. Nor do other rules of criminal procedure provide for such a possibility. Moreover, Articles 10 § 2 and 109 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly require the court, prosecutor, investigator... to release anyone who is unlawfully held in custody beyond the time-limit established in the Code immediately. Such is also the requirement of Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the European Convention... which is an integral part of the legal system of the Russian Federation, pursuant to Article 15 § 4 of the Russian Constitution...” 57.  On 22 January 2004 the Constitutional Court delivered decision no. 66-O on the applicant's complaint about the Supreme Court's refusal to permit him to attend the appeal hearings on the issue of detention. It held:\n“Article 376 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulating the presence of a defendant remanded in custody before the appeal court... cannot be read as depriving the defendant held in custody... of the right to express his opinion to the appeal court, by way of his personal attendance at the hearing or by other lawful means, on matters relating to the examination of his complaint about a judicial decision affecting his constitutional rights and freedoms...” 58.  From 16 February 2000 to 28 May 2004 the applicant was held in detention facility no. OD-1/T-2 of the Vladimir Region (учреждение ОД‑1/Т-2 УИН МЮ РФ по Владимирской области), known as “Vladimirskiy Tsentral”. He stayed in various cells in wings nos. 3 and 4, built in 1870 and 1846, respectively.\n(a)  Number of inmates per cell 59.  According to a certificate issued on 22 April 2004 by the facility director, and which the Government have produced, the applicant was kept in eight cells described as follows: cell no. 4-14 (12.1 square metres, 6 bunks, average population 4 to 6 inmates), cell no. 4-13 (12.3 sq. m, 6 bunks, 5 to 7 inmates), cell no. 4-9 (23.4 sq. m, 13 bunks, 13 to 20 inmates), cells nos. 3-3, 3-53, 3-54, 3-51 and 3-52 (35 to 36 sq. m, 16 bunks, 12 to 18 inmates). 60.  The applicant did not dispute the cell measurements or the number of bunks. He disagreed, however, with the figure given by the Government for the number of inmates. According to him, between February and December 2000 he stayed in cell no. 4-9 that housed 18 to 35 inmates and between December 2000 and May 2004 he was kept in cells measuring approximately 36 sq. m, together with 20 to 40 other detainees. After the new Code of Criminal Procedure came into effect on 1 July 2002, the number of inmates in his cell dropped to between 15 and 25. Given the lack of beds, inmates slept in eight-hour shifts. They waited for their turn sitting on the concrete floor or on a stool if one was available.\nIn support of his statements the applicant produced written depositions by three former cellmates, Mr Abdurakhmon Kayumov, Mr Sergey Gunin and Mr Yan Kelerman. They stated, in particular, that in 2003-2004 cell no. 3-52 had housed 20 to 30 inmates (Mr Kayumov's deposition) or even 25 to 35 (Mr Gunin's deposition), as had cells nos. 3-51 and 3-53. They also testified that they and the other detainees had slept in turns.\n(b)  Sanitary conditions and installations 61.  The Government, relying on a certificate of 8 April 2004 from the facility director, submitted that the “sanitary and anti-epidemic condition of the facility remained satisfactory, including... in the cells where [the applicant] had been held”. Another certificate of 20 April 2004 showed that “the cells... were equipped with [a lavatory pan] placed no more than 10 cm above the floor and separated by a partition of 1.5 m in height with additional curtains”. Running tap water was available and detainees were permitted to use immersion heaters. 62.  The applicant conceded that there had been no outbreaks of contagious diseases or epidemics. Apart from that, the sanitary conditions were wholly unsatisfactory. Prisoners infected with tuberculosis, hepatitis, scabies and the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) were occasionally held in his cell. The cells were infested by lice, bed-bugs, flies, mosquitoes, cockroaches, rats and mice, but the facility administration did not provide any repellents or insecticides. Detainees were not given any toiletries, such as soap, toothbrush, toothpaste or toilet paper, apart from 100 grams of caustic soda once a week and two plastic bottles of bleach (1.5 litres each) every two or three months. Cells had no ventilation systems. In winter they were cold and in summer it was hot, stuffy and excessively damp inside. 63.  The applicant challenged the Government's description of the toilet facilities as factually untrue. The cast-iron pan was raised on a pedestal about 50-80 cm high and separated from the living area from one side with a one-metre-high partition. The person using the toilet was in full view of other inmates. No curtains were provided; occasionally the inmates hung a sheet but wardens tore it down and disciplined those responsible. What is more, the lavatory pan had no seat or cover: inmates stuck an empty plastic bottle in the hole in order to prevent smells from spreading. The dining table was fixed to the floor just a few metres from the pan. His description was corroborated by written depositions by former cellmates, Mr Kayumov, Mr Gunin, Mr Kelerman and Mr Sergey Kalenik, and four colour photos showing the lavatory pan and the dining table from various angles.\n(c)  Food 64.  The Government asserted that “the applicant was fed in accordance with the established legal norms”. It appears from an undated certificate signed by the facility director that his daily diet consisted of 100 g of meat, 100 g of fish, 100 g of groats, 20 g of pasta, 20 g of salt, 1 g of tea [sic], 0.5 kg of potatoes, 0.25 kg of vegetables, 0.55 kg of bread. 65.  The applicant submitted that the food was of an extremely low quality. Many a meal only contained so-called balanda, a soup-like mix of millet, barley and pasta without any fat. Meat was replaced with a soya substitute. No fresh vegetables were given, occasionally the evening meal included cooked beetroot, sauerkraut or pickled cucumbers. Salt and tea were never distributed. Written depositions by four of the applicant's former cellmates confirmed these submissions.\n(d)  Outdoor exercise 66.  The parties agreed that the applicant had been entitled to a daily walk of about one hour. The applicant indicated, however, that he was not able to go outdoors on days when there were court hearings. 67.  The Government did not describe the outdoor conditions. The applicant, and four former cellmates in written depositions, portrayed the following picture of the exercise yards: The yards were closed premises measuring 12, 26 or 40 sq. m. The opening to the sky was covered with a metal roof with a one-metre gap between the roof and the top of the walls. In summer it was extremely hot and stifling inside as the sun heated the roof. The walls were coated with so-called shuba, a sort of abrasive concrete lining, designed to prevent detainees from leaning on the walls. The entire cell population was brought to the yard at once; occasionally it was impossible to move around, let alone to exercise, because of the sheer number of prisoners.\n(e)  Other issues 68.  According to the applicant, metal blinds that prevented natural light getting into the cells were only removed on 28 December 2002 after a delegation that included a representative of the Council of Europe had paid a visit to Vladimir detention facilities. The Government did not contest that information.\n(f)  Contact with the outside world 69.  The applicant's relatives were not permitted to see him throughout the pre-trial investigation. After the trial began, he was allowed four short visits by his wife, children, sister and brother. At these meetings the applicant and his parents were prohibited from talking in any language other than Russian. The applicant was likewise prohibited from corresponding with his relatives other than in Russian: the facility administration refused to dispatch or hand over letters written in Tajik. 70.  The Government explained that these restrictions had been due to the lack of a staff interpreter from Tajik in the facility. 71.  The applicant was transported from the remand centre to the Vladimir Regional Court for hearings on 205 occasions; of these hearings, 185 concerned the charges against him and 20 applications for extensions of detention. The applicant offered the following description of these days, which was corroborated by written depositions from four former cellmates. 72.  On the day of the hearing he was woken up at 4 or 5 a.m. At about 8 a.m. he was taken from his cell to the so-called “assembly cell”, together with other detainees who had a hearing on that day. Each “assembly cell” measured 9.2 to 9.9 sq. m and housed 10 to 20 prisoners. “Assembly cells” had no ventilation system and the air was soon heavy with smoke. At about 9 or 9.30 a.m. the applicant was taken to a van. 73.  The prison van had one collective compartment designed for four prisoners and six individual compartments of one sq. m. It was designed to carry ten prisoners. However, it transported between 15 and 20 and on one occasion 27 detainees. The applicant was put in an individual compartment together with another prisoner. Owing to the lack of space, one of them would sit on the bench and the other on his lap. The route to the Vladimir Regional Court took one hour and the van called at other facilities on its way. 74.  The applicant did not normally arrive back at the prison until 6 or 8 p.m. During the day he received no food or outdoor exercise and was liable to miss out on the shower he was allowed periodically. 75.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been transported in special prison vans that met the standard requirements. The route from facility no. OD-1/T-2 to the Vladimir Regional Court was eight kilometres long and took thirty minutes.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Westcliff on Sea. 6.  On 30 April 1994 the applicant was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment for serious crimes including attempted murder, which carried a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Under the legislative regime applicable at the time, he became eligible for release on parole on 13 March 2002 and entitled to release on 18 March 2005 (see paragraphs 24 and 27 below). 7.  On 25 March 2002 the Parole Board recommended the applicant's release on parole on the grounds that the risk to the public had been significantly reduced; that the proposed resettlement plan would secure his rehabilitation; and that the applicant would comply with the licence conditions. 8.  Under the legislation in force at the time, the final decision on early release in cases involving prisoners serving determinate sentences (i.e. fixed-term sentences) of more than fifteen years' imprisonment lay with the Secretary of State (see paragraphs 27-29 below). For prisoners serving determinate sentences of less than fifteen years and for prisoners serving indeterminate (i.e. life) sentences, the approval of the Secretary of State following a positive recommendation of the Parole Board was not required. On 25 October 2002 the Secretary of State rejected the recommendation of the Parole Board in the applicant's case, concluding that the release of the applicant would present an unacceptable risk to the public. As a result, the applicant was not released. 9.  On 17 February 2003, the applicant was granted leave to bring judicial review proceedings in respect of the decision of the Secretary of State to refuse his early release. His principal ground of challenge was that it was a breach of Article 5 of the Convention taken together with Article 14 that the Secretary of State should retain the power to determine the release on parole licence of only one group of prisoners, i.e. those who were serving determinate terms of imprisonment of fifteen years or more (see paragraphs 23-31 below for details of the law in force at the relevant time). 10.  The Parole Board subsequently reconsidered the applicant's case and on 17 March 2003 did not recommend release. The Court has not been provided with details of the reasons for this decision. 11.  On 9 June 2003, the Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review claim. For the purposes of the proceedings, the Secretary of State accepted that the question of early release from a determinate sentence fell within the ambit of Article 5 of the Convention and that Article 14 was therefore engaged. Hooper J found that there was differential treatment between analogous groups, namely those serving sentences of fifteen years or more and those serving sentences of almost fifteen years, in that prisoners serving sentences of fifteen years or more had to secure a recommendation from the Parole Board and approval from the Secretary of State whereas those serving almost fifteen years needed only a recommendation from the Parole Board. However, he considered that the differential treatment pursued the legitimate aim of reserving to a politically and democratically accountable minister the power to control the release of those serving long determinate sentences. He further considered that the power was proportionate in light of the problems posed by such prisoners for public safety and public order. Accordingly, he found that there was no violation of Article 5 together with Article 14. 12.  On 30 October 2003, the applicant was granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 13.  The Parole Board subsequently reconsidered the applicant's case and on 25 February 2004 once again recommended the applicant's release. On this occasion the Secretary of State accepted the recommendation, and on 10 March 2004 Mr Clift was released on licence. 14.  On 29 April 2004, the Court of Appeal endorsed the judgment of Hooper J and dismissed the applicant's appeal. It found the question of release from a determinate sentence to be arguably within the ambit of Article 5 of the Convention and agreed with Hooper J that although there was differential treatment between two comparable groups, this difference in treatment was objectively justified in that it pursued a legitimate aim and was proportionate. 15.  The applicant was granted leave to appeal to the House of Lords. 16.  On 13 December 2006, their Lordships unanimously dismissed the applicant's appeal. They agreed that the right to seek early release, where domestic law provided for such a right, was clearly within the ambit of Article 5 of the Convention. Lord Bingham of Cornhill noted (at paragraphs 17-18):\n“The Convention does not require member states to establish a scheme for early release of those sentenced to imprisonment. Prisoners may, consistently with the Convention, be required to serve every day of the sentence passed by the judge, or be detained until a predetermined period or proportion of the sentence has been served, if that is what domestic law provides. But this is not what the law of England and Wales provided, in respect of long-term determinate prisoners, at the times relevant to these appeals. That law provided for a time at which (subject to additional days of custody imposed for disciplinary breaches) a prisoner must, as a matter of right, be released, and an earlier time at which he might be released if it was judged safe to release him but at which he need not be released if it was not so judged.\n  A number of grounds (economy and the need to relieve over-crowding in prisons) have doubtless been relied on when introducing pre-release schemes from determinate sentences such as those under consideration here. But one such consideration is recognition that neither the public interest nor the interest of the offender is well served by continuing to detain a prisoner until the end of his publicly pronounced sentence; that in some cases those interests will be best served by releasing the prisoner at the earlier, discretionary, stage; and that in those cases prisoners should regain their freedom (even if subject to restrictions) because there is judged to be no continuing interest in depriving them of it. I accordingly find that the right to seek early release, where domestic law provides for such a right, is clearly within the ambit of article 5, and differential treatment of one prisoner as compared with another, otherwise than on the merits of their respective cases, gives rise to a potential complaint under article 14.” 17.  However, unlike the lower courts, and with some hesitation, their Lordships did not find the difference in treatment in the applicant's case to be the result of his “status”, such as to fall within the prohibition on discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention. Lord Bingham said (at paragraph 28):\n“I do not think that a personal characteristic can be defined by the differential treatment of which a person complains. But here Mr Clift does not complain of the sentence passed upon him, but of being denied a definitive Parole Board recommendation. Is his classification as a prisoner serving a determinate sentence of 15 years or more (but less than life) a personal characteristic? I find it difficult to apply so elusive a test. But I would incline to regard a life sentence as an acquired personal characteristic and a lifer as having an 'other status', and it is hard to see why the classification of Mr Clift, based on the length of his sentence and not the nature of his offences, should be differently regarded. I think, however, that a domestic court should hesitate to apply the Convention in a manner not, as I understand, explicitly or impliedly authorised by the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and I would accordingly, not without hesitation, resolve this question in favour of the Secretary of State and against Mr Clift.” 18.  Lord Hope of Craighead made similar observations (at paragraphs 46-49):\n“It could be said in Mr Clift's case that the length of his sentence did confer a status on him which can be regarded as a personal characteristic. This is because prisoners are divided by the domestic system into broadly defined categories, or groups of people, according to the nature or the length of their sentences. These categories affect the way they are then dealt with throughout the period of their sentences. As a result they are regarded as having acquired a distinctive status which attaches itself to them personally for the purposes of the regime in which they are required to serve their sentences. This is most obviously so in the case of prisoners serving life sentences and where distinctions are drawn between short-term and long-term prisoners serving determinate sentences. It is less obviously so in the case of long-term prisoners serving determinate sentences of different lengths.\nIt must be accepted, as Lord Bingham points out, that a personal characteristic cannot be defined by the differential treatment of which a person complains. It is plain too that the category of long-term prisoner into which Mr Clift's case falls would not have been recognised as a separate category had it not been for the Order which treats prisoners in his group differently from others in the enjoyment of their fundamental right to liberty. But he had already been sentenced, and he had already acquired the status which that sentence gave him before the Order was made that denied prisoners in his group the right to release on the recommendation of the Parole Board. The question which his case raises is whether the distinguishing feature or characteristic which enables persons or a group of persons to be singled out for separate treatment must have been identified as a personal characteristic before it is used for this purpose by the discriminator.\nThe function of article 14, read with article 1 of the Convention, is to secure to everyone within the jurisdiction of the High Contracting Parties the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set out in section 1 of the Convention without discrimination on grounds which, having regard to the underlying values of the Convention, must be regarded as unacceptable. This suggests that a generous meaning should be given to the words 'or other status' while recognising, of course, that the proscribed grounds are not unlimited. It seems to me, on this approach, that the protection of article 14 ought not to be denied just because the distinguishing feature which enabled the discriminator to treat persons or groups of persons differently in the enjoyment of their Convention rights had not previously been recognised.\nBut the Strasbourg jurisprudence has not yet addressed this question and, as my noble and learned friend Baroness Hale of Richmond points out, it is possible to regard what he has done, rather than who or what he is, as the true reason for the difference of treatment in Mr Clift's case ... [T]he duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time. A measure of self-restraint is needed, lest we stretch our own jurisprudence beyond that which is shared by all the States Parties to the Convention. I am persuaded, with some reluctance, that it is not open to us to resolve the second agreed issue in Mr Clift's favour.” 19.  Baroness Hale of Richmond considered (at paragraphs 62-63) that:\n“it is plain ... that a different parole regime for foreigners who are liable to deportation from that applicable to citizens or others with the right to remain here, falls within the grounds proscribed by article 14 and thus ... requires objective justification. The same would surely apply to a difference in treatment based on race, sex or the colour of one's hair. But a difference in treatment based on the seriousness of the offence would fall outside those grounds. The real reason for the distinction is not a personal characteristic of the offender but what the offender has done.\nThe result is that the difference of treatment between Mr Clift and people sentenced either to shorter determinate sentences or to life imprisonment is not covered by article 14 at all. The law may look odd. But not every apparent anomaly is a breach of Convention rights. This one is the result of what the Home Secretary chose to do in relation to people sentenced to shorter terms of imprisonment and what he was obliged by the terms of article 5 itself to do in relation to life imprisonment. The law has since been changed and one can well understand why. But it is not for us to declare legislation which Parliament has passed incompatible with the Convention rights unless the Convention and its case law require us so to do. For the reasons given above, in amplification of those given by my noble and learned friend, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, we are not required to do so in this case.” 20.  Notwithstanding the conclusion of the House as to the applicability of Article 14, Lords Bingham and Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood went on to consider whether, had there been “status”, the difference in treatment would have been objectively justified. Lord Bingham (at paragraph 33) was of the view that:\n“When, in October 2002, the Secretary of State rejected the Parole Board's recommendation that Mr Clift be released on parole, discretionary lifers and HMP detainees had already been brought within the definitive jurisdiction of the Parole Board, and Stafford v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1121, requiring the same procedure for mandatory lifers, had already been decided. The differential treatment of prisoners serving 15 years or more had, in my opinion, become an anomaly. That would not, in itself, be a ground for holding it to be unjustified. Anomalies are commonplace. But by 2002 it had, in my opinion, become an indefensible anomaly because it had by then come to be recognised that assessment of the risk presented by any individual prisoner, in the application of publicly promulgated criteria, was a task with no political content and one to which the Secretary of State could not (and did not claim to) bring any superior expertise. I would accordingly resolve this issue in favour of Mr Clift and against the Secretary of State.” 21.  Lord Brown agreed with the conclusion of Lord Bingham.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 13 December 1994, the applicant sold a horse to A.G. for PLN 2,500. Two days later the buyer returned the horse claiming that it was ill. The applicant was therefore forced to pay the costs of the horse’s upkeep during the following year. As A.G. constantly refused to take the horse back, the applicant sold it to another buyer, as he could not afford the costs of upkeep. 5.  On 25 January 1995 A.G. lodged a suit against the applicant with the Tarnobrzeg District Court, claiming payment of the price. 6.  On 14 March 1995 the applicant lodged a counter-claim for costs of the upkeep of the horse. 7.  During the first hearing on 15 March 1995 the court admitted witness evidence and adjourned the case. 8.  On 5 April 1995 the court heard witnesses and adjourned the case. 9.  On 22 May 1995 the court admitted in evidence an opinion of a veterinary surgeon and adjourned the case. 10.  On 25 July 1995 the expert submitted the opinion, stating that the horse was well and had never been ill. 11.  On 6 September 1995 the court called an expert in agriculture, who estimated that the costs of upkeep of the horse had greatly exceeded its value. The court adjourned the case. 12.  On 2 October 1995 the court heard the parties. 13.  On 11 October 1995 the court delivered a judgment. Both parties appealed. 14.  On 28 March 1996 the Tarnobrzeg Regional Court returned the case file to the District Court to have it completed. 15.  On 5 September 1996 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 16.  On 16 January 1997 the parties declared that they could not reach a friendly settlement. 17.  On 9 October 1997 the court admitted the evidence of a witness and adjourned the case. 18.  On 10 February 1997 a witness was heard and the case was adjourned. 19.  On 9 April 1998 further witnesses were heard. 20.  On 2 June 1998 the court admitted in evidence another expert’s opinion. 21.  On 18 January 1999 the expert submitted the opinion. 22.  On 31 March 1999 the court summoned the expert and adjourned the case. 23.  On 5 May 1999 the court found that the plaintiff had not paid an advance for the expert’s opinion and adjourned the case until 2 June 1999. The expert failed to attend the hearing on that day and the case was adjourned until 25 June. 24.  On 19 November 1999 the District Court delivered a judgment, ordering PLN 4,690 to be paid by the applicant with interest from 1995, and 903 PLN to be paid by A.G. to the applicant. 25.  On 13 April 2000 the Tarnobrzeg Regional Court dismissed the appeals of both parties.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lived until his arrest in the town of Astrakhan. 7.  On 2 March 2003 the office of the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor of Astrakhan opened a criminal investigation into the murder of Ms P. 8.  On 6 March 2003 the applicant was arrested and taken to the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department. According to the applicant, police officers severely beat him up to ferret out information and elicit a confession to the murder. Being unable to bear the beatings, on 8 March 2003 he wrote a statement confessing to having fired his rifle at a window of Ms P's house. He claimed that he had not intended to kill anyone. 9.  On 8 March 2003 an investigator drew up a report restating the applicant's confession. The applicant signed the report and filed a written request for provision of assistance by a lawyer, Mr C. He noted that he had confessed under duress and that the investigator had not informed him of his rights as an accused, in violation of Article 51 of the Russian Constitution. 10.  On the same day a deputy Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor filed an application with the Chernoyarskiy District Court, seeking authorisation of the applicant's detention for an additional forty-eight hours. The applicant's lawyer, Mr C., disputed the necessity to detain the applicant. In addition, he drew the District Court's attention to the applicant's appearance, arguing that the police officers had maltreated the applicant to force him to confess to the murder. While accepting the deputy prosecutor's request, the District Court held, inter alia, that the applicant had left the crime scene and had hidden the crime weapon and that therefore he was liable to abscond and pervert the course of justice. 11.  On 11 March 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court authorised the applicant's further detention on remand, holding as follows:\n“At the same time the court considers that the materials presented by the investigating authorities - records of investigative actions and operative measures - make it sufficiently clear that the arrest of [the applicant], that is the person who may have taken part in the above-mentioned criminal offence, was well-founded and taking into account the particular dangerousness of that criminal offence committed in grave circumstances, belonging to the category of particularly serious criminal offences, the court concludes that it is impossible to apply another, more lenient, preventive measure to [the applicant].”\nThe applicant and his lawyer, Mr C., attended the hearing. The decision was upheld on appeal on 20 March 2003. 12.  As shown by an extract from the registration log drawn up in the detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department and presented by the Government, on 9 March 2003, at approximately 7.25 p.m., an ambulance was called to the applicant, who was complaining about a headache. The ambulance was called again at 11.55 a.m. and 9.30 p.m. on 12 March 2003. In response to the morning call an emergency doctor noted in the registration log that the applicant was suffering from neurasthenia syndrome and high blood pressure. On the latter occasion, a doctor made an entry in the registration log, noting that the applicant had refused a medical examination and assistance. According to the applicant, an emergency doctor did not want to record his head injury out of fear of reprisal. 13.  On 13 March 2003 a police officer working in the detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department reported to the head of the police department as follows:\n“... during my duty in the detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department from 6.00 p.m. on 12 March 2003 to 9.00 a.m. on 13 March 2003 [the applicant] was in cell no. 1; [he] started hitting his head against a wall; [he] did not respond to orders [prompting him] to stop his actions. I reported to the officer on duty in the [police department] about [the applicant's] actions; after that [the applicant] was transferred to a cell for administrative arrestees. On 13 March 2003, at 8.50 a.m., during the replacement of duty officers, [the applicant] started hitting his head against the metal bar in the cell for administrative arrestees, thus causing a head injury.\nI, together with a staff sergeant, police officer, Mr L., and police officer, Mr M., stopped his actions and applied special means, handcuffs. [The applicant] was provided with first aid. After that an ambulance was called.” 14.  On the same day an escorting police officer, Mr M., wrote a report addressed to the head of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department. The report read as follows:\n“[I] hereby inform you that on 13 March 2003, after the transfer, at approximately 8.50 a.m., an arrestee, [the applicant], was in a cell for administrative arrestees. [He] started hitting his head against a metal bar, thus causing injuries to himself. After that special means, handcuffs, were applied to [the applicant] and first aid was provided.”\nAnother escorting officer, Mr Po., submitted an identically worded report. 15.  An officer on duty made an entry in the registration log, stating that an ambulance was called to the applicant on 13 March 2003, at 9.40 a.m., in response to “a fit of hysteria, injuries to the scalp, brain concussion”. 16.  According to the applicant, his brother, who is a resuscitation specialist, visited him on 14 March 2003 in the detention unit and saw his numerous injuries. The applicant complained to his brother that police officers had repeatedly hit him on the head with a small plastic bottle filled with water. On the same day the applicant was taken to the Chernoyarskiy District Central Hospital. His state of health was considered to be critical. On the following day he was transferred to the resuscitation unit of the neurosurgery department of Astrakhan Regional Hospital no. 2. The applicant was in a coma of the second degree. The relevant part of an extract from medical history no. 1069/298 drawn up in the neurosurgery department read as follows:\n“A patient [the applicant], was undergoing in-patient treatment from 15 March to 10 April 2003. When admitted [to the hospital], he did not make any complaints because of his grave condition. According to the escorting persons, a week before his admission [to the hospital], while under arrest, the patient had hit his head against bars... During the treatment the patient stated that he had been beaten up by police officers.\nObjectively: The general condition is grave... Locally: [there are] vast bruises, measuring from 3 to 5 centimetres, on the skin of the frontoparietal sphere; [the bruises] are covered with brown scab. There are subcutaneous yellow haematomas, measuring 4 centimetres [in width] and 5 centimetres [in length], in the middle one-third of the right forearm; in the middle one-third of the left shoulder there is a subcutaneous yellow haematoma, measuring 2 centimetres [in width] and 2 centimetres [in length]. [There is] a subcutaneous haematoma, measuring 4 centimetres [in width] and 5 centimetres [in length], on the chest (with hemosiderin). [The patient] does not control the functions of his pelvic organs, he urinates uncontrollably...\nDiagnosis: A brain injury of medium severity. A subarachnoid haematoma. Injuries, bruises to the head and extremities.”\nOn 19 April 2003 the applicant was transferred from the hospital back to the detention unit. 17.  In the meantime, on 15 March 2003 the head of the duty shift of the duty unit in the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department issued a report which read as follows:\n“[I] hereby inform you that on 15 March 2003 information was received from the duty unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department that [the applicant] had been arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence proscribed by Article 105 of the Russian Criminal Code; [he], in the detention unit of the police department, had injured himself, having hit his head against the walls; after that [he] had been admitted to Chernoyarskiy District Central Hospital, from which, within a day, he had been transferred to a medical institution in Astrakhan – hospital no. 2; [he had been escorted] by two armed police officers... [The applicant's] preliminary diagnosis is a craniocerebral injury”. 18.  On the same day an investigator of the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor's office, in the presence of two attesting witnesses and an expert criminologist, examined the premises of the detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department. The examination record contained a lengthy description of the corridors, duty offices and cells. The relevant part of the record read as follows:\n“...the entrance to [the cell for administrative detainees] is through a metal lattice door which is built from metal reinforcement bars welded together. The cell is a room with concrete walls... During the examination of the cell entrance door a fallow stain, looking like blood [and] measuring 0.7 centimetre, was discovered on the door at a height of 1.30 metre from the floor, 0.85 metre from the upper part of the door and 1.15 metre from the right wall. During the examination of the metal bars of that cell a fallow stain, looking like blood and measuring 2 centimetres in width and 2.5 centimetres in length, was discovered at a height of 1.30 metre from the floor and 1.15 metre from the adjacent right wall. ... blood was collected from the scene and bagged.\n...\nDuring the examination of cell no. 1, fallow stains looking like blood and measuring 1 centimetre to 1 centimetre, 3 centimetres to 3 centimetres were discovered in the far right corner of the cell, on the right wall, 2.5 centimetres from the wall, facing the entrance, and 25 centimetres from the wooden bunk. Those stains are located 5 centimetres from each other. That substance was collected from the scene and bagged.” 19.  On 8 March 2003 the applicant's lawyer, Mr C., filed a complaint with the prosecution authorities, alleging that the applicant had been severely beaten up in the police station after his arrest and asking for the identification of the police officers who had participated in the beatings.\n(a)  Decision of 17 March 2003 and subsequent court proceedings 20.  On 17 March 2003 an investigator of the Chernoyarskiy District prosecutor's office dismissed the complaint about the beatings as unsubstantiated. The investigator based his decision on the following evidence:\n- Statements by the police officers who had claimed that on 12 March 2003 the applicant, who had been detained in cell no. 1, had begun hitting his head against a wall. He had ignored policemen's orders to discontinue the unlawful behaviour and had been transferred to a special cell for administrative detainees, so that the police officers could observe him and prevent him from hurting himself. In the cell for administrative detainees the applicant had once again begun hitting his head against metal bars. Handcuffs had been applied to him and he had been provided with medical assistance.\n- Testimony by the applicant's fellow inmate, Mr I., who testified that on 12 March 2003 he had been detained in cell no. 1 together with the applicant. At approximately 10 p.m. the applicant had begun hitting his head against a wall. Mr I. had called the officer on duty and the applicant had been transferred to another cell. Mr I. noted that he had not seen or heard whether the policemen had beaten the applicant up.\n- Testimony by an emergency doctor, Mr B., who stated that on 12 March 2003, at approximately 10.20 p.m., he had arrived at the Chernoyarkiy District Police Department. The officer on duty had asked him and his colleagues to provide the applicant with medical assistance. According to the officer on duty, the applicant had not felt well. Mr B. had attempted to examine the applicant, but the latter had refused any examination. During the visual examination of the applicant's head, Mr B. had not noticed any injuries. The applicant had been very agitated.\n- Statements by an emergency doctor, Ms K., who stated that on 13 March 2003, at approximately 9.30 a.m., she had received a call from the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department. She had been informed that a detainee had hit his head against a wall. When she had arrived at the police department, she had seen the applicant sitting on a chair with his hands handcuffed behind his back and with his head on a pillow. The applicant had been very nervous and had tried to break away. She had examined him and discovered three parallel injuries in the fibrous part of his head. She had made a bandage and given him an injection of relanium. The applicant had been diagnosed with a fit of hysteria and prescribed an examination by a surgeon and a neuropathologist.\n- The record of the examination of the detention unit, including the cells where the applicant had been detained, performed on 15 March 2003.\n- An expert report, according to which stains discovered during the examination of the cells in the detention unit on 15 March 2003 consisted of the blood of a person, “not excluding the applicant”. 21.  The applicant only learned about the decision of 17 March 2003 in July 2003 and on 18 August 2003 his lawyer appealed against that decision to a court. 22.  On 22 August 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court annulled the decision of 17 March 2003, noting procedural defects in the investigator's decision, and ordered an additional investigation into the applicant's ill-treatment complaints.\n(b)  Decision of 12 September 2003 23.  On 12 September 2003, following an additional investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, an investigator of the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor's office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers, finding no case to be answered. In addition to the witnesses' statements which had served as the basis for the decision of 17 March 2003, the investigator relied on the following evidence:\n- Additional statements by an emergency doctor, Mr B., who stressed that the applicant had not had any visible injuries, including on the head, when Mr B. had seen him on 12 March 2003, at approximately 10.20 p.m..\n- Statements by Mr S., who testified that he had been detained in cell no. 1 with the applicant and Mr I. On a date which Mr S. had been unable to recall, the applicant, lying on the bunk, had begun hitting his head against a wall. He had hit his head three or four times and had broken the skin on the head. Mr S. and Mr I. had called an officer on duty and asked to transfer the applicant to another cell. Their request had been satisfied. No force had been used against the applicant.\n- Additional testimony by Mr I., who confirmed statements given by Mr S..\n- Statements by a psychiatrist, Ms E., who submitted that on 14 March 2003 she had examined the applicant who had acted normally and answered her questions. He had complained about pain in a hip. She had examined him but had found no injuries on his hip. The applicant had had an injury on the fibrous part of his head. The injury had been medically treated.\n- Statements by an escorting officer, Mr La., who noted that on 13 March 2003, at approximately 10.20 p.m., he had noticed that the applicant, who had been lying on the bunk, had started hitting his head against the wall. The applicant had been transferred to a cell for administrative arrestees. On 14 March 2003, at approximately 8.00 a.m., the applicant had grabbed the metal bars with his hands and had begun hitting his head against the bars. A police officer, Mr Lu., had stuck his hands between the bars to stop the applicant from hurting himself. At the same time, the applicant, trying to overcome Mr Lu.'s resistance, began throwing himself against the metal bars. Mr La. with the assistance from officers M. and Po. had dragged the applicant from the metal bars and had started holding him. The applicant had tried to resist the officers, attempting to hit his head against the bars. Mr Po. had run to the duty unit to call an ambulance. Mr La. had taken a towel and had attempted to stop the bleeding. Doctors had arrived at 9.20 p.m. They had unbound the injury and had applied on a bandage. After the doctors had left, soft items had been placed around the applicant and a pillow had been put under his head.\n- Similar statements given by the police officer, Mr Po. 24.  On 25 September 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor annulled the decision of 12 September 2003 and ordered that an expert medical examination be performed and that an expert answer questions as to how the applicant had received the injuries, how grave the injuries had been and whether they could have resulted from his own actions.\n(c)  Decision of 30 September 2003 25.  On 30 September 2003 an investigator of the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor's office once again dismissed the applicant's request for institution of criminal proceedings. The investigator based his decision on the statements by the witnesses which had appeared in the decisions of 17 March and 12 September 2003 and on an expert medical opinion. 26.  According to the expert report of 29 September 2003, the applicant had had the following injuries: a closed craniocerebral injury with a brain injury of medium severity, a subarachnoid haematoma in the right occipital region of the head, bruises on the frontoparietal sphere, an injury in the middle one-third of the right forearm and an injury in the middle one-third of the left shoulder. The head injuries had been caused by a firm blunt object (objects), as a result of the applicant's falling on a surface or owing to “free concussion of the head by a blunt object”. The expert concluded that the most probable cause of the closed craniocerebral injury had been the applicant's own actions, without any “external action”. As regards the remaining injuries, the expert considered that they had also been caused by the application of a firm blunt object (or objects) and that it had been impossible to establish the exact date when they had been caused. The expert did not exclude the possibility that the applicant could also have self-inflicted those injuries. 27.  The applicant's lawyers appealed against the decision of 30 September 2003 to the Chernoyarskiy District Court, arguing that no steps had been taken to investigate the applicant's allegations that he had been beaten between 6 and 8 March 2003, although that issue had already been raised before the prosecution authorities by the applicant's lawyer, Mr C., on 8 March 2003. They pointed to the fact that the investigators had never interviewed the applicant about the events in March 2003. 28.  On 25 November 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court held that the decision of 30 September 2003 had been lawful and substantiated. However, it noted that the investigator had not questioned the applicant in connection with his complaints about the confession under duress, neither had he questioned two police officers who had been present during the applicant's confession. The District Court concluded that the investigator should perform an additional investigation. 29.  On 10 December 2003 the prosecutor of the Chernoyarskiy District, relying on the court's decision of 25 November 2003, annulled the decision of 30 September 2003 and ordered an additional investigation into the applicant's complaints about beatings. 30.  On 22 January 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court quashed the District Court's decision of 25 November 2003 and remitted the matter for a fresh examination. The Regional Court held that on 25 November 2003 the District Court had failed to substantiate its conclusions concerning the lawfulness of the investigator's decision of 30 September 2003. The Regional Court also pointed out that the District Court had made contradictory findings. 31.  On 18 February 2004 the Chernoyarskiy District Court re-examined the decision of 30 September 2003 and considered it to be lawful and well-founded. 32.  On 22 July 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court upheld the decision of 18 February 2004. The Regional Court held that the District Court had taken into consideration and assessed all the circumstances of the applicant's case which could have influenced the District Court's conclusions.\n(d)  Decision of 15 December 2003 33.  On 15 December 2003, following an additional investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, an assistant Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor dismissed the applicant's ill-treatment allegations. The assistant concluded that “no injuries had been caused to [the applicant] by the police officers in the period from 6 to 8 March 2003” and that the injuries which had been discovered on the applicant's body on 13 March 2003 had resulted from his own actions. The assistant based his decision on the same evidence as the decisions of 17 March, 12 and 30 September 2003. In addition, he had questioned the applicant, police officers who had witnessed the applicant confessing on 8 March 2003, the emergency doctor, Mr B., and an expert who had examined the applicant on 9 March 2003. Those statements were as follows:\n- The applicant testified that between 6 and 8 March 2003 police officers had severely beaten him up in the police station in an attempt to extract a confession from him. On 8 March 2003, after the first meeting with his lawyer, Mr C., he had complained about the beatings to a prosecutor. On 9 March 2003 he had been examined by a medical expert. He had complained to the expert about pain in the head, neck, chest and right hip; however, the expert had only examined his head. On the same day he had again been beaten up by a police officer, Mr Po. According to the applicant, several days later two police officers had lifted him up and had thrown him against metal bars in a cell for administrative arrestees. The applicant had lost consciousness. When he had regained consciousness, he had discovered that he had been handcuffed to a metal bar. He had fainted again and had only regained consciousness in the hospital.\n- Mr B., the emergency doctor, supplemented his previous statement. He noted that on 9 March 2003, at approximately 7.20 p.m., he had been called to the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department to assist the applicant who had been complaining about a headache. He had examined the applicant and had not discovered any injuries on his body and head. On 12 March 2003, at approximately 10.20 p.m., he had again been called to the Police Department to treat the applicant. The latter had not had any injuries.\n- The expert stated that on 9 March 2003 an investigator and police officers had brought the applicant for a medical examination. In their presence he had examined the applicant, who had complained about the pain in the head and right hip. The applicant had refused to explain the nature and cause of the pain. The expert had examined the applicant's chest, stomach, back, legs, hands, head and neck and had not discovered any injuries. 34.  The decision of 15 December 2003 was not served on the applicant or his lawyer. On 29 and 30 December 2003 the lawyer unsuccessfully asked the prosecutor to issue him with a copy of the decision of 15 December 2003. 35.  On 7 October 2004, upon the applicant's complaint, the Chernoyarskiy District Court examined the decision of 15 December 2003 and considered it lawful. The District Court held as follows:\n“Having heard the parties and studied the case-file, the court decides to dismiss the complaint. The court is taking this decision on the basis of the materials in the case-file submitted and examined at the court hearing.\nOn 10 December 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor decided to annul the decision of 30 September 2003 and to perform an additional investigation into the events concerning the infliction of injuries on [the applicant]. An assistant prosecutor, Ms S., was entrusted with the performance of the investigation. In the course of the investigation certain violations of the law, which had occurred during the investigation,... [leading] to the decision of 30 September 2003, were remedied. Thus [the investigator] questioned [the applicant], the police officers, the emergency doctors and other persons who had been present in the cell of the temporary detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department during the infliction of injuries by [the applicant].\nAssessing the foregoing, the court does not doubt the impartiality of the investigator Ms S. who performed the investigation... The statements by the police officers, the emergency doctors and staff of the temporary detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department, as well as by the detainees Mr S. and Mr I., do not contradict each other and draw a full picture of the events leading to the self-infliction of the injuries by [the applicant]...” 36.  On 2 December 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court quashed the decision of 7 October and remitted the matter for a fresh examination. 37.  On 11 February 2005 the Chernoyarskiy District Court again dismissed the applicant's complaint about the decision of 15 December 2003. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“Having examined the arguments of the defence, as stated in their complaint, having heard the submissions of the Chernoyarskiy District Prosecutor, and having studied the material in the case-file, the court draws the following conclusion.\nOn 6 March 2003 [the applicant] was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence, as provided for by paragraph 2 of Article 105 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. On 8 March 2003 he wrote a confession statement. The lawyer in his complaint argues that [the applicant] made this confession under duress inflicted by the police officers. However, this fact was not proven by the documents included with the material of the investigation. Upon the lawyer's request, a forensic medical examination was ordered; as shown by [the expert] report of 9 March 2003, at the time of his examination, [the applicant] did not have any injuries... Moreover, that expert examination fully excluded the possibility of [the applicant's] severe systematic beatings, torture and psychological pressure by the policemen in order to force him to confess to the murder of Ms P.\nAs shown by the material of the investigation examined by the court, [the applicant] received injuries on 13-14 March 2003; that is confirmed by the emergency doctor Ms K., the police officers Mr M., Mr Lu., Mr Sm., and by the forensic medical expert report of 29 September 2003. The determination of the means of infliction of injuries lies within the competence of the expert... The expert report can only be assessed in the course of the [applicant's] trial. The fact that [the applicant] caused the injuries to himself on 13-14 March 2003 is confirmed by the statements of Mr S. and Mr I. who had been detained together with [the applicant] in cell no. 1 in the temporary detention unit of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department; [Mr S. and Mr I.] stated that [the applicant] had begun hitting his head against a wall without any apparent reason.\nMoreover, the defence did not provide any reason for inflicting injuries on [the applicant] on 13-14 March 2003, that is after he had confessed to having murdered Ms P. (the confession statement was made on 8 March 2003), the defence did not substantiate what was the aim of torturing [the applicant] in the [later] period.\nIn such circumstances, the court is of the opinion that the defence's arguments about the unlawfulness and unreasonableness of the decision of 15 December 2003 of the assistant prosecutor Ms S. ... were not corroborated and the complaint is to be dismissed.” 38.  On 23 April 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court refused to release the applicant. While finding that the applicant had been charged with a particularly serious criminal offence and that there was a risk of his absconding and perverting the course of justice, having regard to his previous behaviour, the District Court also noted that the applicant had to undergo a forensic psychiatric examination. It thus concluded that he should remain in detention pending such an examination. During the hearing the applicant's lawyer argued that the applicant lived in a local village and could promptly arrive at the prosecutor's office when summoned. He was also in need of lengthy rehabilitation treatment in a neurosurgery department. Such treatment was not available in the temporary detention unit. The prosecutor's office provided the District Court with assurances that necessary medical assistance, including assistance by neurosurgeons, was available to the applicant in the local prison hospital. 39.  On 30 April 2003 the District Court extended the applicant's detention until 6 June 2003. It held that the applicant had been charged with a serious criminal offence, had fled the crime scene and had hidden the crime weapon. The District Court concluded that the materials presented by the prosecution and the results of investigative measures sufficiently corroborated the conclusion that the applicant was liable to abscond, influence witnesses and obstruct justice. It stressed that the investigating authorities had to perform a number of investigative actions with which the applicant could interfere if released. Moreover, the District Court once again noted that the applicant had to remain in detention pending the forensic psychiatric examination. 40.  On 3 June, 1 August and 1 September 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court, by decisions similarly worded to the one issued on 30 April 2003, extended the applicant's detention until 6 August, 6 September and 6 November 2003, respectively. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer appealed against those detention orders. 41.  On 15 October 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's application for release, holding that he had been charged with a particularly serious criminal offence and was liable to obstruct justice and influence witnesses. The District Court also noted that the applicant was undergoing medical treatment in the Regional prison hospital and investigative actions could not be performed in his absence. 42.  On 13 November 2003 the Astrakhan Regional Court quashed the decision of 15 October 2003 and remitted the matter for fresh examination. The Regional Court noted that the District Court had not provided any reasoning for its findings and had also failed to examine the actual state of the applicant's health and whether he could be provided with adequate treatment in detention. It also pointed to the District Court's failure to address the possibility of the applicant's release under recognisance offered by local MPs and the Astrakhan Regional Ombudsman. 43.  On 24 November 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court dismissed the request for release. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“Taking into consideration copies of the material in the criminal case file examined at the hearing - records of investigative actions and decisions of the pre-trial investigation organs and a court - the court notes that [the applicant] has been charged with a particularly serious criminal offence, which presents great public danger; as can be seen from the decision of 11 March 2003, when determining the issue of the preventive measure [to be imposed on the applicant], the pre-trial investigation bodies had provided the court with the material from the investigative actions which contained objective data allowing the conclusion that the accused, if released, could obstruct justice in the case and influence witnesses. During the pre-trial investigation in the case until the present time that information has existed among the material in the case file. The fact that the decision of 11 March 2003 became final confirms that [the applicant's] family situation, his place of residence and personal characteristics were taken into account when determining the possible preventive measure. The court notes that at the present time the family situation and the personal characteristics of the accused have not changed. [The applicant's] illness cannot serve as the reason for his release, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nMoreover, according to the decision of the Chernoyarskiy District Court of 31 October 2003 [the applicant's] detention on remand was extended until 6 December 2003. That decision was upheld on appeal by the Astrakhan Regional Court on 10 November 2003. Those decisions established that [the applicant's] detention had been authorised and extended reasonably and in accordance with the law on criminal procedure ...\nThe court notes that the fact that the pre-trial investigation ended and that the applicant started reading the case file cannot serve as evidence to show that the grounds for [the applicant's] detention in the present case ceased to exist ...” 44.  On 18 December 2003 the Astrakhan Regional Court disallowed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 24 November 2003 because the statement of appeal did not satisfy the requirements of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 45.  On 31 October 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court extended the applicant's detention until 6 December 2003, holding that the applicant had been charged with an especially serious criminal offence and that there had been grounds, as confirmed by the decision of 11 March 2003, to conclude that, if released, he was liable to obstruct justice and influence witnesses. On 10 November 2003 the Astrakhan Regional Court, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court, upheld the decision of 31 October 2003. 46.  On 26 November 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's request for release, relying on similar reasons as had been invoked in the decision of 24 November 2003. The District Court also examined the guarantees provided by nine MPs and the Ombudsman of the Astrakhan Region. Those persons argued that the applicant had not been convicted or charged before, that he had two children and two minor grandchildren, that he was the head of a farm, that he had a permanent place of residence and that he was seriously ill. The MPs and the Ombudsman guaranteed that the applicant would not abscond and would actively participate in the pre-trial investigation and trial. The District Court concluded that the guarantees could not reduce the risk of the applicant's interfering with the course of the judicial proceedings by conniving with witnesses, etc. 47.  That decision was upheld by the Astrakhan Regional Court, acting on appeal, on 25 December 2003. The Regional Court reiterated the District Court's reasoning. 48.  On 5 December 2003 the Chernoyarskiy District Court, using the same reasoning as in the previous extension orders, extended the applicant's detention until 6 January 2004. The detention order was upheld on appeal on 17 December 2003. 49.  The applicant was committed to stand trial before the Chernoyarskiy District Court. 50.  On 9 January 2004 the Chernoyarskiy District Court fixed a preliminary trial hearing and, finding that the circumstances warranting the applicant's detention had not changed, held that the applicant should remain in detention. 51.  In response to the applicant's lawyer's letter enquiring about the grounds for the applicant's detention from 7 to 9 January 2004, on 21 January 2004 the acting head of the Chernoyarskiy District Police Department sent a letter informing him that after 6 January 2004 the applicant's detention was classified as “during judicial proceedings”. A week later the head of the Chernoyarskiy District temporary detention unit informed the applicant that since 7 January 2004 he had been detained on the basis of Article 255 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Russian Federation. 52.  At the beginning of February 2004 the applicant asked the Chernoyarskiy District Court to extend the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 9 January 2004 because he had not been promptly served with it. He also sought the quashing of the decision of 9 January 2004 and his release. 53.  On 22 April 2004 the Astrakhan Regional Court examined the merits of the applicant's appeal statement and upheld the decision of 9 January 2004. According to the applicant, who supported his claims with a written statement from his lawyer, Ms V., during the hearing the lawyer had raised the issue of the applicant's unlawful detention between 6 and 9 January 2004, pointing to the lack of any legal order. However, the Regional Court had allegedly refused to examine the lawyer's argument, concentrating on the grounds for the applicant's detention after 9 January 2004. The Government disputed the applicant's assertion, stating that the argument of the alleged unlawfulness of the detention between 6 and 9 January 2004 had never been raised before the Regional Court. 54.  In the meantime, on 9 February 2004, the case was transferred to the Akhtubinsk Town Court for trial. On 2 March 2004 the Town Court fixed a preliminary hearing for 15 March 2004 and noted that the applicant should remain in custody. 55.  On 17 March 2004 the Akhtubinsk Town Court dismissed the request for the applicant's release lodged during the hearing on that day. The Town Court noted that the applicant had been detained because he had been charged with a particularly serious criminal offence. His continued detention was ordered with reference to the failure of the applicant and his lawyer to study the case file promptly. The applicant had been charged with the murder of Ms P. and he could have threatened and influenced the victim's relatives and witnesses. 56.  On 2 April 2004 the Akhtubinsk Town Court scheduled the first trial hearing and extended the applicant's detention, noting that the reasons for the extension were the same as those listed in the decision of 17 March 2004. 57.  By an order of the acting head of the Akhtubinsk Town temporary detention unit the applicant was released on 13 July 2004, as, according to the Government, the maximum six-month period of detention prescribed by Article 255 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure had expired on that date. On 21 June 2004 the Town Court ordered that the applicant should pay 30,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in bail as security for his future attendance in court. The applicant did not appeal against the decision of 21 June 2004. 58.  In the trial hearing on 8 October 2004 a witness, Mr G., while testifying as to the circumstances surrounding the murder of Ms P., complained to the Town Court that the applicant accompanied by two other men, Mr Sh. and Mr D., had arrived at Mr G.'s house and had invited him to take a ride on a boat. After Mr G. had declined the invitation, Mr D. had hit Mr G. in the face and had forced him to board the boat. During the ride, the applicant had urged Mr G. to change his statements given to the investigating authorities, threatening him and his wife with murder if Mr G. did not comply. Mr G. had refused to make false statements and the men had thrown him out of the boat onto the bank. Mr G. insisted that his ear had been injured during the fall and had started bleeding. His wife, standing on the bank, had witnessed the incident. The applicant and the two men had spent the night in Mr G.'s house. Mr G.'s wife had asked the men about the incident on the boat but the latter had feigned surprise in response to the accusation of assaulting Mr G. On the day following the incident, Mr G. and his wife had lodged a complaint with a prosecutor's office, seeking institution of criminal proceedings against the applicant. Ms G. confirmed her husband's statements in open court. 59.  The applicant denied the accusations, stating that he had visited Mr G. a number of times and had spent the night of the alleged incident in his house. During his stay in the house Mr G., who had been heavily drunk, had tried to extort money from the applicant, alleging that he had had valuable information about Ms P.'s murder. However, the applicant had not believed Mr G. knowing that the latter had had a tendency to fabricate information in a state of alcoholic intoxication. The applicant insisted that he had never been informed about the accusations made by Mr G. although he had frequently met the latter in the village. 60.  In response to Mr G.'s testimony, a prosecutor asked the Town Court to remand the applicant in custody, fearing that the latter could continue his unlawful behaviour. The applicant's lawyer objected, arguing that there were no grounds for a change in the preventive measure. According to the lawyer, Mr G.'s accusations had not been corroborated by any evidence. 61.  On 8 October 2004 the Akhtubinsk Town Court accepted the prosecutor's request, holding as follows:\n“Having studied the material presented by the prosecution..., having assessed the statements by witnesses, spouses Mr and Ms G., who had testified that physical force and threats had been used against Mr G., the court finds that the presented evidence confirms the fact that [the applicant] may obstruct the proceedings in the criminal case and that that circumstance is the ground for a change in the preventive measure; at the same time, taking into account the fact that the criminal offence with which [the applicant] is charged under Article 105 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code belongs to the category of particularly serious offences and relying on the gravity of the charge, [the preventive measure should be changed] to detention on remand.” 62.  The Astraskhan Regional Court examined the applicant's lawyers' appeals lodged against the decision of 8 October 2004 and on 2 December 2004 confirmed the lawfulness and well-foundedness of the Town Court's findings. In particular, the Regional Court held:\n“In order to substantiate its authorisation of the change in the preventive measure [imposed on the applicant]... [the Town] court relied on the [information] pertaining to [the applicant's] having committed actions which amount to obstruction of the judicial proceedings in the criminal case.\nThe above-mentioned conclusions of the [Town] court are well-founded as they are confirmed by the statements of the witnesses, Mr and Ms G.” 63.  The applicant's detention was further extended on 5 January, 8 April and 8 July 2005. Each time the Akhtubinsk Town Court cited similar grounds for the extension: the gravity of the charges and the applicant's liability to obstruct justice by influencing the victims and witnesses, as established by the decision of 8 October 2004. The applicant did not appeal against any of the detention orders. 64.  According to the applicant, on an unspecified date the criminal proceedings against him on the charge of tampering with witnesses had been discontinued. 65.  On 29 August 2005 the Akhtubinsk Town Court found the applicant guilty of murder and unlawful possession of a weapon and sentenced him to nine years and six months' imprisonment. It appears that the conviction was based, primarily, on statements by a number of witnesses, including Mr and Ms G., whom the applicant knew well. On 22 December 2005 the Astrakhan Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant was served with a copy of the appeal judgment in February 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Yalta. 5.  In November 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Yalta Court (Ялтинський міський суд) seeking to oblige the Yalta Council’s Executive Committee (Виконавчий комітет Ялтинської міської ради) to provide his family of five residing in a one-bedroom apartment with larger housing. In his statement of claim the applicant noted, in particular, that he had been placed on the special waiting list for disabled war veterans, which entitled him to obtain suitable housing within two years of the placement. 6.  On 4 May 2001 the court ordered the Executive Committee to provide the applicant’s family with an apartment meeting the standards established by Articles 48 and 50 of the Housing Code of Ukraine (Житловий кодекс України). By way of reasoning, the court dismissed the defendant’s allegations that no municipal housing was available at the time. The court observed in this regard that the applicant’s statutory right to obtain housing within two years of the date of the placement on the waiting list was unconditional. 7.  On 19 September 2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld this judgment following cassation review and it became final. 8.  On 17 December 2002 the Yalta Bailiffs (Відділ Державної виконавчої служби Ялтинського управління юстиції) initiated enforcement proceedings, having given the Executive Committee the time-limit of 17 January 2003 to comply with the judgment. 9.  In summer 2003 the enforcement proceedings were terminated on account that vacant municipal housing was lacking. 10.  On 23 March 2006 the Executive Committee decided to allocate a newly-constructed two-bedroom apartment and a one-bedroom apartment formerly belonging to a hostel to the applicant’s family. 11.  According to the applicant, the two-bedroom apartment at issue lacked necessary facilities, such as sanitary equipment and electric outlets. The apartment, which formerly belonged to a hostel, was unsuitable for establishing a permanent residence. 12.  According to the Government, the apartments at issue complied with applicable housing norms, which had been certified by competent commissions. On 27 October 2006 the applicant registered his residence in the new two-bedroom apartment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Bratislava. 6.  On 28 January 1996 the applicant, in his capacity as an architect, concluded a contract with the Customs Directorate of the Slovak Republic (Colné riaditeľstvo Slovenskej republiky) in which he agreed to produce project documentation for a border crossing between Slovakia and Hungary in return for a fee. 7.  On 20 April 2000 the Customs Directorate brought a civil action against the applicant for late completion of the documentation, seeking an order for the payment of a contractual penalty as well as late-payment interest on that penalty. 8.  On 24 September 2003 the Bratislava V District Court (Okresný súd) dismissed the action, but its judgment was quashed by the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) following an appeal (odvolanie) by the applicant. At the same time, the case was remitted to the District Court for re-examination. 9.  On 6 June 2005 the District Court allowed the action. It found that the applicant and the defendant had agreed on a contractual penalty amounting to 0.1% of the agreed fee per day of delay on the part of the applicant. It also found that the deadline for the applicant to fulfil his obligations under the contract had been 31 July 1997 and that the applicant had not done so until 8 March 1998. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 19 October 2005 the Regional Court declared the appeal inadmissible as having been lodged outside the statutory appeal period. It applied a legal fiction under Article 47 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time), pursuant to which the commencement of the appeal period in the given circumstances is determined with reference to the third day after a written copy of the contested decision has been deposited for the appellant at the local post office, irrespective of when the decision is actually received by the appellant (see paragraph 37 below). The applicant challenged the decision of the Regional Court by way of an appeal on points of law (dovolanie) to the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd). 11.  The applicant’s appeal on points of law per se had no suspensive effect and, consequently, the judgment of 6 June 2005 was considered final and binding (see section D on “Enforcement” below). 12.  However, on 19 April 2006, the Supreme Court made a separate ruling suspending the effects of the judgment of 6 June 2005 pending the outcome of the appeal on points of law. 13.  On 7 December 2006 the Supreme Court, having found that the statutory requirements for applying the above-mentioned legal fiction had not been met, quashed the decision of 19 October 2005 and remitted the applicant’s appeal against the District Court’s judgment of 6 June 2005 to the Regional Court. 14.  It was then incumbent on the Regional Court to re-examine the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of the District Court of 6 June 2005. 15.  On 20 June 2007 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 6 June 2005 in so far as the applicant had been ordered to pay the contractual penalty. However, it reversed the ruling that the applicant should pay interest on the contractual fine. It held that a contractual fine and late‑payment interest had both the nature of a sanction and that cumulating these two sanction mechanisms was excluded by the nature of things. 16.  A written version of the Regional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2007 was received by the District Court on 12 July 2007. It was then incumbent on the District Court to ensure that the judgment was served on the parties in person (do vlastných rúk). 17.  According to the law, once the judgment of 20 June 2007 had been served on both parties, the matter was resolved with final and binding effect (právoplatnosť). 18.  The actual service of the written version of the judgment of 20 June 2007 was carried out as follows:\nOn 23 and 24 July 2007 the postal service was unable to reach the applicant’s lawyer. Accordingly, on the latter date, a written version of the judgment was deposited at the local post office and a notice to that effect was left in her mailbox.\nOn 24 July 2007 the judgment was served on the Customs Directorate.\nOn 7 August 2007 the applicant’s lawyer collected the applicant’s copy of the judgment from the post office. 19.  As to the effective service of the judgment of 20 June 2007 on the applicant, the Government have submitted – and it has not been disputed by the applicant – that it occurred on 27 July 2007, by virtue of the legal fiction (see paragraph 10 above and paragraph 37 below), three days after the deposition of the judgment at the local post office (see the preceding paragraph). 20.  The Government have also submitted – this has not been disputed by the applicant either – that the judgment actually became final and binding on the day of its effective service on the last of the parties, that is to say the applicant, on 27 July 2007. 21.  On 7 September 2007, on the applicant’s request, the District Court stamped (doložka právoplatnosti) his copy of the judgment of 6 June 2005 certifying that, together with the Regional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2007, it had become final and binding on “28 July 2005”. 22.  On 25 September 2007, the District Court provided the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) on its request (see paragraph 25 below), with a different copy of the judgment of 6 June 2005 with a similar stamp certifying that, together with the judgment of the Regional Court of 20 June 2007, it had become final and binding on 24 July 2007. 23.  The applicant then lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd).\nAs to the date of commencement of the two-month period for lodging the complaint (see paragraph 34 below), the applicant took as decisive the date stamped on his copy of the judgment of 6 June 2005, that is to say “28 July 2005” (see paragraph 21 above), assuming that the reference to year 2005 was an obvious typographical error actually meaning 2007, and submitted his stamped copy of that judgment to the Constitutional Court.\nAccordingly, the applicant dated and mailed his complaint on 24 and 25 September 2007, respectively. The complaint was received at the Constitutional Court on 26 September 2007. 24.  The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and challenged the Regional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2007 as being contrary to his right to a fair hearing and the general prohibition of discrimination. In substance, the applicant contested the assessment of the facts and the application of the law by the ordinary courts. 25.  On 6 December 2007 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It noted that it had procured of its own initiative a copy of the contested decisions with a stamp concerning their final and binding effect. This stamp indicated that the matter had been resolved with final and binding effect on 24 July 2007 (see paragraph 22 above).\nAs the applicant’s constitutional complaint had only been mailed on 25 September 2007, it had been lodged outside the two-month time-limit laid down in section 53(3) of the Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 38/1993 Coll., as amended) (see paragraph 34 below). 26.  The applicant subsequently complained to the President of the Constitutional Court that, according to his stamped copy, the challenged decisions had become final and binding on 28 July 2007, the mention of the year 2005 (see paragraph 21 above) being an obvious typographical error actually meaning 2007. He had lodged his constitutional complaint on 25 September 2007 and had therefore met the deadline. 27.  In a letter of 25 April 2008 the President of the Constitutional Court notified the applicant that the two-month time-limit for filing his constitutional complaint had commenced on 24 July 2007 when the contested decisions had become final and binding. It had accordingly ended on 24 September 2007. The applicant’s complaint had only been mailed on 25 September 2007 and had therefore failed to meet the deadline. Nevertheless, if the applicant had sustained any damage as a result of the incorrect information in the stamped copy he had received, it was open to him to claim compensation under the State Liability Act (Law no. 514/2003 Coll., as amended). 28.  On 24 January 2006 a lawyer lodged a petition on behalf of the Customs Directorate with a judicial enforcement officer (súdny exekútor) for enforcement of the judgment of 6 June 2005 against the applicant. 29.  The enforcement proceedings were first authorised, but eventually discontinued in view of the Supreme Court’s judgment of 7 December 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). 30.  Nevertheless, on 11 May 2005, while the enforcement was still pending, the District Court ordered the applicant to pay the court fees for objections (námietky) that he had lodged earlier. 31.  On 31 August 2007 the Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision of 11 May 2005 following the applicant’s appeal. 32.  On 28 February 2008 the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, in which the applicant had relied on Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention and had challenged the decision on fees for his objections as being arbitrary and contrary to his rights to a fair hearing and an effective remedy.\nThe Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s duty to pay the court fees had its legal basis in section 5(1) of the Court Fees Act and that the contested decision had been legally and factually correct.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Baku. 6.  The applicant was a journalist and the editor-in-chief of the Azadliq newspaper. 7.  On 7 November 2007 when the applicant was in front of the entrance of a publishing house in Baku, he had a verbal altercation with a woman (S.Q.) who accused him of having “abused” her. At that moment a man (V.H.) who was an acquaintance of S.Q. approached them and intervened in the quarrel. Following V.H.’s intervention, the initial verbal altercation turned into a physical altercation between the applicant and V.H., which was stopped after other people intervened. 8.  On the same day the applicant informed the media of the incident, stating that he had been attacked because of his activities as a journalist and that he had been set up. 9.  On 7 November 2007 V.H. lodged a complaint with the Yasamal District Police Office alleging that he had been beaten and insulted in front of the publishing house by a man he did not know. In his statement to the police, V.H. stated that on 7 November 2007 he took S.Q. to the publishing house by car. On their arrival, he parked the car in front of the publishing house. S.Q. crossed the street first and he followed her. At that moment he realised that a man was insulting S.Q. and that a verbal altercation occurred between them. He immediately approached the man, asking him in a normal way why he had insulted S.Q., but the man in question began to insult him. When he replied, the man physically assaulted him by first slapping him, then headbutting and punching him. They were separated by bystanders. 10.  S.Q., who was questioned on the same day by the investigator, confirmed V.H.’s statement. In particular, she stated that on 7 November 2007, while she was on the street in front of the publishing house, a man complimented her on her looks. She rebutted his compliment, saying that “she [was] not his type” and the man began to “abuse” her by calling her a prostitute. At that moment a verbal altercation occurred between her and the man. V.H was nearby and approached the man, asking him why he had insulted her. The man also began to insult V.H., and the verbal altercation turned into a physical altercation between V.H. and the man. He first slapped V.H. and then headbutted and punched him. 11.  On 7 November 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted by the Yasamal District Police Office in connection with above-mentioned incident under Article 221.1 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. 12.  On 8 November 2007 V.H. informed the police that he could identify the man with whom he had been involved in the physical altercation on 7 November 2007. V.H. said that it was the applicant and that he could identify him, having seen the applicant’s photo in the Yeni Musavat newspaper. 13.  On the same day the investigator in charge of the case contacted the applicant, asking him to come to the police office. The applicant informed him that he was not currently in Baku, but that he would come to the police office present himself on 10 November 2007. 14.  On 9 November 2007 S.Q. and V.H. were examined by a forensic expert. In respect of S.Q., the expert concluded that there were no signs of injury on her body. As regards V.H., the expert noticed that there were bruises and injuries to his nose, left ear and upper lip. The expert also observed an incomplete fracture of V.H.’s right cheekbone, noting that he had suffered a head injury. Lastly, the expert concluded that the injuries were those causing “less serious injury to health”, because they had long‑term effects. 15.  On 10 November 2007 the investigator questioned two witnesses (A.I. and V.R.), who confirmed that they had witnessed a physical altercation between two men on 7 November 2007 in front of the publishing house. They stated that one of the men, who was older and wearing glasses, punched the other man in the mouth. 16.  At around noon on 10 November 2007 the applicant presented himself at the Yasamal District Police Office. He was questioned as a witness by the investigator in connection with the incident on 7 November 2007. The applicant admitted that he had been involved in a physical altercation with V.H. that day. He said that as he approached the entrance of the publishing house, a woman who was on the street talking on her phone had insulted him. She then accused him of having “abused” her and began to shout at him and insult him. He asked her to stop insulting him and stated that he had not “abused” her. At that moment a man approached them and intervened in the verbal altercation between him and the woman. The man insulted him and then tried to punch and kick him. The applicant defended himself by pushing the man, who fell down to his knees. The applicant stated that he had neither slapped, headbutted nor punched him. 17.  On the same day face-to-face confrontations were carried out between the applicant and V.H., and between the applicant and S.Q. The applicant, V.H. and S.Q. reiterated their initial statements. The investigator also proceeded to a formal identification of the people involved and the applicant was identified by A.I. and V.R. as the older man wearing glasses who had punched the other man during the altercation. 18.  On 10 November 2007 the investigator issued a record of the applicant’s forty-eight-hour detention as a suspect (tutma protokolu) in the presence of him and his lawyer. The applicant was suspected of the deliberate infliction of less serious injury to health and hooliganism, offences under Articles 127.2.3 and 221.1 of the Criminal Code. 19.  On 10 November 2007 the applicant asked the investigator to order a new forensic examination of V.H., disputing the conclusions of the expert report of 9 November 2007. On the same day the investigator granted the applicant’s request and ordered the examination. 20.  On 23 November 2007 V.H. was again examined by a forensic expert. The expert confirmed the existence of various bruises and injuries to his nose, left ear, and upper lip, as well as an incomplete fracture of the right cheekbone and a head injury, concluding that their time of infliction corresponded to 7 November 2007. The expert also concluded that the bruise to the right cheek area and the incomplete fracture of the right cheekbone were injuries causing “less serious injury to health” with long‑term effects, and that his other injuries were those causing “minor injury to health” with short-term effects. 21.  On 11 November 2007 the applicant was charged under Articles 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious injury to health) and 221.1 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. 22.  On the same day the prosecutor asked the Yasamal District Court to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (həbs qətimkan tədbiri) in respect of the applicant. To substantiate the necessity of the measure, the prosecutor gave reasons such as the likelihood of the applicant absconding from and obstructing the investigation and the nature of the criminal acts imputed to him. 23.  On 11 November 2007 a judge of the Yasamal District Court, relying on the formal charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor’s request, remanded the applicant in custody for a period of two months. The judge substantiated the necessity of this measure as follows:\n“Taking into account the likelihood, in the future, of the accused Ganimat Salim oglu Zayidov absconding from the investigation and obstructing the normal functioning of the court proceedings, reoffending ... and the fact that he poses a danger to society, the request must be granted and the preventive measure of remand in custody must be applied in his respect.” 24.  On 14 November 2007 the applicant appealed against this decision. He complained that there was insufficient evidence that he had committed a criminal offence. The applicant further complained of a lack of justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody, arguing that the judge had merely relied on the prosecutor’s submissions without taking into consideration his social status, family situation, place of residence or other personal circumstances when he had ordered his detention. He also argued that the judge had not considered any alternative measures to ensure his appearance at trial. 25.  On 22 November 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the detention order was justified. The relevant part of the appellate court’s decision reads as follows:\n“After having heard the explanations of the investigator, as well as the lawyer’s submissions in support of the appeal and the prosecutor’s submissions against it, the panel of the court considers that the decision should remain unchanged as it is lawful and justified, and the appeal should not be allowed as it is unjustified...\nThe panel of the court points out that when the first-instance court applied the preventive measure of remand in custody, it took into account the nature and degree of danger to the public of the offences with which the accused was charged, the fact that he was charged with a less serious offence punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, and the likelihood that if released he might abscond from the investigation and obstruct the normal functioning of the investigation.” 26.  On 16 November 2007 the applicant lodged a request for bail with the Yasamal District Court. He argued that his detention during the investigation was unnecessary. In this connection he stated that he had no criminal record, had never tried to abscond and had always cooperated with the investigation, that he was a well-known journalist and editor-in-chief of the Azadliq newspaper, that he had a permanent place of residence, and that he was taking care of four young children. 27.  On 21 November 2007 the Yasamal District Court dismissed the request, finding the preventive measure of remand in custody justified. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“There were sufficient grounds for applying the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of Zayidov Ganimat Salim oglu. The preventive measure of remand in custody was applied by ... court decision in accordance with Article 155.2.1 of the CCrP [Code of Criminal Procedure] taking into account the gravity, nature and the circumstances of the commission of the act imputed to Zayidov Ganimat Salim oglu.\nUnder Article 164.4 of the CCrP, if any of the circumstances mentioned in Articles 155.1 and 155.2 of this Code exist, the court may refuse release on bail relying on relevant grounds.” 28.  On 23 November 2007 the applicant appealed against this decision. The applicant reiterated his previous arguments for release. 29.  On 7 December 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Yasamal District Court’s decision of 21 November 2007. The relevant part of the appellate court’s decision reads as follows:\n“The panel of the court considers that the first-instance court was correct in dismissing the request relying on Article 164.4 of the CCrP.\nIf any of the circumstances mentioned in Articles 155.1 and 155.2 of the CCrP exist, the court may refuse release on bail relying on relevant grounds.\nThe panel of the court considers that, as the arguments put forward in the appeal lodged by the lawyers of the accused Zayidov Ganimat Salim oglu were insufficient for his release by way of [replacing] the preventive measure of remand in custody by bail, the decision of the first-instance court should remain unchanged.” 30.  On an unspecified date fourteen members of parliament lodged a request with the Prosecutor General asking for the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant to be changed, but no decision was taken in this regard. 31.  On 11 December 2007 the prosecutor in charge of the case filed the indictment with the Yasamal District Court. 32.  On 26 December 2007 the Yasamal District Court held a preliminary hearing in which it decided, inter alia, that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the applicant should remain unchanged. 33.  On 7 March 2008 the Yasamal District Court sentenced the applicant to four years’ imprisonment. 34.  The applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence by a presidential pardon given on 17 March 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Taganrog. 9.  The applicant worked for the Taganrog Customs Board, supervising the clearance of imported goods at a seaport customs post. In 1996 criminal proceedings were instituted against him and certain others for the alleged smuggling of considerable amounts of vodka. 10.  On 22 May 2000 the Neklinovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region, composed of Judge Kink and two lay judges (народные заседатели), Ms Streblyanskaya and Ms Khovyakova, found the applicant guilty of being an accessory in the avoidance of customs duties and of abuse of office. 11.  Immediately upon his conviction, the applicant was dispensed from serving the sentence partly because of the expiry of a statutory limitation period and partly because of a 1997 amnesty law. 12.  On 26 and 29 May and 16 June 2000 the applicant and his counsel filed appeals against the judgment. 13.  On 17 August 2000 the applicant requested from the President of the Neklinovskiy District Court a list of lay judges currently serving in the court and a copy of the President’s decision selecting those lay judges who were to sit in cases under the presidency of Judge Kink between January and May 2000. 14.  On 29 August 2000 the applicant supplemented his appeal with new points. He challenged the bench that had delivered the judgment of 22 May, alleging a breach of the rules on the appointment of lay judges. In particular, the applicant submitted that, whereas the Federal Law on the Lay Judges of the Federal Courts of General Jurisdiction (“the Lay Judges Act”) allowed lay judges to be called once a year for a maximum period of fourteen days, or for as long as a specific case lasted, the lay judges Ms Streblyanskaya and Ms Khovyakova had been engaged earlier in the course of 2000 in several other trials. In addition, it was claimed that Ms Streblyanskaya’s statutory term of office had expired before the day of the applicant’s trial. 15.  On 29 August 2000 the Criminal Division of the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeals. The court also refused an application by the applicant and his counsel for access to copies of earlier judgments delivered by the Neklinovskiy District Court under the presidency of Judge Kink. The court held that the applicant had been informed of his right to challenge the bench at the outset of his trial, but he had failed to do so. No breach of the rules for the appointment of lay judges had been established. 16.  On 16 November 2000 the President of the Rostov Regional Court refused an application for supervisory review (принесение протеста в порядке надзора) of the applicant’s case. In his application to the President, the applicant had raised a new argument in support of his allegation that the judges had not been appointed according to the applicable rules: it was claimed that there was nothing to indicate that the judges had been drawn at random by lot as required by the Lay Judges Act. The President rejected the applicant’s earlier argument as to the expiry of the judges’ term, referring to the Presidential Decree of 25 January 2000, whereby the terms of lay judges already in office had been extended pending the appointment of new ones. The President noted that the list of lay judges for the Rostov Region had been drawn up on 18 October 2000, after the applicant’s conviction. No answer was given to the applicant’s allegation that the judges had not been drawn by lot. 17.  On 20 February 2001 the President of the Rostov Regional Court refused another application by the applicant for a supervisory review. 18.  In August and October 2001 the applicant requested the President of the Legislature of the Neklinovskiy District to provide information concerning the lay judges who had been authorised to sit in cases during the period between 10 and 22 May 2000. 19.  On 2 October 2001 the Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that the pertinent list of lay judges for the Neklinovskiy District had been compiled on 4 February 2000 and confirmed by the Legislature of the Rostov Region on 15 June 2000. 20.  On an unspecified date following communication of the present application to the Government, the President of the Rostov Regional Court lodged an application for a supervisory review of the case on the ground that the judgment of 22 May 2000 had not described in sufficient detail the offence committed by the applicant and his accomplices. 21.  On 3 May 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court granted the application, partly quashed the judgment of 22 May 2000 and the appeal judgment of 29 August 2000, and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 22.  On 2 July 2001 the Neklinovskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of the same offences but dispensed him from serving the sentence because the case was time-barred. 23.  An appeal by the applicant was dismissed by the Rostov Regional Court on 2 October 2001 and the judgment became final. 24.  Following another application for supervisory review lodged by the President of the Rostov Regional Court on an unspecified date, the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court on 31 January 2002 quashed the decisions given on 2 July and 2 October 2001. It found that the courts were not in a position to decide on the applicant’s guilt because the whole case was time-barred.\nС.  Further developments 25.  Following the request of the applicant’s lawyer, on 28 August 2002 the Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that the list of lay judges serving in the district had been adopted by a decision of the District Legislature on 4 February 2000 and confirmed by a decision of the Rostov Regional Legislature on 15 June 2000. 26.  On 4 October 2002, the Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that there was no record of any adoption of lay judges’ lists before 4 February 2000 [The original letter indicated the date as “4 February 2002”, apparently a typographical error].", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bardejov. 5.  The applicant was employed by the District National Committee (Okresný národný výbor) in Bardejov. In 1988 he was dismissed for breach of discipline. Subsequently courts at two levels of jurisdiction declared the dismissal unlawful. Their decisions became final on 2 August 1991.\n In 1990, while the above proceedings were pending, the national committees ceased to exist ex lege and their liquidation was formally completed on 31 July 1991. The national committees were replaced by district offices (okresné úrady) which were not, strictly speaking, the legal successors to the former. 6.  On 2 September 1991 the Bardejov District Office terminated the applicant’s contract of employment on the ground that the district national committee which had formerly employed him had ceased to exist. The applicant challenged this decision. He argued, in particular, that the government regulations on the liquidation of the former national committees were unlawful, that he had become an employee of the Bardejov District Office after his dismissal in 1988 was declared unlawful on 2 August 1991, and that the District Office had paid his salary until the end of 1991. He claimed compensation for damage caused by the termination of his contract of employment. 7.  On 6 March 1996 the Košice Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment dismissing the action. 8.  The proceedings described below relate to the applicant’s subsequent attempts to obtain redress for the termination of his contract of employment. 2.1  Proceedings concerning the applicant’s action of 27 May 1996 (the Bardejov District Court file no. 4C 451/96) 9.  On 27 May 1996 the applicant sued the Bardejov District Office for a severance payment in respect of his dismissal in 1991. He further claimed a certificate of employment. 10.  On 11 October 1996 the Bardejov District Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay a court fee. On 11 September 1998 it asked him for further particulars of his claim. 11.  On 30 May 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of three claims which the applicant had withdrawn. It further decided to examine the remaining claim concerning a severance payment separately (see proceedings no. 4C 52/03 described below). 12.  The applicant appealed. 13.  On 28 February 2002 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision to discontinue the proceedings in respect of the three claims. That decision became final on 28 January 2003. The Regional Court further rejected the remainder of the appeal as no appeal lay in respect of a procedural decision to examine a claim in separate proceedings. 14.  On 23 December 2002 the applicant appealed on points of law against the Regional Court’s decision. The District Court, which processed the appeal on points of law prior to its submission to the Supreme Court, requested further information from him on 27 January 2003. 15.  After obtaining the relevant information the District Court appointed a lawyer on 21 February 2005 to represent the applicant in the cassation proceedings. On 22 March 2005 the District Court again invited the applicant to give further details of his appeal. 16.  On 11 August 2005 the Supreme Court declared the appeal on points of law inadmissible as none of the statutory grounds permitting the use of that remedy had been established. 2.2  Proceedings concerning the applicant’s claim for a severance payment (the Bardejov District Court file No. 4C 52/03) 17.  The Bardejov District Court started dealing with the claim for a severance payment (which had been filed on 27 May 1996 – see paragraphs 9 and 11 above) on 14 March 2003. 18.  Between 14 October 2003 and 22 September 2005 it held six hearings at which the applicant failed to appear. He informed the court that he did not wish to attend. 19.  On 9 August 2004 the applicant asked for the trial judge to be required to stand down because of excessive delays in the proceedings and because the judge had been excluded for bias from two other sets of proceedings to which the applicant was a party. 20.  On 13 August 2004 the Prešov Regional Court found no relevant reason for requiring the judge to stand down. 21.  The proceedings are still pending. 22.  On 20 March 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court. He alleged a violation of his right to have the case determined without undue delay in the proceedings before the Bardejov District Court registered under file no. 4C 451/96. The applicant stated, inter alia, that the merits of his action had still not been determined after six years. He also alleged that his right to judicial protection had been jeopardised as a result of the length of the proceedings. 23.  On 2 October 2003 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint. It noted that the applicant, who was represented by an advocate, complained exclusively of the Bardejov District Court proceedings no. 4C 451/96. It noted that under section 20(3) of the Constitutional Court Act it was bound by plaintiffs’ submissions as to the subject-matter of proceedings. It was the Constitutional Court’s practice to examine length-of-proceedings complaints only where the proceedings complained of were still pending before the authority liable for the alleged violation when the complaint to the Constitutional Court was filed. That requirement had not been met as regards the applicant’s complaint concerning the District Court’s conduct in proceedings no. 4C 451/96 since that court’s decision of 30 May 2001 had become final on 28 January 2003. 3.1  Proceedings concerning the applicant’s action of 13 July 1998 (the Bardejov District Court file no. 4C 966/98) 24.  On 13 July 1998 the applicant brought an action in the Bardejov District Court. He submitted that the State, represented by the Bardejov District Office, should be ordered to assign him work under a contract of employment and to satisfy his related financial claims. 25.  On 14 December 1998 the District Court invited the applicant to submit further details of his claims. The applicant replied on 17 December 1998. 26.  On 9 October 1999 the District Court informed the applicant that the claim was still incomplete. The applicant replied on 15 October 1999. 27.  On 10 December 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had failed to submit his claim in accordance with the formal requirements. The applicant appealed. The District Court submitted the case to the court of appeal on 25 February 2002. 28.  On 30 September 2002 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision. 29.  On 3 December 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 6 January 2003 he specified his grounds of appeal. He requested that he should be exempted from the obligation to pay a court fee and that the District Court should appoint a lawyer to represent him in the cassation proceedings. On 4 February 2003 the applicant submitted information about his financial situation. 30.  On 7 April 2003 the applicant informed the President of the District Court in separate proceedings that he was ill and unable to respond to the court’s requests. On 25 June 2003 he informed the District Court that he was no longer prevented from pursuing his cases. 31.  On 7 November 2003 the district-court judge involved in the preliminary processing of the applicant’s appeal on points of law asked for permission to withdraw from the case. On 26 November 2003 the Regional Court in Prešov dismissed her request. 32.  On 29 January 2004 the District Court asked the applicant for details of any change in his situation compared with that set out in his statement of 4 February 2003. The applicant replied on 8 March 2004. 33.  On 9 March 2004 the District Court asked the applicant to prove his and his wife’s income. The applicant submitted the relevant documents on 1 April 2004. 34.  On 3 June 2004 the District Court decided not to exempt the applicant from the obligation to pay a court fee. On 28 July 2004 he appealed. The Regional Court upheld the decision on 23 August 2004. 35.  On 28 October 2004 the District Court asked the applicant to provide further particulars of his appeal on points of law and to appoint a lawyer to represent him in the cassation proceedings. The applicant replied on 10 November 2004. The District Court transferred the file to the Supreme Court on 27 December 2004. 36.  On 10 February 2005 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicant’s appeal on points of law on the ground that the applicant had not complied with the statutory requirement of compulsory legal representation. That decision became final on 7 March 2005. 37.  On 15 February 2002 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about the length of the proceedings in his action commenced on 13 July 1998. 38.  On 25 June 2003 the Constitutional Court found that during the relevant period, which had lasted from 13 July 1998 to 25 February 2002, the Bardejov District Court had infringed the applicant’s constitutional right to have the case decided without undue delay. The District Court had been inactive without any justification between 16 October 1999 and 10 December 2001. The applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings as he had failed to rectify defects in his action despite the District Court’s requests (period until 15 October 1999). The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant 20,000 Slovakian korunas (SKK), which was equivalent to 477 euros (EUR) at that time, in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It also ordered the reimbursement of the applicant’s costs.\nb) Complaint of 5 February 2004 39.  On 5 February 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that the way in which the Bardejov District Court had processed his appeal on points of law had infringed his right to a hearing without unjustified delay. 40.  On 14 May 2004 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as being manifestly ill-founded. The length of the proceedings under consideration (from 3 December 2002 to 5 February 2004) was not excessive in view of the fact that the District Court had dealt with the applicant’s procedural motions for exemption from the obligation to pay a court fee and for appointment of a lawyer to represent him in the proceedings. The Constitutional Court also noted that in the relevant period the applicant had informed the District Court that health problems were preventing him from pursuing his cases. 4.1  Action of 13 July 1998 concerning the validity of the applicant’s contract of employment (the Bardejov District Court file no. 4C 968/98) 41.  On 13 July 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Bardejov District Court, alleging that his employment with the Bardejov District Office still subsisted. 42.  On 2 March 2007 the Prešov Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment of 10 March 2006 dismissing the applicant’s action. The Regional Court’s judgment was served on the applicant on 26 March 2007. 43.  On 23 April 2007 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court declared it inadmissible on 14 February 2008. 44.  On 19 February 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about delays in the Bardejov District Court proceedings no. 4C 968/98. 45.  On 28 March 2003 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as the applicant had not first sought redress from the President of the District Court pursuant to the relevant provisions of the State Administration of Courts Act 1992.\nb) Complaint of 21 May 2007 46.  On 21 May 2007 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that the Bardejov District Court and the Prešov Regional Court, in the proceedings leading to the latter court’s judgment of 2 March 2007, had violated his right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a fair hearing within a reasonable time. The applicant also relied on Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention. 47.  The Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible on 6 November 2007. As regards the complaint about the length of the proceedings, it observed that it had been filed after the courts concerned had decided the case, so that in accordance with its established case-law, the Constitutional Court lacked power to examine the complaint. 5.1  Proceedings concerning the applicant’s actions of 9 November 1998 and 11 December 2002 (Bardejov District Court files nos. 4C 1620/98 and No. 3C 569/02)\na) Action of 9 November 1998 (proceedings no. 4C 1620/98) 48.  On 9 November 1998 the applicant brought an action against the State represented by the Ministry of the Interior and the Bardejov District Office. He claimed that the defendant should be ordered to assign him work under a contract of employment and to pay him arrears of salary. 49.  On 21 May 1999 the Bardejov District Court directed the applicant, on pain of discontinuing the proceedings, to specify the sum of salary arrears claimed and to indicate which authority should be ordered to satisfy his claims. 50.  The applicant replied on 6 June 1999. He stated, inter alia, that the State represented by the Bardejov District Office should be ordered to satisfy his claims. He asked for the arrears of salary to be determined in the course of the proceedings. 51.  On 17 June 1999 and 27 January 2000 the District Court summoned the applicant for an interview. In letters of 29 July 1999 and 8 February 2000 the applicant replied that his state of health did not allow him to attend and that that was likely to be the position for some time. 52.  On 19 March 2002 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had failed to rectify defects in his claim despite its request for him to do so. The court found that in his letter of 6 June 1999 the applicant had not sufficiently specified his claim. Its decision was served on the applicant on 22 March 2002. The applicant did not have a right of appeal. 53.  On 29 March 2002 the applicant filed a motion with the Office of the Prosecutor General for an extraordinary appeal on points of law to be lodged against the District Court’s decision. In a letter of 29 April 2002 he was informed that the requested remedy could not be used. 54.  On 22 April 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the District Court’s decision. The District Court, which was responsible for preparing the file for examination by the Supreme Court, invited the applicant to rectify defects in his appeal on points of law. The applicant replied on 10 June 2002 and the District Court submitted the file to the Supreme Court. 55.  On 22 August 2002 the Supreme Court returned the file to the District Court on the ground that no appeal on points of law lay against decisions of first-instance courts. The letter stated that the file should be submitted to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office so that an extraordinary appeal on points of law could be lodged if appropriate.\nb) Action of 11 December 2002 (proceedings no. 3C 569/02) 56.  In a fresh action filed on 11 December 2002 the applicant reiterated his employment-related claims. 57.  The Bardejov District Court dismissed the action on 7 July 2004. On 20 September 2004 the applicant appealed. 58.  On 27 January 2005 the Prešov Regional Court dismissed the appeal as having been submitted outside the statutory fifteen-day time-limit. The decision stated that the postal services had twice attempted to serve the first-instance decision on the applicant at his address. As that had not been possible, he had been notified that the mail would be deposited at the post office. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decision was deemed to have been served on the third day after it was deposited with the post office, namely on 23 August 2004. The applicant had collected the mail at the post office on 6 September 2004. 59.  Prior to its decision the Regional Court asked the applicant whether he had been at his address on 19 and 20 August 2004 when the postal services had attempted to serve the first-instance decision on him and, if not, to provide evidence of his absence. The applicant replied that he was not obliged to reveal information about his private life. 60.  In a complaint of 26 November 2002 the applicant alleged a violation of his right to judicial protection in that the Supreme Court had not delivered a formal decision on his appeal on points of law of 22 April 2002 in proceedings no. 4C 1620/98. 61.  On 8 January 2003 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as being manifestly ill-founded. It held that the action taken by the Supreme Court had not led to a constitutionally unacceptable interference with the applicant’s rights. In particular, with reference to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Constitutional Court observed that an appeal on points of law was available only in respect of final decisions of courts of appeal. As the cassation appeal was not available in the applicant’s case, the Supreme Court’s failure to formally reject the applicant’s appeal on points of law had therefore not been contrary to his right to judicial protection in the circumstances of the case.\nb) Complaint of 10 February 2005 62.  On 10 February 2005 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that the Prešov Regional Court had infringed Article 2 § 1 of Protocol No. 4 by requesting him to inform it of his whereabouts. 63.  On 16 April 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint manifestly ill-founded. It noted that the information requested by the Regional Court was pertinent for establishing the date of service of the first-instance decision and, consequently, for the determination of whether the applicant had lodged his appeal in time. 6.1  Proceedings concerning the applicant’s action of 26 November 1998 (Bardejov District Court file no. 4C 1676/98) 64.  On 26 November 1998 the applicant brought proceedings against the Bardejov District Office claiming salary arrears from 1 January 1992. On 25 January 1999 the District Court asked the applicant for further information. He replied on 27 February 1999 and 14 March 1999. 65.  On 17 March 1999 the applicant was asked to pay a court fee. He sought exemption from this obligation on the grounds that he was indigent. The court summoned him to hearings scheduled for 10 October 2000 and 12 November 2002 respectively, but he said he could not attend. 66.  On 5 June 2002 the applicant challenged the District Court judge for bias. The challenge was submitted to the Prešov Regional Court, which dismissed it on 6 August 2002. 67.  On 7 November 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the Regional Court’s decision of 6 August 2002. On 10 February 2003 he requested that the District Court appoint a lawyer to represent him in the cassation proceedings. He also challenged the District Court judge. On 13 October 2003 the Regional Court held that the judge was not excluded from dealing with the case in the context of the cassation proceedings. 68.  On 7 January 2004 the District Court assigned a lawyer to represent the applicant in the proceedings concerning his appeal on points of law. On 31 January 2004 the applicant appealed against that decision. 69.  In a letter of 3 February 2004 the District Court invited the applicant to inform the court whether he had been at his home between 8 January and 16 January 2004, to enable it to establish the date of service of the District Court’s decision of 7 January 2004. In a letter of 26 March 2004, the applicant replied that he was not obliged to inform the court of his whereabouts. 70.  On 26 May 2004 the Regional Court rejected the appeal against the District Court’s decision of 7 January 2004 to appoint a lawyer as being out of time. 71.  On 23 November 2006 the Supreme Court discontinued the proceedings on the applicant’s appeal on points of law against the Regional Court’s decision of 6 August 2002 as it lacked jurisdiction to review in cassation proceedings a decision whether or not to exclude a judge. 72.  It appears that the proceedings on the merits are still pending. 73.  On 14 April 2004 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that the Bardejov District Court had infringed his right to a hearing within a reasonable time when dealing with his appeal on points of law of 7 November 2002. 74.  On 1 December 2004 the Constitutional Court, with reference to the length of the relevant proceedings (17 months) and the action taken by the District Court, dismissed the complaint as being manifestly ill-founded.\nb) Complaint of 3 April 2007 75.  On 3 April 2007 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about the length of the proceedings concerning his appeal on points of law of 7 November 2002. He also complained that the Supreme Court’s decision of 23 November 2006 had infringed his right to a hearing by a tribunal. Finally, he alleged that the Prešov Regional Court had infringed Article 6 § 1 by its above decisions of 6 August 2002 and 13 October 2003. 76.  On 24 May 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint. It found that the complaint about the length of the proceedings on the appeal on points of law had been lodged out of time as the Supreme Court’s decision of 23 November 2006 to discontinue the proceedings had been served on the applicant on 15 February 2007. Similarly, the two Regional Court’s decisions had become final on 7 October 2002 and 18 December 2003 respectively. The applicant’s complaint in that respect had been filed outside the statutory two-month time-limit. Finally, the Constitutional Court held that the Supreme Court’s decision, delivered in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, to discontinue for lack of jurisdiction cassation proceedings related to the Regional Court’s decision on the applicant’s request for exclusion of a judge did not contravene his right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention or its constitutional equivalent.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born in 1940 and is currently in compulsory residence at San Secondo Hospital – Fidenza (Parma). 12.  On 2 September 1999, after a violent family dispute, the applicant killed his wife and injured one of his sons. He was arrested the following day. 13.  At the end of the preliminary investigation the Rome prosecution service asked for the applicant to be committed to stand trial for murder, attempted murder, ill-treatment of his family and unauthorised possession of a firearm. 14.  On 24 November 2000, under the summary procedure under which the applicant had elected to stand trial, the Rome preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell’udienza preliminare) found the applicant guilty of all the charges and noted that he should be sentenced to life imprisonment. However, because the summary procedure had been used, he sentenced the applicant to thirty years’ imprisonment and a lifetime ban from public office within the meaning of Article 29 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 36 below). 15.  The judge noted that the applicant had first attempted to strangle his wife with the cable of the telephone she had used to call the police. Then, when his wife and children ran out of the flat and down the stairwell of the building, he had fired several shots at his wife at close range, and at one of his sons, who had initially been ahead of his mother but had gone back to help her. 16.  In fixing the sentence the judge took into account certain aggravating circumstances, namely the fact that the applicant’s criminal behaviour had been against his own family and had been triggered by so trifling an incident as his children having allegedly broken his mobile phone. 17.  The judge made no allowance for the fact that the applicant had no previous criminal record, an argument the applicant had relied on as a mitigating circumstance. He found that the applicant’s attitude in denying some of his actions and blaming his family, who he claimed were guilty of rebelling against his authority, showed that he felt no remorse whatsoever. 18.  Lastly, the judge noted that according to witness statements the applicant had been responsible for other episodes of violence over the past twenty years, such as insults, physical violence and threats against his wife and children, including with weapons. 19.  Both the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the applicant appealed against that judgment, and in a judgment of 10 January 2002 the Rome Assize Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment, upholding the conclusions of the preliminary hearings judge as to which aggravating and mitigating circumstances should be taken into account. 20.  The applicant appealed on points of law, and in a judgment deposited with its registry on 20 January 2003 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. 21.  Under Article 29 of the Criminal Code, the life sentence imposed on the applicant entailed a lifetime ban from public office, which in turn led to the permanent forfeiture of his right to vote, in conformity with section 2 of Presidential Decree no. 223 of 20 March 1967 (“Decree no. 223/1967” – see paragraph 33 below). 22.  The applicant’s disenfranchisement was not mentioned in the judgments against him. 23.  In application of section 32 of Decree no. 223/1967 (see paragraph 35 below), on 2 April 2003 the electoral committee deleted the applicant’s name from the electoral roll. 24.  On 30 June 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the electoral committee. Referring to the Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) judgment (no. 74025/01, 30 March 2004), amongst other authorities, he alleged that depriving him of the right to vote was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 25.  The complaint was rejected, and on 16 July 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Rome Court of Appeal. He contended that the fact that the removal of his name from the electoral roll, as an automatic consequence of his life sentence and lifetime ban from public office, was incompatible with his right to vote guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 26.  By a judgment deposited with its registry on 29 November 2004 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It pointed out that, unlike in the Hirst (no. 2) case (cited above), where every person sentenced to imprisonment was divested of the right to vote, with no assessment of the competing interests or the proportionality of the measure, in Italian law the impugned measure was applied only where the offence was punishable with a particularly heavy sentence, including life imprisonment. The court found that the automatic aspect of the application of the voting ban to any custodial sentence was lacking in the applicant’s case. 27.  The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging, inter alia, that his disenfranchisement was a consequence of the ancillary penalty banning him from public office (which was itself the result of the main penalty imposed on him). In his view the impugned ban had nothing to do with the offence committed and the courts had no power to decide to apply such a measure. 28.  In a judgment deposited with its registry on 17 January 2006 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal. First, it referred to the Hirst (no. 2) judgment of 6 October 2005 (Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 77, ECHR 2005‑IX), where the Grand Chamber considered that the withdrawal of voting rights in the United Kingdom “concern[ed] a wide range of offenders and sentences, from one day to life and from relatively minor offences to offences of the utmost gravity”. It then noted that in Italian law, under Article 29 of the Criminal Code, only those offenders sentenced to at least three years’ imprisonment were deprived of the right to vote. Where the offence attracted a sentence of less than five years, the disenfranchisement lasted only five years, a lifelong ban on voting being reserved for offenders sentenced to between five years and life. 29.  On 24 March 2003, the applicant lodged an application with the Court alleging, inter alia, that his life sentence had breached Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention. 30.  In a judgment of 17 September 2009 the Grand Chamber of the Court found violations of those Articles (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009). 31.  Ruling on Article 46 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber indicated that “Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to put an end to the breach of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, the Court therefore considers that the respondent State is responsible for ensuring that the applicant’s sentence of life imprisonment is replaced by a penalty consistent with the principles set out in the present judgment, which is a sentence not exceeding thirty years’ imprisonment.” (see Scoppola (no. 2), cited above, § 154). 32.  Consequently, by a judgment deposited with its registry on 28 April 2010, the Court of Cassation reversed its judgment of 20 January 2003 (see paragraph 20 above), set aside the judgment of the Rome Assize Court of Appeal of 10 January 2002 (see paragraph 19 above) and fixed the applicant’s sentence at thirty years’ imprisonment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants live in Mersin. 5.  On 27 March 1996 the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways expropriated two plots of land belonging to the applicants in Mersin in order to build a motorway. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plots of land and the relevant amount was paid to the applicants when the expropriation took place. 6.  Following the applicants’ request for increased compensation, on 14 October 1997 the Mersin Civil Court of First-instance awarded them additional compensation of 1,503,941,200 Turkish liras (TRL), plus interest at the statutory rate, applicable at the date of the court’s decision, running from 25 May 1994, the date of the seizure of the plots by the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways. 7.  On 16 February 1999 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Mersin Civil Court of First-instance. 8.  On 16 May 2000 the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways paid the applicants TRL 4,442,320,000 (approximately 7,694 euros (EUR), interest included.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Lukavac. 6.  On 16 August 1999 the local police searched the applicant and found a hand grenade on him. The police acted on a tip-off because the applicant had a history of violent outbursts, including the killing of his first wife. 7.  On 24 January 2000 he was charged with possessing a prohibited weapon. 8.  On 14 November 2001 the Gračanica Municipal Court found the applicant not guilty by reason of insanity (paranoid schizophrenia) and imposed a hospital order on him under Article 63 of the Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 (“old Criminal Code”). The decision entered into force on 28 January 2002. 9.  On 28 June 2002 he was placed in Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex. 10.  On 4 July 2003 the Gračanica Municipal Court reviewed the necessity of the applicant’s continued confinement pursuant to Article 480 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 (“old Code of Criminal Procedure”). It decided on the basis of reports prepared by Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex that the applicant’s condition did not allow for his discharge. 11.  On 11 November 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Human Rights Chamber concerning the lawfulness of his detention. 12.  On 3 March 2004 the Gračanica Municipal Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Social Work Centre in Gračanica pursuant to Article 420 of the Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2003 (“new Criminal Code”). 13.  On 23 November 2004 the Social Work Centre in Gračanica established that the applicant’s mental disorder no longer warranted his confinement and ordered his conditional discharge. He was released from Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex on 8 December 2004. 14.  In the light of the applicant’s release, on 26 June 2007 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”), the legal successor of the Human Rights Chamber, held that it was no longer justified to continue the examination of the applicant’s case. 15.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in a care home in Fojnica. 16.  On 31 March 1999 he threatened Z.B. with a knife on the premises of the Social Work Centre in Goražde. 17.  On 16 April 1999 he was charged with threatening behaviour. 18.  On 17 June 1999 the Goražde Municipal Court found the applicant not guilty by reason of insanity (schizophrenia) and imposed a hospital order on him under Article 63 of the old Criminal Code. The decision entered into force immediately. 19.  On 21 June 1999 the applicant was placed in Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex. 20.  On 26 November 2001 the Goražde Municipal Court established that the applicant’s mental disorder no longer warranted his confinement and ordered his conditional discharge. He was released on 9 January 2002. 21.  On 17 January 2002 the Goražde Municipal Court recalled the applicant to Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex, after he had been found to be abnormally aggressive by Sarajevo Psychiatric Hospital. 22.  On 21 January 2003 the applicant complained of the unfairness and outcome of the criminal proceedings (which had ended on 17 June 1999) to the Human Rights Chamber. 23.  On 20 January 2004 the Goražde Municipal Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Social Work Centre in Goražde pursuant to Article 420 of the new Criminal Code. 24.  Relying on section 22 of the Mental Health Act of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 (“Mental Health Act”), on 18 February 2004 the Social Work Centre in Goražde reviewed the necessity of the applicant’s continued confinement. It decided on the basis of reports prepared by Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex that the applicant’s condition did not allow for his discharge. The applicant appealed to the Cantonal Ministry for Social Affairs in Goražde pursuant to the instructions of the social work centre. 25.  On 10 May 2004 the Cantonal Ministry for Social Affairs in Goražde declined jurisdiction and, since it was unable to determine the competent body to which to transfer the file, dismissed the appeal. The applicant lodged a further appeal with the Goražde Cantonal Court. 26.  On 9 July 2004 the Goražde Cantonal Court dismissed the appeal because the applicant had not appealed to the competent second-instance body. The Goražde Cantonal Court was silent regarding which body was competent at second instance. 27.  On 22 November 2004 the applicant complained of the unlawfulness of his detention to special chambers which had been created within the Constitutional Court on 1 January 2004 with a mandate to decide on cases received by the former Human Rights Chamber (namely, the Human Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court). 28.  On 13 June 2006 the Social Work Centre in Goražde established that the applicant’s mental disorder no longer warranted his confinement and ordered his unconditional discharge. It relied on section 25(2) of the Mental Health Act. The applicant was released from Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex on 16 June 2006. 29.  On 26 June 2007 the Constitutional Court, the legal successor of the Human Rights Chamber, dismissed the applicant’s complaint of 21 January 2003 as out of time and that of 22 November 2004 as incompatible ratione temporis: the Constitutional Court had jurisdiction to deal only with those unresolved cases of the former Human Rights Chamber which had been introduced by 31 December 2003. 30.  The applicant was born in 1966. He is still in Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex. 31.  On 12 July 1999 the applicant killed his parents under the delusion that they were trying to kill him. On the same day, having surrendered himself to the police, the applicant was remanded in custody. 32.  On 21 September 1999 he was charged with two counts of murder. 33.  On 9 November 1999 the Mostar Cantonal Court found the applicant not guilty by reason of insanity (schizophrenia) and imposed a hospital order on him under Article 63 of the old Criminal Code. The decision entered into force on 22 November 1999. 34.  On 28 November 2000 the applicant was transferred from the remand section of Mostar Prison to Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex. 35.  On 20 December 2002 and 22 October 2003 the Mostar Cantonal Court reviewed the necessity of the applicant’s continued confinement pursuant to Article 480 § 1 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure (notwithstanding the fact that the Code was in force only until 31 July 2003). It decided on the basis of reports prepared by Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex that the applicant’s condition did not allow for his discharge. 36.  On or around 23 March 2004 the Mostar Cantonal Court relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Social Work Centre in Mostar pursuant to Article 420 of the new Criminal Code. 37.  On 7 November 2005 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court of the unlawfulness of his detention. His application and a number of other similar applications were subsequently joined. 38.  On 21 December 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant (like others in a similar situation) had found himself in a legal vacuum following the 2003 reform of the criminal legislation. Furthermore, it held that Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex was not an appropriate institution for the detention of mental health patients. As a result, the Constitutional Court found breaches of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights and ordered the competent authorities to undertake such legislative and other measures as might be necessary within three months of delivery of the decision. The decision was delivered on 7 February 2007. It would appear that the applicant and the other complainants did not seek any compensation. 39.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Sarajevo. 40.  On 19 January 2003 he entered a tram and stabbed I.D. for no apparent reason. I.D. survived the attack. 41.  On 21 January 2003 the applicant killed E.G. under the delusion that he was persecuting his mother. He was remanded in custody the same evening. 42.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant was charged with murder. 43.  On 20 March 2003 he was transferred from the remand section of Sarajevo Prison to Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex 44.  On 9 April 2003 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court found the applicant not guilty by reason of insanity (hebephrenic schizophrenia) and imposed a hospital order on him under Article 63 of the old Criminal Code. The decision entered into force on 24 April 2003. 45.  On five occasions (28 November 2003, 9 June 2004, 11 March 2005, 10 April 2006 and 16 November 2006), the Sarajevo Cantonal Court reviewed the necessity of the applicant’s continued confinement pursuant to Article 480 § 1 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure (although the Code was no longer in force). It decided on the basis of reports prepared by Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex and Sarajevo Psychiatric Hospital that the applicant’s condition did not allow for his discharge. 46.  On 17 May 2005, 23 May 2006 and 8 February 2007 the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina upheld the decisions of 11 March 2005, 10 April 2006 and 16 November 2006 respectively. 47.  On 21 December 2006 the Constitutional Court examined a number of joined applications (including that of Mr Hadžić) and found breaches of Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (see paragraphs 37-38 above). 48.  On 25 June 2007 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court established that the applicant’s mental disorder no longer warranted his confinement and ordered his conditional discharge. It relied on Article 480 § 2 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure (although the Code was no longer in force). The applicant was released from Zenica Prison Forensic Psychiatric Annex on 10 July 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The first applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Szentendre. He is the managing director of the second applicant, a limited liability company with its seat in Szentendre, established in 1990. 5.  On 9 October 2000 a limited liability company brought an action against the second applicant before the Pest County Regional Court, requesting the court to establish its ownership on a real estate. 6.  On 12 June 2001 the plaintiff company submitted further claims and extended its action to the first applicant and six others. 7.  On 16 December 2002 the court obtained an expert opinion. 8.  On 10 October 2005 the court discontinued the proceedings in respect of the first applicant, as the plaintiff withdrew this part of his claim. 9.  On 13 December 2005 the court held a hearing. It established that the discontinuation of the proceedings in respect of the first applicant had become final in the absence of appeal. The court also delivered its judgment on this day in respect of the second applicant. In the absence of appeal by the parties, the judgment became final on 3 February 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Koper. 6.  The applicant was a director of the company named Kovinar Hrpelje p.o. (“Kovinar”).\nOn 21 January 1992 the applicant was first suspended for having grossly abused his position in the company. He was eventually dismissed. The applicant instituted several proceedings against Kovinar in this respect.\nOn 17 October 1994 bankruptcy proceedings were instituted against Kovinar. The applicant took part in these proceedings, which terminated on 15 January 2003. On 17 January 2003 Kovinar ceased to exist. 7.  In the meanwhile, on 1 March 1995, the applicant had started working as an army officer for the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia. He was employed as an instructor in an army training centre. However, no contract of employment was made, because the applicant refused five times to sign the contract. As a result, the de facto employment relationship was terminated by a decision of the Ministry of Defence on 6 November 1995. 8.  On 18 March and 16 April 1992 the applicant instituted three sets of proceedings in the Koper Court of Associated Labour (Sodišče združenega dela v Kopru) against Kovinar. The applicant sought the annulment of Kovinar's decisions concerning his suspension and dismissal, payment of unpaid salaries, damages for wrongful dismissal and damages for illegal dismissal. The court decided to examine the cases jointly.\nOn 24 September 1992 the Court of Associated Labour of the Republic of Slovenia (Sodišče združenega dela Republike Slovenije) transferred the case to the Nova Gorica Court of Associated Labour (Sodišče združenega dela v Novi Gorici).\nOn 28 January 1993 the court delivered a judgment upholding the applicant's claims in part. 9.  Both parties appealed against this decision to the Court of Associated Labour of the Republic of Slovenia.\nOn 20 May 1993 the latter allowed both appeals in part, because the first-instance court had failed to rule on one of the applicant's requests, and remitted the case in part to the first-instance court. Following this decision, the part of the first-instance court's judgment referring to the illegal dismissal became final. As a consequence, Kovinar called the applicant back to work. 10.  On 22 September 1993 the Nova Gorica Court of Associated Labour upheld the applicant's claim concerning the annulment of the dismissal and dismissed the claims for compensation and continuation of his employment. 11.  Both parties appealed against this decision to the Court of Associated Labour of the Republic of Slovenia.\nOn 21 April 1994 the court dismissed the applicant's appeal and allowed Kovinar's appeal in part. 12.  On 16 June 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court.\nOn 28 June 1994 the Convention took effect with respect to Slovenia.\nOn 5 September 1995 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant's appeal on points of law in part and remitted the case in this respect to the first-instance court for re-examination. 13.  On 27 November 1995 the Koper Labour Court, Nova Gorica Unit (Delovno sodišče v Kopru, Oddelek v Novi Gorici) (the renamed Nova Gorica Court of Associated Labour), was informed that bankruptcy proceedings had been instituted against Kovinar. Therefore, on 29 November 1995 the court decided to stay the proceedings while the bankruptcy proceedings were pending.\nOn 4 November 1997 the applicant instituted a new set of proceedings in order to establish his claim in the bankruptcy proceedings.\nOn 13 May 1999 the case was transferred to a new judge who, on 20 May 1999, issued a decision to continue the proceedings.\nOn 8 September 1999 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant's claims. 14.  At an undetermined time, the applicant lodged an appeal with the Higher Labour and Social Court (Višje delovno in socialno sodišče). The judgment of 19 October 2001, dismissing the applicant's appeal, was served on the applicant on 6 November 2001. 15.  On 20 and 30 August and 7 September 1993 respectively the applicant instituted three sets of proceedings against Kovinar in the Koper Court of Associated Labour. He sought the declaration that his contract of employment was illegal, compensation for illegal dismissal from the post of director and the annulment of Kovinar's decision that he was temporarily a redundant worker. The court decided to examine the cases jointly. On 20 September 1993 the applicant withdrew the first and the third claims.\nOn 13 October 1993 the court held a hearing and decided to deliver a written judgment. On 26 December 1993 the judgment, dismissing the applicant's claim, was delivered. 16.  On 28 January 1994 the applicant appealed against this judgment.\nOn 28 June 1994 the Convention took effect with respect to Slovenia.\nOn 16 February 1995 the Higher Labour and Social Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the first-instance court and remitted the case for re-examination. 17.  On 14 June 1995 the applicant requested the continuation of the proceedings before the first-instance court, which had been stayed due to the bankruptcy proceedings pending against Kovinar.\nOn 11 April and 25 May 2000 the court held hearings. At the latter hearing, the court decided to deliver a written judgment and upheld the applicant's claims in part. 18.  On 10 November 2000 the applicant appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court.\nOn 15 March 2001 the court dismissed the applicant's appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 10 April 2001. 19.  On 9 May 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which was rejected on 14 May 2002 because the applicant had failed to assess the amount of damages at stake. 20.  On 26 October 1993 Kovinar informed the applicant that it would no longer transfer his salaries to his bank account opened at bank A.\nOn 24 December 1993 Kovinar paid salaries to its employees and claimed that it had also transferred the applicant's salary to his bank account at bank B, although the applicant had not had an account with that bank since 21 December 1993. 21.  On 4 January 1994 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against Kovinar in the Koper Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Kopru), requesting a written apology and claiming damages in the amount of 10,000 German marks (DEM) for disclosing his personal data to a bank.\nOn 28 June 1994 the Convention took effect with respect to Slovenia.\nOn 29 February 2000 the court rejected the applicant's claim for an apology and transferred the compensation claim to the Koper District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Kopru). 22.  On 12 March 2001 the applicant appealed to the Koper Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Kopru) against this decision in the part concerning the costs and expenses.\nOn 17 February 2002 the court decided on the appeal.\nOn 13 December 2000 the Koper District Court held a hearing in the proceedings concerning the compensation claim. This hearing was adjourned until 12 February 2001 to allow the court the time to acquire the file on the bankruptcy proceedings pending against Kovinar.\nThe hearing scheduled for 12 February 2001 was adjourned, because neither of the parties appeared before the court, even though the summons had been served on them.\nOn 4 April 2001 the court held a hearing. At the hearing, the applicant modified his claim and requested that the court find a violation of the Personal Data Protection Act and award him appropriate damages.\nOn 26 June 2001 the court rejected both claims, because they were not specified as required by the law, although the applicant had been requested to amend them. The decision was served on the applicant on 1 September 2001. Before this date, he had failed to retrieve the written decision from the post office, although he had been duly informed of this possibility. 23.  On 10 September 2001 the applicant appealed to the Koper Higher Court.\nOn 6 December 2001 the court upheld the first-instance court's decision. This decision was served on the applicant on 3 January 2001. 24.  On 1 February 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Koper District Court.\nOn 27 May 2002 the court rejected the applicant's request because the sum at issue was below 5,000,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT) and the appeal on points of law was therefore not allowed. This decision became final on 21 June 2002. 25.  On 27 September 1993, 4 November 1993 and 7 July 1994 the applicant instituted four proceedings against his former employer, Kovinar, in the Koper Labour Court (Delovno sodišče v Kopru). The applicant raised complaints concerning the offer of employment, the work classification, the allegedly illegal dismissal and the payment of interest on salaries. The court decided to examine the four applications jointly.\nOn 28 June 1994 the Convention took effect with respect to Slovenia.\nOn 30 December 1994, following the institution of bankruptcy proceedings against Kovinar, the court decided to stay the proceedings.\nOn 5 November 1997 the applicant lodged two written submissions and amended his initial claims.\nIn February 2000, the court granted the applicant's request to continue the proceedings. During the stay of the proceedings, the applicant sent several letters and lodged written observations with the court.\nOn 11 April 2000 the court held a hearing at which the applicant withdrew one of his claims. The proceedings with respect to this claim were therefore terminated.\nOn 16 May 2000 the court held a hearing and decided to deliver a written judgment. In the judgment, the court upheld the applicant's claim in part. A part of the claim was dismissed as res iudicata, since the Nova Gorica Labour Court had already delivered a decision in this respect. 26.  On 10 November 2000 the applicant appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court (Višje delovno in socialno sodišče).\nOn 3 July 2002 the Higher Labour and Social Court upheld the applicant's appeal in part and remitted the case to the Koper Labour Court for re-examination. 27.  On 10 February 2003 the Koper Labour Court rejected the applicant's claim because Kovinar had ceased to exist on 17 January 2003, following the termination of the bankruptcy proceedings. The decision was served on the applicant on 11 February 2003 and became final on 24 February 2003. 28.  On 8 November 2004 the applicant requested that the proceedings be continued. This request was dismissed that same day. The applicant appealed against this decision to the Higher Labour and Social Court, but to no avail. 29.  On 15 September 1995 the applicant instituted proceedings against the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia (“the Ministry”) in the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit (Delovno sodišče v Kopru, Oddelek v Postojni), seeking payment of a portion of his salary on the basis of duty service for July 1995 and unpaid benefits in the amount of 15,868.27 Slovenian tolars (approximately 66 euros).\nOn 9 April 1996 the court held a hearing which was adjourned because the Ministry had lodged preliminary written submissions at the hearing.\nOn 10 April 1996 the applicant amended his claim.\nOn 25 April 1996 the court held a hearing and decided to deliver a written judgment. The court upheld the applicant's claim. 30.  On 31 May 1996 the Ministry appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court.\nOn 13 July 1998 the court allowed the appeal, set aside the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case for re-examination, because the applicant had failed to state correctly the name of the defendant. 31.  On 9 October 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which was rejected by the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit as not allowed.\nOn 2 and 22 December 1998 the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit, held hearings. At the latter hearing the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit, dismissed the applicant's claim. 32.  On 11 February 1999 the applicant appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court.\nOn 21 February 2001 the court allowed the appeal, set aside the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit. 33.  On 2 April 2001 the applicant requested that the case be transferred from the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit, to a different first-instance court. The request was dismissed on 11 April 2001.\nOn 22 August 2001 the court held a hearing and decided to deliver a written judgment. At the hearing the applicant withdrew a part of his claim.\nThe court upheld the applicant's claim in part. 34.  On 12 December 2001 the applicant appealed to the Higher Labour and Social Court.\nOn 14 November 2003 the court dismissed the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 4 December 2003. 35.  On 8 December 2003 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 8 December 2003 the Koper Labour Court, Postojna Unit, rejected the appeal as not allowed. This decision became final on 22 December 2003. 36.  On 7 April 1995 a company called Stanovanjsko podjetje d.o.o. Zagorje ob Savi (“Podjetje”) instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant in the Trbovlje Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Trbovljah), seeking payment of a debt.\nOn 27 July 1995 the court declared the case outside of its jurisdiction and transferred it to the Koper Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Kopru).\nOn 12 September 1995 the Koper Local Court issued a decision allowing the enforcement. The decision was served on the applicant on 20 October 1995. The court had attempted to serve the decision on the applicant earlier, but he had failed to collect it at the post office even though he had been notified of the delivery.\nOn 27 October 1995 the applicant objected to the enforcement.\nOn 6 November 1995 the court set aside the decision of 12 September 1995 and requested Podjetje to institute contentious civil proceedings to establish the existence of the debt. 37.  On 21 May 1999 the Koper Local Court held the first hearing. The court requested the Trbovlje Local Court to take testimony from two witnesses, which it did on 15 September 1999.\nOn 29 October 1999 the Koper Local Court held the second hearing. The court delivered a judgment upholding the enforcement decision of 12 September 1995. 38.  On 29 November 1999 the applicant appealed against this judgment to the Koper Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Kopru).\nOn 23 August 2000 the court dismissed the appeal. The decision became final immediately. It was served on the applicant on 2 November 2000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicant was born in 1924 and lives in Skopje. He used to be an army serviceman of the Yugoslav Army until he retired in 1985. 11.  In former Yugoslavia, the citizens used to pay a tax for housing. On the basis of the accumulated funds the State constructed “socially owned” apartments which were then rented to individuals at legally fixed rates. 12.  The Yugoslav Army was the single army on the territory of former Yugoslavia governed by laws which were applicable throughout former Yugoslavia. The applicant, as an officer of the Yugoslav Army, paid monthly contributions from his salary to the Yugoslav Army for the construction of army apartments. All army servicemen were entitled to live in army apartments as tenants. 13.  The applicant, as an army serviceman, used to live until 1982 as a tenant in an apartment owned by the former Yugoslav Army in Skopje. Once he started working for the Macedonian Secretary of Defence, he sought to obtain a bigger apartment. On 3 June 1982 the Governing Council (Извршен совет) of the Socialistic Republic of Macedonia issued a decision by which it rented to the applicant a bigger apartment in its possession. The applicant gave up his previously rented apartment which remained the property of the former Yugoslav Army. In 1985 the applicant retired and continued living in the new apartment. 14.  On 29 December 1990 the Federal Assembly of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia enacted a Law on Housing of the Army Servicemen (Закон за станбено обезбедување во ЈНА) (“Z.S.О.J.N.A.”), according to which army servicemen, current and retired, could purchase apartments in which they lived with a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of army apartments and for development of the construction land. Section 26 of that law provides that the same purchase conditions apply to apartments which do not belong to the army, as it was in the case of the applicant. According to regulations issued by the Yugoslav Federal Ministry, the price difference was to be paid by the federal army (see paragraphs 39-42 below). 15.  Following the fall of Yugoslavia and a referendum held on 8 September 1991, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence. On 17 November 1991 it adopted a Constitution (Устав на РМ) and the Law on the Implementation of the Constitution (Уставен Закон за спроведување на Уставот). According to the Constitution the laws from former Yugoslavia remain in force, except for the laws regulating the organisation and competence of the former Yugoslav federal organs. On 21 February 1992 the Macedonian President and the General of the Yugoslav Army concluded an agreement for the withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from Macedonian territory. 16.  On 28 February 1992 the Macedonian Government concluded an Agreement for Settlement of Claims and Obligations in Respect of Real Property (Спогодба за правата и обврските во врска со примопредажбата на недвижностите на територија на Република Македонија) (“the S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M.”) with the Federal Yugoslav Ministry of Defence. According to this agreement the Macedonian Ministry of Defence took over all the obligations of the Yugoslav Army in respect of army apartments, including the obligation to sell these apartments with a price reduction. The Macedonian Government in 1992 and 1994 enacted regulations implementing this agreement. In 1992 the Macedonian Government enacted Regulations on the Terms of Purchase of the Apartments Obtained by Succession from the Yugoslav Army (Уредба за продажба на државниот стамбен фонд наследен од ЈНА) (“U.P.D.S.F.N.J.A.”), according to which present and former army servicemen living in apartments owned by the Macedonian Ministry of Defence, could purchase them under the Z.S.О.J.N.A. 17.  From the Ministry of Defence’s decision of 12 June 1992 it appears that the Ministry exchanged the title of its apartments which were inhabited by civilians with the title of the apartments owned by the Housing Fund (“ПУИГ”) which were inhabited by servicemen. Thereby, the servicemen were able to exercise the right under the Z.S.O.J.N.A. to purchase the apartments at a reduced price. However, this exchange was limited and concerned only six apartments owned by the Housing Fund and twenty owned by the Ministry. No details were provided as to the criteria concerning the exchange. 18.  In 1993 an amended version of the 1990 Law on the Sale of Socially Owned Apartments (Закон за продажба на станови во општествена сопственост) (“the Z.P.S.O.S.”) was promulgated in the Official Gazette. Under the law their tenants were entitled to purchase them on credit and at a beneficial price. Unlike the Z.S.О.J.N.A., the law did not provide for a price adjustment for the amount of the paid contributions for the construction of “socially owned” apartments and for development of the construction land, despite the fact that the tenants had also paid them. 19.  On 26 June 1996 the Constitutional Court abrogated the Z.S.O.J.N.A. without retroactive effect and the respective Government’s regulations on the ground that they had been contrary to the 1991 Constitution. In particular, the court stated that: a) the Yugoslav Army, its “housing fund” and the “social ownership” no longer existed; b) the 1991 Constitution had abolished all the privileges enjoyed by army servicemen; and c) the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had created an unequal treatment in comparison to the citizens who were entitled to purchase their apartments under the Z.P.S.O.S. The S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M. was not mentioned in the Constitutional Court’s decision. 20.  In 1992 the applicant requested the Macedonian Ministry of Defence to allow him to purchase the apartment owned by the Government at a reduced price or to give him another apartment which used to be owned by the former Yugoslav Army. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the Ministry of Defence to speed up the proceedings. On 4 December 1993 the Ministry informed him that it had been waiting for the Government to settle the issue. 21.  On 20 October 1993 the applicant and fifteen other persons asked the Constitutional Court to examine the compatibility of the Z.P.S.O.S. and the relevant regulations issued by the Ministry of Defence with the Z.S.O.J.N.A. On 29 December 1993 this was refused by the Constitutional Court. 22.  On 4 December 1993 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Skopje I Municipal Court (Општински Суд Скопје I) against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, requesting that the apartment be sold to him at a reduced price in accordance with section 21(2) of the Z.S.O.J.N.A. On 15 March 1994 the court granted the applicant’s request. The court held, inter alia, that the applicant, as a retired army serviceman, was entitled under sections 21(2) and 26 of the Z.S.O.J.N.A. to purchase the apartment at a reduced price. The court stated in particular that the purchase price should be reduced by the re-evaluated amount of the monthly contributions which the applicant had paid to the Federal Ministry of Defence for the construction of apartments and for the improvement of construction land. Whether the apartment had belonged to the Ministry of Defence or to the Government was irrelevant as both apartments now belonged to the single State-owned housing fund. 23.  The Solicitor-General (Јавен правобранител) acting for the Ministry of Defence appealed against the above decision on the ground that there was no formal agreement between the Federal Army and, at that time, the Macedonian Governing Council for an exchange of the apartments and that the applicant had given up the apartment owned by the army for a bigger apartment owned by the Governing Council. Therefore, he had accepted that the apartment in question would be subject to different statutory rules. It further stated that the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had been applicable only to the apartments owned by the former Yugoslav Army which had later become the property of the Macedonian Government, but not to other apartments. 24.  On 31 March 1995 the Skopje Appellate Court (Апелационен Суд Скопје) dismissed the appeal on the grounds (i) that an exchange of the right to use the apartments between the former Federal Army and the Macedonian Governing Council had taken place; (ii) that the applicant, as a former officer of the Yugoslav Army had paid contributions for the construction of army apartments and was therefore entitled to purchase an apartment at a reduced price under sections 21(2) and 26 of the Z.S.О.J.N.A.; and (iii) that its section 26 had explicitly regulated the cases of purchase of an apartment by an army serviceman that had not been owned by the army. 25.  On 4 May 1995 the Solicitor-General lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) with the Supreme Court (Врховен Суд) alleging, inter alia, that since the day of independence it had been for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to regulate the use and purchase of the apartments owned by the former Yugoslav Army and that the agreement which had been concluded with the army could not have been applicable to the apartments not owned by the said army. In 1992 the Council of Ministers enacted a regulation which had made clear that the Z.S.O.J.N.A. applied only to sale-purchase agreements for the apartments previously owned by the former Yugoslav Army. 26.  In the meantime, on 4 September 1995 the applicant and the Government concluded a purchase contract for the apartment on the basis of the Municipal and Appellate Courts’ judgments. The applicant thus purchased the apartment at a price reduced by the amount of contributions he had paid to the former Yugoslav Army. On 29 September 1995 the Skopje I Municipal Court authorised the contract. 27.  From the copy of one document issued by the Public Enterprise for Administering State Property (Јавно претпријатие за стопанисување со стамбен и деловен простор на Република Македонија), it may be deduced that the applicant paid for the apartment in 1995 at the latest. It is not clear whether later the Ministry of Defence reimbursed the Housing Fund with the price difference for the apartment. 28.  On 16 October 1997 the Supreme Court granted the appeal on points of law submitted by the Solicitor-General and dismissed the applicant’s request to purchase the apartment at a reduced price. It found that the Z.S.O.J.N.A. had provided for more beneficial conditions for the sale of apartments to army servicemen, and that it had governed the relations and status of the former Yugoslav Army and its housing fund, both of which had ceased to exist. The court held, inter alia, that as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was not a legal successor of the former Yugoslav Army, it was under no obligation whatsoever to cover the price difference. In addition, the new Macedonian Constitution had abolished special privileges of the army servicemen. 29.  The court did not mention at all the decision of the Constitutional Court and the S.P.O.V.P.N.T.R.M. Nor did it observe that the applicant had already purchased the apartment by contract or that the Ministry of Defence had exchanged a number of apartments owned by the Housing Fund and inhabited by other servicemen. 30.  The applicant was served with the decision on 16 March 1998. 31.  The parties have not indicated whether the applicant was formally registered as the owner of the apartment in the Land Registry (Државен завод за геодетски работи) after the purchase agreement was authorised by the Municipal Court in 1995. From their submissions it appears that the applicant had already recorded his title over the apartment. In addition, the parties have not indicated whether the Government have taken any legal action to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment of 16 October 1997. There is no information that such proceedings have ever been instituted. 32.  The applicant still lives in the apartment in question.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently detained in Remscheid Prison. 7.  On 3 February 2003 the Cologne District Court, having held a hearing at which the applicant and his lawyer had been present and witnesses had been heard, convicted the applicant of bodily injury and sentenced him to a fine amounting to 100 daily payments of fifteen euros (EUR). The applicant had pleaded for his acquittal. 8.  The applicant, represented by counsel, lodged an appeal against that judgment. 9.  On 11 June 2003 the Cologne Regional Court held a hearing at which the applicant’s counsel was present whereas the applicant failed to attend in person. Several witnesses had equally been summoned. The applicant’s counsel explained that an arrest warrant had been issued against the applicant in respect of different charges. The applicant had therefore chosen not to attend the hearing in person but wished to be represented by his counsel. He claimed that, having regard to Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention, a defendant was entitled to be represented by a lawyer in appeal proceedings. 10.  By a judgment of the same day, the Regional Court, granting the request made by the Public Prosecutor’s Office, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that the applicant had lodged his appeal within the prescribed time-limit. However, he had failed to attend the hearing before the Regional Court, to which he had been summoned, without sufficient excuse. He also had not been entitled to be represented by counsel. Therefore, his appeal had to be dismissed pursuant to Article 329 § 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 25 below). 11.  On 26 September 2003 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, in which he had referred to his defence rights under Article 6 of the Convention, as ill-founded, as the judgment of the Regional Court did not disclose an error of law. 12.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that the decision of the Regional Court, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal, not to deal with his appeal on the merits due to his failure to appear at the hearing had violated his right of access to court, his right to be heard in court and his right to defend himself through a lawyer as guaranteed by the Basic Law. 13.  On 27 December 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint as it was ill-founded (file no. 2 BvR 1872/03). The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 23 January 2007. 14.  The Federal Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right to an effective defence, which was inherent in his right to a fair trial under the Basic Law, had not been breached. In coming to this conclusion, it also had regard to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. It stressed that the Court, in its case-law, had never found that an application of Article 329 § 1 of the German Criminal Code failed to comply with Article 6 of the Convention. 15.  The Federal Constitutional Court stressed that the applicant’s right to an effective defence had to be interpreted in the context of the system of appeals of the Code of Criminal Procedure and of further fundamental rights, such as the right to be heard and the principle of immediacy (Unmittelbarkeitsgrundsatz). Following an appeal (Berufung), the appellate court conducted fresh proceedings in respect of questions of both fact and law and took its own decision after having taken evidence. The principles of oral and public proceedings and of immediacy applied also to proceedings before the appellate courts. Under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal proceedings as a rule could not be conducted in the defendant’s absence, even before an appellate court. Therefore, in cases covered by Article 329 § 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there was no hearing on the merits, but the judgment delivered by the court of first instance in the defendant’s presence was upheld. 16.  The Federal Constitutional Court further reasoned that the right to an effective defence could not be asserted irrespective of further rights and principles laid down in the Basic Law and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 329 § 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not only aim at preventing a defendant from delaying proceedings against him by his absence, but also at securing his presence at the hearing, which was both a right and a duty. It was based on the understanding that a court only complied with its duty to establish the truth and to fix a fair penalty if it had seen the defendant in person and had heard his defence. Both under Article 14 § 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and under the European Convention on Human Rights the right to defend oneself entailed the right to be present. That right secured an unrestrained defence, but was at the same time a duty aimed at establishing the truth, for which the defendant’s conduct and his submissions or even his silence could be helpful. There were only very limited exceptions to the rule that no trial should be conducted in the defendant’s absence (Articles 231 § 2, 231a, 231b, 231c, 232, 233, 247, 329 § 2, 350 § 2, 387 § 1, 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; see paragraphs 25-30 below). 17.  The right and duty to be present related to the principles of immediacy and of oral proceedings which aimed at establishing a sound basis for the court’s decision and reflected the defendant’s right to be heard. As the defendant’s presence did not exclusively serve to secure his rights, he was not free to waive his right to be present or to delegate it to his defence counsel. 18.  The legislator had decided not to authorise a criminal trial in the defendant’s absence. Therefore, Article 329 § 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure proportionately restricted the defendant’s right to decide on the way in which he wanted to exercise his right to be heard and his right to defend himself through counsel. Having regard to the principles lying at the heart of the German criminal trial, the right to a fair trial did not oblige the legislator or the courts to authorise a defendant who failed to attend his trial to be represented by his defence counsel. 19.  The Federal Constitutional Court further observed that the German courts, in interpreting the law, were obliged to have regard to the provisions of the Convention and to the decisions taken by the European Court of Human Rights within the limits of a methodically arguable interpretation of the applicable German law. There was no judgment of the European Court of Human Rights finding a violation of the Convention in respect of Article 329 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which the defendant was not authorised to be absent and to have himself represented by his defence counsel at his trial. However, the European Court of Human Rights had given judgments in respect of other Contracting States to the Convention which concerned the defendant’s absence and his counsel’s presence in order to defend him at trial (see Poitrimol v. France, 23 November 1993, Series A no. 277‑A; Lala v. the Netherlands, 22 September 1994, Series A no. 297‑A; Pelladoah v. the Netherlands, 22 September 1994, Series A no. 297‑B; Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC], no. 26103/95, ECHR 1999‑I; and Krombach v. France, no. 29731/96, ECHR 2001‑II). That court had found that the fact that the defendant, in spite of having been properly summoned, did not appear, could not justify depriving him of his right under Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention to be defended by counsel. 20.  According to the Federal Constitutional Court, it could be left open whether the principles established in these cases, having regard to the differences of fact and in the national law which they had concerned, applied without restrictions to the case at issue. In particular, in some of the cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights the defendant had not been heard with legal arguments which, in a German criminal trial, as a rule, had to be examined by the courts ex officio. In any event, Article 329 § 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure complied with Article 6 of the Convention. It only concerned the defendant’s absence at his trial before the appellate court. The fact that his case was not dealt with anew on the merits was a result of his own decision not to attend the hearing without sufficient excuse and did not breach his rights under Article 6 § 3 (c) if, as was the rule, a trial at first instance had been held in his presence. If an arrest warrant had been issued against him for different charges, it was up to the defendant to resolve the conflict this entailed for him as he deemed best. It was not imperative to resolve this conflict for him by authorising him to be represented by his defence counsel at the trial on his appeal. Furthermore, the fact that defence counsel could not claim a hearing in such a case did not breach the principle of “equality of arms”. This principle applied to a hearing on the merits, which was not held in cases covered by Article 329 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said provision also did not deprive the defendant of legal assistance within the meaning of Article 6 § 3 (c). Counsel could claim in court that the requirements of Article 329 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not met. Otherwise, trials in absentia would in fact be authorised. 21.  The Federal Constitutional Court further set out that under Article 329 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 25 below), the court could also order the defendant’s arrest in order to secure his presence at his trial instead of dismissing his appeal without a hearing on the merits. However, such an order was not appropriate to enforce the defendant’s own interest, in particular if there were no indications that he was ready to attend the hearing. 22.  The Federal Constitutional Court further found that for the said reasons the defendant’s right of access to court had not been violated, even assuming that the defendant had substantiated sufficiently this complaint.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is serving a life sentence in Varna Prison. 6.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 10 November 1989 the applicant was convicted and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court confirmed this sentence on 15 January 1990. The applicant was placed in Pleven Prison and was not executed because a presidential moratorium on the execution of death sentences was introduced in the meantime. 8.  After the death penalty was abolished in Bulgaria, the Vice-President commuted the applicant’s sentence to life imprisonment on 21 January 1999. On 7 June 1999 the authorities placed the applicant under a “special regime” to serve his sentence, and on 11 June 1999 they transferred him to Varna Prison, where he remained until June 2004. Between June 2004 and June 2007 the applicant was detained in Pleven Prison, and on 27 June 2007 he was transferred again to Varna Prison, where he was at the time the most recent information was submitted to the Court, in late 2013. 9.  At times he shared his cell with other life prisoners who were serving their sentences under the “special regime”. 10.  According to the applicant, throughout the entire period of his detention he has been held in cells not equipped with sanitary facilities, and has only been allowed to go to the toilet three times a day. During the rest of the time he has had to relieve himself in his cell in a bucket which he could wash out once a day. The prison authorities have not provided him with chemicals for disinfecting the bucket. 11.  He has been permanently locked in his cell. 12.  According to the Government, between 2004 and 2007 in Pleven Prison the applicant was placed in a cell which was only locked at night. This allowed him unlimited access to the toilet, situated in the wing’s corridor, between 5.30 a.m. and 8 p.m. Furthermore, toilets and sinks with running water were installed in all cells in Pleven Prison in 2008. 13.  In Varna Prison the applicant was allowed to go to the lavatory more than three times a day. In particular, he had access to sanitary facilities and hot water also when he was taken out of his cell for his hour’s exercise in the open air. Without specifying further, the Government also stated that this was also the case when he took part in the weekly prison activities. A toilet and a sink with running water were installed in his cell in August 2012. 14.  Between 7 June 1999 and 6 December 2005 the applicant was held under the most restrictive “special regime”. Under this regime prisoners were locked permanently in their cells, and could only communicate with other life inmates and not with the general prison population. In December 2005 a Commission for the Execution of Sentences changed the applicant’s regime to the lighter “enhanced regime” which became called the “severe regime” with the adoption of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act in June 2009. He was able to take part in religious discussions for up to an hour a week and to play table tennis for half an hour up to twice a week. 15.  The Government submitted annual psychological assessments of Mr Radev in respect of 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013. According to those assessments, the applicant demonstrated anti-social behaviour and periodically engaged in conflict with other inmates, whom he also incited to go on hunger strike as a means of pressuring the prison authorities into taking decisions favourable to them. According to the Government, the applicant had been disciplined twenty-six times for breaching the internal rules, and had only received four good-conduct awards. On six occasions he was punished for keeping an unauthorised mobile telephone and/or charger and SIM cards for it in his cell; once for keeping an item which could be used to make a hand-knife; and another time for keeping a small foldable hand-knife. On two occasions the punishments were for violent altercations with other life prisoners. One of those occasions was described by the prison authorities as “not having escalated to the level of lasting tension, but rather being a momentary emotional outburst not uncommon for both the inmates involved”. In the other incident, the physical engagement had been preceded by verbal arguments on the part of both prisoners, and the prison guards rapidly managed to separate the inmates and defuse the tension. When the applicant considered a situation was detrimental to him, he usually threatened legal action, and sometimes attempted self-harm or suicide as a means of “persuading” the prison authorities. He was emotionally unstable and had a tendency to contest the decisions of the prison authorities. Because of all this the prison authorities were not considering a change in the applicant’s prison regime. 16.  After the Government had submitted their observations to the Court, the applicant complained that he was serving his sentence in inadequate material conditions. In particular, there was insufficient fresh air and lighting in his cell, which itself was dilapidated and infested with cockroaches, and it was impossible for him to maintain personal hygiene as he had no access to hygienic or cleaning products. He was permanently handcuffed when outside his cell, the food was rather poor, and so was the medical care provided to him in prison. Lastly, no work had been offered him, nor did he have any meaningful occupational activities. 17.  Between 2007 and 2011 the applicant brought several claims for damages under the State and Municipalities’ Responsibility for Damage Act 1988 (“the SMRDA”) in connection with various aspects of his conditions of detention. The Supreme Administrative Court rejected all of them as inadmissible, finding in particular either that the prison authorities had not acted unlawfully or that the applicant had not established that he had suffered as a result of those conditions.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Călărași, Moldova. 5.  On 24 December 2007 the Călăraşi District Court approved a friendly settlement agreement concluded between the applicant and the Călăraşi local council and discontinued proceedings. This judgment was final. A writ of enforcement obliging the Călăraşi local council to pay the applicant the amount of 521,811 Moldovan lei (MDL) was issued and on 11 January 2008 the applicant instituted enforcement proceedings. 6.  On 12 May 2008 the Călăraşi local council submitted a revision request challenging the final judgment of 24 December 2007. They argued that the representative of the local council had not been authorized to conclude a friendly settlement agreement with the applicant. They invoked as new circumstances a report prepared by the local committee on issues regarding victims of political repressions. The report was drawn up after the settlement agreement had been approved by the court and it invalidated a previous decision of the committee, which acknowledged the applicant’s right to compensation for property confiscated during the 1949 political repressions. 7.  On 30 May 2008 the Călăraşi District Court dismissed the revision request as submitted outside the three-month time-limit and as ill-founded. The local council appealed this judgment. 8.  On 28 October 2008[1] the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld the appeal, quashed the judgments of 30 May 2008 and 24 December 2007, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. On 14 November 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice finally obliged the Călărași local council to pay the applicant MDL 426,265.[2] 9.  On 2 December 2011 the applicant lodged a civil action claiming damages for the violation of his right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time pursuant to Law no. 87 of 21 April 2011 (see paragraph 12 below), which at the time amounted to four years and four months. 10.  On 12 May 2012 the Supreme Court of Justice finally found the length of the proceedings to be excessive and attributable to the acts of the authorities; it awarded the applicant MDL 5,000 (approximately 316 euros (EUR)) as non-pecuniary damage, dismissing the remainder of his claims.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicants were born in 1952 and 1961 respectively and live in Prato. 9.  The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Florence, which they had let to M.P. 10.  In a writ served on the tenant on 4 June 1985, the applicants communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 11.  By a decision of 24 June 1985, which was made enforceable on 1 July 1985, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 August 1987. 12.  On 29 September 1987, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 13.  On 21 October 1987, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 November 1987. 14.  Between 27 November 1987 and 13 April 1989, the bailiff made four attempts to recover possession. 15.  On 29 May 1989, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves. 16.  Between 11 October 1989 and 13 February 1997, the bailiff made nineteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 17.  On 29 April 1997, the applicants repossessed the premises with the assistance of the police.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and second applicants, Mr Andrzej Stankiewicz and Ms Małgorzata Solecka, were born in 1974 and 1970 respectively and live in Piaseczno-Józefosław and Kraków. The third applicant, Presspublica sp. z o. o. is a limited liability company having its registered office in Warsaw. The company is the publisher of the daily newspaper “Rzeczpospolita” where the first and second applicants worked as journalists. 6.  It appears that A.F., the chief executive of the Polish branch of M.S.D. Inc. (“M.S.D.”), a large pharmaceutical company, approached journalists of the daily newspaper “Rzeczpospolita”. He informed them on condition of anonymity that the company had received a proposal to “arrange” the placement of its drug on the list of refunded drugs in exchange for a bribe. 7.  On 12 May 2003 “Rzeczpospolita” published on the front and fourth pages an article entitled “Drugs for millions of dollars” (“Leki za miliony dolarów”), written by the first and second applicants. The subtitle read: “A pharmaceutical company asserts that the Head of the Private Office of the Minister of Health demanded a large bribe” (“koncern farmaceutyczny twierdzi, że szef gabinetu politycznego ministra zdrowia żądał dużej łapówki”). 8.  The journalists alleged that in the summer of 2002 W.D., the Head of the Private Office of the Minister of Health (Szef Gabinetu Politycznego Ministra Zdrowia) had demanded a bribe from representatives of a pharmaceutical company, offering in return his assistance in having a drug manufactured by the company placed on the list of drugs refunded within the framework of the national health care scheme. 9.  In the article, the applicants recounted the circumstances of two meetings which had taken place in Warsaw restaurants. They were attended by W.D., B.O. – director of a private osteoporosis clinic and W.D.’s friend, as well as two representatives of the pharmaceutical company – Ł.Z. and H.M.N. The meetings had been devoted to the plan to set up jointly, by the two companies, a network of osteoporosis clinics in Poland. 10.  The relevant parts of the article read:\n“W.D., the Head of the Private Office of M.Ł. [Minister of Health], demanded a multi-million dollar bribe, offering his assistance in placing drugs on the list of refunded drugs – asserts foreign pharmaceutical company. W.D. rejects these allegations, and M.Ł. [the Minister] does not believe the version of events presented by the company. ...\n“It is the first such obvious case of a corruption proposal which has happened to me” – asserts the representative of the company. W.D. admits that he twice met the representatives of the company, but denies that he demanded money from them. ...\nCompanies are keen to have their drugs placed on the list [of refunded drugs]. Why? Because the State pays part of their price so they are cheaper and more accessible to patients. It has been known for years that decisions concerning registration and placement of drugs on the list of refunded drugs were accompanied by “informal payments”. However, up to now the representatives of the pharmaceutical companies have never directly admitted that they were asked for a bribe. ...\nAccording to the director of the pharmaceutical company, W.D. was trying to convince [them] that the osteoporosis clinic [of B.O.] was a serious project. ... “He [W.D.] offered us cooperation and demanded a one-off rapid payment of 1.5 million dollars and then annual payments of 1-1.5 million. Money was to be spent on “infrastructure””. 11.  The journalists sought comments from W.D. before the publication of the article. They put to him questions about his presence as a high-ranking State official at a business meeting between two companies. W.D. initially denied that he had participated in it. However, two days later he recalled that he had in fact participated in the second meeting. Contrary to his earlier assertions, he also stated that the issue of the list of refunded drugs had been discussed at the meeting but at the initiative of the pharmaceutical company. Eventually, W.D. admitted that his participation at the meetings had been inappropriate and stated that he had felt uncomfortable in his role of an official. 12.  The Minister M.Ł. refused to speak to the journalists. In his written statement he asserted that W.D.’s participation at the meetings had not been inappropriate and that he did not believe the version of events as presented by the pharmaceutical company. 13.  The journalists included in the article critical comments made by A.N., the Deputy Minister of Health responsible for drugs policy at the relevant time. A.N. stated that “W.D. was not authorised to participate at such meetings. It is not the role of the Head of the Private Office.” He also stated that “The Head of the Private Office should not be dealing with his business future in the course of carrying out his official duties”. 14.  The article also included a report on the career of W.D. entitled “Doctor, businessman, official”. It described, inter alia, his activities in the Mazowiecki branch of the Alliance of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) and his association with M.Ł., the future Minister of Health. On the recommendation of his party W.D. was appointed a member of the Board of the Mazowiecki Health Insurance Fund (Mazowiecka Kasa Chorych). After the parliamentary elections in the autumn 2001, won by the Alliance of the Democratic Left, W.D. together with the Minister of Health M.Ł. and the Deputy Minister A.N. became one of the most influential figures in the health ministry to the exclusion of three other deputy ministers. In September 2002 W.D. suddenly resigned from his position as the Head of the Private Office of the Minister. 15.  On 22 May 2003 W.D. lodged a civil action with the Warsaw Regional Court against the applicants for infringement of his personal rights. He demanded that the defendants publish an apology and further sought 500,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Subsequently, he modified the latter claim and sought instead 50,000 PLN to be paid to a charity. W.D. submitted that the information about the alleged request for a bribe in exchange for the placement of a drug on the list of refunded drugs had been misleading and untrue. The newspaper’s allegations against W.D. had been based on unverified information originating from the representatives of the pharmaceutical company. 16.  The applicants argued that the version of events presented in the article was credible and that they had observed due diligence in gathering information for their article. They further argued that the disclosure of the facts presented in the article had been justified in the public interest. 17.  During the proceedings, the Warsaw Regional Court heard several witnesses, including the participants at the business meetings, i.e. B.O., H.M.N., Ł.Z., the claimant W.D. as well as A.F. and the journalists. 18.  Ł.Z., an employee of the pharmaceutical company, testified that the meetings had been devoted to M.S.D. Inc.’s possible involvement in the project of setting up a network of osteoporosis clinics in Poland. This involvement, according to the expectations of B.O.’s company, was to be limited to making a payment of approximately PLN 400,000, i.e. approximately between USD 100,000 and USD 150,000, to a given bank account. According to Ł.Z.’s testimony, this proposal was not accepted by M.S.D. Inc., whose participation in the project was thereby terminated. Ł.Z. further testified that while indeed the participants had also talked about the possibility of placing a certain drug on the list of refunded drugs, there had been in fact no causal link between the two matters. 19.  H.M.N., the finance director of the pharmaceutical company, testified that he had met W.D. and B.O. to discuss the same project. W.D. had introduced himself as a person representing a group which had been interested in the project. According to H.M.N., he expressed his surprise that the representative of the Government would be interested in the project involving a drug which had not been placed on the list of refunded drugs. At that point W.D. had stated that he would look into this issue. H.M.N. further stated that from the company point of view “there had been no connection between the project and the placement of the drug on the list”. The pharmaceutical company refused to participate financially in the project on the terms proposed by W.D. and B.O. 20.  A.F., the chief executive of the company, testified that the participants at the meetings had discussed the project of setting up a network of clinics treating osteoporosis. He was informed by two of his employees present at the meeting that W.D. had proposed to the company to invest a certain amount in that project. According to A.F., W.D. had also discussed the issue of placement of the company’s drug used for treating osteoporosis on the list of refunded drugs. He considered that the two issues, namely the financial investment in the project and the placement of the company’s drug on the list were interconnected. He understood, basing himself on the information from his employees, that if the company had decided to invest in the project then the placement of its drug on the list of refunded drugs would have been possible. 21.  B.O., director of a private osteoporosis clinic and friend of W.D., stated that the participants had discussed osteoporosis and the setting up of a network of clinics treating that illness. According to B.O., Ł.Z. had requested a meeting with W.D. and he had arranged it accordingly. B.O. denied that the participants at the meeting had discussed the issue of the placement of the company drug on the list of refunded drugs or that W.D. had demanded a bribe. 22.  By a judgment of 17 June 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed W.D.’s claim. 23.  The court established that in their article the applicants, besides their critical assessment of the Ministry of Health’s decision-making process concerning the registration and placement of drugs on the list of refunded drugs, described the events related by the anonymous representatives of the Polish branch of one of the large pharmaceutical companies. Their article was also based on the information received from A.N. (the Deputy Minister of Health), B.O., W.D. and the statement received from the Minister of Health. The assertions of the representatives of the pharmaceutical company were confronted with the statements of W.D. The journalists further presented W.D.’s professional and political career. In the article they pointed to specific contradictions and ambiguities in W.D.’s account of his meetings with the representatives of the pharmaceutical company. The article presented the claimant who was a high-ranking official in a negative light, but the readers were offered two versions of the relevant events and could make their own assessment of it. It was undisputed that W.D. had met twice in restaurants with H.M.N. and Ł.Z., the representatives of the American pharmaceutical company M.S.D. Inc. and introduced himself as the Head of the Private Office of the Minister of Health. 24.  The Regional Court further established that W.D. assisted at the meetings with B.O., his friend and the owner of the Mokotów Osteoporosis Centre. The participants discussed the possibility of a joint undertaking of the two companies in developing a network of osteoporosis clinics in Poland. The pharmaceutical company was interested in the placement of its drug for the treatment of osteoporosis on the Ministry’s list of refunded drugs. The parties discussed the organisational and financial details of the joint project as well as the issue of the pharmaceutical company’s difficulties in securing the placement of its drug on the list. Eventually, the joint project failed because the pharmaceutical company had not accepted the financial terms of the Polish company. A.F. and H.M.N., respectively the chief executive and finance director of the Polish branch of M.S.D. Inc. approached the press and informed the journalists that W.D. had demanded from their company a bribe in exchange for the placement of the company’s drug on the list. 25.  Two journalists, M. Solecka, who specialised in the public health issues, together with A. Stankiewicz became interested in the story. Before publishing the article, the journalists had spoken to A.F., H.M.N., B.O. and W.D. as well as high-ranking officials in the Ministry of Health in order to verify their information. A.F., the chief executive of the pharmaceutical company was considered by the journalists as a reliable source, especially as he had undertaken to confirm his story before the court if necessary. The court further noted that the version of events presented to the applicants by A.F. and H.M.N. had been consistent, while the version presented by W.D. had been varying and proved inaccurate upon verification. Faced with divergent accounts, the journalists decided to present two versions of the meetings between the parties. M. Solecka had observed for years irregularities in the process of placement of drugs on the list of refunded drugs and received anonymous information about them. 26.  The Regional Court considered that the testimonies of A.F., H.M.N. and Ł.Z. in respect of the course of the meetings were in principle similar. Witness Ł.Z. stated that the claimant (W.D.) had undertaken to check the list of refunded drugs and the chances of placing on it the drug manufactured by M.S.D. The parties had also discussed the need for the pharmaceutical company to make a quick decision about the transfer of money to an indicated bank account to which the finance director had firmly objected and thus M.S.D. pulled out of the joint project. 27.  The Regional Court found that part of the article contested by W.D. had corresponded to the version of events presented to the journalists by the directors of M.S.D. In view of the consistency of the directors’ account and the lack of coherent explanation as to the course of the meetings by W.D. and B.O. the journalists could consider the former as a reliable source. Moreover, the court expressed a view that the mere fact of W.D.’s participation in the business meeting between two companies, during which he had introduced himself as a Ministry official, had placed him in an ambiguous and awkward situation and lent credibility to the account of the directors of M.S.D. In these circumstances the Regional Court held that the impugned article had been based on reliable and verified information. The accounts of the representatives of the M.S.D. and of W.D. had been accurately reported. It was further no doubt that the article had dealt with issues of public interest, namely corruption. 28.  The court held that the article had infringed the personal rights of W.D. However, it found that the applicants’ conduct had not been unlawful within the meaning of Article 24 of the Civil Code read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the 1984 Press Act because the journalists had shown sufficient diligence in gathering and publishing the information and acted in accordance with the professional ethics. It noted that the information that the applicants had had at their disposal before the publication of the article had been sufficiently reliable to justify the allegation made in the article. Lastly, the court noted that the journalist had not been required to prove the truthfulness of their allegations in order to demonstrate the lack of unlawfulness in their actions. 29.  W.D. appealed against the judgment and dropped his pecuniary claims. He argued that the journalists had largely based their conclusions on the version of events presented to them by A.F., and that the latter had deliberately sought to disparage him with a view to having the drug manufactured by M.S.D. Inc. placed on the list of refunded drugs. He further argued that A.F. had not in fact participated in the meeting at which the alleged offer of a bribe had been made, and thus his version of events could not be regarded as reliable. He further contended that while preparing the article the journalists had failed to question Ł.Z., who had served during the meeting as an interpreter of his conversations with H.M.N. He stressed that he spoke no English and H.M.N. did not speak or understand Polish, making any direct conversation between them impossible. 30.  By a judgment of 11 October 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. 31.  The Court of Appeal concurred with the lower court that W.D.’s personal rights had been infringed. It noted that the allegation levelled against the claimant that a high-ranking public official had demanded a bribe for securing a placement of the drug on the list of refunded drugs amounted to a criminal offence. The allegation that a person had committed or attempted to commit an offence amounted to a flagrant violation of one’s reputation. 32.  The Court of Appeal, leaving aside the question of the truthfulness of the allegation raised, concentrated its analysis on whether the journalists had respected the special diligence required of them under the Press Act in order to rebut the presumption of unlawfulness of the infringement of W.D.’s personal rights. It referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court (the Supreme Court’s judgments of 14 May 2003, case no. I CKN 463/01, and of 18 February 2005, case no. I CKN 463/01) which held that in order to rebut the said presumption of unlawfulness it was sufficient to establish that a journalist had acted with requisite diligence, and that it was not necessary to prove the truthfulness of the allegations raised. Contrary to the lower court, the Court of Appeal found that the journalists had failed to observe special diligence in the preparation of their article. 33.  It noted, first and foremost, that while preparing their article the applicants had failed to question Ł.Z., while the latter’s version of events had been crucial, given that W.D. and H.M.N. had relied on his interpretation to understand each other. The Court held that the journalists’ failure to acquaint themselves with Ł.Z.’s version of events – given that there had been only four participants at the meeting – amounted to a cardinal error and clearly demonstrated that they had failed to observe due diligence. The court further noted that the version of events presented by A.F., the company’s chief executive, to the journalists had been essentially based on summary information concerning the meetings, given to him by H.M.N. and Ł.Z., and thus might have been inaccurate due to possible translation mistakes. The journalists had not attempted to confirm whether the latter’s version of events had corresponded to the version of Ł.Z., but on the other hand they had spoken to persons (certain members of parliament) who had not had much in common with the issues raised in the article. 34.  The Court of Appeal observed that the reliability of A.F. was open to doubt. In this regard, it noted that the chief executive had clearly not wished that the journalists speak to Ł.Z. and that he had contacted the press only a few months after the impugned events had occurred. Furthermore, the list of refunded drugs for 2003 was only published in January of that year, while Ł.Z. had met the claimant in December 2002, on the instructions of A.F., to discuss the placement of the company’s drug on the list. The court noted that it could be concluded from that that if the company’s drug had been included on the Ministry’s list, then A.F. would not have disseminated the information which was the subject of the article. 35.  The Court of Appeal also held that the first-instance court had erroneously assessed the testimonies of certain witnesses and concluded that the information that the applicants had had at their disposal before publication was insufficient for making the allegations of corruption against W.D. It was confirmed that B.O. had met with the representatives of M.S.D. to discuss the project of the network of osteoporosis clinics. This project was at the early stage but it was agreed that the financial contribution of M.S.D. would be in the region of 1-1.5 million USD. The parties did not agree on the form of this contribution. M.S.D. envisaged it in the form of supplying equipment and premises but did not accept the proposal of the Polish company to make a transfer of the above amount to an account of some unspecified company. According to the Court of Appeal it was only A.F. who had linked the demand to make the above payment with the issue of the list of refunded drugs. Witness H.M.N. stated that “there had been no connection between the project concerning osteoporosis clinics and the placement of the drug on the list”, while Ł.Z. denied that there had been any correlation between the two issues. Ł.Z. asserted that neither the claimant nor anyone else had proposed to have the drug placed on the list in exchange for a bribe. Accordingly, the court found that the witnesses’ testimonies did not confirm the truthfulness of the allegations made by the journalists. 36.  In conclusion, the Court of Appeal held that the applicants’ conduct had been unlawful within the meaning of Article 24 of the Civil Code read in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the 1984 Press Act and infringed the claimant’s reputation and trust that was necessary in the exercise of his public duties. 37.  The applicants were ordered to publish an apology in their newspaper, which the Court of Appeal worded as follows:\n“M.S. and A.S. [the first and second applicants], the authors of the article “Drugs for millions of dollars”, published in the newspaper “Rzeczpospolita” of 12 May 2003, as well as the publisher of this newspaper, Presspublica sp. z o.o., hereby declare that by including in the article the statement to the effect that W.D. had offered to place a drug on the Minister of Health’s list of refunded drugs in return for a multi-million bribe, they infringed W.D.’s personal rights by exposing him to a loss of good reputation and trust necessary to pursue his public and professional activity and for that they present their apology.” 38.  The applicants were also ordered to pay PLN 4,400 (1,100 euros (EUR)) in court fees and to reimburse the costs of PLN 6,230 (EUR 1,550) to W.D. 39.  The applicants lodged a cassation appeal against the judgment. They argued, inter alia, that their conduct had not been unlawful, as they had observed due diligence in gathering the material for their article and the information obtained from the persons that they had questioned before publication had been sufficiently reliable. Further, they submitted that it was their right and duty as journalists to publish an article about the issue of corruption and that they had acted in the public interest. 40.  By a judgment of 13 April 2007, the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal, holding that the applicants’ conduct had in fact been unlawful. In doing so, the Supreme Court based its findings largely on the conclusions reached by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. It concurred with that court that the evidence in the case, in particular the testimonies of the witnesses, had not made it possible to establish that in the course of the negotiations concerning investment in osteoporosis clinics the claimant or anyone else had demanded a bribe with a view to securing the placement of the drug manufactured by the company on the list of refunded drugs. The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicants on 20 June 2007. 41.  Following the publication of the article, on 22 May 2003 the Warsaw Appellate Prosecutor Office (Department for the Organised Crime) opened an investigation in the case concerning a bribe-taking by a government official. 42.  On 17 March 2004 the Warsaw Appellate Prosecutor charged W.D. with bribery in that W.D., as a public official, had demanded not less than 1.200.000 PLN from the pharmaceutical company in order to finance a network of osteoporosis clinics. The prosecutor alleged that W.D. jointly with the representative of the Mokotów Osteoporosis Centre had negotiated the project with the M.S.D. He had also participated in the registration in July 2002 of the limited liability company “Woman +50” which was subsequently intended to manage the network of clinics.\nSecondly, W.D. was charged with procurement fraud. The prosecutor alleged that W.D., as a deputy Chairman of the Board of the Mazowiecki Health Insurance Fund and the chief executive of the company “Woman +50”, had submitted false documents to the Mazowiecki Health Insurance Fund in order to secure contracts for the company. The prosecutor imposed preventive measures on W.D., namely a ban on leaving the country and ordered him to put up bail of PLN 200,000. 43.  On 17 January 2007 the Warsaw Appellate Prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against W.D. in respect of the charge of bribery for lack of sufficient evidence that he had committed the impugned offence.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Tiszatenyő. 5.  It appears that in October or December 1991 the applicant brought an official liability action against the Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok County Regional Court. She sought damages which she allegedly incurred as a consequence of the 1991 actions of a court bailiff belonging to the subordinate Szolnok District Court, when the bailiff was executing some claims enforceable on the applicant’s property. 6.  On 24 November 1994 the Supreme Court appointed the Hajdú-Bihar County Regional Court to hear the case. On 2 December 1996 the applicant requested the court to give her case priority. 7.  In January 1997 the defendant submitted its observations in reply to the applicant’s claims. Hearings took place on 27 January and 10 March1997. On the latter date, the proceedings were suspended pending the adjudication of another case. That case was terminated on 13 October 1998. However, it appears that the applicant only notified the Regional Court of this fact, requesting the continuation of the proceedings, in October 1999. She repeatedly requested the resumption of the proceedings in January 2003. Simultaneously, she challenged the Regional Court for bias. On 4 June 2003 the Supreme Court ordered that the case be transferred to the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court. 8.  This court held a hearing on 17 October 2003. On 22 October 2003 it dismissed the action. 9.  On appeal, on 19 February 2004 the Budapest Court of Appeal quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court. 10.  In the resumed proceedings, the Regional Court held a hearing on 28 June 2004. On 2 July 2004 it delivered a decision, which was partly upheld and partly quashed by the Court of Appeal on 25 November 2004. 11.  Concerning the claims still pending, the Regional Court held hearings on 28 February and 29 April 2005. Two experts were appointed who submitted their opinions on 21 June and 6 October 2005, respectively. 12.  On 26 October 2005 the Regional Court awarded the applicant some damages and dismissed the remainder of her claims. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Debrecen Court of Appeal in January 2006. The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sośnica. 6.  The applicant has been undergoing psychiatric treatment since the age of sixteen. He was hospitalised on several occasions in psychiatric hospitals in Lubliniec and Żurawica. 7.  The applicant lived in Nowy Lubliniec with his mother and handicapped sister. At the end of 2000 the applicant’s brother, who did not live with them, applied to the court submitting that the applicant had been aggressive, had been refusing to take his medication and had been abusing alcohol. 8.  On 22 December 2000 the applicant was partly deprived of his legal capacity by a court because of his mental disorder, as he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia. 9.  On 28 August 2001 the Lubaczów District Court appointed his brother, Mr Zbigniew Kędzior, as his guardian (kurator). Subsequently, the guardian applied to the court to have the order varied and to have the applicant declared totally incapacitated. 10.  In the course of the proceedings, on 22 December 2001, an expert psychiatric opinion was prepared which confirmed that the applicant was suffering from schizophrenia and that he had a tendency to abuse alcohol. 11.  On 27 December 2001 the Krosno Regional Court changed its previous decision and decided to declare the applicant totally incapacitated as his mental condition had deteriorated. The applicant’s brother remained his guardian (opiekun prawny). 12.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s guardian requested the Ruda Różaniecka Social Care Home (Dom Pomocy Społecznej) to admit the applicant. 13.  On 8 February 2002 the Lubaczów District Family Centre (Powiatowe Centrum Pomocy Rodzinie) decided to place the applicant in the social care home, as requested by his guardian. In terms of domestic law the admission was voluntary and did not require approval by a court. 14.  Between 31 October 2001 and 11 February 2002 the applicant was in a psychiatric hospital in Jaroslaw. 15.  On 11 February 2002 the applicant was admitted to the Ruda Różaniecka Social Care Home, where he remained for ten years. 16.  The applicant complained to the Lubaczów District Court that he had been placed in the care home against his will and without any medical necessity. On 12 April 2002 the president of the court informed him that the placement had been in accordance with the law. 17.  On 27 December 2004 the District Family Centre informed the applicant that his guardian was authorised to place him in the care home. 18.  On 9 February 2006 the Przemysl Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request for proceedings to be initiated to have his legal capacity fully restored. The court considered that the applicant, being legally incapacitated, did not have the authority to lodge such a request, and that his guardian did not support the request. 19.  On 23 February 2006 the president of the Lubaczów District Court explained to the applicant again that due to his total incapacitaty he had not been a party to the proceedings relating to his placement in the care home. 20.  On 17 March 2006 the president of the Przemysl Regional Court informed the applicant in a letter that there were no grounds to institute proceedings to restore the applicant’s legal capacity of the court’s own motion. 21.  On 5 June 2006 and 15 February 2007 the District Family Centre again replied to the applicant’s letters informing him that only his guardian could approve his release from the care home. 22.  On 21 September 2006 the Przemysl Regional Court again rejected a request by the applicant to have his legal capacity restored, given his lack of legal standing to initiate such proceedings. 23.  On 17 January 2007 the president of the Lubaczów District Court informed the applicant that any variation of his incapacitation order was governed by Article 559 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CCP). The president further clarified that proceedings to vary the incapacitation order could be instituted by a court of its own motion. In addition, the applicant himself, although lacking legal capacity, could apply to the court for such proceedings to be instituted. According to the president, the latter possibility was based on the interpretation of the law as provided in a commentary to the CCP. 24.  The applicant again asked the Przemyśl Regional Court to quash the legal incapacitation order. On 8 February 2007 the court rejected the request as inadmissible in law. 25.  On 1 March 2007 the president of the Przemysl Regional Court explained to the applicant, in a letter of response to the applicant’s query, that only his legal guardian could institute proceedings to have his legal incapacity revoked. Alternatively, the applicant could request the court to institute such proceedings of its own motion, but for that to succeed new medical evidence needed to be provided. 26.  On 11 May and 7 August 2007 the Przemysl Regional Court rejected further requests by the applicant for his legal capacity to be restored, on the ground that the applicant had no legal standing to institute such proceedings. 27.  On 17 September 2007 the same court rejected a further appeal by the applicant against the decision of 7 August 2007. The court noted that following the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 7 March 2007 the domestic law had been amended, and it was now possible for a person lacking legal capacity to institute proceedings to have the incapacitation order set aside. However, the amendments to the CCP had been introduced by the law of 9 May 2007, which would enter into force only on 7 October 2007. Thus, the applicant’s request had not been examined. 28.  On 13 July 2007 the Jarosław District Prosecutor informed the applicant that his complaints, in particular against Dr F., who had prepared an expert opinion in 2001 in the proceedings concerning his incapacitation, were manifestly ill-founded. 29.  On several occasions in 2008 the applicant attempted to institute proceedings to have his incapacitation quashed; however, all his requests were refused for failure to comply with various procedural requirements, including failure to pay court fees in the amount of 40 Polish zlotys (PLN, approx. 10 euros (EUR)). The applicant appealed against all the decisions and submitted new requests for the incapacitation order to be lifted. 30.  It appears that a later request was successful, as on 9 March 2009 the Przemysl Regional Court instituted proceedings to have the applicant’s legal capacity restored (file no. Ns 23/09). The court decided to have an expert opinion prepared and for the applicant to be heard by a judge in the presence of a psychologist and a psychiatrist. 31.  On 20 March 2009 a judge, with a panel of experts, heard the applicant during a twenty‑five‑minute‑long interview. 32.  On 7 April 2009 the experts submitted their opinion to the court on the basis of that interview with the applicant. The applicant submitted to the experts that he had been placed in the social care home against his will by his brother seven years previously. In the home he had been independent, had not been drinking alcohol and had been taking his medication. In the past four years he had been given long leaves of absence to visit his home, and had travelled alone. He would like to make his own decisions and to vote in elections and not to be obliged to ask his brother for everything. He also mentioned that if his capacity were restored he would prefer to stay in the social care home and to continue visiting his family home on leaves of absence. 33.  The experts concluded that the applicant was suffering from schizophrenia, although for several years he had not experienced psychotic symptoms or displayed aggressive behaviour. However, without a rigorous therapeutic regime the applicant’s state of health could worsen. According to the experts the applicant did not consider himself to be a person with a mental disorder, and showed a lack of critical judgment regarding his state of health and his actions. On the basis of the file and the interview with the applicant the experts concluded that his primary intention in applying for restoration of his legal capacity was to leave the social care home. In this context they noted that during the interview the applicant had spontaneously declared that he would prefer to stay in the social care home even if his capacity were restored. Nevertheless, judging from his consistent and extensive correspondence with the courts so far, the experts considered that his sole intention remained “to live freely in the family home and not in the social care institution”. The experts concluded that the applicant’s mental state had improved but not to the extent that would allow him to function independently. 34.  On 8 April 2009 the experts informed the court that they considered it unnecessary to notify the applicant of any court decisions or applications to court, given his state of health. 35.  On 9 April 2009 the Przemysl Regional Court decided to stop sending the applicant any notifications of court decisions and appointed a court officer as a guardian to represent his interests in legal proceedings. The applicant submitted that he had never met this guardian. 36.  On 9 April 2009 the Przemysl Regional Court dismissed a request by the applicant to have his legal capacity restored. The decision contains no reasons, as it appears that the applicant’s guardian had not asked for them. Nor did she lodge an appeal against the decision. 37.  On 16 January 2012, at the request of the applicant’s guardian, he was transferred to the Sośnica Social Care Home.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the Rivne Region. 5.  On 13 March 1996 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Sarny Court against a private company, Vysotskyy, for non-fulfilment of its contractual obligations, under which it should have provided the applicant with agricultural products. 6.  On 1 July 1997 the Sarny Court left the applicant’s complaint without consideration, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the commercial courts. 7.  On 28 July 1997 the Rivne Regional Court quashed that ruling and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 8.  On 22 December 1997 the Sarny Court rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. 9.  On 26 January 1998 the Rivne Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 10.  On 19 May 1998 the Sarny Court found in part for the applicant. 11.  On 13 July 1998 the Rivne Court upheld that decision. 12.  On 23 December 1998 the Presidium of the Rivne Court, following an objection (протест) lodged by its President, quashed the decisions of the lower courts and remitted the case to the Sarny Court for a fresh consideration. 13.  On an unspecified date the Vysotskyy company lodged a counterclaim with that court seeking the annulment of the contract.\nAfter December 1998 the case was reconsidered by the courts at three levels of jurisdiction on four occasions because the courts of first instance and appeal had committed factual and legal errors in their decisions. 14.  On 3 March 2003 the Dubrovytsya Town Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part and ordered the successor of the Vysotskyy company, Zlagoda, to transfer thirty-three tons of potatoes, worth 15,196 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH)[1], and eight tons of wheat, worth UAH 2,598[2], to the applicant. It also ordered the applicant to return 3,855 kg of meat, worth UAH 11,133[3], to Zlagoda. 15.  On 27 June 2003 the Rivne Regional Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On 4 February 2005 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal in cassation. 16.  In the course of the proceedings twenty-seven hearings were adjourned, two of which were adjourned due to the applicant’s failure to attend and the remaining twenty-five due to the need to call witnesses or due to their or their respondent’s failure to attend. 17.  On an unspecified date the Bailiffs started enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 3 March 2003. 18.  On 11 January 2007 the Rivne Court modified the procedure of enforcement, ordering the Zlagoda company to pay the applicant UAH 17,794[4] for the products due to him under the judgment of 3 March 2003. 19.  On 7 February 2007 the Dubrovytsya Court, following a request by the Zlagoda company to modify the procedure of enforcement of the judgment of 3 March 2003, ordered cross-cancellation of the debts under that judgment in the amount of UAH 11,133[5] and ruled that Zlagoda was to pay the applicant UAH 6,661[6]. The ruling of 7 February 2007 was not appealed against and became final. 20.  On 21 February 2007 the judgment of 3 March 2003 was enforced in full. 21.  In March 2007 the applicant instituted proceedings against the Zlagoda company, seeking compensation for the difference between the award paid and the in market prices of the products due to him under the judgment of 3 March 2003. 22.  On 5 June 2007 the Dubrovytsya Court rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. 23.  On 18 July 2007 the Rivne Court quashed that decision and discontinued the proceedings in the case, holding that the issue had been settled by the final judgment of 3 March 2003. 24.  On 27 August 2008 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 18 July 2007 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the Rivne Court, before which it is still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1985 and lives in London. 7.  In the early hours of 2 April 2006 the first applicant was discovered sleeping in a flat in a sheltered accommodation complex. He was naked from the waist down and intoxicated. Blood tests subsequently showed that he had consumed alcohol and ecstasy the night before and that he was a regular cannabis user. The tests also showed a positive response for cocaine. 8.  Police and paramedic personnel were called to the scene. After investigation it was thought that the first applicant had gained entry to the flat through another flat in the complex. Upon entering the second flat, the police discovered its occupant, Mrs B, who was ninety-seven years of age, lying on the floor. She too was naked from the waist down. She was covered in faeces, she was upset and confused, and said she was in pain. She had a number of injuries and told the police she had been sexually assaulted in the night. 9.  The first applicant’s jacket, shoes, trousers and underpants were found in B’s flat. Faecal material, which was found to contain components of B’s DNA, was found on the applicant’s t-shirt. Pubic hair, visually similar to that of B, was found on the first applicant and elsewhere in the flat where he had been found. Swabs were taken from the first applicant’s penis but no DNA or blood was found. There was no semen found anywhere. 10.  When interviewed by police the following evening, the first applicant admitted to having been drinking and to having taken an ecstasy tablet. He denied having committed any offences and stated that he had no recollection of events. He was interviewed on a further four occasions and states that he co-operated with the police each time. 11.  The first applicant was charged with burglary, rape (by penile penetration), rape (by digital penetration), and sexual assault. The applicant’s trial began on 5 February 2007. The prosecution offered no evidence in respect of the burglary charge and a not guilty verdict was recorded. In respect of the remaining charges, it was not suggested by the defence that someone other than the first applicant had assaulted B, or that there had been no contact between them. Instead, the principal area of dispute was whether the first applicant’s actions had amounted to rape or, alternatively, sexual assault. The prosecution’s case was that they did. The applicant maintained that they did not. In giving evidence in his defence, the applicant repeated that he had no recollection of events on the night in question. 12.  The trial judge’s summing up to the jury contained the following direction:\n“We all know this is a horrific, a disgusting episode. We all know that, and we all know – there has not been any argument about this, has there? – where moral responsibility lies but we are a court of law, we are not here to dish out admonitions for immoral conduct, disgusting behaviour. ... We are here to judge whether a crime has been committed, whether the criminal law of the land has been broken.\nIn order to do that you have to be objective. You have to stand back from the feelings of disgust and revulsion that come from the facts of this case and be objective. That last thing anyone would want is to compound an already awful event with another awful event, which would be a verdict based upon emotion and feelings of distaste and disgust rather than a verdict based upon a proper, logical, objective analysis of what has happened and that is what you are trusted to do.” 13.  On 14 February 2007 the jury acquitted the applicant of the three remaining charges. When the first applicant applied for his costs (which exceeded GBP 100,000 and had been met by his family) his counsel stated:\n“This is a case in which [the first applicant] was inevitably going to be charged with a criminal offence, I do not doubt that for a moment, and the point I made to the jury was that had a different criminal offence been charged he may have had no alternative but to plead guilty, but costs have been expended on defending him on charges for which he has been found not guilty.\nBearing in mind everything Your Honour has said about his conduct that, in my submission, would not be a relevant consideration to the application that I make now because once he was interviewed by the police he did his best...to tell the truth as he understood it and remembered it to be so he did not do anything more at that stage to bring this prosecution upon himself, simply the conduct which ended him up where he was.” 14.  In refusing the application, the trial judge said:\n“With regard to a defendant’s costs you [Counsel] are right, the costs should and almost invariably would follow the event. I cannot think of another case in my 35 years’ experience in the criminal courts in which it is more apparent that a defendant’s conduct, albeit that it had led to him being acquitted, but a defendant’s conduct has led to him being brought before the court and, given the nature of the circumstances and the consequences to the very vulnerable victim, the injuries that were seen upon her, where they were seen, the combination of facts, it is one of those cases where I feel it is right for the court to exceptionally say a defendant’s costs order will be refused. He [the applicant] will have an opportunity, I have not the least doubt, in the months and years ahead to make some recompense to his family who have stood so loyally by him. It is not an order that I lightly refuse but this is one of those exceptional cases where it seems to me to be justified.” 15.  The second applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Stourton, West Midlands. 16.  In 2005, the police began investigating the business affairs of a company where, it was alleged, there had been money laundering, theft and fraud. The second applicant is an accountant and the company had been one of her clients. In the course of their investigation the police came into possession of an audio tape, which recorded a conversation between the applicant and another person under investigation, A.R., in which the applicant was alleged to have provided advice on how to steal from the company. 17.  The second applicant was interviewed under caution on 1 June 2006. The tape was played to her and, on the advice of her solicitor at that time, she declined to reply to the questions put to her. It appears that, at this time, the police did not know the provenance of the tape or the date the conversation was recorded; the applicant maintains that, when interviewed, she was unable to remember the conversation or the date of it. 18.  On 11 July 2006, the second applicant was charged with an offence of perverting the course of justice and, in September 2006, with two co‑accused including A.R., she was charged with conspiring to steal from the company between 1 June 2000 and 31 October 2004. 19.  A defence statement was served by the applicant on 18 January 2007 in which she addressed the tape recording. She denied any discussion of impropriety, challenged the admissibility of the tape as evidence and stated that, if the prosecution established her voice was on the tape, any comments she had made in the conversation had been taken out of context. 20.  The second applicant maintained that, at the start of the trial, the prosecution offered to drop the charges against her and three co-defendants if A.R and another defendant, C.R., pleaded guilty to a significant proportion of the charges against them. She alleges that if this offer had been accepted her application for her costs would inevitably have been granted. The Government, in their observations to this Court, do not accept that such an offer was made or that, if it had been accepted, the second applicant’s application for her costs would inevitably have been granted. 21.  At trial the second applicant sought to have the tape excluded from evidence but the trial judge ruled that it was admissible. The second applicant then gave evidence in her own defence in which she explained that she had been able to calculate the date of the recording (1996) by reference to matters referred to in it. She also stated that, even if the tape was genuine and had not been edited as she alleged, the conversation was not in any way criminal or dishonest in purpose. 22.  In his closing speech, counsel for the prosecution argued that the jury could and should draw an adverse inference from the fact that the applicant had relied on many facts in her defence, none of which she had mentioned when she was interviewed. In his summing up, the trial judge told the jury that the second applicant had failed to mention something in her police interview that she now relied upon in court. He also indicated that if the jury concluded that the second applicant had genuinely and reasonably relied on legal advice they should not draw an adverse inference. 23.  On 11 July 2007 the second applicant was acquitted unanimously of the two counts facing her. Three defendants, including A.R. and C.R., were convicted of the majority of the charges against them. One defendant, M.R., was acquitted of all charges against him and another, S.R., was acquitted of all but one charge against her. M.R. and S.R. were legally aided but were granted defendant’s costs orders in respect of their own expenses. 24.  The second applicant applied immediately for a defendant’s costs order, pursuant to section 16(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (see relevant domestic law and practice below). The trial judge refused the application. He stated:\n“The relevant features, in my judgment, in this case are these: that [the second applicant], acting very much on the advice of her then solicitor [name omitted], exercised her right to silence when answering ‘no comment’ in her police interview. I emphasise she cannot be criticised for that, and the advice was given in good faith and it was accepted in good faith by [her]. However, in my judgment it is a relevant consideration in deciding whether a defendant’s costs order should be made in this case. Her failure to answer questions, in my judgment, to some extent had the effect of bringing this prosecution on herself, allowing the police to believe that the case against her was stronger than it in fact has turned out to be. In particular, a cardinal plank of the prosecution case against her on the conspiracy count was a taped phone call between her and [A.R.] in which on the face of it she appeared to give advice to [A.R.] as to how to steal from the company. Her failure, in my judgment, of putting that phone call into its true context and true timescale clearly influenced the prosecution decision to bring charges against her, and it is for that reason, and that reason alone, that I have come to the conclusion that to that extent she brought this prosecution upon herself and in my judgment that is a proper reason for refusing a defendant’s costs order. In no way is that decision meant to indicate that she is in any way guilty of this offence, she is not, she has rightly been acquitted by this jury.” 25.  On 30 July 2007, the second applicant renewed her application in writing, relying inter alia on the fact the she had been unable to recall the conversation on the tape recording until the trial had started and that one of the reasons her solicitor had sought disclosure of the tape was to consider whether to propose to the police that they should re-interview her. The trial judge declined to hold an oral hearing on the renewed application and stated that he was unable to make the order for the reasons he had already given.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sevastopol. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties and as they appear from the documents submitted by them, may be summarised as follows. 8.  At the time of the events the applicant’s only son, Mr Denys Mosendz (“D.M.”), was performing mandatory military service with the Ukrainian Internal Troops, military unit no. 3007. He had been in the army for several months. 9.  On the night of 24 April 1999 D.M. was on guard duty. At 4.30 a.m. on 25 April he reported by radio that everything was calm. At 5 a.m. the soldier who was supposed to take over guard duty discovered that D.M. was missing from his post. 10.  On 25 April 1999 the Military Prosecutor for Ternopil Garrison (“the MPTG”) opened criminal proceedings against D.M. on suspicion of desertion from the army, violation of the statutory rules of guard duty and illegal handling of weapons. 11.  On the same date, at around 6.30 p.m., D.M. was found dead, with gunshot wounds to his head, about six hundred metres from his post, near the concrete fence surrounding an abandoned factory (as documented in the on-site inspection report). The weapons entrusted to him for guard duty – an AK-74 assault rifle, its two magazines (with ten and seven cartridges respectively) and a bayonet – were found near the body. Three empty cartridges were found nearby on the ground. A criminal investigation was opened into the death. 12.  The officer leading the search group, R., stated throughout the investigation and the trial (see also paragraph 42 below) that he had personally discovered D.M.’s body leaning against the factory fence. However, one of the soldiers in that group, B., submitted at a later stage that the body had been found about forty metres from the fence and that the soldiers had been trying to provide first aid to D.M. According to B., they had carried the body and had placed it down near the fence, having realised that D.M. was dead. This discrepancy in the statements remained unaddressed by the investigation. 13.  On 27 April 1999 D.M. was buried in the village of Balamutivka in Khmelnytskyy Region, where the applicant’s brother lived. The body was delivered there in a closed coffin. The funeral took place in the applicant’s absence and without her knowledge. According to the applicant, the military unit had informed her that D.M. had deserted from the army and had taken down the addresses of her various relatives. While she was on her way to the garrison to find out what had happened, D.M. was buried. 14.  On 7 May 1999 a post-mortem examination of D.M.’s body was completed. It discovered one gunshot entry wound in the middle of his forehead and two exit wounds in the right and the left parts of the skull, between the parietal and occipital areas. The entry wound was surrounded by a collar of bruising, indicating that the gun had been pressed against D.M.’s forehead. Noting that there was only one entry wound and two exit wounds, the expert concluded that at least two shots had been fired in a single round. Haematomas around the eyes and near the nose, explained by internal bleeding following the gunshots, were also noted. The wounds had been inflicted when the victim was still alive. No alcohol or drugs were detected in the body. Given that no other injuries or traces of a struggle were discovered, the conclusion was reached that D.M. had committed suicide. 15.  On 12 May 1999 a post-mortem psychiatric evaluation concluded that D.M. had not suffered from any mental disorder. 16.  On 25 June 1999 the MPTG closed the investigation on the grounds that the death had been a suicide and there was no case to be answered. The criminal proceedings against D.M. were discontinued for the same reason. 17.  On 5 October 1999 the General Prosecutor’s Office (“the GPO”) quashed both decisions of 25 June 1999 on the grounds, firstly, that the charges against the deceased had been unlawful and unfounded and, secondly, that the investigation into his death had not been sufficiently thorough. 18.  On 23 November 1999 an additional on-site inspection revealed three holes in the concrete fence near which the body of D.M. had reportedly been found. 19.  On 1 December 1999 the MPTG again closed the investigation on the grounds that there was no indication of a crime having been committed. 20.  On 21 February 2000 the GPO quashed that decision on the grounds that the investigation had been superficial and incomplete. It remained unclear from the records of the witnesses’ questioning whether there had been any blood at the scene, how D.M.’s clothes had looked and whether there had been any signs of the body having been dragged to the place where it had been found. Neither was it clear who had found the empty cartridges, and where. 21.  On 21 March 2000 a forensic chemical examination of the holes in the concrete fence near which the body of D.M. had reportedly been found was completed. Its conclusion was that the holes had originated from gunshots. 22.  On 13 April 2000 the MPTG again closed the investigation, having found that there was no case to be answered. 23.  On 5 September 2000 the Military Court for Lviv Garrison quashed that decision as premature. It criticised the investigating authorities for having confined themselves to the finding that D.M. had committed suicide, without investigating the possible reasons for that act. 24.  At some point the case was transferred to the Military Prosecutor for Lviv Garrison (“the MPLG”). 25.  On 29 December 2000 the MPLG closed the criminal investigation, having found that nobody was to blame for D.M.’s suicide. 26.  The case file contains copies of extracts from the records of interviews conducted on unspecified dates, according to which officers V.K. and V.S. (the senior lieutenant and squadron commander respectively) denied bullying or ill-treatment of D.M. by anybody. V.K. explained that, had that been the case, the commanding officers would definitely have known about it, and that D.M. had been the kind of person who could “stand up for himself”. V.S., in turn, expressed confidence that he had been well-informed about the state of morale in the squadron and said that he had not been aware of any bullying of D.M. 27.  On 1 August 2001 the GPO quashed the decision of 29 December 2000, finding that the investigation had been incomplete. The GPO pointed out that, although fifty-five people were supposed to have been questioned, in the end only five had been questioned, and none of D.M.’s army friends had been among them. Furthermore, it was unclear why it had taken so long to find the body. Lastly, the reasons for the suicide remained unclear. 28.  In February 2002 one of the soldiers mentioned during his questioning, and two other soldiers confirmed this, that D.M. had had a dispute with two sergeants, K. and V., before taking up guard duty on the night of 24 April 1999. They explained that D.M. had been late for drills, for which he had been criticised by the squadron commander. Sergeants K. and V. had then taken D.M., together with a private, So., to a separate room in the guardhouse, where they had stayed for around twenty minutes. When D.M. had returned from the room, he had looked agitated and had kept his head down. No visible injuries had been noticed on him. 29.  On 5 April 2002 another soldier, O., was questioned. He submitted that some senior sergeants had been supervising newly arrived soldiers. He noted that the sergeants had sometimes beaten junior soldiers, but that “it had been rare and not without reason; generally, it had been a punishment for some minor errors”. O. further noted that the sergeants would sometimes make junior soldiers clean the toilets with toothbrushes. He specified that “almost every soldier had gone through this”. However, O. considered that there had been no bullying as such. 30.  On 7 February 2003 So. explained that the sergeants had criticised him and D.M. for insufficient knowledge of the Military Forces Statute. In the separate room, K. and V. had put a copy of the statute on the floor and had forced So. and D.M. to read it and to do push-ups at the same time. At some point D.M. had collapsed. Sergeant V. had ordered him to continue and, when D.M. had failed to do so, V. had kicked him and struck him on the back. When leaving the room, D.M. had said to So.: “I’ll settle with them yet” («Я їм ще зроблю»). In response to a question as to why So. had been withholding this information for so long, he explained that the issue had concerned his superiors in the army, who had asked him to keep silent. He had been scared of them taking revenge and had only given statements once his army service was over. 31.  Relying on the aforementioned soldiers’ statements, on 29 November 2003 the Lviv Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office (“the LGMPO”) opened a criminal case in respect of sergeants K. and V. on suspicion of aggravated abuse of authority (Article 424 § 3 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 57 below). 32.  On 12 October 2004 the LGMPO ordered the exhumation of D.M.’s body, after the investigator discovered certain discrepancies between the findings of the post-mortem examination report of 7 May 1999 and the photographs of the body in the case file. In particular, one of the wounds referred to in the report could not be identified on the photographs. 33.  On 19 November 2004 a forensic psychiatric panel issued a report following a repeated post-mortem psychiatric evaluation of D.M.’s emotional condition prior to his death, which had been undertaken in the light of the information concerning his bullying by sergeants V. and K. It noted that D.M. had not suffered from any mental illness and that his behaviour had not disclosed any emotional or motivational problems. D.M. had been a calm, even-tempered, goal-oriented and independent person. The general conclusion was, however, as follows:\n“The actions of the deceased [D.M.] are explained by adaptive reactions (minor non-psychotic disorders entailing changes in the emotional sphere – mood changes), which had a significant impact on his behaviour.\nGiven his particular psychological make-up, [D.M.] might have committed suicide ..., because the unlawful actions by the sergeants [V. and K.] had triggered [an] acute affective disorder of the anxio-depressive type (adjustment disorder).” 34.  On 25 December 2004 the forensic medical examination of the exhumed body was completed. The panel’s report stated that the initial examination of 7 May 1999 had failed to record a second gunshot entry wound above the right eyebrow of the deceased and had incorrectly located the two exit wounds. Referring to the body’s position, the length of D.M.’s arms and the technical characteristics of the AK-74 assault rifle, the panel confirmed the finding of suicide. 35.  On 5 January 2005 sergeant K. confessed that on the night of 24 April 1999 he had ill-treated D.M. (as described in paragraphs 28 and 30 above). 36.  On 20 January 2005 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against senior officers V.K. and V.S. (see also paragraph 26 above), having discerned no corpus delicti in their actions. It was concluded that they had not personally bullied D.M. and had not instructed anybody to do so. This ruling was not challenged. 37.  On 31 January 2005 the applicant was granted the status of aggrieved party in the criminal proceedings against sergeants V. and K. 38.  On 23 February 2005 the criminal case in respect of sergeant V. was severed into separate proceedings because he had gone into hiding. 39.  On the same date a ballistics test of the three holes in the concrete fence, near which the body of D.M. had reportedly been found, established that the holes had not originated from gunshots. 40.  On 13 October 2005 the Lviv Garrison Military Court delivered a judgment in which it found sergeant K. guilty of bullying his subordinate, D.M., which had led to serious consequences, namely D.M.’s suicide. It mainly relied on the post-mortem psychiatric evaluation report, as well as the forensic medical examination of the exhumed body (see paragraphs 33 and 34 above). The court sentenced K. to a term of five years’ imprisonment, but suspended the sentence and put him on probation for three years. He was also stripped of his military rank (sergeant major). K. admitted that he had deprived D.M. of his rest period and had forced him to do push-ups because D.M. had displayed poor knowledge of the Military Forces Statute. 41.  Among the materials examined by the court was a letter written by D.M. to a friend on an unspecified date, in which he had described his army life as quite normal and had encouraged his friend not to seek to evade military service. While D.M. had mentioned that there was some “didivshchyna”[1] in the army, he had considered that generally he had nothing to complain about. 42.  The judgment also referred, inter alia, to the on-site inspection report, according to which D.M.’s body had been found leaning against the factory fence, as well as to B.’s statements, according to which the body had been discovered about forty metres from that fence. It did not comment on this discrepancy. The court also mentioned, without commenting on it, the ballistics test which had established that the three holes in the fence in question had not originated from gunshots (see paragraph 39 above). 43.  The judgment of 13 October 2005 was not challenged on appeal and became final. 44.  However, the investigation continued in respect of sergeant V., without any more specific information being available regarding its progress. 45.  On 16 September 2009 the Lviv Garrison Military Court delivered another judgment in respect of the case against sergeant V. It found V. guilty as charged (bullying of his subordinate, D.M., having led to serious consequences, namely D.M.’s suicide). V. was, however, relieved from criminal liability as the charge had become time-barred (more than ten years had elapsed). The case file before the Court contains no further details on this trial or on any evidence revealed in its framework. 46.  On 4 May 2006 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court (“the Pecherskyy Court”) against the Ministry of the Interior, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage. She alleged that it had failed to ensure law and order in its military forces, which had enabled the ill-treatment of her son and had led to his death. 47.  On 12 May 2006 the Pecherskyy Court refused to open proceedings on the grounds that the case fell to be examined within administrative rather than civil proceedings. 48.  The applicant lodged another claim with the Sevastopol Gagarinskyy Court (“the Gagarinskyy Court”), the court with jurisdiction over her place of residence. 49.  On 7 August 2006 the Gagarinskyy Court also refused to open proceedings. It noted that the civil case had emanated from the corresponding criminal proceedings, and invited the applicant to lodge a civil claim with the court in the jurisdiction where the tort was committed. 50.  On 12 October 2006 the Sevastopol Court of Appeal quashed the aforementioned ruling of 7 August 2006, finding that the claim lodged by the applicant had been administrative rather than civil and that she had correctly lodged it with the court having jurisdiction over her place of residence. The Court of Appeal also noted that the Gagarinskyy Court had incorrectly applied the rules of civil procedure. 51.  On 30 October 2006 the Gagarinskyy Court opened administrative proceedings concerning the applicant’s claim, having found that it fully complied with the requirements of the Code of Administrative Justice. 52.  On 9 December 2008 the Gagarinskyy Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part and awarded her 200,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (approximately 17,000 euros), to be paid by the Ministry of the Interior. Referring to sections 3(9) and 4(21) of the Regulations on the Ministry of the Interior of Ukraine of 9 October 1992 (see paragraph 56 below), the court concluded that the perpetration of the crime had been made possible by the Ministry of the Interior’s inactivity and its careless fulfilment of its duties. In particular, the failure to ensure law and order in the army had created the conditions for the abuse of power by army officials, which had led to the death of the applicant’s son. The court noted:\n“... the defendant deliberately avoided ensuring legality in the activities of [its] servicemen. The defendant could not have been unaware that this obligation was not being implemented, given that such cases were numerous. Neither could the defendant have remained in ignorance of ... the potential of its failure to ensure law and order to trigger anti-social and dangerous actions. It was because of the failure of the Ministry of the Interior to ensure law and order [in the army] that [the applicant] lost her only child.” 53.  On 18 June 2009 the Sevastopol Administrative Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 9 December 2008 and terminated the proceedings on the grounds that the case fell to be examined within civil rather than administrative proceedings. 54.  On 18 October 2011 (that is, after the Government had submitted their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case – see paragraph 5 above) the Higher Administrative Court upheld that ruling.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in İzmir. On 1 June 1994 he bought a house (no. 97, plot no. 632/26) in the Asansör neighbourhood attached to the Konak District in İzmir. According to the title deed records, he paid 30,000,000 Turkish liras (approximately 986 US dollars at the time). 5.  Following a major rockslide, on 17 July 1962 the Council of Ministers declared the Asansör neighbourhood a natural disaster area. To identify those who had been affected by the natural disaster, a regulation was published in the Official Gazette on 28 August 1968. According to the terms of this regulation, the victims of the natural disaster were given an opportunity to apply to the authorities within a specified time-limit to claim re-housing. At that time, 46 of the 86 families that had been living in the disaster area applied to the administrative authorities and they were provided with new houses in the Esentepe neighbourhood. The houses of these families were subsequently demolished. The owner of house number 97, plot no. 632/26, which was subsequently bought by the applicant in 1994, did not apply to the authorities to claim re-housing. 6.  On 28 April 1971 the owner of plot no. 632/26 at the time received an eviction order from the İzmir Governor's office. 7.  On 26 March 1981, at the request of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, land registry records were amended to indicate that no construction was permitted in the Asansör neighbourhood. 8.  Between 1982 and 1995 several on-site inspections were conducted and many experts' reports were prepared. All of these reports indicated that the neighbourhood was under an imminent danger of rockslide and prevention measures had to be taken by the owners of the houses and the municipality. It appears from the documents that no preventive measures were taken. 9.  As stated above (paragraph 4), on 1 June 1994 the applicant bought the house (no. 97) situated on plot no. 632/26. The applicant never lived in this house, and it was vacant in January 1995. According to the documents submitted by the Government, the house was in ruins and it had no historical or architectural value. 10.  On 7 January 1995 following a heavy rain, rocks fell on house no. 113. On 11 January 1995 the authorities conducted an on-site inspection and prepared a report. The report concluded that eleven houses located in the Asansör neighbourhood, including the one owned by the applicant, required demolition to prevent loss of life. As a result, at the request of the Directorate of Public Works and Settlement, the İzmir Governor's office ordered that the applicant's house be demolished pursuant to Article 13 of Law No. 7269 regarding Natural Disasters. On 12 January 1995 the house was demolished without prior notification to the applicant. 11.  On 26 April 1995 the applicant filed an action before the İzmir Administrative Court against the İzmir Governor's office. He requested compensation for the unlawful demolition of his house. 12.  On 12 December 1996 the İzmir Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's case. The court explained its decision by pointing out that the applicant's house had been situated in a neighbourhood that had been declared a natural disaster area by the Council of Ministers on 17 July 1962 following a major rockslide. The court further took note of the fact that on 28 April 1971 the İzmir Governor's Office had sent an eviction order to the previous owner of the applicant's house. In the court's opinion, as the title-deed records of the building stated that no construction was permitted in the Asansör neighbourhood, the applicant should have been aware of this situation when he had bought the house. As a result, it concluded that by demolishing the vacant house, that had no historical or architectural value, and which posed an immediate threat to public safety, the administration had acted in accordance with the law. The court accordingly refused the applicant's request for compensation. 13.  The applicant appealed. On 26 May 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the İzmir Administrative Court, finding that the applicant's grounds of appeal were unfounded. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Izmir Governor's Office had delivered the demolition order because there was an urgent need to take action to prevent loss of life in the neighbourhood. 14.  On 16 June 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request for rectification. This decision was served on the applicant on 27 July 1999.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and is serving a prison sentence in the Vladimir Region. 6.  On 11 April 2003 the police arrested the applicant in his house in the presence of his family. According to the applicant, in the course of the arrest, the police officers severely beat him up and burnt his body with cigarette butts and matches. 7.  The applicant was taken to the Staropromyslovskiy police station by car. When questioned by the deputy prosecutor, the applicant admitted having been present during the murder of two law-enforcement officers, having been involved in a car-jacking and having been in possession of firearms. It appears that on the same day the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny authorised the applicant’s placement in custody. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with several counts of murder, membership of an armed criminal gang, unlawful possession of firearms, theft and car-jacking. 9.  When questioned in the presence of lawyer Ts. on 12 April 2003, the applicant reiterated his statement of 11 April 2003. According to the record of the questioning, he confirmed that he had made his statement voluntarily. 10.  On 14 April 2003 the applicant was blindfolded and taken to a temporary detention centre of the ORB-2 (Operative investigation bureau). During the night he was taken to an office on the fourth floor. According to the applicant, police officers made him kneel and attached telephone cable to his fingers, subjecting him to electrocution. They also hit him with a rubber truncheon. 11.  On the same date the applicant was questioned and confessed to killing A. and to his involvement in the killing of the Kham. brothers. Lawyer Ts. was present during the questioning. The applicant reiterated his confessions when questioned again, in the presence of the same lawyer, on 21 April 2003. 12.  The applicant remained at the ORB-2 temporary detention centre for two months. He was repeatedly ill-treated by the same police officers. On an unspecified date the applicant signed a written confession. 13.  The applicant’s mother, who visited him at the beginning of June 2003, submitted a written statement that she had seen a purulent wound on the back of the applicant’s head. 14.  On 20 June 2003 the applicant was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-20/1 in Grozny. He was examined by a doctor who noted that the applicant had marks on the back of his head caused by beatings and three cigarette burns on his body. It also transpired from a report signed on 20 June 2003 by two officials of the remand prison and an employee of ORB-2 that the applicant had been handed over to the remand prison “with the following injuries from ill-treatment: (1) cigarette burns (many); (2) [injuries] on the back of the head.” 15.  The applicant’s mother visited him again on 21 or 22 June 2003. In her written statement to the Court she testified that his entire body had been dark blue, and he had had numerous burn marks and a wound on the head. 16.  On 11 October 2003 the applicant was transferred back to the Staropromyslovskiy temporary detention centre. On the same day he was brought before a judge. He retracted his confession, complained about ill‑treatment and asked for another counsel. 17.  According to the applicant, at 10 p.m. on 12 October 2003 he had been taken from his cell to the questioning room at the temporary detention centre. The police officers had handcuffed him, put a plastic bag on his head and started to beat him and torture him with electricity. They had told him that he should not have retracted his confession and that in the future he should always confirm his self-incriminating statements and show remorse. After the applicant had been returned to his cell he unsuccessfully attempted to take his life by slashing his wrists. 18.  On 23 October 2003 the applicant was examined by the doctor of the remand prison, who noted that he had many abrasions on his left forearm. 19.  On 10 January 2004, when questioned in the presence of lawyer B., the applicant chose to remain silent. 20.  During the trial the applicant was represented by two lawyers. He retracted his confession and claimed that he had confessed under torture. He complained to the trial judge that his arrest and detention at ORB-2 had been unlawful, that he had been repeatedly ill-treated and threatened, and had finally been forced to confess. He pleaded not guilty. 21.  On 5 October 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Chechnya convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. It based its decision on the applicant’s confession, confessions of his co-defendants, witness statements to the investigator and the court, and ballistic expert reports concluding that the victims had been shot with the weapons found in the applicant’s house. 22.  In reply to the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and forced confession, the court referred to the prosecutor’s decision of 11 May 2004 (see paragraph 27 below). It reviewed the prosecutor’s findings and found that they had been correct. In particular, the court agreed with the prosecutor that the medical examination had not confirmed the ill-treatment and that the witness statements had been unconvincing. The witnesses had not seen the beatings themselves and had been unable to name the police officers who had allegedly ill-treated the applicant. Moreover, despite the applicant’s claim to the contrary, at least one of the witnesses, Vlad., had known the applicant prior to his arrest. The court also referred to the medical certificate of 22 April 2003 from which it transpired that the applicant had no injuries. Lastly, it pointed out that the applicant had been assisted by counsel during the entire investigation. The court concluded that the prosecutor’s decision of 11 May 2004 had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 23.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that he had given his confession under duress. He had been unlawfully held at ORB-2, where he had been ill-treated and forced to confess. The prosecutor’s inquiry into his allegations of ill-treatment had been inadequate and ineffective. 24.  On 8 June 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction on appeal and reduced the sentence to twenty-three years and ten months’ imprisonment. With respect to the allegations of ill-treatment, the court noted that there was no evidence that the applicant’s confession had been given under duress. 25.  In the course of the trial the applicant’s counsel complained to the court that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment during the arrest and whilst in police custody. The court ordered the prosecutor to carry out an inquiry into the applicant’s allegations. 26.  The prosecutor’s office of the Staropromyslovskiy District of Grozny conducted an inquiry. The prosecutor questioned the applicant, his co-defendants and co-detainees, and the alleged perpetrators. 27.  On 11 May 2004 the prosecutor’s office dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. The investigator and the prosecutor’s office summarised the findings of the conducted inquiries as follows:\n“When questioned, [the applicant] stated that on 11 April 2003 he was arrested ... In the course of the arrest, he was beaten up. [The police officers] burnt him with cigarettes and matches. Then he was taken to [the police station]. Several days later, with a knitted hat pulled over his face, he was taken to [ORB-2] and placed in cell no. 4. On the same night [the police officers] took him to an office on the fourth floor. He was made to kneel. They attached two telephone cables to his fingers and tortured him with electricity. They also beat him with a rubber truncheon. The torture continued every day and night with brief intervals. He had a scar on the back of his head ... On 13-14 October 2004 he was beaten up at [the temporary detention centre] because he had retracted his earlier testimony. He was beaten up by [police officers Bis., Has., Zhab. and Alis.]. The fact that he had been beaten up could be confirmed by Sul. and Khad.\nWhen questioned, [co-defendant] Ch. submitted ... that he had no knowledge as to whether [the applicant] had been subjected to any ill-treatment. When he saw [the applicant] at [ORB-2], he had no visible traces of beatings. He looked quite normal. [The applicant] complained to him through the wall separating their cells that he had been beaten up.\n...\nWhen questioned, Vlad. submitted that around the beginning of May 2003 he had been arrested by [the police] and placed in cell no. 4 at [ORB-2]. [The applicant] had been brought into the cell at night. He had had bruises on his face. [Vlad.] further submitted that ... [the applicant] had been taken for questioning during the night. He had not seen [the police officers] who had taken and then brought back [the applicant]. ... He had seen [the applicant] ... for the last time in the remand prison in Grozny. He had looked well. As regards the use of force against [the applicant] in the course of the preliminary investigation, he had been told about it by [the applicant] himself.\nWhen questioned, Sul. submitted that he had been arrested [by police] in mid‑March 2003 and had been detained in the temporary detention centre. In mid‑April 2003 [the applicant] had been placed in the same cell. [The applicant] had been severely beaten. [Sul.] had seen a wound on [the applicant’s] head and red spots on his chest. ... he further submitted that he had not witnessed how [the applicant] had been beaten; he had seen [the applicant] only afterwards.\n...\nWhen questioned, Khad. submitted that he had been detained in [ORB-2]. In mid‑April 2003 he had heard the police officers mention the [applicant’s] name. At that time, the vent in the door to his cell had been open. He had seen through the vent that [the applicant] had been undressed by the guards ... He had seen dark blue bruises on the [applicant’s] back.\n... T., deputy head of the [temporary detention centre] in Grozny, submitted that on 11 October 2003, upon arrival at the temporary detention centre, [the applicant] had been examined by a doctor. [The applicant] had not complained about his condition. During the time of [the applicant’s] detention in the temporary detention centre, he had never been questioned during the night. Any work with the suspects after 10 p.m. was prohibited ... Whilst in detention in the temporary detention centre, the applicant had slashed his wrists and received medical assistance.\nWhen questioned, ... Bis. submitted that on 11 April 2003 during the [applicant’s] arrest ..., his unit had cordoned off the perimeter to prevent the [applicant’s] escape. The [applicant’s] arrest had been carried out by the [criminal investigation unit of the police]. When [the applicant] had been arrested, they had removed the cordon. ... He had entered the house and had seen [the applicant] standing by the wall in the hallway with his arms up. [The applicant] had recognised him because they knew each other. ... He had not seen [the applicant] since. He had not used any force against the applicant.\n... Khas. submitted that in April 2003 [the law-enforcement agencies] had carried out the arrest of [the applicant], who had been the leader of an organised criminal group. He had not taken part in the [applicant’s] arrest. He did not know who had arrested him. He had not put any physical pressure on [the applicant]. It was impossible for him to have done so because he had not been involved in the [applicant’s] arrest. ...\nWhen questioned, [police officers] Zhab. and Alis. submitted that in the course of the arrest, [the applicant] had tried to resist and abscond. As a result, force had been used against him. They did not know who exactly had used force against [the applicant]. No physical or psychological pressure had been put on [the applicant] during the preliminary investigation and [the applicant’s] detention. [The applicant] had testified voluntarily. The information given by the [applicant] had led to new evidence being obtained in respect of other participants in the criminal gang ... .\n...\nWhen questioned, Sh., the head of the on-call unit of ORB-2, submitted that no psychological or physical force had been used against the detainees in ORB-2. He further explained that the cells ... were equipped with metal doors with vents ... Those vents were kept closed. They were always closed when an arrestee was brought to the premises. This was done to prevent the detainees from seeing each other and communicating. The radio was on all the time. The sound was at full volume in order to be heard in the cells. It was impossible for the detainees to hear any conversation held in the corridor.\n...\nWhen questioned, police officer Ul. ... submitted that he and other police officers had arrested [the applicant]. They had had information implicating [the applicant] in the murder of the Kham. brothers and that he had been armed. At the time of the arrest, [the applicant] had been at home eating on the floor. When the applicant had seen the police officers, he had run to the bed trying to get a gun hidden under the pillow. In order to neutralise and arrest [the applicant], he had had to use force and combat techniques. When they had taken [the applicant] out of the house, they had pulled his T-shirt over his head in order to prevent him from fleeing. He had noticed small scars on the [applicant’s] chest and belly. After the arrest, no force had been used against [the applicant]. [The applicant] had asked to be released and had promised to help the police. He had wanted to give information about all the members of the gang whom he knew personally.\n...\nAccording to the medical register of the temporary detention centre ... , [the applicant] had complained only about his dry cough ...\n...\nAccording to forensic report no. 399 of 5 May 2004 it had been impossible to determine the origin of the scars on the [applicant’s] body because the wounds were infected. There was no forensic data substantiating the allegation that the injuries ... had been caused by electrocution. The deep scar on the front of the right forearm could have resulted from the removal of a lipoma. Multiple ... scars on the front of the left forearm had resulted from injuries caused by stabbing. The position of the scars did not exclude the possibility that they had been self-inflicted.\n...\nVlad., Khad. and Sul. were suspects in the criminal investigation. Their statements that they had seen [the applicant] being ill-treated had been refuted by the evidence collected in the course of the present inquiry.\nAccording to the certificate issued by ORB-2, Sul. had been detained there from 25 July to 5 August 2003 and could not have met [the applicant], who had been detained at ORB-2 from 16 April to 20 June 2003. ...\nKhad. could not have heard the [applicant’s] name pronounced by someone in the corridor because the radio was constantly on. Nor could he have seen [the applicant] from his cell, because the vents in the cell doors were always kept closed when a new arrestee was brought to the premises.\nAs regards the statement made by Vlad., it was [the applicant] himself who had told him about the alleged ill-treatment.\nThe statements made by Vlad., Khad. and Sul. should be interpreted as their attempt to falsely accuse the police officers in order to help [the applicant] ... to evade criminal liability.\nHaving regard to the above, it was established in the course of the inquiry that force had been used against [the applicant] only in the course of his arrest because he had tried to resist and flee. The actions of the police had been lawful. .... The force used against [the applicant] had not been excessive.\nThe [applicant’s] allegations ... have not been substantiated by any evidence.\nThe [applicant’s] allegations ... should be viewed as a line of defence aimed at misleading the courts and evading criminal responsibility.” 28.  On 16 July 2004 the applicant challenged the decision of 11 May 2004 before the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny. According to the Government, the appeal had been lodged by the two lawyers representing the applicant. On 20 July 2004 the statement of appeal was returned to the lawyers because lawyer D. had failed to sign it. According to the applicant, neither he nor his counsel had been informed accordingly; nor had they received the returned statement of appeal. 29.  According to the applicant, on 7 February 2010 his mother had been summoned to the prosecutor’s office in Grozny. An official at the office had allegedly made threats to her in connection with the applicant’s complaints to the Court. He allegedly said that the applicant had lodged too many complaints with the Court and that that might cause him problems. 30.  On 8 February 2010 the house in which the applicant’s family were temporarily living was set on fire. 31.  The official investigation concluded that the fire had resulted from a malfunctioning gas heating system. The possibility of arson was ruled out. 32.  On 17 February 2010 the prosecutor’s office refused to open a criminal investigation into the matter. On 12 April 2010 that decision was quashed and the proceedings resumed in connection with the allegations made by the applicant’s mother that she had been threatened by an official working at the prosecutor’s office. The parties did not inform the Court of the outcome of the proceedings, nor did they provide copies of the relevant decisions.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1951 and the third applicant was born in 1948. They live in Turkey. 6.  The applicants are the heirs of Mr Salih Ekrem Pekinel and Mr Abdurrahim Pekinel, who were their father and uncle respectively (“ancestors”). The applicants’ ancestors (muris) were allegedly the owners of 2,258,000 square metres of land, along with six other persons (“co‑owners”), in the Maltepe village of the Menemen district in the Izmir province. 7.  On 13 October 1961 the Land Registry Commission (Tapulama Komisyonu) attached to the General Directorate of Land Registration (Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü) conducted a land registry survey (tapulama tespiti) and registered a plot of land (“plot no. 726”) in the Maltepe village as being owned by eight people - the applicants’ ancestors and the other co-owners. 8.  In 1964 the Treasury challenged this land registry survey. It claimed that the land in question had been used as meadowland (mera) and that therefore it had not been correctly surveyed by the Commission. 9.  On 22 May 1974 the land register was amended by the Land Registry Commission and the Treasury was registered as the owner of plot no. 726. 10.  On 29 July 1974 six persons (“the plaintiffs”) filed an action with the Menemen Cadastre Court, requesting that the decision of the Land Registry Commission be set aside. They claimed that the land in question had been registered with their title and that it belonged neither to the Treasury nor to the applicants’ ancestors and the co-owners. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicants’ ancestors filed a counter-claim that they held a share in plot no. 726. They requested that the former records at the land registry, which proved their right of ownership in respect of plot no. 726, be confirmed. They based their arguments on the land registry records of December 1884, which indicated that the land in question was owned by their father, Salih Paşa. 12.  On 14 April 1979 Mr Abdurrahim Pekinel and, on 28 November 1982, Mr Salih Ekrem Pekinel died. The applicants were designated as their heirs. 13.  On 7 July 1986 the Menemen Cadastre Court rendered its judgment. It held as follows:\n“The land registry record of 1884 concerning plot no. 726 in Maltepe village was modified. ...\nThe same record was also modified regarding plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy village. The record concerning this plot became final since there was no objection. ...\nAccording to the initial records, the size of the land was 1,103,163 square metres, whereas the size of plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy was found to be 3,619,600 square metres. It was established that the land’s borders were unclear in the records and thus open to enlargement. According to the case-law of the Court of Cassation and Article 42 of the Law on Cadastre, if the borders mentioned on records were uncertain and suitable for enlargement, the total amount indicated in these records should be taken into consideration.\n...\nFollowing the finalisation of the land registry record concerning plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy, both the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in the counter-claim acquired land from this plot.” 14.  The Menemen Cadastre Court further found that the land in question was public property because it had been used as meadowland. Thus it could not be the subject of a determination by the Land Registry Commission. The court concluded that plot no. 726 in the Maltepe village belonged neither to the plaintiffs nor to the applicants’ ancestors and the co‑owners, but to the Treasury. 15.  On 17 November 1988 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Menemen Cadastre Court and remitted the case for reconsideration. The Court of Cassation observed that the Land Registry Commission had established that plot no. 726, which covered 2,258,000 square metres of land, had belonged to some of the plaintiffs. It noted that the Treasury had objected to the registration made by the Commission, claiming that the amount of land shown in the land registry exceeded the amount to which the plaintiffs were entitled. It pointed out that the plaintiffs had challenged the registration with reference to the records kept at the land registry and that the first-instance court had dismissed the case, qualifying the land as a “meadow”. 16.  The Court of Cassation reasoned that the investigation carried out by the first‑instance court was not sufficient to render a judgment. The plaintiffs based their claims on the records kept at the land registry. These records were included in the case file but did not indicate the land’s exact location. Furthermore, the documents concerning the neighbouring plots were not used and the nature of the property was not properly examined. 17.  The Court of Cassation opined that, in order to reach a well-founded conclusion, the documents concerning the neighbouring plots should be included in the file, an on-site examination should be carried out, and local persons who were old and who knew the area should be heard. It considered in particular that issues concerning the nature and the ownership of the land and the identities of the persons who used the land should be determined by way of testimony. In addition, an expert report should be obtained from an agricultural engineer. 18.  The Court of Cassation concluded that taking a decision without making a sufficient examination was incorrect, and that the reasoning as to the necessity of the determination by the Land Registry Commission was not accurate. 19.  Following the decision of the Court of Cassation, the case was remitted to the Menemen Cadastre Court. 20.  The plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in the counter-claim, including the applicants, alleged that plot no. 726 had belonged to Salih Paşa and had been inherited by his heirs. Therefore, neither the Treasury nor other persons had a claim to it. In this connection, they stated that plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy and plot no. 726 in Maltepe had belonged to Salih Paşa and Hacı Velioğlu and that, following an agreement between their heirs, the land had been shared. They alleged that plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy had been given to the heirs of Hacı Velioğlu, whereas plot no. 726 had been reserved for the heirs of Salih Paşa. The applicants averred that they had not acquired any property from plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy. 21.  The representative of the Treasury claimed that all the plaintiffs had received more land than that to which they were entitled after the Land Registry Commission’s decision. He maintained that the plaintiffs had acquired property from plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy. He further claimed that the land in question was meadowland, which could not be qualified as private property. 22.  The Menemen Cadastre Court carried out an on-site inspection and heard evidence from three local experts and an agricultural engineer. 23.  On 13 May 1992 the Menemen Cadastre Court, taking into account the findings of the local experts and the reports of the agricultural engineer, decided that plot no. 726 in Maltepe belonged to the persons specified by the Land Registry Commission in 1961. It therefore ordered the registration of these persons or their heirs, including the applicants, as the owners of plot no. 726 in the Maltepe village at the land registry. 24.  On 21 April 1993 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 13 May 1992 and sent the case file to the Menemen Cadastre Court. 25.  The Court of Cassation reasoned that the first-instance court had not conducted an adequate investigation, the guidelines of which had been indicated in its decision of 17 November 1988. It pointed out that the size of the land in question was 1000 dönüm according to the land registry records of 1884, whereas the land registry records of 1890 had indicated that the size of the land was 1200 dönüm. The court observed in this connection that the first‑instance court had failed to explain the reason for the increase in the size of the land. Moreover, the first-instance court had failed to include in the case file the land registry record of 1875 for the land in question, the documents concerning the neighbouring plots of the land and the military maps of the area. 26.  The Court of Cassation also noted that the land registry record of 1884 referred to some places as being the borders of the land in question, (“sıra melengeç, Yorgaki oğlu, İsmet hanım, harita, Kara istirati, çataka tarlaları and kulak istifanı”), which was not fully comprehensible. Therefore, it should be determined whether the borders of the plot of land were correctly cited in the records at the land registry. The court stated that a map of the disputed plot of land and the neighbouring plots of land should be drawn up, and that the military map of the area, the statements of the experts and the local people should be taken into account when making that map. 27.  Upon receipt of the case file, the Menemen Cadastre Court re-examined the case. 28.  It requested the General Directorate of Land Registration to submit a copy of the records of 1875 kept at the land registry office in respect of plot no. 726. 29.  On 21 July 1994 the General Directorate informed the court that the record in question did not pertain to any plot of land in Seyrekköy. 30.  On 1 December 1994 the Directorate sent the document in question and informed the Menemen Court that the reason for the increase in size of the property could not be determined. 31.  In 1996 the plaintiffs of the initial case, which had been filed in 1974, withdrew their case, informing the court that they did not have a claim to plot no. 726. 32.  The Menemen Cadastre Court carried out two further on-site inspections and took oral evidence from local experts and witnesses. During the on-site visit, a scientific expert and an agricultural expert also inspected the area and submitted their observations concerning the case. 33.  In its judgment of 11 November 1998, the Menemen Cadastre Court stated the following:\n“... The disputed property, plot no. 726 in Maltepe, was registered as a meadowland by the Land Registry Commission. The Commission determined the plaintiffs as the owners of the property having regard to the land registry records of 1921, 1946 and 1952. The Land Registry Commission’s decision indicated the size of the land in the amount of 2,258,000 square metres. Following the objection filed by the Treasury, on 22 May 1974, the record at the land registry was revised by the Land Registry Commission and the Treasury was registered as the owner of plot no. 726.\nPlot no. 1 in Seyrekköy village was registered with the titles of some of the plaintiffs, who relied on the land registry records for their action.\nIt has been understood from the local experts’ statements that the words “kulakistifan, yorgakioğlu, çanako, karaistifan”, which were mentioned in the land registry records of 1952, 1890 and 1884, were the names of the Greeks who had left the country after the establishment of the Republic.\nAccording to Article 20/C of Law no. 3402, if the borders indicated in the records and documents were not based on maps or sketches and were uncertain and suitable for enlargement, the amount indicated in these records and documents should be taken into consideration.\nAccording to the case-law of the Court of Cassation the amount shall be taken into consideration if the records have unclear borders.\nIt has been understood that “kulakistifan, yorgakioğlu, çanako, karaistifan” are the names of Greeks whose whereabouts are unknown. Therefore, the land registry records should be valid as regards the amount of land indicated in them. However, some of the plaintiffs acquired more land than specified in the land registry records for plot no. 1 in the Seyrekköy village. Consequently, the case should be dismissed and, for the reasons explained above, the Treasury should be registered as the owner of plot no. 726 in the Maltepe village.” 34.  On an unspecified date the applicants appealed against the judgment of 11 November 1998. 35.  After holding a hearing on the merits of the case, on 5 October 1999 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal, for the following reasons:\n“It has not been proven that the amount of land cited in the land registry records of 1884 included the disputed plot. The record in question and the land registry records of 1926 had been revised in relation to plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy. It has been understood that the size of plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy is actually more than the size mentioned on the land registry records. It has also been understood that the borders indicated in the land registry records in respect of plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy are uncertain. It is clear that the extent of the land in plot no. 1 is greater than that indicated in both the land registry records. Accordingly, it should be acknowledged that the land registry records on which the plaintiffs based their action relate to plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy. Therefore, the judgment should be upheld.” 36.  On 26 February 2001 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ request for rectification of the decision, holding that the land registry records on which the plaintiffs had based their action in fact related to plot no. 1 in Seyrekköy. 37.  The decision dated 26 February 2001 was not served on the applicants. It was deposited with the Registry of the Menemen Cadasre Court on 12 March 2001. The applicants stated that they only learned of it in July 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in the town of Karabulak, Ingushetia. The complaint is also brought in respect of the applicant’s son, Khadzhi-Murat Aslanbekovich Yandiyev, born in 1975. 10.  The facts surrounding the disappearance of the applicant’s son were partially disputed. In view of this the Court requested that the Government produce copies of the entire investigation file opened in relation to Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev’s disappearance. 11.  The parties’ submissions on the facts concerning the circumstances of the apprehension and disappearance of the applicant’s son and the ensuing investigations are set out in Sections 1 and 2 below. A description of the materials submitted to the Court is contained in Part B. 12.  The applicant’s son, Khadzhi-Murat Aslanbekovich Yandiyev, was born on 27 August 1975. Until August 1999 he was a student at the Moscow Sociology University. The applicant submits that he left the University in August 1999 before completing his final year of studies. One of his classmates told the applicant that her son had travelled to Grozny, Chechnya. The applicant believes that he wanted to find his father, who had apparently gone there. She has not heard from her son since August 1999. 13.  In autumn 1999 hostilities began in Chechnya. After Grozny was captured by federal forces in late January - early February 2000, a large group of Chechen fighters left the city and moved south-west towards the mountains. En route the fighters, and anyone leaving the city with them, encountered mine fields. Many people sustained injuries, especially to their feet and legs. Many of the wounded were treated in a hospital in the village of Alkhan-Kala (also called Yermolovka), which was taken by the Russian military in early February 2000. 14.  On 2 February 2000 the applicant saw her son on a news broadcast about the capture of Alkhan-Kala by the Russian forces. He was wearing camouflage uniform and was being interrogated by a Russian officer, who was also wearing camouflage. 15.  The applicant later obtained a full copy of the recording, made by a reporter for the NTV (Russian Independent TV) and CNN who had entered Alkhan-Kala with the federal troops. A copy of that recording and a transcript of the interrogation have been submitted to the Court by the applicant. 16.  The recording shows the applicant’s son, who is standing near a bus with wounded men. The bus is surrounded by Russian soldiers and the wounded are being removed from the bus. A passing soldier pushes the applicant’s son on his right leg; he winces with pain. He is speaking in a low voice and his words are barely audible. The officer questioning him is speaking in a harsh voice. The following is a translation of the relevant parts of the transcript:\n“Officer: - Turn your face [to me]! Turn it properly. Who are you?\nThe detainee answers something, but the words are not audible.\nOfficer: - What did you say? From Ingushetia? - / The detainee says something about Nazran/ - From Nazran? Where do you live in Nazran?\nAnother serviceman who is standing nearby orders: Hands out of your pockets!\n...The officer takes something - identity documents - from the pocket of the detainee’s camouflage jacket, and inspects them, asking questions. The answers are not audible.\nOfficer: - What is your last name? What is your first and patronymic name?\nThe detainee: - Born on 27 August 1975.\nAnother officer: - Alexander Andreyevich, we need to get the convoy group ready. We have to take all three buses there.\nThe officer takes something out of a small leather packet, wrapped in cellophane, that was among the detainee’s papers [apparently, a compass], and shows it to somebody: - There, you see! A solid, trained fighter.\nHe puts the device back into the packet and wraps it in cellophane.\nAnother officer asks: - Where did you leave your arms?\nThe detainee, shown with his head to the side: - My weapons were left over there.... /Says something about a mine field. /\nThe second officer repeats: In a mine field?\n...The officer, pointing at his camouflage jacket: - From which soldier did you take this? From a federal soldier? From [one of] your soldiers?\nThe detainee says something to the effect that it was given to him. He says something about “fighting against”.\nThe officer: - Fighting against whom? Fighting against such [people] as here? Why did you come here? People are dying because of you!\nThe detainee: - Because of me?\nThe officer: - Of course!\nThe detainee: - People are dying...\nThe officer: - Take him away, damn it, finish him off there, shit, - that’s the whole order. Get him out of here, damn it. Come on, come on, come on, do it, take him away, finish him off, shoot him, damn it...\nThe detainee is led away by two soldiers”. 17.  The video also shows Russian military equipment and other wounded detainees. They are taken out of the buses or remain inside; many have their feet and legs wrapped in bandages or cellophane. The video also contains interviews with the villagers of Alkhan-Kala, who say that the village was shelled on the previous day. 18.  The CNN journalists who filmed the interrogation later visited the applicant in Ingushetia and identified the interrogating officer as Colonel-General Alexander Baranov. 19.  After seeing her son on the news broadcast on 2 February 2000, the applicant immediately began searching for him. She has had no news of him since. 20.  She applied on numerous occasions to prosecutors at various levels, to the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice, to the Special Envoy of the Russian President for rights and freedoms in the Chechen Republic, and others. She also personally visited detention centres and prisons in Chechnya and other regions in the Northern Caucasus. 21.  Acting on the applicant’s behalf, the NGOs Human Rights Watch and Memorial and the Head of the OSCE mission in Chechnya forwarded requests for information about her son to various bodies. 22.  The applicant received very little substantive information from official bodies about the investigation into her son’s disappearance. On several occasions she received copies of letters from various authorities directing her complaints to the Military Prosecutor’s Office for the Northern Caucasus, to the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office and to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102. 23.  On 18 August 2000 the Main Prisons Directorate of the Ministry of Justice (GUIN, Главное Управление исполнения наказаний Министерства Юстиции РФ, ГУИН) informed the applicant that her son was not being held in any prison in Russia. The applicant was advised to apply to the Ministry of the Interior. 24.  On 1 November 2000 the Special Envoy of the Russian President for rights and freedoms in the Chechen Republic replied to the Head of the OSCE mission in Chechnya, stating that the applicant’s son was listed as no. 363 in the list of missing persons compiled by his office following citizens’ complaints. On 1 November 2000 his office had forwarded a request for information in respect of Yandiyev’s whereabouts to the Prosecutor General. 25.  On 24 November 2000 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 in Khankala, where the headquarters of the Russian military forces in Chechnya were based, returned the applicant’s complaint to the Grozny District Department of the Interior, with a copy to the applicant. The accompanying letter stated that there were no grounds to apply to the military prosecutor’s office, because the “attached materials did not corroborate the involvement of any military servicemen in the disappearance of the applicant’s son”. 26.  On 30 November 2000 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 replied to the NGO Memorial that, following examination of its submissions, it had been concluded that “Yandiyev’s corpse had never been discovered and it did not follow from the videotape that he had been killed, as the videotape did not contain such facts.” Consequently, it was decided, under Article 5 part 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not to open a criminal investigation on account of the absence of a criminal act. In a similar reply to Memorial, dated 30 December 2000, the same military prosecutor stated that there were no grounds to conclude that military servicemen had been responsible for the actions shown in the videotape. 27.  On 8 December 2000 the Chechnya Prosecutor informed the Special Envoy about progress being made in several cases, including that involving a videotape “where an officer of the federal forces orders the execution of a wounded fighter. The latter was identified by his relatives as Yandiyev Kh. S. The said videotape has been forwarded to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 for checking and investigation under Article 109 of the Criminal Procedural Code”. 28.  On 18 December 2000 the Moscow bureau of Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the General Prosecutor with the following questions:\n“(1) Was a criminal investigation opened into Yandiyev’s disappearance?\n(2) Was the identity of the interrogating officer established?\n(3) Was he questioned? If not, why not?\n(4) Were the whereabouts of Yandiyev established, in particular if he was still alive?\n(5) Was the interrogating officer or anybody else charged with Yandiyev’s “disappearance”?\nIf a criminal investigation into Yandiyev’s “disappearance” and ill-treatment has not been opened, please open such an investigation.” 29.  On 29 December 2000 and 24 January 2001 the Military Prosecutor’s Office for the Northern Caucasus informed the applicant and Human Rights Watch that their complaints had been forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 30.  In February 2001 two individuals, I. and B., submitted affidavits to the head of the Karabulak District Department of the Interior, in which they stated that on 2 February 2000 Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev had been detained in Alkhan-Kala by federal troops. The affidavits did not contain the addresses of I. and B. and did not explain how they became aware of Yandiyev’s detention. 31.  On 13 February 2001 the Chechnya Prosecutor wrote to Memorial acknowledging receipt of the videotape depicting Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev’s interrogation. The videotape had been forwarded to military unit no. 20102 for the purposes of the investigation. 32.  On 13 and 27 February 2001 the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 forwarded all requests pertaining to the case to the Grozny District Department of the Interior. 33.  On 16 May 2001 Human Rights Watch wrote to the Military Prosecutor’s Office for the Northern Caucasus, asking the prosecutor to quash the decision by the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 not to open a criminal investigation. The letter referred to the contents of the videotape and to the fact that Yandiyev had not been seen subsequently. It again requested that the officers who appeared in the recording be identified and questioned. In reply, on 31 May 2001 the Military Prosecutor’s Office wrote that an inquiry would be conducted. On 22 June 2001 it informed Human Rights Watch that all the documents pertaining to the case had been transferred to the Grozny District Department of the Interior. 34.  On 14 July 2001 a prosecutor from the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal investigation no. 19112 into the abduction of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev by unidentified persons in February 2000 in Alkhan-Kala. The decision referred to Article 126 part 2 of the Criminal Code (kidnapping). 35.  On 17 August 2001 Human Rights Watch again sent a letter to the Chief Military Prosecutor. On 4 September 2001 he replied that the criminal case was being investigated by the local prosecutors’ office in Chechnya, which would inform the interested parties of its progress. 36.  The applicant submits that in December 2001 she was visited at her home by certain persons who stated that they were carrying out a population census. They asked her and her neighbours about her son and whether he had returned home. The next day they returned and told her that they were from the Karabulak Town Prosecutor’s Office and that they had received documents from the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office pertaining to her son’s disappearance. The applicant confirmed that her son was missing and that she had had no news of him. 37.  On 23 October 2002 the SRJI asked the Chechnya Prosecutor for an update on the investigation into Yandiyev’s “disappearance” and possible killing. No response was given. 38.  On 20 December 2002 the SRJI submitted a similar request for information to the General Prosecutor’s Office. On 4 February 2003 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the SRJI that its letter had been forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office for the Southern Federal Circuit. In March 2003 that Office informed the SRJI that its request had been forwarded to the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office. 39.  On 15 April 2003 the SRJI wrote to the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 and asked, with reference to its letter of 30 November 2000, for a copy of the decision by which he had refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s complaint about her son’s possible murder. In June 2003 the military prosecutor responded that all documents related to the case had been forwarded to the Grozny District Temporary Department of the Interior (VOVD) on 24 November 2000. 40.  On 7 December 2003 the investigator of the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that the investigation in criminal case no. 19112 had been resumed on 6 December 2003. On 6 February 2004 the applicant was informed by the same Office that the investigation had been adjourned for failure to identify the culprits. The applicant was informed that it was possible to appeal that decison. 41.  The applicant submits that on 30 March 2004 she was visited at her home in Karabulak by two persons from the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office who again questioned her about her missing son and about other members of her family. The applicant submitted a description of her son, but explained that she had run out of photographs of him because she had previously submitted them to various offices, including the prosecution service. The applicant signed the record of the questioning. 42.  The applicant referred to the Human Rights Watch report of March 2001 entitled “The ‘Dirty War’ in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture and Summary Executions” which reports Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev’s story and his “disappearance” after detention by Russian servicemen. 43.  In November 2003 the application was communicated to the Russian Government, which were requested at that time to submit a copy of investigation file no. 19112. In March 2004 the Government submitted 80 pages out of about 200. The Court on two occasions reiterated its request for the remaining documents, to which the Government responded that their disclosure would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, would compromise the investigation and would prejudice the rights and interests of the participants in the proceedings. 44.  In September 2005 the Court declared the application admissible and reiterated its request for the remaining documents. In November 2005 the Government submitted a copy of the entire criminal investigation file, comprising five volumes (about 900 pages) and three volumes of attachments (about 700 pages). In addition, in January and March 2006 the Government submitted two more volumes of the latest documents from the criminal investigation file (comprising about 470 pages). 45.  The investigation established that the applicant’s son had been detained on 2 February 2000 in Alkhan-Kala, together with other members of illegal armed groups. Immediately after arrest he was handed over to servicemen from the GUIN for transportation to the pre-trial detention centre in Chernokozovo, Chechnya. Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev did not arrive at Chernokozovo and his subsequent whereabouts could not be established. As of July 2001 Yandiyev was placed on the search list as a missing person, and as of October 2004 his name was placed on the federal wanted list. In October 2004 a criminal investigation in respect of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev was opened by the military prosecutor of the United Group Alliance (UGA) under Article 208 of the Criminal Code – participation in an illegal armed group. 46.  The applicant and her husband were questioned on several occasions and granted victim status in the proceedings. The investigation also identified and questioned a large number of eye-witnesses to and participants in the events, including servicemen from the army, the interior troops and the GUIN, journalists and local residents. Several witnesses confirmed that they had observed the encounter between Yandiyev and Colonel-General Baranov and that the latter’s words had been regarded by everyone present not as an order but as “a figure of speech” aimed at calming down Yandiyev, who had behaved in an aggressive and provocative manner and could have inspired disobedience among the detainees. After questioning Yandiyev had been taken away from the bus containing the other wounded and had been placed against the fence; he had remained there for some time. The file also contains a statement by General Nedobitko, who had been in charge of the operation and who denied that any summary executions had taken place. All servicemen present were questioned as witnesses. No one was charged with a crime. 47.  Colonel-General Baranov was questioned twice about the events and stated that he had not given an order to “shoot” Yandiyev, but that he had intended to stop his aggressive behaviour and to prevent possible disturbances that could have ignited violence and entail further casualties among the arrested insurgents and the federal forces. 48.  Several expert reports were carried out on the video recording in question, in order to establish its authenticity; to establish whether the conversation between General Baranov and Yandiyev could be regarded as a proper order given within the chain of command; to evaluate the psychological state of the persons depicted; and to conclude whether the General had insulted Yandiyev. The videotape was found to be authentic. An expert report also concluded that the words used by General Baranov could not have been regarded as a proper order issued to his subordinates within the military chain of command because of its inappropriate form and contents. 49.  The investigation did not establish the fate of Yandiyev following his transfer to the GUIN servicemen on 2 February 2000. Various detention centres, military and law-enforcement bodies denied that his name had ever been on their records. Several men who were detained in Alkhan-Kala on 2 February 2000 stated that they had not seen Yandiyev after his detention. 50.  Between July 2001 and February 2006 the investigation was adjourned and reopened six times. The case was transferred from the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office to the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office and then to the military prosecutor of the UGA. The majority of documents in the case file are dated after December 2003. 51.  The parties submitted numerous documents concerning the investigation into the disappearance. The main documents of relevance are as follows: 52.  The Government submitted the documents from the criminal investigation file into Yandiyev’s disappearance, comprised of over 2,000 pages. The main documents can be summarised as follows:\na)  Decision to open a criminal investigation 53.  On 14 July 2001 a prosecutor from the Chechnya Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal investigation into the abduction of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, born in 1975, by unidentified persons in February 2000 in Alkhan-Kala. The decision referred to Article 126 part 2 of the Criminal Code (kidnapping). On the same date the criminal case was forwarded to the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office for investigation, which accepted it on 19 July 2001. The case file was assigned no. 19112. In May 2004 the investigation was transferred to the military prosecutor of the UGA, where it was assigned case file no. 34/00/0020-04D.\nb)  Statements by the applicant 54.  The file contains the applicant’s letter of 30 May 2001 to the General Prosecutor, in which she stated the known facts concerning her son’s disappearance. She stated that, having seen her son on a news broadcast on 2 February 2000, she immediately set out for Alkhan-Kala. She reached there only on 6 February 2000, and was told that her son, who was listed among 105 detainees, had been transferred to Tolstoy-Yurt. On 8 February 2000 she arrived at Tolstoy-Yurt, where she was told that at 3 p.m. that day the detainees had been transferred to the Chernokozovo pre-trial detention centre. At Chernokozovo she was told that her son was not in their custody and that his name was not on their lists. The applicant had no further news of her son, and requested the prosecutor’s office to establish his whereabouts and to inform her if he had been charged with any crimes. 55.  On 20 January 2002 the applicant was questioned in her home town. Her brief statement repeated the circumstances of her son’s disappearance and reiterated that she had had no news of him. On the same day the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 56.  Later the applicant was again questioned on several occasions. Her husband, Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev’s father, was also questioned and confirmed her previous statements.\nc)  Statements by witnesses to Yandiyev’s detention 57.  The investigators questioned the witnesses to the encounter between General Baranov and Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, including servicemen and journalists. 58.  In December 2003 and January 2004 the investigation questioned several officers from special police forces (OMON) from the Novgorod region. They submitted, almost word for word, that from November 1999 to March 2000 they had been on mission in Alkhan-Kala and that in early February 2000 an operation had been carried out in the village. Their detachment was being held in reserve, but they were aware that a large group of fighters had entered the village, and several thousand federal troops, with support from aviation and armoured vehicles, had captured a large number of fighters – possibly about 700 persons. The operation was under the command of General-Major Nedobitko, the commander of a division of the interior troops, and was visited by Major-General Vladimir Shamanov, the head of the Western Zone Alignment. The Federal Security Service (FSB) and members of the military intelligence dealt with the detainees. 59.  Several army servicemen stated in September and October 2005 that, on 2 February 2000, a group of senior officers headed by Colonel-General Baranov, who at the time had headed the UGA staff, had arrived in Alkhan-Kala by helicopter. They came because a large group of fighters, including casualties, had been detained. They were accompanied by journalists, including TV cameramen. They first visited the Alkhan-Kala hospital, where a large group of wounded fighters was found in the cellar. The cellar was dirty, the wounded were lying on the floor and there was a strong smell of decay. The soldiers deposited a large number of arms and ammunition collected from the fighters near the hospital. They then went to Alkhan-Kala’s central square to see a convoy of three or four buses containing fighters, some of them wounded. The buses were blocked on all sides by army vehicles and guarded by servicemen, who had already disarmed the men inside. Local residents had gathered to watch behind the security cordon. When the senior officers approached the buses they noticed one of the fighters near the first bus, who had been talking to a reporter. He was wearing a new army camouflage jacket and behaved in an aggressive and provocative manner, trying to instigate the detainees and local residents to disobey. The witnesses suggested that he had been under the influence of narcotics. Some witnesses also noted that he was wounded in the hip. Colonel-General Baranov talked to the detainee and calmed him down using harsh words, saying that he should be shot. He also found identity documents, a compass and a map in his pocket. The soldiers then took the detainee away from the bus containing the other fighters and placed him next to a metal fence about five metres away, where he remained calmly for an hour or an hour and a half. Colonel-General Baranov and other army officers left Alkhan-Kala after about an hour and a half, and the detained fighters were left in the charge of the GUIN servicemen. The witnesses stressed that Baranov’s words had not been regarded as an order, that Yandiyev had remained near the bus for a long time after the conversation and that, in any event, there had been far too many people around to issue or to carry out such an order. They also specified that most of the servicemen appearing in the videotape belonged to the Ministry of the Interior (OMON) or Ministry of Justice (GUIN) troops, and thus were not subordinate to a Colonel-General in the army. They denied that summary executions had taken place. 60.  In May 2004 the investigation questioned General-Major Nedobitko who had headed the operation in Alkhan-Kala. He stated that the operation had been carried out by a joint group of the army, internal troops, police units from Chechnya and other regions and GUIN troops from the Ministry of Justice. Work with the detainees came within the competence of the GUIN units. He denied that the servicemen had committed summary executions. 61.  Journalists and cameramen from NTV, RTR and the army’s press service stated that Yandiyev had told the reporters that he had been in charge of a small group of fighters. During the encounter with General Baranov he had behaved in a slowed-down manner, as if under the influence of narcotics. They also testified that Yandiyev had behaved aggressively and thus provoked General Baranov’s remarks. One reporter testified that after the conversation depicted in the videotape Yandiyev had been taken to a fence, where he remained for about 10 minutes, after which servicemen put him into an armoured personnel carrier (APC) and drove away. Other reporters stated that he remained by the fence for about an hour or more, until the group headed by Colonel-General Baranov had left. 62.  In November 2005 the investigation questioned Ryan Chilcote, the CNN correspondent who had been at the scene on 2 February 2000. He stated that he had witnessed the dialogue between the wounded fighter, later identified as Yandiyev, and a high-ranking military officer, later identified as Colonel-General Baranov. He confirmed that although his Russian was weak, he could grasp the meaning of the conversation and had understood that the officer had questioned the fighter about his army jacket and later said that he should be “finished off”. He testified that he saw Yandiyev taken away by soldiers to an APC.\nd)  Statements by Colonel-General Baranov 63.  The investigation questioned Colonel-General Alexander Baranov as a witness on two occasions – in June 2004 and in September 2005. On both occasions he confirmed that he had a conversation with a young rebel fighter (“boyevik”), later identified as Yandiyev, who had been standing outside the bus with other fighters and who had been creating a disturbance by his statements. The witness stated that he had concluded from the fighter’s inadequate reaction that Yandiyev had been intoxicated, but as there was no smell of alcohol, he thought he might be under the influence of narcotics. The officer said that his harsh reaction had been caused by the detainee’s dangerous conduct, which could have incited other fighters and the villagers to disobey. In his first witness statement Mr Baranov claimed that the video footage had been altered to omit the fighter’s provocative statements. He stressed that the servicemen surrounding him were not his subordinates and thus could not have taken orders from him. In any event, nobody regarded his remarks as an order and Yandiyev was simply taken away from the bus and stood by the fence for a long time afterwards. The GUIN servicemen had dealt with the detainees and Mr Baranov had had no involvement in this.\ne)  Expert reports 64.  A number of expert reports were carried out in the case. 65.  In October 2004 experts from the Criminological Institute of the Federal Security Service (Институт криминалистики ФСБ) concluded that the videotape did not contain any signs of altering or editing of image or sound and that the voice which had given the order to execute Yandiyev was that of Mr Baranov. 66.  In October 2005 a professor of linguistics at Moscow State Pedagogical University concluded that, although Colonel-General Baranov had used obscene words and expressions, these were not addressed directly at Yandiyev or anyone in particular and could not therefore be regarded as an insult. 67.  In October 2005 a comprehensive psychological and psychiatric report carried out by two senior medical experts concluded that, judging by the video extract and other materials, the behaviour of both Colonel-General Baranov and Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev on 2 February 2000 had been adequate to the situation and that neither had displayed any signs of weakening of mental performance. 68.  In November 2005 an expert commission made up of three professors from military academies concluded that the extract in the videotape did not contain a valid order given within the chain of command due to its contents and improper form. In particular, the experts’ report recalled that orders had to comply with the Constitution and other legal acts and that they could only deal with matters which were relevant to the work of the military and were within the superior’s competence. Furthermore, orders could only be issued by a superior to an identified person under his command; they were to be given in a clear and unambiguous manner. None of these conditions had been met and therefore the report concluded that neither the Colonel-General nor any of the servicemen present at the scene could have regarded his words as an order.\nf)  The situation of other detainees 69.  The investigation collected a large amount of information about the persons detained on 2 February 2000 in Alkhan-Kala. It identified and questioned the servicemen who had participated in the operation and escorted the detainees to the detention centre, and also the drivers of the buses and other detainees. 70.  Musa G., a resident of Alkhan-Kala, was questioned in June 2004 and October 2005. He stated that on 2 February 2000 he had tried to leave the village with his family in a PAZ bus. He was stopped by a group of armed men who ordered him to remove his belongings and to take the bus to the Alkhan-Kala hospital. At the hospital two other PAZ buses, also driven by villagers, were waiting. The armed men took wounded individuals out of the hospital and loaded them onto the three buses; the drivers were initially instructed to travel to Urus-Martan. However, they were not permitted to pass through a military roadblock at the exit of the village and returned to Alkhan-Kala. They were then instructed to go to Tolstoy-Yurt, where, as the witness understood it, the wounded were removed from the buses by servicemen from the Ministry of Justice. The witness identified Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev from photographs and stated that he had seen that individual being placed in an APC in Alkhan-Kala and subsequently transferred to another APC at the military roadblock at the exit from the village. The witness also stated that he had seen how the servicemen searched the man and found a black flag with Arabic inscriptions. He did not see any ill-treatment of the man or of other detainees. He had not seen the man later identified as Yandiyev prior to 2 February 2000, not did he see him afterwards. 71.  In May 2004 B. (see § 30 above) testified that he had known Yandiyev since their childhood in Grozny. In December 1999 and January 2000 he met him in Grozny on several occasions. At that time Yandiyev was wearing his hair long, had a beard and wore an army camouflage jacket, but he was not armed. At the end of January 2000 the witness left Grozny through a “safe corridor” towards Alkhan-Kala. En route the column was shelled and the witness was wounded in the right arm. In Alkhan-Kala he was admitted to hospital, where he again met Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, who had been wounded in the hip. On the morning of 2 February 2000 three buses were organised to take the wounded to the Urus-Martan hospital, but the convoy was stopped at a roadblock by the military and returned to Alkhan-Kala. There the buses were surrounded by servicemen and military vehicles and the men were taken out of the buses and searched. B. was placed by a metal fence with his back to the buses. He heard Yandiyev’s voice behind him and recalled that Yandiyev talked to some senior officer who ended the conversation by an order to “shoot” Yandiyev. The witness then saw Yandiyev being taken away. He and the other detainees were first taken to a “filtration point” in Tolstoy-Yurt, from where they were transferred to the Chernokozovo pre-trial detention centre about five days later. After that the witness was detained in two other pre-trial detention centres and was released in July 2000. He had not seen Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev after 2 February 2000 and had no news of him. 72.  The investigation obtained documents from the criminal investigation file opened in respect of B. The file contained a police report about his detention in Alkhan-Kala on 2 February 2000 on suspicion of participation in an illegal armed group. On 4 February 2000 B. was questioned in Tolstoy-Yurt and denied the charges. On the same day he was charged with participation in an illegal armed group and his detention was authorised by a prosecutor. In July 2000 the charges were dropped and B. was released under an amnesty granted to persons charged with participation in illegal armed groups in the Northern Caucasus who had not committed any serious crimes. 73.  In December 2005 the investigation questioned two other men who had been detained in February 2000 in Alkhan-Kala and taken to Tolstoy-Yurt. One of them identified Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev from a photograph and stated that he had seen that individual being taken out of a bus in Alkhan-Kala by servicemen. 74.  In November 2005 the investigation questioned several servicemen from the Ministry of Justice, from various regions of Russia, who had been deployed in Alkhan-Kala in February 2000. They stated that although their units had not been involved in the transportation of the three buses, the detainees had been transported on that day to a “filtration point” in the village of Tolstoy-Yurt. They also stated that those detainees who had been identified as “field commanders” or others who were believed to be able to provide valuable information were taken away by officers from the FSB and military intelligence (Главное разведывательное управление, ГРУ Министерства обороны РФ) and were not transported to the filtration points with the other detainees. They also stated that a system of detainee records had been maintained and that individual minutes of detention had been drawn up in respect of each of the detained persons. They estimated that on 2 February 2000 between 100 and 150 persons had been detained on suspicion of participation in illegal armed groups. 75.  The Government also submitted to the Court about 700 pages of documents from other criminal investigation files opened in relation to 62 persons detained in early February 2000 in and around Alkhan-Kala. Each of the detainees was questioned on 4 February 2000 in Tolstoy-Yurt, presented with charges and sent to various pre-trial detention centres. A detention order was issued in respect of each detainee, on suspicion of participation in illegal armed groups, by a prosecutor. It appears that most of the detainees were later released under an amnesty act. No such documents exist with reference to Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev.\ng)  Search for Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev 76.  The investigation tried to obtain information about Yandiyev’s whereabouts from various sources. A number of law-enforcement agencies and detention centres in Chechnya, the Northern Caucasus and further afield in the Russian Federation, including pre-trial detention centre no. 20/2 in Chernokozovo, denied that he had ever been arrested or detained by them. 77.  Their family’s neighbours in Grozny stated that they had not seen the Yandiyevs after they left Grozny in 1994. One neighbour, Ibragim D., questioned in October 2004, testified that in spring 2003 he had noticed a man resembling Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev in a market in Grozny. The witness did not know Yandiyev very well and did not approach the man in the market or talk to him. 78.  Also in October 2004 the investigation questioned a local resident in Alkhan-Kala who stated that in February 2000 he had witnessed Yandiyev’s arrest. He stated that in August 2000 he had noticed a man resembling the detainee in a shop in Alkhan-Kala. The witness did not know Yandiyev personally and did not know him by name. 79.  The investigators questioned a number of Alkhan-Kala residents, including a policeman and the head of the local administration. In similarly worded statements they stated that in early February 2000 a large group of fighters headed by the field commander Arbi Barayev had entered the village. The village had been shelled and large detachments of the federal forces had then entered the village in APCs. None of the villagers questioned had ever heard of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, but they stated that several young men from Alkhan-Kala had been detained by the federal forces on that day and later released. 80.  Several of Yandiyev’s classmates from the Moscow Sociology University stated that they had not seen him after the summer of 1999. They described him as a devout young man who had observed Islamic customs and studied religious literature. The investigation obtained a copy of the order by the Rector of the University by which the student Yandiyev had been discharged as of 15 November 1999 for systematic absence from classes. 81.  Yandiyev’s relatives with whom he had lived in Moscow from 1993 to 1999 testified that he had left for Chechnya in the summer of 1999 and that they had had no news from him since. 82.  The investigation explored the version that the convoy which had transported Yandiyev from Alkhan-Kala could have been ambushed and that he could have escaped or been killed in the skirmish. It requested information from a number of sources about recorded ambushes of convoys in February 2000 and about escaped detainees, but received no examples of such incidents. None of the servicemen questioned were aware of such incidents. The investigation also explored whether Yandiyev could have used a false identity on arrival at the detention centre in Chernokozovo, but the guards of the facility, questioned in December 2005, testified that all the detainees who arrived there had been in possession of identity documents or police reports confirming their identities. 83.  In December 2005 the central information bureau of the Russian railroads submitted data to the investigation about all rail road tickets purchased under the name of Yandiyev from February 1998 to October 2005 (over 450 entries). 84.  On 21 January 2006 the investigation ordered a molecular-genetic analysis of the applicant’s blood sample, in order to verify if her relationship could be traced through samples of any persons killed in action while resisting the federal authorities.\nh)  Criminal investigation in respect of Yandiyev 85.  On 6 October 2004 the military prosecutor’s office in charge of investigating Yandiyev’s kidnapping opened a criminal investigation into Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev’s involvement in an illegal armed group, a crime under Article 208 part 2 of the Criminal Code. On the same day Yandiyev was charged in absentia with the above crime and his name was included on the federal search list. This investigation was assigned case file number 34/00/0040-04.\ni)  Information related to the discovery of bodies in Alkhan-Kala 86.  On 17 February 2005 the military prosecutor responsible for the case adjourned the investigation into Yandiyev’s kidnapping on the ground of failure to identify the culprits. The relevant document summarised the findings by that date. It referred, in particular, to the testimonies of four policemen from the Saratov Region who had been on mission in Chechnya in February 2000. Each of them stated that in mid-February 2000 five male bodies, dressed in camouflage outfits and civilian clothes, had been discovered on the outskirts of Alkhan-Kala, near the cemetery. The residents refused to bury them because they were not from Alkhan-Kala. The bodies were delivered to the Grozny District VOVD, where they were filmed and photographed by officers from the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office. The bodies were then taken by a car belonging to the Grozny district military command to Mozdok, North Ossetia. 87.  The document of 17 February 2005 cited a report by an officer of the Grozny VOVD to the effect that the registration log of the Mozdok forensic centre contained no information about the delivery of unidentified bodies in the first half of 2000. 88.  The document further referred to information from the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office that no criminal investigation had ever been conducted by that office into the discovery of five male bodies at the Alkhan-Kala cemetery in February 2000. 89.  The case file reviewed by the Court does not contain these documents.\nj)  The prosecutors’ orders 90.  At different stages of the proceedings several orders were issued by the supervising prosecutors, enumerating the steps to be taken by the investigators. On 3 December 2001 a prosecutor from the Chechen Prosecutor’s Office ordered that all the circumstances of Yandiyev’s disappearance were to be fully investigated, those who had taken part in a special operation in Alkhan-Kala in early February 2000 were to identified, and that the applicant was to be found and granted victim status in the proceedings. 91.  On 6 December 2003 a prosecutor from the Grozny District Prosecutor’s Office noted that “no real investigation has taken place and the necessary steps have not been taken to establish and investigate the circumstances of the case”. He ordered the investigators to question the applicant and her husband about the “personality” of Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev and about the details of their search for him. It was also necessary to find a copy of the videotape containing Yandiyev’s questioning. The document also ordered that steps be taken to identify the detachments of federal forces that could have been involved in the special operation in Alkhan-Kala in early February 2000 and to establish what had happened to the detained persons. 92.  On 1 March 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor of Chechnya ordered the investigators to establish the whereabouts of B. and I. and to question them about the circumstances of Yandiyev’s detention. He also ordered that investigative measures which could help to clarify Yandiyev’s personality, and other necessary measures, be pursued. 93.  Between July 2001 and February 2006 the investigation was adjourned and reopened six times. The most recent order by the Deputy General Prosecutor, dated 10 February 2006, extended the investigation until 16 April 2006. It summarised the findings until that date and ordered the investigation to proceed with identification and questioning of other detained persons and the GUIN servicemen who had participated in the detention of suspects on the date in question, and to check the version that Yandiyev could have escaped from detention or used a false identity etc. 94.  The Government submitted a copy of a TV report by the NTV company dated 2 February 2000. It contains a short interview with Khadzhi-Murat Yandiyev, who is shown standing by a bus. He confirms that he walked to Alkhan-Kala from Grozny and that he was with a group of about 15 persons. The footage then shows Yandiyev standing alone by a metal fence and a group of servicemen unfolding a black banner with an Arabic inscription. 95.  The applicant submitted an undated copy of an interview with the CNN producer Ryan Chilcote for an on-line magazine, in which he spoke of how Yandiyev’s questioning was filmed by his crew:\n“The Chechen War, especially the second campaign, was my first experience with real warfare. I was able to get close to the action and see a lot of things on both sides of the conflict.\nI was travelling with the Russians when they took Alkhan-Kala, a village near the Chechen capital of Grozny. They captured a bunch of Chechen rebel fighters; one of them, a young guy in his 20s, was wearing a Russian uniform he’d obviously taken from a soldier he’d killed. The second-in-command in the Russian military walked up to him and said, “What the hell are you doing in that Russian uniform?” The rebel fighter talked back to him, and they got into a heated debate. The general looked through the guy’s pockets and found his passport. He read all the information out loud. Then he said to two of his soldiers, “Get rid of this guy. Kill him right here.” The soldiers didn’t know what to do. They knew our cameras were rolling. So they just nodded their heads but didn’t do anything.\nWhen the general came through again, he got upset. “I told you to get rid of this guy!” The soldiers dragged the man to an armoured personnel carrier and drove him off. A Russian colonel came up to me and said, “Hey, Ryan, want to shoot an execution?” It was one of those moments when you don’t know what to do as a journalist. On the one hand, I’d be documenting a war crime, the execution of an unarmed man. On the other, it went against my instincts. Just then, the tank I’d come in on began to leave, and I had to jump aboard. A few months later, we went to the rebel fighter’s address, which the general had read aloud on camera, to find out what had happened to him. We showed his mother the tape and asked if she’d heard from him. She hadn’t. It was really difficult—she totally broke down. It’s quite probable he was executed.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Budapest. 5.  In April 1997 the applicant bought a flat from a private individual, S.M. The seller stipulated that she had the right to buy back the property until 30 July 1997. However, she was not able to exercise this right because of the lack of sufficient means. 6.  In September 1997 the Land Registry registered the applicant’s property rights on the flat. Subsequently, the applicant requested S.M. to let him have possession. Since S.M. was reluctant to leave the flat, the applicant requested the Gödöllő District Court to order the execution of the purchase contract – which had been concluded by a notary public (közjegyzői okirat) and, therefore, was executable as a final court judgment. The District Court issued the order on 10 November 1997. 7.  Subsequently, S.M. brought an action against the applicant before the Gödöllő District Court, requesting the court to establish the invalidity of the purchase contract and to order the termination of its execution. In April 1998 the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action. On appeal, in October 1998 the Pest County Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision. 8.  S.M. requested that the case be reopened. The Gödöllő District Court suspended the execution of the purchase contract. The applicant appealed. The Pest County Regional Court reversed the first-instance decision and ordered the continuation of the execution in April 1999. Subsequently, S.M.’s request to reopen the case was dismissed. In May 1999 S.M. again requested the suspension of the execution, but the District Court dismissed her request. 9.  In the meantime, the applicant was charged with the forgery of the contract in question. In view of the ongoing criminal proceedings, the Gödöllő District Court suspended the execution of the contract on 15 July 1999. In May 2003 the Budapest Regional Court, acting as a second-instance court, acquitted the applicant. On 12 June 2004 the applicant requested the continuation of the execution. On 13 July 2004 the District Court accepted the applicant’s claim. The Regional Court upheld the first-instance decision on 21 October 2004. 10.  According to the information available in the case file, the execution proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1932, 1938 and 1935 respectively. The first and second applicants live in Sofia, Bulgaria, and the third applicant lives in New York, the United States of America. They are brothers. 7.  The applicants’ father owned a factory, together with the adjacent plot, in the town of Gabrovo. In 1947 the property was nationalised under the Nationalisation of Private Industrial and Mining Undertakings Act 1947. In the following years the authorities added a storey to the main factory building, transformed the factory into a school, and transformed the adjacent plot, together with other plots, into a schoolyard. The transformation was reflected in the relevant zoning plan. In 1964 the property was entered in the State properties register. 8.  In 1983 the applicants’ father died, leaving them as his only heirs. 9.  After the Restitution of Ownership of Nationalised Real Property Act 1992 (“the 1992 Act” – see paragraphs 25‑30 below) came into force on 25 February 1992, the applicants asked the mayor of Gabrovo to strike the property out of the State properties register. On 30 November 1992 the mayor granted their request, reasoning that the conditions for restitution were in place and that the applicants had become owners of the property by the operation of the Act. The restituted property consisted of a plot of land of 3,730 square metres, the first storey of the two-storey main building of 620 square metres (the second storey, which, as noted above, had been added by the authorities after the nationalisation, remained the property of the municipality), a one-storey accessory building of 200 square metres, and a second one-storey accessory building of 60 square metres. On 28 March 1996 the applicants obtained a notary deed certifying their title to the property. 10.  In the following years the municipality continued to use the building as a school, with the applicants’ consent. However, the municipality sought to settle the issue of its use of the school. In a letter of 13 March 1995 the mayor invited the second applicant to a meeting to discuss the future amount of rent to be paid by the municipality. The outcome of the meeting was not specified by the parties. In a letter of 3 September 1996 the mayor advised the applicants that the municipality intended to start a procedure for the expropriation of the property or its purchase. When the applicants objected, this initiative was abandoned. 11.  In a contract of 3 August 1998 the applicants allowed the municipality to use the property in return for a monthly rent of 3,646,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL). The municipality also agreed to pay the applicants BGL 34,637,000 as compensation for use of the property between 15 October 1997 and 3 August 1998. 12.  On 21 January 1999 the municipal council adopted a resolution to start a procedure for the purchase of the property. It appears that the resolution was subsequently abandoned. 13.  On 17 May 2001 the municipal council adopted a resolution for the purchase of the property. The price was set at the equivalent of 180,000 United States dollars. 14.  On 22 June 2001 the regional governor of Gabrovo ordered the suspension of the execution of the municipal council’s resolution of 17 May 2001. She noted, in particular, that since 1960 the main building and the yard had accommodated a school. She went on to say that the property served the needs of the local community and was municipal public property, that it had never been returned to the applicants, and that the mayor’s decision to strike it out of the State properties register had been made in error. 15.  The governor also brought judicial review proceedings to have the resolution set aside. On 31 October 2001 the Gabrovo Regional Court dismissed her claim. It found that the governor’s assertions that the property had not been returned to the applicants and had remained municipal property were ill-founded. On appeal, in a final judgment of 15 July 2002 the Supreme Administrative Court disagreed and set the resolution aside. It held, inter alia, that the school was municipal public property by virtue of the Constitution of 1991 and interpretative decision no. 19 of 1993 of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 31 below), and had never been returned to the applicants. The court went on to say that since it had not been possible to return the property to the applicants, they were entitled to compensation under the Compensation of Owners of Nationalised Real Property Act 1997 (“the 1997 Act” – see paragraphs 35‑39 below). 16.  Meanwhile, on 1 April 2001 the municipality stopped paying rent to the applicants. On an unspecified date in 2002 they filed a claim for non‑payment of rent against the municipality with the Gabrovo District Court. The municipality filed a counterclaim, seeking a judicial declaration that it was the owner of the property. 17.  On 3 July 2002 the Gabrovo District Court granted the applicants’ claim and dismissed the municipality’s counterclaim. The municipality appealed, but on 20 December 2002 the Gabrovo Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. 18.  The municipality appealed on points of law. On 14 October 2004 the Supreme Court of Cassation granted its claim in respect of the main building. It held, in particular, that the municipality had reconstructed that building in such a way that a new building, different from the nationalised one, had been created. That building had been earmarked to accommodate a school and thus serve the needs of the community. The court went on to say that in view of that, the main building could not have been returned to the applicants and had remained the property of the municipality. The judgment in this part was final. The court remitted the remainder of the case, which concerned the two accessory buildings and the plot of land, for re‑examination. It instructed the lower court to examine which part of the plot existed independently of the school, because only that part could have been returned. As for the accessory buildings, the lower court had to determine whether they had been part of the school compound and on that basis decide whether or not they had been subject to restitution. 19.  Having re-examined the case, on 7 October 2005 the Gabrovo Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ claim and allowed the municipality’s counterclaim. It found, in particular, that under the relevant zoning plan the plot of land, together with another plot, had been earmarked to serve the school. The court went on to say that the two accessory buildings and the plot of land were functionally connected with the main building and served the needs of the school. Therefore, they could not have been severed and returned to the applicants. 20.  On 12 December 2007 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld that judgment and held that the property in question had always belonged to the municipality. In the court’s view, the property had been municipal public property at the time when the 1992 Act had come into force, and had therefore not been subject to restitution. The adoption in 1996 of the State Property Act 1996 and the Municipal Property Act 1996 (see paragraph 32 below) had not in itself transformed State and municipal property into private and public property, as that transformation had already been envisaged in the Constitution of 1991. The two Acts had simply laid down the detailed rules governing those types of property. The court went on to say that since the property could not be returned to the applicants, they were entitled to compensation under the 1997 Act (see paragraph 26 below). In addition to those findings, the court also endorsed the findings of the Gabrovo Regional Court and held, in particular, that the disputed plot of land was part of a bigger plot, did not feature as a discrete plot in the zoning plan, and could not therefore have been returned. 21.  Following the Supreme Court of Cassation’s ruling of 14 October 2004 in respect of the main building (see paragraph 18 above), in 2005 the municipality lodged a claim for unjust enrichment against the applicants with the Sofia City Court. It sought repayment of allegedly wrongly paid rent in the amount of 151,207 new Bulgarian levs (BGN), plus interest for the period between 3 August 1998 and 31 March 2001. The proceedings are still pending. 22.  On 24 November 2005 the applicants applied for compensation under the 1997 Act (see paragraphs 35‑39 below). On 25 January 2006 the governor dismissed the application, saying that the applicants had missed the one-year time-limit laid down in the Act, which had expired in 1998. The applicants sought judicial review. In a final judgment of 17 May 2007, the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the governor’s decision. 23.  On 27 March 2008 the applicants sent a letter to the chairperson of the municipal council and the mayor of Gabrovo, seeking compensation. Meetings with representatives of the municipal council followed. On 25 May 2008 the applicants sent another letter to the council’s chairperson and the mayor, reiterating their request. According to the applicants, the authorities did not react to that letter. 24.  On 21 October 2010 the municipal council adopted a resolution to close down the school. In April 2011 the applicants sent letters to the mayor, the municipal council and the regional governor, saying that after the closure of the school the property had become private municipal property and should be returned to them.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1957, 1952 and 1926 respectively and live in Gerasdorf. 5.  In 1983 land consolidation proceedings were opened in respect of Gerasdorf, where the applicants live as farmers. The proceedings related to a total area of 1,329 hectares, including 60 hectares out of the 200 hectares of the applicants’ farming estate. The applicants and other family members used to farm their land jointly. In addition they had entered into agreements on rights of use (Nutzungstauschvereinbarungen) with other farmers, allowing them to cultivate third-party plots while waiving their rights to cultivate a number of their own plots of land. These agreements had been made orally and had not been entered into the land register. 6.  In 1986 the occupation and valuation schedule (Besitzstands- und Bewertungsausweis) was issued and on 13 November 1986 the provisional transfer of property (vorläufige Übernahme) was ordered. 7.  On 16 May 1990 the District Agricultural Authority issued the consolidation plan (Zusammenlegungsplan), against which the applicants and some other family members appealed on 5 July 1990. Thirty-seven other parties also appealed. 8.  The Regional Land Reform Board (Landesagrarsenat) granted the applicants’ appeal as well as the appeals of thirty-four other parties in a decision of 28 April 1992 and referred the case back to the lower instance. 9.  In January 1993 the applicants filed an application for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag). As a result, the Regional Land Reform Board became competent to deal with the matter. The applicants’ further application for transfer of jurisdiction to the Supreme Land Reform Board was dismissed by the latter on 7 December 1994 on the ground that there had not been an undue delay in the proceedings before the Regional Land Reform Board. Consequently, the proceedings remained pending before the Regional Land Reform Board. 10.  On 19 June 1995 the Regional Land Reform Board having held a hearing issued a new consolidation plan, amending the allocation of compensatory parcels to the applicants and a number of other parties. The applicants appealed. 11.  In a decision of 6 December 1995 the Supreme Land Reform Board decided to suspend the appeal proceedings pending further amendments of the consolidation plan concerning other parties. The applicants filed a complaint against that decision with the Constitutional Court. On 13 March 1996 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint and transferred the case to the Administrative Court where it became pending on 7 May 1996. On 7 November 1996 the Supreme Land Reform Board submitted observations. 12.  On 26 May 1998 the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) quashed the decision of 6 December 1995 and ordered the Supreme Land Reform Board to continue the proceedings. 13.  Subsequently between 27 October 1998 and 2 June 1999 the Supreme Land Reform Board conducted comprehensive proceedings. It carried out on-site visits, took expert opinions and held a number of hearings. It appears that in the course of a hearing held in April 1999 two judges declared to withdraw from the case as they were also sitting in related proceedings concerning the applicants’ claim under the Official Liability Act. 14.  By decisions of 2 June and 12 October 1999 the Supreme Land Reform Board, after having held hearings in its new composition, again amended the consolidation plan in respect of the applicants and a number of other parties. 15.  The applicants’ complaint against the Supreme Land Reform Board’s decision of 2 June 1999 was dismissed by the Constitutional Court for lack of prospects of success on 27 September 1999 and the case was transferred to the Administrative Court. After the applicants had amended their complaint, the Supreme Land Reform Board submitted the files on 16 May 2000 and observations on 21 July 2000. 16.  The applicants’ complaint against the Supreme Land Reform Board’s decision of 12 October 1999 was dismissed by the Constitutional Court for lack of prospects of success on 13 June 2000 and the case was transferred to the Administrative Court. After the applicants had amended their complaint, the Supreme Land Reform Board submitted observations on 13 March 2001. 17.  In the meantime, the appeal of a third party against the Supreme Land Reform Board’s decisions, led to an amendment of the consolidation plan concerning the first and third applicants by the Regional Land Reform Board’s decision of 4 July 2000. Their appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Land Reform Board on 6 June 2001. 18.  The first and third applicant’s complaint against the Supreme Land Reform Board’s decision of 6 June 2001 was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 25 June 2003 and the case was transferred to the Administrative Court. The Supreme Land Reform Board submitted observations on 1 October 2003. 19.  In judgments of 3 July 2003, 11 September 2003 and 20 January 2005 the Administrative Court set aside the Supreme Land Reform Board’s decisions of 2 June and 12 October 1999 and of 6 June 2001 for various procedural defects. However, it dismissed the applicants’ argument that the agreements on rights of use concluded by them prior to the opening of the land consolidation proceedings should have been taken into account in the occupation and valuation schedule. In that respect the Administrative Court found that neither section 10 nor any other provision of the Lower Austria Agricultural Act (Flurverfassungs-Landesgesetz) supported the applicants’ position. Consequently, the case was again pending before the Supreme Land Reform Board. 20.  Following hearings on 4 April 2005 and 22 June 2005 the Supreme Land Reform Board issued a new decision on the latter date, again amending the consolidation plan and modifying the land compensation granted to the applicants. 21.  On 28 November 2005 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicants’ complaint for lack of prospects of success and transferred the case to the Administrative Court. The Supreme Land Reform Board submitted its observations on 9 May 2006. In January 2008 the Administrative Court requested it to submit further documents. 22.  On 21 February 2008 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ complaints as being unfounded. It confirmed the legal view that the agreements on the use of parcels concluded by the applicants were not to be taken into account in the occupation and valuation schedule. Furthermore, the Administrative Court held that the proceedings had corrected the procedural defects criticised by its earlier decision. Lastly, the compensatory parcels awarded to the applicants complied with the requirements of the Lower Austria Agricultural Act. 23.  The judgment was served on the applicants’ counsel on 11 March 2008. 24.  In 1990 the applicants brought official liability proceedings for loss of earnings as a result of the delays in the land consolidation proceedings and allocation of land of minor quality. Following a first set of proceedings, the Supreme Court, by its judgment of 9 June 1998, remitted the case to the Vienna Regional Civil Court. The proceedings before that court were stayed in June 2000 at the applicants’ request in order to await the outcome of the land consolidation proceedings. They were resumed in June 2008. On 30 December 2009 the Vienna Regional Civil Court dismissed the applicants’ claim. The applicants appealed. The outcome of the proceedings is not known. 25.  At an unknown date, the applicants brought compensation proceedings under section 26a of the Lower Austria Agricultural Act. On 17 February 2009 the Regional Land Reform Board rejected the applicants’ compensation claim. On 29 June 2010 the Supreme Land Reform Board dismissed their appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Lviv. 5.  In 1981 the applicant was convicted of speculating in gold and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In 1992 his conviction was annulled as unlawful. Subsequently the applicant instituted civil proceedings, seeking various kinds of compensation for his unlawful conviction and punishment. 6.  On 24 February 1998 the Khust Court (Хустський районний суд Закарпатської області) awarded the applicant 3,350.55 hryvnyas (UAH)[1] against the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”; Міністерство фінансів України) in compensation for his loss of income while in detention. 7.  This judgment became final and on 3 June 1998 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. They submitted the enforcement writ to the Ministry of Finance, which redirected it to the State Treasury (Державне Казначейство України). 8.  On 18 November 2003 the enforcement writ was returned to the applicant unenforced. 9.  On 13 May 1999 the Khust Court awarded the applicant UAH 7,281.70[2] against the Khust State Treasury Department (“the Khust Treasury”; Відділ Державного казначейства в Хустському районі Закарпатської області) in compensation for the gold confiscated from him following his conviction. This decision became final. 10.  On 12 November 2002 the Khust Treasury informed the applicant that it could not make the payment without the command of the bailiffs. In connection with this, the Khust Treasury had transferred the applicant's request for enforcement and a copy of the judgment to the bailiffs and had requested the Khust Court to transfer the enforcement writ thereto. 11.  On 5 March 2003 the Khust Court informed the applicant that it had never issued the enforcement writ as the applicant personally had never requested the court to do so. 12.  The judgment of 13 May 1999 remains unenforced. 13.  On 2 April 2002 the Lychakivsky District Court of Lviv awarded the applicant UAH 2,000[3] against the State Treasury in moral damages for a delay in the enforcement of the judgment of 24 February 1998. 14.  This decision became final in October 2002 and on 9 December 2002 the enforcement proceedings were instituted. On several occasions the Treasury informed the applicant that the judgment award could not be paid on account of the lack of budgetary allocations. 15.  On 26 January 2004 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Regional Court”; Апеляційний суд Львівської області) gave the applicant, who sought to obtain a higher amount of compensation, leave to appeal against the judgment of 2 April 2002 out of time. 16.  On 15 March 2004 the Regional Court, following the applicant's appeal, reviewed the facts of the case in their entirety and quashed the judgment of 2 April 2002. The court rejected the applicant's claims against the Treasury as lacking statutory basis under domestic law. On 25 September 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal in cassation. 17.  The applicant made several unsuccessful attempts to institute civil proceedings against various authorities, seeking compensation for the delays in the enforcement of the judgments in his favour.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are Finnish citizens. Their dates of birth and places of residence are set out in the Annex. 7.  On 25 November 1995 a group of young people organised a sit-in in the premises of a department store in Helsinki, Oy Stockmann Ab (presently Oyj Stockmann Abp; henceforth “Stockmann”), criticising it for selling fur coats and thereby participating in cruelty to animals. Around the same time various pamphlets and posters had appeared in Helsinki, criticising the fur trade in general and Stockmann in particular. The group had to be forcibly removed from the store. 8.  In March 1996 Stockmann requested a pre-trial investigation into “the distribution to the public of printed matters purporting to be produced on the company’s behalf but which had not been commissioned by [it]”. Should the police find that a criminal offence had been committed, Stockmann requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the public prosecutor. The request was registered as a matter of suspected public defamation. 9.  In the ensuing pre-trial investigation 36 persons, including the applicants, were heard as suspects in respect of the offence of public defamation. 10.  On 11 April 1996 the police conducted a search at the home of Mr Miettinen, relying on chapter 4, section 1, and chapter 5, section 1 of the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen 450/1987). According to the minutes, the search was carried out for the purpose of an investigation into malicious damage (vahingonteko, skadegörelse) of which his room mates – A.L. (not an applicant) and Ms Karjalainen – had been suspected. The police seized pamphlets critical of Stockmann’s sale of fur products as well as letters related to Mr Miettinen’s participation in an association of anti-fur activists. 11.  On 13 June 1996 the police searched the homes of Ms Mikola and Ms Soini. According to the minutes, the searches were carried out “for other investigation purposes”. The police seized pamphlets and documents related to Ms Mikola’s participation in the same association of anti-fur activists. At the home of Ms Soini the police seized similar pamphlets, diaries from the years 1994-1995 and a telephone note book. 12.  On 20 June 1996 the police returned to Ms Mikola some of the seized material, retaining eight pamphlets stating, inter alia: “Stockmann supports trading in carcasses” (Stocka [Stockmann] tukee raatokauppaa). 13.  On 26 June 1996 the police returned two of Ms Soini’s diaries, keeping a third one until 9 September 1996. 14.  On 18 October 1996 the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Helsinki maintained the seizures of Ms Mikola’s and Ms Soini’s materials until 31 December 1996. The seizures were later extended until 31 January 1997. 15.  On 20 November 1996 the pre-trial investigation ended with a signed report. On 10 January 1997 applicants Sami and Sanna Seppilä, Soini, Uosukainen, Karjalainen, Särkisilta, Kaihovaara, Pelkonen, Riska, Karlstedt, Salonen, Miettinen and Mikola were charged with a violation of Stockmann’s domiciliary peace (kotirauhan rikkominen, hemfridsbrott) and a violation of the Police Act, both committed on 25 November 1995. All except applicants Sami Seppilä, Uosukainen, Karlstedt and Miettinen had been minors at the time of the offence. 16.  At the same time, applicants Soini, Therman and Mustonen were charged with having defamed Stockmann in public while being minors. Applicants Uosukainen and Karjalainen were charged with the same offence but were no longer minors when committing the offence, namely between the summer of 1995 and the summer of 1996. In the alternative, all except Karjalainen were charged with common nuisance. 17.  Mr Purmonen was charged with incitement to one or the other of those offences. 18.  In addition, applicants Sami Seppilä, Soini, Särkisilta and Salonen were charged with some further offences. 19.  On 2 April 1997 Ms Soini requested that the seizure of her possessions be lifted. The District Court having maintained the seizures, she appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Helsinki. 20.  On 15 May 1997 the police lifted the seizure and returned the remaining material to Ms Soini and Ms Mikola. On 17 July 1997 the Court of Appeal found that since the police had already returned the material seized from Ms Soini it was not necessary to examine her appeal. 21.  Meanwhile, on 18 June 1997 applicants Sanna Seppilä, Soini, Uosukainen, Särkisilta, Kaihovaara, Pelkonen, Riska, Karlstedt, Salonen, Miettinen and Mikola were convicted of violation of Stockmann’s domiciliary peace and sentenced to forty, fifty or sixty days’ conditional imprisonment respectively. Mr Sami Seppilä was likewise convicted – except on one count not relevant to this case – and given a longer conditional prison sentence coupled with a fine. 22.  Applicants Purmonen, Therman and Mustonen were acquitted of all charges. 23.  On 22 June 1999 the Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s judgment by acquitting all twelve convicted applicants in so far as they had been found guilty of violating domiciliary peace. The court considered that Stockmann’s shop premises, being accessible to the public, could not be considered a domicile for the purposes of the relevant provision of the Penal Code. While upholding these applicants’ convictions of one or several other offences the court reduced their sentences to fines.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Moscow. 6.  In the early morning of 22 February 2001 the applicant entered the grounds of a furniture depot, where he was spotted by security guards. The guards called the police, and, soon after, the applicant was arrested. He claimed that he had been beaten by the police officers and the guards when he was being arrested. After searching the premises, the police discovered a handgun, allegedly belonging to the applicant. The applicant was taken to Vidnovo police station (Moscow Region) for questioning. 7.  The applicant alleges that in the course of the questioning police officers M. and E. tortured him: they put a gas mask over his head and blocked air access, so that he started suffocating. They also hit him with a rubber stick. The applicant agreed to confess to theft and, moreover, to give them money so that they would stop. At about 4 a.m. the applicant went to his flat, accompanied by two police officers, where, at gunpoint, he handed over 5,000 US dollars. Then the police officers returned to the police station with him and he was locked in a cell. However, the policemen promised him that if he confessed to the alleged crimes the town prosecutor would soon release him on bail. The applicant wrote a statement in which he confessed to attempted theft and illegal possession of a handgun. 8.  The Government produced an extract from the police station record of arrests. Entry no. 296 concerned the applicant; it read as follows: “22.02.2001/[the applicant] made no complaints [about his condition]/no visible injuries [on him]”. 9.  In the afternoon the police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of theft and illegal possession of a firearm (criminal case no. 39697). In connection with these proceedings the town prosecutor authorised the applicant's pre-trial detention. 10.  On 23 February 2001 the applicant met with his lawyer. Through him the applicant transmitted to the town prosecutor a written statement in which he described the circumstances of his arrest, the ill-treatment and extortion of money. According to the applicant, his complaint of ill‑treatment was handed to the investigator in charge of his case on that date; however, the case file does not contain any proof of that. 11.  On 5 March 2001 the applicant lodged a formal complaint with the town prosecutor about the ill-treatment and extortion, seeking the criminal prosecution of the police officers involved. He also requested to be released on the grounds that he might easily be subjected to further pressure and physical violence by those police officers while in the pre-trial detention facility. 12.  The applicant claimed that, as a result, officers M. and E. had been dismissed from service. The Government confirmed that M. had been dismissed for underperformance and E. had been transferred to another unit. However, neither of these disciplinary measures was related to the events at issue. 13.  On 21 May 2001, after a preliminary inquiry into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, the town prosecutor decided not to proceed with the investigation. The materials of the inquiry were added to the file in the applicant's case. 14.  On 25 May 2001 the Vidnovo town prosecutor issued a bill of indictment in the applicant's case and transmitted it with the case-file to the Vidnovo Town Court for examination on the merits. 15.  In July 2001 the applicant's lawyer lodged similar complaints of ill‑treatment with the Regional Prosecutor and the Prosecutor General, seeking further investigation into the alleged ill-treatment and extortion. It is unclear whether those complaints were ever examined on the merits. The applicant's complaint in similar terms lodged with the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior was forwarded to the Moscow Regional Court “for further inquiries”. On 5 September 2001 this complaint was forwarded to the Vidnovo Town Court, where it was “added to the case file”. 16.  After the applicant's conviction on 10 September 2001, his lawyer lodged a new complaint with the prosecutor of the Vidnovo district, seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against officers M. and E. As can be seen from the applicant's submissions, he received no reply to this complaint. 17.  On 19 March 2002 the applicant lodged a civil-law complaint about the inaction of the prosecutor of the Vidnovo district before the Vidnovo Town Court, under the provisions of the Judicial Appeals Act (see the “Relevant domestic law” part below). 18.  On 29 March 2002 the court returned his complaint unexamined. The Town Court indicated that the complaint had been lodged under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereas it should have been lodged in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Town Court referred to the position of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, expressed in its Ruling of 21 December 1993 in which the Supreme Court held that decisions of the prosecuting authorities should be challenged by way of a criminal-law complaint. 19.  The applicant appealed, claiming that the Town Court's refusal to examine his complaint was unlawful and breached his constitutional right of access to court. However, on 22 May 2002 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of the Vidnovo Town Court of 29 March 2002. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the decision of the prosecutor not to proceed with the case should have been challenged under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20.  During the pre-trial investigation of criminal case no. 39697 and the trial of his case before the Vidnovo Town Court the applicant remained in the remand prison. On several occasions he requested the investigator in charge of his case and the town prosecutor to release him. In particular, on 22 March 2001 he lodged an application with the Vidnovo town prosecutor. However, it was refused on the ground that the applicant might abscond or interfere with the course of justice. 21.  On 17 April 2001[1] the applicant lodged another application for release with the court. In his application he described the alleged ill‑treatment and extortion of money by the police officers. He also referred to various defects in the investigation proceedings and to his poor health and personal circumstances. 22.  On 11 May 2001 the Kashira Town Court of the Moscow Region rejected his application, putting forward the following arguments:\n“[The applicant] has committed several intentional crimes, including serious ones. This fact is not disputed either by [the applicant] or by his defence counsel. There is no information that the state of his health is incompatible with detention pending investigation. Given this fact and taking into account the fact that Mr Medvedev committed the impugned crime in another district, the Court holds that the investigative authorities have rightly applied detention pending investigation as a preventive measure.”\nThe applicant was informed in that ruling that he had seven days to lodge an appeal with the Moscow Regional Court. 23.  The applicant's lawyer appealed. The applicant indicated that his appeal had been lodged on 14 May 2001; the Government did not dispute that assertion. On 13 June 2001 the appeal was dismissed by the Moscow Regional Court. It appears that neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at the appeal court hearing. The ruling of the appeal court was very short and dealt with the applicant's arguments summarily. 24.  The applicant indicated that he had received a copy of the appeal court's decision in February 2002[2]. The Government did not dispute that; they claimed, however, that the case file concerning the application for release before the Kashira Town Court had been destroyed after the expiry of the time-limits established by domestic legislation for the storage of documents in the court's archives. The applicant indicated that under the applicable rules on document management in the Russian courts the case file concerning his application for release should have been kept in the Moscow Regional Court until 2007, so these documents should have been in the possession of the authorities. 25.  On 22 May 2001 the prosecution forwarded the applicant's case, together with the bill of indictment, to the Vidnovo Town Court of the Moscow Region. In the course of the trial the applicant raised the issue of ill-treatment and extortion of money by the police officers before the court as an argument in support of his innocence. 26.  On 10 September 2001 the Vidnovo Town Court delivered its judgment. As to the alleged ill-treatment, the court rejected this argument, referring to the inquiry conducted by the Vidnovo town prosecutor at the applicant's request. The court further noted that the security guards at the furniture depot, who had been present at the time of the applicant's arrest, had testified that the applicant had confessed to the alleged theft immediately. So there had been no need to put further pressure on him in order to extort a confession. 27.  The court found the applicant guilty of attempted theft but acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms. He was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment. 28.  The judgment of 10 September 2001 was subject to appeal to the Moscow Regional Court. However, the applicant did not appeal, allegedly out of fear of reprisals by the police officers implicated in the ill-treatment. Therefore, the conviction became final on 17 September 2001. A supervisory-review appeal by the applicant was rejected by the Moscow Regional Court on 13 December 2001. 29.  On 24 October 2001 the applicant was released from prison.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Liverpool. 6.  On 6 October 2005 the applicant was charged with two offences of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. 7.  On 7 October 2005 the applicant was produced at Liverpool City Magistrates' Court. Following a contested bail application she was granted bail by the Deputy District Judge. 8.  The prosecution gave notice that it wished to appeal against the grant of bail and the applicant remained in detention. The appeal hearing was to take place at Liverpool Crown Court on 11 October 2005 and the applicant's solicitors arranged with the Prison Service for her to be present at the court building. 9.  The prosecution's appeal came before Judge Globe on 11 October 2005. At the start of the hearing, counsel for the applicant requested that the judge exercise his discretion to allow the applicant to be present while the appeal was heard. It was contended on the applicant's behalf that she had been led to believe that she would be released following the grant of bail at the magistrates' court and that she had not properly understood the implications of the prosecution's appeal. Counsel for the applicant asserted that if she were present she would see that her case was being dealt with fairly and he further clarified that the basis for his application was “common humanity” and “not technical”. Judge Globe declined the request, reasoning that the applicant could be given a full report of what had happened from her counsel. Moreover, her attendance would be undesirable as one of the applicant's co-accused had not been present at the hearing of the appeal against the grant of bail to him, and it would therefore be unfair to treat the applicant more favourably. 10.  When the applicant later arrived in the court building, her counsel again requested that she be allowed to attend the hearing in person. He emphasised that this was a re-hearing and rather unusual as it was the prosecution which had sought to appeal the Deputy District Judge's ruling on bail. As the applicant was already present in the building, her production would cause little inconvenience. Judge Globe again refused, this time explaining that if he allowed the applicant to be present it would set a precedent for any defendant in custody wishing to attend an appeal against bail in the future. 11.  The applicant's counsel submitted to the judge:\n“You have considerable experience of looking at people and taking into account their demeanour. This woman is, on the defence case, a respectable woman of good background and a vulnerable person. I would like you to see her, frankly, because you will be able to tell and see that she does not fall into a category of so many of those who appear before you ... I was able to address the learned District Judge on precisely those terms. I believe that it had some impact on his decision to grant bail because he was able to see her and make an assessment of that person. She is here and you could make that assessment if she was brought up before you.” 12.  In refusing the applicant permission to attend, Judge Globe stated:\n“I am not going to alter my view in relation to [the applicant] being present during the hearing. I will listen to your submissions. If there is anything during your submissions that causes me to hear evidence from her or to have to do something different to what I am doing at the moment in relation to the hearing of the matter, I will reconsider it at that stage.” 13.  At a later stage of the hearing, Judge Globe remarked:\n“... [W]hat beyond what you have been able to describe to me are you suggesting that I should gain from bringing her up from the cells into the dock at the moment? What do you want me to do if I were to ask her to come up into the dock, just look at her? Does that add anything to anything that you are suggesting? I have a very clear picture of the sort of person who is going to walk into the dock. No doubt she is going to be very worried. It must be a very intimidating experience for anybody of no previous convictions who has recently been taken into custody, to be brought into a court as large as this. I can imagine full well what is going to happen when she walks in. But given the fact that I can imagine that, and I have seen it happen many times, what else am I going to notice?” 14.  The applicant's counsel replied that he had withdrawn his application for her to attend. Judge Globe invited him to make any last submissions about what might be gained by seeing the applicant in person. Counsel answered with:\n “...looking at the demeanour of the person, that is all. There is something to do with that assessment which is better if one looks at the person and sees them looking across the court looking back at you. But you have in detail, as you have pointed out, a thorough description of her and if that suffices I am not going to seek to persuade you to go further.” 15.  Judge Globe proceeded with the hearing in the applicant's absence. He decided to allow the prosecution appeal and refuse bail, on the grounds that the applicant's brother, one of the co-accused, was at liberty, possibly overseas, and that there was a risk that she would abscond and join him or provide him with information about the prosecution case which would obstruct the course of justice. 16.  The applicant applied for permission to apply for judicial review of the decision not to allow her to attend the hearing on the ground that her rights under the Convention had been breached. 17.  On 9 November 2005 Mr Justice Sullivan refused the application for permission to apply for judicial review. He first observed that the applicant was challenging Judge Globe's decision not to allow her to attend the prosecution appeal, and that she did not contend that the ultimate decision to refuse her bail was unreasonable. Mr Justice Sullivan further noted that though Rule 19.17 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Rules (see paragraph 22 below) was not referred to during the hearing before Judge Globe, it was Convention compliant because a person was entitled to be present if, in an exceptional case, the interests of justice so required. The applicant's grounds for applying for permission to seek judicial review did not explain why hers was an exceptional case or why the interests of justice required her attendance whilst she was legally represented. 18.  Mr Justice Sullivan took into account Judge Globe's clear indication that he would be prepared to reconsider his view and allow the applicant to be present if there was anything that would require him to hear evidence from her in person. However, counsel representing the applicant had not been able to identify what would be gained by producing the applicant. 19.  On 7 December 2005 Mr Justice Gibbs refused the applicant's renewed application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings. The applicant's counsel attended and argued that the decision to refuse her admission to the hearing of the prosecution's appeal had breached her rights under Article 5 § 3, or alternatively, Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It was asserted that the production of the applicant before the Deputy District Judge did not fulfil the requirements of Article 5 § 3 because the judge was not a judge authorised by law to exercise judicial power, as his decision was subject to immediate appeal and was never put into effect. 20.  In giving judgment, Mr Justice Gibbs took into account a transcript of the proceedings before Judge Globe. Although Rule 19.17 (4) had not been expressly cited to Judge Globe, the latter's approach to the application made to him had been entirely consistent with that rule. The general principle underlying Rule 19.17 (4) was that an applicant should not generally be entitled to be present at the hearing of a prosecution appeal. The first exception to that proposition had not been fulfilled as the applicant was not acting in person. Therefore the judge would have to take the view that the case was of an exceptional nature and/or that the interests of justice required the applicant to be present. Judge Globe, in considering the matter, undoubtedly had the interests of justice in mind. He had referred to the position of the co-defendant and had made an enquiry as to whether there was any particular reason to believe that injustice would occur, having regard to the fact that an explanation could be given to the applicant immediately afterwards as to the judge's decision and his reasons for it. Judge Globe had also, notably, left open the possibility of altering his decision if, for example, it became apparent that oral evidence might be required from the applicant in support of her application. 21.  Mr Justice Gibbs found that the Deputy District Judge was authorised to exercise judicial power as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and clearly had exercised it, even though his decision was subject to immediate appeal and was not put into effect pending appeal. As concerned the applicant's complaints under Article 5 § 4, the legal framework covering applications for bail, including appeals, did in Mr Justice Gibbs view enable her to take proceedings whereby the lawfulness of her detention could be decided speedily by a court as required by that article. There was, in his judgment, nothing even arguably to be found in the wording of Article 5 § 4 which entitled an applicant to be present at such proceedings in all instances. Where prosecution appeals against refusal of bail were concerned, Rule 19.17 (4) provided a Convention compatible procedure to ensure that no injustice was caused to an applicant in cases in which he or she was not permitted to be present.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Komsomolske. 5.  On 16 February 2001 the applicant and six other persons, all members of the collective enterprise Z., lodged a claim with the Zmiyiv Town Court (“the Zmiyiv Court”) against this enterprise and its director seeking the annulment of decisions on the Z.’s re-organisation. The applicant had worked in this enterprise for about thirty years. 6.  On 2 November 2001 the Zmiyiv Court decided to leave the claim without examination. 7.  On 11 January 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed that ruling and remitted the case to the first-instance court for an examination on merits. 8.  Meanwhile the enterprise Z. was liquidated, and the liquidator became a party to the proceedings. 9.  As a result, on 22 October 2004 the Zmiyiv Court restarted its examination of the case. 10.  On 7 February 2007 it found against the claimants. 11.  In the course of the proceedings the Zmiyiv Court adjourned hearings on twelve occasions in allowing requests of the claimants, who needed additional time for amending their claims, or given their failure to appear. There were also thirteen adjournments requested by the defendant enterprise or caused by the absence of its representative. On one or two occasions hearings were adjourned because the judge was busy or following procedural measures ordered by the court. 12.  On 14 March 2007 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal found that the case fell under the jurisdiction of commercial courts and sent it for examination to the Kharkiv Commercial Court of Appeal, which on 5 July 2007 upheld the judgment of the Zmiyiv Court. 13.  On 26 December 2007 the Higher Commercial Court found that the dispute was to be examined by the courts of general jurisdiction, quashed the ruling of 5 July 2007 and remitted the case back to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal. 14.  On 1 April 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal discontinued the proceedings in part concerning the claims against the enterprise Z., as it had been liquidated by that time, and rejected the remainder of the claims as unsubstantiated. 15.  On 17 October 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that ruling. 16.  On 18 December 2002 the applicant, as well as the other claimants (see paragraph 5 above), lodged an additional claim against the enterprise Z. for recovery of a share. 17.  The claimants supplemented and specified their initial claims on a number of occasions. 18.  On 13 December 2005 the Zmiyiv Court stayed the examination of the case pending the outcome in the first set of proceedings. 19.  On 8 February 2006 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above ruling, and the first-instance court resumed the proceedings. 20.  On 9 June 2006 the Zmiyiv Court allowed the applicant’s request for an expert assessment of the value of a share in the enterprise Z., which it entrusted to the Kharkiv Research Institute for Forensic Expert Examinations. 21.  In January 2007 the aforementioned expert institution informed the court that it did not have the required expertise capacities. The proceedings were then resumed, without the evaluation in question having been undertaken. 22.  On 19 February 2007 the Zmiyiv Court found against the claimants. 23.  On 30 July 2007 by the Kharkiv Commercial Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 24.  On 26 December 2007 the Higher Commercial Court found that the case was to be examined by courts of general jurisdiction, quashed the ruling of 30 July 2007 and sent the case for examination to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal. 25.  On 28 May 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal discontinued the proceedings in the part concerning the claims against the enterprise Z. due to its liquidation and upheld the judgment of 19 February 2007 in the remaining part. 26.  On 12 December 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that ruling.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was formerly a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party (“BCP”), in which he held the position of Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP (1976-1986) and was a Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BCP (1977-1988). He was also a Member of the National Assembly (1974-1990), the Minister for Industry and a Member of the Council of Ministers (1984-1986) and the Bulgarian Ambassador to Norway (1989-1990). 6.  The applicant contended that following the democratic changes of 1989 the authorities started to systematically intimidate and harass both him and his family. In particular, despite continuing to have immunity as a Member of the National Assembly, his family residence had been searched, an inventory of all their possessions had been made and several restrictions had been placed on their real property. Fearing further intimidation, reprisals and possible unjustified prosecution by the authorities the applicant left the country on 14 April 1990. Thereafter he resided in Vienna, Austria. 7.  Preliminary investigation No. 3/92 was opened on 9 July 1992 by the Chief Prosecutor's Office against all the members of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the BCP for the period between 1981 and 1989. A total of twenty-two persons were charged, on an unspecified date, that during the said period they had participated in the adoption of decisions to provide financial assistance or extend loans, totalling 243,537,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL), to (a) foreign countries, in respect of the Government, and (b) foreign political parties, in respect of the BCP. The decisions in question had been adopted by the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat or the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BCP. These persons, including the applicant, were charged under Article 203, in conjunction with Articles 201, 202 and 282, of the Criminal Code for having misappropriated, in concert, the aforementioned funds. It was contented that, in breach of their official duties, they had facilitated the misappropriation with the aim of obtaining an advantage for a third party, thereby causing considerable economic damage to the country's economy. In view of the very large sums involved, the offence was qualified as being very serious. 8.  In respect of the applicant, the initial charges against him were also under the above quoted provisions of the Criminal Code. It was contended that between 1981 and 1986 in his capacity of an official, Political Secretary of the BCP, and in concert with another ten officials, members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the BCP, he had misappropriated public funds and property (BGL 8,171,347; 200,000 convertible Bulgarian levs; 2,175,500 United States dollars; 8,000 tonnes of wheat; the value of organising a summit; sixty airplane tickets; 20,000 tonnes of oil; properties given to Ethiopia; training of fifty officials from Mozambique, thirty officers and thirty cadets from Ghana; and, training, accommodation and employment for thirty Turkish nationals), which had been entrusted to him for safekeeping and management and which represented a very serious offence and for a very large amount. In addition, it was claimed that in order to facilitate the aforesaid offence the applicant had perpetrated another offence – that in his capacity as an official, Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, he had violated his obligations as such and had exceeded his authority with the aim of obtaining advantage for himself and for a third party and had caused severe damages, which was qualified as being a very serious offence. 9.  The criminal proceedings continued in the absence of the applicant due to the fact that he was residing in Austria at the time. On an unspecified date, he retained a lawyer to represent him before the investigating authorities. 10.  On 23 July 1992 the Chief Prosecutor's Office ordered that the applicant be detained on remand, but the order was not enforced due his absence from the country. On an unspecified date the applicant was placed on the list of persons being sought by the police. 11.  In a decision of 7 January 1993 the charges against the applicant were amended and the order for his detention was maintained. 12.  On 1 October 1993 the Chief Prosecutor's Office sent a letter to the Chief Prosecutor's Office of Austria requesting it to detain and extradite the applicant to Bulgaria. The applicant was detained by the Austrian authorities on 9 December 1993. 13.  On 8 December 1993 the applicant requested political asylum in Austria. 14.  He was released by the Austrian authorities on 15 December 1993. 15.  On 6 January 1994 the Chief Prosecutor's Office sent an official request to the Republic of Austria seeking the applicant's extradition to Bulgaria. 16.  In a decision of 5 May 1994 the Vienna Court of Appeal refused the extradition request. It found that the actions of the applicant were in conformity with the Bulgarian Constitution and the laws at the time in question and that the payments from the State budget to third countries and organisations were approved by decisions of the Council of Ministers and acts on the State budget. Moreover, the applicant's actions were deemed not to contravene the principles of international law and human rights. In addition, the Vienna Court of Appeal found that the applicant had been acting in conformity with his rights and obligations as an official who could decide on the allocation of State funds, which he did not undertake on his own, but as a member of a collective body, for which he was not individually culpable. 17.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant continued. He contended that no further investigative procedures were conducted thereafter and that on at least four occasions the criminal proceedings had been stayed for undetermined periods of time. The last such occasion had been on 28 May 1995 when the Chief Prosecutor's Office stayed the proceedings because two of the defendants had become members of the National Assembly and had obtained immunity from prosecution. 18.  On 3 June 1999 the applicant's lawyer filed a request with the Chief Prosecutor's Office demanding that the criminal proceedings be terminated. She referred to the findings of the Court in the case of Lukanov v. Bulgaria (judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II, pp. 529-547) which had examined the same criminal proceedings and had found them to be deficient because the actions of the defendant had not constituted an offence under domestic legislation. In addition, the applicant's lawyer referred to the Government's undertaking before the Council of Europe to avoid similar such violations in the future (Resolution DH (98) 203 adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 July 1998 at the 637th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). 19.  On 15 June 1999 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were reopened by the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office and the case was remitted for further investigation to the Specialised Investigation Division. 20.  On 24 August 1999 the applicant's lawyer filed a second request with the Chief Prosecutor's Office demanding that it rule on her previous request of 3 June 1999. 21.  On 17 September 1999 the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office rejected the request of 3 June 1999 as it considered that it could not rule on its merits before the criminal proceedings had been completed. 22.  In a decision of the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office of 28 January 2000 the criminal proceedings against the defendants in case No. 3/92 were terminated and, inter alia, the order for the applicant's detention was rescinded. It found that the actions of the defendants, including the applicant, did not constitute an offence under domestic criminal legislation at the time of the events. In particular, the funds in question had always been included as expenditures in the State budget, the decisions were adopted without exceeding the powers granted thereto under the existing legislation and the provisions of such aid was in harmony with the State's international obligations. Reference was made to the decision of 5 May 1994 of the Vienna Court of Appeal to refuse the applicant's extradition and the Lukanov judgment (cited above) where the Court had found in respect of the same proceedings that:\n“...no evidence has been adduced to show that [the] decisions [for grating aid] were unlawful, that is to say contrary to Bulgaria's Constitution or legislation, or more specifically that the decisions were taken in excess of [their] powers...” (ibid. § 43). 23.  On 27 March 2000 the Sofia Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office to terminate the criminal proceedings against, inter alia, the applicant and the said decision became final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 9 November 2004 the Opole Regional Court convicted the applicant of manslaughter and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The prosecution appealed. 7.  On 8 December 2004 J.G., the lawyer assigned to represent the applicant under the legal‑aid scheme, also submitted an appeal against the first-instance judgment, arguing that the sentence was too severe. In the same pleadings J.G. also requested the court to dispense him from his obligation to represent the applicant and to appoint another lawyer to the case. 8.  In a letter of the same date he informed the applicant that, in his view, the appeal offered no reasonable prospects of success. He also stated that under no circumstances would he represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. 9.  On 16 December 2004 the Wroclaw Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. In the proceedings before the appellate court the applicant was represented by another legal‑aid lawyer, D.K. 10.  On 4 March 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s request for the grant of legal aid and assigned J.G. to represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. 11.  On 15 March 2005 the second-instance judgment with the written statement of reasons was served on both the applicant and his lawyer. 12.  By a letter of 16 March 2005 the lawyer requested the court to be exempted from the obligation to represent the applicant. He submitted that he had already informed the applicant that he would prepare an appeal against the first‑instance judgment on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the sentence was disproportionate. He had also informed him that, in his view, this appeal offered no reasonable prospects of success. In the light of the judgment of the Court of Appeal his opinion proved justified. He also stated that he had warned the applicant that under no circumstances would he represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. In his view, there were no grounds on which to accept that any grounds for a cassation appeal obtained in the case. This was so because in the appeal against the first-instance judgment he had relied only on the disproportionate nature of the sentence, which could not be argued before the Supreme Court. 13.  The Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the applicant of this refusal by a letter dated 22 March 2005. It was further stated that in these circumstances the only course of action left to the applicant was to request the Ombudsman to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf. This letter was served on the applicant on 29 March 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, who is living in Vienna, is a practising lawyer by profession. 5.  The applicant represented a commercial manager in administrative criminal proceedings before the Eisenstadt Municipal Office for alleged violations of the Frozen Food Labelling Decree (Tiefkühlkostkennzeichnungsverordnung – “the FFLD”). Referring to charges brought by the Vienna Food Inspection Agency (Lebensmitteluntersuchungsanstalt) concerning two samples of turkey meat, the applicant on 13 March 1996 filed observations, stating that:\n“Since the samples taken are not labelled as frozen food (contrary to the attempt to play tricks on my client (Schummelversuch) in the expert opinion underlying the criminal charge), they are not covered by Section 1 § 1 (1) of the FFLD.” 6.  On 11 June 1996 the Vienna Municipal Office requested the Vienna Bar Association to institute proceedings against the applicant, claiming that his serious and unfounded allegations had tarnished the Vienna Food Inspection Agency’s reputation and were incompatible with a lawyer’s professional duties. 7.  Subsequently, on 26 June 1996, the Vienna Bar Association opened disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 8.  On 3 July 1997 he filed observations, submitting that the Vienna Food Inspection Agency had repeatedly applied an extensive interpretation of the provisions in issue. By suggesting that the authority had attempted to play tricks on his client, he had merely sought to express his doubts as to the authority’s legal opinion “with a nod and a wink”, even though there may have been sufficient grounds for instituting proceedings for abuse of authority. 9.  By decision of 24 March 1999 the Disciplinary Council (Disziplinarrat) of the Vienna Bar Association discontinued the proceedings. It found that, while the applicant’s allegations may have infringed the profession’s honour and reputation, his statements disclosed only a minor degree of culpability, as they had apparently been made in the context of a heated exchange between him and the authority concerned. 10.  On 7 September 1999 the Bar Association prosecutor (Kammeranwalt) appealed. He asserted that the expression “attempt to play tricks on my client”, used by the applicant, insinuated that the authority had been acting fraudulently. 11.  Subsequently, on 16 September 1999, the applicant filed observations in which he repeated his defence, namely that his remarks were not meant to be taken literally. He had resorted to innuendo, alluding to an allegedly unlawful practice on the part of the Vienna Food Inspection Agency. He alleged in particular that the latter used its position to pursue its aims in the field of food inspection policy. 12.  On 14 February 2000 the Appeals Board (Oberste Berufungs- und Disziplinarkommission) granted the prosecutor’s appeal. It quashed the decision of 24 March 1999 and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Council. 13.  Having held an oral hearing, at which the applicant was present, the Disciplinary Council on 6 September 2000 convicted the applicant under Section 9 of the Lawyers Act (Rechtsanwaltsordnung) and, relying on Section 16 of the Disciplinary Act (Disziplinarstatut), issued a written reprimand. Moreover, it ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the proceedings. 14.  The Disciplinary Council held that the applicant had used a defamatory and disparaging expression. Pursuant to Section 9 of the Lawyers Act a lawyer, when defending the interests of his client, was entitled to address the perceived incorrectness of any official document in an appropriate manner. The applicant’s statement had transgressed the limits of acceptable conduct. In the submissions at issue he had failed to indicate any facts or circumstances which would have justified the use of the expression “attempt to play tricks on my client”. The applicant would have been free to institute proceedings for abuse of authority (Amtsmißbrauch), had there been grounds for such a suspicion. In conclusion, the Disciplinary Council found that the applicant had infringed the profession’s honour and reputation. 15.  On 15 December 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision and on 17 January 2001 the Bar Association prosecutor submitted his observations in reply. 16.  Following another oral hearing, the Appeals Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 7 May 2001. It confirmed that the applicant had transgressed the limits laid down in Section 9 of the Lawyers Act. The impugned statement had been defamatory and had disparaged the staff of the Vienna Food Inspection Agency. Since that statement had been made in writing, it had been well-considered. Therefore, it could not be said that the applicant had acted with a minor degree of culpability. 17.  On 2 August 2001 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). He complained, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, submitting that the Food Inspection Agency’s charges against his client had been objectively wrong. By using the impugned expression, he had merely sought to emphasise his argument. 18.  By decision of 21 June 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the interference complained of had served the aim of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and that the disciplinary authorities had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under the Convention against the profession’s interest in safeguarding its standards of professional duties. Hence, they had given ample reasons why there had been no violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. The decision was served on the applicant on 23 July 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1956 in Algeria, where he currently lives. 10.  The applicant arrived in France with his parents in 1960. He has six brothers and sisters, all of whom were born in France and have French nationality. 11.  On 13 April 1982 he was convicted of burglary and handling stolen goods by the Lyons Criminal Court. He was given an eight-month suspended prison sentence and was ordered to pay a fine of 1,200 French francs (FRF). 12.  On 24 April 1984 he was sentenced by the Lyons tribunal de grande instance to six months' imprisonment for burglary. The court also activated the suspended sentence he had been given previously. On 28 June 1984 the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the activation of the suspended sentence, which was the only point on which the applicant had appealed. 13.  On 6 December 1988 the Lyons tribunal de grande instance sentenced the applicant to fourteen months' imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory for offences under the legislation on dangerous drugs. 14.  On 15 April 1989 the applicant married a French national. The marriage was dissolved on 28 January 1993. He has one daughter, who was born in 1983. 15.  On 27 April 1989 the Lyons Court of Appeal raised the sentence to four years' imprisonment and upheld the permanent exclusion order for offences under the legislation on dangerous drugs. It noted in particular that the applicant had been arrested on his arrival at the home of a drug-addicted prostitute and had been in possession of a small bag containing 100 grams of heroin, which the police laboratory described as being “of good quality”. The court moreover considered that the applicant could not have been unaware that he had been acting as intermediary between a supplier and his principal client and accordingly that he had possessed, transported and dealt in heroin. It concluded that his role in such deals had been confirmed by the discovery at his home of precision scales and lactose.\nThe Court of Appeal further found that, at the material time, the applicant had been on day release from prison and that he had preferred to act as intermediary between a drug supplier and his clients rather than doing a job that he had abandoned for the past month. It held that “the conduct of this foreign national, who present[ed] a risk to public safety and health, [was] incompatible with his continued presence in France”. 16.  On 7 June 1990 the Court of Cassation declared that his right to appeal on points of law was forfeit. 17.  On 22 October 1992 the Lyons Criminal Court tried fifteen individuals on drugs offences.\nIt noted that during a search of the applicant's home investigators had found four small transparent plastic bags containing traces of white powder, a book of matches on which a number of accounts were noted, twenty syringes and a spoon with a blackened underside, two forged identity cards and a forged driving licence. On the basis of various statements, including that of the applicant's wife, and the results of telephone tapping and shadowing, the court concluded that the applicant had played a key role as a supplier in the drug trafficking.\nThe court ordered the applicant to serve prison sentences of six years for the drugs offence, three months for forgery of administrative documents and two months for residing in France in breach of an exclusion order. 18.  In 1994 the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from active chronic hepatitis. 19.  In a judgment of 6 June 1996, the Lyons Court of Appeal dismissed an application by the applicant for the lifting of the exclusion order. It noted that the applicant had had five convictions between 13 April 1982 and 22 October 1992, with prison sentences ranging from two months to six years, and that the offences of which he had been convicted on 27 April 1989 concerned heroin deliveries, including one of 100 grams of very high-quality heroin, and had been committed while he was on day release from prison. The court also found that the authenticity of the applicant's marriage to a French national had not been confirmed by the slightest evidence, and that the order for his removal did not constitute a disproportionate interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 20.  On 8 December 1997 the Minister of the Interior issued a deportation order in respect of the applicant. An appeal by the applicant to the Lyons Administrative Court was dismissed on 16 December 1998. 21.  On 9 August 1999 the applicant was released from prison and taken into administrative detention pending his removal from France. 22.  On 11 August 1999 the prefect ordered the applicant's removal to Algeria. 23.  On 13 August 1999 the applicant lodged an application with the Administrative Court seeking the annulment and stay of execution of that order, together with a request for its immediate suspension. 24.  On 16 August 1999 the Administrative Court dismissed the request for immediate suspension, finding that\n“it is not apparent from the evidence, and in particular from the medical certificate produced by [the applicant], that his state of health entails a short-term imperative need for the treatment of hepatitis C with two associated drugs that are not currently available in Algeria; accordingly, [the applicant] is not justified in seeking the suspension of execution of the decision taken by the prefect of the département of Isère ordering his removal to that country”. 25.  On 16 August 1999 the applicant applied for asylum, which was denied on 18 August 1999 by the OFPRA (French authority for the protection of refugees and stateless persons) on the ground that “his application, which was not lodged in a timely manner, [did] not contain any established or individual elements to substantiate the merits of his fears of persecution by the current Algerian authorities”. 26.  A doctor serving as a public-health inspector for the health and social services department for the département of Rhône sent two letters to the prefect of the Rhône-Alpes region on 13 and 18 August 1999. In the first of those letters the doctor stated, inter alia:\n“I observe that Mr Aoulmi has not produced any medical documents subsequent to January 1998, that he has not asked to see a doctor since his arrival at the detention centre and that he is not currently undergoing any treatment. I am thus entitled to consider that his current state of health is of no immediate cause for concern.\nThe medical certificate mentions that Mr Aoulmi's state of health may justify treatment involving a combination of interferon and ribavirin; ...\nI have contacted the laboratory ... which produces ribavirin. According to the information I received, ribavirin is not yet available on the Algerian market. The drug may be imported with the authorisation of the Algerian Ministry of Health further to a request by the central pharmacy of Algiers Hospital. A procedure has been initiated with a view to exporting the molecule to Algeria. ...” 27.  In his second letter the doctor indicated:\n“I refer to the second medical certificate that you sent to me, for my opinion, concerning the state of health of Mr Rachid Aoulmi, issued by Lyon-Sud Hospital on 13 July 1999.\nSupplementing the previous certificate that you brought to my attention, this second certificate confirms that Mr Rachid Aoulmi's medical condition may be treated with a combination of interferon and ribavirin. The indications on the certificate concerning the availability of ribavirin in Algeria do not correspond to those given to me verbally by the laboratory ...\nI should point out that ribavirin is available in France under temporary authorisation (ATU – autorisation temporaire d'utilisation) for use in hospital pharmacies alone and that the marketing authorisation (AMM – autorisation de mise sur le marché) is to be issued shortly.” 28.  On 19 August 1999 the applicant was put on a boat for Algeria. 29.  On 13 December 2000 the Lyons Administrative Court set aside the prefect's removal order of 11 August 1999, holding as follows:\n“It is apparent from the evidence and in particular from the medical certificate issued by the prison hospital and health-care service on 13 July 1999, as produced by the applicant, that he suffers from hepatitis C. His state of health is such that he requires imperative treatment with two associated drugs, interferon and ribavirin, which were not available in Algeria on the date of the impugned decision. Accordingly, having regard to the exceptionally serious consequences that the measure taken against him may entail, the decision by the prefect of the département of Isère whereby Algeria was designated as the country to which Mr Aoulmi was to be removed in execution of the deportation order issued against him on 10 April 1988 must be set aside.”\nThat judgment was irrevocable. 30.  On 17 June 2003 the applicant's lawyer indicated that his client had encountered difficulties in obtaining a passport. The lawyer enclosed with his letter an attestation to that effect issued on 5 February 2003 by the chief of Bejaia district. 31.  On 13 October 2003 the applicant's lawyer explained that his client could not return to France because the Algerian authorities would not issue him with a passport and he could not obtain a laissez-passer from the French authorities. He added that, according to the information he had received through the applicant's family, his health was continuing to decline and he had not been receiving the necessary medical treatment. 32.  In a letter of 5 November 2003 he provided the Court with a copy of the visa refusal issued by the French Consulate-General in Algiers on 13 October 2003. 33.  According to a medical certificate issued by an Algerian doctor on 31 July 2005, the applicant is suffering from the following complaints:\n“ulcer-related condition, only treatable with omeprazole,\nerythematous gastropathy, intestinal functional disorder and chronic constipation,\nchronic viral hepatitis type C, for which interferon was prescribed in France some ten years ago and which has not been treated or checked for about ten years.” 34.  On 11 August 1999 the President of the Third Section decided to indicate to the Government, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court not to expel the applicant to Algeria prior to the forthcoming meeting of the appropriate Chamber on 24 August 1999. Under Rule 49 § 2 (a) the Government were also requested to submit information, in particular concerning treatment available in Algeria. 35.  The competent authorities decided to stay the execution of the removal until 16 August 1999 in order to obtain an expert medical opinion (see paragraph 27 above). 36.  On 19 August 1999 the applicant was removed to Algeria. 37.  On 20 August 1999 the Government submitted answers to the questions put to them. 38.  The applicant's representative submitted his answers on 24 September 1999. 39.  On 9 November 1999 the Court decided to request the Government to submit their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, and on the fact that the applicant had been expelled notwithstanding the application of Rule 39. 40.  The Government submitted their observations on 3 February 2000 and those of the applicant's representative were submitted on 23 March 2000. 41.  On 9 September 2003 the Court decided to adjourn its examination of the case pending the Grand Chamber judgment in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I). 42.  On 10 May 2005 the Court requested the parties to provide information about the applicant's state of health, his administrative situation, and any action taken further to the Administrative Court's judgment of 13 December 2000. They were also requested to address once again the possibility of a breach of Article 34 of the Convention, in the light of the Mamatkulov and Askarov judgment (cited above), which had been delivered on 4 February 2005. 43.  The parties submitted their observations on 26 September 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are:\n1) Ms Zayra Benuyeva, born in 1951,\n2) Ms Kheda Benuyeva, born in 1985,\n3) Ms Razet Benuyeva, born in 1976,\n4) Ms Larisa Benuyeva, born in 1977,\n5) Ms Khava Benuyeva, born in 1994,\n6) Ms Rezida Benuyeva, born in 1982,\n7) Mr Saydmagomed Benuyev, born in 1986,\n8) Mr Zelimkhan Benuyev, born in 1989,\n9) Mr Magomed Zhanalayev, born in 1941,\n10) Ms Lula Zhanalayeva, born in 1951,\n11) Ms Billant Musayeva, born in 1975,\n12) Ms Kheda Zhanalayeva, born in 1979,\n13) Mr Denis Zhanalayev, born in 1971,\n14) Mr Ilyas Zhanalayev, born in 1983, and\n15) Mr Imam Zhanalayev, born in 1993. 7.  The applicants live in the Chechen Republic. The third applicant lives in the town of Urus-Martan. The twelfth applicant lives in the village of Grushevoye, the Urus-Martan District. The other applicants live in the village of Martan-Chu, the Urus-Martan District. 8.  The first applicant was married to Mr Mumad Benuyev, born in 1951. The couple were the parents of the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants, and of Mr Sayd-Selim Benuyev, born in 1982. Mumad Benuyev died in 2005. 9.  The ninth and tenth applicants are the parents of the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth applicants, and of Mr Abu Zhanalayev, born in 1973. 10.  Abu Zhanalayev and his parents lived at 31 Pervomayskaya Street, in the village of Martan-Chu. Their house shared a courtyard with three other houses belonging to their relatives, including that of Mr Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev, Abu Zhanalayev's uncle. 11.  In the evening of 24 November 2002 around twelve armed men wearing masks entered Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev's house without identifying themselves and started searching it. They asked if someone named Ayup lived there; Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev replied in the negative. 12.  In the meantime, other armed men searched the houses of two other relatives of the Zhanalayevs. Abu Zhanalayev's house was not searched. 13.  At some point the armed men decided to leave Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev's house. In the courtyard they met Abu Zhanalayev and ordered him to produce his identity papers. Abu Zhanalayev asked his uncle to bring the papers. Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev went to the Zhanalayevs' house and told the tenth applicant about the armed men; then they took Abu's identity papers and rushed to the courtyard. They saw no trace of Abu Zhanalayev or the armed men and noticed a UAZ vehicle driving away from their courtyard.\n(b)  Abduction of Sayd-Selim Benuyev 14.  In the evening of 24 November 2002 Sayd-Selim Benuyev, his parents, siblings and other relatives were at their family home at 24 Pervomayskaya Street, in Martan-Chu. It appears that on that night there was a blackout in the village as the electricity had been cut off. 15.  At about 9 p.m. around twelve armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and armed with machine guns burst into the Benuyevs' house. All but four of them wore masks; those that were unmasked had Slavic features. The armed men spoke unaccented Russian. The Benuyev family inferred that the armed men belonged to the Russian military. 16.  The servicemen locked the first applicant in one of the rooms. Then they forced Mumad Benuyev to the floor and asked him where his sons were. Then they asked for Sayd-Selim Benuyev. When Sayd-Selim identified himself, the servicemen kicked and beat him and his father with machine gun butts until the two Benuyev men started to bleed. The servicemen also beat the second applicant. 17.  At some point the servicemen put a sack on Sayd-Selim Benuyev's head and took him barefoot into the street. The first applicant saw two UAZ vehicles parked near her house. The seventh applicant pointed at one of the UAZ vehicles with a flashlight and the first applicant noticed scratches on its right side; the vehicle had an aerial on its roof. The servicemen put Sayd‑Selim Benuyev into the UAZ with the aerial and drove off.\n(c)  Subsequent events 18.  Immediately after Abu Zhanalayev's abduction the tenth applicant and Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev followed the UAZ vehicles. A few minutes later they met the first applicant and her brother-in-law. 19.  The relatives of the two abducted men chased the UAZ vehicles in a car. At some point Mr S., a serviceman of the military commander's office, managed to stop their car and told them not to follow the vehicles because they might be shot. Mr S. added that the UAZ vehicles belonged to the department of the interior of the Urus-Martan District (“the ROVD”). 20.  Later, villagers of Martan-Chu saw red and a green flares in the sky. At about 10 p.m. some of them noticed two UAZ vehicles parked next to the military commander's office of Martan-Chu. Five or ten minutes later three military servicemen got out of the vehicles and entered the military commander's office, while a few men walked out of it and got into them. The two vehicles then drove away in the direction of Urus-Martan. 21.  At about 11 p.m. two servicemen, acquaintances of the applicants, saw two UAZ vehicles driving in the direction of Urus-Martan. At some point they contacted other servicemen on duty at several checkpoints via portable radio and found out that the two vehicles had arrived at the ROVD. 22.  On 24 November 2002 Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev were kidnapped from the village of Martan-Chu. 23.  At about 11 p.m. on 24 November 2002 the first and tenth applicants went to the house of Mr M., the head of the ROVD. Mr M.'s bodyguards fired at the two women. They shouted and the firing ceased. Then the first and tenth applicants talked to Mr M. who told them not to worry and to go home. 24.  On 25 November 2002 the first and tenth applicants lodged written complaints about their relatives' abduction with the ROVD, the military commander's office of Urus-Martan, the prosecutor's office of the Urus‑Martan District (“the district prosecutor's office”) and the local administration. 25.  At about 11 a.m. on 26 November 2002 the first and tenth applicants saw two UAZ vehicles without registration numbers leaving the courtyard of the ROVD. They recognised the vehicles by their distinctive marks because one of them had a thick scratch and an aerial and the other one had white oil-cloth replacing broken windows. 26.  On 25 November 2002 the head of the ROVD told the applicants that he had contacted those who had abducted Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd‑Selim Benuyev and had asked them not to use force against the two men. 27.  Trying to establish the fate and whereabouts of their missing sons, the first and tenth applicants repeatedly contacted, in person and in writing, various State agencies and officials requesting assistance in the search for Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev. In particular, they applied to the Russian State Duma, the President of the Chechen Republic, the Administration of the Chechen Republic and the local administration. Most of those complaints were forwarded to prosecutors' offices at different levels. 28.  On 25 November 2002 the tenth applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about her son's abduction. She mentioned the searches of her relatives' homes. On the same date the first applicant asked the district prosecutor's office to establish her son's whereabouts; she noted that her husband and daughter had been beaten. 29.  On 27 November 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case was assigned the number 61161. 30.  On 29 November 2002 the local administration of the Urus-Martan District informed the first applicant that her complaint about the beating of Mumad Benuyev and the second applicant, as well as about the arrest of Sayd-Selim Benuyev had been forwarded to the military commander's office. 31.  On 20 December 2002 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the tenth applicant's complaint about her son's abduction by State agents to the district prosecutor's office. 32.  On 25 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office granted victim status in case no. 61161 to Mumad Benuyev and Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev. 33.  On 27 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed Mumad Benuyev and Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended for failure to identify those responsible. 34.  On 7 April 2003 the first applicant complained to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic that Russian servicemen had abducted her son and beaten her husband and daughter. 35.  On an unspecified date the tenth applicant asked the district prosecutor's office to resume the investigation into her son's kidnapping. On 11 April 2003 the request was declined for the reason that all possible investigative measures had been taken to solve the crime. 36.  On 12 May 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the district prosecutor's office. 37.  On 14 and 16 May 2003 respectively, the district prosecutor's office informed the tenth and first applicants that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been resumed. 38.  On 30 May 2003 the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 (“the unit prosecutor's office”). 39.  On 6 June 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that on 19 May 2003 the investigation in case no. 61161 had been resumed. They also noted that they were verifying whether the vehicles belonging to the ROVD could have been used in the kidnapping. 40.  On 7 June 2003 the unit prosecutor's office forwarded the tenth applicant's complaint to the district prosecutor's office pursuant to jurisdiction rules. 41.  On 7 June 2003 the head of the Department of the Federal Security Service of the Chechen Republic (“the Chechen FSB”) informed the first and tenth applicants that required measures were being taken to establish their sons' whereabouts and that Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev had not been arrested by the Chechen FSB because there had been no legal grounds for their arrest. 42.  On 10 June 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic informed the tenth applicant that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended on 27 January 2003. They also noted that law-enforcement agencies would search for her son more vigorously. 43.  On 19 June 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic asked the district prosecutor's office for an update on progress in the investigation in case no. 61161. 44.  On 7 July 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic informed the first and tenth applicants that the decision on suspension of the investigation had been quashed on 19 May 2003 and that investigative measures were being taken to solve their sons' kidnapping. 45.  On 31 July 2003 the first and tenth applicants asked the district prosecutor's office to update them on the progress of the investigation. 46.  On 8 August 2003 the tenth applicant complained to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic that the district prosecutor's office was taking no action. 47.  On 18 August 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicants that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended on 19 July 2003. 48.  On 25 August 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic informed the first and tenth applicants that the decision on suspension of the investigation in case no. 61161 had been quashed on 20 August 2003 and that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 49.  On 4 September 2003 the first applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about her son's abduction by Russian servicemen and asked them to take certain investigative measures in order to establish his whereabouts. 50.  On 8 September 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been resumed on 20 August 2003 and was under way. 51.  On 30 December 2003 the SRJI asked, on behalf of the applicants, the district prosecutor's office to take certain measures in order to establish the whereabouts of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev. 52.  On 27 and 30 April 2004 respectively, the district prosecutor's office informed the tenth and first applicants that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended on 20 September 2003 for failure to identify those responsible. 53.  On 23 June 2004 the first and tenth applicants asked the district prosecutor's office to allow them access to the investigation file. 54.  On 26 October 2004 an investigator of the district prosecutor's office told the first and tenth applicants that there was no need to search for Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev as they were most probably dead. 55.  On 19 December 2005 the first and tenth applicants complained about their sons' abduction and the suspension of the criminal investigation to the military commander of the Urus-Martan District. 56.  On 24 January 2007 the first and tenth applicants asked the district prosecutor's office to update them on the progress of the investigation in case no. 61161 and to resume it if it had been suspended. 57.  On 31 January 2007 the district prosecutor's office informed the first and tenth applicants that the investigation had been suspended on 20 September 2003 but that investigative measures were being taken to find their sons and the perpetrators despite the suspension. 58.  On 27 November 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the kidnapping of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev in case no. 61161 on the basis of complaints lodged by the first and tenth applicants. 59.  Mumad Benuyev and Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev were granted victim status. 60.  On 15 December 2002 the first applicant was questioned as a witness and stated that on 24 November 2002 around twelve armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks had arrived in two UAZ-469 vehicles at her house; one of the vehicles had been khaki with an aerial on its roof and a dent on its right door. The armed men had beaten the first applicant's husband, the second applicant and two other relatives. They had demanded that the Benuyevs produce identity papers; while Sayd-Selim Benuyev had been trying to reach for his papers, they had captured him and dragged him outside, put a plastic bag over his head and taken him away. Sayd-Selim Benuyev had not participated in illegal armed groups. 61.  On 16 December 2002 Mumad Benuyev was questioned and made a statement identical to that of the first applicant. He noted that the UAZ vehicles had been grey and khaki. 62.  On 16 December 2002 Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev was questioned as a witness and stated that on 24 November 2002 Abu Zhanalayev had stepped out of his house and encountered armed men who had demanded to see his identity papers. Abu Zhanalayev had asked Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev to bring the papers from his house. While Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev had been absent, Abu Zhanalayev had been taken away by the armed men in a UAZ-469 vehicle. Abu Zhanalayev had not participated in illegal armed groups. 63.  On an unspecified date the first applicant was again questioned. She stated that the armed men in camouflage uniforms had beaten her guests who had arrived to attend a neighbour's wedding. There had been around twelve armed men, they had all been tall. Four of them had not been masked and one armed man had had red hair and a beard. 64.  On 24 January 2003 the department of the interior of the Vedenskiy District established that Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev had not been kept in temporary detention facilities and that their dead bodies had not been found. 65.  On 22 May 2003 the investigators requested information on vehicles used by the ROVD between 10 November 2002 and 25 May 2003 from the head of the ROVD. According to the reply received, the ROVD owned twenty-eight vehicles, none of which was an UAZ-469. 66.  On 8 July 2003 an ROVD officer questioned the second applicant and Mr U., a relative of the Benuyevs. They both stated that at about 11 p.m. on 24 November 2002 armed men speaking Russian had arrived at their house in two UAZ vehicles – one grey and one khaki – and had taken away Sayd-Selim Benuyev. 67.  On 14 September 2003 ROVD officers presented seven UAZ vehicles used by the ROVD for the first applicant to identify. She did not recognise any of those as the vehicle used by her son's kidnappers. 68.  On 20 September 2003 the investigation into the kidnapping was suspended for failure to identify those responsible. 69.  The investigation into the kidnapping of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd‑Selim Benuyev was repeatedly suspended and then resumed. The proceedings were pending and the required investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 70.  Despite specific requests from the Court, the Government refrained from disclosing most of the documents from the investigation file in case no. 61161, except for copies of the decision to institute the investigation, transcripts of witness interviews, a record of the first and tenth applicants' identification of UAZ vehicles and the court judgments of 18 March and 6 April 2005. Relying on information obtained from the Prosecutor General's Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 71.  On 14 April 2003 the first applicant complained to the Urus-Martan District Court that the district prosecutor's office was taking no action in case no. 61161. It is unclear whether the complaint has been examined. 72.  On 28 December 2004 the first and tenth applicants challenged the lawfulness of the decision on suspension of the proceedings of 20 September 2003 before the Urus-Martan District Court. 73.  On 27 January 2005 the Urus-Martan District Court upheld the decision arguing that the district prosecutor's office had taken all the required investigative measures. The applicants appealed. 74.  On 16 February 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic allowed the first and tenth applicants' appeal, quashed the judgment of 27 January 2005 and remitted the case for fresh examination at the first instance. 75.  On 18 March 2005 the Urus-Martan District Court again dismissed the first and tenth applicants' complaint reproducing the reasoning of the judgment of 27 January 2005 verbatim. 76.  On 6 April 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment of 18 March 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  Between 5 July and 27 December 1991 the applicant worked as a manager of a joint stock company (“the employer”). On 7 February 1992 he was dismissed by the employer’s disciplinary commission, a decision which was confirmed by the executive board on 17 March 1992. 5. On 23 March 1992 the applicant brought an action against the employer to annul his dismissal and for his reinstatement as a manager. 6. On 16 June 1992 the then Štip Municipal Court (Општински Суд Штип) dismissed his claim. 7. On 25 January 1993 the then Štip District Court (Окружен Суд Штип) upheld his appeal of 19 November 1992 and remitted the case for a re-examination. 8.  Of nine hearings scheduled before the first-instance court, none was adjourned at the applicant’s request. 9. On 29 December 1993 the then Municipal Court dismissed his claim. That decision was upheld by then District Court’s decision of 30 March 1994 dismissing his appeal of 10 February 1994. 10. On 30 May 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) which was granted by the Supreme Court’s decision of 20 December 1995. On 22 February 1996 the then District Court again upheld the first-instance decision of 29 December 1993. 11. On 17 April 1996 the applicant submitted a fresh appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court. On 20 November 1997 the Supreme Court quashed both the first- and second-instance decisions and remitted the case for a renewed examination. It ruled that the lower courts had erroneously established that the employer’s meeting of shareholders (собрание на акционери) and the strike board (штрајкувачки одбор) had discharged the applicant as the employer’s manager prior to the disciplinary commission having given the dismissal decision (see paragraph 4 above). According to the minutes of their meeting of 27 December 1991, they had only voted against him, but had left the matter to be decided by the disciplinary commission. 12. On 29 May 1998 the applicant requested the removal of the first-instance judge for bias. On 3 June 1998 the President of the Štip Court of First Instance dismissed that request as unsubstantiated. 13. According to the information submitted by the parties, none of the six hearings fixed by the first-instance court was adjourned at the applicant’s request. 14. On 17 December 1998 the Štip Court of First Instance annulled the 1992 dismissal order finding that it was not given by an authorised body. However, it dismissed the applicant’s claim for his reinstatement to a post corresponding to his qualifications since bankruptcy proceedings had been meanwhile launched against the employer. The employer’s receiver (стечаен управник) could decide the reinstatement issue. 15. On 29 December 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed this decision as incoherent and ordered a retrial arguing that the lower court had erred in establishing the facts concerning the body competent to decide on the dismissal. 16. After three hearings being fixed, on 24 April 2001 the Štip Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claims finding that: he was discharged as the employer’s manager by the executive board on 27 December 1991; under an application for disciplinary proceedings submitted by the strike board, the newly appointed manager requested the disciplinary commission to dismiss him for having committed serious work-related violations, which was actually done by the commission’s decision of 7 February 1992; and the executive board dismissed his objection by decision of 17 March 1992. The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s claims were ill-founded. This decision was given by another first-instance judge. On 29 November 2001 the Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 17. On 21 January 2002 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court arguing that the lower courts had wrongly established and assessed the facts. 18.  The applicant died on 31 October 2002. 19. On 11 September 2003 the Supreme Court finally dismissed his appeal finding that the lower courts had properly established the facts and correctly applied the national law. According to a note written on the slip receipt, on 3 December 2003 there was an unsuccessful attempt to serve this decision due to the applicant’s death. The applicant’s successors maintained that they learnt about this decision only on 29 July 2004 when they received the Government’s observations. The Government did not contest that assertion. 20. During the proceedings, the applicant applied several times to the first-instance court to expedite the proceedings. His requests for priority treatment submitted before the Supreme Court were refused. He also notified the State Judicial Council about the protracted length of the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court (oблacний суд) convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons, sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. 10.  On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court (Верхoвний суд) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The applicant was transferred by the authorities responsible for the isolation block of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (Адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Управління міністерства внутрішніх справ) to one of the cells intended for persons awaiting execution of the death sentence. 11.  A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11pп/99 of 29 December 1999, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution. As a result, death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by Law no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. 12.  On 2 June 2000 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court commuted the applicant’s death sentence to life imprisonment. 13.  The facts of the case concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison and the events during his time there are disputed. 14.  The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in paragraphs 17 to 23 below. The facts as presented by the Government are set out in paragraphs 24 to 30. 15.  A description of the material submitted to the Commission and to the Court will be found in paragraphs 31 to 58 below. 16.  The Commission, in order to establish the facts in the light of the dispute over the conditions of the applicant’s detention and the events which occurred in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, conducted its own investigation pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention. To this end, the Commission examined a series of documents submitted by the applicant and the Government in support of their respective assertions and appointed three delegates to take evidence from witnesses at a hearing conducted at the Ministry of Justice in Kyiv on 23 and 26 November 1998, and in Ivano-Frankivsk on 24 and 25 November 1998. The Commission’s assessment of the evidence and its findings of fact are summarised in paragraphs 59 to 75 below. 17.  On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons, sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. After the first-instance judgment, he was placed in a separate cell. He was not allowed to write to his family, nor could he be visited by his lawyer. He applied several times for permission to meet his lawyer. 18.  On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. On a decision of the authorities responsible for the isolation block of the Ministry of the Interior, the applicant was transferred to a cell intended for prisoners awaiting execution of the death sentence. On 30 March 1996 the applicant’s lawyer applied to see the applicant in order to give him the Supreme Court’s decision in the case. The prison governor did not grant him permission to do so. 19.   Conditions of detention of persons sentenced to death were governed by the Pre-Trial Detention Act 1993 (“the Act”) and by an instruction of 20 April 1998 (“the Instruction”), whose content remained top secret. Under the terms of the Instruction, exercise in the open air, watching television, buying newspapers and receiving food parcels from relatives were prohibited. The Instruction therefore prevented the applicant from enjoying the rights guaranteed by the Act. 20.  In a reply by the deputy head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior to a complaint by the applicant’s father concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention, reference was made to the Instruction. Moreover, according to information received by the applicant’s father from the deputy governor of the prison, it appeared that the Act did not apply to him. Had the Act been applicable to the applicant, he would have been entitled under sections 9(1) and 13 to take daily exercise in the open air, to receive parcels twice a month and to watch television. However, this was strictly prohibited between 1995 and 1998. Up to September 1997 the applicant was also prohibited from sending and receiving letters. It was only then that the deputy governor of the prison orally informed the applicant’s mother that he could send and receive letters. Moreover, his father was refused permission to visit him on 29 May 1995 and 10 June and 31 July 1996 without any explanation from the prison authorities. From July 1996 onwards, instead of monthly visits which would last up to two hours, the applicant’s father had been allowed to visit the applicant only once every three months for not more than one hour. 21.  As regards visits from a priest, the applicant’s father and members of the clergy repeatedly but unsuccessfully applied to the prison authorities and those responsible for the isolation block of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for the applicant to be allowed to receive a visit from a priest. 22.  The applicant finally stated that he had complained several times about the conditions in which he was being held. He had also unsuccessfully applied to the prison authorities for permission to lodge an application with the European Commission of Human Rights. 23.  In a letter to the Commission of 6 March 1998, the applicant’s father stated that on 4 March 1998 he had seen his son, who had told him about a check-up carried out by a commission from the Ministry of the Interior in mid-February 1998. After the commission had left, the applicant had been transferred to a cell that was worse equipped and dirty. The window in the cell had been fully shuttered. The bucket for flushing the toilet had been taken away and the toilet could not therefore be cleaned properly, which had caused an unbearable smell. Moreover, the applicant had been given only 25 cl of hot water to prepare tea and milk. All his dishes had been removed. His Bible had been taken away. He had not been allowed to read periodicals and his notebook and calendar had been confiscated. 24.  The Government stated that the legal status and conditions of detention of persons sentenced to death were governed by the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to section 8 of the Act, a person sentenced to death was kept in custody away from other prisoners. The cell to which the applicant had been transferred after his sentence had become final complied with the sanitary and hygiene rules laid down in section 11 of the Act: the cell measured 9 sq. m and had a bed, a table, a radio, sufficient natural and electric light, heating, running water and a toilet. 25.  The applicant was provided with three meals a day, standard clothing and footwear as well as other articles of everyday use. Medical assistance, treatment, prophylactic and anti-epidemic measures were arranged and implemented in accordance with the legislation on health protection. 26.  According to section 12 of the Act, prior to the sentence being carried out, prisoners sentenced to death were, as a rule, allowed visits from relatives and other persons not more than once a month, by written permission of the court within whose jurisdiction the case fell. The length of a visit was two hours maximum. After a case had been dealt with by an appellate court, visits by lawyers and legal assistants could be allowed by the head of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, the head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior or his deputy responsible for the isolation block. According to section 12 of the Act, visits by defence counsel were allowed without any limits as to their number and length. 27.  On 13 December 1995, after the first-instance judgment, the applicant’s parents and lawyer received permission to visit him. The parents visited the applicant on 15 December 1995 and in January 1996. The applicant’s lawyer visited him on 21 December 1995 and on 7 January 1996. During the period from 22 February 1996 to 29 December 1997, the parents applied to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to visit the applicant on 24 February, 4 March, 5 April, 4 May, 2 July, 1 October, 18 November and 25 December 1996, and on 3 and 20 June and 19 September 1997. They were granted permission for visits on 24 February, 5 March, 5 April, 4 May, 2 July, 4 October and 4 December 1996, and on 4 March, 4 June, 4 September and 4 December 1997. 28.  The applicant’s lawyer applied for permission to visit the applicant on 25 April, 11 November, and 18 and 19 December 1996. Permission was granted for a first visit on 7 May 1996 and on the other occasions as requested. 29.  Persons sentenced to death were allowed to send an unlimited number of letters. During the period 1995-98 the applicant sent thirty-one letters: twenty-four letters related to his criminal case and seven letters were to his relatives. The applicant applied for the first time to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send letters to his relatives on 17 September 1997. Thereafter he sent letters to his parents on 19 and 26 November and 31 December 1997, and on 5, 16, 20 and 30 January, 3 February, 11 March, 6 April, 15 May, 17 June, 6 July, 10 August, 15 September, 22 October, 13 November and 11 December 1998. He received letters from his parents on 18 and 29 September, 19 October, 20 November and 24 December 1997, and on 16 and 26 January, 6, 10 and 23 February, 14 and 16 March, 17 April, 14 May, 1 and 8 June, 1 and 30 July, 20 August, 29 September, 10, 22 and 27 October, 4, 20, 26 and 30 November and 4, 17 and 21 December 1998. 30.  The Government further submitted that the Prosecutor-General had conducted a thorough investigation into the applicant’s and his parents’ complaints concerning the application of illegal methods of investigation in the applicant’s case, namely torture and brutal and inhuman treatment. The allegations had not been proved and had been found unsubstantiated. In fact, complaints by the applicant, his parents, his representative and his defence counsel were received on 11 March, 8 April, 13, 14 and 29 May, 24 July, 11 September and 25 October 1996, and on 5 and 17 March, 19 May and 25 July 1997, and answered on 20 and 23 March, 23 and 24 April, 23 May, 27 June, 1 August, 30 September and 14 November 1996, and on 28 and 31 March and 20 May 1997. On 31 July 1997 the exchange of letters and the proceedings concerning the complaints filed by the applicant and his parents were terminated pursuant to section 12 of the Act. 31.  In a letter of 26 May 1998 the prison governor replied to a complaint lodged by the applicant’s father on 10 May 1998 informing him that persons sentenced to death were allowed to send twelve letters a year. He also stated that the applicant was aware of his rights and obligations. 32.  In a letter of 10 August 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk regional prosecutor informed the applicant’s father that visits and correspondence of persons sentenced to death were governed by the Instruction and not by the Act to which the applicant’s father had referred in his complaint. 33.  In a written complaint of 4 September 1998 addressed to the regional prosecutor the applicant’s parents stated, inter alia, that they had not seen the applicant for three months, that since 5 July 1998 they had not received any letters from him, that on 2 September 1998 they had become aware that the applicant had been beaten and humiliated, that Mr Ivashko, the deputy governor of the prison, had intervened during their visit on 2 September 1998 when the applicant had spoken about his conditions of detention, and that, for a period of one year and six months, the applicant had been denied the possibility of a visit from a priest, despite his requests. 34.  In a letter of 10 September 1998 the regional prosecutor informed the applicant’s father that the applicant’s visits and correspondence were governed by the national legislation and that the prison administration had acted within the limits of this legislation. 35.  On 10 September 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk deputy regional prosecutor sent a report to the Prosecutor-General. The report concerned the findings of the investigation carried out following the complaint by the applicant’s father about allegedly unlawful acts by the prison authorities in respect of the applicant’s correspondence and visits. The report concluded that the investigation had not established any violation of the applicant’s rights by the prison authorities. 36.  On 11 September 1998 the applicant’s father sent a complaint to Mr Shtanko, the head of the State Department for the Execution of Sentences, to which the latter replied on 12 October 1998. The allegations he raised were similar to those in his complaint to the regional prosecutor of 4 September 1998. Mr Shtanko replied that the applicant had been placed in solitary confinement because he had broken the rules. Furthermore, an investigation had not established that any physical force had been used against the applicant or that the prison authorities had humiliated him or restricted his rights, as was confirmed by the applicant himself. The applicant’s father was also informed that visits, including visits by a priest, could be allowed by the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. 37.  On 23 October 1998 the applicant’s parents submitted a request to the regional prosecutor, the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor that a commission of independent doctors be set up in order to examine the applicant’s state of health. They alleged that the inmates of the prison had been tortured, which resulted in a suicide attempt by one of them or an attempt on his life. On 3 November 1998 the applicant’s parents were informed by the prison governor that their request had been refused on the grounds that there had been no sign of torture or of the use of any other physical violence against the applicant and that his state of health was satisfactory. 38.  On 23 and 24 October 1998 the applicant’s parents sent a letter to Mrs Leni Fischer, then President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. They complained of torture inflicted on the applicant and one of his fellow inmates, Mr Kuznetsov, which had resulted in a suicide attempt by the latter, and alleged that they had been taken to hospital and that Mr Kuznetsov had been paralysed. The parents further complained that they had been prevented from seeing the applicant. 39.  In a letter of 26 October 1998 the applicant’s parents informed the Commission that “in establishment BI 304/199 in Ivano-Frankivsk there [had] been an attempt to execute the unjustly condemned M. Kuznetsov and B. Poltoratskiy illegally, and [that] the Government [had] tried to conceal the fact”. 40.  A handwritten medical report issued on 28 October 1998 was signed by the applicant. The report stated that the applicant did not show any signs of having been beaten and that his state of health was satisfactory. 41.  In a handwritten statement of 28 October 1998 the applicant said that he had been treated properly by the prison authorities, that no physical violence had been employed, that all disciplinary measures imposed on him had been justified and that his parents’ complaints had not been substantiated. 42.  The Regional Directorate for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior issued a report on 29 October 1998 in response to the applicant’s father’s complaint about alleged torture and his request for a commission of independent doctors to examine the applicant’s state of health. The report stated that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had been examined by the prison doctors who had found no signs of physical injury. It also stated that the applicant denied that he had been tortured. 43.  In a letter of 30 October 1998 the deputy head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant’s mother that her complaint concerning torture to which the applicant had allegedly been subjected had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated. A medical examination of the applicant had not shown any signs of torture. Accordingly, there was no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate the allegations. 44.  A letter of 2 November 1998 from the deputy regional prosecutor to the Prosecutor-General reported on the findings of the investigation carried out in connection with the applicant’s father’s complaint about restrictions on the applicant’s correspondence and visits, the interference by the prison authorities during the applicant’s parents’ visit on 2 September 1998 and the physical torture inflicted on the applicant. The letter said that, as regards the restriction on the applicant’s correspondence and visits, the father had wrongly relied on the Act, which did not apply to that category of prisoners, that the interference by a prison official had been justified, and that on 25 September 1998 the applicant had undergone a thorough medical examination which had not established any physical injuries. Finally, it explained that the applicant had been placed in solitary confinement on 26 August 1998 because he had broken the prison rules by refusing to let himself be examined by a prison warder upon his return from a daily walk outside the cell. 45.  In a letter of 20 November 1998 the deputy regional prosecutor replied to the applicant’s mother’s complaint about the physical torture allegedly inflicted on the applicant and to her request for a medical examination of the applicant. He stated that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had undergone a medical examination which had established that the allegations were unsubstantiated. The medical report had been confirmed and signed by the applicant. 46.  In a letter of 23 November 1998 the regional prosecutor informed the applicant’s father that his allegations about illegal acts on the part of the prison authorities had been found to be unsubstantiated. 47.  In a letter of 30 November 1998 the deputy head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant’s representative, Mr Voskoboynikov, that he could not be granted permission to visit the applicant as the latter had already had a visit from his relatives that month. 48.  In a letter of 8 December 1998 from the State Department for the Execution of Sentences the applicant’s father was informed that a thorough investigation had proved that his complaint about an illegal attempt to execute his son was unsubstantiated and that his son’s state of health was satisfactory. 49.  On 22 December 1998 the applicant requested permission from the head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior to see a priest. His request was granted and he saw a priest on 26 December 1998. 50.  In a letter of 15 February 1999 the prison governor informed the applicant’s father that his complaint of 22 January 1999 had been examined. He stated that persons sentenced to death were allowed to receive two parcels a year but no food parcels. 51.  In a decision of 5 March 1999 the Senior Prosecutor rejected a criminal complaint by the applicant’s parents against the deputy regional prosecutor. He refused to institute criminal proceedings against the latter on the ground that there was no evidence of his having committed an offence. He stated, inter alia, that the Act did not apply to the conditions of detention of death-row prisoners. These were governed by the Instruction, which was covered by the rules on State secrecy. 52.  According to the prison records, the applicant’s parents applied to visit the applicant on 19 September 1997, and on 4 March, 8 April, 19 June, 22 July, 2 November and 1 December 1998. Permission was given on 7 October 1997, and on 4 March, 22 April, 20 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which took place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 12 June, 2 September and 26 November 1998 and on 4 January 1999. The request of 19 June 1998 was not granted. 53.  According to the prison records, the applicant sent letters to his parents on 17 September, 19 and 26 November, and 31 December 1997, and on 5, 16, 20 and 30 January, 3 February, 11 March, 6 April, 15 May, 17 June, 6 July, 10 August, 15 September, 22 October, 13 November and 11 December 1998. He received letters from them and other persons on 18 and 29 September, 19 October, 20 November and 24 December 1997, and on 16 and 26 January (two letters), 6, 10, 17 and 23 February, 6, 14 and 16 March, 6, 17, 20, 27 and 29 April, 14 May, 1, 8 and 30 June, 1, 20 and 30 July, 20 August (two letters), 29 September, 10, 22 (two letters) and 27 October, 4, 13, 20, 26 and 30 November, 4, 17 and 21 December 1998. 54.  In an undated document Mr Y.M. Pavlyuk, the deputy head of the isolation block, declared that during the period between 11 September 1997 and 18 December 1998, neither the applicant nor his parents had asked for permission for the applicant to see a priest. He further declared that during the said period no member of the clergy had asked for such permission. He signed the declaration. 55.  According to the applicant’s medical card, the applicant was X-rayed and blood-tested on 23 April 1998. On 25 September, 1 and 28 October, 9, 19 and 27 November, 3, 10, 17 and 24 December 1998 the applicant was seen by a prison psychiatrist. 56.  In a written request of 2 May 2000 to the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Boyko, the applicant’s father, in his capacity as his legal representative, asked for a confidential meeting with the applicant in order to discuss issues concerning his application pending before the European Court of Human Rights. On 23 May 2000, following a further request lodged on 15 May 2000, he was granted permission for a normal visit on 5 June 2000. 57.  On 16 May 2000 the applicant’s father complained to the Deputy Minister of the Interior that his request of 2 May 2000 for a confidential meeting had remained unanswered. 58.  In a letter of 14 July 2000 the deputy head of the State Department for the Execution of Sentences, Mr V.A. Lyovochkin, replied that Mr Boyko had given the applicant’s father permission to visit the applicant on 5 June 2000 and that the visit had taken place as scheduled. He added that in accordance with Article 40 of the Correctional Labour Code, a lawyer could be given permission for a confidential meeting with his client on presentation of his licence and identity card. 59.  Since the facts of the case were disputed, the Commission conducted an investigation, with the assistance of the parties, and took oral evidence from the following witnesses: the applicant; the applicant’s parents; Mr Bronislav S. Stichinskiy, Deputy Minister of Justice; Mr Drishchenko, Deputy Prosecutor-General; Mr Ivan V. Shtanko, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Mr Petro A. Yaremkiv, the governor of Ivano-Frankivsk Prison; Mr Bogdan V. Kachur, prison doctor; Mr Stanislav V. Prokhnitskiy, medical assistant; Mr Yuriy M. Pindus, assistant to the prison governor, who was on duty on 3 September 1998; Mr Fedir O. Savchuk, assistant to the prison governor, who was on duty during the night of 2 to 3 September 1998; Mr Igor P. Ivashko, the deputy governor of the prison; Mr Yaroslav M. Pavlyuk, the deputy head of the isolation block; Mr Valentin M. Nabiulin, the head of the Department for Supervision of Isolation Blocks and Prisons of the Directorate for the Execution of Sentences; Mr Oleksand V. Kmyta, the deputy head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior; and Mr Anatoliy O. Boyko, the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior.\nThe Commission’s findings may be summarised as follows. 60.  The applicant gave evidence before the delegates that he had been beaten on 2 September 1998 after the visit from his parents on the same day. During that visit, he had said to his parents that he had been beaten and called a beast. The applicant’s parents stated before the delegates that they had been told by their son on 2 September 1998 that he had been beaten and humiliated. The Commission observed, however, that the applicant denied before the delegates that he had been beaten before 2 September 1998. It considered, therefore, that it had not been established that the applicant had been beaten before 2 September 1998. 61.  As to the events on 2 September 1998, the applicant stated before the delegates that, after the visit from his parents on that date, he had been taken to the “cinema room” where four persons, including Mr Pavlyuk, the deputy head of the isolation block on duty, were waiting for him with clubs. He had been asked three times to tell everything, but had refused and had been struck on his legs, hips, back and chest. He had returned to his cell and had written until the morning on four sheets of paper which had been included in a file. 62.  The applicant further stated that he had been beaten on 10, 14 and 22 September 1998. One day, during a technical search of his cell, he had been taken out and ordered to get undressed so that his clothes could be checked. When he was naked, he had been beaten. He had been ordered to lie down on the floor with his face to the ground and his hands behind his head. He mentioned the name of K.Y. Hrevnin to the delegates. 63.  The Commission considered that the applicant’s account contained a number of details and elements which it would not have expected to find in a fabricated story. It noted, however, that there was no record of any occurrence connected to the ill-treatment described by the applicant. The Commission accepted that the applicant may have been afraid to complain or to write to anyone, as he said. However, it accepted this argument with difficulty, having regard to the fact that he had not been scared when he had told his parents on 2 September 1998 that he had been beaten. Moreover, the prison psychiatrist saw him on 25 September 1998 and had not recorded any problems regarding his state of health or any injuries. The Commission added that the medical report of 28 October 1998, which the applicant had signed, concluded that he did not show any signs of having been beaten and that his state of health was satisfactory. 64.  The Commission further noted that the applicant had signed a written statement on 28 October 1998 to the effect that he had been treated properly by the prison authorities, that no physical violence had been used against him, that all disciplinary measures imposed on him had been justified and that his parents’ complaints had not been substantiated. It took into account the fact that, before the delegates, the applicant had denied the contents of his statement, and pointed out that the practice of the prison authorities to require an inmate to confirm in writing that he had been treated properly by prison officers gave rise to suspicion. 65.  As to the applicant’s parents’ submission before the delegates that, after the alleged beatings and torture on 2 September 1998, he had been transferred to Chukopovskiy Psycho-Neurological Hospital early in the morning of 3 September 1998 and had been placed in the intensive care unit where he had been given a blood transfusion, the Commission observed that, although the applicant had maintained that he had been beaten after his parents’ visit on 2 September 1998, he had denied that he had been transferred to hospital. This was corroborated by the statements of the prison doctor, the medical assistant, the governor’s assistant on duty at the time and the deputy governor, all of whom had been heard by the delegates. In addition, there was no documentary evidence proving that the applicant had been taken to hospital on the aforesaid date. The Commission did not consider the parents’ evidence on this point convincing or reliable. 66.  The Commission found that there was no medical or other material evidence establishing that the applicant had sustained injury as a result of ill-treatment by prison officers in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, as he had alleged. It had regard to the fact that the applicant had denied that he had been beaten before 2 September 1998 and had been transferred to hospital after that date, and that the absence of any use of force by prison officers on 2, 10, 14 and 22 September 1998 had been supported by the oral statements of the witnesses heard by its delegates. The Commission therefore found it impossible to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in prison as he had alleged. 67.  The applicant’s parents sent a complaint to the regional prosecutor on 4 September 1998, claiming, inter alia, that they had become aware that the applicant had been beaten and humiliated by prison officers. They made similar allegations to the head of the State Department for the Execution of Sentences on 11 September 1998. On 12 October 1998 the latter informed the applicant’s father that the investigation had not established that any physical force had been used against his son or that the prison authorities had humiliated him or restricted his rights. He also stated that this finding had been confirmed in writing by the applicant himself. 68.  On 23 October 1998 the applicant’s parents requested the regional prosecutor, the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor to set up an independent medical commission in order to examine the applicant’s state of health. They alleged that the prison’s inmates had been tortured, resulting in a suicide attempt by one of them, Mr Kuznetsov, or in an attempt on his life. On 30 October 1998 the applicant’s mother was informed by the deputy head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior that her complaint concerning the alleged torture of the applicant had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated and a medical examination of the applicant had not revealed any signs of torture. There was, accordingly, no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate her allegations. On 3 November 1998 the prison governor informed the applicant’s parents that their request had been refused on the grounds that there was no sign of torture or the use of any other form of physical violence against the applicant and that his state of health was satisfactory. In a letter of 20 November 1998 to the applicant’s parents, the deputy regional prosecutor confirmed that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had undergone a medical examination which had established that the parents’ allegations were unsubstantiated. Moreover, on 2 November 1998 the deputy regional prosecutor sent a letter to the Prosecutor-General which reported on the results of the investigation carried out in connection with, inter alia, the allegations that the applicant had been physically tortured. The letter confirmed that on 25 September 1998 the applicant had undergone a thorough medical examination which had not revealed any physical injury. 69.  The Commission noted that on 8 December 1998 the applicant’s father had received a letter from the State Department for the Execution of Sentences stating that a thorough investigation had proved that his complaint about an attempt to execute his son was unsubstantiated and that the latter’s state of health was satisfactory. The domestic investigation had then ended on 5 March 1999 with a decision by the Senior Prosecutor on the applicant’s parents’ criminal complaint against the regional prosecutor. The Senior Prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings on the ground that no criminal offence had been established. 70.  The Commission found that there were no contemporaneous records giving details of any investigation which the domestic authorities had carried out into the applicant’s parents’ allegations of the events in September 1998. It had not seen a single document proving that an investigation had been carried out by any domestic authorities other than those directly involved in the facts of which the applicant’s parents complained. Moreover, the medical report of 28 October 1998 had been drafted almost two months after the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and the applicant had not been seen by the prison doctor or prison psychiatrist between 23 April and 25 September 1998. 71.  The Commission found that the eight death-row inmates at Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, including the applicant, were being kept in single cells without the opportunity to communicate with other inmates. The applicant’s cell measured 2 x 5 x 3 m. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with a cold-water tap, two beds, a table and a little bench, both fixed to the floor, central heating and a window with bars. The applicant had some books, newspapers, a chess set, a stock of soap and toilet paper, some fruit and other food. During the delegates’ visit on 24 and 25 November 1998, the cell had been overheated, particularly in comparison with other rooms in the prison. The light was on twenty-four hours a day and the central radio was switched off at night. The inmates were frequently observed by prison warders through a spy hole in the door of the cell, which deprived them of any kind of privacy. The cell was freshly painted, from which the inference might be drawn that conditions had been worse prior to the delegates’ visit. The Commission accepted the applicant’s evidence that between 24 February and 24 March 1998 there had been no tap or washbasin in his cell, but only a small pipe on the wall near the toilet, that the water supply could only be turned on from the corridor, that the walls were covered with faeces and that the bucket for flushing the toilet had been taken away. The Commission found the applicant’s evidence – which was not contested by the Government – persuasive. 72.  The Commission also accepted the applicant’s evidence that, until May 1998, the window in his cell had been shuttered and that he had not been allowed to take daily outdoor walks. 73.  Concerning the applicant’s parents’ requests to visit him, the Commission found that, apart from the parents’ request of 19 June 1998, all had been granted. The parents had applied to visit their son on 19 September 1997 and on 4 March, 8 April, 22 July, 2 November and 1 December 1998. Permission had been given on 7 October 1997 and on 4 March, 22 April, 20 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which had taken place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 12 June, 2 September and 26 November 1998 and 4 January 1999. The Commission noted that the parents’ requests to visit the applicant had mostly been granted for a date two or three months after the request had been made. Moreover, two warders had been present during the visits, who were authorised to interrupt the conversation if they considered that the parents or the applicant had said anything “untrue”. 74.  Regarding the applicant’s correspondence, the Commission noted that the applicant had applied for the first time to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send a letter to his relatives on 17 September 1997. Thereafter he had sent letters to his parents on 19 and 26 November 1997, 31 December 1997, and on 5, 16, 20 and 30 January, 3 February, 11 March, 6 April, 15 May, 17 June, 6 July, 10 August, 15 September, 22 October, 13 November and 11 December 1998. He had received letters from his parents on 18 and 29 September, 19 October, 20 November and 24 December 1997, and on 16 and 26 January, 6, 10 and 23 February, 14 and 16 March, 17 April, 14 May, 1 and 8 June, 1 and 30 July, 20 August, 29 September, 10, 22 and 27 October, 4, 20, 26 and 30 November and 4, 17 and 21 December 1998. 75.  The Commission could not establish with sufficient clarity whether the applicant or his parents had asked for permission for a priest to come to see the applicant. It nevertheless found that while the applicant had seen a priest on 26 December 1998 following his request of 22 December 1998, there had been no regular visits to inmates by any chaplain.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": true, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company established under Austrian law with its registered office in Innsbruck. 6.  It publishes Bezirksblatt, Lokalausgabe Hall/Rum (“the Bezirksblatt”), a weekly newspaper distributed free of charge in a region of Tyrol. One edition of the newspaper had 17,440 copies circulated. 7.  In January 2006 approximately 300 copies of an anonymous letter were sent out, many of them to members of the supervisory board of the tourism association for Hall and Wattens, two towns in Tyrol. The letter, written in the form of a survey, concerned C.M. and J.M, referred to as “M&M” on account of the initial letter of their surname. 8.  C.M. was at the time a practising lawyer and chairman of the tourism association for Hall and Wattens. When the article was published, elections for the post of chairman of the tourism association were underway and C.M. was again standing as a candidate for the post. His brother J.M., also a practising lawyer, had been active in politics in Hall for many years, and was at the material time the member of the City Council responsible for public finance. He was also chairman of the supervisory board of Stadtwerke Hall, the town’s electricity, water and heating supplier. 9.  The “survey” part of the letter read:\n“In the course of our M&M survey, I would like to ask you the following questions: 1.  Would you buy a car from this man? 2. Would you stake your money on a promise made by this man? 3. Does this man have the necessary personal/ professional qualifications? 4. Has this man ever built anything properly? 5. Is this man honest with his own family? 6. Would you allow this man to execute your will?\nIf you have answered one of these questions with ‘no’, please ask yourself why you want to leave this man in his current position. We, being entrepreneurs, will decide at the next tourism association meeting with our votes. It is our promise, our money, our qualification, our association and our heritage! ...” 10.  L., a journalist working for the applicant company’s newspaper, was informed of the anonymous letter. He telephoned C.M. and J.M., who commented on it, claiming it to be part of a political campaign against them. A few minutes later, C.M. telephoned the journalist back and asked him whether he was planning to publish the letter. When L. confirmed that he was, C.M. said that he did not agree to its publication and that he would take legal action if it were published. 11.  In the 18 January 2006 issue of the Bezirksblatt, the applicant company published an article entitled “Anonymous campaign against M&M”. The subheading read “M&M or [C.M.’s and J.M.’s full surname] are the target of a not at all bittersweet campaign”. The article contained the story of the anonymous letter and C.M.’s and J.M.’s replies to the accusations made in it. It reported that both of them had stated that the letter had attempted to harm their political activities and had considered the accusations to be a personal insult. The article contained photos of C.M. and J.M. and a reproduction of the letter containing the questions set out above. 12.  Relying on section 6 of the Media Act, C.M. and J.M. brought proceedings against the applicant company for defamation, requesting compensation and publication of the judgment. The applicant company argued that its conduct did not amount to defamation, as the article had only quoted someone else’s statements and had duly distanced itself from the contents of the letter. Moreover, the information had been a matter of public interest. 13.  On 24 March 2006 the Innsbruck Regional Court found in favour of the claimants and ordered the applicant company to publish the judgment and to pay EUR 2,000 in compensation to each of them. 14.  The Regional Court held that the article itself merely commented on the letter in an objective manner and did not agree with its offensive content. Furthermore, the nature of the offices held by the claimants meant that they were often in the local media, but had so far not been the subject of any negative campaign. However, the anonymous letter, which had been included in the article, fulfilled the actus reus of defamation, as it accused C.M. and J.M. of dishonesty and other disreputable character traits, relating to both their professional and private lives. Both had experienced negative repercussions as a result of the article in their professional activities as lawyers, in that they had repeatedly been confronted with the allegations made in the anonymous letter. 15.  The Regional Court, referring to the applicant company’s argument that it had only quoted a statement made by someone else, noted that section 6(2)(4) of the Media Act only permitted quoting the statement of a third person if the quotation was truthful and there was an overriding public interest in its publication. This rule would even apply if the identity of the third person having made the statement was unknown. In any case, the court held that it was required to balance the public interest in disseminating information about the statements quoted against the claimants’ interest in protecting their reputation. It accepted that the local public had an interest in knowing about a campaign against the chairman of the tourism association and a local politician. However, public interest did not justify reproduction of the anonymous letter in the article. The applicant company could have provided information on the campaign against C.M. and J.M. without printing the defamatory letter. In that connection, the court observed that by printing the letter the applicant had also made its entire content known to a far greater number of people than the letter itself had reached. 16.  The applicant company appealed and lodged a plea of nullity, relying on the Media Act, in particular, on the so-called “law on quotations” developed under section 6(2)(4) of that Act. It asserted that the Regional Court had wrongly considered there to be no overriding public interest in publishing the anonymous letter. In particular, the article and the letter related to the tourism association, which was a public law corporation, and the applicants were both public figures in local politics. 17.  The Innsbruck Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 10 August 2006. It held that the law on quotations was not applicable in the present case. It was not possible to claim for damages under Article 6 of the Media Act in respect of quotations in the media where the identity of the third person making the offensive statements was known. In such cases, the person concerned could seek compensation from the person who had made the offensive statements in the first place. As in the present case the person who had made the offensive statements had remained anonymous, the applicant company could not rely on section 6(2)(4) of the Media Act. Furthermore the Court of Appeal, confirming the Regional Court’s view, found that in any event there was no overriding public interest in publication of the anonymous letter. 18.  The judgment was served on the applicant’s counsel on 3 January 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Bucharest. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  On 16 December 1996 a third party brought criminal proceedings against the applicant for wrongful misappropriation. The third party claimed that the applicant had unlawfully used private funds belonging to his companies in order to increase the capital of a commercial bank (Bankcoop) and become a major shareholder in the said bank. 9.  On 14 January 1997 the Judicial Police attached to the Romanian Ministry of the Interior asked the third party to provide additional information in respect of the unlawful acts allegedly committed by the applicant. 10.  On 19 February 1997, the Adevărul daily newspaper published an article entitled “The investigation files of G.C.P. – strictly secret?” The article quoted statements by D.I.C., one of the prosecutors conducting the investigation against the applicant, of which the most relevant part reads as follows:\n“We have been accused of insisting on imposing [on G.C.P.] an order not to leave the city, a measure which is usually taken when there are suspicions that somebody has committed an unlawful act. However, as I already told you and as [can be seen] from checks carried out by the Financial Control Office [Garda Financiară], here there have been unlawful acts committed, not only suspicions. In spite of that, we have proven to be humane, when at his [G.C.P.’s] request we allowed him to leave Bucharest for forty-eight hours.” 11.  On 10 April 1997 the applicant was charged with fraud, forging documents and use of forged documents, embezzlement, using the goods of a commercial company against its interests and undermining the national economy, on account of the fact that, by acting on behalf of the private company (G.C.P. S.A.), which the applicant controlled as the major shareholder, he had allegedly made false statements in an official document submitted to the Romanian National Bank on 31 August 1995 in order to obtain its permission to increase the capital of Bankcoop by the amount of 10,000,000 United States Dollars (USD). More specifically, the applicant was suspected of declaring the aforementioned amount as his personal funds, when in fact it had been obtained as a loan taken out by G.C.P. S.A. from a foreign bank, which was contrary to the National Bank’s regulations on acceptable sources of money used to increase a bank’s capital. 12.  On 2 June 1997 the applicant brought a challenge against the two prosecutors, including D.I.C., charged with the investigation of his case at the time, arguing, inter alia, that press statements made by the said prosecutors on 28 May 1997 in the Evenimentul Zilei daily newspaper – claiming that the applicant’s financial investments were “acts of fraud” – amounted to a breach of his right to the presumption of innocence. 13.  According to the applicant, his challenge of 2 June 1997 against the prosecutors G.M. and D.I.C. was allowed by a final Prosecutor’s Office Order of 23 June 1997 and a new prosecutor was appointed to investigate his case. The applicant failed to include in the file a copy of the order of 23 June 1997. 14.  On 2 July 1997 the Naţional daily newspaper published an article entitled “G.D. states that G.C.P. should have been indicted long ago for two of the proven crimes”. The most relevant part of the article, which quoted statements by G.D., the Romanian Minister of the Interior at the time, reads as follows:\n“G.C.P. could be indicted for two already proven crimes, namely the ones connected to the embezzlement through Bancorex, from Chemical Bank to Bankcoop. The 10 million dollars taken by G.C.P. from Chemical Bank for a factory in Arad were embezzled so that he could take over the majority of the shares in Bankcoop. (...) Although there is proof that several crimes have been committed by G.C.P., he is only under investigation for two, and the prosecutor’s investigation is lasting a suspiciously long time. ” 15.  On 3 July 1997, the Evenimentul Zilei daily newspaper published an article entitled “G.C.P. and R.T. accused of undermining the national economy”. Quoting the same prosecutor, D.I.C., the relevant parts of the article read as follows:\n“On 1 July 1997 in file no. 180/P/97 of the General Prosecutor’s Office, the file concerning the defendant G.C.P., the criminal investigation was extended with respect to the crime of undermining the national economy, punishable under Article 165 § 1 of the Criminal Code. Hence, between 1994 and 1997, [G.C.P.] used a state-owned public interest bank, Bancorex S.A., in order to obtain certain financial facilities in the amount of 202.6 million dollars, to be used for the reimbursement of certain loans contracted by his commercial company, G.C.P. S.A. This undermined the national economy and disturbed the activity of Bancorex S.A. and, as a consequence, the national economy.” 16.  By letter of 17 November 1997 prosecutor C.M., the prosecutor investigating the applicant’s case at the time, asked the Prosecutor General of Romania to confirm that he could continue the investigation in the case. He expressly stated that he did not have any personal interest or otherwise in respect of the investigation and that he would accept the Prosecutor General’s decision. He informed the Prosecutor General that if he was allowed to continue working on the case he would not be subject to any outside influence or pressure in carrying out the investigation. 17.  On 19 December 1997, the Evenimentul Zilei published an article entitled “S.M. found the solution for destroying the mafia in Romania overseas: The Mexicans should come with bazookas”. The article quoted statements made by S.M., the Prosecutor General of Romania at the time. The most relevant part reads as follows:\n“In the case of G.C.P., who knew all about financial tricks [ingineriile financiare] and covered his tracks with lots of documents, the experts’ report is not finished yet. I believe that there is a 99% chance that he will also be sent to trial, but I would make a suggestion to the police to not just stick to the small cases of T. and G.C.P., because the two of them have [done] more than this.” 18.  In addition, the parties agree that a total of around 350 articles containing information on the investigation and the trial against the applicant were published between 1997 and 2002 in all the major national newspapers, including Ziua, Adevărul, Evenimentul Zilei, Cotidianul, Naţional and Libertatea. Some of the most relevant story titles quoted by the applicant in this respect read as follows: “The trap is tightening” (Evenimentul Zilei, 17 March 1997); “Chess at millionaires!” (Evenimentul Zilei, 9 April 1997); “The return of the jackals” (Evenimentul Zilei, 18 August 1997); “Sharks at large” (Evenimentul Zilei, 28 April 1998); “G.C.P.’s companies have filled their bank accounts on Bancorex’s back” (Ziua, 12 February 1999); “Just when the prosecutors were on the point of indicting him, G.C.P. found refuge in a hospital in Switzerland” (Adevărul, 12 March 1999); “G.C.P. ran away in the U.S.A.” (Libertatea, 5 October 1999); and “The heroes G.C.P. and T.” (Evenimentul Zilei, 10 April 2002). 19.  By an order of 30 January 1998 the Prosecutor General dismissed C.M. from his position of Head Prosecutor of the Criminal Department of the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office and transferred him to the Secretarial and Public Relations Department. At the same time, M.I. was tasked with continuing the criminal investigation against the applicant. The Prosecutor General held that the criminal investigation had been unreasonably lengthy without any objective reasons and that Bancorex, one of the parties involved in the matter, had lodged a challenge and had complained about C.M. 20.  On 17 June 1999 the applicant was indicted for making false statements in an official document, as he had not declared the true source of the money used for increasing the capital of Bankcoop. 21.  The investigation also continued separately in respect of the charge of undermining the national economy and using the goods of a commercial company against its interests. At the same time, the charges concerning fraud, forging documents, use of forged documents and embezzlement were dropped and the part of the criminal investigation covering those charges was closed on the grounds that the applicant’s actions were found to have been lawful. 22.  By a final Prosecutor’s Order of 3 September 2001 the criminal investigation initiated against the applicant for undermining the national economy was discontinued on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed. 23.  By a judgment of 11 September 2001 the Bucharest District Court decided that the indictment of 17 June 1999 was null and void because the applicant had not been informed of the charges against him, as he had been in the United States of America at the time of his indictment. Consequently, the court ordered the file to be sent back to the Prosecutor’s Office. 24.  The prosecutor submitted an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the judgment of 11 September 2001. 25.  By a judgment of 18 January 2002 of the Bucharest County Court the Prosecutor Office’s appeal was allowed and the case was sent back to the first-instance court for a retrial on the merits. The County Court held that there had been no reason for the indictment to be annulled, as the decision of the investigating prosecutors to send the case before the court without informing the applicant of the charges against him had been in accordance with the legal provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable to persons avoiding the investigative authorities. In reaching this decision, the court took into account the fact that neither the applicant nor his attorney had provided the investigators with an exact address at which the applicant could be summoned during the investigation. 26.  By a final Prosecutor’s Order of 12 March 2002 the criminal investigation initiated against the applicant for using the goods of a commercial company against its interests was discontinued on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed. 27.  On 13 May 2002 the first hearing in the retrial of the case was held before the Bucharest District Court following the judgment of 18 January 2002. The applicant was heard by the court. He argued, inter alia, that the criminal investigation against him had been based on political motives, a fact which could be confirmed by the negative media campaign conducted against him and by the public statements made by the Prosecutor’s Office representatives. 28.  By a judgment of 17 June 2002 the Bucharest District Court acquitted the applicant on the grounds that from all the evidence produced it emerged that his actions had been in accordance with the law. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the judgment. 29.  By a judgment of 14 November 2002 the Bucharest County Court allowed the Prosecutor Office’s appeal, convicted the applicant of making false statements in an official document and sentenced him to one year of imprisonment, a sentence which was considered pardoned according to the law. The court held that, on the basis of the evidence available in the file, the applicant had made false statements in an official document and had been aware of the legal consequences of his statements. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (recurs) against the judgment. He argued that the criminal investigation against him had been politically motivated, a fact confirmed by the alleged failure of the domestic courts to take into account and to examine the evidence submitted by him in his defence. In addition, the applicant argued that the domestic courts had wrongfully assessed the evidence, had misinterpreted the applicable legal provisions and had ignored the fact that the indictment brought against him had been null and void because the investigating prosecutor had failed to inform him of the charges brought against him prior to sending the case before the domestic courts. 30.  By a final judgment of 23 December 2002 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and his conviction became final. The court held, on the basis of the evidence available in the file, that the lower courts had correctly assessed the evidence and interpreted the applicable legal provisions and that the applicant had been informed of the charges brought against him by the Prosecutor’s Office. 31.  On 26 February, 26 April, 16 July, 21 September, 19 October, 11 November 2004 and on 18 January, 10 February, 17 March and 19 April 2005 the applicant lodged repeated extraordinary appeal of annulment (recurs în anulare) requests against the final judgment of 23 December 2002 with the Public Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court of Cassation. He argued, inter alia, that his right to the presumption of innocence had been breached on account of an aggressive media campaign led by the Prosecutor’s Office and the Minister of the Interior which had resulted in the criminal investigation being opened against him and in him being indicted. 32.  On 20 April 2005 the applicant’s extraordinary appeal applications were dismissed by the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Court of Cassation on account of statutory amendments to the applicable rules of criminal procedure abolishing that form of appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  On 19 July 2000 the applicant’s daughter E., born in June 1997, was first interviewed at a hospital child psychiatric clinic on a suspicion that she had been sexually abused by the applicant. That suspicion was initially based on E.’s own account of what her father had done to her. 7.  Dr S. examined E. at the clinic on 2, 4 and 8 August 2000. The sessions were recorded on videotape. Following those sessions the hospital staff proposed that a meeting be arranged between the applicant and E. to enable the observation of their interaction. Such a meeting was never held, presumably due to the opposition of E.’s mother, the applicant’s former wife. 8.  On 7 August 2000 the applicant met a social worker and a nurse at the hospital. He denied any sexual abuse, suspecting that the mother had manipulated E. into saying negative things about him in order to prevent his visits with the child. The applicant and E.’s mother had divorced in 1998 and they had not been able to agree on the child’s custody and visiting rights. They had subsequently been afforded joint custody of E. by a court. Against this background, the applicant urged that other possible reasons for E.’s behaviour than sexual abuse be taken into consideration. 9.  In a feedback discussion held on 14 September 2000 Dr S. informed the applicant about the results of the examinations, which in his opinion supported the suspicion of abuse by the applicant. The applicant was told that a meeting between him and E. was to be arranged and that he would be informed about the date of the meeting later on. The applicant requested copies of E.’s examination reports. 10.  No meeting between the applicant and E. was arranged. 11.  As copies of E.’s examination reports had not been sent to the applicant, his counsel made fresh requests to that end on 3 and 14 November 2000. She also insisted that the applicant be heard regarding the examinations. 12.  On 15 November 2000 E. was examined at the clinic by Dr H. That session was also videotaped. No meeting with the applicant was arranged in respect of the results of that examination. 13.  On 28 November 2000 the hospital refused to submit copies of E.’s examination reports to the applicant, finding that their disclosure might be detrimental to her health or treatment and that it might conflict with another very important private interest. 14.  In December 2000 the applicant filed a request with the Data Protection Ombudsman (tietosuojavaltuutettu, dataombudsmannen) to obtain access to E.’s medical file. No decision was given by that authority before the beginning of the subsequent trial against the applicant. 15.  E.’s therapy at the hospital started in January 2001. 16.  On 15 February 2001 the police began a pre-trial investigation of the applicant during which his counsel was given the opportunity to view the video recordings of E.’s examinations by Drs S. and H. Apparently, counsel was also given copies of at least some of the documents pertaining to the case. The investigation was closed on 19 September 2001. In his final statement to the pre-trial investigation, the applicant requested that the investigating authorities acquire the totality of E.’s medical file from the hospital. His request was not complied with as the police and the public prosecutor did not regard E.’s patient records as having any influence in the matter. 17.  While the investigation was still pending, in May and June 2001, the applicant’s counsel had again asked the hospital authorities for access to those documents in E.’s medical file which were not already in the possession of the defence. The requests were refused. The applicant appealed against the decisions to the Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen). 18.  On 24 October 2001 the prosecutor brought a charge against the applicant, alleging aggravated sexual abuse of E. between March and June 2000. On 23 November 2001 the applicant submitted a written request to the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) to gain access to E.’s medical file, claiming that it was necessary for his defence. 19.  On 19 February 2002 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the hospital authorities’ refusal to grant him access to E.’s medical file (see paragraph 16 above). It stated that the examination reports requested by the applicant were not included in the trial material, and his request thus lacked legal basis. Furthermore, the court held that the applicant was entitled to obtain any medical documents given to or acquired by the District Court in the course of the criminal proceedings. Moreover, he had already been given copies of the video recordings and documents included in the pre-trial investigation material. 20.  The District Court held a preparatory hearing on 16 August 2002, in which the applicant repeated his request to obtain all of E.’s examination reports. On that date, having obtained the consent of E.’s mother, the court ordered the hospital to submit to the court the requested documents. In another preparatory hearing, held in September 2002, the applicant was finally afforded the opportunity to acquaint himself with the remainder of E.’s medical file. 21.  The main proceedings against the applicant began on 9 December 2002. The court received testimony from the applicant and 17 other persons, including Dr S., Dr H. and other doctors. A number of documents, including medical reports drawn up by the doctors treating E., were referred to in evidence. The videotaped examinations of E. were played back before the court. 22.  On 20 December 2002 the District Court acquitted the applicant of the charge, finding that there was at least reasonable doubt as to his guilt. The court noted that the examination reports obtained during the pre-trial investigation had been exceptionally important to the outcome thereof. According to the court the examinations seemed to have been based on the presumption that E. had been sexually abused by the applicant. Nevertheless, the applicant had not been afforded an opportunity to acquaint himself with E.’s medical file while the examinations at the hospital were being conducted and had only gained access to the totality of her examination reports shortly before the trial. There had thus been crucial shortcomings in the pre-trial investigation, contrary to the rights of the defence as set out in the Criminal Investigations Act (esitutkintalaki, förundersökningslag; 449/1987) and the Convention. 23.  The prosecutor and E., represented by her mother, appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). In his reply to that court, the applicant contended, inter alia, that the investigation against him had de facto been carried out by the doctors and not by the police. He had not been given an opportunity to put questions to E., even indirectly, when she had been examined at the hospital, or at any later stage of the proceedings. He had only seen the video recordings when the pre-trial investigation was already well underway. It transpired from those recordings that during the examinations E. had claimed sexual abuse not only by her father, but also by several other persons. Further, the applicant had only been given access to E.’s medical file at the beginning of the trial, which meant that he had not had adequate time to prepare his defence. 24.  The Court of Appeal held an oral hearing between 19 and 22 May 2003. The evidence presented to the court was in most part the same as had been before the District Court. As to the applicant’s involvement in the examinations, Dr S. testified that during the feedback discussion of 14 September 2000 he had asked the applicant whether he had any questions. The applicant had not indicated at that point that he wished to have any further examinations conducted. 25.  On 19 June 2003 the appellate court quashed the lower court’s judgment and convicted the applicant of aggravated sexual abuse. He was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment. The court found that E.’s account, recorded on videotape, was essential evidence, but not the sole evidence, against the applicant. In its conclusions the court emphasised E.’s behaviour, as it transpired from the video recordings, and the statements of Drs S. and H., who had examined her, and of another doctor who had treated her. This evidence was supported by three other witness testimonies regarding E.’s behaviour. The court further stated as follows:\n“Given that [E.’s] account is essential evidence supporting the charge, [the applicant] or his counsel should have been given an explicit opportunity (“olisi...selkeästi tullut varata tilaisuus”) to put questions to [E.] through the pre-trial authorities or to request further investigations. However, this opportunity has not been provided within a reasonable time nor at a stage when it would have been useful, namely before the beginning of [E.’s] therapy. The procedure has therefore been deficient in part. [Dr S.] has, however, given [the applicant] an opportunity to request further examinations. Having regard to the fact that also other evidence in addition to [E.’s] account has been presented, the Court of Appeal finds that the above-mentioned procedural error cannot lead to the dismissal of the charge. Taking into account the legal protection of the child and her state of health as well as the fact that she had already been undergoing treatment for a long time, it would not have been reasonable to follow the adversarial procedure at a later stage. Naturally, the child’s account and her behaviour, as they transpire from the video recordings, must be taken with circumspection when assessing the evidence. However, the Court of Appeal considers that the taking of evidence, assessed as a whole, meets the minimum requirements of a fair trial.” 26.  The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) contending, inter alia, that the proceedings had been unfair in the light of Article 6 of the Convention as he had been denied adversarial proceedings and the timely opportunity to acquaint himself with the totality of the case material. On 25 March 2004 he was refused leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 21 December 1993 the Public Prosecutor at the Izmir Security Court filed an indictment against four accused persons (H.N., N.S., M.Ş.Ç., A.K.) charging them under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. During their interrogation by the police and the public prosecutor, all of the accused persons stated that they had acted upon the instructions of Mr Mehmet Şerif Öner[1]. Subsequently, during the trial before the Izmir State Security Court, they denied the charges against them and retracted their previous statements. On 24 February 1998 the Izmir State Security Court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. In the judgment the court, presided by Judge G.D.C., found it established that the accused had acted upon the instructions of Mr Mehmet Şerif Öner, whose code name was “Kahraman” and who was active in the Izmir region for the illegal organisation the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan). This judgment became final on 29 July 1998. 5.  On 13 May 2002 the applicant was taken into custody in Batman on suspicion of membership of the PKK. When arrested, he was in possession of a fake identity card. 6.  On 16 May 2002 the applicant was transferred to the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Izmir Security Directorate. The same day, he was interrogated by the police in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant denied all the charges against him. He stated that he was using a fake identity card because he had escaped from prison in 1992. 7.  During his police custody, the applicant took part in an identification parade. The complainants, Mr M.Ç., Mr N.Ş. and Mr F.B., identified him as the person who had been involved in the respective armed robberies that had taken place in 1993. 8.  On 17 May 2002 the applicant was further interrogated before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge respectively, still in the absence of a lawyer. During the questionings, the applicant denied his involvement in the PKK. He explained that in the past he had been involved in an armed robbery and had been sentenced to twenty years’ prison. He stated that after his escape from prison, he started using fake identity cards. When his questioning was over, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody. 9.  On 5 June 2002 the Public Prosecutor at the Izmir State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, accusing the applicant of engaging in illegal activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory, an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. 10. During the hearing held on 3 September 2002 the applicant’s lawyer requested the President of the Court, Judge G.D.C., to withdraw from the case, stating that he had also sat as a member of the court which had delivered the judgment of 24 February 1998, in which the applicant was referred to as a member of the PKK. His request was rejected. 11.  On 15 July 2003 the Izmir State Security Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. In its judgment, the court found it established that the applicant had participated in the armed robberies as alleged and taken part in the activities carried out for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. In delivering its decision, the first instance court relied on the police statements of the four accused persons who had been convicted by the Izmir State Security Court on 24 February 1998 and the identification parade records in which the intervening parties had identified the applicant as the person who had been involved in the respective armed robberies. 12.  On 24 February 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court on the ground that the intervening parties who were eye-witnesses to the armed robberies should be summoned to the court to confront the applicant to eliminate any doubt. 13.  The case resumed before the Izmir State Security Court. In accordance with the decision of the Court of Cassation, the first instance court summoned three intervening parties to give evidence. Before the court, Mr Z.Ö. and Mr N.Ş. stated that as a long time had passed since 1993, they were no longer able to recognise the applicant. Mr M.Ç. however identified the applicant as the person who had stolen his car. As regards the remaining intervening parties, who could not be summoned to the Izmir State Security Court, rogatory courts heard evidence from them. In their statements, Mr F.A., Mr H.A. and Mr Z.A. explained that due to the long time that had elapsed they were not able to recognise the applicant. 14.  In the meantime, by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, the State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was accordingly transferred to the Izmir Assize Court. Subsequently, on 12 October 2004 the new Criminal Code (no. 5237) was published in the Official Gazette. 15.  On 10 November 2005 the Izmir Assize Court once again found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to aggravated life imprisonment under Article 302 of the new Criminal Code. Among other evidence, the court based itself on the fact that the applicant had been identified by the intervening parties during his police custody. 16.  On 9 May 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court on procedural grounds, holding that as Article 302 of the new Criminal Code provided a heavier sentence for the offence committed by the applicant, the provisions of the former criminal code should have been applied in his case. 17.  The case was once again remitted to the Izmir Assize Court, which decided on 29 December 2006 to sentence the applicant to life imprisonment under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code. On 11 March 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld this judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Kaliningrad. 7.  On 17 October 1999 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of the murder of Ms M. On 20 October 1999 an investigating officer charged the applicant and detained him in remand prison IZ-39/1 in Kaliningrad. On 20 April 2000 the Central District Court of Kaliningrad found the applicant guilty of the murder of Ms M. The applicant was sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment. On 22 August 2000 the Kaliningrad Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 8.  The applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-39/1 from 20 October 1999 to 20 September 2000. 9.  On his admission, he was put in a quarantine cell occupied by young offenders, some of whom had already been convicted. This cell measured12-13 square metres and housed fourteen to sixteen prisoners. Of the eight available bunk beds, only six had bedding. The applicant was only able to sleep for three to four hours a day. The window was covered with metal shutters that let through neither light nor fresh air. The air inside was stuffy, the walls were damp. A 60-watt ceiling light stayed on day and night: too dim to read by, too bright to sleep under. The toilet had no flush or ventilation. It stood above the floor exposed to onlookers. Several prisoners had lice, tuberculosis or syphilis. The cell swarmed with cockroaches, bed bugs, ants and rats. Cleaning of the toilet was limited to sprinkling it with bleach. 10.  After about a week, the prison administration moved the applicant to a cell meant for former policemen. This cell was located in the basement and measured seven square metres. It housed between eight and nineteen prisoners, even though there were only six bunk beds. The prisoners had to sleep in shifts of three to four hours a day. The window was covered with a metal shutter in which there were 1 cm holes; too small to let through either light or fresh air. There was no ventilation. The walls had a thick, dirty, wet concrete coating. A weak filament light stayed on day and night. In one corner of the cell, there was a toilet – a concrete cube raised above the floor. The toilet was not partitioned off from the cell, offered no privacy, and lacked a flush. Above it, there was a service water tap used for washing. The dining table stood one metre away from the toilet. The cell swarmed with cockroaches, bed bugs and ants. 11.  In both cells, the applicant had to share bunk beds, and had no bedding, or toiletries. A fifteen-minute shower was available once every fortnight. Because the cells were constantly overcrowded, and because many prisoners smoked, the applicant remained immobile in the stuffy air for long periods of time. Relief came from outside walks, but they were rare and short (thirty to forty minutes a day), and the yard was also overcrowded (seven to fourteen people in seven to eight square metres). There was no drinking water in the cells. The food was cold, tasteless and slovenly served. During his stay in the prison the applicant, who usually weighed sixty kilograms, lost ten kilograms in weight. 12.  Along with his own description, the applicant submitted three witness statements by persons who had been detained in the prison at about the same time as him. Mr A. K. was detained in the prison from December 1998 to August 2000 and confirmed the applicant's description of the prison. Mr M. T. was detained in the prison from February 1996 to October 1999. He confirmed the applicant's description of the prison and added that the bunk beds in the cells were crudely made of sharp metal rods which caused injuries to the prisoners. Mr Y. V. was detained in the prison from August 1999 to May 2000 and confirmed the applicant's description of the prison. 13.  During his detention in the prison the applicant, as a former policeman, was detained in two cells for former policemen. These cells measured 13.6 and 7.8 square metres. The prison administration provided the applicant with a bunk bed, bedding, and dishes. The cells were in a satisfactory sanitary condition, no prisoners had lice, tuberculosis, or other infectious diseases. The cells had central heating, running water, sewage, natural and artificial light, natural ventilation, two-storey beds, toilets and sinks. The average temperature in winter was 18oC, the average amount of light was 75-100 lux. The prison administration systematically disinfected the cells. Food met statutory requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1938 and the third applicant in 1963. They all live in Karlovac. 6.  On 1 April 1993 the first and the second applicants’ daughter, who was the third applicant’s sister, was killed in a bar by Z.R., who at the time served as a soldier in the Croatian army. 7.  By a judgment of the Karlovac Military Court (Vojni sud u Karlovcu) Z.R. was found guilty of murder and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. 8.  On appeal, the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 17 February 1994 upheld the conviction, which thereby became final, but increased the sentence to nine years’ imprisonment. 9.  On 15 January 1998 the applicants submitted a request to the State Attorney’s Office for their claim for damages to be settled in connection with the unlawful killing of their relative by a soldier, as required under the Military Service Act, in force at the material time (see paragraph 26 below). 10.  On 5 March 1998, after their request was refused, the applicants brought a civil action in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu), seeking compensation from the State and Z.R. in connection with the killing of their relative. 11.  During the proceedings, the State Attorney’s Office raised a number of substantive and procedural objections to the applicants’ claim against the State. 12.  Meanwhile, on 4 October 1999 the applicants withdrew their civil action against Z.R. but maintained their action against the State. 13.  Owing to the failure of the applicants’ representative to appear at several hearings, of which the first applicant was informed, on 14 March 2003 the Zagreb Municipal Court found that the civil action was considered to have been withdrawn (see paragraph 24 below; section 216 § 4 of the Civil Procedure Act). 14.  As no appeal was lodged by the parties, on an unspecified date this decision became final. The applicants later in 2005 attempted to have the statement of finality quashed and to lodge a belated appeal, but this was dismissed by the competent court. 15.  On 9 May 2005 the applicants brought their claim for damages before the Karlovac Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Karlovcu), which meanwhile had acquired competence to hear the case, against the State and Z.R. related to the killing of their family member. 16.  During the proceedings, the State Attorney’s Office challenged the applicants’ claim on several procedural grounds, arguing in particular that they had failed to seek to have their claim against the State settled before lodging their civil action, as required under the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 24 below). 17.  On 17 March 2010 the Karlovac Municipal Court declared the applicants’ civil action against the State inadmissible, on the grounds that before they lodged their civil action the applicants had failed to attempt to have the case settled with the competent State Attorney’s Office, as required under the relevant domestic law. 18.  The applicants challenged the decision of the Karlovac Municipal Court by lodging an appeal before the Karlovac County Court. On 29 July 2010 the Karlovac County Court dismissed their appeal, holding as follows:\n“Section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act (Official Gazette, nos. 117/2003 and 88/2005) provides that a person intending to bring a civil suit against the Republic of Croatia must first submit a request for a settlement to the competent State Attorney’s Office. When there is no doubt that before lodging the civil claim the claimant has failed to settle the case with the competent State Attorney’s Office, the first-instance court is correct to declare such a claim lodged directly before it inadmissible (VS Rev-1124/056 of 14 March 2007).\nThe duty to seek settlement with the State Attorney’s Office is a procedural requirement for lodging a civil action which must be complied with at the moment when the action is lodged.\nSection 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act is inapplicable to claims for damages lodged before the courts prior to 1 December 2003.\nIt is not in dispute that the plaintiffs on 5 March 1998 lodged an identical claim against the same defendants before the Zagreb Municipal Court ... It is also not disputed that on 14 March 2003, after the conditions for the stay of proceedings had been met twice, a decision was adopted finding that the claim against the first defendant, the Republic of Croatia, was withdrawn.\nHowever, these undisputed facts do not mean that the plaintiffs were released from their obligation under section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act because they had previously submitted an identical claim. With the amendments to the Civil Procedure Act (Official Gazette no. 117/2003) the duty to seek settlement with the State Attorney’s Office is a procedural requirement for lodging a civil action which must be complied with at the moment when the action is lodged. Further amendments to the Civil Procedure Act (Official Gazette nos. 84/2008 and 123/2008) did not [alter this obligation] with regard to the actions against the Republic of Croatia.” 19.  On 27 October 2010 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court, challenging the decision of the Karlovac County Court on the grounds that it unreasonably restricted their right to access to court. They argued that before they brought their civil action of 5 March 1998 before the Zagreb Municipal Court they had attempted to settle the matter with the State Attorney’s Office. However, their request had been refused, and later during the proceedings the State Attorney’s Office had also challenged their claim in the court. The applicants therefore considered that there was no reason to seek another settlement concerning the identical claim brought before the court after it was decided that it had been withdrawn. 20.  The applicants also lodged a constitutional complaint before the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) on 5 November 2010, reiterating their above arguments. 21.  On 23 March 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicants’ constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the decisions of the lower courts did not concern individual acts deciding on their civil rights and obligations. 22.  On 3 April 2013 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on points of law, endorsing the reasoning of the Karlovac County Court that the applicants had been obliged to seek settlement with the State Attorney’s Office before lodging their action of 9 May 2005. The Supreme Court pointed out:\n“It should be noted that the procedural requirement for the admissibility of an action under section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act, and the reliance of the lower courts on that provision, do not represent a violation of a plaintiff’s right of access to court. This is because the plaintiff, by complying with that provision, does not lose any of their rights to claim [damages] since, for example, the lodging of a request for settlement interrupts the running of the statutory prescription period ([Article 186(a)] § 3) and the plaintiff may lodge an action in the court if the State Attorney’s Office refuses the request [for settlement] or does not decide on it within three months of the date it was lodged ([Article 186(a)] § 5).\nIt cannot therefore be said that the obligation of the plaintiffs to seek settlement of the claim with the State Attorney’s Office before lodging an action against the Republic of Croatia represents an unreasonable restriction of access to a competent court which can decide the case on the merits as required under Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Official Gazette-International Contracts, nos. 18/1997, 6/1999-consolidated text, 8/1999-rectification, 14/2002 and 1/2006). This is because section 186 of the Civil Procedure Act neither impaired the right to lodge a civil action nor the right to have the case decided on the merits ... (see the European Court of Human Rights in Ačimović v. Croatia of 9 October 2003 and Kutić v. Croatia of 1 March 2002).”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Kardzhali. 5.  On 17 September 1999 the applicant, who worked as a foreman in a mine, was dismissed for a violation of the discipline. On 27 September 1999 he brought proceedings against his employer, claiming that his dismissal was unlawful and seeking reinstatement to work and compensation. 6.  The hearing on 1 December 1999 of the Kardzhali District Court was postponed for gathering of evidence. On 1 March and 26 April 2000 the court instructed the applicant to correct certain flaws in his statement of claim. From 7 June to 5 July 2000 it conducted three other hearings and on the latter date postponed the hearing to 20 September 2000 for questioning of witnesses. The applicant made a complaint about delays. On 13 July 2000 the Kardzhali Regional Court established that the District Court had postponed the hearing of the case on a number of occasions for gathering of evidence. It noted that the District Court could have been more diligent in conducting the case in view of the nature of the claim. For example, it could have imposed fines on the parties for not submitting their requests in due course. It instructed the District Court to conduct the next hearing within one month as from the date on which the case file would be returned to it. 7.  In compliance with the instructions, the District Court rescheduled the next hearing for 2 August 2000. On 7 August 2000 it held the last hearing and dismissed the claim. It held that the applicant had breached his duties as a foreman because during the night shift on 27 August 1999 he had exempted one of his subordinates from work without reporting his absence. The applicant appealed. 8.  The Regional Court held two hearings and on 1 February 2001 quashed the judgment of 7 August 2000 and granted the applicant’s claim. It held that the procedural requirements for requesting explanations from the applicant had not been met by his employer. The latter appealed. 9.  On 18 March 2002 the Supreme Court of Cassation conducted a hearing. In a judgment of 15 April 2002 it quashed the judgment of 1 February 2001. It held that the applicant’s employer had met the procedural requirements for taking explanations from the applicant. 10.  On 17 May 2002 the Regional Court held a hearing. The applicant requested the assignment of an expert report. The hearings on 21 June and 13 September 2002 were postponed because the appointed experts had failed to submit their reports. Between 25 October and 6 December 2002 it conducted three other hearings and on 3 February 2003 dismissed the claim. It held that the applicant had exempted a worker from the night shift without reporting his absence, and thus had breached his duties of a foreman and had abused the confidence of his employer. The applicant appealed. 11.  The Supreme Court of Cassation conducted a hearing on 2 June 2005 and in a final judgment of 19 September 2005 upheld the judgment of 3 February 2003. It fully endorsed the findings of the Regional Court. 12.  On two occasions in 2000 and 2002 the applicant complained to the president of the Kardzhali Regional Court and the Ministry of Justice that the examination of his case was delayed. In letters of 23 March 2000 and 20 November 2002 the president of the Regional Court informed the applicant that he had not established any unreasonable delays in the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lived in Odessa. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Ukraine. 6.  In summer 2002 the applicant, who was the president of the Odessa Komsomol (Young Communist League) at the material time, unsuccessfully ran for the Odessa Regional Council. According to him, following the election campaign, the State Security Service of Ukraine (“SSU”) put in place secret surveillance measures against him. 7.  On 15 December 2002 the SSU arrested the applicant in Odessa on suspicion of having organised a criminal group formed of Komsomol members and having planned and directed several violent crimes committed by its members. 8.  On 16 December 2002 the applicant was taken for questioning to Mykolayiv, where several other individuals implicated in membership of the same group had been arrested and detained some time before. 9.  On the afternoon of 16 December 2002 the applicant signed a notice that he had been informed of his rights as a suspect and expressed the wish to have a lawyer. On the same date the applicant was appointed a legal-aid lawyer, A.S. In his presence, the applicant terminated the appointment and stated that he agreed to be questioned without a lawyer, until his wife hired one privately. 10.  On the same date the applicant was questioned and acknowledged his affiliation with the communist party and the Komsomol, a number of whose activists named by the investigator he knew in person. At the same time, the applicant denied having taken part or having been aware of any criminal activity by these individuals. The record of the applicant’s questioning was preceded by his signature, which was underneath a note summarising his rights as a suspect and stating that he had given his consent to take part in the questioning session without legal representation. 11.  On the same date the applicant was placed in Mykolayiv temporary detention centre (ITT), which, according to him, had unsuitable living conditions. The applicant was subsequently remanded in custody and transferred to Mykolayiv pre-trial detention centre (SIZO). 12.  On 17 December 2002 a confrontation was conducted between the applicant and A., one of the individuals implicated in membership of the applicant’s criminal group. The record of the confrontation notes that before the questioning, the investigator informed the parties of their procedural rights and asked the applicant whether, regard being had to the fact that he had no legal representation, he agreed to take part in the confrontation. The applicant expressed his willingness to take part in the confrontation, stating that he felt capable of representing himself at that point. Following this introduction, A., who was represented by a lawyer, testified that the applicant had planned and organised several robberies, in which A. and some other individuals from the Komsomol had been involved. Having heard A.’s statement, the applicant refused to take any further part in the confrontation without a lawyer and the confrontation was discontinued. 13.  On 21 December 2002 lawyer A.A., hired by the applicant’s spouse, was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant’s representative. 14.  On 25 December 2002 the applicant was indicted on a number of charges including organising and directing a terrorist group with a view to re-establishing a communist state by violent means and being in charge of several robberies (“expropriations”) committed in order to raise funds for the group. Following his indictment, the applicant was questioned in A.A.’s presence. During questioning, the applicant reiterated his previous position and denied involvement in any criminal activity. Asked whether he had been subjected to any psychological or physical ill-treatment by the investigative authority, the applicant stated that he had not been subjected to any ill-treatment. 15.  On 21 February 2003 the applicant terminated A.A.’s appointment, as the further investigation of his case had been transferred to the Odessa branch of the SSU, whereas A.A. practiced in Mykolayiv. 16.  On 3 March 2003 the applicant was transported to Odessa no. 21 pre-trial detention facility (“the Odessa SIZO”), where he was detained until November 2005. 17.  On 19 March 2003 the applicant was further questioned as a criminal defendant. Before the questioning session began, he signed a waiver of his right to legal representation, having indicated that he was capable of defending his own interests. During questioning, the applicant refused to answer any questions, referring to his constitutional right to remain silent. Questioned several more times in spring 2003, the applicant signed further waivers of his right to legal representation and chose to remain silent. 18.  On 18 April 2003, referring to his ability to represent his own interests, the applicant refused to accept the appointment of legal-aid lawyers D. and R., who had been selected by the authorities, and asked for no further legal-aid lawyers to be appointed during the investigation stage. 19.  On 21 May 2003 lawyer A. K., engaged by the applicant’s wife, was admitted to the proceedings as the applicant’s new representative. The applicant, questioned in her presence, refused to testify and chose to remain silent. 20.  On 27 May 2003 the investigation was finished and the applicant, along with ten other individuals implicated in membership of the same criminal group, was committed to stand trial before the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal (“Regional Court”), acting as a first-instance court. 21.  On 24 July 2003 the applicant and his lawyer A.K. both signed an affidavit that they had familiarised themselves with the forty-four volume case file. 22.  In the beginning of September 2003 the Regional Court held a preparatory hearing in the applicant’s case and allowed requests made by the applicant’s co-defendants R., S. and D. for additional time to study the case-file materials. 23.  On 3 September 2003 the applicant’s spouse terminated A. K.’s appointment, referring to financial difficulties, and the applicant asked the court to appoint a lawyer to represent him. 24.  At the next court hearing (on 24 September 2003) the Regional Court appointed O.K. as the applicant’s new lawyer and granted her time to study the case file. On the same date the court rejected the applicant’s request for additional time to study the case file, referring, in particular, to his affidavit that he had studied it in full, to his failure to lodge this request before the beginning of the trial, and to the fact that the applicant would be able to seek to have case-file documents that were to be examined at a particular hearing read out in full or in part by the court before their examination. 25.  On an unspecified date the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request to appoint his father, who was not a lawyer, as his lay defender, referring to a conflict of interests that would arise if this was allowed. In particular, the applicant’s father had been summoned for questioning as a witness in the case. According to the applicant, his father was never questioned in the end and never even received an official summons. 26.  On 17 November 2003 the applicant’s lawyer, O.K., did not attend the hearing. 27.  On 24, 25 and 26 November 2003 the applicant asked for O.K. to be excluded from the proceedings, alleging that she had been passive in representing his interests, had not been supportive of his chosen defence strategy, and that he would prefer to be represented by a privately-funded lawyer. On 26 November 2003 the applicant’s request was allowed and he was given until 1 December 2003 to engage a privately-funded lawyer. 28.  On 1 December 2003, the applicant still not having engaged a privately-funded lawyer, the court appointed A.B. as his new legal-aid lawyer. 29.  On 26 January 2004 the applicant sought the replacement of his court-appointed lawyer A.B. with O.K., who had previously represented him as a court-appointed lawyer but who had now been privately engaged by his wife. This request was allowed and O.K. represented the applicant until the end of the trial. 30.  During the trial, the applicant acknowledged that he had supported communist ideas and had taken part in publishing and distributing propaganda. However, he denied having been involved in any violent crimes. The applicant also complained that the investigative authorities had subjected his co-defendants and himself to ill-treatment with a view to breaking their moral resistance. In particular, upon the applicant’s arrest in December 2002, the officers had threatened him with physical ill-treatment and had made inappropriate remarks concerning his wife and family life. He had also been transported to Mykolayiv lying handcuffed on the floor of the prison van and blindfolded with a dark hat, which had made him suffocate and caused him to suffer a heart attack. 31.  After the death of B., one of the applicant’s co-defendants, during the trial proceedings, the applicant and his co-defendants demanded an investigation into the circumstances of his death, alleging that it had resulted from torture and that they had also been subjected to ill-treatment at the investigation stage. Following the investigation, the prosecutor’s office reported to the Regional Court that B. had died of cancer and there had been no evidence of ill-treatment of the other co-defendants. 32.  According to the applicant, it was very difficult for him to concentrate during the trial. In particular, his health was adversely affected by the conditions of his detention and the lack of medical assistance for his heart problems available to him in Odessa SIZO. 33.  He noted, in particular, that between March and November 2003 he was detained in cell no. 187 in block 2 of Odessa SIZO, which was about eight square metres in size, had four beds and, at the time of his arrival, accommodated five detainees. The sanitary facilities were not separated from the living quarters. The wardens thwarted all the inmates’ attempts to gain some privacy by separating them with a curtain. The applicant’s inmates were repeat offenders. Some of them suffered from contagious diseases, such as HIV and tuberculosis. The administration ignored the applicant’s demands to be moved, as a healthy person with no criminal record, to a different cell. In November 2003 the applicant was relocated to a different cell, which was very similar in terms of physical and sanitary conditions. In addition, access to bathing facilities was very irregular. Furthermore, on various occasions the detainees were arbitrarily and brutally searched and beaten by special detachments of the armed forces. 34.  The applicant further noted that he suffered from hypertension, vegetative-vascular dystonia, coronary artery disease and arrhythmia, for which he received no proper care in Odessa SIZO. The applicant’s family sent him medicines, which on some occasions were unreasonably withheld. 35.  The applicant also submitted that on court days he and his co-defendants were routinely taken out of their cells at about 6 a.m. and placed with some 20-30 other inmates scheduled to be transported on that day in a special transit box, which measured some 15-20 square metres, had no windows and no heating. In such conditions the applicant and his co-defendants had to wait several hours for a prison van to come. Upon their return from court, they also routinely had to wait for several hours in the same holding area before being escorted to their regular cells. As a result, they missed meal time and were often left hungry. The “packed lunches” provided to them consisted solely of bread. Sometimes hot lunches were made available at court, but their provision was irregular. 36.  The applicant also maintained that he had raised complaints about these issues in court, but to no avail. He presented unofficial copies of court transcripts, according to which on 22 December 2003 the applicant asked for a hearing to be adjourned as he felt unwell. On 9 January 2004 the applicant asked for a medical appointment in a cardiology clinic. On 10 January 2004 he complained in court that on that day the convoy officers had made the defendants run, while handcuffed and bent over, up to the courtroom located on the sixth floor and had beaten his co-defendant P., who had stumbled and fallen. On 3 February 2004 the applicant complained that he was only allowed to have one-hour daily outdoor walks, while his heart conditions called for him to walk for two hours a day. On 12 February 2004 the applicant asked the court to investigate the conditions of detention in Odessa SIZO, alleging that his and his co-defendants’ health had been deteriorating. On 15 April 2004 the applicant complained to the Regional Court that on 14 April 2004 he and his co-defendants had been taken out of their cells at 8 a.m. and they had been held in the transit box, which had been cold, until 2 p.m. without lunch. Finally on 16 April 2004 the applicant supported a complaint lodged by his co-defendant S., according to whom on the preceding day he and his co-defendants had had to spend five hours in the cold transit box. As can be seen from the same transcript, the presiding judge advised the applicant and S. to address their complaints to the SIZO governor, which advice they rejected as futile. 37.  According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were sufficient to meet his basic needs and compatible with his state of health. While the records enabling the identification of the applicant’s inmates and their health status had not been preserved, inmates suffering from contagious diseases were segregated from other detainees in accordance with the applicable rules. The Government provided numbers of various cells in which the applicant was held throughout his time in Odessa SIZO and indicated that these cells measured from 7.6 to 8.5 square metres and were designed to accommodate four inmates each and had not been overcrowded. They were equipped with windows giving sufficient access to natural light, had functioning sanitary facilities, tap water, heating, electric light and ventilation. Detainees were provided with three meals per day, one-hour daily walks and weekly access to bathing facilities. 38.  The Government further maintained that the applicant’s state of health had been regularly monitored by the SIZO medical staff on account of his pre-existing conditions (hypertension, vegetative-vascular dystonia, coronary artery disease and arrhythmia). In December 2003 the applicant underwent inpatient treatment in the SIZO medical unit for his premature ventricular contractions (arrhythmia). In addition, on several occasions the applicant also had consultations with civilian specialist doctors. In particular, on 15 January 2004, following the applicant’s request for a consultation with a civilian cardiologist, he was examined by the Odessa Emergency Clinic’s cardiologist, who confirmed his previous diagnoses and gave recommendations as to his further outpatient treatment, which was administered in the SIZO. In March 2004 the applicant underwent a medical assessment by a panel of civilian doctors and was certified to be in satisfactory health and fit for detention and trial. The Government presented a copy of a medical certificate, according to which on 12 March 2004 the applicant had been examined by an ophthalmologist, a urologist, a physician, a pulmonologist, a cardiologist and a neurologist from the Odessa Regional Hospital. 39.  The Government also maintained that the applicant and his co-defendants had always been promptly transported to and from the courthouse and had received breakfast and dinner in the SIZO. They had also been provided with either a packed lunch or hot lunch delivered to the court on hearing days. The catering had been organised by officer K., and, while copies of the available menus had not been kept, there was no record of any irregularity in the catering arrangements, which had been regulated by law. 40.  The Government also maintained that there was no record of any complaints by the applicant or his co-defendants, either with the SIZO administration or with the Odessa Prosecutor’s Office, concerning the conditions of their detention, transportation, catering or medical treatment. They presented affidavits by the Odessa SIZO governor and on behalf of the Odessa Prosecutor’s Office in this respect. 41.  On 19 July 2004 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of propagating a violent revolt against the constitutional order and attempting to undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine; organising and running a criminal group; participating in a terrorist act (detonation of an explosive in a rubbish bin near the SSU headquarters in Kyiv); smuggling goods across the Russian border; unlawful handling of firearms and explosives; several armed robberies; and engagement of a minor in criminal activity. The applicant was sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment. The court also dismissed allegations of ill-treatment raised in respect of the applicant and some of his co-defendants as unsubstantiated. Finally, it noted that, insofar as the complaints of inadequate medical assistance in Odessa SIZO were concerned, the applicant had been examined by civilian medical specialists in March 2004 and had been found to be in a satisfactory state of health and fit to take part in the court proceedings. 42.  On 18 August 2004 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal against this judgment. In his statement of appeal, the applicant reiterated his innocence and his allegations of ill-treatment advanced during the trial. He also reiterated that no medical assistance necessitated by his chronic conditions had been made available to him in Odessa SIZO and that the conditions of his and his co-defendants’ transport to the court premises had been inhuman. In this respect he noted that on 10 January 2004 the convoy had made him and his co-defendants run to the sixth-floor courtroom while handcuffed and bent over and that on 10 March 2004 the detainees had been arbitrarily held in the prison van for an extra two hours on the way back to the SIZO. The applicant further complained in his cassation appeal of a breach of his right to mount a defence. He noted in this respect that he had not been provided with a lawyer upon his arrest; his request to have his father appointed as his lay defender had been rejected; and his lawyer O.K. had not attended the hearing of 17 November 2003. Finally, the applicant complained that his right to have sufficient time and facilities for the preparation of his defence had been breached, as the Regional Court had rejected his request for an extension of time in which to study the case-file materials in preparation for the trial. The applicant also mentioned that he was intending to supplement his statement of appeal with further submissions. No copies of any such submissions were provided to the Court. 43.  On 26 July 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine re-qualified the applicant’s conviction for smuggling as aiding and abetting smuggling and otherwise upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. The conviction for distribution of propaganda and attempting to undermine the territorial integrity of Ukraine was not reviewed, as the applicant had not lodged an appeal against it. In its decision, the Supreme Court noted, in particular, that the evidence of the applicant’s guilt included the testimony of his co-defendants and victims of his crimes given during the trial and that there was no evidence that any statements obtained during the pre-trial investigation had been extracted through ill-treatment or in breach of the applicant’s or his co-defendants’ right to mount a defence. Finally, it noted that the Regional Court had properly rejected the applicant’s request for further time in which to study the case-file materials, as it was unsubstantiated. 44.  In November 2005 the applicant was transferred to Sokyriany no. 67 Correctional Colony (“Sokyriany Colony”) to serve his sentence. 45.  In February 2009 the applicant’s lawyer, based in Moscow, Russia, asked the Regional Court to send him a number of documents from the applicant’s case file by post. 46.  On 25 June 2009 the court denied this request, noting, in particular, that it had no facilities with which to prepare and send the copies and that the lawyer could study the case file on the court’s premises. 47.  Between 17 June and 2 August 2005 the applicant was detained in Kyiv pre-trial detention facility (“Kyiv SIZO”) awaiting the review of his conviction in the cassation proceedings. 48.  According to the applicant, the conditions of his detention were detrimental to his health and incompatible with human dignity. In particular, the facility was extremely overcrowded. A cell which contained eleven sleeping places was occupied by twenty-two inmates. The window was covered with metal shutters, barely letting in air and light. The electric light provided in the evenings was so dim that reading or writing could hurt the eyes. The sanitary facilities were not separated from the living quarters. The cell was not ventilated, the metal shutters overheated and the temperature often reached forty degrees. The air, mattresses and pillows were very damp. The provision and change of bedding was irregular. During the one-and-a-half months in which he was held there, the applicant only once had access to the bathing facility. He also received no medical help for his heart problems, which were bothering him because of the unsuitable physical conditions of his detention. 49.  According to the Government, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were reasonably adapted to his needs. The applicant stayed in cells nos. 101, 103 and 110, measuring 60.9 square metres, 31.4 square metres and 9.7 square metres respectively. At the material time cell 101, which was designed to accommodate thirty-eight inmates, was occupied by thirty-four; cell 103, which was designed to accommodate twenty inmates, was occupied by fourteen; and cell 110, which was designed for four inmates, was filled to its capacity. All of the cells were equipped with windows letting in natural light and fresh air, sanitary facilities, sinks, artificial ventilation, refrigerators and televisions. The average temperature in the cells was 20-23 degrees Celsius. The detainees were supplied with soap and bedding, which was regularly changed, and could also buy toiletries in the SIZO shop, if they so wished. They were also provided with three meals a day, and were allowed daily one-hour walks and weekly access to the bathing facility. 50.  On 7 November 2005 the applicant was transferred to Sokyriany Colony, where he served his sentence until July 2006. 51.  According to the applicant, upon his arrival on 7 November 2005 and until 15 November 2005 he was detained in the intake area (quarantine cell), which was very damp and unheated. His warm civilian clothes were seized and he was provided with a prison uniform in a size too small for him. This was not remedied until December 2005, when his mother brought warm clothes, which he was allowed to keep. During his mother’s visit, the applicant was allowed to stay with her in the colony’s visitor hostel, which was also barely heated. On various occasions the administration blocked or delayed the applicant’s correspondence and the delivery of communist newspapers to which the applicant subscribed. The applicant was not provided with appropriate medical care and treatment. In addition, the colony administration exerted arbitrary psychological pressure on him by subjecting him to special supervision (for example, the administration placed his bed by the entrance door to the cell in order to be able to supervise him more effectively). 52.  According to the applicant, he and his mother (on his behalf) brought the aforementioned matters to the attention of the colony administration and the prosecutor’s office. However, their complaints were either not dispatched, ignored, or poorly investigated into. 53.  As is evident from the case file, in 2006 the applicant’s mother lodged several complaints with various authorities, in which she referred to irregularities in the colony postal unit’s handling of the applicant’s correspondence and periodical subscriptions, a prohibition on the detainees keeping sugar in the cells, the poor heating of the colony’s visitor hostel and the disappearance of 200 hryvnias (UAH) transferred by her to the applicant’s account. 54.  On 31 March and 25 May 2006 the Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor’s Office acknowledged certain irregularities in the operation of the colony’s postal unit in their responses to the applicant’s mother and notified her that disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against the officer responsible, while the colony governor had been instructed to improve the oversight of the postal service operation. They further noted that the detainees were forbidden to keep sugar in the cells to prevent alcohol production by them and that in winter 2006 the visitor accommodation had been equipped with movable radiators. Finally, they assured the applicant’s mother that the money purportedly lost had been duly credited to the applicant’s account. 55.  On 6 June 2006 the applicant’s mother wrote a letter to the Chernivtsi Prosecutor’s Office acknowledging an improvement in the delivery of the applicant’s correspondence and thanking them for their intervention. 56.  In June 2006 the applicant’s mother complained on the applicant’s behalf of deterioration in his health. 57.  On 11 July 2006 the applicant lodged a declaration with the colony governor, according to which he had developed skin and liver problems in spring 2006, but stating that he was now satisfied with the treatment he was receiving and had no further requests in this respect or complaints against colony medical staff. 58.  In summer 2006 the applicant was transferred to Torez no. 28 Correctional Colony in the Donetsk Region (“Torez Colony”), which operated under a lower-security regime, to continue serving his sentence. 59.  Having left Sokyriany Colony on 18 July, the applicant arrived in the Torez Colony in September 2006. 60.  According to the applicant, the conditions of his transport were incompatible with his state of health and with human dignity. Long distances were covered in prison trains and shorter ones in prison vans. The transit took several months because he was made to join various groups of prisoners making various shorter connections. The prison train carriages had compartments designed for four to six passengers, which were occupied by eleven or more detainees and their belongings. The overcrowded compartments were not ventilated and in the summer heat (above 30 degrees Celsius) the metal carriages overheated, making it hard to breathe. Reaching a destination took very long time, as upon arrival at an intermediate stop the cars often waited for hours for additional prisoners to be brought to the station or for a new locomotive to be connected to the train. A distance that would be covered in four hours in a regular train could take twenty-four hours or more. The guards escorted the detainees to the bathroom only once every four hours and there was no opportunity to go otherwise. The conditions of transport in the vans were also very uncomfortable. The vans had no windows and largely no ventilation. On many occasions they also took long stops and became overheated in the summer sun, aggravating the symptoms of the applicant’s heart and vascular problems and causing him to suffer intolerably. 61.  The applicant further maintained that the physical conditions in the detention facilities which accommodated him as a detainee in transit between various train and van rides were likewise not suitable for habitation. For instance, the cell in Lviv SIZO had a window facing the inner corridor with no access to natural light. Cell no. 1607 in Donetsk SIZO was located in the basement. It was damp with water dripping from the ceiling and walls covered in mould. Both facilities were heavily overcrowded, with detainees taking turns to sleep, were poorly lit, ventilated and infested with insects. The sanitary facilities in them were not separated from the living quarters. 62.  In addition to the poor physical conditions of detention and transport, the detainees in transit were also subjected to cruel and arbitrary practices by the convoy officers and prison guards. In particular, upon arrival and before departure they often had to spend an hour or so in overcrowded holding areas sitting in squat positions with their hands behind their heads. Guards also often made detainees assume a squat or other unnatural positions when moving somewhere, shouted, insulted, pushed and beat the prisoners, and performed unnecessary and degrading searches. The status of a prisoner in transit not having been sufficiently addressed in law and regulations, the administrative practice was not to provide them with bedding, not to segregate inmates sick with contagious diseases, and deny appropriate medical assistance or any communication with the outside world, including correspondence and visits. 63.  According to the Government, the travel journals containing the particulars of the conditions of the applicant’s transit had been destroyed. However, they asserted that the conditions of the applicant’s transport and detention in transit points had been reasonably adapted to meeting his needs. Prison train carriages were designed to accommodate up to eighty people. They contained large compartments measuring three and a half square metres designed to accommodate twelve people and smaller compartments of two and a half square metres designed to accommodate five people. It was permissible to put sixteen and six people in large and smaller compartments respectively during trips that took less than four hours. All train cars were supplied with artificial ventilation and it was also possible to open a window. Prison vans measured eight square metres inside and were designed to accommodate twenty-two people in three compartments (two larger ones designed for ten passengers each and one small compartment for two passengers). The vans had no windows, but they were equipped with vents and benches for sitting on. 64.  Upon the applicant’s arrival at Torez Colony in September 2006, his medical file was found to be missing. 65.  On 29 September 2006 the applicant’s mother complained to the Sokyriany District Prosecutor’s Office concerning the Sokyriany Colony’s administration’s decision to allow the applicant’s transfer in the summer heat and its failure to include his medical file in his travel documents. 66.  On 1 November 2006 the prosecutor’s office notified the applicant’s mother that according to Sokyriany Colony’s records, the applicant’s medical file had been properly handed over to the convoy officers escorting him out of the colony.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 6.  On 17 January 2005 the applicant was detained on suspicion of having committed a robbery. 7.  By decision of 11 March 2005 the court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 22 March 2005. According to the applicant, his pre‑trial detention continued on 23 March 2005 since the investigator sent his criminal case to the court with a one day delay. 8.  On 25 April 2005 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to nine years of imprisonment. The applicant appealed. 9.  By decision of 22 July 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court upheld the judgment with certain modifications. 10.  The applicant subsequently lodged a request with a court to initiate supervisory review proceedings in his case. On an unspecified date the applicant’s request was granted. 11.  On 22 November 2006 the Presidium of Chelyabinsk Regional Court amended the judgment and reduced the applicant’s sentence to eight years and six months of imprisonment. 12.  During the trial the applicant was transported to the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk to take part in the examination of his criminal case. 13.  While waiting for hearings in the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk the applicant was put in a convoy cell, a barred room measuring approximately 4 sq. metres with one bench. According to the applicant, he was usually kept in the convoy cell with six other accused. On 29 June 2005 as many as nine accused were kept in the convoy cell. The cell did not have a toilet and the detainees were taken to the toilet on the wardens’ orders. Though the accused leaving for a court were provided with a packed lunch, no hot meal or hot water was distributed. The accused were not allowed to smoke. 14.  The applicant did not provide any detailed information as to how many times and how long he had been detained in the convoy cell. 15.  He stated that the average time spent in the convoy cell by an accused was 4-5 hours a day. 16.  On 30 June and 18 July 2005 the applicant complained to the court and the Head of the Court’s Convoy Service about the conditions of detention in the convoy cell. 17.  By letter of 28 July 2005 the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk replied to the applicant’s complaint. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows:\n“... on 29 June 2005 twenty accused were brought to the court’s convoy cells, the cells were filled up to the limit because according to the Order no. 41 ... the following categories of individuals should be detained separately: men and women, minors and adults, individuals with previous criminal record and first time accused, suspects and convicted, suspects and accused in one case.\nAccording to the Federal Law ... smoking is prohibited in all premises of the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, including the convoy cell.” 18.  By letter of 9 August 2005 the Head of the Court’s Convoy Service replied to the applicant’s complaint. The relevant part of the letter reads as follows:\n“On 29 June 2005 the convoy staff was obliged to seat the accused brought to the court according to the rules in force, thus 9 individuals were put together in one of the convoy cells.\nAccording to the Federal Law ... smoking is prohibited in all premises of the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, including the convoy cell.” 19.  On 25 July 2005 the applicant asked the prosecutor to institute criminal proceedings against the wardens of the courthouse. The prosecutor ignored the applicant’s motion and the applicant challenged his inaction in court. By decision of 18 October 2005 the Chelyabinsk Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint in the final instance. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“The court’s conclusion that there are no grounds to record the applicant’s complaint under Article 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and to adopt a procedural decision under Article 145 of CCP correlates with the factual circumstances of the case. It follows from the applicant’s statement of appeal ... that he complained of the conditions of the detention in the convoy cell of the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk, namely the smoking ban and the overcrowding of the cells. The complaint does not contain any information on committed crimes and does not require institution of criminal proceedings. These circumstances were established during the court hearing and confirmed by the record of the hearing. For the reasons mentioned above the court of first instance reasonably dismissed the applicant’s complaint.” 20.  The Government submitted that the courthouse convoy premises measuring 50 sq. metres in total had four cells, 4 sq. metres each. They had adequate ventilation and lighting, the entrance was secured by metal grill doors. Each cell was equipped with one bench. The cells did not have sanitary facilities, but the convoy premises had two lavatories. The applicant had access to the toilet at any time upon request. The Government provided undated photographs and a plan of the convoy premises. 21.  Relying on a certificate issued by the director of facility IZ-74/1 on 21 October 2009, the Government claimed that the applicant was brought to the Tsentralniy District Court of Chelyabinsk seven times: on 11 March, 7, 19, 22 and 25 April, 29 June and 31 August 2005. 22.  The Government submitted that the documents confirming the number of detainees in the convoy cells and their time of arrival and departure were destroyed on 16 January 2009 due to expiry of the time‑limit for their storage. 23.  With reference to the applicable regulations, the Government submitted that on the dates of the applicant’s transfers to the District Court the applicant had received a dry ration (bread, tinned meat or fish, tea, salt, sugar and disposable tableware before 2 August 2005, and instant first and second course, sugar, tea, disposable tableware from 2 August 2005). The Government provided a copy of the invoice dated 15 June 2006 confirming the purchase of a water boiler by the District Court. 24.  The Government acknowledged that on 29 June 2005 the convoy premises were crowded to the limit. According to the statement by the Deputy Head of the Convoy Service dated August 2005, there were twenty detainees in four cells in the convoy premises. The statement does not provide exact numbers for each cell.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Breda. He had a relationship with Ms B. from mid-1993. On 14 April 1995 a daughter, named A., was born to Ms B. and the applicant. 8.  Pursuant to Article 1:287 § 1 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), as then in force, Ms B. obtained guardianship (voogdij) of A. The applicant was appointed as A.’s auxiliary guardian (toeziend voogd) on 19 May 1995 by the Enschede District Court judge (kantonrechter). The applicant’s auxiliary guardianship ended on 2 November 1995, when an amendment to the Civil Code came into force abolishing that function. 9.  The applicant and Ms B. did not formally cohabit, but the applicant visited her and A. on a regular basis. He also babysat and took care of A. on several occasions. Ms B. sometimes consulted the applicant about A.’s hearing problems. The applicant did not formally recognise (erkenning) A., as Ms B. refused to give her permission and her family also opposed such recognition. Although the applicant could have sought judicial consent for recognising A. (see paragraph 17 below), he did not avail himself of this possibility, considering that it would stand little chance of success. Moreover, the applicant preferred to respect the position adopted by Ms B. and her relatives, and maintain the de facto family ties he had with his daughter rather than establish formal legal ties with her. 10.  In August 1996 the applicant’s relationship with Ms B. broke down. On 23 January 1997 the applicant requested the Almelo Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) to grant him access (omgangsregeling) to A. one weekend every fortnight and some weeks during the holiday period. In those proceedings Ms B. argued primarily that the applicant’s request should be declared inadmissible in that there had never been any family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention between the applicant and A. and, in so far as family life had existed, it had ceased to exist after the end of her relationship with the applicant. In the alternative, Ms B. argued that to grant the applicant access would not be in A.’s interests. Ms B. further submitted that the applicant had behaved badly towards her (violence and financial abuse) and had shown little interest in A. She indicated, lastly, that A.’s hearing was impaired and that her daughter thus required a special approach of which she deemed the applicant incapable. 11.  By a decision of 26 February 1997, the Almelo Regional Court accepted that there was family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention between the applicant and A., and that this family life had not ceased to exist since the breakdown of the applicant’s relationship with Ms B. It consequently declared the applicant’s request admissible. However, given the difficulties between the applicant and Ms B., the Regional Court decided to order the Child Care and Protection Board (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) to conduct an investigation and to report to it on the feasibility of an access arrangement. 12.  Ms B. filed an appeal against this decision with the Arnhem Court of Appeal (gerechtshof). By a decision of 16 September 1997, the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 26 February 1997 and declared the applicant’s request inadmissible. In its decision, the Court of Appeal stated:\n“3.1  Out of the parties’ relationship (lasting from mid-1993 to August 1996), A. was born. Mr L. is the biological father of A. He has not recognised the child. The mother holds parental authority over A. by law.\n... 4.5  In addition to what is stated under 3.1, the following, as contended by one side, and not, or insufficiently, disputed by the other, has been established or become plausible.\nThe father was present at A.’s birth. He has never been formally registered at the mother’s address, but (up to August 1996) regularly visited the mother. He has also changed A.’s nappy a few times [enkele malen] and has babysat her once or twice [een enkele keer], but not since August 1996. Further, the mother has on several occasions [verschillende keren] had contact by telephone with the father about (the hearing problems of) A. 4.6  In the light of the above facts and circumstances, it has been insufficiently established that the father has a close personal relationship with the child – who at the time of the breakdown of the parties’ relationship was one year old – or that there is a link between him and the child that can be regarded as ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. The further circumstances relied on by the father, from which it would appear that he has a close personal relationship with the child, have – in contrast to the substantiated denial thereof by the mother – not been established. The terminology used by the mother in the proceedings (she spoke about ‘a relationship until October 1996’ and ‘my ex-partner’) cannot, either in itself or in connection with the above circumstances, lead to a different conclusion.\n... 5.1  On the basis of the above considerations, the impugned decision is quashed, and the father’s request is declared inadmissible.” 13.  The applicant’s subsequent appeal on points of law was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) on 5 June 1998. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that the mere biological link between the applicant and A. was sufficient to attract the protection of Article 8 of the Convention. It held that “family life” for the purposes of Article 8 implied the existence of further personal ties in addition to biological paternity. As to the lack of existence of such further personal ties, it accepted the findings of the Court of Appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1926 and at the material time lived in Limassol. She died on 23 December 2004. 6.  The deceased applicant was the owner (half-a-share) of a plot of land with a house on it in the village of Pelendri in the district of Limassol. The said house was the applicant's home. 7.  By letter dated 22 May 1997 the applicant's lawyer at the time informed the Minister of Communications and Works that the applicant had found out, by chance, that the works planned to take place in her village would entail the compulsory acquisition of her house and its demolition. He further noted that the authorities had been misinformed that no one had been living in the house. He emphasised that the applicant would not consent to the loss of her home and would challenge any administrative act for its compulsory acquisition. 8.  On 25 July 1997 a notice of compulsory acquisition of the applicant's property was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus (administrative act no. 908). The compulsory acquisition was for the purpose of the construction, improvement, alignment and surfacing of a public road. The notice stated as follows:\n“Notification is hereby given that the immovable property described in the Schedule set out below is essential for the following purpose of public benefit, namely for the creation and development of roads in the Republic and its compulsory acquisition is imperative for the following reasons, namely the construction, improvement, alignment and surfacing of the road.”\nOn the same day a requisition order was issued under the Requisition of Property Law of 1962 (as amended) and published in the Official Gazette (no. 930):\n“Because the immovable property described in the Schedule set out below ... is essential for the following purposes of public benefit, namely for the creation and development of public roads in the Republic or for any of these purposes and its requisition is imperative for the following reasons, namely the construction, improvement, alignment and surfacing of the Pelendri main road”\nThe initial duration of the order was for one year. It was subsequently extended until 23 July 1999 by publication in the Official Gazette of 12 June 1998 and until 22 July 2000 by publication in the Official Gazette of 18 June 1999. 9.  By letter dated 29 July 1997 the applicant lodged an objection to the compulsory acquisition and requisition of her property with the Ministry of Communications and Works. 10.  The applicant's objection was dismissed and on 15 May 1998 a compulsory acquisition order issued under the Compulsory Acquisition Law 1962 (Law 15/1962 as amended) was published in the Official Gazette (no. 576). The order referred to the earlier notice of compulsory acquisition. 11.  On 14 July 1998 the applicant lodged a recourse before the Supreme Court (first instance administrative jurisdiction) seeking the annulment of the compulsory acquisition order. She claimed, inter alia, that the impugned administrative act would result in her forced displacement from her village and her ancestral roots. 12.  In a letter dated 17 February 1999 sent by the Limassol District Officer to the Director General of the Ministry of Communications and Works, the former stated that a plot of State land had been found in the applicant's village and that an exchange had been proposed to the applicant and her family on the basis of the valuations that would be carried out by the Land Registry concerning the value of the house and the plot in question. However, the applicant had demanded, despite the fact that the Land Registry's valuations had not yet been completed, that she should be granted two houses on State land of her preference and that she was not willing to withdraw her recourse before such houses or land of her preference were granted to her or, otherwise, before the costs and a period of six months were given to her for the construction of two new houses. In view of the circumstances the Limassol District Officer considered that there was no possibility of reaching a settlement. 13.  On 13 July 2000 the Supreme Court (first instance administrative jurisdiction) dismissed the recourse and upheld the lawfulness of the compulsory acquisition order. 14.  On 19 July 2000, whilst the applicant's right of appeal was still in force, the Public Works Department of the Ministry of Communication and Works demolished the applicant's house. 15.  On 7 August 2000 the applicant was offered the sum of 450 Cyprus pounds (CYP) as annual rent for the period from 25 July 1997 until 25 July 2000 as compensation for the requisition of her property. The Government submitted that no agreement had been reached between the applicant and the authorities concerning the compensation. 16.  On 23 August 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (revisional administrative jurisdiction) challenging the first instance judgment and the demolition of her house pending the expiration of her right to appeal. In her grounds of appeal she noted, inter alia, that the authorities had not taken possession of her property until 19 July 2000, namely, the day that they demolished her house and that following the expiry of the requisition order on 22 July 2000 no other requisition order had been issued. She further invoked Article 8 of the Convention. 17.  In the context of the appeal proceedings it emerged that, pending the first instance proceedings, the compulsory acquisition order (no. 930) and the preceding notification (no. 908) had been revoked by an order published in the Official Gazette of 20 August 1999 (no. 1004) on the ground, inter alia, that the acquisition of the applicant's property had not been necessary for the public benefit purposes stated in the initial notice of compulsory acquisition. In particular, the revocation order stated as follows:\n“...\nWhereas in accordance with the provisions of the Compulsory Acquisition Law, the compensation for the aforementioned acquisition was not paid or deposited.\nWhereas the Acquiring Authority considers the immovable property which is described in the Schedule of this order which is part of the immovable property which is described in notice no. 908 as not required for the public benefit purposes which are referred to in notice no. 908.\nFor these reasons, the Minister of Communications and Works, exercising the powers granted to him by the Council of Ministers by section 7 of the Compulsory Acquisition Law ... with the present notification revokes notice no. 908/97 and order no. 567/98 in so far as they concern the immovable property described in the Schedule of this order”.\nBoth the parties and the first instance court had not been aware of this development at the material time. 18.  In a letter dated 6 November 2000 the Land Registry Department of the Minister of the Interior informed the then Attorney-General that the compulsory acquisition order of 15 May 1998 had been revoked because the relevant plans of the Land Registry did not correspond to the actual situation on the site. Furthermore, following the demolition, the applicant had refused the authorities' offers for a friendly settlement and had not replied to the offer made for the period the property was under the requisition order, i.e. from 25 July 1997 until 25 July 2000. In this connection the Land Registry noted that the applicant had sent letters of protest on 19 and 20 July 2000 to the Director of Public Works and the Minister of Interior respectively. Finally, the Land Registry requested advice with regard to the steps to be taken. In particular, it asked whether the Ministry should send an offer for the compulsory acquisition or whether a new compulsory acquisition order should be issued instead. 19.  Subsequently, in a letter dated 1 December 2000, by the Limassol District Engineer of Public Works to the Director of Public Works of the Ministry of Communications and Works, the following, inter alia, was stated:\n“...\nfollowing your instructions we proceeded with the immediate demolition of the house on 19 and 20 July 2000 after repeated telephone conversations with the owner's son ...\nBefore the demolition process commenced we had a telephone conversation with the complainant's son and we once again mentioned the fact that we would proceed with the demolition of the house.\nAfter this, once the house was opened up in the presence of the police, the Limassol District Officer, the Community Chairman and the Community Secretary of Pelendri village, all objects that were in the house were listed by all the abovementioned which were subsequently taken to a safe place and we proceeded to demolish the house”. 20.  On 18 May 2001 another order of requisition (no. 454) was published in the Official Gazette. On 19 April 2002 the period of requisition was extended until 17 May 2003 and then extended again on 3 April 2003 until 16 May 2004. 21.  In the meantime, on 30 April 2002 a new notice of compulsory acquisition of the applicant's property was published in the Official Gazette (no. 443). Subsequently, on 17 May 2002 an order of compulsory acquisition (no. 499) was published. 22.  On 29 May 2002 the applicant was offered the sum of CYP 12,500 as compensation for the compulsory acquisition of her property. The Government submitted that no agreement had been reached between the applicant and the authorities concerning the compensation. 23.  On 18 February 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal (see paragraph 16 above). In particular, it held that the demolition could not be considered as “damage” connected to the compulsory acquisition order that had been revoked, since, as admitted also by the applicant, the demolition had been carried out after the revocation of that order and whilst the requisition order was still in force. The court noted that, in accordance with its jurisprudence, “damage” in this context should be a direct result of the contested act and not of another cause. Accordingly, the court concluded that no issue of “damage” arose and thus no further examination of the validity of the revoked compulsory acquisition order was justified. The court also pointed out that timely notification of the revocation, which had been the Government's responsibility, would have rendered further consideration of the recourse unnecessary and further, took into account the fact that the compulsory acquisition order had been revoked on the ground that the acquisition of the applicant's property was not necessary for the public benefit purposes stated in the initial notice of compulsory acquisition. The Supreme Court granted the costs of the proceedings, both first instance and appeal, in favour of the applicant. 24.  In the meantime, on 29 September 2002, following the demolition of her house, the applicant lodged a recourse before the Supreme Court (first instance administrative jurisdiction) challenging the lawfulness of the decision and/or order to demolish her house and the act of demolition. She invoked Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this respect. 25.  On 26 March 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse. The court held that the act of demolition had not been an executory administrative act but the implementation of the administrative act of requisition. Furthermore, the court considered that there had not been a violation of the applicant's rights under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. In this respect it noted that under Article 23 (3) of the Constitution limitations to property, by law, were permissible on certain grounds. In the event of a lawful limitation on property, the above Article provided for just compensation which was determined, in the case of disagreement, by the civil courts. The right therefore of the applicant to compensation for the expropriated property was safeguarded. Furthermore the court considered that, in the event the Supreme Court upheld an appeal lodged by the applicant and annulled the compulsory acquisition order, she would be able to claim compensation for any damage suffered as a result of the administrative act under Article 146 (6) of the Constitution. 26.  On 7 May 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court (revisional administrative jurisdiction) against the first instance judgment. In her appeal grounds the applicant claimed, inter alia, that the demolition of her home violated her rights under Article 8 of the Convention and that the Supreme Court, at first instance, had wrongly omitted to examine Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and to find a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. 27.  On 21 November 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first instance judgment. In particular, it held that the demolition of the applicant's house had not been an executory administrative act. Furthermore, it considered that it was not necessary to examine the question whether the demolition came within the parameters of the requisition order since, even in the case of a negative reply, the act at issue would be that of unlawful trespass falling within the ambit of private law and not public law. A remedy for such an act could be sought only by way of action before the district court. The Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the case further on the basis of Article 146 of the Constitution and it therefore did not examine the remaining grounds of appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicants, who were born in Lice, currently reside in Diyarbakır. 11.  The facts of the case are in dispute between the parties. 12.  On the night of 12 May 1994 and in the early hours of 13 May 1994, the applicants heard gun fire coming from outside their village of Yolçatı, located in the administrative jurisdiction of the Lice District within the province of Diyarbakır. The firing continued until approximately 5 a.m. Subsequently, soldiers entered the village and told all the villagers to gather at the village mosque. 13.  The applicants alleged that the following took place: 14.  On 12 May 1994 the applicant was at home with his family. During the night he heard gun fire coming from outside the village. In the early hours of 13 May his son, Kamil Menteşe, left to take the livestock out of the village. The soldiers stopped his son, checked his identity card and released him. 15.  When the soldiers entered the village, they ordered all the villagers to gather near the village mosque. They asked them whether there were any PKK members in the area and whether they had been giving them food. The villagers replied that PKK activities were frequent in the area. Thereafter, the soldiers started to burn the houses in the village. At that time, the applicant’s son returned to the village and was taken away by the soldiers together with three other villagers. The applicant, together with the remaining villagers, was sent away from the village. After two days, they were allowed to go back to the village. When they came back, they saw that the village had been burned down. The next day, the applicant went to the Lice public prosecutor and to the military authorities to inquire into his son’s whereabouts. However, he received no reply. On 17 May 1994, five days after the incident, the corpses of twenty-six persons, including Kamil Menteşe, Sabri Akdoğan, Abdulvahap Maço and Yusuf Bozkuş, were found near the village. The corpse of the applicant’s son was found five hundred metres away from the others. The body was taken to the Lice Health Clinic and was subsequently buried in the Lice cemetery. 16.  The applicant and her family lived in the hamlet of Beğendik in the Yolçatı village. On the night of 12 May 1994 the applicant was at home with her family. At about 11 p.m. they heard gun fire near their house. It continued until 5 a.m. In the morning of 13 May, the applicant’s brother in-law, Yusuf Bozkuş, led the animals towards the Yolçatı village. Yusuf was about 60 years old and he was of unsound mind. At the same time, the applicant and her children tried to leave the hamlet. However, they were not able to go very far as the area was surrounded by soldiers. From a distance, the applicant saw her house catch fire. On the evening of 13 May the applicant and her children stayed in the forest and saw smoke rising from the surrounding hamlets and villages. Early in the morning of 14 May, they headed towards Lice. 17.  On 15 May 1994 the applicant heard from her neighbours that her brother-in-law, Yusuf Bozkus, had been arrested by the security forces near the Yolçatı village together with six other villagers. Upon receiving this information, the applicant attempted to search for Yusuf. However, as the roads were blocked with panzer tanks, she could not go back there. When she returned to Lice, her children told her that Yusuf’s body had been found and identified by Yusuf’s brother, Hasan Bozkuş. According to Hasan Bozkuş, Yusuf’s skull was completely shattered and there were five bullet holes in his chest. 18.  The applicant went back to the village one month later and saw that her house had been burned down. 19.  The applicant and her children were in the village on the evening of 12 May 1994. They heard gun fire throughout the night. On 13 May, at 6 a.m., soldiers arrived in the village and told the villagers to gather around the mosque. The applicant and her children accordingly went to the mosque. The commander then ordered the soldiers to start burning the houses. The applicant’s house was burned down along with others. Subsequently, all men who were under 60 years old were ordered to leave the village together with a soldier. The applicant saw Sabri Akdoğan, Abdulvahap Maço, Reşit Demirhan and Kamil Menteşe being taken away by a soldier. After some time, the applicant heard gun fire from the direction where the men had been taken, and she subsequently saw a couple of soldiers coming back to the village from that direction. 20.  The applicant was in the village of Yolçatı on the night of 12 May 1994. In the early hours of 13 May at about 6 a.m., the village was surrounded by soldiers, who arrived in the village by vehicles, panzers and a helicopter. The villagers were ordered to gather around the mosque and they were interrogated about PKK activities. The soldiers then began burning down the houses. The village men who were under 60 years old were asked to leave the village with the soldiers. Upon this order, the applicant’s son Reşit Demirhan, who was 48 years old, together with Sabri Akdoğan and Abdulvahap Maço, were taken away by the soldiers. The applicant was sent to Lice with the remaining villagers. He tried to get information as to the whereabouts of his son. However, the soldiers did not allow him to look for him. After two days, the applicant returned to the village. The following day, some villagers went to the Lice public prosecutor to obtain information about the missing villagers. The body of the applicant’s son was subsequently found near the village together with the bodies of Sabri Akdoğan, Hasan Bayram, Mehmet İlkkaya, Yusuf Bozkuş, Fahri Bayram, Ramazan Bayram, Ekram Bayram, Abdulvahap Maço and Kamil Menteşe. Kamil’s body was found five hundred metres away from the other bodies. The applicant heard that there were twenty-six bodies at the scene of incident. The body of the applicant’s son was buried on 16 May 1994 in Diyarbakır. 21.  The applicant lived in the village of Yolçatı. When the firing stopped at around 5 a.m. on 13 May 1994, the applicant fled from the village. While running away, she saw a helicopter land in the village. She saw smoke rising from the village. Two weeks later when she returned to the village, she saw that her house had been burned down. 22.  The applicant and his family lived in a hamlet of the Yolçatı village. On the night of 12 May 1994 they heard gun fire. It continued until 5 a.m. When the firing stopped, the applicant and his family tried to go to Lice. While they were passing near the Yolçatı village, they were stopped by soldiers and the applicant’s son, Abdulvahap Maço, was taken away by the soldiers. The applicant was able to witness smoke rising from the nearby villages and hamlets in the area. The applicant and the rest of the family members continued towards Lice and stayed there with relatives for two days. On 15 May 1994 the applicant was informed by some villagers that his son Abdulvahap Maço had been found dead together with four other villagers, Reşit, Hasan, Yusuf and Sabri. The applicant subsequently went to the Lice public prosecutor and the leader of the Council and told them about the incident. However, they both responded that there was nothing they could do to help him. When the applicant received permission to collect his son’s body, he went back to the village. He saw that the village had been burned. He subsequently found the corpse of his son behind some rocks. There were several bullet marks on the body. The applicant took his son’s body to the Lice Health Clinic and subsequently buried him in Lice. 23.  The Government denied the allegations submitted by the applicants. They informed the Court that an armed clash had taken place on 13 and 14 May 1994 in the vicinity of the Dibek village, also attached to the Lice District. According to the Government, four soldiers had been killed during this incident. 24.  In support of their submissions, the Government provided the full case file concerning the investigations into the killings of Kamil Menteşe, Yusuf Bozkuş, Reşit Demirhan and Abdulvahap Maço. 25.  On 15 May 1994 the corpses of Reşit Demirhan, Sabri Akdoğan and Hasan Bayram were found in the vicinity of the Yolçatı village. These corpses were brought to the Lice Health Clinic by the villagers. After the bodies were officially identified, post-mortem examinations were carried out on the bodies by a doctor together with the Lice public prosecutor. The doctor perceived that rigor mortis had set in and bruising had appeared on the body of Reşit Demirhan. He noted the presence of\n- a bullet entry hole under the right eye and a bullet exit hole measuring 5 x 6 cm. in the occipital area, which had cracked the skull and caused heavy damage to the brain;\n- a bullet entry hole on the left side of the chest and an exit hole on the fourth vertebra, measuring 5 x 3 cm, which had caused damage to the spine;\n- a bullet entry hole on the lower right side of the abdomen and a bullet exit hole, measuring 2 x 2 cm. on the right side of the thigh;\n- a bullet entry hole on the front exterior side of the left arm and a bullet exit hole on the interior side of the left arm;\n- a bullet entry hole on the front part of the left arm and a bullet exit hole in the palm of the left hand; and\n- scars possibly caused by gunshot wounds on some parts of the body.\nNo other signs were observed on the body. As the cause of death was found to be the destruction of the brain by gun shots, it was decided not to carry out a classical autopsy on the body. 26.  On 16 May 1994 the villagers found the body of Abdulvahap Maço near the village of Yolçatı. The body was brought to the Lice Health Clinic. Together with the Lice public prosecutor, the doctor conducted a post mortem examination. In the report, it was noted that rigor mortis had set in and bruising had appeared on the body. The doctor also found\n- a bullet entry hole above the left eyebrow and a bullet exit hole in the occipital region measuring 6 x 10 cm., as a result of which the skull had been shattered and the brain heavily damaged;\n- two adjacent bullet entry holes on the left side of the neck;\n- two adjacent bullet exit holes on the right side of the neck, under the chin;\n- a bullet entry hole on the left leg and a bullet exit hole in the calf measuring 2 x 8 cm;\n- two wounds, one on the back of the right ankle measuring 4 x 2 cm. and another on the front part of the ankle measuring 3 x 4 cm, possibly caused by bullets;\n- a fractured tibia; and\n- a bullet entry hole on the right calf and a bullet exit hole above the right knee, causing a wound measuring 10 cm., which had damaged tissue and fractured the lower part of the femur.\nNo other signs were observed on the body. As the cause of death was found to be the destruction of the brain by gun shots, it was decided not to carry out a classical autopsy on the body of Abdulvahap Maço. 27.  On 17 May 1994 the bodies of Yusuf Bozkuş and Kamil Menteşe were also found by the villagers near the mountains in the vicinity of the Yolçatı village, and were brought to the Lice Health Clinic. The body of Kamil Menteşe was identified by his father Abdullah Menteşe and the body of Yusuf Bozkuş was identified by his brother. The doctor conducted post-mortem examinations in the presence of the Lice Public Prosecutor.\nIn the report on the body of Yusuf Bozkuş, it was noted that rigor mortis had set in and bruising had appeared on the body. The doctor also found\n- a bullet entry hole in the chin, and a bullet exit hole, measuring 10 x 15 cm. which had caused heavy damage to the brain; and\n- three bullet entry holes in the left collar bone area, the right collar bone area and the right side of the neck, and three bullet exit holes, two in the shoulder blade area and one under the left underarm.\nNo other signs were observed on the body.\nIn the report on the body of Kamil Menteşe, it was noted that rigor mortis had set in and bruising had appeared on the body. The doctor also found\n- a bullet entry hole in the neck and a bullet exit hole above the right shoulder blade;\n- a bullet entry hole in between the shoulder blades, and a bullet exit hole in the front part of the right underarm, measuring 2 x 3 cm;\n- a lateral wound measuring 10 cm. in the femur area which had been caused by a sharp object;\n- a wound which had been caused by a sharp object, measuring 8 x 3 cm on the right biceps;\n- two further wounds on the right arm, caused by a sharp object;\n- a bullet entry hole on the lower interior part of the left knee and a bullet exit hole on the exterior part of the knee, measuring 4 x 5 cm;\n- scars due to gun shots on the left leg; and\n- the right ear of the deceased was missing for unknown reasons given the one week delay in the autopsy.\nAs the doctor had found that both Yusuf Bozkuş and Kamil Menteşe had died from gunshot wounds, he did not deem it necessary to perform a classical autopsy on the bodies. 28.  The Government maintained that investigations were initiated to find the perpetrators of these killings. In this respect, they referred to the correspondence between the Lice public prosecutor and the Lice Gendarmerie Command. Copies of several letters, written by the prosecutor to the gendarme commander, asking the commander to conduct an investigation into the killings of Kamil Menteşe, Yusuf Bozkuş, Reşit Demirhan and Abdulvahap Maço were submitted to Court. The gendarme commander also sent regular reports to the prosecutor indicating that it had not been possible to locate or identify the perpetrators. 29.  On 28 December 1998 the Lice public prosecutor took statements from two villagers, Mehmet Baltan and Ahmet Baltan, in connection with the killings of Kamil Menteşe and Yusuf Bozkus. In his statement, Mehmet Baltan explained that he did not know Yusuf Bozkuş or Kamil Menteşe but he had heard that someone from the Yolçatı village had been abducted and killed in May 1994. When interrogated about the killing of Yusuf Bozkuş and Kamil Menteşe, the second witness, Ahmet Baltan, explained that he had known Kamil and Yusuf. He also knew that these two villagers were found dead. However he had no knowledge as to who might have killed them. 30.  On 31 January 2000 the Lice public prosecutor concluded that it had not been possible to establish the identities of the perpetrators of the killings of Kamil Menteşe, Yusuf Bozkus, Reşit Demirhan and Abdulvahap Maço. He accordingly decided to issue a continuous search warrant for the perpetrators of the killings, which would remain valid for twenty years, the statutory time limit under Article 102 of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor also instructed the authorities to continue pursuing a meticulous search for the perpetrators. 31.  Subsequently on 16 September 2001, 23 March 2002, 4 September 2002, 10 September 2002, 20 December 2002 and 4 March 2003, gendarme officers attached to the Lice Gendarme Command went to the Yolçatı village for onsite inspections. In their respective reports, they stated that there was no new evidence concerning the incidents, and that the identities of the perpetrators could not have been established.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in the town of Urus-Martan, in the Chechen Republic. She is the mother of Mr Adam Khurayev, born in 1978. 6.  The applicant's house in Urus-Martan was destroyed during the military campaign in the Chechen Republic in the autumn of 1999. The applicant's family had to move temporarily to Ingushetia, where they lived at the material time. Adam Khurayev frequently visited his aunt, Ms M.M., who lived in Urus-Martan, and stayed at her house no. 14, Lomonosova Lane (the street name and the house number were later changed to 74, Kutuzova Street). 7.  In the summer of 2002 Adam Khurayev and his twin brother Arbi Khurayev submitted their documents to the Urus-Martan District Department of the Interior (the ROVD) to exchange their old Soviet passports for new Russian ones. On 22 November 2002 Adam and Arbi Khurayev went to Urus-Martan to pick up their new passports. The brothers stayed at their aunt's house at the above address. At the material time the town of Urus-Martan was under curfew. The authorities maintained manned checkpoints at the entry and exit points to the town. 8.  At about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 the family of M.M. was at home. When Adam Khurayev went outside, to the toilet located in the courtyard, a group of over fifteen armed masked men in camouflage uniforms broke into the house. The intruders neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. The applicant's relatives thought that they were Russian servicemen. They dispersed into different rooms, pointed their guns at the family members and ordered everyone to stay in their rooms. M.M.'s daughter, Ms L.M., rushed to the window and heard the intruders order someone in Russian: “Lie on the ground!” She thought that the order must have been given to Adam Khurayev, as he was the only family member in the yard. 9.  Without providing any explanations or reasons for their actions, the servicemen conducted a quick but thorough search of M.M.'s house. They did not find anything of interest to them. 10.  After that the servicemen returned to the yard and walked out into the street. Shortly thereafter M.M. and L.M. heard the sound of heavy military vehicles in the street. 11.  Ms. A.M., one of M.M.'s neighbours, residing at 47 Lomonosova Street, was woken up at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 by the sound of heavy military vehicles in the street. She looked out of the window and saw an APC (armoured personnel carrier) and two military UAZ vehicles (“таблетка”) parked in the street. A.M. did not go outside because of the curfew. According to A.M., at the material time APCs were frequently driven in Urus-Martan at night and servicemen often took young men away. About fifteen minutes later the vehicles started their engines and drove away. 12.  After the servicemen had left, the applicant's relatives realised that Adam Khurayev, who had been in the courtyard, had disappeared. 13.  The applicant has had no news of Adam Khurayev since 23 November 2002. 14.  The above account of the events is based on the applicant's application form and written statements by M.M. and A.M., dated 10 and 11 November 2005 respectively. 15.  The Government submitted that on 23 November 2002 Adam Khurayev had been abducted by unidentified persons. 16.  In the morning of 24 November 2002 Arbi Khurayev went to Ingushetia to inform the applicant about the disappearance of Adam Khurayev. The applicant immediately went to Urus-Martan and started searching for her son. From 24 November 2002 for almost a month the applicant, who was elderly and illiterate, complained in person about her son's disappearance to a number of local law-enforcement agencies, including the Urus-Martan district military commander's office (hereafter “the district military commander's office”), the ROVD, and the Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office (“the district prosecutor's office”). The authorities denied any involvement on the part of their officials in the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 17.  The applicant's relatives assisted her in the search for Adam Khurayev. They contacted, both in person and in writing, various official bodies, such as the President of the Russian Federation, the Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation for Ensuring Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, the Chechen administration, departments of the interior and prosecutors' offices at different levels, asking for help in establishing the whereabouts of Adam Khurayev. The applicant retained copies of a number of those complaints and submitted them to the Court. An official investigation was opened by the district prosecutor's office. The relevant information is summarised below.\n(b)  The official investigation into the abduction of Adam Khurayev 18.  On 23 December 2002 the applicant complained in writing about her son's disappearance to a number of State authorities, including the district military commander's office, the district prosecutor's office and the ROVD. She stated that on 22 November 2002 she and her sons Arbi and Adam had gone to Urus-Martan to obtain her sons' identity documents. At about 10 p.m. on that day armed and masked members of law-enforcement authorities, wearing camouflage uniforms, had broken into the house at no. 14 Lomonosova Street and had abducted Adam Khurayev. The intruders had used an APC and two UAZ vehicles. She stressed that prior to his abduction her son had undergone stomach surgery. 19.  On 20 January 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic (“the republican prosecutor's office”) forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 20.  On 14 February 2003 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Adam Khurayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The criminal case file was given number 34022. 21.  On 15 March 2003 the district prosecutor's office granted the applicant the status of a victim in criminal case no. 34022. 22.  On 24 April 2003 the applicant wrote to a number of State authorities, including the prosecutor and the military prosecutor of the Chechen Republic. She stated that her son had been abducted by servicemen from the law-enforcement agencies of the Urus-Martan district who had arrived in two UAZ vehicles and an APC. The applicant pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any results and that, apart from instituting an investigation into the abduction, the district prosecutor's office had failed to take any other measures aimed at establishing her son's whereabouts. She stressed that her son's abductors must have been representatives of the State as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew and used military vehicles. 23.  On 22 May 2003 the republican prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 14 February 2003 the district prosecutor's office had opened criminal case no. 34022 into the abduction of her son; that on 14 April 2003 the investigation had been suspended owing to the failure to establish the perpetrators and that unspecified operational and search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. 24.  On 9 June 2003 the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA military prosecutor's office”) forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 for examination. 25.  On 17 June 2003 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's request for assistance in the search for her son to the district prosecutor's office and instructed the latter to inform the applicant of any developments in the investigation. 26.  On 30 June and 2 July 2003 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicant that the examination of her complaints had failed to establish any involvement of Russian servicemen in the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 27.  On 11 December 2003 the applicant complained to the minister of the interior of the Chechen Republic, submitting that her son had been abducted by a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms who had arrived in two UAZ cars and an APC without number plates. She stressed that the abductors must have been State servicemen as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew and used military vehicles. The applicant pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any effect and that the criminal investigation had been suspended and reopened and had failed to produce any results. 28.  On 17 December 2003 the applicant complained to the prosecutor of the Chechen Republic, stating that her son had been abducted by a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms who had arrived in two UAZ vehicles and an APC. She averred that her son's abductors must have been representatives of the State as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew and used military vehicles. The applicant pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any effect and that the criminal investigation into her son's abduction had failed to produce any results and had been suspended and reopened on a number of occasions. She emphasised that her previous complaint to the prosecutor about the inactivity of the district prosecutor's office had not produced any results. Lastly, she requested the prosecutor to oblige the district prosecutor's office to solve the crime. 29.  On 13 January 2004 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's complaint to the district prosecutor's office. The latter was to provide the applicant with detailed information on the investigation and its results. 30.  On 23 January 2004 the head of the ROVD informed the applicant that they had opened an operational-search file for the search for her son and that they had sent an unspecified number of requests for information to law-enforcement agencies in the Urus-Martan District and various regions of the Russian Federation. 31.  Following a complaint by the applicant to the republican prosecutor's office, on 28 January 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed her that on 28 January 2004 it had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 and that the case file had been entrusted to another investigator. 32.  On 1 March 2004 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for inclusion into the criminal case file and instructed the latter to inform the applicant of any developments in the case. The letter also stated that the investigation in case no. 34022 had been reopened. 33.   On 24 March 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 28 February 2004 they had suspended the investigation in criminal case no. 34022. 34.  On 27 March 2004 the ROVD informed the applicant that their numerous requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya and other regions had failed to produce any results. 35.  On 7 May 2004 the Prosecutor General's office in the Southern Federal Circuit informed the applicant that they had forwarded her complaint about the abduction of Adam Khurayev to the republican prosecutor's office. 36.  On 31 May 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 31 May 2004 they had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022. 37.  On 17 June 2004 the republican prosecutor's office informed the applicant that all information concerning the investigation into her son's abduction was to be obtained from the district prosecutor's office. 38.  On 29 July 2004 the applicant wrote to a number of State authorities, including the Urus-Martan district prosecutor and the head of the ROVD. In her letter she described the circumstances of her son's abduction and pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any results. In particular, the criminal investigation into her son's abduction had been conducted in a superficial manner and had not produced any results. All her complaints about the ineffectiveness of the investigation, addressed to the supervisory bodies, had been forwarded to the district prosecutor's office. Although the latter body had replied to the complaints, none of those replies contained any information concerning investigative measures undertaken in the course of the criminal proceedings. Finally, the applicant submitted that her son's abductors must have been representatives of the State as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew, gone through existing checkpoints and used military vehicles. 39.  On 4 August 2004 the district prosecutor's office replied to the applicant, stating that the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 had been carried out in compliance with the law. The district prosecutor's office had taken all the investigative measures which could be carried out in the absence of those to be charged with the crime. They had sent numerous requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies and hospitals. The republican prosecutor's office's (unspecified) instructions concerning the investigation had been complied with. The theory that Russian military servicemen had been involved in the abduction of Adam Khurayev had been examined but had not been confirmed. The latest decision to suspend the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators was dated 30 June 2004. 40.  On 23 August 2004 the republican prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on an unspecified date the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 had been suspended, but operational-search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. 41.  On 2 September 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that her complaint of 1 September 2004 had been included in the case file of criminal case no. 34022. 42.  On 30 September 2004 the ROVD forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 43.  On 15 May 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor, describing in detail the circumstances of her son's apprehension and pointing out that her son had been abducted by representatives of the State. The applicant complained that the investigation into Adam Khurayev's abduction had been too lengthy, that basic investigative measures had not been taken and that she had no information about its progress. The applicant requested the authorities to resume the investigation, to provide her with access to the criminal case-file materials and with copies of basic investigative documents to which she was entitled by law. 44.  On 24 June 2005 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 6 June 2005 they had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 and that she could obtain a copy of the decision to grant her victim status and certain other documents from their office. 45.  On 30 July 2005 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicant that the examination of her complaint about her son's abduction had failed to confirm any involvement of Russian servicemen in the abduction of her son. 46.  On 11 November 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. She described in detail the circumstances of her son's apprehension and pointed out that her son had been abducted by representatives of the State. The applicant submitted that the investigation into Adam Khurayev's abduction had been ineffective and that it had failed to produce any results for more than three years. She complained about the lack of information about the investigation, requested the authorities to grant her victim status in the criminal case, to resume the investigation and provide her with access to the criminal case-file materials. 47.  By a letter of 14 November 2005 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 48.  On 18 November 2005 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that her complaint of 11 November 2005 had been granted only in part. The letter did not specify in which part, but stated that the applicant's request concerning access to the criminal case-file materials had been rejected pursuant to Article 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 49.  On 15 December 2005 the applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. She pointed out that on 11 November 2005 she had requested the authorities to resume the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 and provide her with access to the case-file materials; that on 18 November 2005 the authorities had partially granted her request but had failed to specify in which part. The lack of clarity in the decision had precluded her from appealing against it. She requested that that matter be clarified. 50.  On 23 December 2005 the district prosecutor's office replied to the applicant that she had been granted victim status on 15 March 2003 and that she was only entitled to access to procedural documents concerning investigative measures she had participated in. 51.  On 24 April 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on an unspecified date they had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022. 52.  On 14 February 2003 the district prosecutor's office instituted a criminal investigation into the abduction of Adam Khurayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The case file was attributed number 34022.\n(a)  Witnesses interviewed by the investigation 53.  Being interviewed as a witness on 18 February 2003, M.M. stated that at 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 armed persons in masks and camouflage uniforms had broken into her house and had abducted Adam Khurayev. Before coming to her household, the abductors had looked for Adam Khurayev in her brother's house. Neighbours known as “Zulay” and “Tamusa”, whose family names M.M. did not remember, had seen the abductors use APCs and UAZ vehicles. 54.  On 15 March 2003 the applicant was granted victim status and interviewed. She stated that she had learnt from M.M. that at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 armed and masked persons had broken into M.M.'s house and had taken Adam Khurayev with them. 55.  I.M., questioned on 20 January 2004 as a witness, submitted that on 24 November 2002 he had learnt from M.M. about the abduction of the applicant's son. M.M. had told him that she had not witnessed the abduction and that two women known as Zulay and Tamusa had told her that the abductors had arrived in an APC and two UAZ vehicles. 56.  Zara S., interviewed as a witness on 4 February 2004, stated that in the morning of 24 November 2002 she had learnt from the applicant and other neighbours about the abduction of Adam Khurayev. Zara S. had not seen any vehicles and, apart from herself, there were no other women known as “Tamusa” who lived in the vicinity. Zara S. confirmed her statement while being questioned as a witness on 18 June 2004. 57.  M.Ch. was interviewed as a witness on 11 February 2004. She stated that on the night of 23 November 2002 she had been at home with her husband A.Ch., who worked in the local military commander's office. At about 10 p.m. she had heard noise coming from the neighbouring household of Z.Ch. (see below). M.Ch. and her husband had rushed to Z.Ch.'s house and seen armed men wearing masks there. A.Ch. had asked them why they had broken into Z.Ch.'s house. In response the armed men had forced A.Ch. to the ground. M.Ch. had run back home and had fetched her own and her husband's identity papers. She had presented them to the armed men, explaining to them that her husband worked at the local military commander's office. At that moment the armed men had been ordered over a portable radio to leave, which they did quickly. They had left in several vehicles but M.Ch. did not remember what their models were. On the next morning M.Ch. had learnt about the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 58.  On 17 February 2004 the investigation questioned A.Ch. as a witness. He stated that on the night of 23 November 2002 he had been at home with his family. One of his family members had alerted him to the fact that something had been going on in Z.Ch.'s (his brother's) house. A.Ch. had rushed outside and in Z.Ch's yard he had run into several armed men wearing masks; their clothes had borne no insignia. When A.Ch. had asked what they were doing there, the armed men had forced him to the ground and ordered him to lie down. Several minutes later A.Ch. had overheard somebody order the armed men to leave, which they had done. A.Ch. and his wife had returned home and had learnt on the following day about the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 59.  On 20 February 2004 the investigation interviewed Z.Ch. as a witness. He stated that at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 he had been at home in his house in Urus-Martan. At that moment several armed men in camouflage uniforms had burst into his house and had requested his identity papers. Having carried out a passport check, they had left. 60.  M.B., the wife of Z.Ch., was questioned as a witness on an unspecified date in February 2004. She stated that on the night of 23 November 2002, while she had been at home with her husband, several armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had burst into their house and had ordered the family members to produce their identity documents for a passport check. Upon checking the documents one of the intruders had apologised, saying that the group had come to the wrong address, and they had left. M.B. had not noticed any insignia and did not remember how many intruders there had been. On the next day she had learnt about the abduction of the applicant's son. 61.  On 9 June 2004 M.M. was again questioned as a witness. She confirmed the previous statement she had given to the investigation and stated also that the intruders had carried out a search in her house; that the applicant's son had been outside in the toilet when the armed men had burst into her house and that in the morning on 24 November 2002 she had found his slippers at the toilet entry; and that she herself had not seen whether the intruders had come in military vehicles. 62.  On 12 June 2004 the investigation questioned R.Kh., the applicant's daughter. She stated that on an unspecified date she had learnt from the applicant that on 23 November 2002 Adam Khurayev had been abducted while he had been at M.M.'s house in Urus-Martan. 63.  When questioned again on 15 June 2004 the applicant stated that on 22 November 2002 she had arrived in Urus-Martan with her sons, Arbi and Adam Khurayev, to pick up their passports. In the evening of 23 November 2002 the applicant and Arbi had stayed at Z.Ch.'s place, while Adam Khurayev had gone to stay at M.M.'s place. At about 10 p.m. several armed and masked men had burst into Z.Ch.'s house and had forced Z.Ch. to the ground. One of the intruders had said “I don't think it's him” and another armed man had replied to him “I don't think so either”. On the following morning the applicant had learnt from M.M. that armed men in camouflage uniforms had abducted Adam Khurayev on the previous night.\n(b)  Further investigative steps 64.  On an unspecified date the investigator inspected the crime scene. No objects were seized during the inspection. 65.  With a view to examining the possibility that representatives of the State had been involved in the applicant's son's abduction, on unspecified dates the investigating authorities made enquires with various State bodies, including the commander of military unit no. 6779, the military commander of the Urus-Martanovskiy District, the ROVD, unspecified remand prisons, detention centres and hospitals in the region as to Adam Khurayev's whereabouts. From the replies of those State authorities it followed that their officials had not arrested Adam Khurayev, had not instituted criminal proceedings against him and had no information on his whereabouts. According to those replies, he had not been held in detention and had not applied for medical assistance. 66.  On an unspecified date the detention logs of the ROVD and its temporary detention ward were examined. No information concerning Adam Khurayev was found. 67.  On 6 July 2005 the investigation in case no. 34022 was suspended. 68.  On 18 November 2005 the investigation was resumed and the applicant was notified of that decision. 69.  Despite a specific request by the Court, the Government did not disclose most of the contents of the file in criminal case no. 34022, providing only copies of the records of the witness interviews described in paragraphs 53-63 above. The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 70.  On 3 March 2006 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martanovskiy Town Court (“the Town Court”) about the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the abduction of her son. She requested that the investigation be resumed and the necessary investigative measures be taken and also sought access to the case file. 71.  By a decision of 30 March 2006 the Town Court allowed the applicant's complaint in part. In particular, it held that the district prosecutor's office had unlawfully refused to provide the applicant with information concerning the developments in the investigation, which had prevented her from challenging the investigator's acts or inaction in court. The court ordered the district prosecutor's office to provide for the applicant's access to the case file, subject to the restrictions applicable under the rules of criminal procedure. Lastly, the court declared unlawful and unfounded the decision to suspend the investigation in case no. 34022 and ordered the district prosecutor's office to carry out an effective investigation. The decision, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:\n“... It emerges from the materials of case file no.34022 ... that on 23 November 2002 at about 10 p.m. unidentified masked persons carrying submachine guns broke into the household of [M.M.]'s family ... and abducted Adam Khurayev.\nThe investigation took steps aimed at solving the crime and identifying the perpetrators. In particular, M.M., I.M., Z.S., Z.Ch., R.B., M.Ch. and A.Ch. were interviewed as witnesses. ...\n... The investigation failed to identify the persons who had abducted Adam Khurayev or establish his whereabouts. In that connection it had been suspended ... on numerous occasions and then reopened again. The latest decision to suspend the investigation is dated 18 December 2005.\nHowever it transpires from the case file that the investigator failed to take all relevant investigative steps. In particular:\n- it was not established which [military] units or power structures on the territory of the Urus-Martanovskiy District were equipped with APCs; where each military vehicle had been located at the time of the abduction, and where and on whose order it had been used [at the time of the abduction]”;\n- the commanders of units equipped with APCs at the time of the abduction and the drivers of the APCs were not interviewed;\n- the logbooks of the departments keeping records of the use of military vehicles at the time of the abduction were not examined;\n- the heads of the military commander's office, the district department of the FSB and the district department of the Interior were not questioned with a view to establishing who had been granted authorisation to pass through Urus-Martan on 23 November 2002 at night during the curfew;\n- the logbooks of detention facilities were not seized and checked and the persons responsible for detainees were not questioned with a view to verifying whether the abducted person was being or had been held in any detention facility.” 72.  On 5 July 2006 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in the Cēsis District (Latvia). 6.  On 16 June 1997 the applicant gave birth in the Cēsis District Central Hospital (a municipal enterprise, hereinafter “the Cēsis hospital”). Caesarean section was used, with the applicant’s consent, because uterine rupture had occurred during labour. 7.  In the course of that surgery the surgeon performed tubal ligation (surgical contraception) without the applicant’s consent. 8.  On 4 February 2005, after her attempt to achieve an out-of-court settlement with the hospital had failed, the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the hospital, seeking to recover damages for the unauthorised tubal ligation. In December of 2006 her claim was upheld and she was awarded compensation in the amount of 10,000 Latvian lati for the unlawful sterilisation. 9.  On 19 February 2004 the director of the Cēsis hospital wrote to the Inspectorate of Quality Control for Medical Care and Fitness for Work (hereinafter “the MADEKKI”), requesting it to “evaluate the treatment received by [the applicant] during childbirth in accordance with the legislation in force in 1997”. The MADEKKI initiated an administrative procedure on the following day. The administrative inquiry concerned the applicant’s health care and in particular the gynaecological and childbirth assistance she had been provided from 1996 to 2003. In the process of that inquiry the MADEKKI requested and received medical files from three different medical institutions, containing detailed information about the applicant’s health over that period. 10.  In April 2004 M.Z., a MADEKKI staff member, telephoned the applicant and informed her of the on-going inquiry. M.Z. invited the applicant to comment on the case, which she declined to do, referring the MADEKKI to her legal representative, Ms Olsena, instead. During the conversation M.Z. allegedly admonished the applicant for wanting to sue the hospital for damages, and told her that she herself was to blame for her sterilisation. 11.  On 7 May 2004 Ms Olsena asked the MADEKKI for information on the legal grounds for, and the factual circumstances of, the inquiry. 12.  On 14 May 2004 the MADEKKI issued a report concerning the medical treatment given to the applicant during childbirth in 1997. The report contained medical details about the applicant of a particularly private and sensitive character. It concluded that no laws had been violated during the applicant’s antenatal care or during childbirth. A summary of the findings of the report was sent to the director of the Cēsis hospital on 21 May 2004. 13.  On 18 May 2004 the MADEKKI answered Ms Olsena’s questions concerning the administrative inquiry, setting out its opinion on the legal basis for it and providing information on the steps that had been taken in the course of the inquiry. 14.  The applicant’s representative lodged a claim with the Administrative District Court, alleging that the MADEKKI had initiated the inquiry unlawfully, since in essence its purpose had been to help the Cēsis hospital to gather evidence for the impending litigation, which was outside the MADEKKI’s remit. It was also alleged that the MADEKKI had acted unlawfully in requesting and receiving information about the applicant’s health, as it had violated the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. That right had been further violated when the MADEKKI unlawfully transferred the applicant’s data to the Cēsis hospital. Lastly, the court was requested to annul an administrative act – the MADEKKI’s report – since its findings were erroneous. Compensation in the amount of 500 Latvian lati was requested in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 15.  On 12 May 2005 the Administrative District Court adopted a judgment by which it terminated the proceedings with regard to the request to annul the MADEKKI report, as in the court’s opinion the report did not create any specific rights or obligations for the applicant and thus could not be considered an administrative act, and dismissed the remainder of the application as ill-founded. 16.  Counsel for the applicant appealed and on 16 June 2006 the Administrative Regional Court adopted a judgment by which it upheld in full the first-instance court’s judgment and endorsed that court’s reasoning, essentially equating the activities of the MADEKKI with the provision of health care, which, according to domestic law, was a legitimate reason for gathering personal data. 17.  On 8 February 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant, in which reference was made, inter alia, to Article 8 of the Convention and to the cases of Z v. Finland (25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑I) and M.S. v. Sweden (27 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV). 18.  The Senate agreed with the lower courts that the MADEKKI report could not be considered an administrative act. It further considered that this report was not an action of a public authority (faktiskā rīcība) and thus was not amenable to review in administrative courts. 19.  It thus remained for the Senate to address the applicant’s claims that the MADEKKI’s actions in preparing the report had been unlawful. In this regard the Senate considered that the Medical Treatment Law gave the MADEKKI the right to examine the quality of medical care provided in medical institutions not only upon receiving a corresponding complaint from a patient but also when a request for such examination had been submitted by a medical institution, which had an obligation to protect the interests of the society so that, should any irregularities be found by the MADEKKI, they might be eliminated and their recurrence with respect to other patients avoided in the future. 20.  The Senate agreed with the applicant that the processing of sensitive data concerning her constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention. The Senate then went on to summarise the findings of the Strasbourg Court in the two cases invoked by the applicant, emphasising in particular that the Convention left to the States a wide margin of appreciation in balancing the confidentiality of medical data and the necessity to preserve patients’ confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general. 21.  The Senate further held that both the Medical Treatment Law and the Personal Data Protection Law contained exceptions that permitted the MADEKKI to collect and process the otherwise confidential medical data. The former listed such exceptions explicitly (see paragraph 30 below), while the latter allowed processing of medical data for the purposes of medical treatment or the provision or administration of heath care services (see paragraph 28 below) or if processing of personal data was necessary for a system administrator to carry out his legal duties (see paragraph 29 below). The Senate continued as follows: “according to [the law] the MADEKKI has a duty to control the quality of medical care. In order to carry out such control, the MADEKKI requires information about the patient and his care”. 22.  The Senate concluded as follows:\n“Taking into account the aforementioned, the [Senate] finds that restrictions to a person’s private life connected to gathering and processing of sensitive personal data are provided for by law. When regulating this question, the legislator has already assessed the aim and proportionality of such restrictions, as well as has provided for safeguards against unjustified disclosure of the above-mentioned data. Consequently [the applicant’s] argument that the Regional Court ought to have assessed the aim and proportionality of the restriction is unfounded.\nAdditionally the [Senate] considers that the Regional Court has correctly interpreted and applied the above-mentioned legal provisions and has come to the correct conclusion that the MADEKKI, in order to carry out the control of the quality of medical care, which it is competent to do, had a right to receive and process [the applicant’s] sensitive data without asking for her consent and that the MADEKKI has acted within its sphere of competence and in accordance with the provisions of the law concerning the processing of sensitive personal data. The MADEKKI used the information it had collected about [the applicant] in order to carry out its functions, namely, to control the quality of the medical care provided to [the applicant], while to the Cēsis hospital it only handed over its conclusions concerning the legality of the doctors’ actions, which did not contain [the applicant’s] sensitive data.” 23.  For these reasons the Senate decided to uphold the lower courts’ decisions. 24.  Section 10 of the Medical Treatment Law (Ārstniecības likums) at the relevant time provided that the MADEKKI was the institution responsible for monitoring the quality of medical care provided in medical institutions. 25.  The MADEKKI’s work at the relevant time was governed in more detail by its statute (nolikums), which had been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. The statute provided that the MADEKKI was a government institution, whose main functions were to inspect and monitor the professional quality of health care in medical institutions irrespective of their ownership status (paragraph 1). Paragraph 3 of the statute listed the principal functions of the MADEKKI, such as to examine complaints in order to protect the rights of patients (paragraph 3.3), to oversee and issue reports concerning the professional quality of medical care in the event of complaints (paragraph 3.4), to issue reports on the quality of medical care in medical institutions (paragraph 3.6) and the like. 26.  According to its statute the MADEKKI had a right to carry out scheduled (“plānveida”) checks on the quality of medical care as well as to carry out the required checks in response to complaints and requests (paragraph 4.1). Paragraph 4.2 authorised the MADEKKI “to request from private individuals and officials documents and information concerning questions within its field of competence”. If the MADEKKI found that laws had been broken in the course of providing health care, it was authorised to apply administrative fines and issue warnings, as well as to give appropriate recommendations to doctors and administrators of medical institutions. 27.  Lastly, section 72 of the MADEKKI statute provided that its staff had to maintain confidentiality with regard to any information obtained in the performance of their professional duties. 28.  The Personal Data Protection Law (Fizisko personu datu aizsardzības likums) provides, in section 11, that the processing (which is defined as any activities with personal data, including collecting, registering, using, and so on) of sensitive personal data (including information about a person’s health) is permitted only after having received written consent from the data subject. Without such consent personal data may be processed only in a limited number of situations, including “if ... necessary for the purposes of medical treatment [or] the provision or administration of heath care services” (section 11(5)). 29.  Section 7 of the Personal Data Protection Law provided more generally that processing of personal data was allowed only if that law did not provide otherwise and if at least one of the other conditions was present. One of the additional conditions was that the processing of the data was necessary for a system administrator to carry out his legal duties (section 7(3)). A “system administrator” for the purposes of this Law was “a natural or legal person who determines the aims of a data processing system and the means of processing [of the data]”. 30.  As in force at the relevant time, section 50 of the Medical Treatment Law provided that information concerning patients’ treatment and diagnosis could only be provided to a limited number of institutions, including the MADEKKI.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant, who was born in 1974 and is a citizen of Afghanistan, left Afghanistan on an unspecified date and entered Bulgaria in 1998. 7.  On an unspecified date the first applicant unsuccessfully sought asylum in Bulgaria. The terms of his application, the reasons for the refusal and the relevant dates have not been substantiated by the first applicant. 8.  Since 1999 the first applicant has attended the Bulgarian Church of God, a Baptist Church in Sofia. In 2001 he was baptised. 9.  The first applicant has two children born in Bulgaria in 2003 and 2005 (the third and fourth applicants). Their mother (the second applicant), born in 1982, whom the first applicant married in 2004, is an Armenian national who has had a permanent residence permit in Bulgaria since an unspecified date. According to the first and second applicants, their first child, born in 2003, has no citizenship and their second child, born in 2005, is a national of Afghanistan. 10.  In August 2003 the first applicant submitted a second application for asylum. By a decision of 17 March 2004 he was granted refugee status in Bulgaria on the ground that he risked persecution in Afghanistan on account of his conversion from Islam to Christianity. The short decision stated in its relevant part that according to information from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, conversion to Christianity was “punishable by death in all Afghanistan”. No further details were stated. 11.  On 6 December 2005 the Director of the National Security Service, at that time a department of the Ministry of the Interior, issued an order withdrawing Mr M.’s residence permit, ordering his expulsion and imposing a ten-year ban on his re-entering Bulgaria on the ground that he was a “serious threat to national security”. Factual grounds were not indicated. The Director relied on an internal document of 24 November 2005 which stated that the first applicant was involved in trafficking of migrants, mainly citizens of Afghanistan, through Turkey and Bulgaria to Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Hungary. The Director considered that this activity was as such a threat to national security. Also, it could be used for the transit of terrorists and thus discredit Bulgaria internationally. 12.  The deportation order of 6 December 2005 did not specify the country to which the first applicant should be deported. It appears that there was no legal requirement to do so and that in practice deportation orders did not indicate the country of destination. 13.  The order of 6 December 2005 also stated that the first applicant should be detained pending expulsion. 14.  On 12 October 2006 another government agency, the Migration Directorate of the national police, issued an order for the first applicant’s detention pending expulsion. The relationship between that order and the order of 6 December 2005, which also required Mr M.’s detention, has not been clarified. 15.  According to the order of 12 October 2006, Mr M.’s detention was necessary since he posed a serious threat to national security, and also in view of the fact that there was no (direct) transport connection between Bulgaria and the first applicant’s country of origin, which prevented the immediate execution of the measure against him. 16.  The orders of 6 December 2005 and 12 October 2006 were both immediately enforceable. 17.  On 18 October 2006 the first applicant was arrested and detained at the Centre for Interim Detention of Aliens. He remained there until his release on 3 July 2009 (see paragraph 43 below). 18.  The first applicant has not been deported. 19.  According to a statement by the Director of Migration, prepared for the present proceedings and submitted in 2009, Mr M.’s deportation was impeded by the fact that he did not have a document valid for international travel, the “lack of transport connections” and his refusal to cooperate. The Director further explained, without providing details, that several possible destinations for his expulsion had been considered and that unsuccessful attempts had been made to remove the obstacles to the execution of the deportation order. 20.  At least until April 2007, the first applicant did in fact have a document valid for international travel. He possessed a special refugee passport, issued by the Bulgarian authorities on 16 December 2004, which was valid for international travel until 6 April 2007. The existence of this document, including its number and date of issue, was mentioned in the deportation and detention order of 6 December 2005. It is unclear whether the first applicant presented his refugee passport to the authorities or concealed it, as suggested by the Government. 21.  In February 2007 the Migration Directorate of the police wrote to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Sofia requesting that an identity document be issued to Mr M. It reiterated the request in September 2008 and January 2009. By letter of 30 January 2009 the Embassy of Afghanistan informed the Migration Directorate that it was unable to issue the first applicant with a passport since he had expressly stated at a meeting with Embassy representatives that he did not want to have a passport issued and did not want to return to Afghanistan. In those circumstances, the Embassy would not participate in the first applicant’s forced expulsion. 22.  In a letter of 14 October 2008 to the first applicant’s representative, in reply to his request for release, the Director of the National Security Agency stated that Mr M.’s detention continued to be necessary despite the Court’s interim measures decision (see paragraph 4 above). That was so because:\n“[I]n accordance with the document from the [Court], the [first applicant] should not be deported to Afghanistan. In execution of the expulsion order, he may be deported either to his country of origin or to a third country, where there is no danger for his life and health. The fact that the [deportation] order has not been enforced is the result of the obstinate conduct of [Mr M.] manifested by his frustrating and hampering his deportation from Bulgaria.” 23.  On 20 October 2006 the first applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court against the order of 6 December 2005 of the National Security Service and requested a stay of enforcement pending the determination of his appeal. In these proceedings he was legally represented. 24.  He argued, inter alia, that mere suppositions, not facts, had served as the basis for the impugned measures, there being no evidence of unlawful activities and no criminal proceedings having been brought against him. He also submitted that the expulsion order was in breach of the prohibition to deport a person to a country where his life was under threat. The first applicant further argued that his expulsion interfered with his right to respect for his family life. He also challenged the order for his detention. 25.  The defendant, the National Security Service, submitted a copy of the internal document of 24 November 2005 which had served as the basis for the expulsion order (see paragraph 11 above). It also filed submissions, maintaining, inter alia, that the impugned order did not contravene section 44a of the Aliens Act. 26.  On an unspecified date Mr M.’s representative wrote to the Migration Directorate insisting that the deportation order should be revoked in view of Mr M.’s refugee status in Bulgaria. 27.  By letter of 1 February 2007 the Director of Migration replied that the order was lawful. He stated, inter alia:\n“In accordance with section 67(3) of the Refugees and Asylum Act, execution of the [deportation order] should not be suspended where there are grounds to believe that the alien seeking or having obtained protection imperils national security.\nIn accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, ‘no Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.\nThe benefit of this provision cannot, however, be claimed by a refugee about whom there are grounds to believe that he imperils the national security of the country where he is ...” 28.  In October 2007, as a result of legislative amendments, the examination of the first applicant’s appeal against the order of 6 December 2005 fell within the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court. 29.  On 30 October 2007 a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court refused the first applicant’s request for a stay of enforcement. The court devoted no attention to his allegations about the risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan and his request to stay the execution of the deportation order but stated merely that the alleged interference with family life did not warrant a stay of enforcement of the order for his detention. That decision was amenable to appeal before a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. It is unclear whether the first applicant appealed. 30.  By a judgment of 9 June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s appeal against his expulsion and detention. 31.  The court noted that an internal Ministry of the Interior document dated 24 November 2005 and submitted by the defendant stated that Mr M. had acted in a way that presented a threat to national security. The court did not accept the first applicant’s arguments that it should engage in detailed examination of the evidence allegedly supporting the view of the Ministry that he posed a threat to Bulgaria’s national security. It stated:\n“[The document of 24 November 2005] must be regarded as an official certification which contains data collected by the National Security Service in the exercise of its functions. It has been issued in accordance with section 33 of the Protection of Classified Information Act. It contains evidence and data which have been assessed by the relevant administrative authority as sufficient grounds for ordering [Mr M.’s deportation] for having engaged in unlawful activities threatening national security... It follows that the impugned order is lawful.” 32.  The court rejected the first applicant’s argument that the deportation order should be revoked since he lived in Bulgaria by virtue of his refugee status. The court stated that the domestic provisions regulating deportation did not provide for discretion and their interpretation could not vary on the basis of such factors as residence status. 33.  The court further noted that Mr M. had been granted refugee status on the basis of his allegation that he had converted from Islam to Christianity and was afraid of persecution in Afghanistan. The court observed that there existed evidence of a danger to the first applicant’s health and life in relation to his conversion. It found, however, that this danger did not stem from the Afghan State and that the applicant had not provided evidence that the authorities would be unable to protect him. Therefore, section 44a of the Aliens Act, which reflected the guarantees of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention, did not apply. 34.  As regards the order for the first applicant’s detention, the Supreme Administrative Court found that it was not amenable to judicial review as it concerned a measure undertaken in the execution of the expulsion order and not a separate administrative decision. 35.  On 26 October 2006 the first applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court against the detention order of 12 October 2006 issued by the Migration Directorate. 36.  In these proceedings, on 21 December 2006 the Sofia City Court refused the first applicant’s request for a stay of enforcement of the detention order. It found, inter alia, that there was no evidence that its immediate enforcement would cause irreparable harm. The refusal was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 March 2007. 37.  In the proceedings on the merits, the first applicant argued that his lengthy detention was unlawful and in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and that it disproportionately affected his family life. 38.  By a judgment of 2 April 2009 the Sofia City Court found that the order of 12 October 2006 for the first applicant’s detention had been signed by an unauthorised official and declared it null and void. The court held, however, that it did not have the power to order the first applicant’s release. No appeal was lodged against that judgment. It became final on 2 June 2009. 39.  On 15 May 2009 the Aliens Act was amended with the aim of incorporating into Bulgarian law Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 40.  Under the new section 46a of the Aliens Act, the director of the detention centre for aliens is required to submit to the relevant court a list of persons who have been detained for more than six months and the court must decide of its own motion on their continued detention or release. 41.  In accordance with this new procedure, the situation of a number of aliens, including the first applicant, was reviewed by the Sofia Administrative Court in a decision of 12 June 2009. The decision was presented to the first applicant to read but he was not given a copy of it. 42.  On 30 June 2009 the Director of the Migration Directorate of the national police, referring to the decision of the Sofia Administrative Court of 12 June 2009, issued an order which revoked the order of 12 October 2006 for the first applicant’s detention and imposed on him the obligation to report daily to the local police station. The judgment of the Sofia City Court of 2 April 2009 (see paragraph 38 above) was not mentioned. 43.  The order of 30 June 2009 was served on the applicant on 3 July 2009 and he was released on the same day. 44.  By a decision of 5 October 2009 the third and fourth applicants were granted refugee status in Bulgaria. The grounds for that decision have not been communicated to the Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The facts of each case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  Mr Thomas William Hobbs is a United Kingdom national, born in 1921 and living in Southampton. 9.  The applicant’s wife died on 25 February 1998. On 11 October 2000 he contacted the Inland Revenue (“IR”) and applied for widow’s bereavement allowance (“WBA”: see paragraph 21 below) for the years 1998/9 and 1999/2000. He was informed that he did not qualify for the tax allowance, since he was a man and the law provided only for payments to widows. 10.  Mr Richard was born on 21 May 1957 and lives in Dunfermline. He was widowed on 14 October 1995. There were two children of the marriage, born in 1987 and 1993. 11.  In around November 1995 the applicant telephoned the IR requesting an allowance equivalent to that received by a widow. The IR told him that he was ineligible for WBA. The applicant applied again by letter dated 19 July 2000, but by a letter dated 3 August 2000 he was informed the WBA was not available for widowers. 12.  In around June 1997 the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency (“BA”) for social security benefits equivalent to those to which a widow would have been entitled (see paragraphs 29-37 below). His claim was refused by the BA on 18 June 1997. The applicant wrote on 22 June 1997 requesting an appeal against this decision and requesting that the appeal be heard after the Court had decided the lead case on widowers’ benefits. On 8 May 2000 the applicant requested that his appeal be proceeded with. It was rejected on 15 May 2000. 13.  The applicant began living with another woman in October 1999. In August 2000 he reapplied for widows’ benefits and was refused again on 16 August 2000. 14.  Mr Walsh was born on 19 July 1955 and lives in London. He was widowed on 1 March 1997. There were two children of the marriage, born on 22 February 1991 and 29 December 1992. 15.  On 30 May 2000, the applicant applied to the BA for social security benefits equivalent to those which a widow in his circumstances would receive. He was refused by a letter dated 6 June 2000. 16.  On 3 July 2000 the applicant applied to the IR for a WBA or equivalent. He was refused by a letter dated 11 July 2000. 17.  The applicant was born on 20 October 1958 and lives in Maidenhead. His wife died on 17 October 1995. There were three children of the marriage, born 18 November 1987, 22 August 1989 and 22 April 1992. 18.  In his application form, which was lodged with the Court by facsimile under cover of an introductory letter dated 29 September 2000, there was a general complaint about the discriminatory nature of the widow’s social security and taxation systems, in standard paragraphs included in all the widowers’ applications submitted by the applicant’s solicitors. In the section dealing with the particular facts of the applicant’s case, there was no mention of any contact with the IR concerning WBA. An amended application form was sent to the Court under cover of a letter dated 15 March 2001. A paragraph had been added, stating that in or around December 1995 or January 1996 the applicant had made enquiries at his local tax office about entitlement to tax rebates or allowances following bereavement, and had been told that he had no entitlement. Reference was made in the amended application form also to “the decision of the Inland Revenue made in July 1996 which is ongoing”, and on 26 March 2001 the applicant sent the Court a copy of a letter of refusal from the IR dated 9 July 1996. 19.  On 30 May 2000 the applicant applied to the BA for survivor’s benefits. He was refused by a letter dated 5 June 2000. This information was included in the application form lodged on 29 September 2000. 20.  In their observations on admissibility dated 4 October 2002, the Government informed the Court that the applicant had also made a formal claim to the IR for WBA on 29 September 2000, which had been refused on 3 October 2000. This was confirmed by the applicant in his observations dated 28 November 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Mirosław Zieliński, is a Polish national who was born in 1953 and is currently detained in Włocławek Prison. 6.  From 18 November 2004 until 24 July 2008 the applicant was detained in Łowicz Prison. It is not clear whether on the latter date he was released or transferred to another detention facility. He is currently detained in Włocławek Prison. 7.  The applicant submitted that in Łowicz Prison he had been held in overcrowded and dirty cells. During the period of his detention in Łowicz, the applicant had occupied a total of seventeen cells, including cell no. 202 in wing II, in which he had been detained from 26 October 2007 until 24 July 2008. 8.  The Government acknowledged that during almost the entire period of the applicant’s detention in Łowicz Prison the space per person in his cells had been inferior to 3 square metres. They submitted that the cells had been clean and that the applicant had had one shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 9.  The applicant also complained about the practice of mixing healthy prisoners with those who were infected with transmissible diseases, such as HIV or hepatitis C (HCV). Prisoners were not informed by the authorities about such state of affairs. On one occasion the applicant was told by his fellow cellmate that the latter was HIV-positive. To that effect the applicant submitted a statement dated 13 February 2008, in which a certain P.P., a person claiming to be an HIV-positive prisoner, certified that on 12 February 2008 he had been placed in the applicant’s cell no. 202 wing II. P.P. further stated that neither the applicant nor other inmates had been aware of his illness and that he, in fact, had been instructed by the prison administration not to reveal his HIV status. 10.  The applicant complained that he had been exposed to the risk of contamination because he had shared his cell with infected persons and he had not been informed about it. He also had not been advised of the dangers relating to HIV and HCV and of the means of protection against it. Moreover, he submitted that from the moment when he had found out that his fellow cellmates were either infected or could potentially be infected, he feared for his well-being. 11.  In 2001 the applicant suffered a fracture of the skull and underwent surgery in which a small part of his skull was removed. In addition, prior to his detention he had been hospitalised on several occasions because of his epilepsy, chronic ischemic heart disease (choroba wieńcowa) and thinning of the cervical cortex (zanik kory mózgowej). Prior to his detention in Łowicz Prison the applicant was under regular medical supervision; he received pharmacological treatment and had numerous medical check-ups. On 1 July 2004 he was tested for HIV and HCV. On 12 July 2004 he underwent coronary catheterisation (koronografia). 12.  On 20 May 2004 the applicant was certified as “temporarily disabled” with a mild degree of disability (umiarkowany stopień niepełnosprawności). It was indicated that the applicant occasionally required the help of a third person in his daily life. The certificate was valid until 20 May 2007. 13.  The parties did not furnish any medical reports or certificates related either to the period when the applicant was detained in Łowicz Prison or after his release. 14.  The applicant lodged several complaints about overcrowding in Łowicz Prison. In reply the authorities acknowledged the existence of the problem and pointed to its systemic nature. On the other hand the applicant did not bring a civil action in tort to seek compensation for the alleged infringement of his personal rights on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of his detention. 15.  The applicant instituted three sets of criminal proceedings against the prison administration and filed penitentiary complaints in relation to the alleged fact that from March until October 2006 and from March 2006 until February 2008 he had been forced to share his cell with inmates infected with HIV and HCV. 16.  On 8 December 2006 the Łowicz District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) discontinued the criminal inquiry into the allegations described above. It was established that, as a matter of law, namely because of medical secrecy and antidiscrimination laws, the prison administration had never been informed about prisoners’ health. In consequence, potentially ill prisoners were mixed with potentially healthy prisoners. The practice, however, could not be considered as criminal negligence on the part of the prison administration. 17.  A similar decision was issued by the Łowicz District Prosecutor on 30 April 2007. On 26 September 2007 after the applicant’s interlocutory appeal the decision was upheld by the Łowicz District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). In addition to the reasoning presented in the prosecutor’s 2006 decision, the court relied on the submissions of the doctor in charge of the prison hospital, who had stated that mixing healthy prisoners with those who were HIV or HCV positive did not create any health risks to the prior group. 18.  Lastly on 25 June 2008 the Łowicz District Prosecutor refused to open an inquiry into similar allegations related to the longer period from March 2006 until February 2008. On October 2008 the Łowicz District Court upheld that decision. 19.  The applicant lodged at least eleven complaints with State authorities about the quality of medical care in Łowicz Prison. It appears that he also tried to institute criminal proceedings against the medical staff and administration of Łowicz Prison and applied for a prison break on health grounds. 20.  The penitentiary authorities considered the applicant’s allegations groundless. It was found that the applicant had received good quality medical care and that he had been under the regular supervision of medical specialists. On the other hand, it was repeatedly stated that the applicant had been a difficult and vexatious patient who did not cooperate with prison doctors and did not follow their recommendations. 21.  On 28 September 2006 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) rejected the applicant’s application for a prison break which he claimed to need in order to undergo surgery. The applicant wished to have an implant which would fill the bone gap created in his skull as a result of his 2001 surgery. The regional court considered the procedure which was sought by the applicant unnecessary in the light of the fact that he was under regular medical supervision and received adequate medical treatment. 22.  On an unspecified date the applicant was convicted by a criminal court of the first-instance. He appealed against that judgment and informed the authorities that, despite being represented by a lawyer, he wished to be brought to the appellate hearing under escort from the remand centre in order to present his case in person. 23.  On 15 March 2006 the Płock Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request. The court reasoned that the applicant’s presence was unnecessary in the light of the fact that his legal-aid lawyer was under a duty to participate in the hearing and that the applicant had already presented his case to the appeal court in writing. 24.  The applicant did not submit any further information about the course and the outcome of the proceedings in question. 25.  The applicant’s first letter to the Court, which was dated 1 January 2005, was deposited by the applicant with the administration of Łowicz Prison on 3 January 2005 and was received by the Registry of the Court on 21 January 2005. The envelope of that letter bears a stamp reading “Censored Deliver to the addressee Date ... Judge” (Ocenzurowano Doręczyć adresatowi Data ... Sędzia). The date of 14 January 2005 has been written by hand on the dotted line. An illegible signature is visible under the heading “Judge”. 26.  In his second letter to the Court, which was dated 7 February 2005, the applicant complained about the regular withholding and monitoring of his correspondence by the authorities. That letter was received by the Registry of the Court on 21 February 2005. The envelope of the letter in question bears a stamp and a signature identical to those described above. The date of 17 February 2005 has been written by hand on the dotted line. 27.  The other letters which were sent by the applicant to the Court do not bear any similar stamps.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1923, 1959 and 1963, respectively, and live in Casteltermini. 5.  The applicants are the joint owners of a plot of land designated as agricultural land in Casteltermini. The land in issue was recorded in the land register as Folio no. 40, Parcel no. 185. 6.  On 13 July 1989 the regional councillor for public works issued a decree authorising the Municipality to take possession, through an expedited procedure and on the basis of a public-interest declaration, of a portion of the applicants’ land in order to begin the construction of a road. 7.  On 4 January 1991 the authorities took physical possession of the land. 8.  By a writ served on 23 June 1998, the applicants brought an action for damages against the Casteltermini Municipality before the Agrigento District Court. They alleged that the occupation of the land was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without there having been a formal expropriation of the land and payment of compensation. They claimed a sum corresponding to the market value of the land and a further sum in damages for the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation. 9.  On an unspecified date the court ordered an expert valuation of the land. In a report submitted on 17 September 2001 the expert concluded that the occupied land covered a surface area of 124.87 square metres and confirmed that it could be classified as building land. He further concluded that the market value of the land on the date the occupation became unlawful, which he identified as having occurred on 13 July 1994, corresponded to 6.20 euros (EUR) per square metre, for a total of EUR 773.88. 10.  By a judgment delivered on 22 January 2003 and filed with the court registry on 23 January 2003, the Agrigento District Court declared that the possession of the land, which had been initially authorised, had become unlawful as of 4 June 1993. It found that the land had been irreversibly transformed by the public works. As a result, in accordance with the constructive-expropriation rule (occupazione acquisitiva or accessione invertita), the applicants had been deprived of their property, by virtue of its irreversible alteration, on the date on which the possession had ceased to be lawful. In the light of those considerations, the court concluded that the applicants were entitled to compensation in consideration for the loss of ownership caused by the unlawful occupation. 11.  The court drew on the expert valuation to conclude that the land could be classified as agricultural land and that its market value on the date the occupation had become unlawful corresponded to EUR 773.88. However, in contrast with the expert’s finding, the court reiterated that the occupation had become unlawful as of 4 June 1993. 12.  Therefore, the court held that the applicants were entitled to compensation in the sum of EUR 773.88, to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest. 13.  The court further awarded the applicants EUR 37.43 as compensation for the damage occasioned by the unavailability of the land during the period from the beginning of the lawful occupation (13 July 1989) until the date of loss of ownership (4 June 1993). 14.  The judgment became final in March 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1966. He is serving a life sentence without commutation in Lovech Prison. 6.  On 4 October 1993 the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention in Burgas Prison. 7.  On 25 July 1995 the Burgas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of murder and robbery and sentenced him to death. On 30 May 1997 a three‑member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld his conviction and sentence. On 22 July 1998 a five‑member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s petition for review. Throughout that time the applicant remained in Burgas Prison. 8.  Following the abolition of the death penalty in December 1998, on 25 January 1999 the Vice‑President of the Republic commuted the applicant’s sentence to one of life imprisonment without commutation. On 8 July 1999 the Burgas Regional Court ordered that the applicant’s sentence was to be served under the so‑called “special regime” (see paragraph 41 below). 9.  On 15 July 1999, when the Burgas Regional Court’s order of 8 July 1999 became final, the applicant was transferred to Lovech Prison, where he remains. Since that date he has been placed in different cells for different periods of time, each time with two or three other inmates. 10.  The applicant alleged that because of his detention regime he had been subjected to isolation. He also alleged that his cell, which he shared with three other inmates, measured ten square metres. The inmates were allowed to go to the toilet and wash three times a day, for ten to fifteen minutes each time. During the rest of the time they had to relieve themselves in a plastic bucket as the cell was not equipped with toilet facilities or a sink. 11.  The applicant also alleged that the food served in the prison was of poor quality and that he had found insects and other objects in it. 12.  The witnesses heard in various proceedings for damages brought by the applicant, including inmates detained in the same prison (see paragraphs 20, 26 and 35 below) and kitchen staff, stated that during certain unidentified periods the applicant had had no access to newspapers or books, and had not been allowed to visit the prison chapel, go to concerts or attend rehabilitative courses. He had had no access to the prison canteen and his food had been served in his cell. One inmate stated that during a period of time there had been no fresh air or natural light in the applicant’s cell. The witnesses also corroborated the applicant’s allegations that he only had access to toilets and running water three times a day and had to use a plastic bucket the rest of the time. The kitchen staff stated that the food served in Lovech Prison met the applicable quality standards. 13.  On 21 April 2004 the applicant complained to the prison governor about the conditions of his detention. The governor replied that in view of the applicant’s regime of detention, constant access to the toilet facilities could not be provided but inmates were allowed access to the communal toilets several times a day. As for the dimensions of the cells and their being overcrowded, the governor admitted that this was a problem in all Bulgarian prisons and stated that the administration of Lovech Prison was trying to provide the recommended minimum living space to every detainee. He disputed the allegation that prison food was of poor quality. 14.  According to a report drawn up by the prison governor on 15 November 2009, the applicant was detained under the so‑called “special regime” (see paragraph 41 below). During most of the time that he had spent in Lovech Prison the applicant had been held in cell no. 18, which measured 4 by 3.15 metres and had two windows. At first inmates had had access to toilets and running water three and, after October 2005, four times a day, in accordance with a schedule drawn up by the governor. In the autumn of 2008 toilet facilities had been installed in all life prisoners’ cells and all window frames had been changed. 15.  The governor further stated, without specifying time periods, that the applicant had been entitled to go into the open air once a day, for one hour, and to visit the library and take part in literary and board‑game (chess and draughts) competitions. He had received an award in one such competition. According to the governor, the applicant had regular access to newspapers and magazines. He received food prepared in accordance with the applicable regulations and standards, as did all other prisoners. He had access to medical assistance, which he could receive in his cell or in the prison’s medical wing. 16.  The governor also stated that the applicant’s “special regime” had not yet been changed to a lighter one because of numerous breaches of prison discipline on his part. 17.  The applicant did not dispute those statements. 18.  The Court has not been provided with information as to the conditions of the applicant’s detention after the refurbishment of Lovech Prison in the autumn of 2008. Nor has the applicant provided information about the regime under which he was placed after November 2009. 19.  On 27 October 2004 the applicant brought a claim against the Ministry of Justice under section 1(1) of the State Liability for Damage Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act” – see paragraph 61 below). He sought 4,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (2,045.17 euros (EUR)) in damages in respect of the distress and humiliation resulting from the poor conditions of his detention in Lovech Prison between August 1999 and October 2004. 20.  The judges who dealt with the case visited the prison and inspected the cells in which the applicant had been held. They also heard witnesses, ordered expert reports and gathered other evidence. 21.  On 8 July 2005 the Lovech District Court partly allowed the claim. It found, by reference to this Court’s case‑law, that the failure to ensure that inmates had access to toilet facilities and running water amounted to inhuman treatment and was incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention and domestic law. It held that having to use a bucket for toilet needs, in a cell measuring about ten square metres, without sufficient ventilation and in the presence of others, diminished human dignity and posed a serious risk to health. The court went on to say that the applicant’s allegations that the food was of poor quality and did not meet the minimum standards were unsubstantiated as the food served in prison was prepared in compliance with the Ministry of Health requirements and portions were of the recommended size. 22.  In assessing the quantum of damages, the court noted that the applicant had failed to establish the extent to which he had been affected psychologically and the degree to which he had suffered morally as a result of the conditions of his detention. Ruling in equity, the court awarded the applicant BGN 280 (EUR 143.16) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for the period between August 1999 and October 2004, finding that the claim in relation to the period before August 1999 had become time‑barred. It applied section 10(2) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 65 below) and ordered the applicant to pay BGN 158.80 (EUR 81.19) in court fees in respect of the part of his claim which it had dismissed. 23.  In a final judgment of 6 January 2006 the Lovech Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. 24.  In above‑mentioned proceedings, the applicant acted together with a co‑claimant, Mr Plamen Radkov, who was detained in the same prison and for whom the outcome of the proceedings was similar. The courts examined the applicant’s and Mr Radkov’s claims jointly and the judgments rendered were in respect of both of them. In a judgment of 10 February 2011 this Court found breaches of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention on account of the conditions of Mr Radkov’s detention in Lovech Prison between March 2000 and October 2004 and the lack of effective remedies in that respect (see Radkov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 18382/05, §§ 45‑56, 10 February 2011). 25.  On 20 September 2004 the applicant brought another claim against the Ministry of Justice under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 61 below). He sought BGN 20,000 (EUR 10,225.84) in damages in respect of the anguish suffered as a result of his isolation between October 1993 and September 2004, initially as a prisoner on death row and then as a life prisoner under the “special regime”. 26.  The courts heard witnesses, one of whom had been detained in Burgas Prison and the others in Lovech Prison, and gathered other evidence. 27.  On 14 April 2005 the Lovech Regional Court dismissed the claim, finding, inter alia, that the “special regime” applied to the applicant had been prescribed by law and that the conditions of his detention did not amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. 28.  On an appeal by the applicant, on 14 November 2005 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment. It found that the applicant had been kept in very strict isolation from October 1993 until September 2004, initially as a prisoner on death row and then under the “special regime” applicable to life prisoners. It also found that, during the applicant’s pre‑trial detention in Burgas Prison, his cell had had no toilet facilities but he had had free access to toilets outside the cell. Since 1999, when the applicant had been transferred to Lovech Prison, he had shared a cell with one or two inmates and had been allowed to use the toilet facilities three times a day; the rest of the time he had had to relieve himself in a bucket in the cell. The cell had had only one window, which had constantly remained closed, preventing the flow of fresh air. Furthermore, until 2001 the window had been covered with tin blinds, which had not allowed natural light into the cell. The applicant had not been given any newspapers. The court found that none of the above measures had been required under the legislation or regulations governing the execution of sentences; in particular, the requirement that life prisoners be kept under heightened supervision (see paragraph 41 below). Those conditions had been attributable to unlawful omissions of the prison administration, had amounted to ill‑treatment, and had caused the applicant harm. 29.  The court ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay the applicant BGN 2,000 (EUR 1,022.58) in damages. In assessing the quantum of damages, the court noted that as a result of the poor conditions of his detention the applicant had endured, in particular, “negative feelings caused by the humiliation and debasement”. He had however failed to prove that those conditions had adversely affected his health. 30.  On appeal, in a final judgment of 7 August 2007 (реш. № 330 от 7 август 2007 г. по гр. д. № 92/2006 г., ВКС) the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment. 31.  The courts ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of BGN 1,080 (EUR 552.20) in respect of the part of his claim which they had dismissed, in accordance with section 10(2) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 65 below). 32.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant obtained a writ of execution and on 26 November 2007 requested payment. 33.  As he did not receive payment, on 9 April 2009 the applicant brought proceedings before the Sofia City Administrative Court, requesting the court to order the Ministry of Justice to pay the sums due under the writ of execution. At the time when the applicant filed his observations in the present case (25 March 2010) the proceedings were, following a dispute between various courts as to which was competent to deal with the case, still pending at first instance before the Sofia City Administrative Court. 34.  On 12 April 2006 the applicant brought a third claim under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 61 below). He sought BGN 10,500 (EUR 5,368.56) in damages in respect of the distress and humiliation resulting from the poor conditions of his detention in Lovech Prison between October 2004 and April 2006. 35.  The Sofia City Court heard witnesses and gathered other evidence. 36.  On 28 December 2007 the Sofia City Court found that during the period in question the applicant’s cells had not had toilet facilities or access to running water. The applicant had been allowed to go out of his cell and use such facilities three or four times a day, and had been required to use a bucket the rest of the time. The court found that that practice was in breach of domestic law and Article 3 of the Convention. It partly allowed the applicant’s claim, ordering the Ministry of Justice to pay him BGN 750 (EUR 383.47) in damages. It noted that applicant had been awarded damages in the two previous sets of proceedings in respect of the period preceding October 2004. In assessing the quantum of damages, the court took into account the duration of the period during which the applicant had lived in the conditions described above (one year and five months), the severity of the damage sustained, the applicant’s age and the lack of permanent or temporary damage to his health as a result of those conditions. Applying section 10(2) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 65 below), the court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 390 (EUR 199.40) in court fees in respect of the part of his claim which had been dismissed. 37.  The applicant appealed. 38.  It appears that, on 9 April 2009, the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in so far as the award of damages was concerned. As the applicant has not submitted a copy of that judgment, it is not clear whether the court quashed the part of the judgment which concerned the court fees (see paragraphs 67‑69 below). 39.  In a decision of 6 December 2010 (опр. № 1189 от 6 декември 2010 г. по гр. д. № 905/2010 г., ВКС, III г. о.) the Supreme Court of Cassation refused leave to appeal on points of law and the Sofia Court of Appeal’s judgment of 9 April 2009 became final.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  On 8 November 1993 the applicant commenced employment as an administrative assistant at the United States Embassy in London, in the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, which is a subsidiary of the Central Intelligence Agency. She was dismissed from her employment in February 1995. Following her dismissal the applicant issued proceedings against the United States Government in the North London Industrial Tribunal, claiming that her dismissal had been the result of sex discrimination contrary to sections 1(1)(a), 4(1)(d) and 6(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (see paragraph 15 below). In particular she alleged that she had been the victim of persistent sexual harassment from her supervisor and that working relationships had broken down in consequence. The United States Government defended the claim and did not, at any stage in these proceedings, claim State immunity. On 13 May 1996 the Tribunal upheld the applicant’s complaint. A compensation figure of GBP 12,000 was agreed between the parties. 11.  In June 1995, whilst her first claim in the Industrial Tribunal was still pending, the applicant applied for and obtained a fixed term 12 month contract as an administrative assistant within the Foreign Building Operations section of the Embassy. The contract was due to expire in June 1996. In June 1996 and August 1996 (after the finding in her favour by the Industrial Tribunal), the applicant applied for at least two of the following posts at the Embassy of the United States: secretary with the Office of Foreign Litigation of the United States Department of Justice, temporary secretary with the above office and temporary secretary with the International Marketing Centre, which is operated by the United States Foreign Commercial Service. On each occasion her application was unsuccessful. 12.  On 15 September 1996 the applicant issued a second application before the Industrial Tribunal. She claimed that the refusal of the Embassy to re-employ her in two of the above posts was a consequence of her previous successful sex discrimination claim, and accordingly constituted victimisation and discrimination within the meaning of sections 4 and 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 13.  By a letter of 10 January 1997, solicitors acting for the United States notified the Regional Secretary to the Industrial Tribunal that the United States Government intended to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under sections 1 and 16(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act 1978 (“the 1978 Act”: see paragraph 16 below). The letter enclosed an affidavit sworn by the First Secretary at the Embassy, deposing to the fact that each of the posts for which the applicant had applied were part of the administrative and technical staff of the Embassy, and accordingly fell within the ambit of the immunity imposed by section 16(1)(a) of the 1978 Act. 14.  On 6 February 1997 the applicant received the advice of counsel, to the effect that the United States Government were entitled to claim immunity under the 1978 Act, and that once immunity was properly asserted there was no means by which a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom could accept jurisdiction to entertain the application. Accordingly, the applicant was advised that she had no remedy in domestic law.  15.  The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) creates a statutory cause of action which arises when an employer treats an employee or a potential employee less favourably by reason of her sex (“sex discrimination”), or by reason of the fact that she has taken or intends to take proceedings against any person under the 1975 Act (“victimisation”).\nSection 1(1) of the Act defines “sex discrimination” as follows:\n“A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if:              (a)on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat a man ...”\nSection 4(1) of the Act defines “victimisation” as follows:\n“A person (‘the discriminator’) discriminates against another person (‘the person victimised’) in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if he treats the person victimised less favourably than in those circumstances he treats or would treat other persons, and does so by reason that the person victimised has:              (a)brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act, or  ...              (d)alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which ... would amount to a contravention of this Act or give rise to a claim under the Equal Pay Act 1970 ...”\nSection 6 of this Act defines the circumstances in which it is unlawful to discriminate against employees and applicants, on the grounds of sex discrimination or victimisation, as follows:\n“(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman:               (a)in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who should               be offered that employment, or ...              (c)by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.”               \n(2)It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her ...              (b)by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment.” 16.  The United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act 1978 provides, inter alia, as follows:\n“1(1)A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this Part of this Act.              …4(1)A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a contract of employment between the State and an individual where the contract was made in the United Kingdom or the work is to be wholly or partly performed there.              4(2)Subject to sub-sections (3) and (4) below, this section does not apply if-              (a)              at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is a national of the State concerned; or              (b)at the time when the contract was made the individual was neither a national of the United Kingdom nor habitually resident there; or              (c)the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing.4(3)Where the work is for an office, agency or establishment maintained by the State in the United Kingdom for commercial purposes, sub-section (2)(a) and (b) above do not exclude the application of this section unless the individual was, at the time when the contract was made, habitually resident in that State.              …16(1)This Part of this Act does not affect any immunity or privilege conferred by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 or the Consular Relations Act 1968; and:-              (a)Section 4 above does not apply to proceedings concerning the employment of the member of a mission within the meaning of the Convention scheduled to the said Act of 1964 or of the member of a consular post within the meaning of the Convention scheduled to said Act of 1968. ...” 17.  Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which is scheduled to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 provides the following definitions:\n“(b)the ‘members of the mission’ are the head of the mission and the members of staff of the mission;              (c)the ‘members of staff of the mission’ are the members of diplomatic staff or the administrative and technical staff, and of the service staff of the mission.              ...(f)the ‘members of the administrative and technical staff’ are the members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission.” 18.  The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (“the Basle Convention”), entered into force on 11 June 1976 after its ratification by three States. It has now been ratified by eight States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and signed by one other State (Portugal). It entered into force in respect of the United Kingdom on 4 October 1979, and provides, inter alia:\nArticle 5\n“1.A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a Court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a contract of employment between the State and an individual where the work has to be performed in the territory of the State of the forum.              2.Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:(a)the individual is a national of the employing State at the time when the proceedings were brought;              (b)at the time when the contract was entered into the individual was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually a resident in that State; or              (c)the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the Courts of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter.              3.Where the work is done for an office, agency or other establishment referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the present article apply only if, at the time the contract was entered into, the individual had his habitual residence in the Contracting State which employs him.”               \nArticle 32\n“Nothing in the present Convention shall affect privileges and immunities relating to the exercise of the functions of diplomatic missions and consular posts and of persons connected with them.” 19. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations ((1991), II(2) YBILC 13), provides at Article 11, paragraph 1, that:\n“a State cannot invoke immunity ... in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed in the territory of [the host] State.”\nHowever, this provision is specifically disapplied where “the subject of the proceedings is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of the individual” and where “the employee has been recruited to perform functions closely related to the exercise of governmental authority”.\nAlthough there is no explicit reference to employment at diplomatic or consular missions in these provisions, the commentary indicates that the latter exception was intended to apply in such a context and that all employees at such missions would be precluded from bringing suit on the basis of State immunity. 20.  The Committee on State Immunity of the International Law Association adopted in 1982 its Draft Convention on State Immunity, Article IIIC of which dealt with contracts of employment and was similar in its terms to Article 5 of the Basle Convention. An amendment was added to Article IIIC at the ILA’s 1994 conference, providing for immunity to be granted where “the employee was appointed under the public (administrative) law of the foreign state such as, inter alia, members of the mission, diplomatic, consular or military staff”. In the explanatory commentary on the amendment the Committee stated that it wished “to make clear that the employment relationship of any and all diplomatic and consular staff and other members of the mission should be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the forum state”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Split. 5.  On 1 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) opened a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant and seventeen other persons for conspiracy to supply heroin and cocaine in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 10 January and 30 July 2008. 6.  At a hearing held on 7 August 2008 before the investigating judge, the applicant stated that he had decided to remain silent. The investigating judge heard evidence from another suspect. 7.  On 11 August 2008 the investigating judge heard evidence from two other suspects. On the same day he asked for the applicant’s criminal record, which was submitted on 12 August 2008 with a note that he had not been previously convicted of any criminal offence. 8.  On 20 August 2008 the investigating judge commissioned a psychiatric report on eleven defendants, including the applicant, in order to assess their mental state at the time the criminal offence was committed and whether they were drug addicts. 9.  On 8 September 2008 a psychiatric report commissioned for the purposes of the investigation was submitted by a psychiatrist of the Split Medical Faculty. As regards the applicant, the report stated that he was a long-term drug addict who had received treatment on two occasions but with no lasting results. He had resumed taking drugs a few months before. Since being detained he had been on Heptanon therapy which helped him to overcome his withdrawal symptoms. It was recommended that he continued with that therapy. 10.  On 16 September 2008 the investigating judge heard evidence from six witnesses, police officers who conducted the police inquiry prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings. 11.  On 24 October 2008 the investigating judge heard evidence from another suspect and on 29 and 31 October 2008 from four further police officers. On 7 November 2008 he heard evidence from another two suspects. 12.  On 21 January 2009 the State Attorney’s Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime preferred charges of conspiracy to supply heroin and cocaine in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 10 January and 30 July 2008 against the applicant and seventeen other defendants in the Split County Court. 13.  On 29 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against the bill of indictment (prigovor protiv optužnice). By 4 February 2011 all the other defendants had also lodged their objections. 14.  On 4 March 2009 the Supreme Court returned the bill of indictment to the State Attorney’s Office asking it to submit, within three days, a request to take further investigative steps. 15.  On 10 March 2009 the State Attorney’s Office asked the investigating judge to take further steps. 16.  On 13 March 2009 the investigating judge ordered a transcript of all telephone conversations between the defendants, previously tapped by the police. 17.  On 12 June 2009 an expert in telecommunications submitted his report with a transcript of those telephone conversations. The transcript comprises 568 pages. 18.  On 16 June 2009 the State Attorney’s Office submitted the same indictment to the Split County Court. 19.  On 1 July 2009 the applicant reiterated his objection to the indictment. He also requested that the evidence obtained by the police tapping of his telephone be excluded from the case file. The other defendants also lodged their objections. 20.  On 8 September 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the objections to the indictment and refused the applicant’s request to exclude from the case file all evidence obtained by the police tapping of his telephone. 21.  The first hearing scheduled for 26 April 2010 in the Split County Court was adjourned because two defendants did not appear. One of them had been sent to Zagreb Prison Hospital for treatment and the other was in another medical institution. On the same day the presiding judge ordered psychiatric report in respect of two defendants. The report was submitted on 4 May 2010. 22.  A hearing before the Split County Court was held on 8 June 2010 and all the defendants stated that they would give their defence at end of the trial. 23.  At hearings held on 9, 10 and 11 June 2010 eight witnesses and the expert in psychiatry gave their evidence. 24.  At hearings held on 19 and 20 July 2010 four witnesses gave their evidence. 25.  At a hearing held on 21 July 2010 the County Court refused the request by the defence to exclude from the case file recordings of the defendants’ conversations. 26.  At a hearing held on 14 September 2010 the majority of the defendants, including the applicant, pleaded guilty and two further witnesses gave their evidence. 27.  Further hearings were held on 16 and 20 September 2010 and at the latter hearing a judgment was adopted, finding the applicant guilty and sentencing him to three years’ imprisonment. His detention was lifted. 28.  Some of the defendants lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment and the proceedings are currently pending before the Supreme Court. 29.  On 1 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Split County Court ordered all the suspects to be detained on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (1), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the danger of the suspects absconding, the danger of the suspects reoffending and the gravity of the charges. The relevant part of the decision, referring to the grounds for detention, reads:\n“In view of the manner in which the criminal offence was committed, the type and quantity of the illegal substances in which the suspects were trafficking, the large number of illegal transactions and the persistence and determination involved in committing the criminal offences, as well as the fact that the suspects are mostly unemployed with no means of support and that the suspects ... and Perica Oreb have previously been convicted of the same criminal offence or of similar criminal offences, there exists a justified fear that if released they might repeat a criminal offence of the same kind ...” 30.  A report drawn up on 4 August 2008 by the Split Police Department expressly notes that the applicant had voluntarily come to that Department that day and that he had then been taken to Split Prison. 31.  In his appeal of 7 August 2008 the applicant argued that the written charges against him alleged that he had had contact with only one of the other suspects, which showed that he could not have been a participant in any organised criminal activity since he did not know about the involvement of the other suspects and they were not even known to him. He supported these assertions with the argument that no illegal substances, money or equipment necessary for trafficking in the said substances on a large scale, such as packaging or scales, had been found on him, and that this showed that he personally had not been involved in such trafficking. 32.  He also claimed that he had never been convicted by a final judgment of trafficking in illegal substances, but only of the criminal offence of using illegal substances and that he was not a drug addict. Lastly, he argued that the possibility of ordering an alternative measure to detention had not been considered. 33.  On 8 August 2008 the investigating judge asked for a copy of the applicant’s criminal record. The report of 12 August 2008 submitted by the Ministry of Justice indicated that the applicant had not been convicted of any criminal offence. 34.  On 22 August 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court examined the appeals lodged by the defendants. It accepted that the ground under Article 102 § 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure no longer persisted. In other respects it dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that: the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had previously been convicted of similar criminal offences (without any further explanations in that respect), and that the persistent criminal activity over a long period with which the suspects were charged taken together with their economic situation justified the fear that they might repeat the same offences. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“In view of the level of criminal activity with which the defendants are charged, namely, that they have been engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs over a long period of time, and in view of the resolve and persistence shown in committing the offence, the fact that the defendants ... Perica Oreb ... have already been convicted of criminal offences, and almost all defendants have no means of subsistence, all these things indicate that there is a danger of the defendants reoffending ...\nThe manner in which the criminal offences were committed, with the defendants organising themselves into a group, and the quantity of the illegal substances whose sale might put at risk the health of a large number of persons, amount to grave circumstances ...” 35.  On 3 September 2008 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention for a further month on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the danger of reoffending and the gravity of the charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“In view of the level of criminal activity with which the defendants have been charged, namely, that they have been engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs over a long period of time, and in view of the resolve to commit criminal offences and the fact that the defendants have previously been convicted of similar criminal offences, there is a danger of the defendants reoffending ...\nThe offence was committed under grave circumstances as shown by the manner in which it was committed, the fact that the defendants organised a group and the quantity of the illegal substances in circulation, which, through the sale on the illegal market, could put at risk the health of a number of persons.” 36.  In his appeal of 8 September 2008 the applicant argued that he had not previously been convicted of the same offence and that the ordering of his detention under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (danger of reoffending) violated the principle of the presumption of innocence. He also reiterated that the written charges against him alleged that he had had contact with only one of the other suspects, which showed that he could not have been a participant in any organised criminal activity since he did not know about the involvement of the other suspects and did not even know who they were. He argued, in support of those assertions, that no illegal substances, money or materials necessary for trafficking in the said substances on a large scale, such as packaging or scales, had been found on him and that this showed that he had not personally been involved in such trafficking. 37.  On 11 September 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“... the defendants have been charged with the criminal offence of trafficking in illegal drugs between 10 January and 30 July 2008 ... The documents in the case file show that the defendant ... Perica Oreb has already been convicted of similar criminal offences; the defendant Perica Oreb ... is unemployed, and all three defendants have no assets.\nIn view of the high level of criminal activity with which they have been charged, namely that they engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs during the above-mentioned period and showed resolve and persistence in committing the offence, as well as their economic situation – all these circumstances taken together indicate a danger of the defendants reoffending ...\nFurthermore, the offence was committed under grave circumstances as shown by the manner in which it was committed, the fact that the defendants organised a group and the quantity of the illegal substances, which through their sale on the illegal market could put at risk the health of a number of persons ...” 38.  On 3 October 2008 the investigating judge lifted the applicant’s detention on the ground that the psychiatric report indicated that he had been a drug user and that he had been buying drugs for his own use and not in order to sell it to others. His immediate release was ordered as well. The State Attorney lodged an appeal on 7 October 2008. 39.  On 10 October 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court allowed the appeal and extended the applicant’s detention again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning was the same as that in the decision of 11 September 2008. It was stated, inter alia, that the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had previously been convicted of similar criminal offences (without any further explanations in that respect). The applicant was re-detained on 28 October 2008. 40.  On 21 November 2008 the investigating judge extended the detention in respect of all the defendants for a further month again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision was quashed by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 11 December 2008 on the ground that the period of further detention had to be specified for each defendant. 41.  On 10 December 2008, in another set of criminal proceedings, the Dubrovnik County Court convicted the applicant of trafficking in heroin and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. 42.  On 15 December 2008 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention until 28 December 2008, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning relied on the allegations that the accused had been charged with trafficking in substantial quantities of heroin as their primary activity. On 16 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal. He argued that no drugs, money or tools typical for the sale of drugs had been found on him and that he had never been convicted of any drug-related crimes. He again argued that the possibility of ordering an alternative measure to detention had not been considered. 43.  On 23 December 2008 the investigating judge issued a fresh decision extending the applicant’s detention until 28 December, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He relied on the allegations that the accused had been charged with trafficking in substantial quantities of heroin as their primary activity, on the gravity of the charges and the fact that the defendants had no means of support, without giving further details in this respect. 44.  On 24 December 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court declared the applicant’s appeal of 16 December 2008 inadmissible because a fresh decision on detention had been adopted in the meantime. 45.  On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the investigating judge’s decision of 23 December 2008. He reiterated the arguments from his previous appeal of 16 December 2008 and added that before his arrest he had been employed at a hotel in Cavtat. 46.  On 14 January 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the appeal and reiterated the reasoning from its decision of 11 September 2008. It also stressed that the applicant had been convicted before and that he had no assets. 47.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the above decision, arguing that the following rights had been violated: his right to personal liberty; right to a fair trial; his right to equality before the law because the grounds for detention had been interpreted in an unusual fashion; and his right to an effective remedy because the examination of his appeal had been inadequate. 48.  On 23 January 2009 the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the reasoning in the previous decisions, it added that the applicant was a drug addict and stated, inter alia, that he had already been convicted of similar criminal offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 49.  On 27 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. In addition to the arguments put forward in his appeal of 16 and 30 December 2008 he added that his parents had a regular income and that therefore it could not be said that he had no means of subsistence. 50.  On 16 February 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of 27 January 2009, holding that the alleged manner in which the criminal offence had been committed amounted to particularly grave circumstances which justified detention on the ground under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the ground under Article 102 § 1 (3) – danger of reoffending – it was deemed justified since the applicant was a drug addict and two other sets of criminal proceedings concerning drug-related offences were pending against him, one before the Čakovec County Court and the other before the Dubrovnik County Court. 51.  On 19 February 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 22 January 2009 against the decision of 14 January 2009 inadmissible on the ground that a fresh decision on detention had been adopted in the meantime. 52.  On 16 April 2009 the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with the same reasoning as before, stating, inter alia, that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 53.  On 8 May 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 16 April 2009 on the ground that the three-judge panel which adopted it had no such power and that it was the investigating judge who should have decided whether to extend the detention. 54.  On 15 May 2009 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning relied on the allegations that the accused had been charged with trafficking in substantial quantities of heroin as their primary activity and had no other income. In his appeal lodged the same day the applicant reiterated the arguments from his appeal of 30 December 2008. As regards his previous conviction, he argued that the Dubrovnik County Court’s judgment of 10 December 2008 had not yet become final. 55.  On 28 May 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasons put forward by the investigating judge. 56.  On 10 June 2009 the investigating judge again extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with the same reasoning as in the decision of 15 May 2009. 57.  On 16 June 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. He reiterated his previous arguments. 58.  On 18 June 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the previous decisions concerning the applicant’s detention. It stated, inter alia, that the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 59.  On 24 June 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 60.  On 30 June 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court declared the applicant’s appeal of 16 June 2009 inadmissible because a fresh decision on his detention had been adopted in the meantime. 61.  On 13 July 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal of 24 June 2009. As to the applicant’s previous convictions, it stated:\n“All appellants, save for ... Perica Oreb ... had already been convicted of similar criminal offences ...\n... criminal proceedings are currently pending against the accused Perica Oreb before the Dubrovnik County Court in which he has been convicted, by a judgment that has not yet become final, of a criminal offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Therefore, the fact that the accused had not been finally convicted could not alter conclusion that there is a danger of him reoffending since other criminal proceedings are pending against the accused, which is also relevant in assessing the conformity of their lifestyles with the laws.\n...” 62.  On 14 September 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court again extended the applicant’s detention on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the previous decisions concerning the applicant’s detention and stating, inter alia, that the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 63.  On 17 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 64.  On 28 September 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. As to the applicant’s previous convictions, it stated:\n“All appellants, save for ... Perica Oreb ... had already been convicted of similar criminal offences ...\n... criminal proceedings are currently pending against the accused Perica Oreb before the Dubrovnik County Court in which he has been convicted, by a judgment that has not yet become final, of a criminal offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.\nThe above circumstances taken together justify the fear that they would continue committing the same or similar offences and that therefore [the decision to extend] their detention on the ground under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is correct.\n...” 65.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, challenging the grounds for and the duration of his detention. 66.  On 26 November 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the previous decisions concerning the applicant’s detention and stating that the applicant’s criminal record showed that he had already been convicted of similar offences. 67.  On 1 December 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 68.  On 15 December 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of 28 September 2009 inadmissible on the ground that it was no longer in effect since a fresh decision on the applicant’s detention had meanwhile been adopted. 69.  On 16 December 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. As to the applicant’s previous convictions, it stated:\n“All appellants, save for ... Perica Oreb ... had already been convicted of similar criminal offences ...\nEven though there is no previous conviction in the criminal record of Perica Oreb, the documents in the case file show that ... criminal proceedings are currently pending against him before the Dubrovnik County Court in which he has been convicted, by a judgment that has not yet become final, of a criminal offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. These circumstances, contrary to the submissions of all the appellants, are relevant in assessing the conformity of their lifestyles with the laws.\nThe above circumstances together with the fact that all of the appellants, save for D.R., are heroin addicts and the accused ... Perica Oreb is unemployed ... justify the fear that, if at large, they would continue to commit the same or similar criminal offences and therefore [the decision to extend] their detention on the ground under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is correct.\n...” 70.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, again challenging the grounds for and the duration of his detention. 71.  On 12 February 2010 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning relied on the indictment, which charged the accused with conspiracy to supply a large quantity of heroin for a longer period of time, the danger of such criminal activity, the fact that they were heroin addicts and had no other income. 72.  On 18 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 73.  On 25 February 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of 16 December 2009 inadmissible on the ground that it was no longer in effect since a fresh decision on the applicant’s detention had meanwhile been adopted. 74.  On 12 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the impugned decision. As regards the applicant, it specifically stated that:\n“The accused Perica Oreb is, according to his own statement, unemployed, with no assets and the psychiatric report shows that he is a heroin addict. Furthermore, he has been convicted of the offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code by a judgment of the Dubrovnik County Court which has not yet become final” 75.  On 12 May 2010 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in its decision of 12 February 2010. 76.  On 14 May 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 77.  On 23 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the impugned decision. As regards the applicant, it specifically gave the same reasons as in its decision of 12 March 2010. 78.  On 24 August 2010 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the decision of 12 May 2010. 79.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. As indicated above (paragraph 27) the applicant was convicted by the County Court and released on 20 September 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1974 respectively. The first applicant lives in İzmir. By a letter dated 28 August 2006 the Court was informed that the second applicant was purging his sentence in Bolu prison. 5.  The applicants were arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, namely the PKK, on 25 and 26 July 1993 respectively. They were remanded in custody on 5 August 1993. 6.  On 31 August 1993 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment against twenty-one persons, including the applicant. He accused the applicants of membership of an illegal armed organisation and of aiding and abetting that organisation. The charges included, in particular, bombings of various public and private establishments between July 1992 and June 1993. 7.  The first hearing, held before the Diyarbakır State Security Court on 3 September 1993, in the applicants' absence, was taken up with procedural matters such as the measures to be taken for securing the presence of the accused. 8.  Between 3 September 1993 and 23 January 1996, the first-instance court held hearings on a regular basis during which the judges dealt mostly with procedural matters. It also heard the accused and their representatives who were present on the date of the hearings. At the end of each hearing, the court considered releasing the applicants pending trial both ex officio as well as upon their requests. At each hearing, the court, relying on the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case-file, decided to prolong their remand in custody. 9.  During this time the court also heard two witnesses, on 25 November 1993 and 13 January 1994, who stated that they did not know any of the accused or whether they had any organisational link with the armed organisation. On 28 March 1995 the public prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits. On 7 November 1995 the court decided, upon the request of the accused, to hear a witness, Mr O.B. who was being tried before another court. In the hearing held on 19 December 1995, the court heard Mr O.B. who stated, inter alia, that he knew the second applicant from school. He claimed that the applicant used to talk about the PKK but that he did not know anything about him being a member of or participating in the activities of that organisation. Upon this statement the second applicant maintained that he was not a member of the organisation as was confirmed by the witness and that it was normal to talk like that at school. At this hearing the prosecutor reiterated his observations of 28 March 1995. 10.  In a hearing held on 23 January 1996 the first applicant's representative submitted his observations on the merits. The court also heard the accused. On the same day, the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 11.  On 14 July 1997 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of fourteen of the accused, including the applicants. 12.  The case was sent back to the Diyarbakır State Security Court where the proceedings against the applicants commenced on 29 July 1997. 13.  Between 29 July 1997 and 15 May 2001, the first-instance court held hearings on a regular basis during which the judges dealt with procedural matters and adjourned many hearings, since one of the co-accused could not be found and the statements of another one residing in Germany could not be taken. It also heard the accused and their representatives who were present on the date of the hearings and the public prosecutor, both parties relying on previous submissions. The applicants failed to attend some of the hearings. At the end of each hearing, the court also considered releasing the applicants pending trial both ex officio as well as upon their own requests. At each hearing the court, relying on the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case-file, decided to prolong their remand in custody. 14.  During this time in a hearing held on 7 July 1999 the judge who had been appointed to replace the military judge, sat as a member of the trial court for the first time. On 16 November 1999 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits. 15.  On 15 May 2001 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to disjoin the case of the two co‑accused who could not be found. On the same day the court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 16.  On 7 November 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of the first applicant and upheld it in respect of the second applicant. 17.  On 24 January 2002 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation dismissed the second applicant's request for a rectification of the Court of Cassation's decision. 18.  On 7 February 2002 the case was sent back to the first-instance court where the first applicant was tried alone. 19.  Between 7 February 2002 and 10 September 2002, the first-instance court held hearings on a regular basis. 20.  During this time on 12 March 2002 the applicant repeated his earlier submissions. The prosecutor requested time to prepare his observations on the merits. In the hearing held on 14 May 2002 the prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The applicant was given time to prepare his observations on the merits. The court, taking into account the amount of time the first applicant had spent in remand in custody, ordered his release pending trial. 21.  On 10 September 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the first applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. On 17 March 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld this judgment. 22.  By an additional judgment, the first applicant's sentence was reduced to six years and three months' imprisonment on 22 June 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 5.  In 1987 he took part in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result the applicant suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant underwent medical examinations which established the link between the applicant’s poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events. In 1994 the applicant was awarded compensation, to be paid monthly. 7.  In 1999 the applicant sued a local pension authority (Муниципальное учреждение социальной защиты населения Первомайского района г. Ростова-на-Дону - “the defendant”) requesting to increase his monthly compensation, backdate the increase and recover the unpaid amount. The applicant considered that the amount of compensation had been determined incorrectly. 8.  On 18 October 1999 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don (“the District Court”) granted the applicant’s claim and ruled that since 1 January 1999 his monthly compensation had been wrongly calculated. The court awarded the applicant the arrears of RUR 15,829.25 for the period between 1 January and 1 November 1999 and decided that as of 1 November 1999 the applicant was entitled to a monthly compensation of RUR 2,440.70, to be index-linked in line with changes of the minimum monthly wage. 9.  The judgment of 18 October 1999 was not appealed against by the parties and came into force on 29 October 1999. 10.  On 6 December 1999 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 18 October 1999. 11.  Some time later the enforcement proceedings were terminated by reference to the lack of funding. On 22 March 2001 the bailiffs returned the writ and documents to the applicant. They referred to Decree No. 143 dated 22 February 2001 (see the relevant domestic law section below) and invited him to submit the documents to a local department of the Ministry of Finance (ОФК по Первомайскому району г. Ростова-на-Дону). 12.  The applicant followed this invitation and on the same day applied to the local department of the Ministry which four days later rejected the application. It appears that the applicant was invited to fetch a renewed writ of execution from the District Court. 13.  Having received the renewed writ from the court, the applicant re-submitted the documents to the Ministry which on 11 April 2001 rejected them, this time by reference to the absence of the defendant’s account at the Ministry. 14.  On 30 May and 1 July 2002 respectively the authorities transferred a total amount of RUR 38.661,22 in the applicant’s favour and informed him that the enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999 was thus finalised. 15.  It appears that the applicant disagreed. He informed the authority that they had failed to index-link his monthly compensation in line with the minimum monthly wage, as it was ordered by the judgment of 18 October 1999, and used a less favourable scheme of indexation. 16.  On unspecified date the authority requested the District Court to interpret the judgment of 18 October 1999 and uphold its scheme of indexation. 17.  By a decision of 6 March 2003 the District Court examined and granted the authority’s request. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 16 April 2003. 18.  On 3 June 2003 the bailiffs ruled that the defendant authority had duly enforced the judgment of 18 October 1999 and terminated the enforcement proceedings accordingly. 19.  Thereafter the applicant challenged both decisions by way of supervisory review. 20.  On 3 June 2004 the Regional Court, acting as a supervisory review instance, quashed the decision of 6 March 2003 as unlawful and remitted the request for interpretation for a fresh examination at the first instance. The court noted, in particular, that by accepting the authority’s interpretation of the judgment of 18 October 1999 the District Court had in fact varied its content and thus had acted unlawfully. 21.  On 5 July 2004 the District Court rejected the authority’s request for interpretation as unfounded. 22.  By first instance decision of 2 September 2004 which was upheld on appeal on 13 October 2004 the applicant was issued with a renewed writ of execution. 23.  On 28 November 2004 the bailiffs re-instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 18 October 1999 and requested the authority to enforce it insofar as the judgment had ordered indexation of the applicant’s monthly compensation. 24.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought proceedings against the pension authority claiming indexation for the delay of execution of the judgment of 18 October 1999. 25.  On 11 May 2001 the Justice of the Peace of the Pervomayskiy District examined and granted his claim. It ordered the authority to pay the applicant RUR 3,562.13 in damages for the period between 1 November 1999 and 1 February 2001 and the arrears of RUR 18,556.24. 26.  The judgment of 11 May 2001 was varied on appeal by the District Court on 22 October 2001. In particular, the court ordered the authority to pay the applicant RUR 6,341.73 in damages for the period between 1 November 1999 and 1 September 2001 as well as the arrears for the period from 1 November 1999 and 1 September 2001 of RUR 8,505.47. The decision of 22 October 2001 came into force on the same day. 27.  On 11 November 2001 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in relation to the decision of 22 October 2001. It appears that the defendant refused to comply with it by reference to the lack of funds and its disagreement with the amount of award. 28.  The decision of 22 October 2001 was enforced by the authorities by a bank transfer of 1 July 2002. 29.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a fresh claim against the pension authority for an increase of his monthly compensation. 30.  By judgment of 25 December 2002 the District Court rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. On 26 March 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Rostov Regional Court. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a fresh claim against the authority in which he requested additional damages for non-enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999 and the decision of 22 October 2001. The applicant also referred to the authority’s failure to index-link the award of 18 October 1999 in line with changes of the minimum monthly wage and requested compensation in this respect as well. 32.  By decision of 25 April 2003 the District Court granted the application in part. By reference to the decision of 6 March 2003 (see § 17 above) the court rejected his claim for an increase of the award of 18 October 1999 in line with changes of the minimum monthly wage. In respect of the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999, the court ordered the authority to pay the applicant RUR 3,065.95 in damages for the period between September 2001 and 1 June 2002. As regards the decision of 22 October 2002, the court ordered RUR 2,722.88 in damages in the applicant’s favour for the period from November 2001 to July 2002. 33.  On 23 July 2003 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 April 2003 on appeal. 34.  It appears that the decision of 25 April 2003 was enforced in full on 26 April 2004. 35.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied to a court referring to the authority’s failure to abide by the judgment of 18 October 1999 insofar as the latter had ordered to index-link the applicant’s compensation in line with the minimum monthly wage. 36.  Having adopted a different scheme of indexation from the one suggested by the applicant and set out in the judgment of 18 October 1999, on 18 December 2003 the District Court partly granted his claim and ordered the authority to pay the arrears of RUR 28,947.24. 37.  The judgment of 18 December 2003 was upheld on appeal in full on 10 March 2004. The amount due to the applicant in this connection was paid on 13 September 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, who are a couple, were born in 1934 and 1932 respectively. The second applicant died in 2006. The first applicant lives in Skhodnya, the Moscow Region. 6.  The applicants, both wheelchair-bound and having first‑degree disability status, repeatedly requested social-security services to provide them with a car adapted to their disability. Their numerous complaints in this respect to the General Prosecutor’s Office, Members of the State Duma, and Administration of the President of the Russian Federation proved unsuccessful. As it was mentioned in the authorities’ letters to the applicants, according to the medical expert report ordered by the social-security services, the first applicant was not entitled to a free car and driving was contra-indicated in respect of the second applicant. 7.  On 18 November 2003 the applicants, apparently assisted by counsel, lodged a claim against the Ministry of Labour challenging the refusal to provide them with a car and claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 8.  On 15 March 2004 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (“the district court”) fixed the hearing for 14 May 2004 and at some point, apparently on the same date, summoned the applicants to appear at the hearing. 9.  According to the Government, on 30 March 2004 one of the applicants received the respective notification. They submitted a copy of an acknowledgment-of-receipt card containing information on the date and time of the hearing, the name of the court, the date of notification, and signatures of a recipient and a postman. 10.  According to the applicants, they did not receive the summons. 11.  On 14 May 2004 the district court, having heard the defendant’s representatives, rejected their claim because the applicants had lodged it against a wrong defendant. The court established that the social welfare services did not belong to the Ministry of Labour and that the latter did not have power to review their decisions. The applicants were absent from the hearing. The court found, with reference to the acknowledgment-of-receipt card, that they had been duly summoned and examined the case in their absence. The representative of the respondent authority was present. 12.  On 30 June 2004 the applicants’ representative received a copy of the judgment of 14 May 2004. 13.  On 5 July 2004 the applicants appealed against the judgment. They complained, inter alia, that their right to a fair trial had been violated as neither they nor their lawyer had had a chance to attend the hearing due to their having been summoned belatedly. 14.  On 14 July 2004 the district court on the applicants’ request extended the time-limit for lodging the grounds of appeal. 15.  On 6 October 2004 the Moscow City Court adjourned the examination of the applicants’ appeal until 20 October 2004, having found that the parties had not been notified of the date of the hearing in a timely manner. 16.  According to the Government, at some point the district court dispatched summonses to the parties, including the applicants, informing them of the date and time of the appeal hearing. According to the applicants, neither they nor their representative received the summons. 17.  On 20 October 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 14 May 2004 on appeal. The court examined the case in the applicants’ absence, having mentioned that they had been notified of the appeal hearing. As regards the applicants’ complaint about their absence from the hearing at the first instance court, the appeal court found that they had been properly summoned. The court further upheld the lower court’s finding that the civil action was lodged against the wrong defendant. 18.  On 12 December 2008 the application was communicated to the Government. 19.  On 21 January 2009 the Moscow City Court requested the case file from the district court in order to prepare a report on the factual circumstances of the case, to be included in the Government’s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. 20.  On 27 January 2009 the Moscow City Court received the case file. 21.  On 4 February 2009 Ms Stakhiyeva, the first applicant’s representative before the Court, requested the district court to grant her access to the case file concerning the applicants’ civil proceedings. 22.  On the same date the registry of the district court rejected her request having advised her that she could be granted access to the file not earlier than ten days following the request. 23.  On 5 February 2009 the President of the district court refused to examine the representative’s oral complaint in this respect, apparently having provided no reasons for the decision. It appears that on the same date the lawyer lodged a written complaint about the refusal to allow her to study the file, but the petition remained unanswered. 24.  On 27 February 2009 the registry of the district court again rejected the applicant’s new request for access to the file, and on the same date the President of the district court disallowed her complaint in this respect. 25.  On 10 March 2009 the registry of the Moscow City Court returned the case file to the district court. 26.  On 25 March 2009 the Government advised the Court that the file had been transferred to the district court and was available for study. On 27 March 2009 this letter was forwarded by the Court to the applicant’s representatives. 27.  On 9 April 2009 the Court received the Government’s observations and on 29 April 2009 forwarded them to the applicant’s representatives with a request to provide observations in reply. 28.  On 12 May 2009 the applicant’s lawyer requested to grant her access to the case file. She submits that on the same date the registry disallowed her request, and the President of the court refused to discuss the matter with her. 29.  On 14 May 2009 she was advised by the registry of the district court that the file was available at the registry. 30.  On 18 May 2009 the lawyer studied the case file. 31.  On 9 June 2009 the applicant’s lawyers submitted the observations in reply to the Government’s observations on the applicants’ case.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1968. The second applicant was born in 1973. They are husband and wife and live in the town of Sovetskaya Gavan in the Khabarovsk Region. 6.  In 1994 the first applicant arrived in Russia on the basis of a valid visa and married the second applicant. In 1996 the second applicant gave birth to a daughter. In November 1996, after his visa had expired, the first applicant was deported to China. 7.  In 1999 the second applicant gave birth to a son. 8.  In 2001 the first applicant obtained a work visa valid until 1 August 2002 and resumed his residence in Russia. The visa was later extended until 1 August 2003. 9.  In November 2002 the first applicant went to the Khabarovsk department of internal affairs (hereinafter “the Khabarovsk police department”) to lodge an application for a residence permit. The Khabarovsk police department did not have the necessary forms; therefore, the first applicant could not lodge his application. It was only on 11 July 2003 that the forms became available. 10.  On 24 July 2003 the first applicant applied for a residence permit for a second time. The Khabarovsk police department refused to examine the application and returned the documents to the first applicant. 11.  The first applicant challenged the refusal before a court. On 22 October 2003 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court found that the refusal to examine the application had been unlawful. It ordered that the Khabarovsk police department examine the first applicant's application for a residence permit. 12.  On 22 July 2004 the Khabarovsk police department rejected his application by reference to section 7 (1) of the Foreign Nationals Act (see paragraph 33 below). No further reasons were provided. 13.  The applicants challenged the refusal before a court. They complained, in particular, that the Khabarovsk police department had not given any reasons for the refusal. The first applicant had never been charged with any criminal offence or engaged in any subversive activities. The applicants also claimed that the refusal had interfered with their right to respect for their family life and had caused them non-pecuniary damage. 14.  On 4 November 2004 the Tsentralniy District Court of Khabarovsk found that the decision of 22 July 2004 had been lawful and rejected the applicants' claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It found that the Khabarovsk police department had received information from the Federal Security Service that the first applicant posed a national security risk. That information was a State secret and could not be made public. There is no indication in the judgment that the information had been made available for judicial scrutiny. 15.  The applicants appealed. On 18 January 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 November 2004. It reiterated that, according to the information from the Federal Security Service, the first applicant posed a national security risk. That information was a State secret and was not subject to judicial scrutiny. 16.  On 4 March 2005 the Khabarovsk police department rejected a new application for a residence permit. It found that the first applicant was unlawfully residing on Russian territory, that he had taken no steps to make his stay legal, and that he would therefore have to leave Russia. The refusal of a residence permit did not hinder his family life. 17.  It appears that the applicants did not challenge the refusal of 4 March 2005 before a court. Instead they asked the Khabarovsk Regional Court to direct that the Khabarovsk police department issue the first applicant with a residence permit. They claimed that by refusing to provide the first applicant with a residence permit the authorities had showed disrespect for their family life. They asked for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 9 September 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court rejected their claims in the last instance as having no basis in domestic law. It referred to the judgment of 4 November 2004 and held that there were no reasons to depart from its findings. 18.  On several occasions in 2003, 2004 and 2005 the first applicant was administratively fined for living in Russia without a valid residence permit. However, the domestic courts reversed most of those decisions, finding them procedurally defective or time-barred. 19.  It is apparent from a certificate issued by a deputy head of the Sovetskaya Gavan Town prosecutor's office on 15 December 2005 that no criminal proceedings had been brought against the first applicant between 1996 and 2005. 20.  On 18 November 2005 the first applicant was stopped by the police. The police officer drew up a report on the commission of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code (see paragraph 34 below). The report was transmitted to a judge. 21.  On 21 November 2005 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court held that the first applicant had infringed the residence regulations and ordered his administrative removal and detention pending removal. On the same day he was placed in a detention centre. 22.  On 13 December 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 November 2005 on appeal, remitted the case for a new examination by the Town Court, and ordered the first applicant's release. It held that, in accordance with Article 27.3 § 1 of the Administrative Offences Code, detention with a view to administrative removal could only be ordered if there were sufficient reasons to believe that the person would try to avoid execution of the removal order. The Town Court had not given reasons for the detention order and the case file did not contain any information justifying the first applicant's detention. On the same day the first applicant was released. 23.  On 28 December 2005 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court held that the report of 18 November 2005 did not indicate which residence regulations had been infringed by the first applicant. It returned the report to the local police department for correction. 24.  On 3 February 2006 the administrative proceedings against the first applicant were discontinued as time-barred. 25.  In the meantime, on 3 February 2005, the Khabarovsk police department prepared a decision that the first applicant's presence on the Russian territory was undesirable and submitted it to the head of the Federal Migration Service for approval. The draft decision indicated that the first applicant had been unlawfully resident on Russian territory and had been repeatedly fined under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code for his failure to leave Russia after the expiry of the authorised residence period. On 22 March 2005 the head of the Federal Migration Service confirmed the decision and it became enforceable. The applicants were informed about the decision on 21 April 2005. 26.  On 22 August 2005 the Khabarovsk police department asked the Federal Migration Service to order the first applicant's deportation. On 12 November 2005 the head of the Federal Migration Service ordered the first applicant's deportation by reference to section 25.10 of the Law on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving the Russian Federation (see paragraph 35 below). No further reasons were provided. The applicants were informed of the decision on 12 December 2005. 27.  On 15 May 2006 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court ordered the first applicant's placement in a detention centre with a view to deporting him. It held that the first applicant was unlawfully residing on Russian territory, and that on 12 November 2005 the Federal Migration Service had ordered his deportation. Therefore, he had to be held in custody until deportation. The first applicant was not present at the hearing. He was informed of the decision on 5 September 2006. 28.  On 24 November 2006 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 15 May 2006 on appeal and remitted the case. It found that the decision had been taken in the first applicant's absence, in breach of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 29.  On 25 December 2006 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court for a second time ordered the first applicant's placement in a detention centre with a view to deporting him. It referred to the same reasons as in the decision of 15 May 2006. 30.  It appears that the deportation order was not enforced. The applicant is at present living with his family in Russia.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sapy, Poland. 7.  On 17 July 1992 the applicant lodged with the Skierniewice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) an action for damages against his neighbours. He claimed that the defendants had caused damage to his barn by improperly storing silage and animal waste. 8.  In 1992 two hearings were adjourned. 9.  On 16 February 1993 the court held a hearing at which it heard the parties and witnesses and ordered an expert opinion. 10.  On 3 August 1993 an expert submitted his opinion to the court. The defendants' lawyer contested the expert's opinion. 11.  A hearing scheduled for 17 September 1993 was adjourned due to the absence of the defendants' lawyer. 12.  On 14 October 1993 the court held a hearing and heard an expert witness. 13.  On an unknown later date, at the applicant's lawyer's request, the court ordered another expert opinion. In January 1994 the opinion was submitted to the court. Subsequently, the defendants' lawyer requested the court to order a supplementary expert opinion. 14.  On 29 March 1994 the court held a hearing. It heard two witnesses and an expert witness. 15.  Subsequently, the defendants' lawyer requested the court to order yet another expert opinion. 16.  In August 1994 the applicant's and the defendants' lawyers requested the court not to schedule any hearings until 30 September 1994 because of their respective holidays. 17.  On 8 December 1994 the court dismissed the defendants' request for exemption from the court fees. They lodged an appeal but on 9 January 1995 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed it. 18.  In May 1995 the trial court asked the defendants to indicate an expert who would prepare an opinion. 19.  Two subsequent hearings scheduled for 31 January and 23 February 1996 were adjourned due to the illness of the defendants and their lawyer. 20.  On 10 July 1996 the court, sitting in camera, ordered another expert opinion. 21.  On 6 August 1996 the defendant's lawyer requested the court to appoint two other experts indicated by him. On 15 November 1996 the trial court dismissed this application. 22.  On 17 March 1997 an expert opinion was submitted to the court. 23.  In June 1997 the case was assigned to another judge. 24.  Subsequently, the applicant's lawyer requested the court not to schedule any hearings until 30 August 1997 because of his holidays. 25.  On 8 September 1997 the court stayed the proceedings because one of the defendants had died. Later, his heirs joined the proceedings. 26.  On 21 January 1998 the trial court resumed the proceedings and sent the case‑file to an expert in order to obtain an opinion. 27.  On 20 March 1998 the expert submitted his opinion to the court. 28.  Between 30 March 1994 and 5 May 1998 no hearings were held. 29.  On 6 May 1998 the court held a hearing. 30.  On 15 July 1998 the applicant's lawyer again requested the court not to schedule hearings during his holidays. 31.  A hearing scheduled for 30 October 1998 was adjourned due to the absence of the defendants' lawyer. 32.  In December 1998 the defendants' lawyer requested the court not to schedule any hearings between 1 December and 20 December 1998, and subsequently, until 1 February 1999. 33.  A hearing scheduled for 8 February 1999 was adjourned because of the absence of the defendants' lawyer. 34.  Between 7 May 1998 and 17 March 1999 no hearings were held. 35.  On 18 March 1999 the court held a hearing. 36.  On 31 March 1999 the Regional Court gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant's claim. 37.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. 38.  On 21 October 1999 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed his appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Leipzig. 6.  At the age of three, the applicant was placed in a children’s home and later in the care of foster parents. At the age of seven, he was adopted by his foster parents and was given their family name. After that, he did not have any contact with his family of origin. 7.  In 1984, the applicant’s biological sister, S. K., was born. The applicant was unaware of his sister’s existence until he re-established contact with his family of origin in 2000. Following their mother’s death in December 2000, the relationship between the siblings intensified. As from January 2001, the applicant and his sister had consensual sexual intercourse. They lived together for several years. 8.  In 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005 four children were born to the couple. Following the birth of the fourth child, the applicant underwent a vasectomy. The three older children were placed in the care of foster families. The youngest daughter lives with her mother. 9.  On 23 April 2002 the Borna District Court (Amtsgericht) convicted the applicant of sixteen counts of incest (Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code, see “Relevant domestic law”, below), gave him a suspended sentence of one year’s imprisonment and put him on probation. 10.  On 6 April 2004 the Borna District Court convicted the applicant of another count of the same offence and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. 11.  On 10 November 2005 the Leipzig District Court convicted the applicant of two counts of incest and sentenced him to one year and two months’ imprisonment. Including the sentence of 6 April 2004 and one further previous criminal conviction, the District Court imposed a summary sentence of one year and four months’ imprisonment. The court considered the fact that the applicant had suffered physical abuse by his father during the decisive first three years of his childhood to be a mitigating factor. Furthermore, he had made a confession and had been affected by the media coverage of his case. Lastly, he had previously been attacked during detention. On the other hand, the court considered as aggravating factors the fact that the applicant had reoffended in spite of his previous convictions and that he had had unprotected intercourse with his sister even though he had to have been aware of the risk of further pregnancies. 12.  With regard to the applicant’s sister, S. K., who had been charged with the same offence, the Leipzig District Court, relying on an expert opinion, found as follows:\n“The accused, K., has a very timid, withdrawn and dependant personality structure. This personality structure, taken together with [an] unsatisfying family situation, led to her being considerably dependant on the applicant. In particular, after the death of their mother, she experienced this dependency to an extent that she felt that she could not live without him.”\nThe District Court concluded that this serious personality disorder, seen in conjunction with established mild learning disabilities, had led to her being only partially liable for her actions. Accordingly, the court did not impose a sentence on her. 13.  On 30 January 2007 the Dresden Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The court considered that there were certain doubts as to the constitutionality of the relevant provision. However, it determined that these were not sufficient to call the validity of the law into question. 14.  On 22 February 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing, in particular, that Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code had violated his right to sexual self-determination, had discriminated against him and was disproportionate. In addition, it interfered with the relationship between parents and their children born out of incestuous relationships. 15.  On 26 February 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court, by seven votes to one, rejected the complaint as being unfounded. The decision was based on the following considerations. With the criminal provision of Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code, the legislature had restricted the right to sexual self-determination of biological siblings by making sexual intercourse between them a punishable offence. This limited the conduct of one’s private life by penalising certain forms of expressions of sexuality between persons close to one another. However, the provision did not infringe the core area of private life. Sexual intercourse between siblings could have effects on the family and society and carry consequences for children resulting from the relationship. As the criminal law prohibited only a narrowly defined scope of behaviour and only selectively curtailed opportunities for intimate contact, the parties concerned had not been placed in a position which would be incompatible with respect for human dignity. 16.  The legislator had pursued objectives that were not constitutionally objectionable and that, in any event, in their totality legitimised the limitation on the right to sexual self-determination. The primary ground for punishment was the protection of marriage and the family. Empirical studies had showed that the legislature was not overstepping its margin of appreciation when assuming that incestuous relationships between siblings could seriously damage the family and society as a whole. Incestuous relationships resulted in overlapping familial relationships and social roles and, thus, could damage the structural system of family life. The overlapping of roles did not correspond with the image of a family as defined by the Basic Law. It seemed clear, and did not appear to be far‑fetched to assume, that the children of an incestuous relationship might have significant difficulties in finding their place within the family structure and in building a trusting relationship with their closest caregivers. The function of the family, which was of primary importance for the community, would be decisively damaged if the required family structures were shaken by incestuous relationships. 17.  Insofar as the criminal provision was justified by reference to the protection of sexual self-determination, this objective was also relevant between siblings. The objection that this right was sufficiently protected by the specific provisions on offences against sexual self-determination overlooked the fact that Section 173 of the Criminal Code addressed specific situations arising from the interdependence and closeness of family relationships, as well as difficulties in the classification of, and defence against, transgressions of sexual self-determination in that context. 18.  The legislature had additionally based its decision on eugenic grounds and had assumed that the risk of significant damage to children who were the product of an incestuous relationship could not be excluded. In both medical and anthropological literature, which was supported by empirical studies, reference had been made to the particular risk of the occurrence of genetic defects. 19.  The impugned criminal provision was justified by the sum of the above-mentioned objectives against the background of a common conviction that incest should be subject to criminal liability. This conviction was also evident on the international level. As an instrument for protecting self-determination, public health, and especially the family, the criminal provision fulfilled a signalling, norm-reinforcing and, thus, a general preventive function, which illustrated the values set by the legislature and, therefore, contributed to their maintenance. 20.  The impugned provision complied with the principle of proportionality. The criminalisation of sibling incest was suitable for promoting the desired objective. This was not put into question by the exemption of minors from criminal liability (Art. 173 § 3), as the prohibition of acts of sexual intercourse encompassed a central aspect of sexual relations between siblings which contravened the traditional picture of the family and which was further justified by its potential to produce descendants. Neither was this assessment put into question by the fact that acts similar to sexual intercourse and sexual intercourse between same-sex siblings were not subject to criminal liability, while sexual intercourse between natural siblings was punishable even in cases were conception was excluded. The same applied to the objection that the criminal provision was unsuitable for protecting the structure of the family because it first impacted on siblings when they typically left the family circle upon reaching the age of majority. 21.  The provision was also necessary. It was true that in cases of sibling incest guardianship and youth welfare measures came into consideration. However, these measures did not achieve the same objectives, as they were aimed at preventing and redressing violations in specific cases, but did not have any general preventive effect or reinforce societal norms in the manner achieved through the law. 22.  Lastly, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that the criminal sanction had not been disproportionate, as the provision had also allowed the courts to refrain from imposing punishment in cases in which an accused’s share of the guilt was slight. 23.  Judge Hassemer attached a dissenting opinion which was based on the following considerations. Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code was incompatible with the principle of proportionality. The provision did not pursue a legitimate aim. From the outset, considerations of eugenic aspects were not a valid objective for a criminal law provision. Likewise, neither the wording of the provision nor the statutory context indicated that the provision was aimed at protecting sexual self-determination. Lastly, the prohibition on sibling incest was not justified by the protection of marriage and the family, as it only prohibited the act of sexual intercourse, but did not prohibit any other sexual acts between siblings or sexual intercourse between siblings of the same sex or between relatives who were not blood‑related. If the criminal provision were actually aimed at protecting the family from sexual acts, it would also extend to these acts that were likewise damaging to the family. The evidence seemed to indicate that the provision as set out did not protect any specific rights, but was solely aimed at moral conceptions. However, it was not a legitimate aim for a criminal provision to build or maintain common moral standards. 24.  Furthermore, the provision was not suited to attain the objectives pursued. As regards the protection of the family from the damaging effects of incestuous sexual acts, it was not far-reaching enough, as it did not encompass similarly damaging behaviour and, moreover, acts committed by non-blood-related siblings. It was too far-reaching because it encompassed behaviour that could not (any longer) have damaging effects on the family because of children having reached the age of majority and being about to leave the family circle. 25.  In addition, there were other measures available that could have similarly or even more effectively guaranteed the protection of the family, such as youth welfare measures and measures taken by the family courts. Finally, the impugned provision was excessive, at it did not provide for a limitation of criminal liability resulting from behaviour which did not endanger any of the possible objects of protection. 26.  This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 13 March 2008. On 4 June 2008 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. He was released on probation on 3 June 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "3.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Istanbul. 4.  On 20 August 1996 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the DHKP‑C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi; the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front), as well as aiding and abetting the said organisation. 5.  On 3 September 1996 the applicant was remanded in custody. 6.  On 6 December 1996 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, along with other persons, charging him with membership of an illegal organisation under Article 168 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 7.  On 20 May 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court found the applicant guilty of activities carried out for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. The applicant was sentenced to death; his sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. 8.  On 30 September 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that the latter had failed to specify the provision of the Criminal Code under which the applicant had been found guilty. The Court of Cassation held that the applicant had been unlawfully held accountable for an event which had not been included in the bill of indictment of 6 December 1996. 9.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 10.  On 31 March 2006 the applicant was released pending trial. 11.  According to the information in the case file, the case is still pending before the Istanbul Assize Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and, before his conviction (described below), he lived in Irtyshskiy, a town in the Omsk Region. 7.  On 16 April 1999 the police arrested and detained the applicant on suspicion of murder. After the investigation, the police accused him, inter alia, of shooting two persons and wounding two others, and submitted the case for trial to the Omsk Regional Court. 8.  The trial began on 17 November 1999. Before the hearing, the court excluded the public from the court room. Once the hearing had begun, the applicant's lawyer protested. He argued that the court had acted unlawfully. 9.  The widow of one of the applicant's purported victims, Ms G., had requested in camera proceedings because she feared “the defendant's friends and their threats”. 10.  The applicant stated that he saw no reason to hold the hearing in private. The public prosecutor supported Ms G.'s request “in order to ensure the objectivity of the proceedings” because, in his opinion, the victims and witnesses were under pressure and feared testifying in public. 11.  The court deliberated on the spot and decided to continue the hearing in camera in order “to ensure a comprehensive and objective examination of the case and to avoid any possibility of pressure on the victims and witnesses”. 12.  On 26 November 1999 the court found the applicant guilty of the premeditated murder of two individuals and the attempted murder of another individual in May 1993. He was also convicted of the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm in April 1999. The court sentenced the applicant to seventeen years' imprisonment. 13.  On 5 January 2000 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. His lawyer argued, inter alia, that hearing the case in private had been unlawful for a number of reasons. First, under the Code of Criminal Procedure the intimidation of witnesses did not justify hearings in private. Secondly, the court had failed to identify any specific instance of intimidation. Thirdly, only bailiffs could effectively ensure the witnesses' security. 14.  On 7 June 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal after the applicant's lawyers and a representative of the prosecution had been heard. However, the appeal judgment disregarded the complaint about the trial court hearing in private. 15.  On 6 December 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court reduced the applicant's sentence to twelve years' imprisonment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant, Ms Tatyana Nikolayevna Kislaya, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1950 and resides in the city of Lugansk, Ukraine. 5.  On 21 June 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Leninsky District Court of Lugansk (Ленінський районний суд м. Луганська) against her former employer, the “Lugansky Verstatobudivny Zavod” State-owned plant («Луганський верстатобудівний завод») “the enterprise”, challenging her dismissal and disciplinary measures against her and claiming various payments. 6.  On 1 March 2001 the court found against the applicant. The applicant appealed in cassation. 7.  On 7 May 2001 the Lugansk Regional Court (Луганський обласний суд)[1] upheld this judgment on appeal in cassation by the applicant and it became final. 8.  On 17 August 2001 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Ukraine pursuant the newly introduced cassation procedure. 9.  On 13 December 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgments and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the first-instance court. 10.  On 20 May 2002 the Leninsky Court annulled disciplinary measures imposed on the applicant, ordered her reinstatement and awarded her the total of 2,364 hryvnyas (UAH) in various payments. Both parties appealed. 11.  On 18 November 2002 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 20 May 2002 to the extent that it concerned the monetary award and remitted this part of the case for a fresh consideration. The part of the judgment concerning the reinstatement of the applicant was upheld, became final and was enforced by the end of May 2003. 12.  On 5 March 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 18 November 2002. 13.  On 27 February 2004 the Leninsky Court awarded the applicant the total of UAH 11,733.92 in various payments. Both parties appealed. 14.  On 21 June 2004 the Regional Court reduced the monetary award due to the applicant to UAH 4,971.82. This judgment immediately became enforceable. 15.  On 27 November 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 16.  In the course of the proceedings, the first-instance court scheduled some thirty hearings. Some fifteen of them were adjourned on account of the defendant’s failures to appear or following its requests for adjournments. Three hearings were adjourned for various other reasons. 17.  On numerous occasions the bailiffs referred to the pending bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor as the reason for a delay in the enforcement of the judgment given in the applicant’s favour. On 24 December 2004 the applicant was paid UAH 364 and on 23 February 2006 received the remainder of the award. 18.  On 22 December 2003 the applicant was dismissed again. On 12 January 2004 she instituted civil proceedings in the Leninsky Court challenging her dismissal and claiming compensation. 19.  On 15 June 2005 the court ordered the applicant’s reinstatement and awarded her UAH 2,517.96 in compensation. The part of the judgment concerning the reinstatement of the applicant immediately became enforceable and was enforced by 8 February 2006. On 29 September 2005 this judgment was upheld by the Regional Court and became enforceable. 20.  On 1 December 2006 the judgment was further upheld by the Supreme Court. 21.  On 12 June 2007 the applicant received the payment due to her by the judgment of 15 June 2005.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 9 June 1995 the Vilnius District Court dismissed an action by several private individuals against the applicant company for attribution of ownership rights to two partially built houses, nos. 57-1 and 57-2. The court declared null and void the sale contracts on the basis of which the claimants, including G.G. and M.N., had maintained their title to the houses, and recognised the ownership rights of the applicant company in respect of the houses. 7.  The claimants’ appeal was dismissed by the Vilnius Regional Court on 5 September 1995. The court noted, inter alia, that G.G. and M.N. could request the company to cover their costs for construction of the houses. That decision was final. 8.  On 15 July 1996 the applicant company lodged a civil claim for the eviction of G.G. from the house, no. 57-2, that had previously been attributed to the applicant company in the above-mentioned civil proceedings between G.G. and the applicant company. G.G. had unlawfully occupied the house and continued to live there, thus preventing the applicant company from enjoying its ownership rights. 9.  From 10 January to 11 November 1997 the proceedings were suspended at G.G.’s request, because he had a pending appeal on points of law against the court decision of 9 June 1995. 10.  In December 1998 G.G. lodged a counterclaim against the applicant company, seeking acknowledgement that he was the owner of the house. G.G. also requested that the applicant company be prohibited from disposing of or mortgaging it. 11.  On 21 January 1999 the Vilnius Region District Court (hereinafter “the district court”) imposed a provisional measure and prohibited the applicant company from selling or transferring the disputed property, in order to secure G.G.’s counterclaim. On the same day the proceedings were suspended due to a related civil case which contained material relevant to the proceedings in question. 12.  On 3 February 1999 a letter was sent to G.G. requesting monthly payments from him because he was unlawfully occupying the house. 13.  On 12 May 2000 the district court suspended the enforcement of the court decision of 9 June 1995. 14.  The civil proceedings were resumed on 28 August 2001. 15.  On 23 May 2002 the same court allowed the applicant company’s claim. However, on 18 June 2002 the Vilnius Regional Court remitted the case for re-examination to the first-instance court. On 23 December 2002 the Supreme Court upheld that decision. 16.  Court hearings of 8 April 2003 and 9 February 2004 were adjourned at the request of the parties, as they were involved in friendly settlement negotiations; however, the negotiations failed on both those occasions. 17.  On 18 November 2003 the Vilnius Regional Court ordered the case to be examined by the Vilnius Regional Court as the court of first instance, having found that the district court did not have jurisdiction to examine this kind of case. At the same time the adjournment of the case which had been ordered by the latter court on 2 October 2003 was set aside. 18.  On 7 September 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court, at the request of G.G., issued an order seizing the applicant company’s plot of land on which the house stood, to secure G.G.’s counterclaim. 19.  The case was adjourned from 27 September to 6 December 2004 for a file from a related criminal case against G.G. to be obtained from another court. 20.  On 23 December 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim but allowed G.G.’s counterclaim. 21.  On 24 May 2005 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the lower court and allowed the applicant company’s claim. G.G. appealed to the Supreme Court. 22.  On 19 December 2005 the Supreme Court remitted the case again to the first-instance court for re-examination. 23.  The applicant company lodged a request to lift the seizure of the property, arguing that this measure was not proportionate as it imposed too heavy burden on financial interests of one of the parties to the proceedings. On 2 February 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court rejected that request. 24.  On 26 October 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court adjourned the proceedings until a related civil case, in which the legal status of the applicant company was disputed, was resolved. The applicant company appealed against that adjournment but the higher court upheld it. 25.  On 5 September 2007 the proceedings were recommenced. 26.  The applicant company submitted requests to the court for the seizure of the house occupied by G.G. to be lifted, and argued that the company had been suffering losses because of unpaid rent amounting to 3,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 920 euros (EUR)) each month. On 21 November and 2 December 2008 those requests were dismissed. 27.  On 19 February 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the applicant company’s claim and dismissed G.G.’s counterclaim. The court also ordered the provisional measures to be lifted once the decision became final. 28.  On 22 February 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. That ruling was final. 29.  According to the applicants, the disputed house was returned by the bailiff to the applicant company on 28 July 2010. 30.  On 20 June 1996 a private individual, M.N., submitted a civil claim asking for acknowledgement of his ownership rights to the house, no. 57-1, which had already been attributed to the applicant company by the court decision of 9 June 1995 (see paragraph 6). The house had been returned by the bailiff to the applicant company on 17 April 1996. Later on, M.N. modified his claim, asking only for reimbursement of construction costs. 31.  At the request of M.N., on 25 June 1996 the court gave a ruling on seizure of the applicant company’s property, which prohibited the house from being sold or ownership transferred until the case had been examined by the courts. 32.  On 16 November 1996 a pre-trial investigation against M.N. was opened: he was accused of forgery of documents and misappropriation of property. 33.  On 17 November 1997 and 3 February 1998 M.N. amended his action, withdrawing the claim for attribution of the title to the house and asking only for reimbursement of costs. 34.  In March 1998 the applicant company submitted a counterclaim for damage allegedly caused by M.N. In May an amended counterclaim was submitted. 35.  On 1 June 1998 the court ordered a forensic assessment of the construction costs claimed by M.N., and the proceedings were stayed until 24 June 1999. 36.  On 16 December 1999 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed M.N.’s claim for reimbursement of construction costs. At the same time it dismissed the applicant company’s counterclaim concerning damages. On 5 June 2000 the Court of Appeal dismissed as unfounded both appeals submitted by the parties. 37.  Upon an appeal on points of law by M.N., on 18 October 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of those courts and remitted the case for re-examination to the court of first instance. 38.  The applicant company requested the courts to lift the provisional measure. On 15 February 2001 the Court of Appeal declined to lift it and observed that the proceedings were still ongoing, since the Supreme Court had decided to remit the case for re-examination. 39.  On 8 June 2001 the Vilnius Regional Court suspended the proceedings until a related pre-trial investigation into M.N. actions was complete. 40.  After the proceedings were resumed, on 3 January 2002 the court suspended them again because the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing. 41.  On 17 February 2003 the proceedings were resumed. 42.  On 18 March, 29 April, 10 June, 4 September, and 14 October 2003 the hearings were adjourned, as the case was not ready for examination because the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing; besides, the applicant company’s representative was not present at three of those hearings. M.N. objected to the applicant company’s requests for postponement, considering the criminal proceedings against him irrelevant to the case at hand. 43.  On 17 August 2004 the civil proceedings were recommenced after the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 14 July 2004 to discontinue the criminal case against M.N due to prescription. 44.  On 7 October 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court refused the applicant company’s request for the provisional measure to be lifted. 45.  On 8 June 2005 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the civil claim by M.N. On 26 January 2006 the Court of Appeal by a final decision rejected an appeal by M.N. against this decision as unfounded. 46.  At the request of the applicant company the Vilnius Regional Court lifted the provisional measure on 3 March 2006; that decision became final on 27 April 2006.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Rustavi no. 1 Prison. 6.  The applicant was arrested on 4 October 2007 on suspicion of unlawful purchase and possession of firearms. 7.  On 19 November 2007 the firearms case was merged with another criminal case which concerned the applicant’s alleged involvement in several incidents of armed robbery. 8.  On 8 December 2007 the applicant was placed in Gldani no. 8 Prison. The applicant alleges that on an unspecified date he was beaten there by prison officers. He did not complain before the law-enforcement authorities about the alleged beating. 9.  On 24 June 2008 the Bolnisi District Court found the applicant guilty of unlawful possession of firearms and two distinct incidents of aggravated armed robbery, and imposed on him a sentence of twenty years and seven months’ imprisonment and a fine. On 6 January 2009 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal slightly modified the classification of the offences committed, maintaining the applicant’s conviction but reducing his sentence, fixing it at seventeen years and seven months’ imprisonment, plus a fine. On 1 June 2009 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. The applicant failed to submit to the Court copies of the domestic court decisions. 10.  As disclosed by his medical file, the applicant suffers from epilepsy, which condition he had developed prior to his arrest. 11.  On 18 July 2008 the applicant was placed in Rustavi no. 6 Prison. A medical certificate dated 27 November 2008 issued by the head doctor of that prison further diagnosed the applicant with chronic bronchitis and neurocirculatory dystonia. 12.  According to the applicant, at that time he was denied any medical care in prison; his family provided him with the required medication. In support of that assertion he provided two receipts from pharmacies indicating procurement of several drugs. Further, the applicant alleged that the conditions of his detention in Rustavi no. 6 Prison were poor: he was kept in conditions of inadequate sanitation and hygiene, without proper toilet facilities, and denied regular outdoor exercise. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s mother complained to the governor of Rustavi no. 6 Prison about a deterioration in her son’s medical condition and requested his transfer to the medical establishment of the prison authority (“the prison hospital”). The governor replied on 13 August 2009, claiming that the applicant’s medical condition was stable, that he had benefited from medical supervision and drugs in prison, and that no transfer to the prison hospital was envisaged. 14.  On 30 January 2010 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the Governor and the head doctor of Rustavi no. 6 Prison, drawing their attention to the deterioration in the medical condition of the applicant. The lawyer whilst referring to the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in Gldani no. 8 Prison claimed that he had sustained a head injury and suffered from epileptic seizures and diminished hearing as a result. She also noted that according to the applicantm, he had not been administered with any medical care in prison and he had severely suffered from, inter alia, mobility and speech problems. The applicant’s lawyer requested the prison governor to arrange for a comprehensive medical examination of her client. She also sought access to his complete medical file. 15.  On 10 and 12 February 2010 bacteriological sputum tests were performed on the applicant. Consequently, on 17 February 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with smear-positive focal pulmonary tuberculosis (“TB”) at the stage of infiltration and was classified as a moderately serious patient. On 23 February 2010 the applicant was placed on the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course – the treatment strategy for the detection and cure of TB recommended by the World Health Organisation) and started receiving conventional, first-line anti-tuberculosis agents. In addition, he was provided with vitamins. 16.  On 4 March 2010 the applicant was transferred for the purpose of treatment to Ksani no. 8 Prison, where prisoners with TB were housed. 17.  On 28 April 2010 the applicant’s lawyer requested from the head of the medical department at the Ministry of Prisons a copy of all the medical records concerning the applicant’s state of health from the very first day of his detention. On 19 May 2010 the applicant’s lawyer was provided with a copy of the applicant’s medical file, documenting the treatment administered to her client starting from February 2010. 18.  On 21 May 2010 the applicant underwent another bacteriological sputum test, which was smear-negative, that is, showed no microbacterium tuberculosis. The first phase of the treatment had proved successful. Hence, on 23 July 2010 the applicant was transferred from Ksani no. 8 Prison to the medical unit of Rustavi no. 1 Prison, where the second phase of his anti-TB treatment was initiated. The applicant was continuing to receive the anti-TB drugs. 19.  The latest medical records in the file relating to the applicant’s condition are dated April-May 2011. The results of blood and urine analyses, and also of bacterioscopic phlegm analysis, and various X-ray and other examinations, reveal that the applicant’s TB was then in a non-active phase. As regards the applicant’s other medical disorders, they had not evolved negatively. The applicant was being provided with drug-based treatment on an out-patient basis at Rustavi no. 1 Prison.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1950, and lives in Hatay. 7.  On 10 February 1994 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by officers from the anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate on suspicion of involvement in the activities of an illegal armed organisation, namely the TKEP/L (Turkey’s Communist Labour Party/Leninist). 8.  On 24 February 1994 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and then the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court. The same day the investigating judge ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 9.  In an indictment dated 17 May 1994, the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and eleven other defendants before the Istanbul State Security Court (“the court”), accusing them, inter alia, of membership of an illegal armed organisation and of involvement in activities that undermine the constitutional order of the State. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 10.  By a letter of 24 February 1995, the court requested from the First and Second Divisions of the State Security Court that the two case files pending before them be transmitted to it for examination, as some of the defendants had been put on trial for similar charges before these courts. 11.  On 22 May 1995 the court decided that the criminal proceedings pending before the Konya State Security Court should also be joined to the present case as the applicant was being prosecuted for similar charges before that court. 12.  At the hearings of 27 July 1995, 8 March, 20 May, 19 July, 23 September and 20 November 1996, the court obtained testimonies from the complainants, who claimed to be the victims of the acts of the defendants and eye witnesses to the events. 13.  On 27 January 1997 the court joined the case with that pending before the First Division of the Istanbul State Security Court. In the other case, the applicant was also accused of being a member of the same organisation and the activities in which he was allegedly involved were similar. 14.  On 11 April 1997 the Court of Cassation set aside the decision to join the two criminal proceedings. 15.  By a letter of 10 September 1997, the court requested that the case files pending before the Fifth and the Second Divisions of the State Security Court be sent to it for examination, as the facts were allegedly the same as in the present case. 16.  At the hearings of 19 November 1997 and 26 January 1998, the complainants of a robbery which had taken place in the Ağaoğlu and Aslantaş Commercial Centres were heard. The court noted that some of the witnesses had already made statements before the Seventh Division of the Istanbul Assize Court in relation to the incident at the Aslantaş Commercial Centre. Accordingly, it issued a letter to the Seventh Division of the Assize Court asking the latter to transfer the case file to it. 17.  During the hearings held on 17 June and 5 August 1998, the court noted that the information requested from the Assize Court had not been received. It therefore repeated the earlier request. 18.  On 7 October 1998 the Assize Court informed the State Security Court that it was unable to provide that information, as no defendant’s name had been mentioned in the letter of request. 19.  On 22 February 1999 the prosecutor submitted his observations on the case, in which he sought the applicant’s conviction and sentence pursuant to Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 20.  On 25 October 1999 the applicant read out his forty-page written observations and submitted them to the court. At the same hearing the applicant’s lawyer requested an extension to prepare the defence. 21.  At the hearing of 29 May 2000, the court decided to ask the Fourth Division of the Istanbul Assize Court about the outcome of criminal proceedings brought against the police by one of the co-accused, concerning an allegation of ill-treatment. By a letter dated 19 June 2000, the Assize Court stated that the case was still pending before the Court of Cassation. 22.  In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant made numerous requests for his release pending trial. The State Security Court dismissed these requests at each of the twenty-two hearings held between 17 August 1994 and 16 August 2000. In ordering the applicant’s continued detention each time, it relied on “the nature of the offences charged, the state of evidence and the content of the case file”. 23.  In particular, during the hearing held on 20 November 2000, the applicant’s lawyer reminded the court that his client had been kept in detention for six years and ten months, contrary to the provisions of domestic law as well as the Court’s established case-law. On the same day, due to the change in the representation for the prosecution, the case file was deposited with the new prosecutor for the submission of his observations. 24.  On 27 November 2000 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Fifth Division of the State Security Court, asking it to set aside the decision on the applicant’s continuing detention. In his petition he stated that his client had been detained for a long period despite the absence of any danger that he would destroy the evidence, which had all been collected in the case file, or that he would abscond. The Fifth Division rejected the request on similar grounds (paragraph 22 in fine above), namely “having regard to the content of the case file and the state of evidence”. 25.  On 28 February 2001 the court noted an unrelated letter sent by the First Division of the Assize Court, when it realised that the latest letter concerning the prosecution of the police officers had been mistakenly addressed to the First Division instead of the Fourth. 26.  On 4 June 2001 the applicant was released pending trial. 27.  Of the eight hearings held between 22 October 2001 and 5 May 2003, five were adjourned at the request of the defence. 28.  On 3 September 2003 the court noted that the Fourth Division of the Assize Court had sent the wrong judgment, instead of the one requested. 29.  On 23 February 2004, due to a further change in the representation of the prosecution, the proceedings were postponed to 3 May 2004. Subsequently, the case file was deposited with the new public prosecutor for the submission of his observations on the case. 30.  On 8 December 2004 the court decided to adjourn its deliberations on the judgment until after 1 April 2005, when the new Criminal Code was due to come into force, having regard to the fact that the latter’s provisions could affect the nature of the offence and the punishment to be imposed on the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1954 and until his arrest lived in St Petersburg. He is currently serving his sentence in a correctional colony in the Arkhangelsk Region. 7.   The applicant was arrested on 31 July 2010 on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping, extortion and conspiracy. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 22 June 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment in a high‑security correctional colony with the release to be followed by a year‑long restriction of liberty. 9.  On 8 November 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 10.  The parties provided the Court with the applicant’s medical documents, including his clinical records, discharge summaries, and expert opinions. 11.  The medical records show that the applicant had a long history of cerebral diseases as a result of having sustained a head injury in 1997 that developed into traumatic cystic arachnoiditis. Two years later he underwent a tomography examination which confirmed the presence of a growing liquor cyst located in the right frontotemporal part of the brain. The cyst impacted on his acoustic and visual nerves. The examination also revealed moderate internal hydrocephalus. In the recommendations written on 11 May 2000, the applicant’s doctor noted that a nuclear magnetic resonance examination, an electroencephalography examination and a liquor analysis were required to properly diagnose the applicant’s condition. He further observed that, in the absence of any treatment, it would be reasonable to perform urgent cerebral bypass surgery in order to prevent the applicant from going irreversibly blind. Nothing in the medical documents submitted suggests that the applicant had had any recourse to specific medical assistance or examinations regarding his cerebral problems during the ten years preceding his arrest. 12.  After the arrest the applicant was taken to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg (“facility no. IZ-47/1”). On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor performed a general medical check-up of the applicant, having noted in the medical file that he had a brain cyst. The doctor concluded that the applicant was “somatically healthy” and was therefore fit to remain in the conditions provided by the detention facility. 13.  On 23 September and 26 October 2010 the applicant was seen by a neurologist. In the absence of any medical documents the prison doctor was only able to perform a visual examination of the applicant. He diagnosed the applicant with hydrocephalus and recommended that an X-ray examination of the skull be carried out to make the correct diagnosis. 14.  In January 2011 the applicant’s medical file was supplemented with his old clinical records from a civilian hospital and the prison doctor examined him anew, paying regard to the additional medical information. He confirmed the diagnosis made in 2000 and recommended a consultation with an ophthalmologist. The applicant was prescribed drug therapy for a month. 15.  An ophthalmologist diagnosed the applicant with angiopathy. 16.  In February 2011 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis. He was immediately transferred to prison hospital no. 2 in St Petersburg, where the disease was successfully treated. The applicant was discharged from hospital with the doctors’ attestation of his full recovery from the infection. 17.  On 8 April 2011 the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in St Petersburg for an in-depth medical examination. He underwent a large variety of diagnostic procedures, including a magnetic resonance tomography of the brain and cervical vertebrae performed in a Russian civilian hospital, the Mariinskiy Hospital of St Petersburg. The tests showed that the applicant had a liquor cyst in the right frontotemporal part of the brain and that he suffered from vicarious hydrocephalus of mixed genesis and encephalopathy at the initial stage. In addition, doctors were able to establish that the applicant’s cervical vertebrae had several herniated disks and perineural cysts. 18.  Following completion of the diagnostic cycle, the applicant was released from the hospital and sent back to the detention facility. Discharge summaries issued on 15 April 2011 contained a recommendation of supervision by a prison doctor and regular consultations with a neurologist. 19.  In September 2011 the applicant complained about headaches to the attending prison doctor. In response it was recommended that he undergo an additional neurological medical examination in Gaaza prison hospital. However, the hospital refused to admit him because it did not employ a suitably qualified medical specialist, such as a brain surgeon. 20.  In October 2011 the applicant’s lawyer contacted Dr K. from the neurosurgical department of the Scientific Research Institute for Emergency Treatment, who agreed to study the applicant’s clinical records and give his opinion about the state of the applicant’s health at a court hearing on 4 October 2011, where he saw the applicant for the first time. At the hearing the doctor stated that the computer tomography performed on the applicant in 2000 had indicated a brain oedema at the base of the skull. He insisted that any change of the applicant’s lifestyle could induce complications related to the brain oedema and also seizures. Surgery was required to treat the cyst. However, Dr K. concluded that the applicant’s spinal problems were even more serious, as they could leave the applicant entirely paralysed. Nevertheless, the doctor noted that surgery would be only required if the applicant’s health were to deteriorate. The doctor recommended chondroprotective therapy and cerebral bypass surgery for the applicant. He was also to wear a cervical collar. 21.  The applicant also provided the Court with a certificate issued in November 2011 by Dr T., the head of the hospital where the applicant had received medical treatment in 1997-1998. Dr T. argued that the applicant’s condition called for permanent medical supervision by a neurologist and neurosurgeon so that the applicant could be subjected to urgent surgical intervention should the need arise. In Dr T.’s opinion, a detention facility was ill equipped to guarantee such supervision. The applicant also argued that his transfer to a northerly region in which to serve out his sentence had run contrary to the recommendations of his doctor and might have resulted in serious complications of his illness. Finally, he alleged that he lacked effective remedies whereby to complain about the poor quality of his medical treatment. 22.  On 1 December 2011 in response to a request from the applicant’s lawyer, a medical expert commission assessed the applicant’s health and checked for the existence of medical grounds warranting his release from detention. The commission observed that the applicant had received out‑patient treatment and that he had no focal brain injuries, epileptic seizures or significant limitations of his day-to-day activity. Taking account of the results of his dynamic medical examinations, the doctors concluded that the applicant was in satisfactory health and that there were no medical grounds warranting his release from detention. 23.  On 5 April 2012 Dr K. visually examined the applicant. No recommendations were made. 24.  On 4 December 2012 the applicant was examined by a neurologist to whom he complained about headaches, vomiting and vertigo. The doctor recommended drug therapy based on vasobral, piracetam, and vinpocetine. The following visit in January 2013 by the neurologist resulted in a modification of the drug regimen. 25.  On 20 February 2013 a prison doctor approved the applicant’s transfer to a correctional colony, finding him fit to make the journey. 26.  The applicant arrived on 4 March 2013 at correctional colony no. IK‑42/4 in the Astrakhan Region (“colony no. IK-42/4”), where he was seen by the colony doctor, who noted that the applicant had been suffering from brain cyst. At the end of April 2013 the doctor recommended the applicant’s transfer to a hospital for further assessment. No urgency was warranted. 27.  On 25 July 2013 Dr K. drafted another report, assessing the applicant’s condition on the basis of his medical records and the results of his examination on 5 April 2012. Dr K. concluded that his recommendations had not been complied with and that the applicant’s cyst had increased. He stressed that the appropriate treatment could only be ensured in a specialised medical institution, not least because the requisite dynamic monitoring of the applicant’s condition using computer and magnetic resonance tomography examinations needed to be performed every eight months. Lastly, the doctor emphasised that the applicant’s detention in a northerly region could lead to a further deterioration in his health by inducing epileptic seizures and brain ischemia, thus putting his life at risk. 28.  On 8 August 2013 the authorities transferred the applicant to a prison hospital in the Arkhangelsk Region. Following a number of tests, a medical panel declared that the applicant was not suffering from any disability. The applicant was discharged from the hospital with the recommendation that he be re-admitted for further treatment in June 2014. 29.  The last two entries in the applicant’s clinical records are illegible. The parties did not provide the Court with any additional information on the state of his health.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Istanbul. He is a high school teacher, an executive member of the Education and Science Workers’ Union and a member of the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions. 6.  The 2004 NATO summit took place in Istanbul from 28 to 29 June. The Governor of Istanbul designated thirteen locations in Istanbul where people would be allowed to hold demonstrations. 7.  As the remaining facts of the case are in dispute between the parties, they will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 8-10) and the Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 11-13). The documentary evidence and further factual elements submitted by the applicant and the Government is summarised in Section D (paragraphs 14-27).\n B.  The applicant’s submissions on the facts 8.  On 28 June 2004 the applicant and a number of other teachers arrived at the square outside the Mecidiyeköy Underground Station in Istanbul, which is one of the thirteen locations referred to above, to issue a press release. 9.  The applicant and all his colleagues were unarmed and behaved in a peaceful manner. Nevertheless, police officers who had been circling the crowds grabbed the applicant and his friends by the arms, sprayed them with tear gas and beat them up. 10.  The police officers then took the applicant to a police station, where he was kept for a period of eleven hours. He was subsequently brought before a prosecutor, who ordered his release. 11.  After the applicant and other demonstrating teachers finished reading their press release, police officers asked them to disperse. When the demonstrators refused to do so, the police officers warned them that they would be taken into custody. The group continued to refuse to disperse and, instead, went on to stage a sit-in protest. They told the police officers that they would continue with their protest until their friends, who had been arrested elsewhere, had been released. 12.  When the police continued to try to persuade them, the demonstrators attacked the police with stones and sticks. They also damaged cars in the vicinity and injured a number of police officers. As a result, the police officers used tear gas in order to disperse them. The applicant was taken to the police station, where he was kept for a period of eleven hours before his release was ordered by a prosecutor. 13.  On the same day the applicant was examined by two doctors. The first examination was carried out at 11.30 a.m. at the Haseki State Hospital. The doctor noted that the applicant’s eyes were red, and considered it necessary for the applicant to be examined by a specialist doctor. The specialist doctor who examined the applicant at Sağmalcılar Hospital at 6.45 p.m. on the same day noted that there was no sign on the applicant’s body that he had been subjected to ill-treatment. 14.  According to a report prepared on 28 June 2004 by nine of the police officers who had taken part in the incident, the spokesperson for the demonstrators in Mecidiyeköy told the police officers that a number of fellow union members had been arrested at another location in Istanbul earlier in the day. The spokesperson added that the demonstrators in Mecidiyeköy would not be dispersing unless and until their friends had been released, and would instead march to Taksim Square. When the police informed the spokesperson that this would not be allowed and warned the demonstrators to disperse, the demonstrators attacked the police officers with the sticks from their banners, and proceeded to stage a sit-in protest. The Rapid Response Force (Çevik Kuvvet) then dispersed the demonstrators and arrested eleven persons, including the applicant, who refused to disperse. 15.  The incident was widely reported in the national press. In a photograph published in the daily newspaper Sabah the applicant is pictured between two police officers who are holding him by the arms, and one of whom is spraying the applicant’s nose and mouth with gas at very close range. 16.  At 11.30 a.m. on the same day the applicant was examined by a doctor at Haseki Hospital, who noted redness in both eyes and referred him to a specialist doctor. The ophthalmologist who examined the applicant later that day at the same hospital observed hyperaemia in both eyes, and recorded his findings in a report. 17.  At 6.45 p.m. on the same day the applicant was apparently examined by another doctor. However, no entries were made by that doctor in the sections of the report reserved for detailing the incident, the applicant’s allegations and the doctor’s findings. These parts of the report were simply crossed out by the doctor. Thus, the report only mentions the name of the applicant, his date of birth, the time of the medical examination and the name of the police officer who accompanied him. 18.  It appears that the applicant was examined by yet another doctor on the same day. The doctor noted in his report (report no. 3015) that there were ecchymosed areas measuring 8 centimetres and 5 x 8 centimetres below the applicant’s shoulders. The doctor also noted that the applicant’s eyes were reddened. 19.  According to medical reports submitted by the Government, the ten demonstrators who had been arrested together with the applicant (see paragraph 14 above) also had various injuries on their bodies. 20.  The applicant and the other demonstrators were brought before the prosecutor and questioned. In his statement the applicant maintained that he had not committed any offences but had simply exercised his democratic rights. He also informed the prosecutor that the police had used pepper spray against him. According to the statement, a lawyer was present during the applicant’s questioning. 21.  On 7 September 2004 the applicant lodged an official complaint with the Şişli prosecutor against the police officers. He argued that when he and his colleagues had been preparing for their press release at 10.00 a.m. on the day of the incident, a number of police officers had attacked them with their truncheons and sprayed them with tear gas. He complained that he had been beaten up with truncheons and punched and kicked by the police officers even after he had been arrested. He pointed out that the police officers responsible could be identified from the photographs published in the newspapers. The applicant argued that the police officers’ actions had been in violation of both the domestic legislation and his rights under the Convention, including his rights to liberty and security, freedom of expression and protection from ill-treatment. 22.  The applicant subsequently found out in 2007 that before he had even lodged his official complaint on 7 September 2004 a prosecutor had already decided on 30 June 2004 not to prosecute the police officers. In the prosecutor’s decision sixteen persons, including the applicant, were referred to as “the complainants”. The sixteen persons also included the ten demonstrators arrested together with the applicant (see paragraph 14 above). The nine police officers (see paragraph 14 above) were named as the defendants. The offence in question was given as “ill-treatment”. 23.  The prosecutor stated in his decision that the police officers had allowed the demonstrators to read out their press release but that when the demonstrators had wanted to march to Taksim square, they had had to disperse them. In the opinion of the prosecutor the officers had been carrying out their duties under the Act on the Powers and Duties of the Police, and had not committed any offences. Despite the fact that it was expressly stated in the decision that it was to be communicated to the complainants, and that the complainants could lodge objections against it, the prosecutor’s decision was not communicated to the applicant. 24.  On 4 July 2007 the applicant wrote to the Şişli prosecutor and asked for information about the investigation. 25.  In his reply of 21 November 2007 the Şişli prosecutor forwarded to the applicant’s legal representative a copy of the decision adopted by his office on 30 June 2004. 26.  On 4 December 2007 the applicant lodged an objection against the decision and drew attention to the prosecutor’s failure to have regard to the medical reports described above (see paragraphs 16 and 18 above) and the photographs of him in the press. 27.  On 8 February 2008 the Beyoğlu Assize Court rejected the objection, stating that the prosecutor’s decision of 30 June 2004 had been in compliance with the applicable legislation and procedure.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Yambol. 7.  Around 9 a.m. on 21 April 2004, while shopping in a small supermarket in the town of Yambol, the applicant was stopped by supermarket employees on suspicion of stealing a small bottle of vodka. The bottle cost 1.2 Bulgarian levs, the equivalent of approximately 61 euro cents. The supermarket employees took the applicant to an office at the back of the supermarket and left him with the manager, S.F. The owner of the store, P.D., was also informed and arrived at the supermarket before the police came. 8.  Meanwhile, someone called the police and notified them that a theft had been committed in the supermarket. 9.  According to the applicant, he was searched and his shopping basket was taken away from him. S.F. then accused him of theft, punched him in the face, knocked him down and began kicking his chest, while the applicant was yelling and pleading with him to stop. When S.F. stopped, the applicant managed to stand up and realised that a small amount of his money was missing. When he asked for the money back, as well as his glasses, which had fallen off during the beating, S.F. punched him again in the side of the head and knocked him down, after which P.D. also kicked him several times and told him that people like him caused damage to his business. 10.  Shortly thereafter, two police officers arrived and found the applicant squatting by the wall in the presence of S.F. and P.D. The latter left immediately after the police had arrived, apparently using the back door. 11.  According to the applicant’s statements, made during the ensuing investigation, he had told the police officers that he had been beaten up by two men and that he needed medical help. He also claimed that after the incident he could hardly walk and the police officers had helped him to the police car. During the investigation the police officers stated that upon their arrival they had been informed by the applicant about the beating. They contested the applicant’s assertions that he had requested medical help and maintained that he had not been injured and had been able to walk on his own. 12.  The policemen drove the applicant to the police station in order to establish the circumstances surrounding the theft. While waiting in the reception hall to meet the officer in charge of the case, the applicant apparently felt severe pain, so he left and asked a stranger to drive him home. 13.  Soon after that two police officers headed towards the applicant’s apartment. They found him sitting on a bench in front of the apartment building and accompanied him to the apartment. There the applicant signed a record in connection with the theft. During the ensuing investigation one of the police officers contended that while the officers had been at his apartment the applicant had lain in bed and had looked ill. 14.  After the police officers had left, the applicant felt very sick and his wife called an ambulance. 15.  On the same day the applicant was admitted to the emergency department of the Yambol Hospital, where it was established that he had five broken ribs, bilateral pneumothorax, subcutaneous emphysema of the upper part of the body and bruising to the head, chest and abdomen. 16.  Two days later, on 23 April 2004, the applicant was transferred to Stara Zagora Hospital, where he underwent several examinations. According to the medical reports he had ten broken ribs, subcutaneous emphysema, haematomas on the front, the back, and both sides of the chest, large hematomas in the lumbar area and bilateral hemopneumothorax. On 28 April 2004 he underwent an abdominal ultrasound scan which revealed two-sided pleurisy and traumatic functional changes in the kidneys. 17.  The applicant underwent several medical procedures, including, inter alia, thoracentesis for the removal of 200 ml of liquid from the pleural space. 18.  The applicant was discharged on 5 May 2004 and was granted forty‑five days’ sick leave. 19.  On 14 May 2004 the applicant underwent a chest and lung examination. In his report the doctor noted, in particular, old fractures of ten ribs and pulmonary fibrosis. At another check up, on 4 June 2004, the doctors reiterated those conclusions. 20.  In the afternoon of 21 April 2004 the authorities of Yambol Hospital informed the police about the admission of the applicant and his condition. A police officer was dispatched to the hospital but was unable to see the applicant because of the latter’s serious medical condition. 21.  On the next day, 22 April 2004, the same police officer visited the applicant in hospital. This time the applicant was able to communicate and informed the officer that he had been beaten up by two men at the supermarket who he could identify. 22.  On the same day a police investigation (дознание) was instituted against unknown perpetrators. 23.  On 23 April 2004 the applicant’s wife filed an official complaint with the Yambol District Police Administration, describing the events and requesting that an investigation be opened and the responsible individuals punished. 24.  Between 23 April and 18 May 2004 a police investigator questioned P.D., S.F. and two employees of the shop, the police officers who had been dispatched to the scene of the incident, the police officer who had visited the applicant in hospital and the applicant. The policemen who had been in the supermarket stated that the applicant had smelled of alcohol and had told them he had been beaten up, but that there had been no visible signs of violence on his body. They further stated that he had been able to walk unaided and had not requested medical help. S.F. claimed that while he had been calling the police, the applicant had tried to leave the room. S.F had put a hand against the applicant’s chest to stop him and the latter had bumped into the door. He denied having beaten the applicant up and maintained that the applicant had been drunk and had threatened him. P.D. claimed that when he had arrived at the supermarket the applicant and S.F. had indeed been in the back room but the applicant had been drunk and had not had any injuries. He denied having hit the applicant. He further added that he was not aware of what had happened between the applicant and S.F. while they had been by themselves in the room. The applicant provided a detailed account of the events, although he claimed to have vague memories of certain moments immediately after the incident due to the shock he had experienced. 25.  On 18 May the police investigator ordered a forensic medical report, which was submitted on 23 May 2004. It reiterated the information contained in the applicant’s hospital file. The expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted in the manner described by the applicant, namely by punching and kicking, but not in the manner asserted by S.F. 26.  The investigator organised a line up on 25 May 2004 during which the applicant identified the supermarket manager, S.F., and the owner, P.D., as the individuals who had beaten him up. 27.  On 27 May 2004 the applicant was questioned before a judge of the Yambol District Court. He reiterated his account of the events and said that he would bring a civil claim against the alleged perpetrators during the judicial phase of the proceedings. 28.  On 2 June 2004 S.F. was questioned as a suspect (уличен). He decided to remain silent. On the same day the police investigator concluded the police investigation and transferred the file to the Yambol district prosecutor’s office with the opinion that S.F. should be brought to trial for causing the applicant an intermediate bodily harm. It appears that no charges were brought against P.D. 29.  On 8 June 2004 prosecutor R.L. at the Yambol district public prosecutor’s office terminated the proceedings against S.F., finding that there was not sufficient evidence that he and P.D. had beaten the applicant up. The prosecutor stated, in particular, that the account of the events asserted by the applicant had been contradictory. She made two points in this regard. First, the applicant had not informed the police officers that he had needed medical help. Secondly, despite his allegations that he had been punched in the head twice the witnesses had not reported any injuries and the doctors who had examined the applicant had not recorded any such injuries in their reports. She further added that in addition, the applicant had vague memories of the period immediately after the incident. 30.  On an unknown date the applicant appealed to the court. He maintained that he had informed the police officers that he had been beaten up and that it had been natural for his injuries to become visible later. He also contested the prosecutor’s version of events, which, in the applicant’s view, could have been interpreted as implying that the applicant had inflicted his injuries by himself. 31.  On 2 July 2004 the Yambol District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decree as ill-founded and remitted the case for further investigation. Judge D.S. held that there was substantial circumstantial evidence that the applicant had been beaten up by two men in the shop. As regards the conclusions of the prosecutor, the court noted that right after the incident the applicant had informed the police officers that he had been beaten up by two individuals and had later identified them and that the alleged punching in the head had been recorded in the medical documents which stated, inter alia, that the applicant had suffered from subcutaneous emphysema of the upper part of the body and contusion of the head. The court also specifically referred to the expert’s report, which found that the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted in the manner described by the applicant, namely, by punching and kicking, but not in the manner asserted by S.F. 32.  Following the remittal, on 15 July 2004 the prosecutor instructed the investigator to question the police officers who had seen the applicant in the police department in order to elucidate whether the applicant had had visible injuries, had requested medical help, had needed assistance walking and whether he had consumed alcohol. On 16 and 19 July 2004 the police investigator questioned several officers. The witnesses stated, in particular, that the applicant had been able to move on his own and had not had any visible injuries. 33.  On 20 July 2004 the police investigator concluded the investigation and transferred the file to the prosecutor’s office with the opinion that S.F. should be brought to trial for inflicting intermediate bodily harm. 34.  On 22 July 2004 prosecutor R.L. once again terminated the criminal proceedings against S.F., finding with identical reasoning that despite the additional investigative measures taken there was no evidence that the alleged perpetrators had beaten the applicant up. She stated, in particular, that the applicant had not requested medical help and had had no visible injuries. 35.  The applicant appealed against that decree, maintaining that the prosecutor had failed to discuss crucial evidence. He further argued that the evidence collected supported accusations not only against S.F., but also against P.D. 36.  On 4 October 2004 the Yambol District Court quashed the decree of 22 July 2004 as ill-founded and remitted the case. Judge G.K. noted, in particular, that the applicant had complained to the police officers that he had been beaten up and had later identified the alleged offenders; furthermore, his statements regarding his injuries had been corroborated by the doctors’ opinions. In view of that the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence allowing the prosecutor to bring the accused to trial. Nevertheless, in order to supplement the evidential material, the court instructed the prosecution authorities to question the applicant’s wife and an employee at the shop, who had not been questioned earlier. 37.  Following the remittal, in accordance with the court’s instructions the police investigator questioned the said witnesses. On 15 October 2004 the police investigator concluded the investigation and transferred the file to the prosecutor with the opinion that S.F. should be brought to trial. 38.  On 3 November 2004 prosecutor R.L. once again terminated the criminal proceedings against S.F. with identical reasoning. She further concluded that the statements of the witnesses who had been additionally questioned could not alter her prior conclusions. 39.  The applicant appealed, reiterating his earlier arguments against the discontinuation. In a decision of 9 December 2004 the District Court quashed the decree of 3 November 2004 and remitted the case to the prosecution authorities for a third time. Judge N.N. noted that most of the inflicted injuries had been internal and therefore the witnesses could not have noticed them. The court found that the prosecutor’s conclusions did not correspond to the facts of the case, that she had failed to take into account the medical reports and that there had been sufficient evidence to bring the offenders to trial. It also instructed the prosecutor to question one of the police officers who had been at the scene of the incident. 40.  In the meantime the applicant filed a complaint with the Yambol regional public prosecutor’s office, stating that prosecutor R.L. was not impartial and should be replaced. By a decree of 27 December 2004 the regional prosecutor dismissed the complaint. He stated that the discontinuation of the investigation had been based on the prosecutor’s opinion, which had been formed on the basis of the additional investigation carried out in compliance with the court’s instructions, and that in the absence of other indications the mere fact that the prosecutor had discontinued the proceedings on several occasions did not cast doubt on her impartiality. 41.  On 17 January 2005 the police investigator questioned one of the police officers who had been in the supermarket and on 21 January 2005 concluded the investigation with the opinion that the accused should be brought to trial. On 25 February 2005 the same prosecutor terminated the criminal proceedings for the fourth time with identical reasoning. She stated that the applicant’s memory about events was extremely vague and that there was no information indicating what exactly had happened in the period between his leaving the police department and his arrival at his home. 42.  The applicant appealed. On 11 July 2005 the District Court quashed the decree of 25 February 2005 as unlawful and unsubstantiated and remitted the case. Judge A.A. held, inter alia, that the prosecutor’s conclusions suggested that after leaving the police department the applicant had somehow injured himself or had been attacked by unknown individuals. The court stated that, having regard to the time and location of the incident as suggested by the prosecutor, namely while the applicant was retuning home, it was very unlikely that it would have gone unnoticed. 43.  Meanwhile on an unspecified date S.F. made a request under Article 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1974 that the case against him be examined by a court or terminated as the proceedings had already lasted for too long. In a decision of 24 November 2005 the District Court instructed the prosecutor to either submit an indictment within two months or terminate the proceedings. 44.  It appears that no investigation was conducted in the period between 11 July and 2 December 2005. On 2 December 2005 the case was assigned to another prosecutor as prosecutor R.L. had been promoted. 45.  On 10 January 2006 the prosecutor instructed a different police investigator to proceed with the investigation. 46.  On 17 January 2006 the police investigator ordered a medical report. On an unspecified date before 2 February 2006 the medical expert presented his conclusions. He stated that the injuries sustained by the applicant had aggravated with time, therefore he had been able to walk independently immediately after the incident. He also stated that it normally took thirty minutes to up to two hours for haematomas to become visible; therefore it was possible that the applicant’s injuries could not have been seen immediately after they had been inflicted. 47.  As in the meantime the two-month deadline under Article 239a for discontinuing the proceedings or filing an indictment to the court had expired, by a decision of 9 February 2006 the District Court terminated the criminal proceedings. 48.  The applicant appealed against the decision, arguing that although intermediate bodily harm was a serious offence within the meaning of Article 93 § 7 of the Criminal Code and the accused was therefore entitled to request discontinuation of the proceedings after two years of investigation, the two-year period had not expired and the accused’s request in this respect had therefore been premature. 49.  On 8 May 2006 the Yambol Regional Court upheld the decision. It held that intermediate bodily harm was an offence which did not fall within the scope of Article 93 § 7 of the Criminal Code and therefore the accused’s request had not been premature. It reasoned that pursuant to Article 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1974 after a certain period of time the suspect was entitled to have his case examined by the court or terminated and that in this case the court was only competent to verify whether the prosecution authorities had observed the statutory deadlines and could not examine the merits of the case. 50.  On 3 August 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Chief Public Prosecutor, stating, in particular, that prosecutor R.L. had repeatedly terminated the criminal proceedings despite the court’s instructions to bring the accused to trial and that the second prosecutor in charge of the case had been inactive, which had led to the termination of the proceedings. 51.  On 16 August 2006 a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office opened an inquiry into the applicant’s allegations and requested an explanation from the second prosecutor in charge of the case and his superior in respect of the delay in filing an indictment with the court. 52.  On 30 August 2007 the district prosecutor of Yambol informed the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office that no disciplinary penalty had been imposed on the prosecutor as he was considered a reliable employee and that the failure to file an indictment on time had been an unintentional mistake. 53.  There is no information on whether disciplinary action was pursued against prosecutor R.L.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Wrocław, Poland. 10.  On an unknown date in 1995 the Wrocław District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) issued a warrant to search for the applicant by “wanted” notice on suspicion of his having committed fraud. 11.  On 3 March 1995 the police arrested the applicant under that warrant. 12.  On 10 March 1995 the applicant was brought before the Wrocław Stare Miasto District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy). The prosecutor charged him with several counts of aggravated fraud and ordered that he be remanded in custody until 2 June 1995. The detention order was based on Articles 210 § 1 and 217 § 1(2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As to the grounds for the applicant’s detention, the prosecution first relied on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged. They also considered that the offence in question represented a serious danger to society (wysoki stopień społecznego niebezpieczeństwa czynu) and considered that there was a risk that the applicant might induce witnesses to give false testimony or obstruct the criminal proceedings against him by other unlawful means. 13.  On 26 May 1995, on an application made by the Wrocław District Prosecutor, the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 August 1995 in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged and the serious nature of that offence. The court also found that, in the light of the material collected in the investigation, there was a high risk that the applicant would obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings. Finally, the court held that the interests of the investigation, such as the need to obtain and secure evidence, militated in favour of keeping him in custody. 14.  Subsequently, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) took over the investigation from the District Prosecutor. 15.  On 24 August 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), on an application made by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 1995, finding that it was necessary because there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the serious offence. Furthermore, the court found that the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings militated against releasing him since, at the current stage of the investigation, it was necessary to hear evidence from all the injured parties, to carry out confrontations between witnesses and defendants and to lay further charges of dealing in stolen goods against several other persons who had not to date been involved in the proceedings. 16.  On 24 November 1995, on the subsequent application from the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 December 1995, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the serious offence with which he had been charged. The court also stressed that the applicant should be kept in custody in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, especially as the charges originally laid against the suspects needed to be supplemented. 17.  On 27 December 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor completed the investigation and, on 30 December 1995, lodged a bill of indictment with the Wrocław Regional Court. The applicant was indicted on several counts of aggravated fraud. The bill of indictment comprised charges against 13 co-defendants. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 9 expert witnesses and 104 lay witnesses, and to consider 400 pieces of documentary evidence. 18.  The first hearing was to be held on 15 April 1996. Yet it was eventually cancelled because one of the applicant’s co-defendants, who had already been released under police supervision, was absent. 19.  Subsequently, between 15 April 1996 and 28 August 1997, the Wrocław Regional Court listed 12 hearings for various dates but cancelled all of them because several of the applicant’s co-defendants who had already been released under police supervision had repeatedly failed to appear before it. They had submitted medical certificates to the effect that they could not participate in the trial because of their poor health and asked the court to adjourn the proceedings. 20.  During that time the applicant made numerous unsuccessful applications for release on bail or under police supervision. He submitted that even though his detention pending trial had exceeded any reasonable limits, not a single hearing on the merits had so far been held. He also asked the Regional Court to order, under Article 24 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the charges against the released co-defendants be severed from the case so as to ensure that the trial proceeded without any further impediment. 21.  In the meantime, on 31 December 1996, the Wrocław Regional Court had released A.A., one of the thirteen co-defendants, under police supervision. From then on, only the applicant and two other co-defendants (D.P. and W.K.) were still kept in detention pending trial. 22.  On the same day the Regional Court held a session in camera at which the Regional Prosecutor was present. It made an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), asking it to prolong the applicant’s and his two co-defendants’ detention for six further months. That application was prepared in view of the fact that on 1 January 1997 the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure were to take effect. The new provisions set statutory time-limits for detention pending trial and, in consequence, in all cases where detention had already exceeded, or was about to exceed, the relevant terms, the courts had either to release the person concerned or to ask the Supreme Court to prolong his detention (see also “B.  Relevant domestic law and practice” below).\nThe reasons for the Regional Court’s application read, in so far as relevant:\n“[In respect of the applicant and two other co-accused] the [maximum] time-limits for detention on remand laid down in Article 222 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have expired and 31 December 1996 is the deadline for lodging a request for further prolongation of their detention on remand.\nDuring the period following the date on which the bill of indictment was lodged with this court, it scheduled numerous hearings; however, the trial has not yet began as this court, for valid reasons [,such as the fact that the defendants, one after another, had failed to appear before us,] could not proceed with the trial. In this connection, this court has, in accordance with the suggestion of the Wrocław Court of Appeal, considered whether it would be sensible to sever the charges laid against the co-defendants concerned, pursuant to Article 24 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet, as all the charges in the present case are interrelated, this court finds that there is no just cause to proceed in this way.\nThe detained defendants have repeatedly asked this court to lift or vary the preventive measure imposed on them. This court has dismissed their applications and in doing so it has had [particular] regard to the serious nature of the offences, the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed and, more particularly, to the conduct of the defendants during the investigation, that is to say [the fact that they had had to be] searched for by a “wanted” notice and that there had been problems in the course of their arrest [which had justified the risk that] they might go into hiding. The [Wrocław] Court of Appeal, which has dealt with the defendants’ appeals [against decisions refusing to release them], expressed the same opinion.\nThat being so, and there being other serious obstacles [to the proper course of the trial] the present application for the defendants’ detention to be prolonged must be submitted to the Supreme Court.” 23.  The application was posted to the Supreme Court on 13 January 1997. 24.  On 24 January 1997, a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy), who had been summoned to the session and represented the prosecution, dealt with, and granted, the application. The Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention “from 24 January 1997 to 24 July 1997”. The defendants were not present. Nor were they legally represented since, under Polish law as it stood at that time, defendants or their counsel were not entitled to participate in court sessions held in camera (see also paragraphs 65-66 below). 25.  The Supreme Court’s decision contained exhaustive reasons, the relevant part of which may be summarised as follows:\nThe Supreme Court, noting that the application was filed on 31 December 1996 but posted as late as 13 January 1997, first considered what was the proper date of “lodging” such an application for the purposes of Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\nThe Supreme Court next observed that, depending on the answer to this question, it would have to determine the legal consequences of a potential failure on the part of the Wrocław Regional Court to respect the rule laid down in Article 10 (a) § 2 of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, which stated that in cases where no request for a further prolongation of detention on remand had been “lodged”, the detention on remand had to be lifted and the person concerned released not later than on 1 January 1997.\nThe Supreme Court considered that it should also deal with the question of whether it was competent to rule on the application if it had been “lodged” after the expiry of the term referred to in Article 10 (a) of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, i.e. after 1 January 1997.\nReferring to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the proper date of “lodging” an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had to be deemed either the date of posting the request or the date of submitting it to the registry of the Supreme Court since to hold otherwise would mean leaving a detainee without any guarantee that the Supreme Court was properly supervising his detention. Moreover, if the requesting court was not bound by any time-limits for submitting its application, detention, the most severe among the preventive measures, might continue for an unspecified and unlimited time outside the Supreme Court’s supervision. In consequence, an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a mere “proposal” to continue detention, would, for all practical purposes, transform into a basis for continuing detention. Clearly, that was not the intention of the legislator.\nThe Supreme Court therefore concluded that since in the applicant’s case no application for a further prolongation of his detention was “lodged” before 1 January 1997, the applicant’s (and his co-defendants’) detention from that date to the date of its present decision lacked any legal basis and was, accordingly, unlawful.\nIt went on to find that it was, nevertheless, competent to deal with the application lodged outside the relevant date. It considered that a lower court’s obligation to release a detainee in case of its failure properly to lodge an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was one thing, but its right to make such an application at any time was another. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the application in question should be deemed a “fresh application” and be examined as such.\nIt considered that further prolongation of the applicant’s detention was necessary. In essence, it repeated the arguments adduced by the Wrocław Regional Court and stressed the complexity of the case. 26.  On 9 July 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court made another application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It asked the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention until 31 December 1997. The Regional Court submitted that regardless of its consistent efforts to proceed with the trial, it could not begin the main hearing because several released co-accused had repeatedly failed to appear before it. However, the applicant had to be kept in custody since there was still a risk that he might go into hiding because at the initial stage of the proceedings he had had to be searched for by a “wanted” notice and, likewise his two detained co-defendants, had obstructed his arrest. Finally, the court relied on the complexity of the case and the fact that evidence gathered in the investigation sufficiently supported the charges laid against him. 27.  In the meantime, in July and August 1997, the applicant repeatedly complained to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court, the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) that, from 1 to 24 January 1997, he had been kept in detention without any legal basis. He also asked for release. 28.  On 28 August 1997 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention pending trial until 31 December 1997. The Supreme Court fully upheld the arguments adduced by the Wrocław Regional Court in its application. However, it expressed the opinion that, for the sake of the proper conduct of the trial, the charges against the released co-defendants should be severed from the case. 29.  On 8 September 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held the first hearing. It did not deal with the merits of the case but ordered that the charges against three of the released co-defendants be severed from the case and adjourned the trial until 13 October 1997. The applicant asked for release. The court refused, holding that the reasons for his continued detention, as cited in the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 August 1997, were still valid. 30.  In August, September and October 1997 the applicant sent numerous petitions, letters and applications to, inter alia, the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the Wrocław Regional Court, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor and the Wrocław District Prosecutor. He complained about the unlawfulness and length of his detention, the slow conduct of his trial and asked the authorities to release him and to institute criminal proceedings against the persons who had kept him in unlawful custody. He invoked Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, submitting that he had no remedy whereby he could challenge the lawfulness of his detention from 1 to 24 January 1997 and obtain release. He also relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and maintained that his right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial was not respected. 31.  On 15 September 1997 the applicant made an application for release to the Wrocław Regional Court. He asserted that there was no risk of his going into hiding. He admitted that it was true that, nearly three years previously and before he had been detained, he had used a false identity card. However that single fact could not justify holding him in custody for such a long time. At that point, he added, his detention had already exceeded thirty months. The applicant further complained that there had been an exceptional delay in the proceedings which, in his opinion, had resulted solely from the fact that the Regional Court had failed to ensure the presence of the released co-defendants at the trial. He also maintained that, following his arrest, there had been no single attempt on his part to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. In his view, there was no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that, had he been released, he would have evaded justice or any sentence that might be imposed. 32.  That application was dismissed on 9 October 1997. The Regional Court repeated the reasons previously given to justify the applicant’s detention. It was stressed that he should be kept in detention to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. Moreover, the court considered that the applicant had failed to adduce any arguments militating in favour of his release. On 13 October 1997 the court cancelled a hearing since one of the released co-defendants had failed to appear before it and submitted a medical certificate stating that he was ill. 33.  On 28 October 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held the first hearing on the merits. Since some of the co-defendants decided not to give any oral evidence at the trial stage, the court read out the record of evidence given by them in the investigation. 34.  The next hearing was to be held on 18 November 1997 but was cancelled because one of the released co-defendants had submitted a medical certificate stating that he was ill. 35.  On 20 November 1997 the Regional Court, at the Minister of Justice’s request, submitted to the Ministry a report on the progress of the proceedings. Further similar reports were submitted on 23 and 30 March, 25 May, 26 August and 9 December 1998. 36.  On 25 November 1997 the court held a hearing and had the record of evidence taken from other five co-defendants in the investigation read out. The court then started to hear witnesses. After hearing evidence from two of them, it adjourned the trial in order to hear six other witnesses. 37.  In the meantime, in November 1997, the applicant had again filed several petitions with the Ombudsman, the Minister of Justice and the Division of Judicial Supervision (Wydział Wizytacyjny) of the Wrocław Regional Court. He complained that the overall period of his detention had meanwhile amounted to nearly thirty-three months but the determination of the charges against him had merely begun. He asked the authorities concerned to react, in an appropriate manner, to the fact that he had been unlawfully detained in January 1997, a fact that had already been confirmed by the highest national court. 38.  On 11 December 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed a further application for release which had been filed by the applicant on an unknown date. The court held that all the legal and factual grounds previously given for his detention were still valid. It also considered that since there were no circumstances justifying release, as listed in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his detention should continue to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 39.  On 19 December 1997 the court held a hearing. It heard evidence from three witnesses and adjourned the trial until 30 January 1998 because other witnesses had not appeared. 40.  On the same day the Regional Court made a fresh, and third, application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, asking for the applicant’s, D.P.’s and W.K.’s detention to be prolonged until 31 March 1998. It stressed that it had eventually been able to begin the trial. It considered that, given that evidence had already been taken from all the co-defendants, it could not be said that the court had not handled the case efficiently. While it was true that the process of obtaining evidence had not come to an end, that was not due to any fault on the part of the trial court but had arisen out of other factors. There were still valid reasons justifying the defendants’ continued detention, notably the well-founded suspicion that they had committed the offences with which they had been charged and the risk that they might abscond or go into hiding. 41.  From 19 December 1997 to the beginning of January 1998 the applicant filed numerous petitions with the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Wrocław Regional Court, submitting that his constitutional right to personal liberty, as well as his rights secured by Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, had been violated. He maintained that he had spent nearly three years in detention because the trial court had – wrongly – concluded that there was a risk of his absconding even though, after his arrest, there had never been a single basis for such a finding. Whatever his arguments, the court had never believed him and never given him a chance to prove that his release would not have obstructed the course of the trial. In fact, the applicant claimed, the proper conduct of the proceedings had constantly been impeded by his seven released co-defendants. 42. On 15 January 1998 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention until 31 March 1998. The Supreme Court fully upheld the reasons given by the Wrocław Regional Court to justify its application. 43. On 30 January 1998 the Wrocław Regional Court held a hearing but the trial was again adjourned since, in the applicant’s words, “one of the defence counsel [had] left the courtroom”. 44. On 20 March 1998 the court released the applicant, D.P. and W.K. under police supervision. In its decision, the court conceded that the period of nearly three years that the applicant had spent in detention had been nearly as long as the anticipated penalty and that, in consequence, his continued detention would amount to serving a sentence of imprisonment. 45. Between 20 March 1998 and 4 February 1999 the Regional Court held eleven hearings. At the hearings held on 30 November and 1 December 1998 the court heard evidence from thirty-one witnesses. On 5 January 1999 the court heard fifteen witnesses. The applicant twice failed to appear before the court. 46. Further hearings were held on 4 February, 11 March, 14 April, 7 and 28 May and 9 June 1999. During that time the court heard evidence from 8 witnesses and read out records of evidence taken from 11 witnesses. 47. At a hearing held on 15 December 1999 the court heard evidence from 3 witnesses and read out records of evidence taken from 5 witnesses. The trial continued on 14 and 21 January 2000. 48. On 21 January 2000 the Regional Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine. The applicant did not appeal against his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment became final on 29 January 2000. 49. On 16 January 2001 the Court’s registry received the applicant’s declaration of means filed on 12 December 2000. It was delivered in an envelope bearing two stamps. The first of them read:\n“Wrocław Remand Centre – Department of Records and Employment.\nReceived on [handwriting] 2000-12-13. No. 651/099”\nThe second stamp read “cenzurowano” (censored).\nThe envelope itself bore traces of opening after being sealed: its right side had been cut open and then resealed with six white self-sticking paper slips.\nIt was postmarked 8 January 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Deputatskiy, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 5.  In the 1990s the applicant subscribed to a State savings scheme which would entitle him to receive a VAZ car in 1993. He paid the car’s full value but never received the car. 6.  On 13 February 2003 he received a partial compensation in the amount of 18,538.20 Russian roubles (RUB) equal to 13.35% of the car value. 7.  The applicant brought the court action against the authorities, seeking to recover the monetary value of the State promissory notes for purchasing of a car. 8.  On 30 June 2003 the Ust-Yanskiy District Court of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) allowed the applicant’s action against the Government and awarded him RUB 120,428.80 as the full car value less the amount already paid in February 2003. The award was to be paid at the expense of the Federal Treasury. 9.  On 28 July 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic upheld the judgment and it became final. The award remained unenforced. 10.  On 19 September 2003 the Ministry lodged a request for supervisory review of the case with the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic. 11.  On 15 July 2004 the Presidium quashed the judgment of 30 June 2003 and the appeal decision of 28 July 2003 on the ground of a violation of the substantive law and delivered a new judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s claim in full.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  On the evening of 14 May 1994 the applicant, at that time aged fourteen, went out with several friends in the centre of Vidin to play electronic games. On the way back he left the main group to see a classmate of his and her sister to their door. After he had walked the girls home at about 9.40 p.m., he ran back to re‑join his friends. The applicant was wearing shorts, a yellow tee‑shirt and a green sleeveless jacket. 7.  On the same evening, some time after 9.00 p.m., the Vidin police received a report that an ice‑cream booth in the centre of the town had been vandalised by two individuals. A police patrol was dispatched to the scene and arrested the first of them, but the second managed to get away. All patrols in the area were put on alert and ordered to track him down. The description given over the police radio was of a man wearing short pants and a light‑coloured tee‑shirt. 8.  At that time Mr G.G. and Mr V.E., both trainee police officers, were in the area of the incident, patrolling in Mr V.E.'s private car. Although they were supposed to be accompanied by a supervising police officer, chief sergeant A., they were patrolling by themselves, as sergeant A. had been dispatched elsewhere. Their car was in a street which was not well lit. Seeing the applicant running past the car, they assumed that he was the offender at large. They got out of the car and gave chase. The applicant heard their steps, but, seeing that they had come out of an unmarked rather than a police car, kept on running. It was disputed whether or not Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. had shouted “Stop! Police!” after the applicant. They submitted that they had done so, whereas the applicant and several witnesses stated that they had not heard the officers shouting. The chase continued for about a minute. The applicant ran by a Mr I.P. Shortly afterwards, Mr G.G. caught up with the applicant in front of a beauty parlour and apparently tripped him over. The applicant fell on the ground, face down. Mr G.G. then started hitting the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and kicking his torso. Soon after that Mr V.E. caught up with them and also started hitting the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and kicking his torso. The applicant averred that Mr V.E. had sat on his back and had delivered several truncheon blows to his head. The applicant was crying and begging the officers to stop, insisting that he had done nothing wrong. Mr I.P. was an eyewitness to the incident, and so were a Mr P.S. and a Mr V.K. 9.  Shortly afterwards, chief sergeants A.K. and I.G. arrived at the scene. By that time the physical assault on the applicant had stopped. The applicant was lying on the ground and Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. were standing beside him. The applicant's tee‑shirt was soaked with blood coming from the neck area. 10.  Chief sergeants A.K. and I.G. helped the applicant get into their patrol car. On the way to the hospital they stopped at a fountain and told him to wash the blood off his neck. The applicant told the officers that he felt pain in his legs and in his right lumbar area. 11.  The applicant was admitted to the emergency ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital at 10.01 p.m. Upon his admission he stated that he could not see. His blood pressure was measured to be 70/0. It was found that he had a traumatic‑lacerated injury on the back of his head. He was also complaining of severe pain in the area of the right kidney. He was taken to the surgical ward and the injury on his head was treated. 12.  From the hospital the applicant was taken to the police station, where he was questioned at about 10.30 p.m. It was established that he had nothing to do with the breaking of the ice‑cream booth. After the questioning an officer took the applicant home. When the applicant's mother saw the state the applicant was in, she asked a friend to drive the applicant and herself back to the emergency ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital. There she was informed that the applicant had already been treated and that there was nothing more the staff could do, as there were no doctors on the ward at that time, only paramedics. 13.  The applicant and his mother then went to the police station to find out why he had been beaten and apprise the police of the names of the eyewitnesses to the incident. They were given the names of the officers who had assaulted the applicant and sometime around midnight left the station and went home. 14.  When the severe pain in the applicant's right lumbar area continued through the night and blood showed up in his urine, a doctor was called in and examined the applicant at 2.10 a.m. on 15 May 1994. He found that the applicant had a reddening of the skin in the groins, parallel traces of blood suffusions and grazes on the calves, three on the left leg and two on the right leg, and a head injury. 15.  At 9.15 a.m. on 15 May 1994 the applicant went once more to the emergency ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital. At 10 a.m. he was admitted to the surgical ward. He was diagnosed as suffering from contusion in the right lumbar area, commotion of the right kidney and haematuria (blood in the urine), and was treated with styptics and antibiotics. He remained in hospital until 28 May 1994. 16.  Two days later, on 30 May 1994, the applicant was urgently admitted to the urology centre of the Medical Academy in Sofia because of macroscopic haematuria (high levels of blood in his urine) and sustained dull pain in his right lumbar area. His right kidney was found to be surrounded by a haematoma and retaining liquid. It was established that his blood pressure was 140/100 because of, among other reasons, the pressure from the haematoma on the kidney. The applicant was treated with spasmolytics, analgesics and antibiotics. The applicant had to be released on 13 June 1994 due to an in‑hospital infection outbreak. 17.  Throughout the following years the applicant underwent numerous examinations of his right kidney. 18.  On 15 July 1996 the applicant was admitted to the urology ward of the National Institute for Urgent Medical Care “Pirogov”, after complaining from dull pain in his right lumbar area. He was diagnosed as suffering from hydronephrosis of the right kidney (pathological chronic enlargement of the collecting channels of a kidney, leading to the compression and the eventual destruction of kidney tissue and the deterioration of the kidney function). On 22 July 1996 he underwent surgery and his right kidney was removed. On 9 August 1996 he was released from hospital. 19.  On 14 May 1994 the applicant's mother complained about his beating to the Vidin Regional Prosecutor's Office. On 16 May 1994 the applicant's father also lodged a complaint with the Vidin District Prosecutor's Office. 20.  On 21 June 1994 the Pleven Military Prosecutor's Office, which was competent to deal with offences allegedly committed by police officers, opened criminal proceedings against Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. 21.  The investigator to whom the case was assigned conducted a series of interviews on 27, 28 and 29 June 1994. He questioned the applicant, Mr I.P., Mr V.K. and several other witnesses. On 16 and 17 August 1994 the investigator questioned chief sergeant A.K. and two other police officers. 22.  On 17 August 1994 Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. were charged and questioned. During questioning Mr G.G. stated that he had tripped the applicant but had not subjected him to any other violence. Mr V.E. stated that he had only hit the applicant once with a truncheon on the legs, but had not subjected him to any other violence. 23.  On an unspecified date the investigator ordered a medical expert report to determine the extent of the applicant's injuries. The report was drawn up by Dr A.I., head of the forensic medicine ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital. She found that the applicant had had a wound on his head, haematomas and grazing on his legs, contusion of the right lumbar area and haematuria. She concluded that the beating had caused the applicant a short‑term life‑threatening health disorder, due to a traumatic-haemorrhagic shock resulting from the contusion of the right kidney and a massive haematoma around the kidney. 24.  On 6 July 1995 the applicant's mother, acting for the applicant, who was still underage, submitted a civil claim against Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. She sought 400,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL)[1] on the applicant's behalf. 25.  Another series of interviews was conducted on 20 September 1995 by another investigator at the Pleven Regional Military Prosecutor's Office. Mr V.K. and Mr P.S. were questioned. 26.  On 3 November 1995 the Pleven Military Prosecutor's Office submitted to the Pleven Military Court an indictment against Mr G.G. and Mr V.E., charging them with causing intermediate bodily harm to the applicant. On 6 November 1995 the case was set down for hearing. 27.  The first hearing took place on 12 February 1996. Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. were represented by Mr L.I., a former military prosecutor‑general. The applicant, who was also represented by counsel, amended his civil claim, seeking interest as from the date of the beating and naming the Vidin Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs as a third defendant. The court heard Mr G.G., Mr V.E., the applicant, the applicant's mother, chief sergeant A.K., several other police officers, Mr I.P., Mr V.K. and Mr P.S. Noting that the statements of the accused differed from those of the eyewitnesses, the court carried out a confrontation. Finally, the court heard Dr A.I., the medical expert who had given an opinion about the extent of the applicant's injuries. The accused disputed Dr A.I.'s conclusions and requested a new medical report to be drawn up by three experts, excluding Dr A.I. The court acceded to the request and ordered a new expert report, to be drawn up by three medical experts. 28.  In their report the three medical experts (Dr P.L., head of the forensic medicine and ethics department of the High Institute of Medicine in Pleven, Dr V.G., head of department at the Urology Clinic of the Institute, and Dr K.P., senior assistant at the anaesthesiology and intensive care departments of the Institute) concluded that as a result of the 14 May 1994 incident the applicant had suffered a contusion of the right kidney, haematomas and grazing of the two legs, a wound on the head and a reddening in the right part of the groins. Unlike Dr A.I., they concluded that the traumatic‑neurogenic shock suffered by the applicant had not become truly life‑threatening. They also found that before the incident the applicant had been suffering from a congenital kidney anomaly, which had been the reason for the applicant's haematuria after the incident. In the experts' view, the applicant's kidney injury had not been life‑threatening and had had no long‑lasting effects on his health. The beating had caused the applicant only a temporary (two‑ or three‑week) health problem. 29.  The next hearing took place on 19 June 1996. The court heard the three medical experts, who stated that they adhered to the conclusions given in their report. The prosecutor noted that the first report, drawn up by Dr A.I., and the second report, drawn up by the three medical experts, substantially differed on the issue of the extent of the injuries suffered by the applicant. He therefore requested an additional expert report, to be drawn up by five experts, including Dr A.I. The court acceded to the request. 30.  On 20 May 1997 the report of the five medical experts was ready. They concluded that the applicant had suffered a traumatic‑neurogenic shock, which, however, had not deteriorated and had not become life‑threatening. They also concluded that before the incident the applicant had been suffering from a congenital kidney anomaly, which had been the reason for his haematuria after the incident. In the experts' view, the applicant's kidney injury had not become life‑threatening. As regards the later surgical removal of the kidney and its potential causal link with the beating, the experts were of the opinion that, in view of the long time-span between the beating (14 May 1994) and the surgery (22 July 1996) and the nature of the injury, it could not be concluded that the removal of the kidney had been a direct and proximate consequence of the beating. Additionally, the applicant's congenital kidney anomaly had been prone to natural deterioration and could have led on its own to a decline in the kidney function, which was what had made the removal necessary. It could not be categorically established that the beating had not contributed to the need for the removal of the kidney, but the main factor had been the congenital anomaly. 31.  After several adjournments due to difficulties with the attendance of all five medical experts, the Pleven Military Court listed a hearing for 26 January 1998. At that hearing the court heard all five medical experts. Four of them stated that they adhered to the conclusions made in their report. By contrast, Dr A.I. stated that she did not agree with the conclusions of the report and that she still maintained the opinion expressed in her initial report. The applicant presented X‑rays of his kidneys and, after examining them, the four experts stated that they still adhered to the conclusions reached in their report. The applicant increased his civil claim to BGL 10,000,000. In his concluding argument the public prosecutor stated that, in view of the experts' opinion, he did not pursue the charge of intermediate bodily harm, and urged the court to characterise the officers' act as inflicting minor bodily harm. 32.  In a judgment of 26 January 1998 the Pleven Military Court found Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. guilty of inflicting the applicant minor bodily harm and not guilty of inflicting him intermediate bodily harm. It sentenced them to five months' imprisonment, suspended for three years. The court also partially allowed the applicant's claim for damages, awarding him BGL 300,000[2], to be paid jointly and severally by the two officers and the vicariously liable Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs in Vidin. 33.  The court found that Mr G.G. had tripped the applicant and that the applicant had fallen on the ground face down. After that Mr G.G. had delivered a number of blows on the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and had kicked several times his torso. When Mr V.E. had arrived he had also hit the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and had kicked his torso. During the beating the applicant had told the two accused that he had done nothing wrong. The court stated that it did not find the accused's averment that they had not beaten the applicant persuasive, because it was disproved by the testimony of two eyewitnesses – Mr I.P. and Mr V.K. – and of the applicant himself. The court considered that the eyewitnesses' and the applicant's testimony was consistent and reliable. 34.  The court also examined the officers' assertion that they had acted lawfully, in a situation calling for the arrest of a suspect, and that they had inflicted bodily harm in their efforts to subdue the applicant. In that connection, it noted that the accused were substantially stronger physically than the applicant, that Mr I.P., Mr V.K. and chief sergeant A.K. had testified that the applicant had not tried to resist, and that at the time of the incident the applicant had been fourteen years old. The court accordingly rejected the assertion. 35.  As regards the extent of the applicant's injuries, the court held that the opinion of the four medical experts, which appeared objective, impartial, consistent, well‑reasoned and in conformity with the medical documents in the case file, should be given more credit than that of Dr A.I. In the court's view, the four experts' arguments confuted her opinion. The court therefore held that as a result of the beating the applicant had suffered a temporary (two‑ or three‑week) non‑life‑threatening health disorder, which amounted to minor bodily harm within the meaning of Articles 128 to 130 of the Criminal Code of 1968 (“the CC”). 36.  Finally, the court rejected Mr G.G. and Mr V.E.'s defence under Article 12a of the CC that they had only used the force necessary to arrest a presumed offender, injuring the applicant in the process of subduing his resistance. The court acknowledged the great disparity in terms of physical strength between the two policemen and the applicant. Moreover, the other witnesses had clearly indicated that the applicant had not put up any resistance requiring the use of force. Finally, at the time of the incident the applicant had been only fourteen years old and his age was visible from his physical features. 37.  Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. appealed, arguing that their actions had not constituted an offence, as they had acted within the bounds allowed by the National Police Act of 1993. In the alternative, they submitted that the sentences imposed on them were too harsh. The applicant also appealed, arguing that the amount of damages awarded to him was too low. 38.  The Military Court of Appeals held a hearing on 8 June 1998. The officers were represented by their counsel, Mr L.I. The applicant was represented by two lawyers. 39.  In a judgment of 8 June 1998 the Military Court of Appeals upheld the Pleven Military Court's judgment. It held that the manner in which the applicant's injuries had been caused had been correctly established by the lower court. There existed direct evidence that the applicant had been subjected to violence even after he had been brought to the ground and had not had the possibility to resist or run away. Even if the officers had misidentified the applicant, this had not legally justified the physical assault that they had inflicted on him. Moreover, the use of force had continued after the applicant had been subdued. There existed a direct causal link between the violence and the injuries sustained, as confirmed by all of the medical expert reports. The court went on to state that it did not agree with the lower court's conclusion as regards the extent of the applicant's injury. To exclude the causal link between the surgical removal of the applicant's right kidney and the incident of 14 May 1994, the Pleven Military Court had relied on the conclusion of four medical experts and had rejected as illogical the conclusion of Dr A.I. However, that court had disregarded that conclusion on purely formal grounds, without discussing its main points. It was unclear whether the opinion of the four experts was in fact based on the raw medical data, which in turn cast doubt on its correctness. The court concluded that if the lower court had taken into account these considerations, it could have made a different finding as to the reason for the surgical removal of the applicant's right kidney. However, since no appeal had been lodged by the prosecution, the court only noted this factual mistake and did not correct it in its judgment by holding that the applicant had suffered intermediate bodily harm, as that would worsen the accused's position. 40.  Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant also appealed, requesting an increase in the amount of damages awarded. 41.  The Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing on 17 September 1998. It heard the applicant's and the officers' oral argument and accepted their written pleadings for consideration. The prosecutor present at the hearing submitted that both appeals were groundless and should be dismissed. 42.  In a final judgment of 11 November 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation reversed Mr G.G.'s and Mr V.E.'s convictions and acquitted them. It also dismissed the applicant's civil claim. Its opinion read as follows:\n“...The courts below arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the two [officers]' act had been wrongful and contrary to Article 131 [§ 1] (2) of the CC...\nThis is so for the following reasons:\nThe [officers'] act does not amount to an offence, as they acted under the prerequisites of section 40(1), points 1 and 2 of the National Police Act [of 1993] and within the bounds set by this Act on the use of physical force, namely information about the perpetration of a publicly prosecutable offence in the centre of Vidin, which was broadcast over the [police] radio station and was received by [Mr G.G.] and [Mr V.E.]. Moreover, the description of the perpetrator who had fled from the crime scene coincided with the appearance of the [applicant], and for this reason the ... officers mistook him for the wanted offender. What is more, the [applicant] did not obey and through his actions refused to comply with the lawful order of the [officers], who tried to stop him by shouting 'Stop! Police!' Instead, he tried to escape, in order to avoid arrest by the [police], who, in line with their duties, gave chase with a view to arresting the suspect. As it were, not only did the [applicant] not obey, but he also resisted the [police officers]. Finally, the injuries he sustained upon his arrest are within what is permissible under sections 40 and 41 of the [National Police Act of 1993].\nThe overall situation, including the [applicant]'s inadequate behaviour, led the [officers] to conclude that he was the offender who was being sought after and who had to be caught, overawed and apprehended. This conclusion and the lawful actions of the officers, including the use of force with its consequences for the [applicant], rule out the criminality of their act. [To hold o]therwise [would mean to render] the above‑mentioned provisions of the [National Police Act of 1993] nugatory.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Flats represented nearly 20% of the pre-war housing stock of Bosnia and Herzegovina[1] (around 250,000 housing units out of 1,315,000). By local standards, they were a particularly attractive type of home, equipped with modern conveniences and located in urban centres. Practically all flats were under the regime of “social ownership” – a concept which, while it does exist in other countries, was particularly highly developed in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“the SFRY”). They were generally built by socially owned enterprises or other public bodies for allocation to their employees, who became “occupancy right holders”[2]. All citizens of the SFRY were required to pay a means-tested contribution to subsidise housing construction. However, the amount an individual had contributed was not amongst the legal criteria taken into account in the waiting lists for allocation of such flats. 6.  The rights of both the allocation right holders (public bodies which nominally controlled the flats) and the occupancy right holders were regulated by law (the Housing Act 1984, which is still in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina[3]). In accordance with this Act, an occupancy right, once allocated, entitled the occupancy right holder to permanent, lifelong use of the flat against the payment of a nominal fee. When occupancy right holders died, their rights transferred, as a matter of law, to their surviving spouses (indeed, spouses held occupancy rights in common) or registered members of their family households who were also using the flat (sections 19 and 21 of this Act). Furthermore, in the event of a divorce, the spouses were free to choose which one of them would continue to use the flat; in the absence of an agreement, either of them could apply to a court for a transfer of the occupancy right (section 20 of this Act). In practice, these provisions on transfer meant that occupancy rights originally allocated by public bodies to their employees could pass, as of right, to multiple generations for whom the initial employment-based link to the allocation right holder no longer existed. Occupancy rights could be cancelled only in court proceedings (section 50 of this Act) on limited grounds (sections 44, 47 and 49 of this Act), the most important of which was failure by occupancy right holders to physically use their flats for their own housing needs for a continuous period of at least six months without justified grounds. Although inspections were foreseen to ensure compliance with this requirement (section 42 of this Act), occupancy rights were rarely, if ever, cancelled on these grounds prior to the 1992-95 war. Moreover, on 24 December 1992 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina annulled the inspection provisions[4]. 7.  Following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992, a brutal war started in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 15 May 1992 the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted its Resolution 757 urging that all units of the JNA, the armed forces of the SFRY, and all elements of the Croatian Army either be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring. While the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, the United Nations Secretary General (report of 3 December 1992, A/47/747, § 11) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (see its judgment in the Tadić case of 15 July 1999, § 151) later established that JNA members born in Bosnia and Herzegovina actually remained there with their equipment and joined the VRS forces[5] and only those born in Serbia and Montenegro left and joined the VJ forces[6]. As regards the participation by foreign armed forces in the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Đokić, cited above, §§ 16-17. 8.  The concept of “social ownership” was abandoned during the 1992-95 war[7]. Socially owned flats were thus effectively nationalised. As regards the administration of such flats during and after the war, see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below. 9.  The applicant was born in 1959. She lives in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10.  In 1983 her husband, a JNA sergeant, was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. As the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, he decided to continue his military career in Serbia. The applicant also moved to Serbia, where she was granted refugee status. 11.  The applicant’s husband’s military service was terminated in 1998. 12.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. Shortly thereafter, she filed a petition for divorce in Serbia and returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. She was granted a divorce on 2 March 2000. 13.  On 25 March 2000 her restitution claim was rejected pursuant to section 3a of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998 (“section 3a”; see paragraph 54 below). On 28 September 2000 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. 14.  On 29 June 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the Human Rights Chamber, a domestic human-rights body set up by Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Dayton Peace Agreement”). 15.  On 27 June 2002 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the decisions of 25 March and 28 September 2000 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 16.  On 9 July 2002 the restitution commission set up by Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement (“the CRPC”), before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that the applicant’s husband was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction. 17.  On 22 November 2002 the competent housing authorities rejected again the applicant’s claim pursuant to section 3a. On 23 September 2003 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. 18.  On 9 September 2004 the Human Rights Commission, the successor of the Human Rights Chamber, held that the applicant shared the fate of her former husband as to the restitution of their flat and found no breach of the Convention owing to her former husband’s service in the VJ forces. 19.  On 20 January 2006 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the administrative decisions of 22 November 2002 and 23 September 2003 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 20.  On 5 October 2006 the authorities rejected again the applicant’s claim pursuant to section 3a. On 8 December 2006 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. The decision of 8 December 2006 was served on the applicant on 30 September 2007. The applicant did not appeal. 21.  On 17 November 2008 the Constitutional Court found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in consideration of the length of the restitution proceedings and awarded the applicant 1,200 convertible marks (BAM)[8] for non-pecuniary damage. Regardless of the excessive length of the restitution proceedings, it held that the applicant should have nevertheless lodged an application for judicial review against the administrative decision of 8 December 2006 and rejected her substantive complaints on non-exhaustion grounds. 22.  The applicant was born in Serbia in 1934. He lives in Serbia. 23.  In 1978, as a JNA medical officer, he was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. Whilst he was transferred to Belgrade in 1989, his wife stayed in that flat until 1994. His military service was terminated on 31 October 1992. 24.  On an unknown date, after having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, the applicant was allocated a tenancy right of unlimited duration on a military flat in Serbia. In addition, he was provided a loan, co‑financed by the military authorities, for another flat in Serbia (see paragraph 59 below). 25.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. 26.  On 8 August 2000 his restitution claim was rejected pursuant to section 3a. On 12 March 2001 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. 27.  On 15 August 2002 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the decisions of 8 August 2000 and 12 March 2001 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 28.  On 17 September 2002 the applicant lodged an application with the Human Rights Chamber. 29.  On 22 November 2002 the competent housing authorities rejected again the applicant’s restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. The decision was delivered on 30 December 2002. The applicant did not appeal. 30.  On 7 July 2004 the Human Rights Commission, the successor of the Human Rights Chamber, found that there was no breach of the Convention. That decision was delivered on 11 November 2004. 31.  The applicant was born in Croatia in 1944. He lives in Serbia. 32.  In 1983, as a JNA officer, he was allocated a military flat in Mostar. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, he decided to continue his military career in Serbia. His military service was terminated in 2000. 33.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Mostar. On 4 September 2001 his application was rejected pursuant to section 3a. The decision was upheld by the competent Cantonal Ministry, the Mostar Cantonal Court and the Supreme Court of the relevant Entity on 22 December 2003, 29 December 2004 and 11 October 2006 respectively. 34.  In 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Human Rights Chamber. In 2006 the Human Rights Commission found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in view of the length of the restitution proceedings and awarded the applicant BAM 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage. Given their excessive length, the Human Rights Commission held that the restitution proceedings did not constitute a remedy which would have to be used as a condition for the examination of the applicant’s substantive complaints. It then held, in line with its well-established jurisprudence, that the applicant’s occupancy right constituted “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that his inability to repossess his flat amounted to an interference with the enjoyment of that rights. As regards the proportionality of the interference, the Commission held that the applicant’s service in the VJ forces had shown his disloyalty to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It concluded that the interference was therefore justified and found no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Lastly, it considered that it was unnecessary to examine the discrimination and Article 8 complaints. 35.  The applicant was born in Serbia in 1952. He lives in Serbia. 36.  In 1988, as a JNA medical officer, he was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he decided to pursue his military career in Serbia. 37.  After having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, on 1 June 1999 the applicant was provided a mortgage loan, co-financed by the military authorities, for a flat in Serbia (see paragraph 59 below). 38.  In 1999 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. On 22 June 2004 his application was rejected pursuant to section 3a. That decision was upheld by the competent Cantonal Ministry, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court and the Supreme Court on 1 November 2004, 24 September 2007 and 15 January 2010 respectively. 39.  In the meantime, on 9 July 2002, the CRPC mentioned in paragraph 16 above, before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that he was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction. 40.  The applicant’s military service was terminated in 2003. 41.  The applicant was born in 1942. He lives in Serbia. 42.  In 1987, as a JNA officer, he was allocated a military flat in Mostar. Although the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, he stayed in Mostar. On paper, however, he was a member of the newly-established VJ forces, the armed forces of the neighbouring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, until 31 July 1992. On 3 August 1992 the HVO forces[9] arrested the applicant. He was detained at Dretelj internment camp until 18 August 1992 and then deported to the area controlled by the VRS forces. Shortly thereafter, the Red Cross Society of Montenegro transferred the applicant to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On 26 August 1992 he was examined at Skopje Military Hospital. According to the medical report, the applicant was subjected to serious ill-treatment at Dretelj internment camp. 43.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Mostar. On 9 October 2002 his claim was rejected pursuant to section 3a. On 7 November the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. On 16 April 2003 the Mostar Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed both decisions and remitted the case for reconsideration. 44.  On 11 February 2004 the housing authorities rejected again the applicant’s restitution claim under section 3a. On 5 July 2004 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. On 2 December 2004 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed both decisions and remitted the case to the housing authorities. 45.  On 16 April 2007 the housing authorities rejected for a third time the restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. That decision was upheld by the competent Cantonal Ministry and the Mostar Cantonal Court on 11 February and 2 December 2008 respectively. 46.  On 26 April 2007 the Serbian authorities terminated the proceedings for the allocation of a flat in Serbia because the applicant had not renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Mostar (see paragraph 59 below). On 6 October 2009 the applicant was placed in an old people’s home in Serbia, as he had no other place to live. 47.  The applicant was born in Montenegro in 1941 where he now lives. 48.  In 1981, as an economist employed at a military facility, he was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he accepted a similar job at a military facility in Montenegro. 49.  In 1999 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. On 17 March 2003 his restitution claim was accepted. On 27 November 2003 the competent Cantonal Ministry quashed that decision and rejected the restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. 50.  Meanwhile, on 24 April 2003, the CRPC mentioned in paragraph 16 above, before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that he was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction. 51.  In November 2005 he retired. After having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, he was allocated a tenancy right of unlimited duration on a military flat in Montenegro in December 2005 (see paragraph 59 below). 52.  On 6 February 2006 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the decision of 27 November 2003 and remitted the case to the Cantonal Ministry. On 29 March 2006 the Cantonal Ministry quashed the decision of 17 March 2003 and remitted the case to the housing authorities. On 10 April 2007 the housing authorities rejected the restitution claim under section 3a. The Cantonal Ministry and the Sarajevo Cantonal Court upheld that decision on 5 June 2007 and 24 June 2008 respectively. The last decision was delivered on 10 December 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in St Petersburg. 8.  The applicant is a member of the National Bolsheviks Party. 9.  On 14 December 2004 a group of about forty members of the National Bolsheviks Party occupied the waiting area of the President’s administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office on the ground floor. 10.  They asked for a meeting with the President, the deputy head of the President’s administration Mr Surkov, and the President’s economic advisor Mr Illarionov. Through the windows they distributed leaflets with a printed letter to the President that listed his ten alleged failures to comply with the Constitution and contained a call for his resignation. 11.  The intruders stayed in the office for one hour and a half until the police broke down the blocked door. They did not offer any other resistance to the authorities. 12.  On 16 December 2004 the Khamovnicheskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s detention on the ground that he was suspected of a particularly serious criminal offence, had no permanent residence in Moscow and was a Dutch national. It considered that there was a risk of his re-offending, absconding, interfering with the investigation or intimidating witnesses. 13.  The applicant appealed, complaining that the District Court had not cited any facts to justify the necessity of ordering his detention. On 3 February 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful and justified. 14.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant was charged with an attempted violent overthrow of State power (Article 278 of the Criminal Code) and intentional destruction and degradation of others’ property in public places (Articles 167 § 2 and 214). 15.  On 8 February 2005 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow extended the applicant’s detention until 14 April 2005, referring to the gravity of the charge. The applicant had no permanent residence in Moscow and there were reasons to believe that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. 16.  The applicant’s counsel appealed. He asked the court to release the applicant, taking into account that he had no criminal record, had positive references and was of frail health. On 9 March 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on appeal. 17.  On 16 February 2005 the applicant’s charge was amended to that of participation in mass disorders, an offence under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 18.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor requested the court to extend the applicant’s detention until 14 August 2005. On 14 April 2005 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow extended the applicant’s detention until 14 July 2005 for the following reasons:\n“There are no reasons to vary the preventive measure. Taking into account the gravity of the charges and [the applicant’s] individual situation, the court considers that there are sufficient indications that [the applicant], once released, might abscond.\nAt the same time, bearing in mind that the parties to the criminal proceedings have already started studying the case file, the extension asked for by the prosecution appears to be excessive and must be limited to three months. This period will be sufficient for all parties to the proceedings to study effectively the entire case file.” 19.  On 14 April 2005 the applicant’s counsel appealed. He asked the court to apply a more lenient preventive measure, taking into account that the applicant had no criminal record, had a permanent place of residence in Russia, studied at a university and suffered from a kidney disease. He also submitted that the applicant did not need so much time to study the case file. At the appeal hearing before the Moscow City Court the applicant confirmed that he had finished studying the case file. 20.  On 11 May 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 14 April 2005, finding that it had been lawful, sufficiently reasoned and justified. 21.  On 7 June 2005 the investigation was completed and thirty-nine persons, including the applicant, were committed for trial. 22.  On 20 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow scheduled the preliminary hearing for 30 June 2005 and held that all the defendants should remain in custody. 23.  On 30 June 2005 the Tverskoy District Court held a preliminary hearing. It rejected the defendants’ requests to release them, citing the gravity of the charges against them and the risk of their absconding or obstructing justice. 24.  The applicant’s counsel appealed. He repeated the arguments advanced in the grounds of appeal of 14 April 2005 and added that the applicant’s father, Mr Jaap Jan Lind, a Dutch national and the former Governor of the New Guinea, was dying of cancer in the Netherlands. On 17 August 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 30 June 2005 on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. 25.  The trial started on 8 July 2005. 26.  On 14 July 2005 the applicant lodged an application for release, referring to his frail health and a need for a medical examination. On 27 July 2005 the Tverskoy District Court rejected the request. It held that the applicant’s detention was lawful and justified. The applicant had not submitted medical certificates showing that his state of health was incompatible with custody. On 5 October 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision on appeal. 27.  On 10 August 2005 the applicant’s counsel filed a further application for release. He submitted medical certificates, confirming the applicant’s and his father’s diseases. A human-rights activist, Mr Ponomarev, offered his personal guarantee that the applicant would not abscond. The Dutch Embassy asked the court to release the applicant taking into account the precarious state of his health and his father’s terminal illness. Other defendants also lodged applications for release. 28.  On 10 August 2005 the Tverskoy District Court rejected the requests. It held:\n“The court takes into account the defence’s argument that the individual approach to each defendant’s situation is essential when deciding on the preventive measure.\nExamining the grounds on which ... the court ordered and extended detention in respect of all the defendants without exception ... the court notes that these grounds still persist today. Therefore, having regard to the state of health, family situation, age, profession and character of all the defendants, and to the personal guarantees offered by certain private individuals and included in the case file, the court concludes that, if released, each of the applicants might abscond or obstruct justice in some other way.” 29.  The applicant appealed, complaining that the District Court had disregarded the medical evidence confirming his and his father’s poor state of health. On 2 November 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 10 August 2005 on appeal, finding that the applicant had not submitted medical certificates showing that his state of health prevented him from remaining in custody. 30.  On 16 September 2005 the Tverskoy District Court rejected a new application for release, repeating verbatim the wording of the decision of 10 August 2005. 31.  In September 2005 the applicant asked the domestic courts to release him for a few days so that he could see his father. Mr Jaap Lind had asked for euthanasia which was scheduled for 29 September 2005. The Dutch Ambassador seconded his request. 32.  On 27 September 2005 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow refused to release the applicant. It found that since the applicant was a Dutch national he might abscond or interfere with the proceedings. 33.  On 28 September 2005 the applicant was permitted a phone conversation with his father, in Russian only. The Dutch Embassy paid for the call. The conversation was interrupted by the facility administration a minute later. 34.  On 29 September 2005 Mr Jaap Lind died by euthanasia. 35.  On 27 October 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of 27 September 2005 on appeal. It held that the information about the deterioration of the applicant’s father’s health and the Dutch Ambassador’s request to release the applicant had been considered. However, the refusal to release the applicant had been justified, given the gravity of the charge against him. The court found that the applicant had been living in Russia since 1989, had visited his father no more than once a year and had mainly communicated with him by mail and phone. He had been given an opportunity to talk to his father over the phone. It further held that the applicant’s state of health was satisfactory, therefore there was no reason to amend the preventive measure. 36.  In October 2005 the applicant lodged a new application for release. He submitted that his father had died and he wanted to attend the farewell ceremony. The applicant vouched that he had no intention of absconding and referred to his clean criminal record and positive references. The Dutch Ambassador for a third time asked the court for the applicant’s temporary release so that he could attend the farewell ceremony. 37.  On 3 October 2005 the Tverskoy District Court rejected the request. It referred to the gravity of the charge and the applicant’s Dutch nationality which gave reasons to believe that he might abscond. 38.  The applicant appealed. He again asked the court to release him so that he could attend a farewell ceremony for his father. He also contended that he suffered from a chronic kidney disease and required constant medical supervision and treatment. He complained that his applications to the detention facility doctor had remained unanswered and that he had not been provided with any treatment for his disease. 39.  On 27 October 2005 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision on appeal. It found that the applicant’s father had donated his body to science, therefore there had been no funeral. The farewell ceremony was scheduled for 30 October 2005 in The Hague. Taking into account the gravity of the charge and the applicant’s previously rare contact with his father, it was inopportune to release him. 40.  On 8 December 2005 the Tverskoy District Court convicted the applicant of participation in mass disorders and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment conditional on two years’ probation. The applicant was immediately released. 41.  The applicant was held in detention facility no. IZ-77/2 in Moscow. 42.  According to a certificate of 23 November 2005 issued by the facility administration, produced by the Government, from 16 to 17 December 2004 and from 9 to 10 February 2005 the applicant was kept in cell no. 511. The cell measured 9.7 sq. m, was equipped with five bunks and accommodated three or four inmates. Cell no. 100 – where the applicant was held from 17 December 2004 to 9 February 2005 and from 10 February to 29 April 2005 – measured 54.7 sq. m, was equipped with twenty-two bunks and housed twenty inmates on average. From 29 April to 8 December 2005 the applicant was detained in cell no. 13 measuring 8.4 sq. m, containing four bunks and accommodating four inmates on average. The Government submitted that the applicant had at all times had a separate bunk and had been provided with bedding. 43.  The Government contended that the cells were naturally illuminated through the windows and were also equipped with fluorescent lamps which functioned during the day and at night. On 12 July and 18 October 2005 cells nos. 2, 85, 101, 121, 159, 144, 148, 160, 163, and 236 were examined by a sanitary officer who found the sanitary conditions satisfactory. No traces of insects or rodents were discovered. Relying on a certificate of 12 November 2005 from the facility administration, the Government further submitted that all cells were equipped with a lavatory pan. It was separated from the living area by a brick partition of 1.3 or 2.5 metres in height. 44.  The Government affirmed that inmates were provided with food three times a day. They had an hour-long walk daily. The detention facility housed a medical unit which was open twenty-four hours and had all the necessary equipment for high-standard medical assistance. However, the applicant never applied for medical aid. 45.  The applicant did not dispute the cell measurements, the number of bunks and the number of inmates per cell. He disagreed, however, with the Government’s description of the sanitary conditions. The cells swarmed with cockroaches, crickets and lice. There was no ventilation and it was stifling and smoky inside. The partition separating the toilet facilities from the living area did not offer sufficient privacy and the person using the toilet was in view of the other inmates. The artificial light was never switched off disturbing the applicant’s sleep. The applicant conceded that an hour-long walk was organised every day. However, the exercise yard was covered and measured no more than 15 sq. m. Food was scarce. Inmates were allowed to take a shower for ten minutes once a week. 46.  The applicant suffered from chronic glomerulonephritis (a kidney disease) and required constant medical supervision and treatment. He received no treatment. On 18 and 25 July 2005 he complained of an aching kidney and asked the facility doctor to examine him and prescribe medication. His request remained unanswered.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Xanthi. 10.  In 1990 one of the two Muslim religious leaders of Thrace, the Mufti of Xanthi, died. On 15 February 1990 the local Prefect (Νομάρχης) appointed the applicant to act as a deputy (τοποτηρητής). 11.  In August 1990 the two independent Muslim Members of Parliament for Xanthi and Rodopi requested the State to organise elections for the post of Mufti of Xanthi. Having received no reply, the two independent MPs decided to organise themselves elections at the mosques on 17 August 1990 after the prayers. On that date the applicant was chosen to be the Mufti of Xanthi by those attending Friday prayers at the mosques. 12.  On 24 December 1990 the President of the Republic, on the proposal of the Council of Ministers and under Article 44 § 1 of the Constitution, adopted a Legislative Act (πράξη νομοθετικού περιεχομένου) by which the manner of election of the Muftis was changed. Law no. 1920/1991 retroactively validated the Legislative Act of 24 December 1990. 13.  On 20 August 1991, in accordance with the new regulations, the Greek State appointed another Mufti. The applicant refused to step down. 14.  Eight sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Articles 175 and 176 of the Criminal Code for having usurped the functions of a minister of a “known religion”. The Court of Cassation, considering that there might be disturbances in Xanthi, decided, under Articles 136 and 137 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the proceedings should take place in other cities. The applicant was legally represented throughout the proceedings by lawyers of his own choice. The courts heard a number of prosecution and defence witnesses. 15.  On 17 January 1994 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on the ground that on 11 January 1993 and 19 April 1993 he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi. 16.  On 28 June 1996 the single-member first instance criminal court (Μονομελές Πλημμελειοδικείο) of Agrinio found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment (decision no. 2206/1996). The applicant appealed (see below paragraph 19). 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged for having issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi on 3 January 1994, 19 January 1994 and 10 February 1994. 18.  On 28 June 1996 the single-member first instance criminal court of Agrinio found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment (decision no. 2207/1996). The applicant appealed. 19.  On 29 April 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court (Τριμελές Πλημμελειοδικείο) of Agrinio upheld the applicant’s conviction in the first and second sets of proceedings. It imposed a global sentence of six months’ imprisonment and converted it into a fine (decision no. 682/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 29). 20.  On 20 January 1996 a third set of proceedings was instituted against the applicant for the same offence on the ground that on 3 May 1995, 11 November 1995, 13 December 1995, 30 December 1995 and 17 January 1996 he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi. 21.  On 3 April 1997 the single-member first instance criminal court of Lamia found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment (decision no. 1336/1997). The applicant appealed. 22.  On 25 February 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court of Lamia upheld the applicant’s conviction and imposed a sentence of eight months’ imprisonment. The court converted this sentence into a fine (decision no. 641/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 29). 23.  On 10 September 1996 a fourth set of proceedings was instituted against the applicant on the ground that on 8 August 1995 he had issued a message in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi. 24.  On 3 April 1997 the single-member first instance criminal court of Lamia found the applicant guilty and imposed on him an eight months’ prison sentence (decision no. 1335/1997). The applicant appealed. 25.  On 25 February 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court of Lamia upheld the applicant’s conviction but reduced the prison sentence to six months and converted it into a fine (decision no. 640/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 29). 26.  On an unspecified date a fifth set of proceedings was instituted against the applicant on the ground that on 6 March 1994, 15 May 1994, 14 August 1994, 22 November 1994, 24 December 1994 and 9 January 1995 he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi. 27.  On 7 May 1996 the single-member first instance criminal court of Thessaloniki found him guilty and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment (decision no. 23145/1996). The applicant appealed. 28.  On 5 November 1998 the three-member first instance criminal court of Thessaloniki upheld the applicant’s conviction but reduced the prison sentence to eight months and converted it into a fine (decision no. 14370/1998). The applicant appealed in cassation. He alleged that his conviction amounted to a violation of Articles 6, 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention (see below paragraph 30). 29.  On 12 March 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeals concerning the first, second, third and fourth sets of proceedings. It considered that the offence in Article 175 of the Criminal Code was committed “when somebody appeared as a minister of a known religion and when he discharged the functions of the minister’s office including any of the administrative functions pertaining thereto”. The court considered that the applicant had committed this offence because he behaved and appeared as the Mufti of Xanthi. It further considered that the applicant’s conviction was not contrary to Articles 9, 10 and 14 of the Convention, because the applicant had not been punished for his religious beliefs or for expressing certain views but for usurping the functions of a Mufti. As regards Article 6 of the Convention, the Court of Cassation considered that the applicant was legally represented by lawyers of his own choice throughout the proceedings and that he had exercised all his defence rights (judgments nos. 592/1999 and 594/1999). 30.  On 2 June 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal concerning the fifth set of proceedings for the reasons set out in its judgments nos. 592/1999 and 594/1999 (judgment no. 1133/1999). 31.  Three more sets of proceedings were instituted against the applicant on the ground that on various dates he had issued messages in the capacity of the mufti of Xanthi. The applicant was found guilty by the single-member first instance criminal court of Lamia (decisions nos. 4660/1997, 2552/1998 and 4699/1997). 32.  On 28 March 2001 the three-member first instance criminal court of Lamia acquitted the applicant in the light of the Court’s judgment in the Serif v. Greece case (no. 38178/97, ECHR 1999–IX). The court held that, by addressing religious messages to a group of people who voluntarily followed him as their religious leader, the applicant had not usurped the functions of a minister of a “known religion”, but had simply exercised his right to manifest his religion, a right guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention (decisions nos. 1000/2001, 1001/2001 and 1002/2001).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": true, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Bitlis. 5.  On 10 November 2000 the applicant and his two brothers, E.B. and B.B., went to Darkolink hill[1] in Güroymak, Bitlis, with their two oxen to collect leaves and twigs. The sledge pulled by the oxen detonated a landmine and the animals died on the spot as a result of the explosion that ensued. The applicant and his brother E.B., both injured, were promptly taken to a health care centre in Güroymak by the gendarmerie, who were stationed at the Cevizyatağı gendarmerie station located approximately 500 metres from the scene of the incident. They were subsequently transferred to the Tatvan Military Hospital for further medical intervention. 6.  According to a medical report prepared by the Gölcük State Hospital on 28 March 2001, both of the applicant’s legs were amputated below the knee as a result of the serious injuries he had sustained. It appears, however, that his brother E.B. was only slightly injured. 7.  On 12 March 2002 he was declared disabled by a medical panel of the Van State Hospital, which established that his working capacity had been reduced by 80 %. 8.  Shortly after the incident, the gendarmes drafted an incident report and made a sketch map of the scene of the incident. The incident report indicated that the explosion had taken place on Darkolink hill located 500 metres from the Cevizyatağı Gendarmerie Station, in an area which had previously been regularly used by the gendarmerie for exploration and surveillance purposes. The gendarmes who drafted the report were of the opinion that the landmine had been planted by members of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an illegal organisation) after nightfall, when the area was not under surveillance, with the intention of targeting the security forces. There was no further information in the report as to when the landmine might have been planted. 9.  The gendarmes also took witness statements from the applicant’s brothers and five village guards between 10 and 15 November 2000. 10.  In his statement to the gendarmerie the applicant’s injured brother E.B. stated that they regularly used the site of explosion to collect leaves and that he did not want to bring any complaints in connection with the incident. 11.  The applicant’s other brother B.B., who was apparently a village guard, gave an account of the events in his statement to the gendarmerie. He submitted that the hill where the explosion took place had been used in the past by security officers from the Cevizyatağı gendarmerie station, as well as by village guards, for surveillance purposes. It was very likely that the area had been mined by the PKK to strike at the gendarmerie forces and the guards whilst on surveillance duty. 12.  The other five witnesses, all village guards, confirmed that the hill in question had served as a surveillance and exploration area in the past for both security forces and village guards. According to one of the witnesses, the PKK terrorists must have realised the purpose for which this hill was used and mined the area to harm them. 13.  In his statement taken by the gendarmes on 15 November 2000, the applicant said that he regularly went to the hill in question to collect leaves, but he did not know that the area was mined. He also told the gendarmes that he did not wish to lodge any complaints in relation to the incident. 14.  On 16 November 2000 the commander of the mine-sweeping unit issued a report, where he stated that the pieces collected at the scene of the incident were parts of mortar ammunition, which was used by the PKK to make “homemade” mines (yapma mayın). 15.  On an unspecified date the Güroymak public prosecutor’s office initiated an investigation of its own motion into the circumstances of the incident. On 8 January 2001 the public prosecutor issued a permanent search warrant valid for twenty years from the date of the incident. The search warrant instructed the security forces to carry out a rigorous investigation into the identification of the perpetrator(s) and to report to the public prosecutor’s office every three months. 16.  On 14 November 2007 the Van public prosecutor’s office instructed the Güroymak public prosecutor’s office to continue the investigation until the statutory time-limit expired, and to report to it every three months. 17.  On 4 August 2003 the applicant filed an action for compensation against the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior before the Güroymak Civil Court of First Instance for the alleged pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage he had sustained on account of the explosion of the landmine, including the loss of his oxen. 18.  On 11 February 2004 the Güroymak Civil Court of First Instance issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the action in question fell under the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The first‑instance court held that the criminal investigation conducted by the public prosecutor had not yielded sufficient information to determine whether the landmine that had injured the applicant had been laid by security forces or terrorists. However, even in the latter case, the State could be held responsible for the damage sustained on account of the “social risk” doctrine, which was a no-fault based principle adopted by the administrative courts on the basis of the reasoning that the burden of the damage caused in the fight against terrorism should be shared by society as a whole in accordance with the principles of “justice” and “the social State”. 19.  On 3 November 2004 the applicant brought a new action for compensation against the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, this time before the Van Administrative Court. 20.  On 16 December 2004 the administrative court requested the applicant, via a letter, to deposit postal costs in the amount of 50,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL[2]) (approximately 26 euros (EUR) at the relevant time) within thirty days of the service of the letter. The letter was served on the applicant on 27 December 2004. Upon the applicant’s failure to make the payment, the administrative court repeated its request on 4 March 2005, and warned the applicant that the proceedings would be discontinued in the event of failure to make the requested payment within thirty days of service of the second letter. This second payment request was received by the applicant on 17 March 2005. 21.  On 28 April 2005 the Van Administrative Court discontinued the compensation proceedings on procedural grounds, on account of the applicant’s failure to pay the postal costs despite two warnings that had been sent in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577) (davanın açlmamış sayılması kararı). The Van Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 11 May 2005. 22.  The applicant did not appeal against the decision of the Van Administrative Court. However, on 13 May 2005 he filed a petition with that court, arguing that he had made the requested payment on 15 April 2005. 23.  On 28 November 2006 the applicant filed a new action against the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior before the Van Administrative Court, requesting compensation in relation to the same incident. 24.  In a decision dated 23 February 2007 the administrative court held that it had already delivered a decision on 28 April 2005 on the applicant’s compensation claim against the same parties in relation to the same incident, and the relevant decision had become final by reason of the applicant’s failure to appeal. In view of the “final decision” concerning the dispute in question, the new compensation claim filed by the applicant could not be examined on the merits. The Van Administrative Court accordingly decided to dismiss the action. 25.  On 25 July 2007 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Van Administrative Court. He argued mainly that contrary to the finding of that court, its earlier decision of 28 April 2005 did not constitute a “final decision” on the merits of the case, as it had been dismissed on purely procedural grounds. He further stated that he had not appealed against the relevant decision at the time to avoid loss of time. 26.  On 6 September 2007 the Van Administrative Court requested the applicant to pay court fees of TRY 53.90, within fifteen days of the service of the request. 27.  On 24 September 2007 the applicant made the requested payment, approximately two months after lodging the appeal. 28.  On 30 September 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal request. Although it accepted the applicant’s argument that the Van Administrative Court’s earlier decision could not be considered to be a “final decision” on the merits of the dispute, it nevertheless found that the applicant had failed to lodge his compensation claim within the relevant statutory time-limit. 29.  On 29 January 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s rectification request.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1969 and currently lives in Switzerland.\nBackground to the case 8.  The applicant, convicted of membership of an illegal organisation, was serving his prison sentence in the Ümraniye E-Type Prison in Istanbul at the time of the events. 9.  In December 2000 a large number of prisoners, including the applicant, started a hunger strike to protest against the F-Type prisons. On 19 December 2000 the security forces conducted an operation in several prisons to stop the protests. In the course of these operations, numerous prisoners and members of the security forces were wounded and 32 persons died. Following these events, on 22 December 2000 the applicant was transferred from Ümraniye E-Type Prison to the Kocaeli Kandıra F-Type Prison, together with several other prisoners. The Government stated that the applicant showed resistance to the security forces during the operation in the Ümraniye E-Type Prison. In a medical report issued by the Kocaeli Kandıra F-Type Prison doctors on 22 December 2000, it was noted that the applicant had scars on the right side of his jaw and nose; bruises on his eye lids, a round hyperaemic oedema on his head measuring 3 cm and sensitivity on his abdomen. The report concluded that the applicant was unfit to work for one week. The applicant maintained that he was beaten on admission to the Kandıra F-Type Prison.\nThe applicant's detention in the Tekirdağ F-Type Prison 10.  On 23 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to the Tekirdağ F‑Type Prison. On admission to the prison, he was allegedly strip searched and beaten and his hair and moustache forcibly cut. He also stated that he was put in a cell alone and was forced to listen to loud music. According to the applicant, as he refused to stand up and shout his name during the daily headcounts, he was subjected to ill-treatment by the prison guards, in particular falaka (beating on the soles of the feet). 11.  On 24 February 2001 and 3 March 2001, respectively, the applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who did not find any signs of ill-treatment on the applicant's body. 12.  On 4 March 2001 the applicant's lawyer filed a petition with the Tekirdağ public prosecutor's office and complained about the ill-treatment which the applicant had suffered in the Tekirdağ prison. He also requested that the applicant be examined by a forensic doctor. 13. The Tekirdağ public prosecutor initiated an investigation into the applicant's allegations. Upon the order of the public prosecutor, on 8 March 2001 the applicant was examined once again by the prison doctor, who reported that there were no signs of ill-treatment on his body. On the same day, the Tekirdağ public prosecutor took a statement from the applicant. Before the prosecutor, the applicant explained that, on admission to the Tekirdağ Prison, the prison personnel had shaved his hair and moustache by force and that he had been stripped naked. He further maintained that he had been placed in a single cell and subjected to falaka twice. 14.  On 14 March 2001 the public prosecutor issued a decision of non‑prosecution relying on the medical reports dated 24 February, 3 March and 8 March 2001, according to which there was no sign of ill-treatment on the applicant's body. 15.  On 6 April 2001 the applicant filed an appeal against the decision of the public prosecutor. 16.  On 19 April 2001 the Kırklareli Assize Court rejected the applicant's appeal. 17.  Following the introduction of the present application, on 31 May 2001 the Court requested the Government to conduct further medical examinations on the applicant, namely a bone scintigraphy and a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan (MRI). 18.  On 26 June 2001 the Government submitted two medical reports dated 13 and 14 June 2001 which had been drawn up as a result of the MRI scan and the bone scintigraphy respectively.\nThe MRI report dated 13 June 2001 stated the following:\n“Bone signal intensity was normal. Bone contours were regular. Achilles tendon signal characteristics and thickness were normal.\nNo pathology in the soft tissues was detected.\nResult: Normal\nNote: An increased intensity observed in the fat suppression sequences in the medial regions of both feet is attributed to the coil artefact.”\nThe bone scintigraphy report dated 14 June 2001 read as follows:\n \n“Examination of dynamic, blood flow and blood pool images of both feet taken following intravenous injection of 20mCi Tc-99m MDP and of delayed static and anterior/posterior images of the whole body taken four hours later revealed the following:\n \nIn both feet, blood flow was normal; increased activity uptake was observed in the blood pool phase in the areas of the lower extremity of the left tibia and the ankle.\n \nThe delayed static images revealed increased radiopharmaceutical uptake in the lower extremities of both tibias and in the bones of the big toe (more noticeable in the right foot). Increased radiopharmaceutical uptake was also observed in the left-tibia joint and the upper fibula.\nApart from in the regions indicated above, radiopharmaceutical distribution and uptake in the skeletal system fell within normal limits.\n \nBoth kidneys were visualised slightly.\n \nConclusion: The increased radiopharmaceutical uptake in the regions described above is indicative of traumatism.” 19.  On 19 July 2001, taking into account the applicant's poor health due to the hunger strike, the authorities released him from prison for six months. 20.  On 25 September 2001 the Tekirdağ public prosecutor requested the Forensic Medicine Institute to make an assessment of the applicant's bone scintigraphy result, in particular to indicate the cause of the findings mentioned in the report. 21.  In the meantime, on 16 October 2001 having regard to the findings indicated in the bone scintigraphy, the International Law Department of the Ministry of Justice consulted the Directorate General of Criminal Law Issues as to whether a writ of mandamus (yazılı emir) should be issued to restart the investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment. On 17 October 2001 the General Directorate of Criminal Law Issues wrote to the Tekirdağ public prosecutor, requesting his opinion on the matter. In his reply dated 28 December 2001, the public prosecutor argued that, as the bone scintigraphy test did not reveal the exact cause or the timing of the injuries, a writ of mandamus to quash the decision of the Kırklareli Assize Court could not be issued in the circumstances of the present case. 22.  On 30 November 2001 the Forensic Medicine Institute replied that the findings mentioned in the bone scintigraphy report could not have resulted from rheumatism or the hunger strike, but were caused by a trauma. 23.  On 7 December 2001 the Tekirdağ public prosecutor asked the Forensic Medicine Institute to clarify whether it was possible to determine the date when these injuries had been sustained. 24.  On 12 December 2001 the Forensic Medicine Institute replied that it was not possible to make such an assessment. 25.  The applicant returned to the Tekirdağ F-Type Prison on 5 April 2002, but was released once again on 12 April 2002 for another six months. 26.  On 2 September 2006 the applicant's lawyer requested an additional expert report from Dr Şebnem Korur Fincancı, a forensic expert. Dr Fincancı was asked to evaluate the findings of the bone scintigraphy test dated 14 June 2001 and to assess whether the findings indicated in the report matched the applicant's allegation of falaka. In this connection, Dr Fincancı was provided with a written statement by the applicant, in which he gave a detailed description of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected in the Tekirdağ F-Type Prison. In this statement, the applicant explained that, as a protest against the F-Type prison system, he had refused to stand up and shout his name out during the daily headcounts. When he did not obey the warnings of the prison guards, a large group of guards entered his cell and started beating him, while two guards held his arms and another two secured his feet. Then one guard sat on the applicant's abdomen and another placed his hand over the applicant's mouth. After they had tied his feet with a belt, several guards struck his feet with their belts. 27.  In her report dated 11 September 2006, Dr Fincancı concluded that when the static and dynamic images of the bone scintigraphy test were examined together, the findings in the report corresponded to the applicant's allegation of falaka. She further opined that the trauma complained of was inflicted on the applicant about three months prior to the test. While drafting her report, Dr Fincancı had regard to the applicant's previous medical reports dated 22 December 2000, 24 February 2001, 3 March 2001 and 8 March 2001. 28.  In response to the report of Dr Fincancı, the Government submitted another report issued by the Forensic Medicine Institute dated 9 January 2007 which contradicted Dr Fincancı, stating that the findings in the bone scintigraphy test did not reveal the cause of the injuries on the applicant's feet and that it was not possible to make an evaluation as to when these injuries could have been sustained.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Obninsk, a town in the Kaluga Region. 5.  As a victim of Chernobyl, the applicant was entitled to benefits. Considering himself underpaid, he brought proceedings against the local welfare authority. 6.  On 20 February 2004 the Obninsk Town Court held for the applicant, awarded arrears, fixed a new amount of periodic benefits with subsequent adjustment for the cost of living. This judgment became binding on 2 March 2004 and, according to the Government, was gradually enforced by January 2006. 7.  Later, the applicant sued the welfare authority for its failure to enforce the judgment in time, but on 16 December 2004 the Kaluga Regional Court rejected this claim. 8.  The applicant also believed that the judgment remained unenforced with regard to the adjustment for the cost of living. For this reason, he sued the welfare authority, but on 7 April 2005 the Town Court rejected this claim as unfounded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Pyatigorsk, the Stavropol Region. 6.  On 29 September 2002 a certain Ms Sh. was murdered. On the next day the police initiated criminal proceedings in that connection. 7.  On the same day a certain Mr M., who had been arrested for the administrative offence of public drunkenness, complained to the police that the day before the applicant had allegedly sworn at him and attempted to start a fight. 8.  On 2 October 2002 an administrative offence record was drawn up in respect of the applicant by police officers K. and B. The applicant denied Mr M.’s allegations. 9.  On 3 October 2002 he was found guilty of disorderly conduct and sentenced to five days’ administrative detention by the Justice of the Peace of the 1st Circuit of the Kirovskiy District of the Stavropol Region. 10.  On 3 October 2002, pursuant to the aforementioned judgment of the same date, the applicant was placed in the temporary holding facility of the Kirovskiy District Police Department of the Stavropol Region (“the district police department”). 11.  According to the applicant, between 3 and 6 October 2002 police officers forced him to confess to the murder of Ms Sh. by beating him up and threatening him with rape with a rubber truncheon. 12.  On 6 October 2002 the applicant signed a confession to the murder of Ms Sh. He stated, in particular, that he had strangled her with a TV power cable. 13.  On 7 October 2002 the investigator in charge recorded the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of murder. 14.  The investigator also ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant, which was carried out on 7 October 2002 by a medical expert with ten years’ experience, who certified that he had no injures (certificate no. 181). 15.  On 8 October 2002 the Kirovskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s placement in custody as a preventive measure, stating that he was suspected of having committed a particularly serious criminal offence, might abscond from justice and had been given negative character references at the place of his residence. The applicant was then transferred to the remand centre “SIZO-26/2” of Pyatigorsk. 16.  On 9 October 2002 the applicant was formally charged with murder. 17.  On 6 December 2002 the District Court extended the term of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 7 January 2003. The applicant’s counsel argued that there were no grounds to believe that the applicant might abscond, that he had a permanent place of residence and permanent work and had confessed to the crime. The fact that he was accused of a serious criminal offence could not, as such, be the basis for his continued pre-trial detention. The court decision read as follows:\n“Bearing in mind that it is impossible to complete the pre-trial investigation within two months ... there are no grounds to change or quash the preventive measure [with regard to the applicant], considering that [the applicant] is charged with a particularly serious crime associated with a high risk to society, which does not exclude the possibility of him absconding from the investigating bodies and the court, the judge finds it necessary to grant the investigator’s request for the extension of the term of detention ...”\nThe applicant did not appeal against that decision. 18.  On 27 December 2002 the applicant requested the investigator to exclude his self-incriminating statements of 6 October 2002 from the body of evidence, alleging that he had confessed to the murder under physical and psychological pressure by the police officers during his administrative detention. The applicant alleged that every night they had taken him out of his cell to their office and had psychologically pressurised him to confess. 19.  On 30 December 2002 the District Court examined the investigator’s application for the extension of the applicant’s detention. The applicant stated that he had no intention of absconding or influencing witnesses and asked to be released. The court extended the term of his pre-trial detention until 7 February 2003 for the following reasons:\n“Bearing in mind that it is impossible to complete the pre-trial investigation within two months ... there are no grounds to change or quash the measure of restraint [with regard to the applicant], considering that [the applicant] is charged with a particularly serious crime, and might impede a thorough, comprehensive and objective investigation or abscond from the investigating bodies, the judge finds it necessary to grant the investigator’s request for the extension of the term of detention ...”\nIt does not appear that the applicant appealed against this decision. 20.  On 31 January 2003 the applicant was served with a copy of the bill of indictment for the murder. 21.  On 6 February 2003 the case was sent to the District Court for trial. 22.  Upon receipt of the case file, on 6 February 2003 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing for 17 February 2003. It also ordered that the preventive measure of detention should remain unchanged. It does not appear that the applicant appealed against this decision. 23.  On 19 May 2003 the District Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. It relied, in particular, on his self-incriminating statements. It took into account statements by the police officers, who denied ill-treating the applicant, and the medical expert report, according to which the applicant’s examination on 7 October 2002 had not revealed any injuries on him, and dismissed the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. 24.  On 20 July 2003 the applicant’s counsel obtained written statements from a certain Mr I. Sh. who stated that he had been detained in the same cell as the applicant in the temporary holding facility of the district police department from 3 to 5 October 2002. He stated that the applicant had been taken out of his cell in the night. After his return the applicant had told him that the police officers had beaten him up and that they had threatened him with rape with a rubber truncheon. 25.  On 31 July 2003 the Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal against his conviction. It found that the evidence on which the judgment was based contained a number of discrepancies which had not been resolved by the trial court and that the failure to summon witnesses for the applicant properly had undermined the adversarial nature of the trial. It also held that the applicant’s allegations that his self-incriminating statements had been obtained under duress had not been thoroughly examined; that the police officers’ statements did not constitute sufficient evidence of their proper conduct; and that the applicant’s counsel’s complaint to the prosecutor’s office of the Kirovskiy District (“the district prosecutor’s office”) about the unlawful acts of the police had been left unanswered and no inquiry in that connection had been conducted. The Regional Court thus quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination by the first-instance court. It also ordered that the applicant remain in custody. 26.  On 11 August 2003 the case file arrived at the District Court. 27.  On 12 August 2003 the District Court extended the term of the applicant’s detention until 6 November 2003, stating that the applicant was charged with a particularly serious criminal offence and that, if released, he might impede the criminal proceedings or evade trial. It also noted that the case had been before the courts for more than six months; that the initial term of the applicant’s detention established in Article 255 § 2 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure had expired and that it should be extended for the next three months. The applicant, who was neither present nor represented at the hearing, did not appeal against this decision. 28.  On 12 September 2003 the applicant’s lawyer obtained further written statements from Mr I. Sh., who stated that he had been detained in the same cell as the applicant in the temporary holding facility of the district police department in October 2002. The applicant had been taken out of his cell in the night. After his return the applicant had told him that the police officers had beaten him in the area of the kidneys and liver. Mr I. Sh. further stated that he had seen fresh scratches on the applicant’s left shoulder and elbow and that the applicant’s lower lip had been hurt. 29.  On 6 November 2003 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request for release under an undertaking not to leave a specified place and, with reference to Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, extended his detention for three months until 6 February 2004 on the same grounds as those given in its decision of 12 August 2003. The applicant’s lawyers referred to the length of detention, the applicant’s innocence and the deterioration of his health. The applicant appealed against the decision, arguing, in particular, that it was insufficiently reasoned. 30.  On 10 December 2003 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 6 November 2003, referring to the absence of a transcript of that hearing in the materials of the case, and remitted the matter to the same court for a fresh examination. 31.  On 8 January 2004 the District Court ordered, under Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, that the term of the applicant’s detention be extended until 6 February 2004. It relied on the same reasons as those which were set out in the decision of 12 August 2003. The applicant’s lawyers referred to the absence of reasons for the applicant’s continued detention, in particular the lack of grounds for the risk of him absconding, his permanent place of residence and work, positive references and the length of his detention. The court stated that at that stage it could not take into account the argument concerning the applicant’s innocence. It did not address any other arguments put forward by the applicant’s lawyers. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 32.  On 5 February 2004 the District Court again examined the question of the preventive measure applied to the applicant. The applicant asked to be released, referring to the deterioration of his health and stomach complaints. His lawyers referred to the excessive length of his detention, the absence of reasons to believe that he might abscond or otherwise impede the proceedings and the fact that he had received positive character references. The court dismissed their request for release and extended, on the basis of Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the applicant’s detention for a further three months, until 6 May 2004, for reasons identical to those cited in its previous decisions. It did not address the applicant’s lawyers’ arguments. It does not appear that the applicant appealed against that decision. 33.  On 22 March 2004 the applicant’s father’s flat was searched. The applicant’s father’s complaints about the unlawfulness of the search were dismissed by the district prosecutor’s office on 13 April 2004 and by the District Court on 14 May 2004. 34.  On 26 April 2004 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. It examined, in particular, witness I. Sh. (see paragraphs 24 and 28 above) who stated before the court that the applicant had not complained about any ill-treatment by the police officers and that he had not seen any injures on the applicant. According to Mr I. Sh., his previous statements to the contrary had been false and had been given at the request of the applicant’s parents and defence counsel in order to help the applicant. Two other witnesses, Mr R. and Mr S., who had also been held in the applicant’s cell at some point in October 2002, also stated that they had neither heard from the applicant about any pressure by the police nor seen any injures on him. 35.  On appeal, on 3 August 2004 the Regional Court found that the trial court had failed to assess the arguments put forward by the defence properly and that the applicant’s right to defend himself had been violated. It quashed the judgment of 26 April 2004 and remitted the case to the District Court for a fresh examination. The Regional Court also ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand as a preventive measure remain unchanged. 36.  On 18 August 2004 the case file arrived at the District Court. 37.  On 23 August 2004 the District Court scheduled a preliminary hearing in the case for 1 September 2004. It also ordered that the preventive measure applied to the applicant in the form of detention on remand remain unchanged. It does not appear that the applicant appealed against that decision. 38.  On 1 September 2004 the District Court extended, with reference to Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, the term of the applicant’s detention for three months, to be calculated from 13 August 2004 until 13 November 2004. The court noted that the term of the applicant’s detention, as previously extended on 5 February 2004 (see paragraph 32 above), had expired on 13 August 2004, and that it had received the case file from the Regional Court only on 18 August 2004. The applicant requested the court to release him, referring to the deterioration of his state of health and his stomach ulcer. The court held as follows:\n“... the accused ... is charged with a particularly serious crime; the circumstances of the case were not ... established in detail ... in the course of the trial, the evidence which could have determined [his] guilt [or innocence] was not examined ...\nThe positive character references of the accused ... do not constitute sufficient grounds to release him ... because, if released, he might abscond ... and hinder the establishment of the truth in the case.\nThe court cannot take into account ... the claim that the accused is ill and needs medical treatment as he has not submitted any relevant documents.\nThe court has not established any procedural violations in respect of his detention on remand.” 39.  The applicant and his counsel appealed against the decision of 1 September 2004, arguing that the previously authorised term of the applicant’s detention had expired on 13 August 2004 and had not been extended by the court. According to them, the applicant had therefore been detained unlawfully for 18 days from 13 August to 1 September 2004. 40.  On 17 September 2004 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 1 September 2004 on appeal. It stated that the fact that the applicant was accused of a particularly serious criminal offence had rightly been taken into account by the first-instance court; that the applicant’s state of health did not preclude his being kept in custody and that there had, therefore, been sufficient reasons for extending his detention. 41.  On 1 November 2004 and 26 January 2005 the District Court further extended the term of the applicant’s detention on remand until 13 February and 13 May 2005 respectively. In its similar decisions the court relied on the same reasons to justify the applicant’s continued detention as those set out in the decision of 1 September 2004. The applicant did not appeal against either of those two decisions. 42.  On 25 April 2005 the District Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. During the hearing witness I. Sh. (see paragraphs 24, 28 and 34 above) stated that the applicant had sometimes been taken out of his cell for interrogation after 10 p.m., that he had seen a scratch on the applicant’s lip and that the applicant had told him that he had been beaten up. According to Mr I. Sh., he did not remember whether there had been other injuries on the applicant. Mr I. Sh. also stated that he had lived at the applicant’s parents’ home for several days and had done some work for them and that the applicant’s family had supported him when he had been detained in the context of another criminal case. 43.  On 22 September 2005 the Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case to the District Court for a fresh examination. It found, in particular, that the first-instance judgment was based on conflicting evidence. It also held that the preventive measure should remain in place as there were no grounds to release the applicant. 44.  On 11 October 2005 the case file arrived at the District Court. 45.  On 26 October 2005 the District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case for the purpose of taking a decision on the preventive measure to be applied in respect of the applicant. The applicant requested the court to replace his detention with any preventive measure other than deprivation of liberty. His counsel requested that the preventive measure be changed to an undertaking not to leave a specified place and an undertaking of good behaviour, since the applicant had been held in custody for more than three years, had positive character references and did not intend to evade the trial. The prosecutor asked for the preventive measure to remain the same. 46.  The District Court noted that the applicant’s criminal case had been pending before the court since 6 February 2003, and that from that date onwards his detention had been regulated by Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed it to be extended beyond the initial six-month period for further periods of three months. It further noted that the term of the applicant’s detention had been extended on numerous occasions, and that the last time, on 26 January 2005, the District Court had authorised his detention until 13 May 2005. It also noted that before the expiry of that period, on 25 April 2005, the applicant had been convicted by the trial court. The court then noted that the term of the applicant’s detention, as extended on 26 January 2005, should be considered as having run out on 9 October 2005, provided that the period between 25 April 2005, the date of the conviction, and 22 September 2005, the date of its quashing on appeal, was excluded from the term of detention on remand, in accordance with paragraph 26 of resolution no. 1 of the Supreme Court of Russia dated 5 March 2004. The court thus held that the term of the applicant’s detention had not been extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and that therefore, despite the seriousness of the charge against him, there were no legal grounds for his further detention on remand. It ordered that the preventive measure be changed to an undertaking not to leave a specified place and an undertaking of good behaviour and that the applicant be released immediately. 47.  On 3 November 2005 the prosecutor appealed against that decision, arguing that the District Court had erred in its interpretation of paragraph 26 of resolution no. 1 of the Supreme Court of Russia dated 5 March 2004, since it followed from the meaning of Article 255 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure that the term of detention should run from the day of a criminal case’s arrival at a first-instance court and not from the day of delivery of an appellate court’s decision. Therefore, in the prosecutor’s opinion, the term of the applicant’s detention should have run out on 29 October 2005. The applicant disagreed, pointing out the fact that he was employed, that he did not intend to evade justice and that he simply wanted the trial to be concluded as soon as possible and his good name restored. 48.  On 30 November 2005 the Regional Court found that the District Court had violated Article 255 § 3 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, as the term of detention of a person who had committed a serious or particularly serious criminal offence had to be extended by a court decision each time, and such extension could not be authorised for a period longer than three months at any one time. It went on to agree with the prosecutor’s submissions and stated that the term of the applicant’s detention should have started running on 11 October 2005, the date when the case file had been received by the District Court, and that therefore it should be regarded as having expired on 29 October 2005. The court then held that this procedural breach was grounds for the annulment of the decision of 26 October 2005, and ordered that the case be sent to the District Court for a new examination. According to the applicant, he attended the hearing of 30 November 2005 and was placed in detention immediately after that hearing. 49.  On 21 December 2005 the District Court ordered the applicant’s release on an undertaking not to leave his place of residence. It stated that the applicant had been held in detention on remand for more than three years, that after his release on 26 October 2005 he had immediately started working and that he had been given positive character references from his employers. The court held that there were no reasons to believe that he would evade the trial or put pressure on witnesses and thus obstruct the establishment of the truth, and therefore there were no grounds to keep him in detention. The applicant was released immediately. 50.  On 2 May 2006 the District Court examined the criminal case against the applicant for the fourth time. At the hearing, the applicant insisted that he was innocent and reiterated that he had made his confession at the pre-trial stage because he had been beaten and threatened by the police. 51.  The District Court observed that the charge against the applicant had mainly been based on his self-incriminating statements and written confession made during the preliminary investigation, which he had later repudiated as having been made under duress. It further noted, as regards the applicant’s medical examination on 7 October 2002, which had not revealed any injuries on him, that the applicant had not been apprised of the investigator’s order to carry out that examination until it had been over. Therefore, in the District Court’s opinion, a note on the resulting expert report to the effect that the applicant had had no comments or questions for the expert, and had not wished to call into question the expert’s authority, was devoid of any legal meaning. 52.  The court further stated that on 6 February 2006 the decision of 27 January 2003, by which the district prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment during his administrative detention in October 2002, had been quashed, and that on 15 February 2006 the district prosecutor’s office had again refused to institute criminal proceedings owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence in the police officers’ actions. In the District Court’s opinion, however, the applicant’s allegation that he had made self-incriminating statements and had signed his confession as a result of coercion by the police was corroborated by the evidence in the case. 53.  In particular, the court examined the register of detainees of the temporary holding facility where the applicant had been held and noted that the applicant had been taken out of his cell on 3 October 2002, from 7.30 p.m. to 8.30 p.m., and on 4 October 2002 from 6.25 p.m. to 6.50 p.m. and from 9.40 p.m. to 9.55 p.m. The court further observed that, according to the applicant’s written confession, it had been given on 6 October 2002 in office no. 36 of the temporary holding facility and not in his cell. However, the register did not contain any records confirming that he had been taken out of his cell on that day. Therefore, the District Court doubted the reliability of the official records. It found that the applicant’s confession could not be regarded as having been given voluntarily and was therefore inadmissible as evidence. 54.  The District Court also noted that, when the applicant had been interviewed as a suspect on 7 and 9 October 2002, he had not been warned that his statements could be used as evidence, in breach of the domestic law. Having examined the body of evidence in the case, the District Court further stated that it had been contradictory in a number of aspects. In particular, a report on the medical forensic examination of Ms Sh.’s body had attested to the presence of numerous internal injuries. The investigating authorities, however, had never attempted to establish the circumstances in which the victim had sustained those injuries, and the applicant had never admitted inflicting any such injuries on the victim, simply having confessed to having strangled her (see paragraph 12 above). In this respect the District Court noted that, as was clear from the materials of the case, at the time when the applicant had made his self-incriminating statements and signed his confession, the aforementioned expert examination had not yet been carried out and the investigating authorities had not known of the existence of those injuries. 55.  The court further listed a number of other shortcomings in the preliminary investigation and discrepancies in the adduced evidence. It found it unproven that the applicant had committed the imputed offence. The court thus acquitted the applicant and acknowledged his right to rehabilitation. 56.  On 4 July 2006 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It agreed with the trial court’s finding that the confession had been signed as a result of coercion by the police officers. The court noted in this respect that the very fact that the applicant had been taken out of his cell in breach of relevant regulations had been the proof of coercion, and therefore the arguments of the prosecuting party in the appeal submissions to the effect that the trial court had failed in its judgment to specify the methods of that coercion and to identify those responsible were unfounded. It also agreed with the trial court that the applicant’s self-incriminating statements, which he had later repudiated, had contradicted the other evidence in the case. 57.  On 24 January 2003 the applicant’s counsel lodged a complaint with the district prosecutor’s office about the applicant’s ill-treatment by the police officers from the district police department. An inquiry was carried out in connection with that complaint. Several police officers were questioned. They all denied the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. 58.  On 27 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office decided, relying on their statements and medical expert certificate no. 181 of 7 October 2002, to dispense with criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment owing to the absence of evidence that any crime had been committed. The applicant did not appeal against the decision in court. 59.  On 4 December 2003 the district prosecutor’s office received a complaint from the applicant’s mother about alleged ill-treatment of the applicant by the officers of the district police department. 60.  On 5 December 2003 a decision not to prosecute the police officers was taken. The Court has not been furnished with a copy of that decision. It does not appear that the applicant attempted to challenge the decision in question before a court. 61.  On 11 August 2005 the district prosecutor’s office quashed the decision of 5 December 2003 and ordered an additional inquiry. 62.  During that inquiry Mr A., the head of the investigation department, responsible for the investigation of Ms Sh.’s murder at the time of the events in question, and Mr Z., deputy head of the temporary holding facility of the district police department at the material time, were interviewed. They stated that no physical or psychological pressure had ever been exercised on the applicant and that the applicant had voluntarily confessed to the murder and later confirmed his self-incriminating statements during an interview in the presence of his lawyer. 63.  On 18 August 2005 the district prosecutor’s office, with reference to the aforementioned statements of Mr A. and Mr Z., decided not to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s allegations owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a criminal offence in the police officers’ actions. The applicant did not appeal against that decision in court. 64.  On 6 February 2006 the prosecutor’s office of the Stavropol Region quashed the decisions of 27 January 2003 and 18 August 2005 as unlawful and unfounded in view of the investigating authorities’ failure to establish all the relevant facts. In particular, it pointed out that the applicant had not been questioned; that the materials of the inquiry lacked an extract from the official records of requests for medical aid in the period from 3 to 6 October 2002; that the register of detainees of the temporary holding facility, where the applicant had been held during the relevant period, had not been examined with a view to establishing when and by whom the applicant had been taken out of his cell(s) for interrogation and to identifying who had been in the cell(s) with him so that they could be questioned in respect of his allegations; that a police officer who had been present when the applicant had signed his confession had not been questioned in that connection; that another police officer who had drawn up the administrative offence record in respect of the applicant had not been questioned in that connection; and that Mr R. and Mr S., who had allegedly shared a cell with the applicant, had not been interviewed either. The district prosecutor’s office was thus ordered to eliminate those defects in the course of an additional inquiry. 65.  In a decision of 15 February 2006 the district prosecutor’s office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a crime in their actions. 66.  According to the decision, when interviewed during an additional inquiry, the applicant had stated that on 2 October 2002 he had been taken from his home to a police station where he had met police officers G. and B. The latter had drawn up, on Mr G.’s instructions, an administrative offence record which stated that that the applicant had used obscene language in public. The applicant had been held at the police station from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. and then transported to the district police department. On 3 October 2002 he had been placed under administrative arrest for five days and placed in the temporary holding facility of the district police department. Each night the officers of the Kirovskiy district police department, Mr A. and Mr G., had taken him to an office on the third floor in which they had subjected him to psychological pressure. On 6 October 2002, because of that pressure, he had been compelled to make a written confession to the murder of Ms Sh., which had been dictated to him by Mr G. 67.  The decision went on to quote police officer A., who had stated that he had been present when his subordinates, Mr P. and Mr G., had interviewed the applicant. No physical or other form of coercion had been used on the applicant, who had voluntarily confessed to the murder and then confirmed his statements in the presence of his counsel. 68.  Mr Z., deputy head of the temporary holding facility of the district police department at the material time, had stated that no force had ever been applied to the applicant, who had made no complaints during his detention in that facility. Mr Z. also stated that the applicant, Mr R. and Mr S. had never been held in the same cell at the same time. 69.  Mr G. had stated that on 6 October 2002 he had been told that the applicant wished to see him. He had met the applicant at the temporary holding facility. The applicant had told him that he had killed Ms Sh. and had voluntarily written out his confession. 70.  Mr B. had stated that on 2 October 2002 Mr M. had complained to him that the applicant had sworn at him. He had drawn up an administrative offence record and sent it to the court. 71.  Mr R., who had been detained in the temporary holding facility from 1 to 6 October 2002 for committing an administrative offence, had confirmed that he had shared a cell with the applicant and stated that the applicant had not made any complaints concerning the police officers who had questioned him. Mr S., another detainee during the relevant period, had also been interviewed but had not given any relevant information regarding the applicant’s allegations. 72.  The decision then indicated that, according to the temporary holding facility records concerning medical aid, the applicant had never applied for medical assistance. Nor had he made any complaints concerning his health. 73.  The decision further stated that, according to the temporary holding facility register of detainees, the applicant had been taken out of his cell on 4 October 2002 at 6.45 p.m. by Mr G. and brought back at 6.50 p.m.; on the same day he had been taken away at 9.40 p.m. by Mr P. and brought back at 9.55 p.m. On 7 October 2002 the applicant had been taken out of his cell from 9 a.m. until 6.15 p.m. for the examination of his statements on the scene of the crime. For the rest of the time the applicant had stayed in his cell. 74.  The decision thus concluded that during the inquiry the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment had proved unfounded. The applicant did not appeal against that decision in court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The first five applicants are individual Spanish nationals who live in Itoiz (Navarre province). The third applicant is also the chairperson and legal representative of the sixth applicant, the Coordinadora de Itoiz association. The first, second, fourth and fifth applicants are members of this association. 9.  The case originated in an engineering project of February 1989 for the construction of a dam in Itoiz (Navarre province) which would result in the flooding of three nature reserves and a number of small villages, including Itoiz, where the applicants live. According to the Government, the total number of landowners affected by the dam's construction is 159, thirteen of whom live in Itoiz itself. 10.  On 6 May 1988 the Coordinadora de Itoiz association was set up; its articles of association state, inter alia, that its aim is “to coordinate its members' efforts to oppose construction of the Itoiz dam and to campaign for an alternative way of life on the site, to represent and defend the area affected by the dam and this area's interests before all official bodies at all levels, whether local, provincial, State or international, and to promote public awareness of the impact of the dam”.\nBy a ministerial decree of 2 November 1990, the Ministry of Public Works adopted the Itoiz dam project. 11.  In 1991 the villages concerned by the dam and the applicant association brought an administrative appeal before the Audiencia Nacional against the ministerial decree of 2 November 1990. The appeal was based on several allegations of unlawfulness which, in their opinion, had tainted the procedure for informing the public about the proposed dam, the fact that the project had been adopted without the prior approval of the hydrological plans for each river basin or of the national hydrological plan and the lack of any public or social interest served by the project. They also claimed that the project breached the legislation on environmental protection, since no environmental impact study had been commissioned. Finally, the court's attention was drawn to the project's impact on the nature reserves and habitat within the relevant area in the light of the Council of Europe's recommendations on engineering works in the Pyrenees and the European Union's common agricultural policy. 12.  In a judgment of 29 September 1995, the Audiencia Nacional partly upheld the appeal, considering in particular that, according to the law, the planned dam should have been based on the national hydrological plan, which had not been drawn up when the project was approved. The court also accepted the request for precise designation of the protection zones around the nature reserves affected by the dam and for a breakdown of the quarry use that would be necessary for its construction. 13.  The applicant association applied for immediate enforcement of the judgment and, in particular, for suspension of construction work on the dam. By a decision of 24 January 1996, the Audiencia Nacional granted a suspension order but directed that the necessary measures be taken to ensure the completion of work already begun and for the maintenance and safety of the work already completed, subject to the payment of security by the applicant association. 14.  All the parties to the proceedings lodged súplica appeals against the decision of 24 January 1996. In the context of the interim enforcement of its judgment of 29 September 1995 and, in particular, with a view to maintaining the protection zones around the three nature reserves affected by the project, the Audiencia Nacional, by a decision of 6 March 1996, prohibited the filling of the reservoir and displacement of the population concerned. 15.  On 17 June 1996 the parliament of the Autonomous Community of Navarre (parlamento foral de Navarra) passed Autonomous Community Law (foral) no. 9/1996 on natural sites in Navarre (“the Autonomous Community law of 1996). This law amended Autonomous Community Law no. 6/1987 of 10 April 1987, particularly with regard to the possibility of reclassifying the protection zones or carrying out activities within them for the purpose of introducing infrastructure that had been declared in the general or public interest. According to the applicants, this Law enabled construction work on the dam to continue, with the consequent deterioration of the protected natural site.\nIn application of the Autonomous Community law of 1996, the Autonomous Community's government adopted Decree no. 307/1996 of 2 September 1996, which identified the peripheral protection zones for certain nature reserves and strict nature reserves in Navarre. 16.  In the meantime, Counsel for the State and the government of the Autonomous Community of Navarre had appealed on points of law against the Audiencia Nacional's judgment of 29 September 1995. In a judgment of 14 July 1997, the Supreme Court definitively cancelled the dam project in so far as it concerned the 500-metre protection zones around nature reserves RN 9, 10 and 11. As a result of the judgment, the size of the planned dam, and thus of the area to be flooded, was reduced, so that the village of Itoiz, where the applicants' immovable property was located, was saved from flooding. 17.  In application of the Supreme Court's judgment, by a decision of 4 September 1997, the Audiencia Nacional declared final the interim enforcement measures ordered on 6 March 1996 concerning the prohibition on filling the reservoir and other related work. Before ruling on the question of the possible suspension of construction work on a dyke, the Audiencia Nacional invited the parties to appear before it so that they could submit observations on the consequences of the new Autonomous Community law of 1996, particularly with regard to the protection zones around all the nature reserves provided for in that law, and on the impact of the maximum flood levels on the protection zones of the reserves to which the cancelled project had referred. 18.  The central State authorities and the Navarre Autonomous Community's government argued before the Audiencia Nacional that it had become legally impossible to enforce the Supreme Court's judgment of 14 July 1997, in so far as the Autonomous Community law of 1996 had removed protection-zone status from the area within the nature reserves that was due be flooded. Accordingly, taking that legislative amendment into account, it had become possible to carry out the public-works schemes planned within those protection zones. 19.  The applicant association contested the authorities' argument, claiming that the Autonomous Community law of 1996 was inapplicable in the instant case, since it had been enacted following the administrative decisions in the proceedings in issue and subsequent to the Audiencia Nacional's judgment and the two interim enforcement orders. In the alternative, the applicant association requested that certain provisions in the Autonomous Community law be referred to the Constitutional Court for a preliminary ruling on their constitutionality, particularly those authorising the removal of protection-zone status from the three nature reserves in the area to be flooded, which, in the applicant association's submission, would allow the work to be completed and make the reservoir cover the area specified in the original plans. 20.  By a decision of 1 December 1997, the Audiencia Nacional asked the Constitutional Court to rule on the preliminary question submitted by the applicant association.\nBy a decision of 21 May 1998, the Constitutional Court declared the application inadmissible on account of certain errors in its presentation which could nonetheless be corrected. 21.  In order to rectify the above-mentioned errors, the Audiencia Nacional summoned the parties on 28 May 1998 so that it could hear their submissions on certain aspects of the Autonomous Community law whose constitutionality had been challenged before the Constitutional Court, and on the constitutionality of section 18(3) (A.1.) and (B) of that law. The applicant association submitted its observations on 10 June 1998.\n By a decision of 17 June 1998, the Audiencia Nacional again asked the Constitutional Court to rule on the preliminary question as to constitutionality and extended the question to include a new point raised by the applicant association, namely section 18(3) (B) (B.1.) of the Autonomous Community law. 22.  By a decision of 21 July 1998, the Constitutional Court declared the issues raised in the preliminary question admissible. Under section 37(2) of the Judicature Act, it gave notice of the questions to the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, the government and parliament of Navarre and the Spanish government, and invited them to file their observations within fifteen days. The Constitutional Court received Counsel for the State's observations on 4 September 1998. The government and parliament of Navarre submitted their observations on 11 and 15 September 1998 respectively. The Attorney General's observations were submitted on 29 September 1998. The Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies indicated that the Chamber would present no observations. The Speaker of the Senate asked that the Senate be considered a party to the proceedings and offered its assistance. On 1 March 2000 the Audiencia Nacional forwarded to the Constitutional Court the written pleadings submitted by the applicant association during the proceedings before it. These pleadings, dated 29 September 1997, 10 June 1998 and 28 February 2000, were formally included in the case file at the Constitutional Court. 23.  In a judgment of 14 March 2000, the Constitutional Court, sitting as a full court, held that the impugned provisions of the Autonomous Community law of 1996 were compatible with the Constitution. It observed at the outset that enforcement of the Supreme Court's judgment of 14 July 1997, delivered in accordance with Navarre Autonomous Community Law no. 6/1987, had become impossible since the entry into force of the Autonomous Community law of 1996, in that the cancelled project complied with the new law. 24.  Examining the purpose of the Autonomous Community law of 1996, the Constitutional Court held as follows:\n“... Its purpose is to establish a general system for environmental protection of the natural sites in the Autonomous Community of Navarre. Accordingly, this protection system [was] applicable ... to the nature reserves already identified in the previous Autonomous Community law, even though the essential difference between the legal rules established by those two laws lies in the arrangements regarding the peripheral protection zones.” 25.  The Constitutional Court held, firstly, that this was not to be seen as a legislative solution for the particular problem of the three peripheral zones around the three nature reserves affected by construction of the Itoiz dam and, secondly, that statements and parliamentary initiatives by certain politicians which, in the opinion of the Audiencia Nacional, demonstrated that the main aim of the Autonomous Community law of 1996 was to prevent execution of the Supreme Court's judgment, were immaterial in assessing whether there had been a violation of the principle of lawfulness. The Constitutional Court also ruled that, given the significance of the question raised by the Itoiz dam's construction, which could not simply be ignored, it was justifiable that the explanatory memorandum accompanying the Autonomous Community law of 1996 specifically mentioned the aim and means of environmental protection in the peripheral protection zones around the three above-mentioned nature reserves. 26.  As to the alleged infringement of the right to a fair hearing, in so far as the Autonomous Community law of 1996 now prevented execution of the Supreme Court's judgment partly cancelling the Itoiz dam project, the Constitutional Court considered that the fact that in the meantime a new law had been passed amending the legal system applicable to the peripheral protection zones and replacing the previous law on the basis of which the project had been declared partly void was not in itself incompatible with the right to execution of judicial decisions as enshrined in Article 24 of the Constitution. 27.  Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and, in particular, to the judgments in Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece (9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-B) and Papageorgiou v. Greece (22 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI), the Constitutional Court examined whether the impossibility of executing the Supreme Court's judgment as a consequence of the enactment of the Autonomous Community law of 1996 was justified in view of the values and assets protected by the Constitution. Having held that environmental protection was enshrined in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court examined whether the prejudice arising from the failure to execute the judgment in issue was proportionate to the protected or disputed interests or was on the other hand purposeless, excessive or the cause of a clear imbalance between the interests at stake. It found that both the Supreme Court's judgment of 14 July 1997 and the new Autonomous Community law of 1996 were intended to guarantee the existence of a peripheral protection zone around the three nature reserves affected by the dam's construction. The Constitutional Court further noted that the system of peripheral protection zones introduced by this new law had not in itself been considered arbitrary in the Audiencia Nacional's decision; nor had the zones' new boundaries been held responsible for the serious deterioration of the environment. Accordingly, it held that the balance of general interests had been respected and that there was no clear lack of proportion between the conflicting interests. Consequently, the impugned provisions could not be held to be contrary to Article 24 § 1 of the Constitution. 28.  As to the argument that the new legal rules governing the peripheral protection zones around the nature reserves appeared in a law rather than in regulations, as had previously been the case, and that this deprived the applicants of the possibility of overseeing the administration's actions through an administrative appeal or enforcement proceedings, the Constitutional Court noted that there was no legal provision requiring that certain subjects be dealt with by regulations. It added that the new law did not amount to ad causam legislation, being general in form and in substance, and pointed out that laws could be challenged before the Constitutional Court through the remedy provided for in Article 163 of the Constitution.\nAccordingly, the Constitutional Court dismissed the application for a preliminary ruling. The judgment was published in the Official Gazette on 14 April 2000.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Amsterdam. 7.  On 30 March 2000 the Amsterdam Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) convicted three accused, Messrs K., Van S. and H., of arms trafficking. In the criminal investigation into the offences at issue, the Amsterdam police had stated that an arsenal of weapons had been found by chance: the caretaker of a building situated on the Nachtwachtlaan in Amsterdam had contacted the police when water was leaking from one of the flats in the building, whose occupants were absent. With the aid of two locksmiths, the police had gained entry to the flat and in the subsequent search for the source of the leak, the weapons had been found. 8.  The accused lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Regional Court. 9.  On 12 and 13 September 2000 the daily newspaper Sp!ts published two articles, written by the applicant and his colleague Ms S., in which doubts were expressed about the amount of coincidence allegedly involved in the finding of the weapons. The article of 13 September 2000, entitled “Chance Hit or Perfect Shot?” (“Toevalstreffer of loepzuiver schot?”), quotes an unnamed policeman of the Amsterdam force as commenting in respect of the flooding, “That is what we made out of it. Sometimes you just need a breakthrough in an investigation” (“Dat hebben we er maar van gemaakt. Soms heb je net even een doorbraak nodig in je onderzoek”). 10.  In the proceedings on appeal against K., Van S. and H., the applicant and Ms S. were summonsed to appear as witnesses at the request of the defence. At the first hearing before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) on 22 September 2000 in the cases against Van S. and K., the applicant – who was assisted by counsel – stated inter alia that he knew that the policeman, whom he had quoted verbatim in the article of 13 September 2000, had been involved in a previous investigation against K. When the applicant was asked whether that policeman was also involved in the investigation of the flat or was aware of that investigation, he invoked his right of non-disclosure (verschoningsrecht). Counsel for the defence argued that both the individual interest of the accused – on whom a custodial sentence had been imposed as a result of the investigation carried out by the police – and the interest of criminal justice in the Netherlands outweighed the applicant's interest in not disclosing his source. The Advocate General also expressed as his opinion that the applicant could not invoke a right of non-disclosure. He stated in addition that the source, if his name was made known, had nothing to fear from either the police or the public prosecution service. 11.  After having deliberated, the Court of Appeal considered that, if the statement made by the police officer to the applicant was correct, this might affect the conviction of the accused. It also affected the integrity of the police and judicial authorities. For these reasons, the Court of Appeal held that the applicant was to reply to the question whether his source had been involved in the investigation of the flat and had been aware of that investigation. The President of the court further reminded the applicant that the court was empowered to order his detention for failure to comply with a judicial order (gijzeling). Upon this, the applicant replied that his source had both been aware of, and involved in, the investigation of the flat. 12.  Asked by counsel for the accused to reveal the identity of his source, the applicant once again invoked his right of non-disclosure. Counsel for the applicant submitted that he was justified in so doing, given that disclosing the identity of his source would render it impossible for the applicant to work as a journalist in the future since sources would no longer approach him. The interests of the journalist and of freedom of expression outweighed other interests. Moreover, as the criminal charges at issue concerned only arms trafficking and not, for example, a multiple homicide, it was disproportionate to require the applicant to name his source. It also went against the principle of subsidiarity, since there were other ways in which the identity of the source could be discovered. 13.  In reply, the Advocate General stated that journalists exposed obvious wrongs (kennelijke misstanden) in society. Where they chose to do so, they should also face the consequences. The applicant was the only witness who could clarify whether or not the three accused had been wrongly convicted. In the present case, where official records, drawn up on oath of office (ambtseed) by police officers, and the integrity of the judicial authorities were at stake, the applicant must reveal the identity of his source. It could not be the case that, in order to trace this identity, every member of the Amsterdam police force should be heard, bearing in mind that all officers in the case against K. had already been heard by the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris). 14.  Having deliberated, the Court of Appeal decided that the applicant was to reveal the identity of his source, for the same reasons as it had held that he had to reply to the question of his source's involvement in the investigation. The applicant invoked his right to remain silent (zwijgrecht), upon which the court ordered his immediate detention for a maximum of 30 days. No legal remedy lay against the decision to detain the applicant (Article 294 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – Wetboek van Strafvordering, “CCP”). 15.  When questioned by counsel for the accused, the applicant's colleague, Ms S., stated that she was aware of the identity of the source, but that she had never met him in person. Having regard to this last fact, as well as to the fact that the journalist who had had direct contact with the source – i.e. the applicant – had already been placed in detention, the Court of Appeal considered that Ms S. was not obliged to reveal the identity of the source. 16.  The applicant was served with an unreasoned decision on 25 September 2000. On 27 September 2000 he was handed a copy of the record of the hearing of 22 September, containing the decisions made by the Court of Appeal at that hearing and the reasons for them. 17.  Late on 22 September 2000 the applicant lodged a request with the Court of Appeal to be released from detention. Prior to the examination of this request on 27 September 2000, the applicant was able to consult his lawyer only once, namely in the evening of 25 September. Requests to visit the applicant on 22, 23, 24, (the afternoon of) 25, 26 and 27 September were refused. The request for release was dealt with by the Court of Appeal in chambers (raadkamer), by the same judges who had ordered his detention. 18.  At the hearing in chambers on 27 September 2000, the Advocate General reported that, following the applicant's statements at the hearing on 22 September, a police inspector had carried out an internal investigation, which had revealed that only eight police officers had been involved in both the first and the second investigation into the accused K. All these officers had made sworn affidavits to the effect that they had never been in contact with the applicant. 19.  Informed of the outcome of the internal police investigation, the applicant insisted that he did not want to reveal the identity of his source. He stated that he was a journalist and that he might as well give up on that career if he started revealing his sources; no sources wanting to remain anonymous would any longer be willing to provide him with tip-offs. The applicant was informed by the President of the Court of Appeal that the right of non-disclosure was not absolute, and that more weighty interests could be at stake. In the present case, long prison sentences had been imposed on the three accused, partly on the basis of official records drawn up by police officers. The applicant replied that he was willing to state only that his source was not one of the police officers who had made sworn affidavits in the internal police investigation. 20.  Counsel for the applicant argued that the journalist should be the last, rather than the first, means of arriving at the truth. The witnesses, whose examination had been requested by the three accused, ought to be heard first. Those witnesses could be confronted with the articles published in Sp!ts as well as with the article which had appeared in the weekly news magazine Vrij Nederland on 8 January 2000. This latter article had also suggested that the flooding of the flat had been staged, and the author had informed counsel for the applicant that the information contained in the article had not come from the same source as the one relied on by the applicant. Counsel for the applicant further posited that the State Criminal Investigation Department (Rijksrecherche) could carry out an investigation of the police force. Finally, it was for the Court of Appeal to assess the value of the article written by the applicant – that court could also decide to disregard it. 21.  By decision of 28 September 2000, the Court of Appeal refused the applicant's request for his detention to be lifted. It repeated that the interests of the accused and of the integrity of the police and the judicial authorities outweighed the interest of the applicant in not having to disclose the identity of his source. Having regard to the outcome of the internal police investigation, as well as to the fact that an appeal made by the police commissioner for the applicant's source to come forward had not produced any results, the Court of Appeal considered it unlikely that an investigation by the State Criminal Investigation Department would clarify, within a reasonable time, the cause of the flooding, quite apart from the fact that such an investigation would seriously delay the criminal proceedings against K., Van S. and H. The Court of Appeal similarly rejected the suggestion to hear the witnesses proposed by the defence first, given that those witnesses had already been heard extensively about the point in issue. For these reasons, it could not be held that the detention of the applicant breached the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. 22.  The Court of Appeal further considered that the applicant's objections against the order for his detention as given at the hearing of 22 September 2000 did not require examination since no appeal lay against such order. It also rejected the argument that the order had not been served on the applicant within 24 hours, since – as appeared from the record of that hearing of 22 September – he had been informed of the order orally. Finally, the Court of Appeal held that the possibilities for contact between the applicant and his counsel were laid down in penitentiary legislation. It was not for the Court of Appeal to assess the application of that legislation. 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) against the decision of the Court of Appeal. 24.  A second hearing before the Court of Appeal in the criminal proceedings against Van S. and H. took place on 9 October 2000. The applicant once again refused to reveal the identity of his source. Upon this, the Court of Appeal decided to lift the order for the applicant's detention. It considered that no support for, or confirmation of, the applicant's statement that he had received information from a police officer who had been involved in both investigations against the accused K. could be found in statements made by other persons and/or in the contents of documents. On the contrary, the applicant's statement had been contradicted by ten police officers. Therefore, no credence could be attached to his statement. This being the case, the applicant's detention no longer served any purpose. 25.  At the same hearing on 9 October 2000, and following the Court of Appeal's decision to lift the applicant's detention, counsel for the accused K. challenged (wraken) the Court of Appeal. A different chamber of the Court of Appeal upheld that challenge, also on 9 October 2000. It held that the opinion that the applicant's statement was not credible, as expressed by the Court of Appeal in the criminal proceedings against Van S. and H., might have a bearing on decisions which that court would be called upon to take in the criminal proceedings against K. This constituted an exceptional circumstance, providing an important indication for the conclusion that the accused's fear of a judge being prejudiced against him was objectively justified. 26.  The criminal proceedings against the three accused continued on 30 October 2000 before the Court of Appeal in a new composition. The applicant was again heard as a witness, as were seven other journalists who had also published articles about the case against K. and the possibility of the flooding having been staged. The Court of Appeal also heard two plumbers and the caretaker of the building. 27.  Subsequent to the decision to lift the order for his detention, the applicant withdrew his appeal on points of law as his release had rendered that appeal devoid of interest. 28.  According to the Government, the criminal proceedings against K., Van S. and H. have been brought to a conclusion. 29.  The applicant has submitted photocopies of two cuttings from print media. 30.  The first is of a report in the mass circulation daily newspaper De Telegraaf, dated 24 September 1999. It is therein stated that following reports of flooding from a second flat in Amsterdam, police had found another large quantity of weaponry. Messrs K., Van S. and H., the accused in the applicant's case, were not at that time suspected of involvement; the weapons were thought to belong to a terrorist organisation. The report drew attention to the similarity between the Nachtwachtlaan case and this new case as regards the circumstances in which the weapons were found. It cited “police sources” as suggesting that intelligence services, possibly foreign, had engineered events in order to protect their informants. 31.  The second, which is incomplete, is of an article that appeared on 8 January 2000 in the weekly magazine Vrij Nederland. It links the two events and cites an unnamed source as stating that they had in fact been engineered by the then Netherlands National Security Service (Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst – “the BVD”). 32.  It appears that the report in De Telegraaf and the article in Vrij Nederland were both written by journalists other than the applicant. 33.  The applicant has also submitted a printout of a page taken from the internet web site of the Amsterdam daily newspaper Het Parool, dated 27 September 2000. It quotes the two plumbers who were called in to repair the water leak as dismissing as nonsense all allegations that the damage had been caused deliberately; in actual fact, such leaks were very common in older buildings.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980. She is imprisoned in Gebze Prison. 7.  On 10 October 2001 the applicant was at a bus stop in İçerenköy in Istanbul when she was arrested by plain-clothes police officers on suspicion of being a member of the PKK. She was taken to the Anti-Terrorism Branch of the Istanbul State Security Directorate. On the same day, the police officers drafted an arrest protocol stating that the applicant had been arrested on account of her involvement in PKK-related activities. The applicant signed this protocol. 8.  The applicant's lawyer challenged the arrest before the investigating judge of the Istanbul State Security Court and requested that the applicant be released from detention. Her request was dismissed. 9.  On 11 October 2001 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court extended the detention period until 14 October 2001. 10.  On 14 October 2001 the applicant could see her lawyer for a short period of time following the permission of the public prosecutor. 11.  On 15 October 2001 police officers from the Anti-Terrorism Branch requested that the applicant's custody period be extended for three more days. The single judge of the Istanbul State Security Court granted the request and extended the custody period until 17 October 2001 pursuant to Article 128 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant's lawyer challenged this decision before a panel of three judges of the Istanbul State Security Court and requested that the applicant be brought before a judge. Her request was dismissed. 12.  On 16 October 2001 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor, and thereafter before the investigating judge of the Istanbul State Security Court. Subsequently the judge ordered that the applicant be detained on remand. 13.  On 23 November 2001 the public prosecutor filed an indictment with the Istanbul State Security Court, accusing the applicant of being a member of an illegal armed organisation under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of the Anti-Terrorism Act. 14.  The Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant of the offence and sentenced her to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. The judgment was later upheld by the Court of Cassation on 11 November 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Berlin. 5.  The applicant is 80 % physically disabled. On 23 July 2001 the applicant submitted a request to the Berlin Pensions and Allowances Office for an allowance on the basis of his reduced earning capacity. The Pensions and Allowances Office dismissed the request on 29 October 2001 on the grounds that the applicant was still able to work for more than six hours a day. 6.  On 26 November 2001 the applicant lodged an administrative objection, which was rejected on 26 February 2002. 7.  On 12 March 2002 the applicant brought an action before the Berlin Social Court. On 6 May 2002 the Social Court requested further documentation, which the applicant submitted on 3 June 2002. On 14 June 2002 the Social Court commissioned a socio-medical expert report. The expert report was completed on 22 July 2002. 8.  On 7 April 2003 the applicant suggested that a neurological-psychological expert report be commissioned. The Berlin Pensions and Allowances Office proposed an expert, to whom the applicant objected, for the neurological-psychological report. On 21 May 2003 the Social Court commissioned the report from a different expert. On 23 April 2003 and on 20 August 2003 the applicant submitted further medical documents. On 18 December 2003 the applicant received the neurological-psychological expert report dated 9 December 2003, and commented on it on 5 January 2004. On 19 January 2004 the applicant requested that the neurological-psychological expert amend his report. 9.  The applicant suggested commissioning an orthopaedic expert report, which the Social Court did on 14 January 2004. On 23 March 2004 the applicant received the orthopaedic expert report, dated 15 March 2004. 10.  On 3 November 2004 the Social Court asked the parties whether they agreed to a decision without a further oral hearing; on 16 November 2004 the applicant refused to agree. On 17 January 2005 a scheduled hearing could not take place as one of the lay judges had fallen ill in the morning; on the same day, the parties agreed to a decision through the written procedure. 11.  On 2 August 2005 and 1 September 2005 the applicant requested a progress report. The Social Court’s judgment of 20 June 2005 was served on the applicant on 17 October 2005. It partially granted the applicant’s action. It rejected the applicant’s request in relation to an allowance for fully or partially reduced earning capacity, but awarded an allowance for incapacity to work. 12.  On 10 November 2005 the Berlin Pensions and Allowances Office lodged an appeal with the Berlin-Brandenburg Social Court of Appeal. The Social Court of Appeal informed the applicant on 31 January 2006 that he had yet to submit his respondent’s brief in the appeal proceedings; he did so on 21 February 2006. On 18 April, 22 May, and 2 June 2006 the applicant made further submissions. 13.  On 14 July 2006 the judge rapporteur responsible for the appeals proceedings became unable to work due to illness. The president’s office assigned a different judge, who was delegated for one year from the labour court, to the chamber dealing with the case. 14.  On 26 July 2006 the Social Court of Appeal requested information from the applicant’s former employer, which it received on 1 August 2006. On 28 July 2006 the applicant submitted a medical certificate. On 1 August 2006 the Social Court of Appeal stayed the execution of the first-instance judgment. On 3 November 2006, 22 January 2007, and 29 April 2007 the Social Court of Appeal requested further documents from the applicant, which he provided. On 8 May 2007 the Social Court of Appeal asked the applicant’s former employee to provide additional information, which was submitted on 25 May 2007. 15.  In July 2007, after the one year period of the delegated judge had ended, the former judge rapporteur again took on the proceedings. However, the judge rapporteur suffered a severe relapse in September 2007, which led to her death in the following year. The president’s office reacted in reducing the chamber’s workload. The judge responsible for the case changed several times. 16.  On 16 June 2008 the applicant extended his action to include an allowance claim for fully reduced earning capacity. 17.  On 8 October 2008 the Social Court of Appeal commissioned a general-medical expert report. The applicant received the expert report, dated 31 January 2009, on 25 February 2009 and made further submissions on 27 March 2009. On 30 March 2009 the Social Court of Appeal commissioned a psychiatric expert report, which it received on 15 July 2009. 18.  On 18 November 2009 the Social Court of Appeal rendered its judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1940 and is at present imprisoned in Parma. 9.  On 2 September 1999, after a fight with his two sons, the applicant killed his wife and injured one of his sons. He was arrested on 3 September. 10.  At the end of the preliminary investigation the Rome prosecution service asked for the applicant to be committed to stand trial for murder, attempted murder, ill-treatment of his family and unauthorised possession of a firearm 11.  At a hearing on 18 February 2000 before the Rome preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell'udienza preliminare – “the GUP”) the applicant asked to be tried under the summary procedure, a simplified process which entailed a reduction of sentence in the event of conviction. In the version in force at that time Article 442 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) provided that, if the crime committed by the defendant was punishable by life imprisonment, the appropriate sentence should be thirty years. (see paragraph 29 below). 12.  The GUP agreed to follow the summary procedure. Further hearings were held on 22 September and 24 November 2000. The last-mentioned hearing began at 10.19 a.m. 13.  On 24 November 2000 the GUP found the applicant guilty and noted that he was liable to a sentence of life imprisonment; however, as the applicant had elected to stand trial under the summary procedure, the judge sentenced him to a term of 30 years. 14.  On 12 January 2001 the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Rome Court of Appeal appealed on points of law against the Rome GUP's judgment of 24 November 2000. The prosecution argued that the GUP should have applied Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000, which entered into force on the very day when the applicant was convicted. After being amended by parliament, Legislative Decree no. 341 was converted into Law no. 4 of 19 January 2001. 15.  The prosecution contended in particular that Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 had amended Article 442 of the CCP and now provided that, in the event of trial under the summary procedure, life imprisonment was to be substituted for life imprisonment with daytime isolation if there were “cumulative offences” (concorso di reati) or a “continuous offence” (reato continuato – see paragraph 31 below). The GUP's failure to apply Legislative Decree no. 341 amounted to “a manifest error of law” (evidente errore di diritto). 16.  On 5 and 22 February 2001 the applicant appealed. His chief submission was that he should be acquitted on the ground that his conduct had not been intentional or that, at the time when the offences were committed, he was incapable of understanding the wrongful nature of his acts and of forming the intent to commit them (incapacità de intendere e volere). In the alternative, he requested a reduction of his sentence. 17.  As there were now two appeals, at two different levels of jurisdiction, the Public Prosecutor's appeal on points of law was changed to an appeal on both facts and law and the Rome Assize Court of Appeal was declared to have jurisdiction to hear the case (Article 580 of the CCP). 18.  The hearing in private before the Rome Assize Court of Appeal was held on 10 January 2002. The applicant was not present and was tried in absentia. He alleged that, as he had difficulty in walking, he had asked to be taken to the courtroom by ambulance or some other suitably adapted vehicle but that, as the prison management had refused his request, he had been deprived of the possibility of participating in the appeal proceedings. 19.  In a judgment of 10 January 2002, deposited with the registry on 23 January 2002, the Assize Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. 20.  It observed that before the entry into force of Legislative Decree no. 341 Article 442 § 2 of the CCP had been interpreted to mean that life imprisonment was to be replaced by a term of thirty years, whether or not it was to be accompanied by daytime isolation on account of an accumulation of offences with the most serious one. In following that approach, the GUP had fixed the sentence in relation to the most serious offence, without considering whether to order the applicant's daytime isolation on account of his conviction on the other charges against him. 21.  However, Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000 had entered into force on the very day of the GUP's decision. As its provisions were classed as procedural rules, it was applicable to pending proceedings, according to the tempus regit actum principle. The Assize Court of Appeal further observed that under the terms of Article 8 of Legislative Decree no. 341 the applicant could have withdrawn his request to be tried under the summary procedure and have stood trial under the ordinary procedure. As he had not done so, the first-instance decision ought to have taken account of the change in the rules on penalties which had taken place in the meantime. 22.  On 18 February 2002 the applicant appealed on points of law. He argued in the first place that the appeal proceedings should be declared null and void because he had not been able to participate, as defendant, in the appeal hearing on 10 January 2002. In his second and third grounds of appeal the applicant asserted that the trial courts had not given sufficient reasons either for ruling that he had intended to commit murder or for their finding that he knew what he was doing and had acted intentionally when committing the offences. Lastly, he contested the finding of an aggravating circumstance (that he had acted for futile reasons) and complained of the refusal to grant him extenuating circumstances. 23.  On 31 July 2002 the applicant submitted further grounds of appeal. He contended that a fresh expert opinion should have been produced on his mental state at the time when the offences were committed and presented new arguments on the question of aggravating and extenuating circumstances. Lastly, he submitted that the penalty deemed to be applicable in his case (life imprisonment with isolation) was excessive. 24.  In a judgment deposited with its registry on 20 January 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal. 25.  On 18 July 2003 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on the ground of a factual error (Article 625a of the CCP). He asserted in the first place that the domestic courts' finding that he could have been taken to the appeal hearing by an ordinary means of transport and did not need an ambulance had been the result of an erroneous reading of the documents in the file. In addition, his absence, as the defendant, from that hearing had breached Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant further alleged that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him following the changes made by Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000, and thus through a retrospective criminal-law provision, had breached Article 7 of the Convention and the principles of fair trial. He submitted that his waiver of procedural safeguards as a result of electing to stand trial under the summary procedure had not been compensated for by the reduction of his sentence promised by the State at the time when he made that choice. Lastly, he maintained that life imprisonment was an inhuman and degrading punishment and as such contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 26.  In a judgment of 14 May 2004, deposited with its registry on 28 October 2004, the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's extraordinary appeal inadmissible. It observed that he was not complaining of factual errors committed by the domestic courts but essentially attempting to challenge the Court of Cassation's assessment on points of law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": true, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Bytom, Poland. 5.  The applicant worked as the head of the sales department in a coal mine “Rozbark” in Bytom. On 24 August 1994 she was dismissed from her job. 6.  On 2 September 1994 she lodged a claim for compensation and reinstatement with the Bytom District Court of Labour (Sąd Rejonowy Wydział Pracy). Before 26 January 1995 the trial court held four hearings and heard evidence from one witness. 7.  On 2 March 1995 the parties reached a friendly settlement and the District Court discontinued the proceedings. On 16 March 1995 the applicant’s lawyer asked the court to resume the proceedings, as the defendant company had failed to comply with the terms of the settlement. On 27 June 1995 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the decision of 2 March and resumed the proceedings. 8.  On 21 September 1995 the District Court held a hearing. On 23 October 1995 it stayed the proceedings until the conclusion of criminal proceedings against the applicant (referred to below). The applicant’s further appeal against that decision was dismissed by the Katowice Regional Court of Labour on 28 December 1995. 9.  On 28 January 1999 the applicant asked the court to resume the proceedings. On 25 March 1999 the court held a hearing. On 29 October 1999 it dismissed her application. On 29 December 1999, on the applicant’s appeal, the Katowice Regional Court resumed the proceedings. 10.  Between 9 March and 5 December 2000 the court held five hearings and heard evidence from five witnesses. On 5 December 2000 the Bytom District Court gave judgment. The court granted the applicant compensation and dismissed her claim for reinstatement. Both parties appealed. 11.  On 8 May and 5 June 2001 the Regional Court held hearings. On 15 October 2001 the applicant sent a letter to the President of the Katowice Regional Court asking for a hearing date to be set. 12.  On 21 November 2001 the Regional Court dismissed the defendant’s appeal. 20 December 2001 the Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The judgment is final. 13.  On 30 December 1995 the Bytom District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) submitted to the Bytom District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a bill of indictment against the applicant and three other employees of the “Rozbark” coal mine. The applicant was charged with carrying out fraudulent financial operations. On 14 March 1996 the Bytom District Court returned the case-file to the District Prosecutor instructing him to complete the investigation. The District Prosecutor appealed. On 3 April 1996 the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) ordered the District Court to proceed with the case. 14.  During the proceedings the District Court held fifteen hearings and heard evidence from several witnesses. 15.  On 23 September 1998 the Bytom District Court delivered a judgment and acquitted the applicant. The District Prosecutor appealed. 16.  On 8 February 1999 the Katowice Regional Court quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the prosecution authorities for a further investigation. 17.  On 10 July 1999 the District Prosecutor ordered an expert opinion to be obtained.  The expert submitted his opinion on 22 October 1999. On 2 August 1999 the Bytom District Prosecutor decided to stay the investigation until an expert on management prepared an opinion. 18.  On 15 December 1999 the applicant sent a letter to the Regional Prosecutor complaining about the slow progress of the proceedings. On 20 March 2000 she sent another letter to the Minister of Justice (Minister Sprawiedliwości) asking about the progress of the investigation proceedings. In a letter of 14 March 2000 the Bytom District Prosecutor informed the applicant that there were difficulties in finding an expert competent to prepare an opinion. 19.  On 30 April 2001 the expert on management submitted his opinion to the Prosecutor. The investigation was resumed on 2 July 2001. 20.  On 28 December 2001 the District Prosecutor submitted to the Bytom District Court a bill of indictment against the applicant and three other persons. 21.  On 28 August 2003 the Bytom District Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Kirovograd. 5.  In March 1996 Mr. D. instituted proceedings against the applicant seeking compensation for expenses of the funeral of his brother, the applicant's husband. On 24 July 1996 the Leninsky District Court of Kirovograd (hereinafter “the Leninsky Court”) allowed this claim in part. On 12 September 1996 the Kirovograd Regional Court upheld this decision. 6.  On 1 October 1997 the Presidium of the Kirovograd Regional Court, following the protest of the Deputy President of the Supreme Court, quashed all previous decisions in the case and remitted it for a fresh consideration. 7.  On 22 November 1997 the applicant lodged a counterclaim against D., claiming that she was entitled to property and compensation in connection with the administration of her late husband's estate. 8.  On 11 December 1997 the Leninsky Court declined to consider the counterclaim because the applicant had failed to pay the court fee. 9.  On 18 December 1997 the applicant re-lodged her counterclaim. 10.  On 29 September 1998, on the applicant's request, the case was transferred to the Kirovograd District Court. 11.  On 20 May 1999 the proceedings were resumed. 12.  On 10 October 2000, following Mr D.'s modification of his claim, the hearings were postponed until 14 November 2000. 13.  On 14 November 2000, following the applicant's modification of her claim, the hearings were postponed until 11 December 2000. 14.  On 21 June 2001 the Kirovograd District Court allowed in part both the original claim and the counterclaim. 15.  On 17 October 2001 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal (hereinafter “the Regional Court”) modified the judgment as to D.'s claim. It also quashed the judgment in the part concerning the applicant's counterclaim and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 16.  On 27 December 2001 the Regional Court assigned the case to the Kirovsky District Court of Kirovograd (hereinafter “the Kirovsky Court”). 17.  On 22 March 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's cassation appeal and upheld the ruling of 17 October 2001. 18.  The proceedings were resumed in the Kirovsky Court in June 2002. 19.  On 23 March 2003 the proceedings were suspended until examination by the Leninsky Court of the criminal case instituted upon the applicant's request against Mr D. as to the alleged forgery of his brother's (the applicant's husband's) will. 20.  In April 2003 the applicant lodged with the Kirovsky Court a request to review the judgment of 21 June 2001 in the light of newly disclosed circumstances. 21.  On 22 December 2003 this request was rejected. 22.  In April 2004 the applicant lodged a request with the Supreme Court seeking to review the decision of 21 June 2001 in the light of newly disclosed circumstances. 23.  On 24 March 2004 the Leninsky Court terminated the criminal proceedings against Mr D. as prosecution had become time-barred. On 1 June and 7 December 2004 the Regional Court and the Supreme Court, respectively, upheld this ruling. 24.  On 15 April 2004 the Kirovsky Court requested the Leninsky Court about the outcome of criminal proceedings against Mr D. 25.  On 25 May 2004 the civil proceedings were resumed. 26.  On 10 December 2004 the case-file was transferred to the Supreme Court for examination of the applicant's request to review the judgment of 21 June 2001 in the light of newly disclosed circumstances. 27.  On 31 October 2005 the Supreme Court rejected this request. 28.  Since January 2006 the proceedings are pending before the Kirovsky Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Pskov, the Pskov Region. 5.  In 1986 he took part in the emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result he suffered from the extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. On unspecified dates the applicant underwent medical examinations which established the link between his poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events. The applicant was awarded social benefits, to be paid monthly. 6.  On 13 August 2002 the Pskov Town Court of the Pskov Region granted the applicant's claim against the Welfare Office of the administration of Pskov (Управление Социальной защиты населения администрации г. Пскова) for increase of food allowance. The court awarded the applicant 1,089.60 Russian roubles (RUR) to be paid monthly and ordered the defendant to adjust the forthcoming payments proportionally to the increase of the minimum subsistence level. 7.  On 24 September 2002 the judgment of 13 August 2002 acquired legal force, after it had been upheld on appeal by the Pskov Regional Court. 8.  In December 2003 the defendant filed an application for supervisory review of the judgment of 13 August 2002, as upheld on 24 September 2002, with the Pskov Regional Court. 9.  On 24 May 2004 the Presidium of the Pskov Regional Court quashed the judgment of 13 August 2002 in part concerning the future adjustments of the allowance and upheld the remainder of the judgment. 10.  By a judgment of 23 December 2003 the Pskov Town Court of the Pskov Region granted another of the applicant's actions against the Welfare Office of the administration of Pskov for adjustment of the food allowance. The court increased the monthly payments to RUR 1,231. The judgment was not appealed against and entered into force on 5 January 2004. 11.  The Welfare Office of the administration of Pskov failed to execute the judgments of 13 August 2002 and 23 December 2003. 12.  In February 2006 the local authorities contacted the applicant with a view of reaching an agreement in the matter. However, the applicant refused to accept the terms of the agreement.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Mendeleyevo, a town in the Moscow Region. 5.  In 1995 the applicant brought a court action against a housing maintenance service. Throughout the proceedings she represented herself. She claimed compensation for damages sustained as a result of poor quality repairs carried out by the respondent in her flat and requested that the works be done again. She also claimed penalties for the delays in the reparation of her flat. In course of the proceedings the applicant amended her claims. 6.  On 27 November 1995 the Solnechnogorskiy Town Court of the Moscow Region (“the Town Court”) dismissed her claim. On 6 February 1996 the Moscow Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld that judgment. 7.  On 28 May 1996 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 27 November 1995 and remitted the case for a fresh examination to the first-instance court. 8.  In the meantime the administration of the Solnechnogorskiy District transferred the municipal housing into the authority of a municipal enterprise, Mendeleyevo Service. 9.  On 10 October 1997 the Town Court granted the applicant’s claim in part. On 18 February 1998 the Regional Court upheld that judgment. 10.  On 13 January 1999 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 10 October 1997 and remitted the case for a new examination to the Town Court. It held in particular that the lower courts had failed to establish the proper defendant in the case. It also indicated that in order to decide on the penalties the first-instance court had to establish whether the parties had previously set any deadlines for the repairs. 11.  On 5 March 1999 the Town Court set the examination of the case for 9 April 1999. Between April and October 1999 six hearings were scheduled, however they were adjourned mainly because the respondent and the third party failed to appear. 12.  On 26 October 1999 the Town Court established that the municipal enterprise Mendeleyevo Service was the proper respondent in the case and ordered it to repair the applicant’s flat. It awarded the applicant penalties for the delays in the repair of her flat and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Furthermore, it held that the respondent had been in bad faith in opposing a correct and quick examination of the case and ordered it to pay the applicant compensation for the lost time. 13.  On 2 February 2000 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 26 October 1999 and remitted the case to the first-instance court for a fresh examination. It found that the Town Court had not indicated in its decision which repairs had to be done in the applicant’s flat, it had not followed the Presidium’s decision of 13 January 1999 and it had not given reasons for its conclusions as regards the respondent’s bad faith in delaying the proceedings. 14.  On 3 May 2000 the Town Court set the examination of the case for 29 June 2000. Between June and December 2000 nine hearings were scheduled. Three of them did not take place because the respondent failed to appear, one hearing was postponed because the applicant did not appear and three hearings were adjourned either because the applicant asked for additional time to amend her claims or because the respondent asked for additional time to submit evidence. One hearing was postponed in order to call an expert to trial. 15.  On 19 December 2000 the Town Court held that since the maintenance service no longer existed it was impossible for it to repair the applicant’s flat. Therefore, it awarded the applicant the money necessary for such repairs and compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It also ordered the respondent to replace some equipment in the applicant’s flat. It further established that the parties had not concluded any written contract in respect of the repairs in the flat and had not set any time-limits; therefore there was no call to award the applicant any penalties in that respect. On the same date the Town Court decided to examine the applicant’s claim for payment of penalties for the delayed replacement of sanitary equipment and for compensation for loss of time in separate proceedings. 16.  On 18 April 2001 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 19 December 2000 and referred the case to the first-instance court for a new examination on the ground that the first-instance court had failed to follow its decision of 2 February 2000. 17.  On 6 August 2001 the case was adjourned until 26 September 2001 because the parties failed to appear. 18.  According to the Government, on 26 September 2001 the proceedings were discontinued at the applicant’s request, however on 16 January 2002 the Presidium of the Regional Court quashed that decision in supervisory review on the prosecutor’s application. The Government did not provide the Court with copies of those decisions. 19.  On 15 February 2002 the Town Court set the examination of the case for 13 March 2002. On that date the case was adjourned until 11 April 2002 because the parties failed to appear. 20.  On 11 April 2002 the Town Court left the applicant’s claim unexamined on the ground that she had failed to appear at two hearings. 21.  On 16 January 2003 the applicant requested the Town Court to reinstate the time-limit for lodging an appeal against the decision of 11 April 2002. In her appeal she claimed that she had failed to appear at two hearings because she had not been duly notified of them and that she had not received a copy of the decision of 11 April 2002. On 21 January 2003 the Town Court granted her appeal, quashed the decision of 11 April 2002 and scheduled the examination of the case for 12 March 2003. On that date the case was again adjourned because the parties failed to appear. 22.  On 29 May 2003 the case was adjourned until 23 July 2003 because the judge was on sick leave. On that date the applicant amended her claims. She submitted that since the examination of the case was very lengthy, she had repaired her flat at her own expense and she requested the court to reimburse her those expenses. On the same date the case was adjourned until 25 August 2003. The next three hearings were adjourned either because the respondent company did not appear or because it asked for additional time to submit evidence and comments on the applicant’s claims. 23.  On 24 November 2003 the Town Court ordered the municipal enterprise Mendeleyevo Service to reimburse the applicant for the repair expenses and pay her non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of poor-quality repair works. Furthermore, it ordered the defendant to replace the sanitary installations in the applicant’s flat. It dismissed the remainder of the applicant’s claims. 24.  On 16 March 2004 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of 24 November 2003.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant left Czechoslovakia for Germany in 1968. After his judicial rehabilitation in 1990 he started living partly in Czechoslovakia and partly in Germany. According to the applicant, he spent the major part of the year 1992 in Czechoslovakia. On 25 September 1992 he registered his permanent residence at his friend’s address in Krompachy. He remained registered at this address until 22 June 1994. 9.  On 28 September 1992 the applicant lodged a claim for restitution of his father’s and uncle’s property under the Land Ownership Act of 1991. 10.  On 15 May 1996 the Spišská Nová Ves Land Office dismissed the applicant’s claim on the ground that at the relevant time he had not permanently resided within the territory of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as required by Section 4(1) of the Land Ownership Act. 11.  The Land Office established that a registered letter sent on 8 April 1993 could not be delivered as at that time nobody had lived at the applicant’s address in Krompachy. The Land Office had before it also a certificate in which the competent German authority confirmed that the applicant had registered his main abode (Hauptwohnung) in Wendelstein since 1973. The accompanying letter by the Slovakian vice-consul to Munich explained that, unlike in Slovakia, no distinction was made between permanent and temporary residence in Germany. The letter further stated that under German law the main abode was the place of residence preponderantly used by the person concerned in Germany, and that there was no obligation under German law to terminate its registration when a person spent the major part of a year abroad. The vice-consul expressed the view that in case that the applicant’s stay in Slovakia exceeded 183 days a year, his residence there could, theoretically, be regarded as permanent within the meaning of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act of 1982. 12.  In its decision the Land Office referred also to a police report according to which the applicant had not effectively established his permanent residence in Krompachy. The Land Office concluded, with reference to Section 3(2) and (5) and Section 4(1) of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act of 1982 and to the relevant case-law and administrative practice, that the applicant did not meet the permanent residence requirement. 13.  On 19 June 1996 the applicant requested the Košice Regional Court to review the Land Office’s decision. He alleged that since the beginning of 1992 he had resided at various places in Slovakia and submitted witness statements to this effect. The applicant further explained that several times a year he went to Germany where he was undergoing cancer therapy. 14.  On 29 November 1996 the Košice Regional Court upheld the administrative decision challenged by the applicant. It noted that by the date of expiry of the deadline for lodging his claim on 31 December 1992 the applicant had not permanently resided within the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as required by Section 4(1) of the Land Ownership Act. 15.  The Regional Court recalled, in particular, that under Section 4(1) of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act of 1982 citizens cannot permanently reside at more than one address at the same time. As the applicant failed to terminate the registration of his main abode in Germany prior to the registration of his permanent residence in Krompachy, his stay in the then Czechoslovakia was to be regarded as temporary. Reference was made to the relevant case-law and to the practice of the Ministry of the Interior. 16.  The Regional Court further held that the applicant had submitted no evidence indicating that his abode in Krompachy met the requirements of a permanent residence within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act. Moreover, a police report before the court indicated that the applicant’s registration in Krompachy had been of a formal nature. 17.  On 30 July 1999 the Supreme Court refused to re-examine the case as there was no remedy available against the Regional Court’s judgment of 29 November 1996.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicants are:\n1)  Ms Malika Dzhamayeva, born in 1957\n2)  Ms Kheda Mamayeva, born in 1978,\n3)  Mr Imam Mukayev, born in 2002, and\n4)  Mr Ovkhad Mukayev, born in 2004. 8.  The applicants live in Katyr-Yurt, in the Chechen Republic. 9.  The first applicant is the mother of Khamid Mukayev, born in 1978. The second applicant is Khamid Mukayev's wife and the third and fourth applicants are their children. 10.  At the material time the first applicant lived with her son Khamid Mukayev, the second to fourth applicants and other relatives at 10 Pervogo Maya Street (in the submitted documents the address is also referred to as 10 Pervogo Maya Lane and 25 Pervomayskaya Street), Katyr-Yurt, in the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy district of the Chechen Republic. 11.  On the night of 15 September 2004 the above-mentioned persons and P.B. were staying at the applicants' house. 12.  Between 4 and 5 a.m. on 16 September 2004 a convoy of military vehicles, including an armoured personnel carrier (APC) and Gazel and UAZ vehicles, arrived at the applicants' gate. The vehicles had no registration numbers. A group of about twenty-five to thirty armed masked men in camouflage uniforms got out of the vehicles. Some of them stayed outside, securing the perimeter of the applicants' house. 13.  At about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 the first applicant was woken up by the barking of her dog. Shortly afterwards seven or eight armed masked men in camouflage uniforms and bullet-proof jackets burst into the house. 14.  The intruders did not introduce themselves or explain the reason for their actions. They pointed their guns at the first applicant and her relatives and ordered them in unaccented Russian to get outside. The applicants inferred that the intruders were servicemen. In the courtyard the first applicant saw a large group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks. The servicemen tied the first applicant's and her relatives' hands with adhesive tape. They also tied the first applicant and her other son, Kh.M., to a shed post. The first applicant's eighty-four-year-old mother‑in‑law, Ms M. M., stayed in the house. In a state of stress, Ms M. M. started shouting and the servicemen hit her several times with their rifle butts. 15.  Meanwhile some of the servicemen who were in the house started searching it and some burst into the room where the second to fourth applicants and Khamid Mukayev were staying. They pointed their guns at the second applicant and ordered her in unaccented Russian to stay quiet. The servicemen then ordered Khamid Mukayev to lie down. After a quick search of the room they took Khamid Mukayev, who was in his underwear, to the yard. The second applicant tried to follow them but was forced back into the room under the threat of being shot dead. In the yard one of the servicemen took the tape off the first applicant's mouth and asked her where her husband was. She replied that she did not know and that he had left the family in 1992. 16.  Having checked the house and attic, the servicemen started beating Khamid Mukayev up, requesting him to give them his passport. He replied that the first applicant had it. The servicemen untied her hands and brought her into the house. In the house she saw her mother-in-law Ms M. M., who was leaning against the wall and coughing up blood. The first applicant gave Khamid Mukayev's passport to the servicemen. At that moment one of the servicemen in the yard ordered the others to retreat. While the first applicant looked back to where Ms M. M. was standing, she saw that the latter had fallen to the ground. Shortly after this the first applicant heard military vehicles. She realised that the servicemen were taking Khamid Mukayev away and asked them not to. They ordered her to remain silent and then two servicemen took the first applicant and her other son into the passageway, tied their hands and legs with adhesive tape and put them on to the floor. After asking the first applicant “What is wrong with your granny?” and received the reply that she was Category 1 disabled, the servicemen closed the door and left, taking Khamid Mukayev with them. 17.  The abduction of Khamid Mukayev was witnessed by a number of the applicants' neighbours. 18.  At about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 the applicants' neighbour A.Kh., who lived in Pervogo Maya Street, was woken up by the noise of military vehicles. When he went outside he saw a convoy consisting of an APC with a large number of servicemen on it and Gazel and UAZ vehicles on the Pervogo Maya Street. He immediately went back into his house. Some fifteen to twenty minutes later he again heard the noise of the vehicles coming from the street. When he looked outside his window, he saw the same vehicles reversing. Shortly after this his nephew I.M. came to his house and told him that Russian servicemen had taken away Khamid Mukayev and that they had killed Ms M. M. 19.  During the night of 15-16 September 2004 M.F., who lived at 12 Pervogo Maya Street, was woken up by the noise of vehicles. When she looked outside the window, she saw an APC, a white Gazel vehicle, a light‑coloured UAZ vehicle and a large group of armed masked men going towards the applicants' house. The vehicles had no licence plates. A group of servicemen secured the perimeter of the house. M.F. went home to get dressed but when she got outside, the APC was already driving back and the servicemen sitting on it pointed their guns at her. Once the APC had moved away, M.F. went to the applicants' house and was told about the abduction of Khamid Mukayev and the murder of Ms M. M. 20.  On the night of 15-16 September 2004 A.M. was woken up by noise coming from the applicants' house. When he came closer to the applicants' house through his vegetable garden he saw Gazel and UAZ vehicles parked at the applicants' gate. Afraid to approach closer, he returned home. Some twenty minutes later I.M. came to his house and told him that servicemen had abducted Khamid Mukayev and killed Ms M. M. 21.  The description of the events of 16 September 2004 is based on the first applicant's submissions in her application forms of 21 May and 25 July 2006 and the applicants' account given in the application form of 11 March 2008; accounts given to the applicants' representatives by the following witnesses: an account by P.B. given on 5 March 2008; an account by A.Kh. given on 14 February 2008; an account by M.F. given on 12 February 2008; an account by A.M. given on 15 February 2008; an account by the first applicant made on 11 March 2008, and an account made by the second applicant on 20 February 2008. 22.  The applicants have had no news of Khamid Mukayev since 16 September 2004. 23.  The Government did not dispute most of the applicants' submissions but claimed that the domestic investigation had established neither the implication of servicemen in the abduction of Khamid Mukayev nor that the abductors had used military vehicles. 24.  After the departure of the servicemen on 16 September 2004 with Khamid Mukayev a number of neighbours gathered at the applicants' place. Meanwhile the first applicant's other son, I.M., untied her. Immediately thereafter the first applicant and M.F. ran after the military vehicles, which they saw going into Pervomayskaya Street. On their way the women alerted the local police inspector, M.A., who lived 100 metres from the applicants' house, about the abduction of Khamid Mukayev. M.A. did not say anything to the women and went back into his house. 25.  Shortly after this the first applicant asked her neighbour, D.M., for help. He promised her to follow the servicemen in his private car and told her to go home, which she did. 26.  When she arrived home the first applicant discovered that her mother-in-law was dead. 27.  At about 9 a.m. on 16 September 2004 police officers of the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy Department of the Interior (ROVD), including local police inspector M.A., came to the applicants' house. They interviewed the applicants and some of their neighbours and left. 28.  On 18 or 19 September 2004 a group of police officers visited the first applicant and told her to come to the ROVD. 29.  At the ROVD an officer brought the first applicant to the head of the criminal police department, Mr K. He told her that Khamid Mukayev was in good health, that he was not under the control of the ROVD but that the ROVD was in contact with the “structures which were holding the first applicant's son”. He then asked the first applicant about the whereabouts of her husband, who had participated in illegal armed groups during the first Chechen campaign, and explained her that it was in her interest to provide that information. He also asked her if she knew any Wahhabis in her village. 30.  Subsequently, the local police officer frequently questioned the first applicant about her husband, from which she inferred that the authorities had abducted Khamid Mukayev, because they were still looking for her husband, despite the fact that the latter had been amnestied meanwhile.\n(b)  Investigation of the abduction of Khamid Mukayev 31.  On 16 September 2004 the prosecutor's office of the Achkhoy‑Martanovskiy District (“the district prosecutor's office”) instituted a criminal investigation into the abduction of Khamid Mukayev and the causing of M.M.'s death under Articles 126 § 2 (aggravated kidnapping) and 111 § 4 of the Criminal Code, respectively. The case file was given the number 38041. 32.  On 17 September 2004 the district prosecutor's office granted the second applicant victim status in connection with the proceedings in case no. 38041. 33.  On 11 November 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the Mukayev family that the time-limits for the investigation in criminal case no. 38041 had been extended to 16 December 2004. 34.  On 11 July 2005 the military commander of the Chechen Republic forwarded the first applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy district military commander's office (the district military commander's office) for examination, and ordered the latter body to search for Khamid Mukayev. 35.  On 15 July 2005 the district prosecutor's office replied to the first applicant's complaint about her son's abduction and informed her that the complaint had been appended to case file no. 38041; that on an unspecified date the investigation of the abduction had been suspended, and unspecified operational and search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. 36.  On 18 July 2005 the district military commander's office informed the first applicant that on 16 September 2004 they had not been conducting any special operations in Katyr-Yurt. The letter also stated that the authorities had forwarded information requests concerning the whereabouts of Khamid Mukayev to various law-enforcement agencies in the Chechen Republic. 37.  On 14 March 2006, in reply to the second applicant's request for information, the district prosecutor's office wrote to her that they had been undertaking unspecified operational and search measures aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Khamid Mukayev, but that those measures had failed to produce any results. The letter also stated that the investigation in the criminal case could be resumed upon receipt of new relevant information. 38.  On 18 April 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that they had undertaken the following investigative steps in criminal case no. 38041: examination of the crime scene; forensic examination of the body of M.M.; granting victim status in the criminal case to relatives of the disappeared Khamid Mukayev; questioning of a number of local residents about the abduction; collaboration with a number of other law-enforcement bodies to establish the whereabouts of the applicants' relative. In addition, the supervising prosecutor had issued unspecified instructions aimed at solving the crime and these instructions had been complied with by the investigation. According to the letter, the investigation was examining the theory of the possible involvement of Russian servicemen in the crime, as well as the theory that Khamid Mukayev had been kidnapped for ransom. Finally, the document stated that the investigation in criminal case no. 38041 had been suspended on 16 January 2005; however, the operational and search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. 39.  On 10 July 2006 the second applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office, requesting information on the progress of the investigation and seeking information on the outcome of her previous enquiries, to which she had received no replies. She submitted that, in the absence of information, she was prevented from challenging the investigation omissions before other authorities. She also sought access to the case file and permission to make copies from it. Lastly, she requested that the investigation be reopened if it had been suspended. 40.  On 1 November 2006 the deputy prosecutor of the Achkhoy‑Martanovskiy district quashed the decision of 16 January 2005 to suspend the investigation in case no. 38041 as premature and unfounded, finding that the investigation had failed to take all steps necessary to establish the applicants' relative's whereabouts and to identify the perpetrators. In particular, the investigation had failed to interview officers A. T., A. M., T.Sh., I.Dzh., and R.B. of the ROVD, who had been on duty on 15-16 September 2004 at checkpoint no. 1, located at the entry to Achkhoy-Martan; it also had not interviewed as witnesses five residents of Achkhoy-Martan, whose testimony could have had an important bearing on the establishment of the circumstances of the case. The investigation also failed to take all measures to identify other witnesses and eyewitnesses to the abduction and the perpetrators. No measures aimed at identifying the owners of the APC and the Gazel vehicles were taken. The deputy prosecutor ordered the district prosecutor's office to enlarge the circle of eventual witnesses to the abduction, to take all relevant investigative steps and to coordinate its efforts with other State authorities. It is not entirely clear whether the deputy prosecutor's instructions have been complied with. 41.  On 1 December 2006 the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation in case no. 38041 for failure to identify the perpetrators. The decision noted that the investigation had taken a number of investigative steps. In particular, the crime scene had been inspected; a forensic examination of the body of Ms M.M. had been carried out; a plan of operational and search measures had been compiled; the second applicant had been granted victim status and interviewed; relatives and neighbours of the kidnapped person, as well as residents of Katyr-Yurt and unspecified police officers of the ROVD had been interviewed; servicemen from checkpoint no. 186 had been interviewed; registration logs from checkpoints located in the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District had been examined; character references in respect of Khamid Mukayev had been collected; and unspecified requests had been sent to various law-enforcement authorities in the Chechen Republic. 42.  By a letter of 12 February 2008 investigator K. of the Achkhoy‑Martanovskiy Interdistrict investigating department of the Investigating Department with the Prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic (the investigating department) replied to the second applicant's request for information that, until the termination of the investigation, she was only entitled to have access to the documents from case file no. 38041 which pertained to the investigative actions taken with her participation, and that she could be provided with access to the entire file only upon the termination of the investigation. 43.  On 11 March 2008 the second applicant complained to the Achkhoy‑Martanovskiy District Court (the District Court) that the investigating authorities had taken no action in case no. 38041. She submitted, in particular, that the investigator's refusal to grant her access to the case file had prevented her from getting information on the progress of the investigation into the abduction of her husband and from effectively challenging its omissions before the domestic authorities. 44.  By a decision of 26 March 2008 the District Court granted the second applicant's claims in part. It held that the investigator's permission to the applicant to have access only to the records of investigative steps taken with her participation was unlawful and in breach of the Criminal Procedure Code and the practice of the Constitutional Court. In particular, it referred to the Constitutional Court's finding that a victim could have access to decisions to charge particular persons with a crime, to the information on the composition of the investigating group, decisions to order various expert examinations and their conclusions and complaints of other participants to the criminal proceedings, if those documents and that information pertained to the victim's rights and legal interests. It was for the investigator to determine the manner and conditions of a victim's access to the relevant information, regard being had to the requirements of the interests of the investigation. At the same time, the second applicant's request for access to all the materials in the case file could not be granted until the investigation had been concluded. 45.  On 14 May 2008 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic dismissed the second applicant's appeal against the decision of 26 March 2008. 46.  The Government did not make detailed submissions on the course of the investigation. 47.  They stated that the investigation had interviewed eyewitnesses to the abduction and over forty residents of the village; had inspected the crime scene; had carried out a forensic examination of the fingerprints left presumably by the abductors; had examined the body of M. M., and had sent numerous requests to various State authorities in connection with the abduction of the applicants' relative. 48.  Despite specific requests by the Court, the Government did not disclose most of the contents of criminal case no. 38041, providing only copies of the following documents: the decision to institute the investigation; the record of examination of the body of M. M. and its photographs; the crime scene inspection report and a copy of the sketch of the premises; the decision to grant the second applicant victim status; the decision to order a fingerprint examination; the fingerprint expert's report; the forensic report of examination of M. M., and replies from the authorities mentioned in paragraph 63 below. The Government also submitted interview records in respect of the first and second applicants, D.M., Z.M., M.F., L.M., R.A. and M.A. and another thirty residents of Katyr-Yurt (see paragraph 59 below). The Government claimed that the documents furnished by them were the only case file materials they could submit to the Court without prejudice to the interests of the parties to the criminal proceedings. 49.   Some of the documents submitted by the Government were illegible and some documents were legible only in part. 50.  The information contained in the documents submitted by the Government may be summarised as follows. 51.  On 16 September 2004 officers of the ROVD examined the body of M. M. and photographed it. 52.  On the same date they inspected the crime scene. According to the crime scene inspection report, the entry door to Khamid Mukayev's room was broken and there were tracks described as “presumably those of an APC” in the courtyard of the applicants' house. It further emerges from the report that some fingerprints were taken during the inspection. 53.  On 16 September 2004 the ROVD officers interviewed as a witness D.M., who lived at 21, Pervogo Maya Street. D.M. stated that on the night of 15-16 September 2004 he went outside to relieve himself. At that moment he heard the noise of an APC. Immediately thereafter he saw a light-coloured Gazel vehicle without registration plates come into Pervogo Maya Street. It was followed by a UAZ vehicle and an APC. Shortly after this the first applicant came to D.M.'s house and told him that her mother‑in-law had been killed and her son abducted, upon which D.M. got into his car and followed the military convoy he had seen before. He caught up with it and saw that it was moving in the direction of Achkhoy-Martan. On its way the convoy passed checkpoint no. 186 without being stopped there. When D. M. approached that checkpoint, police officers stationed there stopped him and told him that he could not go any further and that the movement of vehicles was prohibited because of the curfew. 54.  On 17 September 2004 the investigation interviewed the second applicant as a witness. She submitted that at about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 she had been woken up by M.M. shouting for help. Immediately thereafter several armed masked men in camouflage uniforms burst into the room she was sharing with Khamid Mukayev and ordered him in unaccented Russian to lie down and not to move. The intruders then took him outside in his underwear. When the second applicant tried to follow, the intruders threatened her with their guns and ordered to stay inside. When she managed to get outside, she saw I.M., who was untying the first applicant, and Ms M.M., who was lying on the floor covered in blood. The intruders had arrived on an APC and in two Gazel vehicles without registration plates. 55.  Kh.M., interviewed as a witness on 17 September 2004, submitted that he had stayed in the applicants' house on the night of 15-16 September 2004. At about 5 a.m. on 16 September 2004 he had been woken up by the dog barking. Shortly after this a group of twenty-five to thirty armed masked men in camouflage uniforms burst into the applicants' property. They tied Kh.M.'s and the first applicant's hands with adhesive tape and put both of them on the floor. Then the intruders took Khamid Mukayev, who was in his underwear, outside. From the neighbours Kh.M. learnt that the intruders had arrived in an APC and two Gazel vehicles. 56.  Z.M., residing at 1, Pervogo Maya Street and interviewed as a witness on an unspecified date in September 2004, stated that at about 5 a.m. on 16 September 2004 she had been woken up by the noise of military vehicles. When she went outside she saw an APC with a large group of armed masked men in camouflage uniforms. Shortly afterwards she heard shouting coming from the applicants' house and subsequently, when she arrived there, she learnt about the killing of Ms M.M. and the abduction of Khamit Mukayev. 57.  On 5 October 2004 the investigator in charge of the case ordered a forensic examination of the three fingerprints taken in Khamid Mukayev's room during the crime scene inspection. On the same date the expert found that the fingerprints collected were not suitable for identification. 58.  On 6 October 2004 the investigation interviewed the first applicant as a witness. She stated that at about 5 a.m. on 16 September 2004 she had been woken up by the barking of her dog. Shortly afterwards a group of armed masked men in camouflage uniforms had burst into the house. Some of the armed men had stayed in the yard. There were in total about twenty‑five to thirty of them. The intruders took Khamid Mukayev outside in his underwear and beat up M. M., who died as a result of the beatings. According to the neighbours, the armed men had arrived in an APC and two Gazel vehicles. They spoke unaccented Russian. 59.  Between 13 October and 28 December 2004 and on 16 November 2006 the investigation interviewed as witnesses thirty residents of Katyr‑Yurt. According to their interview records, those persons submitted that they had learnt from the applicants or from other residents of Katyr‑Yurt that between 4 and 5 a.m. on 16 September 2004 a large group of armed masked men in camouflage uniforms, who had arrived in an APC and Gazel and UAZ vehicles, had burst into the applicants' house, had kidnapped Khamid Mukayev and beaten Ms M.M. to death. 60.  On 14 November 2006 the investigation interviewed M.F., who lived at 26 Pervomayskaya Street, as a witness. She submitted that at about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 she had been woken up by the noise of several vehicles. When she got outside she saw two light-coloured Gazel vehicles without registration plates. M.F. heard a walkie-talkie in one of the vehicles but could not catch what the people were saying over it. A man in a camouflage uniform with a sub-machine gun was standing near the vehicles. Suddenly another armed man in camouflage ran to him and ordered him in Russian to get the vehicles to the applicants' house. When the vehicles arrived there, about ten armed camouflaged men got into them. Shortly thereafter the two vehicles started taking off. They were followed by an APC with several servicemen on it. Once the convoy had left, M.F. ran to the applicants' house, where she was told that the servicemen had taken away Khamid Mukayev and killed Ms M.M. 61.  L.M., interviewed as a witness on 6 November 2006, stated that at about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 he had been woken up by the noise of an APC. He looked out of the window and saw that an APC had entered Katyr-Yurt from the direction of Achkhoy-Martan and that it was in Pervomayskaya Street. 62.  R.A., interviewed as a witness on 7 November 2006, and M.A., interviewed on 17 November 2006, who both lived in Pervomayskaya Street, stated that at about 4 a.m. on 16 September 2004 they had been woken up by the noise of military vehicles and, looking out of their windows, saw an APC near the applicants' house. 63.  According to replies from SIZOs no. 1 of the Chechen Republic and the Dagestan Republic, the Zavodskoy, Leninskiy, Shalinskiy, Achkhoy‑Martanovskiy and Gudermesskiy interdistrict investigating departments and the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy department of the FSB, those State authorities had no information on Khamid Mukayev's eventual arrest or detention, his whereabouts or on any criminal proceedings against him. The above-mentioned documents were dated between 4 and 10 September 2008 and were sent to the investigating authority in case no. 38041 in reply to its requests for information made in September 2008. 64.  The Government submitted that the investigation in case no. 38041 was pending. 65.  On 18 April 2006 the Achkhoy-Martanovskiy District Court granted the second applicant's request and declared Khamid Mukayev a missing person.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Königstein, Germany. 9.  On 23 October 1990 a criminal charge was laid against the applicant, accusing him of tax evasion. On 8 January 1991 the Frankfurt/Main Tax Office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant and informed him accordingly on 10 January 1991. These proceedings were eventually extended to the suspicion of fraud to the detriment of the joint owners of a plot of land and fraudulent breach of trust (Untreue) to the detriment of the city of Königstein by the Frankfurt/Main Public Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant, a civil servant, was subsequently suspended from office, and his salary was reduced. 10.  On 5 March 1991 the competent public prosecutor at Königstein applied for a search warrant concerning the office of a notary at the Königstein District Court. A (modified) search warrant was issued by the Königstein District Court on 24 April 1991 and the warrant was executed on 14 June 1991, when two documents were seized. 11.  Between 23 August 1991 and 26 March 1992 the Public Prosecutor’s Office granted access to the case files to the city of Königstein and the applicant’s counsel. 12.  From 26 March 1992 until 23 November 1992 the investigations were stayed by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in order to await the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings instituted by the city of Königstein against the applicant. The latter proceedings were then themselves stayed awaiting the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 13.  The hearing of the applicant as an accused by the Public Prosecutor’s Office was postponed from 10 February 1993 to 25 June 1993 upon the request of the applicant’s counsel. 14.  On 3 January 1994 the Frankfurt/Main Tax Office, after hearing two witnesses, made their closing comments regarding the investigations against the applicant. On 12 December 1994 the Prosecutor’s Office, after having ordered further investigations by the Frankfurt/Main Tax Office, issued an indictment charging the applicant with fraud, tax evasion and fraudulent breach of trust. 15.  On 10 October 1995, following three hearings in September and October 1995, the Frankfurt/Main District Court convicted the applicant of fraud, fraudulent breach of trust and tax evasion in accordance with the indictment. It sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment. The District Court found that the applicant had, in his position as head of the municipal building office, deceived the joint owners of real estate as to the value of their property in order to induce them to sell it at a low price to a front man (Strohmann) working for him. He had enriched himself by, again via the front man, offering a part of this property to the municipality for an expansion of the local cemetery. The rest of the property had been sold on the open market. 16.  On 20 May 1996 the Frankfurt/Main Regional Court, following the applicant’s appeal and eight trial hearings in April and May 1996, in which some ten witnesses were heard, amended the District Court’s decision to the effect that it convicted the applicant of fraud and tax evasion, whereas it acquitted him of fraudulent breach of trust, and sentenced him to one year and nine months’ imprisonment suspended on probation. In its judgment comprising 30 pages, the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request that an expert opinion be prepared on the actual value of the real estate involved, finding that such an opinion was unnecessary, as the Regional Court itself had sufficient knowledge of the matters before it. 17.  On 21 May 1996 the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and on 23 May 1996, the applicant appealed against this decision on points of law. On 6 December 1996 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal received the case files together with the substantiation of the appeal by the Prosecutor’s Office and the defence counsel. 18.  On 28 November 1997 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal, following a hearing, set aside the Regional Court’s decision. It found that the Regional Court should have ordered that an expert opinion be prepared on the value of the property concerned. The case was remitted to a different chamber of the Frankfurt/Main Regional Court. 19.  On 13 March 1998 the Regional Court ordered that an expert opinion on the value of the real estate concerned be prepared by the architect A. On 1 October 1998 the Regional Court received the expert opinion. On 5 May 1999 the applicant, in the first rehearing by the Frankfurt/Main Regional Court, requested that the proceedings be discontinued on account of their excessive length. 20.  On 15 June 1999 the Frankfurt/Main Regional Court, following nine hearings in May and June 1999, again convicted the applicant of fraud and tax evasion and sentenced him to one year and nine months’ imprisonment suspended on probation. In its judgment comprising 20 pages, it found that the length of proceedings did not warrant their discontinuance, as proceedings dealing with economic or tax-related offences were always time-consuming. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, the Regional Court did not find the phase of preliminary investigations or the overall length of proceedings excessively long, in particular as the applicant had not been detained at any time. It also noted that the applicant had himself prolonged the proceedings by lodging an appeal and insisting on an expert opinion. It found that the loss caused by the applicant’s fraud, following the expert opinion, had to be assessed to be even higher than presumed by the Regional Court in its first judgment on 20 May 1996. Therefore, the Regional Court considered that, despite the time which had elapsed since then, the sentence imposed by the Regional Court in its first judgment was not to be reduced. 21.  On 17 June 1999 the applicant appealed against this judgment on points of law, again requesting that the proceedings be discontinued because of their excessive length. On 18 January 2000 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal received the case files together with the applicant’s substantiation of the appeal and the observations of the Public Prosecutor’s Office. 22.  On 24 March 2000 the Frankfurt/Main Court of Appeal confirmed the Regional Court’s decision and dismissed the applicant’s request to discontinue the proceedings on account of their allegedly excessive length. 23.  On 2 May 2000 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint consisting of eight pages with the Federal Constitutional Court in which he complained about the allegedly excessive length of the proceedings before the German criminal courts, referring in particular to the delays caused by the Prosecutor’s Office and the Frankfurt/Main Regional Court and Court of Appeal. The applicant asserted that due to the delays in the proceedings, he had been suspended from office and his pension benefits had been reduced. He also complained about a loss of reputation. 24.  On 5 June 2000 (decision served on 15 June 2000) the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant’s constitutional complaint. It found that the applicant had failed sufficiently to substantiate his complaint. He failed to produce the written submissions of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to the Court of Appeal, substantiating their appeal on points of law, from which the Federal Constitutional Court could have drawn further conclusions as to whether the applicant had himself sufficiently substantiated his appeal before the Court of Appeal. Furthermore, insofar as the applicant complained about the delays in the proceedings, he had in particular not specified which delays he considered to be attributable to the judicial organs and had not placed such delays in relation to the overall length of the proceedings. The Federal Constitutional Court also found that the applicant had failed to assess the seriousness of the criminal offences concerned, the complexity of the object of the proceedings, and the extent to which he has suffered damage on account of the length of the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Ankara. 6.  On 6 March 2000 the applicant was arrested by the gendarmerie in the border city of Edirne on her return from Bulgaria. She was detained in a gendarmerie station. According to an arrest report prepared by the gendarmerie the same day, the applicant was informed of her right to be represented by a lawyer and to inform her family about her arrest. Nevertheless, it was also stated in the same document that, if the offence in respect of which she was arrested fell within the jurisdiction of State Security Courts, she could consult a lawyer only if her detention period was extended by a judge or if a judge ordered her detention in a prison. The applicant signed the report and wrote on it that she had “no requests”. 7.  The applicant was interrogated during her detention at the gendarmerie station, and an eight-page statement was taken from her between 7 and 9 March 2000. In her statement the applicant admitted to having engaged in activities on behalf of the PKK[1]. 8.  On 9 March 2000 the applicant was examined by a doctor at the Edirne branch of the Forensic Medicine Directorate. According to the medical report drawn up the same day, there were “no injuries or signs of ill-treatment on her body”. 9.  The same day she was brought before the prosecutor and then before the Edirne Magistrates' Court, which ordered her pre-trial detention in prison. In two statements made during meetings with the prosecutor and the judge the applicant admitted to being a member of the PKK. 10.  According to the three statements referred to above, the applicant did not want to be represented by a lawyer during the questioning. 11.  On 3 April 2000 the prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed an indictment against the applicant with that court for the offence of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. The prosecutor, referring to the above-mentioned statements made by the applicant, alleged that the applicant had left Turkey in 1996 and had been taken to the PKK's training camp in Lavrion, Greece, where she had received training. Following her training she had obtained a false German passport in order to enter the Netherlands. During her time in Europe she had engaged in activities on behalf of the PKK in Germany and the Netherlands. 12.  Criminal proceedings against the applicant commenced before the Istanbul State Security Court (hereafter “the trial court”). During the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer. 13.  During the first hearing, which was held on 22 June 2000, the applicant rejected the allegations against her and alleged that, before she was brought before the prosecutor and the judge on 9 March 2000, she had been told by the gendarmes that if she did not accept the accusations before the judge and the prosecutor she would be taken back to the gendarmerie station and tortured again. That had been the reason she had accepted the accusations before the prosecutor and the judge. When asked by the trial court what she had to say about the medical report of 9 March 2000 in which it was stated that her body bore no signs of ill-treatment, the applicant replied that the medical report had been prepared before she was beaten up by gendarme officers and threatened with rape. She also alleged that she had been stripped naked by the gendarmes during her detention. The applicant further informed the trial court that the gendarmes had not asked her whether she wanted to be represented by a lawyer during the questioning. 14.  During the second hearing, which was held on 29 August 2000, the applicant submitted a handwritten letter to the trial court. In the letter she alleged, in particular, that while she was being detained in the gendarmerie station she had been insulted by gendarme officers, blindfolded, beaten up and drenched with water. Before being questioned she had been undressed and “they” had touched various parts of her body. Threats of rape and death, directed at her and her mother, had also been made. 15.  The lawyer representing the applicant told the trial court that his client's questioning had been in breach of the applicable procedure and legislation and, as such, the statements taken from her constituted unlawfully obtained evidence which was not admissible in a court of law. Other than the statements taken from his client by the gendarmerie and then by the prosecutor and the judge on 9 March 2000, there was no evidence against her. The lawyer drew the trial court's attention to a Court of Cassation decision according to which confessions not supported by further evidence were not admissible as evidence. 16.  The lawyer further asked the trial court to hear a “cassette of the questioning” of the applicant which had apparently been mentioned in a document drawn up by the gendarmerie. This request was rejected by the trial court which noted that the cassette was not in its possession. 17.  The lawyer also pointed out that there was no mention of his client's name in the statements taken from E.Ş. who, according to the indictment, had helped his client to go to Greece. 18.  On 9 October 2001 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. In convicting the applicant the trial court had regard to the statements taken from her at the gendarmerie station and then by the prosecutor and the judge on 9 March 2000, as well as to the statements made by E.Ş. in the course of his trial in 1998. 19.  The applicant appealed against her conviction and argued, in particular, that the decision of the trial court had not been adequately reasoned. In the grounds of appeal the applicant's lawyer also repeated his earlier defence submissions concerning the allegedly unlawful nature of the evidence used in convicting his client, and referred to various Articles of the Convention. 20.  On 8 July 2002 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant's conviction. 21.  At the time notice of the application was given to the respondent Government, the Government were requested to submit to the Court a copy of the “cassette of questioning” referred to above (see paragraph 16 above). It appears from the documents submitted to the Court by the applicant that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested the Ministry of Justice to obtain the cassette so that it could be submitted to the Court. The gendarmerie, who were requested by the domestic judicial authorities to produce the cassette, stated in their letter of 21 May 2008 that they had “no records of the cassette being handed over to the Edirne prosecutor”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Białystok, Poland. 5.  In 1940 the applicant's father had been arrested by NKVD (Soviet People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and was sent with his family to Kazakhstan. The applicant's mother died in 1940 and her father died in London in 1967. In 1946 the applicant and her siblings returned to Poland. 6.  On 6 October 1948 the property belonging to the applicant's parents was taken over by the State. 7.  In 1990 the applicant and her sister were designated jointly as their father's heirs. 8.  On 29 November 2001 the applicant applied to the Podlaski Governor (Wojewoda Podlaski) to have the 1948 decision annulled and her parents' property returned to her. The case was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture for consideration. 9.  Subsequently, the applicant wrote to the Minister and other authorities complaining that the property had not been returned to her. 10.  On 28 November 2003 she complained to the Minister about his inactivity. As she received no reply to her complaint, on 5 December 2003 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, lodged a complaint about the Minister's inactivity with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny). 11.  Following her complaint, on 5 January 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court requested the Minister to provide it with the case file within thirty days. It appears that the Minister did not comply with this order. However, the Minister started examining the merits of the applicant's case and made several requests to various authorities asking them for documents. 12.  On 20 May 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny), to which the case was transferred, informed the applicant that despite its repeated requests the Minister had not complied with the order to provide the case file. The applicant was advised that she could therefore apply for a fine to be imposed on the Minister. 13.  On 4 June 2004 the Minister gave a decision in which he stayed the proceedings. The applicant lodged an appeal in which she asked for the decision to be reconsidered and the proceedings to be resumed. 14.  On 23 June 2004 the applicant followed the Regional Administrative Court's advice and applied to have a fine imposed on the Minister. 15.  On 3 August 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's complaint about the Minister's inactivity. The court found that since the Minister had stayed the proceedings the inactivity had ceased to exist. The applicant's lawyer lodged a cassation appeal against this decision with the Supreme Administrative Court. However, it was rejected on 8 October 2004 as the applicant's lawyer failed to pay court fees for the appeal. 16.  After the decision of 3 August 2004, the applicant withdrew her application for the imposition of a fine, and on 17 September 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court discontinued the relevant proceedings. 17.  On 6 April 2005 the Minister resumed the proceedings. 18.  On 18 November 2005 the Minister of Agriculture gave a decision. He annulled the 1948 decision and returned a part of the property to the applicant. 19.  On 7 December 2005 the Doroszki Agriculture Co-operative, which has been using the land in question, joined the proceedings as a party and lodged an appeal against the decision. 20.  On 22 May 2006 the Minister upheld its decision of 18 November 2005. The Doroszki Agriculture Co-operative lodged an appeal against the decision. 21.  On 11 October 2006 the Regional Administrative Court gave a judgment. It quashed the impugned decision of 22 May 2006 finding that the co-operative had no standing in the proceedings. The Doroszki Agriculture Co-operative appealed. 22.  The proceedings are pending before the Supreme Administrative Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Gorlice. 5.  The applicant served in the army between 1988 and 1989 and was dismissed due to his health problems. He maintained that his physical and mental health problems resulted from his military service. 6.  On 27 December 1995 he applied for a military disability pension. On 8 February 1996 the Social Insurance Authority refused to grant his request. On 20 February 1996 the applicant appealed against this decision to the Kraków Regional Court. 7.  On 19 March 1996 the Regional Court requested an expert opinion concerning the applicant’s health. On 8 May 1996 the expert submitted his opinion. Subsequently, the court requested that two additional medical opinions be prepared. 8.  On 14 June 1996 the applicant’s lawyer requested the court to admit another expert opinion. 9.  On 25 June 1996 another expert submitted her opinion to the court. 10.  On 24 July 1996 the Regional Court forwarded two expert opinions to the applicant for comment. The applicant’s lawyer submitted his observations on 14 August 1996. 11.  On 20 August 1996 the Regional Court held a hearing. The applicant submitted documentation on his medical treatment, which was subsequently forwarded to the medical experts. On 24 September 1996 and 5 November 1996 two experts submitted their supplementary opinions. 12. On 2 December 1996 a hearing was held. 13. On 18 December 1996 the applicant’s lawyer challenged the experts’ opinions and demanded a new opinion to be prepared by the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Krakow. 14.  On 22 January 1997 the Regional Court requested that the applicant be examined by specialists in laryngology, neuropsychiatry and internal medicine of the Institute of Forensic Medicine in Krakow. 15.  On 14 July 1997 the court requested the Institute to accelerate the preparation of their opinion and to return the applicant’s medical records to the court. On 8 August 1997 the Institute of Forensic Medicine submitted their opinion. 16.  On 14 August 1997 the court forwarded the opinion to the applicant’s lawyer for comment. 17.  On 22 September 1997 the applicant’s lawyer requested the court to extend the time-limit for submitting his observations due to his illness. 18.  On 2 October 1997 a hearing was held. 19.  On 18 October 1997 the applicant challenged the expert opinion of 8 August 1997 and requested an additional medical examination. He also submitted an opinion prepared by a privately commissioned expert. The court refused to admit this opinion as evidence in the case. 20.  On 25 November 1997 the Institute of Forensic Medicine submitted a supplementary opinion in which they maintained their previous conclusions. On 9 January 1998 the applicant’s lawyer requested the court to extend the time-limit for submitting his observations as the applicant was to undergo another examination. 21.  A hearing was held on 16 February 1998. 22.  On 20 February 1998 the applicant challenged the presiding judge. The court rejected his motion on 10 March 1998. 23.  On 23 February 1998 the applicant informed the court that he had revoked his lawyer’s power of attorney as he could no longer afford private legal representation. 24.  On 18 May 1998 applicant requested that the hearing scheduled for 28 May 1998 be adjourned because of his medical examination planned for that day. On 28 May 1998 the court adjourned the hearing until 26 June 1998. 25.  On 10 June 1998 the Nowy Sącz Regional Court requested the Kraków Regional Court for the case file of the proceedings as its examination was necessary to conduct proceedings for compensation against the State Treasury instituted by the applicant and pending at that time before the Nowy Sącz Regional Court. 26.  On 16 June 1996 the Kraków Regional Court rejected the request because the next hearing in the case would be held very shortly. 27.  On 26 June 1998 the Regional Court held a hearing and delivered a judgment, dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of the Social Insurance Authority of 8 February 1996. 28.  On 31 August 1998 the applicant appealed against the judgment. 29.  The Regional Court in Krakow transferred the case file to the Krakow Court of Appeal on 21 September 1998. 30.  Between 10 and 23 March 1999 the case file was forwarded to the Przemysl District Court before which another of the applicant’s claims for compensation was pending at that time 31.  On 14 April 1999 the applicant requested the Court of Appeal to accelerate the examination of his appeal. On 20 April 1999 the President of the court replied that since his case concerned pension matters, the hearing would be scheduled sooner than would normally have been the case. 32.  On 8 June 1999 the Kraków Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 28 July 1999 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 33.  On 19 April 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed his cassation appeal as being ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Bratislava. 6.  On 9 May 2007 the applicant lodged an action with the Bratislava V District Court (Okresný súd) seeking a ruling declaring that a meeting of flat owners in a block of flats held on 24 April 2007 was contrary to the law, and that the decisions adopted at that meeting were void.\nThe defendant of the action was an entity with legal personality referred to as a community of owners of residential and non-residential premises in the given building (“the defendant”). Such entities are officially registered with the local District Authority (obvodný úrad). The defendant was so registered with the District Authority in Bratislava. 7.  On 2 January 2008 a submission was made to the District Court by a lawyer indicating that he was acting on behalf of the defendant and informing the court that on 14 December 2007 the defendant had ceased legally to exist. In that connection he submitted a letter from the District Authority which indicated that the defendant had been struck out of the relevant register on that date, the context being that the administration of the building was no longer the responsibility of the defendant and that that responsibility had been transferred to a specialised agency. 8.  On 24 January 2008 the applicant requested that a hearing scheduled before the District Court for 28 January 2008 be postponed sine die. She submitted that she had just learned of the striking out of the defendant by consulting the relevant register, and that she would make a further submission once she had analysed the situation, for which she needed time. The hearing scheduled for 28 January 2008 was accordingly adjourned. 9.  On 3 March 2008 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, on the grounds that the defendant had ceased to exist and had no legal successor. In particular, the District Court held that neither the individual owners of the flats in the building nor the newly contracted administration agency could be considered as having succeeded to the defendant’s position in the proceedings. 10.  On 20 March 2008 the applicant appealed (odvolanie), raising two principal arguments.\nFirst, she submitted that the administration agency was the successor to the original defendant, and that consequently the proceedings should have continued against it.\nSecond, even assuming that the first contention was not correct, the court should not have terminated the proceedings but should rather have stayed them pending the outcome of another set of proceedings before the same District Court, in which a decision was being contested which had been taken at another meeting of the flat owners on 11 September 2007, to the effect that the defendant should be wound up (zrušenie). If that other set of proceedings ended with a ruling declaring the winding up of the original defendant void, its striking out of the given register would lose basis and the proceedings could continue against that defendant. More details about those other proceedings are set out below (see paragraphs 18 et seq.). 11.  On 30 May 2008 the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the first-instance decision, noting that the defendant had been struck out of the relevant register and had thereby lost capacity to be a party to the proceedings, in which situation there was no alternative to a discontinuance of the proceedings. The relevant legal provisions were referred to, but no reasons were offered for the latter conclusion. 12.  On 7 July 2008 the applicant appealed on points of law (dovolanie), relying on Article 237 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended) (“the CCP”), under which such an appeal was admissible if the courts had prevented a party to the proceedings from pursuing a case before them. In particular, she argued that the Regional Court had provided neither any factual nor legal grounds for its conclusion, as a result of which it was not amenable to review. In addition, she pursued and further developed the same line of argument as in her appeal. 13.  On 7 May 2009 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible, holding that the shortcomings alleged by the applicant did not fall within the purview of Article 237 (f) of the CCP. This applied specifically to the alleged deficiency in the Regional Court’s reasoning and the alleged errors of fact and law in the lower courts’ decisions.\nIn addition, in so far as the applicant had contested an error of procedure in that the courts had failed to stay the proceedings rather than to terminate them, the Supreme Court held that staying the proceedings was an option and not a duty of the court concerned, and that the fact that the present proceedings had not been stayed did not make out the admissibility ground cited by the applicant.\nAs the appeal was not admissible, the Supreme Court did not examine the merits of the case. 14.  On 17 August 2009 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). She directed the complaint against all three levels of the ordinary courts and pursued and further developed in principle the arguments described above.\nShe considered that the discontinuance of the proceedings had been unlawful, submitted that it had been a mistake of the ordinary courts not to have examined the merits of her claim, and argued that this had amounted to a breach of her rights of access to court and to a fair hearing under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 15.  On 16 December 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It considered it separately with reference to the individual levels of ordinary jurisdiction involved.\nAs regards the alleged shortcomings in the proceedings leading to the Regional Court’s decision of 30 May 2008, it held that the applicant had failed to submit her complaint within the statutory time-limit of two months.\nAs regards the Supreme Court, it observed that the central argument in the applicant’s appeal on points of law was the alleged error of law. In that regard, it went on to hold, inter alia, that:\n“The Supreme Court ... rightfully emphasised ... that, as there were no grounds on which the applicant’s appeal on points of law would be admissible, it was not possible for it to review the merits of the Regional Court’s decision. The Supreme Court did not exclude in a binding manner that the decision of the Regional Court was the result of a wrongful legal assessment of the matter, nor did it exclude the possibility of there having been another error in the proceedings before it which had resulted in a wrongful decision on the merits.” 16.  Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court found that, as regards the admissibility of the applicant’s appeal, the Supreme Court had given relevant reasons for its decision and that that decision was not arbitrary.\nIn particular, it also noted that, should the other set of proceedings end with a ruling declaring the winding up of the defendant void, this would create for the applicant the opportunity to seek reopening of the proceedings in her case. Future examination of that case on the merits thus could not be completely excluded. However, at the same time, the Constitutional Court noted that even if the winding up of the defendant were to be declared void, this would not automatically mean that the defendant would legally come into existence once more. The coming into being of a legal entity such as the defendant required incorporation, which in turn necessitated a decision of the District Authority, and could not result directly from a judicial decision. 17.  The Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant on 5 February 2010. 18.  On 26 September 2007 an individual brought proceedings against the above-mentioned defendant as well as the above-mentioned newly appointed management agency, seeking a ruling declaring void a decision to wind up the defendant taken at a meeting of flat owners in the block held on 11 September 2007 (see paragraph 10 above). 19.  After the first dismissal of the action was quashed following the claimant’s appeal, the action was again dismissed by the District Court on 4 April 2012 and, following the claimant’s appeal, by the Regional Court on 19 March 2014. 20.  On 14 July 2014 the claimant challenged the judgments last mentioned by way of a complaint to the Constitutional Court.\nThe complaint appears to be still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1957, 1966, 1962 and 1957 respectively and live in Baku. 6.  The first applicant, Mr Panah Huseyn (also sometimes referred to as Panah Huseynov), was a prominent member of the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan. The second applicant, Mr Rauf Abbasov (commonly known as Rauf Arifoglu), was a prominent member of the Müsavat Party and the editor-in-chief of the opposition-oriented newspaper Yeni Müsavat. The third applicant, Mr Arif Hajili, was a deputy chairman of the Müsavat Party. The fourth applicant, Mr Sardar Mammadov (commonly known as Sardar Jalaloglu), was a deputy chairman of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. 7.  The respective political forces with which the applicants were affiliated were founders of the election coalition Bizim Azerbaijan, formed with the aim of supporting the main opposition candidate, Mr Isa Gambar, the chairman of the Müsavat Party, in the presidential elections of 15 October 2003. 8.  Mr Gambar lost the elections of 15 October 2003. 9.  On the evening of election day a group of opposition supporters gathered in front of the Müsavat Party’s headquarters in the centre of Baku, claiming victory for their candidate in the election. At that time there were some violent altercations between opposition supporters and the security forces. 10.  At around 2 p.m. on 16 October a number of opposition supporters started gathering near the State Carpet Museum, in the centre of Baku, to protest against the election results. The crowd then started moving towards Azadliq Square, the main square in the city. It was reported that, on the way, some people in the crowd began damaging cars, buildings, benches and other urban constructions. It was also claimed that the organisers of this unauthorised demonstration and certain leaders of the opposition parties were inciting their followers to violence. 11.  It has been claimed that some police officers who had been deployed at Azadliq Square were attacked by some of the demonstrators. Shortly thereafter large numbers of riot police and military personnel, fully equipped with helmets, shields and truncheons, arrived in the square with the aim of dispersing the demonstration. The situation quickly escalated into public disorder and violent clashes occurred between the crowd and the police. It was widely reported that the authorities used excessive force indiscriminately against anyone who happened to be in the area in question. 12.  The applicants, among other persons, were considered by the State authorities to be the organisers of the demonstration. At around 2.30 p.m. all of the applicants, except Mr Mammadov, had appeared on a tribune in Azadliq Square. Mr Hajili gave a speech to the people gathered in the square, while the two other applicants did not. Mr Mammadov was in the headquarters of his political party at that time and, according to his own statements, was unable to go to Azadliq Square (although he wished to do so), because the exits from the headquarters were reportedly blocked by State security forces. 13.  At around 6 p.m. the demonstration was completely dispersed. Several hundred people were arrested during the events of 16 October and in their aftermath. 14.  On 16 October 2003 the Prosecutor General’s Office instituted criminal proceedings (case no. 80308) concerning the events of 15 and 16 October 2003. More than a hundred persons arrested in connection with those events were eventually prosecuted in the context of those proceedings. The proceedings concerned only the actions of the organisers of the demonstration and those participating in it, and it appears that no criminal or other form of investigation was carried out in connection with the allegations of excessive use of force by the police and military units during the dispersal of the demonstration (see Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no. 22684/05, §§ 23 and 114, 2 April 2009). 15.  In the context of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings, on the dates specified below all of the applicants were arrested and charged with criminal offences. 16.  The first applicant, Mr Panah Huseyn, was arrested at his home on 18 October 2003 by a number of police officers of the Organised Crime Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the OCD”). He was taken to the OCD’s detention facility. 17.  According to the second applicant, Mr Rauf Abbasov, on 17 October 2003 several police officers in plain clothes unsuccessfully attempted to arrest him. Thereafter, in order to avoid being arrested, the applicant sought refuge in the Norwegian Embassy until 21 October 2003. He left the Embassy after he received assurances from the police that he would not be arrested. However, on 27 October 2003 he was arrested and taken to Detention Facility no. 1. 18.  As for the third applicant, Mr Arif Hajili, on 21 October 2003 the Nasimi District Court remanded him in custody, on the basis of a request by the Prosecutor General’s Office. The applicant was not present personally and was not represented at that hearing. On 24 October 2003 he was arrested pursuant to the detention order. 19.  The fourth applicant, Mr Sardar Mammadov, was arrested at his home on 18 October 2003 and taken to the OCD (see Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 34445/04, §§ 6-14, 11 January 2007, for a more detailed description of the circumstances of the fourth applicant’s arrest and detention). 20.  Following their arrests, the first, third and fourth applicants were not given immediate access to a lawyer (see section B.4 below). 21.  All of the applicants were formally charged with offences of “organising public disorder” and “use of violence against State officials” under Articles 32.2, 220.1 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code. On the basis of relevant requests by the Prosecutor General’s Office, all of them were remanded in custody pursuant to a court order, with their detention subsequently being extended until the trial. 22.  The first applicant was kept in the OCD’s detention facility until 22 October 2003. Thereafter, he was transferred to another detention facility. According to him, during the five days of his detention in the OCD he was repeatedly ill-treated. He was also informed that several of his relatives, including his brother, had been detained. He was not allowed access to a lawyer until 23 October 2003 (see below). After his transfer to another detention facility, for an unspecified period of time he was kept in solitary confinement and was not allowed to possess writing accessories, books, a radio or newspapers. 23.  In February 2004 the first applicant, together with several other detained persons (none of whom are applicants in the present case), lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office, alleging that they had been ill-treated during the first few days of their detention and seeking to have criminal proceedings opened against the perpetrators. On 14 February 2004 their complaint was rejected as unsubstantiated. In particular, in respect of the first applicant, it was noted that he had not made any allegations of ill-treatment in the immediate aftermath of his initial questioning, that the various allegations he had made at different times had been inconsistent, and that, when given the opportunity to undergo an examination by a forensic expert, he had refused to do so, stating that there were no injuries on his person. It was concluded that no evidence of ill‑treatment had been produced. 24.  During the trial proceedings (described in section C. below), the first applicant complained before the trial court that he had been tortured in the OCD. Responding to a number of specific questions put to him in connection with his allegations, he mentioned that he had been handcuffed and punched in his chest and kidneys and that it had been hinted to him that his son would be ill-treated, but he expressly refused to provide any further details of the alleged torture, stating generally that he had “never seen such cruelty”. He also refused to mention any names of the alleged perpetrators because “they were not important people”, and instead accused the President, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Head of the Presidential Administration of “making orders” to ill-treat him. He also mentioned that, from what he had heard, many other people had also been ill-treated. It appears that the trial court dismissed his complaints of ill-treatment as unsubstantiated. 25.  According to the second applicant, during the first thirty-six days of his detention in Detention Facility no. 1, he was held in a single cell and was not given access to writing materials, books, newspapers or a radio. 26.  The fourth applicant’s ill-treatment was the subject of an earlier case examined by the Court (see Mammadov, cited above). 3.  Pre-trial investigation, severing the applicants’ case from criminal case no. 80308, and completion of the pre-trial investigation 27.  Throughout the period from the beginning of the criminal proceedings until 1 March 2004, the investigation into the accusations against the applicants, as well as other accused persons, was carried out within the framework of criminal case no. 80308. 28.  On 1 March 2004 the head of the investigation team issued a decision severing a new criminal case (no. 80365) from criminal case no. 80308. The new case concerned seven accused persons in total, including the four applicants and Mr I. Agazade, Mr I. Ibrahimov and Mr E. Asadov. The following reasons were given for the decision:\n“The investigation has gathered sufficient evidence to prove the named persons guilty of having committed the offences with which they are charged. The criminal prosecution in respect of the other accused persons is continuing ...\nThe especially large volume of material in the case file and the large number of incidents comprising the case would make it necessary to prolong the pre-trial investigation and pre-trial detention. This would create difficulties in ensuring the rights and lawful interests of the accused persons in respect of whom sufficient evidence has been obtained and, at the same time, would result in an unacceptable delay in referring the case to the trial court.\nAccordingly ... it is appropriate to sever a new criminal case from criminal case no. 80308 ..., to complete the pre-trial investigation in respect of the severed case and to refer it to the trial court.” 29.  It appears that the pre-trial investigation in respect of criminal case no. 80365 was formally declared completed on the same day, 1 March 2004. 4.  Legal representation of the applicants throughout the proceedings, and their lawyers’ access to the investigation file upon completion of the pre-trial investigation 30.  Below is the information on the legal assistance received by the applicants, the lawyers who represented them, and the circumstances in which they were given access to the investigation file after completion of the pre-trial investigation and before the trial proceedings, inasmuch as this can be discerned from the material available in the case file.\n(a)  The first applicant 31.  Following his arrest on 18 October 2003, the first applicant, Mr Huseyn, was not allowed access to a lawyer until 23 October 2003. From that date on, he was represented by Mr M. Hadi. 32.  Following the completion of the pre-trial investigation on 1 March 2004, the applicant and his lawyer, Mr Hadi, were given access to the prosecution’s case file and on 6 April and 15 April 2004, respectively, they signed a record on familiarisation with the material in the case file. According to the applicant, his lawyer was granted access to the entire case file for only one working day. 33.  Subsequently, starting from an unspecified date during the trial, Mr Huseyn was also represented by another lawyer, Mr S. Panahov.\n(b)  The second applicant 34.  After his arrest, the second applicant, Mr Abbasov, was represented by a State-appointed lawyer. The lawyer was subsequently replaced by three lawyers whom the applicant retained in October and November 2003. One of these lawyers was Mr T. Karim. 35.  It appears that, following the termination of the pre-trial investigation, Mr Karim was given access to the case file and signed a record on familiarisation with the material in the file, dated 15 April 2004. Mr Abbasov himself was also given access to the case file. According to him, he was given less than 100 hours to study the file, which was insufficient to become fully familiar with all the evidence, consisting of twenty-two volumes of documents (amounting to more than 6,200 pages) and twenty-two video cassettes (each containing about two and a half hours of video material). 36.  On 27 May 2004, at one of the preliminary hearings in the Assize Court, which had commenced on 7 May 2004 (see paragraph 44 below), Mr Abbasov lodged an application refusing the services of all three lawyers representing him on the ground that these lawyers had not been able to defend him adequately. He requested leave to defend himself in person but, according to the Government, subsequently asked for a new lawyer. On 4 June 2004 the Assize Court accepted the application and decided that the applicant should be provided with a new State-appointed lawyer. The lawyer, Mr S. Panahov, was appointed at some date around 8 June 2004. During the trial, another lawyer, Mr E. Guliyev, was retained by the applicant.\n(c)  The third applicant 37.  Following his arrest on 24 October 2003, the third applicant, Mr Hajili, was not allowed access to a lawyer until 27 October 2003. From this date on, it appears that he was represented by a number of lawyers throughout the proceedings. 38.  Following the completion of the pre-trial investigation on 1 March 2004, the applicant and several of his lawyers (Mr M. Shahmarov, Mr N. Safarov, Mr M. Hadi and Mr O. Kazimov) were given access to the prosecution’s case file. On 6 April the applicant, and on 15, 16 and 17 April 2004 each of the lawyers, signed a separate record on familiarisation with the material in the case file.\n(d)  The fourth applicant 39.  Mr V. Khasayev was appointed as Mr Mammadov’s lawyer on 18 October 2003. 40.  On 21 October 2003 Mr Khasayev complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office, by telegram, that he had not been allowed to meet the applicant. Eventually, he was able to meet the applicant for the first time on 22 October 2003. 41.  There is no information in the case file as to whether Mr Khasayev or the applicant were given access to the prosecution’s case file following the completion of the pre-trial investigation. 42.  As noted above, more than one hundred persons were prosecuted, in the framework of criminal case no. 80308, for their involvement in the events of 15 and 16 October 2003. Subsequently, this case was split, dividing the accused persons into fifteen separate groups (one of which groups comprised the newly severed criminal case no. 80365 concerning the applicants), and each group was tried separately. The first fourteen trials concerned the cases of those who were accused of participating in mass disorder and use of violence against officials. All those trials were conducted by either the Assize Court or the Sabail District Court and were completed in March and April 2004. All the defendants in those trials were found guilty and were sentenced to either imprisonment, suspended periods of imprisonment or restriction of liberty. 43.  The fifteenth and last trial in criminal case no. 80365 concerned the persons who were accused of organising the mass disorder, including the four applicants in the present case. This trial took place after the first fourteen trials. 44.  The trial was conducted by the Assize Court. It commenced with several preliminary hearings, the first of which took place on 7 May 2004.  The three-judge panel hearing the case was composed of Judges M. Ibayev (presiding), S. Aleskerov and J. Jumaliyev. 45.  During a preliminary hearing on 12 May 2004, the applicants’ lawyers complained to the Assize Court about an alleged danger to their personal safety, notifying the court about an incident which had taken place after the preliminary hearing of 7 May 2004. According to the lawyers, six of them had been harassed and assaulted by a number of police officers outside the courthouse when they were giving an interview to a television journalist. To support this allegation, two of the lawyers produced some items of clothing damaged during the altercation and photographs depicting the incident. They characterised the alleged incident as a form of undue pressure put on them by the authorities and asked the court to take measures to ensure their personal safety. The presiding judge replied that the court could not be concerned with any incidents taking place outside its courtroom and that the lawyers should use the relevant avenues of redress if they wished to complain about any alleged harassment outside the court hearings. The court nevertheless decided to notify “the relevant authorities” about the lawyers’ allegation. However, from the material available in the case file, it is unclear which specific steps were taken by the court in this regard. 46.  Furthermore, the first applicant, Mr Huseyn, lodged an application objecting to the participation in the trial of one of the Assize Court’s judges, Judge Ibayev, noting that the judge’s son worked at the Prosecutor General’s Office and was subordinate to the head of the investigation team dealing with his case. The other defendants joined the application. On 24 June 2004 the Assize Court rejected the application, finding that, although Judge Ibayev’s son indeed worked at the Prosecutor General’s Office, he had never been personally involved in the applicants’ case. 47.  Subsequently, the first applicant, joined by other defendants, also objected to the participation in the trial of Judge Aleskerov. They pointed out that Judge Aleskerov was the brother of Mr N. Aleskerov, an investigator from the Prosecutor General’s Office who, during the period from 19 October 2003 to 26 January 2004, had been a member of the investigation team dealing with the applicants’ case. The first applicant argued that, owing to Judge Aleskerov’s brother’s direct involvement in the case, he would not be able to hear the case as an impartial judge. On 28 June 2004 the Assize Court rejected that application, noting that Mr N. Aleskerov had indeed been one of the forty-three members of the investigation team working on criminal case no. 80308. However, he had been removed from the team on 26 January 2004. Subsequently, after the new case no. 80365 (concerning the applicants) had been severed from case no. 80308, Mr N. Aleskerov had not been included in the investigation team dealing with this new case. For these reasons, the Assize Court concluded that claims concerning the lack of impartiality of Judge Aleskerov could not be objectively justified. 48.  Throughout the trial in the Assize Court, the applicants lodged a number of other applications. According to them, the court’s interim decisions rejecting those applications were either not given to them or were made available to them only after significant delays. Moreover, the applicants requested permission to verify the transcripts of court hearings after each hearing in order to be able to comment on alleged irregularities and “falsifications” contained in them. However, they were given access to the transcripts only at the very end of the trial. 49.  During the course of the trial, the Assize Court examined large volumes of testimonial evidence, as well as video recordings and other materials. Below is a brief summary of the evidence heard and the manner in which it was ultimately assessed in the Assize Court’s judgment.\n(a)  Witnesses for the prosecution 50.  The majority of prosecution witnesses were police officers deployed at Azadliq Square on 16 October 2003. The investigation also produced records of pre-trial questioning of some of the persons who had been convicted at earlier trials in connection with the events of 15 and 16 October 2003, and a number of other civilian witnesses.\n(i)  Evidence concerning the events of 15 and 16 October 2003 in general, which did not directly implicate the applicants 51.  It appears that the absolute majority of prosecution witnesses were called to merely provide a general description of the events of 15 and 16 October 2003 in order to establish the fact of public disorder. Their testimonies were aimed at showing that the demonstrators had collected clubs, stones and other objects from the headquarters of the Müsavat Party and other opposition parties, that they had used these objects as weapons against the police and military forces and that they had damaged a variety of public and private property. These witness testimonies did not directly mention the applicants as either organisers of or participants in those violent actions. In addition, the prosecution produced some expert evaluations of various forms of damage to private and public property.\n(ii)  Statements by police officers directly implicating the applicants 52.  As to the applicants’ specific role in the events of 16 October, in order to establish that they had directed and incited the demonstrators’ violent actions, the prosecution produced pre-trial depositions of several police officers who had specifically described, inter alia, how they had seen the applicants arriving at Azadliq Square on 16 October 2003, publicly proclaiming the election victory of I. Gambar and inciting the demonstrators to violence from the tribune in the square. 53.  Prior to the scheduled examination of these witnesses, on 5 August 2004 the first applicant, joined by all the other defendants, complained that the pre-trial depositions of some of those witnesses had been identical word for word and asked for this evidence to be excluded. He pointed out that, according to the relevant records, some of these depositions had been taken by the same investigator at the same time on the same day. He argued that this was either physically impossible or in breach of Article 230 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which required that witnesses be questioned separately, and that, in either case, this evidence should not be admitted. It is not clear whether the Assize Court ever gave any decision concerning this objection, but it admitted the relevant depositions as evidence. 54.  At the trial hearings, each of the police officers concerned testified separately and was cross-examined by the applicants and their lawyers. In particular, police officer V.N. stated, inter alia, that when the public disturbance had started at Azadliq Square, some of the defendants, including the second and third applicants, had been inciting the crowd to violence and making such declarations as “Isa [Gambar] has been elected President, we are now in power, do not be afraid of anyone, soon we will overtake the entire city, resist anyone who confronts you...”. 55.  From the record of the court hearings, it appears that, during the cross-examination, the defence were able to reveal a number of alleged inconsistencies between the accounts given by V.N. during the hearing and in his pre-trial deposition (concerning such specific details of his testimony as, for example, whether he had actually seen any of the defendants appear on the tribune or not, or whether any of the defendants had actually used any phrases such as “Beat the police!”). The defence read out V.N.’s pre‑trial deposition at the hearing with the aim of pointing out these alleged inconsistencies. Likewise, according to the defence, cross-examination of most of the other witnesses of this type revealed alleged inconsistencies between their statements at the trial and in their pre-trial depositions. As appears from the transcript of the trial hearings, when confronted with these alleged inconsistencies, some of the witnesses stated that their pre-trial statements had not been properly recorded, while others reverted back to their pre-trial statements and retracted any inconsistent statements which they had made during the hearing prior to cross-examination. 56.  It appears from the transcript of the court hearings that more than ten witnesses of this type were heard. In its judgment of 22 October 2004 the Assize Court separately summarised the testimonies of six of those witnesses and relied on them as proving the applicants’ guilt. The judgment addressed neither the objections raised by the applicants as to the admissibility of these witness testimonies, nor any objections concerning the inconsistencies allegedly revealed in their testimonies during cross‑examination by the defence.\n(iii)  Statements by previously convicted participants in the demonstration directly implicating the applicants 57.  The prosecution also relied on testimony obtained during pre-trial questioning from a number of other persons convicted in connection with the events of 15 and 16 October. These persons had already been convicted at first-instance trials conducted by the Assize Court in March 2005. Inasmuch as this can be discerned from the Assize Court’s judgment of 22 October 2004 in the applicants’ case, the court relied on testimonies of five witnesses of this type. 58.  According to the records produced by the prosecution, in the course of questioning as accused persons at the pre-trial investigation stage of criminal case no. 80308, these persons had described, in various degrees of detail, that they had witnessed the applicants at Azadliq Square inciting the demonstrators to violent resistance during the events of 16 October 2003. 59.  During the trial hearings, these witnesses were called to be questioned about their pre-trial statements. According to the relevant trial transcripts and the Assize Court’s judgment of 22 October 2004, having taken to the witness stand at the oral hearings, four of these witnesses openly retracted their pre-trial statements against the applicants, noting that they had been forced to make those statements under torture, ill-treatment and other forms of duress applied to them during their pre-trial detention. 60.  In reply to these allegations, the Assize Court noted that the witnesses’ complaints of ill-treatment had been addressed at their own respective trials and had been found to be unsubstantiated. The court found that, since these witnesses’ statements had already been relied on as sound evidence at those trials, the assessment of this evidence was a “res judicata matter”. In such circumstances, the court decided to accept these witnesses’ pre-trial statements as good evidence, and refused to attach weight to the fact that the witnesses had subsequently retracted them at their own trials and at the applicants’ trial.\n(iv)  Statements by other witnesses directly implicating the applicants 61.  The prosecution also submitted depositions of several other civilian witnesses who had not been convicted in connection with the events of 16 October 2003. According to the records produced by the prosecution, during the pre-trial investigation these witnesses had made statements similar to those made by the witnesses mentioned above. However, again, during the questioning at the public hearing, at least three of those witnesses retracted their earlier statements and claimed that they had been forced to make them under threat of ill-treatment or by means of actual ill-treatment. 62.  According to the trial transcript, witness N.N. noted that he had been detained for a period of several days after the events of 16 October 2003 and, during that time, had been coerced into giving false testimony against the defendants (mostly against the second applicant). He noted that he had been threatened with prosecution and imprisonment for participating in the events of 16 October 2003, had been refused any water during his questioning and had otherwise been intimidated with the purpose of making him sign a pre-printed witness statement prepared by an investigator. 63.  In order to assess the allegations of ill-treatment made by these witnesses, the Assize Court heard evidence from investigators and police officers who had questioned them. They stated that they had not ill-treated these witnesses during pre-trial questioning. Furthermore, the court noted that the witnesses’ pre-trial statements were corroborated by other evidence. On that basis, the court found that the allegations of ill-treatment were unfounded and that, therefore, the statements contained in the pre-trial depositions of these witnesses should be accepted and relied on as evidence incriminating the applicants.\n(b)  Witnesses for the defence 64.  The Assize Court partially granted the applicants’ requests to obtain the attendance of witnesses prepared to testify on their behalf. From the judgment, it appears that more than twenty such witnesses testified. Most of these witnesses were the applicants’ political companions or other persons affiliated with their political parties. 65.  In its judgment, the Assize Court summarised all of these persons’ testimonies noting that all of them denied that the applicants had carried out the specific acts attributed to them, such as planning any violent actions in advance, verbally inciting the crowd to violence or organising the distribution of clubs and stones to demonstrators. It further noted that the witnesses had insisted that, on the contrary, the police had used excessive violence against the demonstrators and that, in their speeches, the applicants had called the demonstrators to refrain from attacking the police and responding to any provocation. 66.  The Assize Court then went on to dismiss these testimonies as unreliable, using the following reasoning:\n“Having examined the testimonies of these witnesses heard at the request of [the defendants], the court established that, as indicated above, these persons were members or employees of the [political] parties headed by the defendants and, as they worked with [the defendants], they were persons subordinate to and associated with [the defendants]. Some of their statements were even contradictory. In particular, while replying to the questions, [N.H.] stated, on the one hand, that the people speaking from the tribune had not been inciting people to violence and, on the other hand, that he had not heard the speeches as he had been standing 70-100 metres away from the tribune and had not been able to even see who had been speaking. [N.Y.] stated that she had been at the square by herself, while [E.P.] stated that [N.Y.] had been there with him.\nMoreover, the circumstances described by them have been refuted by the above-mentioned comprehensive, reliable and mutually corroborative evidence consisting of testimonies of victims and witnesses, video recordings, material evidence and court judgments in force. Therefore, the court considers that [the defence witnesses’] testimonies are groundless.”\n(c)  Other evidence 67.  In addition, a number of videos depicting the events of 16 October 2003 were viewed during the court hearings. 68.  The videos submitted by the prosecution were intended to show the allegedly violent actions of the demonstrators. Some of the images seen on the videos contradicted the testimonies of certain prosecution witnesses. Some of the defendants’ lawyers (for example, Mr Hadi) claimed that they had seen the video evidence for the first time at the court hearings, as it had not been made available to them by the prosecution before the trial, and that they had therefore been unprepared for the examination of this evidence. 69.  It appears that, following an application by the defence, the Assize Court also admitted additional video evidence submitted by the defence, which was intended to demonstrate the allegedly excessive use of force by the police and military while suppressing the demonstration. 70.  Assessing the video evidence, the Assize Court noted that the video depicted the violent actions of the demonstrators as well as the distribution to them of bludgeons, stones and other “weapons” in an organised manner. 71.  On 29 September 2004 the Assize Court announced that the presentation of evidence was complete and that it would proceed to hear the parties’ oral submissions, inviting the prosecution to make their closing address first. The prosecution asked for an adjournment until 1 October 2004 to prepare their speech. On 1 October the prosecution asked for another adjournment until 11 October 2004. The prosecution delivered their closing address during two hearings on 11 and 12 October 2004. 72.  Following the prosecution’s speech, on 12 October 2004 the court invited the defendants to deliver their respective closing addresses. However, in response to this invitation, almost all of the applicants’ lawyers, taking the floor one after the other, refused to take part in the oral submissions and make a closing address for the defence, providing the court with the following explanations for their refusal. 73.  The first applicant’s lawyer, Mr Hadi, speaking first, noted that, throughout the proceedings, he had not been given adequate time and facilities to prepare his client’s defence. He had not been allowed to fully study the investigation file before the trial and had not been given access to some of the prosecution evidence, such as video recordings, in order to be able to adequately plan his defence tactics. He further noted that, during the proceedings, the defence lawyers had come under various forms of pressure and had even been physically assaulted when arriving at one of the preliminary hearings. He claimed that the lawyers had regularly received various threats from unspecified persons aimed at preventing them from adequately defending the applicants. Although the lawyers had repeatedly brought this matter to the Assize Court’s attention, and had even specifically complained about the incident involving the physical assault on them, the court had failed to take any action and had ignored the difficulties faced by them. He further argued that, in reality, the outcome of the trial had been predetermined and politically motivated and that the trial itself was being held only as a show, since even before its conclusion the President had publicly declared that the applicants were criminals and would be punished. He stated that, in such circumstances, the lawyers themselves felt vulnerable and frightened. He stated that, for these reasons, he was unable to adequately defend his client and was therefore unable to submit an oral argument. He apologised to his clients, the first applicant and Mr Ibrahimov, and noted that it would be best if the defendants were allowed to prepare and deliver the oral arguments themselves. 74.  Mr Panahov, counsel for the first and second applicants, gave a similar explanation. He also noted that he was not able to provide effective assistance to his clients because, inter alia, he had never been given access to the investigation file. He claimed that after the completion of the pre-trial investigation the lawyers had been pressured into signing records on familiarisation with the material in the case file so that the case could be sent for trial quickly. Although he had specifically complained about this during the preliminary hearings, the Assize Court had ignored this matter. Like Mr Hadi, Mr Panahov also noted that the lawyers were concerned for their personal safety, and that this affected their ability to provide adequate assistance to their clients. 75.  Other lawyers concurred with everything stated by their colleagues and gave similar explanations for their refusal to give a closing address. 76.  Following this, the first applicant spoke to the court, on behalf of himself and the other defendants, asking for permission to make their defence speeches in person. He noted that, following their lawyers’ refusal to take part in the oral submissions, they were essentially left without any legal assistance. He requested the court to allow them sufficient time to prepare their closing addresses. 77.  In response, Judge Ibayev stated that the defendants would be allowed to exercise a right of reply (replika). Judge Aleskerov noted that procedural law allowed a defendant to give a closing address in person only if he or she was unrepresented by counsel. Judge Jumaliyev commented that counsel could not shirk their duty to defend their clients. 78.  At the next hearing, on 13 October 2004, the first applicant, on behalf of himself and the other defendants, lodged a formal application in writing, requesting the court to allow them to make their defence speeches themselves. 79.  The court rejected the application as groundless. It noted that the defence lawyers had provided effective and adequate legal assistance to their clients. It further noted that the lawyers had been given ample opportunity to consult the investigation file but had themselves failed to do so, that it was the lawyers’ duty to participate in oral arguments, that they could not refuse to assist their clients at this stage of the proceedings, and that they had no good reason for shirking their duties. 80.  It appears that only the fourth applicant’s lawyers delivered a closing address on behalf of their client, despite the fact that the fourth applicant had joined the first applicant’s request for permission to give the closing address in person. 81.  The Assize Court then proceeded to invite the parties to exercise their right of reply. The prosecution waived that right. 82.  Prior to the defendants’ speeches in reply, the third applicant asked the court not to place any time-limits on them, taking into account the fact that no closing addresses had been delivered on their behalf during the oral submissions. The presiding judge noted that this would be taken into account. 83.  Exercising his right of reply, the first applicant spoke for about two hours. The presiding judge interrupted him three times, reminding him that a reply should be brief (no longer than three to fifteen minutes), and ultimately cut short his speech despite the applicant’s protests. 84.  Likewise, all the other applicants attempted to deliver long speeches while exercising their right of reply, but were interrupted and ultimately stopped by the presiding judge after about an hour, on the ground that a reply should be brief. 85.  Following this, the trial hearings ended after each of the defendants was allowed to speak one more time, in order to make their final plea. 86.  On 22 October 2004 the Assize Court convicted the applicants of organising public disorder (Articles 32.3 and 220.1 of the Criminal Code) and organising acts of violence against State officials (Articles 32.2 and 315.2 of the Criminal Code). 87.  The first and fourth applicants were each sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment. The second and third applicants were each sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. 88.  In October and November 2004 the applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal against their conviction. In particular, in his appeal, the first applicant complained of, inter alia, breaches of his rights to an impartial tribunal, adequate time and facilities for preparation of his defence, effective representation, equality of arms and presumption of innocence. He also complained of errors by the trial court in the procedure for the admission and assessment of evidence. The second and fourth applicants made similar complaints in their appeals. 89.  The third applicant’s appeal was shorter than those of the other applicants and was phrased in more general language. Among other things, he complained of the following:\n“The conviction should be quashed as being illegal, unsubstantiated and unfair and I should be acquitted. In particular: 3.  The judicial examination was carried out in breach of my right to make a closing statement and in breach of my lawyer’s right to make a closing statement. 5.  The factual findings in the judgment have not been proven. ...\nThe grounds for my claims concerning the illegality, lack of substantiation and unfairness of the conviction will be presented by me at the [appeal] hearings.” 90.  All of the appeals were drafted by the applicants themselves in their own handwriting. 91.  By a decision of 8 November 2004, delivered after a preliminary hearing, the Court of Appeal granted the applicants’ request to hold a public hearing on the merits of their appeals, but rejected their requests to conduct a fresh “judicial examination” of the case by means of renewed cross‑examination of the witnesses and defendants and admission of new evidence. It also decided to provide the applicants with State-appointed lawyers for appeal proceedings, appointing the same lawyers who had represented the applicants at first instance. The extent of the actual assistance provided by these lawyers during the appellate proceedings is not clear. 92.  By a judgment of 19 November 2004 the Court of Appeal upheld the Assize Court’s judgment. It reiterated the lower court’s findings and rejected, in one sentence, the complaints made by the applicants in their appeals as unsubstantiated. 93.  The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal against that judgment. The cassation appeal consisted of 206 pages and was drafted by the applicant himself in his own handwriting. The appeal was very detailed in respect of all the alleged defects in the proceedings before the Assize Court and the Court of Appeal. The other applicants also lodged cassation appeals, drafted by themselves in their own handwriting. 94.  On 29 March 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments. 95.  In March 2005 all of the applicants were released from serving the remainder of their prison sentences pursuant to a presidential pardon decree. 96.  The applicants submitted a number of publications containing statements by high-ranking State officials and public authorities, which allegedly breached their presumption of innocence. Some of those statements are summarised below. 97.  On 17 October 2003 the Milli Majlis (Parliament) adopted a resolution “on Unconstitutional Actions of the Müsavat, Ümid and Azerbaijan Democratic Parties, and Certain Political Opposition Groups”, denouncing the above-mentioned parties and holding them responsible for “unlawful actions” and mass disturbances resulting in loss of life and injuries inflicted on civilians and members of law-enforcement authorities, as well as for damage to public and private property. Among others, the resolution identified Isa Gambar (the leader of Müsavat), Igbal Agazade (one of the defendants tried together with the applicants) and “a group of other members and supporters of the opposition” as organisers of the above disturbances. The resolution was published in official newspapers. 98.  On 23 October 2003 the official newspaper Xalq Qəzeti published a report by the State-owned press agency AzerTAG concerning a press conference held by the Ministry of Internal Affairs on 22 October 2003. During this press conference, the Head of the Press Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs conveyed the Ministry’s official position concerning the events of 15 and 16 October 2003 and informed the media that criminal proceedings had been instituted in this connection and that a number of persons had been arrested. Among other things, he stated as follows:\n“...on 15 and 16 October 2003 the destructive opposition, at the direct instigation of the leaders of the Müsavat, Ümid and Azerbaijan Democratic Parties Isa Gambar, Rasul Guliyev, Sardar Jalaloglu [Mammadov], Igbal Agazade and others, began committing pre-planned unlawful actions which resulted in mass disorder.” 99.  The same issue of the newspaper contained a declaration by the Head of the Sabail District Police Office, denouncing the opposition. The following was stated:\n“On 15 and 16 October 2003 certain riotous anarchist and extreme reactionary groups, following direct orders by Isa Gambar, Igbal Agazade and Sardar Jalaloglu [Mammadov], committed terrible criminal acts in Baku. ...\n... we are confident that ... the persons who committed crimes ... and oversaw these extreme reactionary acts will bear criminal responsibility and receive deserved punishment. Moreover, we are assured that the Müsavat, Ümid and Azerbaijan Democratic Parties, which organised these criminal actions, will be banned and that the leaders of those political entities (I. Gambar, R. Guliyev, S. Jalaloglu, I. Agazade) will be held criminally liable.” 100.  On 25 October 2003 Xalq Qəzeti published a declaration by the Ombudsperson, in which she criticised the opposition and the actions of the demonstrators during the events of 15 and 16 October 2003 and called upon all compatriots to adhere to civil unity and peaceful behaviour. The declaration was silent about the alleged reports of excessive and repressive use of force by the law-enforcement authorities during or in the aftermath of the events of 15 and 16 October 2003. 101.  On 27 October 2003 Xalq Qəzeti published an almost full‑page‑long “Press statement by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor General’s Office of the Republic of Azerbaijan concerning the events that took place in Baku on 15 and 16 October”. The statement began with praise for the law-enforcement authorities’ success in combating crime in recent years and the Government’s progress in building a democratic State governed by the rule of law. It continued with words of disapproval about the “radical opposition”, which did not “want to accept the positive developments and existing realities” and was attempting to “cast a shadow” on the Government’s successes and to disrupt stability in the country. It further continued:\n“The extremist circles of the opposition, having realised in advance that they would lose in the free and fair elections and having become fully assured of this during the voting conducted in a democratic and transparent manner, once again resorted to destructive actions. Leaders of the Müsavat and Ümid Parties Isa Gambar and Igbal Agazade, their supporters, and leaders of the ADP, including Rasul Guliyev, who is under an international search warrant for the crimes committed by him, and Sardar Jalaloglu [Mammadov], as well as other members of that party, have particularly distinguished themselves in this undertaking.\nIt must be noted that, starting from 1 October, for the purpose of participating in the mass disturbances planned by the [above-mentioned] persons, active members of those parties as well as persons predisposed to crime were brought to [Baku], and money was distributed to some of them in exchange [for their participation].\n[The narration continues with a description of the opposition demonstration held on 15 October 2003, where claims of election irregularities and unfairness were first voiced.]\nThe false accusations and lies deliberately disseminated by the above-mentioned party leaders after the election, as well as their call to [demonstrators] to commit illegal actions, provided an impetus for further actions resulting in a grave breach of public order in the capital. ...” 102.  The statement continued with a detailed description of the events of 15 and 16 October and with a flat denial of any allegations of excessive and repressive use of force by the police during the dispersal of the demonstration, as well as any allegations of torture and ill-treatment of arrested persons. It also stated that only a small number of arrested persons, consisting of the main organisers and perpetrators of the illegal actions referred to, had eventually been prosecuted. 103.  On 30 October 2003 Xalq Qəzeti published an article by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, entitled “Stability and tranquility in Azerbaijan will be protected, the rule of law will be firmly respected”. Almost the entire article consisted of condemnation and harsh criticism of the political opposition’s actions during the events of 15 and 16 October. The author repeatedly used such descriptions as “criminal”, “reactionary”, “destructive”, “radical” and “violent” with reference to the opposition in general, and in particular to the Müsavat Party and its leader I. Gambar. The author expressly stated that the Müsavat Party, its leaders and other opposition forces supporting them had engaged in “actions of criminal character”, had openly declared their intention to capture State power by unlawful means, had distributed bludgeons to their supporters and had ordered them to engage in violent actions and vandalism and to disrupt the stability of the country. Within the above account, the article contained the following statements:\n“... Panah Huseyn[ov] ... threatened bloodshed, and attempted to create a situation of mass psychosis. Not only Panah Huseyn[ov] engaged in such subversive action. While delirious ideas of ‘ripening a revolutionary situation’ came from Isa Gambar and Rasul Guliyev, they were conveyed to society by the likes of Sardar Jalaloglu [Mammadov], Igbal Agazade, Ibrahim Ibrahimli, Arif Haji[li], Rauf Arifoglu [Abbasov] and Flora Kerimova.” 104.  On 5 October 2004, before the Assize Court’s judgment in the applicants’ case was delivered, the official newspaper Azərbaycan published a long interview given by the President to Reuters. Among a wide range of other issues discussed during the interview, the President also made the following statement:\n“The attempt of the opposition to change the election results by means of violence was a criminal act. I stress again that the detained persons who are referred to as the opposition are being tried not for being members of the opposition, but for having committed unlawful acts.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Ankara. 6.  The applicant, who was a professor of political science at the University of Ankara, had stood for the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007, in the second electoral district of Istanbul, as an independent candidate. He had not been a member of any political party at the material time. 7.  With a view to a deeper understanding of the background to the present applications, the Court considers it useful to outline the circumstances under which the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 took place. Accordingly it will refer to the relevant passages of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey ([GC], no. 10226/03, §§ 22-26, ECHR 2008), which read as follows:\n“22. In early May 2007 the Turkish Parliament decided to hold early parliamentary elections, choosing 22 July 2007 as the date. The decision followed a political crisis resulting from Parliament’s inability to elect a new President of the Republic to follow on from Ahmet Necdet Sezer before the expiry of his single seven-year term of office, on 16 May 2007. In the normal course of events, these elections should have been held on 4 November 2007. 23. Fourteen political parties took part in the elections, which were marked by two characteristics. Firstly, a strong mobilisation of the electorate was observed following the presidential crisis, since the participation rate rose to 84%. Secondly, political parties used two pre-electoral strategies to circumvent the national 10% threshold. The Party of the Democratic Left (DSP) took part in the poll under the banner of the CHP, a rival party, and by that means managed to win thirteen seats. The Party for a Democratic Society (DTP, pro-Kurdish, left-leaning) presented its candidates as independents using the slogan ‘A thousand hopes’; it also supported certain left-wing Turkish candidates. This movement was backed by other small left-wing groups such as the EMEP, the SDP and the ÖDP (the Liberty and Solidarity Party, socialist). More than sixty independent candidates stood for election in about forty provincial constituencies. 24. In the elections the AKP, the CHP and the MHP managed to get over the 10% threshold. With 46.58% of the votes cast, the AKP won 341 seats, 62% of the total. The CHP, with 20.88% of the votes, won 112 seats, 20.36% of the total; however, the thirteen MPs mentioned in paragraph 23 above subsequently resigned from the CHP and went back to the DSP, their original party. The MHP, which polled 14.27% of the votes, won seventy‑one seats, or 12.9% of the total. 25. The strong showing by independent candidates was one of the main features of the elections of 22 July 2007. There were none in the National Assembly in 1980 but 1999 saw them return, when there were three. In 2002 nine independent MPs were elected from a national total of 260 independent candidates. In the elections of 22 July 2007, twenty-seven independent MPs were elected. In particular, more than twenty ‘thousand hopes’ candidates were elected, after obtaining approximately 2.23% of the votes cast, and joined the DTP after the elections. The DTP, which had twenty MPs, the minimum number to be able to form a parliamentary group, was thus able to do so. The independents also included a socialist MP (the former president of the ÖDP), a nationalist MP (the former president of the Great Union Party – BBP, nationalist) and a centrist MP (the former president of ANAP). 8.  In accordance with Article 94 II a) of Law no. 298 as amended under section 24 of Law no. 3270 of 28 March 1986, electors were able to vote in polling stations set up at customs posts for political parties but not for independent candidates, who included the applicant. 9.  In a Decree of 27 May 2007 the Higher Electoral Council (Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) stated that it had chosen 25 June 2007 and 22 July 2007 respectively as the dates for the beginning and end of the parliamentary elections in the polling stations set up at customs posts for nationals who had been resident abroad for over six months. In the Decree the Higher Electoral Council explained that the nationals in question could only vote in those polling stations for political parties. 10.  On 3 July 2007, with reference to Articles 67 and 90 § 6 of the Constitution and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, the applicant lodged with the Higher Electoral Council a request for the annulment of the Decree du 27 May 2007. 11.  On 4 July 2007 the Higher Electoral Council dismissed the applicant’s request, on the basis of Article 94 II a) of Law no. 298. It pointed out that this provision could only be modified by a fresh legislative amendment. 12.  Section 52 (1) of Law no. 298 on Elections allowed political parties participating in elections to transmit election broadcasts on national radio and television (TRT), subject to certain restrictions, particularly in terms of airtime. 13.  The Higher Electoral Council oversaw the implementation of the Law, which laid down sanctions for infringements of the provisions on election broadcasts. 14. Election broadcasts were authorised from 15 to 21 July 2007, that is to say during the week before the elections. 15.  According to the applicant, the Law did not allow independent candidates like himself who did not, as a matter of principle, belong to any political party, to electioneer on the national radio and television, or, for that matter, on the private channels. 16.  The applicant stressed that one peculiarity of the 22 July 2007 elections had been the large number of independent candidates standing. He considered that this unprecedented phenomenon had stemmed, firstly, from the 10% electoral threshold imposed during the parliamentary elections, and secondly, from the dissatisfaction felt by most people at the material time with the performance of the political parties, whether in power or in opposition.\n...", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in the Leningradskiy Region. 6.  On 27 December 1998 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder and robbery. He was allegedly ill-treated by the police upon arrest. 7.  On 5 January 1999 a confrontation between the applicant and the witnesses Mr S. and Mr K took place. The two men stated that they were security guards in an office building and that on 27 December 1998 they had seen the applicant carrying office equipment out of the building. He had been armed with a knife. They had apprehended him and called the police. They had found their colleague stabbed to death in the toilets. The applicant was given the opportunity to put questions to the witnesses. 8.  On 6 January 1999 the applicant was formally charged with aggravated murder and robbery. 9.  On 18 June 2002 the St Petersburg City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to nineteen years’ imprisonment. It relied on oral statements by Mr S. before the court, the written deposition of Mr K. made at the pre-trial stage, expert reports indicating that the victim’s blood had been found on the applicant’s clothes, and material evidence such as a knife found on his body. 10.  On 10 April 2003 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the judgment on appeal. 11.  From 29 December 1998 to 14 March 2003 and from 21 June to 6 August 2003 the applicant was held in remand centre no. IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg. 12.  According to the applicant the cells were overcrowded. His cell measured 8 sq. m and housed ten to twelve inmates. The applicant was therefore afforded between 0.6 and 0.8 sq. m of floor space. There were shutters on the windows. 13.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant that the conditions of his detention were appalling, a St Petersburg deputy prosecutor informed him on 1 October 2001 that overcrowding was a systemic problem in all remand centres, including remand centre no. IZ-47/1, and it was not possible to meet the statutory sanitary norm of 4 sq. m per inmate or to provide each inmate with a separate bunk. 14.  According to a certificate dated 7 May 2007 issued by the remand centre administration and submitted by the Government, it was not possible to establish which cells the applicant had been held in, or the number of inmates in those cells, as the registers for that period had been destroyed on expiry of the statutory storage time-limit. 15.  Relying on certificates of the same date from the remand centre administration, the Government further submitted that the applicant had at all times had a separate bunk and had been provided with bedding. All cells were equipped with toilet facilities which were separated from the living area by a partition. Inmates could take a shower once a week. They received wholesome food. The shutters had been removed in the second half of 2002. The applicant had never shared a cell with inmates suffering from tuberculosis. 16.  On 31 December 1998, on his admission to remand centre no. IZ‑47/1, the applicant was examined by the prison doctor and given a chest fluorography examination which revealed no signs of tuberculosis. According to the Government, between January 1999 and October 2002 the applicant was given four more fluorography tests which revealed no pathology in the applicant’s lungs. 17.  On 28 February 2003 a new fluorography test detected changes indicating tuberculosis in the applicant’s lungs. 18.  According to the Government, on 2 March 2003 the applicant was placed in the tuberculosis ward of the remand centre. Following a number of medical analyses carried out in the ward he was diagnosed with infiltrative tuberculosis of the left lung. He was prescribed treatment and a special diet. 19.  On 14 March 2003 the applicant was transferred to the tuberculosis ward of remand centre no. IZ-77/1 in Moscow, where he remained until 21 June 2003. 20.  On 21 June 2003 the applicant returned to the tuberculosis ward of remand centre no. IZ-47/1. A fluorography test carried out on 17 July 2003 detected an improvement in his condition. 21.  On 6 August 2003 the applicant was transferred to a correctional colony, where he was placed in the prison hospital and received anti‑tuberculosis treatment, 22.  On 2 September 2005 a tuberculosis specialist issued the following diagnosis: “clinical recovery from infiltrative tuberculosis”.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bielsko - Biała. 7.  On 8 June 2006 the Bielsko-Biała Social Security Board refused to grant the applicant a disability pension. On 20 March 2007 the Bielsko‑Biała Regional Court dismissed his appeal against that decision. On 9 October 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's further appeal. The judgment was served on the applicant on 15 November 2007 and two-month time-limit for lodging of a cassation appeal started to run on that date. 8.  On 9 November 2007 the applicant requested that a legal‑aid lawyer be assigned to the case for the purposes of lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. On 27 November 2007 the Katowice Court of Appeal granted his request for legal aid and requested the Katowice Bar Association to assign a lawyer to the case. Subsequently, as the first lawyer assigned by the Bar Association suffered from certain health problems at that time, on 23 January 2008 the Katowice Bar Association assigned another lawyer, Mr J.R., to the case. He was served with the letter informing him of the assignment on 28 January 2008. 9.  Subsequently the lawyer requested the Court of Appeal to serve on him its judgment of 9 October 2007. The judgment with the written grounds was served on him on 14 February 2008. 10.  In a letter to the applicant dated 29 February 2008 the lawyer explained in detail why he had found no grounds on which to prepare a cassation complaint in the case.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Praszka. 5.  On 28 March 1991 the applicant lodged a motion with the Oleśno District Court, claiming a division of inheritance and dissolution of co-ownership of a certain property. 6.  The court held hearings on: 15 May 1991, 28 August 1991, 29 January 1992, 10 April 1992, 18 May 1992, 24 August 1992, 30 September 1992, 23 February 1993, 7 June 1993 and 28 March 1994. 7.  Having regard to the lack of progress in the proceedings, and apparently aiming at obtaining possession of the property by other legal means, on 13 April 1993 the applicant lodged a motion with the Oleśno District Court, claiming acquisitive prescription of half of the property in question. By a decision of 11 May 1994 the Oleśno District Court dismissed her motion. By a decision of 27 September 1994 the Częstochowa Regional Court dismissed her further appeal and upheld the contested decision. 8.  Further hearings in the dissolution case were held on 3 June 1998, 30 December 1999, 29 March 2000 and 23 May 2000. 9.  The court ordered a number of expert opinions. They were submitted to the court on: 22 December 1991, 3 July 1992, 8 September 1997, 12 May 1998, 16 June 1998, 9 December 1998, 9 February 1999, 16 April 1999, 11 May 1999, 8 October 1999 and 27 November 2000. 10.  By a decision of 10 January 2001 the Oleśno District Court stayed the proceedings due to the fact that one of the parties to the proceedings had died. By virtue of the same decision the court resumed the proceedings, having regard to his heirs' request that the proceedings be resumed. 11.  On 3 June 2003 the Oleśno District Court gave a judgment on the merits. 12.  On 16 December 2003 the Opole Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. 13.  By a decision of 28 June 2004 the Supreme Court declined to examine the cassation appeal, considering that it had not been shown that arguable public interest grounds existed which would justify the examination of the appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Prievidza. 6.  On 4 August 1999 the applicant was charged with conspiracy and extortion under Articles 9 § 2 and 235 §§ 1 and 2 (b) of the Criminal Code. The charge was based on the suspicion that, acting as part of an organised group and posing as a police officer, the applicant had lured an individual into a car, driven him to another place and forced him at gunpoint to pay an amount of money. Two days later, following his arrest (see below), a lawyer was officially assigned to the applicant. 7.  Between September and December 1999 the investigators assigned to the case heard evidence from and organised a confrontation between the accused, the victim and a witness and obtained other evidence. 8.  On 7 January 2000 the Nitra District Prosecutor indicted the applicant to stand trial in the Nitra District Court (Okresný súd) on the above charge. 9.  On 21 January 2000 the District Court remitted the bill of indictment to the prosecution service for further investigation. It found that the facts had not been established adequately, in particular because it had been overlooked that, at the time of the alleged offence, the applicant had still been on probation following a conviction for an extremely serious offence (obzvlášť závažný trestný čin). It had equally been overlooked that the applicant was also facing prosecution for another extremely serious offence. These facts had to be examined and taken into account in the present case. 10.  On 22 June 2000 an investigator interviewed the applicant again. 11.  On 17 July 2000 the prosecutor filed the indictment again, classifying the applicant as an “extremely dangerous recidivist” as defined by Article 41 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 12.  The applicant requested on 24 July and 21 December 2000 and 30 May 2001 the replacement of his officially assigned lawyers on the ground that he had lost confidence in them. New lawyers were assigned to him on 16 October 2000, 23 April 2001 and 13 September 2001 respectively. The applicant finally appointed a lawyer of his choice, in November 2001. 13.  On 4 June 2001 the applicant's co-accused requested that the case against him be dealt with separately from that against the applicant on the ground that the applicant had deliberately been protracting the proceedings. 14.  On 6 June 2003, after he had been released from detention (see below), the applicant informed the District Court that he could not take part in the proceedings as he was receiving psychiatric treatment. He sent similar letters to the District Court on 13 October 2003 and 14 February 2005. In a letter of 30 October 2003 to the District Court the applicant's psychiatrist confirmed that the applicant was receiving treatment but considered that there was nothing to prevent him from taking part in the proceedings. 15.  Consequently, on 4 March 2005, the District Court appointed a psychologist to report on the applicant's mental health. The report was submitted on 26 May 2005 with the conclusion that the applicant was fit to take part in and able to comprehend the meaning of the criminal proceedings against him. 16.  In the course of the proceedings the District Court held hearings on 13 December 2000, 12 September and 15 October 2001, 23 January, 6 March and 29 May 2002, 22 January 2003, 29 November 2004 and 2 March 2005. Further hearings were listed for 30 March and 9 May 2001 and 22 September 2003. The first of these did not take place as one of the lay judges was unable to attend. The latter two were cancelled without any reasons having been given. 17.  The applicant unsuccessfully challenged on twelve occasions (on 13 December 2000, 27 March, 27 April, 28 May and 17 July 2001, 12 February, 6 March and 23 April 2002, 13 January and 5 September 2003, 1 July and 5 September 2005) the District Court or the Regional Court for bias. Further unsuccessful challenges were lodged by the applicant's co-accused. In substance, it was alleged that, given the background of the case, the judges involved were influenced by the fact that it concerned organised criminal gangs. The applicant also argued that the whole case was a fabrication and that over the recent period he had not had effective legal representation. 18.  The applicant or his lawyers requested on six occasions (25 October 2000, 27 April and 20 November 2001, 28 April, 6 June and 13 October 2003) that a hearing be rescheduled. Further postponements were requested by the applicant's co-accused. 19.  The applicant unsuccessfully complained numerous times to the Prosecutor General, the Ministry of Justice and various other public institutions concerning the manner in which the proceedings against him were being conducted. 20.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending. 21.  On 6 August 1999 the applicant was arrested on the above charge. According to the arrest report, the applicant resisted and attempted to escape. The police forcibly entered his flat, used force against him and put him in handcuffs. There is no indication that the applicant suffered any injuries. 22.  Later on 6 August 1999 the District Court heard evidence from the applicant and remanded him in detention under Article 67 § 1 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) finding that there was a risk that he would abscond. 23.  In the above-mentioned decision of 21 January 2000, which concerned the remittal of the applicant's indictment, the District Court also ruled that the reasons for the applicant's detention persisted. 24.  On 9 and 21 August 2000 the applicant requested that he be released from detention. The requests were dismissed on 27 September 2000 and, on appeal, on 24 January 2001. The courts found that there was a strong suspicion against the applicant and that his continued detention was warranted in view of his “personality, previous way of life, the seriousness of the charge and the potential penalty, the fact that the offence had been committed away from the applicant's place of habitual residence and the fact that during his arrest the applicant had attempted to escape”. 25.  On 19 July 2001 the District Court requested that the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) authorise an extension of the applicant's detention over the two-year time-limit provided for in Article 71 § 2 of the CCP. It was submitted that it had not been possible to complete the proceedings earlier mainly due to the applicant's unfounded repeated challenges of bias and other procedural applications. 26.  On 31 July 2001 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention until 6 February 2002. The reasons for his detention as found at the time of remanding him persisted. He was unemployed and was not staying at a fixed address. He was considered an extremely dangerous recidivist, which, according to the Supreme Court, constituted a further ground for his detention under Article 67 § 1 (c) of the CCP as there was a risk that he would continue engaging in criminal activities. It had not been possible to complete the proceedings earlier and it was in the interests of justice that the applicant remained detained. There was no hearing held before the Supreme Court and no appeal was available against its decision. 27.  In the meantime, on 6 and 20 July 2001, the applicant lodged two requests for release with the Supreme Court. He argued, inter alia, that since 30 May 2001, when he had expressed a lack of confidence in his lawyer, he had in fact had no legal representation, whereas such representation was mandatory. The requests were transmitted to the District Court by which they fell to be determined at first instance, on 12 and 30 July 2001, respectively. 28.  The District Court dismissed the applicant's requests for release of July 2001 on 15 August 2001. On 27 August 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal and on 14 September 2001 the District Court transmitted the appeal to the Nitra Regional Court (Krajský súd) for determination. The latter court returned the case file to the District Court without a decision because the District Court had failed to secure service of a copy of the challenged decision on the applicant's new lawyer. On 2 October 2001 the District Court retransmitted the applicant's appeal to the Regional Court, which dismissed it on 3 October 2001. The case file was returned to the District Court on 18 October 2001. 29.  Both the District Court and the Regional Court examined the applicant's detention in private sessions (neverejné zasadnutie). The session before the Regional Court was attended by the public prosecution but not by the defence. Both courts “were of the view” that the applicant was still under a strong suspicion. They considered that, in view of his personality, his life thus far, the fact that he was suspected of having committed an extremely serious intentional offence away from the applicant's place of habitual residence and the fact that he was potentially facing a heavy penalty, the risk that the applicant would abscond persisted. A general reference to the previous decisions, but not to any specific facts, was made. 30.  On 24 January 2002 the District Court again requested an authorisation for the extension of the applicant's detention. It was argued that it had not been possible to complete the proceedings earlier mainly due to the applicant's unfounded repeated challenges of bias, rejecting his lawyers and other procedural applications. 31.  On 30 January 2002 the Supreme Court extended the applicant's detention until 31 July 2002. It held that the previous reasons for detaining him remained valid. It was observed that the applicant was suspected of having committed a serious offence after having been released on licence following a conviction for robbery. For reasons related to the nature of the case as well as the applicant's repeated challenges of bias, it had not been possible to complete the proceedings earlier. The interests of justice still required that the applicant remain detained. 32.  On 27 March 2002 the applicant requested release. The request was dismissed on 3 May 2002 and, on appeal, on 28 August 2002. However, in the meantime, on 31 July 2002, the Regional Court decided that the applicant should be released and he was, on the last-mentioned date. 33.  On 20 April 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He directed the complaint against the District Court and argued that the proceedings before it had been too lengthy. 34.  On 28 September 2005 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It observed that the length of the proceedings had been due to the applicant's numerous and repeated procedural applications, which could not be imputed to the District Court, whose conduct of the proceedings had been active and expeditious.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lived in Nakhchivan at the time of the events. 6.  The applicant was an independent journalist and worked as a reporter of the Yeni Musavat newspaper in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (“the NAR”). 7.  The applicant was the author of two critical articles about the economic and political situation in the NAR published in the Yeni Musavat newspaper in August and September 2007. The articles, entitled “Food has become considerably more expensive in Nakhchivan (owing to Vasif Talibov’s “care”)” (“Naxçıvanda ərzaq xeyli bahalaşıb (Vasif Talıbovun “qayğısı” sayəsində)”) and “Vasif Talibov rebuilds his native village” (“Vasif Talıbov doğulduğu kəndi söküb yenidən tikdirir”), related in particular to the activities of the Speaker of the Parliament of the NAR, Vasif Talibov, who is also “the supreme official of the NAR” (“Naxçıvan Muxtar Respublikasının ali vəzifəli şəxsi”) under its Constitution of 29 December 1998. 8.  On 17 September 2007 the applicant also met a reporter from Radio Liberty and helped him to prepare a report about the economic and political situation in Nakhchivan. 9.  At around 2 p.m. on 22 September 2007, when the applicant was in a café in the village of Jalilkand in the Sharur District, the head (M.M.) of the district department of the MNS approached him. M.M. accused the applicant of publishing defamatory articles about the NAR, and ordered four men in uniform to arrest him. 10.  The applicant was taken to the premises of the MNS in Sharur by car. His mobile phone was taken away while he was being transported there. When they arrived at the MNS building M.M. told him to stop spreading misinformation about the NAR. He further ordered agents of the MNS to explain to the applicant “the meaning of his activity as a reporter” and left the room. 11.  Five men then began to torture the applicant. They hit him repeatedly with truncheons, kicked him and punched him in the head. Approximately an hour later, M.M. returned and asked the applicant whether he had “grown wise”. M.M. further ordered five men to make the applicant “understand his mistakes”. The applicant was then subjected to further ill-treatment. 12.  The applicant was subsequently taken to the office of M.M. who demanded that he become a member of the ruling political party (YAP - Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası) and to write defamatory articles about opposition leaders. The applicant refused to do so. 13.  The applicant was released at 2 a.m. on 23 September 2007; his mobile phone was returned to him. Before his release, M.M. told him that if he did not “grow wise”, he would be brought back to the MNS. 14.  Following his release, the applicant immediately informed the Yeni Musavat newspaper of his arrest. According to the applicant, his relatives also took photographs of the injuries on his body. However, he was unable to see a doctor immediately, because it was night. 15.  The Government submitted that on 22 September 2007 the applicant was not arrested, detained or ill-treated, by agents of the MNS. 16.  In the morning of 23 September 2007, while the applicant was about to go and see a doctor, he was arrested by the police and taken to the Sharur District Police Office. 17.  The head of the Sharur District Police Office, M.H., shouted at the applicant, demanding to know why he had informed the press of his arrest. 18.  On the same day the applicant was taken to the Sharur District Court, which sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention for obstructing the police. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer at the hearing. Two police officers testified against him. The applicant was not provided with a copy of the court decision. 19.  At the request of the applicant, after the court hearing he was taken to the Sharur Central Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor who observed numerous bruises on his body. However, he was not provided with any medical record. 20.  At around 2.30 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was approached by the police in the centre of the Jalilkand village, because he was using loud and abusive language in public. As the applicant did not comply with the police request to stop his unlawful action, an administrative offence report was drawn up and he was taken to the police station. It appears from the report that the applicant refused to sign it. The relevant part of the report of 23 September 2007 provides as follows:\n“On 23 September 2007 H. Mehdiyev did not comply with the lawful request of the police, and continued to shout and use insulting language in the centre of the Jalilkand village.” 21.  On the same day the Sharur District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 310.1 (obstructing the police) of the Code of Administrative Offences, and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention. It was specified in the decision that it could be appealed against within ten days of its receipt. The relevant part of the decision of 23 September 2007 provides as follows:\n“Assessing the evidence at its disposal, the court concludes that the fact that Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu [the applicant] committed the above-mentioned administrative offence is proved by his confession and the statements of witnesses heard in connection with the case.\nThe court qualifies the administrative offence committed by Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Therefore, he must be found guilty under this article and must be punished.” 22.  The Government produced a receipt confirming that the applicant had received a copy of the court decision at 5.30 p.m. on 23 September 2007. The receipt was dated 23 September 2007 and signed by the applicant. 23.  At around 7 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was taken to detention facility no. 8 to serve his sentence. 24.  During his detention the applicant was deprived of food and water. He was not provided with any bedding and was forced to spend nights outside on a concrete walkway. The applicants’ hands were handcuffed at all times and due to the detention facility’s proximity to the River Aras, he suffered badly from mosquito bites. 25.  At midnight on 25 September 2007, the Minister of National Security of the NAR arrived at the detention facility with two other men. They appeared to be drunk. The Minister insulted the applicant and then all of them beat him. 26.  The Government submitted that there was no detention facility no. 8 in the NAR and the applicant was detained in the temporary detention facility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the NAR. 27.  The applicant was detained alone in a cell which was 2.8 metres high, 5.2 m long, and 2.2 m wide. The cell was adequately lit and ventilated. The applicant was provided with a separate bed and bedding, as well as with other necessities. In support of their account of the conditions, the Government produced photographs of the detention facility in question and the cell in which the applicant was held. 28.  The Government also produced a medical record dated 16 December 2013 from the doctor on duty at the detention facility at the time. According to the medical record, at 7.45 p.m. on 23 September 2007 the applicant was examined by the doctor and “no pathology was revealed” (heç bir patalogiya aşkar edilmədi). The medical record of 16 December 2013 provides as follows:\n“Examination by the doctor on duty:\nAt 7.45 p.m. on 23 September 2007 Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu accompanied by two police officers came to the admission department for examination. During the examination of the citizen, no pathology was revealed. The blood pressure was 120/85 mm Hg. Practically healthy (praktiki sağlam). The doctor on duty: I.M.” 29.  Following the applicant’s administrative detention, various Azerbaijani and international human rights organisations asked the Azerbaijani authorities for the applicant’s release. In particular, on 26 September 2007 Reporters Without Borders submitted a request to the Azerbaijani authorities to stop the applicant’s harassment because of his journalistic activities and to order his release. In respect of the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by agents of the MNS on 22 September 2007, the request reads:\n“The day before his arrest, Mehdiyev was forced into a car by national security ministry agents and held all day in a ministry building where, according to Reporters Without Borders’ sources, he was beaten because of his reports about gas and electricity problems in the region.”\nOn 27 September 2007 the Committee to Protect Journalists also called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to stop the applicant’s harassment because of his journalistic activities and to carry out a thorough investigation in this respect. The applicant’s alleged ill‑treatment by agents of the MNS on 22 September 2007 and his administrative detention were also covered by the Azerbaijani media. 30.  On 27 September 2007 the applicant was released from administrative detention. No official reason was given for his early release from detention. 31.  According to the applicant, after his release from detention, he was treated in the Nakhchivan Republic Hospital, however all the medical institutions refused to give him an official medical certificate. The doctor who examined the applicant told him that his seventh rib was broken. In support of his claim, the applicant relied on a medical record dated 1 October 2007 in which the doctor indicated that an X-ray examination of the applicant’s seventh rib had been carried out, without providing further information. Although the name of the doctor appeared on the medical record, it was not signed or stamped and there was no information about the medical establishment in which the examination was carried out. The medical record of 1 October 2007 provides as follows:\n“Mehdiyev Hakimeldostu Bayram oglu; born in 1961 in Jalilkand;\nX-ray examination of the ribcage and the seventh left side rib in the back armpit (sol yeddinci qabırğasının arxa qoltuqaltı).” 32.  Relying on Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the Convention, on 3 October 2007 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office asking for the institution of a criminal investigation. He submitted the same factual information as what he submitted to the Court (see paragraphs 9-14 above) i.e. that at around 2 p.m. on 22 September 2007 he had been arrested, at the request of the head (M.M.) of the district department of the MNS, in a café in the village of Jalilkand in the Sharur District by agents of the MNS, and had been taken to the premises of the MNS in Sharur. Once there M.M. demanded that he stop spreading misinformation about the NAR. He further ordered the agents of the MNS to explain to the applicant “the meaning of his activity as a reporter” and left the room. Five men then began to torture him. They hit him repeatedly with truncheons, kicked him and punched him in the head. Approximately an hour later, M.M. returned and asked him whether he had “grown wise”. M.M. further ordered the five men to make him “understand his mistakes”. He was then subjected to further ill-treatment and was only released at around 2 a.m. on 23 September 2007. Before his release, M.M. told him that, if he did not “grow wise”, he would be brought back to the MNS. 33.  The applicant sent his complaint by recorded delivery and it appears from the postal document submitted to the Court that the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office received it on 4 October 2007. 34.  The applicant did not receive any reply to his complaint. 35.  On 19 October 2007 the applicant lodged the same complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ombudsman. The applicant produced postal documents confirming that the letters had been sent to the above-mentioned authorities. 36.  By a letter of 25 October 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant that it had forwarded his complaint to the Prosecutor of the NAR for examination. 37.  On 7 November 2007 the applicant re-submitted the same complaint to the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office by recorded delivery. The applicant produced a postal document confirming the receipt of his letter by the Sharur District Prosecutor’s Office. 38.  By a letter of 23 November 2007, the Ministry of Internal Affairs informed the applicant that it had forwarded his complaint to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the NAR for examination. 39.  No action was taken in respect of the applicant’s above-mentioned complaints. 40.  On 9 February 2008 the applicant lodged an action with the Sharur District Court in accordance with the procedure established by Articles 449‑451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning appeals against actions and decisions taken by the prosecuting authorities. Relying on Articles 3, 5 and 10 of the Convention, he reiterated his previous complaints and asked the court to declare unlawful the prosecuting authorities’ failure to examine his complaint. 41.  The applicant did not receive any reply from the Sharur District Court. 42.  On 17 March 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court of the NAR, reiterating his previous complaints. He further complained that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint concerning the prosecuting authorities’ inaction. 43.  In the meantime, the applicant sent the same complaint to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Azerbaijan, complaining that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint. By a letter of 1 April 2008 the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court for examination. 44.  By a letter of 29 April 2008, the Supreme Court of the NAR informed the applicant that his complaint could not be examined by it because, as an appellate court, it examined appeals only against first‑instance courts’ decisions. 45.  On 28 July 2008 the applicant made representations to the Judicial Legal Council, stating that the Sharur District Court had failed to examine his complaint. 46.  By a letter of 5 August 2008, the Judicial Legal Council forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court, asking the court to examine the complaint and to take necessary measures. The Judicial Legal Council further asked the Sharur District Court to inform the applicant about the result of the examination. 47.  On 8 January 2009 the applicant applied again to the Judicial Legal Council, arguing that, despite its letter of 5 August 2008 sent to the Sharur District Court, he had not been informed of any decision taken by the Sharur District Court. 48.  By a letter of 14 January 2009, the Judicial Legal Council forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Sharur District Court. The Judicial Legal Council’s letter of 14 January 2009 was identical in wording to its letter of 5 August 2008. 49.  On 18 June 2009 and on 6 January 2010 the applicant sent further letters to the Sharur District Court, reiterating his previous complaints. 50.  The applicant did not receive any response from the Sharur District Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 1 April 1996 the applicant retired from the position as a consultant at the Ministry of Finance of Russia. 7.  In 1996 – 1997 he repeatedly applied to the Ministry of Labour for additional retirement benefits due to former State employees. By decision of 3 October 1997 a deputy Minister granted the applicant’s request and increased his pension as of 9 September 1997. 8.  Thereafter the applicant sued the Ministry of Labour seeking arrears for the period between 1 April 1996 and 8 September 1997. 9.  On 19 December 1997 the Basmanny District Court of Moscow dismissed his claims, stating that the applicant had only become eligible for a higher pension as of 9 September 1997 and therefore he had no right to arrears. 10.  On 14 April 1998 the Moscow City Court set aside the first instance judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11.  On 15 September 1999 the Basmanny District Court ruled in the applicant’s favour confirming his entitlement to additional retirement benefits as of 1 April 1996 and ordered the Ministry of Labour to re-calculate his pension. 12.  No appeal was lodged, and on an unspecified date the judgment of 15 September 1999 became final. 13.  On 25 November 1999 enforcement proceedings commenced. 14.  On 26 October 2000 a deputy Prosecutor General lodged an extraordinary appeal against the judgment of 15 September 1999. 15.  On 16 November 2000 the Presidium of the Moscow City Court examined and rejected the extraordinary appeal in supervisory review proceedings, thus upholding the judgment of 15 September 1999. 16.  On 2 February 2001 a deputy Prosecutor General filed another extraordinary appeal against the judgment of 15 September 1999 and the decision of 16 November 2000. 17.  On 23 February 2001 the Civil Section of the Supreme Court of Russia, by way of supervisory review, quashed the judgment of 15 September 1999 and the decision of 16 November 2000, and remitted the case to the first instance court. It is not clear whether the applicant has pursued the proceedings. 18.  In 2001 – 2003 the applicant unsuccessfully applied for supervisory review of the decision of 23 February 2001. 19.  During the fresh examination, on 27 February 2003, the Basmanny District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims. 20.  On 30 July 2003 the applicant appealed against the above judgment. 21.  By decision of 29 August 2003 the Basmanny District Court refused to examine the applicant’s appeal brief as having been lodged outside the statutory time-limit of ten days.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in the town of Belgorod in the Belgorod Region. 6.  On 29 December 1992 the applicant's husband bought municipal property, including the premises of a former restaurant. According to the applicant, several years later her husband, fearing for his life and for the safety of his family, signed a contract with a number of individuals, transferring title to the restaurant building to them. 7.  On 5 May 2002 the applicant, in the interests of her minor child, lodged an action against her husband, seeking invalidation of the contract. She claimed that her husband had acted ultra vires while signing the contract, as he had not been the sole owner of the building. A part of the building had belonged to their minor child. 8.  The Sverdlovskiy District Court of Belgorod accepted the claim for examination and listed a hearing.  However, on 13 August 2002 it transferred the case to the Commercial Court of the Belgorod Region for further adjudication. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:\n“By virtue of paragraph 1 of Section 4 of the Code of Commercial Procedure of the Russian Federation, which entered into force on 6 August 2002, the present case falls into the jurisdiction of a commercial court.\nUnder Article 7 of the Federal Law “On Putting into Operation the Code of Commercial Procedure of the Russian Federation” cases which are in the process of adjudication by courts of general jurisdiction and which, according to the Code of Commercial Procedure..., have been placed under the jurisdiction of commercial courts, should be transferred by courts of general jurisdiction, with the plaintiff's consent, to commercial courts within two weeks after paragraph 1 of Section 4 of the Code of Commercial Procedure has entered into force... If the plaintiff does not consent to the transfer of the case from the court of general jurisdiction to the commercial court, the court of general jurisdiction discontinues the proceedings in the case at issue because the case is not within the jurisdiction of the court of general jurisdiction.\nAt the hearing the plaintiff, [the applicant], consented, which she had confirmed in writing, to the transfer of the case to the commercial court.\nThe court finds it necessary to transfer the case pertaining to the [applicant's] action against [her husband]... to the Commercial Court of the Belgorod Region.”\nAn appeal against the District Court's decision could have been lodged before the Belgorod Regional Court within ten days. 9.  On 17 October 2002 the Commercial Court of the Belgorod Region discontinued the proceedings because it found that it had no jurisdiction over the claim. 10.  On 10 December 2002 the Appeal Division of the Commercial Court of the Belgorod Region upheld the decision of 17 October 2002, endorsing the reasons given by the Commercial Court. On 24 March 2003 the Federal Commercial Court of the Central Circuit, in the final instance, upheld the decisions of 17 October and 10 December 2002.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 5.  On 21 May 2004 at 08.15 two household workers (“M.R.” and “I.B”) discovered the body of the applicant’s daughter (“S.J.”) at her home in Ventspils. She had a rope around her neck, the other end of which was thrown over the top of a door and tied to the door handle on the other side. 6.  At 08.20 M.R. and I.B. reported the incident to the Ventspils City and District Police Department of the State Police (“the Ventspils State Police”). Three police officers from the Ventspils State Police were dispatched to S.J.’s home. S.J.’s husband (“A.J.”), who worked as a policeman-driver for the Ventspils State Police, arrived separately. 7.  The Government have provided details of the investigation which followed. Their account has not been disputed by the applicant. 8.  From 09.40 to 10.35 officers G.A. and A.G. from the Ventspils State Police examined S.J.’s home. They prepared the procedural record, photographed the scene and seized material evidence. Later that same day S.J.’s body was transported to the Ventspils City Morgue and A.G. requested an autopsy and forensic medical examination of the body. He also submitted an internal report to the Head of the Ventspils State Police which stated that he and G.A. had arrived at the scene, established that S.J. was dead, arranged for the transportation of the body, examined the scene, and took statements. In the report he noted that the persons transporting S.J.’s body to the morgue had removed the rope from around her neck. 9.  In a letter dated 23 May 2005 a Prosecutor from the General Prosecutor’s Office admitted to the applicant that the examination of the scene by A.G. had not been done “qualitatively” or in compliance with the requirements of the Criminal Procedure Law. He had been subjected to disciplinary action and prosecuted under Article 319(1) of the Criminal Law (Failure of a State Official to Perform His Duties) and under Article 327(19) (Forgery of a Document by a State Official). The second prosecution would appear to relate to the forgery of a Doctor’s signature on a document purporting to set out an expert’s conclusion. A.G. was later released from criminal liability. 10.  In the same letter the Prosecutor from the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that another officer from the Ventspils State Police (“A.M.”) had been subjected to disciplinary action for violating the Criminal Procedure Law when verifying the fact of S.J.’s death. It is not clear whether or not the disciplinary action related to the examination of the scene on 21 May 2004. 11.  On 24 May 2004 the police took statements from the applicant and S.J.’s sister (“B.L.”), both of whom expressed the opinion that S.J. had no reason to commit suicide. 12.  On 25 May 2004 a forensic expert, having examined S.J.’s body, concluded that she had died on 21 May 2004 and attributed the cause of death to mechanical asphyxiation. The report stated that there was no evident sign of violence, aside from the strangulation, although it noted that S.J. had bruises on her shoulder, hands and legs and three scratches on her right palm which could have been acquired up to three days prior to her death. 13.  The following day the police obtained statements from a neighbour (“M.N.”) and two of S.J.’s colleagues. M.N. recalled that between 22.00 and 22.15 on 20 May 2004 she had observed a red vehicle similar to the one driven by A.J. parked in the courtyard of the building where S.J. and A.J. lived. Another neighbour (“Ma.N.”) subsequently recalled seeing such a vehicle in the courtyard from 22.00 to 22.30. 14.  S.J.’s colleagues confirmed that she had finished her shift in the shop she worked in at 22.00 and headed to an office where she had a second job as a cleaner. Another witness later confirmed that she had arrived at the office at 22.15 and left at 22.45 ‑ 22.50. 15.  The Government submitted that on 27 May 2004 the Kurzeme Regional Division of the Organised Crime Combating Department (“the OCCD”) requested a list of incoming and outgoing calls to S.J.’s mobile phone from her operator. 16.  On 30 May 2004 the son of S.J. and A.J. (“Av.J.”) made a statement. He said that A.J. had picked him up at home at 18.00 on 20 May 2004. He had remained with his father until 23.00, when his father returned to work and he went to the home of his sister (“D.J.”). A colleague of A.J. later reported going with him to the cafeteria in the police station at 23.00 and the chief officer on duty that night confirmed that A.J. had remained with the squad until his shift ended at 07.00 on 21 May 2004. He also told the investigators that after midnight the police station was locked and the main gate closed, with the consequence that no person – or vehicle – could leave the premises without his permission. 17.  On 1 June 2004 Officer A.M. performed a further examination of S.J.’s home. He examined marks and traces left by the rope on the door and seized several samples for forensic traceology examination. 18.  On 8 July 2004 a household worker gave a statement to the police confirming that on 20 May 2004 A.J. had returned home at 18.00 to collect Av.J. On 20 July 2004 D.J. confirmed that A.J. and Av.J. had arrived at her home at 23.00 that night. 19.  On 21 July 2004 the State Forensic Expertise Centre reported that the groove marks on the upper fragment of the door had been chafed into the wooden surface by the rope attached to S.J.’s neck. Those marks could only have been made by pulling the weight of S.J.’s body towards the door handle, to which the rope was subsequently tied. 20.  On 23 July 2004 the OCCD initiated criminal proceedings to investigate the aggravated murder (murder with mercenary intent) of S.J. From this point onwards, Inspector V.L. of the OCCD was responsible for the investigation under the supervision of the General Prosecutor’s Office. A.L. was the Prosecutor in charge and he reported to A.B., who was the supervising Prosecutor. 21.  On 23 July 2004 A.J. was interrogated as a suspect and he was informed that he could not change his registered place of domicile. Av.J., D.J. and B.L. were questioned as witnesses. 22.  A couple of days later, M.N. and Ma.N. were again interviewed about the red vehicle parked in the courtyard of S.J.’s home. Both indicated that they had believed the vehicle to be the one driven by A.J. 23.  Throughout the following months witnesses were interviewed, including A.J. (who was questioned repeatedly), his relatives and acquaintances, S.J.’s relatives (including the applicant), the couple’s neighbours, a number of police officers, S.J.’s employer and some of her colleagues, her household workers and her dentist. The General Prosecutor’s Office also instructed the OCCD to order further forensic tests, although records indicate that many were in fact ordered by the Ventspils State Police. 24.  Attempts were made to establish the exact time of death but on 11 August 2004 the forensic expert indicated that “considering that the forensic medical examination of S.J.’s body had been performed four days after it was found and that livor mortis appears within the first hour of death, a more precise time of death could not be established”. 25.  A.J.’s uniform and the seat covers of his service car were seized on 9 August 2004 and DNA samples were taken from him. On 9 September 2004 the expert reported that there were several different DNA samples on the rope used to hang S.J. but none belonged to A.J. The expert was unable to establish the gender identification of the samples. On 16 September 2004 an expert concluded that some fibres found on S.J.’s coat possibly came from A.J.’s car seat but the results were inconclusive. 26.  Further tests were also carried out on S.J.’s body, but no injuries were found which would indicate a struggle or self-defence. 27.  Furthermore, S.J.’s bank records were requested, as were details of all red vehicles matching the description of the one seen at the scene of the crime. S.J.’s family members were also questioned repeatedly about whether or not she had kept a personal diary. On 23 March 2005 the diary appears to have been handed over to the police and attached to the criminal file. 28.  On 1 December 2006 a further forensic traceology report suggested that there was a “high probability” that if S.J. had committed suicide the grooves on the top of the door would not have appeared as they did. 29.  On 21 March 2007 A.J. was again declared a suspect. Further DNA tests were performed on the rope and experiments were carried out to determine the driving time from Ventspils Police Station to S.J.’s home. The results of the latter test appeared to confirm A.J.’s alibi and on 13 November 2008 the decision to once again declare him a suspect was quashed. 30.  On 11 January 2011 a new OCCD investigator (“A.Jo.) assumed jurisdiction over the case file. 31.  On 20 August 2007 the OCCD acknowledged D.J. (the applicant’s granddaughter) as a victim in the criminal proceedings. 32.  On 26 May 2004 the applicant wrote to the Head of the OCCD alleging that S.J. had been murdered. The OCCD informed the applicant on 2 July 2004 that the circumstances of S.J.’s death were still being investigated. 33.  The applicant subsequently submitted further complaints to the Prosecutor’s Office concerning the conduct of the investigation. In the course of these complaints, he implied that A.J. was directly or indirectly implicated in S.J.’s murder and that his colleagues on the police force were deliberately obstructing the investigation. 34.  On 22 December 2004 A.Mi., a senior Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court, informed the applicant that an in-depth investigation was being carried out. It was being conducted in an impartial manner and there was no evidence of any deliberate obstruction by the police. A.Mi. noted that the investigation was complicated and was supervised by another prosecutor from the same office (“A.L.”). 35.  On 23 May 2005 a Prosecutor from the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that the investigation was still ongoing and that the evidence which had been gathered was not sufficient to bring charges against any specific persons. The Prosecutor admitted that A.G. had not carried out the initial examination of the scene of S.J.’s death “qualitatively”, that both A.G. and A.M. had violated the requirements of the laws on criminal procedure and that the two officers had received disciplinary penalties. In addition, criminal proceedings had been initiated against A.G. for criminal inaction of a State official (section 319 of the Criminal Law) and for the forgery of official documents (section 327 of the Criminal Law). However, on 14 March 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court had decided to release A.G. from criminal liability pursuant to Article 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 36.  On 17 July 2007 the applicant wrote to A.L., the supervising Prosecutor, and asked to see certain expert reports and other specific information concerning the investigation into S.J.’s death. More particularly, he asked for additional information concerning the violations committed by the police officers A.M. and A.G. He also enquired when the case would be sent to a court. 37.  On 20 August 2007 the Prosecutor replied to the applicant. He informed him that the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing and a forensic biological analysis of DNA was being carried out. Further investigative steps would be planned after receiving the results of that analysis and it was therefore impossible to predict the date of the completion of the pre-trial investigation. The applicant was further informed that under the Law of Criminal Procedure he had no right to read the case file or to receive copies thereof. The only persons who had such a right were the accused and the victims, but only after the completion of the criminal proceedings. With regard to the violations committed by the police officers, the applicant was advised to contact the Ventspils State Police. 38.  On 10 September 2007 the applicant submitted a complaint to the Prosecutor General concerning the Prosecutors’ responses of, inter alia, 22 December 2004, 23 May 2005 and 20 August 2007. He principally complained that the investigation was being deliberately delayed in order to protect S.J.’s murderer(s). 39.  The applicant’s complaint was forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court. On 1 October 2007 he received a response from A.Mi. informing him that the investigation and the gathering of evidence were continuing “in order to establish important facts”. Unspecified expert reports had apparently been ordered and their results were expected no earlier than December. Finally, the applicant was informed that his “allegation that the investigator and the supervising Prosecutor were not sufficiently active and were uninterested in establishing the truth were unfounded”. 40.  On 26 October 2007 the applicant submitted a further complaint to the Prosecutor General. He criticised the Office of the General Prosecutor’s decision to forward his complaint to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Kurzeme Regional Court. He also denounced the response of 1 October 2007 as “passive and unfounded” and considered that the fact that it did not address the substance of his complaints demonstrated that A.Mi. was not interested in establishing the truth about S.J.’s murder. 41.  On 13 November 2007 the Prosecutor General gave a final response to the applicant’s complaint. In the relevant parts of the response the applicant was informed:\n“... [the senior prosecutor A.M.] in his response of 1 October [2007] informed you that the investigation of the criminal case ... was ongoing, that expert reports had been ordered, and that after receiving expert reports further investigative steps would be planned. While criminal proceedings are pending, the materials in the criminal case file are an investigative secret (section 375 of the Law of Criminal Procedure), which is why it is impossible to give you more specific information concerning the investigative steps that have been taken and will be taken. It might be for that reason that you have formed an incorrect opinion that the investigation is being intentionally delayed and not conducted with the aim of establishing the culprit; however, such an opinion does not find support in the steps actually taken in the criminal proceedings.\nIn the course of the pre-trial investigation of the criminal case ... a sufficient amount of investigative steps were carried out: more than 15 expert reports were ordered and received and the need to order [additional] expert reports and the planning of further investigative steps was determined by the [findings of the] expert reports already received. In addition, the preparation of expert reports took significant time; more than 40 witnesses were questioned and other investigative steps carried out. Unfortunately the pre-trial investigation to this date has not allowed us to establish the circumstances [of S.J.’s death] or the culprit.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Sevastopol. 5.  The circumstances of the case concern a dispute between the applicant and a State company over the execution of a contract pursuant to which the latter undertook, in June 1990, to install a tombstone at the applicant’s son’s grave. 6.  On 21 August 1999 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Leninsky District Court of Sevastopol against the company for the alleged failure to comply with the contract. 7.  On 28 December 2000 the court adopted a judgment, partly allowing the applicant’s claim. It ordered the company to install the tombstone or to reimburse the money the applicant had paid for it. The court noted that although the applicant had missed the statutory time-limit for lodging her claim, it was justified, in the applicant’s particular situation, to renew the time-limit. 8.  On 6 February 2001 the Sevastopol City Court quashed that judgment, finding that the first instance court had erred in the assessment of facts and the application of law, and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 9.  On 19 June 2001 the Leninsky Court rejected the applicant’s claim as time-barred. It dismissed the applicant’s request for renewal of the statutory time-limit as unsubstantiated. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 29 January 2002 the Sevastopol City Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 19 June 2001. Under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in force at that time, the applicant had three months to lodge an appeal in cassation. 11.  On 4 April 2002 an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure became effective providing for one-month, instead of three-month, time-limit for lodging appeals in cassation. 12.  The applicant appealed in cassation on 25 April 2002. The Leninsky Court refused to refer the cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, finding that it had been lodged more than one month after the delivery of the decision of 29 January 2002. 13.  The applicant challenged the refusal, arguing that in her case the previous three-month time-limit had been applicable. 14.  Subsequently, for about a year the courts at two levels of jurisdiction (first and appeal) reconsidered the admissibility of the applicant’s cassation appeal. In particular, on 3 September 2002 and 23 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the first instance court’s decisions of 7 August 2002 and 14 January 2003 respectively which concerned the admissibility of her cassation appeal. 15.  Eventually, on 10 April 2003 the cassation appeal was referred to the Supreme Court. 16.  On 25 January 2006 the Supreme Court, having examined the appeal in camera, rejected it as unsubstantiated. It found no ground to annul the decisions on the merits of the applicant’s case. 17.  A copy of the Supreme Court’s decision was sent to the applicant on 18 April 2006. The applicant received it on 26 April 2006. 18.  According to the Government, in the course of the proceeding, the applicant amended her claim for non-pecuniary damages and submitted additional petitions. Also, out of thirty-two scheduled hearings, five were adjourned due to the applicant’s or her representative’s failure to appear, one hearing was not held because of the respondent’s failure to appear, one hearing was adjourned due to the judge’s absence for health reasons. On several occasions the courts had to renew, at the applicant’s request, the term for lodging an appeal which resulted in delays of about three months. 19.  According to the applicant, she attended all the hearings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Negotino. 6.  On 22 November 2001 the public prosecutor requested an investigating judge of the Negotino Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) to open an investigation against the applicant on the count of forgery of a notice convening a meeting of shareholders of a company, N., in which he was also a shareholder (“the notice”). The applicant was accused of having deceived a considerable number of shareholders into signing the notice by misleading them in the belief that there would be only one item on the agenda, instead of eight, as was actually the case. The investigating judge heard the applicant and 47 witnesses. After the investigation had been completed, on 29 May 2002 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment against the applicant. 7.  The trial court fixed twelve hearings, including that of 6 May 2004, which the applicant did not attend, although he had been summoned properly. During the trial, the court again heard oral evidence from the applicant, who had a court-appointed lawyer, and the 47 witnesses and admitted other documentary evidence. On 31 May 2005, in the presence of the applicant's lawyer only, the trial court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to four months' imprisonment suspended for one year. It did not rely on the statements made by the witnesses before the company's management denying that they had been informed about the remaining items on the agenda. The court rejected the applicant's defence as self-serving and the testimony of 6 defence witnesses as inconsistent and implausible. 8.  On 13 July 2005 the applicant who, at the relevant time, was not represented by counsel, appealed against that decision. He did not request to be notified of the date of the session (седница) of the Court of Appeal. 9.  On 2 November 2005 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the trial court's decision. The court decided in private. The public prosecutor was present, but not the applicant. The court addressed the public prosecutor's written submission of 17 October 2005 and her oral pleadings requesting that the applicant's appeal be dismissed. 10.  The decision was served on the applicant on 21 November 2005. 11.  On 19 January 2006 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request with the Supreme Court for the protection of legality (“legality review request”).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Zonguldak. 5.  On an unspecified date the Land Registry Commission attached to the General Directorate of Land Registration conducted a land registry survey of plots of land in Belen village in the Ereğli district of Zonguldak. Following this survey, plot nos. 2 and 3 were registered in the Land Registry in the names of A.G. and K.G. respectively. 6.  On 22 February 1985 the applicant brought a case before the Karadeniz Ereğlisi Cadastral Court requesting that plot nos. 2 and 3 be registered in his name. 7.  On 12 December 1986 the court joined the case in question to another claim, having regard to the fact that the parties and the subject matter of the cases were the same. 8.  On 6 December 2000 the court granted the applicant's request in part. The parties appealed. 9.  On 12 December 2002 the Court of Cassation remitted the case to the first-instance court on grounds of incorrect service. 10.  On an unspecified date the first-instance court rectified the error in service and sent the case to the Court of Cassation for re-examination. 11.  On 29 April 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 6 December 2000. 12.  On 11 October 2006 the first instance court dismissed the case. 13.  On 13 March 2008 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 11 October 2006. 14.  The case was remitted to the first-instance court for further examination. 15.  According to the information in the case file, the case is still pending before the first-instance court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is detained currently in Matīsa Prison. The relevant facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 21 March 2002 the State Police telephoned the applicant and asked him to appear at their station. According to the applicant, at the State Police station, prior to any formal charges being laid against him, he was accused of murdering Ģ.Č. The police officers used physical force against him in order to obtain a confession to the crime. As a result of the duress brought to bear upon him, the applicant made a written confession. 8.  On 23 March 2002 the applicant was transferred to a short-term detention facility. 9.  On 23 May 2002 the police opened an investigation into the alleged misconduct of police officers at the time of the applicant’s questioning. On 25 June 2005 a prosecutor concluded that the complaint was no longer subject to the prosecutor’s review. The prosecutor referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court of 26 April 2005 (see paragraph 40 below) dismissing the allegation of ill-treatment. 10.  Further details in relation to the events following the applicant’s appearance on 21 March 2002 at the State Police station are set out in the decision in Cesnieks (cited above), where the Government acknowledged, inter alia, that the applicant had been ill-treated while in police custody and there had been a lack of effective investigation of the applicant’s complaint of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 30, 32 and 36). 11.  The typewritten transcript of the applicant’s questioning as a witness dated 21 March 2002 from 5.20 p.m. to 6.40 p.m.[1] recorded the applicant’s statement to the police. 12.  The applicant declared that he had given Ģ.Č. documents concerning his late father’s company, T.S.C., because Ģ.Č. had been looking for a company to carry out the leasing of motor vehicles. Later, Ģ.Č. had asked the applicant whether he knew anyone who could make withdrawals at the bank. The applicant had suggested his acquaintance Z.K. Occasionally Z.K. had sent Ģ.Č. sums of money that he had withdrawn from the bank via the applicant. 13.  On the applicant’s evidence at the end of January 2002 he travelled to Moscow. While there Ģ.Č. had called him looking for Z.K., because Ģ.Č. had needed Z.K. to collect money at the bank. 14.  The applicant gave further information in his police statement about meeting Z.K. in Riga upon his return from Moscow and Z.K. telling him about a withdrawal of the funds and their handover to Ģ.Č. 15.  The applicant stated that he had learnt of Ģ.Č.’s murder from the police officers on the day the police had contacted him. 16.  In the applicant’s handwritten confession dated 22 March 2002[2], he stated that in October 2001 he had borrowed the sum of 4,500 Latvian lati (LVL), which he had been unable to pay back. 17.  On 25 January 2002 the applicant together with his acquaintance O.O. had travelled to Moscow hoping to obtain money there, but they were unsuccessful. 18.  The applicant had told O.O. about the transfers of money to Ģ.Č. by Z.K. and himself. O.O. had also learnt that the sum of LVL 17,000 would arrive in the coming days in the bank account, to be sent on to Ģ.Č., and had told the applicant that he could resolve the issue of the debt if the applicant gave him full information. 19.  On 1 February 2002 they had left Moscow and had arrived the next day in Riga. At around 2 p.m. the applicant had phoned Z.K., who later gave him LVL 5,600 and told him that the remaining amount would be withdrawn on Monday. On Sunday O.O. called the applicant, saying that everything was in order. Later the applicant realised that something terrible had occurred. 20.  The same handwritten confession contained an addendum to the effect that O.O. had said that he would murder Ģ.Č. 21.  According to the typewritten transcript of the applicant’s questioning as a suspect dated 22 March 2002 from 11 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.[3], the applicant confirmed the truthfulness of his confession. 22.  He added that he had concealed the circumstances and the purpose of his travel to Moscow. 23.  He declared that he had borrowed a sum of money from his acquaintance O.O. which he had failed to return. O.O. had demanded to be repaid in a threating manner and to go with the applicant to Moscow. O.O. had insisted that the applicant keep the money intended for Ģ.Č. and give him some of it in repayment of the debt instead. O.O. had told the applicant to forget about Ģ.Č., meaning that O.O. had decided to kill him. 24.  After their return to Riga, on 3 February 2002 O.O. had told the applicant over the phone that he could now forget about Ģ.Č. and that nobody would ever find him. The applicant had understood him to mean that Ģ.Č. had been murdered. 25.  A typewritten transcript of a further interview of the applicant as a suspect dated 22 March 2002 from 11.30 p.m. to 12.50 a.m.[4] indicated that the applicant wished to supplement his previous statement. 26.  The applicant stated that he had concealed the fact that he had sought the killing of Ģ.Č. in order to obtain the LVL 17,000 belonging to Ģ.Č. He had wanted Ģ.Č.’s money because he had been experiencing serious financial difficulties. He had ordered parts for his sports car from Japan but did not have the means to pay for them. 27.  The applicant added that while in Moscow Ģ.Č. had phoned him, looking for Z.K. The applicant then had learnt that Z.K. was to withdraw the sum of LVL 17,000 for Ģ.Č. On 31 January 2002 the applicant had asked O.O. to kill Ģ.Č. That same day, using the applicant’s phone, O.O. had called an acquaintance in Riga about the job and told his acquaintance that he would give details later. In the evening they had again phoned the same person from a hotel. That person had been Latvian and had had difficulty understanding Russian. O.O. had passed the phone over to the applicant, who had provided more information about Ģ.Č. On 1 February 2002, while on a bus to Riga, O.O. had again called the same person. 28.  Both transcripts of the applicant’s questioning recorded that he had wished to give a statement in the absence of a lawyer. 29.  The applicant and three co-accused O.O., V.Z. and J.G. were brought before the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa) to stand trial on charges related to the murder of Ģ.Č. 30.  On 11 October 2004 the Riga Regional Court found V.Z. and J.G. guilty of aggravated murder. The Regional Court established that V.Z. and J.G. had murdered Ģ.Č. on 2 February 2002, which they had partly admitted in the course of the trial. 31.  The Regional Court was unable to establish the guilt of the applicant and O.O. 32.  With reference to the applicant, the Regional Court reasoned that at trial he had pleaded not guilty to the criminal offences he was charged with and recanted the statements he had given to the police. According to the applicant, he had provided these statements as a result of ill-treatment by police officers, who had beaten him and broken his nose. In this regard the Regional Court reasoned:\n“In assessing the [applicant’s] explanation the court does not have a reason to not believe it, because, as is evident from the case materials, on 21 March 2002 from 5.20 p.m. to 6.40 p.m. [the applicant] was questioned as a witness ... however ... he was taken into custody on 21 March at 8 p.m. ... [but] he was not transferred to a detention facility until 1 a.m. on 23 March, remaining in the premises of the Riga police station (Rīgas rajona policijas pārvalde)...\nThe fact that [the applicant] had been asked at around 11 a.m. on the morning [of 21 March] to attend the police station was confirmed by the witness [S.R.], an employee of the Department for the Combat of Organised Crime (Organizētās noziedzības apkarošanas pārvalde)...\nThe foregoing was also confirmed by witnesses [A.B.], a police employee, and [I.K.], an inspector, who were unable to explain to the court why [the applicant] had not been released from the police station after having been questioned as a witness.\nThe fact that [the applicant] ... suffered bodily injuries while in custody is confirmed by the expert reports contained in the file...” 33.  In that light, the Regional Court found that Article 3 of the Convention had been violated with respect to the applicant, irrespective of the fact that the criminal case against the police employees had been terminated. 34.  The Regional Court also added that the applicant’s statements of 22 March 2002 had been contradictory. It deemed unreliable an expert report finding that there were no signs that the applicant had written the confession “in the circumstances of anxiety, fear or physical ill-treatment”. The Regional Court reasoned that the expert report did not contain “a study section” (izpētes daļa) that would allow it to understand how the expert had arrived at her conclusion. 35.  Accordingly, the Regional Court ruled that the applicant’s statements of 22 March 2002 could not be used in the applicant’s conviction. 36.  It further held that no other evidence had been obtained to the effect that the applicant had in any way organised, assisted or incited another person to commit Ģ.Č.’s murder. The evidence established that transactions involving money transfers had taken place between the applicant, Z.K. and Ģ.Č. This was corroborated by the evidence of witness I.Š., a police inspector who testified about an ongoing criminal investigation into illegal transactions involving all three individuals. 37.  The Regional Court in its judgment referred to telephone call records admitted in evidence. On 1 February 2002 at 5.27 p.m. a phone call had been made from the applicant’s mobile number to V.Z.’s mobile number. At the same time, it reasoned that V.Z. had never testified having spoken on the phone to the applicant or having previously known him. In addition, the Regional Court considered that it had no reason to conclude that O.O.’s testimony that he had used the applicant’s phone in order to contact V.Z. about a vehicle had been false. It was evident from the telephone call records that on several occasions between 20 January and 18 March V.Z. had been contacted from a number which according to O.O. was his. 38.  The first-instance judgment was appealed against to the Criminal Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Krimināllietu tiesu palāta) on behalf of the prosecution, the victim and both co-accused convicted at first instance. 39.  On 26 April 2005 the Supreme Court overturned the applicant’s acquittal and found him guilty of the aggravated murder of Ģ.Č. 40.  The judgment of the Supreme Court noted that in the appeal proceedings the applicant had continued to deny his initial statements and maintain that he had given them as a result of ill-treatment by police employees. In that regard, the Supreme Court reasoned as follows:\n“The Regional Court groundlessly (nepamatoti) accepted that [the applicant’s] statements and [his] confession given during the pre-trial investigation were not truthful.\nThe file does not contain impartial evidence affirming [the applicant’s] assertion that he gave these statements as a result of physical and psychological ill-treatment by police employees, [and] that police employees dictated the testimonies [to him]. That it was merely a coincidence that during the commission of the crime [the applicant] was together with [O.O.] ... [and] that a call was made from his phone at that time to [V.Z.].\nThe criminal case ... against police employees that they possibly had exceeded their powers and inflicted injuries on [the applicant] has been terminated and [the applicant’s] defence has not disputed this decision...\nThe Regional Court groundlessly rejected the expert report ... which concluded that the confession had been written by [the applicant] and [that there was] no indication ... of it being written in the circumstances of anxiety, fear or physical ill-treatment ... because the said expert report provides answers to the questions put to the expert. The expert report contains a study section providing the manner in which the expert reached the conclusion.\nFurthermore ... in comparing [the applicant’s] complaint of 25 March 2002 ... and the confession written on 22 March 2002 ... [there can be] no doubt ... that it is [the applicant’s] free style (brīvais stils) [of handwriting].” 41.  The Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s statement of 22 March 2002 to be admitted in evidence and relied on it in its judgment. 42.  The applicant was sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment, with confiscation of property and police control for two years. The applicant was immediately taken into custody. 43.  The defence lodged an appeal on points of law with the Criminal Cases Department of the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāta Krimināllietu departaments), arguing that the Supreme Court had convicted the applicant in violation of Articles 3 and 6 of the Convention because he had given the pre-trial confession and other statements relied upon by the court as a result of ill-treatment by police employees. The defence presented an extensive volume of evidence and pointed out that the applicant had been injured while in police custody and the circumstances of the injuries had not been explained. They submitted that there had been no other evidence in the file attesting to the applicant’s guilt. The court had been under an obligation to assess the material in the criminal case against the police employees and not merely to rely on the fact that the case against them had been terminated. In the defence’s submission, on 7 April 2004 they had appealed against the decision terminating that criminal case. Pursuing appeal had subsequently become impracticable “because the criminal case regarding the [applicant’s] beating had been joined, as evidence, to the criminal case concerning [Ģ.Č.’s] murder”. 44.  On 26 August 2005 the Senate of the Supreme Court decided to dismiss the appeal without holding a hearing. 45.  The decision of the Senate of the Supreme Court in its relevant part read as follows:\n“... contrary to the [requirements of the] Criminal Procedure Code, the appeals filed ... are not substantiated with [submissions as to] a violation of the said provisions of the law, but [rather] factual submissions are put forward [with the aim of obtaining] a re-evaluation of the evidence on which the appeals court’s guilty verdict is based.\n...\nPursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code ... the re-evaluation of evidence and establishment of new facts ... is not within the competence of the cassation court.\nThe reference in the appeal on points of law to a violation of ... the relevant international Convention in the course of [the lower court’s] adjudication is not based on the materials of this case and is therefore [purely] formal in nature.” 46.  The decision of the Senate of the Supreme Court was not subject to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969. A native of Chechnya, from 1996 she lived in the settlement for internally displaced persons from Chechnya in the village of Ordzhonikidzevskaya (also known as Sleptsovskaya), in the Ingush Republic of the Russian Federation (Ingushetia). The applicant later left Russia with her children and sought asylum in another country, where she now resides. She is the wife of Sultan Khatuyev, who allegedly disappeared in 2004 following his arrest by the security forces. 6.  On 2 August 2004 at about 8.00 a.m. an operation was carried out in the Ordzhonikidzevskaya settlement by the security forces with a view to finding members of illegal armed groups. More than one hundred servicemen and numerous vehicles were involved in the operation. 7.  The applicant stated that her home had been searched during this operation by two servicemen who neither introduced themselves nor produced any document. They checked Sultan Khatuyev's passport and ordered him to follow them to their car. In response to the applicant's questions, the servicemen told her that her husband would be taken along with some of their neighbours to the Sunzhensky district department of the Interior (ROVD) for an identity check. Six other persons were apprehended and taken to the Sunzhensky ROVD during the same operation. They were all neighbours and knew each other. 8.  As soon as the operation was over the applicant went by car to the Sunzhensky ROVD together with R.A., a relative of another apprehended person. They saw the seven apprehended men being taken from the yard into the ROVD building. 9.  Three of these men were released at approximately midnight. Two of them later stated that they had initially been detained for several hours in a wing on the ground floor and then taken to the second floor for questioning. 10.  On 3 August 2004 at approximately 1 a.m. a ROVD officer informed the applicant and the three men who had just been released that the other detainees, including Sultan Khatuyev, would be released in the morning. 11.  Around 8.00 a.m. on 3 August the applicant went back to the ROVD with relatives of the other detainees. They were told that the four remaining detainees had been taken to the Federal Security Service (FSB) office in Magas. The applicant and the other detainees' relatives immediately went there. While they were not allowed to enter the premises, an officer confirmed that the four people, including Sultan Khatuyev, were being detained at that office. 12.  In response to the applicant's repeated requests an officer came out of the building at 4.00 p.m. and released two more persons. He also told the applicant that the other two persons, Sultan Khatuyev and U.I., had already been released. According to U.I.'s relatives, he had indeed been released in an extremely poor condition by FSB officers between 1.00 and 2.00 p.m. and left alone at a rubbish dump. The applicant went to the rubbish dump to look for her husband but did not find him or any of his personal belongings. 13.  U.I. later told the applicant that he and Sultan Khatuyev had been detained in two neighbouring cells on the FSB premises and that he had heard Sultan Khatuyev groaning. He told her that he had been beaten by the FSB officers and that, given the sounds coming from the other cell, Sultan Khatuyev had been beaten as well. The lawyer representing the applicant submitted a written statement about his conversation with U.I. to that effect; however, he noted in the same statement that U.I. had feared reprisals and refused to sign any testimonies about his detention. According to the lawyer's submissions, U.I. and Sultan Khatuyev had been taken in the same car from the Sunzhenskiy ROVD to the FSB office in Magas. U.I. had had a plastic bag over his head but he had heard the voice of the applicant's husband, whom he had known well as they had been neighbours. He also told the lawyer that the car had not stopped anywhere on the way to Magas and that at one point he had heard Sultan Khatuyev screaming in the building. 14.  The applicant has had no news of Sultan Khatuyev since 2 August 2004. 15.  In support of her own statements, the applicant submitted statements by her relatives and a statement by one of the persons who had been detained on 2 August 2004 at the Sunzhenskiy ROVD together with Sultan Khatuyev. 16.  The Government did not dispute the circumstances of the applicant's husband's detention on 2 August 2004. 17.  Since 3 August 2004 the applicant has repeatedly applied in person and in writing to various public bodies. She has been supported in her efforts by NGO Memorial. In her letters to the authorities the applicant referred to her husband's detention and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. Mostly these enquiries have remained unanswered, or purely formal replies have been given in which the applicant's requests have been forwarded to various prosecutors' offices. The applicant submitted some of the letters to the authorities and the replies to the Court, which are summarised below. 18.  On 3 August 2004 the applicant lodged a written complaint with the Sunzhensky ROVD about the abduction of her husband. She was informed by the ROVD officers that they were not aware of his fate after he had been taken to the FSB office in Magas. 19.  On 4 August 2004 the applicant again went with her relatives to the ROVD office to inquire about her husband and talked to officer A.B., whom she had seen take part in the operation at issue. He gave them no information, but insulted the applicant and her sister-in-law using obscene language. The incident was interrupted by another officer, A.G., who had also taken part in the operation. The latter informed the applicant, after a telephone call to the FSB office in Magas, that Sultan Khatuyev was still being detained there. A.G. promised to find out the reasons for his detention, but failed to provide any further information in response to the applicant's subsequent telephone calls. 20.  On 6 August and 9 August 2004 the applicant complained to the Sunzhensky District Prosecutor's Office (hereafter “the district prosecutor's office”) about the abduction of her husband and demanding an investigation into the matter. 21.  By a letter of 9 August 2004 the FSB office of Ingushetia informed the applicant that they had no information about Sultan Khatuyev's apprehension and whereabouts. 22.  On 12 August 2004 the applicant requested the Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia to identify the servicemen involved in the abduction of her husband. 23.  On 19 August 2004 the applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office and submitted additional details of her husband's disappearance. 24.  On 20 August 2004 the District Prosecutor's Office opened a criminal investigation (case file no. 04600054) into Sultan Khatuyev's kidnapping under Article 126, part 1, of the Criminal Code. The applicant was informed thereof by letters of 31 August and 8 September 2004. 25.  In September 2004 the applicant received a reply from the acting Minister of the Interior of Ingushetia. The letter stated that on 2 August 2004 eight persons, including Sultan Khatuyev, had been apprehended during an operation carried out jointly by the FSB Department for Ingushetia and the special forces of the Ingush Ministry of the Interior (OMON) with a view to identifying and arresting persons involved in illegal armed groups. The Minister also confirmed that four of those persons had been released, while four others, including Sultan Khatuyev, had been relocated pursuant to the orders of the head of the FSB group Mr M.Ye. The Minister indicated that the investigation to find out Sultan Khatuyev's whereabouts was under way. 26.  On various dates in October 2004 the applicant again wrote to the district prosecutor's office. She inquired about the progress of the criminal proceedings, requested to be granted victim status and access to the case file and to question the six witnesses who had been apprehended together with her husband. The prosecutor's office replied on 1 November 2004 and confirmed that four persons including Sultan Khatuyev had been taken to the ROVD and subsequently transferred to the FSB office in Magas and that Sultan Khatuyev's whereabouts were still not known. 27.  On 4 November 2004 the applicant asked the district prosecutor to bring criminal charges against the persons involved in the abduction of her husband. She again requested access to the criminal case file. She also asked specifically for the other men who had been apprehended on the same day and the officials involved, including the ROVD officers who had arrested her husband and the FSB officer M.Ye., who had ordered his transfer to the Magas FSB Department, to be questioned. 28.  The applicant received no response to these requests. In reply to her subsequent requests the prosecutor's office indicated, by letter of 19 February 2005, that the investigation concerning criminal file no. 04600054 was still ongoing. 29.  On 20 February 2005 the investigation was discontinued given the failure to identify the persons against whom the charges were to be brought (Article 208, part 1, paragraph 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and the applicant was informed thereof by letter of 5 March 2005. 30.  On 5 May 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Sunzhensky District Court (“the district court”) under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. She requested the court to declare the inaction of the prosecutor's office unlawful, to quash the prosecutor's decision adjourning the investigation and to order a thorough and effective investigation into Sultan Khatuyev's abduction. 31.  On 24 May 2005 the district court dismissed the applicant's complaint. The court noted in particular that the investigation authorities had questioned certain officers of the Sunzhensky ROVD, including A.G., and complied with the plan of investigation measures. The court also noted that the necessary measures had been taken to secure the questioning of FSB officer M.Ye., but the latter had failed to appear due to circumstances beyond the investigator's control. 32.  On 4 June 2005 the Supreme Court of Ingushetia reviewed the applicant's cassation appeal against this decision. The court quashed and remitted the decision of 24 May 2005, with an instruction to the investigation authorities to question Mr M.Ye. 33.  The applicant received no further information about the proceedings in the case concerning her husband's abduction. In 2008 she informed the Court that she had been threatened by unnamed representatives of the security forces, who had allegedly told her to stop complaining. They threatened to plant drugs or arms on her teenaged sons or accuse them of being involved with illegal armed groups. The applicant and her family left Russia and sought asylum in another country. 34.  The applicant submitted that her health had deteriorated significantly since the events of 2 August 2004 and the disappearance of Sultan Khatuyev. Without presenting any documents, she claimed that in 2008 she had been diagnosed with a benign tumour, which she thought was a result of the endured stress. 35.  With reference to the information provided by the Prosecutor General's Office, the Government submitted that the investigation of the abduction of Sultan Khatuyev had commenced on 20 August 2004. 36.  On unspecified dates the investigation questioned the applicant and Sultan Khatuyev's parents. The applicant was granted victim status on 25 August 2004. 37.  The Government stated that two servicemen of the Sunzhenskiy ROVD had been questioned in the course of the investigation. They testified that on 2 August 2004 their office had assisted the FSB and the criminal police of Ingushetia in the security operation in Ordzhonikidzevskaya. One serviceman had taken part in this operation, while the other one had not. The aim of the operation had been to identify members of illegal armed groups and to check that the inhabitants of the settlement of internal migrants from Chechnya were complying with residence rules. The participating serviceman had been aware of the detention of four men, the identities and the reasons for detention of whom he had not known. The other serviceman (presumably, this was A.G., questioned on 3 September 2004 – see paragraph 31 above) had learnt of Sultan Khatuyev's detention from the latter's relatives. The witnesses had no other information about Sultan Khatuyev. 38.  It also appears from Government's observations that on an unspecified date the investigators questioned U.I., who refused to submit any complaints about the alleged ill-treatment. As it appears, no other witnesses were identified or questioned. 39.  The Government further cited the report of the border security regiment of the Ministry of the Interior of Ingushetia of 8 November 2004. According to them, 60 servicemen of the regiment had participated in the joint operation on 2 August 2004 aimed at identifying the persons who had taken part in a terrorist attack on 22 June 2004. Several persons had been delivered to the Sunzhenskiy ROVD. 40.  The Government also referred to a report from the Ingushetia Department of the FSB of 15 September 2004, according to which Sultan Khatuyev had been questioned in the service car in order to establish his identity. The FSB officers thus found out that in fact they had been looking for a relative of his, A.B. Khatuyev. In view of this Sultan Khatuyev had been released from the car at the gas station situated at the exit from Ordzhonikidzevskaya, before the road police block “Volga-20”. Sultan Khatuyev had rejected the servicemen's offer of a lift home. 41.  The Government submitted that in November 2004 the investigating authorities had sent a number of queries to various State bodies. On an unspecified date the Ingushetia department of the FSB stated that their office had not detained Sultan Khatuyev and had no information about his whereabouts. The Ministry of the Interior of Chechnya also replied, on 7 September 2004, that their agents had not detained Sultan. Also on unspecified dates the remand centres in the Northern Caucasus informed the investigation that the missing man had never been detained there. 42.  As far as the applicant's attempts to obtain judicial review of the prosecutor's decisions are concerned, the Government added that on 28 July 2005 the district court had granted the applicant's action against the prosecutor's office and had obliged the latter to carry out a complete and effective investigation into the circumstances of her husband's abduction. 43.  The investigation failed to establish the whereabouts of Sultan Khatuyev. The law enforcement authorities of Chechnya had never arrested or detained Sultan Khatuyev on criminal or administrative charges and had not carried out a criminal investigation in his respect. The Government insisted that the incident should be qualified not as detention, but as “apprehension with the aim of identifying personal identity” (“задержан для уточнения личности») and that as soon as his identity had been established, he had been released. 44.  According to the information submitted by the Government, between 20 August 2004 and 4 February 2008 the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions, and has so far failed to identify those guilty. The latest decision to resume the investigation was dated 4 February 2008. 45.  Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose any of the documents of criminal case no. 04600054. Relying on the information obtained from the Prosecutor General's Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Diyarbakır. 9.  On 28 October 2001 he was arrested by gendarmes and taken into custody at the Diyarbakır gendarmerie command. 10.  On 30 October 2001 the gendarmes took a statement from him. He was suspected of having assisted and supported the PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan), an illegal organisation under Turkish law. He allegedly signed his statement while blindfolded. At the end of his detention in the gendarmes' custody, he was examined by a forensic medical expert. No signs of ill-treatment were observed on his body. 11.  On 1 November 2001, after being interviewed by the public prosecutor, the applicant was brought before a judge of the Diyarbakır National Security Court, who ordered his detention pending trial. Before both the prosecutor and the judge the applicant denied the accusations against him. He was subsequently taken to Diyarbakır Prison. 12.  On 1 November 2001, ruling on applications by the governor of the state of emergency region and the public prosecutor, and on the basis of Article 3 (c) of Legislative Decree no. 430 on additional measures to be taken in connection with the state of emergency, the judge granted leave for the applicant to be sent back to the gendarmerie command for questioning for a period not exceeding ten days. The applicant was returned to the gendarmes' custody at 10.45 p.m. that day. 13.  On 6 November 2001 the National Security Court dismissed an objection by the applicant's family, on the ground that the length of his detention was consistent with the limits laid down in domestic law. 14.  On 10 November 2001 the judge extended the applicant's detention at the gendarmerie command by ten days, again on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 430. 15.  On 15 November 2001 an objection by the applicant's representative was dismissed by the National Security Court. 16.  On 20 November 2001 the applicant was taken back to prison. 17.  On 20 and 21 November 2001 the governor of the state of emergency region and the public prosecutor, again on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 430, asked the judge to extend the applicant's detention at the gendarmerie command by a further ten days. 18.  On 21 November 2001 the judge refused that request on the ground that the case file did not contain any evidence to substantiate it and that such an omission was attributable to the authorities. 19.  The public prosecutor lodged an objection against that decision. 20.  On 22 November 2001 the National Security Court allowed the objection and observed that the applicant was the subject of three other investigations. It granted a further ten-day extension and leave for the applicant to be taken from prison for questioning. 21.  On the same day the applicant was handed over to the gendarmes. 22.  On 1 December 2001 the judge extended the applicant's detention at the gendarmerie command by a further ten days. 23.  On 12 December 2001 the applicant was taken back to Diyarbakır Prison. 24.  Each time the applicant left and returned to the prison, he was examined by a doctor. The reports subsequently drawn up did not mention any signs of blows to the applicant's body. 25.  In an indictment of 6 April 2001, the public prosecutor brought criminal proceedings against the applicant under Article 168 of the Criminal Code, by which it is an offence to be a member of an armed gang. 26.  At a hearing on 26 June 2001, the National Security Court ordered the applicant's provisional release. 27.  On 27 August 2001 he was acquitted in the absence of any evidence other than his initial statement to the gendarmes. 28.  On 20 September 2001 the judgment became final. 29.  On 9 November 2001 the applicant's representative lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor at the National Security Court against the gendarmes, alleging that they had ill-treated the applicant in order to obtain a confession from him. He asked for the applicant to be given a thorough medical examination. He further submitted that the applicant's recurring periods of detention at the gendarmerie command had breached both the provision of the Constitution governing the maximum length of detention in police custody and Article 5 of the Convention. 30.  On 13 November 2001 the public prosecutor at the National Security Court ruled that he did not have jurisdiction and forwarded the file to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office. 31.  On 13 December 2001 the applicant was interviewed by the Diyarbakır public prosecutor. He asserted that he had been sprayed with cold water, had been insulted, threatened and beaten, had had his testicles squeezed and had been placed naked in front of a fan blowing cold air. He lodged a criminal complaint against the gendarmes involved in questioning him. He also requested a medical examination and treatment. 32.  In a letter of 21 December 2001 to the Diyarbakır public prosecutor, the applicant's representative reiterated his allegations of torture and asked for his client to be examined at a specialist medical department. 33.  On 14 February 2002 the public prosecutor ordered thorough medical examinations to be carried out at the urology department and a testicular scintigram and pelvic ultrasound scan to be carried out at the nuclear medicine department of Dicle University in order to detect any signs of ill-treatment. 34.  In a document of 27 March 2002, addressed to the Diyarbakır provincial governor, the public prosecutor sought leave to bring proceedings against the gendarmes in whose custody the applicant had been held. 35.  A urological ultrasound scan of 18 April 2002 and a testicular scintigram of 13 May 2002 did not reveal any abnormalities. 36.  A preliminary investigation was opened by the Diyarbakır Provincial Administrative Council in respect of the gendarmerie commander. 37.  On 1 May 2002 the Administrative Council decided, in the absence of sufficient evidence, not to open an investigation with a view to prosecuting the official in question. 38.  On 22 May 2002 the applicant lodged an objection against that decision with the Diyarbakır Administrative Court. 39.  On 31 December 2002 the Diyarbakır Administrative Court upheld the decision. The Diyarbakır public prosecutor's office subsequently discontinued the proceedings. 40.  On 7 February 2003 the applicant appealed to the Siverek Assize Court against the decision to discontinue the proceedings. 41.  On 26 March 2003 the appeal was dismissed in view of the decision by the Diyarbakır provincial governor's office.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Moscow. He is a professional politician who has held in the past the posts of Nizhniy Novgorod governor, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister for Energy. He later became one of the best-known opposition leaders, a founder of the political party the Union of Right Forces, and subsequently of the political movement Solidarnost. 7.  On 10 December 2010 eight individuals, none of whom are applicants in the present case, submitted notice of a public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow. They indicated, in particular, that a meeting would be held from 6 p.m. to 7.30 p.m. on Triumfalnaya Square, Moscow. They estimated that about 1,500 people would take part in the event. The notice stated that the proposed demonstration was intended “to demand respect for the constitutional right to peaceful demonstration and assembly guaranteed by Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation”. The organisers indicated, inter alia, that it would not be necessary to divert the traffic. 8.  On 22 December 2010 the Moscow Government’s Department for Liaison with Security Authorities informed the organisers that the event had been approved by the deputy mayor of Moscow. The number of participants had been limited to 1,000, and a particular sector of Triumfalnaya Square had been designated for the event: “in the area between the First and the Second Brestskaya Streets, opposite the Pekin Hotel and the adjacent road leading to the Tchaikovsky Concert Hall”. 9.  In the meantime, on 16 December 2010 another group of three individuals, none of whom are applicants in the present case, submitted notice of an alternative public demonstration to the mayor of Moscow, at the same time and place as the authorised event and with the same title. It appears that this second public demonstration was not authorised, but on 22 December 2010 a number of alternatives as to the time and place were offered to the organisers. Moreover, none of its organisers could go to the venue on 31 December 2010 because two of them had been arrested earlier on the same day; the third had been abroad. 10.  The authorised meeting began at 6 p.m. on 31 December 2010 at Triumfalnaya Square, as planned. According to the applicant, the perimeter of the square was cordoned off and was guarded by the riot police. The only access to the meeting venue was at Tverskaya Street. The applicant claimed that he had arrived at the meeting with his daughter; he had parked his car at Tverskaya Street and they had entered Triumfalnaya Square from Tverskaya Street through the only opening in the cordon. 11.  During the meeting the applicant addressed the participants with a speech in which he criticised the criminal conviction of Mikhail Khodorkovskiy, the former owner of the Yukos oil company, and Platon Lebedev, his associate. He also condemned the corruption in the State administration. He chanted the slogans “The authorities to resign!”, “Putin to resign!”, “Happy New Year without Putin!” 12.  At the end of the meeting the applicant, accompanied by his daughter, headed across Triumfalnaya Square towards Tverskaya Street. At the exit he saw the riot police arresting one of the participants in the demonstration. Shortly afterwards the applicant was also arrested and put into a police vehicle. 13.  The parties disagreed as to the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest. 14.  The applicant claimed that on the way to his car his passage had been obstructed by police officers and he and his daughter had found themselves in a crowd. They heard the police instruction over a loudspeaker calling for people to stay calm and to pass through. The applicant saw two people being arrested and put in police vans, and then he was arrested too, without any warning or explanation. The applicant claimed that he had not disobeyed or resisted the police; on the contrary, he had followed their instructions “to pass through”. He had been arrested by an officer who had been wearing a fur hat, an indication of his higher rank, as opposed to the crash helmets worn by the riot police troops guarding the cordon. 15.  The applicant alleged that there existed at least three video recordings of his arrest, including the events immediately leading up to it; they had been produced by two media channels and one independent photographer, Mr T. He also maintained that there existed an official video of the public demonstration and the ensuing arrests, which had allegedly been shot by the police and kept at the Moscow Department of the Interior. 16.  According to the Government, at the end of the meeting the applicant had headed towards Tverskaya Street and had begun calling passers-by to take part in another, unauthorised, meeting while shouting out anti-government slogans. They alleged that two police officers, Sergeant X and Private Y, had warned the applicant; they had ordered him to stop agitating the crowd and to return to the authorised meeting. They further contended that the applicant had ignored the warning and had continued shouting out the slogans and disobeying the police. Confronted with this behaviour, X and Y arrested him. 17.  At 7 p.m. on the same day the applicant was taken to the police station of the Tverskoy District Department of the Interior. At 7.10 p.m. Private Y drew up a report stating that the applicant had been escorted to the police station “in order to draw up the administrative material”. Also at 7.10 p.m., the on-duty police officer drew up a report on the applicant’s administrative arrest under Article 27.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, stating, like the other report, that he had been arrested “in order to draw up the administrative material”. The applicant signed both reports, indicating his disagreement with their content. 18.  Both X and Y produced identical duty reports stating, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“... on 31 December 2010 at 18.30 Boris Yefimovich Nemtsov was apprehended [because] he had disobeyed a lawful order of the police in connection with [X and Y] performing [their] duty of maintaining public order and safeguarding the public. He (Nemtsov) stood at 31 Tverskaya Street and began to shout “Down with Putin!”, “Russia without Putin!” as well as insults to President Medvedev, catching people’s attention and calling them to come to the Mayakovskiy monument for a meeting. [X and Y] approached Nemtsov, introduced themselves and warned him that it was unacceptable to hold a meeting at Triumfalnaya Square. They invited him to proceed to the authorised event that was taking place between the First and the Second Brestskaya Streets, opposite the Pekin Hotel. Nemtsov did not react and continued to shout out slogans and call people to hold a meeting. Nemtsov deliberately refused to comply with the lawful orders to cease his actions breaching public order, and continued them ostentatiously. To prevent him from organising an unauthorised meeting at Triumfalnaya Square and to prevent the unlawful acts, he was invited to enter a police van. In response to [these] lawful orders to enter the police van, Nemtsov began to break loose. He pushed us away and shouted insults to us: “Down with the police state!”, “Free-for-all cops!”, attempting to cause mayhem among the citizens surrounding him. By doing so he demonstrated his refusal to carry out the lawful order of the police and prevented them from carrying out their duty, thus committing an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences”. 19.  At 7.30 p.m. X and Y made witness statements, essentially copying the text of their duty reports. 20.  At the same time the district police inspector drew up a report on the administrative offence, stating that the applicant had disobeyed a lawful order of the police in breach of Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicant signed that report with the remark “100% lies”. 21.  On the same day the head of the same police station issued a decision to transfer the administrative case file to the Justice of the Peace. 22.  On the same day at about 7.15 p.m. the NTV television channel reported on the series of arrests following the demonstration at Triumfalnaya Square. Police Colonel B. commented on the applicant’s arrest, stating that he had been arrested for instigating an unauthorised meeting. 23.  The applicant remained in detention at the police station until 2 January 2011, pending the determination of the charges against him. 24.  The applicant described the conditions of his detention at the police station as extremely poor. He was detained in a solitary cell measuring 1.5 by 3 metres, with a concrete floor, without windows and with very bleak artificial lighting, which was insufficient for reading. The cell was not equipped with ventilation or furniture, except for a narrow wooden bench without a mattress or any bedding. The walls in the cell had been coated with “shuba”, a sort of abrasive concrete lining. The cell was not equipped with a lavatory or wash basin. The applicant had been obliged to call the wardens to take him to the lavatory when they were available. He was not provided with food or drink; he received only the food and drinking water that was passed to him by his family. 25.  The Government submitted that from 31 December 2010 to 10 a.m. on 2 January 2011 the applicant had been detained in an administrative‑detention cell measuring 5.6 sq. m equipped with artificial lighting and mandatory ventilation. They claimed that the applicant had been provided with drinking water and food, as well as with a sleeping place and bedding, but had refused to take them because he had received everything necessary from his family and friends. 26.  On 1 January 2011 two members of a public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited the police station to check the conditions of the applicant’s detention. Their report stated that the applicant had been detained in a cell without a window, which was poorly lit, lacked ventilation and had no sanitary facilities, sleeping place, mattress or bedding. They found that the cell was not adequate for a two-day confinement and noted that the applicant had not been receiving hot food. 27.  On 2 January 2011, following his conviction for an administrative offence, the applicant was transferred to another detention facility until 15 January 2011. 28.  The applicant claimed that the poor conditions of detention had had a negative impact on his health. He submitted a medical certificate indicating that between 3 and 12 January 2011 he had sought medical assistance every day. 29.  On 2 January 2011 the Justice of the Peace of circuit no. 369 of Tverskoy District of Moscow scheduled the hearing of the applicant’s case to take place on the same day. 30.  At 11.30 a.m. the applicant was brought before the Justice of the Peace, who examined the charges. 31.  In the courtroom the applicant discovered that there was no seat for him and he remained standing during the hearing, which lasted for over five hours. The parties disagreed as to the reasons why the applicant had remained standing. According to the applicant, the Justice of the Peace had ordered him to stand. The Government contested that allegation and claimed that the Justice of the Peace had repeatedly asked if anyone in the audience could give their seat to the applicant, but the applicant and his counsel had objected and insisted that he remain standing. 32.  The applicant claimed that standing throughout the trial had been humiliating and physically difficult, especially after having spent two days in detention in poor conditions. He also alleged that it had prevented him from participating effectively in the proceedings because he could only address the judge in writing and had been obliged to write his submissions while standing up. This had further aggravated his fatigue and hampered the conduct of his defence. 33.  The applicant pleaded not guilty and claimed that he had been detained for no reason other than political oppression. He contested the content of the police reports, in particular the statement that the police had given him a warning or an order which he could have disobeyed. 34.  At the hearing the applicant lodged a number of motions. He requested in particular that the court admit as evidence the video footage of his arrest broadcast by two media channels. He also requested that the recording made by Mr T., an independent photographer, be admitted as evidence (see paragraph 15 above). 35.  The applicant also requested that the court obtain from the prosecution the video recording made by the Moscow police at the scene of the public demonstration. 36.  The applicant further requested that the court call and cross-examine Police Colonel B. about the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, which he had commented on in the media (see paragraph 22 above). 37.  The Justice of the Peace dismissed the applicant’s request to admit the video recordings on the grounds that the provenance of the recordings was not supported by evidence. The court also refused to order that the video recording made by the police be admitted as evidence, stating that the applicant’s request was not “specific enough” and that the applicant had failed to prove the existence of any such recordings. Lastly, the court refused to call and examine Police Colonel B. as a witness, having considered that request irrelevant. 38.  At the applicant’s request the court called and examined thirteen witnesses who had been at the scene of the authorised demonstration. They testified that they had heard the applicant addressing the meeting and that after his speech he had said farewell and left; he had not made any calls to go on to another meeting. Six of those witnesses testified that they had left the meeting at the same time as the applicant and had witnessed his arrest. They explained that the exit from the meeting had been blocked by the riot police and the crowd had begun to build up because those who wanted to leave Triumfalnaya Square could not do so. When the applicant arrived at the cordon the police surrounded him so as to separate him from others wanting to leave the meeting, and arrested him. Eight witnesses stated that the applicant had not been shouting any slogans and had not been acting against the police orders before being surrounded and arrested. One of those witnesses, M.T., stated that she had heard the applicant asking the riot police why the exit had been blocked. She had also heard him shouting that Article 31 of the Constitution guaranteed the freedom of assembly, but he had not shouted any calls or obscenities. The remaining witnesses had not seen the actual arrest. In particular, the applicant’s daughter and her friend testified that they had been walking back to the car with the applicant and talking about the plans for New Year’s eve, and when they had arrived at the police cordon they had lost sight of the applicant in the crowd; one or two minutes later they had called him on his mobile phone and had found out that he had been arrested. 39.  The court called and examined two policemen, sergeant X and private Y, who had signed the reports stating that they had arrested the applicant because he had disobeyed their orders. They testified that on 31 December 2010 they had been on duty maintaining public order at Triumfalnaya Square. They had seen the applicant at 31 Tverskaya Street. He had been shouting anti-government slogans and calling people around him to hold an unauthorised meeting. They had approached the applicant and requested him to stop agitating outside the authorised meeting; they had asked him to return to the place allocated for the meeting and to speak there. The applicant had not reacted to their requests, so they had asked him to proceed to the police van. The applicant had disobeyed that order and had been arrested; he had put up resistance while being arrested. 40.  On the same day the Justice of the Peace found that the applicant had disobeyed the police orders to stop chanting anti-government slogans and had resisted lawful arrest. The Justice of the Peace based her findings on the witness statements of X and Y, their written reports of 31 December 2010, their written statements of the same date, the report on the administrative arrest of the same date, the notice of the public demonstration of 16 December 2010 and the reply of 22 December 2010 indicating that it had not been authorised (it appears that this reference concerned the events described in paragraph 9 above). The Justice of the Peace dismissed the applicant’s testimony on the grounds that as a defendant, he would have sought to exonerate himself from administrative liability. She also dismissed the testimonies of seven eyewitnesses on the grounds that they had contradicted the policemen’s testimonies and because those witnesses had been acquainted with the applicant, had taken part in the same demonstration and therefore must have been biased towards the applicant. The testimonies of the remaining six witnesses were dismissed as irrelevant. 41.  The applicant was found guilty of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police, in breach of Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 42.  On 3 January 2011 the applicant wrote an appeal against the judgment and submitted it to the detention facility administration unit. It appears that despite his counsel’s numerous attempts to lodge the appeal directly with the court, it was not accepted before 9 January 2011. On 11 January 2011 his counsel submitted a supplement to the points of appeal. 43.  In his appeal the applicant claimed that his arrest and conviction for the administrative offence had been in breach of the domestic law and in violation of the Convention. He alleged that his right to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly had been violated. He contested the findings of fact made by the first instance as regards his conduct after he had left the meeting. He challenged, in particular, the court’s refusal to admit the photographic and video materials as evidence or to obtain the footage of the demonstration shot by the police. In addition, he complained about the manner in which the first-instance hearing had been conducted. In particular, he alleged that the Justice of the Peace had ordered him to stand throughout the hearing, which had been humiliating and had made it difficult to participate in the proceedings. The applicant also complained about the conditions of his detention at the police station from 31 December 2010 to 2 January 2011. 44.  On 12 January 2011 the Tverskoy District Court examined the appeal. At the applicant’s request the court kept the verbatim records of the hearing. 45.  During the appeal hearing the applicant complained of the alleged unlawfulness of his arrest and the poor conditions of his detention at the police station. He asked the court to declare the acts of the police who had detained him for over forty hours before bringing him before a court unlawful. 46.  As regards the merits of the administrative charges, the applicant reiterated before the appeal instance his requests that the court admit three video recordings of his arrest as evidence and that it obtain the video recording made by the Moscow police. He also requested that two photographs of his arrest be admitted as evidence. He asked the court to call and examine photographers T. and V. as witnesses and to cross-examine police officers X and Y again. The court granted the requests to admit one video recording and two photographs as evidence, and decided to call and examine photographer T. as a witness, but rejected all the other requests. 47.  Photographer T. testified at the hearing that he had gone to the meeting to film it and had been waiting for the applicant at the exit from the meeting because he had wanted to interview him. When the applicant approached the exit a big group of policemen rushed over to block his way and there had been a minute’s pause when a crowd began to build up against the cordon, blocking the passage. Then one person was arrested, and about thirty seconds later someone else, and then the applicant. T. saw the applicant’s arrest as he was filming it from a distance of about five or six metres. He was separated from the applicant by several rows of people, of which two rows consisted of policemen. The recording began a few minutes before the arrest and continued without any interruption until the applicant had been put in the police van. He specified that the applicant had not put up any resistance to the officers arresting him. He identified on the photograph the officer wearing a fur hat, who had arrested the applicant, and explained that that person had taken the applicant out of the crowd and then passed him on to another policeman in order to put the applicant into the police van. He also stated that the applicant had not shouted any slogans or insults. The applicant had repeated “Easy, easy” to the policemen while being escorted to the van. T. also testified that the applicant had been standing throughout the first-instance hearing, while his counsel had been sitting on a chair. 48.  The court watched the video recording made by T. However, it decided not to take cognisance of T.’s testimonies, his recording or the photograph, on the following grounds:\n“... the footage begins with the image of a large number of people gathered at 31 Tverskaya Street in Moscow, with Mr Nemtsov at the centre. A policeman addresses the citizens through a loudspeaker with a request to disperse and not to block the passage, but Mr Nemtsov remains standing in one place addressing the gathered citizens. The video operator is at such a distance from the applicant that he is separated from him by several rows of people, including the gathered citizens and the riot police, and it is impossible to understand what these citizens and the applicant are saying. Subsequently the recording of the applicant is interrupted as the camera points away onto the policemen putting the first arrested person, and then another one, into the police vans. Only afterwards does the video recording show the applicant being led to a police van by policemen, and he puts up no resistance at this moment of the footage.\nIn this respect, and taking into account that the footage does not show Mr Nemtsov’s actions immediately before his placement in the police van, the video and the accompanying audio do not depict Mr Nemtsov addressing the citizens before he was detained. The court concludes that the submitted footage does not refute the testimonies of the policemen, and [T.’s] testimony cannot refute them either because he observed only those actions of Mr Nemtsov that appear on the footage.\n...\nThe photographs submitted during the appeal hearing that depict Mr Nemtsov surrounded by policemen, one of whom is supporting his arm, cannot be considered by the court as refuting the event of the offence or the evidence, including the testimonies of [X and Y], because of the absence of information on the exact time of its taking, or on its connection with the place ... ” 49.  On the same day the court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. It found, in particular, on the basis of the testimonies and reports of X and Y, that the applicant had indeed been guilty of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police. It upheld the reasoning of the first-instance court whereby it rejected the testimonies of thirteen witnesses called at the applicant’s request. As regards the testimonies of X and Y, on the other hand, it found no reason to mistrust them because they had had no personal interest in the outcome of the applicant’s case. 50.  In its appeal decision the court addressed the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention pending the first-instance trial and considered that there had been no breach:\n“... after the report on the administrative offence had been drawn up, the information necessary for establishing the circumstances of the committed offence was collected, including the explanations of [X and Y], the notice of the place of the public demonstration of 31 December 2010, the [mayor’s] reply to that notice, as well as the personal characteristics of the person in relation to whom the administrative offence report had been drawn up. A ruling was made by the Justice of the Peace of 2 September 2010 convicting the applicant of an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. Therefore the applicant’s detention during less than 48 hours was not in breach of Article 27.5 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences.” 51.  As regards the conditions of the applicant’s detention between 31 December 2010 and 2 January 2011, the court found that his complaints had been outside the scope of the current proceedings, holding that another type of legal action should have been brought by the applicant to challenge those acts. The court did not specify what procedure the applicant should have followed as an avenue for those complaints. 52.  On 31 March 2011 the applicant lodged before the Tverskoy District Court a complaint under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He challenged his initial arrest and complained of the poor conditions of detention for over forty hours. 53.  On 4 April 2011 the court refused to accept the applicant’s action, holding that the questions concerning the lawfulness of the police acts had to be examined in the relevant administrative proceedings, but could not be dealt with in civil proceedings. 54.  On 14 April 2011 the applicant appealed against the refusal to accept his complaint. The Moscow City Court dismissed his appeal on 22 July 2011. It relied, in particular, on Ruling no. 2 of 10 February 2009 by the Plenary Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and held, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“... the courts may not examine complaints lodged under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure against acts or inaction connected with the application of the Code of Administrative Offences, Chapter 30 of which provides for the procedure for challenging them; or acts or inaction for which the Code of Administrative Offences does not provide for a procedure by which they may be challenged. Acts or inaction that are inseparable from the administrative case may not be subject to a separate challenge (evidence in the case, [including] reports on the application of precautionary measures to secure the course of justice in the administrative case). In this case the arguments against the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence or the application of a precautionary measure to secure the course of justice may be put forward during the hearing of the administrative case or in points of appeal against the judgment or ruling on the administrative case. However, if the proceedings in the administrative case are terminated, the acts committed in the course of these proceedings, if they entailed a breach of an individual’s or a legal person’s rights or freedoms, or hindered the exercise of their rights and freedoms, or imposed an obligation after the proceedings had been terminated, [they] may be challenged under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under the same procedure one may challenge the acts of officials if no administrative file has been opened.” 55.  The applicant also attempted to challenge the acts of the judiciary involved in his case before the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow. His attempts were, however, unsuccessful.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Budaörs. 6.  On 2 January 2008 the applicant, a journalist, published an article in a column entitled “Opinion” of a national daily paper. The subject of the article was the quality of a well-known Hungarian wine variety, a product of T. Zrt, a State-owned corporation, which was, in the applicant’s view, bad and its popularity with Hungarian consumers unjustified. The article contained the following passage:\n“On nine out of ten occasions, it is a product of T. Zrt, available below 1,000 [Hungarian forints] per bottle, that represents the world’s best wine region, the Hungarian National Pride and Treasure... [and that could make me cry]. Not only because of the taste – although that alone would easily be enough for an abundant cry: sour, blunt and over-oxidised stuff, bad-quality ingredients collected from all kinds of leftovers, grey mould plus a bit of sugar from Szerencs, musty barrel – but because we are still there ...: hundreds of thousands of Hungarians drink [this] shit with pride, even devotion... our long-suffering people are made to eat (drink) it and pay for it at least twice ([because we are talking about a] State-owned company); it is being explained diligently, using the most jerk-like demagogy from both left and right, that this is national treasure, this is how it is supposed to be made, out of the money of all of us, and this is very, very good, and we even need to be happy about it with a solemn face. This is how the inhabitants (subjects) of the country are being humiliated by the skunk regime through half a litre of alcoholised drink.\nAnd once again, I would remind everybody of how people were whining back then, saying that foreigners were coming to destroy [T.], buy up the market and make everything multinational and alien-hearted; and then it turned out that those foreigners made gorgeous wine, just like some lucky, resolute and very talented Hungarian family wineries, that they tried to make [T.] world-famous again, because this was their business interest (profit, ugh!); while we as a community are trying to destroy their achievements using State money, lest something finally could be a success. ...” 7.  T. Zrt filed a criminal complaint against the applicant. On 2 June 2009 the Budapest II/III District Court convicted him of defamation (rágalmazás). The court held that the criticism expressed in the applicant’s article went beyond the boundaries of journalistic opinion and amounted to stating a fact susceptible of harming the reputation of the producer of the wine variety in question. The court refrained from imposing a sentence for a probationary period of one year. 8.  On appeal, on 5 November 2009 the Budapest Regional Court reversed this judgment, holding that the incriminated statement was a value judgment and that therefore the applicant was to be convicted for libel (becsületsértés) under section 180(1)b of the Criminal Code. The court held that although the applicant was entitled to express his opinion about the wine in question, by characterising it as “shit” – an expression unduly insulting – he had infringed the producer’s right to a good reputation. The court reduced the sanction to a reprimand. 9.  On 10 May 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in the Orenburg Region. 6.  In April 2003 the applicant, a retired military officer, sued the Military Department of the Orenburg Region for an increase of his pension and compensation for pecuniary damage. 7.  On 16 April 2003 the Totskiy District Court of the Orenburg Region allowed the applicant's action and awarded him 20,989.90 Russian roubles (RUR). 8.  On 11 June 2003 the bailiffs opened enforcement proceedings. 9.  On 12 August 2003 the bailiffs' service discontinued the enforcement proceedings because the debtor had no available funds. It advised the applicant to apply to the Orenburg regional department of the Ministry of Finance. 10.  By letter of 10 October 2003, the Orenburg regional department advised the applicant to apply to head office of the Ministry of Finance. 11.  On 25 December 2003 the Ministry of Finance refused to pay the award and referred the applicant back to the bailiffs. 12.  On 9 January 2004 the applicant resubmitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs' service. On 15 March 2004 the bailiffs again discontinued enforcement because the debtor had no available funds. 13.  On 10 March 2005 the Military Department transferred the amount due into the applicant's bank account. 14.  On 16 May 2005 a prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings against the head of the Military Department for his failure to enforce the judgment, finding that he had not acted with intent.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Warsaw.\nThe facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10.  On 1 May 1983 the applicant, following clashes with the police during anticommunist demonstrations, was put by the police in their van and beaten. He was seriously injured. On 17 May 1983 he was discharged from hospital. A brain injury, post-traumatic epilepsy and permanent brain damage were diagnosed. Since then he has remained under permanent care in a psychiatric clinic. 11.  By a judgment of 24 June 1986, the Warsaw Regional Court granted the applicant compensation for damage to his health and held that a monthly supplementary pension be paid by the police – the State Treasury. The court observed that the applicant had lost the capacity to work and was disabled in the so-called second degree (an intermediate degree of disability). 12.  On 11 April 1990 the applicant was granted the first degree status of disability (serious disability). 13.  In 1990 the monthly supplementary pension was increased to 100 PLN as a result of a settlement between the parties. 14.  On 27 February 1993 the applicant's father lodged a claim with the Warsaw Regional Court, in which he requested an increase in his son's monthly pension. On 8 March 1993 the Warsaw Regional Court remitted the case to the Warsaw District Court. Subsequently, six hearings were held in the case. On 15 September 1993 the court held a hearing. The defendant's lawyer asked for an adjournment in order to reach a friendly settlement. 15.  On 12 November 1993 the court held a hearing. The applicant increased the amount of the claim. The court decided to request certain information from the applicant's former employer. On 19 November 1993 the court obtained the requested information. 16.  On 23 November 1993 the court held a hearing. The applicant increased the amount of the claim. The court decided to request the psychiatric clinic for some additional information on the applicant's health. On 13 December 1993 the applicant's lawyer specified the claim. He requested the court to appoint an expert to give a report on the applicant's health. 17.  On 17 December 1993 the next hearing was held. It was decided to request the psychiatric clinic to expedite the preparation of the requested documents. 18.  On 27 January 1994 the court held its next hearing and interviewed witnesses. The applicant further specified the claim. 19.  On 6 May 1994 a hearing was held. The defendant contested the amount of the applicant's claim. The court decided to request the applicant's former employer to submit certain information. On 24 May 1994 the applicant increased his claim. Taking into account the value of the claim, on 25 May 1994 the applicant requested the court to remit the case to the Regional Court. On 23 June 1994 the Warsaw District Court remitted the case to the Warsaw Regional Court, as the latter had become competent following the increase of the applicant's claim. Subsequently, on 25 November 1994 and 21 December 1994 the defendant and the applicant submitted pleadings to the court. 20.  In January 1995 the applicant requested the court not to schedule any hearings in the period from 1 until 18 March 1995. In February 1995 the applicant requested the court not to schedule any hearings from 1 until 15 April 1995. On 19 April 1995 the applicant increased the claim. 21.  On 28 April 1995 the parties asked for an adjournment in order to reach an out-of-court settlement. Their negotiations subsequently failed. By pleadings of 18 May, 20 June, 20 July, 21 August, 22 September, 10 October and 21 November 1995 the applicant further specified his claim. On 14 November 1995 the court requested the applicant's former employer to submit certain documents. The documents were submitted on 21 November 1995. 22.  On 1 December 1995 the hearing was adjourned to give the applicant two weeks to submit his comments on the documents received by the court on 21 November. On 1 December 1995, 2 January 1996 and 22 January 1996 the applicant specified his claim.\nOn 23 February 1996 the applicant complained to the Supreme Court about the length of the proceedings. On 15 April 1996 he was informed that the case had been placed under the administrative supervision of the President of the Warsaw Regional Court. 23.  On 9 September 1996 the applicant lodged a motion with the Warsaw Regional Court challenging the presiding judge for an alleged lack of impartiality. This motion was dismissed on 18 September 1996. 24.  On 29 January 1997 the court received requested information from the applicant's former employer. On 5 February 1997 the expert submitted a report ordered by the court in November 1996. On 13 February 1997 the applicant's lawyer requested the court not to schedule any hearings in March 1997. 25.  On 17 February 1997 the court requested the parties to submit their comments on the expert report within the fourteen days' time-limit. On 26 February 1997 the defendant informed the court that he agreed with the conclusions of the report. On 11 March 1997 the court once more requested the applicant to submit his comments. Apparently, further questions were put to the expert. On 7 November 1997 the expert submitted to the court the supplementary report. On 1 December 1997 the applicant lodged his objections against the report. 26.  On 9 January 1998 the court held a hearing. The applicant requested the court to appoint a new expert. He once more challenged the expert opinion. The court refused and closed the hearings in the case. 27.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant increased and modified his claim to a very significant extent. 28.  On 16 January 1998 the court accordingly re-opened the proceedings. The court also gave an interlocutory decision that a certain sum be paid monthly to the applicant in order to secure his claim. 29.  On 4 March 1998 the applicant submitted motions as to the evidence to be taken. On 24 March 1998 the applicant submitted a new proposal for calculating the amount of the pension. On 8 April the defendant opposed that new proposal. On 24 July 1998 the applicant increased his claim. 30.  On 5 August 1998 the court held a hearing. 31.  By a judgment of 14 August 1998 the applicant's claim was partly dismissed and partly allowed. The judgment was served on the applicant three months later. The applicant appealed. By an order of 2 December 1998, he was requested to submit certain copies of documents for his appeal. This order was left by the postman at the applicant's door. Later, the post office returned it to the court marked “apartment closed”. 32.  On 29 December 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected the applicant' s appeal for failure to comply with its order of 2 December 1998. On 5 January 1999 the applicant complained to the Warsaw Appeal Court. On 11 January 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal remitted the case to the Warsaw Regional Court and ordered the court to clarify whether the applicant wished to challenge the decision of 29 December 1998, or to lodge a request in order to reinstate the time-limit for submitting the requested documents. 33.  On 14 January 1999 the applicant appealed against the decision of 29 December 1998. 34.  On 26 January 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of 50 PLN for the procedural appeal, which the applicant did on the next day. 35.  On 5 February 1999 the applicant received an order dated 2 February 1999 summoning him to pay 50 PLN in court fees. The applicant requested a meeting with the President of the Civil Section on 8 February 1999 in order to clarify what the court fee was for. The meeting did not take place as the President was absent on the date which had been fixed. The President apologised in a letter of 24 February 1999. 36.  On 12 February and 29 March 1999 the applicant specified his claim. 37.  By a decision of 29 April 1999, the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 29 December 1998 and rejected his appeal on the merits of the case for failure to comply with the procedural requirements. The court informed the applicant that he could lodge a request to reinstate the time-limit for submitting the documents requested by the court. 38.  On 16 June 1999 the applicant requested the court to appoint a lawyer under the legal aid scheme with a view to lodging a cassation appeal against the decision of 29 April 1999. He lodged also a “personal” cassation appeal. On 22 June 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal allowed this request, but the lawyer was not appointed until 13 August 1999. 39.  In the meantime, on 5 August 1999 the Court of Appeal rejected the cassation appeal against the decision of 29 December 1998 for not having been presented by a lawyer as required by law.\nOn 20 August 1999 the applicant's lawyer lodged an appeal against the decision of 5 August 1999 with the Supreme Court in order to reinstate the time-limit for lodging the cassation appeal. The cassation appeal itself was submitted to the Supreme Court on 30 August 1999. 40.  By a decision of 7 December 1999, the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 5 August 1999 for having been reached without due consideration to the applicant's pending legal aid application. 41.  On 31 January, 4 and 15 May 2000 the applicant specified the claim. 42.  On 25 May 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal reinstated the time-limit for lodging the cassation appeal against the procedural decisions of 29 December 1998 and of 29 April 1999. 43.  On 3 October 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of 29 December 1998 and 29 April 1999 for procedural defects. 44.  On 12 January 2001 the applicant increased his claim. 45.  By a letter of 16 February 2001, the Warsaw Court of Appeal informed the applicant that the next hearing in the appellate proceedings would be held on 16 March 2001. 46.  On 29 March 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the judgment of 14 August 1998. The judgment was served on the applicant on 8 June 2001. 47.  On 2 July 2001 the applicant's lawyer lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. On 20 December 2001 the court rejected the cassation appeal, considering that it had not been shown that arguable grounds existed which would justify the examination of the appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are:\n1) Mr Usman Karimov, born in 1949,\n2) Ms Rikhant Karimova, born in 1957,\n3) Ms Luiza Karimova, born in 1978 and\n4) Ms Seda Amayeva, born in 1985. 6.  The applicants are Russian nationals. The first applicant lives in Grozny, Chechnya, and the other three applicants live in the village of Proletarskoye (also known as Proletarskiy), in Grozny district, Chechnya. The applicants are represented before the Court by lawyers of the Stichting Russian Justice Initiative (“the SRJI”), an NGO based in the Netherlands with a representative office in Russia. 7.  The first and the second applicants are the parents of Arbi Karimov, who was born in 1981. The third applicant is his sister and the fourth applicant is his wife. 8.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 9.  At the material time the applicants lived in Proletarskoye, in Grozny district, Chechnya. The settlement was under the full control of Russian federal forces and the area was under a curfew. Russian military checkpoints were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement. 10.  On the night of 11 January 2003 (in the submitted documents the date is also referred to as 12 January 2003) the applicants and Arbi Karimov were sleeping in their house at 32 Belostotskaya Street. At about 2 a.m. a group of military vehicles arrived at the street. A Ural military lorry and two APCs (armoured personnel carriers) parked next to the house of the applicants’ neighbours I. Two other APCs and another Ural military vehicle with Russian military servicemen in it drove up to the applicants’ yard. One APC drove through the gates and a group of about twenty armed masked men in helmets broke down the entrance door and rushed into the applicants’ house. 11.  The noise woke the first applicant and he approached the servicemen. They hit him and took him into the kitchen. There they forced the first applicant down on to the floor and two of the servicemen put their feet on him to keep him on the floor. The intruders dispersed the family members into different rooms, pointed their guns at them, and ordered them to lie face down. When the second applicant asked the servicemen what was going on she was ordered to be quiet. 12.  The intruders neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. They spoke Russian without an accent. The applicants heard them using the code name “Vityaz” among themselves. The applicants thought that they were Russian military servicemen. 13.  The servicemen put handcuffs on the first applicant and on his son Arbi Karimov. The fourth applicant and her husband Arbi Karimov were placed together in the living room. Every time Arbi Karimov tried to move the serviceman on guard kicked him in the torso. After that the servicemen took Arbi Karimov outside; they did not allow him to put on warm clothing. 14.  A few minutes later the servicemen took the first applicant outside where he saw his son in the Ural military vehicle. The first applicant heard Arbi Karimov saying to the servicemen: “Why are you taking my father? He is an elderly man”. After that the officers talked among themselves and released the first applicant. Having spent about twenty minutes outside, the first applicant was taken back into the house. On his way into the house the first applicant saw that his son had been taken out of the Ural vehicle and put into one of the APCs. In the house the servicemen took off the first applicant’s handcuffs. They ordered the applicants to stay inside, threatening to shoot them and blow up the house if the applicants attempted to go outside. 15.  Having taken away Arbi Karimov the servicemen started searching the applicants’ house. There was no electricity and the servicemen used torches. The servicemen took a number of items of the applicants’ property, including a couch, pillows, bed linen and fabrics. They also took a number of personal documents, including the first applicant’s passport and his pensioner’s identity card, and the passports of the fourth applicant, Arbi Karimov and the first applicant’s other son Umar Karimov (brother of Arbi Karimov). The applicants’ belongings were loaded into the military vehicles, which was witnessed by a number of the applicants’ neighbours. 16.  After the vehicles left the house, the applicants immediately followed them. On the outskirts of the village the vehicles stopped and the servicemen opened fire in the applicants’ direction. The vehicles spent about twenty minutes there and drove away in the direction of the route to the Staropromyslovskiy district of Chechnya. 17.  The description of the events of the night of 11 January 2003 is based on two hand-drawn maps of the premises, on accounts provided by the applicants and their neighbours to the applicants’ representatives: on an account by the fourth applicant on 26 September 2005 ; on an account (undated) by witness Ms Um.; on an account (undated) by witness Ms Im.; on an account (undated) by witness Mr B.; and on an article published in the August-September 2003 issue of the magazine Zashchita prav i svobod cheloveka (Защита прав и свобод человека). 18.  In the morning of 11 January 2003 the applicants started their search for Arbi Karimov. They spoke to a number of local residents who lived close to the route to the Staropromyslovskiy district. The residents confirmed that on the night of 11 January 2003 they had seen that some of the military vehicles had driven in the direction of Grozny while others had left in the direction of the area called Solyenaya Balka, in the Staropromyslovskiy district of Chechnya. 19.  On the same day the applicants found out that Russian military forces had also detained two other residents of their village, who had not been seen since. In addition, on the same morning, at the place where the vehicles had halted for twenty minutes on the night of 11 January 2003, residents of Proletarskoye found the mutilated corpse of Mr R. S., who had been abducted on 6 January 2003 in Grozny. It appears that the local authorities conducted a crime scene investigation there. 20.  On an unspecified date in January 2003 the applicants complained about Arbi Karimov’s abduction to the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross (the Red Cross) in Grozny. On 26 May 2003 representatives of the organisation visited the applicants and showed them a letter from the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. The letter stated that on an unspecified date an illegal bandit group had been discovered in Proletarskoye and in connection with this the Russian law enforcement agencies had conducted a special operation in the village on 12 January 2003. As a result of the operation Mr I. and Mr Umar Karimov had been killed while resisting arrest. Out of fear for their personal safety, the Red Cross representatives refused to provide the applicants with a photocopy of the letter, but they allowed them to make a handwritten copy of it. 21.  Upon receiving the information provided in the letter, the applicants complained about their relative’s abduction to a number of local authorities. About two weeks later, on an unspecified date, around 4 a.m., a group of armed military men arrived at the applicants’ house in military UAZ vehicles. They told the applicants that they were conducting an identity check. This time the servicemen did not detain anybody and did not take anything. 22.  Some time later the applicants received a letter from the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 stating that the authorities’ letter to the Red Cross had incorrectly stated the names of those killed during the operation of 12 January 2003. 23.  About three months after receiving the letter from the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 the second applicant wrote to a number of local law enforcement agencies. In her letters she complained about the abduction of her son Arbi Karimov and pointed out that the passport of her other son, Umar Karimov, had been taken away by Russian military servicemen during the abduction. 24.  After that, on 30 December 2003, at about 6 a.m. a group of military men in four military UAZ vehicles again arrived at the applicants’ house for an identity check. They did not detain anyone and did not take anything from the house. 25.  The applicants also contacted, both in person and in writing, various official bodies, such as the President of the Russian Federation, the Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation for Ensuring Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic (the Envoy), the Chechen administration, military commanders’ offices and prosecutors’ offices at different levels, describing in detail the circumstances of their relative’s abduction and asking for help in establishing his whereabouts. The applicants retained copies of a number of those letters and submitted them to the Court. 26. The Government did not challenge most of the facts as presented by the applicants. According to their observations of 22 July 2008, “In connection with the abduction by unidentified persons of A.U. Karimov on 11 January 2003 in the settlement of Proletarskoye in Grozny district, the Grozny district prosecutor’s office initiated criminal case no. 42009 under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping).” 27.  On 11 January 2003 the applicants complained about the abduction of Arbi Karimov to the Grozny district department of the interior (the Grozny ROVD), to the Grozny district prosecutor’s office (the district prosecutor’s office), and to the Grozny district military commander’s office (the district military commander’s office). 28.  Between 11 and 14 January 2003 the applicants complained about Arbi Karimov’s abduction to the Envoy, stating that their relative had been taken away by military servicemen who had arrived in APCs and Ural vehicles and that the abductors also had taken away valuables and family members’ passports. On 15 January 2003 the Envoy forwarded the applicants’ complaint to the Chechnya prosecutor. 29.  On 14 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Arbi Karimov under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was given number 42009 (in the submitted documents the number is also referred to as 42099). 30.  On 17 and 21 January 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s complaints about her son’s abduction by armed men in APCs to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 31.  On 17 January 2003 the head of the administration of the village of Proletarskoye complained to the Grozny ROVD about the abduction of Arbi Karimov by masked federal servicemen. 32.  On 24 January 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that on an unspecified date they had instituted an investigation into the abduction of Arbi Karimov and that the case file had been given the number 42009. The letter also stated that the investigators were aware of the fact that Arbi Karimov’s abductors had also taken away the passports of the first and the fourth applicants and of their relative Umar Karimov. 33.  On 31 January 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 34.  On 2 February 2003 the second applicant complained to the Chechnya department of the interior (the Chechnya MVD). In her letter she stated that her son had been abducted by Russian military servicemen who had arrived in APCs. She pointed out that the servicemen had taken valuables from their house along with identity documents of her family members. She complained that her son had been taken away in his underwear and that the servicemen had ill-treated family members. The applicant requested the authorities to inform her about the following: who had control over the Russian military forces in Chechnya; what was the difference between the “sweeping” operations conducted by representatives of the federal forces and nightly pinpoint raids; if those who had abducted her son had been bandits or Chechen rebel fighters, why were these men equipped with APCs and why after the completion of their operation did they leave openly in the direction of the checkpoints of the Russian military forces and finally why did the abductors fail to inform the relatives of the abducted persons about their relatives’ subsequent whereabouts. 35.  On 4 April 2003 the second applicant again complained to the Chechnya MVD. In her letter she stated that her son had been abducted by Russian military servicemen who had arrived in APCs and a military Ural vehicle. The applicant also complained that the authorities had failed to establish her son’s whereabouts. 36.  On 5 April and 12 May 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the United Alignment Group (the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA) forwarded the second applicant’s complaints about the abduction of Arbi Karimov to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 37.  On 9 April 2003 the Chechnya MVD forwarded the applicants’ complaint to the Grozny ROVD. 38.  On 25 April 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s complaint about her son’s abduction to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 39.  On 28 April 2003 the Chechnya department of the Federal Security Service (the Chechnya FSB) informed the second applicant that they had no information concerning the whereabouts of Arbi Karimov; that his name was not on the authorities’ wanted list and he was not under suspicion of having committed a crime. 40.  On 22 May 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 forwarded the second applicant’s complaint about the abduction of Arbi Karimov to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. The letter stated that her complaint did not provide any grounds to suspect the involvement of the Russian military forces in the abduction. 41.  On 29 May 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that on 14 January 2003 they had instituted an investigation into the abduction of Arbi Karimov and that later the investigation had been suspended for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. The letter stated that the examination of the criminal case file had established that the authorities had failed to take all possible investigative measures and in connection with this the investigation in the case had been resumed on an unspecified date. 42.  On 3 June 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that the investigation in criminal case no. 42009 had been suspended on 14 March 2003 for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. On 29 May 2003 the investigation had been resumed owing to the necessity to take additional investigative measures. 43.  On 17 June 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the second applicant that her complaint had failed to provide any information indicating the involvement of Russian military servicemen in the abduction of Arbi Karimov. 44.  On 19 June 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that they had already provided responses to her requests concerning the search for Arbi Karimov. 45.  On 30 June 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA forwarded the second applicant’s complaint about her son’s abduction to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. The letter stated that the examination of the applicant’s complaint had not established any involvement of the Russian military forces in the crime. 46.  On 5 July 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA forwarded the second applicant’s request concerning the search for her son to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 47.  On 15, on 30 July and 21 October 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s complaints about her son’s abduction to the investigators. The first letter stated that the applicant had received the information concerning her son’s murder from the local headquarters of the Red Cross. 48.  On 24 July, 5 and 20 August and 19 September 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the second applicant that the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 had examined her complaints and that this exanimation had not established any involvement of the Russian military forces in the abduction of Arbi Karimov. 49.  On 2 August 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that her complaint to the Prosecutor General had been included in the criminal case file. 50.  On 20 August 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicant that the examination of her complaint had not established any involvement of the Russian military forces in the abduction of Arbi Karimov. 51.  On 25 August and 2 September 2003 the Departments of Correction of the Ministry of Justice in the Volgograd and Rostov regions informed the second applicant that they had no information concerning the whereabouts of Arbi Karimov. 52.  On 23 September 2003 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that her complaint about the abduction of Arbi Karimov had been included in the criminal case file. 53.  On 13 October 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA forwarded the second applicant’s complaint to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 for examination. 54.  On 14 October 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s complaint about the abduction of Arbi Karimov by armed men in APCs and a Ural military vehicle to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 55.  On 22 October 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that the operational search measures aimed at establishing the whereabouts of Arbi Karimov and the perpetrators of the crime were under way. 56.  On 21 November 2003 the Ministry of Defence informed the second applicant that her complaint had been forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of the North-Caucasus Military Circuit for examination. 57.  On 1 December 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that on an unspecified date they had instructed the district prosecutor’s office to resume the investigation in the criminal case and take all necessary measures aimed at establishing the perpetrators. 58.  On 5 December 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of the North-Caucasus Military Circuit forwarded the second applicant’s letter concerning the search for her son to the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA. 59.  On 8 January 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the second applicant that the examination of her complaint had not established any involvement of the Russian military forces in the abduction of Arbi Karimov. The letter also stated that the office did not have any information concerning his death. 60.  On 13 February 2004 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that the district prosecutor’s office had been investigating her son’s disappearance. 61.  On 14 February 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the second applicant that her complaint had been forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. The letter also stated the following:\n“... earlier an assistant of the military prosecutor of military unit no. 20102 Major I.S. provided the response to the information request of the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross stating that A. Karimov had been killed during a special operation while resisting police officers. However, this information statement of Mr I.S. was not confirmed.\nYou are requested to conduct an inquiry and inform us and the applicant about the grounds for the response given to the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the death of A. Karimov.” 62.  On 24 February 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the second applicant that the information provided by them to the Red Cross about the killing of Arbi Karimov was incorrect. This information had been provided along with information concerning other missing persons, in a table format, and this table must have contained a mistake. The letter also stated that the examination of the applicant’s previous complaints had demonstrated that the Russian military forces had not been involved in the abduction of her son. 63.  On 27 March and 9 April 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA forwarded the second applicant’s complaints about her son’s abduction to the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102. 64.  On 8 April 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 forwarded the second applicant’s complaint about the search for her son to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. The letter stated that it had been established that the Russian military servicemen had not been involved in the abduction of Arbi Karimov. 65.  On 16 April 2004 the Chief Military Prosecutor’s office forwarded the second applicant’s complaint to the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA. 66.  On 15 May 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the second applicant that her complaint did not contain any indication of involvement of the Russian military forces in the abduction of Arbi Karimov. The letter also stated that, upon examination of the information provided to the Red Cross about the killing of her son, it had been established that this information was incorrect. 67.  On 20 September 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the second applicant that the examination of her previous complaints had established that the Russian military forces had not participated in the abduction of Arbi Karimov and that her complaints had been forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. According to the letter, the district prosecutor’s office had been taking measures to establish identity of the perpetrators. 68.  On 4 February 2005 the district prosecutor’s office informed the second applicant that\n“... as a result of the examination of the criminal case file it has been established that the case was initiated on 14 January 2003 under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code in connection with the abduction at about 3 a.m. on 11 January 2003 in Proletarskoye in Grozny district of A.U. Karimov, Sh. Isayev and I.S. Magayev by unidentified military servicemen....\nas a result of the investigation of this criminal case, ....on 17 January 2005 the investigator decided to suspend the investigation...for failure to establish the identity of the perpetrators. ..” 69.  On 7 June 2005 the second applicant complained to a number of State authorities, including the Minister of the Interior and the Prosecutor General. She complained that the investigators had failed to conduct an effective and thorough investigation into the abduction of her son. In her letters she described in detail the circumstances of Arbi Karimov’s abduction. In particular, she stated that he had been abducted by Russian military servicemen; that the servicemen had seized a number of items of family property and identity documents; that they had threatened to blow up the applicants’ house; that two other residents of the village had been abducted by the same group of servicemen; that the morning after the abduction local residents had found a corpse which had been left behind by the servicemen; that the authorities had failed to take any meaningful investigative steps; that on 15 January 2003 one of the abducted men had been released and he had told her that he had been detained on the premises of the 21st division of the Russian federal troops, “Sofrino”, in the area known as Solyenaya Balka, Chechnya; that she had informed the investigators about it, but that the latter had failed to take any measures to verify the information; that in May 2003 she had been told at the local headquarters of the Red Cross that the military prosecutor’s office had informed the organisation that Arbi Karimov had been killed while resisting arrest on 12 January 2003; and that the investigators had failed to question employees of the military prosecutor’s office and the Red Cross about this information. The applicant expressed her opinion that the investigators’ failure to take basic investigative measures was unlawful. She requested the authorities to resume the investigation in the criminal case and to conduct it in a thorough and effective manner. It does not appear that the applicant received any response from the authorities. 70.  According to the Government, on 12 January 2003 the investigation conducted a crime scene examination at the applicants’ house. As a result a photograph of A. Karimov was collected; no damage to the house gates or to other property was referred to in the record of the examination. 71.  On 31 January 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case and questioned. According to her statement, at about 2 a.m. on 11 January 2003 several APCs and a Ural vehicle had arrived at her house, breaking one of the gates. Her husband had woken up from the noise and opened the entrance door. Then a group of unidentified armed men in blue camouflage uniform, bullet-proof vests and masks had rushed into the house. They had forced all the family members on to the floor and searched the house. After that they had handcuffed her son Arbi Karimov and without letting him get dressed had taken him and his father into the yard and forced them into the Ural vehicle. Then the intruders had released her husband, but had taken away her son Arbi. During the search the men had taken family belongings (kitchen utensils, male underwear), passports and documents for the family car. The abductors had used four APCs and four Ural vehicles, as well as several UAZ and GAZ (“Gazel”) vehicles. All the registration numbers were covered with mud. According to the applicant, on 16-17 January 2003 she had complained about her son’s abduction to the International Committee of the Red Cross. From the organisation’s response, in which they had referred to a letter from the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102, she had found out that Arbi Karimov had been eliminated during a special operation. 72.  On 11 September 2003 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 informed the investigators that they had not provided the Red Cross with information concerning the detention of Arbi Karimov. 73.  On an unspecified date the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA informed the investigators that a representative of the Red Cross had been provided with incorrect information concerning the death of Arbi Karimov. Upon examination of the relevant documentation no information pertaining to this was found. 74.  On an unspecified date the investigators requested the Red Cross to provide a copy of the letter from the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 concerning the death of Arbi Karimov. According to the Government, the organisation refused to provide the document. 75.  According to the Government, the investigation questioned a number of witnesses. On unspecified dates members of the Karimov family, Mr U. Karimov, Ms Kh. Imadayeva, Ms L.Karimova and Ms S. Amayeva had provided the investigators with statements similar to the one given by the second applicant. 76.  On an unspecified date the investigators additionally questioned the third applicant, who stated that during the events her brother Arbi Karimov had tried to hide under the bed, but three armed masked men in helmets and blue camouflage uniform had dragged him out and taken him into the yard. These men were speaking Russian. The abductors had taken a number of items of property from the house: three video cassettes, audio cassettes, a car radio/cassette player, female underwear, passports, an axe, soap, shoe polish, footwear, perfume, a grindstone and some items of clothing. A few minutes after the abductors’ departure she had heard shooting coming from the outskirts of the settlement. 77.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour, Mr I.B., who stated that at about 2.30 a.m. on 11 January 2003 he had been woken by the noise of vehicles. From the window he had seen an APC and a khaki Ural vehicle and heard people talking among themselves in Russian. Twenty minutes later the vehicles had left and he had gone outside. His neighbours had told him that these men had taken away Arbi Karimov and a number of items of property from the house. 78.  On an unspecified date the investigators questioned an employee of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Grozny, Mr R.I., who stated that relatives of Arbi Karimov had applied to the organisation with requests for assistance in the search for their relatives. According to the witness, he had informed the main office of the Red Cross in Nalchik about it, and their employees had forwarded information requests to a number of law enforcement agencies. Responses had been provided to those requests, but the witness did not remember their contents. 79. According to the Government, on unspecified dates the investigators also requested information about the disappearance from various State authorities, including a number of district departments of the interior in Chechnya and other units of the Ministry of the Interior, the Grozny department of the Federal Security Service (the FSB), various military commanders’ offices in Chechnya, the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102, the military prosecutor’s office of the UGA, a number of penitentiary institutions in Chechnya and the neighbouring regions, the prosecutors’ officers of various levels, various detention centres in the Northern Caucasus and the archives of the Northern Caucasus Military Circuit. According to the responses received from these agencies, they did not have any information about Arbi Karimov’s arrest and detention. 80.  According to the response received by the investigators on an unspecified date from the Grozny ROVD, they did not detain Arbi Karimov, he had not been placed in a detention centre, his corpse had not been found, he had not applied for medical assistance and no criminal proceedings had been initiated against him. 81.  On unspecified dates the investigators forwarded requests for assistance in searching for Arbi Karimov to the Chechnya FSB and the Grozny ROVD, asking them to take operational search measures. According to the information received from these agencies, Arbi Karimov’s brother, U.U. Karimov, was a member of illegal armed groups. 82.  The Government further submitted that on 10 and 11 January 2003 no special operations had been conducted in the settlement of Proletarskoye in the Grozny district, Chechnya and that representatives of the State had not detained Arbi Karimov. 83.  According to the Government, the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions, and has so far failed to identify the perpetrators of Arbi Karimov’s abduction. However, operational search measures were being taken to establish the whereabouts of Arbi Karimov and identify the perpetrators. The progress of the investigation was being supervised by the Investigations Department of the Prosecutor General’s Office. 84.  Despite specific requests by the Court the Government did not disclose any documents of criminal case no. 42009. The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, a limited liability company with its seat in Vienna, is the owner of the daily newspaper Der Standard. 6.  In its issue of 14 May 2004 Der Standard published an article in the domestic politics section under the heading “Gossip mongering” (“Kolportiert”). The article, which was entitled “A society rumour” (“Ein bürgerliches Gerücht”) commented on certain rumours relating to the marriage of Mr Klestil, the then Federal President. The article also appeared on the website of Der Standard. It read as follows:\n“If the stories circulating between the outlying district of Döbling and the city centre are to be believed, there is only one topic of conversation at the moment among the so‑called upper crust of Viennese society: the marriage of the departing presidential couple Thomas Klestil and Margot Klestil-Löffler [bold print in the original]. Rumour has it that not only is he about to leave office, but she is about to leave him. The latter claim has of course set tongues wagging furiously in bourgeois – and not-so-bourgeois – circles. People here like nothing better than to be able to express outrage about one of their own.\nIn addition to the allegedly less-than-blissful domestic situation on the Hohe Warte [the Federal President’s residence], there has been persistent gossip recently about the supposedly close ties between the First Lady, who is her husband’s junior by 22 years, and other political figures. Head of the FPÖ parliamentary group Herbert Scheibner [bold print in the original], for instance, is reported to be close to her (Scheibner has accompanied the presidential couple on a number of foreign trips). Ms Löffler is also said to be well acquainted with the husband of the Canadian ambassador (unsurprisingly, given her post as head of the American department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry).\nThe fact that the President’s wife took a few days off recently to organise the move from the official residence to the couple’s newly renovated home in Hietzing fuelled further speculation. So much so, in fact, that Klestil – never squeamish about putting his emotions on display – had the following pre-emptive statement published in his information bulletin, News [an Austrian weekly]: ‘Rumours of a separation are nothing but idle gossip’ he said. He added: As of 8 July we will be embarking on a new phase of our life together. Any assertions to the contrary are untrue.\nBe that as it may, the people are concerned for the well-being of their President. Apparently, the public information desk of the President’s Office has recently had more callers than ever before enquiring about the state of the President’s marriage. And more than a few of the callers made their enquiries in the ultra-refined tones of Schönbrunn.” 7.  The article was accompanied by a picture of Mr Klestil and Mrs Klestil-Löffler, looking in different directions. 8.  On 18 May 2004 Mr Klestil and Mrs Klestil-Löffler brought proceedings under sections 6 and 7 of the Media Act (Mediengesetz) against the applicant company, claiming that the article published in Der Standard of 14 May 2004 reported on their marriage and family life and thus interfered with the strictly personal sphere of their lives. 9.  By judgment of 15 June 2004 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) ordered the applicant company to pay compensation of 5,000 euros (EUR) to the first claimant, Mr Klestil, and EUR 7,000 to the second claimant, Mrs Klestil-Löffler. Furthermore, the court ordered the applicant company to publish its judgment and to reimburse the claimants’ costs. 10.  The Regional Court, referring to section 7 of the Media Act, held that the applicant company had reported on the strictly personal sphere of the claimants’ lives in a manner that was likely to undermine them in public. It analysed the contents of the impugned article as alleging, on the one hand, that Mrs Klestil-Löffler intended to divorce and, on the other hand, that she had close contacts with two men, thus describing her as a double adulteress and Mr Klestil as a deceived husband. In reply to the applicant company’s defence that the article merely reported on a rumour, the Regional Court noted that even the dissemination of a rumour could breach section 7 of the Media Act, if it conveyed the impression that there was some truth in it. 11.  As to the applicant company’s request to take evidence in order to show that the rumour had actually been spread at the time, the court noted that in cases concerning an infringement of the strictly personal sphere of a person’s life, section 7 § 2 of the Media Act excluded the proof of truth (Wahrheitsbeweis), unless the statement at issue was directly related to public life. Such a direct link would exist, for instance, where a publication reported on the state of health of the Federal President which might prevent him from exercising his functions. However, the state of his marriage did not have any bearing on his capacity to exercise his functions nor did it have any other link with public life. 12.  In assessing the amount of compensation, the Regional Court had regard to the fact that Der Standard was a widely read newspaper and to the considerable degree of insult suffered by the claimants. In addition it noted that it was highly uncommon in Austria to report on (true or untrue) details of the private lives of politicians. Having regard to the above considerations and the need to deter other media from making similar publications, a relatively large amount of compensation appeared justified. The difference in the sums awarded was to the fact that the second claimant was described as a double adulteress, while the first claimant was “merely” depicted as a deceived husband. 13.  The applicant company appealed. As a point of law it submitted that the Regional Court had wrongly refused its request for the taking of evidence. In its view the publication was directly related to public life within the meaning of section 7 § 2 of the Media Act. The claimants, being public figures, had made their private life part of their “marketing strategy”. Like no other presidential couple before, they had kept the public informed about their marriage, starting with the first claimant’s divorce from his former wife and his remarriage, to the second claimant. Moreover, the first claimant had relied heavily on family values during his first electoral campaign. He therefore had to accept that the public had an interest in being informed about his private life. 14.  As regards points of fact, the applicant company argued that the Regional Court had wrongly assessed the contents of the article at issue. Read in its proper context, the article did not state that Mrs Klestil-Löffler actually intended to divorce and even less that she was an adulteress. On the contrary the article rather aimed at exposing the idle gossip propagated in certain upper-class circles. It clearly pointed to the absurdity of the rumour by explaining that the allegedly close ties of the second claimant with Mr Scheibner and with the husband of the Canadian ambassador had perfectly unsuspicious reasons. Seen in that light, the article did not even relate to the strictly personal sphere of the presidential couple but made fun of the gossip in bourgeois society. 15.  As regards the sentence the applicant company claimed that the compensation awards were excessive. 16.  While the appeal proceedings were pending, Mr Klestil died. By decision of 2 September 2004 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court discontinued the proceedings as regards Mr Klestil. On 9 December 2004 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht), on an appeal brought by Mr Klestil’s estate, quashed the Regional Court’s decision. 17.  By a judgment of 20 January 2005 the Vienna Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment of 15 June 2004. 18.  It confirmed that in the present case, the proof of truth was excluded by section 7 § 2 of the Media Act. The applicant company’s argument that the claimants were public figures and had exposed their private and marital life to the public eye like no other presidential couple before was not convincing. While the first claimant had relied on his family life and on his then marriage in his first campaign some twelve years ago, his marriage with Mrs Klestil-Löffler had not played a role in his second campaign nor otherwise during his second period in office. Moreover, his second and last period in office had been drawing to a close at the time of the publication. In sum, the Regional Court had rightly found that the publication at issue was not directly related to public life. Consequently, it had rightly refused to take the evidence proposed by the applicant company. 19.  There was no basis for the applicant company’s assertion that the article was aimed at unveiling the hypocrisy of the so called upper crust of Viennese society or that it described the rumours about the claimants’ marriage as absurd. The Regional Court had rightly understood the article’s contents as conveying rumours about the Federal President’s marriage as if there was some truth in them. 20.  Finally, as regards the amounts granted in compensation, the Court of Appeal found that deterring other media from similar publications was not a relevant criterion. Nevertheless the other considerations relied on by the Regional Court justified the compensation awards. 21.  On 11 June 2004 Mr Scheibner brought proceedings under sections 6 and 7 of the Media Act against the applicant company in respect of the electronic version of the article, which had been published on the website of Der Standard and in respect of the print version. He alleged that the passage referring to him contained an untrue statement amounting to defamation. 22.  By judgment of 20 July 2004 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court ordered the applicant company to pay EUR 4,000 to Mr Scheibner as compensation for the publication in the printed version of Der Standard and EUR 2,000 as compensation for the publication on the website. Furthermore, the court ordered the applicant company to publish its judgment and to reimburse the claimant’s costs. 23.  The court, arguing along the same lines as in its judgment of 15 June 2004 (see paragraphs 10-11 above), held that the applicant company had reported on the strictly personal sphere of the claimant’s life in a manner that was likely to undermine him in public. It analysed the contents of the impugned article as alleging that the claimant, Mr Scheibner, who was a married man, had a close relationship with Mrs Klestil-Löffler and therefore described him as an adulterer. Thus, his strictly personal sphere was affected. However, it found that the publication did not amount to defamation within the meaning of Article 111 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). 24.  As to the amount of compensation it considered that the insult as regards Mr Scheibner weighed less heavily than as regards the claimants in the first set of proceedings. In sum, compensation awards of EUR 4,000 as regards the publication in the paper version of Der Standard and EUR 2,000 for the publication on the website, which was less widely read, appeared appropriate. 25.  The applicant company and Mr Scheibner appealed, whereby the applicant company relied on the same grounds as in its appeal in the previous set of proceedings. 26.  On 22 December 2004 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal but partly granted Mr Scheibner’s appeal. It held that the impugned statement also breached Article 6 of the Media Act, since it fulfilled the objective elements of defamation as defined in Article 111 of the Criminal Code. The claimant was accused of adultery, which even in a liberal society was still considered an unlawful and dishonourable act. It considered however, that this had no influence on the amount of compensation to be paid, which was therefore upheld. 27.  As to the applicant company’s appeal, the Court of Appeal again confirmed the Regional Court’s reading of the contents of the article. It added that the placement of the article in the domestic politics section and its presentation including the picture of the presidential couple supported this assessment. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the applicant company had not argued before the Regional Court that the publication was directly related to public life within the meaning of Article 7 § 2 of the Media Act. 28.  In any case, Mr Scheibner, though a public figure, had a right to respect for the strictly personal sphere of his life. Rumours about an alleged relationship between him and the wife of the Federal President had no link with his public functions and responsibilities and did therefore not justify the reporting at issue. 29.  Once the judgment of the Court of Appeal had become final, Mr Scheibner brought proceedings under the Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) requesting an injunction ordering the applicant company to refrain from publishing any statement alleging that he had a relationship with Mrs Klestil-Löffler. 30.  At the hearing of 22 April 2005 before the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht), the applicant company entered into a settlement with Mr Scheibner undertaking to refrain from publishing any such statement. The Commercial Court noted that according to constant case-law, a judgment under section 6 of the Media Act had binding effect in subsequent civil proceedings relating to the same facts. It ordered the applicant company to pay Mr Scheibner’s procedural costs. 31.  The Commercial Court’s judgment was served on the applicant company’s counsel on 25 May 2005. The applicant company did not appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Prague, the Czech Republic. The second applicant was born in 2005. She currently lives in Russia with O.H., her mother. 7.  On 5 June 2003 the first applicant married a Russian national, O.H. The couple decided to settle in Prague. 8.  On 28 January 2005 their daughter, the second applicant, was born. 9.  In 2007 the first applicant and O.H. decided to separate. 10.  On 1 November 2007 O.H. filed for divorce in the Czech Republic. Both O.H. and the first applicant sought custody of the child. 11.  In April 2008 O.H., unbeknownst to the first applicant, obtained a one‑month Russian visa for the second applicant, and on 17 April 2008, together with the latter, left for Russia (Vologda Region). Upon the expiry of the visa on 12 May 2008 O.H. did not bring the second applicant back to the Czech Republic. Instead, on 20 May 2008 she obtained a temporary residence permit for the second applicant from the Russian Federal Migration Service, and on 27 May 2008, Russian citizenship for the latter. On an unspecified date O.H. and the second applicant left for St Petersburg. 12.  On 7 July 2009 O.H. applied to the Federal Security Service Border Control (Пограничное управление Федеральной службы безопасности Российской Федерации по городу Санкт-Петербургу и Ленинградской области) in order to restrict the second applicant’s travel outside Russia. 13.  As of 10 July 2009 the second applicant’s travel abroad was restricted. 14.  Since 29 May 2011 the first applicant has had no contact with the second applicant, because O.H. prevented him from either seeing the second applicant or communicating with her by telephone. The Russian authorities have been unable to establish O.H.’s and the second applicant’s whereabouts since then. 15.  The interim decision of Prague 4 District Court of 30 April 2008 as amended by the interim decision of Prague Municipal Court of 21 July 2008 granted the first applicant temporary custody of the second applicant pending the outcome of the divorce proceedings. The Prague Municipal Court thereby obliged O.H. to hand the child over to the first applicant, not to leave the Czech Republic and not to remain outside the territory of the Czech Republic with the minor. The interim decision entered into force on 8 August 2008. 16.  On 2 June 2011 Prague 4 District Court issued a final custody judgment by which custody of the second applicant was granted to the first applicant. O.H. was obliged to pay the first applicant 5,000 Czech korunas – about 200 euros (EUR) – monthly in alimony. The court held as follows:\n“The father loves [his daughter] very much; in the opinion of the experts he is better developed emotionally in comparison to the mother, is more capable of self-control and handling [stress] so as to not spoil the relationship between the mother and [the child] or otherwise turn [the child] against her mother. It was established that the interests of [the child] require that she be placed in her father’s care [as he] was established to be a more suitable caregiver; at the same time it was established that as a result of [the child’s] separation from her father the former’s psychological well-being [has been affected]. It was established that for the last three years the father, unlike the mother, has been cooperating with [the custody and guardianship authority], and the [guardian] had therefore had a real possibility to examine the father’s living conditions and his situation; ... it was established that he can provide [the child] with normal accommodation ... The father is financially stable, which enables him to provide [the child] with the material [items] and non-material values necessary for her health, mental, cultural and physical development. [The child] will soon go to primary school and the father, in view of his education and indisputable interest in [the child], is capable of providing her, along with the possibility of school education, with everything she needs. ... Despite the fact that the father was and is still being prevented from communicating with [the child], he [supports the child financially by giving money directly to the mother and making deposits into the child’s bank account], and in addition to alimony the father gives [the child] presents whenever he has the possibility to meet her.\nThe mother, on the contrary, was characterised as unstable, authoritative, unfriendly to the father and inclined to impulsive aggression and rash behavior. While carrying out her parental duties she harms [the child], she has abused her parental authority since November 2007 at least ... Therefore, she acts both unlawfully and contrary to the interests of [the child] and the court’s decision. While exercising her parental authority the mother consciously and purposefully acts in total disregard of the recommendations of the experts and her lawful duties; she completely prevented communication between the father and [the child], at first without any reason. Subsequently, under an invented pretext, in April 2008 she took [the child], without the permission of the father, the court or [the custody and guardianship authority] abroad to the Russian Federation, where she has kept [the child] until now. At the same time the mother has not complied with the decision of the court pursuant to which she should have handed [the child] over to the father, to render to the father [the child’s] travelling passport and not to remain [with the child] outside the territory of the Czech Republic. [It was established that the decision in question] was served on [the mother] first of all through her representative in the Czech Republic, and thereafter to her personally in the course of the proceedings at the courts in St Petersburg and Moscow. Furthermore, the mother refuses to send an invitation for visiting Russia to the father, [who] has to go through demanding procedures to obtain Russian entry visas, and when the father succeeds in obtaining a visa and goes to Russia the mother often hides [the child] and refuses to communicate with the father[.] [S]he does not even allow the father to talk to [the child] on the telephone, and even if she lets them talk she purposefully manipulates the father’s and [the child’s] mindset according to the situation. Therefore, the court believes that the mother has, in disregard of the law of the Czech Republic, willfully interfered with [the child’s family life], her right to know her father and her right to be in her father’s custody. She has interfered with [the child’s] right to freedom of movement and to choose her place of residence, and her right to free entry to her homeland, the Czech Republic. Thereby the mother has breached the rights guaranteed by the State in the framework of Conventions on Human Rights, including the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The mother, unbeknownst to the father, the court or [the custody and guardianship authority] and without their consent in contravention of the legal order of the Czech Republic, applied to Russian administrative authorities to grant [the child], a national of the Czech Republic, Russian citizenship, on the basis of which in a record-breaking short term of five days the latter was granted Russian citizenship.\n...\nRegarding the father’s claim for termination of the mother’s parental rights, the court has decided to dismiss it [since termination of parental rights is the most serious interference in relations between parents and children, when the violation of parents’ duties is so serious that the termination of parental rights is the only possible solution to protect the interests of the child]. The court has arrived at the conclusion that termination of the mother’s parental rights would be in contradiction with the father’s own statement in his final speech that [the child] should have both parents.\n...” 17.  The case was examined in the absence of O.H. The District Court established that on 10 May 2011 consul T. of the Czech Consulate General informed O.H. by telephone about the venue and the time of the hearing, that is, 2 June 2011 at 1 p.m. in Prague 4 District Court, but O.H. did not say anything in reply and hung up. Nobody answered the phone when the consul tried to reach O.H. again. The telephone was subsequently switched off. The International Department for Civil Matters of the Czech Ministry of Justice did not receive confirmation from the Russian authorities on whether the request of October 2010 for the delivery of a court summons to O.H. had been complied with. The District Court therefore considered that O.H. had been duly notified and that she had failed to appear in court without valid reason. It therefore proceeded in her absence. 18.  On 10 February 2012 that judgment became final. 19.  The judgment remains unenforced to this day. 20.  The first applicant challenged the decision of the Russian Federal Migration Service of 20 May 2008 granting the second applicant a temporary residence permit (see paragraph 11 above). 21.  On 13 February 2009 Vologda Town Court dismissed the first applicant’s claims. The court held that the temporary residence permit had been granted to the second applicant in accordance with the procedure established by law, and that the relevant procedure did not require the applicant’s consent. 22.  On 24 April 2009 Vologda Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. 23.  The first applicant challenged the decision of the Russian Federal Migration Service of 27 May 2008 granting the second applicant Russian citizenship (see paragraph 11 above). 24.  On 6 July 2009 Vologda Town Court dismissed the first applicant’s claim. The court held that the granting of Russian citizenship to the second applicant had been carried out in compliance with the procedure provided for by the Russian law and did not require the consent of the first applicant as O.H., the second applicant’s mother, had Russian citizenship and the second applicant, having received a Russian temporary residence permit, was considered to be residing in Russia at the moment when the relevant decision had been taken by the competent authorities. The court held that the Russian Constitution allowed for dual citizenship, and that the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of 6 June 1980 on prevention of dual citizenship, relied on by the first applicant, was no longer in force after 5 July 2006. The court further held that there was no evidence of criminally punishable acts in the actions of the Federal Migration Service. 25.  The hearing of the case on 6 July 2009 took place in the absence of the first applicant. His request for adjournment of the hearing (due to his involvement in other court proceedings in St Petersburg) was dismissed. The first applicant was, however, represented by a lawyer. 26.  On 9 October 2009 Vologda Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 27.  On 12 March 2009 the first applicant applied to St Petersburg City Court seeking formal recognition of the interim measure of the Prague Municipal Court of 21 July 2008 granting him temporary custody of the second applicant pending the divorce proceedings (see paragraph 15 above). 28.  By a final decision of 15 December 2009, however, the Supreme Court of Russia rejected the request. It held that the Treaty of 12 August 1982 between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance did not apply to interim measures. 29.  As he had been prevented by O.H. from seeing the second applicant, on 20 April 2009 the first applicant brought proceedings before the Russian court seeking to have the terms of his contact with the second applicant in Russia fixed. 30.  By a final decision of 18 May 2010 St Petersburg City Court discontinued the above proceedings. It found that according to the Treaty of 12 August 1982 between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance, litigation in the domestic courts of one High Contracting Party to the agreement had to be discontinued if the same litigation between the same litigants was pending before the domestic courts of the other High Contracting Party. 31.  On 23 September 2010 the first applicant brought proceedings against O.H. seeking to cancel the restriction on the second applicant’s travel outside Russia (see paragraph 13 above). 32.  By a final decision of 18 April 2011 St Petersburg City Court dismissed his claim. The court held that the essence of the first applicant’s complaint had been the fixing of the terms of his contact with the second applicant, which had been for the Czech courts to determine. The court held, therefore, that until the final judgment of the Czech courts the first applicant and O.H. were to decide on the issues in question by mutual agreement. The court further pointed out that the first applicant had the right to communicate with the second applicant on the territory of the Russian Federation and that O.H. had no right to prevent that. 33.  On 29 June 2012 the first applicant applied to St Petersburg City Court for recognition and enforcement of the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011 (see paragraph 16 above). 34.  On 9 October 2012 St Petersburg City Court, relying on Article 60 of the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance and Articles 409-12 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure, refused the first applicant’s request, because O.H. had not been duly notified of the hearing of 2 June 2011 and had been deprived of the opportunity to take part in it. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:\n“As it follows from the material of the case file [O.H.] did not participate in the proceedings before Prague 4 District Court resulting in a judgment the compulsory enforcement of which is sought by [the first applicant].\nThis circumstance is supported by the text of the judgment itself. As it follows from this document [O.H.] failed to appear [in court] for the hearing of the case [on 2 June 2011], although she had been informed orally about [the time and the place] of the hearing. The [Prague 4 District Court] found it established that [O.H.] had been informed about the hearing orally by a consul.\nAt the same time it follows from [the applicant’s] application and the text of the above-mentioned judgment that in 2008 [O.H.] had left the territory of the Czech Republic with the child [and] resides on the territory of the Russian Federation.\nTaking into consideration [the fact] that at the time of delivery of the judgment O.H. has been residing on the territory of the Russian Federation, her notification should have been carried out in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty, which provides that service of documents [must be] certified by a confirmation signed by the person on whom the document is served and officially sealed and signed by the competent authority responsible for the service with indication of the date of service, or by a confirmation issued by that competent authority with indication of the means, the place and the time of service.\nNo such [confirmation] was provided by [the first applicant]. It follows from the contents of the above-mentioned judgment that a request for delivery of documents to [O.H.] was addressed to the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation and remained without reply.\nAt the same time, according to Article 411 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Russian Federation a request for compulsory enforcement of a foreign court judgment must be accompanied by a document showing that the party against whom the judgment was taken, and who did not participate in the proceedings, had been duly notified of the time and the place of the hearing. The same rule is contained in Article 55 of the Treaty.\nIt follows from the contents of the above-mentioned legal provisions that notification of [O.H.] of the time and the place of the hearing should have been certified by [a] written confirmation, signed by [O.H.], [and] sealed by [the competent authority] which handed over the notification.\nNo such documents were, however, provided by the [first applicant].\n...\nAs noted above, the judgment of Prague 4 District Court indicates that [O.H.] was notified orally by a consul.\n...\nThe [first applicant’s] argument that [O.H.’s] notification by consul orally by telephone was in accordance with section 51 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Czech Republic does not amount to proof of [O.H.’s] proper notification ...\nThe above-mentioned Treaty does not provide for the possibility of notification by a consul. Under Article 10 of the Treaty Contracting Parties are entitled to serve the documents through consular establishments to their citizens only. However, [since O.H.] is not a citizen of the Czech Republic, but only had a permit for permanent residence on the territory of the Czech Republic, the [court summons] was not served on her ...\nIn view of the foregoing the court finds that [O.H.] was deprived of the possibility to take part in the proceedings as a result of a failure to duly notify her of the time and the place of the hearing ...” 35.  The decision of 9 October 2012 was taken in the absence of O.H. Court summonses were repeatedly sent to O.H.’s place of residence in St Petersburg and to the address in Nyuksenitsa, Vologda Region, given to the court by the first applicant. However, the summonses returned unclaimed following the expiration of the storage time. Attempts were also made to notify O.H. through a local police inspector, without success. The court therefore considered that it had taken sufficient and exhaustive measures to notify O.H. and to ensure her presence at the hearing, that the latter had abused her right, and that it was possible to examine the first applicant’s request in her absence. 36.  On 3 December 2012 St Petersburg City Court upheld the judgment of 9 October 2012 on appeal. 37.  On 16 September 2013 the first applicant’s “cassation appeal” lodged against the judgment of 9 October 2012 and the decision on appeal of 3 December 2012 was dismissed. 38.  In February 2009 the first applicant applied to the guardianship and trusteeship body for St Petersburg Porokhovye municipal circuit (орган опеки и попечительства местной администрации внутригородского муниципального образования г. Санкт-Петербурга муниципальный округ Пороховые) to facilitate visits between him and the second applicant. 39.  In March 2009 the first applicant renewed his application. 40.  On 12 March and 29 September 2009 representatives of the guardianship and trusteeship body accompanied the first applicant to visit the child. 41.  In the meantime, on 8 July 2009 the guardianship and trusteeship body examined O.H.’s living conditions in St Petersburg. It was established that the flat was in a very good condition, that all the furniture and household appliances were new, and that the girl had a separate room, which was spacious, tidy and cosy. 42.  Between 2010 and July 2011 the first applicant did not apply to the guardianship and trusteeship body to organise visits between him and the second applicant. 43.  In February 2012 the first applicant again applied to the guardianship and trusteeship body to organise his upcoming visit in March 2012. He relied on the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011. However, his request was refused in the absence of a judgment by the Russian court obliging the guardianship and trusteeship body to organise visits between the first applicant and the second applicant. 44.  On over a dozen occasions the first applicant applied to the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg seeking for assistance in establishing contact with his daughter and visa support. 45.  In response to the first applicant’s requests the Ombudsman tried to reconcile the first applicant and O.H. In particular, during his visit to Russia between 23 September and 4 October 2010 the first applicant stayed at O.H.’s apartment and was able to have contact with his daughter. However, the first applicant and O.H. later had a conflict. O.H. claimed that the first applicant had been cruel to the child and that she would interfere with contact between the first applicant and the child in the interests of the latter. The Ombudsman explained to O.H. the provisions of the Family Code concerning the right of the parent living apart from the child to have contact with the child. Nevertheless O.H. stated that she viewed the situation as a strictly private family matter. In her opinion the wide media coverage of the case initiated by the first applicant and the involvement of a number of official bodies went contrary to the principles of the inviolability of private and family life. She further submitted that the child did not want to communicate with the first applicant. Since May 2011 the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg has lost all contact with O.H. Information about the second applicant was put on the Ombudsman’s website (www.spbdeti.org) in the “missing child” section. 46.  Concerning the issue of visa support to the first applicant, the Ombudsman applied to the representation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in St Petersburg, which explained that the first applicant could apply to the health care and social welfare authorities for the invitation which was required in order to obtain a Russian visa. 47.  In his letter of 23 August 2013 the first applicant expressed his gratitude to the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg for her active participation in protecting the second applicant’s rights.\n(b)  In Vologda Region 48.  On 24 October 2012 the first applicant lodged a request with the Ombudsman for Children in Vologda Region asking for assistance in establishing his communication with his daughter. 49.  On 21 November 2012 the Ombudsman visited Nyuksenitsa, where O.H. was supposedly living. However, the information about O.H. and the second applicant’s whereabouts in Nyuksenitsa was not confirmed. The first applicant was informed accordingly. 50.  On 7 December 2012 the first applicant applied to the Ombudsman for Children in Vologda Region asking for an inquiry into the activity of the commission for the affairs of minors in Nyuksenskiy municipal district to be carried out owing to what he saw as their negligent attitude in examining the issue of establishing his communication with his daughter. 51.  On 29 December 2012 the first applicant was informed that his request was outside the Ombudsman’s competence and that he could apply to the prosecutor’s office or the court. 52.  On 11 April 2013 the first applicant again applied to the Ombudsman for Children in Vologda Region asking for assistance in establishing his daughter’s whereabouts. 53.  On 29 April 2013 the first applicant was informed that the child was not studying in any school in Nyuksenskiy municipal district and was not living there.\n(c)  Ombudsman for Children under the President of the Federation of Russia 54.  On 25 November 2009 and 29 July 2010 the Czech Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs applied to the Ombudsman for Children under the President of the Federation of Russia for assistance in the protection of the right of the second applicant to communicate with both parents. Since at the time O.H. lived in St Petersburg with the child, the applications were transmitted to the Ombudsman for Children in St Petersburg. 55.  On 21 March 2011 and 28 November 2011 the Ombudsman for Children under the President had consultative meetings with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czech Republic in the Russian Federation and actively corresponded with the Czech Embassy on the issue. Regular contact was maintained with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the guardianship and trusteeship body for St Petersburg Porokhovye municipal circuit. 56.  Meanwhile, on 25 July 2011 and 3 September 2012 the first applicant himself applied to the Ombudsman for Children under the President of the Federation of Russia. Regular contact was maintained with the first applicant by telephone and e-mail. 57.  As a result of the work carried out by the Ombudsman for Children under the President and the ombudsmen for children in St Petersburg and Vologda Region, on 28 February 2013 a reply was given to the first applicant. He was informed about the legal means of protecting his right to communicate with his daughter which were applicable to his situation. In particular, he was told that he could bring a civil action before the Russian courts in order to determine his access rights (иск об определении порядка общения с дочерью). That recommendation was made with regard to the first applicant’s repeated assurances that he was not seeking compulsory enforcement of the judgment of Prague 4 District Court of 2 June 2011 as he understood that after such a long – in comparison to the child’s life – passage of time, the enforcement of that judgment could be harmful to his daughter and would not be in her best interests. At the same time the first applicant repeatedly stated his wish to establish and maintain regular contact with his daughter and to receive information about her life. However, the first applicant did not follow the above recommendation. 58.  On 2 November 2011 the first applicant reported O.H.’s refusal to allow him to communicate with his daughter, the second applicant, to the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Prosecutor’s Office of St Petersburg. 59.  The local police inspector went to O.H.’s registered place of residence in St Petersburg and found that she was not living there. The neighbours had no information about O.H.’s whereabouts. A summons requesting O.H. to present herself at the local police station was returned unclaimed after the expiration of its storage time. 60.  On 22 December 2011 the first applicant asked the police to search for O.H. in the absence of any information about her and the second applicant since 30 May 2011. The file was transferred to Krasnogvardeyskiy District investigations department (следственный отдел по Красногвардейскому главному следственному управлению Следственного комитета Российской Федерации по Санкт-Петербургу). 61.  The investigator of Krasnogvardeyskiy District investigations department succeeded in reaching O.H.’s mother, G.K., on her mobile telephone. The latter submitted that she was in regular contact with O.H., but refused to divulge O.H.’s whereabouts. 62.  On 11 January 2012 the investigator received a fax message from O.H. in which the latter confirmed that she was living at her registered place of residence with the second applicant, and that she refused all contact with the first applicant. 63.  On the same day the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings into the disappearance of O.H. and the second applicant. 64.  On 22 March 2012 the juvenile inspector of the local police went to the flat at O.H.’s registered address in St Petersburg, but nobody opened the door. O.H.’s neighbour, Mr Sh., said that O.H.’s flat had not been lived in since June 2011. 65.  On 26 March 2012 the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Deputy Prosecutor set aside the decision of 11 January 2012 and returned the file to the investigator with instructions to carry out an additional check aimed at determining the whereabouts of O.H. and the second applicant. 66.  On 3 April 2012 and 26 May 2013 the investigator again refused to institute criminal proceedings into O.H.’s and the second applicant’s disappearance. Those decisions were subsequently set aside by the Krasnogvardeyskiy District Deputy Prosecutor and additional checks were ordered. 67.  The additional checks revealed that O.H. had not been receiving her correspondence. They also established that the second applicant had not been attending kindergarten since 6 June 2011, and that the last appointments she had attended at the health care facility had been on 22 June and 6 September 2011. 68.  According to information provided by the Krasnogvardeyskiy District commission for the affairs of minors (комиссия по делам несовершеннолетних и защите их прав при администрации Красногвардейского района), since the end of May 2011 O.H. had been hiding the second applicant from her father, the first applicant; she had not been opening the door and had been ignoring summonses to appear in court. 69.  The Krasnogvargeyskiy District Prosecutor’s Office examined the possibility of bringing administrative proceedings against O.H. under Article 5.35 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. However, the failure to establish O.H.’s whereabouts made it impossible to serve summonses on her, to obtain her explanations and to serve her with the record of administrative offence. 70.  The prosecution authorities also conducted a check at O.H.’s presumed place of residence in Nyuksenitsa, Vologda Region. It was established that O.H. and the second applicant did not live there. 71.  On 21 December 2012 Nyuksenskiy District Prosecutor questioned O.H.’s mother, G.K. The latter submitted that O.H. had lived and worked in Nyuksenitsa between June and August 2012, but that O.H.’s subsequent whereabouts were unknown to her. G.K. further submitted that the first applicant was not supporting O.H. financially, that he had arrived in Nyuksenitsa in summer 2012 and sent 4,000 Russian roubles (RUB) to O.H.’s place of residence in St Petersburg, although he had known that O.H. had been living and working in Nyuksenitsa at that time. 72.  It was established that in 2012 the second applicant had been enrolled for external studies in the first grade of Kirovskiy District school no. 277 in St Petersburg under a distance learning programme. When O.H. had signed a contract with the school she had given a St Petersburg address. 73.  On 31 January and 13 May 2013 the local police inspector again went to the above-mentioned address in St Petersburg, in vain. 74.  In August 2013 O.H. logged onto the school educational website, which suggested that the child started the second grade programme. 75.  To the present day the whereabouts of O.H. and the second applicant remain unknown. 76.  On 30 December 2008 the Russian Ministry of Justice received from the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic court orders issued by Prague 4 District Court for a check of O.H.’s living conditions and certain other procedural actions to be carried out. 77.  On 26 January and 27 January 2009 respectively, in accordance with the Treaty between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on legal assistance, the court orders were submitted to the North-Western Federal Circuit Department of the Ministry of Justice (Управление Министерства юстиции Российской Федерации по Северо-Западному федеральному округу). 78.  On 16 March and 30 April 2009 reminders were sent to the North‑Western Federal Circuit Department of the Ministry of Justice. 79.  According to that department, the execution of the orders had been complicated by the failure of the court to provide O.H.’s correct address. 80.  On 31 July 2009 the Russian Ministry of Justice submitted to the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic the documents on execution of the orders of Prague 4 District Court. 81.  On 29 October 2010 and 12 November 2010 the Russian Ministry of Justice received from the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic another order issued by Prague 4 District Court to take certain procedural steps in respect of O.H. and a request for service of court documents on O.H. 82.  On 11 November and 23 November 2010 respectively the court order and request for service of documents were submitted to the North‑Western Federal Circuit Department. 83.  On 12 May 2011 the Russian Ministry of Justice informed the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic that it was impossible to execute the orders of Prague 4 District Court. 84.  Following receipt of a note from the Embassy of the Czech Republic forwarded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, on 29 March 2012, the Russian Ministry of Justice submitted to the North-Western Federal Circuit Department a court order issued by Prague 4 District Court for service of court documents on O.H. 85.  On 31 July 2012 the Russian Ministry of Justice submitted to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the documents attesting to the impossibility of executing that court order. 86.  Following receipt of another note from the Embassy of the Czech Republic, on 22 November 2012 the Russian Ministry of Justice again submitted to the North-Western Federal Circuit Department a court order issued by Prague 4 District Court for service of court documents on O.H. 87.  On 1 June 2012, the first day of acceptance by the Czech Republic of Russia’s accession to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction, the first applicant filed a request under Article 21 of the Convention for securing the effective exercise of his “access rights” in respect of his daughter, the second applicant. 88.  On 21 August 2012 the Office for the Legal Protection of Children (“the Czech Central Authority”) informed the Russian Ministry of Education and Science (“the Russian Central Authority”) that the first applicant had discovered the whereabouts of O.H. in Vologda Region. However, he had not seen his daughter. 89.  As the Russian Central Authority had not replied to the above‑mentioned letters, on 1 October 2012 a reminder was sent to it. 90.  On 1 November 2012, at the request of the Czech Central Authority, the Ambassador of the Czech Republic in Moscow sent a letter to the Russian Central Authority. 91.  On 5 March 2013 the Russian Central Authority replied that it was not possible to establish O.H. and the second applicant’s place of residence. 92.  In the meantime, on 12 December 2012 and 27 March 2013 the Czech Central Authority contacted the Russian Children’s Ombudsman about the same issue. The Czech Authority has not yet received a reply. 93.  On 21 May and 6 September 2013 the Czech Central Authority sent further letters to the Russian Central Authority. No reply has been received. Another reminder was sent on 13 December 2013. 94.  On 11 November 2013 the Czech Central Authority sent a letter to the Secretary General of the Hague Conference on Private Law asking for help in securing effective cooperation between the Czech and Russian Central Authorities.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Wadowice Górne. 6.  The applicant is married with two children. Prior to his early retirement he had been employed for twenty-eight years and had paid social security contributions to the State. 7.  On 28 May 2001 the applicant filed an application with the Rzeszów Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych) to be granted the right to an early-retirement pension for persons raising children who, due to the seriousness of their health condition, required constant care, the so-called “EWK” pension. 8.  Along with his application for a pension, the applicant submitted, among other documents concerning his daughter’s health condition, a medical certificate issued by a specialist doctor on 24 May 2001. The certificate stated that his daughter M (born in 1990) had suffered from chronic asthma (przewlekła astma oskrzelowa) and chronic allergy sinusitis (całoroczny alergiczny niezyt nosa) and that she was in need of her parent’s constant care. 9.  On 16 July 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board (“the SSB”) issued a decision granting the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension as of 1 May 2001 in the net amount of 880.99 Polish zlotys. 10.  The Social Security Board initially suspended the payment of the pension due to the fact that the applicant was still working on the date of the decision. On 31 July 2001 the applicant resigned from his full-time job as a driver at the road and bridge construction company (Przedsiębiorstwo Drogowo-Mostowe) in Dębica. 11.  Consequently, on 21 August 2001 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued a new decision authorising the payment of the previously awarded retirement pension starting from 1 August 2001. 12.  On 27 August 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board asked the Main Social Security Board’s doctor (Główny Lekarz Orzecznik) to inform it whether the applicant’s daughter required the permanent care of a parent. On an unknown date the doctor stated that, on the basis of the medical documents, the child could not be considered as ever having required such care. 13.  On 4 September 2002 the Rzeszów Social Security Board issued simultaneously two decisions in respect of the applicant. 14.  By virtue of the first decision, the payment of the applicant’s pension was discontinued with immediate effect. By virtue of the other decision, the Board reopened the proceedings and revoked the initial decision granting a pension and eventually refused to award the applicant the right to an early‑retirement pension under the scheme provided for by the 1989 Ordinance. 15.  The applicant appealed against the respective decisions divesting him of the right to an early-retirement pension. 16.  On 28 November 2002 the Tarnobrzeg Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) ordered that the case be remitted to the Social Security Board and that the applicant’s child be examined by the Social Security Board’s doctor. 17.  On 31 March 2003 the Social Security Board’s doctor, who had examined the applicant’s child, stated that M suffered from asthma (astma oskrzelowa) and allergy sinusitis (alergiczny nieżyt nosa) but did not require the permanent care of a parent. 18.  On 25 February 2004 the Tarnobrzeg Regional Court dismissed the appeal. The Regional Court concluded on the basis of the evidence that the applicant’s child did not require her father’s permanent care, since her health condition did not significantly impair her bodily functions. The domestic court held that the applicant had been rightfully divested of his right to a pension under the scheme provided by the 1989 Ordinance as he did not satisfy the requirement of necessary permanent care. 19.  The applicant appealed against the first-instance judgment. 20.  On 22 July 2004 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the appeal. 21.  On 24 January 2005 the Supreme Court refused to entertain a cassation appeal lodged by the applicant’s lawyer. 22.  Following the revocation of his right to the early-retirement pension the applicant was not ordered to return his early-retirement benefits paid by the Social Security Board. 23.  As from 1 September 2002 the applicant was unemployed and has been covered by the social insurance scheme for farmers. 24.  The Government submitted that between 6 January 2005 and 11 May 2010 the applicant received sickness benefits in a total amount of PLN 7,183. They stressed that the applicant and his wife own a farm with an area of 1.83 hectares which was an additional source of income for them. Furthermore, a farm with an area of at least 1 hectare entitles the owner to receive support payments for farmers from European Union funds. 25.  In addition, the Government submitted information as regards various types of social benefits available in Poland. However, they did not specify which of those benefits, if any, were available in the applicant’s situation. 26.  The applicant did not provide details about his financial situation after the revocation of his EWK pension. He only submitted that he was unemployed and although he ran a small farm it did not generate much income. 27.  Under the relevant laws currently in force, it appears that the applicant will qualify for a regular retirement pension when he turns sixty‑five in 2018. 28.  Some 130 applications arising from a similar fact pattern have been brought to the Court. The majority of the applicants form the Association of Victims of the SSB (Stowarzyszenie Osób Poszkodowanych przez ZUS) (“the Association”), an organisation monitoring the practices of the Social Security Board in Poland, in particular in the Podkarpacki region. 29.  Out of all applications lodged with the Court, about twenty-four applicants decided not to lodge a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal given in their case. 30.  One hundred-and-four applicants lodged cassation appeals against the final judgments given in their cases. The Supreme Court entertained and dismissed on the merits fifteen appeals. In eighty-one applications the Supreme Court refused to entertain cassation appeals on the ground that they did not raise any important legal issues or require the Supreme Court to give a new interpretation to legal provisions which raised serious doubts or gave rise to ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the domestic courts. In the remaining eight cases cassation appeals were rejected for failure to comply with various procedural requirements.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Siemianowice Śląskie, Poland. 5.  On 21 August 2001 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having stabbed a certain A.T. during a quarrel and being under the influence of alcohol. 6.  On 23 August 2001 the Katowice District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) decided to detain the applicant on remand on the basis of a reasonable suspicion that he had attempted to commit a homicide. The court also considered that given the severity of the penalty that could be expected, it was probable that the applicant would interfere with the course of proceedings. At the same time, the court rejected the prosecutor’s assertion that there was also a risk of collusion. 7.  On 12 November 2001 the District Court further prolonged the detention, referring in particular to the fact that the investigation had not yet ended. 8.  On 8 February 2002 the applicant was indicted before the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 9.  The applicant’s pre-trial detention was subsequently prolonged on 18 February and 5 August 2002 and on 5 January 2003. The trial court justified its decisions by reference to the high probability that the applicant had committed the offence and the gravity of the charges, which might attract a heavy sentence. 10.  On 14 April 2003 the Katowice Regional Court further prolonged the applicant’s detention relying, in addition to the previous grounds, on the fact that the trial court had not yet completed the taking of evidence. 11.  The applicant’s numerous applications for release and appeals against decisions concerning prolongation of his detention were to no avail. 12.  On 23 May 2003 the trial court gave judgment. The court convicted the applicant as charged finding that, given his state of mind at the time of events, he could not be held fully responsible for his actions. The Regional Court sentenced the applicant to six years’ imprisonment. 13.  On 11 December 2003 the Katowice Court of Appeal gave judgment which it quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and remitted the case. 14.  The applicant’s pre-trial detention was not lifted. The trial court prolonged it on 16 January, 10 May and 13 September 2004 relying on the same grounds as before: the reasonable suspicion against the applicant, the gravity of the charges and the risk that given the severity of the expected penalty the applicant would obstruct the proceedings. 15.  On 29 September 2004 the Katowice Regional Court gave judgment. The court considered that the applicant had overstepped the limits of legitimate self-defence and sentenced him to 5 years’ imprisonment. 16.  On 27 January 2005 the Katowice Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. It appears that the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal and that this judgment became final. 17.  On 27 November 2004 the applicant sent a letter to the Court. The envelope in which the letter was delivered bears the following stamp: Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny Katowice), a handwritten note: censorship, 29 December 2004 (cenzura, 29.12.04) and an illegible signature. The envelope bears signs of having been opened after being sealed: its left side has been cut open and then resealed with sellotape. It appears that the envelope was stamped with the Court of Appeal’s stamp described above after being resealed with sellotape.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1929 and 1937 respectively and live in Plovdiv. 6.  The applicants are sisters. Their ancestor and another person, P.D., had owned 14,688 square metres of agricultural land which they had divided in 1957 in equal parts of 7,344 square metres each. Following the adoption of the Agricultural Land Act in 1991, the applicants and the heirs of P.D., separately, requested the restitution of their respective parts. The applicants’ request was submitted on 13 March 1991. In a decision of 5 July 1994 the Plovdiv Agricultural Land Commission (“the land commission”) restored 7,015 square metres to the applicants and dismissed their request for the remaining 329 square metres. The heirs of P.D. obtained a decision restoring to them their 7,344 square metres of land. 7.  On 8 September 1994 the applicants appealed to the Plovdiv District Court, asking the court to declare that they were entitled to restitution of the entire plot. 8.  On 24 October 1995 the District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. Relying on an expert’s report it held that the land had been restored to the heirs of P.D. The court thus concluded that the applicants should have brought an action against the latter. The applicants did not submit a petition for review (cassation) against the judgment of 24 October 1995. 9.  On 18 August 1997 the applicants brought an action for rei vindicatio against the heirs of P.D. They sought to be recognised as the owners of 391.5 square metres of land and to obtain possession thereof. 10.  Of the seventeen hearings held between 12 November 1997 and 16 March 2000 four were adjourned at the applicants’ request. Six of the remaining hearings were adjourned for reasons related to the preparation of expert reports commissioned by the court. At least four other hearings were adjourned so that new evidence could be collected or to allow the parties to get acquainted with such evidence. 11.  On 5 April 2000 the Plovdiv District Court found against the applicants. It noted that the applicants had stated that their action had been based on section 14 § 4 of the Agricultural Land Act and had not been a rei vindicatio one. However, it was clear from the facts on which it was grounded and the formulation of the applicants’ claims that the action was for rei vindicatio. The District Court noted that the land commission had restored 7,015 square metres to the applicants and 7,344 square metres to the defendants. The missing land had not been restored to the defendants, although it was not clear to whom it had been given. Accordingly, the action was dismissed. 12.  On 13 April 2000 the applicants filed an appeal against the judgment of 5 April 2000. 13.  The first hearing was held on 12 December 2000 and the second one on 26 February 2001. 14.  On 29 June 2001 the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It noted that the applicants did not claim that the heirs of P.D. had obtained land in excess and on that ground found that there was no legal dispute, within the meaning of section 14 § 4 of the Agricultural Land Act. It further found that it could not assess the lawfulness of the land commission’s decision of 1991 which had become final in 1995. 15.  Following an appeal filed by the applicants on 2 August 2001 and a hearing held on 10 October 2002, on 4 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 29 June 2001 and remitted the case to the Regional Court for fresh examination holding that the latter had failed to examine all the relevant issues and instructing it to examine the whole restitution file. 16.  On 12 September 2003 the Regional Court upheld the judgment of the District Court of 5 April 2000. It subscribed to the lower court’s findings and noted that the land commission’s decision had become final in 1995. 17.  Following an appeal filed by the applicants on 15 October 2003 and a hearing held on 26 January 2005, on 10 February 2005 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment. The court endorsed the lower courts’ finding that the decision of the land commission had become final and therefore must be respected. It also held that the applicants had neither proved that the defendants were in possession of the claimed piece of land nor its precise location.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in the town of Vanadzor, Lori Region of Armenia. 6.  The applicant worked as the Lori Regional Branch Manager of the Credit Service Bank (hereafter, the Bank). 7.  On 19 March 2002 criminal proceedings were instituted on account of abuse of official capacity by the former management of the Bank through embezzlement of funds entrusted to it by another company. 8.  On 8 April 2002 the Lori Regional Court issued a judicial warrant authorising the search of the premises of the Bank’s Lori Regional Branch with the aim of seizing relevant accounting documents. 9.  On 22 April 2002 the applicant was questioned as a witness and was asked various questions about the Bank’s activities in dealing with the funds entrusted to it. According to the applicant, during the following year he was questioned as a witness on seven other occasions. 10.  On 29 November 2002 the prosecutor’s office ordered an expert examination of the Bank’s financial records. 11.  On 1 April 2003 the applicant was arrested. 12.  On 2 April 2003 the applicant was formally charged under paragraph 4 of Article 90, paragraph 4 of Article 90 in conjunction with Article 17, and Article 187 of the former Criminal Code (hereafter, the former CC) with embezzlement through abuse of his official capacity and official falsification through preparation and use of false accounting documents. It appears that ten other persons, including A.D., were also charged with involvement in the above crimes and later stood trial with the applicant. 13.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the investigator’s motion seeking to have the applicant placed in pre-trial detention for a period of two months. In doing so, the District Court referred to the nature and degree of dangerousness of the acts of which the applicant was accused, as well as all the grounds envisaged by Article 135 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter the CCP). 14.  On 16 April 2003 the applicant, who had a defence lawyer, lodged an appeal against this decision. 15.  On 2 May 2003 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 16.  On 23 May 2003 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to grant the investigator’s motion seeking to have the applicant’s detention extended for two months, referring to the need to carry out further investigative measures. The applicant did not lodge an appeal against that decision. 17.  On 23 July 2003 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to grant the investigator’s motion seeking to have the applicant’s detention extended for one more month, namely until 1 September 2003, on the same ground. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 18.  On 1 August 2003 a new Criminal Code (hereafter, the new CC) entered into force in Armenia. 19.  On 11 August 2003 the charges against the applicant were adapted to the new CC and on 12 August 2003 he was formally charged under Article 179 § 3 (1), Article 179 § 3 (1) in conjunction with Article 38 and 325 § 2 of the new CC. 20.  On 26 August 2003 the applicant was informed of the conclusion of the investigation and was granted access to the case file which apparently consisted of 34 volumes of written materials. It appears that the applicant finished familiarising himself with the materials of the case on 10 November 2003. 21.  On 11 November 2003 the applicant complained to the prosecutor that, inter alia, he had been kept in detention since 1 September 2003 without a court decision and requested to be released. 22.  On 13 November 2003 the prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unfounded. 23.  On 14 November 2003 the prosecutor approved the indictment and the case was transmitted to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan for examination. 24.  On 17 November 2003 Judge A. of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to admit the case to his proceedings. 25.  On 1 December 2003 Judge A. decided to set the case down for trial, fixing the date of the first hearing for 8 December 2003 and finding, inter alia, that there were no grounds to change or cancel the applicant’s detention. 26.  Between 8 December 2003 and 13 September 2005 the District Court held 57 hearings at varying intervals, ten of which were apparently adjourned. At the trial the indictment was maintained by prosecutors T. and A. 27.  As it appears from the handwritten court transcripts, at the hearing of 15 December 2004 the applicant filed a motion seeking to be released from detention. Upon a request of a representative of the victim, Judge A. postponed the examination of the applicant’s motion until the next court hearing due to take place on 27 December 2004. At the hearing of 27 December 2004 the applicant requested the trial court not to examine his motion lodged at the previous hearing, and Judge A. left it without examination. 28.  According to the applicant, during the hearing of 27 December 2004 two of his co-defendants lodged two other motions with the trial court. At the time those motions were made, his written motion to be released, lodged at the previous court hearing, was still lying on the judge’s desk. As the judge retired to the deliberation room in order to decide on the two motions of the co-defendants, he expected the judge to examine his motion too. However, as the judge came back and pronounced his decision on the two co-defendants’ motions only, he realised that his motion to be released had not been examined. The judge’s behaviour caused considerable stress to him and his family members, who were present in the court room. As a result, a dispute broke out between him and the judge, which grew into a polemic involving all the co-defendants, their defence lawyers and the court audience. The court room became very noisy and the judge announced that he was going to adjourn the hearing. It was at that moment that he gave in to his emotions and announced that if the judge continued subjecting him and his family to psychological anguish, he would better never examine the motion. Immediately thereafter, the judge adjourned the hearing and left the court room. The judge apparently took his emotional announcement as an explicit request to withdraw the motion as he then decided to leave it without examination. In substantiation of his account of the events, the applicant attached written statements made to that effect by one of the co-accused, A.D. and his mother. 29.  On 14 November 2005 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan delivered its judgment. The District Court found the applicant guilty under Article 179 § 2 (3) in conjunction with Article 38, and Article 325 § 1 of the new CC of abetting one of the co-defendants to embezzle funds, and of falsification and use of documents such as various credit agreements concluded between the Bank and a third person. The District Court sentenced the applicant to two years and six months’ imprisonment under Article 179 § 2 in conjunction with Article 38, and discontinued the proceedings under Article 325 § 1 by applying a statute of limitations. The applicant was immediately released from detention since he had already served the term of his sentence. 30.  On 29 November 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal. It appears that during the examination of the appeal by the Criminal Court of Appeal the applicant submitted that he could not have been considered as a perpetrator of an offence under Article 325 § 1. 31.  On 10 April 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court finding, inter alia, that any person who had reached the age of 16 and had a legal capacity, including a private employer, could be considered as a perpetrator under Article 325 § 1. 32.  On 20 April 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his appeal he argued, inter alia, that Article 325 of the new CC should not have been applied to his case as documents of a private bank could not be considered as official and, consequently, their falsification fell outside its scope. 33.  On 1 June 2006 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Cassation found, inter alia, that:\n“Documents to which public authorities give legal significance are considered official. Official documents may be issued both by public authorities, their officials and bodies of local self-government, and by legal entities, commercial and other types of organisations. Such documents as credit or other financial documents drawn up by commercial banks can also be considered as [official documents], since they also have legal significance...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 1 May 2007, at about 1 a.m., the corpse of Ms Kh., the applicant’s wife, from whom he was separated, was discovered with multiple stab wounds. 7.  Later on 1 May 2007, at about 3 a.m., the police apprehended and questioned the applicant. His questioning was documented as that of a witness. The applicant confessed to the murder of Ms Kh. 8.  The applicant described the circumstances in which that confession was given as follows. He had been taken to Gorodok Town Police Station, where the police had threatened him with a view to extracting a confession. As the applicant had refused to confess, they had handcuffed his hands behind his back, pulled a black cap over his head, covering his eyes, and had taken him somewhere downstairs. The applicant had been made to sit on a chair and his feet had been tied to the chair legs. The applicant had felt something touching his head behind the ears and something being pressed against his temples, and as his body started to shake and jerk realised that electric shocks were being administered to him. This had been repeated several times. The applicant had fallen off the chair. Thereafter a police officer had unzipped the applicant’s trousers and attached electric wires to his genitals. After several electric shocks had been administered to his genitals, the applicant had agreed to confess to the incriminated murder. After saying that he could not remember certain details, more electric shocks had been administered to him. One of the police officers involved in the ill-treatment had complained to the applicant that the latter had ruined his birthday celebration and had expressed his determination to obtain a confession from him. 9.  According to the Government’s account of the events, the applicant had not suffered any ill-treatment and had confessed to the murder of his own free will. 10.  On the evening of 1 May 2007 the applicant’s “voluntary surrender to the police” was documented, and he was questioned again, this time as a suspect. He signed a report confirming that his right to legal assistance had been explained to him. As noted in the questioning report, at first the applicant had expressed the wish to be represented by a lawyer, but had later decided to waive his right to legal assistance. He stated during the questioning that his waiver had not resulted from any ill-treatment. 11.  On the same day an expert from the Yarmolyntsi Town Forensic Expert Examination Bureau examined the applicant on the investigator’s instruction with a view to establishing whether he had any injuries, if so, what their location and nature were, and finally whether those injuries could have been caused by a struggle with the victim. 12.  With effect from 2 May 2007, the applicant was represented by lawyer B., who had been contracted by his sister. He was questioned as a suspect in the presence of his lawyer and maintained his confession. He further maintained it during the reconstruction of the crime conducted on the same day with the participation of his lawyer. 13.  On 3 May 2007 the expert who had examined the applicant on 1 May 2007 completed the examination report. It documented a bruise on the applicant’s left shoulder blade, a bruise on the left side of his torso, a bruise beneath the right shoulder blade, a bruise on the left shoulder and another bruise in the upper part of the left forearm, a bruise on the left wrist, a bruise on the back of the right hand and on the right wrist, and an abrasion and a bruise on the left ear. The injuries in question were assessed as having originated one or two days prior to the examination from blows inflicted by blunt objects with a limited surface, and by falling against a blunt surface. They were assessed as insignificant. In addition, the expert reported two abrasions behind the applicant’s right ear, which could have originated from blunt hard objects with a limited surface and a slightly sharp edge (such as nails). The age of these sores was assessed as one day prior to the examination. Some older bruises (three to five days old) were also discovered. 14.  On 4 May 2007 the applicant was again questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He maintained his confession. As regards his injuries, he explained that he had sustained them while working on a construction site and during his fight with Ms Kh. The applicant stated that the police had not ill-treated him. 15.  On the same day the Gorodok Town Court remanded the applicant in custody pending trial. During the hearing he repeated his confession and did not lodge any complaints. 16.  Still on that date, 4 May 2007, the applicant was examined by a panel of doctors in the Gorodok Central City Hospital. They found him to be in good health. 17.  With effect from 8 May 2007 the applicant was represented by lawyer T. instead of lawyer B. He immediately retracted his confession and complained of his ill-treatment to the Gorodok town prosecutor’s office. The applicant submitted that he had incriminated himself as a result of coercion and that he had not committed the crime in question. He alleged that he had sustained electric shocks at the hands of the police and stated that no other ill-treatment had been used on him. As to his bruises, the applicant noted that they could have been caused by his falling to the floor whilst tied to a chair. He further explained that even when represented by lawyer B., he had been afraid to tell the truth and had repeated his confession as the lawyer had recommended. 18.  On 10 May 2007 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer T. While maintaining the complaint concerning his ill-treatment, he submitted that his ear had been injured earlier, prior to his encounter with the police. 19.  On 7 June 2007 an additional forensic medical examination report was delivered in respect of the applicant. The question before the expert was whether the applicant had any injuries demonstrating that electric shocks had been administered to him on 1 May 2007. According to the report, the applicant had three superficial wounds to his genitals, which had been inflicted at least two weeks before the examination. The expert found it impossible to establish whether those wounds had originated from electric shocks. However, he stated that it was equally impossible to exclude that possibility. 20.  On 14 November 2007 the prosecutor questioned the forensic medical expert who had examined the applicant on 1 May and 7 June 2007 (see paragraphs 11, 13 and 19 above). She submitted, in particular, that the bruises discovered on his wrists on 1 May 2007 could have been caused by handcuffs. The expert also noted that the applicant had not complained before 7 June 2007 that electric shocks had been administered to him. It was not possible to state with precision when the wounds on his genitals could have been inflicted. Their healing time could vary significantly depending on individual characteristics. Overall, the expert considered it improbable that the applicant might have sustained those injuries on 1 May 2007 and in the circumstances described by him. 21.  On the same day the prosecutor also questioned the dermatologist who had participated in the examination of the applicant on 4 May 2007 (see paragraph 16 above). The doctor stated that she had examined the applicant’s genitals and that no wounds or other signs of ill-treatment had been discovered. She also noted that the applicant had not raised any complaints. 22.  During the period between May 2007 and January 2008 the prosecution authorities refused on six occasions to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers involved in the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant. Five of those rulings were quashed for the incompleteness and superficiality of the investigation. As to the sixth ruling, of 29 January 2008, it is not clear whether it was eventually quashed. The report of 7 June 2007 was mentioned in only one ruling, that of 16 November 2007. The prosecutor, however, concluded that it could not be regarded as sufficient evidence that electric shocks had been administered to the applicant. 23.  On 27 February 2008 the Dunayivtsi Town Court found the applicant guilty of the premeditated murder of Ms Kh. and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. It relied, in particular, on the applicant’s “surrender to the police” and subsequent self-incriminating statements. As to his allegation of ill-treatment by the police, it was dismissed as unsubstantiated. 24.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that he had incriminated himself under duress and pointed out certain discrepancies in the evidence. 25.  On 14 May 2008 the Khmelnytskyy Regional Court of Appeal (“the Khmelnytskyy Regional Court”) upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. 26.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which he maintained the arguments advanced earlier in his appeal. 27.  On 14 April 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the ruling of 14 May 2008 and remitted the case for fresh examination by the appellate court. It stated that the Khmelnytskyy Regional Court had not sufficiently addressed the applicant’s arguments. The Supreme Court also criticised the lower courts for formalistic examination of the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. It stated that no evaluation had been made of the medical evidence in the case file, according to which it could not be ruled out that his injuries had been sustained in the circumstances as described by him. 28.  On 27 July 2009 the Khmelnytskyy Regional Court quashed the judgment of 27 February 2008 and remitted the case to the Gorodok Prosecutor for additional investigation. It referred to the issues pointed out by the Supreme Court. 29.  On 17 March 2010 the Dunayivtsi Court pronounced a new verdict, the operative part of which was identical to that of 27 February 2008. As before, the court relied on the applicant’s initial confessions, including that of 1 May 2007, which was documented as his “voluntary surrender to the police”. The court dismissed all the defence arguments, considering them to be nothing more than the applicant’s attempts to avoid criminal liability. As to his motives for the murder, the court considered them to have been his jealousy and his wish to reunite with Ms Kh. Allegations of aggressive behaviour towards the victim in the past had been confirmed by several witnesses. Lastly, the applicant’s allegation about having suffered electric shocks was rejected as unsubstantiated. The court noted in that regard that the applicant had made his confessions in the presence of his lawyer B. 30.  The applicant submitted an appeal, and later an appeal on points of law, reiterating his earlier argumentation. 31.  The Khmelnytskyy Regional Court and the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 17 March 2010 on 26 May 2010 and 24 March 2011 respectively.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who live in various districts of the Chechen Republic. They are the close relatives of people who disappeared after allegedly being arrested at their homes by servicemen. In each of the applications, the events took place in areas under the full control of the Russian federal forces. The alleged abductions were primarily carried out during curfew hours, at night or early in the morning. In some of the cases, the applicants submitted that, at the material time, a special operation was being conducted by military servicemen or law-enforcement agencies in the area, which was subsequently confirmed by the investigation (see, for example, Vezirov and Others (no. 44284/11), Nuraliyevy (no. 48134/11) and Sangariyevy (no. 52182/11)). 6.  The applicants complained to law-enforcement bodies, and official investigations were opened. The proceedings were repeatedly suspended and resumed, and have remained pending for several years without achieving any tangible results. 7.  From the documents submitted, it appears that the relevant State authorities were unable to identify the State servicemen allegedly involved in the arrests or abductions. 8.  In their observations, the Government did not challenge the allegations as presented by the applicants. At the same time, they stated that there was no evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that State agents had been involved in the alleged abductions. 9.  Below are summaries of the facts relevant to each individual complaint. Each account of events is based on statements provided by the applicants, their relatives and/or neighbours to the Court and to the domestic investigative authorities. The personal data of the applicants and their disappeared relatives, and some other key facts, are summarised in Appendix I. 10.  The applicant, Ms Petimat Ismailova (in the documents submitted also referred to as Baskhanova), was born in 1980, and lives in Katyr‑Yurt in the Achkhoy-Martan district, the Chechen Republic. She is represented before the Court by lawyers from the NGO Materi Chechni. 11.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Ruslan Baskhanov, who was born in 1980. 12.  At the material time, the applicant and her husband Mr Ruslan Baskhanov lived in Achkhoy-Martan, Chechnya. Their house was situated in proximity to the Achkhoy-Martan district military commander’s office. 13.  At about 3 a.m. on 6 January 2004 a group of about fifteen masked servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicant’s house in two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and took Mr Ruslan Baskhanov away. 14.  There has been no news of Mr Ruslan Baskhanov since that day. 15.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 16.  On 9 January 2004 the applicant reported the abduction, and on 15 January 2004 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 38002. 17.  On 15 January 2004 investigators examined the crime scene and collected three bullet cartridges. The expert examination they carried out subsequently concluded that they had been fired from various types of firearms. 18.  On 26 April 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 replied to the investigators, denying that military servicemen had been involved in the abduction. 19.  On 15 May 2004 the investigation was suspended. 20.  From the documents submitted, it appears that on an unspecified date in July 2007 the investigation was resumed, several witnesses were questioned (see paragraph 29 below) and the proceedings were then suspended. 21.  On 11 June 2008 the investigation was again resumed, and on 16 July 2008 it was again suspended. The applicant was not informed thereof. 22.  On 24 March 2009 the supervising prosecutor ordered that the investigation be resumed as the investigators had failed to take a number of basic steps, such as establishing the owners of the APCs used by the abductors and granting the applicant victim status in the criminal case. On the same date the orders were given, the applicant was granted victim status and the proceedings were resumed. 23.  On 28 March 2009 the investigation was suspended again. The applicant was informed thereof. 24.  On 21 April 2012 the investigation was resumed again. It is still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 25.  On 9 January 2004 the investigators questioned five of the applicant’s relatives and neighbours, all of whom stated that they had learnt of the circumstances of the abduction from the applicant. 26.  On an unspecified date in January 2004 the investigators questioned the applicant, whose statement concerning the events was similar to the account submitted to the Court. In addition, she told the investigators that the perpetrators of her husband’s abduction had been federal servicemen. 27.  On 22 January 2004 the applicant’s relative and the aunt of Mr Ruslan Baskhanov, Ms A.M., wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office, stating that on an unspecified date between 6 and 21 January 2004 she had been invited by the head of the Achkhoy-Martan District Department of the Interior (ROVD) to a meeting with law-enforcement and military officers at the police station. During the meeting, she had pointed out to those present that the military commander had acknowledged that Mr Ruslan Baskhanov had been detained on 6 January 2004 by a law-enforcement agency. From the documents submitted, it transpires that no steps were taken by the investigators to verify this information. 28.  Between February 2004 and May 2005 the investigators questioned about thirty of the applicant’s relatives and neighbours, all of whom provided statements similar to the account furnished by the applicant to the Court. 29.  On 18 July 2007 the investigators questioned another four of the applicant’s relatives and neighbours, whose statements did not yield any new information. 30.  On various dates between 1 and 10 July 2008 the investigators questioned several more of the applicant’s relatives and neighbours, whose statements did not yield any new information either. 31.  On 24 March 2009 the applicant was questioned again. She reiterated her previous statements.\n(c)  The applicant’s contact with the authorities 32.  On 3 June 2004 the investigators replied to a request by the applicant for information, stating that they had taken a number of steps to establish the whereabouts of her abducted husband and that even though on 15 May 2004 the proceedings had been suspended, the measures to identify the perpetrators and establish her husband’s whereabouts were still in progress. 33.  On 26 November 2008 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court declared Mr Ruslan Baskhanov missing. 34.  On 24 February 2009 in reply to a request by the applicant of 27 January 2009, the investigators informed her that she had the right to review only certain documents from the investigation file, but not its entire contents. 35.  On 11 October 2010 the Achkhoy-Martan District Court partially allowed a complaint by the applicant against the decision to suspend the investigation of 28 March 2009 and ordered the investigators to take all necessary steps. 36.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Khava Idigova, born in 1961,\n(2)  Mr Ibragim Khamzatov, born in 1999, and\n(3)  Ms Marem Khamzatova, born in 2000. 37.  The applicants live in Grozny, Chechnya. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 38.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Magomed Khamzatov, who was born in 1959. The first applicant is his wife, and the second and third applicants are his children. 39.  At the material time, the applicants and Mr Magomed Khamzatov lived at 93 Saltykova‑Szhedrina Street in the Staropromyslovskiy district in Grozny. 40.  At about 5 a.m. on 5 December 2004 the first applicant saw from her window a group of about ten to twelve armed servicemen in military uniforms, masks, bulletproof vests and helmets running down the street and breaking into a nearby house, which belonged to the applicants’ relatives. 41.  Shortly afterwards, the armed men went to the applicants’ house and demanded that the first applicant open the door. They said that they were the police and were conducting identity checks. The intruders, who spoke unaccented Russian, took Mr Magomed Khamzatov outside, along with his passport and some clothing. The first applicant followed the abductors and saw that they had arrived in the neighbourhood in a UAZ minivan parked on a neighbouring street. A number of the applicants’ neighbours saw the servicemen forcing Mr Magomed Khamzatov into the vehicle and driving off. 42.  On the same night the same group of servicemen broke into a neighbouring house occupied by Ms A.T. and her family. The men quickly checked the family’s identity documents and searched the premises. 43.  The applicants have not seen Mr Magomed Khamzatov since his abduction on 5 December 2004. 44.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 45.  On 6 December 2004 (in the documents submitted also referred to as 5 December 2004) investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 46.  On 15 December 2004 (in the documents submitted also referred to as 7 December 2004) the Staropromyslovskiy district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 33090. On 18 December 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status. 47.  On 15 February 2005 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were not informed thereof. 48.  On 20 May and then on 24 June 2005 an operational search officer reported to the investigators that Mr Magomed Khamzatov had been an active member of illegal armed groups, which could have been the reason for his detention by law-enforcement agencies. 49.  On 26 May 2005 the investigation was resumed. 50.  On 26 June 2006 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were not informed thereof. 51.  On 25 December 2007 the supervising prosecutor criticised the way the investigation was being conducted and ordered that it be resumed. 52.  On 2 February 2008 the investigation was resumed and then suspended on 2 March 2008. The applicants were informed thereof. 53.  On 24 March 2008, again upon criticism and orders from the supervising prosecutor, the investigation was resumed. 54.  On 25 April, 8 August and 3 October 2008 the investigation was suspended again, and was resumed on 7 July, 3 September and 24 November 2008 respectively upon orders from the supervising prosecutor. The applicants were informed of the last suspension. 55.  On 28 January 2009 the investigation was again resumed and then suspended on 27 February 2009. 56.  On 23 April 2012 the investigation was again resumed. It is still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 57.  On 5 December 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant and eight of her relatives and neighbours. The witnesses’ descriptions of the abduction were similar to the account furnished by the applicants to the Court. 58.  On 18 December 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who reiterated her previous statement. 59.  Between 25 December 2004 and 20 January 2005 the investigators questioned eight of the applicants’ relatives and neighbours, whose statements did not yield any new information. 60.  On 26 March 2008 the investigators questioned six of the applicants’ neighbours, who did not provide any new information about the circumstances of the abduction.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 61.  On 24 February 2005 the father of Mr Magomed Khamzatov, Mr Kh., wrote to the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences, asking them to confirm whether his son was being detained on the premises of the main Russian military base in Khankala, Chechnya. No reply was given to this request. 62.  On 1 April 2005, in reply to a request by the first applicant of 25 March 2005 concerning the progress of the proceedings, the investigators informed her that they were ongoing. 63.  On 12 July 2005 the first applicant requested that the investigators take steps to establish her husband’s whereabouts and resume the proceedings if they had been suspended. 64.  On an unspecified date in October or November 2008 the applicants’ relative and the mother of Mr Magomed Khamzatov, Ms Kh. Kh., complained to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court in Grozny that the investigators had failed to take a number of basic steps to solve her son’s abduction and requested that the proceedings be resumed. On 28 November 2008 the District Court rejected the complaint, stating that the investigation had already been resumed that day. 65.  On 25 May 2010, upon a request by the first applicant, the Staropromyslovskiy District Court in Grozny declared Mr Magomed Khamzatov dead. 66.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Mr Zaurbek Vezirov, born in 1954,\n(2)  Ms Aminat Vezirova, born in 1957,\n(3)  Ms Raisa Bibulatova, born in 1979,\n(4)  Ms Eliza Vezirova, born in 1990,\n(5)  Ms Elina Vezirova, born in 1990,\n(6)  Ms Rukiyat Vezirova, born in 1986 and\n(7)  Ms Zhansari Vezirova, born in 1980. 67.  The first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants live in the settlement of Ilyinovskoye (also spelt Ilyinovka) in the Naurskiy district, the Chechen Republic. The sixth applicant lives in the Rostov region and the seventh applicant lives in Grozny. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 68.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Kharun Vezirov, who was born in 1977, and Mr Askhab Vezirov, who was born in 1979. The first and second applicants are their parents, and the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh applicants are their sisters. The third applicant is the wife of Mr Askhab Vezirov. 69.  At the material time the applicants, along with Mr Kharun Vezirov and Mr Askhab Vezirov and other relatives, lived at 4 Nagornaya Street in Ilyinovskoye. 70.  At about 4 a.m. on 7 July 2003 a group of about ten servicemen arrived at their house in several UAZ vehicles and a GAZEL minivan. The servicemen, who were armed and in camouflage uniforms and masks, checked the identity documents of the family members and then dragged Mr Kharun Vezirov to the backyard, where they subjected him to beatings, demanding in unaccented Russian that he show them the firearms he had allegedly hidden in the house. Having searched the house, the servicemen forced Mr Kharun Vezirov and Mr Askhab Vezirov into the minivan and drove off in the direction of Argun, a nearby town. 71.  The applicants have not seen the two brothers since that date. 72.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 73.  On 27 February 2004 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 34025. 74.  On various dates in March and April 2004 the investigators requested that the Grozny ROVD assist them in the search for the Vezirov brothers stating, amongst other things:\n“[...] on 7 July 2003 in Ilyinovskoye, a special operation involving a large number of military servicemen and policemen was carried out...” 75.  On 9 March 2004 the third applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case, and on 25 May 2004 the first applicant was also granted that status. 76.  On 27 May and 29 July 2004 the investigation was suspended and then on 22 June and 17 August 2004 respectively it was resumed upon orders from the supervising prosecutor. 77.  On 12 March 2007 and 14 April 2011 the applicants were informed that the investigation had been suspended on 19 September 2004 for failure to identify the perpetrators. 78.  From the documents submitted, it appears that the investigation was resumed on or around 29 May 2012 and is still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 79.  On 25 February 2004 the investigators questioned the first, second and third applicants, whose statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction were similar to the account submitted to the Court. In addition, the second applicant provided the investigators with a detailed description of the appearances and uniforms of two of the abductors. 80.  On March 2004 the investigators questioned the first and third applicants and one of the applicants’ neighbours, Mr Kh.-A.A. again, whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the applicants’ account submitted to the Court. 81.  On 2 September 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who stated that he suspected that the abduction of his sons had been perpetrated by State agents because of his family’s kinship with a certain Mr Abubakar, who had been an active member of illegal armed groups. He also stated that his son Mr Kharun Vezirov had fought against the federal forces during the first military campaign in Chechnya in 1996. 82.  On 6 September 2004 the investigators questioned the third applicant again, who reiterated her previous statements. 83.  On 9 September 2004 the investigators questioned the head of a local state enterprise, Mr A.A., who stated that there were no detention facilities on their premises.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 84.  On 9 June 2004 the third applicant wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office, asking for assistance in the search for her abducted relatives. 85.  On an unspecified date between January and March 2007 the applicants requested information on the progress of the investigation. They were informed in reply on 12 March 2007 that the proceedings had been suspended on 19 September 2004 (see paragraph 77 above). 86.  Between 24 and 27 July 2009 the applicants requested their representatives to assist them in dealing with the investigative authorities and establishing the circumstances of the abduction. 87.  On an unspecified date between January and March 2011 the applicants again requested information on the progress of the investigation. They were informed in reply on 14 April 2011 that the proceedings had been suspended since 19 September 2004 (see paragraph 77 above). 88.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Khazan (also spelt as Khaza) Ismailova, born in 1957,\n(2)  Ms Medni Isayeva, born in 2003, and\n(3)  Ms Zina Ismailova, born in 1939.\nThe first and second applicants live in Goyty, and the third applicant lives in Grozny, the Chechen Republic. The applicants are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 89.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Aslambek Isayev, who was born in 1981. The first applicant is his aunt, the second applicant is his daughter, and the third applicant is his grandmother. 90.  At the material time, the applicants and Mr Aslambek Isayev lived together in flat no. 8 (in the documents submitted also referred to as no. 11) in a block of flats at 54 Tobolskaya Street in Grozny. The applicants’ neighbourhood was surrounded by military checkpoints and the area was under curfew. 91.  At about 3 a.m. on 16 April 2003 a group of about ten armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the block of flats in two UAZ vehicles. They broke into the applicants’ flat, asked the applicants in unaccented Russian whether any firearms were hidden on the premises and quickly searched it. Afterwards, they told the applicants that identity checks had been conducted in the area and that more than fifty people had already been arrested as a result. They then said that they would check Mr Aslambek Isayev’s identity, put him in one of the UAZ cars and drove off. 92.  The applicants have not seen Mr Aslambek Isayev since 16 April 2003. 93.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 94.  On 1 May 2003 the Grozny town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 40070. 95.  On 19 May 2003 the wife of Mr Aslambek Isayev, Ms M.M., was granted victim status in the criminal case. 96.  On 22 May 2003 the crime scene was examined. No evidence was collected. 97.  On 1 August 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were informed thereof. 98.  On 12 May 2005 the decision to suspend the proceedings was overruled for failure on the part of the investigators to take basic steps and the proceedings were resumed. On 15 June 2005 they were again suspended. The applicants were not informed thereof. 99.  From the documents submitted, it appears that on an unspecified date in 2012 the investigation was resumed and that it is still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 100.  On 15 May 2003 the investigators questioned the third applicant, whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the account submitted to the Court. In addition, she told the investigators that Mr Aslambek Isayev’s abductors had informed her of the identity checks in the area resulting in the arrest of about fifty local residents. 101.  On the same date, 15 May 2003, the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative and Mr Aslambek Isayev’s wife, Ms M.M., who stated that on the morning of 16 April 2003 Mr Aslambek Isayev had been arrested by military servicemen who had arrived in two UAZ vehicles. 102.  On 19 May 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement about the events was similar to the one given by Ms M.M. on 15 May 2003. 103.  On 8 June 2005 the investigators questioned Ms M.M. again, who reiterated her previous statement.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 104.   On 12 May 2003 Ms M.M. requested that the Chechnya prosecutor’s office assist her in the search for her husband. 105.  On 7 June and 21 December 2005 and then in March 2006 the first applicant complained to a number of law-enforcement authorities, including the Chechnya military prosecutor’s office and the Chechnya prosecutor’s office, that Mr Aslambek Isayev had been abducted by “representatives of power structures” and that the investigation into the matter had been ineffective. 106.  On 20 January 2008 Ms M.M. complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Grozny that the investigation had been ineffective. The complaint was left without examination. 107.  On 15 April 2009 the first applicant requested that the investigators allow her to access the investigation file. On 16 April 2009 the investigators replied that she was allowed to make copies of only certain documents from the file. 108.  On 26 January 2011 the applicants complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court, stating that the investigation into the abduction had been ineffective. The outcome of this complaint is unknown. 109.  The applicants are Ms Maret Nuraliyeva, who was born in 1970 and lives in Grozny, and Ms Aset Nuraliyeva, who was born in 1972 and lives in Dyshne‑Vedeno, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from the NGO Materi Chechni. 110.  The applicants are sisters of Mr Daud Nuraliyev, who was born in 1979, and Mr Khalid Nuraliyev, who was born in 1974. 111.  At the material time, the applicants, their two sisters and four brothers, including Mr Daud Nuraliyev and Mr Khalid Nuraliyev, lived together in Chechen-Aul in the Grozny district. 112.  Between 10 and 24 June 2002 the federal military forces conducted a ‘sweeping-up’ operation in Chechen-Aul. The temporary headquarters of the operation were stationed on the outskirts of the village. 113.  On 16 June 2002 a group of about ten armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in two APCs. The servicemen, some of whom were masked, searched the house and demanded Mr Daud Nuraliyev in unaccented Russian to proceed with them for an identity check; Mr Daud Nuraliyev was put into one of the APCs, which drove off towards the temporary military headquarters. 114.  On 23 June 2002 by the corner of Sadovaya Street and Sovkhoznaya Street the same group of military servicemen in APCs detained Mr Khalid Nuraliyev and took him to the temporary headquarters. 115.  The applicants have not seen their brothers since their abduction. 116.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 117.  On 28 June 2002 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 56099. The document stated that Mr Khalid Nuraliyev had been abducted “by unidentified persons during [a] special operation”. 118.  On 6 January 2003 the applicants were informed that the investigation of the abduction had been suspended, but that operational‑search measures were being taken to establish the whereabouts of the abducted men and identify the culprits. 119.  On 30 November 2006 the investigation was resumed. 120.  On 19 December 2006 the applicants’ sister, Ms Ya.N., was granted victim status in the criminal case. 121.  On 30 December 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended. The applicants were not informed thereof. 122.  On 17 September 2010 the investigation was resumed and on 21 September 2010 the crime scene was examined. No evidence was collected. 123.  On 11 November 2010 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 124.  On 18 October 2010 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 125.  On 11 November 2010 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation and ordered its resumption. On the same date the first applicant was again granted victim status and questioned. 126.  On 14 November 2010 the investigation was again suspended. It appears, however, that the investigation has been resumed and that the proceedings are still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 127.  On 29 June 2002 the investigators questioned the first applicant, whose statement about the circumstances of her brothers’ abduction was similar to the account furnished to the Court. She stressed to the investigators that, in her opinion, the abductors had been federal servicemen. 128.  On the same date, 29 June 2002, the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Ms R.T., whose statement was similar to the one given by the first applicant. 129.  On 19 December 2002 and then on 20 January 2003 the investigators questioned the second applicant, whose statement concerning the circumstances the abduction was similar to the one given by the first applicant. She also stressed that the abductors had been in the federal forces. 130.  On 19 December 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants’ sisters Ms Ya.N. and Ms Ma.N. and their relative Ms P.N., whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the ones given by the applicants. 131.  On 28 December 2006 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who reiterated her previous statements and added that the district police officer had admitted participating in her brothers’ arrest. 132.  On 29 December 2009 the investigators questioned a local police officer, Mr A.I., who confirmed the conduct of the ten-day special operation in June 2002 in Chechen-Aul. 133.   On various dates in September and October 2010 the investigators questioned several of the applicants’ fellow villagers, whose statements did not provide any relevant information. 134.  On 7 October 2010 the investigators questioned the applicants’ sisters again, who reiterated their previous statements. 135.  On 11 November 2010 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who reiterated her previous statements.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 136.  According to the applicants, at some point in 2005 they heard a rumour that Mr Khalid Nuraliyev was allegedly being detained in a prison in the Rostov region. In the same year they forwarded a number of requests to various authorities asking them to verify this information. The replies given were in the negative. 137.  On 26 May 2010 the first applicant complained to the Grozny district prosecutor that the investigation of her brothers’ abduction by servicemen during the special operation had been ineffective, and requested to be informed of its progress. 138.  On 3 June 2010 the investigators replied to the applicant, stating that they were taking all possible measures to have the crime solved. 139.  On 24 February 2011 the first applicant complained to the Grozny District Court that the investigation of criminal case no. 56099 had been ineffective and requested the court to order the authorities to resume the proceedings and conduct an effective investigation into the abduction. 140.  On 14 March 2011 the District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint, stating that the investigation had already been resumed. On 13 April 2011 this decision was upheld on appeal by the Chechnya Supreme Court. 141.  The applicant, Ms Arbiyat Khamstkhanova, was born in 1960 and lives in Grozny, the Chechen Republic. She is represented before the Court by Mr D. Itslayev, a lawyer practising in Grozny. 142.  The applicant is the wife of Mr Iles Khamstkhanov, who was born in 1960 (in the documents submitted the date is also stated as 1955). 143.  At about 11 p.m. on 12 January 2006 a group of ten armed servicemen in bulletproof vests and special helmets (the uniform usually worn by special forces) arrived at the applicant’s house in Grozny in three UAZ vehicles. One of the vehicles was armoured, while the others were equipped with mobile radio stations. 144.  The servicemen smashed windows and broke their way inside. They grabbed Mr Iles Khamstkhanov and dragged him outside; two of the intruders held the applicant’s son Mr Khussein Khamstkhanov at gunpoint and ordered him not to move. The servicemen put Mr Iles Khamstkhanov in one of the vehicles and drove off in the direction of the Oktyabrskiy ROVD in Grozny. Mr Khussein Khamstkhanov went to the ROVD with his relatives immediately; they were told at the police station that Mr Iles Khamstkhanov had been arrested by mistake and that he would be released soon. 145.  The applicant has not seen Mr Iles Khamstkhanov since 12 January 2006. 146.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 147.  On 12 January 2006 the applicant and her relatives reported the abduction in writing to the ROVD. 148.  On 13 January 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 149.  On 30 January 2006 the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor’s office in Grozny opened criminal case no. 52007. On 31 January 2006 the applicant was granted victim status in the proceedings. 150.  On 20 May 2006 the applicant was informed that the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 151.  On 25 June 2007 the investigation was resumed and then suspended the next day. 152.  On 16 June 2008 the investigation was resumed and then suspended the next day. 153.  On 20 October 2008 the investigation was resumed and then suspended on 21 November 2008. 154.  On 26 April 2011 the investigation was resumed and then suspended on 6 May 2011. 155.  On 23 April 2012 the investigation was resumed. The proceedings are still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 156.  On 13 and 14 January 2006 investigators questioned the applicant, her young daughter and her son Mr Khussein Khamstkhanov. Their statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction were similar to the account submitted to the Court. In addition, the applicant told the investigators that one of the abductors had told her that they had been from the Federal Security Service. 157.  On 31 January 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant and her son Mr Khussein Khamstkhanov and their neighbour Ms P.U. again; their statements contained the same information concerning the abduction as the account submitted to the Court. 158.  On 28 April 2006 the investigators questioned the applicant’s daughter Ms P.Kh., Mr Iles Khamstkhanov’s brother, Mr Kh.Kh., and Mr Iles Khamstkhanov’s cousin, Mr A. Kh. Their statements concerning the incident were similar to the ones given by the applicant.\n(c)  The applicant’s contact with the authorities 159.  On various dates between 1 January and March 2006 the applicant wrote to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office asking for assistance in the search for her husband. 160.  On 25 February 2011 the applicant complained to the Oktyabrskiy District Court in Grozny that the investigation of her husband’s abduction by representatives of power structures had been ineffective and requested that it be resumed and carried out effectively. On 27 April 2011 the court rejected her complaint, stating that the investigation had been resumed on 26 April 2011. 161.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Khedi Aguyeva, born in 1960,\n(2)  Mr Inderpash Ismailov, born in 1956,\n(3)  Ms Marusa Aguyeva, born in 1921,\n(4)  Ms Luiza Makhmadova (also spelt Makhamdova and Makhamadova), born in 1985, and\n(5)  Mr Atama Ismailov, born in 2003.\nThe first and third applicants live in Malorechnaya in the Kurchaloy district, the second applicant lives in Tsotsi-Yurt (also spelt Tsotsen-Yurt) in the Kurchaloy district, and the fourth and fifth applicants live in Gudermes, Chechnya. The applicants are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 162.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Dzhandar (also spelt Zhandar) Ismailov, who was born in 1979, and Mr Dzhalil (also spelt Zhalil) Ismailov, who was born in 1982. The first and second applicants are their parents, the third applicant is their grandmother. The fourth applicant is the wife of Mr Dzhandar Ismailov and the fifth applicant is his daughter. 163.  At the material time, the town of Gudermes was under curfew; it was surrounded by military checkpoints. A special military unit, no. 291 of the 42nd regiment of the Motorised Infantry Division of the Russian Ministry of Defence, known as ‘Battalion Vostok’ (батальон 291-го мотострелкового полка 42-ой гвардейской мотострелковой дивизии Министерства Обороны РФ) was stationed in the settlement. According to the applicants, the battalion was involved in special operations of the Russian federal forces. Mr Dzhandar Ismailov and Mr Dzhalil Ismailov lived with their families, including the applicants, on the second floor of a block of flats at 52 Kavkazskaya Street in Gudermes. 164.  In the early hours of 21 January 2003 (in the documents submitted also referred to as 17 January 2003) a group of about ten to fifteen servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks arrived at the applicants’ address in a grey UAZ vehicle with a smeared registration plate. The only serviceman without a mask had dark hair and a clearly visible scar on his left cheek. The intruders, who spoke Chechen, were armed with machine guns and dispersed themselves throughout each floor of the building. They then broke into the applicants’ flat and quickly searched it. They were in a rush and gave no explanation for their actions. After the search they took Mr Dzhandar Ismailov and Mr Dzhalil Ismailov outside, without allowing them to put on any warm clothing. They forced the brothers into the UAZ vehicle and drove off in the direction of Grozny. 165.   About two or three months after the abduction, the second applicant was informed by Mr A.Kh., an officer from Battalion Vostok, that his sons had been detained upon orders from the battalion’s commander Mr Dzhabrail Yamadayev. 166.  The applicants have not seen their relatives since that date. 167.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 168.  On 21 January 2003 the applicants reported the abduction of their relatives by federal servicemen to the local law-enforcement authorities. On 23 January 2003 the Gudermes district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 32005. 169.  On 24 January 2003 the second applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 170.  On 23 April 2003 the investigation was suspended. On 2 December 2004 the applicants were informed thereof. 171.  On 8 May 2009, upon complaints by the applicant of a lack of information about the proceedings, the investigators informed them that the investigation had established that representatives of the law-enforcement agencies had possibly been involved in the abduction. 172.  On 11 June 2009 the investigation was resumed. 173.  On 26 November 2011 the investigation was suspended again. The proceedings were subsequently resumed and are apparently still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 174.  On 23 January 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant’s neighbour, Ms M.S., whose statement concerning the abduction was similar to the account provided by the applicants to the Court. 175.  Between 23 and 25 January 2003 the investigators questioned the second, third and fourth applicants, whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the account submitted to the Court. 176.  On 11 February 2003 the investigators questioned the second applicant again. He reiterated his previous statement and added that Ms Zukhra S. had contacted him to say that his abducted sons had been detained in Khankala (where the main military base of the federal forces was stationed at the time) and that they would be released in exchange for 10,000 American dollars (USD). 177.  On 21 February 2003 the investigators questioned Ms S. Zukhra, who stated that she had servicemen contacts and had tried to use them to expedite the release of abductees. 178.  On 24 April 2009 the investigators examined the crime scene. 179.  On various dates in 2009 the investigators questioned a number of witnesses concerning the activities of Ms S. Zukhra, who had used several other identities. All of the witnesses confirmed that she had had servicemen contacts and assisted in organising the release of detainees in exchange for money. In August or September 2009 Ms S. Zukhra absconded from the authorities.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 180.  Between January and February 2003 the applicants and their relatives requested assistance in the search for their relatives from various authorities. 181.  From the documents submitted, it appears that between December 2004 and August 2008 the applicants did not contact the authorities. 182.  On 11 September 2008 the first applicant complained to the Gudermes inter-district investigations department of the prosecutor’s office of a lack of information on the progress of the investigation and requested permission to review the case file. On 11 October 2008 the investigators replied that the proceedings had been suspended on 23 April 2003 and that she could review the file at their office. 183.  On 23 March 2009 the investigators informed the first applicant that she could not review the case file as she did not have victim status in the criminal case. 184.  On 5 April 2009 the first applicant again complained to the investigators of a lack of information and requested to be allowed to review the case file. On 21 April 2009 she was granted victim status in the criminal case. 185.  On 1 June 2009 the first applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigators grant him access to the case file. No reply was given to this request. 186.  On 14 February 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigators provide her with an update on the progress of the proceedings. No reply was given to this request. 187.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Ms Zulay Sangariyeva, born in 1957,\n(2)  Ms Zulikhan Sangariyeva, born in 1986,\n(3)  Ms Aminat Sangariyeva, born in 1983,\n(4)  Mr Islam Sangariyev, born in 1981,\n(5)  Ms Raisa Sangariyeva, born in 1950, and\n(6)  Mr Said-Magomed Sangariyev, born in 1950.\nThe applicants are two related families. All of them live in Stariye Atagi in the Grozny district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 188.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Said-Ibragim Sangariyev, who was born in 1978, and the second, third and fourth applicants are his siblings. The fifth and sixth applicants are the parents of Mr Idris Sangariyev, who was born in 1977. 189.  On the night of 11 February 2001 two cousins, Mr Said-Ibragim (also referred to as Ibragim) Sangariyev and Mr Idris Sangariyev, were staying at their uncle Mr Said‑Khussein Sangariyev’s house in Stariye Atagi. 190.  At 6 a.m. a group of about forty to fifty military servicemen arrived at the house in three APCs. Other military vehicles and URAL lorries cordoned off the neighbourhood, and the servicemen ordered the neighbours to stay inside. 191.  The servicemen climbed over the fence and broke into the house. Threatening to blow up the dwelling, they took Mr Said-Khussein Sangariyev outside and made him kneel against the wall, demanding that he tell them where his nephews Mr Said-Ibragim Sangariyev and Mr Idris Sangariyev were. The servicemen then searched the house looking for the two cousins; about an hour later they found them and dragged them outside. The servicemen then reported the arrest to their superiors via portable radios using the code numbers ‘22-23-43’. Afterwards, they took Mr Said-Ibragim Sangariyev’s car, a VAZ-2107 with registration number C96 AP 20RUS, put both cousins inside and drove them off in the direction of Grozny. According to the documents submitted, the applicants’ relatives were taken to Khankala, the headquarters of the Russian federal forces in Chechnya. 192.  Less than a month after the abduction, the fourth applicant saw that Mr Said-Ibragim Sangariyev’s car was being driven around by a group of military servicemen of Slavic appearance, whose uniform had small stars on the shoulder straps. 193.  The applicants have not seen their relatives since 12 February 2001. 194.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 195.  On 14, 19, 22 and 28 March 2001 the applicants reported their relatives’ abduction by military servicemen to a number of law-enforcement agencies. 196.  On 9 April 2001 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 19045 (in the documents submitted also referred to as no. 42229). From the documents submitted, it appears that criminal case no. 19045 was opened in connection with not only the abduction of the applicants’ relatives, but also the abduction of a number of other residents of Stariye Atagi perpetrated by the same group on the same date. 197.  On 17 May 2003 the investigation was suspended again and then on 13 December 2003 it was resumed. 198.  On 20 January 2004 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 199.  On 25 March 2004 the investigation was suspended again and then on 27 September 2004 it was resumed, following orders from the supervising prosecutor to that effect. 200.  On 14 November 2006 the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 201.  The investigation was subsequently suspended on several occasions, including on 26 November 2005, 26 August 2006 and 5 April 2008. It was most recently suspended on 25 December 2011. 202.  The criminal proceedings appear to be still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 203.  On 5 and 20 April 2001 the investigators questioned the first applicant and three of the applicants’ relatives, Ms Kh.R.D., Ms Kh.D.D. and Ms Ya.S., whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the account submitted by the applicants to the Court. 204.  On various dates between April and June 2001 the investigators questioned the first and sixth applicants and six of their relatives and neighbours, whose statements corroborated the account of events they submitted to the Court. 205.  On 6 June 2001 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who reiterated her previous statements and added that the same group of abductors had also abducted a fellow elderly villager, Mr K.I., who had been released three days later. According to the latter, he had been detained with the applicants’ relatives somewhere in the vicinity of a very large tent, helicopter runway and tarmac; it had most probably been the main military base of the federal forces in Khankala. 206.  On 22 January 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who added to her previous statements that she and her relatives had attempted to obtain the release of their abducted relatives in exchange for money, but on 15 March 2001 both her son and nephew had been taken from Khankala to elsewhere. 207.  On 6 March 2004 the investigators questioned the sixth applicant, whose statement was similar to the one given by the first applicant. In addition, he stated that after the abduction he had visited the military base in Khankala, where an officer named Sergey had told him that his relatives had been transferred elsewhere. In 2002 the witness had learnt that Mr Said‑Ibragim Sangariyev and Mr Idris Sangariyev had been allegedly detained in remand prison (SIZO) no.60/1 in Rostov-on-Don; he had gone there, but the information had turned out to be incorrect. 208.  On various dates between July and December 2004 the investigators questioned a number of local residents and the local police officers, whose statements did not yield any new information. 209.  On 17 October 2005 the investigators questioned Mr K.I., whose statement corroborated that of the first applicant given on 6 June 2001 (see paragraph 205 above). 210.  On 20 October 2005 the investigators questioned the first and sixth applicants, who reiterated their previous statements and added that they had been aware that their abducted sons had been members of illegal armed groups. 211.  On 14 November 2006 the investigators questioned the sixth applicant and three of his relatives again, whose statements did not yield any new information. 212.  On 19 March 2008 the first applicant was questioned again by the investigators. She provided a detailed description of the events and stated that the abductors had been military servicemen who had used armoured vehicles. On the same date the second applicant and three of the applicants’ relatives were questioned; they too asserted that the abductors had been military servicemen.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 213.  On 21 December 2001 the first applicant complained to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office that the investigation of the abduction had been ineffective and that the investigators had failed to provide her with updates as to its progress. 214.  On 1 August and 9 October 2002 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the applicants that on 6 June 2001 the investigation had been suspended, and that on 1 August 2002 the proceedings had been resumed for failure on the part of the investigators to take a number of steps. 215.  On 14 May 2003 the investigators informed the applicants that the investigation had been resumed. The letter also stated, amongst other things:\n“... the investigation has been unable to establish exactly which law-enforcement agency abducted the two men... in connection with this it was suspended on 30 January 2003.” 216.  On various dates in November 2003 the Department of the Execution of Sentences for the Rostov and Volgograd Regions informed the applicants that their abducted relatives were not being detained in their detention facilities. 217.  On 27 December 2003 the Chechnya FSB replied to the applicants that Mr Said-Ibragim Sangariyev and Mr Idris Sangariyev were not listed in their database as people involved in illegal activities. 218.  On 5 May 2005 the applicants complained to the investigators of a lack of information about the proceedings. 219.  On 17 March and 17 May 2004 and 15 February 2005 various military prosecutors’ offices replied to the applicants that their inquiries had not established that military servicemen had been involved in the abduction. 220.  On various dates between 2002 and 2005 the applicants complained about the investigation to a number of public and military prosecutors’ offices, the police, the military commanders’ offices and different levels and departments of the Federal Security Service (the FSB). In their complaints the applicants described the circumstances of the abduction and stressed that the perpetrators had been working for the State authorities, driven around in military vehicles and used portable radios. In reply the authorities forwarded the applicants’ complaints to the investigators or other law-enforcement agencies for examination. 221.  On 14 February 2008 the first applicant complained to the Grozny District Court that the investigation had been ineffective and requested that it be resumed and conducted effectively. The complaint was allowed on 6 March 2008. 222.  On 14 February 2011 the first applicant requested the investigators to inform her of the progress of the criminal proceedings. No reply was given to the request. 223.  The applicants, Mr Sultan Nutayev, who was born in 1958, and Ms Tamara Nutayeva, who was born in 1959, live in Stariye Atagi in the Grozny district, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 224.  The applicants are the parents of Mr Saykhan Nutayev, who was born in 1983. 225.  At the material time, the village of Stariye Atagi was under curfew. It was surrounded by military checkpoints situated on all roads leading to and from the settlement. A military unit of the Russian federal forces was stationed on the outskirts of the village, on the premises of a former mill factory (“the mill”). According to the applicants, the mill was used as a filtering point by the military for the processing and detention of local residents detained during special operations (see Arzu Akhmadova and Others v. Russia, no. 13670/03, § 10, 8 January 2009). 226.  At about 5 a.m. on 26 February 2003 a group of about twenty armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms arrived at the applicants’ house in two grey UAZ minivans and two VAZ‑2121 (“Niva”) cars. The vehicles surrounded the house. Some of the servicemen were wearing masks; some of them had helmets on. They broke into the applicants’ house and ordered everyone to show them their identity documents. They then grabbed Mr Saykhan Nutayev, forced him outside and put him into one of the vehicles. The applicants, accompanied by a neighbour, got in a car and followed the abductors to the premises of the military unit at the mill. There they tried to gain access to the military compound, but to no avail. The servicemen on duty at the time denied having seen any cars leaving or entering the premises. 227.  The applicants have not seen their son since 26 February 2003. 228.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 229.  On 28 February 2003 the applicants reported their son’s abduction by military servicemen to the Grozny district prosecutor. On the same date the investigators examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 230.  On 11 March 2003 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 42043. 231.  On 22 March 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status. 232.  On 11 May 2003 the investigation was suspended. The applicants were informed thereof. 233.  On 16 March 2006 the investigation was resumed. The applicants were informed thereof. 234.  On 25 March 2006 the Chechnya Federal Security Service informed the investigators that Mr Saykhan Nutayev had been a member of illegal armed groups. 235.  On 15 April 2006 the investigation was again suspended. 236.  On 19 April 2012 the investigation was resumed. The proceedings are still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 237.  On 28 February 2003 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants, whose statements concerning the circumstances of the abduction were similar to the account furnished to the Court. In addition, they told the investigators that immediately after the abduction, when they had followed the tracks left by the abductors with a neighbour, through the gates of the military compound they had seen the UAZ vehicle used to take their son away. 238.  On 28 February 2003 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Ms Ya.K., whose statement concerning the abduction corroborated the account submitted by the applicants to the Court. In addition, the witness added that she had followed the tracks left by the abductors’ vehicles with the applicants; they had led them to the premises of the military unit stationed on the outskirts of the village. They had not been allowed to enter the compound. 239.  On 27 March 2003 the investigators questioned the applicants and Ms Ya.K. again, all of whom reiterated their previous statements. 240.  On 22 March 2006 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who reiterated his previous statements. 241.  On 4 April 2006 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour Ms Kh.T., who corroborated the applicants’ statements and added that on the night of the abduction she had seen four military vehicles and two APCs on their street. 242.  On 5 April 2006 the investigators questioned the second applicant again, who reiterated her previous statements.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 243.  On 30 June 2008 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20102 replied to a request by the applicant that because of the rules of jurisdiction they did not have any information about the investigation. 244.  On 17 December 2009 and 17 August 2010 the applicants requested the investigators to update them on the progress of the proceedings. On 12 January and 23 August 2010 respectively the authorities replied that the investigation had been suspended and that the applicants had the right to review certain documents from the case file. 245.  On 11 March 2011 the applicants again requested the investigators to update them on the progress of the proceedings. No reply was given to this request. 246.  On 26 April 2011 the first applicant requested the investigators that the proceedings be resumed. No reply was given to this request either. 247.  The applicants, Ms Khadisht (also spelt Khadishat) Saltuyeva, born in 1955, and Mr Abdul-Khalim Saltuyev, born in 1946, live in Urus‑Martan, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by Mr Tagir Shamsudinov, a lawyer practising in Grozny. 248.  The applicants are the parents of Mr Aslanbek Saltuyev, who was born in 1981. 249.  At the material time, the town of Urus-Martan was under curfew; it was surrounded by military checkpoints. A number of law-enforcement agencies, including the military commander’s office, were operating in the settlement. 250.  At about 2.30 a.m. on 14 October 2002 a group of ten armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms wearing head torches broke into the applicants’ house and took away their son, Mr Aslanbek Saltuyev. The intruders, who were equipped with portable radios, took him to the UAZ minivan which was waiting in the street and drove off. The applicants saw that the servicemen had also arrived in an APC, a URAL lorry and another UAZ vehicle. 251.  The applicants have not seen their son since 14 October 2002. 252.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 253.  On 14 October 2002 the applicants reported the abduction to a number of law-enforcement agencies and on 7 November 2002 the Urus‑Martan district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 61141. 254.  On 27 December 2002 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 255.  On 7 January 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended and then resumed on 19 June 2003. 256.  On 9 July 2003 the investigators examined the crime scene. 257.  On 25 July 2003 it was again suspended and then resumed on 6 June 2005. The applicants were informed thereof. 258.  On 6 July 2005 the investigation was suspended again. It was subsequently suspended and resumed on several occasions; it was most recently resumed on 25 May 2011 and then suspended on 3 June 2011. The applicants were informed of that suspension. 259.  The investigation appears to be still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 260.  On 15 October 2002 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants, whose statements concerning the abduction were similar to the account submitted to the Court. 261.  On 15 October 2002 the investigators also questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Ms Z.V.Kh., whose statement corroborated those given by the applicants. 262.  On 27 December 2002 and then on 11 June 2005 the investigators questioned the first applicant, who reiterated her previous statement. 263.  On 28 July 2005 the investigators questioned the second applicant, who reiterated her previous statement. 264.  On 28 July 2005 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbours, Ms Z.A.Kh. and Ms S.G., whose statements corroborated those of the applicants. 265.  On 28 June 2007 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants again, who reiterated their previous statements.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 266.  From the documents submitted it appears that on various occasions between 2003 and 2007 the applicants complained to prosecutors at various levels of a lack of information about the progress of the criminal proceedings and the way they were being conducted. 267.  On 28 April 2011 the applicants complained to the head of the Achkhoy-Martan investigations department of a lack of information about the progress of the investigation and requested to be allowed to review the case file. On 5 May 2011 their complaint was rejected. 268.  On 17 May 2011 the applicants complained to the Urus‑Martan District Court that the investigation had been ineffective and requested that they be allowed to access the case file. On 25 May 2011 their complaint was allowed by the court. 269.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Mr Khalit Salamov, born in 1938,\n(2)  Ms Bikazhu Dzhambulatova, born in 1946, and\n(3)  Mr Imran Salamov, born in 1977.\nThe first and second applicants live in Katyr-Yurt in the Achkhoy‑Martan district, the Chechen Republic. The third applicant lives in Grozny. The applicants were represented before the Court by lawyers from the NGO Materi Chechni. 270.  The first and second applicants are the parents of Mr Usman Salamov, who was born in 1977. The third applicant is his brother. 271.  At the material time, the settlement of Katyr-Yurt was under curfew. The applicants lived with Mr Usman Salamov in Chapayeva Street. 272.  At about 4 a.m. on 12 November 2002 a group of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks arrived at the applicants’ house in two APCs and a VAZ car. They broke into the house, quickly searched it, took Mr Usman Salamov outside, forced him into one of the APCs and drove off. 273.  On the same night at least one other resident of the village was allegedly abducted by the same group of servicemen (see the case of Ilyasova v. Russia, no. 26966/06, §§ 7 and 112, 10 June 2010). 274.  Later the same day at about 4 .30 p.m. the policemen from the Achkhoy-Martan ROVD arrived at the applicants’ house and dug two plastic barrels with firearms and ammunition out of their garden. 275.  The applicants have not seen their relative since 12 November 2002. 276.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 277.  On 29 January 2003 the Achkhoy-Martan inter-district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 44015 and examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 278.  On 28 April 2003 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 279.  On 29 April 2003 the investigation was suspended and then resumed on 12 September 2004. The applicants were informed thereof. 280.  The investigation was again suspended on an unspecified date between 2004 and 2005 and resumed on 16 June 2008; then suspended again on 16 July 2008 and resumed on 15 June 2010. The applicants were informed thereof. 281.  On 8 July 2010 the investigators examined the crime scene again. 282.  On 15 July 2010 the investigation was suspended again. The applicants were informed thereof. 283.  The last suspension of the investigation took place on 13 September 2011 and on 21 April 2012 the proceedings were resumed. They are still pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 284.  On 24 January 2003 the investigators questioned the first and second applicants and their neighbour, Ms B.D., all of whom provided statements of their relative’s abduction similar to the account submitted to the Court. 285.  On 8 February 2003 the investigators questioned the applicants’ relative, Ms M.S., whose statement about the abduction corroborated those of the applicants. 286.  On 11 and 28 April 2003 the investigators questioned the first applicant again, who reiterated his previous statement. 287.  On the same date the investigators questioned two of the applicants’ neighbours, Mr R.R. and Mr Sh.Kh., whose statements corroborated those given by the applicants. 288.  On 26 and 27 June 2008 the investigators questioned seven of the applicants’ relatives and neighbours. No new information was obtained. 289.  On various dates in June and July 2010 the investigators questioned three of the applicants’ close relatives and three representatives of local authorities. No new information was obtained. 290.  On 12 September 2011 the investigators questioned the second applicant again, who reiterated her previous statement.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 291.  On 16 July 2009 the applicants complained to the head of the Achkhoy-Martan investigations department that they did not have information about the progress of the investigation and requested to be allowed to review the case file. On the same date the investigators replied that the applicants could obtain copies of a few documents from the file and suspended the investigation. 292.  On 2 February 2010 the applicants complained to the Achkhoy‑Martan District Court that the investigation of their son’s abduction had been ineffective and requested that it be resumed. On 10 June 2010 this complaint was rejected by the District Court, as the investigation had been resumed on 7 June 2010. 293.  The applicants appealed against the decision to suspend investigation of 15 July 2010 to the District Court, which rejected the complaint on 30 August 2010. 294.  On 28 January 2011 the applicants again requested to be allowed to review the case file. On 9 February 2011 the investigators replied that the applicants could take copies of a few documents from the file. 295.  On 25 July 2011 the applicants again requested to be provided access to the case file. On 1 August 2011 their complaint was rejected by the investigators. 296.  The applicants are:\n(1)  Mr Islam Dashtayev, born in 1991,\n(2)  Mr Bislan Dashtayev, born in 1993,\n(3)  Mr Yusup Dashtayev, born in 1994,\n(4)  Mr Shamkhan Dashtayev, born in 1997,\n(5)  Mr Khamzat Dashtayev, born in 1999,\n(6)  Ms Kulsum Abubakarova, born in 1957,\n(7)  Ms Yakhita Abdurzakova (also referred to as Akhmadova), born in 1954, and\n8)  Mr Musaid Akhmadov, born in 1953.\nThe applicants live in Noviye Atagi, the Chechen Republic. They are represented before the Court by lawyers from SRJI/Astreya. 297.  The first, second, third, fourth and fifth applicants are the sons of Mr Imran Dashtayev, who was born in 1955; the sixth applicant is his wife. The seventh and eighth applicants are the parents of Mr Idris Akhmadov, who was born in 1982. 298.  According to the applicants, who all live on the same street, on 20 July 2003 the Russian federal forces conducted a sweeping-up operation in Noviye Atagi, as a result of which at least three local residents were arrested, including the applicants’ relatives. Military checkpoints were situated on all of the roads leading to and from the settlement. The area was under curfew. 299.  At about 5 a.m. on 20 July 2003 a convoy of military vehicles, consisting of at least three APCs (with hull numbers 100, 101 and F-121), one URAL lorry (with registration number 75-99 6 RUS) and a UAZ all‑terrain car, arrived at the applicants’ street. A group of about fifty heavily-armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms got out of the vehicles and broke into at least four houses in the street, including those of the applicants. 300.  A group of about fifteen servicemen climbed over the fence and broke into the house of the Akhmadov family. They checked the identity documents of the male residents, quickly searched the house without producing a warrant or giving any explanation for their actions and took Mr Idris Akhmadov outside. The servicemen also took some of the family’s valuables. They put Mr Idris Akhmadov into the UAZ minivan, and then they dragged him out and forced him into the APC and drove off. 301.  At about 5.30 a.m. a group of fifteen to twenty servicemen in a yellow UAL lorry with registration number 75 99 86 broke into the house of the Dashtayev family. Several APCs and a UAZ minivan were waiting on a neighbouring street. They found Mr Imran Dashtayev in the yard and demanded his passport. His passport had been submitted for renewal, so the servicemen told his relatives that they would take him away for an identity check. They then forced him into the yellow lorry and drove off. 302.  The applicants have not seen their relatives since 20 July 2003. 303.  The Government furnished a copy of “the contents of the entire criminal case file” without specifying the number of pages. The information submitted may be summarised as follows.\n(a)  Main investigative steps taken by the investigators 304.  On 21 July 2003 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 22106 and examined the crime scene. No evidence was collected. 305.  On the same date the sixth and eighth applicants were granted victim status. 306.  On 21 September 2003 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 307.  On 23 March 2004 the investigation was resumed and then suspended again on an unspecified date. 308.  On 21 July 2005 the eighth applicant was granted victim status in the criminal case. 309.  On 6 July 2005 the investigation was suspended again and then resumed on 19 March 2008. 310.  On 26 June 2008 it was suspended again and then resumed on 23 April 2012. The criminal proceedings are currently pending.\n(b)  Main witness statements taken by the investigators 311.  On 21 July 2003 the investigators questioned the sixth and eighth applicants, whose detailed accounts of the abduction were similar to the account submitted to the Court. 312.  On the same date the investigators questioned a local resident, Mr I.T., who had been detained by the same group of abductors on the same night. He stated that he had been beaten by them, questioned about his involvement in illegal armed groups and then released later that evening. 313.  The investigators also questioned the seventh applicant and two of the applicants’ neighbours, Mr Kh.S. and Ms E.M. that day, whose statements corroborated those of the sixth and eighth applicants. 314.  On 24 July 2003 the investigators questioned officer D.K. who manned checkpoint no. 112 in the vicinity of the applicants’ settlement. According to him, on the night of 19 July 2003 a convoy of forty vehicles from the Security Service of the Chechen President had passed though the checkpoint two times: during the evening and then the following morning. 315.  On 4 August 2003 the investigators questioned officer A.P., who was stationed with his military unit no. 2 on the premises of the old mill on the outskirts of Noviye Atagi. He denied having any knowledge of either a special operation in the settlement or the vehicles used by the abductors. 316.  On 22 June 2005 the investigators questioned the eighth applicant again, who reiterated his previous statement. 317.  On 14 and 17 April 2008 the investigators questioned the eighth applicant’s relative, Mr I.A., and his neighbour, Mr Sh.I., whose statements corroborated those of the eighth applicant.\n(c)  The applicants’ contact with the authorities 318.  On 4 January 2004 the eighth applicant complained to the head of the military base in Khankala about his son’s abduction by federal servicemen. On 25 March 2004 the military authorities in Khankala replied that the involvement of military servicemen in the abduction had not been confirmed. 319.  On 8 February 2005 the eighth applicant complained to the Russian Prosecutor General about the abduction and the investigators’ failure to take important steps. In their reply of 25 April 2005, the investigators informed the applicant that the investigation had been resumed on 22 April 2005. 320.  On 3 July 2008 the sixth applicant’s relative, Ms K.D., complained to the investigators that the investigation had been ineffective. On 4 April 2008 the investigators replied that the proceedings were in progress. 321.  On an unspecified date in July or August 2011 the investigators replied to a request by the applicants for information of 24 July 2011, stating that the investigation had been suspended on 26 June 2008. 322.  In reply to numerous complaints by the applicants lodged on various dates between 2004 and 2011 about the abduction, the investigators gave similar replies to the effect that the investigation was in progress and that they were taking all possible measures to have the crime solved.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Šabac. 5.  The applicant was employed by “Zorka -mineralna đubriva” AD, a socially/State-owned company based in Šabac (hereinafter – “the debtor”). 6.  On 3 July 2003 the Šabac Municipal Court ordered the debtor to pay the applicant certain sums in respect of salary arrears and procedural costs. On the same date the judgment became final. 7.  On 17 May 2007 the applicant lodged an application for the enforcement of the above court decision with the Šabac Municipal Court. 8.  On 18 May 2007 the court allowed the application and issued an enforcement order. 9.  On 19 February 2008 the enforcement proceedings were stayed because the debtor was undergoing restructuring. 10.  On 2 March 2010 the applicant urged the court to continue the enforcement proceedings. 11.  On 1 June 2010 the court informed the applicant that the debtor was still undergoing restructuring and that therefore the enforcement proceedings could not be continued. 12.  On 10 July 2002 the Privatisation Agency ordered the restructuring of the debtor as part of privatisation process. The restructuring of the debtor is still ongoing.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The first applicant, Mrs Regina Juozaitienė, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1940 and lives in Kaunas. The second applicant, Mr Jonas Bikulčius, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1935 and lives in Kaunas. 8.  In the late evening of Friday 24 July 1998 the first applicant’s son, Dalius Juozaitis, and the second applicant’s son, Darius Bikulčius, were found dead in a car with single gunshot wounds to their backs. The deaths had occurred as the police tried to chase a Ford Escort (hereinafter “the car”) driven by a private individual, RM, the applicants’ sons being the passengers in the car. RM was not killed during the incident. 9.  On 25 July 1998 criminal proceedings were instituted against RM for manslaughter in regard to the deaths of the applicants’ sons (Article 109 of the Criminal Code as then in force) and for resisting the orders of the police (Article 201). The applicants submitted their civil claims and were recognised as complainants in those proceedings. 10.  On 15 March 1999 the Kaunas City District Court convicted RM of resisting the lawful orders of the police, an offence under Article 201-1 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 11.  The following account of the incident can be reconstructed from the evidence admitted by the court in those proceedings. On 24 July 1998, after 10.30 p.m., the police received a telephone call from a private individual, informing them about a car driving in the streets of Kaunas in breach of various road-traffic regulations. 12.  Officers AM and AR submitted that they had been patrolling in police car no. 548 when they had heard the information about the Ford Escort on the police radio and had unsuccessfully tried to stop it at around 11 p.m. Officers AM and AR had followed the car, but had soon lost sight of it. AR submitted to the court that, to his knowledge, two passengers and a driver had been in the car. 13.  The information about the car being driven in a dangerous manner was transmitted through the control centre to other patrol officers on duty, and two more policemen, NB and EP, in police vehicle no. 424, were involved in the chase. 14.  They were joined by three more policemen, RZ, SG and JM, patrolling in police vehicle no. 427. These officers submitted to the court that they had received information about the car via the police radio at around 11 p.m. and had followed the order to arrest the driver. They had therefore arrived as reinforcements and had joined car no. 424 in chasing the Ford Escort, which was fleeing at about 130 to 140 kilometres per hour. 15.  The two police cars had their light and sound signals turned on, and tried to block the Ford Escort, while orders to stop were given over the loudspeakers. However, the car tried to escape, attempting to push the police vehicles off the road. 16.  RZ fired two warning shots into the air, but the car only accelerated. 17.  A moment later, the driver of the car lost control of the vehicle, hitting the fence of a building. The car was brought to a halt. Police vehicle no. 427 stopped several metres behind the car, and vehicle no. 424 moved to its left, trying to block its way. Suddenly, the car started moving backwards, damaging police vehicle no. 427. The policemen left their vehicles and ran towards the car, shouting and gesturing at the driver to surrender. The Ford Escort turned right, hitting officer RZ, and began to drive away. An expert medical examination later confirmed that RZ had suffered slight bodily injuries, including several scratches and bruising to his left calf. 18.  When the car hit him, officer RZ fired a shot, apparently damaging its radiator, as he noticed that the cooling liquid was leaking. 19.  In addition, immediately after RZ had been hit, NB, who had left police vehicle no. 424, fired one shot towards the car’s wheels. RZ then fired several more shots towards the car as it escaped. Officer SG likewise fired a number of shots towards the fleeing car. The other policemen did not use their guns. 20.  Soon afterwards, the car was forced to stop in another area of Kaunas as a result of the leak of the cooling liquid from the radiator which had been damaged by RZ’s shot. Police officers AR and AM, who were driving vehicle no. 548, arrested RM while he was trying to flee. In the car, the policemen found the bodies of the applicants’ sons, whose deaths were confirmed on the arrival of a medical team at 11.56 p.m. RM was found to have been drunk and not in possession of any of the relevant documents permitting him to drive a car. 21.  The court did not specify how many shots had been fired by SG, even though it noted that two of his shots had caused the deaths of the applicants’ sons. The court took account of SG’s statements that he had suspected that one of the passengers of the car had a weapon which he thought he had seen through the front window which was wound down, and that he had fired only after having heard a first shot (in fact fired by his colleague RZ), and having no idea where that shot had come from. The court also noted that no firearms or other weapons had been found in the car. 22.  The court did not establish the exact time when the chase had started, concluding that the crime of which RM was convicted had been committed at around 11.30 p.m. 23.  RM was acquitted of the offence of manslaughter, the court having noted that the deaths had been caused not by his acts, but by the “lawful actions of a third person who had used an official weapon.” The court noted in this connection:\n“the internal institutional inquiry shows that all the policemen acted in a lawful and reasonable manner. The court has no grounds to doubt the conclusions of the internal investigation, as they have been confirmed by the circumstances established during the criminal investigation. Article 42 of the Police Act authorised the policemen to use firearms against the vehicle and the offender. The acts committed by the defendant, including his resisting the police officers, constituted grounds for using firearms. The use of firearms was lawful and reasonable...” 24.  The applicants’ civil claims for damages against the police were not examined. The court nonetheless noted that it was open to the applicants to bring their claims by way of a separate set of civil proceedings. 25.  The court sentenced RM to six years’ imprisonment for resisting the lawful orders of the police, and ordered the confiscation of part of his property amounting to 200 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 58 euros (EUR)). 26.  On 18 May 1999 the Kaunas Regional Court upheld the judgment. It was also decided to institute criminal proceedings against SG for the manslaughter of the applicants’ sons (Article 109 of the Criminal Code as then in force) and for exceeding his authority (Article 287). In this connection, the court noted:\n“in the situation under consideration, there were no circumstances permitting the use of a firearm against a person (Article 42(2) of the Police Act). The police officers had the right to use firearms against the vehicle only (Article 42(5) of that Act). ...\nNobody disputes that the police officer [SG] had the right to use a firearm against the car (Article 42(5) of the Police Act); however, despite the fact that two innocent people were shot, it has not been examined whether he used that right properly. In taking this decision, the court is seeking to establish the truth. It does not intend to weaken the determination of police officers when carrying out their duties. Nevertheless, the duty of professional integrity, self-control and endurance cannot be underestimated; when using firearms, police officers must seek to avoid severe consequences (Article 41(3) of the Police Act). ... The investigation should aim to examine [the elements pointed out by the applicants], inter alia, the allegedly poor visibility at the scene of the incident, and the fact that [SG] hit the interior of the car and not its tyres, which he had allegedly fired at. According to [the applicants], this fact alone indicated that [SG] had fired the shots while being guided by his anger and ill-temper. ...” 27.  On 12 October 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 18 May 1999. 28.  The criminal proceedings brought against SG by virtue of the decision of the Kaunas Regional Court on 18 May 1999 were discontinued by the prosecutor on 27 December 1999. The prosecution found no indication of any crime in the actions of officer SG. It was noted, in particular, that SG had used his gun in accordance with instructions, had targeted the wheels of the car and had had recourse to his firearm only after the driver had committed a crime by hitting one of his colleagues. The driver, RM, had apparently been predisposed to escape by any means, threatening the safety of other people. The deaths of the two victims had been the result not only of the shooting as such, but also of the unpredictable actions of the driver. 29.  The prosecution based their conclusions, inter alia, on the following sources of evidence: the submissions of the policemen; the records of the on-site examinations of the scene, conducted on 27 July 1998, 19 August 1998 and 21 September 1999; a letter from the meteorological service on weather conditions at the time of the events; illumination tests at the scene of the shooting; the results of the ballistic examination of 30 November 1999, and records of the on-site reconstruction of the event, including diagrams of the position and movement of the cars and policemen, drawn in accordance with the submissions of the officers concerned. 30.  On 19 April 2000 the Kaunas City District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decision. The court noted, inter alia, that the prosecutors had not made a detailed assessment of “the way” in which SG had used the gun with reference to the relevant domestic legal provisions. 31.  During the investigation, none of the policemen made clear submissions as to the moment when SG had begun shooting. 32.  On 9 June 2000 the prosecutor again discontinued the investigation, noting that no evidence of any crime had been found in the actions of SG. The prosecution referred to the evidence mentioned in the earlier decision of 27 December 1999 as well as the additional submissions of the policemen. 33.  The following order and impact of the use of firearms had been established. Two warning shots had been fired into the air by RZ during the chase; one shot by RZ had damaged the radiator after the car had hit the fence, and soon afterwards one shot fired by NB had hit the wheel of the car. Finally, seven shots had been fired by RZ towards the fleeing car and four by SG. The prosecutor found that two of SG’s shots had hit the applicants’ sons, causing their deaths. Some of the other shots had marked the car’s tyres, wheel rims, seats, front panel and windows, and the rear window was broken. The car body work also bore traces of bullets. 34.  Referring to the submissions of SG, taken at the scene of the shooting, the prosecution concluded that SG had directed the shots at the wheels of the moving car from a distance of 11.4 metres (the first shot) up to 27.5 metres (the fourth shot). He had fired the shots after the driver had hit his colleague RZ, that is, after he had committed an offence punishable by the criminal law (Article 201-1 § 2 of the old Criminal Code), of which he had already been convicted. Hence, it could not be alleged that the firearms had been used only because the car had been driven in defiance of traffic regulations. The prosecution took account of RZ’s statement that he had been hit by the car and thrown onto the bonnet and then the ground. For this reason the policemen could have reasonably considered it necessary to avert the danger which the car represented for other people, given in particular that RM had been drunk and had been seeking by dangerous means to escape arrest and punishment. 35.  It was stressed that SG had used the firearm not against the people in the car, but against the vehicle, and he had only tried to hit the tyres. There had been no significant obstacles to visibility, such as inadequate lighting or dust. However, the fact that the car had moved in sudden and swerving directions was emphasised as a cause of the deaths, rather than any breach of regulations governing the use of firearms. In view of these circumstances, and given that SG had had a valid reason to use the gun as a last resort in accordance with Article 42 of the Police Act, the prosecutor concluded that there was no evidence that he had committed a crime. 36.  Finally, the prosecution stated that, during the proceedings against RM, none of the three levels of jurisdiction had questioned the lawfulness of the use of the firearm by SG. 37.  The applicants appealed against the decision to discontinue the investigation. They alleged that SG had sought revenge against the driver of the car and had fired recklessly at the moving vehicle, disregarding the fact that he might hit the passengers. The applicants argued that SG had known about the presence of other people in the car and must have understood that innocent passengers might be killed; however, he had allowed this to happen, as he had fired at the vehicle. 38.  As to the quality of the investigation, the applicants stressed that the prosecution had failed to provide any explanation for the fact that one of the bullets fired by SG had hit the side window of the car, whereas it had been concluded that SG had first fired at the vehicle only after it had moved 11.4 metres away. 39.  On 17 October 2000 the Kaunas City District Court upheld the decision of the prosecution. The court mentioned that SG had fired at the moving car during a very a short period of time, within a perimeter of about 20 metres. The court held that SG had used the firearm lawfully, the shots being directed at the wheels of the car, not at the people sitting in it. It was found that the car had been moving in swerving directions, two shots having, as a result, hit the passengers. SG had thus not been able to foresee the consequences of his actions. At the same time the court noted that, even though the incident had taken place at about midnight, the street and the car had been well lit. 40.  The court emphasised that the ground for using firearms was the fact that RM had been driving while drunk, and had not only violated traffic regulations, but had tried to escape in a dangerous manner. His behaviour had put other people at risk. The policemen had tried all alternative means to stop RM, and firing at the tyres of the fleeing car had been used as a measure of last resort. 41.  The court also stated that there had been no causal link between the actions of SG and the impugned consequences, namely the death of the applicants’ sons. It held that manslaughter had not occurred as a result of the actions of SG; he had made an appropriate assessment of the circumstances and had not exceeded the requirements of the relevant legal provisions in using his gun. The death of the applicants’ sons had been an accident for which SG could not be held criminally responsible.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Włodawa. 8.  On 28 June 2000 the Rzeszów District Court remanded the applicant in custody for two months. The court relied on a statement given on 27 June 2000 by the applicant's mentally ill son, G.M., who accused the applicant of homicide. The court also referred to the likelihood that a heavy penalty would be imposed on the applicant. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant appealed and requested that the preventive measure imposed on him be reduced in severity. He relied on his age (he was seventy-two years old at the time) and on the fact that he was undergoing medical treatment. 10.  On 12 July 2000 the Rzeszów Regional Court, relying on the same grounds as the District Court, upheld the challenged decision. 11.  On 23 August 2000 the Rzeszów Regional Prosecutor requested the court to extend the applicant's detention. 12.  On 25 August 2000 the Rzeszów District Court granted the request and extended the applicant's detention for another month, until 28 September 2000. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant's lawyer appealed against that decision. 14.  On 12 September 2000 the Rzeszów Regional Court upheld the challenged decision. The court recognised that the only evidence against the applicant was the statement by the applicant's son, who had undergone a psychiatric examination. It stressed, however, that according to the results of the psychiatric report, the applicant's son's mental condition had improved. The court also relied on the risk that the applicant could obstruct the proceedings. 15.  The Rzeszów Regional Court, relying on the same grounds as previously, extended the applicant's detention on 22 September 2000 for three months, and then, on 22 December 2000 for a further three months. 16.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed against the latter decision. 17.  On 18 January 2001 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal gave a decision and released the applicant. The court referred to a psychiatric opinion of 2 January 2001 concerning the applicant's son and found that his statements could not be considered reliable evidence. 18.  On 20 December 2001 the Rzeszów Regional Court gave judgment and acquitted the applicant. 19.  On an unspecified date the Regional Rzeszów Prosecutor appealed against that judgment. 20.  On 9 May 2002 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. 21.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for manifestly unjustified detention with the Rzeszów Regional Court. 22.  On an unspecified date the Rzeszów Regional Court gave judgment, against which the applicant appealed. 23.  On 22 December 2004 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal remitted the case. 24.  On 29 June 2005 the Rzeszów Regional Court granted the applicant compensation in the amount of 10,360 Polish zlotys (PLN). 25.  The applicant appealed against that judgment, arguing that the instructions given by the Court of Appeal, which had remitted the case, had not been followed. 26.  On 22 September 2005 the Rzeszów Court of Appeal granted the appeal in part, amended the first-instance judgment and increased the compensation to PLN 10,809. The court considered that the compensation should also include the travelling costs borne by the applicant's family to visit him in prison. 27.  On 10 July 2000 J.M., the applicant's wife, and R.M., the applicant's second son, asked the Rzeszów Regional Prosecutor for permission to see the applicant. They also requested information on the applicant's state of health. 28.  According to the applicant's submissions the prosecutor did not reply to their request. 29.  On 3 August 2000 the applicant's lawyer requested the Rzeszów Regional Prosecutor to allow him to see his wife and son. He relied on the applicant's age and state of health. 30.  On 17 August 2000 the Rzeszów Regional Prosecutor refused to allow the applicant personal contact with his family. The refusal was motivated by the need to secure the proper conduct of the investigation (z uwagi na dobro toczącego się śledztwa). 31.  On 21 September 2000 J.M. and R.M. again requested the prosecutor to allow them to visit the applicant. They submitted that for almost three months they had been denied personal contact with the close family members. Apparently this request remained unanswered. 32.  According to the findings of the Court of Appeal which examined the matter of the applicant's family's visits in prison for the purposes of calculating their travelling costs, the applicant's son visited him twice in the hospital wing of the Kraków Remand Centre on 14 October and 18 November 2000, and once, on 7 January 2001, in the Remand Centre itself. The applicant's wife was allowed to see her husband on 14 January 2001.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicants are Irish citizens, born in 1958 and 1957, respectively, and they both live in County Wicklow, Ireland. 10.  On 12 September 1990 they agreed to buy a site with planning permission from “the vendors” on which they intended to build a house. The sale was completed in October 1990. It subsequently emerged that, because of discrepancies in the relevant site maps on which they relied during the sale, they did not have access to the site from the road. They were obliged to discontinue building and to sell the site. 11.  On 31 May 1991 the Minister for Agriculture and Food established the Tribunal of Enquiry into the Beef Processing Industry (“Beef Tribunal”) and nominated the President of the High Court to be the sole member of the Tribunal. While conducting the Beef Tribunal, the President continued, when possible, to sit in cases in the High Court. 12.  On 17 July 1991 the applicants instituted High Court proceedings for negligence, negligent misstatement, breach of contract, misrepresentation and breach of warranty against their own solicitors (“the applicants' solicitors”), the vendors and “the vendors' solicitors”. On 10 March 1992 the High Court ordered discovery on a consent basis. Pursuant to the applicants' motion and the defendants' consent, on 4 May 1992 the High Court ordered the defendants to file their defence within 4 weeks. Further motions of the applicants were struck out on 22 and 24 June and on 19 October 1992. On 18 May 1993 the case was certified ready for hearing by the applicants' senior counsel. 13.  The case was originally listed for hearing on 8 July 1993 but it was adjourned (the applicants objected) due to the illness of one of the defendants to 15 July 1993 when another hearing date would be fixed. On 15 July 1993 a hearing date was fixed for 6 October 1993. On that date there was no judge available and the matter was heard on 7 October 1993 when the President of the High Court (“the trial judge”) made himself available.\nThe Government maintained that the trial judge was advised by counsel present that the hearing required two days, that the judge had notified the parties that his tribunal commitments meant that he had only two days for their case so that, if the case took longer, he would be obliged to adjourn until after the Beef Tribunal, that he would only deal with issues of liability and that the applicants agreed to this. The applicants denied that their counsel so advised the trial judge, that the trial judge had informed them that the trial would be so adjourned, that their counsel would have agreed to an indefinite adjournment (given the second applicant's psychological state) or that they agreed to the separation of issues of liability and damages. 14.  The applicants' case was heard on 7 and 8 October 1993 and, since it was unfinished, the trial judge adjourned it. On 2 November 1993 and 8 February 1994 the applicants wrote to the Chief Registrar of the High Court asking for enquiries to be made as to when the action would be resumed. On 16 March 1994 they wrote to the Registrar asking him to intervene with the trial judge to fix a date and enclosing a medical report of the second applicant's doctor dated 12 March 1994 (see paragraph 32 below). The Registrar was also contacted by telephone on numerous occasions by the applicants regarding a hearing date. In March 1994 the Registrar informed the applicants by telephone that the trial judge had confirmed a hearing date in July 1994. A letter to the Registrar of 9 June 1994 requested that a hearing date be fixed. 15.  During this period, the applicants wrote also wrote to, inter alia, numerous members of Dáil Eireann (the House of Representatives) including to the Minister for Justice. The Deputy Chair of Dáil Eireann indicated, in a letter dated 25 March 1994, that he had contacted the Acting President of the High Court asking the latter to intercede on the applicants' behalf. On 7 April 1994 the Acting President responded that the case would be taken in July 1994. 16.  On 29 July 1994 the trial judge completed his report on the Beef Tribunal. On 19 September 1994 he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The trial judge resumed the hearing of the applicants' case on 5 October 1994. He heard the last two witnesses and requested legal argument in writing. He reserved judgment, indicating that he would deliver it approximately one week after receipt of the written submissions. Those submissions were made by the end of October 1994 17.  On 29 November 1994, 2 February, 12 April and 22 May 1995 the applicants wrote to certain Registrars of the High Court requesting information as to when the judgment would be delivered. A response, dated 26 May 1995, stated that the trial judge could not confirm when he could deliver his judgment given his heavy commitments. Further to the applicants' letter, the Minister for Justice indicated in a letter of 10 July 1995 that, while she could not intervene, she had brought the matter to the attention of a Registrar of the High Court. The applicants also wrote to a Registrar on 12 July 1995 again requesting an early delivery date. A Registrar's letter of 13 July 1995 indicated a delivery date before the end of the month. By letter dated 25 July 1995 the Minister for Justice responded to a further letter from the applicants indicating that she had forwarded a copy of the applicants' correspondence to the trial judge. Further to another letter from the applicants, a Registrar subsequently confirmed delivery of the judgment on 12 September 1995. 18.  Judgment was orally delivered on that date. Both the vendors and the applicants' solicitors were found liable in damages and the claim against the vendors' solicitors was dismissed. On 21 September 1995 the Court made various orders concerning damages (adjournment of the assessment of damages) and costs to be paid by the unsuccessful parties. Pending finalisation by the trial judge of the written judgment, the form of order was not to be perfected in order to allow the applicants time to consider the text of that judgment prior to the expiration of the time-limit for appealing any orders of the High Court. The applicants wrote two letters to a Registrar of the High Court (dated 6 and 13 October 1995) and the text of the judgment became available in mid-October 1995. The order of the High Court was perfected on 17 October 1995 and on 3 November 1995 the applicants appealed the findings in favour of the vendors' solicitors to the Supreme Court. The vendors also appealed the High Court findings against them. 19.  Since a stenographer had not been present during the High Court hearings, it was necessary to prepare and agree a record of the evidence given during those hearings for the purposes of the appeal. By 9 February 1996 the applicants had completed a substantial note of evidence and on 29 March 1996 they submitted it to the vendors and to the vendors' solicitors for their agreement. On 17 July 1996 the applicants issued two motions. The first sought the comments of the vendors' solicitors on the note of evidence and the second requested that the vendors' appeal be struck out for “want of prosecution” since the vendors had not filed documents in their appeal. 20.  On 26 July 1996 the Supreme Court heard both motions with the trial judge (then Chief Justice) presiding. The court requested the vendors and the vendors' solicitors to submit their comments on the note of evidence within two weeks, in default of which the trial judge would finalise the note. On the second motion, the vendors were given until 7 October 1996 to file the relevant appeal documents, in default of which the Supreme Court envisaged striking out the vendors' appeal. Both motions were adjourned until 11 October 1996. The vendors' appeal and the related motion were later dropped. 21.  Following further letters from the applicants in August 1996, on 17 September 1996 the vendors' solicitors indicated that they disagreed with 16 items in the note of evidence. On 11 October 1996 the applicants' motion concerning the note of evidence was adjourned to 18 October 1996. Three days later the vendors' solicitors confirmed that agreement would not be reached on the note. On 18 October 1996 three judges of the Supreme Court (not including the trial judge) directed the trial judge to settle the note of evidence. On 24 October 1996 the applicants submitted the note of evidence together with a note of the 16 disputed points to the trial judge. 22.  In or around November 1996 the President of the High Court gave directions that all complaints about delays in proceedings should be forwarded to him. A memorandum of the President of the High Court published in the Bar Review of January/February 1997 noted the delays in delivering reserved judgments due to the shortage of judges and requested legal practitioners formally to notify the President of the High Court of their concerns about such delays. 23.  Subsequently, the applicants wrote to a Registrar of the High Court on a number of occasions (including on 14 January, 12 March and 25 June 1997) requesting the early settlement of the note of evidence. On 8 July 1997 the applicants wrote to the President of the High Court requesting him to intervene given the delay in their proceedings. In July 1997 a Registrar of the High Court indicated orally that the trial judge would deal with the matter after 20 August 1997. The applicants sent a further reminder to that Registrar on 18 September 1997. On 10 October 1997 the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (“the Department of Justice”) requested the Chief Registrar's comments on the alleged undue delay in the case. On 16 October 1997 a Registrar indicated to the Department of Justice that the note of evidence matter would be resolved in one week. 24.  By letter dated 22 October 1997 the trial judge forwarded a report (six pages) he had prepared on the evidence and on the points disputed by the relevant parties and he apologised to the applicants for the delay. By letter dated 24 October 1997 a Registrar assured the Department of Justice that the note of evidence matter had been resolved and that an early date for a hearing of the appeal would be made available. 25.  Further to the applicants' complaints to their member of Dáil Eireann and to the Tánaiste (the deputy Prime Minister), the Attorney General expressed, by letter dated 30 October 1997 to the applicants, his concern at the delay in their case. While he was constitutionally obliged not to interfere in judicial matters, he had mentioned the matter informally to the trial judge and the latter assured him that all outstanding matters had been dealt with. In a letter dated 4 November 1997 the Attorney General confirmed to the Tánaiste that he was concerned about the delays which the applicants had experienced in their case and that he had raised these matters in a private and informal manner with the trial judge who had assured him that all outstanding matters had been dealt with. Following an invitation, the applicants met with a member of the Attorney General's Office in late November 1997, although the advice was that that office could not interfere in judicial processes. 26.  By motion dated 9 December 1997 the applicants amended their appeal. By letter dated 21 January 1998 the Minister for Justice responded to queries of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) concerning the applicant's case pointing out that on 21 November 1997 the appeal hearing had been fixed for 2 February 1998. 27.  The Supreme Court delivered its reserved judgment on the applicants' appeal on 9 March 1998 and found in the applicants' favour, considering that the vendors' solicitors were also liable in negligence to the applicants. 28.  The case was remitted to the High Court for the assessment and apportionment of damages. By letter dated 7 May 1998 the Attorney General responded to queries raised by the applicants' member of Dáil Eireann: he indicated that their case was “concerning” and that it was hoped that the recently established system for monitoring judicial delays would ensure that their experience would not be repeated. 29.  The vendors' solicitors filed an amended defence in May 1998 and the applicants filed further particulars of damage in June 1998. On 26 June 1998 the vendors' solicitors made a late lodgement into court in the sum of 85,000 Irish pounds (IR£). The applicants objected. A letter dated 13 July 1998 from the Attorney General's office to the applicants explained that his previous intervention related to an administrative act by the trial judge (the note of evidence) but that the outstanding matters were judicial in which he could not interfere. By letter dated 22 July 1998 the Attorney General's office confirmed that it had been informed that a hearing date had been fixed by the High Court for 13 October 1998. A letter dated 6 August 1998 from the Taoiseach's office to the applicants confirmed that increased resources to the courts meant that it was hoped that their experiences would not be repeated. On 9 October 1998 the applicants also met with the Tánaiste to discuss the length of their ongoing proceedings. 30.  On 13-16 October 1998 an assessment hearing took place in the High Court. On 25 November 1998 the High Court awarded the applicants approximately IR£200,000 in respect of pecuniary loss and IR£10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (the High Court finding that both applicants had been put through “a high degree of anxiety and upset” as a consequence of the defendants' negligence). The applicants were also awarded their costs when taxed and ascertained. On 11 December 1998 the High Court dealt with matters concerning the attribution of liability between the defendants. The order of the High Court was perfected in early February 1999. There was no appeal on these matters to the Supreme Court. 31.  The Taxing Master abridged the time for service of the applicants' bill of costs (Order 99, Rule 28(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts) and fixed a hearing for 29 July 1999. The bill of costs contained 519 items and comprised 172 pages. This hearing was then adjourned on the application of the vendors' solicitors until 20 October 1999. The hearing took place on that date and, since it did not finish, it was adjourned to and continued on 20 November 1999. It was again adjourned and concluded on 22 November 1999, when the Taxing Master delivered his reserved ruling. The Certificate on Taxation (approximately IR£300,000) was signed by the Taxing Master on 15 December 1999. 32.  The applicants submitted a number of medical certificates to the Court.\nA certificate prepared by the second applicant's doctor on 26 May 1993 attested to her severe symptoms of anxiety since the legal problems had arisen. She had required repeated courses of medication and she was, at that stage, depressed and on medication. Her anxiety symptoms were likely to continue until the legal situation was resolved. The same doctor confirmed, in a certificate dated 12 March 1994, a deterioration of the second applicant's condition into “frank depression”. Medication had initially helped but the delay in the proceedings was worsening her condition. A psychiatric report on the second applicant dated July 1998 recorded her significant clinical depression since the start of the proceedings which warranted anti-depressants and tranquillisers on many occasions. It was considered that the proceedings continually threatened to bring about a relapse, in spite of certain periods of recovery following appropriate treatment. It was also considered that a full recovery was foreseeable only after the proceedings terminated. A psychiatric report on the first applicant dated August 1998 attested to the great strain the proceedings had caused him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Žetale. 7.  At 8.10 p.m. on 18 February 2001 the Podlehnik police patrol, consisting of two officers, J.Š. and G.K., was called to a bar, B. According to the Government the officers were told by customers and a waitress there that the applicant had been shouting at customers and threatening them with a gun. The officers were also told that a person they believed to be the applicant had headed to another bar, Š,. in the town of Čermožiše. 6.  At 8.30 p.m., the two police officers entered bar Š. They asked the owner of a white VW Golf to come forward. The applicant, who was the owner of the car in question and was in the bar that evening, approached the officers and followed them out to the car. The events which followed are in dispute between the parties. 7.  According to the applicant, on the way out the officers asked him where his gun was. The applicant replied that he had no gun. One officer requested the applicant to open the boot of the car. The applicant took the keys from the car to unlock the boot. At that point one of the officers hit him on the head. Both officers continued to beat the applicant until they knocked him down. They then kicked him all over his body. When the applicant started to get up, he received several punches to the stomach. The police officers then handcuffed him and took him to Podlehnik Police Station in a police car. In his criminal complaint (see paragraph 11 below), the applicant also alleged that he was hit twice in the face in the police car. At the police station one of the officers punched the applicant, who was still handcuffed, several times in the face. 8.  According to the Government, the police officers informed the applicant that he was charged with breach of the peace and possession of a weapon. The applicant then starting hitting his car. When he learned of the officers’ intention to search the car the applicant opened the boot and took out a metal bicycle wrench. Officer J.Š. asked the applicant to put the wrench down. The applicant refused, and lifted the wrench above his head. The officer then hit the applicant on the head, at which point the wrench fell to the ground. The applicant then attempted to run away. Officer J.Š. caught the applicant by the shirt. The applicant then fell to the ground, but got up again immediately. At that point he also told officer G.K. that he would kill his family. Not having been able to restrain the applicant, G.K., using professional skills, threw the applicant over his hip by gripping his neck. The officers then handcuffed the applicant, who was lying on the ground but still trying to resist, and searched him, as well as the car, but found no weapons. On suspicion that the applicant, who was believed to be under the influence of alcohol, would continue to commit offences, the officers ordered his detention at around 9.15 p.m. The officers took the applicant to Podlehnik Police Station, where the handcuffs were taken off him. The applicant was bleeding from the mouth. 9.  The applicant, who was complaining of pain, was taken to hospital by officers B.H. and M.B., who had taken over for the night shift. He remained hospitalised until 22 February 2001. According to the hospital reports, the applicant had suffered concussion, injury to the upper arm (fracture of the left humerus), excoriation, haematoma and contusion on the head, neck and thorax, and a rupture of the eardrum (perforation of tympanums). The applicant also submitted that two of his teeth were loose and one had been broken during the alleged ill-treatment. He continued outpatient treatment until 19 June 2001. The medical records noted that the results of the treatment were “satisfactory”. 10.  On 12 March 2011 the police lodged a criminal complaint of violent behaviour against the applicant. A bill of indictment was lodged by the Ptuj District Prosecutor, S.E., whereupon the Ptuj Local Court heard the applicant, as well as four witnesses. On 15 May 2006 the charges were reclassified to the criminal offence of endangering security. Since the proceedings concerning the latter offence could only have been conducted at the request of an aggrieved party, the court requested the presumed aggrieved party, G.H., to inform the authorities whether he wished to pursue proceedings. On 18 September 2006 the proceedings were discontinued, as G.H. refused to submit a request for them. 11.  On 28 March 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Ptuj District Prosecutor’s Office against unidentified officers, of aggravated bodily harm and violation of human dignity by abuse of authority or official position. The applicant supported his criminal complaint with hospital records and photographs of his injuries. He also proposed that A.K., who saw the incident, be examined. 12.  On 6 November 2001 the Ptuj District Prosecutor, S.E, dismissed the criminal complaint on the basis of the police report prepared by Maribor Police (to which Podlehnik Police Station was subordinate). The latter was based on official notes concerning interviews held by officer S.P from Podlehnik Police Station with officers J.Š., G.K., B.H. and M.B. It would appear that in the context of the police inquiry, statements were taken by an officer from Maribor Police from five persons who had been present in the two bars but had not witnessed the relevant events outside the bar. The police report noted that witness A.K. had not been questioned, as he was working in Austria. The public prosecutor found that the police officers, who were identified as J.Š. and G.K., had acted in accordance with the law. In the decision dismissing the applicant’s criminal complaint the public prosecutor found that the applicant had allegedly breached the peace in bar B., where he had threatened customers with a gun. Further to that allegation, which had been communicated to the police by a person from that bar, the two officers attempted to find the applicant. They entered bar Š. for that purpose. As regards the subsequent events, the public prosecutor found in her decision that the applicant had refused to cooperate with the officers and had taken a metal tool out of his car in an attempt to attack officer J.Š. She concluded that this, and the fact that the applicant had presumably been carrying a gun, justified the use of force and the injuries the applicant had sustained as a result. The applicant was not heard by the public prosecutor or involved in those proceedings in any way. The public prosecutor’s decision was served on his representative on 16 November 2001. 13.  On 22 November 2001 the applicant, acting as a subsidiary prosecutor represented by a lawyer, lodged a request with the Ptuj District Court for an investigation. 14.  On 24 January 2002 the two accused officers appeared before the investigating judge. Both of them refused to give statements. On the same day the investigating judge upheld the request for an investigation. The officers appealed against the decision. On 23 April 2002 their appeals were rejected by an interlocutory-proceedings panel, which found that the applicant’s criminal complaint, and in particular the medical records, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the offences had been committed. 15.  Further to the investigating judge’s request, the police informed her that no disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against the officers in question with respect to the alleged abuse of power. 16.  On 3 June 2002 the investigating judge heard evidence from the owner of bar B., who testified that she had seen the applicant with a gun in the bar that evening and that the applicant was known as an aggressive person. 17.  On 1 July 2002 the investigating judge heard the applicant. The applicant’s testimony essentially corresponded to the description of the arrest as provided in his application to the Court; however, before the investigating judge, he denied having been beaten up in the police car. The applicant maintained that he did not possess a gun and that that was why the police had not found one. He also stated that nobody had witnessed the arrest except A.K., a customer from bar Š. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had no interest in pursuing a pecuniary claim for compensation in these proceedings, because he was seeking damages in civil proceedings.\n 18.  On the same day the investigating judge examined six witnesses: four from bar B. and two from bar Š. As regards the latter, a waitress testified that she had noticed nothing unusual that day and confirmed that the officers had entered the bar and asked the applicant to step outside with them. She had not witnessed the events outside the bar. A.K. testified that he had heard the applicant screaming outside and as he was leaving the bar had seen the applicant lying on the ground being beaten by the officers. He had observed the situation for only a few seconds, however, and had not been able to see the incident very well because it was night. 19.  On 25 September 2002 the investigating judge heard evidence from a forensic expert in general surgery, L.T. The latter stated, on the basis of the applicant’s medical records relating to his hospitalisation following the arrest in question, that the applicant had sustained at least five blows during the arrest: at least two to the head, one to the neck, one to the left side of his thorax and a hard blow to the left shoulder, and had possibly also been kicked while he was on the ground. He further specified that it was possible that the applicant’s face had been hit with an open hand, but powerful force would have had to be used to cause such an ear injury. As regards the injury to the upper arm, L.T. explained it could have been the result of a hard direct blow or kick, but could also have been caused during a professional hit or throw. 20.  On 27 January 2003 one of the customers from bar B., M.K., was examined. He denied seeing the applicant carrying a gun or noticing anything special that evening. After further questioning, M.K. admitted that he had known that the police had been called to the bar because of the applicant’s threatening customers with a gun. He indicated that he had not said that earlier during questioning because he was afraid of the applicant. However, M.K. later denied having had any previous negative experience with the applicant. 21.  On 12 February 2003 the applicant lodged an indictment against the two police officers. The officers lodged objections to the indictment. On 5 May 2006 the interlocutory proceeding panel rejected the objections, finding that the evidence collected so far supported a reasonable suspicion that the alleged acts had been committed. 22.  The Ptuj District Court, sitting as a panel, held hearings on 12 and 29 December 2006 and on 23 March, 13 April, 31 May, 22 and 31 August and 6 September 2007. It heard the accused officers, the applicant and a number of witnesses from the bars in question, as well as the officers who had taken over for the night shift. In addition, the court obtained a forensic report from an expert in general surgery, L.T., and a report by the Commission of the Faculty of Medicine prepared by V.S., an expert in traumatology and surgery, and L.Š, an expert in otorhinolaryngology. It also examined all three experts at the hearing. It furthermore obtained the opinion of an expert in fighting techniques, B.Z. 23.  At one of the hearings, expert L.T. testified that the rupture of the eardrum could only have been the consequence of a slap. The shoulder injury could have occurred as a result of a professional throw. He further explained that the haematoma on the right side of the applicant’s face could have been the result of a blow to the right cheekbone. The haematoma on the forehead was caused by a blow or a kick from the heel of a shoe while the applicant was either kneeling or lying down. Expert V.T. testified that the bruises on the applicant’s forehead and the right side of his face could have been caused by a blow from a closed fist. Furthermore, he said that the damage to the eye socket was very unlikely to have been caused by the pressure employed during the professional throw, but must have been the result of a direct blow with a fist or a kick to this area. Expert L.Š. testified that being thrown down, or pressure on the thorax, would be very unlikely to cause perforation of the eardrum. He further stated that in his opinion there had been two or more blows to the applicant’s face. Lastly, the expert in fighting techniques, B.Z., gave an opinion that the professional throw, which was called koshi guruma, and the blow with a hand, called oi tsuki jodan, were professionally justified during the applicant’s arrest. 24.  On 6 September 2007 the court convicted J.Š. and G.K. of the criminal offence of violation of human dignity by abuse of powers or official position under Article 270 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to imprisonment of four and three months respectively, suspended for two years. The court found that J.Š. and G.K. had been beating and kicking the applicant while he was lying on the ground after he had been thrown down by G.K. In addition, the court found that J.Š. had hit the applicant at least once on the right side of the face at Podlehnik Police Station. The officers were acquitted of the charges of aggravated bodily harm. 25.  In its judgment the Ptuj District Court, referring to the case of Matko v. Slovenia, (no. 43393/98, 2 November 2006), noted that it had reached the decision independently of the findings of the initial police inquiry and the public prosecutor’s decision, which had not complied with the requirement of an effective investigation. The court accepted the accused officers’ assertion that the applicant had attempted to attack them with a tool, which, however had not been seized. It also accepted the accused officers’ explanation that they had used a professional hit and a professional throw to overcome his resistance, which was lawful. It also considered that there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had been hit while he was in the car, an allegation that had, moreover not been made consistently. On the other hand the court found, on the basis of the evidence gathered in the criminal investigation and during the trial, in particular from the testimony of A.K. and the forensic medical reports, that the applicant had not been subjected only to the above-mentioned use of force. In particular, the court concluded, referring to the opinions of forensic experts, which it found to be consistent, that the applicant had received several blows to the head, not just one. As regards witness A.K., who had passed the scene of the incident when leaving the bar, the court noted that although A.K. had known the applicant, there was no close relationship between them which could call into question A.K.’s credibility as a witness. It further noted that A.K. had first stated during the investigation that he had seen the applicant being beaten up by the officers while he was lying on the ground, but that subsequently, at the hearing at which the two accused officers had been present in their uniforms, he had modified his statement by saying that he had seen one of them kick the applicant. The court, which took into account the evidence concerning the visibility at the scene of the incident and heard witnesses for the defence, who failed to undermine A.K.’s credibility, concluded that it was to be believed that A.K. had seen the applicant being kicked by at least one of the officers. It also rejected the accused officers’ assertion that, given the circumstances, they had been entitled to use even lethal force. It noted in this respect that the officers outnumbered the applicant, were in excellent physical condition and were trained in fighting techniques. In addition, they had been aware of the possibility that the applicant might be carrying a gun and could therefore have predicted his behaviour. The court concluded that the accused officers had ill-treated the applicant in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and Article 18 of the Slovenian Constitution and committed the criminal offence under Article 270 of the Penal Code. As regards the charges of aggravated bodily harm, the court found that it could not determine with the degree of certainty required in criminal cases whether the injuries with long-term consequences, namely, the fracture of the left humerus and rupture of the eardrum, had been caused intentionally by the unlawful use of force. Finally the court ordered the applicant to pay court fees in the amount of 400 euros (EUR). 26.  The applicant appealed on 5 November 2007. The officers also lodged appeals against the judgment in so far as it related to their conviction. 27.  On 27 February 2008, after deliberations, the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the accused officers’ appeal. As regards the quashing of the conviction, the court found, in a reasoning of less than two pages, that the first-instance court had erred in establishing the facts. However, referring to sections 392 (5) and 394 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was of the opinion that a reassessment of the evidence could be done without a remittal of the case or a fresh hearing. The Maribor Higher Court then found that the defence statements of the accused officers were consistent and credible and should be fully followed and that the operation had not been a random one, as the applicant had a reputation as a dangerous person and had attacked the officers with a tool. The court found that the applicant’s statements had not been consistent and called into question the credibility of witness A.K. In this connection it rejected the reasoning given by the first-instance court, that the change in A.K.’s testimony had been understandable. It found that “the conduct of both accused officers, who had ultimately managed to get the applicant under control, had therefore proved to be correct and lawful”. The court concluded that “there was no evidence that the officers had committed the criminal offence concerned, but only certain indications on the basis of which the court could not conclude with all certainty that the accused had committed the alleged criminal offence”. It acquitted them of all the charges and ordered the applicant to pay court fees in the amount of 600 euros (EUR). The judgment was served on the applicant on 19 March 2008. 28.  By the Ptuj District Court’s decision of 5 May 2008 the applicant was ordered to pay EUR 14,572 for the costs and expenses of the proceedings, which was broken down to EUR 3,214 for procedural costs such as expert fees, and EUR 11,358 for the officers’ legal representation. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Ptuj District Court altered the decision concerning the costs and expenses so that the applicant was now required to pay EUR 2,441 for the procedural costs and EUR 413 for the costs relating to the preparation of G.K.’s appeal. The court found that the remaining costs of the legal representation of the officers had already been paid by the Ministry of the Interior during the trial, and reimbursement could therefore no longer be claimed by the officers. 29.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant requested the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office to lodge a request for protection of legality against the Maribor Higher Court’s judgment. On 15 September 2008 the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office rejected his request. 30.  On 19 May 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal in which he argued that the subsidiary prosecutor should have locus standi in proceedings before the Constitutional Court, and that he should have been able to lodge a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, as the public prosecutor had. He complained that the proceedings, in particular the judgment of the Maribor Higher Court, had been unfair and arbitrary. He submitted that the Maribor Higher Court’s judgment was biased, which could also be because the judge rapporteur was a former police officer. The applicant also referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, which had found that a subsidiary prosecution was not a proper remedy for the protection of human rights. Lastly, the applicant complained that he, unlike other parties in criminal proceedings, was not able to be exempted from payment of the costs of the proceedings. 31. On 14 December 2010 a panel of three judges of the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal without further examination. It found that the applicant presented no reason to distinguish his case from case no. Up-285/97, in which it had taken the position that the aggrieved party could not lodge a constitutional appeal against acquittal. It moreover noted that the applicant’s case was also to be distinguished from cases nos. Up-555/03 and Up-827/04, which concerned lack of independent investigation into a death during police intervention (see paragraphs 50 and 51 below). As regards the complaint concerning the costs of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court rejected it is as manifestly ill-founded. 32.  On 27 December 2001 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State in the Ptuj District Court, seeking damages for the injuries he had sustained as a result of ill-treatment by the police. 33.  In the course of the proceedings the applicant modified his claim for non-pecuniary damages to 2,800,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT) (approximately EUR 11,700). The court heard several witnesses, including officers K.G. and J.Š., obtained a medical report from an expert, S.T. (see paragraphs 38 and 39 below), and took account of the evidence obtained in the criminal proceedings. 34.  The court delivered its judgment on 22 August 2006. It found that the officers had admitted to using only one “professional hit” and one “professional throw” against the applicant. They maintained that they had not used any other force against him and that all the injuries he had sustained had been caused by his passive resistance to arrest. Having regard to the medical opinions of experts S.T. and L.T., which confirmed that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of several kicks or blows, the court concluded that the officers had “clearly overstepped their powers”. It continued by saying that there was no excuse for the behaviour of the police officers and that “there was nothing to be proud of in this under the rule of law”. The court further stated that “no officer in this country was authorised to kick a person who was lying on the ground, no matter how violent that person was”. It concluded that the applicant was responsible for 30% of the injuries and the State was responsible for the rest. The court noted that the State, through its agents, had not acted “diligently and within its powers” but had acted “negligently, irresponsibly and culpably and therefore should be liable for damages in accordance with section 154 č of the Civil Code”. The applicant was granted compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of SIT 1,820,000 (approximately EUR 7,600). 37.  On 13 November 2007 the Maribor Higher Court upheld the first-instance court’s conclusion as regards the unlawfulness of the use of force against the applicant, finding that the police officers had “greatly overstepped their powers” and that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result. However, it allowed the State’s appeal in part, and reduced the amount of compensation awarded for damage suffered as a result of “fear” and “bodily pain” related to the injuries. The court reduced the award of damages to EUR 5,853. 38.  The report lists the following injuries sustained by the applicant on the day of the incident and their most probable cause:\n- Lesions on the face: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.\n- Rupture of the right eardrum: normally caused by a slap.\n- Several excoriations: caused by friction between the skin and an object.\n- Fracture of the left humerus: likely to have been caused during a direct fall or by a blow to the shoulder. 39.  As regards the above-mentioned injuries, the forensic expert concluded that the applicant had received several hard blows to the right side of his face, one of which had resulted in the eardrum injury. He also considered it possible that the applicant had received a hard blow to his left shoulder. Most of the injuries could have been caused by a punch or a kick. As regards the remaining skin excoriations, these had been caused by a lighter application of force. 2.  Report of 16 February 2007 by the Commission of the Faculty of Medicine, Ljubljana, prepared in the context of the criminal proceedings by experts L.Š. and V.S. 40.  The report lists the following injuries sustained by the applicant on the day of the incident, with their most probable cause:\n- Fracture of the left humerus (abruptio tuberculi maioris humeri sin): most likely caused by a fall on to hard ground.\n- Concussion: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.\n- Excoriation on the neck and thorax: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.\n- Rupture of the right eardrum: caused by a punch or a slap.\n- Lesions on the thorax, left shoulder, neck and head: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants live in Katowice. 6.  On 8 May 2002 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the applicants’ claim under Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code for the protection of personal rights. The court found that B.K. and A.M., journalists working for the national daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita, had published an article about a number of politicians. The journalists had alleged that the applicants, who were lawyers, had made a fortune over the years by assisting in shady business deals in which these politicians were involved. The journalists had alleged that the applicants had taken advantage of their positions at the expense of the public purse by obtaining unjustified benefits from the manner in which they had carried out their professional roles as liquidators of State‑owned companies in bankruptcy. 7.  The court observed that the journalists had failed to contact the applicants and that their allegations were, to a large extent, based on gossip and hearsay. It noted that journalists had a right and an obligation to inform society about important issues and that they enjoyed freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the authors of the article had failed to take the minimum steps necessary in order to verify the information contained in the article by at least getting in touch with the applicants and trying to obtain their comments. The allegations had not been shown to have had a plausible factual basis. The journalists had smeared the applicants’ good name and reputation. The court allowed the applicants’ claim in its entirety, by ordering the journalists and the editor‑in‑chief to pay, jointly, PLN 30,000 to a charity and to publish an apology in the newspaper. 8.  The defendants appealed. On 24 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal, endorsing the findings of fact and the reasoning of the first‑instance court. The obligations imposed by the courts were subsequently complied with by the defendant newspaper. 9.  On 7 July 2004 the applicants sued again the newspaper under the same provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraph 6 above). They alleged that they had recently found out that the article remained accessible on the newspaper’s Internet website. They submitted that the article was positioned prominently in the Google search engine and that anyone seeking information about them had very easy access to it. The article’s availability on the newspaper’s website, in defiance of the earlier judicial decisions, created a continuing situation enabling a large number of people to read it. The applicants’ rights were thereby breached in the same way as had occurred through the publication of the original article. It rendered the protection granted by the judgments in their favour ineffective and illusory.\nThe applicants sought an order requiring the defendants to take down the article from the newspaper’s website and publish a written apology for their rights having been breached by way of the article’s continued presence on the Internet. They sought compensation in the amount of PLN 11,000 for the non‑pecuniary damage. 10.  In their reply to the statement of claim, the defendants submitted that the case was res judicata, The applicants had already obtained a judgment in their favour. Moreover, the article had been placed in the archive of the website. Readers would therefore be aware that the article had been published in the past. The article had been published and could by no means be erased from history or, for that matter, from copies of “Rzeczpospolita” kept in numerous libraries and archives throughout the country. The applicants’ request to have it expunged was therefore ill‑founded, not only because it lacked a legal basis but also because it was absurd.\nThe defendants further submitted that the applicants had referred to the publication of the article on the newspaper’s website in the first set of proceedings. They had therefore already been well aware that the article had been disseminated in that way. As they had failed to submit any specific claims in respect of the Internet publication in the first set of proceedings, it had to be inferred that they had not sought to have any measures taken in respect of the online version of the article and that they had been fully satisfied by their situation having been remedied in the manner ordered by the judgments given in the first set of proceedings. 11.  The Warsaw Regional Court, by a judgment of 28 September 2005, dismissed the applicants’ claim. It first referred to the judgments of 8 May 2002 and 24 April 2003. It noted the applicants’ submission that they had discovered, a year after the latter judgment had been given, that the article was still available on the newspaper’s website.\nIt observed that the facts of the case were not in dispute betweeen the parties. The applicants’ submissions had addressed facts – namely the article’s continued presence on the newspaper’s website five years after the publication of the article in the newspaper – which had occurred after the judgment in the first case had been given. The gist of the legal issue to be determined by the court was whether the discovery of a new source of publication – including on the Internet – provided a factual basis for a new claim for the protection of personal rights within the meaning of the Civil Code. In the court’s view, the response to such a question should be in the positive. The court was of the opinion that the discovery of a new source of publication, namely the newspaper’s website, of the defamatory article had given rise to a new claim on the applicants’ part. The issues involved in the case were therefore not res judicata.\nHowever, in the circumstances of the case the court was of the view that the defendants’ arguments had to be given an equal weight. The court referred to the constitutional guarantees of free speech and noted that preventive censorship was incompatible with the Constitution. It was the journalists’ right and obligation to inform the general public of matters of public interest. 12.  Adressing the three claims made by the applicants, the court stressed that removing the article from the website would have been devoid of any practical purpose and would amount to censorship and to rewriting history. Moreover, it would run counter to the principles of archiving.\nThe court pointed out that the applicants have already received a public apology. Allowing the applicants’ claim to have a new apology published would not offer adequate protection to the applicants. Had they sought an order in the present set of proceedings that the Internet publication be supplemented by a footnote or a link informing a reader about the judgments of 8 May 2002 and 24 April 2003, or had they asked the court to order the defendants to publish an apology on the newspaper’s website, the court would have given serious consideration to such a request. 13.  The court further noted that the applicants had already received compensation in the first set of the proceedings. It was further stated that if they had discovered circumstances relevant for the assessment of the case but unknown to them during the first set of the proceedings, they should have requested that the proceedings be reopened rather than bringing a new civil case before the courts. 14.  The applicants appealed. They argued that the case was important in that it raised new issues which had hitherto not been addressed by judicial practice. They submitted that each new reading of the article on the newspaper’s website, which was open to the general public, amounted to a new publication of that article. Traditional principles governing the archiving of various printed materials and documents in traditional archives were not the same as those applicable to the operation of a website, regardless of whether a part of it had been labelled as an “archive” or not. The term “archive” was to be understood as a set of documents which had lost their currency. The Internet was not an instrument for archiving materials, but had to be regarded as a means of communication of information on current topics. The mere fact that a part of a website was called an “archive” did not affect this in any way. 15.  In so far as the first-instance court had been of the view that the publication of a printed apology would have been, in the circumstances of the present case, devoid of any practical purpose, the applicants argued that under Article 24 of the Civil Code it had been open to that court to order other measures to remedy the breach of their rights. Article 24 provided that in order to remedy an infringement of personal rights “necessary steps” could be taken, but did not specify the concrete nature of such measures. The court had unequivocally acknowledged that the impugned article had violated their rights. It had, however, limited itself to dismissing the claim. It had failed to consider, contrary to its duty, other remedial measures, including those it had expressly referred to in its judgment. 16.  On 20 July 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It was of the view that it was of cardinal importance for the assessment of the case that the article had been published on the newspaper’s website in December 2000. The court noted that the applicants had submitted that they had only learned of its online publication a year after the judgment given in April 2003 had become final. However, the fact that in the first set of proceedings they had failed to make a specific request for remedial measures in respect of the online publication made it impossible for the court in the present case to examine facts which had already existed prior to that judgment.  The plaintiffs could not lodge a new claim based on factual circumstances which had already existed during the previous set of proceedings. The court noted in passing that the existing online publication was not a fact which would have been impossible to establish at that time (“nie była to tzw. okoliczność nieujawnialna”). 17.  The applicants submitted an appeal on points of law, invoking their right to the effective legal protection of their personal rights, including their reputation. They reiterated that the continued availability of the article on the newspaper’s website infringed their personal rights. 18.  On 3 November 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal requested the applicants’ legal representative to amend the statement of appeal’s formal deficiencies by specifying whether it had been lodged on behalf of one or both of the applicants. It noted that the court fee paid in connection with the appeal had corresponded to the sum to be paid for an appeal lodged by one person only. 19.  By letter of 10 November the applicants’ lawyer clarified that the appeal had been lodged by the second applicant, Mr Smolczewski. 20.  On 17 November 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal rejected the appeal in so far as it related to the first applicant, having regard to the fact that the relevant court fee had not been paid. This decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 4 December 2006. No appeal was lodged against this decision. 21.  By a decision of 7 February 2007 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera, refused to entertain the first applicant’s cassation appeal (odmówił przyjęcia kasacji do rozpoznania).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  At approximately 11 p.m. on 24 August 1995, a police car stopped outside the shop run by the applicant in Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district. Three police officers got out of the car and asked the applicant to remove the letters “DHKP/C” (the abbreviation for the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, an illegal organisation) written on a wall, two shops down the road from the applicant’s shop. 7.  When the applicant refused to comply with that request and told the police officers that it was not his wall and therefore he had no obligation to clean it up, the police officers started to beat him. A number of other police officers, who were driving in the area at the time, also stopped and took part in the beating. The police officers then took the applicant into custody where they continued to beat him in order to force him to sign statements, confessing to the offence of obstructing the police in the course of their duty. 8.  According to the incident report prepared by the three police officers who had beaten the applicant, the letters “DHKP/C” had been on the wall of the applicant’s shop and the applicant had told them that he would “rather die than wipe them away” and had then run away. When the police officers gave chase, the applicant had thrown stones at them and had kicked and punched them, injuring one of them in the process. Consequently, the officers had taken the applicant to the police station. 9.  The following day the applicant was taken to the First Aid Hospital in Istanbul’s Taksim district where a medical report was prepared. According to this report, the applicant’s body bore a number of ecchymoses and lacerations. 10.  The applicant was then brought to the office of the public prosecutor in Beyoğlu district where he told the prosecutor that the police officers had tortured him. 11.  The same day the prosecutor referred the applicant to the Beyoğlu branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute where he was examined by a doctor. The following injuries are recorded in the medical report prepared at the end of that examination: a one centimetre long abrasion on the left side of the rear parietal region; a thirty centimetre long ecchymosed area stretching from the back of the left shoulder to the right scapular area; an ecchymosed area measuring fifteen by three centimetres below the left scapular region; an ecchymosed area, measuring fifteen by five centimetres, on the left lumbar; two ecchymosed areas, measuring seven by three and seven by fourteen centimetres, on the right side of the chest; four one centimetre long bleeding grazes and two ecchymosed areas, each measuring three centimetres in diameter, on the inside of the left arm; two ecchymosed areas, each measuring two centimetres, on the left cheek; and another ecchymosed area on the right tibial region. The report concluded that the applicant would be unable to work for a period of ten days. 12.  The same day the prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release. 13.  On 10 October 1995 the applicant lodged a formal complaint with the Beyoğlu prosecutor, seeking the prosecution of the three police officers responsible for the ill-treatment. 14.  The following day the Beyoğlu prosecutor rendered a decision of non-jurisdiction, under the Law on the Trial of Civil Servants, and transferred the case file to the governor’s office in Beyoğlu for the “necessary action to be taken”. 15.  On 21 July 1997 the Beyoğlu District Administrative Council, presided over by the Beyoğlu governor, granted authorisation for the prosecution of the three officers. 16.  In its decision of 29 February 2000, the Beyoğlu Criminal Court of First Instance (hereinafter “the trial court”) convicted the three police officers of the offence of ill-treatment contrary to Article 245 of the Criminal Code, and sentenced each of them to three months’ imprisonment. The trial court also ordered their suspension from duty for a period of three months. Considering that the applicant’s “refusal to wipe away the writing on the wall and his attacks on the police officers” amounted to a “provocation”, within the meaning of Article 51 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the trial court reduced the prison sentences by a quarter and sentenced each officer to two months and seven days’ imprisonment. Taking into account the way in which the incident had taken place and the unlikelihood of police officers committing offences, the trial court was of the opinion that these particular officers would not reoffend if their sentences were suspended. Accordingly, it suspended their sentences under Article 6 of Law no. 647. 17.  Two of the three police officers lodged appeals against the judgment. The judgment became final in so far as it concerned the third police officer, who did not appeal. 18.  On 30 January 2002 the judgment was quashed by the Court of Cassation in so far as it concerned the two appellant police officers. The Court of Cassation held that the provisions of Law no. 4616 should be applied to them. 19.  On 26 April 2002 the trial court suspended the proceedings against the two police officers in accordance with Law no. 4616, which had entered into force on 22 December 2000 and which provides for the suspension of criminal cases in respect of certain offences committed before 23 April 1999. 20.  The applicant lodged an objection with the Beyoğlu Assize Court against the trial court’s decision, pointing out that the Court of Cassation had waited two years before rendering its judgment, and had only quashed the judgment following the entry into force of Law no. 4616. In any event, criminal proceedings concerning the offence of torture were outside the scope of that Law and could not, therefore, be suspended. Since, under Turkish law, ill-treatment could only be classified as torture if it was inflicted with the aim of extracting information from the victim (the offence defined in Article 243 of the Criminal Code), the trial court had no choice but to apply Article 245 of the Criminal Code in the present case. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected constituted “torture” within the meaning of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 21.  On 28 May 2002 the Beyoğlu Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objection.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Artashat, Armenia. He is a member of the National Democratic Union (NDU) political party. He is also the party's representative in the Ararat Region of Armenia. 5.  In 2003 a presidential election was held in Armenia with its first and second rounds taking place on 19 February and 5 March respectively. The applicant was involved with the work of the main opposition candidate and his responsibilities included monitoring the voting process. He alleges that, following the election, he prepared a report on various irregularities which had allegedly taken place during the election, but high officials from the Government and the Ararat Region tried to prevent him from making his report public, which he refused. 6.  The applicant further alleges that from February 2003 until his arrest on 20 May 2004 he was repeatedly harassed because of his political activity. In particular, the police frequently called him to the local police station without any reasons and demanded that he stop his political activities. Furthermore, on 9 April 2004 his son was arrested and subjected to an administrative fine for disobeying the lawful orders of police officers and using foul language. Finally, from the date of his participation in a major demonstration held on 10 April 2004 until 19 May 2004, the police officers of the Ararat Police Department visited his home on a daily basis between 5 a.m. and 9 a.m., demanding that his whereabouts be disclosed. As a result of these actions, he was forced to stay away from his home and returned there only on 20 May 2004 after, in reply to his complaint, he had allegedly been assured by the Ombudsman that these visits would stop. 7.  On 20 May 2004 the applicant was taken to Ararat Police Department. According to the record on bringing the applicant into custody (արձանագրություն անձին բերման ենթարկելու մասին), he was brought to the police station by two police officers at 1.15 p.m. for disobeying the lawful orders of a police officer and for using foul language. 8.  At the Police Department an administrative case was prepared against the applicant. One of the arresting police officers reported to the Chief of Police:\n“On 20 May at 1 p.m. [we] were in the yard of building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street in Artashat where the resident of flat no. 55 of the same building, [the applicant], was speaking loudly with an unknown man. We approached and demanded [the applicant] to lower his voice and not to violate public order. Having heard this, [the applicant] turned from the unknown man towards us and spoke to us in the same manner, saying that it was not our business to judge how he was speaking and then he said that we should stop poking our noses into everything and pestering. We tried to calm him down but he continued insulting us and using insulting language. This lasted about five minutes, after which he was brought to the police station.” 9.  A record of an administrative arrest was drawn up in which it was stated that the applicant had “disobeyed lawful orders and used foul language” which constituted an offence under Article 182 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO). It was also stated that the applicant had refused to make any statements. This record was signed by the applicant. 10.  On the same date the applicant was taken to the Ararat Regional Court (Արարատի մարզի առաջին ատյանի դատարան) where Judge S. examined his case and found him guilty under Article 182 of the CAO, sentencing him to eight days of administrative detention. This decision stated the following:\n“On 20 May 2004 at around 1.15 p.m. next to building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street in Artashat the resident of the same building, [the applicant], was speaking loudly and making a loud noise with an unknown person, disturbing public order[. In this connection the police officers of the Ararat Police Department] tried to call him to order but [the applicant] continued to make a loud noise and to use foul language, not obeying the lawful orders of [the police officers].\n[The applicant] refused to give explanations at the court hearing.\nPolice officers of the Ararat Police Department [N.S. and G.N.] stated that indeed on 20 May 2004 at around 1.15 p.m. next to building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street the resident of the same building, [the applicant], while being called to order, used foul language, telling them: “stop poking your noses into everything and pestering”, and [using] other disrespectful words, and disobeyed their lawful orders.\nThe court finds that [the applicant] has violated public order and disobeyed the lawful orders of [the police officers] so he should be subjected to an administrative penalty.” 11.  According to the record of the court hearing, the hearing started at 4.30 p.m. with the participation of the applicant and the two arresting police officers. The applicant did not wish to have a lawyer and did not file any motions. The judge read out the materials of the administrative case. The applicant refused to make any submissions. The two arresting police officers testified, repeating their earlier statements. The judge departed to a deliberation room, after which he came back and pronounced the decision. 12.  The applicant contests the circumstances of his trial as presented in the above record and alleges that he was taken to Judge S.'s office where the hearing took place at 3 p.m. He was not allowed legal representation. Nor was he allowed properly to familiarise himself with the materials of the case but was only told of the formal charges against him. Despite his requests he was not allowed to make any submissions, to question the two arresting police officers or to call other witnesses. The entire hearing lasted about 10 to 15 minutes. 13.  Following the hearing the applicant was taken to a detention facility. It appears that, while serving his sentence, he decided to go on a hunger strike. 14.  It appears that on 26 May 2004 the administration of the detention facility applied to the Regional Court, seeking to have the detention imposed on the applicant changed to some other administrative penalty due to the deterioration of the applicant's health. 15.  On 26 May 2004 the same Judge S. examined this request and decided to grant it partially. While refusing to change the type of penalty imposed on the applicant, the judge ordered that the applicant be released and the sentence be postponed for one month. 16.  On 3 June 2004 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the President of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal (ՀՀ քրեական և զինվորական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարանի նախագահ). In his appeal, he argued in general terms that the decision of the Regional Court had been unfounded and unlawful and had been taken in violation of the procedural law. The Regional Court had failed to carry out an objective and thorough examination of the case and had convicted him without any compelling evidence, relying on the false testimony of the police officers. In support of his allegations the applicant presented in detail his account of the events of 20 May 2004. He submitted that this account could be confirmed by a number of witnesses, including his neighbours and family members, but the Regional Court had not summoned and examined them. Finally, he complained about the persecution by the police to which, allegedly, he had been subjected in the past. 17.  On 8 June 2004 the President of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal, on the basis of the written materials of the case, reviewed the decision of the Regional Court of 20 May 2004 with the following reasoning:\n“[The applicant] was subjected to eight days of administrative detention under Article 182 of the CAO by the decision of the Ararat Regional Court of 20 May 2004 for having made loud noise, violated public order and maliciously disobeyed the lawful orders of the police officers who tried to prevent those acts, next to building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street in Artashat on 20 May 2004 at around 1 p.m. ...\nBy applying to the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal [the applicant] seeks to have [the above decision] quashed and the proceedings terminated in view of the fact that he has not committed an administrative offence.\nHaving acquainted myself with the appeal and the materials of the administrative case (the reports [and] the records), I find that the appeal must be dismissed because [the applicant] did commit the acts in question on 20 May 2004, in connection with which he had been brought to the police station, an appropriate record had been drawn up and an administrative penalty under Article 182 of the CAO had been imposed by the first instance court.” 18.  The President of the Court of Appeal nevertheless decided, due to the applicant's state of health, to mitigate the sentence to six days of administrative detention, which the applicant had already served.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The second applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Espoo. 5.  The applicant company, which is wholly owned and administered by the second applicant, bought shares in a housing corporation on 18 June 1992. Later the applicants found out that the same shares had been given as security by company X. which had been declared bankrupt. They also found out that the whole of the real estate had been placed under an interdiction against sale or dispersal. 6.  On 23 August 1993 the applicant company initiated an action for damages in the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) against the bank and the bank director responsible for selling the shares, claiming compensation for the loss of the shares. On 25 October 1993 the District Court dismissed the claim as premature without considering the merits. 7.  On 23 December 1993 the applicant company initiated, together with the other share holders, a new action for damages against the bank as the rules on civil procedure had changed in the meantime. The company claimed that the damage had been caused by a bank manager and that the bank as employer was liable for its employees. Allegedly, the bank manager had given incorrect information, had not acted diligently but in breach of good banking practice and was guilty of criminal conduct. The company claimed that the bank was obliged to compensate, inter alia, by reimbursing the purchase price of the shares, the condominium charges paid to the housing corporation and the company’s legal expenses incurred in the criminal case. 8.  The case was postponed pending the outcome of other civil proceedings related to the present case. The final judgment in those proceedings was rendered on 7 December 1995. 9.  After the conclusion of the above-mentioned civil proceedings, the present case was postponed once more pending the outcome of criminal proceedings which had been brought against the representatives of the bank and which concerned the same sale of shares. The Helsinki District Court judgment in the criminal proceedings was issued on 19 December 1997. 10.  In letters dated 14 January and 2 April 1998 and addressed to the Espoo District Court, the applicant company requested that, despite the pending appeal against the judgment in the criminal case, the consideration of the present case be resumed. 11.  On 2 April 1998 the applicant company also informed the Espoo District Court that the shares in the housing corporation had been declared part of the bankruptcy estate of company X. pursuant to the above-mentioned final judgment of 7 December 1995. The shares were thus worthless since the housing company was de facto bankrupt. 12.  On 18 June 1998 the defendant bank requested that the proceedings remain adjourned pending the outcome of criminal proceedings since the proceedings were still pending on appeal. 13.  On 6 November 1998 the Espoo District Court held a preparatory meeting. On 4 March 1999 it decided to adjourn the proceedings pending the final outcome of the criminal proceedings. According to the court, it was important to await that outcome as the question of criminal liability formed the basis of the civil proceedings and the cases partly overlapped. 14.  On 8 March 1999 the applicant company lodged an appeal with the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten), requesting that the Espoo District Court decision of 4 March 1999 be annulled and that the civil proceedings be immediately resumed. It claimed that, due to the adjournment, the proceedings would necessarily last over ten years and that, as a result, the excessive length of the proceedings would violate its rights under Article 6 of the Convention. It requested that the proceedings in the Appeal Court be examined urgently. 15.  On 6 May 1999 the Appeal Court found that the applicant company’s appeal did not give reason to take any action. 16.  By an appeal dated 21 June 1999 the applicant company appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), which refused leave to appeal on 10 December 1999. 17.  The applicant company filed a written statement dated 31 July 2001 informing the Espoo District Court that the criminal proceedings had been terminated by a final judgment given on 9 March 2001 and requesting the resumption of the civil proceedings. 18.  On 27 November 2001 the second applicant lodged a request to intervene in his own name in the proceedings before the Espoo District Court and claimed compensation. The applicants presented as written evidence a deed of sale with which the second applicant had purchased the said shares of the housing corporation from the applicant company on 1 December 1992 and with which the claim for compensation had been transferred to the second applicant. 19.  The court held an oral hearing in the case on 3 and 7 May 2002. 20.  By a judgment of 10 July 2002, the Espoo District Court first rejected the second applicant’s request to intervene and found that the first applicant was the correct plaintiff. The court rejected the remainder of the complaints and considered that the circumstances of the sale of the shares and the documents relating to it were so obscure that the risk involved in the purchase had been apparent. Moreover, the court found no causal link between the acts of the defendant bank and the damage suffered by the first applicant. 21.  By an appeal dated 2 September 2002, the applicants appealed to the Appeal Court, requesting that the Espoo District Court judgment be quashed. By a letter dated 6 August 2003, the applicants asked the appellate court to accelerate the proceedings. 22.  On 1 February 2005 the Appeal Court found that the rightful owner of the shares was the second applicant and that, consequently, only the second applicant could claim damages. The court noted, however, that the defendant bank had already paid compensation and interest due from 6 February 1996 onwards. Since the second applicant had claimed damages in his own name only on 27 November 2001, he no longer had any claims against the bank. The Appeal Court thus rejected the applicants’ appeal. 23.  On 4 April 2005 the defendant bank appealed to the Supreme Court, complaining about the partial rejection by the Appeal Court of its claim for costs and expenses. On 18 January 2006 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants live in Vladikavkaz. 6.  The applicants are former policemen. They were all involved in the conflict-resolution and peace-keeping operation in the zone of the armed Ossetian-Ingush conflict in October and November 1992. As a consequence they were entitled to certain social payments. 7.  The applicants sued the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereafter “the regional internal-affairs department”) for social-payments arrears. On various dates in 2001 or 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz allowed their claims and ordered that the regional internal-affairs department pay the arrears. The dates of the judgments and the amounts of the awards are listed in the Annex. 8.  The applicants submitted the writs of execution to the Ministry of Finance. However the Ministry returned the writs of execution on the ground of lack of funds to pay the judgment debts. 9.  The judgments in favour of all the applicants were eventually enforced between September 2004 and April 2005. The dates of payment in respect of each applicant are listed in the Annex. 10.  All the applicants except Mr Varziev sued the regional internal-affairs department for pecuniary damage incurred through the belated enforcement of the judgments in their favour. On various dates in 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz acknowledged that the delays in enforcement had violated the applicants’ rights and awarded each of them a sum to cover inflation losses sustained as a result. The awards were paid on various dates in 2005. One of the applicants, Mr Tsallagov, did not submit the writ of execution to the Ministry of Finance and did not therefore receive his award. 11.  On 15 September 2003 the applicants notified the Vladikavkaz Town Administration of their intention to hold a demonstration in Svoboda Square in Vladikavkaz to protest against the regional internal-affairs department’s failure to settle the social-payments debt. The demonstration was scheduled to start on 30 September 2003 and was announced as being of unlimited duration. 12.  On 24 September 2003 the Town Administration refused to approve the venue and suggested that the demonstration be held in front of the Tkhapsayev theatre. 13.  On 30 September 2003 the applicants began their demonstration in Svoboda Square in front of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Regional Government building. About one hundred people participated in it. They put up tents and remained in the square day and night. They displayed placards and banners stating their criticisms and demands. 14.  On 3 October 2003 the Vladikavkaz Town Legislature annulled the decision of 24 September 2003 at the request of the regional internal-affairs department “in connection with a risk of terrorist acts in the places of mass gatherings of people”. It asked the regional internal-affairs department to take measures to break up the demonstration and restore public order in Svoboda square. 15.  On 11 October 2003 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz declared the demonstration unlawful because it violated the rights of others. The court found that it hampered citizens’ access to public transport and to the cinema and officials’ access to the administrative buildings situated in Svoboda Square. The chanting of slogans by the applicants also disturbed the officials’ work. Moreover, the regional internal-affairs department had information about an expected outbreak of terrorist activities in the region. The mass gathering of people in the vicinity of the administrative buildings increased the risk of terrorist acts and other offences being committed and impeded the conduct of preventive operations by the law-enforcement agencies. The court further noted that the Vladikavkaz Town Administration had ordered that all meetings and assemblies be held in front of the Tkhapsayev theatre; therefore the demonstration in Svoboda Square was in breach of that order. Lastly, the court found that public gatherings of unlimited duration were not authorised by Russian law. 16.  It appears from the videotape and press articles submitted by the applicants that on the same day the police ordered the protesters to disperse. As the protesters refused to stop the demonstration, the police dismantled the tents they had erected. The protesters, however, put the tents back up and continued their demonstration. 17.  On 18 November 2003 the Supreme Court of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic upheld the judgment of 11 October 2003 on appeal. 18.  On 27 November 2003 the Parliament of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic decreed that Svoboda Square in Vladikavkaz was reserved for meetings, assemblies and demonstrations organised at the initiative of the authorities of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic and the town of Vladikavkaz. Other public gatherings were to be held at a venue to be determined by the Vladikavkaz Town Administration. 19.  On an unspecified date in December 2003 the protesters ended the demonstration.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lived in Łódź, Poland. 6.  On 14 June 1998 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. 7.  On 15 June 1998 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody until 14 September 1998. The court notes that the applicant was suspected of having committed a serious offence and that there was strong evidence against him. There was also the risk that he might attempt to intimidate witnesses, abscond or go into hiding. The court also stressed the likelihood that a heavy penalty would be imposed on him. 8.  On 24 June 1998 the Łódź District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) dismissed the applicant’s request for release. The decision was upheld by the Łódź Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) on 7 July 1998. The prosecutor relied on the fact that the applicant, shortly before his arrest, had been wanted by the police in another case and that he had no permanent place of residence. 9.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently extended pending trial several times by the Łódź Regional Court. Each time, the court repeated the reasons previously given for the applicant’s detention and, further, relied on the need to take expert evidence. The court requested that an expert opinion be prepared by the end of November 1998. 10.  On 18 December 1998 the Łódź District Prosecutor indicted the applicant for attempted murder. 11.  On 2 June 1999 the trial began, the bill of indictment was read and the court began hearing statements from the applicant. In the course of giving explanations the applicant felt unwell and the hearing was adjourned. 12.  The applicant’s state of health did not prevent him from participating in the proceedings. The next hearing was held on 2 September 1999. Subsequent hearings were held at regular intervals ranging from one to four months. Several hearings were adjourned for different reasons, such as the absence of one of the judges, the need to examine the victim’s place of residence and to request expert opinions on biological and chemical examination of tracks. 13.  On 5 June 2000 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) convicted the applicant of attempted murder and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed on 15 September 2000. 14.  On 22 January 2001 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. The applicant remained in custody. 15.  On 30 March 2001 the prosecutor refused an application for release by the applicant. He found that there were no reasons for releasing him. 16.  The applicant’s detention was extended by the Regional Court on 23 March, 22 June, 17 August and 16 November 2001. Appeals by the applicant against those decisions, and requests for release, were dismissed. 17.  On 6 July 2001 the prosecutor lodged a new bill of indictment with the Łódź Regional Court and accused the applicant of attempted murder. 18.  The Regional Court held five hearings at regular intervals. 19.  On 30 January 2002 the Łódź Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. 20.  On 22 October 2002 the Łódź Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. 21.  On 12 December 2002 the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer refused to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf because he had found no grounds for doing so. 22.  The applicant died on 6 April 2006. On 30 January 2007 the Government informed the Court that the applicant had died nearly 7 months before the application was communicated to the Government. Furthermore, the Government requested the Court to adjourn the examination of the application until the applicant’s successors declared whether they intended to pursue the application. The Court requested Ewa Kocik, the applicant’s life partner, mentioned as his successor before the Court in his letter of 31 March 2005, to submit information as to whether she wished to continue the proceedings in her partner’s stead. On 21 February 2007 Ewa Kocik informed the Court that she wished to continue the proceedings before the Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970. He is serving a life term in the Leopoldov prison. 5.  On 22 March 2004 the applicant claimed compensation before the Bratislava I District Court for damages allegedly caused by legal malpractice of his former lawyer. 6.  On 31 August 2004 the District Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay the court fees. 7.  Subsequently, between 22 October 2004 and 4 August 2008, the District Court appointed one-by-one four legal-aid lawyers for the applicant who appealed against the appointment or refused to take up the legal representation submitting that they were in a friendly relationship with the defendant or that their illness or business prevented them from providing legal aid to the applicant. 8.  The Bratislava Regional Court, on the appeal of the appointed lawyers, twice quashed the District Court’s decisions to appoint a legal-aid lawyer and remitted the matter for a new determination and in one instance it dismissed the attorney’s appeal. 9.  On 24 September 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint about alleged delays before the District Court. It held that the District Court had been proceeding in a continuous manner and that short periods of inactivity of the court had not violated the applicant’s right invoked. It further held that the lawyers’ refusals to take up the legal representation were supported by reasonable grounds and therefore the delays caused by this fact could not be attributable to the District Court. 10.  By a decision of 12 January 2009 the District Court appointed a fifth legal-aid lawyer and in March 2009 it requested the applicant to eliminate shortcomings in his action within ten days. 11.  The applicant’s legal-aid lawyer asked for extension of the given time-limit or alternatively the appointment of another legal-aid lawyer on account of her temporary illness presumably to last until the end of April 2009. 12.  On 10 November 2009 the District Court repeatedly requested the lawyer to complete the petition. 13.  On 15 March 2010 the lawyer requested that her appointment be quashed. The District Court dismissed her request and on 2 September 2010 again requested her to amend the petition. 14.  The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1968, 1972, 1964, 1966, 1973, 1962, 1976, 1962, 1963, 1971, 1970 and 1969 respectively. They were detained in the Buca prison, in İzmir, at the time of the events giving rise to the present application. 5.  On 20 July 1995 the applicants, along with ten other prisoners, were taken from their cells to an area of the prison in order to be brought before the İzmir State Security Court for trial. According to the applicants, while they were waiting to be collected, they were attacked by prison administrators, prison warders and gendarmes using truncheons and wooden planks, because they had objected to being searched. According to the Government the applicants had resisted the search, attached themselves to one another and subsequently fallen down the stairs and injured themselves. The applicants were then taken to the İzmir State Security Court in prison vehicles. 6.  At the hearing before the State Security Court, the applicants' complained that they had been beaten before being brought before the court. The court noted the applicants' condition and decided to postpone the proceedings on the ground that it was impossible to hold a hearing in such circumstances. It ordered that the applicants be medically examined and that the results be sent to the İzmir public prosecutor's office with a view to the opening of an investigation. A letter to that effect was sent the same day to the public prosecutor. 7.  A preliminary investigation was instigated by the İzmir public prosecutor's office into the allegations of the applicants. On 20 July and 14 August 1995 the prosecutor took statements from the applicants who reiterated that they were beaten by the gendarmes and the prison wardens. 8.  On 20 July 1995 a forensic expert examined Ahmet Güven, Kadri Sönmez, Metin Göktepe, Neslihan Göktepe, İzzettin Koç, Kadir Issı, Mehmet Kışanak, Rıdvan Karatay, Ali Kemal Yıldız and Ms Emsihan Karatay in prison. 9.  In his report, the doctor noted that Emsihan Karatay complained of a pain in her head and her left leg. The doctor decided that the applicant be referred to the orthopaedist at the Izmir State Hospital. 10.  As regards Neslihan Göktepe, he observed that there were swellings on her head, behind her left ear and an erythema on her back as a result of blows. He also noted a graze on her neck. The doctor concluded that Neslihan Göktepe should be re-examined by a forensic expert at the Izmir Forensic Medicine Institute in seven days. 11.  In respect of Kadri Issı, the doctor noted erythemas on the upper left part of his back and on his left arm. He further observed a wound and haemorrhage under his left ear. Kadri Issı further complained of pain in the lower right part of his back. The doctor considered that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for fifteen days. 12.  As to İzzettin Koç, the medical report referred to wounds over his eyebrows and nose and several ecchymoses, erythemas and grazes on his back and his left knee which had been caused by blows. The doctor concluded that the injuries rendered İzzettin Koç unfit for work for ten days and that he would recover within twenty days following a medical treatment. 13.  As regards Mehmet Kışanak, the doctor observed swellings and erythemas on the upper part of the back, underneath the chin and around the nose and mouth as a result of blows. He further noted an erythema on the applicant's right leg. The doctor concluded that the injuries rendered Mehmet Kışanak unfit for work for ten days and that he would recover within twenty days following a medical treatment. 14.  As regards Rıdvan Karatay, the medical report referred to an erythema and a swelling on the right eye orbit, erythemas and ecchymoses on the upper part of the back as a result of blows. The applicant further complained of pain in his head. The doctor decided that Rıdvan Karatay should be referred to the ophthalmologist at the Izmir State Hospital. 15.  With regard to Kadri Sönmez, the forensic expert noted erythemas and swellings on the upper part of his back, on both his arms and his right ear. The applicant also complained of pain in his left leg. The doctor observed that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for five days. 16.  As to Ali Kemal Yıldız, the report referred to swellings and erythemas on the applicant's back, neck, and head and to an ecchymosis behind his ear as a result of blows. There were also erythemas on the applicant's left arm and left leg. The doctor further noted that the applicant complained of pain in his head and his chin. He concluded that the injuries rendered him unfit for work for seven days and considered that he would recover within five days. 17.  As regards Metin Göktepe, the doctor observed swellings, erythemas and ecchymoses behind the applicant's head, on his chin, back, neck and arms as a result of blows. The forensic expert concluded that the injuries rendered him unfit for work for ten days and considered that he would recover within twenty days following medical treatment. 18.  Finally, as regards Ahmet Güven, the medical report referred to pain in the applicant's head, wounds on the right eye orbit and around the eyebrows, to swellings and pain in his right arm and to ecchymoses and grazes on his back and around his ribs. The doctor decided that the applicant be referred to the orthopaedist at the Izmir State Hospital. 19.  On 18 August 1995 an expert from the Forensic Medicine Institute examined Ramazan Akdağ and sent the medical report to the Izmir public prosecutor's office. According to this report this applicant sustained the following injuries: haemorrhage on the right sclera, swelling of 4 x 4 cm on the post-parietal bone on the scalp, erythemas on the forehead, swellings and ecchymoses on the zygomas, the orbits and the left ear, swelling and a scar on the lower lip, a trauma on the left clavicle, ecchymosis of 10 cm in diameter on the left hemithorax and ecchymotic lesions on the right hemithorax. The forensic expert considered that the injuries were not life threatening but rendered him unfit for work for seven days and that he would recover within twenty days. 20.  On 17 November 1995 a doctor from the Forensic Medicine Institute reported that Yaşar Avcı, who was hospitalised on 20 July 1995 with the diagnosis of “general body trauma”, had sustained the following injuries at the time of the hospitalisation: ecchymoses on the back and on both shoulders, a graze of 2 x 2 cm on the right zygoma, erythemas in the forehead, sensitivity on the left tibia. The doctor considered that the applicant should wear a cervical collar. According to the report of 17 November 1995 the applicant was discharged from the hospital on 28 July 1995 and was re‑examined on 9 October 1995. The expert concluded that the injuries had not been life threatening but had rendered him unfit for work for ten days and that he would recover. 21.  On 9 April 1996 the prosecutor decided not to prosecute the Director of Buca Prison and his staff for alleged ill-treatment of the applicants. The applicants objected to this decision. On 25 June 1996 the Karşıyaka Assize Court dismissed the applicants' objection. 22.  On 11 April 1996 the prosecutor transferred the investigation file concerning the gendarmes to the İzmir Administrative Council. However, the case file subsequently went astray after it was sent to the Divisional Gendarme Command at Buca Prison. 23.  On 1 May 2000 İzmir Administrative Council decided to open an investigation against three gendarme officials in connection with the disappearance of the above-mentioned case file. It however decided not to bring proceedings against the gendarmes responsible for the transfer of the applicants to court on 20 July 1995. 24.  The Government informed the Court that the proceedings against the gendarmes who had lost the file were terminated by a decision of non‑prosecution on 15 January 2002 on account of the expiry of the statutory time-limit. 25.  The applicants claimed that they were never informed of the outcome of the proceedings and that they learned of the decision of the İzmir Administrative Council when the Court delivered its judgment in the case of Satık and Others (no. 31866/96, 10 October 2000) which had been lodged by ten other prisoners who had been injured on 20 July 1995 in Buca prison. 26.  The applicant was convicted of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of a part of the national territory under Article 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to death on 2 December 1998. This judgment became final on 17 April 2000 after the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. On 6 September 2002 the applicant's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the İzmir Assize Court. 27.  It appears from the case-file that the applicant took part in hunger strikes on various occasions and that as a result his health deteriorated. 28.  According to the medical report issued by Bitlis State Hospital on 26 June 2003 the applicant suffered from hypertension, anxiety and slight amnesia. On 15 July 2003 the Bitlis State Hospital Medical Commission issued an additional report in which it concluded that the medical condition of the applicant did not necessitate the suspension of his sentence. 29.  On 28 July 2003 the applicant requested the suspension of his sentence pursuant to Article 399 of the Criminal Code on Procedure. On 17 July 2003 the Bitlis public prosecutor, relying on the aforementioned reports of the Bitlis State Hospital, dismissed the applicant's request. No document has been submitted by the parties as to whether the applicant objected to this decision. 30.  According to a medical report issued by Bitlis State Hospital on 24 June 2004 the applicant suffered from hypertension, depression, vertigo (light-headedness) and head pains. The applicant was prescribed medication as well as a special diet. Following this report the prison authorities decided that the applicant be given a special diet. 31.  According to a medical report issued by two doctors, Mr U.O. and Mr N.S., on 1 November 2005, the applicant was diagnosed in 2003 as suffering from hypertension and amnesia. They noted that he was receiving drug treatment and that he could physically continue to take care of himself within a prison facility. 32.  The Government submitted a number of documents as regards the applicant's transfer to various medical centres for check-up and the results of his analyses.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and is presently serving a prison term in Šibenik Prison. 6.  Following a series of criminal convictions for drug abuse, the applicant was sent to serve the sentence in Lepoglava State Prison (Kazneni zavod Lepoglava) on 11 November 2002. On 29 July 2004 he was transferred to Gospić Prison. 7.  While the applicant was serving a prison term in Lepoglava State Prison, the prison authorities instituted disciplinary proceedings against him on an unspecified date. The hearings were held on 10 and 13 October 2003. Both the applicant and his counsel were present at the hearings. The applicant and four witnesses gave evidence in person. In the Head of the Disciplinary Proceedings' decision of 14 October 2003 it was established that on 19 July 2003 the applicant had held closed the door of cell no. 9 and had thus prevented a member of the prison staff from entering the cell and performing his duties. The applicant's conduct was found to be in breach of section 145 § 3(10) of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act (Zakon o izvršavanju kazne zatvora) and he was sentenced to seven days' solitary confinement suspended for three months. The decision was served on the applicant on 17 October 2003 at 2.45 p.m. It was also served on his counsel on an unspecified date. The applicant's counsel lodged an appeal against the decision on Monday, 20 October 2003. 8.  In a decision of 27 October 2003 the Varaždin County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences declared the appeal inadmissible as being out of time. The judge held that the time-limit for an appeal was forty-eight hours and that the time-limit had expired on 19 October 2003 at 2.45 p.m. despite the fact that this day had been a Sunday. The time-limit could not be extended to the first working day, since it had been fixed in hours. 9.  During his stay in Gospić Prison the prison authorities opened disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. The prison authorities found that on 16 August 2004 the applicant had attempted to smuggle illegal drugs into the prison via a letter sent to him by his girlfriend, which constituted a disciplinary offence under section 145 (3)(11) of the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act. In his decision of 2 November 2004 the Head of Disciplinary Proceedings imposed on the applicant a disciplinary measure consisting of a restriction on his movement inside the prison and frequent contacts with the outside world for a period of three months, including a ban on receiving postal parcels, starting from 2 November 2004. 10.  In an appeal of 16 November 2004 the applicant, inter alia, alleged that he had not attended the final hearing before the prison disciplinary authorities because his lawyer had not been present. The applicant also alleged that the notes of that hearing had not been served on him. He further stated that his counsel would elaborate on these issues in a separate appeal. On 16 November 2004 counsel lodged a separate appeal whereby he contested the findings of the applicant's guilt and the severity of the disciplinary measure imposed. On 18 November 2004 the Gospić County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed the appeal. The decision analysed in some detail the evidence presented in the disciplinary proceedings but made no mention of the procedural defects complained of by the applicant. 11.  The applicant submitted that he had firstly been put in cell no. 5 in Unit 1. However, later on he had been moved to Unit 2. He alleged that the room had been very damp, and the mattresses old and torn so that bare wire stuck out. The bed sheets and pillowcases had been dirty and the blankets old and foul smelling. No daylight entered the cell and the electric light had to be switched on all day. He had been locked in his cell for twenty-one hours per day, with no contact with other prisoners or the outside world. He had been allowed two one-hour walks and one hour of exercise in a gym per day, both without the presence of any other prisoner. The rest of the time he had had to spend locked alone in his cell. He had not had regular access to a bathroom or running water and his access to sanitary facilities had been left to the discretion of the prison guards. The heating had been inadequate and the food of low quality. No toiletries had been provided to the applicant and no permanent doctor had been on duty in the prison. Only one doctor (a paediatrician) had come once in a while for an hour at a time.\n(b)  The Government's submissions 12.  According to the Government, the main building of the Gospić Prison was built in 1878 and renovated in 1995. It comprised two units. The first (“Unit 1”) consisted of five-bed cells and the other (“Unit 2”) of two-bed cells, each equipped with a toilet. Inmates shared a communal bathroom. Unit 1 had a communal living-room. Disinfection and rat extermination were performed regularly. Inmates' clothes and bed sheets could be washed in the prison laundry every day. The bed sheets were changed once a week. 13.  On 29 July 2004 the applicant had arrived at Gospić Prison. He had been put in Unit 1, under the “semi-open” prison regime until 24 September 2004 when he had been moved to Unit 2, under a higher security regime, to a cell measuring 3.75 x 3.5 metres and sanitary facilities measuring 2 x 1.6 metres, which he had shared with another inmate. In November 2005 he had been moved back to Unit 1 to a cell measuring 7.15 x 3.7 metres with sanitary facilities measuring 1.6 x 1.5 metres, which he had shared with three to four inmates at times. He had stayed there until 17 March 2006 when he had been moved back to Unit 2 due to an incident involving a fight with another inmate. He had stayed there until May 2006 when he had been transferred to Pula Prison. During his stay in Unit 2 the applicant had been locked in his cell save for one hour in the mornings when he had been allowed to go out in the courtyard and for two hours between 8 and 10 p.m. when he had been allowed to watch television, read or play games in a common room. During his stay in Unit 1 the applicant worked for four hours per day. 14.  According to the applicant, on 17 March 2005 he had been injured by another prisoner who had struck him twice on the head. He had been taken to a doctor to whom he had complained of general sickness, dizziness and heavy thirst. However, the doctor had only prescribed painkillers and had not made any further examinations. The applicant had asked that an X-ray examination be carried out at his own expense, but this had been refused. He further alleged that he had a bruise under his left eye.\n(b)  The Government's submissions 15.  According to the Government the applicant had been seen by the prison doctor the very same day and the following day. The doctor had prescribed painkillers. Following the applicant's further complaints of backache, he had been taken to the Gospić General Hospital and seen by a specialist. An X-ray examination had been carried out but no fractures had been identified. The applicant had been prescribed further painkillers to be taken orally and a soothing gel. The Government submitted a copy of the medical report from the Gospić General Hospital to confirm their submissions. 16.  On 14 September 2004 the applicant petitioned the Gospić County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences, complaining about the prison conditions and also alleging that a postal parcel sent to him by his parents on 30 August 2004, containing three cartons of cigarettes, two magazines on motor cars and one notebook, had never been delivered but had instead been returned to his parents, who had informed the applicant about it. 17.  On 21 September 2004 the judge requested the Gospić Prison authorities to comment on the complaint concerning the alleged non-delivery of the parcel. In his letter to the prison authorities of 24 September 2004, the judge noted that a prison governor was allowed to temporarily prohibit a prisoner from receiving parcels for health and security reasons and that the prisoner in question should be informed about such a decision and the reasons for it. The applicant received a copy of the letter. 18.  The applicant again petitioned the Gospić County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences on 21 October 2004, repeating his complaints about the prison conditions and further asserting that six to eight letters he had sent to various persons had never been delivered. The judge replied to the applicant's allegations by letter of 8 November 2004 stating that the Gospić Prison authorities had informed him that all his letters had been properly forwarded and instructed the applicant to send future letters via registered mail only. As to the applicant's complaints concerning the prison conditions, the judge expressly stated that he had no jurisdiction to supervise the running of prisons. 19.  Following the incident of 17 March 2006, the applicant was moved back to Unit 2, and the Prison Governor ordered that disciplinary proceedings be instituted against him. On an unspecified date the applicant appealed against that decision, alleging that he had been attacked by another inmate who had struck him twice on the head. The applicant further complained that the medical assistance provided to him had been insufficient since the doctor had only prescribed him painkillers and had not made any further examinations. His request that an X-ray examination be carried out at his own expense had been refused. On 23 March 2006 the Gospić County Court judge responsible for the execution of sentences dismissed the applicant's appeal on the ground that the decision to place the applicant under the “closed prison regime” had been based in law and was a consequence of his conduct, which had endangered the order and security in the prison. No comment was made about the applicant's allegations concerning the lack of adequate medical assistance. 20.  The applicant appealed against the judge's decision on 27 March 2006 to a three-judge panel of the Gospić County Court. In his appeal he complained about the conditions in Unit 2 (see paragraph 11 above). The panel dismissed the applicant's appeal on 28 March 2006 on the ground that the only way to prevent further unacceptable behaviour on his part had been his isolation. They made no remarks concerning the applicant's complaint about the conditions in Unit 2.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Bratislava. 6.  On 24 March 1992 the applicant claimed restitution of real property before the Považská Bystrica District Court. He relied on the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 7.  The District Court held a number of hearings and took extensive evidence. In a judgment of 11 August 1995 it ordered the defendant to restore the property to the applicant. 8.  On 6 November 1996 the Regional Court in Banská Bystrica quashed the first-instance judgment. 9.  After several hearings the District Court delivered its second judgment on 13 January 2000. It granted the applicant’s claim. The defendant appealed. On 30 November 2001 the court of appeal quashed that judgment. 10.  In a third judgment, delivered on 26 February 2004, the District Court ordered the defendant to restore the property to the applicant. The Regional Court quashed the judgment on 10 May 2005. 11.  In a fourth judgment delivered on 21 November 2005 the District Court partly granted the applicant’s claim. On 10 February 2006 one defendant appealed. The file was transferred to the court of appeal on 16 February 2006. 12.  On 26 September 2006 the Regional Court in Trenčín upheld the relevant part of the first-instance judgment. The decision to grant the applicant’s claim in part became final on 16 November 2006. 13.  On 25 January 2007 the applicant petitioned an executions officer for execution of the District Court’s judgment of 21 November 2005 in conjunction with the Regional Court’s judgment of 26 September 2006. 14.  On 17 May 2007 the District Court in Žilina authorised the officer to execute the judgments. 15.  On 8 June 2007 the debtor objected to the notification of the execution as being unclear. The executions officer submitted the objection to the District Court in Žilina. The execution proceedings are pending. 16.  On 8 December 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court in Považská Bystrica had violated the applicant’s right to a hearing without unjustified delay. The Constitutional Court admitted that the case was complex from both a factual and legal point of view. 17.  The applicant by his conduct had significantly contributed to the length of the proceedings. In particular, he had been asked three times to specify his claim and to submit relevant documents. Between 8 December 1994 and 19 April 1995 the parties had attempted to reach an agreement. The applicant had failed to appear before the court on 15 September 1992, 15 December 1997, 10 and 25 May 1999 and 10 January 2000. On 16 October 2002 the applicant had requested that a third party be allowed to join the proceedings; on 3 February 2003 he had extended his claim. 18.  Finally, the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had not dealt with the case in an effective manner. The District Court had remained inactive between 17 December 1992 and 25 June 1993 as well as from 11 August 1995 to 1 July 1996. It had delivered three judgments on the merits which the court of appeal had quashed on the ground that the District Court had not sufficiently established the relevant facts and had made procedural mistakes. The overall length of the proceedings was unacceptable in the circumstances. 19.  The Constitutional Court granted SKK 80,000 (the equivalent of EUR 2,115 at that time) as just satisfaction to the applicant. It ordered the District Court in Považská Bystrica to proceed with the case without further delay and to reimburse the applicant’s costs.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The applicant is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1980. 10.  She alleged that she had been raped by two men on 31 July and 1 August 1995, when she was 14 years and 10 months old. The ensuing investigation came to the conclusion that there was insufficient proof of the applicant having been compelled to have sex. 11.  On 31 July 1995 the applicant and a friend of hers had been waiting to enter a disco bar in the town of K., when three men, P. (21 years old at the time), A. (20 years old at the time) and V.A. (age not specified), arrived in a car owned by P. The applicant knew P. and A. She had met P. in the same disco bar and had danced with him once. A. was the older brother of a classmate of hers. 12.  A. invited the applicant to go with him and his friends to a disco bar in a small town 17 km away. According to the applicant, she agreed on condition that she would be back home before 11 p.m. 13.  In the bar, one or two of the group had drinks. The applicant saw some friends, with whom she had a short chat. According to the applicant, she repeatedly told the others it was time to leave, as it was getting late. 14.  At some time late in the evening, the group left and headed back to K. On the way, they were briefly stopped and checked by traffic police. 15.  A. then suggested stopping for a swim at a nearby reservoir. According to the applicant, they went there despite her objections. She submitted that she had not suspected the men's intentions. 16.  At the reservoir, the applicant remained in the car, in the front passenger seat, saying that she was not interested in swimming. The three men headed towards the water. Soon afterwards, P. came back and sat in the front seat next to the applicant. 17.  In her statements to the investigating authorities, the applicant submitted that P. had then pressed his body against hers, proposed that they “become friends” and started kissing her. The applicant had refused his advances and had asked him to leave. P. had persisted in kissing her while she had tried to push him back. He had then moved the car seat back to a horizontal position, grabbed her hands and pressed them against her back. The applicant had been scared and at the same time embarrassed by the fact that she had put herself in such a situation. She had not had the strength to resist violently or scream. Her efforts to push P. back had been unsuccessful, as he had been far stronger. P. had undressed her partially and had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. 18.  In her testimony, the applicant stated: “It was my first time and it hurt a lot. I felt sick and I wanted to throw up. I started crying.” 19.  According to P.'s statements, he had had sex with the applicant in the car with her full consent. He had started kissing her, she had responded, and he had tried unsuccessfully to unbutton her jeans or loosen her belt, whereupon she had done so herself and had taken off her pants. 20.  After P. had finished, he left the car and walked towards A. and V.A. In his submissions to the police, A. said that P. had told them that he had “shagged” the applicant. Shortly afterwards, the three men returned to the car and the group drove off. 21.  In her submissions to the investigator, the applicant stated that she had later come to suspect that the three men had planned to have sex with her and had invented the pretext of swimming to drive to a deserted area. In particular, she did not remember A. and V.A. being wet when they had come back to the car, although they had insisted on going to the reservoir for a swim. 22.  The applicant later testified that after the first rape she had been very disturbed and had cried most of the time. According to the version of events given by P. and A. when later questioned, the applicant had been in an excellent mood, had started caressing A., which had irritated P., and had asked to go to a bar or a restaurant. The group had gone to a restaurant, where the applicant had briefly talked with a Ms T., the singer performing there. Ms T. had been sitting at a table there with one Mr M. 23.  Ms T., the singer, stated that on 1 August 1995 she had been in the restaurant with Mr M. Shortly after midnight the applicant, whom she knew vaguely, had approached her and asked whether her group would be performing in the next few days. Ms T. recalled having seen at that moment a man waiting at the door. Having heard the answer to her question, the applicant had left. Ms T. stated that the applicant had appeared cheerful and that there had been nothing unusual in her behaviour. 24.  Mr M. was also questioned by the police. He stated that he knew the applicant very well and that he did not remember having seen her that night. 25.  The applicant disputed the statements of P., A., V.A. and Ms T., maintaining that there had been no visit to a restaurant and that she did not know Ms T. The applicant and her mother later accused Ms T. of perjury (see paragraphs 66-68 below). 26.  Instead of returning to K., at around 3 a.m. the group went to a neighbouring town, where V.A.'s relatives had a house. A., V.A. and the applicant got out of the car. P., who was the owner of the car, drove off. 27.  The three men and a baker, Mr S., called by them as a witness, later maintained that in the meantime there had been a short stop at Mr S.'s bakery. Mr S. allegedly had the key to the house. Mr S., when interrogated, stated that at about 2 a.m. he had given the key to V.A. and had seen the applicant waiting in the car, apparently in a good mood. Loud music had been coming from the car. The applicant disputed that there had been any visit to a baker's shop and accused the baker of perjury. P., A. and V.A. submitted in their statements that they had decided to go to the house as the applicant had told them that she had quarrelled with her mother and did not want to go back home. 28.  The applicant stated to the police that she had felt helpless and in need of protection. As A. was the brother of a classmate of hers, she had expected such protection from him and had followed him and V.A. into a room on the ground floor of the house. 29.  There was one bed in the room and the applicant sat on it. The two men smoked and talked for a while. V.A. then left the room. 30.  The applicant maintained that at that point A. had sat next to her, pushed her down onto the bed, undressed her and forced her to have sex with him. The applicant had not had the strength to resist violently. She had only begged the man to stop. She later related in her statement:\n“I started crying and asked him to stop ... He started caressing my breasts and sucking my neck ... At some point he took my jeans and my pants off with his feet. Then he spread my legs apart with his legs and forced his way into me ... [After he finished] I started crying and I continued crying until some time in the morning, when I fell asleep ... [V.A.] woke me up telling me that [A.] had gone to find a car to drive me back to K. I sat on the bed and started crying.” 31.  A.'s position before the police was that he had had sex with the applicant with her full consent. 32.  On the following morning at around 7 a.m., the applicant's mother found her daughter in the house of V.A.'s relatives. The applicant's mother stated that, having learned from neighbours that her daughter had been seen the previous evening with A., she had been on her way to A.'s house when she had met V.A. in the street. V.A. had allegedly tried to mislead the applicant's mother in an effort to gain time and warn A. However, she had insisted. 33.  The applicant and her mother maintained in their submissions during the investigation that the applicant had told her mother right away that she had been raped. A. had also been there. He had told the applicant's mother that “a truck driver” had had sex with her daughter the previous night. 34.  According to A.'s version of events, the applicant and her mother had quarrelled, the applicant allegedly refusing to go with her and telling her to go away. A neighbour, apparently named as a witness by A. or V.A., stated that he had heard the quarrel and, in particular, the refusal of the applicant to leave with her mother and her saying that nothing had happened to her. The applicant accused the witness of perjury. 35.  The applicant and her mother went directly to the local hospital, where they were directed to see a forensic medical examiner. The applicant was examined at about 4 p.m. 36.  The medical examiner found that the hymen had been freshly torn. He also noted grazing on the applicant's neck, measuring 35 mm by 4 mm, and four small oval-shaped bruises. As noted in the medical certificate, the applicant had reported only one rape, stating that it had occurred between 10.30 and 11 p.m. the previous day at the reservoir. 37.  The applicant submitted that during the next few days she had refused to talk to her mother about the incident. She had given no details and had not mentioned the second rape at all. She explained that she lived in a conservative small-town environment where virginity was considered to be an asset for marriage. She felt ashamed of the fact that she had “failed to protect her virginity” and of “what people would say about it”. 38.  On the first evening after the events, on 1 August 1995, P. visited the applicant's family. The applicant and her mother stated that that evening P. had begged for forgiveness and had claimed that he would marry the applicant when she came of age. The applicant's mother had considered that accepting the offer would be reasonable in the circumstances. This had influenced the initial behaviour of the applicant, who had accepted her mother's idea of minimising the damage. 39.  On one of the following evenings, the applicant went out with P. and some of his friends. 40.  P. and V.A., the latter claiming that he had been with P. during the visit to the applicant's house on the evening of 1 August 1995, stated that the applicant's mother had told them that “all pleasure must be paid for” and had tried to extort money from them. 41.  P.'s grandmother also made a statement to the police. She asserted that on an unspecified date the applicant's mother had visited her, trying to extort money. 42.  With regard to that visit and other relevant events, Mrs D., a neighbour and friend of the applicant's mother, stated that the applicant's mother had been very upset about the events and had agreed to her daughter going out with P. as he had maintained that he loved the applicant. The applicant's mother had nevertheless decided to talk to P.'s parents. On an unspecified date Mrs D. and another neighbour had approached the house of P.'s family, but his grandmother had told them to go away, stating that the applicant had slept not only with P. but also with A. At that moment A. had arrived. Mrs D. had asked him whether it was true that he had slept with the applicant. He had confirmed that it was true, adding that he had the money and power to do as he pleased. Until then, the applicant's mother had not known about the second rape. 43.  The applicant submitted that a visit by A.'s father on 8 August 1995 had caused her to break down. She had then confided to her mother about the second rape. On 10 August 1995 the applicant's father returned home, after being absent for several days. The family discussed the matter and decided to file a complaint. The applicant's mother did so on 11 August 1995. 44.  On 11 August 1995 the applicant made a written statement about the events of 31 July and 1 August. On the same day P. and A. were arrested and made written statements. They claimed that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with them of her own free will. The two men were released. Written statements were also made by V.A. and a person who lived next to the house where the second alleged rape had taken place. On 25 August 1995 a police officer drew up a report and forwarded the file to the competent prosecutor. 45.  On 14 November 1995 the district prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the alleged rape and referred the case to an investigator. No charges were brought. 46.  No action was taken on the case between November 1995 and November 1996. 47.  On 24 August 1995 P. and A. filed complaints with the district prosecutor's office, stating that the applicant and her mother had been harassing them by making false public accusations. 48.  On the basis of these complaints, on 28 August 1995, the district prosecutor ordered a police inquiry. In September and October 1995 several persons were heard and made written statements. 49.  On 25 October 1995 a police officer drew up a report apparently accrediting the allegations of P. and A. and disbelieving the version of the facts as submitted by the applicant and her mother. 50.  On 27 October 1995 the file was transmitted to the district prosecutor's office with jurisdiction to decide whether or not to institute criminal proceedings against the applicant and her mother. It appears that the matter was left hanging and no decision was taken. 51.  Between 2 November and 9 December 1996 the investigator questioned the applicant, her mother and other witnesses. P. and A. were heard as witnesses. 52.  The applicant gave a detailed account of the facts, repeating that P. had overcome her resistance by pressing her against the car seat and twisting her hands, and that thereafter she had been in a state of shock and unable to resist A. 53.  In his evidence, P. claimed that the applicant had actively responded to his advances. He also asserted that the applicant had spoken with Mr M. at the restaurant they had allegedly gone to after having sex. 54.  Both A. and P. stated, inter alia, that shortly after having sex with P. at the reservoir, the applicant had started caressing A. in the car. 55.  On 18 December 1996 the investigator completed his work on the case. He drew up a report stating that there was no evidence that P. and A. had used threats or violence, and proposed that the prosecutor close the case. 56.  On 7 January 1997 the district prosecutor ordered an additional investigation. The order stated that the initial investigation had not been objective, thorough or complete. 57.  On 16 January 1997 the investigator to whom the case had been referred appointed a psychiatrist and a psychologist to answer several questions. The experts were asked, inter alia, whether it was likely that the applicant would have spoken calmly with Ms T., the singer at the restaurant, and then listened to music in the car, if she had just been raped and whether it was likely that several days after the alleged rape the applicant would have gone out with the person who had raped her. 58.  The experts considered that, owing to her naivety and inexperience, the applicant had apparently not considered the possibility that she might be sexually assaulted. There was no indication that she had been threatened or hurt, or that she had been in a state of shock during the events, as she had demonstrated a clear recollection of them. The experts considered that during the events she must have been suddenly overwhelmed by an internal conflict between a natural sexual interest and a sense that the act was reprehensible, which had “reduced her ability to resist and defend herself”. They further found that the applicant was psychologically sound and that she had understood the meaning of the events. In view of her age at the time, however, she “could not assert a stable set of convictions”. 59.  The experts also found that, if there had indeed been a meeting between Ms T. and the applicant after the events at the reservoir – and this was disputed – it was still possible that the applicant could have had a short exchange with Ms T. after being raped. As to the applicant going out with P. several days after the events, this could be easily explained by her family's desire to lend a socially acceptable meaning to the incident. 60.  On 28 February 1997 the investigator concluded his work on the case and drew up a report, again proposing that the case should be closed. He considered that the experts' opinion did not affect his earlier finding that there was no evidence demonstrating the use of force or threats. 61.  On 17 March 1997 the district prosecutor ordered the closure of the criminal investigation. He found, inter alia, that the use of force or threats had not been established beyond reasonable doubt. In particular, no resistance on the applicant's part or attempts to seek help from others had been established. 62.  The applicant lodged consecutive appeals with the regional prosecutor's office and the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office. The appeals were dismissed in decisions of 13 May and 24 June 1997 respectively. 63.  The prosecutors relied, inter alia, on the statements of the alleged perpetrators and V.A. that the applicant had not shown any signs of distress after having sex with P. at the reservoir, and the evidence of the three men and Ms T. that the latter had met the applicant and had spoken with her that night. As regards the applicant's objections that those statements should be rejected as being untrue, the decision of 13 May 1997 stated that “prosecutors' decisions cannot be based on suppositions, and witnesses' statements cannot be rejected only on the basis of doubts, without other evidence ...”. 64.  The decision of 13 May 1997 also stated:\n“It is true that, as can be seen from the report of the forensic psychiatric experts, the young age of the applicant and her lack of experience in life meant that she was unable to assert a stable set of convictions, namely to demonstrate firmly her unwillingness to engage in sexual contact. There can be no criminal act under Article 152 §§ 1 (2) and 3 of the Criminal Code, however, unless the applicant was coerced into having sexual intercourse by means of physical force or threats. This presupposes resistance, but there is no evidence of resistance in this particular case. P. and A. could be held criminally responsible only if they understood that they were having sexual intercourse without the applicant's consent and if they used force or made threats precisely with the aim of having sexual intercourse against the applicant's will. There is insufficient evidence to establish that the applicant demonstrated unwillingness to have sexual intercourse and that P. and A. used threats or force.”\nIt was further noted that the applicant had explained that the bruises on her neck had been caused by sucking. 65.  The decision of 24 June 1997 reiterated those findings, while noting that the statements of Ms T., the singer at the restaurant, were not decisive. It also stated:\n“What is decisive in the present case is that it has not been established beyond reasonable doubt that physical or psychological force was used against the applicant and that sexual intercourse took place against her will and despite her resistance. There are no traces of physical force such as bruises, torn clothing, etc. ...\nIt is true that it is unusual for a girl who is under age and a virgin to have sexual intercourse twice within a short space of time with two different people, but this fact alone is not sufficient to establish that a criminal act took place, in the absence of other evidence and in view of the impossibility of collecting further evidence.” 66.  In June or July 1997 the applicant and her mother requested the institution of criminal proceedings against Ms T. and other witnesses, including V.A., alleging that they had committed perjury in that their statements in connection with the investigation into the rape of the applicant had been false. 67.  On 14 July 1997 the same prosecutor from the district prosecutor's office who had ordered the closure of the rape investigation refused the request, stating that it was unfounded and even abusive, as all the facts had been clarified in previous proceedings. 68.  An ensuing appeal by the applicant was dismissed on 6 February 1998 by the regional prosecutor's office. 69.  In June 2001 the applicant submitted a written opinion by two Bulgarian experts, Dr Svetlozar Vasilev, a psychiatrist, and Mr Valeri Ivanov, a psychologist, who had been asked by the applicant's lawyer to comment on the case. 70.  The experts stated, with reference to scientific publications in several countries, that two patterns of response by rape victims to their attacker were known: violent physical resistance and “frozen fright” (also known as “traumatic psychological infantilism syndrome”). The latter was explained by the fact that any experience-based model of behaviour was inadequate when the victim was faced with the inevitability of rape. As a result the victim, terrorised, often adopted a passive-response model of submission, characteristic of childhood, or sought a psychological dissociation from the event, as if it were not happening to her. 71.  The experts stated that all the scientific publications they had studied indicated that the “frozen-fright pattern” prevailed. Further, they had conducted their own research for the purposes of their written opinion in the present case. They had analysed all the cases of young women aged 14 to 20 who had contacted two specialised treatment programmes for victims of violence in Bulgaria during the period from 1996 to 2001, declaring that they had been raped. Cases that were too different from that of the applicant had been excluded. As a result, twenty-five cases had been identified, in twenty-four of which the victim had not resisted violently, but had reacted with passive submission.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959. He is currently serving a prison sentence for aiding and abetting murder and extortion of a ransom. 6.  The murder was committed by a certain R.N. on 19 May 2001. 7.  The applicant and R.N. were apprehended on 6 June 2001. R.N. had a loaded gun on him. 8.  R.N. was questioned four times: twice on 7 June 2001 (at 14:20 and 19:55 hours), and then on 8 June and 25 July 2001. 9.  On 7 June 2001 R.N. broke down. He confessed to the murder of E.U. and stated that he had received the gun from the applicant in order to commit the murder and that he and the applicant had been planning to split the victim’s money. R.N. confirmed those facts in his statements of 8 June and 25 July 2001. He mentioned twice the exact place where he had received the gun from the applicant (in Kobyłka, near the Zepter warehouse). 10.  When heard for the fourth time on 25 July 2001, R.N. changed his statements slightly. This time he stated that one unnamed man had also been present at the moment of the killing of the victim and that he himself had also been kidnapped and that the kidnappers had ordered him to dig a grave for himself. At some point, R.N. broke off his statement, explaining that he had to think everything through and that he would write everything down and send a letter to the prosecutor. 11.  On 31 August 2001 R.N. committed suicide by hanging himself in his prison cell. 12.  On 23 May 2002 the prosecution filed with the Warsaw Regional Court a bill of indictment against the applicant. He was charged with (I) aiding and abetting the murder of E.U. committed by R.N. by means of providing the gun in full knowledge that it would be used to kill E.U. (Article 18 § 3 in conjunction with Article 148 § 2 (4) of the Criminal Code) and with (II) illegally possessing the gun with a silencer. The applicant and a certain P.D. were also charged with (III) attempted extortion of ransom from E.U.’s family. 13.  The applicant denied any involvement in the crime. He stated that he had not possessed any gun and had not provided it to anyone. P.D. also denied any involvement in extortion. 14.  The Regional Court reclassified the first charge to aiding and abetting armed robbery. 15.  On 27 May 2003 the Warsaw Regional Court found the applicant guilty of aiding and abetting armed robbery by means of providing the gun to R.N. and of illegal possession of the gun. It also convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting extortion. The court sentenced the applicant to a cumulative penalty of eight years’ imprisonment. In respect of the first charge, the trial court held that there had been no irrefutable evidence that the applicant had known that the gun would be used to kill E.U. 16.  The court relied on the statements made by R.N. in the course of the investigation which it considered credible. R.N. had pointed to the spot where the body was buried and described his preparations for the murder. He stated that about a week before the murder, he had asked the applicant for a gun, explaining that he needed it to obtain some money. Apparently he had said that he was planning on killing somebody but had not said whom. R.N. also stated that he had informed the applicant that he had committed a murder using the applicant’s gun. Apparently the applicant had told him to get rid of the gun; however R.N. had failed to do so. R.N. also stated that since the victim had had no money on him, the applicant had come up with the idea of trying to extort a ransom from the family. 17.  The court found that R.N.’s statements concerning the applicant and P.D. as well as their respective roles in the impugned offences were reliable. The court reasoned that R.N. had had no reason to lie about the applicant’s participation in the crime. The court stated that it would have been useful to hear R.N. in court but that it had been impossible owing to his death. 18.  On 25 August 2003 the applicant appealed. He pointed out that the court had relied only on some parts of R.N.’s testimony, ignoring the parts which were inconsistent with the presumed version of events. The applicant also pointed out that the court had ignored testimonies made by R.N.’s friends and ex-wife, who had testified that R.N. had possessed a gun a long time before the murder. In addition, some other witnesses stated that R.N. had never told the truth. Another witness testified that R.N. had been taking drugs. Therefore, the applicant’s lawyer maintained that the statements made by R.N. could not serve as the proof of the applicant’s guilt. 19.  The prosecutor also filed an appeal. He submitted that the evidence in the case was sufficient to convict the applicant of aiding and abetting murder. 20.  On 9 December 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the trial court’s judgment. 21.  The appellate court found that the proceedings before the first-instance court had been flawed. The trial court had failed to examine all the evidence gathered and the assessment of evidence had lacked consistency. It noted that while the trial court had been entitled to rely on the statements of R.N., it had been required to carry out a particularly thorough assessment of it since it had not been possible to hear this witness before the court. In its assessment of evidence the trial court had failed to address the evidence of a number of witnesses (D.I., M.A., J.G., M.F., A.K.-N., M.Ł., H.D., D.T., D.C. and R.M.). The appellate court instructed the trial court to (I) establish whether the gun used for murder had been provided by the applicant or had been in the possession of R.N., (II) consider admitting evidence with regard to establishing or excluding the presence of the applicant’s fingerprints on the gun, and (III) establish whether the applicant had possessed a gun permit. 22.  The case was remitted to the trial court. 23.  The Warsaw Regional Court held 19 hearings. It gave judgment on 27 November 2007. The applicant was convicted of aiding and abetting murder, illegal possession of a gun and aiding and abetting extortion of a ransom. The court sentenced the applicant to a cumulative penalty of 15 years’ imprisonment. P.D. was convicted of dealing in stolen goods and attempted extortion of a ransom and sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment. The judgment ran to 135 pages. 24.  The trial court established the facts of the case on the basis of statements of the two accused: the applicant and P.D., the statements of R.N. as well as evidence of some 40 witnesses, including members of the victim’s family, police officers who had questioned R.N., the wife of R.N. as well as creditors and friends of R.N. It further relied on documentary evidence, including inter alia, the notice of disappearance, the protocol of autopsy, the protocol of inspection of the site and the expert opinions. 25.  The applicant pleaded not guilty and refused to testify. The second defendant, P.D. pleaded not guilty and refused to testify. 26.  The trial court found the following in its judgment of 27 November 2007. 27.  The applicant ran a car repair business. He cooperated with R.N. who supplied damaged cars to the applicant. They were close friends and business partners. In 2000 the applicant and R.N. began experiencing financial difficulties. Both promised to deliver cars to their customers and took advance payments, but subsequently failed to respect the agreements and delayed in repaying the money (evidence of witnesses H.D. and D.T.). Both the applicant and R.N. had considerable debts. At one point the applicant’s wife proposed to sell the house of her parents in order to pay the applicant’s debts. The trial court established that the applicant had had financial difficulties which he could not normally resolve. He therefore had a motive to obtain money illegally. 28.  R.N. had also been experiencing serious financial difficulties (evidence of witnesses D.I., R.T. and M.R.). He was unable to pay his debts and his behaviour indicated that he would seek to obtain money by any means. According to one witness (W.S.), R.N. fell into a “debt paranoia”. For this reason, at the end of April 2001, R.N. moved out of his house and began hiding from his creditors. R.N. decided to pretend that he had a car for sale and kill the person interested in purchasing it. R.N. informed the applicant about his plan, obtained the promise of his support and carried out the murder. 29.  R.N. was hiding from his creditors in Motel Europa, Motel Max, Motel Komorek and a worker’s hostel in Warsaw consecutively. At the same time he met the second defendant P.D. The applicant had regular telephone contact with R.N. as indicated by the evidence of mobile telephone traffic. The applicant also visited R.N. in the Europa and Max motels at least three times. In the middle of May 2001 the applicant brought R.N. a coat, trousers and a pair of shoes. Later, on about 17 or 18 May 2001 he supplied R.N. with hygiene products. The applicant, knowing the reason for R.N.’s hiding, did not break off contact with him but instead helped him. There was no conflict between them. The applicant, however, had attempted to demonstrate that he had had no contact with R.N. before 19 May 2001 and had had nothing to do with the crime. Nonetheless, this assertion did not stand up in the light of the evidence. 30.  The applicant’s explanation as to the alleged debt owed by R.N. to him was illogical and contradictory. At first he did not claim that R.N. had owed him any money. Subsequently, he alleged that R.N.’s debt had amounted to 20,000-21,000 PLN; and later he quoted the amount of 150,000-200,000 PLN. The applicant could not explain these inconsistencies. The evidence obtained in the case also demonstrated that R.N. had owed money to third parties but not to the applicant. 31.  The circumstances of the murder of E.U. were clear in the light of the evidence. However, it was necessary to examine what was the role of the applicant in the crime. The applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed that he had learnt about the fact that R.N. had possessed the gun at the time of their arrest on 6 June 2001. In the trial court’s assessment, the explanation of the applicant was untrue as it contradicted the other evidence. 32.  The applicant had possessed a Reck Miami 92 gas gun for which he held a relevant permit until the end of 1993. He returned it to the police in June 2000. A witness H.D. (a friend and customer) noticed a silver gun in the applicant’s garage (Reck Miami). The witness D.T. (police officer) was informed by the applicant that he had been in possession of a gun without specifying its type or presenting the relevant permit. The court noted that the applicant had been very careful in not showing the gun for which the permit expired to the police officer. On the basis of the evidence the trial court established that the applicant had been interested in firearms and had possessed a gun. For this reason, he was the right person to be approached by R.N. to obtain a gun. 33.  In the trial court’s assessment the applicant had provided the gun to R.N. with a view to using it against E.U. Such conclusion was supported first of all by the statements of R.N. who had clearly stated that the applicant had provided him the Walther gun. Already in his first statements made directly after his arrest, namely on 7 June 2001 at 14:20 hours, R.N. stated that in the middle of May 2001 the applicant had provided him the gun during their meeting in Kobyłka near the Zepter warehouse. The trial court considered the statements of R.N. credible since he had revealed this fact at the very beginning of his questioning and had no time to think the story over. He had further precisely indicated the place of the meeting with the applicant which was in the vicinity of the applicant’s home. The gun had been handed over in a plastic bag and the expert did not disclose the applicant’s fingerprints on it. This circumstance further supported the credibility of R.N.’s statements. 34.  R.N. confirmed the fact of receiving the gun from the applicant during his second questioning on 7 June 2001 at 19:55 hours and during the questioning on 8 June 2001 at 14:00 hours. It transpired from his statements that the applicant had asked him to get rid of the gun after the murder, but the applicant had failed to do so. According to the trial court, the applicant had been surprised by the fact that R.N. still possessed the gun. The applicant stated at the hearing that “he did not know that he [R.N.] had the gun”. One of the police officers (D.C.) had noted that the applicant had been surprised by the discovery of the gun on R.N. during the arrest. 35.  According to the trial court, there was no doubt as to the purpose of providing the gun to R.N. Being in a difficult financial situation, R.N. had decided to obtain money by pretending that he had a car for sale. He had needed a gun to frighten the potential buyer (E.U.), and if this did not work he intended to use it. The applicant’s role was to provide help in hiding the corpse. He was to receive half of the amount robbed from the victim. R.N. shared his plan with the applicant who decided to take part in it and to provide a gun to R.N. There was no doubt that the eventual intention of R.N. was to kill the chosen victim and the applicant had been aware of this. 36.  In the trial court’s view, R.N. had logically and objectively explained his and the applicant’s role in the murder during the first interrogation. He had not been in any way pressurised. The police officer R.M. who questioned R.N. testified that the latter’s statements had been spontaneous. R.N. had explained of his own volition the facts concerning the gun, the murder and the hiding. The police officer did not know the case so he could not lead R.N. to provide any particular answers. During the interrogation R.N. enjoyed unrestricted freedom of expression and disclosed facts incriminating both himself and the applicant. The other police officer J.G. confirmed the facts concerning the interrogation of R.N. 37.  According to the trial court, the reliability of R.N.’s deposition was strengthened by the fact that R.N. had clearly and in a detailed manner explained his role in the crime. R.N. had mostly incriminated himself while being aware that he would be liable to a severe penalty. In such a situation it would be difficult to assume that R.N. had also intentionally incriminated the applicant. The applicant could not give any reason why R.N. would incriminate him. In the trial court’s view there was no such reason since the applicant had been helping R.N. in hiding by supplying him, inter alia, with clothes and hygiene products. 38.  Furthermore, the facts stated by R.N. were corroborated by many other items of evidence obtained in the case, which again strengthened their reliability. In respect of R.N.’s making of an appointment with E.U. (the victim), this was confirmed by the evidence of witnesses P.U., E.U. (son and wife of the victim respectively) and J.G. In respect of the presence and behaviour of R.N. in a club following the murder, this was confirmed by the evidence of witnesses J.G., M.F., D.I. and A.U. The facts as stated by R.N. were also confirmed by the search of the site where the victim had been buried, medical documentation, the protocol of autopsy and the opinion of the expert in firearms. The latter concluded that the gun found on R.N. had been used for murder. 39.  These and other items of evidence showed that R.N. had revealed all facts known to him when making his statements. Later, during a site inspection he indicated the location and the manner of hiding the victim’s body. After the murder R.N. disposed of his shoes. It was significant that according to statements of the applicant, R.N. requested him to bring him a pair of shoes to the Europa motel in the middle of May 2001. 40.  The trial court examined the evidence of witnesses D.I. (one of the applicant’s creditors) and M.A. (friend of the applicant) with regard to the fact of possession of the gun by R.N. The witness D.I. stated in the course of the investigation that she had seen a black gun with a silencer in R.N.’s house at the night of 27 to 28 April 2001. She changed her testimony when heard during the trial. In the court’s assessment, her testimony did not permit to establish when exactly she had seen the gun and what sort of gun it had been. The witness was also a fiancée of M.A. who in turn was a close friend of the applicant. 41.  The witness M.A. stated in the course of the investigation that R.N. had told him that he had bought a gun to protect himself against the mafia. When heard at the trial he changed his earlier statements and stated that R.N. had showed him the Walther gun type. The trial court found that the testimony of M.A. had been biased and aimed at exonerating the applicant. He changed his testimony in important respects and included in it contradictory facts. For these reasons, his testimony was not reliable. 42.  The witness A.K.-N., the wife of R.N., repeatedly denied that her husband had kept a gun at home. Her testimony was credible as it transpired from the other items of evidence that R.N. had received the gun only after moving out of the house. 43.  The testimony of the witness M.Ł. concerning the gun and her contacts with R.N. was not credible. Her testimony changed over time and was not corroborated by other items of evidence. In particular, despite her claim that she had met R.N. many times, she was unable to recognise him on photographs showed to her at the hearing. The court considered that M.Ł. had been called to give favourable evidence for the applicant. There was no evidence that R.N. had been taking drugs. 44.  The trial court considered the evidence of mobile telephone traffic between the applicant and R.N. On 18 May 2001 the applicant telephoned R.N. 4 times, on 19 May – 3 times and on 21 May 2001 – 30 times. This evidence showed that the applicant had been in regular telephone contact with R.N. in the period leading to the murder, on the day of the murder (19 May) and after the crime had been committed. The number of calls made to R.N. on 21 May 2001 was not accidental but was related to the murder. There was no other possible explanation for the number of calls. It was logical that the applicant had been interested in the results of R.N.’s actions since he had assisted R.N. in the commission of the crime. The fact that R.N. had not called the applicant on the day of the murder indicated that on that day he had been busy arranging a meeting with the victim (R.N. telephoned the victim 9 times) and after the commission of the crime he had been occupied with disposing of the evidence related to the murder. 45.  The statements of the applicant made in the investigation were incoherent, contradictory with the depositions of R.N. and the evidence of telephone traffic. The applicant and R.N. also met between 19 May and 6 June 2001. Therefore, the applicant’s assertion that R.N. had not taken his calls and that they had been in conflict over R.N.’s debt to him was not sustainable. In particular, the applicant visited R.N. on 24 May 2001 in the Max Motel as confirmed by the Motel employees. 46.  The trial court did not consider credible R.N.’s statement that he had been kidnapped at the beginning of May 2001. These statements were incoherent and contradictory with his earlier statements. The evidence obtained in the case demonstrated that R.N. had been hiding from his creditors in various locations but not that he had been kidnapped. 47.  With regard to the charge of extortion, the trial court found that in the light of R.N.’s statements the applicant had participated in this crime. R.N. clearly and logically described the respective roles in the crime. R.N. chose the person who was to demand the ransom (P.D.) and the manner of communicating with the victim’s family. The applicant proposed the idea of ransom and supervised the operation. P.D. demanded the ransom. Furthermore, the applicant and R.N. decided on the manner of collecting the ransom. R.N.’s statements in respect of the charge of extortion were reliable and logical. R.N. incriminated in equal measure himself and his accomplices. R.N. chose P.D. to demand the ransom because he had been unknown to the victim’s family. The evidence of telephone traffic demonstrated that on 31 May and 1 June 2001 – when the demand had been made – the applicant had telephoned R.N. 10 and 12 times respectively. The frequent telephone contact on these dates were not accidental but were connected with the planned extortion. It was the objective evidence of the truthfulness of R.N.’s statements in respect of the crime of extortion. Furthermore, the expert in voice analysis concluded that the voice recorded during one of the telephone conversations with the victim’s son had most likely belonged to P.D. 48.  R.N. had confessed to murder and had precisely described all circumstances of it in three subsequent questionings. There were many items of evidence which unquestionably supported the reliability of R.N.’s statements. The trial court noted that the case was very difficult because R.N. had died; however, a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the evidence permitted the court to determine that the applicant had been guilty of the impugned offences. 49.  On 20 March 2008 the applicant appealed. He argued that the first‑instance court had wrongly established the facts and had erred in its assessment of evidence. In particular, the applicant alleged that the trial court had relied only on some statements of R.N. and had omitted those statements which had been contradictory with the presumed version of events and as well the applicant’s role in them.\nFurthermore, the fact that the applicant provided the gun to R.N. in the middle of May 2001 had been established on the basis of R.N.’s statements. However, this fact was contradicted by the evidence of witnesses D.I., M.A., J.G., M.Ł. and the wife of R.N., A.K.-N. 50.  On 30 July 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 51.  The Court of Appeal found that the allegation of the erroneous establishment of facts by the trial court could not be sustained. The factual findings made by the trial court were fully supported by the evidence examined at the trial. The court had thoroughly analysed the evidence and convincingly explained which evidence it had considered credible and which it had disregarded. It was not disputed that the statements of R.N. had constituted the basis of factual findings made by the trial court. 52.  The Court of Appeal noted that the statements of a co-suspect, called in practice “incriminating evidence” (pomówienie) were a specific sort of evidence, which required particularly thorough and careful assessment. Owing to the death of R.N. and the lack of possibility to hear him directly before the court the assessment in the present case had to be particularly rigorous. 53.  The Court of Appeal noted that the case-law of the Supreme Court defined the conditions which had to be taken into account in the assessment of this sort of evidence:\n1) the nature of an incriminating statement, namely whether it was so-called “simple incrimination” where the culpability was exclusively attributed to a co-accused and the person making the statement wished to clear himself, or “a complex incrimination” where the accused (the suspect), while confessing to a crime indicated at the same time other persons who were also involved in it;\n2) the timing of making incriminating testimony, in particular whether the relevant statements were spontaneous, made shortly after the relevant events or after a considerable lapse of time;\n3) the motives for making incriminating statements and for retracting them;\n4) the reliability of incriminating testimony in the light of other evidence, the logic and experience.\nFurthermore, (5) it was necessary to establish that the person making the incriminating testimony had enjoyed unlimited freedom of expression at the relevant time[1]. 54.  The Court of Appeal held, in so far as relevant:\n“In the view of the Court of Appeal, when assessing the statements of R.N. the trial court met the above conditions. The trial court is right when noting that R.N., while making incriminating statements that P.B. [the applicant] and P.D. were involved in the crimes committed by him, had no reason to falsely accuse them. The two accused did not contest the fact that until the time of arrest of R.N. they had good friendly relations with him, and this fact is also confirmed by other witnesses heard in the case. P.B. [the applicant] was in contact with R.N. at the time when the latter was in hiding and brought him food, change of clothes and hygiene products (testimony of witness I.W., the receptionist at the Max Motel in Emilianów, ...). Both men were in frequent telephone contact too (table of telephone calls). (...)\nThe court of first-instance rightly underlines that when incriminating the two accused, R.N. did not attempt to put on them the criminal responsibility for the crimes committed by him; on the contrary he admitted that he was the initiator and executor of crime against E.U., and that the role of P.B. was limited to providing him with a gun and the declaration of assistance in “getting rid of the corpse” if such a need arose. (...)\nAssessing the statements of R.N. the trial court correctly points out that R.N. confessed to the murder of E.U. when the police did not know about E.U.’s death, since they were only notified of the disappearance and the demand for ransom, and thus the statements made by R.N. were of spontaneous character and in no manner could the persons interrogating him suggest to R.N. the content of his statements ...” 55.  The Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court that the reliability of R.N.’s incriminating testimony was supported by other evidence. The circumstances of E.U.’s death were confirmed by the inspection of the location where he had been buried, the medical documentation, and the opinion of the firearms expert. Furthermore, witnesses P.U., E.U and J.G. confirmed the facts prior to the murder, that is to say, the reasons for which E.U. had left for a meeting with R.N. and that at the time he had not had on him the amount of money corresponding to the value of the cars offered for sale. 56.  The Court of Appeal further noted:\n“... the reliability of R.N.’s testimony incriminating P.B. [the applicant] and P.D. is further supported by the analysis of the mobile telephone traffic between R.N. and P.B. [the applicant] which indicates that directly after the murder of E.U., namely on 20 and 21 May 2001 and at the time when the telephone calls were made to the victim’s family with the ransom demand (31 May and 1 June 2001), there was a significant increase in the number of those connections, and more calls were made by P.B. [the applicant]\nThe above circumstance indicates that P.B. [the applicant], although not participating directly in the actions undertaken by R.N. and P.D., showed strong interest in the events.” 57.  Furthermore, the opinion of the voice expert and the testimonies of P.U. and E.U. confirmed that, when undertaking action with a view to extorting a ransom from the victim’s family, R.N. had decided to engage a third person, P.D. The latter’s voice, unlike that of either the applicant or R.N., had been unknown to the family of E.U. 58.  The Court of Appeal noted that the trial court had not overlooked the fact that on 25 July 2001 R.N. had changed his statements. The trial court found that the new statements had been illogical, unconvincing and contrary to the evidence obtained in the case, and the Court of Appeal concurred in this analysis. 59.  Next, the Court of Appeal examined the evidence related to the gun used by R.N. It found in this respect as follows:\n“Another important issue for the assessment of the reliability of R.N.’s statements (...) was to establish since when R.N. had been in possession of the gun and how he had obtained it.\nThe first-instance court, complying with the instructions of the appellate court, considered in a very detailed manner the evidence of witnesses D.I. and M.A., that is, persons who were supposed to know about the possession of the gun by R.N. in the period prior to the one indicated by R.N.\nAssessing the testimony of D.I., the trial court rightly points out that on the basis of the testimony it is not possible to establish the date on which R.N. supposedly demonstrated the fact of possessing the gun, since in the successive statements of this witness there are significant inconsistencies, and [it is not clear] whether the gun allegedly seen was a firearm or a simple dummy. (...)\nThe first-instance court rightly notes that D.I. testified that R.N. was in possession of a gun only after the questioning of M.A.; M.A. was a good friend of P.B. and could have been interested in making statements incriminating R.N. and exonerating the accused [P.B.].\nThe validity of this contention is supported by the fact that in the course of his successive questionings M.A. was changing his testimony, initially stating that R.N. had simply informed him about possessing a gun, and subsequently he added new facts, such as that he had seen the gun, that it was the Walther type of gun and that R.N. had played with the gun in his presence” 60.  With regard to the applicant and P.D., the appellate court noted that their evidence had been thoroughly analysed. The trial court had logically and convincingly explained that it had considered their evidence unreliable since it contradicted the deposition of R.N., and was contrary to the logic and experience. The Court of Appeal noted that changes in the statements of R.N. did not disqualify all of his deposition, but had required the trial court to assess this evidence with particular rigour. 61.  The Court of Appeal concluded:\n“In the Court of Appeal’s view, contrary to the assertions of both appellants, the first-instance court analysed in a very thorough manner all statements made by R.N. in connection with the other evidence heard in the case, [and] logically and convincingly explained which of these statements and why, were considered credible, and which of them were disregarded and why. (...)\nHaving regard to the above, the Court of Appeal found no grounds to question both the assessment of evidence carried out by the Regional Court and the facts established on the basis of the evidence.” 62.  On 6 October 2008 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a cassation appeal. The lawyer argued, inter alia, that the conviction had been based solely on the statements of R.N., who would have been a co-accused if he had not committed suicide. 63.  On 10 December 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976. He is currently serving a twenty-five year prison sentence for armed robbery of Ms L., murder of Ms L. and for attempted murder of a policeman during his arrest. He was convicted in 2003 (the conviction was amended in 2004) and began serving his sentence in penal colony FBU IK-5, and then in colonies FBU IK-13 and FBU IK-8, all situated in the Russian Far East. 6.  In the Far Eastern colonies the applicant was diagnosed with several chronic diseases. However, there is no evidence that his finger or toenails were affected by a fungal infection at that time. It appears that in 2002 he was also seen by colony doctors in connection with dermatitis and eczema. Otherwise, the materials of the case file indicate that the applicant’s state of health was satisfactory, he exercised regularly – mostly doing weightlifting – and, as can be seen from the applicant’s photos taken in 2010, he was very muscular and must have been a physically strong man (he weighed 115 kilos and was 180 cm tall). 7.  The administration of the colonies where the applicant was detained during that period characterised the applicant rather positively as belonging to a group of convicts loyal to the administration. Some time after his transfer to colony FBU IK-13 he informed the administration of a conflict between him and several other convicts, who allegedly belonged to a gang. An internal inquiry carried out in 2008 concluded that the applicant was simulating conflicts with his co-detainees in order to get a transfer to another colony, closer to Moscow. However, the administration later changed its opinion and recommended that the applicant be transferred for security reasons. As a result, in January 2009 the applicant was transferred to FBU IK-1, a penal colony situated in the town of Plavsk, Tula Region. 8.  As can be seen from the applicant’s disciplinary file, during the first year of his detention in FBU IK-1 his behaviour and attitude were considered by the administration of the colony as “positive”. He was attributed to the category of “loyal” convicts and obtained various disciplinary bonuses (such as additional family visits). He was on good terms with most of his co-detainees. At the same time, he had a conflict with some of the hardened criminals. In July 2009 he was temporarily placed, for his own safety and based on a reasoned decision of the colony administration, in the SHIZO (the punishment and isolation unit), which was also occasionally used as a “safe place” in such situations. 9.  The applicant alleged that soon after his transfer to the Plavsk colony he had learnt of the existence of an informal group of loyal convicts which helped the colony administration. That group (which the applicant called “the death squad”) was composed solely of ethnic Russians. Their role was to threaten, beat or kill those convicts who opposed the colony administration, or those who had influential enemies outside the colony or refused to pay money to the administration. One of the cells in the colony (no. 112) was turned into a torture room and was used by the members of the group to “break down” those convicts who resisted the administration. 10.  According to the applicant, the group was responsible for at least two deaths which had occurred in the colony – the death of Mr Gr. in December 2009, and that of Mr Kl. in 2005. Both convicts were found asphyxiated on the premises of the SHIZO; officially both deaths were characterised as suicides, although in respect of Mr Kl. an investigation into an alleged “forced suicide” was opened and then suspended for want of a suspect. In 2010 the case of Mr Kl. was reopened because of the failure of the investigator to establish the origin of the injuries found on the body of the deceased that did not fit with the scenario of suicide. 11.  According to the applicant, some time after his transfer to the Plavsk colony one of the officers of the colony proposed that he join the “death squad”. Out of fear of reprisals, the applicant had agreed. He started his “apprenticeship” under the guidance of several colony officials and other convicts. However, several months after joining the “death squad” he understood that he might be required to do terrible things. In addition, the colony administration realised that he was of Jewish origin. His relations with the supervising officers and other loyal convicts deteriorated. The applicant decided to quit and try to obtain a transfer to another colony. Having learnt of his intention to quit, the colony administration decided to punish him for refusing to cooperate. 12.  On 28 January 2009, upon his arrival at the Plavsk colony (hereinafter “the colony”), the applicant underwent a medical check-up which revealed several chronic diseases, in particular, kidney diseases (such as nephrolithiasis, urolithiasis, and nephroptosis). 13.  It is unclear whether the applicant was suffering from a fungal infection (mycosis) at that time. According to the transcript of the applicant’s medical record made on 31 May 2010 by the Tula Regional Department of the Federal Prison Service, before 15 February 2010 the applicant did not suffer from mycosis. It can be seen from an extract from the applicant’s medical file (to the extent that it is legible) that the applicant underwent a check-up on 27 January 2010. His overall state of health was recorded in the report as “satisfactory”. The record did not contain any mention of an injury or abnormality on his hands or feet. 14.  At the same time, a certificate issued by the chief doctor of the colony, Dr Pr., indicated that the applicant had a fungal infection on his feet. That certificate had no date on it; an authentic copy was dated “17 November 2010”. Another certificate issued by Dr Pr. and dated 29 January 2009 specified that on the day of his arrival to the colony the applicant had been offered hospitalisation, but he had refused. The applicant’s medical notes apparently also contained the following handwritten entry dated 29 January 2009: “foot mycosis”. The applicant asserted that those entries had been added to his medical file much later, in 2010, and that the certificates issued by Dr Pr. had been backdated and did not reflect his real condition at that time. 15.  From the documents submitted by the Government it appears that on 4 February 2010 the applicant underwent another medical check-up. The extract of the record of 4 February 2010, to the extent that it is legible, does not mention any injury or abnormality on the applicant’s hands or feet. 16.  On 27 January 2010 the applicant was placed in the SHIZO. According to the Government, it was done at the applicant’s own oral request, because of a conflict with other convicts. 17.  On the same day the applicant was subjected to a body search, during which Mr Sch. and Mr Dm. (warders), Mr Tn., Mr Vr. (convicts), and several other convicts, whose names the applicant did not know, insulted him. In the applicant’s words, they were trying to provoke a fight. Colony officers hit him several times with a rubber truncheon. 18.  After that he was taken to cell no. 313 in the SHIZO. Several colony officials gathered in that cell: the acting head of the colony, Mr Yer., and two colony officials, Mr Kzh., and Mr Avd., an officer from the prison security department. They handcuffed the applicant to a bench and started to beat him severely with a wooden stick wrapped in cloth. They also used a gas mask to induce suffocation. He lost consciousness several times. Other colony officials were also present during the beatings, including Mr Sr. and Mr Mkh. Some time later other people arrived: the deputy head of the colony, Mr Zhd., another officer from the prison security department, Mr. Chr., the personnel officer, Mr Vl., the chief doctor, Dr Pr., and Mr Yud. The chief doctor checked his pulse and eyes several times to see whether the applicant was conscious. Mr Chr. and Mr Zhd. personally took part in the beatings. The applicant presented a very detailed account of what they were doing and saying. After a heavy blow to the head the applicant passed out. 19.  On the morning of 28 January 2010 the applicant found himself in cell no. 203. Mr Kzh. and Mr Avd., Mr Tn., Mr Vb. (convicts) and some other convicts arrived bringing with them a wooden tool resembling a clamp and some other tools. The applicant’s hands were fixed in the clamp and his feet were tied to the legs of the stool. They put a gas mask on him and started to insert needles under his nails and then began tearing his nails away with the pincers: first his toenails, then his fingernails. The applicant described in detail where he had been sitting, and how he had been tied up. At a certain point the applicant started to vomit and passed out. Mr Vb. and Mr Tn. then gave him an injection and ordered him to wipe his blood off the floor with a rug. While doing that he managed to collect and hide some of his finger and toenails. 20.  On the following day the applicant was beaten again. He gave the names of people who had beaten him (Mr Sh., Mr Yersh., Mr Sch., Mr Dm., and Mr Slm.). He spent several nights naked and handcuffed in a seated position by an open window. 21.  On 1 February 2010 the applicant saw Dr Pr. and Mr Kzh. They returned his clothes to him and gave him an injection. As the applicant understood from their dialogue, the injection was supposed to make the bruises disappear. In the evening he was allowed to call his wife, but was ordered not to tell her anything about what had happened to him. 22.  The applicant alleged that for several weeks after that episode he did not take any outdoor exercise, since he had been afraid of being attacked by other convicts loyal to the administration of the colony in the areas of the exercise yard not covered by the video surveillance cameras. 23.  On 4 February 2010, during a family visit, the applicant managed to pass nine of his nails to his mother. According to the applicant, he concealed the nails by sticking them to his body with tape. The applicant’s mother saw numerous bruises on his body. 24.  On 11 February 2010 the applicant’s wife formally complained to the Investigative Department of the Tula Region that her husband had been tortured. She sought to initiate criminal proceedings against the colony officials involved in the alleged torture. To her request she attached a hand-written statement by the applicant dated 5 February 2010 in which he had described the ill-treatment and had identified colony officers and convicts involved in it. On the same day her complaint was forwarded to the Donskoy Town Investigative Department, with a cover letter. 25.  On 15 February 2010 the complaint was allocated to investigator Kn. of the Donskoy Town Investigative Department. At 2 p.m. he decided to open a preliminary inquiry into those events. 26.  Having arrived to the colony the investigator questioned the applicant, who confirmed his earlier account, and seven colony officials, who unanimously denied the applicant’s allegations. Later on that day the applicant underwent a medical check-up by a doctor, a trauma surgeon. Having visually examined the applicant’s hands and feet the doctor concluded that the applicant “did not have any traumatic injuries or post-traumatic changes to his finger or toenails”, but that his finger and toenails had been “deformed” by fungal infection (“onychomycosis”, or “ringworm of the nail”). 27.  On the same day the colony was visited by a delegation of the Commission on the Public Supervision of Penal Institutions of the Tula Region. The head of the delegation had a private conversation with the applicant himself and the colony administration officials and concluded that the applicant’s allegations were lies. 28.  On 16 February 2010 the investigator visually examined cell no. 203. The investigator did not find any traces of blood or other evidence to confirm the applicant’s account. The examination took place in the presence of several colony officials, namely Mr Kzh., Mr Sch., Mr Avd., and Mr Bl. In the record of the examination the applicant made a handwritten remark to the effect that he had felt intimidated by the presence of the colony officials during the examination. After the examination the applicant gave the investigator one of the nails which he had kept. 29.  On the same day the investigator questioned twenty-three other colony officers and convicts and recorded their written explanations. The witnesses had been informed of their right not to testify against themselves or against their close relatives. However, they had not been warned about criminal liability for perjury. They all denied any ill-treatment of the applicant; they also denied having heard of it, or having seen any traces of ill-treatment on the applicant. Written statements obtained from many of those witnesses were similar in their language, structure and content. It appears that none of them was questioned in detail about their contact with the applicant between 27 and 29 January 2010, or about their whereabouts. 30.  Among other witnesses, the investigator obtained explanations from Dr Pr. While describing the applicant’s health condition at the time of his arrival at the colony in January 2009 Dr Pr. mentioned eczema and dermatitis on the hands and feet, but no fungal infection. He also testified that the applicant had not complained of any health problems before February 2010. None of the convicts questioned by the investigator mentioned any abnormalities on the applicant’s hands or toes before the events complained of. 31.  On the same day the investigator commissioned two examinations of the applicant, a medical one and a psychological one, and formulated a number of questions for the experts to answer. 32.  On that same day the acting head of the Tula Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences decided not to proceed with the internal disciplinary inquiry for want of evidence of any abuse of power on the part of the colony officials. It was established, inter alia, that on 27 January 2010 the applicant had been placed in the SHIZO “at his own oral request”, because of a conflict with other convicts. The decision to close the inquiry did not contain any reference to the injuries found on his body. 33.  On 17 February 2010 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 207 in the SHIZO. According to him, it was freshly painted, not ventilated and very cold – the applicant had to put all of his clothes on. In the cell the applicant was constantly under videosurveillance, even when using the toilet, which had no partition. In that cell the applicant met with a journalist, in the presence of several colony officials (including those allegedly involved in the beatings). He confirmed to the journalist his account of the events and demonstrated his hands without nails. He also tried to give the journalist a sample of his saliva, asking him to give it to an expert for examination, but the colony officials present at the meeting opposed to it, so the journalist did not take the sample. The journalist later testified that he had smelt the odour of fresh paint in the cell. 34.  On the same day the investigator questioned the applicant again. The applicant confirmed his account. In addition, in his written comments added to the record of his questioning he complained that the investigator in charge of the case had refused to investigate the case thoroughly, that he had discouraged the applicant from pursuing the case, and warned that it would not bring the applicant anything but trouble, that he might be killed, that the colony officials had friends everywhere, in particular in the prosecutor’s office, and so on. The applicant indicated that on the previous day he had met with two of the colony officials involved in the torture and had seen in their hands copies of the official materials of the inquiry. They had allegedly told him that the investigator, Kn., had been helping them to conceal the evidence of the crime, and that he had been well paid by them to do so. 35.  On an unspecified date the investigator obtained a copy of the video footage from the surveillance cameras on the premises of the SHIZO. Copies of the video surveillance recordings were submitted to him by Mr Kzh. Having watched the recordings, the investigator drew up a report stating that no beatings could be seen on them. It was not specified what time period and what area of the SHIZO premises those recordings covered, or what they showed exactly. 36.  On the same day the investigator commissioned an expert examination from the Tula Regional Dermatovenerology Clinic. The investigator sought to establish whether the applicant suffered from any skin condition affecting the nails. 37.  On 18 February 2010 the applicant’s relatives hired a lawyer, Mr St., to represent the applicant’s interests in that case. 38.  On 18 and 19 February 2010 two doctors from the Tula Regional Dermatovenerology Clinic examined the applicant. After a visual examination of his hands and feet they concluded that the applicant suffered from “onychomycosis of the finger and toenails”. The report had a postscript indicating that the applicant had been diagnosed with mycosis in January 2009, when he had arrived at the colony. 39.  On 19 February 2010 a visual examination by Dr G. from the Forensic Bureau confirmed that the applicant did not have any fingernails, but that this was related to a fungal infection. The examination also revealed traces of beatings (caused by about fifteen blows to different parts of his body, including the shoulders, chest, belly and hips), received between three and twelve days prior to the examination. The expert considered that all those blows had been to parts of the body “accessible to the applicant’s own hand”. 40.  On 19 February 2010 the colony administration organised a press conference on the premises of the colony. The applicant was afforded an opportunity to answer the journalists’ questions. 41.  On the same day the applicant wrote to his lawyer expressing his wish to provide a sample of his saliva on a cotton ball in the event that the nails he had given to his mother were examined. 42.  On 24 February 2010 a psychological expert examination of the applicant was carried out on the premises of the colony. It did not reveal any significant details. The doctors were unable to conclude whether or not the applicant was prone to self-harm or to fantasising. The doctors recommended conducting an additional psychological examination of the applicant in a hospital. 43.  Several “psychological profiles” of the applicant were obtained from the administration of the colonies and prisons where he had been detained before. They described the applicant as mentally stable, self-confident, a religious person, obedient to the prison rules, and not belonging to any criminal gang within the colony. A psychological profile drawn up by the staff of the Tula colony was quite different; the applicant was described as a skilful, ambitious, arrogant and egotistical person, who liked to dominate others and to “show off”. The investigator also obtained personal characteristics and a disciplinary record of the applicant. 44.  On 24 February 2010 the investigator questioned the relatives of the applicant, who had seen him shortly after the described events. The investigator also obtained one of the applicant’s nails from his relatives. The applicant’s relatives described the state in which they had found the applicant on 4 February 2010 and the circumstances in which they had received the nails from him. In particular, Ms Krk., the applicant’s sister, testified that she had visited him in the colony together with their mother. According to her, when the applicant had entered the meeting room, he had been fully dressed and was wearing outdoor clothes. He had explained to her that it had been very cold in the cell. Then he had described to her and their mother what had happened to him over the previous few days and had given them the nails. She had seen shreds of skin on the nails and traces of needles on them. According to her, at that moment the applicant’s hands had been so damaged that he had been unable to wash himself and had had to ask his mother to help him with that. It had taken him two days to write his first description of the events. When he had taken off his shoes his socks had been stained with blood and traces of injections had been visible on his arms and legs. She had also seen yellowish bruises on his body; the applicant had been very pale and weak. The applicant’s mother gave evidence in similar terms. 45.  On the same day the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the investigator, asking him to organise for an expert in mycology to examine the applicant, to take samples of his blood, skin and scrapes from the nail beds to examine whether they contained traces of a fungal infection, to establish whether the nails in the possession of the applicant’s relatives did indeed belong to the applicant, and to examine whether or not the applicant had had a brain concussion. The investigator replied to the applicant’s lawyer that since no criminal investigation had been opened, the alleged “victim” had no right to request such investigative actions. 46.  On 25 February 2010 the investigator decided not to open an investigation on the ground that there was no indication that a crime had been committed. The testimony of the applicant and his relatives was not, in the investigator’s opinion, credible. The investigator held that the applicant’s allegations were not confirmed by other evidence collected during the inquiry, namely the answers of the colony officers and convicts, the video recordings, and the results of the forensic examinations which had concluded that his fingernails had been affected by a fungal infection and that all the bruises on his body had been located in places accessible to the applicant’s own hand. 47.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyer, Mr St., commissioned an expert examination of the fingernails he had received from the applicant’s relatives. 48.  On 19 February 2010 the State Scientific Centre for Dermatovenerology in Moscow concluded that the fingernails they had been given had not been affected by a fungal infection. On the same date the applicant sent his lawyer samples of his saliva on a cotton ball for genetic examination. The lawyer sent that sample together with one fingernail to an expert. 49.  On 1 March 2010 an expert from the Medical Agency “Bion” concluded, on the basis of the DNA analysis of the samples of saliva provided by the applicant and the nails submitted by the applicant’s mother, that the fingernail had belonged to the applicant. 50.  On 9 March 2010 experts from a private forensic laboratory “Granat” answered the questions put by the applicant’s representative. They concluded that the fingernails had been extracted with the help of a blunt and hard tool, from a living person with blood type A II. 51.  On 11 March 2010 the applicant wrote to the colony governor asking him to allow the expert to visit the colony and examine him. 52.  On 12 March 2010 the applicant, through his lawyer, concluded an agreement with the State Centre for Forensic and Criminological Examinations of the Ministry of Defence. 53.  On 23 March 2010 a medical expert from that Centre, Ms M., visited the applicant in the colony. She examined the applicant and discovered several long scars, mostly on the right side of his body. His fingernails were one third of the normal size; his toenails were one quarter of the normal size, and very thin. The expert did not detect any visual signs of a fungal infection, but established that the applicant’s fingertips and toes had been injured and then infected. She concluded that the applicant had lost finger and toenails by “traumatic extraction”, which had happened within a short period of time. She took samples of his blood, urine, and subungual matter. A visual inspection showed the presence of blood in the urine; the expert concluded that it was the result of kidney damage. She also concluded that the applicant had had a traumatic head injury, high blood pressure and high blood sugar levels. The colony officials took part in the taking of samples and signed, inter alia, the blood collection record. 54.  When Ms M. was about to leave, the colony administration stopped her, referring to the absence of authorisation from the investigator, and ordered her to destroy the samples. According to her, the colony officers offered her money if she agreed to sign a statement that she had never examined the applicant and had never been in the colony. When she refused, the colony officers threatened to plant prohibited goods in her bag if she insisted on taking the samples back. She was held on the colony administration premises until she agreed to give or destroy the samples she had collected. Thus, she had to tear up the written record of the sample collection which contained the applicant’s blood samples, but she kept the shreds of it with the signatures of the colony officials, so she managed to examine them later in the Centre’s laboratory. 55.  On the same day Mr Kzh., who had seized the samples from Ms M., wrote a report explaining the circumstances of Ms M.’s visit. He explained that the samples had been seized from her because her participation in the expert examination had not been approved by investigator Kn. 56.  On the same day the State Scientific Centre for Dermatovenerology in Moscow sent the applicant a written reply to his questions. The letter indicated that a diagnosis of mycosis could be confirmed only following a microscopic examination for the presence of fungi. A fungal infection may affect all nails on the hands and feet, and is very often provoked by a trauma, and not by the fungi. Long-term mycosis may result in the infection spreading to other parts of the body, especially to the soles of the feet and the groin, but can also remain located in the nail area. The letter excluded that nail mycosis could disappear by itself. 57.  On 24 March 2010 Ms M. wrote a report to her superior, describing the events of the previous day. 58.  On 12 April 2010 the State Centre for Forensic and Criminological Examinations of the Ministry of Defence issued a report in which it concluded that the blood on the fingernails and the blood on the “shreds” of the record belonged to the same person. 59.  On 15 April 2010 the Federal Security Service (FSB) sent a letter to the Moscow Investigative Department concerning a criminal investigation in an unrelated case. That case involved several lawyers who worked together with Mr St., the applicant’s lawyer. It appears from that letter that the FSB obtained information from the telephone operating company about the telephone calls of Mr St., their time and duration. 60.  On 3 March 2010 the Tula Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the Donskoy District Investigative Department to conduct an additional inquiry. It ordered it, in particular, to question the warders in detail, to establish the identity of some other persons involved in the alleged torture and question them, to search cell no. 112 (the “torture room”), to assess the applicant’s psychiatric condition, to examine other allegations of ill-treatment in the colony in respect of other convicts referred to by the applicant, to establish the cause of the injuries found on the applicant’s body, and to question him again. The Tula Regional Prosecutor indicated, in particular, that the list of investigative actions to be taken was not exhaustive and that other measures might be required in order to establish the circumstances of the case. 61.  The case was again entrusted to investigator Kn. of the Donskoy Town Investigative Department. Investigator Kn. added information concerning the death of the convict Mr Gr. to the case-file materials. He also added materials in respect of Mr Kl. – the investigation in that case was pending and the main suspicion at that time was that Mr Kl. had died as a result of a “forced suicide”. It can be seen from the decision of 1 March 2010 concerning the investigation in the case of Mr Kl. that he had been beaten before his death, whereas the death itself had been caused by asphyxiation. 62.  On 11 March 2010 investigator Kn. questioned thirteen people – colony officials and convicts. The investigator concluded from the written explanations obtained from them that the applicant had not been ill-treated. The wording of their testimony was identical in some places. 63.  On 12 March 2010 the investigator visited the colony and examined cell no. 112. He did not find any visible traces of blood on the floor. He also continued to question the colony officials and convicts. 64.  On 13 March 2010 the investigator questioned the doctors of the Tula Regional Dermatovenerology Clinic who had examined the applicant earlier. The doctors confirmed that the applicant’s finger and toenails had been deformed by a fungal infection. The wording of their testimony was identical in some places. 65.  On 22 March 2010 the investigator commissioned an expert examination of the two fingernails he had earlier received from the applicant and his wife. 66.  On 9 April 2010 the medical examination was completed. Although some of the pages from the examination report in the Court’s possession are missing, it appears that the experts concluded that the blood on the fingernails was of the same group as the applicant’s blood. Furthermore, they did not find any traces of “mechanical extraction” on the “outer edges” of the fingernails, but did not exclude the “traumatic” origin of their removal due to the shape of the “inner edges” of the nails. 67.  On 12 April 2010 the Deputy Chief Investigator of the Donskoy District gave formal instructions to the investigator in charge of the inquiry about further investigative actions to be taken. In particular, the investigator was ordered to carry out an additional expert examination of cell no. 112 with the use of special techniques, to carry out a medical examination of the applicant in order to establish whether he was indeed suffering from a fungal infection, and to clarify contradictions in the statements of some witnesses. 68.  On 21 April 2010 the investigator examined cells nos. 203, 112, and 313 in the colony with the use of an ultraviolet lamp. No traces of blood were found there. 69.  On 21 April 2010 the investigator commissioned the Forensic Bureau to carry out a second medical examination of the applicant. On 28 April 2010 the Bureau refused to conduct the examination requested with reference to its earlier findings to which they had nothing to add in the absence of any new facts or materials. 70.  On 21 April 2010 the investigator ordered an examination of the fingernails received from the applicant and his relatives. The expert from the Tula Regional Dermatovenerology Clinic concluded that one of the nails (received by the investigator from the applicant himself) did have traces of fungal infection, whereas the other (received from the applicant’s wife) did not. 71.  On 21 April 2010 the investigator tried to question the applicant, but the applicant refused. The applicant told the investigator that he would give evidence only if a criminal case was opened, and only in the capacity of the injured party and in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant also refused to be questioned with a polygraph. 72.  On 21 April 2010 the investigator requested an additional expert examination of the applicant’s case by the Forensic Bureau. However, on 28 April 2010 the head of the Forensic Bureau refused to conduct the examination since the questions put by the investigator were the same as those addressed in the report of 19 February 2010. 73.  On 24 April 2010 the investigator questioned two colony officials, allegedly involved in the torture. They denied any ill-treatment; their testimony was identical in some places. 74.  On 27 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to another colony in the Tula Region, FBU IK-4. 75.  On 6 May 2010 the investigator questioned two convicts, Mr Abr. and Mr Mat. Those convicts had been detained in the SHIZO at the time of the events at issue, next to the cell where the applicant had allegedly been ill-treated. According to the written text of their testimony, both convicts had not heard any screams or other sounds and had not seen the applicant. The type-written text of their testimony contained a handwritten note by the investigator stating that both witnesses had refused to sign it. 76.  On 13 May 2010 the investigator decided to test the credibility of the witnesses with a polygraph. The applicant refused to undergo the test without having obtained the opinion of his lawyer. Two of the officers of the colony underwent the test. They denied any involvement in the applicant’s ill-treatment. 77.  On 14 May 2010 the investigator decided not to initiate a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations. In support of his decision the investigator referred mainly to the testimony of the colony officials, who had denied any ill-treatment. Their major argument was that if the applicant had been beaten or ill-treated, other convicts would have learnt of it, and that would represent a serious security issue, maybe even cause a riot. They all claimed that nobody had heard the noise of beatings or screams. The convicts questioned by the investigator testified that they had not heard the screams, neither had they seen traces of torture or beatings on the applicant. The investigator also referred to the testimony of the doctors who had examined the applicant as part of the official inquiry and who had confirmed their findings that the applicant had suffered from a fungal infection which could lead to the “deformation of, or damage to the nails”. They had also not detected any signs of the forceful extraction of the nails. The investigator considered that the expert examinations carried out by Granat and by Ms M., hired by the applicant’s lawyer, were unreliable, since they had been conducted “by inappropriate persons using extra-procedural methods”. The investigator also summarised the applicant’s medical history. That summary states that the fungal infection was not detected before the examination of the applicant on 15 February 2010. The investigator concluded that the applicant’s allegations were untrue and refuted by other evidence obtained in the course of the previous inquiries. 78.  On 20 May 2010 the Donskoy Town Prosecutor quashed the decision of the investigator and ordered him to continue the inquiry. On 25 May 2010 the Deputy Chief Investigator of the Tula Regional Prosecutor’s Office also ordered the investigator to continue the inquiry. In particular, he ordered him to question the applicant in the presence of his lawyer, to carry out investigative actions specified in the decision of 3 March 2010 (see paragraph 60 above), and to assess the conclusions of expert Ms M. 79.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer. He testified that he would give evidence only as part of a formal criminal investigation in respect of the colony officials who had tortured him. 80.  On 2 June 2010 the investigator again examined cell no. 203 and established that loud screams in that cell were perfectly audible in the adjacent cell and in the corridors. 81.  On 4 June 2010 investigator Kn. decided not to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations. In his decision the investigator summarised the statements made by the applicant and his relatives, and compared them with the statements of the colony officials and convicts questioned in the course of the previous inquiries. The text of the decision of investigator Kn. was very close to the text of his earlier decision of 14 May 2010. Thus, he referred to the testimony of the colony officials, all of whom denied ill-treatment and characterised the applicant’s allegations as “lies”, “fairy-tales”, “delirium”, and so on. The colony officials excluded any possibility of the unlawful use of force by a colony official and or by a “loyal” convict in respect of another convict, since this would not have passed unnoticed by other detainees, and would have provoked a riot. This phrase, with minor variations, was repeated in the statements of at least seven colony officials and three convicts. They denied having seen the applicant being ill-treated or having heard of anything of that kind. The investigator also referred to the expert reports which attributed the absence of the applicant’s finger and toenails to mycosis (reports of 15 and 19 February 2010) and described the bruises on his body as not having been received before 4 February 2010. The investigator summarised the testimony of Mr Abr. and Mr Mat., two other convicts detained in the SHIZO at the time of the events at issue. He also mentioned the testimony of prison warder Kol., who had been on duty on an unspecified date after 10 February 2010. Warder Kol., in particular, testified as follows:\n“... During my round [I] noticed [the applicant] sitting by the table and beating himself with both hands in the chest, belly and legs. [I] did not attach any importance to it, since [I] believed that [the applicant] was trying either to flex his muscles or to warm himself up, although it was quite warm in the cell, and [the applicant] had his outdoor clothes on. [The applicant] hit himself on the hips, belly, chest, arms, and shoulders. Later [I] learned that [the applicant] had complained of beatings ... and then ... [I] reported [that incident] to my superiors.” 82.  The applicant challenged the decision of 4 June 2010 before the Donskoy Town Court. On 20 August 2010 the Town Court dismissed his complaint. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the Donskoy Town Court. The court of appeal, having examined the decision, quashed it and remitted the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination. 83.  According to the Government, the court proceedings are still pending. According to the information and copies of court documents produced by the applicant, on 9 December 2010 the Donskoy Town Court decided to quash the decision of 4 June 2010 and remit the case for further inquiry to the investigator. In the operative part of the judgment, the Town Court held, with reference to the provisions of Article 13 of the European Convention, that the applicant’s arguments about the ineffectiveness of the inquiry were convincing, that the investigator had failed to establish with certainty the existence of grounds precluding further criminal investigation, and that the expert opinions should have been obtained by the investigator in full compliance with the law, in particular, by complying with the obligation to inform the experts about criminal liability for perjury. The Town Court added that the information thus obtained (that is, not in accordance with proper procedure) was unfit for confirming or rebutting the applicant’s allegations. The Town Court also noted that it was incapable of addressing the applicant’s allegations concerning the reliability of the information collected during the inquiry, since it was not the court’s role to predetermine the possible conclusions of a future criminal case. The case was thus referred back to the investigator. That decision was confirmed by the Tula Regional Court on 16 February 2011. 84.  On 21 March 2011 investigator Kn. decided not to open a criminal investigation into the case. The conclusions of investigator Kn. repeated his earlier decisions not to open a case. Investigator Kn. compared the applicant’s submissions and the testimony of the applicant’s relatives with other evidence, and concluded that the applicant had lied. The investigator concluded that the bruises found on the applicant’s body had been self-inflicted. He also concluded that the applicant had lost his fingernails as a result of a fungal infection. The investigator’s decision referred to the conclusions of the experts hired by the applicant’s lawyer. The investigator concluded that their reports were unreliable since those examinations had not been made as part of the official inquiry. 85.  On 2 April 2010 the Head of the State Centre for Forensic and Criminological Examinations of the Ministry of Defence, Mr P., wrote to the Prosecutor General about the incident of 23 March 2010 when one of the experts of the Centre, Ms M., was detained and threatened by colony officials. He asked the Prosecutor General to conduct an inquiry into that episode. In the opinion of Mr P. such actions of the colony officials could amount to an abuse of power, a criminal offence under the Criminal Code. 86.  That request was forwarded from the General Prosecutor’s Office to the Donskoy Town Investigative Department and was received there on 11 May 2010. 87.  On 14 May 2010 the investigator decided to open an inquiry into the actions of Ms M. The decision to open an inquiry pointed to various procedural irregularities in the expert report and its overall unreliability. The investigator also considered that the conclusions of Ms M. were outside of the field of her professional competence. He characterised the actions of the expert as having been in “excess of power”. There is no information about any development in those proceedings. 88.  On 3 June 2010 investigator B. of the Donskoy Town Investigative Department refused to open an investigation into the episode of 23 March 2010. Based on the testimony of colony officials who had accompanied Ms M. during her visit, the investigator concluded that she had lied about the circumstances of her visit to the colony. 89.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to a court about the incident of 23 March 2010. The applicant sought to have the actions of the colony officials declared unlawful. 90.  On 15 July 2010 the Donskoy Town Court of the Tula Region dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The judge found that the colony administration had granted Ms M. leave to visit and examine the applicant, but that the permission had not included taking samples. When she had tried to obtain samples of the applicant’s blood and urine, the colony officials had contacted investigator Kn., who had informed them that Ms M. was not an officially appointed expert in the case. The colony officials had then examined her documents again, and decided that she was not entitled to provide medical assistance to the applicant. They had seized the samples and some medical instruments she had had with her. All those objects were “prohibited items” within the meaning of the prison rules, so their seizure had been lawful. 91.  The applicant appealed. On 23 September 2010 the Tula Regional Court dismissed the appeal, having confirmed the conclusions of the Town Court. 92.  On 23 June 2010 the applicant complained to the court that several entries in the medical file allegedly related to January, February and September 2009, had in fact been added much later by Dr Pr., or on his orders. Those entries indicated that the applicant had been diagnosed with “foot mycosis”, that he had twice refused hospitalisation without giving reasons, and that he had received some “ointment” from the colony pharmacy. The applicant claimed that those entries had been falsified and asked the court to commission an expert examination of his medical file. 93.  On 15 July 2010 the Donskoy Town Court dismissed his complaint as unfounded. The Town Court refused to commission an examination of the medical file or of the specific entries made by the medical personnel of the colony by a graphologist. The Town Court indicated that the applicant had sought to have the lawfulness of the colony officials’ actions verified. The court concluded that when making the entries at issue the colony officials had acted within their competence and thus lawfully, and that the applicant’s right to receive adequate and accessible information about his health condition and about the treatment he had received had not been breached. On 9 September 2010 the Tula Regional Court upheld the judgment of 15 July 2010 by the Town Court. 94.  On 16 July 2010, upon a complaint by a number of colony officials accused by the applicant of torture, the police of the Donskoy Town charged the applicant with criminal libel. He was prosecuted for having falsely accused those colony officials. By a decision of 17 November 2010 (confirmed on appeal on 30 March 2011) the Donskoy Town Court confirmed the lawfulness of the prosecutor’s decision to open a criminal case. There is no information about any further development in those proceedings. 95.  On 12 April 2010, in the evening, the applicant felt sick after having eaten: he suspected that he had been poisoned deliberately by the colony officials. He asked the warder on duty, Mr Shm., to call a doctor. He then purged himself in his cell, using tap water. According to the applicant, Dr Pr. came to examine him and gave him some pills. After taking one pill, the applicant felt acute pain in his stomach and started vomiting blood. Dr Pr. came again, but did not do anything to help. From his words the applicant understood that Dr Pr. expected him to die. At 7.40 p.m. Dr Pr. ordered the applicant’s transfer to the colony medical unit. The applicant refused to take any medicine from the colony doctors since he did not trust them, so an ambulance was called from a nearby town. The ambulance team arrived at 8.40 p.m.; the doctors gave him injections and fitted a drip. The applicant felt better. After that incident the applicant remained in the colony medical unit. He refused to eat the food prepared in the colony and ate only tinned food, out of fear of poisoning. 96.  According to the documents produced by the Government, on 12 April 2010 the applicant started to vomit blood. He was examined by a colony doctor and by an external ambulance team; however, he refused hospitalisation since he did not trust the doctors. According to the testimony of the doctors, he refused to show his mouth for examination. 97.  On 27 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to another colony, FBU IK-4, in the Tula Region. In his words, during the transfer he was insulted – the warders dragged him across the floor despite his weakness and the high fever he had that day. 98.  On 30 April 2010 the applicant had a meeting with his lawyer, Mr St. He gave Mr St. his T-shirt tainted with blood, which he had been wearing the day of the alleged poisoning. 99.  On 12 May 2010 the investigator questioned the colony doctor who testified that he had not detected any signs of the applicant having been poisoned. On the same day the applicant was taken from FBU IK-4 to FBU IK-1 for questioning. According to the applicant, the temperature in the prison van which transported him there and back was very high. In FBU IK-1 he was questioned by an investigator who threatened him and his wife, distorted his words, and refused to record his exact testimony. 100.  On 19 May 2010 the applicant was taken to FBU IK-1 for questioning again. He spent six hours in an overheated compartment of a metal prison van, in which he could not even stand upright (the dimensions of that compartment were 0.5 x 0.6 x 1.2 metres). The applicant stated that this had been on purpose, to cause a heart attack or other medical incident that would kill him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  At the relevant time the applicant was a member of the teaching staff, as associate professor (“conferenţiar universitar”), of the University of Agronomical Sciences and Veterinary Medicine (hereafter “the University”), which is a State university. 7.  Between 2002 and 2005 the applicant submitted many requests to the education authorities of the University and the Ministry of Education for the creation of a position of full professor in his department. He claimed that he met all the required professional criteria for occupying such a position. On 23 March 2005 the rector informed the applicant that for financial and other objective reasons, a new professor position could not be created. 8.  The applicant was also a member of a non-profit organisation called the European Association of University Teaching Staff in Romania (“the Association”). Its general aim was to stop the degradation of education and research standards by making known the abuses, unlawful acts and corruption in education. 9.  On 8 March 2005, a journalist, S.A., had an article published in the newspaper România liberă entitled “Corruption at university level”. The article stated that intellectual theft and plagiarism had been noted at the University of Agronomical Sciences and Veterinary Medicine. The journalist stated in this connection that O.A.A. had published a book, which was mostly (80%) a copy of another book. She nonetheless enjoyed the status of university lecturer under the protection of the deputy rector, Professor N.C.I., who was also the scientific referent of the book. 10.  On 7 June 2005 S.A. had another article published in the same newspaper, entitled “University lecturer ostracised because he denounced university corruption”. The article referred to the applicant, who, having noted that his disclosure about O.A.A.’s plagiarism to the dean and the rector of the University had not been followed up by any measures, had informed the press. Instead of benefiting from the protection provided by Law no. 571/2004 for employees who revealed infringements of the law within public authorities and institutions, the applicant had been invited to a meeting organised by the rector on 14 March 2005 and asked why he had informed the press. On 19 April 2005 another meeting was organised by the deputy rector and the dean of the applicant’s faculty. On the pretext of redistribution of the faculty’s space, they cleared the laboratory used by the applicant for research and practical activities with his students. 11.  On 3 August 2005 the Association organised a press conference the main topic of which was corruption at university level. Seven cases of alleged corruption were presented. While other members of the Association referred to the corruption existent in other universities, the applicant, in his capacity as secretary-general of the Association, delivered a speech about corruption in his own university. He referred to the cases of O.A.A., a colleague, and of the deputy rector, N.C.I. The former had published a book called The Chemistry of Wine that according to him was mostly (80%) a copy of another book, Oenology, published in 1994 by another author. The applicant also mentioned that the book had been written under the direct supervision and guidance of N.C.I, who had written a eulogistic foreword to the book. 12.  The applicant criticised the way in which N.C.I. had managed the AGRAL programme concerning public funding of scientific research stations; he alleged that N.C.I. had offered funding only to stations from which he could make personal gains. 13.  The applicant also stated that N.C.I. was benefiting from a preferential regime because of his past as former secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. According to the applicant, N.C.I. was occupying too many positions to be able to handle them properly: professor at several different universities; deputy rector of the University of Agronomical Sciences and Veterinary Medicine; president of the National Office of Wine and Vineyards; and director of the AGRAL programme for public funding of research stations. He was also the head of the Department of Viticulture and Oenology. 14.  The applicant also stated that N.C.I. was involved in sabotaging scientific research and that in the department of Viticulture and Oenology led by N.C.I. there was a mafia-type organisation (“încregătură de tip mafiot”). 15.  Most of those statements were repeated in an article entitled “Professor at Piteşti University accused of corruption” published in the weekly newspaper Impact în Argeş of 26-30 September 2005. 16.  On 10 November 2005 N.C.I. lodged a joint criminal and civil complaint against the applicant for defamation. He claimed that the newspaper Impact în Argeş had published an article containing the applicant’s views expressed at a press conference on 3 August 2005. 17.  The applicant adduced extensive documentary evidence before the Bucharest District Court. He submitted certificates from different universities at which N.C.I. had taught, the statute of the Association, different documents concerning the AGRAL programme, including the composition of the management of the programme, and a few letters issued by the Odobeşti research station at which O.A.A had performed research activity. He also submitted several newspaper articles containing criticism of N.C.I. and O.A.A. 18.  N.C.I. gave a statement before the court on 13 February 2006. He acknowledged that he was cumulatively occupying the positions of deputy rector of the University, president of the National Office of Wine and Vineyards and director of the AGRAL programme for public funding of research stations. He also stated that even before the press conference the applicant had made defamatory statements about him in letters addressed to the rector of the University, the dean of the Faculty of Oenology and the Ministry of Education. 19.  On 13 March 2006 the court heard as a witness on behalf of the applicant S.A., one of the journalists who had written articles about the alleged corruption in the University (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). He stated that he had attended the press conference of 3 August 2005. As regards the applicant’s allegation that N.C.I. was responsible for the incorrect manner in which public money had been allocated for scientific research, the journalist pointed out that on the basis of the documents he had seen on that occasion, such as salary slips and reports, it was clear to him that discriminatory treatment had been applied to the researchers working for the research stations and the University. The very high payments received by certain members of the University staff had convinced the applicant that only research stations which had accepted the teaching staff agreed by the plaintiff obtained public funding. The journalist also referred to the fact that the plaintiff was occupying several teaching positions at different universities. Lastly, the journalist stated that he had based his articles about the University not only on the material presented by the Association but also on documents from other sources, which he could not reveal. 20.  By a judgment of 17 April 2006, the Bucharest District Court dismissed the criminal complaint. It held that even though the applicant could not prove the veracity of his statements, one element of the crime of defamation was missing, namely an intent to damage the reputation of N.C.I. It also held that the applicant, convinced by the accuracy of his statements, had only intended to present a case of corruption at university level. The most relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n“In the instant case, the defendant did not prove the accuracy of his statements despite the fact that on 13 February 2006 the court (taking into account that the morality and legality of the education system at university level is obviously a topic of public interest, and the interest of informing the public opinion and the authorities is serious and legitimate in accordance with Article 207 of the Criminal Code and the Court’s case-law – the case of Castells v. Spain[1] and the case of Colombani v. France[2]) had admitted all the evidence proposed on his behalf.\n...\nMoreover, the documents submitted by the defendant (namely, the foreword of the book signed by the injured party (N.C.I.), copies of the book covers of The Chemistry of Wine and of the original Oenology, chapters from the two books) do not prove that the injured party encouraged plagiarism.\nSome resemblance in the form and contents of the two works that could be noted by reading in parallel certain chapters cannot lead to the conclusion that the injured party was liable for not denouncing plagiarism. Such a conclusion would mean that the injured party knew perfectly well the previously published book and that he had made a comparative analysis of both works, noting some inconsistencies which he ignored ...\nHowever, the role of that foreword (and of any foreword in general) is to express a point of view about a work ... and does not represent an objective and critical opinion.”\n...\n“Moreover, the defendant did not prove that the injured party had blackmailed the research stations ...\nThe documents submitted by the defendant (copies of the pay slips of March 2005 issued by the Odobeşti research station, the records of the salaries paid by the same research station to several collaborators, and the report of an assessment performed at the research station by an authority of the Agriculture Minister on 20 July 2005) could not lead to the conclusion that the injured party had blackmailed the Odobeşti research station”.\n...\n“In addition, the defendant’s allegations that the injured party obtained undeserved profit by unlawfully occupying several positions have not been proved to be true, as the injured party acknowledged that he had several sources of income by lawfully occupying several public offices.\nAs regards the defendant’s allegation about the sabotaging by the injured party of scientific research by damaging different types of hybrids and then selling the greenhouse in which the defendant carried out research was not proved by the adduced evidence.\nThe minute (“proces-verbal”) signed by the Faculty of Horticulture and a private company proved that the latter rented a building and the adjacent greenhouse, in which no plants were cultivated; moreover the minute was not signed by the injured party.\nUnder these circumstances, after the examination of all evidence, it cannot be concluded that the defendant has proved, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the aspects stated by him are true.” 21.  As regards the applicant’s intent to commit defamation, the first‑instance court stated the following:\n“The court notes that the defendant’s statements were made in the context of a press conference organised by the European Association of University Teaching Staff (of which the defendant is secretary-general), the main topic of which was the corruption and unlawful acts committed at university level, it being well known that the main object of the Association is the monitoring and disclosure of irregularities in the academic system.\nEven though the defendant’s speech was shocking and exaggerated, it should be regarded as part of a topic of public interest – namely, corruption among university teaching staff – and the legislative and moral reform of the teaching system, an objective desired by the whole of society.\nIt should be noted that before the press conference of 3 August 2005, the newspaper România Liberă had published an article concerning the plagiarism of The Chemistry of Wine, and the Association had drafted a report concerning the situation of teaching in Romania. The report denounced the fact that university teachers were simultaneously teaching at several universities (“cu normă întreagă”) and that teachers, guilty of plagiarism and scientific fraud, were maintained in their positions at universities (a report that should have been known by the defendant in his capacity as secretary-general of the Association). These aspects prove that the topic had been previously published and debated in a public context.\nAt the same time, another important aspect is the fact that at the conference the defendant submitted several documents, such as: time sheets (“fişe de pontaj”), reports, the foreword written by the injured party for The Chemistry of Wine and copies of the alleged plagiarised book ..., documents which the defendant considered as evidence of the alleged acts.\nNotwithstanding that these documents did not directly prove that the injured party had committed the acts of which he had been accused, they formed the basis of the defendant’s intimate conviction that the former was guilty of committing certain irregularities.\nIn this context, even though it is obvious that the honour and reputation of the injured party were objectively harmed, the court considers that this situation was the result of the speech and not an aim in itself, since the speaker had expressed his viewpoint in his capacity as a member of the Association and not as a private person, with the intention of contributing to informing on a topic of extreme public interest, that of corruption at university level, which had already been known by the press.\nConsequently, the court considers that the defendant did not act with intent to gratuitously harm the injured party’s reputation, but with the conviction that he was revealing a corruption case.” 22.  The court partially allowed the civil complaint, ordering the applicant to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage amounting to 3,000 Romanian lei (RON) (approximately 860 euros (EUR)). It held that under the applicable civil law the applicant could be held liable for even the slightest level of fault. Therefore, the applicant was ordered to pay compensation to N.C.I. for the way he had brought to the attention of journalists the information regarding his professional activity.\nThe relevant passages of the decision read as follows:\n“The way in which the defendant brought this information to the journalists’ attention, without clear evidence, convinced them that the presented facts were plausible (see in this respect the statements of witness S.A., as well as the articles published in the daily newspapers Impact de Iaşi and Fortune).\nConsequently, the presentation of superficial information, with a high degree of suggestibility, constitutes an illicit act.\n...\nAs regards the defendant’s liability, it must be emphasised that the court’s finding concerning the defendant’s good faith has relevance only in connection with the criminal complaint, given the fact that in order to establish civil liability it is enough for the court to find the slightest level of fault.\nIt is true that according to the ECHR’s case-law, persons acting as whistleblowers can share information concerning topics of public interest, even if shocking and disturbing; however, they should also take into account the protection of the reputation of others, as provided for by Article 10 § 1 of the Convention (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999‑I).” 23.  Appeals on points of law lodged by the parties were allowed. By a decision delivered on 11 November 2006 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the criminal complaint, as a direct consequence of an amendment made to the Criminal Code regarding the decriminalisation of defamation. The civil complaint was left unresolved. 24.  On 13 December 2006 Professor N.C.I., brought a separate civil action for compensation against the applicant before the Bucharest Civil Court of First Instance. He claimed that certain remarks made by the applicant on 3 August 2005 and other occasions had constituted an attack on his reputation. 25.  The applicant produced extensive testimonial and documentary evidence before the court in order to demonstrate the accuracy of his statements. He adduced copies of the books The Chemistry of Wine and Oenology, and underlined the paragraphs he said had been copied by O.A.A. He also proposed that the court hear statements from individuals working for a certain research station in order to prove that the author of the book The Chemistry of Wine, a “protégée” of N.C.I., was registered as an employee and received a salary from the Odobeşti research station, which benefited from funding granted by N.C.I., without ever turning up to work there. He tried to prove that despite the fact that under the applicable law, a professor does not have the right to teach at more than two universities, N.C.I was a professor at at least three universities. 26.  On 2 April 2007 the Bucharest Civil Court of First Instance allowed the action and the sum of RON 20,000 was awarded to N.C.I as compensation for non-pecuniary damage. It held that the applicant was liable for the way in which he had presented the above information concerning N.C.I. to journalists, who were convinced of the accuracy of his information and had published it in newspapers. The court endorsed the reasoning of the Bucharest District Court in its judgment of 17 April 2006 by copying most of the paragraphs from the latter judgment. Thus, it held among other things, that the applicant had not proved that N.C.I. had encouraged plagiarism by writing the foreword for the book The Chemistry of Wine as the role of any foreword is to express a point of view about a work and not to represent a critical opinion. The court also held that the applicant had not proved that N.C.I. had obtained undeserved profit by unlawfully occupying several positions.\nThe applicant was also ordered to pay N.C.I.’s legal expenses. 27.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against that judgment. He claimed that he had submitted enough evidence to prove the accuracy of his statements about N.C.I. He pointed out that the court had turned his statement that “in the department of oenology there is a mafia‑type organisation (“încregătură de tip mafiot”) into the statement that N.C.I. “is involved in a mafia-type organisation”. On 30 October 2007 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgment of the first‑instance court. The applicant was ordered to pay the N.C.I.’s legal expenses. 28.  On 20 March 2008 the University issued a decision by which it ordered the seizure of one third of the applicant’s monthly salary up to RON 27,877 (approximately EUR 7,470), representing compensation for non-pecuniary damage and the legal expenses awarded to N.C.I. by the domestic courts. 29.  On an unspecified date the Association lodged a criminal complaint against O.A.A. accusing her of plagiarism. On 20 March 2007 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Bucharest County Court decided not to institute criminal proceedings against O.A.A. on the grounds that the complaint had not been lodged by the aggrieved party. It noted, however, that a significant part of the two books, The Chemistry of Wine and Oenology, was similar. 30.  On 6 May 2009 the Association together with the author of the book Oenology lodged another criminal complaint against O.A.A. They also accused N.C.I. of being an accomplice to O.A.A.’s plagiarism in his capacity as scientific coordinator of the book. On 17 November 2010 the prosecutor’s office attached to Bucharest County Court discontinued the investigation on the grounds that the statutory time-limit for prosecuting the offence of plagiarism had expired. 31.  On 3 October 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint against the University’s decision to decrease his salary of April and May 2006 on account of his unjustified absence from work. He claimed that the measure was illegal as timesheets for registering presence at work had not been introduced at the University until June 2006. Moreover, he adduced evidence according to which he had been at work on the days in question. Among other aspects, he pointed out that the actual reason for sanctioning him was his conflict with the management of the University because he had made public that the deputy rector had encouraged plagiarism. 32.  By a decision of 26 March 2007 the Bucharest County Court – Department of Labour Litigation – allowed the applicant’s complaint and ordered the University to pay him the amounts withdrawn from his salaries of April and May 2006. The court held that under Article 287 of the Labour Code the burden of proof lay with the applicant’s employer but that it had been unable to produce any legal documents which could prove the applicant’s unjustified absence from work. 33.  On 19 June 2006 the University issued a decision by which it applied a disciplinary sanction to the applicant consisting in the suspension, for a period of two years, of his right to apply for a higher teaching position, to obtain a teaching degree or take up a management position. The reasons for the sanction were the following: (i) unjustified absences from several classes and teaching activities; (ii) non-compliance with the teaching curriculum; and (iii) contempt and ignorance of the decisions taken by the management of the faculty and of the department concerning the clearance of a space assigned for setting up a research laboratory. 34.  The applicant challenged the decision before the Bucharest County Court. 35.  On 25 May 2007 the county court noted that the applicant’s action remained without object as the University had decided to revoke its decision of 19 June 2006.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "12.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Pesco Sannita (Benevento). 13.  On 17 January 1992 the applicant brought proceedings in the Benevento Magistrate's Court, sitting as an employment tribunal, seeking acknowledgement of her right to be reregistered on the lists of farmers and of her status in that capacity. That status had been contested by the Farmers' Social Insurance Fund (Servizio Contributi Agricoli Unificati – “the SCAU”). Her entitlement to a maternity allowance depended on the type of occupational status she had. 14.  On 22 February 1992 the Magistrate's Court set the case down for the first hearing on 14 March 1994. On that day it also requested documents relating to the records drawn up by the labour inspector and ordered them to be filed at a hearing on 8 November 1995. On that date, at the request of counsel for the defendant, the Magistrate's Court declared the proceedings interrupted on the ground that the SCAU had been abolished. 15.  On 24 November 1995 the applicant lodged an application with the court registry for the proceedings to be resumed against the social-security department (Istituto Nazionale di Previdenza Sociale). On 25 January 1996 the Magistrate's Court set the case down for hearing on 21 October 1997. However, that hearing was adjourned by the court of its own motion to 4 March 1999. The next three hearings, held between 8 April 1999 and 18 September 2000, were devoted to hearing evidence from witnesses. One of those hearings was adjourned at the parties' request. On 13 November 2000 the parties made their submissions. 16.  In a judgment of the same date, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 21 November 2000, the Magistrate's Court dismissed the claim because the applicant had failed to show that a relationship of subordination had existed at her work. 17.  On 24 April 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Naples Court of Appeal. On 11 February 2001 the president set the appeal down for hearing on 26 January 2004. On that day the Court of Appeal reserved judgment. In a judgment of the same date, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 15 March 2004, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. 18.  On 3 October 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the Rome Court of Appeal under Law no. 89 of 24 March 2001, known as the “Pinto Act”, complaining of the excessive length of the above-described proceedings. She asked the court to rule that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to order the Italian Government to pay compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained, plus an unquantified amount for costs and expenses. 19.  In a decision of 28 February 2002, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 30 April 2002, the Court of Appeal found that the proceedings had been excessively long. It held as follows:\n“...The Convention principle that everyone's case must be examined within a reasonable time has been breached, and the applicant has sustained non-pecuniary damage for the excessive length of the proceedings involving interests of considerable importance. In truth, the proceedings ... should not have lasted more than five years for two levels of jurisdiction. Non-pecuniary damage (distress on account of the prolongment of proceedings relating to an important situation in the applicant's life) must be deemed to exist in relation to the violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention – a violation which objectively exists on account of the unreasonable length of the proceedings.\nGiven the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties has not caused any delays. Nor has the conduct of the court and the other authorities involved in disposing of the proceedings caused the excessive delay. In truth, the length of the adjournments and thus the delay must be considered to be due to structural reasons.\nThe damage has to be determined on the basis of Article 2056 of the Civil Code in accordance with the criteria established in Articles 1223, 1226 and 1227-I of the Civil Code and only the damage relating to the period beyond the reasonable time must be taken into consideration under section 3 of the Pinto Act.\nIn respect of non-pecuniary damage (moral distress on account of the length of the proceedings beyond the reasonable time, as above) an amount of 500 euros should be paid for each of the two years exceeding a reasonable time, plus statutory interest accruing from the day on which the reasonable time was exceeded, which was at the end of 1997 (the usual scale relating to just satisfaction has been redefined in relation to the negative outcome of the proceedings at first instance, which has an effect on the expectations of justice and therefore on the stress caused by the delay). ...”\nThe Court of Appeal awarded the applicant 2,500 euros (EUR), on an equitable basis, in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 710 for costs and expenses. That decision became final by 15 June 2003 at the latest and was executed by the authorities on an unspecified date between 23 March 2004 and 12 July 2004. 20.  In a letter of 7 January 2003 the applicant informed the Court of the outcome of the domestic proceedings and asked it to resume its examination of her application.\nIn the same letter the applicant also informed the Court that she did not intend to appeal to the Court of Cassation because an appeal to that court could only be on points of law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Fintice. 5.  On 29 December 1994 the applicant lodged an action with the Prešov District Court (Okresný súd) seeking an order for payment of outstanding wages. 6.  On 28 February 2002 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) found that there had been a violation of the applicant’s right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) to a hearing without unjustified delay in the proceedings. 7.  On 27 May 2003 the Court came to a similar conclusion in a judgment, in which it found a violation of the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time (see Piskura v. Slovakia, no. 65567/01, 27 May 2003). 8.  Meanwhile, the action had been allowed by the District Court. Following the defendant’s appeal, it was also allowed by the Prešov Regional Court (Krajský súd), on 21 June 2005. 9.  The judgment became final and binding on 2 August 2005 and enforceable on 18 August 2005. It contained an order that the defendant pay the applicant the equivalent of some 35,500 euros (EUR). 10.  In the course of the proceedings described above, on 16 December 2003, the Košice Regional Court declared the defendant insolvent. 11.  On 27 January 2003 the applicant registered in the insolvency proceedings a claim, which appears to be identical to the claim asserted by way of his action of 29 December 1994 (see paragraph 5 above). 12.  At a hearing held on 21 May 2003 the insolvency receiver contested the applicant’s claim, in response to which he lodged a new action with a view to having the claim acknowledged by a court. 13.  On 27 September 2005, upon the applicant’s action, the Regional Court ruled that his claim in the insolvency proceedings was valid and fell to be satisfied of the proceeds of the realisation of the insolvency estate. The judgment became final and binding on 10 December 2005 and enforceable on 14 December 2005. 14.  On 28 April 2008 the applicant registered a further claim in the insolvency proceedings and the receiver acknowledged it on 3 July 2008. 15.  On 20 January 2011 the Regional Court issued a decision approving a final report by the receiver on the realisation of the estate and on his fees and expenses (konečná správa o speňažovaní majetku úpadcu a o vyúčtovaní odmeny a výdavkov správcu). Following the applicant’s appeal, on 30 March 2011 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) quashed the decision and remitted the matter to the Regional Court for re examination. It found, inter alia, that the Regional Court had omitted to deal with the applicant’s objections to the report. 16.  On 17 October 2011 the Regional Court issued a fresh decision approving the report and it was upheld by the Supreme Court on 13 January 2012, following the applicant’s appeal. 17.  The insolvency proceedings are still pending in their phase aimed at distribution of the proceeds of the realisation of the estate, the applicant having thus far not recovered any part of his claim. 18.  On 19 August 2009, following the applicant’s complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court found that, in the insolvency proceedings, there had been a violation of his constitutional right to a hearing without unjustified delay. At the same time, it ordered that the enforcement proceedings be proceeded with without unjustified delay and awarded the applicant EUR 1,600 by way of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 19.  As to the just satisfaction award, the Constitutional Court also ruled that it was payable within two months of the day on which the constitutional judgment (nález) became final and binding. It became final and binding on 24 September 2009 and enforceable the following day. The award was actually paid on 3 September 2010. 20.  The applicant’s previous constitutional complaint of alleged delays and subsequent five constitutional complaints of alleged continuing delays in the insolvency proceedings were unsuccessful. 21.  On 28 November 2005 the applicant lodged a claim under the State Liability Act (Law no. 514/2003 Coll.) with the Ministry of Justice, arguing that there had been “wrongful official conduct” consisting of unjustified delays in the insolvency proceedings and seeking damages. 22.  Not having received any compensation from the Ministry voluntarily, presumably on 29 November 2006, the applicant lodged his claim with the Bratislava I District Court. After the question of the court fees was dealt with at three levels of jurisdiction and the question of legal aid at two, the action has been pending at first instance. 23.  Meanwhile, the applicant had three times unsuccessfully contested before the Constitutional Court alleged unjustified delays in the proceedings in his action. His latest complaint was declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded on 4 May 2011. 24.  On 24 October 2003 the applicant filed a criminal complaint accusing one or more persons unknown of having unlawfully failed to pay him wages. However, this has not resulted in the opening of any criminal proceedings in the matter.\nThe applicant also unsuccessfully sought enforcement of the judgment concerning his wages and made a number of various other submissions including complaints against various persons involved in his case and a motion to the Public Prosecution Service seeking, inter alia, a challenge to the constitutionality of the Insolvency and Restructuring Code (Law no. 8/2005 Coll., as amended).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Moscow. At the material time she had been working as a judge for 18 years. 7.  From 6 November 2000 the applicant held judicial office at the Moscow City Court. 8.  In 2003 the applicant was appointed to sit on a criminal case concerning abuse of powers by a police investigator, Mr Zaytsev. He was accused of carrying out unlawful searches while investigating a case of large-scale customs and financial fraud involving a group of companies and, allegedly, certain high-ranking state officials. 9.  In June 2003 the court, composed of the applicant as judge and two lay assessors, Ms I. and Ms D., began to examine the case. During the hearing on 26 June 2003 the court invited the public prosecutor to present evidence for the prosecution. He replied that the court had failed to ensure the attendance of the prosecution witnesses and objected to the manner in which the proceedings were being conducted. On the following day, Friday 27 June 2003, he challenged the applicant as judge on the grounds of bias which she had allegedly shown when questioning one of the victims. Other parties to the proceedings, including the victim in question, objected to the challenge. On the same day the lay assessors dismissed the challenge, following which the public prosecutor challenged both lay assessors. The parties to the proceedings objected to the challenge and it was dismissed. On the same day the prosecutor filed another challenge to the lay assessors on the grounds of bias, which was also dismissed by the applicant on the same day. 10.  On Monday 30 June 2003 both lay assessors filed a motion to withdraw from the proceedings. 11.  On 1 July 2003 the public prosecutor declared that the minutes of the proceedings were being kept incorrectly and requested access to the records. The court refused his motion, on the grounds that the minutes could be accessed within three days of their completion. 12.  On 3 July 2003 the applicant allowed the withdrawal of both lay assessors, having found as follows:\n“At the hearing the lay assessors I and D declared their withdrawal from the proceedings, on the grounds that they were unable to participate in the examination of the case because of the [public prosecutor’s] biased and discourteous behaviour towards them and due to the perverse environment at the hearing, for which he is responsible and which made them ill.” 13.  According to the applicant, the Moscow City Court President, Ms Yegorova, then during the proceedings called the applicant to her office and asked her about the details of the proceedings, putting certain questions regarding the conduct of the trial and the decisions on the above motions. 14.  The parties disagree on the circumstances of the applicant’s withdrawal from the case. According to the applicant, the Moscow City Court President removed her from sitting in the case on 4 July 2003, the day after the lay assessors’ withdrawal. According to the Government, the case remained with the applicant until 23 July 2003, when it was withdrawn from her by the Moscow City Court President on the grounds that she had delayed forming a new court composition and that there was a risk of further delay in view of her request for annual leave from 11 August to 11 September 2003, filed on 22 July 2003. 15.  On 23 July 2003 the Moscow City Court President assigned the case to judge M. 16.  The applicant subsequently sat as a judge in several other criminal cases. 17.  In October 2003 the applicant submitted her candidature in general elections for the State Duma of the Russian Federation. Her election campaign included a programme for judicial reform. 18.  On 29 October 2003 the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow granted the applicant’s request for suspension from her judicial functions pending the elections in which she was standing as a candidate. 19.  On 1 December 2003 the applicant gave an interview to the radio station Ekho Moskvy, which was broadcast on the same day. She made the following statements:\n“Ekho Moskvy (EM): ... it has come to our knowledge that an acting judge of the Moscow City Court has expressed criticism of the existing judicial system and mentioned certain instances of pressure being exerted on the court ...\nOlga Kudeshkina (OK): Indeed. Years of working in the Moscow City Court have led me to doubt the existence of independent courts in Moscow. Instances of a court being put under pressure to take a certain decision are not that rare, not only in cases of great public interest but also in cases encroaching on the interests of certain individuals of consequence or of particular groups.\n...\nEM: So what about that case in which you were confronted with such bare and ruthless pressure, what was it?\nOK: Some of you have probably heard about the criminal case concerning the smuggling of furniture which was subsequently sold in the large Moscow shopping centres ‘Tri Kita’ and ‘Grand’. The damage caused by this crime, as the investigation has revealed, amounted to several million roubles. Among those who came within the sights of the investigators, led by Zaytsev, were extremely influential and prominent people. This case received great publicity after the Prosecutor General hastily withdrew the file from the investigation unit of the Ministry of the Interior and charged the investigator Zaytsev [with abuse of official powers].\nEM: So you examined Zaytsev’s case, and not that of the furniture dealers?\nOK: Yes, [the case] against Zaytsev. First the Moscow City Court examined the case and acquitted him. What is more, the court expressly stated in the judgment that the office of the Prosecutor General itself sometimes failed to conform to, or was in direct breach of, the law. The reputation of the Prosecutor General’s Office had been publicly challenged.\nEM: And the judgment was quashed, as I remember?\nOK: Yes, it was. The Panel of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remitted it to the Moscow City Court for a fresh examination.\nEM: And you received the case?\nOK: Yes. The Panel of the Supreme Court in its decision indicated the points to be taken account of in the new proceedings.\nEM: So far as I know you were unable to hear the case to the end ... What happened?\nOK: In the course of the examination the case was withdrawn from me by the Moscow City Court President, Yegorova, without any explanation.\n...\nEM: What happened just before the withdrawal?\nOK: During the hearing the court was considering the evidence for the prosecution and started to cross-examine the victims. However, the public prosecutor, a representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office, must have reckoned that the victims’ testimonies ran contrary to the prosecution’s version of events. He therefore attempted to bring the proceedings to naught. In 20 years in the judiciary this was the first time that I was confronted with such behaviour ... he was trying to keep the court within the strict bounds of the questions he thought the court ought to ask the victims ... if the court went beyond these limits he started challenging the court and bombarding it with unreasoned requests.\n...\nEM: ... what are judges supposed to do in such a situation, when a party to the proceedings acts in breach of the law? Can you seek help, support or at least advice?\nOK: Yes, the court ... could request the Prosecutor General to replace the public prosecutor on the grounds of undue conduct in the proceedings. But at that very moment the court president called me to her office.\nEM: How come the court president could intervene in the proceedings?\nOK: Of course she could not. Criminal procedure in Russia is adversarial; in accordance with the law the court acts neither for the prosecution nor for the defence ... Here, it was expressly brought home to me that the President of the Moscow City Court and the agent of the Prosecutor General’s Office had common cause in this case.\n...\nEM: ... do you think this case was exceptional or is this a widespread phenomenon?\nOK: No, as far as I am aware, this is not the only case where the courts of law are used as an instrument of commercial, political or personal manipulation. This is a dangerous state of affairs because no one can rest assured that his case – whether civil or criminal or administrative – will be resolved in accordance with the law, and not just to please someone ... I do realise what kind of statement I have just made. But if all judges keep quiet this country may soon end up in a [state of] judicial lawlessness.” 20.  On 4 December 2003 two newspapers – Novaya Gazeta and Izvestiya – published interviews with the applicant. 21.  The interview with Novaya Gazeta, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“... Over the past 20 years working in the courts of law I have ... dealt with various cases: civil, criminal and administrative. Having examined hundreds, if not thousands, of cases ... I have seen a bit of everything, I know the judicial system inside out. I would not have imagined anything like what happened between me and Yegorova. In Siberia, by the way, the courts are much purer than in Moscow. There you cannot imagine such brutal manipulation and would not be talking about corruption to such an extent.\n...\nThis was not a conflict, but unprecedented pressure on justice. Yegorova called me several times, whenever the prosecutor thought that the proceedings were not going the right way; on the last occasion I was called out of the deliberations room, which is unheard of. Never in my life had I been shouted at like that. I would not have gone if I knew what I was being called for. ...\nIt was that conflict which made me consider changing my career, should I succeed in the elections. There is a job for me in the highest legislative body, namely the problems of justice. I doubt that any provincial courts would harbour scandals as outrageous as those in the Moscow City Court, but this a question of degree, while the problems are more general.\nA judge, although defined by law as the embodiment of judicial power and independent in this capacity, in fact often finds himself in a position of an ordinary clerk, a subordinate of a court president. The mechanism of how a decision is imposed on a judge is not to contact [the judge] directly: instead, a prosecutor or an interested person calls the court president, who then tries to talk the judge into a ‘right’ decision, first gently, by offering advice or a professional opinion, then pushing him or her more strongly to take the ‘correct’ decision, that is, one that is convenient to somebody. A judge, on the other hand, is dependant on the president for the daily basics, such as accommodation grants, bonuses, and also the distribution of cases between the judges. The president can always find a flaw in the judge’s work if he or she wishes (as simple as exceeding judicial time-limits, a situation impossible to avoid in practice, given the volume of work). On these grounds the president may seek termination of the judge’s office, which is decided upon by the qualification board, usually controlled by the same court bureaucrats. ... in reality a court still more often than not takes the position of the prosecution. The courts then become an instrument of commercial, political or personal manipulation.\nNo one can rest assured that his case – whether civil or criminal or administrative – will be resolved in accordance with the law, and not just to please someone. Today it is investigator Zaytsev, investigating the smuggling of furniture, tomorrow it may be any one of us ...”\nThe interview with Izvestiya, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“Izvestiya: Why did you decide to stand for election?\nOK: Looking around, one is just stunned by the lawlessness. The law applies quite strictly to ordinary people, but this is not the case when it comes to persons holding important posts. But they break the law too. I would like to participate in making laws that would provide for real independence of the judicial power ...\nIzvestiya: What does the pressure look like in practice?\nOK: There is a kind of consultation, legal advice, usually in cases of great public interest. Sometimes this has a healthy pretext, such as academic debate. The judge expresses his position, and the deputy president replies. The court president rarely speaks to the judges directly. Through such conventions the court administration tests each judge to see how flexible he is, so that when it comes to [the allocation of cases] they know who can be entrusted with a delicate case and whom to avoid.\n...\nIzvestiya: So how exactly was pressure exerted on you?\nOK: The public prosecutor exerted pressure on me. You put a question to the victim, and he immediately challenges you. In 20 years of practice I have not seen anything like it. Zaytsev was accused of abuse of official powers. He carried out a search without authorisation from a prosecutor. The law allows this in urgent cases, but the investigator must report to the prosecutor within 24 hours. Zaytsev reported to the prosecutor [in time], and it was for the court to verify whether there had indeed been any urgency in conducting those searches. Therefore it was necessary to examine the criminal case files against the firms ‘Grand’ and ‘Tri Kita’ who were dealing in furniture. Through his constant objections, however, the public prosecutor would not allow the court to touch this subject ...” 22.  On 7 December 2003 the general elections took place. The applicant was not elected. 23.  On 24 December 2003 the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow reinstated the applicant in her judicial functions as of 8 December 2003. 24.  On 2 December 2003 the applicant lodged the following complaint with the High Judiciary Qualification Panel:\n“I request that the President of the Moscow City Court, Olga Aleksandrovna Yegorova, be charged with a disciplinary offence for exerting unlawful pressure on me in June 2003, when I was presiding in the criminal proceedings against P.V. Zaytsev. She demanded that I give an account on the merits of this case while its examination was underway, and that I inform her about the decisions the court was about to take; she even called me out of the deliberations room for that purpose. [She] insisted on removing certain documents from the case file, forced me to forge the minutes of the hearing, and also recommended that I ask the lay assessors not to turn up for the hearing. Following my refusal to bow to this unlawful pressure [she] removed me from the proceedings and transferred the case to another judge.\nAs to the particular circumstances, they were as follows.\nI was appointed to examine the case against Zaytsev, and the court, acting in a bench with two lay assessors, I and D, started its examination.\nHaving started the trial, the court questioned a number of victims. The public prosecutor who was representing the Prosecutor General’s Office clearly decided that this questioning was not favourable to the prosecution and therefore did everything possible to disrupt the hearing. For no reason he challenged me as a judge, the lay assessors and the whole composition of the court. His motions were made in a manner that was humiliating, offensive and insulting to the court, and were clearly untrue. Soon after the challenge was rejected by the court, the Moscow City Court President Yegorova called me to her office.\nIn violation of Article 120 of the Constitution and section 10 of the Law ‘On the Status of a Judge in the Russian Federation’, the Moscow City Court President demanded an explanation from me as to why the lay assessors and I were putting one or other question to the victims in the trial and why one or other motion by the parties was refused or accepted. In my presence the Moscow City Court President had a telephone conversation with the [First Deputy Prosecutor General], who had issued the indictment against Zaytsev. Yegorova informed [the First Deputy Prosecutor General] that the judge was being called to account with regard to what was going on in the proceedings.\nBack in my office I told the lay assessors what had happened. By then they were already reduced to despair by the repeated groundless objections and insulting challenges against them on the part of the public prosecutor, and they therefore considered it impossible to continue to take part in the proceedings. One of the assessors, Ms I., was seeking medical assistance for a health problem. For these reasons they decided to withdraw from the proceedings and to state frankly in their request that the reason for their withdrawal was the pressure put on them by the agent of the Prosecutor General’s Office.\nAt the court’s following meeting the lay assessors announced their withdrawal on the above grounds. Their written requests were given to me to be enclosed in the file, and the court adjourned for deliberations.\nI was again called from the deliberations room by the Moscow City Court President, Yegorova. This time she demanded that I explain what we were doing in the deliberations room and what decisions we were going to take. Her main point was that there should have been no mention in the assessors’ written requests that the reason for their withdrawal was pressure being exerted on the court. The Moscow City Court President also insisted on excluding from the hearing minutes any mention of the behaviour by the public prosecutor which the assessors had regarded as pressure. In essence, Yegorova was pushing me to forge the case file. Moreover, she proposed that I ensure that the assessors did not turn up for the hearing, literally ‘ask them not to come to the court any more’. The aim was obvious – if the assessors [did] not appear the proceedings themselves [would] fall apart. It seemed that for some reason [she] did not want the case to continue to be examined in this composition. The unlawfulness of the Moscow City Court President’s actions was obvious.\nI followed none of her instructions. The lay assessors’ requests were included in the file, the court allowed their withdrawal and stated that the reason for it was the pressure being applied by the Prosecutor General’s Office. The hearing minutes reflected everything that happened in the proceedings.\nOnce I signed [the minutes] Yegorova withdrew the case from me and transferred it to another judge without stating reasons.\nI consider that such acts on the part of the Moscow City Court President, Olga Alexandrovna Yegorova, are incompatible with the status of a judge and undermine judicial authority, and are thus destructive for justice, for which she must be held liable. This is what I hereby request from the High Judiciary Qualification Panel of the Russian Federation.” 25.  On 15 December 2003 Ms D., one of the lay assessors who had, on 3 July 2003, withdrawn from the criminal case against Mr Zaytsev, sent a letter to the High Judiciary Qualification Panel in support of the applicant:\n“Further to the publication of an interview with judge Kudeshkina ... I decided to write you because I participated in Zaytsev’s case as a lay assessor.\nI entirely support everything judge Kudeshkina said in her interview.\nDuring the trial the [public prosecutor] did everything to prevent the court from hearing the case. He was rude and aggressive to the court; in his interventions and requests he deliberately misrepresented what was going on in the proceedings, and he repeatedly filed objections to the court composition. These motions were made in a humiliating, even obnoxious manner. By doing so he was exerting pressure on the court, to force it to give a judgment that was convenient to him, or, alternatively, to set the court hearing at naught.\nI was appalled by that, but what was my surprise when I learned about the pressure also being exerted on judge Kudeshkina by the court President!\nWe, the assessors, were there when, during the interval, judge Kudeshkina received a phone call from the court President to come and see her. After some time judge Kudeshkina came back, she was upset and depressed. To our question she replied that the court President Yegorova had accused her that the court was reluctant to examine the case; that the lay assessors were asking the victims the wrong questions; and that she had suggested that judge Kudeshkina arrange for the lay assessors not to appear at the court proceedings.\n... On the following morning ... both Ms I. and I decided to withdraw from the proceedings.\nAt the start of the hearing on that day the public prosecutor, before he was called by the court, began with a motion in which he, in essence, again degraded and insulted me by repeating [a] comment made by [the victim] outside the courtroom about me ... he did not react to the reproof by the judge.\nAfter that ... I declared that I withdrew from sitting in the proceedings on the grounds of the public prosecutor’s rude and offensive behaviour, which could not be defined as anything but pressure on the court. Ms I. then withdrew as well.\nBefore the trial I had never met anybody [involved in the proceedings]: not the judge, not Zaytsev, not the public prosecutor, not the defence counsel; I had no personal interest in the case. The public prosecutor’s behaviour was therefore inexplicable and came as a shock to me.\nAt about 6 p.m. judge Kudeshkina was called out from the deliberations room where the court was taking a decision. It was the court President who called her...\nOn the following day ... judge Kudeshkina told us that the court President had shouted at her, demanding that she refrain from enclosing [the assessors’] withdrawal requests in the file and not refer in the court’s decision to the reason for the withdrawal.\nMs I. and I were shocked by what was going on. First it was the public prosecutor who put pressure on us at the hearing, and then it turned out that the [court President] joined in.\nWhat a surprise it was when the [court’s Deputy President] came into the deliberations room and started trying to persuade me and Ms I. not to comment on the public prosecutor’s behaviour in the court decision, but to state in our requests and in the court decision that we withdrew on medical grounds. She said that they would invite me and Ms I. to take part in other proceedings.\nMs I. and I refused to change our requests, and after the Deputy President left the court issued the decision [to allow withdrawal] which reflected what had happened.\nI have been a lay assessor before, I have taken part in several other proceedings, but this was the first time that I came across such pressure being exerted on the court.\nI request you to look into the above events and to take action against the [court’s President and her Deputy].” 26.  On 16 December 2003 the other lay assessor who had withdrawn, Ms I., sent a similar letter to the High Judiciary Qualification Panel. 27.  Similar allegations were made by Ms T., a court secretary, in a letter to the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. She related her participation in Zaytsev’s case and volunteered to testify that the applicant had indeed been frequently called up by the court president and had been distressed because of the intrusion in the court proceedings. She also complained about the unacceptable behaviour of the public prosecutor, who had forced, in her opinion, the lay assessors to withdraw. 28.  Following the applicant’s complaint of 2 December 2003, the High Judiciary Qualification Panel appointed Mr S., a judge of the Moscow City Commercial Court, to examine the allegations against Ms Yegorova. 29.  The Government submitted a copy of a report prepared by Mr S. and submitted to the High Judiciary Qualification Panel, which contained the following conclusions:\n–  during the hearing of the criminal case against Zaytsev the applicant herself consulted Ms Yegorova, seeking advice on the conduct of the proceedings in view of the public prosecutor’s behaviour;\n–  further communications between the applicant and Ms Yegorova and, on another occasion, the deputy court president, took place in private and their content could not be established;\n–  there was insufficient evidence that Ms Yegorova exerted pressure on the applicant, since both Ms Yegorova and the deputy court president denied the allegations;\n–  Ms Yegorova transferred the criminal case file against Zaytsev to another judge on the grounds that Ms Kudeshkina “was unable to conduct the court hearing, her procedural acts were inconsistent, [she acted] in breach of the principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms, she stated her legal opinion on the pending criminal case and she attempted to seek the court president’s advice on the case, and in view of the existence of confidential reports by relevant agencies to the Moscow City Court President with regard to judge Kudeshkina, in connection with the examination of Zaytsev’s case and other criminal cases”. 30.  On 11 May 2004 the High Judiciary Qualification Panel reported to the President of the Supreme Court their findings concerning the complaint against Ms Yegorova. He decided, without elaborating on the reasons, that there were no grounds for charging Ms Yegorova with a disciplinary offence. 31.  On 17 May 2004 the High Judiciary Qualification Panel decided to dispense with disciplinary proceedings against Ms Yegorova. No copy of this decision was provided to the Court. On the same day the applicant was informed by letter that her complaint against the court president had been examined and that no further action was considered necessary. 32.  In the meantime, on an unidentified date prior to the applicant’s above reinstatement in the judicial function, the President of the Moscow Judicial Council sought termination of the applicant’s office as judge. He applied to the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow, alleging that during her election campaign the applicant had behaved in a manner inconsistent with the authority and standing of a judge. He claimed that in her interviews she had intentionally insulted the court system and individual judges and had made false statements that could mislead the public and undermine the authority of the judiciary. The applicant filed her objections. 33.  The hearing before the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow was scheduled for 24 March 2004, but was then adjourned until 31 March 2004, at the applicant’s request, on health grounds. It was subsequently adjourned for the applicant’s failure to appear until 14 April 2004, then until 28 April 2004, 12 May 2004 and, finally, 19 May 2004. 34.  On 19 May 2004 the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow examined the Moscow Judicial Council’s request. The applicant was absent from the proceedings, apparently without any valid excuse. The Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow decided that the applicant had committed a disciplinary offence and that her office as a judge was to be terminated in accordance with the Law “On the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation”. The decision, in so far as relevant, read as follows:\n“During her election campaign, in order to win fame and popularity with the voters, judge Kudeshkina deliberately disseminated deceptive, concocted and insulting perceptions of the judges and judicial system of the Russian Federation, degrading the authority of the judiciary and undermining the prestige of the judicial profession, in violation of the Law On the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation and the Code of Honour of a Judge in the Russian Federation.\nThus, in November 2003, when meeting with [members of her] constituency, judge Kudeshkina stated that the Prosecutor General’s Office exerts unprecedented pressure on judges during examination of a number of criminal cases by the Moscow City Court.\nIn the live broadcast of her interview with the radio station Ekho Moskvy on 1 December 2003, judge Kudeshkina stated that ‘years of working in the Moscow City Court have led me to doubt the existence of independent courts in Moscow’; ‘a judge, although defined by law as an embodiment of judicial power and independent in this capacity, in fact often finds himself in a position of an ordinary clerk, a subordinate of a court president’; ‘the courts of law are used as an instrument of commercial, political or personal manipulation’; ‘if all judges keep quiet this country may soon end up in a [state of] judicial lawlessness.’\nIn the interview with the newspaper Izvestiya of 4 December 2003, judge Kudeshkina stated: ‘looking around, one is just stunned by the lawlessness. The law applies quite strictly to ordinary people, but this is not the case when it comes to persons holding important posts. But they break the law too – although they are not subject to liability’; ‘the court administration tests each judge to see how flexible he is, so that when it comes to [the allocation of cases] they know who can be entrusted with a delicate case and whom to avoid’.\nIn another interview with judge Kudeshkina, published in Novaya Gazeta on 4 December 2003, she also stated that ‘in Siberia, by the way, the courts are much purer than in Moscow. There you cannot imagine such brutal manipulation and would not be talking about corruption to such an extent’; ‘I doubt that any provincial courts would harbour scandals as outrageous as those in the Moscow City Court, but this a question of degree, while the problems are more general’; ‘a judge, although defined by law as an embodiment of judicial power and independent in this capacity, in fact often finds himself in a position of an ordinary clerk, a subordinate of a court president. The mechanism of how a decision is imposed on a judge is not to contact [the judge] directly, instead a prosecutor or an interested person calls the court president, who then tries to talk the judge into a ‘right’ decision, first gently, by offering advice or a professional opinion, then pushing him or her more strongly to take the ‘correct’ decision, that is, one that is convenient to somebody’; ‘in reality a court still more often than not takes the position of the prosecution. The courts then become an instrument of commercial, political or personal manipulation. No one can rest assured that his case – whether civil or criminal or administrative – will be resolved in accordance with the law, and not just to please someone’.\nIn so doing judge Kudeshkina knowingly and intentionally disseminated in civil society false and untruthful fabrications about the arbitrariness allegedly prevailing in the judicial sphere; that, in dealing with specific cases, judges find themselves under constant and undisguised pressure exercised through the court presidents; that the court presidents pre-test to what extent one or other judge may be controlled in order to determine who could be entrusted with delivering a knowingly unjust judgment in a case; that no one can be sure that his case is examined by an impartial tribunal; that judges in fact betray the interests of justice by adopting the position of the prosecution in most cases; that a judge in this country is not independent and honest, but [is] a typical subordinate public servant; that in this country we have complete lawlessness, and judicial chaos.\nThe above-mentioned statements by judge Kudeshkina are clearly based on fantasies, on knowingly false and distorted facts.\nHowever, dissemination by a judge of such information poses a great public danger because it signifies deliberate slandering of the authority of the judiciary and intentional undermining of the prestige of the judicial profession, and also promotes incorrect ideas about corrupted, dependent and biased judicial authorities in this country, which leads to the loss of public trust in the fairness and impartiality of examination of cases brought before the courts of law.\nAs a result, the false information imparted to civil society by judge Kudeshkina, a member of the judiciary of Russia, undermined public confidence that the judiciary in Russia are independent and impartial; consequently, many citizens were lead to believe, erroneously, that all judges in this country are unprincipled, biased and venal, that in exercising their functions they only pursue their own mercenary ends or other selfish goals and interests.\n...\nIn support of her unsubstantiated and groundless attempts to defile the judicial system of our country, judge Kudeshkina referred [in her interviews] to the criminal case against P.V. Zaytsev, in which she had earlier acted as judge.\nShe referred to the same case in her complaint to the High Judiciary Qualification Panel of the Russian Federation.\n...\nAccording to the note of the President of the High Judiciary Qualification Panel (ref. no. BKK-7242/03 of 17 May 2004), the High Judiciary Qualification Panel of the Russian Federation carried out an enquiry to verify the allegations made by judge Kudeshkina in her complaint; the President of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation concluded, on the basis of the above, that there were no grounds to grant her request.\nThus, the allegations of interference with judge Kudeshkina’s exercise of judicial function have not been confirmed by the conclusions of the enquiry.\nThe Qualification Board of Moscow notes that judge Kudeshkina did not make these allegations during the period when she was examining the case against Zaytsev, but nearly half a year later, during and immediately after the election campaign. Therefore the Panel considers that the dissemination by judge Kudeshkina of false and untrue information is based only on her subjective conjectures and personal insinuations.\nBesides, in making her statements in the media judge Kudeshkina disclosed specific factual information concerning the criminal proceedings in the case against Zaytsev, before the judgment in this case had entered into legal force.\n...\n[The Law on the Status of Judges in the Russian Federation and the Code of Honour of a Judge in the Russian Federation] obliged her to refrain from any public statements discrediting the judiciary and the justice [system] in general.\n...\nIn sum, the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow finds the actions of judge Kudeshkina to have degraded the honour and dignity of a judge, discredited the authority of the judiciary [and] caused substantial damage to the prestige of the judicial profession, thus constituting a disciplinary offence.\nIn choosing the disciplinary sanction to be imposed on judge Kudeshkina the qualification board takes into account that in making her statements [she] dishonoured the judges and the judicial system of Russia; she disseminated false information about her colleagues; she traded the dignity, responsibility and integrity of a judge for a political career; demonstrated bias when hearing a case; preferred her own political and other interests to the values of justice; abused her status as a judge in propagating legal nihilism and causing irreparable damage to the foundations of judicial authority. ...” 35.  The decision indicated that it could be challenged before a court within 10 days of being served. 36.  The applicant applied to the Moscow City Court, contesting the decision of the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow. 37.  On 13 September 2004 the applicant filed a request with the President of the Supreme Court to transfer her case from the Moscow City Court to another court, on the grounds that the former would lack impartiality. 38.  On 7 October 2004 the Moscow City Court, composed of a single judge, began to examine the case. The applicant first challenged the judge on the grounds that he was a member of the Moscow Judicial Council and was thus directly associated with the other party to the proceedings. She further claimed that the Moscow City Court, in any composition, would lack independence and impartiality because the impugned statements were specifically concerned with that court and its President. This request was examined on the same day and was refused, on the grounds that it was not possible to transfer the case to another judge within the same court and that only a higher court was entitled to transfer the case to another court. The applicant lodged a request seeking to have the case adjourned pending the Supreme Court’s decision on her request for transfer of the case; this was also refused. 39.  On 8 October 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the decision of the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow. It found that the applicant’s statements in the media were false, unsubstantiated and damaging to the reputation of the judiciary and the authority of all law courts. It also established that the applicant had publicly expressed an opinion prejudicial to the outcome of a pending criminal case. It concluded that the applicant had abused the right to freedom of expression out of political ambition, that she had publicly denied the rule of law and that such conduct was incompatible with holding judicial office. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument that the decision was taken in her absence, having found that after many adjournments she had failed to present the court with any document certifying the reasons for her absence. It also dismissed her objection that at the time of the election campaign her duties as a judge were suspended and held that, during the suspension, she was still bound by the rules of conduct applicable to judges. Concerning the applicability of the Code of Honour of a Judge in the Russian Federation, the court decided that it was in force and legally binding at the material time and could be applied in this case. 40.  The applicant filed an appeal with the Supreme Court. 41.  On 25 October 2004 the applicant received a letter from judge R. of the Supreme Court, informing her that transfer of the case from the Moscow City Court was refused on the grounds that it would be contrary to the rules of jurisdiction. 42.  On 19 January 2005 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, ruling at final instance, upheld the judgment of 8 October 2004, having reiterated the earlier findings by the Judiciary Qualification Board of Moscow and the Moscow City Court. On the question of the alleged lack of impartiality by the Moscow City Court, which considered the case at first instance, it found that the applicant had not made any relevant complaints in the proceedings before the Moscow City Court and was therefore barred from raising this objection on appeal.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Rīga. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  In July 2003 the applicant was convicted of unauthorised acquisition and storage of narcotic substances. According to the criminal case file he had acquired and stored for personal use nine packages of a narcotic substance which contained 0.5108 grams of methamphetamine. The applicant pleaded guilty. He was given a suspended prison sentence. Before 2003 he had been convicted four times of theft. 8.  At the Government Agent’s request the State police furnished the following information on 5 October 2011:\n“...since 2002 the Anti-Drugs Office [Narkotiku apkarošanas birojs – ONAP] had information to the effect that [the applicant] had been involved in the trafficking of narcotic substances. [The applicant] has six previous convictions; before [the arrest] he was convicted on 18 July 2003 of unauthorised acquisition, storage and transfer of narcotic substances with intent to sell...\nIn February 2004 the Anti-Drugs Office received new unofficial information in connection with the applicant’s drug-trafficking activities. [The Office] therefore commenced undercover investigation by carrying out a preliminary inquiry (izziņa), as a result of which on 24 February 2004 the [investigators] opened Case No. 7004204 in order to verify the operational information (operatīvās pārbaudes lieta). Information concerning the applicant was entered in the operational records (operatīvā uzskaite). Within the framework of the above proceedings [the investigators] collected information from various sources and carried out several operational investigative measures, including operational inquiry (izzināšana) phone tapping, which was authorised by the Supreme Court.\nThe information acquired during the verification process confirmed that the applicant was involved in drug trafficking. Accordingly, operational case (operatīvās izstrādes lieta) No. 7019304 was opened on 27 October 2004. Various operational measures were carried out within the [above case], including operational surveillance (operatīvā novērošana), operational interception of telephone conversations (operatīva sarunu noklausīšanās) and others.\nThree undercover operations conducted in the context of the operational case were used as evidence of [the applicant’s] guilt, in the criminal proceedings ...which were instituted on 1 December 2004. [Their] aim was to create a situation in which the applicant would have an opportunity to either procure narcotics or refuse to do so, in order to determine how he would behave.\nAs a result it was proved that [the applicant] procures narcotic substances in large quantities.\n...” 9.  According to the information provided by the Government, on 2, 11 and 30 November 2004, at the request of the Anti-Drugs Office, a specially authorised prosecutor from the Office of the Prosecutor General (Ģenerālprokuratūras īpaši pilnvarots prokurors) authorised the carrying-out of investigative tests (operatīvais eksperiments) in which an undercover police agent, I., was supposed to make a “test” purchase of amphetamine from the applicant. The authorisation was granted in accordance with section 15(3) of the Law on Operational Activities (Operatīvās darbības likums, hereafter “the LOA”) (see the relevant domestic law part below). 10.  According to the statements of the undercover police agent I. and the reports of the official of the Anti-Drugs Office, the investigative tests were carried out in the following manner. On 3 November 2004 I. called the applicant and asked to meet him. The applicant replied that he was busy. Later the applicant called back and they arranged a meeting. When they met, I. gave the applicant 500 Latvian lati (LVL) (approximately 700 euros (EUR)) in marked banknotes. According to I.’s statement, they did not enter into a conversation. The applicant said that he would call back. Later the same day I. called the applicant, who told him that everything would be fine. I. again called the applicant, who told him that the deal had fallen through and that they had to meet at a petrol station. At the petrol station I. called the applicant, who gave him instructions where to find the “goods”, which consisted of about 100 grams of amphetamine. Their conversations were recorded. 11.  According to I.’s statements, he also arranged a meeting with the applicant on 8 November 2004 in a supermarket in order to establish contact and gain the applicant’s trust. The applicant asked I. if everything had gone well and I. replied that everyone was satisfied, meaning that he had delivered the drugs to his partners. Then I. asked if there was any possibility of purchasing larger quantities of amphetamine. The applicant replied that this was not possible, but then added that he had 300 grams of amphetamine which he could sell. I. then asked about those 300 grams of amphetamine and the applicant replied that he could sell them the same day. I. told him that he could not make it that day, to which the applicant said “tomorrow then”, and they agreed to call each other. Later on I. asked the applicant about his occupation, to which the latter replied that it was his “only bread”, meaning drug trafficking. These statements could not be heard on the recordings because the applicant spoke in a low voice. 12.  On 25 November 2004 I. called the applicant and asked him to procure the same type and amount of drugs as before. They met at a petrol station and I. gave him LVL 500 (approximately EUR 700). The applicant took the money. Later he asked I. to come to a restaurant where the applicant was waiting for a supplier. On the same day the applicant met I. in a restaurant and delivered a package of about 100 grams of amphetamine by putting them under a chair cover. 13.  On 1 December 2004 I. called the applicant and asked to meet him. During the meeting I. offered to purchase 400 grams of the same type of drugs for LVL 2,000 (approximately EUR 2,800). The applicant told him that he was not sure whether he could supply it. I. said he wanted to pay in two instalments, and gave the applicant half the agreed sum. I. asked about a discount and the applicant lowered the price by LVL 80. The next day the applicant complained to I. that the money was marked. Afterwards, all attempts to contact the applicant were unsuccessful. 14.  On 1 December 2004 the Anti-Drugs Office initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant on charges of aggravated unauthorised acquisition and possession of narcotic substances with intent to sell. 15.  On 6 December 2004 the applicant was arrested by the police. He refused to give any statements. 16.  On 7 December 2004 the Rīga City Centre District Court authorised a search of the applicant’s home, where the police officers seized a weighing scale, some money and a SIM card for a mobile phone. The results of a forensic chemical examination revealed traces of unauthorised psychotropic substances on the scale. 17.  On 9 December 2004 a judge of the same court remanded the applicant in custody. The judge noted that the file did not contain, inter alia, the authorisation from a specialised prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor General to carry out the undercover operation. The court extended the applicant’s detention on several occasions. 18.  In response to a request by the Specialised Prosecutor’s Office for Organised Crime and Other Offences, the Office of the Prosecutor General stated that the undercover operations in respect of the applicant had been authorised by the prosecutor on 2, 11 and 30 November 2004. The relevant decisions had not been added to the criminal case file since they were classified in accordance with the Law on State Secret. 19.  On 29 December 2004 the criminal case was sent to the prosecutor’s office and on 4 January 2005 the applicant was charged with unauthorised acquisition and possession of narcotic substances with intent to sell. On 6 May 2005 the applicant was presented with the bill of indictment, which referred to the undercover operations of 3 and 25 November 2004. 20.  On 23 May 2005 the Rīga Regional Court decided to commit the applicant for trial. 21.  On 21 October 2005 the Rīga Regional Court convicted the applicant of aggravated unauthorised acquisition and possession of narcotic substances with intent to sell and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. Police officer I. did not attend the hearing and his statements given during the pre-trial proceedings were read out. The court heard evidence from a police officer, T., who in the course of the undercover operation had carried out surveillance and tracking of the applicant. When questioned at the hearing, officer T. stated that during the period in question the applicant had tried to avoid being tracked and had met with suspicious individuals who might have been involved in drug trafficking. The Court also questioned V., who stated that the applicant had brought the marked banknotes to the currency exchange office at which she worked, to have them checked to see if they were forged. 22.  The court relied on: the written statements provided by the police officers on the conduct of the investigative tests carried out on 3 and 25 November and from 1 to 6 December 2004; information about the telephone conversations between police officer I. and the applicant; an inspection report on the marked banknotes; an inspection report on the recording of the conversations between the applicant and officer I.; a forensic chemical report according to which the items seized at the applicant’s apartment bore traces of amphetamine and cocaine; a medical examination report according to which no presence of psychotropic substances had been found in his body but traces of marihuana had been found on his hands; and a forensic chemical report on the narcotic substances acquired during the undercover operation. Items seized at the applicant’s apartment (see paragraph 16 above), together with various data storage devices (a SIM card, a CD and an audio tape), were admitted as physical evidence in the criminal proceedings. 23.  On appeal, the applicant requested witness I.’s attendance at the hearing but during the appeal hearing withdrew his request. On 15 September 2006 the Rīga Regional Court dismissed the appeal. It dismissed the incitement plea, finding that it was merely a defence strategy used in an attempt to mitigate the charges. 24.  In an appeal on points of law the applicant alleged that police officer I. had incited him to commit the offence. 25.  Following a request from the Senate of the Supreme Court to furnish observations, the Office of the Prosecutor General on 1 March 2007 submitted the following arguments in support of the dismissal of the applicant’s incitement plea:\n“...Section 15(3) of the LOA authorises ... the carrying-out of undercover operations the aim of which is to determine the behaviour of a person ... in a situation which is liable to result in (izraisa) criminal or otherwise unlawful activities. Section 22 of the LOA provides that the precondition for instigating operational proceedings (izstrāde) is ... information ... which provides sufficient basis to suspect [specific] individuals of committing or preparing to commit an offence. Based on the above provisions [and] after having received authorisation from the prosecutor, the investigators are authorised to create a situation which is conducive to (veicina) the disclosure of [an individual’s] criminal intent, but in which [the individual] remains free to choose whether or not to carry out the criminal activities. ... The applicant did not become involved in the trafficking of narcotic substances as a result of the undercover operation; on the contrary, the criminal activities commenced by the applicant [had been] interrupted.” 26.  The Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It noted that the pre-trial investigation in the criminal case had been conducted before the Law of Criminal Procedure entered into force and that the former Code of Criminal Procedure did not regulate special investigative activities. With regard to the incitement plea, the Senate found as follows:\n“... It is clear from the materials of the case that on 2, 11 and 30 November 2004 a prosecutor from the Office of the Prosecutor General approved the decision of the Anti-Drugs Office to conduct undercover operations in relation to [the applicant] in order to record [the latter’s] behaviour when [the investigator] asked [him] to supply him with narcotic substances against payment.\n... there is no evidence in support of the allegations that the police officer incited the applicant to commit a criminal offence; neither did [the officer] apply methods aimed at overcoming the applicant’s doubts or his resistance to committing a crime.\nThe Court of Cassation concludes that, in accordance with the Law on Operational Activities, the aim of an investigative test is to record a person’s behaviour in a situation in which he or she is liable to commit criminal or other unlawful acts.\nIt was established that the police officers had sufficient information to suspect [the applicant] of unlawful activities involving narcotic substances...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1948, 1939, 1946, 1973 and 1941 respectively. The first applicant, Mr Fulvio Rossi, lives in Turin, while the other applicants live in Naples. 5.  The applicants inherited a plot of land in Crispano. The land in issue – of a surface area of 8,950 square metres – was recorded in the land register as Folio no. 2, Parcel no. 44. 6.  On 9 February 1982 the Mayor of Crispano issued a decree authorising the Municipality to take possession, through an expedited procedure and on the basis of a public-interest declaration, of 416 square metres of the applicants’ land in order to begin the construction of a road. 7.  On 23 March 1982 the authorities took physical possession of the land. 8.  By a writ served on 30 May 1990, the applicants brought an action for damages against the Crispano Municipality in the Naples District Court. They alleged that the occupation of the land was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without there having been a formal expropriation of the land and payment of compensation. They claimed a sum corresponding to the market value of the land and a further sum in damages for the loss of enjoyment of the land, both during the periods of lawful and unlawful occupation. Lastly, the applicants claimed compensation for the demolition of buildings and the destruction of crops present on the land. 9.  On an unspecified date the court ordered an expert valuation of the land. In a report submitted on 5 November 1996 the expert concluded that the market value of the land on the date of its irreversible alteration, which he identified as having occurred in 1987, corresponded to 73,682 Italian lire (ITL) per square metre (38.054 euros (EUR)). 10.  By a judgment delivered on 31 May 2000 and filed with the court registry on 12 January 2001, the Naples District Court declared that the possession of the land, which had been initially authorised, had become unlawful as of 23 March 1990. It found that the land had been irreversibly transformed by the public works. As a result, in accordance with the constructive-expropriation rule (occupazione acquisitiva or accessione invertita), the applicants had been deprived of their property, by virtue of its irreversible alteration, on the date on which the possession had ceased to be lawful. In the light of those considerations, the court concluded that the applicants were entitled to compensation in consideration for the loss of ownership caused by the unlawful occupation. 11.  The court considered that the land could be classified as building land and that its market value on the date the occupation had become unlawful (23 March 1990) corresponded to ITL 275,000 per square metre (EUR 142.026). 12.  The court held that the applicants were entitled to compensation, calculated in accordance with Law no. 662 of 1996, which had entered into force in the meantime, in the sum of ITL 61,339,393 (equivalent to EUR 31,679.53), to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest. 13.  The court further awarded the applicants ITL 22,305,234 (EUR 11,519.692) as compensation for the damage occasioned by the unavailability of the land during the period from the beginning of the lawful occupation (23 March 1982) until the date of loss of ownership (23 March 1990), as well as 45,400,000 (EUR 23,447.143) as compensation for the demolition of buildings and the destruction of crops present on the land. 14.  On 31 May 2001 the Municipality appealed against the order before the Naples Court of Appeal. 15.  By a judgment of 27 May 2003 the Court of Appeal held that the applicants were entitled to compensation in the sum of EUR 48,899.90 to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest for the loss of ownership caused by the unlawful occupation. The court further awarded EUR 7,090.90 as compensation for the period of lawful occupation from 23 March 1982 to 23 March 1990. 16.  The judgment became final on 31 October 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1956, 1963, 1985, 1995 and 2001 respectively and live in Čakovec. The first and second applicants are husband and wife and the third to fifth applicants are their children. 5.  During 2004 M.T., the first and second applicants’ daughter and the third to fifth applicants’ sister, entered into a relationship with a certain M.M. They started living together with the applicants in their home. On 1 March 2005 they had a child, V.T. Soon afterwards M.M. had a series of disputes with the members of the household and often expressed verbal threats against M.T., which resulted in him moving out of the house in July 2005. On 4 January 2006 the Čakovec Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Čakovec – hereinafter “the Welfare Centre”) filed a report with the Međimurje Police Department (Policijska uprava međimurska) stating, inter alia, that on 2 January 2006 M.M. had come to the Centre and claimed that he had a bomb and would “throw it at his former wife [meaning M.T.] and child”. 6.  On 5 January 2006 M.T. lodged a criminal complaint with the Čakovec State Attorney’s Office against M.M. She alleged that on a number of occasions since July 2005 M.M. had come to her parents’ house where she also lived with her daughter and had threatened to kill her and their daughter with a bomb unless she agreed to come back to him. He had also often made telephone calls and sent SMS messages to her by mobile phone repeating the same threats. 7.  On 3 February 2006 M.M. was detained following the instigation of the criminal proceedings against him in the Čakovec Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Čakovcu) on 27 January 2006. A psychiatric opinion obtained during the proceedings stated that on 2 January 2006 M.M. had claimed before the employees of the Welfare Centre that he had a bomb and that his threats had been meant seriously. He had repeated the same claim on 19 January 2006 before police officers from the Međimurje Police Department. The relevant parts of the conclusions of the report read as follows:\n“1. Defendant M.M. is a person suffering from a profound personality disorder etiologically linked to innate malfunctioning of the brain and the highly unfavourable pedagogical circumstances of his childhood. Dg: mixed personality disorder ... 2. In the context of the said personality disorder the defendant’s reaction to a problematic situation was an inadequate and pathological defence mechanism with inflated ideas and related activities. These inflated ideas do not amount to a mental illness. 3. I have not found elements of either permanent or temporary innate mental illness, diminished intellectual capacity or epilepsy which might be linked to the criminal offences with which the defendant is charged. 5. In view of what has been said under 1, 2 and 3 and in view of all the other information collected so far in connection with the criminal offences, I consider that his ability to wilfully control and understand the meaning and consequences of his act tempore criminis was diminished, but that [he was not] completely unaccountable. 6. There is a strong likelihood that he will repeat the same or similar criminal offences. In order to prevent this, I recommend that the court, apart from the other measures, order compulsory psychiatric treatment with a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach with the aim of developing an ability to resolve difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.” 8.  On 15 March 2006 the Municipal Court found M.M. guilty of threatening M.T. on several occasions during the period between July and 30 December 2005 both in front of her family house and at the parking lot near the city graveyard when M.T. had been alone. He had shouted threats that he would kill her, himself and their child with a bomb; at the Welfare Centre on 2 January 2006 he had said that his threats had been meant seriously, that he actually had a bomb and that he would kill himself and the child with the bomb on the child’s first birthday on 1 March 2006. He was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment and a security measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment was ordered during his imprisonment and afterwards as necessary. In ordering the defendant’s compulsory psychiatric treatment the court relied entirely on the findings of the psychiatric report. The relevant part of the judgment read as follows:\n“... throughout the whole period in question the defendant had been telling the victim that he would throw a bomb at himself and their child as well as her [the victim] if she happened to be around. These events came to a head on 30 December. The defendant did not refrain from mentioning a bomb either in front of the Welfare Centre’s employees or a policeman. Furthermore, he said in front of the policemen that he would blow himself and the child up with a bomb on the child’s first birthday. Therefore, there is no doubt that both the victim and the witnesses understood these threats as being meant seriously ... Thus, the victim’s fears for her own as well as her child’s safety were justified ...\n...\n... all conditions for ordering a security measure [of compulsory psychiatric treatment] have been fulfilled since the defendant committed a crime while his capacity for understanding was diminished and it is likely that he will repeat the same or similar offence. It is necessary to order compulsory psychiatric treatment during his prison term and after his release. The treatment shall take a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach, as recommended by the expert, in order to develop [the defendant’s] ability to address difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.” 9.  On 28 April 2006 the Čakovec County Court (Županijski sud u Čakovcu) reduced the security measure to the duration of M.M.’s prison sentence and upheld the remaining part of the judgment. The relevant part of the judgment reads as follows:\n“... there is no doubt that frequent murder threats by ... a bomb should by any objective test have been understood as meant seriously and that [such threats] would cause a real sense of disquiet, fear and anxiety in an average person, in particular in a situation where the victim has known the perpetrator as an aggressive person out of control, as is the case with the victim in the present case.\nThere is also no doubt that ... the defendant’s threats extended throughout a period of half a year during which the victim feared, owing to continued threats, not only for her own safety but also for the safety and wellbeing of her child which was not even a year old at the time. The victim was thus undoubtedly put in a difficult and unenviable position where she feared daily for her and her daughter’s life, which was confirmed not only in her testimony but also the fact that she sought assistance from the competent authorities [such as] the police, the Social Welfare Centre and the State Attorney.\n...\nWhile examining ... the impugned judgment under Article 379 paragraph 1(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure this appellate court has established that the first-instance court violated the statutory provisions to the detriment of the defendant when it ordered that a security measure of compulsory psychiatric treatment should continue after the defendant’s release [from prison], which is contrary to Article 75 of the Criminal Code according to which compulsory psychiatric treatment may last as long as the reasons for its application exist but no longer than the prison term.\n...\n... this court does not agree with the defendant’s argument that in his case the purpose of punishment would be achieved by a suspended sentence, especially in view of the fact that the defendant ... did not show any self-criticism as regards his acts or any feelings of remorse for what he had said ...” 10.  M.M. served his sentence in Varaždin Prison and was released on 3 July 2006. On 15 August 2006 he shot M.T., her daughter V.T. and himself. Before the shooting he was spotted by M.T.’s neighbour carrying an automatic gun and leaving his bicycle in the adjacent woods. The neighbour immediately called the police. The police arrived at the scene twenty minutes later, just after the tragic event. 11.  On 15 August 2006 the police interviewed M.T.’s neighbour I.S. who had seen M.M. approaching M.T.’s house immediately before the critical event. At the request of the police, on 17 August 2006 an investigating judge of the Varaždin County Court issued a search warrant of a flat and a vehicle belonging to a certain M.G. who was suspected of having procured weapons for M.M. The warrant was executed the same day, but no connection was established between M.G. and the weapons used by M.M.. The investigating judge has not taken any further steps in that case. 12.  On 18 August 2006 the police submitted a report to the Čakovec County State Attorney’s Office detailing the circumstances of the tragic event. 13.  On 28 November 2006 the State Attorney’s Office dismissed a criminal complaint against M.M. for murdering M.T. and V.T. on the ground that he was dead. It is unclear who lodged that complaint, but a copy of this decision was sent to the applicants. In a letter of the same day the State Attorney’s Office asked the Međimurje Police Department to collect all information concerning psychiatric treatment of M.M. in Varaždin Prison. The relevant part of a report drawn up on 13 December 2006 by the Varaždin prison authorities reads as follows:\n “M.M. had been kept in detention on remand in Varaždin Prison from 3 February to 22 May 2006 when he was sent to serve his prison term ... which expired on 3 July 2006.\nA psychiatric examination of M.M. carried out during his stay in detention showed that he suffered from a mixed personality disorder which derived from innate malfunctioning of the brain and the unfavourable pedagogical circumstances of his childhood. In the same opinion the expert psychiatrist recommended that compulsory psychiatric treatment be ordered with a predominantly psychotherapeutic approach with the aim [that M.M.] develop an ability to resolve difficult situations in life in a more constructive manner.\nWhile M.M. served his prison term, intensive treatment consisting in frequent individual conversational sessions was envisaged, in accordance with the individual programme of serving a prison term. He rarely came for the sessions of his own accord and was therefore, in [order to satisfy] the need for treatment, requested to do so by the staff. ...\nWhile in prison M.M. saw the prison doctor on five occasions, sometimes of his own accord, sometimes at the doctor’s call. He did not insist on his psychiatric therapy and therefore his treatment was based, as recommended by the expert, on intensive psychotherapeutic treatment by the staff, the prison governor and the others who talked to him. He was a highly introverted person, so his true personality could not be detected in detention or prison conditions.” 14.  On 11 December 2006 the Međimurje Police Department interviewed the Varaždin prison governor, P.L. The relevant part of a report on the interview drawn up on 2 December 2006 reads as follows:\n“The above-mentioned is the governor of Varaždin Prison and he states that the late M.M. served his prison term in Varaždin Prison from 3 February to 3 July 2006 ...\nWhile in prison M.M. underwent psychiatric treatment pursuant to the expert opinion and recommendation. The treatment was based on intensive psychotherapeutic treatment of M.M. consisting of conversational sessions between M.M. and the prison staff, himself [meaning the governor] and the prison doctor. During the treatment M.M. neither received nor asked for any pharmacotherapy. It was also established that M.M. was a very introverted person who did not wish to cooperate in the treatment.\nDuring his stay in the prison M.M. saw the prison doctor on five occasions in connection with some other problems, that is to say, illnesses.\nHe further maintains that there are no internal regulations on the implementation of security measures and that all treatment is carried out in accordance with the Enforcement of Prison Sentences Act.” 15.  According to the Government, since no oversights on the part of the persons in charge of the execution of the M.M.’s prison term and security measure had been established, the investigation was concluded, although no formal decision to that effect has been adopted. 16.  M.M.’s medical record from prison, submitted by the Government, does not indicate any psychiatric or psychotherapeutic treatment. 17.  On 6 November 2006 the applicants submitted a proposal to the State Attorney for a settlement of their claim for non-pecuniary damages related to the deaths of M.T. and V.T. They alleged failures by the competent authorities to take adequate steps to protect the lives of M.T. and V.T. and inadequacy of the investigation into the circumstances of their deaths. They sought 1,105,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) in compensation and HRK 13,481 for costs. They received no reply. Under section 186(a) of the Civil Procedure Act, where such a request has been refused or no decision has been taken within three months of its submission the person concerned may file an action with the competent court. The applicants have not brought a civil action.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are husband and wife. They were born in 1981 and 1987 respectively and live in Syktyvkar in the Komi Republic of Russia. 7.  The first applicant, a Georgian national, arrived in Russia in 1999. On 4 May 2001 he received a first residence permit, which was subsequently extended at regular intervals. 8.  The first applicant’s parents have lived in Syktyvkar since the early 2000s. His father and mother acquired Russian nationality in 2005 and 2008 respectively. 9.  On 26 August 2011 the first applicant married the second applicant, a Russian national. 10.  On 28 June 2012 the second applicant gave birth to a son. 11.  On 14 November 2011 an operative officer of the Federal Service for Drug Control in the Komi Republic discovered that the first applicant had injected himself with desomorphine, a derivative of morphine known under the street name “krokodil”. An administrative case was instituted under Article 6.9 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“Use of narcotic substances without a medical prescription”) and the matter was referred to the Town Court. 12.  On the following day the Syktyvkar Town Court found the first applicant guilty as charged and, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 6.9 concerning foreign nationals, fined him 4,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and ordered his administrative expulsion from Russia (the “expulsion order”). 13.  Counsel for the first applicant appealed. He submitted that the penalty of expulsion was extremely severe given that the first applicant had lived in Russia for almost ten years, his wife, who was pregnant with their first child, was a Russian national and a majority of his relatives lived in Russia. In the lawyer’s opinion, the first applicant’s expulsion would destroy his family life. 14.  On 1 December 2011 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic rejected the appeal, upholding the first applicant’s conviction. On the alleged disruption of the first applicant’s family life, the Supreme Court pronounced as follows:\n“The representative’s argument to the effect that, in the light of Mr Gablishvili’s family situation, the Town Court had wrongly ordered his administrative expulsion from the Russian Federation cannot be taken into account as paragraph 2 of Article 6.9 of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for mandatory expulsion of the offender and is not an alternative to the main penalty which may take the form of either detention or a fine.” 15.  On 24 April 2012 the first applicant paid the fine. 16.  On 29 March 2008 the first applicant was issued with a five-year residence permit that was valid until 8 May 2013. 17.  On 6 June 2011 the Komi Regional Centre for AIDS Prevention and Treatment notified the Komi division of the Federal Migration Service that the first applicant had been diagnosed with HIV. 18.  On 10 June 2011 the Migration Service revoked the first applicant’s residence permit in accordance with section 9(1)(13) of the Foreign Nationals Act, which provided for the revocation of the residence permits of HIV-positive foreign nationals. The first applicant was informed of that decision on 9 November 2011 and ordered to leave Russia within fifteen days. 19.  Counsel for the first applicant challenged the decision before a court, claiming that it amounted to a disproportionate interference with the first applicant’s family life and also put the first applicant’s life at risk. 20.  On 28 February 2012 the Syktyvkar Town Court set aside the decision of 10 June 2011, observing that the first applicant had strong family ties in Russia and could receive medical treatment there with the assistance and under the supervision of his family. However, the Town Court declared itself incompetent to order the reinstatement of the residence permit. 21.  On 31 May 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic heard an appeal against the Town Court’s judgment. It endorsed its reasons for setting aside the decision of 10 June 2011 and noted that the following logical step would be to reinstate the first applicant’s residence permit. It ordered the Migration Service to proceed accordingly. 22.  On 28 June 2012 the Federal Migration Service complied with the judgment and reinstated the first applicant’s residence permit. 23.  On the following day the Migration Service issued a new decision to revoke the permit, referring to the Town Court’s judgment of 15 November 2011 and section 9(1)(3) of the Foreign Nationals Act, which provided for the revocation of residence permits of foreign nationals who were liable to be expelled. 24.  On 20 January 2012 the Federal Service for Drug Control issued a decision on the undesirability of the first applicant’s presence in Russia (the “exclusion order”) which read in its entirety as follows:\n“1.  On the basis of the materials received from the Komi division of the Federal Service for Drug Control, and in accordance with section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act, to declare undesirable the presence in Russia of the Georgian national Mr Gablishvili ... 25.  Counsel for the first applicant challenged the exclusion order in court, claiming that it would disrupt the first applicant’s family life. 26.  On 20 July 2012 the Syktyvkar Town Court found for the first applicant as follows:\n“The grounds for issuing the said decision were the following: use of drugs by the claimant, an offence of which he had been found guilty under Article 6.9 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences by the Town Court’s judgment of 15 November 2011 and fined RUB 4,000, and for which his administrative expulsion had been ordered; the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings on 29 November 2003 on non-exonerating grounds in connection with his active repentance; and his repeated convictions in administrative proceedings for breaches of public order.\nHowever, in the court’s view, these elements are not sufficient to reach the conclusion that Mr Gablishvili, who has lived in Russia for a long time and who has stable family connections and can undergo treatment under his family’s supervision, represents a real threat to national security, public order and health.\nIn these circumstances, taking into account the provisions of the Russian Constitution ... according to which the rights and freedoms of man and citizen are directly operative and determine the essence, meaning and implementation of laws ... and may be restricted only to the extent necessary for the protection of the foundations of the constitutional system, morality, health, the rights and lawful interests of other people, national defence and security, the court considers that the said decision is unlawful and must be quashed.” 27.  On an appeal by the Federal Service for Drug Control, the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic quashed, on 11 October 2012, the Town Court’s judgment and rejected the first applicant’s challenge to the exclusion order, finding as follows:\n“It was established by the Town Court and not disputed by the claimant that Mr Gablishvili was a drug user, that he had previously breached the criminal law and that he had been repeatedly charged with administrative offences in the period from 2003 to 2011.\nThose elements, taken cumulatively, indicate that, while living in the Russian Federation, Mr Gablishvili does not respect the applicable laws and lives an immoral lifestyle which – undoubtedly – is an imminent threat to public order and to the health and morals of Russian citizens.\nThe [Supreme Court] considers that his stable family connections in Russia may not be a bar to deciding on the undesirability of his presence in Russia because the law provides that such a decision may be taken against a specific individual not as a punitive measure but as a means of upholding public order and if it pursues, as stated above, the aim of safeguarding the health and morals of the Russian population.” 28.  In their submissions to the Court, the Government specified that the first applicant’s previous administrative convictions, referred to in the Supreme Court’s decision, had been in respect of the following offences:\n(a)  non-medical use of heroin on 29 January 2009;\n(b)   minor disorderly acts on 25 January and 18 June 2000, 28 October 2003, 19 April 2004 and 30 January 2011;\n(c)  drunkenness in a public place on 26 February 2000;\n(d)  failure to have his residence registered on 25 November 2004; and\n(e)  “non-compliance with existing procedure” on 20 May 2010. 29.  After the Town Court’s judgment dated 15 November 2011, the first applicant was found guilty of the following administrative offences:\n(a)  breach of public order, public drunkenness and refusal to obey a police officer, all committed on 8 March 2012;\n(b)  two cases of public drunkenness and a breach of public order on 27 and 28 May 2012;\n(c)  breach of public order on 30 January 2013, for which the first applicant was sentenced to five-days’ detention; and\n(d)  two driving offences on 31 March and 7 May 2013. 30.  According to the Government, the first applicant’s current whereabouts are not known; he does not live at home. Nor is there any information showing that either the expulsion or the exclusion order has been executed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant is a private small-scale trading company which has its registered office in Yerevan. 5.  On 29 January 2001 the Tax Inspectorate conducted an inspection of the applicant company's accounts. As a result of this inspection, on 2 April 2001 the Ministry of State Revenue (ՀՀ պետական եկամուտների նախարարություն) made an assessment, according to which the applicant company's tax arrears amounted to 3,797,281 Armenian drams (AMD) (approx. 5,400 euros (EUR)), including surcharges and fines prescribed by the relevant tax laws. 6.  On an unspecified date, the Yerevan City Prosecutor's Office (Երևան քաղաքի դատախազություն) and the Tax Inspectorate of the Myasnikyan District of Yerevan (Երևանի Մյասնիկյանի տարածքային հարկային տեսչություն) instituted proceedings against the applicant company, claiming that it had failed to meet its tax obligations in an appropriate and timely manner and seeking to recover the above tax arrears. 7.  On 13 July 2001 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (Երևան քաղաքի Կենտրոն և Նորք-Մարաշ համայնքների առաջին ատյանի դատարան) decided against the applicant company. 8.  On an unspecified date, the applicant company lodged an appeal with the then Commercial Court of Appeal (ՀՀ տնտեսական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարան). The applicant company also requested that payment of the court fee (known as State fee) be deferred. In his request, the manager of the applicant company submitted, inter alia, that the company was experiencing financial problems and that he was the company's sole employee. 9.  On 31 August 2001 the Commercial Court of Appeal granted the applicant company's request for deferral and admitted the appeal. 10.  Following the reform of the court system introduced in Armenia on 11 September 2001 which brought about the establishment of the Commercial Court (ՀՀ տնտեսական դատարան), the applicant company's case was transferred to be examined by that court. 11.  On 5 November 2001 the Commercial Court decided to leave the authorities' claim unexamined on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to appear. In its decision, the Commercial Court levied a court fee on the Tax Inspectorate in the amount of AMD 189,864.05 (approx. EUR 370). 12.  It appears that the proceedings were resumed on an unspecified date. 13.  On 24 December 2001 the Commercial Court decided, at the prosecutor's request, to take measures aimed at securing the claim, freezing the applicant company's property and monetary assets in the amount of AMD 3,797,281. 14.  On an unspecified date, the applicant company lodged a counterclaim with the Commercial Court, seeking to have the 2 April 2001 assessment ruled unlawful. The applicant company requested that the payment of the court fee be deferred on the same grounds as before. 15.  On 18 January 2002 the Commercial Court granted the applicant company's request for deferral of payment of the court fee and allowed the applicant company's counterclaim, referring to Articles 21 (d) and 31 (c) of the Law on State Fees («Պետական տուրքի մասին» ՀՀ օրենք). 16.  On 3 December 2002 the Commercial Court decided to join both claims and to examine them together. 17.  On 20 January 2003 the Commercial Court granted the authorities' claim and dismissed that of the applicant company. The court decided to levy on the applicant company a total of AMD 3,797,281 of tax arrears, including profit tax arrears of AMD 193,400 plus a surcharge of AMD 11,352.9 (approx. EUR 310 and EUR 18 respectively), Value Added Tax (VAT) arrears of AMD 132,610 plus a surcharge of AMD 57,839.44 and a fine of AMD 73,080 (approx. EUR 213, EUR 93 and EUR 117 respectively), and simplified tax arrears of AMD 1,919,820 plus a surcharge of AMD 304,428.66 and a fine of AMD 1,104,750 (approx. EUR 3,096, EUR 491 and EUR 1,781 respectively). In imposing the surcharges and fines, the Commercial Court referred to Article 43 of the Law on Value Added Tax («Ավելացված արժեքի հարկի մասին» ՀՀ օրենք), Articles 25 and 28 of the Law on Taxes («Հարկերի մասին» ՀՀ օրենք) and the provisions relating to the delayed payment of taxes. The amount of the unpaid court fee to be paid by the applicant company was calculated at AMD 79,946 (approx. EUR 129). 18.  On 3 February 2003 the applicant company lodged a cassation appeal. Together with the appeal, the applicant company submitted a request for deferral of payment of the court fee, claiming that the company was experiencing financial problems: the company had only AMD 770 (approx. EUR 1.2) on its books and in its bank account, both of which had been frozen. 19.  By a letter of 14 February 2003 the Court of Cassation informed the applicant company that its cassation appeal would be examined on 28 February 2003. The letter also stated that the appeal would be returned unexamined should the applicant fail to pay the court fee by 24 February 2003. 20.  By a letter of 27 February 2003 the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարան) returned the applicant company's cassation appeal on the ground that it had not paid the required court fee. The judgment of the Commercial Court came into force. 21.  On 28 February 2003 the applicant company applied to the Chairman of the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարանի նախագահ), requesting that its appeal be examined out of time and claiming that it was incapable of paying the court fee since the company had almost no assets and the existing ones were frozen. 22.  By a letter of 13 March 2003 the Senior Advisor to the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարանի քաղաքացիական և տնտեսական գործերի պալատի ավագ խորհրդատու) informed the applicant company that its cassation appeal had been returned since “according to Article 70 of the Code of Civil Procedure [(CCP) (ՀՀ քաղաքացիական դատավարության օրենսգիրք)] commercial entities could not be exempted from payment of the State fee”. 23.  On 25 March 2003 enforcement proceedings were instituted and an injunction was placed on the applicant company's assets in the amount equal to the judgment debt. 24.  On 22 April 2004 the Commercial Court instituted bankruptcy proceedings in respect of the applicant company on the basis of an application lodged by the Tax Inspectorate. 25.  On 20 May 2004 the Commercial Court decided to stay those proceedings until a decision had been taken on the applicant company's application lodged with the European Court. It appears that the bankruptcy proceedings are currently still stayed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant is a lawyer who also writes articles for various Russian law journals and online legal information databases and networks. 7.  According to the applicant, his work usually requires extensive scientific research, including in the field of law enforcement in the Khabarovsk Region. He supported his assertion with copies of contracts with well-known Russian publishing houses and owners of a number of legal magazines, including one supervised by the Secretariat of the President of the Russian Federation. Under the contracts he undertook the task of writing articles on specific topics of legal and social interest. 8.  Having received an assignment to write an article on prostitution and the fight against it in the Khabarovsk Region, on 12 May 2009 the applicant wrote to the head of the Khabarovsk Region police department by registered letter, asking for statistical data for his research. The relevant parts read:\n“[I am] interested in [receiving] information for the period between 2000 and 2009, in particular:\n- [information on] the number of people found administratively liable under Article 6.11 of the ... Code of Administrative Offences (prostitution), with a breakdown by sex, residence (residents of the Khabarovsk Region or visitors), nationality (nationals of the Russian Federation, foreigners or stateless persons) and the year [of the offence];\n- [information on] the number of criminal cases instituted during the above‑mentioned period under Articles 241, 242, 242.1 [and] 127.1 (cases related to sexual exploitation) of the ... Criminal Code, with a breakdown of the specific Articles ... and the year [the case was opened];\n- [information on] the number of individuals found criminally liable under Articles 241, 242, 242.1 [and] 127.1 ... of the ... Criminal Code, with a breakdown by sex, age, educational background, permanent residence (residents of the Khabarovsk Region or visitors), nationality and period [in which the crime was committed];\n- general information on sentences imposed on individuals found criminally liable under Articles 241, 242, 242.1 [and] 127.1 ... of the ... Criminal Code ‑ the types of sentences and in how many cases they were imposed, and the years [they were imposed].\n...\n[I] stress that I do not need any specific personal information about individuals found administratively or criminally liable; [I only need] general statistical information for writing a scientific article.” 9.  It appears from an acknowledgement of receipt that the letter reached the Khabarovsk Region police department on 25 May 2009. 10.  Under Russian law, State officials must provide a reply to letters from individuals within thirty days. In the absence of any response, on 26 June 2009 the applicant lodged a claim with the Tsentralniy District Court of Khabarovsk (“the District Court”), complaining that the police authorities had failed to provide him with the information he had requested and requesting for access. Relying on the Information Act (see below) and Article 10 of the Convention, he argued that the officials’ implied refusal to provide him with the information had been unlawful as he had not asked for access to any confidential personal information, State secrets or information related to internal police working methods. He claimed that his request had related purely to statistical data of a general nature collected by the Information Centre of the Khabarovsk Region police department (hereinafter “the Information Centre”). 11.  On 18 July 2009 the applicant received a letter from the head of the Information Centre, notifying him that information as specific as he had asked for could only be collected on production of a written order issued by a deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, a head of a regional or municipal police department or their divisions or a prosecutor or investigator from a prosecutor’s office. The Information Centre did not collect such information at the request of private individuals. General statistical data summarised by the Information Centre was provided to the Federal Service of State Statistics and in particular its regional office for the Khabarovsk Region, to whom the applicant could apply for the statistical data. 12.  On 19 July 2009 the applicant wrote to the Khabarovsk Region Service of State Statistics (hereinafter “the Statistics Service”) by registered letter, asking for the statistical data for his research. 13.  On 23 July 2009 the head of the Statistics Service replied, stating that specific statistical information on the fight against prostitution had never been provided by the Khabarovsk Regional police department. 14.  The applicant filed copies of his letters from the Information Centre and Statistics Service with the District Court. 15.  On 4 August 2009 it dismissed the applicant’s claim on the grounds that the Information Centre was not authorised to process data requests from private individuals. Under domestic law, the Statistics Service was tasked with dissemination of official statistical data on a broad variety of subjects, including those falling within the applicant’s field of interest. It also noted that the applicant had failed to obtain the information sought from open sources, such as libraries, archives and the Internet. The District Court also stressed that the information requested did not touch upon the applicant’s rights and legitimate interests, so the authorities’ refusal to grant him access to such information had been lawful and well-founded under section 8(2) of the Information Act. 16.  The applicant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the police authorities had exclusive possession of the information sought by him and that he had no other means, including through assistance from the Statistics Service, of obtaining the necessary data. In addition, he submitted that the fact that his rights and legitimate interests were not affected by the requested information had no bearing on the case as under Russian law, it was not only those directly concerned who were granted access to public information. 17.  On 16 September 2009 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 August 2009. Relying on section 8(2) of the Information Act, it concluded that the authorities were not obliged to provide the applicant with the information as it did not touch upon his rights and legitimate interests.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Tsentrelnye Koryaki in the Kamchatka Region. 6.  On 20 June 2005 at approximately 3.30 a.m. he was arrested by traffic police while driving a vehicle which had been declared stolen earlier in the evening, and was taken to the local police station. 7.  On the same day at 3.00 p.m. he gave a confession statement. 8.  Later on at approximately 6.00 p.m. a record of his arrest was drawn up. This document indicated that he had been apprehended at 6.00 p.m. by an investigator, Mr S. 9.  On 22 June 2005 the Yelizovskiy District Court (“the District Court”) authorised the first applicant’s detention. The court found that there were grounds to believe that he would abscond, because he was suspected of having committed an offence punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, was unemployed and without any source of income, and did not reside at his official address. It further referred to the risk that the first applicant might continue his criminal activities on the grounds that, having been released on parole on 17 June 2005, he had been apprehended three days later on suspicion of an offence similar to that for which he already had a conviction. 10.  On 29 June 2005 the first applicant was charged with theft. 11.  On 19 July 2005 the detention order of 22 June 2005 was upheld on appeal. 12.  By a judgment of 1 March 2006, upheld on appeal on 2 May 2006, the District Court convicted the first applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. 13.  The second applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Vladimir. 14.  On 10 April 2005 Ms F. complained of having been raped by three unidentified individuals. 15.  A criminal investigation into the rape was opened at 12 noon on 11 April 2005 and the second applicant was apprehended on the same day. He and the Government provided differing versions of how he was arrested. 16.  According to the second applicant, at around 12 noon he was stopped in the street by police and escorted to the local police station. Between 12.25 p.m and 12.33 p.m. he took part in an identification parade, as a result of which he was identified by the victim as one of the individuals who had raped her. Between 3.10 p.m. and 4.20 p.m. he was questioned by an investigator. A record of his arrest was not drawn up until 11.35 p.m. 17.  According to the Government, the second applicant was taken to the police station as a witness. They have provided no indications as to when he was taken there or why he was considered to be a witness for the purposes of the investigation. The Government further claimed that the second applicant was interviewed as a witness between 3.10 p.m. and 4.20 p.m., and that the identification parade during which he was identified by the victim took place between 10.25 p.m. and 10.33 p.m. At 11.25 p.m. he was arrested as a criminal suspect and ten minutes later an arrest record was drawn up. 18.  During the above procedures, the second applicant waited in different offices of the police station. Had he tried to leave, he would have been stopped by the police officers who were standing guard at the doors of the offices. As soon as the record of arrest was compiled, he was incarcerated. 19.  At 6.25 p.m. on 13 April 2005 the Gus-Khrustalnyy Town Court of the Vladimir Region (hereinafter “the Town Court”) remanded the second applicant in custody on the basis of Article 108 of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the CCrP”) (see paragraph 34 below). It found that he was suspected of having committed a serious criminal offence, had been identified by the victim, had escaped from the scene of the crime, did not work and had a recent criminal record, and that for those reasons he might abscond, reoffend, influence the victim and the other parties to the proceedings, destroy evidence, or otherwise obstruct the proper administration of justice. The Town Court did not address the second applicant’s allegation that he had been unlawfully detained for more than forty-eight hours without judicial authorisation. 20.  On 15 April 2005 the second applicant appealed. Among other things, he complained that his detention was unlawful, on the grounds that he had been brought before a judge more than forty-eight hours after his actual arrest and the Town Court had not established any “exceptional circumstances”, as required by the CCrP in order to place a suspect in detention (see paragraph 33 below). 21.  On 16 May 2005 the Vladimir Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) upheld the order of 13 April 2005. It considered that the second applicant had been apprehended as indicated in the arrest record. It further found that the Town Court had based its decision on sufficient grounds. Lastly, as regards his argument concerning the absence of “exceptional circumstances”, the Regional Court held as follows:\n“The exceptional nature of remanding a criminal suspect in custody implies that he must be charged not later than ten days from the time of his arrest. Otherwise, he should be immediately released.” 22.  In the meantime, on 19 April 2005 the second applicant was charged with aggravated rape. 23.  On 20 December 2005 the Town Court found him guilty as charged and gave him a custodial sentence. 24.  On 3 March 2006 the Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 25.  Between 20 April 2005 and 22 March 2006 the second applicant was held in Vladimir Prison T-2 in connection with the criminal proceedings against him. He submitted that the facility had been severely overcrowded and in an appalling sanitary condition. The detainees did not have access to fresh air, sunlight or drinking water.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1986. Since February 2015 he has been kept in a detention centre for foreign nationals in the town of Makhachkala, Dagestan Republic, Russia. 6.  The applicant arrived in Russia in October 2011. He was in possession of a visa declaring the purpose of his visit as business. The applicant’s visa was due to expire in October 2012. However, the visa allowed the applicant to stay in Russia for no longer than ninety days in the course of a single visit. As submitted by the Government, he was therefore expected to leave Russia in early 2012. 7.  The applicant did not leave and started to live together with Ms B., a Russian national. In November 2013 they had a child together. In April 2014 they married. 8.  In the meantime, on 15 and 19 February 2013 the applicant was found guilty of an offence under Article 18.10 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO), which provided that a foreigner could be punished for unlawful employment activities in Russia. 9.  By judgment of 26 February 2015 the Sovetskiy District Court of Makhachkala found the applicant guilty of an offence under Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the CAO (see paragraph 24 below), of remaining in Russia after the expiry of the visa. It sentenced him to a fine and a penalty of forcible administrative removal (принудительное административное выдворение) from Russia. The District Court held as follows:\n“Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the CAO provides for the following penalties: a fine of between 2,000 and 5,000 roubles with or without administrative removal from Russia ...\n The subsidiary penalty of administrative removal from Russian may be imposed with due regard to the information that confirms the actual need to impose such a penalty on the defendant, as well as the information that confirms the proportionality of this penalty as the only acceptable measure for achieving a balance between the public and private interests at stake ...\nThe defendant has no legal grounds for remaining in Russia. If a fine is imposed, the defendant will add himself to the group of illegal labour immigrants who do everything to avoid compliance with the Russian migration legislation. The penalty of administrative removal is also necessary for the sake of national security, to avoid the spread of various infectious diseases such as HIV, tuberculosis and leprosy, and to ensure the optimal balance of labour resources and in order to support, as a matter of priority, the employment of Russian nationals ...” 10.  In the same judgment the District Court ordered that, while awaiting enforcement of the administrative removal, the applicant be placed in a special detention facility for foreigners in the town of Makhachkala. 11.  Lawyer D. lodged a statement of appeal on behalf of the applicant against the judgment of 26 February 2015. It appears that the applicant raised arguments relating to his family life in Russia; it is unclear whether he raised any argument relating to a risk to his life and physical integrity in the event of enforcement of the penalty of forcible removal. 12.  On 4 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Dagestan Republic upheld the judgment. The appeal court held as follows:\n“Article 18.8 § 1.1 of the CAO provides for the following penalties: a fine of between 2,000 and 5,000 roubles with administrative removal from Russia ...\n[The applicant] has committed a violation of the regime applicable for the presence of foreigners in Russia, by way of omitting after 7 October 2012 to leave Russia ...\nThe court dismisses [the applicant’s] argument relating to his family life in Russia ... The marriage with Ms B. was concluded on 28 April 2014, which was a long time after the commission of the offence by [the applicant] ... The administrative offence record did not contain any information relating to his family life in Russia. No such information was adduced during the proceedings before the first-instance court ...\n[The applicant’s] prolonged violation of the migration legislation since October 2012 amounts to abuse of Russia’s hospitality and thus should be treated as a breach of the receiving country’s interests ...” 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant received a copy of the appeal decision. 14.  The penalty of administrative removal was not enforced. According to the Government, the bailiff service instituted enforcement proceedings on 12 March 2015, but they were not pursued on account of an application lodged by the applicant for temporary asylum (see below). 15.  On 5 May 2015 the applicant applied for temporary asylum. He referred to the ongoing intensive military actions in Syria, in particular in his home town of Aleppo. He further argued that given his age, he would be drafted by the governmental forces for active military service, thereby putting his life and physical integrity in danger. 16.  It appears that the applicant engaged lawyer K. to assist him in those proceedings and had a meeting with him in the detention centre. On 2 June 2015 the applicant called the lawyer from the detention centre, complaining of beatings. On the same day, the lawyer was refused access to the applicant in the detention centre, apparently because he should have obtained authorisation for the visit from the regional migration authority. The lawyer wrote to the regional prosecutor’s office complaining of a violation of the applicant’s rights and physical integrity. 17.  On 4 June 2015 the lawyer made a further unsuccessful attempt to gain access to the applicant. 18.  On 6 August 2015 the local migration authority dismissed the applicant’s application for temporary asylum. The applicant sought review of this refusal before the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”). On 24 September 2015 the FMS upheld its decision, stating as follows:\n“In February 2012 there were no large-scale military operations in Syria; there were only localised hostilities between governmental forces and opposition groups. Despite the above, the applicant failed to leave Russia ... At the time he did not apply for asylum and continued to stay in Russia unlawfully until the imposition of the penalty of administrative removal.\nThe following violations of the migration rules for foreigners should be pointed out:\nThe applicant arrived in Russia under a business visa, whereas his actual goal was employment. Thus, his declared aim did not correspond to the actual aim for arriving in Russia.\nThe applicant was unlawfully engaged in employment activities ...\nIn February 2013 he was twice prosecuted for administrative offences. However, even after this, he did not seek asylum, while neglecting the real possibility of his future deportation from Russia ...\nThe Ministry of Foreign Affairs points out that Syrian nationals who return to their homeland or who are deported or expelled there may arrive in Damascus and then proceed to other regions that are controlled by governmental forces.” 19.  On 14 October 2015 the applicant, assisted by lawyer M., sought judicial review of the refusal of temporary asylum under the Code of Administrative Procedure (“the CAP”) and asked the Leninskiy District Court of Makhachkala to put in place an interim measure by way of suspending enforcement of the judgment of 26 February 2015. On 16 October 2015 the court refused to deal with the case, concluding that it had to be lodged before a court with jurisdiction in the area of the applicant’s current “place of residence”; his stay in the detention centre did not qualify as a place of residence. 20.  Assisted by Ms Biryukova (who is his representative before this Court) the applicant resubmitted his application for judicial review to the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. On 27 October 2015 the District Court left the matter without examination because the applicant had not indicated the date and place of his birth; had not specified whether he had a law degree, which was relevant because the case could only be lodged by a person in possession of a law degree; and had not provided evidence that his representative had a law degree. The applicant was required to remedy the above defects by 18 November 2015. 21.  By a judgment of 9 December 2015 the District Court upheld the refusals of temporary asylum. The court held that the applicant was at risk of violence which was no more intensive than for other people living in Syria:\n“The grounds for granting temporary asylum on account of humanitarian considerations include the following situations: a grave medical condition for which the foreigner will not receive the requisite medical care in the country of nationality, thus putting his or her life at risk; a real threat to his or her life or liberty on account of hunger, epidemics, emergency situations of environmental or industrial origin or on account of an internal or international conflict that encompasses the entire territory of the state of nationality; a real threat of being subjected to torture or another cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the country of nationality.\nUnder Article 62 of the Code of Administrative Procedure the parties to the case must prove the circumstances to which they refer as the basis for their claims or objections, unless otherwise provided for by the Code.\nAssessing the evidence submitted to it, the court concludes that [the applicant] has not adduced convincing arguments that he is at risk of being persecuted by the authorities or by groups of the population on account of his religion, race or membership of a social group ... Despite the difficult social and political situation in Syria, there are no grounds to consider that his life will be at a higher risk than that of other people living in this country ... According to information from the Federal Migration Authority, people returning to Syria may reach directly the city of Damascus, which is under the control of the government. ...” 22.  The applicant received a copy of the judgment in February 2016 and lodged an appeal. He argued that the first-instance court had not paid proper attention to his argument relating to the risk to his life and physical integrity in the event of his removal to Syria; the migration authority had not refuted his argument while the court had shifted the burden of proof onto the applicant and had placed undue emphasis on the illegality of the applicant’s presence in Russia. His appeal was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 8 June 2016. The appeal court held as follows:\n“The first-instance court considered that the applicant did not fall within the scope of the notion of “refugee” under the Refugees Act ... In view of the applicant’s failure to submit specific facts disclosing that in the event of his removal to Syria he would be exposed to a real threat to his security ... or that he was persecuted in this country, the appeal court agrees with the first-instance court ... The appeal court also notes that the applicant arrived in Russia in 2011 but only sought temporary asylum in 2015.”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Hatay. 5.  On 20 February 1998 the applicant’s ten-year-old son, Erhan Cevrioğlu, was found dead, together with his friend G.B., who was around the same age, after falling into a water-filled hole on a construction site where they had apparently been playing. The cause of death was determined as drowning. 6.  The hole on the construction site was covered by the Municipality of Antakya (“the Municipality”) in the aftermath of this tragic incident. 7.  Shortly after the incident, criminal proceedings were instigated against the owner of the construction site, H.C. (also referred to as “the employer”) and three officials from the Antakya Municipality for causing death by negligence and failing to comply with the regulations and orders, pursuant to Article 455 of the Criminal Code in force at the material time (Law no. 765). 8.  During the course of the criminal proceedings the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance obtained three different expert reports with a view to determining liability for the death of the applicant’s son.\n(a)  The first expert report 9.  The first report, dated 16 April 1998, was drawn up by three civil engineers. The report noted at the outset that the hole in question, which measured 5 x 15 metres with a 2 metre depth, had been dug in the side yard of the construction for use as a shelter and no safety measures had been taken to enclose it. The hole was located 36 metres from the main avenue and 18 metres from the closest apartment building. The witnesses interviewed at the scene of the incident, including two construction workers, confirmed that no precautions had been taken to cover or otherwise enclose the hole. The two workers indicated that they had initially placed wooden planks on the south side of the hole but had later removed them after discovering that children were throwing them into the hole. They further stated that the construction workers were aware that the hole in question regularly filled up with rainwater and one of them said that they occasionally used the water that accumulated in the hole for construction work. The workers disagreed, however, as to when the hole had been dug: while one of them claimed that it had been there since June or July 1997, the other one said that it had been dug only two months prior to the incident. 10.  On the basis of their observations and the witness statements, the committee of experts concluded that the deceased children had been partly at fault for the incident (25%), as the construction site where they had been playing was clearly not a play area. The experts noted that the Municipality also bore 25% responsibility for the two children’s deaths, as (i) they had failed to duly inspect whether the construction, for which it had issued a permit, had complied with the rules on work safety, and to ensure that the construction site had been properly closed off with wooden panels as a safety measure, and (ii) it was not clear on what legal ground it had allowed the digging and the use of the hole in question as a shelter, as such shelters had to be built beneath buildings and not in open spaces. According to the experts, the remaining responsibility (50%) lay with the owner, H.C., who had failed to put in place the necessary safety measures on the construction site, such as building a wooden fence around the hole, erecting warning signs or recruiting a security guard to control access to the construction site.\n(b)  The second expert report 11.  On 25 May 1998 a second report was prepared by three occupational safety experts. Reiterating the factual findings in the previous report of 16 April 1998, the experts identified four main causes of the accident in question: (i) absence of wooden panels around the construction site, which was located in a residential area in close proximity to other houses and public roads; (ii) absence of any railing around the hole; (iii) absence of signs prohibiting entry into the construction site or warning against the water-filled hole on the site; and (iv) lack of diligence of the deceased children. The experts indicated that responsibility for all of the causes identified, save for the last one, lay with the employer, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Labour Code (Law no. 1475) and the Regulation on Workers’ Health and Occupational Safety in Construction Work (Yapı İşlerinde İşçi Sağlığı ve İş Güvenliği Tüzüğü) in force at the material time. They noted that, according to the information provided to the investigation authorities by the applicant, the hole in question had been open for the past eight to ten months, and a number of residents from the neighbourhood had warned H.C. to take the necessary safety measures against the hazards on the construction site, particularly vis-à-vis children. However, H.C. had disregarded all their warnings, saying that parents were responsible for attending to the safety of their children. They further noted that at the time of the incident the construction work had been suspended and the site had been unsupervised. 12.  Relying on the information and evidence they had gathered, the experts concluded that H.C. had principal liability for the incident (75%) on account of his failure to take the necessary safety precautions in and around the construction site in compliance with the relevant laws and regulations. They stressed that the failure to install wooden panels around the construction site was one of the principal reasons for the accident. They further found that the remaining responsibility lay with the deceased children, as they should have been aware of the perils of entering a construction site and approaching a water‑filled hole, even at their young age. The experts considered, lastly, that while the Municipality had a general duty to inspect construction sites and impose penalties for breaches of the laws, they could not be held accountable for failing to conduct inspections, impose safety precautions or issue penalties unless it could be proven with conclusive evidence that the authorities had overlooked the deficiencies on the construction site despite having been aware of them, or had otherwise neglected their duties, which evidence was lacking in the instant case.\n(c)  The third expert report 13.  On 4 April 1999 a third expert report was issued by a committee of experts from the Istanbul Technical University. The report indicated that neither the construction site nor the hole in which the deceased children had drowned had been surrounded by panels or a wooden fence to prevent unauthorised access. Similarly, there had been no warning signs around the construction site or the hole. According to the expert report, H.C. had made the following statements in the aftermath of the incident before the investigative authorities and the trial court:\n“... [After digging the hole on the construction site], I enclosed the hole with wooden planks. Children kept removing the planks. That is why the hole was not closed off. [At the time of the incident] the hole was filled with water following rainfall. On a previous occasion, we had pumped the rainwater out. I was in Ankara at the time [of the incident]. I have no fault here... . If I had not been out of town, I would have checked the hole and covered it.\n...\nIn view of the size and depth of the hole, it was not possible to cover it. We had therefore put planks around it... There were no warning signs around the hole. I was in Ankara when the incident took place, and the construction had stopped while I was gone. The hole filled up with water whenever it rained... It must have filled up again when I was away, there was no opportunity to remove the water.” 14.  Referring to the relevant provisions of the Labour Code, the Regulation on Workers’ Health and Occupational Safety in Construction Work and the Municipalities Act (Law no. 1580) in force at the material time (see “Relevant domestic law”, below, for further details), the experts from the Istanbul Technical University found that H.C. and the Municipality were 75% and 25% at fault respectively and that no liability could be attributed to the deceased children. They indicated that since the construction work had started, none of the safety measures required under the relevant legislation had been put in place. Moreover, no permission had been obtained for the digging of the hole or the “shelter” in question, which had claimed the two children’s lives; nor had any safety measures been taken around it to prevent accidents. The experts stressed that the dangers posed by the hole had been aggravated when it rained, as the muddy surface made it easier for people to slip and fall in. The responsibility for failure to take any safety measures around the hole or to prevent access to the construction site, despite the knowledge that the site attracted children, fell firstly on the contractor and then on the Municipality, which was required to inspect the construction site periodically in order to identify deficiencies and issue the necessary warnings; the Municipality authorities had clearly neglected that duty.\n(d)  Judgment of the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance 15.  On 14 April 2000, relying on the third expert report, the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance held that İ.H.S., who was the director of reconstruction at the Municipality (belediye imar müdürü), and the construction owner, H.C., were 25% and 75% responsible for the incident respectively. Accordingly, the court found the accused guilty as charged. 16.  However, on 9 July 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed that judgment, finding that the case should have been examined under Law no. 4616, which provided, inter alia, for the suspension of criminal proceedings in respect of certain offences committed before 23 April 1999. 17.  Accordingly, on 6 August 2001 the trial court decided, pursuant to section 1(4) of Law no. 4616, that the criminal proceedings should be suspended and eventually discontinued if no offence of the same or of a more serious kind was committed by the defendants within the next five years. 18.  On 16 September 2002 the family members of both deceased children, including the applicant, initiated compensation proceedings before the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance against H.C., his construction company and the Antakya Municipality, arguing that they bore joint responsibility for their children’s deaths. The applicant and his family claimed 5,000,000,000 Turkish liras (TRL)[1] in respect of pecuniary damage and TRL 3,000,000,000[2] in respect of non-pecuniary damage, together with interest accrued from the date of the incident. 19.  On 5 November 2004 an expert report was prepared by a mechanical engineer, who was also an expert on occupational safety, and an architect at the request of the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance. After setting out the circumstances in which the incident had occurred, much like in the previous reports submitted to the criminal court, and referring to the relevant provisions of the Labour Code and the Regulation on Workers’ Health and Occupational Safety in Construction Work, the experts concluded that H.C. bore 85% of the responsibility for the incident on account of his failure to take the necessary safety measures on the construction site, such as erecting wooden panels or other fencing around the site, taking special precautions in those parts of the site that presented a danger of falling, placing warning signs as necessary, informing the construction workers of possible hazards at the construction site and employing a guard to control access to the site. They indicated in particular that the unenclosed hole, which had been opened in June or July 1997, had presented a grave danger for the residents and the children in the neighbourhood, which risk increased when the hole filled with water and became slippery on the edges following rainfall. They also stressed that, according to the relevant Court of Cassation jurisprudence, the responsibility of the employer was not limited to putting the necessary safety measures in place to avert the existing and potential dangers on the construction site, but he or she was also required to supervise compliance with those measures. 20.  Turning to the liability of the deceased children, the report held that while it was natural for the children to have been playing out on the street, they should not have entered the construction site and approached the water-filled hole, the dangers of which were obvious bearing in mind in particular that the ground had been slippery at the relevant time. It therefore found that the children bore the remainder of the liability for their own deaths on account of their failure to display the necessary care and diligence. 21.  As for the alleged responsibility of the Municipality, the experts stated that the latter had had no involvement in the construction, apart from issuing the necessary permits. Moreover, the accident had occurred within the boundaries of the construction site, and not in a public space or other area under the direct responsibility of the Municipality. In such circumstances, the Municipality could not be held responsible for the deficiencies on the construction site; otherwise, the Municipality would have to be held liable for all accidents occurring in any construction. They accordingly concluded that the owner of the construction site bore sole responsibility for the site. 22.  On 22 March 2005 the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance upheld the applicant’s case in part. The court stated that, after examining the findings of the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance and the expert reports submitted to that court, it had requested a further expert report in order to clarify the conflicting aspects of the previous reports. On the basis of that final report, the court established that the responsibility of H.C. and his construction company for the incident was 85%. It thus concluded that H.C. and the construction company were to pay TRL 5,000,000,000 in respect of pecuniary damage to the applicant and his wife and TRL 3,000,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage to the applicant, his wife and their three surviving children as requested, with interest accrued from the date of the incident. The court dismissed the case concerning the Municipality, as no fault could be attributed to it on the facts before it. 23.  On 12 April 2006 the applicant, along with the other claimants, appealed against the decision of the first-instance court. They mainly argued that, despite the Municipality’s liability for the incident having been established in the criminal proceedings, the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance had ordered a new expert report against their wishes, and moreover had disregarded their objections concerning the findings in the said report. The Municipality was clearly responsible for the deaths of the two children for having tolerated the presence of a large and uncovered water-filled hole in the very centre of the city for months on end, yet its responsibility had been disregarded by the first-instance court. 24.  On 18 June 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment with regard to the part concerning the Municipality. It noted that the first‑instance court should have dismissed the case against the Municipality at the outset for procedural reasons, without examining its substance, as the complaints concerning the Municipality’s responsibility to inspect the construction site fell within the jurisdiction of the administrative courts. The Court of Cassation upheld the rest of the judgment. 25.  Accordingly, on 11 December 2007 the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance dismissed the case against the Municipality. The court also noted that its previous judgment concerning H.C. and his construction company had become final and that there was no need to render a new judgment in respect of that part of the case. 26.  The applicant did not appeal against that judgment, which eventually became final on 16 February 2009. 27.  On an unspecified date in 2009 the applicant, together with other family members, brought compensation proceedings before the Hatay Administrative Court against the Municipality for the death of their son and brother Erhan Cevrioğlu due to the alleged negligence on the part of the Municipality in the discharge of its inspection duties. 28.  On 31 December 2009 the Hatay Administrative Court requested a copy of the case file pertaining to the compensation proceedings initiated by the applicant and others from the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance. Subsequently, on 29 January 2010 the Administrative Court requested the case file of the criminal proceedings against H.C. and the municipality officials from the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance. On 23 March 2010 the Administrative Court also requested the applicant’s lawyer to submit the relevant criminal court decision along with the expert reports submitted to that court. 29.  On 9 December 2010 the Hatay Criminal Court of First Instance informed the Administrative Court that the relevant criminal case file could not be found. However, on 14 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer submitted the requested documents to the administrative court. In the meantime, the case file pertaining to the compensation proceedings was also made available by the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance. 30.  On 11 March 2011, relying solely on the expert report submitted to the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance on 5 November 2004, and without undertaking any analysis of its own as to the responsibilities of the Municipality under the applicable legislation and whether it had fulfilled those responsibilities, the Hatay Administrative Court held that no fault was attributable to the Municipality on the facts of the instant case and thus dismissed the compensation claims of the applicant and his family. The Hatay Administrative Court emphasised in its judgment that the earlier ruling of the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance, which had apportioned liability for the incident between H.C. and his company and the deceased children, had also been upheld by the Court of Cassation. 31.  On 15 November 2011 the Adana District Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court, and on 26 April 2012 it rejected rectification requests lodged by the applicant and his family. 32.  According to a declaration submitted to the Hatay Civil Court of First Instance on 23 October 2013 by the lawyer who had represented the applicant in the proceedings before that court, the applicant and his family had not received any compensation from H.C. and his company, nor had they commenced enforcement proceedings against the latter.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, Mr Ramaz Tsartsidze, Mr Samvel Bozoyani, Mr Mamuka Gelashvili (applicants nos. 1-3, case no. 1); Mr Alexander Mikirtumov, Mr Binali Aliev (applicants nos. 4-5, case no. 2); Mr Gia Dzamukov, Mr Vladimer Gabunia (applicants nos. 6-7, case no. 3); Mr Boris Gogoladze, Ms Anastasia Tvaradze, Ms Madona Kapanadze (applicants nos. 8-10, case no. 4); and Mr Jimsher Gogelashvili, Mr George Kurua and Mr Omar Chubinidze (applicants nos. 11-13, case no. 5) are all Jehovah’s Witnesses. Their application to the Court relates to five cases of religiously motivated aggression to which they were allegedly subjected in Georgia at various times. The events described in cases nos. 1 and 4 were the subject of the Court’s examination in the case of Begheluri and Others v. Georgia (no. 28490/02, 7 October 2014). 6.  The following account of the facts is based on the applicants’ submissions. 7.  This part of the application concerns the applicants Mr R. Tsartsidze, Mr S. Bozoyani and Mr M. Gelashvili (applicants nos. 1-3). 8.  On 16 September 2000 nineteen coaches and several cars with Jehovah’s Witnesses headed to Marneuli to attend the convention at Mr Tsartsidze’s premises. The police set up checkpoints along the route and blocked the roads, preventing the Jehovah’s Witnesses from reaching their destination. At the same time, the police authorised a coach containing extremist members of the Orthodox Church, led by Mr V. Mkalavishvili, also known as Father Basil (see Members of the Gldani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Others v. Georgia, no. 71156/01, § 11, 3 May 2007), to continue their journey to Marneuli in order to attack and damage the site within Mr Tsartsidze’s property where the Jehovah’s Witnesses were to gather. The attackers destroyed objects for religious use and seized items belonging to others. The police officers who were in attendance refused to intervene. Property belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses, including 1.5 tonnes of religious literature was confiscated. The religious literature was burnt in the street. Other items (tents, 400 benches, and other items) were distributed to local residents by Father Basil’s supporters (see Begheluri and Others, cited above, §§ 16-21). 9.  According to estimates made on 25 January 2001 and 28 February 2002, the stolen and destroyed equipment and material was worth about 9,000 euros (EUR) and the 1.5 tonnes of stolen and burnt religious literature was worth about EUR 700. 10.  On 16 October 2000 applicants nos. 1-3, other Jehovah’s Witnesses, the representation of the Pennsylvania Watchtower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses, lodged an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court in Tbilisi against the Ministry of the Interior, the governor of Marneuli, the Marneuli chief of police and his deputy and twelve other police officers involved in the case. The applicants sought compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the State’s agents. 11.  On 8 May 2001 the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court decided to consider the Ministry of the Interior as a third-party intervener and referred the case to the Marneuli District Court for examination. 12.  On 13 May 2002 the Marneuli District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint as ill-founded. The court considered it to have been shown that individuals acting under the orders of Father Basil had attacked Mr Tsartsidze’s property and the Jehovah’s Witnesses. As to the Marneuli police, the court held that they had not been informed that a convention was due to be held on 16 September 2000 at Mr Tsartsidze’s home and had been taking part on that date in an anti-drugs operation in the area bordering Azerbaijan. The court found that the defendants who were police officers had gone to the scene only after the attack in question and had only been able to observe the damage that had already been done. They could not therefore have contributed by being passive or taking part in the acts of religious aggression against the applicants. 13.  On 18 June 2002 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Tbilisi Regional Court complaining that the court of first instance had ignored the fact that the police had turned back the Jehovah’s Witnesses but had allowed Father Basil and his supporters to go through the same checkpoints. The applicants argued that their witness statements had been disregarded by the first-instance court in favour of unsubstantiated statements by the police officers. The applicants also challenged the status of third-party intervener granted to the Ministry of the Interior in spite of the fact that it had been cited as a defendant. 14.  On 30 December 2003 the regional court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the same grounds as the first-instance court. 15.  On 29 September 2004 an appeal on points of law by the applicants was dismissed by the Supreme Court, which considered that the applicants had not demonstrated an “intentional” or “negligent” breach of professional obligations by the police officers. 16.  This part of the application concerns Mr Alexander Mikirtumov and Mr Binali Aliev, applicants nos. 4 and 5. 17.  On 26 October 2000, when about thirty members of the Azerbaijani Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses were preparing to hold a meeting in Marneuli at Mr Aliev’s home, five plainclothes police officers entered the property. They included S.Kh. and G.N., who, a few days earlier, had allegedly taken part in the attack on the Jehovah’s Witnesses at Mr Tsartsidze’s property (see case no. 1), and N.N. The police officers stated that the meeting could not go ahead. Using insulting language towards the participants, they ordered them to leave the premises. They confiscated religious books and Bibles belonging to the Jehovah’s Witnesses. 18.  Mr Aliev and Mr Mikirtumov, a pastor, were taken to the police station. There, they were insulted by Officer G.N., who ordered Mr Mikirtumov to leave Marneuli and never to return, otherwise he would face serious problems. S.Kh. ordered Mr Aliev not to hold any more religious gatherings at his home if he wished to avoid problems with the police. Mr Mikirtumov was then forced into a car and driven away from Marneuli. 19.  On 27 November 2000 the two applicants, together with the representation of the Pennsylvania Watchtower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses, lodged an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court against the Ministry of the Interior and the police officers involved. As well as identifying the three police officers, the applicants also gave the number plates of the two vehicles in which the police officers had arrived. They asked that the Ministry of the Interior make a public apology, in accordance with the Police Act, and bring disciplinary proceedings against its staff. The applicants also asked that they be paid compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage and that a directive be sent to all police stations in the country, saying that the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be respected. 20.  On 6 June 2001 the case was sent to the Marneuli District Court, which sent it in turn to the Bolnisi District Court on 14 May 2002. 21.  Questioned by that court, the applicants and other people who had attended the meeting confirmed the above-mentioned facts. Officers S.Kh. and G.N. denied the accusations. While G.N. claimed that he had never entered Mr Aliev’s property on the date in question and was seeing the applicants for the first time, S.Kh. stated that he had that day seen G.N. and other police officers, who were his subordinates, in front of Mr Aliev’s house. He had gone to see what was happening. G.N. had explained that a group of people had informed the police that a meeting of Jehovah’s Witnesses was due to be held and had asked the police to intervene before they did so themselves. The police officers had therefore been obliged to go to the premises. According to S.Kh., G.N. had entered Mr Aliev’s property in order to ask him not to hold the meeting, so as to avoid a clash with the group of individuals in question. S.Kh. stated that he had then continued his journey and denied having taken the two applicants to the police station. He acknowledged, however, that G.N., Mr Aliev and Mr Mikirtumov had been taken together “somewhere”. According to S.Kh., if the applicants had been taken to the police station on the day concerned they would have been questioned, and their visit to the police station duly registered. He criticised the applicants for failing to lodge a complaint with the police chief if they had indeed been taken unlawfully to the police station. 22.  The two applicants, on the contrary, submitted that they had been taken to S.Kh.’s office and that he had ordered that they be required to give written undertakings, respectively, to leave Marneuli and for Mr Aliev not to allow religious meetings at his home. S.Kh. denied those allegations also. 23.  On 17 June 2003 the proceedings brought by the applicants were dismissed as ill-founded. In the court’s opinion, it had not been established that the police officers in question had prevented the religious meeting from being held at Mr Aliev’s home, confiscated the religious books and taken the two applicants to the police station in order to forbid them from performing religious rites in accordance with their faith. With regard to the statements made by four eyewitnesses, the court held that they were not reliable because they had been made by people taking part in the meeting, who had an interest in supporting the applicants’ complaint. Moreover, the statements made by the complainants had been completely rejected by the police officers. Consequently, the court found that there was nothing to prove that the police officers had failed in their professional obligations, within the meaning of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code. 24.  On 21 October 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 June 2003, on the same grounds as those used by the lower court. 25.  On 23 February 2005 the Supreme Court, ruling in written proceedings, dismissed an appeal by the applicants on points of law. It concluded that the applicants had failed to prove either an intentional or a negligent breach of duties by the respondent police officers. 26.  This part of the application concerns Mr Gia Dzamukov and Vladimer Gabunia (applicants nos. 6 and 7 respectively). 27.  On 2 September 2000, while in possession of religious tracts, Mr Dzamukov was stopped in the street in Kutaisi by two uniformed police officers, E.K. and E.Ch. His bag with religious literature was confiscated and he was taken to the police station. The applicant was struck by several police officers, including E.Ch., before being released. Before leaving the police station, the applicant asked that his belongings be returned to him. In reply, E.Ch. came up to him and attempted to strangle him with his tie, ordering the applicant to get out of his sight. Outside the station, police officers blocked his path and threatened to beat him with their truncheons. Seeing that the applicant refused to leave and insisted that the confiscated religious literature be returned, a police officer came up and threw his Bible in his face. 28.  On returning home, the applicant and his wife noticed that his chest was red. He also found it painful. His wife immediately went to the police station, protesting about the way her husband had been treated, and asking for the return of the confiscated belongings. She was, in turn, insulted and chased out of the premises. 29.  On the following day, Mr Gabunia, applicant no. 7, was walking in the street in Kutaisi with religious tracts. He gave one to E.K., who was accompanied by another police officer. In response, E.K. reprimanded him, stating that his conduct was not worthy of a Christian. B.M., the second police officer, punched him in the stomach and, after he had fallen to the ground, pulled his bag away from him. The police officers emptied the bag and tore up the religious literature inside. They kept two Bibles for themselves. When the applicant insisted that they return his Bible, B.M. threatened to put him in his car and dump him in the Rioni River. 30.  On 2 October 2000 the applicants lodged an administrative complaint with the Kutaisi Court against the Ministry of the Interior, the chief and deputy chief of Kutaisi police and police officers B.M. and E.K. Claiming that their rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention had been breached, they asked that the Ministry of the Interior issue a public apology and bring disciplinary proceedings against two of its staff who, in their opinion, had failed to comply with their professional duties, as provided for in the Police Act. The applicants also asked to be compensated in respect of pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage, in application of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code. 31.  Questioned by the court, the applicants confirmed the above‑mentioned events. Mr Gabunia described in detail the place where he had met the two police officers, and stated that they had been in uniform and wore badges. He also provided information about the make, colour and registration number of their car. Mr Dzamukov provided the registration number of the car in which he had been taken to the police station. His wife gave the registration number of the vehicle in which E.Ch. had followed her., while Ms L.K., a witness to the incident at the police station, confirmed that she had seen Mr Dzamukov there. E.Ch. denied the allegations, stating that he had been on leave on the day in question and had not been in Kutaisi. B.M. and E.K. also denied the allegations, claiming that they were seeing the applicants for the first time. 32.  On 7 June 2002 the applicants’ complaint was dismissed as ill‑founded. The court pointed to the rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and noted that, historically, no religion had ever been persecuted in Georgia. It further noted the following:\n“It is also well known that many of Jehovah’s Witnesses blatantly violate the requirements of Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution and frequently impose their opinion and belief on others, thus violating their rights.”\nThen the court set aside the three witness statements in favour of the applicants on the ground that those people had not been eyewitnesses. In addition, it noted the following:\n“The first two witnesses are Jehovah’s Witnesses and the applicants’ friends, and they have an interest in having the case decided in the applicants’ favour.”\nAs the applicants had not submitted any other valid evidence (medical reports, torn-up religious literature, or other items), their allegations were held to be ill-founded. Lastly, the court noted that Mr Dzamukov had waited one year before adding E.Ch.’s name to his complaint. 33.  The applicants lodged an appeal, stating that submitting the destroyed religious literature to the court would have had no valid evidential value, since it would not have sufficed to prove that the police officers concerned had torn up the literature on the date in question. The applicants also explained that it had not been necessary to obtain a medical report, given that they had not received serious wounds or injuries. That did not, however, alter the fact that they had been struck by the police officers. Furthermore, in their opinion, the insults directed against them on account of their faith had been sufficient to establish that the police officers had been negligent in carrying out their professional duties. 34.  On 18 December 2002 the Kutaisi District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal on the same grounds as the first-instance court. In particular, it took account of the fact that the police officers had denied the allegations and that the applicants had suffered no physical injuries. It concluded that, in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary, there had been no damage to the applicants’ dignity or any infringement of their right to freedom of religion, which ruled out the application of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code and the granting of compensation. 35.  According to the applicants, the appeal court took into consideration an oral statement by E.K., who had claimed that he did not recognise a white car with the registration number DAQ 492, which Mr Dzamukov had nonetheless identified as being that in which the two police officers had been patrolling at the time of the incident in question. After the hearing, however, E.K. had left in that same vehicle, which had been parked in front of the regional court. The applicants took a photograph, and attached it to their appeal on points of law. They complained, in particular, that E.K.’s denial had been accepted by the first-instance court and on appeal without any supporting evidence. 36.  After postponing the hearing several times on account of the absence of the defending parties, the Supreme Court examined the applicants’ appeal on points of law in written proceedings, and dismissed it on 17 October 2003. It criticised the applicants for failing to bring criminal proceedings against the police officers. The Supreme Court stated that acknowledging that the police officers had failed in their professional obligations in the impugned manner (attacking and assaulting the applicants) would be equivalent to recognising, in the context of administrative proceedings, their criminal guilt, which would be contrary to the law. At the same time, if the accusation against the police officers had indeed been confirmed in criminal proceedings, the applicants would have been entitled to compensation, and also to a public apology. 37.  The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicants on 27 November 2003. 38.  This part of the application concerns Mr Boris Gogoladze, Mrs Anastasia Tvaradze and Mrs Madona Kapanadze (applicants nos. 8-10 respectively). 39.  On 1 April 2001 a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses was returning from a religious meeting in the village of Dviri, Borjomi region. At a bus stop they met Mr S.Kh., the deputy governor of the town of Borjomi, Mr J.B., the governor of Dviri, and about fifteen local residents. One of the latter, assaulted Mr Gogoladze, wounding him on the cheek, and tore a bag containing religious literature and other personal effects from his hands. Then he struck the two applicants on the head with a shoulder strap ripped from Mr Gogoladze’s bag. The two governors, who watched the attack, directed insults at the victims. In the end they asked the assailant to desist and left with him (see Begheluri and Others, cited above, § 56). 40.  On 30 April 2001 the applicants filed an administrative complaint with the Borjomi Court against the Borjomi regional administration, the local police chief and the two governors concerned. The applicants asked that the officials apologise publicly and that the regional administration take disciplinary proceedings against them. They also claimed compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage (Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code). 41.  On 17 September 2001 the court dismissed the applicants’ complaint on the grounds that the governors had not been under a legal obligation to ensure the maintenance of public order. It concluded that it had not been shown that they themselves had organised the attack in question or had personally attacked or assaulted the applicants. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Tbilisi Regional Court on 25 July 2003. The regional court held that ensuring the maintenance of public order did not amount to a “pressing obligation” on the governors. 42.  On 13 February 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicants, using the same grounds as the regional court. 43.  This part of the application concerns Mr Jimcher Gogelashvili, George Kurua and Omar Chubinidze (applicants nos. 11-13). 44.  On 27 March 2001 a group of Orthodox religious extremists led by Mr P. Bluashvili, a leader of the Jvari movement, burst into Mr Gogelashvili’s flat, where a congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses was holding a meeting. The assailants ordered the Jehovah’s Witnesses, whom they described as Christ-insulters and Satanists, to hand over their religious literature and to leave the premises. The Jehovah’s Witnesses protested, referring to provisions of the Constitution, but were nonetheless obliged to comply. Mr Kurua was insulted by Mr Bluashvili, who then pulled on his tie to strangle him. 45.  After confiscating religious literature from the people present in the flat, the attackers opened the cupboards and took out similar literature, first throwing it on the floor, and then out of the window. The benches used by the Jehovah’s Witnesses during the meeting were also thrown out of the window. 46.  The attack was recorded on video. Moreover, an individual wearing civilian clothes, who, according to the applicants, was a police officer named L. Gogolauri, appears on the screen. He stands in the courtyard, observes the Jehovah’s Witnesses being chased from the flat and allows a child to leave, carrying a bench that has been thrown from a window. 47.  The applicants assessed the pecuniary damage caused by the attack in question at about EUR 760 (audio-visual equipment, religious literature, benches, and other items). They submitted an audit report, dated 23 May 2001, in support of their claim. 48.  On the day after the above incident the same group of attackers publicly burned the religious literature taken from Mr Gogelashvili’s home at the main market in Rustavi. That scene was also captured in the above‑mentioned recording. According to the applicants, the police officers patrolling the market did not react. 49.  On 30 April 2001 the Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been victims of the attack, including the three applicants named above, as well as the representation of the Pennsylvania Watch Tower in Georgia and the Union of Jehovah’s Witnesses, filed an administrative complaint with the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi Court against the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Th.A., the chief of Rustavi police, Mr L.G., the head of the police station involved in the case, and Mr K.Z., a police officer. They alleged that the officials had failed in their professional obligations and had breached Articles 8-11, 13 and 14 of the Convention. 50.  In particular, the applicants asked that the Ministry of the Interior issue a public apology, in accordance with section 8(37) of the Police Act, and bring disciplinary proceedings against the above-named police officers. The applicants also claimed compensation in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, in application of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code, and asked that a directive be sent to all police stations in the country, stating that the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be respected. Drawing the court’s attention to the spread of violence against Jehovah’s Witnesses throughout the country, they asked that it rule on their case in accordance with the law, as, in their opinion, a proper judicial decision could help to halt such violence. 51.  The court heard the three applicants and other Jehovah’s Witnesses who had been victims of the attack. They all complained about the passivity of the police officers present at the scene. Mr Gogelashvili stated that when the attack had begun, he had gone to a police station located about a hundred metres from his building. After some delay, two police officers had accompanied him back to the scene. He had seen that books and furniture were being thrown out of the window. The police officers had taken no action. He had then run up the stairs to his flat to retrieve some money that he kept in a cupboard. He had found that the cupboard door had been broken and that EUR 130 had been stolen. Mr Gogelashvili complained that the police officers had not intervened to prevent the violation of his private property or to protect the victims. 52.  Mr Kurua stated that immediately after leaving the flat on the attackers’ orders, he had gone to the police station, where he had learned that the alarm had already been raised. He had asked that police officers return with him, in order to “intimidate” the attackers. The officers had refused to accompany him. 53.  Mr Chubinidze stated that during the attack he had telephoned the police from the flat, but that the person on the other end of the telephone had hung up immediately. He had then been obliged to comply with the orders to leave the flat. He had managed to grab his bag back from an attacker who had taken it. 54.  On 10 May 2002 the court decided to strike the case out of its list of cases, on the basis of a letter, allegedly signed by the applicants, withdrawing their complaint. On 5 June 2002 they lodged an appeal, stating that the signatures on the letter in question had been forged and that they had never withdrawn their complaint. On 16 December 2002 the appeal court overturned the decision of 10 May 2002 and proceedings resumed. 55.  Questioned by the Mtatsminda-Krtsanisi District Court, a representative of the Ministry of the Interior argued that it had not been established that the police had been present at the scene and asked that the applicants’ complaint be dismissed. The police officers themselves did not attend the hearings on two consecutive dates. Obliged to rule in their absence, on 16 July 2003 the court dismissed the complaint as ill-founded. It considered it established that the applicants had been attacked by a group of individuals led by Mr Bluashvili on 27 March 2001. It considered, however, that the applicants had not demonstrated that the police had been present at the scene or that they had watched passively as acts had been committed against property and the applicants’ rights to freedom of religion. Accordingly, it had not been established that the police officers had failed to perform their professional duties within the meaning of Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, in the same decision, the court acknowledged that, after having been informed of the attack, the police officers had gone to the scene, which had resulted in a decision to place the attackers under investigation. According to the court, in the context of the latter criminal proceedings, it would be lawful for the applicants to submit a claim for compensation against the individuals who had infringed their rights. The decision made no reference to the burning of literature at Rustavi market. 56.  On 25 June 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment, repeating the grounds used in it. Neither the representative of the Ministry of the Interior nor the police officers appeared. 57.  On 2 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicants. The court concluded that the fact of a breach of duty by the police, either intentionally or by negligence, had not been proven.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": true, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant company is a limited liability company based in Vienna. It is the owner and publisher of the weekly news magazine Profil. 6.  Until 2007 the Land of Carinthia (Land Kärnten) owned almost 50% of the shares of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank. From 1996 until 2006 a man called Mr. Rauscher was in charge of the treasury department of the bank. In that capacity he was responsible for authorising foreign currency transactions. He was answerable only to the bank’s executive board, which consisted of three members. While Mr. Rauscher was head of the treasury department, his father, who had been a regional government member responsible for finance until 1996, was also on the bank’s supervisory board. The father had that position until 2003. 7.  At the beginning of 2006 the bank’s executive board informed the Financial Market Authority (Finanzmarktaufsicht, “the FMA”) that the bank had financial difficulties. On 31 March 2006 the executive board held a meeting with the executive board of the FMA and informed it that the bank had made a loss of several hundred million euros in 2004. Mr Kulterer, the chief executive of the bank, informed the FMA that the treasury department had gone over its internal transaction limit of 100 million euros (EUR) by EUR 47 million. 8.  Between 1 and 6 April 2006 a number of daily newspapers published reports on the investigation and mentioned Mr Rauscher by name as responsible for the speculative transactions in question. Among those articles was one by newspaper Der Standard published on 4 April 2006 (see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 3), no. 34702/07, §§ 6-17, 10 January 2012). 9.  On 5 April 2006 the FMA filed criminal information (Strafanzeige) about offences committed in relation to the business of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank against the three members of the executive board and Mr Rauscher, accusing them of embezzlement by investing money entrusted to the bank contrary to the instructions of the executive board. In substance, the FMA alleged that Mr Rauscher had authorised highly speculative transactions with foreign currency derivatives (swaps), disregarding instructions by the executive board. 10.  In its issue of 10 April 2006, the applicant company published an article on the investigations into the heavy losses incurred by Hypo Alpe‑Adria Bank. The front cover of Profil had the words: “Kärntner Hypo‑Affäre – Wie viel wusste Haider?” (“Carinthian Hypo affair - How much did Haider know?”). 11.  The article, headlined “Schwere Hypothek” (“Heavy Mortgage”), ran to nine pages. It reported on the enormous loss of EUR 328 million incurred by Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank in 2004, the question of who was responsible for the damage and whether there were failings in the bank’s risk management. It accused the bank’s executive board of failing to give information to the supervisory board, the bank’s accountants and the FMA, and of trying instead to hush up the losses by manipulating the balance sheets for 2004, which meant that the full extent of the damage was only discovered by external accountants when examining the balance sheets for 2005. The accountants had then informed the FMA. Furthermore, the article featured an interview with Mr Kulterer, confronting him with those accusations. Mr Kulterer was quoted as accusing Mr Rauscher of having disregarded internal guidelines in his foreign currency transactions.\nThe relevant passages of the article read as follows:\n“By the time the warning system was triggered the disaster had long since run its course. On Wednesday 17 November 2004 the risk management and control software programme in the head offices of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank in Klagenfurt showed, in all the relevant departments of the bank, exactly the kind of figures which bring managers of credit institutions out in a cold sweat: staggering losses on investment operations. In the treasury division, which manages the bank’s liquidity and for that purpose trades, among other things, in interest rates and currencies, there was a shortfall of more than 100 million euros. ‘At that point we immediately called a halt’ said CEO Wolfgang Kulterer. However, as several similar operations were in progress simultaneously, it was impossible ‘to close the floodgates at once’. When that was eventually done, the losses stood at 328 million euros, several times higher than the self-imposed threshold of 100 million.\nTreasury manager Christian Rauscher, who was responsible for authorising the transactions, was immediately told to clear his desk. (This son of the former SPÖ regional finance chief Max Rauscher was not available for comment). However, the consequences of the orgy of speculation, which lasted just two weeks, continue to preoccupy the bank’s management. And they are not the only ones: in particular, the manner in which Kulterer and his colleagues dealt with the loss-making transactions has also come to the attention of the authorities in recent days. Last Wednesday the financial markets supervisory authority (the FMA) even saw fit to lodge a criminal complaint against the entire executive board. Rauscher is the object of a preliminary enquiries [Vorerhebungen] (file no. 3 St 79/06x) before the Klagenfurt Regional Court on suspicion of embezzlement. The executive board faces charges of misrepresenting the end-of-year accounts, in other words, falsifying the balance sheets.\n...\nThe transactions in question were all performed between 20 September and 5 October 2004. According to Hypo boss Kulterer, Rauscher – in breach of internal regulations – gambled, by means of so-called swaps, on the occurrence of a highly explosive combination of two trends on the financial markets: on the one hand a fall in interest rates and on the other a rise in the dollar and the yen against the euro. A few weeks later, on 17 November 2004, the perfect storm hit.\n...\nLack of controls. Rapid rates of growth motivate not just the boss, but also the employees – including the now ex-treasury manager Christian Rauscher. According to inside sources, Rauscher may have set the stakes so high precisely because he wanted to make his mark as a candidate for the vacant post of department manager. After all, high stakes mean correspondingly high profits if all goes according to plan. A marked surplus on his account would undoubtedly have boosted his chances of securing the post.” 12.  The article continued with an overview of the history of Hypo Alpe‑Adria Bank, which had gone from being a regional bank to an international investment bank in the space of fifteen years. The article looked at previous business transactions which had resulted in risks and losses for the bank and the conduct of the executive board. Finally, the article examined the relationship between the bank’s management and local politicians and asked how much Mr Haider, the then regional governor of Carinthia, knew of the losses, and when he had found out about them. It noted that the Land of Carinthia owned 49.4% of the bank and that funds from the bank had financed a number of political projects in the region, in particular Mr Haider’s Future Fund (Zukunftsfonds), designed to fund infrastructure and other large-scale projects. 13.  On 14 June 2006 Mr Rauscher brought proceedings against the applicant company for disclosing his identity in breach of section 7a of the Media Act (Mediengesetz). He submitted that he was not a public figure and that his position at the bank had not been such as to justify the disclosure of his name. He asserted that when authorising the transactions at issue he had acted in accordance with his instructions and with the approval of his superiors. The publication of his name had had negative repercussions on his professional advancement and had not been justified by any public interest. 14.  On 19 August 2008 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) dismissed Mr Rauscher’s action. It found that the following facts had been established: the article had provided a comprehensive report on the losses of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank. At the time the article had been published, the Land of Carinthia had owned 49.4% of the bank. The claimant’s father had been a regional government member responsible for finances and had also been on the bank’s supervisory board until April 2003. The claimant had been the head of the bank’s treasury department since 1999. He had not been active in politics nor had he been in the public eye in connection with his professional activity. The Regional Court noted that the task of a bank’s treasury department was to carry out liquidity and finance planning for the bank. Hypo Alpe-Adria’s treasury department had been directly answerable to the executive board. The transactions which had subsequently led to such enormous losses had been carried out between the end of September and the beginning of October 2004 and the claimant had been the main person in charge. On 5 April 2006 the FMA had sent information to the Klagenfurt public prosecutor’s office on three members of the executive board, who were suspected of manipulating the bank’s balance sheets, and on the claimant who was suspected of embezzlement for carrying out unauthorised foreign currency transactions. Following receipt of that information the public prosecutor’s office had started preliminary enquiries. From 24 May 2006 preliminary investigations (Voruntersuchung) had been conducted by the Regional Court. Criminal proceedings against the claimant had been discontinued in 2008. After accusations against the claimant had been published in various media, his employment contract had been terminated. He had not been able to find a similar position in another bank. 15.  The Regional Court noted that section 7a (1) of the Media Act required a weighing of the claimant’s interest in the protection of his identity and the public interest in its disclosure. As a rule, adults who were suspected of having committed a crime were only protected against the disclosure of their identity if such disclosure disproportionately affected their professional advancement. 16.  It observed that at the material time the Land of Carinthia owned almost 50% of Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank. That fact alone demonstrated an increased public interest as the taxpayer had a right to know who was responsible for the bank’s losses. The applicant had been a senior employee at the bank, and had been suspected of embezzlement. Although the criminal proceedings had still been at an early stage, the Financial Market Authority, the competent controlling authority, had laid criminal information against the claimant. Moreover, the chief executive of the bank, Mr Kulterer, had levelled similar accusations against him. Having regard to the function of the press as a “public watchdog” and the circumstances of the case, the Regional Court found that the public interest of obtaining information outweighed the claimant’s interest in not having his name disclosed. 17.  On 20 April 2009 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) granted an appeal by the claimant, declared that the disclosure of his identity in the article had violated his rights and ordered the applicant company to pay him EUR 3,000 euros in compensation and to reimburse his procedural costs. 18.  The Court of Appeal found that the Regional Court’s conclusion had been wrong after it had weighed the conflicting interests at issue. It shared the view of the Regional Court that there was a public interest in knowing who was responsible for Hypo Alpe-Adria Bank’s losses due to the fact that the Land owned 50% of the bank. However, the article should have confined itself to mentioning the head of the bank’s treasury department without disclosing his name. The public interest in reporting on the criminal offences at issue had not in itself been sufficient to justify disclosing the claimant’s identity. The fact that the claimant had been answerable to the executive board, although he had an important position in the bank, and that the criminal proceedings against him had been at an early stage, meant that the claimant’s interest in protecting his identity outweighed the public interest in the disclosure of his name. 19.  The applicant company lodged an application under Article 363a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). It submitted in particular that the Vienna Court of Appeal’s judgment had violated Article 10 of the Convention as there had been an overriding public interest in what it had reported, including the disclosure of Mr Rauscher’s identity. 20.  On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant company’s application. It examined in detail the reasons given by the Court of Appeal. Referring to the Court’s findings in “Wirtschafts-Trend” Zeitschriften-Verlagsgesellschaft mbH v. Austria (no. 2) ((dec.), no. 62746/00, 14 December 2002), the Supreme Court found that the appeal court had correctly weighed the conflicting interests of the claimant under Article 8 on the one hand and of the applicant company under Article 10 on the other, especially because of the early stage of the criminal proceedings against the claimant. 21.  The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on the applicant company’s counsel on 15 April 2010.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Waldegg, Austria. 6.  On 28 September 1994 the applicant initiated civil proceedings requesting the division of a certain estate. 7.  On 5 January 2009 the Ivanjica Municipal Court suspended the said proceedings until conclusion of another civil case. 8.  It would appear that the said civil proceedings are still pending. 9.  On 23 June 2011 the Constitutional Court found a breach of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and ordered the speeding up of the impugned proceedings. The court, additionally, declared that the applicant was entitled to the non-pecuniary damages sought, in accordance with Article 90 of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 13, Article 90, below). 10.   It seems that, the applicant contacted the Commission for Compensation on 11 December 2011 and requested the payment of the compensation awarded, but apparently received no response.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant is a non-governmental organisation that publishes Orlovskaya Iskra, a newspaper in the Orel Region. As of March 2003, the Orel branch of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Orel branch of the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia, a nationwide movement, were listed as the applicant organisation’s founders. This information was specified on the front page of the newspaper. 6.  Pursuant to the Articles of incorporation, the founders were in charge of setting up an editorial board and determining the editorial policy; in the case of disagreement on the editorial policy the matter was to be resolved by a meeting of the founders’ representatives. 7.  During the election campaign for the State Duma, the lower chamber of Parliament, on 2 December 2007, the applicant organisation expressed to the Electoral Committee of the Orel Region (see paragraph 41 below) its intention to accept proposals for publication for a fee and, as required by law, published the fees applicable to the publications on behalf of political parties (30,000 roubles (RUB) per page). The applicant organisation specified that the above fee “was not applicable to the newspaper’s founder”. The applicant organisation signed a contract with the Communist Party for this purpose for publications on 7, 14, 21 and 28 November 2007. The contract mentioned a fee of RUB 30,000 per page; the total amount of the contract was RUB 300,000 for ten pages. Some of the publications in the applicant organisation’s newspaper on these dates did mention the Party’s sponsorship, others did not (see paragraph 8 below). 8.  Apart from the publications mentioned above, on 7 and 14 November 2007 the applicant organisation’s newspaper also published, in the same weekly issues, two articles written by its staff correspondent, Ms O. Both articles were critical of Mr Stroyev, the then governor of the Orel Region and the former Chairman of the Federation Council (the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament). Governor Stroyev was a candidate at those elections: he was no. 1 on the regional list of United Russia (Единая Россия), a political party aligned with President Putin and dominant in the State Duma. The Communist Party was one of the main opposition parties at those elections. 9.  The first article was entitled ‘Hatred, Stroyev style’. It can be summarised as follows. It described Governor Stroyev as a person consumed by hatred towards people who oppose him. The journalist referred to the decision of the governor to wind up a publicly owned newspaper, Gorod Orel. According to journalist O., that decision was a direct consequence of a conflict between Mr Stroyev and the newspaper’s former editor-in-chief who kept criticising Stroyev’s policies. The speaker of the municipal council, who was politically weak owing to a corruption scandal involving municipal land, was unable to oppose the decision of the governor to close the newspaper. Most of the regional journalists under Stroyev became servile; those few who, like the editor-in-chief of Gorod Orel, remained independent and refused to flatter Mr Stroyev, were subjected to pressure and fell victim to Mr Stroyev’s hatred. The article then turned to the story of two deputies of the regional legislature. They were elected as members of the Communist Party and were originally in opposition to Mr Stroyev, but later they both became members of United Russia. One of them was a businessman. The author suspected that the first deputy had changed political sides because of very serious pressure exerted by the Stroyev administration on local businessmen. The second deputy was a history professor. The article suggested that his decision to leave the Communist Party was also forced. The journalist ironically supposed that in fact Mr Stroyev did not want United Russia to win the elections, since he was doing everything to make the electorate angry with the ruling party. In 2006 the town population voted in large numbers for the Communist Party, which was in fact a vote of disapproval of Mr Stroyev’s policies. However, the journalist supposed that Mr Stroyev’s personal interests always prevailed over those of the United Russia party. The town mayor tried to protect himself by joining United Russia, but this was a weak defence against Mr Stroyev’s hatred. The only people Mr Stroyev loved and defended were his own relatives and protégés. The article cited the example of Mr Stroyev’s nephew, a businessman suspected of abuse of public funds and fraud. His case was still pending; the article suggested that regional law-enforcement agencies being discouraged from pursuing the investigation actively. The article then turned to the dismissal of the head of the regional public Audit Chamber, who reported on abuses of funds allocated for road maintenance. The newly appointed head of the Audit Chamber, who was Mr Stroyev’s man, came to the opposite conclusion, namely that the manipulation of the road funds had been perfectly in order. Nevertheless, the money had been spent; as a result, the federal authorities had had to allocate additional funds for road maintenance in the Orel Region. Mr Stroyev tried to get credit for that funding, but it was not United Russia’s money that had been used, as they claimed, but taxpayers’money. In the opinion of the author, by trying to present the whole situation as his personal achievement Mr Stroyev was making a fool of President Putin and of the population of the Orel Region.\nThe article had a long post-scriptum. It cited the European Court’s findings in the case of Chemodurov v. Russia (no. 72683/01, judgment of 31 July 2007). That case concerned a defamation claim lodged by a governor of another Russian region against a journalist of a local newspaper. The case ended with a finding of a violation of Article 10 of the Convention by the Court. The author alluded to similarities between her criticism of Mr Stroyev’s policies and the situation in the Chemodurov case. 10.  The second article was entitled ‘Stroyev sues people: people sue Stroyev’. It also concerned several topics. It opened with the statement that the electorate of Orel Region did not trust the authorities and at the 2006 and 2007 elections preferred to support the Communist Party. Next, it touched upon the story of Ms Ch., a former forest inspector who was dismissed from her job as a result of a reorganisation of the forestry authority. Forty-two other workers of the forest authority also lost their jobs. The article alleged that the reform of the forest authorities was initiated by Governor Stroyev in breach of federal legislation. It suggested that the reform was driven by the need to facilitate industrial tree-cutting. Ms Ch. sued the regional authorities, and at the relevant time the proceedings were pending. However, in the opinion of the journalist, there was little hope for impartiality on the part of the regional courts. The article then turned to the case of Ms G., who had made statements critical of the governor during a public rally and had been prosecuted for slander. The article then analysed recent public statements of the governor, who had criticised the policy lines of former President Yeltsin, whereas he himself during that period had been Chairman of the Federation Council, and therefore the second most important statesman in the country. According to the journalist, the proceedings in the case of Mr G. were adjourned, probably because Governor Stroyev wanted to avoid a scandal before the date of elections. The article closed with the suggestion that President Putin should not have associated himself such controversial figures as Governor Stroyev. 11.  On 17 November 2007 the Working Group on Informational Disputes of the regional Electoral Committee examined both articles. The Working Group concluded that the articles contained elements of electoral campaigning (агитация). The Working Group concluded as follows:\nThe publications contained “negative, purposeful, systematically published information about a member of the High Political Council of the United Russia political party ... Mr E. Stroyev. The above-mentioned publications have created a negative attitude on the part of the voters towards ... United Russia. Although the text of the articles does not call for people to vote for or against United Russia, all the electorate understand that this is in fact counter-campaigning [against Mr Stroyev]”. The publications “did not correspond to the current information policy of the organisations editing mass media”, which (the policy) was “aimed at informing the voters about the development of the electoral campaign ... [and] about the political parties participating in it”. Those articles, in the opinion of the Electoral Committee, fell “outside the information space created by the political parties during the ongoing electoral campaign”. The publication of those articles was not paid for from the official campaign fund of any party participating in the campaign, contrary to section 52 § 6 of the Electoral Rights Act of 2002. 12.  Consequently, in the opinion of the Electoral Committee, publication of those articles amounted to a breach of electoral law punishable by a fine in accordance with Article 5.5 of the Federal Code of Administrative Offences (CAO). 13.  The official of the Electoral Committee compiled an administrative offence record against the applicant organisation, referring to the legislative provisions defining “campaigning” (see paragraph 40 below):\n“[The applicant organisation] has committed an administrative offence: publications on 7 and 14 November 2007 containing elements of election campaigning as defined in sections 10 and 55 § 1(6) of the State Duma Deputies Elections Act” ...\nLiability for this offence is prescribed under: Article 5.5 § 1 of the CAO.” 14.  The case was then submitted to a justice of the peace. On 29 November 2007 the justice of the peace examined the case. At the hearing the editor-in-chief of the newspaper explained that both articles were informational in essence and were not a part of the election campaign. They reflected the author’s opinion of Governor Stroyev. Consequently, there was no need for those articles to be paid for from any candidate’s campaign fund. 15.  The judge held that, according to the State Duma Deputies Elections Act of 2005, taken in conjunction with the Electoral Rights Act, “election campaigning” meant publications where information about one of the candidates prevailed and was combined with negative comment about him or her. Having studied the impugned articles the judge agreed with the Electoral Committee that they primarily concerned candidate Stroyev, and secondly were negative. The judge concluded that those articles were in substance election “campaigning”. Such material should either have been paid for from the campaign fund of one of the candidates or have been published free of charge; in any event, the newspaper had been required to indicate who had sponsored the publication. No such mention had been made in the articles. Consequently, the publication of both articles amounted to a breach of the electoral law. The applicant organisation was therefore found guilty of the administrative offence described in Article 5.5 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Offences of 2001 (hereinafter “the CAO”). The justice of the peace ordered the applicant organisation to pay a fine of 35,000 roubles (RUB, equivalent to 1,000 euros (EUR) at the time). 16.  The applicant organisation appealed to the Zheleznodorozhny District Court of Orel. On 27 December 2007 it heard the applicant organisation’s representatives and rejected the appeal. The relevant extract from the judgment reads as follows:\n“Having regard to the fact that the publication of the above articles took place during an election campaign period, the judge considers that the above-mentioned articles contained elements of election campaigning, and therefore could be described as campaign literature. This conclusion is supported by the words of the representatives of the newspaper ... who acknowledged that the articles contained criticism of Governor Stroyev ...” 17.  The appeal decision entered into legal force on the same date. 18.  On unspecified dates the applicant organisation received a copy of this decision and lodged a supervisory-review application with the President of the Orel Regional Court. The scope of that application remains unclear. 19.  Without holding a hearing, on 29 January 2008 the acting president of the court issued a decision dismissing the application. The reasoning of the decision of the acting president was identical to that of the lower courts. On an unspecified date the applicant organisation received a copy of the acting president’s decision. 20.  The applicant organisation then lodged a supervisory-review application with the President of the Supreme Court of Russia. The scope of this application remains unclear. On 19 June 2008 the Vice-President dismissed it. On an unspecified date the applicant organisation received a copy of this decision. 21.  On an unspecified date the applicant organisation introduced an individual application before the Constitutional Court of Russia, arguing that the impugned provisions of the Electoral Rights Act and the State Duma Deputies Election Act ran counter to freedom of the press. The Acts de facto regarded any critical material published during a pre-election period as “campaigning”, and imposed additional requirements on such publications. 22.  By a letter of 23 October 2008 the Registry of the Constitutional Court informed the applicant organisation that its application was not allowed because, in substance, it was merely challenging the factual and legal findings made by the courts in the administrative offence case. 23.  On an unspecified date the applicant organisation resubmitted its application to the Constitutional Court. On 25 December 2008 a panel of judges of the Constitutional Court issued a decision (определение) refusing examination of the application. It held as follows:\n“In its ruling of 30 October 2003 the Constitutional Court made the following statement of principle concerning a distinction between information for voters and pre-election campaigning. To protect the right to free elections, freedom of expression on the part of the mass media may be restricted, provided that the balance of constitutional values has been respected ...\n[The Electoral Rights Act] distinguishes between information for voters appearing in the mass media and pre-election campaigning by them. Both information and campaigning can influence voters to make certain choices, thus the obvious and only criterion to distinguish between them would be the existence of a particular aim, namely to incline voters to support or oppose a certain candidate ... Without such an aim in mind there would be no dividing line between information and campaigning, to the effect that all information would amount to campaigning. This would go against the constitutional guarantees of freedom of information and freedom of expression ...\nIt is incumbent on the courts and other authorities to establish that there is a campaigning aim in each case ... Thus, in view of the above statement of principle, the impugned legislative provisions cannot be considered to have violated the applicant organisation’s rights or freedoms ... Establishment of the specific circumstances (whether or not the information provided by the applicant organisation concerned the electoral campaign rather than the reporting on the candidate’s professional activity as a governor) are beyond of the Constitutional Court’s competence ...”", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Andrzej Klibisz, is a Polish national who was born in 1968 and is currently detained in Włocławek Prison. 6.  On 31 August 1995 the Chief Prosecutor of Lithuania requested the Polish prosecution authorities to carry out a criminal investigation against the applicant, who had been charged in Lithuania with certain offences he had allegedly committed there. On the basis of the bilateral 1993 Cooperation Agreement, the Polish authorities took over the case. 7.  On 7 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) issued a decision to remand the applicant in custody for a period of seven days. The applicant was suspected of the murder of a certain T.K., the attempted murder of a certain W.S. in Vilnius in 1994 and illegal possession of weapons. 8.  On 8 March 1996 at 1 p.m. the applicant appeared voluntarily at the Warsaw Police Headquarters (Komenda Policji) in connection with a matter unrelated to the proceedings which are the subject of the instant application. He was immediately arrested. He was not served with the prosecutor’s decision ordering his detention. 9.  On 14 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor issued another decision to retain the applicant in custody. He gave as reasons for his decision the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences in question, and the gravity of the charges. 10.  On 1 April 1996 that decision was upheld by the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were allowed to attend the hearing. They were not, therefore, able to present their arguments to the court. In addition, neither the applicant nor his lawyer had access to the case file in order to prepare their appeal against the decisions ordering the applicant’s detention. 11.  On 15 March 1996 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an interlocutory appeal, challenging the fact that his client had been detained by a prosecutor’s decision. It appears that the appeal was not entertained by the authorities. 12.  On 21 March 1996 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor rejected the applicant’s lawyer’s application to have the preventive measure in question lifted. 13.  On 3 June 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 1996. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer were authorised to attend the hearing and to present their arguments orally. They did not have access to the case file. 14.  That decision was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) on 4 July 1996. Only the prosecutor attended the appellate hearing. The applicant and his lawyer were not allowed to attend the hearing and were not granted access to the case file. 15.  Subsequently, the applicant’s detention was extended by numerous consecutive court decisions. The decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 19 September 1996 (upheld by the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) on 22 November 1996) and the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 6 December 1996 (upheld by the Supreme Court on 13 January 1997) were all justified by the courts by the existence of strong evidence against the applicant, comprising the testimony of the alleged victim W.S., the results of the line-up and confrontation with witnesses, as well as by the gravity of charges and a need to take additional investigatory measures. 16.  The Supreme Court’s hearing of 22 November 1996 and the Warsaw Court of Appeal’s hearing of 6 December 1996 were held in the presence of the prosecutor, with neither the applicant nor his lawyer entitled to attend or to have access to the case file. 17.  Meanwhile, the Warsaw Regional Court on 16 May and 12 August 1996, the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 8 October 1996 and the Supreme Court on 4 December 1996 refused to lift the preventive measure in question as requested by the applicant and his lawyer. 18.  The court’s hearing of 16 May 1996 was held with the prosecutor present, whereas the applicant and his lawyer were not allowed to participate. In addition only the prosecutor had access to the case file. 19.  On 7 February 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 8 March 1997, giving as reasons for the decision, inter alia, the fact that the suspect and his lawyer were in the process of consulting the case file. 20.  On 4 March 1997 the applicant was indicted on charges of the murder of T.K., the attempted murder of W.S. and illegal possession of weapons. 21.  Subsequently, the applicant’s detention was not formally extended. Nevertheless he remained in custody beyond 8 March 1997. 22.  On 6 May 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s interlocutory appeal lodged against the decision of 7 February 1997. The Supreme Court observed, however, that the lodging of an indictment did not transform the interim detention into a measure sine die. Consequently, if a defendant was to remain in detention, a domestic court had to issue a decision to extend the interim measure in question each time it was about to expire. 23.  The applicant’s lawyer followed with an application for the release of his client pending the proceedings. On 19 May 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to lift the measure and conversely, extended it until 14 March 1998. On 20 June 1997 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided to uphold the decision to extend the detention, but only until 8 March 1998. 24.  The applicant’s subsequent applications for release were rejected by the Warsaw Regional Court on 27 June 1997 and 26 March 1998. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had the opportunity to attend the latter hearing or have access to the case file. The prosecutor was present. 25.  The applicant’s detention was further extended by the Supreme Court on 21 April 1998, until 31 August 1998, and on 15 October 1998, until 30 November 1998, on the grounds of the existence of strong evidence against him, the gravity of the charges, the complexity of the case and the need to obtain statements from witnesses who lived in Lithuania. 26.  Meanwhile, the first hearing in the applicant’s case took place on 11 February 1998. 27.  On 23 October 1998 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to ten years’ deprivation of civic rights. 28.  On the same day, the Regional Court decided to extend the applicant’s detention until the moment he started serving his imprisonment sentence. On 2 June 1999 the Warsaw Regional Court rejected an application for release lodged by the applicant’s lawyer. 29.  On 25 January 2000 the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 23 October 1998 and ordered that the applicant’s detention be continued. On 1 February 2000 the applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal. On 7 April 2000 the detention decision was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. 30.  On 19 July 2000 the Warsaw Regional Court refused to release the applicant on bail as sought by his lawyer. On 30 August and 18 December 2000, and 7 February 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court issued decisions to continue the applicant’s detention. They were upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 10 October 2000, 16 January and 3 April 2001 respectively. 31.  On 7 February 2001 the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment and to ten years’ deprivation of civic rights (no. VIII K 168/00). 32.  Subsequently the applicant’s detention was extended by the Warsaw Regional Court’s decisions of 26 April 2001 (upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 5 June 2001) and of 16 July 2001 (upheld on 31 August 2001), and by the decision of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 19 October 2001 (upheld by the same court on 16 November 2001). 33.  On 18 December 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 7 February 2001 (II AKa 467/01). 34.  On 22 October 2002 the Supreme Court quashed the second-instance judgment of 18 December 2001 and decided to continue the applicant’s detention. 35.  On 29 November 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request to have a legal-aid lawyer appointed for the purpose of “requesting the revocation of the court decisions to extend his detention”. 36.  On 7 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided not to lift the measure in question as sought by the applicant, and on 17 January 2003, extended his detention. The latter decision was upheld by the same court on 18 February 2003. 37.  On 18 February 2003 and 11 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided again not to lift the measure and furthermore, in a separate decision of 11 April 2003, extended the detention until 22 July 2003. The latter decision was upheld by the same court on 13 May 2003. On 17 June 2003 and on 5 September 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal refused to lift the preventive measure. On 11 July 2003 the same court decided to extend the applicant’s detention further. On 18 July and 14 August 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal decided again neither to lift the applicant’s detention nor to order a substitute preventive measure. 38.  On 20 October 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld in principle the judgment of 7 February 2001, altering, because of amendments to the Criminal Code, only the legal classification of certain offences accompanying the main charges of murder and attempted murder (no. II Aka 487/02). 39.  On 12 May 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal and his conviction became final. 40.  Throughout the criminal proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer of his own choice. The applicant was present at the hearings and accompanied by his counsel. At the final stage of the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer appointed by the court for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal of 20 October 2003. 41.  The applicant brought an action for compensation alleging that his detention between 10 March 1996 and 8 March 1997, between 8 March 1997 and 18 December 2001, and between 22 October 2002 and 20 October 2003 had been unlawful. With regard to the first-mentioned period, the applicant argued that detaining him on the basis of a prosecutor’s decision, and not a court’s, was in breach of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Regarding the second-mentioned period, the applicant argued that after his indictment he had continued to be detained beyond the term prescribed in the relevant court’s decision. Finally, in connection with the third-mentioned period, the applicant complained that having quashed his second-instance conviction, the Supreme Court had decided to extend his detention despite the fact that the applicant had been absent from the relevant hearing, thus, in breach of the principle of equality of arms. 42.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the impartiality of numerous judges who had decided on the extension of his detention pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings. He requested that those judges be excluded from the examination of his case for compensation for unlawful detention. 43.  On 14 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s motion. In connection with the challenge of the impartiality of Judge B.S. and Judge G.S, the court held that the applicant had failed to show that there was a reasonable doubt as to the impartiality of those judges. The court stated that the applicant had merely expressed his personal conviction that the judges in question had given unjustified decisions to keep him in custody. The court concluded that the fact that a judge had given a decision contrary to the wishes of a party was not an indication of any personal prejudice of that judge against that party. 44.  On 12 October 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation. With regard to the first period of detention, the court considered it to be in compliance with the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969, which at the relevant time provided that pre-trial detention was to be ordered by the prosecutor, whose decision could be challenged in court. Regarding the second period in question, the court acknowledged that the practice of considering pre-trial detention as a measure sine die upon the indictment of a detainee had been changed by the 1996 Supreme Court’s Resolution. However, the decision to extend the applicant’s detention on 19 May 1997 was considered justified since the court had applied the literal meaning of the relevant procedural provisions. Finally, as to the third period complained of, the court found that there were no shortcomings in the impugned proceedings before the Supreme Court and that the decision to maintain the applicant’s detention upon the quashing of his conviction had been fully justified. 45.  That judgment was upheld by the Warsaw Court of Appeal on 1 March 2006. A cassation appeal was not available. 46.  On 13 December 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court two complaints under the 2004 Act. He claimed compensation for the alleged delays in the Supreme Court’s examination of his interlocutory appeals against the decisions of the Warsaw Appeal Court of 19 September 1996 and 7 February 1997 extending his pre-trial detention. 47.  On 14 January 2005 the Supreme Court gave two decisions, dismissing both of the applicant’s complaints. 48.  In both decisions the court considered that the proceedings in question had not been unreasonably lengthy, bearing in mind the fact that judges of the Supreme Court had had to examine voluminous material in what was a complex case. 49.  On 17 December 2004 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court two complaints under the 2004 Act. He claimed compensation for the alleged delays in the Supreme Court’s examination of the Warsaw Regional Court’s appeals to extend his detention of 4 March 1998 (Supreme Court’s decision of 21 Aril 1998) and of 25 August 1998 (Supreme Court’s decision of 15 October 1998). 50.  On 14 January 2005 the Supreme Court gave two decisions, dismissing both of the applicant’s complaints on the ground that no delays had occurred in the proceedings in question. 51.  On 27 April 2005 the Supreme Court refused to entertain the applicant’s appeals against those decisions. 52.  The applicant lodged thirty complaints under the 2004 Act about a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time at various stages of the criminal proceedings against him. 53.  On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. SPK 12/05) refused to entertain the complaints related to the proceedings before the Warsaw Court of Appeal no. II AKa 467/01 and no. II AKa 487/02. The Supreme Court held that the applicant had not complied with the procedural requirements of the relevant domestic law because his application with the ECHR had not been lodged during the impugned appellate proceedings but during the preceding first-instance trial no. VIII K 168/00. 54.  On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. KSP 5/05) refused to entertain the complaint lodged in relation to the pending proceedings concerning the breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (no. II S 3/05), on the ground that such a complaint was not available under the applicable domestic law. 55.  On 16 June 2005 the Supreme Court (no. WZ 38/05) upheld the Supreme Court’s order of 27 April 2005. 56.  On 16 August 2000 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor opened an inquiry into the allegations that during his detention in Barczewo Prison the applicant had uttered threats and incited third persons to kill Judge B.P., who had presided in the applicant’s criminal case. 57.  On 28 December 2001 the applicant was charged with the above‑mentioned offence. 58.  On 30 November 2004 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor closed the investigation on the ground that the applicant had not committed the offence in question. 59.  The applicant brought numerous civil actions for infringement of his personal rights in connection with various events. 60.  On 3 February 2005 the applicant filed a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code seeking compensation for a breach of Article 6 and other provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had allegedly been committed by domestic courts and penitentiary facilities in relation to the applicant’s main criminal case (VIII K 168/00).\nOn 8 May 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, considering that the plaintiff had failed to substantiate some of his allegations and to demonstrate that the remainder of the alleged procedural shortcomings and the actions of the respondent had been unlawful or linked with any damage which the applicant might have suffered.\nOn 2 July 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal.\nOn an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyer informed him that a cassation appeal against that judgment was without any prospects of success. 61.  On 13 October 2005 the applicant brought a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code, seeking compensation for the fact that in the official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor (Zastępca Dyrektora) of Radom Remand Centre had stated that the applicant was guilty of uttering threats against Judge B. P.\nOn 8 June 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It was established that the official letter in question contained information that proceedings for uttering threats were pending against the applicant and did not, as the applicant had alleged, imply that he was guilty of uttering threats. In fact, the impugned criminal proceedings against the applicant had been terminated on 21 December 2004 but the remand centre’s administration had been informed about it only on 28 December 2004, that is, one day after the deputy governor’s letter was sent.\nOn 16 November 2006 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 62.  On 19 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for infringement of his personal rights in that a judge of the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre had found him guilty of uttering threats against Judge B. P.\nOn 21 November 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as manifestly ill-founded. On 6 June 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal in the case. 63.  On 5 November 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for breach of his personal rights in that the Governor (Dyrektor) of Radom Remand Centre had reported to the Penitentiary Commission that the applicant had been uttering threats against Judge B. P.\nOn 30 March 2007 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim.\nOn 4 July 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment.\nOn 23 October 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal granted legal aid for the purpose of lodging a cassation appeal in the case. By letter of 26 November 2007 the applicant’s lawyer informed the applicant that there were no grounds for such an appeal and that consequently that he would not lodge one on the applicant’s behalf. 64.  It appears that 18 April 2006 the applicant brought another civil action for compensation in relation to an unspecified event.\nOn 30 November 2006 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim.\nOn 26 June 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. On 13 August 2007 it rejected the applicant’s request for legal aid. 65.  On an unspecified date in 2009 the applicant brought a civil action for libel against a certain M.G., the applicant’s former fellow cellmate, who had allegedly informed the prosecution services that the applicant had been uttering death threats against Judge B.P.\nOn 22 July 2010 the Włocławek Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action, holding that he had failed to prove that the respondent had acted unlawfully. 66.  The applicant submitted photocopies of three envelopes which contained letters sent to him at his address in Warszawa-Białołęka Remand Centre by the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office (Krajowe Biuro Wyborcze) and the Central Board of the Prison Service (Centralny Zarząd Służby Więziennej) respectively. 67.  The first envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz [an abbreviation]....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 13 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of the stamps and the date of 24 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”). The date of 18 December 2002 has been written by hand on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 68.  The second envelope bears similar rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 11 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 19 December 2002 on the other. “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”) has been stamped over one of the rectangular stamps. The date of 17 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 69.  The third envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 11 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 19 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”). The date of 17 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 70.  The applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence to the penitentiary authorities. 71.  He also brought a related civil action for the infringement of personal rights, seeking 100,000 Polish zlotys (PLN - approximately 24,500 euros (EUR)) of compensation. 72.  On 27 November 2006 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 5,000 in compensation for the infringement of his personal rights on account of the fact that three letters sent to him from the Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service, the Country Election Office and the Central Board of the Prison Service had been censored by mistake. 73.  By virtue of the same judgment the applicant, who at the beginning of the proceedings had been exempted from court fees, was ordered to pay PLN 5,000 towards a part of an unpaid court fee. 74.  The applicant and the respondent appealed. 75.  On 28 June 2007 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment on the merits and quashed the part concerning the court’s fees. 76.  The applicant also submitted a photocopy of an envelope containing the letter which had been sent to him on 12 December 2002 by the Registry of the Court. 77.  The envelope bears two rectangular stamps reading “Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre Received ... L.dz....” (“Areszt Śledczy Warszawa Białołęka Wpłynęło ... L.dz. ...”). The date of 16 December 2002 is printed in the middle of one of these stamps and the date of 24 December 2002 on the other. The envelope also bears a stamp reading “Letter censored date ...” (“List ocenzurowano dnia ...”). The date of 18 December 2002 has been handwritten on the dotted line and an illegible signature is visible next to it. 78.  It appears that the applicant complained about the interference with his correspondence to the penitentiary authorities. 79.  He also brought a related civil action for the infringement of personal rights, seeking PLN 100,000 of compensation. 80.  On 9 August 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court awarded the applicant PLN 1,000 of compensation for unlawful interference with the applicant’s correspondence and waived the court fees. 81.  The applicant did not appeal. 82.  The applicant has been in continuous detention since 8 March 1996. 83.  He complained that throughout his entire detention he had been held in overcrowded cells with the right to only one hour of an outdoor exercise per day and to one shower per week. More recently, the applicant submitted that despite the fact that the domestic authorities claimed to have resolved the issue of overcrowding in detention facilities, the conditions of his own detention had not improved. 84.  The applicant maintained that the authorities of different detention facilities had persecuted him for helping his fellow inmates write legal motions and complaints and for spreading information about the case‑law of the ECHR. The alleged persecution took the forms of: placing the applicant under a special regime for dangerous prisoners, transferring him frequently between different detention facilities, sending him to prisons located far from his family’s home and confiscating his personal belongings. 85.  The applicant was detained in this detention facility (in his hometown) during the following periods: (1) from 8 March 1996 until 26 March 1997, (2) from 14 January until 19 November 1998, (3) from 12 January 2000 until 20 February 2001, (4) from 3 December 2001 until 18 March 2002, (5) from 11 February until 25 June 2003, (6) from 23 July until 16 December 2003; (7) from 13 May until 1 June 2004; and (8) from 4 until 14 February 2008.\n(a)  Description of the living conditions 86.  As established by the Warsaw Regional Court in the course of the civil proceedings described below, during the six terms of his detention in Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were the following. 87.  The applicant had been detained in cells, in which the space per person had at all times been inferior to 3 square metres. From 1 January until 31 December 2000 the maximum capacity of the remand centre had been exceeded by almost 5%. 88.  As a non-smoker the applicant had been assigned to non-smoking cells. The internal rules, however, had not been respected by his fellow‑prisoners and the applicant had been exposed to cigarette smoke. The toilet annex in the applicant’s cells had been separated from the rest of the cell either by a piece of plywood with the entrance covered with a piece of fabric or by a concrete wall with a sliding door. In most cases the applicant’s cells had not been ventilated. 89.  In addition, the applicant submitted that during his detention in Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre he had not received a non-meat diet (dieta jarska), which had been contrary to a doctor’s recommendations and which had allegedly resulted in malnutrition and, consequently, a deterioration in his health. 90.  During his detention under high-security regime, from 13 May until 1 June 2004, the applicant was committed to a single-occupancy cell and was in complete isolation from other prisoners. Every day he had a one-hour period of an outdoor exercise alone. Every few days he had access to the remand centre’s day-room in which he was also alone. He did not have access to any sporting, education or leisure activities. The applicant was subjected to personal checks when he was admitted to and transferred from the remand centre and, on a daily basis, each time he left and returned to his cell. The applicant’s cell with the exception of the toilet area, the outdoor yard, day-room and all other places open to the applicant, were under constant camera surveillance.\n(b)  Related civil action and complaints 91.  On 7 March 2006 the applicant brought a civil action in tort against Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre. He invoked Article 417 of the Civil Code and Article 3 of the Convention. He claimed PLN 500,000 in compensation for his alleged suffering, during his entire stay in that remand centre, resulting from overcrowding and poor living and sanitary conditions and from exposure to cigarette smoke. 92.  On 7 November 2008 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. The domestic court examined the case under Article 23 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 448 of that code. The court held that the suffering which the applicant had experienced because of the overcrowding had not been great enough to warrant an award of compensation. It was stressed that despite the overcrowding, the overall sanitary and living conditions in the remand centre had been acceptable. The domestic court did not rule on the issue of the applicant’s passive smoking. 93.  On 19 December 2008 the applicant appealed against that judgment. 94.  It appears that on an unspecified date the appeal was dismissed by the second-instance court. 95.   It appears that the applicant also complained to the penitentiary authorities about the conditions of his detention under high-security regime. 96.  In this facility (200 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained during the following periods: (1) from 26 March 1997 until 14 January 1998; and (2) from 11 September until 9 October 2002. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 97.  In this establishment (230 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained from 19 November 1998 until 12 January 2000. He submitted that he had been detained in an unheated cell (no. 11 wing XIV) in temperatures as low as 14 degrees Celsius with an average temperature of 16-17 degrees Celsius in wintertime. 98.  In this facility (270 km from his hometown) the applicant was detained (1) from 20 February until 3 December 2001; and (2) from 17 January until 7 February 2006. 99.  He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 100.  The applicant was detained in this prison (in his hometown) during the following periods: (1) from 18 March until 24 April 2002; (2) from 22 May until 11 September 2002; (3) from 9 October 2002 until 11 February 2003; (4) from 30 September until 18 November 2005; (5) from 7 until 15 February 2006; (6) from 30 August 2007 until 4 February 2008; (7) from 14 February until 8 April 2008; (8) from 24 April until 7 May 2008; (9) from 1 until 23 October 2008; and (10) from an unspecified date after 13 February 2012 until an unspecified date before 5 March 2012.\n(a)  Description of the living conditions 101.  In his application form of 15 November 2010 the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in Warszawa Białołęka Prison. He submitted that he had been detained together with another inmate in a single-occupancy cell measuring 5 square metres and then, together with five other inmates, in a cell measuring 13 square metres. The cells in question were run down, dirty, not ventilated and badly-lit. There was mould on the walls and water dripped from the ceiling whenever someone was using the tap in the cell upstairs. The applicant had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. Prisoners did not have the opportunity to participate in any activities. The prison’s computer room, which had been funded by the European Union, was permanently locked. The applicant had a shower once a week but could barely wash himself because the shower heads were designed to limit water consumption. The applicant’s meals were always served cold one hour and a half after the distribution round had started. 102.  The applicant also submitted that he had been beaten up by a warden in Warszawa Białołęka Prison.\n(b)  Related civil action 103.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a civil action in tort against Warszawa Białołęka Prison. He was represented by a lawyer practising in Warsaw. 104.  On 12 February 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the action. 105.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant was informed by his lawyer that the latter had failed to appear at the court’s final hearing and had not been aware of the ruling. In consequence the lawyer had failed to request a reasoned judgment from the first-instance court and to lodge an appeal. The lawyer offered to pay the applicant PLN 2,000 in compensation for his own negligence (“nienależyte wykonanie obowiązku”) and instructed the applicant about the possibility of bringing a civil action if he considered that amount insufficient. 106.  The first-instance judgment became final on 30 August 2010.\n(c)  Penitentiary complaints 107.  In 2002 the applicant filed several complaints with different penitentiary authorities about the lack of a vegetarian diet, frequent power cuts and other issues relating to the living conditions in Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre. None were successful. 108.  On 11 July 2002 the Director of the Warsaw Regional Inspectorate of the Prison Service informed the applicant that detention facilities were not under any duty to cater to the dietary preferences of detainees if, as in the applicant’s case, they were not medically justified. 109.  On 7 January 2003 the applicant complained to a competent penitentiary judge, inter alia, that he had been punched by a warden in the course of an argument they had had in the morning of the same day. On 28 February 2003 the judge, who had examined witnesses’ statements and the report from the applicant’s medical examination immediately after the incident, found the applicant’s allegations to be unfounded. 110.  The applicant was detained in that facility (287 km from his hometown) from 24 April until 22 May 2002. He alleged that he had not received proper medical care there. 111.  The applicant was detained in this facility (140 km from his hometown) from 25 June until 23 July 2003.\n(a)  Description of the living conditions 112.  In his application form, which was received by the Registry on 30 November 2010, the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention in Łódź Prison, to which he had been committed for psychiatric observation. He alleged that his cell had been overcrowded. The toilet had been separated by a brick wall, which was only one-metre high. Because the windows had been blocked by heavy blinds, the cell had not been ventilated and the temperature inside had reached up to 40 degrees Celsius.\n(b)  Alleged medical malpractice 113.  The applicant had had one hour of outdoor exercise per day. He also submitted that, on 4 July 2003, during an EMG head examination which had been carried out in the prison, his arm had been badly damaged and he had not been prescribed any physiotherapy for that.\n(c)  Related civil proceedings concerning medical malpractice and detention conditions 114.  On 6 September 2006 the applicant brought a civil action for compensation for the health damage which he had allegedly suffered as a result of the negligence of the medical staff of Łódź Prison on 4 July 2003 and of inadequate care, namely the lack of physiotherapy, afterwards. On 14 April 2008 the applicant broadened the scope of his claim by alleging a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights in that the prison authorities had failed to ensure that the conditions of his detention in Łódź Prison were adequate. 115.  On 22 January 2010 the Łódź Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action. 116.  The claim concerning the alleged medical malpractice was examined by the court under Article 417 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 445 of that code, whereas the claim concerning the allegedly inadequate conditions of detention was examined under Article 24 of the Civil Code in conjunction with Article 448 of that code. 117.  As regards the claim under Article 417 of the Civil Code the domestic court analysed in detail the course of the medical procedure in question and a number of medical experts’ reports. It was concluded that the medical staff who had performed the applicant’s EMG scan on 4 July 2003 had not made any errors. The damage to the nerve of the applicant’s arm had occurred much later and it was impossible to determine its cause. The court considered, however, that there was certainly no causal link between the events of 4 July 2003 and the damage suffered by the applicant. 118.  As regards the claim under Article 24 of the Civil Code, the respondent party raised an objection, arguing that pursuant to Article 4421 of the Civil Code the statutory three-year limitation period for claims in tort had elapsed, at the latest, three years after the applicant had left Łódź Prison, that is, on 23 July 2006. 119.  The domestic court did not address the respondent’s objection and examined the case on the merits. 120.  The following facts were established by the court on the basis of the data from various prison and hospital registers, and prison inspection reports. In the relevant period the applicant had been detained in cells nos. 303 and 305. The space per person in those cells had at all times been greater than the statutory minimum standard of 3 square metres. The cells had been well-lit and well-ventilated even though the windows had indeed been partly covered by semi-transparent blinds attached to the outside wall at an angle, creating a twenty-six centimetre gap between the window and the blind. A toilet annex in each cell had been sufficiently separated and clean. 121.  In the light of the above facts the court held that the applicant’s personal rights had not been infringed. 122.  On 20 May 2010 the Łódź Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. 123.  The applicant was detained in this prison (160 km from his hometown) (1) from 16 December 2003 until 12 January 2004. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention in that period. The applicant was again committed to that detention facility (2) from an unspecified date, no later than 11 August 2011 until an unspecified date before 20 February 2012 and (3) from an unspecified date before 2 July 2012 until the present day. 124.  The applicant submitted that on 11 August 2011 he was committed to cell no. 118 in wing S. On 12 August 2011 he was moved to cell no. 213 in wing E and on 19 August 2011, to another cell in wing B. On 22 August 2011 he was committed to cell no. 214 in wing D and later, to cell no. 210 in wing D. On 28 December 2011 he was transferred to cell no. 202 in wing D and on 16 January 2012 to cell no. 210 in the same wing. 125.  The above mentioned cells of wing D, which was reserved to prisoners attending school, were, for the most part, shared by five inmates (including the applicant). The statutory minimum standard of 3 square metres had not been secured in those cells. They were insufficiently lit and the toilet annex was small. The applicant had access to shower once a week for 10 minutes at a time. No additional shower was allowed to the applicant on the days when he worked in the school workshop. 126.  From September 2011 until September 2012 (presumably with a break when he was detained in Warszawa Służewiec Remand Centre – see paragraph 250 below) the applicant attended vocational high school three days per week. From September until late-October 2012 he was enrolled in an additional technical course from Monday through Friday. 127.  From May through September prisoners could use the prison’s football pitch once a week for 45 minutes. Throughout the year they had an hour-long outdoor exercise per day in a small concrete yard. 128.  The applicant submitted that he and his cellmates often quarrelled and got in fights because of tension caused by their constant rotation between cells. 129.  On 23 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to a single cell no. 114 in wing F. 130.  On 21 November 2012 the Penitentiary Commission of Włocławek Remand Centre decided to revoke the applicant’s authorisation to study in view of the applicant’s moderate progress in resocialisation and unfavourable criminological prognosis which he had received on 20 November 2012. On 11 December 2012 this decision was partly changed on appeal and the applicant was allowed to resume his education. 131.  On 18 December 2012 the Penitentiary Commission of Włocławek Remand Centre decided to continue the applicant’s detention in a closed‑type prison in view of the seriousness of the offence of which he had been convicted, his increasingly vexatious behaviour, disobedience and unfavourable criminological prognosis. 132.  The applicant is currently attending the remand centre’s school. 133.  The applicant was detained in this facility (100 km from his hometown) (1) from 12 January until 13 May 2004; (2) from 28 June 2004 until 30 September 2005; (3) from 18 November 2005 until 17 January 2006; (4) from 15 February 2006 until 30 August 2007; (5) from 7 May until 1 October 2008 (one-day prison leave on 11 August); (6) from 23 October 2008 until 1 July 2009; (7) from 14 until 27 August 2009; and (8) from 24 September 2009 until 12 February 2010.\n(a)  Detention from 12 until 20 January 2004 under increased supervision 134.  On 10 January 2004 the Deputy Director General of the Prison Service informed the administration of Radom Remand Centre that the applicant had been charged with uttering threats against Judge B.P., who had been involved in the applicant’s criminal trial (see paragraphs 56 ‑ 58 above).\nAs a result, on 13 January 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre issued a decision, in which he established the following detention regime in respect of the applicant. 135. (1) Personnel monitoring the applicant’s private correspondence were to pay particular attention to the content of the applicant’s letters. Any letter containing threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department was to be immediately transferred to the remand centre’s governor or his deputy.\n(2) The applicant’s prison education officer (wychowawca) was to monitor the applicant’s official correspondence (korespondencja urzędowa). The remand centre’s governor or his deputy was to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered.\n(3) Two officers were to be designated to monitor the applicant’s telephone conversations. The remand centre’s governor or his deputy was to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered. In the event that the applicant was heard uttering threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department, the telephone call was to be interrupted.\n(4) The applicant’s conversations during his visits (widzenia) were to be subject to “strict supervision” by a designated prison officer. Supervisors were to be immediately informed if any irregularities were discovered. In the event the applicant was heard uttering threats against Judge B.P. or any other member of the justice department, the conversation was to be interrupted. 136.  From 12 until 20 January 2004 the applicant was detained in wing XI of Radom Remand Centre under the above-described special supervision regime. He did not submit, however, if in the material time any of his letters, phone calls or conversations with visitors had been monitored as described the preceding paragraph. The Government submitted that the relevant remand centre’s registers of correspondence or visits did not exist. 137. As to the living conditions in the remand centre, the applicant submitted that he had not received any food and had lived off what he bought in the prison canteen. The power in the electric sockets had been turned off each morning between 9 and 11 o’clock. 138.   On an unspecified date in January 2004 the applicant informed the Head of the Security Department of Radom Remand Centre (Kierownik Działu Ochrony) that he feared for his life and well-being because a certain W.S., a convicted criminal who had been the victim and the prosecution witness during the applicant’s trial, had been detained in Radom Remand Centre.\n(b)  Detention from 20 January until 13 May 2004 and from 28 June until 5 October 2004 under high-security regime\n(i)  The imposition of the special regime 139.  On 20 January 2004 the Head of the Security Department applied to the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre for the applicant’s classification as a “prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility” (więzień stwarzający poważne zagrożenie społeczne albo poważne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa zakładu karnego) and his detention under high-security regime. The regime was to entail (1) general security measures as regulated by the law, including the monitoring and censorship of the applicant’s correspondence and monitoring and control of his telephone conversations and visits, and, in addition, (2) the use of handcuffs and fetters during the applicant’s transport; (3) transport only with the help of police; and (4) handcuffing the applicant behind the back anywhere outside the remand centre’s living quarters.\nIt was noted as reasons for the request that the applicant had been convicted of a serious offence and sentenced to a long term in prison and that he was hostile towards the officers of the justice department. In consequence, the applicant was considered likely to pose a real threat to society and remand centre’s internal order, and to abscond, in particular, during transport outside the remand centre. 140.  On 20 January 2004 the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre, acting under Article 76 § 1 (7) of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (“the Code”), decided to place the applicant under high‑security regime for prisoners posing a serious threat to society or to security of a detention facility. This status is regulated by Article 88 § 5 of the Code in conjunction with Article 88 (a) § 1 of that Code. The Commission’s decision did not contain any written grounds. 141.  The applicant appealed. 142.  On 9 February 2004 the Radom Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal and observed that already in 2003 the Penitentiary Commission of Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre had classified the applicant as a prisoner posing a serious threat to security of that detention facility. It was also noted that one day after the applicant had been transferred to Radom Remand Centre, the Deputy Director General of the Prison Service informed the remand centre’s administration that the applicant had been uttering threats against Judge B.P. (see paragraph 134 above). It had been derived from the above-mentioned letter that the applicant was likely to pose a real threat to the security of the other judges of the bench. In view of the above, the Radom Regional Court decided to uphold the Penitentiary Commission’s decision on the applicant’s status. 143.  On 20 April and 5 July 2004 the administration of Radom Remand Centre issued two identical requests to extend the applicant’s high security detention regime. The requests were justified by invoking: (1) the gravity of the offences of which the applicant had been convicted and the long sentence; (2) the fact that the applicant manifested his hostility towards the agents of the justice department; (3) serious lack of moral character; and (4) other unspecified features of the applicant’s character and his personal qualities (właściwości i warunki osobiste) which, together with the above‑mentioned elements, made him a person who posed a serious threat to the society and to the security of the remand centre. 144.  On 20 April and again, on 5 July 2004 the Penitentiary Commission examined the above-mentioned requests and reviewed the applicant’s situation. It was found that the original reasons for the imposition of the special regime were still valid. Consequently, it was decided that the applicant’s status be extended, each time, for another three months. 145.  The applicant initially appealed against the review decision of 20 April 2004. Later on, however, he withdrew his appeal in protest that the penitentiary authorities had not granted him access to his entire prison record but only to reports of the relevant authorities which had been used in the proceedings before the Penitentiary Commission and which concerned the applicant’s conduct and character. Consequently, on 16 September 2004 the Radom Regional Court formally discontinued the appellate proceedings. 146.  During the third review proceedings, the administration of Radom Remand Centre, submitted that the applicant had stopped posing a threat to the security and internal order of the remand centre and of the officers of the justice department and did not cause any problems to the remand centre’s staff. 147. Consequently, on 5 October 2004 the Penitentiary Commission of Radom Remand Centre decided that the applicant’s special status be lifted.\n(ii)  The features of the regime 148. On 20 January 2004 the applicant was moved to the wing for “dangerous” prisoners. On 13 May 2004 he was temporarily transferred to Warszawa Mokotów Remand Centre and then, to Sztum Prison. The special regime was also enforced in these two detention facilities (see paragraphs 90 above and 204 below). On 28 June 2004 he returned to Radom Remand Centre (see paragraph 133 above).\n(α)  The applicant’s isolation and other special measures 149. During his detention in Radom Remand Centre, from 20 January until 8 March, 14 April until 13 July and from 3 to 13 September 2004 (a total of 5 months), the applicant was committed to a solitary cell. From 8 March until 14 April, 13 July until 3 September and from 13 September until 5 October 2004 (a total of 4 months), he shared his cell with one or two other persons. 150.  The applicant submitted that from 9 March until 1 April 2004 he had been committed to cell no. 109 together with a smoking fellow inmate. 151. The applicant’s cells, except for the toilet annex, were under constant camera surveillance. The light was on all the time. 152.  The applicant was scheduled to have his daily outdoor exercise in the company of another special-type prisoner from cell no. 405. Because the prisoner in question regularly refused to go outside, the applicant had his walks alone. The applicant was not authorised to participate in sporting activities with other prisoners. During one hour twice and sometimes, three times per week he had individual access to a day-room with a TV-set, books and magazines. The Government submitted that the applicant had been authorised to attend cultural and educational courses and catholic mass but they were unable to say whether the applicant had indeed made use of those facilities. The applicant submitted that with the classification as a “dangerous prisoner” he had not had access to any such activities. 153.  The applicant was subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell, for example, from an outdoor exercise, telephone booth or the appointment with the prison’s doctor. The applicant submitted that on average he had been subjected to four to eight personal checks per day. He also stressed that the frequency and the very practice of strip searches was unjustified in the light of the fact that the applicant had at all times been under camera surveillance or wardens’ supervision.\n(β)  Censorship of the applicant’s correspondence and monitoring of his telephone calls and visits 154.  The applicant’s incoming and outgoing private and official correspondence continued to be opened and read and his telephone calls and visits, to be monitored by the remand centre’s administration. 155.  The applicant submitted that because of the lapse of time, he had not been able to keep the receipts or the copies of the relevant letters. He stated, however, that in 2004 he had sent approximately 4,000 letters and that all of them had been censored. He enumerated 1,128 of such letters and, additionally, 48 incoming censored letters.\nThe applicant also submitted that when he had been detained in Radom remand Centre in 2004 the following visits (eleven in total) had taken place: on 23 February, 15 and 29 March, 12 July, 23 August, 27 September, 4 October, 11 and 21 November and 30 December 2004 – with his brother K.K. and on 26 July 2004 - with a certain A.W.\nIn addition 180 telephone conversations which the applicant had in 2004 in Radom Remand Centre were controlled. 156.  The Government submitted that the relevant remand centre’s registers of correspondence or visits did not exist but acknowledged that the practice of routine monitoring and censoring of the applicant’s correspondence, telephone calls and visits had been in place.\n(iii)  Related penitentiary complaints and civil action 157.  The applicant lodged numerous complaints with the penitentiary authorities in relation to the conditions of his detention under high-security regime. They were to no avail. 158.  On 30 January 2007 he also brought a civil action for compensation on account of his detention under a high-security regime from 20 January until 5 October 2004 and false accusations that he had been uttering threats against Judge B.P. The outcome of these proceedings is unknown.\n(c)  The applicant’s detention from 5 October until 24 November 2004 under increased supervision\n(i)  The conditions of the applicant’s detention 159.  On 5 October 2004 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 404 in general wing IX.\n(ii)  The applicant’s correspondence\n(α)  The monitoring of the correspondence 160.  On 11 November 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre (Dyrektor) decided that the applicant, even though no longer classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison, should, nevertheless, be treated with particular precaution because of the threats he had uttered in the past against judge B.P. To that effect the applicant’s correspondence was to be checked by the remand centre security guard (inspektor działu ochrony) in the applicant’s presence. 161.  It is uncontested that all of the applicant’s incoming and outgoing mail was opened and read. 162. The applicant submitted that on 18 and 19 November 2004 he had wished to send two private letters to his fellow prisoners K.S. and P.K. The letters contained information on prisoners’ rights and the procedure under the European Convention on Human Rights. Attached to one of the letters was a brochure containing a summary of the Court’s case-law. 163.  The envelopes were inspected and the letters read by a remand centre officer. Because the letters contained comments by the applicant, which were considered as a threat to the remand centre’s internal order, they were seized. 164.  It is unclear whether the above-mentioned inspection was carried out during the dispatching of the letters in the applicant’s wing and in his presence or rather, on their receipt in the wing of the addressee, K.S. 165.  It appears that the letters were eventually delivered to the addressees. The ECHR’s brochure, however, was taken out and put in the remand centre’s depository (see paragraph 175 below).\n(β)  The applicant’s complaints about the monitoring of his correspondence 166.  In November and December 2004 the applicant lodged several applications with the Radom Regional Court to complain about the monitoring of his correspondence under the increased supervision regime, the seizure of his private letter to S.N. and, further, about the arbitrariness and unlawfulness of his disciplinary punishment of 23 November 2004 and the living conditions in his solitary cell. 167.  In an official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor of Radom Remand Centre informed the Radom Regional Court that the following findings, concerning the applicant’s correspondence, had been made in the course of an internal inquiry. 168.  After the decision of 11 October 2004 the applicant’s official correspondence had been monitored by an authorised officer in the applicant’s presence. The letters had been opened and their content checked. The procedure had been in compliance with Articles 90 (8) and 242 § 6 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. 169.  On 18 and 19 November 2004 two private letters had been sent by the applicant to a fellow prisoner K.S. who was, at that time, detained in wing XIII of the same remand centre as the applicant. The letters had been opened and read. It was revealed that the envelopes contained documents from the applicant’s criminal proceedings and official letters which had been sent by various penitentiary authorities to the applicant. Handwritten notes by the applicant had been on top of some of those documents. The applicant had made insulting remarks about the Deputy Head of the Prison Service. He had also informed K.S. that he was preparing an application to the ECHR about the living conditions in the remand centre and that he was going to distribute copies of it among the detainees. They would then be able simply to sign that model application and send it to the ECHR on their own behalf.\nIn the letter of 19 November 2004 the applicant had further informed K.S. that he had taken steps to encourage detainees to lodge complaints with the ECHR. That, in the applicant’s view, would make the remand centre’s authorities reduce the overcrowding and comply with other minimum standards set out in the Convention. 170.  The warden, who had monitored the letters in question, had considered that they were aimed at raising tension among detainees. He had applied to the remand centre’s governor for authorisation to seize the correspondence. Having read the letters in question, the governor had decided to seize them and include them in the applicant’s personal file. Hehad considered that the content of the letters might be a threat to the remand centre’s internal order and security. The applicant had been informed about the governor’s decision in compliance with Article 105 § 4 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. 171.  Because the applicant’s actions had been perceived as a serious violation of the remand centre’s internal discipline and order, an application for his disciplinary punishment had been filed with the remand centre’s governor on 23 November 2004 (see paragraphs 176 - 178 below). 172. On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court examined five complaints from the applicant, concerning, among others, the monitoring of his correspondence, and considered all of those complaints ill-founded. 173.  As far as the issue of the applicant’s correspondence was concerned, the court found that the governor’s decision of 11 November 2004 to monitor the applicant’s correspondence had been in compliance with the law and justified in the applicant’s case. Moreover, the regional court came to the following conclusion:\n“There are no grounds to call into question the [fact] of intercepting the [applicant’s] letters to [K.S.] and [P.K.] because those letters contained information and documents other than instructions as to how, where to and what to write about the conditions of [detention]. [Phrases such as]: ‘prisoners are treated inhumanely’ appeared in those letters. Such statements are groundless and [were] employed with the goal of making a particular impression and [to enhance] the ‘effectiveness of [the applicant’s] actions.’” 174.  On 10 January 2005 the applicant complained to the penitentiary judge that the Governor of Radom Remand Centre had confiscated his private copy of a brochure on the case-law of the ECHR, which he had intended to send to K.S., a fellow prisoner detained in another establishment. 175.  In reply, by letter of 9 February 2005 the penitentiary judge informed the applicant that his complaint was manifestly ill-founded. The judge gave an account of the events which had led to the applicant’s complaint. He considered that the governor’s decision to confiscate the brochure in question had been justified in the light of the fact that the applicant, in his letter to K.S., had incited the latter to lodge complaints against the prison authorities with the ECHR. The brochure in question was included to help K.S. in drafting his ECHR application. It was also noted that, even though as of 22 November 2004 the applicant could have requested the return of the brochure in question from the prison depository, he had not done so.\n(d)  The applicant’s disciplinary punishment from 23 November until 8 December 2004\n(i)  The imposition and the features of the measure 176.  On 23 November 2004 the Governor of Radom Remand Centre received an application to punish the applicant for inciting his fellow prisoners to rebellion by disseminating information about their Convention rights and the procedure for applying to the ECHR. 177.  On the same day, having heard the applicant and his prison education officer (wychowawca) the governor imposed on the applicant a disciplinary punishment in the form of fourteen days’ solitary confinement. 178.  The sanction was applied from 24 November until 8 December 2004.\n(ii)  The applicant’s appeal against the measure 179.  On 23 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Radom Regional Court to challenge the governor’s decision to impose a disciplinary punishment by placing him in solitary confinement. He also asked that the enforcement of the punishment be stayed while his appeal was pending. 180.  On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court heard the submissions of the prosecutor and of the applicant. The court upheld the impugned decision. 181.  The penitentiary court noted that the applicant had admitted that he had been disseminating information about prisoners’ Convention rights among his fellow inmates in Radom Remand Centre and that he had transferred such information by letters to K.S. and P.K. The information in question concerned, in particular, the minimum living standards required by the Convention for detention facilities and instructions on how to lodge an application with the Court. The applicant admitted that he had been encouraging his fellow inmates to send applications to Strasbourg by assuring them that he would prepare model letters for them. He stressed, however, that his actions had not been aimed at starting rebellion but rather at achieving the improvement of the living conditions in that establishment. 182.  In addition, the penitentiary court took note of the threats which the applicant had been heard to express in the following words: “You wanted me in Radom [Remand Centre], so now you have it; this is only the beginning! I will put [this place] in order, do you understand?!” 183.  The court found that the applicant, through his actions, had incited other prisoners to rebellion and thus the governor had been justified in imposing a disciplinary punishment on him. 184.  Moreover, the penitentiary court considered that the governor had acted in compliance with Articles 144 and 145 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences in deciding that his decision of 23 November 2003 was not to be announced publicly. 185.  The court did not rule on the applicant’s request to stay the enforcement of his disciplinary punishment.\n(iii)  Complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings concerning the applicant’s disciplinary punishment 186.  On 3 December 2004 the applicant filed with the Lublin Court of Appeal via the Radom Regional Court a complaint under the 2004 Act alleging an unreasonable delay in the above-mentioned proceedings concerning the challenge to his disciplinary punishment. The complaint was rejected by the Radom Regional Court on 2 February 2005.\n(iv)  Conditions of the applicant’s detention during his disciplinary punishment\n(α)  Description of the living conditions 187.  During his disciplinary punishment, from 24 November until 8 December 2004, the applicant was detained consecutively in cells nos. 305 and 306. In the applicant’s submission, the temperature in the cells in question had dropped to 12 degrees Celsius. The windows were sealed with nails and could not be opened. The glass was painted white and did not let any light inside.\n(β)  Related penitentiary complaints 188.  On an unspecified date in December 2004 the applicant complained to the Radom Regional Court about, among other things, inadequate temperature, lighting and ventilation in his solitary cells. 189.  In an official letter of 27 December 2004 the Deputy Governor of Radom Remand Centre informed the Radom Regional Court that the temperature in the cells in question had been maintained by an automatic system at 20 degrees Celsius. The lighting and ventilation had met the required standards. The windows had not been nailed shut. 190.  On 30 December 2004 the penitentiary judge of the Radom Regional Court examined five complaints from the applicant, concerning, among other things, inadequate living conditions in his solitary cells.\nThe penitentiary court found that the temperature in the applicant’s cells had been maintained automatically at 20 degrees Celsius. The heating system had been checked and the applicant had not complained. The lighting and ventilation had been adequate in both cells in question. The windows had not been sealed. When the applicant had complained that his bed was broken, he had been moved, without any delay, to cell no. 306.\nThe applicant’s complaint about the conditions of his detention was therefore considered ill-founded.\n(γ)  Civil action concerning the applicant’s disciplinary punishment 191.  It appears that on 9 May 2005 the applicant brought a civil action under Article 417 of the Civil Code and numerous articles of the Convention. He claimed compensation on account of the alleged degrading and inhuman treatment resulting from the imposition and the conditions of his disciplinary punishment. 192.  On 30 March 2007 the Warsaw Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 29 May 2008 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. A cassation appeal against that judgment was available to the applicant under Polish law. It is unclear, however, whether he used the remedy.\n(e)  The applicant’s detention in 2005 and 2006 193.  On 18 July 2005 the applicant came across prisoner W.S. in the Radom Remand Centre’s yard but no incident was reported. 194.  The applicant had regular visits from his relatives and friends. Altogether fifty persons were authorised to apply for a visit in the remand centre. Many of them visited the applicant regularly. The Government submitted that it was impossible to establish who had actually visited the applicant at the material time. 195.  On 5 June 2006 and on an unspecified date the remand centre’s governor refused to authorise the applicant’s first cousin, P.W. and his former inmate, Z.W. to visit the applicant in the remand centre. It was considered that the persons in question were not related to the applicant and that one of them was a former detainee. The authorities also expressed the opinion that the list of people authorised to apply for a visit was long enough to allow the applicant sufficient contact with the outside world and to maintain his family ties. 196.  On 23 August and 11 October 2006 the Radom Regional Court upheld the governor’s decisions.\n(f)  The applicant’s civil action concerning his solitary confinement and restrictions on receiving visitors 197.  On 19 July 2005 the applicant brought a civil action against Radom Remand Centre, seeking compensation under Article 417 of the Civil Code for an alleged infringement of his personal rights. He claimed that, as a form of punishment for disseminating information about the ECHR, he was detained in isolation from other detainees. He also alleged a breach of Article 8 of the Convention in that: (1) the remand centre’s authorities had not authorised visits from his brother, P.W. and his close friend, Z.W.; (2) his letters and telephone conversations were monitored and the numbers of people he called were registered; (3) for eighteen months there had been no supply of hot water in the remand centre; and (4) W.S., a convicted criminal with whom the applicant was in conflict, was detained in the same establishment, which put the applicant in constant danger. 198. On 7 May 2007 the Radom Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action.\nA number of the applicant’s fellow inmates and the remand centre’s staff testified in the course of the civil proceedings. It was established that the applicant had been placed under a typical security regime for his own protection and at his own request. The regime was not aimed at the applicant’s isolation from other detainees and had certainly not been imposed as a punishment for his active role in disseminating information about Convention prison standards and the ECHR. 199. The fact that the applicant had had his daily outdoor exercise alone had been an incidental result of the refusal of another special-regime detainee who had been scheduled to accompany the applicant to go outside. The remand centre’s refusal to authorise the applicant to do sports together with other detainees in a gym or on an outdoor field was considered justified because such authorisation normally constituted a reward for prisoners’ good behaviour, and the applicant had not earned such a reward. 200. The monitoring of the applicant’s letters and telephone conversations was considered justified by the fact that the applicant, due to the nature of the offences of which he had been convicted and the opinions of prison wardens, had been classified by the Penitentiary Commission as a “dangerous prisoner”. 201. Lastly, it was established that the applicant had regular visits from his relatives and friends. Altogether fifty persons were authorised to apply for a visit in the remand centre. Therefore, the authorities’ refusal to authorise additional two people, P.W. and Z.W., had been justified and had not caused the applicant any harm. 202.  The court concluded that all the actions undertaken by the remand centre’s administration and staff had been lawful and justified by the need to protect the remand centre’s internal order and to provide security to the applicant and his fellow inmates. 203. On 18 September 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment.\nOn 15 February 2008 the applicant’s lawyer informed him that there were no grounds for lodging a cassation appeal. 204.  The applicant was detained in this prison (301 km from his hometown) from 1 until 28 June 2004. At the material time, he was still classified as a “prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison” and, accordingly, was detained under a high-security security regime.\nThe applicant did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there.\nThe Government submitted that the applicant’s cell had been under constant camera surveillance. The images from the area of the toilet annex were blurred.\nThe applicant had a one-hour period of an outdoor exercise and was subjected to a strip search each time he left and returned to his cell.\nThe applicant did not make any penitentiary complaints in relation to his detention in that facility. 205.  The applicant was detained in this prison (287 km from his hometown) from 8 until 24 April 2008. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 206.  The applicant was detained in this prison (110 km from his hometown) from 1 July until 13 August 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 207.  The applicant was detained in this remand centre (290 km from his hometown) from 27 August until 4 September 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 208.  The applicant was detained in this prison (343 km from his hometown) from 4 until 24 September 2009. He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the conditions of his detention there. 209.  The applicant was detained in this prison (165 km from his hometown) from 12 February until 13 May 2010.\n(a)  Living conditions in the prison 210.  He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions during his detention there. He submitted, however, that he had been persecuted by the prison staff, who imposed disciplinary punishment on him on any pretext. Requests for the applicant’s punishment were sent to the penitentiary court on 6, 13, 18, 19 and 20 April 2010.\n(b)  The applicant’s disciplinary punishment 211.  On 6 January 2011 the applicant submitted information concerning his disciplinary punishment in Opole Lubelskie Prison. 212.  On 20 April 2010 a certain S. M., the Deputy Governor of Opole Lubelskie Prison imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant in the form of fourteen days’ solitary confinement. 213.  The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the time‑limit for the punishment of the alleged offences, which had taken place on 22 March 2010, had expired. 214.  On 24 June 2010 the penitentiary court upheld the impugned decision, considering the applicant’s calculation of the statutory time-limit inaccurate. The decision was served on the applicant on 9 July 2010. 215.  The applicant submitted to the Court that the measure had not been imposed in compliance with the law, because under Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor had the power to order detention in a solitary cell. 216.  The applicant was detained in this prison (220 km from his hometown) from 13 until 20 May 2010.\n(a)  The imposition of a high-security regime 217.  On 13 May 2010 the administration of Pińczów Prison requested that the applicant be classified as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society or to security of a prison on the following grounds: (1) the applicant had been convicted of murder with the use of arms and an attempted murder; (2) he had been previously classified as a special-type prisoner within the meaning of Article 88 § 3 of the Code; (3) in Opole Lubelskie Prison he had been gathering information about officers of Radom Remand Centre and had been inciting prisoners to rebellion; (5) he had received disciplinary punishments many times during his incarceration; (6) he seriously lacked moral character and was vexatious; (7) he had close links with the criminal world; and (8) prisoners looked up to him because of his leadership qualities and facility to dominate other people and the fact that he had become a self-declared speaker for prisoners’ rights. 218.  On 13 May 2010 the Penitentiary Commission of Pińczów Prison, having heard the applicant and taken under consideration the reasons for the above-mentioned request, classified the applicant as a prisoner posing a serious threat to society and the security of the prison within the meaning of Article 88 § 3 of the Code. 219.  The applicant appealed, arguing that he had been behaving correctly and therefore, his classification as a high-security prisoner had been not fair. 220.  On 6 September 2010 the Kielce Regional Court examined the applicant’s appeal under Article 7 § 1 of the Code as to the formal compliance of the impugned Commission’s decision with the law and as to the alleged arbitrariness of its assessment of the applicant’s character and his conduct.\nThe domestic court held that that the impugned decision had been given in compliance with the law and that the substantive grounds on which it was based, were fully confirmed by the material in the applicant’s personal file, including documents, transcripts of the applicant’s intercepted telephone conversations and information derived from the monitored correspondence of other prisoners. 221.  The applicant’s special status was lifted in Tarnów Prison on 9 August 2010 (see paragraph 230 below).\n(b)  The features of the regime 222.  The applicant was placed in solitary confinement. He was entitled to a one-hour long period of outdoor exercise every day. On three occasions, however, the applicant decided not to leave his cell. In the applicant’s submission, the cell was like a dungeon, dark and not ventilated. 223.  In accordance with the special detention regime, the applicant had been monitored twenty-four hours per day via a short-circuit camera installed in the cell. The toilet was not separated from the cell’s living area. The Government submitted that the recording system automatically blurred the applicant’s private parts. 224.  The applicant had also been subjected to strip-searches each time he left and returned to his cell. In his submission, that was from two to eight times a day. In the Government’s submission, the applicant had not left his cell as frequently as he had claimed. At the material time, he did not receive any visitors and did not wish to attend the culture and education activities which were available in prison. Depending on whether he decided to go to the outdoor yard, he spent 23 or 24 hours inside his cell. Consequently, he had not been subjected to personal checks as often as he had claimed.\nThe applicant maintained that during his personal checks, he had had to undress in the presence of several wardens. The Government did not contest this but submitted instead that the officers conducting the search had all been male and that no third parties had been present. 225.  The applicant also submitted that once a week on his way to and from the shower, he had been handcuffed and escorted by four wardens. Two of them watched the applicant in the shower.\n(c)  Related penitentiary complaints and criminal and civil proceedings 226.  It appears that the applicant made a number of penitentiary complaints in relation to his detention in Pińczów Prison under high‑security. 227.  On 1 July 2010 the Opole Lubelskie District Prosecutor decided to refuse to open an investigation into the applicant’s allegations that the officers of Opole Lubelskie Prison had deliberately registered in the applicant’s personal file false information about his attempts to organise prison rebellion, which in turn had led to his transfer to Pińczów Prison and his detention under a high-security regime in that facility. 228.  A vast material was gathered in the course of the preliminary criminal investigation. It included copies of reports of a prison psychologist, the applicant’s supervisor, wardens and many other members of the staff and administration of Opole Lubelskie Prison who in the relevant time had examined and monitored the applicant’s conduct and resocialisation progress and who interviewed and monitored his fellow-inmates. Copies of all these documents have also been submitted to the Court. The documents in question, without any exception, stated that the applicant had seriously lacked moral character, had been a trouble maker and had been inciting his fellow inmates to rebellion. The action was scheduled for 1 June 2010 and it was going to involve breaking of the plastic window blinds in all cells. 229.  In the light of the applicant’s detention history, the prosecutor came to the conclusion that the above-mentioned material was credible. Consequently, recording the relevant information about the applicant’s conduct in his personal file was not in breach of the rights and duties of the prison’s officers. Similarly, the subsequent decision of the Penitentiary Commission of the Opole Lubelskie Prison on the applicant’s transfer to Pińczów Prison had been dictated by justified fear that the applicant had posed a serious risk to the security of Opole Prison. 230.  The applicant was detained in this prison (300 km from his hometown) from, presumably, 20 May until an unspecified date prior to October 2010. His special detention regime was maintained until 9 August 2010. 231.  Under high-security regime, the applicant was detained in a solitary cell. In his submission, the cell in question was small and badly-lit and ventilated. 232.  The applicant was entitled to a daily one-hour long period of an outdoor exercise under surveillance. On two occasions he decided not to leave his cell. The Government submitted that from 20 May until 11 June 2010 the applicant had been entitled to attend culture and sports events organised in prison. Despite that, he had decided to remain in his cell.\nThe applicant could listen to a radio broadcast of a catholic mass and meet with a priest. 233.  The applicant’s cell was under constant surveillance via a short‑circuit camera which, in the Government’s submission, blurred his private parts. 234.  The applicant was subjected to strip searches each time he left and returned to his cell. In the Government’s submission, the search had been conducted by one male officer. The applicant claimed that personal checks had been conducted from two to eight times per day, often inside his cell under the camera surveillance. 235.  During his detention in Tarnów Prison, the applicant’s mail and phone calls were monitored. In the applicant’s submission, his family and friends’ visits were restricted to two hours per month. 236.  The applicant submitted that on 20 May 2010 the wardens at Tarnów Prison had taken away all his documents concerning his proceedings before the domestic courts and the ECHR and his own law books. On 28 June 2010 the applicant had been allowed for the first time to consult those documents and books in a separate room. He had been given 30 minutes to do so and was not allowed to take anything back to his cell. 237.  The applicant lodged penitentiary complaints and brought a civil action for compensation on account of inadequate conditions of his detention in Tarnów Prison (no. I C 864/10). These proceedings are currently pending before the domestic court. 238.  The applicant was detained in that prison (150 km from his hometown) for an unspecified period.\n(a)  Living conditions in the prison 239.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained in overcrowded, badly-lit and unventilated cells. He had only one-hour outdoor exercise per day and no cultural or leisure activities were available. Food served in Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison was of poor quality and low nutritional value. In September 2010 the applicant informed the Court that prisoners did not have access to hot water. 240.  The applicant also claimed to have been persecuted by the prison’s administration. He claimed that the prison authorities had imposed a disciplinary punishment on him in order to “break him” and to discourage him from writing to the ECHR. 241.  He also submitted that: on 13 December 2010 he had been verbally and physically assaulted by a prison warden; on 20 December 2010 he had been assaulted by a certain A.C., a prison staff member, and on 7 January 2011 some of the applicant’s personal belongings (such as toothpaste and other toiletries, writing paper, garbage bags, coffee and pork sausages) had been stolen or destroyed by a certain A.C., a prison warden.\n(b)  The applicant’s disciplinary punishment 242.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant submitted information concerning his disciplinary punishment in Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison. 243.  On 5 November 2010 a certain S. S., the Deputy Governor of Czerwony Bór - Łomża Prison imposed a disciplinary punishment on the applicant in the form of twenty-eight days’ solitary confinement. The measure had been ordered after the applicant had insulted the deputy governor. 244.  The applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that his behaviour had not justified solitary confinement. The applicant also asked that the execution of the measure be put on hold pending the proceedings before the penitentiary court. 245.  By an order of 22 November 2010 a penitentiary judge of the Łomża Regional Court refused to postpone the execution of the disciplinary punishment. 246.  The applicant appealed against the order, arguing that his disciplinary punishment had not been ordered in compliance with the law, because under Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences, only a prison governor had the power to order detention in a solitary cell. 247.  On 10 January 2011 the penitentiary court (Łomża Regional Court) upheld the impugned prison governor’s decision of 5 November 2010, having established that the applicant had written a note in which he had gravely insulted the prison’s deputy governor. 248.  In a separate decision of the same date the penitentiary court upheld the penitentiary judge’s order of 22 November 2010. It was reiterated that according to the applicable provisions, disciplinary punishment should always be immediately enforced. Moreover, the court held that the wording “a prison governor” in Article 144 § 1 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences should be interpreted as extending to a prison’s deputy governor. The applicant’s disciplinary punishment had therefore been ordered in compliance with the law. 249.  From an unspecified date the applicant was detained in Zamość Prison (253 km from his hometown). He did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions in the prison. 250.  It appears that the applicant was detained in that facility from an unspecified date prior to 5 March 2012 until an unspecified date prior to 2 July 2012.\nHe did not make any specific submissions in respect of the living conditions and the regime in this remand centre. 251.  Moreover, the applicant complained about the inconvenience of being frequently transferred between different prisons. He submitted that he should be detained in Warsaw Remand Centre because his family lived in that city. Instead, he had been sent to detention facilities across the whole country. Since 1996 the applicant had been transferred from one detention facility to another at least forty-four times. A number of his prisons were located as far as 300 km from his hometown.\nThat practice had caused the applicant and his family additional stress and suffering and effectively restricted contact with his relatives. 252.  The applicant and his family lodged with the relevant penitentiary authorities multiple complaints and applications for the applicant’s definitive transfer to a prison close to his hometown. 253.  The applicant submitted that the domestic civil courts had not implemented the recent judgments of the ECHR delivered in the cases of Orchowski and Sikorski. Civil actions brought by prisoners, who alleged breaches of their personal rights on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention were always dismissed by the courts and the plaintiffs were ordered to bear the costs of the proceedings. The applicant claimed that the civil remedy was therefore illusory. 254.  To that effect the applicant submitted a copy of a letter sent to him on 15 May 2009 by the Deputy of the President of the Warsaw Regional Court (Wiceprezes Sądu Okręgowego). The letter stated that out of a total number of fifteen actions in tort, which had been brought by detainees against Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre, in fourteen judgments the court had dismissed the claims and in one judgment (of 17 December 2007) the plaintiff had been awarded compensation in the amount of PLN 10,000. 255.  The applicant submitted copies of a dozen other domestic court rulings in which the claims on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of detention had been dismissed. 256.  On 27 October 2002 when the applicant was detained in Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre, he was not allowed to cast his vote in the elections to municipal and district councils and provincial assemblies (wybory do rad gmin, rad powiatów i sejmików województw). He lodged numerous complaints in that connection. 257.  By the letter of a penitentiary judge of the Supreme Court of 7 November 2002 and a letter of the Warsaw Election Commissary (Komisasz Wyborczy) of 3 December 2002, the applicant was informed that he should have been allowed to cast his vote in the elections because on 23 October 2002 the remand centre’s management had been officially notified that the ruling depriving the applicant of his civic rights had been quashed by the Supreme Court on 22 October 2002. The applicant was further informed that, following the Supreme Court’s judgment, he should have immediately lodged a reclamation about the fact that his name was missing from the register of persons entitled to vote in the remand centre (reklamacja na nieprawidłowości w spisie wyborców). 258.  On 9 December 2002 the Warsaw District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) refused to open a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of non-compliance by the staff of the Warszawa Białołęka Remand Centre with their official duties (niedopełnienie obowiązków służbowych) in that on 27 October 2002 the applicant had not been allowed to participate in the local elections.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  In 1995 Dr Marija Arsovska, a psychiatrist whose name at the time was Marija Karanfilova (“the psychiatrist”), established a private practice called Dr Marija Karanfilova’s Independent Psychiatric Practice (Самостојна специјалистичка ординација по невропсихијатрија „Д-р Марија Каранфилова„ – “the Practice”) where she treated people using Carl Jung’s analytical psychotherapy methods. The Practice was assigned an individual tax number beginning with the numbers 503. 6.  In 2004 the Practice signed a contract with the State Health Insurance Fund (“the Fund”) on the funding of treatment provided by the Practice to health insurance beneficiaries. 7.  On 15 February 2006 the Ministry of Health’s State Sanitation and Health Inspectorate (“the Inspectorate”) conducted an on-site inspection (инспекциски надзор). It ordered the Practice to re-register as a private health institution in order to comply with amendments to the Health Protection Act of 2004 (Закон за изменување и дополнување на Законот за здравствена заштита, Official Gazette no. 10/04). 8.  In compliance with the Inspectorate’s orders, the psychiatrist applied to the Ministry of Health to have the Practice re-registered and to change its name, as required by the new statutory provisions. 9.  On 28 February 2006 the Ministry of Health issued a decision on the registration of the Private health institution Dr Marija Karanfilova’s Specialist Psychiatric Practice (Приватна здравствена установа – специјалистичка ординација по невропсихијатрија „Д-р Марија Каранфилова„ – “the new Practice”) at the same address as the previous Practice. It stated that the 1995 registration decision relating to the original Practice would no longer be in force (ќе престане да важи) after the new decision had been entered into the relevant register. The decision was delivered to several institutions, including the Fund. 10.  The Inspectorate conducted a fresh on-site inspection on 6 March 2006. It concluded that the Practice had fully complied with its decision of 15 February 2006, including the instructions for re-registration. 11.  On 17 April 2006 the Central Registry recorded the registration of the new Practice as of 29 March 2006. It was given a new individual tax number, beginning with the numbers 403. 12.  On 6 June 2006 the new Practice notified the Fund about the changes in its registration, including the change of its name. 13.  On 29 November 2006 the Fund notified the new Practice that it did not intend to sign a new contract after the expiry of the previous one. 14.  On 2 August 2007, on the basis of a request by the new Practice, the Central Registry allowed the new Practice to change from being a private health institution to one that was a limited liability company established by a single person (ДООЕЛ) and entered that transformation in its records. The applicant company was known officially as the Centre for the Development of Analytical Psychology Ltd. (Центар за развој на аналитичка психологија – ДООЕЛ). It kept the same tax number as the new Practice. The link between the new Practice and the applicant company was not disputed in the impugned proceedings (see below). 15.  On 25 January 2006 the Practice initiated compensation proceedings against the Fund in the Skopje Court of First Instance (Основен суд Скопје) for non-adherence to the terms of the contract. Both the new Practice and the applicant company continued the proceedings as the claimant. 16.  On 10 June 2008 the first-instance court granted the claim in part. 17.  On 26 August 2008 the Fund lodged an appeal against the first‑instance judgment, objecting to the applicant company’s standing in the proceedings for the first time. It argued that the claimant was a different legal entity than the one which had signed the contract with the Fund in 2004, as evident in the two entities’ different individual tax numbers. 18.  The applicant company submitted in reply that the re-registration of the Practice had been carried out in compliance with the Inspectorate’s orders and that the Fund had been aware of the changes. It also argued that the Fund had implicitly recognised the legal continuity of the two entities as it had accepted reports submitted by the new Practice under the contract of 2004 and had given notice of the termination of the contract to the new Practice. 19.  The Skopje Court of Appeal (Апелационен суд Скопје) on 28 January 2009 granted the Fund’s appeal and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 20.  On 10 April 2009 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant company’s claim, finding that it had no standing in the proceedings (нема активна легитимација во спорот). It established that the contract had been signed by the Fund and Dr Marija Karanfilova’s Independent Psychiatric Practice and that the applicant company could not be considered as the Practice’s legal successor as they had different individual tax numbers. 21.  The applicant company appealed, complaining that the first-instance court had disregarded the evidence that had shown the existence of a legal relationship between the parties and had based its assessment solely on the different tax numbers. In particular, the first-instance court had disregarded the fact that the new Practice had continued to perform its contractual obligations until the contract had been terminated by the notice of 29 November 2006 (see paragraph 13 above). The applicant company maintained that those circumstances indicated that the Fund had implicitly recognised the legal continuity of the original and the new Practice. The applicant company alleged that the formalistic approach of the first-instance court had meant its claim had remained undecided on the merits. 22.  On 2 December 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant company’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. 23.  On 7 July 2006 the new Practice lodged a civil claim against the Fund for the payment of an undetermined sum for failing to adhere to the terms of the contract of 2004. After the new Practice turned itself into the applicant company (see paragraph 14 above) the latter continued the proceedings as the claimant. 24.  At a hearing held on 27 June 2008 the Fund raised an objection that the applicant company lacked standing in the proceedings. 25.  On 16 February 2009 the Skopje Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant company’s claim, finding that it had no standing in the proceedings. The first-instance court relied in its reasoning on the difference in the tax numbers between the original Practice that had been party to the contract with the Fund in 2004 and the applicant company. 26.  On 11 December 2009 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant company and upheld the first-instance judgment. It stressed that a tax number was a unique attribute of a particular entity and would remain unchanged, regardless of any structural or other changes to the entity.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants are close relatives of persons who disappeared as a result of a large-scale sweeping operation conducted by the Russian federal military forces in Mesker-Yurt between 21 May and 11 June 2002. 7.  The Court has already examined cases in which other residents of Mesker-Yurt were abducted by federal servicemen in 2002 in the following judgments: Amanat Ilyasova and Others v. Russia, no. 27001/06, 1 October 2009, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Musa Ilyasov on 11 August 2002; Ilyasova and Others v. Russia, no. 1895/04, 4 December 2008, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Adam Ilyasov on 15 November 2002; Magamadova and Iskhanova v. Russia, no. 33185/04, 6 November 2008, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Viskhadzhi Magamadov and Mr Khaskhan Mezhiyev on 14 November 2002; Petimat Magomadova v. Russia, no. 36965/09, 9 January 2014, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Buvaysar Magomadov on 27 October 2002; Aliyeva and Dombayev v. Russia no. 67322/099 January 2014, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Apti Dombayev on 4 November 2002; Kosumova and Others v. Russia, no. 27441/07, 7 June 2011, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Abdul Kasumov on 21 November 2002; and Takhayeva and Others v. Russia, no. 23286/04, 18 September 2008, concerning the abduction and subsequent disappearance of Mr Ayub Takhayev on 13 November 2002. 8.  The relevant facts are summarised below. The personal data of the applicants and their missing relatives are summarised in the attached table (Appendix I). 9.  The circumstances of all the abductions are similar and can be summarised as follows. At the material time the village of Mesker-Yurt was under curfew. The federal forces had set up checkpoints on the roads leading to and from the settlement. 10.  Between 21 May and 11 June 2002 servicemen of the Russian federal forces conducted a large-scale “sweeping-up” operation in Mesker-Yurt. On 21 May 2002 they arrived in the settlement in several armoured personnel vehicles (APCs) and other military vehicles, such as UAZ minivans and URAL lorries. They blockaded the village and set up a temporary filtration camp on the outskirts. Nobody was allowed to leave the village. 11.  The servicemen, who spoke Russian without an accent, checked the residents’ identity documents. After the check they took some of the residents away, including the applicants’ relatives, under the pretext of needing to carry out further identity checks. They told the applicants that their relatives would be released once the checks had been completed. 12.  The majority of the applicants’ relatives were taken away between 21 May and 5 June 2002, either from their homes or from the local mosque, where they had been hiding in the belief that it was a safe place. All of the residents detained during the special operation were taken to the temporary filtration camp. 13.  The applicants visited the temporary filtration camp on several occasions and passed food to their relatives through the servicemen guarding it. 14.  On 4 June 2002 the body of Mr Adam Temersultanov, who had been detained during the special operation, was thrown from a military UAZ vehicle on the outskirts of the village. He was found by local residents. The other sixteen abducted men were transferred from the filtration camp to an unknown location. The applicants have had no news of their missing relatives ever since. 15.  On an unspecified date between 9 and 17 June 2002 the military unit conducting the special operation in Mesker-Yurt left the place where they had been stationed as well as the temporary filtration camp in the vicinity of the village. On 17 June 2002, local residents went to the place where the unit had been stationed and found several pits with blown-up human remains. 16.  From the documents submitted by the parties it transpires that along with the applicants’ relatives, a number of other residents of Mesker-Yurt, including Mr R. Makhtykhanov, Mr M. Magomedov and Mr I. Gachayev, were abducted during the special operation. All of them, like the applicants’ relatives, were arrested at home or at the mosque and taken to the filtration camp. They then went missing. 17.  According to the applicants, as a result of the special operation, nineteen residents of Mesker-Yurt were killed and a number of others, including their relatives, have gone missing.\n(b)  Information submitted by the Government 18.  The Government did not submit their version of the events and did not dispute the circumstances of the abductions as presented by the applicants. 19.  From the Government’s submission concerning the official investigation into the events, it transpires that during a passport check on 27 May 2002, federal servicemen killed Mr A. Saltamirzayev. In addition, on 4 June 2002 a resident of Mesker-Yurt, Mr I. Khadzhimuradov, died as a result of an explosion and on 5 June 2002 two other residents of Mesker-Yurt, Mr M. Malayev and Mr A. Temersultanov, died under similar circumstances. 20.  Mr Islam Ortsuyev was born in 1980. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his house at 157 Lenina Street.\n(b)  Abduction of Mr Adam Gachayev 21.  Mr Adam Gachayev was born in 1973. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from the family house at 24 Sheripova Street (in the documents submitted, also referred to as Vishnevaya Street).\n(c)  Abduction of Mr Aslan Israilov and Mr Anzor Israilov 22.  Mr Aslan Israilov was born in 1981 and his brother, Mr Anzor Israilov, was born in 1984. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted the brothers from their house at 71 Lenina Street.\n(d)  Abduction of Mr Ibragim Askhabov 23.  Mr Ibragim Askhabov was born in 1983. On 22 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his house at 8 Checkhova Street. 24.  According to the applicants, shortly after the abduction they learnt from undisclosed sources that in June 2002 Mr Askhabov had been detained on the premises of the Shali district department of the interior (Шалинский районный отдел внутренних дел (РОВД)) (“the ROVD”) and then transferred elsewhere.\n(e)  Abduction of Mr Shaip Makhmudov 25.  Mr Shaip (also spelled as Shoip) Makhmudov was born in 1980. On 23 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him on the outskirts of Mesker-Yurt where he was tending cattle. In the documents submitted the place of the abduction was also referred to as 63 Tereshkova Street.\n(f)  Abduction of Mr Sayd-Magomed Abubakarov 26.  Mr Sayd-Magomed Abubakarov was born in 1982. On 21 May 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 23 May 2002) a group of armed servicemen, who arrived in two APCs with registration numbers 588 and 466, abducted  him from his house at 64 Lenina Street.\n(g)  Abduction of Mr Lechi Temirkhanov 27.  Mr Lechi Temirkhanov was born in 1980. On 21 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from his uncle’s house at 1 Moskovskaya Street.\n(h)  Abduction of Mr Apti Dedishov, Mr Abu Dedishov and Mr Adam Dedishov 28.  Mr Apti Dedishov was born in 1965, and his brothers, Mr Abu Dedishov and Mr Adam Dedishov, were born in 1968 and 1971. On 22 May 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted the brothers from their family house at 6 Shkolnaya Street. 29.  On 11 June 2002 residents of Mesker-Yurt found clothing belonging to the Dedishov brothers and human remains on the outskirts of the village.\n(i)  Abduction of Mr Suliman Magomadov and Mr Salambek Magomadov 30.  Mr Suliman Magomadov was born in 1978 and his brother, Mr Salambek Magomadov, was born in 1980. On 23 May 2002 (in the documents submitted the date was also referred to as 25 May 2002) a group of armed servicemen abducted the brothers from their house at 19 Shkolnaya Street.\n(j)  Abduction of Mr Vakha Ibragimov 31.  Mr Vakha Ibragimov was born in 1975. On 1 June 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from the village mosque in Mesker‑Yurt (in the documents submitted the address was also referred to as 4 Gorkova Street).\n(k)  Abduction of Mr Abu Dudagov 32.  Mr Abu Dudagov was born in 1981. On 5 June 2002 a group of armed servicemen abducted him from the village mosque in Mesker-Yurt (in the documents submitted the address was also referred to as 1 Sportivnaya Street).\n(l)  Abduction of Mr Adam Temersultanov and subsequent discovery of his body 33.  Mr Adam Temersultanov (in the documents submitted also spelled Timersultanov) was born in 1976. On 25 May 2002 he went to the village mosque in Mesker-Yurt and stayed there for several days during the special operation, believing that it was a safe place. 34.  On 30 May 2002 the servicemen conducting the special operation took Mr Temersultanov from the mosque to a checkpoint situated on a nearby bridge for an identity check and detained him. 35.  On 4 June 2002 some villagers saw one of the military UAZ vehicles used for the special operation with Mr Temersultanov’s body in it; they then saw servicemen throw the body out of the vehicle. According to the applicants, Mr Adam Temersultanov’s body bore signs of violence. 36.  Mr Magomedrasul Magomedov was born in 1951. At the material time he and the applicants lived in the settlement of Komsomolskoye in the Kizilyurt district of Dagestan. On 23 May 2002, Mr Magomedov went to visit his sister in Mesker-Yurt, Chechnya, with his friend, Mr Kh. M. 37.  On 24 May 2002 Mr Magomedov and Mr Kh. M. wanted to leave Mesker-Yurt, but the entire settlement was cordoned off by military servicemen and all the roads leading to and from the village were blocked due to the special operation. 38.  On an unspecified date at the beginning of June 2002 Mr Magomedov and Mr Kh. M. were told by the servicemen to go to the village mosque and join the other residents who had gathered there. On the same day, the servicemen took Mr Magomedov from the mosque to the temporary filtration camp. His whereabouts remain unknown. As for Mr Kh. M., he was allowed to leave the village a few days later. 39.  In response to the Court’s request for a copy of the contents of the criminal cases opened in connection with the abductions, the Government did not furnish any documents but provided an information statement concerning the investigation of joint criminal case no. 14/90/0091-11. 40.  The applicants in Ortsuyeva and Others (application no. 3340/08) furnished the Court with copies of numerous requests for assistance in the search for their relatives lodged by them with various State authorities between 2002 and 2008 and the replies received thereto. 41.  The information submitted by the parties concerning the investigation into the abduction can be summarised as follows. 42.  Between June and July 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal cases nos. 59114, 59125, 59126, 59127, 59128, 59129, 59133, 59134, 59135, 59136, 59138, 59163, 59164, and 59171 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction) in respect of the abduction of the relatives of the applicants in Ortsuyeva and Others (application no. 3340/08). It also opened criminal case no. 59166 in respect of the abduction of the relative of the applicants in Magomedova and Others (application no. 24689/10). 43.  On 6 August 2002, all of the criminal cases, along with cases nos. 59113 and 59205 opened in connection with the abduction of other residents of Mesker-Yurt, were joined under joint criminal case no. 59113. 44.  On 26 December 2002 the joint criminal case was forwarded to the military prosecutor’s office of the United Group Alignment (Объединенная группировка войск (ОГВ)) (“the UGA”) for further investigation. The applicants were not informed thereof. 45.  On an unspecified date between January 2003 and April 2007, while the proceedings were suspended, the military prosecutor’s office remitted joint criminal case no. 59113 to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office for further investigation. The applicants were not informed thereof. 46.  On 19 April 2007 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. It was then suspended again on 20 April 2007 for failure to identify the perpetrators. The relevant decision stated, among other things:\n“... the preliminary investigation has established that between 21 May and 10 June 2002 in the vicinity of Mesker-Yurt in the Shali district of the Chechen Republic, servicemen of the Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian Ministry of the Interior together with servicemen from the Department of the Execution of Sentences of the Russian Ministry of Justice, conducted a special operation to check identity documents and identify members of illegal armed groups. During the special operation unidentified persons abducted twenty-one local residents whose whereabouts have not been established since ...” 47.  On 20 April 2007 the investigation of the joint criminal case was suspended yet again for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were not informed thereof. 48.  According to the documents submitted, the special operation in Mesker-Yurt was conducted under the command of General Bornovitskiy and on an unspecified date between 2002 and 2007 the applicants and their relatives forwarded that information to the investigators. It is unclear whether any steps were taken to verify the information. 49.  From the documents submitted it appears that on various dates between 2002 and 2007 the applicants and/or their relatives gave statements to the investigating authorities. In their statements, they stressed that their relatives had been abducted by military servicemen during the special operation, and taken to the temporary filtration camp and that they had been missing ever since. 50.  Furthermore, on various dates between 2002 and 2010 the applicants lodged complaints and requests for assistance in the search for their relatives with the investigative authorities and other State bodies. In reply, they were informed either that their complaints had been forwarded to another law‑enforcement or military agency, or that the investigating authorities were taking operational search measures to establish the abducted men’s whereabouts and identify the culprits. 51.  According to the documents submitted by the applicants in Ortsuyeva and Others (application no. 3340/08), between 2002 and 2010 the applicants lodged numerous complaints and information requests concerning the search for their abducted relatives and the progress of the investigation into the matter. 52.  Between 2002 and 2010 the applicants in Magomedova and Others (application no. 24689/10) lodged a number of complaints and information requests with the authorities as well. For instance, from a copy of the decision of the Kizilyurt Town Court of 5 April 2010 declaring Mr Magomedrasul Magomedov dead, it transpires that on unspecified dates in March 2003, April 2005, May 2006, December 2009 and March 2010 the applicants requested assistance in searching for him and complained to the supervisory prosecutors of the lack of progress in the investigation. In reply, they were informed that proceedings were under way and that the necessary measures were being taken. 53.  From the documents submitted it follows that between 2002 and 2010 the investigation of the criminal case consisted mostly of taking short statements from the applicants and/or some of their relatives and forwarding numerous requests for information to various State bodies. The proceedings were suspended and resumed on several occasions for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicants were either not informed thereof or informed with significant delays. 54.  It appears that following complaints lodged by the applicants, on 4 October 2011 the investigation of the joint criminal case was resumed and transferred again to the military authorities – the main military investigations department of the investigative committee of the Russian Federation. The relevant decision gave the following reason for the transfer:\n“... the investigation has established that the military servicemen who conducted the special operation in Mesker-Yurt between 21 May and 10 June 2002 were involved in the abductions.”\nThe joint criminal case file was given a new number, 14/90/0091-11. It is unclear whether the applicants were informed of those decisions. 55.  On 16 December 2011 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended again for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was subsequently suspended and resumed again on several more occasions. The last suspension of the proceedings took place on 29 April 2015. 56.  From the information statement furnished by the Government, it transpires that between 2011 and 2015 the investigators questioned twenty-eight people, including the applicants, and forwarded about 310 information requests to various authorities. No new information was obtained. 57.  The proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1952 and 1955 respectively and live in Sofia. 5.  The first applicant’s parents owned part of a house in Sofia. 6.  In 1986 the house was expropriated with a view to constructing a street and a residential building. The expropriation decision, based on section 98 (1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973 (Закон за териториалното и селищно устройство – “the TUPA”), provided in particular that in compensation the applicants were to receive a three-room flat. 7.  By another decision of 28 May 1993, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor indicated the exact future flat to be provided as compensation to the applicants. It measured 87 square metres and was situated in a building to be constructed by the Sofia municipality. Its value was set at 21,185 old Bulgarian levs (BGL), later amended to BGL 21,231. The applicants paid to the municipality the part of this amount which was not covered by the value of the expropriated property. 8.  In 1990 the applicants, their children and the first applicant’s parents were accommodated in a three‑room municipal flat. They remained in it until 2004, when they chose to move to another dwelling better adapted for the first applicant’s mother’s frail state of health. 9.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the applicants brought a tort action against the Sofia municipality, claiming pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage on account of its continued failure to build and provide them with a flat. 10.  The action was dismissed on 21 February 2006 by the Sofia District Court, which found that the applicants had not proven that they had sustained damage, in particular because they had been accommodated in a municipally-owned dwelling, and that in any event domestic law provided for a special remedy for persons in the applicants’ situation, namely the possibility to request a new valuation of the expropriated property. 11.  Following that judgment, the applicants made a request for a new valuation. In a letter by the municipality dated 2 June 2006 and signed by a deputy mayor, they were informed that they were not entitled to seek such a valuation since they had not been the owners of the expropriated property. 12.  In the meantime the flat due to the applicants was built and they took possession of it on 19 June 2006. 13.  In the tort proceedings, in judgments of 14 December 2006 and 8 July 2008 the Sofia City Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the Sofia District Court’s judgment of 21 February 2006, reiterating its findings. 14.  In these proceedings the applicants were ordered to pay 1,200 new Bulgarian levs (BGN, the equivalent to 612 euros – EUR) in court fees.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Pechora, the Komi Republic. 5.  The applicant sued the Municipal Unitary Enterprise for Housing and Communal Services (MUP Pechorazhilkomhoz or MUP PZHKH – МУП Печоражилкомхоз – hereafter “the company”) of Pechora, the Komi Republic, for salary arrears. 6.  On 31 May 2007 the Justice of the Peace of the Privokzalnyy Court Circuit of Pechora awarded the applicant the equivalent of 18,358 euros (EUR) of the salary owed to him for the period from 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2006. The judgment became final ten days later. 7.  On 12 January 2009 the Pechora Town Court granted another claim which the applicant had lodged against the company, awarding him EUR 592. The judgment became final ten days later. 8.  Neither judgment has been enforced. 9.  The company was incorporated as a municipal unitary enterprise. It was set up by a decision of the local administration to provide heating supply and housing maintenance services in the local area. The company had “the right of economic control” (право хозяйственного ведения) over the assets allocated to it by the administration in order to carry out its statutory activities. 10.  In 2006 the owner (the local administration) withdrew several of the company’s assets and transferred them either to the local treasury or to other legal entities. 11.  On 17 January 2007 the respondent company was declared insolvent and liquidation proceedings started. 12.  The company sued the owner in subsidiary liability proceedings. On 13 May 2009 the Commercial Court of the Komi Republic dismissed that action, having found that the owner had acted without intending to cause the company’s insolvency when transferring the assets. 13.  On 16 June 2009 the company was liquidated. 14.  The applicant brought subsidiary liability proceedings against the owner before the Pechora Town Court, arguing, inter alia, that the company’s insolvency had been premeditated. On 21 June 2012 the court dismissed the applicant’s claim against the owner as unfounded. On 3 September 2012 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld that decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  At the time of the events giving rise to the application, the applicant was working at the Directorate of National Palaces as a secretary. On an unspecified date in 2002, following ongoing conflict with a colleague and at the request of a certain professor, M.Ü., from the same Directorate, the applicant was demoted. When she complained about her demotion to her friend, M.G., the latter offered to call professor M.Ü., who was a mutual acquaintance, and seek a reconciliation between the parties and thus her possible reinstatement. The applicant accepted this offer. 8.  It appears that subsequently M.G. made a number of harassing phone calls to the professor with violent threats to hurt his son, accompanied by a ransom request. The professor, in turn, filed a criminal complaint against both M.G. and the applicant in relation to these threatening calls, which resulted in charges being brought on 3 December 2002 against M.G. for threatening the professor, and against the applicant for inciting M.G. 9.  In his statements during the criminal proceedings, M.G. admitted to having threatened the professor, but claimed that he had had no intention of hurting anyone. He asserted that he had only meant to scare the professor, at the applicant’s request. 10.  The applicant, on the other hand, denied M.G.’s allegations. She claimed that, although she had taken up M.G.’s offer to contact the professor to settle the dispute which had caused her demotion, she had never instructed him to threaten or otherwise harass the professor. 11.  On 27 October 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted M.G. as charged, but acquitted the applicant on the grounds of a lack of sufficient evidence to corroborate the allegations against her. That decision, which was not appealed against by the defendants, was finalised on 4 November 2005. 12.  In the meantime, on 31 December 2002, shortly after her indictment, the applicant had been dismissed from the position to which she had been demoted, without receiving payment in lieu of notice or severance pay. It appears that her employment contract was terminated under section 17 of the now defunct Law no. 1475 (the Labour Law), without any further information being given as to the exact grounds for her dismissal under that provision. 13.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant brought an action against the Directorate of National Palaces before the Bakırköy Labour Court, claiming severance pay and payment in lieu of notice on grounds of wrongful dismissal. 14.  On 28 March 2006 the Bakırköy Labour Court rejected the applicant’s application. On the basis of its examination of the case file before the Istanbul Assize Court, the labour court first found it established that the applicant had incited M.G. to commit the offences of making threats and requesting a ransom, and had breached the relationship of trust with her employer. In the light of those findings, it then concluded that the termination of the applicant’s employment contract had been in accordance with section 17 of Law no. 1475. The relevant part of the judgment reads:\n“...In their observations, the respondent party submitted that the applicant had incited her friend to threaten and extort ransom from M.Ü, and that she had confessed to the charges against her in her statement to the police...\nThe court has requested the case file of the Istanbul 6th Criminal Assize Court and examined the entire criminal investigation file. Based on its examination, it notes that the other accused M.G., in his statement to the police of 19 November 2002, stated that it was the applicant who had instructed him to threaten M.Ü. on the telephone and ask for a ransom; and that it was again she who had called him one day and had explained how M.Ü. had demoted her, and that when he had visited the applicant at the office, she had said that M.Ü. should also suffer just as she suffered and that it would be best to threaten him with kidnapping his son unless he gave 50 billion Turkish Liras. M.G. also stated that he had called M.Ü. 8 or about 10 times from the telephone numbers 0212 XXX XXX and 0532 XXX XXX, hence based on the following, the court finds it established that the plaintiff had incited M.G. to commit the crime.\nThe court has also given regard to the documents submitted by the plaintiff’s employer and finds it established that the plaintiff’s contract had been terminated on the basis of the fact that the plaintiff had incited M.G. to commit the crime of making threats and requesting a ransom.\nBased on the documents submitted by the parties, the statements made during the proceedings, the statements of M.G. in the criminal case file, the court finds that the employer is under no obligation to continue employing the plaintiff and that the relationship of trust between the employer and the employee was breached and therefore the termination of the employment contract was just and lawful.” 15.  The applicant appealed against the decision of the Bakırköy Labour Court. In her appeal, she maintained that the labour court had erroneously based its decision on the fictitious statements made by M.G. during the criminal proceedings, in total disregard of the fact that she had been acquitted of incitement by the Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  On 20 December 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the Bakırköy Labour Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant organisation is the Vienna Chamber of Medical Doctors (Ärztekammer für Wien). The Chamber represents all medical practitioners in Vienna and also has its own website. The second applicant was the Chamber’s president at the time of the events. 6.  On 18 January 2007 the second applicant published a letter on the first applicant organisation’s website, which was addressed to all members of the Chamber in Vienna and was also sent out to all of them via e-mail. The letter was titled “Locust funds want to take over medical practices” (“Heuschreckenfonds wollen Ordinationen übernehmen”). The second applicant went on to state that he had been forced to write to his colleagues for a serious reason, namely, because it had been reported in the media that the F. company planned to go into “the radiology business”. He added that share-bidding companies planned to offer medical services – initially in the area of radiology, but soon enough in other areas of the profession as well ‑ and that doctors risked becoming mere employees of such “locust” companies. If they would not act according to the companies’ wishes, they would be dismissed. The second applicant then explained the assumed legal and organisational basis of such a plan: radiology services which were currently being provided by medical practices could, in future, also be offered by limited companies. Shares of those companies could then be bought by the F. company, and the “locusts” would reach their goal, namely control of the medical profession. Giving an example of a risky development, the second applicant stated that in the last 20 years, colleagues had founded laboratories which had reciprocal agreements with certain health insurance boards. Today, almost all of those laboratories were owned by the F. group, which, in turn, was owned by insurance companies, investment funds and foundations, and which employed a large number of doctors. The second applicant ended his letter by stating that he could guarantee one thing: that the doctors’ professional representative body would make use of all legal and political means available to stop such a disastrous development from going ahead, to prevent that the quality of medical treatment being determined by “managers and controllers” and to ensure, inter alia, that existing medical practices were protected from the competition from “international locust funds” (“internationale Heuschreckenfonds”). 7.  On 24 January 2007 the F. company lodged an action against the two applicants and an application for an injunction with the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht Wien). The applicants contested the application. 8.  On 16 February 2007 the Vienna Commercial Court issued an injunction prohibiting the applicants (each of them individually) from repeating the statement that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties, in particular medical professionals. The injunction prevented the applicants from referring to the F. company as a “locust”, “locust company” or “locust fund”. The applicants were further prohibited from stating that the provision of services by the F. company, particularly services in the area of radiology, was a disastrous development. The court found that there was a competitive relationship between the F. company and the applicants, and found the statements made by the applicants to be defamatory under Article 1330 of the Civil Code and unethical under the Unfair Competition Act (Bundesgesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb). 9.  The applicants appealed against the injunction. On 30 October 2007 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien) partly granted the appeal, and prohibited the applicants from alleging that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties and medical practitioners, and from calling it, inter alia, a “locust company”. However, it dismissed the F. company’s application to prohibit the applicants from calling its provision of services a “disastrous” development. The Court of Appeal found that the first applicant organisation had locus standi in the injunction proceedings. The Chamber of Medical Doctors held official authority status in relation to certain areas of its work (Bereich der Hoheitsverwaltung), in addition to representing the interests of its members; it was therefore considered a legal entity under the Official Liability Act (Amtshaftungsgesetz). However, when acting as a special interest group, it represented its members’ interests from a mainly economic perspective, rather than acting in its capacity as an official authority. According to the Court of Appeal, the letter in issue pursued the interests of the Chamber’s members, outside the Chamber’s official sphere of activity. 10.  The Court of Appeal further established, referring inter alia to Wikipedia, that the term “locust company“ (“Heuschreckenunternehmen“) was introduced into the political discussion in German speaking countries in 2005 by Mr Franz Müntefering, a German politician, and is ever since used in political debates as a pejorative term for private-equity companies or other forms of capital funds with short-term or exaggerated return expectations – like hedge funds or „vulture“ funds, which also had negative connotations. The domestic court found that there was a need to balance the interests involved in the present debate, reiterating that extreme opinions were only unlawful if they were excessive. As a result of that balancing exercise, the Court of Appeal found that the “locust” statement had to be considered a lawful criticism in the context of a public debate, and that the F. company could therefore not base its claim on Article 1330 of the Civil Code. However, the Court of Appeal classified the applicants’ actions as competitive in nature. Statements of fact made in violation of the Unfair Competition Act could not be justified by the right to freedom of expression. The Court of Appeal found that Austrian law provided wide‑ranging protection for commercial and economic interests. Those who published an opinion in an economically competitive context were obliged to exercise a higher level of diligence with regard to the facts and bases of their allegations than those who acted in the non-competitive context of a public debate of general interest. Therefore, the Court of Appeal upheld the injunction decision with regard to the statements about the “locust company”. 11.  However, as regards the further statement, namely that provision of certain services by the F. company was a “disastrous development”, the Court of Appeal found that, read in context, the statement indicated a general assessment and did not refer to a particular service of the F. company. It was therefore to be considered a personal opinion, and thus a value judgment that was not defamatory under Article 1330 of the Civil Code. It also did not fall under section 7 of the Unfair Competition Act. 12.  The applicants lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof). On 22 January 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal. It acknowledged the applicants’ argument that where a competitor, even for economic purposes, took part in a debate of public interest, freedom of expression had to hold more weight in the balancing test. However, the Supreme Court observed that the applicants had made their statement in the clearly economic context of competition between medical practitioners and companies which provided the same services. The applicants could have warned their members of the possible risks of cooperating with companies without overstepping the margin of acceptable criticism. However, the applicants had exceeded that limit and stated that the F. company was a “locust”. That statement was one of fact, and the applicants had not provided evidence of a factual basis for their allegations, and had therefore exceeded the permissible limitations of freedom of expression. 13.  On 7 July 2008 the Commercial Court gave its judgment in the substantive proceedings and ordered the applicants to refrain from: repeating the statement that the F. company was ruthless towards third parties, in particular medical practitioners and patients; and stating that the F. company was a “locust company”, a “locust fund” or a “locust”. It further ordered the applicants to publish and display the operative part of the judgment on the first applicant organisation’s website for thirty days, and to publish it in the first applicant organisation’s print newsletter. 14.  The Commercial Court made substantial reference to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in the interim injunction proceedings. It followed the previous finding that the relevant statements did not constitute defamation pursuant to Article 1330 of the Civil Code. Examining the statements in relation to the provisions of the Unfair Competition Act, the Commercial Court found that the letter had been written by the Chamber of Medical Doctors in a commercial and not a political context. It had also had the advancement of independent medical practices as an objective, and had contained a warning regarding capital ventures which allegedly threatened doctors’ independence. The Commercial Court found the relevant comparisons with “locusts” to be statements of fact regarding both the F. company and its conduct in relation to third parties, doctors and patients. The statements were also likely to damage the F. company’s commercial interests, and had not been proved to be true. 15.  The used language could also not be justified with a reference to the right to freedom of expression as the statement was uttered within the framework of a commercial competitive relationship. With reference to the Court’s case-law allowing for a wider margin of appreciation under Article 10 of the Convention with regard to commercial language, the Commercial Court observed that a competitor was required to be more diligent in the context of commercial communication among competitors. The term “locust” was almost exclusively loaded with negative meaning, which led to the unethical general vilification of a competitor. The applicants were therefore prohibited from using that statement in relation to the F. company, pursuant to the Unfair Competition Act. 16.  On 19 September 2008 the applicants lodged an appeal against that judgment. On 12 December 2008 the Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as unfounded. It referred to the extensive reasoning given in the interim injunction proceedings and added that, according to the case-law of the Supreme Court, the test used to verify whether a statement was covered by the right to freedom of expression required the assessment of whether a factual basis for such a statement existed; if a competitor participated in a public debate of general interest, freedom of expression had more weight with regard to the assessment of the statement than in the context of purely commercial communication. The greater the public interest in being properly informed and the less the statement related to commercial interests, the more the statement would be protected by Article 10 of the Convention. In the present case, there was no doubt that there was an ongoing public debate; however, the commercial interests of the applicants had very much been in the foreground of the communicated statement itself. 17.  The applicants lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law against that judgment, which was rejected by the Supreme Court on 14 July 2009. The Supreme Court found that the applicants had not only called the F. company a “locust”, but had also reproached this company for negative conduct, such as dominating doctors, dismissing doctors who did not act in accordance with company wishes, and focusing on economic factors rather than the welfare of patients (“Herrschaft über den ärztlichen Berufstand, Kündigung nicht “spurender” Ärzte, Orientierung an ökonomischen Erwägungen und damit nicht am Wohl der Patienten”). Therefore, the expression used had turned into a statement of fact, giving the reader the impression that the F. company had already demonstrated unethical conduct which threatened the interests of doctors and patients. In view of the specific circumstances of the case, the prohibition ruled upon by the lower courts was justified. Even though the applicants had taken part in a debate of general public interest, an untrue and damaging statement of fact was not protected by freedom of expression. Furthermore, the issuing of warnings concerning the potential risks of the provision of medical services by companies was not, as such, prohibited by the decisions of the Austrian courts; the applicants had only been required to refrain from making untrue statements of fact in respect of their competitors. 18.  The decision of the Supreme Court was served on the applicants’ counsel on 27 August 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Pozuelo de Alarcón (Madrid). 7.  The applicant cohabited with another man in a homosexual relationship from 1990 until the latter’s death on 2 July 2002. During that period they lived together in an apartment belonging to the applicant’s partner. When his partner died, the sister and only heir of the applicant’s partner gave the applicant, because of the relationship he had had with her brother, an apartment that had belonged to the applicant’s late partner and in which the couple had spent their holidays together since 1990. 8.  On 19 September 2003 the applicant claimed social security allowances as a surviving spouse, under section 174 (1) of the General Social Security Act, arguing that he had cohabited with his deceased partner for many years. 9.  On 22 September 2003 the National Institute of Social Security (Instituto Nacional de la Seguridad Social, hereafter referred to as “INSS”) refused to grant the applicant a survivor’s pension on the ground that since he had not been married to the deceased person, he could not legally be considered as his surviving spouse for the purposes of section 174 (1) of the General Social Security Act. That decision was formally served on 13 June 2005. 10.   On 1 July 2005 Law no. 13/2005 amending the provisions of the Civil Code with respect to the right to enter into marriage was passed. Two days later it entered into force. This law legalised same-sex marriage in Spain. In accordance with its first additional provision all legal and regulatory provisions making reference to marriage should be understood thereafter as applicable to all marriages irrespective of the sex of its members (see paragraph 35 below). 11.  On 5 July 2005 the applicant filed an administrative complaint against the decision of 22 September 2003. This complaint was dismissed by the INSS on 11 August 2005. The INSS noted that there was no provision in the legislation in force that allowed, for the purposes of social security rights, the person who had been cohabiting with the deceased to gain the status of a widower. 12.  On 26 September 2005 the applicant challenged that decision before the Madrid Social Tribunal no. 33 (“the Social Tribunal”). 13.  In a judgment of 14 November 2005 the Social Tribunal ruled for the applicant. The Social Tribunal firstly outlined that the facts of the case had to be assessed in the light of the newly enacted Law no. 13/2005, which was already in force and deemed constitutional by the tribunal. As to the merits, the Social Tribunal observed that the issue at stake was whether the applicant, as the surviving partner of a same-sex relationship that ended (following his partner’s death) before the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005, had the right to a survivor’s pension. The Social Tribunal then reiterated that, according to the well-established domestic case-law, surviving partners of unmarried couples were not entitled to a survivor’s pension under section 174 of the General Social Security Act, marriage being a constitutive element to access any such social-security benefit; that the applicant had been prevented from marrying his partner because same-sex marriage had not been recognised in domestic law at the time his partner died; that the social security administration had relied on the fact that the couple had not married to refuse the applicant a survivor’s pension; and that it was evident that after the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005, surviving spouses of same-sex marriages were entitled to survivors’ pensions on the same footing as survivors of different-sex marriages. 14.  The Social Tribunal was of the view that the solution to the legal issue raised by the applicant’s case depended on whether it could be inferred from Law no. 13/2005 that Parliament’s intention had been that surviving partners of same-sex couples who had been prevented from marrying under the former legislation could access a survivor’s pension on a similar footing to same-sex couples who could marry after the entering into force of that Act. The Social Tribunal drew attention in this regard to the provisions and the explanatory memorandum of Law no. 13/2005 to contend that this new legislation had a very strong egalitarian purpose, and that from the date it entered into force, that is to say 3 July 2005, all legal provisions concerning marriage should be interpreted on the basis of the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005 as applying fully to same-sex marriage (see paragraph 35 below). The Social Tribunal held in this regard that:\n“This is a wide-ranging provision which affects all the other provisions of the legal system making reference to marriage. From now onwards all references to marriage established in the law shall be understood as applying also to marriage celebrated between two persons of the same sex. Accordingly, whoever shall be called to interpret or apply any marriage-related provision should do so in egalitarian terms without taking into consideration whether the spouses are of the same or different sex”. 15.  The Social Tribunal further recalled that additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 of 7 July 1981 amending the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining to marriage and the procedure to be followed for cases of annulment, judicial separation and divorce, recognised the right to obtain a survivor’s pension for individuals who had been prevented from marrying a person who later died by the legislation in force until then, provided that he or she had cohabited in a relationship similar to marriage with the deceased person and that the deceased had died before Law no. 30/1981 entered into force. 16.  The Social Tribunal stressed that such a provision was included in order to provide a solution for those cohabiting couples consisting of a man and a woman who could not have married under the legislation in force until that time, and thus did not qualify for a survivor’s pension, because one or even both of them had still been married to another person whom they had been prevented from divorcing, divorce having been legally impossible in Spain until the passing of Law no. 30/1981. The Social Tribunal considered that the applicant’s circumstances were “fully comparable” to those outlined in additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 in so far as:\n“- the claimant could not marry his partner because the legislation then in force prevented him from doing so;\n- the claimant had shared a marital life with his partner until the latter’s death;\n- the latter’s death had taken place before the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005” 17.  The Social Tribunal acknowledged, however, that whereas Law no. 30/1981 was aimed at protecting the rights of those cohabiting heterosexual couples who were prevented from marrying because divorce was prohibited at the time, Law no. 13/2005 was aimed at protecting the rights of those who could not marry on account of their sexual orientation, and that this distinction was the main impediment to the recognition of the applicant’s right to a survivor’s pension. 18.  The Social Tribunal considered nonetheless that treating these two groups differently would not be in harmony with the strong egalitarian intention expressed by Parliament with the passing of Law no. 13/2005 and that, accordingly, additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was applicable to the applicant by force of additional provision no. 1 of Law no. 13/2005. The Social Tribunal stated as follows:\n“Therefore, the interpretation that in my opinion better fits the legislature’s intention is the following:\n- If the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005 sets out that provisions making reference to marriage shall apply irrespective of the sex of the spouses,\n- And one of [these provisions], currently in force to provide access to a survivor’s pension, is additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981.\n- The only method to apply it in a way which is consistent with the egalitarian intention of the legislature is to do so irrespective of the sexual orientation of the members of the cohabiting couple.\n- In order to ensure that sexual orientation does not constitute discriminatory grounds in the application of additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981, the right thereby recognised shall currently be interpreted as providing a solution to factual situations such as the one in the instant case in which the impediment to access to a survivor’s pension is no other than the sexual orientation [of the claimant].” 19.  As regards the administration’s submission that in the area of social security benefits the governing principle was that of non-retroactivity of laws and that according to the law in force at the time the applicant’s partner died the former did not qualify for a survivor’s pension because they were not married, the Social Tribunal was of the view that this general principle was not absolute and that it did not apply where there was a specific rule giving retroactive effect to laws more favourable to the citizens, as is true of the instant case. Thus, additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 should be read in the light of the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005. 20.  As to the degree of retroactivity that should be given to additional provision 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 in the applicant’s case, the Social Tribunal relied on the constitutive effects of Law no. 13/2005 which created new rights and was effective only from the date it entered into force. Accordingly, the Social Tribunal recognised the applicant’s right to be awarded a survivor’s pension with effect from 3 July 2005. 21.  The INSS and the Treasury General of Social Security appealed (recurso de suplicación) against that judgment to the Madrid High Court of Justice (Tribunal Superior de Justicia). 22.  On 18 September 2006 the Madrid High Court of Justice upheld the appeal and reversed the first-instance judgment. The court found that the legislature had not intended Law no. 13/2005 to cover same-sex partnerships which had been ended by the death of one of the partners before said law had entered into force and that the lack of protection of these unions could not be considered discriminatory in the light of Article 14 of the Spanish Constitution. 23.  For the court, it was only as from the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005 that marriage between same-sex couples was recognised and that this law affected other rights for those persons who would wish to marry thereafter. Hence, the court was of the view that Law no. 13/2005 had no retroactive effects, except as otherwise expressly provided, which was not the case at hand. 24.  The court further stated that even though Law no. 13/2005 had been inspired by the constitutional principle of equality, prior legislation preventing same-sex marriage could not be deemed unconstitutional as contrary to either any constitutional principle or to the right not to be discriminated against. The court referred to constitutional case-law dating from 1994 according to which the requisite of heterosexuality for the purposes of marriage was fully constitutional and that it was within the margin of appreciation of the public authorities to treat heterosexual marriages more favourably than homosexual partnerships. In this connection, the court maintained that despite the reference in the preamble of Law no. 13/2005 (see paragraph 35 below) to the discriminatory treatment to which homosexuals had traditionally been subjected on account of their sexual orientation, the aim of Parliament in passing that law was merely to respond to a new social reality and award homosexuals the right to marry, but not to protect same-sex partnerships which had already ended before its enactment. 25.  The court referred to constitutional case-law according to which a difference in legal treatment of individuals due to subsequent changes in the law does not necessarily entail discrimination, even if those persons could be said to be in similar circumstances. Given the complexity that a change in legislation might involve, it was for Parliament to establish the characteristics of the legal transition, either by introducing retroactivity clauses or by restricting the application of the new legislation to circumstances arising after its entry into force. 26.  The court noted in this regard that Law no. 13/2005 had not included any provision concerning same-sex partnerships which had already ended at the time of its entry into force and that it strictly concerned same-sex couples still in existence at that time and who would be willing to enter into marriage. The court considered that the difference between the situations before and after the passing of Law no. 13/2005 was essentially an expression of the principle of succession of laws without constitutional implications as regards the right not to be discriminated against. 27.  As regards the applicability to the present case of additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981, the Madrid High Court of Justice found that this provision was not applicable to the applicant’s case for two main reasons. Firstly, that provision could not be considered as among the provisions to which the first additional provision of Law no. 13/2005 referred. Additional provision no. 10 (2) was, as the Constitutional Court had established, of a provisional or transitory nature and had been envisaged for those specific cases in which one of the partners had died before the entry into force of Law no. 30/1981. It had not been intended to govern future situations. Secondly, that provision had been envisaged for a totally different situation from that of the applicant. Additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was aimed at guaranteeing a survivor’s pension to those heterosexuals who had been prevented from marrying their out-of wedlock partner because divorce had not been legal at the time of the latter’s death. The inability to remarry for those affected by additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/1981 was based on the fact that divorce was not permitted at the time. The institution of marriage was open to them in their capacity as heterosexuals. On the contrary, same-sex couples were absolutely prevented from marrying before Law no. 13/2005 since the institution of marriage was until then restricted to heterosexual couples. 28.  Furthermore, the court contended that the applicant could never have fulfilled the more uxorio marital cohabitation requirement established by additional provision no. 10 (2) of Law no. 30/ 1981 of, because only those who were in principle eligible for marriage but had been prevented from marrying for whatever reason could qualify for de facto marital cohabitation. The applicant and his partner could have never cohabited “as if married” before the entry into force of Law no. 13/2005, because before then they were ineligible for marriage as they were both male. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law seeking harmonisation of the case-law (recurso de casación para la unificación de doctrina). In a decision of 27 June 2007, the Supreme Court (Social Chamber) declared the appeal inadmissible on the ground that the decision produced for purposes of comparison, specifically a judgment of the High Court of Justice of the Canary Islands of 7 November 2003, was not relevant. That decision was served on 26 July 2007. 30.  Relying on Articles 14 (principle of equality and prohibition of discrimination) and 24 § 1 (right to effective judicial protection), the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. In a decision of 11 February 2009, served on 17 February 2009, the Constitutional Court declared the appeal inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant had failed to substantiate the special constitutional relevance of his complaints.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and is currently detained in a psychiatric hospital in Lippstadt. 6.  In 1979 the applicant forced two seven-year-old girls, and in 1980 a four-year-old girl, to undress and hit them with a stick. In 1981 the applicant forced a seven-year-old girl to undress and lay on top of the girl on a bench. The criminal proceedings relating to these offences were discontinued because of the applicant’s lack of criminal responsibility as a minor. 7.  On 21 January 1983 the Münster Regional Court convicted the applicant of attempted rape together with sexual assault and dangerous assault and of attempted murder and assault. Applying the criminal law relating to young offenders, it sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment and ordered his detention in a psychiatric hospital under Article 63 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 28 below). 8.  The Regional Court found that on 22 June 1982 the applicant, then aged seventeen, had forced a fourteen-year-old girl to follow him into a forest where he had attempted to rape her, sexually assaulted her with a stick and then attempted to kill her by strangling her to cover up his offences. When, on return to the crime scene, he realised that his victim was not dead, he forcefully hit her buttocks with a branch. 9.  In the Regional Court’s finding, it was necessary to order the applicant’s detention in a psychiatric hospital under Article 63 of the Criminal Code. It considered that the applicant had acted with diminished criminal responsibility (Article 21 of the Criminal Code; see paragraph 27 below). Having regard to the findings of expert H., the court was convinced that the applicant had reduced mental capacities which had been caused by infantile brain damage. This damage, combined with failings in his upbringing (he had repeatedly been hit by his father with a stick himself), had caused a consciousness disorder and the sadistic sexual tendencies the applicant had disclosed in his offence. These disorders amounted to an “other serious mental abnormality” for the purposes of Articles 20 and 21 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 26-27 below). Moreover, a comprehensive assessment of the applicant’s personality revealed that, as a result of his condition and notably the sadistic tendencies which had manifested themselves in the offence of which he was found guilty, he could be expected to commit further unlawful acts and was therefore dangerous to the general public. 10.  Since 29 January 1983 the applicant has been detained in a psychiatric hospital. 11.  In December 1990, when the applicant was granted leave from detention, he attacked a twenty-six-year-old cyclist, threatened her with a knife and attempted to force her into a forest. He was chased away by a car driver. The criminal proceedings in this respect were discontinued with regard to his previous conviction. 12.  The courts dealing with the execution of sentences reviewed the applicant’s detention at regular intervals. In particular, on 5 February 2010 the Paderborn Regional Court ordered the applicant’s detention in a psychiatric hospital to continue. It had noted, in particular, that the applicant had refused therapeutic discussions. There was stagnation in the applicant’s treatment, the representatives of the psychiatric hospital having explained that they considered substantial changes in the applicant’s personality by sex therapy no longer possible. 13.  On 28 January 2011 the Paderborn Regional Court ordered the continuation of the applicant’s detention in a psychiatric hospital under Articles 67d and 67e of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 29-31 below). 14.  The Regional Court noted that external psychiatric expert T., in his report dated 28 January 2010, had diagnosed the applicant, whom he had examined in person, with an abnormality of the sex chromosomes (so-called Klinefelter syndrome). The latter had most probably caused an endocrine personality syndrome characterised by retardation and disorders in the development of a person’s personality and by an insufficient internalisation of ethical rules. The applicant had therefore developed a dissocial and schizoid personality. It was unclear whether the applicant still suffered from sadistic paraphilia. The expert considered that the applicant’s retardation had partially been offset by hormonal treatment. Moreover, the applicant’s dissocial conduct and schizoid personality disorder had been alleviated by social therapy and psychotherapy. 15.  In assessing the risk emanating from the applicant, the expert considered that it had to be taken into account that the applicant had already committed a number of sadistic offences against children. Moreover, the seriousness of the offence of which the applicant had been convicted in 1983, and the attack on a woman at a time when he had already been detained in the psychiatric hospital in 1990, had to be taken into consideration. It appeared that it had not been possible to continuously pursue sex therapy with the applicant during his long psychiatric internment. There was a risk that, if the applicant were overstrained or frustrated, he might commit offences as a result of sadistic tendencies. The expert stated, however, that it was impossible for him to assess how far the applicant was still driven by sadistic fantasies. Consequently, the risk that the applicant would reoffend if released was difficult to assess and could only be determined in the course of further therapy. 16.  A representative of the psychiatric hospital, in submissions to the court dated 7 December 2010, confirmed that the applicant had spoken with a psychologist on his request. However, he was still unable to reflect on the motives for his offence. Therefore, it was difficult to assess how dangerous the applicant was; there was a risk that he would reoffend if released. Furthermore, the therapist responsible for the applicant confirmed that it was impossible to make a proper assessment of the danger posed by the applicant. 17.  The Regional Court, having heard the applicant and having regard to the evidence before it, considered that the continuation of the applicant’s detention in a psychiatric hospital had to be ordered. Despite the fact that the applicant had proved reliable during leave from detention during recent years, it could not be expected with sufficient probability that the applicant would not reoffend if released. In particular, it could not be ruled out that his sadistic tendencies persisted. The applicant was currently not undergoing therapy, in the proper sense of the term, and suffered from hospitalism. 18.  The Regional Court further considered that the continuation of the applicant’s detention was proportionate. In support of this view, it referred to the serious offence which had led to the applicant’s placement in a psychiatric hospital, to the fact that he had relapsed during the execution of his detention order and to the potential risk, as confirmed by the expert and the psychiatric hospital staff, that the applicant would reoffend if released. 19.  On 23 February 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal against the Regional Court’s decision. 20.  On 15 March 2011 the Hamm Court of Appeal, endorsing the reasons given by the Regional Court, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 21.  By submissions dated 1 April 2011, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He argued that his continued detention in a psychiatric hospital for more than twenty‑eight years was disproportionate and had therefore breached his constitutional right to liberty and the constitutional protection of the rule of law. It had been insufficient for the courts to base their assessment that he was currently still dangerous on offences dating back more than twenty‑eight years and on an incident during the execution of his detention order dating back more than twenty years. Moreover, the experts and courts had confirmed that he was no longer undergoing any therapy and that it was unclear whether he was still dangerous to the public. 22.  On 27 July 2011 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint, without giving reasons (file no. 2 BvR 735/11). 23.  The applicant underwent several courses of therapy, including social therapy and psychotherapy, during his detention in the psychiatric hospital. After the applicant had failed in his attempts to complete a sex therapy course on a number of occasions, the Lippstadt Psychiatric Hospital authorities decided to discontinue attempts at sex therapy for some time. The applicant was transferred to the so-called “long-stay” department of the hospital in 2006, where he was detained during the time covered by the proceedings at issue and where he did not undergo any sex therapy. The purpose of the applicant’s placement in the “long-stay” department was in fact to grant him a break from his failed attempts to complete sex therapy. He was being prepared for another attempt at completing sex therapy in psychotherapeutic one-to-one meetings with a psychologist. However, he had repeatedly declined offers to restart such individual or group therapy. 24.  The applicant has been working in the factory on the premises of the psychiatric hospital. When granted leave under escort several times per year, he has visited members of his family. 25.  On 18 January 2012 the Paderborn Regional Court, endorsing the reasons given in its previous decision, ordered the applicant’s continued detention in a psychiatric hospital. It agreed with the view expressed by the psychiatric hospital representative that sadism could not be cured and considered that there was a high risk that the applicant would again commit further serious offences against the life and sexual self-determination of others. On 20 March 2012 the Hamm Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Kavadarci. 6.  In April 2000, while criminal proceedings were pending against a certain Mr I.A., the latter sold a lorry (“the lorry”) to a company, M. 7.  On 13 June 2000 the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the Trial Court”) convicted Mr I.A. of smuggling nearly 9 tonnes of sugar, which he had transported in the lorry in November 1997. According to the Government, the court dismissed the prosecutor’s application to have the lorry confiscated, given that Mr I.A. had stated that he had already sold it. The court considered that the conditions for confiscation of the lorry under Article 68 (2) of the Criminal Code 1996 (see paragraph 21 below) had not been fulfilled: specifically it had not been established that the lorry could be used again to commit an offence; that the confiscation had been necessary for the protection of safety or for reasons of ethics; and that the lorry had been specially adjusted for the commission of specific type of offences. On 20 November 2001, following separate appeals by Mr I.A. and the public prosecutor, the Skopje Court of Appeal found the public prosecutor’s application immaterial (беспредметна) and quashed all aspects of this judgment. 8.  On 17 September 2003 the Trial Court convicted Mr I.A. in absentia. It fined him and ordered, under Article 278 (3) of the Criminal Code 1996, the confiscation of the lorry and the sugar (“the confiscation order”). In the absence of an appeal, the judgment became final on 29 October 2003. 9.  On 6 September 2004 the company M. sold the lorry to the applicant, who later registered the lorry in his name. 10.  On 12 June 2006 the Kavadarci Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”) enforced the confiscation order of 17 September 2003 against the applicant and issued a record of enforcement (записник за извршување). 11.  On 15 November 2006 the applicant objected to the enforcement of the confiscation order, arguing that Mr I.A. had died on 21 March 2005 and that the confiscation order accordingly could not be enforced. There had been no injunction restricting the sale of the lorry. He had been the lawful owner and he had been making his living using the lorry. Lastly, he stated that he had sought, in separate civil proceedings, return of the lorry (see paragraph 14 below). 12.  On 20 November 2006 the execution-of-sanctions judge of the Trial Court rejected the objection as inadmissible, finding that the applicant had no procedural standing. It found that the confiscation order had been enforced in accordance with section 355 of the Enforcement of Sanctions Act (see paragraph 26 below). It further found that the applicant, as the third person from whom the lorry had been confiscated, could assume his rights under section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 25 below). 13.  The applicant appealed. On 6 December 2006 a three-judge panel of the Trial Court dismissed his appeal reiterating that he had no right to object to the enforcement of the confiscation order. However, he had been entitled to claim, in civil proceedings, return of the lorry. Civil courts had jurisdiction, under section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act, to reverse a final confiscation order issued in criminal proceedings and order the return of the confiscated item. 14.  On 19 June 2006 the applicant submitted a civil claim seeking that the first-instance court declare him to be the owner of the lorry and to order the State to restore it to his possession. In the case of failure of his first claim, he sought that the State would reimburse him for the upgrades made to the lorry. In this latter context, he identified the upgrades that he had installed in the lorry. He further maintained that he was the bona fide and lawful owner of the lorry. He argued that the authorities had failed to seize the lorry immediately after the offence had been committed (на лице место) and to note a ban on the sale of the lorry on its registration certificate. As he was making his living off the lorry, he requested an injunction restricting the State from selling or otherwise disposing of the lorry until the final resolution of the dispute. 15.  By decisions of 29 June and 16 November 2006 respectively, the first-instance court and the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the second-instance court”) dismissed the applicant’s application for an injunction finding no evidence that in the absence of such a measure his claim would be considerably affected or that he would sustain irreparable damage. 16.  On 2 March 2007 the applicant informed the first-instance court that Mr I.A. had died in Austria in 2005. 17.  On 10 May 2007 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It established that Mr I.A., who knew that the lorry could have been confiscated, had sold it to the company M. At the relevant time, neither the manager of M. nor the applicant had known that the lorry had been used in the commission of the offence and that it had been subject to a confiscation order. Relying on Articles 68 and 278 (3) of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 21 and 22 below), the court stated that:\n“Confiscation is a safety measure, the typical aim of which is to remove conditions which are convenient for the commission of offences, and it is a condition for ordering such a measure that the offender has been sentenced, as in the present case. The court considers that it is mandatory to confiscate the [lorry] under the afore-mentioned provisions, because this safety measure has a wider influence [in the sense of] general deterrence of all future offenders of this type of offences, and otherwise the offenders would be encouraged, after the offence has been committed, to dispose of the means with which they committed the offence and, thus, to even acquire pecuniary benefit; furthermore that would have a negative influence on the ethics of the wider public, [that is to say] on general deterrence ...\n... Given that from the evidence and the above-mentioned statutory provisions it has been established that the [lorry] in question was confiscated in favour of [the respondent State] in lawful proceedings, the court finds that the [respondent State] has therein obtained ownership of the [lorry] in question on the basis of a final and enforceable judgment ... in accordance with sections 112(2) and 154 of the [Property Act.]\nFor these reasons, the court dismisses the [applicant’s] main claim and also the alternative claim, because it concerns upgrades made to the [lorry].\nOn the other hand, the court considers that the [applicant], as the bona fide owner, can be indemnified for the value of the entire [lorry], including the upgrades, but solely from the offender, [Mr I.A.], in accordance with Article 68 (3) of the [Criminal Code], and not from the [respondent State] ...\nThe court dismisses as groundless the argument that at the moment of confiscation of the [lorry] in question it was not owned by [Mr I.A.] but by the [applicant] as the bona fide possessor (совесен владетел), given that from the evidence it was established that when the offence was committed the [lorry] was owned by [Mr I.A.] and the safety measure confiscation of the [lorry] was issued on those grounds. The court also considers groundless the [applicant’s] representative’s arguments that under section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act the final decision for confiscation of the [lorry] could be amended with a decision in civil proceedings if there were a dispute concerning the ownership of the confiscated items, given that this provision would have been applied if the [lorry] had been sold to the [applicant] before the offence was committed and had, under any legal basis, remained in the factual possession of the convicted [Mr I.A.] and he, after having sold it, committed the crime; but in the present case it is vice versa; firstly the offence was committed and then the [lorry] was sold.” 18.  The court also established that the applicant had upgraded the lorry to the value of 69,150 Macedonian denars (MKD). Furthermore, on the basis of the applicant’s and two witnesses’ statements, the court established that the applicant had bought the lorry for 4,300 euros (EUR). 19.  The applicant appealed. He stated that he had previously requested that the first-instance court obtain evidence from the Ministry of the Interior which would confirm that Mr I.A. had died in Austria in 2005. He argued that the domestic authorities had failed to ban Mr I.A. from disposing of the lorry or to seize the lorry at the time the offence had been discovered. He also argued that he was the bona fide owner and that he had obtained title to the lorry by adverse possession (одршка). The first-instance court had incorrectly applied section 129(5) of the Criminal Proceedings Act. The lorry had been confiscated nine years after the offence had been committed. The State had been unlawfully enriched by the value of the upgrades installed by the applicant. 20.  On 19 October 2007 Skopje Court of Appeal (“the second-instance court”) dismissed the applicant’s appeal finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and reasons given by the lower court. On 13 November 2007 this judgment was served on the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990. 6.  The applicant is a man who is intellectually disabled. On 14 February 2001 he was taken, with his two brothers, into public care by the child welfare authorities and placed temporarily with a foster family with whom they had already been living since August 2000. The foster family lived in a village situated about 50 km from the applicant’s home town, which is in the South of Finland. 7.  In June 2006 the foster family, the applicant and one of his brothers moved to a village in the North of Finland. The removal of the children was not authorised by the competent child welfare authority. In June 2007 the applicant finished his compulsory school education as a special needs student integrated into a normal school. Thereafter his foster parents planned to place him in a vocational school some 300 km away from their village, without authorisation by the competent child welfare authority. 8.  On 11 July 2007 the competent child welfare authority decided to remove the applicant from the foster family and to place him in a disabled children’s home in his home town in southern Finland. The authority found that the foster care had not been satisfactory in the light of the fact that the foster parents had made important decisions without consulting the child welfare authorities, such as moving north and planning to place the applicant in a vocational school 300 km away from their home. The foster parents brought an appeal in court against that decision, but the decision was upheld by the Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen) on 18 February 2008 and subsequently by the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) on 10 December 2008. 9.  On 31 July 2007 the applicant was placed in a children’s home in his home town in southern Finland. One of his brothers was placed in the same home in the autumn of 2007. 10.  On 23 July 2008 the applicant turned 18. On 13 August 2008 he began studying at a local vocational school. On 4 November 2008 a mentor (edunvalvoja, intressebevakare) was appointed for the applicant for matters other than those pertaining to his person. The applicant could thus freely make his own decisions in matters pertaining to his own person. 11.  On 30 December 2008 the social welfare authorities requested the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) to appoint a mentor for the applicant also for matters pertaining to his person. The request was, inter alia, based on the fact that a conflict had emerged between the child welfare service and the applicant’s former foster parents as to where the applicant should live. The appointment of an external mentor was therefore needed in order to assess the applicant’s best interests and settle the matter accordingly. The applicant as well as his biological parents were heard before the court and none of them objected to the appointment of such a mentor. 12.  On 25 January 2009 the former foster parents took the applicant to the North of Finland, invoking his decision to move there to live with them. He considered them to be his real family. The next day, the social welfare authorities arrived with the police to fetch the applicant and to take him back, against his will, to his home town. He was placed in his home town in a special living unit for intellectually disabled adults. 13.  On 18 June 2009 the District Court, on the basis of the Guardianship Service Act, appointed a mentor for the applicant in matters concerning his property and economy, as well as matters pertaining to his person to the extent that the applicant was unable to understand their significance. The court found that, owing to his diminished mental faculties, the applicant was incapable of looking after his own interests and taking care of his personal affairs. The decision was based on medical records concerning the applicant’s level of development and on submissions according to which the applicant was gullible and keen on small children’s play. The appointed mentor was an official of the local public legal aid office entrusted with functions of this kind. 14.  On 7 February 2011, after having received a psychologist’s report dated 26 November 2010 on the applicant, the appointed mentor decided, against the applicant’s will, that it was in his best interests for him to live in his home town, where his family members also lived. He had better educational and work opportunities there than in the village in the North of Finland, where he only knew his elderly former foster parents. The applicant was given a possibility to go for holidays to his foster parents in the North of Finland. 15.  On 8 April 2011 the applicant asked the District Court to discharge the mentor appointed for him from her duties as far as matters pertaining to his place of residence and education were concerned. He requested that another person of his choosing be appointed as his mentor in those matters. 16.  On 22 June 2011 the District Court, having heard the applicant in person, as well as witnesses including the applicant’s mentor, his former foster mother, his brother and two staff members from his housing service, refused his request. In its judgment, the court put on record the various testimonies. According to the record of the testimony of the applicant’s mentor, she had discussed with the applicant his plan to move prior to her decision. The mentor was of the view that the applicant did not understand all the consequences of the plan, and did not realise that the good things in his present situation would not be relocated with him. In the light of all the circumstances, the mentor considered that the move would have been against the applicant’s interests. 17.  As regards the facts, the court recalled the background of the previous decision, taken on 18 June 2009 (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above). The court further noted that, according to an expert evaluation dated 26 November 2010 and established by a psychologist, the applicant’s decision-making skills were equal to those of a child aged between six and nine years. Consequently, the evaluation concluded that the applicant was not able to consider whether his plans about future were realistic and what consequences or implications they would have. The court noted that the applicant had told the court that he had no particular complaints about his current situation and that according to the witness statements he enjoyed his apartment and work in his home town. There was no evidence that the applicant’s situation in his home town was not good. The court found that the applicant clearly did not understand what it would be like to live in a remote part of the country, especially as he had previously lived there for only one year, and what the implications of the move would be for his situation. Moreover, the court found it uncertain how clear or strong the applicant’s will actually was, taking into account the evidence regarding his gullibility. It was likely that his opinion was influenced by that of the former foster parents. The applicant’s development had improved in his home town and he had been able to live in a special unit for intellectually disabled adults, to go to work and to cycle independently around town. The applicant had in his home town a support network consisting of relatives, friends and staff of the social welfare authorities, a job, hobbies and educational possibilities. Due to the remote and isolated location of the former foster parents’ home, the applicant would miss out on all these possibilities if he were to move there. The court further noted that according to the plan, the applicant would attend a vocational school far away from his new home, requiring daily long-distance trips each school day, more specifically a 15 km taxi ride to a bus station followed by a 70 km bus transport, and the reverse after school. The court was in doubt as to whether it was reasonable to expect that the applicant could cope with such demands on a daily basis. 18.  As matter of law, the District Court stated that as, on the evidence, the applicant was not able to understand the significance of the envisaged decision, the mentor was not required, or even permitted, to resolve the question of the applicant’s place of residence in accordance with the applicant’s own wishes. Under such circumstances the mentor was required to take the decision on the basis of an assessment of the applicant’s best interests. 19.  Taking into account the evidence and the factual findings referred to above (see paragraph 17 above), the District Court concluded that it was in the applicant’s best interests to remain in his home town. The mentor had not acted in breach of her powers and the District Court found no reason to replace the mentor by another person as regards matters concerning the applicant’s place of residence and his education. 20.  On 15 July 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Turku Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). He pointed out that the Finnish Constitution guaranteed everyone the right to choose their place of residence. Moreover, a mentor had to enjoy the confidence of his or her client, which was not so in the present case. 21.  On 9 May 2012 the Turku Court of Appeal, after holding an oral hearing, rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the District Court’s decision by two votes to one. The Court of Appeal found no reason to deviate from the assessment of the evidence as conducted by the District Court and affirmed the conclusions reached by the latter. The dissenting judge found that the former foster mother had been the only adult with whom the applicant had had a long-standing and safe relationship in his life. The applicant had clearly understood the importance of this relationship in his life, he knew the former foster family and what life with them entailed, although he might not be able to understand all the implications of the envisaged move. When the applicant had been removed from the former foster family in 2007 and placed in a children’s home in Southern Finland, no specific reasons had been given as to why this measure had been in the applicant’s best interests. The decision taken subsequently by the mentor in February 2011 had merely confirmed the earlier decision. These decisions had created distrust between the applicant and his mentor. As both the present mentor and the proposed replacement were equally competent, the one who had the applicant’s trust should be chosen. 22.  By a letter dated 6 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal already submitted before the Appeal Court. 23.  On 8 February 2013 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 24.  According to the information provided by the Government, in July 2013 the applicant learned that his foster father had died and he attended his funeral in Northern Finland. From 2010 to 1 January 2015 the applicant resided in his home town in a block of flats providing special care for persons with intellectual disability. Since 2 January 2015 he has been residing in sheltered accommodation, in a small two-room flat. He is employed by his home town, undertaking work five days a week in a shelter for intellectually disabled people. He is a talkative, efficient and well-liked employee and fits in very well in the working community. 25.  The applicant’s former foster mother is in contact with the applicant via telephone but the frequency of their contact is not known. She moved to the eastern part of Finland before Christmas 2015 and invited the applicant to spend Christmas with her, but in the end he decided not to visit her. Instead, the applicant spent Christmas with his brother and other relatives. According to the Government, the applicant has not discussed the possibility of moving elsewhere for a long time. He is happy with his work and plays floorball twice a week as a hobby. The applicant states that he has stopped talking about his desire to move since there is no point in doing so, given the fact that the social welfare authorities do not want him to leave his home town. Although he now has a girlfriend in his home town, he maintains that his true and most sincere wish is still to live with or near to his former foster mother. There is nothing in his home town that keeps him there or makes him want to stay there.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1984 and is detained in Saint-Petersburg. 5.  On 22 April 2004 he was arrested on suspicion of murder. 6.  On 24 April 2004 the Vyborgskiy Federal District Court of Saint-Petersburg authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 7.  On 7 February 2005 the District Court extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. The court referred to the gravity of charges, the applicant’s character, lack of permanent residence in Saint-Petersburg, and risk of absconding or re-offending. 8.  On 7 April 2005 the District Court returned the case to the prosecutor and extended the applicant’s detention without specifying any reasons. 9.  On 15 September 2005, 21 October 2005 and 15 December 2005 when extending pre-trial detention, the District Court reproduced the grounds for detention described above. 10.  On 2 March 2006 the Saint-Petersburg City Court quashed the detention order of 15 December 2005 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11.  On 16 March 2006, 22 March 2006 and 21 June 2006 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention referring to the gravity of charges, absence of permanent residence, his character, possibility of absconding and committing crimes. The applicant and his lawyer did not attend the hearing on 21 June 2006. 12.  On 30 June 2006 the Vyborgskiy District Court of Saint-Petersburg convicted the applicant of murder and theft. 13.  On 31 January 2007 the Saint-Petersburg City Court upheld his conviction on appeal. As regards the applicant’s appeal against the detention order of 21 June 2006, the court noted that the lower court had failed to ensure the applicant’s and his lawyer’s presence at the hearing of 21 June 2006. However, in view of the applicant’s conviction, it discontinued the appeal proceedings finding them unnecessary.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Baku. 5.  Demonstrations were planned to be held on 31 July 2010 and 10 March 2013 in Baku. 6.  On 23 July 2010 the organisers, consisting of several members of opposition parties, gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), of the demonstration of 31 July 2010. It appears that no prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 10 March 2013. Information about that demonstration was disseminated via Facebook or the press. 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the demonstration of 31 July 2010 at the places indicated by the organisers and proposed three other locations on the outskirts of Baku – a stadium situated in the Binagadi District, a square near Zigh Road in the Khatai District, and the yard of a driving school situated in the 20th habitable area of the Sabail District. The BCEA noted that of the locations proposed by the organisers at which to hold the assembly, the squares were all designated public leisure areas and the other places were areas with heavy traffic. 8.  The organisers nevertheless decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 31 July 2010 were demanding free and fair elections and democratic reforms in the country. The participants of the demonstration of 10 March 2013 were protesting over the deaths of numerous soldiers in the army. 10.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse those who had gathered. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. 11.  In both cases on the day of the applicant’s arrest, an administrative offence report (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued on him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order of the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). In the second case he was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the CAO (participation in a public assembly organised not in accordance with the law). 12.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative offence reports or with other material from his case files. In both cases he was not given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while he was in police custody. 13.  In the first case the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court on 31 July 2010, the day of his arrest. In the second case he was held in police custody overnight and brought before the Sabail District Court on 11 March 2013, the day after his arrest. 14.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. In the second case members of the public were not allowed inside the courtroom, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 15.  According to the applicant, in both cases he was not given an opportunity to appoint a lawyer of his own choosing. 16.  At the court hearing in the first case the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. According to the material submitted to the Court by the parties, he refused legal assistance. 17.  It appears that at the court hearing in the second case a State-funded lawyer was invited to represent the applicant. None of the material submitted to the Court contain any records showing that the State-funded lawyer, Ms E.Z., made any oral or written submissions to the first-instance court. 18.  At the hearings in both cases the court did not question any witnesses. 19.  By a decision of 31 July 2010 the first-instance court convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days’ administrative detention. By a decision of 11 March 2013 the same court convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to seven days’ administrative detention. 20.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals with the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated had been peaceful. The applicant also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the first-instance court had not been fair. 21.  In the first case the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. In the second case the applicant prepared his appeal with the assistance of a lawyer of his own choosing, but that lawyer did not attend the hearing. 22.  On 16 August 2010 and 27 March 2013 respectively the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeals and upheld the decision of the first-instance court. 23.  According to the applicant, the decision of the Court of Appeal of 16 August 2010 was sent to him on 23 December 2010, after he complained that the court had failed to serve him with that decision.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1980 in Tetovo and lives in Golema Rečica in the municipality of Tetovo in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. He arrived in Switzerland in 1989 via family reunification and was granted a permanent residence permit. 7.  On 1 July 1999 the applicant married a national of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, born in 1978, who arrived in Switzerland in 1990 and who also held a permanent residence permit. The couple has two children, born in 2001 and 2005, who are likewise nationals of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. 8.  After leaving school, the applicant did not undergo professional training, but worked in a variety of jobs, namely as a postman, mailman, plasterer and construction worker, with brief periods of unemployment. 9.  On 13 March 2003 the Zurich District Court convicted the applicant of embezzlement for having sold a rental car to a third person in September 2000 and gave him a suspended sentence of three months’ imprisonment. 10.  On 16 December 2004 the Supreme Court of the Canton of Zurich convicted the applicant of homicide with indirect intent (Eventualvorsatz) and serious violations of the rules of road traffic. On 4 October 2000, while he was engaged in a car race on a public road with an acquaintance, the applicant, driving at a speed of at least 170 kilometres per hour, lost control of his car and crashed into a lamppost, which caused the death of his passenger. That court took the view that the applicant, by agreeing to engage in the race, had deliberately taken the risk of killing him. It found that the applicant had acted with a high degree of recklessness and sentenced him to five years and three months’ imprisonment. 11.  The applicant’s appeals against this conviction were dismissed by the Cantonal Court of Cassation on 10 December 2005 and by the Federal Supreme Court on 28 March 2006. 12.  On 25 April 2006 the applicant started serving his sentence. 13.  On 30 September 2007 the Hinwil District Office (Statthalteramt) sentenced the applicant to a fine of 120 Swiss Francs (CHF) for the purchase and consumption of marihuana. 14.  On 28 October 2009 the applicant was released on parole after having served two thirds of his sentence. 15.  On 27 July 2009, after having heard the applicant, the Migration Office of the Canton of Zurich revoked the applicant’s permanent residence permit. It found that the conditions for revocation pursuant to, inter alia, Article 63 § 1 lit. a in conjunction with Article 62 lit. b of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (Ausländergesetz, AuG, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27 below) were met. After considering the circumstances of the case, it concluded that the public interest in the applicant’s removal outweighed his interest in enjoying his family life with his wife and children in Switzerland. It ordered his expulsion pursuant to Article 66 § 1 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals. 16.  On 30 September 2009 the government (Regierungsrat) of the Canton of Zurich dismissed the applicant’s appeal lodged on 27 August 2009. 17.  On 10 February 2010 the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich dismissed the applicant’s appeal lodged on 20 October 2009. It considered that the applicant had committed a serious criminal offence, that he was not well integrated in Switzerland despite the length of his stay, that expert prognosis regarding the likelihood that he would reoffend was positive but did not rule out any such risk, that he spoke Albanian and was familiar with the culture in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, where he spent parts of his childhood and which he had visited since. It concluded that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit was proportionate. Moreover, the court noted that the applicant’s wife was a national of “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” as well, knew Albanian and the country’s culture, and was not well integrated in Switzerland either. Observing that the couple’s children were five and nine years old and thus of an adaptable age, it concluded that the applicant’s wife and children could reasonably be expected to relocate to “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” with him. 18.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant appealed that decision, arguing that the decision to revoke his permanent residence permit was disproportionate. 19.  On 27 July 2010 the Federal Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. It considered that the main criminal offence, of which the applicant was convicted, intentional homicide, was a particularly serious one. While it acknowledged that he had lived in Switzerland for over twenty years, which had thus become the centre of his life, it found that he was neither professionally nor socially integrated. It considered that he had no stable employment, but considerable debts. Both he and his wife and children had benefitted significantly from social welfare. Moreover, the court considered that the applicant could reasonably (re-)integrate in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, considering that he spoke Albanian, was born there and had spent a part of his childhood there and had visited the country since. It observed that the same was true for his wife, who likewise originated from “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, where she spent the first twelve years of her life and still had relatives. She knew Albanian and visited the country annually on holiday. At the same time, she was not well integrated in Switzerland as she did not undergo any professional training after leaving school, had received social welfare as from 2005 and only started to work in 2010. As far as their children were concerned, the court considered that they attended primary school and kindergarten, respectively, and were still of an adaptable age. The Federal Supreme Court concluded that the public interest in the applicant’s removal outweighed the applicant’s interest in remaining in Switzerland and enjoying respect for his family life there, also noting that his wife and children had a choice between either following him to “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” or remaining in Switzerland and maintaining contact through short but regular visits. 20.  On 16 October 2010 the applicant left Switzerland in compliance with the expulsion order. 21.  On 10 December 2010 the Federal Office for Migration issued an entry ban against the applicant for a period of nine years. 22.  In late 2011 the applicant’s wife and children relocated to “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” to live with him. 23.  On 14 May 2013 the Federal Administrative Court, on the applicant’s appeal, reduced the duration of the re-entry ban to seven years due to proportionality considerations. It found that the conditions in Article 67 §§ 2 lit. a and 3 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals for the issuance of an entry ban for a period of more than five years were met (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 26). It considered that the offence committed by the applicant was particularly serious and that he continued to be a serious threat to public order, notwithstanding his mostly good behaviour since the commission of the offence and positive personality development. It noted that the applicant could ask for a temporary suspension of the entry ban for humanitarian or other important reasons (Article 67 § 5 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals) and that the applicant’s wife, who originated from “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” herself, could visit him there together with their children and also maintain contact by various means of communication. 24.  In August 2015, i.e. after almost four years, the applicant’s wife and children returned to Switzerland to avoid the expiry of their permanent residence permit pursuant to Article 61 § 2 of the Federal Act on Foreign Nationals (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27) and because their socioeconomic living conditions in “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” were difficult. They live in Zurich.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Ms Gabriele Fürst-Pfeifer, is an Austrian national who was born in 1964 and lives in Mödling. She is a psychiatrist and has been registered since the year 2000 as a psychological expert for court proceedings in custody and contact-rights-related disputes and decisions on public care as well as child abuse. Specialised in the psychological examination of children and adolescents, her focus is mainly on custody and contact-rights-related disputes. 6.  The online publication “meinbezirk.at” was published and edited by the “Print” Multimedia Company GmbH, a private company which had its registered office in St. Pölten. 7.  The regional weekly print publication Bezirksblatt, which was sent to every household of the district free, was published and edited by the “Print” Zeitungsverlag GmbH, a private company which had its registered office in Innsbruck. 8.  On 23 December 2008 an article was published in “meinbezirk.at” as well as in the print version of Bezirksblatt, which stated as follows:\n“The quality of experts in the spotlight (Gutachterqualität im Visier)\nDisclosed: Court Expert for custody proceedings a case for therapy\n(Aufgedeckt: NÖ Sorgerechts-Sachverständige selbst ein Therapie-Fall)\nSuffering from up-and-down mood swings, panic attacks, suicidal thoughts and hallucinations, together with paranoid ideas – but working as a court-appointed expert. In the last 12 years she has examined over 3.000 married couples in custody‑related disputes. Now it seems, it gets rough for [the applicant] as an expert report about her psychological condition has been disclosed ...\nA psychological expert report by Dr. M. was commissioned in 1993 in the course of civil proceedings (action because of an alleged breach of promise of marriage) which unearthed the deficiencies of [the applicant] described above. Moreover, Dr. M. came to the conclusion that the applicant’s impairments were hereditary, as the history of her family showed an accumulation of these impairments. Three years later, the applicant was introduced to the “expert community” at the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, and her integrity was beyond reproach for a decade – until now.” 9.  The passage was followed by comments by a member of the Green Party, who had made a criminal complaint against the applicant with the Public Prosecutor’s office, the Youth Advocate at the Regional Government of Lower Austria, and the Vice-President of the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, who was responsible for managing the list of experts at the court. At the end of the article it was mentioned that the applicant was no longer answering her phone and had withdrawn from all her cases. 10.  As a result of the article the applicant was confronted with questions related to it from colleagues and patients, and proceedings were initiated at the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court to clarify whether she was still fit to work as a court-appointed expert. In the course of those proceedings the applicant’s mental status was also set to be examined. 11.  On 14 January 2009 the applicant lodged an action with the St. Pölten Regional Court. She sought damages under section 8a of the Media Act (Mediengesetz) and the publication of the judgment claiming that the article and in particular the passages dealing with the psychological expert report on the applicant had violated her intimate personal sphere and compromised her publicly. However, she did not argue that the expert report had been obtained unlawfully. 12.  On 3 April 2009 the St. Pölten Regional Court (Landesgericht St. Pölten) allowed the applicant’s action, ordered the publisher to pay damages in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR) and the operative part of the judgment to be published. Furthermore, the publisher was to bear the costs of the proceedings. The court found that an average reader would understand the article as putting the expert opinion from 1993 in direct relation to the applicant’s work as an expert now, thus questioning the quality of her work. The article, that also featured the applicant’s full name and the description of her psychological impairment, touched her intimate personal sphere, since it created a link between her mental state and the quality of her work. However, the information itself did not allow for such a link, especially since the expert opinion dated from 1993 and dealt only with a very specific question in the context of civil proceedings at the time. The incomplete and manipulative content of the article was not able to meet the standards of reporting on matters of fact. Furthermore, the court did not consider that there was a direct link between the contents of the article and the applicant’s public position, given that she mainly worked as an expert in custody cases, which were not usually heard in public. Furthermore, it could be assumed that the applicant, a psychiatrist herself and a medical doctor, was managing her illness well and was able to do her work without any impairments. 13.  The publisher appealed on points of law and fact, as well as against the sentence (Berufung wegen Nichtigkeit, Schuld und Strafe). 14.  Thereupon, on 30 November 2009, the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Wien) heard the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower court, and dismissed the applicant’s action. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the article and the impugned passages giving opinions on the applicant’s mental state affected her intimate personal sphere and were capable of compromising her. However, the content of the article was true, as it only repeated true information that had not been disputed by the applicant. Furthermore, the court did not find the article to be incomplete or manipulative, but sufficiently well-balanced and faithful to the different sides of the story in that it also referred to the fact that the applicant’s integrity had never been questioned in ten years; the court also asked for statements from the Vice-President of the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court, a member of the Green Party, and the Youth Advocate of the Regional Government of Lower Austria. 15.  The Court of Appeal further found that the publication in issue was directly linked to the applicant’s public status. She had been included in the list of experts to be appointed by the courts since the year 2000 and had been appointed in several cases. This regular work as an expert in court proceedings belongs beyond doubt to the public sphere (“...ist zweifellos dem öffentlichen Leben zuzuordnen...”) as she took part in association with the State-organised judiciary and held an important position in connection with the decision-making process of judges. Even though the impugned expert opinion dated from 1993 and concerned a period in the applicant’s life prior even to that date, the reporting in question touched sufficiently upon the present public activities of the applicant. Considering the importance and sensitivity of the area of custody proceedings and the dominant role of experts in the field, the psychological integrity of an expert assigned to those cases had to be beyond doubt. Any reservation in relation to the mental health of experts – if based on sufficient reasons – had to be met with a thorough investigation in the interest of good conduct of the administration of justice, which was what had happened as the next step in the present case. According to the Court of Appeal, the article took up doubts arising from the neurologist opinion in 1993 without denying the applicant’s abilities as an expert in the area. The truthful information in the article and the public interest in the subject matter justified the article’s critical questioning of exactly those abilities. 16.  That judgment was served on the applicant’s representative on 17 December 2009. 17.  In the meantime the applicant lodged an action with the Innsbruck Regional Court on 7 April 2009. She sought damages under section 8a of the Media Act (Mediengesetz) and publication of the judgment claiming that the article, and in particular the passages dealing with the psychological expert report on her, violated her intimate personal sphere and compromised her publicly. 18.  On 2 October 2009 the Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht Innsbruck) granted the applicant’s action, ordered the publisher to pay damages in the amount of 5,000 euros (EUR) and the publication of the operative part of the judgment. Furthermore, costs were awarded against the publisher. The court found that the average reader would understand the article as stating that the applicant was incapable of being an expert in custody proceedings because of her own mental health impairments in 1993 and that this placed in question the quality of the applicant’s work so far. That the applicant’s psychological illness was directly linked to the intimate personal sphere was beyond doubt. The present article not only mentioned the applicant’s mental health status, but also grossly exaggerated individual symptoms, which was also capable of compromising her. The article was so incomplete and distorted that it could not be considered a report of matters of fact. The Regional Court in particular noted that the article did not mention that the period of examination was even earlier than 1993 and that only certain aspects of the expert opinion had been published, while others had not. Scandalously the article created the impression that the applicant had rendered decisive opinions in custody proceedings for over a decade while herself suffering from the symptoms described above. Furthermore, the publication was not linked in any way to the applicant’s public status (“...steht [...] in keinem unmittelbaren Zusammenhang mit dem öffentlichen Leben der Antragstellerin”). There was no connection between the applicant’s work at present and her mental health status years ago. Her work in the context of custody proceedings was also not conducted in public. 19.  The publisher appealed on points of law and fact, as well as against the sentence (Berufung wegen Nichtigkeit, Schuld und Strafe). 20.  Thereupon, on 11 February 2010, the Innsbruck Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht Innsbruck) granted the appeal, set aside the judgment of the lower court, and dismissed the applicant’s action. In contrast to the Regional Court it found that the average reader would understand from the article at issue that in 1993 an expert opinion was rendered in respect of the applicant that showed the above-mentioned psychological impairments. However, the article also stated that the applicant’s integrity had not been questioned for over a decade. The article, while focusing on the applicant’s work in custody proceedings, gave space to comments from the Youth Advocate of the Regional Government of Lower Austria, a member of the Green Party, and the Vice-President of the Wiener Neustadt Regional Court. The article did not indicate however that the applicant was not competent to exercise her profession as a psychological expert. Furthermore, the published information was true. The fact that only parts of the expert opinion were repeated in the article did not render the article distortive, nor the relevant information untrue. 21.  As regards the connection to the public sphere and public interest, the Court of Appeal found that the State administration, together with the administration of justice, belonged to the public sphere. The applicant had been included in the list of court-commissioned experts since the year 2000, and her repeated work as an expert in court proceedings must be considered as belonging to the public sphere. The activity was closely linked to the administration of justice, and had a considerable influence on judges’ decision-making processes. The impugned article concerned the applicant’s activity as an expert in custody proceedings. Considering the importance and sensitivity of the area of custody proceedings and the dominant role of experts in the field, the psychological integrity of an expert assigned to those cases had to be beyond doubt. Any reservation in relation to the mental health of experts – if based on sufficient reasons – had to be met with a thorough investigation in the interest of the proper administration of justice, which had happened as a next step in the present case. Insofar, a truthful report linked to a person’s public status, which also contained information belonging to the intimate personal sphere must be permitted to be published. The Court of Appeal concluded that the article, by way of an appropriate commentary, critically examined a matter of public interest and therefore exercised its role as a “public watchdog”. 22.  That judgment was served on the applicant’s representative on 11 March 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Traun. 5.  The applicant was employed as a civil servant of the Traun Municipality (Stadtgemeinde Traun). 6.  On 5 August 2002 the applicant declared to resign from his civil service employment as of 31 August 2002. However, on 29 August 2002 he revoked his declaration. 7.  On 12 September 2002 the mayor of Traun informed the applicant that the Traun City Council (Stadtrat) had not been able to accept his revocation and that his employment as a civil servant had therefore ended on 31 August 2002. 8.  On 26 September 2003 the applicant requested that his employment relationship be declared as still valid. On 11 December 2003 the City Council dismissed the request. 9.  On 30 December 2003 the applicant appealed. On 15 January 2004 he requested that suspensive effect be granted in respect of his appeal. On 18 May 2004 he requested that the City Council declare him entitled to (retroactive) payment of his salary as from 1 September 2002. 10.  On 18 June 2004 the Traun Municipal Council (Gemeinderat) dismissed the appeal, holding that the applicant was not entitled to his salary after 31 August 2002 and rejected his request for suspensive effect of 15 January 2004 as having been filed out of time. 11.  On 8 July 2004 the applicant filed an objection (Vorstellung) against the Municipal Council’s decision of 18 June 2004. On 24 June 2005 the Upper Austria Regional Government (hereinafter, “the Regional Government”) quashed the Municipal Council’s decision in the part rejecting the applicant’s request for suspensive effect of 15 June 2004 (see paragraph 9 above) and referred it back to the lower instance for a new decision. The remainder of the applicant’s objection was dismissed. 12.  On 5 August 2005 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) against the Regional Government’s decision of 24 June 2005. On 25 September 2006 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the complaint and on 15 November 2006, at the applicant’s request, transferred the complaint to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 13.  On 15 November 2007 the Administrative Court lifted the Regional Government’s decision of 24 June 2005 (see paragraph 11 above) on the ground that it had not heard the applicant in order to assess his credibility. 14.  On 4 March 2008 the Regional Government lifted the Municipal Council’s decision of 18 June 2004 (see paragraph 10 above) and referred the case back to the lower instance for a new decision. 15.  On 3 December 2006 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Municipal Council’s failure to decide (Säumnisbeschwerde) on his request for suspensive effect of 15 January 2004 (see paragraph  9  above). On 31 January 2007 the Administrative Court rejected the complaint because the Municipal Council had not been competent to decide on this issue. 16.  On 25 June 2007 the applicant filed an application for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) with the Municipal Council regarding his request of 15 January 2004, claiming that the City Council had failed to render a decision in due time. 17.  On 4 January 2008 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Municipal Council’s failure to decide on his request for suspensive effect. 18.  On 27 June 2008 the Municipal Council dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the City Council’s decision of 11 December 2003 (see paragraph 8 above) and his request for suspensive effect of 15 January 2004 (see paragraph 9 above). Consequently, on 5 September 2008 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings regarding the applicant’s complaint of 4 January 2008 about the Municipal Council’s failure to decide (see paragraph 17 above) and awarded costs to the applicant. 19.  On 7 July 2008 the applicant filed an objection with the Regional Government against the Municipal Council’s decision of 27 June 2008. 20.  On 4 February 2009 the applicant complained to the Administrative Court about the Regional Government’s failure to decide on his objection. On 9 February 2009 the Regional Government dismissed the objection. Therefore, on 13 March 2009 the Administrative Court closed the proceedings regarding the Regional Government’s failure to decide and awarded costs to the applicant. 21.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court against the Regional Government’s decision of 9 February 2009 (see paragraph 20 above). On 29 November 2010 the Constitutional Court declined to examine the complaint and on 27 January 2011, at the applicant’s request, transferred the complaint to the Administrative Court. 22.  On 25 January 2012 the Administrative Court dismissed the complaint against the Regional Government’s decision of 9 February 2009. The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 9 February 2012.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The first applicant, Mr Aleksey Yuryevich Vlasov, was born in 1957 and lives in Moscow. 7.  On 6 October 2008 Mr Vlasov applied to the Federal Migration Service for a travel passport which would allow him to go abroad. 8.  On 27 October 2008 the Golovinskiy District Court of Moscow convicted him of smuggling and sentenced him as follows:\n“... the penalty in the form of three years’ imprisonment is not to be enforced and is to be considered conditional with a three years’ probationary period.\nTo require Mr Alexey Vlasov to report twice a month during the probationary period to the authority in charge of execution of conditional sentences, and to inform [that authority] of any change of residence ...” 9.  On 11 November 2008 his application for a travel passport was refused by reference to the fact that he had been given a suspended three‑year sentence whose period of suspension had not yet expired. 10.  The applicant Mr Vlasov applied for judicial review of the refusal. 11.  On 3 June 2009 the Butyrskiy District Court of Moscow upheld the refusal as lawful, finding as follows:\n“The argument by Mr Vlasov to the effect that the Golovinskiy District Court’s judgment of 27 October 2008 contained an exhaustive list of restrictions during the probation period which did not include a restriction on leaving Russia and which was not, in the claimant’s view, subject to expansive interpretation by State officials, does not contradict section 15(4) of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act which provides for a restriction on the right to leave for abroad in cases of both actual custodial and suspended sentences. A person who is given a suspended sentence is a convicted offender serving a sentence, and may be relieved from punishment only after the period of suspension has expired. Mr Vlasov’s period of suspension expires on 14 January 2012 and after its expiry Mr Vlasov’s criminal conviction will be spent in accordance with Article 86 of the Criminal Code. Until that time Mr Vlasov is an offender serving a sentence, which is a ground for restricting his right to leave for abroad.” 12.  On 18 August 2009 the Moscow City Court rejected an appeal against the District Court’s judgment. It held:\n“The arguments that Mr Vlasov was subjected to restrictions that go beyond those imposed by his conviction and that he was compelled to serve the sentence within the Russian Federation, whereas he needed to take care of his business interests and perform his duties abroad, are not grounds for setting aside the correct judgment [of the first-instance court].” 13.  The second applicant, Mr Mikhail Mikhaylovich Benyash, was born in 1977 and lives in Sochi. 14.  On 31 August 2011 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi convicted Mr Benyash of extortion and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years. He was released in the courtroom. On 12 October 2011 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the conviction on appeal. 15.  On 5 December 2011 the Federal Migration Service refused Mr Benyash’s application for a travel passport, noting that he had been arrested on 1 September 2010 and that, according to the available information, the criminal proceedings against him were still pending. 16.  The applicant Mr Benyash applied for judicial review of the refusal. 17.  On 28 June 2012 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Sochi upheld the refusal as lawful:\n“...for the time being the conviction of 31 August 2011 is not yet spent, Mr Benyash is a convicted offender, and, accordingly, the refusal [of travel documents] does not violate his rights”. 18.  On 29 November 2012 the Krasnodar Regional Court rejected the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the District Court. 19.  On 11 April 2013 the Regional Court refused him leave to appeal to the cassation instance.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": true}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Mosfellsbær, the second applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Reykjavík and the third applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Seltjarnarnes. At the material time the first and second applicants were on the editorial board of the newspaper DV and the third applicant was a journalist for DV. 7.  On 30 September 2010, an Icelandic private limited company, (hereafter “the company”), was declared bankrupt. The company was established in 1960 and is one of the leading industrial companies in Iceland in the production of plastic packaging material. 8.  In October 2010 the liquidator of the bankruptcy estate hired an accountancy firm to investigate the company’s accounts. 9.  On 31 January 2011 the accountancy firm finalised a report indicating a suspicion of criminal misconduct by the board members. The chairman of the board, A, who was also one of the owners of the company, was an assistant professor at the University of Iceland at the time. 10.  The liquidator reported the suspected criminal misconduct to the police. A holding company and a bank also reported the company and A to the police. 11.  On 14 March 2011 DV published a picture of A on its front page under the headline “Black report on [the company]: Police investigate Assistant Professor”. An article on the matter was printed on pages 2 and 3. The third applicant was identified as its author. The headline of the article read “Assistant professor entangled in police investigation” and another picture of A appeared beside the headline. The article was based on information from the accountancy firm’s report. It is not known how the applicants knew about the report and its contents. The article discussed inter alia A, who was a board member and one of three owners of the company and the former supervisor of the MBA programme and assistant professor of business studies at the University of Iceland. The article described the company´s situation with reference to the accountancy firm´s report. It stated that the report had concluded the company had paid for the A´s expenditures, which were unlikely to be connected to the company´s operations. The report had also indicated that A and one of his co-owners had known about the grave financial situation of the company long before it had been declared bankrupt in 2010. The report had concluded that the company´s assets had been partly expended when it was clear that it was insolvent. These assets had in fact been transferred to another company, owned by the A´s co-owner.When the company was declared bankrupt on 30 September 2010 the company owed approximately 1,100,000,000 ISK (approx. 7,150,000 euros at the time) to a large bank in Iceland. The amount had increased significantly after the financial crisis in 2008. 12.  On 16 March 2011 A’s lawyer received an email from a police prosecutor confirming that the liquidator’s complaint had been received and was being “examined” and that two other complaints received by the police were also under consideration. He stated that no formal decision had been taken to instigate a police investigation. A’s lawyer sent this email to the first applicant and requested correction of the impugned statements. The first applicant refused his request. 13.  On 28 April 2011 A lodged defamation proceedings against the applicants and DV before the Reykjavík District Court and requested that the statements published by DV, “Police investigate Assistant Professor” and “Assistant Professor entangled in police investigation”, be declared null and void and that the applicants be ordered to pay compensation, including expenses for publishing the final judgment. 14.  The applicants and A were heard and the email of 16 March 2011 from the police prosecutor to A’s lawyer was submitted as evidence. 15.  By a judgment of 5 March 2012 the District Court found that both disputed statements had been defamatory and ordered the applicants to pay 200,000 Icelandic Krónur (ISK) (approximately 1,600 euros (EUR)) to A in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, plus interest, ISK 200,000 for the cost of publishing the judgment and ISK 500,000 (approximately 4,200 EUR) for A’s legal costs before the District Court. The statements were declared null and void. 16.  The judgment contained the following reasons:\n“... According to Article 73(1) of the Constitution everybody has the right to freedom of opinion and belief. However, Article 73(3) of the Constitution allows certain restrictions on the freedom of expression. It states that freedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions. In Chapter XXV of the Penal Code, freedom of expression is restricted in the interest of the rights and reputation of others. When deciding the limits of freedom of expression, the possibility of a public debate has to be guaranteed.\n[The applicants] claim that the statements are true and refer to the principle that they cannot be held liable for true statements. It is undisputed that, before the newspaper coverage, [the police] had been informed by the liquidator of a reasonable suspicion of criminal acts by the company’s board members, of which A was one. It is also clear that the information given by the liquidator was based on [the accountancy firm’s] report of 31 January 2011. An email of 16 March 2011 from [the prosecutor] to [A’s] lawyer stated that the liquidator’s report was being “examined” [“til skoðunar”]. Furthermore, it was stated that two other entities [had reported, inter alia, A] to the police and that those reports “were also being considered” [litið til framangreindra kæra]. However, it is stated that no formal decision has been taken about a police investigation nor possible criminal acts defined.\n[The applicants] base their defence on the fact that nothing in their statements, which [A] wants declared null and void, indicates that a formal decision had been taken to start [a police] investigation and that the wording of the statements should not be interpreted more widely than its general meaning indicates. Here it has to be taken into account that in general the media are required to base coverage on thorough research of the facts. Taking this into account, and having regard to [the absence of a formal decision by the police to investigate] [the company] and its board members, including [A], the court cannot accept [the applicant’s] arguments. No police investigation had been instigated against [A], thus the statements “Police investigate Assistant Professor” and “Assistant professor entangled in police investigation” were factually wrong, but both statements did in fact have the same meaning. It was not unreasonably difficult to verify whether such an investigation had in fact been opened. The wording of the statements was of such a nature as to make the reader believe that [A] was a suspect in a police investigation because of his criminal and punishable acts. This damaged [A’s] reputation. Therefore, the court has to agree with [A] that [the applicants] violated Article 235 of the Penal Code No 19/1940 (Almenn Hegningarlög) by publishing the aforementioned statements. In the light of the aforesaid, and with reference to Article 241(1) of the Penal Code, [A’s] request to declare the statements null and void is granted. However, there is no reason to impose punishment; therefore [A’s] request that [the applicants] be punished is rejected ...” 17.  On 8 May 2012 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court against the District Court’s judgment. 18.  By judgment of 6 December 2012 the Supreme Court confirmed the District Court’s judgment and ordered the applicants to pay, in addition, ISK 500,000 for A’s legal costs before the Supreme Court. 19.  As to the reasoning, the Supreme Court stated:\n“... The aforementioned email from [the police prosecutor] can only be understood as meaning that no investigation had been instigated on account of the three reports [to the police] which are referred to in the email. There is nothing to indicate that such an investigation was initiated later and it will not be held against [A] that he did not provide confirmation of that during the proceedings as requested by [the applicants].\nWith these comments, [and] with reference to the District Court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court confirms the District Court’s decision on declaring the statements null and void and confirms the publication of the judgment in the next issue of DV and the next online edition of DV after the delivery of this judgment. The annulled statements were wrong and defamatory for [A]. When examining the coverage and the publication of pictures of [the company] and its representatives in the printed issue of DV and in the online edition of [DV], [A’s] reputation was attacked, at a time when there were no grounds for it ...” 20.  By letter of 31 May 2013 the Special Prosecutor notified another company representative that “the investigation” into the complaints against him and A had been closed and the case had been dismissed.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Baghramyan village. 6.  On 26 June 2001 Suren Muradyan was drafted into the Armenian army and assigned to military unit no. 59703 of the Nagorno Karabakh Armed Forces (hereafter, the military unit) situated in the unrecognised Nagorno Karabakh Republic (hereafter, Nagorno Karabakh). During his service he also participated in the activities of the music squad as a trumpet player. 7.  From 24 or 25 July 2002 Suren Muradyan started to feel unwell. His temperature occasionally rose to 40oC, he shivered and had headaches, and suffered from nausea and loss of appetite. 8.  It appears that on the next day Suren Muradyan, who remained in the barracks throughout this period, was visited by the head of the military unit’s medical service, A.H. (hereafter, military unit doctor A.H.). The outcome of this visit is unclear. It further appears that on 27 July 2002, when Suren Muradyan’s condition worsened, his fellow servicemen once again called A.H., who at the time was at the aid post. He refused to visit, telling them that Suren Muradyan should come to the aid post himself. 9.  It further appears that later Suren Muradyan was visited by the head of the military unit’s aid post, S.G. (hereafter, military unit doctor S.G.), who apparently administered anti-fever pills and gave some injections. Suren Muradyan was apparently diagnosed as having “acute respiratory illness”. 10.  Throughout this entire period only two entries were made in Suren Muradyan’s personal medical file kept at the military unit’s aid post, on 29 July and 1 August 2002, according to which Suren Muradyan was suffering from general asthenia, loss of appetite, body aches, muscle pain and high fever. Anti-fever medicine was prescribed, such as analgin and paracetamol. 11.  On 3 August 2002 at 6.30 p.m. Suren Muradyan, whose condition had deteriorated, was taken to the military hospital of Mekhakavan (Nagorno Karabakh) by military unit doctor S.G. At the time of admission Suren Muradyan complained of general asthenia, nausea, fever and shivering. As a preliminary diagnosis “malaria” was indicated. The acting head of the infection unit of the hospital, I.M. (hereafter, hospital doctor I.M.), was assigned as his doctor in charge. 12.  At 6.45 p.m. Suren Muradyan underwent a preliminary examination. His temperature was 38.5oC and his general condition was considered to be of medium gravity. He believed himself to have been ill for the past week with periodic rises of temperature and shivering fits. His lungs were checked and abdomen palpated. Upon palpation, the left side of his abdomen caused him pain, while the right side caused only light pain. In conclusion it was noted that Suren Muradyan was to undergo close observation of his temperature and a parasitological examination, taking into account that he was serving in a malaria hotbed and had preliminary clinical signs of malaria. Anti-fever medicine and vitamins were prescribed and he was put on a drip. 13.  On 4 August 2002 at 11 a.m. Suren Muradyan’s general condition was considered relatively satisfactory and his temperature was 37.2oC. He had no shivering fits. 14.  At 3.30 p.m. Suren Muradyan started shivering and his temperature rose to 39.8oC. A general blood test and a parasitological examination were assigned, and a blood sample was taken for examination. 15.  At 7.40 p.m. Suren Muradyan’s condition worsened. He was conscious and agitated. He vomited, complained of nausea and abdominal pains and was pale and breathing heavily. According to the medical orderly, Suren Muradyan fell down after returning from the lavatory. While being examined, he lost consciousness and his pulse disappeared. A resuscitation specialist was urgently called. 16.  At 7.45 p.m. the resuscitation specialist registered Suren Muradyan’s clinical death and started resuscitation therapy. 17.  At 9.15 p.m., after the resuscitation therapy proved ineffective, Suren Muradyan’s biological death was registered. According to the results of the parasitological test, which became known on the same day, no trace of malaria was discovered in Suren Muradyan’s blood sample. 18.  On 5 August 2002 investigator G. of the Hadrut Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office of Nagorno Karabakh ordered a post-mortem examination of Suren Muradyan’s body to be conducted by a forensic medical expert in Yerevan, Armenia. The expert was asked to determine the time and cause of death, the existence of any external injuries, their nature, method of infliction and possible link with the death. The above‑mentioned blood sample was also presented to the expert for a malaria test. 19.  On the same day the investigator conducted an external examination of Suren Muradyan’s body. He then took a statement from a senior nurse from the hospital reception who submitted that Suren Muradyan, upon his arrival at the hospital, was feeling so unwell that he could hardly speak and asked to lie down. After he told hospital doctor I.M. that he had been feeling this way for the last eight days, I.M. angrily asked military unit doctor S.G., who had accompanied Suren Muradyan to the hospital, why he had been brought to the hospital so belatedly. The nurse further confirmed that Suren Muradyan had been brought to the hospital with suspected malaria. 20.  On 6 August 2002 forensic medical expert M.B. started the post‑mortem examination, including an autopsy, of Suren Muradyan’s body and on the same day sent a telegram to investigator G., saying that Suren Muradyan had died as a result of acute internal bleeding caused by a ruptured spleen resulting from an internal blunt injury to the left side of the abdomen involving old and new bruises. 21.  On the same day the investigator decided, taking into account that Suren Muradyan had been subjected to ill-treatment, to institute criminal proceedings no. 91204602 under Article 105 § 2 of the old Criminal Code of Armenia (intentional infliction of grave bodily harm resulting in the victim’s death). 22.  On 7 August 2002 at least six servicemen of the military unit were questioned as witnesses. According to their statements, on 21 July 2002 a group of servicemen of the military unit, including Suren Muradyan, had been taken to the town of Martuni (Nagorno Karabakh) in order to participate in a comedy contest organised between teams from different military units. The group was accompanied by lieutenant V.G. and captain D.H. (hereafter, officers V.G. and D.H.). After the contest, the servicemen had been taken to a post office, outside which an argument had erupted between officers V.G. and D.H. on one side and Suren Muradyan on the other. Officer V.G. claimed that a watch that Suren Muradyan was wearing belonged to him and had been lost some days before, during a table tennis match. Officers V.G. and D.H. had both started swearing at Suren Muradyan. Officer V.G. had then grabbed Suren Muradyan’s hand and removed the watch. Suren Muradyan had explained that he had borrowed the watch from a fellow serviceman, whose name he did not know, to wear at the comedy contest. Officers V.G. and D.H. did not believe him and gave him a deadline to reveal the identity of that person. They further claimed that a second watch had been lost and ordered Suren Muradyan to find and bring it within the same deadline. Officer D.H. had threatened that, if he failed to do so, he would get into trouble. After the incident the group had walked to the bus to return to the military unit. Suren Muradyan and officers V.G. and D.H. had walked apart, calmly discussing something.\nIn reply to the investigator’s question, the servicemen stated that neither V.G. nor D.H. had hit Suren Muradyan during the argument. They further stated that they had heard later from Suren Muradyan that during the following days he had been taken on several occasions by officers V.G. and D.H. to the office of lieutenant colonel K.Z., the acting commander of the military unit, who was also its deputy commander (hereafter, officer K.Z.). There he had been given a deadline to comply with their demands. Officer K.Z. had threatened that, if he failed to do so, he would get into trouble and would be punished. From 24-25 July 2002 Suren Muradyan had started to feel unwell and stayed in bed. A couple of times he had been visited by military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. On 2 August a group of servicemen of the military unit had travelled to the town of Stepanakert (Nagorno Karabakh) to participate in another round of the contest. Suren Muradyan had gone along but could not participate as he felt very unwell. The group had returned to the military unit from Stepanakert late at night and on the following day Suren Muradyan had been taken to hospital.\nIn reply to the investigator’s question, the servicemen stated that they were unaware if Suren Muradyan had been beaten or had been involved in a fight. 23.  On the same date two other servicemen of the military unit, K.E. and G.M., were questioned. Serviceman K.E. stated that he had been present during the table tennis match in question, while serviceman G.M. stated that he was the person who had lent the watch to Suren Muradyan. On 23 or 24 July 2002 (according to serviceman G.M.) or 25 July 2002 (according to serviceman K.E.) all three of them had been taken several times by officers V.G. and D.H. to officer K.Z.’s office in the headquarters, where they were asked about the watches. There they had been given a deadline until 6 p.m. to find and bring the second watch. When they had returned at 6 p.m., Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. had been ordered to enter first, while serviceman G.M. had entered after they went out. According to serviceman G.M., they had been given two more days, while according to serviceman K.E., they had been given until Saturday (27 July) morning to find the second watch. Serviceman K.E. further stated that on 27 July he had been temporarily transferred to a different location for works and was no longer involved in this story. He added that when he and Suren Muradyan had been together in the office nobody had touched them. 24.  On 9 and 10 August 2002 respectively the investigator took statements from officers D.H. and V.G. in their capacity of witnesses, who recounted the events that had taken place on 21 July 2002 in Martuni, including the argument between them and Suren Muradyan near the post office. Officer V.G. stated, inter alia, that Suren Muradyan had voluntarily removed and handed the watch to him. Officer D.H. stated, inter alia, that he had met Suren Muradyan on the next morning in front of the headquarters and had given him a three-day deadline to find and bring the second watch. Both officers further stated that following the expiry of the three-day deadline they had taken Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. to the office of officer K.Z. who had had a talk with them in private.\nNo questions were posed by the investigator to officer D.H., while officer V.G. was asked several questions about the argument of 21 July 2002. Officer V.G. admitted swearing at Suren Muradyan, as well as briefly shaking and pulling on his hand, but denied hitting him and could not remember whether he or officer D.H. had slapped him. 25.  On 11 August 2002 the investigator questioned officer D.H. as a witness, posing a number of questions about the argument of 21 July 2002. The investigator further asked for information on the follow-up meetings, to which officer D.H. confirmed his earlier statement, adding that he had not heard any noise coming from officer K.Z.’s office while waiting outside. 26.  On the same date serviceman K.E. was questioned again. He added to his previous statement that officer K.Z. had sworn at them but had not hit them, when he and Suren Muradyan were in his office. 27.  On 12 August 2002 officers D.H. and V.G. were questioned again and asked further questions about the argument of 21 July 2002. Officer D.H. was further asked, inter alia, whether he had had personal motives in summoning Suren Muradyan so often to the headquarters, as well as why no entry had been made in Suren Muradyan’s medical file until 3 August 2002, if he had asked for medical help already on 25 July 2002. 28.  On 17 August 2002 the investigator took a statement from officer K.Z. in his capacity as a witness. Officer K.Z. confirmed that he had summoned Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. to his office for a talk in connection with the lost watches. During their talk Suren Muradyan had been allowed to go and fetch serviceman G.M. He had then had a talk with all three of them, releasing G.M. first and ordering the other two to find and bring the second watch. Officer K.Z. further stated that on 29 July 2002 he had again summoned Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. but the latter had come alone since Suren Muradyan was unwell. He had then ordered serviceman K.E. to fetch Suren Muradyan. When the latter came, he had asked what was wrong with him and why he was staying in the barracks, to which Suren Muradyan had replied that he had a fever and was taking treatment prescribed by the doctor. He had then given them one week to find the second watch.\nThe investigator posed two questions to officer K.Z.: (a) whether he had beaten, slapped or sworn at Suren Muradyan or serviceman K.E. when they were in his office, which officer K.Z. denied, and (b) whether he was alone when he met with them, to which officer K.Z. replied that he had met them only in his office. 29.  On 2 September 2002 the applicant was granted victim status. 30.  On 11 September 2002 the post-mortem examination was completed and its results were sent to the Hadrut Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office. The relevant parts of forensic medical expert M.B.’s conclusions read as follows:\n“External examination of the corpse. ... Injuries: There is an abrasion measuring 0.8 x 0.6 cm on the right side of the forehead, which is located lower than the surrounding skin and has a dark red surface. ...\nInternal examination of the corpse. ... In the thickness of the muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen, in the projection of the spleen, bruising measuring 10 x 9 cm was discovered...\nThe blood sample taken from Suren Muradyan at the hospital was sent to the Ministry of Defence of Armenia and the National Security Service of Armenia for a bacteriological examination...\nThe following reply, dated 21 August 2002, was received from military unit no. 74252 of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia on 28 August 2002 ... ‘three-day-old malaria agents ... were found as a result of a bacteriological examination under a microscope slide of Suren Muradyan’s blood smear taken at the hospital’. According to the results of the forensic histological examination ... dated 11 September 2002 ... ‘Forensic histological conclusion: ... old and new bruises to soft tissues in the area of the left side of the abdomen; internal bruising of the spleen’.\nForensic medical diagnosis. A closed blunt injury to the abdomen, old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen, enlarged spleen..., spleen rupture and bruising, ... Acute internal bleeding. Malaria. An abrasion on the right side of the forehead...\nConclusions.\n... 2.  Suren Muradyan’s death was caused by acute internal bleeding resulting from the rupture of the deformed and enlarged spleen, accompanied by a closed and diffuse abdominal injury and by old and new bruises in the area of the left side of the abdomen. 3.  The following injuries were identified as a result of the forensic medical examination of Suren Muradyan’s corpse: old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen, spleen rupture and bruising ... [and] an abrasion on the right side of the forehead. ... Of the above-mentioned bodily injuries the old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen [and] spleen rupture and bruising ... were inflicted by blunt objects or tools having a limited surface; judging by the nature of the old and new bruises to soft tissues and muscles in the area of the left side of the abdomen it can be said that the old bruises are more than about 8-10 days old, while the new bruising is about 1-2 days old. The closed and diffuse abdominal injury accompanied by spleen rupture and acute internal bleeding is considered a grave bodily injury posing threat to life and has a direct causal link with [Suren Muradyan’s] death. The abrasion on the right side of the forehead was inflicted while alive by a blunt object having a limited surface and is considered a minor bodily injury... 4.  As indicated above, the death occurred more than 8-10 days after the infliction of the main injuries (the above-mentioned old bruising in the area of the left side of the abdomen, in all probability accompanied by an initial sub-capsular rupture of the spleen and absorbent haemorrhage). As regards the abrasion on the right side of the forehead and the new bruise, these were inflicted 1-2 days before death.\n... 12.  It follows from the reply received from Laboratory no. 3 of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia that three-day-old malaria agents were discovered in the blood sample [taken from Suren Muradyan at the military hospital]. 31.  On 12 September 2002 officers V.G. and D.H. were arrested under Article 251 of the old Criminal Code of Armenia (insult of a subordinate by a violent act by a superior). 32.  On 13 September 2002 they were charged under the same Article and were detained. This decision stated that on 21 July 2002 at around 6.30 p.m. near Martuni post office, officers V.G. and D.H., being public officials and suspecting Suren Muradyan of theft, instead of applying disciplinary sanctions, attacked him in front of about fifteen servicemen by swearing at him, thereby humiliating him. It further stated that officer V.G., having pulled at Suren Muradyan, caused him physical pain. 33.  On 14 September 2002 officers V.G. and D.H. were questioned as suspects and both confirmed that on 21 July 2002 they had pulled and sworn at Suren Muradyan near the Martuni post office. They were asked questions about the swear words used. 34.  On 25 September 2002 investigator G. decided to assign a panel forensic medical examination in order to determine the scope of responsibility of the military unit and the hospital doctors for Suren Muradyan’s death, including the timeliness and accuracy of the diagnosis and the treatment provided, the timeliness of his transfer to hospital and whether they could have detected the injuries revealed by the post-mortem examination. This decision stated, inter alia, that on 21 July 2002 Suren Muradyan had had an argument with two officers of the military unit, V.G. and D.H., after which, starting from 24 July, his health had deteriorated. 35.  On 6 October 2002 a serviceman of the military unit’s music squad was questioned. He stated that Suren Muradyan had had no arguments or scuffles with anybody. On the way back from Martuni, Suren Muradyan had told him that he had got into trouble because of this watch and that “now they would frame him”. However, Suren Muradyan had never told him or others that he had been ill-treated, even in reply to a direct question following his visit to officer K.Z.’s office. The serviceman confirmed that Suren Muradyan had started to feel unwell from 24 July 2002. He further stated that he and others had wiped sweat from Suren Muradyan’s forehead, belly, back and legs during his illness but had not noticed any traces of injuries. On the second day of his illness, military unit doctor A.H. had come to visit him and concluded that he had caught cold. Several days later military unit doctor S.G. had come, said that Suren Muradyan had flu and given him some pills. On the last days Suren Muradyan had been very ill: he had lost a lot of weight and staggered when walking, so they had to accompany him to the toilets. 36.  On 6 November 2002 the experts conducting the panel forensic medical examination produced their opinion. According to its conclusions, it had been possible for the doctors of the military unit not to discover the injuries which led to Suren Muradyan’s death since there were no visible traces of injuries on the surface of the skin. The enlarged spleen might have been caused by malaria and the injury sustained by Suren Muradyan might have brought about the sub-capsular bleeding which later led to a ruptured spleen and acute internal bleeding. Referring to the fact that no malaria agents were discovered in Suren Muradyan’s blood sample by the parasitological examination of 4 August 2002, the experts attributed this to the fact that agents could be detected at the stage of the disease when the sick person experiences shivering and fever accompanied by high temperature. The opinion lastly stated that, given that no malaria agents had been discovered, not specific but symptomatic treatment had to be prescribed, and in fact had been provided in full. 37.  On 7 November 2002 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and stated that both Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. had denied having been beaten or sworn at during their first visit to officer K.Z.’s office. When he and Suren Muradyan visited the office the next morning, officer K.Z. had said to him “Why did you enter? You go out, you have received your punishment”. In reply to the investigator’s question, serviceman G.M. stated that he had not noticed any bruises or signs of pain on Suren Muradyan when he came out of the office five minutes later. He could not say what officer K.Z. meant by his statement and whether it meant that now it was Suren Muradyan’s turn to be punished. 38.  On 2 December 2002 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, arguing in detail that his son had died as a result of a beating by officers V.G., D.H., K.Z. and another officer, B., as well as the failure of the doctors of the military unit, S.G. and A.H., to provide medical assistance. He claimed that serviceman G.M. had admitted during questioning, in his presence, that he had been badly ill-treated by officer K.Z. in his office. Suren Muradyan had been next to enter that office, alone, and the following morning he had been so unwell in bed that he was not able to return to officer K.Z.’s office. The applicant alleged that the beating which resulted in Suren Muradyan’s ruptured spleen and subsequent death had taken place at that moment. He further claimed that the doctors had intentionally refused to provide medical assistance and to transfer Suren Muradyan to hospital in order to cover up the abuse. The applicant requested the Military Prosecutor to identify those responsible for his son’s death. 39.  On 10 December 2002 investigator G. decided to order an additional forensic medical examination. In addition to the questions asked earlier, the experts were requested to determine whether the military unit and the hospital doctors could have detected the spleen enlargement and what they were supposed to do if it had been detected, as well as whether Suren Muradyan’s spleen could have ruptured earlier and been followed by slow bleeding. 40.  On 11 December 2002 the forensic medical experts produced an additional opinion. According to its conclusions, since on 29 July 2002 Suren Muradyan had not complained of abdominal pains, the doctors of the military unit had no reason to suspect malaria and diagnosed his condition as an acute respiratory illness. The opinion further stated that usually a doctor was obliged to deliver a diagnosis after having carefully examined the patient. Suren Muradyan’s medical file contained his complaints but no indication of results of any such examination. If on 29 July 2002 Suren Muradyan’s spleen had already been enlarged, it would have been possible to detect this through palpation and to transfer him to hospital. The same was possible at the hospital. As regards the sub-capsular rupture of the spleen, it was almost impossible to detect. Had the spleen rupture been detected and the spleen removed by surgery, Suren Muradyan’s life could have been saved. Lastly, the injuries discovered by the post-mortem examination were not detected by the doctors since there were no visible traces of injuries on the outer part of the skin. 41.  On 15 December 2002 a serviceman, K.B., who had been undergoing treatment at the hospital when Suren Muradyan was admitted, was questioned. He stated that he had become acquainted with Suren Muradyan upon the latter’s admission to hospital. Suren Muradyan had looked very ill and told him that he had spent the last eight days in the barracks. K.B. further stated that he had not noticed any bruises on Suren Muradyan’s forehead or any fights or arguments during his two-day stay in hospital. 42.  On 4 February 2003 the criminal case against officers V.G. and D.H. concerning the charges of insult was disjoined from the main criminal proceedings concerning Suren Muradyan’s death since there was no causal link between the two. A new number was assigned to the disjoined case (no. 91200703). 43.  During the investigation a number of other unrelated offences committed by officers V.G. and D.H. were revealed. As regards, in particular, officer D.H., the investigation revealed that in April 2002 he had kicked a soldier for sleeping on watch duty and broken the soldier’s arm. Officer D.H. was charged with inflicting bodily injuries. 44.  On 28 February 2003 the bill of indictment concerning the disjoined case was submitted to the Syunik Regional Court. 45.  By a letter of 19 March 2003 the Minister of Defence of Nagorno Karabakh filed a motion with the Syunik Regional Court requesting that a non-custodial sentence be imposed on officer D.H. and that he stay under the control of the military unit command, taking into account his long and diligent service in the armed forces, the report/request of the command of formation no. 42009 and the fact that he regretted his actions and that his actions posed no danger to society. 46.  On 12 April 2003 forensic medical expert M.B. was questioned. He confirmed that Suren Muradyan had already been ill with malaria when he sustained the old bruises in the area of the left side of the abdomen. He stated that the fact that Suren Muradyan was ill might have accelerated the transformation of the sub-capsular rupture into a full rupture and internal bleeding. However, even a healthy spleen could suffer a sub-capsular rupture from a blow, later leading to a full rupture. The transformation of the sub-capsular rupture into full rupture could happen with or without external influence. The expert lastly confirmed that the new bruises found on Suren Muradyan’s body and the abrasion to the left side of his forehead could have been caused by his falling on the hospital floor not long before his death. 47.  On 18 April 2003 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and confirmed that no sound of blows or other loud noise could be heard when he had waited for Suren Muradyan outside the office. Later he had heard rumours that Suren Muradyan had been beaten by officers V.G. and D.H. Serviceman G.M. further explained that he had inquired with Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. whether they had been beaten, because officer K.Z. had hit him a few times while in the office. He lastly requested that no criminal proceedings be brought against officer K.Z. because he had hit him just two or three times on his buttocks. 48.  On 24 April 2003 the applicant contacted the investigating authority, willing to provide additional information. On the next day he was questioned and stated that in October-November 2002 he had heard from a former colleague of his, who in mid-August 2002 had visited a relative serving in the same military unit, that he had heard one of the officers saying that a serviceman matching Suren Muradyan’s description had recently died as a result of a beating by officer V.G. 49.  On 26 April 2003 both the former colleague and his relative serving in the military unit were questioned and confirmed this information but could not remember the name of the officer in question. On 4 October 2003 the former colleague’s relative was once again questioned and stated that the officer’s name was V.M. 50.  On 27 April 2003 several more persons were questioned, including military unit doctors S.G. and A.H., hospital doctor I.M., and an orderly of the hospital, H.G. 51.  Military unit doctor S.G. stated, inter alia, that a few months before, during a conversation with serviceman G.M., he had asked the latter to confirm the rumours that Suren Muradyan had been beaten by officers V.G. and D.H., to which serviceman G.M. replied that he was not aware of that. S.G. was further asked questions regarding the medical assistance provided to Suren Muradyan at the military unit. 52.  Military unit doctor A.H. claimed that he had also examined Suren Muradyan once, including palpating his abdomen, but no abnormalities were found or bruises and injuries revealed. He was further asked to explain as to why he had refused to visit Suren Muradyan after being called by the latter’s fellow serviceman. 53.  Hospital doctor I.M. stated that it was he who had initially diagnosed Suren Muradyan as having malaria, because of the symptoms and the fact that he was serving in a malaria hotbed. Suren Muradyan had not told him, except on the day he died, that he had been beaten or that he had fallen, and since there were no symptoms he did not put such questions to the patient. However, on the last day, when he rushed to provide medical aid to Suren Muradyan, the latter, when asked what had happened, told him “I have pain in my belly, I feel very ill, I fell not long ago in the ward”. 54.  Hospital orderly H.G. stated that on 4 August 2002 at 7 p.m. Suren Muradyan had told him that shortly before he had felt giddy and fallen down. About half an hour later he had called a doctor because Suren Muradyan’s condition had worsened and then, after Suren Muradyan lost consciousness, he summoned the resuscitation specialist, who came and started resuscitation procedures. 55.  On an unspecified date the court proceedings into the disjoined criminal case against officers V.G. and D.H. on account of insult commenced at the Syunik Regional Court of Armenia, sitting in Stepanakert (Nagorno Karabakh). It appears that officer V.G. pleaded guilty and admitted that he had sworn at and pushed Suren Muradyan and pulled the watch off his wrist, but said that he had not hit him. 56.  On 5 May 2003 the Syunik Regional Court found officers V.G. and D.H. guilty as charged and sentenced them to one year’s imprisonment. 57.  On 2 June 2003 officer V.G. was released on parole. 58.  On 10 July 2003 the investigation into Suren Muradyan’s death (criminal case no. 91204602) was taken over by the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia and assigned to investigator H. 59.  On 12 September 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia, claiming that the investigation was flawed and had failed to reveal those responsible for his son’s death, despite the fact that there was sufficient evidence that he had died as a result of ill‑treatment by the three officers, V.G., D.H. and K.Z. 60.  On 1 October 2003 military unit doctor A.H. was questioned again and confirmed his earlier statement (see paragraph 52 above). 61.  On 6 October 2003 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and added to his previous statements that on the day of their first visit to officer K.Z.’s office, K.Z. had hit him two or three times with a wooden pole on his buttocks when he was alone in his office. 62.  On 11 November 2003 a confrontation was held between serviceman K.E. and another serviceman, during which K.E. stated that on the day of their first visit to officer K.Z.’s office they had also gone to officer D.H.’s office where the latter had started screaming at them because of the stolen watch. Officer K.Z. also threatened to undress them in front of the entire battalion if they failed to find the second watch. 63.  On 5 December 2003 serviceman G.M. was questioned again and described in greater detail how officer K.Z. had taken a wooden pole from behind a safe, told him to lean against the wall and hit him three times on his buttocks. 64.  On 14 April 2004 officer V.G. was questioned and stated that he had not provided the full story in his previous testimony and that during the argument between him and Suren Muradyan on 21 July 2002 he had grabbed the latter’s left wrist with his right hand and started shaking it briskly, during which Suren Muradyan’s fist had touched the left side of his abdomen in the area of the spleen. Being very angry, he had not noticed whether Suren Muradyan’s facial expression had changed as a result of the blow, but he had not displayed any unusual movements or convulsions. Officer V.G. further denied hitting Suren Muradyan. 65.  On 19 April 2004 the investigator questioned two of the servicemen, A.P. and D.M., who had previously testified on 7 August 2002 and asked them to describe how officer V.G. had pulled on Suren Muradyan’s hand on 21 July 2002. According to A.P., officer V.G. had grabbed Suren Muradyan’s left forearm, while according to D.M. – the left wrist, and had pulled forcefully. Suren Muradyan had tried unsuccessfully to free his arm. When he was pulling back his arm, officer V.G.’s hand was also being pulled back with it. Officer V.G. had then removed the watch with his other hand, while still holding on to Suren Muradyan with his right hand. 66.  On 2 August 2004 the applicant was questioned and stated that some days earlier he had bumped into a number of servicemen who had told him about the circumstances of Suren Muradyan’s murder and the identities of those who had ill-treated him. According to them, Suren Muradyan had told them that he had been summoned to the headquarters where he had been badly beaten by officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z., as a result of which he had lost consciousness and been taken back to the barracks by couriers. The applicant requested that these allegations be investigated. 67.  On 9 August 2004 the Military Prosecutor of Armenia addressed a letter to the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh, informing him of the applicant’s allegations and requesting that those circumstances be clarified. 68.  On 17 and 19 August 2004 the investigator questioned officers D.H. and V.G. respectively. Both denied the above allegations. Officer V.G. added that the only time that there had been any use of force in respect of Suren Muradyan was during the incident of 21 July 2002, when he had shaken Suren Muradyan’s hand briskly, during which his hand had touched Suren Muradyan’s abdomen. In reply to the investigator’s question as to why he had earlier stated that it had been Suren Muradyan’s hand that touched the abdomen while now he was stating that it had been his hand, officer V.G. stated that, since he was holding Suren Muradyan’s hand in his hand, both his and Suren Muradyan’s hands had touched the abdomen. 69.  On 2 September 2004 the investigator decided to assign an additional panel forensic medical examination and pose further questions to the medical experts, taking into account that it had been established that during the argument of 21 July 2002 officer V.G. had accidentally hit Suren Muradyan in the left side of the abdomen. It had been further established that on 4 August 2002 Suren Muradyan had fallen at the hospital, with his left hand under his belly. 70.  On 16 September 2004 forensic medical expert M.B. was questioned again. He stated that the sub-capsular rupture and the bruising to the soft tissues had been caused by direct contact with a blunt object. If, during that blow, officer V.G. had held in his hand the deceased’s forearm or part of his wrist, those parts must have touched the front wall of the deceased’s abdomen during the blow, while the injuries, namely the rupture and the bruising to the soft tissues of the abdominal area, were caused by direct contact with officer V.G.’s fist; contact between the deceased’s wrist or forearm with that area could not have caused the sub-capsular rupture. If the deceased’s wrist or forearm or fist touched the abdomen, then officer V.G.’s fist must have undoubtedly touched the front wall of the abdomen. 71.  On 12 October 2004 the panel of experts produced their opinion in reply to the questions posed by the investigator’s decision of 2 September 2004. As regards the responsibility of the military unit and the hospital doctors, the experts found that they had failed to reach a timely and accurate diagnosis and to provide adequate medical treatment. The opinion further included, inter alia, the following questions and answers:\n(1)  Question: what impact could the blow sustained by Suren Muradyan during the argument of 21 July 2002 have had on his health? Could it have caused spleen rupture, internal bruising and subsequently death? Answer: as a result of the blow sustained during the argument of 21 July 2002, Suren Muradyan sustained bruises to muscles and a sub-capsular rupture of his spleen which later led to his death.\n(2)  Question: was he ill with malaria on 21 July 2002 and why were no malaria agents found in his blood sample at the military hospital, if three‑day-old malaria agents were found in the same sample following a later test? Answer: on 21 July 2002 Suren Muradyan was suffering from malaria.\n(3)  Question: what impact would the above-mentioned blow have had on his health if he had not been ill with malaria? Answer: depending on the strength, location and nature of the blow, it was possible not to sustain a sub-capsular rupture, but even a light blow could cause spleen rupture to an unhealthy and deformed spleen.\n(4)  Question: could he have sustained bruises to soft tissues in the area of the left side of his abdomen by falling at the hospital on 4 August 2002? Answer: the new bruising to soft tissues in the area of the left side of Suren Muradyan’s abdomen could have been caused by his fall at the hospital.\n(5)  Question: exactly when did his spleen rupture occur, and would his life have been unequivocally saved, if diagnosis had been made in a timely manner? Answer: the sub-capsular rupture of Suren Muradyan’s spleen occurred on 21 July 2002, while the second rupture occurred on 4 August 2002 at 7.10 p.m., as a result of which he most likely lost consciousness and fell down. Had the internal bleeding been diagnosed in a timely manner, it might have been possible to save Suren Muradyan’s life. 72.  On 21 October 2004 forensic medical expert K.H., who had contributed to the opinions of 6 November and 11 December 2002 and 12 October 2004, was questioned. Asked about the discrepancies between the findings in those opinions, expert K.H. stated that it must have been an automatic mistake and admitted that she had not read one of the opinions before signing it. She further stated that the reason why no trace of malaria had been discovered at the Mekhakavan hospital could have been due to lack of proper equipment. She lastly stated that an enlarged spleen in a person suffering from malaria would become hard and filled with blood, the capsule would be strained and become more sensitive. Even a light blow might cause a sub-capsular rupture. 73.  On 4 November 2004 hospital doctor I.M. was questioned and added to his previous statement that the pain upon palpation of Suren Muradyan’s abdomen made him suspect that it was connected with malaria. In reply to the investigator’s question as to why he had not administered anti-malaria treatment if he had been convinced of that diagnosis, I.M. replied that he had had to wait for the result of the parasitological test. Furthermore, often an initial negative result of such test did not mean that a patient had no malaria and this could be confirmed only after a third negative result. 74.  On 5 November 2004 the forensic medical expert who had presided over the panel which had produced the opinion of 12 October 2004 was questioned and confirmed the responsibility of both the military unit and the hospital doctors. 75.  On the same date the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh sent a letter, marked “secret”, to the Military Prosecutor of Armenia. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n“To your [letter] of 9 August 2004: ...\nThe following has been disclosed as a result of the activities aimed at revealing the circumstances, which are of interest, concerning the death on 4 August 2002 of private [Suren Muradyan], a compulsory military serviceman of military unit no. 59703.\nFor the purpose of clarifying the names of those servicemen who, after the well‑known beating of [Suren Muradyan], accompanied him to the barracks or were eyewitnesses, a list of staff of the military unit’s music squad, who have been demobilised and are Armenian nationals, was retrieved. At present only the deputy commander of the military unit, [officer K.Z.] (since the incident he has become uncommunicative and avoids discussing this matter even with his close relatives), continues to serve in the said military unit, while [officer D.H.] has possibly moved to [another] military unit, while [officer V.G.] has been demobilised.” 76.  On 15 November 2004 the Minister of Defence of Nagorno Karabakh filed a motion with the Military Prosecutor of Armenia, asking for officer K.Z. not to be prosecuted, taking into account his positive characteristics, his impeccable service in the armed forces and his active participation in the struggle for the existence of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as the report/request of the command of formation no. 42009. 77.  On 17 November 2004 charges were brought against hospital doctor I.M. under Article 375 § 2 of the new Criminal Code of Armenia (abuse of authority or public position, accidentally resulting in grave consequences) on the ground that he had failed to provide adequate treatment to Suren Muradyan. 78.  On 19 November 2004 the Military Prosecutor of Armenia lodged an application with the Court of Cassation seeking to re-open the proceedings concerning the criminal case against officer V.G. on the basis of a newly established circumstance. The Military Prosecutor submitted that all possible hypotheses had been verified and it had been established that, apart from the incident of 21 July 2002, Suren Muradyan had no other conflicts and had good relations with fellow servicemen and officers. It followed from the statements made by officer V.G. on 14 April and 19 August 2004, in which he admitted that during the incident of 21 July 2002 both his and Suren Muradyan’s hands had touched the left side of the victim’s body, that the sub-capsular rupture of Suren Muradyan’s spleen was a result of that incident. 79.  On the same date the applicant lodged a challenge with the General Prosecutor’s Office against the Military Prosecutor and other employees of the Military Prosecutor’s Office, arguing in detail that they had failed to conduct an adequate investigation into his son’s death. 80.  On 18 and 29 November 2004 charges were brought against military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. under Article 375 § 2 of the new Criminal Code of Armenia. 81.  On 24 November 2004 the Senior Assistant to the General Prosecutor decided to dismiss the applicant’s challenge of 19 November 2004. This decision stated, inter alia:\n“On 10 July 2003 the criminal case [concerning Suren Muradyan’s death] was transferred from the Hadrut Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office to the investigative division of the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia, where following an investigation it was disclosed that from 22 to 25 July 2002 [officers D.H. and V.G.] had on several occasions summoned [Suren Muradyan] to the headquarters of the military unit, demanded the lost watch and, having received no positive reply, had taken him to [the acting commander of the military unit, K.Z.], who in his office had hit [Suren Muradyan], as well as serviceman [K.E.], who had been called to the office in connection with the same matter, with a wooden pole.\nAccording to the materials of the case, a number of witnesses testified that during the argument of 21 July 2002 nobody had hit [Suren Muradyan]. In the course of additional questioning [officer V.G.] alleged that during the argument of 21 July 2002 he, infuriated by [Suren Muradyan’s] behaviour, had grabbed his hand and shaken it briskly, during which his hand had touched [Suren Muradyan] in the area of the spleen.”\nThe decision further referred to the expert opinion of 12 October 2004 and specifically its finding that Suren Muradyan had sustained bruises to muscles and a sub-capsular rupture of his spleen as a result of the blow sustained during the argument of 21 July 2002. The Senior Assistant to the General Prosecutor concluded that the arguments raised by the applicant had been examined in the course of a thorough and objective investigation by the Military Prosecutor’s Office and his challenge was therefore unfounded. 82.  On 10 December 2004 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the Syunik Regional Court of 5 May 2003 in its part concerning officer V.G. (see paragraph 56 above) and remitted the case for further investigation. 83.  On 14 December 2004 the investigator, finding that there were discrepancies between previous expert opinions, and also upon the request of one of the accused, namely military hospital doctor I.M., decided to assign a new panel forensic medical examination. 84.  On 24 December 2004 the criminal case against officer V.G. on charges of insult was re-joined to the main criminal proceedings concerning Suren Muradyan’s death. 85.  On 28 December 2004 new charges were brought against officer V.G. under Article 375 § 2 (abuse of authority or public position, accidentally resulting in grave consequences). It appears that he was detained on the same day. 86.  On 25 January 2005 the panel of experts produced their opinion in reply to the questions posed by the investigator’s decision of 14 December 2004, confirming their earlier findings regarding the responsibility of the military unit and the hospital doctors. The opinion also included, inter alia, the following question and answer:\nQuestion: what was the intensity of the blow sustained by Suren Muradyan, considering that it caused bruising of deep muscles? Answer: it was impossible to determine the exact intensity of the blow in the absence of relevant medical criteria, although it could be asserted that the blow had been of certain intensity. 87.  On 18 February 2005 the applicant lodged a complaint with the General Prosecutor’s Office similar to that of 12 September 2003. He also offered to bring witnesses who, according to him, could tell the truth, namely that on 24 July 2002 his son had been beaten by officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z., as a result of which he had suffered the fatal injury. The witnesses could further confirm that his son had lost consciousness and that military unit doctor A.H. had provided first aid and was therefore aware of the ill‑treatment. 88.  On 21 and 22 February and 5 and 10 March 2005 the investigator posed a number of questions, suggested by the applicant, to the four forensic medical experts who had produced the opinion of 25 January 2005. Three of the experts were unable to answer the applicant’s question about whether it was possible for his son, who on 21 July 2002 had allegedly been ill with malaria and had an enlarged spleen, not to complain, have fever or shiver and to feel well. The fourth expert stated that his son might have experienced dull pain.\nIn reply to the applicant’s question about whether it was possible for his son, whose spleen was enlarged and already ruptured, not to complain for three days of any pain, to feel healthy, participate in exercises and to play the trumpet, two of the experts were unable to provide an answer, the third expert stated that it was only a sub-capsular rupture and not a full one, and the fourth expert stated that it was possible for him not to complain if the sub-capsular rupture had been small, and possible to complain if had been big.\nIn reply to the applicant’s question about how his son would have reacted (screaming, losing consciousness, and so on) when he sustained the injury resulting in extensive bruising and a sub-capsular spleen rupture, three of the experts stated that different people felt and expressed pain differently. The fourth expert stated that it was equally possible for him to feel or not to feel pain. One of the experts also added that it was only a sub‑capsular rupture and the spleen was not a painful organ.\nIn reply to the applicant’s question about whether the bruising would have been visible from the outside, one expert referred to the findings in the opinion, two experts said “not necessarily”, while the fourth expert stated that it would have been visible, although external bruises healed faster than internal ones.\nIn reply to the applicant’s question concerning the responsibility of the military hospital doctor, all experts stated that the doctor had no reason to suspect internal bleeding because the patient had failed to inform him about the injury, there were no visible external traces and the clinical signs were similar to those of malaria. The hospital doctor had carried out all the examinations and tests which he was obliged to in such circumstances. The applicant alleged that each time the investigator had posed this question to an expert, he would first invite him to leave the room. The answers given to this question by all four experts in his absence were almost identical. 89.  On 25 March 2005 the investigator decided to discontinue criminal proceedings against military hospital doctor I.M. for lack of corpus delicti, finding that I.M. had carried out all possible examinations which he was able and obliged to perform in the circumstances. This conclusion was reached on the basis of the above statements of the four forensic medical experts. 90.  On 29 March 2005 the Military Prosecutor of Armenia decided not to prosecute officer K.Z. for beating serviceman G.M. This decision stated that officer K.Z., suspecting Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. of lying about the lost watch, had started swearing at them and demanding that they find it. Thereafter he had ordered them to leave his office and called serviceman G.M. When the latter had told the same story as the two other servicemen, officer K.Z. had become furious, started swearing and ordered serviceman G.M. to turn towards the wall, whereupon he had taken a 120 cm long pole and twice hit serviceman G.M. on his buttocks. Serviceman G.M. had started crying and after leaving the office he had asked Suren Muradyan and serviceman K.E. whether they had also been beaten, to which both of them replied “no”. The decision concluded that it was not necessary to prosecute officer K.Z. because he had no criminal record, was known to be of good character and regretted his actions. The motion of the Ministry of Defence of Nagorno Karabakh asking not to prosecute him was also taken into account. 91.  On an unspecified date the applicant submitted to the investigating authority a photograph of his son allegedly performing on stage at the comedy contest in Stepanakert on 2 August 2002, arguing that this proved that his son was not yet that ill on that day. The version that his son felt ill and could not perform had been made up on purpose in order to justify the deterioration of his condition and his transfer to hospital. In reality, upon arriving at the military unit from Stepanakert, he had once again been beaten by the officers on the night from 2 to 3 August 2002, which had caused the spleen rupture. This was also confirmed by the new bruising to soft tissues in the area of the left side of the abdomen revealed during the autopsy. 92.  On 15 April 2005 the bill of indictment was finalised and on 16 April 2005 approved by the Military Prosecutor of Armenia. Its relevant parts stated as follows:\n“A number of hypotheses have been checked in the course of the investigation, which have been investigated in an objective manner. Thus, because of a watch found on [Suren Muradyan’s] wrist [officers D.H. and V.G.] invited him to the headquarters on several occasions and presented him to the acting commander of the military unit, [K.Z.], who in an attempt to clarify the above-mentioned question, subjected to beating [serviceman G.M. He] did not, however, beat or hit [Suren Muradyan].\n...\nIt has been confirmed by the investigation that on 21 July 2002, as [officer V.G.] noticed on Suren Muradyan’s wrist his younger brother’s stolen watch, he argued with him, grabbed his hand, started swearing and shook it briskly, during which he hit Suren Muradyan’s abdomen resulting in a sub-capsular rupture of his spleen. Thereafter from 24 July 2002 Suren Muradyan’s health started to deteriorate while in the military unit. On 25 July 2002 Suren Muradyan was visited by [military unit doctor A.H.,] who failed to diagnose Suren Muradyan’s real illness and to make any entries [in the registers] and, having given several paracetamol pills, left. When on 27 July 2002 [A.H.] was called to provide medical assistance to Suren Muradyan, he refused to come and provide assistance and said that the patient should be brought to the aid post. Thereafter Suren Muradyan’s fellow servicemen called [military unit doctor S.G.]. The latter came, also failed to diagnose Suren Muradyan’s real illness and, having given some anti-fever injections and several paracetamol pills, left. Hence, Suren Muradyan remained ill in the military unit until 3 August 2002, which was also in violation of Order no. 586 of the Minister of Defence of 29 May 2000, namely Suren Muradyan was transferred to hospital later than the prescribed 7 days, as a result of which it was impossible to save [his] life.\nDuring the investigation at his additional questioning as a witness on 14 April and 19 August 2004 [officer V.G.] regretted his actions and stated that he had not provided the full story in his previous statements and added that during the incident of 21 July 2002 both his and Suren Muradyan’s hands had hit the left side of the latter’s abdomen.\n...\nThe investigation carried out has confirmed that the sub-capsular rupture of Suren Muradyan’s spleen resulted from [officer V.G.’s] actions during the incident of 21 July 2002.” 93.  All three defendants, namely military officer V.G. and military unit doctors A.H. and S.G., were accused under Article 375 § 2 of the CC in connection with the above acts. 94.  On 21 December 2005 the Syunik Regional Court, sitting in the town of Goris (Armenia), found officer V.G. guilty as charged and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment, minus the one year and twenty‑four days already spent in detention, finding it to be confirmed that on 21 July 2002 officer V.G., during an argument with Suren Muradyan about a stolen watch, shook briskly Suren Muradyan’s hand, and in doing so his hand touched the left side of Suren Muradyan’s abdomen causing a sub‑capsular rupture of the spleen. As regards military unit doctors A.H. and S.G., the Regional Court re-qualified the charges from Article 375 § 2 to Article 376 § 2 of the CC (official negligence resulting in grave consequences) and, applying Article 64 of the CC, sentenced each of them to a fine of 200,000 Armenian drams (AMD). The Regional Court also granted the civil claim lodged by the applicant and ordered officer V.G. to pay 1,000 United States dollars (USD) and military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. to pay AMD 200,000 each as reimbursement of funeral costs and legal costs incurred by the applicant. 95.  On 4 January 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal. He argued in detail that there was sufficient evidence suggesting that his son had been harassed by a number of high-ranking officers, including V.G., D.H. and K.Z., in the period between 21 and 24 July 2002 and that the fatal injury had been inflicted by them on 24 July. The applicant referred, in particular, to a witness statement by his son’s fellow serviceman, according to which his son had woken up in the night of 24 July and complained that he was feeling ill. The same followed from the findings of the post-mortem examination, according to which the initial bruising had been inflicted 8-10 days before death. Furthermore, 24 July was the last day of the deadline fixed by the officers. The investigating authority was deliberately ignoring this evidence and had failed to clarify what had happened on that day, while the proceedings had been perfunctory and not objective and aimed to lead the case into an impasse and not to punish the murderers. The applicant further referred to the fact that serviceman G.M. had admitted that he had been ill-treated by officer K.Z. in his office. It followed from the decision of the General Prosecutor’s Office of 24 November 2004 that the same had happened to his son. The accused, officer V.G., had also admitted in court that he had been outside officer K.Z.’s office when the latter ill-treated Suren Muradyan and that he had heard him scream. Furthermore, no explanation had been given for the second bruising and abrasion on the forehead sustained by his son 1-2 days before his death. The applicant further complained that the Regional Court had failed to clarify what was meant by the “well-known beating of Suren Muradyan” referred to in the letter of the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh, as well as the circumstances and perpetrators of this beating. Lastly, as regards the military unit doctors, the applicant complained that the re‑qualification of the charge had been inaccurate and the sentence imposed too lenient. 96.  Appeals against the judgment of 21 December 2005 were lodged also by officer V.G. and the Prosecutor, who sought harsher penalties. 97.  On 20 March 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal commenced the appeal proceedings. Officer V.G. admitted before the Court of Appeal that either his or Suren Muradyan’s hand had possibly touched the latter’s abdomen during the argument of 21 July 2002, but argued that Suren Muradyan’s spleen could not have ruptured as a result of that contact. 98.  In the course of the proceedings, upon the applicant’s request, two witnesses, serviceman K.B. (see paragraph 41 above) and hospital orderly H.G. (see paragraph 54 above), were summoned and examined in court. K.B. stated that Suren Muradyan had told him at the hospital that he had been called to the headquarters by officer D.H. on the day when the latter was on duty and beaten by him, officers V.G. and K.Z. and another officer, N., because of the watch. The officers had pushed him to the ground and started kicking him, while officer K.Z. hit him with a wooden pole. They had demanded that he bring the watch or its value in cash. The most active beaters were officers V.G. and K.Z. He had been beaten so badly that the headquarters couriers had had to carry him back to the barracks. On the next day he was called again by officer K.Z. He had been unable to go but K.Z. had insisted. Thereafter he had remained in the barracks for eight days. H.G. stated that upon admission to hospital Suren Muradyan was very agitated and kept uttering swear words directed at officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z. He then said that he had been beaten by officers V.G. and K.Z.\nBoth K.B. and H.G. stated that they had been afraid to tell the truth at their questioning during the investigation as they had been military servicemen at that time. They had been demobilised now, had nothing to be afraid of and were telling the truth. K.B. added that Suren Muradyan had asked him not to tell this to anyone in order not to get into trouble. 99.  Officer K.Z. was also summoned and examined in court. He denied having ill-treated Suren Muradyan, but admitted that he had hit serviceman G.M. for having stolen the first watch. 100.  The Court of Appeal sent an inquiry to the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh asking for clarification of the content of the letter of 5 November 2004. 101.  By a letter of 27 April 2006 the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh informed the court that the expression “well‑known beating” had been used merely as a brief description of the incident and had no other meaning. 102.  The applicant submitted once again before the Court of Appeal that his son had died as a result of ill-treatment by officers V.G., D.H. and K.Z., while the military unit doctors had failed to provide adequate medical assistance. 103.  On 20 June 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal delivered its judgment, upholding that of the Regional Court in its part concerning the guilt of officer V.G. and military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. However, it decided to modify the penalty in respect of A.H. and S.G., imposing a suspended sentence of three and a half and three years’ imprisonment respectively, with two years’ and one and a half years’ probation period respectively. The Court of Appeal decided also to modify the judgment in its part concerning the applicant’s civil claim, by annulling the award of AMD 200,000 to be paid by both A.H. and S.G., on the ground that they had already paid those amounts to the applicant voluntarily. 104.  As regards the statements of former servicemen K.B. and H.G., as well as the applicant’s arguments, the Court of Appeal found that these were not sufficient grounds for bringing harsher charges against officer V.G. or for remitting the case for further investigation with the aim of bringing criminal proceedings against officers D.H. and K.Z. Firstly, the court was required by law to examine the case only in respect of the accused and within the scope of the charge against him. Secondly, the law prescribed only two grounds for remitting a case for further investigation, namely (1) if the investigating authority had committed a substantial violation of procedural law or (2) upon the Prosecutor’s request, if there were grounds for harsher prosecution or prosecution on a different factual basis. No such request had been filed by the Prosecutor, while the investigating authority had carried out a thorough, full and objective investigation by examining a number of hypotheses, none of which confirmed that Suren Muradyan had been ill-treated. The Court of Appeal further noted that both K.B. and H.G. had been questioned on numerous occasions during the investigation but had never made such statements in the past. Moreover, they cited as their source of information the late Suren Muradyan. The Court of Appeal lastly referred to the letter of the Head of the National Security Service of Nagorno Karabakh of 27 April 2006. 105.  On 29 June 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments. 106.  The Prosecutor also lodged an appeal on points of law, seeking that the case be remitted for fresh examination in its part concerning the military unit doctors on the ground that the sentence imposed was too lenient. 107.  On 4 August 2006 the Court of Cassation decided to dismiss the applicant’s appeal and to grant that of the Prosecutor, finding that the sentence imposed on military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. had not been proportionate to the gravity of the offence and remitting that part of the case for fresh examination. 108.  On 15 September 2006 the applicant received a copy of this decision. 109.  On 26 September 2006 the Criminal Court of Appeal examined the case anew in its part concerning military unit doctors A.H. and S.G. and decided to sentence them to four years and three and a half years’ imprisonment respectively. At the same time the Court of Appeal decided to grant amnesty and to release them from serving their sentence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant organisation, SIA AKKA/LAA (SIA “Autortiesību un komunicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra/Latvijas Autoru apvienība” –Copyright and Communication Consulting Agency ltd./Latvian Authors Association) is a non-profit organisation founded in Riga by a separate non‑profit organisation, the Latvian Authors Association, whose members are various Latvian artists. 6.  At the end of the 1990s the applicant organisation, acting as a representative of approximately 2000 domestic and two million international authors who had entrusted the applicant organisation to manage the copyright of their musical works, was concluding licence agreements with several broadcasters in Latvia. From 1998 to 1999, after the expiry of the previous licence agreements, the applicant organisation and certain broadcasting organisations in Latvia could not reach an agreement on the terms of the future licence agreements, especially with regard to the remuneration to be paid for the broadcasting of music. As a result some broadcasting organisations continued to use the protected musical works without a written agreement, either without paying any remuneration or paying the amount the broadcasting organisations unilaterally considered equitable. In 2002 the applicant organisation instituted civil proceedings against several broadcasters operating in Latvia. 7.  In July 2002 the applicant organisation lodged a claim against a private radio station, Radio SWH, and requested that the Riga Regional Court, acting as a first-instance court, recognise that by broadcasting protected musical works without a valid licence agreement between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2001, the defendant had violated economic interests of the authors represented by the applicant organisation. The applicant organisation further asked that the court award compensation for unauthorised use of musical works. By relying on the authors’ exclusive rights to control the use of their musical works, the applicant organisation asked the court to apply an injunction precluding the defendant from using the authors’ works before a valid licence agreement between the parties had come into effect. 8.  The defendant lodged a counterclaim arguing that the applicant organisation had abused its dominant position and had fixed an unreasonably high royalty rate, which was six times the rate which had been applicable for the period from 1995 to 1998. They asked the court to order the applicant organisation to conclude a licence agreement with the defendant organisation and to lay down an equitable royalty rate. 9.  During the first-instance court’s hearing, the applicant organisation admitted that the parties had a dispute over the royalty rate in the draft licence agreement negotiated by the parties, but that the court was precluded under section 41 of the Copyright Law from setting the rate as long as there was no licence agreement concluded between the parties (see paragraph 26 below). 10.  On 16 January 2003 the first-instance court partly upheld the claim and fully upheld the counterclaim. It established that between 1 January 1999 and 31 December 2001 the defendant had infringed the authors’ rights by broadcasting the protected works without authorisation, contrary to the provisions of the Copyright Law. The first-instance court ordered the defendant to pay to the applicant organisation compensation for the above period in the amount of 78,000 Latvian lats (LVL, equivalent to 111,500 euros (EUR)), which was 1.5% of the defendant’s net turnover over this period. 11.  Furthermore, the first-instance court ordered the applicant organisation to conclude a licence agreement with the defendant for the next three-year period with a royalty rate set at 2% of the defendant’s monthly net turnover (ikmēneša neto apgrozījums). 12.  Lastly, by relying on the preamble of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 11 and 11bis of the Berne Convention (see paragraph 37 below), the first-instance court dismissed the applicant organisation’s application to have an injunction granted to prohibit the defendant from broadcasting works of the rightsholders represented by the applicant organisation. By referring to the testimonies of two authors represented by the applicant organisation, the first-instance court concluded that the authors themselves were interested in their musical works being publicly broadcasted. An interdiction on broadcasting of the musical works would infringe the authors’ exclusive rights to have their work reproduced, as well as it would negatively affect the interests of the society to listen to music. 13.  On 23 October 2003 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, upheld the part of the first-instance judgment concerning the compensation for copyright infringement and the injunction. 14.  On the issue of ordering the conclusion of a licence agreement, the appellate court observed that both parties had expressed their intention to enter into a such an agreement, as attested by a draft licence agreement of 7 October 2003 in which the parties had agreed on certain terms and conditions such as the duration of the licence and the income from which royalties should be calculated. The appellate court noted that it was partly due to the applicant organisation’s inconsistent negotiating that a licence agreement could not be concluded. The appellate court accordingly recognised that the licence agreement was to be considered concluded in the wording as agreed by the parties on 7 October 2003. On the question of remuneration, the appellate court established that in the negotiation process the applicant organisation had changed the royalty rate from 6% to 4% and then to 3.5%, whereas the defendant had insisted on 1.6% of the income from which royalties should be calculated. The appellate court took note of the characteristics of the defendant’s activities and concluded that an equitable remuneration would be 2% of the income from which, as agreed by the parties, the royalties should be calculated. 15.  On 11 February 2004, following an appeal on points of law, the Senate of the Supreme Court upheld the appellate court’s findings that after the expiry of the earlier licence agreement on 31 December 1998 the de facto contractual relationship between the parties had continued mainly owing to the fact that the applicant organisation had failed to reach an agreement with the defendant on the terms of the licence agreement. The Senate of the Supreme Court further observed that the parties did not contest that the authors had a right to receive equitable remuneration, but that to that day the parties had not reached an agreement on the rate of the royalty payments. Given that there was no other authority responsible to decide on this matter, the Senate of the Supreme Court concluded that pursuant to Article 11bis of the Berne Convention and section 5 of the Civil Law, it was within the court’s competence to set the royalty rate. The Senate of the Supreme Court also dismissed the allegations that the appellate court’s judgment had infringed the intellectual property rights protected under the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia. 16.  In their claim against Latvijas Radio, a state-owned limited liability company, the applicant organisation asked the Riga Regional Court, acting as a first-instance court, to find that by broadcasting the rightsholders’ musical works without a valid licence agreement between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2001, the defendant had violated economic interests of the authors represented by the applicant organisation. The applicant organisation further asked that the court award compensation for unauthorised use of musical works. By relying on the authors’ exclusive rights to control the use of their musical works, the applicant organisation asked the court to apply an injunction precluding the defendant from using the authors’ works before a valid licence agreement between the parties had come into effect. 17.   By lodging a counterclaim the defendant in essence asked the court to recognise that in the disputed period the parties had a de facto contractual relationship. 18.  On 2 April 2003 the Riga Regional Court dismissed the applicant organisation’s claim and upheld the counterclaim. The court established that even though the licence agreement concluded between the parties with the royalty rate set at 3.2% of the defendant’s annual income had expired in 1999, the applicant organisation had continued receiving royalty payments from the defendant, which continued to pay at a lower rate. Given that the applicant organisation had not referred to objections to the broadcasting of the musical works, the existence of a de facto contractual relationship between the parties had been proven. Relying on section 41 of the Copyright Law the court set the royalty rate from 2000 to 2001 at 1.57% of the defendant’s annual income. 19.  On 26 November 2003 the Civil Cases Chamber of the Supreme Court, acting as an appellate court, diverted from the first-instance court’s findings and recognised that the defendant had infringed copyright by broadcasting the musical works over a prolonged period of time without a valid written licence agreement. It awarded the applicant organisation compensation in the amount of LVL 100,000 (EUR 143,000), which exceeded the amount the defendant had paid under the expired licence agreement. It considered that it would be fruitless to issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant from broadcasting the works. The appellate court observed that in principle the parties had expressed their interest in concluding a licence agreement but that before and during the court proceedings the parties had not agreed on the equitable royalty rate. It also pointed to the applicant organisation’s responsibility in failing to reach an agreement in the negotiation of a new licence. As a result, over a prolonged period of time the authors’ rights had been unprotected. As the parties had not asked the court to decide on the exact terms and conditions of a licence agreement, the appellate court decided to impose on the parties a general obligation to conclude a licence agreement by 1 March 2004. Given that the parties had been unable to agree on a royalty rate, the appellate court set the rate at 3% of the defendant’s net turnover. In reaching this conclusion the appellate court took into consideration such elements as, inter alia, the royalty rate set in other court proceedings and the existing practice in certain other EU member States. 20.  The applicant organisation appealed on points of law arguing that by, inter alia, ordering the parties to conclude a licence agreement and setting its terms, the court had overstepped its powers and acted in breach of section 11bis of the Berne Convention and section 15 of the Copyright Law. 21.  On 17 March 2004 the Senate partly upheld the lower court’s judgment with similar reasoning as in the first set of proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant’s husband owned part of a house and a yard in Sofia. 6.  By a decision of the mayor of 15 October 1981 the property was expropriated with a view to constructing a metro station. The decision, based on section 98(1) of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act of 1973, provided that the applicant’s husband was to be compensated with a three‑room flat in a building which the municipality planned to construct. 7.  In 1989 the applicant and her husband were moved out of the expropriated property and settled in a two-room municipally-owned flat. The expropriated house was subsequently pulled down. 8.  By a supplementary decision of 1 September 1989, based on section 100 of the Territorial and Urban Planning Act, the mayor determined the exact location, size and other details in respect of the future flat offered in compensation, which was to measure 94 square metres. 9.  In 1993 the applicants’ husband passed away, after which the applicant became the owner of the future flat allocated in compensation to him. 10.  In the years that followed the applicant requested on many occasions that the authorities complete the compensation procedure and deliver the flat due to her, but to no avail. The construction of the building in which the flat was to be located did not commence. 11.  In 2001 the applicant brought a tort action, claiming wrongful failure on the part of the Sofia municipality to build and provide her with the flat due to her during the period from January 1993 to September 2001. In a final judgment of 6 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Cassation, holding that the municipality was responsible for the failure to deliver the flat within a reasonable time-limit, awarded the applicant 10,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) in non-pecuniary damage and BGN 44,320 for loss of profit. 12.  In 2009 the applicant brought a new tort action against the Sofia municipality covering the period after October 2001. The action was dismissed in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 March 2013, on the ground that the applicant had had a special remedy at her disposal, namely the possibility provided for in section 9(1) of the transitional provisions of the Territory Planning Act 2001 to claim monetary compensation for the expropriated property instead of compensation with a flat (see paragraph 16 below). 13.  In 2013 the Sofia municipality informed the applicant that the construction of the building where the flat due to her was to be located was to start in the near future. According to the latest information submitted by the parties in 2014, the municipality was looking for a company to carry out the construction works.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1960 in the Georgian SSR of the USSR. He had lived in Russia since 1995. On 23 November 2007 his Georgian nationality was revoked by a decree of the President of Georgia. 6.  In 1998, 2007 and 2009 the applicant was convicted of drug-related \noffences in Russia and given a custodial sentence. The most recent sentence was set to expire on 11 October 2012. 7.  On 8 October 2012 the Ministry of Justice issued a decision declaring that the applicant’s presence in Russia would be undesirable upon his release (the “exclusion order”). 8.  On 11 October 2012 the Federal Migration Service (FMS) issued a deportation order against the applicant and asked the Abakan Town Court of the Khakassiya Republic to authorise the applicant’s placement into the detention centre for aliens pending his deportation. On the same day the Town Court granted the request, holding that the applicant should remain in the centre “until his deportation”. 9.  On 1 November 2012 the Abakan Town Court, and on 16 January 2013 the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic, confirmed the validity of the exclusion and deportation orders. On 8 April 2013 the applicant’s request for leave to appeal was rejected. 10.  On 7 November 2012 the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic heard the applicant’s appeal against the decision on his placement in custody. The Supreme Court upheld the detention order but limited it in time until 31 December 2012. 11.  On 14 December 2012 the Abakan Town Court examined an application for an extension of the time-limit. Noting that the FMS had not yet received a response from the Georgian Interests Section as to the applicant’s nationality, it extended the time-limit until 1 July 2013. 12.  The applicant filed an appeal. He submitted that, upon serving the sentence, he should have been given an opportunity to leave Russia of his own will but that had been refused to him. 13.  On 24 January 2013 the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic rejected the appeal. It further held that the Town Court had erred in fixing a specific time-limit for the applicant’s detention and that the applicant should remain in detention “until his deportation”. On 8 April 2013 the applicant’s request for leave to appeal was rejected. 14.  On 1 March, 16 October and 23 November 2012 the FMS inquired the Georgian Interests Section at the Embassy of Switzerland in Moscow whether or not the applicant was a Georgian national. On 5 February 2013 the Georgian Interests Section replied that the applicant’s Georgian nationality had been revoked by the President’s decree on 23 November 2007. 15.  On 30 January and 19 February 2013 the applicant asked the FMS to consider his deportation to Turkey where he owned real estate and where he had lived between 2001 and 2005. On 27 February 2013 the FMS applied for assistance to the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). However, on 16 May 2013 the MFA explained that it was unable to issue laissez-passer documents to foreign nationals and referred the FMS to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow. 16.  In June 2013 the FMS established a working group on the applicant’s deportation. On 1 July 2013 the group sent a request to the Turkish Embassy and also asked the Georgian Interests Section whether the President’s decree revoking the applicant’s Georgian nationality could be quashed in connection with the Georgian amnesty act of 13 January 2013. 17.  The applicant complained to a court about an excessive length of his detention. He submitted that he had been spent more than eight months in custody owing to the FMS’s failure to act diligently in the deportation proceedings. On 26 July 2013 the Abakan Town Court agreed with the applicant’s claim, noting that more than six months had lapsed between a first inquiry to the Georgian Interests Section about the applicant’s nationality dated 1 March 2012 and the second inquiry dated 16 October 2012, that no information about any action by the FMS in the period between 27 February and 1 July 2013 had been submitted, and that a request to the Turkish Embassy had been sent more than forty-five days after receiving the MFA’s explanation. The Town Court pronounced unlawful the FMS’s failure to act but refused to fix a time-limit for the applicant’s detention, referring to the Supreme Court’s judgment of 24 January 2013 (see paragraph 13 above). 18.  In the meantime, Georgian counsel for the applicant’s family challenged the President’s decree revoking the applicant’s Georgian nationality in the Tbilisi City Court. Hearings were held on 26 September and 11 and 22 October 2013. On 11 November 2013 the City Court granted the claim and set aside the decree. That decision was upheld on appeal on 10 January 2014. 19.  On 24 February 2014 the applicant obtained Georgian passport. On 3 March 2014 he was deported from Russia.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1977 and 1979 respectively and live in Tbilisi and Tskaltubo. 6.  On 20 January 2004 criminal proceedings were brought against unidentified people following an armed attack on K.G., a member of the Georgian Parliament (“the member of parliament”). 7.  On 4 February 2004 the victim was questioned for the first time by an investigator. A photofit image of the attacker was created with the help of the victim’s description, but the member of parliament also added that he did not know who the attacker was. 8.  On 25 February 2004 the investigator drew up a report on the handing in to the police of a PSM pistol, equipped with a silencer, by a woman and her child. Notably, according to the report, the child had found the weapon while playing with his mother in the back yard of their house, close to where the member of parliament had been attacked. The report on the handing in of the gun was also signed by two taxi drivers and an interpreter. 9.  On 13 May 2004, at around 10 a.m., the first applicant, who had two convictions for robbery and drugs offences, was arrested in the street in connection with the above-mentioned criminal case on suspicion of attempted murder. He was searched in the presence of two witnesses at the time of his arrest, which revealed that he was in possession of a Browning pistol. 10.  The applicant was taken under arrest to Tbilisi police headquarters and put in an office to be questioned by a police officer, D.Ch. He confessed during the interview to conspiring with the second applicant to murder the member of parliament. In particular, as noted in the police report of 13 May 2004, the first applicant stated that he had been contacted by the second applicant in the autumn of 2003 and offered 10,000 United States dollars (USD) to kill a man whose identity was not specified at the time. The second applicant had therefore driven him to the building where the victim lived, without explaining the reasons for the murder. He had furnished him with a PSM pistol, which had been loaded and fitted with a silencer. From that date onwards the first applicant had regularly gone to the building, however, he had not tried to kill the victim on those occasions. The second applicant had telephoned him and insisted that he carry out the plan. On 19 January 2004, the first applicant had successfully entered a garage at the same time as the victim, had fired shots at him until he had run out of ammunition and then fled. Later that evening, the second applicant had called him to express his discontent because the victim, although seriously injured, had survived. A few days later, the first applicant had learnt from the television that the man he had tried to kill was a member of parliament. 11.  According to the record of the questioning of 13 May 2004, the first applicant had been feeling remorse and had wanted to give himself up to the police for some time. He told the investigator that his confession was sincere, that he regretted committing the crime and was relieved to have been arrested. The first applicant had no lawyer present during the questioning and did not sign the record of it. As subsequently explained by P.B., an investigator in charge of the applicant’s case from the Tbilisi City public prosecutor’s office (“the investigator”), the reason the applicant did not sign the record was that he had lost consciousness several times during the interview and had had to be brought round with cold water. 12.  At 5.15 p.m. that day, 13 May 2004, the investigator formally charged the first applicant with attempted murder, based on his confession, and, without informing the latter of his right to call in a lawyer of his own choice, assigned a public defence lawyer to him; according to the case materials, that public lawyer was dismissed by the applicant on 4 June 2004 (see paragraph 23 below), and, in general, the latter replaced his defence lawyers several times as the criminal proceedings unfolded. The first applicant was taken to the scene of the crime for a reconstruction of the events, and asked to repeat his confession there, which he did in the presence of the public defence lawyer and two independent witnesses. The applicant repeated his confession word for word, again implicating the second applicant and adding that he hoped that his sincere confession would be taken into account as a mitigating circumstance. The statements given during the reconstruction were recorded in writing, with the written record bearing the signatures of both the first applicant and the lawyer appointed for him. 13.  Later the same day, the first applicant was brought face-to-face with the victim in a formal confrontation. He was lined up with three other people in front of the member of parliament, who, after some hesitation, identified him as the attacker. After the identification parade, the member of parliament asked to speak privately with the first applicant and was allowed to do so. No one else was present during their talk. 14.  The investigator then showed the first applicant the PSM pistol and silencer which had been handed in to the police by the two independent witnesses on 25 February 2004 (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant stated that he recognised the gun as the one he had used to attack the victim. The identification procedure was recorded in writing and was signed by the first applicant’s public defence lawyer. 15.  On 13 May 2004 the second applicant was also arrested and charged with attempted murder. A public defence lawyer was assigned to him. The charges stated that he had wanted to kill the member of parliament, who was a distant relative. As the founder of a bank which had employed the second applicant’s brother, the member of parliament had demanded that the applicant and his brother repay USD 700,000, which had been found missing by an internal audit (see also paragraph 62 below). 16.  On 14 May 2004, the first applicant met the second applicant in a formal confrontation and accused him in accordance with his previous confession. According to a written report on the formal confrontation, the second applicant was assisted by the public defence lawyer. 17.  On 15 May 2004 the first applicant was charged in connection with the discovery of the Browning pistol on his person when he was arrested with an additional offence of illegally carrying a weapon. 18.  On 16 May 2004 the Vake-Saburtalo District Court ordered at a public hearing that the two applicants be held in pre-trial detention for three months, until 13 August 2004. After reviewing the criminal case material and hearing the parties’ oral submissions, the court confirmed the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the offences in question had been committed. A further main justification for the imposition of pre-trial detention was the assumption that the accused might abscond, in view of the severity of the possible sentence. 19.  According to statements subsequently given to the investigative authorities by the first applicant’s wife, she attended the hearing on 16 May 2004 and noticed that her husband’s nails had been bitten down and were blackened and that he had bandages on his wrists which he attempted to hide under his pullover. 20.  On the same day, 16 May 2004, the first and second applicants were transferred from Tbilisi police headquarters, where they had been held since their arrest, to, respectively, Prison no. 7 and Prison no. 1 in Tbilisi. They remained in those prisons for the whole of their pre-trial detention, until their conviction at first instance (see paragraph 73 below). 21.  Upon his admission to Prison no. 7 on 16 May 2004, the first applicant was examined by the prison doctor, who noted in a report that there were no marks of violence on his body. 22.  On 27 May 2004 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicants and upheld the reasons given in the detention order of 16 May 2004. 23.  On 4 June 2004, immediately after, a private lawyer, had been hired for the first applicant by his family (“the private lawyer”), the first applicant submitted a complaint to the investigator, alleging that he had given his confession of 13 May 2004 as a result of torture, and that those statements had not been true. The first applicant asked to be questioned again. He alleged that he had been subjected to electrical shocks and severe beatings on 13 May 2004 and requested that a comprehensive medical examination be conducted for the purposes of establishing the exact nature of the injuries he had received. 24.  On 24 June 2004 the investigator ordered an expert medical report on the applicant’s physical condition, which was only produced three months later (see paragraph 35 below). 25.  On 15 June 2004 the first applicant made a submission to the Tbilisi City public prosecutor in charge of his case (“the city prosecutor”), asserting his innocence. He specified that his first lawyer, appointed by the State, had been assigned to him by the investigator without his consent (see paragraph 12 above), that he had done nothing to defend him, and that he had not even been offered the possibility of appointing another lawyer, one of his own choice, at that time. The first applicant alleged that before being questioned on 13 May 2004 he had been beaten with a square iron padlock, which had caused him to have seizures, and a doctor had had to be called. 26.  On 17 June 2004 the first applicant submitted a complaint to the city prosecutor about threats he had received in Prison no. 7. Notably, he had been threatened by unidentified people that his family would suffer if he did not stand by his confession. 27.  On 22 June 2004 the first applicant submitted an alibi to the investigator, citing the names of six people he had been with on 19 January 2004, when the member of parliament had been injured. He requested that those people be questioned as witnesses. 28.  On 28 June 2004 the investigator rejected the first applicant’s request of 22 June 2004 on the grounds that his guilt had been established by his own, very detailed, confession, which he had repeated in the presence of a lawyer during the reconstruction of events at the crime scene. The investigator noted that, in addition, when confronted with the second applicant, the first applicant had accused him of being the instigator of the crime. Furthermore, the first applicant had been identified by the victim. There was therefore no reason to check his alibi. 29.  On 14 July 2004 the first applicant’s lawyer submitted written statements to the investigator from the six witnesses concerned (see paragraph 27 above), supporting the alibi and stating that on 19 January 2004 the first applicant had been at a church wedding ceremony and subsequent reception until 2 a.m. The lawyer repeated his request for those people to be questioned. For his part, the second applicant stated his interest in having the first applicant’s alibi verified. On 24 July 2004 the investigator again rejected the request, using the same grounds as on 28 June 2004. 30.  On 13 July 2004 the second applicant informed the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office (“the CPPO”) that the member of parliament had clandestinely visited the first applicant in prison at 9 p.m. on 25 June 2004 to demand that he stand by his confession. In exchange, he had offered him money. The member of parliament’s visit to the prison had not been officially registered, but could be confirmed by prison staff. The second applicant also complained of the fact that the expert medical report on the first applicant had still not been produced and that the people who were capable of confirming his alibi had not been questioned. 31.  Between July and August 2004 the second applicant lodged several more complaints with the city prosecutor about the investigator’s repeated refusals to check the first applicant’s alibi. The complaints were rejected on 3 and 7 August, the city prosecutor considering that there was no need to take the first applicant’s alibi into account, given that he had freely confessed to the crime, and that there was no evidence in the record of his interview of 13 May 2004 that he had alleged that he had been subjected to ill-treatment. 32.  On 2 August 2004 the first applicant submitted a written request to the investigator to replace his private lawyer who had been hired by his family and had been in charge of his defence since 4 June 2004 (see paragraph 23 above), with a new lawyer, Sh.Dz. The applicant added that he wished to be “questioned again with a view to a confession” and “arranging a plea bargain” with the prosecution in the presence of this new public defence lawyer. 33.  On 5 August 2004 the investigator and the newly appointed lawyer Sh.Dz. went to the prison hospital to attend the questioning of the first applicant, as he had requested on 2 August 2004. The applicant, however, refused to be questioned, without providing any explanation. 34.  On 11 August 2004 the Tbilisi Regional Court granted an application by the prosecutor to extend the applicants’ pre-trial detention to 13 November 2004. 35.  On 13 September 2004 an expert from the Ministry of Health commissioned by the investigator on 24 June 2004 (see paragraph 24 above) issued a report on the applicant’s physical condition. It appeared that the expert had not examined the applicant in person but had asked the investigator to provide him with X-rays of his head and body. Two X-rays had been sent by the investigator to the expert as late as 8 September 2004. Notably, an X-ray of his head, taken only from one side, and an X-ray of his thorax showed that at that time he bore no signs of lesions on those parts of the body. 36.  On 27 September 2004 the second applicant’s mother lodged a criminal complaint with the CPPO, alleging that the member of parliament had visited the first applicant in prison in July 2004 and had offered him 30,000 Georgian lari (GEL) (approximately 13,000 euros (EUR)) to stand by his confession. The investigator had then put pressure on the first applicant’s wife to convince her husband to accept the offer. She further alleged that after the member of parliament’s visit, criminal bosses had been allowed to enter the applicant’s cell on 2 August 2004 in order to pressure him to testify as the member of parliament wished. 37.  On the same day, 27 September 2004, the first applicant’s wife lodged the same complaint as the second applicant’s mother with the CPPO. She added that in exchange for the money offered by the member of parliament, her husband had been expected to dismiss the private lawyer hired by his family, stand by his confession and ask for a plea bargain with the prosecution. The member of parliament had given her an advance payment of USD 1,500 to convince her husband. However, when on 5 August 2004 the first applicant had refused to make a statement confirming his confession in the presence of the investigator and the newly appointed public lawyer Sh.Dz. (see paragraph 33 above), the investigator had left the hospital and K.K., a “mafia boss” whose criminal case had been investigated by the same investigator, had been allowed into the first applicant’s cell. K.K. had threatened the applicant with death if he refused to cooperate with the investigator, giving him two days to think about it. The first applicant’s wife added that she had received threats since 19 August 2004 that her child would be killed if she dared to speak about the above-mentioned events with the authorities. 38.  The allegations of the second applicant’s mother were subsequently confirmed by a journalistic investigation into the events in question (see paragraphs 83-85 below). 39.  On 1 October 2004 the city prosecutor replied to the first applicant’s wife and the second applicant’s mother that their complaints of 27 September 2004 were manifestly ill-founded for the same reasons given in the replies to the first applicant’s repeated requests to have his alibi checked. 40.  At the beginning of October 2004 the first applicant dismissed Sh.Dz. and reappointed his private lawyer (see paragraph 23 above). 41.  On 8 October 2004 the first applicant’s lawyer wrote to the Tbilisi city prosecutor requesting, among other things, that secret recordings of various meetings between the first applicant’s wife and the member of parliament’s lawyer (see the details of the journalistic inquiry at paragraphs 83‑85 below) be obtained from the investigation into the ill‑treatment case (see paragraphs 46‑53 below) and added to the applicants’ criminal case file. That request was rejected on 12 October 2004. 42.  On 21 October 2004 the first applicant’s lawyer informed the investigator that his client wished to be questioned again. The investigator questioned the first applicant the same day and he repeated all the factual details concerning his allegations of ill-treatment on 13 May 2004, gave the names of the police officers involved and detailed the threats made against him. He complained of having been coerced into accepting Sh.Dz. as his lawyer and that his sole purpose had been to sign witness statements for the investigator. 43.  On 5 November 2004 the prosecutor applied for an extension of two months to the applicants’ pre-trial detention, until 13 January 2005. By a decision of 10 November 2004, a judge at the Supreme Court, after reviewing the application in the presence of the prosecution and the applicants’ lawyers, granted the extension. As grounds for that decision he noted that the applicants had been accused of particularly serious crimes and that the “circumstances of the case” gave reason to believe that if they were released the accused would attempt to impede the establishment of the facts and evade justice. In his view, a request by the applicants to be released on bail had to be rejected for the same reasons. No reference to any specific, factual circumstances of the case was given in the decision of 10 November 2004. 44.  On 30 December 2004 the investigation was completed, a bill of indictment was approved by the prosecutor and the case was sent for trial to the Tbilisi Regional Court. 45.  On 7 June 2005 the Tbilisi Regional Court held a pre-trial conference hearing in the case, ruling to commit the applicants for trial as defendants. The decision was rendered in a standard, template form with pre-printed reasoning. The judge simply added in the blank spaces a brief statement of the facts, the names of the accused, the definition of the impugned offence and the measure of pre-trial restraint. As regards the confirmation of the latter, the printed standard phrase read as follows:\n“The measure of pre-trial restraint – detention – has been chosen correctly.” 46.  On 7 September 2004 the first applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, alleging that he had been subjected to ill-treatment on 13 May 2004 and requesting an investigation. He specified that at around 10 a.m. he had been taken to police headquarters in Tbilisi and placed in a room on the twelfth floor. He had been given electric shocks and beaten. The surname of the officer who had held a weapon to his head and forced him to sign a pre-prepared confession was D. K. Two other officers, K. Ch. and D. En., had also participated. Other police officers had also been involved, and while the applicant did not recall their names, he stated that he would be able to identify them if confronted with them. He had also been beaten on the neck with a square padlock. He had passed out while being given the electric shocks and the police officers had poured water on his head to bring him around. When he had regained consciousness, a doctor had been there who had said that he needed an injection of a sedative, but the doctor’s recommendation had been ignored. The first applicant had then been told by the police officers that his flat had already been visited, drugs had been planted there, and that his wife could easily be arrested. Upon his transfer to Tbilisi’s Prison no. 7 on the night of 16 to17 May 2004, the prison doctor had asked him, in the presence of the police officers, if he had been beaten, but he had denied it for fear that the ill-treatment would resume. 47.  On 9 September 2004 the CPPO referred the complaint of 7 September 2004 to the Tbilisi city prosecutor and the investigator in person, asking them to take action and to inform the Chief Prosecutor of their response. On 5 October 2004 the investigator replied to the first applicant directly, informing him that his criminal complaint about ill‑treatment had been rejected as unsubstantiated as the applicant had not supported it with evidence. 48.  On 8 October 2004 the first applicant’s wife complained to the Inspectorate General of the CPPO and the Inspectorate General of the Ministry of the Interior that her husband had been ill-treated by police officers and that there had been a lack of response by the investigator and the Tbilisi city prosecutor to her various previous complaints. She asked for the investigator to be removed from the case and for those who had carried out the ill-treatment to be identified and punished. In support of her request, she attached a copy of a report dated 29 September 2004 on an examination of the applicant conducted at her request, and with the prison authority’s permission, by private medical experts. That report showed that three medical specialists – a psychiatrist, a neurologist and a trauma specialist – had examined the first applicant in prison, using the medical equipment available in the prison hospital, in the course of several visits. They first noted that the first applicant had repeated the statements he had made in his complaint of 7 September 2004. The medical experts also observed that the applicant suffered from epileptic fits, and that, according to the applicant himself, the first fit had occurred on 22 July 2004. Their view, on the basis of ultrasound and computed tomography (CT) scans, was that the applicant suffered from epileptic fits which had been caused by a traumatic head injury. The CT scan also showed a scarred lesion in the area of the joint at the nape of the neck, and signs of intracranial hypertension syndrome. A poorly healed fracture of the zygomatic bone and the left of the upper jaw was also detected. In the experts’ opinion, the physical and psychological problems that had been revealed could well have been caused, in principle, by the type of ill-treatment complained of by the first applicant. 49.  On 12 October 2004 the Inspectorate of the CPPO asked the investigations department of the Tbilisi city prosecutor’s office to set up a meeting with the first applicant for 13 October 2004 with a view to checking the wife’s allegations. The Inspectorate General of the Ministry of the Interior, for its part, replied to the first applicant’s wife that the criminal complaint made by the applicant had already been examined and dismissed as unsubstantiated. 50.  When questioned by an investigator of the Inspectorate General of the CPPO on 13 October 2004, the first applicant stood by his allegations that he had been tortured by the police officers on 13 May 2004. 51.  Following a request by the Inspectorate General of the CPPO, on 19 October 2004 State experts drew up another medical report on the first applicant. The experts noted a wound at the nape of the neck, which was at an advanced stage of scarring and had been caused by a hard, blunt object; various cuts on the stomach, some of which measured 18 by 0.1 cm and 16 by 0.1 cm; and several cuts on his left forearm. The scar on the head was old and it could not be said exactly when the injury had been sustained. However, it could have been caused between April and July 2004. 52.  Between late October and early November 2004, the Inspectorate General of the CPPO questioned a number of potential witnesses to the first applicant’s alleged ill-treatment: P.B., the investigator in the applicant’s case; M.S., a Ministry of the Interior camera operator who had recorded the applicant’s confirmation of his initial confession at the crime scene; the public defence lawyer who had been assigned to the applicant after his arrest and first interview; G.B., the judge who had ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 16 May 2004; two relatives of the first applicant who had attended the above-mentioned hearing; and the doctor from Prison no. 7 who had carried out a visual examination of the applicant at the time of his admission to prison. None of those people said they had seen marks of ill-treatment on the first applicant. In addition, all three police officers accused by the first applicant of ill-treatment denied those accusations when questioned by the Inspectorate General of the CPPO. 53.  On 15 November 2004 another medical expert examined the first applicant at the request of the Inspectorate General of the CPPO. As well as confirming the findings of the previous expert report (see paragraph 51 above), he added that the zygomatic bone surrounding the left eye was deformed. 54.  On 17 November 2004 the Inspectorate General of the CPPO, on the basis of the statements given by the various witnesses as well as the medical reports of 19 October and 15 November 2004, decided not to institute proceedings in relation to the first applicant’s alleged ill-treatment. 55.  The Krtsanisi-Mtatsminda District Court quashed that decision on 23 December 2004. The court found that the investigation carried out by the prosecution authority had not been comprehensive enough, and ordered the Inspectorate General to undertake further investigative actions aimed at re‑examining the well‑foundedness of the serious allegations made by the first applicant. On 8 February 2005 that decision was upheld at final instance by the Supreme Court, and on 24 February 2005 criminal proceedings were initiated in the case under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code (torture). 56.  After the reopening of the investigation the prosecutorial authority questioned the same people who had already been questioned in October‑November 2004. The applicant was also examined again in April 2005. A report issued on 27 April 2005 suggested that the deformation of the zygomatic bone surrounding the applicant’s left eye could not be said with certainty to have been caused by a traumatic injury from a dense or blunt object in 2004. 57.  According to the case file as it stands, including the parties’ most recent factual addendums, the relevant authorities never took a definitive decision in relation to the investigation of the applicant’s torture case under Article 126 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 58.  On 14 September 2006 a trial started at the Tbilisi Regional Court. 59.  The first applicant, who was represented by the private lawyer, pleaded innocent, making particular reference to the ill-treatment he had been subjected to in order to obtain a confession. He complained that despite repeated requests the contents of the criminal file opened by the Inspectorate General of the CPPO with respect to his alleged torture had not been added to the file in the criminal case against him and the other applicant (see paragraph 41 above). He insisted that the outcome of the criminal investigation into his ill-treatment would be of decisive importance for the assessment of the well-foundedness of the criminal charges against him and the second applicant. The first applicant also underlined the fact that he had an alibi. 60.  The second applicant also pleaded innocent. His lawyer applied to have the record of the member of parliament’s identifying the first applicant on 13 May 2004 declared inadmissible as tainted by irregularities. In that connection, he maintained that on 4 February 2004 the victim had said he was unable to identify his attacker while the photofit image created with his help had not resembled the first applicant. Later, however, he had stated that he was able to identify his attacker, and did so on 13 May 2004 on the basis of the first applicant’s “general appearance”. In addition, the first applicant had been lined up in front of the victim with three other people who had looked totally different from him (see also paragraphs 64 and 65 below). The second applicant’s lawyer also applied to have the record of the formal confrontation between the first and second applicants, dated 14 May 2003, declared inadmissible as tainted by irregularities. Notably, the report contained the name of a public defence lawyer who had supposedly assisted the second applicant at the time. However, in actual fact the second applicant had been alone during the confrontation. Indeed, according to a letter from the Ministry of the Interior, between 13 and 17 May 2004 the public defence lawyer officially assigned to the second applicant on 14 May 2004 had not possessed a badge allowing him to enter the main police station in Tbilisi. Both applications were rejected by the trial court on the same day as ill-founded. 61.  When questioned by the trial court, the woman and son who had allegedly handed in the weapon used to commit the crime to the police on 25 February 2004, according to the official version of events contained in the case file (see paragraph 8 above), stated that they had never handed in such a gun to the police. On the contrary, it had been the police who had suddenly come to her house, and had searched for and found the PSM pistol in the yard. She added that the gun that the police had found had not been equipped with a silencer. 62.  Among other statements concerning a possible motive for the attack allegedly perpetrated by the applicants, the member of parliament told the court that as one of the founders of the bank and one of its largest shareholders, he had recommended the second applicant’s brother for the post of manager of the bank’s Batumi branch (see also paragraph 15 above). However, the two brothers had abused his trust. They had taken certain items of gold belonging to clients and a large sum of money and had disappeared in October 2003. Three days later, as a result of efforts made by the family, the brothers’ uncle had returned the objects and the money to the bank. Some months earlier, an internal audit of the branch in question had uncovered considerable losses there. The second applicant and his brother had put pressure on the members of the audit committee to not inform headquarters in Tbilisi. Following internal discussions in which the member of parliament had been involved in person, it had been agreed that the two brothers would by 25 January 2004 at the latest repay the USD 750,000 they had embezzled by various means. The member of parliament also told the trial court that he had easily identified the first applicant on 13 May 2004. He confirmed that he had approached the applicant after the identification parade, with the investigator’s consent, and had asked him why he had tried to kill him. During their private talk the first applicant had allegedly replied that he had not wanted to kill him but had been acting on the second applicant’s orders (see paragraph 13 above). 63.  When questioned by the trial court, the two witnesses to the reconstruction of the crime on 13 May 2004 stated that they had been stopped by police officers in the vicinity of the main police station. The officers had asked them to go with them to assist in an investigative procedure and added that they would be arrested if they refused. At the station, the witnesses had seen the first applicant who, despite it being a warm day in May, had been wearing a woollen hat. He had also had a deep bruise around one of his eyes. The investigator had asked the first applicant one or two questions but he had remained silent for much of the time. When asked by the investigator about the place in question being the scene of the crime, he had simply nodded. The reconstruction had lasted between ten and fifteen minutes, at the end of which the two witnesses had signed a record of the procedure, without reading its contents. No pressure had been put on the first applicant in their presence. 64.  One of the men who took part in the identification parade where the first applicant had been identified by the victim on 13 May 2004 told the court that he had been approached at random in the street by the police to take part in the line-up. He stated that, with the exception of the first applicant, all three members of the identification parade, including himself, had been clean-shaven. Another clearly distinguishing feature had been that of the four men in the line-up, only the first applicant had been bald. The applicant had looked exhausted and had had a deep bruise around one eye. There had therefore been a considerable difference in appearance between the first applicant and the others. 65.  Another participant in the identification parade, who had also been approached in the street to take part, gave the same version of events, including regarding the bruise. He added that the first applicant had been the only one not wearing a belt and without shoelaces. When the victim had identified him as the one who had shot at him, the first applicant had exclaimed that it was not him. 66.  When questioned by the trial court, the two taxi drivers who had signed the report of 25 February 2004 on the handing in of the PSM pistol by the woman and her son stated that they had been taken to the main police headquarters under coercion, on pain of having their driving licences confiscated by the police, in order to take part as witnesses in an investigative procedure. They were told by an officer that a woman and a child were going to bring in a weapon, and they would have to confirm that fact by signing a record. They had waited in vain for an hour and a half for the woman and child to arrive. The two policemen had then taken a weapon equipped with a silencer out of a drawer in a table, explaining to the taxi drivers that it was the weapon in question. The police officers had drawn up a report saying that a woman and child with non-Georgian names had brought the weapon to the station. The two taxi drivers had signed the fabricated document in order to get their driving licences back and leave the premises as soon as possible. 67.  The interpreter whose signature was appended to the bottom of the same record of 25 February 2004 stated before the trial court that she had not acted as an interpreter in the investigative procedure in question for a woman and child who did not speak Georgian. She alleged that her signature had been forged. 68.  Four people who had attended the wedding party of 19 January 2004 also attended the hearing and confirmed the applicant’s alibi by stating that they had seen him at the party, that he had stayed until late in the evening, and definitely until after 9 p.m. 69.  A member of an independent human rights organisation told the trial court that at the time of the events she had had official permission from the State to visit prisoners who had allegedly been subjected to abuse. Following a series of complaints by the family, she had visited the first applicant two weeks after his arrest. She had seen that he had a head wound, cuts on his face and had been in a generally poor condition. The first applicant had also complained to her of a fracture of the bone surrounding his eye. He had subsequently spent time in the prison hospital but had requested to be transferred back to prison because various people, including the member of parliament’s lawyer, had been able to visit him in the hospital and disturb him. The first applicant had given the human rights activist the name of a police officer, a certain K., saying he had been one of the men who had tortured him on 13 May 2004 at Tbilisi main police station. She had immediately informed the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief Prosecutor’s Office of the applicant’s allegations, but neither of them had reacted. 70.  The first applicant’s wife told the court that she had visited her husband in prison on 2 June 2004. She had been able to see through the glass between them that he was wearing a woollen hat, under which a plaster was visible. He had had dark circles under his eyes and his nails were blackened. She also confirmed the facts relating to her meetings with the parliamentarian’s lawyer. 71.  On application by the defence, the secret recordings of the two meetings between the first applicant’s wife and the victim’s lawyer were played to the trial court (see details of the journalistic investigation at paragraphs 83‑85 below). 72.  On 21 February 2007 the Tbilisi Regional Court ruled that the following pieces of evidence were inadmissible owing to significant procedural shortcomings in the way they had been obtained:\n(i)  the first applicant’s confession at his first interview on 13 May 2004 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above);\n(ii)  the record of 25 February 2004 of the woman and her son handing in the PSM pistol at the police station (see paragraph 8 above);\n(iii)  the record of 13 May 2004 of the first applicant identifying the PSM pistol (see paragraph 14 above). 73.  On 26 February 2007 the Tbilisi Regional Court gave judgment. It first held that it was undeniable that the first applicant had had various injuries on his body, as confirmed by the various expert reports. However, the time, place or circumstances of sustaining the injuries had not been established. 74.  The first applicant was found guilty of attempted murder with aggravating circumstances, on account of his attack on the member of parliament on 19 January 2004, and illegal possession of a weapon, owing to the Browning pistol that had been found on him when he had been arrested. His guilt related to the Browning had been proved, according to the court, by the record of the body search after his arrest and the record of the seizure of the weapon thus discovered. 75.  The court found that the charge of attempted murder had been proved by the following items of direct evidence, which it considered to have been obtained without any major irregularities:\n(i)  the written record of the first applicant’s confession given during the reconstruction at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004 (see paragraph 12 above);\n(ii)  the record of his identification by the member of parliament on the same day (see paragraph 13 above);\n(iii)  the member of parliament’s statements concerning the private talk he had had with the first applicant on 13 May 2004 (see paragraph 13 above). 76.  The second applicant was also found guilty of attempted murder with aggravating circumstances and of the illicit possession of a weapon on account of his role in planning to kill the member of parliament by hiring the first applicant and providing him with a firearm. He was additionally found guilty of embezzlement on account of his complicity with his brother in misappropriating the bank’s assets (see paragraphs 15 and 62 above). In the trial court’s opinion, the same evidence as used against the first applicant had proven the charge of attempted murder against the second applicant (see the preceding paragraph):\n(i)  the written record of the first applicant’s confession during the reconstruction at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004; and\n(ii)  the member of parliament’s statements concerning the private talk he had had with the first applicant on 13 May 2004. 77.  As to the defence’s arguments concerning the lawfulness of the various records mentioned above, the trial court conceded that there had been a series of irregularities in the course of the investigative procedures in question, but they had not been such as to render the evidence inadmissible. 78.  Both applicants appealed. 79.  With respect to the conviction for attempted murder, the first applicant reiterated his complaints about the absence of a lawyer of his own choice at the first interviews, his ill-treatment and forced confession. According to him, numerous witnesses questioned by the judges had raised a reasonable doubt that he had been able to participate properly in the confirmation of his confession during the reconstruction of the events at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004. Nevertheless, the record of that procedure had been considered a key piece of evidence in establishing his guilt. The second piece of evidence used to establish his being guilty of attempted murder – the record of his identification by the victim – had also been tainted by irregularities. In fact, contrary to the requirements of Article 347 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the other men who had lined up with him had all looked healthy, had had full heads of hair, had been clean‑shaven and had been wearing belts and shoes that had been laced up. He, on the other hand, was partially bald, had been injured and looked tired, had not been able to shave for several days and had had no belt or laces. The first applicant also referred to the secret recordings of the meetings between his wife and the member of parliament’s lawyer (see paragraphs 83‑85 below). Those recordings had been played to the trial court judges, but they had chosen not to mention them in their judgment or take them into consideration in any way. 80.  The second applicant’s appeal had similar arguments as regards the conviction for attempted murder. He specifically complained that while the trial court judges had confirmed his guilt by reference to the record of the confirmation of the first applicant’s confession during the reconstruction at the scene of the crime on 13 May 2004, that specific item of evidence had clearly been tainted by the ill-treatment the first applicant had suffered at the hands of the police. 81.  On 17 July 2007 the Criminal Affairs Chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals. As far as the alleged ill‑treatment was concerned, the criminal chamber affirmed that it was not in dispute that the first applicant had had marks of violence on his person. Nevertheless, the circumstances under which the injuries had been sustained and who had caused them were not known. The court held that the guilty verdict against both applicants had to be upheld in its entirety. The first and second applicants were convicted, respectively, to twenty-one and sixteen years’ imprisonment. 82.  The cassette contains a recording of the investigative journalism programme 60 minutes. The recording in question is about the applicants’ case and is entitled “Contract murder, or rigged investigation?” 83.  Amongst other details, the programme aired secret video-recordings of two meetings between the first applicant’s wife and the member of parliament’s lawyer. 84.  At the first meeting, which took place a few days before 2 August 2004, the lawyer offered an advance payment to the first applicant’s wife to ensure that her husband replaced the lawyer he had chosen with Sh.Dz., who was trusted by the member of parliament. It was with the help of that new lawyer that the applicant was expected by the member of parliament to stand by his initial confession. The first applicant’s wife replied that her husband’s lawyer could do the job just as well, but the member of parliament’s lawyer stated that that lawyer could not be trusted in such dealings. 85.  The secret recording of the second meeting showed how Sh.Dz., by then appointed as the first applicant’s lawyer on the advice of the member of parliament’s lawyer, handed over USD 1,500 to the first applicant’s wife on behalf of the member of parliament (see also paragraph 37 above).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "10.  The applicants were born, respectively, in 1971 in Togo and in 1979 in Ghana. They live in Malmö, Sweden. 11.  The first applicant lived in Togo until the age of 6 and again briefly from the age of 21 to 22. From the age of 6 to 21 he lived in Ghana with his uncle. He attended school there for ten years and speaks the local language. On 18 July 1993, when he was 22 years old, he entered Denmark and requested asylum, which was refused by a final decision of 8 March 1995. 12.  In the meantime, on 7 November 1994, he had married a Danish national. Having regard to his marriage, on 1 March 1996, by virtue of the former section 9, subsection 1(ii), of the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven) he was granted a residence permit, which became permanent on 23 September 1997. 13.  On 25 September 1998 the first applicant and his Danish wife got divorced. 14.  On 22 April 2002 the first applicant acquired Danish citizenship. At the relevant time he met the requirements set out in the relevant circular relating to the length of his period of residence (at least nine years), age, general conduct, arrears owed to public funds and language proficiency. 15.  On 22 February 2003 the first applicant married the second applicant in Ghana. He had met her during one of four visits to Ghana made in the five years prior to their marriage. 16.  On 28 February 2003, at the Danish Embassy in Accra, Ghana, the second applicant requested a residence permit for Denmark with reference to her marriage to the first applicant. At that time she was 24 years old. She stated that she had never visited Denmark. Her parents lived in Ghana. On the application form, the first applicant submitted that he had not received any education in Denmark, but had participated in various language courses and short-term courses concerning service, customer care, industrial cleaning, hygiene and working methods. He had been working in a slaughterhouse since 15 February 1999. He had no close family in Denmark. He spoke and wrote Danish. The spouses had come to know each other in Ghana and they communicated between themselves in the Hausa and Twi languages. 17.  At the relevant time, under section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act family reunion could be granted only if both spouses were over 24 years old and their aggregate ties to Denmark were stronger than the spouses’ attachment to any other country (the so-called attachment requirement). 18.  On 1 July 2003 the Aliens Authority (Udlændingestyrelsen) refused the residence permit request because it found that it could not be established that the spouses’ aggregate ties to Denmark were stronger than their aggregate ties to Ghana. 19.  In July or August 2003 the second applicant entered Denmark on a tourist visa. 20.  On 28 August 2003 she appealed against the Aliens Authority’s decision of 1 July 2003, to the then Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration). The appeal did not have suspensive effect. 21.  On 15 November 2003 the applicants moved to Malmö, Sweden, which since 1 July 2000 has been connected to Copenhagen in Denmark by a 16 km bridge (Øresundsforbindelsen). 22.  By Act no. 1204 of 27 December 2003, section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act was amended so that the attachment requirement was lifted for persons who had held Danish citizenship for at least 28 years (the so‑called 28-year rule – 28-års reglen). Persons born or having arrived in Denmark as small children could also be exempted from the attachment requirement, provided they had resided lawfully there for 28 years. 23.  On 6 May 2004 the applicants had a son. He was born in Sweden but is a Danish national by virtue of his father’s nationality. 24.  On 27 August 2004 the Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration upheld the decision by the Aliens Authority of 1 July 2003 to refuse to grant the second applicant a residence permit. It pointed out that in practice, the residing person was required to have stayed in Denmark for approximately twelve years, provided that an effort had been made to integrate. In the case before it, it found that the applicants’ aggregate ties to Denmark were not stronger than their ties to Ghana and that the family could settle in Ghana, as that would only require that the first applicant obtain employment there. In its assessment, it noted that the first applicant had entered Denmark in July 1993 and had been a Danish national since 22 April 2002. He had ties with Ghana, where he had been raised and had attended school. He had visited the country four times in the past six years. The second applicant had always lived in Ghana and had family there. 25.  On 18 July 2006, before the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret), the applicants instituted proceedings against the Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration and relied on Article 8 of the Convention, alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, together with Article 5 (2) of the European Convention on Nationality. They submitted, among other things, that it amounted to indirect discrimination against them when applying for family reunion, that persons who were born Danish citizens were exempt from the attachment requirement altogether, whereas persons who had acquired Danish citizenship at a later point in life had to comply with the 28-year rule before being exempted from the attachment requirement. In the present case that would entail that the first applicant could not be exempted from the attachment requirement until 2030, thus after 28 years of Danish citizenship, and after reaching the age of 59. 26.  In a judgment of 25 September 2007 the High Court of Eastern Denmark unanimously found that the refusal to grant the applicants family reunion with reference to the 28-year rule and the attachment requirement did not contravene the Articles of the Convention or of the European Convention on Nationality relied upon. It stated as follows:\n“...the facts given in the decisions of the immigration authorities in the case are found not to be in dispute.\nAccordingly, [the second applicant] who is a Ghanaian national, was thus 24 years old when she applied for a residence permit on 28 February 2003, and she had no ties with Denmark other than her recent marriage to [the first applicant]. [The second applicant] had always lived in Ghana and had family there. [The first applicant] had some ties with Ghana, where he had lived with his uncle while attending school in Ghana for ten years. He entered Denmark in 1993 at the age of 22 and became a Danish national on 22 April 2002. [The applicants] married in Ghana on 22 February 2003 and have lived in Sweden since 15 November 2003 with their child, born on 6 May 2004. [The first applicant] has told the High Court that the family can settle lawfully in Ghana if he obtains paid employment in that country.\nIt appears from a Supreme Court judgment of 13 April 2005, reproduced on page 2086 in the Danish Weekly Law Reports (Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen) for 2005, that Article 8 of the Convention does not impose on the Contracting States any general obligation to respect immigrants’ choices as to the country of their residence in connection with marriage, or otherwise to authorise family reunion.\nIn view of the information on [the applicants’] situation and their ties with Ghana, the High Court accordingly finds no basis for setting aside the Respondent’s decision establishing that [the applicants’] aggregate ties with Ghana were stronger than their aggregate ties with Denmark and that [the applicants] therefore did not meet the attachment requirement set out in section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act. In this connection, the High Court finds that the refusal did not bar [the applicants] from exercising their right to family life in Ghana or in a country other than Denmark. The fact that [the first applicant] is able to reside in Ghana only if he obtains paid employment there is found not to lead to any other assessment. Accordingly, the High Court holds that the decision of the Ministry did not constitute a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.\nAlthough the High Court has held that Article 8 of the Convention has not been breached in this case, the High Court has to consider [the applicants’] claim that, within the substantive area otherwise protected by Article 8, the decision of the Ministry constituted a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.\nThe High Court initially observes that [the first applicant] had been residing in Denmark for 11 years when the Ministry issued its decision. Although he acquired Danish nationality in 2002, nine years after entering Denmark, he did not meet the 28‑year nationality requirement applicable to all Danish nationals pursuant to section 9, subsection 7 of the Aliens Act, irrespective of whether they are of foreign or Danish extraction. Nor did he have the comparable attachment to Denmark throughout 28 years which will generally lead to an exemption from the attachment requirement according to the preparatory work of the 2003 statutory amendment.\nThe 28-year rule is a generally-worded relaxation of the attachment requirement based on an objective criterion. In practice, however, the rule may imply that a Danish national of foreign extraction will only meet the 28-year rule later in life than would be the case for a Danish national of Danish extraction. When applied, the rule may therefore imply an indirect discrimination.\nAccording to the relevant explanatory report, Article 5 of the European Convention on Nationality must be taken to mean that Article 5 § 1 concerns the conditions for acquiring nationality while Article 5 § 2 concerns the principle of non-discrimination. According to the report, it is not a mandatory rule that the Contracting States are obliged to observe in all situations. Against that background, Article 5 is considered to offer protection against discrimination to an extent that goes no further than the protection against discrimination offered by Article 14 of the Convention.\nThe assessment of whether the refusal of the Ministry implied discrimination amounting to a breach of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention is accordingly considered to depend on whether the difference in treatment which occurred as a consequence of the attachment requirement in spite of nationality can be considered objectively justified and proportionate.\nAccording to the preparatory work of the Act, the overall aim of the attachment requirement, which is a requirement of lasting and strong links to Denmark, is to regulate spousal reunion in Denmark in such a manner as to ensure the best possible integration of immigrants in Denmark, an aim which must in itself be considered objective. In the view of the High Court, any difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish extraction and Danish nationals of foreign extraction can therefore be justified by this aim as regards the right to spousal reunion if a Danish national of foreign extraction has no such lasting and strong attachment to Denmark.\nThe balancing of this overall consideration relating to the specific circumstances in the case requires a detailed assessment. The High Court finds that the assessment and decision of the Ministry were made in accordance with section 9(7) of the Aliens Act and the preparatory work describing the application of the provision. Accordingly, and in view of the specific information on [the first applicant’s] situation, the High Court finds no sufficient basis for holding that the refusal by the Ministry to grant a residence permit to [the second applicant] with reference to the attachment requirement of the Aliens Act implies a disproportionate infringement of [the first applicant’s] rights as a Danish national and his right to family life. The High Court therefore finds that the decision of the Ministry was not invalid, and that it was not contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.” 27.  The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Højesteret), which delivered its judgment on 13 January 2010 upholding the High Court judgment. 28.  The Supreme Court, composed of seven judges, found, unanimously, that it was not in breach of Article 8 of the Convention to refuse the second applicant a residence permit in Denmark. It stated as follows:\n“In its decision of 27 August 2004, the Ministry of Integration refused the application from [the second applicant] for a residence permit on the grounds that the aggregate ties of herself and her spouse [the first applicant] with Denmark were not stronger than their aggregate ties with Ghana (see section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act).\n[The applicants] first submitted that the refusal was unlawful because it was contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. If the refusal was not contrary to Article 8, they submitted as their alternative claim that it was contrary to the prohibition against discrimination enshrined in Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8, for which reason they were eligible for family reunion in Denmark without satisfying the attachment requirement set out in section 9(7) of the Act.\nFor the reasons given by the High Court, the Supreme Court upholds the decision made by the Ministry of Integration that it is not contrary to Article 8 to refuse [the second applicant’s] application for a residence permit.” 29.  Moreover, the majority in the Supreme Court (four judges) found that the 28-year rule was in compliance with Article 8 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. They stated as follows:\n“Pursuant to section 9, subsection 7, as worded by Act No. 1204 of 27 December 2003, the requirement that the spouses’ or cohabitants’ aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their aggregate ties with another country (the attachment requirement) does not apply when the resident has been a Danish national for 28 years (the 28-year rule).\nUntil 2002, Danish nationals had had a general exemption from the attachment requirement. Act No. 365 of 6 June 2002 tightened the conditions of family reunion, one of the consequences being that the attachment requirement would subsequently also apply to family reunion where one of the partners was a Danish national. One of the reasons for extending the attachment requirement to include Danish nationals also given in the preparatory work (on page 3982 of Schedule A to the Official Gazette for 2001 to 2002 (2nd session)) is that there are Danish nationals who are not particularly well integrated in Danish society and for this reason the integration of a spouse newly arrived in Denmark may entail major problems.\nIt quickly turned out that this tightening had some unintended consequences for persons such as Danish nationals who had opted to live abroad for a lengthy period and who had started a family while away from Denmark. For that reason, the rules were relaxed with effect from 1 January 2004 so that family reunion in cases where one of the partners had been a Danish national for at least 28 years was no longer subject to satisfaction of the requirement of stronger aggregate ties with Denmark.\nAccording to the preparatory work in respect of the relaxation, the Government found that the fundamental aim of tightening the attachment requirement in 2002 was not forfeited by refraining from demanding that the attachment requirement be met in cases where the resident had been a Danish national for 28 years (see page 49 of Schedule A to the Official Gazette for 2003 to 2004). It is mentioned in this connection that Danish expatriates planning to return to Denmark one day with their families will often have maintained strong ties with Denmark, which have also been communicated to their spouse or cohabitant and any children. This is so when they speak Danish at home, take holidays in Denmark, read Danish newspapers regularly, and so on. Thus, there will normally be a basis for successful integration of Danish expatriates’ family members into Danish society.\nPersons who have not been Danish nationals for 28 years, but were born and raised in Denmark, or came to Denmark as small children and were raised here, are normally also exempt from the attachment requirement when they have stayed lawfully in Denmark for 28 years.\nA consequence of this current state of the law is that different groups of Danish nationals are subject to differences in treatment in relation to their possibility of being reunited with family members in Denmark, as persons who have been Danish nationals for 28 years are in a better position than persons who have been Danish nationals for fewer than 28 years.\nAccording to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, nationals of a country do not have an unconditional right to family reunion with a foreigner in their home country, as factors of attachment may also be taken into account in the case of nationals of that country. It is not in itself contrary to the Convention if different groups of nationals are subject to statutory differences in treatment as regards the possibility of obtaining family reunion with a foreigner in the country of their nationality.\nIn this respect, reference is made to paragraph 88 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 28 May 1985 in the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom. In this case the Court found that it was not contrary to the Convention that a person born in Egypt who had later moved to the United Kingdom and become a national of the United Kingdom and Colonies was treated less favourably as regards the right to family reunion with a foreigner than a national born in the United Kingdom or whose parent(s) were born in the United Kingdom. The Court said in that respect: ‘It is true that a person who, like Mrs Balkandali, has been settled in a country for several years may also have formed close ties with it, even if he or she was not born there. Nevertheless, there are in general persuasive social reasons for giving special treatment to those whose links with a country stem from birth within it. The difference of treatment must therefore be regarded as having had an objective and reasonable justification and, in particular, its results have not been shown to transgress the principle of proportionality.’ The Court then held that Mrs Balkandali was not a victim of discrimination on the ground of birth.\nAs regards Mrs Balkandali, who was a national of the United Kingdom and Colonies, it was not contrary to the Convention to make it an additional requirement for family reunion that she must have been born in the United Kingdom. A different additional requirement is made under Danish law: a requirement of Danish nationality for 28 years. The question is whether [the first applicant] is subjected to discrimination contrary to the Convention owing to this criterion.\nWe find that the criterion of 28 years of Danish nationality has the same aim as the requirement of birth in the United Kingdom, which was accepted by the Court in the 1985 judgment as not being contrary to the Convention: to distinguish a group of nationals who, seen from a general perspective, had lasting and strong ties with the country.\nIn general, a person of 28 years who has held Danish nationality since birth will have stronger real ties with Denmark and greater insight into Danish society than a 28-year-old person who – like [the first applicant] – only established links with Danish society as a young person or an adult. This also applies to Danish nationals who have stayed abroad for a shorter or longer period, for example in connection with education or work. We find that the 28-year-rule is based on an objective criterion, as it must be considered objectively justified to select a group of nationals with such strong ties with Denmark when assessed from a general perspective that it will be unproblematic to grant family reunion with a foreign spouse or cohabitant in Denmark as it will normally be possible for such spouse or cohabitant to be successfully integrated into Danish society.\nEven though it is conceivable that a national who has had Danish nationality for 28 years may in fact have weaker ties with Denmark than a national who has had Danish nationality for a shorter period, this does not imply that the 28-year rule should be set aside pursuant to the Convention. Reference is made to the case, relative to the then applicable additional British requirement of place of birth considered by the European Court of Human Rights, of a national who was not born in the United Kingdom, but who had in reality stronger ties with the United Kingdom than other nationals who satisfied the requirement of place of birth, but had moved abroad with their parents at a tender age or maybe had even been born abroad. It is noted in this respect that it was sufficient to satisfy the then British requirement of place of birth for only one of the relevant person’s parents to have been born in the United Kingdom.\nWe also find that the consequences of the 28-year rule cannot be considered disproportionate relative to [the first applicant]. [He] was born in Togo in 1971 and came to Denmark in 1993. After nine years’ residence, he became a Danish national in 2002. In 2003 he married [the second applicant] and applied for reunion with his spouse in Denmark. The application was finally refused in 2004. The factual circumstances of this case are thus in most material aspects identical to Mrs Balkandali’s situation assessed by the Court in its judgment in 1985, when the Court found that the principle of proportionality had not been violated. She was born in Egypt in 1946 or 1948. She first went to the United Kingdom in 1973 and obtained nationality of the United Kingdom and Colonies in 1979. She married a Turkish national Bekir Balkandali in 1981, and their application for spousal reunion in the United Kingdom for the husband of a British national was refused later in 1981. A comparison of the two cases reveals that both [the first applicant] and Mrs Balkandali only came to Denmark and the United Kingdom, respectively, as adults. In [the first applicant’s] case, the application was refused when he had resided in Denmark for 11 years, two of which as a Danish national. In Mrs Balkandali’s case, the application was refused after she had resided in the United Kingdom for eight years, two of which as a British national.\nOn these grounds we find no basis in case-law to find that the 28-year rule implied discrimination against [the first applicant] contrary to the Convention.\nAs regards the significance of the European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997, we find for the reasons stated by the High Court that it cannot be a consequence of Article 5 § 2 of this Convention that the scope of the prohibition against discrimination based on Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights should be extended further than justified by the 1985 judgment.\nWe hold on this basis that the refusal of residence for [the second applicant] given by the Ministry of Integration cannot be set aside as being invalid because it is contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.\nFor this reason we vote in favour of upholding the High Court judgment.” 30.  A minority of three judges were of the view that the 28-year rule implied indirect discrimination between persons who were born Danish citizens and persons who had acquired Danish citizenship later in life. Since persons who were born Danish citizens would usually be of Danish ethnic origin, whereas persons who acquired Danish citizenship at a later point in their life would generally be of foreign ethnic origin, the 28-year rule also entailed indirect discrimination between ethnic Danish citizens and Danish citizens with a foreign ethnic background. More specifically, they stated as follows:\n“As stated by the majority, the requirement of section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act that the spouses’ or cohabitants’ aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their aggregate ties with another country (the attachment requirement) does not apply when the resident person has been a Danish national for 28 years (the 28‑year rule).\nThe 28-year rule applies both to persons born Danish nationals and to persons acquiring Danish nationality later in life, but in reality the significance of the rule differs greatly for the two groups of Danish nationals. For persons born Danish nationals, the rule only implies that the attachment requirement applies until they are 28 years old. For persons not raised in Denmark who acquire Danish nationality later in life, the rule implies that the attachment requirement applies until 28 years have passed after the date when any such person became a Danish national. As an example, [the first applicant] who became a Danish national at the age of 31, will be subject to the attachment requirement until he is 59 years old. The 28-year rule therefore implies that the major restriction of the right to spousal reunion resulting from the attachment requirement will affect persons who only acquire Danish nationality later in life far more often and with a far greater impact than persons born with Danish nationality. Hence, the 28-year rule results in obvious indirect difference in treatment between the two groups of Danish nationals.\nThe vast majority of persons born Danish nationals will be of Danish ethnic origin, while persons acquiring Danish nationality later in life will generally be of other ethnic origin. At the same time, the 28-year rule therefore implies obvious indirect difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish ethnic origin and Danish nationals of other ethnic origin regarding the right to spousal reunion.\nPursuant to section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act, the attachment requirement may be disregarded if exceptional reasons make this appropriate. According to the preparatory work of the 2003 Act, this possibility of exemption is to be administered in such a manner that aliens who were born and raised in Denmark or who came to Denmark as small children and were raised here must be treated comparably to Danish nationals, which means that they will be exempt from the attachment requirement when they have lawfully resided in Denmark for 28 years. However, relative to persons who were not raised in Denmark, but acquire Danish nationality later in life, this does not alter the situation described above concerning the indirect difference in treatment implied by the 28-year rule.\nWhen the attachment requirement was introduced by Act No. 424 of 31 May 2000, all Danish nationals were exempt from the requirement. Act No. 365 of 6 June 2002 made the attachment requirement generally applicable also to Danish nationals. Concerning the reason for this, the preparatory work in respect of the Act states, inter alia: ‘With resident aliens and Danish nationals of foreign extraction it is a widespread marriage pattern to marry a person from their country of origin, among other reasons due to parental pressure ... The Government find that the attachment requirement, as it is worded today, does not take sufficient account of the existence of this marriage pattern among both resident foreigners and resident Danish nationals of foreign extraction. There are thus also Danish nationals who are not well integrated into Danish society and where integration of a spouse newly arrived in Denmark may therefore entail major problems.’ By Act No. 1204 of 27 December 2003, the application of the attachment requirement to Danish nationals was restricted through the 28-year rule, and the preparatory work in respect of the Act stated that the purpose was, inter alia, ‘to ensure that Danish expatriates with strong and lasting ties to Denmark in the form of at least 28 years of Danish nationality will be able to obtain spousal reunion in Denmark’. In the light of these notes, it is considered a fact that the indirect difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish ethnic extraction and Danish nationals of other ethnic extraction following from the 28-year rule is an intended consequence.\nUnder Article 14 of the Convention, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised by the Convention, including the individual’s right under Article 8 to respect for his or her family life, must be ‘secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. As mentioned above, the 28-year rule implies both indirect difference in treatment between persons born Danish nationals and persons only acquiring Danish nationality later in life and, in the same connection, indirect difference in treatment between Danish nationals of Danish ethnic extraction and Danish nationals of other ethnic extraction. Both these types of indirect difference in treatment must be considered to fall within Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. The two types of indirect difference in treatment implied by the 28‑year rule are therefore contrary to Article 14 unless the difference in treatment can be considered objectively justified and proportionate.\nThe European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997, which has been ratified by Denmark, provides in Article 5 § 2: ‘Each State Party shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently’. The memorandum of 14 January 2005 made by the Ministry of Integration and the memorandum of November 2006 made by the working group composed of representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Integration state that the provision solely concerns issues on the revocation and loss of nationality. In our opinion it is dubious whether there is any basis for such a restrictive interpretation as the provision, according to its wording, comprises any difference in treatment exercised as a consequence of how and when nationality was acquired. As is apparent from the explanatory report, the provision is not a prohibition from which no derogation may be made, and the provision must be taken to mean that it may be derogated from if the difference in treatment is objectively justified and proportionate. However, when assessing the 28-year rule relative to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, we consider it necessary to include the fact that, at least according to its wording, Article 5 § 2 of the European Convention on Nationality comprises a general provision stating that any difference in treatment between different groups of a State Party’s own nationals is basically prohibited.\nIn an assessment made under Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention, another factor to be taken into consideration is the crucial importance of being entitled to settle with one’s spouse in the country of one’s nationality.\nAs mentioned, Danish nationals were originally generally exempt from the attachment requirement. The Supreme Court established in a judgment reproduced on p. 2086 in the Danish Weekly Law Reports for 2005 that discrimination relative to the right to spousal reunion based on whether the resident spouse is a Danish or foreign national is not contrary to the prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. In this respect, the Supreme Court referred to paragraphs 84 to 86 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 28 May 1985 in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom. Difference in treatment based on nationality must be seen, inter alia, in the light of the right of Danish nationals to settle in Denmark, and no significance can be attributed to the fact that such discrimination is not considered contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 when assessing whether it is permissible to implement a scheme implying a difference in treatment between different groups of Danish nationals. In our opinion, no crucial significance can be attributed to paragraphs 87 to 89 of the Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali judgment either in this assessment, among other reasons because difference in treatment based on the length of a person’s period of nationality is not comparable to a difference in treatment based on place of birth.\nIn the cases in which the attachment requirement applies, some of the factors emphasised are whether the resident spouse has strong links to Denmark by virtue of his or her childhood and schooling in Denmark. Such strong attachment to Denmark will exist in most cases where a person has held Danish nationality for 28 years. However, when assessing whether the difference in treatment implied by the 28‑year rule can be considered objectively justified, it is not sufficient to compare persons not raised in Denmark who acquire Danish nationality later in life with the large group of persons who were born Danish nationals and were also raised in Denmark. If exemption from the attachment requirement was justified only by regard for the latter group of Danish nationals, the exemption should have been delimited differently. The crucial element must therefore be a comparison with persons who were born Danish nationals and have been Danish nationals for 28 years, but who were not raised in Denmark and may perhaps not at any time have had their residence in Denmark. In our opinion, it cannot be considered a fact that, from a general perspective, this group of Danish nationals has stronger ties with Denmark than persons who have acquired Danish nationality after entering and residing in Denmark for a number of years. It should be taken into consideration in that connection that one of the general conditions for acquiring Danish nationality by naturalisation is that the relevant person has resided in Denmark for at least nine years, has proved his or her proficiency in the Danish language and knowledge of Danish society and meets the requirement of self-support.\nAgainst that background, it is our opinion that the indirect difference in treatment implied by the 28-year rule cannot be considered objectively justified, and that it is therefore contrary to Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention.\nThe consequence of this must be that, when applying section 9, subsection 7, of the Aliens Act to Danish nationals, the authorities must limit the 28-year rule to being solely an age requirement, meaning that the attachment requirement does not apply in cases where the resident spouse is a Danish national and is at least 28 years old.\nAccordingly, we vote for ruling in favour of the [applicants’] claim to the effect that the Ministry of Integration must declare invalid the decision of 27 August 2004, thereby remitting the case for renewed consideration.\nIn view of the outcome of the voting on this claim we see no reason to consider the claim for compensation.” 31.  The applicants remained in Sweden and did not subsequently apply for family reunion in Denmark, which they could have done under section 9, subsection 7 of the Aliens Act, had the first applicant decided to reside in Denmark anew. He maintained a job in Copenhagen and therefore commuted every day from Malmö in Sweden to Copenhagen in Denmark.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Sibinj. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was a civil servant of the City of Slavonski Brod, working in its Office for Public Relations and Protocol (Grad Slavonski Brod, Ured za odnose s javnošću i protokol – hereinafter “the City of Slavonski Brod”). In 2007 he was suspended from the civil service on account of having been accused of severe breaches of his official duties. 8.  For the duration of his suspension, that is to say between September 2007 and September 2008, the applicant was entitled to monthly salary compensation in the amount of 60% of the salary remitted in the month prior to his suspension from the civil service. 9.  On 5 September 2008 the Osijek Civil Service Tribunal (Službenički sud u Osijeku) found the applicant guilty of severe breaches of his official duties and fined him 10% of the salary paid to him in the month in which the said sanction was imposed. 10.  On 14 October 2008, after the applicant lodged an appeal, the Superior Civil Service Tribunal (Viši službenički sud) amended the impugned decision and fined the applicant 5% of his salary paid in the month in which the said sanction was imposed. 11.  On 3 November 2008 the applicant lodged an application for the reimbursement of the portion of his gross salary – in the total amount of 78,428.47 Croatian kunas ((HRK), approximately 10,900 euros (EUR) at the time) – withheld during the suspension period between September 2007 and September 2008, together with accrued default interest running from the date of his suspension until payment of the said portion. He was of the opinion that by withholding 40% of his salary for a period of 12 months and imposing a fine on him the administrative bodies had punished him twice. 12.  By a decision of 17 November 2008 the City of Slavonski Brod dismissed that application. 13.  The applicant then lodged an appeal, which was dismissed as ill-founded by the same administrative body that delivered the above-mentioned decision (that is to say the City of Slavonski Brod). However, in its decision of 22 December 2008 it gave the instruction that the applicant had a right to bring an administrative action against it before the Administrative Court. 14.  On 22 January 2009 the applicant brought an administrative action, in accordance with the City of Slavonski Brod’s ruling. 15.  On 1 January 2012 certain amendments to the Court Act entered into force and the Administrative Court became the High Administrative Court. 16.  By a decision of 4 January 2012 the High Administrative Court, relying on sections 9 and 30(1), point 5, of the Administrative Disputes Act, declined jurisdiction in respect of the subject matter, stating that an ordinary municipal court (redovni, općinski sud) was the appropriate court to hear the applicant’s case, and declared the applicant’s action inadmissible. This decision was final. On 16 February 2012 it served its decision on the applicant’s representative. 17.  On 12 March 2012 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. He complained, inter alia, that his right to a fair hearing, in particular his right of access to court, as guaranteed by Article 29 of the Croatian Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, had been violated when the High Administrative Court had declared his action inadmissible. In particular, he argued that according to the Supreme Court’s case-law, ordinary municipal courts did not have jurisdiction over disputes arising from legally binding decisions of administrative bodies. He also argued that even if he had brought a civil action, it would have been time-barred because it had taken the High Administrative Court more than three years to declare his administrative action inadmissible. 18.  By a decision of 5 July 2012 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the case raised no constitutional issue. On 17 July 2012 it served its decision on the applicant’s representative. 19. On 6 September 2012 the applicant brought a civil action in the Slavonski Brod Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) for reimbursement of salary arrears withheld between September 2007 and September 2008. 20.  By a judgment of 20 March 2013 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant’s claim as time-barred. It held, inter alia, that given that the High Administrative Court had declared the applicant’s administrative action inadmissible, it could not be deemed that the statutory limitation period had been interrupted. It relied on section 242(2) of the Civil Obligations Act. 21.  By a judgment of 12 August 2013 the Slavonski Brod County Court (Županijski sud u Slavonskom Brodu) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment of 20 March 2013.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Both applicants were born in 1943 and live in Vladivostok. 6.  The first applicant is the editor of a weekly newspaper, Arsenyevskiye Vesti (Арсеньевские вести), and the second applicant is a journalist and columnist there. It has a circulation of 17,100. The newspaper is published and distributed in the Primorskiy Region. 7.  In late 2003 during a campaign for elections to the national parliament, the State Duma, the newspaper published a number of satirical and parodic articles on the course of the campaign in the Primorskiy Region. They featured a Russian online cartoon character, a girl called Masyanya, who was very popular at the time, going from St Petersburg to Vladivostok as an election observer. 8.  An article in issue no. 46 of the newspaper for 13-19 November 2003 contained a pretend interview with Masyanya, stating that on her arrival at Vladivostok Airport she had been attacked and injured by local prostitutes, who did not want outsiders competing with them and who had forced her to return to St Petersburg. Masyanya had had a particularly fierce fight with a certain Vasilinka, the director of an escort agency called Contact or Image! (агентство интимных услуг Контакт или имидж!). The article stated that Vasilinka had refused to make any comments. 9.  In issue no. 47, dated 20-26 November 2003, in a column called “Nadezhda Alisimchik’s Hummock of View”[1] (Кочка зрения Надежды Алисимчик) written by the second applicant, Arsenyevskiye Vesti published a pretend interview with Vasilinka. The article was headlined “Candidates must be known from the inside!” (Кандидатов нужно знать изнутри!). The relevant part read as follows:\n“Nonetheless, we managed to get in touch with Vasilinka, the director of the escort agency Contact or Image! for an interview and photograph. Vasilinka proved to be a dame with a touch of greed and was pulled by a free advert for her agency in our newspaper, although she warned us that she would not answer a single question about that ‘bitch’ Masyanya.\n‘This ragtag bunch from St Petersburg has no reason to be here because my agency Contact or Image can handle the elections – all my girls are professionals, and I myself am a lawyer and have extensive working experience as a prosecutor. Sporadically, during elections, I run the Contact or Image escort agency in coordination with superior organisations. There is no conflict here – the clientele is the same, and there is no need to spend money on protection on the side. Besides, this is a good opportunity for the Contact or Image escort agency to study its clients from the inside, which is particularly important when working with candidates to the State Duma. This is, so to say, a governmental order, which, I think, is also supported by the President. Especially as it’s for extra income, and there’s no such thing as too much money, even when one is at liberty,’ Vasilinka told our newspaper.\nWe asked this prostitute-werewolf to comment on the list of candidates to the State Duma for circuit no. 52 ...” 10.  The article was followed by a list of candidates and Vasilinka’s comments on them, using slang words and expressions commonly used in the criminal underworld. Some candidates were described in more positive terms than others. To the left of the article was a picture of a female dressed in a one-dollar banknote. The figure’s left hand pointed in the direction of three handwritten letters which were reproduced in small type. The face on the figure, which had long, flowing hair, was a photograph of the then prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, Mr V. 11.  On 9 December 2003 Mr V., in a private prosecution, brought criminal proceedings against the applicants, under Article 130 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code, before the Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 27 in the Frunzenskiy District of Vladivostok (“the Justice of the Peace”). He alleged that the article headlined “Candidates must be known from the inside” and the picture published in issue no. 47 of Arsenyevskiye Vesti for 20-26 November 2003 had been highly insulting, had aimed at damaging his honour and human dignity and had ascribed negative characteristics to his personality in an indecent, cynical and defamatory manner. He pointed out, in particular, that there was no doubt that the article had referred to him as it had stated that the character Vasilinka, “was a lawyer herself and had extensive working experience as a prosecutor”. Mr V. further submitted that the article in question, and the comments in respect of the list of the candidates, had been written in slang words and expressions and had represented him as an immoral and corrupt “prostitute-werewolf”, thus clearly indicating the intention of the writers to humiliate and insult him. He also complained that the picture accompanying the article had been put together in an indecent manner, in breach of the established rules of behaviour and public morals. 12.  By a judgment of 2 June 2004 the Justice of the Peace convicted the applicants as charged. The court noted in particular:\n“In issue no. 47 for 20-26 November 2003 in the column headlined “Nadezhda Alisimchik’s Hummock of View” the newspaper Arsenyevskiye Vesti published an article ‘Candidates must be known from the inside’ which was accompanied by a photographic collage showing a female body covered with a one-dollar banknote. The photographic collage shows the face of the claimant, the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, [Mr V.], portrayed with long hair. The article contains an interview with ‘Vasilinka’, the director of an escort agency and states that it was possible not only to get in touch with her, but also to obtain her photograph. The text of the article and the portrayal of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, [Mr V.], as an immoral and corrupt ‘prostitute-werewolf’ in an indecent and insulting manner damage the claimant’s honour and dignity.\nThe claimant’s representative has highlighted the insulting nature of the information published in the newspaper ... pointing out that the claimant is a public figure and often takes part in TV programmes; his photograph has been published on numerous occasions in the media, and [Mr V.’s] face is therefore well known to people in the Primorskiy Region.\nHaving examined the photographic collage and the text of the article ... the use of the name ‘prostitute-werewolf Vasilinka’, the explanations of the claimant’s lawyer, who has insisted that the character’s name in the article and the surname of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region have the same root, and that the article states that the character is a lawyer by profession and has extensive working experience as a prosecutor, the court concludes that [the applicants] undertook deliberate actions which were insulting to [Mr V.], and which were committed publicly as [the insult was disseminated] in a newspaper, that is to say in the media.\n... The applicants’ actions ...were intended to damage the honour and dignity and the professional reputation of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, [Mr V.]...” 13.  The court found the applicants guilty of aggravated insult as it had been published in the media, and fined each of them 30,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (approximately 860 euros (EUR)). 14.  On 19 July 2004 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladivistok (“the District Court”) delivered its decision in the appeal proceedings. 15.  At the hearing the applicants had contested the guilty verdict. The second applicant had stated that the article in question had been written as a parody of various negative social phenomena, especially corruption during the elections and the role of the law-enforcement agencies. The first applicant stated that the article had been misinterpreted and that it had in fact concerned violations committed by law-enforcement agencies during the election campaign. She also argued that the picture had not been related to the article, nor had it depicted the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region. 16.  The appellate court found it established that “[the applicants had] deliberately insulted” Mr V. when in issue no. 47 of Arsenyevskiye Vesti for 20-26 November 2003 they had in the column called “Nadezhda Alisimchik’s Hummock of View” published an article entitled “Candidates must be known from the inside!”, accompanied by a photographic collage representing a female body with the face of the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, the body having been covered with a one-dollar banknote. In the District Court’s opinion, “the text of the article and the photographic collage [were] of an insulting nature, ascribe[d] negative characteristics, expressed in an indecent manner, to Mr V.’s personality and damage[d] the honour and dignity of Mr V., the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, as a private individual and as an official”. 17.  The appellate court observed, in particular, that the article had involved an interview with the director of an escort agency, “Vasilinka”, who “sporadically, during elections, [ran] the escort agency Contact or Image in coordination with superior organisations”, and that the article was followed by “director Vasilinka’s rating of the candidates”, using slang words and expressions on her behalf. The photographic collage had illustrated the text about “Vasilinka”, a “prostitute-werewolf”, who “herself is a lawyer and has extensive working experience as a prosecutor”. In the District Court’s opinion, “the said information [was] of an insulting nature, since it degrade[d] Mr V.’s honour and dignity”. In reaching that conclusion, the District Court “[took] into account the fact that the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region, Mr V., [was] a public figure and his photograph [had] been published in the media on many occasions ...” 18.  With reference to its findings, the appellate court concluded that the applicants “[had taken] deliberate actions which [had been] of an insulting nature in respect of Mr V. and were performed in public, as [the impugned information] was disseminated in the media”. In the District Court’s opinion, although Mr V.’s surname had not been mentioned in the article, the image which had illustrated the article had used a photograph of him. It had therefore been clear that information “of an insulting nature” had related to Mr V. The District Court observed that, “by virtue of his office, Mr V. [was] a public figure and readers [could] therefore easily understand that the photographic collage [showed] Mr V.; so that readers [were] not mistaken, the name of the character in the article, ‘Vasilinka’, [had] the same root as Mr V.’s surname, and the character [was] a lawyer by profession and has extensive working experience as a prosecutor”. 19.  The District Court further held as follows:\n“The court cannot accept the defendants’ arguments that it has not been proven that [Mr  V.] was insulted as, in the court’s opinion, it is the text of the article and the photographic collage that are themselves insulting. Judging by its location on the page and its composition, the said photographic collage accompanies the article headlined “Candidates must be known from the inside”. Besides, the text itself refers to the fact that the photographic collage represents that very ‘Vasilinka’ who is the character in the article. The article states ‘nonetheless we managed to get in touch with the director of the escort agency Contact or Image, Vasilinka, for an interview and a photograph. Vasilinka proved to be a dame with a touch of greed and was pulled by a free advert for her agency in our newspaper’.\n...In the court’s opinion, the offence took place in the form of public speech in the media, [the applicants] acted deliberately, the related words ‘prostitute’ and ‘werewolf’ indicate an intention to humiliate, dishonour and disgrace the subject of the article and photographic collage and, in a figurative sense, portray condemnable and distinctly negative characteristics, which are seen by the public as well as the person to whom they are addressed as insulting. In the court’s opinion, representing the prosecutor of the Primorskiy Region as an immoral and corrupt ‘prostitute-werewolf’ is intended to ascribe distinctly negative characteristics to [Mr V.’s] personality in an indecent form.” 20.  The appellate court concluded that the first-instance judgment had been well-founded and dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 21.  By a decision of 30 August 2004 the Primorskiy Regional Court upheld the applicants’ conviction at final instance, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. 22.  On 23 March 2005 a bailiff issued a writ of execution in respect of the first applicant, ordering her to pay the fine and an execution fee of RUB 2,200. 23.  On 5 April 2005 the first applicant informed the bailiff that she was unable to pay the fine in one amount owing to a lack of funds. She requested that she be authorised to pay by instalments over six months. It appears that her request was refused and the first applicant had to borrow a part of the fine from the bank. According to the first applicant, she was able to pay back the money she borrowed six months later. 24.  The second applicant was also unable to pay the total amount of the fine and execution fee in one amount. She paid in instalments by deductions from her wages until 28 February 2006.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant, Ms Floare Cacuci, was born on 2 March 1939 and lives in Oradea. She is an accounting expert and the owner and general manager of the second applicant, S.C. Virra & Cont Pad SRL, a single‑member company based in Oradea. Both applicants were members of the Romanian Institute of Accounting Experts and Certified Accountants (Corpul experților contabili și contabililor autorizați din România). 6.  On 30 July 2001 the criminal department of the Bihor County Police ordered a forensic accounting report in a criminal case it was dealing with. The first applicant was appointed to produce this report, which concerned pecuniary damage to the State budget in the sum of 22,143,258,699 Romanian lei (ROL), allegedly caused by S.C. T.P. SRL, a private company. The first applicant’s fees in relation to that expert report amounted to ROL 497,250,000.\nClaiming that she had not been fully paid for the report, on 25 January 2004 the first applicant submitted to the county police only approximately ninety-five pages of the report, which actually consisted of more than five hundred pages. She only submitted the conclusions of the report. The annexes justifying the conclusions were thus not appended on that occasion, but at a later date (see paragraph 22 below).\nThe first applicant alleged that, when asked by the Police to hand in the remaining pages of the report, she had replied that the report was on her computer, and that, since she had not received any payment for it, she was not able to print it, as it was extremely long. 7.  On 25 March 2005 the first applicant, together with two other accounting experts, was appointed by the Oradea District Court to produce a forensic accounting report in a criminal case concerning tax fraud, forgery and the use of forged documents – offences allegedly committed by two third parties, M.G.S. and C.V.C, in their capacity as managers of two private companies. A fourth expert, who was assisting M.G.S. and C.V.C., was also appointed to participate in producing the report.\nThe conclusions of the report, which was submitted on 15 September 2005 by the three experts and with which the assisting expert agreed, noted that no damage had been caused to the State budget by the managerial activities of M.G.S. M.G.S. and C.V.C were acquitted on 7 December 2005 by the Oradea District Court. That judgment was later upheld by the Bihor County Court on 28 May 2007 on appeal, and by the Oradea Court of Appeal on 22 May 2008 in an appeal on points of law. 8.  On 18 October 2005 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Oradea District Court proposed to initiate ex officio criminal investigations against the first applicant in relation to an offence of intellectual forgery (fals intelectual, defined by Article 289 of the Criminal Code) in connection with the second forensic accounting report. The prosecutor noted that the report was based solely on documents provided by M.G.S., in spite of the fact that it stated that the district court’s case file had been consulted. In the case file, there was no request from any of the experts to either consult the file or obtain copies of it. The conclusions of the report were therefore not based on all the documents on file, in spite of what the report stated. 9.  The prosecutor’s proposal also concerned the two other accounting experts, who were investigated for the same offence as the first applicant. 10.  The proposal to initiate criminal investigations in respect of the first applicant was confirmed by the prosecutor’s office on 19 October 2005. 11.  On 20 October 2005 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Oradea District Court filed an application with the court, asking it to issue a search warrant in respect of the first applicant’s home.\nThe prosecutor argued that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed intellectual forgery while producing the second forensic accounting report, in order to help one of the defendants, M.G.S, avoid investigation. The grounds for this suspicion were: the report’s conclusions contradicted the conclusions of a previous report which had been produced by another accounting expert during the criminal investigation; the report objectives proposed by M.G.S. had most likely been copied and pasted into the report itself, the two documents having the same page settings, wording, spelling and grammar mistakes; and there was no proof that the first applicant had ever studied the case file in the court’s archives or requested copies of the documents in order to produce the expert report, therefore the report was probably based solely on information provided by M.G.S.\nThe prosecutor also stated that, in accordance with the decision of 19 October 2005, a criminal investigation had already been initiated in respect of the first applicant in relation to intellectual forgery.\nThe prosecutor further submitted that important evidence relating to the production of the second expert report – such as a computer, a printer, files and documents (whether on paper or on disc) – could be obtained from the first applicant’s home. 12.  On the same day the Oradea District Court – sitting as a single judge, Judge F.P. – allowed the prosecutor’s application and issued a warrant to search the first applicant’s home, with the aim of discovering evidence concerning the alleged offence of intellectual forgery. In accordance with the relevant domestic law, the decision was taken in camera, in the presence of the prosecutor and without summoning the parties.\nThe warrant was to last three days, the court stating that the search was to be carried out in compliance with Articles 101, 103-108 and 111 of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure (hereafter “the RCCP” – see paragraph 46 below). It was formulated as follows:\n“Based on Article 100 of the RCCP, in view of the prosecutor’s application issued on 20 October 2005 and the investigative work which has been presented, namely: the minutes attesting to the decision of the prosecutor to initiate criminal investigations ex officio, confirmation of the proposal to initiate criminal investigations against Cacuci Floare in relation to the offence of intellectual forgery as set out in Article 289 of the Criminal Code, and the forensic reports included in the file, [the court] authorises that a home search (percheziție domiciliară) be performed at the suspect’s place of residence, [the suspect being] Cacuci Floare, daughter of ..., born on ..., in Oradea, ..., in the Bihor District.\nThe search shall be performed in compliance with Articles 101, 103-108 and 111 of the RCCP.\nThis warrant is to last three days from the day of issue.\nGiven in camera on 20 October 2005 at 3 p.m.” 13.   According to the first applicant, on 21 October 2005, while she was in the street, having just left her house, she was stopped by a police officer, who told her that he had a search warrant for her home. The first applicant asked to be assisted by her lawyer. The police officer then searched her bag, from which he seized some personal documents, including an orange notebook containing various phone numbers. Subsequently, a prosecutor entered the first applicant’s home in order to perform the home search, accompanied by three police officers, one of whom was an information technology (IT) specialist. 14.  According to the Government’s version of events – supported by the documents in the file, as issued by the criminal investigating authorities (see paragraph 42 below) – the search of the bag was carried out inside the first applicant’s home. 15.  The first applicant’s lawyer arrived at the beginning of the search, namely around ten minutes after the first applicant had been stopped in the street (see paragraph 13 above); two assistant witnesses, who were neighbours of the first applicant, were also present during the search. 16.  The prosecutor’s notes in the search report produced on that occasion at the place of residence of the first applicant state that the first applicant was asked to surrender the items used to commit the alleged offence of intellectual forgery, namely the computer, the printer, and the documents on which the second expert report was based (Articles 96-99 of the RCCP, see paragraph 45 below). The first applicant confirmed the existence of such items at her place of residence.\nAccording to the search report, the first floor of the building was occupied by the first applicant’s office, where she claimed to keep the objects which had been requested and other objects essential to her professional duties.\nSeveral items and documents were found, the first applicant claiming that everything belonged to the second applicant. She showed the prosecutor a lease contract concluded between herself and the second applicant in respect of the use of one half of the immovable property.\nAccording to the report, the following objects were seized: the computer’s central processing unit, one printer, four files and documents concerning various forensic accounting reports, one CD, forty-two floppy discs, an orange notebook containing several notes written by the first applicant and telephone numbers – one of which belonged to M.G.S., see paragraph 7 above – and an empty printer cartridge box. 17.  The applicants argued that, while the copy of the search report handed to them at that moment had made no mention of the manner in which the seized items had been sealed, the copy in the criminal file contained supplementary information on page 4, mentioning that the objects had been put in a sealed cardboard box labelled MAI (the Ministry of Internal Affairs) 15980. 18.  At the end of the search the first applicant declared, in the presence of her lawyer, that she would submit written objections at a later stage. The witnesses had no objections concerning the manner in which the search had been carried out. 19.  According to the report, the search started at 8.45 a.m. and was finished by 12.30 p.m. 20.  On 18 November 2005, at the request of the prosecutor, the Oradea District Court issued a warrant for a search of the computer system and IT data seized from the applicants on 21 October 2005, namely one CD and forty-two floppy discs. The court gave reasons for its decision, accepting that there was sufficient indication that the IT data would prove that the impugned expert report had been partly copied from a document given to the first applicant by M.G.S (see paragraph 11 above).\nThe warrant was to last three days, starting on 21 November 2005. 21.  According to the applicant, on 18 November 2005 she was summoned to the Cluj District police headquarters to participate in the unsealing of the computer on 21 November 2005. She went there with her lawyer, where they noted that the sealed box was different to the box which had been used at her house during the search (see paragraphs 16-17 above). She therefore asked that the two witnesses who had been present at the search be summoned to attest that the box was different, but the request was refused. Consequently, together with her lawyer, she decided to leave the police headquarters without attending the unsealing and search procedure. 22.  On 5 December 2005 the first applicant submitted the missing 497 pages from the first expert report (see paragraph 6 above) to the Oradea District Court, following payment of 60% of her fee. 23.  On 8 November 2005, pursuant to Articles 275-2781 of the RCCP (see paragraph 47 below), the first applicant filed a complaint against the search carried out on 21 October 2004 (see paragraphs 13-19 above). She contested both the search itself and the manner in which it had been carried out.\nThe first applicant submitted that the warrant had been issued only in respect of her home, and not in respect of the registered office of the second applicant. In spite of that, a search of the whole house had been carried out, including the space used by the second applicant. The seized items and documents belonged to the second applicant.\nThe first applicant also submitted that the search had not been necessary, and could have been avoided if she had been asked to submit the relevant items and documents, as set out in Article 98 of the RCCP (see paragraph 45 below). Furthermore, no reasons had been given to justify the search measure.\nShe argued that the limits of the search warrant had been exceeded by the search carried out in respect of her purse, which constituted a body search (percheziţie corporală), and by the fact that she had been prevented from using her mobile phone during the search.\nShe complained of the manner in which the electronic devices seized had been sealed on that occasion.\nShe further referred to the seizure of various items from her home, namely “personal documents and personal notebooks which had no connection to the criminal charge against her”, concluding that all the above circumstances constituted evidence of a breach of her right to a private life, personal inviolability, professional secrecy, and right of property. 24.  On 24 November 2005 the head prosecutor of the prosecutor’s office attached to the District Court of Oradea dismissed the first applicant’s claims, finding that the complaint against the search measure itself was inadmissible, given the lack of specific legal provisions allowing for such an appeal, while the complaint concerning the carrying out of the search was ill-founded. 25.  Concerning the appeal against the search measure itself, the prosecutor gave reasons for his inadmissibility decision, stating that it was inconceivable that any search warrant application would be debated in adversarial proceedings, as such a procedure would impede the very purpose of the search, namely the discovery and collection of specific evidence from a specific place without prior notice.\nThe prosecutor stated that the search at the applicant’s home had been conducted in accordance with the law. The warrant had been issued in respect of her residence as stated on her identification documents. The prosecutor submitted that the investigating authorities had had no obligation to check whether that residence was also the registered office of various private companies. In the impugned forensic expert report, the first applicant had given her identification details, including her place of residence, without mentioning that the report had been issued by or on behalf of the second applicant. Moreover, during the search, the first applicant had submitted a lease contract concluded between herself and the second applicant concerning one half of the immovable property, without specifying or determining which half belonged to which party.\nThe prosecutor also stated that the investigating authorities had been obliged to seize all pieces of physical evidence found at the search location, irrespective of who owned them, and that the pieces not belonging to the suspect had been returned to their owner at the end of the criminal trial. 26.  Concerning the body search, namely the search of the first applicant’s bag, the prosecutor submitted that the relevant forensic rules set out clearly and authoritatively that such a search had to be performed before the start of a home search, “so as to preclude any potential act of aggression against the authorities or self-aggression, but also so as to locate and collect any potential corpora delicti thus hidden by the searched person (in [this] case, documents)”.\nThe rules also provided that the investigating authorities were obliged to prevent any people inside the building in question from communicating with people outside, whether by phone or otherwise, which justified the fact that the first applicant had been temporarily prevented from using her mobile phone. 27.  In respect of the manner in which the seized electronic devices had been sealed, the prosecutor stated that the report produced on that occasion had been signed by both the first applicant and her lawyer, and no objections had been raised. As mentioned in the report, the central processing unit of the computer had been sealed in a cardboard box with the MAI seal. In any event, the manner in which the seized objects had been sealed could not affect the legality of the search, but possibly their use as evidence in the criminal proceedings. 28.  The first applicant contested that decision before both the prosecutor’s office attached to the County Court of Bihor and the Oradea District Court. 29.  It is unclear whether any response to that complaint was given by the prosecutor’s office. In any event, the same complaint was assessed by the domestic courts in two separate sets of proceedings, as detailed below. 30.  In the first set of proceedings, started by the first applicant on 23 December 2005, the Oradea District Court gave its judgment on 29 June 2006, dismissing the first applicant’s complaint as inadmissible in respect of the search measure itself, and ill-founded in respect of the manner in which the search had been carried out. The court stated that, in the event that she was indicted, the first applicant would be entitled to lodge with the criminal courts complaints regarding the search and the acts of the prosecutor. 31.  The first applicant appealed. On 28 November 2006 the Bihor County Court dismissed her appeal, upholding the first instance court’s decision. It considered that the search had been lawful and in compliance with the warrant issued by the Oradea District Court. Furthermore, at the material time, the first applicant, assisted by her lawyer, had not objected to either the search or the manner in which it had been carried out.\nThe court considered that it would be “abusive” to have an adversarial procedure for debating the necessity of a search, either before or after it was carried out. 32.  In the second set of proceedings, a complaint lodged by the first applicant on 4 January 2006 reiterated the same main arguments as those presented in the proceedings described above. In particular, it referred to the fact that the limits of the search warrant had been exceeded as follows: the warrant had only been issued in respect of her home, and not in respect of the registered office of the second applicant; no warrant had existed in respect of her purse or mobile phone; certain items, like her personal notebooks, had been seized even though they had no connection with the criminal charge. The computer had been seized without being appropriately sealed, therefore the first applicant had refused to take it back in the absence of verification and confirmation by an expert that the IT data had not been altered. The first applicant argued that the real aim of the prosecutor and the police had been to seize her computer in order to copy the 497 pages of annexes to the first accounting expert report (see paragraph 6 above).\nIn any event, the search had not been necessary, as she would have surrendered all required items and documents if she had been asked to. 33.  The complaint was allocated to a single judge for determination, Judge F.P., who on 21 February 2006 asked to recuse herself from the case, as it had been she who had examined and approved the application for a search warrant on 20 October 2005 (see paragraph 12 above).\nThat request was dismissed by the President of the Oradea District Court on the same day. It was noted that the first applicant had expressly confirmed that she was not challenging the search measure itself, but the manner in which it had been carried out. In such circumstances, there was no reason for Judge F.P. to withdraw from the case. 34.  In the context of the second set of proceedings, on 28 June 2006 the first applicant lodged an application calling into question the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 100 § 4 of the RCCP (see paragraph 46 below). She claimed that the impugned provisions breached a claimant’s defence rights, right to a fair trial and right to an effective remedy, as he or she was denied the right to participate in proceedings and contest a search measure. 35.  The application was dealt with by the Romanian Constitutional Court (“the Constitutional Court”), which gave its judgment on 30 November 2006, dismissing the objection as ill-founded. The Constitutional Court firstly found that the constitutionality of the impugned provisions had already been examined and found to be in accordance with the Constitution (the court referred to its decision of 21 October 2004, detailed in paragraph 52 below). The court reiterated that only the legislature could dictate the jurisdiction of the domestic courts and trial procedure.\nFurthermore, the Constitutional Court held that the issuing of a search warrant was a procedural measure and not a trial in itself, and that therefore the summoning of parties was not obligatory, especially as a search was conducted in the presence of the interested parties and/or their representative. Moreover, interested parties had at their disposal several opportunities and means to contest any measure taken during a criminal investigation or criminal trial. 36.  The case was sent back to the Oradea District Court, which gave its judgment on 31 January 2007, dismissing the first applicant’s complaint. The court noted that a similar claim lodged by the first applicant in another set of proceedings had already been dismissed by a final judgment (see paragraph 31 above).\nThe court further stated that the search had been carried out in compliance with the domestic legal provisions and in the presence of the prosecutor, the applicant and her lawyer, and no objections had been raised at the material time.\nIt appears that the decision was not appealed against by the first applicant. 37.  In January 2006 the second applicant was struck off the list of the Romanian Institute of Accounting Experts and Certified Accountants; the first applicant was removed from the list from January 2006 until 7 April 2010, allegedly as a result of the criminal investigations against her. 38.  The first applicant was indicted on 27 September 2009, charged with perjury as a witness in a criminal trial, aiding and abetting a perpetrator (with specific reference to the criminal trial concerning M.G.S. and C.V.C.), and spoliation (the material alteration, thereby invalidation) of evidence.\nThe indictment referred to the items seized during the search of 21 October 2005, namely documents relating to the forensic accounting reports issued by the first applicant and relevant to several criminal proceedings against various suspects (C.V.C., A.D., F.K., G.P.); the prosecutor considered that such documents had been withheld by the first applicant for the purpose of obstructing justice.\nThe indictment stated that the criminal proceedings against the two other accounting experts (see paragraph 9 above) were to be terminated (scoatere de sub urmărire penală). 39.  By a judgment of 30 November 2010 the Oradea District Court acquitted the first applicant of all charges.\nIn relation to the charge of perjury, the court held that such a charge was relevant where an expert had been called before a court to give oral evidence, which had not been the case with regard to the first applicant. In relation to the written evidence given by the first applicant in the form of the forensic accounting report, the court held that the report was a collective piece of work produced by the three experts appointed in the case. Even if evidence had been adduced proving that only one of the experts had personally studied the file in the court’s archives, it could not be inferred that the work had been done by the first applicant exclusively and in the absence of consideration of all the relevant documents and consultation with the other experts.\nThe court further stated that there was insufficient proof that the first applicant had favoured M.G.S. The accounting expert report had been produced with the other experts appointed in the case. The first applicant had been selected as an expert in the impugned criminal proceedings from a list of six experts, and it had therefore been impossible for her to plan to help M.G.S in any way.\nWith reference to the documents found at the first applicant’s residence during the search carried out on 21 October 2005, the court stated that they had not been in her possession unlawfully, as all of them had been given to her by the police for the purpose of allowing her to produce the relevant forensic accounting reports. It could therefore not be inferred that the applicant had withheld the documents with the intention of obstructing justice. The court ordered that all IT equipment seized from the first applicant should be returned to her once the judgment became final. 40.  By a judgment of 21 April 2011 the Oradea Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal lodged by the prosecutor and upheld the first-instance court’s judgment, stating essentially that the presumption of innocence in respect of the first applicant had not been rebutted. The only dissenting opinion of the Oradea Court of Appeal considered that the case should have been remitted to the first-instance court for a re-trial, as the first-instance judgment had lacked appropriate reasoning. 41.  The first applicant filed several criminal complaints against the relevant prosecutors and police officers who had requested and carried out the search of 21 October 2005 with various domestic authorities (the Romanian Senate, the High Council of the Judiciary and the Ministry of Internal Affairs), accusing them of abuse of office for carrying out the search in breach of Articles 100-111 of the RCCP (see paragraph 46 below). She reiterated her arguments: a special warrant and a separate report had been needed for the body search (Article 106), and another warrant had been necessary for the search of the company’s registered office (Article 111). 42.  Those complaints were joined and assessed in a unique case file, being dismissed as ill-founded by the Oradea Court of Appeal on 20 September 2006. The court upheld the prosecutor’s decision. In respect of the complaint concerning the body search, it found that the search of the applicant’s bag had been carried out inside her house, as a preliminary step of the actual search measure. Furthermore, the home search warrant had been issued in respect of an address, not in respect of a person or company. The court concluded that all the complaints were ill-founded.\nThat decision was upheld by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 10 November 2006. 43.  The first applicant also submitted to the Court a copy of another undated criminal complaint, which was addressed to the prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. In the complaint, the first applicant claimed that the search report had been forged with regard to the manner in which the computer had been sealed (see paragraphs 16-17 above). She also stated that, at some point after the search, she had noticed that the data on her computer relating to various forensic accounting reports which she had produced had been altered while at the police headquarters, so as to provide evidence to incriminate her.\nIn the absence of any registration number or reference to a domestic file number, it is unclear if and when that complaint was lodged with the domestic authorities; assuming that it was, it is equally unclear whether the first applicant received any response.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, Mr K.S. and his wife Mrs M.S., were born in 1939 and 1942 respectively and live in Lauf. 6.  In 2006 the German secret service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) bought a data carrier from a certain K. for a considerable amount of money. The data carrier contained financial data from the Liechtenstein L. Bank relating to 800 people. K., who had formerly been an employee of the L. Bank, had illegally copied the data. The data carrier was submitted to the German tax investigation authorities, which subsequently instigated proceedings against, inter alia, the applicants, in relation to tax evasion crimes. 7.  On 10 April 2008 the Bochum District Court (“the District Court”), following an application from the Bochum prosecutor’s office, issued a search warrant in respect of the home of the applicants, who were suspected of having committed tax evasion between 2002 and 2006. The search warrant allowed the seizure of papers and other documents concerning the applicants’ capital, both inside and outside Germany, especially documents concerning information on foundations and any documents that could help to determine the true tax liability of the applicants since 2002. 8.  The search warrant indicated that, in the course of investigations against another suspect, the prosecution had obtained information that the applicants had established the “K. Foundation” on 17 January 2000 and the “T.U. S.A.” on 14 June 2000. The applicants were suspected of having made financial investments via these two associations with the L. Bank in Liechtenstein, for which they were liable for tax in Germany. According to the search warrant, the applicants had failed to declare about 50,000 euros (EUR) of the yearly interest accrued from the capital of both the K. Foundation and T.U. S.A. in their tax returns for the years 2002 to 2006. It indicated that the applicants had evaded tax payments of EUR 16,360 in 2002, EUR 24,270 in 2003, EUR 22,500 in 2004, EUR 18,512 in 2005 and EUR 18,000 in 2006. The search warrant stated that the house search was urgently needed in order to find further evidence and that, weighing the seriousness of the alleged crimes against the constitutional rights of the applicants, the house search was proportionate. 9.  On 23 September 2008 the applicants’ flat was searched and one envelope containing L. Bank documents and five computer files were seized. 10.  The applicants appealed against the search warrant. They argued that the warrant had not been granted in accordance with the law. It had been based on material which had been acquired in breach of international law, especially the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 20 April 1959 and the Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 8 November 1990, because the data had been stolen from the L. Bank and had been bought by the secret service. The acquisition of the data had also violated domestic law, as the secret service had no authorisation to obtain tax data. In fact, such an act was a criminal offence under German law, as it infringed section 17(1) and section 17(2)(2) of the Unfair Competition Act (“divulgence of official secrets” (Geheimnisverrat)). Furthermore, the secret service was not authorised to forward tax data to the financial authorities and the prosecution, as this infringed the German legal principle of separation of the secret service and the police/prosecution (Trennungsprinzip). 11.  On 8 April 2009 the Bochum District Court dismissed the appeal. It was of the view that the house search had been legal as it had been based on a lawful search warrant. The court had no doubt that it had been lawful to base the search warrant on the information contained in the Liechtenstein data carrier, as, in its view, the data had neither been seized in direct violation of international law nor by circumventing international treaties. 12.  The District Court was also of the view that the search warrant in question could be issued on the basis of the information in the data carrier, as the secret service had only played a passive role in acquiring it. According to the court, there was no indication that the secret service had incited a third person to steal the data, and it had merely accepted the data from a third person when this person had offered it. The fact that the secret service might have remunerated the seller did not, in the court’s view, change the fact that the secret service had only played a passive role. In the court’s opinion, it was within the secret service’s remit to acquire the data carrier in the prescribed way and hand the data over to the prosecution, as the data carrier contained 9,600 sets of data concerning international cash flows. 13.  On 7 August 2009 the Bochum Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. It held that the search warrant had been lawful, even if it was true that the German authorities had infringed domestic criminal law in obtaining the evidence. Even assuming that the German authorities might have committed the criminal offences of acting as an “accessory to a criminal offence” (Begünstigung, Article 257 § 1 of the German Criminal Code) and an “accessory to the divulgence of official secrets” (Beihilfe zum Geheimnisverrat, section 17(1) and section 17(2)(2) of the Unfair Competition Act, in conjunction with Article 27 of the German Criminal Code) in buying the Liechtenstein data from K., and that K. might have committed the offence of “industrial espionage” (Betriebsspionage, section 17(2)(1) of the Unfair Competition Act), it considered the search warrant to have been lawful. With regard to the applicants’ allegation that the data had been acquired in breach of international law, the Regional Court doubted any such breach. 14.  As regards the question whether illegally obtained evidence could be used in criminal proceedings, the Regional Court referred to a decision of the same court of 22 April 2008, where it had held in a similar case and with regard to the same data carrier that the interest in prosecuting the suspects outweighed the possible infringements of criminal law, as the principal criminal act of “data theft” had been committed by a third party and not by the German authorities. According to the well-established case-law of the Federal Court of Justice, evidence that had been illegally acquired by a third party could generally be used in criminal proceedings, unless it had been acquired through coercion or force. It also had to be considered that the use of the “stolen” data had not infringed the core of the applicants’ private sphere, but their business affairs. Furthermore, the “data theft” had not primarily infringed the rights of the applicants, but the data-protection rights of the bank from which it had been “stolen”. Thus, the Liechtenstein data was not excluded as evidence and the search order could be based on it. As to the presumed breach of international law, the court added that such a breach would not lead to the unlawfulness of the search warrant, firstly because international law did not grant the applicants any personal rights and secondly because the use of the evidence did not in itself constitute a breach of international law. 15.  On 11 September 2009 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. They were of the view that the Regional Court and the District Court should have decided that the search warrant had not been in accordance with the law, as the use of the Liechtenstein data as a basis for a search warrant had violated international treaties and the sovereignty of Liechtenstein, which had protested against the use of the data. 16.  Furthermore, they argued that their right to respect for their home under Article 13 of the Basic Law had been infringed, as the search warrant had been based on evidence that had been acquired by the secret service and passed on to the prosecution in violation of domestic law. The data purchase from K. had constituted a criminal act. Moreover, the secret service had no authority under German law to purchase such data. Furthermore, the transfer of the Liechtenstein data from the secret service to the financial authorities and the prosecution had violated the principle of the separation of the secret service and the prosecution in Germany. The infringement of domestic law had been so severe that the criminal courts should have come to the conclusion that the Liechtenstein data could not have formed the basis of a search warrant. They would thus have been obliged to declare the search warrant illegal. 17.  On 9 November 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint as manifestly ill-founded. It found that the fact that the search warrant had been based on the Liechtenstein data did not infringe Article 13 of the Basic Law. 18.  The Federal Constitutional Court reiterated that there was no absolute rule that evidence which had been acquired in violation of procedural rules could never be used in criminal proceedings (compare paragraph 28 below). The court further pointed out that it had to be borne in mind that the case at hand did not concern the question of whether evidence could be admitted in a criminal trial, but only concerned the preliminary question of whether evidence that might have been acquired in breach of procedural rules could form the basis of a search warrant in criminal investigation proceedings. Even if evidence was considered inadmissible in criminal proceedings, this did not automatically mean that the same was true for all stages of criminal investigations. 19.  Furthermore, the court reiterated that it was not its role to substitute itself for the authorities in the interpretation and application of domestic law, but to review, in the light of the Basic Law, the decisions taken by the authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation. 20.  In applying these general principles to the case at hand, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled, at the outset, that it was not necessary to decide upon the question whether the acquisition of the data had been in breach of national or international law or violated the principle of the separation of the secret service and the prosecution in Germany, as the Regional Court had departed in its decision from the applicants’ allegation that the evidence might in fact have been acquired in breach of domestic and international law, including criminal law. 21.  The Federal Constitutional Court found that the fact that the Regional Court based its legal assessment on the assumption that the acquisition of the data had been in breach of domestic and/or international law was not arbitrary and hence could not be found to be in violation of Article 13 of the Basic Law. Its finding that the applicants could not invoke international law in their favour only showed a different legal opinion without disregarding the applicants’ basic rights. Furthermore, the Federal Constitutional Court considered reasonable the District and Regional Court’s legal assessment that the principle of separation of the secret service and the prosecution had not been infringed, as the facts of the case did not show that the secret service had either ordered or coordinated the “data theft”, but had been offered the data on K.’s own initiative. Acquiring data in such a way and passing it on to the prosecution could not violate the principle of separation, and hence could not render a search warrant unconstitutional. 22.  With regard to the Regional Court’s finding that the search order could be based on the Liechtenstein data the Federal Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court’s legal assessment sufficiently took into account the applicants’ basic rights as the Regional Court had departed from the applicants’ allegation that the evidence had been obtained in breach of domestic law and thus based its decision on, what was, for the applicants, the best possible assumption. 23.  The Federal Constitutional Court further considered that the Regional Court had struck a fair balance between the different interests at stake. The alleged breach of national and/or international law did not entail an imperative prohibition to use the evidence in the proceedings at issue. Furthermore, the Regional Court had rightly pointed out that the data did not relate to the core area of the applicants’ private life, but to their business activities. It had recognized the decisive interest at stake, namely the applicants’ right to inviolability of their home, and took it sufficiently into account, as nothing showed that German authorities purposely and systematically breached international or domestic law in obtaining the data carrier. 24.  On 2 August 2012 the Nuremberg District Court acquitted the applicants of the charges of tax evasion, finding that it had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the capital of the foundation in question had been invested in an interest-bearing way.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  Since 1994 the first applicant company, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy collected data from the Finnish tax authorities for the purpose of publishing information about natural persons’ taxable income and assets in the Veropörssi newspaper. Several other publishing and media companies also publish such data which, pursuant to Finnish law, are accessible to the public (see paragraph 39 below for an explanation of the Finnish access to information regime). 9.  In 2002 Veropörssi appeared 17 times, with each issue concentrating on a certain geographical area of the country. The data published comprised the surnames and forenames of approximately 1.2 million natural persons whose annual taxable income exceeded certain thresholds, mainly from 60,000 to 80,000 Finnish marks (approximately 10,000 to 13,500 euros (EUR)), as well as the amount, to the nearest EUR 100, of their earned and unearned income and taxable net assets. When published in the newspaper, the data were set out in the form of an alphabetical list and organised according to municipality and income bracket. 10.  The first applicant company worked in cooperation with the second applicant company, Satamedia Oy, and both were owned by the same shareholders. In 2003 the first applicant company started to transfer personal data published in Veropörssi, in the form of CD-ROM discs, to the second applicant company which, together with a mobile telephone operator, started a text-messaging service (SMS service). By sending a person’s name to a service number, taxation information could be obtained concerning that person, on the requesting person’s mobile telephone, if information was available in the database or register created by the second applicant company. This database was created using personal data already published in the newspaper and transferred in the form of CD-ROM discs to the second applicant company. From 2006 the second applicant company also published Veropörssi. 11.  It transpires from the case file that in 1997 the Minister of Justice requested that the police instigate a criminal investigation into the publishing activities of the applicant companies. No information is contained in the file as to the outcome of this request or of any subsequent investigation. 12.  In September 2000 and November 2001, the applicant companies ordered taxation data from the Finnish National Board of Taxation (verohallitus, skattestyrelsen). Following the first order, the Board requested an opinion from the Data Protection Ombudsman, on the basis of which the Board invited the applicant companies to provide further information regarding their request and indicating that the data could not be disclosed if Veropörssi continued to be published in its usual form. The applicant companies subsequently cancelled their data request and paid people to collect taxation data manually at the local tax offices. 13.  On an unspecified date, probably in 2003, the Data Protection Ombudsman (tietosuojavaltuutettu, dataombudsmannen) contacted the applicant companies and advised them that, although accessing and publishing taxation data were not prohibited as such, they had to cease publishing such data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002, when they had published data concerning the 2001 tax year. The applicant companies refused to abide by this request, which they considered violated their right to freedom of expression. 14.  By a letter of 10 April 2003 the Data Protection Ombudsman asked the Data Protection Board (tietosuojalautakunta, datasekretessnämnden) to prohibit the applicant companies from processing the taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from passing those data to the SMS service. He claimed that under the Personal Data Act the companies had no right to collect, store or pass on personal data and that the derogation provided by that Act concerning journalism did not, in his view, apply to the present case. The collecting of taxation information and the passing of such information to third parties were not for journalistic purposes and therefore were not covered by the derogation in the Personal Data Act, but rather constituted the processing of personal data in which the applicant companies had no right to engage. 15.  On 7 January 2004 the Data Protection Board dismissed the Data Protection Ombudsman’s request. It found that the derogation laid down in the Personal Data Act concerning journalism applied to the present case. As regards the SMS service, the data used in the service had already been published in Veropörssi and therefore the Act did not apply to it. 16.  By letter dated 12 February 2004 the Data Protection Ombudsman appealed to the Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen) reiterating his request that the applicant companies be prohibited from processing taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from passing such data to the SMS service. 17.  On 29 September 2005 the Administrative Court rejected the appeal. It found that the derogation laid down in the Personal Data Act concerning journalism, which had its origins in Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data was adopted (OJ 1995 L 281, p. 31, hereafter “the Data Protection Directive”), should not be interpreted too strictly, as an overly strict interpretation would favour protection of privacy over freedom of expression. That court considered that Veropörssi had a journalistic purpose and that it was also in the public interest to publish such data. It emphasised, in particular, that the published data were already accessible to the general public. The journalism derogation thus applied in the circumstances of the present case. As regards the SMS service, the Administrative Court agreed with the Data Protection Board that, as the information had already been published in the newspaper, the Act did not apply to it. 18.  By letter dated 26 October 2005 the Data Protection Ombudsman lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Helsinki Administrative Court. 19.  On 8 February 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court decided to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Communities (which became the Court of Justice of the European Union on 1 December 2009, hereafter the “CJEU”) on the interpretation of Directive 95/46/EC. 20.  On 16 December 2008 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU handed down its judgment (see Case C-73/07 Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy, EU:C:2008:727). It found, first of all, that the activities in question constituted “processing of personal data” within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 95/46. According to the CJEU, activities involving the processing of personal data such as those relating to personal data files which contained solely, and in unaltered form, material that had already been published in the media, also fell within the scope of the Directive (see paragraphs 37 and 49 of the judgment). The object of the derogation in Article 9 of the Directive for the processing of personal data carried out solely for journalistic purposes was to reconcile the protection of privacy with freedom of expression. In order to take account of the importance of the latter in every democratic society, it was necessary to interpret notions relating to that freedom, such as journalism, broadly. However, in order to achieve a balance between those two fundamental rights, the protection of the fundamental right to privacy required that the derogations and limitations in relation to the protection of data had to apply only in so far as were strictly necessary (see paragraphs 54 and 56 of the judgment). Journalistic activities were not limited to media undertakings and could be undertaken for profit-making purposes (see paragraph 61). Furthermore, when interpreting the journalistic purposes derogation, account must be taken of the evolution and proliferation of methods of communication and the dissemination of information. Activities such as those involved in the domestic proceedings, relating to data from documents which were in the public domain under domestic legislation, could be classified as “journalistic activities” if their sole object was the disclosure to the public of information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which was used to transmit them. Whether or not that was the case, was for the national court to determine (see paragraphs 60-62 of the judgment). 21.  On 23 September 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court, applying the ruling of the CJEU and with reference to the case-law on Article 10 of the Convention, quashed the impugned decisions of the Data Protection Board and the Helsinki Administrative Court and referred the case back to the Data Protection Board for a fresh examination with a view to issuing an order pursuant to section 44(1) of the Personal Data Act. The Supreme Administrative Court requested the Board to prohibit the processing of taxation data by the applicant companies in the manner and to the extent carried out in 2002. 22.  In its legal assessment, the Supreme Administrative Court gave the following reasoning:\n“Scope of the matter\nThe present case does not concern the question of the extent to which taxation data and official documents concerning taxation are public under the Act on the Public Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information.\nNor does it concern the right to publish taxation data as such but only the processing of personal data. Therefore, there is no issue of possible prior interference with the content of the publications, but rather an assessment of whether the legal conditions set for personal data processing and protection of privacy are fulfilled.\nThe reconciliation of protection of privacy with freedom of expression is part of the legal assessment of personal data processing in the matter.\n...\nReconciliation of the protection of privacy and freedom of expression\nInterpretation of the exception concerning journalistic purposes in the Data Protection Directive. The Court of Justice of the European Communities emphasised that the purpose of the Data Protection Directive is to ensure that when processing their personal data, the Member States guarantee individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular their right to privacy, while allowing the free movement of such information. The Court further emphasised that these fundamental rights must be reconciled to a certain extent with the fundamental right to freedom of expression, and that this task belongs to the Member States.\n...\nIt therefore appears from the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the concept of journalism must, as such, be interpreted broadly within the meaning of Article 9 of the Directive, that, on the other hand, the protection of privacy can be derogated from only in so far as it is strictly necessary, and that this task of reconciliation of the two fundamental rights is the task of the Member States. Ensuring proper balance between the rights and interests at stake, including the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Communities’ legal order, is the task of the domestic authorities and courts (see also case C-101/01 Lindqvist).\nInterpretation of the exception in the Personal Data Act concerning journalistic purposes. ... It transpires from the preparatory work on the Personal Data Act (HE 96/1998 vp) that the purpose of the adoption of the Personal Data Act was to maintain the existing situation in respect of journalistic files kept by the media, provided it remained within the limits imposed by the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, in order to conclude that processing of personal data is conducted for journalistic purposes within the meaning of the Personal Data Act, inter alia, that data must be used solely for journalistic activities and the data must not be made available to persons other than those involved in those journalistic activities.\nWhen interpreting section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act, particular regard must be had to the fact that it concerns the reconciliation of two fundamental rights, namely the freedom of expression and the protection of privacy.\n...\nThe case-law of the European Court of Human Rights has also adopted a position on reconciling freedom of expression with the protection of privacy. The Court has held, inter alia in its von Hannover judgment of 24 June 2004, that the press plays an essential role in a democratic society. Although it must not overstep certain bounds, in particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart, in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities, information and ideas on all matters of public interest.\nOn the other hand, the Court also held in the above-mentioned judgment that increased vigilance as regards the protection of private life was necessary in order to contend with the new communications technologies which make it possible to store and reproduce personal data.\nAccording to the Court, when balancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression, the decisive criterion had to be the contribution made by publishing the data to a debate of public interest. If a publication is only meant to satisfy the curiosity of a certain audience, freedom of expression must be interpreted more narrowly.\nIn the present case, it must be assessed to what extent the impugned processing of personal data as carried out in the course of the companies’ activities falls within the scope of the exception concerning journalistic purposes that is provided for in section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act. The starting point is whether the aim of their activities was to disclose information, opinions or ideas to the public. In this assessment, account must be taken of whether or to what extent those activities can be seen as contributing to a debate in a democratic society rather than solely satisfying the curiosity of certain individuals.\nProcessing of personal taxation data in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and in the Veropörssi newspaper\nSatakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy collected for the Veropörssi newspaper taxation data from different tax offices in which individuals’ names appear together with information on their taxable income.\nAs mentioned above, the case concerns the processing of personal data to which the general requirements in Chapter 2 of the Personal Data Act are applicable, unless the Act allows for an exception from the application of these provisions. It must first of all be assessed whether the processing of personal data in the company’s background file before the publication of such data in the Veropörssi newspaper falls within the scope of the exception concerning journalistic purposes.\nFrom the preparatory work on the amendment of the Personal Data File Act (HE 311/1993 vp), which was the Act in force before the Personal Data Act, it transpires in particular that the press considers that the right to freely disclose information also requires journalists to be able, in advance, to freely collect and store information. Restricting the processing of personal data at this stage, that is to say before publication, could in practice mean that a prior decision is taken on what can be published. Such an outcome would be incompatible with the fundamental right guaranteeing freedom of expression.\nThe issue at stake in the present case concerns publicly accessible personal data received from the tax authorities. The collection and processing of such data in the company’s internal files for the purpose of the company’s publishing activities can, on the basis of above-mentioned grounds, be regarded as processing of personal data for journalistic purposes. The processing of large quantities of such data from the various municipal taxation records may well be necessary as background information for the purpose of the editing of a publication concerning taxation and from the point of view of free communication and open debate. At this stage of activities the protection of the privacy of the persons concerned can also be sufficiently secured, provided that the data collected and stored in the file are protected against unlawful processing as required by section 32 of the Personal Data Act.\nSatakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy has published the personal data collected from the tax offices as wide-ranging municipality-based catalogues in the Veropörssi newspaper. As already stated above, in this regard too it is a question of processing personal data within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Personal Data Act. As part of the case file, the Supreme Administrative Court had at its disposal Veropörssi newspaper no. 14/2004, published by Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and covering the Helsinki metropolitan area.\nIn this respect it must be decided whether a derogation is possible from the requirements relating to the processing of personal data on the basis of section 2(5) of the Act, that is to say whether the impugned processing of personal data by publishing those data in the Veropörssi newspaper came within the scope of the exception provided for journalistic purposes.\n...\nIt transpires from the preparatory work on the Personal Data Act (HE 96/1998 vp) that the processing of data in the background file referred to in the Personal Data File Act must relate solely to journalistic activities and that the processed data must not be made available to any persons not engaged in journalistic activities. The purpose of section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act was to maintain the existing situation in respect of journalistic files kept by the media, within the limits allowed by the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, the purpose of the Personal Data Act in this respect can be seen as guaranteeing the possibility for free journalistic work prior to the publication of information.\nThe term “processing of personal data for journalistic purposes” cannot be regarded as covering the large–scale publication of the journalistic background file, almost verbatim, as catalogues, albeit split into different parts and sorted by municipality.\nSince the disclosure of registered data on such a scale is equivalent to the disclosure of the entire background file kept for journalistic purposes by the company, such disclosure does not represent solely an expression of information, opinions or ideas. As stated above, with a view to reconciling the requirements of freedom of expression with the protection of privacy, the collection of data before publication has been made permissible under section 2(5) of the Personal Data Act without any requirement of compliance with general conditions set out in section 8 of the Act. By contrast, the processing of personal data collected in the company’s background file by publishing it and by rendering it available to the general public to the extent that has been done in the present case, and beyond the scope of the minimum requirements set out in section 2(5) of the Act, cannot be regarded as compatible with the purpose of the Personal Data Act.\nOpen public-interest debate, the monitoring of the exercise of power in society and the freedom to criticise, which are necessary in a democratic society, do not require the disclosure of the personal data of specific individuals in the manner and to the extent described above. When regard is also had to the foregoing comments on the narrow interpretation of section 2(4) of the Personal Data Act and the fact that a strict literal interpretation of that provision would result in a situation incompatible with the purpose of the Act as regards protection of personal data, the processing of personal data with a view to publishing them in the Veropörssi newspaper, and as far as the contents of this publication itself are concerned, was not conducted for journalistic purposes within the meaning of the Personal Data Act.\n...\nHaving regard to sections 2(5) and 32 of the Personal Data Act and Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in its preliminary ruling, the collection of personal data prior to its publication in the Veropörssi newspaper and its processing in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy cannot as such be regarded as contrary to the regulations concerning the protection of personal data, provided that, inter alia, the data have been protected properly. However, with reference to all the clarifications on how and to what extent the personal data in the background file were further processed in the Veropörssi newspaper, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy did in fact process personal data concerning natural persons in violation of the Personal Data Act.\nHandover of data in a CD-ROM\nSatakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy handed over a CD-ROM containing the published data to Satamedia Oy so that the latter could start up an SMS service using that data. As mentioned above, that action amounts to the processing of personal data within the meaning of section 3(2) of the Personal Data Act.\nHaving regard to the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and its effect on the interpretation of section 2(4) of the Personal Data Act, as well as all that has been said above about the processing of personal data in the Veropörssi newspaper, the handover to Satamedia Oy of personal data collected in the background file of Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, even though they were published in the Veropörssi newspaper, cannot be regarded as processing of personal data for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Personal Data Act. Nor can the processing of personal data in such a manner be regarded as having been effected for journalistic purposes within the meaning of Article 9 of the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, in that regard too, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy processed personal data in violation of the Personal Data Act.\nProcessing of personal data for the realisation of a SMS service by Satamedia Oy\nAs stated above in the “Facts” section, Satamedia Oy handed over the above-mentioned personal data to a third company in order to start up a SMS service, which company operated the SMS service on behalf of Satamedia Oy.\nIt was pointed out above that Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy had no right under the Personal Data Act to process the personal data at issue by handing it over to Satamedia Oy. Consequently, Satamedia Oy also had no right under the Personal Data Act to process personal data received in this manner.\nIn addition, it follows from the preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Communities that the exception provided for in the Data Protection Directive, which concerns the processing of personal data for journalistic purposes, requires the disclosure of data to the public. According to section 2(1) of the Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, the term “the public” in that Act refers to a group of freely determined message recipients. Satamedia Oy’s SMS service involves the company processing personal data relating to the taxation of a specific individual on the basis of a request by another individual. It therefore does not concern disclosure of data to the general public, as explained above, but replying to a request by an individual concerning the personal data of another individual.\nOpen public-interest debate, the monitoring of the exercise of power in society and the freedom to criticise, which are necessary in a democratic society, do not require the possibility of processing the personal data of specific individuals as has been done in this case. Freedom of expression does not require any derogation from the protection of privacy in such a situation.\nThe Court of Justice of the European Communities further stated in its preliminary ruling that the technical means used for the transfer of information is not relevant when assessing whether there is any question of activities undertaken solely for journalistic purposes. As regards the SMS service operated by Satamedia Oy, it is irrelevant that the data were transferred via mobile phones and text messages. Therefore, this is not a case of treating this mode of transmission of data differently from other modes of transmission. The assessment would be the same if the company processed, on the basis of a request by an individual, the personal data of another individual by using some other mode of transmission.” 23.  Pursuant to the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court, on 26 November 2009 the Data Protection Board prohibited the first applicant company from processing taxation data in the manner and to the extent that had been the case in 2002 and from forwarding that information to an SMS service. It found that the collection of personal data prior to its publication in Veropörssi and its processing in the background file of the first applicant company could not as such be regarded as contrary to the data protection rules, provided, inter alia, that the data had been protected properly. However, considering the manner and the extent to which the personal data in the background file had been published in Veropörssi, the first applicant company had processed personal data concerning natural persons in violation of the Personal Data Act. The second applicant company was prohibited from collecting, storing or forwarding to an SMS service any data received from the first applicant company’s database and published in Veropörssi. 24.  By letter dated 15 December 2009, after the Data Protection Board had made its decision, the Data Protection Ombudsman asked the applicant companies to indicate what action they were envisaging in response to the Board’s decision. In their reply, the applicant companies asked for the Data Protection Ombudsman’s views on the conditions under which they could continue to publish public taxation data at least to a certain extent. In his reply the Data Protection Ombudsman stated, with reference to the decision of the Data Protection Board of 26 November 2009, that “when data on taxable income were collected in a database and published in large catalogues almost as it stood, the Personal Data Act was applicable...”. He reminded them of his duty to report any breach of the Personal Data Act to the police. 25.  By letter dated 9 February 2010 the applicant companies appealed against the decision of the Data Protection Board to the Helsinki Administrative Court, which transferred the case to the Turku Administrative Court. They complained that the decision violated the Constitutional prohibition of censorship as well as their right to freedom of expression. According to the applicants, under domestic law, it was not possible to prevent publication of information on the basis of the amount of information to be published or of the means used for its publication. Nor was it possible to rely on the “public interest” as a criterion for preventing publication where preventive restriction of freedom of expression was concerned. Accepting that would mean that the authorities would be able to prevent publication if they thought that the publication did not promote discussion of a topic of public interest. 26.  On 28 October 2010 the Turku Administrative Court rejected the applicant companies’ appeal. It found that the Supreme Administrative Court had stated in its decision of 2009 that the case concerned neither the public accessibility of taxation data nor the right to publish such information per se. As the court was now examining only the 2009 decision rendered by the Data Protection Board, it could not examine the issues which the Supreme Administrative Court had excluded from the scope of its 2009 decision. As the Board’s decision corresponded to the content of the latter decision, there was no reason to change it. 27.  By letter dated 29 November 2010 the applicant companies further appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. 28.  On 18 June 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Turku Administrative Court, reiterating that the case concerned neither the right to publish taxation information as such, nor preventive censorship. 29.  According to the information submitted by the applicants, the SMS service was shut down after the 2009 decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was served on the applicant companies. The newspaper continued publishing taxation data in autumn 2009 when its content was only one fifth of the previous content. Since then the newspaper has not appeared. The Government, on the other hand, submitted that, according to the applicant companies’ website, Veropörssi was still being published on a regional basis in 2010 and 2011. Moreover, an Internet service continued to operate allowing anyone to request a natural person’s tax data concerning the year 2014 by filling in a form on the website in question. The requested tax information would then be delivered to the customer by phone call, text message or e-mail. 30.  The editor-in-chief of Veropörssi lodged an application with the Court in 2010, complaining that the impugned decision of the Supreme Administrative Court violated his right to freedom of expression. On 19 November 2013 the application was declared inadmissible as being incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention (see Anttila v. Finland (dec.), no. 16248/10, 19 November 2013). 31.  The first applicant company was declared bankrupt on 15 March 2016. The bankruptcy administration did not oppose the continuation of the present proceedings before the Court (see paragraph 94 below).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Plovdiv. 6.  In January 2000 the applicant, who had been diagnosed with invasive ductal carcinoma, underwent mastectomy of her left breast. 7.  In the beginning of 2002 the applicant began to experience pain in the left side of her chest, for which in February 2002 she underwent a bone scintigraphy. The scintigraphy found a pathological uptake of radioactive tracer in her sixth left rib. Another bone scintigraphy in May 2002 confirmed that finding. However, a computerised axial tomography scan carried out later in May 2002 showed a suspected metastasis in the area of the eighth and ninth left ribs rather than the sixth one. The doctor who performed the scan recommended a further bone scintigraphy. Two such scintigraphies, in August 2002 and in January 2003, showed the same findings as the previous two. A radiography in February 2003 showed a suspected pathological lesion in the sixth left rib. But a second computerised axial tomography scan later in February 2003 found again that the suspected metastasis was in the area of the eighth and ninth left ribs. 8.  On 26 February 2003 a panel of five medical doctors decided that the suspected metastasis was to be surgically removed. 9.  Worried that the exact location of the suspected metastasis had not been fully established, the applicant asked the surgeon who was to operate on her, Dr K.M., whether further tests were required before the operation. According to the applicant, he told her that the available imaging results were sufficient and that he would be able to identify the metastasis once he had opened up her thorax. The applicant then approached the medical doctor who had performed the mastectomy in January 2000 (see paragraph 6 above). He told her that the suspected metastasis was very small, could not be localised visually, and had to be precisely localised before any surgery. The applicant shared her misgivings in that respect with Dr K.M. and reiterated her request for further tests before the operation. However, he reassured her that the available imaging results were sufficient. 10.  Having assented to the operation by signing an informed consent form, the applicant underwent surgery on 13 March 2003. In the course of that surgery Dr K.M. removed fragments of her fourth and fifth left ribs, rather than her sixth, eighth or ninth left ribs. However, the operation report erroneously said that he had removed fragments of the eighth and ninth ribs. When talking to the applicant the next day, Dr K.M. likewise told her that he had removed fragments of those ribs, and that he had inspected her lungs. 11.  The removed rib fragments were sent for histological testing, the results of which were ready on 25 March 2003 and showed that they did not contain cancerous tissue. 12.  When seeing her hospitalisation report upon her discharge from hospital on 24 March 2003, the applicant was surprised to find that her sixth left rib had been left in place and that, instead, fragments of her fourth and fifth left ribs, where no lesions had been detected by the scans and where no cancerous tissue was present according to the histological tests, had been removed. She approached Dr K.M., who denied having made a mistake but agreed to prescribe a further bone scintigraphy, which was carried out in September 2003 and found an increased uptake of radioactive tracer in the sixth left rib and also in the fourth and fifth left ribs. A computerised axial tomography scan carried out the same month found that parts of the fourth and fifth left ribs had been removed and that the sixth left rib was fractured. 13.  The applicant asked Dr K.M. to explain all that, and he apparently again denied having made any mistake. 14.  For years after the operation, the applicant was undergoing radiotherapy and hormonal therapy. 15.  In late 2003 the applicant complained about the operation to the Ministry of Health. The Ministry ordered the Plovdiv Regional Health Inspectorate to carry out an inquiry and, based on its findings, on 23 January 2004 informed the applicant that in view of the inconclusive results of the medical imaging tests, the operating team had chosen to make a wide opening in the thorax, enabling them to inspect the left side of the thoracic wall from the fourth to the ninth ribs. They had decided to remove parts of the fourth and fifth ribs because they had observed macroscopic changes on them; they had not found pathological changes in the sixth rib. The reference to the eighth and ninth ribs in the operation report had been a clerical mistake. 16.  The results of the inquiry, coupled with a complaint filed by the applicant with the hospital, prompted the hospital’s ethical commission to review the case. It did not find any misconduct on the part of Dr K.M. 17.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant brought a claim for damages against Dr K.M. and the hospital in which he was employed, a State-owned limited liability company. She alleged that he had (a) erroneously removed parts of two healthy ribs, the fourth and the fifth on the left, without having obtained her consent; (b) inspected her lungs, which had been unnecessary and unjustified; (c) fractured her sixth left rib; and (d) failed to remove the metastasis, which had been the very purpose of the operation. 18.  On 14 April 2004 the Plovdiv Regional Court admitted a number of medical documents, including the consent form signed by the applicant before the operation. At the request of the applicant, the court ordered an expert report, to be drawn up by an oncologist, nominated by the applicant, a thoracic surgeon, nominated by Dr K.M., and a radiologist, nominated by the court, on a number of points raised by counsel for the applicant. At the request of Dr K.M., the court ordered a second expert report, to be drawn up by another thoracic surgeon. 19.  On 2 July 2004 the court appointed a new oncologist because the one initially chosen had declined the task, ordered the applicant to present herself for examination by the experts, admitted her medical files, and heard as witnesses a surgeon who had taken part in the operation alongside Dr K.M. and another surgeon who had monitored the applicant in the hospital after the operation. 20.  The two expert reports were filed in October 2004. 21.  The report drawn up by the three experts described the different methods for detecting bone metastases, including bone scintigraphy, emphasising that their results had to be assessed cumulatively; said that when operating on cancer patients it was mandatory to inspect adjoining organs by palpation; described the extent, in their view limited, to which the removal of parts of the fourth and fifth left ribs had affected the applicant’s body movements; said that rib fractures were almost inevitable and very frequent in thoracotomies; said that the main principle when operating on cancer patients was that all decisions were to be made by the entire team; and opined that it would be possible to operate on the applicant again, should the need arise. 22.  The thoracic surgeon’s report said that the operating team had not erred from a medical point of view when carrying out the operation, and that the applicant’s prognosis and quality of life would have been much worse had the operation not taken place. 23.  On 20 October 2004 the court heard the four experts, including their answers to questions put by counsel for the applicant. The experts stood by their conclusions. The court then reserved judgment. However, on 5 January 2005 the court, finding that the applicant had not specified whether her preferred defendant was Dr K.M. or the hospital, reopened the proceedings and instructed her to do so. 24.  On 23 March 2005 the court asked the thoracic surgeon to deal with additional questions. He filed his supplementary report in June 2006. 25.  On 17 June 2005 the court admitted further written evidence and heard two witnesses called by the applicant. At the request of counsel for the applicant, it disqualified the thoracic surgeon on the basis that he was employed by the defendant hospital (see paragraph 51 below). The court then appointed a new expert. 26.  In his report the new expert, a thoracic surgeon from Sofia, said that the operating team had not breached good medical practice by removing parts of the applicant’s fourth and fifth left ribs based on their visual and tactile inspection in the course of the operation, bearing in mind that histological testing of bone tissue required time and therefore no histological conclusion could be obtained during the operation; that they had correctly inspected the applicant’s lungs by palpation; that rib fractures in the course of such operations were almost inevitable; that the removal of the rib fragments had not unduly affected the applicant because they had later partly regenerated; and that it could not be categorically said that the applicant had a metastasis in her sixth rib, especially bearing in mind that no further metastases had been detected for many years after the operation. 27.  On 26 October 2005 the court heard the new expert, including his answers to questions put by counsel for the applicant. He explained in detail why he stood by his conclusions. Counsel for the applicant requested a further expert report on the need for the operation. The court turned down the request on the basis that it went beyond the scope of the case. 28.  In a judgment of 11 January 2006, the Plovdiv Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It referred to the conclusions of the experts but said that it would not take into account the reports drawn up by the expert who had been disqualified (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above). Based on those conclusions, the court found that the precise location of the suspected metastasis had not been fully established before the operation. It went on to say that the allegation that Dr K.M. had removed parts of the applicant’s fourth and fifth left ribs without her consent was baseless, since the written consent form that she had signed before the operation, following an explanation on the proposed procedure, had not specified the rib to be operated upon. The court further held, with reference to the expert opinions, that Dr K.M. had not erred by removing parts of the fourth and fifth left ribs, as he had observed on them tissue which he had suspected to be cancerous. The fact that the histological test had later showed otherwise had not retrospectively rendered his assessment flawed. Nor had he erred by inspecting the applicant’s lungs by palpation – that was standard practice in that type of operation. Furthermore, the evidence did not categorically prove that the applicant still had a metastasis in her sixth left rib, especially bearing in mind the lack of other metastases after the operation. In particular, the experts were agreed that the medical imaging results submitted by the applicant could not be conclusive on that point in the absence of a fresh histological test. Lastly, the court found that it had not been proved that the applicant’s sixth rib had been fractured in the course of the operation and that, in any event, such a fracture was a habitual risk in that sort of operation. 29.  The applicant appealed to the Plovdiv Court of Appeal. 30.  On 10 April 2006, at the request of counsel for the applicant, the court instructed the replacement thoracic surgeon who had acted as expert in the proceedings before the lower court (see paragraph 26 above) to draw up a supplementary report in which to address several points raised in the appeal. Counsel for the applicant also requested a fresh expert report, to be drawn up by three thoracic surgical oncologists. They asked that one of those be Dr V.T. Counsel for Dr K.M. opposed the request, arguing that Dr V.T. would be biased in favour of the applicant because he had known her for years. The court did not order the report. 31.  The thoracic surgeon’s supplementary report said that the applicant had correctly been subjected to surgery; that the operating team had not erred by acting on the basis of the visual and tactile findings made in the course of the operation, especially bearing in mind the uncertain results of the prior medical imaging tests; that there was no universally reliable method to establish the presence of bone metastases; that it had been impossible to mark the precise spot of the suspected metastasis before the operation; and that Dr K.M. had had the requisite qualifications to operate on the applicant. 32.  On 29 May 2006 the court admitted the report and heard the thoracic surgeon. The applicant submitted a private expert opinion which said that the removal of parts of her fourth and fifth left ribs had been needless and erroneous. This opinion could not be admitted because it had not been drawn up by court-appointed experts. The applicant however reiterated her earlier request for a fresh expert report (see paragraph 30 above), and the court acceded to it, appointing as experts two thoracic surgeons, one of whom was Dr V.T., and a thoracic surgical oncologist, all from Sofia. 33.  The experts were divided. Dr V.T., who filed a minority report, was of the view that the operation had not been necessary and had been carelessly carried out, with the removal of parts of two healthy ribs. The other two experts expressed the same views as those set out in the thoracic surgeon’s supplementary report (see paragraph 31 above), and came to the conclusion that the operation had been required and that the operating team had not acted out of line with good medical practice. 34.  On 18 September 2006 the court admitted the reports and heard the three experts, who each stood by the views expressed in their respective reports. On 2 October 2006 it admitted further written evidence and heard the parties’ oral argument. 35.  On an unknown later date in 2006 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment. It said that it credited all expert opinions save that of the expert disqualified in the proceedings before the lower court (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above) and that of Dr V.T. (see paragraph 33 above), which went against the remainder of the evidence. It went on to hold, by reference to the other experts’ conclusions, that the operation had been necessary, and that by removing parts of the applicant’s fourth and fifth left ribs on the basis of a visual and tactile examination Dr K.M. had acted in line with established medical practice, even though it had later transpired that they did not contain cancerous tissue. The court came to the same conclusions as the lower court with respect to the inspection of the applicant’s lungs by palpation, the alleged fracture of her sixth rib, and the question whether it had been proved that she had cancer after the operation (see paragraph 28 above). On that basis, the court held that the medical team which had operated on the applicant had not acted negligently and that it had not been categorically established that the applicant had suffered damage as a result of their actions. 36.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 37.  In a judgment of 29 July 2008 (реш. № 393 от 29.07.2008 г. по гр. д. № 2227/2008 г., ВКС, I г. о.), the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the lower court’s judgment and remitted the case. It held that that court had failed duly to elucidate the facts and in particular to take on an active role in the formulation of the questions to the experts. It had thus not fully clarified whether it had been necessary to operate on the applicant, whether her sixth left rib had been fractured in the course of the operation, and why it had been necessary to remove parts of her fourth and fifth left ribs. It had likewise failed to explain fully why it had disregarded Dr V.T.’s opinion; simply saying that it went against the rest of the evidence was not enough. On remittal, the lower court had to re-visit these points by taking into account the history of the applicant’s medical condition, and inquire into the need for the operation, the presence of metastases in her ribs, and the alleged worsening of her health after the operation. In so doing, it had to obtain a fresh medical expert report and enable the parties to take part in the formulation of the questions to the experts. 38.  On remittal, the Plovdiv Court of Appeal ordered a fresh expert report, to be drawn up by two thoracic surgeons from Sofia and a medical imaging specialist from Plovdiv. 39.  The report said that it had been imperative to carry out the operation; that the fracture of the sixth rib had been there before the operation and had been due to the rib’s heightened fragility resulting from previous anti-cancer treatment; that the removal of parts of the fourth and fifth ribs had not been an error in view of the inconclusive prior medical imaging data, which had its limitations, and the visual observation of tissue that could at the time have been suspected to be cancerous; that there was no categorical medical data proving the presence of a metastasis in the sixth rib before or after the operation – the bone scintigraphies had only showed an increased uptake of radioactive tracer there – in spite of the medical treatment undergone by the applicant after the operation; that the applicant could be operated upon again, should the need arise; and that the applicant’s medical condition would have been much worse had she indeed had an untreated metastasis in her sixth, eighth or ninth rib for years after the operation. 40.  On 26 November 2008 the court admitted the report and heard the three experts, including their replies to questions posed by counsel for the applicant. The experts stood by their conclusions. The court also admitted other evidence submitted by the applicant. 41.  On 11 May 2009 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal again upheld the lower court’s judgment. It held, by reference to the reports of the three experts that it had appointed, the three experts appointed in the proceedings before the lower court, and three of the experts appointed in the first appeal proceedings (see paragraphs 21, 31, 33 and 39 above), that the operation had been required. It said that it could not follow the opinion of Dr V.T. on this point (see paragraph 33 above) because, even though the question whether it had been advisable to operate in such circumstances could be debated theoretically, the medical team treating the applicant had been faced with an exigently practical situation: the medical imaging tests had showed the presence of a suspected isolated tumour whose exact location was uncertain, and there had been for this reason only one course of action: localise the tumour using the methods of surgical diagnostics and immediately remove it. The court agreed with the experts’ conclusions that the operating team had not erred by removing parts of the applicant’s fourth and fifth ribs on the basis of their suspicion that they contained cancerous tissue, even though that had turned out not to be the case. The mention of the eighth and ninth ribs in the operation report had been a clerical mistake without incidence for the applicant’s health. Again by reference to the experts’ conclusions, the court fully agreed with the lower court’s findings with respect to the inspection of the applicant’s lungs by palpation, and held that it had not been proved that her sixth rib had been fractured in the course of the operation, or that a metastasis in that rib had erroneously not been removed. On that basis, it concluded that Dr K.M. had not acted negligently. 42.  The applicant again attempted to appeal on points of law. 43.  In a decision of 10 November 2009 (опр. № 1537 от 10.11.2009 г. по гр. д. № 1275/2009 г., ВКС, IV г. о.), the Supreme Court of Cassation refused to admit the appeal for examination, holding that there was no divergent case-law on the points of law decided by the lower court and that the appeal in effect concerned that court’s findings of fact.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 in the Tambov Region. Before his arrest he lived in St Petersburg. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 23 August 2007. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 9 November 2009 the Kuybyshevskiy District Court of St Petersburg found him guilty of aggravated fraud and money laundering committed within an organised criminal group and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. That judgment was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 30 March 2010. 9.  On 6 March 2012, in another set of criminal proceedings, the Kuybyshevskiy District Court, found the applicant guilty of two counts of aggravated extortion committed within an organised criminal group and imposed a cumulative prison sentence of fifteen years. The judgment became final on 12 July 2012 when endorsed by the City Court. 10.  In 1994 the applicant lost his right arm. He suffered heart attacks in 2000 and 2007 and a kidney affected by cancer was removed in 2003. At the time of his arrest the applicant’s diagnoses listed: ischemic disease, exertional angina of the second functional group, atherosclerotic and post infarction cardiosclerosis, third-stage hypertension with a high risk of vascular complications; cardiac failure of the second functional group; chronic post-traumatic pericarditis with effusion; remote cancer metastases requiring permanent supervision; kidney stones; concretion of the right kidney; chronic pyelonephritis; chronic kidney failure of the first degree; adenocarcinoma of the prostate gland; chronic prostatitis; chronic cystitis, and constantly recurrent multidrug-resistant infection of the urinary tract. To keep his medical condition under control, the applicant followed a daily complex drug regimen comprising up to ten medicaments and underwent an in-depth medical examination every two months in a hospital where he received necessary treatment in respect of his oncological illnesses. 11.  On 24 August 2007 upon his admission to remand prison no. IZ‑77/1 in Moscow the applicant informed the prison medical authorities of his condition, submitting the full list of his diagnoses. 12.  In September 2007 he started complaining about a number of symptoms such as a heart pain, fatigue, difficulty in breathing, and frequent urination. He received basic treatment which alleviated a part of his health problems, but the urinary condition worsened. In November 2007 he complained of a pain in the low abdomen and inability to urinate. On 20 November 2007 a surgeon recommended urinary catheterisation, that is to say the insertion of a tube into the patient’s bladder via the urethra. That procedure was performed approximately 250 times during the first year of detention. In the meantime the urinary condition became more acute. 13.  On 4 December 2008 the applicant was examined by a urologist for the first time whilst in detention. The doctor recommended treatment with antibiotics, regular urological supervision and to avoid catheterisation in so far as possible. 14.  Throughout 2009 the applicant’s urinary condition persisted. He urinated up to thirty-seven times per day and his nocturnal sleep was interrupted every hour or two. He had to continue resorting to urinary cauterisation. On several occasions he had a consultation with a urologist. 15.  On 12 October 2009, at the request of the applicant’s lawyer, three medical experts prepared a report assessing the capability of the custodial authorities to properly treat the applicant. Having examined the medical file on the applicant compiled in the civilian hospital, submissions by the custodial authorities and the applicant’s own comments, the experts concluded that he required systematic treatment with amendments to the chemotherapy regimen and periodic admissions to a specialised cardiology hospital for instrumental examinations and necessary amendments to drug regimen. Given the absence of proper medical supervision, the experts also warned of a possible deterioration of the applicant’s urinary and oncological problems and a risk of those illnesses advancing to a stage requiring surgery, or to a stage with no prospects of the applicant being cured or even his life being saved. The experts observed that the medical unit of the detention facility where the applicant was kept was not equipped for treating patients in such a medical condition. 16.  On 28 December 2009, 19 March, 15 June, 26 July, 25 August and 30 November 2010 the applicant was examined in the Moscow Scientific Institute of Urology (hereinafter “the Urology Institute”), having been diagnosed with neurogenic bladder dysfunction. The treatment provided slightly improved his condition. 17.  On 21 December 2010 the doctors from the Urology Institute performed a surgery on the applicant. A suprapubic catheter was inserted into his bladder through a cut in the abdomen. The applicant was discharged from the hospital to a remand prison under the supervision of the resident doctor. 18.  Three days later the applicant complained of continuous bleeding from the abdominal incision. The next day, having lost more than one litre of blood, he was sent back to the Institute, where his condition was brought under control. 19.  In April 2011, in the remand prison, the applicant developed an acute inflammation of the urethra, which was successfully treated in the Institute. 20.  From 2012 to 2014 the applicant’s urinary condition remained stable. He continued using the suprapubic catheter to remove the urine. 21.  In the meantime, in December 2009 the applicant brought a court claim against the detention authorities, seeking that the lack of appropriate medical treatment be declared unlawful. 22.  On 28 June 2010 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed his claim. The court found as follows:\n“From the [applicant’s] medical file submitted by the [remand prison] it is apparent that ... [the authorities] provided him with medical aid, subjected him to medical testing, and prescribed treatment. In particular, on 4 December 2008, 25 September and 15 November 2009 he was seen by a urologist... On 28 December 2009 he was examined in the [Urology Institute]. It is not apparent from the medical file that the authorities refused to provide [the applicant] with the medical assistance or that he was deprived of the requisite medication”. 23.  On 24 March 2011 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 1 February 1994 F. bought a 19.3 square metre flat at 22-2-68 Nagatinskaya Naberezhnaya, Moscow. On 23 July 1997 F. died intestate and without heirs. According to the Government, his flat was locked and sealed by the housing maintenance company. 7.  On an unspecified date N. brought a civil action seeking recognition as F.’s heir-at-law. The City of Moscow authorities took part in the proceedings as a respondent. On 8 February 2010 the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow granted her claim and recognised her title to F.’s flat. The judgment came into force on 19 February 2010. 8.  On 14 May 2010 N. sold the flat to K. The transaction was registered by the Federal Registration Service. 9.  On 24 June 2010 the Moscow City Court quashed the judgment of 8 February 2010 on appeal and dismissed N.’s claims. 10.  On 6 July 2010 K. sold the flat to the applicant. On 21 July 2010 the Federal Registration Service registered the sale agreement and the transfer of the title to the flat to the applicant. 11.  On an unspecified date the Housing Department brought a civil action claiming that N. had been erroneously recognised as F.’s heir-at-law and that the City of Moscow should inherit his property instead. 12.  On 8 November 2012 the District Court granted the Housing Department’s claims. It ordered the transfer of title to the flat to the City and the requisition of the flat from the applicant. The court also considered that the applicant had not demonstrated due diligence when buying the flat from K. and could not be recognised as a bona fide purchaser. 13.  On 4 February 2013, following an appeal by the applicant, the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 8 November 2012. 14.  On 15 April 2015 the District Court granted the Housing Department’s claims against the applicant and ordered her eviction. 15.  According to the Government, the applicant has not been evicted and continues to reside in the flat. 16.  On 9 December 2013 the Perovskiy District Court of Moscow granted a claim by the applicant for damages against K. and awarded her, inter alia, 4,060,006 Russian roubles (RUB). K. appealed. 17.  On 20 March 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December 2013 on appeal. 18.  According to the Government, the bailiff failed to establish K.’s whereabouts or locate any of his assets. The judgment in the applicant’s favour remains unenforced. The enforcement proceedings are still pending.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant, Franz-Olivier Giesbert, is the publication director of the magazine Le Point. The second applicant, Hervé Gattegno, is a journalist with Le Point. The third applicant is the company operating Le Point. 6.  The proceedings against the applicants which form the subject matter of the three applications are related to the events commonly referred to as the “Bettencourt affair”. 7.  Mrs Liliane Bettencourt, principal shareholder of the group L’Oréal, is one of the richest individuals in France. From the late 1990s she made numerous gifts to her friend B., a writer and photographer, totalling several hundred million euros in value. 8.  In December 2007 Mrs Bettencourt’s daughter, Ms Bettencourt‑Meyers, filed a criminal complaint against B., for the offence of undue influence (abus de faiblesse), with the public prosecutor at the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance. A preliminary investigation was opened. In that context numerous interviews were conducted, in particular with individuals close to Mrs Bettencourt, and searches were carried out. In September 2008 B. was taken into police custody. 9.  Without waiting for the outcome of the investigation, Ms Bettencourt-Meyers brought a private prosecution against B. in the Nanterre Criminal Court, on the same charge of undue influence. She sought and obtained the inclusion in the case file of material and reports from the preliminary investigation. 10.  In September 2009 the public prosecutor’s office decided to discontinue the proceedings based on Ms Bettencourt-Meyers’ original complaint. 11.  The case initiated by the private prosecution was first set down for hearing on 3 September 2009, then on 11 December 2009. On that date it was decided to seek a medical assessment of Mrs Bettencourt and the hearing was deferred again to 15 April 2010 (for the subsequent criminal proceedings, see paragraphs 52 and 53 below). 12.  Mrs Bettencourt publicly announced that she was refusing to undergo the assessment ordered by the court. She also filed submissions by way of voluntary intervention, including in the alternative an application to join the proceedings as a civil party in the event that the prosecution was regarded as valid by the court. She argued that the aim of her civil-party application was to persuade the court that her mental faculties were not diminished and that she had made her gifts to B. with all due lucidity. 13.  The developments in the case were widely reported in the press. The offending articles in Le Point were thus published in that context. 14.  On 10 December 2009 the third applicant published, with the second applicant’s byline, a four-page spread under the heading “Investigation into a very dear friend” and with the sub-heading: “Treasure. Did he take advantage of Liliane Bettencourt? [B.] denies it but the finger of suspicion points to him”. 15.  The article referred to various aspects of the case and in particular the very significant gifts made by “the heir of L’Oréal”, for a total of one billion euros, to B. The journalist wrote, quoting the testimony of Liliane Bettencourt’s former accountant: “She too describes the psychological domination imposed on an elderly lady who is more fragile than she may like”. He also inserted a passage from the “prosecution document” which summed up the situation as follows:\n“Taking advantage of his influence and Liliane Bettencourt’s weakness, [B.] persuaded her, at a time when her health was declining, to give him sums of money and assets going beyond tokens of friendship.” 16.  The article was full of comments between inverted commas, presented as extracts from statements made to the investigators working under the public prosecutor. It pointed out that the latter had discontinued the investigation in question. Among the quotations were explanations given by B. when he was in police custody in September 2008, and it was claimed by the journalist that those explanations were often contradicted by the facts:\n“He swears that Liliane Bettencourt has acted towards him ‘like a patron’. Their first meeting goes back to the 70s but their friendship dates from a portrait he made of her in 1987 ... ‘I was then sufficiently well off that I did not need financial assistance from Mrs Bettencourt’, he retorted to the investigators. ‘I already owned five apartments on rue Servandoni [Paris 6th], a large collection of paintings and had co-ownership of the Brouzet estate [a large estate in the Gard], together with copyright dues and a commission on the sale by Dior of the perfume Poison’. After verification, this inventory seems to be somewhat overstated: in actual fact it was through a series of cheques from the billionaire and the cancellation of astronomical debts to real estate companies owned by him that B. has managed to build up his assets to the point of acquiring seven apartments in the well-to-do neighbourhood of Saint Sulpice. Today the whole complex forms a quaint townhouse with swimming pool, CCTV cameras and secret passages between the bookshelves.\nContradicted by the numbers and dates, the photographer was forced to explain, more humbly, that Mrs Bettencourt wanted him ‘to expand’ in order to ‘install all his works and perhaps set up a museum’. But curiously his benefactor did not even mention such a project during her own hearing on 13 May 2008. B’s explanation: ‘She is a modest woman; she will not say the things that are in the depth of her heart’.\nThe police investigation also demonstrates the lavishness of his property in the Gard ... ‘Mrs Bettencourt did not contribute to its financing’ he claimed. However, the billionaire’s accountant testified that ‘numerous cheques’ had been signed by her, made out to contractors doing work on the estate, ‘for at least 150,000 euros, and as much as a cheque of 10 million euros in December 2006’.\nSeveral employees testified that around the same time the old lady’s health had deteriorated ... Herein lies the gravamen of the whole case: was the L’Oréal heiress really aware of the extent of her generosity? ... 17.  Those two statements are extracts from the testimony of the “former director of L’Oréal once responsible for the management of Liliane Bettencourt’s assets” and her former accountant. The first spoke of a “hold” over Mrs Bettencourt. He had asked to be relieved of his duties because, he testified, “I ran the risk of being complicit in the misdeeds of Mr [B] by my tacit consent”. The second witness referred to “pressure” on the part of the photographer and testified that he was always “asking for money”. In late 2006 her attention was drawn to the proposed assignment of a life insurance policy (for an amount in excess of 260 million euros). “I tried to reason with Mrs Bettencourt but she was no longer her old self”, recalled the accountant. “I then bumped into B. in the house and said to him ‘you’ve seen the state she is in, you know she is very ill’. He replied ‘never mind, as long as she is not under deputyship she can still sign’”. 18.  The article also contained comments made by Mrs Bettencourt on 13 May 2008, in a box headed: “Exclusive: what Liliane Bettencourt told the police”. The journalist, after quoting extracts from the statement showing that Mrs Bettencourt did not recall the agreements she had signed with B., wrote that “these memory lapses are clearly at odds with the picture that B. would be painting of her to the same investigators”. 19.  In another box the journalist reported on the application for “judicial protection” filed by Mrs Bettencourt’s daughter and quoted an extract from the “report of neurologist P.A.”, who had been “asked by the public prosecutor to examine the billionaire’s medical records”, revealing “a state of vulnerability related to a probable degenerative neurological condition which impaired her individual faculties”. 20.  The article stated that from this episode and many others, the financial brigade investigators, in a report of 1 December 2008, had concluded that there was “a series of sufficiently strong presumptions that the offence of undue influence [had] been committed by B.”; and that the photographer, for his part, had denounced an “odious attack” on a “world-famous artist”. It ended thus: “the court will rule whether the fortune passed to him by Liliane Bettencourt was a windfall or a swindle – either way, it’s a masterstroke”. 21.  On 4 February 2010 the third applicant published, with the second applicant’s byline, an article indicated on the full front cover of the magazine under the headline “Bettencourt affair: how to gain one billion (without any effort)”. The subheadings announcing the article read: “the unbelievable story of a society photographer who made a fortune by ‘seducing’ Liliane Bettencourt, the richest woman in France” and “the accusations of Madam’s employees”. A photo-montage showing Mrs Bettencourt “with her friend B.” also appeared on the cover. 22.  The subject of the article, which extended to eight pages, was indicated as follows: “Bettencourt affair. Has the richest woman in France been conned by the photographer [B.]? Some of her former employees have said as much to the police. Le Point reveals their testimony and the secrets of this incredible high-society melodrama”. The article began as follows:\n“Is it about money or sentiment? A quarrel over an inheritance or a question of principle? A settling of family scores or the most perfect scam? All of these things put together, perhaps and much more, because the millions slip away by their hundreds in an atmosphere redolent of an Agatha Christie novel and a setting worthy of Scott Fitzgerald ... Even the trial – the inevitable epilogue – will resemble a high-society event: on 15 and 16 April, the court of Nanterre will look into the incredible generosity, for almost a decade, of the richest woman in France towards the person she has made her favourite, the photographer [B.].” 23.  The article continued as follows:\n“Since the billionaire’s daughter has taken her case to the courts, accusing her mother’s protégé of the offence of ‘undue influence’, ripples of disgust have been felt along the majestic avenues of Neuilly and beyond – the high society of Paris in finance, industry and politics – concerned that it may one day be regretted that no one had seen anything, or at least said anything.\nFor the investigation has revealed the existence of lavish gifts, apparently totalling around 1 billion euros. Could such riches pass unnoticed? There’s a disturbing detail: the largest sums were assigned to B. in the spring of 2003 and in the summer of 2006, at a time when Liliane Bettencourt’s health was declining sharply ...\nGuru. Much testimony has come to light since then – Le Point is exclusively publishing several extracts (see the following pages). Housemaids, nurses, secretaries, the chauffeur, accountants, all describe ‘the hold’ that [B.] had over the L’Oreal heiress (aged 87), his own individual way of soliciting her generosity, the equivocal aspects of his behaviour. Before the court, the succession of these indignant employees will be reminiscent of the spectacle in the von Bülow affair – the trial of the libertine and cynical American aristocrat who was accused, in the early 80s on Rhode Island, of poisoning his wife so that he could take over her fortune. But even that scenario would not be the worst for [B.]: convicted at first instance, von Bülow was nevertheless acquitted on appeal ...\nFor the time being, the photographer confronts the suspicions with sardonic contempt. ‘To make a work of one’s life, that’s what matters’, he proclaimed in Le Monde, describing the charges against him as ‘pathetic rumours’. His benefactor? ‘An intelligent woman who knows how to choose men, to take risks’, he told the police, sweeping a little too quickly under the carpet the doubts about her state of health. To be sure, the heiress affirmed a year ago, in Le Journal du dimanche, that she was attached to [B.] and that she had no time for gossip. ...\nShe has since shut herself away, leaving her lawyers to speak in her place, refusing any medical assessment and cutting short her appearances at receptions or ceremonies. This silence has only served to reinforce the impression of a woman under influence.” 24.  In the middle of the article, under the heading “Exclusive: the women who accuse”, there were long extracts (over three pages) from statements of employees who worked at Mrs Bettencourt’s house (accountant, secretary, chambermaid, nurse) that had been given during the preliminary investigation. The following statements were highlighted in particular:\n“It was as if [B.] had woven his web around Mrs Bettencourt.”\n“He answered me: ‘As long as she is not under deputyship she can sign.’”\n“[B.] takes advantage of Madame’s weakness to benefit from her generosity.” 25.  After referring to remarks by B. and by Mrs Bettencourt in the press, the article added: “a number of statements paint a less idyllic picture: under oath, employees and servants mentioned pressing requests for money going as far as harassment, harsh language, and various schemes bordering on the sordid. ...” 26.  Under an intermediate heading “Strategy” the article then mentioned and partially quoted documents that had been discovered by the financial investigators at B.’s home in Paris. 27.  The article ended with a small insert indicating that B. had refused to respond to Le Point, preferring to “reserve his answers for the judges”. 28.  On 11 February 2010, following the publication of 4 February 2010, Mrs Bettencourt brought urgent proceedings against the applicants in the Paris tribunal de grande instance claiming a manifestly unlawful nuisance under Articles 808 and 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure ... She asked the urgent-applications judge to find that the reproduction of procedural documents from the file of the preliminary investigation initiated by the Nanterre public prosecutor breached section 38(1) of the Law of 29 July 1881 on freedom of the press (“section 38”, ...), which prohibited the publication of documents from a criminal case file before they had been read out in open court, and Article 9 of the Civil Code, guaranteeing the right to respect for private life ... She requested that a court-ordered notice be published in Le Point, on pain of a coercive fine, and that the applicants be ordered to pay her, by way of an advance, compensation for her non-pecuniary damage, on account of her portrayal as an individual with diminished intellectual faculties who had been duped. 29.  The applicants disputed Mrs Bettencourt’s standing to bring the proceedings, as prosecution in respect of the section 38 offence could only be initiated by the public prosecutor under section 47 of the same law ... On the merits, they claimed that it was contradictory, on the one hand, to require journalists to establish the veracity of the information that they published and, on the other, to penalise them for substantiating their investigation. 30.  In a decision of 2 March 2010, the Vice-President of the Paris tribunal de grande instance found that Mrs Bettencourt had standing in so far as she was arguing that the publication of the impugned documents had, on the basis of that provision, caused her personal damage. The judge indicated that while section 47 of the 1881 law reserved the prosecution of the section 38 offence for the public prosecutor, an individual who claimed to have sustained pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage as a result of a publication was entitled to act as a civil party in the proceedings or to bring a case before the urgent-applications judge under Article 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to seek the requisite protective or remedial measures to put an end to the unlawful nuisance resulting from such publication, or to request a sum by way of an advance. The judge explained: “It suffices for the publication of the documents prior to their reading in open court to have caused the person actual and direct damage, regardless whether or not the person is a party to the proceedings in which the documents are to be presented”. He ordered the applicants jointly to pay an advance of 3,000 euros (EUR) and the same sum in procedural expenses under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 31.  As to the application of section 38 of the 1881 Act, the judge took the view that the statements by employees of Mrs Bettencourt (paragraph 24 above) constituted “procedural documents” which were part of the preliminary investigation and that, even though it had been discontinued, those documents had been joined to the criminal proceedings now pending, after their transmission had been sought and obtained by Ms Bettencourt‑Meyers in support of her own private prosecution. He added that those statements all helped the case for the prosecution, as indicated on the magazine’s cover, “the accusations of Madame’s employees”, and observed as follows:\n“... the publication of long passages emanating from insiders helps to give the reported facts an appearance of authenticity and objectivity (that the article does not seek to nuance but, on the contrary, to reinforce); the reader is thus led to regard those facts as proven, because they are presented through the prism of a journalist’s analysis, which is bound to contain a degree of subjectivity or opinion. For those reasons, the alleged breach of section 38 cannot be combined with the breaches under Article 9-1 of the Civil Code (presumption of innocence) or Article 9 of the Civil Code (private life) or section 29 of the Law of 29 July 1881 [defamation proceedings, ...], nor can it result in redress on the basis of those separate legal provisions.”\nThe judge concluded that the publication was capable of infringing the rights of Mrs Bettencourt as it portrayed her, at a time when the Nanterre Criminal Court had not yet begun to examine the criminal cases, as a woman who was manipulated and weak, a description that she categorically denied. 32.  The judge further found that the applicants were not justified in relying on the provisions of Article 10 of the Convention and the necessities of information. In this connection he indicated that section 38 sought mainly to preserve the independence and orderly conduct of the judicial process, in addition to protecting the rights of the persons concerned, particularly by guaranteeing the presumption of innocence. He emphasised the limited and temporary nature of the restriction on freedom of expression, as the legislation did not prevent analysis of, or comments on, procedural material, or the publication of information gleaned from the proceedings themselves, but only prohibited the reproduction of documents which were intended for public disclosure in the context of a judicial process surrounded by safeguards. These safeguards include respect for defence rights and the principle of adversarial proceedings, “which could not be ensured by a prior, isolated and partial media report”. The judge went on to explain as follows:\n“... the impugned restriction cannot be compared to the case of disclosure of professional secrets or of secrets from the preliminary or judicial investigation, on account of the possession by a journalist of documents covered by secrecy and used in publications imparting information to the general public, in so far as the journalist, who is not bound [by those secrets], is required to possess such documents in order to justify the veracity of the facts reported or the seriousness of his investigation, but also to use them in compliance with the applicable legislation.” 33.  All of the claims submitted by Mrs Bettencourt alleging a breach of her privacy were dismissed on the ground that such a breach had not been sufficiently established, having regard to the general public’s right to be informed, and interest in being informed, of current affairs or events in the general interest:\n“... the claimant has not relied on any specific breaches of her private life which would go beyond the information that it is permitted to mention in connection with the criminal case before the court of Nanterre, as Le Point did not, in particular, provide details about any health problems she may have.” 34.  The applicants appealed. They argued in particular that the procedural documents in question, which had been included in the case file solely on the initiative of the claimant, and not on that of the public prosecutor, could not be regarded as carrying the degree of authority which justified, by derogation to the principle of freedom of expression, the prohibition imposed by section 38. They further emphasised that neither Mrs Bettencourt’s right to a fair hearing, nor any undermining of the authority or impartiality of the courts, was at stake. 35.  In a judgment of 19 March 2010, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the court below, in the main, and raised the amount of the advance to EUR 10,000, in addition to charging EUR 5,000 for the costs of the appeal proceedings. It confirmed that the witness statements “clearly” constituted “procedural documents”, even though the preliminary investigation had been discontinued, since they had been transmitted by the public prosecutor at the request of the civil party and thus formed an integral part of the criminal proceedings. In the court’s view, “the fact that they were transmitted at the request of the civil party and not on the initiative of the public prosecutor bore little relevance in this connection”. It concluded that the publication of long passages from those statements constituted a violation of section 38 and thus an unlawful nuisance within the meaning of Article 809 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It added as follows:\n“... the requirement for the journalist to verify his sources and to compare the various material available to him on a given subject in the context of a serious investigation, before imparting information to the public, does not mean reproducing verbatim the documents used for his investigation, where, as in the present case, such publication is prohibited under press legislation of which he cannot be unaware.”\nThe court concluded that the applicants’ submission that section 38 should be declared incompatible with Article 10 of the Convention was unfounded. It took the view that Mrs Bettencourt was entitled to claim non-pecuniary damage as she had been portrayed as:\n“a woman in a weak mental state, being easy to manipulate and under the influence of [B.], which the reader is all the more likely to regard as the truth as [the observations] are presented as emanating from individuals who have played a particular role, making them privileged observers of her private life.”\nLastly, the Court of Appeal confirmed that there had been no breach of Mrs Bettencourt’s privacy in the following terms:\n“... the mere mention of Mrs Bettencourt’s mental health in the body of the article, without any details falling within her private sphere, and in the testimony reproduced, which was mainly about the conduct and manoeuvres attributed to [B.], does not suffice to establish any particular breach of the respondent’s privacy that would go beyond the limits of legitimate information that the public is entitled to expect about a case which, already being widely covered by the media, is before the courts ....” 36.  The applicants appealed on points of law. In their grounds of appeal they argued, under Article 10 of the Convention, that they had a duty to inform the public about a case pending before the courts which had been revived after a private prosecution, following its discontinuance by the public prosecutor, and which had given rise to wide media coverage especially on account of the personality and wealth of Mrs Bettencourt; that the judgment of the Court of Appeal had found against them solely for publishing the statement extracts and not on account of their content; that there had been no impairment of the interests protected by section 38(1) because Mrs Bettencourt was not the defendant in the proceedings; that there was a manifest contradiction in the Court of Appeal’s position, as it had declared Mrs Bettencourt’s action admissible on the basis of the damage sustained, while taking the view that she had not been portrayed as a weak and manipulated woman in terms of her right to respect for her private life. 37.  In a judgment of 28 April 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal and ordered them to pay Mrs Bettencourt the sum of EUR 4,000 in costs. It gave the following reasons for its decision:\n“... the judgment observes that long extracts were published from the statements taken during the preliminary investigation ..., in which [Mrs Bettencourt] was portrayed as a manipulated and weak woman; proceeding with a correct application of Article 10 of the Convention ..., the Court of Appeal was able, without contradicting itself, to conclude from that publication, since the documents drawn up by the police during an investigation are procedural documents within the meaning of section 38 of the Law of 29 July 1881, that [Mrs Bettencourt] was justified in claiming, solely on the basis of that publication, that she had sustained personal damage ...” 38.  On 11 February 2010 B. brought urgent proceedings against the applicants in the Paris tribunal de grande instance following the publication of 4 February 2010, arguing that it had caused him a manifestly unlawful nuisance, infringing both his copyright to the photographs illustrating the article and his defence rights, including his right to be presumed innocent. 39.  In a decision of 2 March 2010, the Vice-President of the Paris tribunal de grande instance, in addition to endorsing the reasoning already set out in paragraphs 31 and 32 above, took the view that the impugned publication could have the alleged effects, infringing B.’s right to a fair hearing and his right to the presumption of innocence. B.’s claim concerning the infringement allegedly caused by the reproduction of photographs was rejected as falling outside the remit of the urgent proceedings judge. The judge ordered the publication of a notice inside the magazine together with an indication of it on the cover (to take up one half of the page in bold type, under the heading “Judgment against Le Point in proceedings brought by [B.]”) and on the weekly magazine’s website. The applicants were also ordered jointly to pay B. an advance of EUR 3,000 on compensation for his non-pecuniary damage, together with an equivalent sum by way of procedural expenses. 40.  The applicants appealed. 41.  In a judgment of 19 March 2010 the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the decision appealed against, mainly in the same terms as those set out in paragraph 35 above. It reiterated that the witness statements, “without engaging in any extensive interpretation of [section 38]”, could be characterised as procedural documents, even though the investigation had been discontinued: “the fact that they were transmitted at the request of the private prosecutor and not on the initiative of the public prosecutor is of little relevance in this connection because they support the prosecution case”. It went on to find that “consequently, the mere publication of substantial extracts from those statements, before they had been referred to or read out in open court, [had] indeed constituted a violation of section 38 of the Law of 29 July 1881 and therefore an unlawful nuisance”. The Court of Appeal further found as follows:\n“... the four statements thus presented to the public portray [B.] as a devious and unscrupulous individual, using seduction, manoeuvres and psychological pressure to persuade Liliane Bettencourt to grant him substantial and frequent gifts, at a time when she was weak and when her husband’s state of health had declined;\n... the reader is all the more likely to consider these statements to be true, supporting as they do the accusation against [B.] before the Nanterre Criminal Court, as they are presented as emanating from individuals who, as a result of the services they rendered to her (nurse, chambermaid, secretary), played a particular role through which they became privileged observers of her private life;\n... the reader is thus led to believe in the accusation, even before the court hearing the case has been able to reach its decision, in conditions that breach the respondent’s right to be presumed innocent and his defence rights ...” 42.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. 43.  In a judgment of 7 July 2011 the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeal in the same terms as those of its judgment of 28 April 2011 (see paragraph 37 above). 44.  On 9 March 2010, B. brought proceedings against the applicants on the merits before the Paris tribunal de grande instance seeking redress for the damage sustained on account of the publication of the articles of 10 December 2009 and 4 February 2010, in breach of section 38(1) of the 1881 Act. 45.  In a judgment of 21 June 2010, that court dismissed all of B.’s claims. On the admissibility of his suit, it observed that the applicants were correct to assert that an individual who claimed to be the victim of the offence provided for under section 38 of the 1881 Act was not authorised to bring a private prosecution on that basis. It pointed out that, by contrast, the provisions of that Act did not preclude the injured party from bringing proceedings in the civil courts, as only one section of that Act (section 46) prohibited the bringing of civil proceedings separately from a public prosecution, namely in cases of defamation against public authorities, State institutions and civil servants. After observing that section 38 usefully contributed to preserving the orderly functioning and impartiality of the justice system and to guarantee due process, since the full and verbatim publication of documents from a criminal file before the trial could hinder the conduct of pending investigations or influence individuals who might subsequently be called upon to testify, or even lay magistrates who might have to adjudicate upon the case, the court gave the following reasons for its decision:\n“... The prohibition that it establishes must not, however, restrict the ability of journalists to report on criminal cases, even those which have not yet been publicly examined by a court, and specifically those which, raising issues of general interest, involving significant interests, or concerning people with high-level responsibilities, especially in political, economic or artistic fields, particularly deserve to be brought to public attention.\nThe application of this legislation cannot, in particular, have the effect of precluding journalists from imparting to their readers, in such a case, all or part of the documentary resources from which they derived their information, in order to establish its credibility, or which substantiate their commentary and analysis, in order to submit them for open discussion. This is the case here: extracts ... from reports which have been drawn up by the police acting on the instructions of the public prosecutor and which have been appended, after the discontinuance of the proceedings for which they were produced, to the file of further proceedings brought directly by a civil party in a criminal court – those extracts, therefore, were included by [the second applicant] in two successive articles which were each the result of a journalistic investigation and sought to present readers with information, analysis and comments on a criminal case that would soon be adjudicated upon by a court, that involved considerable financial interests and concerned one of the richest individuals in France and a photographer and writer who has, as he himself boasts, ‘undeniable success and notoriety’.\nIn the first of the impugned texts, short quotations from procedural documents, which are reproduced in quotation marks in the body of the article and are therefore fully integrated into the journalist’s writing, mention certain facts and offer an analysis thereof. In the second text, the three pages of extracts from procedural documents are included in a broader editorial presentation, consisting essentially of a four-page spread and a large photograph of the person concerned, from which they are indissociable; the journalist expressly refers to those extracts in his article, analysing them and basing his conclusions on them.\nIf one were to accept, in those circumstances, that these two bodies of text should be examined by this court only on the basis of the strict-liability offence under section 38 of the Freedom of the Press Act, that would lead, as the respondents rightly argue, to preventing them from initiating the debate that is warranted by the journalist’s work, within which the impugned extracts are merely one element; and they would be deprived, in the present case, of the defences made available by law to persons who are prosecuted for defamation or for a breach of the right to be presumed innocent, in other words precluding them from proving the veracity of the allegations or, at least, the journalist’s good faith, and from submitting argument to the effect that the impugned texts do not contain any final conclusions expressing a biased view that the person in question is definitely guilty.\nIt should be noted in this connection that the claimant directs his main criticism, in his writ of summons, against the comments and analyses that the journalist has been led to write, under his own name, by the procedural documents cited .... and that he mainly reproduces in that writ only those comments and not the quotations that he is supposed to be challenging. It should be observed in particular that the claimant complains that the statements from which extracts were quoted – or in reality the journalist’s analysis thereof – breached his right to be presumed innocent and were presented as ‘damning’ and ‘particularly incriminating’.\nIt can be concluded that B. himself admits that, absent his chosen basis of action, he had other options at his disposal: a private prosecution or civil proceedings for defamation, or a civil action for a breach of his right to be presumed innocent; both of those courses of action would have entailed fair proceedings, ensuring respect for the equality of arms, and he was not therefore deprived of his right to have access to a court in order to secure respect for his rights.\nIn those circumstances, the upholding in the present case of the claims that he has submitted under 38 would constitute a restriction of freedom of expression devoid of any necessity in a democratic society.” 46.  In a judgment of 22 February 2012, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned that judgment. It found that the impugned publications infringed B.’s right to a fair trial with respect for his defence rights, including the right to be presumed innocent, and breached section 38 of the 1881 Act. It ordered the applicants jointly to pay B. the sum of EUR 1 for each publication by way of compensation and EUR 6,000 in expenses under Article 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It also ordered the publication, on pain of a coercive fine, of a notice containing the operative provisions of the judgment in Le Point and on the magazine’s website. 47.  The Court of Appeal explained that the assessment of the offending publication “clearly” went beyond “the framework of that of so-called ‘procedural’ offences” and that it would have to be carried out with regard to Article 10 of the Convention and to the question whether the interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression was necessary to protect the reputation or rights of others and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 48.  As regards the article of 10 December 2009, the court noted that it had been published the day before B.’s appearance in the criminal court and that it clearly suggested that he was guilty, as he was portrayed as an individual against whom there was “a series of sufficiently strong presumptions [that he had committed] the offence of undue influence”. It took the view that the court below had wrongly regarded the aim of informing the public as prevailing over the means used, namely illegal methods whereby extracts had been selected from statements collected in an investigation in order to show that B. had committed the offence of undue influence, whereas there had been no judicial decision to that effect. It could be understood by the reader that B. was not telling the truth about Mrs Bettencourt’s mental health and that his guilt was “doubly suggested” in the introduction (citing an extract from the prosecution document, which fell under section 38) and in the conclusion. It added as follows:\n“... The reasoning given by the court below is tantamount to legitimising the practice, which is legally prohibited, of publishing extracts from an investigation file before they are read out in open court, first, on account of the interest of the subject, and secondly, while noting B.’s claim that his right to be presumed innocent was breached.\nThe court cannot agree with the reasoning of the court below ...\nThe article of 10 December 2009, in so far as it portrays [B.] as having committed the offence of undue influence vis-à-vis Mrs Bettencourt in the above-mentioned context, clearly breaches his right to a fair trial including to the presumption of innocence.\nThat breach, according to the article, is exclusively based on the publication of extracts from statements which legally speaking are not addressed to journalists when they are not parties to the proceedings.\nThe court would reiterate that, for a reader who has an average knowledge of the courts, documents from judicial investigations take on particular credibility and an undeniable evidential value.\nThe court reaches the conclusion that the date of publication, the choices of quotation, and the portrayal of [B.] as guilty according to the documents from the judicial investigation, even though it had been discontinued, had the consequence of influencing his exercise, which was legally and conventionally guaranteed, of his defence rights, which meant that before being heard by a court he should not have been portrayed as guilty of the offence of undue influence against Mrs Bettencourt. [B.] thus finds himself required to give explanations on evidence against him which has not yet been debated in a court of law and which has been taken from an investigation, then still secret, conducted under the supervision of a judge ...\nIt is not befitting to consider, as did the court below, that [B.] had other courses of action available to him. Being entitled to bring his case to the civil court under section 38, it cannot be suggested to the claimant that he should have opted for other types of proceedings on the erroneous ground that his action contravenes Article 10 of the Convention ...” 49.  As regards the article of 4 February 2010, the Court of Appeal took the view that the editorial choices – front cover of the magazine, presentation of whole swathes of statements, highlighting of the exclusive publication of the witness statements – constituted a communication of some importance directly aimed at B. who had not been able to explain before a court his position “on the accusations of the staff”. It added that the publication portrayed B. “as being accused by third parties in conclusive terms” and that the article was “a repeated incrimination of [B.] two months before a hearing at which the ‘epilogue’ of the case was supposed to take place”. 50.  The applicants appealed on points of law. In their grounds of appeal, they argued in particular that the ban on publishing procedural documents was a matter of defence of the general interest falling within the sole jurisdiction of the public prosecutor, and that a private person could not seek redress for damage on that basis. They added that their argument was supported by the fact that B. could have, under Article 9-1 of the Civil Code, used another legal remedy to ensure the protection of his interests and that the interference with freedom of expression and of information had therefore not been justified or proportionate. 51.  In a judgment of 29 May 2013 giving the following reasons, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal:\n“Having found, first, that the article of 10 December 2009 was based on an analysis of extracts from various statements taken by the criminal investigation police, in order to portray [B] as having taken advantage of Mrs Bettencourt’s weakness, the day before his appearance before a criminal court, which was to rule on the relevance and merits of the accusations made against him by her daughter, and, secondly, that the article of 4 February 2010, based on a partial reproduction of statements taken by the criminal investigation police, seeking to portray [B.] as being accused by third parties in conclusive terms in order to lead the reader to believe that the case against him was made out, two months before a hearing which would constitute, according to the article, ‘the epilogue of the case’, the Court of Appeal ... reached the conclusion that the publication had infringed [B.]’s right to a fair trial with due respect for his right to be presumed innocent and his defence rights; ...” 52.  After June 2010 there were many developments in the case, with its various political and financial repercussions, and they were widely reported in the media. On 17 November 2010 the Court of Cassation ordered the transfer of all the aspects of the Bettencourt case to the Bordeaux tribunal de grande instance. Mrs Bettencourt’s daughter withdrew her claims but the criminal proceedings were later resumed, and on 14 December 2011 B. was placed under judicial investigation for the offence of undue influence. 53.  In a judgment of 28 May 2015, B. was found guilty of that offence and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, of which six months were suspended, a fine of EUR 350,000 and the payment of EUR 158 million in damages awarded to Mrs Bettencourt. In a judgment of 24 August 2016, the Bordeaux Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in respect of the prosecution case and varied the sentence, giving B. a four-year suspended prison sentence, fining him EUR 375,000 and ordering the confiscation of part of his property. The Court of Appeal also took the view that it did not need to make an award of damages on account of settlements that had been agreed between the parties.\n... 59.  The Court refers to Recommendation Rec(2003)13 of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers to the member States on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings, adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 July 2003 (see Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, § 21, ECHR 2016).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  At the time of the events giving rise to the present application, the applicants lived in Istanbul and their children attended different public elementary schools. 5.  On unspecified dates in December 2001 the applicants (save for Mr Yılmaz Yavuz) each sent petitions to the Bağcılar, Esenler and Kadıköy Education Directorates with a request for their children to be provided with education in Kurdish in their respective elementary schools. It appears that similar petitions were submitted by many other parents of Kurdish ethnic origin around the same time. 6.  According to the examples submitted by the applicants, the petitions were worded, with slight variations, as follows:\n“I want my child who is studying at ... school to receive education in Kurdish, which is his [her] mother tongue, in addition to education in Turkish, at school...” 7.  On receipt of the petitions the relevant education directorates informed the Istanbul Security Directorate, which brought the matter to the attention of the principal public prosecutor’s office at the Istanbul State Security Court. 8.  On 28 December 2001 the public prosecutor asked the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate to identify the names and addresses of the persons who had petitioned the Bağcılar and Esenler Education Directorates with a request for education in Kurdish. It appears that on an unspecified date the same instruction was given in relation to the petitions lodged with the Kadıköy Education Directorate. 9.  On 8 January 2002 the public prosecutor requested a warrant authorising a search of the homes of forty people, including the applicants, who had submitted petitions. The public prosecutor considered that the petitions in question had been made on the instructions of the PKK (Workers’ Party of Kurdistan), an illegal armed organisation, and wished to collect relevant evidence from the petitioners’ homes. The Istanbul State Security Court granted the public prosecutor’s request that day. 10.  On 9 January 2002 the public prosecutor instructed the Anti‑terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate to conduct the searches with a view to finding evidence that could link the relevant persons to the PKK as aiders and abettors. It also instructed the Anti-terrorism branch to take the petitioners into police custody and question them in relation to the content and purpose of their petitions. The public prosecutor provided a list of questions to ask the petitioners, which mainly aimed to establish whether they had acted on the orders of the PKK. 11.  Early on the morning of 13 January 2002 police officers from the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate carried out a simultaneous search of all the properties, including the applicants’ houses. The search and seizure reports drafted by the police and signed by the applicants and other members of the household indicated that a search warrant had been issued by the Istanbul State Security Court on account of their petitions requesting education in Kurdish for their children. The reports also stated that the public prosecutor had ordered the petitioners’ arrest for questioning. According to these search and seizure reports, no illegal material was found in the applicants’ homes. 12. The applicants were arrested and taken into police custody following the searches on 13 January 2002. The search and seizure reports and custody records submitted by the Government indicate that the applicants were arrested and taken into police custody at the following times:\n \nName\nTime of arrest\nTime of placement in detention centre\nEsma Döner 13.  On the same day the applicants were questioned by officers from the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate. They were asked, in particular, whether they had submitted the petitions in accordance with the PKK’s new “civil disobedience” strategy adopted at its Sixth National Conference held between 5 and 22 August 2001. The applicants Meryem Peker and Yılmaz Yavuz claimed that they had not submitted any petitions requesting education in Kurdish to any State authorities. The remaining applicants mainly denied any affiliation with the PKK and stated that they had submitted the petitions in question so that their children could learn their parents’ mother tongue. Some of the applicants also stated that the issue of submission of such petitions had also been discussed at the Bağcılar branch of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – the People’s Democracy Party), a Turkish political party, which they attended from time to time. The applicants’ signed statements suggest that interpretation services were provided to three of them (Ayşe Döner, Fatma Yılmaz and Güli Akyol) on request. A note drafted by the police also suggests that the applicants other than Meryem Peker, Halime Günana, Asiya Karadeniz and Yılmaz Yavuz were illiterate. 14.  It appears that in the meantime, some of the applicants’ families contacted the Istanbul Bar Association seeking legal aid for their relatives during their detention in police custody. A lawyer was accordingly appointed. On 13 January 2002 the lawyer applied to the public prosecutor’s office at the Istanbul State Security Court for information in relation to twelve of the applicants (Esma Döner, Gülperi Döner, Ayşe Döner, Hanım Gülün, Şahide Gümüş, Hasibe Yılmaz, Fatma Yılmaz, Tenzile Akyol, Güli Akyol, Fatma Duruşkan, Meryem Peker and Mehmet Şirin Döner). In particular, he enquired about their legal status and the charges they were facing, and asked to meet them and to provide them with the necessary legal assistance. On the same day he applied to the Istanbul State Security Court to have the same twelve applicants released, arguing that they were being held in custody unlawfully. 15.  On the same day a judge at the Istanbul State Security Court decided that there was no need to decide on the lawyer’s request as there was no record of the individuals in question being detained in relation to an investigation conducted by the public prosecutor’s office. On 16 January 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court rejected a request by the lawyer to have the decision rendered by the judge set aside. 16.  In the meantime, on 14 January 2002 the public prosecutor informed the lawyer that the applicants in question were in custody on suspicion of being affiliated with an illegal organisation, and that there was no need to decide on the lawyer’s request to have access to them as no authorisation for their detention in police custody had yet been issued by the public prosecutor’s office. 17.  It appears that shortly after that decision, still on 14 January 2002, the public prosecutor authorised the applicants’ detention in police custody for four days between 13 and 17 January 2002. The authorisation was granted in response to a request made by the Anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate, who had claimed that the applicants’ detention was needed for the completion of their files, in particular to verify whether the petitions had been submitted by the applicants themselves, whether they had any affiliation with the PKK and whether they were being searched for in connection with other offences (see paragraph 32 below for the legal basis for that authorisation). 18.  At 8.30 a.m. on 17 January 2002 the applicants were taken out of the detention centre and, following a routine medical check-up, were brought before the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court. They admitted before the public prosecutor that they had written the petitions, either themselves or with the help of their children, but stated that they had no other motive than wanting their children to learn their mother tongue. They denied any involvement with the PKK. Some of the applicants claimed that they had submitted petitions after hearing about it from other parents at school or on television. According to the information provided by the Government, seven of the applicants (Ayşe Döner, Hasibe Yılmaz, Fatma Yılmaz, Tenzile Akyol, Güli Akyol, Meliha Can and Kudret Dağ) were assisted by an interpreter during questioning by the public prosecutor. 19.  At an unspecified time on 17 January 2002 the applicants (except for Meryem Peker, Mehmet Şirin Döner and Yılmaz Yavuz) were brought before a judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, who ordered their release after taking statements from them. The applicants concerned were actually released following the Istanbul State Security Court’s order. Seven of the applicants (Ayşe Döner, Şahide Gümüş, Hasibe Yılmaz, Fatma Yılmaz, Güli Akyol, Meliha Can and Kudret Dağ) were assisted by an interpreter before that court. It appears that Meryem Peker, Mehmet Şirin Döner and Yılmaz Yavuz were also released that day, but the decision ordering their release was not submitted to the Court. 20.  On the same day the public prosecutor filed an objection concerning the decision to release the applicants, claiming that it was evident from the statements made by them following their arrest that they had submitted the petitions in an organised manner with the aim of assisting the PKK’s “politicisation” process. The public prosecutor added that although the applicants appeared to have lawfully used their right to petition, in reality they were acting on the instructions of the PKK and were thus aiding and abetting that organisation. 21.  On 18 January 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court upheld the public prosecutor’s objection in respect of the applicants Esma Döner, Hanım Gülün, Hasibe Yılmaz, Meliha Can, Şükrüye Temüroğlu, Halime Günana and Zübeyde Yavuz, and issued a warrant for their arrest. The court did not provide any reasons for its decision. 22.  On 22 January 2002 the lawyer asked the Istanbul State Security Court to set aside its decision of 18 January 2002 ordering the arrest of the relevant applicants. On 28 January 2002 the State Security Court dismissed that request, basing its decision on the nature of the offence, date of arrest, state of the evidence and contents of the case file. 23.  In the meantime, on 19 January 2002 Esma Döner, Hasibe Yılmaz and Zübeyde Yavuz were arrested on the basis of that warrant. The next day they were remanded in custody. It appears that the remaining four applicants named in the warrant could not be located. 24.  On 21 January 2002 the applicants Esma Döner and Zübeyde Yavuz filed objections concerning their detention on remand. 25.  On 22 January 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court dismissed Esma Döner and Zübeyde Yavuz’s objections, basing its decision on the nature of the offence and the state of the evidence. 26.  On 6 February 2002 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court decided not to prosecute the applicant Yılmaz Yavuz because of a lack of evidence against him. 27.  On the same day the public prosecutor issued an indictment against thirty-eight suspects, including the remaining applicants, accusing them of aiding and abetting an armed organisation under Article 169 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713) in force at the material time. In the indictment the public prosecutor stated that following the arrest and conviction of their leader Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK had set out to pursue new policies. Accordingly, at the Sixth National Conference held between 5 and 22 August 2001, it had adopted the “Democratisation and Peace Project”, a new strategy which had involved undertaking non-violent activities of “civil disobedience” and aimed at leaving the State and its authorities in a difficult position in the international arena. The public prosecutor submitted that such organised acts of civil disobedience agreed on by the PKK had included petitioning the State authorities for education in Kurdish, dressing up in traditional Kurdish female costume, and applying to courts or population registration offices with requests for their Kurdish identities to appear on their national identity cards. When viewed against this background, the petitions in question – which had been submitted to certain authorities on predetermined dates and times – could not be considered to be individual acts. They had actually been part of an organised movement which had aimed to implement the decisions adopted by the PKK and thereby undermine the authority of the State. 28.  On 12 February 2002 the first-instance court ordered the release of the applicants Esma Döner, Hasibe Yılmaz and Zübeyde Yavuz pending the criminal proceedings. 29.  On 28 May 2003 the Istanbul State Security Court acquitted all the accused, including the applicants, because on the facts none of the elements of the crime of aiding and abetting an armed organisation had been present in their actions and there was no other evidence to support the allegations brought against them. The judgment became final on 5 June 2003.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lived, prior to arrest and conviction, in Cheboksary. 5.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant was arrested. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 6.  On 7 October 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Cheboksary convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to six years and nine months’ imprisonment. 7.  On 13 December 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld his conviction on appeal. The court reduced the applicant’s sentence to five years and ten months. 8.  On 22 June 2007 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic quashed the judgments of 7 October and 13 December 2005 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The applicant was remanded in custody. 9.  On 11 July 2007 the Leninskiy District Court ordered the applicant to stay in prison pending trial. 10.  On 22 November 2007 the Leninskiy District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention, having noted that:\n“... Taking into account the seriousness of the charges against [the applicant], his health condition, personal profile, a possibility that he might abscond, the court considers that the previous measure of restraint should remain unchanged ...” 11.  On 5 February 2008 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld this decision on appeal. 12.  By decision of 24 December 2007, as upheld on appeal, the Leninskiy District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention for three months. Having heard the parties, the court ruled that:\n“... As it can be seen from the case file, [the applicant] has been accused of a serious crime, which is punishable with an imprisonment exceeding two years. The grounds, which were used to put him in custody ..., have not ceased to apply. Being at large, [the applicant] may abscond and continue his criminal activity...” 13.  On 27 March 2008 the Leninskiy District Court convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced him to five years and ten months’ imprisonment. 14.  On 1 July 2008 the Supreme Court of the Chuvash Republic upheld his conviction appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Sumgayit. 6.  On 6 March 2010 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of possession of narcotic substances. According to a record dated 6 March 2010 relating to the carrying out of operational measures and the seizure of physical evidence (əməliyyat tədbirlərinin keçirilməsi və maddi sübutun götürülməsi haqqında protokol), the applicant was arrested by the police at 11.30 p.m. on 6 March 2010 in Sumgayit, on the basis of operational information that he was in possession of narcotic substances. He did not resist arrest and was taken to the Sumgayit City Police Office (“the Police Office”), where he was searched in the presence of two police officers and two attesting witnesses. It appears from the record that the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. During the search, narcotic substances were found on his person. 7.  On 9 March 2010 the applicant was charged with illegal possession of a large quantity of narcotic substances with intent to sell, under Article 234.4.3 of the Criminal Code. 8.  On 10 March 2010 the Sumgayit City Court, relying on the official charges brought against the applicant and the prosecutor’s request to apply the preventive measure of remand in custody (həbs qətimkan tədbiri), ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of two months, calculating the period of detention from 9 March 2010. 9.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 10.  On the same day the Sumgayit City Court also delivered a separate special decision (xüsusi qərar), acknowledging a violation of the applicant’s right to liberty. In this connection, the court held that the investigator had unlawfully deprived the applicant of his liberty, because the applicant had not been brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of his arrest, as required by the relevant law. The court also informed the Police Office about the investigator’s unlawful action, and asked the Police Office to inform it about the measures taken in this respect within one month. 11.  According to the applicant, following his arrest by the police on 6 March 2010, he was taken to the Police Office, where he was detained in various rooms. He was repeatedly subjected to ill-treatment in police custody, with the aim of extracting a confession from him. He was also forced by the police to make an incriminating statement against two other people arrested in connection with possession of narcotic substances. As he refused to make the statements requested by the police, on 6 and 7 March 2010 he was regularly beaten with wooden and rubber truncheons, and was given electric shocks and cigarette burns by police officers X., S. and M. 12.  On 10 March 2010 the applicant met his lawyer for the first time when he was brought before the Sumgayit City Court. According to the applicant’s lawyer, he made an oral complaint at the hearing before the Sumgayit City Court in the presence of the Sumgayit city deputy prosecutor, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated in police custody. He also pointed out the signs of ill-treatment present on the applicant’s body, and requested his examination by a forensic expert. However, no action was taken by the court or the prosecuting authorities in respect of the applicant’s ill-treatment. 13.  On 3 and 10 April 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a written complaint with the investigator in charge of the case, complaining that the applicant had been ill-treated in police custody. In this connection, he pointed out that, although he had made such a complaint at the hearing of 10 March 2010 before the Sumgayit City Court, no action had been taken by the investigating authorities. The lawyer asked the investigator for a forensic examination of the applicant. He also asked the investigator to question the applicant and organise a formal face-to-face confrontation between the applicant and the other co-accused in his presence. No action was taken by the investigator. 14.  On an unspecified date in April 2010 the lawyer informed the Ombudsman of the applicant’s ill-treatment in police custody and the investigator’s failure to order a forensic examination of the applicant. 15.  Following a conversation between the applicant and agents from the Ombudsman’s Office in a temporary detention centre, on 22 April 2010 the Ombudsman requested that the Prosecutor General’s Office carry out a forensic examination of the applicant and conduct an effective investigation into his allegation of ill-treatment. 16.  By a letter of 7 May 2010, the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the lawyer that the complaint submitted by the Ombudsman concerning the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment by the police would be examined, and he would be informed of its outcome. 17.  In the meantime, on 5 May 2010 the investigator had ordered a forensic examination of the applicant. It appears from forensic report no. 600 dated 11 May 2010 that the forensic expert noticed an abrasion (sıyrıq) measuring 5 cm by 1.2 cm on the applicant’s left wrist joint. He concluded that the injury had been caused by a hard blunt object, and could have been inflicted on 6 March 2010. The expert stated that the severity of the injury had not been determined, because it was not an injury causing harm to health. 18.  On an unspecified date in May 2010 the applicant’s case was assigned to another investigator. 19.  On 25 May 2010 the applicant’s lawyer was provided with a copy of the forensic report of 11 May 2010. He immediately asked for a new forensic examination, claiming that the applicant’s forensic examination had been conducted in his absence and in breach of relevant procedural rules. He also claimed that, although numerous injuries were still visible on the applicant’s body, the expert had noted only one injury in his report. 20.  On 26 May 2010 the investigator granted the request and ordered a new forensic examination of the applicant. 21.  On 1 June 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a new request with the investigator, asking to participate in the forensic examination. He also asked the investigator to allow him to photograph and make a video recording of the forensic examination. 22.  On 3 June 2010 the investigator granted the request in part, allowing the lawyer to participate in the forensic examination. 23.  On 8 June 2010 the Sumgayit city deputy prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s allegation of ill-treatment. He held that it had not been established that the applicant had been beaten by the police officers, or that the injury found on his left wrist joint had been caused by them while he was in police custody. However, the prosecutor also found that the applicant had been unlawfully detained in police custody from 6 to 7 March 2010 in the absence of any official record of his arrest. In this connection, he decided to inform the Police Office of the unlawful actions of the police officers. 24.  In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant’s lawyer had lodged a complaint with the Sumgayit City Court under the procedure concerning the review of the lawfulness of procedural actions or decisions by the criminal prosecuting authority under Article 449 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He complained, in particular, that the applicant had been ill-treated in police custody, that the investigator had failed to reply to his complaints concerning the ill-treatment, and that the applicant’s procedural rights had been violated within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 25.  In the proceedings before the Sumgayit City Court the judge heard the applicant, the two other co-accused, the applicant’s lawyer, the police officers involved in the applicant’s arrest, and the two investigators who had been in charge of the applicant’s case. Although the police officers denied the ill-treatment allegation, the investigator who had replaced the first investigator in charge of the case stated that he had also noticed the signs of a beating on the applicant’s body during his questioning. 26.  On 25 June 2010 the Sumgayit City Court delivered a decision, finding that the applicant had been subjected to torture and violent treatment (işgəncə və zorakı rəftar) in police custody. In this connection, the court relied on the conclusions of the forensic report of 11 May 2010 and the statement made by one of the investigators. The court also held that, at the court hearing, the applicant’s body had shown signs of ill-treatment as established by the court. The court further found that the applicant had been unlawfully detained in the Police Office, and that he had been questioned by the investigator in the absence of his lawyer. The court ordered the Sumgayit city prosecutor’s office to investigate the fact that he had been ill‑treated. 27.  On 5 July 2010 the Sumgayit city prosecutor lodged an objection against the Sumgayit City Court’s decision of 25 June 2010. 28.  On 21 July 2010 a panel composed of two forensic experts issued a report concerning the second forensic examination of the applicant. It appears from forensic report no. T76/2010 that the applicant was examined by the forensic experts in the presence of his lawyer on 23 June 2010. During the examination the applicant stated that he had been tortured in police custody, and gave a detailed description of his ill-treatment. In particular, he stated that on 6 and 7 March 2010 police officers X., S. and M. had tortured him with truncheons, a device which gave electric shocks and cigarette burns. As a result of the examination, the experts noticed numerous scars (çapıq) and areas of pigmentation (piqmentasiya sahələri) on various parts of the applicant’s body. They pointed out that, while the scars had been caused by a hard blunt object, the areas of pigmentation had resulted from intense heat. The experts concluded that these injuries had been inflicted three to six months prior to the examination, and the characteristics of the injuries did not contradict the applicant’s description of ill-treatment. 29.  On 27 July 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor’s objection, finding the first-instance court’s decision justified. As to the fact of the applicant’s ill-treatment, the appellate court held that this was supported by the expert reports of 11 May and 21 July 2010, which confirmed the existence of various injuries on his body. The court further held that the investigator who had replaced the first investigator in charge of the case had also stated before the court that he had noticed injuries on the applicant’s body when he had questioned him. The court lastly noted that it had taken into account the fact that, although the applicant had been examined by the forensic experts a few months after his beating by the police officers, there were still signs of ill-treatment on his body. 30.  On 24 August 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, complaining that the investigating authorities had failed to investigate the applicant’s ill-treatment, despite the explicit acknowledgment of the fact of the ill-treatment by the court decisions of 25 June and 27 July 2010. 31.  On 20 September 2010 the Sumgayit city deputy prosecutor again refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the applicant’s ill-treatment. The prosecutor concluded that the injuries found on the applicant’s body had not been caused in police custody. In this connection, he noted that the applicant was a drug addict and that there was a likelihood that the injuries had been caused by “external influences” (kənar təsirlərdən) before he had been taken to the temporary detention centre. 32.  On 8 October 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office against that decision. He complained, in particular, that the prosecuting authorities had unlawfully refused to investigate the applicant’s ill-treatment, despite the explicit acknowledgment of the fact of the ill-treatment by the relevant court decisions. 33.  No action was taken by the prosecuting authorities. 34.  On 7 May 2010 the Sumgayit City Court extended the applicant’s detention pending trial for a period of one month, namely until 7 June 2010. The court indicated as the reason for its decision that it needed more time to perform some investigative actions, such as the carrying out of forensic narcotic and psychiatric examinations. It further relied on the gravity of the charges against the applicant, and the existence of a risk of his absconding from and obstructing the investigation. 35.  The applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that the first‑instance court had failed to justify the extension of his detention. 36.  On 14 May 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court’s decision. The appellate court’s reasoning was essentially the same as that in the first-instance court’s decision. 37.  On 3 June 2010 the Sumgayit City Court again extended the applicant’s detention for a period of one month. The court justified this by relying on the necessity to carry out further investigative actions within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 38.  On 4 June 2010 the applicant appealed against the decision, reiterating that there was no reason to hold him in detention, and that the first-instance court had failed to justify his continued detention. 39.  On 11 June 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extension order was justified. The appellate court justified its decision by relying on the gravity of the charges and the risk of the applicant’s absconding from the investigation. 40.  On 6 July 2010 the Sumgayit City Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 July 2010. The court again justified the extension by relying on the necessity to carry out further investigative actions. 41.  The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 42.  On 11 July 2010 the investigator reclassified the criminal charges against the applicant, replacing the previous charges under Article 234.4.3 of the Criminal Code with new charges under Article 234.1 (illegal possession of narcotic substances in a quantity exceeding that necessary for personal consumption, without intent to sell). 43.  On 21 July 2010 the investigator issued a bill of indictment under Article 234.1 of the Criminal Code and filed it with the Sumgayit City Court. 44.  On 6 August 2010 the Sumgayit City Court held a preliminary hearing. At that hearing, the prosecutor stated that there had been numerous breaches of procedural rules during the investigation, and that the bill of indictment had not been compiled in accordance with the requirements of the relevant law. He asked the court to discontinue its examination of the criminal case and remit it to the prosecutor supervising the investigation. The court granted the prosecutor’s application. The court’s decision made no mention of the applicant’s detention, even though the latest extension order had expired on 22 July 2010. Under domestic law, a decision taken at a preliminary hearing was not open to appeal. 45.  On 13 August 2010 the prosecutor lodged an application with the Sumgayit City Court, asking for an extension of the applicant’s detention until 7 September 2010. 46.  On 16 August 2010 the Sumgayit City Court dismissed the application, finding that there was no basis for such an extension. However, taking into account the prosecutor’s intention to lodge an objection against that decision, the court ordered the applicant’s detention for a period of seven days. 47.  On 23 August 2010 the Sumgayit Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecutor’s objection and upheld the first-instance court’s decision. The applicant was released from detention. 48.  On the same day the applicant lodged a request with the investigator, asking for unlawfully obtained evidence to be removed from the case file and the criminal proceedings against him to be discontinued. 49.  By a decision of 26 August 2010, the investigator dismissed the applicant’s request. 50.  In the meantime, following the applicant’s release from detention, on 25 August 2010 the investigator in charge had issued a decision placing the applicant under police supervision (polisin nəzarəti altına vermə). The decision did not detail the duration of that preventive measure. According to the applicant, his placement under police supervision lasted approximately five or six months, during which time he was obliged to report to the police twice a week and not leave the city where he resided. At the end of this period, although he was no longer required to report to the police, he was not provided with any official decision confirming the end of his placement under police supervision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants’ dates of birth and places of residence are given in the Appendix. 5.  At the material time the second applicant was a member of an opposition group Nida. The third applicant was a member of an opposition group İctimai Palata; he was also one of the organisers of several demonstrations held in Baku. 6.  The first and the second applicants participated in a demonstration organised by the opposition on 20 October 2012. Prior to that assembly, on 15 October 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”). The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration at the place indicated by the organisers and proposed a different location on the outskirts of Baku – the grounds of a driving school situated in the 20th residential area of the Sabail District. Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstration as planned. 7.  The second applicant also participated in demonstrations held on 12 January and 26 January 2013. The third applicant participated in a demonstration held on 30 April 2013. The organisers of those demonstrations gave no proper prior notice to the BCEA. Information about the demonstrations was disseminated on the internet or in the press. 8.  According to the applicants, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants of the demonstration of 20 October 2012 were demanding democratic reforms in the country and free and fair elections, and protesting against impediments on freedom of assembly. The demonstration of 12 January was aimed at protesting about the deaths of soldiers in the army, while the demonstration of 26 January 2013 condemned the use of force by the police against the participants of previous demonstrations. The participants of the demonstration of 30 April 2013 were commemorating the victims of a terrorist attack which had been committed in 2009 at the Azerbaijan State Oil Academy. 9.  The police began to disperse the demonstrations of 20 October 2012, 12 January, 26 January and 30 April 2013 as soon as the protesters began to gather. 10.  The circumstances related to the dispersal of the demonstration of 20 October 2012, the first and second applicants’ arrests and custody, and subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Gafgaz Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 60259/11, 15 October 2015) (see also Appendix). 11.  The circumstances related to the dispersal of the demonstrations of 12 January, 26 January and 30 April 2013, the second and third applicants’ arrests and custody, and the subsequent administrative proceedings against them are similar to those in Bayramov v. Azerbaijan ([Committee] nos. 19150/13 and 52022/13, 6 April 2017) (see also Appendix).", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Bacău. 5.  On 20 September 2012 the applicant was placed in Bacău Prison in order to serve a five-year sentence for robbery. He remained there until 26 April 2013 when he was transferred to Vaslui Prison. In May 2015 the applicant was transferred to Focşani Prison from where he was conditionally released in 2016. 6.  The applicant described the detention conditions in Bacău and Vaslui prisons as inhuman because of overcrowding and extremely poor hygiene. He further mentioned the prison authorities’ failure to provide the necessary cleaning products. He also complained of the presence of pests and of dampness in the cells and the poor quality of food, which sometimes even contained sand. 7.  In Bacău Prison the applicant was held for 7 months and 5 days in three different cells in section 1: one measuring 27.12 sq. m, which he shared with eleven prisoners; a second measuring 39.36 sq. m, which he shared with fifteen other prisoners; and a third measuring 39.27 sq. m, shared with seventeen other prisoners. All the cells had sanitary facilities with an area that was not provided. Taking into account the overall area of the cells without deducting the surface of the in-cell sanitary facility, the applicant had personal space ranging from 2.18 to 2.46 sq. m available. The cells were provided with natural light and ventilation through windows with measurements ranging from 118 x 147 cm to 237 x 75 cm. 8.  The hygiene conditions were adequate. Toiletries were provided within the limits of the prison budget. General disinfection of the cells was conducted once per trimester and also whenever necessary. 9.  The applicant received a menu in line with the regulations. The food prepared was always tested by the prison doctor and a representative of the prisoners and the results were marked in a register.\n(b)  Vaslui Prison 10.  In Vaslui Prison the applicant was assigned to a semi-open detention regime. He was held in cells measuring 14.75 sq. m, including a storage closet of 0.75 sq. m and sanitary facilities of 1.8 sq. m. For various periods of time the applicant shared the cells with three or five other prisoners. 11.  After deducting the surface of the in-cell sanitary facility and the storage closet from the overall surface of the cells, the applicant had personal space of 2.03 sq. m available for several non-consecutive periods totalling ten months. 12.  For the rest of the time spent in Vaslui Prison until 11 September 2014, the date of the correspondence from the National Administration of Prisons submitted by the Government, the applicant had personal space of 3.05 sq. m available for three non-consecutive periods of time totalling two months and twenty-four days. 13.  For several remaining short periods of time the applicant was transferred for various reasons to other locations. 14.  According to the government, the cells in which the applicant was accommodated were put in use on 1 May 2012 when new mattresses and bed clothes were distributed. The cells were provided with natural light and ventilation through windows measuring 116 x 115 cm. Artificial lighting was also provided as well as the necessary furniture. All the cells had separate sanitary facilities equipped with one toilet, one shower, one sink and a window of 35 x 55 cm. Hot water was provided for two hours twice per week while cold water was provided without interruption. 15.  The applicant was given a special diet for sick prisoners in line with the regulations. Here too the food prepared was always tested by the prison doctor and a representative of the prisoners and the results were marked in a register. 16.  According to the regulations in force at the relevant time a prisoner had the right to receive for free during a year a maximum of six tubes of toothpaste, twelve rolls of toilet paper, 10 kg of washing powder, three kilograms of poor quality soap and 3 litres of bleach. These items were provided within the limits of the prison budget. Between April 2013 and August 2014, washing powder, chlorine, soap and toilet paper were distributed to prisoners on a monthly basis. The Government submitted a copy of a printed form for the distribution of toothbrushes, toothpaste, shaving cream, razors, toilet paper and soap in Vaslui Prison, dated 1 August 2014. According to this form, on the said date the applicant received one razor, one roll of toilet paper and one bar of soap. 17.  On 28 August 2012, upon his placement in Bacău Prison, the applicant’s medical chart mentioned that he was suffering from tuberculosis, and gastro duodenitis. 18.  Between 6 and 22 December 2012 the applicant was admitted to Târgu Ocna Prison Hospital where he underwent follow-up examinations on a skin-graft operation carried out before his imprisonment. On this occasion he was diagnosed with chronic hepatitis B (HVB). He was released with the prescription of hepatoprotective and anti-inflammatory drugs and a special diet. 19.  Between 1 and 15 March 2013 the applicant was again admitted for a check-up to the same hospital. Arteriopathy obliterans of the lower limbs was added to his previous diagnosis. He was released with the same prescription. 20.  On 17 May 2013 the applicant was admitted to Târgu Ocna Prison Hospital with acute appendicitis. On 30 May 2013 he was transferred to Moineşti Emergency Hospital where he was operated on. The applicant was subsequently hospitalised four times for follow-up examinations. 21.  The applicant was examined by a dentist on three occasions throughout his detention. He was diagnosed with lateral, latero-frontal maxillary edentation and latero-terminal mandibulary edentation. On 28 August 2013 he was treated for an abscess and was prescribed antibiotics. 22.  The applicant requested in writing adequate dental treatment and prostheses. On 18 December 2013 in reply to the applicant’s request the National Prisons Administration confirmed that he needed dental prostheses for which the price should be calculated by the prison dentist. The applicant’s personal contribution was to amount to 40% of the calculated price in accordance with the rules for the application of Law no. 275/2006. In case he did not have the necessary financial means to cover his contribution, the applicant was instructed to lodge a request with the Vaslui Prison administration after obtaining an estimate of the extent of the dental work needed and its total costs. 23.  On 18 April 2013 the applicant lodged a complaint on the basis of Law no. 275/2006 on the serving of prison sentences with the post-sentencing judge in Bacău Prison claiming that his right to medication, medical treatment and a special diet had been breached by the prison administration. 24.  On 20 May 2013 the post-sentencing judge decided to reject the applicant’s complaint as ill-founded. The judge reviewed the applicant’s medical file and his doctors’ prescriptions and, taking into account that the applicant had failed to mention any specific failures on the part of the prison administration, concluded that no breach of rights could be found in the case. 25.  The applicant contested the above decision before the Bacău County Court but during the hearing of 22 August 2013 he withdrew his complaint. 26.  On 18 December 2013 he complained to the Vaslui Prison administration that there had been no hot water for ten days and that the heating had also been cut recently. The prison administration replied on 20 December 2013 that there had been technical problems which had since been remedied.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  On 16 September 1982 the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. The life sentence was mandatory. 5.  On 26 April 1996 the applicant was released on licence by virtue of section 23 of the Prison Act (Northern Ireland) 1953. 6.  On 7 March 1997 the applicant’s licence was revoked by order of the Secretary of State following his arrest for alleged sexual offences, which included acts of indecent assault and gross indecency with two of his nieces, who were aged nine and thirteen at the time. 7.  The applicant was subsequently charged with the offences but the charges were withdrawn by the Director of Public Prosecutions on 13 January 1998 because it was not considered to be in his nieces’ best interests to give evidence. 8.  After considering representations made on behalf of the applicant, the Secretary of State decided that his life licence should not be reinstated and that his case should be considered by the Life Sentence Review Board. The role of the Board, which consisted largely of senior officials from the Northern Ireland Office, was to advise the Secretary of State on when he should release on licence under section 23 of the 1953 Act prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for life. In considering these cases the Board took into account the nature of the prisoner’s offence, his age and background, his response in prison, and all other relevant factors, including the comments made by the trial judge when passing sentence. 9.  The applicant’s case was reviewed by the Board on 12 November 1998, 3 November 1999, 7 December 1999, 26 April 2000 and 30 October 2000. On each occasion the Board declined to direct his release as it believed that he had committed the conduct alleged against him and that there was a risk he would commit further acts of a similar nature if released. 10.  The applicant sought permission to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decisions of 7 December 1999 and 30 October 2000 on the grounds, inter alia, that the decisions were contrary to Articles 5 § 4 and 6 of the Convention because the proceedings before the Board had not been “fair” and its function was “administrative rather than quasi-judicial”. 11.  Permission was granted but the application was dismissed on 29 June 2001. Insofar as the applicant had sought to rely on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the court, having regard to Wynne v. the United Kingdom, 18 July 1994, Series A no. 294‑A, found that at the relevant time it did not apply to a mandatory life sentence in Northern Ireland. 12.  The applicant did not seek permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. 13.  Following a review in anticipation of the coming into force, in October 2000, of the Human Rights Act 1998, the Life Sentence Review Commissioners (“the LSRC”) replaced the Life Sentence Review Board. Unlike the Board, the LSRC was independent of the Executive and could give legally binding decisions in relation to the release of prisoners. 14.  On 29 November 2001 the applicant’s case was referred to a panel of the LSRC. The panel’s role was first, to establish whether, at the date of recall, there had been a significant risk of the applicant committing serious harm; and secondly, to consider whether the risk currently posed by the applicant was capable of being managed safely in the community, and, if not, whether there were steps that might be taken with a view to reducing the current risk to a level that could, in the future, be safely managed in the community. 15.  An initial hearing took place on 17 June 2002. At the hearing the applicant’s solicitor indicated that he had no more factual evidence to adduce concerning the allegations of sexual abuse and asked the panel to conduct a paper review of the credibility of those allegations. The panel agreed and, based on the written material, concluded that on the balance of probabilities the applicant had committed the alleged sexual assaults. It therefore set that issue aside and the remainder of the hearing only addressed the question of risk at that point in time. 16.  In the course of the hearing the applicant dismissed his solicitor. The hearing was then adjourned as the applicant had no legal representative. He instructed new solicitors in late September 2002 but they only obtained a legal aid certificate in April 2003, despite the Chairman of the panel intervening to expedite the process. 17.  The panel requested submission of evidence and representations by 31 July 2003. An extension was granted at the applicant’s request and the representations were filed on 17 September 2003. In those representations, the applicant submitted, inter alia, that in a recall case the panel was required to conduct a merits review of the recall decision. He therefore argued that the decision arrived at on paper on 17 June 2002 – that on the balance of probabilities he had committed the alleged sexual assaults – had been unlawfully and unfairly arrived at and the question should be revisited by a fresh panel. 18.  At a hearing on 9 January 2004 the Chairman indicated that he would allow the applicant to reopen the issue of whether or not he had committed the alleged assaults. As a consequence, the panel members recused themselves on 12 January 2004 and a new panel, chaired by Mr Peter Smith QC, was appointed (“the Smith panel”). 19.  A preliminary hearing date was fixed for 16 March 2004. At the hearing the Secretary of State indicated that he would not be calling the two complainants as witnesses, although he did intend to tender the transcripts of video-recorded interviews with them. The applicant’s representatives asked the Chairman to direct the Secretary of State to call them as witnesses. The Chairman refused this application but made it clear that the applicant could subpoena the complainants and cross-examine them as though they were witnesses for the Secretary of State. He assured the applicant that no adverse inferences would follow if he did not summons the witnesses. 20.  The substantive hearing was fixed for 18 and 19 May 2004. On 12 May 2004 the Prison Service on behalf of the Secretary of State submitted twenty-one witness statements taken by police during the course of the original investigation and sought leave to call one of the complainants as a witness. On 14 May 2004 the Smith panel issued a direction permitting the supplementary material to be appended to the hearing materials and granting the Secretary of State permission to call the complainant. 21.  On 17 May 2004 the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Smith panel to complain about the late submission of the witness statements and the decision to permit the complainant to be called as a witness. 22.  As a consequence, a further preliminary hearing was held on the morning of 18 May 2004 instead of the substantive hearing originally planned. At the hearing the applicant was told that the complainant would not be attending and it was decided that the Secretary of State should seek to encourage her to attend voluntarily. In the meantime the hearing was adjourned. 23.  On 23 August 2004 the applicant wrote directly to the Smith panel to complain about the delays in his case. 24.  On 21 September 2004 the Smith panel replied to the applicant’s letter, indicating that the Secretary of State was still trying to secure the complainant’s attendance. 25.  On 8 October 2004 the Secretary of State was “forced to conclude that despite our best efforts [the complainant] is reluctant to give evidence voluntarily to the [panel]”. 26.  On 4 November 2004 the Smith panel indicated that it would not direct the Secretary of State to issue a witness summons to secure the complainant’s attendance. 27.  The hearing began on 21 March 2005. Evidence was heard over 21 and 22 March, 23, 24 and 31 May and 1 June 2005, including video recordings of social services’ interviews with the applicant’s nieces. In addition, both parties submitted written representations. In his representations the applicant argued that the evidence of sexual abuse should not have been admitted as he had been unable to cross-examine the complainants. 28.  Having considered the evidence the Smith panel concluded that the Secretary of State had proved on the balance of probabilities that the applicant had committed the alleged sexual assaults against children and that it was not safe to release him on licence at that point. 29.  The Smith panel dealt with the applicant’s submissions on the unfairness of the proceedings by noting that:\n“... [counsel for the applicant’s] approach to the issue of [the complainant] being subpoenaed was a perfectly legitimate tactical manoeuvre by which he sought, on the one hand, to characterise the failure to subpoena [the complainant] as unfair, while on the other hand, he sought to avoid being instrumental in securing her attendance at the hearing and giving evidence with the consequent danger of the case against [the applicant] being strengthened. The panel remains of the opinion... that it would have been unreasonable to have directed [the complainant] to be subpoenaed.” 30.  On 3 November 2005 the applicant applied for permission to seek judicial review of the Smith panel’s decision of 3 August 2005 not to direct his release from prison. He contended first, that the procedure before the LSRC had been unfair and in breach of Articles 5 § 4 and 6 of the Convention, as the Smith panel had based a finding against him on the statements of witnesses who had not been available to be challenged by cross-examination. Secondly, he submitted that the Smith panel had misdirected itself on the applicable standard of proof. Thirdly, he argued that there had not been a sufficient “causal connection” between the deprivation of his liberty following his recall and the crime for which he was originally convicted. Finally, the applicant submitted that there had been undue delay by the LSRC in progressing the hearing of the referral and there had accordingly been a breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 31.  Permission for judicial review was granted on 9 November 2005. On 23 May 2006 the High Court dismissed the application. With regard to the question of causal connection, it found that the offences of murder and serious sexual assault were both crimes of violence and the applicant had been recalled to prison on the ground that his actions pointed to an actual or potential threat of harm to members of the public. In relation to the issue of procedural fairness, the court found that no unfairness was caused to the applicant by the decision not to call his nieces as witnesses as he had had the option of subpoenaing them himself. Moreover, the court accepted that the panel had applied the correct standard of proof. Finally, in respect of the question of delay, the court found that the Smith panel had not been in breach of its Article 5 § 4 obligations as the applicant’s side “was very largely responsible for the long periods in progressing the matter to the point of a hearing”. Even if the Smith panel had been responsible, the applicant’s detention had not been shown to be unlawful and he had not, therefore, suffered any loss of liberty in consequence of any breach of Article 5 § 4. 32.  On 4 July 2006 the applicant filed a notice of appeal against the judgment of the High Court in which he argued that the Smith panel had misdirected itself as to the standard of proof required to establish the allegations against him; that the procedure before the Smith panel had been unfair and in breach of Articles 5 § 4 and 6 of the Convention, most notably because the applicant’s nieces should have been required to give evidence; and finally, that there had not been a “speedy determination” of the lawfulness of his detention. The appeal was heard on 23 April 2007. 33.  On 6 September 2007 the Court of Appeal delivered its judgment. The court dealt summarily with the issue of delay. Although it noted that the Smith panel was “beset with a number of problems, not the least of which was the obtaining of legal aid for the appellant”, having examined the chronology furnished by the LSRC it was satisfied that it had acted “with appropriate dispatch”. 34.  On the question of fairness the court observed that the applicant had suffered no disadvantage on account of the decision not to subpoena his nieces. He had had the opportunity to summons them as witnesses and cross‑examine them as though they were the Secretary of State’s witnesses. In any case, the court found it inconceivable that evidence of this nature should have been ignored when the safety of the public was at stake. It therefore concluded that there had been no unfairness to the applicant. 35.  However, the Court held that in determining the standard of proof the Smith panel had misdirected itself. The court accordingly quashed the Smith panel’s decision of 3 August 2005 and directed that a fresh decision be taken by a differently constituted panel. 36.  The applicant’s counsel subsequently filed a further written submission with the Court of Appeal, in which he sought a declaration that the applicant’s detention since 2 October 2000 had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He also sought damages in respect of that violation and an order for bail. 37.  On 5 December 2007, after hearing oral submissions, the court decided not to consider the applicant’s submissions on Article 5 § 1. It noted that this issue had not been raised in the course of the appeal proceedings and, although it had been included in the initial Order 53 statement (a statement lodged with the judicial review application setting out the name and description of the applicant, the relief sought and the grounds on which it was sought), it had not been directly in issue before the High Court and the judge had therefore made no findings on it. 38.  The LSRC was granted permission to appeal to the House of Lords on the issue of the standard of proof. The applicant cross-appealed on several grounds: that the procedure adopted before the Smith panel had been unfair; that he had been detained unlawfully in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention; and that the delay had caused a breach of Article 5 § 4. 39.  Before the decision of the Court of Appeal the Secretary of State had made a second referral of the applicant’s case to the LSRC as two years had passed since the decision of 3 August 2005. A second panel had been convened to conduct the referral (“the Garrett panel”). However, following the decision of the Court of Appeal this review could no longer take place. Instead, the initial referral to the LSRC, which took place on 29 November 2001, was revived and a third panel was convened to consider afresh the applicant’s recall (“the first Rodgers panel”). 40.  The first Rodgers panel first convened for a hearing on 4 January 2008. It had to consider the same two main issues as the Smith panel: whether there had been a significant risk of the applicant committing serious harm at the date of recall; and whether the risk presently posed by the applicant was capable of being safely managed in the community. 41.  At a hearing on 4 January 2008 the Governor of the Life Management Unit and a senior psychologist at HMP Maghaberry gave evidence to the Rodgers panel on the question of present risk. Following the hearing the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Northern Ireland Prison Service, asserting that on the basis of the evidence of these two witnesses the risk posed by the applicant could be managed safely in the community. They therefore asked the first Rodgers panel to conclude that there was no significant risk and argued that any further delay in the determination of the case would be in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 42.  At a further hearing on 12 March 2008 several witnesses indicated that they no longer believed the applicant would pose a significant risk to the public. Counsel for the applicant therefore contended that a licence should be issued immediately without waiting for a determination of the outstanding factual issue, namely whether or not the applicant had committed the alleged sexual assaults. 43.  However, on 20 March 2008 the first Rodgers panel indicated that it was required to hear all the evidence before taking a decision. 44.  On 1 May 2008 the applicant issued a claim for judicial review challenging this decision of 20 March 2008 by the first Rodger’s panel. He sought an order of mandamus requiring it to come to a decision on the question of his licence; a declaration that his detention since 12 March 2008 had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention; and a declaration that the handling of the referral by the Rodgers panel on 12 March 2008 was unlawful and in breach of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. 45.  At an oral hearing on 9 May 2008 the High Court refused permission to apply for judicial review on the ground that the applicant had not demonstrated an arguable case. In particular, it found the application to be premature, as the first Rodgers panel had not been afforded the opportunity to hear all the relevant evidence in the matter and it would be “incomprehensible” for it to complete its statutory task without doing so. With regard to the issue of delay, the court noted that, while circumstances had prevented the case from proceeding with the expedition which normally attends upon such cases, the evidence as a whole demonstrated that the delays had been necessary and purposeful. 46.  The applicant filed a notice of appeal against this decision. 47.  In the interim further hearings before the first Rodgers panel took place on 21 and 27 May 2008. 48.  On 11 June 2008 the House of Lords allowed the LSRC’s appeal, finding that the Smith panel had not failed to adopt and apply the correct standard of proof, and restored its decision of 3 August 2005. At the same time the House of Lords dismissed the applicant’s cross-appeal (see paragraph 38 above). 49.  Their Lordships considered that the procedure adopted in respect of the subpoenaing of the complainant had not been unfair because it had not disadvantaged the applicant. Likewise, they agreed with the High Court that there had been a sufficient causal connection between the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty and his original conviction. Their Lordships therefore found that there had been no breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 50.  In respect of the Article 5 § 4 issue, although their Lordships expressed some “disquiet” at the “extraordinarily long period which elapsed between recall and final decision”, they found “no single gap in the chronology which points to avoidable delay on the part of the Commissioners”. They therefore considered that from 29 November 2001 – when the matter was first referred to the LSRC – until 3 August 2005 – the date of the Smith panel’s decision – the LSRC had taken reasonable steps to proceed to a hearing and that any delays had been mostly out of its control. In particular, Lord Carswell stated that\n“[32]  It is necessary to bear in mind, first, that the remedy is being sought by the Respondent against the Commissioners, not against the Secretary of State, and that what has to be considered is whether the Commissioners failed to act with proper expedition, not whether the system required overhaul so as to speed up the process in some way. For this reason one must leave out of consideration the period up to November 2001 – over half of the overall lapse of time – when the matter was referred to the Commissioners for consideration. One may observe, however, that a good deal of activity took place between March 1997 and November 2001, involving two determinations by the Life Sentences Review Board and an application for judicial review.\n...\n[35].  I am of the view, on consideration of the foregoing summary [of events between November 2001 and August 2005], that the Commissioners took reasonable steps to proceed to a hearing, and that the delays were mostly outside their control. Some of them were attributable to the respondent’s change of legal representation and to requests from his solicitors to extend time over various steps. Some delays were unavoidable, bearing in mind that the panel consisted of part-time members and dates had to be found when they could all attend and the witnesses were available. I conclude accordingly that the Commissioners did not delay unduly at any stage, notwithstanding the very long time that the proceedings took to reach a determination. I therefore would not favour making any declaration of breach of article 5(4) of the Convention.” 51.  Following the judgment of the House of Lords, the decision of the Smith panel of 3 August 2005 was reinstated and the first Rodgers panel became functus officio. A new panel was appointed; however, in light of the previous involvement of the members of the first Rodgers panel in the applicant’s case those members were appointed to the new panel (the second Rodgers panel). It was not necessary for the second Rodgers panel to re‑determine the lawfulness of the applicant’s recall in 1997 as this issue had already been determined by the Smith panel. The sole issue was therefore that of current risk. 52.  A hearing was listed for 7 October 2008. Following the hearing of updated evidence, the second Rodgers panel directed that the applicant be released on licence subject to conditions. 53.  In the meantime, the Court of Appeal had allowed the applicant’s appeal against the High Court’s refusal to grant permission to apply for judicial review of the first Rodgers panel’s decision of 20 March 2008 (see paragraph 46 above). The judicial review application was remitted to the High Court. 54.  On 23 January 2009 the High Court refused the applicant’s application for judicial review. Insofar as the applicant had relied on Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the court found that the first Rodgers panel had been entitled to refuse to reach a conclusion on risk until they had heard the further evidence as to the basis of the recall. There had therefore remained a causal connection between the original conviction and the risk of harm to the community which justified the detention of the applicant in March 2008. In respect of his Article 5 § 4 arguments, the court found that there had been no absence of consideration or periodic review of the applicant’s detention. 55.  On 14 June 2011 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. On the Article 5 § 4 issue – namely, whether the evidence of risk before the first Rodgers panel in March 2008 must inevitably have led it to the conclusion that the applicant’s detention was no longer necessary for the protection of the public –, the court noted that the evidence of the witnesses with regard to the risk the applicant posed had not been uniform and the panel had therefore been entitled to reach the decision that it did. Consequently the applicant’s continued detention between March and October 2008 had not been arbitrary and was rationally connected to the reason for his recall and sentence. 56.  On the advice of counsel given on 20 June 2011 the applicant did not pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, Dorina and Viorel-Aurel[2] Ioniță, were born in 1976 and 1972 respectively and live in Brăila. 6.  On 7 November 2005 the applicants’ son, aged four years and nine months at that time, underwent surgery for the removal of polyps, which was performed by Dr C.B. in the State-run Brăila Emergency Hospital. 7.  Dr C.B. decided to perform the operation under general anaesthetic with tracheal intubation. The general anaesthesia was performed by Dr P.A, assisted by P.V.I., a staff nurse. 8.  After surgery the child was immediately transferred to the intensive care unit. Ten minutes after his transfer P.V.I. informed Dr P.A that the child was cyanotic and had no pulse. 9.  The child suffered a haemorrhage, causing blood to flood his lungs. A team of doctors tried to resuscitate him and clear his respiratory channels, but without any success. The child was declared dead two hours after the operation. 10.  A criminal investigation into the cause of death was opened by the Brăila police on the same day. 11.  Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. were questioned and gave written statements. 12.  An autopsy report issued by the Brăila Forensic Service (Serviciul de medicină legală Brăila) on 8 November 2005 said that the applicants’ son had died of acute respiratory failure as a result of the blood that had blocked his airways and flooded his lungs. It also noted that the child had suffered from several congenital deficiencies which had probably played a role in the post‑operative complications: myocardia and hepatic dystrophy, and interatrial septum aneurisms. 13.  The report was sent for the approval of the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Iaşi Forensic Institute (Comisia de avizare și control din cadrul IMF Iaşi). On 5 May 2006 the commission confirmed that the child’s death had occurred after surgery and had been caused by the blood that had blocked his airways and lungs. It held that there had been a causal link between the post-operative treatment and the child’s death. It noted the deflation of the balloon of the catheter (balonaşul sondei de întubaţie), applied after post-operatively to prevent the ingress of blood into the lungs, as a possible cause of the presence of blood there and in his airways. 14.  On 12 October 2006 the superior commission of the Mina Minovici Forensic Institute examined all the documents and approved the conclusions of the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Iaşi Forensic Institute. 15.  On 8 November 2005 the child’s father lodged a disciplinary complaint against Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. 16.  The disciplinary committee of the Brăila College of Doctors opened an investigation into the patient’s death, collecting documents from the patient’s medical file and taking statements from Dr C.B. and Dr P.A., as well as from the doctors involved in the resuscitation procedure post‑operation. It gave its decision on 9 July 2007 by which it concluded that the child’s death could be included among cases of sudden death (with a frequency of 2-4 % owing to the child’s pre-existing medical conditions: myocardia and hepatic dystrophy, and inter-atrial septum aneurisms). Although the committee concluded that there had been no direct link between the child’s death and the doctors’ medical conduct, it reprimanded both doctors for their failure to perform the necessary pre-surgical medical tests and to seek the applicants’ informed consent before surgery. 17.  The applicants objected to the committee’s conclusions and their appeal was examined by the superior disciplinary committee of the National College of Doctors. 18.  An expert medical opinion was submitted to the committee and was used by it in reaching its final conclusions. The expert noted, among other things, that the child’s preparation for surgery had not been appropriate as his examination before anaesthesia had been “very superficial”; in this respect the committee noted the lack of a radioscopy of the lungs, of an EKG and an exploration of the necessary time for blood coagulation. In the expert’s view, the doctors had ignored the child’s severe congenital deficiencies as they had considered that surgery for the removal of polyps had been a “minor intervention” and therefore no special precautions had been necessary. 19.  By a decision of 6 June 2008 the superior disciplinary committee of the National College of Doctors quashed the decision of 9 July 2007 and fined each doctor 1,000 Romanian lei (the equivalent of approximately 220 euros (EUR)). It found that the child’s pre-surgical tests had been insufficient for avoiding post-operative complications. Therefore, it held that Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. had infringed Article 53 of the Medical Deontological Code, pursuant to which a doctor should perform diagnoses with maximum diligence in order to determine the adequate treatment and avoid predictable complications that might occur for a patient under his or her care. 20.  The committee further stated that the presence of blood in the child’s airways could not be explained on the basis of the documents and statements in the file. It noted that all the doctors and the nurses who had given evidence stated that the balloon of the intubation catheter had been leak‑proof (etanche); however, the fact that the cause of death had been the presence of blood in the child’s lungs could only lead to the conclusion that such statements had been inaccurate. 21.  Relying on Articles 58 and 60 of the Deontological Code and Article 6 of Law no. 46/2003, the committee also noted that the parents had not given their informed consent. 22.  On 7 November 2005 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint alleging that the flawed surgical and post-surgical treatment received by their son had resulted in his death. They asked that those responsible be identified and held accountable for their son’s death. They joined the criminal proceedings as civil parties. 23.  Following a request of the Brăila Police Inspectorate, on 19 July 2006 Brăila Emergency Hospital stated that the medical staff members in charge of monitoring the child were Dr P.A. during the intervention and the child’s transfer to the intensive care unit and P.V.I. while in the intensive care unit. 24.  On 5 January 2007 the prosecutor’s office of the Brăila District Court decided to institute criminal proceedings against Dr P.A. 25.  P.V.I. was interviewed as a witness immediately after the child’s death, during the preliminary criminal investigation. During the criminal proceedings against Dr P.A., in spite of the fact that she had been repeatedly summoned, the investigating authorities were not able to question her as she had not been found. She had left her job at the Brăila Emergency Hospital in January 2006. 26.  The prosecuting authorities interviewed several doctors and nurses from the hospital’s medical staff who had been involved in the applicants’ son’s post-operative care. 27.  Dr P.A. lodged a request with the investigating body for a new forensic medical report. He pointed out that there were major contradictions between the autopsy report and the opinion issued by the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Iaşi Forensic Institute. 28.  On 4 April 2007 the Brăila Police Inspectorate asked the Iaşi Forensic Institute to carry out a forensic expert report that would identify the cause and circumstances of the child’s death. The Iaşi Forensic Institute replied that a new forensic report could not be produced as the evidence examined had been sent by Brăila Forensic Service to the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute. 29.  On 20 February 2008 Dr P.A. submitted an extrajudicial expert report. It stated that the cause of death had not been the presence of blood in the child’s lungs owing to a lack of adequate post-operative monitoring, but the post-operative reaction of a child with pre-existing medical conditions (cardiac congenital malformation, hepatic dystrophy, renal stasis, mesenteric adenopathy and hemorrhagic enterocolitis) mentioned in the medical records kept by the child’s paediatrician. The report noted a generalised inflammatory reaction associated with diffused haemorrhages in his digestive tract, lungs, heart and spleen. 30.  The applicants gave evidence to the investigating authorities on 23 January 2008. They contended that they had not been properly informed about the risks of surgery and of the general anaesthetic and consequently they had not given their consent for such interventions. 31.  On 30 June 2008 the Brăila Police Inspectorate ordered that a new forensic report be produced by the Mina Minovici National Forensic Institute. The applicants, Dr P.A. and the investigating authorities submitted several questions for the forensic experts. They asked, among other things, whether the pre-existent medical condition of the child had influenced his unfavourable post-surgical evolution and whether administration of a general anaesthetic had been the right option, given the age and the diagnosis of the child. The child’s father also asked the Forensic Institute whether the post-operative monitoring of the child had been adequate. 32.  However, on 28 July 2008 the Forensic Institute replied that it could not deliver such a report because under the relevant domestic legislation a new forensic expert report could not be ordered unless there were new medical and factual elements. Accordingly, the Forensic Institute stated that it maintained its previous opinion. 33.  Copies of the documents from the disciplinary file were added to the criminal file. 34.  On 30 September 2008 the prosecutor’s office of the Brăila County Court decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings against Dr P.A., finding, in the light of evidence gathered in the case, that there had been no element of criminal negligence in his conduct. That decision was upheld on 10 November 2008 by the chief prosecutor of the same prosecutor’s office. 35.  A complaint by the applicants against the prosecutors’ decisions was allowed by the Brăila District Court on 25 February 2009. The prosecutors’ decisions were quashed and the District Court kept the file for fresh consideration. It considered that although a new forensic report had not been produced, the decision of the superior committee of the National College of Doctors provided enough information concerning the cause of death, which had been the presence of blood in the child’s airways owing to the balloon of the tracheal catheter not being tight enough. It considered that it should be established whether the post-operative monitoring of the child by Dr P.A. had been appropriate and more precisely whether Dr P.A. should have noticed the non-functioning catheter. 36.  Dr C.B. and Dr P.A. gave statements before the District Court on 18 January 2010. Moreover, members of the medical staff that had attempted resuscitation gave evidence (on 1 March, 20 April and 8 June 2008). Some of them maintained that the blood in the lungs could be explained by the resuscitation attempts and that the balloon of the catheter had been kept tight all the time after surgery. 37.  P.V.I. did not give evidence before the court as, although summoned, she did not attend the hearings. According to several reports issued by bailiffs seeking to bring her before the court, she had left the country for Italy. Based on the material in the case file it does not appear that the court took special measures to identify her address there. 38.  The child’s father gave evidence before the Brăila District Court on 18 January 2010. He reiterated his claims for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damages. He again contended that the doctors had not informed his family about the risks of surgery and in particular of the general anaesthetic and accordingly they had not given their informed consent. 39.  On 1 October 2010, after several hearings, the Brăila District Court acquitted Dr P.A. and dismissed the applicants’ civil claim as unfounded. 40.  The District Court took into account the extrajudicial forensic report submitted by Dr P.A. It noted that the conclusions of the extrajudicial report were in total contradiction to the conclusions of the medical report of 8 November 2005 and the conclusions of the commission for confirmation and supervision of the Iaşi Forensic Institute. 41.  This judgment was upheld by a decision of the Brăila County Court delivered on 21 December 2010. 42.  The County Court did not take into account the conclusions of the extrajudicial forensic report as in its opinion it represented only extrajudicial evidence which could not set aside the conclusions of competent forensic institutes. 43.  The County Court concluded that the death of the child had been caused by the presence of blood in his airways and lungs. However, based on the evidence in the file, it was not possible to explain when the blood had entered the child’s airways because of the deflation of the catheter’s balloon. Moreover, the post-operative complications occurred ten minutes after the child had been transferred to the intensive care unit, while under the supervision of P.V.I. The County Court held therefore that Dr P.A. could not be held responsible for the deflation of the catheter’s balloon after surgery. 44.  The applicants lodged an appeal on points of law against that decision. They requested that the court extend the criminal investigation to P.V.I., who had had the child under her supervision in the intensive care unit. 45.  By a decision of 15 April 2011 the Galaţi Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and quashed the decisions of the lower courts. Noting that the lower courts had not examined the allegation made by the child’s parents that they had not given their consent for surgery and the general anaesthesia, the appeal court sent the file back to the Brăila District Court. 46.  On 22 December 2011 the Brăila District Court acquitted Dr P.A. It held that no causal link existed between the death of the child and the presumed omission of the medical authorities to obtain the applicants’ informed consent for the administration of a general anaesthetic. 47.  It further held that it could not establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Dr P.A. had been negligent in ensuring the tightness of the catheter’s balloon after surgery. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicants’ civil claim as unfounded. 48.  The court also dismissed the applicants’ request to extend the criminal investigation to P.V.I. on the grounds that, under Article 337 § 1 of the CCP, only the prosecutor could ask for the extension of the investigation to other persons while the proceedings were pending before the courts. 49.  This judgment was upheld by a final decision delivered by the Galaţi Court of Appeal on 22 May 2012. 50.  On 28 October 2008 the applicants instituted separate civil proceedings against the Brăila Emergency Hospital and doctors C.B. and P.A. in the Brăila District Court for the pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damages they had sustained as a result of their son’s death. 51.  On 23 April 2009, referring to Article 19 of the CCP (see paragraph 57 below), the court stayed the civil proceedings pending a final decision in the criminal proceedings. It noted that the outcome of the civil proceedings would depend to a large extent on the verdict in the criminal proceedings. 52.  On 29 January 2013 the Brăila District Court lifted the stay of the civil proceedings. However, the applicants gave up their separate civil claim on 6 March 2013.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Narva, Estonia. 6.  On 29 April 2009, some time before 6 p.m., the police emergency call centre received a call about two young men who were at the junction of Kreenholmi and Kerese streets in Narva, Estonia. The caller reported that one of the men was carrying a knife and that the other was obviously drunk and had difficulty walking. He considered the men to be dangerous to passers-by. At 5.55 p.m. Officers S.B. and E.V., who were on patrol duty, were given instructions to respond to the call. At around 6 p.m. they found the men – the applicant and M.Z. – at a public playground. 7.  The applicant’s version of events relating to his encounter with the police, as it appears from his application and the documents submitted to the Court, is the following. At around 6 p.m. on 29 April 2009, he and M.Z. were waiting for an acquaintance, Y.B., at a playground. Both the applicant and M.Z. were drunk. Two policemen approached him. He did not behave aggressively or swear at them. The applicant spoke with the officers. He did not remember exactly what they talked about, except that it concerned a knife and that the applicant said that he did not have one. He also recalled that the name of one of the policemen was Andrei (this later turned out to be S.B.). He was then punched on the jaw by S.B. and fell to the ground, his face landing in a hole in the pavement. He momentarily lost consciousness, and when he attempted to get up he received another blow on the back, close to the bottom of his neck. One of the police officers put his knee on his neck and pushed him to the ground. He was handcuffed and then the officers started punching and kicking him all over his body and head. He lost consciousness after the beating and only regained it at the police station. 8.  According to the Government, the criminal investigation carried out by the domestic authorities showed that the applicant’s arrest had taken place in the following manner. The police officers who found the applicant and M.Z. at the playground had been given information about two men, one of whom was possibly carrying a knife, while the other one was reportedly drunk and walking with difficulty. At the playground, the applicant behaved aggressively and used obscene language. Officer E.V. tried to talk to the applicant, but the applicant acted in an erratic manner, and started waving his hands around and shouting at the officers. Officer E.V. decided to force him to the ground and keep him there until a police patrol vehicle arrived. He handcuffed the applicant with the help of two police officers, S.J. and N.S., who had arrived by car. While he was being kept on the ground, the applicant attempted to get up, kicked out and continued to utter obscenities at the officers. The police officers did not use excessive force against him and did not beat him. The applicant continued to resist the police while he was being put into a police van, which was last to arrive and was carrying Officers S.T. and J.S. Some force therefore had to be used to get the applicant in the van. In the course of that process, the applicant hit his left temple against the door of the van. The applicant also remained aggressive during his transportation. The officers on the front seats of the van heard what sounded like something being pounded against another object from the back compartment. 9.  The applicant’s account of the events during his detention, as it appears from his application and the documents submitted to the Court, is the following. When he woke up in a room next to the detention cells in the police station, he saw the two police officers who had been present at the playground in front of him. He was lying on the floor with his hands cuffed. When he attempted to stand up, S.B. kneed him in the area of his left ear. When the applicant tried to sit on a chair, he was knocked off his feet and ordered to sit on the floor. After E.V. left the room, S.B., who had on black leather gloves, started systematically punching and kicking the applicant. The applicant stood up and fell over several times. At one point, he was taken to the toilet, the sink tap was turned on and his head was put under the water. He was then taken back to the detention room. While passing the detention cells, he asked those inside whether they would confirm anything they had seen or heard. In the detention room, the applicant sat on the chair and S.B. punched him again several times. When E.V. returned, the applicant was knocked off the chair and beaten again on every part of his body. S.B. continued beating him after E.V. left the room. The applicant lost consciousness for a while and when he came around he had blood on his face and was eventually put on the chair. His handcuffs were removed and he was allowed to go to the toilet, where he washed himself. He returned to the detention room and was then placed in a cell to sober up. After a while, an ambulance came and he was taken to a hospital in the company of different policemen. He had blood on his clothes, but he threw away the T-shirt, while his mother washed his trousers. 10.  According to the Government, the facts as they were established in the subsequent criminal investigation showed the following. The applicant, who was still handcuffed, continued to behave aggressively at the police station. He ran up to detainees in other cells, shouting that he was being beaten by the police. As he did not obey orders to calm down and stay still, physical force had to be used to make him sit or to place him on the floor. When he began to calm down, he was placed on a chair with his hands cuffed. He suddenly lost his balance and fell off the chair face down. The police officers lifted him up and put him back on the chair. Shortly after, the applicant again fell on the floor. In the interests of the applicant’s safety, the officers left him sitting on the floor. The police removed the applicant’s handcuffs as soon as he calmed down. He was then taken to a cell to sober up. A test showed that the applicant was in a moderate state of alcoholic intoxication. 11.  At 7.45 p.m. Officers S.B. and J.S. drafted a report that the applicant had been taken from 10 Kreenholmi Street to recover from alcoholic intoxication. The report stated that the applicant had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication, had walked with difficulty, had fallen over and had been aggressive. It also stated that the applicant’s face had been dirty and that he had had abrasions on his head. 12.  At 1.42 a.m. on 30 April 2009 Officer P.S. called an ambulance to the police station at the request of the applicant. According to ambulance registration card no. 1419, the applicant complained of pain in the left part of his head and the right wrist, as well as nausea, vomiting and loss of hearing in the left ear. The findings on examination were that he had haematomas on the left part of the cranium and a swollen right wrist and was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. He was diagnosed with an intracranial injury and a fracture of the right hand and wrist. The applicant was taken to hospital. 13.  Later at the hospital, according to patient registration card no. 4460, dated 30 April 2009, the applicant complained about losing consciousness and vomiting. The findings on examination were that he had haematomas and an oedema in the area of the left ear and eye. He was diagnosed with concussion and being in a state of alcoholic intoxication. 14.  At 2.15 a.m. on 30 April 2009 other police officers, not those who had allegedly beaten the applicant at the police station, took a statement from him at the hospital. At 2.40 a.m. those officers drafted a misdemeanour report where they stated that the applicant had been drunk in a public place, Kreenholmi Street, and had been brawling, shouting and using obscene language, actions which amounted to a breach of the peace and a disturbance to others. 15.  At 6.26 a.m. on 30 April 2009 a computer tomography scan was performed on the applicant. The results showed “temporal extracranial swelling on the left side, no haemorrhage, no intracranial pathology or haemorrhage, ventricular system symmetric, no midline shift, cranial bones intact and paranasal sinuses, middle ear spaces aerated”. He was then released from hospital. 16.  On 1 May 2009 the applicant, when close to home, called an ambulance. Ambulance registration card no. 1454 shows that he complained of severe headaches, dizziness, nausea, vomiting and pain in the neck. The findings on examination were that he had a haematoma around the left ear, an oedema in the area of the left eye, and was in a state of alcoholic intoxication. He was diagnosed with concussion and taken to hospital. He was examined at the hospital by a traumatology doctor who found paraorbital haematoma and swelling around the left eye, bruises on the neck and upper limbs, a smell of alcohol from the mouth, dysarthria, and that he staggered. He was diagnosed with concussion and being in a state of alcoholic intoxication. The applicant did not wish to stay in hospital. 17.  On 30 April 2009 the applicant complained to the police of his ill-treatment. He alleged that police officers had beaten him while arresting him, and that this had also happened later, while he was in detention at the police station. The police officer on duty refused to deal with the complaint and said it had to be submitted to a prosecutor’s office. The prosecutor also refused to deal with the complaint and said it had to be submitted to the police. When the applicant returned to the police station, a police investigator allowed him to file his complaint. 18.  On 5 May 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the prosecutor’s office related to the same circumstances. On the same day the police decided to open a criminal investigation based on his complaint. According to the Government, the next day, on 6 May, the police investigator asked the hospital for the applicant’s medical records. 19.  On 13 May 2009 the applicant made a statement to the police investigator and gave his account of events (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). 20.  On the same day, the investigator took a statement from A.P., who had been held in the police station’s sobering-up cell until 9 p.m. on 29 April 2009. He explained that he had looked through the eyehole of his cell door and had seen that a young man, with his hands cuffed behind his back, had been taken to the room in front of the sobering-up cells. Officer S.B., whose name he saw on his nametag, knocked the young man off his feet. He attempted to stand up, but the officer stopped him and ordered him to stay on the floor. Each time the young man attempted to stand up he was again knocked off his feet. Both men used foul language. He also heard someone being slapped on his body and saw how the police officer swung his hands towards the detainee. He understood from these gestures that the young man was being hit. The young man was then taken to a neighbouring room. After that, A.P. heard the man shouting and begging for his beating to stop. According to A.P. there was certainly some kind of fight between the young man and the officers. Subsequently, the man was put in a cell, where he continued to shout and requested a doctor, but he went quiet after a while. 21.  On 15 May 2009 the applicant’s legal representative sent a letter to the police requesting, among other measures, that the two police officers who had arrested the applicant, taken him to the police department and used force against him at the police station be shown to the applicant for identification. He also wanted the applicant to be taken to the police station so that his statements could be compared with the actual layout of the premises and so he could relate on the spot what happened. He further requested that the applicant’s mother to be questioned about the applicant’s state of health when he had left home on 29 April and when he had returned on 30 April; that the ambulance doctor and nurse be questioned as witnesses; and that a forensic medical examination of the applicant’s injuries be ordered. 22.  On 15 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from M.S., who had been held at the police station’s sobering-up cell on 29 April 2009. He said that while he had heard that somebody in the neighbouring room had at one point shouted for help and that the police officers had shouted back at him, he had not seen police officers beating anybody when he had from time to time looked through the eyehole. 23.  On 15 May 2009 the police investigator also took statements from Police Officer S.J., who had arrived in a police car with Officer N.S. at the scene of the applicant’s arrest. While still in the police car, they had seen Officer E.V. talking to the applicant and that there had then been a scuffle between the applicant and the officer. S.J. and N.S. ran out of the car, but by the time they reached the scene the applicant had already been placed on the ground. He was aggressive and uttered obscenities at E.V. Officer S.J. kept him on the ground by using his knee to restrict the applicant’s movement. Together with N.S., he helped E.V. to cuff the applicant’s hands behind his back as the applicant was still putting up physical resistance. The applicant attempted to get up, continued to use indecent language and did not obey orders. The officers therefore kept the applicant on the ground until the police van arrived to transport him to the police station. No other force was used against him. S.J. added that at some point an elderly man had approached them and attempted to give them some money which allegedly belonged to the applicant. He was told that it was not necessary at that time to hand over the money. S.J. further stated that at the time of the events in question Officer S.B. had been in the vicinity talking to another young man who had a knife. 24.  On 18 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from R.L., who had been detained in the police station’s sobering-up cell on 29 April 2009. He told the investigator that he had heard through the door how officers had dragged somebody into the room facing the cells. He had heard how the officers provoked that person into using rude language, shouted at him, themselves using foul language, and then started to beat him. R.L. did not remember exactly in what way the officers had hit the person, but thought that it involved punches and kicks. The person had attempted to stand up, but had not been allowed to do so as he had been knocked off his feet. He had then been taken to another room. 25.  On 18 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from M.Z. As to the arrest, he explained that before the events that happened at around 6 p.m. on 29 April 2009, he had had several beers with the applicant. They had just sat down at the playground behind some buildings when three police officers arrived in a police car. One of the officers came to talk to him and two went to the applicant and pushed him over. One of the policemen put his leg on the applicant’s neck, while the other attempted to stand on the applicant’s legs. M.Z. was taken to where the applicant had been beaten. The applicant was lying on the asphalt with his face down in some sand as there was a hole in the asphalt. After a while a police van arrived with two police officers. The applicant’s hands were put behind his back and he was handcuffed, lifted onto his feet and moved towards the van. In the course of that process, one of the police officers slapped the applicant on the head. He was put in the van and taken to the police station. 26.  Regarding the events at the police station, M.Z. explained that the applicant had been taken to a room where the cells were located. M.Z. himself had been left in the corridor which was situated immediately after the detention section. He could see through the open doors how the applicant was put on the floor right in front of the doors and two policemen started to beat him. They hit the applicant with their elbows and kicked him on the back of the head and elsewhere. No other police officers entered the room. The doors were open, as was the door to the duty room, but no one came out of that room. After some time, one of the police officers who had been beating the applicant came to M.Z. and took him to an office to make a statement. He gave a statement against the applicant because he was afraid as he had seen how the police officer had beaten his friend. 27.  On 18 May 2009 the police investigator also took a statement from P.S., a police officer on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant’s detention. He explained that when he had arrived at work at 8 p.m. on 29 April 2009 Officer E.V. had told him that the person who had been put in a temporary detention cell, that is, the applicant, might request that an ambulance be called and that he should be checked from time to time. During the night, the applicant went by himself to the toilet, complained of pain but declined an offer for an ambulance to be called. When during the night he was about to be released he requested an ambulance and P.S. called it for him. P.S. overheard the applicant telling the doctor and nurse that he had been beaten by police officers. When P.S. asked who had beaten the applicant, he replied that it had been the police officers who had taken him to the police station. When P.S. asked where the applicant had been beaten, he replied that it had happened on the street during his arrest. The ambulance then took him to the hospital. 28.  On 27 May 2009 the police investigator took a statement from K.I., who had been on duty at the police station’s command centre at the time of the events in question. He said that when he had passed the detention room on his way out, he had seen the applicant sitting on the floor of the detention room with his hands cuffed. He was using offensive language, behaving aggressively and was intoxicated. K.I. said that the applicant had not been beaten in his presence. The applicant had not complained of being beaten or requested an ambulance. 29.  On 2 June 2009 the police investigator took a statement from one of the suspects, Police Officer S.B. According to him, when he arrived with Officer E.V. on foot at the playground between the buildings at 10 Kreenholmi Street and 18 Kerese Street, the applicant was very drunk and was having an argument over some money with another man. As he had gone further on to talk to M.Z., he had not seen what had happened between the applicant and Officer E.V. or how E.V. had forced the applicant to the ground. M.Z. did not have a knife on him, but was wearing a large sheath on his belt. S.B. had no contact with the applicant. However, he saw that the applicant continued to be aggressive after E.V. had put him on the ground, while Officers S.J. and N.S had helped E.V. to handcuff him and kept him on the ground. He also saw what happened when Officers S.T. and J.S. helped to place the applicant in the police van. The applicant was not kicked or punched. On the way to the police station thumps and bangs could be heard from the back compartment of the police van. 30.  S.B. also stated that at the police station officers had put the applicant in the room facing the detention cells. The door of the room had stayed open. He was alone in the room with the applicant for about 40 minutes, but did not beat him. The applicant did not obey orders to calm down and stay on the floor. S.B. could not therefore remove his handcuffs and had to use force against the applicant to make him stay on the floor and to calm him down. At one point E.V. had helped him. When the applicant calmed down a little, he was taken to another room to take his statement and was put on a chair with his hands still handcuffed behind his back. While sitting on the chair in the detention room, the applicant suddenly fell face down off the chair. Together with E.V., who had entered the interrogation room at that moment, S.B. put the applicant back on the chair, but he fell off again and was again helped back up onto the chair. When the paperwork had been done, the applicant was taken to a cell to sober up. He did not have any bodily injuries, except for some old scratches on the head, and did not request medical assistance. 31.  On 3 June 2009 the police investigator took statements from four children who had seen the applicant’s arrest (A.N., D.K., D.B. and E.G.). Three of the children (A.N., D.K., and D.B.) had seen the applicant when he was drunk and having an argument with an elderly man over some money. According to the statements of A.N. and D.K., two police officers arrived and first went to speak with the applicant and the older man. A.N., D.K., and D.B. said one of the officers had then gone further away to deal with the applicant’s companion, who was carrying a knife sheath. According to A.N. the applicant started to shout obscenities at the police officer who had stayed with him. A.N., D.K. and D.B. stated that following an exchange with the applicant the police officer forced him to the ground. A.N. and D.K. said that the officer pushed the applicant over. D.K. added that the applicant was put on the ground with his right cheek facing down. Two other officers, who had arrived by car, helped the first police officer to cuff the applicant’s hands behind his back. All of the children, including E.G., who had arrived after the applicant was put on the ground, confirmed that the officers kept the applicant on the ground by force. According to A.N. and E.G. that was done by standing on his legs, while D.K. and D.B said one officer knelt on the applicant’s neck to keep his head down, while the other stood on his legs, close to his heels. All the children said the officers had neither punched nor kicked the applicant. The applicant had attempted to get up off the ground, had continued to swear and said that the officers were hurting him. All of the children confirmed that the applicant resisted being walked over to the police van. The police used force to put the applicant in the van and he had hit his head (the left side of his head, according to D.B. and E.G.) against the door of the van. 32.  On 4 June 2009 the police investigator took statements from the ambulance nurse, L.G., and the ambulance doctor, V.K. They had received a call about a man with a head trauma at the police station. The applicant, who was drunk, said that police officers had beaten him at the police station. He did not have any blood on his clothes, and he did not vomit. However, given the nature of his injuries, the doctor decided to take him to the hospital for a further examination. 33.  On 8 June 2009 the other suspect, Police Officer E.V., gave a statement. He explained that he had received an order to respond to a call that a man in a state of heavy alcoholic intoxication, possibly carrying a knife, was walking along Kreenholmi Street. He had then immediately gone with his partner, Officer S.B., to where the man was presumed to be. On reaching the building at 10 Kreenholmi Street he saw the applicant was not behaving appropriately as he was waving his hands and staggering. When he approached the men, M.Z. led the applicant by the hand behind the building at 10 Kreenholmi Street. The police officers followed them and found the applicant sitting on a kerbstone with M.Z. and an elderly man, who was standing next to him. When E.V. and S.B. approached, the applicant stood up and staggered towards them. M.Z. went in a different direction. When the applicant reached the officers, E.V. asked him politely to stop. As the applicant did not react and walked past him, E.V. stopped him by taking his elbow and spoke to him again. The applicant reacted quite violently, and started arguing and waving his hands around. E.V. therefore used the radio to call for assistance to have the applicant removed so he could sober up. Meanwhile, the elderly man had approached and told the applicant to calm down because he was dealing with police officers. The applicant replied that he did not care and started throwing money on the ground, telling the man to keep it. The man picked the money up, said he did not need it and put it back in the applicant’s pockets. By that time, S.B. had gone after M.Z. E.V. attempted to calm the applicant down, but he continued to walk back and forth, waving his hands around and uttering obscenities. E.V. decided to handcuff the applicant because there were a lot of children around. The applicant was also clearly being aggressive and might have hurt other people, particularly given the possible presence of a knife. As the applicant did not let E.V. handcuff him, he forced the applicant to the ground, but did not hit him. Officers N.S. and S.J. arrived and helped in handcuffing the applicant and then took him to the police car, which was 10 metres away. The applicant did not have a knife. E.V. had no further contact with the applicant at the playground. While in the police van on the way back to the station the applicant continued his aggressive behaviour and E.V. heard what sounded like the applicant hitting himself against something. 34.  E.V. further stated that at the police station the applicant shouted that the police were beating him, while S.B. tried to calm him down and conduct a search. E.V. left the room to interview M.Z. as a witness to the applicant’s breach of the peace. When E.V. returned he saw that the applicant had fallen face down off his chair and he helped S.B. to lift him back onto the chair. The applicant fell to the ground for a second time and was then left on the floor. According to E.V., the applicant intentionally tried to injure himself in order to later accuse the police. When he started to behave calmly, the handcuffs were removed. The applicant walked unaided to the sobering-up cell. He did not have any injuries that required immediate medical attention. He had haematomas in the area of his face, but he could have received those during his transportation or when he fell off the chair. The applicant’s clothes were dirty but did not have any bloodstains. E.V. informed the applicant that an ambulance would be called for him if he had any complaints about his health. 35.  On the same day, 8 June 2009, the investigator took a statement from Officer N.S., who had arrived by police car with Officer S.J. at the scene of the applicant’s arrest. When N.S. arrived, Officer E.V. was already holding the applicant down on the ground. When he and S.J. reached them they saw the applicant behaving aggressively and using foul language. N.S. helped E.V. to cuff the applicant’s hands behind his back. The applicant was then lifted onto his feet and taken to the police car, but he refused to obey orders to keep still and calm down and started to kick the police car. The officers therefore removed him from the car and put him on the ground. N.S. held his feet and hands, while another officer knelt on the applicant to keep his head down. The applicant constantly resisted the officers, used bad language and behaved aggressively. He was kept down to prevent him from hurting himself and others. The officers did not beat him. The applicant continued to resist the police officers while he was being put in the police van and continued to be aggressive in the van. N.S. added that at some point an elderly man came to them offering to hand over some money which had allegedly belonged to the applicant. He was, however, informed that it was not necessary to hand over the money at that moment. 36.  On the same day, 8 June 2009, the police investigator took statements from Officers S.T. and J.S., who had arrived in the police van at the scene of the applicant’s arrest. When J.S. got out of the van, he saw that Officers S.J. and N.S. were holding the applicant down on the ground. The applicant was aggressive, was shouting and swearing and attempting to break free. N.S. and S.J. took the applicant to the police van. J.S. opened the door for them. He did not see the applicant banging into anything, but while he was being transported sounds could be heard from the back compartment which sounded like something being hit. S.T. stated that he did not get out of the van. He did not hear the applicant banging against anything while he was being put in the van. At the police station he and J.S. carried the applicant to the detention room and left him in front of the cells. He did not see any blood on the applicant or his clothes. Nor did he notice any visible injuries on the applicant. 37.  That day, 8 June 2009, the police investigator ordered a forensic medical assessment of the injuries on the basis of the available documentary evidence (the ambulance cards, patient registration card and the statements of the applicant, the suspects in the case and two other police officers as witnesses). 38.  On 9 June 2009 the police investigator took a statement from D.R., a police officer who had been on duty at the police station on 29 April 2009. He stated that he had arrived at work at 8 p.m. At around 2 a.m. he started to work on the applicant’s documents. The applicant told D.R. that he had a bad headache and that his hands were hurting because of the handcuffs. He requested an ambulance. He also said that his head injury had been caused by other police officers. He had no blood on his clothes and did not vomit. When the applicant was taken to hospital, D.R. accompanied him. 39.  On 15 June 2009 the applicant’s legal representative lodged a complaint against the police with the prosecutor’s office. He stated that the police had not taken the investigative measures he had requested on 15 May 2009 (including the presentation of the police officers for identification; a formal confrontation between the applicant and M.Z., who had allegedly witnessed him committing a breach of the peace; a comparison of the applicant’s statements with the circumstances at the scene of the alleged offence; a forensic medical examination of the applicant’s injuries; and interviews with the children that the applicant’s representative had identified and about whom he had informed the police investigator on 27 May 2009). He requested that the prosecutor take measures to secure the collection of evidence. The prosecutor rejected the complaint on 1 July 2009, stating that the applicant had not challenged any acts or orders of an investigative authority. 40.  On 17 June 2009 the police investigator showed the applicant photos to identify the possible suspects. According to the record of the meeting, the applicant was shown four lists with an unspecified number of photos of police officers who were similar in appearance. The applicant identified S.B. as the police officer who had beaten him at the police station. He did not remember whether that police officer had also beaten him during his arrest. The applicant was unsure in his idenfication of E.V. from the photos. Nevertheless, he added that he would be able to identify the other officer on the basis of his features and height if he saw him in person. 41.  On 6 July 2009 the police investigator took a statement from V.Z., who was the person who had called the police on 29 April 2009 about the applicant’s alleged breach of the peace. He explained that from his car on the crossroads of Kreenholmi and Kerese Street he had seen two young men crossing the street. One of them was carrying a knife. Another young man who was very drunk was walking in front of him, but was having trouble walking. He had called the police after seeing the young men and the knife as he considered them to be clearly dangerous and was worried about the safety of passers-by. 42.  On 13 August 2009 the forensic medical expert delivered his opinion about the applicant’s injuries. He concluded that the injuries found on the applicant on 30 April and 1 May had been caused by blows with a blunt object or objects. The exact cause of those injuries could not be established as their description in the documents was not sufficiently detailed. Nevertheless, the expert concluded that they had been inflicted shortly before the applicant had seen a doctor, possibly on 29 April 2009. He also noted that as there were no detailed descriptions of the injuries to the upper limbs, it was not possible to conclude whether those injuries had been received in self-defence. None of the documents disclosed any information about the ethanol content in the applicant’s blood, but stated simply that the applicant had been in a state of alcoholic intoxication. 43.  On 2 September 2009 the forensic expert gave an oral statement to the police investigator about his written opinion. In reply to a question about whether the applicant had had a haematoma in the area of the left eye on both 30 April and 1 May, the expert replied that there was no information about that in the documents of 30 April. He explained that it could not be excluded that the haematoma had been inflicted on 29 April, but it could also have been inflicted on 30 April or 1 May. He also stated in relation to a question about the cause of the injuries that since the documents had not contained detailed descriptions of the injuries, it was not possible to establish the exact nature of the object which had caused the traumas. 44.  On 14 September 2009 the police investigator presented photos of officers to M.Z. for him to identify. According to the report of the meeting, M.Z. was shown four lists with an unspecified number of photos of police officers who were similar in appearance. M.Z. identified one of the police officers (E.V.) as the officer who, together with the other officer (S.B.), had beaten the applicant at the police station and had used force against the applicant at the playground. He was not certain in his recognition of S.B. on the photos, but pointed out another officer who, in his words, was very similar to S.B. He also stated that there had been no beating at the playground, but that the applicant’s hands had simply been twisted behind his back and that he had been forced to the ground. 45.  On 8 January 2010 the applicant complained to the prosecutor that he had still not been informed of a decision to carry out a forensic medical examination, despite repeated requests. He added that he had still not been examined by an expert, even though he had complained about headaches and a loss of vision after the beating. He requested that he be sent a copy of any expert reports if one had been carried out without his knowledge. He also complained that he had not had a formal confrontation with M.Z. and the suspects in order to eliminate any contradictions in their statements. The prosecutor rejected the complaint on 14 January 2010, stating again that the applicant had not challenged any acts or orders of an investigative authority. 46.  On 20 January 2010 the police investigator decided to discontinue the investigation, concluding that there was no evidence that the police officers had committed the criminal offence of abuse of authority. Their use of force had not violated the Police Act, it had been lawful, justified and not excessive. The decision of the police investigator was approved by the prosecutor on 15 February 2010. 47.  Regarding the applicant’s arrest, the police investigator was of the view that the applicant’s allegations about his beating were completely groundless. She concluded in substance that the use of force against the applicant during his arrest had been justified by the applicant’s breach of the peace while being in a state of alcoholic intoxication; his refusal to obey the officers’ lawful orders; and his attempt to leave the scene without the officers’ consent. The physical force used to put the applicant on the ground, put on handcuffs and keep him on the ground had not been excessive. 48.  In the decision, it was considered as established that the applicant’s arrest had taken place in the following manner. While at the playground in the vicinity of 18 Kerese Street, the applicant had not behaved appropriately, had waved his hands around, used foul language and had been staggering a lot. He had not reacted to the orders given by the police officers. Police Officer E.V. had decided to put handcuffs on the applicant given that children were standing around, that the applicant was clearly of an aggressive state of mind, that he might have injured others and that there was a certain context to the call (the suspicion of carrying a knife). At that moment Officers N.S. and S.J. had arrived and helped to put the handcuffs on. The applicant had not complied with the officers’ orders to stay still and calm down, but had started kicking the police vehicle. N.S. and S.J. had kept the applicant on the ground to restrain him. The applicant had continued to resist, use foul language and behave aggressively. Because of his aggressive behaviour, E.V. had been forced to call for a police van to transport the applicant to the police station. The applicant had resisted being put in the police van and had continued to behave aggressively and use foul language while being transported. Sounds from the transportation compartment made it seem like the applicant had hit himself against something. 49.  In arriving at the conclusion that the applicant had not been beaten and that only lawful force had been used, the police investigator relied concretely on the statements of the children, Police Officers N.S., S.J., J.S., S.T., the suspected police officers, S.B. and E.V., and on the statements of M.Z., who had said during the presentation of the identification photos that there had been no beating at the playground, that the applicant’s hands had simply been forced behind his back and that he had been forced to the ground. 50.  Regarding the events at the police department, the police investigator rejected the statements of M.Z. as unreliable as he could not have seen what was happening to the applicant in the detention room. Though the door of that room had been open, M.Z. had been standing further away. As to the people detained at the police station, the investigator concluded that their statements had not directly confirmed that the applicant had been beaten. The statements of the detainees A.P. and R.L., who had stated that the applicant had been beaten, were dismissed as they contradicted the statements of the third detainee – M.S. – and other evidence. Four other police officers involved in the arrest and the transportation of the applicant, as well as one police officer who had been present at the police station during the applicant’s detention, had also stated that the applicant had not been beaten. 51.  As to the applicant’s injuries, the police investigator cited observations in the report from when the applicant was taken to sober up, and from the ambulance and patient registration cards. Regarding the haematoma around the left eye, first documented at the hospital on 1 May 2009, the investigator referred to the forensic expert’s opinion that it could have been caused on 29 April, 30 April or 1 May 2009 and that on the basis of the documents it was impossible to establish its cause. On the basis of that information the investigator concluded that the applicant’s allegation that the haematoma around the left eye had been caused during his beating at the police department was unfounded and untrue. Turning to the applicant’s allegations that he had vomited and that there had been blood on his clothing, the investigator viewed them as being disproven by the statements of the police officers as well as those of the ambulance doctor and the nurse who had not seen any blood on the applicant’s clothes or witnessed any vomiting. 52.  The police investigator found in conclusion that while at the police station the applicant had been aggressive, continued to use foul language and ignored orders to keep still. The force that S.B. and E.V. had used against him had been justified and lawful, and had not been excessive. 53.  On 15 March 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision to discontinue the criminal investigation. He submitted among other things that the investigation had not been objective, that the statements of witnesses had been selectively cited and distorted, that some of the witnesses (such as Y.B., who had seen the applicant’s arrest, and A.D., who had been detained in the police station at the same time as the applicant) had not been questioned, that he himself had not had a forensic medical examination; and that formal confrontations to eliminate any contradictions in statements in the case had not been arranged. 54.  On 23 March 2010 the State Prosecutor’s Office rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision to discontinue the investigation as having been lodged out of time. The decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had stated that the applicant had to lodge an appeal to the State Prosecutor’s Office within ten days of the receipt of the relevant decision. The decision had been sent to the applicant’s address by ordinary mail on 26 February 2010. Estonian Post had indicated that a standard letter was sent to an addressee on the next working day of the post office. The letter should therefore have reached the applicant on 1 March 2010, so the final day for lodging an appeal had been 11 March 2010. The applicant had lodged his appeal on 15 March 2010. The applicant stated that he had only received the letter on 5 March 2010 after returning home from his job in another city. Though the applicant had not requested the restoration of the time-limit for his appeal, the State Prosecutor’s Office stated that in any event there had been no grounds for such a procedure. The State Prosecutor’s Office was of the view that the applicant had a duty of diligence regarding his mail because he knew that there were proceedings pending where decisions concerning his situation might be made. The applicant had had several options available to him to avoid exceeding the time-limit. 55.  On 30 April 2010 the Tartu Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the State Prosecutor’s Office. The court agreed with the applicant’s counsel that the time-limit for an appeal started to run from the date of actual receipt of the decision and not from the date it should have been received according to calculations based on mail delivery deadlines. It nevertheless considered that the decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings had reached the applicant’s mailbox on 1 March 2010, without however explaining on the basis of what evidence this conclusion was reached. The court also stated that there was no need to express an opinion with regard to the restoration of the deadline for the appeal, because the applicant had not believed that he had breached the deadline and had not sought its restoration. 56.  On 25 May 2009 the East Police Prefecture found the applicant guilty of the misdemeanour of committing a breach of the peace at Kreenholmi Street and ordered him to pay a fine. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision with the Viru County Court. 57.  On 17 November 2010 the Viru County Court, having held a public hearing on 4 November, acquitted the applicant of the charges. The court considered that there was no evidence to prove that his behaviour had constituted a misdemeanour. 58.  The court, pointing to the fact that it was unlawfully obtained evidence, set aside the applicant’s statements given on 30 April 2009 at 2.15 a.m. in the hospital, and which had been contained in the misdemeanour report drafted the same night at 2.40 a.m. It noted that the evidence had been gathered more than eight hours after the offence had allegedly been committed and after the person had in the meantime been taken to sober up, at 7.45 p.m. 59.  The court considered that the witness M.Z. had given reliable testimony at the court hearing on 4 November 2010 when he had said that the police had unduly influenced him to give evidence against the applicant by letting him hear the applicant being beaten. The court considered that statement to be corroborated by the fact that the applicant had been taken to the hospital and had been interrogated there. 60.  The court concluded that the evidence in the misdemeanour proceedings had been collected in an unlawful manner which infringed the applicant’s honour and dignity and endangered his health. That conclusion was based on the statements of the applicant, M.Z., information from the hospital and the place and time of the drafting of the misdemeanour report. 61.  The court further stated that there had been a material violation of the provisions governing misdemeanour proceedings because the applicant had been arrested at 5.40 p.m. and transported immediately to the police station, but had not been taken to sober up until 7.45 p.m.; also, his statement had only been taken at the hospital at 2.15 a.m. and the misdemeanour report not drafted at the hospital until 2.40 a.m. 62.  The East Police Prefecture did not appeal against that judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in the town of Severodonetsk, Ukraine. 7.  According to the applicant, in 1996 he brought criminal proceedings for libel before the Severodonetskyy Town Court, complaining that it had been noted in his employment record that he had been dismissed because he had committed theft. The applicant alleged that, following his numerous complaints to a prosecutor’s office about the failure to investigate the above case, in 2000 the prosecutor’s office had requested his placement in a psychiatric facility. 8.  According to case-file materials, on 18 March 2000 the principal of the Severodonetsk Territorial Medical Association (Северодонецьке територіальне медичне об’єднання, hereinafter the “Severodonetsk Hospital”) received a letter from the Severodonetsk Town Prosecutor’s Office asking for an opinion on the state of the applicant’s mental health. The parties did not submit a copy of that letter to the Court. 9.  Psychiatrists Ma. and K. studied the applicant’s letters at the prosecutor’s office and decided that the applicant should be examined, since the letters contained evidence of a “high probability of socially dangerous behaviour”. The parties did not submit copies of those letters to the Court either. 10.  On 19 March 2000, Ma., assisted by a team of paramedics and two police officers, visited the applicant at home. The applicant stated that he had been visited by seven persons in total. 11.  The parties differed on the circumstances of this visit. According to the applicant’s testimonies given before the court in civil proceedings (see paragraph 29 below), he opened the door only after the police had threatened to break it. Once the applicant had opened the door, Ma. said that they should go to a hospital to examine the applicant there. A police officer, P., was shouting at the applicant and threatening him with criminal prosecution for resisting the police. The applicant replied that he would “submit to force”. He was subsequently taken by his arms and put in an ambulance. 12.  The Government submitted that there was no evidence that any pressure had been applied to the applicant. According to Ma.’s testimonies given in the same court proceedings, the applicant opened the door and let Ma. and the police officers in. Ma. introduced himself and had a conversation with the applicant. It was then proposed that the applicant accompany them to a hospital for further examination. The applicant agreed, collected his belongings, closed the door and got into the ambulance. Upon arrival in the Severodonetsk Hospital it was decided that the applicant needed hospitalisation. 13.  On 20 March 2000 the applicant was examined by a panel of four doctors, including Ma. and K., which confirmed the necessity of his urgent hospitalisation. On the next day the applicant was examined by an assistant of the psychiatric medicine department of the Lugansk State University Hospital in the presence of Ma., and was offered hospital treatment. Since he refused, he was further examined by three doctors of the Lugansk Regional Psychoneurological Hospital (Луганська обласна клінічна психоневрологічна лікарня, hereinafter the “Lugansk Hospital”), who concluded that he should be urgently admitted for treatment because he had written threatening letters to various authorities. 14.  Between 21 March and 7 September 2000 the applicant was a patient in the Lugansk Hospital. He was allegedly examined on 21 April, 22 May, 23 June and 22 August 2000 by a panel of three psychiatrists. Each time it was decided that his treatment had to be continued. On 26 July 2000 the applicant was examined by a regional medico-social expert commission, which established that he had a second-degree disability. 15.  On 7 September 2000 the applicant was transferred to the Svatove Regional Psychiatric Hospital (Сватівська обласна психіатрична лікарня, the “Svatove Hospital”) to continue his treatment there. He was discharged from the hospital on 4 December 2000. 16.  The applicant also stayed in a hospital between 31 May and 26 June 2001. 17.  In July and August 2001 the applicant requested that the medical establishments where he had stayed in 2000 allow him to study his medical file and inform him on what legal basis he had been subjected to psychiatric treatment. According to the applicant, he received an answer only from the Lugansk Hospital but the answer was not satisfactory. 18.  On 26 September 2001 the applicant brought proceedings before the Severodonetskyy Town Court against the Severodonetsk Hospital, complaining of its failure to reply to his request. The case file contains a copy of the applicant’s complaint dated 26 September 2001. There are two handwritten notes on it: “received on 28 September 2001” and “received on 2 October 2001”. The Severodonetskyy District Court issued a note on the progress of the applicant’s case stating that the applicant had instituted the proceedings on 2 October 2001. In October 2001 the applicant lodged a similar complaint against the Lugansk Hospital. 19.  On 15 November 2001 the court stayed the proceedings in the case pending examination of the issue of the applicant’s legal capacity. On 26 December 2001 the request to recognise the applicant as legally incapacitated was left without consideration, so the proceedings were resumed on 1 February 2002. 20.  On 29 April 2002 the court rejected the applicant’s claims as unsubstantiated. On 21 November 2002 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 21.  On 6 February 2003 the applicant modified his claims. In addition to his initial claims, he complained, inter alia, that his committal to the psychoneurological department of the Severodonetsk Hospital on 19 March 2000 and his confinement there until 21 March 2000 had been unlawful. He also complained that he had been unlawfully transferred to the Lugansk Hospital and the Svatove Hospital, where he had been confined until 4 December 2000. The applicant also claimed damages. 22.  Between 23 February 2003 and 23 March 2004 ten court hearings took place and three hearings were postponed. In particular, on two occasions the defendants and/or their representatives failed to appear in court, and one hearing did not take place because the court recording equipment was not available. 23.  Following a request by one of the defendants, on 23 March 2004 the court ordered a forensic psychiatric examination of the applicant. On 14 July 2004 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal quashed that decision and remitted the case for examination on the merits. 24.  In their observations the Government provided a list of scheduled court hearings which had taken place in the applicant’s case. The case file also contains a note on the progress of the applicant’s case issued by the Severodonetskyy District Court. Those two descriptions of the progress of the proceedings in the applicant’s case contain some contradictory information. 25.  According to the Government’s submissions, between 3 September 2004 and 14 June 2005 eleven court hearings were scheduled but only five took place because either the defendants, the applicant or their representatives failed to appear. According to the domestic court record, seven hearings took place. 26.  On 14 June 2005 the term of office of the judge in the applicant’s case expired. The next hearing scheduled for September 2005 allegedly with a new judge did not take place because the court recording equipment was not available. 27.  Between 3 November 2005 and 13 August 2007 forty-eight court hearings were scheduled. According to the Government, all of them took place; according to the domestic court record, ten of them did not take place because the defendants, the applicant or their representatives failed to appear. The number of such failures to appear was almost equal for both parties. 28.  On 13 August 2007 the court partially allowed the applicant’s claims. It summarised his submissions as follows. On 19 March 2000 Ma., with the assistance of the police, had the applicant unlawfully committed to a psychoneurological department, where he stayed for two days. On 21 March 2000 the applicant was transferred to the Lugansk Hospital without his consent; he stayed there until 7 September 2000. He was then transferred to the Svatove Hospital, where he stayed until 4 December 2000. The applicant claimed that Ma. had acted unlawfully, had breached the applicant’s right to respect for his home, had examined the applicant against his will and had deprived him of his liberty. The applicant further complained that he had been unlawfully confined in all three hospitals, and that the principals of those institutions had failed to respond to his requests for information. The applicant claimed 100,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 29.  The court further noted that in a court hearing the applicant had submitted that he had not challenged his diagnosis but considered that the doctors’ actions had been unlawful. He gave his version of the events of 19 March 2000 (see paragraph 11 above). The applicant also submitted that force had been used against him in the Severodonetsk Hospital; he had been administered with injections and had been kept behind bars in a locked room. He had been transferred to the Lugansk and Svatove Hospitals without his consent. Information about his state of health had been provided to his employers and to the relevant prosecutor’s office. He had been discharged from the Svatove Hospital having been advised not to lodge any official complaints, otherwise he would be hospitalised again. He had not lodged any complaints since he had been “afraid for his future”. The applicant stated that he had sustained non-pecuniary damage caused by his involuntary hospitalisation, the administering of unknown medication by means of injection, poor nutrition, fear for his life, unsanitary conditions and a breach of his right to respect for his home. 30.  In court hearings Ma., and police officers Sh. and G. testified that no pressure had been brought to bear on the applicant at the time of the visit to his home. Witness Mb. testified that he did not remember the circumstances of that visit and witness Z. testified that she had seen “a doctor entering [the applicant’s house?] alone, followed several minutes later by a police officer”. She had then seen the applicant getting into an ambulance. Ma. also submitted that the applicant’s hospitalisation had been in compliance with temporary instructions nos. 16 and 17 “On procedure for the conduct of preliminary psychiatric examination of citizens” and “On procedure for urgent hospitalisation of mentally ill persons” (“Instructions nos. 16 and 17”) appended to Order no. 225 of the Ministry of Health of the USSR of 25 March 1988 “On actions for further improvement of psychiatric assistance” (“Order no. 225”), in particular, paragraphs 1, 2, and 10 to 13 of Instruction no. 16 and paragraphs 1, 2, 5 and 6 of the Instruction no. 17 (see relevant domestic law below). 31.  The court found that the visit to the applicant’s home on 19 March 2000 when the applicant had been examined and later taken to the Severodonetsk Hospital had been performed in compliance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 10 to 13 of Instruction no. 16 and paragraphs 1, 2 (b), 5 and 6 of Instruction no. 17. Referring to the “testimonies of Ma., Mb. and G.”, the court held that the applicant had failed to prove that any force had been used against him. The decision of 19 March 2000 on the applicant’s admission to hospital had also been adopted in compliance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of Instruction no. 17. The subsequent decision of 21 March 2000 to hospitalise the applicant had also been taken in compliance with paragraph 2 (b) of Instruction no. 17. However, the applicant’s transfer to the Svatove Hospital on 7 September 2000 had been in breach of section 16 of the Psychiatric Medical Assistance Act, which was in force as of 4 April 2000. The applicant’s requests for access to information had been rejected as a result of a decision to limit his access to his medical file, which he had not challenged. Such information could have been provided to the applicant’s relatives if he so wished. The court awarded the applicant UAH 2,000 to be paid by the Svatove Hospital (approximately 286 euros (EUR) at the material time) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 32.  The applicant appealed, stating, in particular, that by Order no. 81 of 18 April 1996 of the Ministry of Health of Ukraine (“Order no. 81”), Order no. 225 had been declared “not applicable on the territory of Ukraine”. 33.  On 29 November 2007 the Lugansk Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 13 August 2007. The court held that the first-instance court had correctly applied the law in force at the material time. The court rejected the applicant’s arguments about the invalidity of Order no. 225 as unsubstantiated without giving any further details. It did not comment on the validity and/or legal effect of Order no. 81. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, reiterating his arguments. 35.  On 12 February 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as unsubstantiated. 36.  On 23 November 2010 the applicant complained to the Severodonetskyy Town Court that he had not received a writ of enforcement. In reply, the court informed him that he could receive the writ of enforcement from the court’s secretariat upon a written request. 37.  It is unclear whether the applicant received the compensation awarded to him.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant company specialises in taking soil samples by way of drilling for geological examination, inter alia, for the purpose of assessing suitability for building sites and for the construction of wells. 7.  In the building industry in Germany, a number of collective agreements operated, which contained regulations related to the social welfare of employees working in that sector (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs 21-28). The employers’ associations in the building industry (Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie and Zentralverband des Deutschen Baugewerbes) and the trade union (IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt) concluded the Collective Agreement on Social Welfare Proceedings in the Building Trade (Tarifvertrag über das Sozialkassenverfahren im Baugewerbe, “VTV”). The VTV contained rules about contributions and entitlements in relation to both the ZVK and the Holiday and Wage Equalisation Fund of the Construction Industry (Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft, “ULAK”), which jointly comprised the Social Welfare Fund in the building industry which went by the common name “SOKA-BAU”. 8.  As the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs declared the VTV generally binding (allgemeinverbindlich) pursuant to Section 5 § 1 of the Law on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz), it was binding on all employers in the building industry, even if they did not belong to the employers’ association (Section 5 § 4 of the Law on Collective Agreements, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 20). As a consequence, all employers in the building industry were obliged to contribute to the Social Welfare Fund an additional sum amounting to 19.8% of the gross wages paid to their employees. 9.  The applicant company was not a member of an employers’ association that was party to the relevant collective agreements. It was thus not directly bound by any collective agreements by virtue of such membership. 10.  On 10 August 2004 the Social Welfare Fund sent a letter to the applicant company with key information about the supplementary welfare schemes, including with regard to contributions to be paid and possible benefits it might receive. The applicant company did not react to this letter. 11.  On 12 April 2005, following enquiries made in order to establish whether the applicant was obliged to pay contributions, the Social Welfare Fund sent a letter to the applicant company, informing it about its duty to pay contributions and that an account had been opened into which benefits would be paid. 12.  On 28 April 2005 the applicant company’s lawyer sent a letter to the Social Welfare Fund, objecting to being registered with the Fund. 13.  On 11 October 2007 the Wiesbaden Labour Court ordered the applicant company to pay 63,625.58 euros (EUR) in welfare fund arrears for the period between September 2002 and March 2004 to the ZVK. The applicant company was further ordered to submit copies of the wage slips issued to its employees between January 2006 and June 2007. The Labour Court considered that the applicant company was bound by the VTV, which was binding on all employers in the building industry even if they did not belong to one of the employers’ associations. The activities of the applicant company fell within the scope of the VTV which, in its Article 1 § 2 (v) no. 6, listed drilling as an activity within its scope. 14.  The applicant company lodged an appeal submitting, in particular, that the generally binding effect of the VTV violated the negative aspects of its right to freedom of association. It argued that it was obliged to contribute to a fund jointly set up by the employers’ association and the trade union, even though it did not belong to either of these associations. The applicant company further complained that it was prevented from founding its own association, due to a lack of funds. 15.  On 27 June 2008 the Hesse Labour Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company’s appeal and did not grant leave for an appeal on points of law. As well as confirming the Labour Court’s reasoning, the Court of Appeal held that the generally binding effect of the VTV did not violate the applicant company’s right to freedom of association. It observed that the generally binding effect did not entail an obligation to adhere either to one of the employers’ associations or to the Social Welfare Fund. Referring to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (decision of 15 July 1980, 1 BvR 24/74, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27), the Labour Court of Appeal conceded that the applicant company, which was not a member of one of the employers’ associations, had the disadvantage of not being able to assert its interests by exercising control over the activities of the Social Welfare Fund via these associations. The right to participate in the decision-making process within these associations was reserved to members of the respective association. In so far as this fact exerted a certain pressure to become a member of one of the employers’ associations, this was, however, not sufficient to amount to a violation of the negative aspect of its right to freedom of association. 16.  The Court of Appeal further considered that the obligation to contribute to the Social Welfare Fund did not prevent the applicant company from founding its own association. It observed that the major parts of the contributions due would be reimbursed to the applicant if properly declared. 17.  The Court of Appeal finally considered that the obligatory contribution to the Social Welfare Fund took account of the high fluctuation of employees in the building industry and served the public interest of allowing for management of the employee’s claims by the Social Welfare Fund, thus preventing a distortion of competition. 18.  On 10 December 2008 the Federal Labour Court rejected the applicant company’s complaint against the refusal to grant leave to appeal. 19.  On 5 February 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicant company’s constitutional complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (1 BvR 243/09).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1969. 6.  On 27 June 2005 a criminal investigation was initiated into a theft allegedly committed by the applicant in the Republic of Uzbekistan. On 12 September 2005 an investigator ordered the applicant’s arrest and placed him on the list of fugitives. 7.  It appears that in the meantime the applicant moved to the Russian town of Perm. On 21 January 2007 he was arrested there. On 23 January 2007 a prosecutor issued a decision to detain the applicant pending resolution of the extradition request in his regard. The decision referred to Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (signed in Minsk on 22 January 1993 and amended on 28 March 1997, “the Minsk Convention”). It did not indicate that it was amenable to appeal. On 25 January 2007 the prosecutor wrote to the prison authorities asking them to hold the applicant in detention until further notice. 8.  On 19 February 2007 the Uzbek authorities requested the applicant’s extradition. On 6 March 2007 the prosecutor applied to the court for authorisation of the applicant’s detention pending extradition. He again relied on Article 61 of the Minsk Convention and Articles 97‑101, 108 and 466 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Russia (“the CCrP”). On 9 March 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Perm authorised the applicant’s detention pending extradition. The District Court did not set a limit on the length of the applicant’s detention. It referred to Article 108 of the CCrP. On 27 March 2007 the Perm Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. No court subsequently reviewed or extended the applicant’s detention. 9.  It appears that on 10 July 2007 the applicant was handed over to the authorities of the Republic of Uzbekistan.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1978 respectively and are detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility and Kybartai Correctional Facility. 5.  The first applicant was detained in Šiauliai Remand Prison from 11 January 2011 to 3 November 2011. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in four different remand prison cells: nos. 9, 104, 29 and 37. 6.  In 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Šiauliai Remand Prison had been degrading: cell no. 9 had not been renovated, had had almost no natural light and the artificial light provided in the evening had been very poor; the ventilation had been insufficient and the cell was cold; cell no. 104, although renovated, lacked sufficient ventilation and was cold, and there was almost no natural light; cell no. 29 had insufficient light and ventilation; cell no. 37 was dirty, the electrical system was damaged and thus dangerous, the sanitary facilities were not separated from the cell, the cell lacked light, ventilation and the temperature was too low. The applicant also submitted a document from the Šiauliai Health Care Centre from 19 April 2012, which noted violations of hygiene norms in the remand prison’s cells. 7.  On 21 December 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant’s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation. The court held that the applicant had not complained about his conditions of detention while in prison and had only lodged his complaint a year after leaving it. Moreover, it was up to the applicant to prove that he had sustained damage. The court held that there was no information to show that the remand prison had purposely interfered with his right to dignity or treated him inhumanely, that he had not suffered a great enough negative impact from the hygiene violations, and that there were no grounds to award him compensation. 8.  The applicant appealed but on 17 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court observed that the document from the Šiauliai Health Care Centre (see paragraph 6 above) had been issued five months after the applicant had left the remand prison and it was not able to determine the negative impact of the unsanitary conditions on the applicant on the basis of such evidence alone. 9.  The second applicant was detained in Šiauliai Remand Prison from 15 December 2009 to 8 February 2012. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in several different cells: nos. 101, 95, 54, 14 and 49. 10.  On 27 December 2011 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages and on 9 January 2012 he submitted a detailed complaint. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Šiauliai Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells were damp and dirty, there was insufficient light and ventilation, and the walls had not been painted. As a result, his health had deteriorated: his sight had worsened and he had pain in his joints and his back. 11.  On 28 December 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant’s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation. The court found that the Šiauliai Health Care Centre had examined cell no. 101 on 7 January 2011, while the applicant had been detained there from 5 January 2011 to 3 February 2011 and from 14 February 2011 to 28 April 2011. The cell had been dirty, the toilet doors broken, and there was mould on the walls and ceiling. The health centre also examined cell no. 101 on 27 April 2011 and established that there was no longer any mould and the temperature was satisfactory, but the lighting was still insufficient. The court thus held that the applicant had proven that the conditions in cell no. 101 had been unsanitary. However, the court noted that the applicant had not proven the existence of unsanitary conditions in the other cells. The court further noted that the inmates were responsible for keeping the cells clean, but that the remand prison had not proven that it had provided the applicant with cleaning materials for at least six months. As regards the applicant’s health, the court observed that he had been prescribed several drugs for spinal osteochondrosis, but that there was no relation between his illness and the unsanitary conditions in cell no. 101. The court also noted that during the hearing the applicant had claimed that all the cells had been overcrowded but he had failed to mention this in his written complaint. The court thus held that the case concerned sanitary conditions and not overcrowding. 12.  The applicant appealed and on 11 June 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court found that the court of first instance had acted unreasonably in dismissing his compensation claim, and awarded him with 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 87 euros (EUR)) for non-pecuniary damage.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Strausberg. Before the reunification of Germany he lived in the former GDR, serving in the police force from 1952 to 1954. 6.  On 13 June 1958, the Frankfurt (Oder) District Court convicted the applicant of “criminal assault against the local bodies of the State” (“verbrecherischer Angriff gegen die örtlichen Organe der Staatsmacht”) after he had attacked a member of the GDR parliament of the ruling Socialist Unity Party. He was sentenced to one year and eight months’ imprisonment and served 14 months in prison. 7.  On 8 February 1994 the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court annulled the 1958 judgment for its incompatibility with the principles of the rule of law and rehabilitated the applicant pursuant to Section 1 § 1 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act (Gesetz über die Rehabilitierung und Entschädigung von Opfern rechtsstaatswidriger Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen im Beitrittsgebiet ‑ Strafrechtliches Rehabilitierungsgesetz) designed to rehabilitate and compensate prisoners of the GDR regime for deprivation of their liberty incompatible with the principles of the rule of law. 8.  On 25 April 1994 the applicant lodged an application for compensation under the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. The application form contained instructions that, according to Section 16 § 2 of the Act (see Relevant domestic law and practice, paragraphs 23 and 24 below), such compensation could not be granted to a person who had offended against the principles of humanity and the rule of law. The applicant declared on the questionnaire that he had never acted in disregard of these principles and never worked for the former GDR’s Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit). On 13 February 1995 the President of the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court, acting as the competent authority, awarded him compensation of 8,250 German marks, equivalent to about 4,218 euros (EUR), pursuant to Section 17 in conjunction with Section 16 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. 9.  On 7 August 2007, after an amendment of the Act, the applicant also applied for a special, income‑related pension which benefits former victims of imprisonment (monatliche besondere Zuwendung für Haftopfer). He again confirmed that he had never offended against the principles of humanity and the rule of law and never worked for the former GDR’s Ministry of State Security. On 14 November 2007 he was granted a special monthly pension of EUR 250 pursuant to Section 17a of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, with the reservation that information held by the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR (“the Federal Commissioner”) must not contradict the applicant’s statements. A respective request for information was submitted on 19 November 2007. 10.  On 25 February 2008 the Federal Commissioner informed the President of the Regional Court that the applicant, between 22 September 1953 and 25 November 1954, had been a secret informant of the Ministry of State Security while he was a member of the police force. This information was based on a number of documents, including 32 handwritten reports allegedly drafted by the applicant and a declaration to commit to serve as a secret informant to the state security service. 11.  On 18 February 2009 the President of the Regional Court, relying on Section 48 §§ 1 and 2, third sentence, no. 2 of the Brandenburg Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz für das Land Brandenburg), withdrew the decisions granting compensation and a special pension and at the same time ordered the applicant to reimburse the amounts already received pursuant to Section 49a of the same Act. The President considered that the decisions had been unlawful from the beginning as the prerequisites for either entitlement had never been met and that the applicant could not legitimately rely on these decisions being maintained, as he had obtained them by giving information that was substantially incorrect. Referring to Section 16 § 2 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, he observed that the applicant, contrary to the statements in his applications, had worked as a secret informant for the Ministry of State Security and had produced at least five reports for the Ministry in which he put at real risk the persons on whom he had informed. 12.  On 9 March 2009 the applicant applied for judicial review of that decision and asked to be heard in person. He claimed that the information contained in the documents of the Federal Commissioner was incomplete and not accurate. The fact that at the time of recruitment he was only 19 years old and had been severely traumatised when fleeing his home town in Silesia in 1945 and experiencing the bombing of Dresden on 13 February 1945, followed by several months of homelessness after the war had ended, also had to be taken into account. His father had returned, incapacitated for work, from Soviet captivity only in 1947 or 1948. While serving in the police forces he had not been aware of working for other government agencies. The written commitment to the state security service might have been dictated to him when he was under the influence of alcohol but he had no memory of it whatsoever. In any case, he ruled out that the wording was his own and that he had known that the reports were to be used by the state security service. 13.  On 16 February 2010 the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court, sitting as a chamber of three judges, dismissed the applicant’s request for judicial review, finding that his work as a secret informant for the Ministry of State Security was of such nature, scope and duration that it was reprehensible enough to justify ruling out the applicant’s eligibility for compensation payments pursuant to Section 16 § 2 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. Acknowledging that in a dictatorship which lasted for decades, minor involvement with the regime was frequent, it considered that the applicant’s position as a secret informant of the state security service did not itself suffice to trigger the application of that provision. However, compensation provided under the Act was intended to benefit innocent victims only, but not those who had also participated in offences contrary to the principles of humanity and which were harmful to others or at least put them at risk. This could be assumed when a secret informant voluntarily reported on others and the reports could potentially cause persecution by the state security service. In that case compensation payments were ruled out, no matter how great the offender’s own suffering had been. The courts were not to compare the extent of suffering involved. 14.  The Regional Court observed that the applicant had penned a handwritten commitment to serve the state security service after he had already reported twice on others. Thus the applicant’s submission that he had believed that he was reporting to police officers and not to the state security service was, in the light of that declaration, not credible (“nicht glaubhaft”). Furthermore, the five reports mentioned in the decision of the President of the Regional Court, as well as two more reports were capable of putting in danger the persons informed on. The applicant mainly reported on their contacts with West Germany and West Berlin. An intention to leave the former GDR without permission, in particular, could have led to severe criminal persecution of the persons involved. The reports were not meaningless but contained valuable information for the state security service. The applicant’s claim that some reports were unknown to him and factually incorrect and that he did not recognise the names of the superior officers was irrelevant to the Regional Court’s decision. 15.  The Regional Court also pointed out that it was unnecessary to hear the applicant in person. His personality at the time and the circumstances of his recruitment would have been relevant only if there were indications that the applicant acted under insupportable pressure. However, there were no such indications and the applicant had made no claims in this regard. He had reported twice on others, even before being recruited by the state security service. Further, the court could not see a connection between the applicant’s experiences relating to the impact of war and the post-war period on him and his psychological strain at the time of recruitment on the one hand and his willingness to cooperate with the state security service on the other hand. 16.  On 24 August 2010 the Brandenburg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the Regional Court’s reasons. 17.  On 28 October 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons (2 BvR 2329/10).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and, until his death in 2006, lived in Vinnytsya. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 7.  In 2001 the applicant was arrested in the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT”) on charges of murder. On 28 June 2002 he was convicted in a final judgment by the “MRT” Supreme Court and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. 8.  According to the applicant, during his pre-trial detention he was subjected to ill-treatment to make him confess to committing the murder. 9.  After his conviction the applicant’s mother made many requests to various Ukrainian official bodies to obtain the transfer of her son to a Ukrainian prison. The case file before the Court contains approximately forty replies received by her from various Ukrainian authorities. However, her efforts were not successful. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine informed the applicant that it had contacted its counterpart in Moldova, which had informed it that Moldova could not secure the applicant’s transfer to a Ukrainian prison because it did not have control over the territory of the “MRT”. The Ukrainian authorities also contacted the “MRT” authorities, but to no avail. In a letter to the applicant’s mother, the “MRT” authorities stated that they would only transfer the applicant to a Ukrainian prison after the conclusion of a treaty between Ukraine and the “MRT” which would make the transfer of prisoners possible. Since Ukraine refused to sign such a treaty with it, the transfer was not possible. The applicant’s mother went so far as to initiate court proceedings against the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denouncing its lack of action, but she was not successful. 10.  On several occasions the applicant’s representative also contacted the Moldovan authorities, enquiring about the status of the Transdniestrian region and, on at least two occasions, asking them for assistance with the question of the applicant’s transfer to a Ukrainian prison. It does not appear from the material submitted by the applicant and his mother that he complained to the Moldovan authorities about alleged breaches of his Convention rights by the “MRT” authorities. In a letter of 25 April 2003 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Moldova informed the applicant’s representative that it had contacted the prosecuting authorities of the “MRT” and requested the necessary documents to have the applicant transferred to a Ukrainian prison. It is not clear from the case file whether the “MRT” authorities reacted to that letter. In another letter sent to the applicant’s representative by the office of the President of the Republic of Moldova, the lawyer was informed that the Moldovan authorities were unable to bring about the applicant’s transfer to a Ukrainian prison while the Transdniestrian conflict remained unsettled. 11.  The applicant’s mother also wrote to the OSCE mission in Moldova, which informed her that her letter had been forwarded to the Ukrainian Embassy in Chisinau. 12.  In around March 2006 the applicant broke his leg and was admitted to hospital. It appears from his mother’s statements that she was able to spend time with him during his stay in hospital. 13.  On 24 May 2006 the applicant was found hanged in the gym of the prison in which he was being detained. It does not appear that the applicant’s mother requested or obtained a medical forensic report concerning the circumstances of his death. However, it appears from her statements that the applicant did not have any signs of violence on his body.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  In a dispute between the applicant and the domestic pension authorities, on 18 February 2011 the Kryviy Rih Dovgyntsivskyy District Court ruled in his favour, ordering an increase of his pension based on the rise in the average wages in the country since his retirement. The court sat in camera. 5.  On 3 November 2011 the first-instance court amended the judgment at the applicant’s request, indicating that it was enforceable immediately. In doing so, the court referred to the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice governing abridged procedure (see paragraph 11 below). 6.  The defendant pension authority appealed to the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). 7.  On 23 November 2011 the first-instance court informed the applicant that an appeal had been lodged in his case. On 29 February 2012 he wrote to the Court of Appeal, requesting to be informed about the date of the hearing of his case. According to him, he received no response and no further information about the proceedings until 22 February 2013 when he received the Court of Appeal’s final decision, dated 26 June 2012, quashing the first-instance court’s judgment. 8.  It can be seen from the material before the Court that the applicant’s domestic case file contains copies of the ruling of the Court of Appeal’s judge (date illegible) opening appeal proceedings in his case and a notification letter dated February 2012 from the court clerk informing him of the upcoming examination of his case in camera on 26 June 2012 and stating that the judge’s ruling and a copy of the appeal were enclosed with the letter. The Government alleged that the above documents had been sent to the applicant, while the applicant alleged that they had not. The file does not contain any postal documents or registers of sent correspondence showing that the above documents had been sent or delivered to the applicant. 9.  On 26 June 2012 the Court of Appeal, in a final decision not amenable to appeal, quashed the first-instance court’s judgment, dismissing the applicant’s claim for a pension increase and holding that the domestic law did not require the pensions to be increased in case of rise in the average wages in the country following retirement. The court sat in camera.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Split. 6.  The applicant is the owner of a commercial building in Split, which he uses as a car repair workshop. The building in issue was bought from the State in 2001. At the time of purchase, no limitation on its use was registered or apparent. 7.  On 28 March 2003 the Split Department for the Conservation of Cultural Heritage (Ministarstvo kulture, Uprava za zaštitu kulturne baštine, Konzervatorski odjel u Splitu, hereafter “the Split Department”) ordered a measure of preventive protection relating to cultural heritage with regard to the applicant’s building, pending the final evaluation of its cultural value. It explained that the building, which was being used as a car repair workshop at that point, appeared to be a rare example of early industrial architecture in Split, and therefore this warranted a measure limiting its use by the applicant. Under section 10 of the Protection and Preservation of Cultural Heritage Act (Zakon o zaštiti i očuvanju kulturnih dobara, hereafter “the Cultural Heritage Act”) the measure would remain in place for a period of three years, and, in accordance with section 11 of the same Act, would afford the same protection as a final protective measure (see paragraph 21 below). 8.  The decision ordering the preventive protection was not transmitted to the applicant. It was forwarded to the land registry of the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) and duly registered in the land register. 9.  On 10 January 2007, after the expiry of the three-year period, the Split Department again ordered a measure of preventive protection with regard to the applicant’s commercial building, reiterating the same grounds as those specified in its previous decision. 10.  The applicant was not informed of the above decision relating to the second measure of preventive protection in respect of his building. On 3 September 2007 the measure was registered in the land register. 11.  On 16 October 2007, after becoming aware of the second measure of preventive protection following an enquiry with the land registry, the applicant challenged the extended application of that measure before the Ministry of Culture (Ministarstvo culture, hereafter “the Ministry”). He contended, in particular, that he had not been informed of the decision ordering the preventive protection, and that the protection could no longer be ordered, since the maximum duration of such a measure under the Cultural Heritage Act was three years. The applicant also enquired about compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage he had sustained as a result of the measure of preventive protection. 12.  On 8 January 2008 the Split Department forwarded the applicant’s appeal to the Ministry. It stressed that the decision of 10 January 2007 extending the preventive protection after the expiry of the first three-year period had been necessary, owing to the fact that it had not been possible to obtain an excerpt from the land register from the Split Municipal Court, and that the building represented an important example of early industrial architecture in Split. 13.  On 31 January 2008 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded, on the grounds that there was nothing in the law preventing the competent authority from applying the measure twice for periods of three years, and that the measure of preventive protection had not limited the applicant’s ownership rights. It also pointed out that it was necessary to extend the preventive protection in respect of the building, as the determination of its heritage value required further comprehensive assessment. 14.  On 9 March 2008 the applicant lodged an administrative action in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lawfulness and reasonableness of the measure of preventive protection, and emphasising the passivity of the competent authorities in finally resolving the matter. He also contended that the decisions of the lower authorities had been arbitrary. He pointed out that, contrary to what the Ministry had stated, his ownership rights had been significantly limited, as his freedom to deal with the property as he wished had been restricted. In particular, his several attempts to sell the building and set up another business cooperation had failed, owing to the existing preventive protection. The applicant also asked the Administrative Court to award him 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the damage he had sustained as a result of the conduct of the administrative authorities. 15.  Meanwhile, the Split Department found that the applicant’s building should not be registered as an object of cultural heritage. On 15 April 2010, after the expiry of the measure of preventive protection, the Split Municipal Court ordered that the entry concerning the measure be deleted from the land register. 16.  On 18 May 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower authorities. In particular, it pointed out that there had been solid evidence suggesting that the building was an important object of cultural heritage, and that the measure of preventive protection was therefore justified given the need to carry out further assessments. Moreover, the Administrative Court considered that nothing in the relevant domestic law prevented the adoption of the second decision on preventive protection following the expiry of the first three-year time-limit. 17.  On 10 September 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining of a violation of his property rights under Article 48 of the Constitution with regard to the allegedly unlawful and unreasonable application of the measure of preventive protection in respect of his property. 18.  On 14 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Between 2005 and 2006 the applicants successfully sued the authorities for miscalculating social benefits. The judgments became final. 6.  On various dates the supervisory review courts quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour after applications by the defendant authorities, considering that the lower courts had misapplied substantive or procedural law (for more details see the Appendix). 7.  On 3 July 1986 the applicant was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment. On 25 February 1997 he was acquitted. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application with the Sovetskiy District Court, claiming 3,973,578 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage on the grounds of wrongful prosecution. 9.  On 24 May 1999 the Sovetskiy District Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part, awarding him RUB 43,568 in compensation for unpaid salary, the confiscation of his car, and judicial costs and expenses. The judgment was fully enforced. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a similar set of proceedings against the Ministry of Finance, claiming compensation for wrongful prosecution in 1997. 11.  On 27 July 2006 the Leninskiy District Court granted the applicant’s claim in full and awarded him RUB 761,815 in compensation for unpaid salary; the confiscation of his car and other property; rent for his flat; travel expenses; and judicial costs and expenses. No appeal against the judgment was lodged and it became final. 12.  On 1 February 2007 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed that judgment by way of supervisory review on the grounds that the same issue had already been decided by the judgment of 24 May 1999 and that there had been no grounds to examine the complaint a second time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Moscow. 5.  The flat at 137A-9-267 Samarkandskiy Boulevard, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. G. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 21 February 2007 G. died. 6.  On an unspecified date G.’s daughter Get. submitted to a local real estate registration body a forged copy of a court’s decision recognising her as G.’s heir and asked the latter to confirm her title to the flat at 137A-9-267 Samarkandskiy Boulevard, Moscow. On 19 March 2008, following the expert review of her application, she obtained the relevant certificate. 7.  On 17 April 2008 Get. sold the flat to N. On 28 May 2008, following the expert review of the transaction, N. was issued with a certificate confirming his title to the flat. 8.  On 28 July 2008 N. sold the flat to the applicant. On 28 August 2008, following the expert review of the transaction, the applicant obtained a certificate confirming his ownership in respect of the flat. He and his family moved into the flat and resided there. 9.  On 15 May 2009 the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat by Get. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the proceedings. 10.  On an unspecified date the Department for Municipal Housing and Housing Policy of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department) brought a civil claim seeking (1) the annulment of the entry in the real estate register confirming the existence of Get.’s title to the flat; (2) annulment of the flat purchase agreements between Get. and N. and N. and the applicant; (3) transfer of the ownership to the flat to the City of Moscow; and (4) the applicant’s eviction. 11.  On 19 June 2009 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims. The court ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser’s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow as a previous owner who had been deprived of the property against its will. The applicant’s title to the flat was annulled and the ownership of the flat was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicant’s eviction. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 29 September 2009 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 19 June 2009 on appeal. 13.  On 25 January and 12 May 2011 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged an application with the Housing Department asking for provision of housing. 14.  On 13 December 2011 the applicant was evicted from the flat. 15.  According to the Government, on 16 July 2012 the Housing Department assigned the flat as social housing to a family of four. On 25 April 2014 the ownership of the flat was transferred to them under the privatisation scheme. 16.  On 19 June 2009 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims against N. and awarded him 990,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages. 17.  On 12 October 2011 the bailiff opened enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 15 March 2006 the bailiff discontinued enforcement proceedings as it was impossible to establish N.’s whereabouts or to obtain information about his assets. 19.  According to the Government, the enforcement proceedings are still pending. The judgment in the applicant’s favour has not been yet enforced.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant is a privately owned company which was established in 1989 and registered in Belgrade. 6.  On 9 September 2003 the applicant and Beranka AD, a socially‑owned company, concluded a guarantee agreement. To secure the payment of obligations under this agreement, the applicant and Beranka AD concluded Annex No. 1 on the fiduciary transfer of the latter’s property to the applicant (Anex br. 1 Ugovora o fiducijarnom prenosu prava svojine). In this Annex, the property offered as collateral was: (a) property no. 6 – storehouse (magacin); (b) property no. 29 – power plant (energana); (c) property no. 30 – boiler-room (kotlovnica); (d) property no. 9 – laboratory (laboratorija); and (e) property PM2 – paper machines (papir mašine). 7.  On 31 October 2003 the fiduciary transfer of Beranka AD’s property to the applicant was registered by the Real Estate Office in Berane (Direkcija za nekretnine, Područna jedinica Berane). 8.  On 8 April 2004 the Commercial Court in Bijelo Polje (Privredni sud u Bijelom Polju) opened insolvency proceedings in respect of Beranka AD. 9.  On 5 June 2004 the applicant reported its claim in these proceedings. 10.  On 17 September 2004 the Commercial Court refused to recognise this claim. 11.  Following the decision of 17 September 2004, on 11 October 2004 the insolvency administrator for Beranka AD (stečajni upravnik) lodged a request with the Real Estate Office in Berane seeking that the registration of the fiduciary transfer of property to the applicant be erased. On the same day the Real Estate Office Registry accepted this request. 12.  On 5 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Real Estate Department in Berane (Uprava za nekretnine Područna jedinica Berane). On 26 November 2004 the Real Estate Department amended the said decision. 13.  On 13 April 2005 the Real Estate Department in Podgorica (Uprava za nekrentine u Podgorici) quashed both decisions on appeal and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14.  On 1 June 2005 the Real Estate Department in Berane re-registered the fiduciary transfer on properties nos. 6 and 9, as well as on PM2, but refused to re-register the fiduciary transfer on properties nos. 29 and 30. 15.  On 22 November 2005 the Real Estate Department in Podgorica upheld this decision. 16.  The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court. On 6 February 2007 the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Real Estate Department in Podgorica and remitted case to the Real Estate Department in Berane. It would appear that the case is still pending before that body. 17.  On 11 April 2007 the Administrative Court issued an enforcement decision ordering the registration of the applicant’s fiduciary rights in respect of all properties. 18.  Following the Commercial Court’s decision of 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), the applicant lodged an objection. The hearings concerning the objection were held on 11 August 2004, 31 May 2005 and 17 April 2006. On 24 August 2006 the Commercial Court dismissed the applicant’s objection. 19.  On 17 January 2007 the Real Estate Department in Berane again erased the fiduciary transfer of Beranka AD’s property from the public register. On 24 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 20.  On 3 September 2007 the Ministry of Finance upheld the decision of the Real Estate Department to erase the applicant’s fiduciary rights. 21.  On 8 July 2008, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Ministry and remitted the case to the Real Estate Department in Berane for reconsideration. 22.  On 2 October 2008 the Real Estate Department in Berane ordered the removal of the applicant’s rights on Beranka AD’s property from the public register. 23.  On 9 April 2009 the Ministry of Finance quashed the decision of 2 October 2008 and remitted case to the first instance. 24.  On 8 April 2010 the Real Estate Department in Berane stayed the proceedings, because it needed some documents which were in the file of a case pending before the Commercial Court. This decision was quashed by decision of the Ministry of Finance and the matter was remitted to the first instance. 25.  On 26 October 2011 the Real Estate Department adopted a decision allowing the deletion of the applicant’s rights from the public register. The same authority confirmed that decision on 2 November 2011. 26.  On 16 November 2011 the applicant filed an objection with the Ministry of Finance. 27.  On 9 July 2012 the applicant also lodged an appeal with the Administrative Court. On 30 November 2012 the Administrative Court rendered a decision in the applicant’s favour and ordered the Ministry of Finance to reconsider on the applicant’s prior objection. 28.  On 14 June 2013 the Ministry of Finance remitted the case to the first instance. The proceedings are still pending before the Real Estate Department in Berane.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were claimants in civil proceedings. 6.  In the applications Trapeznikov v. Russia and Bychkov and Others v. Russia, the applicants were former participants of the Chernobyl clean-up operation who sued the relevant authorities for an inflation adjustment to their social benefits. 7.  In the application Markova v. Russia, the applicant sought the eviction of her late son’s wife and her granddaughter from the flat she was living in, alleging that she was the sole owner because her son had renounced his share in the flat in her favour. 8.  In the application Ryabchikov v. Russia, the applicant inherited a house in accordance with a will drawn up by his late mother. Later he discovered that she had two plots of land which she transferred back in 1994 to an agricultural company to which she was a member. The applicant sought to recover the property of these two plots of land alleging that the transfer had not been duly formalised and that consequently the land formed part of his inheritance. 9.  In all of the applications, the first-instance courts found for the applicants, the judgments were upheld on appeal and they became enforceable. Subsequently, at the defendants’ requests, the presidia of the relevant regional courts quashed the judgments by way of supervisory review. In the applications Trapeznikov and Bychkov and Others, the presidia found that the lower courts failed to take into account the specific method of calculation of indexation established by the Government for this particular category of social benefits. In the applications Markova and Ryabchikov, they concluded that the findings of the lower courts favorable to the applicants were based on the retrospective application of the law (see Appendix).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Zvolen. 7.  In 1929 the applicant’s grandfather built a house in Piešťany. His predecessors retained ownership under the communist regime. Ownership was transferred to the applicant from his mother on 21 December 1998. 8.  The house comprises four flats. Two have a surface area of 108 sq. m each in size, while the other two measure 123 sq. m each. 9.  At the time the application was lodged, the flats were inhabited by tenants with a regulated rent. Their or their predecessors’ right to use the flats had been established by decisions taken by the municipal authorities between 1953 and 1986. After 1 January 1992 their right of use had been transformed into tenancies with regulated rent for an indefinite period. 10.  Under the relevant legislation, the applicant had to accept that his flats were occupied by those tenants and that he could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State (“the rent-control scheme”). The applicant had no possibility of unilaterally terminating the leases on his flats. 11.  Under the applicable legislation, the maximum monthly rent chargeable for the flats in 1999 was the equivalent of some 13 to 33 euros (EUR). After several increases in the regulated rent, in 2004 the applicant was able to charge EUR 115 monthly in respect of each of the smaller flats and EUR 124 monthly in respect of the larger ones. 12.  The applicant contended that he, in fact, received from the tenants less than the maximum amount of rent set by the applicable legislation. To this end he led several property disputes with them and the local municipality. 13.  The parties provided differing figures as to the market rent.\nThe applicant relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (“the NAREA”) and claimed that the monthly market rent for similar flats reached EUR 600 to 800 between 2004 and 2007.\nThe Government submitted an expert valuation according to which the monthly market rent for the applicant’s flats in 2010 amounted to EUR 265.50 and EUR 325 respectively. 14.  In submissions made on 16 June 2014 the applicant informed the Court that the rent control in respect of his four flats had been terminated. The first flat had been subject to rent control until May 2007, the second and third flats until August 2007, and the fourth flat until April 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  Mr Tadeucci (“the first applicant”) was born in 1965. Mr McCall (“the second applicant”) was born in 1958. They live in Amsterdam. 8.  The applicants have formed a same-sex couple since 1999. They lived in New Zealand, with the status of unmarried couple, until December 2003, when they decided to settle in Italy on grounds of the first applicant’s poor health. 9.  During their first period of residence in Italy the second applicant had a student’s temporary residence permit. He subsequently applied for a residence permit for family reasons, under Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ... . 10.  On 18 October 2004 the chief of the Livorno police rejected his application on the ground that the statutory criteria were not satisfied. 11.  On 27 January 2005 the applicants appealed on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, requesting that the second applicant be issued with a residence permit for family reasons. 12.  In a judgment of 4 July 2005 the Florence Civil Court allowed the applicants’ appeal. 13.  The court observed that the applicants were recognised as a couple in New Zealand, the first applicant having been issued with a residence permit in that country for family reasons in his capacity as an unmarried partner. The court found that the applicants’ status as an unmarried couple was not contrary to Italian public policy, as de facto couples received social and legal recognition in the Italian system. In the court’s view, Article 30 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ... had to be interpreted in conformity with the principles established by the Constitution, which meant that a same-sex cohabiting partner should be regarded as a “member of the family” of the Italian national and thus entitled to obtain a residence permit. 14.  The court found that the right asserted by the second applicant also derived from Articles 3 and 10 of Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 May 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council ..., which recognised the right of the partner of a citizen of the European Union (EU) to obtain a residence permit where the existence of a durable relationship was duly attested. 15.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed against the judgment of the Florence Civil Court. 16.  In a judgment of 12 May 2006 the Florence Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It observed that the New Zealand authorities had recognised that the applicants had the status of “unmarried cohabiting partners” and not that of “members of the same family”. 17.  The Court of Appeal found, first, that the lower court’s recommended interpretation of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, according to which the “cohabiting partner” was regarded as a “member of the family”, was not compatible with the Italian legal system, which, according to the court, ascribed a different scope and meaning to those two legal concepts. Secondly, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly held that a relationship based on cohabitation alone, and lacking stability and legal certainty, could not in any circumstances be regarded as a legitimate family based on marriage. 18.  The Court of Appeal found that New Zealand law was not compatible with Italian public policy on the grounds, firstly, that it regarded persons of the same sex as “cohabiting partners” and, furthermore, that it could be construed as conferring the status of “family members” on them for the purposes of granting them a residence permit. Lastly, it added that neither European law, particularly Directive No 2004/38/EC ..., nor the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, obliged the States to recognise same-sex relationships. 19.  The applicants appealed on points of law. 20.  In a judgment of 30 September 2008, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 17 March 2009, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 21.  The Court of Cassation observed first that, according to the terms of Article 29 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ..., the concept of “family member” extended only to spouses, minor children, adult children who were not self-supporting for health reasons, and dependent relatives who lacked adequate support in their country of origin. It pointed out that as the Constitutional Court had, moreover, ruled out the possibility of extending to cohabiting partners the protection granted to members of a legitimate family, the Constitution did not require an extensive interpretation of Article 29 cited above. 22.  The Court of Cassation also considered that Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention did not require such an interpretation either. In its view, those provisions left a wide margin of appreciation to the States regarding the choice of means of exercising the rights they guaranteed, particularly in the area of immigration control. The Court of Cassation added that there had been no discrimination on grounds of the applicants’ sexual orientation in the present case. It observed in that connection that the non-eligibility of unmarried partners for a residence permit for family reasons applied to opposite-sex couples as well as same-sex partners. 23.  Lastly, it held that European Directive 2004/38/EC ..., which concerned the right of EU citizens to move freely within the territory of the Member States other than their State of origin, did not apply to the present case, which concerned family reunification with an Italian national resident in his own country. 24.  After being notified of the Court of Cassation’s judgment, the applicants left Italy in July 2009. They moved to the Netherlands, where the second applicant was issued with a five-year residence permit on 25 August 2009 as a de facto partner in a long-term relationship with an EU national. 25.  On 8 May 2010 the applicants married in Amsterdam. They stated that they had chosen to marry for personal reasons and not in order to obtain a residence permit, as the Netherlands authorities had already issued one to the second applicant. They added that the marriage contracted in the Netherlands did not allow them to live together in Italy. On 22 August 2014 the second applicant obtained a second five-year residence permit in the Netherlands, valid until 22 August 2019.\n...", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants in each case were affected by decisions of the Russian Federal Penal Authority («Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний», “the FSIN”) on prisoners’ allocation to post-conviction penal facilities. The applicants’ individual circumstances are detailed below. 6.  The application was lodged on 13 June 2009 by Ms Elvira Vasilyevna Polyakova, who was born in 1976 and lives in Vladivostok, Primorskiy Region. She was represented before the Court by Ms L. Ovchinnikova, a lawyer practising in Vladivostok. 7.  The applicant is the live-in partner of Mr R. The couple originally set up home in Vladivostok in the Primorskiy Region. They have a son born in 2003. 8.  On 22 May 2008 Mr R. was convicted of drug-related crimes and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime penal facility. After the conviction became final he was allocated to IK-33 in the Primorskiy Region, close to his family home. 9.  In September 2008 the head of the Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN decided to transfer Mr R. to the Krasnoyarsk Region, some 5,000 kilometres from Vladivostok. It appears that the basis for this decision was a telegram of 18 April 2008 from the deputy head of the FSIN of Russia that read as follows:\n“The Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN are allowed, until special notice, to send up to thirty convicts per month from remand prisons to the care of the Krasnoyarskiy regional department of the FSIN pursuant to Article 73 § 2 of the CES.” 10.  On 30 September 2008 the Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN informed Ms Polyakova that her request for Mr R. to be allowed to remain in the facility in the Primorskiy Region had been refused, and advised the applicant as follows:\n“... pursuant to Article 73 § 2 of the CES and the instruction by the FSIN of Russia, on 14 September 2008 Mr R. was sent to serve the remainder of his sentence in the care of the Krasnoyarskiy regional department of the FSIN. You will be notified of his arrival at a penal facility.” 11.  The applicant challenged the FSIN’s decision before a court, asking for her partner to be transferred back to the Primorskiy Region so that she and their son could afford to visit him. 12.  On 28 October 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Vladivostok examined the applicant’s complaint under Article 258 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) and dismissed it. It found, referring to Article 73 § 2 of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences (“CES”), that strict-regime facilities in the Primorskiy Region were overcrowded and that transfers of a number of detainees to other facilities had been necessary for their own safety, as there could be conflicts among inmates fighting for a sleeping place. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s argument related to her family life as unsubstantiated, stating that she could apply to the FSIN for permission to visit Mr R. in the Krasnoyarsk Region. 13.  On 30 December 2008 the FSIN of Russia dismissed the applicant’s request for Mr R. to be transferred from the penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region to one in the Primorskiy Region, stating that under Article 81 of the CES prisoners should, as a rule, serve the entirety of their sentence in the same penal facility, and that there were no reasons for Mr R.’s transfer. 14.  On 13 January 2009 the Primorskiy Regional Court summarily dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 15.  The applicant and her son visited Mr R. in the penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region on three occasions. 16.  The application was lodged on 6 June 2011 by Ms Natalya Anatolyevna Kibalo, born in 1979, Miss Linda Aliyevna Kibalo, born in 2006, and Miss Iman Aliyevna Kibalo, born in 2009. The applicants live in the village of Dubovskaya in the Shelkovskiy District of the Chechen Republic. They were represented before the Court by lawyers of the Memorial Human Rights Centre. 17.  Ms Natalya Kibalo is the wife of Mr Kh. The couple are the parents of Linda and Iman Kibalo. 18.  On 29 May 2007 the Supreme Court of Dagestan found Mr Kh. guilty of kidnapping, illegal possession of arms, and attempted murder of a law-enforcement officer. Mr Kh. was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime penal facility. The judgment was upheld on appeal. 19.  On an unspecified date the FSIN decided to send Mr Kh. to serve his sentence outside the North Caucasus area. 20.  On 7 February 2008 Mr Kh. arrived at UV14/8, a strict-regime penal facility in the town of Blagoveshchensk in the Amur Region, some 8,000 kilometres from Dubovskaya village. 21.  Ms Natalya Kibalo asked the FSIN to transfer Mr Kh. to a penal facility located closer to their home village, arguing that she had been de facto deprived of the opportunity to visit her husband because it would take her about eight days to travel from her home village to Blagoveshchensk by train, and because the cost of the trip was prohibitive for her as an unemployed mother of two young children. 22.  On 25 May 2009 the head of a department of the FSIN dismissed the first applicant’s request, referring to the lack of grounds for transfer listed in Article 81 of the CES. Ms Natalya Kibalo challenged the refusal before a court. 23.  On 21 August 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow refused to examine Ms Natalya Kibalo’s complaint on the merits, stating that she had no standing to bring a complaint on behalf of her husband. The Moscow City Court quashed that ruling on 14 January 2010 on appeal. 24.  On 17 June 2010 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow held a hearing in the absence of both parties. It examined Ms Natalya Kibalo’s complaint under Articles 254-6 and 258 of the CCP and dismissed it. The District Court observed that Mr Kh. had been allocated to the penal facility in Blagoveshchensk under Article 73 § 4 of the CES, and that under Article 81 of the CES, as a rule, convicts should serve their sentence in the same facility throughout. It reasoned that Mr Kh. had breached prison rules on multiple occasions both in the remand prison and in UV14/8, and that he had been “convicted of terrorist offences in the Dagestan Republic, shows no remorse, and does not undertake to commit no unlawful actions in the future”. The judgment read, in particular, as follows:\n“The claimant’s argument that neither she nor her children could come to visit [Mr A. Kh.] because he is serving his sentence in the Amur Region cannot be taken into consideration, because the possibility of receiving visits is governed by the norms of the CES and is unrelated to the location of a penal facility.” 25.  On 7 December 2010 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 17 June 2010 on appeal. It reasoned that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had not erred in finding that there were no grounds listed in Article 81 of the CES that would warrant Mr Kh.’s transfer to another penal facility, and that “the appeal statement contain[ed] no references to circumstances that would refute the [first-instance] court’s findings and demonstrate that there were grounds for Mr Kh.’s transfer from one facility to another within the meaning of Article 81 of the CES”. 26.  Between 2008 and 2012 Ms Natalya Kibalo visited her husband in Blagoveshchensk on eight occasions. On six of those occasions, between 2008 and 2010, her travel expenses were sponsored. She visited her husband once in 2011 and once in 2012 but could not afford to travel at all in 2013 or 2014. Miss Linda Kibalo accompanied her mother on her trip to visit Mr Kh. once. Miss Iman Kibalo, born during Mr A. Kh.’s detention, has never seen her father. 27.  The application was lodged on 13 July 2013 by Mr Ivan Dhzimsherovich Yeliashvili, who was born in 1979 and lives in Noginsk, the Moscow Region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-8 in Labytnangi, the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented before the Court by Mr V. Shukhardin, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 28.  By a final judgment of 8 September 2009 the Moscow Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime facility. 29.  On 15 September 2009 the FSIN decided to send the applicant to serve his sentence in IK-8 in the settlement of Labytnangi in the Yamalo‑Nenetskiy Region, located about 3,300 kilometres from Noginsk. 30.  The applicant asked the FSIN to transfer him to a facility closer to Noginsk, arguing that his father, brother, sister and nephew all lived in that town and that they would have no realistic opportunity to visit him in Labytnangi. On 21 November 2011 the FSIN dismissed his request, noting that the applicant had been allocated to the penal facility in Labytnangi under Article 73 § 2 of the CES because of the lack of strict-regime penal facilities in the Moscow Region, and that under Article 81 of the CES prisoners should serve their entire sentence in the same penal facility. 31.  The applicant challenged the FSIN’s refusal before a court. On 11 April 2012 the FSIN submitted their objections to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow, which read, in particular, as follows:\n“The claimant’s arguments that he is unable to receive visits from his relatives cannot be taken into account, because the possibility of receiving visits from next of kin and relatives is governed by the norms of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences and is unrelated to the location of any penal facility.” 32.  On 5 June 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant’s complaint under Articles 254-5 and 258 of the CCP, and dismissed it with reference to Articles 73 and 81 of the CES. The judgment read, in so far as relevant, as follows:\n“The claimant’s arguments that it is difficult to receive visits from relatives owing to the remoteness of the [place of] the sentence is being served cannot be taken into account by the court, because the possibility of receiving visits is governed by the norms of the Russian CES and is unrelated to the location of any penal facility.” 33.  On 14 January 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 34.  To date, the applicant’s relatives have not been able to afford to visit him in Labytnangi. 35.  The application was lodged on 6 November 2014 by Mr Vladimir Aleksandrovich Palilov, who was born in 1968 and lives in the Yaroslavl Region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-18 in the settlement of Kharp, the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid. was represented before the Court by Mr E. Markov, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. 36.  On 11 August 2006 the Yaroslavl Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on appeal and became final. 37.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in a special-regime facility for those sentenced to life imprisonment in the village of Kharp in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region, 2,000 kilometres from the Yaroslavl Region. 38.  On 9 January 2013 the applicant asked the FSIN to transfer him to any detention facility located closer to his elderly mother’s and sister’s place of residence. 39.  On 14 February 2013 the FSIN dismissed the request, stating that the applicant had been sent to serve his sentence in a remote penal facility under Article 73 § 4 of the CES, and noting that under Article 81 of the CES a prisoner must serve their entire sentence in the same facility. The applicant challenged the decision before a court. In his statement of claims he requested to be present at court hearings. 40.  On 19 July 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow held a hearing in the applicant’s absence, which was referred to in the judgment as follows: “[t]he applicant was notified of the date of the hearing. He has failed to appear at the court hearing owing to the fact that he is serving a sentence”. The representative of the FSIN was also absent. The District Court examined the complaint pursuant to Articles 254-5 and 258 of the CCP and dismissed it, noting that there were “no grounds listed in Article 81 § 2 of the CES that would preclude Mr Palilov from continuing to serve his sentence in the penal facility in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region”. The applicant’s argument related to the difficulties of maintaining his family ties was rejected as follows:\n“The claimant’s arguments that he cannot receive visits from his relatives does not give grounds for allowing the claims, because the possibility of receiving visits from family members and relatives, receiving correspondence, or using the telephone, are all governed by the norms of the Code on Execution of Sentences and are unrelated to the location of any penal facility.” 41.  The applicant appealed against the judgment and requested that an appeal hearing be held in his presence. 42.  On 4 June 2014 the Moscow City Court held a hearing in the applicant’s absence, which was explained as follows: “under Article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellate collegium deems it possible to examine the case in the absence of the parties to the proceedings; they have been notified of the date and place of the court hearing”. The appellate court upheld the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court’s judgment. Referring to Article 73 § 4 of the CES, it stated that the rule on serving a sentence in a particular region close to a detainee’s permanent residence was inapplicable to the applicant given the nature of the crime of which he had been convicted. The City Court also found that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had correctly interpreted Article 81 § 2 of the CES, reasoning as follows:\n“... there were no medical recommendations that would contain contraindications for Mr Palilov’s serving his sentence in the penal facility in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. Other exceptional circumstances that the law connects with the FSIN’s obligation to grant a claimant’s request to be transferred to another penal facility were not referred to in the appeal statement and cannot be discerned from the circumstances of the case.\nThe argument that Mr Palilov is being deprived of the opportunity to maintain contact with his relatives because of the remoteness of the penal facility cannot serve, in the context of Article 73 § 4 of the CES, as grounds for declaring the actions of the penal authority’s officials unlawful.” 43. The applicant’s mother and sister could not afford to visit him in Kharp. The mother died in 2013.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and until his conviction lived in the town of Slantsy in the Leningrad Region. 7.  In 1991 the applicant sustained a penetrating head injury, which involved the crushing of brain tissue. This trauma caused paralysis of the entire right side of his body, light speech impairment and post-traumatic epilepsy. To reduce the frequency of epileptic seizures the applicant was obliged to take Benzonal. 8.  The following year the applicant was examined by a social security medical assessment board (бюро медико-социальной экспертизы) and certified as having the highest-degree disability on the grounds that he had lost the ability to work, to walk without assistance or to look after himself. Those findings were confirmed by the board during routine re-examinations in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000, when the applicant was granted life-long disability status. 9.  In 2005 the applicant committed a homicide. On 16 April 2007 the Slantsy Town Court found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment in a highly secure correctional colony. On 15 August 2007 the Leningrad Region Court upheld the sentence on appeal. 10.  On 16 April 2007 the applicant was taken to a police ward in the town of Slantsy. 11.  Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-47/6 in St Petersburg. On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor conducted a general medical check-up of the applicant and noted his disability. The applicant was allowed to take Benzonal supplied by his wife in order to minimise his suffering from epileptic seizures. 12.  In the remand prison the applicant was detained in a normal cell block where he allegedly faced great difficulties in his daily routine owing to the lack of special arrangements, in particular when using the squat toilet and shared dormitory shower, which lacked handrails and non-slip flooring. 13.  On 26 September 2007, when the sentence became final, he was transferred to correctional colony no. 7 in the Leningrad Region, where he was also placed in a cell designed for healthy inmates and, allegedly, continued to experience the inconveniences arising from his disability. 14.  Having no licence to treat inmates with as strong a medication as Benzonal, the colony’s medical authorities offered the applicant two substitute drugs with similar anticonvulsive effect, but the latter refused, alleging their low efficiency and possible side effects. 15.  On 3 March 2008, at his own request, the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in St Petersburg (“the prison hospital”) for an in‑depth medical examination and treatment. In the hospital he was subjected to various medical tests which showed that his health was stable. On 1 April 2008 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. In the discharge summary the supervising doctor mentioned that the patient was able to look after himself and to walk without assistance. 16.  On 10 October 2008 the deputy head of the correctional colony ordered the applicant’s transfer to a special unit for disabled prisoners. According to the Government’s description, this unit had “enhanced housing conditions” and “less strict security regime”. It accommodated only disabled inmates, who were detained in a prison wing located close to the medical unit. 17.  The applicant submitted that even after his transfer to the special unit he had not been provided with nursing assistance. Being unable to dress himself or perform hygiene procedures without assistance, he had asked his inmates for help in exchanging valuable prison products such as tea, coffee, sweets and cigarettes. 18.  On 1 July 2009 the special medical board, at the request of the penal authorities, issued an advisory report confirming the gravity of the applicant’s disability. 19.  On 4 August 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical board composed of the prison hospital management and a neurosurgeon. The doctors noted that the applicant’s health had remained stable, that he was able to look after himself, and that nursing assistance was not required for him. However, due to the gravity of the applicant’s brain condition it was decided to check whether his illness fell within the established list of illnesses warranting early release. 20.  Three days later a special medical board confirmed that the applicant’s condition justified his early release. 21.  It appears that the applicant remained in the prison hospital until 8 September 2009. 22.  In the meantime the detention authorities applied for his early release on medical grounds. 23.  On 28 August 2009 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed their application, citing the gravity of the applicant’s offence, the fact that he had developed paralysis and epilepsy prior to his arrest and that in detention his condition had remained stable. The decision was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 17 November 2009. 24.  Between 1 February and 18 March 2010, at his own request, the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital for treatment, and on 16 March 2010 he was re-examined by a medical board, which confirmed his right to early release on medical grounds. 25.  On 10 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 4 in the Leningrad Region. He was accommodated in a special unit for disabled prisoners. It appears that the conditions of his detention were similar to those in correctional colony no. 7. The applicant continued to receive Benzonal from his wife and refused to take any substitutes. 26.  On 10 June 2010 the Tosnenskiy Town Court dismissed the application for early release on medical grounds, referring to the gravity of the applicant’s offence, the fact that his health status had already been taken into account by the court which sentenced him, and, lastly, to the fact that the applicant’s medical condition had not worsened in detention.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Novokuznetsk, the Kemerovo Region. 5.  In the morning of 14 June 2007 policemen came to the applicant’s flat and took him to the police station in Pospelikha village in the Altay Region (“the police station”) for an interview. He was questioned about the circumstances of a theft which had occurred the day before and made self‑incriminating statements. 6.  During the questioning the investigator had to answer a telephone call and stepped out of the office. Left alone, the applicant attempted to walk out but was stopped at the door by a policeman who told him to stay inside and wait. He spent around four hours in the investigator’s office before he was allowed to leave. According to the Government, the applicant came to the police station voluntarily and stayed there for no longer than forty minutes. 7.  On 18 June 2007 the investigators charged the applicant with theft but dropped the charges one month later. 8.  In 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation for unlawful criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty. 9.  On 20 October 2009 the Pospelikhinskiy District Court of the Altay Region examined the case in the applicant’s absence. The court noted that the applicant had been informed about the date and place of the hearing but, as he was serving a term of imprisonment, his presence in person could not be ensured. On the merits, the court held that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the unlawful criminal prosecution. It also considered that the questioning of 14 June 2007 had not amounted to a deprivation of liberty and could not give rise to any form of compensation. The applicant was awarded 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the court award was too low and that it did not take into account the deprivation of liberty. He also requested leave to appear before the appeal court. On 10 February 2009 the Altay Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal in his absence, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. 11.  The judgment of 20 October 2009 was enforced on 5 March 2011. 12.  In 2007 Ms I. brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking to recover a contractual debt. On 5 July 2007 the Justice of the Peace of the Pospelikhinskiy District of the Altay Region examined the case in the applicant’s absence. The judgment indicated that the applicant was serving a term of imprisonment and that he had been informed in a timely way about the date and place of the hearing. The Justice of the Peace granted the claim and ordered the applicant to pay RUB 11,311 to Ms I. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Pospelikhinskiy District Court and sought leave to appear before the appeal court. By an interim decision of 12 September 2007, the District Court refused the applicant leave to appear, finding that the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for escorting detained litigants to courts hearing civil cases. On 10 October 2007 the Pospelikhinskiy District Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the findings of the Justice of the Peace. The applicant received a copy of the appeal judgement in November 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  Details of the applicants are set out in the appendix. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 3 December 2004 the third and fourth applicants filed a request with the Restitution and Compensation Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”), seeking compensation for land expropriated from their legal predecessor in 1946. 8.  Between 17 July and 12 August 2005 the first and second applicants made statements waiving their rights in respect of the property belonging to the same legal predecessor in favour of the third and fourth applicants. 9.  On 28 August 2005 the Commission ruled in favour of the third and fourth applicants. 10.  On 14 October 2005 the Ministry of Finance quashed that decision upon an appeal filed on 19 September 2005 by the Supreme State Prosecutor (Vrhovni državni tužilac) in his capacity as legal representative of the respondent State. 11.  On 17 April 2006 the Commission issued a new decision, awarding compensation to all the applicants as they were all heirs of the legal predecessor. In so doing, it also examined the waiver statements of the first and second applicants made in 2005, but considered that, pursuant to section 40 of the Restitution of Expropriated Property Rights and Compensation Act, such waiver statements could only be validly made in non-contentious proceedings before a competent court (see paragraph 20 below). 12.  Between 12 June 2006 and 27 March 2014 the competent second‑instance administrative body (firstly the Ministry of Finance and later the Appeals Commission) and the Administrative Court, before which the case was first brought on an unspecified date in 2006, issued sixteen decisions in total (eight decisions each). The second-instance body ruled upon a series of appeals and gave decisions within 55 days, 65 days, 30 days, 53 days, 14 days, 78 days, 94 days, and 132 days. The Administrative Court gave rulings within 1 year 8 months and 17 days, 7 months and 22 days, 7 months and 27 days, 3 months and 23 days, 5 months, 5 months and 19 days, 4 months and 16 days, and 4 months and 23 days. 13.  On at least four occasions, when initiating an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court, the applicants explicitly referred to section 37 and/or section 58 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 26 below) and urged the Administrative Court to decide on the merits of their request. The Administrative Court never ruled on the merits of the initial compensation request, but instead quashed or upheld the quashing of the first-instance decision of the Commission. Its last decision was issued on 27 March 2014, in substance remitting the case once again to the Commission. 14.  On 27 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the Administrative Court’s decision. The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicants on 8 July 2014. 15.  On 25 July 2014 the applicants each lodged a constitutional appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court, relying on, inter alia, Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Government submitted that, on the same day, in addition to those constitutional appeals against the Supreme Court’s decision, the applicants had also each lodged a second constitutional appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court of 27 March 2014. No copies of those second constitutional appeals were provided by either party. 16.  On 28 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional appeals against the Supreme Court’s decision as premature, given that the Commission was still considering their compensation request. 17.  On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court issued another decision dismissing the applicants’ constitutional appeals. The decision stated that the applicants’ constitutional appeals had been filed against the judgments of the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. In its ruling, the Constitutional Court constantly referred to the “impugned judgments”. There is no information in the case file as to when that decision was served on the applicants. 18.  On 31 March 2016, at a hearing before the Commission, the proceedings were adjourned at the applicants’ request until this Court ruled on their applications.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 6.  On 23 December 2011 the applicants, political activists, participated in a demonstration organised by the political party “Politics Can Be Different’” (Lehet Más a Politika). The demonstrators blocked the entrance of a car park adjacent to the Parliament building by chaining themselves to each other and to concrete columns situated next to the entrance. 7.  Following the incident the Budapest main police department opened criminal investigations against twenty-nine persons, including the applicants, on charges of violation of personal liberty under Article 175(1) of Act no. IV on the [old] Criminal Code. 8.  On 9 March 2012 Parliament enacted Act no. XII of 2012 (“the Amnesty Act”) (see paragraph 12 below), which entered into force on 10 March 2012. 9.  On 29 March 2012 the Budapest main police department discontinued the criminal investigation against the twenty-nine suspects, pursuant to Article 190 §§ 1 (e) and 2 of the Code on Criminal Procedure on the grounds that they had been granted amnesty. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 10.  On 6 September 2012 six of the applicants, Ms Bende, Ms Kalocsai, Ms Ámon, Ms Székelyné Rákosi, Mr Moldován and Mr Gajárszki, lodged a constitutional complaint requesting the Constitutional Court to declare sections 1, 2 and 4 of the Amnesty Act unconstitutional as infringing the right to their reputation and the principle of presumption of innocence. 11.  The Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It reasoned that the complaint did not raise any constitutional-law issues of “fundamental importance”, since it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the language employed by the Act could not be interpreted as establishing that the applicants had indeed committed the offence. In any event, the complaint was time-barred since it had been lodged outside the statutory 180 days’ time-limit following the entry into force of the legislation.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicants are a mother and child born in 1990 and 2012 respectively. 8.  On 16 January 2012 the first applicant, who was in the fifth month of pregnancy, was detained by the police on suspicion of robbery. 9.  On 26 January 2012 the Dzerzhynskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the Dzerzhynskyy Court”) ordered her pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. 10.  On the same date she was placed in the Kharkiv SIZO. 11.  On 22 May 2012 the first applicant was taken to Kharkiv Maternity Hospital no. 7 (“the maternity hospital”). 12.  On the same date she gave birth to the second applicant. He measured 49 cm and weighed 2.9 kg. 13.  Three female security officers guarded the first applicant in the hospital. According to her, they stayed on the ward at all times. The Government submitted that they had left the ward during the delivery. 14.  The first applicant alleged she had been continuously shackled to her hospital bed or to a gynaecological examination chair, the only exception being during the delivery when the shackles had been removed. It is not clear from her submissions exactly how she had been shackled; on one occasion, she submitted that after the delivery she had had her foot shackled to the bed. At the same time, she submitted that the guards had only removed the shackles from her wrists for breastfeeding. 15.  According to the Government, the first applicant was never handcuffed or shackled in the maternity hospital. 16.  On 25 May 2012 the applicants were discharged. 17.  On 12 November 2012 the first applicant wrote in a statement for the SIZO administration (see paragraphs 41 and 76) that the maternity hospital staff had treated her well, that she had not been handcuffed or shackled, and that the two female security officers who had been on her ward had been helping her take care of the baby. 18.  In December 2012 and January 2013 the prosecution authorities questioned some maternity hospital staff and the security officers who had guarded the first applicant with a view to verifying her allegations, particularly as regards her shackling (see also paragraphs 76-82 below). 19.  On 21 December 2012 the chief doctor of the maternity hospital wrote to the governor of the Kharkiv SIZO, in reply to an enquiry by the latter, to say that during her stay in the maternity hospital the first applicant had been guarded by SIZO officers at all times, that the officers in question had not been on the delivery ward, and that the first applicant had not been handcuffed or shackled during the delivery. 20.  On 24 December 2012 the chief obstetrician, Ms Ti., gave a written statement to the prosecution authorities. She submitted that the first applicant had been shackled by the wrists to the gynaecological examination chair during her examinations both in the admissions unit and later in the obstetric unit, and that it was usual practice for detainees to be shackled and guarded by three guards. 21.  Two other obstetricians, Ms F. and Ms S., and a nurse, Ms To., made similar statements. Ms F. submitted that she could not remember any details regarding the second applicant’s delivery. Ms To. specified that the first applicant had not been shackled during the delivery or subsequently during breastfeeding. 22.  The chief doctor of the neonatal unit Ms Vl. also submitted that the first applicant had been shackled to a gynaecological examination chair. Furthermore, she indicated that two guards had been staying on the ward near the applicants, with a third near the door. 23.  The security officers who had guarded the first applicant denied that she had been handcuffed or shackled in hospital. 24.  The applicant’s lawyer enquired with a former nurse, Ms P., about the conditions faced by women in detention during delivery, with reference to her related work experience. On 7 February 2013 Ms P. wrote to him indicating that she had indeed worked as a nurse at Donetsk Regional Childcare and Maternal Health Centre from 1996 to 2005, and that in 2004 or 2005 a detained woman had been shackled to her bed during her baby’s delivery there. 25.  While the first applicant was held in several different cells in the SIZO, her application form referred only to the conditions of her detention with her baby in cell no. 408, in which she had been held from 14 March to 8 November 2012. The summary of facts below therefore only concerns that cell.\n(a)  The first applicant’s account 26.  The cell, situated in a semi-basement, was cold and damp. There was no hot water and only an irregular supply of cold water. The first applicant therefore rarely had the opportunity to take a shower and bath her new-born son. She also had to store cold water in plastic bottles for her own use. She boiled water on a defective electric cooker in a kettle, which she had to borrow from the administration and which was provided to her for no longer than fifteen minutes each time. The toilet and shower were in a niche not separated from the living area. The toilet was often blocked. There was no baby changing table or cot in the cell. 27.  The first applicant was not provided with any baby hygiene products. Nor did she receive nutrition suitable to her needs. On the days of court hearings her only meal was breakfast, which consisted of bread and tea. No packed lunches were provided to her. 28.  The applicants were able to have outdoor walks of about ten minutes per day, but not every day, in a communal walking area. 29.  Lastly, one of the inmates she shared with was HIV positive.\n(b)  The Government’s account 30.  Cell no. 408 was a high-comfort cell designed for pregnant women and women with children. It was located on the ground floor, measured fifty-two square metres and could accommodate up to six people. The first applicant shared it with two or sometimes three inmates. 31.  The cell had three windows measuring over eight square metres in total. There was hot and cold water, as well as a drinking water cooler with a capacity of ten litres. 32.  Furthermore, there were all the necessary furniture and facilities such as air conditioning, a refrigerator, an electric stove, a baby cot and a pram. There was also a supply of nappies and hygiene products. The toilet and shower were separated from the living area. 33.  The first applicant was provided with adequate nutrition in accordance with the applicable standards (the total energy value of her daily meals being 3,284 kilocalories). She received three hot meals per day with the exception of hearing days, when she missed lunch. She breastfed her son and refused the baby food provided by the SIZO. There were no restrictions on food or other parcels she received from her relatives. 34.  The applicants had a daily two-hour walk in a specially designated area. 35.  They never shared a cell with inmates with HIV. 36.  The Government provided four colour photographs of cell no. 408, showing a spacious and light room in a visually good state of repair. There were three large windows with sheer curtains. The cell had a washbasin. There was also a lavatory with a bidet and a shower cubicle, both separated from the living area by opaque glass doors. Also on the photographs were a wardrobe, two beds with bedside cabinets, a cot, a table with two stools, a baby stool, a shelf with some tableware, a microwave, a television and a baby changing table. 37.  Another photograph showed a walking area for detained mothers with babies, with a flowerbed and a wall with a nature mural. The first applicant and her baby were on the photograph, as well as another woman with a pram.\n(c)  Other detainees’ accounts and relevant information 38.  On 1 and 2 February 2012 the local sanitary and epidemiological service inspected the SIZO in the context of an unspecified investigation. It observed that there was a special cell for women with babies, with all the essential amenities. It was noted in the report that there had been no pregnant inmates or inmates with babies in the SIZO at the time of the inspection. 39.  On 24 May 2012 the sanitary and epidemiological service also inspected the drinking water in the SIZO to check that it complied with the relevant standards. No irregularities were found. 40.  On 22 October 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the Agent of the Government that there had been no complaints from the first applicant regarding the conditions of detention or the second applicant’s medical care in the SIZO. 41.  On 12 November 2012 the first applicant wrote a statement giving a detailed description of her cell in the SIZO similar to that submitted by the Government (see paragraphs 30-37 above). The last paragraph also concerned her stay in the maternity hospital (see paragraph 17 above). 42.  On 13 November 2012 one of the SIZO staff wrote to the State Prisons Service to say that the first applicant’s statement had been made freely. 43.  During her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO the first applicant received about thirty food parcels from her mother, often with basic foodstuffs such as bread, butter, tea, sugar and milk. 44.  The first applicant lodged numerous requests for release with the trial court dealing with her criminal case, subject to an undertaking not to abscond (dated 6 July, 6, 26 and 31 August, 3 September and 9 October 2012). She alleged, in particular, that the conditions in the SIZO were not adequate for her baby. The court rejected those requests. 45.  The applicants’ case received some media coverage. For example, in November 2012 the article “Baby as a victim of inhuman treatment” was published online by the Kharkiv Human Rights Group. In December 2012 a television programme was broadcast, in which the first applicant and the State authorities gave accounts, particularly as regards the conditions of the applicants’ detention in the SIZO. The parties did not submit to the Court a copy of the relevant article or video footage or a transcript of the television programme. 46.  On 12 December 2012 one of the detainees, Ms B., wrote a statement addressed to the head of the local department of the State Prisons Service. She submitted that in November 2012 she had been held in the same cell as the first applicant and had been satisfied with the conditions of detention there. It was noted in the statement that there had been large windows in the cell, a shower cubicle with hot and cold water and all the necessary furniture and appliances, including a refrigerator and a television. 47.  On 19 December 2012 the Kharkiv Regional Department of the State Prisons Service issued a memorandum stating that the first applicant had not submitted any complaints during her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO. 48.  The case file contains three statements by detainee Ms M. concerning the conditions of detention in the SIZO. She wrote two of them while detained there (on an unspecified date and on 25 December 2012), and a third on 30 January 2013 when she had already begun serving her prison sentence elsewhere. In the first two statements Ms M. described the conditions of her detention in cell no. 408 as quite satisfactory and comfortable. Her account was similar to that given by the Government (see paragraphs 30-32 above). The first two statements also contained critical remarks regarding the first applicant claiming, in particular, that she had displayed a careless attitude towards her baby and had acted in bad faith in applying to the Court. In her third statement, Ms M. stated that the food in the SIZO had been poor. More specifically, the bread had been stale and the meat had been tinged blue. She also submitted that there had been no hot water in cell no. 408. Lastly, she submitted that on two occasions she had witnessed the first applicant requesting medical care for her baby when he had had stomachache, but her requests had been ignored. 49.  On 28 December 2012 a former detainee, Ms Sa., wrote a statement for the first applicant’s lawyer and had it certified by a notary. She stated that she had shared cell no. 408 with the first applicant from an unspecified date in March to 19 April 2012. Ms Sa. had been pregnant at the time. She described the conditions of their detention as follows. The cell was located in a semi-basement and inmates saw practically no daylight. The windows were so high that they could not be opened without the assistance of a guard. There were about seven inmates in the cell, some of them with HIV and some suffering from other illnesses. The toilet was separated from the living area by a waist-high wall and leaked. As a result, there was always a bad smell. The shower also leaked and the cubicle door was broken. It was so humid in the cell that the plaster had fallen off the ceiling and the walls were covered in mould. The cell was infested with mice and lice. There were no household appliances like a kettle or microwave. Nor were there any beds or bedside cabinets as shown by the State Prisons Service on television (see paragraph 45 above). Ms Sa. specified that in fact none of the detainees had ever been held in the cell presented by the authorities on television. There was no hot water and the pressure in the cold water taps was so low that inmates had to store water for their own use. Furthermore, the SIZO administration did not provide them with any tableware. Their daily walk lasted only twenty minutes and took place in a small walking area covered with bars. Furthermore, according to Ms Sa., the food in the SIZO was neither fresh nor tasty. Lastly, she stated that she had been shackled to her bed when undergoing some treatment in the maternity hospital in Kharkiv while pregnant. 50.  On an unspecified date Ms Ve., who had also shared cell no. 408 with the first applicant (the exact period is unknown), wrote a statement about the conditions of detention there. Her description was similar to that given by Ms Sa. as regards the leaking toilet, high humidity levels, lack of hot water and irregular supply of cold water, as well as the duration and conditions of the daily outdoor walks and poor nutrition. 51.  On 25 May 2012 the applicants were discharged from the maternity hospital. The second applicant was found to be in good health. 52.  According to a letter from its chief doctor to the first applicant’s lawyer dated 12 December 2012, on 25 May 2012 the second applicant was transferred to Children’s Hospital no. 19 (“the children’s hospital”). All the other relevant documents in the case file indicate that on 25 May 2012 both applicants were taken to the Kharkiv SIZO. 53.  As submitted by the first applicant and noted in a letter by the chief doctor of the children’s hospital to the first applicant’s lawyer dated 6 September 2012, a paediatrician from that hospital had examined the second applicant on 28 May 2012. The baby was found to be in good health but to have phimosis (a condition of the penis where the foreskin cannot be fully retracted). 54.  However, according to the second applicant’s medical file kept by the SIZO, the first time a paediatrician of the children’s hospital examined him was on 31 May 2012. He was found to be in an adaptation period and the first applicant received advice regarding childcare. 55.  According to the second applicant’s medical file, on 12 June 2012 he was examined again by a paediatrician, who diagnosed him with intestinal colic and recommended Espumisan, massage, feeding on demand and outdoor walks. The doctor also suspected that the boy had a patent (open) foramen ovale (PFO; the foramen ovale allows blood circulation in the fetal heart and closes in most individuals at birth). 56.  The second applicant’s next medical examination appears to have taken place on 20 July 2012. It was noted in his medical file that the paediatrician had given advice to the first applicant regarding feeding and care. 57.  The first applicant denied that any of the examinations following that on 28 May 2012 had taken place. She alleged that her baby had not been examined by a paediatrician until 10 September 2012. She submitted that the records of her son’s earlier examinations in the medical file had been forged. According to her, the first page of that book referred to an examination on 10 September 2012, whereas the records of his earlier examinations had been written on separate pages and subsequently glued into the file. The case file as it stands before the Court contains a separate copy of each page of the file, which makes it impossible to verify the first applicant’s allegation. 58.  On 28 August 2012 the first applicant’s lawyer asked the Kharkiv SIZO administration to provide him with details of when the second applicant had been examined by a paediatrician and whether the conditions of detention had been appropriate for such a small baby. He also requested copies of the relevant documents. 59.  On 4 September 2012 the SIZO administration replied that it would be able to provide comprehensive information on the second applicant’s health after a complete medical examination in the children’s hospital, which was due to take place. 60.  On 31 August 2012 the first applicant asked the judge dealing with her case to order a medical examination of her son “given that the SIZO administration [was] ignoring her requests to that effect”. It appears that her request was rejected. 61.  On 6 September 2012 the chief doctor of the children’s hospital wrote to the first applicant’s lawyer in reply to an enquiry by him dated 5 September 2012. He said that with no paediatrician at the Kharkiv SIZO, a paediatrician from that hospital monitored babies born there. He also indicated that the second applicant had been examined by the hospital paediatrician on 28 May 2012 (see also paragraph 53 above). In so far as the lawyer enquired about the baby’s medical condition at the material time, the chief doctor stated that it was impossible to provide him with such information because the first applicant had not requested any medical care for him until then. 62.  On 10 September 2012 a dermatologist, cardiologist, ear, nose and throat specialist, neurologist and paediatrician all examined the second applicant. He was found to have allergic dermatitis, dysplastic cardiomyopathy and phimosis. Furthermore, the patent foramen ovale diagnosis had been called into question (see paragraph 55 above). The doctors concluded that the second applicant did not require any medical treatment, but recommended that the mother follow a hypoallergenic diet. 63.  According to the first applicant, the examination was carried out in the context of custody proceedings initiated by the second applicant’s stepfather. She specified that it had been done with her consent so that the second applicant could be taken from the SIZO, where he was not receiving adequate care. 64.  On 14 September 2012 the SIZO sent a copy of the second applicant’s medical file to the applicants’ representative, further to a request made by him on 28 August 2012 (see paragraph 58 above). 65.  On 18 October 2012 the chief doctor of the children’s hospital wrote to the first applicant’s lawyer, in reply to an enquiry made on 10 October 2012, to say that hospital was in charge of the medical supervision of children in the Kharkiv SIZO where needed, subject to the SIZO administration making the relevant application. It was also noted that the second applicant required an additional examination in the regional cardiology centre, and that the children’s hospital had already requested the SIZO administration’s cooperation in that regard. 66.  On 19 October 2012 a paediatrician and a cardiologist examined the second applicant again. He was diagnosed with a patent foramen ovale (a heart condition, see paragraph 55 above for further details) and an additional examination was recommended. 67.  On the same date the second applicant underwent an echocardiogram and was found to be healthy. 68.  On 14 November 2012 the first applicant refused to allow her son to undergo a paediatrician examination, which she had been offered. 69.  The following day the first applicant was released (see also paragraph 75 below). 70.  On 30 November 2012 the first applicant’s lawyer enquired with the children’s hospital whether it had kept a medical file in respect of the second applicant and whether he had been vaccinated during his stay with the first applicant in the SIZO. 71.  On 4 December 2012 the chief doctor replied that the children’s hospital provided medical care to children residing permanently in its catchment area. As regards children residing there temporarily, a written application by one of the parents was required. The first applicant had never submitted such an application. Accordingly, the hospital had not opened a medical file in respect of the second applicant. At the same time, its doctors had examined him when requested by the SIZO administration. The results of each examination had been reflected in the medical file provided by the SIZO. In so far as the second applicant’s vaccinations were concerned, it was noted that he had always been brought for examinations without his mother, and without her consent no vaccinations had been given. 72.  On 12 April, 17 May, 15 June, 2 and 31 August and 15 November 2012 the first applicant participated in court hearings, during which she was held in a metal cage. Her requests not to be placed in a cage were rejected. 73.  On 14 March 2013 the judge of the Dzerzhynskyy Court, who had been in charge of the first applicant’s case, wrote to the Agent of the Government, in reply to the latter’s request, to say that the first applicant had indeed been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings. The judge emphasised that it was a legal requirement to place criminal defendants in a metal cage and there were no exceptions to this rule. Furthermore, he considered that allowing the first applicant to remain outside the cage in the courtroom would have been equal to her temporary release, contrary to the custodial preventive measure applied. 74.  On 15 March 2013 the Ministry of the Interior confirmed once again to the Agent of the Government that the first applicant had been held in a metal cage in the courtroom during hearings. It further specified that the second applicant had remained with the SIZO medical specialist outside the cage and had been passed to her for breastfeeding when requested. 75.  On 15 November 2012 the first applicant was released on an undertaking not to abscond. 76.  On 25 December 2012 she complained to the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office that she had been shackled to her bed in the maternity hospital at all times, including during the delivery. She also complained that the conditions of detention and nutrition in the SIZO had been inadequate. Lastly, the first applicant alleged that the statement she had written on 12 November 2012 expressing her satisfaction with the conditions of detention had been made under psychological pressure (see paragraphs 17 and 41 above). 77.  On 27 December 2012 the State Prisons Service completed the internal investigation it had undertaken following the media coverage of the applicants’ case (see paragraph 45 above). The first applicant’s allegations were dismissed as unsubstantiated. 78.  On 2 January 2013 the first applicant complained to the Kharkiv Zhovtnevyy District Prosecutor’s Office (“the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor’s Office”) that she had not been provided with adequate medical care during her pregnancy and the delivery; that she had been shackled by her wrists and feet to a gynaecological examination chair or her bed in the maternity hospital at all times, including during the delivery; that the conditions of her detention in the Kharkiv SIZO had been poor; and that neither she nor her baby had received adequate medical care there. On the same date her complaint was registered in the Integrated Register of Pre-trial Investigations and the investigation was started. 79.  On 18 January 2013 the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor’s Office ordered a forensic medical examination of the case material with a view to establishing: (i) whether the first applicant had any injuries and, if so, how they had been caused; (ii) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the first applicant had been handcuffed or shackled between 26 January and 15 November 2012; (iii) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the Kharkiv SIZO; (iv) whether there was any forensic medical evidence that the applicants had not been provided with adequate or sufficient medical care in the maternity hospital; and (v) if the applicants had not received adequate or sufficient medical care, whether this had had any negative impact on their health. 80.  The aforementioned examination continued from 18 January to 26 March 2013. The answers in the report to all five questions were negative. 81.  On 1 April 2013 the Zhovtnevyy Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation for lack of evidence of a criminal offence. 82.  Also in April 2013 the State Prisons Service, following an enquiry by the Government’s Agent, undertook an internal investigation as regards the lawfulness of the second applicant’s detention in the SIZO. On 22 April 2013 it was completed, with the conclusion that there had been no violation. It was noted in the report that, although in August 2012 the first applicant had verbally expressed her intention to transfer the custody of her baby to her mother, she had later changed her mind as she had been breastfeeding.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, are similar to those in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011). They have the same historical context and relate to the same domestic criminal proceedings. 6.  Between 17 and 28 December 1989, many people, including the applicants and the close relatives involved in this case, took part in anti‑communist demonstrations in Bucharest, Timișoara, Slobozia, Vișina and Țăndărei, which led to the fall of the communist regime. They were injured or killed by gunfire during the demonstrations, which took place on 17 December 1989 in Timișoara, and in Bucharest and other cities across the country from 21 to 28 December 1989. 7.  In 1990, following the overthrow of the communist regime, the military prosecutor’s office opened a criminal investigation into the December 1989 armed crackdown on the anti-communist demonstrations in Bucharest and the other cities. 8.  In a number of cases concerning the events in Timișoara, the investigations culminated in referral to the courts and the conviction of senior military officers (see Şandru and Others v. Romania, no. 22465/03, §§ 6-47, 8 December 2009). 9.  As regards the events in other cities, the criminal investigation is still pending before the prosecuting authorities. The most important procedural steps were summarised in Association “21 December 1989” and Others (cited above, §§ 12-41). Subsequent developments in the investigation are as follows. 10.  On 18 October 2010, the military prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided not to institute criminal proceedings with regard to the acts committed by the military, finding that the applicants’ complaints were partly statute-barred and partly ill-founded. The investigation into crimes committed by civilians, members of Patriotic Guards, members of militia and prison staff was severed from the case file and jurisdiction was relinquished in favour of the prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 11.  On 15 April 2011 the chief prosecutor at the military prosecutor’s office set aside the decision of 18 October 2010 on the grounds that the investigation had not yet been finalised and that not all the victims and perpetrators had been identified. 12.  On 18 April 2011 the military prosecutor’s office relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice on the grounds that the investigation concerned both civilians and military personnel. 13.  On 9 March 2012 - following the opening of the classified information in the criminal investigation file to the public in 2010 - the case was re-registered with a view to an investigation in the light of the newly available data. 14.  Following the entry into force of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in February 2014, jurisdiction over the case was relinquished in favour of the military prosecutor’s office. 15.  On 14 October 2015, the prosecutor’s office closed the investigation, finding that the applicants’ complaints were partly statute-barred, partly subject to an amnesty and partly ill-founded. It also found that some of the facts which had been investigated could not be classified as criminal offences; and that some of the facts were res judicata. The parties have not submitted any information on whether there was an appeal against that decision.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Dębowa Kłoda. 6.  In 1997 the applicant married R. In 2004 R. underwent infertility treatment so she could conceive a child with him. 7.  In autumn 2004 the applicant met A.H. In January 2005 he moved out of the flat he had lived in with R. 8.  On 31 October 2005 A.H. gave birth to their daughter, M. 9.  On 25 September 2006 the applicant filed a petition for divorce. At first he requested a no-fault divorce. In his petition the applicant referred to various marital misunderstandings and quarrels for which he blamed the respondent. He admitted that he had moved out of the matrimonial home, but did not mention his involvement with a new partner. 10.  At a hearing held on 15 November 2006 the applicant refused to undergo the mediation process provided for by divorce law. R. did not agree to a divorce, declared that she loved the applicant and asked the court to dismiss the divorce petition. 11.  Subsequently, the applicant requested a divorce on fault‑based grounds. 12.  During the proceedings thirteen witnesses were heard. Most of them were of the opinion that the marriage seemed happy until autumn 2004. Only the applicant’s mother, his two colleagues and his cousin recalled minor arguments between the spouses. 13.  During the final hearing on 9 February 2009 the respondent reiterated her refusal to divorce. 14.  On 17 February 2009 the Lublin Regional Court refused to grant the divorce to the applicant. The court held that he was the only person responsible for the breakdown of his marriage because he had failed to respect the obligation of fidelity. The court did not find it credible that problems had already begun within the first year of the marriage. It observed that until 2004 the applicant had not wanted children. In that year he had changed his mind. For that reason R. had undergone surgery, the operation having taken place in August 2004. 15.  The marital situation had subsequently changed when the applicant had met A.H. He had no longer wished to have a child with his wife. The court noted contradictions between the testimony given by the applicant, who had referred to the alleged serious problems in marital life prior to 2004 on the one hand, and the decision to treat R.’s infertility in summer 2004 on the other. The respondent had been shocked by the applicant’s unfaithfulness and had been treated for depression since autumn 2004. 16.  The court acknowledged that there had indeed been “a complete and irretrievable marriage breakdown” within the meaning of Article 56 § 1 of the Family and Guardianship Code. Reconciliation was unlikely as the applicant had consistently rejected all attempts made by R. to reconcile their differences. Moreover, he had been in a relationship with A.H. for almost four years and had a child with her. 17.  The court emphasised that under Article 56 § 3 of the Family and Guardianship Code, a divorce could not be granted if it had been requested by the party whose fault it was that the marriage had broken down, if the other party refused to consent and the refusal of the innocent party was not “contrary to the reasonable principles of social coexistence” (zasady współżycia społecznego) within the meaning of Article 5 of the Civil Code. 18.  The court considered that R.’s refusal to divorce should be presumed to be compatible with those universally accepted principles. It referred to the case-law of the Supreme Court to the effect that a refusal of consent to a divorce was to be presumed to be compliant with those principles unless there were case-specific indications to the contrary. There was no indication that when refusing to give her consent R. had acted out of hatred, was motivated by vengeance, or simply wanted to vex the applicant. The court emphasised that she had repeatedly stated during the proceedings that she was ready to reconcile with him despite the fact that he had a child with another woman. 19.  The court stressed that the duration of the applicant’s new relationship could not by itself be considered to be a sufficient reason for granting the divorce. 20.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He argued, inter alia, that the court had erred in holding that a spouse’s refusal to consent to a divorce could be disregarded only when it was of an abusive nature or was dictated by hostility towards the spouse seeking the divorce. The court should have examined the negative social consequences caused by continuing the formal existence of failed marriages. In his case, it had failed to do so. 21.  On 16 June 2009 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 22.  The applicant did not request to be served with the written grounds for the appellate judgment. The grounds were therefore not prepared. 23.  The judgment was final, a cassation appeal against a divorce judgment not being available in law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Nizhyn in the Chernihiv Region. 6.  On 1 May 2010 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody pending the outcome of the investigation and trial. 7.  On 30 April 2013 the Alchevsk Court of the Luhansk Region convicted the applicant and his four co-defendants of armed robbery committed in an organised group, banditry and illegal possession of firearms in connection with a series of armed attacks committed in the Perevalsk District of the Luhansk Region. The court sentenced the applicant to eight years and nine months’ imprisonment, to be counted from 1 May 2010 (the date on which he had been arrested), and to confiscation of his property. It ordered that the applicant remain in detention pending appeal. 8.  On 14 May 2013 the applicant’s sister, acting in the capacity of his lay defender, appealed against the judgment to the Luhansk Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). Other parties lodged appeals as well. 9.  From the beginning of April 2014, armed groups started to seize official buildings in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and announced the creation of self-proclaimed entities known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” and the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (“DPR” and “LPR”). 10.  In response, on 14 April 2014 the Ukrainian Government, who consider those armed groups to be terrorist organisations, authorised the use of force against them in the legal form of an “anti-terrorist operation”. 11.  As a result of extensive military action, between May and August 2015 the Ukrainian Government forces recaptured some territory in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, but certain parts of the regions have remained outside of the Government’s control since that time. The parts of the Luhansk Region not under the Government’s control include the Perevalsk District, where the offences for which the applicant was convicted were committed, Alchevsk, where the applicant was tried and convicted, and Luhansk, where the Court of Appeal was located. 12.  A ceasefire was agreed upon within the framework of the Tripartite Contact Group composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (hereinafter, “the OSCE”). An obligation to uphold the ceasefire and to withdraw heavy weaponry from the contact line was enshrined in the Minsk Agreements and the Package of Measures for their Implementation of September 2014 and February 2015 respectively. However, numerous violations of the ceasefire have continued to occur ever since. 13.  At the time the events of spring and summer 2014 were unfolding, the applicant was detained in Starobilsk remand prison, located in the part of the Luhansk Region that has remained under the control of the Ukrainian Government. He remained in that prison until his release (see paragraph 30 below). 14.  On 6 June 2014 the Court of Appeal, which was still sitting in Luhansk, failed to hear the applicant’s case because the applicant could not attend the hearing on account of the armed conflict. A hearing by video conference was scheduled for 8 August 2014, but it did not take place because as from 1 August 2014 the electricity and water supply and telephone communications were cut off at the Court of Appeal’s building in Luhansk. At some point around that time, the judges of the court moved to the Government-controlled territory. The case files, however, remained at the court’s building in Luhansk. 15.  On 2 September 2014 the President of the High Civil and Criminal Court, acting under the Law of 12 August 2014 (see paragraph 44 below), reassigned jurisdiction over cases which would normally have fallen within the jurisdiction of the Alchevsk Court to the Lysychansk Court of the Luhansk Region (“the Lysychansk Court”), located in the Government‑controlled area. 16.  On 12 November 2014 the President of Ukraine issued a decree defining Sieverodonetsk in the Luhansk Region, also located in the Government-controlled area, as the seat of the Court of Appeal instead of Luhansk. 17.  On 25 February 2015 the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal about the delay in the examination of his appeal. 18.  On 3 March 2015 the applicant lodged a similar complaint with the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights. 19.  On 27 March 2015 the Court of Appeal informed the applicant that his criminal case file was in Luhansk, which was not under the Government’s control, and that this prevented the court from examining his case. In order to resolve the problem, amendments would have to be made to the relevant legislation. 20.  On 30 March 2015 the Parliamentary Commissioner’s office responded that there was no way to obtain case files from the territory that was not under the Government’s control, but that the Commissioner was working with the courts, the prosecutor’s office and other authorities to find a way to resolve the problem. 21.  In response to another complaint from the applicant, on 19 May 2015 the Court of Appeal informed him that it was unable to apprise him of the state of proceedings in his case because his criminal case file was in the court archives in Luhansk, to which there was no access. 22.  On 21 May 2015 the Parliament of Ukraine (Verkhovna Rada) adopted a declaration which read, insofar as relevant, as follows:\n“I. Derogation from Obligations\n... 2. In view of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine involving both the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and illegal armed groups guided, controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, since April 2014 an anti-terrorist operation has been conducted by the units of the Security Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine and the Armed Forces of Ukraine in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts) of Ukraine. The anti-terrorist operation is part of Ukraine’s inalienable right to individual self-defense against aggression under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Russian Federation, which has occupied and is exercising control over certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, is fully responsible for respect for and protection of human rights in these territories under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 3. The Russian Federation’s ongoing armed aggression against Ukraine, together with war crimes and crimes against humanity committed both by the regular Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and by illegal armed groups guided, controlled and financed by the Russian Federation, constitutes ‘a public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ in the sense of ... Article 15 § 1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 4. In order to safeguard the vital interests of society and the State in response to the armed aggression of the Russian Federation, the Parliament of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and other authorities have to adopt decisions which constitute a derogation from certain obligations on the part of Ukraine under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.\n... 7. On 12 August 2014, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted the Law on Administration of Justice and Criminal Proceedings in connection with the Anti‑terrorist Operation. The Law changed, for the duration of the anti-terrorist operation, the territorial jurisdiction over cases amenable to the courts located in the anti-terrorist operation area and, concerning the situations where it is impossible to conduct a pre-trial investigation in that area, investigative jurisdiction over criminal offences perpetrated there. The application of this law makes it necessary for Ukraine to derogate from certain of its obligations under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, the courts and pre-trial investigation bodies are not currently functioning in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions because of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation and the actions of terrorist groups backed by the Russian Federation. That is why Ukraine has had to change the territorial jurisdiction of the courts and investigative jurisdiction in respect of criminal offences in conditions where the life of the nation is threatened.\n...” 23.  On 5 June 2015 the Permanent Representation of Ukraine to the Council of Europe transmitted to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe a note verbale containing the text of the above declaration and its translation. 24.  On 15 June 2015 the applicant applied to the Lysychansk Court for restoration of the lost case file (відновлення матеріалів втраченого провадження). 25.  On 22 June 2015 the Lysychansk Court held a hearing in the presence of a prosecutor but in the applicant’s absence. The prosecutor stated that the case file in question was not in the area of the Luhansk Region controlled by the Ukrainian Government and that it was therefore not possible to furnish the court with any of the material therein. The court found that there was insufficient material available to restore the file. It discontinued the examination of the application, reminding the parties that if sufficient material was provided, the question of restoration could be re‑examined. 26.  On 22 October 2015 the Court of Appeal again informed the applicant that examination of his case required amendments to the legislation. In this context, it referred to draft law no. 2930 (see paragraph 47 below). 27.  On five occasions between May 2015 and February 2016 the applicant applied for release, arguing that his detention was unlawful because his conviction was not final and “would never become final”. 28.  The Starobilsk Court of the Luhansk Region rejected the applicant’s applications for release, finding that, contrary to his submissions, there were sufficient legal grounds for continuing to detain him, since he had been convicted and his case was pending before the Court of Appeal. The most recent of those decisions was taken on 25 February 2016. No appeal lay against them. 29.  On 30 December 2016 the applicant applied to the Court of Appeal for release under the Law of 26 November 2015 (see paragraph 46 below). 30.  On 18 March 2016 the Lysychansk Court released the applicant. It considered that, as he had been held in pre‑trial detention since 1 May 2010, under the Law of 26 November 2015 he could be deemed to have already served his sentence. 31.  The regional prosecutor’s office appealed, arguing that the applicant’s conviction had not become final because his domestic case file had remained inaccessible in a non-Government-controlled area and appeals against his conviction were still pending before the Court of Appeal. According to the prosecutor’s office, only convicted persons whose convictions had become final could benefit from the application of the new legislation. By contrast, those whose convictions were not final could be released only once the period for which they had been detained had exceeded half of the maximum sentence for the offence of which they stood accused. Since the applicant was accused of offences, in particular banditry and aggravated robbery, the maximum punishment for which was fifteen years’ imprisonment (see paragraph 41 below), and he had served much less than half of that term, he could not be released. 32.  On 24 May 2016 the Court of Appeal upheld the Lysychansk Court’s ruling of 18 March 2016 (see paragraph 30 above). 33.  Following communication of the case to the respondent Government, on 11 August 2016 the regional prosecutor’s office informed the office of the Government Agent that, apart from the applicant, there were seven other individuals still held in the region’s remand prisons against whom criminal proceedings were still pending but whose case files were in the non-Government-controlled areas. The prosecutor’s office stated that it had requested the assistance of the police in gathering the documentation necessary to restore the relevant files. That work had allowed the prosecutor’s office to gather sufficient material to ask the courts to consider the case against one of those individuals. The work was ongoing concerning two other defendants. Assistance had also been requested from the International Committee of the Red Cross, which operated in both the Government-controlled and the non-Government-controlled areas, in facilitating the transfer of files from the Court of Appeal’s building in Luhansk. 34.  At the date of last information made available to the Court (19 January 2017), the applicant’s appeal against his conviction remained pending before the Court of Appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Olekminsk, Sakha (Yakutia) Republic. 5.  On 23 December 2008 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. 6.  On 25 December 2008 the Olekminskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutia) Republic remanded the applicant in custody. 7.  On 21 February, 19 March, 18 May, 18 June, 15 August, and 12 September 2009 the court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention and held that despite the fact that he had permanent residence, job and family, he should remain in detention as the investigation was still pending, he could threaten witnesses or re-offend. 8.  On 18 June 2009 the judge stated in his detention order as follows:\n“... the circumstances of the case have not changed. [The applicant] ... committed the crime under the influence of alcohol ..., he concealed that he had committed the crime ...” 9.  On 27 November 2009 the court replaced the pre-trial detention with a house arrest. 10.  On 10 June 2010 the Olekminskiy District Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to 8 years’ imprisonment. On 10 August 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld his conviction on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. 6.  The applicant had been employed by the National Security Service as a system operator since 1981. She submitted that, on account of the nature of her duties, she had held a security clearance permitting her access to classified information constituting State secrets. According to the applicant’s job description, being in a possession of such a security clearance had been a prerequisite to her holding her post. 7.  On 30 April 2002 the Classified Information Protection Act (hereinafter “the Act”) was promulgated in the State Gazette. Under the Classified Information Protection Act, permits granting access to classified information that had been issued under the legal provisions existing before the entry into force of the Act were to remain valid until their replacement by security clearance allowing access to classified information. The heads of organisational units employing persons who possessed an access permit and whose positions required that they have access to classified information were to request the issuance of security clearance, in accordance with the requirements of the Act. Non-compliance with that provision would result in the invalidation of the respective existing access permits. 8.  On 3 June 2003, in compliance with that obligation, the Director of the National Security Service issued a decision refusing the applicant security clearance allowing access to classified information. The applicant submitted that that decision had been based on a psychological test. The decision did not contain any reasoning in respect of the refusal, apart from a reference to Section 57 of the Classified Information Protection Act. 9.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the refusal with the State Commission for Information Security. The latter, by a decision of 5 February 2004, upheld the refusal. That decision was final and not amenable to judicial review. 10.  On 27 April 2004, the Director of the National Security Service ordered that the applicant be dismissed. The reason given for the termination of her employment was the refusal to grant her security clearance, possession of which was an indispensable condition of her being able to perform her duties. 11.  The applicant challenged her dismissal at three levels of jurisdiction. She contested the objectivity and the lawfulness of the dismissal procedure, arguing that she had fulfilled all conditions for the issuance of security clearance and that she had been dismissed on account of the negative personal relationship between her and her direct supervisor. In the applicant’s view, the clearance had probably been refused because she had suffered from depressive neurosis in 1995, a condition which according to her was no longer relevant. The applicant’s request that a report by a psychiatric expert be commissioned was refused by the Sofia District Court. 12.  By its judgment of 11 May 2005 the Sofia District Court rejected the applicant’s claims, reasoning that the refusal of the Director of the National Security Service to grant security clearance to the applicant was a final and valid administrative act, and it rendered the applicant’s dismissal inevitable because she was no longer able to perform her duties. The court added that the refusal was not amenable to any judicial review; therefore, the court was not competent to examine, within the framework of the dismissal proceedings, any substantial or procedural questions related to its lawfulness. 13.  On appeal, the Sofia City Court, by a ruling of 6 April 2006 upheld the lower court’s decision, endorsing its reasoning. 14.  On 19 June 2008, the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld those rulings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Vilnius. 6.  At around 12.30 p.m. on 28 April 2006, the applicant’s motorcycle collided with a car driven by M.N. in a residential area of Vilnius. M.N. was not injured, but the applicant suffered multiple spinal fractures and serious damage to his spinal cord. As a result of the accident, he lost the ability to walk and became disabled. 7.  On the day of the accident, 28 April 2006, the Vilnius City Police Department opened a pre-trial investigation concerning a possible violation of road traffic safety regulations resulting in an accident that caused non‑severe impairment to another person’s health (Article 281 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The pre-trial investigation was supervised by the Vilnius City District Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the district prosecutor”). 8.  On the same day M.N. was questioned as a witness. He stated that before the collision he had been driving at a speed of around 50 km/h and had decided to overtake the car in front of him. The road had two lanes. He checked that there were no cars in the left-hand lane, coming either from in front or from behind, indicated left and overtook the car. He then indicated right and began returning to the right-hand lane. At that moment he felt a blow to the back of his car but did not understand what had happened. He drove for another thirty metres and stopped the car. Then he noticed that a motorcycle and its rider were lying on the ground, and called the police and the ambulance service. He had not seen the motorcycle before the collision. 9.  On the same day the police investigator examined the scene of the accident. The investigator’s report indicated that the accident had occurred on a sunny day, on a straight paved road which had been dry. It described the location of the applicant’s motorcycle and M.N.’s car as they had been found after the accident, as well as the presence of skid marks and fragments of glass and plastic on the road. All those elements were also indicated in a sketch drawn by the investigator. The sketch included a column for drivers to sign if they agreed that the scene of the accident had been depicted accurately, but it was not signed by either the applicant or M.N. 10.  On the same day the investigator examined the applicant’s motorcycle and M.N.’s car. The investigator’s report described the damage to the front, back and both sides of the motorcycle, and to the back of the car. It also stated that before the accident both the motorcycle and the car had been in good technical condition and working properly. 11.  On the same day a court medical expert took blood samples from the applicant and M.N. in order to determine whether they had been sober. The examination detected no traces of alcohol in the blood of either of them. 12.  On 4 May 2006 the applicant was granted victim status in the investigation and questioned about the details of the accident. He stated that before the collision he had been driving at about 60 km/h and had decided to overtake a bus and two cars. Seeing that the left-hand lane was free, he began overtaking the bus and the cars and accelerated to about 70 km/h. After overtaking them, while still in the left-hand lane, he slowed down to 50 km/h, but as that lane was free, he decided to also overtake three more cars and a truck. He began to accelerate again, but then one of the three cars, which at that moment was about fifteen metres in front of him, suddenly pulled out into the left-hand lane without indicating. The applicant applied the brakes but started losing control of the motorcycle, so he released the brakes before applying them again. The front wheel of the motorcycle hit the back of the car. The applicant fell off the motorcycle and landed on the road. He did not see what happened to the motorcycle after the collision. He lay on the ground until the ambulance arrived and took him to hospital. 13.  On 5 May 2006 a court medical expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries corresponded to severe health impairment. 14.  On an unspecified date the legal ground for the pre-trial investigation was changed to Article 281 § 3 of the Criminal Code – violation of road traffic safety regulations, which resulted in an accident causing severe impairment to another person’s health. 15.  From 3 to 16 May 2006 the police investigator questioned the applicant’s mother and five eyewitnesses to the accident. It appears that the eyewitnesses provided contradictory testimonies as to the location and speed of the two vehicles immediately before the collision, the distance between them and the exact account of the events leading up to the collision. 16.  On 15 May 2006 the investigator examined the scene of the accident together with M.N. The latter indicated the trajectory of his car before the collision and the exact location of the collision. 17.  On 20 June 2006 the applicant was informed that a forensic expert would be instructed to examine the circumstances of the accident and establish an account of the events. The applicant’s lawyer submitted additional questions to be forwarded to the expert. The relevant order adopted on 14 July 2006 by the Vilnius City Second District Court and forwarded to the expert on 1 September 2006 does not appear to have included the questions submitted by the applicant’s lawyer. 18.  The examination was carried out by an expert from the Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (Lietuvos teismo ekspertizės centras), a governmental institution responsible for carrying out forensic examinations required by courts and other pre-trial investigation bodies. The expert was provided with the sketch of the accident (see paragraph 9 above) and photographs of the two vehicles, and asked to determine the location of the collision, to estimate the speed of the motorcycle before the collision, and to establish who had been responsible for the accident. The expert report, delivered on 31 January 2007 (hereinafter “the first expert report”), stated that the description of the skid marks and the fragments of glass and plastic on the road indicated that the collision had occurred in the right-hand lane. The expert estimated the speed of the motorcycle immediately before the collision as at least 70.3 km/h and, assuming that the speed limit on that road was 50 km/h, noted that the applicant had exceeded that limit. The expert concluded that the accident had been caused by the applicant because he had been exceeding the speed limit and had started applying his brakes too late to avoid the collision. 19.  On 22 February 2007 the district prosecutor instructed the police investigator to carry out a number of additional investigative actions, including:\n−  interviewing the officer who had sketched the accident scene (see paragraph 9 above) in order to determine whether the sketch was accurate and why it had not been signed by the applicant and M.N.;\n−  examining the scene of the accident together with the applicant in order to verify his account of the events leading to the collision;\n−  finding out whether, at the time of the accident, there were any traffic signs on the road indicating the speed limit, or any restrictions on overtaking;\n−  additionally questioning an eyewitness who had claimed that following the collision the applicant’s motorcycle had risen up in the air and landed in the right-hand lane, in order to clarify the details of that testimony; and\n−  questioning another eyewitness identified by the applicant’s mother. 20.  On 26 February 2007 the applicant’s mother, R.K., whom the applicant had authorised to act on his behalf, complained to the district prosecutor that the pre-trial investigation was being carried out slowly and ineffectively. She claimed that the sketch of the accident was inaccurate, as proven by the absence of the drivers’ signatures. She also complained that the investigators had not questioned all the eyewitnesses to the accident and had not eliminated the contradictions between different testimonies. R.K. further complained that the questions of the applicant’s lawyer had not been forwarded to the expert examining the circumstances of the accident (see paragraph 17 above). Lastly, she complained that the prosecutor had sent that expert’s report to the wrong address, so she and the applicant had not received it. R.K. asked the court to change the investigator in charge of the pre-trial investigation and to ensure that essential investigative measures were carried out. 21.  On 16 March 2007 the district prosecutor upheld R.K.’s complaint. The pre-trial investigation was transferred to a different investigator within the Vilnius City Police Department and the investigator was instructed to carry out the investigative measures requested by R.K. As to the forensic expert’s report, the prosecutor informed R.K. that the questions to be submitted to the expert had been approved by a court decision, which the applicant had not challenged. 22.  On 27 March 2007 the district prosecutor notified the Vilnius City Police Department that the newly appointed investigator was conducting the pre-trial investigation “in a sluggish manner” (vangiai), contrary to the requirement to complete it in the shortest possible time. 23.  In March and April 2007 the police investigator carried out the additional investigative measures ordered by the district prosecutor (see paragraph 19 above). 24.  On 18 April 2007, in response to R.K.’s complaint, the district prosecutor informed her that the police officer who had drawn up the sketch of the accident had been questioned and confirmed its accuracy, so there were no grounds to suspect that the sketch had been falsified. The prosecutor also noted that an internal inquiry had been opened concerning the absence of the drivers’ signatures on the sketch of the accident. 25.  Subsequently, in his order to the Vilnius City Police Department the district prosecutor pointed out that the absence of the drivers’ signatures on the sketch had given R.K. legitimate doubts as to its accuracy, and asked the police to look into the officers’ actions when drawing up the sketch. On 29 May 2007 the inquiry found that the police investigator who had carried out the initial investigative measures and who had been responsible for ensuring that the drivers signed the sketch had not performed her duties properly. However, the investigator was not given a disciplinary penalty because more than one year had passed since the breach and she was no longer working in the interior affairs system. 26.  On 21 May 2007 R.K. complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office that the district prosecutor was not properly supervising the pre-trial investigation, which was slow and ineffective. She raised similar complaints to those she had raised before (see paragraph 20 above) and asked for the removal of the prosecutor who had been in charge of supervising the investigation. On 15 June 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office dismissed R.K.’s complaint, finding no serious breaches in the prosecutor’s actions. The Prosecutor General’s Office also held that although the prosecutor had sent some documents to an incorrect address, those same documents had also been sent to the applicant’s lawyer, so the applicant had in fact received them. 27.  On 10 December 2007 the Vilnius City Second District Court ordered an additional forensic examination of the circumstances of the accident. The examination was carried out by the same expert from the Forensic Science Centre as before (see paragraph 18 above). The expert report, delivered on 16 June 2008 (hereinafter “the second expert report”), did not make a fresh estimate of the speed of the applicant’s motorcycle but relied on the findings of the first expert report and considered that the applicant had been travelling at a speed of at least 70.3 km/h. It found that the speed limit at the location of the accident had been 60 km/h and not 50 km/h, as assumed in the first expert report, which nonetheless meant that the applicant had exceeded the speed limit. Having examined the sketch of the accident and the damage to both vehicles, the second report confirmed the conclusion of the first report that the collision had occurred in the right‑hand lane, while the motorcycle was moving into it from the left-hand lane. It found no data indicating that M.N. had been driving at speeds in excess of the speed limit or that he had done anything which might have caused the accident. The report concluded that the accident had been caused by the applicant: the main cause had not been the speed of the motorcycle but the difference between the speed of the two vehicles, and the fact that the applicant had not started to brake in time to avoid the collision. 28.  On 13 August 2008 the district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that M.N.’s actions had not amounted to a crime as provided for by Article 281 § 3 of the Criminal Code. R.K. appealed against that decision before a senior prosecutor, arguing that the investigation had been biased and incomplete. She stressed in particular that the sketch of the accident had been inaccurate, as proven by the absence of the drivers’ signatures (see paragraph 9 above). She also submitted that the prosecutor had disregarded the testimonies of some eyewitnesses that the collision had occurred in the left-hand lane and that it had caused the applicant’s motorcycle to rise up in the air and land in the other lane (see paragraph 19 above). Her appeal, however, was dismissed. The senior prosecutor pointed out that two expert reports had concluded that the accident had been caused not by M.N. but by the applicant himself, and that the testimonies of several eyewitnesses had confirmed that conclusion. 29.  R.K. appealed before the Vilnius City First District Court. She again argued that the sketch of the accident was inaccurate, as proven by the absence of the drivers’ signatures. She also submitted an opinion by a specialist in the field of road traffic accidents, issued at R.K.’s request on 17 October 2008 (hereinafter “the specialist’s opinion”), which had concluded that although both the applicant and M.N. had exceeded the speed limit, that fact had not been the cause of the accident. The specialist considered that the accident had occurred in the left-hand lane and that it had been caused by M.N. suddenly entering that lane – despite the applicant’s attempts to brake and slow down, it had not been objectively possible for him to avoid the collision. 30.  On 20 November 2008 the Vilnius City First District Court upheld R.K.’s appeal and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court noted the contradictory findings of the expert reports on one hand and the specialist’s opinion on the other hand, and considered that it was necessary to conduct a fresh forensic examination by a different expert in order to eliminate those contradictions. 31.  On 23 February 2009 the police investigator ordered a fresh examination of the circumstances of the accident. The examination was carried out by a different expert from the Forensic Science Centre. In his report, delivered on 15 May 2009 (hereinafter “the third expert report”), the expert examined the sketch of the accident and photographs of the two vehicles, and estimated that immediately before the collision the applicant had been travelling at a speed of at least 70 km/h, and that it was not possible to determine the speed at which M.N. had been driving. The report also stated that the motorcycle had hit the right side of the car, so even if, as claimed by the applicant, the car had entered the left-hand lane suddenly and unexpectedly, that would not have caused the collision, which had occurred in the right-hand lane. The report concluded that the accident had been caused by the applicant, who had exceeded the speed limit and had not slowed down in time to avoid the collision. 32.  On 3 June 2009 the district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that M.N.’s actions had not amounted to the crime stipulated in Article 281 § 3 of the Criminal Code. On 7 July 2009 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, noting that the third expert report had confirmed that the accident had been caused by the actions of the applicant and not of M.N. 33.  R.K. lodged an appeal with the Vilnius City Second District Court, submitting that the third expert report was inaccurate, in particular because it concluded that the collision had occurred in the right-hand lane, which was contrary to the material in the case file. She also submitted that the third expert report had not refuted the conclusions of the specialist’s opinion. R.K. further argued that the testimonies of some eyewitnesses had clearly demonstrated that the accident had been caused by M.N. (see paragraph 28 above), but they had not been properly considered by the prosecutor. 34.  On 5 August 2009 the Vilnius City Second District Court upheld the appeal and reopened the pre-trial investigation. The court held that it was necessary to address the arguments presented in R.K.’s appeal and that the third expert report had to be assessed together with the other available evidence, such as reports concerning the location of the accident and eyewitness testimonies. 35.  On 23 November 2009 the Vilnius City Second District Court ordered a fresh expert examination of the circumstances of the accident. The order was forwarded to the Forensic Science Centre on 4 March 2010, together with the specialist’s opinion. The examination was carried out by a different expert from the Forensic Science Centre. The expert report, delivered on 11 June 2010 (hereinafter “the fourth expert report”), examined the sketch of the accident and photographs of the two vehicles, and estimated that immediately before the collision the applicant had been travelling at a speed of at least 70.3 km/h. It found that although it was not possible to estimate the speed at which M.N. had been driving, the fact that the motorcycle had hit the back of the car meant that the car had been going slower than the motorcycle. The expert considered that it was not possible to determine the trajectory of the two vehicles before the collision. However, even if the applicant’s version was to be believed and M.N.’s car had suddenly entered the left-hand lane at a distance of fifteen metres from the applicant’s motorcycle (see paragraph 12 above), the applicant could have slowed down and avoided the collision. The fourth expert report concluded that the accident had occurred in the right-hand lane and that it had been caused by the applicant who had exceeded the speed limit and had not slowed down in time to avoid the collision. 36.  In January and February 2010 the police investigator again questioned the applicant, M.N. and some of the eyewitnesses questioned previously. 37.  R.K. was informed about the findings of the fourth expert report on 2 August 2010. She complained to the district prosecutor that she had not been given the opportunity to submit additional questions to the expert, in particular, whether having collided with the car, the motorcycle could have risen up in the air and landed in a different lane, as claimed by some eyewitnesses (see paragraph 28 above). R.K. also complained that the expert had relied on low-quality photographs of the motorcycle but had not examined the motorcycle itself, and that the report’s findings had been incorrect. On 8 September 2010 the district prosecutor upheld R.K.’s complaint and ordered the police investigator to examine the applicant’s motorcycle and to forward R.K.’s questions to the expert who had conducted the fourth examination. On 18 October 2010 the expert responded that the description of the location of the accident showed that during the collision the motorcycle had not risen up into the air. 38.  On 2 November 2010 the district prosecutor again discontinued the pre-trial investigation on the grounds that M.N.’s actions had not amounted to the crime stipulated in Article 281 § 3 of the Criminal Code. On 22 December 2010 a senior prosecutor upheld that decision, considering that the fourth expert report had assessed all the material collected during the pre-trial investigation, including the specialist’s opinion, and that R.K. had been given sufficient opportunity to present her questions to the expert. 39.  On 17 February 2011 the Vilnius City Second District Court dismissed an appeal lodged by R.K. and upheld the prosecutor’s decision. The court considered that expert reports and eyewitness testimonies demonstrated that M.N. had entered the left-hand lane within a safe distance from the applicant’s motorcycle, and thus had not violated road traffic safety regulations. Although there had been contradictory eyewitness testimonies as to the exact distance between M.N.’s car and the applicant’s motorcycle, the court considered that any doubts had to be interpreted in M.N.’s favour. The court also held that the conclusions of the specialist’s opinion that the collision had occurred in the left-hand lane had been contrary to the description of the location of the accident as provided in the sketch (see paragraph 9 above). 40.  On 22 March 2011 the Vilnius Regional Court quashed the lower court’s decision and reopened the pre-trial investigation. It held that the decision to discontinue the investigation had not been based on a comprehensive assessment of all the collected material but had relied exclusively on evidence favourable to M.N., disregarding the applicant’s statements, eyewitness testimonies, and the specialist’s opinion. The court disagreed with the conclusion that M.N. had started overtaking within a safe distance from the applicant’s motorcycle, and noted that M.N. had also had an obligation to make sure that none of the drivers behind him had started overtaking, so it was possible that he had committed the crime stipulated in Article 281 § 3 of the Criminal Code. The court observed that the question of M.N.’s criminal responsibility would be best determined by a court examining the case on the merits. 41.  On 30 May 2011, at R.K.’s request, another expert from the Forensic Science Centre submitted an opinion that, judging from the damage to both vehicles, there were no grounds to believe that the motorcycle had risen up in the air when it had collided with M.N.’s car. 42.  On 31 May 2011 the district prosecutor discontinued the pre-trial investigation as time-barred, while also observing that the investigation had not identified any grounds to believe that a crime may have been committed (the prosecutor did not refer to the Vilnius Regional Court’s decision of 22 March 2011 – see paragraph 40 above). The prosecutor’s decision does not appear to have been appealed against. 43.  On 18 August 2011 the applicant submitted a civil claim for damages against M.N. He stated that the accident and the resulting injuries and disability had caused him significant distress, inconvenience and emotional trauma. The applicant claimed 600,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL − approximately 173,772 euros (EUR)) in non-pecuniary damages and LTL 76,739.37 (EUR 22,225) in pecuniary damages for medical expenses and rehabilitation. 44.  On 26 September 2012 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It relied on the expert reports delivered during the pre‑trial investigation and noted that all of them had established that the accident had been caused not by M.N. but by the applicant himself. Although the specialist’s opinion, delivered at the request of the applicant’s mother, had reached a different conclusion, the court considered that the fourth expert report had taken its findings into consideration, and that it was thus unnecessary for the court to discuss the specialist’s findings separately. It also observed that the judgment of the Vilnius Regional Court of 22 March 2011 (see paragraph 39 above) could not be interpreted as affirming M.N.’s responsibility for the accident. As a result, the court concluded that it had not been established that M.N. had breached any legal requirements, which was a pre-condition for his civil liability to arise. The court also noted that the applicant had bought the motorcycle only two days before the accident, that he had not had any prior experience in driving that kind of vehicle, and that the motorcycle had not undergone a technical examination before the accident. Accordingly, the court found that the applicant himself may have breached road traffic safety regulations. The civil claim was dismissed and the applicant was ordered to pay LTL 1,521 (EUR 440.5) in legal expenses to M.N. and the State. 45.  On 2 December 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the lower court in its entirety.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962. He is serving a prison sentence in the Orenburg region. 6.  The applicant was head of the security service of the Yukos oil company. 7.  On 14 April 2005 the applicant, who had been found guilty of several counts of attempted murder and murder on 24 March 2005, was charged with the murder of Kr. and Fd. and the attempted murder of R., I. and Fl. On 4 July 2005 the applicant was charged with the murder of P. and the attempted murder of Kk. The charge sheet stated, in particular, that the applicant had entered into a criminal conspiracy with N. and other unidentified managers of the Menatep bank to murder Kr., R. and P. with whom the Yukos oil company had been in conflict for various reasons. The applicant had asked G. to find and hire hitmen to commit those murders. G. had hired Sh., Ts., Re., Go. and O. who had killed Kr. and P. and had committed several unsuccessful attempts to kill R. Fd., I., Fl. and Kk. had been collateral victims of their actions. 8.  According to the applicant, the investigation was completed on 5 July 2005. 9.  On 5 July 2005 a Deputy Prosecutor General K., gave an interview to two major Russian channels, the NTV and the First Channel. The interview was broadcasted in their news programmes of the same date. K. said, in particular:\n“N., a member of the Committee of Directors of the Yukos oil company and the first deputy president of that oil company, [the applicant], the head of the 4th division of the internal and financial security service of that oil company, and other still unidentified persons among the employees of that oil company founded a criminal gang for committing criminal offences in their personal and other interests. In 1998 [the applicant], upon instructions from N. and other employees of the Yukos oil company ..., organised the murder of the head of the Nefteyugansk Town Council P[.] ... For that purposes [the applicant] involved G., Go., Sh., Re. and Ts. ...”\n“[The applicant], upon instructions from N. and other unidentified persons from among the managers of the Menatep bank, organised the murder of the director of the Fenix company Kr[.] who had acted contrary to their interests ...”. 10.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. He complained that the prosecutor’s statements had encouraged the public to believe him guilty and prejudged the assessment of the facts by the competent court. They therefore had breached his presumption of innocence. The applicant also stated that he had wished to ask for a trial by jury but had had to renounce his wish for fear that the jurors might be influenced by the prosecutor’s statements to the press. 11.  On 10 July 2007 the District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint, finding that the applicant had been charged with many counts of murder and attempted murder. In his statements to the press K. had related the facts as established by the investigation and confirmed by the materials in the criminal case file. He had acted lawfully and had not breached the applicant’s rights. 12.  On 16 October 2007 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 10 July 2007 on appeal. 13.  On 11 September 2005 the TVC Channel broadcasted an interview with B., a lead investigator of the Prosecutor General’s office in charge of the applicant’s case. B. said, in particular:\n“B.: At present we have already completed the investigation into several more episodes of the criminal activities of the Yukos oil company. [The applicant], the former head of the internal financial security service, has been charged with six [counts of murder]... The crimes were organised by, among others, N. ... In fact, N. organised and financed all these crimes.\nThe presenter: Does it mean that P. was killed by the same gang that had committed other murders? B.: This gang was founded by [the applicant] on the instructions from N.. Yes, this was proved. It was financed by N.” 14.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. He complained that B.’s statements had breached his presumption of innocence. 15.  On 11 January 2006 the District Court rejected the applicant’s complaint. It found that B. had orally expressed his personal opinion about the applicant’s guilt in his interview to the press. His statements were not contained in an official document issued in the framework of the criminal proceedings. There was no reason to believe that B.’s opinion had breached the applicant’s constitutional rights or had undermined the fairness of his forthcoming trial. 16.  On 6 March 2006 the City Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 17.  On 20 March 2006 the City Court held a preliminary hearing of the applicant’s case. 18.  On 17 August 2006 the City Court convicted the applicant and his co-defendants Sh., Ts., Re. and O. of the murder of Kr., P. and Fd. and the attempted murder of R., I. and Fl. It acquitted the applicant of the attempted murder of Kk. The applicant was sentenced to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. 19.  On 21 February 2007 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation upheld the conviction in respect of the applicant’s co-defendants. It quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the case for a retrial before another judge of the City Court. 20.  The second trial started on 17 April 2007. During the hearing the court examined a handwritten note containing R.’s address in Vienna. That note had been found among the personal belongings of the late G. who, according to witness statements, had been an intermediary between the applicant, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Ts. and Re. who had committed the two attempts on R.’s life. 21.  The Court also examined the expert reports of 24 December 2003 and 7 October 2004, ordered by the investigator. In the report of 24 December 2003 the experts found that it could not be excluded that the note had been written by the applicant. It was however not possible to make any firm conclusions about the author of the note for the lack of comparative material. In the report of 7 October 2004 the experts found, after having examined additional samples of the applicant’s handwriting, that the note in question had been written by him. When questioned in court, the experts confirmed their findings. 22.  The applicant submitted to the court a “specialist” opinion of 4 July 2004 by V. According to V., the samples of the applicant’s handwriting submitted for comparative analysis were insufficient to make any firm conclusions as to whether he was the author of the note. V. confirmed her findings when questioned in court. 23.  Referring to the “specialist” opinion of 4 July 2004, the applicant asked for a new handwriting expert opinion and submitted a list of questions to be put to the experts. The court refused the request, finding that the case file already contained two expert opinions and a “specialist” opinion and that there was no need for an additional expert examination of the note. The court refused to admit the “specialist” opinion as evidence noting that it contained only “a value judgment” in respect of the experts’ findings. 24.  On 6 August 2007 the City Court found the applicant guilty of the murder of Kr., P. and Fd. and the attempted murder of R., I. and Fl. and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 25.  As regards the attempted murder of R., the court relied, inter alia, on the expert opinion of 7 October 2004, finding that the applicant had been the author of the handwritten note containing R.’s address. It declared the specialist opinion of 4 July 2004 inadmissible as evidence because V. had not been appointed as a forensic expert and did not therefore have any procedural status. 26.  On 31 January 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Șopârlița. 6.  On 30 June 2013 the applicant’s sister called the emergency services and reported that the applicant was causing a disturbance in respect of his family (a făcut scandal ȋn familie). Two police officers from the Bobiceşti police, C.B. and M.D.B., were dispatched to the applicant’s home. 7.  Once they arrived at the applicant’s home, the police officers proceeded to handcuff him in order to take him to the police station, because they claimed that he was aggressive towards them. The officers immobilised him and pushed him to the ground with his face down, even though he was not resisting arrest. They handcuffed him with his hands behind his back, dragged him towards a police car, and banged his head against a metal gate owned by a neighbour, M.V. 8.  The Government acknowledged that the police officers had put the applicant to the ground and had forcibly handcuffed him. They stated, however, that the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment and of being thrown against a metal gate by the police officers were contradicted by the available evidence. The evidence proved that his injuries were not caused deliberately by the police officers. 9.  On 30 June 2013 one of the police officers who had been dispatched to the applicant’s home produced a contravention report, and fined the applicant 1,000 Romanian lei (RON – approximately 230 euros (EUR)). According to the report, the applicant had offended his father, had been inebriated, and had admitted his actions. The report was signed by the applicant. 10.  From 1 to 3 July 2013 the applicant was in Bagdasar‑Arseni Emergency Hospital in Bucharest. According to a medical report produced upon his discharge from hospital, he was diagnosed with a cervical spine injury and a minor cranial cerebral trauma. 11.  On 3 July 2013 the applicant’s father lodged a criminal complaint against police officers C.B. and M.D.B., on the grounds that they had physically abused his son. On 12 September 2013 the applicant took up (şi‑a ȋnsuşit) the criminal complaint lodged by his father against the police officers. 12.  On 14 August 2013 the Olt prosecutor’s office interviewed the applicant’s father with regard to the circumstances of the case. He stated, inter alia, that his son had not been suffering from a psychological illness. On the day of the incident the applicant had been inebriated and had made a scene, but he had not hurt either of his parents. Neither parent had called the police, and the applicant’s father was unaware of who could have done so. The police officers had produced a contravention report in the applicant’s name and had asked him to sign the report without informing him why. The applicant had complied and had signed the contravention report. Subsequently, he had agreed to accompany the police officers to the hospital, but had informed them that he needed to go inside the house to get dressed. The police officers had stopped him from entering the house, pushed him to the ground with his face down, and handcuffed him. Afterwards, they had dragged him away and banged his head against a metal gate owned by M.V. When they had put the applicant in the ambulance he had had blood on his face, and they had left him in the ambulance face down and wearing handcuffs. The following day, Dr B. from the psychiatric unit of Slatina Emergency Hospital had informed him (the applicant’s father) that his son had been seriously beaten, and that he had been transferred to a different hospital because he had suffered a cervical spine injury. 13.  On 12 September 2013 the Olt prosecutor’s office interviewed the applicant. In his statement, inter alia, he asked the investigating authorities to also interview his mother and N.B. with regard to the incident. He also stated that he had signed the contravention report produced by the two police officers, even though he had not been informed by them about its content. One of the police officers had travelled with him in the ambulance. That officer had refused to remove his handcuffs and had punched him in the face. 14.  On the same date the Olt prosecutor’s office interviewed both the applicant’s mother and N.B. His mother stated, inter alia, that the police officers had not allowed her son to get dressed, had chased him through the courtyard, and had tripped him. After he had fallen to the ground they had twisted his hands behind his back and handcuffed him. Because the applicant had been agitated after he had been handcuffed, and had refused to accompany the police officers, they had repeatedly banged his head against the gate owned by M.V. One of the police officers had travelled with the applicant in the ambulance and had continued to beat him until he had been asked by the medical staff in the ambulance to stop the violence. 15.  N.B. stated, inter alia, that he had been on the street on the day of the incident and had seen two police officers handcuff the applicant. Afterwards, they had grabbed him by his hands and had banged his head repeatedly on the gate owned by M.V. N.B. further stated that he had worked with the applicant, and he had not been suffering from any psychological condition or drinking alcohol. 16.  On an unspecified date in 2013 the Olt prosecutor’s office asked the Olt County Forensic Medical Service to examine the available medical documents and produce a forensic expert report in the case. The prosecutor’s office asked the forensic service to determine: the applicant’s injuries and their cause; the number of days of medical care needed for healing; if there was a direct link between the applicant’s injuries and their cause; and if the injuries could also have been caused by something other than intentional force. 17.  On 31 October 2013 the Olt County Forensic Medical Service examined the applicant and the available medical documents. 18.  On 18 November 2013 the Olt County Forensic Medical Service produced a forensic expert report. It noted that on the day of the incident the applicant had been transferred by ambulance to Slatina Emergency Hospital because he had been extremely agitated and his breath had smelled of alcohol. Subsequently, he had been transferred to the hospital’s psychiatric unit and had been sedated. The following day he had started complaining of pain in his cervical spine area, and of paralysis of his right hand. He had been examined and had been diagnosed with a cervical spine injury. The interdisciplinary medical examination carried out by, inter alia, a neurologist, a surgeon and an orthopaedist had not identified any signs of trauma. Eventually, the applicant had been admitted to a specialist hospital and had been operated on in relation to the cervical spine injury. 19.  The forensic report concluded that the applicant’s injury could have been caused on 30 June 2013. Most probably, the injury had been caused by a forced rotation movement of the neck when the applicant had been immobilised and handcuffed. No signs of trauma specific to intentional force had been identified on the applicant’s head, body or limbs during the interdisciplinary examinations carried out after his admissions to Slatina Emergency Hospital and Bagdasar-Arseni Emergency Hospital. The applicant had needed seventy to eighty days of medical care from the moment of his injury. 20.  On 10 January 2014 a prosecutor attached to the Olt prosecutor’s office decided not to open a criminal investigation against the two police officers for abusive behaviour, on the grounds that their actions had lacked the elements of an offence. The prosecutor held that a third party had called the emergency services at the applicant’s sister’s request, because the applicant, who had a history of psychological problems and who had been drunk, had been aggressive and had endangered his own life and safety and that of his family. Once police officers C.B. and M.D.B. had arrived at the scene of the incident, they had asked the applicant to calm down and accompany them to the police station. The applicant had refused the police officers’ demand, and had become aggressive and had verbally abused them. 21.  The prosecutor further held that the applicant’s father had confirmed the fact that the applicant had been drunk at the time of the incident. However, his statements that his son had not been aggressive and that he had been unaware of the identity of the person who had called the emergency services had not been confirmed by the rest of the evidence adduced in the file. Moreover, in such a case, it would have been highly unlikely that an individual would call the emergency services for no reason. According to the prosecutor, those arguments were also supported by the fact that, in the medical report produced by the psychiatric unit of Slatina Emergency Hospital, where the applicant had been taken after the incident, it was stated that the applicant was suffering from a polymorphic personality disorder, which was aggravated by alcohol consumption. Also, his father had acknowledged that the applicant would generally act normally when he was sober, but transformed into a verbally and physically aggressive person once he drank alcohol. 22.  The prosecutor also held that the applicant was known in his village as a violent and aggressive person with psychological problems. He had been investigated in relation to several other criminal files concerning alleged violent acts committed against the members of his family, and for theft, but the investigations had been discontinued after his parents had withdrawn their complaints. 23.  The prosecutor noted that, according to the reports describing the police officers’ intervention and the use of force and handcuffs, once the officers had arrived at the applicant’s home they had realised that he was drunk, and they had been forced to immobilise him and take him to Slatina Emergency Hospital. Also, according to the available medical documents, the applicant had been transferred to the hospital by ambulance, he had been extremely agitated, and his breath had smelled of alcohol. Subsequently, he had been transferred to the hospital’s psychiatric unit and had been sedated. The following day he had started complaining of a cervical spine injury, which had eventually required surgical treatment. In addition, according to the information provided by the psychiatric unit of Slatina Emergency Hospital, since 1998 the applicant had repeatedly been admitted to the unit for similar reasons. 24.  The prosecutor held that the conclusions of the forensic expert report produced on 18 November 2013 contradicted N.B.’s and the applicant’s parents’ testimonies that the applicant’s head had repeatedly been banged against M.V.’s gate by the police officers. 25.  By referring to Article 34 §§ 1 and 2 of Law no. 218/2002, but expressly citing the relevant provisions of Article 33 §§ 1 and 2 of the same aforementioned Law, the prosecutor further held that, given the available evidence, the police officers had not injured the applicant deliberately. His injuries could have been the result of a forced rotation of his neck, which could have happened at the moment when he had been immobilised by the officers. Also, the police officers had stated that they had not hurt the applicant, and had confirmed that he had been drunk, and that he had been transported and admitted to hospital. 26.  The applicant challenged the decision of 10 January 2014 before a more senior prosecutor. 27.  On 29 January 2014 a more senior prosecutor attached to the Olt prosecutor’s office dismissed the applicant’s challenge as ill-founded, and upheld the decision of 10 January 2014. 28.  The applicant appealed against the decision of 29 January 2014 before the Slatina District Court. In his written submissions he argued that the forensic expert report produced in the case was incomplete and superficial. The report had failed to determine if his injury would have been possible considering the physical characteristics of the parties involved in the incident and the standard procedure which had to be followed in cases of handcuffing. Also, the report had not explained how the forced rotation of his neck had happened, as he would not have made such a painful movement instinctively. In addition, the prosecutor’s office had wrongfully dismissed his parents’ and N.B.’s testimonies, as those witnesses had confirmed the police violence, and the forensic report had acknowledged that his injury had most probably been caused as a result of the forced rotation of his neck. Consequently, the applicant argued that the available forensic expert report had to be complemented by another report (completat), and that the second report had to be submitted for the approval of a higher review commission. 29.  The applicant further argued that none of the circumstances set out in sections 1 and 2 of Article 34 of Law no. 218/2002 had applied in his case. Also, even assuming that he had resisted immobilisation, as claimed by the authorities, the handcuffing measure could only have been taken against him if there had been a reasonable suspicion that his behaviour could endanger the police officers’ physical integrity or lives. Even assuming that such a situation had existed, the police officers had still had a lawful duty to use their handcuffs without seriously injuring him. 30.  Lastly, the applicant contended that the prosecuting authorities’ conclusion that the police officers had not hurt him intentionally had been ill‑founded, given that the officers had indirectly acted with intent. In particular, they had foreseen the result of their actions, and even if they had not intended that result, they had accepted that it was a possibility. 31.  On 12 March 2014 the Slatina District Court referred the case to the Balş District Court for examination. 32.  By a final judgment of 9 April 2014 the Balş District Court, sitting in private as a pre-trial chamber judge, and without the parties being present, dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the more senior prosecutor’s decision and upheld that decision. It noted that it had notified the parties about the date of the hearing, but they had failed to submit written observations. The court held that the Olt prosecutor’s office had correctly established that officers C.B. and M.D.B. had not committed the offence of abusive behaviour. Also, the available forensic report did not need to be complemented by an additional report or submitted for approval. The forensic report had examined extensively the available medical evidence, and had concluded that no evidence of trauma as a result of deliberate force had been identified on the applicant’s head, body or limbs during the multidisciplinary examinations. 33.  The court further held that, according to the available medical evidence, the applicant had been in an extreme state of psychomotor agitation, and the cranial X-ray had not shown any post-traumatic injury of the skull. Consequently, the court considered that the existence of a minor cranial cerebral trauma had not contradicted the conclusions of the forensic medical report, which had taken that trauma’s presence into account. 34.  The court also considered that it had been unnecessary for the forensic expert report to explain how the forced rotation of the applicant’s neck had happened, given that the victim would not have made such movements instinctively, because he had been drunk and extremely agitated at the time of the incident, and his behaviour could not have been compared with the normal behaviour of another person. 35.  The court further considered that the prosecutor had correctly dismissed the testimonies in the case, given that, according to the forensic expert report, no trauma as a result of deliberate force had been identified, and the forensic pathologist had had the opportunity to consider the possibility of the applicant’s head being banged repeatedly against a metal gate. 36.  The court held that it was true that the police officers had had a duty to use their handcuffs without seriously injuring the applicant. However, the applicant’s injuries had not been the direct result of the police officers’ actions. They had occurred in circumstances where he had been drunk, violent and extremely agitated, and therefore the police officers could not have controlled their actions towards him. 37.  The court also held that the violent actions towards the applicant had been carried out by the police officers within the framework of their work duties. In addition, the actions had been lawfully justified in order to alleviate the danger the applicant had represented to society and himself, given that he had been drunk, agitated and aggressive, and had been suffering from an organic personality disorder as a result of drinking alcohol. The police officers had not acted with the intent of hitting or hurting the applicant. His injuries had been the result of his immobilisation and handcuffing measures to stop his aggressive actions and transport him to the hospital. Therefore, the police officers’ actions had been justified. 38.  On 22 October 2014 the applicant underwent a medical examination at a private medical establishment, the Medical Civil Association for the Brain. According to a medical report produced by that establishment, the applicant had an organic personality disorder with “polymorphic decompensation” (decompensare polimorfă). The report noted that the applicant’s symptoms included a moderate intrapsychological tension, concentration difficulties, mixed insomnia and a low resilience to frustration and annoyances. It further noted, inter alia, that the applicant had repeatedly been admitted to psychiatric hospitals, had poor social and family support, and persistent symptoms for which he was receiving treatment. 39.  On 6 January 2015 the applicant underwent a medical examination at Schitu-Greci Psychiatric Hospital, because he was suffering from psychomotor agitation, a conflicted personality disorder, headaches, dizziness and mixed insomnia. According to a medical report produced by the hospital, he was diagnosed with an organic personality disorder and received treatment for his condition. The report also noted that alcohol and coffee consumption, as well as conflict, amounted to risk factors in relation to the applicant’s medical condition. 40.  On 26 May 2015 a neurologist attached to Bagdasar‑Arseni Emergency Hospital in Bucharest produced a medical report in respect of the applicant’s medical condition, following his operation for his cervical spine injury. According to the report, inter alia, the applicant continued to experience movement difficulties. Consequently, the report considered it appropriate that the applicant’s ability to work be assessed by a local expert commission, with a view to his potential retirement. 41.  On 8 June 2015 the Caracal branch of an office specialising in expert medical assessment of a person’s ability to work, which was attached to the Olt Retirement Agency, acknowledged that the applicant was suffering from a serious functional deficiency and had completely lost his ability to work.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  On 25 March 2004 the applicant company concluded a contract with Univerzal Banka AD (hereinafter “the bank”), a private institution based in Belgrade. Under the terms of this contract, the applicant company acquired a debt belonging to the bank resulting from a final court judgment of 28 December 1999. That judgment was rendered against a socially-owned company called Mehanizacija (hereinafter “the debtor company”) with its seat in Vladičin Han. On 29 August 2000, upon the bank’s application to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment and the debtor company subsequently paid a part of the judgment debt. 6.  On 14 April 2005, upon the applicant company’s application to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court again ordered the full enforcement of the judgment in question. 7.  On 26 July 2005 the applicant company concluded a settlement with the debtor company, which was later annulled following an application by the debtor company by a decision of the Leskovac Commercial Court of 22 January 2009. That decision became final on 3 March 2010. 8.  On 24 December 2001 the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the debtor company to pay the applicant company specified amounts. 9.  On 2 February 2005, upon the applicant company’s application to that effect, the Leskovac Commercial Court ordered the enforcement of the said judgment. 10.  On 1 March 2010 the Leskovac Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor company. As a result, all of the other ongoing enforcement proceedings against the debtor company were stayed. 11.  The applicant company duly reported its claims based on the above-mentioned judgments. 12.  On 15 October 2010 the Leskovac Commercial Court recognised a part of the applicant company’s claims and instructed the applicant company to initiate civil proceedings in respect of the remainder. 13.  On 29 May 2012 the Leskovac Commercial Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant company and dismissed the remainder of its claims. That decision was upheld by the Commercial Appeals Court on 25 October 2013. The domestic courts found that the contract which the applicant company had concluded with the bank (see paragraph 5 above) entitled it only to the recovery of the amount paid for the transfer of the debt owed to the bank in question, not the judgment debt itself. 14.  The insolvency proceedings are still ongoing.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977. He has served sentences in several prisons. On 21 April 2015 he was released from Târgu-Jiu Prison. 5.  The applicant alleged that while detained in cell no. 5 of Târgu‑Jiu Prison for eight days, between 1 October and 9 October 2013, he had not had an individual bed and had therefore been forced to sleep on the cold floor on two blankets. As a consequence, the renal disease from which he suffered had been re-activated and he had experienced intense pain. 6.  On 3 October 2013 he had been examined by a prison doctor and had been prescribed medical treatment. However, he had been unable to submit any evidence in this connection as the prison authorities had rejected his requests for a copy of his medical records. He submitted instead an old medical certificate stating that on 23 September 2012 he had been hospitalised in the Nephrology Department of Slatina Hospital suffering from renal colic. 7.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the post‑sentencing judge asking for an individual bed. 8.  His complaint was examined on 15 October 2013. The applicant informed the judge that he had eventually been given a bed, but only after nine days. The post-sentencing judge took note that the applicant had obtained an individual bed; he did not draft an interlocutory judgment, but merely noted that the complaint had been withdrawn. 9.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Gorj District Court seeking compensation in connection with the lack of an individual bed for eight days in cell no. 5 of Târgu-Jiu Prison. 10.  On 12 November 2013 the Târgu-Jiu District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint as inadmissible without examining its merits on account of the fact that the applicant had not submitted an interlocutory judgment by the post-sentencing judge in connection with his complaint.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1984 and 1982 respectively and live in Vienna. The third applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Switzerland. 6.  The following summary of the background of the case and the events in Austria is based on the submissions by the applicants. The account of the investigation in Austria is based on the submissions by both parties. 7.  The applicants are all nationals of the Philippines. The first and third applicants were recruited in 2006 and 2009 respectively by an employment agency in Manila to work as maids or au pairs in Dubai (United Arab Emirates). The second applicant travelled to Dubai in December 2008 for the same purpose, at the suggestion of the first applicant, not via an agency. All of the applicants had their passports taken away by their employers. During the course of their work in Dubai, they allege that they were subjected to ill-treatment and exploitation by their employers, who also failed to pay them their agreed wages and forced them to work extremely long hours, under the threat of further ill-treatment. 8.   In late 2006 the first applicant contacted an agency in Manila in order to find a job abroad. She is a single mother with one daughter who was eight months old at the time. She signed a contract in which she agreed to work for a family in Dubai for two years, from December 2006 until December 2008. The contract also stipulated that she would be paid 700 United Arab Emirates dirhams (AED – approximately 150 euros (EUR) at that time) per month to work for eight hours each working day. Upon her arrival in Dubai the first applicant was taken to her employers, who were two sisters or sisters-in-law sharing one large residence with their families. One of them took possession of her passport. 9.  For most of the initial two-year contract the first applicant was not subjected to physical abuse or direct threats of harm by her employers, and she was paid regularly. However, she had to work from 5 a.m. to midnight throughout the initial two-year period. Her duties included looking after her employers’ children, preparing meals, cleaning the house, doing the laundry and numerous other jobs around the house and garden. During the first nine months she was required to perform this work seven days per week without a single day off, and was not allowed to leave the house unsupervised. She was not allowed to have her own telephone and was only allowed to call her family in the Philippines once a month, the costs of these calls being deducted from her wages. Further, the first applicant was forbidden from speaking to any of the other workers from the Philippines in their native language. She was constantly hungry, as she was generally only given the family’s leftover food. Only when she accompanied the family to the supermarket approximately once a month was she allowed to buy some basic food for herself. 10.  After approximately nine months, the first applicant faced the first punishments by her employers. She was forced to sleep on the floor when they found out that she had been talking to another employee from the Philippines in their native language. When she became ill after sleeping on the cold floor, her employers prevented her from buying medicine or contacting a doctor; instead, she had to continue working the same hours. 11.  Towards the end of her two-year contract, the first applicant’s employers informed her that they wished her to stay, and offered her better pay, more days off and a telephone of her own, as well as permission to visit her family, provided that she recruited someone to take over her job while she was away. The first applicant finally agreed to extend her contract and returned to the Philippines for three months. Owing to the incentives and the prospect of improved working conditions, she asked the second applicant to take over her role in Dubai during the time she was away. 12.  While the first applicant was in the Philippines, she received threats from her employers that if she did not return to Dubai to work, she would be banned from ever going back there, and the second applicant would be subjected to ill-treatment. The first applicant therefore returned to Dubai in April 2009. 13.  After she returned to Dubai, she was taught how to drive. After she failed her first driving test, she was forced to pay for further lessons and tests out of her own salary, with four further driving tests costing AED 700 each, a month’s salary. While she was driving, one of her employers hit her on the shoulder on a number of occasions to force her to speed up. The employer also started to slap or hit her regularly for no or little reason. She also repeatedly threatened to let her husband hit the first applicant if she did not follow her orders or made any mistakes. 14.  The first applicant accompanied her employers on trips to Europe, Australia, Singapore and Oman, where she spent significant amounts of time locked up in hotel rooms or under the close supervision of her employers. She only had to visit one embassy in person to obtain entry documents, and that was in relation to a trip to London, at which time she was ordered by her employers to lie about her work conditions. When they arrived in London, the first applicant was not allowed at any time to leave the apartment in which they were staying. 15.  The second applicant was married with three young children in the Philippines. Her husband had no regular work. Because she expected better pay in Dubai, she agreed to work for the same employers as the first applicant. The employers in Dubai arranged a visiting visa for her, under false pretences. As a result of this arrangement, the second applicant did not approach the employment agency in the Philippines and did not have a written contract with her employers. Her understanding was that she would get AED 700 per month, which would be paid directly to her family in the Philippines. 16.  In December 2008 the second applicant started to work in Dubai. After the first applicant returned to the Philippines for three months in January 2009 (see paragraph 11 above), the employers significantly changed their conduct towards the second applicant. They threatened not to pay her family if she made any mistakes. They refused to let her leave Dubai, including by refusing to return her passport and ordering her to repay them her travel costs and related expenses. They also told her that she would be put in prison if she ran away or went to the authorities in Dubai for help. They physically and emotionally abused her, and there was one incident when one of her employers struck her across the shoulder using significant force. She was also forced to work from around 5 or 6 a.m. until midnight or 1 a.m. the following day. 17.  Between April 2009 and June 2010 the violent and threatening behaviour of the employers increased. The second applicant was punched by one of her employers on one occasion, and in another incident the employer aimed a hard slap at her face, but instead struck her across the shoulder. 18.  The third applicant’s family were desperate for money to pay for crucial medical treatment for her brother. Therefore, in 2009 she contacted an employment agency in the Philippines and was offered work as a maid in Dubai. She was informed that she would be earning between AED 800 and 1,000 (approximately EUR 160 to 200 at that time) per month, roughly twice her salary in the Philippines. Upon her arrival in Dubai in 2009 she had to hand over her passport and mobile phone to someone supposedly working for the employment agency. She was told that these items would be returned to her when she finished her work in Dubai. 19.  The third applicant was working for a family member of the first and second applicants’ employers. The applicants got to know each other, as the two families met every Friday. They secretly shared their experiences on these occasions. 20.  The third applicant was also bound by working hours going from 6 a.m. to midnight. Her employer forced her to clean her car in the sun and in unbearable heat, and she was prohibited from going to the toilet without letting her employer know. She was only allowed to call her family in the Philippines once a month, and only in the presence of her employer. She did not receive any remuneration at all for the first three months of her employment. Afterwards, she only received approximately AED 750 per month, less than what had been agreed. On one occasion she was slapped by her employer, and on a different occasion she witnessed another employee being hit over the head. 21.  When the third applicant told her employer that she wished to return to the Philippines, she was told that she would have to pay the cost of the flight and the agency fees, which her employer knew she could not afford at that point. Her employer also made it clear that, in any event, her passport would not be returned to her until she had completed at least nine months of work in Dubai. Subsequently, the third applicant was too scared to ask to leave Dubai again, owing to her fear that her employer would take her earnings from her or refuse to return her passport for an even longer period. 22.  On 2 July 2010 the applicants’ employers took them along on a short holiday trip to Austria. The applicants all stayed at the same hotel in the city centre of Vienna. The applicants slept in their own, separate apartment together with the female children. The male children slept in the same apartment as their parents. As in Dubai, the applicants had to take care of all of the employers’ children and perform numerous other domestic duties. They were still required to work from approximately 5 or 6 a.m. until midnight or even later. The third applicant was regularly shouted at by her employer, for example if she failed to get all the children ready early every morning. In addition, their employers woke the first applicant up at around 2 a.m. and forced her to cook food for them. Furthermore, the first applicant was forced to carry the employers’ twenty suitcases into the hotel by herself. While the applicants were in Austria, their passports remained with their employers. In the hotel in Vienna in which the applicants were staying, they became acquainted with N., an employee at the hotel who could speak Tagalog, the first applicant’s mother tongue. 23.  When the applicants accompanied their employers to a zoo one or two days after their arrival in Austria, one of the children went missing for some time. One of the employers started screaming at the first and third applicants in a manner which the applicants had not experienced before. The first applicant found the level of verbal abuse extreme, and this was a particularly distressing and humiliating experience for her. The employer threatened to beat the third applicant, and said that “something bad” would happen to her if the child was not found safe and well. By this stage, the third applicant had formed the impression that this employer, of whom she lived in a constant state of fear, was a dangerous person who might try to hurt her very badly. She had the feeling that the violence towards her was likely to escalate at any time. Therefore, she believed that something bad was going to happen to her if she remained with the family. Similarly, the first applicant believed that they could not live with their conditions of work any longer, and did not want to risk waiting to see what happened if they travelled with their employers from Vienna to London, as they were scheduled to do. The applicants therefore decided to speak to N., the Tagalog-speaking employee at the hotel, to see whether she could help them. 24.  The night following the incident – that is, two or three days after their arrival in Austria – the applicants left the hotel with the help of N., who had organised a car to pick them up in a side street near the hotel and take them to a “safe place”. The applicants subsequently found support within the local Filipino community in Vienna. 25.  In April or May 2011, approximately nine months after they had left their employers, the applicants contacted a local NGO called “LEFÖ” for assistance in reporting their ill-treatment, abuse and exploitation to the police. LEFÖ is actively involved in the fight against trafficking in human beings in Austria. It is financed though government funds, in particular for the provision of assistance to victims of trafficking. In July 2011 the applicants decided to turn to the Austrian police and filed a criminal complaint (Strafanzeige) against their employers. They explained that they had been the victims of human trafficking. On 11 and 21 July and 17 August 2011, accompanied by representatives of LEFÖ, they were interviewed at length by officers from the Office to Combat Human Trafficking (Büro für Bekämpfung des Menschenhandels) at the Federal Office of Criminal Investigations (Bundeskriminalamt). In their report, the officers concluded that the offences had been committed abroad. 26.  The applicants were informed that their employers had also made allegations about their conduct, alleging, inter alia, that they had stolen money and a mobile phone from them when they had fled the hotel. Those allegations were subsequently formally recognised by the Austrian authorities as false. The applicants all expressed their willingness to actively cooperate with the authorities and to engage in criminal proceedings against their employers. 27.  On 4 November 2011 the Vienna public prosecutor’s office (Staatsanwaltschaft Wien) discontinued the proceedings under Article 104a of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch – hereinafter “the CC”) relating to human trafficking (see paragraph 35 below), pursuant to Article 190 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung – hereinafter “the CCP” – see paragraph 36 below). On 14 November 2011 the public prosecutor gave a short written decision with reasons for the discontinuation of the proceedings. In the public prosecutor’s view, the offence had been committed abroad by non-nationals, and did not engage Austrian interests within the meaning of Article 64 § 1 (4) of the CC. 28.  On 30 November 2011 the applicants lodged an application to continue the investigation (Fortsetzungsantrag) with the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Straflandesgericht Wien). They submitted that Austrian interests had indeed been engaged, and that their employers had continued to exploit and abuse them in Austria. In their view, the elements of the crime punishable under Article 104a § 1 (2) of the CC had been present. 29.  The Vienna public prosecutor’s office then submitted a statement to the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, specifying its reasons for discontinuing the investigation. There had been no indication in the case file that any of the criminal actions exhaustively listed in Article 104a of the CC had occurred in Austria, particularly since the offence had already been completed in Dubai (zumal das Delikt bereits in Dubai vollendet wurde), and the accused were not Austrian citizens. Furthermore, from the applicants’ statements (looking after children, washing laundry, cooking food), it did not appear that they had been exploited in Austria, especially since they had managed to leave their employers only two to three days after their arrival in Vienna. 30.  On 16 March 2012 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court dismissed the applicants’ application. The relevant parts of the decision read (translation from German):\n“The decision to discontinue [criminal proceedings] requires – by implication – that the facts of a case are sufficiently clear, or a lack of indication that investigations would be promising.\nThere is no reason for further prosecution if, on the basis of the ... results of the investigation, a conviction is no more likely than an acquittal ...\nAccording to Article 64 § 1 (4) of the CC, if Austrian interests have been harmed by the offence or the perpetrator cannot be extradited, Austrian criminal laws apply independently of the criminal laws of the place where the crime was committed, for example in relation to the offence of kidnapping for ransom under Article 104a of the CC. Owing to the fact that the applicants spent approximately three days in Vienna, the conditions regarding the fulfilment of the elements of the crime under Article 104a § 1 (2) of the CC have not been met, since the relevant acts relating to the exploitation of labour must be committed over a longer period of time; therefore, the commission of the offence in Austria is ruled out.\nThe jurisdiction of the Austrian criminal-law enforcement authorities cannot be deduced from Article 64 § 1 (4) of the CC either.\nAustrian interests are engaged if either the victim or the perpetrator is an Austrian citizen, or if the criminal acts have a concrete connection to Austria, or if an obligation arises under international law in relation to the prosecution of certain offences. Austrian interests are, in any event, engaged if a criminal offence under Articles 102, 103, 104 or 217 of the CC is committed against an Austrian citizen, or if Austrian funds or Austrian securities (Wertpapiere) are the subject of offences under Article 232, or Article 237 in conjunction with Article 232, of the CC.\nThe applicants’ argument that the elements of the crime under Article 104a of the CC had also been fulfilled in Austria therefore fails, and the plea that the alleged criminal actions against them by their employers in Dubai ... would lead to an obligation on the part of Austria under international law is likewise not convincing. In relation to the present case, [this latter argument] also cannot be inferred from the quoted [Supreme Court] judgment no. 11 Os 161/81, which affirmed that Austrian interests had been damaged as a result of the import into Austria of a large amount of narcotics for transport...”\nThis decision was served on the applicants’ counsel on 23 March 2012. 31.  In January 2013 two of the three applicants lodged a civil claim against their employers with the Vienna Labour and Social Court (Arbeits‑und Sozialgericht) in order to claim their wages. However, they alleged that because of the high risk of having to pay the costs of the proceedings because the employers did not reside in Austria, they withdrew the action. 32.   The NGO LEFÖ not only assisted the applicants in filing a criminal complaint against their employers, but also supported them in applying for a special residence permit in Austria for victims of human trafficking, under the former section 69a of the Residence Act (Niederlassungs- und Aufenthaltsgesetz – see paragraph 46 below). 33.  All three applicants were granted a residence permit for special protection purposes in January 2012, valid for one year initially. Subsequently, because of their progressing integration, they were granted other types of residence permits with longer periods of validity. 34.  The applicants were officially registered in the Central Register (Melderegister) from the point when LEFÖ started supporting them. A personal data disclosure ban was enacted on the Central Register for their protection, so that their whereabouts would not be traceable by the general public.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Pyatigorsk. 6.  The applicant took part in the cleaning-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. He was subsequently registered disabled by Ukrainian authorities, becoming entitled to various social benefits. 7.  In September 1999 the applicant settled in Russia. The welfare authorities rejected re-establishing the applicant’s disability status. The applicant challenged the rejection before the courts. 8.  On 30 August 2005 the Pyatigorsk Town Court granted the applicant’s claim and ordered the Administration of Labour and Social Security of the Population of Pyatigorsk to issue a certificate of benefits. 9.  On 20 September 2009 the judgment became final. 10.  On 18 October 2005 the applicant was issued with the certificate of benefits. 11.  On 1 November 2006 the Presidium of Stavropol Regional Court allowed the defendant authority’s application for supervisory review and quashed the judgment of 30 August 2005, considering that the lower courts misapplied the material law. The case was remitted for fresh consideration. 12.  On 13 December 2006 the the Pyatigorsk Town Court discontinued the proceedings since the parties failed to appear.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Boscana. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was a police officer. In December 2006 he and another police officer, V.G., arrested two suspects (A.C. and A.V.) on the street and took them to a police station. Since one of the suspects resisted arrest, the police officers used force to make him get into their car. At the police station one of the police officers allegedly kicked one of the suspects in the chest. Both police officers were charged with the offence of ill-treating the suspects. 7.  According to the statements made by the victims to prosecutors, only officer V.G. ill-treated A.C. at the police station by kicking him in the chest. Therefore, on 10 August 2007 the charges against the applicant were dropped. However, on 24 September 2007 that decision was annulled and the applicant was again charged with ill-treating one of the victims during the arrest. 8.  During the court proceedings, the two victims submitted that they had been approached by the two police officers on the street and had been asked to accompany them to the police station. As one of the victims (A.V.) had resisted, the officers had struggled with him and forced him into the car. According to the statements of several witnesses, the two victims were intoxicated. One of the witnesses stated that A.V., who was tall and well‑built, had refused to get into the car. The police officers had handcuffed him and had had to punch him in the stomach to make him bend over and enter the vehicle. It does not appear that A.V. suffered any injuries. A.V. submitted that the police officers had continued beating both of them, even after they had got into the police car. A.C. did not confirm that statement. According to the victims, the police officers had taken some personal items off them, including their wallets, immediately after the arrest. 9.  At the police station, the personal items were returned to the victims. According to A.C., he noticed after checking his wallet that his money was missing. He asked V.G. where the money was and, instead of receiving an answer, he received a kick in the chest. V.G. then kicked A.V. as well. A.C. later discovered that he had suffered a fractured rib from the kick. 10.  A.V. made two different and contradictory statements during the court proceedings. He at first submitted that both the applicant and V.G. had kicked him at the police station after he had asked where his wallet and documents were, but later submitted that only V.G. had hit him, using a machine gun for that purpose. Moreover, he submitted that he had not lodged a formal criminal complaint about the alleged ill-treatment and was only involved as a witness in the proceedings. He also stated that he did not have a clear memory of what had happened because of his acute state of intoxication. 11.  In a judgment of 21 May 2009 the Buiucani District Court found that the police officers had used force during the arrest but that the force had not been disproportionate in the circumstances. It acquitted both the applicant and V.G. in respect of that episode. As far as the ill-treatment at the police station was concerned, the court acquitted the applicant and found V.G. guilty of kicking A.C. in the chest. It based its conclusion on the statements of the victims, the accused and witnesses and on medical documents. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed. 12.  On 18 January 2010 the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the appeal lodged by the Prosecutor’s Office and reversed the judgment of the first‑instance court. The applicant was convicted as charged and given a three-year suspended prison sentence. In the process of examination of the appeal, the Court of Appeal did not question the suspects, victims or witnesses again, but only cited some of the statements they had made before the first-instance court. In particular, the Court of Appeal cited the part of A.V.’s statement where he had accused both police officers of ill-treating him at the police station. The rest of his statement was not mentioned. The suspects and the victims were also asked to state whether or not they agreed with the appeal by the Prosecutor’s Office against the judgment of the first‑instance court. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his submissions to the Supreme Court of Justice the applicant’s lawyer argued, inter alia, that the applicant’s conviction had been contrary to Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because the Court of Appeal had neither examined the case file nor heard him, the victims or witnesses in person. 14.  On 25 February 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law, finding, inter alia, that in the circumstances of the case it had not been necessary for the Court of Appeal to examine the witnesses again because their statements had not been contested by the defendants. As to the objection that the Court of Appeal had not heard the defendants or the victims in person, the Supreme Court considered that asking them whether they agreed with the appeal had been sufficient to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. Moreover, the Supreme Court argued that the parties had not wished to submit new evidence. 15.  One of the members of the panel of judges of the Supreme Court wrote a dissenting opinion, expressing the view that a new examination of the victims and witnesses before the Court of Appeal had been imperative to ensure the fairness of the proceedings and concluding that the proceedings had not been fair within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. 16.  The applicant also lodged an extraordinary appeal with the Supreme Court of Justice, arguing that there had been a breach of Article 6 of the Convention. However, on 27 October 2011, the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Hamburg. 6.  On 26 August 2004 the Zagreb Municipal State Attorney’s Office (Općinsko državno odvjetništvo u Zagrebu; hereinafter: the “State Attorney’s Office”) indicted the applicant and another person in the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court (Općinski kazneni sud u Zagrebu) on charges of aggravated fraud under Article 224 §§ 1 and 4 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 14 below). 7.  The applicant was tried in summary proceedings (skraćeni postupak). On 11 February 2009 the Zagreb Municipal Criminal Court found the applicant and the other accused guilty as charged and sentenced the applicant to one year’s imprisonment, suspended for four years. She was also ordered, jointly with the other accused, to pay damages to the victims in the total amount of 230,335.22 Croatian kunas (HRK; approximately 31,100 euros (EUR)). 8.  The applicant appealed against her conviction and sentence, challenging all legal and factual aspects of the case and asking that her conviction be quashed and a retrial ordered. She submitted, in particular, that she had not had fraudulent intentions, but had merely acted as an intermediary between the loan provider and the borrowers in order to earn commission for herself. Moreover, she stressed that the trial judge had erred in the factual findings and had failed to obtain certain evidence requested by her, which meant that some crucial facts had been left undetermined. She also asked that she and her defence lawyer be allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 9.  On 20 January 2011 the Bjelovar County Court (Županijski sud u Bjelovaru), without informing the applicant or her lawyer, examined the case without holding a hearing. After examining all of the factual and legal issues of the case it dismissed the appeal and upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence. 10.  On 5 April 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining of a lack of fairness of the criminal proceedings against her. She contended in particular that she had not been allowed to appear at the session of the appeal panel. 11.  On 29 September 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Michał Ojczyk, is a Polish national who was born in 1977 and is currently in detention in Łódź Remand Centre in Poland. 6.  The parties’ statements relating to the conditions of the applicant’s detention from 17 July 2008 to 8 January 2010 are to a large extent contradictory. 7.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained in Łódź Remand Centre from 17 August 2005 to 26 April 2010. 8.  In their observations, the Government submitted that the applicant had been detained in the remand centre from 17 August 2005 to 17 July 2008 and that from 17 July 2008 to 13 August 2009 he had been detained in Łódź Prison. From 13 August 2009 to 8 January 2010 the applicant had been at liberty on a temporary release, while from 8 January to 26 April 2010 he had again been detained in Łódź Remand Centre. 9.  From 17 August 2005 to 17 July 2008 and from 8 January to 26 April 2010 the applicant was detained in Łódź Remand Centre. 10.  The applicant submitted that for seven months during his detention between 17 August 2005 and 26 April 2010 he had been held in overcrowded cells, where the space per person had been below the Polish statutory minimum of 3 sq. m. 11.  Official statistics published by the Prison Service (Służba Więzienna) show that during the applicant’s detention from 17 August 2005 to 7 August 2007, overcrowding at Łódź Remand Centre ranged from 20.1% to 35.3%. The figure shows the degree by which the number of prisoners exceeds the maximum allowed capacity of a particular detention facility, which, in turn, is calculated on the basis of the standard of 3 sq. m of cell space per prisoner provided for in Polish law. Overall capacity at Łódź Remand Centre was exceeded on average by 26.8% in that period. 12.  From 8 August 2007 to 7 July 2008 the size of the applicant’s cells varied between 4.76 and 11.69 sq. m and the occupancy rate fluctuated between two and six people. 13.  Official statistics published by the Prison Service show that during the applicant’s detention in Łódź Remand Centre from 8 January to 26 April 2010 there was no overcrowding. 14.  The applicant was detained with a person infected with the hepatitis C virus for three weeks in August 2005. 15.  From January to April 2007 the applicant was held in a cell with an HIV-positive person. 16.  He alleged that the cells had been badly ventilated. The applicant made no other submissions as to the conditions of his detention in the subsequent period. 17.  It appears that the applicant had one hot shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day.\n(b)  Facts in dispute\n(i)  The Government’s submissions 18.  The Government submitted that the applicant had failed to inform the Court that from 17 July 2008 to 13 August 2009 he had been detained in Łódź Prison, not in Łódź Remand Centre, and that from 13 August 2009 to 8 January 2010 he had been at liberty.\n(ii)  The applicant’s submissions 19.  The applicant submitted that he had been detained in Łódź Remand Centre from 17 August 2005 to 26 April 2010. He argued that that was confirmed by the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) in the written grounds of its judgment of 17 September 2010 (see paragraph 24 below). 20.  Official statistics published by the Prison Service show that during the applicant’s second period of detention, overcrowding at Łódź Prison had ranged from highs of 18.5% in July 2008 and 19.4% in August 2008 to a low of 2.5% in June and August 2009. The overall capacity of Łódź Prison from 17 July 2008 to 13 August 2009 was exceeded on average by 10.4%. 21.  The Government did not contest the fact that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells in Łódź Prison. 22.  On 25 May 2008 the applicant brought a civil action for infringement of his personal rights on account of the inadequate living conditions in Łódź Remand Centre (between November 2004 and June 2011). The applicant argued that he had been detained in overcrowded cells with space that was below the minimum statutory standard. He claimed 290,000 Polish zlotys (PLN – 37,500 euros (EUR)) in compensation. 23.  On 28 April 2010 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed the applicant’s action. The court found that the applicant had been detained in overcrowded cells from 17 August 2005 to 26 April 2010. Nevertheless, the applicant had failed to prove that those conditions of detention had had any adverse effects on his health. The applicant appealed. The State Treasury, represented during the proceedings by a professional lawyer, did not submit any objections neither to the period nor to the indications of the prison facilities in which the applicant had been held. 24.  On 17 September 2010 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) amended the above judgment, granted the applicant PLN 6,000 (EUR 1,500) in compensation and dismissed the remainder of his appeal. The court held that the award was adequate redress for the period in which the applicant had been detained in permanently overcrowded cells. The court found that the applicant had been held in overcrowded cells for most of the time of his detention. The domestic court exempted the applicant from paying the costs of the proceedings but ordered him to reimburse part of the legal fees paid by the respondent, a sum of PLN 1,000 (EUR 250). 25.  In a letter dated 15 February 2011, the applicant’s legal aid lawyer issued an opinion that there were no legal grounds to lodge a cassation appeal. 26.  The Government submitted that the applicant had been served with the opinion by his legal aid lawyer on 15 February 2011 and again by the Łódź Court of Appeal on 27 September 2012. The Government attached to their observations a postal slip confirming the February date for the posting of the opinion to the applicant at Łódź Remand Centre.\n(b)  The applicant’s submissions 27.  The applicant submitted that the legal opinion dated 15 February 2011 had not been served on him as he had been on a temporary release between 8 February 2011 and 22 February 2012. The applicant submitted a certificate to the Court issued by Łódź Remand Centre confirming the above dates.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Bar (Montenegro). 7.  On 6 February and 4 March 2009 the applicant entered Croatia from Montenegro and deposited – on each occasion – the sum of EUR 90,000 with a commercial bank in Dubrovnik, without declaring these amounts to the custom authorities. 8.  On 2 June 2009 the Money Laundering Prevention Office (Ured za sprječavanje pranja novca) informed the Financial Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo financija, Financijski inspektorat, hereinafter “the Ministry”) that on 30 March 2009 the applicant had ordered a transfer of EUR 95,000 from his bank account to the account of a certain Mr S.K. in a bank in the United Arab Emirates. The Money Laundering Prevention Office stated that the funds had originated from the two above-mentioned cash deposits of EUR 90,000 each. 9.  On the same day, 2 June 2009, administrative offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) were instituted against the applicant before the Administrative Offences Council (Vijeće za prekršajni postupak) of the Ministry for his failure to declare the sum of EUR 180,000 while entering Croatia, an administrative offence as defined in section 40(1) of the Foreign Currency Act and section 74 of the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act (see paragraphs 16-17 below). On the same day the Administrative Offences Council ordered the bank to transfer EUR 180,000 from the applicant’s account to the Ministry’s account, to be kept there until the conclusion of the administrative offence proceedings. 10.  On 1 July, 17 August and 17 September 2009 hearings were held before the Administrative Offences Council. In his defence, the applicant explained that he had sold business premises in Montenegro, and that he had intended to use the money gained from that sale to purchase a flat in Podgorica (Montenegro) from a Croatian national, S.K., who had insisted that the money be paid to him from a Croatian bank account. The applicant provided a written copy of the contract of sale in respect of his business premises dated 25 December 2007, and a preliminary agreement relating to the purchase of the flat in Podgorica dated 18 March 2009. 11.  By a decision of 19 October 2009 the Administrative Offences Council found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence in question and fined him 10,000 Croatian kunas (HRK). At the same time, the Administrative Offences Council imposed a protective measure (zaštitna mjera), confiscating the EUR 180,000 pursuant to section 69(2) of the Foreign Currency Act (see paragraph 16 below). The Administrative Offences Council held that the evidence presented did not corroborate the applicant’s defence. In particular, while the applicant had indeed submitted a preliminary agreement relating to the purchase of a flat in Podgorica which had been concluded between himself and S.K., that agreement had been concluded two weeks after the commission of the offence, and the sale price indicated in it (EUR 125,000) did not correspond to the amount he had brought into Croatia. The Administrative Offences Council also held that its decision to apply the protective measure was influenced by the fact that the applicant had been unable to provide sufficient evidence to justify his earlier money transfers to accounts in Tunisia and Jordan belonging to S.K. and S.K.’s wife, totalling EUR 882,900 in the period between 2005 and 2008, and the fact that he had stated that he had opened a non-resident’s account in his name in order to do a favour to S.K., namely in order to transfer money from the sale of S.K.’s wife’s house, deposited on his account, to S.K.’s wife’s accounts. With respect to the scope of the confiscation and the amount of the fine, the Administrative Offences Council held as follows:\n“With this type of administrative offence, what is important for the purposes of ordering a protective measure is whether the statements of the accused can be supported by relevant documents. If, in terms of amounts and dates, there is no link between the transfers whereby the accused acquired the funds and the business transactions for which those funds were intended, or if [those transfers] do not have a basis in lawful transactions, the Administrative Offences Council cannot apply section 69(4) of the Foreign Currency Act, which allows that, in particularly justified situations where special mitigating circumstances exist, the authority adjudicating on the administrative offence may decide not to confiscate or confiscate only in part the cash that was the object of the offence.\nEarlier transfers from [the applicant’s] account and the motives for opening that non-resident’s account also influenced the decision to impose the protective measure ...\nIn determining the amount of the fine the [Administrative Offences] Council took into account [the applicant’s] admission of guilt and the absence of a criminal record as mitigating circumstances, and the value of the object of the administrative offence as an aggravating circumstance. [Therefore] it imposed a fine which corresponds to the gravity of the offence.” 12.  The applicant appealed by arguing, inter alia, that the imposition of the protective measure of confiscation was disproportionate in the circumstances and therefore contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. In so arguing, he referred to the Court’s case-law, in particular to the case of Gabrić v. Croatia (no. 9702/04, 5 February 2009). 13.  By a decision of 23 December 2009 the High Court for Administrative Offences (Visoki prekršajni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Administrative Offences Council’s decision, endorsing the reasons given therein. 14.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging, inter alia, a violation of his constitutionally protected right of ownership. 15.  By a decision of 9 December 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible on the grounds that the case did not raise a constitutional issue.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Kyiv. 5.  In 1995-2002 the applicant was convicted of and served a sentence for aggravated theft and burglary. 6.  On 27 December 2005 and 6 January 2006 the police found the applicant in possession of illegal drugs. 7.  On 20 January 2006 the police arrested the applicant on suspicion of drug manufacturing and possession. 8.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant and a certain Mr I. for armed robbery committed in a group. 9.  On 23 January 2006 the Kyiv Podilsky District Court (“the District Court”) ordered the applicant’s detention on remand until 20 March 2006 on the grounds that he had previous convictions and there was a risk that he would abscond, continue his criminal activities or obstruct the investigation. 10.  On 16 March 2006 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 20 April 2006, stating that there was no reason to change it and there was a need to carry out investigative actions. 11.  On 27 June 2006 the District Court held a preliminary hearing in the case and upheld the preventive measure imposed on the applicant without giving any reasons or setting a time-limit for it. 12.  On 17 March and 14 July 2008, and 19 January and 23 April 2009 the District Court refused the applicant’s requests for release. 13.  On 17 July 2009 the District Court convicted the applicant of drug possession and armed robbery committed in a group and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. 14.  On 27 July 2010 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the District Court for fresh consideration. 15.  On the same day the applicant was released against his undertaking not to abscond. 16.  On 30 September 2013 the District Court sent the case against the applicant to the prosecutor for further investigation. 17.  On 25 April 2014 the charges concerning the armed robbery were separated into a second set of criminal proceedings. 18.  On 29 April 2014 the bill of indictment for robbery was approved and on 3 June 2014 the District Court committed the applicant for trial on that charge. 19.  As at the date of the last communication from the parties to the Court, 5 March 2015, proceedings against the applicant were still pending before the District Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was born in 1984 and moved to live in Russia in the early 2000s. 8.  In 2008 she met A.U., a Russian national, and they started living together in the Krasnodar Region. In 2009 the applicant’s daughter from a previous marriage moved in with them to attend a primary school. On 16 March 2012 the applicant and A.U. married and on 23 August 2012 their son was born. He acquired Russian nationality. 9.  On 30 March 2013 the applicant was returning home by train after a visit to Ukraine, together with the two children. Shortly after midnight on 31 March 2013 the Russian Border Control Service handed her a notice, informing her that she would not be allowed to re-enter Russia, in accordance with the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. The notice did not specify the grounds for that decision. 10.  In April 2013 the applicant’s husband obtained a copy of a decision pronouncing her presence in Russia to be undesirable (“the exclusion order”), which the Consumer Protection Authority (CPA) had issued on 9 June 2012. The text of the order indicated that the applicant’s presence in Russia had been declared undesirable by the Krasnodar regional division of the CPA on 9 June 2012, in accordance with section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. It did not state any facts or reasons for the applicant’s exclusion. It directed the applicant to leave Russia by 22 June 2012 or face deportation and informed her that she would be denied re-entry to Russia, in accordance with section 27 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. It subsequently transpired that the basis for the exclusion order was that during her pregnancy in 2012 the applicant had tested positive for HIV and that the hospital had reported her HIV-positive status to the CPA. 11.  According to the Government, the Krasnodar division of the CPA sent the exclusion order to the applicant by registered mail on 19 June 2012. They produced a log of registered correspondence which was to be submitted to the post office for dispatch on that date. 12.  The applicant’s husband, acting as the claimant and also as the applicant’s representative, challenged the exclusion order before the Russian courts, claiming in particular that the CPA had disregarded the applicant’s family connections in Russia and her state of health. 13.  On 24 May 2013 the Tsentralnyy District Court in Sochi rejected the claim in summary fashion, repeating verbatim the text of the exclusion order and holding that it was lawful. On 23 July 2013 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment, finding that the applicant’s infection with HIV “created a real threat to the Russian population”. 14.  In the statement of appeal to the cassation instance, the applicant’s husband prayed in aid the position of the Russian Constitutional Court which emphasised the necessity to take humanitarian considerations into account when deciding on the removal of a family member, and on the Court’s case‑law under Article 8 of the Convention. He pointed out that the applicant’s husband and newborn son were Russian nationals, that her daughter was enrolled in a Russian school and that the HIV infection was in a latent stage. On 30 September and 19 December 2013 the Krasnodar Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Russia respectively issued summary decisions, dismissing the application for an examination of the case by the cassation instance. 15.  The applicant and her daughter eventually took up residence in Novogrodovka in the Donetsk Region of Ukraine. Her husband and their son have been living in St Petersburg, Russia. The husband was unable to visit her in the Donetsk Region. 16.  On 12 March 2015 the Constitutional Court ruled on a constitutional challenge brought by the applicant and two other aliens and their Russian spouses against section 11(2) of the HIV Prevention Act, section 7(1)(13) of the Foreign Nationals Act, and section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act. The Constitutional Court held that migration laws can lawfully restrict access to Russia by non-Russian nationals whose medical condition might jeopardise public health and pose a threat to national security. It acknowledged the contemporary medical consensus that HIV did not pose a threat to public health because it could not be transmitted merely because of the presence of an infected individual in the country or through casual contact, airborne particles, food or water. The Constitutional Court held as follows:\n“1.  To declare that the closely related provisions of section 25.10 of the Entry and Exit Procedures Act, section 11(2) of the HIV Prevention Act, and section 7(1)(13) of the Foreign Nationals Act are incompatible with the Russian Constitution ... in so far as they allow [the executive authorities] to declare undesirable the presence of a foreign national or a stateless person whose family permanently resides in Russia, to issue a deportation order or an entry ban, to refuse him a residence permit or to cancel a previously issued residence permit solely because that person is HIV-positive, provided that the person has complied with the legal requirements on HIV-positive individuals relating to the prevention of spreading the infection, and provided that no other circumstances would call for such restrictions. 2.  The federal legislator should – in the light of the requirements of the Russian Constitution and the position of the Constitutional Court, as expressed in the present judgment – introduce the necessary amendments into the existing corpus of laws which would clarify the grounds and the procedure for making decisions relating to the right of HIV-positive foreign nationals or stateless persons to stay and live in the Russian Federation.”\nPending such amendments, the Constitutional Court directed that the executive and judicial authorities be guided by the position it had formulated in the judgment. 17.  On 20 April 2015 the applicant’s husband applied to the Tsentralnyy District Court in Sochi for a reconsideration of the District Court’s judgment of 24 May 2013 on account of the new case-law of the Constitutional Court. On 3 July 2015 the District Court dismissed his application. It found that, lacking the information that the applicant had been receiving antiretroviral therapy, she must be presumed to be a threat to others, including those with whom she had social and casual contact. The District Court also stated that she was not a law-abiding individual because she had given birth to a child in Russia after her presence there had been declared undesirable. 18.  The applicant’s husband appealed and on 22 October 2015 the Krasnodar Regional Court quashed the above judgment, finding that the District Court had not heeded the position of the Constitutional Court and had incorrectly shifted the burden of proof onto the applicant:\n“The Krasnodar office of the Consumer Protection Authority did not produce any evidence of Ms Ustinova’s conviction under Article 122 of the Criminal Code (Infection by HIV) and/or under Article 6.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (Concealing the source of HIV infection). Nor did it show that she had breached any obligation which the law imposes on HIV-positive individuals, for instance, by refusing to take antiretroviral therapy. No such information is available in the case file, whereas the court establishes that [the applicant and her husband] are both receiving medical treatment. It follows that the first-instance court’s finding that Ms Ustinova’s presence constitutes a threat to other Russian residents, including those with whom she has had social and casual contact, is erroneous and contradicts the Constitutional Court’s judgment since the mere fact of HIV infection is not a ground for applying such important restrictions on her private life.” 19.  The Regional Court pronounced the exclusion order unlawful and directed the Krasnodar office of the Consumer Protection Authority to redress the effects of the violation. 20.  In response to the Court’s request for additional information of 12 May 2016 (see paragraph 4 above), on 29 June 2016 the Government submitted that the applicant had crossed the Russian border on 17 August 2015. On 18 May 2016 the Federal Migration Service issued her a three‑year temporary residence permit. On 31 May 2016 the Consumer Protection Authority informed the Border Control Service about the annulment of the exclusion order. Lastly, the Government indicated that measures for removing her name from the list of persons who should be refused entry to Russia, “[were] being taken”. 21.  The applicant replied that she had only been able to re-enter Russia by crossing the border between Ukraine and Belarus and by continuing from Belarus to Russia, as there are no controls on the Belarus-Russia border. As of 16 August 2016, she has not been notified that the exclusion order of 9 June 2012 was formally rescinded and that the Border Control database was updated accordingly.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Rijeka. He is a professor of theology. As a professor of theology he was qualified to teach Catholic religious education and courses in ethics and culture, as provided under the relevant domestic law (see paragraph 36 below). 7.  On the basis of a proposal from the applicant’s local priest, the archbishop of the Rijeka Archdiocese (Riječka Nadbiskupija) issued the applicant with a canonical mandate (missio canonica) (no. 492/08-2002) authorising him to teach Catholic religious education. 8.  On 1 September 2003, following the intervention of the Catechetical Office of the Rijeka Archdiocese (Katehetski ured riječke Nadbiskupije), the applicant was offered, without having to undergo a public competition, a contract of employment of indefinite duration as a layman teacher of Catholic religious education in two State high schools in Opatija. 9.  The applicant’s appointment was based on the Agreement of 18 December 1996 between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs and the relevant complementary domestic regulations (see paragraphs 32, 40-41, 43-44 below). He was thereby employed in the public service and remunerated by the State. 10.  At the time, the applicant was married to T.F. They had married in a religious ceremony on 14 December 2002 and their marriage had been recognised at the same time by the civil authorities, as provided for under the relevant domestic law (see paragraphs 33 and 38 below). 11.  The applicant’s subsequent divorce from T.F. was registered before the civil authorities, and in March 2006 he married another woman in a civil ceremony. 12.  On 18 April 2006 the Rijeka Archdiocese informed the applicant that his civil marriage to another woman while still bound, in the eyes of the Church, by the religious marriage to his previous wife was contrary to Christian doctrine and disqualified him from teaching religious education. The relevant part of the letter read:\n“It has been established that in March this year you concluded a civil marriage although you are still bound by the Sacrament of Matrimony to a third person. The local Catechetical Office of the Rijeka Archdiocese issued you a mandate to teach Catholic religious education in school. Each religious education teacher must demonstrate that he is ‘outstanding in true doctrine and the witness of a Christian life’ (Canon 804 § 2) and must participate in the sacramental and evangelical community of a parish. The new situation does not enable you to do this.\nYou are therefore invited to explain in writing as soon as possible the manner in which your canonical situation can be harmonised with canonical mandate no. 492/08-2002 and then, by 28 April 2006, to come for a meeting in the Catechetical Office.” 13.  After obtaining the applicant’s explanation of his situation, on 31 August 2006 the Rijeka Archdiocese withdrew his canonical mandate to teach Catholic religious education. 14.  On the same day the Rijeka Archdiocese informed the two schools in which the applicant was employed of the new situation. The relevant part of the letter read:\n“We should inform you that on 31 August 2006 canonical mandate no. 492/08-2002 was withdrawn from the teacher of religious education, Petar Travaš.\nThe canonical mandate was withdrawn under Article 3 § 2 of the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs (Official Gazette-International Contracts no. 2/1997) because of a breach of Canon Law (Canon 804 § 2). Petar Travaš explained his situation in writing.” 15.  On 8 September 2006, relying on section 106 § 1(2) of the Labour Act (regular termination of an employment contract), the schools dismissed the applicant from his teaching job on the grounds that he could no longer be a teacher of Catholic religious education without a canonical mandate. They stressed that it had been impossible to find another position for the applicant or to offer him an alternative post within the schools. The applicant was given two months’ notice and the right to an indemnity. 16.  On 13 October 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Opatija Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Opatiji), challenging the decisions on his dismissal. 17.  On 22 February 2007 the Opatija Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s civil action on the grounds that as stipulated in the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia and the related Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference on Catholic religious education in State schools and pre-school institutions, he could not teach Catholic religious education without a canonical mandate. The Opatija Municipal Court also found that the schools had examined the possibility of appointing the applicant to another suitable post, but that as there was no such post, they had justifiably terminated his contract of employment. 18.  The applicant challenged the judgment of the Opatija Municipal Court by lodging an appeal before the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci). He argued that he had not breached the Labour Act or any other relevant legislation and that the Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference did not require that a person whose canonical mandate had been withdrawn should be dismissed. 19.  On 17 October 2007 the Rijeka County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the findings and reasoning of the Opatija Municipal Court. 20.  On 18 and 19 February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) and a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) respectively. He relied, inter alia, on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, and the corresponding provisions of the Constitution, arguing that there had been an unjust interference with his private and family life as a result of the decisions on his dismissal, and that his dismissal had been of a discriminatory nature. He contended, in particular, that the conclusion of a second marriage contract in a civil ceremony could not be a reason for dismissal under the Labour Act or any other State laws. He therefore considered that his dismissal based on the fact that he had divorced his former wife and remarried in a civil ceremony had disproportionately affected his private life. 21.  On 3 December 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower courts. In particular, the Supreme Court stressed that the applicant’s dismissal had been based on the withdrawal of his canonical mandate, which was a necessary requirement for employment as a teacher of Catholic religious education as provided for under the relevant domestic law. The Supreme Court also held that it was not for the schools or the courts to enter into the examination of the reasons for the withdrawal of the applicant’s canonical mandate by the Church. 22.  On 7 February 2009 the applicant supplemented his constitutional complaint by extending his arguments to the judgment of the Supreme Court. He contended in particular that the Supreme Court’s refusal to examine the reasons for his dismissal had essentially deprived him of the possibility to have those reasons effectively challenged in court. 23.  A public hearing was held and on 22 May 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint, finding that there had been no violation of his right to respect for his private and family life, or any discrimination against him. The relevant part of the decision reads:\n“10.1.2. It follows from the available material and the [appellant’s] constitutional complaint that the appellant’s first marriage had been concluded in a religious ceremony before an official of the religious community and that [the appellant] was divorced on the basis of a final court decision as provided for under the relevant Croatian law. The Constitutional Court notes that the appellant subsequently concluded a new marriage in a civil ceremony without any restriction imposed by the State. It follows that the State did not inhibit his determination to remarry, nor did it prevent him from remarrying and founding a new family.\nAccordingly, the appellant’s right to marry under Article 12 of the Convention and his constitutional right to respect for his family life under Article 35 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention has not been breached.\n...\n 10.2.2. ... [T[he Constitutional Court starts by observing that the Republic of Croatia and the Holy See concluded an Agreement on education and cultural affairs, signed in Zagreb on 18 December 1996. The Act ratifying that Agreement came into force on 11 February 1997 and thereby this international treaty became part of the internal legal order of the Republic of Croatia with precedence in terms of its legal effects over the [domestic] statutes.\nBy this Agreement the Republic of Croatia undertook certain obligations which must be abided by and respected. Primarily, it undertook to secure Catholic religious education in all State elementary and high schools and all pre-school institutions as a mandatory class for all those who have chosen that course, under the same conditions applicable to other mandatory classes.\n[The Agreement] stipulates that Catholic religious education will be taught by qualified religious education teachers who are suitable for that position, in the opinion of the Church authorities, and meet the requisite legal requirements of the Croatian legislation. It also stipulates that teachers of religious education must hold a canonical mandate (missio canonica) issued by the diocesan bishop, and that withdrawal of the mandate leads to an immediate loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education. Under the Agreement, teachers of religious education are members, together with their pupils, of the educational corps ... The Republic of Croatia undertook to regulate the programme and functioning of Catholic religious education in schools of all types and levels by a special agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference.\nThe Constitutional Court considers it necessary to note at this point that the appellant is wrong when he argues that the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs does not require a canonical mandate as a condition for employment and that such a requirement only flows from the Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference on Catholic religious education in State schools and pre-school institutions of 29 January 1999. The appellant specifically contends that the Agreement between the Government [of the Republic of Croatia] and the Croatian Episcopal Conference is a bilateral agreement which ‘is not a statute and does not have the status of an international treaty’ and thus could not be binding for [him and the State] nor could it be applied to [his] case, as was done by the [lower] courts.\nAlthough the appellant relies on an erroneous premise that the canonical mandate, as a condition for employment as a teacher of religious education, has been stipulated (only) by the Agreement between the Government [of the Republic of Croatia] and the Croatian Episcopal Conference, it could be held that in essence he considers that the consequences of the withdrawal of the canonical mandate on his contract of employment, and his position of teacher of religious education, are contrary to the Constitution.\nThe Constitutional Court reiterates that the requirement to hold a canonical mandate in order to teach religious education, and the consequences of its withdrawal (loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education), are provided for under Article 3 of the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs. ... 10.2.3. The Constitutional Court considers it necessary to examine the special requirement stipulated by the Vatican agreements for employment as a teacher of religious education – the canonical mandate.\nThe Constitutional Court firstly notes that the Government of the Republic of Croatia have so far concluded seven agreements on questions of mutual interest with different religious communities, in particular with:\n- the Serbian Orthodox Church in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 163/03);\n- the Islamic community in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 196/03);\n- the Evangelical Church in Croatia and the Christian Reformed Church in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 196/03);\n- the Evangelical (Pentecostal) Church in Croatia, the Christian Adventist Church in Croatia and the Baptist Union of Croatia (Official Gazette no. 196/03);\n- the Bulgarian Orthodox Church in Croatia, the Croatian Old Catholic Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church in Croatia (Official Gazette nos. 196/03 and 141/04);\n- the Jewish community Bet Israel in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 4/12); and\n- the Coordination of Jewish townships in Croatia (Official Gazette no. 4/12).\nAll these agreements have been concluded under the Act on the Legal Status of Religious Communities (Official Gazette no. 83/02) and they all contain identical provisions concerning, for example, mandatory religious education classes for those who have chosen them, the teaching of these courses under the same conditions as other mandatory courses, and the necessity for teachers of religious education to hold the requisite mandate to teach religious education, which can always be withdrawn ‘for reasons of deficiencies related to the correctness of teaching and personal morality’.\nSuch a requirement, given the nature of their job and its proximity with the mission of dissemination of the church’s teaching, in the Constitutional Court’s view, is not an excessive burden for persons who have chosen to become teachers of religious education. The assessment of a person’s adequacy [to teach religious education] by the competent church authorities is a concretisation of the freedom of the church’s activity and the right to religious freedom, which [also] includes the right of parents to a religious education of their children. 10.2.4. The enforcement of the obligation undertaken by an international agreement, namely the organisation of Catholic religious education in State elementary and high schools and pre-school education institutions, as provided for under the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs and the Agreement between the Government of Croatia and the Croatian Episcopal Conference, brought religious education teachers into the employment system of the Republic of Croatia. Although their employment status is not fully defined by these Agreements, the provisions of the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs in themselves show that the employment status of religious education teachers is a sui generis employment status – in order to teach religious education they must be suitable for that position in the opinion of the Church authorities; they must hold a canonical mandate and the withdrawal of the mandate leads to the loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education.\nAt the public hearing – on the basis of evidence given by the Director of the Administration for legal affairs of the Ministry of Science, Education and Sport of the Republic of Croatia S.S.B., it has been undoubtedly established that the employment of all teachers of religious education was conducted without an open competition, although that has not been provided for under the relevant law. It was only [later], after the public hearing, by section 12 of the amendments to the Act on Tuition and Education in Elementary and High Schools (Official Gazette no. 90/11) that a new section 107 § 10(6) was introduced, which provides that a contract of employment without an open competition may be concluded for the position of religious education teacher.\nIn June 2000 the Ministry of Education and Sport forwarded to all county offices for education, culture, information, sport and technical culture a letter concerning the employment status of religious education teachers in elementary and high schools; more precisely, concerning their hiring and dismissal.\nThe letter indicates that a contract of employment is to be concluded with religious education teachers meeting the relevant requirements, and that if the diocesan bishop by means of a decree withdraws the canonical mandate to teach Catholic religious education from a religious education teacher due to deficiencies related to the correctness of the teaching and personal morality, the contract of employment is to be terminated under section 107 of the Labour Act as an extraordinary dismissal. 10.2.5. It therefore follows that the appellant also entered the State education system without participating in an open competition. At the public hearing he stated that, on the basis of the local priest’s recommendation the bishop had given him the mandate, the Ordinary had acted as an intermediary, and the school had given him the employment. Thus, by having the canonical mandate and meeting all other requirements, the appellant and the defendants concluded a ‘classical’ contract of employment under the Labour Act, which does not mention the canonical mandate or the consequences of its possible withdrawal.\nAt the public hearing, when asked whether he had been aware of the consequences of his conduct on the right to teach religious education, the appellant stated that he had passed the exam in canon law which he could not have passed without learning [also the issues] concerning those consequences. It follows that the appellant knew that his position depended on the mandate given by the diocesan bishop and that he would lose it if the mandate were withdrawn.\nAccordingly, although he had concluded a ‘classical’ employment contract under the Labour Act, the appellant could not have expected, after he had lost the canonical mandate as a consequence of entering into a new civil marriage while he was still in a ‘religious’ marriage with a third person, that he would be able to continue to teach religious education. However, he could have expected, irrespective of the internal instructions of the Minister, that the schools where he was employed would take all necessary measures to employ him in another post. This is because the withdrawal of the canonical mandate leads to the loss of the right to teach Catholic religious education and not dismissal or the loss of his degree in theology. Under section 2 of the By-law on the educational level and pedagogical-psychological education of teachers in high schools (Official Gazette nos. 1/86 and 80/99), a degree in theology [opens the possibility] of teaching courses in ethics and culture.\nAccording to the findings of the first-instance court, the defendants had examined the possibility of employing the appellant in another post but, as such a post had not existed, they terminated his contract of employment by so-called regular dismissal, which gives rise to the right to a notice period and an indemnity. In so doing, the defendants acted in the usual manner for terminating a contract of employment by so-called regular dismissal. The Constitutional Court therefore finds that the appellant has not been treated differently from other workers, including employees in schools, in the situation of a termination of a contract of employment by so-called regular dismissal.\nThe assessment of the lawfulness of the termination of the appellant’s contract of employment was, in the light of the relevant labour law, conducted by the [competent] courts at three levels of jurisdiction. In view of the fact that for the position of teacher of religious education there is a further special requirement, without which it is impossible to conclude a contract of employment (a canonical mandate), and having found that the appellant, due to the withdrawal of [the canonical mandate] no longer met the requirements for teaching Catholic religious education, and the fact that the defendants had tried to find him another post ..., the [competent] courts, in the Constitutional Court’s view, applied a constitutionally acceptable interpretation according to which the appellant’s contract of employment had been terminated in accordance with the relevant law. 10.2.6. Against the above background, in view of the defendants’ conduct following the withdrawal of the appellant’s canonical mandate and in view of the manner in which the competent courts provided him with judicial protection in terms of the State’s obligations under the Vatican agreements, the Constitutional Court finds that the appellant has been afforded sufficient protection of his [employment rights].” 24.  Judge D.K. appended a concurring opinion to the decision, agreeing with the findings of the majority. However, he argued that the Constitutional Court had not sufficiently appreciated the fact that the applicant had voluntarily consented to his position depending on the canonical mandate, which the diocesan bishop was authorised to issue and to withdraw. 25.  The President of the Constitutional Court gave a dissenting opinion in which she argued, in particular, that the normative framework for the employment of teachers of religious education, based on the Agreement between the Holy See and Croatia on education and cultural affairs, had not been implemented sufficiently precisely in the relevant domestic employment system, which had left a number of issues undetermined. 26.  The decision of the Constitutional Court was served on the applicant’s representative on 27 May 2013. 27.  In March 2010 T.F. applied to the Rijeka First-instance Inter-diocesan Matrimony Court (Interdijecezanski ženidbeni sud prvog stupnja u Rijeci) for the annulment of her religious marriage to the applicant on the grounds that, when entering into the marriage, he had demonstrated “a positive act of the will excluding marriage itself” (see paragraph 45 below, canon 1101 § 2). 28.  On 16 August 2012 the Rijeka First-instance Inter-diocesan Matrimony Court accepted T.F.’s application and annulled her religious marriage to the applicant. The decision was then forwarded for examination to the Zagreb Inter-diocesan Appeal Court (Međubiskupijski prizivni sud u Zagrebu). 29.  The proceedings were held in the applicant’s absence because he had failed to respond to the court’s summons. During the proceedings, an email sent by the applicant to T.F. on 4 December 2009 was admitted as evidence. In the email the applicant stated that if he “could return all other sacraments [he] would gladly do it. This way, if [he] managed to get rid of only one, which, as [they] both knew, never existed, [his] heart would be happier.” 30.  On the basis of the evidence adduced, on 24 April 2013 the Zagreb Inter-diocesan Appeal Court upheld the decision of the Rijeka First-instance Inter-diocesan Matrimony Court annulling the applicant’s religious marriage to T.F.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant, Mr Vladimir Nikolayevich Ruban, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1972 and is currently serving a life sentence. 6.  On 13 August 1996 the Voznesensk local prosecutor’s office in the Mykolayiv region started an investigation into the murder of four persons on 12 August 1996. 7.  On 18 October 1999 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office started investigating the murder of A. 8.  On 10 November 1999 the Slavyansk Police Department of the Donetsk region started an investigation into hooliganism concerning R. 9.  On 22 November 1999 the above three investigations were joined. Several persons were suspected of committing the above crimes as a group, one of them being the applicant. 10.  On 14 December 1999 the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office formally charged the applicant in absentia with the above crimes. He was also placed on the list of wanted persons. The same day the investigation in respect of the applicant was suspended until he was apprehended; the criminal proceedings continued in respect of the other suspects. 11.  On 23 December 2002, the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal convicted and sentenced G., P. and F. for the above mentioned crimes. 12.  On 2 February 2004 the Slavyansk Local Court ordered the applicant’s detention. 13.  On 28 June 2007 the applicant was apprehended by the Yartsevo Prosecutor’s Office in the Smolensk region, Russia. 14.  On 31 March 2008 the investigation was resumed after the applicant had been extradited to Ukraine. The same day the applicant was formally charged with participation in an organised criminal group together with G., P., F. and two other persons, who had died in the intervening time. The applicant was accused of strangling A., of killing four persons together with G. in 1996 and inflicting grievous bodily harm on R. in a murder attempt, the latter crime in the context of the extortion of R’s brother. All these crimes had been committed as a group. 15.  On 22 May 2008 the investigation was completed and on 26 June 2008 the case was transferred to the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal. 16.  On 10 July 2009 the Court of Appeal, acting as a first-instance court, found the applicant guilty of aggravated murder and banditry and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 17.  The applicant and his lawyer appealed, considering that the applicant’s guilt had not been proved. 18.  On 15 July 2010 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the judgment of 10 July 2009. On that day the applicant’s lawyer submitted an additional appeal claiming that the Court of Appeal had to apply the most favourable wording of the relevant provisions of the Criminal Code, which was that between 29 December 1999 and 29 March 2000 when the death penalty had already been abolished and life imprisonment had not yet been introduced. The Supreme Court in its decision noted that the applicant had been sentenced correctly.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Frolovo, Volgograd region. 6.  On 17 April 2009 Mr K. was found with very serious bodily injuries in the entrance to a block of flats. He died in hospital several days later. 7.  Between 7.15 a.m. and 8.55 a.m. on 18 April 2009 the scene of the incident was examined by investigator P. from the investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd with the participation of attesting witnesses, police officers, and the applicant, who lived in the same block of flats. According to the record of the examination of the scene of the incident, the applicant stated that he had physically assaulted K. and described the circumstances of the crime committed by him against K. At around 9.30 a.m. the applicant was brought to the police station of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district of Volgograd (УВД по Красноармейскому району г. Волгограда), where operative police officers interviewed him about the circumstances of the crime. 8.  According to the applicant, they demanded that he give statements concerning the circumstances of the crime committed by him and subjected him to ill-treatment which the applicant described as follows. Having handcuffed him, they punched and kicked him, hitting him with a rubber truncheon and giving him electric shocks using a device called a “TP-50”. The applicant gave the statements as demanded. 9.  At 6 p.m. investigator Ye. of the investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and his brother. At 8 p.m. the investigator drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect and questioned him from 8.30 p.m. until 10 p.m. in the presence of D., a State-appointed lawyer invited by investigator Ye. The applicant repeated the statements incriminating himself and his brother and also stated that the previous evening he had been drunk and had fallen down a flight of stairs, and that he therefore had a headache and pain in the area of his ribs and kidneys. 10.  At 2.15 a.m. on 19 April 2009 the applicant was placed in a temporary detention facility (an “IVS”) at the Volgograd town police department. According to a document signed by a senior police transportation officer, the IVS duty officer and the applicant, the applicant had: (i) a haematoma on the left side of the body; (ii) a swelling on the left hip; and (iii) a swelling and redness on the right ear. 11.  On 20 April 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court ordered his detention on remand. The applicant was taken to hospital no. 15. He complained of pain in his chest and in his left knee joint, and of generally feeling unwell. At the hospital he was diagnosed with contusion to the thoracic cage and left wrist, and his condition was assessed as not incompatible with being detained in a pre-trial detention facility. 12.  On 21 April 2009 the applicant was placed in pre-trial detention facility SIZO-4, where he was examined by the SIZO doctor who recorded multiple abrasions and haematomas on his trunk, and contusion to the thoracic cage and left wrist. The applicant was interviewed by the SIZO officer. He stated that he had received the injuries as a result of ill-treatment by police officers on 18 April 2009 whilst held at the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department of Volgograd. 13.  The SIZO operative unit carried out an inquiry into the incident and concluded in a report of 22 April 2009 ‒ approved by the acting head of the SIZO ‒ that the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted by police officers from the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department at about 11 a.m. on 18 April 2009 during the applicant’s interview. 14.  On 28 April 2009 the applicant was examined as an accused in the presence of lawyer D. The applicant stated that when examined as a suspect on 18 April 2009 he had given statements – concerning the origin of his injuries and also his brother’s involvement in the crime – as demanded by the police officers who had ill-treated him, as he had still been in physical pain and was under the influence of threats from them, as well as threats from investigator Ye. that he would find himself at the hands of those police officers again should he not give “correct” statements. The applicant described the circumstances of his alleged ill-treatment and retracted the statements he had given earlier incriminating his brother. The criminal proceedings against his brother were eventually discontinued for lack of evidence. The applicant reiterated his self-incriminating statements. 15.  On 29 April 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigation division of the investigative committee at the Volgograd regional prosecutor’s office (“the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee”) received a communication from the SIZO concerning the applicant’s injuries. 16.  On 5 May 2009 a forensic medical examination of the applicant was carried out at the request of the investigator in charge of the criminal case against the applicant. The applicant stated to the medical expert that on 18 April 2009 he had been physically assaulted at the police station of the Krasnoarmejskiy district of Volgograd by police officers who had delivered many blows to his lumbar region, chest, shoulders, hips and ears, and had used a device called a “TP-50” to ill-treat him. He complained of pain in his chest. During the applicant’s forensic medical examination, the expert detected only one linear abrasion, measuring 23 mm by 2 mm, located within a bruise of indeterminate form on the left side of the applicant’s chest. The expert concluded that this injury had come about as a result of at least one (possibly tangential) impact by a hard, blunt object of limited surface area seven to nine days before the applicant’s examination, and had not caused him any “damage to his health ”. 17.  On 6 May 2009 investigator N. in charge of the inquiry into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment ordered an examination of the applicant’s medical records by the forensic medical expert . The investigator inquired whether the injuries could have been received as a result of the applicant falling down from his own height and hitting himself against “protruberant objects in the vicinity”. A forensic medical expert concluded in a report of 8 May 2009 that the applicant’s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects and surfaces – including the applicant falling from his own height and colliding with curved objects. The expert further concluded that it was hard to establish the time at which the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted. 18.  Between 9 May 2009 and 16 June 2010 investigators from the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee issued eight refusals to initiate criminal proceedings into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment, finding, in accordance with Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that none of the elements of the offences provided for in Articles 285 and 286 of the Criminal Code (on abuse of powers) were present in respect of the police officers’ actions. Those refusals were overruled by the head or deputy head of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee as being unlawful, and the investigators were ordered to carry out additional inquiries. 19.  On 10 September 2009 the Krasnoarmeyskiy District Court of Volgograd convicted the applicant of manslaughter and sentenced him to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant was ordered to pay 500,000 Russian roubles to the victim’s mother by way of compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. The applicant was found to have invited the victim to his flat, to have inflicted many injuries on him, then moving the victim to the landing of the stairwell near the applicant’s flat and leaving him there. The applicant pleaded guilty and his confession served as a mitigating factor. The court based its judgment on the applicant’s consistent confession statements, the results of the search carried out in his flat in which the victim’s passport and clothing had been found, and other evidence. The trial court found that the applicant’s injuries had been unrelated to the actions of the victim of the crime and had been sustained after the crime had been committed. 20.  According to the most recent decision of an investigator of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district investigative committee of 11 September 2010, the police officers in question denied subjecting the applicant to ill‑treatment. Investigator P. stated that during the examination of the scene of the incident on 18 April 2009 the applicant had confessed that he had committed the crime. According to police officers B., D. and M. ‒ as well as E., the head of the criminal investigating unit of the Krasnoarmeyskiy district police department ‒ the applicant had been brought to the police station on suspicion of having inflicted very serious bodily injuries on K. At some point the applicant had been taken from a cell to E.’s office. The police officers had inteviewed the applicant and established the circumstances of the crime against K. According to B., the applicant had complained of pain in his chest, explaining that he had fallen down a flight of stairs.  The applicant’s mother stated that on 16 April 2009 she had seen the applicant without any sign of physical injury. 21.  In his decision of 11 September 2010 the investigator noted that, while being questioned as a suspect on 18 April 2009, the applicant had explained that he had fallen down a flight of stairs the day before as a result of being in an inebriated state. The investigator further noted that the applicant’s forensic medical examination results indicated that the applicant’s multiple abrasions and haematomas could have come about as a result of blows from hard, blunt objects or collisions with such objects or surfaces – including the applicant falling from his own height. The investigator concluded that none of the constituent elements of the alleged crimes had been present in the conduct of the police officers and refused to institute criminal proceedings under Article 24 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 22.  On 2 March 2010 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the judgment in the applicant’s criminal case on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Baku. 5.  The opposition planned to hold demonstrations on 17 November 2012 and 26 January 2013 in Baku. 6.  On 12 November 2012, the organisers gave notice to the relevant authority, the Baku City Executive Authority (“the BCEA”), about the demonstration of 17 November 2012. It appears that no prior notice was given to the BCEA by the organisers of the demonstration of 26 January 2013. Information about that assembly was disseminated through Facebook or the press. 7.  The BCEA refused to authorise the holding of the demonstration of 17 November 2012, stating in general terms that that assembly was not in accordance with the Law on Freedom of Assembly. The BCEA further stated that the square where the organisers proposed to hold the assembly was a designated public leisure area and that the assembly itself was impractical. 8.  Nevertheless, the organisers decided to hold the demonstrations in the centre of Baku. 9.  According to the applicant, the demonstrations were intended to be peaceful and were conducted in a peaceful manner. The participants in the demonstration of 17 November 2012 were demanding democratic reforms in the country and protesting against impediments to freedom of assembly. The participants of the demonstration of 26 January 2013 were condemning the use of force by the police against participants of previous demonstrations. 10.  The applicant attended both demonstrations, but shortly after they had begun the police started to disperse them. In both cases the applicant was arrested during the dispersal operation and was taken to a police station, where he was questioned. According to the applicant, in the first case he was arrested by people in plain clothes. 11.  In both cases on the day of the applicant’s arrest, an “administrative‑offence report” (inzibati xəta haqqında protokol) was issued in respect of him. In the first case the report stated that by deliberately failing to comply with a lawful order from the police, the applicant had committed an administrative offence under Article 310.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences (“the CAO”). In the second case the applicant was charged with an administrative offence under Article 298.2 of the CAO (participation in a public assembly that had not been organised in accordance with the law). 12.  According to the applicant, he was never served with copies of the administrative-offence reports or with other documents from his case files. In neither case was he given access to a lawyer after the arrest or while in police custody. 13.  In both cases the applicant was brought before the Sabail District Court on the day of his arrest, 17 November 2012 and 26 January 2013 respectively. 14.  According to the applicant, the hearing before the court in both cases was very brief. Members of the public were not allowed to attend, even though the court had not taken a formal decision to close the hearing to the public. 15.  According to the applicant, in neither case was he given an opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. 16.  The record of the court hearing in the first case shows that the applicant declared that he did not need legal assistance and would defend himself in person. 17.  At the court hearing in the second case a State-funded lawyer was appointed to assist the applicant. According to documents submitted by the Government, the applicant refused the assistance of that lawyer and decided to defend himself in person. 18.  At the hearing in the first case the court did not question any witnesses. In the second case the court questioned two police officers. The police officers testified that they had arrested the applicant because he had staged an unauthorised demonstration. 19.  In both cases the first-instance court found that the applicant had participated in an unauthorised demonstration. 20.  In the first case, by a decision of 17 November 2012 the first‑instance court convicted the applicant under Article 310.1 of the CAO and sentenced him to five days’ “administrative” detention.  In the second case, by a decision of 26 January 2013 the court convicted the applicant under Article 298.2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 500 manats (AZN). 21.  On unspecified dates the applicant lodged appeals before the Baku Court of Appeal, arguing that his convictions were in violation of his rights because the demonstrations in which he had participated had been peaceful. He also complained that his arrests had been unlawful and that the hearings before the respective first-instance courts had not been fair. 22.  In the first case the applicant was assisted before the Baku Court of Appeal by a lawyer of his own choice. In the second case he was not represented by a lawyer. 23.  In both cases, on 23 November 2012 and 5 February 2013 respectively, the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of the first-instance court.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in İzmir. 5.  At the time of the events giving rise to this application, the applicant was working as a watchman on a construction site located in the vicinity of a military compound housing the 7th Gendarmerie Commando Regiment in Foça, İzmir. 6.  On 14 October 2008, sometime between 8 p.m. and 9 p.m., the applicant left the construction site to meet three friends, M.K., N.V., and F.T., who worked on nearby farms. While walking towards his friends, the applicant suddenly collapsed for an unknown reason; his friends immediately took him to hospital. The applicant’s initial medical examination at the Foça State Hospital did not reveal any findings other than a cut measuring 0.5 cm on his back between the tenth and eleventh ribs. However, a lung X-ray taken subsequently showed that a foreign object, which appeared to be a bullet, was lodged between his eleventh and twelfth ribs. The applicant was transferred to the Karşıyaka State Hospital to receive further treatment for serious injuries sustained to his lungs and liver. After undergoing various operations, on 23 October 2008 he was discharged from the hospital. According to a medical report issued on 30 December 2008 by the Karşıyaka State Hospital, it had been decided for medical reasons to leave the bullet inside the applicant’s body, to be extracted only in the event of deterioration in the applicant’s condition. The report also noted that the injuries sustained by the applicant had been life-threatening. 7.  At 2.30 a.m. on 15 October 2008 two gendarme officers from the crime scene investigation unit of the Menemen Provincial Gendarmerie Command arrived at the site of the incident, which was located by a farm by the name of “Dürüs” (“the Dürüs farm”), to carry out a preliminary investigation and to prepare a scene-of-incident report (on the instructions of the Foça public prosecutor). After photographing the site of the incident, they talked to the witnesses and the gendarmerie patrol unit on duty. According to the information they obtained, the applicant had collapsed abruptly while he was walking to meet his friends. No gunshots had been heard at the site of the incident, but a firing practice had been underway at the relevant time at the nearby military compound housing the 7th Gendarmerie Commando Regiment. The gendarme officers indicated in their report that there were two shooting ranges within the said military compound: one located 1,780 metres to the north of the Dürüs farm, at an altitude of fifty metres (“the first shooting range”); and the other 1,050 metres to the east, at an altitude of ninety metres (“the second shooting range”). The altitude of the Dürüs farm was forty metres. There were three hills between the Dürüs farm and the first shooting range; the first two hills had an altitude of fifty-five metres, and the third hill had an altitude of ninety metres. No information was provided regarding the terrain between the farm and the second shooting range. Firing practice was carried out with G3 rifles at the first shooting range and with 5.56 mm rifles at the second shooting range. According to a sketch map prepared by the gendarme officers, the site of the incident was approximately 15 degrees to the east of the assumed trajectory of bullets fired from the first shooting range. In the gendarme officers’ opinion, the applicant had been hit by a stray bullet that had ricocheted during firing practice, particularly in view of the fact that no evidence of criminal conduct had been found at the site of the incident. The only evidence collected by the gendarme officers was the jacket that the applicant had been wearing at the time of his shooting, which was handed to the İzmir Gürçeşme Criminal Police Laboratory for examination. 8.  The gendarme officers visited the site of the incident once again at approximately 9.45 a.m. on the morning of 15 October 2008 to make further investigations, but did not discover any new evidence. It appears that on the same morning they also went – on the instructions of the Foça public prosecutor – to the military compound to photograph the shooting ranges. 9.  At approximately 10.15 a.m. on 15 October 2008 the Foça public prosecutor visited the site of the incident together with a police expert, H.Ö. The public prosecutor noted that the investigation had not thus far revealed any spent cartridges, bullet shells, arms or any other such material on or around the site of the incident, nor had any suspects who might have shot at the applicant been identified. According to the information provided by the applicant’s three friends to the public prosecutor, the applicant had collapsed right before their eyes and there had been no one else present at the relevant time. They also told the public prosecutor that they often heard gunfire coming from the military compound during shooting practice and that gunfire had also been audible at the time of the incident, although they had not heard gun shots emanating from anywhere nearby. 10.  According to the information in the case file, the applicant was still in a critical condition on the morning of 15 October 2008. Nevertheless, at 3 p.m. on that day, he was interviewed by two gendarme officers in the office of the security team commander (Asayiş Tim Komutanı) of the local gendarmerie. It is not clear whether this office was located inside the hospital or outside. Prior to the commencement of the interview, the applicant was informed of his right to request the appointment of a lawyer from the local bar association to assist him, but it appears that he did not exercise that right. The applicant told the gendarme officers that at approximately 8.45 p.m. on 14 October 2008, he had left his house to check up on the construction site where he worked as a watchman. As he had been walking towards the site, he had heard whizzing sounds above his head. He had continued to hear the same sounds on his way out of the construction site, along with the sound of gunfire from the military compound located nearby. Then, all of a sudden, he had felt a sharp pain in his back and had collapsed to the ground. He had not known what had happened until he had been told in the hospital that he had been shot in the back with a firearm. When the gendarme officers asked the applicant whether he had been in ongoing conflict with anyone and whether he had heard any gunshots at the time of the incident, he replied that he had not been in any conflict and that the only shots he had heard had been those coming from the military compound, which he had been hearing for the past week. The applicant also stated that he did not wish to press charges against anyone regarding the incident. 11.  On 16 October 2008 H.Ö., the police expert who had accompanied the Foça public prosecutor during his examination of the site of the incident, issued a report of his findings. He indicated in his report that the distance between the site of the incident and the military shooting ranges, which were spread over hilly terrain, was approximately one and a half kilometres. Having regard to the witness statements, and to the absence of any other factors that might explain the applicant’s injury, the police expert opined that the injury had probably been caused by a bullet that had ricocheted during the firing practice at the military compound. He submitted a simple sketch map of the site of the incident along with his report. 12.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. 13.  On 12 November 2008 two gendarme officers visited the applicant at his home on the instructions of the Foça public prosecutor to enquire about the bullet that had wounded him. The applicant informed the gendarme officers that the bullet had still not been extracted from his body and that the doctors would re-evaluate the situation once he had fully recovered from the earlier operations. The applicant was requested to inform the authorities in the event that the doctors decided to remove the bullet. 14.  On 13 November 2008 the İzmir Criminal Police Laboratory issued a report on the analysis carried out on the applicant’s jacket. According to the report, a hole measuring 0.5 cm in diameter was found in the back of the jacket, but no gunshot residue was found around that hole. Having regard to the shape and other characteristics of the hole, it was decided that it had been caused by a firearm and that the shot had been fired from a long distance. 15.  On 14 November 2008 the Foça public prosecutor took the applicant’s statement for the first time. The applicant was reminded of his right to request the assistance of a lawyer, which he once again declined to do. The applicant largely reiterated the statement he had made to the gendarme officers earlier. He also repeated that he did not want to press charges against any particular person, as he did not believe that he had been shot intentionally. He did, however, reserve his right to claim compensation. 16.  On 24 November 2008 the Foça public prosecutor delivered a decision not to prosecute. The public prosecutor found firstly that, in view of the statements of the applicant and of the witnesses and the manner in which the incident had occurred, the applicant had not been shot intentionally. He noted secondly that the forensic examination conducted on the applicant’s jacket had revealed that the shot had been fired from a long distance; however, the source of the shot had not been identified, as the bullet had for medical reasons not yet been extracted from the applicant’s body. Nevertheless, having regard to all the information in the case file and to the fact that a military firing practice had been underway a few kilometres away at the time of the incident, the public prosecutor found that the applicant had probably been hit by a stray bullet that had ricocheted during the firing practice. According to the public prosecutor, this offence was to be classified as one of causing bodily harm through negligence (taksir), as opposed to recklessness (bilinçli taksir), in view of the significant distance of the shooting range from the site of the incident. Since the prosecution of the offence of causing bodily harm through negligence required a formal complaint to be made by the victim (which was lacking in the instant case), the Foça public prosecutor decided to close the investigation. 17.  On 12 January 2009, after medical complications had arisen, the bullet was extracted from the applicant’s body and handed over to the hospital police. On 6 February 2009 it was registered in the custody of the Foça public prosecutor’s office. 18.  In the meantime, on 16 January 2009 the applicant lodged an objection against the decision of the Foça public prosecutor, with the assistance of his lawyer. The applicant’s lawyer stated that the decision to close the investigation had been taken prematurely, before the investigation process had been completed and the gun from which the bullet had been fired and the identity of the shooter had been identified. There had also not been an attempt to establish whether the bodily harm had been caused through negligence, recklessness, lack of experience or breach of duty or with intent. Moreover, requesting the victim to indicate whether he wanted to press charges without first having established the perpetrator and the nature of the offence did not comply with due procedure. 19.  The applicant’s objection was rejected by the İzmir Assize Court on 24 April 2009. The assize court did not provide any justification for its decision, apart from stating that the Foça public prosecutor’s decision had been in compliance with the law. This decision was served on the applicant on 20 May 2009. 20.  On 3 March 2009 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in respect of his wounding. The Ministry refused the request; the applicant then brought an action for compensation before the İzmir Administrative Court. 21.  On 22 February 2012 the İzmir Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. It held that while it was not disputed that the applicant had been wounded by a bullet, there was no tangible evidence to prove that the bullet in question had in any way been connected to the firing practice held by the 7th Gendarmerie Commando Regiment in Foça on the date in question. The criminal investigation into the incident had been closed on account of the applicant’s decision not to bring an official complaint, and the bullet extracted from his body after the closing of the investigation had therefore not been subjected to a ballistic examination. In these circumstances, by not pursuing his complaints the applicant had hindered the collecting of evidence that could have proved a causal link between the administrative act (idari eylem) and the damage sustained. In the administrative court’s opinion, the applicant had thus not proved his allegations. 22.  On 22 October 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the İzmir Administrative Court. 23.  An internal administrative inquiry was also conducted by the military authorities into the applicant’s shooting. During the course of that inquiry thirteen gendarme officers of various ranks who had attended the firing practice in question were interviewed on 15 October 2008 by a lieutenant-colonel. The officers stated, in virtually identical words, that a firing practice had been held on 14 October 2008 between 7 p.m. and 10 p.m. with G3 rifles, that all necessary security measures had been taken at the shooting range prior to the commencement of the practice, in line with the applicable laws and instructions, that all rifles had been fired under the supervision of senior officers, that no firing had been permitted outside the designated shooting areas, and that, in view of the security measures in place and the distance of the applicant from the shooting range, the applicant should not have been affected by bullets fired during the practice. 24.  On 22 October 2008 a report was issued on the findings of the administrative inquiry. According to this report, all requisite safety measures had been implemented at the shooting range on the date in question, in compliance with the relevant security regulations, and no fault or negligence had been found on the part of the military officers who had participated in the firing practice. The report indicated that additional security precautions had nevertheless been taken on the shooting range in the aftermath of the incident, such as adding to the sand bags and barrels behind the target boards, and building barriers in order to reduce the incidence of ricochets, and surrounding the gun-target line with additional barrels.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  The applicant’s husband, Ali Sinim, entered into an agreement with a truck owner, Mr A.S., for the transportation of some personal goods and furniture from Istanbul to Antalya on 5 August 2006. According to the applicant’s allegations, her husband was informed that the truck in question had been booked by a transport company for the same day and that it would also be carrying some raw materials belonging to another client. 7.  On the date in question the applicant’s husband loaded his goods into the truck and got into it as a passenger. However, before reaching its destination the truck collided with another vehicle and caught fire. The truck’s driver and substitute driver died at the scene of the accident as a result of the fire. The applicant’s husband died a few days later at the hospital where he had been receiving treatment for his burns. 8.  It was discovered after the accident that the “raw materials” being transported in the truck with the applicant’s husband’s goods were in fact an inflammable liquid, which had caught fire upon impact. According to the police scene-of-incident report, the containers that had contained the spilt inflammable liquid bore the words “Şenocak chafing fuel[1]”. 9.  An autopsy report issued on 31 January 2007 by the Forensic Medicine Institute stated that the applicant’s husband had died as a result of the burns he had sustained at the time of the accident rather than from trauma caused by the impact of the crash. 10.  According to the initial report prepared by the traffic police at the scene, the driver of the truck, whose identity could not be established at the time, bore the main responsibility for the accident as he had hit the other vehicle, driven by S.S.H., from behind. 11.  On 5 August 2006 officers from Sultanbeyli police station took statements from the applicant, S.S.H. and the owner of the truck, A.S., who was also the son of one of the truck drivers, M.S. A.S. confirmed in his statement that he was the owner of the truck, which his father M.S. had loaded with goods to be transported to Antalya. He stated that a third person, namely A.Ç., had also been in the truck to help his father during the journey. He was not asked any questions about the nature of the goods transported. 12.  On 4 September 2006 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor’s office against A.S., S.S.H, and the transport company to which the truck had been leased, if any, for causing her husband’s death by illegally carrying dangerous inflammable goods. The applicant stressed in her complaint that the incident in question had not been a simple traffic accident caused by negligence, and that her husband had lost his life because of the inflammable goods that had been loaded unlawfully in the truck without his knowledge and consent. The applicant argued that if her husband had been properly informed of the nature of the truck’s cargo, he would never have agreed to travel in it. The applicant therefore requested the identification of all the individuals or companies who may have been responsible for her husband’s death, including the transporter, the seller and the buyer of the inflammable goods. She also requested to be informed of developments in the investigation as she intended to join the proceedings as a civil party (müdahil). 13.  On 9 November 2006 A.S. submitted a petition to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor’s office for an investigation into the liability for the accident of both the transport company which had leased his truck and of the seller and buyer of the inflammable cargo, whom he accused of concealing the dangerous nature of the goods in question. As evidence, he submitted the invoice and delivery note (sevk irsaliyesi) prepared on 4 August 2006 by the transport company Salihli Nakliyat Otom. Ltd. Şti. (“Salihli Ltd. Şti.”) for the recipient, Şenocak Dış Ticaret ve Turizm Sanayi Ltd. Şti. (“Şenocak Ltd. Şti.”), where the shipment was described as “raw materials” without any further details. A.S. stated that if it had been made clear that the goods involved were inflammable then they would have been transported in accordance with the conditions set out in the law, which might have prevented the fatal accident. 14.  On 28 November 2006 the applicant filed an additional complaint against the producer of the inflammable liquid, which she had identified as Şenocak Ltd. Şti. based on the information provided in the scene-of-incident report (see paragraph 8 above). The applicant claimed that the liquid in question contained ethanol and methanol, which had both been classified as “hazardous goods subject to control” in the Regulation on Dangerous Goods and the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods, and which accordingly had to be packed, labelled, stored and transported in compliance with the strict requirements set down in those regulations. Moreover, under the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods, it was prohibited to carry passengers, apart from a substitute driver and a guard, in vehicles transporting dangerous goods. Having regard to the various responsibilities imposed by the relevant legislation on the producer, seller, transporter and buyer of such goods, the applicant requested that the public prosecutor (i) check if Şenocak Ltd. Şti. was the producer and whether it also engaged in the distribution of such material; (ii) establish whether the truck in question had been leased by a transport company or by Şenocak Ltd. Şti. itself and whether it had a licence to carry such dangerous goods; and (iii) identify the buyer of the goods. She also repeated her request to be informed of developments in the investigation. 15.  On 6 May 2007, at the request of the Sultanbeyli prosecutor, a traffic engineer submitted an expert report, where it was found that the deceased truck driver M.S. had been responsible for the accident by failing to comply with the law applying to vehicles carrying inflammable goods on keeping a distance of fifty metres. The expert found that S.S.H., the driver of the other vehicle, had not been at fault. 16.  Relying mainly on the expert report, on 7 May 2007 the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor found that the only person responsible for the accident within the meaning of Article 85 of the Turkish Criminal Code (causing death by negligence – see paragraph 46 below) was M.S. However, since M.S. had also lost his life in the accident, the public prosecutor decided against prosecution. A.S. was listed as the sole complainant in the decision, which was not notified to the applicant. 17.  After finding out about the decision on her own initiative, on 29 June 2007 the applicant objected to the public prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute, arguing mainly that the issues she had raised in her petitions of 4 September and 28 November 2006 had not been taken into account by the public prosecutor. She reiterated that her husband had not been informed that the truck was carrying inflammable liquids, and also argued that the prosecutor had failed to identify the companies involved in the shipment of such dangerous goods, including the seller, buyer and transport company, and had not established the relations of the truck owner, A.S., to those companies. She argued that it was of the utmost importance to collect that information in order to establish the facts and to identify those responsible for the accident, apart from the driver of the truck. She added that despite the numerous complaints she had lodged with the public prosecutor’s office and her requests to be informed of developments in the investigation, she had not been named as a complainant in the public prosecutor’s decision and the decision had not been notified to her. 18.  It appears that A.S., as the other complainant, did not lodge an objection against the public prosecutor’s decision. 19.  On 4 September 2007 the Kadıköy Assize Court rejected the objection against the decision of the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor not to prosecute M.S. and S.S.H. It held, nevertheless, that complaints lodged by A.S. against Salihli Ltd. Şti. and Şenocak Ltd. Şti. had remained unanswered and instructed the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor to investigate their liability for the accident. A.S. was once again listed as the sole complainant in the decision, which was not notified to the applicant. 20.  On 6 December 2007 the applicant submitted a petition to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor’s office, asking it to investigate the matters raised in her previous petitions. The applicant also stressed that despite her numerous requests, she had, once again, not been recognised as a complainant in the Kadıköy Assize Court’s decision. 21.  It appears that on 22 January 2008 an agent of the transport company Salihli Ltd. Şti., a certain B.T., was questioned about the accident for the first time by the police. B.T. stated that Şenocak Ltd. Şti. had requested a truck from them to transport some goods. The company had, however, put Şenocak Ltd. Şti. in touch with A.S., who provided transportation services with his truck upon request, and they had had no further involvement with the shipment in question. 22.  In a further petition submitted by the applicant to the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor’s office on 23 May 2008, she expressed her concern that the investigation after the Kadıköy Assize Court’s decision had appeared to focus solely on the liability of the transport company Salihli Ltd. Şti., whereas both Şenocak Ltd. Şti., as the producer and/or the shipper of the goods, and A.S., as the owner of the truck, also bore responsibility for the accident on account of their failure to comply with the relevant legislation on the transport of dangerous goods. 23.  On an unspecified date the Sultanbeyli public prosecutor asked the traffic branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute to prepare a report to determine the respective liability of Salihli Ltd. Şti. and Şenocak Ltd. Şti., or any others, for the accident in question. In its response dated 10 July 2008 the Forensic Medicine Institute stated that there was no information in the case file on Şenocak Ltd. Şti. and that, in the absence of such information, it could not report on the requested matters. 24.  On 15 October 2008 S.Ş., the owner of Şenocak Ltd. Şti., was questioned about the accident for the first time by the police. S.Ş. stated that he had requested a truck from Salihli Ltd. Şti. to send goods to his company’s Antalya branch. A truck owned by A.S. had been provided to him by Salihli Ltd. Şti. and he had loaded it with the goods in question. He confirmed that the truck had been involved in an accident shortly after loading and that it and his goods had been destroyed in a fire. 25.  Following the receipt of the above information, on 19 February 2009 the Forensic Medicine Institute submitted its report on the accident. It found that there was no information in the file that the truck in question had been loaded with inflammable goods by Şenocak Ltd. Şti. There was, furthermore, no information on the identity of the recipient of the shipment. Although containers bearing the name “Şenocak” had been found in the truck after the accident, there was no other evidence in the file to enable the Institute to determine who had loaded the truck. In those circumstances, it had not been possible to establish the liability of Şenocak Ltd. Şti., Salihli Ltd. Şti., or anyone else for the accident. 26.  On 8 May 2009 the applicant submitted objections to the Forensic Medicine Institute’s report. She contested the finding that there had been no evidence to suggest the involvement of Şenocak Ltd. Şti. with the shipment in question. She argued that the owner of Şenocak Ltd. Şti. had made it clear in his police statement that the truck had been loaded with his company’s goods, which had consisted of chafing fuel. Moreover, in response to the compensation request she had made to the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance (see below paragraph 30 for further details), the owner of Şenocak Ltd. Şti. had stated, inter alia, that he had also suffered a loss as a result of the accident as he had lost all of his merchandise. A representative of Salihli Ltd. Şti. had similarly told the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance that the truck involved in the accident had been sent to Şenocak Ltd. Şti. for loading, accompanied by a delivery note prepared by them on 4 August 2006. In the applicant’s opinion, those statements provided sufficient proof that the inflammable goods loaded in the truck had belonged to Şenocak Ltd. Şti. On the basis of that information, and having regard to the legal requirements in the relevant legislation on the packaging, labelling, storing and transportation of inflammable goods, none of which had been observed in the instant case, it was clear that both Şenocak Ltd. Şti. and Salihli Şti., as well as the owner and driver of the truck, had been responsible for the accident. 27.  On 25 May 2009 the Sultanbeyli prosecutor decided not to prosecute representatives of Salihli Ltd. Şti. and Şenocak Ltd. Şti. on the basis of the Forensic Medicine Institute’s report of 10 July 2008. In the decision, the public prosecutor did not respond to any of the applicant’s allegations. 28.  On 17 June 2009 the applicant objected to that decision. Reiterating mainly the arguments she had raised in her objection to the Forensic Medicine Institute’s report, she submitted that the public prosecutor had failed to establish the facts of the case and had disregarded essential evidence in the investigation file which pointed to the representatives of Salihli Ltd. Şti. and Şenocak Ltd. Şti, A.S. and the deceased driver of the truck as being criminally liable for the accident. 29.  On 23 July 2009 the Kadıköy Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objection, without responding to any of her arguments. 30.  On 16 July 2007 the applicant brought an action for compensation before the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance against Şenocak Ltd. Şti., Salihli Ltd. Şti, the owner of the truck, A.S., the heirs of both dead truck drivers, and an insurance company. Reiterating the legal requirements for the packaging, labelling, storage and transportation of dangerous goods that she had referred to during the criminal proceedings, the applicant argued that the defendants had caused her husband’s death by their failure to comply with the relevant legislation. 31.  On unspecified dates, representatives of Salihli Ltd. Şti. and Şenocak Ltd. Şti. responded to the applicant’s allegations, as noted in paragraph 26 above. 32.  At the request of the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance, on 19 March 2012 three experts from the traffic branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute submitted a report (“the first report”) on the defendants’ liability for the accident in question, where they made the following findings:\n-  Şenocak Ltd. Şti., which was the producer of the inflammable goods in question, had requested Salihli Ltd. Şti.’s services for the transportation of merchandise from its headquarters in Istanbul to its Antalya office;\n-  Salihli Ltd. Şti. had subcontracted A.S. for the business;\n-  in the consignment note it had prepared, Şenocak Ltd. Şti. had described the consignment as sixteen tonnes of raw material, without indicating that it consisted of inflammable goods;\n-  the fire that had broken out upon impact with S.S.H.’s vehicle and that had claimed the applicant’s husband’s life had been caused by the inflammable goods loaded in the truck;\n-  Şenocak Ltd. Şti. was liable for the accident because it had failed to comply with the consignor’s obligations set out in the relevant legislation;\n-  Salihli Ltd. Şti. and A.S. were liable on account of their failure to pay heed to the type of raw material they had accepted, which had resulted in the transportation of dangerous goods in a truck which had not fulfilled the relevant criteria for such transportation;\n-  A.S. was also liable for having unlawfully loaded other goods in the truck and accepting a passenger (the applicant’s husband);\n-  the driver of the truck was liable owing to his failure to drive with care.\nIn the light of those considerations, the Forensic Medicine Institute found that Şenocak Ltd. Şti. bore 40% of the liability for the accident, Salihli Ltd. Şti. and A.S. bore 20% each, while the remaining liability lay with the driver. 33.  On 18 October 2012 Salihli Ltd. Şti. objected to the Forensic Medicine Institute’s report. 34.  Following that objection, seven experts from the traffic branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute, including the three experts who had prepared the previous report, issued another report on 18 September 2013 (“the second report”). They found that while Salihli Ltd. Şti., Şenocak Ltd. Şti. and A.S. may all have disregarded their legal obligations on the transport of dangerous goods, the accident had been caused by the driver’s carelessness rather than the other defendants’ failure to comply with those obligations. They could not therefore be held accountable for the accident in any way. 35.  On 19 November 2013 the applicant objected to the Forensic Medicine Institute’s report, which in her opinion conflicted with its previous report of 19 March 2012. The applicant reiterated that her husband had not died as a result of a simple traffic accident, but had burned to death because of the inflammable goods carried unlawfully in the truck, for which all the defendants bore responsibility. The applicant requested that the Sultanbeyli Civil Court of First Instance obtain a third report from independent experts to resolve the contradictions between the two reports prepared by the Forensic Medicine Institute. 36.  At a hearing held on 29 April 2014, the civil court of first instance appointed a group of experts, consisting of a mechanical engineer and two professors of mechanical engineering and chemistry from Istanbul Technical University. The court asked them to comment on the contradictions between the two Forensic Medicine Institute reports and to state which report they agreed with. 37.  In their report dated 13 November 2014 (“the third report”), the experts established at the outset that the action brought by the applicant concerned the death of her husband as a result of the burns he had sustained because of the fire caused by the accident. The examination in the instant case therefore had to focus not on the technical cause of the accident per se, which was what the second report had done, but on the reasons and the responsibility for the fire that had claimed her husband’s life. The experts stated in that connection that the fire had been caused by chafing fuel, which was a “highly inflammable liquid”, according to the Regulation on the Transport by Land of Dangerous Goods and which therefore had to be transported in accordance with the relevant legislation concerning the transportation of such dangerous substances. The truck in which the chafing fuel had been loaded in the instant case had, however, not been suitable for the transportation of dangerous goods: it had not been equipped with an electrical system to prevent short circuits and fire; it had had no warning signs; and the driver had not been trained in the transportation of such goods. Şenocak Ltd. Şti., as the producer of the chafing fuel, bore the principal liability (40%) for the fire on account of its failure to ensure the safe transportation of its merchandise in accordance with the relevant legal requirements. Salihli Ltd. Şti., which had procured the truck in question, and A.S., the owner and operator of the truck, were each 20% liable for agreeing to transport such dangerous goods in a vehicle unfit for the job. A.S. was further liable because he had accepted additional cargo in the truck. The remaining responsibility lay with the deceased driver, who had not kept a safe distance from the vehicle in front. On the basis of those findings, the experts stated that they agreed with the first report’s conclusions. 38.  At a hearing held on 7 October 2015 the civil court of first instance decided to appoint an expert to calculate the applicant’s pecuniary damage, on the basis of the findings of the third report of 13 November 2014. 39.  In a report dated 19 November 2015 the expert calculated the applicant’s pecuniary damage as 229,613 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 75,145 euros (EUR) at the material time). 40.  According to the latest information in the case file, the compensation proceedings are still ongoing in the court of first instance.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Yekaterinburg. 5.  On 13 May 2009 he was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery. On the following day the Verkh-Isetskiy District Court in Yekaterinburg remanded him in custody and set the time-limit until 12 July 2009. 6.  On 13 July 2009 the District Court granted a two-month extension of the detention period. However, on 31 July 2009 the Sverdlovsk Regional Court quashed the extension order as it had been issued outside the authorised detention period, and ordered the applicant’s release. 7.  The applicant was not released. He was not allowed to leave the police ward and was re-arrested on the charge of theft. The arrest record mentioned the charge, without specifying when or where the theft had been committed or why the applicant was suspected of it. 8.  On 2 August 2009 the District Court adjourned the detention hearing for seventy-two hours, at the request from the applicant’s counsel. On 4 August 2009 the District Court issued a detention order which did not set a time-limit for the applicant’s detention or give any assessment to the existence of a “reasonable suspicion” against the applicant.  On 2 September 2009 the Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. 9.  Further extensions of the applicant’s detention were granted by the Leninskiy District Court on 29 September, 20 October and 2 November 2009. The last extension order was issued in the absence of the parties. On 25 November 2009 the Regional Court found that extension order unlawful and set it aside, but extended the applicant’s detention for a future period. 10.  On 23 December 2009 the Bogdanovichi Town Court in the Sverdlovsk Region opened the trial and extended the applicant’s detention. The applicant’s appeal against the extension order was rejected by the Regional Court on 11 June 2010. 11.  On 2 March and 22 April 2010 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention. Each time the court referred to the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s criminal record. The appeals against the orders were rejected on 30 June and 11 June, respectively. 12.  Throughout the trial the applicant was held in a metal cage. 13.  On 13 May 2010 the applicant was found guilty of theft and armed robbery and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. On 18 August 2010 the Regional Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to three years’ imprisonment. 14.  On 24 June 2010 the applicant’s mother died. His request to be allowed to attend the funeral was rejected by the governor of the IZ-66/1 remand prison and upheld by the courts on the ground that remand prisoners did not have the benefit of a leave of absence under Russian law. When his father died on 5 November 2010, the director of the correctional colony in Sosnovoborsk in the Krasnoyarsk Region also refused his request for a short-term absence, on account of the funeral being held outside of the region where the colony was located. 15.  The Sosnovoborsk colony was located some 2,400 kilometres away from Yekaterinburg where the applicant’s family lived.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants are serving either life sentences or a lengthy period of imprisonment in different prisons in Bulgaria. 5.  The applicant was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment in November 2011. As it transpires from documents in the file, pursuant to an order of the prison governor referring to section 248(1)(1) of the 2009 Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act (see paragraph 18 below), on 29 July 2011 the applicant was placed in isolation in Burgas Prison, in a permanently locked cell without the possibility to take part in collective activities. The applicant described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. He was kept in isolation since 29 July 2011, without running water and toilet in his cell. He had to use the same bucket to relieve himself and as a chair at meal times as he ate in the cell. The heating was insufficient in winter and the temperature was excessively high in the cell in summer. There was poor ventilation and poor natural light in his cell. Also, the light in his cell was kept on during the entire night, the cell was infested with rats and cockroaches, and the latter sometimes also reached his food. On an unspecified date before July 2016 the applicant was transferred to Varna Prison and he has not complained about the conditions there. 6.  The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment in a final decision by the Supreme Court of Cassation of 10 November 2005. He complained about the conditions under which he has been serving his sentence since 12 July 2007 when he had been transferred to Plovdiv Prison. He described, and the Government did not comment on, the conditions under which he had been detained there as follows. There has been no running water or toilet in his cell which measured about 6 square metres. He has had to use a bucket to comply with the needs of nature in his cell; he has also been taking his food in the cell. The cell was overly humid, which was not mitigated by the fact that he has had to hang his clothes to dry there after washing them. The ventilation was poor, which aggravated the repugnant smell coming out of the sewers situated close to his cell. In the summer the temperatures were very high and in the winter the heating was switched off at around 6 p.m. as a result of which it became very cold in his cell. 7.  In addition, between 2007 and 2011 he had been kept under the very impoverished and restrictive “special regime”, alone in a cell. According to the applicant, while his regime was formally changed from “special” to the lighter “strict” one on 6 June 2011, in reality the restrictions and inadequate conditions in which he has been detained did not change. He has been handcuffed systematically upon leaving his cell. 8.  The applicant was sentenced to whole-life imprisonment on 26 July 2004 in a final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation. He complained about the “special regime” and inadequate material conditions of detention in which he has been serving his sentence since 24 January 2012 in Varna Prison. The period of detention of this applicant before that date was subject to examination in an earlier Court’s judgment in which it found a violation of Article 3 on account of the excessively strict prison regime and poor conditions of detention (see Iordan Petrov v. Bulgaria, no. 22926/04, § 128, 24 January 2012). 9.  The applicant submitted that he has been serving his sentence in isolation from the surrounding world, namely in a permanently locked cell. He has not been involved in any collective activities or provided with work and has been denied contact with prisoners who are serving sentences lighter than life imprisonment. Every time he was taken out of the high security zone, he has been hand-cuffed. The authorities have not carried out meaningful assessments of the need to keep him serving his sentence under the “special regime”. Thus, their assessments did not involve an analysis of his psychological and physical state, or of his attitude and demonstrated willingness to change, and were not conducted by specially-trained personnel. 10.  As to the material conditions in which he has been kept since 24 January 2012, the applicant submitted that, although a toilet had been installed in his cell in August 2012, it stands at about 45 cm from his bed. As the toilet has not been separated from the rest of the space, he has had the intrusive feeling of living in a toilet. Given that the prison administration has been refusing to provide hygienic products for cleaning the toilet, such as brushes and washing products, the toilet has been unusable. The overall hygiene in the cell and the common spaces has been extremely poor, with cockroaches and rats roaming about. 11.  On 10 June 2011 the first instance court sentenced the applicant to a whole-life sentence, which was confirmed by the appellate court on 27 June 2013. The Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the whole-life imprisonment sentence in a final judgment of 21 May 2014. 12.  The applicant submitted, and the Government did not comment on, that he has been kept in a permanently locked cell in Pazardzhik Prison, isolated from the rest of the prison population and only allowed to communicate with other life prisoners during the one-hour daily physical exercise he took outside his cell. There has been no running water or toilet in his cell which measures less than 6 square metres. The hygiene in the cell has been very poor and there have been cockroaches and bed bugs, and the prison administration has done nothing to get rid of them. As there is no table in his cell the applicant has been eating over a newspaper spread over his bed. While the natural light which reached the cell has been extremely weak, the artificial light has been kept on throughout the night. The temperature in the cell was inadequate, fluctuating between extremes in the summer and winter.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  She gave birth to her first three children in hospital. In 2011 she became pregnant with her fourth child and had a due date in February 2012. 7.  In November 2011 she sent a letter to the Croatian Chamber of Midwives (Hrvatska Komora Primalja), enquiring about the possibility of having professional assistance with a home birth. She explained that her first three hospital deliveries had gone normally, without the need for much medical intervention, but that she had not felt fulfilled afterwards. She therefore wanted to give birth to her fourth child at home. 8.  On 1 December 2011 she received a reply that according to the relevant domestic legislation health professionals, including midwives, were unable to assist with home births. In particular, although the Act on Midwifery allowed the setting up of private practices by midwives, the Healthcare Act, as the general Act in the sector, still did not expressly provide for such a possibility. Therefore, since the matter was not clearly regulated, no midwife had set up a private practice or officially assisted with home births. The letter also cited a statement from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Ministarstvo zdravstva i socijalne skrbi Republike Hrvatske - hereinafter “the Ministry of Health”) issued in August 2011 and published on the Croatian Chamber of Midwives’ website:\n“Having regard to the current circumstances, where the requirements for organising a system of professionally conducted home births do not exist (education and training of personnel) and where the other accompanying elements (availability of emergency transport and proper admission [to a medical facility] in the case of complications) which would enable safe delivery at home are lacking, we are of the opinion that in this area of healthcare the lawmaker has ensured, as far as possible, all the conditions for the care of mothers and the right of children to life and health. Considering the above, we are of the opinion that the protection of children, who do not choose the circumstances of their coming into this world, takes precedence over respect for a woman’s right to freely choose to give birth outside a medical facility.”\nThe Croatian Chamber of Midwives thus declined to assist with the applicant’s planned home birth. It noted that home births nevertheless occurred in Croatia, and for that reason it had urged the Ministry of Health to clearly regulate the matter as soon as possible. 9.  On 15 February 2012 the applicant gave birth to her child at home, assisted by a midwife from abroad. 10.  After the birth a paediatrician and a gynaecologist allegedly declined to examine the applicant and her baby but she eventually managed to find doctors who examined them both. 11.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant registered the birth and obtained a birth certificate. 12.  On 11 May 2011 the Ministry of Health sent a letter in reply to an enquiry from the Ombudswoman for Children (Pravobraniteljica za djecu), which stated that the relevant domestic law provided that babies were to be delivered in medical facilities. The question of home births had not been regulated by law and medical assistance in such procedures was considered as quackery. It further stated that home births were the personal responsibility of the mother and the person assisting with the delivery. In the event of a delivery outside a medical facility and where a woman claiming to be the mother did not have any medical documentation, the doctor carrying out the first examination of the child was obliged to make note of the absence of such documents. The doctor was not allowed to register data which he or she was not able to verify. 13.  On 25 August 2011 the Ministry of Administration (Ministarstvo uprave Republike Hrvatske) sent a letter in reply to an enquiry from the Parents in Action - Roda NGO (Roditelji u Akciji – Roda) stating that the law provided for the possibility to register the civil status of a child born outside a medical facility. It further stated that officials were obliged to verify data reported to them before putting anything down in the State register. Consequently, a person reporting the birth of a child born outside a medical facility was required to submit proof that the woman reported as the child’s mother had indeed given birth to the child. The medical documentation required for proving such circumstances was a matter for the health administration authorities. 14.  On 31 May 2012 the Ministry of Health replied to an enquiry from Parents in Action – Roda NGO by saying that it had never instructed doctors not to examine children born at home. On the contrary, having regard to the increased frequency of situations in which doctors were faced with having to examine children born at home without any medical documentation, it had consistently held that doctors were obliged to examine such children but were not allowed to register any data that they were not able to verify. It added that home birth was still not regulated by law and that therefore there was no mechanism for registering requests for home birth or regulations on the duty to report them. 15.  On 24 January 2012 the Croatian Chamber of Midwives reported on a case in which, according to the media coverage, a woman who had given birth at home had been separated from her child for two days. In particular, the hospital had called the police and social workers in order to establish that she was indeed the child’s mother after she had refused to be examined by a gynaecologist in a hospital. In addition, several midwives suspected of having taken part in the birth had been questioned by the police. 16.  According to information submitted by the Government, no health professional has ever been prosecuted in criminal proceedings or sanctioned for assisting with a home birth. 17.  In the Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic reports on Croatia issued on 24 July 2015, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women expressed concern regarding the lack of oversight procedures and mechanisms for ensuring adequate standards of care, the protection of women’s rights and their autonomy during deliveries and the lack of options for giving birth outside hospitals. 18.  A survey on maternity practices in Croatia undertaken by the Parents in Action - Roda NGO in March 2015 noted situations of women’s wishes being disregarded by medical staff during childbirth, of a lack of consent for procedures conducted during labour, and limits on the presence of an accompanying person during childbirth. 19.  The Gender Equality Ombudsperson (Pravobraniteljica za ravnopravnost spolova) issued a research report in 2013 which noted inconsistencies in hospital practices regarding the presence of an accompanying person during childbirth.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Verona, Italy, in connection with criminal charges unrelated to the present case. 7.  In the early morning of 22 July 2005 a sales clerk, G., was attacked in a shop in Kharkiv where she worked. She suffered multiple cuts, including a penetrating chest wound, which led to pneumothorax. She was hospitalised in an intensive-care unit. 8.  According to the subsequent findings of the domestic court which convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery (see paragraph 18 below), the applicant had attacked G., whom he had known previously, and seized a certain amount of cash belonging to her employer, the company that ran the shop. 9.  According the applicant’s account, which he maintained throughout the proceedings before the domestic courts and before this Court, G. owed him money and he had gone to the shop to collect the debt. However, G. had attacked him with scissors and, trying to defend himself, he had hit her back, seized the scissors from her and stabbed her with them. When the shop’s alarm had gone off, he had taken the money and run away. 10.  According to the applicant, late on 22 July 2005 he was arrested by the police and taken to a police station where he was questioned about the incident. Allegedly, his request for a lawyer was ignored. 11.  In a statement (объяснение) dated 22 July 2005 taken by a police officer, the applicant gave the account of events as set out in paragraph 9 above. 12.  On 23 July 2005 a number of reports were drawn up: (i) an arrest report according to which the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery; (ii) a record stating that the applicant’s procedural rights as a suspect had been explained to him, including the right to remain silent, to have a legal aid lawyer appointed and to consult him prior to the first questioning; (iii) a record stating that the applicant, having been informed of the right to legal assistance, had decided to waive it; (iv) a transcript of the applicant’s questioning as a suspect: the applicant’s account of events was as set out in paragraph 9 above. 13.  On 25 July 2005 the applicant was examined by a forensic medical expert. He repeated his account of the fight with the victim (see paragraph 9 above), adding that in the course of the fight the victim had hit him in the jaw with a mug. He stated that he had not been ill-treated by the police. The expert noted that the applicant had a hematoma on his jaw and a number of cuts on his right hand, and concluded that the injuries were consistent with the applicant’s account. 14.  According to the applicant, at the close of the pre-trial investigation and then, subsequently, in preparation for his appeal, he had not been given sufficient time to study the case file. 15.  On 17 October 2005, at the opening of the trial before the Kharkiv Kyivsky District Court (“the trial court”) the applicant stated that he wished to defend himself and waived his right to legal assistance. He subsequently alleged that he had been forced to do so by the police guards present in the courtroom. 16.  In the course of the trial the applicant repeated the account of events set out in paragraph 9 above. 17.  Also in the course of the trial the applicant asked the trial court to call certain witnesses, without clearly identifying them. He claimed that they could have testified to the existence of the victim’s debt to him and to his good character. The trial court refused his applications in that respect (see paragraph 19 below). 18.  On 18 October 2005 the trial court convicted the applicant of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment. The court relied on, inter alia: (i) the applicant’s admissions in the course of the trial; (ii) the victim’s court testimony, denying, in particular, having borrowed any money from the applicant, as well as her statements incriminating the applicant given in the course of a reconstruction of the crime scene and confrontation with the applicant; (iii) money and clothes with brown spots seized from the applicant on 22 July 2005;[1] (iv) testimony given by D., the applicant’s girlfriend, who denied any knowledge of the applicant having lent any money and stated, on the contrary, that he himself had been borrowing money from her; (v) the testimony of the victim’s sister and son, equally denying knowledge of any debt. The sister stated that at 7 p.m. on 22 July 2005 in the hospital, the victim had told her that she knew the attacker; (vi) the pre-trial statement of M., a sales clerk in a neighbouring shop, who had stated in the course of the pre-trial investigation that he had seen someone looking like the applicant enter the victim’s shop and then run away from it after the alarm had gone off; he had then discovered the victim injured. 19.  As far as the applicant’s requests to call additional witnesses were concerned, the trial court stated that he had failed to indicate the names and addresses of those individuals, whom he had supposedly informed about the debt and who could have overheard a telephone call he had had with the victim’s son in that connection. The trial court considered those allegations to be an obfuscation tactic on the part of the applicant and pointed out that his girlfriend, with whom he had lived for two years, did not know of any debt. On the contrary, she had testified that he had had no money to lend. 20.  On 14 November 2005 the applicant appealed to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). He raised, notably, various matters concerning the assessment of the evidence. He asked the Court of Appeal to provide him with a lawyer. 21.  On 6 January 2006 the applicant reiterated the latter request. 22.  On 2 February 2006 the Vice-President of the Court of Appeal asked the regional Bar association to assign a lawyer for the applicant. There is no indication of any follow-up. 23.  On 20 July 2006 the Court of Appeal held a hearing in the presence of the applicant and the prosecutor, and upheld the applicant’s conviction. 24.  On 21 July 2006 the applicant asked the trial court to appoint a lawyer for him, for the preparation of an appeal on points of law to the Supreme Court. On 28 August 2006 the trial court replied that, as his conviction had been upheld on appeal, there were no lawful grounds for appointment of a legal aid lawyer. The applicant was free to hire such a lawyer himself. 25.  On 4 December 2006 the applicant lodged a handwritten appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. He raised various matters of fact, disagreeing with the lower courts’ assessment of the evidence. He also complained that he had not been provided with a lawyer before the first police interview on 22 July 2005, had been forced to waive his right to legal assistance on 17 October 2005 under duress from the police (see paragraphs 10 and 15 above), and that the Court of Appeal had failed to appoint a lawyer for him. 26.  On 28 February 2007 a Supreme Court judge, sitting in private, rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. The judge considered that the applicant’s appeal concerned only matters of fact and assessment of the evidence, which were not grounds for the opening of proceedings. 27.  Following his arrest, in July and August 2005 the applicant was allegedly held in a police station, a hospital and a police temporary detention facility. 28.  On 17 August 2005 the applicant was transferred to the Kharkiv pre‑trial detention centre (“SIZO”). According to him, he was held in a cell that had twenty-four sleeping places, with more than fifty other inmates. 29.  According to the Government, at the SIZO the applicant was held in the following cells:\nCell no.\nDates \nCell area, in square metres\nNumber of sleeping places\nSquare metres per sleeping place\n657\n17/08/05-18/08/05 1.34\n250\n07/06/06-16/07/06\nno information as that cell no longer existed at the time when the Government submitted their observations\n276\n \n17/07/06-28/08/06\n05/10/06-14/12/06 30.  On 28 August 2006 the applicant was transferred from the SIZO to Kharkiv correctional colony no. 18, where he served the rest of his sentence until being released on 3 October 2012. From 5 October to 14 December 2006 he was returned to the SIZO to enable him to study the case file in preparation for his appeal on points of law. 31.  On arrival at the SIZO, the applicant was examined by a doctor, who noted that he had no health problems at the time. The doctor noted, however, that in 1999 the applicant had been treated for tuberculosis, which was currently inactive. The applicant was recommended periodic courses of prophylactic treatment to prevent the reactivation of his tuberculosis, which he subsequently underwent in the course of his detention. In September 2011 he was diagnosed with the first signs of a cataract in the left eye. Glasses were prescribed and issued to him. On one occasion in October 2011 he was diagnosed with high blood pressure and was given the relevant medication. No other complaints in this respect were recorded. On several occasions in the course of his detention the applicant was treated for seasonal influenza, back pain and headaches. 32.  On 28 January 2008 the applicant’s representative engaged a lawyer practising in Kharkiv to visit him in prison and advise him on legal matters. From 6 to 18 February 2008 the lawyer examined the applicant’s criminal case file. 33.  In a letter to the Court of 12 December 2008, the applicant submitted that the domestic authorities were refusing to provide him with certain documents, which could prove his innocence, for his application to the Court, namely:\n(i)  the statement by M. and documents concerning the court’s efforts to summon that witness (see paragraph 18 (vi) above);\n(ii)  the statement of the victim;\n(iii)  documents concerning a civil claim for damages made by the shop that had been robbed;\n(iv)  the transcript of a particular hearing before the trial court;\n(v)  statements made by the applicant in the course of the investigation on 22 and 23 July 2005;\n(vi)  search and seizure records of 22 July 2005.\nThe applicant added that he did have copies of the documents from the criminal case file but they were of poor quality, preventing him from sending them to the Court. 34.  On 23 August 2010 the Registry pointed out to the applicant that his application was incomplete and asked him to provide copies of:\n(i)  his first appeal;\n(ii)  his requests for the appointment of a legal aid lawyer;\n(iii)  his appeal on points of law. 35.  On 4 September 2010 the applicant responded by providing copies of his first appeal and his request of 6 January 2006 to the Court of Appeal that a lawyer be appointed for him (see paragraph 22 above). He added that the trial court and the Supreme Court had not provided him with the remaining documents he had requested.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and at the time of lodging his application he was serving his prison sentence in the Bolu F-type prison. 5.  On 3 December 2007 the applicant wrote a letter to the Ministry of Justice, in which he had praised the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan by using the honorific “sayın”, meaning esteemed. 6.  Pursuant to the Regulations on the administration of penitentiary institutions and the execution of sentences, the applicant was found guilty of breaching prison order by the Bolu F- type Prison Disciplinary Board (referred hereafter as “the Board”). 7.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant was sentenced to 11 days’ solitary confinement on the orders of the Board, on account of his statements in the above mentioned letter. 8.  On 25 December 2007 the Bolu Enforcement Judge rejected the applicant`s objection. 9.  On 15 January 2008 the Bolu Assize Court upheld the judgment of 25 December 2007.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 2007 respectively and live in İzmir. 6.  On 25 October 2008, as the first applicant was driving in İzmir with his wife and one year-old daughter in the back seat, he lost control of his car when the road curved into a sharp bend. As a result, the car dropped into an empty concrete canal running along the right-hand side of the road, some five to six metres below the level of the road. The first applicant’s wife, Yeşim Çakır, lost her life at the spot and his daughter (the second applicant) was slightly injured. 7.  The accident report – prepared on the same day by the traffic police on the basis of their findings and the statements of the first applicant – indicated that after the first applicant had lost control of the vehicle on the bend, it had first crashed into the metal barrier alongside the road, and had then fallen over the barrier into an empty canal. The report specified that the crash barrier at that particular spot had been damaged prior to the accident. It also indicated that a road sign warning of a sharp bend ahead had been in place at the time of the accident. 8.  After the accident the first applicant was taken to a police station to give a statement. He told the police that as he had been approaching the sharp bend, he had felt his car skidding to the left. When, at the same time, he had noticed another car approaching him from behind on his left, he had first applied the brakes and had then swerved his car to the right, at which point he had lost control of the car and hit the crash barrier on the right side of the road. However, since the barrier had been damaged prior to the incident, it had not stopped the car and, therefore, the car had dropped down into the empty canal. He claimed that he had lost control of the car as a result of the dangerous bend in the road. 9.  On the same date, the police also took a statement from M.S, an eyewitness. M.S. told the police that as he had been driving down the opposite side of the road, he had seen the first applicant’s car suddenly swerve to the right, after which it had hit the crash barrier on its right-hand side and had dropped down the side of the road. 10.  Later the same day the İzmir public prosecutor questioned the first applicant in connection with the accident. The first applicant admitted before the public prosecutor that he had lost control of the car as he had been taking the bend. He said that, for a reason unknown to him, his car had skidded. He claimed that the road had not been wet, but there had been some slippery substance on it, like sand. 11.  On 28 October 2008 the İzmir public prosecutor’s office filed a bill of indictment with the İzmir Assize Court against the first applicant, for causing death and bodily injury by negligence. 12.  At the first hearing held before the İzmir Assize Court on 15 December 2008 the first applicant stated that as he had been driving along the road at a normal speed, his car had started skidding to the left for an unknown reason, and that he had swerved the car to the right to avoid hitting the car approaching him from the opposite lane on the left. He did not ask the court to carry out an additional investigation into the incident, but stated that the fatal accident had taken place as the crash barrier alongside the road, which was supposed to have been able to stop the car, had been badly damaged. 13.  At the same hearing, the İzmir Assize Court decided that although the first applicant had been charged with causing death and bodily injury by negligence and that his negligence in that regard had been established, there was no need to subject him to a criminal penalty as it could be accepted that he had been aggrieved by the accident, which had resulted in the death of his wife, to a sufficient degree within the meaning of Article 22 § 6 of the Turkish Criminal Code. That judgment, which was not appealed against by the first applicant, became final on 23 December 2008. 14.  In the meantime, on 17 November 2008 the first applicant applied to the İzmir Magistrates’ Court for a declaratory judgment in order to establish (i)  whether and to what extent the state of the crash barrier alongside the road had contributed to the fatal accident and whether the barrier had been repaired after the accident; and (ii)  whether there had been any structural problems with the road, such as unusual sloping. 15.  The expert report submitted to the İzmir Magistrates’ Court on 5 December 2008 made the following findings:\n-  the crash barrier at the bend in question had been damaged prior to the accident and the damaged parts of it had not been repaired after the accident;\n-  there was a slight dent in the road right by the damaged barrier; however, there was no structural problem with the slope of the road surface. 16.  On 2 March 2009 the first applicant applied for compensation from the General Directorate of Highways (“the General Directorate”) and the Municipality of İzmir (“the Municipality”) in connection with the road traffic accident that had claimed his wife’s life. According to him, it was evident from the traffic accident report that the crash barrier at the site of the incident had been damaged prior to the incident, which suggested that other road accidents had taken place at that same spot. He argued that the defective state of the barrier, which had been put in place to prevent cars from dropping down the side of the road in the event of impact, had greatly aggravated the outcome of the accident. Had the barrier been repaired prior to the accident, it would most probably have prevented the car, which had been travelling within the legal speed limit, from dropping down into the canal, in which case his wife would possibly not have sustained fatal injuries. He further claimed that the fact that there had been other accidents at the same spot in the past suggested a structural problem with the road. 17.  Both the General Directorate and the Municipality denied responsibility for the maintenance of the crash barrier at issue. 18.  On 20 May 2009 the applicants brought an action for compensation before the İzmir Administrative Court against the Municipality alone, arguing that the latter had been responsible for Yeşim Çakır’s death on account of its failure to repair the crash barrier in a timely manner, as well as the possible structural problems with the road. The applicants submitted to the Administrative Court as evidence the expert report ordered by the İzmir Magistrates’ Court (see paragraph 15 above). 19.  The Municipality once again denied responsibility for the maintenance of the crash barrier in question, but also stated that in any event, sole responsibility for the accident lay with the first applicant, who had lost control of his car despite the road signs warning of a sharp bend ahead. 20.  In their response to the Municipality, the applicants repeated that the state of the roadside barrier showed that other accidents had happened at that exact spot on previous occasions, which in turn suggested a structural problem with the road, such as an unusual sloping towards the side. They requested an expert examination on that matter. 21.  By an interim decision dated 18 February 2010 the İzmir Administrative Court requested a copy of the criminal case file, as well as detailed information from the Municipality and the General Directorate in order to be able to determine which of those authorities had been responsible for repairing the crash barrier. It appears from the information submitted by the authorities that the repair work in question fell under the responsibility of the Municipality. 22.  On 16 April 2010 the applicants once again requested an expert examination of the road in order to establish any structural problems that may have triggered the accident. They also asked the Administrative Court to find out how many accidents had happened on that road in the past. It appears that the Administrative Court did not obtain the information requested by the applicants. 23.  Relying mainly on the findings in the traffic accident report and the statements of the first applicant, on 27 May 2010 the İzmir Administrative Court found that the first applicant bore sole responsibility for the accident in question, as he had lost control of his car while taking the bend, despite a sign warning of the sharp bend ahead. It therefore rejected the applicants’ claims against the Municipality. 24.  The applicants appealed against that judgment. They argued that the judgment was based solely on the traffic accident report, and that a technical expert opinion was required to be able to ascertain whether the first applicant had lost control of his car as a result of an anomaly in the road. They also argued that although the roadside barrier had been damaged to the point of completely losing its protective capacities, the Administrative Court had not taken that factor into account in assessing the Municipality’s responsibility for the accident. 25.  On 25 January 2011 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the İzmir Administrative Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  During the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest, on 21 December 1989, the applicant suffered injuries caused by impingement and compression, as a result of which she needed 50 days of medical care, her life not being imperilled. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor’s office opened, of its own motion, several investigations into the ill-treatment and injuries suffered by those participating in the events of December 1989. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (currently no. 11/P/2014). As regards the applicant, an investigation was opened under a separate file and she gave a statement as a witness on 23 June 1994. Her case has been further examined at a later date in the main criminal investigation. 7.  The most important procedural steps were described in the case Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011), and also in Sidea and Others v. Romania ([Committee] no. 889/15 and 38 others, §§ 8-11, 5 June 2018). Subsequent relevant domestic decisions are referred to below. 8.  On 14 October 2015 the military prosecutor’s office closed the main investigation, finding that the complaint regarding the offence of attempted homicide committed against the applicant was statute-barred. This decision was annulled by a Prosecutor General’s decision of 5 April 2016, confirmed by the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 13 June 2016. It was noted that the investigation under file no. 11/P/2014 was incomplete and that the facts could not be established based on the evidence gathered up to that date. 9.  On 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor ordered the opening of a criminal investigation in rem for the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same factual circumstances. Up to February 2017 further steps were taken to gather information from domestic authorities: the prosecutor’s office contacted 211 civil parties, questioning members of the political party which took over the presidency at the time of the events, planning the hearing of military officers and other participants in the events, and verifying the activity of the relevant military units and the audio/video recordings broadcast by radio and television. 10.  At the date of the latest information available to the Court (see Sidea and Others, cited above, § 11), the criminal investigation was still ongoing.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lived in Moscow until his arrest. 6.  The background facts relating to the planning, conduct and dispersal of the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square are set out in more detail in Frumkin v. Russia (no. 74568/12, §§ 7-65, 5 January 2016), and Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia (nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, §§ 7-33, 4 October 2016). The parties’ submissions on the circumstances directly relevant to the present case are set out below. 7.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square, which was supposed to end at 7.30 p.m. The march was peaceful and held without any disruptions, but when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square it became apparent that barriers installed by the police had narrowed the entrance to the meeting venue, allegedly restricting the space allocated for the meeting. To control the crowd the police cordon forced the protestors to remain within the barriers; there were numerous clashes between the two sides. At 5.30 p.m. the police ordered the meeting to finish early and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the square. 8.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate suspected acts of mass disorder and violence against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was transferred to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 an investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising acts of mass disorder (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day. 9.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was a second-year student at the Moscow University of Social Studies and worked part-time as a courier for an insurance company. According to him, on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Kaluzhskaya Square to take part in the march and walked with other participants to Bolotnaya Square. Upon arrival there he discovered that the police cordon had blocked access to the square. When passage to the stage of the rally taking place along the embankment was opened, the applicant went in that direction. The police started to disperse the protesters, using excessive force and beating them with truncheons. In response, the protesters dragged metal barriers in place to protect themselves from the police. At one point the applicant observed a protester in a green T-shirt, who five or six police officers were holding and beating with truncheons. He grabbed the protester and pulled him back, trying to protect him from the blows. The applicant was later arrested by the police and taken to a police station before being released shortly after. After the events in question he continued to live at his usual address and pursue his studies. 10.  On 26 July 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in acts of mass disorder on 6 May 2012. 11.  On 27 July 2012 the Basmannyy District Court ordered that the applicant be placed in pre-trial detention until 26 September 2012. It referred to the gravity of the charges and information about the applicant’s character, including a report by Moscow Police’s chief of department at the Centre for Counter-Extremism. According to that report, the applicant was an active member of organisations of a destructive character. If he were to stay at liberty, he planned to threaten witnesses, abscond and obstruct the investigation. The court concluded that those circumstances gave sufficient grounds to believe that the applicant was likely to flee to avoid the investigation and trial, destroy evidence or otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, which was still at an initial stage. 12.  On 1 August 2012 charges were brought against the applicant under Article 212 § 2 (participation in acts of mass disorder accompanied by violence). He was accused, in particular, of resisting police officers by pushing them away when they were arresting other protestors and by trying to liberate the latter. 13.  On 27 August 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 27 July 2012. 14.  On 24 September 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined an application from the investigator for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant asked for the preventive measure to be changed to house arrest, a written undertaking not to leave a specified place, bail or personal guarantees. On the same day the District Court granted the investigator’s application and extended the applicant’s detention until 6 November 2012. It considered that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. 15.  On 1 October 2012 Police Officer T. identified the applicant during an identification parade as a participant in mass disorder who had used violence against him. In particular, when T. and other officers had been arresting a protester, the applicant had grabbed his hand and pulled it off the protestor, thereby causing the police officer pain. Another police officer, L., also identified the applicant as a participant in acts of mass disorder who had tried to prevent the police arresting another protestor. 16.  On 22 October 2012 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the extension order of 24 September 2012. 17.  On 29 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s detention until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds as earlier, noting that the circumstances justifying the detention order had not changed. In particular, it dismissed an objection from the applicant to the use of the operational-search reports concerning his character and rejected his contesting of the alleged membership of any organisations of a destructive nature. 18.  On 15 November and 21 December 2012 the charges against the applicant were reformulated. It was stated that the applicant, who had been wearing a surgical mask to conceal his face, had used violence against the police while trying to liberate protestors who had been arrested and that he had pushed police officers away. In particular, he had grabbed Officer T.’s hand and pulled it off a protester, thereby preventing his arrest. He had also built a line of metal barriers to block the police and had tried to repel the police with them. The applicant’s alleged offences were classified additionally under Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code (use of violence against a public official). 19.  On 5 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant’s detention, until 6 July 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before. On 17 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order. 20.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of criminal charges. 21.  On 6 June 2013 that court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 24 November 2013. The decision concerned eleven defendants. Along with the gravity of the charges, the court based its decision on the findings that “the reasons which initially warranted the detention have not changed” and that “no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings”. The applicant’s request for an alternative preventive measure was dismissed on the grounds that no other measure could secure the proper course of justice in the case. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 2 July 2013. 22.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the nature of the offences imputable to them. On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld that extension order. 23.  The applicant was held in IZ-77/2 for the whole period of his pre-trial detention from 4 September 2012. According to him, the conditions of his detention had been poor. The applicant referred to cases against Russia in which the Court had previously found a breach of Article 3 because of overcrowding in IZ-77/2 in 2004-2005 (see Lind v. Russia, no. 25664/05, §§ 42 and 58-63, 6 December 2007; Zentsov and Others v. Russia, no. 35297/05, §§ 25-29 and 40-44, 23 October 2012; and Vyatkin v. Russia, no. 18813/06, §§ 26‑27 and 38-43, 11 April 2013). The applicant submitted that his conditions of detention had been similar. 24.  The applicant’s description of the conditions of detention during his transfer from the remand prison to court and back and the Government’s submissions in that regard were identical to those in the case of Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 69-73). 25.  As regards the conditions of detention in the convoy room of the Moscow City Court, the applicant submitted that it was poorly lit and that access to the toilet was limited to once an hour. In addition, he had been required to strip naked and to perform sit-ups during the body search conducted in the convoy room. 26.  On 6 June 2013 court proceedings began in hearing room no. 338 at the Moscow City Court, moving at the end of July 2013 to hearing room no. 635. The defendants, including the applicant, were held in glass cabins in both hearing rooms. From mid-September 2013 to the end of 2013 the hearings continued at the Nikulinskiy District Court of Moscow in hearing room no. 303, while in January and February 2014 they took place at the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court in hearing room no. 410. Those hearing rooms were equipped with metal cages in which nine defendants (seven from 19 December 2013), including the applicant, sat during the hearings. 27.  For a detailed description of the conditions in those hearing rooms see Yaroslav Belousov (cited above, §§ 74-77). 28.  On 6 June 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow began a preliminary hearing in a criminal case against ten participants in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, who were charged with participation in acts of mass disorder and committing acts of violence against police officers. On 18 June 2013 the same court began the trial on the merits. 29.  On 5 September 2013 Police Officer T., the alleged victim of the applicant’s assault, was examined as a witness. He testified that the applicant had impeded him and two other police officers from arresting a protester by grabbing T.’s hand and pushing the officers away. The applicant had caused him pain but had not inflicted any injuries. During the hearing the applicant and his lawyers applied to deprive T. of victim status because no harm had been caused to him, but the court refused that request as unsubstantiated. 30.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretsky District Court of Moscow found the applicant guilty as charged. It held, in particular, as follows:\n“Between 4 p.m. and 8 p.m. on 6 May 2012 ... at Bolotnaya Square ... unidentified persons ... called those present [at the venue] to move outside the agreed meeting venue, to defy the lawful orders of the police ..., to use violence ... which led to mass disorder accompanied by the use of violence against public officials in connection with the performance of their duties [and] the destruction of property.\nOn the same day at 5 p.m. at the latest [the defendants] acquired the criminal intent to participate in mass disorder and to use violence against ... police officers ...\nMoreover ... the participants of the acts of mass disorder threw chunks of tarmac, stones, sticks and other objects at the police ... which hit them on various parts of their body, and [the defendants] ... [who] participated in the acts of mass disorder ... implemented their criminal intent to use violence against public officials ... applied physical force which was not a danger to the life or health of those [officials] ...\n[The applicant] ... who was wearing a surgical mask to hide his face, together with unidentified persons ... tried to liberate those arrested by the police for a breach of public order and pushed the police officers away ...\n... [the applicant] used violence against Police Officer [T.] which did not endanger his life or health ...\n[The applicant] ... from 5 p.m. to 9.40 p.m. ... when unidentified participants of acts of mass disorder tried to break the police cordon, acting intentionally and using force, grabbed [T.’s] hand and then pulled it off the person whom [T.] was arresting, thus impeding his apprehension, which caused [T.] pain.\nIn addition, [the applicant] together with unidentified persons ... built a line of metal barriers blocking the police’s movements, and ... tried to repel the line of police officers ... with the help of those barriers.\n[The applicant] pleaded not guilty and testified that ... he had decided to attend the public gathering on 6 May 2012 ... for the purposes of personal security he wore a surgical mask ... [The applicant] was at the bridge when a blockage occurred. He did not see what was happening, but at one point ... he had been able to proceed with the flow of people towards the stage. There [the applicant] saw the mass beating of people by police officers and participants of the rally starting to bring forward metal barriers ... and to put them close to the police officers, trying to protect themselves from the latter. [The applicant] was standing close to the barriers, taking his hands off when the police officers used their truncheons to hit over the barriers. Then ... [the applicant] saw a group of five or six police officers who were trying to seize a young man in a green T-shirt. They hit the man with their truncheons, and [the applicant], considering that the man was in danger because the police actions were unlawful, tried to snatch him from the officers’ hands. He grasped the young man’s waistband, pulled it and turned his back to protect him from the truncheon blows. [The applicant] finds it conceivable that in this turmoil he might unintentionally have pushed someone and asks for attention to be paid to [T.’s] statements that the latter did not feel any pain. Then [the applicant] was arrested and taken to a police vehicle.\n... the court considers the [defendants’] arguments that they were protecting somebody from police officers or happened to be victims of the police’s use of force as farfetched and aimed at the mitigation of their responsibility ...” 31.  The applicant was sentenced to three years and six months’ imprisonment, calculated on the basis of a three-year prison term under Article  212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, partly concurrent with a term of one year and three months under Article 318 § 1. The applicant’s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence. 32.  The applicant appealed. He complained that the same acts imputed to him had been classified under both Article 212 and Article 318 of the Criminal Code. He insisted that he had not used violence against T. because the latter had not suffered any pain or injuries. 33.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Kharkiv. 6.  At the time of the events she worked as a passport registration officer (паспортист) in one of the municipal housing and public utilities’ offices (КПЖРЕП) in Kharkiv. 7.  On 6 February 2004 a certain M. went to the passport registration office where the applicant worked to apply for a passport for her son, who had reached the age of sixteen. As M. subsequently mentioned to the police (see paragraphs 13 and 17 below), she had already applied to the applicant in the past. According to M., when she was waiting in the queue, she heard people saying that the applicant was known for taking bribes and that her “usual rate” was 100 United States dollars (USD). Given the considerable number of visitors, M. could not get an appointment that day. She waited for the applicant in the corridor after work and explained the situation to her. The applicant allegedly told M. that it might be time-consuming to settle the matter, in particular because of the fact that M.’s son had been born in Russia and his original birth certificate was not available. However, according to M., the applicant agreed to help her to speed up the procedure with the higher authority, where she would need to pay USD 100 to the official in charge. 8.  According to the applicant’s version of events, she did indeed have a late visitor in the corridor that day, whom she advised to come back during working hours, with no further exchange taking place. 9.  On 7 February 2004 M. made a written statement to the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Police that the applicant had asked for a bribe of USD 100 to speed up the passport issuance procedure. M. confirmed that she was aware of the criminal liability for knowingly making a false report about a crime. According to the police records, the above statement was made at 5 p.m. However, as subsequently established (see paragraph 59 below), that was an error and the actual time of the statement was about 10 a.m. 10.  M. provided the police with a banknote of USD 100, two banknotes of USD 20 and one of USD 10. A detective officer put a special luminescent fluid on the banknotes and returned them to M. That act took place in the presence of two attesting witnesses and was documented in a report. It is not known why it was decided to mark the additional banknotes, not only the USD 100 note. 11.  At about 1 p.m. on the same day M. entered the applicant’s office and emerged a few minutes later, indicating to the investigator and the attesting witnesses that she had given the USD 100 banknote to the applicant. As it was the end of the working day, the applicant locked her office and began to leave. However, the investigator stopped her and suggested she return to her office, which they did together in the presence of the two attesting witnesses. The investigator asked the applicant whether she had received any money from M. She stated that she had and took the banknote from her purse. The police officer then checked the applicant’s hands with a special device and found traces of the luminescent liquid. They were wiped off with cotton pads, which were then packed and sealed as material evidence. Such traces were also found on the banknote of USD 100 in the applicant’s purse and on the purse itself. Lastly, several passports and other papers with various banknotes inserted, varying from two Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) (equivalent to about 0.28 euros (EUR) at the time) to UAH 50 (equal to about EUR 7), were found in the applicant’s bag and were seized. The investigator drew up an inspection and seizure report. The serial number of the USD 100 banknote seized from the applicant, as indicated in the report, differed by one letter (out of eleven characters) from the one noted in the report on marking the bill with the luminescent fluid drawn up earlier that day (see paragraph 10 above). 12.  The applicant wrote an explanation, stating that she had indeed taken USD 100 from M., which she had intended to pay to an unspecified official at the local passport registration authority with a view to speeding up the issuance of the passport for M.’s son. The applicant also stated that she had voluntarily complied with the police’s request to give them the banknote in question. She noted that she had studied the inspection and seizure report and that she agreed with its contents. Lastly, she stated that she had no complaints against the police and that she regretted her actions. 13.  Also on 7 February 2004, following the police operation, the investigator collected “explanations” from M. and the attesting witnesses. M. supplemented her initial statement to the police with further factual details (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). Both attesting witnesses described the police operation which they had observed, as summarised in paragraphs 10 and 11 above. 14.  On 10 February 2004, during her questioning by the investigator, the applicant changed her account of the events as follows. On 7 February 2004, when she had been about to leave work at 1 p.m., M. had entered the office. She had brought some documents in order to get a passport for her son. The applicant had informed her that certain documents were missing. The applicant had also clarified that she would be working in a different office from Monday, 9 February 2004. While collecting her papers and belongings before leaving, the applicant had noticed that M. had thrown something on the table and had run out of the office. The applicant had seen that it was a USD 100 banknote. She had taken it and had tried to get an explanation from M. However, she had already left. When the applicant had looked out into the corridor, she had only seen a man waiting there. It was T., one of the attesting witnesses. Given that different people would be working in the office on the following working day and because she knew her manager was away, the applicant had decided to keep the banknote in order to return it to M. later. 15.  Furthermore, the applicant explained that her initial statement (see paragraph 12 above) had been made in a state of shock and had not been truthful. Allegedly, the investigator had dictated the statement to her. 16.  On 11 February 2004 a criminal case was opened against the applicant on suspicion of incitement to bribery. 17.  On the same date M. gave written explanations to the Kyiv District Prosecutor’s Office with her account of the events, which was the same as before (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above). 18.  On 16 February 2004 the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by the lawyer Zh. and the latter was admitted to the proceedings. When questioned in her lawyer’s presence on the same day, the applicant admitted that on 7 February 2004 she had hinted to M. that the examination of her application was likely to take time and that the applicant would be prepared to speed up the procedure before the higher authority, which she had not intended to do in reality. However, she had seen M. putting a USD 100 banknote on the table and had decided to take advantage of the situation given her own financial difficulties. She explained the difference between her latest account and her earlier submissions by shock and stress, and expressed remorse for what had happened. 19.  On the same date, 16 February 2004, M. was also questioned. As indicated in the report of the questioning, she was registered as living in Kharkiv. 20.  On 26 February 2004 an expert report established that the traces of luminescent liquid on the USD 100 banknote and on the applicant’s hands were the same. 21.  On 28 February 2004 fraud was added to the charges against the applicant, given that she had promised to M. to act as an intermediary in bribing a higher-level official, whereas in reality she had meant to keep the money for herself. 22.  On 28 February 2004 formal charges were brought against the applicant and her status changed from being a suspect to an accused. 23.  On the same day the applicant changed her lawyer. When questioned that day in the presence of her new lawyer (K.), she returned to the account of events she had given on 10 February 2004 (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above). She submitted that she had stated differently in the presence of her previous lawyer (see paragraph 18 above) because she had “considered it useless to prove [her] case and feared that nobody would believe [her]”. 24.  On the same day the investigator returned the USD 100 banknote to M., who wrote a receipt in confirmation. She also undertook to keep the banknote until the end of the proceedings. 25.  On 29 February 2004 the Kyivskyy District Prosecutor’s Office approved the bill of indictment against the applicant. It contained the following list of persons to be summoned to court: the applicant, the victim (M.) and the two attesting witnesses (G. and T.). 26.  On 10 November 2004 the Kyivskyy Court dropped the charge of incitement to bribery. It also ruled to relieve the applicant of criminal liability in respect of the fraud charge and terminated proceedings on that point on the grounds that she was not a danger to society (see paragraph 60 below). 27.  The applicant appealed, seeking the termination of the criminal proceedings against her owing to the absence of the constituent elements of a crime in her actions. She denied asking for or receiving any money from M. and maintained that the latter had simply thrown the banknote on her table. Overall, the applicant considered “everything that had happened to [her] as a provocation on the part of the law-enforcement authorities”. She also complained that she had not been able to cross-examine M. 28.  On 14 April 2005 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the above decision. It held that the first-instance court had not been entitled to terminate the proceedings in the way it had done without the applicant’s consent. The appellate court also noted that the applicant’s argument about her inability to cross-examine M. had not been examined. The case was remitted to the same first-instance court for fresh examination by a different panel. 29.  The Kyivskyy Court adjourned hearings in the case several times owing to the absence of M. and the two attesting witnesses. On 18 July 2005 it decided that it was impossible to complete its judicial investigation in their absence and ordered the police to ensure their attendance. 30.  The police found out that M. had sold her house in Kharkiv on an unspecified date in 2004 and had moved to Russia, with her new address being unknown. G. had moved to a different city in Ukraine, but eventually attended one of the hearings. The other attesting witness, T., was always away from home when visited by the police and his neighbours had not seen him for some time. Eventually, the police located him and on 14 October 2005 he made a written statement that he would appear at a hearing scheduled for 17 October 2005 (with no further details available). 31.  As stated in a note issued by a clerk of the Kyivskyy Court on 17 October 2005, the hearing scheduled for that day was postponed to 6 December 2005 given the judges’ involvement in a different case. It is not known whether there was a hearing on 6 December 2005. It is an established fact, however, that T. did not attend any of the hearings. 32.  In January 2006 the applicant enquired with the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Military Enlistment Office as to whether M.’s son was registered there. On 24 January 2006 she received a reply that he had appeared before that office in April and May 2005, and that the army conscription commission had found him unfit for military service in peacetime by a decision of 6 May 2005. The son had not changed the place of his military registration. The applicant brought the above information to the knowledge of the trial court dealing with her case. 33.  On 26 January 2006 the Kyivskyy Court once again ordered the police to ensure the presence of M. and the two attesting witnesses at the trial. 34.  On 8 February 2006 it decided to continue the examination of the case in the absence of M. as it appeared impossible to establish her whereabouts. In reaching that conclusion, the court referred to the fact that she was no longer registered as being resident in the Kharkiv region and that the police had information that she had emigrated to Russia. By the same ruling, the Kyivskyy Court ordered the prosecution authorities to ensure the mandatory presence of T. 35.  On 16 February 2006 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of fraud and incitement to bribery and sentenced her to a fine of UAH 5,000 (then equivalent to EUR 830). Although the applicant pleaded innocent, the court considered her guilt to be proved by the totality of the evidence. It relied on the statements of M., the aggrieved party, made during the pre‑trial investigation, and those of the attesting witnesses, made by G. before the court and by T. during the pre-trial investigation. The court stated that it had “no grounds for questioning the credibility of the aggrieved party and the witnesses whose statements [were] corroborated by other objective [...] evidence”. The trial court also relied on the inspection and seizure report of 7 February 2004 (see paragraph 11 above) and the forensic expert examination report of 26 February 2004 (see paragraph 20 above). The verdict noted that the applicant had initially confessed to the offences, but had later retracted her confession for no apparent reason other than an attempt to escape liability. Her initial statement was considered, however, more plausible. 36.  On 3 March 2006 the applicant appealed and on 25 April 2006 she submitted further “written explanations to [her] appeal”. She complained, in particular, that her conviction had been based mainly on the statements of M., who had never appeared before the court and whom the applicant had never been able to cross-examine. She argued that the first-instance court had not shown due diligence in finding and summoning M. The applicant also complained that the Kyivskyy Court had wrongly relied on her initial confession, which had been dictated to her by the police before the institution of criminal proceedings against her. 37.  The applicant did not refer in her appeal or in its supplement to her inability to examine T. or to have him examined. At the same time, on 7 April 2006, she lodged a written application to the appellate court to summon T. given that he “was an attesting witness” and that he “had made statements against [the applicant]”. 38.  On 25 April 2006 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 16 February 2006. It considered that the applicant had initially made a confession of her own free will and that she had failed to give any convincing explanation about her subsequent change in position. Furthermore, the appellate court noted that the whereabouts of M. and T. could not be established. There were no reasons to question the veracity of the statements they had made during the pre-trial investigation. Nor were there any reasons to suspect any intention by them to falsely accuse the applicant. In sum, the appellate court did not discern any procedural flaws which warranted quashing the verdict. 39.  The applicant appealed on points of law. She argued that the covert operation of 7 February 2004 had been unlawful because it had not been duly authorised and had taken place in the absence of any criminal proceedings against her, even prior to the formal registration of M.’s statement. The applicant also complained that her rights under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention had been breached on account of her inability to cross-examine M. and T. 40.  On 18 October 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the lower courts’ decisions. Its general conclusion was that no violations of the law of criminal procedure had been established. 41.  On 27 March 2009 the Kyivskyy Prosecutor’s Office opened a criminal case against the applicant for a failure to comply with the judgment of 16 February 2006 (see paragraph 35 above and paragraph 61 below). 42.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant was placed under an undertaking not to leave her town of residence as a preventive measure pending trial. 43.  In the absence of any formal charges against her, the preventive measure ceased to apply ten days later, on 20 November 2009 (see paragraph 62 below), a fact of which the applicant was not aware. It is not known if there was any formal decision lifting the measure in question. 44.  On 7 December 2009 the criminal proceedings were terminated for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in the applicant’s actions. On 11 December 2009 that decision was quashed and the case was returned for additional investigation. The case file does not contain any documents regarding the preventive measure then applicable to the applicant, if any. 45.  On 12, 15 and 18 June 2012 the applicant, who considered herself still bound by the undertaking not to leave her town of residence of 10 November 2009, requested leave to travel outside the Kharkiv region from the investigator. On 22 June 2012 the investigator sent her a letter stating that her request could not be granted because she had not provided any address or other details about the planned trip. 46.  On 5 July 2012 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were discontinued again. However, two days later the investigation was resumed. 47.  On 12 October 2012 the investigator terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant for lack of the constituent elements of a crime in her actions. It was concluded that she had not evaded paying the fine, but that it had been impossible for her to do so given her low income. By the same ruling, the preventive measure in respect of the applicant was lifted, without further details. 48.  On 20 November 2012 a new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) entered into force. Instead of opening a criminal case, it provided for the initiation of an investigation by way of making an entry in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations. 49.  On 22 March 2013 a criminal investigation into the applicant’s failure to comply with the judgment of 16 February 2006 was launched again and was registered in the Unified Register of Pre-trial Investigations. On an unspecified date the proceedings were discontinued. On 8 April 2013 they were, however, resumed. 50.  On 5 June 2013 those proceedings were discontinued once again on the grounds that there were no constituent elements of a crime in the applicant’s actions. The case file contains no information about any further developments. 51.  On 26 February 2013 the applicant lodged a claim against the State Treasury, seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of her allegedly unlawful criminal prosecution from 27 March 2009 to 12 October 2012. She enclosed copies of the two rulings of those dates, by which the investigator had opened and had discontinued the criminal proceedings against her. The applicant also mentioned, in general terms, that she had been unlawfully placed under an undertaking not to leave her town, without further details. 52.  The prosecutor submitted objections. He stated that on 20 November 2009 the investigator dealing with the applicant’s case had revoked the impugned preventive measure, given that no charges had been brought against her within ten days of 10 November 2009 (see paragraphs 43 above and 62 below). The prosecutor also noted that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been reopened on 8 April 2013 (see paragraph 49 above) and remained pending. 53.  On 17 May 2013 the Kyivskyy Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated. As regards her undertaking not to leave the town, the court concluded that it had only been applicable from 10 to 20 November 2009. 54.  The applicant appealed. She submitted, in particular, that “the [first‑instance] court had not given any legal assessment to the fact that the criminal proceedings against [her] had been instituted on 27 March 2009 and discontinued on 12 October 2012, and that all that time [she] had been under an undertaking not to abscond, which had been lifted by the ruling on the termination of the criminal proceedings of 12 October 2012, that being confirmed by [the investigator’s] letter of 22 June 2012” (see paragraph 45 above). The applicant indicated in brackets the page number of the letter concerned in the case file. She further argued, in general terms, that the court had incorrectly interpreted Article 1176 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 63 below) and that it had not calculated, as prescribed under the Compensation Act (see paragraph 64 below), an amount of compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage to which she was entitled. The applicant did not enclose any documents with her appeal. 55.  On 18 June 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Kyivskyy Court. It noted that the sole fact that the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued did not imply that she had suffered non-pecuniary damage and she had failed to prove otherwise. The appellate court further observed that the applicant “[had] not proved when exactly she had been placed under the undertaking not to leave the town as a preventive measure. Therefore, her submission that she had been restrained in her liberty of movement for more than three years [could] not be taken into consideration”. 56.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, in which she indicated, in particular, that the applicability of the undertaking not to leave the town from 10 November 2009 to 12 October 2012 had been established by documents. She reiterated her earlier argument that no assessment had been given to the investigator’s refusals of her requests for leave to travel outside the Kharkiv region in June 2012. This time the applicant enclosed a copy of the letter referred to. 57.  On 22 July 2013 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 58.  On 17 April 2006 the applicant sought the institution of criminal proceedings against the police officers involved in the undercover operation of 7 February 2004. Her main argument was that M.’s complaint had been registered only at about 5 p.m. that day, which had been after the completion of the police operation and thus had undermined its lawfulness. 59.  The prosecution authorities refused to open a criminal case against the police on several occasions. It was established that M.’s complaint had indeed been registered, by mistake, at 5 p.m. instead of 10 a.m. on 7 February 2004, for which the respective officer had been reprimanded. However, there was no indication of a criminal offence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and is detained in Tekirdağ. 7.  On 13 February 1999, the applicant was arrested during an operation carried out against an illegal organisation, namely the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party), at which time he was found to be in possession of a fake identity card. 8.  On 15 February 1999 the applicant was interrogated by police officers at the Istanbul Security Headquarters in the absence of a lawyer pursuant to Law No. 3842, which at the time of the applicant’s arrest provided for a systemic restriction in respect of offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. 9.  The applicant admitted in his statement that he was a member of the organisation in question and gave information about a number of activities in which he had participated, including armed activities. 10.  On 18 February 1999 statements were taken from the applicant by the Istanbul public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer. The applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation in question, that he had joined them in a rural area, and that he had afterwards tried to collect money for the organisation in Istanbul. However, he withdrew the statements he had made to the police, maintaining that he had not participated in any other activity for the illegal organisation. He alleged that he had given those statements to the police under duress. 11.  On the same day the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge, once again in the absence of a lawyer. He confirmed the statement he had made to the public prosecutor, but withdrew the one he had made to the police. The investigating judge ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 12.  On 19 March 1999 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with the Diyarbakır State Security Court, charging the applicant under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with membership of an illegal organisation and involvement in separatist activities against the Republic of Turkey. 13.  On 5 June 1999 Diyarbakır State Security Court declared that it had no jurisdiction to examine the case and transferred the file to the Istanbul State Security Court. 14.  At a hearing held on 18 February 2000, the applicant stated that he had not been able to see his lawyer to prepare his defence and requested time to do so. The applicant was granted time to prepare his defence. 15.  At a hearing held on 1 September 2000, the applicant gave evidence in person and denied all the charges. He stated that he had given his previous statements under duress. 16.  At a hearing held on 14 November 2001 the applicant stated that he was a member of the illegal organisation, but had carried out only political activities for the organisation and not armed activities. 17.  On 1 July 2003 another set of criminal proceedings brought against the applicant, which had been pending since 1994 and concerning charges related to membership of the PKK and taking part in activities for that illegal organisation, was merged with the one that had been initiated in 1999. 18.  The State Security Courts were later abolished by Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004 and the case was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 19.  On 16 September 2004 Istanbul Assize Court held that the applicant had committed an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court based its decision, inter alia, on the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, and other witness statements taken by the police and the public prosecutor. 20.  On 3 May 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of 16 September 2004 on the grounds that the details of a number of PKK activities for which the applicant had been held responsible had not been discussed in the decision in depth and that the case file lacked the necessary official reports. 21.  The applicant was tried afresh before the Istanbul Assize Court. A number of hearings took place during the trial. The applicant claimed during the trial that his statements during the preliminary investigation had been made under duress and he asked to be allowed to confront and examine a certain witness, namely S.K., whose statements had been relied on by the prosecutor in the indictment. His request to examine that witness was rejected. 22.  On 1 February 2007 Istanbul Assize Court found the applicant guilty of committing an offence under Article 125 of the former Criminal Code and again sentenced him to life imprisonment. 23.  On 9 October 2007 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of 1 February 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  On 12 April 2002 the local police sent to the local investigations committee audio recordings of telephone conversations between the applicant and several persons, and video recordings of their meetings in a flat in Novgorod. The accompanying letter, which the Government presented to the Court, stated that the audio and video recordings had been obtained in the course of covert “operational-search” measures (“оперативно-розыскные мероприятия”) authorised by the President of the Novgorod Regional Court on 19 July and 31 August 2000 and 17 and 27 February 2001. 6.  On 16 April 2002 the applicant was arrested and charged with several counts of drug trafficking committed by an organised criminal group. Four more persons were arrested on the same charge. 7.  On 18 April 2002 the Novgorod Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the applicant’s placement in custody pending trial. He remained in custody throughout the criminal proceedings. 8.  The applicant learned about the audio and video recordings on an unspecified date while studying the criminal case file. 9.  On 26 June 2002 the investigation was completed and the case was sent for trial to the Novgorod Town Court. 10.  On 18 July 2002 counsel of one of the defendants asked that the trial be adjourned until September 2002 because he would be on annual leave until 6 September. 11.  On 20 August 2002 the Novgorod Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 16 September 2002. The hearing of 16 September 2002 was adjourned until 23 September 2002 because the applicant’s counsel was in hospital and because the prosecution witnesses did not appear. The trial eventually started on 20 November 2002. 12.  At the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He claimed, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence as they had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation. 13.  His co-defendants pleaded guilty. They testified that the applicant was the leader of an organised group dealing in drugs. The applicant and another defendant, Mr K., had rented a flat where the members of the group had met to receive instructions from the applicant and to distribute the profits. They had also packaged and stored drugs in the flat. The owner of the flat testified that he had rented his flat to Mr K. and that on several occasions the rent had been paid by the applicant. 14.  On 24 November 2004 the Novgorod Town Court found the applicant and his co-defendants guilty of drug trafficking. It found it established that the applicant was the leader of an organised criminal group dealing in drugs. It relied on witness testimony, expert reports, audio recordings of telephone conversations between the defendants and video recordings of their meetings in the rented flat. It found that the recordings were admissible as evidence because they “had been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him”. The applicant was sentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. 15.  In his appeal submissions the applicant complained, in particular, that the audio and video recordings had been obtained without prior judicial authorisation. 16.  On 8 February 2005 the Novgorod Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. It repeated verbatim the Town Court’s finding that the audio and video recordings were admissible as evidence because they “had been obtained in the course of authorised covert operational-search measures aiming at uncovering criminal acts committed by Zubkov and the criminal group organised by him”. 17.  The applicant worked as an investigator at the Prosecutor General’s Office. 18.  On 6 April 2004 he was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting bribery. 19.  On 29 October 2004, while studying the criminal case file, the applicant discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations during the period from November 2003 to March 2004. 20.  The criminal case file also contained a letter of 21 October 2004 from the Federal Security Service to the local prosecutor stating that the audio recordings had been obtained in the course of covert operational‑search measures authorised by the Tver Regional Court in its decisions nos. 55-21, 55-30, 55-76, 55-93 and 55-103. Given that they were classified documents, the decisions could not be shown to the prosecutor and would be shown to the trial court only at its request. 21.  During the trial the applicant pleaded not guilty. He argued, in particular, that the audio and video recordings were inadmissible as evidence because the case file did not contain a copy of the judicial authorisation. The prosecutor stated in reply that the interception of his telephone communications had been authorised by the Tver Regional Court. A copy of the authorisation had not been included in the case file because it was confidential. 22.  On 14 May 2005 the Regional Court convicted the applicant of aiding and abetting bribery and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The court relied, among other things, on the audio recordings of his telephone conversations. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence, finding that “the examination of the material in the case file [had] permitted [the court] to establish that the evidence [had been] obtained in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Operational-Search Activities Act”. 23.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that the Regional Court had not given reasons for its finding that the audio recordings were admissible as evidence. In particular, it had not examined whether the interception of his telephone conversations had been duly authorised by a court and carried out in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. 24.  On 7 December 2005 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. The court did not specifically address the applicant’s argument that the audio recordings were inadmissible as evidence. It held that the finding of guilt had been based on evidence which had been properly analysed and assessed by the Regional Court. The applicant received the decision on 7 March 2006. 25.  On 5 July 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir ordered the applicant’s detention on charges of fraud. The applicant was absent from the hearing but his counsel attended. On 14 July 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the detention order on appeal. The applicant was absent also from the appeal hearing, which was again attended by his counsel. 26.  On 3 November 2006 the Frunzenskiy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 5 January 2007. On 7 November 2006 the applicant appealed. On 5 December 2006 the Vladimir Regional Court found that there were no reasons to vary the preventive measure and upheld the decision of 3 November 2006. 27.  The applicant’s detention was further extended on several more occasions. 28.  In the period from 14 September 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was detained in four remand prisons. According to the applicant, all four remand prisons were overcrowded. 29.  From 14 to 22 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-67/1 in Smolensk. Cell 196 measuring 15 sq. m was equipped with eight sleeping places and accommodated up to sixteen inmates. 30.  From 25 to 28 September 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 76/1 in Yaroslavl. Cell 133 measuring 9 sq. m was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to eight inmates. 31.  From 29 September to 1 October 2006 the applicant was held in remand prison 43/1 in Kirov. His cell measuring 50 sq. m was equipped with forty sleeping places and accommodated up to twenty inmates. The cell was equipped with wooden boards instead of individual beds. 32.  From 2 October 2006 to 12 January 2007 the applicant was held in remand prison 33/1 in Vladimir. Cell 63 measuring 14 sq. m was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated up to five inmates. 33.  On 28 and 29 September 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-76/1 and remand prison IZ-43/1 from Yaroslavl to Kirov. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to ten inmates. 34.  On 1 and 2 October 2006 the applicant was transported by rail between remand prison IZ-43/1 and remand prison IZ-33/1 from Kirov to Vladimir. The train compartment was equipped with seven sleeping places and accommodated up to twelve inmates. 35.  On 25 December 2006 the applicant started to study the criminal case file and discovered that it contained audio recordings of his telephone conversations between 22 and 25 July 2004. 36.  On 2 February 2007 the applicant asked the investigator for a copy of the judicial decision authorising the interception. On the same day the investigator refused his request. Relying on the Interior Ministry’s Order no. 336 of 13 May 1998 (see paragraph 54 below), he replied that the police were not required to send the interception authorisation to the investigator; it was to be kept in the operational search file. The Vladimir Regional Court’s decisions of 28 May and 2 June 2004 authorising interception of the applicant’s telephone communications were stored by the local police. They were classified documents and neither the applicant nor his counsel, who had no security clearance, could be granted access to them. 37.  On 6 February 2007 the applicant complained to the Frunzenskiy District Court of Vladimir that the interception of his telephone communications had been unlawful, in particular because the case file did not contain a judicial authorisation. He submitted that the refusal to give him a copy of the interception authorisation had frustrated him in the exercise of his defence rights and deprived him of an effective remedy against an interference with his rights guaranteed by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the Convention. In particular, he had been unable to ascertain whether the interception authorisation had been issued by a competent court in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, whether it had been based on relevant and sufficient reasons or whether the requirements for judicial authorisation, such as the authorised duration of interception, had been complied with at the implementation stage. 38.  On 19 February 2007 the Frunzenskiy District Court examined the complaint under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 63 below) and rejected it. Relying on section 12 of the Operational-Search Activities Act (see paragraph 49 below), the court held that the judicial decision authorising operational-search measures and the material that served as a basis for that decision were to be held in the exclusive possession of the State agency performing such measures. It had therefore not been included in the criminal case file and the defendant was not entitled to have access to it. The court further referred to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 14 July 1998, holding that the person whose communications were to be intercepted was not entitled to participate in the authorisation proceedings or to be informed about the decision taken (see paragraph 50 below). The refusal to give the applicant a copy of the judicial authorisation had therefore been lawful. The court also rejected the applicant’s complaint about the unlawfulness of the interception, without giving any reasons. 39.  On 3 April 2007 the Vladimir Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 February 2007 on appeal, finding it lawful, well reasoned and justified.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1957, 1961 and 1980 respectively and live in Svetlograd, Stavropol Region. The first and second applicants are husband and wife. The third applicant is their son. 5.  According to the first applicant, on 8 August 2003, at approximately 11.30 p.m., a police patrol car approached his car on a dark village road. A police officer, using a loudspeaker, ordered the first applicant to pull over. The first applicant replied that he would stop at the nearest road police post. The officer repeated his order, noting that he needed to borrow gasoline for the police car. The first applicant kept driving. Near Svetlograd the police officers blocked the road. When the first applicant stopped the car, one of the five policemen pulled him out of the car and hit him in the face. The police officers threw him against the hood of his car, kicked him in the shins and hit him with a butt of a machine gun. The first applicant fell down and fainted. After he regained consciousness and stood up, the police officers claimed that he was drunk and told him to take a breath test which showed that the first applicant was sober. The police officers checked his documents, searched his car and left. The first applicant got into his car and drove away in the same direction. Having driven approximately 500 metres, he saw that the police car had stopped and that the police officers had gathered around it. The first applicant approached the officers. The officer in charge identified himself as Ye. and apologised for the excessive force his subordinates had used towards the first applicant. 6.  The first applicant arrived home at approximately 2.30 a.m. on 9 August 2003. On the same day the first and third applicants filed a complaint about the incident with the local police station. 7.  At 9 a.m. on the same date the first applicant visited the second applicant who underwent a medical treatment in hospital. According to the second applicant, her husband told her about the altercation with the police. He also had visible bruising on his face. At 10.30 a.m. the first applicant underwent a medical examination at the same hospital. Having been diagnosed with multiple injuries, he was admitted for in-patient treatment. An extract from a medical record drawn up in the hospital indicated that the first applicant had injuries on the right cheek, the left shin and the lower back and the swelling of soft tissues. 8.  On 13 August 2003 the first applicant was admitted to the Stavropol Regional Hospital where he was diagnosed with “a multisystem trauma; closed craniocerebral injury; a light brain contusion; an injury of the soft tissues of the right temporal region; a closed uncomplicated stable vertebra medullispinal injury, a compression fracture of the Th. VII vertebra; an intramuscular haematoma of the right side of the lumbar region; a neurologic form of the lumbar plexitis.” Ten days later he was released from hospital on conditions of bed rest and subsequent supervision by a neurologist and orthopaedist. 9.  On 11 August 2003 investigator G. questioned the police officers who denied the first applicant’s allegations. They claimed that they had ordered the first applicant to pull over because they had suspected that he had been driving under the influence of alcohol. The first applicant had refused to comply and had verbally insulted them demonstrating obscene hand gestures. After having searched the first applicant and his car, they had let him go. 10.  On the same date the investigator ordered a forensic medical examination of the first applicant. Having examined the first applicant, the forensic expert documented multiple injuries on the right cheek and the lumbar region, multiple bruises all over the body and swelling of the soft tissues. The expert considered that those injuries could have resulted from the impact of solid blunt objects or from the fall. 11.  On 20 August 2003 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. It appears that his decision was quashed on a later date. 12.  On 9 September 2003 the first applicant underwent another forensic medical examination. The expert documented the first applicant’s injuries considering that they might have resulted from the impact of solid blunt objects. 13.  According to the first applicant, on 20 September 2003 an investigator of the district prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers. On 3 October 2003 the district prosecutor dismissed the first applicant’s complaint against the investigator’s decision. Ten days later, the Petrovskiy District Court of the Stavropol Region quashed the prosecutor’s decision and authorised a new round of inquiry. 14.  On 28 October 2003 the police issued a report on the inquiry conducted in response to the first applicant’s complaint. Having examined the forensic medical documents and the statements made by the police officers, the first applicant and the witnesses, the police investigator concluded that the first applicant might have sustained injuries as a result of the force used by the police officers in response to his unlawful actions. 15.  On 21 December 2003 investigator G. ordered a new forensic medical examination of the first applicant in order to reconcile inconsistencies in the experts’ findings. 16.  It appears that the first applicant’s complaint about the police brutality was dismissed by the authorities on another six occasions. Each time a superior prosecutor or a court quashed those decisions considering the investigator’s findings incomplete and unsubstantiated and ordering further inquiry into the first applicant’s allegations. 17.  On 22 July 2005 the district prosecutor opened a criminal investigation into the first applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment by unidentified police officers. 18.  On 22 December 2005 the investigator V. stayed the criminal proceedings, holding that it was impossible to establish the alleged perpetrators who had assaulted the first applicant. 19.  On 2 February 2006 the first deputy of the regional prosecutor quashed decision of 22 December 2005 noting that the investigation had not been completed and reopened the proceedings. 20.  On 6 March 2006 the investigator concluded that there was no evidence showing that the first applicant’s injuries had been caused by the police officers and that he was unable to establish the real perpetrator. The first applicant appealed. 21.  On 3 April 2006 the district prosecutor partly accepted the first applicant’s complaint and resumed the investigation. At the same time the prosecutor endorsed the investigator’s reasoning that there was no evidence showing that the offence had been committed by the police officers. A week later the proceedings were again stayed because the perpetrator of the offence remained unknown. 22.  On 6 June 2006 investigator D. again discontinued the criminal investigation. The investigator established that, when searching the first applicant and his car, one of the police officers had punched him on the right cheek and hit him in the back twice with a blunt solid object. The investigator also accepted that, as of the morning of 9 August 2003, the first applicant had bruises on the right cheek, the back and the left shin. He further noted that the forensic medical experts had not ruled out a possibility that the first applicant might have sustained those injuries as a result of the altercation with the police, as alleged by him. The investigator dismissed the first applicant’s allegations referring to his prior criminal record. He also noted that a number of the first applicant’s neighbours had not confirmed that the latter had had any injuries on him on 9 August 2003. As regards the statements made to the contrary by the other neighbours, the investigator found them to be unsubstantiated. Lastly, the investigator took into account that all the police officers denied the first applicant’s accusations. However, it was impossible for the investigator to establish the alleged perpetrator for lack of relevant evidence. 23.  It appears that the decision of 6 June 2006 was quashed and the case was re-opened. 24.  On 17 July 2006 investigator D. discontinued the criminal investigation reproducing verbatim his earlier decision of 6 June 2006. He also considered that the first applicant had willfully made false accusations against the police officers and should be held liable for his actions. The investigator forwarded the relevant material to the prosecutor’s office. 25.  On 14 January 2011 the deputy head of the supervision unit of the Investigative committee considered the decision of 17 July 2006 unlawful and unsubstantiated, quashed it and remitted the matter for further investigation. He noted, inter alia, that the investigator had failed (1) to establish what each of the police officers had done once they had pulled over the first applicant’s car; (2) to check whether any of the police officers had had a machine gun as claimed by the first applicant; and (3) to establish the reasons why the witnesses who had initially claimed that they had seen the police officers beating the first applicant had revoked their statements. 26.  On 1 March 2011 the senior investigator with the district investigative committee dismissed the first applicant’s accusations against the police officers duplicating the findings summed up in the earlier decisions on the matter. Nevertheless, he allowed that the first applicant’s injuries could have resulted from the beatings and that a criminal investigation should be opened on charges of battery. He transmitted the materials to the head of the district investigative committee. The parties did not inform about the outcome of the proceedings. 27.  On 30 September 2004, at approximately 11.00 p.m., the applicants, suspecting that their neighbour had committed a number of thefts and intended to steal their property, beat him up, broke into his car, took the documents for the car and refused to return them until the arrival of a police patrol car. 28.  On 15 June 2005 the Petrovskiy District Court found the applicants guilty of vigilantism and sentenced each of them to two and half years’ imprisonment. The sentence was suspended on eighteen months’ probation. On 4 August 2005 the Stavropol Regional Court upheld the applicants’ conviction on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born in 1944. He is currently detained in Istanbul. 12.  The applicant is a journalist who had been working since 2002 for the daily newspaper Zaman, which was viewed as the principal publication medium of the “Gülenist” network and was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency (see paragraphs 14-18 below). From 2001 onwards, he also lectured on comparative politics and Turkish political history at a private university in Istanbul. 13.  In the years leading up to the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016 the applicant had been known for his critical views on the serving government’s policies. 14.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. 15.  During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators’ control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 300 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 16.  The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. 17.  On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018. 18.  On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 19.  On 27 July 2016, in the course of one of the criminal investigations initiated in respect of suspected members of FETÖ/PDY, the applicant was arrested at his home in Istanbul and taken into police custody. 20.  On 30 July 2016 the applicant, assisted by his lawyer, was questioned at the Istanbul Security Directorate. During the questioning the applicant denied that he belonged to an illegal organisation. Later that day, the Istanbul public prosecutor sought a judicial order for the applicant’s pre-trial detention on suspicion of belonging to an illegal organisation. 21.  On the same day, several editors and columnists of the daily newspaper Zaman, including the applicant, were brought before the Istanbul 4th Magistrate’s Court. The magistrate questioned the applicant about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. The applicant stated that he had joined Zaman in order to be able to express his opinions; that he was in favour of a democratic system corresponding to European standards; that he was a secular person; that he had not been aware of the threat posed by Fetullah Gülen’s movement until after the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016; and that he was opposed to any attack on democracy. 22.  At the end of the hearing, the magistrate, taking into account the contents of the articles written by the applicant – and finding that they had promoted the terrorist organisation in question, even after 17 December 2013 – ordered his pre-trial detention. He noted in that connection that although criminal proceedings had been instituted against E.D. (the editor-in-chief of Zaman) before the attempted military coup, the applicant had continued to work for the newspaper and within the organisation’s media structure. In the reasons given for ordering the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the magistrate took the following factors into consideration: the strong suspicions against him; the nature of the alleged offence and the fact that it was among the offences listed in Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) – the so-called “catalogue offences”, for which a suspect’s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion; the risk of absconding; the state of the evidence and the risk of its deterioration; and the risk that alternative measures to detention might be insufficient to ensure the applicant’s participation in the criminal proceedings. 23.  On 5 August 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. He argued that there was no justification for detaining him. He also contended that his state of health was incompatible with the conditions in the prison where he was being held. In a decision of 8 August 2016 the Istanbul 5th Magistrate’s Court dismissed the applicant’s objection. 24.  On 17 October 2016 the applicant lodged a fresh application for his release. In a decision of 19 October 2016 the Istanbul 10th Magistrate’s Court rejected the application. In his decision, the magistrate stated in particular that it was an established fact that in order to prepare the ground for a military coup, the instigators needed to create the perception that the leaders of the country concerned were dictators. In his view, the applicant’s articles accusing the President of Turkey of being a dictator and calling for him to leave office had contributed to propaganda of that kind. 25.  On 10 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court in respect of several individuals, including the applicant, who were suspected of being part of the FETÖ/PDY media network, in particular accusing them, under Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 § 6 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”), of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being members of it. The public prosecutor sought the imposition of three aggravated life sentences and a sentence of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment on the suspects, including the applicant. As evidence, he produced six articles written by the applicant in 2013 and 2014. 26.  The public prosecutor submitted that the articles by the applicants and other individuals being charged in the same criminal proceedings against leading members of FETÖ/PDY’s media wing could not be regarded as an expression of the authors’ opposition to or criticism of the government. In the applicant’s case, the public prosecutor contended that the expressions he had used had gone beyond the limits of freedom of the press in that they had undermined the rights of the official authorities and endangered social peace and public order. The public prosecutor found that the applicant had not hesitated to call for a possible military coup in his articles and, in short, had discharged functions serving the interests of the terrorist organisation in question. 27.  During the criminal proceedings, the applicant denied having committed any criminal offence. 28.  The criminal proceedings are currently pending before the Istanbul 13th Assize Court. 29.  On 8 September 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been placed in pre-trial detention on account of his articles and alleged that this infringed his right to liberty and security and his right to freedom of expression and of the press. He also contended that his state of health was incompatible with the conditions of his continued detention since he was suffering from benign prostate hyperplasia, hyperlipidaemia, hyperuricemia, a multinodular goitre and sleep apnoea. On that account he asked the Constitutional Court to indicate an interim alternative measure to detention, thus allowing him to be released pending trial. 30.  In a decision of 26 October 2016 the Constitutional Court refused to apply an interim measure of that kind. In reaching that decision, it noted firstly that the applicant’s health had been regularly monitored from the start of his pre-trial detention, and that there was a State hospital inside the prison where he was being held. In that connection, it noted that on 4 October 2016, following a request he had made to that effect the previous day, the applicant had been examined in prison by a general practitioner and had then been transferred to the urology department of the State hospital, where he had undergone a medical examination on 20 October 2016, and that his next appointment had been scheduled for 22 March 2017. In those circumstances, the Constitutional Court found that keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention did not currently constitute a danger to his life or health. It added that should there be a change in his health or the conditions of his detention, he would be entitled to make a further application for an interim measure to secure his release. 31.  On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/16092) in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. 32.  With regard to the applicant’s complaint concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that the evidence forming the basis for his detention had included: (i) an article entitled “As if it were a religious war” (“Din Savaşıymış”), published on 21 December 2013; (ii) an article entitled “The President must not remain a spectator” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Seyirci Kalamaz”), published on 24 December 2013; (iii) an article entitled “Between Erdogan and the West” (“Erdoğan ile Batı Arasında”), published on 28 December 2013; (iv) an article entitled “Yes, both the crime and the punishment are individual” (“Evet Suç da Ceza da Şahsidir”), published on 8 February 2014; (v) an article entitled “This nation is not empty-headed” (“Bu Millet Bidon Kafalı Değildir”), published on 1 March 2014; and (vi) an article entitled “The solution is a government without Erdoğan” (“Çıkar Yol Erdoğan’sız Hükûmet”), published on 29 March 2014. After examining the substance of these articles, the Constitutional Court found that they mainly dealt with matters relating to the “17-25 December [2013]” criminal investigations. In them the applicant had set out his opinion that the government members implicated in the criminal investigation in question should be brought to justice and that it was the responsibility of the President and the ruling party’s leaders to take action to that end. He had contended that the government’s reaction to the investigation had been unjust. The Constitutional Court also observed that the applicant had written that if the investigation in question had been carried out on the orders of suspected members of FETÖ/PDY, they too should be the subject of a criminal investigation. However, he had maintained that it was unfair to accuse all members of the Gülenist movement. The Constitutional Court further noted that in the articles in question, the applicant had not argued that the government should be overthrown by force. On the contrary, he had asserted that the ruling party would lose in the next elections. The Constitutional Court also found that the article published one day before the attempted military coup suggested that the applicant was opposed to coups d’état. It held that he had been expressing opinions on a topical issue that were similar to those of the opposition leaders. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FETÖ/PDY. It added that the fact that he had expressed his views in Zaman could not in itself be deemed sufficient to infer that the applicant was aware of that organisation’s goals. Accordingly, it concluded that “strong evidence that an offence had been committed” had not been sufficiently established in the applicant’s case. Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency). On this point, it noted firstly that in a state of emergency, the Constitution provided for the possibility of taking measures derogating from the guarantees set forth in Article 19, to the extent required by the situation. It observed, however, that if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless. Accordingly, it held that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation and that his right to liberty and security, as safeguarded by Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, had been breached. 33.  Next, with regard to the complaint concerning freedom of expression and of the press, the Constitutional Court observed that the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention on account of his articles amounted to interference with the exercise of that right. Taking into account his arguments regarding the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court held that such a measure, which had serious consequences since it resulted in deprivation of liberty, could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society. It further noted that it could not be clearly established from the reasons given for ordering and extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention whether the measure met a pressing social need or why it was necessary. Lastly, it found that it was clear that the applicant’s pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any concrete evidence other than his articles (see paragraph 140 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). Regarding the application of Article 15 of the Constitution, it referred to its findings concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention (as set out in paragraphs 108-10 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment – see paragraph 32 above) and held that there had also been a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as enshrined in Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. 34.  With regard to the applicant’s complaint that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with respect for human dignity, the Constitutional Court noted that he had access to the treatment required for his condition within the prison where he was being held, and declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 35.  The applicant did not submit a claim for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court made no award under that head. The applicant claimed an unspecified sum in respect of the pecuniary damage he had allegedly sustained. The Constitutional Court found no causal link between the violation established and the damage alleged on that account and dismissed the claim. However, it held that the applicant was to be awarded 2,219.50 Turkish liras (TRY – approximately 500 euros (EUR)) in respect of costs and expenses. 36.  As the applicant was still in pre-trial detention on the date of delivery of its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided to transmit the judgment to the Istanbul 13th Assize Court so that it could take “the necessary action”. 37.  On 11 January 2018 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Istanbul 13th Assize Court for his client’s release. 38.  On the same day, the Istanbul 13th Assize Court rejected the application, on the grounds that it had not yet received official notification of the Constitutional Court’s judgment. 39.  On 12 January 2018 the Istanbul 13th Assize Court, having observed that the Constitutional Court’s judgment had been published on its website, examined of its own motion the question of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. Noting firstly that the examination of the merits of an individual application to the Constitutional Court against a judicial decision entailed determining whether there had been a violation of fundamental rights and what measures would be appropriate to put an end to the violation, and secondly that grounds of appeal on points of law could not be examined by the Constitutional Court in the context of an individual application, it found that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. On that account, the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 2016/16092 was not in compliance with the law and amounted to usurpation of power (görev gasbı). Regarding the effects of the Constitutional Court’s judgments, the Assize Court added that only judgments that were in accordance with the Constitution and the law should be deemed to be final and binding. It noted, moreover, that more extensive reasoning could be given to justify keeping the applicant in pre-trial detention and that the file contained sufficient evidence against him in that regard. However, this would create the risk of prejudging the case (ihsas-ı rey), seeing that a detailed explanation of the reasons justifying continued detention could be seen as an expression of the judges’ opinions before they had determined the merits of the case. Accordingly, the Assize Court held that it was impossible to accept the Constitutional Court’s judgment. Lastly, reiterating that the judgment in question amounted to usurpation of power, it held, by two votes to one, that there was no need for it to give a decision on the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 40.  The judge in the minority observed in his dissenting opinion that he agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the Constitutional Court’s judgment was not in compliance with the law. However, noting that the Constitutional Court’s judgments were final and binding on the Assize Court, he expressed the view that the applicant’s release should be ordered. 41.  On 12 January 2018 the applicant lodged an objection with a view to securing his release. 42.  In a decision of 15 January 2018 the Istanbul 14th Assize Court unanimously dismissed the applicant’s objection, essentially on the same grounds as the 13th Assize Court had done. 43.  On 1 February 2018 the applicant lodged a further individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention, he complained mainly that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kazan. 5.  In 1969 the Shumelka river in Tveretinovka, Republic of Tatarstan, was dammed and an artificial lake was created. 6.  The original owner of the plot of land that contained the lake was a State fur farm. 7.  In 2003 the fur farm sold the plot of land and the lake to a private limited liability company through a public sale by tender. The new owner’s title to the plot of land was registered in the State land register. 8.  On 5 May 2008 the company sold the land to the applicant through a public sale by tender. The applicant’s title to the plot of land was registered in the State land register and on 28 June 2008 the applicant was issued with the relevant certificate. 9.  On 18 October 2011, following bankruptcy proceedings, the limited liability company was de-registered as a legal entity. 10.  On 29 March 2012 the regional agency for management of State property brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking to reclaim the plot of land and the lake. 11.  On 5 May 2012 the Pestrechinskiy District Court of the Republic of Tatarstan granted the claims in full. The Court noted that, pursuant to the applicable legislation, the lake could not be owned by a private entity or a person and should be returned to the State. The court further noted that the public sale by tender in 2008 had been conducted in contravention of certain regulations (in particular, the announcement concerning the sale had not been published in the newspapers indicated in the State-approved list) and refused to apply the three-year statute of limitations to the agency’s claims. 12.  On 5 July 2012 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan quashed the judgment of 5 May 2012 on appeal and rejected the claims in full. The court considered that the District Court had erred in the interpretation of the applicable legislation and that the plot of land with the lake could be owned by a private party. It further noted that, in any event, the agency’s claim should be dismissed for its failure to bring its action within the three-year time-limit. In this connection the court referred to the fact that (1) the State had been aware that the contested property had left its possession back in 2003 when the plot of land had been sold by the State farm to a private company and the new owner’s title to the property had been registered in the State land register and (2) the State had been aware that the applicant had owned the plot of land since 2008 when the applicant’s title to the property had been registered in the State land register. The agency appealed. 13.  On 14 September 2012 the Supreme Court referred the matter for a review of points of law. 14.  On 10 October 2012 the Presidium of the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgement of 5 July 2012 and upheld the judgment of 5 May 2008, by way of a points-of-law review. It rejected the applicant’s request to apply the statute of limitations, considering that the agency had learnt about the infringement of the State’s rights in respect of the plot of land only in 2012 after receiving a letter from the Federal Water Resources Agency (Федеральное агентство водных ресурсов России). 15.  On 22 February 2013 the plot of land was registered as federal property in the State land register. 16.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the imposition of a fine on her in 2011 as the owner of the plot of land. She claimed that she had not been the owner of the plot of land. 17.  On 19 April 2013 the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan dismissed the applicant’s claims. It noted that the applicant had been the owner of the plot of land in 2011 and that the parties had not furnished any evidence to the contrary.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Baku. 5.  He was the chairman of the Azerbaijani National Statehood Party. 6.  In December 2010 the applicant sold his car to a certain E.R., who encountered a number of technical problems with it. 7.  On 7 January 2011 E.R. contacted the applicant and they agreed to meet on the same day. During the meeting E.R. expressed his dissatisfaction with the car and requested that the applicant return his money and take the car back. The applicant got angry, started to insult E.R. and then assaulted him together with a certain C. 8.  A passer-by intervened and stopped the altercation. E.R. reported the incident to the police on the same day. 9.  On 8 January 2011 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant by the Nasimi District Police Office under Article 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. The investigator’s decision stated that at around 8.30 p.m. on 7 January 2011 the applicant and a certain C. had insulted and assaulted E.R. on the street in Baku. 10.  On 8 January 2011 the police compiled a record of the applicant’s arrest as a suspect. 11.  On 10 January 2011 the applicant was charged under Articles 127.2.3 (deliberate infliction of less serious injury to health) and 221.3 (hooliganism) of the Criminal Code. 12.  On the same day the Nasimi District Court, relying on the charges brought against the applicant and an application from the prosecutor to apply the preventive measure of remanding the applicant in custody, ordered his detention pending trial for a period of two months. The court justified the application of the preventive custodial measure by the gravity of the offences imputed to him, the risk of his reoffending and the likelihood that he might abscond if released. 13.  On 12 January 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, stating that there was no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody and that the court had failed to substantiate the necessity for his detention pending trial. He also submitted that the court had failed to take account of his personal situation and to consider the possibility of another preventive measure, such as house arrest or release on bail. 14.  On 17 January 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were no grounds to quash the first-instance decision. 15.  On 2 March 2011 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal case applied to the court for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of one month. He submitted that more time was needed to complete the investigation. 16.  On 3 March 2011 the Nasimi District Court extended the applicant’s detention pending trial by one month, until 8 April 2011. The court justified its decision by the need for more time to carry out further investigative actions, the complexity of the criminal case and the likelihood that the applicant might abscond and obstruct the investigation if released. 17.  On 4 March 2011 the applicant appealed against that decision, arguing that the first-instance court had failed to substantiate its decision on his continued detention. 18.  On 9 March 2011 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Nasimi District Court’s decision of 3 March 2011. 19.  No further extension decisions are available in the case file. 20.  On 17 June 2011 the Nasimi District Court found the applicant guilty on all counts and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. 21.  The applicant was released from serving the remainder of his sentence by a presidential pardon issued on 17 March 2016.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Malyn, Zhytomyr Region. 5.  On 17 November 1993 M. gave birth to a baby girl, K. Given that the applicant had had relations with M. at the relevant time, on 2 December 1993 he accepted paternity of K. by submitting the relevant declaration to the authorities. 6.  On 23 March 2000 the applicant married M. They divorced in 2006. 7.  In July 2006 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Malyn District Court against M., challenging the paternity of K. The applicant claimed that, even though he had been married to another woman at the relevant time, he had had relations with M. and he had been sure that he was the father of the child and so accepted the paternity. However, in 2005 he had reason to doubt his paternity. 8.  On 24 March 2008 the District Court found for the applicant, relying on a genetic expert’s opinion which excluded the possibility of the applicant being K.’s biological father. The court noted that the applicant had a right to challenge his paternity given that there was no evidence in the file to suggest that he had known that he was not the father of the child when accepting paternity of K. 9.  M. appealed, stating that from January 1993 she and the applicant had lived together without being married and that she had never had any doubts about the applicant’s paternity of K. She argued, inter alia, that the genetic expert’s opinion was not reliable. 10.  On 29 May 2008 the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance court’s decision and held that, under Article 56 of the Family and Marriage Code, the applicant had not had a right to challenge his paternity because at the time that he accepted paternity of K., he was aware that he was not K.’s father. In support of that finding the Court of Appeal noted that before K.’s birth, the applicant and M. had not been married, they had not lived together (noting, in particular, that between February and April 1993 the applicant lived in another town), and the applicant had been married to another woman at the relevant time. 11.  The applicant appealed on a point of law, contending that there were no grounds for the Court of Appeal to find that at the material time he was aware that he was not the biological father of the child. No such evidence was available in the file and the Regional Court of Appeal had exceeded its powers in drawing such a conclusion. 12.  On 9 September 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal by the applicant as unfounded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "9.  The first applicant was born in 1942 and at the time of the events he lived in Baku. 10.  He was a linguist and worked at the Linguistic Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He was of Talysh ethnicity and carried out research on the Talysh language. He also worked as editor-in-chief of the Tolishi Sado, a bilingual Azerbaijani-Talysh newspaper, and regularly published articles therein. 11.  At around 4 p.m. on 2 February 2007 the first applicant was arrested by agents of the MNS in Javid Park in Baku. He was taken to the premises of the MNS where he was questioned for twenty-three hours about his alleged collaboration with the Iranian intelligence service. 12.  He was deprived of water and food and was kept awake. He was also subjected to physical violence. In particular, the fingers of his right hand were several times squashed with a door and he got injuries on his left shoulder. His ill-treatment was stopped owing to his high blood pressure. 13.  At around 4 p.m. on 3 February 2007 the MNS’s agents took the first applicant by car to the area near the Elmler Akademiyasi metro station in Baku and released him there. The applicant was not provided with any document concerning his arrest and detention. 14.  Immediately after his release while the first applicant crossed the road, a police officer approached and arrested him because of his alleged failure to comply with the police officer’s request to identify himself. He was taken to Yasamal District Police Station no. 28, where an administrative-offence record was drawn up by police officers. The first applicant refused to sign the record. 15.  On the same day the first applicant was taken to the Yasamal District Court and appeared before a judge. The judge found him guilty under Article 310 § 1 (failure to comply with a lawful order of a police officer) of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced him to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 16.  On 5 February 2007 the first applicant’s lawyer appealed against that decision. He claimed that the first applicant’s administrative conviction had been totally unjustified and that the first-instance court had not examined any evidence proving his guilt. His lawyer further noted that the first applicant had been ill-treated on the premises of the MNS, where he had been unlawfully detained from 4 p.m. on 2 February 2007 to 4 p.m. on 3 February 2007. In that connection, the lawyer submitted that there were bruises on his hand and asked the court to order his forensic examination. The relevant part of the complaint reads as follows:\n“It appeared at the court hearing [before the first-instance court] that N. Mammadov [the first applicant] had also been subjected to physical violence. In fact, the existence of bruises on his left hand was clearly seen.” 17.  On 9 February 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance court’s decision. The appellate court’s decision made no mention of the lawyer’s particular requests and complaints. The hearing was held in the absence of the first applicant. 18.  Following his administrative conviction on 3 February 2007 by the Yasamal District Court, he was returned to the premises of the MNS where he was kept until 17 February 2007. He was again ill-treated by MNS agents during that period. In particular, although he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism, he was not provided with the relevant medical care and medication. He was questioned in general at night and no record was drawn up in respect of those interviews. He was given false information about his family according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and that his wife had been hospitalised and was suffering from a serious disease. He was not provided with clean clothing during this period. His family was not informed of his place of detention. 19.  It appears from the documents in the case file that an investigator at the MNS, N.Z., compiled on 9 February 2007 a record on the first applicant’s questioning as a witness on the premises of the MNS. The investigator questioned him about his travels to and relations with Iran. 20.  The Government submitted that they had been unable to obtain the files of the case concerning the first applicant’s administrative detention as they had been destroyed owing to the expiration of their term of storage. For this reason, the Government were not able to clarify the conditions of the first applicant’s detention and treatment to which he had been subjected during this period. 21.  As the first applicant’s family had no information about his place of detention following his administrative conviction, his lawyer sent numerous letters and telegrams to the MNS, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Court of Appeal asking for information about the first applicant’s place of detention. The lawyer also indicated in his submissions that there were bruises on the first applicant’s hand, and that the first applicant had to follow a special diet and be provided with the relevant medication because of his state of health. 22.  In reply to the above-mentioned requests, by a letter of 9 February 2007 the MNS informed the lawyer that the first applicant had not been arrested or detained on their premises. By a letter of 16 February 2007 the Ministry of Internal Affairs also informed the lawyer that the first applicant had not been taken to or detained in the detention facilities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. 23.  On 15 February 2007 the second applicant lodged a request with the Prosecutor General asking for the first applicant’s forensic examination in the presence of his lawyer. In that connection, she noted that at the hearing of 3 February 2007 before the Yasamal District Court the first applicant’s family members had noticed injuries to the index finger of his right hand. She further noted that she had not been informed of his place of detention and that the first applicant could not live without his medication because of his state of health. 24.  By a letter dated 20 February 2007 the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the second applicant that her request concerning the allegedly unlawful actions taken against her husband had been transferred to the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office and that she would be informed of the outcome. 25.  It appears from the case file that on 7 April 2007 the investigator in charge of the case ordered the first applicant’s forensic examination. According to forensic report no. 32/TM, during his examination by the expert on 12 April 2007, the first applicant complained of having been ill‑treated on the premises of the MNS on 2 February 2007. In particular, he stated that the index finger of his right hand had been squashed with a chair and that he had been struck on his left rib cage. The expert concluded that there was not at that time any objective sign of injury on the first applicant’s body. The first applicant was not provided with a copy of the report. Despite the Court’s explicit request to the Government to submit copies of all the documents relating to the domestic proceedings, the Government failed to provide the Court with a copy of the above-mentioned forensic report. 26.  On 8 October 2007 the first applicant lodged an action with the Sabail District Court, asking the court to find violations of his rights protected under Articles 3, 5 and 14 of the Convention. He alleged, inter alia, that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007, that his arrest and detention on the premises of the MNS from 2 to 3 February 2007 had been unlawful, and that he had been discriminated against on the grounds of his ethnicity. The part of the complaint concerning the first applicant’s ill-treatment reads as follows:\n“It appeared from the submissions that he [the first applicant] made to his representative in the presence of the investigator on 17 February 2007 that, although he had not officially asked for medical aid, he suffered from hypertension, prostatitis and poor eyesight. During the period when he had been administratively detained on the premises of the MNS, he had been subjected to unrecorded interviews with 200/220 mm Hg blood pressure, he had not been provided with the relevant medication, and on several occasions, he had not been allowed to go to the toilet with the intention of breaking his will.\n... N. Mammadov had been threatened on several occasions and had been given false information according to which his two sons had also been arrested and detained in the next cells and his wife had been hospitalised on account of a serious heart disease ...\nAlthough the application and request of his wife and representative concerning the violence against N. Mammadov had been addressed to the Prosecutor General’s Office, those complaints had been sent first to the Yasamal District Prosecutor’s Office and the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office, and then again to the Prosecutor General’s Office. The latter sent the complaints made on 9 March for a legal assessment two months later to the Investigation Department of the MNS. They were dealt with with delay on purpose so that the visible trace of injuries to the index finger of his right hand would disappear and recover; and the forensic examination had been ordered only in April 2007.” 27.  On 18 October 2007 the Sabail District Court, which examined the action under the procedure established by Articles 449-51 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning appeals against the prosecuting authorities’ actions and decisions, dismissed it without addressing any of the first applicant’s particular complaints. 28.  On 24 October 2007 the first applicant appealed against that decision, reiterating his previous complaints. 29.  On 16 November 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 18 October 2007. 30.  On 17 February 2007 the first applicant was charged with the criminal offence of high treason under Article 274 of the Criminal Code. 31.  On the same day the Sabail District Court, relying on the official charges brought against the first applicant and the prosecutor’s request for the preventive measure of remand in custody to be applied, ordered the first applicant’s detention for a period of three months. The judge substantiated the necessity of this measure by the seriousness of the first applicant’s alleged criminal acts, and the possibility of his absconding and obstructing the investigation. 32.  On an unspecified date the first applicant appealed against the Sabail District Court’s decision of 17 February 2007. He claimed, in particular, that there had been no justification for the application of the preventive measure of remand in custody. He also complained that the court had failed to take into account his personal situation, such as his age and his having a permanent place of residence, when it had ordered his detention pending trial. 33.  On 1 March 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the detention order was justified. 34.  On 12 May 2007 the Sabail District Court extended the first applicant’s pre-trial detention until 3 August 2007. The court substantiated the need for the extension by the seriousness of the charges and by the necessity of additional time to carry out further investigative steps. 35.  On an unspecified date the first applicant appealed against that decision, claiming that he had not committed any crime and that there was no reason for his continued detention. 36.  On 31 May 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 37.  On 28 July 2007 the Sabail District Court extended the first applicant’s pre-trial detention until 3 December 2007. The court substantiated the necessity of this extension on the grounds that a number of investigative steps needed to be carried out and thus more time was needed to complete the investigation. 38.  On 3 August 2007 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance court’s decision. 39.  On 15 November 2007 the first applicant’s case was sent to the Assize Court for trial. 40.  On 7 December 2007 the Assize Court held a preliminary hearing. The first applicant complained at the hearing that he had been ill-treated and had been unlawfully detained on the premises of the MNS and asked the court to return the case to the investigators for a new examination. On the same day the Assize Court dismissed his applications. The court further decided that the preventive measure of remand in custody in respect of the first applicant should remain “unchanged”, as there were no grounds for his release. 41.  In the course of the proceedings before the Assize Court, the first applicant reiterated his previous complaints relating to the alleged violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. In this regard, he claimed that he had been ill-treated by agents of the MNS between 2 and 17 February 2007 and that he had been unlawfully arrested and detained by them. 42.  It appears from the case file that on 5 March 2008 a judge of the Assize Court ordered the applicant’s forensic medical examination, asking the expert to clarify the conclusions of forensic report no. 32/TM (see paragraph 25 above). Following the first applicant’s examination on 3 April 2008, the expert concluded in his report, no. 54/TM, that there was no objective sign of injury on the first applicant’s body. The expert also concluded that the first applicant’s pain in his left shoulder had not been noted in the conclusions of forensic report no. 32/TM as it had not constituted an objective sign of injury. It further appears from report no. 54/TM that the first applicant complained of pains in his left shoulder and these pains were having an effect on the fourth finger of his left hand. However, there was no sign of injury to his finger or left shoulder. 43.  On 5 March 2008, following a request from the first applicant’s lawyer, a judge at the Assize Court asked the MNS to inform the court, inter alia, whether the first applicant had been on the premises of the MNS on 2, 3 and 9 February 2007, whether he had been questioned on the premises of the MNS on 9 February 2007, and whether he had been subjected to a medical examination and what his diagnosis had been. 44.  In reply to the judge’s letter of 5 March 2008, by a letter dated 16 April 2008 the MNS informed the judge that the first applicant, who was at that time detained in the MNS pre-trial detention facility, had been diagnosed with hypertension and was being provided with the relevant treatment. However, the MNS’s letter was silent as to the judge’s requests for information concerning the first applicant’s presence on the premises of the MNS on 2, 3 and 9 February 2007. 45.  On 24 June 2008 the Assize Court convicted the first applicant of high treason and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment and confiscation of his property. The Assize Court also held, relying on the conclusions of forensic report no. 54/TM, that there had been no objective sign of injury to the first applicant’s body. 46.  On 26 December 2008 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the Assize Court’s judgment of 24 June 2008. 47.  On 27 May 2009 the Supreme Court upheld the Baku Court of Appeal’s judgment of 26 December 2008. 48.  According to the first applicant, he suffered from various medical conditions, including hypertension, prostatitis and hyperthyroidism and poor eyesight before his arrest. He regularly received medical treatment in connection with the above-mentioned conditions. 49.  It appears from the documents in the case file that the first applicant was detained from 17 February 2007 to 25 June 2008 in the MNS pre-trial detention facility, from 25 June 2008 to 14 January 2009 in pre‑trial detention facility no. 1, from 14 January to 28 July 2009 in prison no. 15, and from 28 July 2009 until his death on 17 August 2009 in the medical facility of the Prison Service (“the medical facility”). 50.  It appears from the extracts of the first applicant’s detention-facility medical record (tibbi kitabça) no. 353, as well as from the documents in the case file, that in 2007 and 2008 the first applicant was examined on numerous occasions by doctors. During this period the first applicant’s state of health was stable and he mainly complained of high blood pressure and headaches. According to medical record no. 353, which covered the first applicant’s detention from 17 February 2007, the first applicant was subjected to initial examination (ilk baxış) upon his arrival at the detention facility. The initial examination did not contain references to any injury on his body. The date of the initial examination was not indicated in the medical record, but there was a stamp dated 20 February 2007 on that page of the medical record indicating the result of the first applicant’s blood test. 51.  It appears from two letters dated 1 and 12 September 2007 sent from the first applicant’s lawyer to the head of the MNS pre-trial detention facility that the lawyer asked for information about the first applicant’s medical treatment. The lawyer also expressed his gratitude for the conditions created for the first applicant’s medical treatment in detention. 52.  It also appears from a request from the first applicant dated 30 June 2008 that he asked the head of pre-trial detention facility no. 1 to allow his lawyer to provide him with the medication. 53.  As regards the period of his detention from 14 January to 28 July 2009 in prison no. 15, on 14 January 2009, upon his transfer to that facility, the head of that prison decided to place the first applicant in a punishment cell for a period of fifteen days. It appears from the case file that following the intervention of the Azerbaijani Committee against Torture, a local non-governmental organisation, on 21 January 2009 the first applicant was transferred to a normal cell. 54.  On 26 January and 19 February 2009 the first applicant’s lawyer wrote to the head of prison no. 15, complaining about the first applicant’s conditions of detention. The lawyer noted that the first applicant had been placed in a punishment cell for a period of fifteen days without any reason and asked for a copy of the decision in this regard. The lawyer further submitted that although the first applicant suffered from various medical conditions, he had not been provided with the adequate medical assistance. 55.  On 23 February 2009 the first applicant’s lawyer lodged an action with the Nizami District Court, complaining of the first applicant’s conditions of detention and the violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he pointed out that the first applicant had been unlawfully placed in a punishment cell and had not been provided with the adequate medical assistance. 56.  On 6 March 2009 the Nizami District Court partially allowed the action, holding that the first applicant’s placement in a punishment cell had been unlawful. The court also found that the first applicant had not been subjected to a medical examination upon his arrival at the prison and ordered the latter to carry out a medical examination of the first applicant and to provide him with adequate medical care. It further appears from the judgment that the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 stated at the court hearing that he had been on leave when the first applicant had been placed in a punishment cell and that he had requested to be transferred to a normal cell immediately after his return to work. He further stated that the first applicant suffered from hypertension and that he had informed the first applicant of the necessity of his transfer to a specialised medical establishment, but the first applicant had rejected that suggestion. 57.  On 29 March 2009 the first applicant appealed against that judgment, noting that the first-instance court had failed to acknowledge the violation of his rights protected under Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. In particular, he noted that he had been detained from 14 to 21 January 2009 in a punishment cell which had been windy, wet and not heated. He also pointed out that the cell had not received natural light and that he had not been provided with the relevant clothing. During this period, he had been obliged to remain standing from 5 a.m. to 9 p.m. every day as there had been no chair in the cell. In his appeal the first applicant confirmed that the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 had proposed his transfer to a specialised medical establishment. In that connection, he submitted that he had refused that proposal because of his financial situation as he had not considered that he would have been provided with the adequate medical assistance free of charge. 58.  On 16 April 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The appellate court’s decision was not amenable to appeal. 59.  It appears from the documents in the case file that in the meantime, as evidenced by a document dated 30 March 2009 and signed by the first applicant, the latter refused to be transferred to a specialised medical establishment. He substantiated his refusal by the poor quality of medical treatment in that particular medical establishment. 60.  It appears from the documents in the case file that on 7 July 2009 the first applicant again refused to be transferred to a specialised medical establishment. In that connection, he submitted that he had not had any financial means and that he had not thought that he would have been provided with the adequate medical assistance there. 61.  It further appears from the extracts of the first applicant’s medical records that he refused on several occasions to be examined by the doctors. Various medical records were compiled by the doctors in this connection. 62.  On 28 July 2009 the first applicant was transferred upon his consent to the medical facility with the diagnosis of osteochondrosis of the cervical vertebrae (boyun fəqərələrinin osteoxondrozu) and right shoulder plexus (sağ tərəfli çiyin pleksiti). 63.  It appears from a letter dated 14 August 2009 and signed by the head of the medical facility, sent in reply to an information request from the first applicant’s lawyer, that upon his arrival at the medical facility the first applicant mainly complained of neck pains, general weakness and dyspnea. On various dates indicated in the letter the first applicant was examined by a number of specialists, including a neurosurgeon, an endocrinologist, a urologist and an ophthalmologist, who confirmed the diagnosis of osteochondrosis of the cervical vertebrae and right shoulder plexus. The doctors also confirmed that the first applicant suffered from various other medical conditions such as hypertension, prostatitis, acute cholecystitis, bronchitis, hyperthyroidism and cataracts. 64.  On 17 August 2009 the first applicant died. According to the death certificate, the death resulted from an ischemic cerebral infarction (baş beyinin işemik infarktı). 65.  Following the death of the first applicant, the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office launched a criminal inquiry into the circumstances of his death. 66.  On 18 August 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office ordered a post-mortem examination of the body, which was carried out on the same day, for the purposes of determining the cause of death. Report no. 105 dated 29 August 2009 showed that death had resulted from an acute ischemic cerebral infarction (baş beyinin kəskin işemik infarktı). 67.  On 24 August 2009 the second applicant lodged a request with the Prosecutor General, claiming that the first applicant had died in detention because he had not been provided with the adequate medical treatment after January 2009. In that connection, she submitted that the first applicant’s state of health had worsened following his placement in a punishment cell between 14 and 21 January 2009 in prison no. 15 and that his medical treatment following that had not been adequate. 68.  By a letter dated 27 August 2009, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office returned the documents of the criminal inquiry to the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office, finding that the inquiry into the first applicant’s death had not been conducted thoroughly. In particular, the Baku City Prosecutor’s Office held that the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office had failed to determine the medical conditions from which the first applicant had suffered and whether he had been provided with adequate medical assistance. It further found that the first applicant’s cellmates and the doctors examining him in prison had not been questioned by the prosecuting authorities. 69.  On 31 August 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office ordered a forensic examination by a panel of experts. The prosecutor asked the experts to establish whether the first applicant had been provided with adequate medical assistance, whether his medical conditions had been correctly diagnosed and whether his death had resulted from a lack of adequate medical treatment in detention. 70.  Report no. 177/KES dated 1 September 2009, which examined only the period of the first applicant’s treatment following his transfer to the medical facility on 28 July 2009, showed that the first applicant’s medical conditions had been correctly diagnosed and treated in the medical facility. The three experts furthermore found that, although the first applicant had been suffering from numerous conditions (such as osteochondrosis, hypertension, prostatitis, cataracts), the latter could not have developed during a short period of time and could only have appeared following long pathological processes in his body. The report further found that the death had resulted from a cerebral infarction as a result of thrombosis inside cerebral blood vessels and was not related to his medical treatment. 71.  On 28 September 2009 the deputy prosecutor of the Nizami District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings in connection with the first applicant’s death because of the lack of evidence of a crime in his death. He relied in this connection on the findings of the above-mentioned two forensic expert reports, concluding that the first applicant’s medical treatment had been adequate and that there had been no causal link between his medical treatment and death. The decision also referred to the statements from various doctors and the first applicant’s cellmates according to which the medical treatment had been adequate and that the first applicant had not made any complaint in this connection during his treatment. In particular, the head of the medical department of prison no. 15 stated that although the first applicant’s transfer to the medical facility had been proposed on several occasions, he had refused that proposal. 72.  On 21 October 2009 the second and third applicants lodged a complaint against the prosecutor’s decision of 28 September 2009 with the Nizami District Court, asking the court to overrule it. They claimed that the first applicant had not been provided with adequate medical assistance in detention and that his unlawful placement in a punishment cell on 14 January 2009 had resulted in the development of numerous diseases. In that connection, they complained that the first applicant had been transferred to the medical facility only on 28 July 2009, despite the fact that on 6 March 2009 the Nizami District Court ordered prison no. 15 to provide the first applicant with adequate medical care. They further submitted that they had not been provided with a copy of the first applicant’s medical records and the forensic reports relating to his death and that they had been provided with a copy of the prosecutor’s decision of 28 September 2009 only on 19 October 2009. 73.  On 2 November 2009 the Nizami District Court dismissed the complaint. The court found that the first applicant had been provided with adequate medical care. It further noted that although his transfer to the medical facility had been proposed on several occasions before 28 July 2009, he had rejected these proposals. 74.  On 5 November 2009 the second and third applicants appealed against that decision, reiterating their previous complaints. 75.  On 17 November 2009 the Baku Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. As to the argument that the Nizami District Court’s decision of 6 March 2009 had not been executed, the appellate court found that the first applicant had refused to be transferred to the medical facility. That decision was not amenable to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Sivas. 7.  According to a report drawn up by the police officers and signed by the applicant, on 19 November 2002 at 1.30 p.m., the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the Hizbullah following an hour long armed conflict with the police officers during which he had resisted, had thrown a grenade and had fired back at the police officers. 8.  On the same day at 1.50 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Silvan State Hospital, in Diyarbakır, by a doctor who observed the following on the applicant’s body: 2 cm-long scrape on his lower left chest, handcuff marks on his wrists, a traumatic scrape on the front side of his right leg. The doctor observed no unfitness for work. Also on the same day at 5.45 p.m. the applicant was examined at the Diyarbakır State Hospital by another doctor who made similar findings as those mentioned in the first medical report. 9.  On 22 November 2002 the applicant was interviewed by police in the absence of a lawyer in the course of which he had allegedly sustained both physical and psychological ill-treatment. According to the applicant’s submissions, he was allegedly forced to sign some documents, as well as a declaration to waive his right to legal assistance. He further maintained that when he had wished to read the documents that he had been made to sign he had been threatened with further ill-treatment. 10.  On 23 November 2002 at the end of his police custody, the applicant was examined at the Diyarbakır State Hospital by a doctor who noted that there were no new signs of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. According to the applicant, during the examination the police officers intervened and ordered the doctor to write that the applicant had some grazes on his wrists and ankles. 11.  On 23 November 2002 the applicant gave a statement to the public prosecutor in the absence of a lawyer in which he accepted the accusations against him. On the same day the applicant was brought before the investigating judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court, who took his statements in the absence of a lawyer in which he had accepted most of the statements he had given to the police. According to his submissions before the Court, the applicant claimed that he had admitted being a member of the Hizbullah before the public prosecutor and the judge on account of the duress and the intimidation exerted on him by the police. He further claimed that the police officers had threatened him with excessive length of proceedings and had told him that if he had accepted the charges they would help him and release him from detention. 12.  On 27 November 2002 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with attempting to undermine the constitutional order of the State. 13.  On 19 March 2003 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case. During the hearing, the applicant gave evidence without a lawyer in which he denied his previous statements and the accusations. He further stated, without providing any details, that he had been subjected to pressure while in police custody and that he had pressurised to sign his police statements without reading them.\nWhen asked about his statements before the public prosecutor and the investigating judge, the applicant stated that he had given self-incriminating statements as a result of the pressure from the police officers. 14.  At a hearing held on 18 September 2003 the applicant submitted, without providing any details, that he had been tortured during the preliminary investigation. 15.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 16.  On 22 June 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court found that, inter alia, on the basis of the applicant’s statements to the police, the public prosecutor and the investigating judge that the applicant had committed the offence under Article 146 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Relying on the medical report dated 23 November 2002, it also rejected the applicant’s contention that he had been tortured while in police custody. 17.  On 10 April 2008 the Court of Cassation upheld the trial court’s judgment.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1933, 1940 and 1975 respectively and live in Teghout village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. The plot of land belonging to the applicants was listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 8.  The applicants, a family of three, live in Teghout village and earn their living from agriculture. They jointly owned a plot of arable land in the village measuring 0.430 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening and feeding their livestock. 9.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicants containing an offer to buy their plot of land for 231,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 500 euros (EUR)) plus an additional 15% as required by law, making the final offer AMD 265,650 (approximately EUR 578). 10.  The applicants did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that they were unable to obtain a valuation of their property by another company. They claim that no other valuer was willing to make an independent evaluation of the market value of their land. 11.  On 12 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicants, seeking to oblige them to sign an agreement on the taking of their property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on a valuation report prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the report the market value of the applicants’ plot of land was estimated at AMD 231,000 (approximately EUR 500). 12.  In proceedings before the Lori Regional Court the applicants argued that the market value of their land had been underestimated, since the lowest market prices had been considered during the valuation, while several plots of land had been acquired for much higher prices. They also argued that no account had been taken of the presence of fruit trees and that the valuation report erroneously stated that their plot of land did not have a water supply whereas it did have such a supply, which had actually been cut off because of the plaintiff’s activities on the property. 13.  On 3 July 2008 the first hearing at the Lori Regional Court was held. According to the Government, the applicants were duly notified of the date of the proceedings, but they did not appear. 14.  In the course of the proceedings Teghout CJSC submitted another valuation report on the applicants’ property, stating that Oliver Group LLC had prepared a corrected report according to which the market value of the land was AMD 262,000 (approximately EUR 570). The final amount of compensation with the additional 15% would thus be equal to AMD 301,300 (approximately EUR 655). 15.  On 6 October 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicants a total of AMD 301,300 (approximately EUR 655) in compensation. 16.  The applicants lodged an appeal, complaining that they had not been duly notified about the dates and times of the rescheduled hearings. 17.  On 29 January 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 18.  On 27 February 2009 the case was set for trial in Lori Regional Court. The court hearing was scheduled for 2 April 2009. The Government argued that the applicants had been duly notified of the hearing and that the notification letter, as always, had been sent to their addresses. 19.  On 2 April 2009 the applicants’ representative requested adjournment of the examination of the case. The court examination was adjourned and rescheduled for 22 April 2009. 20.  On 21 April 2009 the applicants’ representative lodged an application with the Lori Regional Court, asking for the examination of the case to be adjourned. Accordingly, on 22 April 2009 the court examination was adjourned and rescheduled for 29 April 2009. 21.  On 27 April 2009 the applicants’ counsel requested the Regional Court to order a forensic expert examination to determine the market value of the applicants’ plot of land, and to order that this examination was to be performed by experts of the State non-profit organisation “Expertise Center of the Republic of Armenia” (“Հայաստանի Հանրապետության փորձագիտական կենտրոն” պետական ոչ առևտրային կազմակերպություն). 22.  On 29 April 2009 the Lori Regional Court held a court hearing. During the hearing it became clear that there was no information concerning whether the applicants had been notified. In these circumstances, the Lori Regional Court decided to adjourn the examination, taking into consideration the fact that the applicants were not duly notified about the court hearing. The next hearing was scheduled for 20 May 2009, a notification to that effect was sent both to the applicants’ representative and the applicants. 23.  On 20 May 2009 both the applicants’ representative and the applicants were present at the hearing. The applicants’ representative requested that the court ordered that a forensic expert examination be made to determine the market value of the applicants’ plot of land. Furthermore, the Lori Regional Court refused the applicants’ representative’s request, which was based on the domestic legislation, according to which each party to the proceedings must itself present evidence on the facts. 24.  On 2 June 2009 the Lori Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim finding, inter alia, that the valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group LLC were lawful and acceptable evidence to determine the market value of the applicants’ property to be taken for State needs. The Regional Court dismissed counsel’s request and awarded the applicants AMD 301,300 (approximately EUR 655) in equal shares as compensation. 25.  On 22 June 2009 the applicants’ counsel lodged an appeal, claiming, inter alia, that the amount of compensation was not adequate. He argued that the Regional Court had accepted the reports submitted by the applicants’ opponent as established proof of the market value of their property, and that it had refused to order a forensic examination without any grounds. He further argued that the Regional Court should have exercised its statutory discretion to order an expert examination, since the necessity for it had arisen in the course of the proceedings and the applicants had no opportunity to provide an alternative valuation themselves. 26.  According to the case file, on 10 July 2009 the notifications of the hearing of the Court of Appeal scheduled for 24 July 2009 were sent to the applicants, but they did not appear at that hearing. 27.  On 24 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal hearing was held; the applicants and their representative were not present. 28.  On 7 August 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, finding that the latter’s decision not to order a forensic examination was well grounded, since there was no necessity for it. The Court of Appeal further found that the amount of compensation had been correctly determined, on the basis of the corrected valuation report prepared by Oliver Group LLC, given that that report was the only lawful and acceptable piece of evidence produced during the proceedings. 29.  According to the applicants, the decision of the Court of Appeal was not served on their counsel. 30.  On 1 October 2009 the applicants’ counsel requested permission from the Regional Court to consult the case file. After the counsel’s request was granted, he made a copy of the Court of Appeal’s decision in order to lodge a cassation appeal. 31.  On 9 October 2009 the counsel lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar complaints to those raised before the Court of Appeal. The counsel also submitted that the Court of Appeal had not duly notified him of the proceedings and had examined the appeal in his absence. Additionally, he requested to have the missed time-limits for lodging an appeal on points of law restored, explaining that the reason for late submission was the failure of the Court of Appeal to serve on him a copy of the decision of 7 August 2009, despite the fact that he was the applicants’ authorised representative in the proceedings. 32.  On 28 October 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the cassation appeal inadmissible as lodged out of time. In doing so, it found that the reasons for late submission advanced by counsel were not justified in view of the fact that the applicants had been served with a copy of the decision in due time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1990 and lives in Galashki, Ingushetia Republic. 5.  On 11 December 2009 the applicant was abducted by S. with intent to marry her. The applicant’s mother opposed the marriage and on the same day S.’s relatives took the applicant back to her mother’s house. 6.  On 12 December 2009 the relatives of the applicant’s deceased father made the applicant go back to S.’s, because of the presumed consummation of the marriage. They also threatened to kill S., should the applicant decide to leave him. 7.  The applicant had to live with S.’s family as his wife. The marriage was not officially registered. She was kept locked in a room without being able to communicate with people outside S.’s family. S. moved to a different town. On rare occasions S.’s sister let the applicant use her mobile phone so that she could call her mother. She complained that S.’s family, especially her mother-in-law, treated her poorly. She did not feel well and complained about dizziness, numbing of the lower jaw and difficulty to breathe. According to the applicant’s mother, the applicant told her once that her mother-in-law did not let her see S. and claimed that the applicant would not last living with them longer than two months. On several occasions the applicant lost consciousness and foamed at the mouth. 8.  On 28 December 2009 the applicant was taken to a municipal hospital. The doctor diagnosed her with renal colic. 9.  On 29 December 2009 during another visit to hospital the applicant was diagnosed with poisoning by unknown substance. 10.  On 1 February 2010 the applicant foamed at the mouth again and was taken to hospital. She was released on the same day. 11.  On 2 February 2010 the applicant lost consciousness and was taken to hospital. A general practitioner and a neuropathologist examined her. She was diagnosed with stress and overdose of sedatives and placed in an intensive care unit. Subsequently she was diagnosed with post-hypoxic encephalopathy and vegetative state. She has not regained consciousness since then. 12.  In April 2010 the applicant was released to her mother’s care. 13.  On 23 September 2010 the applicant’s mother complained to the local police department and prosecutor’s office that the applicant had been forcefully held by S.’s family in inhuman conditions which led to deterioration of her health and coma. 14.  On 10 October 2010 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.’s family on the charges of incitement of suicide and causing damage to health. 15.  On 24 October 2011 the applicant’s mother lodged another complaint with the local police department alleging that the applicant had been poisoned while staying at S.’s house. She also stated that the applicant had been repeatedly beaten up and deprived of her liberty. 16.  According to the forensic medical report completed on 8 November 2011, a vegetative state, similar to the applicant’s, could be caused primarily by intoxication. The expert, however, was unable to determine the cause of the applicant’s condition. 17.  On 24 November 2011 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against S.’s family. The applicant appealed. 18.  On 29 July 2012 the supervising prosecutor quashed the decision of 24 November 2011 and ordered further inquiry into the matter. 19.  On 3 August 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of attempted murder. 20.  On 1 October 2012 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings on the charges of causing serious damage to health. The applicant appealed. 21.  On 26 July 2013 the Sunzhenskiy District Court of the Ingushetiya Republic quashed the decision of 1 October 2012. The court noted that the inquiry had been incomplete. The investigator had failed (1) to question a number of important witnesses and (2) to determine the cause of the applicant’s condition. 22.  On 26 September 2013 the investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings reiterating verbatim his reasoning set out in the decision of 1 October 2013. 23.  On 15 January, 14 March and 21 May 2014 the deputy head of the district police department ordered a new inquiry noting that the previous inquiry had been incomplete. 24.  On 18 January and 18 March 2014 the investigator refused to open a criminal investigation reproducing verbatim the earlier decisions of 1 October 2012 and 26 September 2013. 25.  On 21 May 2014 the investigator again refused to open a criminal investigation. In addition to his earlier findings, he studied the applicant’s medical case-file and concluded that it did not contain information accounting for the cause of her medical condition. 26.  On 28 February 2015 the district deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2014 and ordered a further inquiry. 27.  The case-file materials submitted by the Government contain two decisions dated 6 March 2015. The first decision was taken by the investigator who refused to institute a criminal investigation in the applicant’s case. The second decision was taken by the district deputy prosecutor who ordered a new inquiry. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in the Poltava region. 7.  According to the applicant, who lived in Donetsk at the material time, on 27 May 2008 a police officer called him and invited him to attend the Donetsk regional police station to discuss his past service in the police. When he arrived there at about 10 a.m. he was told that he would not be able to leave because he was going to be arrested. His mobile telephone was taken away and switched off. Two hours later police officers from the Volnovakha police arrived and took him to the Volnovakha police station, where at about 2 p.m. police officers G., P. and S. started threatening him and told him to confess to the murder of A. He refused and at about 9 p.m. they twisted his arms behind his back, put handcuffs on his wrists, pushed him down to the floor, put a plastic bag on his head blocking his airway, connected and switched on an electric shock device attached to his right wrist, and started hitting him in the head and body. After thirty minutes of ill-treatment he lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness, G. put the plastic bag on his head again. Afraid of further ill-treatment, he agreed to make written statements, dated 28 May 2008, concerning A.’s murder. One of the police officers forced him to write his signature in an empty entry of the police visitors’ book (книга обліку відвідувачів). He was then held at the police station until the next evening when, at 7.52 p.m., he was taken to appear before the investigator, Sh. When the latter started drawing up the arrest report pursuant to Article 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, T., a lawyer from Donetsk hired by the applicant’s father, entered Sh.’s office and informed Sh. that she would provide legal assistance to the applicant. 8.  According to the Government, at 7.10 p.m. on 27 May 2008 the applicant attended the Volnovakha police station to “give explanations” and left at 9.10 p.m. the same evening. At 9.10 a.m. on 28 May 2008 he attended the police station again to “give explanations” and left at 11.40 a.m. At 7.52 p.m. he was arrested there in the presence of his lawyer, T. 9.  According to the police visitors’ book, on 27 May 2008 the applicant arrived at the police station at 7.10 p.m. and left at 9.10 p.m. On 28 May 2008 he arrived at the police station at 9.10 a.m. and left at 11.40 a.m., while T. came to the police station at 7.10 p.m. Only the above two entries were made on 28 May 2008. The photocopy of the visitors’ book provided by the Government does not contain a column with visitors’ signatures. 10.  According to the police arrestees’ logbook (книга обліку доставлених), at 7.52 p.m. on 28 May 2008 the applicant was brought to the police station on suspicion of aggravated murder. 11.  The arrest report drawn up by Sh. between 7.52 and 8.12 p.m. on 28 May 2008 contained the applicant’s complaint that at about 9 p.m. on 27 May 2008 he had been beaten by police officers. It also contained a request by him to be taken to hospital for a medical examination. It also stated that the applicant’s father had been notified of the applicant’s arrest. 12.  It appears from the case file that on the evening of 28 May 2008 Sh. allowed T. to talk briefly with the applicant. During their conversation G. allegedly approached them, shouting at T. and threatening her. Later T. made a complaint against G. in the police visitors’ book. 13.  The search report, drawn up on 28 May 2008 and attested by witnesses K. and B., stated that nothing had been seized from the applicant during his search. 14.  At about 10 p.m. the same evening the applicant was examined in the local hospital. Doctors noted in a medical certificate that he had informed them that at about 9 p.m. on 27 May 2008 he had been beaten by police officers. They documented numerous bruises, haematomas and abrasions on his face, head, wrists and shoulders. 15.  At 10.45 p.m. the same evening the applicant was placed in the Volnovakha temporary detention facility (“the ITT”). The ITT officers noted numerous injuries on the applicant’s face, forehead, wrist joints, shoulder joints and right thigh. The ITT duty officer then reported those injuries to the head of the Volnovakha police station. 16.  On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint with the town prosecutor regarding his alleged ill-treatment at the Volnovakha police station on the evening of 27 May and unlawful detention on 27 and 28 May 2008. In particular, he described in detail the alleged ill-treatment (as stated in paragraph 7 above). He also stated that his detention in that police station had not been recorded and that the duty officer had only made an entry in the police visitors’ book about his alleged visit to that police station at 9.10 a.m. on 28 May 2008 after T.’s arrival. 17.  On the same day T. complained to the prosecutor that on the evening of 28 May 2008 G., who had ill-treated the applicant the day before, had threatened her during her conversation with the applicant in the police station corridor. 18.  On the same day the applicant was questioned. In addition to the statements made in his complaint to the prosecutor, he stated that one of the alleged perpetrators had forced him to write his signature in an empty entry of the police visitors’ book. 19. On the same day, at Sh.’s request, P. conducted a forensic medical examination of the applicant. According to his expert report, completed on 2 July 2008, the applicant had a number of bruises, haematomas and abrasions, which were classified as minor bodily injuries. They had been caused by blunt objects or by impact with them. Some of them (abrasions on the right forearm and left wrist) had been sustained up to one day before the examination, while others had been sustained three to four days (some bruises on his face, right shoulder joint and right shoulder) or five to seven days (haematomas in the right groin area and on the left shoulder joint) before the examination. A number of others (haematomas on the head, neck, face, left hip and forearm, left wrist and knee, abrasions on the right forearm, left leg, and a scratch on the right leg) could have been sustained during the period indicated by the applicant. There were no signs of electric shock treatment. 20.  On 12 November 2008 the applicant acquainted himself with the above-mentioned report. He stated that he disagreed with it, because he still had signs of electric shock treatment, the injuries on his wrist joints had not been examined, and the manner in which they had been inflicted had not been established. He added that all the injuries had been sustained at the police station. 21.  On 3 June 2008 the prosecutor questioned the applicant as a suspect in A.’s murder. According to the interview record, the prosecutor’s first question concerned the vehicles which the applicant had used from 1 January 2008 “until the time of [his] arrest on 27 May 2008”. 22.  Following the pre-investigation inquiries, on 7 June, 7 August and 28 November 2008, 21 January and 10 April 2009 the town prosecutor or his assistant refused to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant’s complaint of 29 May 2008. While mentioning the applicant’s explanation that he had been beaten at the police station on 27 May 2008 and the expert report of 2 July 2008, which had established that he could have sustained a number of injuries during the period indicated by him, the prosecutor found that there was no evidence that those injuries had been inflicted at the police station and not elsewhere, because on 27 and 28 May 2008 the applicant had not been at the police station all the time. The prosecutor relied on statements given by the alleged perpetrators, the investigator Sh. and police officer K., who had been on duty on 28 May 2008. According to them, on 27 May 2008 G. had received a call from the Donetsk regional police informing him that they were holding the applicant, who was suspected of a crime committed on the territory of the Volnovakha district. G. and another police officer had gone by car to Donetsk, where they had arrived at about 5 p.m. They had taken the applicant and at about 7 p.m. had returned to the Volnovakha police station. The applicant had not been questioned that day because he had given confused answers to their questions and had asked for some time to think things over. He had left the police station at about 9 p.m. and written his signature in the police visitors’ book. The following day he had come back at around 9 a.m. and had written a statement concerning A.’s murder. He had then been invited to wait to be questioned by Sh., but he had said that he would wait for him outside and had left the police station premises at about 11 a.m., having put his signature in the visitors’ book. At 7.52 p.m. G. and S. had taken the applicant to the police station and then to appear before Sh. Nobody had seen any injuries on him, and he had not been handcuffed. When Sh. had started drawing up the arrest report, T. had entered Sh.’s office, informing him that she had been appointed as the applicant’s lawyer. 23.  The applicant appealed against the prosecutor’s decisions. In his appeals he again described his alleged ill-treatment in detail (as stated in paragraph 7 above). Furthermore, he stated that his signatures in the police visitors’ book had been forged and that when he had asked for the book to state his complaints, it had been hidden from him. Only T. had been able to write her complaint against G. in it. 24.  On 21 July and 4 November 2008, 18 January, 30 March and 21 September 2009 the higher prosecutor or the Volnovakha Court set aside the above-mentioned decisions on the grounds that the inquiries were superficial and had not examined all the circumstances stated by the applicant. In decisions of 30 March and 21 September 2009 the latter court also instructed the prosecutor to order a handwriting analysis of the applicant’s signatures in the police visitors’ book. 25.  On 14 January 2010 the town prosecutor ordered a handwriting analysis of two signatures allegedly written by the applicant in the visitors’ book on 27 and 28 May 2008. However, on the same day he again refused to institute criminal proceedings, largely for the same reasons as before. 26.  On 27 April 2010 a specialist, S., concluded that the signatures were authentic. In complaints lodged with the Volnovakha Court the applicant stated that he had only been informed of the results of the above-mentioned analysis in a letter from the prosecutor, but had not been provided with the document containing those results. 27.  On 30 April 2010 the prosecutor ordered an additional forensic medical examination of the applicant as per the court’s instructions of 22 October 2009 (see paragraph 34 below). On 6 May 2010 P. supplemented his expert report of 2 July 2008 by adding that injuries which could have been sustained during the period indicated by the applicant had also included haematomas on his back. 28.  On 1 June 2010 the applicant complained to the Volnovakha Court about the decision of 14 January 2010. He stated, inter alia, that if the prosecutor had established that he had been taken to the police station on 28 May 2008 at about 8 p.m. without any visible injuries, and the medical examination at 10 p.m. had found numerous injuries on him, that meant that he had received them on 28 May 2008 between 8 and 10 p.m. The applicant also complained that those who had attended the police station on 27 and 28 May 2008 and could have been witnesses to the events on those days had not been identified. 29.  On 8 October 2010, following a request from the applicant’s father, who was acting as his representative, two experts, G. and K. from the Kharkiv State Medical Academy, issued an expert medical report. That report, based on the material of the expert medical examination of 29 May 2008, established that the applicant’s injuries had been caused by rubbing, compression and hyperextension of the skin and by blows. He had sustained at least twenty-two blows from blunt solid objects. Formation of haematomas on the neck and back of the head as a result of the tightening up of a plastic bag was “not excluded”. A haematoma and abrasion on the forearms were “typical” handcuff injuries; their being sustained as a result of sharp raising by another person of the applicant’s hands twisted behind his back was “not excluded”. A haematoma on the applicant’s left knee had been sustained upon impact of that area with a blunt object; it could have resulted from him falling over. Haematomas in the right part of the head and on the cheeks could have been caused by punches. 30.  On 27 April 2011 the Volnovakha Court set aside the decision of 14 January 2010 on the grounds that the inquiry was incomplete and one-sided. In particular, the prosecutor had not complied with the court decision requiring a handwriting analysis. He had not assessed the fact that, according to the expert report of 2 July 2008, some of the applicant’s injuries had been sustained during the period indicated by him. Nor had he questioned the officer who had been on duty on 27 May 2008 and a doctor who had examined the applicant on 28 May 2008. 31.  On 6 July 2011 the prosecutor again refused to open criminal proceedings. The applicant’s father complained to the higher prosecutors, pointing to a contradiction between the prosecutor’s decisions in which it had been established that the police officers had not seen any injuries on the applicant when he had been taken to the police station on 28 May 2008, and the expert report of 2 July 2008, which stated that a number of injuries could have been sustained by the applicant on 27 May 2008. Therefore, those officers would have seen the injuries and had therefore given false statements. 32.  On 18 July 2011 M. and G., who shared a cell with the applicant for some time during his pre-trial detention, sent letters to the prosecutor stating that on 14 July 2011 S., one of the alleged perpetrators, who was later arrested on charges of bribery, had been placed in their cell for thirty minutes. M. and G. asked him whether he had participated in the applicant’s ill-treatment. He had answered in the affirmative, adding that he would have been fired if he had not participated in the ill-treatment. 33.  On 25 July 2011 the higher prosecutor set aside the decision of 6 July 2011. The parties did not inform the Court of the subsequent events. 34.  The applicant also raised complaints of ill-treatment within the criminal proceedings against him. On 22 October 2009 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal sent the criminal case against him for further investigation, inter alia, on the grounds that the prosecutor’s inquiry into his complaints was incomplete. In particular, the expert report of 2 July 2008 had not mentioned the injuries on the applicant’s back and the expert had to establish the manner in which the injuries had been sustained and whether they could have been sustained in the circumstances alleged by the applicant. 35.  The parties did not inform the Court of the subsequent events. Publicly available material shows that on 3 April 2014 the Dokuchayivsk Town Court acquitted the applicant for lack of evidence against him. In examining various pieces of evidence, it also referred to the applicant’s statement given during the trial that, inter alia, on 27 May 2008 he had been ill-treated at the Volnovakha police station.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 19 February 2008 a presidential election was held in Armenia, which was followed by daily protest rallies held at Yerevan’s Freedom Square from 20 February onwards by the supporters of the main opposition candidate, Mr Ter-Petrosyan. The applicant was the head of Mr Ter‑Petrosyan’s election headquarters in the town of Abovyan and regularly attended the rallies. On 1 March 2008 the assembly at Freedom Square was dispersed by the police, causing mass protests throughout Yerevan. 6.  On 8 March 2008 the applicant was summoned to a local police station in Abovyan where he was questioned about the leaflets that he had prepared and distributed among the demonstrators during the rallies. 7.  On 11 March 2008 the applicant was charged with organising mass disorder and an attempt to usurp State power. 8.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (the District Court) ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention for a period of two months, namely until 8 May 2008, taking into account the nature and the gravity of the imputed offence and the severity of the punishment prescribed for it. By the same decision the District Court refused the applicant’s request to be released on bail. 9.  On 14 March 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing that the investigating authority had not presented any evidence to substantiate the need for his detention. 10.  On 21 March 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the applicant’s appeal, holding that the fact that the applicant had been accused of a grave offence punishable by up to ten years’ imprisonment increased the probability of his evading criminal punishment. Furthermore, it was unacceptable to release the applicant on bail in view of the fact that, if at large, the applicant could abscond, obstruct the proceedings, commit another offence, evade responsibility and punishment, and continue to breach public order. As to the applicant’s good character, mentioned by him in his appeal, this was not sufficient to justify lifting the detention order. 11.  On 4 May, 2 July, 3 September and 30 October 2008 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention on the same grounds, on each occasion by two months. 12.  On 19 May, 18 July, 19 September and 16 November 2008 the Criminal Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeals against those decisions. 13.  On 10 December 2008 the trial court decided to set the case down for trial, ruling in the same decision that the applicant’s detention was to remain unchanged. 14.  On 22 June 2009 the District Court found the applicant guilty of making public calls inciting a violent overthrow of the government, and imposed a two-year sentence. It further decided to absolve the applicant from serving his sentence under a general amnesty declared by the Armenian parliament on 19 June 2009. The applicant was immediately released from detention.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Grimăncăuți. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant is a farmer who grows and sells potatoes. On 5 February 2008 he and his brother went to the Varnița village, in the vicinity of the city of Bender/Tighina. The latter is controlled by the authorities of the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdiestria” (“the MRT”), while Varnița itself is under Moldovan control. 8.  Having sold potatoes for some time in various places in Varnița, with authorisation from the local administration, on 5 February 2008 at around 2.30 p.m. the applicant was approached by plain clothed officers of the “MRT” customs authority. The latter asked for documents for the merchandise, including evidence of payment of taxes for importing merchandise into the “MRT”. The applicant explained that he had all the relevant documents and had paid taxes to the Moldovan local authorities in Varnița. Shortly thereafter two more officers from the “MRT” security and customs authorities arrived in a car. When the applicant’s brother announced that he had called the Moldovan police, the applicant was attacked by the “MRT” officers, forced into their car and driven away. The Moldovan police arrived after the impugned event. 9.  Later in the evening, the applicant’s car with the remainder of merchandise was seized by the “MRT” customs authority. According to the applicant, an officer of the Moldovan police was present and did not interfere. 10.  On 6 February 2008 the Bender city court (an “MRT” court) found the applicant guilty of having committed the administrative offence of resistance to the customs officers. The applicant explained that he considered having been arrested on Moldovan territory (Varnița village) and not having seen any signs warning that he was about to cross into the territory under the “MRT” control. The court sentenced him to three days’ detention. According to the applicant, the hearing took place in Russian, a language which he understood only to a limited degree, and in the absence of a translator. He was refused the right to be assisted by a lawyer when preparing for the hearing, and a court-appointed lawyer was only present at the court hearing, not assisting him in any manner. The applicant was given neither a copy of the record of his arrest prior to its examination by the court, nor a copy of the court decision of 6 February 2008. 11.  The decision was enforced immediately and the applicant served all three days until the evening of 8 February 2008, when he was released. He could recover his car and merchandise at 11 p.m. on the same day. 12.  On 15 February 2008 the applicant lodged a summary appeal against the decision of the first-instance court, noting that he would submit a full appeal once he received a copy of the decision of 6 February 2008. At his request, on 17 March 2008 he obtained a copy of that decision. 13.  On 18 March 2008 the “MRT” Supreme Court quashed the lower court’s decision because of the failure to specify the exact place where the offence had been committed. The case was sent for re-examination by the lower court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. On 25 April 2008 the “MRT” Supreme Court accepted an extraordinary appeal lodged by the president of that court’s chair and decided that the case was to be re-examined by that court. The applicant was not informed of that decision. 14.  On 27 May 2008 the applicant received by fax a letter dated 12 May 2008 summoning him to the hearing of the “MRT” Supreme Court on 27 May 2008 at 10 a.m. Because of this late summoning he could not appear at the hearing. On the same day the court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 6 February 2008, finding that he had been arrested on the territory of the city of Bender after refusing to abide by orders of the “MRT” customs authority. 15.  On 6 February 2008 the applicant’s brother made a criminal complaint in the applicant’s name to various Moldovan authorities, including the Prosecutor General’s Office, about the applicant’s unlawful arrest by officers from the “MRT”. He asked for the criminal prosecution of those responsible. 16.  On 7 February 2008 the applicant’s brother sent a complaint about the applicant’s abduction by the “MRT” authorities to the embassies of several countries in Moldova, including that of the Russian Federation. On 11 February 2008 the applicant sent letters to various embassies, including that of the Russian Federation, thanking them for their intervention into the case by bringing the matter before the Joint Control Commission.[1] Following this alleged intervention the applicant’s car and merchandise were returned to him. 17.  On 28 February 2008 the Moldovan police station in Bender started a criminal investigation into the applicant’s abduction by “MRT” officers. Several witnesses confirmed that the applicant had been forcibly taken away in a car from near a bar in Varnița village and that two of the “MRT” officers were identified. In view of the Moldovan prosecuting authorities’ inability to effectively prosecute persons on the territory controlled of the “MRT”, on 28 August 2008, the investigation was suspended. On 30 May 2013 the investigation was resumed and was pending by the time of the last submissions made to the Court (December 2013). The parties did not inform the Court of any subsequent developments in that regard.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bacău. 6.  On 13 January 2005 the Bacău police division responsible for the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking (“the police”) was informed by the Bacău Regional Division of the Romanian Post Office (“the Post Office”) that it had identified three envelopes containing suspicious items. The envelopes, sent abroad by registered post sometime between 11 April and 13 May 2003, had been returned unopened as the intended recipients had failed to collect them. The people who had sent them could not be identified by postal workers and their addresses had proved to be fictitious. Consequently, the postal workers had opened the envelopes and contacted the police. 7.  The police seized and examined the envelopes and found that they contained Diazepam, a prescription medicine which also belonged to one of the categories of prohibited drugs under Law no. 143/2000 on the fight against drug trafficking and illegal drug use (“Law no. 143”). 8.  Between January and February 2005 similar envelopes containing similar prescription medicines meant to be sent abroad were discovered by the Post Office and given to the police. 9.  On 9 and 14 February 2005 the division for the investigation of organised crime and terrorism from the Bacău Prosecutor’s Office (“the prosecutor”) issued orders authorising the seizure of the suspicious envelopes under the urgent procedure provided for by Article 98 § 12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “the urgent procedure” and “the CCP” – see paragraph 26 below). The prosecutor sent the orders to the County Court for the court’s information on the next day.\nThe relevant parts of the orders read as follows:\n“The investigation showed that the recipients’ addresses are false.\nAs it appears that the envelopes contain prohibited substances which are among those listed in Law no. 143,\nBearing in mind the urgency and the well-foundedness [of the measure] under Article 98 § 12 of the CCP\nOrders\nThat the envelopes ... be taken by police officers ...\nItems which are of no relevance to the case shall be returned.” 10.  On 18 February 2005 the prosecutor started criminal investigations in the matter against unidentified perpetrators. 11.  The prosecutor requested audio and video-surveillance of the post offices in Bacău. The measure was authorised by the Bacău County Court on 23 February 2005. 12.  With the help of the surveillance material the applicant (who at that point remained unidentified) was seen on 14 March 2005 in two different post offices as he deposited two other suspect envelopes to be sent abroad. The envelopes were seized under the urgent procedure provided for by Article 98 § 12 of the CCP (see paragraph 26 below) and on the next day the prosecutor sent the orders to the court for the court’s information. An examination of the envelopes showed that they contained prescription medicine and that the sender’s address was false. The prosecutor’s orders read as follows:\n“... a man brought a parcel with suspicious contents which were of interest to investigators ...\nAs the correspondence was of interest to investigators and as the situation is urgent and duly justified, under Article 98 § 12 of the CCP\nOrders\nThat the police ... seize the parcel.\nCorrespondence and items which have been seized but which are of no relevance for the case shall be returned.” 13.  On 25 March and 18 April 2005 an expert examined the writing on the envelopes seized by the police and concluded that it belonged to the applicant. 14.  During the investigation, the prosecutor identified two pharmacies where the drugs had been procured without prescription. The pharmacists identified the applicant as the person to whom they had sold the medicine. 15.  Based on the evidence that had been gathered, the prosecutor concluded that between 2003 and 2005 the applicant had obtained medical products classified as drugs without prescription and had tried to sell them abroad. 16.  On 2 June 2005 the prosecutor committed the applicant for trial on a charge of dealing in drugs. Five of the envelopes seized on 9 February, 14 February and 14 March 2005 (see paragraphs 9 and 12 above) were attributed to the applicant and used as evidence. 17.  The applicant contested the lawfulness of the interception of his correspondence before the Bacău County Court and argued that the prosecutor had not obtained authorisation from the court to seize it, as required by the relevant provision of the CCP. As for the contents of the seized envelopes, he stated that he had sent scientific papers and samples abroad in relation to his research work and that he had used a fake identity to protect his private life and reputation in case the quality of the scientific work was considered as poor. He denied any involvement in drug trafficking. 18.  On 27 February 2007 the applicant was acquitted. The County Court excluded the prosecution’s main evidence, considering that the seized envelopes had been obtained unlawfully as the prosecutor had failed to ask the court to approve the measure. As for the remaining evidence in the file, it noted that the audio and video-recordings were not relevant for the accusations brought against the applicant and that the witnesses were unreliable as they had changed their statements in court. 19.  On 18 September 2007 the Bacău Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. 20.  However, on 28 January 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice allowed an appeal on points of law by the prosecutor. It found that the lower courts had erred when they had set aside the evidence obtained from the seized correspondence. It considered that the provisions of the CCP meant that the prosecutor had been obliged to inform the courts about the seizure orders but not to seek their approval. It therefore sent the case back to the County Court and recommended that the court check whether the prosecutor’s orders had been sent as information to the court and to examine the accusation in the light of all the evidence in the file. The decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice was final. 21.  On 12 February 2009 the Bacău County Court convicted the applicant of drug trafficking and gave him a three-year suspended sentence. The County Court relied on the evidence in the file, namely the seized envelopes and the expert evaluation of their content and of the writing on them. It also relied on transcripts of the audio and video-surveillance in the post office and of the applicant’s telephone; statements by seven pharmacists that they had sold the medicine in question to the applicant without prescription; and testimony by two doctors who had been asked by the applicant or pharmacists to write prescriptions to cover up for the medicine sold without prescription. There was also testimony from the family doctor, who denied prescribing any medicine to the applicant’s parents, as the applicant had asserted. The County Court also had at its disposal statements from other witnesses, notably nine post office workers who remembered the applicant sending between one and five envelopes a week abroad, starting from 2003; four fellow researchers from the University, who worked or had worked in the same research team as the applicant; and a bus driver who said he had delivered an envelope for the applicant. The court heard evidence from twenty-three witnesses who had participated in various procedural acts as independent witnesses at the request of the police (martori asistenţi). The court further relied on the results of checks on the addresses abroad used by the applicant; Interpol information about the recipients of the envelopes; and police reports about checks on the two pharmacies used by the applicant, notably concerning bills and permits for selling prescription medicine which constituted drugs (see paragraph 14 above). In addition, it referred to the police report concerning the applicant’s activity on the Internet related to his alleged scientific work abroad (see paragraph 17 above). The court also had at its disposal reports from seven banks, attesting to the fact that between 2003 and 2005 the applicant had received more than a hundred money transfers from abroad for small sums, amounting to more than 41,000 United States dollars (USD) and 10,000 euros (EUR). 22.  The court dismissed the applicant’s argument of the unlawfulness of the interception of the correspondence. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention, it found that the interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his privacy had been provided for by law and had been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. 23.  It also reiterated that as the situation had been urgent, the prosecutor had been allowed by law to intercept the correspondence without court authorisation, provided that he informed the court afterwards, which he had done. 24.  The applicant appealed. In the main, he argued that the interception of his correspondence had been unlawful and had breached his Article 8 rights. The court dismissed his arguments, making reference to the interpretation of the law given by the High Court of Cassation and Justice in its decision of 28 January 2008 (see paragraph 20 above). He also contested the manner in which one of the postal workers had been interviewed by the prosecutor (see paragraph 21 above). He did not contest the lawfulness of the remaining evidence. In his defence, he explained that he had received money from abroad for experiments he had performed for foreign scientists’ research work (see paragraph 21 above). 25.  The applicant reiterated his arguments in an appeal on points of law lodged with the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He did not contest the remaining evidence in the file. The High Court dismissed the case in a final decision on 22 June 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Siirt. 5.  On 9 January 2009 the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation and disseminating its propaganda. 6.  On 13 January 2009 the applicant was brought before the Siirt Magistrates’ Court, who ordered his detention on remand taking into account the strong suspicion that he had committed the alleged offences. 7.  On 3 August 2009 the applicant’s lawyer filed an objection against the above decision on the applicant’s detention and requested his release. 8.  On 6 August 2009 the Diyarbakır public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with disseminating terrorist propaganda, and aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation. 9.  On 10 August 2009, at the end of the preparatory hearing, the Diyarbakır Assize Court decided to prolong the applicant’s detention on the basis of the case-file. 10.  On 8 September 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court ex officio examined the applicant’s detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 11.  On 1 October 2009, at the end of the first hearing before the Diyarbakır Assize Court, the applicant was released pending trial. 12.  On 31 December 2009 the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charges against him. No appeal was filed and the judgment became final on 8 January 2010.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Orhei. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 16 January 1997 the Orhei mayor’s office attested the property right of a number of private individuals over plots of land in the town. Based on that decision, on 3 April 1997 the same office issued the applicant’s brother (C.) title to 0.0569 hectares of land. 7.  On 13 July 1998 C. died. After his death the applicant took possession of the land and used continuously for her own needs. 8.  On 10 September 1999 the territorial cadastre office registered the plot of land as belonging to C. 9.  On 31 January 2000 the Orhei mayor’s office amended the annex to its decision of 16 January 1997. C. continued to be mentioned as the owner of the relevant plot of land. 10.  On 15 July 2005 the Orhei mayor’s office lodged a civil court action aimed at annulling the property right of C. and the applicant to the relevant land. It claimed that the title had been issued in error since C. had moved to an apartment provided by the town and was no longer eligible to obtain such land. Following this relocation, the cadastre office was supposed to remove C.’s title from the list, which it had failed to do. In the meantime, on an unspecified date the applicant initiated a court action aimed at extending the time-limit for accepting her brother’s inheritance. The two court actions were joined by the court on 6 November 2006. 11.  On 15 February 2017 the Orhei district court rejected the court action lodged by the mayor’s office and accepted that of the applicant. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant had raised the issue of expiry of the three-year limitation period and added that under Article 78 of the old Civil Code (see paragraph 15 below), the court had to apply the rules concerning the limitation period regardless of the parties’ arguments. It found that the mayor’s office had missed the three-year limitation period. However, in the operative part the court omitted to refer to the expiry of the limitation period and found that the court action had been groundless. The court also accepted the applicant’s action, extending the time-limit for accepting her brother’s inheritance since she had taken possession of the relevant land immediately after his death. 12.  On 4 October 2007 the Chișinău Court of Appeal overturned that judgment, accepting the appeal lodged by the mayor’s office. It annulled C.’s title to the relevant land, finding that he had obtained it in error and that under the applicable law he could not be the owner of that land. Moreover, the court rejected the applicant’s claim for extending the time-limit for accepting her brother’s inheritance, finding that she had missed it without a valid reason. 13.  On 12 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the judgment of the Chișinău Court of Appeal. 14.  The applicant submitted documents showing that she had paid various taxes for the land in question over the years. 15.  The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (1964, in force before 12 June 2003) reads as follows:\n“Article 74.  General limitation periods.\nThe general limitation period for defending, by a court action, against the breach of a person’s rights (prescripția) is of three years ...”\n“Article 78.  Mandatory application of the limitation period.\nThe competent court ... shall apply the limitation period regardless of the parties’ request.”\n“Article 581.  Acceptance of inheritance.\nIn order to inherit, the heir must accept the inheritance. ...\nIt shall be considered that the heir has accepted the inheritance if he/she took actual possession or administration of inheritance assets ...” 16.  The relevant provisions of the Civil Code (in force from 12 June 2003) read as follows:\n“Article 7.  Application of the civil law in time.\n(1)  The civil law has no retroactive effect. It does not modify and does not annul the conditions of creation of a legal situation which previously appeared, nor the conditions of ending of a legal situation which previously ended.\n...\n(6)  The provisions of the new law concerning limitation periods ... shall apply to limitation periods which started before the date of entry into force of the new law, but did not end before that date. ... The start, the suspension and the interruption of the limitation period shall be determined under the old law for the period before the entry into force of the new law.\n...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently in the Netherlands. 6.  On 6 July 2012 the applicant left his home in Salouin[1] (Morocco), where he had been living with his parents, for the Netherlands. He went to the Netherlands to visit family but overstayed his tourist visa, which was valid until 24 August 2012. During his stay in the Netherlands he lived with his brother and the latter’s family in Amsterdam. 7.  According to an official report (ambtsbericht) drawn up by the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – “the AIVD”) dated 14 September 2014, information provided by a generally reliable source indicated that a certain Moroccan national residing in the Netherlands, had sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (“ISIS”), and that he was trying to obtain a firearm with which to attack the Netherlands police. The information also contained two telephone numbers used by that person. The official report further stated that it appeared from the AIVD’s own investigation that the person was the applicant, that he was not registered in the Netherlands and that he did not have a valid residence permit. 8.  On 15 October 2014 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed acts in preparation of terrorist offences and placed in police custody. The house where he had been staying was searched by the police, who found and seized notes containing, inter alia, instructions on how to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and a written pledge to ISIS. Furthermore, the police seized a computer and found on the applicant’s Facebook account conversations in which he had made enquiries into how to make IEDs, projecting himself as a supporter of ISIS and expressing his wish to join the jihad in Syria. 9.  On 5 November 2014 the Netherlands investigating authorities sent a request for mutual legal assistance (rechtshulpverzoek) to the competent Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation against the applicant, requesting, inter alia, the examination of a number of bank accounts and bank cards. The request contained the number of the applicant’s national identity card and specified that the criminal investigation concerned suspicion of (preparation of) murder with a terrorist motive, participation in a criminal organisation with a terrorist aim, preparation of a terrorist offence, and financing of terrorism. On 20 April 2015 a supplementary request was sent to the Moroccan authorities. 10.  The applicant’s remand in custody was extended. Criminal proceedings against him commenced on charges of several preparatory acts of terrorism, including the criminal offence defined in Article 134a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), namely the acquisition of information and know-how in preparation of the commission of a terrorist offence. 11.  In April 2015 several articles, written in Dutch, Arabic and English, about the dismantling of a terrorist cell and arrest of its members in Selwane were published on Internet news sites. Those articles also mentioned the arrest in the Netherlands of a Moroccan living there, who was planning attacks in the Netherlands and who had links with that terrorist cell. Some of the articles also stated that information provided by the Moroccan intelligence agency (the General Directorate of Surveillance of the National Territory – “the DGST”) to the AIVD had led to the person’s arrest in the Netherlands. 12.  On 8 September 2015 the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) acquitted the applicant of all charges. It found that his intent to commit terrorist offences had not been proven in the light of evidence presented by him showing that his chat messages had been meant to impress and show off. His acquittal was reported by various media outlets in the Netherlands. One of those reports stated that, according to his lawyer, the applicant intended to apply for asylum in the Netherlands, as he feared that, in the event of his removal to Morocco, he would be detained in Morocco as a terror suspect. The public prosecutor (officier van justitie) appealed against the acquittal. 13.  On 20 June 2016 the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague quashed the impugned judgment, convicted the applicant of having committed the offence under Article 134a of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment. The applicant’s intent to acquire information and know-how in order to use it in the commission of a terrorist offence was found proven on the basis of numerous chat messages and written notes. Referring to the systematic and radical nature of those messages and given the relatively long period during which the applicant had been engaged in the internet conversations, the Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that he had merely been trying to impress and show off. 14.  The applicant subsequently lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). On 21 March 2017 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible, providing summary reasoning in application of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). 15.  On 28 August 2015 the applicant’s remand in custody came to an end and he was placed in immigration detention (vreemdelingenbewaring). On the same day he applied for asylum, claiming that, if removed to Morocco, he would, inter alia, run the risk of being arrested by the Moroccan secret service, detained in inhumane conditions and tortured, as the Moroccan authorities considered him to be a terrorist. 16.  In support of his claim, the applicant referred to various press articles about the criminal proceedings against him in the Netherlands, as well as to several Internet news articles written in Dutch, Moroccan and English about a terrorist cell in Salouin ‒ the town where he had been living before going to the Netherlands ‒ which had been dismantled by the Moroccan authorities in April 2015. Some articles also mentioned that a member of that terrorist cell who was residing in the Netherlands had been arrested. According to the applicant, they had been referring to him (see paragraph 11 above). Although the applicant denied that he had any contacts with this cell, he stated that because of these allegations he will be associated with these Moroccan suspects of terrorism. 17.  The applicant further submitted that he had learned from his family in Morocco that two acquaintances from his place of birth, Driouch named “A.M.” and “B.M.”, had been arrested by the Moroccan security service in March or April 2014. According to the applicant, this was a strong indication that he too was a target of the Moroccan security service. 18.  By a letter of 15 October 2015, the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie) requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) to conduct an investigation in Morocco in relation to the applicant’s asylum application. In so far as relevant for the instant case, the letter contained the following questions:\n“1)  Is [the applicant] known by his stated identity ... at his last known address in Morocco ... in Salouin, region of Nador?\n2a)  The report about the dismantling of a terrorist cell appeared in Moroccan and international media on 13 April 2015. When were the members of the Moroccan terrorist cell arrested?\n2b)  Are A.M. and B.M. among those who were arrested? If so, are they from [the applicant’s] birth place, namely Driouch?\n2c)  Is it known whether [the applicant] and the persons mentioned under 2b) know each other?\n3)  Are the persons mentioned under 2a) still detained since their arrest in April 2015? If so, what are the charges? If not, when were they released?\n4)  Is [the applicant] known by name in the media in Morocco as the member residing in the Netherlands of the terrorist cell dismantled in Morocco (as referred to in question 2a)?\n5a)  Is [the applicant] being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation of the terrorist cell (as meant in question 2a)?\n5b)  Is there a charge against [the applicant]? If so, what is the charge?\n5c)  Is [the applicant] being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in relation to offences other than those mentioned under 5a? If so, in relation to what offences is he being searched for? Has he been convicted of those offences and, if so, what is the sentence?” 19.  In reply to the above request, a person-specific official report (individueel ambtsbericht) was released on 3 December 2015 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The relevant part of the report stated as follows:\n“Question 1:\nThe address ... in Salouin, region of Nador, is [the applicant’s] last known address in Morocco.\nQuestion 2:\na)  The members of the Moroccan terrorist cell were all arrested on 13 April 2015.\nb)  A.M. and B.M. do not find themselves in the group [of persons] arrested on 13 April 2015.\nAdditional information: the above-cited names are not necessarily the actual names of the persons. In the group of persons, there is an A. and a B.. However, these persons do not have the surname M.\nc)  This question cannot be answered in the light of the above.\nQuestion 3:\nAt the time of the investigation, the persons referred to in 2a) were still detained. The charge is:\n‘the establishment of a criminal organisation which supports jihadist ideology, in particular by planning to assassinate persons with opposing religious convictions’ (‘la constitution d’une bande criminelle adepte de la pensée djihadiste, projetait notamment l’assassinat de personnes aux convictions religieuses contraires’).\nQuestion 4:\n[The applicant] is not mentioned by name in the media reports. It was mentioned in the media reports that a Moroccan national residing in the Netherlands had been arrested in cooperation with the local authorities.\nAdditional information: nor were the other persons who were arrested on 13 April 2015 mentioned by name in the media reports. ...\nQuestion 5:\na)  No, at the time of the investigation [the applicant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation as referred to in question 2.\nb)  No, at the time of the investigation, there was no charge against [the applicant].\nc)  No, at the time of the investigation [the applicant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of a criminal investigation into offences other than those as referred to by question 5a.” 20.  By letter of 12 January 2016, in reply to a request for further clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:\n“There are no indications that [the applicant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation referred to in question 2a of your letter of 15 October 2015. There are also no indications of a charge against [the applicant] or indications that [the applicant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation of facts other than those referred to in question 2a of your letter of 15 October 2015.” 21.  The asylum application was rejected by the Deputy Minister on 21 July 2016. In addition, an entry ban (inreisverbod) of twenty years was imposed on the applicant, the Deputy Minister holding that he posed a threat to public safety on account of his criminal conviction and information from the Netherlands security service that he posed a danger to national security. Furthermore, and referring to the person-specific official report of 3 December 2015, the Deputy Minister held that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he faced a real and personal risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in Morocco. The applicant was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities, nor had he been charged with any criminal offences there. The Deputy Minister found that the applicant’s fear of being arrested, tortured and detained was based on general reports and assumptions. The Deputy Minister referred to earlier experiences with young Moroccan men who had stood trial in the Netherlands on charges related to Islamic terrorism and who had been removed to Morocco. None of them had encountered any problems from the side of the Moroccan authorities that could be regarded as relevant from an asylum-law perspective. On this point, the Deputy Minister referred to an article published on 10-11 September 2011 in the Netherlands daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad about the experiences of four convicted members of the Islamist terrorist “Hofstad group” (Hofstadgroep) who, after having served their sentence in the Netherlands, had been removed to Morocco. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal (beroep) with the Regional Court, submitting in addition to his previous submissions, inter alia, a copy of an email from his Moroccan attorney, E.I., and extracts from a Moroccan police report dated 24 April 2015 concerning a criminal investigation in respect of several persons, including one “B.B.” (previously referred to by the applicant as “B.M.”). The police report stated that B.B. was the person behind the radicalisation of his neighbour (the applicant), who was being detained in the Netherlands in connection with terrorism. It further stated that, after the applicant’s departure to the Netherlands, they had remained in contact by telephone and that in their conversations, the applicant had indicated his wish to buy a firearm, and that he intended to learn how to make explosives for use in a terrorist act in the Netherlands. 23.  On 14 February 2017 the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Rotterdam, dismissed the appeal and upheld the impugned decision. As regards the applicant’s reliance on Article 3 of the Convention, it held as follows:\n“6. [The appellant] argues that on return he will be at a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. He fears that he will be detained and ill-treated because – due to media reports – he is being linked by the Moroccan authorities to terrorist groups and terrorist activities. On this point [the appellant] refers to various documents. In addition, [the appellant] argues that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as insufficient due care had been taken in drawing it up and, in addition, as it lacks clarity. 6.1.  The court states at the outset that it is in principle for [the appellant] to make out a plausible case that he is running a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. [The appellant] has submitted a number of documents in substantiation of his claim. In addition, [the Deputy Minister] has met [the appellant] halfway in the discharge of the burden of proof which rests on the latter by having the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct an investigation which has resulted in a person-specific official report. The court will discuss below [the appellant’s] documents and the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6.2.  [The appellant] has submitted media reports about a terrorist cell that intended to commit attacks in the Netherlands and about a Moroccan man, [name of appellant], who was arrested in October 2014 in the Netherlands on suspicion of terrorism and convicted by the Court of Appeal. [The appellant] also submitted documents about a Moroccan Dutchman who had been interrogated and tortured in Morocco and referred to information from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about torture and ill-treatment of detainees and unfair proceedings for terrorist suspects in Morocco. In addition, [the appellant] has submitted an email message from his Moroccan lawyer about the negative attention which [the applicant] will attract upon return and a copy of (part of) an official report of the police in Morocco in the terrorism case of B.B. in which [the appellant’s] name is mentioned. In addition, [the appellant] has submitted part of a judgment of the [Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris] concerning G.H., who is suspected of terrorist activities and [the appellant] claims that this person has been convicted again in Morocco for the same set of facts. 6.2.1.  In so far as it appears from the documents submitted by [the appellant] that he is known as a terror suspect or has been convicted of facts relating to terrorism, the court considers that this has already been found credible by [the Deputy Minister]. The circumstance that, because of media reports about this, [the appellant] is known in the Netherlands and Morocco does not mean that therefore he runs a real risk of serious harm when he returns to Morocco. [The appellant] fears that, because of being known [by those authorities], he will upon return be arrested and ill-treated by the Moroccan authorities, but for substantiation purposes has not submitted documents concerning [himself]. [The appellant] has pointed to general information about the treatment of detainees in Morocco and about the proceedings in respect of terrorist suspects, but this information is only relevant if it is plausible that [the appellant] upon return will be arrested or prosecuted for terrorism. In the court’s opinion, [the Deputy Minister] has not unjustly adopted the position that [the appellant] has not made out a plausible case. In the email message from [the appellant’s] Moroccan lawyer submitted by [the appellant], this lawyer reports that [the appellant] will be tried when transferred to Morocco, even though he has already been tried in the Netherlands, and refers to two decisions in which the same person was convicted both in France and in Morocco for the same facts. This means that the email message contains no more than a statement from [the appellant’s] lawyer, without specific further substantiation relating to [the appellant] from which it follows that [the appellant] will be prosecuted in Morocco. Reference is only made to a case of another person convicted in France, but no documents have been submitted showing that this person has been convicted of the same facts in Morocco. Nor have documents been submitted from which it can be deduced that [the appellant] finds himself in the same situation. It can further not be concluded from the copy of (a part of) a report of the Moroccan police, submitted by [the appellant], that [the appellant] is being searched for in Morocco as a suspect of terrorism. As pointed out rightly by [the Deputy Minister], the document only contains information about the activities of the suspect B.B., including the influencing of [the appellant], but it does not appear from the document that [the appellant] is involved in any criminal proceedings. However, triggered by what [the appellant] has presented about the terror cell dismantled in April 2015, of which B.B. was a member, [the Deputy Minister] asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a person-specific official report, which will be discussed below. 6.3.1.  According to the constant case-law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) (including the ruling of 29 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2171), an official report from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the situation in a country is an expert opinion for the Deputy Minister for the exercise of the latter’s powers. If it provides information in an impartial, objective and transparent manner with an indication, in so far as this is responsible, of the sources from which this information is derived, the Deputy Minister may, in making a decision, assume the correctness of this information, unless there are concrete reasons for doubting that accuracy. As regards person-specific official reports, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division has considered that, if a person-specific official report contradicts the asylum claim which it concerns, it is for the alien concerned to refute the official report. 6.3.2.  [The appellant’s] argument that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because insufficient due care had been taken in drawing it up, fails. On 8 December 2015 the Deputy Minister carried out a REK-check, which entails [the Deputy Minister] assuring himself that the person-specific official report has been drawn up with due care and is comprehensible. The outcome of the REK check was that this could not be concluded. Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked for further clarification, [in response] to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplemented, by letter of 12 January 2016, the person-specific official report. On 14 January 2016 a fresh REK check was carried out and it was concluded that the person-specific official report was comprehensible but that, procedurally, due care had not been exercised in preparing the report, as the investigation in Morocco had taken place without using a trusted local advisor (vertrouwenspersoon). Although in the case of an asylum application this falls short of due care, the court finds that in this case [the Deputy Minister] did not have to see reason for not taking into account in the decision making the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as [the Deputy Minister] has given sufficient reasons for holding that the interests of [the appellant] were not harmed by this failure to exercise due care. [The Deputy Minister] has indicated that the use of a trusted local advisor is to ensure that the authorities of the country of origin are not informed of the alien’s stay in the Netherlands and of his asylum application, whereas in this case it can be assumed that the Moroccan authorities, due to reports in the media there, are already aware [of this circumstance]. On this point [the Deputy Minister] has referred to a number of media reports. [The appellant] has not argued or further substantiated that that knowledge by the Moroccan authorities will lead to problems. Also for the remainder, [the appellant] has not indicated why his interests would have been harmed by the lack of due care in the preparation of the person-specific official report. 6.3.3.  The person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, inter alia, that the members of the terrorist cell dismantled on 13 April 2015, which is mentioned in the coverage referred to by [the appellant], were all arrested on that date. This group does not include A.M. or B.M. as mentioned by the applicant, but these names are not necessarily the names of the persons. The group does include an A. and a B., but not with the family name M. In addition, the person-specific official report states that these persons were still in detention at the time of the investigation and that neither [the appellant] nor these persons were mentioned by name in press reports about the dismantled terror cell. It is indeed mentioned in press reports that a Moroccan staying in the Netherlands has been arrested in cooperation with the local authorities. Finally, it has been included in the person-specific official report that at the time of the investigation [the appellant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation into the dismantled terror cell, that at the time of the investigation no charge had been brought against [the appellant] and that at the time of the investigation [the appellant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation into other facts. 6.3.4.  [The appellant’s] argument that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it contains unclear points, also fails. In the opinion of the court, [the appellant] has not presented any concrete arguments for [the court] to doubt the correctness of the person-specific official report. [The appellant] has argued that it is unclear to what extent the [Moroccan] investigating judge (onderzoeksrechter) is competent to make statements about [the appellant]. In the first place, this mere remark does not comprise a concrete argument as mentioned above. Irrespective of this, the court considers that, on the basis of the underlying materials of the person-specific official report which the court has consulted, it can be assumed that the investigating judge in question is competent and able to provide the information given. Also the mere assertion of [the appellant] that it is odd that the investigating judge, who apparently holds all information on terrorism cases, is not asked whether [the appellant] is being searched for, is not a concrete argument in the above sense. Moreover, it follows from question 5 in the letter from [the Deputy Minister] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 15 October 2015 that the Ministry has been asked both whether [the appellant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation into the arrested terror cell and whether [the appellant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation into other facts. Also, the unclear assertions made by [the appellant] about the names of the persons arrested, mentioned in the person-specific official report and the notion ‘at the time of the investigation’ offer no concrete reasons to doubt the accuracy of the person-specific official report. The term ‘at the time of the investigation’ cannot be read otherwise than that the question has been answered by the investigating judge on the basis of the state of affairs at the time of the investigation. Incidentally, [the appellant] has not argued that the state of affairs would be different at a different (later) point in time. As to the names of the arrested persons, the person-specific official report already states that the names may also be different. Also on this point the court sees no reason for doubting the correctness [of the official report]. As the document from the criminal case file submitted by [the appellant], which possibly refers to him, is of a much earlier date than the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is not plausible that this reference has given the Moroccan authorities cause to open a criminal investigation against [the appellant]. This is [therefore] not a concrete reason for doubting the correctness and completeness of the person-specific official report. 6.4.  In addition to the person-specific report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [the Deputy Minister] has also referred to experiences made with young Moroccan men (including members of the Hofstad group) who had been the subject of a terrorism trial in the Netherlands and/or constituted a danger to Dutch national security in connection with involvement in Islamic terrorism and/or jihad and for that reason [had been] returned to Morocco. According to [the Deputy Minister], no signals to be taken seriously have been received from them that, upon their return, they had encountered problems, relevant from an asylum-law perspective, from the side of the Moroccan authorities. The court notes that [the appellant] has not rebutted this in a substantiated manner and finds that [the Deputy Minister] has correctly taken this into account in his assessment. In this respect, the court refers to the ruling of the [Administrative Jurisdiction] Division of 5 October 2016 (ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2692). [The appellant] has not established that the Moroccan authorities will act differently in his case. 6.5.  The court concludes that it follows from the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that [the appellant] is not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation concerning the dismantled terror cell or other facts and that [the appellant] has not put forward any concrete arguments for [the court] to doubt the correctness of this information. Nor can it be deduced from the documents submitted by [the appellant] that he is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities and/or will be detained and tortured upon return. This can also not be inferred from previous experiences in similar cases. Thus the fear alleged by [the appellant] upon return has not been made plausible. In view of this, [the Deputy Minister] rightly took the view that [the appellant] has not established that, upon return, he will run a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. ...” 24.  The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) against the Regional Court’s decision with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State). He also requested a provisional measure (voorlopige voorziening), namely to stay his removal pending the outcome of the further appeal. Neither a further appeal nor a request for a provisional measure has automatic suspensive effect. 25.  On 21 February 2017 the applicant asked the Court to apply an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order to stay his removal to Morocco. The determination of that request was adjourned by the Court on the same day and the Government were requested to submit factual information. 26.  On 22 February 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division granted the applicant’s request for a provisional measure by revoking the order to expel the applicant to Morocco scheduled for 25 February 2017. In view of that decision, the Court decided on 23 February 2017 to suspend until further notice the determination of his Rule 39 request. 27.  On 28 February 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the applicant’s further appeal. It held that under section 91 § 2 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), no further reasoning was called for, as the arguments submitted did not raise any questions requiring determination in the interest of legal unity, legal development or legal protection in the general sense. No further appeal lay against this ruling. On the same day the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the applicant’s request for a provisional measure. 28.  On 2 March 2017 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that the applicant’s removal to Morocco had been scheduled for 4 March 2017. 29.  On 3 March 2017 the Court applied Rule 39 for a period of four weeks and requested further factual information from the Government. The requested information was received on 22 March 2017. 30.  The Government informed the Court that in the context of the criminal proceedings against the applicant information had been exchanged between the Moroccan and the Dutch authorities through a legal assistance request submitted by the Dutch authorities on 5 November 2014 and a supplementary request on 20 April 2015 (see paragraph 9 above). They added that the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst), in establishing that there was no Article 3 risk for the applicant were he to be removed to Morocco, had taken into account that the Moroccan authorities had been apprised of the criminal proceedings and that they were likely to be aware of the outcome thereof. The Government added that the Moroccan authorities had not sought the applicant’s extradition. The Government had not sought specific guarantees from the Moroccan authorities as they took the view that the applicant’s removal would not result in a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The authentic and valid ID-card held by the applicant was sufficient for him to be accepted onto a flight to Morocco. No special procedure had been put in place for his removal, but during his transfer he would be accompanied by officers of the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) and after arrival he would be handed over to the authorities at the destination airport. The Government lastly informed the Court that they had not been able to obtain further information regarding the criminal proceedings against the members of the terrorist cell which had been dismantled in Morocco in April 2015. 31.  On 29 March 2017 the applicant informed the Court that, through his Moroccan attorney E.I., he had been able to obtain a copy of the judgment by which B.B. and eight others had been convicted of, inter alia, the establishment of a terrorist group loyal to the Islamic State intended to commit terrorist activities against the public order of Morocco. B.B. had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The judgment in Arabic, which runs to twenty-three pages, contains the following passage:\n“B.B. has several connections with jihadis. In particular, he recruits young men in his area for his terrorist organisation. In 2015 a befriended policeman in Nador informed B.B. – after receiving secret Government information – that he should break off his contact with people involved with terrorist organisations, including amongst others [the applicant’s name] who lives in the Netherlands.” 32.  On 30 March 2017 the interim measure under Rule 39 staying the applicant’s removal to Morocco was extended for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. 33.  On 15 November 2017 the Government submitted a copy of a judgment given on 21 December 2016 by the criminal division of the Rabat Court of Appeal for Terrorism Cases on an appeal lodged by G.H. (see paragraph 23 above at point 6.2) – assisted by the attorney E.I. – against a judgment given on 10 March 2016 by the criminal division of the Rabat First Instance Court for Terrorism Cases. The appellate court overturned the impugned judgment, finding that pursuant to Article 707 of the Moroccan Criminal Code, which contains the ne bis in idem rule, the appellant could no longer be tried for facts in respect of which he had already been convicted by a criminal court in France and had already served the sentence imposed by that court. Consequently, it acquitted him of the charges of the establishment of a criminal group for the preparation and commission of terrorist offences, illegal use and possession of fire arms and ammunition in the context of a joint project aimed at endangering public order, and inciting and persuading others to commit terrorist offences. It did, however, convict him of complicity in providing support to those who commit a terrorist offence and imposed a conditional one-year prison sentence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are all Roma who live in Vâlcele. 6.  At around 5 a.m. on the morning of 15 December 2011 several police officers and gendarmes, together with the local forest ranger – all wearing special intervention clothing – knocked on the applicants’ door, claiming to be their neighbours. As the applicants hesitated, they broke down the unlocked front door and entered by force. Upon entering the applicants’ home, the forest ranger placed a balaclava on his head. The police officers also wore balaclavas. 7.  In the first room the police found the fourth applicant (Ms Elena Lingurar), her daughter (the second applicant, Ms Ana Maria Lingurar) and her daughter-in-law with a seven-month-old baby in her arms. The police dragged the two applicants out of their beds and started hitting them. The fourth applicant was hit on her collar bone with a police truncheon. When the second applicant asked the police why they were beating her mother, she was hit in the mouth and then forced to wash her face to remove the traces of blood. 8.  When the police entered the next room they found the third applicant (Mr Aron Lingurar, born in 1985) with his wife. They dragged him onto the ground, kicked him and shouted abuse. The first applicant (Mr Aron Lingurar, born in 1949) was also taken into that room. He had also been beaten by the police. 9.  Without allowing them to put any clothes on, the police took the first and third applicants out into the yard, pushed them onto the ground and hit them. They then put them in a police car, where the violence continued. The fourth applicant was not allowed to approach them or take them clothes. 10.  The first and third applicants were taken to a police station, where they gave their statements. They were fined and sent back home. 11.  On 12 December 2011 a forest ranger informed the Araci police that on 7 December 2011 the first applicant had taken home timber which had been illegally cut from the forest. When confronted by forest rangers, the first applicant had become aggressive. The forest ranger explained that the first applicant had exhibited a hostile attitude towards the forest rangers ever since his son, the third applicant, had been fined by the police, in spring 2011. He submitted that the first applicant had set a bad example for his community:\n“We consider that Mr Lingurar Aron, who sees himself as being the leader of the Roma in Vâlcele, by his attitude, instead of helping us solve the problems connected with the Roma community in Vâlcele – which in fact is more peaceful and hard-working than the community in Araci – creates more problems with the example he sets for the others.” 12.  In this context, and in order to reduce and prevent the criminal activity, to strengthen citizens’ safety, to identify individuals without identity documents, to summon those suspected of having committed several crimes and to recover stolen goods, the police organised the raid of 15 December 2011. 13.  On 14 December 2011 the Covasna Inspectorate of Police (Inspectoratul de Poliție Județean Covasna; hereinafter “the IPJ”) drafted an intervention plan with a view to carrying out a raid in the villages in the municipality of Vâlcele. Describing the population of the applicants’ village, the plan stated that out of 4,311 inhabitants, 826 had been released on parole, 432 had a criminal record, and 600 had been found guilty of violent crimes. The general context was described as follows:\n“The Vâlcele municipality consists of the villages Vâlcele, Araci, Hetea, and Ariuşd. Out of a total population of 4,300 inhabitants, 2,902 are of Roma ethnicity. Most of the members of this ethnicity do not have a steady income and make ends meet from social benefits, the sale of timber stolen from the forest, seasonal and occasional work, and from crime – mostly thefts. ...\nOf the individuals having committed crimes in 2011, it appears that 80% are of Roma ethnicity, with a variety of offences. ...\nAs a result of the preventive activity carried out by the [IPJ] in Araci village, six criminal groups have been identified, made up of members of Roma families R., B., C., G., L., and N. [nb: the applicants’ family is not mentioned among them]” 14.  Given the range of issues to be tackled and the goals of the raid, the intervention involved: fifty-three police officers (eleven from the department for public order, four from the department for criminal investigations, eighteen from the Sfântu Gheorghe police department, six from Vâlcele police station, ten from the Rapid Intervention Squad (Serviciul de Intervenție Rapidă; “SIR”), and two from the department for criminal forensics) and thirty gendarmes from the Covasna Gendarmerie Inspectorate (Inspectoratul Județean de Jandarmi Covasna; hereinafter “the IJJ”). They had thirteen cars at their disposal. 15.  According to the police report of 15 December 2011, the police officers performed the following acts during the raid: they searched 140 cars and performed 190 identity checks; they issued eight administrative fines (sancţiuni contravenţionale); they confiscated fifteen cubic metres of timber; they took sixty-four individuals to the police headquarters for further criminal enquiries; they solved six criminal complaints and enforced two orders to appear (mandat de aducere); they identified ten individuals from police operational information; and they took fingerprints from and photographs of fourteen individuals. 16.  The police officers approached the applicants’ home after 6 a.m. and knocked on the door. When two women (the second and fourth applicants) exited the house, the police asked them to call the third applicant, who was wanted for questioning regarding several criminal acts. The third applicant came out of the house, shouted abuse at the police officers and became physically violent. At that point the police immobilised and handcuffed him, and took him to one of the police cars. The first applicant then came out of the house shouting abuse at the police officers. For safety reasons, they handcuffed him and took him to the same police car where the third applicant was waiting. The second and fourth applicants were presumably injured in the process, as they tried to oppose the police actions. They pulled their own hair, slapped themselves on their faces, hit the gate with their fists and shouted, in order to intimidate the police officers. 17.  On 15 and 16 December 2011 the applicants were examined in the emergency ward of the local hospital. Subsequently, they also underwent a forensic examination. 18.  The forensic report delivered on 15 December 2011 states that the second applicant had dried blood on her lips and left cheek, but no bruises or dental pain. The reason for the bleeding could not be established. She refused to undergo further medical examinations. The conclusion of the report was that she did not present any traumatic lesions but that a trauma caused by an act of aggression could not be excluded. 19.  On 20 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the first applicant. It stated that he had complained of chest pain and had two bruises on his chest. An X‑ray examination performed on the same day had not revealed any further damage. It was concluded that the trauma could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and that on account of the injuries, the first applicant needed one to two days of medical care. 20.  On 20 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the third applicant. The presence of bruises on the right eye, chest and right arm were recorded. The examiner concluded that the injuries could have been caused by a blow with a baseball bat and that the third applicant needed four to five days of medical care. 21.  On 21 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the fourth applicant. She complained of abdominal and chest pains and had a bruise on her lower chest. It was concluded that her injuries could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and that she needed one to two days of medical care. 22.  On 20 February 2012 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint against the forest ranger and the police officers on duty on 15 December 2011. They accused the officials of beating them and committing other acts of violence. 23.  The case was investigated by the IPJ under the supervision of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Braşov Court of Appeal. Thirteen police officers and three gendarmes were put under investigation. The prosecutor interviewed the applicants and the police officers and gendarmes, as well as three witnesses. The witnesses were the applicants’ neighbours who had been present during the incidents. The applicants had proposed that they be questioned. 24.  The prosecutor established that the operation had been organised in accordance with the intervention plan drawn up by the IPJ and the IJJ. The assignment had been to take to the Vâlcele police station several individuals needed for questioning concerning several criminal complaints linked to various criminal investigations. 25.  Relying on the statements given by the forest ranger and the police, the prosecutor established that the forest ranger had not participated in the events, and that the raid had started at 7 a.m. and not at 5 a.m. as indicated by the applicants and their neighbours. 26.  The gendarmes denied having committed acts of violence or having seen traces of injuries on the applicants. Police officer P.A. explained that the use of force and the handcuffing had been necessary because of the applicants’ violent behaviour. Concretely, the first applicant had opposed the police intervention, claiming that he was a local counsellor for Roma matters, and had shouted abuse and threats at the police. 27.  On 6 July 2012 the investigators examined the applicants’ front door. They noted that some of its window panels had been broken, the wood had been splintered, and the paint was missing from the bottom of the door; they were unable to establish when the door had been damaged. 28.  On 11 March 2013 the prosecutor concluded that there was not enough evidence to institute proceedings against the police officers. 29.  The applicants objected to the prosecutor’s decision. They argued mainly that the prosecutor, without justification, had given preference to the statements made by the police to the detriment of those made by the applicants. They also averred that the investigation had failed to provide an explanation for the violence perpetrated against them. They stressed that it was the established and frequent practice of the police in the area to attack members of the Roma community without any justification. 30.  On 17 April 2013 the prosecutor-in-chief from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Braşov Court of Appeal dismissed the objection on the following grounds:\n- the intervention had been lawful;\n- the applicants’ immobilisation and the use of handcuffs had been lawful and made necessary by their aggressive behaviour; they had therefore been taken to the police station, interviewed and fined;\n- the investigation had been completed;\n- the prosecutor had clarified all aspects of the case and examined the evidence gathered;\n- the decision had represented the prosecutor’s own conviction based on the evidence in the file, and the reasons given had been adequate;\n- the other assertions made by the applicants had not been substantiated by evidence. 31.  The applicants challenged the prosecutors’ decisions, reiterating the arguments put forward in their objection (see paragraph 29 above). 32.  The Braşov Court of Appeal heard the case and in a decision of 23 May 2013 it sent the case back to the prosecutor’s office for further investigations. It mainly considered that the authorities had to provide justification for the injuries sustained by the applicants. The first and third applicants had been taken to the police station, and had thus been under police control for a few hours. The second and fourth applicants had sustained injuries which the prosecutor had failed to explain. 33.  The court further noted that the prosecutor had not identified the person who had given the order to immobilise the first and third applicants and take them to the police station. Both the gendarmes and the police officers involved had denied having immobilised the applicants. 34.  The court went on to question the lawfulness of the police intervention. It noted that at that time the applicants had not been the subject of any criminal investigation and that no order to appear before the police had been issued in their names. It further noted that the second and fourth applicants had not even been arrested. 35.  The court concluded that the criminal investigation had not been exhaustive. It therefore ordered the prosecutor:\n- to hear evidence from witnesses, in particular from other persons who had been targeted by that police intervention and neighbours who could clarify whether the police officers had entered the applicants’ home;\n- to hear the police officers involved in the operation and those responsible for mounting the operation, in order to find out who had given the order to immobilise the first and third applicants and who had carried out that order;\n- to establish how the immobilisation of the first and third applicants had happened;\n- to establish how the second and fourth applicants, who had not been immobilised by the police, had been injured;\n- to establish who had participated in the operation on behalf of the authorities, whether police officers, gendarmes or other individuals. 36.  A new investigation was carried out under the supervision of the same prosecutor from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Braşov Court of Appeal. 37.  On 24 July 2013 the IPJ drafted a report on the investigation, confirming the previous findings concerning the use of force and the applicants’ conduct. The injuries sustained by the second and fourth applicants were explained in the report as follows:\n“[The two women] had exhibited behaviour specific to Roma in such circumstances: they had started pulling their own hair, slapping themselves on their faces, hitting the gate with their fists and shouting in order to intimidate the police officers.” 38.  On 5 August 2013 the prosecutor’s office decided not to prosecute. It considered that all the indications given by the court had been observed during the new investigation and that further clarifications concerning the case and the general situation in Vâlcele had been provided. 39.  The prosecutor explained, in particular, that because of the problems with the Roma community in Vâlcele, the police and gendarmes had had to combine forces. He recalled that on 27 June 2013 a police officer had been injured and was currently in a critical state in hospital following a police intervention aimed at settling a conflict between two rival Roma clans. Likewise, on 15 July 2013 another police officer had had to open fire in self-defence against an individual who had broken the windscreen of a police car during a police intervention triggered by a distress call. The prosecutor noted that most of the inhabitants of Vâlcele, and in particular those from three villages (Hetea, Vâlcele and Araci), were known for breaking the law and were aggressive towards the police. The applicants’ family members had been subject to investigations for the theft of wood or for disturbing public order. 40.  The prosecutor held that the injuries sustained by the first and third applicants could be explained by the use of force during the immobilisation, which had been made necessary by the applicants’ violent behaviour. The second and fourth applicants had been injured when they had attacked the police officers in order to prevent them from immobilising their family members. The prosecutor reiterated the explanation given in the police report about the behaviour allegedly exhibited by the second and fourth applicants. The identities of the four gendarmes who had executed the immobilisation were known, but had to be kept secret for their own protection. 41.  The applicants objected to that decision, arguing that the prosecutor had failed to investigate whether the use of force had been proportionate and justified. They also complained of the use of stereotypes in respect of Roma in the prosecutor’s decision. 42.  On 20 September 2013 the prosecutor-in-chief from the same prosecutor’s office upheld the decision on similar grounds to those given in the decision of 17 April 2013 (see paragraph 30 above) and, in addition, on the ground that the prosecutor had complied with the orders made by the court (see paragraph 35 above). 43.  The applicants complained about the prosecutors’ decisions, reiterating their previous arguments. 44.  On 16 January 2014 the Braşov Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ complaint as unfounded. The decision was final. 45.  The court considered that the prosecutor had respected the requirements set by the previous court decision (see paragraph 35 above). Additional witnesses who did not belong to the police or gendarmerie had been heard. It also considered that the evidence adduced could not prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the police officers had injured the applicants. The applicants’ statements and the medical reports, which remained the only elements supporting that theory, were not sufficient to change the conclusion. According to the Court of Appeal, the explanations offered by the prosecutor as to the cause of injuries were plausible and the police officers had not used excessive force. The court also considered that the applicants had an obligation to identify the alleged perpetrators. Lastly, the court noted that the investigations had not been influenced by the fact that the applicants were Roma.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": true, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Riga. 5.  On 24 November 2005 a residential building maintenance services provider, Kurzemes Namu Apsaimniekotājs, a limited liability company (“the plaintiff”), brought a claim against the applicant for recovery of a debt for their services in the amount of 320 Latvian lati (LVL – approximately 455 euros (EUR)). The next day civil proceedings were instituted in that connection. The applicant disagreed; she argued that she did not owe any money to the plaintiff – they had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services and she was free to choose another service provider. In those proceedings the applicant was represented by Mr S. Seļezņovs, who was not a lawyer. 6.  On 30 December 2005 a judge of the Riga City Kurzeme District Court (Rīgas pilsētas Kurzemes rajona tiesa – hereinafter “the City Court”) scheduled the first hearing to take place on 21 April 2006. During this hearing the applicant’s representative requested additional time to examine the relevant legal norms and to obtain the relevant documents from the plaintiff. The City Court postponed the hearing to allow both parties to “prepare documents”. The next hearing was scheduled for 9 August 2006. 7.  On 9 August 2006 the plaintiff applied to have the hearing postponed because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased and the plaintiff had not yet settled the courts fees for the increased claim. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2006. 8.  On 17 October 2006 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed so as to examine those documents. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 31 January 2007. 9.  On 31 January 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim to LVL 426 (approximately EUR 606) and submitted more documents. The applicant’s representative submitted written observations and some documents showing some debts that had been paid. The City Court admitted them to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 23 March 2007. 10.  On 23 March 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted more documents. The applicant’s representative requested that more detailed information be provided in this connection. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide observations by 13 August 2007 and scheduled the next hearing for 12 September 2007. 11.  On 11 September 2007 the City Court informed both parties that another judge was taking over the case; the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2007. 12.  On 17 October 2007 both parties pleaded their case. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide more detailed information and scheduled the next hearing for 13 November 2007. 13.  On 13 November 2007 the applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed as he had only received the relevant documents on the previous day. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 14 February 2008. 14.  On 14 February 2008 the applicant’s representative pleaded the case. He argued that the service charges which the applicant had been asked to settle had been unclear. The plaintiff did not have all the relevant documents at hand and thus requested time to submit additional information. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to submit the specific documents and scheduled the next hearing for 17 April 2008. 15.  On 17 April 2008 the plaintiff submitted the relevant documents and the applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed to examine them. His application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 4 June 2008. 16.  The parties continued to plead their case in the hearing of 4 June 2008. The City Court imposed a monetary fine on the applicant’s representative for disobeying a judge’s order. Following an application by the plaintiff the hearing was postponed because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased; they had not prepared the documents for the increased amount of the debt. The plaintiff was ordered to submit the relevant documents by an unknown date in September 2008 and the next hearing was scheduled for 28 October 2008. 17.  On 28 October 2008 the City Court held the last hearing in the case; it refused a fresh application by the plaintiff to postpone the hearing once again. On 6 November 2008 the City Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the applicant as unsubstantiated – the plaintiff had not proved that the expenses had actually been incurred and that they had duly reflected the services provided. On 27 November 2008 the plaintiff appealed against the judgment. On 28 November 2008 a judge of the City Court gave the plaintiff additional time to comply with the procedural requirements for lodging an appeal. On 2 December 2008 the plaintiff rectified those deficiencies. On 3 December 2008 the appeal was admitted and sent to the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa – hereinafter “the Regional Court”). 18.  The first hearing before the Regional Court was held on 13 September 2010. The plaintiff increased the amount of the claim because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased to LVL 3,173 (approximately EUR 4,515) and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant’s representative disagreed with the increase of the claim. The Regional Court admitted those documents to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 8 December 2010. 19.  On 8 December 2010 the Regional Court held the last hearing in the case. The plaintiff did not attend, nor did it inform the court of any reasons for its absence. The Regional Court decided to proceed with the case. On 22 December 2010 the Riga Regional Court partly allowed the plaintiff’s claim and ordered the applicant to settle the debt in the total amount of LVL 2,854 (approximately EUR 4,059). Although the parties had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services, the applicant was obliged to pay for those services in accordance with domestic law. She could contest bills provided by the plaintiff, however she had failed to do so. The applicant had selectively paid some bills, but not all of them. The Regional Court refused the plaintiff’s claim to receive contractual penalty (līgumsods) for late payment but awarded default interest of 6%. On 18 January 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 3 February 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) remitted it to the Regional Court as the applicant had not paid the security deposit for lodging it. Those deficiencies were rectified. 20.  On 3 April 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court, following a preparatory meeting, refused to institute proceedings on points of law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tianchang, the People’s Republic of China. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was an undergraduate economics student at Kharkiv National University, Ukraine. 7.  On 1 May 2009 a group of about fifteen Chinese students, including the applicant, were having a picnic. When they were about to finish, four Ukrainian men (D., Sa., Su. and M.), who were picnicking nearby, approached them to get some beer. The Ukrainians were clearly drunk. D. took a knife from the Chinese students’ table and threw it in the river on the pretext that it was a weapon and there was no place for it there. M., who appeared less drunk than his friends, was friendlier and the applicant gave him a bottle of beer. All four drank the beer and returned for more. Apparently, they offered the Chinese students a small folding knife instead of the one that had been thrown away, but their offer was declined. D.’s behaviour was particularly insulting and indecent: he undid his trousers and showed his genitals to everyone around him, including girls. The applicant gave the Ukrainians another bottle of beer and the group of Chinese students started packing up. M. filmed the events on his smartphone. The last thing recorded was one of the Chinese students, subsequently identified as W., taking two metal skewers out of a plastic bag. 8.  At some point a fight started between the two groups. They later blamed each other for beginning it. In the course of the fight M. was stabbed in the back with a metal skewer. 9.  Sa. took hold of one of the Chinese students, Ch. When the police arrived, Sa. stated that he had seen Ch. stabbing M. in the back with a folding knife and confirmed his statement in writing the same day. According to the report of the police officer on duty, Su. and D. were so drunk that it was impossible to question them. As for the victim, he was unconscious. 10.  The applicant had been waiting for the police together with the four Ukrainians and some of his companions (several others had run away). None of the Ukrainians expressed any suspicions about the applicant and he eventually left with his friends. 11.  On 2 May 2009 M. was questioned in hospital. He submitted that he had been stabbed unexpectedly in the back and that he had not seen who had done it. When he had fallen down, he had seen three Chinese men stepping over him, including the applicant. M. remembered the applicant because he appeared bigger than the other Chinese men and had spoken some Russian. M. considered that, most probably, it had been the applicant who had injured him. 12.  On the same day Sa. changed his initial statement and submitted that he had seen “one of the Chinese [men], who [had] appeared bigger than the others and called himself Yura [the applicant], jump on [M.’s] back and stab him with a metal skewer”. 13.  On 4 May 2009 M. died of his injury in hospital. 14.  On the same day Su. told the police he had seen one of the Chinese men, who had appeared bigger than the others, stab M. with a metal skewer. 15.  During an identification parade conducted that day Sa. and Su. pointed at the applicant as the one who had injured M. 16.  The applicant was arrested that day on suspicion of M.’s murder. 17.  On 6 May 2009 one of the Chinese students, W., speaking in the presence of a lawyer and with the aid of an interpreter, made a statement of surrender to the police. He stated that he had accidentally injured one of the Ukrainians with a skewer and had run away because he had been scared. He was sorry for what had happened. 18.  On 8 May 2009 W. repeated his confession, adding that the applicant had done everything possible to prevent the conflict. 19.  On an unspecified later date W. retracted his confession and submitted that he had only slightly injured D. and Su. with a metal skewer, but not M. 20.  The investigation established that the Chinese students had initially had six metal skewers. Only four of them, packed in a plastic bag, were discovered. The two skewers taken by W. from the bag shortly before the fight were never found. 21.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation twelve Chinese citizens made witness statements describing the events prior to, during and after the fight. None of them had seen who had injured M. or how it had happened. Nor had anybody seen the applicant holding a metal skewer at any point. To the contrary, some witnesses among the Chinese students submitted that they had been next to the applicant during the fight and that he had not been the one who had injured M. 22.  Furthermore, several of the Chinese witnesses told the police that W. had been particularly nervous after the incident, had destroyed the clothes he had been wearing on 1 May 2009 and had asked his parents for a considerable amount of money. 23.  On an unspecified date the investigation was declared completed and the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Court (“the Kyivskyy Court”) started the trial. 24.  On 15 January 2010 the Kyivskyy Court ordered an additional pre‑trial investigation. As stated in its ruling, several people had seen metal skewers in W.’s hands, but nobody had seen the applicant holding a skewer, let alone stabbing M. Sa. had eventually retracted his statement of 2 May 2009 about seeing the applicant stab M. and specified that in fact he had not seen the injury being inflicted on M. He explained that when pointing out the applicant he had been “driven by [his] emotions”. Furthermore, while D. and Su. considered the applicant guilty of injuring M., it was established in the court hearing that none of them had seen how that had actually happened. The trial court further found unconvincing the conclusion reached by the pre-trial investigation that W. had inflicted light injuries on D. and Su. with a metal skewer, but that it had been unlikely that he might have also injured M. Next, the court referred to the statement of the police officer who had been on duty on 1 May 2009, that the applicant had been there all the time after the arrival of the police and that he had been calm, clean and without any injuries. The officer further submitted that the Ukrainians had indicated that it was Ch. who had wounded M. and they had handed him over to the police. Ch. did not speak Russian well. After being provided with an interpreter, he had maintained his innocence. The investigator could not explain how suspicion had fallen on the applicant. He submitted that somebody from the criminal investigation department had told him that the applicant was the perpetrator, but he could not remember exactly who. Lastly, it was observed in the court ruling that although some of the Ukrainians’ witness statements had identified the applicant as appearing bigger than his companions, it was clear that there had been several other Chinese students who had appeared bigger and heavier than him. The investigation had failed to make any assessment of that point. 25.  On 25 March 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the above-mentioned ruling, concluding that all the issues it raised could be clarified in the course of the trial and that an additional pre-trial investigation was not necessary. 26.  On 26 September 2011 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. It relied on the statements of Sa. and Su., who claimed to have seen the applicant “hanging on [M.’s] back” shortly before the latter had shouted that he had been stabbed. The court also relied on the statements of D., who stated that he had seen the applicant running away from the victim with Ch. The court concluded that two metal skewers had been used in the fight. Given that W. had injured D. and Su. with one of them, he could not also have stabbed M. W. could not be examined in court as he had left Ukraine. The Chinese students gave their account of the fight. However, the court did not consider it credible and expressed the opinion that they had been trying to help the applicant. 27.  The applicant appealed, submitting, in particular, that his conviction lacked any evidential basis apart from the controversial and speculative statements of M.’s friends. The prosecutor also lodged an appeal, considering the sentence to be too lenient. 28.  On 26 March 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for additional pre-trial investigation owing to numerous flaws and omissions. It observed in particular that no effort had been made to establish the motive for the murder. It was clear from the evidence in the case file that both the applicant and M. had been friendly and that both of them had tried to avoid the conflict. Furthermore, the appellate court pointed out that the statements of D., Sa. and Su., on which the first‑instance court had based the applicant’s conviction, had been contradictory, inconsistent and speculative. They could not therefore be interpreted as conclusive evidence of the applicant’s guilt. The appellate court also considered the accusation against the applicant to be too vague as it had never been established where exactly M. and the applicant were situated prior to the incident. Nor had the exact mechanism of M.’s injury been established. 29.  Following an additional round of pre-trial investigation measures, the case was sent to the Kyivskyy Court. 30.  On 2 July 2012 the Kyivskyy Court held that the deficiencies pointed out by the Court of Appeal in its ruling of 26 March 2012 had not been rectified and that the additional investigation, like the one carried out earlier, had been incomplete and superficial. The case was therefore remitted once again for further pre-trial investigation. 31.  On 20 September 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the above‑mentioned ruling. 32.  On 19 November 2012 the new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP 2012”) came into effect, introducing many major changes in criminal procedure (see paragraph 45 below). 33.  On 19 December 2012 the investigator announced to the applicant a “notice of suspicion”, that being the new procedure of opening criminal proceedings under the CCP 2012. 34.  On the same date the pre-trial investigation was declared completed, and on 24 December 2012 the case was referred to the Kyivskyy Court. 35.  On 24 July 2013 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. It relied in particular on the statements made by Sa., Su. and D. at the court hearing, which were identical to those summarised in the judgment of 26 September 2011 (see paragraph 26 above). The court observed that it was impossible to establish with precision the mechanism of the fatal injury to M. on the basis of the evidence of those witnesses. It held, however, that their statements had not been refuted by any forensic medical findings. The court also relied on M.’s testimony during the pre-trial investigation (see paragraph 11 above). At the same time, in spite of requests by the applicant, it refused to admit in evidence any of the statements of the other Chinese students, who had meanwhile left Ukraine and could therefore not be questioned in court. Only one Chinese student had not left the country and was questioned. However, his statement was of little evidential value, given that he had left the scene prior to the beginning of the fight and had not seen any of it. The Kyivskyy Court held as follows:\n“... [Pursuant to Articles 85 and 86] and Article 95 § 4 of the CCP [2012], the court may only base its conclusions on statements received directly at the court hearing or in accordance with the procedure [established by] Article 225 of this Code, and is not entitled to base judicial decisions on statements made to the investigator or prosecutor, or to refer to such statements. The court therefore holds that the reference by the applicant and his lawyer to the witness statements documented in the investigation’s reports and made either to the investigator or to the prosecutor outside of court hearings and not in accordance with the procedure [established by] Article 225 of the CCP [2012], cannot be regarded as proper and admissible defence evidence.” 36.  The trial court further held:\n“..The court has no doubts regarding the circumstances of the case which it considers established ... The statements of the witnesses [Sa., Su. and D.] are consistent and corroborated by other evidence in these criminal proceedings.” 37.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that the only evidence leading to his conviction had been the victim’s friends’ inconsistent and contradictory statements, which they had drastically changed on at least three occasions. The applicant emphasised that the trial court had not analysed either any of those contradictions or the reasons why the witnesses had changed their statements. Likewise, he complained, no assessment had been given to the contradictions between the above-mentioned witness evidence and the version of events given by the victim himself shortly before his death (see paragraph 11 above). He observed in particular that M. had been clear in his statement that the stabbing in his back had been a complete surprise for him and that he had never submitted that somebody had been “hanging on [his] back” as alleged by the witnesses. 38.  The applicant also complained that the statements of twelve other Chinese people during the pre-trial investigation had been disregarded. He observed that, under Article 5 § 2 of the CCP 2012, the admissibility of evidence was to be assessed in the light of the CCP provisions in force at the time when that evidence was obtained. Furthermore, the applicant referred to Article 8 of Chapter 11 of the Transitional Provisions of the CCP 2012, which stipulated that the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained prior to the entry into force of the new CCP was to be decided in accordance with the procedure applicable prior to its entry into force (see paragraph 45 below). In his case, he emphasised, all the evidence had been obtained while the old CCP 1960 had still been in force. Accordingly, he considered that the trial court should have been guided by provisions of the CCP 1960 when deciding on the admissibility of the evidence including the witness statements given by the Chinese students. Given that under the CCP 1960 evidence obtained in the course of a pre-trial investigation was admissible in criminal proceedings (see paragraph 44 below), the applicant complained that it had been unlawful and unfair to exclude the witness evidence for the defence and that by doing so the trial court had substantially aggravated his situation and had deprived him of the opportunity to defend himself. 39.  On 27 November 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the findings and the reasoning of the Kyivskyy Court’s judgment. It held in particular as follows:\n“The [first-instance] court’s findings regarding [the applicant’s guilt] are concordant with the factual circumstances of the case. [They] are based on the evidence, which was explored in the court hearing and which is set forth in detail in the judgment. The trial court thoroughly verified [that evidence] and assessed it in an objective manner.” 40.  The Court of Appeal did not comment on the applicant’s argument about the applicability of the CCP 1960 on the assessment of the admissibility of evidence. 41.  The applicant reiterated his arguments in an appeal on points of law. 42.  On 22 July 2014 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters found against him and upheld the lower courts’ decisions. It found no reasons to consider the investigation at the trial superficial or otherwise flawed. The Higher Specialised Court was silent on the applicant’s argument on the admissibility of the defence evidence in the light of the CCP 1960. 43.  According to the information provided by the applicant, on 31 March 2016 he was released and he returned to China. The case file before the Court does not contain any further details in that regard.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant organisation is a public notary professional association and has its main office in Bucharest. 8.  According to the applicant organisation, on 13 December 2007 approximately thirty police officers dressed in civilian clothes entered its premises. They informed a receptionist that they were clients. The receptionist asked them to leave the premises and to wait outside, but they refused. 9.  Eventually two of the officers disclosed their identity and the fact that they were police officers and proceeded to seize an original sale contract that had been signed by two private parties and had been notarised by D.O.R. One of the private parties in question was suspected by the police of being part of an organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud. 10.  The police officers also seized a number of documents, including the sale contract and original documents concerning the aforementioned private parties. Moreover, the police officers seized the fees and taxes that had been paid by the private parties for the services rendered by the applicant organisation. Furthermore, the police officers took statements from the applicant organisation’s employees. 11.  According to the report produced and signed by the two police officers on the same date, they seized 8,943 euros (EUR), the amount paid in income tax by the private party selling the immovable property, and EUR 1,000 and 12,215 Romanian Lei (RON – approximately EUR 3,470), representing public notary fees and the applicable tax for the registration of the sale in the immovable property register. 12.  On 23 April 2008 the applicant organisation, legally represented by D.O.R., brought criminal proceedings against the two police officers (see paragraph 9 above) for unlawful home intrusion and abuse of office against private interests. Furthermore, it asked for the report produced by the police officers on the day of the incident to be annulled and for the original documents and for the relevant fees and taxes seized to be returned. 13.  On 27 March 2009 the Bucharest prosecutor’s office noted that the police officers had seized the relevant documents and sums of money without an express order to do so having been issued by the prosecutor charged with the case because the police officers had at the time been carrying out an operational mission aimed at catching suspects red-handed in the commission of an offence. Moreover, according to the available evidence, an official order from the prosecutor would in any case not have been necessary in this regard because the seized documents and sums of money had been turned over to the officers without any objections. 14.  On 11 August 2009 a prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation opened against the two police officers on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed. She held that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against an organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud. A large number of police officers had been mobilised for an operation aimed at catching the suspects red‑handed. The two police officers had entered the premises of the applicant organisation, disclosed their identity and the fact that they were police officers, and proceeded to seize the relevant documents and fees. Consequently, the police officers had acted in their professional capacity in order to fulfil their professional duties and with the aim of investigating cases they had been working on. Their presence on the applicant organisation’s premises had not amounted to the offence of unlawful home intrusion because the premises of the applicant organisation constituted by their nature a public area and the event in question had occurred during working hours. Moreover, the elements of the offence of abuse of office against private interests had not been met. Consequently, no damage had been caused given that the valuables seized by the officers had concerned the commission of offences. 15.  The applicant organisation challenged the prosecutor’s decision before the superior prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office. 16.  On 31 August 2009 the superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant organisation’s challenge as ill-founded. 17.  On 21 September 2009 the applicant organisation lodged an appeal against the prosecutor office’s decisions with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. It argued, among other things, that the police officers had entered its premises in breach of Article 27 § 2(b) of the Romanian Constitution (see paragraph 32 below). They had not been seeking to protect other people’s property and in any event they could have done that by taking property preservation measures (that is to say take measures to prevent the re-sale or use of the property – indisponibilizarea bunului). Moreover, the two above-mentioned police officers had entered the premises accompanied by their colleagues and had remained there outside the applicant organisation’s working hours. Also, they had unlawfully seized the public notaries’ professional fees and returned them to the private party who had been the victim of the alleged fraud. Furthermore, they had failed to include in the report produced on the day of the incident the applicant organisation’s objections against (i) the police officers’ presence on its premises, (ii) the seizure of fees and (iii) the questioning of its staff members, who had been bound by rules concerning professional secrecy. 18.  On 2 November 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal and upheld the prosecutor office’s decisions. It considered that the two police officers, accompanied by other colleagues, had carried out an operational mission seeking to catch suspects red-handed in the commission of an offence and to gather evidence. In this connection they had surveyed the suspected criminal group and after a sale contract had been signed, they had asked D.O.R. to turn over all the documents and sums of money connected to the sale. D.O.R. had relinquished all the documents connected to the sale contract in question and the relevant public notaries’ professional fees and taxes without any objection. 19.  With regard to the lawfulness of the police officers’ presence on the applicant organisation’s premises, the court held that the said premises did not constitute a home, room, annex or closed area attached to a home or a room and that entering such premises had therefore not constituted the offence of unlawful home intrusion. It considered that in classifying the latter act as an offence, the legislature had been concerned only with entering or refusing to leave areas which were closely connected to a person’s private life and where the person concerned conducted activities away from the eyes of the public which were closely related to his or her personal life. A public notary’s office did not comply with the aforementioned criteria because it was a place for a professional activity, open to the public during working hours and designed for a public activity. Moreover, the relevant domestic legislation concerning public notaries did not impose on interested individuals special rules in respect of entering a public notary’s office. The two police officers’ presence on the applicant organisation’s premises had not constituted any other offences either. They could have protected the victims’ property by taking property preservation measures only after establishing that an offence had been committed. 20.  The court also held that the seizure of the relevant documents and sums of money had been justified and lawful because they amounted to evidence which could be used in criminal proceedings and could clarify the circumstances of a criminal case. In addition, D.O.R.’s statement that the police officers had failed to mention his objections in the report produced on the day of the incident was relatively untrustworthy, given that as a public notary he was aware that he could have asked for any objections voiced by him to be included in the report; otherwise he could have refused to sign the said report. 21.  The court furthermore held that the police officers who had asked the employees of the applicant organisation to give statements had not breached the relevant domestic rules concerning professional secrecy because the information provided by the said employees with regard to the commission of an offence had not amounted to them being formally heard as witnesses in the case. Moreover, the domestic rules concerning professional secrecy applicable to employees of a public notary’s office had not prevented them from providing relevant information or from allowing access to documents to anyone proving a legitimate right or interest, such as police officers exercising their professional duty. 22.  The court concluded that the applicant organisation was mainly unhappy with the fact that the sale contract and the public notaries’ professional fees seized by the police officers had been returned to the alleged victims of the offence and not to the organisation. The court considered, however, that such a measure could not be contested by way of an appeal against the prosecutor office’s decisions but rather by a complaint lodged with the prosecutor’s office against the acts and measures taken by the police officers. 23.  The applicant organisation appealed on points of fact and law (recurs) against the judgment and reiterated in part the arguments raised before the first-instance court. In addition, it argued, inter alia, that according to the Court’s case-law the fact that the police officers had entered its premises and subsequently had refused to leave amounted to a breach of its rights, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The operation had not concerned the commission of an offence, as the sale contract validated by the applicant organisation had not been a forged one. The statements given by its employees could not be categorised as mere information and had in fact amounted to witness testimony. According to the relevant rules concerning professional secrecy, only specially assigned magistrates could access public notary documents and police officers could therefore not be considered to constitute persons who could legitimately justify such access. Also, the first-instance court’s finding that the applicant organisation could have vented its discontent with the unlawful seizure of its fees by the police officers by means of a complaint against the acts and measures taken by the police officers (rather than by means of a criminal complaint lodged against the perpetrators – see paragraph 22 above) had amounted to a breach of its right of access to court. 24.  By a final judgment of 25 January 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal on points of fact and law and upheld the decisions of the prosecutor’s office and the judgment of the first-instance court. It held, among other things, that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation and in their professional capacity. According to the relevant criminal procedure rules, police officers were entitled and had a duty to carry out operations seeking to identify and investigate unlawful acts and to gather and seize relevant evidence. Furthermore, any natural and legal person had a duty to turn over impugned evidence. The applicant organisation’s submissions that the police officers had entered its premises outside working hours and had acted unlawfully in seizing the relevant documents, taxes and fees were unsubstantiated. 25.  On 15 January and 11 June 2008 – within the framework of the criminal investigation initiated by the domestic authorities against the organised criminal group allegedly involved in immovable property fraud – the applicant organisation lodged a complaint with the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office in respect of the acts and measures taken by the police officers. It asked the prosecutor’s office to quash the acts and measures taken by the police officers and to order the return of the original documents produced by the applicant organisation and of the relevant fees and taxes seized by the police officers. In addition, it stated that if the prosecutor’s office refused to order the return of the relevant fees the applicant organisation would join the criminal proceedings opened against the criminal group as a civil party. 26.  On 8 July 2010 the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant organisation that the criminal case in question had been referred to the domestic courts which had the authority to examine its requests. 27.  On 3 August 2010 the applicant organisation informed the Bucharest County Court that it had joined as a civil party the criminal proceedings opened by the domestic authorities against the organised criminal group allegedly involved in immovable property fraud. It asked the court to order the return of the original documents produced by the applicant organisation and to order the defendants to return the relevant fees and taxes seized by the police officers and to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 28.  On 30 November 2010 the Bucharest County Court convicted the members of the organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud and annulled the sale contract validated by the applicant organisation. In addition, it dismissed the applicant organisation’s requests for the return of the original documents produced by it and the relevant fees and taxes on the grounds that the documents in question had been annulled and the relevant fees and taxes returned to the private party who had sold the property and who had been the victim of the offences committed by the criminal group. Moreover, the applicant organisation had not proved that it had suffered non-pecuniary damage. 29.  The applicant organisation appealed against the judgment. 30.  On 17 November 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal. It held, inter alia, that if the applicant organisation considered that it had suffered some damage following its validation of the subsequently annulled sale contract, it could initiate proceedings in tort before the civil courts and prove the alleged damage. Given the offences which were the object of the criminal case at hand, the applicant organisation could not be awarded damages within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 31.  There is no evidence in the file that the applicant organisation appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment of the second‑instance court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Juodšiliai in the Vilnius Region. 5.  In 1991 the applicant’s mother applied for restoration of her property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 6.  On 27 September 2001 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored the applicant’s mother’s property rights by giving her a plot of six hectares in Pagiriai, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. As the applicant’s mother had died in 1995, the applicant was issued with a certificate of inheritance in respect of the plot on 13 March 2003. 7.  On 4 December 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant’s mother’s property rights to the six hectares given to her annulled. The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, 5.59 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, §§ 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant’s mother’s property rights to the plot, the applicant’s property rights to it also be annulled. 8.  The applicant and the VCA disputed the prosecutor’s claim. However, on 15 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim and annulled the VCA’s decision to restore the applicant’s mother’s property rights to six hectares of land, as well as the applicant’s property rights to that land. 9.  The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision, arguing that the restoration of the applicant’s mother’s property rights had complied with the relevant legislation. The applicant also submitted that he was being deprived of his property without any compensation. However, on 1 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the lower courts had incorrectly found that the forest on his land constituted an urban forest, but on 25 January 2011 it was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 11.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “the NLS”) confirming that his mother had retained the right to have her property rights to six hectares of land restored. It stated that there was no more vacant land in Pagiriai and asked the applicant to inform the authorities of his choice as to one of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., § 92). It is unclear whether he replied to this letter. 12.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for the applicant to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid., § 92). He was also informed that there might be some vacant land in Pagiriai, so if he wished to receive a plot in that area, his request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 13.  On 21 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. He submitted that the annulment of his property rights to six hectares of land had caused him pecuniary damage in the amount of 251,217 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 72,760 euros (EUR)), according to an assessment of the value of the land carried out in May 2012. In the applicant’s view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. He asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when he might expect to receive one. If he could not be given such a plot, he wished to receive compensation of LTL 251,217. The applicant also stated that he would only be able to decide whether he wished to receive a plot in Pagiriai after being presented with a plan of a specific plot. He stated that he did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 14.  On 7 October 2013 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Pagiriai. The applicant’s mother was included in that list as a candidate to receive six hectares of land. On 22 October 2013 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas and the applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS, he stated that the question of the restoration of his property rights was pending before the European Court of Human Rights, that he was dissatisfied with the available vacant land and that he refused to choose any plots (žemės sklypų nesirinko). 15.  On 22 April 2016 the NLS held another meeting in which the applicant took part. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he asked to be shown the plots which had been offered to him at their location and not just on a plan. He stated that he had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and wished to receive its decision  only then would he “decide what to do with his land”. The applicant examined the land plan but did not make any decisions with regard to the available plots (jokių sprendimų nepriėmė), stating that he would “seek solutions from organisations of a higher instance”. 16.  At a subsequent meeting held on 17 May 2016, the applicant stated that he had seen the plots offered to him but that they could not be used according to their purpose because of their uneven surface and the presence of electricity and other installations on them. He therefore “saw no possibility of choosing any plots” (žemės sklypų pasirinkimo galimybių nemato). The applicant further stated that the plot which had been taken away from him had been large and of good quality, and that he preferred to “wait for decisions of a higher instance”. 17.  On 9 October 2017 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Pagiriai. The applicant’s mother was included in that list as a candidate to receive six hectares of land. On 25 October 2017 the NLS held a meeting for candidates in which the applicant took part. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he was dissatisfied with the size and location of the plots which had been offered to him. He again stated that he had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and wished to receive that Court’s decision  only then would he decide “what to do with the land which had not been returned to him”. He refused to make any decisions during the meeting (susirinkimo metu jokių sprendimų nepriėmė) on the grounds that he was “waiting for a response from a competent institution”. 18.  On 24 November 2017 the NLS held yet another meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in the aforementioned areas and the applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he again refused to make any decisions (susirinkimo metu jokių sprendimų nepriėmė) and repeated that he was waiting for a response from the European Court of Human Rights. 19.  At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (13 February 2018), the applicant’s property rights to six hectares of land had still not been restored.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Galway, Ireland. 6.  On 27 March 2000 the applicant gave birth to a child, a girl named A. She was married at the time to the child’s father, M.K., and lived in Poland. She already had a son from a previous relationship, B, born in 1993. 7.  In 2006 the family moved to Ireland. They lived there together until January 2009, when the couple split up and M.K. moved back to Poland. 8.  In June 2009 M.K. went to Ireland on holiday and said he intended to take A to Poland for the summer holidays. The applicant was concerned whether M.K. would return the child to Ireland after their holidays in Poland. On 29 June 2009 she instituted proceedings before Ennis District Court under the Guardianship of Infants Act of 1964, seeking declaration that the habitual residence of the child was in Ireland and that the child was to return to Ireland on 15 August 2009. 9.  On 2 July 2009 the Ennis District Court issued a consent order as an interim measure. It stated that the child could visit Poland between 7 July and 15 August 2009 with M.K. and established that her habitual residence was in Ireland. Other custody matters were adjourned to the next hearing, scheduled for 15 September 2009. On the latter day the court issued a certificate of enforceability of the order of 2 July 2009, pursuant to Article 42 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (“the Brussels II bis Regulation”). 10.  M.K. failed to return A to her mother on 15 August 2009. 11.  On 15 September 2009 the Ennis District Court decided that A’s residence would be in Ireland with her mother, who was granted sole custody. The court also ordered the return of the child to the applicant. On 17 September 2009 it also issued a certificate of enforceability of the order pursuant to Article 42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation. 12.  M.K. appealed against the order of 15 September 2009 but the appeal was dismissed by the Limerick Circuit Family Court on 10 December 2009. 13.  In September 2009 the applicant applied to the Polish Ministry of Justice – designated as the Central Authority under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) – for assistance in securing the return of the child. 14.  On 6 October 2009 the Malbork District Court heard the applicant’s application and M.K.’s counterclaim to dismiss the case. It decided to commission an expert opinion from the Regional Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny – “RODK”). 15.  On 18 December 2009 the Malbork District Court rejected the applicant’s application under the Hague Convention to return A to her. The court based its decision on Article 13, stating that the Polish authorities were not bound to return the child since there was a risk she would be exposed to physical or psychological harm or otherwise placed in an intolerable situation. The court supported its reasoning by referring to the findings of the RODK and other social and psychological studies. In particular, the court highlighted that the RODK report had stated that A wished to remain in Poland. The RODK had also stated that M.K. was closer to A and more attentive to her particular needs than the applicant. It was found that although the applicant was also an important person in A’s life, the child saw her actions as going against her own wishes and placing her in uncomfortable situations. 16.  On 18 May 2010 the Gdańsk Regional Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant. The court took into account the preference of A to stay with her father. The child, at that time nine-years-old, was considered by the experts as mature and aware of her family situation. 17.  On 15 October 2009 the applicant applied to the Polish authorities to recognise and enforce the Ennis District Court’s order of 15 September 2009. 18.  On 18 November 2009 the applicant requested that the proceedings be dealt with more speedily and that an earlier date for hearing the case be scheduled. The applicant underlined her lack of contact with her daughter. 19.  On 4 December 2009 the Gdańsk Regional Court decided to enforce the Irish order of 15 September 2009. M.K. appealed to the Gdańsk Court of Appeal. 20.  On 22 June 2010 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the Gdańsk Regional Court of 4 December 2009. The court decided that the Irish court had ruled on parental responsibility and that judgment could not be reconciled with the subsequent judgment of the Polish court of 18 December 2009 dismissing the applicant’s claim for the child’s return under the Hague Convention. The Irish decision was therefore no longer enforceable in Poland. 21.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. 22.  On 24 August 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s ruling and remitted the case for re-examination. The Supreme Court firstly reiterated that the provisions of the Brussels II bis Regulation were binding and directly applicable. Secondly, the court explained that the purpose of a ruling under the Hague Convention was the prompt return of a child to the country of his or her habitual residence. A decision to return a child or a decision to refuse such a return under Articles 12, 13 and 20 of the Hague Convention could not be understood as containing a ruling on matters of custody or parental responsibility. The reasons for a decision not to return a child under Article 13 (b) were factual in nature and could not create a new custodial right. That had also been set out in Article 10 of the Hague Convention. Thirdly, the exception allowing for a refusal to enforce a judgment provided for in Article 23 (e) of the Brussels II bis Regulation required the existence of a later and contradictory ruling relating to parental responsibility. The decision of 18 December 2009 issued under Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention could not be considered as such a ruling. 23.  On 28 February 2012 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal refused to declare that the order of 15 September 2009 was enforceable on the grounds that the High Court of Ireland had made a new custody order on 9 September 2011 (see paragraph 27 below). 24.  On 4 October 2010 the applicant lodged an application in Ireland for enforcement of the Ennis District Court’s decision of 15 September 2009 and the return of A to her. 25.  On 28 January 2011 the High Court of Ireland gave an interim order. It considered that the Irish courts had jurisdiction to decide on the custody of A and had retained that jurisdiction after her wrongful removal in August 2009. 26.  On 28 August 2011 a court-commissioned clinical psychological report was published. The expert involved interviewed the applicant, A and M.K. She found that both parents had the ability to provide a stable and loving home environment for A and that their care and affection was important to her emotional, social and psychological wellbeing. The report recommended that the court should take account of the wish A had expressed to attend school in Poland and to consider an arrangement whereby the child lived with her father during school terms and spend her holidays in Ireland. The report also stated that firm arrangements should be put in place by the court for the time that A was to spend in her mother’s care and for the father’s access during those times since, if there was room for parental discretion, the time allocated was likely to be reduced. That was especially important because there was a risk that M.K. would interfere with the development of the child’s confidence and security in her mother’s care owing to the father’s belief in the importance of his constant input in A’s life. 27.  On 9 September 2011 the High Court of Ireland gave a judgment superseding the order of 15 September 2009. The court decided to grant joint custody to both parents, but still ordered the child’s return to Ireland by 2 November 2011. The court decided that A should finish the school year in Ireland and start the next one, from September 2012, in Poland. The judgment also set out which parts of the school holidays A should spend with the applicant and which with M.K. 28.  M.K. unsuccessfully appealed against the judgment and was refused a stay in the order on 21 October 2011. 29.  In October 2011 the applicant lodged an application with the Polish Ministry of Justice to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Ireland of 9 September 2011 and for the return of the child to her. The Polish Ministry of Justice advised the Irish Central Authority to lodge an application with the relevant court in Poland for the compulsory removal of the child. 30.  On 28 November 2011 the applicant lodged a request through the Irish Central Authority to have A returned to her. 31.  From October 2011 to January 2012 the Irish and the Polish Central Authorities corresponded with each other for the purposes of enforcing the Irish judgment of 9 September 2011. 32.  On 23 January 2012 the Irish Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform received a letter from the Polish Ministry of Justice stating that the applicant’s application for the compulsory removal of her daughter and her return to Ireland had been sent to the Gdańsk District Court that day. 33.  On 25 January 2012 the Irish Family Liaison Judge for the European Judicial Network (EJN) sent a letter to the Polish Family Liaison Judge for the European Judicial Network, urging Poland to execute the High Court of Ireland’s custody decision of 9 September 2011. Noting that M.K. had commenced divorce proceedings in which there was also a reference to custody, the letter also requested that the relevant judge in the divorce proceedings be made aware of the High Court of Ireland order of 9 September 2011. 34.  On 4 May 2012 the court appointed guardian interviewed A and submitted an opinion to the court. It stated that A had wished to stay in Poland where she had had home, school, and friends. A expressed her wish to have regular contacts with her mother via Skype. She felt her mother had been putting pressure on her to return to Ireland. The parental conflict made her follow a psychological treatment and take antidepressant medication. 35.  On 9 May 2012 the Malbork District Court held a hearing and encouraged the parties to reach agreement on a date for the child’s return to Ireland. At the hearing M.K. explained that he had refused to comply with the Irish courts’ orders because his daughter had been in a bad psychological state. 36.  On 28 June 2012 the Malbork District Court ordered A’s removal from M.K. by a guardian on the basis of Article 598 § 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court also ordered that its decision was immediately enforceable. 37.  On 6 July 2012 the applicant and the guardian arrived at M.K.’s place of residence to take the child away, but found no one there. 38.  On 9 July 2012 the guardian made a further attempt to remove the child but their home was again empty. On 13 July 2012 the guardian made a third unsuccessful attempt to remove the child. On 24 July 2012 the guardian requested that the police intervene. 39.  On 7 September 2012 the Malbork District Court discontinued proceedings for the compulsory execution of the decision by the Irish court of 9 September 2011. The court considered that the applicant’s right to demand A’s return to Ireland had effectively expired on 31 August 2012 and that, as of that day, there was no executory title which could provide grounds for proceedings to be carried out effectively. It found that the original 2011 Irish order had stated that A was to start the 2012 school year in Poland and so her compulsory removal, as a minor, was not allowed. 40.  On 26 September 2012 the applicant met A outside her school and travelled to Ireland with her. 41.  On 12 November 2012 the Gdańsk Regional Court quashed the Malbork District Court findings of 7 September 2012, stating that the return order remained valid. 42.  On 21 October 2012 the applicant applied to the High Court of Ireland for an order prohibiting A’s removal from that country by any person save the applicant, unless she had given her consent or a court had given leave. During the subsequent proceedings M.K. made requests to have unsupervised contact with A by telephone or Skype. The court commissioned an expert opinion and held hearings. 43.  On 24 June 2013 the parties reached an agreement. The terms of the agreement stated that the applicant would have sole custody of A for the following year, pending review by the court in July 2014. It also set out M.K.’s access rights, which provided that during his visits to Ireland he would have to give two weeks’ notice to the applicant and could see the child on Saturdays from 1.30 p.m. to 7 p.m. and on Sundays from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. Access during the school holidays would take place in Ireland, but could be for longer periods and on weekdays. 44.  On 8 October 2012 M.K. brought proceedings in the Polish courts for an order that A be returned to him. 45.  On 11 January 2013 the Malbork District Court excluded the presiding judge from taking part in the proceedings owing to close personal ties with M.K.’s mother. 46.  On 11 February 2013 the Malbork District Court rejected M.K.’s action, stating that the Irish courts had jurisdiction given A’s habitual place of residence. M.K. lodged an appeal. 47.  On 22 March 2013 the Malbork District Court appointed a legal guardian to represent A’s interests in proceedings concerning the applicant’s taking of A to Ireland without M.K.’s consent. 48.  On 6 May 2013 the Gdańsk Regional Court quashed the decision of the Malbork District Court of 11 February 2013. The court decided that in accordance with the decision of the Gdańsk Regional Court in its decision of 4 July 2011 (see paragraph 52 below) A’s place of residence was with her father in Malbork. 49.  Following the quashing, M.K.’s motion had to be returned to the lower court. There is no information about the course of the proceedings afterwards. 50.  In July 2009 M.K. initiated divorce proceedings before the Gdańsk District Court, which were subsequently stayed pending the determination of the application concerning the child’s return. 51.  On 16 March 2011 M.K. applied for an interim order to establish that A’s place of residence was with him during the proceedings. 52.  On 4 July 2011 the Gdańsk Regional Court granted M.K. an interim order establishing that he should have custody over A for the duration of the proceedings. The court considered that the child’s place of residence was in Poland. The court reasoned that, although both parents had custody of A, M.K. was better placed to exercise parental rights as he had lived in Poland and had developed a strong bond with his daughter. M.K. provided a guarantee that A would be properly cared for. A was found by the court to have settled well in Malbork since she was doing well at school and had good relations with her fellow students. The court stated that in spite of the divorce proceedings in Poland the applicant had also gone to court in Ireland concerning A, thus giving rise to feelings of uncertainty in the child and the fear that she would be taken to Ireland against her will. The court found that such factors made it necessary to grant the injunction. 53.  On 17 October 2013 the Irish liaison judge for the EJN wrote to the Polish liaison judge informing him of the custody proceedings in Ireland, the agreement of 24 June 2013 made by the parties in relation to custody and access rights and the order of 25 June 2013 of the High Court of Ireland giving effect to that agreement. The letter requested that the information be passed on to the judge in the Polish divorce proceedings. 54.  On 30 October 2013 the Gdańsk Regional Court granted a divorce between M.K. and the applicant, stating that they shared fault. The court refused to decide on issues of custody and access, referring to the agreement the parties had come to on 24 June 2013 in Ireland. 55.  On 13 May 2014 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance judgment. 56.  After M.K. failed to return the child on 15 August 2009, the applicant had no contact with her daughter for three months. 57.  On 8 October 2009 the applicant saw A for the first time during an interview conducted by court experts. 58.  On 18 December 2009 the applicant saw A in Poland at the court hearing but spent no time alone with her at any point. 59.  In May 2010 the applicant saw A in Poland over several consecutive days. She also saw her in February 2011 and attended her birthday party in March 2011. 60.  It appears that afterwards A went to Ireland upon a court order in July 2011. At that time A, the applicant, B and M.K were all interviewed by the High Court’s expert. 61.  A has been in the care of the applicant since 26 September 2012 and they live in Ireland.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Chișinău. 7.  The applicant is the chief executive officer of a large Moldovan company specialised in the importation of medical equipement. 8.  On 8 April 2015 he was arrested by the National Anti-Corruption Center (NAC) in connection with a crimial investigation opened in November 2014. He was charged with bribery in the context of public auctions. Searches were conducted at the applicant’s home and at the headquarters of his company and numerous documents, computers and mobile phones were seized by the investigators. 9.  More than twenty persons were accused in the same criminal case. Among them were the former Minister of Health and hospital directors. Many of them were apprehended and later released by the NAC or by the courts. As of July 2015, the applicant was the only accused who was kept in custody. 10.  After arrest the applicant was placed in the NAC detention facility. Between 8 April and 8 October 2015 the applicant was detained in custody. Between 8 October and 4 November 2015 he was detained under house arrest. 11.  The need for the applicant’s detention was justified by the prosecutors in the following way: that the applicant could abscond; he could influence witnesses; he could collude with other co-accused persons; and because the offence imputed to him was sanctioned with imprisonment of up to ten years. All of the prosecutors’ applications for the prolongation of the applicant’s detention were identical. 12.  The applicant argued every time that he was ready to give up his passport and that there were no reasons to believe that he would attempt influencing witnesses or hindering the investigation. The reasons relied upon by the prosecutors in favour of detention were stereotyped and there was no evidence that he intended to abscond or do other things imputed to him. He also argued that he had a family, children, a permanent employment and a permanent abode. 13.  On 10 April 2015 the Buiucani District Court issued a detention order for a period of thirty days arguing that the applicant did not produce guarantees in favour of an undertaking not to hinder the good unfolding of the investigation if no detention was applied. That decision was later upheld by the Chișinău Court of Appeal, which added that there was also a risk of the applicant’s reoffending. 14.  On 7 May 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention by twenty-five days relying on the same grounds as before. The applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Court of Appeal on 14 May 2015. The Court of Appeal used the same arguments as the first time and added that one of the reaosons to hold the applicant in custody was to protect other persons involved in the proceedings from his violent actions. 15.  By decisions dated 1 and 26 June, 21 July 2015 and 15 August 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention for twenty‑five days each time. The court relied on similar reasons as before. The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeals arguing that the applicant’s defence did not prove the fact that the applicant did not intend to abscond or hinder the investigation. In a decision of 11 June 2015 the Court of Appeal held for the first time that there was a risk of the applicant’s absconding. 16.  On 15 and 29 September 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged again the applicant’s detention by twenty and eight days, respectively. It argued that the risk of absconding was justified by the gravity of the offence and that the prosecutor had presented evidence in support of the claim that the applicant may hinder the investigation. The court did not state what that evidence was. On 6 October 2015 the Buiucani District Court prolonged again the applicant’s detention by ninety days. 17.   On 8 October 2015 the Court of Appeal examined the appeals lodged by the applicant against the decisions of 29 September 2015 and 6 October 2015. In its first judgment it dismissed the applicant’s appeal after finding that all the risks enumerated by the first-instance court persisted. However, when examining the appeal against the second decision, the same panel of judges considered that the risk of the applicant’s absconding was no longer justified and that there were no new reasons to consider necessary the applicant’s continued detention. Therefore, the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s house arrest. 18.  On 4 November 2015 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus request and asked for the revocation of the house arrest. On the same date the Buiucani District Court accepted the applicant’s request and ordered his release from house arrest. 19.  On 9 April 2015, on the second day of his detention, the applicant felt an accute pain in the region of his lower back. At 10.46 p.m. an ambulance was called for the applicant. The doctors diagnosed the applicant with “lumbar radicular syndorme with pronounced algic syndrome” and prescribed him hospitalisation. However, the prison administration refused to follow the doctors’ prescription. 20.  Several hours later, on 10 April 2015 between 3 and 4 a.m. the applicant started experiencing again pain and asked for an ambulance to be called. An ambulance was called only at 9.27 a.m. The doctors repeated the same diagnosis and prescribed again hospitalisation. However, the prison administration refused to follow the doctors’ prescription. 21.  At 10.10 a.m. an ambulance was called again for the applicant. This time the doctors diagnosed the applicant with “artherial hypertension of third degree”, “discopathie with agravated algic syndrome” and “lumbar radiculopathy” (sensory and/or motor deficit). Hospitalisation was again prescribed, but the prison administration refused to follow the doctors’ prescription. 22.  At 11.44 a.m. an ambulance was called again for the applicant. The doctors diagnosed again “lumbar radiculopathy” and discopathie with a possible lesion of the nerve. The doctors reiterated the urgent need for hospitalisation, but the administration refused again. 23.  At 2 p.m. the administration invited several doctors from the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery who confirmed the initial diagnosis and the urgent need for hospitalisation. Only after that, the prison administration allowed the applicant’s transfer to a hospital. 24.  On 11 April 2015 the applicant was operated on his spine at the Institute of Neurology and Neurosurgery. He remained in hospital until 21 April 2015, when he was moved to a prison hospital. 25.  On 22 June 2015 the applicant was examined by a commission of five doctors who diagnosed him with cholecystitis and fequent biliary colic. They recommended him surgical removal of his gall bladder within maximum seven days. 26.  After that date the applicant and his lawyers submitted numerous requests and complaints to different authorities seeking the approval of his surgery. It was only on 3 August 2015, after the applicant’s condition drastically deteriorated, that his transportation to a normal hospital was approved. He had high fever and presented a swelling. After three days of preparations, he was subjected to surgery on 6 August 2015 and remained in intensive care for another week.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Bucharest. 1.  At the material time the applicant was the Executive Chair of the Partidul Verde ecological party, a political movement affiliated with the European Green Party. 2.  Partidul Verde had put up candidates for the 2008 general elections but failed to win any seats. In 2009 the applicant was the party’s candidate in the presidential elections. He won about 60,000 votes, or some 0.6 % of the total validly cast votes. 3.  The 2008 general elections had been governed by Law no. 35/2008 on elections to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, amending Law no. 67/2004 on local authority elections, Law no. 215/2001 on local public authorities and Law no. 393/2004 on the status of local elected representatives (“Law no. 35/2008”; see paragraph 17 below). In 2009 Parliament amended Law no. 35/2008 under Law no. 323/2009 approving Emergency Order no. 97/2008 (“Law no. 323/2009”; see paragraph 18 below). That amendment made it impossible for parties not represented in Parliament, as well as independent candidates, to put up candidates for or stand in parliamentary by-elections. 4.  Parliamentary by-elections were scheduled for 17 January 2010 in order to fill a vacant seat in a Bucharest constituency. According to information available to the Court, that seat had fallen vacant in October 2009. 6.  On 29 December 2009 the Electoral Board rejected the candidacy on the grounds that Partidul Verde was not represented in Parliament. 7.  Partidul Verde, represented by the applicant, challenged that rejection before Bucharest County Court (“the County Court”) and requested the acceptance of the applicant’s candidacy. It entered an objection of unconstitutionality under section 48 (17) of Law no. 35/2008 (see paragraph 18 below). It alleged in particular that the ban on candidates from parties not represented in Parliament and independent candidates infringed the right to free elections and amounted to unjustified discrimination as compared with parties represented in Parliament. The party added that, contrary to the recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (“the Venice Commission”; see paragraphs 20 and 21 below), Law no. 35/2008 had been amended less than one year before the by-elections. 8.  By interlocutory decision of 30 December 2009 the County Court deferred its ruling so that the Constitutional Court could consider the objection of unconstitutionality. 9.  By Decision no. 61/2010 of 14 January 2010, the Constitutional Court dismissed the objection of unconstitutionality. Having reiterated that Parliament’s political structure was defined by general elections, the Constitutional Court rejected Partidul Verde’s arguments as follows:\n“The [Constitutional] Court observes that the reason for the holding of the parliamentary by-elections was the fact that a parliamentary seat had fallen vacant. Such by-elections are held in order to assign seats in Parliament while simultaneously respecting the structure of Parliament as it emerged from the latest general elections. In order to respect the sovereignty and the will of the electorate as expressed in the framework of general elections, it is necessary that the by-election stage, which is subsidiary and complementary to the general elections, should observe the electoral threshold criterion which allows political parties to be represented in Parliament. To allow candidates to stand in by-elections for political parties which are not represented in Parliament would alter the latter’s political structure, [which is] incompatible with the votes cast by the electorate during the general elections which led to the constitution of the Romanian people’s supreme representative body, with a specific political make-up, which can only be modified in the cases and conditions determined by law.\n...\nMoreover, allowing a person who does not belong to a party represented in Parliament to obtain a parliamentary mandate further to by-elections would be tantamount to allowing something which had not been obtained in the framework of general elections to be obtained by the ‘devious means’ of a by-election.” 10.  As regards the plea based on the recommendations of the Venice Commission, the Constitutional Court assessed it “with reservations”. It noted that the said recommendations advised against amending the electoral law less than one year before any elections, but that they also comprised the hypothesis that such amendments “should be adopted at the level of the Constitution or at a level higher than that of ordinary law” (see paragraph 20 below). In the present case the Constitutional Court ruled that the recommendation had been complied with because the amendment to Law no. 35/2008 had been effected under an organic law, which met the criterion of a “level higher than that of ordinary law” (see paragraph 16 below). 11.  By judgment of 30 March 2010 the County Court dismissed the party’s challenge, referring to the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in its aforementioned decision of 14 January 2010, to the effect that since Partidul Verde had failed to pass the electoral threshold in the general elections it could not put up candidates for the by-elections. The County Court further noted that the elections had already been held and that the challenge had therefore become devoid of purpose. 12.  Fresh parliamentary by-elections were scheduled for 25 April 2010 in Bucharest to fill another vacant seat. 13.  The applicant stood as an independent candidate. His candidacy was rejected by the Electoral Board pursuant to section 48 (17) of Law no. 35/2008. The applicant appealed to the County Court against the rejection of his candidacy, and lodged a fresh objection of unconstitutionality. 14.  By Decision no. 503/2010 of 20 April 2010, the Constitutional Court allowed the objection of unconstitutionality lodged by the applicant and declared the part of the impugned section prohibiting independent candidacies unconstitutional on the grounds that it infringed the right to stand for election. The relevant parts of that decision read as follows:\n“Although, as regards political parties which are not represented in Parliament, the Constitutional Court’s Decision no. 61 of 14 January 2010 set out the reasons justifying, in the light of constitutional standards, the elimination of such parties from by-elections, as regards independent candidates no reason was given for subjecting them to the same legal treatment. Thus the electoral threshold means that political parties must be representative, to some extent, of the electorate, as required by the sovereignty principle. in the case of independent candidates, however, such a criterion would be absurd; ... they are asked to submit support lists comprising the signatures of a minimum 4% of all the voters registered in the permanent electoral lists of the boards to which they submit their candidacies, [and the total number should not be lower that] 2,000 electors in the case of the Chamber of Deputies and 4,000 electors in the case of the Senate. Consequently, for general elections, the legislature had laid down this precondition, which is necessary in order to stand as an independent candidate, and simultaneously in order to exercise the right to be elected. Nevertheless, in relation to by-elections, the legislature failed to lay down the requisite conditions for this category of persons standing for election, providing that the category of candidates for by-elections comprised only political parties and organisations of citizens belonging to national minorities having passed the legal electoral threshold at the general elections, whether individually or in the framework of a political or electoral alliance. That being the case, it is a case not of setting limits on or circumscribing the manner of exercising the right to be elected, but of annulling that right by failing to recognise it, [by an] unlawful absence of regulation.\n...\nIn conclusion, the Electoral Law may specify the conditions in which an individual may stand for election as an independent (financial deposit, a specific number of supporters, etc.), but it can in no way exclude from the electoral process, in the case of by-elections, the candidacy of a person [standing as an] independent candidate without thereby infringing the fundamental right enshrined in Article 37 of the Constitution – the right to be elected.” 15.  The applicant stood in the 2012 general elections and obtained a seat in the Chamber of Deputies for a four-year mandate.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1965 and 1954 respectively and live in Bucharest. 5.  Both applicants were ill-treated and injured on 21 December 1989 during the events which led to the fall of the communist regime in Bucharest. The first applicant suffered injuries that needed eight days of medical care and the second applicant was beaten by militia forces on the same occasion. 6.  In 1990 the military prosecutor’s office opened ex officio investigations into the illegal detention, ill-treatment and injury suffered by the applicants and other participants in the events of December 1989 in respect of several offences as mentioned below. The main criminal investigation was recorded in file no. 97/P/1990 (current no. 11/P/2014). 7.  In the meantime, an ex officio investigation concerning the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty, illegal arrest and abusive investigation of a large number of persons, including the applicants, culminated in the referral to court and subsequent conviction of senior military and public officials by a decision of the Supreme Court of Justice of 10 May 1991, which became final on 14 November 1991. The injured parties, including the applicants, did not participate in that procedure, as the Government acknowledged. 8.  As regards the offence of abusive conduct, the military prosecutor’s office decided on 9 March 1994 (in respect of the first applicant) and 28 October 1994 (in respect of the second applicant) not to open a separate ex officio investigation on the grounds that the offence of abusive conduct fell under a subsequently enacted amnesty law; that decision was communicated only to the second applicant on 4 October 2001. No decision was adopted in respect of the applicants’ injury. 9.  Further, without a formal decision to overturn the decisions issued by the military prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 8 above) and to reopen the applicants’ respective cases, in the main criminal investigation, the prosecutor heard the applicants who reiterated their complaints regarding the offences of illegal deprivation of liberty and homicide as an attempt raised on account of their ill-treatment and injury during the events of December 1989. Thus, the first applicant requested on 5 January 2005 and on 4 August 2008 to participate in these proceedings as a civil party and for the investigation of his case to be pursued by the military prosecutor’s office. In the main criminal investigation, the second applicant gave a statement on 4 October 2001 and lodged a civil claim on 17 May 2005, asking for the punishment of those responsible. 10.  The relevant procedural steps taken in the main criminal investigation were described in Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania (nos. 33810/07 and 18817/08, §§ 12-41, 24 May 2011) and Anamaria‑Loredana Orășanu and Others v. Romania ([Committee] (nos. 43629/13 and 74 others, §§ 10‑11, 7 November 2017). 11.  On 14 October 2015, as regards the second applicant, the military prosecutor’s office issued a decision only in respect of the offence of instigation to illegal deprivation of liberty by closing the main criminal investigation on the grounds of res judicata in relation to the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision of 10 May 1991, failing to decide the offence of homicide as an attempt or her injury, as complained of (see paragraph 7 above). No decision was taken in respect of the first applicant. 12.  Although the parties have not communicated any information regarding the lodging of an appeal against this decision, it can be seen from the military prosecutor’s office website that it was subsequently quashed. Thus, on 1 November 2016 the military prosecutor’s office ordered the initiation in rem of a criminal investigation regarding the offence of crimes against humanity in respect of the same circumstances of fact. To date, the main criminal investigation is still ongoing.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The Ohrid Archdiocese (Охридска Архиепископија), in its original form, existed until 1767, when it was abolished by the Turkish Sultan. As stated by the applicant association, after its abolition the territory over which the Ohrid Archdiocese had jurisdiction, which had included what is now the territory of the respondent State, fell under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which in 1918 issued a canonical release of those territories to the benefit of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC). As stated by the Government, in 1943 it was decided that the Ohrid Archdiocese would be restored and continued by an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC). In 1959 the MOC seceded from the SOC, and in 1967 it declared autocephaly. The Head of the Holy Synod of MOC is designated as “Archbishop of Ohrid and Macedonia” (Архиепископ Охридски и Македонски). 6.  In negotiations which have been continuing since then, on 17 May 2002 the two churches signed a draft agreement (known as “the Niš agreement”) which provided for ecclesiastical union between them. It further specified that the MOC would renounce its autocephaly and obtain widest autonomy within the SOC under the name “Ohrid Archdiocese”. 7.  According to the Government, during the negotiations and the signing of the Niš agreement, there had been strong reaction by the public, which regarded the draft agreement as “a scandalous and indecent act of treason” and, owing to strong pressure by the public, on 25 May 2002 the Holy Synod of the MOC ultimately rejected this agreement. The applicant association disagreed that the rejection of the agreement had resulted solely from the reaction by the public and submitted that “the main pressure came directly from the Macedonian authorities who stood behind the protests”. 8.  Mr J. Vraniškovski, a bishop and a member of the Holy Synod of the MOC at the time, was supportive of the Niš agreement. After the Holy Synod of the MOC had rejected that agreement, Mr Vraniškovski accepted a call by the SOC for reunification dated 20 June 2002; on 21 June 2002 he publicly announced that he was prepared for canonical union with the SOC. The Government submitted that that had provoked a public reaction and that there had been street protests in several cities in the respondent State. 9.  On 5 July 2002 the Holy Synod of the MOC dismissed Mr Vraniškovski on the ground that, by his unilateral accession to the SOC, he had violated the oath by which he had bound himself to safeguard the Church’s unity and Constitution (see Vraniškoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.) 39168/03, 22 June 2010). On 23 September 2002 the SOC declared the dismissal of Mr Vraniškovski null and void and appointed him “exarch of the Peć Archbishop and the Patriarch of Serbia for all eparchies of the Ohrid Archdiocese”. 10.  On 25 December 2003 the applicant association constituted its own Holy Synod and appointed Mr Vraniškovski as its President. By a letter of 16 January 2004, received by the Commission for religious communities and groups (“the Commission”, Комисија за односи со верските заедници и религиозните групи) on 27 January 2004, Mr Vraniškovski requested an opinion as to whether the applicant association should be registered, given that “in all civilised States a church, which is older than the State is accepted without needing to be registered.” The letter, which remained unanswered, further stated:\n“... the true Macedonian Orthodox Church is the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese. It is a legitimate church, recognised by all churches in the world, so all who want to be Orthodox are welcome, the doors are open. Those who are schismatic should join the schismatic Synod (MOC). The Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese has nothing against the State registering schisms ... but it is against the State preventing its spiritual and leading operation in the Republic of Macedonia ...” 11.  On 6 September 2004 Mr Vraniškovski submitted an application (барање за регистрирање) seeking that the applicant association be registered as a religious group (религиозна група). In support of the application, the applicant association submitted the following documents: (a) a founding decision of 1 September 2004 rendered by its Holy Synod. Under section 1 of that decision, the applicant association was defined “as a voluntary, non-profit association of Christians that were not associated with any other religious community or group”. Its aim was to acquire legal-entity status and to manage its property. The decision specified the temporary place of registration of the applicant association and authorised Mr Vraniškovski to submit an application for registration on behalf of the applicant association; (b) a list of its adherents; and (c) a Charter on the organisation and operation of the applicant (“the Charter”). The latter provided that the applicant “would be autonomous within the canonical jurisdiction of the Peć Patriarchy (the SOC)”; it specified that its temporary place of registration would be in Bitola, in the respondent State, “until it was possible to designate a permanent seat”; and that the applicant association and its structural units were legal entities and could obtain and manage property. It further provided that all legal persons that the applicant association might set up could have bank accounts. 12.  On 30 September 2004 the Commission found the application to be incomplete, and requested that the applicant association submit the following further documents: a) a copy of a decision appointing the authorised person to seek registration of the applicant association and b) a copy of the minutes of the constituent assembly. On 18 October 2004 the applicant association submitted the requested documents. 13.  On 3 November 2004 the Commission dismissed the application (се одбива барањето за пријавување) for the following reasons:\n(a)  the application was not submitted by an authorised person. The Commission held that it had been submitted by a certain J.N. (Bishop D.) and not by Mr Vraniškovski, who had been authorised to seek registration of the applicant association;\n(b)  the application for registration had been submitted outside the thirty‑day time-limit specified in section 11 (1) of the Act on Religious Communities and Religious Groups (“the 1997 Act”, see paragraph 47 below), which had started to run on 25 December 2003, the date on which the applicant association’s Holy Synod had been set up (see paragraph 10 above);\n(c)  relying on the applicant association’s Charter, the Commission established that it would act as an autonomous religious group in canonical union with the Peć Patriarchy (SOC). That the applicant association would operate as part of a foreign orthodox church was, in the Commission’s view, in violation of section 12 of the 1997 Act. The Commission further stated that a religious community could be established only by nationals of the respondent State, and not by a foreign church or State;\n(d)  the applicant association had emerged from an already existing and registered religious community, notably the MOC, whose position and role had been specified in the Constitution. The fact that the applicant association had sought registration under the name “Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese” had implied that its real intention was to create a parallel orthodox religious group to the MOC, which had been using that name (Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese) “constitutionally, historically, actually and continuously” (уставно, историски, актуелно и во континуитет) for over eight centuries. That was not in compliance with section 8 (2) of the 1997 Act, under which only one religious community could be registered for one faith group. The Commission referred to a decision of the Constitutional Court which had found that provision compliant with the Constitution. It had ruled that the provision had protected people from being manipulated and same-faith believers from being divided into several religious groups (U.br.223/97 of 28 October 1998, see paragraph 54 below). The Commission also argued that the Preamble to the Constitution of the MOC specified that it was the canonical successor to the Ohrid Archdiocese. This was confirmed on 17 July 1967 when the Ohrid Archdiocese declared autocephaly, which was continued by the MOC. The Commission further held that on 6 August 2004 the MOC had asked the Industrial Property Bureau (“the Bureau”, Завод за заштита на индустриската сопственост) to register the name “Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese” in its trademark register (TM 2004/574).\nMoreover, on 13 August 2004 the MOC had asked the Commission to prevent registration of several names, including the name “Ohrid Archdiocese”, to which it was entitled for historical, religious and moral reasons; and\n(e)  the Commission held that property-related provisions of the applicant’s Charter were contrary to section 9 of the 1997 Act, according to which a religious group was a voluntary, non-profit association of believers. 14.  In its decision of 3 November 2004, the Commission further referred to several international documents and a Declaration that the Parliament of the respondent State adopted in 2004 regarding the MOC (see paragraph 51 below). 15.  The applicant association complained against this decision, arguing that:\n(a)  the application for registration had been submitted by Mr Vraniškovski. J.N. had only handed it over to the Commission’s archives;\n(b)  the applicant association had been founded formally on 1 September 2004. On 25 December 2003, the date to which the Commission referred in its decision, the applicant association had only appointed the members of its Holy Synod;\n(c)  the applicant association was a new religious community that had no connection with, let alone stemmed from, the MOC, which, in any event, had not been recognised by any Orthodox Church;\n(d)  the fact that the MOC had sought to have the Bureau add “Ohrid Archdiocese” to its name was irrelevant, since no such name existed in the Commission’s records;\n(e)  the applicant association had denied that it had been set up by a foreign church or a foreign State. That it would operate in canonical union with another church of same religion did not imply that it had been founded contrary to section 9 (2) of the 1997 Act; 16.  On 11 January 2005 the Government Appeal Commission (Комисија за решавање во управна постапка во втор степен од областа на внатрешни работи, судството, државната управа, локалната самоуправа и работите од верски карактер) dismissed the appeal, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the Commission. 17.  The applicant association challenged these decisions before the Supreme Court. In addition to the arguments already raised, it submitted that its name was neither identical with nor similar to the name of any other religious community or group registered by the Commission. 18.  On 9 November 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that the applicant association’s name had implied creation of a parallel religious community, rather than a religious group as claimed, given that its name was substantially the same as the name of the MOC. The court referred to the applicant association’s Charter and found that its determination to operate as an autonomous church in canonical union with the Peć Patriarchy was contrary to the fact that the MOC had canonical jurisdiction in the territory of the respondent State. It also held that property-related rules were in violation of section 16 of the 1997 Act. The court accepted the remaining reasoning given by the administrative bodies. That decision was served on the applicant on 15 July 2006. 19.  On 15 July 2007 Bishop D. applied to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the refusal of the authorities to register the applicant association violated the freedom of belief and religion specified in Article 110 § 3 of the Constitution. While relying on the decisions of the authorities refusing the applicant association’s registration as “Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese”, he also notified the court that a fresh application for registration had been submitted under the name “Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy” (see paragraphs 23-34 below). He stated, inter alia:\n“... it is obvious that followers of our religious organisation have been deprived of the rights specified in Articles 16 and 19 of the Constitution for seven years ... the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy is a religious organisation which should protect the religious needs of, among others, Serbs and Greeks in the Republic of Macedonia. It is an autonomous church under jurisdiction of the Peć Patriarchy, notably the Serbian Orthodox Church ...” 20.  On 9 September 2009 (U.br.184/09) the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal, which, as specified in the decision, concerned “freedom of belief and prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds”. Relying on, inter alia, Articles 9, 16 and 19 of the Constitution (see paragraphs 42‑44 below), the court found:\n“The complainant did not claim personal protection from discrimination ... but, he acts as a representative of a group of people with which he is associated ...” 21.  It further stated:\n“The Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to decide on the rights and interests of citizens in specific cases before administrative and judicial bodies. Neither has it jurisdiction to decide as a hierarchically superior court and examine the lawfulness and constitutionality of decisions adopted by competent administrative bodies ... the complainant refers to the non-registration as an action, but such an action ... stems from an individual decision which this court is not competent to examine ... the registration of ... a religious community or a group does not determine the religious beliefs and internal religious belief of a person, since expression of beliefs is an individual act, the registration procedure does not affect personal religious belief and rituals, and the court has not been presented with any evidence that they have been violated at any point.” 22.  The court also held that the appeal had been submitted outside the two-month time-limit specified in the Rules of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 52 below), calculated since 9 November 2005, the date of the Supreme Court’s decision (see paragraph 18 above). 23.  On 20 September 2007 a new Act on the legal status of churches, religious communities and religious groups (“the 2007 Act”) was adopted. It entered into force on 1 May 2008. 24.  On 3 and 6 April 2009 the applicant association inspected the register of churches, religious groups and communities (“the court register”) of the Skopje Court of First Instance, which became, by virtue of the 2007 Act, the registration court. From 11 November 2008 onwards the MOC was recorded in the court register as “Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese”. The registration decision stated that in communication with third parties it would use the name “Macedonian Orthodox Church”. 25.  According to “the minutes of the constituent assembly” (записник од основачкото собрание) “... at the proposal of His Beatitude (Неговото Блаженство), the Archbishop of Ohrid and Metropolitan of Skopje Mr Jovan (Vraniškovski), the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese composed of (Bishops J., M., and D., all Macedonian nationals) convened a meeting on 27 April 2009 in order to adopt decisions for setting up and registration of “the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy”. The minutes of the constituent assembly were signed by all three bishops (their personal identity numbers and addresses were provided therein). 26.  On the same date a decision setting up the applicant association was adopted. As stated in its introductory part, “at a meeting dated 27 April 2009 the Holy Synod decided to submit a request to the Skopje Court of First Instance for registration of ‘the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy’”. It was set up “as a voluntary, non-profit organisation of Christians who are not associated with any other registered religious community, and, in particular, has no connection with (the MOC)”. It further stated:\n“It is an Orthodox church in full canonical and liturgical union with all recognised Orthodox churches in the world. For this reason, we consider that we should be registered as a church, but if the court considers otherwise, we would accept registration as a religious community or religious group.” 27.  The decision further indicated that the applicant association’s temporary place of registration would be in Bitola, in the respondent State. Bishop D. was authorised to submit the application for registration. He was also nominated to act on behalf of the applicant association (застапува) in relations with other legal entities until “... Mr Jovan (Vraniškovski) returned from exile”. 28.  The applicant association’s Charter on the status, organisation and operation of the association (“the Charter”) provided that it was “an autonomous church under the canonical jurisdiction of the Peć Patriarchy” (section 2). The Holy Synod was “the highest managerial body” of the applicant (section 6). It was composed of the Archbishop and two eparchy bishops (section 9). The assembly of archbishops (архиепископско собрание) was “the supreme regulatory, administrative, supervisory and executive body concerning internal, financial and religious self-management” (section 12). 29.  On 28 April 2009 Bishop D. submitted an application for registration of the “Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy” as “one of the churches” in the respondent State. The application expressly stated that the applicant association would agree to be registered as a religious community or group if the registration court found this more appropriate. The applicant association further expressed willingness to submit any documents, if need be, in order to avoid its application being refused. It was also stated that a refusal to register a religious group would be unjustified in a democratic society unless it was proven that the teaching of the group was destructive. That had not been the case with the ‘“Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of Peć Patriarchy’ which is two thousand years old”. It further stated that:\n“... any refusal to register ‘the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy’ is an obstacle to the Republic of Macedonia’s future membership of the European Union ... It will not be pleasant, at the present time and place in history, if a judge appears as a persecutor of a church. Any person who does not respect human rights and freedoms regarding association of people on religious grounds, especially if he or she is a judge ... does not differ much from famous persecutors of the Holy Church ... we wrote the above in order to warn that it will be unpleasant if the court does not register ‘the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy’ ...” 30.  On 10 July 2009, without reference to the applicant, the registration court sought an explanation from the MOC as to the meaning of the notion of “Peć Patriarchy”. On 21 July 2009 the MOC replied (the reply was reproduced in the decision of the registration court of 28 July 2009, see paragraph 31 below) as follows:\n‘“Peć Patriarchy’ forms part of the name of the Serbian Orthodox Church and expresses the historical continuity of the Serbian Orthodox Church as canonical heir of the Peć Patriarchy: in the same way the name ‘Ohrid Archdiocese’ is part of the name of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. The name ‘Ohrid Archdiocese’ is protected by the Macedonian Orthodox Church in the Industrial Property Bureau. The Serbian Orthodox Church, specifically the Peć Patriarchy, has no canonical or any other jurisdiction over the Macedonian Orthodox Church or in the territory of the Republic of Macedonia.” 31.  On 28 July 2009 the registration court dismissed the applicant association’s request for registration in the court register (се одбива барањето за упис) for the following reasons:\n(a)  it was founded by the so-called Holy Synod, as a body, which was contrary to section 2 of the 2007 Act (see paragraph 49 below) according to which a decision to establish a religious entity was to be taken by the founding members at a constituent assembly. No such assembly had been held in the applicant’s case;\n(b)  the application for registration concerned an organisation which had not been provided for under the 2007 Act. Its name did not specify whether it was a church, religious community or religious group. On the contrary, it implied that it was a divine organisation, which would operate as an autonomous Archdiocese under the canonical jurisdiction of the Peć Patriarchy. “It did not state that it was a voluntary organisation of physical persons” as required under section 2 of the 2007 Act;\n(c)  the intended name of the applicant association included names or terms that were part of or indicated a relationship with the official names of States or religious communities or canonical territories already registered and under foreign jurisdiction. In this connection it held that the term “Greek” (Грко) was an English translation of “Orthodox Church”. Its use was not in conformity with the 2007 Act (section 10 (3)). The “Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese” partly covered the generic and historical name of the MOC; it did not differ from the latter’s registered name. That name (Ohrid Archdiocese) has been used by the MOC “constitutionally, historically, actually and continuously” for over 800 years, and only the MOC had the “historical, religious, moral and substantive right” to use it. In this connection the court held that the legal status, name and official insignia of the MOC were safeguarded by the 2007 Act and the Constitution. That the applicant’s intended name implied that it was under the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign church was in contravention of the 2007 Act and other laws. It was so because the MOC had canonical jurisdiction in the territory of the respondent State. It was only formally indicated that the applicant association would operate as an autonomous church. If registration was granted “it would operate in the territory of the respondent State as part of a foreign orthodox church ... it would operate and be managed autonomously within the canonical jurisdiction of the Peć Patriarchy, notably (the SOC) ... which had no canonical or any other jurisdiction over (the MOC) or in the territory of (the respondent State).” That was in violation of Article 1 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, Article 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the Convention;\n(d)  the founding decision had specified only the temporary place of registration of the applicant association, without specifying “a specific seat and address” (точно одредено седиште и адреса), as required under section 13 § 1 (2) of the 2007 Act; and\n(e)  Bishop D. was nominated to act on behalf (застапува) of the applicant association, but not to represent (претставува) it, as required under section 12 § 2 (5) of the 2007 Act. 32.  The registration court concluded that the applicant association’s registration would run counter to the 2007 Act. It further stated that:\n“(such a registration would violate) the freedom of religion ... of all physical persons, which they manifest through already registered religious communities. It would also violate the legitimate legal status of other voluntary associations of persons recorded in the court register ... their management bodies, hierarchy, competencies, titles, religious activities ...” 33.  The applicant appealed, arguing (i) that the court had erred when seeking “an expert opinion” about the meaning of “Peć Patriarchy” from the MOC, which was not neutral; (ii) that the registration of the MOC in November 2008 under the name “Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese” had been unlawful. In this connection, the applicant submitted extracts from several media reports published at the time, according to which the competent body of the MOC, at its meeting held on 4 and 5 October 2008, had refused to change the name in its Constitution; (iii) that the MOC had applied to the Bureau for registration of the name “Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese” as a trademark was irrelevant, since the Industrial Property Act concerned goods and services and not religious organisations. In this connection, the applicant argued that, in any event, the Bureau had confirmed that on 6 August 2004 the MOC had requested registration of seventeen trademarks, including the trademark “Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archdiocese”. However, the MOC had never paid the registration fee for any of the trademarks for which registration had been sought. Consequently, those names were never registered as trademarks, nor were trademark certificates ever issued; (iv) the applicant association was set up by three founding members who had signed the minutes of the constituent assembly held on 27 April 2009. Consequently, the court had been wrong to hold that the founding decision had been rendered by the applicant association’s Holy Synod, as that body had no legal capacity to act before the applicant association was registered; (v) no reasonable explanation had been given as to why the applicant association’s intended name did not imply that it concerned a religious organisation; (vi) the court’s interpretation that the expression “Greek” was an English translation of “Orthodox Church” was wrong; (vii) the intended name of the applicant association was different from the name of any registered religious organisation, including the name of the MOC to which “Ohrid Archdiocese” had been unlawfully added. In this connection the applicant stated “(it) differs from the MOC, with which we refuse to be associated.” It further submitted that the court had allowed registration of two churches despite the fact that their names were substantially the same, namely “Christian Adventist Church (church of the Adventists of the Seventh Day) in the Republic of Macedonia” and “Christian Adventist Church in Macedonia”. It concluded the discussion under this head by saying that “had the court had difficulty with the intended name, it could have raised that issue in written correspondence and we would have replied. This clearly suggests that the court would refuse to register [the applicant association] under any name”; (viii) the registration court had given unsubstantiated explanations of a theological and historical nature favourable to the MOC; (ix) the applicable legislation did not preclude a religious community from being in canonical union with other churches in the world; (x) the refusal to register the applicant association violated the freedom of religion of the orthodox Greeks and Serbs in the respondent State, as the intended name suggested that it represented those communities; and (xii) lastly, the applicant association reiterated that it was ready to rectify any error the registration court might ask it to. 34.  On 4 February 2010 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant association’s appeal, reiterating the reasoning given by the registration court. 35.  On an unspecified date thereafter, D.N. (Bishop D.) submitted a constitutional appeal to the Constitutional Court, claiming that the authorities’ refusal to register the applicant as “the Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy” had affected his religious rights specified in Articles 16 and 19 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Convention. In this connection, he claimed that the religious organisation with which he was affiliated had not been allowed registration for many years, and thus had been denied the opportunity to obtain legal-entity status. He stated “I’m prevented from exercising my freedom of religious observance in association with other people on a voluntary basis.” He further argued that without legal-entity status the applicant association was prevented from enjoying certain statutory rights: it could not construct religious temples; its members could not conduct religious ceremonies; it could not instruct religion or create religious schools; and it could not manage its property, nor could it hold bank accounts. Bishop D. invited the court to consider his appeal as submitted on behalf of all members of his religious organisation. Since the Constitutional Court had already rejected a similar appeal lodged on behalf of several people (U.br.182/09, see paragraph 55 below), he consented that his appeal be regarded as being submitted only in his name. He further stated:\n“I agree, and after having consulted the other members of my religious community, I know that they also agree, that the Constitutional Court orders registration of the Greek Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy under conditions specified by law and we would adjust to any requirements set by the court. If a change in the name is needed, that should be indicated as a condition for our registration and once it is satisfied, (we) should be registered. If another condition should be fulfilled, that should be specified and we will try to accommodate it.” 36.  On 15 December 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the constitutional appeal of D.N. concerning “the freedom of belief and prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds” (U.br.118/10). Referring to the courts’ decisions rejecting the applicant association’s request for registration as “Greek-Orthodox Ohrid Archdiocese of the Peć Patriarchy” and relying on Articles 9, 16 and 19 of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Convention, the court stated:\n“The court cannot examine the appeal on the merits since the complainant did not comply with the formal statutory requirements before a competent court (for registration of the applicant). The complainant is willing to comply with the statutory requirements for registration, but he has failed to do so in practice and (he) does not prove that the competent court was wrong in its judgment that those requirements had not been complied with ... in such circumstances, this court cannot rule on the request for the protection of human rights and freedoms in relation to specific final decisions of competent bodies. It is so since the person concerned (субјектот) did not take any action in the court proceedings to comply with the statutory requirements, which apply similarly to all citizens. This derives from his request that this court suggest to him what needs to be done for (the applicant association) to be registered, which implies knowledge that there were (certain) flaws which led to non-registration. The complainant was not a priori refused registration of his religious community by a final judicial decision. The refusal he received was for non-compliance with the statutory requirements.” 37.  An article published in the daily newspaper Dnevnik on 26 September 2002 quoted the then Chairman of the Commission (see paragraph 10 above), who stated that:\n“not at any price will Bishop Jovan (Vraniskoski) be allowed to perform religious rituals or to have a seat in an exarchate.” 38.  An article published in the daily newspaper Vest on 8 April 2004 quoted the following part of a joint statement by the then President of the respondent State and the Archbishop of the MOC:\n“The MOC and the Macedonian State are and will remain together. Schismatics and renegades should be marginalised, isolated and rejected. The media attention they receive, irrespective of motives and intentions, affects both the MOC and Macedonian national and State interests.” 39.  An article published in the daily newspaper Večer on 23 November 2006 reported on discussions held between the Prime Minister of the respondent State and the Archbishop of the MOC regarding certain provisions of the 2007 Act. Following that discussion, the majority of bishops in the MOC, as stated in the article, had requested that the MOC should not accept any compromise which would prevent it from protecting itself against a parallel church, led by Mr Vraniškovski, being created. 40.  An article published in the daily newspaper Večer on 2 June 2009 reported on the alleged discontent of the applicant’s followers about its name as submitted in the second registration proceedings. In this connection the article quoted a letter by Mr Vraniškovski in which he allegedly stated:\n“The (Holy) Synod was governed by the idea that the name of the religious community in respect of which we seek registration does not betray the essence of our Church. You know well that Greek-Orthodox does not mean Greek (by nationality) of Orthodox faith, but that name refers to all known Christian Orthodox Churches.” 41.  The article continued, stating that Mr Vraniškovski had further asserted that the second part of the name was reasonable because the “Ohrid Orthodox Archdiocese” was a part of the Peć Patriarchy.", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant company is registered in Vilnius. 6.  It provides heating, cooling, ventilation and air conditioning equipment in Lithuania. 7.  In 2013 the Vilnius territorial customs office (hereinafter “the customs office”) carried out an audit of the applicant company’s accounting data, related to goods imported between 1 July 2009 and 31 August 2012. During that period the applicant company bought some goods and declared them as air conditioning equipment, comprising of one unit and its parts. The goods were bought from a company registered in the United States of America (hereinafter “the seller company”) but the applicant company claimed that it had not concluded purchase agreements with that company and that the goods had been bought on the basis of an order. In April 2013 the customs office found that in twenty‑three import declarations the value of the goods had been three to four times lower than the value of similar goods declared by other importers. In addition, invoices provided by the applicant company had not contained any information on payment for the goods. Moreover, the customs office stated that the applicant company and seller company were related because two of the latter’s logistics managers were also employed by the applicant company. As a result, the applicant company was ordered to pay 618,083 euros (EUR) in total as customs tax, value added tax, late payment interest and a fine. 8.  The applicant company complained about the customs office’s report to the Customs Department. In June 2014 the latter annulled part of the report and ordered the customs office to carry out an additional investigation. The Customs Department held that the customs office had not precisely indicated which legal provisions had not been complied with by the evidence or facts the applicant company had provided. Furthermore, it was not clear which of the grounds specified in Article 143 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the implementation of the Community Customs Code (hereinafter “Regulation No. 2454/93”) (see paragraph 25 below) the customs office had been referring to when stating that the applicant company and seller company were related. Moreover, the mere fact that the buyer and seller companies were related and the declared value of goods was small was not enough to warrant a recalculation of the import taxes. 9.  In December 2013 the customs office carried out an additional investigation. It held that in the absence of any evidence that could prove that employees of the applicant company were not related to the American company, it had to conclude that the buyer and seller were related. The customs office also refused to approve twenty‑three import declarations provided by the applicant company and calculated the value of the imported goods in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/1992 of 12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs Code (hereinafter “the Community Customs Code”). The customs office ordered the applicant company to pay 173,005 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately EUR 50,106) in customs tax, LTL 1,457,978 (approximately EUR 422,260) in value added tax, LTL 437,675 (approximately EUR 126,759) in late payment interest and a fine of LTL 163,098 (approximately EUR 47,236), the total amount being EUR 646,361. 10.  The applicant company complained about the report drawn up during the additional investigation to the Customs Department with a request for it to be annulled. The applicant company claimed that the refusal of the customs office to approve the value of the goods provided by it in accordance with the transaction value method was unfounded, as was the conclusion that the applicant company and seller company were related. Moreover, the applicant company disagreed with the late payment interest because it had increased due to the protractedness of the investigation of the customs office. 11.  In March 2014 the Customs Department approved the customs office’s report of December 2013 (see paragraph 9 above) and dismissed the applicant company’s complaint. 12.  The applicant company appealed against that decision to the Tax Disputes Commission, providing documents from the seller company proving that none of its employees were also employed by the applicant company. In July 2014 the Tax Disputes Commission held that because the applicant company had provided incomplete data, it had been unable to determine the exact circumstances of the purchase agreement concluded with the seller company. Nevertheless, the Tax Disputes Commission decided to exempt the applicant company from paying LTL 27,118.40 (approximately EUR 7,854) of late payment interest. 13.  The applicant company complained to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. It claimed that it was not clear from the customs office’s report of December 2013 on which of the grounds specified in Article 143 of Regulation No. 2454/93 (see paragraph 25 below) the customs office had been relying when stating that the applicant company and seller company were related. The mere fact that the applicant company and seller company had been involved in the purchase agreements was not sufficient to conclude that they were business partners. The applicant company also argued that the customs office had refused to apply the transaction value method without providing any reasons. During the hearing, the applicant company asked the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter “CJEU”). 14.  On 22 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant company’s complaint as unfounded. It held that there was enough information to adopt a decision in the case and that no question as to the interpretation of European Union customs law had arisen (teismas pažymi, kad byloje yra pakankamai duomenų sprendimo priėmimui, teismui jokių papildomų klausimų teisės aiškinimo klausimais nekilo, todėl nėra pagrindo kreiptis į Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismą). 15.  The applicant company appealed against that decision. It stated that the first‑instance court had misinterpreted the provisions of the Community Customs Code and Regulation No. 2454/93. Moreover, the decision of the first‑instance court had lacked reasoning. The applicant company submitted that an interpretation of certain provisions of European Union law was necessary because the case-law of the CJEU regarding the application of Articles 29‑31 of the Community Customs Code was inconsistent. According to the applicant company, it was necessary to refer the following questions to the CJEU:\n- (1) Whether the conditions specified in Article 29 § 1 (b) of the Community Customs Code, which influence the sale and price of the goods and whose effect cannot be assessed, include cases such as the one at hand, where at the time of presentation of the goods to customs and the assessment of those goods a debt of buyer to seller exists? If the debt does not have any effect on the sale or price of the goods, is it included in the transaction value defined in Article 29 § 1 (b) of the Community Customs Code?\n- (2) Can the difference between the price of imported goods and the list of comparative prices collected by customs be independent grounds not to apply the transaction value method, and is this difference considered a circumstance whose effect on the sale or price of goods cannot be assessed, within the meaning of Article 29 § 1 (b) of the Community Customs Code?\n- (3) If the seller authorises the buyer’s employees to perform certain actions related to the transportation and the customs procedures of the goods, can this be considered a relationship between buyer and seller, within the meaning of Article 29 § 1 (d) of the Community Customs Code, and can it be grounds not to apply the transaction value method?\n- (4) Can a national customs office rely on Article 31 § 1 of the Community Customs Code independently, without applying the methods set out in Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code? If the national customs office has to rely on one of the methods set out in Articles 29 and 30 of the Community Customs Code, comparative data relating to which period is considered relevant? Does the use of the only case of export as a comparative correspond to the criterion of “at the same time or almost at the same time” when applying it to establish the value of goods declared within a period of three years? Can cases of export from other States (for example, Malaysia) be assessed and can this data be considered comparative? Does the national customs office have to rely on the data collected by it and involving cases of export to Lithuania only or does it have to send other member States a request of information?\n- (5) Is the provision of domestic law that the customs office use data existing in the Customs Department database when applying the transaction value method of similar and identical goods in accordance with Article 31 § 1 of the Community Customs Code, which provides that where the customs value of imported goods cannot be determined under Articles 29 or 30, it must be determined on the basis of data available in the Community?\n- (6) Can the transaction value of similar goods be compared by comparing not the transaction value of similar goods but the price of one kilogram, which is determined by dividing the transaction value existing in the national customs database by the amount of kilograms? 16.  On 22 March 2016 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first‑instance decision. The court referred to the case‑law of the Court that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention could not be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. The extent to which this duty to give reasons applied could vary according to the nature of the decision. Moreover, it was necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the submissions that a litigant could bring before the courts and the differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and the presentation and drafting of judgments. This was why the question of whether a court had failed to fulfil the obligation to state reasons, deriving from Article 6 of the Convention, could only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case. The Supreme Administrative Court relied on the following authorities: Hiro Balani v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 27, Series A no. 303‑B; Ruiz Torija v. Spain, 9 December 1994, § 29, Series A no. 303‑A; and Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, § 34, 1 July 2003, Series A no. 303‑A. It held that the first‑instance decision had been adequately reasoned. It was established in domestic case‑law that the court could refer the issue to the competent judicial institution of the European Union (see paragraph 18 below). However, the Supreme Administrative Court stated that the request of a party to the proceedings to refer a certain question to the judicial institution of the European Union was not obligatory if the application of European Union law was so obvious that no doubts could arise (bylos šalies prašymas teismui nėra privalomas ir jei Europos Sąjungos teisės taikymas yra toks akivaizdus, kad dėl pateikto klausimo sprendimo negali kilti jokių pagrįstų abejonių, galutinės instancijos nacionalinis teismas neprivalo kreiptis į Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismą su prejudiciniu klausimu). Also, the mere fact that a party to the proceedings did not agree with the interpretation of the law provided by the first‑instance court did not mean that the substance of the European Union law was not clear and that there was a necessity to refer the question to the CJEU (Pastebėtina, kad vien faktinė aplinkybė, jog ginčo šalis nesutinka su pirmosios instancijos teismo pateiktu teisės aiškinimu, savaime nereiškia, jog nėra aiškus Europos Sąjungos teisės turinys, ir, atitinkamai, kad yra pagrindas kreiptis į ESTT prejudicinio sprendimo). The Supreme Administrative Court also held that the application of European Union law was clear enough in the present case and that there was no need to refer a question to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling (Šio ginčo apimtyje teismui nekyla neaiškumų dėl Bendrijos muitinės kodekso 29-31 straipsnių taikymo, todėl pareiškėjo prašymas kreiptis į Europos Sąjungos Teisingumo Teismą su prejudiciniu klausimu netenkintinas). It quoted another of its cases regarding the interpretation of certain provisions of a directive regulating markets in financial instruments, where it held that the applicant company in that case had failed to indicate specific uncertainties as to the interpretation of that directive and had not indicated why the referral to the CJEU was necessary (case no. A858-48/2011 of 14 April 2011). 17.  In April 2017 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed a request lodged by the applicant company to reopen the proceedings.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Novyy, Tatarstan Republic, Russia. 6.  The domestic authorities opened a criminal investigation in relation to the murder of G. committed on 7 September 2002. The applicant’s husband, Zhavdet Khayrullin, was identified in the course of the investigation as a possible eyewitness. A certain Mr V. was a suspect. 7.  On 13 September 2002 the applicant’s husband was taken to Tukayevskiy police station. The exact timing of this, various other circumstances, and the legal grounds and reasons for his detention were the subject of conflicting accounts at domestic level (see, for instance, paragraphs 8 and 23 below). 8.  It is apparent from a copy of the police logbook submitted by the applicant that her late husband was taken to the police station by officers Ag. and Na. at around 1 p.m., according to the record, for the purpose of verifying his identity; this verification was completed and he was released at 1.30 p.m. It is also apparent from the evidential material that between 4.15 and 4.45 p.m. the applicant’s husband was in an office, apparently on the fifth floor, where he was interviewed by investigator R. According to the material in the case file record, the applicant’s husband stated during the interview that he and V. had left the house of victim G. after drinking vodka together. Subsequent to this interview, for unspecified reasons the applicant’s husband was interviewed again, this time by field officer (оперуполномоченный) Kh., and made a written statement affirming that V. had punched G. during a quarrel. It appears that the applicant’s husband was thereupon required to come for another interview on 14 September 2002. 9.  On the same date, 13 September 2002, V. was taken to the police station and made a spontaneous confession regarding the murder. According to the applicant, V. heard the applicant’s husband screaming (allegedly in pain) in the neighbouring room during the evening of 13 September 2002 (however, for V.’s amended statement in 2010, see paragraph 38 below). 10.  According to the applicant, V. had been beaten up and ill-treated whilst at the police station, in particular by suffocation inflicted through the application of a gas mask. 11.  According to the authorities, the applicant’s husband left Kh.’s office at 8 p.m. and attempted to commit suicide on a balcony located on the fifth floor of the police station. The same evening he was found unconscious and was admitted to hospital. 12.  On an unspecified date a pre-investigation inquiry was opened in relation to the above events (see also paragraph 16 below), apparently within the framework of the investigation into G.’s murder (see paragraph 6 above). According to the applicant, during this inquiry investigative measures were carried out by unspecified officers from Tukayevskiy police station. 13.  Officer Kh. stated during the inquiry that he had collected a statement from the applicant’s husband and had seen him leave his office at 8 p.m. Soon thereafter Kh. had left for home. 14.  Ga., the deputy chief officer of the police station, stated that after hearing some noise and seeing officers on the fifth floor balcony, he had gone there and had seen Officers F., Va. and Kha. providing medical assistance to an unconscious man. 15.  It also appears that Gar., another deputy chief officer, carried out an internal inquiry and concluded that no official had committed any offence. 16.  On 21 September 2002, referring to the ongoing murder investigation into G.’s death (see paragraph 6 above), an assistant to the district prosecutor issued a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against any officers on account of Mr Khayrullin’s attempted suicide or incitement to suicide. Having summarised the above testimonies and referring to the conclusions of the internal inquiry, the assistant to the prosecutor concluded that no criminal offence had been committed. 17.  This decision was annulled by the higher prosecutor and the inquiry was reassigned to another investigator. 18.  On 13 December 2002 the applicant’s husband died, apparently without ever regaining consciousness. On the same day the investigator commissioned a forensic medical examination of the victim’s body. The expert was asked to clarify the cause of death, to identify any injuries and to specify their origin, in particular whether they had been sustained before death and whether they were linked to his subsequent death, and whether the victim could have continued to be active after the injuries. 19.  According to the autopsy report issued on 17 January 2003, the victim died of asphyxia resulting from strangulation. 20.  On 3 February 2003 the district prosecutor issued an order for the opening of a criminal investigation into an offence under Article 286 § 3 of the Criminal Code (actions committed by a public official manifestly outside the scope of his powers, causing significant damage to a person’s rights and freedoms, and entailing serious consequences). In his order the prosecutor stated, inter alia, that “acting manifestly beyond the scope of their powers, unspecified officers unlawfully placed [the victim] in an interrogation room”. The criminal investigation was opened against unspecified officers, and was then assigned to investigator R. 21.  The investigator interviewed paramedic A., who stated that upon arrival at the police station he and his colleagues had been taken to a detention cell; one of the officers explained to him that during a routine check of cells they had had difficulty opening the door of one of the cells and had discovered that it was blocked by the body of an unconscious detainee with a jacket tied around his neck; he had not seen any injuries on the visible part of the body, only on the neck. A similar statement was made by paramedics Zh. and Gi. A reanimation medical professional B. stated that the victim had had no other visible injuries. 22.  The investigator also questioned the victim’s son. The latter had received a telephone call from the victim on the evening of 13 September 2002 in which his father had told him that he was to be interviewed and would be let go next morning. On arriving at the police station the next day, he had been told that his father would be released in the afternoon. 23.  Field officers Na. and Ag. told the investigator that, while on patrol checking permits for firearms, they had spotted the applicant’s husband, who had looked suspicious. They had therefore taken him to the police station to check his identity; having checked it, this person had been allowed to leave the police station. 24.  According to Officer F., the victim was found sitting on the floor with his back against the balcony bars, with one part of his jacket tied around his neck and the other attached to the balcony bars. 25.  On 3 May 2003 investigator R. issued a decision discontinuing the criminal investigation for absence of any criminal event, while noting that “unidentified officers from the police station had manifestly exceeded their powers when placing [the victim] in an investigation room”. Having listed the summaries of various testimonies mentioned above, the investigator concluded that the victim had attempted suicide. 26.  On 20 June 2003 the district prosecutor ordered that the investigation was to be continued in order to examine the instructions relating to the placement of detainees in designated rooms or cells, to determine who exactly had placed the victim in the cell or investigation room, and who had opened the doors. It was also to deal with contradictory statements made by the officers Na. and Ag., on one hand, and by other officers and the victim’s relatives on the other. It was also to properly examine the testimonies given by the paramedics, in particular as regards the place where the victim had been discovered. 27.  It appears that the criminal investigation was reassigned to another investigator, I., who suspended it on 20 July 2003. On 22 July 2003 the regional deputy prosecutor issued an order requesting further investigation and on 23 July 2003 the acting district prosecutor quashed the suspension and ordered the investigation to be continued. 28.  On 23 August 2003 investigator R. issued a decision discontinuing the criminal investigation in terms that were similar to the decision of 3 May 2003. On 12 September 2003 the district prosecutor stated that the requirements made on 22 July 2003 had not been complied with, and that the investigation must be continued. 29.  On 12 October 2003 investigator I. issued a decision to discontinue the criminal investigation. 30.  On 10 November 2003 the deputy regional prosecutor quashed this decision, finding that (i) it remained necessary to interview officer F. again and to give a more detailed assessment of the circumstances in which the victim’s body had been discovered by this officer. In particular, it was important to clarify whether the officer had seen the victim in the state of strangulation, what was the body’s position, where the “noose” had been and who had removed it, and (ii) it was necessary to interview V. who allegedly heard the victim screaming, to interview the victim’s next of kin in relation to the circumstances in which the victim had been apprehended and taken to the police station, and in particular to interview the victim’s wife, who had allegedly seen signs of bleeding around the victim’s wrists resulting from the use of handcuffs. 31.  A fresh discontinuation decision was issued by the investigator on 10 December 2003. 32.  This decision was subsequently quashed and other similar decisions were issued and quashed on several occasions. For instance, on 10 December 2008 an investigator issued a decision to discontinue the criminal case, concluding that the applicant’s husband had attempted to commit suicide. 33.  On an unspecified date, the investigating officer asked expert Va., who had issued the report of 17 January 2003 (see paragraph 19 above) to express his opinion. Expert Va. stated that the constriction mark on the victim’s neck could have been caused by soft pressure such a fabric jacket. Various types of mechanical asphyxia such as hanging or asphyxia in an enclosed space (by way of placing a gas mask a person’s head) entail the same pathological process arising from a sudden insufficiency of oxygen inflow into blood and tissues. 34.  On 28 January 2010 the investigator issued a decision to discontinue the criminal case because of the absence of a criminal event. 35.  The applicant sought judicial review of the discontinuation decision. On 10 June 2010 the Tukayevskiy District Court of the Tatarstan Republic allowed her complaint. On 10 June 2010 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 36.  On 25 August 2010 the decision of 28 January 2010 was revoked and the investigation was resumed. 37.  A new refusal was issued on 25 September 2010. It was quashed on 1 November 2010 because the circumstances in which the victim had been taken to the police station and possible reasons leading to the attempted suicide had not been clarified. 38.  On 23 November 2010 the most recent discontinuation decision was issued, which read as follows:\n“On 13 September 2002 Khayrullin was taken to the police station for questioning as a witness. During an interview he stated that he and V. had gone to G.’s home, where they had consumed vodka and had then left.\nKhayrullin was then interviewed by field officer Kh. and stated that V. had struck several blows to G.’s face and had then run away. Khayrullin was required to attend a further interview and then left room no. 514 ...\nIt is apparent from the report of the medical expert that Khayrullin’s death was caused by a post-strangulation condition which had been caused by the squeezing of the neck by some kind of noose; this condition had been aggravated by an impact adversely affecting brain function. The medical documents show no indication of any bodily injuries when he was admitted to the hospital.\nParamedics A., Zh. and Gi. stated during their interviews that no bodily injuries (except for a faint, non-continuous strangulation mark on his neck) had been identified on the victim’s body when they attended to him in the police station.\nOfficer F. stated during his interview that around 11 p.m. on 13 September 2002 he had gone out to the balcony on the fifth floor for a smoke and had seen the victim sitting on the floor with his back to the railing; his neck had been encircled by a jacket, with a part of it being fixed to the railing. He had detached the jacket and had started to provide first aid to the victim. He had also alerted the duty-officers of the police station and had then helped to take the victim to the first floor. The victim had then been examined by a medical professional before being taken to hospital.\nAn investigative re-enactment was carried out on the basis of the above information. Medical expert Va. was interviewed in this connection and confirmed that it would have been possible for the hanging and the strangulation marks to have been created in the circumstances described by F.\nInterviews were carried out with those police officers at the police station who had talked to the victim on 13 September 2002. They stated that ... the victim had been interviewed by the investigator; no questioning had been carried out prior to that ...\nAccording to the expert reports and Va.’s statement during an interview, the strangulation mark could have been caused by the pressure of a soft “noose” such as might be left, for instance, by a jacket. Moreover, for other types of mechanical asphyxia, including hanging or asphyxia in a limited space (as by means of applying a gas mask) the same life-threatening pathological process occurs, which is caused by a sudden insufficiency of oxygen in the blood and tissues ...\nMrs Khayrullina stated that at 8 p.m. on 13 September 2002 she had received a telephone call from her husband who told her he would come home. His voice had been calm and cheerful.\nMr V. stated that around 8 p.m. he had been kept in one of the rooms on the fifth floor; he had heard the victim in a neighbouring room speaking indistinctly; there had been no screaming or any suspicious noise ...\nIn view of the above, all possible investigative measures have been completed ...\nIt is not possible to carry out expert examination of samples collected from the balcony or the jacket because [they] were lost ...\nAccording to an additional medical report by an expert, a strangulation mark is produced by the pressure of some kind of “noose” on the neck; one can speak about the pressure by a soft “noose”, for instance made by a jacket such as the one given to the expert; in normal circumstances a gas mask the size of a person’s head would not exert excessive pressure on the neck and would not leave a strangulation mark ...\nAccording to a further expert report dated 13 September 2010, the absence of macroscopic indications of mechanical asphyxiation in the available material means the cause of death cannot be determined, in particular whether it could have resulted from asphyxia following a hanging or the blocking of the airflow by an object ...\nFurthermore, there were four forensic reports dated 14 December 2002, 17 January 2003, 4 December 2003 and 5 December 2004. None of them indicated any other bodily injuries.\nThere is thus insufficient evidence to consider that any official of the police station abused his or her power or acted in a manner pushing the victim to attempt suicide.\nThe available medical documents do not specify whether the victim had any bodily injuries when admitted for treatment to the hospital.” 39.  The applicant brought civil proceedings claiming 1,500,000 Russian roubles (RUB) by way of compensation in connection with the unlawful arrest and detention of her late husband in the police station and his subsequent death following his ill-treatment at the police station. 40.  By a judgment of 5 December 2008 the Novo-Savinovskiy District Court of Kazan awarded her RUB 250,000 (equivalent to 7,066 euros (EUR) at the material time) against the Federal Ministry of Finance. Retracing the procedural history of the pre-investigation inquiry and the criminal investigation, the court held as follows:\n“The court has established that Mr Khayrullin’s body was discovered at the police station after he had been taken there for questioning as a witness and that he had been unlawfully placed in an investigation room of the police station. The above has been confirmed by the investigating authority. As noted in the decision of 13 September 2002, unspecified officials of the police station had acted manifestly outside their powers when placing Mr Khayrullin in an investigation room.\nOn the same day Mr Khayrillin attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself in the investigation room.\nIn contrast to this finding, according to the decision of 10 December 2002 setting aside the refusal to prosecute, it was noted that the victim had been discovered on the balcony on the fifth floor. Neither of the above decisions contains any explanation about the change in the circumstances in which the victim had been discovered ... At the same time, the refusal to prosecute dated 10 December 2003 clearly indicates as an established fact that Mr Khayrullin had attempted suicide at the balcony of the fifth floor ...\nIt is apparent from the available material that a criminal investigation was opened under Article 286 of the Criminal Code in respect of unidentified officials; this legal classification has not been changed since 2002; the investigation is ongoing.\nSince the investigation is ongoing, this court − dealing with a civil case as it is − has no competence to question whether the legal classification is appropriate or whether there is a corpus delicti. However, this court finds it established that the damage to Mr Khayrullin’s health was caused on the premises of the police station.\nThis conclusion is based on the facts established in the present case, irrespective of the prosecutor’s office’s findings regarding the place where the body was discovered; the circumstances relating to his presence in the police station (that is his being taken there for questioning as a witness) remain unchanged ...\nThe court therefore finds it established that on 13 September 2002 Mr Khayrullin sustained injuries in the police station, entailing his death ...\nThe court considers that the grave consequences (Mr Khayrullin’s death) ensued as a result of unlawful actions on the part of public officials at the police station ...\nAs stated by the European Court in the case of Sheydayev v. Russia (application no. 65859/01, 7 December 2006), the national authorities are responsible for ensuring the physical inviolability of detained persons. Where a person was placed in custody in good health and had injuries when released, the national authorities must provide a plausible explanation for the injuries ...\nThe court accepts the claimant’s argument that the harm was caused by unlawful actions on the part of public officials at the police station ... Thus, the court finds it appropriate to grant the claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage ...\nThe matters relating to the unlawful arrest and the ineffective investigation cannot form a basis for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage ... The court has not established that the mere arrest of Mr Khayrullin on 13 September 2002 entailed a violation of the claimant’s non-material rights or interests; any eventual violation might relate to Mr Khayrullin ...\nThe court considers that the suspension and resumption of the criminal investigation are legitimate procedural actions and thus, even if multiple, do not entail a conclusion of unlawfulness on the part of public officials ... The prosecution period for the offence under Article 286 of the Criminal Code has not yet expired. The court dismisses the claimant’s argument that non-pecuniary damage was caused by the ineffective investigation ...” 41.  The Ministry of Finance and the applicant appealed. The applicant argued that the first-instance judgment’s conclusion regarding her standing to seek compensation in relation to Mr Khayrullin’s arrest contradicted the Court’s case-law (Imakayeva v. Russia, no. 7615/02, ECHR 2006‑XIII (extracts), and Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v. Russia, no. 40464/02, 10 May 2007). It was acceptable for the next of kin of a deceased person to lodge a complaint under Article 5 of the Convention about that person’s deprivation of liberty; the Court has awarded next of kin just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained in relation to such deprivation of liberty. Moreover, it was open to next of kin to lodge a complaint under Article 3 of the Convention on the basis of their own suffering in relation to events relating to a relative who had died or disappeared in suspicious circumstances engaging the responsibility of the State. The applicant also argued that the award of RUB 250,000 was manifestly insufficient in view of the first-instance court’s findings relating to the responsibility of public officials in relation to Mr Khayrullin’s death. At the same time, the trial court did not adduce sufficient reasons for dismissing her monetary claim in relation to her argument about the ineffective investigation into her late husband’s death. 42.  On 22 January 2009 the Supreme Court of the Tatarstan Republic upheld the judgment. The appellate court held as follows:\n“When granting the claims in relation to the injuries sustained by the victim, the trial court rightly proceeded from the understanding that the injuries had been sustained in the police station on 13 September 2002 because the case file materials confirmed that public officials had committed actions exceeding their powers ...\nThus, as a result of actions on the part of public officials, the claimant had sustained psychological suffering on account of the death of a person close to her ...\nWhen dismissing the remainder of the claim, the trial court rightly proceeded from the understanding that there was no evidence that the claimant had sustained psychological suffering on account of the ineffective investigation ... The investigation is ongoing; at present there is no criminal court judgment in respect of the officials at the police station. Moreover, their actions in relation to the arrest of the victim did not in any event impinge upon the claimant’s non-material rights or interests.” 43.  The applicant received the judicial award on 20 April 2009.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Morozivka. 5.  On 20 September 2007 the applicant, who was head of the Brusyliv District State Administration of Zhytomyr Region at the time, was arrested on charges of bribery. 6.  On 21 September 2007 the investigator applied to the court for the applicant’s pre-trial detention as a preventive measure pending trial. The application indicated that the applicant had been accused with a serious crime punished up to twelve years’ imprisonment, and that he could try to abscond from justice, obstruct the investigation, and continue his criminal activities. On the same day the Pechersk District Court of Kyiv ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The court reiterated the reasons mentioned in the investigator’s application without providing further details in that regard. 7.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation the applicant’s detention was extended a number of times, including on 15 November 2007, 17 January 2008 and 19 March 2008. The reasons for extending the applicant’s detention were the need to take additional investigative and procedural steps and the fact that there were no grounds to change the preventive measure. No further details were provided in that regard. 8.  On 19 May, 17 June, 26 June, 29 July and 7 August 2008 the courts further extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention, basing their decisions, in addition to the previously mentioned grounds (see paragraph 7 above), on the need for him to familiarise himself with the case file. 9.  In the course of reviewing the extension of his detention on 24 September 2007, 8 January, 19 March and 7 August 2008, the applicant raised objections arguing, in particular, that his state of health had been unsatisfactory, that he had a stable family relationship, and that he had not absconded from justice. It appears from the relevant decisions that his arguments were not addressed by the courts. 10.  On 3 October 2008 the Malyn District Court of Zhytomyr Region (“the trial court”) committed the applicant for trial. The trial court maintained the custodial preventive measure, providing no reasons for that decision and setting no time-limit. 11.  In the course of the trial the applicant applied eleven times to change the preventive measure to a non-custodial one. He stated that his state of health had been unsatisfactory, that his relatives were ready to make the necessary payment of bail, and that a number of individuals, including a member of parliament and State officials, had provided personal guarantees securing his presence during the trial. The trial court rejected those requests, giving similar reasons to those given at the initial stage (see paragraph 6 above). The court further stated that the applicant had been provided with the necessary medical treatment in detention and that his state of health did not warrant his release. 12.  On 16 July 2010 the court found the applicant guilty of bribery and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment, confiscated half of his property and banned him from occupying posts in State bodies and local authorities for three years. On 1 December 2010 and 19 May 2011 respectively the Zhytomyr Regional Court of Appeal and the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters upheld that judgment with minor amendments. 13.  According to the material in the case file, the applicant has suffered from varicose dilatation (варикозне розширення вен) since 1980. According to the Government, the applicant was diagnosed with varicose dilatation of the lower limbs as early as in 1984. 14.  On 18 October 2007 the applicant was placed in the Kyiv pre-trial detention centre (“the SIZO”). In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant was transferred between different detention facilities. 15.  It was concluded in a forensic examination carried out on 16 January 2008 at the request of the investigator that the applicant had a number of endocrine, heart, venous, neurologic, and digestive conditions. In particular, he was diagnosed with varicose dilatation of the lower limbs and chronic venous insufficiency of the lower limbs with trophic disorders. The forensic experts concluded that the applicant required elective surgery in respect of the varicose dilatation, and outpatient treatment in respect of the other conditions. 16.  Overall, in the course of his detention the applicant was recommended surgery six times in respect of the varicose dilatation, on 16 January 2008, 5 May 2008, 23 October 2008, 18 March 2009, 22 July 2009 and 18 March 2010. 17.  On 8 April 2009 the applicant was recognised as falling into the “third category” (the mildest category) of disability (третя група інвалідності). 18.  On 22 April 2009 the SIZO informed the applicant’s lawyer that he had been diagnosed with varicose dilatation of the lower limbs, third degree chronic venous insufficiency of the lower left limb, second degree chronic venous insufficiency of the lower right limb, hypothalamic dysfunction, impaired glucose tolerance, first degree diffuse non-toxic goiter (an enlarged thyroid) and a chronic trophic ulcer on the left shin. It was specified that the recommended surgical treatment in respect of the varicose dilatation was not available in the SIZO. 19.  On 12 October and 19 November 2009 the SIZO issued another reply to the applicant’s lawyer, stating that it had been recommended that the applicant undergo surgical treatment in respect of his progressing varicose dilatation. This type of treatment could not be carried out within the SIZO, and its medical staff were not in a position to foresee the consequences of the refusal to provide him with surgical treatment. 20.  On 15 February 2013 the applicant consulted a specialist in therapeutics, who recommended that he undergo further examination and treatment at a medical facility within the penal system. On 18 February 2013 the applicant refused that offer, insisting that he needed highly qualified medical assistance in specialist civilian medical institutions. 21.  There is no information in the case file regarding whether the applicant received any medical care after the above-mentioned refusal. 22.  On 18 November 2013 the applicant was dispensed from serving the remainder of his sentence pursuant to a decision of the local court of 8 November 2013 altering his imprisonment to correctional labour. 23.  On 28 November 2013 the applicant underwent surgery on his lower limbs. 24.  On 20 January 2014 he was recognised as falling into the “second category” (more advanced category) of disability (друга група інвалідності). 25.  According to the available information, from November 2007 to February 2013 the applicant consulted a surgeon thirteen times in respect of the varicose dilatation. Outpatient medical treatment was prescribed to him. From 21 March to 5 May and from 23 October to 17 November 2008 he underwent outpatient medical treatment both within the SIZO and at a civilian hospital.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Nova Pazova. 6.  From 1991 until 2001 the applicant lived with M.K. The couple had two children, a daughter, J.G., born on 20 January 1992 and a son, M.G., born on 28 July 1994. 7.  M.G. has a moderate intellectual disability. 8.  By a decision of the Stara Pazova Social Care Centre (“the Social Care Centre”) of 9 January 2001, custody of the children was given to M.K. By the same decision the applicant was given contact with the children every other weekend from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday and during the first half of the summer and winter school holidays. The decision provided that the applicant had to collect and return the children outside M.K.’s family home. 9.  On 30 June 2005 the Social Care Centre suspended the enforcement of the decision of 9 January 2001 at the applicant’s request, as he intended to assert his parental rights in judicial proceedings. 10.  On 11 August 2005 the applicant applied to the Stara Pazova Municipal Court for sole custody of the children. 11.  On 27 December 2005 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court issued an interim contact order giving the applicant contact with the children every other weekend from 6 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday and during the first half of the summer and winter school holidays. The order was to remain in force until the final resolution of the custody proceedings. 12.  On 2 February 2006 the interim contact order was upheld by the Sremska Mitrovica District Court (“the District Court”). 13.  On 11 September 2008 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court decided that the applicant’s civil claim had to be considered withdrawn because neither he nor M.K. had given valid reasons for their failure to attend the main hearing that day. On 11 December 2008 the District Court upheld that decision. 14.  On 17 October 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court Stara Pazova Judicial Unit (the Stara Pazova Municipal Court having ceased to exist following the 2010 judicial reform – hereinafter “the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court”) revoked the interim contact order of 27 December 2005 given that the custody proceedings had terminated on 11 December 2008. The applicant was ordered to pay 30,625 dinars (approximately 257 euros (EUR)) to M.K. in legal costs together with statutory interest. That decision became final on 10 November 2011. 15.  On 18 January 2006, at the applicant’s request, the Stara Pazova Municipal Court ordered enforcement of the interim contact order (see paragraph 11 above) by a court bailiff. The enforcement order was upheld by the District Court on 17 March 2006. 16.  On 20 January 2006 a first attempt to enforce the contact order was made. A bailiff went to M.K.’s home, but J.G. refused to see the applicant. M.G. wanted to see him, but M.K. refused to let him go without his sister. 17.  J.G. and M.G. stayed with the applicant for the weekend of 7 to 9 April 2006. 18.  In another attempt to enforce the contact order on 21 April 2006, the bailiff and the applicant went to M.K.’s home. The children’s maternal grandmother Z.K.V. told them that M.K. and the children were away. In later criminal proceedings against M.K. (see paragraph 45 below), it was established that the applicant had not been meant to have contact that weekend as it had been the third weekend in the month. 19.  On 5 May 2006 another attempt was made to enforce the interim order, but M.K. told the bailiff that the children did not want to see the applicant. 20.  On 19 May 2006, in another attempt to enforce the contact order, M.K. informed the bailiff that the children were on a school trip. The applicant, who was also present, requested the assistance of the police at the next enforcement attempt. 21.  On 2, 16 and 23 June, 14 July and 22 September 2006 other attempts to enforce the contact order were made. At every attempt J.G. refused to see the applicant and M.K. did not want to let M.G. go alone. 22.  On 5 July 2006 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court fined M.K. 5,000 dinars for non-compliance with the enforcement order of 18 January 2006 (see paragraph 15 above). 23.  On 27 October 2006 J.G. again refused to see the applicant, despite M.K.’s insistence that she should go. As before, M.K. refused to let M.G. go without his sister. 24.  On 10 November 2006 the enforcement was attempted in the presence of a police officer, the bailiff and the applicant. J.G. refused to see the applicant and M.K. refused to let M.G. go alone. 25.  On 24 November, 8 and 22 December 2006 J.G. again refused to see the applicant, and M.K. refused to let M.G. go alone. Furthermore, on the latter date M.K. threatened to press criminal charges against the bailiff and the applicant. 26.  On 4 April 2007 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court heard J.G. and M.G. in the presence of a child psychologist from the Social Care Centre. The children stated that they did not want to have contact with their father because they were afraid of him. J.G. said that the applicant had yelled at her before and that once, when they had been in a coffee bar together, he had snatched her mobile phone from her hand. Another time, when they had been playing in the swimming pool in their mother’s garden, the applicant had grabbed M.G. and taken him to a coffee bar, threatening not to return him. 27.  On 11 September 2008 the custody proceedings were terminated because the applicant and M.K. failed to attend the main hearing without valid reasons (see paragraph 13 above). 28.  On 3 February 2009 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court decided to obtain an opinion and recommendation from the Social Care Centre concerning the continuation of the enforcement proceedings and the possible harm it might have on the children’s development. 29.  In its opinion of 30 March 2009 the Social Care Centre reported that the relationship difficulties between the applicant and M.K. had persisted after their separation and had transformed into arguments over parental rights. Moreover, J.G. had developed strong resistance to her father. She was ashamed and afraid of him because of his behaviour during the time the family had lived together. In addition, M.G. did not want to see the applicant without his sister. The Social Care Centre further reported that M.K. was unable to give support to her children in order to overcome the difficulties in maintaining contact with their father. She claimed that she had not forbidden the children from having contact with him, but was unable to influence her daughter’s opinion. However, M.K. had never expressed the desire to attend counselling or any other specialist therapy, even though it had been suggested several times. 30.  In the past three years the applicant had not once seen J.G., but submitted that he had occasionally met with M.G. at his school during the recess. In such circumstances he had been unable to exercise his parental rights and had had no other way of maintaining contact with his children. The absence of contact had made it impossible for him to create a good interaction with his children. The opinion concluded that the continuation of the enforcement proceedings would put additional pressure on the children and create even greater resistance, particularly in J.G. It suggested the use of other methods provided for by law to create the conditions to enable the father to exercise his parental rights. 31.  On 14 August 2009 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court scheduled a meeting between the applicant and the children for 4 September 2009 at M.K.’s home in the presence of a bailiff and social workers. 32.  On 4 September 2009, in the presence of a psychologist and a social worker, a bailiff and the applicant, J.G. and M.G., both visibly distressed, stated that they did not want to see the applicant. 33.  On 25 February 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court (see paragraph 14 above) held a hearing at which M.K., J.G., M.G. and the applicant were heard separately. A psychologist and a social worker from the Social Care Centre were also present. The court noted that shortly before the hearing an ambulance had had to be requested for M.G., who had been displaying signs of an anxiety attack. At the hearing J.G. and M.G. stated that they did not want to have contact with their father and that he was violent towards them. J.G. said, in particular, that the relationship with her father and his attempts at maintaining contact had affected her psychologically (she was afraid to go outside the home alone at night). She said further that the applicant exerted a psychological pressure on M.G. After meeting his father M.G.’s behaviour always changed and he would say offensive things to his mother and grandmother. M.K. stated that she had not obstructed the enforcement of the contact order – the children had not wanted to see the applicant. The social worker stated that at the court’s request the Social Care Centre would submit a proposal on the possibility of maintaining contact between the applicant and M.G., who was still a minor. The applicant insisted on continuation of the enforcement. 34.  On 1 March 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court ordered the Social Care Centre to hear the applicant, M.K. and M.G. separately concerning the possibility of maintaining contact between the applicant and M.G. and to prepare an opinion on M.G.’s physical and mental health and development. In particular, the court referred to M.G.’s statements given at the hearing of 25 February 2011 (see paragraph 33 above) and the fact that he had suffered an anxiety attack before that hearing. While the applicant, as a parent, had the right to maintain contact with his child, M.G.’s wishes, needs and best interests had to be taken into account. In a situation where M.G. refused to see his father, the court considered that it was in everyone’s interests to realise the contact gradually with the assistance of the Social Care Centre until the conditions for uninterrupted enforcement of the contact order were created. 35.  On 26 May 2011 the Social Care Centre submitted its opinion to the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court. It stated that M.G. had a moderate intellectual disability and needed help with dressing, personal hygiene and feeding himself. He was very close to his mother and sister, and felt loved and accepted by them. M.K. stated that she was not preventing M.G. from seeing his father, but feared for his health. She believed that M.G. was afraid of his father because of two previous incidents. According to M.K., on one occasion the applicant had grabbed M.G. from their garden; another time he had allegedly forced open M.G.’s mouth to check his teeth. The opinion stressed, however, that according to the information submitted by M.G.’s school, he had occasionally met his father at school. The meetings had always been warm and affectionate and M.G. had never displayed any signs of fear or anxiety. According to the opinion, the applicant was very keen to maintain contact with his children and cooperate with the Social Care Centre. It was suggested that a meeting be organised between M.G. and the applicant at the Social Care Centre in the presence of the social workers. 36.  On an unspecified date thereafter, the applicant, M.K. and the social workers agreed that the meetings between the applicant and M.G. would be held every Monday at 11 a.m. M.K. was to take M.G. to the Social Care Centre. The first meeting was scheduled for 2 June 2011. 37.  On 31 May 2011 the children’s maternal grandmother Z.K.V. informed the Social Care Centre that M.G. was in Greece with his mother. 38.  A further meeting was scheduled for 13 June 2011. 39.  On 13 June 2011 the applicant met with M.G. at the Social Care Centre in the presence of the social workers. The meeting lasted one hour and passed pleasantly. M.G. talked and laughed with his father. Later that day M.K. informed the Social Care Centre that M.G. had been upset after the meeting so she had had to call an ambulance. This was confirmed by a doctor on duty at the time. 40.  The next meeting, scheduled for 20 June 2011, was cancelled because M.K. informed the Social Care Centre that she was unwell and had no one to take M.G. to the meeting. Several minutes later Z.K.V. called the Social Care Centre and was verbally aggressive towards a person dealing with the case. After being informed that the meeting had been cancelled, Z.K.V. and J.G. took M.G. to the centre and were verbally aggressive towards the social workers present. M.G. was frightened and confused. 41.  The next meeting was scheduled for 27 June 2011. There is no information in the case file as to whether or not it was held. 42.  On 28 June 2011 the Social Care Centre created a meeting schedule for July and August 2011. The applicant was to see M.G. every Monday between 11 a.m. and 12 noon at the Social Care Centre. It would appear that those meetings were held without any problems. 43.  On 15 November 2011 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court terminated the enforcement proceedings initiated on 18 January 2006 (see paragraph 15 above). The applicant was ordered to pay 28,125 dinars (approximately EUR 236) to M.K. in legal costs. 44.  On 24 December 2015 the Stara Pazova Basic Court (which had been re-established and renamed in the 2014 judicial reform; see paragraph 14 above), at M.K.’s request, ordered enforcement of the decision of 15 November 2011. In addition to the legal costs ordered by that decision, the applicant was ordered to pay enforcement costs of 10,225 dinars (approximately EUR 85), to be deducted from his disability pension. On 5 April 2016 the appeals chamber of the Stara Pazova Basic Court upheld the decision of 24 December 2015. 45.  On 12 October 2007 the Stara Pazova Municipal Court found M.K. guilty of non-compliance with the interim contact order and ordered her to pay sixty day-fines of 500 dinars (approximately EUR 6.40) each. The court held that M.K. had obstructed the enforcement of the interim contact order of 27 December 2005 by preventing M.G. from seeing his father without J.G. She had thus prevented the applicant from having contact with his son, except on one occasion when he had not had the right to visit him (see paragraph 18 above). The court considered that M.K. had not prevented J.G. from seeing the applicant and that J.G.’s resistance was due to her personal conflict with him. The applicant was instructed to submit his claim for damages in civil proceedings. 46.  On 29 July 2008 the Sremska Mitrovica District Court upheld the judgment of 12 October 2007 and it became final. 47.  On 28 March 2013 the Sremska Mitrovica Basic Court acquitted M.K. and Z.K.V. of charges of non-compliance with the interim contact order concerning the incident of 20 June 2011 (see paragraph 40 above).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and at the time of introduction of the application to the Court he was detained in Diavata Prison. 6.  The applicant is serving a life sentence for drug dealing. He was initially placed in Diavata Prison from 1 October 2014 until 24 November 2015. On that date he was transferred to Malandrino Prison, from where he was transferred back to Diavata Prison on 9 May 2016. Lastly, on 20 December 2016 he was transferred back to Malandrino Prison. 7.  The applicant alleged that he had been detained initially in cell no. B 14, which had measured 9 sq. m and had held four detainees in total. On 7 August 2016 he had been placed in cell no. GR 2 on the ground floor, which had measured 24 sq. m and had held ten detainees. In both cases, therefore, the living space afforded to him had been less than 3 sq. m. Overcrowding had exposed him to infectious diseases and he had suffered from passive smoking. In addition, detainees had had barely any space to move within their cell and their bunk beds had been low, not allowing them to sit up comfortably. 8.  Apart from the overcrowding, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had been very poor. Access to natural light and ventilation had been inadequate. Sanitary facilities and supplies had been old, broken and insufficient to ensure the detainees’ well‑being and personal hygiene. Heating had been provided only for one hour per day from 9 p.m. to 10 p.m., while hot water during winter had been provided for two hours per day and had not sufficed for all detainees. They had been forced to wash themselves using buckets of water, as the water pressure in showers had been insufficient. In each ten-person cell there had been five bunk beds, five stools, a small table and five side tables but no lockable space for personal belongings. In the four-person cell there had been two bunk beds and two stools. The mattresses had been old, mouldy and smelly, and sheets and towels had not been provided. 9.  In general, detainees had lacked access to cultural, recreational and sports activities. They had had to rely on visits from friends and family in order to obtain any newspapers or magazines, which had intensified their feeling of isolation. The hours that they had been allowed to spend in the corridors had been insufficient, taking into account that they had coincided with the meal times as well as with the times they had been allowed to receive visits or make phone calls. The yard had included a football field but no balls had been provided to the detainees and the yard had not offered any opportunities for spending time creatively. The applicant further complained of the quantity and the quality of the food, claiming that it had been repetitive and lacking any nutritional value. 10.  Lastly, the applicant submitted that the conditions of his detention had led him having several cardiac arrests. 11.  The Government, referring to a document provided by the prison authorities, submitted that Diavata Prison had a capacity of 358 detainees on the basis of allocation of 4 sq. m per detainee according to the minimum standards set by the CPT. At the time the applicant had been detained, the prison facility had exceeded its capacity by accommodating 460 to 500 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 11 on the first floor, which had measured 24 sq. m, including a toilet measuring 2 sq. m. The cell had had a capacity of ten detainees; however, following a new law in April 2015 aimed at relieving overcrowding in prisons, many detainees had been released and that had resulted in the applicant sharing the cell with four to six detainees. Therefore, the living space afforded to the applicant had ranged from 3.14 to 4.4 sq. m. 12.  As regards the rest of the applicant’s complaints, the Government argued that the prison had had a central heating system, in addition to the electric heating devices that had been provided to each cell. The cell in which the applicant had been detained had had large windows. Detainees had had access to hot water and had been provided regularly with personal hygiene products. The cells had been regularly disinfected. As regards prisoners’ meals, the Government submitted the menu of various random weeks to demonstrate that they had been comprised of a variety of food. 13.  The Government submitted the applicant’s medical file in order to prove that the applicant had already suffered from cardiac conditions when his incarceration had started. The applicant’s medical needs had been fully fulfilled during the time he had spent in Diavata Prison either by visits to the prison doctor or by his transfer to nearby hospitals. Lastly, the applicant had been granted fifteen days of leave in order to take matriculation exams.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Cork. 5.  He suffers from severe brain damage. It was asserted on his behalf that his condition was caused by the measles vaccination administered to him in 1988 when he was 15 months old. 6.  In November 2002, 14 years after receiving the vaccine, the applicant’s mother instituted proceedings on his behalf against four defendants; the local health authority, the State, the Attorney General (collectively described in the domestic proceedings as the State defendants) and the doctor who had administered the vaccination, H. 7.  On 5 August 2003, the High Court issued a limited order of discovery addressed to the local health authority seeking all relevant records about the applicant in its possession, as well as information about the vaccine used, about any adverse effects noted at the time with this vaccine, about the manner in which the mother’s consent was obtained, and about the health of the other members of the applicant’s family. Although the High Court set a time-limit of 8 weeks for discovery, the local health authority only complied with the order in June 2008, that is to say with a delay of over four and a half years. 8.  The applicant appealed the scope of the order of discovery of 5 August 2003, leading to the grant of a further limited order of discovery by the High Court on 30 January 2004, addressed to all four defendants. The applicant brought another appeal against the order of discovery of 30 January 2004, but in July 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, making only a minor amendment to the order granted by the High Court. 9.  The applicant’s mother died in December 2007. 10.  In June 2008 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the local health authority to complain that the long delays in litigating the case had caused grave prejudice to the case. The applicant’s mother had been a vital witness, and with her death essential evidence had been lost. Settlement of the substantive dispute was proposed but not agreed. 11.  In May 2008 the applicant’s lawyer sought to have the defence of the State defendants set aside. The High Court refused this application on 12 March 2010. 12.  The trial involved ten days of hearings. No factual evidence was called on behalf of the applicant, but independent medical witnesses gave evidence, having read the applicant’s medical records, and documentary evidence provided by way of discovery was before the court. On the eleventh day of the trial, 19 July 2011, the judge accepted an application by the defendants to strike the case out for failure to establish a prima facie case against them. 13.  Regarding the doctor, he noted that the applicant accepted there was insufficient evidence to establish any negligence in the administration of the vaccine. The claim against the doctor H was dismissed. In relation to the State defendants, the judge held that no evidence had been produced that could support the various grounds relied on by the applicant. 14.  The proceedings in the High Court terminated on 19 December 2011. The applicant filed a notice of appeal presenting 30 grounds of appeal. Following the establishment of the Court of Appeal in October 2014, the applicant’s case was transferred to it. Outline written submissions were submitted by H in February 2015 and by the State defendants in September 2015. 15.  The Court of Appeal gave its judgment on 10 February 2016, dismissing the appeal. In its conclusions, the Court of Appeal stated that, by taking the case at its highest, the trial judge had adopted the correct approach on the question of striking the case out. The Court of Appeal concluded by remarking on the many legal hurdles the applicant would have had to overcome in order to succeed. It found no basis for overturning the decision of the High Court. 16.  The proceedings ended on 10 May 2016 when the Supreme Court declined the applicant’s request for leave to appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Novska. He is of Albanian origin. 6.  In 1960 the applicant’s parents fled Albania as political refugees and settled in Kosovo,[1] which was at the relevant time an autonomous province of Serbia. They were granted refugee status in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“the SFRY”). The SFRY was a federal State composed of six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia (with two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo), Slovenia, Montenegro and Macedonia. 7.  The applicant was born in Kosovo soon after his parents’ arrival to the SFRY. In 1979 the applicant, at the time seventeen years old, came from Kosovo to Croatia. He settled in Novska, where he has lived ever since. 8.  The applicant has no family in Croatia. Since moving to Croatia, his parents have died in Kosovo. For a while, the applicant maintained a relationship with his two sisters, who lived in Germany and Belgium (see paragraphs 21, 29 and 35 below). In 2014 he declared to the domestic authorities that his only close relative was his sister in Belgium, with whom he had lost contact (see paragraph 48 below). 9.  In 1987 the applicant applied for a permanent residence permit to the relevant police station in Novska. 10.  He was instructed by the Novska police that he should regularise his status in Kosovo, where he had been officially registered. However, as the applicant refused to do that, he was provided with a temporary residence permit in Novska for the period between 4 January and 30 June 1988, pending the determination of his request for a permanent residence permit. 11.  At the relevant time, the applicant possessed a certificate issued by the SFRY authorities in Kosovo in 1988 indicating that he had been an Albanian national with the status of a foreigner holding a temporary residence permit in the SFRY. The certificate also indicated that the applicant’s parents had been nationals of Albania living in the SFRY as refugees. 12.  On 2 February 1989 the Ministry of the Interior of the then Socialist Republic of Croatia informed the Novska police that the applicant’s application for a permanent residence permit in the SFRY had been refused in accordance with the government policy according to which Albanian refugees should be instructed to apply for the SFRY citizenship. 13.  On 22 February 1989 the applicant was interviewed by the Novska police in connection with the Ministry of the Interior’s instruction. He explained that he had been granted a temporary residence permit by the relevant authorities in Kosovo which was valid until July 1989. He also stated that he had attempted to travel to Germany but had not had a valid visa and had thus been refused entry. At the time he was waiting for a visa for Belgium. The applicant further explained that he hoped to be granted a permanent residence permit but that he was not interested in acquiring SFRY citizenship as that would not provide him with any security. He considered that by acquiring SFRY citizenship, he should be granted a flat or a house in private ownership just as one had been granted to his father when he had come from Albania as a refugee. However, as he would not be granted any property, he refused to apply for SFRY citizenship. 14.  On 23 February 1989 the Novska police informed the Ministry of the Interior that the applicant had refused SFRY citizenship. The report further explained that the applicant was employed in a garage of a private entrepreneur, M.R., and that he had several times contacted the Novksa police insisting that he be granted permanent residence. The report also indicated that according to the available information the applicant had secured a temporary residence permit from the authorities in Kosovo until July 1989. 15.  A further report of the Novska police to the Ministry of the Interior of 26 February 1990 indicated that the applicant was still living in Novska and working in a restaurant. As his temporary residence permit issued by the authorities in Kosovo had expired, he had been instructed to regularise his status. This report also contains a handwritten note dated 12 June 1990 according to which the applicant had come to the police station and presented an identity card for a foreigner with temporary residence status in the SFRY issued by the relevant authorities in Kosovo and valid until 5 November 1991. 16.  On 25 June 1991 the Croatian Parliament (Sabor Republike Hrvatske) declared Croatia independent of the SFRY, and on 8 October 1991 all ties between Croatia and the SFRY were severed. 17.  Meanwhile, war broke out in Croatia and the applicant was called up for mandatory civilian service with the local authorities. On 22 March 1992 the Novska police issued a permit to the applicant to move freely within the region of Novska-Kutina in order to perform his mandatory civilian service. The permit was valid until 31 December 1992. 18.  On 9 June 1992 the applicant applied for Croatian citizenship with the Novska police. He submitted that he had been living at his current address in Novska since 1980s, and that he had been a refugee from Albania. He also explained that he was working in a garage of a private entrepreneur, Z.A. 19.  On 20 July 1992 the Novska police forwarded the applicant’s application to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Croatia (Ministarstvo unutarnjih poslova Republike Hrvatske – hereinafter “the Ministry”) with a suggestion that it be granted. 20.  On 2 November 1992 the Ministry instructed the Novska police that they had failed to provide a report concerning the applicant’s personal circumstances and information on his residence in Croatia. 21.  In connection with the above application, on 16 December 1992 the applicant was interviewed by the Novska Police. In his interview, the applicant explained that he had Albanian nationality as he had been a refugee from that country. He further explained that he had come to Novska in 1979 where he had first worked as a waiter until 1984. Between 1986 and 1989 he had worked as a car mechanic for a private entrepreneur, M.R., and since 1989 for Z.A. During the war he had worked as a car mechanic for the police and the army. He was not married and did not have children. He had a sister living in Germany and one living in Belgium. He also had a brother living in Kosovo and another brother living at an unknown place in Albania. His parents lived in Kosovo. 22.  On 18 December 1992 the Novska police informed the Ministry of the obtained information explaining that the applicant had lived in Novska as a foreigner since 1980 and that he had Albanian citizenship. 23.  In May 1993 the national intelligence agency informed the Novska police that there was nothing preventing the applicant from being allowed to acquire Croatian citizenship. 24.  According to the available information, the file concerning the applicant’s application also contained a birth certificate issued by the SFRY authorities in Kosovo on 23 December 1987 according to which the applicant did not have any nationality. 25.  On 14 June 1993 the Ministry issued an assurance that the applicant would obtain Croatian citizenship if he obtained a release or provided evidence that he had renounced his Albanian citizenship within a period of two years. In its reasoning to this assurance, the Ministry explained that the applicant had met all the necessary conditions to be granted the assurance and thus Croatian citizenship. It also referred to section 8a of the Croatian Citizenship Act (see paragraph 60 below). 26.  Upon the expiry of the above-noted period of two years, on 16 February 1995 the applicant lodged a new application for Croatian citizenship with the Novska Police. He explained that he was a national of Albania and that he had been living in Croatia since 1979. He was asking for Croatian citizenship in order to obtain legal certainty of his position. He stressed that he was ready to renounce his current citizenship and that he had nowhere to go back to in Kosovo. He also explained that he was employed as a car mechanic. 27.  Meanwhile, the applicant had obtained a permit for extended residence of a foreigner (he was considered to be an Albanian citizen) from the Novska police for the period between September 1993 and September 1994, which was first extended until September 1995 and then January 1996. He was also granted a driving licence on 14 April 1994 valid until 19 November 2027. 28.  In February 1995 the intelligence agency informed the Novska police that there was no bar to the applicant’s acquiring Croatian citizenship. 29.  A report on the applicant’s personal circumstances prepared by the Novska police on 8 March 1995 indicated that he had lived in Croatia since 1979. The report contains a statement that the applicant had an Albanian passport issued in Kosovo (then part of Serbia) and that he had allegedly disappeared from his place of residence during the war in Croatia. It also suggests that the applicant socialised with individuals of similar characteristics who were involved in trading of grey-market goods and repairing cars. Moreover, the report alleged that the applicant had never tried to regularise his status in Croatia. The report also indicated that the applicant’s parents had died and that he had two sisters, who lived in Germany and Belgium. 30.  On 28 March 1995 the Novska police informed the Ministry that the applicant had had a registered residence in Croatia since September 1993 (see paragraph 27 above). 31.  On 3 August 1995 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s application for Croatian citizenship on the grounds that he did not have a registered residence in Croatia for an uninterrupted period of five years as required by section 8(1)(3) of the Croatian Citizenship Act (see paragraph 60 below). 32.  The applicant challenged the above decision before the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). He argued that he had had a registered residence in Novska since 1979 and that his personal circumstances had been well known to the Novska police. He also stressed that he was in employment and that he possessed an identity card and a driving licence issued by the Novska police. 33.  On 29 May 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action on the grounds that there was no evidence that he had had a registered residence in Croatia since 1979. In fact, according to the Novska police’s report of 28 March 1995 (see paragraph 29 above), he had had a registered residence in Novska, as a foreigner with extended residence status, since 24 September 1993. In these circumstances, the Administrative Court considered that no available evidence suggested that the applicant had had an uninterrupted registered residence in Novska for a period of more than five years as required by section 8(1)(3) of the Croatian Citizenship Act. 34.  On 13 November 2001 the applicant asked the Ministry to grant him a permanent residence permit. He argued that he was employed and had sufficient means of subsistence and a strong interest to live in Croatia. Together with his application, the applicant provided the birth certificate issued by the SFRY authorities in Kosovo on 23 December 1987 (see paragraph 24 above). He also provided his employment booklet according to which he had been employed in the periods between 1 July 1986 and 15 July 1987, 1 August 1987 and 1 December 1988, and 1 January 1989 and 31 December 1989 in the garage of M.R. 35.  A report on the applicant’s personal circumstances prepared by the Novska police on 24 April 2002 indicated that the applicant was a national of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro – hereinafter “the FRY”). According to the report, the applicant had settled in Novska in 1979 and had first worked in the garage of Z.A. until 1984; and then, between 1985 and 1990, in the garage of M.R. The report further indicated that the applicant was at that time unemployed and supported by his sisters in Germany and Belgium. He had lived in Novska for twenty-two years and had never left Croatia. The only document which he possessed was a driving licence. Up to that point he had been prosecuted only for a minor offence related to the status of aliens. 36.  On 29 April 2002 the Ministry instructed the Novska police that the applicant should also be interviewed in connection with his application. 37.  The applicant was interviewed by the Novska police on 10 June 2002. He explained that after he had been given an assurance of eligibility for Croatian citizenship (see paragraph 25 above) he had contacted the Albanian embassy several times. However, they had at first delayed their response and then dismissed his request. He had therefore been unable to obtain a certificate of renunciation of Albanian citizenship within the relevant period of two years. The applicant further explained how his second application for Croatian citizenship had been refused because he had not had a registered residence in Croatia for five years (see paragraphs 26‑33 above). 38.  In his interview the applicant also stated he did not have a travel document of any country. So far he had always relied on his Albanian citizenship but whenever he had tried to obtain Albanian travel documents, he had been orally refused. The same was true for his attempts to obtain travel documents from the FRY. The applicant further explained that he did not have a family and was not married. He wanted to stay in Novska because there he knew a lot of people and would be able to make a living there. 39.  On 3 July 2003 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s application on the grounds that he did not meet the necessary statutory requirements under section 29(1) of the Movement and Stay of Foreigners Act (see paragraph 61 below). In particular, he was not married to a Croatian national or an alien with a permanent residence in Croatia, and he did not have three years of uninterrupted employment in Croatia. The Ministry also held that there was no particular interest of Croatia in granting him residence under section 29(2) of the Movement and Stay of Foreigners Act. The Ministry considered the applicant to be a national of Serbia and Montenegro. 40.  The applicant challenged this decision before the Administrative Court. He argued that the fact that he had previously been a national of Serbia and Montenegro and had resided in Croatia since 1979 qualified him for permanent residence in Croatia. The applicant also contended that it was difficult for him to find a formal employment as he did not have permanent residence permit for Croatia. 41.  On 17 August 2006 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action as unfounded. The Administrative Court held that the Ministry had properly established that the applicant had failed to meet the statutory requirements under section 29(1) of the Movement and Stay of Foreigners Act as his employment booklet did not show that he had worked for an uninterrupted period of three years. Moreover, the Administrative Court considered that nothing in the circumstances of the case suggested that the applicant should be granted permanent residence under section 29(2) of that Act. 42.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the decisions of the lower bodies. He argued that he had continuously lived in Croatia since 1979 and that he had worked. He argued that he should have been granted permanent residence. 43.  Meanwhile, the applicant obtained a note from M.R., for whom he had worked, attesting that he had been employed by M.R. in the period between 1986 and 1989 and that he had proved to be a hardworking and responsible employee. M.R. also promised to employ the applicant again and to secure him accommodation should he be granted permanent residence. 44.  On 1 October 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint as unfounded endorsing the reasoning of the Administrative Court. 45.  In the period between 26 July 2011 and 27 August 2013 the police three times temporarily extended the applicant’s residence for periods of one year by reference to the humanitarian grounds under the Aliens Act (see paragraph 62 below). In the relevant decisions, the applicant was considered to be a national of Kosovo. 46.  When extending his temporary residence permit on humanitarian grounds on 27 August 2013 for another year under section 65(1)(5) of the Aliens Act, the applicant was requested to provide a valid travel document as provided under section 52(4) of the Aliens Act (see paragraph 62 below). 47.  On 10 June 2014 the applicant again applied for an extension of his temporary residence permit. He argued that he did not have a travel document of Kosovo as he had not been there nor did he have any interest in going there. He explained that he just wanted to regularise his status in Croatia. 48.  In connection with his application for an extension of his temporary residence permit, in July 2014 the applicant was interviewed by the Novska police. A note on his interview indicated that the applicant was a national of Kosovo and that he had knowledge of the Albanian language. It also stated that the applicant had been employed by M.R. in the period between 1981 and 1991 and that during the war in Croatia he had worked for Z.A. repairing military and police vehicles until 1993. Since then he had been unemployed but had been earning money by helping out on the farms in the Novska area. His parents had died and the only close relative he had was a sister living in Belgium, with whom he had lost contact. The note further explained that the applicant’s neighbours had been interviewed and that they confirmed that he had been a good and hardworking person. The note also indicated that the applicant had committed several minor offences for which he had been fined and a criminal complaint had been lodged against him in connection with a road accident in which he had been involved. 49.  On 30 July 2014 the Ministry instructed the Novska police that there were no grounds to extend the applicant’s residence since he had failed to provide a valid travel document. 50.  The Novska police invited the applicant for an interview on 28 August 2014 at which he was informed of the Ministry’s instruction. The applicant explained that he had come to Croatia in 1979 and had no connection to Kosovo. He had had the status of a refugee from Albania until he had reached the age of eighteen, since that status had been granted to his parents. He stressed that he had lived his whole life in Novska. He also promised to contact the embassy of Kosovo in order to obtain a travel document and asked the Novska police not to dismiss his request. 51.  On 16 September 2014 the Novska police dismissed the applicant’s application for the extension of his temporary residence on humanitarian grounds. It held that the applicant did not meet the requirements for granting further temporary residence status as he had failed to provide a valid travel document and the Ministry had not given its consent to an extension of his residence permit. 52.  On 7 October 2014 the applicant challenged the decision of the Novska police before the Ministry, relying on Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. He argued that he had had SFRY citizenship, which he had lost in unclear circumstances following the dissolution of that country. As he had come from Kosovo to Croatia, it was possible that he was considered to be a national of Kosovo by the Croatian authorities, but in reality he did not have citizenship of that territory. The applicant also argued that he was not a classic alien but an individual who found himself in the very specific circumstances of the dissolution of the SFRY in a situation whereby he was no longer able to provide a valid travel document. He also contended that he had been erased from the register of domicile and residence in Croatia without ever being informed thereof. He was therefore unable to regularise his residence status in Croatia and thus to find employment, to move freely without valid documents or to travel, which was neither a lawful nor a proportionate interference with his Article 8 rights. Moreover, the applicant contended that there was a gap in the relevant domestic law as the status of individuals who found themselves in his situation following the dissolution of the SFRY was not regulated. Accordingly, a strict formal application of the Aliens Act could not lead to a solution in his case. 53.  On 30 January 2015 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It referred to the applicant’s previous attempts to regularise his status in Croatia, which had all been unsuccessful. According to the Ministry, this showed that he had not been erased from the relevant registers without being informed. The Ministry further stressed that the applicant had been invited several times to provide a valid travel document and he had promised to contact the embassy of Kosovo in this connection but had failed to do so. Accordingly, in the Ministry’s view, his arguments that he had not been a typical alien and that the relevant authorities had formalistically applied the relevant law had been misplaced. Moreover, there was a possibility for him to obtain a temporary travel document in order to travel to his country of origin so as to obtain a valid travel document. 54.  On 25 February 2015 the applicant challenged the Ministry’s decision before the Zagreb Administrative Court. He contended that he had been a national of the SFRY and that he had had a registered residence in Novska since he had arrived there in 1979, which had been erased at a later stage. He also relied on his available birth certificate showing that he did not have any citizenship (see paragraph 58 below). He also reiterated his complaints of an unjustified infringement of his Article 8 rights by a decision of the administrative authorities and a breach of Article 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 12. On 21 April 2017 the Zagreb Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action endorsing the reasoning of the Ministry’s decision. The applicant challenged these findings before the High Administrative Court (Visoki upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) and the proceedings are still pending. 55.  Meanwhile, on 4 September 2015 the Novska police granted the applicant temporary residence status on humanitarian grounds for a further year inviting him to provide a valid travel document. The Novska police held that the applicant was a national of Kosovo whose parents had come from Albania to Kosovo and that they had had the status of refugees in the SFRY. It also stressed that the Ministry had given consent to the extension of the applicant’s temporary residence irrespective of the fact that he had not provided a valid travel document. 56.  On 4 October 2016 the Novska police extended the applicant’s residence status on humanitarian grounds for a further year. It referred to the same reasons as cited above. 57.  According to the applicant’s handwritten statement to his representative of 7 July 2015, he never had Albanian citizenship. He explained that he had contacted the Albanian embassy after he had been given an assurance that he had qualified for Croatian citizenship but they had told him that he had not been a national of that State (see paragraphs 25 and 37 above). The applicant further stressed that in his contacts with the police concerning the regularisation of his residence status, the police officers had always suggested that he had been an Albanian national. He also explained that he had been born in Kosovo and that his parents had had SFRY citizenship. He had come to Croatia in 1979. He simply wanted to regularise his status in Croatia. 58.  According to a birth certificate issued by the Kosovo authorities on 10 June 2009, the applicant’s parents had had Kosovo nationality but the applicant did not have that nationality.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Nova Gorica. 6.  The applicant was working as a cleaning lady when she allegedly developed serious medical complications in her left wrist, which could only partly have been addressed by surgery. This resulted in her using predominantly her right arm, which in turn resulted in the overburdening of that arm, giving rise to a number of medical problems. Because of these medical issues she was found, in 2006, to be incapable of further work and officially recognised as having a partial disability. 7.  On 30 December 2011 the applicant applied to the Pensions and Disability Insurance Institute of the Republic of Slovenia (“the Institute”) for a disability allowance in respect of a physical impairment (nadomestilo za invalidnost – hereinafter “disability allowance”). 8.  On 12 March 2012 the first-instance disability commission of the Institute, located in Nova Gorica, issued a report to the effect that the applicant was not suffering from any physical impairment stipulated in the Self-Management Agreement on the List of Physical Impairments (Samoupravni sporazum o seznamu telesnih okvar – hereinafter “the List”; see paragraph 22 below). The commission – composed of an occupational medicine specialist, an orthopaedic specialist and a physical medicine and rehabilitation physician – based its opinion on an examination of the medical records submitted by the applicant and a clinical examination of the applicant. 9.  On 15 March 2012 the Nova Gorica unit of the Institute, relying on the opinion of the first-instance disability commission, dismissed the applicant’s application for a disability allowance. A copy of the first-instance disability commission’s opinion was attached to the decision. The applicant appealed. 10.  On 15 May 2012 the second-instance disability commission of the Institute, located in Ljubljana, composed of an occupational medicine specialist and an orthopaedic specialist, examined the applicant’s medical file and again issued a report to the effect that no physical impairment stipulated in the List could be found. 11.  On 7 June 2012 the Central Office of the Institute, referring to the conclusions of the second-instance disability commission, dismissed the applicant’s appeal. A copy of the second-instance disability commission’s opinion was attached to the decision. 12.  On 12 July 2012 the applicant initiated court proceedings against the Institute before the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court seeking the annulment of the above-mentioned decisions taken by the Institute, arguing that the facts had been wrongly established, and that the procedure had not been properly conducted. She argued that because of the incapacity of her arms the functioning of her body was inhibited and greater efforts were required to satisfy her daily needs. She also argued that the opposing party should have more seriously examined all her medical problems. In her view her physical impairment amounted to at least 50% incapacity; however, the exact degree could only be determined by a medical expert. She accordingly proposed that a medical expert be appointed. 13.  On 6 September 2013 the Ljubljana Labour and Social Court, sitting in a single-judge formation, dismissed the applicant’s application for a disability allowance. It observed that its role was to check whether the impugned administrative decisions had been issued in a procedure that had complied with the procedural rules, and had been based on a proper establishment of fact and proper application of the law. It furthermore observed that the claimed physical impairment was a legally relevant fact, whose degree of severity under the relevant legal provisions (see paragraph 22 below) had to be proved in order for entitlement to a disability allowance to be established. After taking into account the documents in the file and the hearing of the applicant, the court found that the Institute had correctly established the facts. Referring to the findings of the disability commissions and its own direct observation of the applicant at the hearing, it concluded that the impairment to the applicant’s health did not amount to a physical impairment within the meaning of the law. 14.  Considering the above-mentioned findings sufficient to reach its conclusion, the court refused the applicant’s request for the appointment of a medical expert as unnecessary. 15.  On 17 October 2013 the applicant lodged an appeal against the first-instance court’s finding. She argued that the impairment to both of her arms, her psychological illness and her headaches meant that the normal functioning of her organism was inhibited and that she had to exert greater efforts in order to perform daily tasks; that the List, which was out of date, could not possibly contain a complete list of all illnesses and injuries; that the first-instance court should not have relied on the opinions of the disability commissions and a doctor (opinions which the applicant had disputed); that the first-instance court should have appointed a medical expert, as requested by the applicant; that the applicant could not have explained all her medical issues at the hearing and that the court had not been in a position to assess the flexibility of her arms. 16.  On 6 February 2014 the Higher Labour and Social Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding that the facts had been sufficiently established and the substantive law applied correctly. It also found that the refusal of the applicant’s request for the appointment of an expert had not undermined the legality of the decision as that decision would not have been any different had an expert been appointed. The Higher Labour and Social Court further found the following:\n“A court in a judicial social dispute ... assesses the correctness and lawfulness of the impugned administrative decisions [in question] and having regard to the dispute of the full jurisdiction [the court] when quashing [the administrative decisions] alone decides on the merits. Within the context of the judicial review of the administrative decisions [the court] is of course not obliged to accept evidence [submitted by] a forensic medical expert if the expert opinions of the disability commissions at first and second instance allow for the conclusion that the negative administrative decisions are correct and lawful because they are based on an assessment by both commissions which is convincing in view of the available medical documentation and the report of [the relevant] medical examination. Such a procedural situation is found in the present case, because in the opinion of the appeal court the expert bodies in the pre-judicial administrative proceedings correctly determined that the applicant had no physical impairment.” 17.  The court furthermore found that physical impairments could not be determined contrary to what was provided in the List. Moreover, the question of whether a particular condition amounted to an impairment was different to the question of whether it amounted to a disability. In the applicant’s case, although she had a recognised disability, this fact alone – without any functional problems in respect of inflexibility of joints – could not suffice to categorise her condition as one of physical impairment. The Higher Labour and Social Court agreed with the court of first instance that the disability commissions in the pre-judicial administrative proceedings had made the right assessment when concluding that the applicant had not suffered from any physical impairment. It also pointed out that the court had not been obliged to appoint an independent expert if it had been possible to conclude from the disability commissions’ opinions that the Institute’s decisions had been well-founded, as had been so in the instant case. 18.  The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law. She argued that her right to a fair trial had not been respected because the court had refused to appoint a medical expert and had assessed the applicant’s condition itself, despite lacking the necessary medical knowledge. She had thereby been deprived of her only possibility to challenge the Institute’s decisions. The applicant also drew attention to the fact that in numerous cases court-appointed experts had found the disability commissions’ fact-finding to be erroneous. She moreover argued that the first-instance court should not have based its decision on the List. 19.  On 10 June 2014 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s application, holding that there were no grounds for allowing an appeal on points of law. 20.  On 21 July 2014 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. She complained that the Supreme Court’s decision had not been reasoned. She further argued that she could not have explained all her medical issues at the hearing and that the court had not been in a position to assess the flexibility of her arms. Her only way of effectively challenging the Institute’s decision would have been by way of appointing an independent medical expert; as had been proved in the past, independent medical experts had often reached findings contrary to those of disability commissions. She invoked Article 22 (equal protection of rights) and Article 23 (the right to judicial protection) of the Constitution. She also reiterated her complaint about the reliance on the List. 21.  On 10 December 2014 the Constitutional Court decided to not accept the applicant’s constitutional complaint for consideration, finding that it did not concern an important constitutional question or entail a violation of human rights which would have serious consequences for the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and at the material time was serving a sentence of imprisonment. The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows. 6.  The case file indicates that in April 2001 and March 2005 the applicant was found guilty of various criminal offences, but his prison sentence was suspended for health reasons (cardiovascular and lung disorders, high blood pressure, a left bundle branch block, and tuberculosis of the left lung). 7.  In November 2005 and March 2007 two additional sets of criminal proceedings on multiple charges including armed robbery were initiated against the applicant. He was arrested on 28 December 2006 and placed in pre-trial detention. 8.  On 14 June 2007 the applicant was found guilty as charged in the first set of proceedings and sentenced to twenty-four years’ imprisonment. The applicant did not appeal against his conviction. 9.  On 25 September 2007, in the second set of criminal proceedings, the applicant was found guilty of armed robbery and sentenced to thirteen years’ imprisonment. The court further decided that the aggregate term of imprisonment to be served pursuant to that judgment and the judgment of 14 June 2007 should be fixed at thirty years. 10.  The judgment of 25 September 2007 was altered on appeal on 21 January 2008. The prison sentence for the offences committed in 2005 was reduced to ten years, but the total sentence to be served remained unchanged at thirty years. An appeal on points of law by the applicant was rejected as inadmissible by the Supreme Court of Georgia on 15 September 2008. 11.  On 1 November 2012 the applicant was granted early release from prison. 12.  The applicant entered the prison system with a history of tuberculosis of the left lung. On 10 April 2008 he was transferred to the Department of Prisons’ medical facility (“the prison hospital”), where an X‑ray of his lungs was performed. As no pathologies were revealed, the applicant was returned to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 17 April 2008. 13.  On 1 May 2008 he was hospitalised again because of a cyst on his right testicle, and on 4 May 2008 he underwent a surgical operation to have the cyst removed. The results of a subsequent biopsy revealed that the cyst was a benign skin cyst. On 6 May 2008 additional blood tests revealed that the applicant did not have AIDS, but it was not possible at that stage to determine the presence of the hepatitis C antibody in his blood. Further tests three months later were recommended. After a trouble-free period of convalescence, the applicant was sent back to prison on 24 May 2008. 14.  On 23 June 2008 the applicant’s lawyer asked for additional medical tests to be organised for the applicant. In particular, he asked for a blood test for hepatitis C. That request apparently went unanswered. On 10 July 2008 the applicant was transferred to the prison hospital because of an abscess in his lower jaw. In addition to being treated by a dentist, according to the medical file, the applicant had a consultation with a neurologist and an endocrinologist because he was experiencing persistent headaches. The neurologist diagnosed him with post-traumatic encephalopathy and prescribed treatment. On 30 July 2008 the applicant was discharged from the prison hospital, although his headaches persisted. 15.  On 8, 9, 15 and 24 September 2008 the applicant applied to the prison authorities to be returned to the prison hospital “for serious health reasons”. He did not specify what was wrong with his health. On 10 September 2008 the prison authorities forwarded the applicant’s letters to the governor of Rustavi Prison no. 6 and the head of the prison administration’s group of medical experts, so that they could be examined and appropriate action could be taken. 16.  On 30 October 2008 the applicant staged a hunger strike to obtain an examination by a neurologist. On 5 November 2008 the applicant was seen in prison by a neurologist, who prescribed treatment for his post-traumatic encephalopathy. 17.  On 10 November 2008 representatives of the Public Defender’s Office visited the applicant, who complained of headaches. The applicant alleged that during his previous stay in the prison hospital he had taken medicine for his headaches for a week, but to no avail. He said that he had suffered from headaches before his arrest, however, the pain had become more severe, and at that point it had been constant for six months. He also alleged that the treatment prescribed on 5 November 2008 had not yielded any results. On 11 November 2008 the Public Defender sent a report on the meeting to the prison governor and requested news of the applicant’s state of health. 18.  On 27 November 2008, after having examined the applicant, the neurologist diagnosed neurasthenia and post-traumatic encephalopathy. Noting that the previous treatment had not worked, he considered that a more thorough examination was necessary. 19.  On 8 December 2008 the applicant staged a second hunger strike, requesting that he be transferred to the prison hospital. He maintained that, having suffered a serious head injury in the past, he was in need of a comprehensive inpatient examination of his head. He further complained that, although he was only being prescribed simple sedatives, he was not receiving them. On 17 December 2008 a representative from the Public Defender’s office met with the chief physician of Rustavi Prison no. 6, where the applicant was staying at the material time. The doctor confirmed that the applicant was suffering from headaches and was in need of a tomography scan. He explained, however, that the applicant was only receiving pain medication, as the relevant insurance company refused to finance the required examination and treatment. According to an entry in the applicant’s medical file, on 19 December 2008 he was still on hunger strike, suffering from headaches. 20.  On 29 December 2008 the Public Defender wrote a letter to the Minister of Justice, the head of the Prisons Department, and the Governor of Rustavi Prison no. 6, challenging the effectiveness of the insurance company with which the Ministry of Prisons had concluded a contract, on the basis of, inter alia, the applicant’s case. The Public Defender alleged that the applicant was being denied adequate examination and treatment for his post-traumatic brain condition. While discussing in detail the failures and shortcomings of the existing insurance scheme, the Public Defender recommended that the relevant authorities annul the relevant contract. 21.  In the meantime, an X-ray of the applicant’s lungs taken on either 22 or 23 of December 2008 had revealed signs of recurrent tuberculosis. His doctor recommended bacteriological analysis and an examination by a specialist. On 23 January 2009 bacteriological tests revealed the presence of tuberculosis bacteria, and the applicant was immediately put on a DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment, Short‑course) programme, the treatment strategy for the detection and cure of tuberculosis, as recommended by the World Health Organisation. 22.  According to an entry in the applicant’s medical file, on 18 February 2009 he was still suffering from constant headaches. The doctor treating the applicant recommended that he be transferred to the prison hospital for proper examination. On 19 February 2009 the applicant was placed in the prison hospital with a diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis and post‑traumatic encephalopathy. There, he underwent various medical tests, including a blood test for hepatitis C markers, which was negative, and a tomography scan. He also had a consultation with a neurologist. As a result, he was diagnosed with intracranial hypertension syndrome. The applicant was prescribed relevant treatment and sent back to Rustavi Prison no. 6 on 26 February 2009. 23.  On 5 March 2009 the applicant was placed in a facility in Ksani for prisoners with tuberculosis. On 10 and 13 July 2009 he violated the internal rules of the facility. As a result, on an unspecified date he was transferred back to Rustavi Prison no. 6, where, according to the latest medical examination of which the Court was informed, he continued his treatment for tuberculosis. 24.  On 14 July 2009 the applicant underwent a serological test, which detected no active hepatitis C virus in his system. 25.  On 29 December 2006 the applicant was placed in Tbilisi Prison no. 5, where he stayed for almost six months. According to him, the conditions of detention in that prison were inhuman and degrading. In view of the severe overcrowding in prison, he had to take turns sleeping, sleeping for a maximum of four hours a day. The sanitary and hygienic conditions were appalling, and for months there was no opportunity for him to have proper shower. The applicant was also deprived of the opportunity to have regular outdoor exercise. Whilst in Tbilisi Prison no. 5, he was not allowed to see his family even once. 26.  On 23 June 2007, following his conviction, the applicant was transferred to Rustavi Prison no. 6. According to him, the conditions of his detention improved there, although he was still deprived of regular outdoor exercise. Moreover, the nutrition in the prison was poor and he was deprived of basic items relating to hygiene, such as soap, bed linen, toilet paper, and towels. 27.  According to a letter from the prison governor dated 24 June 2008, the applicant was only visited by his family once during his time in that prison, on 22 April 2008.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Silistra. 5.  In 2003 an individual installed a printing company in a building situated in close proximity to the building where the applicant was living with his family. Shortly after the printing company began operating, the applicant and his family started resenting the nuisance it was causing. In particular, they found the constant smell of ink and solvents intolerable; also, they were continuously disturbed by the vibrations caused by the printing machines, which reverberated through the walls of their dwelling. Moreover, as time went by, the applicant’s young daughter developed an allergy, which the applicant believed was due to the chemicals used in the printing process and had to take daily medication to keep it under control. 6.  Between July 2006 and August 2007, the applicant turned to several State institutions, including regional branches of the hygiene and epidemiological inspectorate, the public health directorate at the Ministry for Health, the regional building inspectorate, the mayor of Silistra and the prosecution service. He complained to them in writing about the nuisance caused by the printing company. He claimed that the latter was operating contrary to a number of legal requirements found in different ministerial regulations. He also asked the authorities for help in forcing the printing company to cease its operations. 7.  More specifically, the chronology of his correspondence with the authorities can be traced as follows. 8.  On 15 August 2006, the director of the regional agency for public health (Регионална инспекция за опазване и контрол на общественото здраве – hereafter “the public health agency”) informed the applicant that on 10 August 2006 two junior inspectors from the agency had visited the printing company in question. He did so in a brief one-paragraph letter in reply to a complaint made by the applicant on 31 July 2006. The inspectors had established during that visit that two printing machines (without specifying their type, power or capacity) were operating at that time in the printing company and that this number was in line with the requirements set out in Regulation No. 7 of 1992 of the Ministry for Health. The letter invited the applicant to propose a day and time for the measuring of the noise generated by the printing company. 9.  Two days later, on 17 August 2006, the applicant together with three of his neighbours complained in writing to the public health directorate at the Ministry for Health that the printing company was operating in contravention of relevant legal requirements. On 22 August 2006, the applicant and the same three neighbours wrote again to the same directorate expressing concern about and dissatisfaction with the manner in which the measurements in respect of noise and air pollution had been taken on 18 August 2006. In particular, two individuals who had not shown any credentials had turned up and measured the noise with a machine which had not reacted to sudden high-pitched noises but was set up to measure only background noise. Furthermore, when the applicant had invited the inspectors to also measure the purity of the air, one of them had opened the window, sniffed the air and stated that it was not that bad and that, in all likelihood, it would turn out to be within the relevant norms when measured. The applicant further stressed in the letter that the printing company was operating in close proximity to inhabited dwellings, whereas according to the relevant regulations this was prohibited within less than 50 metres of such buildings. 10.  The applicant and his three neighbours also wrote to the building inspectorate on 23 August 2006, complaining that the printing company’ premises had been built in contravention of the relevant construction norms. 11.  On 25 August 2006 the Ministry for Health wrote to the public health agency, asking that a check be carried out and the applicant informed of the results accordingly. On 29 August 2006 the Ministry for Health issued an instruction to the owner of the printing company, inviting him to bring the noise levels generated by his business within the limits stipulated in the relevant regulations. 12.  On 30 August 2006, apparently in reply to the applicant’s letter of complaint of 31 July 2006, the head of the public health agency informed the applicant that: the chemical agents identified at the work stations at the printing company in question were within the limits listed in Regulation No. 13 of 2003 for the protection of individuals exposed to chemical agents at their work station; the noise reaching the applicant’s home when the windows were open, as well as the dwelling of one of his neighbours, was not in conformity with the requirements of Regulation No. 6 of 2006; and that instructions had been issued to the owner of the printing company to ensure that the noise levels produced by his business were brought within the legal limits. 13.  On 5 October 2006 a representative of the Ministry for Health wrote to the applicant informing him that staff from the public health agency had carried out two checks at the printing company; neither the dates of those checks, nor any further details about them were mentioned. The letter then read that on 18 August 2006 officials had measured the reverberating noise and the chemical agents produced at the printing company. As the noise levels had been found to be beyond the legal limits, the owner had been instructed to lower them by 29 October 2006. 14.  On 27 October 2006 the applicant and his three neighbours wrote to the Ministry for Health, expressing their dissatisfaction with the reply they had received on 5 October 2006. They reiterated that the printing company was surrounded on three sides by inhabited dwellings, in which a number of small children lived. They referred to point 393 of Regulation No. 7 of 1992, which prohibited the installation of printing houses less than 50 metres from inhabited buildings and to the fact that the owner of the printing company had not obtained an agreement from any of his neighbours for installing his business at that location. They pointed out too that the noise levels had not been lowered, contrary to the authorities’ instructions, and stressed that the record which they had signed on the day when the noise measurements had been taken had indicated 58 decibels (dB) and not 38 as stated in the record included in the file. They asked once again that the authorities order the printing company to cease its operations on the ground that they were in breach of point 393 of Regulation No. 7 of 1992. 15.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant and four of his neighbours wrote to the regional inspectorate for the environment and water in Ruse (Регионална инспекция за околната среда и водите). They stated that, although the printing company had been apparently functioning on the basis of a lawful permit since 2003, given that it was located in a densely populated area, in their opinion, this was inappropriate. The letter then listed the exact name of the machines operating at the printing company and the type of ink used. The applicant and his neighbours further pointed out that, according to Regulation No. 7 of 1992 of the Ministry for Health, printing houses had to be located at least 50 metres from inhabited dwellings and that the printing company in question was joined on three sides to the complainants’ dwellings. The printing business in question had been formally registered as “a workshop for printing services with up to two work stations” and not as a “printing house”; in this way it had successfully circumvented the legal requirements applicable to printing houses, despite the fact that the notice exhibited at its entrance read “printing house” (печатница). 16.  The letter further stated that in reality, for a number of consecutive years, more than two people had been working at the printing house at any given time. The applicant and his neighbours had learned from the staff that no antidote was being given to them; this was obligatory as protection against carcinogens present in printing inks and solvents used to clean the machines (up to ten times a day on a busy day). The authors of the letter then wondered whether they as well as the people living in the immediate vicinity of the printing house should also have been taking such antidotes. The applicant’s daughter had developed an allergy towards some of the chemicals used by the printing house and was taking daily medication called Zertec. Whenever the door of the printing house was opened a pungent smell entered directly into the bedroom of the applicant’s children, the window of which was situated directly opposite it at about seven metres’ distance. 17.  Like the staff at the printing company, the applicant and his neighbours suffered frequently from headaches, their washing turned grey whenever it was hung to dry and the noise produced by the machines when operating was unbearable. In particular, at the house of one of the applicant’s neighbours the noise was so loud it was as though an earthquake had started every time the guillotine was operating. The applicant and his neighbours had sought a copy of the original record signed at the time the noise had been measured but had not received one. The letter concluded that the residents whose dwellings adjoined the printing company were doomed to bringing up their children for the foreseeable future in an environment of noise and chemicals, without any guarantee for their health and normal development. One of the staff working for several years at the printing company had developed a brain tumour, which was a source of serious worry for everyone in the vicinity. The applicant and his neighbours were also worried that the owner did not wish to hear any suggestion of moving his printing business away, but insisted that it was harmless as he preferred to profit from the commercial advantages a central location offered. The letter’s authors then invited the authorities to carry out an unannounced nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry in order for the community to learn about the poisons they were being exposed to, as well as to proceed with closing down the business. They enclosed a copy of the 810 signatures collected in support of their cause. 18.  On 10 September 2007 the head of the Ruse regional inspectorate for the environment and water wrote to the applicant in reply to the letter of 20 August 2007. The reply stated that two experts sent by the inspectorate had carried out a check on 30 August 2007 at the printing company in the presence of its owner. The conclusions of that check were that the printing company was operating on the basis of a permit issued by the building authorities on 25 July 2003. The type of operation – offset printing on sheets of paper – was not among the operations listed in Annex I of Regulation No. 7 of 2003 on limiting emissions of volatile organic compounds released into the environment as a result of the use of solvents in certain installations. Lastly, the noise emissions had been measured at 49.7 dB, which was lower than the legal limit of 60 dB to be found in Annex II – Table 2, point 2 of Regulation No. 6 of 26 June 2006. 19.  In addition to his appeals to the above-mentioned institutions, the applicant decided to attract public attention to his dispute with the printing company. He produced some posters for that purpose, calling on the community in the town of Silistra to express support for the termination of the printing company’s operations. The text on the posters claimed that the printing company had been licensed in breach of the relevant legal requirements and that the pollution it was causing was harmful to the people living in the vicinity. The posters also listed parts of three regulations issued by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Regional Development and concerning sanitary requirements and, protection of public health in an urban environment. 20.  The applicant exhibited the posters described above on the windows of his own shop, which was situated close to both his home and the printing company. The posters were exhibited between 12 December 2006 and 22 February 2007, and within a little over a month the applicant had collected more than 800 signatures from individuals in support of his cause. 21.  On an unspecified date the owner of the printing company, V.V., brought defamation proceedings against the applicant under Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968. V.V. complained in particular that the applicant’s actions had damaged his printing business and his personal reputation. 22.  The applicant’s three neighbours, who together with the applicant had been continuously complaining to the authorities, submitted a signed declaration in support of the applicant. They stated that, irrespective of all the different permits which the printing company might have obtained from the authorities, this did not change the fact that it was causing a chemical and noise-related nuisance to the community on a daily basis. 23.  On 5 June 2007 the Silistra District Court found the applicant guilty of libel. It held that he had defamed V.V. by complaining in writing to various institutions about the latter’s printing operations and by printing and publicly disseminating material which claimed that the business was operating unlawfully. Contrary to the requirements of Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968, the applicant had not submitted proof showing that his complaints to the authorities and the claims he had made in the posters were true. While officials from the Ministry of Health had indeed established that the noise emitted by the printing business had been beyond the authorised limits, the authorities had instructed its owner to bring it within the relevant norms and had given him a deadline, with which he had complied. The court then stated that, as seen from a chemical agents inspection report of August 2006 and from the subsequent explanations of the person who had carried out the check, it was clear that measurements had been taken throughout the working process at the printing premises and that the level of the chemical agents measured was not above the norms. 24.  As to the claim that the printing business had been set up in breach of Regulation No. 7 of 2003, that was impossible as the said regulation had become applicable as of 13 January 2004, whereas the printing business had been lawfully operating since 25 July 2003. In respect of the claim that Regulation No. 7 of 1992 had also been breached, the court found that while point 393 of that regulation indeed provided that printing houses had to be at least fifty metres away from inhabited dwellings, this only concerned “printing houses”, while the business in question had been registered as a “workshop for printing services and a shop with an office”, and the printing-house regulations did not apply to workshops. 25.  The allegation that the applicant’s daughter had developed an allergy had also remained entirely unproven, given that the applicant had presented as evidence only a medical document stating that she was suffering from “bronchitis”. The court went on to say that “every biological parent of average intelligence whose child was frequently ill had to know that respiratory ailments were the most frequent ones in early childhood”. 26.  The court concluded that, given that the applicant’s claims were factually wrong, they had inevitably damaged the printing business owner’s reputation. That amounted to defamation, which was in breach of the law and had to be sanctioned. The court then waived the applicant’s criminal liability and imposed on him an administrative penalty in the form of a fine in the amount equivalent to 250 euros (EUR). It further partially upheld the claimant’s civil claim submitted in the criminal proceedings and ordered the applicant to pay EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damages to V.V. and EUR 20 in court fees. 27.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the Silistra Regional Court upheld the first-instance court’s findings in a final judgment of 30 October 2007. It observed that the relevant authorities had carried out a number of inspections at the printing business in question in response to the applicant’s complaints. Contrary to the applicant’s allegations, none of those checks had established either a breach of the relevant legislation or the existence of pollution caused by the printing company. Despite this, the applicant had continued to disseminate false and discrediting information about V.V. by exhibiting posters on the windows of his own shop. 28.  The court agreed with the finding at first instance that the applicant could not be absolved from responsibility as he had been unable to prove the veracity of his allegations. It further found that the punishment had been neither excessive nor unfair and, if anything, it had been too lenient.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plots of land belonging to the applicant were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture and bakery production. He owned eight plots of agricultural land in the village measuring 0.420 ha, 0.890 ha, 0.904 ha, 1.206 ha, 0.780 ha, 0.900, 0.974 and 0.354 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening, beekeeping and feeding their livestock. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his eight plots of land for 194,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 422 euros (EUR)), AMD 422,000 (approximately EUR 917), AMD 417,000 (approximately EUR 907), AMD 555,000 (approximately EUR 1,207), AMD 328,000 (approximately EUR 713), AMD 426,000 (approximately EUR 990), AMD 409,000 (approximately EUR 890), and AMD 240,000 (approximately EUR 522) respectively, plus an additional 15% on each amount offered as required by law, making the final offer AMD 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 11.  The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that he tried to obtain an alternative valuation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of his land. 12.  On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant, seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on the taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicant’s plots of land was estimated at 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 13.  In proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had apparently been underestimated. He further submitted that the valuation of his property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the amounts he had actually paid for the plots of land in question and of the significant investments he had made. He also claimed that the deprivation of his property was not in the public interest since it was aimed at securing high profits for several individuals. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports in respect of the applicant’s property, stating that after the institution of the proceedings Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicant’s eight plots of land was estimated at respectively AMD 187,000 (approximately EUR 407), AMD 456,000 (approximately EUR 991), AMD 437,000 (approximately EUR 950), AMD 535,000 (approximately EUR 1,163), AMD 343,000 (approximately EUR 746), AMD 411,000 (approximately EUR 893), AMD 427,000 (approximately EUR 928), and AMD 268,000 (approximately EUR 583). The representative of Teghout CJSC asked the court to take into account the relatively higher amounts of the initial valuations in respect of those plots of land that were valued lower as a result of the new valuation. The final amounts of compensation would therefore be equal to the amounts mentioned in the corrected reports for those plots of land valued higher than previously, and would stay the same as in the initial offer for the rest, together with the additional 15% required by law. 15.  On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicant AMD 223,100 (approximately EUR 485), AMD 524,400 (approximately EUR 1,140), AMD 502,550 (approximately EUR 1,093), AMD 638,250 (approximately EUR 1,388), AMD 394,450 (approximately EUR 858), AMD 489,900 (approximately EUR 1,065), AMD 491,050 (approximately EUR 1,068). and AMD 308,200 (approximately EUR 670) respectively in compensation for his eight plots of land. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17.  On 18 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19.  On 18 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Kybartai. 5.  On 22 December 2011 the applicant was arrested and taken to Klaipėda police station, where he was detained for various periods until 5 March 2013, for 130 days in total. For twenty-two days the applicant had between 3.25 and 4 square metres of personal space at his disposal; for the remaining period he had more than 4 square metres of personal space, sometimes even up to 9.36 square metres. 6.  On 4 January 2012 the applicant was taken to Šiauliai Remand Prison, where he was detained for various periods until 13 March 2013. No information concerning separate cells, their sizes and the number of inmates has been provided to the Court. 7.  On 4 March 2013 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. On 11 October 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by the applicant and the judgment became final. 8.  On 13 March 2013 the applicant was taken to Lukiškės Remand Prison to serve his sentence, and was detained there until 23 December 2015, when he was transferred to Kybartai Correctional Facility. 9.  According to the documents in the Court’s possession, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were as follows. Between 13 March 2013 and 5 May 2014 the applicant was held in five different cells: nos. 88A, 93, 111, 223 and 228 and he was detained there for 419 days in total. For 316.5 days the applicant was alone in the cells, the plot of which varied between 6.83 and 7.94 square metres. For the remaining period he had between 3.82 and 3.87 square metres of personal space, except for one evening, when he had 2.48 square metres of personal space at his disposal. 10.  The applicant submitted two schemes of different cells in Lukiškės Remand Prison. It is indicated in the schemes that the toilets were separated from the rest of the cells by partitions but that they were visible from the entrance of the cell. The Government have not provided any information regarding this matter. 11.  On 3 June 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. He asked the court to oblige Lukiškės Remand Prison to immediately terminate his inhuman and degrading treatment, transfer him to a cell where he would have no less than 4 square metres of personal space (not including space for the toilet and the furniture), and award him 86,886 euros (EUR) in compensation. He complained regarding overcrowding, low temperatures, damp, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, the fact that he was held with convicted inmates who were serving sentences for grave crimes, the insufficient nutritional value of the food, the fact that he could only shower once a week for fifteen minutes, and the lack of time spent in the open air. He also complained about the lack of long-term visits in Lukiškės Remand Prison from 23 November 2011 until October 2013, and claimed that consequently he had separated from his partner.\nThe applicant further complained regarding his conditions of detention in Klaipėda police station between 23 December 2011 and 5 March 2013. He complained regarding overcrowding, the lack of ventilation, damp, low temperatures, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, the lack of time spent in the open air, the fact that the shower had only been available once a week for fifteen minutes, the insufficient nutritional value of the food, the fact that there had been no long-term or short-term visits, and the fact that there were no separate cells for non-smokers and inmates who had tuberculosis or HIV.\nHe also complained regarding his conditions of detention in Šiauliai Remand Prison between 4 January 2012 and 13 March 2013. He complained regarding overcrowding, low temperatures during the winter and high temperatures during the summer, insufficient ventilation, the fact that he could only shower once a week, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, and the fact that there had been no long-term visits. 12.  On 26 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. The court held that he had spent 419 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison, and had had more than 3.6 square metres of personal space at his disposal for 418 days. On one evening the applicant had had 2.48 square metres of personal space at his disposal. The court further held that the partition between the toilet and the cell of 1.5 < metres in height did not constitute sufficient implementation of national hygiene norms and the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). The other complaints by the applicant (regarding high temperatures in the summer, damp, a lack of proper ventilation, mould, a lack of cleaning materials, not having enough time to shower, the low energy value of the food, and having insufficient time outside) were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards long-term visits, the court held that the applicant could not receive them, as he was a remand prisoner and not a convicted inmate.\nAs regards Šiauliai Remand Prison, the court held that the applicant had spent 296 days there. The court further held that he had had insufficient personal space in the cells for 283 days (insufficient cell space had been unquestionably proved in respect of forty-eight days, and for the remaining 235 days the applicant had had a varying amount of personal space at his disposal) and found that the lack of proper partition walls between toilets and cells had breached both domestic requirements and the standards of the CPT. The court also found that the air temperature in cell no. 9 had been 0.19˚C lower than the standard. As regards long-term visits, the court held that the applicant had not been entitled to them, in accordance with domestic law.\nWith regard to Klaipėda police station, the court found that the applicant had had insufficient personal space (less than 5 square metres) for fifty‑seven days, and that the partition wall between the toilet and the cell, which was 1.2 and 1.3 metres in height in different cells, had been too low and had not satisfied the standards of the domestic law or the CPT. In relation to visits, the court held that people did not have a right to receive any visits from their relatives when they were transferred to police stations temporarily.\nAs a result, the court awarded the applicant compensation of EUR 1,200 from Šiauliai Remand Prison and EUR 200 from Klaipėda police station. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court only noted that with regard to Klaipėda police station, the first-instance court had miscalculated the time that the applicant had spent in overcrowded cells and stated that he had had less than 5 square metres of personal space for eighty-three days. However, the higher court found that for twenty-six days he had had between 4.77 and 4.84 square metres of personal space, which was less than the domestic requirement at the time (see paragraph 18 below). However, the court held that for those twenty-six days the deviation from the domestic norms had not been significant and thus it agreed with the first-instance decision. 14.  From the information available to the Court, it appears that the applicant never asked the prison administration if he could receive long‑term conjugal visits from his partner, and although short-term visits were available to him, he only used his right to receive them once, on 26 June 2013. Two other short-term visits were changed into phone calls (the visits of 12 June 2015 and 29 October 2015).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1980 in Abakan, the Khakassiya Republic. 5.  The applicant stood accused of theft and murder. On 22 November 2004 the Sayanogorsk Town Court in Khakassiya fixed, in the hearing held without the applicant’s attendance, the opening date for the trial and ordered an extension of his pre-trial detention. On 2 December 2004 the applicant was convicted and given a custodial sentence. 6.  On 22 March 2005 the Constitutional Court held, in unrelated proceedings, that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be interpreted as guaranteeing the right of the defendant to take part in the hearing where the matter of detention was decided, to make submissions to the court and to produce evidence (Judgment no. 4-P, point 4 of the operative part). 7.  On 8 August 2013 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic quashed the Town Court’s decision of 22 November 2004 in the part relating to the detention matter. Referring to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, it found that the District Court had unlawfully extended the applicant’s detention without giving him an opportunity to take part in the hearing or to make submissions to the court. 8.  The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for the unlawful detention from 22 November to 2 December 2004. By judgment of 16 September 2013, as upheld on appeal on 27 November 2013, the Abakan Town Court rejected his claim, holding that he was not eligible for compensation in respect of pre-trial detention because he had been found guilty and given a custodial sentence.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant gave birth to a son, I., whose father was E., her partner. 7.  Following their separation in November 2010, the applicant and E. agreed that I. would live with the applicant and E. would visit him regularly. 8.  On 22 October 2013 E. took the boy to Grozny in Chechnya. 9.  The applicant followed them to Grozny, where she attempted to visit her son, but was prevented from doing so by E. 10.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (“the District Court”) for a residence order under which I. would live with her. She submitted that I. had lived with her from birth until his removal by his father the previous October. They were very attached to each other. She had a stable income, a spacious flat, good character references, and was capable of providing I. with everything necessary in terms of his living expenses, education and development. She also complained that since the removal she had made many attempts to visit her son, but E. had prevented her from seeing him. 11.  On 19 March 2014 the childcare authority of the Chertanovo District of Moscow visited the applicant’s flat in Moscow and found the living conditions there suitable for a small child. 12.  On 19 March 2014 the Justice of the Peace of the 230 Court Circuit of the Chertanovo District of Moscow convicted E. of assault and battery, finding E. guilty of assaulting and injuring the applicant in August 2013, and sentenced him to a fine. 13.  On 9 April 2014 the childcare authority of Grozny visited E.’s flat in Grozny and found that the living conditions there were suitable for a small child. The officials noted that E. lived in the flat with his mother A. and his son I. 14.  On 15 April 2014 the childcare authority of Grozny issued its report on the case. The report reiterated that E.’s living conditions were suitable and further read as follows:\n“[E.] works as a senior medical officer at [a private medical clinic] and, according to him, has a monthly income of 50,000 roubles ...\nThe child has been living with his father [E.] for a long time. His mother lives in Moscow and does not participate in his upbringing. The boy is very attached to the father and receives a lot of attention, tenderness and care. Bearing in mind the best interests of [I.], [the childcare authority of Grozny] considers that a residence order in respect of [I.] in favour of his father [E.] would not be contrary to the child’s interests and would not hinder his contact with the mother.” 15.  At the hearing concerning the applicant’s application for a residence order, E. stated that I. had indeed lived with his mother until recently, but he was not at all attached to her. E. had financially supported them and had visited them regularly. The applicant was “not leading the right kind of life” and she would have a bad influence on I. 16.  At the hearing, an official of the childcare authority of Grozny reiterated the findings contained in the report of 15 April 2014. 17.  On 17 April 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s application for a residence order in her favour. It held that a residence order in respect of I. should be granted to his father, even though he had not requested it. The court held as follows:\n“Article 196 § 3 of [the Code of Civil Procedure] provides that a court decides on the claims submitted by a claimant. However, the court may go beyond those claims in cases provided for by the federal law.\nArticle 65 of [the Family Code] provides that if no agreement can be reached, a dispute between parents must be decided by a court, having regard to the child’s best interests.\nIt follows that the court may go beyond the parties’ claims and make a residence order in respect of the child in favour of the father [E.].\nThe report of the childcare authority of Grozny no. ... of 15 April 2014 indicates that it is preferable to make a residence order in respect of the child [I.] in favour of his father [E.], and not to hinder his contact with his mother.\nThe available information shows that both parents have good character references from their employers and their neighbourhoods, have permanent employment, stable incomes, and real estate.\nAccording to inspection reports, the living conditions of both parents meet the conditions necessary for raising and accommodating a child.\nPoint 5 of Ruling no. 10 of the Plenary Supreme Court of 27 May 1998 enumerates, in line with Article 65 § 3 of [the Family Code], factors which must be taken into account when deciding on a dispute concerning a child’s residence arrangements. These factors are the child’s attachment to each of the parents and [any] siblings, the relationship between the child and each of the parents, the child’s age, the parents’ moral and other personal qualities and the possibilities each of them have for creating [proper] conditions for the child’s upbringing and development (in the light of such considerations as each parent’s occupation, employment schedule, and financial and family situation), and other factors defining the situation in each parent’s place of residence. The Plenary Ruling stresses, in particular, that the better financial or living conditions of one of the parents cannot, in themselves, constitute a decisive reason for granting this parent’s application for a residence order in his [or her] favour.\nThe better financial and living conditions of one of the parents (the claimant has a higher income and owns residential property in Moscow) cannot constitute a decisive reason for making a residence order in her favour and for rejecting the other parent’s claim, because there are other factors.\nBy contrast, [the applicant] is a single mother who has one more child from her previous marriage: a daughter [R.] born on 25 June 1997. This age is most difficult, and requires special attention from the mother.\nBecause she works, on 2 September 2013 the claimant placed I. in a [nursery school] in Moscow, despite the fact that, by her own admission, he suffers from a congenital central neural system anomaly: dysgenesis of the corpus callosum.\nThe [factors considered] above indicate that [the applicant] is unable to create [proper] conditions for the child’s upbringing and development. Because of her work, she does not have enough time to devote to her children. These circumstances could have a disastrous impact on the child’s immature mind.\nIt has been established that the defendant occupies a managerial position at work. His income allows him to create comfortable financial and living conditions. He lives with his mother [A.], who helps to raise [I.]. The childcare authorities’ report indicates that the child is attached to his father.\nThe defendant has not hindered [the applicant’s] contact with the child.\nUnder Articles 56 and 57 of [the Code of Civil Procedure], each party must prove the circumstances on which [he or] she relies in support of [his or] her claims or submissions.\nIn the court’s opinion, the claimant has not submitted evidence in support of her arguments in [the] adversarial proceedings.” 18.  The applicant appealed. She complained, in particular, that the residence order had been granted to E. at the District Court’s own initiative, as E. had never requested it. She further submitted that she was perfectly capable of providing I. with everything which he needed for his development. Her elder daughter was healthy and self-reliant and did not require any special attention. Her daughter would therefore not hinder her ability to take care of I.; on the contrary, she was of great help. The applicant had placed I. in a nursery school to give him a pre-school education and to further his social adaptation. His medical condition was not an obstacle to his attending a pre-school. The District Court’s finding that she did not have enough time to take care of her children was not based on any evidence. Neither her working schedule nor that of E. had been examined. Nor had the court explained how, within such a short period of time, I. could have become more attached to his father than his mother, with whom he had lived from birth until his recent abduction. Lastly, the applicant complained that E. was preventing her from seeing her son. That fact had been confirmed by the childcare authorities’ representative at the hearing, who had recounted E.’s assertions that he would not allow any contact between I. and his mother. 19.  On 3 July 2014 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it was lawful, well-reasoned and justified. The judgment was based on the best interests of the child, taking into account his age, his attachment to the father, and the father’s ability to create proper conditions for his son’s upbringing and development. 20.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant that she had been prevented from seeing her son for a long time, by a letter of 7 August 2014, a deputy mayor of Grozny informed her that E. had stated to the childcare authorities that he would not allow any contact between I. and his mother. 21.  By a letter of 12 September 2014, the head of the childcare authority of Grozny informed the applicant that the childcare official who had issued the report of 15 April 2014 had been disciplined. An internal inquiry had established that the report was based on incorrect and incomplete information. In particular, E.’s statement that he had high income had not been checked. The finding that the applicant had not participated in I.’s upbringing was not based on any evidence. The length of time I. had lived with each of the parents had not been established. Lastly, the fact that I. had a half-sister living with his mother had not been taken into account. The report of 15 April 2014 had therefore violated the applicant’s rights and legitimate interests. 22.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, referring, in particular, to the letter of 12 September 2014. 23.  On 27 November 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal to the Presidium of that Court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. Relying, in particular, on the childcare authorities’ report of 15 April 2014, the judge found that it was in I.’s interests to live with his father. 24.  On 5 December 2014 E. died in a car accident. I continued to live with his paternal grandmother A. 25.  On 14 January 2015 the applicant applied to the Shali Town Court of the Chechen Republic (“the Town Court”), asking that I. be returned to her. 26.  On 31 July 2015 the Town Court granted her application. The court held that I. should be taken away from A. and returned to the applicant, with whom he should live from that point onwards. On 12 November 2015 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 27.  On 24 November 2015 the Town Court issued a writ of execution. On the same day bailiffs initiated enforcement proceedings. 28.  On 28 November 2015 the bailiffs visited A. and ordered that she return I. to the applicant on 3 December 2015. When the bailiffs visited A. on 3 December 2015 to take I. away, A. and I. were not at home. The bailiffs visited A. again on 5 and 25 December 2015 and 4 February 2016, but could not find her or I. The childcare authorities also visited A.’s address on several occasions, but found nobody at home. It was finally established that A. had moved out with I. 29.  On 24 December 2015 the bailiffs banned A. from leaving the country. 30.  On 10 February 2016 A.’s and I.’s names were put on the list of wanted persons. 31.  On 28 April 2016 I. was returned to the applicant by the police. On the next day the enforcement proceedings were closed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant company has its registered office in Essingen, Germany. 5.  From the 1990s onwards the applicant company regularly purchased scrap metal from A. Safaryan and Associates LLC, a limited liability company registered in Armenia (“the LLC”). 6.  On 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003 the applicant company and KBKS (another German company owned by the applicant company) concluded three contracts with the LLC, under which KBKS and the applicant company were to make advance payments to the LLC in return for scrap metal. The contract of 2 April 2003 contained the following dispute resolution clause:\n“... 7.  Arbitration 7.1  The parties agree that any disputes and differences arising out of the performance of this contract shall be resolved through negotiations in order to reach a mutually beneficial resolution. 7.2  If it is not possible to settle such disputes amicably, these matters shall, with the exception of those falling within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, be referred to the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the respondent.\n...” 8.  On 8 April 2002 KBKS and the applicant company concluded an assignment agreement whereby KBKS transferred all its contractual rights, including those towards the LLC, to the applicant company. 9.  On 8 November 2002 the applicant company provided the LLC with a loan in the amount of 100,000 euros (EUR), which was due to be repaid by 31 January 2003. The purpose of the loan was to assist the LLC in paying off a bank loan. It appears that it was not paid back to the applicant company. 10.  It further appears that the LLC failed to meet its contractual obligations vis-à-vis the applicant company, in that it supplied less scrap metal than the advance payments that it had already received. 11.  On 28 October 2005 representatives of the applicant company and the LLC made a calculation of their liabilities as at that date and it was revealed that the LLC owed 1,213,824 US dollars (USD) to the applicant company. As a result of negotiations, the applicant company agreed to provide debt relief in the amount of USD 613,824 on the condition that the LLC paid off the rest of the debt, namely USD 600,000, in accordance with a debt repayment schedule which was set up in a separate agreement signed on the same day by the directors of both companies. According to this agreement, the LLC undertook to repay the debt in five instalments, with the first payment due by 15 December 2005. If the LLC failed to meet its obligations as set out in the repayment schedule, it would be immediately liable to repay the entire debt, and any disputes with regard to repayment would be resolved through litigation. 12.  On the same day the parties concluded another agreement, setting out a repayment schedule in respect of the loan of EUR 100,000 and arrears in the amount of EUR 10,000. It also stated that an additional 6% would be payable in the event of failure to respect the repayment schedule. 13.  It appears that the LLC missed the required payments. In subsequent correspondence, the director of the LLC acknowledged the debt but deferred its repayment, each time providing different reasons. 14.  On 15 January 2007 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Commercial Court against the LLC, seeking to recover USD 10,000 from the initial debt of USD 1,213,824. 15.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant company amended its initial claim, seeking to recover a total of USD 1,516,442 and EUR 116,600 from the LLC, including the principal debt, the loan and interest on both. It also requested a waiver of the court fees. 16.  On 4 October 2007 the LLC filed a counterclaim, contesting the applicant company’s claims. The director of the LLC requested the annulment of the two documents dated 28 October 2005, arguing that, having no command of German, he had been unaware of their content and had signed them as a result of fraud. 17.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant filed a response to the counterclaim, arguing, inter alia, that the director of the LLC had been personally present during the negotiations in Germany when a recalculation of liabilities between the companies had been carried out. Since the director of the LLC was fluent in Russian, the negotiations had been conducted in Russian and there had also been a copy in Russian of the documents signed. Moreover, the fact that the director of the LLC had been fully aware of the content of the documents he had signed of his own free will was confirmed by his numerous letters, where he had provided justification for having failed to transfer the amounts due in a timely manner. 18.  On 7 November 2007 the LLC requested the Commercial Court to leave the applicant company’s claim unexamined on the grounds that the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003 contained a dispute resolution clause whereby disputes concerning their performance would be resolved by the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the respondent. The LLC therefore claimed that, it being the respondent, resolution of the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia (“the Arbitration Tribunal”). 19.  On 16 November 2007 the Commercial Court granted the request and decided to leave the applicant company’s claim and the counterclaim lodged by the LLC unexamined. In doing so, it referred to Article 103 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and found that the resolution of the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal. It found that, as the contract of 2 April 2003 contained an arbitration clause, the agreement of 28 October 2005 was also subject to arbitration. The decision was amenable to appeal before a three-judge bench of the Commercial Court within three days of receipt by the party. 20.  On 23 November 2007 the applicant company lodged a complaint concerning the decision to leave the claim and counterclaim unexamined. It argued, inter alia, that the agreements signed on 28 October 2005, which had succeeded the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003, provided that disputes concerning the failure of the LLC to respect the repayment schedules set out in them would be determined by the courts. It further argued that, subsequent to the agreements of 28 October 2005, no other arrangements concerning dispute resolution had been concluded between the parties. Relying on section 8(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act, the applicant company also argued that, contrary to its requirements, the court had decided to leave the claim unexamined, even though the LLC had submitted the relevant request several months after the litigation had started and had already made its submissions on the merits of the claim. Lastly, the applicant company argued that its claim in the part relating to the recovery of the amount of the loan of EUR 100,000 was not connected in any way to the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003. However, the court had decided that the entirety of its claims were to be determined through arbitration. 21.  On 10 December 2007 a three-judge bench of the Commercial Court rejected the complaint submitted by the applicant company. The decision stated that, inter alia, the claims concerning the debt and the loan were interconnected and stemmed from the commercial relationships between the parties based on the contract for the supply of scrap metal. 22.  On 23 July 2008 the applicant company’s representative sent a request for information to the President of the Arbitration Tribunal, asking whether the arbitration clause contained in the contracts concluded between the parties was sufficient for the tribunal to accept the claim for examination, and whether the decisions of the Commercial Court to leave the claim unexamined on the grounds that the determination of the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of a commercial arbitration court provided sufficient grounds for accepting the claim. Translations into Armenian of extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause and copies of the two decisions of the Commercial Court were enclosed with the letter. 23.  On 1 August 2008 the President of the Arbitration Tribunal replied that the question of whether the arbitration clause stipulated in the contracts concluded between the parties was sufficient for it to accept the claim for examination could only be determined once the claim had been lodged. 24.  At the same time, the registrar of the Arbitration Tribunal submitted to the representative of the applicant company a draft arbitration agreement to be concluded with the LLC. According to the applicant company, its representative told the registrar that the conclusion with the LLC of this type of new agreement was at that point impossible and unreasonable, since the Commercial Court had already found that the arbitration clause contained in the contracts was sufficient to start arbitration proceedings. 25.  On 17 September 2008 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Arbitration Tribunal, seeking to recover EUR 116,600, the amount of the loan and interest. A copy of the promissory note signed on 8 November 2002 on providing a loan to the LLC in the amount of EUR 100,000, together with other documents, was attached to the claim. In addition, it was stated in the claim that the decisions of the Commercial Court and extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause had already been submitted to the President of the Arbitration Tribunal with the letter of 23 July 2008. 26.  On 7 October 2008 the President of the Arbitration Tribunal informed the applicant company that its request to start arbitration proceedings would not be granted. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:\n“... The promissory note of 8 November 2002 and the agreement of 28 October 2005, on which your claim was based, do not contain an arbitration clause and, moreover, the parties have not concluded any agreement to submit the disputes arising out of the performance of the above-mentioned promissory note and the agreement to the permanent arbitration institution of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia for determination. Consequently, in the absence of an arbitration agreement between the parties, the [Arbitration Tribunal] cannot start arbitration proceedings.” 27.  In view of the fact that the Commercial Court had been abolished by that time, on 17 October 2008 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Yerevan Civil Court, seeking to recover EUR 116,600 from the LLC, representing the amount of the loan and interest. It submitted that the Arbitration Tribunal had refused to accept the claim for examination even though the Commercial Court had already found that the determination of the dispute fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the applicant company’s right of access to a court had been violated. The applicant company also applied for a freezing injunction in respect of the respondent’s assets in the amount of the claim. 28.  On 12 November 2008 the Yerevan Civil Court accepted the applicant company’s claim for examination and scheduled a preparatory hearing. On the same day it allowed the applicant company’s interlocutory application for a freezing injunction in respect of the property of the LLC in the amount of the claim. 29.  On 27 February 2009 the Yerevan Civil Court transferred the case to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) based on territorial jurisdiction, in view of the fact that on 1 March 2009 the Yerevan Civil Court would be abolished. 30.  On 13 March 2009 the District Court accepted the case for examination. 31.  On 12 June 2009 the LLC, relying on the decision of the Commercial Court of 16 November 2007, requested the District Court to leave the applicant company’s claim unexamined. It submitted, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to substantiate that the grounds for leaving its claim unexamined no longer existed. 32.  The applicant company contested the arguments put forward by the LLC, arguing that the possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal no longer existed since, by a letter of 7 October 2008, examination of the claim had been refused. 33.  On 16 June 2009 the District Court decided to leave the claim lodged by the applicant company unexamined, finding that the refusal to start arbitration proceedings stated in the letter of 7 October 2008 did not substantiate the fact that there was no possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal. The District Court further referred to the previous findings of the Commercial Court to conclude that the claim should be left unexamined. 34.  On 25 June 2009 the applicant company lodged an appeal. It argued, in particular, that the Arbitration Tribunal had been provided with the decisions of the Commercial Court and the contracts concluded between the parties. Having examined them, it had concluded that it had no jurisdiction to determine the dispute. In such circumstances, the rationale for considering that the dispute should be determined by the tribunal was incomprehensible. 35.  In its reply to the applicant company’s appeal, the LLC submitted, inter alia, that the applicant company had failed to provide the Arbitration Tribunal with copies of the relevant extracts of the contracts that contained the arbitration clause and the relevant decisions of the Commercial Court. Therefore, the tribunal had refused to accept the claim. 36.  On 21 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 16 June 2009. In doing so, it stated, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to submit to the Arbitration Tribunal extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause, as a result of which its claim had not been accepted. 37.  On 4 August 2009 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. It argued, in particular, that the Civil Court of Appeal had upheld the lower court’s decision, despite the fact that there was no possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal. The applicant company further pointed out that the argument that it had failed to submit the relevant extracts of the contracts to the tribunal was groundless since, in its claim lodged with that institution, it had expressly mentioned that copies of the decisions of the Commercial Court and extracts of the contracts in question had already been submitted with the letter of 23 July 2008. 38.  On 23 September 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant company’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. In doing so, it stated the following:\n“... As for the letter of the President of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of 7 October 2008 concerning non-acceptance of the claim lodged by [the applicant company], it was based on the grounds that [the applicant company] had not submitted the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy, as required by the Commercial Arbitration Act and [the provisions contained therein], in the absence of which arbitration proceedings could not be started.\nThe Court of Cassation finds that, taking into account the failure to submit to the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy ... and non-examination of [the applicant company’s] claim, [the applicant company] is not deprived of judicial protection in accordance with the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ...”", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kayseri. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant, who was a sergeant in the Army had a traffic accident in 2007 and was declared “disabled” (Adi malül”). 7.  On unspecified date, the applicant requested the General Directorate of Pension Fund (the Fund) (“Emekli-Sandığı”) to modify his retirement statute as service-disabled (“vazife malülü”), but the fund rejected that request. 8.  On 9 August 2007 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the Fund’s decision. 9.  On 22 May 2008 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request. 10.  On 11 September 2008 the applicant’s rectification request was rejected. 11.  During the proceedings, namely on 12 May 2008 and 29 July 2008 the Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Military Administrative Court filed lengthy written opinions on the case. However these opinions were not communicated to the applicant.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The first applicant, Mr Eugeniusz Bukowski, the second applicant, Ms Grażyna Zmysłowska, and the third applicant, Ms Jolanta Barszcz, were born in 1931, in 1960 and 1959 respectively and live in Warsaw. 6.  The property in Warsaw which gives rise to the present application (two adjacent plots of land with a detached house situated on it) was originally co-owned by the applicants’ predecessors, the D. family and the K. family. 7.  The land and the building in question fell under the Decree of 26 October 1945 on Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw by virtue of which the Warsaw Municipality (and after 1950, the State Treasury) became the owner of all plots of land located in Warsaw. Due to subsequent amendments of law, on 6 January 1992 (“the 1992 decision”) the land in question was transferred ex lege to the Warsaw Municipality. 8.  According to a further donation contract, a sale contract and the rules on inheritance, since 1998 the rights and claims to the land and the building have belonged in 3/6 to the third applicant, in 2/6 to the second applicant and in 1/6 to the first applicant. 9.  On 22 June 1988 the third applicant filed with the Mayor of Warsaw an application for restitution of the right of ownership of the building and the land in question pursuant to the Land Administration and Expropriation Act of 29 April 1985 (Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości). On 12 September 1996 the first applicant and on 25 February 1998 the second applicant joined the proceedings. 10.  In a decision of 3 January 2005 the Mayor of Warsaw noted that on 1 January 1998 the new Land Administration Act of 21 August 1997 had entered into force. Pursuant to section 214 of that act restitution of the right of ownership of the land was not possible. The former owners whose property had been taken over by the State and whose claims for restoration had expired were only entitled to apply for perpetual use of the land. Consequently, the Mayor granted the applicants the right of perpetual use of the land and declared that they retained the ownership of the building located thereon. 11.  On 17 January 2005 the applicants applied to have this decision amended and the ownership of the land restored. 12.  On 6 June 2005 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and remitted the case for re-examination. 13.  On 21 November 2005 the Mayor of Warsaw issued a decision, granting the applicants the right of perpetual use of the land. The Mayor decided to return the ownership of the building to the applicants and decided on the annual amount of fees to be paid for the perpetual use of the land. 14.  On 8 December 2005 the applicants appealed against this decision objecting to the amount of fees. 15.  On 5 December 2007 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed the decision of 21 November 2005 (see paragraph 13 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. 16.  On 15 October 2008 the applicants lodged with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court a complaint about the inactivity on the part of the Mayor of Warsaw. 17.  By a judgment of 28 January 2009 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court obliged the Mayor of Warsaw to issue a decision within four weeks. 18.  On 18 June 2009 the Mayor of Warsaw issued a new decision, granting the applicants a right of perpetual use of the land and the ownership of the house. It further fixed the amount of annual fees to be paid for the perpetual use of land. 19.  On 30 June 2009 the applicants applied to the Warsaw Self‑Government Board of Appeal contesting the amount of fees for the perpetual use of land. 20.  On 5 November 2009 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. 21.  On 27 November 2009 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. On 1 June 2010 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected their appeal as lodged out of time. However, subsequently, it granted them leave to appeal out of time. 22.  On 26 January 2011 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 23.  The applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, which was dismissed on 9 August 2012. 24.  On 24 May 2013 the applicants signed a notarial deed by virtue of which they acquired the ownership of the building and a right of perpetual use of the land. 25.  On 6 April 2010 the applicants filed an application to declare the 1992 decision (see paragraph 7 above) null and void. 26.  On 25 February 2011 the Minister of the Interior refused to declare the 1992 decision null and void. 27.  Subsequently, on various dates, the applicants applied to have the case re-examined. Following several remittals on 12 February 2013 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court refused the applicants’ request. 28.  On 14 March 2013 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. However, they have failed to submit any information about the further course of the proceedings. 29.  On 20 June 2013 the applicants applied to the Mayor of Warsaw for transformation of their right of perpetual use of land into the right of ownership under the Act of 25 July 2005 on Transformation of a Right of Perpetual Use into a Right of Ownership. 30.  On 28 August 2013 the Board of the Mokotów District (Zarząd Dzielnicy Mokotów) refused to grant the application. The applicants appealed against this decision on 13 September 2013. 31.  On 3 October 2013 and 3 September 2014 the Warsaw Self‑Government Board of Appeal and the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court, respectively, upheld the first-instance decision. 32.  On 3 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed both decisions. 33.  On 14 April 2016 the Board of the Mokotów District issued a decision on the free of charge transformation of the right of perpetual use of the land into the right of ownership.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Krasnodar. 6.  The applicant had a press card issued to him as a photographer, stating that he was a “correspondent at Agency.Photographer.ru”. According to the applicant’s submissions, he also prepared various texts for publication in print and Internet media outlets on an occasional basis. 7.  In August 2009 the applicant and Ms D. travelled to Abkhazia to prepare a report with photographs on, as he described it, “the life of this unrecognised republic”. 8.  On 27 August 2009 they returned to Russia, arriving on foot at the Adler customs checkpoint. The applicant presented his Russian passport, press card and a customs declaration, stating that he had electronic information devices (a laptop and flash memory cards) in his luggage. The laptop was his own property, however, he also used it for professional purposes. 9.  The applicant and D. were examined by Officer K. In his report to his superior, drawn up at 10.40 a.m. on 27 August 2009, he stated that in view of the applicant’s answers to questions and because of his behaviour, neither of which have been specified to the Court, there was a need to verify the information contained in the applicant’s customs declaration by way of an “inspection procedure” (see paragraph 31 below) in respect of the items in his bag and backpack and to “apply the measure for minimising risk as per profile no. 55/1000000/11062008/00228 ...”. 10.  The Government have submitted to the Court a written statement from K., which reads as follows:\n“Following the customs control measure of an interview and given [D.’s and the applicant’s] behaviour and the nature of their professional activities, a supposition/assumption (предположение) arose that they might have banned printed and/or audio- and video-material with extremist content in their bags ... Since [the applicant] noted in his declaration that he had electronic storage devices, I made a written report to the acting chief officer of the customs checkpoint concerning the need for carrying out an inspection of [the applicant’s] bags in the framework of the risk management system and for involving Officer B., an IT specialist. The inspection was approved by the chief officer by way of his handwritten approval on my report ... The chief officer issued an order for an inspection and authorised B. and myself to use the sampling procedure ... The above-mentioned supposition/assumption was based on the presence of a folder labelled “Extremist” in the laptop ... Data from it was copied on the same day [on the spot] ... to DVD RW disks, which were then sealed in a plastic bag ... [The applicant], B. and two attesting witnesses were present ... The sampling report contained a detailed description of the data that was copied, including the names of the folders that had been copied, their number and the number of files in each folder ... The copying was carried out by Officer B. I did not open or copy any electronic folders or files ... I did not read any ‘correspondence’ (personal correspondence or other text material) ... An order to carry out a forensic examination was issued on 8 September 2009 ... because on 27 August 2009 we had no information about the relevant expert organisations for that type of forensic examination ...” 11.  The Government have also submitted a written statement from Officer B., which reads as follows:\n“In accordance with the order for an inspection [no. ...], which required sampling and which also indicated ‘other’, I copied data from [the applicant’s] laptop to six DVD RW disks ... because we had no other type of disks or electronic storage devices ... Since the laptop’s hard drive was some 160 Gb and at the time we had no means for fast copying, I decided only to copy folders with strange names. I did not read any ‘correspondence’ (personal correspondence or other text material) from the laptop.” 12.  According to the Government, after finding in the directory of the laptop an electronic folder entitled “Extremism (for RR[1])”, which contained a number of photographs, the customs officer decided to copy it and some other folders from the laptop for further examination by an expert, who could determine whether they contained any information of an extremist nature. 13.  The folder contained seven subfolders and 180 files. The applicant made a note in the record, stating that the material had been copied onto rewritable DVD disks (thus technically allowing the data to be modified, including by way of adding data). According to the applicant, the folder had some photographs and a PDF copy of an article entitled “How to incite hatred?” on anti-extremism legislation. The article, written by Ms V., was published in the Russian Reporter magazine in June 2009 and was accompanied by photographs taken by the applicant. The author of the article discussed the controversies and difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Russian anti-extremism legislation, with reference to four criminal cases under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, the material that was copied included documents and text concerning two ethnic groups (the Yazidis and the Meskhetian Turks), who were allegedly under pressure from the Krasnodar regional administration. For instance, a folder named “Isolation” contained texts describing the social problems facing thirty-seven Yazidi families (with references to their personal details), who had been discriminated against by the regional administration. 14.  It can be seen from the record of the sampling that thirty-four folders (containing some 480 subfolders with over 16,300 electronic files) were copied. The folders had the following names (mostly in Russian): In motion, Miscellaneous, Desktop, Foto_projects, On the road, Isolation, Drawings, 1 May, 9 May, 14 February, Law, Extremism (for RR). 15.  It appears that the data from the laptop was first copied to a mobile or external hard drive and then recopied to six DVDs. According to the Government, the information was then deleted from the external hard drive. The original data in the laptop was not deleted and remained intact. 16.  According to the applicant, his laptop remained with Officer B. for several hours. Allegedly, the officer read through the applicant’s correspondence in the ICQ messaging program and copied some 26 gigabytes of data, including the applicant’s personal correspondence, personal photographs and FTP[2]-type passwords. 17.  The applicant submitted the following written statement by Ms D. to the Court:\n“At 10 a.m. we presented ourselves at the border control and presented our passports ... We were then taken to the customs control area ... There the customs officers asked [the applicant] to hand over his press card; so they were aware that he had one ... Officer K. interviewed us about the purpose of our visit to Abkhazia and our professional and civic activities ... I heard an FSB border officer tell the customs officers about the need for a ‘special check’ of our electronic storage devices ... Seeing a laptop in [the applicant’s] bag, the customs officers expressed their intention to copy all the available information ... I was interviewed (again) about my civic activities, my political views and about [the applicant’s] professional activities ... the type of work done and the publications ...” 18.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant was informed that a report had been commissioned from a criminal forensics expert to determine whether the data copied from his laptop had any prohibited “extremist” content. 19.  In November 2009 the expert organisation returned the DVDs to the customs office, stating that it was not possible to carry out the examination, although it gave no reasons. In December 2009 a report was sought from another expert organisation. Apparently, it concluded that the data contained no extremist material. According to the applicant, the DVDs with his data were handed over to him in November 2011. 20.  In the meantime, the applicant brought judicial review proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), challenging the adverse acts and actions of the customs officials. 21.  By a judgment of 25 January 2010 the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed his claims. The court held as follows:\n“Laptops, storage devices, photo- and video-cameras should be considered as ‘goods’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the Customs Code. All goods should be presented for checking by customs, as required under Article 14 of the Code ... The customs authorities are authorised to take samples of goods for examination ... and to use technical devices to speed up the checks ... The data from the applicant’s laptop was copied for the purposes of examination in compliance with Presidential Decree no. 310 on combating fascism and political extremism ... In the circumstances, the fact that the samples taken for examination constituted all the relevant data was justified ...” 22.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the first-instance court’s assessment had not taken into account the requirements relating to Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention, in particular, the requirement that any interference by a public authority had to be shown to be “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. He mentioned the Court’s case-law relating to the seizure of printed material and electronic devices, an action which adversely affects the maintenance of professional secrecy. The applicant also argued as follows:\n(a)  Compliance with Decree no. 310 was not possible without actually reading someone’s correspondence and other personal information, thereby interfering with the constitutional right to the protection of the secrecy of correspondence and other communications. Article 55 of the Constitution only permitted restrictions on people’s rights on the basis of a federal statute; the decree in question was secondary legislation (подзаконный акт) and could not lawfully introduce additional limitations on constitutional rights;\n(b)  The trial court had mentioned that laptops, flash memory cards and the like were “goods” for the purposes of customs legislation. However, the sampling had been carried out in respect of the information they contained rather than the carriers or containers of the information (“the goods”). Access to that information, however, was only allowed on the basis of a court order, as stated in Article 23 of the Constitution;\n(c)  In his “written explanations” to the appeal court, the applicant insisted that in Chapter 25 proceedings a public authority had the burden of proving that its acts were lawful and justified. However, the first-instance court had not required the customs authority to cite a specific legal provision authorising its officials to examine electronic data. According to the applicant, the customs authority representative had refused at the hearing to explain the specific content of the risk profile concerning the applicant, referring to the fact that the information in question was classified and was for internal use only. However, a 2004 Instruction by the Federal Customs Authority only authorised a customs inspection where the risk profile in question provided for that type of measure (see also paragraph 37 below). 23.  On 22 April 2010 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment, essentially reproducing the lower court’s reasoning as follows:\n“Under Articles 403 and 408 of the Customs Code, customs authorities fulfill the tasks and functions assigned to them by federal and other legislation ... and have the authority to apply measures prescribed by the Customs Code for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ...\nArticle 11 of the Customs Code defines goods (for the purposes of customs legislation) as movable property which is being transferred across the customs border. This includes laptops, memory flash cards, photo-cameras, video-cameras, printed material and the like. Article 14 of the Code provides that all such goods should be subject to customs clearance and customs control. Article 123 of the Code provides that goods should be declared when being transferred across the customs border. Article 124 of the Code provides that the declaration is made by way of presenting a written declaration or otherwise ... The transfer of goods by individuals for personal use is prescribed by Chapter 23 of the Customs Code, and Government decree no. 715 of 27 November 2003 and no. 718 of 29 November 2003. Article 13 of the Code provides that goods which are prohibited from being transferred to Russia must be removed from Russia.\nBy a letter of 16 July 2008 the Federal Customs Authority listed the goods which are banned from Russian territory ... By a letter of 3 May 2006 the Authority listed the goods that must be declared to customs.\nThe procedure for and the types of customs checks are described in Chapters 34-37 of the Code. Article 358 of the Code provides that customs checks are based on the principle of selectiveness and, as a rule, should be limited to such forms of control as are sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ... When selecting the form of control, the risk management approach is applied, which is based on the effective use of resources for preventing violations of the legislation ... Risk is defined as a probability of non-compliance with customs legislation.\nWhen carrying out a customs check, the customs authority is allowed to take samples of goods which are needed for further assessment. The relevant procedure is defined in Article 383 of the Code and Customs Authority order no. 1519 of 23 December 2003. When carrying out a customs check, the authority is allowed to use technical means to limit the time of such checks; the list and procedures for their use are defined in Article 388 of the Code and in Customs Authority order no. 1220 of 29 October 2003 ...\nOrder no. 677 of 10 November 1995 by the Customs Authority (‘On preventing the transfer of prohibited printed, audio- and video-material across the customs border’) does not contradict the current customs legislation and has not been revoked because the current Customs Code contains Article 13 concerning bans and limitations on the transfer of goods across the customs border ...\nIn view of the above, the court agrees with the first-instance court that the customs inspection was authorised and carried out within customs control procedures and that the data was copied in line with Russian Presidential Decree no. 310 of 23 March 1995 ... Article 2 of the decree clearly requires the customs authority to ‘arrest and bring to liability persons who disseminate printed, cinematographic, audio-, photo- or video-materials which are aimed at being propaganda in favour of fascism, at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity; and to take measures for seizing printed material of that kind’ ...\nArticle 383 of the Code concerning the minimal amount of samples was complied with because the information taken for sampling was not homogenous. Thus when the samples were taken, it was necessary to take the full amount of information from the device ...\nIn addition, it is noted that under Article 10 of the Customs Code, information received by customs officials may be used exclusively for the purposes of customs legislation ...\nCustoms officials are not authorised to disclose that information or transfer it to third persons, except as set down in the Code or other legislation ...” 24.  The applicant does not appear to have been prosecuted subsequently in criminal, administrative or other proceedings in connection with the data obtained from his laptop by the customs authorities.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  On 6 August 2003 the Cabinet of Ministers decided that Kryvorizhstal State Metallurgical Enterprise (hereinafter “Kryvorizhstal”) was to be privatised. At the time Kryvorizhstal was one of the world’s largest steel manufacturing companies, employing about 60,000 people and producing about 20% of Ukraine’s annual steel supply. On 4 November 2003 the Ministry of Economy and European Integration included Kryvorizhstal in a list of State-owned assets which were to be privatised. Subsequently, the Ministry of Industrial Policy and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market adopted decisions designed to ensure the privatisation of the enterprise. 7.  The applicant company was founded in April 2004 by nine private companies, five of which were owned or controlled by A., one of the leaders of the Party of Regions. Members of that party held the majority of posts in the Cabinet of Ministers in the period 2003-2004, including the post of Prime Minister. The remaining four companies were owned or controlled by P., the son-in-law of Mr L. Kuchma, the second President of Ukraine who held the post from 19 July 1994 to 23 January 2005. 8.  On 12 May 2004 the State Property Fund (“the Fund”) announced a bidding competition for the purchase of 93.02% of the share capital of Kryvorizhstal. A condition of bidding was that a bidder had to have produced one million tons of charcoal of Ukrainian origin and two million tons of steel in Ukraine in each of the three years preceding the competition. The applicant company took part in that competition. 9.  Out of six bids submitted by various companies, the Fund selected bids by the applicant company and Consortium Industrial Group, finding that these companies satisfied the conditions of the competition. 10.  On 14 June 2004 the applicant company was declared the winner (successful bidder) of the bidding competition. On the same day the applicant company concluded a purchase contract with the Fund and paid 4,260,000,000 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH), the equivalent of about 608,000,000 euros (EUR) at the time, for the shares at issue. The shares were transferred to the applicant company’s deposit account at ING Bank Ukraine. 11.  On 23 July 2004 the applicant company appointed T. to represent it as the owner of the Kryvorizhstal shares and to complete the formalities of the transfer pursuant to the contract of 14 June 2004. 12.  Without any further specification or evidence, the applicant company stated that it had invested substantial financial resources in Kryvorizhstal during the period of its control. 13.  The lawfulness and transparency of the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal was contested by the political opposition, whose leaders in 2004 were Mr V. Yushchenko, Mrs Y. Tymoshenko and Mr O. Moroz. In their public statements, they all accused President Kuchma, P. and A. of fraud, and called for the enterprise to be returned to the State. 14.  During the 2004 presidential election campaign the issue was debated by two main rivals, Mr Yushchenko and Mr Yanukovych. Mr Yanukovych, whose candidature was openly supported by President Kuchma and A., insisted that the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been lawful and fair. 15.  Between late November 2004 and January 2005 a series of protests took place in the immediate aftermath of the run-off vote of the 2004 election, an election which, according to numerous national and international reports, was compromised by massive corruption, voter intimidation and direct electoral fraud. These events are commonly known as the Orange Revolution. 16.  Following the revote of 26 December 2004, Mr Yanukovych lost the election to Mr Yushchenko, who became the third President of Ukraine on 23 January 2005. On 24 January 2005 Mrs Tymoshenko was appointed to the post of interim Prime Minister. On 4 February 2005 the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian Parliament) approved the appointment of the new Cabinet of Ministers, headed by her. The Party of Regions formed the parliamentary opposition. 17.  According to different media reports submitted by the applicant company, between January and April 2005 President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko made public statements that the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been unlawful, and that the enterprise would be returned to the State and subsequently resold. 18.  In particular, in an interview of 26 January 2005 Prime Minister Tymoshenko said that “Ukrainian enterprises, like Kryvorizhstal, which had blatantly been stolen, had to be returned to the State.” 19.  On 4 February 2005 President Yushchenko made the following statement when addressing the Verkhovna Rada:\n“...I promise that fair privatisation will be carried out this year. Those facilities which were stolen, starting with Kryvorizhstal, will be returned to the State ...” 20.  On 12 February 2005 the Cabinet of Ministers revoked its decision of 6 August 2003 by which the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been launched. On 15 February 2005 the Fund also revoked its decisions concerning the privatisation. 21.  On 8 June 2005 the State took control of Kryvorizhstal, pursuant to commercial court decisions declaring its privatisation unlawful (see paragraphs 51-53 and 56-57 below). By a decree of 11 June 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers declared the contract of 14 June 2004 invalid and withdrew the Kryvorizhstal shares from the applicant company. 22.  On an unspecified date the money paid for the shares in the enterprise in 2004 was returned to the applicant company. 23.  By two decrees of 23 June 2005, the Cabinet of Ministers launched the procedures for resale of 93.02% of Kryvorizhstal’s share capital. On 9 August 2005 it approved the bidding conditions. The next day the bidding competition was officially announced. 24.  The applicant company did not participate in the competition. Instead, it challenged the authorities’ decrees issued in February and June 2005 before the commercial courts and the courts of general jurisdiction, but to no avail. The applicant company did not provide any further details of those proceedings. 25.  On 24 October 2005 the bidding competition was completed by an auction, which was broadcast live by major television stations. Mittal Steel Germany GmbH was declared the successful bidder. On 28 October 2005 it concluded a purchase contract with the Fund and became the new owner of 93.02% of Kryvorizhstal’s share capital, for the price of UAH 24,200,000,000, the equivalent of about EUR 3,964,021,752 at the time. Eventually, Mittal Steel Germany GmbH was succeeded by ArcelorMittal Duisburg GmbH, which, according to the documents submitted by that company, made significant investments in Kryvorizhstal. 26.  According to the applicant company, after the 2004 election A. was targeted for his political expression and association. In particular, companies which he owned or controlled were subjected to various checks by the authorities. The authorities allegedly attempted to nationalise some of those companies, though they were unsuccessful. The applicant company submitted copies of several petitions to the domestic authorities made by third parties with a view to preventing the nationalisation of those companies. 27.  On 28 May, 3 and 11 June 2004 respectively, three private individuals, N., a lawyer practising in Kyiv, S. and Kh., members of Parliament, lodged with the Golosiivskyy District Court of Kyiv three separate administrative law complaints against the decisions of the Fund and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market concerning the organisation of the 2004 bidding competition, contending that those decisions had violated the right of every citizen to participate in the privatisation of State property. 28.  On an unspecified date the President of the Kyiv Court of Appeal transferred the case to the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv (“the Pecherskyy Court”). By separate decisions of 8 and 14 June 2004, the latter court refused to consider those complaints, and ordered that its decisions be immediately “enforced”. No copy of those decisions was provided to the Court. 29.  On 2 August 2004 the Kyiv Court of Appeal changed the decisions of 8 and 14 June 2004 in part by excluding the provisions concerning their immediate enforcement. 30.  On 14 June 2004 I., a private individual, and N. lodged with the Shevchenkivskyy District Court of Kyiv a claim against the Fund, the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, and ING Bank Ukraine, challenging the validity of their decisions and actions in connection with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal. On an unspecified date the case was transferred to the Pecherskyy Court. 31.  At the claimants’ request, the applicant company was invited to participate in the proceedings as a third party. By letters of 20 October and 25 November 2004, the Pecherskyy district prosecutor applied to the court for leave to participate in the case to represent the interests of I. and those of the State. The prosecutor’s application was granted. 32.  On 25 June 2004 Consortium Industrial Group, the losing party in the 2004 bidding competition, instituted proceedings in the Kyiv Commercial Court against the applicant company, the Fund, the Ministry of Industrial Policy and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, challenging the validity of the authorities’ decisions adopted in connection with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal and the contract of 14 June 2004. It contended that the 2004 bidding competition had been unlawful and unfair. 33.  In particular, Consortium Industrial Group argued that the shares in Kryvorizhstal had not been issued in accordance with the law; that the competition had not been announced in due time; that the conditions of the competition had been too narrow and restrictive, thereby limiting the circle of potential bidders and disrespecting the statutory right of every citizen to participate in the privatisation of State assets; that the shares should have been sold through the stock exchange; and that its total offer, including the money it had planned to invest in Kryvorizhstal, had been higher than the amount paid by the applicant company for the shares in the enterprise. It also argued that, because the complaints by three private individuals against the decisions concerning the organisation of the 2004 bidding competition had been ongoing before the courts in the period May-June 2004, any decision adopted between 8 and 14 June 2004 in relation to the competition had been invalid. 34.  On 5 July 2004 the applicant company lodged a counterclaim against the other parties to the proceedings, asking the court to endorse its right to 93.02% of the Kryvorizhstal shares. 35.  By a procedural ruling of 20 July 2004, the Kyiv Commercial Court found that the Office of the Prosecutor General had to participate in the proceedings, and ordered it to designate a representative in the proceedings. Notwithstanding that ruling, no prosecutor appeared before the Kyiv Commercial Court or the Higher Commercial Court in 2004. 37.  On 19 August 2004 the Kyiv Commercial Court, having considered the arguments of Consortium Industrial Group in detail, dismissed them as unsubstantiated and found that the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal had been carried out in accordance with the relevant legislation. The court held, inter alia, that citizens’ rights to participate in the privatisation had not been restricted, since they had been free to establish companies and participate in the competition through such companies. It also stated that the complaints by the private individuals against the competition had not been lodged in accordance with the law, and thus had had no suspensive effect. The court further endorsed the applicant company’s property rights over the Kryvorizhstal shares, and banned any actions by the defendants which could violate these rights. 39.  On 22 October 2004 the Higher Commercial Court held a hearing in the presence of the parties’ representatives and upheld the judgment of 19 August 2004. The parties made no appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of 22 October 2004. 40.  On 7 February 2005 the Prosecutor General lodged a cassation appeal in the interests of the State with the Supreme Court, alleging that the contested decisions of the Kyiv Commercial Court and the Higher Commercial Court concerned the rights and obligations of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prosecutor General sought an extension of the time-limit for lodging his appeal, stating, without giving any further details, that he had missed it since he had only become aware of the decision of 22 October 2004 in the course of examining a complaint by S. to the Prosecutor General. According to the Government, the Office of the Prosecutor General had received that complaint on 30 December 2004, and it had been directed mainly against the decision of the Higher Commercial Court of 22 October 2004. 41.  In his appeal, the Prosecutor General mainly challenged the application of the law by the Kyiv Commercial Court and the Higher Commercial Court, and alleged that those courts’ decisions had been inconsistent with a decision of the Supreme Court in a similar case. He also stated that the courts had failed to invite the Cabinet of Ministers to take part in the proceedings, although the subject matter had concerned its functions under the relevant privatisation regulations. 42.  On 17 February 2005 the Supreme Court granted the extension requested and opened the proceedings on the merits of the Prosecutor General’s cassation appeal. No copy of that procedural ruling was provided to the Court. 43.  On 1 March 2005 the Supreme Court allowed the appeal by the Prosecutor General, quashed the decisions of the lower courts, and remitted the case for fresh consideration. It found that under Ukrainian law neither Consortium Industrial Group nor the applicant company had been eligible to participate in the 2004 bidding competition; that the competition had not been announced in due time, as required by law; and that the lower courts, when allowing the applicant company’s counterclaim, had erred in applying the rules of procedure, which stated that no counterclaim could be lodged by a defendant against another defendant in the proceedings. 44.  On 21 March 2005 the Deputy Prosecutor General lodged with the Kyiv Commercial Court, to which the case had been remitted, a claim in the interests of the State and on behalf of the Fund against the applicant company, the Ministry of Industrial Policy, and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market. His claim was directed against the decisions concerning the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal and the contract of 14 June 2004. He also sought the return of the Kryvorizhstal shares to the Fund, and asked the court to seize the shares as a temporary measure until the dispute was finally resolved. 45.  The Deputy Prosecutor General argued that the 2004 bidding competition had not been organised in a lawful and fair way, particularly regarding the conditions which the potential bidders had had to satisfy. He further submitted that the bidders whose offers had been chosen had not satisfied the legislative requirements for participating in that competition. 46.  On 23 March 2005 the court held a hearing in camera at which it decided to open the proceedings and invite the parties to submit their arguments on the case. It also scheduled the next hearing for 1 April 2005. 47.  On 1 April 2005 the court ordered that ING Bank Ukraine, where the shares at issue had been deposited, participate in the case as a defendant. The Office of the General Prosecutor was granted leave to take part in the proceedings as a third party on behalf of the Cabinet of Ministers. 48.  On 15 April 2005 the applicant company requested that the court allow journalists to attend the hearings in the case. The court rejected that application, finding that the journalists had not obtained official authorisation from the court administration. 50.  On 21 April 2005 a copy of the Pecherskyy Court’s decision of 21 April 2005 (see paragraph 83 below) was included in the case file and examined by the court at a hearing on the same day. 51.  On 22 April 2005 the court delivered a judgment in the case whereby it allowed the claims of Consortium Industrial Group and the Office of the Prosecutor General, which it found to be of the same nature. It annulled the authorities’ decisions concerning the 2004 privatisation and the contract of 14 June 2004, and ordered the Fund to return the money paid by the applicant company for the Kryvorizhstal shares. The applicant company’s counterclaim was rejected, and it was ordered to return the shares to the Fund and pay UAH 1,903, the equivalent of about EUR 291 at the time, to the State for costs and expenses. 52.  The court held that the Fund had failed to announce the competition in due time; that it had unlawfully introduced a condition concerning the production of charcoal and steel; that the Fund had failed to set out specific conditions of sale of certain number of the Kryvorizhstal shares outside the bidding competition; that the Fund’s decisions issued between 8 and 14 June 2004 in relation to the competition had been invalid, as the complaints of three private individuals against the decisions concerning the organisation of the 2004 bidding competition had been ongoing before the courts during that period; and that the applicant company and Consortium Industrial Group had unlawfully been allowed to participate in the competition. 53.  By a procedural ruling of 28 April 2005, the same court seized the shares at issue. On the same day, bailiffs started enforcement proceedings in respect of that ruling. 54.  The applicant company appealed against the judgment of 22 April 2005 and the ruling of 28 April 2005. According to the text of the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal’s decision of 2 June 2005 (see paragraph 56 below), the applicant company contended that the Kyiv Commercial Court had wrongly established the circumstances of the case, and that it had erred in applying the law. The applicant company further challenged the lawfulness of the bailiffs’ actions as regards enforcement of the ruling of 28 April 2005. No copy of the applicant company’s appeal was provided to the Court. 55.  In the appeal proceedings, the applicant company asked the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal to suspend the proceedings before the commercial courts pending the outcome of the proceedings before the courts of general jurisdiction (see paragraphs 81-87 below). The court rejected that application on the grounds that the latter proceedings were not decisive for the outcome of the commercial case. 56.  On 2 June 2005 the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal changed the judgment of 22 April 2005 in part. In particular, the appeal court found that the claims by Consortium Industrial Group had to be rejected, as it had not been eligible to participate in the 2004 bidding competition. The applicant company’s appeal was dismissed as unsubstantiated. 57.  By the same decision, the appeal court annulled the ruling of 28 April 2005 for non-compliance with the procedural rules, and refused to consider the applicant company’s complaints against the bailiffs, on the basis that the matter fell outside its jurisdiction. The court further ruled to seize the Kryvorizhstal shares for the purpose of securing the claim by the Office of the Prosecutor General. 58.  The applicant company appealed in cassation. No copy of the cassation appeal was provided to the Court. 59.  On 21 July 2005 the Higher Commercial Court rejected the applicant company’s cassation appeal as unsubstantiated. 60.  On 31 August 2005 a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the applicant company’s further cassation appeal. No copy of that appeal was provided to the Court. 61.  In the course of the proceedings before the commercial courts between February and June 2005 the applicant company challenged the impartiality of the judges and the courts dealing with its case on a number of occasions, alleging that their decisions and actions were influenced by government officials. According to the text of the judgment of the Kyiv Commercial Court of 22 April 2005 and the decision of the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal of 2 June 2005 (see paragraphs 51-52 and 56‑57 above), the applicant company’s procedural applications were rejected as unsubstantiated. No further explanation in that regard was given by the courts. 62.  After 1 March 2005, and while the applicant company’s case was being considered by the commercial courts, the President and the Prime Minister made a number of public statements concerning the proceedings. The applicant company submitted different media reports reproducing and/or interpreting those statements. The Government argued that some of the reports had not interpreted the statements accurately. In particular, they referred to the reports concerning the Prime Minister’s press conference of 5 April 2005, at which she had made statements as to when the ongoing proceedings before the Kyiv Commercial Court might be completed. 63.  According to a number of other reports, at a press conference of 11 April 2005 the Prime Minister said:\n“... Facilities such as Kryvorizhstal ... I think that today the [authorities] are involved in the court proceedings concerning the return of those assets to the State. We are confident that we have a clear position [in relation to the case], and these enterprises will be returned to the State ...”\nIn an interview of 14 April 2005 the President stated:\n“... If the owners refuse to cooperate voluntarily, we will go down the legal route and will undoubtedly win [the case]. [However,] this will take several months...\nThe facility has been stolen, and the cost of that theft is several billion [United States] dollars. For me, this is a fact...\nWe prepare the terms of a new [bidding] competition...” 64.  On 23 April 2005, commenting on the possibility that the applicant company could appeal against the judgment of 22 April 2005, the Prime Minister stated:\n“... This will be an important decision by the appeal [court]. It will be evidence not only of the court’s objectivity, but also of the [past] negotiations behind closed doors between various representatives from the authorities and the business...” 65.  In July 2004 Consortium Industrial Group instituted proceedings in the Pecherskyy Court against the applicant company, the Fund, the Ministry of Industrial Policy and the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market, challenging the validity of the authorities’ decisions issued in connection with the privatisation of Kryvorizhstal and the contract of 14 June 2004. Consortium Industrial Group relied mainly on the same circumstances and considerations referred to in its claims before the commercial courts. Its claims before the courts of general jurisdiction contained an additional element – a challenge to the validity of T.’s appointment on 23 July 2004 as the applicant company’s representative in the procedures following the 2004 bidding competition. 66.  T. took part in the proceedings as a defendant. Kryvorizhstal participated in the proceedings as a third party. 67.  On 25 August 2004 the court delivered a judgment dismissing the claims of Consortium Industrial Group. For the most part, it contained identical reasons to those in the judgment of the Kyiv Commercial Court of 19 August 2004 (see paragraph 37 above). 68.  On 1 and 27 December 2004 respectively the Kyiv Court of Appeal and a panel of three judges of the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 25 August 2004. 69.  On 9 February 2005 N. lodged an application for review of the above case with the Pecherskyy Court, in the light of newly discovered circumstances. In particular, she argued that the findings concerning the right of every citizen to participate in the privatisation of State assets contained in the judgment of 25 August 2004 had been contrary to the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 December 2004 (see paragraph 99 below). She also contended that the courts had not been aware of the fact that the decisions of the Pecherskyy Court of 8 and 14 June 2004 had been challenged on appeal, and thus they had not become final before 2 August 2004. 70.  N.’s application was dealt with by the same judge of the Pecherskyy Court who had sat in the main proceedings. 71.  By a telegram of 15 February 2005, the court informed the applicant company that the next day it would hold a hearing, at the request of N.. 72.  On 15 February 2005 the applicant company lodged with the court an application to consult the case file. The application was not granted. 73.  On 16 February 2005 the court held a hearing on the merits of N.’s application. Consortium Industrial Group, T., the State Commission on Securities and the Stock Market and Kryvorizhstal, who had been the parties to the main proceedings, did not take part in the hearing. 74.  The representatives of the applicant company requested leave to consult the case file and the adjournment of the hearing on the grounds that they had not been informed about the merits of the application before the hearing, and accordingly had not been able to prepare for it. They also sought the withdrawal of the judge dealing with the case, challenging her impartiality. 75.  The judge rejected the applications by the applicant company’s representatives, and read out the application by N. 76.  The applicant company’s representatives objected to the application, arguing that N. was not entitled to ask for a review of the case, since she had not been a party to the original proceedings, and there were no newly discovered circumstances or other reasons capable of warranting the reopening of the proceedings. 77.  The applicant company’s representatives did not receive a copy of the application either before or during the hearing. 78.  On 17 February 2005 the court allowed the application. It found that the right of every citizen, including that of N., to participate in privatisation and challenge its lawfulness had been confirmed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1 December 2004. It also held that the ruling of 8 June 2004 on N.’s complaint concerning the 2004 competition had not entered into force at the time when the competition had taken place, and thus it could not have served as one of the grounds for rejecting the claims by Consortium Industrial Group. 79.  The court quashed its judgment of 25 August 2004 and held that the higher courts’ decisions of 1 and 27 December 2004 were no longer valid. 80.  On an unspecified date the case was transferred to another judge of the Pecherskyy Court for fresh examination. 81.  On 28 February 2005, following an application by N., the Pecherskyy Court decided to examine the claims of I., N., and Consortium Industrial Group (see paragraphs 30 and 65 above) jointly, holding that they were of the same nature and concerned the same defendants. 82.  On an unspecified date the applicant company lodged an application for review of the ruling of 17 February 2005 with the same court, in the light of newly discovered circumstances. 83.  On 21 April 2005 the court granted the application by the applicant company, quashed the ruling of 17 February 2005, and rejected N.’s application of 9 February 2005 on the grounds that she had not participated in the original proceedings concerning the claims by Consortium Industrial Group. 84.  By a separate ruling of the same date, the court rejected the claims by I. and N., finding that they had not participated in the 2004 bidding competition and did not have an arguable claim in respect of the subject matter of the proceedings. The court held that their claims represented a disguised attempt to settle a dispute between legal entities falling within the jurisdiction of commercial courts. 85.  By decisions of 20 and 27 July 2005, the Kyiv Court of Appeal quashed the ruling of 21 April 2005, stating that, in the light of newly discovered circumstances, the ruling of 17 February 2005 was not to be reviewed, and that, with regard to Article 6 of the Convention, the Pecherskyy Court had unlawfully limited I.’s and N.’s right of access to a court. 86.  On 15 October 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, acting as a court of cassation, upheld the decisions of 20 and 27 July 2005. 87.  The case was remitted to the Pecherskyy Court, which on 6 February 2008 decided not to examine the claim of Consortium Industrial Group, because its representatives had failed to appear before the court. 88.  No appeal was lodged against the decision of 6 February 2008. According to the Government, on the basis of that decision the joined proceedings before the courts of general jurisdiction were terminated. The applicant company did not contest this.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicants are fifty Russian nationals. Their dates of birth and places of residence are listed in Appendixes I, II, III and IV. 8.  The applicants are former military servicemen. They all obtained final court decisions in their favour ordering military units to provide them with housing before their dismissal from military service. The respective court orders’ details, such as dates of the judgments and their entry into force and the respective court’s names, are summarised in the Appendixes. 9.  In some cases the defendants were subsequently replaced by the Housing Provision Department of the Ministry of Defense. 10.  The judgment in case of Mr Nazarov has remained unenforced to date. The judgments in favour of other applicants were enforced on the dates listed in the Appendixes below. 11.  Pursuant to the judgment in favour of Mr Medinskiy (Appendix III) the authorities decided to allocate a flat to the applicant on 6 November 2015. According to the transfer and acceptance act, the applicant accepted the flat on 20 November 2015. On 21 January 2016 he registered his title to the flat. 12.  Pursuant to the judgment in favour of Mr Vedernikov (Appendix III) the authorities decided to allocate a flat to the applicant on 27 October 2015. According to the transfer and acceptance act, the applicant accepted the flat on 13 November 2015. On 11 January 2016 he registered his title to the flat. 13.  Since 1999 Mr Nazarov owned a ¼ share in a flat (15 sq.m.) in Pushkino, the Moscow Region. In 2007 the housing commission of the military unit considered his housing situation, noted his title to a share in the flat and decided to put the applicant on the list of persons in need of housing. 14.  On 13 January 2009 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison ordered the housing commission of the military unit to provide him with housing in Moscow, as indicated in the appended table. On 27 January 2011 the same court replaced the defendant by the Housing Provision Department of the Ministry of Defense. 15.  Between 18 August 2009 and 24 June 2011 the applicant had a ½ share in tenancy of a flat in the Smolensk Region. 16.  On 25 April 2013 the Hosing Department of the Ministry of Defense found that overall size of the applicant’s living premises (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above) exceeded the housing norms for the respective region. Accordingly, the debtor authority decided to strike his name off the list of persons in need of housing. 17.  On 24 February 2014 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison and on 26 June 2014 the appeal court upheld lawfulness of the above decision. 18.  In the meantime, the defendant twice applied to the domestic courts with a request for termination of the enforcement proceedings, as the applicant’s name had been removed from the list of persons in need of housing, and there had “no longer been a possibility to enforce the judgment”. 19.  On 29 November 2013 the Presnenskiy District Court allowed the request. On 14 April 2014 the Moscow City Court quashed the lower court’s decision on appeal and issued a new ruling dismissing the request in full. The court found that the first-instance court had incorrectly interpreted the applicable law. There was no evidence that the judgment in the applicant’s favour could no longer be enforced. It was not quashed or amended. A “loss of a possibility to enforce” should have been “of an objective nature” and could not be conditional on the circumstances depending on the debtor itself. The defendant’s arguments were rather indicative of its disagreement with the court’s findings in the judgment of 13 January 2009, but did not constitute a ground for termination of the enforcement proceedings. 20.  On 23 December 2014 the first-instance court and on 4 September 2015 the Moscow City Court acting as an appeal instance rejected the defendant’s new request to terminate the enforcement, based this time, inter alia, on the judgment of 24 February 2014 (see paragraph 17 above). The courts gave the same reasons for the refusal as in the previous round of the similar proceedings. 21.  In 2016 the defendant again requested the court to terminate the enforcement proceedings, the application being lodged this time with a military court. The registry of the military court sent to the applicant notifications of the hearing by registered mail and by telegram to his known address. The notifications had not been delivered as the flat was closed. On 20 December 2016 the registry of the court informed the applicant of the date and place of the hearing by phone, as confirmed by a “telephonogram” (a telephone conversation record). The applicant stated in the telephone conversation that he had no longer lived at the address he had provided to the court and had refused to give his new address. 22.  On 21 December 2016 the Military Court of the Moscow Garrison granted the request. With reference to the judgment of 24 February 2014 (see paragraph 17 above) it found established that as of 25 April 2013 the applicant had no longer been in need of the housing, which meant that the defendant had no longer had a possibility to enforce the judgment of 2 February 2009. 23.  The applicant was not present at the hearing. The decision specified that he had been duly notified of the date and time of the examination of the case. 24.  On 23 December 2016 he collected the telegram (see paragraph 21 above) from the post office. 25.  The applicant appealed, referring, inter alia, to the two earlier decisions on the same matter rejecting the defendant’s similar requests, and argued that he had not been duly notified of the hearing in his case. 26.  On 16 February 2017 the Civil Division of the Military Court of the Moscow Command upheld the decision on appeal. It found, inter alia, that the defendant’s prolonged failure to take actions to enforce the judgment in the applicant’s favour did not have any bearing on the lawfulness of the decision to discontinue the enforcement, as since 2013 the applicant had no longer been entitled to State housing. The proceedings were held in written form. 27.  As regards the absence from the first-instance hearing, the appeal court noted that the notifications of the hearing had been sent to the applicant by registered mail and by telegram to his known address, but had not been delivered as the flat had been closed and the applicant had failed to collect the telegram pursuant to a notification thereof. Further, on 20 December 2016 he was informed of the date and the place of the hearing by phone. The court also noted his reply in the telephone conversation that he had no longer lived at the address he had provided to the court, as well as his refusal to provide his new address, and rejected the complaint. 28.  On 3 May 2017 a judge of the Military Court of the Moscow Command rejected the applicant’s first leave for cassation appeal. The judge found, in particular, that the decisions of the Presnenskiy District court referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20 had not had a res judicata effect on the proceedings as the domestic law did not prohibit the debtor from lodging a repeated request for termination of the enforcement proceedings. 29.  On 20 July 2017 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation refused to grant leave for the second cassation appeal against the decision of 21 December 2016. 30.  On 15 March 2015 the applicant Mr Bazhenov (Appendix II) died. On 23 May 2015 his widow, Ms Leyla Khalilyevna Bazhenova, born on 13 July 1973, expressed a wish to maintain the application in his stead, and submitted a copy of the certificate confirming that she was her late husband’s legal heir. 31.  Two applicants, Mr Balyas and Mr Golovachev, withdrew their complaints on the dates specified in Appendix IV.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Gebze. 6.  On 17 August 2002 a certain H.A. was found dead in a junkyard. The police initiated an investigation into the matter to find the perpetrators. 7.  On 20 August 2002 the applicant, a minor at the time, was brought to the police headquarters, where he was searched. Following the search, he went through a medical examination. The report drawn up after that examination noted that he did not have any complaints and that there were no signs of injury on his body. 8.  On 21 August 2002 at 1.30 p.m. another report was issued in respect of the applicant, indicating that there were no traces of ill-treatment on him. He was released afterwards. 9.  The same day the applicant’s house was searched by the police, who seized certain objects. The search records prepared by the police noted that the applicant was suspected of having committed the crime. 10.  At around 11 p.m. the applicant was brought to the police headquarters once again, together with some others. 11.  On 22 August 2002 he gave his statements before the police in the absence of a lawyer and indicated that he had spent the day with his friends on 16 August 2002, the day H.A. had been killed. The medical report prepared following his examination reiterated the findings of the previous reports, noting no signs of injury on his body. Several members of the applicant’s family were also questioned the same day. The applicant and the others were all released after their questioning. 12.  On 26 August 2002 the applicant turned eighteen years of age. 13.  On 20 September 2002 the applicant was questioned by the police once again. In the absence of a lawyer, he submitted that he had known H.A. as the grandmother of one of his friends and that when he had heard of the murder, he had speculated with his friends that she could have been killed for the jewellery she wore. 14.  A police report prepared on 11 October 2002 established that according to the results of a DNA test, the blood stains on a tile-cutting machine found at the applicant’s house matched the sample tissues taken from the deceased. Subsequently, the applicant, other members of his family and his friend A.S. were arrested. The search and arrest records held by the police noted that all of those arrested had been placed in police custody following their medical examinations. The medical report concerning the applicant noted no signs of injury. 15.  On 12 October 2002 the police conducted a reconstruction of the events at the applicant’s house, during which he confessed to having killed H.A. He maintained that he had hit her on the head with a wooden club in the basement of their house, with the intention of stealing her jewellery, and that he had put her in a nylon bag afterwards as he had panicked. He went on to describe in detail how he had disposed of the body and showed the police the pushcart he had used to that effect. According to the police records bearing the applicant’s signature, the applicant did not benefit from the assistance of a lawyer during the reconstruction of events and was not informed of his rights to request legal assistance and to remain silent. 16.  Subsequently, the applicant was taken back to police station, where he reiterated his confession in the absence of a lawyer. He also added certain details such as the locations of the jewellery stores in Istanbul and İzmir where he had changed the deceased’s jewellery, and how he had spent the money in İzmir with his friend A.S., who had not known how he had obtained it. His statements were transcribed on a form, on the first page of which there was a pre-printed message stating, inter alia, that the person being questioned had been informed of his right to remain silent and to choose a lawyer, and that he refused legal assistance. 17.  On 13 October 2002, at the end of the applicant’s police custody, another medical report was drawn up, again indicating no signs of ill‑treatment on his body. 18.  On 13 October 2002 the applicant was questioned by the Gebze Public Prosecutor. Pursuant to his request, he was assisted by a lawyer appointed by the Bar Association during the questioning. He reiterated his previous statements and maintained that he accepted those he had made before the police. He argued, however, that electric shocks had been administered to him through his penis and small toe during his time in police custody. 19.  A medical examination conducted pursuant to the Public Prosecutor’s request revealed no traces of injury on the applicant’s penis, small toe or any other part of his body. 20.  On the same day the applicant repeated his previous statements before the investigating judge and claimed once again that he had been subjected to electric shocks while in police custody. He was subsequently placed in detention on remand. 21.  On 22 October 2002 the Public Prosecutor filed an indictment with the Gebze Assize Court, accusing the applicant of murder and robbery. 22.  At the first hearing held on 19 November 2002, the applicant denied his previous statements and argued that he had had to confess to having committed the murder as a result of the ill-treatment inflicted on him. He requested that the appointed lawyer who had been present during his questioning by the Public Prosecutor and the investigating judge be heard as a witness. The court rejected that request. 23.  In a petition dated 11 September 2003, the applicant argued that he had been coerced into making self-incriminating statements, in that he had been subjected to ill-treatment and psychological duress by the police, who had threatened him with bringing charges against his family members if he did not confess to having murdered H.A. He submitted that his waiver of his right to legal assistance had not been unequivocal, which had been proven by the fact that he had requested a lawyer before the Public Prosecutor, as soon as his police custody ended. He further contested the relevance of the DNA examination with regard to the tile-cutting machine, arguing that the court should conduct an examination of the wooden club indicated in his police statements, in order to prove that his confessions had not been genuine. 24.  On 16 October 2003 the Gebze Assize Court held that it lacked jurisdiction and forwarded the case to the Kocaeli Juvenile Court as the applicant had been a minor at the time of the murder. During the course of the thirteen hearings before it, the Assize Court obtained a report from the Istanbul Forensics Institute and heard all the police officers involved in the applicant’s questioning. It further examined two witnesses, namely, the owners of the jewellery stores described by the applicant, who stated that they had not seen him before. 25.  During the course of the hearings before the Juvenile Court, the applicant requested the court to obtain a new forensics report, claiming that there were discrepancies between the police report and that prepared by the Istanbul Forensics Institute, as the latter noted that no blood sample could be found on either the tile-cutting machine or the wooden club. The court rejected that request. Nevertheless, it re-examined and accepted the applicant’s request to have the appointed lawyer heard. In his statements before the court, that lawyer submitted that he had first seen the applicant during the interview at the Public Prosecutor’s office and had suspected that he might have been ill-treated as he had been nervous. The court also heard a number of other witnesses, including his friend A.S., who indicated that the applicant had spent a considerable amount of money in İzmir. 26.  In his submissions before the Juvenile Court, the applicant maintained that he had not been assigned a lawyer while in police custody and claimed that he had been coerced into making a false confession although he had not committed the murder. He added that he had withdrawn the money he had spent after the events with his father’s debit card. Following that latter submission, the court obtained the transcripts of the applicant’s father’s bank account, which showed no such transaction. 27.  On 31 May 2004 the Juvenile Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-six years and eight months’ imprisonment. The court noted that it did not take account of the statements made by the applicant during his questioning by the police, as in any event it found him guilty on the basis of his subsequent statements confessing his acts, the records of the reconstruction of events, the forensics reports, the statements of A.S., and the bank transcripts which rebutted his defence with regard to the money he had spent after the murder. 28.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that he might have made contradictory remarks as he had been confused with the questions of the judges. Reiterating his submissions with regard to his alleged ill-treatment, he maintained that he had not been assigned a lawyer while in police custody although he had requested one. 29.  On 16 June 2005 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment, finding that the applicant’s sentence needed to be re-evaluated in the light of the new Penal Code, which had entered into force following the judgment. 30.  On 27 July 2005 the Juvenile Court sentenced the applicant to a total of twenty-one years’ imprisonment. On 12 October 2006 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment once again, this time as a result of the Juvenile Court’s failure to hold a hearing while re-evaluating the sentence. 31.  On 15 February 2007, after holding a hearing and assessing the applicant’s final submissions, the Juvenile Court sentenced him to twenty-one years’ imprisonment for murder and robbery. That judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 19 July 2007.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The first applicant was born in 1976 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Sverdlovsk region. The second applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Vladivostok. 7.  In July 2012 the first applicant’s employer, the prosecutor’s office of the Primorskiy Region, provided him with a flat and concluded a tenancy agreement with him. The second applicant was included in the agreement as a member of the first applicant’s family. 8.  In August 2012 the second applicant was classified as having a first‑degree disability. 9.  On 7 October 2014 the first applicant retired from the prosecutor’s office. On the same date he applied to the General Prosecutor of the Russian Federation with a request for the transfer of the title to the flat in question to him. 10.  On 8 October 2014 criminal proceedings were initiated against the first applicant in respect of a suspected criminal offence. On the same date he was arrested and on 10 October 2014 he was detained pending investigation. On an unspecified date in 2016 the first applicant was released and placed under house arrest. 11.  On 21 November 2014 the first applicant’s request for the transfer of the title to flat in question to him was refused. 12.  On 25 November 2014 the first applicant received notice to vacate the flat by 5 December 2014. 13.  On 26 November 2014 the first applicant’s brother received notice to vacate the flat (the notice was addressed by the prosecutor’s office to the second applicant). 14.  In December 2014 the prosecutor’s office brought eviction claims against the applicants on the grounds that the first applicant no longer worked for the prosecutor’s office and that therefore, he and his family had to vacate the flat. 15.  The first applicant contested those claims. He submitted that it would be unlawful to evict him and his mother because he, as a retired prosecutor, had a right to acquire ownership of the flat in question. He and his mother had no other housing. In addition, his mother was a retired person and had a first-degree disability. 16.  On 27 February 2015 the Frunzenskiy District Court (“the District Court”) dismissed the eviction claims. The prosecutor’s office appealed against that judgment to the Primorskiy Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). 17.  On 8 June 2015 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 27 February 2015 and delivered a new decision ordering the applicants’ eviction, with no alternative accommodation being provided. The first applicant was represented by a lawyer, K. The second applicant was not present and was not represented in those proceedings. In particular, the Regional Court found that the first applicant and his mother had been provided with a flat for the period of the first applicant’s service in the prosecutor’s office. Under domestic law and the terms of the agreement, the tenants had had to vacate the housing after the termination of the agreement and in the event of their refusal they had had to be evicted with no alternative accommodation being provided. As at the date of the examination of the eviction claims the first applicant had not applied to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation for title to the flat in question to be transferred to him; therefore, the District’s Court conclusion as to the absence of any obstacles to the transfer of ownership of the flat in question to the first applicant was in conflict with the circumstances established in the case. As at the date of the examination of the prosecutor’s appeal the question regarding the transfer of ownership of the flat in question to the first applicant had not been decided. 18.  The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal against that decision with the presidium of the Regional Court. He complained that the hearing of 8 June 2015 had been held in his absence and that as a result he had been evicted from the only accommodation he had had. 19.  On 22 July 2015 a judge of the Regional Court refused to refer the first applicant’s appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Regional Court for examination on the merits. The first applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. 20.  On 22 September 2015 the second applicant was evicted from the flat. 21.  On 30 September 2015 a judge of the Supreme Court refused to refer the first applicant’s cassation appeal to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court for examination. 22.  In June 2015 the first applicant’s brother (Mr D. Pylayev) initiated court proceedings for the second applicant to be deprived of legal capacity and for him to be appointed as her guardian. 23.  On 11 May 2016 the District Court declared that the second applicant lacked legal capacity because she was suffering from illness. In particular, the District Court based its decision on an expert report dated 25 January 2016 which had established that she had been suffering from a mental handicap since 2010 and as a result had not been able to understand or control her actions. That judgment entered into force on 14 June 2016. 24.  On 29 June 2016 the local public health department appointed the first applicant’s brother as her guardian.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "8.  The applicant was born in 1982 in Venezuela and is currently detained in Valdemoro Prison. 9.  The applicant has been living in Spain with his family since 2003. 10.  In an indictment filed on 15 November 2005 in the United States (hereinafter, “the US”) District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the applicant was charged with one count of conspiracy to import one or more kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, into the United States in violation of Title 21, United States Code, sections 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(A), and 963, and Title 18, United States Code, sections 3551 et seq. (Count Four); and one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one or more kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, sections 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(I), and 846, and Title 18, United States Code, sections 3551 et seq. (Count Five). Each of those offences carried a possible maximum term of life imprisonment. 11.  By diplomatic note of 6 December 2013, the US authorities transmitted a request to the Spanish authorities for the applicant’s provisional arrest with a view to his extradition. 12.  On 13 December 2013 the applicant was arrested in Lugo by the Spanish police. The Central Court of Investigation No. 4 (Juzgado Central de Instrucción) initiated extradition proceedings on the same day and ordered his provisional release. The extradition request was then allocated to the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional. 13.  On 31 March 2014 the Public Prosecutor’s Office agreed to the applicant’s extradition. 14.  On 1 October 2014 the Audiencia Nacional granted the extradition request on condition that the US authorities provided a guarantee that any life sentence that was handed down would not be irreducible. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. 15.  On 3 November 2014 the ruling was upheld by the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional. The applicant subsequently lodged a plea of nullity (incidente de nulidad de actuaciones) against that decision. On 19 December 2014 the Plenary of the Criminal Section of the Audiencia Nacional ruled against the applicant, arguing that the object and purpose of annulment proceedings was not to serve as a second appeal instance against an extradition decision, but to correct possible violations of a fundamental right committed in a decision which was not subject to appeal. 16.  On 3 December 2014 the U.S. Embassy issued a note verbale, which provided the following answer:\n“The United States notes that the bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Spain does not provide a basis for conditioning extraditions on assurances relating to life sentences. While the United States is not, therefore, obligated to provide the assurance requested, in consideration of the request of the Spanish Court and given the intentions of the U.S. prosecutor, the United States is prepared in this particular case to inform the Government of Spain as follows: Should LOPEZ ELORZA be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on 15 November 2005 for which extradition is sought, he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment because, if a life sentence is imposed, he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence ...” 17.  On 19 January 2015 the note verbale was communicated to the interested parties. On 23 January 2015 the Public Prosecutor submitted a report stating that the guarantees provided by the United States were adequate and that consequently extradition should be granted. 18.  On 24 February 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision (providencia) assessing the US guarantees, deeming them to be “sufficient”. 19.  The applicant brought two súplica appeals against that decision, the first of which was lodged on 28 February 2015. The applicant argued that the decision of 24 February 2015 should be declared null and void since the matter should have been addressed through an auto, instead of a providencia[1]. Secondly, the applicant contested the argument that the US Government had provided sufficient guarantees, stating that they were identical to the ones that had already been analysed by the Court in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium (no. 140/10, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) and found to be in violation of Article 3 (inter alia). The second súplica appeal was lodged on 2 March 2015 and included three different requests. First, he requested that the decision on whether the US guarantees were sufficient be addressed and dealt with by the Plenary of the Audiencia Nacional. He also sought the recusal of three judges who were members of the bench which had initially issued the decision of 24 February 2015. Lastly, he lodged an application for the general recusal of all the judges of the Audiencia Nacional who “had been invited by the United States of America on holiday trips” which had been paid for by that country. 20.  On 25 March 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision stating the following:\n“FIRST - We will examine in the first place the plea for a referral to the Plenary formation of this Court of the decision about the sufficiency of the assurances given by the U.S. Government concerning the possibility for two life sentences to be imposed on the extradited person. This Chamber, given that the President of this Court has duly empowered it to decide about this matter, considers that the referral is not necessary as the assurances given are correct and sufficient, and furthermore show compliance with the ECtHR case-law in the Trabelsi vs Belgium case referred to by the appellant ....\nTherefore, if the assurances given by the U.S. Government are the following:\n“Should LOPEZ ELORZA be convicted of either of the charges in the indictment filed on 15 November 2005, he will not be subject to an unalterable sentence of life imprisonment, he may seek review of his sentence on appeal and he may subsequently seek relief from his sentence in the form of a petition for a pardon or commutation to a lesser sentence;”\nwe can conclude that the warranty expresses the actual existing legal means for the revision of a sentence of life imprisonment in a way that shows that this punishment is not irreducible during the whole life-span of the person, complying with what the ECtHR has requested in order to consider that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention.\nThat is why there is no need to refer a decision on this matter to the Plenary formation of this Court.” 21.  Additionally, the Audiencia Nacional agreed on opening a procedure aimed at addressing the issue of the recusals requested by the applicant through a full report, at the same time ordering the suspension of the extradition proceedings until the recusal proceedings had been terminated. 22.  On 12 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a decision (acuerdo gubernativo) dismissing the applicant’s request. 23.  On 25 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional ordered the applicant’s provisional detention (auto). The applicant lodged another súplica appeal against that decision and requested that the extradition proceedings be suspended on the grounds that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first súplica appeal of 28 February 2015. 24.  In a decision of 28 May 2015 the Audiencia Nacional rejected the applicant’s request to stay the extradition proceedings, finding that the complaints contained in the first súplica appeal had already been dealt with in the decision of 25 March 2015. 25.  On 1 June 2015 the applicant lodged another súplica appeal against the decisions of 25 May 2015 and 28 May 2015, contesting the reasoning as regards his request to stay the extradition proceedings and emphasising that no decision had been taken on the issues complained of in the first súplica appeal of 28 February 2015. 26.  On 3 June 2015 the Audiencia Nacional issued a new decision dismissing the súplica appeals lodged by the applicant and confirming the decision on the applicant’s imprisonment pending extradition to the United States. In particular, the decision stated the following:\n“The applicant considers that his súplica appeal lodged against the decision of 24 February 2015 has not been answered ... .\nThis Court refers at this point to what was already established in its decision of 25 March 2015 ... .\nNevertheless, in order to clarify any doubts that the applicant might have concerning whether or not he has received an answer to his súplica appeal, we [the Court] will resolve here the issued raised in that appeal.\n...\nThe guarantees provided have been considered sufficient for the Court. Consequently, regardless of the judgment mentioned by the applicant, we consider that they comply with the requirements established in the ECtHR’s judgment Hutchinson v. United Kingdom [(no. 57592/08, 3 February 2015)], as well as the judgment of 13 November 2014 [Bodein v. France, no. 40014/10, 13 November 2014)], lodged by a French citizen...\nTaking into consideration the above-mentioned reasoning, the Court\nDecides\nto dismiss the súplica appeals referred to in the present ruling, maintaining the order of imprisonment for Andrés López Elorza, in view of his extradition to the United States of America”. 27.  On 19 June 2015 the applicant was detained for the purposes of being extradited to the United States. 28.  On 22 June 2015 the applicant lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court against the extradition decision. He asked for interim measures, requesting the Constitutional Court to order a stay of the extradition while the case was still pending. He contended, inter alia, that the assurances provided by the US authorities did not fulfil the criteria for assessing the reducibility of a life sentence and that the extradition would amount to a violation of his right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 29.  On 1 July 2015 the Constitutional Court issued a decision declaring the amparo appeal and the request for interim measures inadmissible. In particular, it found that the part of the amparo appeal concerning the validity of the assurances given by the US authorities and about a possible violation of the applicant’s right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment had been lodged too late as the alleged violations stemmed from the decision of 25 March 2015, thus the 30-day time‑limit established in section 44(2) of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court No. 2/1919 had already passed when he had lodged his amparo appeal. 30.  On 2 July 2015 the applicant lodged a request for interim measures with the Court under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. He requested the Court to indicate to the Spanish Government that his extradition should be stayed pending the outcome of proceedings before the Court. The request was granted on the same day on a temporary basis until 1 August 2015, and the Government were asked the following questions:\n“a.- Does the applicant risk under US criminal law, in respect of the charges, a maximum penalty that precludes early release and/or release on parole?\nb.- What are the concrete mechanisms and under what US legal basis is the applicant entitled to review his possible final life sentence? In this sense, are the appeal, pardon and other review mechanisms referred to in the note verbale of 3 December 2014 the ones described in the case of Trabelsi v. Belgium (application no. 140/10, 4 September 2014, § 27)?” 31.  On 23 July 2015 the Government submitted their response and attached a document issued by the Office of International Affairs of the US Department of Justice called “supplemental information to Spain on Sentencing Issues in Relation to Andres Lopez Elorza, a/k/a ‘Andres Lopez Flores’ (hereinafter, “the US report”). The report stated the following:\n“By way of introduction, Lopez Elorza’s extradition is sought in order for him to stand trial on federal narcotics offenses in the Eastern District of New York. In essence, Lopez Elorza, a veterinarian, is charged with having been a member of a conspiracy between September 2004 and January 2005, the goal of which was to import heroin into the United States for subsequent distribution, in which Lopez Elorza’s role was to surgically implant packages of liquid heroin into the bodies of dogs that later were transported to the United States. The charges followed the search, in January 2005, of a farm Lopez Elorza operated in Medellin, Colombia, in which law enforcement authorities seized six puppies into which three kilograms of liquid heroin had been surgically implanted. The six puppies were bound for the United States, and the heroin they carried was surgically removed. After the search of his farm, Lopez Elorza fled Colombia.” 32.  As regards the first question put to the Government, the US report argued that there were pretrial factors that could affect the applicant’s sentencing. In particular, the report noted the following:\n“Before any trial, Lopez Elorza could, with the advice of his lawyer, decide to give up the right to a trial and plead guilty to the charges in the indictment, with or without the agreement of the prosecution. See Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a). A timely admission of guilt is a factor which could reduce the sentence the judge decides to impose following a conviction. In the United States, the vast majority of criminal cases are resolved by guilty pleas. Lopez Elorza may seek to reach an agreement with the prosecution wherein he would plead guilty in exchange for certain favorable actions, such as an agreement to allow him to plead guilty to fewer than all the charges in the indictment (with the remainder of the charges to be dismissed at sentencing), or even to lesser charges, or in exchange for the government’s promise to affirmatively recommend to the court that a particular lesser sentence be imposed. The agreement may also include the parties’ recommendation as to the appropriate sentence that - depending upon the type of plea agreement that is negotiated - may or may not bind the judge regarding the sentence that will be imposed. Such agreements are within the discretion of the government to enter into, and the judge may also decline to approve an agreement she or he does not believe to be in the interests of justice. The agreement may include, inter alia, an agreement to cooperate with U.S. authorities. Thus, if Lopez Elorza were willing and able to provide substantial assistance to the United States in the investigation or prosecution of another person who had committed a crime, a plea agreement might include a promise by the government attorneys, in exchange for his guilty plea, to file a motion with the court asking that Lopez Elorza’s cooperation be taken into account and permitting the Court to impose a lower sentence that it might otherwise impose. Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(e); United States Sentencing Guidelines, Section 5K1.1. In such cases, it is not atypical for a judge to impose a sentence that is significantly less than the Guidelines recommendation.” 33.  It also observed that “[i]f, however, Lopez Elorza decides not to plead guilty and instead exercise his right to a trial, and if he is found guilty of one or more charges, his sentencing exposure will vary, depending on the nature of the charges on which he is found guilty. Moreover, the judge will have broad discretion to determine the appropriate sentence [...]”. 34.  As regards the estimated sentence that the applicant could face, the US report stated firstly that, “In imposing a sentence in a federal criminal case, the judge must consult the U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines”. It added that the Guidelines were advisory since the judge had “the discretion to impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range so long as the court states ‘with specificity,’ both at sentencing and in the written judgment and commitment order, its reason for doing so”. It additionally stated that, “[b]oth the defendant and the government have the statutory right to appeal any sentence imposed on the grounds that it is substantively or procedurally unreasonable under the circumstances of the case”. Moreover, the decision whether to sentence a person convicted of multiple counts concurrently or consecutively was at the discretion of the court. Section 3584 of Title 18 of the US Code, states, in part, that “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively”. The report further stressed the following:\n“Prior to sentencing, a probation officer will prepare a presentence report that contains information about the defendant’s offense, his criminal history, other background information, and a calculation of the advisory sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines. The defendant has the right to object to the information and conclusion in the present report. Later, during the sentencing phase of the proceedings, defense counsel will be able to present to the judge various mitigating factors to consider that may result in the reduction of his sentence. Specifically, under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a), in determining the particular sentence imposed on a defendant, the court shall consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to promote respect for the law, punishment for the offense, deter the defendant or others from committing similar criminal conduct, and the need to protect the public; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the applicable guideline range; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution to the victims of the offense(s). In assisting the court in considering the above seven factors, defense counsel will be able to present to the court in detail any mitigating factors relating to these criteria. This would enable the defense to provide to the sentencing court information regarding Lopez Elorza’s background and circumstances, including: his family environment and relationships, the environment in which he was raised, his work history,... socioeconomic factors including educational opportunities or lack thereof, his physical and psychological well-being and any past or current treatment, prior criminal conduct, if any, and any resultant rehabilitative programs and periods of probation, incarceration, and parole, as well as Lopez Elorza’s longterm educational, vocational, and sociological goals”. 35.  The report noted that there were many factors that contributed to the imposition of a sentence and that it was “impossible to address every conceivable permutation that could occur or every possible scenario that might arise”. However, the report indicated that according to the US Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the advisory sentencing range was “188 to 235 months incarceration, far less than the possible life sentence provided for under the statutes with which he was charged”. 36.  Furthermore, the report stated that under section 3553(a) of Title 18 of the US Code, there was a “need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”. In that regard, the report stated that several of the applicant’s co-conspirators had already been sentenced in a related case before the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant’s case. One of the co-conspirators “faced a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months and received a sentence of 72 months incarceration”, another “faced a Guidelines range of 78 to 87 months and received a sentence of 14 months incarceration” and a third had “faced a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months and received a sentence of Time Served (approximately 12 months incarceration)”. The US report also noted that none of those defendants had entered into cooperation agreements with the government. Consequently, the sentences imposed on the applicant’s co-conspirators by the same judge who had been assigned to the applicant’s case “[could] be of value in assessing the sentence that will be imposed on him”. 37.  The report concluded that while it was possible that any available maximum sentence could be imposed for an offence, under the circumstances present in this case, “the risk of López Elorza receiving such a sentence is low”. 38.  As regards the second question, the US report stated that if the applicant was sentenced to a life term, he could benefit from a variety of mechanisms to seek to have the sentence invalidated or reduced or to obtain early release. 39.  Concerning the applicant’s right to invalidate or reduce his sentence, the Government stated that the applicant would have the right under US law to lodge an appeal with the Court of Appeals, asking for a reversal of his conviction “based on an error in the proceedings”. The applicant would also be able to “ask the Court of Appeals to review the appropriateness of his sentence”. He could argue that a life sentence was “unreasonable” in the circumstances of his case. The report also stated that even after the applicant had exhausted his rights at trial and on appeal, he could under US law file “a motion in the trial court claiming that his life sentence was imposed ‘in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States’, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack”. 40.  Concerning the applicant’s right to obtain early release, the report specifically stated that “since 1987, there has been no federal parole system in the United States”. The applicant, however, could ask for early release if he provided substantial assistance after his conviction and the imposition of his sentence. In addition, US law also allowed for compassionate release under section 3582 of Title 18 of the US Code. The report specifically stressed that the Bureau of Prisons could reduce the applicant’s sentence if it found that there was “an extraordinary and compelling reason to do so; for example, if a medical condition arose with López Elorza that would warrant such a modification”. Finally, the applicant could also seek executive clemency in the form of commutation (reduction) of his sentence. The report noted that in cases similar to the applicant’s, commutation of life sentences was not “a rare occurrence”. It gave as an example that of 13 July 2015, when President Obama had commuted the life sentences of “fourteen persons who had been convicted of drug related offenses”. 41.  On 31 July 2015 the interim measures under Rule 39 were extended and the Court requested that the Government stay the applicant’s extradition to the United States while the proceedings were pending before the Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicants were born in 1983, 1973, 1983, 1986, 1984 and 1984. Mr Yaşar Çalışkan lives in Ankara. The other applicants live in Samsun. According to the applicants’ submissions, which were not contested by the Government, at the time of the lodging of the application, they were serving the prison sentences arising out of their criminal convictions which gave rise to the present application. 7.  On 17 and 18 June 2005 seventeen members of the Maoist Communist Party (hereinafter “the MKP”), an illegal organisation, were killed in a rural area within the administrative jurisdiction of the town of Ovacık, near the city of Tunceli, by members of the security forces. 8.  On 21 June 2005 a gathering was held in protest at the alleged unlawful killings of 17 and 18 June 2005 in Samsun. University students from the Samsun Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi, including the applicants, gathered in front of the building of the Black Sea Fundamental Rights and Freedoms Association (Karadeniz Temel Haklar ve Özgürlükler Derneği) where a press statement was read out. 9.  On 8 July 2005 one of the applicants, Mr Ahmet Doğan, attended another reading out of a press statement in Samsun. The press statement concerned the killings of 17 and 18 June 2005, the arrest of a number of persons subsequent to the reading out of the press statement on 21 June 2005 and the alleged unlawful killing of a detainee by the police. 10.  On 21 February 2007 the Ankara public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against twenty-three people, including the applicants, charging them with disseminating propaganda in favour of the MKP, under section 7(2) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713). According to the indictment, during the gathering of 21 June 2005, slogans such as “Long live revolutionary solidarity” (“Yaşasın devrimci dayanışma”), “We have paid a price. We will make them pay a price.” (“Bedel ödedik, bedel ödeteceğiz.”), “Murderer State” (“Katil devlet”), “Revolutionary martyrs are immortal” (“Devrim şehitleri ölümsüzdür.”), “Martyrs are immortal” (“Şehit namırın”), were chanted and the applicants participated in the gathering. The public prosecutor further noted that Mr Ahmet Doğan had participated in the gathering of 8 June 2005, during which the following slogans had been chanted: “No emancipation alone, either all of us or none of us.” (“Kurtuluş yok tek başına, ya hep beraber ya hiçbirimiz.)”, “Arrests, provocations and coercion cannot discourage us.” (“Tutuklamalar, provakasyonlar, baskılar bizi yıldıramaz.”), “We will resist and succeed” (“Direne direne kazanacağız.”), “We have paid a price; we will make them pay a price.” “Bedel ödedik, bedel ödeteceğiz”). 11.  On 31 March 2009 the Ankara Assize Court found the applicants guilty as charged and sentenced each of them to ten months’ imprisonment pursuant to section 7(2) of Law no. 3713, except for Mr Ahmet Doğan, who was sentenced to twenty months’ imprisonment. As regards the gathering of 21 June 2005, the assize court found it established that the slogan “Martyrs are immortal” had been chanted by Mr Kürşad Arslan, Ms Dilek Kömpe, Mr Olcay Bayraktar and Mr Ahmet Doğan and that the slogans “The murderer state will pay the price”, “Revolutionary martyrs are immortal” and “Long live revolutionary solidarity” had been chanted by Mr Yaşar Çalışkan, Mr Kürşad Arslan and Ms Dilek Kömpe. The court also found it established that all the applicants except for Mr Olcay Bayraktar had chanted the slogan “We have paid a price; we will make them pay a price” and that Mr Ahmet Doğan had carried a banner bearing the slogan “Ovacık Martyrs are immortal”. As regards the gathering of 8 July 2005, the court noted that Mr Ahmet Doğan had chanted the slogans “Arrests, provocations and coercion cannot discourage us.”, “We will resist and succeed” and “We have paid a price; we will make them pay a price.” during that public gathering. 12. In its judgment, the Ankara Assize Court referred to Article 10 of the Convention as well as to the Court’s judgment in the case of Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) ([GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999‑IV) and the report of the European Commission of Human Rights in the case of Karataş v. Turkey (no. 23168/94, Commission’s report of 11 December 1997). The court held that by chanting the above-mentioned slogans the applicants had not exercised their democratic rights but had glorified terror by adopting the style of discourse of terror organisations and that they had not distanced themselves from violence. In the court’s view, by chanting those slogans the applicants had not intended to find a solution to a problem but had praised and glorified the source of the problem, that is to say, the terrorist organisations concerned. Hence, the applicants had incited terror. The Ankara Assize Court concluded that chanting the slogans in question could not be considered as falling within the scope of the right to freedom of expression. 13.  On 8 July 2010 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of 31 March 2009 in so far as it concerned the applicants’ conviction. 14.  On unspecified dates the applicants served their prison sentences.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, whose names are listed in the appendix, are Turkish nationals. 6.  On 17 and 18 July 2008, each of the applicants sent a letter to the Halfeti (Şanlıurfa) public prosecutor`s office which contained the following passage:\n \"If using the word of “sayın” (esteemed) is an offense, then I also say “Sayın Abdullah Öcalan”, I commit this offense and denounce myself.\" 7.  On 19 September 2008, the public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Halfeti Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters against the applicants. They were charged with praising an offence and offender, prescribed by Article 215 of the Criminal Code (Law no. 5237), on account of their statements in the above mentioned letters. 8.  On 9 March 2009 the Halfeti Magistrates’ Court in Criminal Matters found the applicants guilty of praising the imprisoned leader of the PKK, an illegal armed organisation, on account of their statements in the aforementioned letters and accordingly, sentenced them each to two months and fifteen days’ imprisonment. In accordance with Article 50 of the Criminal Code, this prison sentence was commuted to a fine of 1,500 Turkish Liras (TRY). 9.  The applicants appealed against this judgment. On 20 June 2012 the Court of Cassation, holding that the amount of the fine that had been imposed on the applicants did not attain the minimum requisite level, dismissed the appeal request.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  The applicant is a psychiatrist and a founder and director of the Rehabilitation Centre for Victims of Torture “Empathy”, a non‑governmental organisation (“the NGO”). 7.  On 4 October 2003 the applicant’s NGO concluded an agreement with the Ministry of Justice (“the Ministry”) and undertook, among other tasks, to create a psychosocial rehabilitation office in Tbilisi Prison no. 1. The agreement specified that, depending on the availability of resources, the NGO was to involve specialists, use clinical laboratory and diagnostic methods, and provide medication to inmates if treatment was prescribed. It was to provide quarterly progress reports to the Ministry and make suggestions on how to solve the social problems it identified through its activities. The Ministry undertook to support the proper functioning of the rehabilitation office and to designate a coordinator from the Ministry’s Medical Department in order to ensure the implementation of the contract. 8.  On 3 August 2004 the applicant became member of the Public Monitoring Commission overseeing the implementation of the inmates’ rights and competent to issue recommendations if any irregularities were observed. Presidential order no. 309 issued to that end specified that the members of the Commission could enter all prisons during the working hours without prior authorisation. The persons concerned had the right to meet inmates in private and access any documentation except that which was classified as confidential. 9.  On 29 November 2004 the then Minister of Justice created the Inmates’ Mental Health Research and Monitoring Commission. It included seven State and non-State mental health experts, including the applicant. The document did not elaborate on the specific functions of the Commission or its members. 10.  On 10 September 2005 Mr L.Ts. – an inmate placed in the prison hospital in view of his mental health issues – physically assaulted the Director and the head doctor of the prison hospital (“the incident of 10 September 2005”). He had been transferred to the prison hospital by the director of the Medical Department of the Ministry (“the Medical Department”), based on the applicant’s medical opinion to that end. In an unrelated incident that happened at around the same time, an inmate died of a complication in his health problems and it was reported that numerous others were waiting in vain to be admitted to the hospital. Both incidents attracted wide media coverage in view of the allegations of corruption and mismanagement in the medical management of the penal system. Some members of the civil society contended that the transfers to the prison hospital were not implemented adequately and objectively but were based on suspicious arrangements within the Ministry. 11.  On 11 September 2005 an investigation was opened into the incident of 10 September 2005 on account of an alleged abuse of official power. On an unspecified date the applicant was questioned as a witness. 12.  On 13 September 2005 the then Minister of Justice, Mr K.K. (“the Minister”) commissioned an internal investigation concerning the activities of the Medical Department of the Ministry carried out between the period of 1 January 2005 and 13 September 2005. The General Inspectorate of the Ministry was to deliver its findings on 13 October 2005. 13.  On 16 September 2005, while speaking live on a private television channel, Rustavi 2, about allegations of corruption and mismanagement within the Ministry and its Medical Department, the Minister, Mr K.K., stated:\n“I am impelled to specify surnames and specific facts... Mariam Jishkariani, the president of non-governmental organisation [Empathy] and a member of the [public] monitoring council [for penal institutions] has been ... grossly exceeding her powers and writing medical conclusions concerning specific persons, bypassing the commission [set up for that purpose]. I have those conclusions on my desk. The investigation has them already and practically speaking a full assessment will be carried out which will reveal whether this was done for the sake of pretty eyes or whether it was precisely the type of business that this shameless person – I cannot call her anything else – has found for herself. Because it was owing precisely to Jishkariani’s scribbles on a piece of paper that [two allegedly healthy inmates who later assaulted doctors] found themselves in the prison hospital without any legal grounds for that ...” 14.  The Minister further noted that the director of the Medical Department was “the one who... [relied on] Jishkariani’s illegal notes ... not signed by the members of the [medical] commission... to transfer the inmates [to the prison hospital].” He noted that “therefore he [was] the suspect in these illegal arrangements and “[would] become an object of the investigation along with Jishkariani.” The Minister continued to note that “there are not only these two facts and the investigation is pending because it was Mariam Jishkariani who was the most important figure and [whose opinions were guiding the director’s actions]...” 15.  The Minister also criticised the Public Defender and accused his representatives of having a vested interest in transferring certain inmates to the prison hospital. 16.  The Rustavi 2 TV channel also transmitted brief comments made by representatives of the civil society, including the Public Defender, who were involved in the public monitoring of the prisons (see paragraph 8 above). They noted that the accusations levelled by the Minister had been groundless in view of the fact that the transfers of inmates to and from the prison hospital had been within the exclusive competency of the Ministry. 17.  The programme also featured the applicant’s brief comment, as recorded by a journalist, that the Minister wanted to have “a monitoring council that [would] not take a peek inside a prison]” and “the prisons [were] in the same conditions ... as those under Saddam Hussein’s regime.” 18.  On 20 September 2005 the daily newspaper Rezonansi published an interview with the Minister. He discussed allegations of corruption in the management of medical facilities in the penal system. The relevant excerpts of the interview read as follows:\n“Journalist: You give two names – Jishkariani and [the director of the Medical Department] that were involved in corruption. What concrete facts do you have when making such statements?\nThe Minister: [The director of the Medical Department] was completely under the influence of Mariam Jishkariani. Jishkariani is a psychiatric doctor of non‑governmental organisation [Empathy]. That field is very tainted with respect to prisons. Even during Soviet times a lot of money was made on psychiatric reports. Certificates of declarations of insanity were granted to those who were not entitled to them.\nIt was precisely in her own interests that this lady [referring to the applicant] made a nest in this monitoring council. ...\nThe confrontation started immediately after we uncovered materials where Mariam Jishkariani had signed documents on the transfer of inmates to the prison hospital. It was revealed that there had been healthy people amongst those inmates. ...\nJournalist: Are you saying that money taken from the inmates was circulating among those people?\nThe Minister: Only among them. Doctors at the medical department are responsible for the medical reports. Their boss was [the director of the Medical Department]. Jishkariani and others were accomplices. The money they took should either have been brought to me or taken by them. Nothing was brought to me. [The inmates] who assaulted the personnel had been transferred to the prison hospital based on Jishkariani’s medical report even though they are healthy. She had no authority to do that. Is that not a crime? Naturally, Jishkariani could not have committed it alone. She only wrote a report, or to be precise, scribbled something on a piece of paper that was not signed by any of the commission members. Despite this [the director of the Medical Department] ordered the transfer [of the two inmates] to the Republican Hospital.” 19.  On 13 October 2005 the General Inspectorate delivered its report. It principally concerned the actions and omissions of the director of the Medical Department in the management of the transfers of inmates to the prison hospital. The report mentioned the applicant, in brief, and only with respect to one transfer. In particular, it noted that an inmate L.Ts. (see paragraph 10 above) was assessed by the medical commission of the Ministry on 12 January 2005. He was diagnosed with organic personal disorder with periodic episodes of decline. The commission noted that the inmate had been receiving treatment for a mental illness since 2002 and had a second-degree disability status. He had further suffered a head trauma on 8 January 2005. However the commission did not recommend his transfer to the prison hospital. According to the report, the same inmate was reassessed on 21 January 2005 by the applicant who, noting his medical history described above, wrote in the commission’s journal that the inmate needed to be supervised in a psychiatric ward, and prescribed him certain medication. Subsequently, despite the fact that the members of the medical commission did not agree with the applicant’s assessment, “the director of the Medical Department bypassed the commission and decided – unilaterally – to transfer L.Ts. to the prison hospital based on [the applicant’s] medical conclusion [in the journal] ... and in doing so he violated ... all the relevant rules concerning the prisoners’ transfers to the medical establishment.” 20.  On 27 December 2007 the investigation into the incident of 10 September 2005 was discontinued on the grounds of the absence of a crime, as provided under Article 28 § 1 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 32 below). 21.  On 26 September 2005 the applicant instituted civil-law defamation proceedings against the Minister. She claimed non-pecuniary damages and requested a retraction of the false accusations by the same means as they had been disseminated. According to the applicant, the drafting of recommendations on inmates’ mental health had been part of the agreement of 4 October 2003 (see paragraph 7 above) and that all of her conclusions had been based on verifiable medical documents readily available in inmates’ medical files. The explicit and public allegations of corruption and fraudulent behaviour against her circulated by the Minister through the media outlets were false and devoid of any factual grounds, especially considering that no investigative actions had ever been taken against her. The Minister’s false allegations had had all the more of a negative impact on the applicant’s reputation as a mental health professional because of the Minister’s position as a high-level public official and the public confidence that it invited. 22.  On 13 April 2006 the Tbilisi City Court dismissed Mr K.K.’s application to discontinue the consideration of the case based on Section 5 of the Freedom of Expression and Speech Act (“the Act”) (see paragraph 30 below). It reasoned that while a public debate existed on the matter, it was not of a political character for the purposes of that provision as the applicant was not a politician. Yet, according to the court, she could have been considered as a public figure in view of the public attention that her activities had attracted. 23.  On 22 June 2006 the Tbilisi City Court found against the applicant. In spite of the applicant’s reliance on Article 18 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 31 below), it applied the standards established by the Freedom of Expression and Speech Act (“the Act”) as lex specialis. The court concluded that the applicant was a public figure for the purposes of the Act (see paragraph 30 below) in view of her activities in prison (see paragraph 7 above), and that the burden of proving the existence of the three cumulative conditions set out in Section 14 of the Act (see paragraph 30 below) to classify the Minister’s statements as defamation had rested with her. 24.  The court agreed that the applicant had presented evidence that she was not and had not been a suspect, or otherwise officially accused of violating the law, and concluded that the Minister’s accusations “may have contained erroneous facts.” However it continued to note that in any event, the other two requirements of Section 14 of the Act had not been met. Namely, according to the court, the applicant had failed to show what harm she had suffered from the false information being disseminated by the Minister in the media, as required by the second condition set by Section 14. 25.  With respect to the third criterion of whether the Minister had known that the impugned statements were false or had acted with apparent and gross negligence, the court noted the following:\n“The court agrees with the respondent’s argument that Mr K.K. took measures to verify the information before communicating it. The respondent presented Order no. 1640 of the Minister of Justice of Georgia of 13 September 2005 instructing the General Inspectorate of the Ministry to carry out an inspection of the Medical Department. Thus [the Minister] issued an order aimed at verification three days prior to making the public statement. Accordingly, it is possible that he was in possession of preliminary information about the existence of irregularities. However, the possession of [such information] is not confirmed in the case file. According to the case file, the existence of violations in the medical department is confirmed by the General Inspectorate’s conclusion dated 13 October 2005. Therefore it has not been confirmed that the Minister was aware that the information was false by 16 September 2005. It has also not been proven that he acted with gross negligence when making the statement. [The Minister] scheduled the inspection of a department within the scope of his competence and thus he took measures to verify the information.” 26.  The Tbilisi City Court concluded that the statements in question had been made as part of an important public discussion surrounding the management of medical facilities in the penal system. It noted that the Minister had enjoyed freedom of expression to voice his opinion about the state of affairs within his Ministry and that his statements had fallen within the limits of acceptable criticism, which it found to be wider in respect of the applicant because of her status as a public figure. 27.  On 2 July 2007 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal fully upheld the lower court’s judgment. Regarding the third criterion of whether the Minister had known that the impugned statements were false or had acted with apparent and gross negligence, the court noted the following:\n“The Appellate Chamber shares the reasoning of the [lower court’s] judgment that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that [the Minister] was either aware of the falsehood of the disseminated facts, or that [he] acted with apparent and gross negligence which led to the dissemination of a statement containing a substantially false fact.\nCivil procedure is based on the principle of adversarial procedure which, in addition to conferring certain rights to the parties, also imposes procedural obligations in their own interest. The failure of a party to abide by [those obligations] will lead to an unfavourable result. This rule stems from Article 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure according to which the parties have an equal possibility to define facts in support of their [position] and they themselves decide which evidence shall confirm those facts. Article 102 of the same Code provides that each party shall prove the circumstances on which it bases its [requests]. ” 28.  The appellate court concluded that “K.K. had a right to voice his opinion about the state of affairs within his Ministry and the applicant, in view of her status as a public figure, was obliged to tolerate it as acceptable criticism.” 29.  On 16 May 2008 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Berehove. 6.  In the early hours of 22 August 2004 M. was robbed and killed in Berehove, where the applicant was also living. On the same date the applicant and two other people, K.A. and St., were arrested on suspicion of robbing and killing M. 7.  According to the applicant, he was apprehended by the police task force at about 10 a.m. on 22 August 2004 in the apartment of his girlfriend and taken to the police station, where he was beaten up and threatened in an attempt to force him to confess to the robbery and murder of M. 8.  The case file contains two arrest warrants – one issued by a police officer and another one by the prosecutor investigating the murder (hereinafter “the investigator”), both indicating that the applicant had been arrested by the above-mentioned officials on 22 August 2004 at 6.30 p.m. at their offices. The arrest warrant issued by the investigator indicates that the applicant acknowledged his guilt, had no observations regarding his arrest and that he wished to be legally represented. It bears the applicant’s signature, with no comments. The lower part of the last page of the record contains a printed statement (“довідка”) that was added later (it was dated 2007); this additional statement is signed by the investigator only and asserts that the applicant’s relatives were informed of his arrest. The applicant alleged that his family had been informed of his arrest on the evening of the following day (that is to say 23 August 2004). 9.  After his arrest, the applicant signed a record, bearing no time, explaining his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before he was first questioned. The relevant entry in the record indicates that the applicant expressed his wish to be represented by S., a lawyer who lived in Uzhhorod, some 70 kilometres from Berehove, and noted the address of the latter. 10.  At about 4 p.m. on 22 August 2004, according to the applicant, and from 9 until 10 a.m. on that day, according to the official record, the applicant was questioned as a suspect by the investigator in the presence of B., a lawyer. The record of the questioning noted that the applicant had been informed of his rights as a suspect from 6.30 until 6.45 p.m. on that day and that a separate procedural document existed in this respect evidencing that he had wished to be legally represented. The handwritten entry in the record furthermore stated that the applicant wanted to have B. as his lawyer and that he acknowledged in full his guilt in respect of the robbery and murder. During the questioning, the applicant provided details regarding the robbery and admitted that he had hit M. in the head with a bat during the robbery but that he had done so instinctively, in self-defence. The applicant did not state what had become of the bat – namely where or in what circumstances he had hidden the bat after the murder. The applicant and B. signed the verbatim record, making no objections as to its contents. B. then left. 11.  Later that day, from 8 until 8.30 p.m., the applicant took part in a videotaped reconstruction of the crime in the presence of a forensic expert, an investigator from the local police, two attesting witnesses and the investigator in the case. According to the Government, B. was apparently busy and was not able to participate in the reconstruction. No other lawyer was instructed to assist the applicant during this investigative step. According to the applicant, he repeated his request for S. to be called, but this was not done and he was forced by means of threats to testify. 12.  During the reconstruction, which commenced near the place where the bat used for the murder had been hidden, the applicant pointed to the exact place where the bat was; the bat was then uncovered and retained as evidence. A copy of the verbatim record of the reconstruction provided to the Court by the applicant indicates that he was informed of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself. The verbatim record bears a handwritten “not” next to the following printed “agreed to testify”. The relevant part of the text is not visible on the copy of the record provided by the Government. The record furthermore contains the applicant’s statement that he had not been forced to testify by means of any psychological or physical violence. The applicant signed the record without indicating any objections as to its contents next to his signature. 13.  At an unspecified time on the same date St. and K.A were questioned as suspects. St., being represented by B. (the same lawyer who represented the applicant), acknowledged his guilt in respect of the robbery. He stated, inter alia, that he had seen the applicant carrying a bat when they had been entering the victim’s house. K.A., having waived his right to legal assistance, admitted that he had taken part in the robbery. He furthermore participated, still unrepresented, in a videotaped reconstruction of the crime during which he stated, inter alia, that he had seen the applicant with a bat in his hands but had not seen who had murdered M. 14.  On 23 August 2004 the investigator appointed B. to represent the applicant, and St., and admitted him to the proceedings. 15.  On the same day the applicant, in the presence of B., participated in another videotaped reconstruction of the crime in the victim’s house. The applicant admitted his guilt and gave further details about the robbery and murder. He reiterated that he had hit M. on the head with the bat and stated that another suspect in the case had helped him to hide the bat afterwards. 16.  On 26 August 2004 the applicant’s mother signed a contract with the lawyer S. concerning her son’s legal representation. On the same date S. contacted the prosecutor, who allowed S. to represent the applicant instead of B. The applicant furthermore made a written statement declaring that he was refusing the services of B. and wanted S. to act as his lawyer. 17.  On 8 October 2004 medical experts examined the applicant following his complaint that he had been ill-treated by the police. No injuries were discovered on the applicant’s body. 18.  On 14 October 2004 the video recording of the reconstruction of the crime of 23 August 2004 was played to the applicant in the presence of S. The applicant retracted his earlier confession and explained that he had only given it because he had been threatened and beaten up by the police on 22 August 2004. 19.  On 2 September 2004, and 20 and 28 January and 17 February 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his defence lawyer but refused to give any evidence. 20.  On 19 January 2005 the prosecutors refused to institute a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegation that he had been beaten up by the police, having found the police officers’ actions to be lawful. 21.  On 18 February 2005 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant – together with St. and K.A. – was charged with robbery and murder. It was established that another person, I.K., had also participated in the robbery, but as he had absconded, he would have to be tried separately. 22.  During the trial the applicant denied having participated in the robbery and the murder and refused to give any evidence. He stated that his earlier confessions to the crimes should not be admitted as evidence as they had been made under duress and in breach of his defence rights, including his right to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing. He also argued that the bat which had been retained as evidence and examined by experts during the investigation had not been the same bat as that which he had pointed out during the reconstruction. He supported his allegation by referring to the fact that in the verbatim record, the prosecutor had described the bat as blue, while the experts who had subsequently examined it had described it as grey. 23.  In April 2005 the police detained I.K. In the course of the trial St., A.K. and I.K all pleaded guilty to robbery but denied killing M. 24.  On 29 August 2006 the Zakarpattya Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the first-instance court, convicted the applicant of murder and robbery and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. St., A.K. and I.K. were also found guilty of robbery but acquitted of murder. The hearing was held in the presence of the applicant’s new lawyer, D., who had replaced the lawyer S. on an unspecified date. 25.  The court based the applicant’s conviction, among other evidence, on the confessions he had made during his questioning by the investigator on 22 August 2004, the reconstructions of the crime on 22 and 23 August 2004, the statements of his co-defendants that they had seen him with a bat in M.’s house, and physical evidence, including an expert’s report suggesting that the traces of blood found on the bat (the location of which had been pointed out by the applicant during the reconstruction of the crime on 22 August 2004) could have belonged to M. 26.  By the same judgment, the court rejected as unsubstantiated the applicant’s submissions that he had made his self-incriminating statements under duress, referring to the results of the medical examination of 8 October 2004 (see paragraph 17 above) and the prosecutors’ decision of 19 January 2005 (see paragraph 20 above). 27.  The court also found no violation of the applicant’s defence rights. It noted, inter alia, that on 22 August 2004 the prosecutor’s decision to appoint B. as the applicant’s lawyer had been lawful, because at the material time the applicant had not had a contract with S. for legal representation. It also observed that on 22 August 2004 the applicant had raised no objections to the questioning record. The court also suggested, without giving details, that there had been some technical errors in the procedural documents, in particular as regards the time of the applicant’s arrest and questioning, but that they did not affect the fairness of the respective investigative actions. 28.  The court refuted the applicant’s allegation that the bat retained as evidence had been switched with another (see paragraph 22 above), noting that the disparity in the bat’s description by the experts and the prosecutor could have been explained by the fact that the latter was colour blind. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court on points of law, reiterating his complaints. He stated, in particular, that he had not been represented by the lawyer of his choice, S., on 22 and 23 August 2004, but by B., who had been appointed by the investigator against the applicant’s will. He further stated that he had not been assisted by any lawyer when he had been forced to confess during the crime reconstruction of 22 August 2004. He also complained about the fact that B. had represented him and his co-accused St. at the same time (see paragraph 13 above) – a conflict of interest (as there had been important discrepancies in their respective statements) that should have prevented him from being allowed to do so. 30.  On 12 April 2007 the Supreme Court, acting as the second-instance court, upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence in his presence. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer during the hearing, but he did not provide any further details in this regard. 31.  The Supreme Court found that the applicant’s guilt was proved, inter alia, by the statements he had made during his questioning of 22 August 2004 and during the reconstructions of the crime. It noted in this respect that those statements had been corroborated by other evidence, including the testimony of his co-accused, and concluded that the lower court had correctly admitted the applicant’s self-incriminating statements as evidence. The court also noted that the details of the crime which the applicant had revealed in his statements could not have been known to him unless he had been the direct perpetrator. 32.  Without mentioning the applicant’s arguments regarding the alleged breach of his defence rights, the Supreme Court found no procedural violations during the proceedings serious enough to necessitate it quashing the judgment. 33.  On an unspecified date the applicant was released from prison.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Orhei. 5.  In September 2009 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against a company which was in process of insolvency. 6.  On 18 December 2009 the Drochia District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant company to pay him 24,957 Moldovan Lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 1,413 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage and MDL 749 (the equivalent of EUR 42) for costs and expenses. The representative of the defendant company was not present at the hearing. 7.  On 28 December 2009 the secretariat of the Drochia District Court sent a copy of the reasoned judgment to the defendant company by ordinary mail. 8.  On 11 January 2010 an enforcement writ was issued to the applicant by the same court in respect of the judgment of 18 December 2009. 9.  On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company’s insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date. 10.  On 26 April 2010 the insolvency administrator of the defendant company lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2009. The applicant objected to the appeal by arguing that it had been time-barred. He indicated that the time-limit for lodging the appeal had expired twenty days after the serving of the impugned judgment and that the insolvency administrator of the defendant company had been aware of the judgment of 18 December 2009 since in February 2010 he had informed the court dealing with the insolvency proceedings about the judgment in question. 11.  On 28 September 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal admitted the appeal lodged by the insolvency administrator of the defendant company and quashed the judgment of 18 December 2009. The Court of Appeal did respond to the objection raised by the applicant and, after re-examining the merits of the case, dismissed the applicant’s action against the defendant company. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising the same arguments as in his appeal. 12.  On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court did not make any comment about the applicant’s objection concerning the late appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Marmarashen village. 6.  In June 2006 the applicant’s son, Gegham Sergoyan, was drafted into the Armenian army. 7.  On 8 November 2006 he was assigned to military unit no. 37673 (the “military unit”) situated in the unrecognised Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (the “NKR”). 8.  On 9 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan underwent surgery on a toe on his left foot. 9.  On the same date the military unit doctor temporarily discharged Gegham Sergoyan from his duties until 16 April 2007. Because of the surgery, he was allowed to wear slippers instead of army boots. 10.  On 15 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan was put on duty. On that day lieutenant H.G. was the duty officer in charge of the military unit. 11.  By an order of the Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia of 29 December 2003, H.G. had been hired to perform military service for a period of five years and assigned to the military unit with the rank of junior lieutenant.\nAccording to the personal report provided by the military unit command, H.G. had been a weak officer from the first day of service. He had been the subject of several disciplinary penalties, including a “strict reprimand” and “not fully fit for service” in September and October 2004 respectively. In July 2006 H.G. was given another reprimand. It was further indicated by his superiors that H.G.’s performance was deficient and his professional training poor. 12.  On 15 April 2007 at 9.40 p.m. H.G., upon seeing Gegham Sergoyan in the duty station room, reproached the latter for having entered without permission and for not wearing uniform, including for being in slippers instead of army boots. Although Gegham Sergoyan admitted his mistake and tried to leave the room, H.G. verbally abused him and violently pushed him against the wall. Then H.G. pointed his gun at Gegham Sergoyan’s head and fired a shot. 13.  On the same date Gegham Sergoyan was taken to Stepanakert Military Hospital in the “NKR” (the SMH) where he underwent surgery. 14.  Upon admission to Stepanakert military hospital, the diagnosis of ballistic trauma of the cervical vertebrae with axis (second cervical vertebra) fracture and mandibular fracture with displacement of the right side was noted in Gegham Sergoyan’s medical records. 15.  On 16 April 2007 at 10 a.m. Gegham Sergoyan was examined by doctors H.E., N.C. and A.G. of the SMH who indicated in the relevant record that Gegham Sergoyan had sustained a ballistic trauma to the cervical vertebrae with axis fracture, and that he had a fracture of the right side of the lower jaw. 16.  On the same day Gegham Sergoyan was transferred to the Central Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia (the CMH) in Yerevan pursuant to the transfer certificate issued by Doctor H.E. The same diagnosis, namely ballistic trauma and fracture of the right side of the jaw, was mentioned in the certificate. 17.  On the same day the Askeran No. 1 Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 34-104 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Armenia (attempted murder). 18.  On 17 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan was admitted to the CMH in Yerevan. It was indicated in the medical record that, according to the transfer diagnosis, Gegham Sergoyan had suffered ballistic trauma to the cervical vertebrae. Mandibular fracture with displacement on the left side and fracture of the second cervical vertebra was also mentioned, with a question mark. The clinical diagnosis made by the doctors of the CMH stated ballistic trauma to the neck with lesion of the cervical part of the spine (second cervical vertebra) and ballistic fracture of the second and third vertebrae with traumatic spinal cord injury. 19.  During his stay at the CMH, Gegham Sergoyan was examined by forensic medical expert A.D. of the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Health of Armenia (the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine) who stated in his conclusion, inter alia, that the bullet had penetrated from the left side of the lower jaw and, according to descriptions contained in the medical records, it was directed from left to right and upwards from front to back. 20.  On 18 April 2007 H.G. was officially charged with attempted murder and abuse of power resulting in grave consequences (Articles 34-104 § 1 and 375 § 1 of the Criminal Code). 21.  On the same day H.G. was questioned and fully admitted his guilt. He submitted, in particular, that he had been on duty on 15 April 2007 when at 9.40 p.m. he had seen his assistant, J.G., and Gegham Sergoyan watching television together in the duty room. Given that Gegham Sergoyan was in slippers, he had reprimanded him for violation of the uniform code and for having entered the duty room without permission, and had sworn at him, grabbed him by the chest and pushed him against the wall. Gegham Sergoyan and J.G. had been laughing while watching television and he had thought they were laughing at him. Although Gegham Sergoyan had said that he would leave the room, he became even angrier since the latter had been laughing while speaking to him. At that moment he had taken out his gun, loaded it and, pointing the gun at the left side of Gegham Sergoyan’s face, had sworn at him and shot him in the head. He had shot Gegham Sergoyan with the gun attributed to him. 22.  On 2 May 2007 Gegham Sergoyan died in hospital without having regained consciousness. 23.  On the same day the investigator of the Askeran No. 1 Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office ordered a post-mortem examination of Gegham Sergoyan’s body to be conducted in Yerevan by forensic medical expert A.L.D. of the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine. The expert was requested to determine, inter alia, the cause of death, the existence of any injuries on the body, the time and method of their infliction and their possible link with the death. The expert was also asked to determine whether there were any other external injuries on the body apart from the ballistic trauma, the time of their infliction and their gravity. 24.  On 10 May 2007 the Minister of Defence of Armenia issued an order concerning the incident with the applicant’s son and the imposition of disciplinary penalties on persons responsible. The order stated, inter alia, the following:\n“... The internal investigation has revealed the following:\n- the military unit command had not thoroughly examined [H.G.’s] moral character or his personal and professional preparation, there had been no proper control over the observance of the daily schedule;\n- the instructions from the personnel responsible for the daily timeline in the military unit had been of a formal nature;\n- there had been an unhealthy moral environment among the officers and draft soldiers...\nWith a view to penalising the persons liable for the incident I order 1. The imposition [of the following penalties]\na. a “reprimand” in respect of the commander of [the military unit] ... for poor supervision of personnel responsible for the daily timeline;\nb. a “strict reprimand” in respect of:\n- the deputy commander of [the military unit] ... for failure to organise properly [military] service;\n- the deputy commander of [the military unit] responsible for the armoury ... (in charge of the military unit on the day of the incident) ...\n- the deputy commander of [the military unit] responsible for working with the personnel ... for the tense moral environment among the officers and draft soldiers. 2. Commanders of military units\n- to discuss the incident ... and to undertake concrete measures to prevent the occurrence of such ...” 25.  On an unspecified date in May 2007 the Ministry of Defence of Armenia paid the applicant 2,250,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) (approximately EUR 4,650 at the relevant time), including compensation for Gegham Sergoyan’s funeral expenses and a lump sum insurance payment for the family. 26.  On 15 May 2007 the investigator made a decision to involve the applicant in the proceedings as Gegham Sergoyan’s legal heir. 27.  On 1 June 2007 the post-mortem examination, including an autopsy, was completed. Forensic medical expert A.L.D. concluded that Gegham Sergoyan’s death had been caused by acute penetrating ballistic trauma to the neck. The expert stated, inter alia, that on 17 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan had been examined by a maxillofacial surgeon who had not detected any jawbone pathology on the basis of X-ray computed tomography and radiography results. 28.  On 9 June 2007 the investigation into Gegham Sergoyan’s death was taken over by the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia. 29.  On 14 September 2007 the charges against H.G. were modified and he was charged with murder motivated by hooliganism and abuse of power resulting in grave consequences (Articles 104 § 2 (10) and 375 § 1 of the Criminal Code). 30.  On 13 February 2008 the case, together with the finalised bill of indictment, was transmitted to the Southern Criminal Court for examination on the merits. Thereafter the case was transmitted to the Syunik Regional Court for reasons of territorial jurisdiction. 31.  On the same date the Military Prosecutor filed a civil claim against H.G. seeking to recover AMD 2,789,153 (approximately EUR 6,200 at the relevant time) from the latter. This amount included the expenses borne from the State budget, including the medical expenses paid by the State and AMD 2,250,000 paid to Gegham Sergoyan’s family for funeral expenses and insurance benefit. 32.  In the course of the proceedings before the Syunik Regional Court the applicant lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Armenia, namely the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance of Armenia, seeking compensation in the amount of EUR 300,000 for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the murder of his only son, which had caused him deep sorrow and severe mental suffering: he had lost the normal rhythm of life and his health had deteriorated. The applicant relied, in particular, on Article 18 of the Civil Code of Armenia and Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. 33.  In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Court H.G. pleaded guilty. 34.  A number of witnesses were questioned during the proceedings, including Gegham Sergoyan’s fellow servicemen. In particular J.G., who had personally witnessed the events of 15 April 2007, testified that he had seen H.G. swear at Gegham Sergoyan and shoot him in the face. 35.  Several officers of the military unit stated that to their knowledge Gegham Sergoyan had never had any problems with lieutenant H.G. before. 36.  On 1 September 2009 the Syunik Regional Court found H.G. guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The Regional Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim by stating that no possibility of compensation for non-pecuniary damage was envisaged under the law. It further stated that, although the accused had committed the crime while in military service, the crime had been committed on a personal level and therefore any damage incurred should be compensated by the person liable for it. 37.  On 1 October 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. He submitted, inter alia, that lieutenant H.G. had committed the crime during his service while assigned to duty in the military unit on 15 April 2007. Gegham Sergoyan was murdered while performing his army service obligations when he was on duty according to the relevant orders of the military unit command. He further submitted that, although no possibility of compensation for non-pecuniary damage existed under Armenian civil law, such a requirement existed under the Convention: according to Article 6 of the Constitution ratified international treaties were a constituent part of the legal system of Armenia and, in the case of inconsistency with the national law, the norms of the treaty should prevail. 38.  On 2 February 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Regional Court. As regards the applicant’s civil claim, the Court of Appeal relied on Article 1087 of the Civil Code to state that, in the event of the victim’s death, only compensation for funeral expenses is envisaged under the civil law. 39.  On 26 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. The applicant submitted the same arguments as before and restated his position concerning his claim for non-pecuniary damages as expressed in his initial civil claim with the Regional Court and in his appeal before the Court of Appeal. 40.  On 1 April 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. 41.  Article 34 provides that attempted crime is the action (inaction) committed through direct wilfulness deliberately aimed at committing the crime if the crime was not completed for reasons beyond the person’s control. 42.  Article 104 § 1 provides that murder shall be punishable by imprisonment from six to twelve years. 43.  Article 104 § 2 (10) provides that murder committed out of hooliganism shall be punishable by imprisonment from eight to fifteen years or life imprisonment. 44.  Article 375 § 1 provides that abuse of authority or public position, exceeding public authority, as well as omission by a superior or public official, if such acts were committed for selfish ends, personal interest or the interests of a group and which resulted in grave damage, shall be punishable by imprisonment from two to five years. 45.  Article 154 § 3 provides that the civil claim lodged in criminal proceedings is decided in accordance with the provisions of civil law. 46.  According to Article 17 § 1 the person whose rights have been violated may claim full compensation for the damage suffered, unless the law or contract envisages a lower amount of compensation. 47.  According to Article 17 § 2, damages are the expenses borne or to be borne by the person whose rights have been violated, in connection with restoring the violated rights, loss of his property or damage to it (material damage), including lost income. 48.  Article 18 provides that damage caused to natural or legal persons as a result of unlawful actions (inaction) of state and local self-government bodies or their officials is subject to compensation by the Republic of Armenia or the relevant local community. 49.  Article 1077 § 2 provides that damage caused to the life or the health of a person while performing, inter alia, military service is compensated in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Civil Code, if stricter liability is not provided for by statute or contract. 50.  According to Article 1087, persons responsible for damage linked to the victim’s death shall reimburse the necessary funeral expenses to the person who has incurred such expenses. 51.  Since 1 November 2014 Article 17 § 2 has included non‑pecuniary damage in the list of the types of civil damage for which compensation can be claimed in civil proceedings. The Civil Code was supplemented by new Articles 162.1 and 1087.2 which regulate the procedure for claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Until the introduction of further amendments on 30 December 2015 (in force from 1 January 2016), compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage could be claimed where it had been established by a judicial ruling that a person’s rights guaranteed by Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention had been violated, and also in cases of wrongful conviction. 52.  The Constitutional Court found Article 17 § 2 of the Civil Code incompatible with Articles 3 § 2, 16 § 4, 18 § 1, 19 § 1 and 43 § 2 of the Constitution in so far as it does not envisage non-pecuniary damage as a type of civil damages and does not provide for a possibility to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary damage by impeding the effective exercise of the right of access to court and the right to a fair trial and at the same time hindering due compliance with its international obligations by the Republic of Armenia.\nThe Constitutional Court stated that Article 17 § 2 of the Civil Code would lose its legal force at the latest on 1 October 2014.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Marusino, Moscow Region. 6.  On 1 August 2000 the Ministry of the Interior of Belarus ordered the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of her having committed several criminal offences. On an unspecified date her name was put on the international wanted persons list. 7.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant was arrested in Lyubertsy, Moscow Region. 8.  On 20 February 2014 the Lyubertsy Town Court of the Moscow Region authorised the applicant’s detention for forty days pending her extradition to Belarus. 9.  On 28 March 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 August 2014. 10.  On 18 August 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 February 2015. On 18 September 2014 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 18 August 2014 on appeal. The applicant did not attend the hearing. The applicant’s lawyers were present and made submissions to the court. 11.  On 10 February 2015 the Town Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release on an undertaking not to leave town. 12.  On 20 August and 21 September 2015 the investigative committee of the Republic of Belarus discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 13.  On 4 February 2016 the Town Prosecutor discontinued the extradition proceedings against the applicant. 14.  From 21 February 2014 to 10 February 2015 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-6 in the Moscow Region. According to the Government, she was held in the following cells:\nCell no.\nPeriod of detention\nCell size (sq. m)\n28\nFrom 21 to 22 February 2014 15.  According to the Government, the personal space afforded to the applicant during her detention in the remand prison was approximately 3.27 sq. m, which was below the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. She was provided with an individual sleeping place, a mattress, a pillow, two bed sheets, a pillowcase, a towel and a blanket. She also received a bowl, a spoon and a mug. The inmates were allowed to take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. The bed sheets were changed on a weekly basis. The applicant was provided with access to a radio, books and board games. The temperature in the cells was 22oC in summer and at least 18oC in winter. The food provided to the inmates was in compliance with the relevant norms and standards. 16.  According to the applicant, the cells in which she was held were overcrowded and dirty. The walls were covered with mould and fungus. The lighting was insufficient during the day and was not turned off at night. The heating was also insufficient. On numerous occasions it was completely turned off. The mattresses, pillows and bed linen were too old and worn-out. The inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week. The food was of poor quality. No fruit or vegetables were available. The inmates were allowed one hour of exercise a day in a prison yard with no sports facilities. If one of the inmates were sick or refused to take part in the daily exercise, the administration cancelled it for all the inmates held in the same cell. 17.  During her transfers between the remand prison and court, the applicant was placed in a compartment measuring 1 by 0.7 m, often with another inmate. The journey lasted for two and a half to three hours. 18.  Upon her return to the remand prison, the applicant was placed in a holding cell measuring 1 by 1.5 m with three other inmates. Prior to being admitted to their cells, the inmates were required to take off their clothes, do several sit-ups and then remain crouched down. 19.  On 26 February 2014 the Deputy Town Prosecutor carried out an inspection of remand prison SIZO-6. He established, inter alia, that it was overcrowded, noting in particular that the average personal space afforded to inmates varied from 1 to 3 sq. m and that in cells nos. 8, 69 and 97 the inmates were not provided with individual beds. According to the prison administration, the remand prison capacity was 327 inmates. However, at the time of the inspection the prison population exceeded that limit by 62%, holding a total of 530 inmates. 20.  On an unspecified date in 2014 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office carried out an inspection of the conditions of detention in remand prison SIZO-6. On 21 March 2014 the Regional Prosecutor issued a notice to the head of the regional penal service (FSIN), advising that the conditions of detention in the prison be brought in line with the statutory requirements. As to the issue of overcrowding, the prosecutor indicated as follows:\n“As regards the number of beds ... in the cells ... the [statutory] requirement of 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate is not being complied with ... The average personal space afforded to detainees is 2.6 sq. m and in cells nos. 10, 14, 16, 25 etc. it varies from 1.6 to 1.55 sq. m per inmate.” 21.  According to the applicant, between February and March 2014 the Town Prosecutor authorised the applicant’s mother to visit her at the remand prison on three occasions. 22.  On 10 October 2014, in response to a request by the applicant to meet with her family, the Prosecutor General’s Office responded that, as stipulated in the Pre-trial Detention Act, suspects and defendants could have no more than two family visits per month, subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case, and advised the applicant to apply to the law-enforcement bodies in Belarus for approval of her relatives’ visits. 23.  On 21 January 2015 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the prosecutor’s decision of 10 October 2014, without considering the merits. 24.  On 11 March 2015 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 21 January 2015 and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. 25.  On 6 May 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 10 October 2014. 26.  On 17 August 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 6 May 2015 on appeal. 27.  On 24 January 2001 the applicant was issued with a Russian passport by the Russian Embassy in Minsk, Belarus. On an unspecified date she moved to Moscow, Russia. 28.  On 20 August 2004 a district police department in Moscow issued an internal passport in the applicant’s name. 29.  On 16 February 2012 the Moscow City Department of the Federal Migration Service decided, on the basis of an earlier inquiry, that the applicant had been wrongly issued with a Russian passport. They based their findings, inter alia, on information received from the Russian Embassy in Minsk indicating that there was no information in the relevant database confirming the issuance of a Russian passport in the applicant’s name in 2001. 30.  On 5 February 2015 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the decision of 16 February 2012. On 26 June 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 5 February 2015. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant, being a Belorussian citizen, applied for a residency permit in Russia. On 17 April 2017 the Federal Migration Service issued a residency permit.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lived in Kalvarija. She died on 8 April 2017. 7.  In December 1993 a large sum of money disappeared from A.G.’s mother’s home in the town of Kalvarija. A.G. suspected the applicant’s son R.A., and R.A.’s friend, Z.V., of having stolen the money. 8.  As later established by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 40 below), on 19 April 1994 A.G., acting with accomplices, forced R.A. and Z.V. into a car and drove them to a forest in Kalvarija. R.A. and Z.V. were tied to a tree, interrogated, beaten, put in a hole in the ground and, when they tried to escape, shot, stabbed and thus killed. Both victims were then buried in the forest in an attempt to hide the evidence. Their bodies were never found. 9.  On 8 July 1994 the applicant’s daughter reported to the police that her brother R.A. had disappeared.  Having examined the material indicating that on 19 April 1994 R.A. had been placed in a car and had not returned, on 29 August 1994 the police opened a criminal investigation into charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty. 10.  In autumn 1994 the authorities started connecting A.G. to the disappearance of the applicant’s son and Z.V. On 25 October 1994 A.G. was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. However, as later established by court decisions, when in October 1994 two witnesses gave false testimony that they had seen the two missing persons – R.A. and Z.V. – alive in Klaipėda, on 4 November 1994 A.G. was released from pre‑trial detention. 11.  The criminal investigation into the charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty continued. The authorities questioned a number of witnesses, including A.G., who had also been questioned as a suspect earlier. In order to eliminate contradictions between the witnesses’ testimony, the authorities conducted several formal confrontations (akistata). As noted by the Government, several forensic expert examinations were performed with regard to the seized vehicle allegedly used in the kidnapping, but no traces of blood were found in that vehicle. 12.  On 29 November 1994 the pre-trial investigator took the decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, because R.A. and Z.V. could not be located and there were no objective grounds for establishing who was responsible for their disappearance. The police were instructed to continue searching for R.A. and Z.V., as well as for those who were responsible for their disappearance.\nAccording to the Government, the applicant did not appeal against that decision. 13.  The Government also stated that afterwards R.A. had been considered a missing person (dingęs be žinios). In order to find him, the authorities had entered information into the relevant registers and databases. Various police records had been inspected. R.A. had been sought in medical establishments. Information with regard to unidentified corpses had been checked in order to look for similarities. The media had also been employed to ask the general public for assistance. The search had been closed on 26 May 2004 because of the expiry of the statutory limitation period. Before closing the search, R.A.’s relatives had been questioned once again, and the matter of whether R.A. had crossed the Lithuanian border had been verified. 14.  According to the Government, within the context of another criminal case instituted in April 2004 regarding an attempt to murder A.G., information was received that A.G. could have been involved in R.A.’s and Z.V.’s disappearance. According to the documents before the Court, in June 2004 the Prosecutor General office asked the Criminal Police Bureau to continue investigating the disappearance. 15.  On 24 January 2005 the Criminal Police Bureau found that A.G., acting together with G.S. and G.M., had killed R.A. and Z.V. (see paragraph 8 above). The Criminal Police Bureau thus opened a criminal investigation into the murder of two persons. It appears that the evidence against A.G. consisted of witness testimony, including the testimony of two witnesses who agreed to testify on the condition that they could do so anonymously, as well as the secret surveillance of another witness who had misled the investigators in 1994 (see paragraph 10 above). 16.  On 13 June 2005 the police wished to question A.G., but he could not be found either at his home or at his place of work. Two days later, on 15 June 2005 the authorities issued a decision to charge A.G. with the murder of two persons. The following day an operative search (operatyvinė paieška) in respect of A.G. was announced. By 24 June 2005 the authorities obtained information that A.G. was already abroad, possibly in Latvia, and planned to travel to either the United States of America or Kazakhstan. On 30 June 2005 a court authorised A.G.’s detention, in the event that he was found. 17.  On 18 July 2005 a prosecutor specified (patikslino) charges against A.G. and charged him with the aggravated murder of two persons (compare paragraph 11 above). Noting that the operative search which had been announced earlier had not brought about any results, the prosecutor announced a national and international search in respect of A.G. (vietinė ir tarptautinė paieška). On 16 August 2005 the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a European arrest warrant in respect of A.G. 18.  In December 2005 the Criminal Police Bureau obtained information that A.G. could be in Kazakhstan, and it noted that it intended to contact the Kazakhstan authorities in order to establish A.G.’s exact whereabouts and to seek his arrest and extradition to Lithuania. 19.  A.G was arrested on 17 March 2006, when he came to the Prosecutor General’s Office in Vilnius. He was questioned as a suspect in R.A.’s and Z.V.’s murder. He denied any involvement. By that time, the authorities had questioned a number of witnesses, performed searches, sent a legal aid request to Latvia, asked for information from the Lithuanian embassy in the United States of America, and also had agents travel to Ukraine, where one of A.G.’s accomplices had been apprehended. The documents before the Court also show that between June 2005 and March 2007 the Criminal Police Bureau investigator repeatedly questioned the suspects and organised formal confrontations between them, so that any inconsistent testimony would be clarified. 20.  In response to a request by the applicant of 12 June 2006, on 19 September 2006 a prosecutor granted her civil claimant (civilinis ieškovas) status in the case regarding her son’s murder. 21.  The applicant’s daughter had been granted the status of a victim (nukentėjusioji) on 12 June 2006. For her part, on 19 September 2006 the applicant was recognised as a victim in the criminal case regarding her son’s murder. 22.  In September 2006 the prosecutor also imposed a restriction on A.G.’s real property. 23.  From 17 March to 22 November 2006 A.G. was again detained pending trial, including by a ruling of the Vilnius Regional Court of 20 October 2006. The applicant appealed against that ruling. 24.  As later established by a court decision (see paragraph 40 below), whilst being detained, on 22 March 2006 A.G. had attempted to offer a bribe of 20,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 5,800 euros (EUR)) to the Criminal Police Bureau investigator, in an attempt to persuade the latter not to actively pursue leads in the criminal murder case, so that the remand measure which had been imposed on him – pre-trial detention – could be replaced with a less stringent one. 25.  On 22 November 2006 the Court of Appeal ordered A.G.’s release from pre-trial detention. Whilst acknowledging that, at that stage, it was not pronouncing judgment on the question of A.G.’s guilt, the appellate court nevertheless noted that the evidence corroborating his guilt on the charges of murder was very scarce to support his detention pending trial. In particular, although the victims had allegedly been killed as early as 1994, their bodies had still not been found, and A.G. had been charged with their murder only in 2005. The Court of Appeal also pointed out that there was no evidence that A.G. could hide from the investigation, although these had been the grounds relied on by the prosecutor in support of A.G.’s detention. On the contrary, the case material showed that, when summoned in March 2006, A.G. had attended the Prosecutor General’s Office. His wife had also later taken his passport to the prosecutor, which, according to the Court of Appeal, showed that he had not been hiding that document. Moreover, between June 2005 and February 2006 – the period which the prosecutor referred to as the period when A.G. had been hiding from the authorities – in reality, A.G. had been working in Lithuania and receiving a salary. Similarly, although the prosecutor claimed that in the summer of 2005 A.G. had been recognised as a suspect and a national and international search in respect of him had been announced, in reality, the police had not been actively searching for A.G. This was because, during the relevant time, A.G. had taken part in an unrelated court hearing in Lithuania and had also crossed the Lithuanian State border a number of times. It was very plausible that A.G. had not even known that he was being sought by the authorities. For the Court of Appeal, there were also no grounds to hold that A.G. could hide from the authorities abroad, because he had not done so, in spite of his numerous trips to foreign countries. 26.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the case was particularly complex and the case file was voluminous, given that the case involved more than one suspect, numerous witnesses had been questioned, and many forensic examinations, including DNA, had had to be performed. Even so, the appellate court pointed to the inconsistency in relation to the arguments for A.G.’s detention. In particular, in October 2006 and in a co-accused’s case, the prosecutor had asserted that all necessary actions in the criminal investigation had already been performed, and that therefore it was unlikely that that co-accused would hide from the authorities and there were no grounds for his pre-trial detention. However, in A.G.’s case, in October 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court had extended A.G.’s detention, considering that many investigative actions had yet to be performed. For the Court of Appeal, this meant that, with regard to the collection of evidence, double standards had been applied to the two co-accused in the case, which raised doubts as to the objectivity of the criminal investigation. The Court of Appeal also considered that such actions could be seen as discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, as was apparent from the material presented by A.G.’s lawyer, a DNA examination had already been performed in the case. This fact had also been acknowledged by the prosecutor, who had also confirmed that all the main investigative actions had already been completed. The Court of Appeal thus considered that continuing A.G.’s detention would be unnecessary, and would risk breaching Article 5 of the Convention. 27.  The Court of Appeal lastly observed that A.G. had no prior convictions, and had a family, two minor daughters, a permanent place of residence, and a job. Accordingly, a less stringent remand measure could be imposed on him, and it was for the prosecutor to choose what that measure would be, given that the court could not choose another remand measure by itself. 28.  On 22 November 2006 the prosecutor thus varied the remand measure in respect of A.G. and imposed on him an obligation not to leave his place of residence. A.G. was also ordered to periodically register with the police (įpareigojimas periodiškai registruotis policijos įstaigoje) every other day, and he had his personal documents – identity card and passport – taken off him. 29.  On 1 February 2007 the prosecutor discontinued the criminal investigation into the murder charges in respect of A.G.’s co-accused. The prosecutor established that the co-accused had not wanted R.A. and Z.V. to die, and that it had been only A.G. who had exceeded their initial plan (vykdytojo ekscesas) to kidnap R.A. and Z.V. and had murdered them. 30.  In August 2007 A.G. asked that the criminal proceedings against him be discontinued on the grounds that pre-trial investigation had been going on too long. However, by a ruling of 28 August 2007 the Vilnius City Second District Court dismissed his complaint, noting that even after 22 November 2006 the investigators had continued to question suspects and witnesses, performing expert examinations on handwriting and documents, as well as other investigative actions. The court pointed out that the case file was voluminous, that the crime in question had been committed a long time ago, and that certain actions could not be performed because of A.G.’s illness in 2007. 31.  In January 2008 the applicant asked the Kaunas Regional Court to hear the criminal case without her being present. She submitted that her health was frail and that she could not face seeing her son’s murderer at the court hearing. She asked the court to rely on her earlier testimony given at the stage of the pre-trial investigation. The Government specified that the applicant had later taken part in one hearing before the trial court. 32.  The prosecutor drew up the bill of indictment on 11 October 2007 and transferred the case to the trial court. According to the chronology provided by the Government, afterwards the trial court held eighteen hearings, when witnesses were questioned and evidence was examined. 33.  By a judgment of 2 February 2009 the Kaunas Regional Court acquitted A.G. of R.A.’s and Z.V.’s murder and of the attempted bribery of a police investigator. The applicant and her daughter had participated in some of the hearings before the trial court.\nThe trial court ordered that the remand measures imposed on A.G. – the obligation not to leave his place of residence, the taking away his identity documents (passport and ID card), and the order to periodically register with the police – should be lifted and his identity documents returned. The trial court also rejected civil claims by the applicant and I.V. (the mother of the other person who had been killed).\nLastly, the trial court lifted the restrictions on A.G.’s real property (see paragraph 22 above). 34.  It transpires from the documents before the Court that A.G.’s identity documents were returned to him on 17 February 2009, after he requested this. 35.  Both the prosecutor and the applicant’s daughter appealed against the trial court’s judgment acquitting A.G. 36.  On 15 December 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld A.G.’s acquittal in relation to the charges of murder and attempted bribery of a police investigator, and left the civil claims by the applicant and I.V. unexamined. 37.  The prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law, and by a ruling of 5 July 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal decision of 15 December 2010 and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh examination. The Supreme Court took note of the appellate court’s conclusion that the case was a complex one because it involved criminal charges for a serious crime that had been committed many years previously. It also found that, although the appellate court had examined the evidence by questioning not only some of those witnesses who had already been questioned before the first-instance court, but also some newly summoned witnesses, it had nevertheless failed to rule on some other evidence and had not questioned an anonymous witness, even though earlier the appellate court had considered that witness’s testimony pertinent to the case. Furthermore, the appellate court had not answered all the questions regarding the evaluation of evidence which had been raised in the appeal against the first-instance court’s judgment. 38.  Once the case was returned to the Court of Appeal, the latter completed the examination of the merits of the case during the hearing of 12 October 2012, announcing that the judgment be pronounced on 27 November 2012 (see paragraph 40 below). 39.  It transpires that no remand measure was imposed on A.G. during the examination of the case by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeal. 40.  On 27 November 2012 the Court of Appeal reversed the Kaunas Regional Court’s judgment of 2 February 2009, and on the basis of all the evidence found A.G. guilty of the aggravated murder of two persons – R.A. and Z.V. – under Article 105 § 2 (2 and 5) of the old Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). The Court of Appeal established that that crime had been committed against persons in a particularly vulnerable situation (bejėgiškos būklės), since both R.A. and Z.V. had been shot after they had been beaten and placed in a hole in the ground with their hands tied, which was an aggravating circumstance. The Court of Appeal also found A.G. guilty of the attempted bribery of a pre-trial investigation officer, under Article 227 § 2 of the new Criminal Code (see paragraphs 24 above and 50 below). A.G. was sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment, to be served in a correctional home (pataisos namuose). The time which he had already spent in pre-trial detention – from 25 October 1994 to 4 November 1994 and from 17 March 2006 to 22 November 2006 – was to count as time served in relation to that sentence. The Court of Appeal noted that A.G. had no prior convictions; he worked, was married and had four children. Moreover, the criminal proceedings had lasted rather a long time, which was a reason to impose a less severe punishment than the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 41.  By the same judgment, the Court of Appeal also awarded the applicant and I.V. (the mother of the other murdered person), LTL 150,000 (approximately EUR 43,500) each, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the loss of their sons. 42.  According to the Government, on 6 December 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court sent the judgment convicting A.G. to the Marijampolė police, so that it could be executed. 43.  As the documents before the Court show, on 11 December 2012 the police established that A.G. had absconded to avoid serving his sentence. The same day, the police announced a national and international search in respect of him. The Government provided the Court with a copy of an authorisation, confirmed by a notary, which A.G. had signed on 28 November 2012 in the Smolensk Region in the Russian Federation, empowering his wife to represent his interests before the Lithuanian institutions. The Government specified that in November 2013 A.G.’s wife had presented that authorisation to a court in Lithuania when she had asked to familiarise herself with the applicant’s criminal file. 44.  On 26 February 2013 the Lithuanian authorities issued a European arrest warrant in respect of A.G. The authorities noted, inter alia, that A.G. had been physically present when the Kaunas Regional Court had acquitted him on 2 February 2009, when the Court of Appeal had delivered a ruling on 15 December 2010, when the Supreme Court had issued a ruling on 5 July 2011, and when the Court of Appeal had heard his case afterwards. He had also been physically present on 12 October 2012, when the hearing on the merits had been completed and the appellate court had adjourned pronouncement of the judgment. It had been A.G.’s lawyer who had been physically present when the Court of Appeal had pronounced the judgment of 27 November 2012. 45.  On 6 December 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court issued a writ of execution, pursuant to which the applicant and I.V. were to get LTL 150,000 each from A.G. On 11 December 2012 the applicant took the writ of execution to the bailiff, who on the following day accepted the execution request and on that same day took a decision to seize A.G.’s property. It transpires from the documents before the Court that in the period April-July 2013 amounts totalling about EUR 400 were recovered to compensate for the execution costs of roughly the same value already paid by the applicant’s daughter. In July 2013 the bailiff decided to suspend the enforcement proceedings until A.G. was found. The applicant was informed about the decision to suspend the enforcement proceedings. 46.  The applicant’s daughter appealed against the Court of Appeal’s judgment convicting A.G. (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above), asking for A.G. to be ordered to serve his sentence not in a correctional home, which was an institution with a less stringent regime, but in a prison. She pointed out that A.G. had killed her brother in a particularly cruel way when he had been particularly vulnerable. A.G., for his part, in his appeal on points of law, asked to be acquitted and for the criminal proceedings to be discontinued. 47.  By a final ruling of 25 June 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on points of law by the applicant’s daughter and by A.G. The Supreme Court considered that the punishment imposed on A.G. had been just. At the Supreme Court hearing, A.G.’s wife admitted that her husband was abroad, but refused to disclose his whereabouts.\nAccording to the information provided by the Government in 2017, A.G. had been granted refugee status in the Russian Federation (see also paragraph 80 below).", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. 6.  In early 2012 Ms B., headmistress of School no. 118 of Rostov‑on‑Don and chairwoman of the local electoral committee, removed the applicant from his position as an electoral committee member. 7.  On 1 September 2012 festive events were taking place at School no. 118 to celebrate “The Day of Knowledge” (День знаний). Around 8.15 a.m. on that day the applicant staged a solo demonstration (одиночный пикет) in front of the school. He distributed leaflets to the parents of the pupils expressing his negative opinion about the professional and personal qualities of the headmistress, Ms. B. The leaflets read as follows:\n“Dear parents, you have entrusted your children to the staff of School no. 118, with Ms B. as its headmistress. I, Eduard Nikolayev, have reasons to believe that your child will be taught from Hottentot and Old Testament ethics. See for yourself: on 10 March 2012 I held a demonstration and was handled by the police. I was then sentenced to two days in detention by a justice of the peace, on a fabricated charge of hooliganism. This is now a widespread practice in respect of political matters in Russia. As the judicial reprisals were manifestly unlawful (since I had immunity as a member of an electoral committee), they needed to invent some justification. Such a justification was deliberately faked by Ms B., chairwoman of the local electoral committee ...” 8.  The school staff called police officer O., who was present at the school premises owing to enhanced security measures taken on that day. 9.  According to the applicant, within thirty minutes two additional police officers, T. and M., had arrived. He complied with their order to show his identity documents. At some point, while the police officers were carrying out an identity check through the police database, he decided to leave. However, when the applicant saw police officer T. following him, he changed his mind and returned. Officer T. then took him in a painful armlock and handcuffed him, without giving any valid reason; the applicant was then taken to the police van. 10.  According to the Government, Ms B. had informed police officer O. that the applicant was distributing leaflets. The applicant refused to familiarise officer O. with the contents of the leaflet or to leave the school premises upon her request. At 8.30 a.m. a special group of police officers arrived. They asked the applicant to present his identity documents and to proceed to the police van for an identity check. The applicant tried to escape; the police used force and handcuffs to stop him. Then the applicant was taken to the police station. 11.  At the police station the officer on duty drew up a record of the applicant’s administrative arrest for the purpose of bringing him to court. The record indicated that the applicant had been escorted to the police station at 9.55 a.m. and released at 12.20 p.m. on 1 September 2012. After that the on-duty officer compiled an administrative-offence record, according to which the applicant had used foul language at the premises of School no. 118 and disturbed passers-by in an insulting manner. Moreover, he had resisted arrest by pushing the police officers away and had tried to escape from them. The applicant was accused of minor hooliganism, an offence punishable under Article 20.1 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, “the CAO”) (see paragraph 25 below). 12.  The administrative case file contained a report by police officer M., which stated that at 8.50 a.m. on 1 September 2012 he and officer T. had arrested the applicant at the premises of School no. 118. The applicant had used foul language and had behaved inappropriately; in particular, he had disturbed passers-by. He had not reacted to their multiple requests to calm down and to cease this behaviour, had refused to present his identity documents and had tried to escape. Officer M. also recorded that the police had used physical force and handcuffs. 13.  On 1 September 2012 the administrative case was transferred to the Justice of the Peace of the Voroshilovskiy District of Rostov-on-Don. 14.  Upon his release from the police station on 1 September 2012, the applicant went to Rostov-on-Don City Emergency Hospital. At 4.25 p.m. he was examined by a doctor, who diagnosed him with a sprain to the right shoulder and bruises on both wrists. After being provided with the necessary treatment, at 5.20 p.m. the applicant was released from the hospital. The applicant stayed on sick leave in connection with these injuries from 1 until 24 September 2012. 15.  On 3 September 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Investigative Committee of Rostov-on-Don alleging breaches of his rights to liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly by the police. It appears that the Rostov regional department of the Ministry of the Interior conducted an internal inquiry into this complaint. As a result, it was determined that police officers T. and M. had acted in accordance with the law and internal requirements and had not breached the applicant’s rights. 16.  On 12 September 2012 police station no. 1 of Rostov-on-Don informed the applicant in a letter that the administrative proceedings against him had been discontinued as his actions lacked the constituent elements of the crime. 17.  In November 2012 the applicant brought civil proceedings (in accordance with Article 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure) challenging the following actions on the part of the public authorities and officials: the police order to stop the demonstration and distribution of leaflets, in breach of his right to impart information; their recourse to physical force and use of handcuffs; taking him to the police station; and his prosecution under the CAO. 18.  By a judgment of 5 April 2013 the Voroshilovskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don dismissed his claims. The court accepted the applicant’s submission that he had staged a static demonstration (пикетирование), which consisted of distribution of leaflets. It considered that the applicant had attempted to escape during the identity check and had been arrested, and that the use of force and handcuffs had complied with the relevant regulations. Further, the court dismissed the applicant’s allegation that the administrative proceedings against him had been discontinued, on the grounds that no formal decision had been issued. The court also relied on the statements of a representative of the regional department of the Ministry of the Interior in that regard, who had testified that the administrative-offence file against the applicant had been lost. However, the police had been reassembling the file at the time of the trial. 19.  On the basis of several testimonies, the District Court concluded as follows:\n“In the present case the police officers intended to put an end to the breach of public order, consisting of [showing] disrespect to society accompanied by the use of foul language in a public place [by the applicant], disturbing citizens in an insulting manner and refusing to obey an order by a public official ... The police officers ... acted within their powers and did not violate the applicant’s rights. Nor did they cause any impediment to the exercise of any such rights ...” 20.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He contended that the finding of the first-instance court had been based on the pending charge against him and the wording of Article 20.1 of the CAO, and had thus violated his right to be presumed innocent. Furthermore, in the applicant’s view, the court had failed to specify the factual details concerning his showing of “disrespect to society”, the content and the alleged victims of the foul language allegedly used by him, the details of his “disturbing others” and “the order by a public official” and the lawfulness of any such order. 21.  On 17 June 2013 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. The court pointed out that the circumstances concerning the applicant’s guilt in the commission of an administrative offence should be discussed in the context of the administrative offence proceedings.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and was at the time of the introduction of the application detained at the Safi detention centre. 6.  On 10 September 2016 the applicant, a refugee from Ivory Coast who claimed to have previously obtained asylum in Armenia, left Russia and arrived in Malta by plane. Upon arrival he presented his documents (including a national passport) to the immigration authorities. 7.  According to the applicant he immediately informed the authorities that he was a refugee from Ivory Coast and that he had fled the war in his country many years before. He claimed that he had reached Malta from Armenia, where he had lived as a refugee prior to his arrival in Malta. He also promptly confirmed his intention to seek asylum in Malta, due to his fear that Armenia would return him to Ivory Coast. 8.  The applicant was found carrying false Italian identification documents and, according to the Government, when questioned, he informed the police that he had obtained the documents from a friend in Italy and that his intention was to travel to Italy by transiting via Malta. The applicant was also found to be in possession of a travel ticket to Italy. 9.  The applicant was denied entry since according to the immigration authorities he was not in possession of the required documentation. On the same day he was taken to police headquarters were he was questioned. During questioning the applicant provided further information concerning his escape from war in Ivory Coast, his life in Armenia and the reasons why he felt he could no longer live there, reasons primarily linked to his skin colour and the lack of physical security. The police confiscated his documents. 10.  On the same day, the police (immigration branch) issued a detention order in terms of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) and Subsidiary Legislation 420.06 “Reception of Asylum Seekers Regulations” (hereinafter “the Reception Regulations” – see Relevant domestic law below) on the grounds that the elements on which the applicant’s application for international protection had been based could not be determined in the absence of detention, in particular due to the risk of absconding. He was informed that he had the right to appeal this decision before the Immigration Appeals Board (hereinafter “the Board”) within three days. He was further informed that the Board would automatically review this order within seven days from the date of its issuance, which could be extended by a further seven days; and that if he remained in detention a further review would occur every two months. He was informed that he was entitled to free legal assistance. 11.  The applicant was accompanied to Safi Barracks detention centre, where he was detained. 12.  On 20 September 2016 the applicant applied for international protection and was formally registered as an asylum‑seeker. 13.  According to documentation submitted by the Government, on 30 September 2016, the applicant appeared before the Board accompanied by one of his lawyers (of choice), but the case was put off to the next board meeting to be held on 5 October 2016, since one of the applicant’s representatives (of choice) was abroad. The applicant appears to contest the existence of this hearing and notes that the Government have not provided any proof of notification of such hearing or what went on. He however claims that even if it did occur his legal aid lawyer was not present as required by law. 14.  On 5 October 2016 the Board convened in order to review the legality of the applicant’s detention, in accordance with Regulation 6(3) of the Reception Regulations. The applicant was present with his legal representatives and was provided with an interpreter. 15.  According to the applicant, during the hearing before the Board, in the presence of a representative of the Malta Police Force who explained the circumstances of the applicant’s detention, the Board informed the applicant that it had not been able to comply with the deadline provided by the law for the review of his detention since on the date required by the Reception Regulations (namely seven working days from the issuing of the detention order) a Board member was attending a conference overseas and therefore he could not take part in the hearing. Furthermore, the Board stressed that since its members were merely part-time employees meeting once a week and lacking administrative support while being responsible for a vast array of immigration related appeals, it was simply unable to meets its legal obligation and determine the lawfulness of his detention on time. 16.  During the hearing the applicant’s representative repeatedly requested the Malta Police Force’s representative and the chairperson of the Board to specify the grounds on which he was being detained. Both the Malta Police Force’s representative and the Board’s chairperson orally indicated “fear of absconding” as the primary reason for the applicant’s detention. 17.  The applicant’s representative made written and oral submissions to the Board. He noted, in particular, that from the moment of his first contact with the Maltese authorities the applicant had provided consistent factual information about his identity, nationality, countries of transit, intention to seek asylum in Malta, migration/asylum status in third countries and reasons for flight from Ivory Coast. He had not made any attempt to conceal any information and had acted with honesty, openness and transparency towards the authorities. It followed that he had already presented to the authorities all the elements on which his application for international protection had been based, thus the legal basis on which the authorities had relied in order to justify his detention could not be held applicable to his case and the interference with the applicant’s liberty had not been provided by law. The applicant also claimed that his detention had been neither necessary nor proportionate. In his opinion the immigration police had failed to demonstrate that without the applicant’s detention it would have been impossible for them to determine any elements on the basis of his asylum application. 18.  On the same day the Board dismissed the applicant’s complaints and confirmed the legality of his detention. The Board specified that: (i) the elements in question referred to the application for refugee status, which had not yet been determined; (ii) if the applicant left Malta he would be unable to provide the information (elements) required by the Commissioner for Refugees (REFCOM); (iii) the fact that the applicant had been found in possession of a ticket to go to Italy showed that his intention was not to remain in Malta; (iv) “with the fact that he was inadmissible in the first place because he had forged a document, there is no reason to believe that appellant will not abscond”. 19.  The Board requested the Principal Immigration Office (PIO) to enquire as to whether all elements had been clarified and given to REFCOM, and whether the applicant would have been given refugee status, in order to ensure that detention did not subsist for longer than was needed. If the period of detention continued because of the asylum proceedings, including an appeal, the PIO were to consider alternatives to detention particularly those listed in Regulation 6(8) of the Reception Regulations S.L. 420.06, as such detention would then no longer be reasonable. 20.  On 21 October 2016 the applicant applied to the Court of Magistrates relying on Article 409(A) of the Criminal Code to contest the lawfulness of his detention. He argued that there had been no individual assessment of the applicant’s situation, and that it was not clear what elements were still required. He noted that a risk of absconding could not be examined on its own and that Regulation 1(6) of the Reception Regulations S.L. 420.06 could not be interpreted as meaning that detention could be prolonged throughout the entire proceedings. 21.  It appears that the immigration police argued that the one fundamental element they expected the applicant to provide was a document confirming the statement that he was recognised as a refugee in Armenia. 22.  On the same day the Court of Magistrates upheld the legality of the applicant’s detention. The court found that the applicant was raising the same issues he had raised before the Board, and which had already been decided by it. The court agreed that the risk of absconding under Regulation 6(1) (b) could not be seen on its own but in the light of the whole Regulation. The Reception Regulations, L.S. 420.06, allowed the detention of persons like the applicant ‑ pending a decision on asylum ‑ in order to establish the elements on which such application was based, when it would be difficult to do so in the absence of detention. During the hearing it transpired that further verifications were necessary and that the applicant was at risk of absconding, making the asylum determination impossible. It followed that the applicant’s detention could not be considered unlawful. 23.  The applicant was released from immigrant detention on 8 November 2016, subject to reporting at the police station daily. 24.  By a judgment of 19 January 2017, in accordance with his guilty plea, the applicant was found guilty of using a false passport. Although he was liable to imprisonment for a period of six months to two years, the court, in application of Section 22 of the Probation Act (Chapter 446 of the Laws of Malta) conditionally discharged the applicant for three years. 25.  On an unspecified date in March 2017 the applicant’s asylum application was rejected. The applicant appealed, which appeal reached the Secretary of the Refugee Appeal’s Board on 21 March 2017.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is serving a sentence in Diyarbakır prison. 7.  On 12 September 1994 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. He was allegedly subjected to torture while held in police custody, which lasted twenty-two days. 8.  The applicant was questioned by the police at the Diyarbakır Security Directorate. Subsequently, the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor took statements from him in the absence of a lawyer, concerning his involvement in the activities of Hizbullah. In his statements, the applicant admitted his membership of the illegal organisation and mentioned certain activities in which he had participated. 9.  On 20 September 1994 the applicant participated in an on-site inspection (keşif) and a reconstruction of events (yer gösterme), in the course of which he confessed, in the absence of a lawyer, to committing some offences. 10.  On 25 September 1994 the applicant participated in another on-site inspection and reconstruction of events, in the course of which he confessed, again in the absence a lawyer, to other offences. 11.  Twenty-two days after his arrest, namely on 4 October 1994, a doctor at Diyarbakır Public Hospital drew up a collective medical report in respect of the applicant and twenty-seven other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. 12.  On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He retracted the statements he had made to the police and the prosecutor, alleging that he had given them under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant’s remand in custody. 13.  Owing to a lack of prison places, the applicant was not put in prison but was kept at the anti-terrorism branch of the Diyarbakır Security Directorate for three more days, during which time he was allegedly subjected to torture again. 14.  On 24 October 1994 the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor issued an indictment charging the applicant and twenty-one others under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State’s control by killing and injuring numerous individuals. Seven other individuals were charged under Articles 168 and 169 of the same Code. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 15.  On 4 November 1994 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 18 November 1994. 16.  At the second hearing held on 23 January 1995 the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and retracted the statements he had made to the police and the public prosecutor, alleging that they had been obtained through torture. He further stated that he had no relationship with the illegal organisation and that all the acts attributed to him had been a sham orchestrated by the police. 17.  At the hearings of 28 April, 8 December and 28 December 1995, the State Security Court heard evidence from F.E., C.D., H.Y., C.Ö., İ.A. and M.A. as witnesses and from İ.Ç. as a complainant. 18.  At the hearing held on 26 January 1996 the State Security Court informed the applicant that he was entitled to lodge a complaint with the public prosecutor concerning his allegations of torture against the police officers. 19.  At the hearings of 22 August, 4 October and 15 November 1996, the State Security Court heard evidence from H.O., Ş.D. and M.H.B. as witnesses, and from S.Ö. as a complainant. 20.  On 22 August 1996 the applicant maintained his allegation that he had been tortured while in police custody and applied to the court for his release and acquittal. 21.  At the hearings of 5 August and 30 December 1997, the State Security Court heard evidence from A.Y. and M.E. as witnesses. 22.  On 6 November 1997 the applicant stated that he had been coerced by the police into admitting to the acts attributed to him. 23.  At the hearings of 5 March and 3 December 1998, the State Security Court heard evidence from A.Y. and A.Ö. as witnesses. 24.  While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. 25.  In the first thirty-four hearings that were held until the hearing of 20 July 1999, the composition of the Diyarbakır State Security Court changed seventeen times. Each time the previous reports were read out as a result of the change in the composition of the trial court. 26.  At the hearing of 20 July 1999, the Diyarbakır State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, read out the previous reports as a result of the change in the composition of the trial court. 27.  On 15 January 2002, 23 October 2003 and 12 May 2005 the public prosecutor filed additional indictments against the applicant, charging him under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code. In total, the applicant was accused of taking part in the killing of nineteen people and of injuring eight others on behalf of Hizbullah. The Diyarbakır State Security Court joined all the cases owing to the link between them. 28.  By virtue of Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 29.  At a hearing held on 2 February 2007, the applicant applied to the court for his acquittal. 30.  On 26 February 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial court relied on, inter alia, the statements the applicant had given to the police and the public prosecutor, the reports of the reconstruction of events and the on-site inspection, as well as the statements of some of the co-accused and the witness F.E. It rejected the applicant’s contention that he had been tortured while in police custody on the grounds that according to the medical report dated 4 October 1994, no traces of ill-treatment had been found on him. According to the reasoned judgment, thirty other co-defendants who had given incriminating statements to the police denied the accusations against themselves when giving evidence in person before the trial court. In particular, twenty-eight of them had fully retracted their police statements before the trial court while two of them had partially done so. 31.  The applicant appealed and on 16 April 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. It appears from the decision of the Court of Cassation that the applicant’s request for a correction of his age had been dismissed by the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 32.  In 2010 the applicant requested a copy of the medical report prepared on 4 October 1994 from the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor’s Office. On 5 February 2010 he was informed that all the documents prepared in 1994 had been destroyed in 2004.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "7.  The applicant was born in 1987 in the Netherlands and arrived in Denmark when he was approximately 9 months old. He remained in Denmark, together with his parents and three brothers. 8.  The applicant has a criminal record. Before he turned 18 years old, he had been convicted four times by a City Court: on 8 May 2003 of, inter alia, drug offences, with a sentence of four months’ imprisonment, suspended; on 1 October 2003 of armed robbery, with a sentence of one year and six months’ imprisonment, of which one year was suspended; on 24 June 2004 of, inter alia, theft and possession of weapons, with a sentence of one year and four months’ imprisonment; and on 12 May 2005 of, inter alia, robbery, and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. He was released on 10 July 2006 with two hundred and fifty-five days remaining, suspended for two years. 9.  After having reached the age of majority the applicant was convicted a number of times. 10.  By a City Court judgment of 7 September 2006 he was convicted of handling stolen property and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. 11.  By a City Court judgment of 11 June 2008, he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Moreover, the City Court ordered the applicant’s expulsion, suspended with two years’ probation. He was released on 28 January 2010. 12.  By a City Court judgment of 25 March 2010, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to thirty days’ imprisonment. 13.  By a judgment of the High Court, acting as an appeal instance, on 9 November 2010 he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to one year and three months’ imprisonment. In addition, his expulsion was again ordered, suspended with two years’ probation. 14.  By a City Court judgment of 27 February 2012 the applicant was convicted of attempting to escape from prison. No additional sentence was imposed. 15.  In the meantime, on 12 November 2011 the applicant was arrested and charged with offences under the Penal Code, inter alia two counts of robbery, the first committed in a private home on 4 October 2011, and the second in a bank on 24 October 2011. The applicant was also charged with possession of arms, threatening a witness, drug offences and handling stolen property. 16.  The case was heard by the City Court of Copenhagen (Københavns Byret). Two co-accused from the applicant’s family were also on trial. The applicant was heard and pleaded not guilty to the robberies. He explained that he was 25 years old. Except for eight months spent, as a baby, in the Netherlands, he had lived all his life in Denmark, where all his family lived, including his parents, three brothers and 80 other family members. He had never been to Croatia or the former Yugoslavia. He had no family there and did not speak the language. He had been diagnosed with ADHD and took medication for that. He had had a girlfriend for 2 years and 3 months. They wanted to marry and have children. 17.  For the purpose of the court proceedings, the Aliens Authority (Udlændingestyrelsen) issued a report on the applicant. It noted that since the applicant had turned 15, he had been convicted of similar criminal offences and served sentences totalling 1,755 days, equal to four years and ten months.\nThe applicant’s mother had been granted a residence permit in 1987 on the grounds of her marriage with the applicant’s father. She had left in June 1988, but returned in November 1988 with the applicant, who was 9 months old at the time, and who was granted a residence permit until March 2005, later extended to April 2012. The length of his legal stay in Denmark was therefore calculated at approximately sixteen years and two months. The conditions for ordering an expulsion were set out in the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven), section 22 no. 6 or section 24 no. 1, read in conjunction with the former.\nThe applicant had been to school for seven years, but had no other education, and at the relevant times had received social welfare. He had stated that, for the past two years, he had had a girlfriend, and that his father, three brothers and about 80 family members lived in Denmark. He had also stated that he had been diagnosed with ADHD, that he suffered from emotional stress and that he heard voices when smoking cannabis, to which he had been addicted for ten years. He had suffered three cannabis psychoses during the past four years, and been treated once in hospital for such psychosis.\nIn conclusion, the Aliens Authority endorsed the prosecution’s recommendation of expulsion. 18.  By a judgment of 12 December 2012, the City Court convicted the applicant inter alia of the two counts of robbery, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. It attached special weight to the fact that he was convicted of two robberies and had previously been convicted of similar crimes. 19.  In addition, by virtue of section 22 no. 6 in conjunction with section 26, subsection 2, of the Aliens Act, the City Court ordered the applicant’s expulsion, with a permanent ban on his return. In this respect the City Court stated:\n“As regards the issue of expulsion, the Court observes that it depends on an assessment of proportionality as established by the Supreme Court (Højesteret) in a judgment reproduced on page 225 of the Danish Weekly Law Reports for 2012 ((UfR) 2012.225H), whether an offender is to be expelled. The Supreme Court said with reference, inter alia, to § 71 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 23 June 2008 in Maslov v. Austria ([GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008 application no. 1638/03) that, where the person to be expelled is a young adult who has not yet founded a family of his or her own, the relevant criteria for the assessment of proportionately, see Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, are as follows:\n(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by that person,\n(b) the length of the person’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled,\n(c) the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the person’s conduct during that period, and\n(d) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.\nAccording to §§ 72 and 73 of the judgment, the age of the relevant person can play a role when applying the said criteria. For instance, when an assessment is made of the nature and seriousness of an offence committed, it has to be taken into account whether the relevant person committed it as a juvenile or as an adult. When an assessment is made of the length of the person’s stay in the host country and the solidity of the ties with the host country, it evidently makes a difference whether the person concerned had already come to the country during his or her childhood or youth, or was even born there, or whether he or she only came to the host country as an adult. Regard is to be had to the special situation of a person who has spent most, if not all of his or her childhood in the host country, was brought up there and received his or her education there (§ 74). According to § 75 of the judgment, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion of a settled migrant who has lawfully spent all or the major part of his or her childhood and youth in the host country.\nIn the case at hand, the defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years for two robberies: a robbery committed at a private home and a bank robbery. Both robberies were committed in October 2011.\n[The applicant] is a national of Croatia and entered Denmark a few months after his birth. Accordingly, the defendant has spent all his childhood and youth in Denmark. All his family, including his parents and his three siblings, are Danish residents. He has no ties with Croatia, has no family or friends there and does not speak Croatian according to the information provided, but only Roma in addition to Danish. He has a Croatian passport.\n[The applicant] has not yet founded a family of his own as he is neither married nor the father of any children. No significance should be attributed to the circumstance that the defendant has had a Danish girlfriend for about two years as this relationship was started at a time when his girlfriend, who is domiciled in Denmark, was or ought to have been aware of his criminal activities.\n[The applicant] dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He has not started any vocational training or education, and he has never had a job, but has lived on social security benefits. He has been addicted to cannabis, and he has suffered a number of cannabis psychoses according to the information provided. Even though he has lived in Denmark all his life, he must be considered very poorly integrated into Danish society.\nConsidering the fact that he has spent all his childhood and youth in Denmark and has received all his schooling in this country, and since he has no ties with Croatia, strict requirements must be met for the crime to result in expulsion.\n[The applicant] has been convicted of robbery on several previous occasions. Two of those sentences were imposed for robberies committed before he attained the age of 18: a sentence for robbery at a post office in 2003 when the defendant was almost 16 years old and a sentence for two street robberies and other offences in 2004/2005 when the defendant was 17 years old. The proceeds of both robberies were of minor value.\n[The applicant] has furthermore been convicted of robbery twice after he has attained the age of 18. The first of those sentences was imposed on 11 June 2008 when he was found guilty of a street robbery and a robbery at a shop contrary to section 288, subsection 1 (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of two years and suspended expulsion from Denmark. The second sentence was imposed on 9 November 2010 in appeal proceedings when he was found guilty of a street robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year and three months and suspended expulsion from Denmark subject to a probation period of two years.\nMoreover, several sentences have been imposed for other offences against property. Altogether, the defendant, who is 25 years old today, has been sentenced to and has served 1,755 days in prison, corresponding to four years and ten months, since his 15th birthday.\nThe offences for adjudication in connection with the case at hand were committed during the probation period of the most recent suspended expulsion order. The offence for adjudication in connection with the judgment of 9 November 2010 delivered in appeal proceedings was committed in the probation period of the first suspended expulsion order. The nature and seriousness of the offences in combination with the previous sentences for similar offences and the fact that the defendant has now failed to observe the conditions of two suspended expulsion orders is deemed by the Court to provide weighty reasons why the defendant should now be expelled. The fact that a number of the judgments relate to offences committed after the defendant has come of age also makes expulsion appropriate. Against this background, the Court finds that altogether such very serious reasons exist that the defendant must be expelled and permanently banned from re-entry as set out in section 22, subsection 1(vi), section 26, subsection 2) and section 32, subsection 2 (v) of the Aliens Act, in which connection it is observed that the expulsion order is deemed not to be contrary to Denmark’s international obligations.” 20.  On appeal, by a judgment of 26 August 2013 the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret - henceforth “the High Court”) upheld the conviction, the sentence and the expulsion order. A majority of five judges out of six stated:\n“On the grounds given by the City Court, we concur that altogether such very serious reasons exist that [the applicant] must be expelled and permanently banned from re-entering despite his lack of ties with Croatia. We concur that an expulsion order is found not to be contrary to Denmark’s international obligations, including section 38 and 39 of Executive Order no. 474 of 12 May 2011 on Residence in Denmark for Aliens Falling Within the Rules of the European Union (bekendtgørelse om ophold i Danmark for udlændinge, der er omfattet af Dem Europæiske Unions regler) [implementing EU Council Directive 2004/38/EC].”\nOne judge stated:\n“Since [the applicant] has lived his whole life in Denmark and has no ties to Croatia, I find it contrary to Denmark’s international obligations to issue an expulsion order despite the serious crime committed.” 21.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret), was refused by the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) on 12 December 2013. 22.  In December 2013, pursuant to Council Framework Decision 2008-909-JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, as amended by Council Framework decision 2009-299-JHA of 26 February 2009, the Ministry of Justice requested the Croatian authorities to take over the enforcement of the sentences imposed on the applicant by the High Court judgment of 9 November 2010 and the High Court judgment of 26 August 2013. 23.  By a City Court judgment of 6 September 2016 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for three months and expulsion for violence against a fellow inmate. He appealed against the judgment to the High Court. It is unknown whether the appeal proceeding have ended. 24.  It appears that the applicant was expelled from Denmark in December 2017, after having served his sentence, and that he re-entered Denmark shortly after, in breach of the ban.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is currently living in Armenia. 7.  The applicant left Iran in March 2011 and travelled to Turkey. He entered Cyprus unlawfully through the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) on 21 March 2011. 8.  On 28 March 2011 the applicant was arrested at Larnaca airport as he attempted to take a flight to London on a forged Romanian passport. He was arrested for the offences of (i) circulating a forged document (sections 331, 333, 335 and 339 of the Criminal Code (Cap. 154) – see A.H. and J.K. v. Cyprus, nos. 41903/10 and 41911/10, § 114, 21 July 2015), (ii) impersonation (section 360 of Cap. 154; ibid.) and (iii) unlawful entry into the Republic (section 12(1), (2) and (5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105, as amended) – see Seagal v. Cyprus, no. 50756/13, §§ 91 and 93, 26 April 2016). He was placed in detention at Nicosia central prisons. 9.  On 29 March 2011 the applicant appeared before the Larnaca District Court, which ordered his detention on remand for three days. 10.  On 31 March 2011 criminal charges were brought against him (case no. 5220/2011). The Larnaca District Court adjourned the case until 5 April 2011 and extended the applicant’s detention on remand until that date. 11.  On 31 March 2011, however, the Attorney General decided to discontinue the criminal proceedings and gave instructions for the applicant to be deported. 12.  In a letter dated 4 April 2011 sent by the District Aliens and Immigration Branch of the Larnaca Police to the Aliens and Immigration Service, the issuance of deportation and detention orders against the applicant was recommended in order to ensure that the applicant would not abscond following the expiration of the detention order issued by the Larnaca District Court. 13.  On 4 April 2011 detention and deportation orders were issued by the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of the Interior under section 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (Cap. 105) on the grounds that the applicant was a prohibited immigrant within the meaning of sections 6(1)(k) and (l) of that law (see paragraph 97 below). A letter from the Ministry of the Interior dated 4 April 2011 was addressed to the applicant informing him (i) that he was an illegal immigrant under the above-mentioned provisions on the grounds of illegal entry and (ii) of the decision to detain and deport him. 14.  On that letter there is a note signed by a police officer stating that the letter was served on the applicant on 5 April 2011 at 12:05 p.m. but that he refused to sign for it. 15.  The police also ascertained at the time that the applicant did not have a valid passport. 16.  The applicant was transferred to the holding facility for immigration detainees at Famagusta police station. 17.  On 12 April 2011, while in detention, the applicant applied for asylum. 18.  In view of that development, on 14 April 2011, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior decided to suspend the deportation order pending the examination of the applicant’s asylum application. 19.  The application was dismissed by the Asylum Service on 30 April 2011. 20.  On 5 May 2011 the applicant was served with a letter informing him of the above decision, but he refused to sign for it. 21.  On 1 June 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Reviewing Authority for Refugees (“the Reviewing Authority”) against the Asylum Service’s decision. This was dismissed on 10 August 2011; the applicant was served with the relevant decision on 17 August 2011. 22.  On 21 September 2011 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Paphos police station. 23.  On 10 October 2011 the applicant brought a recourse (“judicial review proceedings”; recourse no. 1320/2011) before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) under Article 146 of the Constitution, challenging the decision of the Reviewing Authority. 24.  On 13 October 2011 the Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service re-examined the applicant’s case and recommended that the authorities proceed with the applicant’s deportation following the dismissal of his asylum application by the Reviewing Authority (see paragraph 21 above). Bearing in mind the circumstances of the case, the Director decided that the principle of non-refoulement was not an obstacle to his removal. 25.  On 9 November 2011 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application (application no.133/2011) with the Supreme Court (as the first-instance court) challenging the lawfulness of his detention owing to the length of its duration. 26.  On 11 November 2011 the Permanent Secretary of the Minister of the Interior instructed the police to proceed with the applicant’s deportation. According to an internal note subsequently sent by the Civil Registry and Migration Department to the Attorney General, the applicant’s deportation had not been possible as the applicant had not had a valid passport and had not co-operated with the authorities in order to secure one. 27.  On 25 November 2011, while the habeas corpus proceedings were pending, Amending Law no. 153(I)/2011 to the Aliens and Immigration Law (transposing into national law Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Members States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals – “the EU Returns Directive” (see paragraph 100 below)) came into force. 28.  On 29 November 2011 the Minister of the Interior decided to extend the applicant’s detention for up to eighteen months on the basis of section 18 ΠΣΤ(8)(α) of the Aliens and Immigration Law, as amended by Law no. 153(I)/2011 (see paragraphs 100 and 101 below). 29.  On 22 December 2011 the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered his immediate release. With regard to the preliminary issues raised, the Supreme Court firstly held that it had the authority to examine the application, as it had been called upon to examine the lawfulness of the applicant’s protracted detention and its extension, and not the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders. The Aliens and Immigration Law expressly provided that habeas corpus applications challenging the lawfulness of detention with a view to deportation could be lodged with the Supreme Court on length grounds. 30.  The Supreme Court then examined the substance of the application and held that the applicant’s detention after 4 October 2011 – that is to say following a period of six months – had been unlawful under the EU Returns Directive, which at the time had had direct effect in domestic law. In this connection it held that the six-month period provided in Article 15 § 5 of the above-mentioned Directive had started to run on 4 April 2011 and had ended on 4 October 2011. Although Article 15 § 6 of the Directive provided for the possibility of extending detention for a period not exceeding a further twelve months if there was a lack of cooperation on the part of a third-country national, it provided that this should be applied in accordance with the provisions of the national law; however, there had been no such national law in force when the six-month period had expired in this case. As Law no. 153(I)/2011, transposing the Directive into national law had come into force only after the expiration of the six-month period it could not have applied to the applicant. Furthermore, the extension of the applicant’s detention by the Minister of the Interior on the basis of Law no. 153(I)/2011 had been made after the expiration of the six-month period. It had therefore not fallen within the legal framework applicable at the time, and the Ministry of the Interior had not been entitled to retroactively validate the applicant’s detention. The authorities had not been entitled to cite the applicant’s refusal to cooperate as grounds for extending his detention after 4 October 2011. 31.  The Government did not lodge an appeal against this judgment. 32.  On 22 December 2011, following the judgment in his favour given by the Supreme Court on that date, the applicant (who was present at the court) was immediately released but was then rearrested a few minutes later upon his leaving the courtroom. 33.  The applicant was arrested on the basis of new detention and deportation orders issued against him on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the first detention and deportation orders – that is to say under sections 6(1)(k) and (l) and 14(6) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 13 above). The Government submitted that the decision to rearrest the applicant had been based on the Ministry of the Interior’s decision of 29 November 2011 to extend the applicant’s detention period to eighteen months (see paragraph 28 above). Upon his arrest, the police officers informed the applicant of his rights, pursuant to the 2005 Law on the Rights of Persons Arrested and Detained (Law no. 163(I)/of 2005 – see Seagal, cited above, § 99). He was also served with a letter dated 22 December 2011 from the First Chief Administrative Officer of the Ministry of the Interior informing him that he was an illegal immigrant under sections 6(1)(k) and (l) of the Aliens and Immigration Law on the grounds (i) of his having illegally entered and stayed in the Republic of Cyprus and (ii) the decision to detain and deport him. 34.  On the letter there is a note signed by a police officer stating that it had been served on the applicant on 22 December 2011 at 12:10 p.m. and that the contents had been explained to him but that he had refused to sign it. 35.  The applicant was taken back to Paphos police station. 36.  On the same date the applicant’s lawyer sent a fax to the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Police, stating that the new detention and deportation orders were in conflict with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 22 December 2011 and infringed the provisions of the EU Returns Directive. She pointed out that the orders had been issued on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous ones and that the applicant’s detention had been found to be unlawful by the Supreme Court. She also stressed that the applicant had been detained despite the fact that he was an asylum seeker. She requested the applicant’s release. She also requested, in the event that the authorities continued to detain him, that the applicant be transferred to another facility; she lodged that request because the applicant was being held at Paphos police station, along with criminal suspects, in inhuman and degrading conditions. The applicant submitted that no reply had been received from the authorities. 37.  On 28 December 2011 the applicant brought a recourse (no. 1724/2011) before the Supreme Court (as the first-instance revisional jurisdiction) challenging the lawfulness of the new detention and deportation orders on the basis of which he had been rearrested and detained. 38.  By a letter dated 15 March 2012 the applicant’s representative complained to the Minister of the Int+erior about the applicant’s detention and requested that the applicant’s detention order be reviewed, in accordance with section 18 ΠΣΤ(4) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 101 below). The applicant submitted that this letter had received no reply. 39.  By a letter dated 22 May 2012 the applicant’s lawyer complained again to the Minister of Justice and Public Order and to the Chief of Police about the applicant’s continuing detention, as well as the conditions of his detention at Paphos police station and the psychological and psychosomatic effects that those conditions had had on him. 40.  On 25 May 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided on its continuation for another six months as the applicant did not have travel documents and continued to refuse to visit the Iranian Embassy in order to secure the issuance of a passport to him, thus hampering the deportation process. 41.  On 29 May 2012 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Larnaca police station. 42.  On 13 June 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided to extend it for six months on the same grounds as those cited in respect of the previous decision (see paragraph 40 above). 43.  On 14 June 2012 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior sent a letter to the applicant informing him of the above-mentioned decision taken by the Minister under section 18 ΠΣΤ(8)(α) of the Aliens and Immigration Law because of his refusal to cooperate with the authorities regarding his return to Iran (see paragraph 101 below). The Director of the Aliens and Immigration Service was also informed of this decision. 44.  On 13 July 2012 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s recourse. It found that the applicant’s main claims – namely that (i) the Aliens and Immigration Law, where it concerned the issuance of the deportation and detention orders, was unconstitutional, (ii) the deportation and detention orders had not been issued under the correct provision of that law, and (iii) he had the right under the Refugee Law to remain in the country pending the determination of his appeal by the Supreme Court (no. 1320/2011 – see paragraph 23 above) – had not been raised or dealt with adequately in the legal points of the recourse. 45.  On 24 July 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided to extend it on the same grounds as those cited in respect of his previous decisions (see paragraphs 40 and 42 above). 46.  On 30 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (as the appellate revisional jurisdiction – appeal no. 156/2012) against the first-instance judgment on his recourse (see paragraph 44 above). 47.  On 11 August 2012 the applicant was transferred to Aradippou police station. 48.  On 27 August 2012 and again on 25 September 2012 the Minister of the Interior reviewed the applicant’s detention and decided to extend it on the same grounds as those cited in respect of his previous decisions (see paragraphs 40, 42 and 45 above). 49.  In the meantime, on 12 September 2012 the applicant’s lawyer sent a fax to the Minister of the Interior complaining about the period of the applicant’s detention and about the failure of the Minister of the Interior to review the applicant’s detention order every two months, as provided by section 18 ΠΣΤ(4) of the Aliens and Immigration Law (see paragraph 101 below). The applicant submitted that no reply had been received from the authorities. 50.  On 15 October 2012 the applicant was transferred to the detention facility at Larnaca police station. 51.  Οn 18 October 2012 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior decided to annul the deportation and detention orders of 22 December 2011, as the applicant’s deportation had not been effected within the above-mentioned eighteen-month time-limit. 52.  On 25 October 2012 the applicant was released under conditions to which he agreed. The applicant was informed that he would be issued with a special residence/employment permit under the Aliens and Immigration Law and the relevant regulations for a period of six months from the date of his release. However, prior to the issuance of this permit he was obliged to sign a contract of employment with an employer indicated to and approved by the Department of Labour. He was also asked to (i) report to the police once a week, (ii) report his residential address to his local branch of the Aliens and Immigration Police within fifteen days of his release, and (iii) contact the Iranian Embassy in Nicosia in order to make appropriate arrangements for the issuance of a passport. The applicant was informed that the residence permit would not be extended unless he obtained a valid Iranian passport. 53.  The last time the applicant presented himself at a police station, in line with the conditions of his release, was on 10 January 2013. 54.  The applicant was informed by a letter dated 4 January 2013 that the Reviewing Authority had decided to revoke its negative decision of 10 August 2011 and that it would re-examine his appeal and issue a new decision on his asylum application. Consequently, on 7 January 2013 the applicant withdrew recourse no. 1320/2011 (see paragraph 23 above). He provided the Reviewing Authority with a number of documents in support of his claims. 55.  The applicant subsequently left Cyprus without informing his lawyer. 56.  By a letter dated 14 October 2014 the Reviewing Authority requested him to attend an interview on 24 October 2014 and to provide original documents in support of his claims. The letter also stated that if he failed to contact the Authority he would be considered as non-co-operative and his application would be dismissed and his file closed, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Refugee Law (Law 6(I) of 2000, as amended). 57.  When his lawyer tried to contact the applicant she was informed by other Iranians in Cyprus that he had left the country. 58.  By a letter dated 20 October 2014 the applicant’s lawyer informed the Reviewing Authority that the applicant had left Cyprus and could not attend the interview. 59.  By a letter dated 30 October 2014 the Reviewing Authority informed the applicant’s lawyer that, following a second review, it had rejected his appeal under the above-mentioned provisions and that the first-instance decision of the Asylum Service had been upheld. 60.  In a letter dated 7 April 2015 the applicant’s lawyer informed the Registry that the applicant had left Cyprus through the “TRNC” and was living in Armenia but that his status there was undocumented. He informed her that he had left Cyprus because he feared he would be arrested and detained again and had no means of survival. 61.  On 27 February 2018 the Supreme Court gave its judgment on the applicant’s appeal in respect of the second deportation and detention orders (see paragraph 46 above). It upheld the first-instance judgment (see paragraph 44 above). In addition it noted that during the proceedings the applicant’s lawyer had informed the court that the applicant had in the meantime left Cyprus. As this had been of his own free will, without any coercion, pressure or reservations, the applicant no longer had any legitimate interest in challenging the lawfulness of the deportation and detention orders; such a legitimate interest had to continue to exist up to the conclusion of the appeal. 62.  The applicant submitted that during his detention in the various police stations he had felt disoriented in terms of space and time. Moreover, he had been suffering from memory loss since his detention. He had been detained immediately upon his arrival in Cyprus and had never lived in Cyprus before and had not known where each detention centre was. He had been completely disoriented when he had been transferred from one police station to another because he had not been given any information or explanations regarding his transferral.\n(a)  Famagusta police station (5 April 2011 - 21 September 2011)\n(i)  The applicant’s description of the conditions 63.  The applicant stated that Famagusta police station, during the period of his detention there, must have contained about twenty detainees. He had shared a cell, which he estimated had measured approximately 20 or 25 sq. m, with another eight detainees. 64.  The sanitary facilities had been poor: the detention facility had only had a few toilets and showers, which had not been properly cleaned or disinfected. The detainees had lacked basic hygiene products, such as toilet paper, soap and shampoo; these had been provided by the officers only after persistent requests lodged by detainees. 65.  The applicant had had to remain in his cell all the time: there had been no exercise yard and therefore no possibility for any outdoor activity. 66.  The food had been very bad, and the quantities thereof had been insufficient and had not met the dietary needs of Muslim detainees during the Ramadan period. 67.  Furthermore, detainees had been handcuffed during visits. 68.  Lastly there had been violent incidents at the police station. He had informed a local non-governmental organisation, KISA, about one of these incidents; KISA had then reported it to the Commissioner for Administration of the Republic of Cyprus (“the Ombudsman”), resulting in a visit to the station by her office (see paragraph 120 below).\n(ii)  The Government’s description 69.  The Government submitted that this detention facility had stopped operating and had been subsequently demolished in 2015 following the issuance of a report by the Ombudsman dated 3 October 2011 (see paragraphs 120-122 below). 70.  The applicant’s personal file concerning his detention in the said facility had been destroyed, pursuant to the applicable police rules. As a result, the Government did not have any records concerning the dimensions of the cells in which the applicant had been kept or the number of inmates kept with the applicant in the same cell. The Government therefore accepted the Ombudsman’s findings in her report of 3 October 2011 in this connection (see paragraph 121 below). 71.  According to a report submitted by the Government dated 18 October 2011 prepared by the police officer in charge of the detention facilities at the time, all cells had had access to natural light and ventilation. The cells had had windows measuring 1.5 by 2 metres which had been capable of being opened. The cells had also had sufficient artificial light. They had been equipped with a bed and a table with chairs. 72.  The cells had been open during the day and detainees had been able to move freely in the common areas of the facility. The common area had been equipped with chairs, tables, a satellite television and books in various languages. Detainees had also been able to exercise in the common area. 73.  The facilities had had an air cooling and heating system (referred to by the Government as “split units”). The detainees had been able to regulate the temperature as they wished. The sanitary facilities had been for common use. Detainees had been provided each day with toilet paper, soap and shampoo upon request. Detainees had been able go outside for three and a half hours per day, accompanied by a police officer, in a yard measuring 5 by 5 metres. 74.  Detainees had been served three meals a day of adequate quantity, in line with their religious needs. They had also been able to order takeaway meals and receive food or other items from friends or relatives. 75.  Detainees had been allowed to have their telephones in their possession and they had been able to receive visitors at any time during the day. They had been able to meet with their visitors in the offices of police officers outside the facility. They had been handcuffed only during their transfer from the facility to the police offices and back. 76.  Detainees had been kept together according to their ethnic origin.\n(b)  Paphos police station (21 September 2011- 29 May 2012)\n(i)  The applicant’s description of the conditions 77.  In this station the applicant had been in a cell on his own. The cell had measured between approximately 8 and 10 sq. m. There had been a toilet and a shower in the cell; these had not, however, been separated from the rest of the cell and had been visible to the staff. The cells had not had proper windows – just small glass windows that it not been possible to open. Thus, there had been no natural ventilation, and the cell had lacked adequate natural light. Furthermore, the police officers had often switched off the ventilation system as a form of punishment when detainees had protested about various issues in the facility. His lawyer stated that on one of her visits, the ventilation system had been turned off and the atmosphere – including in the visitors’ area – had become unbearable. The applicant had been brought to the visitation area handcuffed. 78.  The applicant had been responsible for cleaning his cell himself but no cleaning products had been given to the detainees. Apart from toilet paper, no other hygiene products had been provided. 79.  There had been an indoor exercise area. There had been no specific schedule for exercise and on some days detainees had not exercised at all and had remained in their cells. As a result of this the applicant had felt completely disoriented and had lost all sense of time. 80.  The food had been bad and the quantities inadequate: detainees had been provided with only two small meals per day. 81.  Furthermore, immigration detainees and criminal suspects had been held together. 82.  The applicant submitted that the conditions at this station had been very harsh and had caused him great psychological distress, as well as prompting suicidal tendencies. For this reason his lawyer had sent letters to the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice and Public Order and the Chief of Police requesting his transfer to other facilities.\n(ii)  The Government’s description of the conditions 83.  The applicant had been kept alone in single-occupancy cells –specifically, cells nos. 32 and 29. Cell no. 32 had measured 11.7 sq. m (4.50 by 2.60 metres), and cell no. 29 had measured 15.95 sq. m. (5.50 by 2.90 metres). All cells had had properly insulated windows measuring 120 cm by 76 cm and made of glass bricks that had allowed natural light to enter. Ventilation in the cells had been artificial. There had been two lamps in each cell, providing adequate artificial light. 84.  All cells had been equipped with a plinth, a fixed stool, a table and an in-cell toilet, sink and shower. The toilet, sink and shower had together accounted for about 2.1 sq. m. Detainees using the sanitary facilities in their cells had not been visible from the outside. There had been a central-heating and ventilation system which had operated twenty-four hours per day. During the summer, room temperature had been between 20˚C and 23˚C, and during the winter between 24˚C and 25˚C. 85.  Upon being placed in the cells, detainees had been provided with toilet paper, soap and shampoo, as well as with clean sheets and blankets. Each detainee had had the right to have additional hygiene products but this had had to be at their own expense or provided by their visitors. Each detainee had been offered sufficient cleaning materials with which to clean his or her own cell if they wished to do so. Common areas had been cleaned by the police station’s cleaners. The Government provided invoices for December 2011, April and May 2012 in respect of the purchase of, inter alia, cleaning materials and hygiene products (namely toilet paper and liquid hand soap) by the headquarters of the Paphos Divisional Police (which, the Government submitted, also covered the detention facility). 86.  During his detention, the applicant had been served with three meals a day (breakfast, lunch and dinner). The Government provided the contract with the company providing the meals for the relevant period and the weekly three-meals-a-day plan that it had followed. The applicant had not been served with food unacceptable to Muslims. In addition, he had had the right to obtain additional food at his own expense or from friends or relatives. 87.  The station’s detention facility had had an open courtyard where the applicant had been allowed to move around and exercise freely during the day, given his status as a long-term immigration detainee. During the day the applicant’s cell had been open and he had been able to move freely in the facility’s corridors and common areas. 88.  According to the entries in the station’s record ledger in respect of the period of the applicant’s detention at Paphos police station (which the Government submitted), the applicant had had a psychiatric condition for which he had been provided with prescribed medication and had received psychiatric care at Paphos General Hospital. It could also be seen from this ledger that the applicant had attempted to self-harm and to commit suicide and had also threatened to commit suicide if he was not transferred to another detention facility.\n(c)  Aradippou police station (11 August 2012 - 15 October 2012)\n(i)  The applicant’s description of the conditions 89.  The applicant had been detained in a cell which he estimated had measured approximately between 7 and 8 sq. m and which he had shared with another detainee. The sanitary facilities had been outside the cell and common to all detainees. There had been a television which detainees had been sometimes able to watch. There had been no natural light or ventilation and the hygiene conditions had been poor. The food had been bad and insufficient.\n(ii)  The Government’s description of the conditions 90.  The Government submitted that the applicant’s personal custody file concerning his detention at this station had been destroyed, in line with the applicable police rules. 91.  Cells in this facility had measured 7.08 sq. m (2.92 by 2.42 metres). As the applicant alleged that he had shared a cell with another detainee this meant that he would have had about 3.5 sq. m of personal space in his cell. All cells had had insulated windows measuring 1 by 0.8 metres, which it had been possible to open. The cells had had sufficient natural and artificial light. The station had had a central air-cooling and heating system. Room temperature during the summer had been between twenty and twenty-three degrees Celsius and during the winter between 24˚C and 25˚C. 92.  During the applicant’s detention the cells had been open during the day and the applicant had been allowed to move freely in the station’s common areas and interior yard. There had been benches and a television in the yard. Fresh drinking water (cold and hot) had also been available. 93.  Sanitary facilities had been for common use. There had been two toilets and two showers for every eight detainees. 94.  The detainees had been provided with toilet paper, soap and shampoo once a day 95.  Detainees had been offered three meals per day: breakfast and two cooked meals (lunch and dinner), prepared in line with their religious needs. In addition, detainees had been able to order takeaway food and to receive food from friends or relatives.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Toronto, Canada. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  The applicant was the director of a company (D.) registered in Ukraine. In 1996, in the name of D., he concluded a contract with a collective farm (N.), situated in the self-proclaimed “Moldovan Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT” – for further details about the “MRT”, see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII, and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). Under the contract, N. undertook to send D. 15 tonnes of paprika and 5 tonnes of butter, while D. undertook to send N. 275 tonnes of diesel fuel as payment. 9.  Subsequently, N. sent the paprika, but according to the applicant some of it was of poor quality and D. suffered financial losses as a result. Consequently, D. refused to send the diesel fuel. 10.  On 22 December 1996 the applicant was summoned to the Department for the Fight against Organised Crime in Crivoi Rog, Ukraine, and asked to give an explanation for his refusal to send the diesel fuel. On 24 January 1997 he was summoned again. After the second interview he was taken, allegedly against his will and without his passport, to the “MRT”. 11.  The applicant was accused of fraud by the “MRT” authorities. On 30 December 1999 he was convicted and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment by the Ribnita People’s Court, which was under the jurisdiction of the “MRT”. He did not appeal against that judgment, which then became final. 12.  On 2 March 2002 the applicant was released from prison on the basis of an amnesty act. 13.  While in detention pending trial and after his conviction, the applicant was initially held in solitary confinement for more than two years. The cell was a concrete box with no windows or ventilation, and no natural light, toilet or tap water. 14.  According to the applicant, after his transfer to an ordinary cell and until his release, he was detained in cells with persons who were ill with tuberculosis. During his detention several detainees died from tuberculosis. He was given food once a day – some 250 grams of soup (containing no protein or vitamins), 100 grams of porridge of the same quality, and 250 grams of bread. As a result of the lack of food the applicant developed constant hunger pains, which he viewed as tantamount to torture. The cell was infested with blood-sucking parasites. Their bites caused him discomfort and itching, which in turn created wounds that bled after being scratched. As a result, he caught the skin disease streptodermia. The lack of medical treatment left him suffering and he was only able to cure himself by taking medication borrowed from another detainee. The lack of medication caused him to constantly fear that he might fall ill with no possibility of being treated. 15.  On an unknown date in 1997 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office of the unlawful detention of his client ordered by the “MRT” authorities. In a letter dated 21 January 1998 the Office replied that the complaint had been accepted and that an action had been brought in the Supreme Court of Justice for the annulment of any “MRT” court sentence that might be imposed in respect of the applicant. 16.  On 14 November 2000, in reply to a complaint by the applicant’s lawyer, the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office informed him that it had initiated a criminal investigation into his client’s abduction. It noted that the investigation was aimed at establishing whether the applicant had indeed been abducted, and if so by whom and precisely from where. 17.  On 19 February 2001, the Moldovan Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicant’s lawyer that on 17 January 2001 a previously adopted decision to discontinue the investigation had been annulled; the documents relevant to the investigation of the complaint of kidnapping from Ukrainian territory had been sent to Ukrainian prosecutors. 18.  In reply to a complaint concerning his client lodged on an unknown date with the Russian President, on 25 September 2002 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that the complaint had been forwarded to the Moldovan Supreme Court of Justice.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Forráskút. At the time of lodging the application, he was detained at Márianosztra Prison. 5.  On 29 January 2014 the applicant was convicted of possession of narcotics and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, on 14 October 2014 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. 6.  The applicant began serving his sentence at Szeged Prison on 15 January 2015 and was transferred to Márianosztra Prison on 26 January 2015. He was released on parole on 8 September 2015. 7.  While the applicant was held at Szeged Prison, the per capita space available to him was about 3.2 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 16 sq. m for five occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. He was allowed to spend one hour per day in the open air and could take part in various sports and other activities, thus reducing the time spent in the cell. He was provided with basic standard meals and was able to take a shower twice a week. 8.  At Márianosztra Prison, the per capita cell space available to the applicant was about 2.67 sq. m; the gross ground surface of the cell was 8 sq. m for three occupants but included the in-cell sanitary facility. Only between 26 and 29 January and 11 and 15 May 2015 he was held in a cell where a wall separated the toilet from the rest of the space. He could take a shower twice a week and pursue certain free-time activities. At his request, he was provided with vegetarian meals but very often consisting only of soya beans. 9.  The applicant submitted that he suffered from epilepsy and a personality disorder. In his own submissions he stated that prior to his conviction he had cultivated and consumed cannabis partly because it alleviated his symptoms. 10.  As regards the medical care in prison, the Government submitted that, during the first examination at Szeged Prison, the applicant had stated that he suffered from epilepsy without presenting any relevant documentation. The doctor referred him for a psychiatric examination, which took place on 22 January 2015; but the applicant refused the treatment prescribed by the specialist. 11.  During his first medical examination at Márianosztra Prison, the doctor noted that the applicant’s aptitude for work could be assessed only after external medical records concerning his illness had been obtained. 12.  The applicant suffered an epileptic seizure on 24 April 2015, whilst in his cell. Following medication, his condition improved but he refused the neurological examination recommended by the doctor and any further treatment. He suffered further fits on 4 May and 8 July 2015, following which a neurologist prescribed him anti-epileptic drugs, but he agreed to take them only after suffering yet another seizure.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": true, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants, who were born in 1984, 1987 and 1988 respectively, live in İstanbul. 5.  On 23 August 2007 the applicants were arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. 6.  On the same day, the judge at the İstanbul Assize Court decided to restrict access to the investigation file, under Article 153 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the “CCP”), Law no. 5271. The judge also decided to delay the second and third applicants’ right of access to their lawyer for twenty-four hours pursuant to section 10 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the material time. 7.  On 26 August 2007 the applicants were questioned by police officers from the Anti-Terror Branch of the İstanbul Security Directorate, in the presence of their lawyer. They used their right to remain silent. 8.  On the same day, the applicants were also interrogated by the public prosecutor, in the presence of their lawyer. They were mainly questioned about certain records of telephone conversations and the incident of the arson of vehicles during an illegal demonstration. The prosecutor read out the transcripts of the intercepted conversations to the applicants. The applicants did not remember that they had had these conversations but claimed that these conversations did not prove that they had committed the offences with which they were charged with, or that they attended the illegal demonstration on behalf of a terrorist organisation. 9.  On 26 August 2007, after having taken the applicants’ statements, the judge at the 10th Chamber of the İstanbul Assize Court ordered their pre‑trial detention. 10.  On 31 August 2008 the applicants’ lawyer filed an objection against the decision of 26 August 2007 ordering the applicants’ detention, and requested their release. On the same day, the 10th Chamber of the İstanbul Assize Court, relying on the public prosecutor’s written opinion, which had not been communicated to the applicants or their representative, dismissed the objection without holding a hearing. 11.  On 3 December 2007 the İstanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment against the applicants, accusing them, inter alia, of membership of a terrorist organisation, illegal possession of explosives and causing damage to public property. 12.  On 17 December 2007 the İstanbul Assize Court accepted the indictment. 13.  On 27 December 2007 the İstanbul Assize Court held a preparatory hearing and dismissed the applicants’ requests for release. 14.  On 18 April 2008 and 22 July 2008 the court held further hearings, in which the applicants and their lawyer were present. At the end of those hearings, the court ordered the continuation of the applicants’ detention. 15.  At the end of the third hearing, held on 20 November 2008, the court prolonged the applicants’ detentions. The applicants were present at this hearing. Subsequently, they filed an objection against this decision. On 28 November 2008 the 11th Chamber of the İstanbul Assize Court dismissed the objection, without holding an oral hearing and based on the written opinions of the public prosecutor, which had not been communicated to the applicants or their representative. 16.  On 19 December 2008 the court ex officio examined the applicants’ detention on remand on the basis of the case-file and decided to extend it. 17.  At the hearings held on 19 March 2009 and 16 July 2009, in which the applicants were present, the trial court ordered the continuation of the applicants’ detention on remand. 18.  On 24 November 2009, 30 March 2010 and 24 May 2012, respectively, the applicants were released from detention on remand. 19.  On 1 October 2013 the İstanbul Assize Court acquitted the second applicant of the charges against him. The court convicted the first and the third applicants and sentenced them to imprisonment. The judgment in concerning the acquittal of the second applicant became final, as there was no appeal against it. 20.  On 1 July 2016 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first instance court in so far as it concerned the convictions of the first and third applicants. Accordingly, the case file was remitted to the first instance court. 21.  According to the latest information in the case file, the criminal proceedings against the first and third applicants are still pending before the İstanbul Assize Court.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Százhalombatta. 5.  On 11 April 2009, quoting the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Pest Central District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on charges of terrorist acts and other related offences involving abuse of firearms and explosives on the grounds that he might abscond for fear of a severe punishment, might frustrate the on-going investigation by colluding with accomplices still at large, or might execute the planned offences or re-offend. 6.  The detention measure was extended on 8 May and again on 7 August 2009. The court reiterated its earlier reasons, adding that the risk of collusion was serious, since certain other suspects had not yet been apprehended. 7.  A further extension was ordered on 9 November 2009. The court stated that the applicant was being prosecuted for terrorist acts committed as an associate of an organised criminal group whose plans entailed a real risk of loss of life. It was of note that the group had existed for quite some time and had been committed to carrying out terrorist acts. Moreover, the volume of evidence supporting a reasonable suspicion, as weighed individually against the applicant, was increasing. 8.  On 9 February 2010 the applicant’s detention was again extended, the court noting that, in view of the grounds for his detention, not even his clean criminal record, family ties and settled background could provide adequate justification for a less strict measure. 9.  On 7 April 2010 the measure was renewed, with special reference to the fact that the case was concerned with a series of crimes committed over a long period of time by a criminal organisation. 10.  On 9 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court ordered that the applicant be held under house arrest, holding that the danger of his re-offending was not of a degree that justified his continued detention, noting also that the investigation was about to be wrapped up and that, in any case, some accomplices in the case had already been released pending trial.\nThe applicant was released from detention the next day. During the ensuing period he complied with the rules of house arrest. 11.  On 7 July 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal again ordered the applicant’s detention. It held that the charges of several very serious offences committed over a long time in an organised group were of such gravity that they could not be addressed merely by house arrest. 12.  The measure was extended on 4 August 2010. In addition to the previously cited reasons, the court considered that there was no reason to assume that the applicant’s political motivation behind the incriminated acts had subsided, which meant that the risk of re-offending was real. 13.  On 24 November 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal ordered the applicant’s house arrest, observing that the applicant had abided by the previous house arrest (see paragraph 10 above) and holding that the risk of re-offending was slight. 14.  On 20 September 2012 the applicant’s house arrest was replaced by a restraining order, which was eventually lifted on 6 July 2014. 15.  On 22 April 2015 the applicant was again detained on remand for the purposes of prosecution for a new offence allegedly committed during the on-going proceedings. He was accused of having threatened and harassed a relative of one of the witnesses in the main case. For want of evidence, this new investigation was discontinued on 30 October 2015. 16.  On 18 December 2015 the applicant was released from detention and put under house arrest, which lasted until 27 July 2016. 17.  On 30 August 2016 the applicant and his accomplices were convicted. He was sentenced to 12 years in a strict-regime prison. 18.  Both the defendants and the prosecution appealed. The outcome of the ensuing proceedings is unknown.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Štip. 6.  On 21 September 2012 a vacancy notice was published in respect of five posts on the State Judicial Council (“the SJC”) to be filled by sitting judges elected from among their peers. Ethnicity was not among the stated requirements for the posts (see paragraph 20 below). 7.  On 28 September 2012 the applicant lodged a request with the Ministry of Justice for his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll to be changed from that of Bulgarian to Macedonian. 8.  On 15 October 2012 the electoral roll was made available to the Štip Court of Appeal for inspection. Since the applicant’s ethnic designation had not been changed, on the same date he lodged a fresh request for it to be rectified (from Bulgarian to Macedonian), relying on section 17 of the State Judicial Act (“the Act”) (see paragraph 23 below). 9.  By a decision of 18 October 2012, the Ministry of Justice refused the applicant’s request. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:\n“... [the applicant’s] requests for a change to the details [recorded] in the electoral roll regarding ‘ethnicity’ were submitted after the announcement had been published of an election of [new] members to [the SJC]. The requested change cannot be made because it [was intended to secure] the attainment of a(n) [electoral] right concerning the election of members of [the SJC]. A change of ethnicity entry [sought exclusively for the attainment of another right] after the announcement for the election of members of the SJC [would put other judges] ... , in a disadvantageous position ...” 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Administrative Court challenging that decision and arguing that the Ministry’s decision had not been based on any statutory grounds. In particular there had been no provision preventing him from changing his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll while the election of members to the SJC had been ongoing. He furthermore submitted that it had been his personal right to determine his own ethnicity and that the Ministry had had no grounds for disregarding his chosen affiliation in this regard. The conclusion that his request would have put other judges in a disadvantageous position had been unreasonable and unsubstantiated. 11.  On 25 October 2012 the Ministry submitted its observations in reply, to which it appended, inter alia, extracts from the electoral rolls of 2006, 2008 and 2010. 12.  On 26 October 2012 the Administrative Court upheld the Ministry’s decision and the reasons that the Ministry had given. It furthermore added that:\n“... the request (lodged after the publication of the [election] announcement) for a change to the ethnicity entry was aimed exclusively at the attainment of another [electoral] right that would have put other judges (who had attained their right related to the election of [new] members to [the SJC]), in a disadvantageous position. [The applicant’s] request for the rectification post-dated the announcement of the election of [new] members to [the SJC]. The requested change cannot be regarded as a ‘rectification’ since it does not concern a change to numbers, names or other obvious errors, but rather concerns a detail [concerning his ethnicity] that [the applicant] provided. He enjoyed rights as [an individual] of Bulgarian ethnicity concerning the election of members to [the SJC]. That was established on the basis of extracts from the electoral rolls of October 2006, December 2008 and July 2010 submitted together with the observations in reply to [the applicant’s] claim. In these three electoral rolls [the applicant was] declared [to be] Bulgarian. This means that there has been no violation of his right to declare his own ethnicity.” 13.  The applicant appealed against this decision, contesting as unreasonable the finding that his request had aimed at enabling him to attain rights related to the election of new members to the SJC and that the requested change would have put other judges involved in that election in a disadvantageous position. It was unclear how and by what means those judges would have been put in such a position, or indeed which judges would have been affected. Such findings had no legal basis. Furthermore, he contested as irrelevant the findings that his requests had been lodged after the publication of the announcement. He also reiterated his arguments that declaring his own ethnic identity was his personal right. In that connection it was irrelevant which ethnicity had been ascribed to him in 2006, 2008 and 2010 and what electoral rights he had attempted to attain in the past as a Bulgarian. Lastly, he had not been given the opportunity to comment on the electoral rolls of 2006, 2008 and 2010, which the Ministry of Justice had submitted in evidence and to which the Administrative Court had referred in its decision establishing his ethnic identity as Bulgarian. 14.  On 2 November 2012 the Ministry’s observations in reply were communicated to the applicant. 15.  On 5 November 2012 the Higher Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The judgment, in which the court cited the wording of provisions of the Act and the General Administrative Procedure Act (see paragraphs 19, 23 and 24 below), stated, inter alia, that:\n“... [the applicant requested] the modification of his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll after the [publication of] the announcement of the election of [new] members to the SJC, in which he ... participates. Such a modification of the national ethnicity after the publication of the announcement related to another right would leave other judges who attain the right related to election of members to the SJC in a disadvantageous position. [The applicant], as a Bulgarian, enjoyed rights related to the election of members to the SJC [given the fact that] he had declared himself in the electoral rolls of [2006, 2008 and 2010] as Bulgarian ...\n... [The Ministry’s] decision is based on the State Judicial Council Act and the General Administrative Procedure Act ...\n... [T]he court examined and rejected as ill-founded [the applicant’s] allegations that the impugned decision had restricted his right to assert his own ethnic identity. In the present case, [the applicant] requested a rectification – that is to say the modification of his ethnicity entry in the electoral roll. [The Ministry’s] refusal [to do so] cannot be regarded as a restriction on his right to assert his ethnic identity, given that the modification in question was sought after the announcement of the election of [new] members to the SJC had been published.” 16.  On 5 October 2012 the applicant submitted himself for election as a member of the SJC. On an unspecified date, he submitted a written statement affirming that he was of Macedonian ethnicity and that his application for election to the SJC had been made with regard to the general list of judges of the courts within the territorial jurisdiction of the Štip Court of Appeal (see paragraph 21 below). 17.  By a letter of 3 December 2012, the SJC informed the applicant that it had struck his name out of the general list of candidates for election to the SJC to be selected from judges of the courts within the territorial jurisdiction of the Štip Court of Appeal. It had decided to do so in the light of the fact that his declared ethnicity (Macedonian) had not corresponded with the official records, according to which since 1995 he had been registered as being of Bulgarian ethnicity. It also acknowledged the outcome of the “rectification proceedings” described above. The SJC furthermore stated that it was not required under the Act to take any decision related to entries in the electoral roll. Section 17 of the Act specified the procedural rules and the relevant body in respect of their rectification.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  The applicant was employed by the State Revenue Service (“the Service”), division no. 2. On 23 February 2009 the head of the Service decided to terminate the applicant’s employment. 6.  On 2 April 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings in the Administrative Court against the Service seeking to 1) have the decision of 23 February 2009 annulled; 2) be reinstated in her previous position; and 3) recover her average salary starting from the moment of her dismissal until her reinstatement to the previous position. 7.  On 17 September 2009 the Administrative Court granted the applicant’s three claims. In particular, it annulled the decision of 23 February 2009, ordered the Service to reinstate her to her previous position and to pay her her average monthly salary starting from 23 February 2009 until her reinstatement. It reasoned its decision, inter alia, by stating that while the Service had been under an obligation to offer the applicant another position within the Service before deciding to dismiss her, it had failed to do so, even though such a position had existed in the Service at the material time. 8.  This judgment was upheld in the final instance by the Court of Cassation and it became final on 4 November 2009. 9.  On 29 November 2009 the Service paid the applicant 1,197,748 Armenian drams (AMD) (approximately 2,131 euros (EUR) at the material time) as compensation for her unemployment during the period from 23 February to 29 November 2009. 10.  On 11 December 2009 the Administrative Court issued a writ of execution. 11.  On 25 February 2010 the Department for the Enforcement of Judicial Acts (“the DEJA”) initiated enforcement proceedings. On the same day the DEJA gave a decision obliging the Service to comply with the writ of execution of 11 December 2009 within two weeks. 12.  It appears that no further actions were taken by the DEJA and the Service in relation to the enforcement of the judgment of 17 September 2009 between the period of 25 February 2010 and 18 July 2011. 13.  On 18 July 2011 the bailiff decided to discontinue the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. The bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because that position was no longer vacant. 14.  On 29 May 2012 the applicant asked the DEJA to resume the enforcement proceedings. 15.  On 1 June 2012 the bailiff granted the applicant’s request and decided to resume the enforcement proceedings. On the same day the bailiff gave a decision on obliging the Service to take certain actions. In particular, the bailiff obliged the Service to 1) annul the decision of the head of the Service of 23 February 2009; 2) reinstate the applicant to her previous position; and 3) pay her her average monthly salary for the period between her dismissal and her reinstatement to the previous position. 16.  On 2 July 2012 the bailiff decided once again to terminate the enforcement proceedings on the basis of section 41(1)(8) of the Enforcement of Judicial Acts Act. In particular, the bailiff reasoned that the Service had already paid the applicant AMD 1,197,748 as ordered by the judgment of 17 September 2009 while the reinstatement of the applicant in her previous position in the Service was impossible because Division no. 2, where the applicant had previously worked, no longer existed.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants are Russian nationals who at the material time lived in the neighbouring regions of the Chechen Republic and the Republic of Ingushetia. They are close relatives of individuals who disappeared in these regions in 2000-04 after allegedly being unlawfully detained by service personnel. In each of the applications the events took place in areas under full control of the Russian federal forces. The applicants had no news of their missing relatives thereafter. 6.  In each of the cases the applicants complained in respect of the abduction to law-enforcement bodies and an official investigation was instituted. In every case the investigations, after being suspended and resumed on several occasions, have been pending for several years without attaining any tangible results. It is apparent from the documents submitted that no active investigative steps have been taken by the authorities other than forwarding formal information requests to their counterparts in various regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia and the North Caucasus. Further to such requests, the authorities generally reported that service personnel’s involvement in the abduction had not been established and that no special operations had been carried out at the relevant time. The applicants also lodged requests for information and assistance in the search of their missing relatives to various authorities but received only formal responses, if any. The perpetrators have never been established by the investigating bodies. It appears that all of the investigations are still pending. 7.  Summaries of the facts in respect of each application are set out below. Each account of events is based on statements provided by the applicants and their relatives and/or other witnesses to the Court and the domestic investigating authorities. Despite the Court’s request to this end, the Government did not submit the documents from the investigation files in each application. They did not dispute the principal facts of the cases as presented by the applicants, but denied that the abductors had been State service personnel. 8.  The applicant is the mother of Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev, who was born in 1986. 9.  The applicant’s husband and two sons, who were ten and eleven years old at the material time, died during shelling of Grozny in 1994. When military operations were launched in Chechnya in 1999, the applicant with two other children moved to Nazran, Ingushetia where they lived as refugees. 10.  On 28 May 2000 the applicant’s son, Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev, who was thirteen years old at the time, left Nazran and went to Grozny by bus. He was taken off the bus by service personnel at a checkpoint near the canning factory in Grozny because he did not have identity documents. Then he was forced into an APC and taken away. While being taken to the APC, Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev shouted out his name and the applicant’s name and asked the bus passengers to inform her of his arrest. 11.  The circumstances of the abduction were confirmed by bus passengers’ statements submitted to the Court. 12.  The whereabouts of Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev have remained unknown ever since. 13.  According to the applicant, she reported the abduction immediately to the local military command in Grozny, the Office of the Prosecutor of Chechnya and various NGOs. 14.  On 14 July 2000 the applicant complained in respect of the abduction again to the Leninskiy district police station and asked for assistance in the search for her son. 15.  On 21 July 2000 the Leninskiy district police station opened search file (розыскное дело) no. 30/48 into the abduction. Between May and September 2000 police officers took steps to establish Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev’s whereabouts but to no avail. 16.  On 18 December 2000 the Leninskiy district police station refused to open a criminal case into the abduction of Mr Shamil Amirkhadzhiyev. 17.  On 19 August 2001 the applicant complained in respect of the abduction to the Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District and asked him for assistance in the search for her son. 18.  On 29 July 2005 the Leninskiy district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 40147 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 19.  On 14 September 2005 the applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She stated that she had visited all checkpoints in Grozny trying to find her son but to no avail. Near the canning factory she had met women who had been trading at the local market. They had told her that a teenager who had looked like her son had been forced into an APC and taken away. 20.  The investigators sent several requests for information to the law‑enforcement authorities. According to the responses, it was established that Mr Amirkhadzhiyev had been arrested and taken away by service personnel of the federal forces. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Amirkhadzhiyev was available. 21.  On 29 September 2005 the investigation was suspended. It was resumed on 19 January 2006 and suspended again on 20 February 2006. 22.  On 4 June 2010 the applicant requested that the investigators provide her with copies of documents from the investigation file. On 8 June 2010 the applicant’s request was granted. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 23.  According to the applicant, between 2000 and 2010 she contacted various authorities, including the investigators, seeking their assistance in the search for her son, but to no avail. 24.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev, who was born in 1979. The first applicant is his mother, the second applicant is his brother and the third applicant is his sister. 25.  On 11 July 2002 service personnel under the command of General I.B. carried out a “sweep” operation in Chechen-Aul. As she was afraid for her son’s safety, the first applicant told Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev to go to her sister, who lived in Belgatoy village. 26.  On their way to Belgatoy Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev and Mr M.Z. were passing by the Argun river, when the service personnel saw them and opened fire. It is unclear whether it was Mr Vatsayev or Mr M.Z. who was injured and fell to the ground on the bank. The other man jumped into the river and was carried away by the strong current. The service personnel picked up the injured man and took him away to an unknown destination. 27.  The eyewitnesses did not see which of the two men had been injured and who had jumped into the water. According to the applicants, the injured man must have been Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev, as his passport was later found on the bank. 28.  The whereabouts of Mr Said-Magomed Vatsayev have remained unknown ever since. 29.  On 23 July 2002 the first applicant reported the abduction to the Head of the Government of the Chechen Republic. 30.  On 9 September 2002 the first applicant complained of the abduction to the Grozny district police station. 31.  In October 2002 police officers interviewed several relatives of Mr M.Z. and the first applicant. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 32.  According to the applicants, on several occasions between 2002 and 2005 they complained of the police’s failure to take necessary investigative steps to the Grozny district prosecutor’s office. 33.  In December 2005 the Grozny district police station carried out additional preliminary enquiries into the applicants’ abduction complaint. 34.  On 21 December 2005 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office examined the results of its preliminary enquiries and pointed out that contrary to the relevant procedural regulations, no operational search activities had been carried out by the Grozny district police station since 2002. 35.  Following the prosecutor’s office’s criticism, the head of the police station sent several requests for information to the law-enforcement authorities. The responses contained statements that no information about Mr Vatsayev was available. 36.  On 24 January 2006 the Grozny district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 54006 under Article 105 of the Criminal Code (murder). 37.  On 30 January 2006 the first applicant was granted victim status. According to the applicant, on several occasions between 2006 and 2011 she contacted the authorities with requests for assistance in the search for her son. 38.  On 24 March 2006 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was resumed on 4 June 2011, then suspended on 16 June 2011 and resumed again on 21 July 2011. 39.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 40.  On 1 July 2011 the applicants challenged the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation of 16 June 2011 and their failure to take basic steps before the Grozny District Court. On 22 July 2011 the court terminated the proceedings having found that the day before the investigation had been resumed. On 24 August 2011 the Chechnya Supreme Court upheld that decision on appeal. 41.  The applicants are close relatives of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev, who was born in 1964. The first applicant is his wife and other applicants are his children. 42.  Around 5 a.m. on 17 July 2002 several armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke into the applicants’ house in Shali. Another group of service personnel also broke into the house of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev’s brother, which was situated nearby. The service personnel, who spoke unaccented Russian, asked for the identity documents of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev. After checking them, the service personnel handcuffed Mr Chapsurkayev. Then they pulled his shirt over his head, forced him into the one of three APCs (armoured personnel carriers) and drove off in the direction of Shali town centre. One of the service personnel filmed the events on a video camera. The abduction took place in the presence of the applicants and their neighbours. 43.  The whereabouts of Mr Khamzat Chapsurkayev have remained unknown ever since. 44.  On 24 October 2002 the first applicant lodged an official complaint in respect of her husband’s abduction with the authorities and requested assistance in the search for him. 45.  On 29 November 2002 the Shali district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 59267 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 46.  On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the events as described above. 47.  On 29 January 2003 the investigation was suspended. The first applicant was informed thereof. 48.  On 3 July 2003 the first applicant complained of the abduction to the military prosecutor of Shali and requested assistance in the search for him. 49.  On 17 April 2004 the military prosecutor’s office of military unit no. 20166 replied to the applicant’s complaint, stating that on 17 July 2002 their service personnel had neither carried out any special operation nor detained anyone. 50.  In 2005 the first applicant complained about the abduction to the State Council of the Chechen Republic. It is unclear whether her complaint was forwarded to the investigators and whether any reply was given to it. 51.  On 30 November 2006 the first applicant again complained to the Shali district prosecutor in respect of the abduction. It is unclear whether she received any reply. 52.  On 29 February 2010 the first applicant requested that the investigators resume the investigation and grant her access to the case file. No reply was given to this request. 53.  However, following the above request, on an unidentified date in June 2010 the investigation was resumed. 54.  On 13 July 2010 the investigators questioned the first applicant. 55.  On 22 and 26 July 2010 the investigators questioned the applicants’ neighbour, Mr A.D., who confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 56.  On 6 May 2012 the first applicant requested that the investigators inform her of the progress in the investigation. On the same day she challenged the investigators’ decision of 29 January 2003 to suspend the investigation and their failure to take basic investigative steps before the Shali Town Court. The outcome of the court proceedings is unknown. 57.  It appears that the investigation is still pending. 58.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev (in the documents submitted also referred to as Lorsanukayev, Lorsunukayev, Lorsankayev), who was born in 1961. The second applicant is his wife. 59.  At the relevant time Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev lived as a refugee in Nazran, Ingushetia. On 10 May 2002 he went with his relative, Ms Ya.S., to Grozny to visit his brother Mr A.L. At around 2 p.m. on 12 May 2002 Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev, his brother and two neighbours, Mr V.B. and Mr S.E., were playing cards in Mr A.L.’s flat when a group of eight or nine armed service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas broke in. Without any explanation, they pulled Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev’s shirt over his head, took him barefoot outside and forced him into a UAZ minivan (таблетка) with tinted windows. The vehicle had no registration numbers. The service personnel spoke Russian and Chechen. 60.  Mr. V.B. attempted to inform the service personnel that he was a police officer from the Leninskiy district police station in Grozny. The service personnel disregarded this information, kicked him and then pushed him to the floor together with Mr. S.E. Then the service personnel took Mr A.L. outside and put him in a UAZ vehicle in which Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev was being held. Ms Ya.S. tried to stop the service personnel, but they hit her with their rifle butts and drove away. Five minutes later the service personnel pushed Mr A.L. out of the UAZ vehicle and proceeded to an unknown destination. 61.  The whereabouts of Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev have remained unknown ever since. 62.  About three weeks after the abduction a man visited Mr A.L. and passed him a written message from Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev. The message, written on an empty cigarette box, stated “I am here”. According to the man, that cigarette box had been thrown out of a vehicle parked near the building of the Federal Security Service in Grozny. 63.  On 20 June 2002 Mr A.L. complained to the Grozny prosecutor’s office of the abduction of his son and requested assistance in the search for him. 64.  On 24 July 2002 the Grozny prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 48116 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 65.  On 6 August 2002 Ms Ya.S. was granted victim status and questioned. She confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 66.  On the same day the investigators questioned Mr A.L. and his wife. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 67.  On 24 September 2002 the investigation was suspended. According to the applicants, between 2002 and 2008 they contacted the investigators and other authorities asking for information on the progress of the investigation. 68.  On 15 July 2008 the first applicant requested that the investigators inform her of the progress of the investigation, resume the investigation and allow her access to the case file. She stated, in particular, that they had passed the message from Mr Alvi Lorsnukayev to the investigators. 69.  On 23 July 2009 the investigation was resumed. 70.  On 20 August 2009 the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 71.  On 22 August 2009 the investigation was suspended. 72.  On 29 June 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigators grant her access to the case file. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 73.  On 20 April 2012 the second applicant asked the investigators to provide her with the copies of the investigation-file documents. It is unclear whether any reply was given to this request. 74.  On 30 August 2012 the investigation was resumed. It appears that it is still pending. 75.  On 26 June 2012 the second applicants challenged the investigators’ decision of 22 August 2009 to suspend the investigation before the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny. On 8 August 2012 the complaint was transferred to the Staropromyslovskiy District Court of Grozny. On 31 August 2012 that court terminated the proceedings, having found that a day earlier the investigation had been resumed. On 24 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld this decision on appeal. 76.  The first applicant is the mother of Mr Arbi Isiyev, who was born in 1985. The second applicant is his sister. 77.  Around 1 p.m. on 29 September 2004 Mr Arbi Isiyev left his home in Argun to visit his aunt, who lived in the same town. When Mr Arbi Isiyev was walking down Gudermesskaya Street, several service personnel in camouflage uniforms and balaclavas forced him into a white GAZ-3110 car and took him to an unknown destination. Mr Arbi Isiyev managed to throw 10,000 Russian roubles (RUB) on the ground and asked a passer-by, Mr R.D., in Chechen (so that the service personnel could not understand him) to give that money to his relatives. The abduction took place in the presence of Ms S.Sh. and Mr R.D. 78.  Mr Arbi Isiyev has not been seen since. 79.  On 30 September 2004 the applicants’ relative, Mr I.K., complained of the abduction to authorities. 80.  On 23 October 2004 the Argun town prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no. 48042 under Article 126 of the Criminal Code (abduction). 81.  On the same day the first applicant was granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 82.  Between October and December 2004 the investigators questioned the first applicant and the witnesses Ms S.Sh. and Mr R.D. They confirmed the circumstances of the abduction as described above. 83.  On 23 December 2004 the investigation was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. It was resumed on 18 February 2008 and suspended again on 18 March 2008. 84.  In 2009 the first applicant asked the head of the Chechen Parliamentary Committee on the Search for the Disappeared (Комитет Парламента Чеченской Республики по поиску лиц, без вести пропавших в период проведения контртеррористической операции) for assistance in the search for her son. Her request was forwarded to the investigators, who on 18 May 2009 replied that that the investigation had been suspended and that operational search activities were being carried out to establish Mr Isiyev’s whereabouts. 85.  On 22 April 2010 and then again on 22 July 2011 the first applicant requested that the investigators grant her access to the investigation file. 86.  On 1 August 2011 the applicants’ request was granted. 87.  On 26 October 2011 the investigation was resumed and then suspended again on 26 November 2011. 88.  On 4 September 2012 the applicants requested that the investigators inform them of the progress in the investigation. 89.  On 11 September 2012 the investigation was resumed. It appears that the investigation is still pending. 90.  On 17 October 2011 the first applicant challenged the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation of 18 March 2008 and their failure to take basic investigative steps before the Shali Town Court. On 17 November 2011 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 26 October 2011 the investigation had been resumed. On 21 December 2011 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that decision on appeal. 91.  On 7 September 2012 the applicants challenged the investigators’ decision to suspend the investigation of 26 November 2011 before the Shali Town Court. On 17 September 2012 the court terminated the proceedings, having found that on 11 September 2012 the investigation had been resumed. On 31 October 2012 the Supreme Court of Chechnya upheld that decision on appeal.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": true, "14": false, "2": true, "3": true, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicants, whose names, dates of birth and places of residence are shown in the Appendix, were all individual small shareholders of Demirbank, a private bank in Turkey. On different dates they purchased different amounts of Turkish and German share certificates in Demirbank through the German stock market. 6.  By a decision dated 6 December 2000, the Banking Regulation and Supervision Board (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu – hereinafter “the Board”) decided to transfer the management and control of Demirbank to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu – hereinafter “the Fund”). In its decision the Board held that the assets of Demirbank were insufficient to cover its liabilities and that the continuation of its activities would threaten the security and stability of the financial system. Accordingly, Demirbank’s management and control, and the privileges of its shareholders except for dividends, were transferred to the Fund. The Fund also confiscated all properties belonging to Demirbank. 7.  On 6 December 2000 the Board of Directors of the Fund decided to take over the shares of Demirbank in exchange for paying Demirbank’s loss corresponding to its paid-up capital, namely 275,000,000 Turkish liras (TRY). 8.  On 31 January 2001 all equities of Demirbank were removed from its account at the Istanbul Stock Exchange and were transferred to the account of the Fund. 9.  On 2 February 2001, the main shareholder of Demirbank, namely Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankalar Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurumu – hereinafter “the Agency”) before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking a ruling setting aside the decision of 6 December 2000 to transfer Demirbank to the Fund. The Ankara Administrative Court found that it lacked jurisdiction, and transferred the case to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 5 November 2004 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the Board’s decision of 6 December 2000, holding that the takeover had been illegal. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Agency were rejected on 14 April 2005 and 15 December 2005 respectively. 10.  On 20 September 2001 the Fund entered into an agreement with HSBC Bank, and sold Demirbank to the latter. Accordingly, Demirbank’s legal personality was extinguished and it was struck off the commercial register on 14 December 2001. 11.  On 20 September 2001 Ms S. Cıngıllıoğlu, the main shareholder of Cıngıllı Holding A.Ş., brought administrative proceedings against the Fund before the Ankara Administrative Court, seeking the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC. On 21 April 2004 the Ankara Administrative Court annulled the agreement on the ground that the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund had been found to be illegal by the Supreme Administrative Court. An appeal and a request for rectification lodged by the Fund were rejected and the decision became final on 24 February 2006. 12.  On different dates the applicants applied to the Board and claimed compensation arguing that they had lost their shares in Demirbank, as a result of its transfer to the Fund. The Board did not respond to the applicants’ claims within the statutory period. The applicants therefore applied to the administrative courts and requested the annulment of the Board’s implied rejection of their compensation claims. However, the administrative courts dismissed the applicants’ cases as out of time on the ground that they should have initiated proceedings at the latest within sixty days following 31 January 2001, the date on which Demirbank’s equities had been transferred to the Fund’s account at the Stock Exchange. The administrative courts’ decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court and thus became final. 13.  Following the annulment of the decision concerning the transfer of Demirbank to the Fund by the domestic courts in 2005, the applicants applied to the administrative courts. Relying on the restitutio in integrum principle, the applicants argued that the judgment of the court which annulled the Board’s decision dated 6 December 2000 had to be enforced and their rights as shareholders of Demirbank should be reinstated. On different dates the applicants’ requests were rejected by the administrative courts and the administrative courts’ decisions were upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgment regarding the annulment of the Board’s decision of 6 December 2000 could be secured by the return of the supervisory and executive rights to Demirbank’s shareholders, and did not require the restitution of the actual shares. It also maintained that even if that was the case, the judgment could not be executed, as Demirbank’s shares had ceased to exist as a result of the loss of its legal personality following its sale to HSBC. 14.  Following the annulment of the agreement to sell Demirbank to HSBC, the applicants in the applications followed by an asterisk (*) in the annexed list, brought a third set of proceedings against the Fund and claimed compensation for their lost shares in Demirbank. The Istanbul Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ compensation claims for being out of time on the ground that they should have brought their claims within sixty-day statutory time-limit after Demirbank’s equities had been transferred to the Fund’s account at the Stock Exchange on 31 January 2001. The decisions of the administrative courts were upheld, and the applicants’ requests for rectification of the decision were rejected.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant is a Roman Catholic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Sarajevo. 5.  By decision of 9 May 2003, which became final and binding on 4 September 2003, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Chamber”) found that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had discriminated against the applicant in its enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by Article 9 of the Convention. In order to remedy the situation it ordered the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the relocation of public schools housed in the Archdiocese High School building in Travnik, and to reinstate the applicant in the premises within one year. The Chamber rejected a request by the applicant for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 6.  By an agreement of 21 May 2004, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina undertook to reinstate the applicant in the impugned premises by 1 July 2006. Shortly thereafter, the Travnik Municipal Council adopted the implementing decisions, and also one of the public schools was moved from the premises. 7.  On 23 June 2010 the Travnik Municipal Council issued a writ of execution (rješenje o izvršenju). On 5 October 2011 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 17 October 2011 the Travnik Municipal Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to deal with the case. On 16 May 2012 the Travnik Cantonal Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. On 3 July 2012 the Travnik Municipal Court held that the decisions of the Chamber were not subject to enforcement proceedings. On 12 July 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (28 August 2017), the Travnik Cantonal Court had not yet ruled on the matter. 8.  On 30 October 2012 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina determined that the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not yet fully enforced the decision of 9 May 2003. 9.  On 17 February 2017 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the public school remaining in its premises, requesting its relocation, as well as damages for the use of the premises for the period between 1 February 2014 and 1 June 2017. 10.  On 14 July 2017 the Municipal Court in Travnik rendered a judgment in the applicant’s favour, rewarding in full its claims finally specified in the proceedings, namely 270,360 convertible marks (BAM)[1] for pecuniary damages and 6,713 BAM for costs and expenses. The Municipal Court also ordered the respondent to vacate the applicant’s premises within 30 days from receiving the judgment. On 20 December 2017 the Cantonal Court in Novi Travnik upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. At the date of the latest information available to the Court (20 February 2018), the Central Bosnia Canton submitted a revision petition to the Supreme Court of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the final judgment in these proceedings. It also appears that the public school has still not been relocated.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant company is a privately owned company registered in Danilovgrad, Montenegro. 5.  In July 2004 a call for tender for hotel “Otrant” in Montenegro was issued. The deadline for submitting bids was October 2004. Together with three other companies, the applicant company took part in the tendering process. On 30 November 2004, however, it was informed that the tender was awarded to another bidder. 6.  On an unspecified date in December 2004, the applicant company objected to this decision. On 29 December 2004 the Commercial Court in Podgorica (Privredni sud u Podgorici) rejected the applicant company’s objection. 7.  On 28 January 2006 the Court of Appeal quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first instance. 8.  On 15 June 2006 the Commercial Court ruled against the applicant company. This decision was served on the applicant company on 8 September 2009. 9.  On 26 March 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Commercial Court. The decision of the Court of Appeal was served on the applicant company’s lawyer on 27 April 2010. 10.  On 15 July 2010 the applicant company lodged an initiative urging the Supreme Public Prosecutor’s Office (Vrhovno državno tužilaštvo) to file a request for the protection of legality (zahtjev za zaštitu zakonitosti), but this motion was rejected on 21 July 2010. 11.  On 30 July 2010 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal. On 14 October 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected this appeal as having been lodged out of time.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicants were born in 1984 and 1979 respectively and live in Moscow. 5.  On 14 December 2012 the State Duma adopted at first reading a draft law which, in particular, prohibited adoption of children of Russian nationality by US citizens. 6.  On 17 December 2012 the official daily newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta announced that the second reading was scheduled for 19 December 2012. 7.  According to the applicants, they read on various online social networks that many people intended to stage solo “pickets” (одиночные пикеты) on 19 December 2012 in front of the State Duma to express their opposition to the draft law. The format of solo “pickets” was chosen because there was no longer time to observe the minimum statutory three‑day notification period for other types of (group) events. 8.  The applicants decided to hold their own solo “pickets” and at around 9 a.m. positioned themselves, holding banners, in the vicinity of the State Duma at some distance from other protesters (see also Lashmankin and Others v. Russia, nos. 57818/09 and 14 others, §§ 206-15, 7 February 2017). 9.  According to the applicants, they were arrested by the police several minutes later and brought to a police station. At 10.30 a.m. the police drew up a record of the administrative escorting (протокол административного доставления) in respect of each applicant. A record of administrative arrest (протокол административного задержания), drawn up at the same time, stated that the applicants had arrived at the police station at 10.30 a.m. The first applicant, Mr Tsukanov, made a handwritten note on his arrest record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.20 a.m. The second applicant, Mr Torchinskiy, made a handwritten note on his escorting record that he had been actually apprehended at 9.30 a.m. 10.  At the police station both applicants were accused of organising and holding a group public event without prior notification, in breach of Article 20.2 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, “CAO”). The administrative offence records indicate that the offences were committed at 10 a.m. The first applicant made a handwritten note that he came to the event venue at 9 a.m. and was arrested at 9.20 a.m. 11.  The first applicant was released at 1.20 p.m. The second applicant was released at 1.10 p.m. 12.  On 15 January 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the second applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of 20,000 Russian roubles (RUB), (about 495 euros (EUR) at the time). The justice of the peace found it established, on the basis of the records and testimony of police officers, that the applicant had taken part in a “picket” involving fifty people. That “picket” was unlawful because no notification had been submitted by the organisers as required by the Public Events Act (hereinafter “PEA”). The applicant had waved a banner, thereby attracting the attention of passers-by and journalists assembled for the occasion. He had not complied with the police order to stop picketing. 13.  On 6 February 2013 the justice of the peace of the 369th Court Circuit of the Tverskoy District of Moscow found the first applicant guilty under Article 20.2 § 2 of the CAO and sentenced him to a fine of RUB 20,000 (about EUR 495 at the time), with the reasoning identical to that in the judgment of 15 January 2013. The justice of the peace also relied on police reports and testimony of a police officer who had apprehended the first applicant at the venue of the public event. 14.  Both applicants appealed, insisting that each of them had held a solo demonstration which did not require prior notification of the authorities. The first applicant also pointed out that he had been arrested earlier than indicated in the arrest record. 15.  On 13 February and 11 March 2013 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow upheld the judgments concerning the second and the first applicant respectively. 16.  The second applicant applied for review of the court decisions under Article 30.12 of the CAO. On 28 June 2013 the Deputy President of the Moscow City Court partly allowed his complaint and changed the classification of the administrative charge against him. The second applicant was found guilty of the breach of the established procedure for the conduct of public events committed by a participant, an offence punishable under Article 20.2 § 5 of the CAO. His fine was reduced to RUB 10,000 (about EUR 233 at the time).", "10": false, "11": true, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Split. 5.  On 16 January 1961 the Municipal Institute for Social Insurance in Split (which later became the Croatian Pension Fund and is therefore hereinafter referred as such) awarded the applicant, as its employee, the specially protected tenancy (stanarsko pravo) of a socially-owned flat in Gajeva Street in Split, with a surface area of 37 square metres. 6.  On 19 April 1969 the applicant married a certain M.M. and went to live in the flat in respect of which he held a specially protected tenancy. 7.  On 2 October 1972 the Yugoslav People’s Army awarded the applicant’s husband, as a serviceman, a socially-owned flat in Šimićeva Street in Split, with a surface area of 62 square metres, with a view to satisfying the housing needs of him and his family (the applicant and their two sons, who were both less than two years old at the time). 8.  The applicant, her husband and their two sons moved into that flat some time in 1973. Pursuant to the relevant legislation (see paragraph 45 below), the applicant thereby, as her husband’s wife, automatically became a co-holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. 9.  Once the applicant moved out from the flat in Gajeva Street her brother moved in. He remained living there with his family until 1982, when he moved out. 10.  The applicant stated that in May 1982 she had moved out of the flat in Šimićeva Street and returned to the flat in Gajeva Street to live there with her elderly mother and to take care of her. She stated that she had lived there until her eviction on 16 May 2012 (see paragraph 38 below). 11.  On 22 June 1982 the applicant applied to the Croatian Pension Fund, as the provider of the flat in Gajeva Street, for permission to exchange the flats in Gajeva and Šimićeva Streets for a single, larger flat, a possibility provided for under section 49(3) of the 1974 Housing Act (see paragraph 48 below). 12.  On 30 June 1982 the Croatian Pension Fund refused its consent for the exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. It held that the applicant had been for many years using two socially-owned flats, which was contrary to the law (see paragraph 45 below). 13.  The applicant then instituted administrative proceedings before the relevant first-instance administrative authority charged with housing affairs (hereinafter “the first-instance housing authority”), applying for permission to exchange the two flats for a single, larger one (see paragraph 48 below). The Croatian Pension Fund, for its part, on 13 July 1982 instituted administrative proceedings before the same authority, seeking her eviction from the flat in Gajeva Street. The two administrative proceedings were subsequently joined. 14.  At the hearing held on 16 September 1982, the applicant stated that after her brother had moved out of the flat in Gajeva Street she had moved in with her mother who was, owing to her age, in need of care and no longer able to live alone (see paragraphs 9-10 above). 15.  By a decision of 17 December 1982, the first-instance housing authority dismissed the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats, and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. That authority held:\n-  that she had permanently left the flat in in Gajeva Street in 1969, thereby losing her specially protected tenancy of that flat,\n-  that once her brother had moved out the applicant had indeed moved back into the flat in May 1982 (see paragraphs 9-10 and 14 above) but had not thereby re-acquired the specially protected tenancy of the flat.\n-  that it was therefore not possible to grant her permission for an exchange of flats because she no longer held a specially protected tenancy in respect of one of the two flats involved in the desired exchange. 16.  Following an appeal by the applicant, by a decision of 20 May 1983 the relevant second-instance administrative authority quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case. It held that the applicant retained the status of a holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. Instead of seeking her eviction, the first-instance housing authority should have followed the procedure stipulated for situations where a tenant held a specially protected tenancy in respect of two flats (see paragraph 48 below). That procedure provided for the possibility of exchanging the two flats for a single one if neither flat satisfied the housing needs of the tenant’s household (but would if taken together). It instructed the first-instance housing authority to examine whether the flats in Gajeva and/or Šimićeva Streets satisfied the housing needs of the applicant and her family. 17.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance housing authority established that the flat in Šimićeva Street had fully satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs. It therefore, by a decision of 10 October 1984, again dismissed the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. 18.  By a decision of 1 February 1985 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 10 October 1984. 19.  The applicant then brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court which, by a judgment of 6 June 1985, quashed the second-instance decision of 1 February 1985 for incomplete facts and remitted the case for fresh examination. 20.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance housing authority, after collecting relevant evidence and thereby completing its earlier factual findings, again held that the flat in Šimićeva Street had fully satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs. It therefore, by a decision of 6 November 1987, again dismissed the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. 21.  By a decision of 31 May 1988 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 6 November 1987. 22.  The applicant then again brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court which, by a judgment of 22 December 1988, quashed the second-instance decision of 31 May 1988. The court held that the issue of whether the flat in Šimićeva Street had fully satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs had to be determined by applying relevant military housing standards and not general housing standards, given that the flat in question had been awarded to her husband as a serviceman (see paragraph 7 above). 23.  In the resumed administrative proceedings, on 25 May 1992 the applicant withdrew her application for an exchange of flats, stating the passage of time and changed family circumstances as the reasons for her withdrawal. In particular, she stated that she had in the meantime divorced (see paragraph 39 below). 24.  By a decision of 1 June 1992 the first-instance housing authority discontinued the proceedings in so far as they concerned the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats. It also ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street, finding that the flat in Šimićeva Street had satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs even according to the relevant military housing standards. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that her specially protected tenancy of the flat in Gajeva Street had never been terminated and that the first-instance housing authority had not taken into account her changed circumstances – that is to say her divorce and the fact that she had not been using two flats. 25.  By a decision of 14 January 1993 the relevant ministry, as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision of 1 June 1992. 26.  The applicant then, for the third time, brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court, which dismissed it by a judgment of 26 May 1993. 27.  Following a request for the protection of legality (zahtjev za zaštitu zakonitosti) by the Principal State Attorney, on 12 July 1996 the Supreme Court quashed the Administrative Court’s judgment and remitted the case. The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Court and the administrative authorities had wrongly applied the relevant military housing standards to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court also held that the issue of whether the flat in Šimićeva Street had satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs had to be determined having regard to the circumstances existing at the time she had moved into that flat in in 1973 and that the subsequent change in circumstances was of no relevance. 28.  In the resumed proceedings, by a decision of 6 December 1999 the first-instance housing authority again ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street, finding that at the time that she had moved into the flat in Šimićeva Street the latter flat had satisfied her and her family’s housing needs, having regard to the relevant military housing standards. That authority also reiterated that the subsequent changes in her family situation were irrelevant. 29.  On 29 March 2000 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision, which thereby became definitive and enforceable. 30.  The applicant then, for the fourth time, brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court, which dismissed it by a judgment of 12 June 2003. 31.  The Principal State Attorney then again lodged a request for the protection of legality. 32.  By a judgment of 16 September 2004 the Supreme Court allowed that request, quashed the Administrative Court’s judgment and remitted the case. The Supreme Court held that, because the proceedings concerned the applicant’s eviction from the flat in Gajeva Street, the issue of whether the flat in Šimićeva Street had satisfied her and her family’s housing needs had to be determined in accordance with general and not military housing standards. 33.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 12 May 2005 the Administrative Court again dismissed the applicant’s action. 34.  The applicant then, on 3 April 2006, lodged a constitutional complaint alleging a violation of her constitutional right to fair procedure. She argued, inter alia, that the administrative and judicial authorities had not taken into account the fact that she had divorced her husband and thus had no longer needed to exchange the flats nor the fact that she had not been using two flats. She also mentioned that she had been living in the flat in Gajeva Street together with her son, D.M., and his family (his wife and daughter), as members of her household. 35.  On 13 December 2006 the Constitutional Court issued an interim measure whereby it temporarily postponed the enforcement of the first‑instance decision of 6 December 1999 (see paragraph 28 above) pending the adoption of its decision on the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 36.  By a decision of 13 July 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 37.  Meanwhile, on 14 March 2003 the first-instance housing authority issued an enforcement order with a view to executing its decision of 6 December 1999 and evicting the applicant by force (see paragraph 28 above). 38.  The enforcement was postponed following several judicial decisions. A first attempted eviction took place on 28 November 2006 but it was agreed to postpone it, the applicant being in poor medical condition. On 16 May 2012 the applicant was evicted. The records drawn up by the enforcement officer show that the applicant was present during both the attempted eviction and the actual eviction. 39.  By a judgment of 30 March 1992 the Split Municipal Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and her husband. 40.  On 8 May 1992 the applicant obtained a declaratory judgment by the same court whereby she was declared the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in Gajeva Street. The judgment was rendered in the context of civil proceedings she had instituted against her husband and was based exclusively on her husband’s admission of her claim, that is, without taking any evidence. 41.  On 9 January 1996 the applicant’s former husband M.M. purchased the flat in Šimićeva Street from the State and thereby became its sole owner – a possibility open to all holders of specially protected tenancies of socially-owned flats under the Specially Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act of 1991. Beforehand, on 27 November 1995 the applicant and her husband concluded an agreement whereby they both agreed that he was the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy of that flat. 42.  It would appear that before selling the flat in Šimićeva Street to the applicant’s husband, on 13 November 1995 the Ministry of Defence, as the State authority responsible for management of the flat at the time, conducted an on-spot inspection of the flat. Enclosed with the minutes of the inspection was a statement by the tenants’ board that, along with M.M. and his two sons, a wife (that is to say the applicant) was also living in the flat as an unregistered member of the household. 43.  The Government submitted that the applicant was currently living in the flat in Šimićeva Street owned by her former husband M.M. In support of their contention they furnished a certificate of domicile which indicates that since 19 September 2012 the applicant has had her domicile registered at the address of the flat in Šimićeva Street. The certificate also indicates that before that date she had had her registered domicile at the address of the flat in Gajeva Street since 9 August 1962. 44.  The Government furnished evidence that the applicant was the co‑owner of a number of properties in the Split area, including two houses.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": true, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Baia Mare. 6.  At the relevant time, the applicant was the chief prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court. He was also the staff member in the prosecutor’s office tasked with providing information to the media in relation to criminal proceedings. 7.  On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court had caught V.F. red-handed being given money by a relative of V.T.V., who was detained in Baia Mare Prison. 8.  According to statements given by the detainee, V.F. had promised to intervene and pass on the money to the prosecutors and judges who were to make the decision concerning his conditional release from prison. 9.  On 22 October 2008 the file was transferred to the National Anticorruption Department (“the NAP”), which by law was competent to continue the investigation. 10.  On the same day, the applicant issued a press release, which received considerable public attention. 11.  The press release read as follows:\n“After being informed by police that V.F. seeks and receives money from individuals in exchange for intervening in favour of the conditional release of detainees held in Baia Mare Prison, the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court organised a flagrante delicto operation on 21 October 2009. V.F. was caught red-handed while accepting the sum of 1,650 euros (EUR) from a detainee’s relative...\nA criminal investigation into influence peddling was opened and, according to the initial findings in the case, it was found that the suspect had received EUR 9,850 of the EUR 11,000 she had sought for intervening to influence favourably the conditional release of that detainee or the allocation of his work placements.\nAccording to the detainee, the suspect claimed that the intended recipients of the money were prison employees with responsibility for the allocation of work to the detainees or members of the commission for conditional release. Moreover, the suspect told the detainee that part of the money was to go to the magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees.\nAs the object of the offence of influence peddling was a sum of money exceeding EUR 10,000, the file was transferred to the National Anticorruption Department.” 12.  On the same day, at the request of a local television channel, AXA TV, the applicant gave a short statement providing mainly the same information as was contained in the press release. 13.  The newscaster added the following comments to the information provided by the applicant:\n“The commission for conditional release, which comprises nine members, is chaired by a delegated judge. We don’t know whether it is purely coincidence that yesterday, the same day on which the flagrante delicto operation was organised and the detainee was conditionally released, that judge’s assignment to the Baia Mare Prison came to an end...” 14.  A few local newspapers wrote articles about the incident. Some of them contained images of the flagrante delicto operation, taken by journalists who had been present at the operation organised by the prosecutors and police. 15.  On 3 November 2008 judge G.E. lodged a complaint with the Superior Council of the Magistracy (“the SCM”) seeking the commencement of a disciplinary investigation against the applicant in connection with the manner in which he had informed the media about the incident of 21 October 2008. She contended that at the time of the incident she had been the judge delegated to Baia Mare Prison and because of the applicant’s press release and interview with AXA TV it was suggested by the media that she might be the alleged recipient of the money. 16.  The disciplinary commission for the prosecutors of the SCM instituted an investigation against the applicant in connection with two disciplinary offences, namely failure to observe the secrecy of deliberations or the confidentiality of documents that are of a secret nature, and adopting a disrespectful attitude towards colleagues in the exercise of his duties under Article 99 letters d) and k) of Law no. 303/2004 on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors. The SCM also held that the applicant had breached the provisions of Article 12 § 1 let e) of Law no. 544/2001 concerning the restriction of citizens’ access to information in relation to criminal proceedings at the investigation stage. 17.  The applicant was questioned by the SCM’s disciplinary commission for prosecutors on 23 March 2009. According to his statement, he had prepared the press release after receiving additional information about the investigation from the chief prosecutor of the NAP. He had then submitted the press release to two colleagues at the NAP, namely the prosecutor in charge of the case and the chief prosecutor, and had asked for their opinion. The first had had no objections concerning the press release; the other had advised him that he should limit its content to aspects concerning the investigation carried out by his office. 18.  On 27 March 2009 the applicant’s lawyer received a letter from the president of Baia Mare District Court. In that letter the president of the court had stated that he had not considered it necessary to open an investigation into corruption offences allegedly committed by judges from Baia Mare District Court because in his opinion “the press release did not make any reference to the identity of the magistrates involved”. 19.  At a hearing held before the SCM’s disciplinary commission on 31 March 2009 the applicant was assisted by a lawyer of his choice. He proposed as evidence a video recording of the news programme presented by AXA TV concerning the incident of 21 October 2008 so that it could be compared to the press release drafted by the applicant. He also proposed that the news editor of AXA TV be questioned. As documentary evidence he requested copies of the articles published in the local newspapers concerning the incident and the letter addressed by the National Audiovisual Council to judge G.E. in reply to the complaint she had lodged in connection with the comments made by AXA TV about her alleged involvement in the influence peddling. 20.  At the same hearing the SCM’s disciplinary commission heard evidence from the prosecutor who had organised the flagrante delicto operation. He stated that it had taken place in a public space, namely a bar, in the presence of two journalists, one of whom had taken pictures. The pictures accompanied articles published by local newspapers in the days following the events. 21.  The applicant asked the SCM to question the two journalists. This request having been rejected, the journalist who had taken the pictures gave a written statement, which was joined to the case file by the applicant. The journalist maintained that he had been present at the flagrante delicto operation by chance: he had been attending a conference in the building in which it had been staged. Seeing masked police officers entering the bar, he had followed them and had seen suspect V.F. being caught red-handed. 22.  When questioned by the SCM at the hearing of 31 March 2009, the prosecutor in charge of the case at the NAP stated that the press release issued by the applicant had not jeopardised the outcome of the criminal investigation. Moreover, the press release had only referred to “statements at the initial stage of the investigation, while the case was still at the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court”. 23.  The SCM’s disciplinary commission heard evidence from judge G.E. She stated that before lodging her complaint with the SCM she had asked AXA TV to retract its remarks concerning any possible connection between the termination of her mandate as the delegated judge to Maramureş prison and the case of influence peddling. As she had not received any reply she had referred the matter to the National Audiovisual Council but had not been satisfied with its response. 24.  The applicant joined to the case file copies of the complaints lodged with the television channel and the National Audiovisual Council by judge G.E. and the letters she had received in reply.\nThe relevant part of the letter sent by the National Audiovisual Council read as follows:\n“On 11 November 2008 the Council, convened in a public meeting, examined the report prepared by the Inspection Department and watched a recording of the broadcast mentioned in your complaint....\nIt was noted that the news item had been broadcast on 22 October 2008 at 9.30 p.m. As the information broadcast did not contain any specific reference to you, the item could not infringe your right to a protected public image.\nThe members of the Council considered that the requirements for granting the right of reply or remedy, as provided for under Articles 52 and 60 of Decision no. 187/2006 concerning the regulation of audio-visual content, were not met.” 25.  On 6 April 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the General Prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He attached a copy of the press release issued by him on 22 October 2008 and asked the opinion of the Prosecutor General about the way in which he had drafted it and especially whether it had been drafted in compliance with Order no. 116 issued by the General Prosecutor on 24 May 2007 regulating activities undertaken in relation to the mass media within the public prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 63 below). 26.  On 10 April 2009 the applicant received a reply to his letter from a prosecutor working at the Office for Public Information and Relations with the Mass Media based in the General Prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 27.  In the prosecutor’s view, the information provided by the applicant in the press release had been “minimal and general, but necessary so that the public could understand the facts of the case”. As regards the fact that the applicant had issued the press release after the case had been transferred to the NAP, the prosecutor concluded that the action had complied with the practice observed by the public prosecutor’s office. Moreover, the press release had contained only information concerning the investigation carried out by the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court. 28.  This letter, accompanied by the General Prosecutor’s Order no. 116/2006, was added by the applicant to the case file to be examined by the SCM on 13 April 2009. 29.  In his oral submissions before the disciplinary commission, the applicant’s lawyer claimed that the applicant had acted in good faith in informing the press about the incident. His references had been general and impersonal and he had made no reference to any specific person. He also submitted that the applicant had merely fulfilled his obligation to inform the press and to protect the image of his institution and of the legal system by informing the public about a pending criminal investigation. The public had already been exposed to information about the incident as the two journalists who had been present at the flagrante delicto operation had published articles about the incident. The lawyer also pointed out that the applicant had observed the confidentiality of the investigation and had referred only to the activity carried out by his office without making statements which could have led to the identification of the magistrate, judge or prosecutor who was the alleged recipient of the money from V.F. The applicant’s reference to “magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees” was too general to have resulted in the identification of the magistrate concerned. The lawyer concluded by submitting that the information presented by AXA TV about the incident had been more comprehensive than the information provided by the applicant in the press release and in his interview with the AXA TV channel. 30.  On 5 May 2009 the SCM’s disciplinary commission found the applicant guilty of two disciplinary offences under Article 99 letters d) and k) of Law no. 303/2004 and imposed a disciplinary sanction under Article 100 of Law no. 303/2004 in the form of a reprimand. The disciplinary commission noted that the applicant had issued a press release and given an interview to AXA TV revealing information about the investigation into the offence of influence peddling on 22 October 2008. 31.  It further noted that the applicant had provided information about the alleged recipient of the money from V.F. without checking the accuracy of the detainee’s statements and had done so one day after the case file had been transferred to the NAP. Such information had led to the identification of judge G.E. as one of the alleged recipients of the money. The disciplinary commission concluded that the applicant had therefore breached the provisions of Article 12 § 1 let e) of Law no. 544/2001 concerning the restriction of citizens’ access to information in relation to criminal proceedings at the investigation stage when there was a risk that the result of the investigation would be undermined or confidential sources revealed. From the way in which the press release was drafted, “the circle of magistrates who could have been the recipients of the money was restricted and limited and made possible the identification of the judge delegated to Baia Mare Prison in the person of judge G.E.” As the six-month term of her delegation expired just at the time of the events in question, the mass media made speculative suggestions that the termination was connected with the influence‑peddling case. 32.  Two of the five prosecutors comprising the disciplinary commission were opposed to reprimanding the applicant for the offence of adopting a disrespectful attitude toward colleagues in the exercise of his duties. They expressed their position in a dissenting opinion. 33.  They noted, among other things, that:\n(i)  the names of the persons who were allegedly to receive money from the influence peddler were not mentioned in the press release or in the television interview; there was only a general, impersonal reference to the judges and the prosecutors who were involved with the conditional release of detainees;\n(ii)  individuals in this sphere included not only the judge delegated to the prison but also the judges who examine requests for conditional release at first instance and on appeal, as well as the prosecutors who attend the hearings concerning these requests. AXA TV’s reference to the judge whose involvement with the prison had just ended was made in an additional comment that was not included in the press release;\n(iii)  the reference to the delegated judge made possible the identification of the magistrate, but since this statement was attributable exclusively to the television channel, the latter should bear responsibility for all subsequent comments and speculations;\n(iv)  only the additional information concerning the end of the delegated judge’s mandate allowed the identification of judge G.E. Possible damage to her reputation could therefore not be imputed to the press release from the prosecutor’s office;\n(v)  the press release from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court and the interview with the defendant referred to the offence of influence peddling and not to the offence of active bribery. The defendant stated that the allegations concerning the alleged recipients of the money had been made by the detainee. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the SCM’s disciplinary commission. 35.  In his appeal the applicant complained about the unfairness of the proceedings before the disciplinary commission. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention the applicant also complained that the imposition of a disciplinary sanction had infringed his right to impart information to the press. 36.  He argued that questioning the two journalists who had been present at the flagrante delicto operation would have proved that he had not supplied any confidential information. They had published articles, accompanied by pictures of the incident, stating that “according to unofficial sources, V.F had connections in prison employees’ and magistrates’ circles”. 37.  Moreover, the main reason for issuing the press release had been to prevent possible speculation in the media about the operation ‒ which was already known to the press ‒ that could have been detrimental to the judiciary. 38.  As regards the accusation that he had shown a disrespectful attitude towards his colleague judge G.E., the applicant submitted that the latter had not contacted him to express any displeasure about the press release before lodging her complaint with the SCM. If he had known that she had felt that her reputation and public image had been damaged by his press release of 22 October 2009, he could have clarified the matter by issuing a new one. 39.  The High Court allowed a request lodged by the Association of Romanian Magistrates to intervene in the proceedings in support of the applicant’s appeal. 40.  The association justified its intervention in the disciplinary proceedings by referring to its role as protector of the magistrates’ status and their public image, pointing out that ‒ in its opinion ‒ the decision delivered by the SCM against the applicant had had a serious negative impact on his professional career. It further argued that in its opinion the press release issued by the applicant had complied with the provisions of Law no. 554/2001, with the guidelines issued by the SCM concerning cooperation between courts and prosecutor’s offices and the media, and with guidelines issued by the General Prosecutor’s office attached to High Court. It also pointed out that the applicant had observed Recommendation Rec(2003) 13 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in so far as he had not disclosed confidential information concerning the criminal investigation to the media and had not in any way undermined the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 41.  On 23 November 2009 a panel of nine judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the applicant should have limited his press release to the minimum of information, which would not have allowed the identification of any magistrate as the alleged recipient of the money obtained by the influence peddler from the detainee’s family. In the High Court’s opinion the applicant should not have added to his press release the reference to “magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees”. 42.  One of the judges drafted a dissenting opinion, noting that the press release drafted by the applicant contained only general and impersonal information about the flagrante delicto operation and the pending criminal investigation. The judge noted that the applicant had not mentioned in his press release and interview any magistrates or prison employees involved in the conditional release of detainees in Baia Mare Prison. The applicant could not be held liable for the fact that, after presenting his press release, AXA TV had made express references to the judge delegated to the Baia Mare Prison. The evidence in the file proved that judge G.E. already had a strained relationship with the local media. 43.  On 5 May 2009, the day on which the disciplinary action against the applicant was approved, the SCM’s disciplinary commission for prosecutors issued a decision to remove him from his position as chief prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court. 44.  The applicant challenged this decision before the plenary of the SCM’s members on 8 May 2009. 45.  On 21 May 2009 in a plenary meeting, the SCM dismissed the applicant’s challenge. 46.  The applicant appealed against this decision before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 47.  By a decision of 8 December 2009 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the applicant’s removal as chief prosecutor had been the direct consequence of imposing on the applicant a disciplinary sanction pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Article 51 § 2 let c) of Law no. 303/2004. The removal of a magistrate from a leading position following imposition of a disciplinary sanction is similarly mandatory according to the law (see paragraph 50 below). 48.  On 19 May 2009 the deputy chief prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court lodged a complaint against the applicant, claiming that the latter had continued to act as chief prosecutor in spite of the SCM’s decision of 5 May 2009 by which he had been removed from that position (see paragraph 43 above). 49.  A fresh set of disciplinary proceedings was instituted against the applicant, who alleged that he had been threatened with exclusion from the profession if he continued to exercise his duties as chief prosecutor. He had therefore decided to give up his position even though the appeal on points of law against the SCM’s decision to remove him from the position of chief prosecutor had had a suspensive effect according to the law.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "4.  Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5.  Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6.  On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,600,000 for non‑pecuniary damage. 7.  No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final but have never been executed. 8.  On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal on the grounds that the authorities had not received a copy of the judgment in due course. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": true, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 29 December 2007 N., the owner of two rooms in flat 10 located at 3‑3, ulitsa Anny Severyanovoy, Moscow, signed a deed of gift in respect of the rooms for Ya. The Moscow City Department of the Federal Registration Service (the “Registration Service”) registered the deed and Ya.’s title to the rooms. 7.  On an unspecified date the investigative committee opened criminal investigation into M.’s actions who was suspected of having tricked N. into signing the deed of gift for Ya.’s benefit. 8.  On 2 June 2008 Ya. sold the rooms to the applicant. According to the sale contract, the applicant paid 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the rooms. 9.  On 11 July 2008 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow issued a seizure order in respect of the rooms within the framework of the criminal investigation on the charges of fraud against M. 10.  On 16 July 2008 the Registration Service registered the sale agreement between Ya. and the applicant and the applicant’s title to the rooms. 11.  On 28 September 2009 the District Court found M. guilty of multiple offences, including a fraud in respect of the room later purchased by the applicant, and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. The Court established that M. had tricked N. into signing the deed of gift in respect of the two rooms whilst M. had actually sold the rooms to Ya. 12.  On 16 March 2010 N. died. 13.  On 7 February 2014 the Department of Housing of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department”) brought a civil action seeking restitution of the title to the two rooms to the City of Moscow and the applicant’s eviction. 14.  On 29 December 2014 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims. The court found the deed of gift null and void. It further established that N., the lawful owner of the rooms, had died intestate and without heirs. Accordingly the rooms should be considered a bona vacantia and should be transferred to the City of Moscow, even though the applicant had bought the rooms in good faith. The court transferred the title to the rooms to the City of Moscow and ordered the applicant’s eviction. 15.  On 18 June 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 29 December 2014 on appeal. 16.  On 26 October 2015 the City Court refused to grant the applicant leave to a cassation appeal against the judgments of 29 December 2014 and 18 June 2015. 17.  On 9 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision. 18.  The parties did not provide any information as regards the enforcement of the judgments in the City’s favour.", "10": false, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": false, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": true, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}
{"text": "11.  The applicant was born in 1953. He is currently detained in Istanbul. 12.  The applicant is an economics professor and a journalist in Turkey. Prior to the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016, he presented a political discussion programme on Can Erzincan TV, a television channel that was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency (see paragraphs 14-18 below). 13.  In the years leading up to the attempted coup, the applicant had been known for his critical views on the serving government’s policies. 14.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. 15.  During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators’ control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 300 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 16.  The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. 17.  On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018. 18.  On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 19.  On an unspecified date, the Istanbul public prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation in respect of suspected members of FETÖ/PDY. In addition, on the basis of Article 3 § 1 (l) of Legislative Decree no. 668, he ordered restrictions on the right of the suspects’ lawyers to inspect the contents of the investigation file or to obtain copies of documents in the file. In the course of the criminal investigation, the applicant was arrested at his home on 10 September 2016 and taken into police custody on suspicion of having links to the media wing of the organisation in question. 20.  On the same day, the applicant’s home was searched by police officers without his lawyers being present, as they had been prevented from attending the search on account of the state of emergency. 21.  Later that day, the applicant lodged an objection challenging his detention in police custody and seeking his release. On 12 September 2016 the Istanbul magistrate’s court dismissed the objection. 22.  The applicant remained in police custody for twelve days at the Istanbul police anti-terrorist branch. During his first five days in custody, he was not permitted to speak to his lawyers. 23.  On 20 September 2016, while at the police station, the applicant stated that he was asserting his right to remain silent. 24.  On 21 September 2016 he was questioned by the Istanbul public prosecutor on suspicion of attempting to overthrow the government or to prevent it from discharging its duties (Article 312 of the Criminal Code – (“the CC”) and of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation (Article 314 of the CC). 25.  The records of the questioning indicate that the applicant was accused of: (i) attempting to discredit an investigation into an alleged coup (the “Balyoz” case); (ii) making certain statements serving the interests of FETÖ/PDY, in particular during a television programme broadcast on Can Erzincan TV on 14 July 2016, in the course of which, according to the public prosecutor, the terrorist organisation had sought to prepare the public for a military coup; (iii) holding an account with Bank Asya, a bank with alleged links to FETÖ/PDY; (iv) avoiding a criminal investigation through the assistance of members of the national police suspected of belonging to FETÖ/PDY; (v) visiting Fetullah Gülen at his home in Pennsylvania and kissing his hand; and (vi) having in his possession a United States one-dollar bill with an “F” serial number (denoting the initial of the forename Fetullah). In reply, the applicant stated that he did not know any Turkish army officers and had no links to the attempted coup. The comments he had made during the television programme in question had been intended as warnings to prevent future military coups. Regarding the bank account, some years previously he had taught for three months at a private university, which had asked him to open an account at the bank in question for payment of his wages. He added that he had not been aware of having avoided a criminal investigation through the assistance of certain suspected members of an illegal organisation, and that this was a matter to be taken up with the police officers allegedly responsible. Furthermore, he had visited Fetullah Gülen as a member of a group of journalists, for purely professional reasons linked to his role as a journalist, and had never kissed anyone’s hand. Lastly, the one-dollar bill was of no special significance. 26.  On 22 September 2016 the applicant appeared before the Istanbul 10th Magistrate’s Court and was questioned about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, having taken the following factors into consideration: the strong suspicions against him; the nature of the alleged offences and the fact that they were among the offences listed in Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) – the so-called “catalogue offences”, for which a suspect’s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion; the risk of absconding; and the risk that alternative measures to detention might be insufficient to ensure the applicant’s participation in the criminal proceedings. In the reasons for his decision, the magistrate noted the following: during the attempted military coup, members of FETÖ/PDY had used heavy weapons; since February 2012 the organisation in question had been explicitly waging a campaign against the political authorities; the members of FETÖ/PDY had attempted to force the government’s resignation by discrediting it in public opinion, especially through judicial operations carried out between 17 and 25 December 2013; and the organisation had taken control of several media outlets with a view to achieving its aim. The magistrate further noted that during the television broadcast on 14 July 2016, the applicant had said: “Within the State of the Republic of Turkey, there is probably another structure, whose components outside Turkey are closely observing and documenting all these events. It is not clear exactly when [it] will pull its hand out of the bag or how [it] will do so” (“Türkiye Devleti içinde de muhtemelen bütün bu gelişmeleri dış dünyada daha fazla belgeleyen, izleyen bir başka da yapı var. Onun ne zaman torbadan elini çıkaracağı, nasıl elini çıkaracağı belli değil”). The magistrate concluded that there were suspicions that the contents of the applicant’s statements about the political authorities had been intended to prepare the ground for a military coup and were not covered by freedom of the press. 27.  On 28 September 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. In a decision of 10 October 2016 the Istanbul 2nd Magistrate’s Court dismissed the objection. 28.  On 14 October 2016 the applicant lodged a fresh application for his release. In a decision of 26 October 2016 the Istanbul 3rd Magistrate’s Court rejected the application. 29.  On various dates the applicant lodged further applications seeking his release pending trial. According to the documents produced by the parties, the applications were all rejected by the competent magistrates’ courts, for example on 10 and 24 November 2016 and 8 December 2016. 30.  On 14 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court in respect of several individuals, including the applicant, in particular accusing them, under Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 § 6 of the CC, of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being members of it. The public prosecutor presented the following items of evidence against the applicant: two articles written by him; his comments during the television broadcast on 14 July 2016; the fact that he had an account with Bank Asya; and the seizure at his home of a United States one-dollar bill with an “F” serial number. He sought the imposition of three aggravated life sentences and a sentence of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment on the applicant. 31.  On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor filed his submissions on the merits (esas hakkında mütalaa). He sought the applicant’s conviction for the offences with which he was charged. Besides the evidence he had already submitted when the bill of indictment had been filed, the public prosecutor also produced messages sent by other suspected members of FETÖ/PDY via ByLock, an encrypted messaging service allegedly used by members of that organisation. 32.  During the criminal proceedings, the applicant denied having committed any criminal offence. 33.  In a summary judgment of 16 February 2018 the Istanbul 26th Assize Court sentenced the applicant to aggravated life imprisonment, in accordance with Article 309 of the CC, for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order. The criminal proceedings are still ongoing in the national courts. 34.  On 8 November 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been placed in pre-trial detention on account of his articles and statements and alleged that this infringed his right to liberty and security and his right to freedom of expression and of the press. He also submitted that he had been arrested and detained for reasons other than those provided for by the Constitution. In addition, he complained that his detention in police custody had been unlawful and excessively lengthy, that he had had no access to the investigation file in order to challenge his pre-trial detention, that the magistrates ordering his detention had not been independent or impartial, that no hearings had been held following his applications challenging his continued pre-trial detention, and that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. 35.  On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/23672) in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. 36.  With regard to the applicant’s complaint that his pre-trial detention was unlawful, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that the evidence forming the basis for his detention had included: (i) an article entitled “The meaning of Sledgehammer” (“Balyoz’un Anlamı”), published in the Star newspaper in 2010; (ii) his statements during the television programme broadcast on Can Erzincan TV on 14 July 2016; and (iii) an article entitled “Turbulence” (“Türbülans”), published on his own website on 20 July 2016. After examining the substance of these items of evidence, the Constitutional Court held that the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FETÖ/PDY or with the purpose of preparing the ground for a possible military coup. The Constitutional Court observed that, as well as having published the above-mentioned articles and made the statements in question, the applicant was accused of holding an account with Bank Asya, having avoided a criminal investigation through the connivance of members of the national police suspected of belonging to FETÖ/PDY, and having in his possession a United States one-dollar bill with an “F” serial number. Addressing those allegations, the Constitutional Court held, having regard to the applicant’s testimony and line of defence, that no specific facts had been established that could refute his explanations, which were “consistent with the normal course of life”. Similarly, regarding the contents of the messages exchanged by other individuals via ByLock, the Constitutional Court held that the messages could not in themselves be regarded as significant indications that the applicant had committed an offence. Accordingly, it concluded that “strong evidence that an offence had been committed” had not been sufficiently established in the applicant’s case. Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency). On this point, it noted firstly that in a state of emergency, the Constitution provided for the possibility of taking measures derogating from the guarantees set forth in Article 19, to the extent required by the situation. It observed, however, that if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless. Accordingly, it held that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation and that his right to liberty and security, as safeguarded by Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, had been breached. 37.  However, having regard to the length of the applicant’s detention and the documents available to it, the Constitutional Court held that his complaint that he had been detained for political purposes, on grounds other than those provided for by the Constitution, lacked a sufficient basis. 38.  With regard to the complaint concerning freedom of expression and of the press, the Constitutional Court observed that the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention on account of his articles and statements amounted to interference with the exercise of that right. Taking into account his arguments regarding the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court held that such a measure, which had serious consequences since it resulted in deprivation of liberty, could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society. It further noted that it could not be clearly established from the reasons given for ordering and extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention whether the measure met a pressing social need or why it was necessary. Lastly, it found that it was clear that the applicant’s pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any concrete evidence other than his articles and statements (see paragraph 235 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). Regarding the application of Article 15 of the Constitution, it referred to its findings concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention (as set out in paragraphs 155-57 of its judgment – see paragraph 36 above) and held that there had also been a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as enshrined in Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. 39.  With regard to the complaints concerning the lawfulness and duration of the applicant’s detention in police custody, the Constitutional Court held that he should have brought an action under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP but had refrained from doing so. Furthermore, it noted that there was no information in the application or the appended material as to whether the applicant had lodged an objection under Article 91 § 5 of the CCP against his detention in police custody. Accordingly, it declared these complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 40.  As to the complaint of a lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the magistrates who had ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court dismissed it as being manifestly ill-founded, on the grounds that the magistrates were appointed by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and were entitled to the same constitutional safeguards as other judges. 41.  Concerning the applicant’s complaint that he had had no access to the investigation file, the Constitutional Court held that he had had sufficient means available to prepare his defence to the charges against him and challenge his pre-trial detention, in view of the contents of the detailed questions put to him during questioning by the public prosecutor and the magistrate, and the overall duration of the restriction on access to the case file. Accordingly, it declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 42.  With regard to the complaint that no hearing had been held during the examination of the applicant’s applications challenging his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court found that there was no obligation to hold a hearing on each and every objection to pre-trial detention orders and their extension, and that where a person had been able to appear before the first-instance court considering the issue of detention, the fact that there was no hearing on a subsequent appeal did not in itself contravene the Constitution since it did not breach the principle of equality of arms. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant and his lawyer had been present at the hearing on 22 September 2016, following which the applicant had been placed in pre-trial detention. It observed that he had lodged an objection against his detention on 28 September 2016, that the objection had been dismissed on 10 October 2016 and that eighteen days had thus elapsed between his previous appearance in court and the dismissal of his objection. Taking this period into account, the Constitutional Court considered that there had been no obligation to hold a hearing during the examination of his objection, and accordingly declared this complaint likewise inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 43.  Lastly, with regard to the applicant’s complaint that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the Constitutional Court observed that he had not raised this issue with the enforcement judge. Accordingly, it declared the complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 44.  Having regard to its findings of violations, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant was to be awarded 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY – approximately 4,500 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and TRY 2,219.50 (approximately EUR 500) in respect of costs and expenses. 45.  As the applicant was still in pre-trial detention on the date of delivery of its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided to transmit the judgment to the Istanbul 26th Assize Court so that it could take “the necessary action”. 46.  On 11 January 2018 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Istanbul 26th Assize Court for his client’s release. 47.  On the same day, the Istanbul 26th Assize Court rejected the application by two votes to one, on the grounds that it had not yet received official notification of the Constitutional Court’s judgment. It held in addition that the summary judgment submitted by the applicant’s lawyer did not contain any indication by the Constitutional Court of a measure relating to the applicant’s release. 48.  In his opinion the dissenting judge stated that, in accordance with Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court’s judgments were binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the administrative authorities and natural and legal persons. Accordingly, where a violation had been found on account of a judicial decision, the relevant court was required to take the necessary action to redress the effects of the violation, pursuant to section 50(2) of Law no. 6216 on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court (“Law no. 6216”). In his view, the only way of satisfying this requirement in the applicant’s case was to order his release. 49.  On 12 January 2018 the applicant lodged an objection with a view to securing his release, submitting a copy of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018 as published on the court’s website. 50.  In a decision delivered on 15 January 2018 the Istanbul 27th Assize Court, by two votes to one, dismissed the applicant’s objection and ordered the continuation of his pre-trial detention. In reaching that finding, it observed that the Constitutional Court’s judgment had not been published in the Official Gazette as required by Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution. 51.  In his dissenting opinion, the judge in the minority expressed the view that, since the Constitutional Court’s judgments were binding and not subject to appeal, the applicant should be released pending trial without waiting for the judgment in question to be published in the Official Gazette. 52.  On 19 January 2018 the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the individual application lodged by the applicant was published in Official Gazette no. 20306. 53.  On the same day, the Istanbul 26th Assize Court examined of its own motion the question of the applicant’s continued detention. Noting firstly that the examination of the merits of an individual application to the Constitutional Court against a judicial decision entailed determining whether there had been a violation of fundamental rights and what measures would be appropriate to put an end to the violation, and secondly that grounds of appeal on points of law could not be examined by the Constitutional Court in the context of an individual application, it found that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. On that account, the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 2016/23672 was not in compliance with the law. The Assize Court added that ordering the applicant’s release as an automatic consequence of the judgment in question would run counter to the general principles of law, the independence of the courts, the principle that no authority could give orders or instructions to the courts, and the “natural judge” principle. Lastly, by two votes to one, it ordered the continuation of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. In so holding, it took the following into account: the evidence before it; the large scale of the attempted military coup; the risk of the applicant’s absconding; the current state of the case file; and the severity of the potential sentence in the event of a conviction. 54.  The judge who had voted in favour of the applicant’s release stated in a dissenting opinion that the Constitutional Court’s judgments were binding and that the Assize Court was thus required to comply with judgment no. 2016/23672. He pointed out that the only possible way for it to do so was to order the applicant’s release. 55.  On 30 January 2018 the applicant lodged a further individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention, he complained mainly that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018.", "10": true, "11": false, "13": false, "14": false, "2": false, "3": false, "5": true, "6": false, "7": false, "8": false, "9": false, "P1-1": false, "P1-3": false, "P4-2": false}